Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview, Volume 1: 1770 to 1880

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Author: Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan (editors)

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

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volume 1 1770 to 1880

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview V o lume 1 1770 to 1880

GU N T R AM H . H E R B D AV I D H . KA P L A N Editors

S A N TA B A R B A R A , C A L I F O R N I A

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Copyright 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nations and nationalism : a global historical overview / Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-907-8 (alk. paper) 1. History, Modern—18th century. 2. History, Modern—19th century. 3. History, Modern—20th century. 4. Nationalism—History. I. Herb, Guntram Henrik, 1959– II. Kaplan, David H., 1960– D299.N37 2008 320.54—dc22 2008004478

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an ebook. Visit abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 Senior Production Editor Cami Cacciatore Production Editor Kristine Swift Production Manager Don Schmidt Media Manager Caroline Price Media Editor Katherine Jackson File Management Coordinator Paula Gerard This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

volume 1 1770 to 1880

Contents List of Contributors

vii

147 Denmark Marianne Rostgaard

Preface xi

158 England Ben Wellings

Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii

169 France Elizabeth Rechniewski

Thematic Essays 1 The Class Nature of Nationalism Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood

195 The Netherlands Hans Knippenberg

14 Nationalism and Conflict Ray Taras

207 Poland Daniel Stone

29 Education and Nationalism Klaus Schleicher

219 Scandinavia Byron Nordstrom

43 Gender and Nationalism Jennifer Heuer

232 Scotland Graeme Morton

59 Landscape, Monuments, and National Identity Kenneth R. Olwig

244 Switzerland Daniel Speich

72 Nationalism and Music Ben Curtis

Middle East 256 Egypt Mona Russell

85 Philosophy and Nationalism Nenad Miscevic 99 Religion and Nationalism Christopher Marsh

Americas 268 Argentina Alberto Spektorowski

111 National Symbols Michael E. Geisler

282 Brazil Roderick J. Barman

126 Technology and Nationalism Joshua Barker and Sharon Kelly

298 Canada Colin M. Coates

Europe 137 Belgium Robert Kerr

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181 Germany Celia Applegate

309 Central America Jordana Dym

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CONTENTS

323 Chile Patrick Barr-Melej

367 Peru Nils Jacobsen

332 Haiti Chris Dixon

381 United States John M. McCardell Jr.

344 Mexico Will Fowler

393 Uruguay Luis Roniger Index

358 Paraguay Jerry Cooney

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List of Contributors

Marco Adria University of Alberta

Linda Bryder University of Auckland

Christopher A. Airriess Ball State University

Melanie E. L. Bush Adelphi University

Mohammed Hassen Ali Georgia State University

Roderick D. Bush St. John’s University

Stephen Alomes Deakin University

Juan Manuel Carrión University of Puerto Rico

Celia Applegate University of Rochester

Sun-Ki Chai University of Hawaii

Christopher P. Atwood Indiana University

Colin M. Coates York University

Ghania Azzout University of Algiers

Saul B. Cohen Queens College CUNY

Alan Bairner Loughborough University

Jerry Cooney Louisville University (emeritus professor)

Frederic Barberà Lancaster University Joshua Barker University of Toronto Roderick J. Barman University of British Columbia Patrick Barr-Melej Ohio University Berch Berberoglu University of Nevada, Reno Stefan Berger Chris Bierwirth Murray State University Brett Bowden University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Stella Coram Independent Scholar Stéphane Corcuff University of Lyon Jeffrey J. Cormier University of Western Ontario Ralph Coury Fairfield University Philippe Couton University of Ottawa Kathryn Crameri University of Sydney Ben Curtis Seattle College Patrice M. Dabrowski Harvard University

David Brandenberger University of Richmond

Dev Raj Dahal Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nepal

David Brown Murdoch University

Gertjan Dijkink University of Amsterdam

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CONTRIBUTORS

Jason Dittmer University College London

Dennis Hart Kent State University

Chris Dixon University of Queensland

David Allen Harvey New College of Florida

Christine Doran Charles Darwin University

Stephen Heathorn McMaster University

Maria Dowling St. Mary’s College

Ulf Hedetoft Aalborg University

Stéphane Dufoix Universite Paris X–Nanterre

Jennifer Heuer University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Kevin C. Dunn Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Vernon Hewitt University of Bristol

Jordana Dym Skidmore College

Helen Hintjens Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands

Jonathan Eastwood Washington and Lee University

Yaroslav Hrytsak Central European University

Aygen Erdentug Bilkent University

Hugh Hudson Georgia State University

Kyle T. Evered Michigan State University

Bonny Ibhawoh McMaster University

Søren Forchhammer University of Copenhagen

Grigory Ioffe Radford University

Will Fowler University of St. Andrews

Zachary Irwin Penn State University–Erie, The Behrend College

Michael E. Geisler Middlebury College Paul Gilbert University of Hull Eagle Glassheim University of British Columbia Arnon Golan Haifa University Liah Greenfeld Boston University Jouni Häkli University of Tampere

Tareq Y. Ismael University of Calgary Nils Jacobsen University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign Laura Dudley Jenkins University of Cincinnati William Jenkins York University Steve Jobbitt University of Toronto

Seyoum Hameso University of East London

Lonnie R. Johnson Austrian-American Educational Commission (Fulbright Commission), Vienna

Paul Hamilton Brock University

Rhys Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Samira Hanifi University of Algiers

Cynthia Joseph Monash University

N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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John E. Joseph University of Edinburgh

Christopher Marsh Baylor University

Gregory Jusdanis The Ohio State University

Warren Mason Miami University, Ohio

Aristotle A. Kallis Lancaster University

John Maynard University of Newcastle, Australia

Antoni Kapcia Nottingham University

John M. McCardell Jr. Middlebury College

Martha Kaplan Vassar College

John McLane Northwestern University

Sharon Kelly University of Toronto

Kim McMullen Kenyon College

James Kennedy University of Edinburgh

Neil McWilliam Duke University

Robert Kerr University of Central Oklahoma

Nenad Miscevic Central European University

P. Christiaan Klieger Oakland Museum of California

Graeme Morton University of Guelph

David B. Knight University of Guelph Hans Knippenberg University of Amsterdam Taras Kuzio George Washington University Albert Lau National University of Singapore Orion Lewis University of Colorado, Boulder Hong-Ming Liang The College of St. Scholastica Catherine Lloyd University of Oxford Ouassila Loudjani University of Algiers

Joane Nagel University of Kansas Byron Nordstrom Gustavus Adolphus College Kevin C. O’Connor Gonzaga University Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas Steven Oluic United States Military Academy Kenneth R. Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Brian S. Osborne Queen’s University Cynthia Paces The College of New Jersey

Norrie MacQueen University of Dundee

Razmik Panossian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

Paul Maddrell Aberystwyth University

Christopher Paulin Manchester Community College

Fouad Makki Cornell University

Hooman Peimani Bradford University

Virginie Mamadouh University of Amsterdam

Nicola Pizzolato Queen Mary University of London


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CONTRIBUTORS

Linda Racioppi Michigan State University

Ray Taras University of Colorado

Pauliina Raento University of Helsinki

Jessica Teets University of Colorado, Boulder

Jane M. Rausch University of Massachusetts–Amherst

Anne Marie Todd San Jose State University

Elizabeth Rechniewski University of Sydney

Anna Triandafyllidou Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Angelo Restivo Georgia State University Elisa Roller European Commission Luis Roniger Wake Forest University Marianne Rostgaard Aalborg University Victor Roudometof University of Cyprus Mona Russell East Carolina University Jörg Schendel Independent Scholar Conrad Schetter University of Bonn Klaus Schleicher University of Hamburg Katherine O’Sullivan See Michigan State University Nanda R. Shrestha Florida A&M University Daniel Speich ETH Zurich Alberto Spektorowski Tel Aviv University Daniel Stone University of Winnipeg Christine Straehle University of Quebec at Montreal Laszlo Strausz Georgia State University William H. Swatos Jr. Association for the Sociology of Religion

Toon van Meijl University of Nijmegen Neil Waters Middlebury College Peter J. Weber University of Applied Languages (SDI), Munich Ben Wellings The Australian National University George W. White Frostburg State University Joseph M. Whitmeyer University of North Carolina, Charlotte Peter Wien University of Maryland Michael Wood Dawson College Kathleen Woodhouse Rutgers University David N. Yaghoubian California State University, San Bernardino Takashi Yamazaki Osaka City University Antonina Zhelyazkova International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria Research Assistants Gruia Badescu Zachary Hecht-Leavitt Jonathan Hsu Kathleen Woodhouse Cartography Conor J. Stinson Jonathan Hsu


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Preface

What is a nation? What is nationalism? What does it mean to examine them in global perspective? We conceive of a nation or national identity as a form of loyalty. People have a multitude of loyalties: to family, friends, places, clubs, institutions, regions, countries, even to their place of work or brands of products. What distinguishes loyalty to a nation is the primacy it holds on people’s allegiance. It is so powerful that people are willing to give their lives to ensure the continued existence of the group members and territory that make up their nation. By extension, we call nationalism the process that defines, creates, and expresses this essential loyalty to the nation. We view the term nationalism in a neutral sense. While this process can take extreme forms and lead to violent aggression and the extermination of others, nationalism can also be benign and form the basis for peaceful coexistence. Nations and nationalism have found a bewildering range of expressions across the world and through time, and it is this geographic and temporal variation that we seek to address in a systematic fashion. Given the sheer number of nations that exist or have existed historically—some scholars argue that there are as many as 4,000–5,000 in just the contemporary era—our global perspective does not attempt to be comprehensive. Instead we have chosen to follow cross-sections through time and space. We identify major historical eras in the development of nations and nationalism to examine characteristic themes and representative cases from all major regions of the world. Our emphasis is on depth rather than breadth. The 146 entries in this encyclopedia are full-length articles that go in depth to cover major debates and issues instead of brief descriptions of general features. They are authored by reputable scholars and try to provide accessible introductions to topics that are ambiguous, complex, and frequently misunderstood. Because literature on nations and nationalism arguably ranks among the most diverse and convoluted, our goal is to provide students, nonspecialists, and even junior scholars with concise information on this subject. In deciding what cases and themes to use, we take representative examples from each world region. These run the gamut from large powerful nations such as China and Russia to smaller nations that do not enjoy any form of sovereignty, like Tibet and Wales. We try to cover both prosperous nations of the developed world along with ex-colonial nations in the less-developed world. Similarly, some nations only appear during one time period, and others do not appear at all, because the most important consideration for us was that at least one representative example from all major regions of the world was included, even if scholarship has sorely neglected or sidelined that area, such as in Africa. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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PREFACE

The selection of specific themes and cases that are treated intensively means that our coverage will have some unavoidable gaps. For example, there are no thematic chapters that treat race independently. This omission is not because we consider the issue to be of little significance, but because we feel that race is so elemental to discussions of nations and nationalism that it cannot be separated out. Similarly, it was not always possible to stick to the neat historical categorization into the four time periods. Some of our entries bridge several volumes to provide the most effective treatment of individual cases and themes. This encyclopedia is arranged chronologically in four volumes. The first volume traces the origins and formative processes of nations and nationalism from 1770 to 1880. The second volume covers the aggressive intensification of nationalism during the age of imperialism, from 1880 to 1945. The third volume deals with the decline of nationalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, from 1945 to 1989. The final volume outlines the transformations of nationalism since the end of the Cold War in 1989. All 104 country essays have the same format, and each is approximately 4,000 words. Each includes a chronology to position the reader in time; a discursive essay on main features; illustrations to help the reader visualize specific issues, situations, or persons; and a brief bibliography to guide additional inquiries. The case study essays also contain sidebars that highlight unique events, persons, or institutions. The main essays all contain five sections that help structure the inquiry and provide a universal key to access the information: (1) “Situating the Nation” places the national case in a historical, political, social, and geographic context; (2) “Instituting the Nation” examines key actors and institutions as well as philosophical foundations; (3) “Defining the Nation” discusses the role of ethno-cultural, civilizational, and geographic markers in creating the us–them distinction that is at the heart of national identity; (4) “Narrating the Nation” addresses particular events, stories, and myths that are used to create a community of belonging; and (5) “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” focuses on actions and strategies that help legitimize the national idea. Our 42 thematic essays address the interplay between national identity, politics, culture, and society and are generally 6,000 words long. They focus on geopolitical contexts and economic conditions, such as postcolonialism and globalization; social relations, such as gender and class; dominant philosophies and ideologies, such as fascism and fundamentalism; and nationalist cultural creations and expressions, such as art, literature, music, or sports. Though specific themes vary in each of the four volumes, each of the thematic essays include bibliographies and illustrations, and touch on the following questions: (1) How were the issues/phenomena under discussion important? (2) What is the background and what are the origins? (3) What are major dimensions and impacts on different groups, societal conditions, and ideas? (4) What are the consequences and ramifications of this issue for the character and future development of nations and nationalism? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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We feel that our encyclopedia makes an important addition to the current reference literature on nations and nationalism. Existing encyclopedias in the field generally contain only very brief entries (Spira 1999, 2002; Leoussi 2001); are dated (Snyder 1990); neglect such civic nations as the United States or Switzerland (Minahan 2002); or are uneven because they combine a few excessively long survey articles with several extremely short entries (Motyl 2001). A universal and significant shortcoming is the lack of maps and illustrations. Except for a limited number of general maps and select illustrations in Minahan, the other works do not have a single map, figure, or image. We believe that an encyclopedia on nationalism must contain visual information for it to effectively convey the contexts within which nationalist movements arose and to depict the important symbology that was used to galvanize national sentiment. Our encyclopedia also offers a unique and novel way to access information on nations and nationalisms. The thematic entries give insights into the larger contexts for the country essays and illustrate linkages among them in regard to general topics such as national education. The individual country entries allow readers to compare and contrast developments in different places and to examine trends in major regions of the world during different time periods. Finally, since some of the places and themes appear in all four volumes, it is possible to trace developments and identify linkages not only among places, but also through time. We hope that this encyclopedia helps to further an understanding of perhaps the most influential set of identities and ideologies in the world today. We also hope that this collection of cases and themes selected across space and time sheds some light on the different ways in which these loyalties are manifested. While this encyclopedia constitutes a very large body of work, it can only scratch the surface of all of the different varieties inherent in a study of nations and nationalism. We encourage the reader to follow up on some of the selected readings that are listed at the end of each entry and to further explore some of the various cases and themes that have not been explicitly addressed. References Leoussi, Athena S. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Minahan, James. 2002. Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Motyl, Alexander J. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. San Diego: Academic Press. Snyder, Louis. 1990. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York: Paragon House. Spira, Thomas. 1999 (vol. 1), 2002 (vol. 2). Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.


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Acknowledgments

An enormous undertaking such as this four-volume work could not be accomplished without the help of several individuals. Of course we would like to thank all of our contributors, who were wonderful about following formatting guidelines, making revisions, and cheerfully supplying additional material as the need arose. We are very saddened that one of our contributors, Jeffrey Cormier, did not live to see the publication of this work. We would also like to pay special thanks to the people at ABC-CLIO, among them Ron Boehm, Wendy Roseth, Kristin Gibson, and especially Alex Mikaberidze. The efforts of ABC-CLIO’s publication team have allowed us to complete this project in a sustained and timely manner. Above all we wish to extend our gratitude to those people who have worked tirelessly in assisting us in this endeavor. Their efforts are reflected throughout these four volumes. Kathleen Woodhouse from Kent State University was instrumental in helping to conceive of this project, in identifying and lining up the contributors, and in evaluating and editing each and every entry in Volumes 3 and 4. She also played a major part in the development of three of the essays. She has been an enormous asset and has worked tirelessly to see this project from start to finish. Gruia Badescu, Zachary Hecht-Leavitt, Jonathan Hsu, and Conor Stinson provided invaluable assistance in Middlebury, Vermont. Their contributions would not have been possible without the generous support of Middlebury College, which is deeply appreciated. Zach and Gruia aided in identifying contributors, selecting illustrations, and managing numerous administrative tasks. Zach’s excellent writing and editorial skills ensured that many of the entries authored by non-native English speakers were transformed into stylistically polished pieces. Gruia’s remarkable linguistic skills and knowledge of the scholarship of nationalism allowed him to contribute deep insights to the review process as well as to the drafting of two introductory essays. Jonathan Hsu and Conor Stinson are to be credited for the beautiful cartographic design. Producing maps for these volumes proved to be a challenging and enormous project. The maps needed to vary greatly in scale—from small areas, such as Estonia, to giant regions, such as Russia—but at the same time needed to allow for easy comparisons. The historical maps were particularly difficult given the numerous border changes that took place and the lack of good reference sources, but Jonathan mastered this hurdle with ease. He is not only a gifted cartographer but an excellent researcher. Putting on the finishing touches to turn the massive manuscript and numerous images and maps into a coherent and beautiful set of volumes was also an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

enormous challenge, and we were fortunate to have the able assistance of Cami Cacciatore, Kristine Swift, and Kerry Jackson at ABC-CLIO and of Samuel Lazarus, Caitlin Sargent, and Mithra Harivandi at Middlebury College. Finally, we would like to thank our families for the unwavering support they gave us throughout this giant undertaking. We dedicate this work to the memory of David Woodward.


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Introduction Volume I: 1770 to 1880

The first volume in our encyclopedia covers the period from 1770 to 1870. It was at the beginning of that era that we saw the emergence of the modern idea of the nation and nationalism. Although “nation” was used as early as medieval times to distinguish groups of students who came from the same region or country, it only became politicized in the 1770s. The influence of the new conception of the nation was striking. Over the next 100 years, revolutions carried the idea across the Atlantic world and redrew the political map. Most of the European colonies in the Americas became independent states, France became a republic, and new nation-states such as Germany, Italy, and Belgium appeared in the center of Europe. The rest of the world was largely untouched by the new concept. China, India, Japan, and the African kingdoms focused inward and tried to resist European incursions. The only exception was Egypt, where Napoleon’s conquest and occupation laid the first seeds for national consciousness. The geographically limited spread of the modern concept of the nation during this early period explains why our first volume does not include case studies from sub-Saharan Africa or Asia. We can identify four major changes that led to the politicization and subsequent spread of the idea of the nation and nationalism. First, the growing importance of the Enlightenment and Romanticism, which offered attractive alternatives to the prevailing absolutist and dynastic order. Second, commercial, industrial, and agricultural revolutions dramatically restructured societies in Europe and the Americas. Third, the control of empires and states over their populations increased and engendered resistance. Fourth, advances in communication intensified social interaction, which allowed for more effective dissemination of information. To elaborate, the first major change has to do with the Enlightenment thinkers, such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, who provided the foundation for the new perspective on the idea of the nation. The world of the late eighteenth century was dominated by empires. On all continents, political structures were highly hierarchical, and rule was absolute with very few exceptions. People were simply subjects of the authority and mired in rigid social codes, with little chance for mobility, by an order that was supposedly imposed by divine will. The Enlightenment offered an attractive alternative to this worldview. It stressed the fundamental freedom of the individual, secularization, general education, and new democratic forms of government. It argued that political power should rest in the people, who were termed a “nation” because they were deemed to share a common interest and identity. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Initially, nation referred to the population in a given political territory. This was the principle behind the revolutions in the Americas and France. In the Americas, the populations were heterogeneous, made up of a mix of European immigrants and indigenous inhabitants. While racism within these populations was prevalent and in most cases virulent, the fight against a clearly defined “other”—the colonizer—provided at least initially a common identity. In France, the existence of common government institutions, administration, and commerce over several centuries created social homogeneity and commonality among the people living in the state territory. The idea of the nation took on a different meaning when it was adopted by proponents of Romanticism, such as Johann Gottfried von Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This philosophical and cultural movement developed as a reaction to the Enlightenment and proposed a different alternative to the prevailing dynastic and absolutist order. Instead of rational thinking and freedom of the individual as in Enlightenment thinking, Romanticism stressed the subjective, the emotional, the passionate in human beings, and the need for individuals to find solace in the “organic” community that was made up of those who spoke the same language, shared the same folklore and customs, and were attached to the same native soil. This meant that individuals had to follow the call of their blood and celebrate their ethnic culture. While there was still room for divine order, the emphasis in Romanticism on popular culture, common people, and idyllic communities in which everyone was equal made it incompatible with the hierarchical order of absolutist dynasties. The Romantic version of the nation found an enthusiastic reception in central and eastern Europe where ethnic groups, such as the Germans, Italians, Poles, Czechs, and many others, lived in a complex regional mosaic. There were regions with homogenous populations, but the border zones were always intermixed. Moreover, some of these groups, such as the Germans, were widely dispersed into the main settlement regions of other groups. Finally, political borders of different empires cut across the ethnic groups and subjugated them to rule by other ethnicities. As a result, identity developed along ethnic lines rather than in existing state territories. The Romantic idea of an ethnic nation was much more volatile than the Enlightenment version of the inhabitants of existing states (civic nation)— it required redrawing political boundaries to give an ethnic nation sovereign control over its affairs in its own state. Given the complex mosaic of the distribution of ethnic groups and their intermixing at the borders, this Romantic version of nation invariably led to conflict. The modern idea of the nation thus meant that self-determination could be demanded by ethnically heterogeneous inhabitants of existing states (civic nations) and by ethnic groups that occupied a state, part of a state, or were dispersed across existing political boundaries (ethnic nations). Starting in the late eighteenth century, the rallying call of the nation would be used to dethrone monarchs and to liberate oppressed people, but also to expel or exterminate those who were considered different (“others”) or to wage wars of expansion. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The second major change that took place in this era was a radical restructuring of societies in Europe and the Americas through commercial, industrial, and agricultural revolutions. This period constituted the birth of the modern age. Expanding trade with overseas colonies and at home brought tremendous wealth to merchants and associated professions. A middle class, the bourgeoisie, emerged that had virtually no power but often had more wealth than aristocrats. The idea of the nation was an attractive proposition for this class since it promised a redistribution of power from the aristocracy to the general population. The Industrial Revolution created huge job opportunities around factories and led to large-scale population movements from rural areas to urban centers. The agricultural revolution rang the death knell for the rural subsistence way of life. Family farming was replaced by large-scale mechanized agriculture. Villages became depopulated as younger people moved to cities, craftsmanship was no longer passed on through the generations in the same family but supplanted by specialized industrial production, places of residence and work were segregated, and people commuted increasing distances to their place of employment. As a result of these commercial, industrial, and agricultural revolutions, traditional social ties in towns and in the countryside were severed; instead of communities where everyone knew each other (Gemeinschaft), we see the development of a society stratified by classes (Gesellschaft). For the growing middle class, a key issue was access to power; for the masses, it was the breakup of extended families and being crowded together with people from different places. Since traditional religions could not provide the spiritual support to meet these new challenges, the nation filled the gap. It offered solace from the alienation of modern living and a powerful sense of belonging. The third change has to do with an increasing assertion of state power and a commensurate increase in resistance and demands for liberation. As economies became more complex from expanding overseas and domestic trade, and as people moved to urban areas and increased in numbers—this period was the start of a tremendous growth in the size of the human population—states and empires were challenged to centralize control over industries, commerce, financial systems, and their populations. To maintain an efficient administration, to have sufficient food to prevent famines, to recruit enough soldiers for their standing armies, and to procure weapons of war for defense and expansions, states had to collect more information, whether in the form of surveys, maps, or censuses. As state surveillance increased, so did resistance. Increasing state involvement in the educational system was a further factor. The need for a better-educated workforce and a uniform language for an efficient economy and army meant centralization and homogenization of the curriculum. Considering that empires and states included populations speaking various languages and practicing diverse religions, this standardization was bound to engender resistance, particularly when the dominant language and culture favored a small minority. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The fourth major change involves advances in communication. Newspapers and other literature were printed in larger numbers and disseminated through an improved transport system, such as regular postal services in Europe and the Americas. People could find out much more easily and quickly about new ideas or events. The 1848 republican uprisings started in Sicily and spread to France, Germany, Italy, and the Austrian empire within a few months. Increased communication and social contact meant that rulers could no longer keep their population completely isolated and in the dark. Greater dissemination of the printed word also provided language with a fixed form and helped establish a dominant national language. Local dialects and the social and cultural differences they expressed became less important. For example, in the middle of the 19th century, the Germans Wilhelm and Jacob Grimm not only helped create a German national consciousness through their compendiums on German mythologies and fairytales but established a uniform German language through their dictionaries and grammar books. The national uprisings in the Americas in the early 1800s similarly were augmented by newspapers that helped Creoles in the different colonies create “imagined communities,” to use the famous title of Benedict Anderson’s 1991 book. Printed language became the vector for the national idea, and its spread was unstoppable. Gun t ram H. Herb Gru i a B ad e s cu


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The Class Nature of Nationalism Liah Greenfeld and Jonathan Eastwood Relevance The relationship between nationalism and social class is a highly complex one, and this article will only begin to tease out their multiple points of intersection. The most fundamental distinction that we might begin with concerns the changing relationship between stratification (by the term stratification we mean the variety of processes by which human societies are compartmentalized in hierarchical fashion) and nationalism. Disruptions in the status hierarchy and in traditional regimes of status deference (Shils 1972) are crucial elements in nationalism’s emergence in a variety of societies, and, conversely, nationalism tends to have a considerable impact on, and even remake, the stratification system. In all the cases studied in detail (that is, English, French, Russian, German, Japanese, and North and Latin American societies), nationalism originated in response to the disintegration, or relative opening, of rigidly closed systems of stratification (Greenfeld 1992). The effect of the nationalist response was to undermine the legitimacy of explicit distinctions among social ranks and to render the system of stratification open by definition. Nationalism implies a social order that is essentially undivided by social rank, or at least one that insists that one’s primary identity is national and that hierarchical distinctions are incidental, contingent, and less fundamental than national identity (Greenfeld 1992). Open stratification is the definitive characteristic of class stratification. Ironically, therefore, nationalism plays an important part in creating the cultural blueprint for the class society. Preliminary Definitions Before we can come to terms with “the class nature of nationalism” for the period in question, we need to establish certain terminological points. First, we need to have at least a provisional understanding of what a “social class” is and what, therefore, it would mean for something like nationalism to have a “class nature.” As is generally the case, there has been little consensus among social scientists with regard to this issue. The most influential social class theorist, Karl Marx, saw history as the unfolding of “class struggle.” According to the dialectical materialist schema that Marx originated (which is similar to Adam Smith’s earlier ideas), history is marked by the extension of the division of labor. As the division of labor has developed over time, certain forces of production have come to the fore and achieved predominance. In the capitalist era, the relevant forces of production were capital (that N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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THE CLASS NATURE OF NATIONALISM

is, wealth in a variety of forms that can be reinvested in further economic activity) and labor (all human productive activity—activity that, for Marx, defines our essence). These two forces of production, according to Marx, corresponded to the social classes of the period; in a more mystical form of Marxist doctrine, classes themselves actually became the collective personifications of these forces of production. For Marx, each period in history had a distinctive mode of production in which relative equilibrium was reached among the forces of production characteristic of the era (Marx 1978c). The mode of production in question was the defining feature of the period. Thus, for Marx, the 19th century was the capitalist era precisely because it was the era of the capitalist mode of production. The period was characterized by a temporary equilibrium in which the bourgeois, or capitalist class (the owners of capital), exerted control, through the state and through ideology, over society at large, allowing this class to exploit the proletariat, which was the personification of labor (the owners of the labor force), the true source of all value. Modes of production would survive, according to Marx, only until their existing structures became “fetters” on growth; then, revolutionary change would take place (Marx 1978a, 477–478). The force of production furthering growth at this point in time, and represented by the “ascendant” class, would wrestle power from the hands of the “ruling” class and establish relations of production favorable to itself. The ascendant class in the feudal era, after the prevailing agricultural mode of production had outlived itself and foisted “fetters” on growth, was the very same bourgeoisie that would be the new ruling class of the capitalist era (Marx 1978a). The Marxist conception of class has been criticized on a number of grounds, both empirical (historical) and theoretical. For the purposes of stratification theory, the most important criticisms of Marx’s approach are that (1) he never defined class (he did not complete the section of the third volume of Capital, in which he was to have done so) (Grusky 2001, 15); (2) his model seems to allow for only two large classes in any given historical moment, thus giving at best an extremely simplified (and at worst simply wrong) picture of any known historical society, though admittedly it leaves room for what he and his followers have called “class fragments” and the like (Grusky 2001, 15–17); and (3) the unfolding of industrial and postindustrial societies in the 20th century did not fit the pattern that he predicted (Bell 1999, 148; Grusky 2001, 16): increasing “pauperization” and “immiseration” (that is, growth in both the size and absolute exploitation of the proletariat), eventual revolution, the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” the “withering away” of the state, and the glorious future in which the division of labor would disappear (Marx 1978a, 483, 490–491). Another element of these unsubstantiated predictions is Marx’s related claim that nationalism would disappear, since it was essentially a form of false consciousness that prevented—or at least temporarily reduced—the realization of true international class consciousness (Marx 1978a, 1978b, 1978c). Theorists and social scientists in the Marxist tradition have attempted to resolve these problems in myriad ways. Some, such as Erik Olin Wright, have proposed a more detailed class typology (Wright 2001). Others N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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tried to show what Marx might have missed so as to save the broader theory by rejecting some of its more specific claims ( for an example, see Dahrendorf 2001). Their efforts, generally, were not successful in adding to the explanatory value of Marx’s class theory. The other major tradition of social science class conceptions is rooted in the work of Max Weber. In an essay translated as “Class, Status, and Party,” Weber (1958) drew distinctions among a variety of different elements of stratification systems. He posited the existence of at least three orders in any given society: the social order (by which prestige, deference, or status is distributed), the political order (by which political power is distributed), and the economic order (by which access to or control over goods and resources is distributed), characterized by “classes” (M. Weber 1958, 181). The orders are to be understood as analytical rather than ontological, that is, they are pure types constructed for the purposes of social analysis. Weber recognized that in actual practice the orders are tightly intermixed and that, moreover, relationships among them vary from society to society. In general, where a Marxist theorist sees determination and uniformity, a Weberian one sees contingency and heterogeneity. But there is more to the difference between the Marxist and the Weberian positions. Weber refers to status stratification as the “social” order (“class” is “merely” the economic order) because only status groups represent actual communities characterized by common culture (M. Weber 1958, 186–187). As a result, belonging to a status group defines the individual’s values, beliefs, and style of life, thereby defining one’s identity. “Classes,” in their ideal form, do not designate cultural units; they are not communities but simply categories of classification (M. Weber 1958, 181). They are defined quantitatively, by the amount of money one commands at the market or by the level of education, rather than qualitatively, or by a characteristic style of life and set of values. One cannot usually derive from someone else’s class position any of their other characteristics (such as profession, hobbies, tastes, and so on). In contrast to status groups such as castes or estates, seen in qualitative cultural (religious and/or legal) and therefore absolute terms, classes are quantitative and therefore relative terms, forming a relative hierarchy of lower, middle, and upper classes (M. Weber 1958). The quantitative distinctions of class stratification acquire significance, that is, they become meaningful to their members and outsiders, only when class— one’s economic position—becomes a basis for status and therefore for the social order. Certain societies show remarkable isomorphism between status and class (M. Weber 1958). These are the societies that we refer to as “class societies.” Quantitative goods (such as wealth and years of education) are transferable, however. Therefore, the isomorphism of social and economic orders and the dependence of status on class imply social mobility, or the open system of stratification. One’s identity (the community to which one belongs, one’s values, and one’s style of life) becomes a matter of choice and achievement rather than ascription, as when the status hierarchy is independent from class. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Weberian perspective, unlike the Marxist one, has considerable explanatory value, among other things, because it helps us draw important distinctions between types of stratification systems. This aspect is particularly important to the present task, since the rise of nationalism in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in much of Europe and elsewhere involved a transformation from an estate (rigidly stratified) to a class (open) system or, in Weber’s terms, from an honor society in which the “social order” and the “economic order” were relatively independent to one in which social status is essentially identical with class position. Now that we have achieved some level of clarity regarding our use of the term “class,” it is important that we also clarify what is meant by “nationalism.” We do not consider nationalism as being patriotic feeling, in-group solidarity, or xenophobia. Something like patriotism, or certainly the sense of identification with and solidarity with a group and some differential treatment (if not hostility) toward outsiders, is an essentially human universal. Human beings have always classified themselves socially and constructed boundaries between their own kind and others. Nationalism, however, is a particular cultural form of such boundary construction. It is an historical phenomenon, not a human universal; it has a beginning, a process of development, and possibly an end. Like all historical phenomena not bound up in human nature, it is contingent and therefore unpredictable. If we imagine the viewpoint of a 15th-century European, for example, we will readily see that the division of the world into nations, in the sense discussed below, was quite an improbable political development. To understand this historical form of identity, indeed, the most central form of identity in the modern world, we need to focus on and explain what is distinctive to it. In other words, we must determine what separates it from the most salient forms of identity that preceded it. In the European context, the relevant comparisons are with religious identity, in which virtually the entire population partook, and with the estate identity, as understood above, which corresponded to one’s position in the rigid social hierarchy. We hesitate to describe whole eras in such stark terms, but, for analytical purposes, it is justifiable to view the forms of identity characteristic of prenational Europe as essentially religious and hierarchical in nature (Bruce 1997). National identity is in many ways the inverse of these previous forms of identity. It is resolutely egalitarian (Greenfeld 1992). It identifies the dignity of the individual with his or her membership in the nation itself, and this nation is imagined as fundamentally unstratified. From the point of view of the national image, there is little difference in the inherent worth of the various members of the society. Obviously, stratification in national societies persists, though it changes its nature. The persistence of some kind of stratification does not remain unnoticed, but it is treated by members of national societies as essentially superficial. Put differently, the fundamental equality of national membership is understood in meritocratic terms; we are all born equal, such national thought asserts, but we justify the superficial inequality of our world by our deeds (such as individual economic performance or service to the nation) (Greenfeld 1992). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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In addition to being egalitarian, nationalism is also inseparably bound to the notion of popular sovereignty. Whereas in pre-national societies legitimate authority was understood to have an ultimately transcendental source, under nationalism it is the will of the people, whether expressed through one leader or the majority of the voting population, that is the ultimate source of legitimate authority. For this reason, the national image of the world is a secular one since it asserts, at least implicitly, that the final arbiter is the community itself (Greenfeld 1992).

Origins The need for identity ( for a definite position in the social world, or for a status) is an elemental feature of human nature. Our relative genetic impoverishment—the fact that we need extrinsic, cultural sources of information to pass on our social order and to construct our sense of self (Geertz 1973)—leaves us in a particularly vulnerable position, because extrinsic sources of information can be susceptible to disruption, confusion, or other disturbances. The term “status inconsistency” refers to one such disturbance when our society sends us mixed or irreconcilable messages about our place in the social order or about that order’s very structure. It must be emphasized that status inconsistency is much more than a mere nuisance. It causes considerable psychological distress, particularly among those who are acutely sensitive to cultural messages, and is one of the most disruptive forces known to observers of social reality. Status inconsistency is the characteristic form of what Durkheim called anomie (Durkheim 1997). As Greenfeld has written, “Anomie, commonly translated as ‘normlessness,’ refers to a condition of cultural insufficiency, a systemic problem which reflects inconsistency, or the lack of coordination, between various institutional structures, as a result of which they are likely to send contradictory messages to individuals within them” (Greenfeld 2006a, 212). Such contradictory messages, by pulling individuals simultaneously in different directions, tear the social fabric and are found behind all kinds of traumatic phenomena, from revolutions to increased rates of suicide and mental disease. Acute status inconsistency lay behind the emergence of nationalism, as well as its spread around much of the globe, though its nature and sources varied from time to time and place to place. In early 16th-century England, where nationalism first appeared, the status inconsistency that preceded the invention of its national image was rooted in the devastation of the traditional nobility in the War of the Roses, in the rise from the periphery of the new Tudor dynasty, and in the Tudors’ strategy of recruiting from lower strata to fill top positions in their state bureaucracy (Greenfeld 1992). The vacuum on the top of the social hierarchy and the recruitment of commoners to fill it inaugurated the age of social mobility. For about a century, upward mobility visibly predominated over downward movement. It is worth emphasizing that, although upward social mobility seems N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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generally preferable to downward mobility, even upward movement, particularly in certain sociocultural contexts, unsettles status situations and produces status inconsistency (Durkheim 1997). In early Tudor England, the self-understanding of the time was appropriate to a society of orders model, meaning that one’s social position was essentially ascribed, established at and by birth, as ordained by God. There was, therefore, something positively unnatural about leaving one’s station and moving up, and this fairly common experience required a new rationalization. Nationalism provided this rationalization. The term “nation” had, in the immediate period preceding this transformation, referred to “an elite” (Greenfeld 1992, 6). Redefining the people of England as a nation allowed a new elite from the people (the new Tudor aristocracy) to render its newfound social success intelligible and, thereby, to justify it. At the same time, it necessarily implied the redefinition of the social order itself—as egalitarian, based on popular sovereignty, and secular. As a result, the system of stratification was redefined and, thus, reconstructed as open, based on individual achievement, and presupposing constant social mobility. Precisely because status inconsistency in England was caused by upward mobility, England was not only the site of nationalism’s invention, as far as research has shown, but it was the only society in which nationalism captured the imaginations of more than a handful of individuals, and from more than one social stratum, for several centuries. In fact, most nationalisms in the European and American contexts developed between the late 18th and the late 19th centuries. Several cases are paradigmatic, hence we will focus on them here. For reasons of chronology, we start with France. The French case transcends simple historical interest for a couple of reasons. First, it seems to have been the first nation to understand itself in collectivistic and civic terms, meaning that it was the first to see the nation as a sort of superentity and site of agency rather than as an association of individuals, like England had done before it. Nevertheless, France drew boundaries between members of the nation and those outside it in terms of civic, not ethnic, criteria. Therefore, it originated a new “collectivistic and civic” type of nationalism, as opposed to the English “individualistic and civic” and the most common variety at present, the “collectivistic and ethnic” type (Greenfeld 1992). French nationalism, importantly, was an aristocratic nationalism at its birth. That is, although it was, like English nationalism before it, a response to acute status inconsistency, the social group experiencing this instability was a different one—mostly the traditional aristocracy—and the cause for its status inconsistency was humiliation rather than social success. The well-documented marginalization and chronic disempowerment of the aristocracy under Louises XIII, XIV, XV, and XVI deprived members of this estate of the justification for their privileges and the deference they expected. Their privileges were diluted by the virtual torrent of new “creations” (ennobled commoners), which washed away the boundaries of their identity. Members of the aristocracy experienced their society as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Painting from 1755 depicting an evening in Madame de Geoffrin’s salon. One of the bestknown women of the Enlightenment, Madame de Geoffrin was the hostess of a salon that attracted artists, philosophers, politicians, and many other intellectuals during this critical period in France’s development. (Réunion des Musées Nationaux/Art Resource, NY)

profoundly unjust. Some articulated this dissatisfaction in terms of the old order, attempting to restate the traditional grounds for their noble status and argue that the king had overstepped the traditionally established bounds. What has been seldom recognized, at least until recently, is that this reflection on noble status also led many aristocrats, paradoxically, to reject the old order and its traditions and turn to an ideology that would ultimately lead to their near-total eradication: nationalism. To these nobles, their counterparts in Britain seemed to have maintained their traditional prerogatives through the strength of the English Parliament, a stark contrast to the capacity of opponents of the French Crown to assert themselves. Some recognized, perhaps unconsciously, that the language in which parliamentary authority was articulated could also be used to express their grievances. Their humiliation could be redressed after being reinterpreted as an attack on the nation. The king’s use and the alleged abuse of his authority could be understood as a violation of the principle of popular sovereignty. When the Crown privileged commoners with money, the act could be understood as a violation of the principle of equality, regardless of how foreign egalitarian principles might be to the traditional order. For this reason, many of the initial movers of the French Revolution came from the aristocracy, though, it must be admitted, some of them abandoned ship when other revolutionaries saw further implications ( for them!) N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of the ideas they had championed. In the process, however, the aristocracy largely redefined itself as a cultural elite (Greenfeld 1992). This type of redefinition was of central significance in the development of Russian nationalism. The identity of the small service nobility, in whose midst Russian nationalism first emerged, began metamorphosing into that of the Russian intelligentsia in the late 18th century. The chief reason for this transformation was the near-absolute dependence of the noble status on the favor and satisfaction of the autocrat. In his efforts to modernize Russia, Peter the Great single-handedly created the conditions for the status inconsistency in his nobility and introduced it to the idea of the nation. As with France, nationalism alone was not enough to resolve this status inconsistency but, in fact, exacerbated it and made it intolerable. The transformation of the ascribed noble identity into that of cultural elite, in principle based on achievement (specifically, service to the nation), made the nobles again confident in deserving their high status, but it also created a rift between the intelligentsia and the government. In the view of the intelligentsia, the government never sufficiently acknowledged its dignity and authority. This rift exists to this day, for belonging to the intelligentsia denotes a high aristocratic status in Russia, one that is opposed to the “common” people (Greenfeld 1992, 1995, 2006b). Most Latin American nationalisms, which emerged a generation later, had similar geneses to the French. Particularly in more peripheral areas of the Spanish colonial world, such as in Caracas or Buenos Aires, traditional elites had long been accorded a sort of de facto autonomy and had effectively set themselves up as an American nobility. This status was perhaps most pronounced in colonial Caracas (Ferry 1989). Certain groups (the Bolívar family, for example) were long accustomed to deference and privileges. When the reforms of the Bourbons, which took place over the mid- to late 18th century, upset these deferential patterns and privileges, considerable discontent was produced. Though for many years the status inconsistency generated by these changes did not lead the local elite to turn to nationalism, Napoleon’s intervention in Spain allowed marginal voices to assume center stage, and a variety of nationalisms were born. In what became the nation of Venezuela, the early nationalists were often first American nationalists and only then Colombian or Venezuelan ones (Eastwood 2006). This pattern was similar to the one set throughout the region. The Latin American wars of independence were bloody and long, yet events here deviated from the French model in that society was not entirely reconfigured to make it consistent with the national view. As has often been noted, a new, predominantly agricultural elite sprung up and essentially mimicked the forms of political and economic domination of the elite that preceded them (Lynch 1986, 219–227), though with the important difference that it was rationalized in national terms. In other words, in much of Latin America, patrimonial forms of political relations persisted, but they were now expressed in national language, and the caudillos or strongmen of the 19th century invariably presented themselves as saviors and/or representatives of the nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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In all cases where nationalism has an aristocratic genesis, such as in France, Russia, or Latin America, a national image of the world (that the world is divided into nations, imagined as sovereign communities of equals) is eventually realized, or at least closer and closer approximations of the implied reality in question are achieved. The elite class that first imports the idea of the nation to promote its own status-oriented agenda articulates an image of the polity and the social structure and creates a new form of political rhetoric that is then seized upon and transformed by other actors in different social positions. Sometimes members of the very first aristocratic, revolutionary class see the gap between the national ideals they proclaim and the reality of a society that does not live up to the standards the new national elite sets for it. A variety of solutions might then be proposed, such as extensive programs of national education and/or temporary authoritarian rule, until the members of the nation are “civilized” or judged capable of self-government. The most striking example comes from Japan, whose first nationalists came from the samurai elite of the pre-national era. One of them, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the “apostle of Japanese nationalism,” relates a story of the initial unpreparedness of the Japanese peasant masses for nationalism. Peasants were unable to comprehend its egalitarian implications. Once he encountered a peasant on the road who, in recognizing Fukuzawa’s superiority, got off his horse and bowed to him. Fukuzawa protested, but the peasant persisted in traditional expressions of deference. “Get back on your horse,” Fukuzawa commanded. “If you don’t, I’ll beat you” (Greenfeld 2001, 278). As Eugen Weber has famously documented with regard to the French case, it may take a considerable period of time before the bulk of a population is actually brought into the orbit of national discourse and comes to see the world in national terms (E. Weber 1976). This was certainly true in much of Latin America, where personalist caudillos ruled for much of the 19th century over essentially agricultural societies, while the bulk of the population remained in semifeudal conditions. Thus far we have considered two models of nationalism’s origins in status inconsistency: the original case of England, in which nationalism was a response to the novel experience of upward social mobility among the lower gentry, and much of the urban population, under the Tudors; and the aristocratic origins model, in which a threatened traditional elite is placed into a position of status inconsistency and imports nationalism to deal with this problem. A third pattern of the emergence of nationalism in response to status dynamics is exemplified by Germany (Greenfeld 1992). There, the relevant social group was the non-noble intellectuals, a new class of individuals produced by the growing university system established throughout the German lands in the 18th century. In distinction to the aristocracy, these intellectuals were indeed a class, not an estate. Their social position was a result of a choice and individual achievement rather than of birth. The university system and the general cultural climate of the Enlightenment offered talented young men from the lower urban strata— burghers—an opportunity for upward mobility. The broader social structure of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the German principalities, however, was still that of a society of orders—an estate structure quite deaf to the Enlightenment’s new ideas. In this rigid traditional structure, class and social mobility were anomalies. Indeed, it was the Enlightenment and the growing prestige of learning that lay behind the growth of German universities and not, as one might expect, a developing capitalist economy that could be used to explain their rise in functionalist terms. What this meant was that high numbers of German intellectuals, with great aspirations, were sent out into a society not prepared to receive them, and they invariably suffered from the status inconsistency this situation generated; the high expectations they had cultivated were met with meager returns. These were the essential preconditions for the development of German Romanticism, which, in turn, constructed the cultural material out of which German nationalism was born. The process was a classic instance of what Nietzsche called ressentiment and the “transvaluation” of values (Nietzsche 1998, 19–23; Scheler 1994). First, the Enlightenment was turned upon, and the opposites of Reason, a supreme value of the Enlightenment, were championed: emotions, the will (above all), and the cult of death and of nature instead of the corrupting, false, and inauthentic ( from the Romantic point of view) society that had spurned them (Greenfeld 1992). Then, following the Napoleonic invasion, this transvaluation was recast in national terms. The ultimate embodiment of the romantic ideal was the German nation, and the pains and humiliations of its unhappy intellectuals were projected onto that nation, which was then declared morally superior to and, in today’s parlance, “deeper” than the shallow, materialistic societies of “the west,” meaning essentially France and England. The political unification of Germany would have to wait for Bismarck, but its national consciousness was alive and well among its intellectuals for two generations before him. The German case is the paradigmatic instance of a ressentiment-laden, “collectivistic and ethnic” type of nationalism, as noted above—the most common variety of nationalism today (Greenfeld 1992).

Dimensions As we have tried to show, in so far as its “class origins” are concerned, transformation in a society’s self-understanding, that is, the emergence of national consciousness, has historically taken three forms. The first form, of course, was highly singular, for it was not simply the importation of nationalism and squaring it with indigenous traditions and forms of self-understanding but, rather, its very invention. Most subsequent nationalisms, however, have taken either the path blazed by France or by Germany in the sense that either traditional noble elites (often cum intellectuals) or the non-noble intellectuals have been the first converts to nationalism (Greenfeld 1992). Another common case in the 20th century, whereby nationalism is essentially forced (by a political elite) onto a society whose boundN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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aries are carved by colonial powers, lies beyond the purview of this article. Likewise, societies such as Australia, the United States, or Canada, which essentially inherited their nationalism from England/Britain (though their independence movements achieved a transformation in the geopolitical referent for national loyalty) do not concern us here. The genesis of a given nationalism, and in particular the nature of the original nationalist stratum, exerts considerable influence over the content of the nationalism in question and, in turn, over that nationalism’s subsequent “class nature.” In cases where nationalism is adopted as a solution for elite status problems, the social group in question will often attempt to construct the new nationalism in its own interest, arrogating to itself the exclusive right to interpret the will of the nation. Such societies are thus generally imagined in collective terms, as superagents and not mere associations of individuals (Greenfeld 1992). This form allows for a convenient rationalization of elite dominance in a variety of ways, since elites (particularly intellectual elites) can claim special expertise or prerogatives in guiding the nation and can legitimate the differential rewards they receive. It is not at all surprising, for this reason, that the systems of stratification (or class systems) of collectivistic nationalisms show important differences when compared to the systems of stratification characteristic of individualistic nationalisms. Collectivistic nationalisms tend to preserve inequality in new forms, by awarding privileged status to representatives of the very groups who first turned to nationalism. Ethnic nationalisms carry the potential to add to this class stratification a hierarchy of ethnic groups, which often takes the form of virtual caste distinctions.

Consequences As noted above, after nationalism emerges, its spread throughout the population is a secondary process. In terms of nationalism’s intersection with class, it is again worth noting that nationalism’s most fundamental consequence is its open stratification (Greenfeld 2006a). Given that it presents an image of the social world as essentially unstratified, it implies that qualitative status distinctions within the national population are false or inauthentic and must be done away with. In addition, given that nationalism becomes the fundamental framework for organizing social life, it expresses this demand with a high degree of normative force. Thus, it implies that national societies will be class societies (as defined above) and that social mobility will be possible. It hardly needs to be added that nationalism is perhaps the most important out of several factors (along with the spread of industrial capitalism and the growth of technology, for example) that converged in the 19th century in Europe to create the classic class societies that so concerned the founders of the social sciences. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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To conclude, the traditional account of nationalism as having “bourgeois” origins is misleading. The notion of the bourgeoisie as the class representing the productive force of capital, according to Marxist class theory, is a myth rather than a reality, and in all the cases considered here, whatever might be called the bourgeoisie was not the central actor in nationalism’s emergence. Instead, the importers and articulators of nationalism tended to come from the cultural elite, for nationalism is a response to a cultural problem, not a class situation. It has no specific “class basis.” Rather, it is the basis of classes; it creates the very framework in which class systems develop. Selected Bibliography Bell, D. 1999. The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting. Special Anniversary Edition. New York: Basic Books. Bruce, S. 1997. “The Pervasive World-View: Religion in Pre-Modern Britain.” British Journal of Sociology 8, no. 4: 667–680. Dahrendorf, R. 2001. “Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. In Social Stratification: Race, Class, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, edited by D. Grusky, 105–111. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Durkheim, E. 1997. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. New York: Free Press. Eastwood, J. 2006. The Rise of Nationalism in Venezuela. Gainesville: University Press of Florida. Ferry, R. 1989. The Colonial Elite of Early Caracas: Formation and Crisis, 1567–1767. Berkeley: University of California Press. Geertz, C. 1973. “Religion as a Cultural System.” The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Greenfeld, L. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greenfeld, L. 1995. “Russian Nationalism as a Medium of Revolution.” Qualitative Sociology 18, no. 2: 189–209. Greenfeld, L. 2001. The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Greenfeld, L. 2006a. “Nationalism and the Mind.” Nationalism and the Mind. Oxford: Oneworld. Greenfeld, L. 2006b. “Nationalism and Modernity.” Nationalism and the Mind. Oxford: Oneworld. Grusky, D. 2001. “Introduction: The Past, Present, and Future of Social Inequality.” In Social Stratification: Race, Class, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, edited by D. Grusky, 3–51. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Hobsbawm, E. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lynch, J. 1986. The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826, 2nd ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Marx, K. 1978a. “Manifesto of the Communist Party.” In Marx-Engels Reader, edited by R. C. Tucker, 469–500. New York: W. W. Norton. Marx, K. 1978b. “The German Ideology: Part 1.” In Marx-Engels Reader, edited by R. C. Tucker, 146–200. New York: W. W. Norton. Marx, K. 1978c. “Marx on the History of His Opinions.” In Marx-Engels Reader, edited by R. C. Tucker, 3–6. New York: W. W. Norton.


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Nietzsche, F. 1998. On the Genealogy of Morality. Translated by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Scheler, M. 1994. Ressentiment. Translated by Lewis B. Coser. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. Shils, E. 1972. “Deference.” The Constitution of Society, 143–175. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Weber, E. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Weber, M. 1958. “Class, Status, and Party.” In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, 180–195. New York: Oxford University Press. Wright, E. O. 2001. “A General Framework for the Analysis of Class Structure.” In Social Stratification: Race, Class, and Gender in Sociological Perspective, edited by D. Grusky, 116–127. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.


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Nationalism and Conflict Ray Taras Relevance It was during the late 17th and early 18th centuries that nationalism first emerged as a political force that shaped both international and domestic politics. Until then, political nationalism did not exist. The nation was identified with the state or, more precisely, with the dynastic rulers of the state. Their subjects formed part of the nation only insofar as they expressed their loyalty to a dynasty. Nationalism of the people was nonexistent. During most of this period, political nationalism was infused with liberal ideas that spoke in favor of cooperation among, rather than conflict between, contending parties—whether they be dynastic states or emergent nation-states. Modern liberalism, especially as it applies to international relations between states, can be traced to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who advanced the notion of a “perpetual peace.” His proposal for a liberal constitution to be adopted by states so that such a peace could be achieved included the following requirements: (1) the state should be a republic in which the consent of citizens for going to war was mandatory; (2) a league of free states should be formed that would guarantee the emergence of a pacific federation; and (3) in such a universal community, a citizen’s rights should be respected everywhere, hence the idea of a “cosmopolitian right”—the precursor to human rights—was put forward (Kant 1991, 99–108). Kant’s ideas became widely accepted (though not always practiced) during this period, and a liberal form of nationalism emerged that did not often foment conflicts among peoples. To be sure, conflicts did break out, and among those discussed here were those between, on the one hand, Napoleon’s military campaigns in Europe and overseas and, on the other, national uprisings by peoples against the invading French armies. Conflict also occurred between imperial powers (Austria, Russia, Turkey) and the peoples subjugated by them; the events of 1848 were the most dramatic examples. Finally, as this period came to a close, the liberal content of nationalism began to erode as European powers scrambled for colonies and their nationalist programs became inseparable from political and economic expansion. We must not lose sight of the bottom line, however: liberal nationalism in the 19th century was an ideology that stressed the spread of political liberties and cooperation among peoples—not oppression of or conflict between them. Before the outbreak of the 1789 revolution, French political thinkers debated new understandings of government and the organization of nations. Voltaire (1694–1778) rejected the narrowness of national and religious parochialism and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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NATIONALISM AND CONFLICT

advocated cultural and commercial progress in nations. He stressed the importance of creating a civilized society based on a common sense of citizenship. Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) believed that government had to be based on the general will of the people, in this way introducing the notion of popular sovereignty. The state had to provide for the liberty and happiness of its inhabitants. In turn, it was itself dependent on the virtue of its citizens. The state derived its strength from citizens who felt a responsibility for the good of the commonweal. The way that the state bound individuals together in a community was through the popular expression of national civic feelings. For Rousseau, liberty and justice were the underpinnings of the national state. Fusing private individuality with the collective organism of a state was also a method of restoring the original goodness of human beings. Although their approaches differed, Voltaire and Rousseau were both precursors of 19th-century liberal nationalism. The revolutionaries who overthrew Louis XVI (1754–1793) in 1792 invoked the will of the people—the French nation—for their actions. To be sure, the French constitution adopted a year earlier, in 1791, and accepted by Louis, referred to him as “King of the French” rather than, as earlier, “King of France and Navarre.” This change in title symbolized a move to a popular monarchy from a dynastic one. It also underscored the monarchy’s direct links to the people rather than to the territory of France. Rousseau’s followers who insisted on constitutional change assumed that unity and fraternity among the French would be promoted by giving them rights and liberties. They also wished to suppress the privileges of the upper class. In this way, they recognized nationalism as both a revolutionary and democratic ideology. The equation nation = state = people was applicable not just to France but to other countries when they achieved popular self-determination. As the French Declaration of Rights of 1795 asserted: “Each people is independent and sovereign, whatever the number of individuals who compose it and the extent of the territory it occupies” (cited in Hobsbawm 1993, 19). The ideas of the French Revolution were to have a major impact on many different nationalities within 19th-century European empires. The movement for popular sovereignty also soon spread beyond Europe, illustrated by nationalist uprisings from Egypt to Latin America early in the 19th century. At that time, nationalism was a term synonymous with political liberty. It remained that way until the end of the period under discussion. The desire for political liberty inevitably entailed a conflict with political elites unwilling to be held accountable to the people. Another defining feature of nationalism at that time, therefore, was the mobilization of forces seeking regime changes. As with the French Revolution, which overthrew what became known as the ancien régime, the political objective of nationalist forces in other countries also was to effect regime change and replace dynastic or autocratic rule with popular sovereignty. Nationalism threatened the power of long-ruling political elites by seeking to empower hitherto disenfranchised groups. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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There was a more circuitous way that the French Revolution and its aftermath stirred nationalist movements in other European countries. In the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars fought from 1792–1815, France invaded and occupied many European states. Napoleon’s imperial vision marked a contrast to the multicultural practices of the Habsburg empire because it insisted that all conquered peoples had to introduce French laws and administration and pay tribute to France. In reality, then, Napoleon’s objective was to weaken rather than liberate other nations, even though he had announced—and many Europeans believed— that he stood as the champion of oppressed peoples. Napoleon’s logic was a political variant of the 16th-century principle of cuius regio, eius religio, that is, the religion of the ruler is the religion of the people of a region. The principle suggested that, through the will of the emperor, national loyalty could be switched from a weak nation to a stronger one. Napoleon’s failure in this endeavor is symbolized in the reaction of Vienna-based composer Ludwig van Beethoven, who was initially infatuated by the French ruler’s idealism. On hearing that Napoleon had taken the title of emperor in 1804, Beethoven angrily tore up the dedication page of his Third Symphony, which was to be named after the French commander. After Napoleon’s victory over the Prussians at Jena in 1806, Beethoven’s disillusionment with French national emancipation was complete. He inveighed: “It is a pity I do not understand the art of war as well as I do the art of music. I would conquer him!” (cited in Clubbe 2006). It is usually assumed that nationalism must be anchored in a national language spoken by all subjects in a country. In other words, cuius regio, eius linguo, that is, the ruler’s language is the country’s language. As late as 1789, one-half of all people living in France could not speak French, and many decades after the birth of French nationalism in 1789, that principle had not been realized. Thus, in 1863 more than one-fifth of schoolchildren in France still did not understand French, and one-half considered it a foreign language (Weber 1976, 67–68). The nations that battled the invading Napoleonic armies were asserting a national principle of their own. Most of the national movements of the 19th century—Italian, German, Polish, Hungarian, South Slav, Greek—were in some measure stimulated by revolutionary France and Napoleon. Nationalist ideas soon spread to Latin America, and in the early 19th century, Simón Bolivar’s (1783–1830) dream of establishing a unified South America independent from Spain ran aground on the particularist nationalisms—Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and later Panama—of the various administrative parts of the Spanish viceroyalty of New Granada. European nationalism had found its reflection on a distant continent. Sweeping political changes invariably transform a nation’s culture. The French Revolution replaced a cultural establishment with a revolutionary vanguard. This new cultural elite set out to revolutionize the arts, paradoxically looking to classical antiquity for ways to express the newfound sovereignty of the people. The fusion of nationalist forms of expression with universal values was the aim of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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French cultural avant-garde, foreshadowing the modern idea of “national in form, global in content”—the characteristic of a culture in the age of globalization. The breakthrough of political nationalism in the late 18th century continues to shape our world today. While the term now often has negative associations, it continues to provide fuel for political leaders, their followers, and the cultural intelligentsia in most countries of the world. Nationalism has served many noble purposes, such as the emancipation of subjected peoples, but it has also been harnessed in support of xenophobic, racist, and imperialist movements.

Origins If the catalyst for the emergence of modern nationalism was the French Revolution, itself inspired by the ideas of 18th-century French thinkers, much of the intellectual spadework had been carried out by German intellectuals. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), regarded as the father of German liberalism, was in a more indirect way a source of German nationalism. To be sure, he considered himself to be a citizen of the world, but this identity did not refute his Germanic origins since being German signified, he believed, being cosmopolitan. The positive attribute of the German-speaking people of his time was, Kant advanced, their belief in reason. National passions had little place in their lives. German lands, accordingly, were to constitute the abode of reason. The philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) and his contemporary Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) shared the idea that the greatness of the German nation lay in its language and culture. Specifically, Fichte sought to awaken a hitherto fragmented German nation through educational expansion. Like Kant, Fichte ascribed a universalist mission to the German people; they were to bring about the religious and moral regeneration of humanity, for only Germans had maintained linguistic continuity and encouraged different social classes to take part in the development of German culture. One of the most influential German philosophers of this period was Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), whose writings on nationalism are often overshadowed in his overall oeuvre. Like Beethoven, Hegel was shaken by Napoleon’s victory over Prussia at Jena, but he drew different lessons from it. For one, displaying his skepticism about Germany’s claim to being a great nation, Hegel found the Jena outcome proof that civilized nations were stronger than primitive ones. He stood in opposition to the German national aspirations of his time and rejected political Romanticism. He also contended that the political disintegration and demoralization of a nation could only be prevented by the selection of a strong leader. Yet Hegel was more concerned with building the state than the nation; it was in the state, he was convinced, that reason and morality resided. Hegel’s work had a strong appeal to Karl Marx (1818–1883), who also deprecated the emergent nationalism of his German homeland. Marx’s belief that N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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social class was more important than national affiliation shaped and scarred the movement that bore his name for the next century. His reference to “historic nations”—Hungary, Poland, Ireland—was an ideological construct that acknowledged only revolutionary peoples with an insurrectionist tradition. His denigration of Russia as backward illustrated his capricious, arbitrary, and hostile approach to nationalism. It is ironic, then, that his attempts in the 1860s to establish an International Workingmen’s Association foundered as a result of disagreements among socialists coming from different European nations. Marx’s internationalist orientation stood in sharp contrast with the nationalist views of German economist Friedrich List (1789–1846). List held that the way for Germany to catch up with England, France, and America was by developing into a great economic power. Advancing a theory of national economics, List held that the political union linking state and people had to be transformed into a commercial union. The state had a particular responsibility to promote the interests of its merchants and manufacturers so that the nation as a whole could prosper. Whereas Marx opposed capitalist development, List tried to show how a nation could adopt this strategy to catch up with the advanced economies. German writing about German nationalism is more eclectic than what is found in other European nations of this period. The explanation for this diversity was that “it was precisely because there were so many untested and wholly Utopian theories about the reality of a German nation, her boundaries and internal order, that German nationalism became so attractive. . . . Nationalism was open to all kinds of content; it could be made religious, Liberal, democratic and egalitarian. . . . In short, it formed the ideal vehicle for every kind of anti-establishment creative idea” (Schulze 1991, 98). The collapse of the German revolution in 1848–1849 put an end to the hopes for a liberal, all-German nation-state and seemed to back up Marx’s preference for an illiberal and internationalist solution. English nationalism during this period did not stir either the passions of intellectuals to the same degree as in Germany or the actions of the revolutionaries that dominated France. In his essay “Of National Character,” Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1766) argued that Britain’s mixed form of government and the freedom enjoyed by all its social classes and religions hindered the emergence of a national character. He took pride in the fact that the English “of any people in the universe have the least of a national character, unless this very singularity may pass for such” (Hertz 1944, 44). Lacking a national character, embracing a banal, low-key form of patriotism, and putting individual liberties ahead of national interests seemed to be the qualities that made England, paradoxically, the first modern nation. English nationalism was also shaped by the country’s move away from mercantalism. Mercantalism’s state-led approach to economic development may have suited the overseas English trading companies of the 16th century, but promoting a national economy was at odds with the new spirit of liberty and individualism emerging in the late 18th century. Mercantalism fettered England’s economic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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growth in the age of industrialization because economic growth was promoted most efficiently when the government refrained from regulating commerce and adopted laissez-faire economic relations. The publication by Adam Smith (1723–1790) of The Wealth of Nations in 1776 was a turning point that signaled England’s impending embrace of free market and free trade economics. Smith argued that enjoying economic freedom was more valuable than having state regulation, and that competition was invariably preferable to monopoly. He viewed political economy as based on the commonweal of the whole nation—not just a particular social class—and on cooperation among citizens organized through a division of labor. For Smith, the economic interests of all nations were best served through a free exchange of commodities. Economic liberalism was therefore essential to the promotion of a nation’s wealth, resources, and even the development of civilized culture. War would become pointless when all nations accepted economic liberalism as the pathway to mutual prosperity and cultural development. The English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) advanced a political version of this argument by stating that nations should be associates instead of rivals in the grand social enterprise of building civilization. Smith has sometimes been portrayed as a liberal imperialist because he believed that a fair and just imperial structure based, for example, on English commerce could come to pass. This conclusion was opposite to the one Marxists drew, which was that cutthroat capitalist competition and, eventually, imperial ambitions would lead to war among nations. Predictions of whether economic liberalism would lead to peace or conflict depended on rival world outlooks. That it led to the strengthening of the nationstate was a less controversial proposition, however. The historian Eric Hobsbawm asked whether it was “historically fortuitous that the classic era of free trade liberalism coincided with that ‘nation-making’ which [Walter] Bagehot [1826–1877] saw as so central to his century” (Hobsbawm 1993, 25). He answered his own question by postulating that the nation-state performed indispensable functions for the development of capitalism. It was especially important that this state was based on the principle of consent. In Considerations on Representative Government published in 1861, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) defined the nation as a collectivity informed by national sentiment. A crucial factor was that its members wanted to be ruled by the same government that they themselves would establish. Throughout the 19th century, the peculiar nature of English nationalism harbored both liberal political and economic principles and imperial expansion and pride. Both owed much to the nature of the British state, supported by the British people, which acted as an invisible hand as well as a rudder for a far-flung empire in the making. A type of nationalism very different from that in France, Germany, or England was emerging in Russia. Empress Catherine the Great (1729–1796) saw herself N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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as a “philosopher on the throne” and looked to the West, mostly to France and its philosophes, for ideas. The language of her court was French, but she also took care to learn the language of her subjects, Russian. Like Peter the Great (1672–1725) before her, Catherine was intent upon Russia becoming part of a modernizing western Europe. These two absolutist monarchs were pivotal in putting Russia on the road to becoming a nation—rather than a loose association of disparate peoples. The social class most receptive to the ideology of nationalism was Russia’s extensive nobility. “The protracted crisis of identity within the nobility, similarly to the development in other countries, rendered this elite stratum sympathetic to the nationalist ideas that had been forcefully promoted by Russia’s energetic despots, Peter and Catherine the Great” (Greenfeld 1992, 220). Although, at the turn of the 19th century, most of the country’s leaders had apparently been seduced by the appeal of nationalism, a schism arose that divided the movement. Some thinkers saw the path to greatness as modeling Russia on the West, while others were certain that Russia’s greatness lay in its own unique attributes and institutions. Slavophilism was the name given to the latter orientation, and it was most clearly manifested in 19th-century Russian literature, music, and architecture. Many of its proponents were motivated by an envy of the West, and they took pride in Russia not having a full European identity. They regarded the Russian Orthodox Church—which used Church Slavonic as its language and the Eastern rite as its liturgy—as the last preserver of the original form of Christianity. Slavophiles also extolled the virtues of the village commune, where individual identity was subsumed under a collective one. It represented a distinctive Russian institution that gave the nation organizational and moral superiority over the West. The Russian national idea propagated by the Slavophiles was based on the nation “(1) defined as a collective individual, (2) formed by ethnic, primordial factors such as blood and soil, and (3) characterized by the enigmatic soul, or spirit” (Greenfeld 1992, 261). At the same time, it was the educated elite who were needed to interpret this spirit of the people, putting Russia on a course for continued autocratic rule. Slavophilism was also closely linked to pan-Slavism—the idea that all Slav peoples should be united under Russian leadership. In this respect, Slavophiles were supporters of a multinational, Russian-led state. The Westernizers in Russia—the Slavophiles’ opponents—were convinced that the country’s efforts to identify with the West best served Russia’s interests. It was in western Europe that Enlightenment ideas, scientific discovery, industrialization, capitalist development, and technological progress had been recorded. In many respects, Russia’s Westernizers shared the economic nationalism advanced by Germany’s List—the way for a backward country to catch up with more advanced states was through economic development based on a capitalist system. Becoming interdependent with western Europe was part of that process. The ruler with the most radical agenda for political unification with the West was Czar Alexander I (1777–1825), during whose reign Napoleon’s armies had been N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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driven out of Russia. He called for a European confederation of Christian states that would prevent future European wars. Before there was a French Revolution, there was the American Revolution. It was in America that many of the European ideals of the age of Enlightenment had been put into practice. European elites admired the liberties, religious tolerance, and prosperity enjoyed by the inhabitants of the British colonies. The English traditions of constitutional liberty, common law, and participation by citizens in the commonweal infused the colonists with a new sense of nationhood. The American Revolution of 1763–1783 is usually depicted as a backlash against English tyranny. But it was also fueled by the belief among American settlers that they were already among the freest people on Earth. The Revolution also enabled Americans to emancipate themselves from their own European past. Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790) bore witness to this idea: “Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world” (Kohn 1969a, 276). The American Revolution had an indelible impact on many of the world’s nations. The clearest immediate effect was the political and national awakening of the French, which followed in the aftermath of the American Declaration of Independence. In central Europe, Poland believed it could stave off partition by enacting the democratic constitution of 1792, which captured the spirit of the American

Memorialized in this famous painting by Emanuel Leutze, George Washington crossed the Delaware River to attack the British in Trenton, New Jersey, in December 1776 during the American Revolution. (National Archives and Records Administration)


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document. Analyzing the fate of Poland, Rousseau insisted that large independent states with recognizable national communities had the right to remain independent: “It is making fools of people to tell them seriously that one can at one’s pleasure transfer peoples from master to master, like herds of cattle, without consulting their interests or their wishes” (Cobban 1969, 32). This, too, was a lesson learned from the American experience of nation-building. For American federalism to flourish, a centralizing power was needed to manage its geographic and ethnic breadth. Alexander Hamilton (1755–1804) set out to create a strong national government and a national economy that, in the process, would develop a national character. Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826) elaborated an ideological foundation for the new nation that complemented its political independence. He advocated a new egalitarianism, popular democracy, and public support for the national idea as prerequisites for the nation’s existence. For Jefferson, as for nationalist thinkers in other messianic societies, America’s nationhood also had a universal importance. Its form of government constituted “a standing monument and example for the aim and the imitation of the people of other countries” (Kohn 1969a, 310). As with the nationalisms of certain other peoples, the claim was being advanced that American nationalism represented universalist ideals. This youthful, liberal, idealistic American nationalism was gradually transformed into an expansionist program—termed Manifest Destiny—by political leaders at the turn of the 19th century. The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 involved a combination of secret diplomacy and antidemocratic measures; inhabitants of Louisiana—many of whom were French speakers with a distinct culture originating in Acadia—were not given the opportunity to say whether they endorsed incorporation into the United States. The U.S. annexation of West Florida in 1810 was the result partly of diplomacy, partly of military action. The brutal 1817–1818 attack on the Seminole Indians, who included runaway slaves, led to the U.S. takeover of the rest of Florida from the Spanish. The War of 1812 against the British represented a rare military failure. It started as an attempt to conquer British North America, fed by Americans’ heightened awareness of their nationhood. Instead, their new capital, Washington, was burned down, and their armies were driven out of Canada. The conquest of the American West after 1815 marked an additional phase of expansion, tarnished by mass killings of Native Americans. The Mexican-American War of 1846–1848 led to the annexation of California (where the discovery of gold in 1848 led, two years later, to statehood) and New Mexico, as well as recognition of the 1845 U.S. annexation of Texas—an independent state from 1836 to 1845. Although this expansion was largely driven by conflict, it did allow most residents of annexed territories to experience greater political liberty and equality than they had before. In contrast to European nationalisms, then, the idea of the American nation was not a simple product of blood or soil or shared memories. It was informed by a universal ideal of liberty that meant that just about everyone could be incorporated into it. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Dimensions Nationalism became the foremost kind of political discourse in the first part of the 19th century at a time when European societies were being transformed by the spread of literacy, primary education, and mass-circulation newspapers. Liberal nationalism evolved as a result of the philosophical, political, and economic programs developed by intellectual elites, combined with rising popular demands for greater freedoms. The liberal component of nationalism, therefore, gave it broad appeal as a desirable movement and ideology. For subjected and established nations alike, it offered a blueprint for political, economic, and cultural growth. Liberal nationalism was attractive to disadvantaged peoples, but it also was embraced by established elites intent on acquiring democratic legitimacy. Nationalism was not yet seen as threatening the stability of the international system, which, at this time, constituted a classic balance-of-power equilibrium. Historian E. H. Carr believed that the period extending from the time of Napoleon to the outbreak of World War I “succeeded in delicately balancing the forces of ‘nationalism’ and ‘internationalism’; for it established an international order or framework strong enough to permit of a striking extension and intensification of national feeling without disruption on any wide scale of regular and peaceful international relations” (Carr 1945, 6). A historian of nationalism, Hans Kohn had a different assessment of this period: “The great voices of former ages—Aquinas, Erasmus, Voltaire—spoke for Christendom or Europe; Bentham, Rousseau and Kant were concerned with mankind; but in the 19th century the European society and the European mind lost the oneness of the preceding age and dissolved into conflicting groups and culture patterns” (Kohn 1969b, 15). Nationalism made for fractious international politics, Kohn contended, and it did not possess the universal values with which previous ideologies had been able to forge consensus. A third perspective—that taken by Eric Hobsbawm—made reference to the major changes produced by liberal nationalism. Accepting Bagehot’s thesis that nation-making was the chief characteristic of 19th-century politics, this view rested on what were seen as the contradictory developments in the “era of triumphant bourgeois liberalism” from 1830 to 1880: The European balance of power was transformed by the emergence of two great powers based on the national principle (Germany and Italy), the effective partition of a third on the same grounds (Austria-Hungary after the Compromise of 1867), not to mention the recognition of a number of lesser political entities as independent states claiming the new status as nationally based peoples, from Belgium in the west to the Ottoman successor states in southeast Europe (Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria), and two national revolts of the Poles demanding their reconstitution as what they thought of as a nation-state. (Hobsbawm 1993, 23)


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In short, the era of liberal nationalism proved messy because it stirred the political aspirations of many European peoples. The impact of liberal nationalism was felt most acutely during the so-called springtime of peoples in 1848. To be sure, the Greek Christian uprising against Turkish rule in 1821 and the Belgian rebellion against the Netherlands in 1830 represented successful nationalist revolts that produced political independence. The Poles, in addition, rose up against the Russian tsars in 1831 and 1863, although they suffered only greater oppression. But in 1848, most of Europe was caught up in democratic nationalist uprisings. The Czechs, Danes, Germans, Hungarians, Romanians, Serbs, Italians, and, in 1850, Bulgarians demanded national self-determination and their own liberal states. Although the revolutions shook the Habsburg monarchy and brought the French one down, none led to the immediate establishment of new independent states. On the other hand, over the longer term the middle class throughout Europe became infused with the nationalist idea, which, internationally, was to lead to changes in the European political map and, in individual countries, was to challenge the grip on power held by conservative groups. The first delayed national product of the 1848 revolutions was the creation of an independent Italy. In 1861 a series of political and military actions led to the proclamation of a united Kingdom of Italy, and the process of Italian unification was completed in 1870 when Italian troops drove the French out of Rome and the city became the capital of the kingdom. The intellectual father of unification was Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872), who stressed the importance of moral unity in the struggle for a national state. Mazzini’s influence reached beyond Italy; his political program, which combined democracy, republicanism, national unity, and state independence, was popular not only in Europe but as far away as India. His vision of creating a United States of Europe, however, on the framework of diverse nationalist movements failed, just as Bolivar’s had in South America. German unification took about a decade longer to achieve, but, again, the 1848 revolution was instrumental to eventual statehood. The revolt, aimed at achieving political liberty and national unity, was largely peaceful and encouraged cooperation with other oppressed nations. Yet when the German empire was proclaimed in 1871 as a federation of smaller states, it was more the making of one man than of popular desire for unity or sovereignty. Otto von Bismarck (1815–1898) displayed an extraordinary gift for statecraft, and, combined with the military victories of the Prussian army over Austria in 1866 and over France in 1871, he had obtained the support of most of Europe’s leaders for the creation of a unified German state. Hungary’s accession in 1867 to equal status with Austria in what became known as the dual monarchy is another result of the 1848 revolutions. Hungarians had risen up in that year, demanding parliamentary government and the transformation of Habsburg rule into a constitutional monarchy. Defeated by Austrian forces, Hungary’s nationalist movement seemed unlikely to achieve these objectives. But military defeat by a French-Italian coalition a decade later, then by the Prussians in 1866, weakened Austria, and in 1867 a refashioned AustroHungarian empire was established. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Why did the 1848 springtime of peoples take two decades to percolate and produce changes on the map of Europe? For Benedict Anderson, many of the nationalisms that underpinned independence movements were modeled on American and French precedents and so constituted “reactionary, secondary modelling.” In turn, existing empires decided that they, too, might “appear attractive in national drag” and adopted nationalist policies. Thus, “ ‘official nationalism’—willed merger of nation and dynastic empire . . . developed after, and in reaction to, the popular national movements proliferating in Europe since the 1820s” (Anderson 1993, 86–87). So ended the halcyon days of liberal nationalism. After the civil war in the United States and the French-Prussian war of 1870–1871, a wave of economic protectionism took hold of Europe. More and more political leaders implicitly accepted a principal tenet of economic nationalism—that vital goods should be produced domestically rather than be imported. Among other results, this led to the imposition of the 1879 German tariff regime. The protectionist backlash against global interdependence in the second half of the 19th century had begun to take shape. Ineluctably, nationalism slipped out of the hands of its liberal creators and was taken over by an illiberal variant. By the 1870s, the competing nationalisms of European states expanded beyond economic issues and inspired a drive for colonial expansion. Not long afterward, at the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference, rival European powers carved up possessions in Africa among themselves. Colonialism had become an integral part of European states’ emerging aggressive nationalism (see Figure 1). Political Nationalism

Economic Nationalism

Liberal philosophical ideas Mercantalism ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ The French Revolution Economic liberalism ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Nationalist backlash to Growth strategy for Napoleonic nationalism national economy ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ National unification and Capitalist expansion and statehood the search for markets ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ → European empire-building ← FIGURE 1

The Rise and Decline of Liberal Nationalism, 1770s–1870s


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Consequences The 100-year period of nationalism considered here suggests that the phenomenon had a contagious effect. The liberating ideas of the French Revolution spread quickly to other countries in Europe. The belief that strengthening the national economy was the surest road to great power status was viewed as a truth in late 18th-century England and, some 50 years later, became dogma for many German nationalists. When a European state’s nationalism was defined so as to include the search for overseas colonies, English, Spanish, Dutch, and Portuguese empires became models for the new nationalisms of Belgium and Germany. Th e diffusion of specific nationalist ideas across countries is a pattern appearing throughout this period. Modern nationalism was largely a 19th-century European creation. It was more precocious in western Europe, where nations had existed before there were state structures. It was slower to appear in eastern Europe where the establishment of states usually preceded nation-building. The latter process also seemed to apply to Latin America, where administrative boundaries drawn by the Spanish colonists were transformed in the 1820s into state boundaries, with individual “nations” like Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia being constructed subsequently. Nationalist unrest in the colonized world was a common, if sometimes underemphasized, feature throughout the 19th century. It represented an inevitable backlash against the expansionist nationalism of Western powers. As in the case of Europe, the French Revolution was instrumental in sowing the intellectual seeds of nationalism in other parts of the world, and Napoleon’s military campaigns overseas often proved the catalyst for galvanizing nationalist opposition. In 1791 a slave revolt took place in the French Caribbean colony of SaintDomingue (now Haiti). A decade later, a new constitution, enacted by moderate black political leaders, formally abolished slavery in the colony. In 1802 Napoleon dispatched an expeditionary force to crush the antislavery forces and protect French plantation owners. The conflict only worsened, with both black and French residents of the island brutally slaughtered. Finally in 1804 anticolonial ex-slaves proclaimed the independence of the colony, thereby establishing the first free black republic in the world. A remarkable and precocious watershed in anticolonial nationalism, the revolutionary movement began subsequently to drift in a different direction, and France was able to extract large indemnities from SaintDomingue for the losses it had suffered. Napoleon faced another nationalist backlash in a different part of the world to which he had sent troops. In 1798 his army invaded the Ottoman province of Egypt. Within a year, however, his campaign was bogged down by first Mamluk and then Turkish military forces in the country. In Cairo, Muslim groups fought French soldiers on the streets. The result was the emergence of a still-inchoate form of anticolonialism in much of Egypt. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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British colonial practices also sparked nationalist backlashes. Chinese outrage at the British-run opium trade in the country led to a revolt in 1839 that precipitated the Anglo-Chinese war. It ended in 1842 with the imposition of the Nanking Treaty, which gave the British extraterritorial rights and many trading privileges in China. The “unequal treaty” became a rallying cry for the Chinese nationalist movement. The Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 has been described as India’s first war of independence against Britain. At that time, Indian troops made up 95 percent of the British Army in the Raj (the British Indian empire), and when they were subjected to culturally offensive practices, their officers led a revolt that ended with the taking of Delhi and Lucknow. The British Army quickly retook these cities, but Britain’s hand had been forced; it had to resort to direct rule over India the following year, and the birth of an organized Indian nationalism soon followed. In southern Africa, the Zulus struggled to prevent European colonialists from taking control over their traditional homelands. Zulu armies attacked the Dutchspeaking Boers in 1838, then the British in 1879, inflicting unprecedented defeats upon European colonial powers. Zulu victories on the battlefield were short-lived, but they earned the respect of British political leaders, who until then had taken their imperial rule largely for granted. Like China and other subject Asian nations, in this period the Japanese were forced to sign unequal treaties with Western powers. In 1867 the Meiji Restoration took place, marking a change of political system and strengthening the power of the emperor. Many domestic reforms followed, most of which were aimed at modernizing Japan and allowing it to catch up economically and militarily with the West. Outside of Europe, then, the staging of nationalist revolts, the organizing of nationalist movements, and the writing of nationalist manifestos were primarily the result of subjugated peoples’ experience of colonialism. It was on nationalist platforms that anticolonial political leaders emerged to challenge the authority of the metropole (or colonial center). Although nationalism generally embodies the spirit of rebellion, by the end of this period, the European states’ nationalism had become an established creed; that of colonized peoples, however, had turned into an oppositional force. Nationalism was framed differently in status quo–oriented powers compared to nations of the periphery. In the first, nationalism was the blueprint for greater prosperity, prestige, and power. In the second, nationalism was the framework for obtaining basic freedoms. In any given country, nationalism could be a unifying force or a fragmenting one. It could promote stability, but it could also cause instability. Its consequences largely depended on the focus of identity for the people living in a particular country. Where the primary identity was national, elite-driven nationalism had either accomplished its mission already or was well equipped to reinforcing unity. Where the primary identity was religious, ethnic, or regional—as was commonplace in multinational states like the Habsburg, Ottoman, and Tsarist empires— “subnationalisms” embraced by these groups could produce centrifugal tendencies, as the 1848 insurrections illustrated. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The liberal nationalism characterizing Europe for much of the 19th century was generally a positive development. It represented an ideology of emancipation, self-determination, and development—political, economic, and cultural. To the extent that it became diffused and led to national awakenings elsewhere, on balance European nationalism was also positive. The negative features of nationalism—conflict, oppression, injustice, intolerance, xenophobia—began to surface only as the period in question was drawing to an end. While nationalism is recognized today as a political force with staying power —it is over three centuries old—the contribution made by 19th-century liberal nationalism is not fully recognized. The romantic nationalism of the early 19th century that fired the imagination of artists, philosophers, and political leaders in distant parts of the world is often forgotten. The rising of the nations of Europe in 1848 and of downtrodden peoples around the world in the decades before and after is not as familiar to us as it should be. Many of the nationalist ideas proclaimed in 1989—the year the communist bloc unraveled—were the ones that had inspired national revolutionaries over a century earlier. The study of 19thcentury liberal nationalism is relevant today for teasing out the positive aspects of the phenomenon from the negative ones. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1993. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso Books. Carr, E. H. 1945. Nationalism and After. London: Macmillan. Clubbe, John. 2006. “Beethoven, Byron, and Bonaparte.” Fondation Napoléon. (Retrieved June 13, 2006), http://www.napoleon.org/en/reading_room/articles/files/clubbe_beethoven_ byron.asp. Cobban, Alfred. 1969. The Nation State and National Self-Determination. London: Collins. Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hertz, Frederick. 1944. Nationality in History and Politics: A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character. New York: Oxford University Press. Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1993. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Program, Myth, Reality. New York: Cambridge University Press. Kant, Immanuel. 1991. Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kohn, Hans. 1969a. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: Collier Books. Kohn, Hans. 1969b. Prophets and Peoples: Studies in 19th Century Nationalisms. London: Collier Books. Schulze, Hagen. 1991. The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763–1867. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Szporluk, Roman. 1991. Marxism and Nationalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Taras, Ray. 2002. Liberal and Illiberal Nationalisms. London: Palgrave. Weber, Eugen. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.


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Education and Nationalism Klaus Schleicher The existence of nationalism in education presupposes the development of the concepts of state and nation. The concept of nation originated in Europe and spread to all continents in the 18th century. Its goals were and still are to integrate a country, legitimize a power system, and influence public opinion. These goals were often accomplished through national educational systems and particularly through the subjects of history, geography, and civics. Additionally, since fewer people could read and write in those days, non-formal education was also used by states to further nationalistic goals. Both educational strategies developed national emotional ties while degrading the importance of other cultures and nations. The American and French revolutions were particularly notable for such emotionalizations. Since those days, national identity has been increasingly emphasized by formal educational systems, school directives, and curricula almost everywhere. Nonetheless, informal education continues to play a strong, or perhaps stronger, role through national festivals, symbols, literature, national competition, and, last but not least, war.

Relevance The role of education in nationalism is complex and multifaceted. First, nobody is asked at birth what nation he or she would like to be born into. Thus, children are born without national identities and prejudices and they are socialized and educated in their early years to conform to ethnic and national traditions (Piaget and Weil 1951). This informal enculturation is of great importance to the transfer of social and national values, attitudes, traditional rituals, and stereotypes to children. It occurs by parents, local communities, the church, and so on. Children thus develop emotional loyalties to their nation, such as pride in their milieu and identification with their language, heroes, and national celebrations, before the teaching of history, geography, and literature adds more rational details. Teaching with the goal of creating a national consciousness became common in the 18th century in France and England because a certain agreed-upon national history was available; however, in Germany no such common history existed until 1871. Generally, the ruling classes used education, particularly the teaching of religion and history, to protect their social and political status quo insteas of increasing the understanding and participation among the common people. Accordingly, heromodels became touchstones for national value systems, historical developments N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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EDUCATION AND NATIONALISM

were cast so as to bring glory to the fatherland, and educators envisaged an orientation toward authority and not toward economic and social changes, so much so that average citizens were often more alienated from their daily life than connected to it. Such formal nationalistic education was accompanied by informal education through symbols, architecture, media, and so on. For instance, in the French Revolution, different types of media were used to emotionalize the masses. Furthermore, the stronger the focus on the fatherland or nation became, the more human rights and notions of transnational cooperation or peace suffered, as is illustrated by the hypertrophic attitudes of so-called “grand” nations, cultures, races, and religions. The concept of nation was elaborated in philosophy and literature as local and universal loyalties decreased. National visions, constructs, and policies helped integrate geographic and/or cultural areas in administrative and legal terms. Certainly, national orientations did not become powerful unless they gained public support. Here, education, specifically in history and civics, was called upon to support national ideals and interests. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the European nation-states also dominated, administered, and educated South America, Asia, and Africa. There they constructed states and inculcated them with an artificial nationalism that did not take into account existing tribes, feuds, cultures, and languages. Nevertheless, the colonial upper classes regarded the establishment of the new states as a chance to gain some affluence and to finally liberate themselves from their masters. In sum, national developments occurred topdown through the dominating powers and not bottom-up. The process supported a centralization of language(s), economics, traffic, and so on. It led to a definition of cultures and states as well as the development of educational systems, because the existence of a nation depends—at least in principle—on daily plebiscites to hold up common traditions and to instill responsibility for a common future.

Origins State school systems arose out of the ruins of church, town, or private educational structures. On the one hand, there was a strong belief in the 18th century that the world and its social problems could be solved by education. On the other hand, governments and cultural elites tried to strengthen the very institutions the philanthropists sought to change, using the very same means. For instance, in 1772, when the territory of the Poles was divided by Russia and Prussia, J. J. Rousseau asked the Poles to strengthen their patriotism through education, whereas J. G. Herder used his “letters to encourage humanity” in 1797 to demand comprehensive education in Germany. Rousseau stressed that “education offers an important chance to develop national perspectives and minds, in fact, a chance to direct public opinion so that citizens become patriots. Because, if we have no fatherN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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lands we are nobody.” On the other hand, Herder saw national traditions in the following way: “A lazy inherited glory leads to vanity, but not what the fatherland was or is now and what we can love. This could be a good constitution or a fair competition of the peoples without discrimination of others” (Vogt 1967, 14, 32). But in France, about half the population neither spoke nor understood French at the beginning of the revolution. Nevertheless, the national self-interpretation of the ancien régime was quickly pushed aside in the Revolution, first by the bourgeoisie, then by the propaganda of the Jacobins, and, finally, by Napoleon. Since the French Revolution, many states established educational systems, and their feudal orientation in education changed toward an emphasis on national identity to overcome social, regional, and language differences. Again, informal education was of great importance. Influential in the formation of nationalism were social organizations (e.g., theaters) and culturally potent individuals (poets, musicians, architects, etc.). Additionally, military training was of considerable importance. National symbols had a considerable impact, for example, the layout of capitals and government buildings, such as in Rome or Washington. Additional veins for the expression of nationalistic ideas were poetry ( for example, F. Dostojewski’s pan-Slavism and Schiller’s “Wilhelm Tell”), music (R. Wagner’s operas), philosophers (Fichte’s “Addresses to the German Nation”), and the press (the Irish weekly The Nation or the later The United Irishman). Also museums were used to strengthen national traditions and consciousness, as were national festivals, stamps, and anthems. For instance, in western Europe and South America, national hymns were created in the first decades of the 19th century, either to praise the sovereigns (e.g., in England, Spain, or Austria) or to promote a liberation movement (e.g., in the United States, France, Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and so on). Certainly, Romanticism supplemented nationalism, emphasizing native traditions and folklore to glorify a distant past.

Dimensions The national principle, that is, the setting of territorial boundaries, the determination of economic life, the regulation of law and order, and the integration of administration, was developed in Europe along with the use of education to confirm its legacy. The importance of the aforementioned aspects differed given the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and political contexts. Altogether, national consciousness was and is a political fact that influences not only concepts of value, mental communities, and attitudinal behavior but also political and educational developments. The point must also be made that European nations dominated, administrated, and educated Asia and Africa until these countries created their own national perceptions to liberate themselves. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Revolutionary Impulses from the 1750s to 1815 Before 1750, “nation” was a fairly benign concept. Then, states began to develop national law, administrative structures, and some ideas about their identity— even if some sparks of chauvinism could be detected—as illustrated in the poem of J. Thomson (1740): When Britain first, at Heaven’s command, arose from out the azure main; this was the charter of land . . . The nations, not so blest as thee must, in their turn, to tyrants fall: While thou shalt flourish great and free . . . Rule, Britannia, rule the waves; Britons never will be slaves . . .

As another example, Abbé Coyer in 1755 “was writing that French mothers should understand that they were bearing children for la patrie; that soldiers should learn to die for it . . . and priests belonged first and foremost to the nation” (Gelber 2001, 63). Nationalism and national education spread in France until 1815, as they did in the United States as well. The United States of America was the first European colonial territory that developed into a nation in its own right. The immigrants had already started with a strong engagement in independence (note the Mayflower Compact in 1629). Democratic self-organization increased ( for example, the Fundamental Orders of Connecticut in 1639) along with the development of some transregional information (the almanac for New England from 1639), and then some states linked specific aspects in their constitutions to compulsory education (Massachusetts in 1642). Furthermore, a few American history books were already published in the 17th century (see E. Johnson, A History of New England, 1653). The origins of national consciousness were emphasized in the War of Independence because a patchwork of some 3 million people had to be transformed after the war into a sovereign nation. Individuals from various nations had to be melted into a new nation-state. Accordingly, early efforts (by some founding fathers) were made to promote a republican education, even though the regional states were in charge of education. By and by, an Americanized form of education evolved through the teaching of geography and history. Some civics books became available at the turn of the century (e.g., E. Winchester, A Plain Political Catechism, 1796). Schools received a new role, for they had to shift emotional ties to an impersonal state and had to educate the people for responsible participation. Thomas Jefferson proposed “New Education Laws for Virginia” in 1782 and recommended that every citizen “should receive an education proportional to the condition and pursuits of his life” (Calhoun 1969, 107). Soon Noah Webster became one of the leading protagonists of a national education: “Nothing but the establishment of schools and some uniformity in the use of books, can annihilate differences in speaking and preserve the purity N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Illustration from the 1800s of an American colonial schoolmistress. The United States educational system played a role in fostering nationalist sentiment in the young nation. (Library of Congress)

of the American tongue. . . . Our political harmony is therefore concerned in an uniformity of language” (ibid., 89). Webster made a great career for himself. He started out as a poor teacher during the War of Independence, but soon his national “speller” became a best-seller (1783). Then, “he invented the concept of ‘America’ in his textbooks for children, . . . [which gave] for more than a century . . . millions of illiterate native and foreign-born children a new, common heritage as well as a new, common language.” He published many revised editions of a Compendious Dictionary of the American Language (in 1806, 1812, and 1828) to assimilate immigrants from various countries. In a nutshell, the American Revolution led to the first liberal and somehow democratic nationalism in the world. National integration was supported by books about geography and history and by didactic tales written for children and other juvenile literature. Education was regarded as crucial for national integration, although the content of curricula and textbooks was left to the authorities at regional and/or school levels. In Europe, the development of nations, educational systems, and nationalism in education was quite different. National education was dependent on the states for organizing, financing, and controlling mass educational systems. In Austria, for example, Chancellor Kaunitz proclaimed in 1765 that education was to cultivate N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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love and dedication to the royal family and the fatherland. In Prussia, a similar state domination of education and teacher training was not established until 1807. The earlier “general school reform plan” of 1787 was supplemented by programmatic discussions, for example, by the Freiherr von Stein, who supported education to enhance civilian participation (1807), or by Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation, in which he proposed education for inculcating humanity and nationality (1808). But these programs had limited practical consequences. A new national and nationalistic impetus, however, resulted from the French Revolution. It called for the universal values of liberty, equality, and fraternity for all when the States-General met in 1789 and declared that it represented the nation. “Plans for national education” were developed by L. M. Lepeletier when he stressed in 1792 that “the national convent owes to history three monuments: The Constitution, a Codex of Civil Law, and Public Education.” In other words, Lepeletier argued that the French had to create and educate a new population and spread knowledge to all classes at all levels. Additionally, Lepeletier noted that, “with 5 years the fatherland will receive the children from nature and with 12 it will give it back to society.” He thus argued that education must be compulsory in a child’s early years because this initial basis will determine his long-term contribution to society. The cosmopolitan approach of the early revolution, however, was quickly altered thanks to successful military action abroad and Jacobinism in the country. Radicalism eroded human rights, leading to internal mass execution and external conquest. In 1794 Abbé Gégoire asked the National Assembly to introduce French as the standard language and to eliminate all dialects and minority languages. In addition, Napoleon introduced a militaristic and bureaucratic dimension to the nation-state, in which other cultures were subordinated to the French “mission civilisatrice,” a doctrine that even spread overseas (Wiggin 1962, 6, 18). But, Napoleon’s occupations also led to patriotic liberation and national movements in other countries, which either called for political unification, as in Prussia with Stein and Hardenberg, or for separation, as with the Magyar and Czech language groups in the Habsburg empire. In Germany at this time, a number of national education plans were developed with the goal of furthering the participation of the German public, with specific attention given toward the subject of civics. A different point of view dominated the Batavic revolution in the Netherlands (1795–1806), where seven small states united and introduced educational reforms. The first educational minister was asked to establish a common language and to produce schoolbooks to form a new nation. In other European areas, like Ireland, nationalism had a regional dimension. In central Europe, outstanding reformers of education, such as Humboldt in Prussia, Basedow in Austria, or Pestalozzi in Switzerland, pleaded more or less simultaneously for national resistance against French suppression as well as for a neo-humanistic, liberal, and civic education. These calls came because in France N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the political practice was quite nationalistic, in spite of the fact that the revolutionary theory was largely humanistic. National perceptions and educational policies thus differ according to regional experiences. The United States regarded itself as a nation in spite of its rather autonomous states and manifold immigrants. In France, centralization, ethnicity, and national identity were stressed, whereas different nationalities had to be considered in Switzerland and Austria (where Maria Theresa supported elementary education in different regional languages). Additionally, in Germany, several kingdoms, cultures, and regional identities were held together only by loose cultural bonds until 1871—with some long-term consequences, as can be seen in the federal structure of today’s German republic (see Green 2001). To sum up, European and American history and historical textbooks tried to legitimize nationalism in similar ways. “In history textbooks a selective approach is taken to the past, by choosing what is considered necessary to better understand the present. . . . It is through such textbooks that the notion of ‘what a nation stands for’ is passed from one generation to the next” (Schiffauer and Sunier 2004, 33). Although the presented concepts were more ideological than based in reality, they were used to introduce the young to the so-called national culture while at the same time painting a less-than-positive picture of other nations. Restorative Nationalism between 1818 and 1848 Between 1818 and 1848, Europe was largely backward-oriented, reconsolidating its royal systems, controlling its expanding educational systems, and limiting civic participation. At the same time, South America became freer from the control of conservative Spain. Even here, oligarchic groups stayed in power, and the lower social strata were barely educated. Meanwhile, the United States developed a more colonial attitude by trying to export its democratic ideals and expanding its domination of the continent. In Europe, poets, philosophers, and educators helped spread national enthusiasm in the wake of Napoleon’s defeat, while most governments felt endangered by national idealism and civilian interest in political participation. Accordingly, the Vienna Congress of 1819 tried to reconstitute ancient political structures with its chessboard politics. It regarded constitutional liberty as Jacobinism and suppressed popular movements; therefore, neither the populations that fought against Napoleon nor those at the European periphery (e.g., Greece, Hungary, Poland, or Ireland) gained in national liberty or self-determination. But, the hopes and frustrations of the people came to the surface in 1848, when the educated middle classes attempted to reform governments with an eye toward constitutional liberties. This effort failed, however, because there was not sufficient homogeneity and communication among the reformers. For instance, the German National Assembly adopted a declaration for the protection of national minorities in 1848, “accepting the legal rights of non-German ethnicities . . . to follow their traditional folk rituals, religion, literature, administration and education.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The academic institution had too little power to carry through its intentions (Alter 1994, 192). Well-known educationists like J. H. Pestalozzi and F. Fröbel also argued for a self-reliant, humanistic education as necessary for national engagement. Nevertheless, states tried to reinforce religious education, control teaching, and strengthen obedience to the authorities, especially after the Hambacher Festival in 1832 and after the surfacing of the social question in 1848. National developments in Europe were not quite identical, however. In central Europe, national revolutions failed because no collective separation from the established monarchies took place as it did in France in 1789. In Germany, the task was not to reform the state’s constitution but, rather, to form the state itself. Austria lacked the strong sociopolitical and ethno-cultural homogeneity to enforce political representation on the monarch, and Italy still stayed under Austrian control in spite of several uproars and Mazzini’s passionate call for national unity. Nevertheless, all the states regarded themselves as more and more responsible for education, as is evident by the passing of legislation on primary education in Saxony in 1835, Württemberg in 1836, and Hannover in 1845. In England, which was a model constitutional monarchy, the traditions of individualism and public consent dominated the political perception. Public education, though, was limited until the right to vote was expanded in 1832, 1867, and 1884/1885. Only after this expansion did state engagement in education spread with the requiring of education reports and the introduction of legislation to set up new educational structures. Civic education, however, was not emphasized at all and often regarded as indoctrination. In France, the situation differed, for the coup d’état of Napoleon III had left France with a dictatorship and a strong emphasis on the French language, while education was used to praise French genius. In Spain, a restorative absolutism prevented popular representation in spite of the liberal constitutionalism of Cadiz in 1812 and a draft law to create a national educational system in 1814, which was intended to create honorable citizens with respect for the law and constitutional powers. Nonetheless, patriotism was not made part of education in general nor in history textbooks, which stayed rather vague about national geography, the liberal revolutions, and civil wars after 1820 (Thomson 2002, 195). On the whole, European revolutions generally failed because they were too national and academic in scope, hence the monarchies—except for France—hardly changed. Almost everywhere educational curricula and teacher training were strongly controlled, and history teaching was used to support the ruling classes. In North and South America, national development and national education differed as well. In the United States, common values were urgently needed to unify the 13 states as well as their multiethnic inhabitants. The dream of the United States was to base the society and the spirit of education on republican law, on respect for political institutions, and above all on a firm belief in liberty, equality, and a great common future. In comparison, education in France or BritN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ain had only to reinforce established social structures and behaviors. The challenge of nation-building in America was made more difficult by its expansion, first to the West and then to Florida, Canada, and finally Mexico. The United States depended on an enlightened public opinion. Thus, the “common school” became the main method to help citizens exercise their rights and duties nationwide. In fact, the beginning of “civics” can be dated to 1827 when American history became compulsory in Massachusetts. In addition, the “common school” stressed symbols of national unity, such as national holidays, the flag, and the anthem. However, the United States had no qualms with borrowing from traditions of Pestalozzi and Herbat, as well as from Prussia later on. As Horace Mann pointed out in his “7th Annual Report” to the Massachusetts Board of Education in 1843, “Prussia has long enjoyed the most distinguished reputation for the excellence of its schools,” which was worth observing, although with a skeptical attitude (Binder 1970, 323). In South America, independence from Spain (1810–1830) led to the creation of republics. The state borders, however, were artificially defined by the colonial oligarchies. The states tried to identify the new republics with flags, national anthems, and books of history. They also used education to strengthen nationalism in the face of border disputes and other territorial claims involving neighboring countries. Certainly, it was in their interest to integrate their underdeveloped and quickly growing populations so that they could function in a largely class-ridden, scholastic, and Catholic culture. “Colonial education in South America was thus more or less of the same kind and quality as that provided by Spain, . . . so South Americans were . . . (more or less) socialized into a European civilization,” and even the native Indians were assimilated under the imposed language of Castille, the Catholic religion, imported agricultural methods, and arts, crafts, music, songs, and dances (Romo 1993, 213). On the whole, education was not related to specific cultures and practical demands of the day but largely dominated by religion and Spanish traditions. Until about 1848, European nationalism was primarily directed toward internal integration and stabilization of the ruling classes. It was also exported and imitated in various countries. In South America it was used to liberate countries from colonization, although the governing groups kept their hierarchical structures. In the United States, some new colonial attitudes emerged that were concealed by nationalism and some liberation ideas. The traditionalism of this period is obvious in the political architecture of capital cities (e.g., Washington, Paris, Munich, and so on). It is also evident in the construction of national symbols (e.g., the British Museum, the so-called “Spree-Athen” in Berlin, the “Zwinger” in Dresden, and the “Emeritage” in Petersburg). Belligerent Nationalism, 1848–1870 In the second half of the 19th century, national developments and perceptions reacted to specific political and social challenges in Europe, America, and the developing countries. In Europe, the revolutionary dreams of 1848 did not materialize N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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anywhere, although the liberal bourgeoisie and socialist movements called for more political legitimacy. Two socialist statements illustrate these political dreams. F. Lassale stressed in 1859, “We repeat, the principle of democracy has its basis and habitat in the principle of free nationalities.” M. Bakunin added in 1865 that “the international federation of revolutionary populations . . . will be based on revolutionary principles,” that is, each country, nation, and province, whether weak or strong, has the right to decide their future (cited in Alter 1994, 96). During the same period, the civil war in the United States demanded new energies and educational initiatives to integrate the country. South American countries searched for their identities as well during this time, although national education was hardly available. Most African countries still depended on the colonial powers for their educational input. Quite different was Japan, though; it vigorously constructed its own identity, introduced compulsory education, and used it to build a national consciousness. In Europe, the political and educational situation altered with the consolidation of the German nation-state in the center, Russia’s isolation through the Crimean War in spite of increasing pan-Slavic ambitions, Austria’s engagement in the Balkans, and England’s imperial focus on Suez, India, and North America. On the one hand, political stability was sought in Prussia through constitutionalism, in France with Bonapartism, and in Spain by the overthrow of Queen Isabel II, which led to a short republican interval. On the other hand, governments tried to gain national support in so-called “cabinet wars,” as in the Franco-Austrian war related to Italy’s unification in 1859 or in the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866. However, populations were not yet ready to fight each other under national flags and images until the French-German war in 1870, when national emotions were strongly swayed by the media. Generally, governments, the media, history, and education were paying increased attention to nation-states and nationalism in the second half of the 19th century. In history books and in history instruction, nationalistic points of view began to overturn patriotic self-awareness. In German schools, history and geography “readers” tried to awaken love in “regional fatherlands” and their rulers until the mid-1860s. But with the emergence of the French threat and war in 1870, the particularistic (i.e., local or regional) outlook—tied to quite different cultural perceptions —changed to a new type of national education. The majority of the population was not really moved by the national unification in 1871, however. Since the Reichstag had only limited influence on education, new national ambitions were less influenced by education than by political symbols (the new national flag, the celebration of Sedan Day, and monuments like the victory column in Berlin). In France, the concentration on national history was much stronger due to French absolutism, its earlier revolution, and its cultural vision. The idea is largely maintained even today in French history books that the revolutions of 1798, 1830, and 1848 mark phases in the battle of rationality against irrationality (Schiffauer and Sunier 2004, 38). In comparison, English national identity and consensus N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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were based on old constitutional, juridical, and social structures as well as on an unchallenged national common sense and an imperial development, as John Stuart Mill commented in 1861. Thus, a national or civic education could not become popular until the right to vote and state education expanded so that socialistic initiatives (e.g., the Fabian Society in 1883/1884) or university developments (e.g., the London School of Economics in 1895) could give a new impetus to it. Finally, it is worth mentioning that Eurocentrism was common to European teaching and history books in the 19th century. During this period, the American continents experienced some revolutionary and independence movements in South America, a civil war in the United States (1861–1865), and some French intervention in Mexico. In the United States, all adult, white, native-born and immigrant males could already vote, whereas the Europeans still fought for civil rights in 1848. Nonetheless, the United States feared a revolutionary influx from Europe with regard to slavery (Roberts 2002, 76) and an increasing instability due to her large territorial expansions in Oregon, California, New Mexico, and Texas after 1845. Political integration and democratic awareness became even more important after the American Civil War. Thus, “comprehensive education” was encouraged by the political elite of the United States to cope with regional, social, and ethnic differences. Also, the social and political sciences made quick progress (with many associations, academies, and quarterlies coming about) and influenced national education and education on nationalism. A surprising case is the development in Mexico, which lost large territories to the United States, suffered from French occupation, was colonized again until 1867, and had an adult literacy rate below 40 percent until the end of the century. In spite of all this, at least 40 political catechisms were published between 1808 and 1861 that instructed children on the merits of republican government, the meaning of the Mexican nation, and the rights and duties of citizens. However, after independence, that is, after these rights had been won, the centralizing state pointed largely to the past instead of educating for the national future (Thomson 2002, 192). In South America, most countries were liberated from Spanish rule by 1828. Thus, the European revolutions of 1848 had a limited impact on the moderate governments and monarchies of South America, although they were echoed in Chile (1850–1851), Colombia (1849–1854), and Argentina (1852) when the Rosa dictatorship was overthrown (Lida 2002, 46). Generally, the South American states tried to find and articulate their national identity, but education was scarce and hardly capable of supporting those intentions. In the second half of the 19th century, many regions of Asia and Africa were still dominated by foreign powers. Colonial administrations set up on “their” territories hardly cared whether they cut across regional, ethnic, or language differences. Soon a small, native elite was incorporated into governmental tasks and educated by the occupation forces. By and by, the religious and national education N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ideas of the European states spread to and socialized larger sections of the population, particularly in the French colonies. After a while, the integrated native upper classes accepted their new state boundaries as well as the language, culture, and Christian mission of their colonizers. However, by the end of the century some colonial leaders used European strategies and educational concepts to liberate their states and redirect parts of their education to suit their own traditions and literature (Shafer 1972, 273). Japan is a special case. The country developed its national identity by using European models and tying them to its own traditions. The term “nation” (Ishin in Japanese) became common after the Meiji Restoration in 1868, when the nationstate was established and tried to legitimize itself through connections with archaic Japanese customs (Shimanda 2000, 183). It was simply presupposed that a Japanese people existed. The national idea was amended by Darwin’s theory of descent and Gobineau’s perception of racism. “Since the Meiji Restoration Japan has been known for her nationalistic orientation in education,” using the “Tenno” as a symbol of national identification. With the adoption of the Western nationstate concept and other modernization efforts, education began to play a central role in unifying the country. Compulsory and standardized education came under the control of a Ministry of Education in 1869, and the nationalistic orientation in education increased again after the country became a constitutional monarchy in 1889 (Kim 1993, 243).

Consequences Between 1770 and 1870, nationalism spread from Europe to the colonies. The concept took root in increasing numbers of people and manifested itself in media campaigns as well as in economic competition, as Max Weber pointed out in 1885. On the whole, it is obvious that national integration did not increase peace among the nations but rather created belligerent competition. During this period, patriotic, national, and nationalistic attitudes and values were perpetuated not only by a complex process of formal education via curricula, school books, teacher training, and state control but also by non-formal and informal socializations via symbols such as national anthems, flags, celebration days, memorials, and military training. Interest in national identification was most strong among the ruling strata, which tried to line up people and education to its own purposes. Nationalism was sometimes tied to integrational approaches (as in the United States and France) or to bridge ethnic differences (as in Austria or Canada). It was also related to self-determination (as in the German resistance against Napoleon) or used to justify a “manifest destiny” agenda (as in the United States at the end of the century). In this process, national education was a result of state developN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ment linked on the one hand with the erosion of religious traditions and the ancien régime and on the other hand with a new economic and scientific dynamic. Between 1770 and 1870, many countries developed a canonical history used in education that was little reflected upon or discussed in comparative contexts. In sum, nationalism spread throughout the world since the end of the 18th century, with national wars becoming more common in the late 19th century. State-dominated educational systems and curricula became the norm in most countries. It was a century of increasing nationalism, as Leopold von Ranke predicted, but it was also one of racial differentiation, as H. St. Chamberlain stressed. Sometimes nationalism was brought into line with democratic developments, however, more often an authoritarian nationalism led to war. In spite of the early link between humanism and nationalism, J. G. Zinnermann stressed in 1758 that “the spectacles of self-love tend to sit on the nose of every large and small nation boasting themselves on something which other nations do not have” (Vogt 1967, 61). These traditions are still so powerful today that hardly any states subordinate their educational support for national identity to a critical comparison of different national perceptions, a move necessary for global cooperation. Selected Bibliography Alter, P., ed. 1994. Nationalismus: Dokumente zur Geschichte und Gegenwart eines Phänomens. München: Piper. Binder, F. 1970. Education in the History of Western Civilisation. London: MacMillan. Calhoun, D., ed. 1969. The Educating of Americans. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Gelber, H. G. 2001. Nations Out of Empires: European Nationalism and the Transformation of Asia. New York: Palgrave. Green, A. 2001. Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kim, J. 1993. “Nationalism and Internationalism in Korean and Japanese Education.” In Nationalism in Education, edited by K. Schleicher, 237–254. Frankfurt am Main, NY: P. Lang. Lida, C. E. 2002. “The Democratic and Social Republic and Its Repercussions in the Hispanic World.” In The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas, edited by G. Thomson, 46. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. The Nationalism Project. (Retrieved August 15, 2005), http://www.nationalismproject.org/ about.htm. Piaget, J., and A. Weil. 1951. “The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and of Relations with Other Countries.” International Social Science Bulletin 3:561. Roberts, T. 2002. “The United States and the European Revolutions of 1848.” In The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Americas, edited by G. Thomson, 76. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. Romo, L. 1993. “Nationalism and Regionalism in South America: Implications and Consequences for Education.” In Nationalism in Education, edited by K. Schleicher, 213–236. Frankfurt am Main, NY: P. Lang. Schiffauer, W., and T. Sunier. 2004. “Representing the Nation in History Textbooks.” In Civic Enculturation, edited by W. Schiffauer and G. Baumann, 33. New York: Berghahn.


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Shafer, B. C. 1972. Faces of Nationalism: New Realities and Old Myths. New York/London: Harvest Book. Shimanda, S. 2000. Die Erfindung Japans: Kulturelle Wechselwirkungen und nationale Identitätskonstruktion. Frankfurt/M.: Campus. Smith, R. M. 2003. Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Thomson, G. 2002. “Liberalism and Nation-Building in Mexico and Spain during the Nineteenth Century.” In Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America, edited by J. Dunkerley, 189. London: Institute of Latin American Studies. Vogt, H. 1967. Nationalismus gestern und heute. Opladen: Leske. Wiggin, G. A. 1962. Education and Nationalism: An Historical Interpretation of American Education. New York: McGraw-Hill.


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Gender and Nationalism Jennifer Heuer Relevance In 1792, the brand-new French Republic decreed that the seal of the state would henceforward be a woman dressed in classical clothing. In her right hand, she would hold a pike adorned with a Phrygian hat or a bonnet of liberty; the left was to hold a fasces. The rudder of the ship of state lay under her feet. The armed woman, soon dubbed “Marianne,” was to replace the dethroned king as the symbol of the nation, an image reproduced on coins, medals, and official decrees. The image of Marianne—one of the most well-known and most analyzed symbols of the age—suggests that gender played a role in the iconography of revolutionary nationalism. More than this, however, she points us toward changes in national identity and in gender roles that took place between approximately 1770 and 1870. Over the course of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the modern map of nation-states began to take shape, from the independence of the United States of America and subsequently of many Latin American countries, to the official creation of Italy and Germany. Perhaps more importantly, even established states, like France, dramatically redefined what it meant to be part of a nation or to promote a nationalist cause. At the same time, ideas about gender roles also changed, in ways that often seemed contradictory. If the period fostered images of armed citizenesses and defenders of national causes, it also reinforced divisions between men and women and distanced women from political life. Perhaps most notably, the seemingly traditional ideology of “separate spheres” and the middle-class model of a male breadwinner and female housewife were themselves products of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Looking at gender and nationalism together can help us better understand how contemporaries imagined who could or should participate in new or transformed nations. It illuminates how they defined the rights or obligations men and women had as citizens or as members of a national group or state, and the assumptions behind these definitions. Conversely, and perhaps less obviously, looking at the role of gender in national symbols and social orders gives us insights about how nationalists tried to win people over to their movements. This is especially important for the frequent moments in this tumultuous era when the “nation” existed more as a loose cultural or political movement than as a clearly defined, or easily understandable, entity. It helps us better understand emerging forms of nationalism and why nationalist movements did—or did not—resonate with contemporary populations.


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GENDER AND NATIONALISM

Eugene Delacroix’s painting Liberty Leading the People, ca. 1830. (Bettmann/Corbis)

To trace these interactions, this essay focuses on gender and nationalism in Europe and, to a lesser extent, the Americas. This is in part a logistical choice. The author is a European historian; historians of Asia or Africa would write different overviews. But it also corresponds to some of the most influential developments in the period. Europe and the Americas generated models of national identity, nationalism, and gender order that would be imposed upon, adopted, rejected, or adapted by much of the rest of the world. We begin with a general overview of some of the origins, turning points, and longer-term patterns in the development of nationalism in the period, focusing especially on shifts that had particular potential for changing men and women’s roles or were particularly likely to be shaped by expectations about gender. We then turn to a series of subthemes to investigate these interactions in depth, beginning with the use of gendered images as national symbols. New (or newly transformed) nations sought icons to represent them publicly and inspire citizens to identify with a larger collectivity. Such cultural expressions of nationalism often played with gendered imagery, sometimes with unanticipated results. We look next at the activities and anticipated roles of real, as well as symbolic, men and women in the nexus of revolution, war, and nationalism that characterizes N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the 18th and early 19th centuries. A third subsection explores both the gendered aspects of cultural nationalism over the longer term and the development of women’s suffrage movements. Finally, we turn to a topic often neglected in historical accounts of European nationalism in the period: colonialism. While the connections between gender, imperialism, and nationalism would become even more pronounced during the later 19th and 20th centuries, both colonial and anticolonial nationalism in our period drew on, and were shaped by, gendered imagery and expectations. After addressing these themes, the essay briefly returns to the general rubrics of this collection. We will look further at the relevance of these changes for different groups, focusing especially on the role of industrialization and class divisions. We will conclude by briefly examining some of the consequences of such developments both for later history and for the contemporary world.

Origins Discussing “nationalism” in the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries is a tricky endeavor. Many modern scholars have tried to develop a precise vocabulary for discussing national identity and nationalism. One common distinction is between a more aggressive nationalism and a more desirable patriotism. This distinction is hard to apply for our period, in part because the very word “nationalism” did not exist before the 1790s. It seems to have appeared first in Abbé Barruel’s Memoirs Illustrating the History of Jacobinism, published in French in 1797 and in an English translation a year later. Other European languages later adopted cognates for the term. Yet both “nation” and “nationalism” were subject to constant redefinitions, while nationalist movements and activities varied dramatically. In looking at gender and nationalism during the period, it is thus useful to cast a wide net, to consider groups that characterized themselves as either national or patriotic, and both movements that were self-consciously nationalist and ones that proclaimed the importance of national identity or unity even as they invoked other causes. Nonetheless, one can identify a series of turning points, as well as more longterm evolutions. At the beginning of the period, both the American and French revolutions not only affected their own countries and their immediate neighbors and rivals but also created powerful models of national identity. They introduced new visions of national belonging, proclaiming that all citizens had rights as members of the nation-state, not because they lived in particular localities or belonged to particular communities. Citizens also had new obligations toward the state, most dramatically, the quasi-universal obligation of men to risk death for the nation. The American Revolution mobilized the male population to fight, while the French revolutionary government linked citizenship to voluntary military service and eventually instituted mass conscription. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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These revolutions inspired both men and women to action and called into question existing gender roles. Both the new American and French republics transformed family relations, although French revolutionaries did so more dramatically. For example, both revolutions led to the creation or generalization of divorce, but the 1792 divorce law in France was far more egalitarian, including measures for mutual incompatibility. The idea that all inhabitants of the country—or more precisely, especially in the new United States, all white citizens—had equal rights also provided powerful grounds for women to claim legitimate political participation in the nation. On the other hand, the cause of revolutionary nationalism, especially in connection to war, could also trump individual demands for rights and lead to an increased insistence on “natural” differences between the sexes. The Napoleonic empire marks one of the next controversial turning points in the history of nationalism and gender. Napoleon extended French territorial control over much of the European continent; at the empire’s height in 1812, Napoleon and his government controlled not only France but also Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, the Italian peninsula, much of modern-day Germany, and a variety of central and eastern European lands, including parts of the Balkans and modern-day Poland (the last was officially independent, but only in name). Some historians have viewed the Napoleonic wars as a vital catalyst for the spread of nationalism, bringing together previously disparate groups against a common enemy, often by emphasizing a national unity based on shared language and culture. Other scholars have questioned whether anti-Napoleonic resistance was necessarily nationalist, attempting to determine how much such sentiments extended beyond elites and the degree to which individuals identified themselves with a larger nation rather than with their immediate families or threatened hometowns. As we will see, the contemporary militarization of society and attempts to define and create national unity could, and often did, reshape gender order throughout the empire. At the same time, looking more closely at gender helps illuminate the historiographic debate of whether, why, and how much nationalist movements rallied men and women to their causes. The 1815 Congress of Vienna aimed to prevent another French Revolution or another Napoleon from threatening European stability and dynastic order. It explicitly rejected the principle that states should correspond to ethnic or cultural boundaries. Yet this principle did not disappear. On the contrary, specific nationalist movements repeatedly challenged political order, including the movement for Greek national independence from the Ottoman empire in the 1820s and the Polish uprisings in the 1830s against Russia. These movements were paralleled in part by the ongoing wars for independence in much of Latin America through the 1820s. Such movements continued to try to mobilize citizens to join their cause and to determine who, men or women, could, or should, be included as members of that citizenry. Even in areas that already existed as nation-states, romantic or cultural nationalism became increasingly important in the first half of the 19th century. Its N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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proponents celebrated and sometimes invented “traditional” folklore and customs, depicting a common and deep-rooted national culture. As we will see, women were often supposed to play a particular role in embodying and transmitting such cultural nationalism—from wearing newly defined “national costumes,” especially in Scandinavian countries, to teaching children a “national” language. The early 19th century was also the age of the first Industrial Revolution. Industrialization advanced earliest and most quickly in Britain, but it also developed in America and parts of continental Europe, especially northern and western Europe. Romantic nationalist movements and industrial change combined to feed a new wave of revolutions in 1848. Revolutionaries were most active in major cities, including Paris, Berlin, Rome, and Vienna; as in earlier movements, both men and women participated in revolutionary uprisings, although often in different ways. Similar patterns recurred across Europe. After dizzying initial victories against traditional orders, revolutionary coalitions fell apart. Liberals and radicals fought over the kinds of governments they wanted. Those more interested in general political change sometimes clashed with more fervent nationalists, while different groups of nationalists, most notably in the Austrio-Hungarian empire, were also divided among themselves. Conservative governments returned to power in the wake of the 1848 revolutions across Europe and retained control in many areas for the following decades. Indeed, although the creation of Italy in 1861 and Germany in 1871 corresponded to certain dreams for national unification expressed in 1848, the new nations were established not through popular nationalist uprisings but through diplomacy, war, and the economic power of Piedmont-Sardinia and Prussia. The particular means of national unification would have implications not only for the later political development of such countries but also for how they defined and instituted gender order. While often neglected in historical accounts of nationalism in the period, there is at least one other important dimension to its development: colonialism. The “great scramble” for Africa and Southeast Asia took place primarily in the later 19th and early 20th centuries. Yet imperialism played vital roles in the development of European and anticolonial national identities over the course of the 19th century. The narrative may initially appear to be one of liberation, including national liberation. French revolutionaries abolished slavery in their empire in 1794, and the eventual independence of Haiti sent shock waves around the Caribbean. Napoleon reestablished slavery in 1802, and it was not outlawed permanently until 1848. The British abolished it in 1832 in their empire; it would take the Civil War to end it in the United States. Yet ironically, more virulent forms of racism followed the elimination of slavery, sometimes applied even to those who might otherwise have been deemed “white.” For example, images of Irishmen took on harder racial classifications in the 1860s after the nationalist group, the Fenians, began to plan for uprisings against the British to establish independence for Ireland. Many of the categories of “natural” differences between races were shaped by ideas of “natural” gender differences and were used to support certain N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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visions of appropriate gender roles. As ideas about racial differences shifted, European empires also began to expand afresh. The French laid claim to their most important colony, Algeria, in 1830, while India was transformed from a domain controlled by the East India Company into an integral part of the British empire in 1857. Nationalist imperialism would develop even more dramatically as the century progressed, both reacting to and imposing new forms of sexual and racial hierarchies.

Dimensions Gender and National Symbols Marianne was far from the only image of a woman to represent a nation in this tumultuous period. Indeed, abstract national symbols often took the forms of iconic women or, less often, men. The best known include Marianne, Britannia and John Bull in the United Kingdom, Uncle Sam of the United States, Mother Russia, and Germania. Many other groups—particularly, although not exclusively, within Europe—also adopted figures to depict the nation or national inspirations: from the Maiden of Finland to Helvetia of Switzerland and from Slavia to Pannonia, symbols respectively of Czech and Hungarian nationalist movements within the Austrian-Hungarian empire. Some of these symbols have long histories; Britannia, for example, can be traced to the Roman conquest of Britain and gradually evolved from the symbol of a conquered province to the icon of a powerful empire. Yet even long-established symbols became increasingly popular in the later 18th and especially 19th centuries. Scholars have looked closely at the reasons for the power of this iconography. One factor is that such figures were simultaneously abstract and accessible in an age of increasing democratization and political experimentation. They could exist alongside a monarchy that also represented the nation, as in Prussia and England, though they were often overshadowed by it. Indeed, in many countries where monarchy remained, it often continued as the primary symbol of the nation. Abstract symbols of the nation as a man or woman were perhaps most often used to symbolize newly created or transformed nations and aspiring nationalist movements. Why, particularly, were such figures often women? Part of the answer is straightforward. Many country names and associated terms were grammatically feminine. In France, for example, not only were “France,” “nation,” and “patrie” feminine terms, but so were the words for republic (la république), liberty (la liberté), and so on. Feminine allegories were thus natural choices to represent the nation. But the answer is not simply linguistic. The choice of a masculine or a feminine national symbol, as well as the particular kind of woman or man it portrayed, often served to promote particular forms of nationalism or imagined connections to the nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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In one recent and controversial work, Joan Landes has argued that the nation was often depicted as a desirable female body during the French Revolution. Such imagery eroticized patriotism and served to bind male subjects to the nationstate. Other historians have emphasized maternal representations of the nation and the use of expressions like “mother-country.” Such representations were often invented or particularly mobilized during wartime as a means of rallying the “sons of the country” to accept unprecedented sacrifices for the nation. The armed figure of Marianne was used to inspire resistance against the enemies of the French revolutionary nation. Germania appeared in 1813 when Germanic countries were at war with Napoleon. After an eclipse, the symbol reappeared in the 1840s and reached another apogee in 1870, during another war: the war against France that led to the creation of Germany as a nation. Such images of women often served both to inspire men to fight and to protect family and state. Indeed, even though Germania often wore a helmet and armor, she was usually depicted as not actively involved in battle but rather as a protector of the country, or as a bride awaiting her groom. Images of the nation as a woman, especially in Romantic art and literature in the 1820s and 1830s, could also serve to dramatize national oppression and, implicitly, the need to rally to its defense. One of the most famous examples is Eugene Delacroix’s 1827 Greece Expiring on the Ruins of Missolonghi. The painting depicts the Greek uprisings against the Ottoman empire and, particularly, the Turkish repression in Missolonghi in 1826. Greece appears as a woman in a gesture of martyrdom, appealing to her viewers for help. A Greek fighter is crushed under the ruins of the city, while a Turkish soldier looms in the background. The uses and interpretations of such gendered symbols, however, were also open to constant revision. This is scarcely surprising given that individual monarchs—particularly, perhaps, queens—were themselves contentious symbols of the nation. In Spain, for example, the followers of Queen Isabel II (reign 1833–1869) depicted her as a Catholic mother figure and as the hope of the nation after political turmoil; republicans portrayed her instead in terms similar to those used to attack Marie Antoinette during the French Revolution, as the sign of both sexual and national disorder. In the case of the abstract symbol of Marianne, officials tried hard to control the image of the republic that she conveyed. After Napoleon’s ascent to power in 1799, Marianne was used less and less often as a symbol of France. She reappeared again during moments of revolution, particularly during the Second Republic of 1848 and the Third Republic beginning in 1871. She became an official symbol again in 1882. As Maurice Aghulon has shown, her dress and position often represented a particular image of the republic. In later versions, she is often a more sedate figure, often seated rather than exalted on the barricades and demurely dressed rather than bare breasted and militant. As has often been noted, the symbolic status of women as icons of the nation jarred with the inability of real women to participate fully in the polity. Marianne N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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may well have carried a pike or Germania donned armor, but individual French and German women were rarely supposed to carry arms or be able to vote to determine the nation’s future. To understand better how and why nationalist movements challenged or reinforced expectations about gender roles, let us turn to some of the revolutionary movements and military engagements of the period. Gender and Nation on the Barricades The period from 1770 to 1870 is often identified as the age of revolution. It is less often associated with wars, largely because the carnage of the world wars in the 20th century dwarfs the violence of earlier conflicts. Nonetheless, there were devastating wars, including the American War of Independence, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, the Crimean War of 1853–1856, the American Civil War, the Italian Risorgimento, the Franco-Prussian and Austria-Prussian wars, and colonial conflicts. The nexus of revolution and war often overlapped with nationalism and provides a useful lens for looking more closely at the activities and anticipated roles of men and women. The first of these major conflicts, the American Revolutionary War, was simultaneously a civil war and a war for national liberation. Women often participated actively in nationalist activities, although the extent of such participation can be difficult to measure. They were engaged in the early waves of economic resistance to Britain in the late 1760s and early 1770s, particularly in the boycott of imports from Britain and the manufacture of American textiles as substitutes. Some contributed to military resistance. Many accompanied armies as cooks, nurses, or laundresses—a traditional pattern of war, but one with a new importance because of the goals of the American uprising. A few women were active directly as soldiers or spies, like Margaret Corbin, who took the place of her husband who died in combat, or Deborah Sampson, who enrolled under the name of Robert Shirtliff. Such participation in a common national struggle was sometimes connected to specific demands for women’s rights. Abigail Adams’s correspondence with her husband John Adams, a delegate at the Continental Congress at Philadelphia, is one of the best-known examples. In a celebrated and often published passage, she exhorted her husband and other legislators to “remember the ladies” as they established a new constitution. Her pleas, however, had little impact. The longerterm consequences of the American Revolution and national independence on gender roles are harder to determine. The historian Linda Kerber has analyzed the complicated legacy of the American Revolution in terms of the idea of “Republican motherhood.” Leaders of the nation turned to mothers to raise the children of the nation as better citizens; women could thus claim a political role by their ability and obligation to raise a patriotic child. But the development of the republican ideal as an independent male citizen also cast women in the opposite role as dependent, unreliable, and weak. In the French Revolution, women were involved in collective political action to a far greater extent than in the new United States, acting as citizens or deN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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manding rights as vital members of the sovereign nation. Some of the most famous examples include the women’s March on Versailles in October 1789, Olympe de Gouges’s version of the “Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen,” and the founding of the Society of Revolutionary Republican Women in 1793. Yet the story of the French Revolution is also partially one of repression for women: the government of the Terror closed women’s political clubs in the fall of 1793 after women led an invasion of the National Convention in the spring of 1795, the postTerror government forbade them to attend any political assembly, and the Napoleonic Civil Code reinstituted a deeply patriarchal order. Historians thus often give very different interpretations of the revolution’s legacy. Some emphasize its importance in establishing lasting precedents for women to claim rights as citizens. Others contend that it led to the systematic exclusion of women from the nation. While both men and women had had different rights in the old regime depending not only on their sex but also on their occupations, religion, and residence, all men were now declared to be equal in rights; women were not. In the French case, however, there is another aspect of the connections between nationalism and gender that is often overlooked: war. War continued long after the revolution as such was proclaimed to be over, and gender played important roles in promoting both Napoleon’s conquests and the resistance, including nationalist resistance, to Napoleonic rule. During the revolution, the French Army was officially based on volunteers; after 1799, the government instituted mass conscription, establishing unprecedented links between manhood and military service to the nation. In both cases, the state attempted to persuade would-be soldiers and their families of the need to fight for their country. Revolutionaries sometimes emphasized symbolic attacks on homes; the founding anthem of the republic, the “Marseillaise,” cursed the fearsome soldiers of the enemy who “slaughter your sons and consorts.” As Napoleon consolidated his reign, he increasingly promoted an image of himself as “father of the country,” looking after his soldier-children. The government portrayed love and marriage as a reward for military glory, attempting to use state-sponsored weddings and dowries for particularly deserving veterans as a means to foster support for continued fighting. Gendered imagery and the participation of men and women were also important in the resistance to the Napoleonic empire. Two examples show the range of such participation and long-term impact: Spain and Prussia. In Spain, the conditions of guerrilla war encouraged the participation of women in resistance to Napoleon. In situations like the 1808 uprising in Zaragoza, women engaged directly in combat; some, like Augustina of Aragon, even became national heroines because of their bravery. But as John Tone has argued, the widespread image of heroic Spanish Amazons standing in for male combatants at decisive moments often exaggerated or misrepresented the actual activities of contemporary women. The image served instead to represent and inspire national unity against outsiders. As Spain was divided by civil war during much of the 19th century, such stories also served later to invoke an imagined moment of nationalist cohesion, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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in which the joint struggle of both sexes against the invader symbolized the unity of the people of the whole. As such, images did little to change gender relations more generally. In Prussia, as in Spain, the wars against Napoleon entailed the mobilization of both men and women in the name of unified national resistance; similarly, the wars were later seen as critical for creating a Prussian and ultimately a German national identity. Yet the nature of the war in Prussia led to the introduction of universal conscription and close association of the army with the “nation” (as opposed to just the state). Karen Hagemann has argued that a patriotic, defense-oriented national identity was thus formed based on a male citizenry able and willing to bear arms and was explicitly masculine in character. A Prussian “national character” was elaborated for both men and women that strictly separated the two in their contributions to the common nation. In both countries, gender, war, and nascent nationalism were deeply intertwined, but were configured differently. Later revolutionary movements, particularly the 1848 uprisings across Europe, stirred similar dreams of dramatic social change. Women and men fought on the barricades and renewed demands for certain rights. Yet many, like Kathinka Zta-Halein, a German writer and democratic activist, also counseled patience in pushing what later observers would term a “feminist agenda”; women’s rights were secondary to the success of the revolution. The revolution Zta-Halein dreamed of, however, did not succeed. Some of the nationalist aspirations associated with the 1848 uprisings were later realized, but women were less militantly involved in the Italian Risorgimento or German unification in 1871 than in earlier uprisings. Late 19th-century wars leading to unification, especially the Austrio-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars, were largely fought by professional armies, not citizen armies on the scale of those organized during the revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. As such, they did not mobilize national populations in the same way. But this did not mean that gender was absent from nationalist rhetoric and movements. On the contrary, it was often central. The Risorgimento provides a particularly clear case of such dynamics. In the early 19th century, both foreign commentators and Italian patriots often viewed the country as effeminate—attractive, but also indolent, demilitarized, and degenerate. As Silvana Patriarca has recently shown, nationalists’ desire to redeem the Italian patria was often framed as the recovery of manly honor. Such language persisted and intensified with the formal unification of the country under Piedmont-Sardinia. Cultural Nationalism, Political Rights, and Women’s Suffrage Although revolutions and war provide particularly dramatic moments in the history of nation-building, many contemporary developments in cultural nationalism were often quieter and longer term but, nonetheless, significant. Throughout the 19th century, women remained, or were made, central to projects of cultural nationalism. They were asked to, or claimed an ability to, further the cause of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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nation by cultivating its language, literature, and customs. Such projects could be double-edged. The case of Greek nationalist resistance against the Ottoman empire suggests some of the complexities of such participation. As Eléni Varikas has shown, one of the ways in which elite women participated in such movements was by helping to foster a cultural nationalism, translating or publishing at their expense works deemed to be “useful for the nation,” and memorializing insurgents’ patriotic exploits. After the country’s independence, activists for women’s rights drew on an ideology of the Greek nation’s “civilizing mission” to demand the emancipation of Greek women as a precondition for fully realizing national aspirations. At the same time, however, traditional values about the relationship between the sexes were one of the few matters of national cohesion, especially in the face of Greece’s industrial backwardness. More generally, women’s roles in promoting national culture could provide platforms for demanding participation in the nation. This was especially the case where the “nation” or national culture elided official definition, or where it appeared threatened by alien forces. Indeed, Lynn Abrams has argued that it is precisely because of the continually shifting nature of cultural nationalism that women could find it a useful place to nurture their own aspirations. Yet nationalist organizations and governments also sought to limit and channel women’s activities to desirable ends. As Malgorzata Fidelis has shown, in Poland, for example, the traditional ideal of womanhood was defined by national ideology: women were to promote national strength and solidarity but were to do so in the home by preserving language and culture, producing sons, and supporting soldiers. If cultural nationalism was a phenomenon of growing importance during the 19th century, so, too, was another well-known issue: campaigns for women’s suffrage. Some of the earliest and most famous calls for women’s suffrage emerged during moments of revolution, like Condorcet’s call for gender equality during the French Revolution or Mary Wollstonecraft’s 1792 Vindication of the Rights of Women. But organized suffrage movements were largely a product of the later 19th century, even though later movements sometimes referred deliberately back to moments of national founding. The 1848 Seneca Falls Declaration lamented that women were prevented from exercising their “inalienable right to the elective franchise.” Its authors, Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, deliberately adapted the founding document of the United States, the Declaration of Independence, proclaiming, “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and women are created equal . . . .” Despite Mott and Cady Stanton’s claims, women would not obtain the right to vote in the United States until 1919. Nor did women gain suffrage quickly elsewhere; the first country to grant women the vote, New Zealand, did so only in 1893. Many other democratic countries did not institute female suffrage until the 20th century; in particularly notorious cases, France did not do so until after World War II and Switzerland not until 1971. While a full analysis of suffrage is beyond the scope of this essay, it is striking that invocations of women’s rights as N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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citizens, of their roles in cultural nationalism, and of their service to the state could all affect debates over suffrage. This is particularly clear in Finland, the country in Europe where women first gained the franchise in national parliamentary elections, in 1906. As Aura Korppi-Tommola has shown, a series of factors were at work, including the late introduction of universal suffrage and the relative proportion of highly educated women and women in the workplace. However, Finns of both sexes were particularly united by the common struggle against Russian rule, and in nationalist resistance against the Russianification of language and institutions; in this context, women’s suffrage appeared partly as a recognition of, and reward for, such resistance. Colonialism, Gender, and Nationalism Let us turn to our final theme in exploring the interactions of gender and nationalism: colonialism. European imperialists often linked national pride and prosperity to colonial conquest. Some measured the status of civilizations by their treatment of women, justifying colonialism partly because of the perceived barbarity of native populations. Champions of this perspective in the early 19th century often characterized “Oriental” societies by emphasizing customs of polygamy, veiling, and the seclusion of women in harems, themes that appeared simultaneously fascinating and horrific to Western audiences. Conversely, anticolonial nationalists often assigned women the task of preserving indigenous traditions and identities against outsiders, a trend that would become more pronounced in the later 19th and 20th centuries. More generally, both imperialists and anti-imperialists represented relations of power through gender and family imagery. One particularly powerful trope was that of colonial powers as parents and of conquered peoples as children: weak, immature, and in need of guidance. In the 18th and early 19th century, this was often combined with paternalistic justifications of slavery, as some of the most valuable colonies in existence were plantation economies in the Caribbean. Critics of slavery and colonialism sometimes adopted the same rhetoric; even European abolitionists often championed gradual emancipation by referring to slaves with expressions like “children in the cradle,” “minors, children of the country,” or children “under the guidance of those charged to better their lot.” But family imagery also implicitly empowered such “children” to demand eventual independence, both individually and as nations. Indeed, several commentators on the Haitian revolution equated colonies to adult children who had found metropolitan authority to be a gentle guide in their political infancy but later experienced it as an intolerable yoke. Colonized peoples, or those whose lands were subject to colonization, were also often depicted as women—seductive and desirable, but passive and incapable of acting sensibly or fully independently. Such imagery played on and reinforced contemporary images of sexual subordination and hierarchy. Yet contemporary iconography also often made key racial distinctions; where “white, virtuous” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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women appeared, they were almost always represented fully dressed, whereas native women were often shown in naked or half-naked poses. In some cases, colonized peoples and regions were represented as male, but only as a certain kind of man: irrational, savage, and threatening to European women. One of the most dramatic examples of this dynamic corresponds to the British decision to take direct control of India from the East India Company in 1857. The Sepoy Mutiny, otherwise known as the Indian Mutiny or the First War of Indian Independence, was provoked by a seemingly trivial event, new ordinances that required Indian soldiers serving under the East India Company to use rifle cartridges greased with animal fat. The procedure violated both Hindi religious bans on eating beef and Muslim bans on pork and served as a trigger for what became a widespread uprising, including attacks on Europeans in the town of Cawnpore. Both official English accounts and popular literature focused on brutalities against English women. While such accounts corresponded to some real atrocities, they also dramatized the mutiny as an irrational and savage attack rather than as a legitimate political and nationalist uprising, and justified the British government’s decision to claim full control of the country. Impact on Different Groups Men and women did not act only as individuals but also participated in different groups that made competing claims to national territory and appropriate forms of government. The rival nationalist movements within the Austria-Hungarian empire or among Latin American independence movements reveal divisions among these groups with particular clarity, as do certain imperialist and anticolonialist organizations. One can also see forms of relevant cleavage among other kinds of groups, including those among competing political movements that each identified their causes with national advancement, among different generations, and among different cultural movements. I want to focus here, however, on another form of division that both influenced and was influenced by nationalism: that of class. Social divisions were fundamentally entangled with nationalism. Often more educated and elite figures were the most prominent in calling for national unification; these people were usually, although not always, men. Peasants of both sexes were inclined to continue to think in terms of local or regional identities. Ironically, the peasant woman imagined to incarnate national traditions—by teaching children their national language and culture or literally embodying the nation by wearing “national clothes” and producing new members of the nation—was often far removed from direct nationalist activity or even consciousness. Indeed, some of the social elites who wrote on patriotism and fashion in late Enlightenment Germany recommended folk costumes to those they considered their inferiors, but were unwilling to don such clothing themselves. Class divisions have another saliency in the period, precisely because of the contemporary dynamics of the Industrial Revolution. Industrialization fostered N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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an increasing tendency for people to think of social relations in terms of classes. It also contributed to the rise of particular views of appropriate middle-class life, in which men were to be the sole breadwinners and women, especially married women, were not supposed to work outside the home. While this view was often far from the realities of industrialization for workers (textile mills relied on cheap female labor) and even for those on the margins of the middle and upper classes, industrialization meant that national pride was often identified in part with specific class behavior. Middle-class moralists often tried to impose their ideas of appropriate behavior on the rest of population and depict them as signs of national identity. The British national icon of Queen Victoria, surrounded by her children and dogs, simultaneously embodies a very middle-class and a very gendered image of national prosperity. Similarly, the English women attacked in the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny were imagined to embody a class-specific modesty and virtue. Where it was not possible to identify the nation and the middle class, political leaders sometimes adopted other strategies. This is particularly true in Belgium, where women miners became symbolic of the country after its independence in 1830. As Patricia Hilden has argued, such women were portrayed as young, strong, and hard working, linked to industrial progress and national pride. Other parts of industrializing Europe often tried to implement marriage bars to both exploit and limit women’s labor; in England, for example, employers in many trades refused to hire married women on the grounds that this would degrade home life. Belgium’s circumstances made this “solution” to the problem of controlling potentially independent working women difficult to implement. Belgium thus celebrated its women coal miners, while turning them into nonthreatening icons of the nation. Not everyone embraced the image of the nation as middle class or of nationalism as a bourgeois movement. The nation invoked by revolutionaries during 1848 was often specifically defined in contrast to bourgeois power, a “workers’ republic” par excellence. In contrast, Marx’s famous demand in the Communist Manifesto that the workers of the world unite explicitly attempted to counter national identities in all forms. Indeed, Marx explicitly linked contemporary family structures, property, and national rivalries to oppressive capitalist order, implying that both gender and national structures should be transformed. For many later socialist activists, especially women, it could be difficult to balance the desire for national change with the dreams of international movements, and to balance hopes for women’s rights with those of workers’ rights. In the case of the 1871 Paris Commune, for example, female leaders struggled to defend Paris and the French nation, defining themselves repeatedly as citizenesses. But as Carolyn Eicher has pointed out, they also viewed the Commune as the beginning of international socialism, espousing social and economic rights, while leaving aside questions of women’s suffrage and political rights in the nation. As Marxism became a stronger movement in the later 19th century, it often N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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proved increasingly difficult for socialist women to champion political rights within the nation.

Consequences Marxism and other forms of socialism, along with the cosmopolitan ideals of the French Revolution and other revolutionary uprisings and a variety of international movements—from antislavery societies to religious movements—all developed contemporaneously with new forms of nationalism. In the case of an internationalist women’s or “feminist” movement (though the term was not widely used until the 1890s), connections between different groups, particularly Americans and British, often cross-cut national identities even as women claimed rights specifically as citizens of their home countries. Whereas Lucretia Mott and Elizabeth Cady Stanton played on references to American national identity in the Seneca Falls Declaration, other calls for women’s rights made explicit references to international developments. To take an example from one of the best-known treatises for women’s rights, The Subjection of Women (1869), John Stuart Mill and his unsigned coauthor, Harriet Taylor Mill, argued for suffrage in part by noting the emergence of a women’s movement not only in Britain, but also in France, Italy, Switzerland, and Russia. However passionate the debates over the nature of citizenship or the appropriate forms of national identity might become, national arenas were not only the ones that shaped changing gender roles. Yet the nationalist experiments of the age of revolution did have dramatic effects in providing new opportunities—and sometimes new obligations—for men and women to act on behalf of a nation. They redefined the rights and duty of citizens, forcing contemporaries to address whether both women and men should be included as part of the citizenry entitled to such rights or subject to such obligations, and what legitimated such inclusion or exclusion. At the same time, nationalist experiments were themselves shaped by gendered expectations, from the uses of national symbols to the definitions of citizenship, from the tasks of embodying or cultivating national identities to the ways in which imperial enterprises were promoted and justified. Selected Bibliography Abrams, Lynn. 2002. The Making of the Modern Woman: Europe, 1789–1918. London: Pearson. Agulhon, Maurice. 1981. Marianne into Battle: Republican Imagery and Symbolism in France, 1789–1880. Translated by Janet Llyod. New York: Cambridge University Press. Blom, Ida, Karen Hagemann, and Catherine Hall, eds. 2000. Gendered Nations: Nationalisms and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Berg. Dudink, Stefan, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh, eds. 2004. Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History. Manchester: Manchester University Press.


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Hagemann, Karen. 2004. “Female Patriots: Women, War and the Nation in Prussia during the Anti-Napoleonic Wars.” Gender and History 16, no. 2: 397–424. Hilden, Patricia. 1991. “The Rhetoric and Iconography of Reform: Women Coal Miners in Belgium, 1840–1914.” Historical Journal 34, no. 2: 411–436. Kerber, Linda. 1998. No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship. New York: Hill and Wang. Korppi-Tommola, Aura. 1990. “Fighting Together for Freedom: Nationalism, Socialism, Feminism, and Women’s Suffrage in Finland, 1906.” Scandinavian Journal of History 15, no. 3: 181–191. Landes, Joan. 2001. Visualizing the Nation: Gender, Representation, and Revolution in EighteenthCentury France. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mosse, George. 1985. Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Patriarca, Silvana. 2005. “Indolence and Regeneration: Tropes and Tensions of Risorgimento Patriotism.” American Historical Review 110, no. 2: 380–408. Pierson, Ruth Roach, Nupur Chaudhuri, and with the assistance of Beth McAuley, eds. 1998. Nation, Empire, Colony: Historicizing Gender and Race. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Tone, John Lawrence. 1999. “Spanish Women in the Resistance to Napoleon, 1808–1814.” In Constructing Spanish Womanhood: Female Identity in Modern Spain, edited by Victoria Lorée Enders and Pamela Beth Radcliff, 259–282. Albany: State University of New York Press. Varikas, Eléni. 1993. “National and Gender Identity in Fin-De-Siècle Greece.” Gender and History 5, no. 2: 269–283. Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. Gender & Nation. London: Sage Publications.


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Landscape, Monuments, and National Identity Kenneth R. Olwig Relevance Throughout Europe and the Americas, the linking of national identity and landscape scenery became both ubiquitous and taken for granted as “natural” in the period from about 1770 to 1870. It is difficult to survey the connection between landscape and national identity, because landscape scenery is not a clearly defined object in and of itself but a way of looking at the world, derived ultimately from the arts. During this period, it became natural to apprehend the landscape as scenery and as an expression not just of nature but of a natural process of national development incorporating the individual and giving the individual identity. It was thus natural to involve the landscape in expressions of national feeling, but it was not natural to reflect on just what it was that constituted landscape, why it was identified with nature, or why it was relevant to national identity. There were exceptions, however. The American philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882) showed an acute awareness of the constructed character of landscape when he wrote in his classic 1836 essay, Nature: “Miller owns this field, Locke that, and Manning the woodland beyond. But none of them owns the landscape. There is a property in the horizon which no man has but he whose eye can integrate all the parts, that is, the poet. This is the best part of these men’s farms, yet to this their warranty-deeds give no title” (Emerson 1991, 7). Emerson does not explain what landscape is, but he does tell us that it is not simply an object to be gazed upon but rather a totality that must be integrated by the eye of a poet to be seen, and it is only with such an eye that one can receive “title” to the “best part” of the land. Emerson refers to the eye of the “poet,” but it was the eye of the painter that first integrated the parts of a landscape into a visual totality with which people felt they could identify and to which they could feel entitled. Before returning to Emerson’s poet, it is useful to take a look at the historical background of landscape art to understand its relation to place identity.

Origins The representation of scenes from particular places first emerged as an artistic genre, called “landscape,” north of the Alps in the early 16th century and gained particular prominence in the flourishing artistic world of the 17th-century N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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LANDSCAPE, MONUMENTS, AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Netherlands. Newly developed perspective methods of scenic representation, in tandem with related techniques developed in cartography, facilitated a unified visual perception of the lands making up the countryside of a historical region or country as shaped by the people and their customs. The sense of identity fostered by these pictures was particularly important in places such as Switzerland and the Netherlands where there was a federation of differing historical regions (or countries), often termed Landschaft (German) or landschap (Dutch), and no monarch—and hence no royal iconography and portraiture to act as a unifying symbol. Germanic northern Europe in general was politically and culturally fragmented at this time, lacking the sense of identity imparted by a unified territorial state, as in France and Spain, or a glorious imperial past upon which to build a Renaissance, as in Italy. Landscape art, in tandem with cartography and topographical description, helped create a larger sense of both local and regional identity. Connoisseurs throughout Europe collected landscape paintings not because they depicted specific known places but, rather, for their esthetic value. Similarly, a portrait of a person might be collected for its esthetic value rather than for its portrayal of a particular, known person. These paintings, taken thus out of context, stimulated a general interest in the painting of landscape scenery as a genre, alongside other genres such as portraiture. By the latter half of the 18th century, when the period under study begins, the original Germanic meaning of landscape as “a region, the prospect of a country,” was still current in English as Samuel Johnson made clear in his classic dictionary from 1755. A landscape, however, could also simply be a form of picture: “A picture, representing an extent of space, with the various objects in it” (Johnson 1968, “landscape” entry). Finally, it was possible to use the term to mean the scenery of a place, which a person perceives of as if in a picture (Oxford English Dictionary 1971, “landscape” entry). Landscape had thus become synonymous with scenery, as in the modern definition: “a portion of land or territory that the eye can comprehend in a single view including all the objects so seen” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 2000, “landscape” entry). The link between landscape and modern nation-state identity involved, however, not just a process of simple pictorial representation; it also required a notion of an organic incorporation of the individual into a given national territory. This understanding of landscape appears to have grown out of the way landscape was used in the theater. The modern notion of nationality as being naturally linked to a state now tends to be taken for granted. The historical root of nation, like that of nature, derives, however, from a Latin word meaning birth. A nation is thus, by implication, a people or race united by blood ties of birth, whether or not they live together in one territory or have their own state. A modern nation, however, is usually assumed to be a people, often of differing ethnicities, united by the territorial bounds of the nation-state in which they are citizens. The nature of this territory, furthermore, is characterized by the landscape scenery within its boundaries—defined “naturally” by a terrestrial coast or a river, or even by a celestially defined line of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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latitude or longitude. The American nation is thus identified with its “purple mountain majesties, and fruited plains, from sea to shining sea,” described in the popular national song, “America the Beautiful” (Bates 1974). Under medieval feudalism, the state, though it might be made up of geographically dispersed territories, was symbolically unified and embodied in the monarch or prince, to whom the feudal nobility owed fealty. The centralized Renaissance state, by contrast, tended to take the form of a unified territorial body that could be inscribed upon a map and divided into administrative regions, supervised by a state bureaucracy under the watchful gaze of the monarchical head of state. The difference became apparent in 1603, for example, when King James VI of Scotland (1566–1625) was crowned King James I of England, thereby uniting the two states in his person. James’s court saw the possibility of creating a centralized state, but this required the cooperation of the parliaments of the two countries. James therefore gave a speech to the English Parliament in which he described Britain as a geographical and dynastic unity incorporated in his body: “What God hath conjoined then, let no man separate. I am the Husband, and all the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife; I am the Head, and it is my Body . . .” (James I [1616] 1918, 271–273). In this way, he maintains the medieval idea of the state as being incorporated in the body of the monarch. He adds to it, however, the notion that the state is also naturally defined by a geographical body, thereby becoming the “perfect union of bodies, politic as well as natural,” as Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626), James’s lord chancellor, the scientist, jurist, and courtier, put it (cited in Kantorowicz 1957, 24). “Natural” ties of birth and blood united Britain, but it was not the extended family ties of birth and blood that united, for example, the Scottish clans. This unification of the Scots, the English, and the Welsh within the geographical body of Britain, with James as its head, provided the basis for William Camden’s (1551–1623) claim, made in his classic 1607 chorography (regional geography) of the territory called Britannia, that Britain now formed “one large state, united under one august monarch,” and the two “nations” now formed “one people” (Camden 1806, 4:17). Britain was being born as a nation-state. The problem for the court was to create a convincing picture of this Britain with which the leading segments of society could identify. It was here that the court stage designer and architect, Inigo Jones (1573–1652), played an important role through his pioneering use of central point perspective to create progressively shifting “landtschap” scenography for theater pieces, in which the eye of the head of state was the focal point for the lines of perspective that integrated the scene on stage—called “the bodily part.” The shifting stage scenes typically represented the stages of Britain’s development into a peaceful and fruitful state, dotted with monuments marking the progress of that state, under the ruling gaze of the monarch (Olwig 2002, 62–98). The modern French philosopher Regis Debray has noted that, because nobody has ever seen or heard a state, a state must, at any price, make itself visible and let itself be heard: “It is the theater of the state N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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which creates the state, just as the monument creates memory” (Debray 1994, 66). This opinion also seems to have been that of the artist Abraham Bosse when he sought to create a fitting illustration for the title page of Thomas Hobbes’s 1651 classic study of the nature of the central state, Leviathan (Hobbes 1991). He made the state visible in the figure of the state as a giant body, composed of the bodies of its citizenry, with a head that commanded, with its gaze, a landscape scene that could have been the set of a stage scene by Jones. During the course of the 18th century, the role of landscape as the natural embodiment of the nation increased in importance in tandem with the role of representative national government, as that of the monarchical head of state lessened. Particularly after 1707 when the Parliament of Westminster passed the Act of Union linking Scotland to England and Wales, it became the landscape of the geographical body of Britain, as represented in Parliament, that came into focus rather than the head of state. It was during this time that the memory of Jones’s work was revived by the pioneering landscape architect William Kent (1684–1748) and his architect partner Lord Burlington (1694–1753). They created gardens that looked to be straight out of Jones’s theater scenes, complete with monuments. These gardens were seen to emulate nature, and for the first time, nature and landscape began to be treated as synonyms. By the end of the 18th century, when our period begins, a British vogue had developed for landscape arts ranging from painting to gardening to picturesque travel, sketchbook in hand, and as a framework for scientific understanding. Now, it became a mark of education and citizenship to be able to perceive the world from the integrative perspective of landscape, which provided a common denominator for national identity. The vogue for landscape was identified, throughout Europe, with Britain, as was the institution of parliamentary rule.

Dimensions Britain, by the beginning of our period, had become the site of an ongoing social, political, and agricultural and industrial revolution that helped make it a symbol of social and economic progress throughout Europe. One early influential anglophile was Charles-Louis Montesquieu (1689–1755), who admired not only Britain’s tripartite form of government, with its executive, judiciary, and parliamentary branches of government, but also its landscape gardens, which he emulated on his own French estate. The landscape garden, with its lawns among freely growing groves of fully crowned individual trees, represented, for Montesquieu, the quintessence of the British political landscape. Montesquieu gained European prominence for his influential writings on law and constitutionality in the book The Spirit of the Laws, from 1748. Following the lead of the ancient Roman author, Tacitus (ca. 56–120), he saw the ancient northern “nations,” living scattered among N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Title page of Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. (Bettmann/Corbis)


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the forests of northern Europe, Germania, and Scandinavia, as freedom-loving sources of individual liberty and parliamentarian government. England became the repository of these liberties through the settlement of the Anglo-Saxons. Montesquieu thus helped generate a European fashion for things British, including landscape gardens. Monumental Landscapes Montesquieu’s writings drew attention to the Roman author Tacitus’s Germania (Tacitus 1942) as a model by which northern Europeans could construct an alternative identity in opposition to a southern European “other,” with its Roman heritage. Tacitus defined Germany in opposition to Rome as a natural, egalitarian society where families lived not in towns, as in classical Rome, but in family households dispersed among the forest. Thus, if Rome, and the inheritors of the Roman culture, had its pagan monuments of carved marble, northern Europe’s monuments of rough earth and stone could be seen as springing from nature itself. Protestantism, which predominated in much of northern Europe, had largely de-sacralized nature. It removed the associations with various Christian saints characterizing the pilgrim sites of southern Europe. This allowed the landscape to become re-sacralized as a national monument, often as the home site of the ancient pagan Nordic gods, or a godlike “Nature.” As early as 1819, we find the German geographer and natural philosopher Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859), in his book on his expedition to the equatorial regions of America, using the concept of “monuments of nature” in reference to large, old trees (Sundin 2005, 10). Scandinavia became important in this context because it lay beyond the direct influence of ancient Rome. Scandinavia was seen as the repository of the ancient Germanic language and folklore, a thinly populated area dominated by nature and unsullied by Roman culture. The close association between landscape, nature, and national identity developed in Germanic northern Europe in counterdistinction to southern Europe, with its Roman cultural heritage and romance languages. This tended to exclude southern Europeans from cultivating this form of identity—unless they chose to identify with the northern “gothic” heritage being promoted in northern Europe. Likewise, the well-established state boundaries of France and Spain, coupled to weak parliamentary institutions and strong kings or emperors, also made these areas less fertile ground for the linking of landscape and national identity. Thus, though landscape may have become an ubiquitous component in national iconography throughout Europe and the Americas at this time, it did not play the same core role in nation-state identity building in southern Europe as was the case in northern Europe. It was largely from the core area of northern Europe, especially Britain, that the link between landscape and national identity spread early on to the United States of America, which gained independence at the beginning of the period discussed here and which helped play a formative role in developing and spreading national identification with landscape. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Like Germany and Scandinavia, the United States lacked the heritage of marble monuments linking the country to a glorious, ancient past. It did have monumental natural landscapes, however, ranging from Virginia’s natural bridge to Yosemite and the Grand Canyon to the monumental redwood trees of California. Thomas Jefferson (1743–1846) purchased the natural bridge and gave it to the nation, making it the first American national monument. At his Monticello estate, he emulated the British tradition established by Kent and Burlington of Palladian mansions set in landscape gardens. The natural bridge, from this perspective, could be seen as a monument in a vast extended landscape garden, which was America itself. This was an America Jefferson himself had greatly extended when he bought and mapped the vast western area acquired with the Louisiana Purchase in 1803. For Jefferson, a man of the Enlightenment, the designer of America was no landscape architect but, rather, “Nature,” a subject for science although spelled with a capital, like “God,” the subject of religion. Jefferson, in this respect, was not just an inheritor of British tradition but also of German tradition, as personified, for example, in the work of the geographer and explorer Alexander von Humboldt. Humboldt, though a natural scientist, also had a highly spiritual feeling for the totality of landscape and nature, as illustrated by his classic work of synthesis, Cosmos, which was published between 1849 and 1858. Humboldt’s books were read all over the world, not least in the Americas, where he traveled widely and met Jefferson. It was thus appropriate that it was the American painter Frederic Edwin Church (1826–1900), a devotee of Alexander Humboldt’s scientific and spiritual approach to landscape, who popularized the monumentality of the bridge in an 1852 painting. This structure was the work of Nature, as well as the nature of the American continents that Humboldt explored and glorified. Church, easel in hand, followed literally in Humboldt’s footsteps. The transformation of America’s landscape into monuments was in large measure inspired by the landscape paintings of artists who were either from northern Europe, such as Albert Bierstadt (1830–1902), or who were inspired, like Church, by German and Nordic art. The United States was born a republic, thus rejecting the monarch as the head of state and embodiment of the nation. This allowed the national landscape particular force as a source of national identity. The phrase “purple mountains majesty” in the popular national song, “America the Beautiful,” can thus be taken almost literally as a landscape substitute for a monarch (Bates 1974). The 20thcentury carving of the faces of the nation’s founding fathers into the face of a mountain by Gutzon Borglum (1867–1941), the scion of Danish immigrants, was a further concretization of this idea. The monumental heads of the “fathers” of the nation were literally carved into the body of the continent that gave the nation its name. The national identification with the body of the continent, and its natural landscape scenery, also had the effect of legitimizing the European settlers’ right to the land because it systematically overlooked the cultural landscapes of the native American population and the earlier Mexican settlers. Through the mediums of popular songs like “America the Beautiful,” dramatic landscape paintings N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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displayed in monumental places like the Capitol building and disseminated as inexpensive lithographs, spectacular panorama shows, and tourist visits to what were to become national monuments and parks, the idea of landscape as a source of national identity was to spread, by 1870, from the enlightened precincts of Jefferson’s mansion to the family homes of ordinary Americans. The identity between nation and landscape scenery was furthered by the tendency to identify the cultural and political heritage of the United States with that of northern Europe. New Englanders were widely thought of as the inheritors of the Anglo-Saxon democratic traditions originally brought to old England from Germany and Scandinavia. America, furthermore, was characterized by a heavily wooded and thinly populated landscape scene that was being cleared by Anglo-Saxon woodsmen who bore a distinct resemblance, in national mythology, to the freedom-loving northern Europeans described by Tacitus, and later by Montesquieu. The idea that the freedom-loving ancient Northmen created the foundation for democracy was not only influential in 19th-century America but also in Europe, where the idea had originally developed. In the following paragraphs, I will illustrate this idea by focusing on the way that certain individuals, in the course of their lives, became caught up in the nationalist movements of the 19th century and, in turn, came to influence the course of nationalism. The focus will initially be upon the philosopher and natural scientist Henrik Steffens (1773–1845), because of the way his life was transformed due to the way nationalism fragmented a cosmopolitan northern European world into rivaling nations. The point is to show that nationalism was not simply the outcome of ideas and socioeconomic forces but of lived experience that forced people to redefine their world and their landscape in national terms. Steffens is particularly interesting as a case study because he speculated directly on the relationship among nature, the individual, and national identity. His work played an important role in linking the philosophy and natural science of his time to the issue of national identity, and he became a catalytic figure in the development of national identity both in Germany and Scandinavia, as well as in America. Steffens thus serves as an ideal figure upon which to focus, because he provides a means of comprehending the role of the broad intellectual currents that shaped ideas concerning the relationship among landscape, nature, and national identity. Landscape, Natural Science, Art, and Philosophy Henrik Steffens (1773–1845) embodied the contradictions, shared by many in his time, of being born into a multinational state that was in the process of being divided into national entities. He was born to the son of a Danish mother and a father from Holstein (now Germany) in what was to eventually become the Norwegian nation-state, but the entire area was then under the suzerainty of the Danish monarch. Steffens received his secondary schooling in Denmark, did his doctorate in Germany, married a German, and became a prominent natural scientist, natural philosopher, and German patriot. Steffens’s biography illustrates N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the paradox of national identity-building at this time in that national identity tended to be constructed according to an international body of ideas and principles, by people with multinational cultural roots, yet it divided people into what often became warring national groups. As a student of the noted German geologist Abraham Werner (1749–1817), Steffens learned to understand the physical landscape as a layered phenomenon, with geological layers overlain by a layer of flora and associated fauna. Through his contact with such Dresden landscape artists as Caspar David Friedrich (1774– 1840), who was born in (then) Swedish Greifswald and who had worked in Copenhagen, and the Norwegian-born Jens Christian Dahl (1788–1857), he was exposed to artists who gave visual expression to the landscape as a mystic unity between Nordic nature and nation. As a friend and neighbor of Jacob (1785–1863) and Wilhelm (1786–1859) Grimm, he helped with the German translation of Scandinavian folk stories, which were seen to be an expression of Scandinavia’s physical landscape. In Jena, Steffens was exposed to German “universal romanticism,” as developed by Friedrich Schelling (1775–1854) and the brothers August Wilhelm (1767–1845) and Friedrich (1772–1829) Schlegel, and through them was introduced to ideas concerning the relationship between individual subjectivity and objective nature. Steffens was thus in a position to synthesize these developments in the arts and sciences into a comprehensive natural philosophy. It was this philosophy that he brought with him to Copenhagen in 1802, where he delivered a series of epochal lectures that provided the starting point for a Scandinavian national Romantic artistic and philosophical movement that was influential both in Europe and America. Steffens’s Copenhagen lectures demonstrate the way landscape served as an underlying conceptual framework that gave structure and meaning to national identity. The generative process of national development occurs, according to Steffens, through a reciprocal historical interaction between the individual and the nation, founded upon nature and expressed in terms of changing landscape scenery. It is through this process of interaction that an identity between the individual and the national landscape is formed (Steffens 1905, 91). Steffens’s lectures sum up the contemporary tendency to see the landscape as a series of pictures depicting human progress as a developing interaction between the individual, the nation, and nature. He provided a way to link landscape to a notion of individual and national progress from a primitive state to that of a civilized state. It is difficult to grasp how landscape works this way without an example, so it is useful to return to Emerson’s “poet,” who integrates the elements of the landscape into a unified picture. The poet, unlike the painter, makes use of a medium that lends itself to a narrative flow through time. The painter may paint a series of pictures, but it is the author who connects them together into a narrative. Steffens’s lectures had a catalytic effect upon a young man who was to become one of the most celebrated Romantic poets in Europe, Adam Oehlenschläger (1779–1850). The national theme was central to Oehlenschläger’s serious poetry N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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and drama, but it was in one of his most simple and popular poems that he successfully captured the pictorial approach to history of his mentor, Steffens. The success of the poem is measured by the fact that it became the Danish national anthem, popular to this day on national occasions. Oehlenschläger is thus a good example of the role of the poet in integrating all of the landscape’s parts into a whole to the people of a nation could feel entitled. Landscape Poetry Adam Oehlenschläger’s poem “There Is a Delightful Land” was probably written in 1819. It was published in 1823, put to music in 1835, and by midcentury had gained general acceptance as Denmark’s “National Anthem.” The verses most commonly used when sung are as follows (Oehlenschläger 1823, my translation): There is a lovely land, It stands with broad beech trees Near the eastern strand; It curves through hill and dale, Its name is olden Denmark, And it is Freya’s bower. There sat in days of yore, The armor-clad warriors, Rested from strife; They then set out to the enemy’s harm, Now rest their bones Behind the grave barrow’s monolith. This land is still beautiful, For the sea belts blue around the land, And the leaves stand green; And noble women, lovely maids And men and hearty lads Inhabit the Dane’s isles. Hail king and fatherland! Hail every Danish citizen, Who does his very best. Our ancient Denmark shall endure, As long as the beech reflects Its top in the waves of blue.

Unlike the single image of a landscape painting, Oehlenschläger’s poem provides a series of textual images illustrating the way poetry was able to weave a narrative that linked national identity to a process of transformation appropriate to the generation of national identity at a time of change. Oehlenschläger’s poem progresses, stage by stage, like the changes in theater stage scenery in the dramas that he wrote as poet laureate for the national theN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ater. Each stage provides the landscape scenery within which the drama of national history takes place. In the first scene, the stage floor, upon which the national drama is to be played, is presented in the form of the feminine curves of the natural landscape, the home of the pagan Nordic fertility goddess Freya, with its stands of beech trees. In the next scene, a layer of culture is added, as Denmark becomes the homeland retreat of ancient marauding warriors who now lie buried behind their monolithic memorial stones. Finally comes a modern scene with its hail and hearty citizenry willingly serving a fatherland that will endure as long as the broad beeches of the landscape reflect in the blue sea. The progressive movement in the poem through stages of development might seem contradictory to the development of identity, because the root of “identity” derives from the Latin idem, meaning “the same” (Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 2000, “identity” entry), as opposed to the idea of change. The trick, however, as illustrated by Oehlenschläger’s poem, lies in the fact that the natural landscape of terrain, coast, and monumental beech trees remains constant, while society and its cultural landscape undergo transformation. In Oehlenschläger’s poem, Denmark progresses from a childhood state of nature under a feminine pagan goddess, to a youthful male warrior stage, to one in which the men and women of Denmark are described neither as warriors nor as subjects but as hard-working citizens. The Danish word for citizen, borger (burgher in German), also means a member of the bourgeoisie—a class of people whose rise to power supplanted that of noble warrior classes that dominated ancient and medieval society, and who were then, throughout Europe, demanding a greater say in government based upon liberal principles of individual representation. Oehlenschläger’s beech trees, as a symbol of the nation, are rooted in the tradition of Tacitus and Montesquieu in which the people of the north are seen as being freedom-loving individualists living among the trees, even if Denmark itself was an absolute monarchy at the time of the poem’s writing; Oehlenschläger dutifully included a “hail” to the king. By 1849, however, when the poem gained popular acceptance as the national anthem, Denmark had become a constitutional monarchy, and the bourgeois citizenry was assuming political power. In the course of the century, popular poetry and songs, such as Oehlenschläger’s, along with, as in America, the greater availability of landscape images, would broaden the appeal of landscape in relation to national identity. Blood, Soil, and Gender The foundation for national progress, as outlined by Steffens and implemented by Oehlenschläger, remains nature, as studied by the scientist and as experienced by the people. This is a point that Steffens later made more emphatically when he wrote: “Man is wholly a product from the hands of nature. Only in his being this wholly—not partly, but wholly—do we confess that in him nature centers all her mysteries. And so it became plain to me that natural science is bringing a new element into history, which is to become the basis of all knowledge of our race. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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History and nature must be in perfect concord, for they are really one” (Steffens 1874, 100). What we see occurring in these texts is the completion of a swing from the Renaissance idea of the landscape as the embodiment of the monarch as head of state to the landscape as the natural organic embodiment of a nation that progressively develops through interaction with its natural foundation. There is also, as in Oehlenschläger’s poem, the suggestion that this development follows the same pattern as the development of an individual from birth out of the womb of a feminine natural landscape, through a youthful wild state, to adult maturity. The native of the nation is thus defined by nativity in this natural landscape. The power of this idea, by the beginning of the 20th century, is reflected in the statement by the German philosopher of history, Oswald Spengler (1880–1936), that “cultures grow with original vigor out of the lap of a maternal natural landscape, to which each is bound in the whole course of its existence” (translation in Sauer 1969, 325). The identification between blood and soil implied by this conception of landscape helped create a strong collective bond to the nation, but it also excluded immigrants and those, such as the Jews and the Romany, who were seen to be of foreign nomadic stock, without ties of blood to the national soil. Though blood and soil ideology is often identified particularly with German nationalism, it is, in fact, built into the very structure of the spatially and historically layered conception of landscape as scenery. In America, it thus helped generate the notion of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant superiority, due to the idea that America was founded by the pioneer woodsman descendents of the Anglo-Saxons.

Consequences The visualization of landscape as scenery grew out of the arts. As used in the theater, it provided the layered scenic foundation for the drama on the birth of the nation. The changing of scenes, in turn, helped stimulate the idea of progressive historical stages of national development within the territory of the state. Landscape thus acted as an underlying framework in which the nation, as a body of individuals, was seen to grow organically out of the national environment in a series of natural stages that move from the wild to the civilized. At the end of the 18th century, the link between landscape and national identity was primarily cultivated by the rising bourgeoisie, for whom it was also tied to the rise of representative democracy and the individual’s role in the political and economic process. By the latter part of the 19th century, the link between landscape and national identity had broadened as landscape scenery was incorporated into songs and popular iconography. The implied link between blood and soil, however, excluded immigrants and groups like the Jews and the Romany, who were seen to be nomadic or foreign, without an historic link to the national N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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soil. It also excluded peoples such as Native Americans whose group identity was based on clan or tribal bonds rather than bonds to the territory of a state. The power of landscape lay in the way it tended to be taken for granted as an expression of nature and progressive natural development through time. The paradox of this power, however, was that the bond between nation and landscape was, in fact, constructed by artists, poets, and scientists through a long period of cultural history. Identification with the landscape thus worked to naturalize national identity and strengthen its links to the national territory, even though the construction of national identity was very much a social process. Selected Bibliography Bates, Katharine Lee. 1974. “America, the Beautiful.” In The Good Times Songbook, edited by James Leisy, 24–26. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press. (Orig. pub. 1895.) Camden, William. 1806. Britannia. London: John Stockdale, 2nd ed. 4 vols. (Orig. pub. 1607.) Debray, Régis. 1994. L’État séducteur: Les révolutions médiologiques du pouvoir. Mesnil-surl’Estrée: Gallimard. Emerson, Ralph Waldo. 1991. “Nature.” In Nature/Walking, edited by John Elder, 1–67. Boston: Beacon Press. (Orig. pub. 1836.) Hobbes, Thomas. 1991. Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Orig. pub. 1651.) James I. [1616] 1918. “A Speach, As It Was Delivered In The Vpper Hovse Of The Parliament To The Lords Spiritvall And Temporall, And To The Knights, Citizens And Burgersses There Assembled, On Mvnday The XIX. Day of March 1603.” In The Political Works of James I, edited by Charles Howard McIlwan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Johnson, Samuel. 1968. A Dictionary of the English Language. London: W. Strahan. (Orig. pub. 1755.) Kantorowicz, Ernst H. 1957. The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Oehlenschläger, Adam Gottlob. 1823. “Fædrelands-sang (Der er et yndigt Land).” Samlede Digt, vol. 2, 102–104. Copenhagen: by author. Olwig, Kenneth Robert. 2002. Landscape, Nature and the Body Politic: From Britain’s Renaissance to America’s New World. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Oxford English Dictionary. 1971. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sauer, Carl O. 1969. “The Morphology of Landscape.” In Land and Life: A Selection from the Writings of Carl Ortwin Sauer, edited by John Leighly, 315–350. Berkeley: University of California Press. (Orig. pub. 1925.) Steffens, Henrik. 1874. German University Life: The Story of My Career as Student and Professor. Philadelphia: Lippincott. (Orig. pub. 1840–1844.) Steffens, Henrik. 1905. Indledning til Philosophiske Forelæsninger i København 1803. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Sundin, Bosse. 2005. “Nature as Heritage: The Swedish Case.” International Journal of Heritage Studies 11, no. 1: 9–20. Tacitus. 1942. “Germany and Its Tribes.” In The Complete Works of Tacitus, edited by Moses Hadas, 709–732. New York: Modern Library. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language. 2000. Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster.


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Nationalism and Music Ben Curtis Relevance The interaction of nationalism with music is one of the defining features of this art form during the period 1770–1870. Indeed, around the mid-19th century in Europe and for two or three decades thereafter, the influence of nationalism was so pervasive in Western music at a variety of levels that it can be said that no art form was more deeply affected by nationalist currents. Nationalist music eventually reached across the whole of Europe, with some of the key ideas traveling beyond to the Americas as well. At its heart, the interaction of nationalism and music in this period sought to define a unique and uniquely recognizable musical style and tradition for every putative nation. The development of a national music was supposed to help codify the values, history, and identity of the nation—in other words, a national music was supposed to form an essential part of the national culture that would define the nation both for its own people and for people internationally. This chapter first outlines the historical background of nationalism and music from roughly 1770 to 1870, focusing on some of the major figures in the development of the relationship. Then the chapter examines nationalist music’s impact and dimensions in the context of the broader nationalist movement. Here, several key themes receive special attention, including the typical tropes that constituted nationalist music, the role of folk inspirations therein, the importance of national opera, and how the creation of a national musical tradition often depended upon an idea of resistance to what was perceived as cultural domination by other nations. Finally, the chapter summarizes the consequences of music’s wide-ranging historical role within nationalism.

Origins The interaction of nationalism and music fits squarely into the familiar processes of nation-building and is, in fact, inseparable from such processes during the time period under consideration. One of the fundamental elements underlying the entire concept of the nation is that a national community will share a common culture. This culture is in large part what binds the members of the national community together; features such as language, history, myths, and the particuN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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larities of the ostensible national character are understood to be the inheritance and common property of all members of the nation. Particular forms of cultural expression, such as music, painting, dress, and even architecture, have typically been held as essential elements of the larger national culture that define the nation and give it its identity. As with all features of the national identity, cultural forms such as music are subject to a process that elaborates their content, that defines them as “national,” and that propagates the idea of them as innate characteristics of the national community. This national culture, then, is neither given nor inherently national but is rather constructed, like the very idea of “the nation” itself. Both the national culture and the idea of the nation are elaborated at least at first by elites known as nationalist intellectuals; in the case of music, the key figures are a few writers and especially nationalist composers. The historical period 1770–1870 was when the idea of music as national first emerged and is hence key for understanding how this art form came to be constructed into a defining feature of nationality. The figure who in many ways set the tone for the subsequent connections between nationalism and music was the German philologist, philosopher, and playwright Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803). Herder advanced what was to become the enormously influential concept of the Volksgeist, which stated that every people had its own unique “spirit” or character. Herder applied this concept in his researches into the musical traditions of various peoples, with a particular interest in folk songs, that is, the music and poetry of peasant peoples or the peasant classes within an individual country. His claim was that the peasant traditions embodied the pure essence of a people’s Volksgeist, which presupposed that the urban classes of a society were somehow removed from that essence, denationalized in one way or another. Herder’s interest in folk songs was matched by many roughly contemporaneous and subsequent investigators across Europe. Besides several other figures in Germany, including such names as Ludwig Christian Erk, Achim von Arnim, and Clemens Brentano, collectors across Europe compiled volumes of folk songs, including Scots such as James Johnson and Robert Burns, Czechs such as František Ladislav Cˇ elakovský and Karel Jaromír Erben, Norwegians such as Ludvig Mathias Lindeman, and Swedes such as Erik Gustaf Geijer and Arvid August Afzelius. Again in Germany, the diffusion of this interest in folk songs among a broader population was catalyzed by the Napoleonic invasions, which marked the first outbreak of anything resembling a mass nationalism among the scattered states of German-speaking Europe. The result in musical terms was that composers such as Carl Maria von Weber (1786–1826) began setting to music patriotic verses by poets such as Theodor Körner protesting the French occupation. These songs were often taken up by choral groups such as the Männersangvereine (the men’s singing unions); their performances expressed nationalistic feelings through music as well as mobilized people for resistance. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The early decades of the 19th century witnessed a shift in emphasis away from folk products as the sole emblems of nationality in music to an increasing trend by composers to create their own, artistically ambitious nationalistic pieces. This shift was predicated upon the idea that out of these folk products composers should fashion works of high art that would display the values of the nation and help build a national culture. One of the most important early examples of this trend was Weber’s efforts to create a German national opera; his opera Der Freischütz (1821) is considered the culmination of his efforts. A number of German composers followed in Weber’s footsteps, most notably Richard Wagner (1813–1883), who in his voluminous prose writings such as Deutsche Kunst und deutsche Politik often espoused the primacy of nationality in music. Most of his operas, as well, including Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, were conceived partly with the intent of expressing his idea of Germanness through this art form. By the middle decades of the century, so-called “national schools” had begun to develop in several other European countries as well, as composers and other musicians responded to ideas similar to those that had motivated the Germans. Frédéric Chopin (1810–1849) was a self-avowed Polish patriot and wrote many polonaises and mazurkas inspired by Polish folk music; his compatriot Stanisław Moniuszko (1819–1872) premiered what is considered to be the quintessential Polish national opera, Halka, in 1858. Deeply influenced by Wagner, by Chopin, and by the Hungarian composer Franz Liszt (1811–1886) was the Czech Bedˇrich Smetana (1824–1884), generally considered the founder of Czech national music. Smetana’s treatments of Czech folk dances, his tone poems depicting elements of the Czech landscape, and his national operas such as The Bartered Bride and Dalibor influenced several generations of subsequent Czech composers. Among

Bedrˇich Smetana (1824–1884), the founder of Czech national music. (Library of Congress)


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them stands Antonín Dvoˇrák (1841–1904), who though less dedicated to the cause of a Czech national music produced a number of nationalist works and even encouraged the creation of an American national music during his stay in the United States in the 1890s. The interest in national music also passed to Scandinavia, where its most famous exponent was the Norwegian Edvard Grieg (1843–1907), many of whose works were based on Norwegian folk tunes, dances, and legends, for example, his set of Symphonic Dances of 1898. A very strong Russian national school also emerged with Mikhail Glinka (1804–1857) as an important early light. His notable successors included Mili Balakirev (1837–1910) and Modest Mussorgsky (1839–1881), the latter regarded as perhaps the greatest talent of the group for his achievements, such as the opera Boris Godunov. Unquestionably the greatest Italian composer of the 19th century, Giuseppe Verdi (1813–1901), was himself an avid proponent of Italian nationalism, and some of his works, such as the opera Nabucco, played an important role in fomenting national feeling. Not infrequently, nationalist composers were also linked to nationalist political figures in their countries; Smetana and Verdi in particular were closely involved in the politics of the Czech lands and Italy, respectively. Though the typical ideas and practices of nationalist music in the period 1770–1870 were developed overwhelmingly in Europe—and most of the bestknown composers and works representative of this trend are European—other parts of the world, particularly in the Americas, also began to be influenced by these same ideas. The interaction between nationalism and music in the Americas

Modest Mussorgsky (1839–1881), one of the “mighty handful” of Russian nationalist composers that also included Balakirev, Borodin, Cui, and Rimsky-Korsakov. (Library of Congress)


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truly blossomed only in the last two decades of the 19th century, but already by the 1840s the composer Louis Moreau Gottschalk (1829–1869) was creating an American musical tradition by fusing Creole musical styles from his native New Orleans with European forms. Also in the United States, people like the composer and critic William Henry Fry (1813–1864) and the composer George Bristow (1825–1898) began both arguing for the need for a distinctly American music and composing works to meet that perceived need. Toward the end of the century, George Chadwick (1854–1931) and Edward MacDowell (1860–1908) also each contributed to the furthering of an American art music tradition, though still relying on many of the typical European tropes of what makes music national, as in MacDowell’s Indian Suite, which incorporates American folk songs. Music throughout the rest of the Americas was similarly strongly influenced by European styles even as rich indigenous traditions developed, though it was again not until the last decades of the 19th century that ideas of a national music began to take root in countries such as Cuba or Argentina. Although most Latin American countries were relatively quick to adopt national anthems after they achieved independence in the early decades of the 1800s, that event was not accompanied by any immediate drive to build an independent national music, and Italian and French music tended to dominate in urban centers. Only a few composers before 1900 explored the idea of a national music, among them the Cuban composer Ignacio Cervantes (1847–1905) who incorporated Afro-Cuban rhythms into his art music, or the Peruvian José María Valle-Riestra (1858–1926) whose opera Ollanta contains a storyline dealing with the Incas. These earlier generations of Latin American composers were succeeded by a number of better-known figures who took an active interest in creating a national music, including Carlos Chávez and Silvestre Revueltas in Mexico and Heitor Villa-Lobos in Brazil, among others. The other notable development in national styles in Latin America also gained momentum at the very end of the 19th century: the growth of recognizable national popular music styles such as the tango in Argentina, samba in Brazil, ranchera in Mexico, and rumba in Cuba. These styles typically developed in working-class urban neighborhoods and often involved a fusion of European forms with African-influenced rhythms. Over time they came to be adopted by the middle classes as well, and in the 20th century more classically minded composers would incorporate, for instance, tango or samba inflections in their own art music because such styles were already viewed as national and belonging to all the people, much as what had transpired with peasant musics in Europe. The example of popular music styles points to one of the key questions in the interaction between nationalism and music: How does music become national? Broadly speaking, there are two main answers that are not mutually exclusive. Music can become national by public reception of it as such, and also by design. Reception deals with the public’s acceptance of a work of music or of another cultural product as embodying, expressing, or representing the values of the nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Design means that a nationalist activist such as a composer employs certain tropes and devices that he or she considers national in an attempt to configure a work as national for the public. In the period 1770–1870, the design element predominated in creating a national music, for this was the first period of nationbuilding in Europe and certain other countries worldwide; nationalist intellectuals, including composers, were actively attempting to construct an idea of the national culture. In turn, they were also attempting to construct a public, in the sense of convincing their country’s population that, for example, Grieg’s music was also Norway’s music. Historically, there first had to be a somewhat self-conscious national public before a work could be received as national—and that public had to be made. Very rarely did a work come to be regarded as national by spontaneous mass public acclaim; one famous exception is the chorus “Va pensiero” from Verdi’s Nabucco, which even at its premiere was ecstatically received as a hymn lamenting the oppression of Italy. The instant successes—Weber’s Der Freischütz was another—are actually the exceptions that prove the rule, however. Often, nationalist composers in the early part of their careers battled to convince their publics of both the need for and existence of a national music. Even subsequently canonical national artists like Wagner, Smetana, and Grieg initially struggled with audiences that were not especially receptive to their ideas of what would constitute the national music. While folk music was one of the first elements to be accepted as “national” by mass publics, even that was a gradual process: the folk music that was eventually embraced by the urban bourgeoisie was rarely the actual music as practiced by the peasants. It was rather the idealized version presented in composed art pieces. Reception of national music, then, depended in large part on the progress of nation-building, as publics increasingly became inculcated with the ideas of what would constitute the national culture and could apply these ideas both to new musical works and old. Though the particularities in each country of course varied, in general both composers’ ideas of how to create national music and public standards for receiving a piece as national were very similar across Europe and beyond. The diffusion of these ideas has two main explanations. First, nationalist composers were aware of what their contemporaries and forebears had achieved and the principles by which they had operated. Hence Wagner could take inspiration from Weber, Smetana would be influenced by Wagner, later nationalist Czech composers borrowed from Smetana, and Russians could look to previous nationalist composers as models either to follow or reject. Second, nationalist music came to be very popular in Europe after the mid-19th century, in part for reasons of exoticism and novelty that will be discussed below. But as ostensibly national symphonies, operas, or chamber works were increasingly either published or performed not just in their home countries but internationally, the typical traits of nationalist music became cemented in public understanding. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Dimensions The ideas guiding the interaction of nationalism and music are common to most nationalist discourse and cultural production. Several key themes reappear in nationalist music across the globe: references to the national language, landscape, and history; an emphasis on national opera and a tendency to define national identity through negative comparisons or “othering”; and the reliance on folk materials. These different themes help illustrate the sociopolitical function of music within nationalism. Language, Landscape, and History Language as one of the indispensable markers of group identity is fundamental to most nationalisms and again traces its lineage partly to Herder. In music, language is similarly viewed as one of the elements that can make a piece national. Therefore, many nationalist activists in the 19th century insisted on having music in their national language; they wanted songs, choruses, and operas in German, Russian, Czech, Hungarian, and so on. One of the motivations was the idea that the national language inherently reflected elements of the national character, and that these elements would thereby come out in vocal music. An example is Smetana’s determination to have Czech art music reflect the distinctive speech patterns or rhythms of the Czech language. The idea of the Volksgeist is again at play here; just as the national language was viewed as a natural outgrowth of the national spirit, so would music sung in that national language also express the national spirit. An obvious additional motivation for the emphasis on national languages in music was the belief that audiences in Dresden, St. Petersburg, Prague, or Budapest should have opera in a language they could more readily understand, rather than in French or Italian, the two dominant languages of opera in the earlier part of the century. More importantly, however, many nationalists had a desire to prove that their language was the equal of French or Italian as a vehicle for high culture, that Norwegian, Czech, or Polish could be as expressive and artistic as the more “prestigious” languages. Much the same desire motivated many poets who set about writing verse in their native languages to prove its poetic capacities. Many composers, in turn, set to music the poems of these poets, translating the artistic aspirations from the verse realm to the musical one. Examples include Glinka’s and Mussorgsky’s settings of Pushkin’s works, or the close relationship between Grieg and the writer Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson. Evocations of the national landscape count as among the most famous works of nationalist music. Several of the tone poems in Smetana’s cycle Má vlast (My country) are representative here, such as the piece depicting the river Vltava, or the fourth in the cycle titled “From the Czech Woods and Meadows.” Alexander Borodin’s The Steppes of Central Asia, written to extol that feature of the Russian


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landscape, is also well known; less-familiar works from this time period include Balakirev’s On the Volga or the Hungarian composer Mosonyi’s Puszta Life, depicting life on the Hungarian plains. Such pieces are obvious expressions of the patriots’ love for the physical features of their nation, whether rivers, plains, mountains, or even ruined castles, and they also help fix in the national culture an idea of what the most salient, most national features of the landscape are. Sometimes, as in the case of Smetana’s musical references to the mountain of Blaník in Má vlast or Wagner’s choice of the Wartburg as the setting of his opera Tannhäuser, these places in the landscape are tied inextricably to what nationalists view as key elements of their nation’s history. In Smetana’s case, Blaník mountain is connected with a legend concerning the Hussite wars of the 15th century; in Wagner’s, the Wartburg was commonly regarded by German nationalists as the epicenter of a previous golden age. As both those examples attest, the line between history and myth is easily blurred in nationalist discourse. The objective in nationalist music, though, is again identical to that in other areas of the discourse: namely, to make reference to important elements that are conceived of as uniting all the nation’s people. That history is ostensibly commonly shared between, say, the Czechs of the year 900 and the Czechs of 1900. Historical and mythical subjects are thus a very common feature of nationalist music. Grieg wrote several works connected to the historical Norwegian king Olav Trygvason, Balakirev evoked the myths and history of Russia in his symphonic poem Rus, and later in the 19th century Jean Sibelius produced several works based on Finnish myths, such as Kullervo. Opera lent itself especially well to historical subjects since onstage the nation’s past could be dramatized and brought to life for the present. Many national operas leading up to 1900 took their inspiration from historical and/or mythical material, among them Mikhail Glinka’s A Life for the Tsar, Ferenc Erkel’s Bánk bán, Smetana’s Dalibor, Wagner’s Ring, and even Verdi’s little-known La battaglia di Legnano. National Operas and the “Other” Another major theme in the interaction between nationalism and music is that nationalist music was often a reaction against the perceived dominant or hegemonic trends in art that were identified with other nations. The question of the exoticism of folk sources is related here in that such sources seemed exotic precisely because they stood outside the cultivated “classical” traditions of art music. In the early decades of the 19th century, those cultivated traditions were identified with France and Italy, above all in opera. The reason that Weber and, later, Wagner were intent on creating a uniquely German opera was because they believed that Germans needed to express themselves in this art form which was dominated by Italian and French composers. Wagner, in particular, railed against what he saw as the pernicious influence of French and Italian music on German art. Interestingly, by the end of the century, and in part thanks to Wagner, German music had attained a position of such primacy within the art form that later


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nationalist composers—including Balakirev, Grieg, and even Verdi—complained about the hegemony of German music and voiced their intent to free their own nations’ musical expression from German influence. This example of resistance and scapegoating within nationalist music again demonstrates how this art form was a part of the larger nation-building project. One of the ideas behind developing a uniquely national music was to establish boundaries between one’s own nation’s musical culture and the culture of other nations. By recurring to the common theme of an antithetical opponent or “other”— so common in nationalist discourse—activists in the realm of national music sought to help define their own nation’s identity. This example also raises the question of why some countries, namely the French, never developed their own nationalist music. The answer does lie partly in the fact that the French and Italian traditions were dominant, at least in opera, in Europe until after the 1850s. Also, France in 1850—unlike Germany, Italy, Norway, the Czech lands, Hungary, Poland, and many other areas within Europe—was already a secure, established state. For those nationalist movements engaged in asserting political sovereignty, however, elaborating a national culture (i.e., determining the content of that culture as well as who belonged to it) seemed to require the conscious creation of a unique, and uniquely national, cultural identity. Finally, opera, with its blend of music, acting, and visuals, was regarded throughout the 19th century as perhaps the paramount art form. Opera was certainly the main nexus of 19th-century urban cultural life, above all for the bourgeoisie and upper classes. The theater in general was one of the main means of mass communication in the era. Its appeal to nationalists is therefore easily understandable; onstage a fully realized vision of the nation can be represented through the depiction of the nation’s past, present, future, landscape, and folk life. It also provided a vehicle for the artistic development of the national language. As a method of both elaborating and propagating the values of the national culture and of establishing a prestigious art work in an internationally valorized genre, national opera thus became a goal for many nationalists during this period. Folk Inspirations One of the most significant aspects of nationalist music is its treatment of folk inspirations or sources such as folk songs, dances, or tales. Indeed, the relationship between “the folk” and nationalist music is one of the best demonstrations of how such music was not merely an artistic phenomenon but one with social and political ramifications as well. It must be noted, however, that the incorporation of folk inspirations is not the sine qua non of nationalist music since music can be nationalist even when it is not based on a folk dance or folktale—references to other features such as landscape or history, or even a composer’s intent or the public’s reception, can also make a piece nationalist. The nationalist’s conception of folk music united what were originally often highly localized regional songs, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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dances, or tales beneath a broader heading of belonging to and representing the entire nation. Hence, for example, a song from the Mazury region in Poland comes to be seen as belonging not just to that region but to all Poles throughout the country. When folk song collectors made their expeditions into the rural areas to gather melodies, texts, and dances, their eventual collections performed this unifying function, constituting a kind of national canon from very diverse sources. The nationalist understanding of folk music presupposes another kind of unification as well: a bridging of the urban/rural divide in society. According to this understanding, a folk dance from rural Russia belongs just as much to the city dwellers in St. Petersburg as it does to the peasants who originally practiced that dance. The reason is because the urbanite and the peasant are all ostensibly members of the same nation; despite whatever class differences may exist between them, they are all Russians, for example. This process of unification is one of the central goals of the nation-building movement, and nationalist music plays its part by effecting this unification artistically. When a folk tune is incorporated into a symphony, the culture of the countryside is bound to the culture of the city, and the resulting artwork is understood to belong equally to all members of the nation, whether pig farmer or professor. Folk elements did not appear in European art music solely for nationalist motivations, however. Composers prior to the 19th century took inspiration from folk dances as well. Part of the reason is that folk elements had a certain exotic value—they were seen as novel, as original and characteristic sources of musical material. This exotic appeal was one reason for the success of nationalist composers; for instance, Edvard Grieg’s pieces based on Norwegian folk dances would indeed have seemed quite unusual and original to Parisian audiences. What defines nationalists’ use of folk elements is the ideas of national unification and representativity mentioned above. Also, nationalist composers such as Smetana commonly insisted that folk elements, while valuable for being characteristic, nonetheless needed to be “idealized” or edified by artistic treatment to be of value for the whole society. Hence, as examples such as Chopin, Liszt, or Smetana show, composers preferred to transpose folk material into the realms of high art with the intention of making that material more “worthy” for the national culture. This somewhat supercilious attitude toward the “raw” products of folk culture evinces the predominantly urban, bourgeois bias of most 19th-century European nationalist movements. Though the ostensible goal of such movements —and of individual activists whose aim it was to create a national culture—was to unify the entire populace on a national basis, in actual fact the target of most nationalist appeals (particularly in the realm of art) was the urban middle and upper classes. Few peasants, after all, ever attended opera. Not surprisingly, then, one frequent component of nationalist composers’ discourse was that the lower classes and rural people needed to be lifted up or educated into the values of the national art. Some variant of this educational idea was espoused by composers from Weber to Borodin to Grieg and even to Zoltán Kodály (1882–1967) in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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20th century. Moreover, uplifting the peasantry was an analogue to the insistence on “idealizing” the folk inspirations themselves, since most nationalist composers of the day regarded it as essential that both folk tunes and the folk people be refined to be of service to the nation.

Consequences Nationalist music is overall a phenomenon of unification in that it purports to provide a common musical culture for all the nation’s people, bridging regional and class divides. However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that consensus about the attributes of the national music was not always reached easily or without conflict. For instance, in the Czech lands in the 1860s and 1870s there was much debate among the cultural elites about what form the national music should take. Some figures held that Czech art music should be based exclusively on folk tunes, while other activists such as Smetana insisted that Czechs should look to what were regarded as the most “modern” musical standards of the day, namely those espoused by Berlioz, Liszt, and Wagner. This insistence in turn led to a fight about what some viewed as an unacceptable amount of German influence in Czech music, another example of how national musics by the end of the 19th century often came to oppose German culture for its supposed hegemony in music. A similar case of internal conflict and backlash took place in Russian efforts to create a national music. There the circle of composers around Mili Balakirev (a group that received the nickname “the mighty handful” and included Cesar Cui, Modest Mussorgsky, Alexander Borodin, and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov) believed that a Russian music must be drawn from uniquely Russian sources and that the cosmopolitanism of international trends originating in Paris or Vienna would only dilute the Russianness of the music they sought to create. They waged a battle against other Russian composers such as Anton Rubinstein or (to a much lesser extent) Piotr Tchaikovsky, whom they regarded as beholden to just such cosmopolitan trends. The importance of the interaction between nationalism and music in the period 1770–1870 lies above all in music’s contribution to nation-building. From the original interest in collecting folk songs as expressions of the nation’s Volksgeist to the building of prestigious national theaters for staging national operas, the various facets of this interaction all involved efforts to define aspects of the national identity through music. The creative products of these efforts—whether folk tune collections, patriotic songs, tone poems, or operas—all contributed to building a distinctive national culture. This process of nation-building through music followed the typical patterns of most nationalist movements and went hand in hand with other contemporaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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neous efforts to elaborate a national identity. The process consistently began with a few committed activists who began advocating the need to preserve the nation’s culture by collecting its songs or rehabilitating its language. From there, the next stage was usually undertaken by a subsequent generation of activists who insisted on the need to publicize and propagate more widely their ideas on the constitutive elements of the national identity. The goal behind their publicizing and propaganda was actually to begin nationalizing the public. Nationalist composers fit into this category of activist because their ideas of writing national music were aligned both ideologically and practically with the ideas of nationalist intellectuals in other fields, whether in literature or politics. Most nationalist composers operated out of a desire to give some expression to their nation’s spirit or culture in the realm of art music, and some nationalist composers went even farther by believing that their music would actually help nationalize the people by inculcating them with the music’s national values. There were many facets to how composers in the 19th century thought the populace could be nationalized through music. Besides creating symphonies, songs, chamber works, and operas inspired by some idea of nationality, many nationalist composers also engaged in institution-building; national theaters or conservatories were believed to perform the function of directly educating people in the values of the national culture. The combined effects of the process of nation-building are visible, for music, through the growth of audiences for nationalist music as the 19th century progressed. The reception and acceptance of the ostensible defining features of the nation’s culture—the trove of ideas about language, history, landscape, and the relationship to the folk—are demonstrated by the canonization of many of these features and their subsequent reproduction not just in elite but in popular discourse and their consistent use by a variety of nationalist artists. Likewise, whereas at the beginning of the century few would have been drawn to an explicitly national opera, already by the 1870s in many European countries, such operas were very popular and produced in significant numbers. Though the development of this consensus on the values of the national culture was not due to nationalist music alone, the consensus does nonetheless show how elites were successful in elaborating and propagating ideas of that culture, how publics received those ideas, and how music was an indispensable part of that elaboration and propagation. Nationalist music, thus, has historically formed a critical element in many nationalist movements. Though naturally the content of the tropes varies from country to country, many of the basic tropes themselves are consistent across not just geographical space but even time periods. Composers in the decades after the 1870s developed their own meanings for and understandings of what nationalist music could and should do, but usually the principle of every nation needing its own musical characteristics has remained unquestioned. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Selected Bibliography Beckerman, Michael. 1986. “In Search of Czechness in Music.” 19th-Century Music 10, no. 1: 61–73. Bohlman, Philip V. 2004. The Music of European Nationalism. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. Brusatti, Otto. 1978. Nationalismus und Ideologie in der Musik. Tutzing: Hans Schneider. Curtis, Ben. 2002. “On Nationalism and Music.” PhD diss., University of Chicago. Dahlhaus, Carl. 1980. Between Romanticism and Modernism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dahlhaus, Carl. 1989. Nineteenth-Century Music. Berkeley: University of California Press. Finkelstein, Sidney. 1989. Composer and Nation: The Folk Heritage in Music. 2nd ed. New York: International Publishers. Ling, Jan. 1997. A History of European Folk Music. Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Taruskin, Richard. 1997. Defining Russia Musically. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Taruskin, Richard. 2001. “Nationalism.” In The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, edited by Stanley Sadie, 689–706. New York: Grove’s Dictionaries. White, Harry, and Michael Murphy, eds. 2001. Musical Constructions of Nationalism: Essays on the History and Ideology of European Musical Culture 1800–1945. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press. Wiora, Walter. 1957. Europäische Volksmusik und abendländische Tonkunst. Kassel: Johann Philipp Hinnenthal-Verlag.


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Philosophy and Nationalism Nenad Miscevic Relevance The period under consideration, roughly from the French Revolution to the Franco-Prussian war, is the time of the birth of nationalism as an explicit and elaborated political ideology. This period has produced ideas and proposals of crucial significance for the history of nation and nationalism. The thinkers promoting the new political paradigm, based on cultural-national belonging, sought to provide an answer to two crucial questions: First, is there one kind of politically relevant group (smaller than the whole of mankind and bigger than the family) that is morally of central importance to every human being or not? Their answer was that there is just one, namely, the nation. They also addressed the second question, what is the ground of obligation that the individual has to her community or communities, voluntary choice or involuntary belonging? Many of these thinkers saw the nation as essentially a nonvoluntary community to which one belonged by birth and early nurture, but they often stressed that this unreflective belonging had to be refined and strengthened by a reflexive, “self-conscious” acceptance. Some important authors, like John Stuart Mill and Ernest Renan, define nation in a more voluntaristic way, as any community striving for self-government. One can represent these answers in a table.

Basis of Political Obligation

Is there a unique community of central cultural, moral, and political importance for each individual? Yes: The Nation

No: Only Humankind

Nonvoluntary belonging

classical nationalism: Herder, Fichte, Romantics

strict cosmopolitanism: Condorcet, Kant

Voluntary choice

voluntarism: Mill, Renan

liberal non-nationalist political programs: Rawls, Lord Acton

The columns stand for the number of relevant kinds of groups, whereas the rows determine the relative importance of voluntary versus nonvoluntary association. The righthand column mentions alternatives to nationalism. Of course, every such attempt involves oversimplifying the matter and obscuring the rich cluster of possible intermediate positions, so the table is meant only as a very rough guide to the actual diversity of views and positions.


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PHILOSOPHY AND NATIONALISM

Origins The background to the birth of philosophical reflections on nation and of philosophical pro-nationalism was the cosmopolitan and humanistic intellectual climate of the mid-18th century. The ideas of common humanity, of human rational nature, and of progress toward free and rationally organized society became an intellectual fashion among the elites of the time. French, British, and German intellectuals developed various kinds of cosmopolitan doctrines, most importantly moral, political, cultural, and economic cosmopolitanism (see Kleingeld 1999). Jean Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) is perhaps the most typical figure, and Anacharsis Cloots (1755–1794), the most picturesque activist. They were not inimical to the idea of nation; they described it, however, in rather low-key terms as a group whose members live on the same territory and under the same government, a view that formed the kernel of the famous definition offered by Sieyès (1748–1836) in his 1788/1789 pamphlet What Is a Nation? The answer to the question raised in the title is that “it is a body of associates living under a common law, represented by the same legislature” (Sieyès 2003, 96). Some forms of cosmopolitanism are not inimical to pro-nationalist considerations. A good example is cultural cosmopolitanism (as represented, for instance, in Germany through Georg Forster [1754–1794]), that is, the view that “humanity expresses itself in a rich variety of cultural forms, that we should recognize different cultures in their particularity, and that attempts to achieve cultural uniformity lead to cultural impoverishment” (Kleingeld 1999, 51). Since such cosmopolitanism is not a definitive political view, like those represented in our table, and since it insists on differences among cultures, it is a small step from there to the more nation-centered view claiming that each cultural form corresponds to some particular nation. Similarly, economic cosmopolitanism, advocating a single global sphere of free trade in the interest of perpetual peace, is in principle compatible with the important role assigned to the national state in other areas. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) and Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) are the two most famous philosophers writing in the late 18th century whose work illustrates the interplay of non-nationalist ideas, cosmopolitan or purely republican on the one hand and some interest in what a nation as a distinct political entity can achieve on the other. In his central political works, in particular in The Social Contract (1762), Rousseau focuses on universal political principles meant to be valid for all humanity. He does mention tradition and “mores,” but these are secondary to the voluntaristic and contractualist components of his political theory. In Émile he contrasts patriotism and humanism and expresses his preference for the latter. However, in his The Government of Poland (1772), he glorifies “patriotism” and patriotic education that makes the citizen see only his fatherland and nothing else and feel himself more a Pole, a Frenchman, or a Russian than a man in general. Many have interpreted the glorification literally; according to their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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reading, it is the national pre-political unity that, in Rousseau’s view, grounds civic virtue. Some interpreters point to the artificial character of the political unity described by Rousseau: it is a unity forged by a legislator that determines the character and the virtue of the future state. Indeed, Rousseau glorifies the tactics of Moses, who, wishing to prevent his people from melting away among foreign peoples, gave them customs and usages incompatible with those of other nations. Moses constructed the identity of his people on the basis of induced xenophobia; he made them “forever strangers among other men,” and at the same time taught them to be alert when dealing with the Gentiles. It seems, therefore, that Rousseau oscillates among three options in our table; his initial preference for humanism over nationalism places him under the rubric of cosmopolitanism, his insistence on the artificial and choice-based nature of the community puts him under voluntaristic nationalism, and some of his remarks put him close to classical nationalism. Kant is more consistent in his political philosophy than Rousseau. He stands firmly in the tradition of moral cosmopolitanism, the view that all human beings are members of a single moral community and that they have moral obligations to all other human beings. The view is a direct consequence of his central moral doctrine, which enjoins respect for humanity and treating each individual never purely as a means but always as an end. The transition from purely moral considerations to legal and political ones is provided by the requirement of “perpetual peace,” the only kind of global political condition that is compatible with central moral imperative(s). In his Metaphysics of Morals and, more explicitly, in This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity, Kant argues for a world government as the only guarantee of such a peace; there is no justice within a country without justice in international relations, and there are no just and stable international relations without the global alliance of all peoples. In his most famous defense of legal and political cosmopolitanism, Perpetual Peace (1795), he is less sanguine about the world-state. He notes the potential dangers hidden in the overwhelming power that such a state would command and offers a sketch of a “contract concerning perpetual peace” upon which nations should agree to avoid war and internal and external instability. (Some historians speculate that he counted on revolutionary France to make the first step in the process.) The sketch comprises two stages: a preliminary one that could be implemented in the foreseeable future, and the “definitive” one left for better times to come. Among the preliminary articles some are specific to 18th-century circumstances, such as the one forbidding exchange, purchase, or donation of an independent state. Some seem to reaffirm already established principles of the laws of nations, for example, that no state shall by force interfere with the constitution or government of another state. Others strike the contemporary reader as visionary, like the one stating that no peace treaty shall be held valid in which there is tacitly reserved matter for a future war. This article reminds the reader of how major wars of the 20th century developed from crises created in part by inadequate N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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peace treaties that one side found extremely and unbearably frustrating. Among the most radical articles is the demand for the abolishment of standing armies, since their very existence leads to competition and incites renewed conflict. The permanent articles are even more demanding. The civil constitution of every state should respect the principle of separation of the executive power from the legislative, which Kant characterizes as the republican principles. Republicanism gives a favorable prospect for perpetual peace since it implies that citizens will be asked for their opinion about declaring a war. Citizens are much more cautious in regard to war than dynasties and despotic governments that have little to loose and everything to gain by aggressive warfare. Finally, the law of nations would be founded on a federation of such free republican states. Kantian cosmopolitanism had less success in the century immediately following its introduction, but it has been an important source of inspiration to contemporary thinkers such as Habermas, O’Neill, and Pogge.

Dimensions Universalistic Culture-Based Nationalism It is a matter of dispute what social and political factors have prompted the turn from cosmopolitan and moderately nation-focused views to explicitly (pro-) nationalist paradigm in political thought. Here we concentrate on thinkers themselves. The thinker who initiated the turn from the predominantly universalistic, individualistic, and cosmopolitan paradigm to recognizably nationalistic theorizing is J. G. Herder (1744–1803), who proposed an original, clear, and attractive rationale for an alliance between nationalism and universalism. Herder’s picture of the plurality of nations starts with a mosaic of independent units each pursuing its own particular way as dictated by its circumstances, character, and traditions. Each nation is like a living organism, with its laws, potentialities, and limitations. But his “living organisms” apparently do not grow at the expense of others; expansionism is unnatural, as are ethnically mixed empires, which he condemns as “monstrosities.” This brings us to the crucial contribution Herder makes to the pro-nationalist view of culture: the thesis that the right and natural unit of culture is a nation, that is, the culture is first of all (or essentially) a national culture. In his argument he draws upon language as his central example. Meanings exist only within a given language, and only through that language can one apprehend them. They are learned together with words and sentences and become fused in conscious understanding and speech. But for the native speaker of a language, the contents apprehended are not just abstract meanings. The words carry with them their emotional significance. One’s mother tongue is thus one’s first and perhaps most important window to the realm of concepts, knowledge, social and cultural sigN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder. (Library of Congress)

nificance, and so on. We, the speakers of the language, owe our humanity, indeed our very identity, to it. The same point generalizes to culture in its totality. Similar points are made by various defenders of tradition, for instance, E. Burke (1729–1797) in his criticism of the French Revolution. In his view, good lives do not just spring from rational discussion or reflection; they take centuries of experience and innovation to develop. Traditionalists in general insist upon the initial, nonvoluntary belonging to given, native traditions. They are more impressed by the fact that people are usually “born into” certain traditions than with people’s free choices of the tradition they pledge allegiance to. To return to Herder, since nature produces particular national cultural characters, pursuing a particular “national” way is, according to him, the natural and moral destiny of nations. Next, due to common humanity, each nation reflects in its particular way the totality of the mosaic, which guarantees that the resulting mosaic is a harmonious one. The mosaic resulting from all particular efforts is the cultural, moral, and humanistic ideal to be realized by the history of humanity. He can be usefully read as proposing an argument for nationalism that starts from the intrinsic value of a nation and from the cultural proximity of its members, as well as an argument about the value of diversity. Each cultural national community has intrinsic value, that is, it is valuable in itself since it is the natural encompassing framework of various cultural traditions that produce and transmit important meanings and values. It also provides for a special cultural proximity among its members. The underlying traits of the cultural nation make for a very close proximity, and thus their carriers constitute a network of mutually very close agents in a moral sense as well. The network is therefore a moral community, with special, very strong ties of obligation. Each individual has a prominent N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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obligation to the underlying traits of the ethnic community, above all to its language and customs; they ought to be cherished, protected, preserved, and reinforced. From this obligation, the nationalist finally derives the community’s right to dictate the political and cultural duties of its citizens. Finally, Herder adds his argument about diversity, that each national culture gives its contribution to the diversity of human cultures in general. The “physiognomies” of cultures are unique: each presents a wonderful exfoliation of human potentialities in its own time and place and environment. The carrier of basic value is thus the totality of cultures. The argument ascribes a value—either general or particularly moral, or both—to each particular culture from a pluralistic viewpoint of the totality of cultures available. Assuming that the (cultural) nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the (ethno-)national culture. The attractive combination of particularism and universalism that can be—and has often been—derived from Herder’s reflections can be described as universalizing nationalism. Later authors, like Mazzini, have been more precise and demanding in regard to the obligations that follow from it. The final upshot can be summarized as follows: Each member of a given nation has serious duties toward his or her people, a valid obligation for all peoples and their members. One should value what is part of one’s cultural tradition for the tradition’s sake. The French should live and feel French, the Germans, in their “German fashion.” The “should” is to be taken seriously here; when it comes to organizing the cultural life, high priority should be given to one’s own cultural tradition. The same is valid not only for individuals but for collectives and institutions as well. Once a national state has been formed and the dominant cultural community has established itself as its “rightful owner,” it has to guard its full sovereignty. It has a duty to promote the ethno-national culture of its owners in a recognizable form, defending it from spontaneous mixing with foreign influences, preferring a kind of isolationism if the purity of national tradition is threatened. The citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other. However, this is all in accord with the Golden Rule: all peoples should act as my people do, namely, to promote their respective values. This universalistic attitude usually means that nations are viewed as being of central importance, but not in absolute terms; national demands don’t automatically trump all other claims, above all those that nowadays take the form of human rights. Classical Particularistic Nationalism It was J. G. Fichte (1762–1814) whose Addresses to the German Nation, delivered in the midst of the military and political crises of 1808, proposed a model for nationalist thought that can be regarded as classical and central for the future development of nationalism. Fichte started from Kantian cosmopolitanism, passed through a stage of isolationist republicanism, and then, moved by military defeats and the French occupation of his fatherland, reformulated his political phiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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losophy in a clearly nationalist fashion. In his Addresses one finds a protracted argument for the primacy of one’s own nation, which will serve as a model for nationalist thinkers of smaller nations. It is the decisive step in the formulation of particularist nationalism, the nationalist political doctrine according to which there exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character, the interests and values of which take priority over all or almost all other interests and values, and that nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty. Fichte’s argument for the particular character of the German nation starts with language. In general, the sameness of language guarantees, through mutual understanding, the existence of bonds of solidarity, which Fichte depicts in an exaggerated fashion; the speakers of the same language belong together and are by nature one and an inseparable whole, a stream of original and independent life, as he puts it. No wonder that a member of the nation has natural duty to sacrifice his or her life for it. In regard to the particularities, the German language and national character has depth and universality, whereas French and other romance languages don’t. Here, Fichte abandons the principled egalitarianism of Herder. Instead, the “essence of humanity” is present in “extremely diverse gradations” in different peoples. Some peoples or nations just partake in the common essence of humanity in a much more intensive fashion than others, and Germans do so in the fullest possible measure. (In his ninth address, Fichte notes that a crucial advantage of Germans is that they have his, Fichte’s, philosophy, which expresses the deepest German philosophical spirit.) One national culture, Germans, thus possesses distinct claims to virtue. This view implies that patriotism requires that one believes one’s nation is better than others, in other words, that other cultures are inferior to it. Patriotic loyalty thus involves a negative judgment about other nations. In important places in the Addresses, Fichte tempers the consequences of this extremely antiegalitarian view of nations by redefining the notion of nation and of national belonging. There is such a thing as “being German” in the spiritual fashion, he explains; in this spiritual sense, a person whom one would classify as, say, French in the literal sense can be spiritually German more than another person who would be classified as German in the literal sense. Contemporary interpreters sympathetic to Fichte stress this feature as the redeeming quality of his nationalism. Unfortunately, the political message of the Addresses makes sense only if actual Germans in the literal sense are for the most part also German in the spiritual sense, and conversely, the literal non-Germans also for the most part lack “spiritual German” traits. In this case, the special character of the actual majority of Germans, who are such in both a literal and a spiritual sense, justifies the special status of Germany and its future mission. The Addresses thus offer the model of a refined particularistic nationalism. Its proponents typically claim that their own group has reasons particularly to foster its own heritage, since it is objectively so much more perfect than anyone else’s, and that other groups have proportionally N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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less reason to concentrate upon their own heritage. The stance has begotten an apparently altruistic rhetoric where one’s own nation is depicted as bringing cultural salvation to others. A decade before Fichte, the conservative thinker Joseph de Maistre (1994/1796, 42) had already anticipated this conclusion: “Each nation, like each individual, has obtained a mission, which she has to fulfill.” The further development of this line of thought was achieved through the work of the Romantics, above all, German ones. Most of them conserve important elements of universalism, which makes them difficult to classify into a simple scheme. Novalis (1772–1801) is viewed by some as more of a nationalist, by others, as a romantic cosmopolitan. Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Schlegel (1772–1829) offers similar ambiguities. Their spiritualizing of the state can be seen either as extreme, totalitarian nationalism, or as harmless poetic fantasy without serious political implications. But they all insist on an organicist view of the nation, and Schlegel offers new arguments for the primacy of German culture, spirit, or character. Much more clearly nationalist are Adam Müller (1779–1829) and Joseph Görres (1776–1848). In the writings of the latter, nationalism is formulated in stark terms, as well as a xenophobia toward the French. The love for country Görres demands is unrestrained, devoid of any universalistic considerations. In consequence, the fatherland is not to be loved for its actual qualities or for the universal values it happens to incarnate but rather for being just what it is, one’s fatherland. The political activism of Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778–1852), who organized nationalistically minded gymnastic societies as instruments for the physical, military, and spiritual rebirth of Germans, forms the connection between Romantic particularistic nationalism and political reality. G. W. F. Hegel’s (1770–1831) philosophical contribution to the debates about nation and nationality is much more subtle and open to contrasting interpretations. Of immediate relevance to the issue of nation and nationalism is his notion of Volksgeist, the spirit of “people,” where “people” means a group with a pronounced national character. History is a process in which a particular Volksgeist dominates at a particular period. It should be noted that the “spirits” are conceived more broadly than the actual nations as we identify them today; there is a German spirit and a Slavic spirit, but not a Dutch or a Bulgarian spirit. The other important notion is the ethical and metaphysical importance of the state: only those peoples that achieve a state achieve freedom and become noticeable in history. This interdependence of the spiritual character of a people, its freedom, its statehood, and its role in history makes his views interesting for a nationalist thinker. Translated into more concrete terms, it suggests that national culture is essential for identity, moral development, and survival of the members of the people/nation. For a culture to preserve its own identity, it normally has to acquire (always or, at least, in most cases) the political form of a state. The institution of the state of the particular cultural-spiritual nation will promote its interests and fight all interests that oppose it, including those of its own members that happen not to coincide with the interests of the nation. The state should N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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enjoy full sovereignty and expand if possible. It should provide for freedom, identity, flourishing, and thereby ethical development of its citizens, and this requirement takes precedence over most others, including the “arbitrary” decision of each citizen about whether to identify oneself with one’s nation. The only way for a state to perform its function is to focus upon the particular national culture, thereby becoming the desired framework for the Volksgeist it embodies. Hegel’s criticism of Kantian cosmopolitan pacifism adds important elements to the picture. In his Philosophy of Right he explains many advantages of war, in particular, added strength and internal peace of the state. Peace often ends with ossification and the death of a state (1991, 324). As opposed to the cosmopolitan ideal of suprastate institutions, he affirms the legitimacy and moral advantages of the system of independent sovereign states (the so-called “Westphalian” order); a supranational league might be more fanatical against its enemies than any existing state is against those who oppose it. Hegel’s view appears to be an attempt to synthesize voluntaristic elements with the classical nationalist stress on spontaneous, nonchosen belonging. Although his “spirit” of a people is decidedly more encompassing than particular national cultures, his general ideas have been used by defenders of particularistic national identities, who simply ignored the considerations of size and talked about spirit of their particular nation in Hegelian terms. The ideas just sketched, including those of Fichte, German Romanticists, and Hegel, have undergone some interesting variations in the hands of thinkers of Slavic, predominantly Russian, culture. The most interesting variety concerns pan-Slavism. A central topic in Russian culture for two centuries has been the socalled Russian Idea, a syndrome of views and attitudes about the special role Russia is called upon to play in world history. Many leading intellectuals, from Dostoyevski on, have been inventing theories about the special character of Russian people and the beastly nature of its enemies, from East or West, as the case may be. In such a perspective, cultural Russification and Orthodox proselytizing have been justified as bringing moral, cultural, and religious salvation to backward neighbors. The actual background to the messianic nationalism has been the social and political backwardness of czarist Russia, characterized by the very strong position of the gentry, by poverty and the extreme lack of education of the most numerous class—the peasantry—and by a triad of political principles: autocracy, orthodoxy (implying the lack of separation of church and state), and nationality (narodnost). Faced with the almost impossible task of bringing more democratic, Western values to their country, many intellectuals—for instance, Fedor Dostoyevski (1821–1881) and his brother Mihailo, as well as biologist and culturologist Nikolai Danilevski (1822–1885)—gave up and decided to take the opposite course, arguing that the “apparent” deficiencies of Russian society in fact constituted its specific and precious national character, to be cherished, preserved, and offered as a gift to other Slavic “brotherly nations.” Others used the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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messianic program to improve their position with the czar, or to further their imperial dreams. The idea had been anticipated by Nikolai Karamzin (1766–1826), an early precursor writing at the very beginning of the 19th century. In short, the argument was that Russia is a special and great nation, with a first-rate role to play in world history. It has preserved an organic spiritual unity, a familylike political structure, with the czar as the father of the nation and a pure, unadulterated, and original Christian faith that saves it from the liberal egoism of the West. Danilevski, in his Russia and Europe (1869), gives a quasi-scientific typology of cultures, diagnoses the inevitable future decay of the European culture-type, and argues that Russians and Slavs in general have to engage in a bitter struggle against Europe’s political power and its nefarious intellectual influence. In the later 19th and early 20th centuries, the tradition continued through contributions by important thinkers like the creator of contemporary phonology, Prince Trubetskoy, the biologist Gumilev, son of the poet Ana Akhmatova, and the art historian Losev (Russkaya ideya 1992). They have argued for the special mission of Russia, Trubetskoy in anti-European terms, others stressing Russia’s task to guard Christianity from its alleged Asian, presumably Muslim, enemies (quoted in Ryazanaovsky 1993, 118). Trubetskoy’s general ideas about nation are quoted with approval by the moderate. One of the well-known fathers of linguistic structuralism, N. S. Trubetzkoy, was also an important although less well-known philosopher of 20th-century nationalism. He expressed the view that in the story of the Tower of Babel the Bible demonstrated a clear preference for the variety of languages and cultures over one language and culture. The fact that they had only one language and culture brought the tower builders to the boring emptiness that ended in the arrogant project of building the tower. In Trubetzkoy’s opinion, the “confounding of the languages”—that is, the imposition of cultural variety—is not a curse or a punishment but a solution to the problem of the sin that results from cultural homogeneity. Moderate and Voluntaristic Views The ideas proposed by the original pro-nationalist thinkers of the first generation, such as Fichte, Müller, and Görres, spread around Europe in the first half of the 19th century and ignited movements for national and social liberation. Among the most important thinkers and activists who combined social liberation, universalism, and a strong national enthusiasm is the Italian revolutionary Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872). He is best known for his dual loyalty to the ideals of humanity and of nation, two “altars” of the “new religion” of which he sees himself as an apostle. In his considered view, the former has primacy over the latter, but he does not think of the two as being in any significant way contrary to each other; love for humanity finds its natural expression in loyalty to one’s nation, which is ideally a community of free and equal citizens. His revolutionary “faith” is quite demanding: Mazzini is inimical to utilitarianism, happiness, and mateN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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rial prosperity as political goals and focused on the duties of the individual toward one’s fellow citizens and fellow human beings, in particular, the duty to fight for their freedom. His ideas are now often quoted by proponents of moderate and liberal nationalism. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) offers a much less loaded definition of nationality than the ones proposed by German and Russian thinkers. According to Mill, “a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality, if they are united among themselves by common sympathies, which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of themselves, exclusively”(1975, 380). He then lists various causes of this feeling of nationality, like identity of “race and descent,” community of language and of religion, common territory, and, the strongest of all, identity of political antecedents that encompass a national history producing, in its turn, a common pool of memories. The sympathy then generates the desire and decision to unite under a common government. Since the issue of government ought to be decided by the governed, it follows that the mere presence of the sentiment of nationality yields a prima facie case for a common government distinct and separate from others. The importance of this intermediate role of desire and decision turns Mill into a proponent of a more voluntaristic conception of the nation-state than the one traditionally associated with the Germanic tradition. The French scholar and political thinker Ernest Renan (1823–1892) developed a famous proposal along similar lines. The immediate occasion was the issue of who was to govern Alsace and Lorraine—the French or the Germans—and the interesting circumstance was that many inhabitants of the two regions had a Germanic culture but apparently wished to join the French state. To offer a theoretical solution to this issue, Renan, in his What Is a Nation? (1882), proposes a simple and elegant argument for a definition of nationality of the kind encountered in Mill’s work. It involves commonality of tradition and present-day solidarity, as well as willingness of the members of a nationality to live together. He reviews various traditionally proposed candidates for the defining feature(s) of a nation—dynastic belonging derived from an earlier conquest, commonality of blood, of race, of language, of interest, or of something else. He concludes that it is not a single dynastic rule, for first Switzerland and then the United States formed themselves without any dynastic basis, and, second, France, immediately following the dynasty’s fall, was able to stand without it. It is not a population’s race or blood either. Such ethnographic considerations have played no part in the constitution of modern nations; even the initial carving out of the barbarian kingdoms had nothing ethnographic about it. Moreover, “there is no pure race,” so to make politics dependent on ethnographic analysis is to surrender it to a chimera, he writes. It is not language either. Language invites people to unite, but there is nothing compelling about the invitation. The United States and England share a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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language, a great part of Latin America and Spain speak the same languages, yet these do not form single nations. It is obviously not religion. It is not mere community of interest, since nationality has an important sentimental side to it. Renan comes to the same conclusion as Mill did: all these commonalities are neither necessary nor sufficient for common nationality. According to Renan, the real essence of the nation lies elsewhere and has two related components. The first, derived from the past, is a rich commonality of memories. The second concerns the present and is the actual consent, consisting in the desire to live together and the will to preserve the common heritage. The second exploits the “social capital” (as Renan puts it) of common past glories. Nation is thus defined through large-scale solidarity, stemming from common past sacrifices and prompting such sacrifices in the future. He is famous for his characterization of the nation as “a daily plebiscite,” decided on the grounds just listed. His characterization has shaped the understanding of the nation in the French republican tradition and influenced other thinkers, all the way to contemporary French republican thinkers such as Dominique Schnapper.

Consequences The ideas just discussed have become politically successful to an extraordinary extent. Already in the 1770s–1880s they were spreading across Europe, North and South America, and parts of Asia, and then continued their triumphant march into the rest of the world. We just mentioned Russia and Italy; another big area of immediate influence was the Austro-Hungarian empire, encompassing, besides Austrians, Hungarians and several Slavic peoples. There are many examples of nationalist philosophers from these areas. One is the early Polish nationalistdemocratic thinker, Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko (1746–1817), active in both Poland and America. In the mid-19th century, Hungary fostered a whole group of pronationalist thinkers and activists, but the deepest and most liberal is probably Jószef Eötvös (1813–1871). His Czech counterpart is František Palacký (1798–1876), the author of a monumental history of the Czech people. Slovak L’udovit Štúr (1815–1856) codified the Slovak literary language and produced a very influential, although not quite consistent, nationalist ideology. In Croatia, the thinker who comes closest to Fichte’s line of thought is Ante Star evi (1823–1896), who uses the same ambiguity between nationality in the “spiritual or moral” sense and in the literary sense to justify his explosive mix of democratic republicanism and extreme xenophobia. Bulgaria had its own, more tragic version of Mazzini in Vasil Levski (1837–1873). These are just a few examples among several patriotic or nationalist thinkers of various nationalities through the 19th century. Historians have been looking for common patterns to explain why and how particular ideas were adopted in particular contexts, but it seems that the overall similarities among those ideas and the mutual borrowing that characterizes them are N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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much more common than any stark contrast between various versions of pronationalist doctrines. For almost two centuries it was customary to link the nationalistic view to organicist metaphors of society. Isaiah Berlin, writing as late as the early 1970s, proposed as a part of his definition that nationalism is the conviction that people belong to a particular human group and that “the characters of the individuals who compose the group are shaped by, and cannot be understood apart from, those of the group” (1972, 341). In the first half of the 20th century, this idea was supplemented by the metaphor of “national character.” However, contemporary proponents of nationalism, above all its philosophical defenders, don’t use this language any more; it is hard to find the organicistic metaphor any more except in the most radical and extreme writers. Elsewhere, it has been replaced by one central idea, that of national identity: individuals have an identity as individuals, nations have national identities, but the identities of individuals somehow depend on their participation in the identity of the nation. The most interesting recent development in pro-nationalist thought is the revival of interest in combining a moderate nationalistic agenda with a liberal democratic framework. In the English-speaking world, the main impetus for this idea has been Isaiah Berlin, who also revived Herder’s argument about diversity. More recently this notion has been expanded upon by M. Walzer and A. Margalit. Berlin’s former pupil, Yael Tamir, an admirer of Mazzini, has offered the now standard version of liberal nationalism, and Will Kymlicka sometimes characterizes his own view as belonging to the same category. Another important development is the return to a variety of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, reformulated for the age of globalization. Closest to Kant himself is J. Rawls, whereas more radically cosmopolitan ideas have been proposed by J. Habermas, Martha Nussbaum, Onora O’Neill, Brian Barry, and Thomas Pogge. They typically radicalize Kant’s principles; Pogge, for instance, reinterprets Kant’s modest principle of hospitality as involving the right of free migration of labor and a very substantial right to political asylum. With these authors, the history of political ideas around the issues of cosmopolitanism and nationalism almost seems to have come full circle. Selected Bibliography Berlin, I. 1972. “Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power.” Against the Current, 333–356. New York: Penguin. Berlin, I. 1976. Vico and Herder. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fichte, J. G. 1922. Addresses to the German Nation. Translated by R. F. Jones and G. H. Turnbull. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Hegel, G. W. F. 1991. Philosophy of Right. Edited by Allen Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Herder, J. G. 2002. “This Too a Philosophy of History for the Formation of Humanity.” In Philosophical Writings, translated and edited by Michael N. Forster, 268–358. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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Kant, I. 2003. To Perpetual Peace. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. Kleingeld, P. 1999. “Six Varieties of Cosmopolitanism in Late Eighteen-Century Germany.” Journal of the History of Ideas 60: 505–524. Kohn, H. 1967. Prelude to Nation-States. Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. Maistre, Joseph de. 1994. Considérations sur la France. Paris: Imprimerie nationale. (Orig. pub. 1796.) Meinecke, F. 1979. Cosmopolitanism and the National State. Translated by R. B. Kimber. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mill, J. S. 1975. Three Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Renan, E. 1990. “What Is a Nation?” In Nation and Narration, edited by Homi Bhabha, 8–22. London: Routledge. (Orig. pub. 1882.) Rousseau, J. J. 1997. “Considerations on the Government of Poland.” The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Russkaya ideya. 1992. Moskva: Respublika. Ryazanaovsky, Nicholas V. 1993. “Prince N. S. Trubetskoi’s Europe and Mankind.” Collected Writings. Los Angeles: Charles Schlacks, Jr. Sieyès, E. J. 2003. Political Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.


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Religion and Nationalism Christopher Marsh Relevance The Sacred, the Secular, and the National National identity, or the affinity one feels toward a nation, can be based on any combination of myriad characteristics, including language, cultural values, shared history, and physical characteristics, just about anything that a group of people feels binds them together and makes them one people. While the ingredients of various forms of national identity vary, each has some set of these at its core. Of the many features that can serve as the basis for a national identity, religion is perhaps the most potent characteristic that can be attached to nationalism. Nothing else relates so directly to matters of ultimate concern such as justice, salvation, and the afterlife quite the same way religion does. It is no surprise then that religion has come to reinforce nationalism and national unity in many parts of the world, both historically and today. Religious difference, however, can perhaps serve just as easily as a force for division within society—even among people who share characteristics such as ethnic composition and language—as in the case of Protestants and Catholics in Bismarck’s Germany. Nationalism shares several features with religion. Émile Durkheim, one of the fathers of the sociological study of religion, began his study of the elementary forms of religious life by identifying things sacred and profane, and he defined religion as the rituals that surround the sacred. Nations, too, often have sacred images and objects. We can thus think of nationalism in some ways as a civil religion, as religious language and symbolism become used to legitimate the state and provide divine sanction to political authority. In similar fashion, religious language and symbolism give legitimacy and authority to nations that do not have a state, for example, in ethnic nationalist and separatist movements, particularly in cases where the secessionist nation does not share a religious tradition with the overarching state. In America, civil religion has been a way in which religious meaning and symbolism have become attached to American nationalism. Items such as the flag and the Constitution are its sacred objects, leaders such as Lincoln and Jefferson are its high priests, and the monuments to these men are its temples. The American case is not exceptional. In many societies religion and nationalism have become intertwined, to greater or lesser degrees. In some cases, religion has become so bound up with nationalism that it is hard to see where one ends and the other begins. This is especially true in situations in which nationalism has drawn upon


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the resources of a genuine religion, such as the fusion between Christianity and American civil religion or between Russian Orthodox Christianity and Russian nationalism. Religion and nationalism seem more prone to become mutually supportive when there is a strong attachment to a given territory. This sacralization of land is common in many cultures, from the concept of Holy Russia to that of the Holy Land. In Japanese Shinto, the islands of Japan are seen as the home of kami, or divine spirits, thus in some ways conflating the this-worldly with the transcendental. The phenomenon of the sacralization of land can also be quite effective in arguing for divine sanction for the state. As Pope Boniface phrased it in the late 13th century, as with “the people of Israel, . . . the kingdom of France [is] a peculiar people chosen by the Lord to carry out the orders of Heaven” (Davis 1958, 298). From the moment the Pilgrims arrived in the New World, they, too, began to associate their journey and settlement with divine providence, stating in the Mayflower Compact that they had undertaken the journey “for the glory of God, and advancement of the Christian faith and honor of our king and country.” If religion is a sacred canopy and provides a society with cosmological significance, then that society can quite easily be conceived of as a nation with divine sanction and purpose as well. Religion might be more prone to becoming an important part of a nation’s group identity when a particular nation has an historic attachment to a certain religion that is distinct from that of neighboring nations. For instance, Catholicism is an important component of Irish nationalism perhaps because it is a major line of demarcation between the Irish and the British. Likewise, Catholic Poles stand in contrast to the Orthodox of Russia, and their independent identity has been historically stronger than that of other nations that are coreligionists of the Russians, such as the Belarusians, despite the fact that all three nations are Slavic. In this way, religion has also played an important role as a national identifier in the Balkans, not only between Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats, but between the southern Slavs in general and the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the historic Battle of Kosovo of 1389, during which the Slavic peoples of the Balkans fought to the end against the Turkic encroachment of the region, has had a lasting significance on nationalism in that part of the world. Celebrated by Serbs as the “Balkan Alamo,” it was perhaps a significant factor in the failure of the people of the region to form an umbrella “Yugoslav” identity. It certainly contributed to the development of the metaphor of Prince Lazar as a Christ prince, and almost by definition Slavic Muslims came to be viewed as Christ killers and Turkifiers ( poturice ). The 19th-century epic The Mountain Wreath did much to connect this metaphor to modern Serb nationalism and to take the battle from the pages of history and make it applicable to the present day, vilifying the Muslims of Bosnia in the process. Forms of nationalism that have strong connections with particular religious traditions could very easily be referred to as religious nationalism (and many N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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scholars do). Their distinction from other forms of nationalism is that religion is an important factor in the formation of the nation and the understanding of the nation’s distinctive role in history. It is important to bear in mind that religious nationalism is still a form of nationalism, however, and that religious nationalism is not loyalty to one’s religion or religious group but rather an attachment to the nation proper. The line that separates the two may become so blurred in some cases that it can be hard to distinguish between them. It is not uncommon for people of various levels of belief to fuse their religious convictions with state authority, and for state authority to become seen in people’s minds as divinely ordained for some specific purpose. Indeed, this is the purpose of civil religion, and religion is quite often used by political leaders in this way to great effect as citizens are called upon to serve both “God and country.” Of course, throughout history religion’s relationship with nationalism has been competitive as well as complementary. Nationalism has often competed directly against religion for the loyalty of the people, and hence nationalism has sometimes developed strong antireligious dimensions. This seems to have been particularly the case when the religion in question was perceived as foreign. For example, in 19th-century China under the Qing dynasty, a form of Christianity competed for the loyalty of the empire’s subjects, leading to the Taiping Rebellion, the bloodiest civil war in history. Christianity appeared to pose the same dangers for Japan, where not long after its arrival it became tied up with revolutionary movements and thus contributed to the decision to close off communication with the outside world as a way of protecting Japanese society from foreign “contamination.”

Origins Religion, Nationalism, and Political Legitimacy Religion has been a very common basis for group identity throughout history, and prior to the rise of the nation-state, religion often functioned in place of nationalism. As Leopold von Ranke observed in 1872, “in most periods of world history nations were held together by religious ties alone” (Baron 1947, 20). Throughout almost its entire history from the 13th to the early 20th centuries, for example, the Ottoman Empire was ordered along religious lines, not national ones. In fact, there was no national identity per se, with all Muslims enjoying the same rights and privileges no matter what their ethnic background—Turkic, Arabic, Slavic, or so on. All non-Muslims (dhimmi) in the empire, meanwhile, were placed by the Sublime Porte into a confessional community, or millet. This system provided a high degree of tolerance for ethnic differences and even religious diversity and worked well for hundreds of years. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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After the rise of the nation-state in the 17th century, however, empires had to deal with the issue of their own national identity, as well as with the national question and the aspirations of the newly cognizant nations within their borders. In fact, one of the factors contributing to the Ottoman Empire’s downfall was its inability to manage the national question and its relationship to religion, particularly Islam. France had a similar problem in forging a national identity. In the words of Eugene Weber, France had to go about making “peasants into Frenchmen” (Weber 1979, 73). In the case of the Ottoman Empire, however, the problem was making Ottomans out of such an ethnically and religiously diverse population. Prior to the rise of the nation-state, political authority was often legitimated by religion, as church and state were often mutually supporting institutions. While history is replete with examples of each trying to bend the other to its will in an attempt to gain the upper hand, these two pillars of society were taken for granted both by the institutions themselves and by the people, whose fortunes they so heavily influenced. The Enlightenment began to dismantle this edifice, however, and to replace faith and the power of the church with belief in science, reason, and progress. Science and reason then began to erode belief in the divine right of kings and the necessity of monarchical authority. And if kings were not divinely ordained to rule their lands, what was the basis of their authority? Kings and clergy quickly went from being viewed as divinely ordained to being interpreted as usurpers of power. As Denis Diderot concluded, “men will never be free until the last king is strangled with the entrails of the last priest” (De La Harpe 2001). In moving from a religious to a rational legitimation of political authority, it was found that there was still a need for people to identify with their political community in ways similar to how they had previously identified with a religiously mandated state and their coreligionists. The answer was nationalism, and, in the words of 19th-century French historian Jules Michelet, belief in the nation itself arose to fill the “immeasurable abyss” left by the extinction of the idea of God (Himmelfarb 1993, 57). The forms of nationalism that first emerged to fill this void were secular in nature and often anticlerical, if not outright antireligious. This was the case in France, where the revolution had wrested power away from the king and the church. Given the close connection between church and state in France under the ancien régime, however, it was difficult to find symbols for the new regime that did not hark back to either, which led to the use of the figure of Marianne, the tricolor flag, and the motto liberty, equality, and fraternity. Nationalism and World Religions Given the great diversity of religious traditions around the world, it is no surprise that nationalism’s relationship to religion is in many ways related to the theological, ecclesiastical, and historical dimensions of any particular religion. Whether a religion is monotheistic or polytheistic, whether its institutions are structured hierarchically or horizontally, and the context in which a religious tradition rose to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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prominence—or struggles to survive—can all affect the way a particular religion relates to nationalism. Perhaps the oldest connection between religion and national identity is what has existed for millennia among Jews. In Judaism, the connection between religion and national identity is a natural one. Hebrew scripture refers to the Jews as God’s “chosen people” and the land of Israel itself as being given by God to the Jews: “And the Lord said to Jacob . . . ‘Unto thy offspring will I give this land!’” (Genesis 35:11–12). It is important to distinguish between Jewish ethnic identity and Jewish nationalism proper. The former refers to the Jewish people as a distinct ethnic group, which incidentally can be broken down further into subgroups such as Sephardic and Ashkenazi, while the latter is a nationalist sentiment that conceives of a global community of Jews as sharing a common bond, whether they live in Israel or in the Diaspora. There are multiple expressions of Jewish nationalism, and not all Jews are Jewish nationalists. In most forms of Jewish nationalism, however, there is an importance placed upon the land of historical Israel, and for this reason it is an example par excellence of the sacralization of land. It is this expression of Jewish nationalism that has become important and that, over the past century and a quarter, has become closely connected with the Zionist movement, which sees the resurrection and maintenance of a Jewish state of Israel as the only safeguard against anti-Semitism and the only guarantor of the safety of Jews in the world. Another historical example that provides some interesting insight into the relationship between religion and nationalism is that of Eastern Orthodox Christianity. A great paradox exists among the Eastern churches of being one within the single, worldwide church, which is the body of Christ, and the tendency toward the ever-greater division of this body into national-territorial churches. This tendency, though having historical precedents, began to emerge in the late 19th century with the attainment of separate patriarchates for such states as Serbia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Although setting up churches along territorial lines for administrative reasons is theologically permissible, the practice of placing greater attachment to one’s nation than to the church as a whole is not, as it borders on the heretical act of ethnophylitism. In fact, throughout the Orthodox world the ethnic attachment of most of the Orthodox churches is very strong. Even in some Orthodox churches in the United States, where the liturgy is performed in the language of the motherland as well as in English and where national holidays and ethnic festivals are often connected with church life—and often even celebrated at the church itself—the connection between the Orthodox faith and the various national identities of Orthodox nations becomes blurred and often fused. The relationship between Islam and nationalism is a very modern one. Historically, all members of the Muslim faith were conceived of as being united into one community of believers, the Ummah Wahida. In this ummah, one’s particular ethnicity and place of residence were irrelevant, for the common faith in the teachings of Muhammad was what united Muslims together. This overarching, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Jewish National Fund poster, ca. 1939. The rise of the Zionist movement in the late 19th century was influenced by nationalist currents in Europe, as well as by the secularization of Jewish life in eastern Europe, which led many assimilated Jewish intellectuals to seek a new basis for a Jewish national life. (Library of Congress)


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transnational identity lasted for centuries, and today the idea, though in a slightly altered form, remains a central goal of Islamists who seek to establish an Islamic state that will unite all Muslims in lands where they predominate and that were historically under the Islamic Caliphate. It was in the wake of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the subsequent development of nation-states throughout the Muslim world that nationalism began its association with Islam. With the development of separate states in which Muslims predominated, separate national identities began to emerge alongside the existing Muslim identity, leading to a hybrid religio-national identity, for example, Egyptian Muslims, Libyan Muslims, and Saudi Muslims. The agenda of political Islam to move beyond the boundaries of the nation-state is a response to this development. Although overall the relationship between Islam and nationalism is noteworthy for the weakness of the bond between the two, an exception may be in national liberation movements among Muslims who are seeking to secede from a non-Muslim state, such as in Chechnya, Kashmir, and Xinjiang. In such cases, Islam is often merged with nationalism in the articulation of a distinct national identity for the secessionist group.

Dimensions Although secular nationalism was originally meant to replace religious attachments and to engender loyalty to the nation and its political brother, the state, before long nationalism itself began to resemble religion and in many cases to become intertwined with it. For example, given Russia’s tradition of Christianity, which even predates Prince Vladimir’s conversion to the faith in 988, and its long history of wars with neighboring peoples of other faith traditions, it is no surprise that its national identity is inextricably linked with Orthodoxy, even among those who do not express any deep faith commitment. One reason that the link between Orthodox Christianity and national identity is so closely intertwined in Russia may be the longstanding tradition there of symphonia, or harmony in relations between church and state. According to this ideal, the czar ruled over the secular realm, whereas the church and its leadership ruled over otherworldly matters, both exercising their control in the name of God. This symphonia was changed under Peter the Great in 1721, however, when he replaced the patriarchate with a body known as the Holy Governing Synod, thus putting the church effectively under the control of the state. The group that perhaps did the most to strengthen the bond between Russian nationalism and Orthodoxy Christianity was the Slavophiles. A group of intellectuals writing in the 19th century, the Slavophiles emphasized the distinctiveness of Slavic culture and the centrality of Orthodoxy for Russia. It was largely at the pen of the Slavophiles such as Dostoyevsky that Orthodoxy became very closely connected with what it meant to be Russian. As he wrote, in Russia “the ideal N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of the people is Christ” (Dostoyevsky 1972). The church itself willingly grasped onto the idea and carried it even further. As Metropolitan Ioann of St. Petersburg wrote, “if Russia isn’t your mother, God can’t be your father” (Boyle and Sheen 1997, 338). The interconnectedness of Orthodox Christianity and Russian nationalism was partly attributable to the ecclesiastical structure of Orthodoxy and the fact that Moscow was the seat of the patriarchate that had administrative control over the churches in Russian lands. This combination of territorial autonomy and coextensive church and state boundaries facilitated the formation of a Russian national identity that had Orthodoxy as one of its central components. It is perhaps this fact that led to the sharp attack against the church under the czar’s successors—the Bolsheviks. Shortly after wresting control from the provisional government in 1917, the Bolsheviks launched a systematic attack against religion with the purpose of eradicating it, and the methods used made it seem as though they were taking Diderot’s call almost literally. Despite their best efforts, however, even today Orthodoxy remains a central component of Russian national identity, so much so that more people in Russia identify themselves as Orthodox than profess a belief in God. Prior to the arrival of the Jesuits in the 16th century, there was not even a word in Japanese for religion. Indeed, when entering into treaties with the United States in the second half of the 19th century, the Japanese had to invent a word for religion, using the word shukyo. It is not that Japan was void of religious practice and belief at the time, however, but rather that religion was such a deep part of the culture that its distinctiveness had not been articulated. The “development” of Japanese religions then followed as Shinto and Buddhism came to be defined against Christianity as well as each other. In 1868, only months after the Meiji Restoration, the new government issued a decree “to unite the church and the state,” thus setting off a process that would meld the Shinto religion to Japanese nationalism. The result would only end with the horrific events of World War II and the emperor’s renunciation of his divinity under U.S. pressure immediately after the war. While Shinto was being elevated to the status of a state religion, efforts were simultaneously being made to separate Shinto from Buddhism, with which it had become largely interconnected over the centuries. Such a policy ran counter to the centuries-old practice of incorporating Buddhist deities into Shinto, but it was necessary if Shinto alone was to be elevated as the source of Japanese nationalism. By the early 20th century, Shinto and Japanese nationalism had become fused to a degree probably greater than in any other society in the world, and to catastrophic ends. In the hands of the Japanese imperial regime, Shinto not only provided a sense of superiority and invincibility to the nation but also provided a divine justification to the war and greatly contributed to soldiers’ willingness to die, particularly those who were chosen as kamikazes. The important role played by this religion in World War II was not lost on the Allied powers after the war. In N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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one of the first reports issues by the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers (SCAP), Shinto was recognized as a major cause of Japanese nationalism, and recommendations were made on curtailing the negative effects of this relationship. The primary recommendation was to separate church and state as much as possible, and one of the first moves taken by the SCAP was to have the emperor renounce his divinity, thus bringing to an end a process that was 2,000 years in the making. Whereas in Japan religion acted as a source of unity for the Japanese, in India religion has been a major source of division and violence. In the early years of the 20th century, the power of the British empire in India declined as national self-consciousness began to emerge, and the two major new nations that were forming—India and Pakistan—were divided along the lines of religion. The distinct national identities that arose during this time were more than simply religious, ethnic, or regional identities, however, for Indian Hinduism and Pakistani Islam were central components of their respective national identities. Indian national identity, or Hindutva, had Hinduism as its core, albeit a “secular” form of Hinduism, as Ghandi and Nehru saw it. Hindutva was not intended to be a Hindu nationalism but rather to appeal to all citizens of the subcontinent by drawing upon a common set of values, including brotherly love, peace, and nonviolence. In this way, Hindutva was intended to be a broad civilizational identity. Perhaps ironically, Hindutva was also quite secular, with religion divorced from politics. For many people, however, to be Indian meant to be Hindu as well, and resentment began to develop among non-Hindus, particularly the Muslims and Sikhs. In the aftermath of World War II, as the United Kingdom began the process of decolonization, India and Pakistan gained their independence, although in a way in which the religious cleavages of the subcontinent were exacerbated, not ameliorated. Not only were two separate states created, with the rationale for the lines of demarcation being primarily the dividing line between the dominant Hindu and Muslim populations, but the actual boundaries between the two new nation-states were kept secret. This led to a mass exodus of population into and out of both states, as many Hindus in what was likely to be Pakistan headed south, while many Muslims in India headed north; on both sides these migrations were often accompanied by coercion and horrific violence.

Consequences Unity and Division Religion, as a component of nationalism can be both a force for unity as well as for division. Which way the pendulum will swing depends entirely upon the unique attributes and historical circumstances of each nation and potential N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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nation. In a society plagued by economic disparities, ethnic diversity, and regional inequalities, for example, a common religious tradition may provide a sacred canopy of common meaning under which all citizens can live and prosper. That challenge can be quite formidable, however, for the forces of diversity are not easily overcome. When religious difference is combined with ethnic, linguistic, and cultural difference, however, the potential for conflict can quickly be triggered. Even among people who seemingly share myriad characteristics, including ethnic composition and language, religious difference can prove an insurmountable hurdle in the formation of a nation, and it can tear formed nations apart. Often ethnic entrepreneurs appeal to people’s religious sentiment or draw upon religious symbolism in their articulation of the nation. The result can, again, be either unity or diversity, regardless of the intent of those who seek to unleash this force. The attempt to draw upon India’s Hindu tradition in the formation of Hindutva was not meant to be an act of exclusion, for example, but in the end it alienated many of the millions of Muslims who called India home. Likewise, the development of the concept of Christo-Slavism in Serbia, or the belief that Serbs are a chosen people who are divinely ordained to be Orthodox Christians, degenerated into a view of non-Orthodox peoples as Christ-killers. In somewhat different fashion, the melding of Shinto and Japanese nationalism was intended to provide unity for the Japanese nation, but by elevating the Japanese nation above the rest of the world, the door was opened for an aggressive nationalism that legitimized the subjugation of other nations. Finally, because religion is such an effective means of providing cosmological significance, those societies that undergo dramatic religious transformations are prone to see their political authority undermined. The cases of Africa and Asia are illustrative here. The spread of Christianity in Africa has often resulted in the emergence of revolutionary groups with religious overtones—such as the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda—or in political transitions that result in Christians coming to power. This was also the case in China in the second half of the 19th century when the leaders of the Taiping Rebellion sought to tear down the imperial system and to establish a “heavenly kingdom” on Earth. It seems that dramatic religious transformations in a society have the potential to undermine political authority unless the regime is quickly able to identify itself with the new religion. Even if religion was not a component of nationalism under the ancien régime, this is no guarantee that those who have found a new religious conviction will not want leaders who share their beliefs. Religion and Nationalism in the Modern World Religion’s relationship with nationalism is a complicated one, and throughout history it has been put to use to both positive and negative effect. By facilitating the formation of an identity above that of traditional tribal and linguistic groups, religion has played a productive role in the formation of many multinational nations. Likewise, religion has also been to blame for many failed attempts to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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form nations from people who share common ethnic and linguistic traits, with Yugoslavia serving as a reminder of just how difficult religious differences can be to overcome. Although religion’s ability to strengthen in-group bonds can be used effectively to unite members of a society, its negative effects on relations with outside groups can be quite visible. The stronger the role that religion plays in the formation of an in-group identity, the more likely that the group will find it difficult to maintain peaceful relations with other groups who do not share the same religious tradition. In a very real sense, it is this phenomenon that is at the core of the “clash of civilizations” debate. For many, the end of World War II signaled a new age in international relations, one in which religion and parochial identities were to play a much less significant role than in previous periods in history. With the spread of communism and the initiation of the Cold War, ideologies and value-based identities seemed to be transforming the world around us. The collapse of those regimes and the failure of policies of forced secularization attest to the difficulty of eradicating religion and nationalism, and in today’s desecularizing world, it would be foolish to discount the continuing significance of the relationship between religion and nationalism. Selected Bibliography Baron, Salo Wittmayer. 1947. Modern Nationalism and Religion. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1971. Bellah, Robert. 1967. “Civil Religion in America.” Daedalus 96, no. 1 (Winter): 1–21. Berger, Peter. 1967. The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. Berger, Peter, ed. 1999. The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans. Boyle, Kevin, and Juliet Sheen, eds. 1997. Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report. London and New York: Routledge. Colley, Linda. 1992. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Davis, R. H. C. 1958. A History of Medieval Europe. London: Longman’s. De La Harpe, Jean-François. 2001. Cours de Littérature Ancienne et Moderne. Boston: Adamant Media Corporation. (Orig. pub. 1840.) Dostoyevsky, Fyodor. 1972. The Dream of a Queer Fellow/The Pushkin Speech. London: Unwin. Durkheim, Émile. 1965. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. New York: Free Press. (Orig. pub. 1915.) Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Himmelfarb, Gertrude. 1993. “The Dark and Bloody Crossroads: Where Nationalism and Religion Meet.” The National Interest 32 (Summer): 53–62. Hobsbawm, Eric. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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Juergensmeyer, Mark. 1993. The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Sells, Michael. 1996. The Bridge Betrayed: Religion and Genocide in Bosnia. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Weber, Eugene. 1979. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. London: Chatto & Windus.


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National Symbols Michael E. Geisler Relevance Why Nations Need Symbols The German satirist Kurt Tucholsky once quipped that “every human being has a liver, a spleen, a lung, and a flag. All four organs are essential for life. One has heard of people without a liver, without a spleen, and with half a lung; but there are no human beings without a flag.” Why are national symbols so important to so many people? Why is it that politicians feel the need to “wrap themselves in the flag?” Why did New York firemen raise the Star-Spangled Banner on the ruins of the World Trade Center, imitating the Iwo Jima Monument? Why are American schoolchildren asked to pledge allegiance to the flag? Why do audiences break into tears while watching the famous scene in Casablanca in which the Czech resistance fighter Victor Laszlo induces the ragtag patrons of Rick’s Café to launch into a stirring rendition of “La Marseillaise,” the national anthem of France, with Nazi officers glowering in the background? Even though it often seems quite normal to us, there is nothing “natural” in our response to national symbols. There is no inherent reason why Americans should rise when their national anthem is played at the opening ceremony of a football game. Whether we believe that (some) nations, as social and political organizations, are thousands of years old and that nationalism responds to some kind of anthropological need, or whether we consider both as modernist forms that have come into existence only at the end of the supraregional empires marked by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (A. D. Smith 2000; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Anderson 2002), there are few scholars who would question the crucial role played by national symbols in the process of nation-building itself. Symbols, as catalysts and media of collective organization, hark back to prehistoric times. Émile Durkheim first directed our attention to the social organization of experience by symbols. In his study of Australian aborigines, Durkheim showed that the significance of totems for the survival of a clan extended well beyond religious matters; a most important function of these symbols was to maintain a stable experience of the world among collectives. Without such symbols, Durkheim said, “social feelings could have only an unstable existence.” As soon as the group loses physical contact with each other, cohesiveness begins to fade. The transference of emotions onto totemic emblems maintains the collective identity of the group. To Durkheim, it made no difference whether such feelings


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are “incarnated” in persons or in what he called “formulas”: “Some formulas are flags; some real or mythic personages are symbols” (Durkheim 1912, 233). A symbol reduces the enormous complexity of communication by using a concrete sign as a kind of shorthand for a web of interrelated concepts, ideals, and value systems. The larger the collective to be held together by the symbol, the more complex is the signification process, that is, the process of attaching meaning to a symbol to which all members or subsets of the group can subscribe. It is precisely at the intersection of small-scale social organizations (like the tribal village or the polis, the city-state in ancient Greece), defined by a shared regional identity, and that more amorphous collective, the nation, that the symbol comes into its own as a communicative device. The nation-state is a form of large-scale collective organization that evolved quite logically at a time when mass communication and mass transport were rapidly making older, more regional networks both economically and politically obsolete. However, by their very size, nationstates must contend with a significant amount of centrifugal pull—people identify first and foremost with their city or region and only secondarily with their nation and the state that claims to represent it. This is where national symbols take on a crucial role. The Greek origin of the word symbol, to symbolon, refers to the joining of two corresponding pieces, each of which is held by a person who is able to recognize the other individual (or, more importantly, his designate) by the missing piece. Presumably, the only reason somebody would have to pass this kind of identity check is because one of the pair has been traveling. Consequently, the symbol, from its very beginning, has been tied to forms of supraregional communication, whether in the form of commerce, exploration, political conquest, or any combination of these three. Over time, symbols evolved to become the communicative macros or metaphor clusters that we have come to understand. Yet underlying the narrative coral reefs that many symbols present (with layers and layers of cultural signification clustering around the original metaphor), there is always the basic function of shorthand communication, to be projected across the boundaries of time and space. Symbols thus are “present in political events whenever social conflict is expressed or solved and whenever social identity is confirmed. . . . Cultural values, although a fundamental component of the cultural system, do not exist in any material form outside symbolic texts” (Mach 1993, 37). National symbols fuse the nation, as a cultural, historical, and ideological construct, to the state, as an empirical reality; this is their single, most important function. They do so by giving “concrete meaning and visibility to the abstractions of nationalism” (A. D. Smith 1991, 73). The three vertical stripes of the flag of the Republic of Ireland, for example, show green as the color representing traditional Irish Catholic nationalism, orange as the color of Protestant loyalism (harking back to William of Orange who reestablished Protestantism in both England and Ireland), and white as the symbol of hope for peace between the two factions. The Irish tricolor thus seeks to overlay the ideological construction of a unified, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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nonsectarian nation over the political reality of what was at least in its beginnings a Catholic state with an oppressed Protestant minority. Conversely, the state of Northern Ireland flies the British Union Jack, thus signaling not only its continued allegiance to Great Britain, but also the fact that the six counties making up Northern Ireland do not consider themselves a separate nation of any kind but derive their collective identity from what they perceive of as their loyalty to Britain. Yet the Irish Catholic Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland is rapidly approaching the 50 percent mark (at which point they could presumably join the Republic of Ireland by means of a simple majority vote). The ensuing tensions between Nationalists and Loyalists have not only led to more than 30 years of civil strife (the “Irish Troubles”) but they have also found an expression in territorial claims by both sides, claims expressed through national symbols. Protestant/ Loyalist boroughs use the Union Jack to demarcate their territory, down to painting curbstones and lampposts in the British national colors (Jarman 2005). Catholic/Nationalist neighborhoods have responded with the liberal use of the Irish tricolor. Given the tension between the two groups, the symbols used in both cases also serve a very practical purpose as guideposts: they signal to members of the respective communities where they “belong,” where they can feel safe, and where their sense of collective identity will be validated. The same goes for the colorful murals (of “King Billy” on his white horse at the Battle of the Boyne, for instance), which are, as it were, placeholders for national symbols in a state without its own separate national identity, whose citizens define themselves as either “Irish” or “British.” The case of Northern Ireland, precisely because of its somewhat exceptional nature, throws the importance of national symbols as key ingredients of collective identity formation into higher relief. There may be states that do not qualify as nations, and there have been many nations in history without a state, at least temporarily (the Jews, the Poles, the Palestinians), but there are no nations without national symbols. Especially in those cases where the territorial boundaries of the state do not correspond to the geographic outlines of the ancestral “homeland” claimed by a nation, or where a state is created without the ideological support structure of a nation, such as the United States of America (Connor 1994, 95), national symbols are charged with the difficult task of making a nation. What Is a National Symbol? Before we go on to discuss their uses and functions, we need to clarify what is and what is not a national symbol. Anthony D. Smith (1991) proposes a register of national symbols that would include not only “flags, anthems, parades, coinage, capital cities, oaths, folk costumes, museums of folklore, war memorials, ceremonies of remembrance for the national dead, passports, frontiers” but also “national recreations, the countryside, popular heroes and heroines, fairy tales, forms of etiquette, styles of architecture, arts and crafts, modes of town planning, legal procedures, educational practices and military codes—all those distinctive N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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customs, mores, styles and ways of acting and feeling that are shared by the members of a community of historical culture.” One might easily expand on Smith’s list even further to include, for instance, the writing system, national monuments in general (beyond war memorials), stamps (as a collective subsystem), allegorical figures representing alleged national characteristics (Uncle Sam, Marianne), animals, both real and mythical (the eagle, the Russian bear, or the Chinese dragon), and certain elements belonging to the sphere of high cultural production: literature, music, the fine arts, the cinema. In addition, David Marsland (2001, 220) adds maps, business advertising, and tourist materials. The Swiss flag is a particularly successful example of the fusion of a national symbol and the branding of an economic product (the white cross against a red background endorsing innumerable products from army knives to “swatches” to water bottles with the “Swiss quality” stamp of approval). Types of dance have been cited as national symbols: the tango for Argentina, the flamenco for Spain, and the merengue for the Dominican Republic. Some people even consider wine a national symbol of France. A particularly interesting subcategory are national leadership figures (William Tell, Jeanne d’Arc, Abraham Lincoln, Winston Churchill). Their significance as national symbols extends far beyond the pedagogical use made of their example by grade-school textbooks and similar “educational” materials. Whereas in the United States, for instance, the president is simultaneously the chief executive of the state, the commander-in-chief of the army, and the representative figurehead of the nation, these roles are distributed among different government positions in other countries. In Britain, the prime minister is the chief executive, and the queen is the titular leader of the nation; in Germany and Israel, the chancellor and prime minister, respectively, are the chief political executives, while in both cases the president represents the nation. These constitutional arrangements have a significant impact on the way people in these countries see their leaders. Whereas in England, Germany, and Israel, criticism of the prime minister’s or chancellor’s policies are treated primarily as a political dispute, political attacks on the American president as the proponent of a particular policy (i.e., as a political leader) are sometimes (mis)understood as attacks on the president as the symbolic figurehead of the American nation—and thus as an attack on the nation itself. This effect has, of course, not been lost on holders of that high office, many of whom knew how to turn such misunderstandings to their political advantage. The symbolic use of national landscapes connects older concepts of regionalism and regional identity (dialect, ethnic traditions) to the more abstract centralist notion of a national culture: the Alps as a symbol for Switzerland, and the Rhine as the classically contested symbol claimed by both Germany and France. Landscapes are the symbolic link between the region and the nation. For this reason, they are frequently evoked by cultural critics of the existing political or social N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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order in a nostalgic or sentimental way that—explicitly or implicitly—pits the “authentic” nature of a regional landscape and regional traditions against the allegedly more constructed nature of the nation-state. Yet it is debatable whether landscapes really qualify as national or regional symbols. A distinction needs to be made between national symbols, which are a phenomenon of relatively modern times, and ancient transnational symbols, which are shared by many different cultures, such as the Christian cross or the Islamic crescent. However, ancient transnational symbols have also been incorporated into some modern national symbols: the cross is prominently displayed on the flags of Switzerland, Greece, Great Britain, and the Scandinavian countries (among others), and the crescent is featured on the flags of many countries with predominantly Islamic populations such as Turkey, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Algeria.

Origins The Religious Background of National Symbols As Émile Durkheim’s reference to totems and the afterlife of ancient transnational symbols in many national symbols demonstrates, collective symbols have been around since ancient times. Yet what endows national symbols, in particular flags and anthems and certain national monuments, with such an intense affective energy, an emotional force that causes us to break into tears when listening to our national anthem or feel a sense of elation when ascending the steps of the Lincoln Memorial, is not merely their importance as signifiers of our national heritage but also the historical vacuum they filled. In the wake of the terrible destruction wrought by Europe’s most devastating religious war (the Thirty Years’ War, which ended in 1648), religion as the most powerful ideological force was replaced, in some countries, by a secular competitor: the nation. In the more secular world created by the Enlightenment, science, and industrialization, a world in which religion had lost its central role as purveyor of collective identity, nationalism provided people with a new overarching sense of communion, belonging, identity, and collective purpose. In this context, nationalism has been referred to as a “civil religion” (Bellah, 1967). For the nationalist project to succeed, national symbols must be imbued with the same kind of spirituality that had hitherto been reserved for the cross or the crescent. Where this ideological cross-pollination does not succeed, the nation, as an ideological construct, will likely fail (unless the “secular religion” merges with its predecessor, as has happened in many Islamic nations), even though the state may survive without it for some time. Different nations have chosen different ways of accomplishing this ideological grafting. The most common recipe involves a kind of ideological plagiarism; for their national symbols, the intellectual elites that shaped the nation simply adopted elements of religious symbolism, recombining them with the symbolic N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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register of nationalism. We have already discussed the migration of the cross and the crescent onto national flags of various nations. In the Balkans, where people’s strong religious beliefs made the idea of simply replacing religious traditions with secular ones a risky proposition for nationalists, the ensuing compromises involved, among other ideological stratagems, the casting of religious leaders in the role of “founding fathers” of the nation (Bishop Germanos in Greece) and the “doubling” of religious holidays as national holidays—Annunciation Day for Greece (March 25) and St. Vitus’s Day for Serbia (June 28), which is also the day on which Serbians traditionally commemorate the Kosovo Battle of 1389. The Serb case is particularly interesting since the fusion of religious traditions and secular nationalism, as articulated in the June 28th commemoration, proved sturdy enough to survive four decades of Titoist suppression of Serb nationalism (Roudometof 2005, 52). The Israeli flag features the Star of David, while the menorah is the national emblem. Both are religious symbols (the menorah more overtly so than the Star of David), while more secular national symbols such as the Roaring Lion of Tel Hai, which commemorates the very secular struggles of the early settlers, have faded over time (Mayer 2005). Similarly, the strong formal affinities of many national anthems to religious hymns are a reminder of their musical origins. National Symbols as “Invented Traditions” Whether we think of nations as primordial or perennial phenomena or consider them modernist social constructions (Anderson 2002), the symbols representing them, although often perceived of as an ancient or organic part of a nation’s history, are actually “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983) reaching back no further than the 18th century for the most part. The flag, for instance, dates back as a signal, that is, a medium of communication, to 1542 BC India and as an emblem of dynastic power to ancient China (Chou dynasty, 1122 BC). Yet the oldest flag used as a national symbol, the flag of Denmark, can be dated with certainty to late medieval times only, and even the Swiss flag, representing a nation that can trace its roots to 1291, did not replace the old cantonal coats of arms of the Swiss Federation until 1848. In contradistinction to many other national symbols such as the anthem and the holiday, the flag and the national emblem not only represent the nation-state to other nation-states, they also assert the state’s claim to represent the nation to the nation itself. In other words, each time we spot our national flag or our national emblem, we are reminded that the particular state we live in, with its specific political and economic system, claims to be the one and only legitimate articulation of the nation as a cultural, social, and historic collective. The state invests the flag and the emblem with the official imprimatur of its power over the lives and welfare of its citizens. This may be why the burning of the flag is seen as a symbolic attack on the country itself and why “desecration of the flag” is a much more serious offense against national etiquette than, for instance, a parody of the national anthem or N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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a critical essay on the conventions of a national holiday. While some nations feel that their anthems also ought to be protected against satirical attacks or disrespectful renditions, the public outrage following such an offense is usually relatively short-lived, as was the case when comedienne Roseanne Barr “murdered” the U.S. national anthem at a baseball game in 1990 by singing it off key and ending her performance with an obscene gesture. By contrast, the burning of the flag, especially in the United States, is taken so seriously that there may yet be a constitutional amendment restricting this freedom of expression. In the hierarchy of national symbols, the flag is (literally) at the top of the totem pole. The oldest national anthems we know are the Dutch “Wilhelmus van Nassouwe” (which can be traced back to the early 17th century but was not declared the Netherlands’s national anthem until 1932) and the English “God Save the King,” written in the 1740s (we don’t know exactly by whom) and first performed in London in 1745, probably in symbolic defiance of the Scottish (Jacobite) rebellion. One of the most interesting aspects of national anthems is their almost chronic intertextuality. Part of the reason we don’t know whether the English anthem was written by Henry Carey (as both Joseph Haydn, who heard the hymn in England in the 1790s, and John Philip Sousa thought) or by Henry Purcell or John Bull is that, in various ways, they each contributed something to the anthem, which nevertheless turned out to be such a success that Ludwig van Beethoven, Carl Maria von Weber, Johannes Brahms, Giacomo Meyerbeer, Charles Gounod, and scores of other composers all adopted the tune as part of various compositions (Eyck 1995). Joseph Haydn was so impressed with both the anthem and its acceptance by the people in England that he resolved to write a similar hymn for the Austrian empire (then technically still the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation). In turn, Haydn’s composition, the “Kaiserquartett” (Emperor’s Quartet), written as a hymn to the Austrian emperor and featuring a slow, folkloric tune in intentional contradistinction to the revolutionary clamor of the “Marseillaise,” eventually became associated with Hoffmann von Fallersleben’s “Lied der Deutschen,” the current national anthem of Germany. During Bismarck’s empire, the preferred anthem of the Prussian monarchy, however, was “Heil Dir im Siegerkranz” (Hail to You Wearing the Victor’s Wreath)—sung to the tune of “God Save the King.” The same composition is, of course, also the tune for an unofficial competitor for the American national anthem, “My Country, ’Tis of Thee.” The “Star-Spangled Banner” itself, on the other hand, written by Francis Scott Key while watching the terrible bombardment of Fort McHenry, presents the interesting case of a national symbol (the anthem) grafted onto another national symbol (the flag), not only confirming the ranking of symbols as outlined above but, more importantly, attesting to the crucial role of national symbols in articulating some of the collective myths that hold a nation together. Although public monuments usually lack the “official” state-endowed status accorded the flag, the currency, or even the national holiday, they may nevertheless N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Sheet music of the “Star-Spangled Banner,” printed in 1861. The lyrics of the song were written in the War of 1812 and the song gained popularity through the 19th century, until it was finally officially adopted as the anthem of the United States in 1931. (Library of Congress)


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exert significant influence over the collective self-image of a nation. In the United States of America, this is certainly true of the Lincoln Memorial, the White House, and, above all, the Statue of Liberty. The latter’s unusual genesis makes this particular monument a more genuine expression of the collective mythology of the American people than most other national symbols. While defacements of public monuments may be subject only to relatively minor legal penalties (more likely for the destruction of public property than for the offense against the national symbol), the actual destruction of an important national monument carries a very different, and often traumatic, emotional charge. The 1933 burning of the German parliament building, the Reichstag, by Marinus van der Lubbe, provided the National Socialists with an excuse for forcing passage of the infamous Enabling Law that gave Hitler dictatorial powers. More recently, the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center turned what until then had been at most an unofficial or virtual national symbol into a real one. Moreover, the targets chosen by Mohammed Atta and his group—the Twin Towers and the Pentagon—highlight yet another facet of national symbolism: not all national symbols are created by the nation or state with which they are associated—some symbols are projected onto a nation by others. While many of these are ephemeral, emerging in the context of particular international political and cultural configurations and disappearing just as quickly, others may be more stable and exercise a significant degree of control over the imaginations of people living in other countries. Some Americans may have vaguely conceived of the Twin Towers as emblems of America’s economic prowess even before 9/11, but few U.S. citizens (but a great many members of other nations) would have assigned such a role to the Pentagon. However, there is little doubt that the Twin Towers, at least as apocalyptic-looking structures of molten steel, have since become a new national symbol for most Americans. The example of the Twin Towers reminds us that national symbols may crystallize around a nation’s traumatic events, often serving as a “permanent” reminder to the nation that events such as the one commemorated by the symbol “must never be allowed to happen again.” Other symbols in this category are the USS Arizona Memorial, the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, or the Hiroshima Peace Memorial (Genbaku Dome) in Japan. The difference between these and other war memorials is that there exists an indexical relationship between the symbol and the event commemorated by it. In other words, instead of simply being the result of an apt metaphor or an artistic creation, the symbol in these cases bear within them material traces of the very event they commemorate. They do not merely commemorate; they are also assigned an evidentiary function as part of their portfolio, that is, the task to preserve part of the historical evidence within the symbol itself. While most symbols are metaphorical in nature, in other words, one mental operation removed from the collective myth or value to which they refer, symbols like the USS Arizona Memorial and the Wailing Wall could be described as material trace symbols (or, in semiotic terms, indexical symbols). The purpose N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of such symbolic sites is to facilitate the work of mourning by displacing the trauma, as well as the widespread anxiety caused by the sudden and unexpected tear in the fabric of collective identity, into the imaginary realm of the national narrative.

Dimensions What makes national symbols, like the flag, powerful enough that people are willing to die for them? Again, Émile Durkheim’s early description of the process is amazingly astute: We cannot detect the source of the strong feelings we have in an abstract entity that we can imagine only with difficulty and in a jumbled way. We can comprehend those feelings only in connection with a concrete object whose reality we feel intensely. . . . The symbol thus takes the place of the thing, and the emotions aroused are transmitted to the symbol. It is the symbol that is loved, feared, and respected. . . . And it is to the symbol that one sacrifices oneself. The soldier, who dies for his flag, dies for his country, but the idea of the flag is actually in the foreground of his consciousness. . . . He forgets that the flag is only a symbol that has no value in itself but only brings to mind the reality it represents. The flag itself is treated as if it was that reality. (Durkheim 1912, 221)

The feelings of attachment, affinity, or solidarity we may harbor for a particular group or collective are projected onto the symbolic object. The problem with this process is that, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is to sustain the emotional energy needed to embrace the whole group. Even though people pay lip service to this ideal all the time, it is actually fairly difficult to “love” a nation, much less a state. The object of our affection, or love, is simply too diffuse. National symbols function as stand-ins for the nation (or the state) by giving us something that is tangible, concrete, and available for sensory experience. That is why we refer to symbols—including national symbols—as examples of objectified emotions. Unfortunately, Durkheim’s explanation for the modality by which national symbols accrue this emotional investment by millions of people is ultimately unsatisfying. He simply speaks of “spontaneous attachment”; however, there is absolutely nothing about a national symbol to which an emotion could “spontaneously attach” itself. Rather, this process occurs over a long period of time and as the result of what in cultural studies has been called “overdetermination.” This term is used to describe an invisible cultural web formed by all public institutions that implicates everybody in an all-encompassing network of signification maintained by the redundant and repetitious expression of the same ideas and values. What we learn in school is reinforced by what we see in movies, which is confirmed by what we read in the newspapers, which agrees with the stateN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ments made by politicians, which reflects what priests and ministers preach to us from the pulpit, and so on. Overdetermination works because each of these institutions echoes what all the others say, producing a cumulative effect (Althusser 1971). The term is an apt description of the way in which we are indoctrinated to accept natural symbols as “naturalized” expressions of our collective identity. On a typical day, I will spot the U.S. flag both virtually (on the morning news) and in reality, flying in front of numerous public buildings. I will see various national monuments and national leaders depicted on dollar bills (one type of national symbol grafted on top of another); I may be treated to a rendition of the U.S. national anthem on a Web site or as part of a live broadcast of a football game; and I will, of course, be exposed to innumerable variations of red-whiteand-blue on advertisements, television commercials, and product packaging. Most of these I will not even notice, at least not consciously, because I have been conditioned to expect them and to accept this as the natural order of things. Michael Billig refers to this ubiquity of (largely “unnoticed”) national symbols as “Banal Nationalism” (Billig 1995), pointing out that nationalist ideologies and behaviors are by no means limited to radical groups on the extreme right but are as pervasive in liberal democracies as they are overlooked, because we have been trained or “naturalized” to overlook them. As an “overdetermined” system, national symbols persuade us to accept the ideological, social, economic, and political realities of the state in which the “accident of birth” has placed us as the only possible order. Through constant exposure to these symbols, the particular historical context in which we grew up appears to most of us as the only “natural” way of life: “The historical nation aspires to achieve the inevitability of the status of natural law” (Berlant 1991, 25). A by-product of this process in which the nation as an ideological concept is connected to the state as an empirical reality is the teaching of “our national history.” Each generation of American schoolchildren has to be taught anew that the 50 stars on their flag represent the 50 states and that the 13 stripes stand for the original 13 states. Through this process of permanent recursive communication, the national symbol not only assures loyalty to the state but also serves as a historical “bookmark,” a link to actual or legendary events in the nation’s past that helped shape it. Each time this “bookmark” is actualized ( for example, a flag being saluted or a national anthem being played), it reminds us of our collective history as a nation, a shared past that makes us a nation, bestowing upon each of us a sense of collective identity. The monumental Lieux de mémoire movement, which originated in France under the guidance of the historian Pierre Nora, is essentially a vastly expanded version of this bookmarking function of national symbols. By seeking to preserve France’s most important “realms of memory” (the English translation of les lieux de mémoire), Nora and his fellow historians assembled what they considered the essential pieces of French historical identity in the hope of thus preserving this identity for future generations (Nora 1996). The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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similarities between the bookmarking function of national symbols and the Realms of Memory project become manifest in the third volume of the American edition, which explicitly focuses on national symbols. But many of the other realms of memory cited by Nora and his associates (such as the Tour de France or Gastronomy) could also be subsumed under the label of national symbols. Another important reason for the strong appeal of national symbols is that they shore up individual identity. Ironically, this happens by giving some of it up, suspending it within a larger, transcendent individuality—that of the nation. In doing so, national symbols, if only momentarily, allow us to overcome one of the horrors of modernity—individuation, the modernist anxiety that makes many people (especially those living in secular nations) feel disconnected from the society they live in. As Benedict Anderson (2002, 145) says about the feelings generated by listening to one’s national anthem, especially on ceremonial occasions: “There is in this singing an experience of simultaneity. At precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each other utter the same verses to the same melody. . . . How selfless this unisonance feels.” “Selfless” is the key to this experience. As the national anthem beckons us to lose our individual selves in the totality of the whole, comprised of all those who, through their simultaneous communication with the national symbol, become part of us as we become part of them, its attendant promise is to make us whole again. The feeling of suspending one’s individuality in the collective whole is one of the most powerful psychological elements of the semiotics of national symbols— and at the same time, one of the most dangerous. On the one hand, the transcendent affect of the anthem is what makes all those people singing the “Marseillaise” in Rick’s Café forget their everyday worries and concerns, the thousand little compromises that they, like all of us, make every day. Instead, they experience the rapture of being caught up in a community, of rising above one’s egotistical self and anxieties to support a common cause and being swept away by collective emotion. On the other hand, the threatening presence of the Nazi officers in the background reminds us of the abuse this affective power of national symbols can engender given extreme forms of nationalism. One way to understand the function and operation of national symbols is to think of them as a communications or mass media system (Geisler 2005). We have already seen that national symbols work in concert to establish a web of communication that “naturalizes” our experience of everyday reality by reassuring us of our collective identity, our “belonging” to a particular culture, with its particular language, history, and social conventions. In this they bear a strong resemblance to the operation of mass media. Like mass media, national symbols “implicate the individual members of the culture into its dominant value systems, . . . assure the culture at large of its practical adequacy in the world by affirming and confirming its ideologies/mythologies, . . . convince the audience that their status and identity as individuals is guaranteed by the culture as a whole . . . and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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transmit by these means a sense of cultural membership (security and involvement)” (Fiske and Hartley 1978, 88). Just as newspapers, television, the Internet, and other media construct our everyday lives by generating and maintaining a stable and seemingly immutable “background reality” (Luhmann 2000), that is, the kind of reality we take for granted when we leave our house to go to work in the morning, so national symbols, through the very redundancy of their communication, stabilize our sense of collective identity. In both cases the psychological gain for the individual is a reduction of the risk of a breakdown in the way we experience everyday reality on a psychological level. Precisely through their predictable (and therefore reliable) ubiquity, national symbols seem to confirm that the world as we know it will continue to exist without the threat of overly disruptive conflict and contradiction, no matter what disturbing stories the news media may tell us. That is one reason why, when such disruptions in the fabric of everyday reality do occur (as was the case with the attacks of September 11, 2001), people “rally around the flag” in the hope of being reassured that the “background reality” they have taken for granted still exists. Like mass media, national symbols may be used in ways for which they were not intended: to subvert the power structure they are meant to buttress. This may in fact happen in two entirely different ways, either by a direct attack on the symbols (burning the flag, spraying graffiti on monuments, and so on), or more subtly, by using national symbols to reclaim a part of their definition that is believed to be lost—think of the iconic use of the U.S. flag in Easy Rider or the pivotal role played by the Lincoln Memorial in Frank Capra’s Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (and many other movies). Finally, the role they play in promoting and sustaining a certain ideology may, at least in liberal democracies, be seized upon by underprivileged groups and redirected against the dominant (or “hegemonic”) culture, as an implicit promise made, but not fulfilled, by the ideology for which the national symbol stands. This “subversive” use of a national symbol is exemplified by Jimi Hendrix’s interpretation of the U.S. national anthem or, more recently, by the significance of the national holiday celebration featured in Oliver Stone’s 1989 film Born on the Fourth of July. Perhaps the most famous instance of a reappropriation of a national symbol by an oppressed minority group is Martin Luther King’s 1963 speech at the Lincoln Memorial, in which he used the impressive backdrop of the monument to remind the nation of the values celebrated by it.

Consequences Over time, national symbols are naturalized to the point where it is no longer feasible for many people to think of alternative representations. Yet alternatives to national symbols have existed as long as the symbols themselves, and there is N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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perhaps not a single one that has not been the subject of attacks, attempts to replace it with another symbol, or, at the very least, a renegotiation of its meaning and the specific values it represents. In the United States, the civil rights movement has changed the political landscape, creating in the process a new national symbol—Martin Luther King Day—as an additional bookmark in the American national narrative; and the veterans of the war in Vietnam have permanently “reminded” the nation of a war it desperately wished to forget, resulting in another new national symbol—the memorial wall. National symbols are a powerful expression of our collective imagination. Yet, although some symbols are more revered than others, they are far more fragile than they appear. They do have a shelf life and may change, lose some of their relevance, or even disappear over time. Selected Bibliography Althusser, Louis. 1971. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” In Lenin and Philosophy, translated by Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books. Anderson, Benedict. 2002. Imagined Communities. Rev. ed. London: Verso. Bellah, Robert N. 1967. “Civil Religion in America.” In The Robert Bellah Reader, edited by Robert N. Bellah and Steven M. Tipton, 225–245. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2006. (Orig. pub. in Daedalus 96, no. 1 (Winter 1967): 1–21.) Berlant, Lauren. 1991. The Anatomy of National Fantasy: Hawthorne, Utopia, and Everyday Life. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Cerulo, Karen A. 1995. Identity Designs: The Sights and Sounds of a Nation. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Connor, Walker. 1994. Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Durkheim, Émile. 1912. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. Translated by Karen E. Fields. New York: The Free Press, 1995. Eyck, F. Gunther. 1995. The Voice of Nations: European National Anthems and Their Authors. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Fiske, John, and John Hartley. 1978. Reading Television. London: Methuen. Geisler, Michael E., ed. 2005. National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Hobsbawm, Eric, and Terence Ranger, eds. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jarman, Neil. 2005. “Painting Landscapes: The Place of Murals in the Symbolic Construction of Urban Space.” In National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative, edited by Michael E. Geisler, 172–191. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Luhmann, Niklas. 2000. The Reality of the Mass Media. Translated by Kathleen Cross. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Mach, Zdzislaw. 1993. Symbols, Conflict, and Identity. Essays in Political Anthropology. Albany: State University of New York Press. Marsland, David. 2001. “National Symbols.” In Encyclopedia of Nationalism, edited by Athena S. Leoussi, 220–222. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.


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Mayer, Tamar. 2005. “National Symbols in Jewish Israel: The Interplay of the Religious and the Secular.” In National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative, edited by Michael E. Geisler, 3–34. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Nora, Pierre, ed. 1996. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. English language edition edited by Lawrence D. Kritzmann, translated by Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Columbia University Press. Roudometof, Victor. 2005. “National Commemorations in the Balkans.” In National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative, edited by Michael E. Geisler, 35–59. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Smith, Anthony D. 1991. National Identity. Reno: University of Nevada Press. Smith, Anthony D. 2000. The Nation in History. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England. Smith, Whitney. 2001. “National Symbols.” In Encyclopedia of Nationalism, vol. 1, edited by Alexander Motyl, 521–530. San Diego: Harcourt.


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Technology and Nationalism Joshua Barker and Sharon Kelly Relevance The birth and spread of nationalism and nation-states between the 18th and 20th centuries took place against a backdrop of tremendous social and technological upheaval. The last decades of the 18th century witnessed not just the American and French revolutions but the advent of a host of new technologies, including the power loom, the cotton gin, and the steamship. During the 19th century, as nationalism was spreading throughout Europe and the Americas, technological change continued apace, with such revolutionary inventions as the steam locomotive, the telegraph, the typewriter, the machine gun, and the telephone. During the first half of the 20th century, as independence movements emerged and gained strength in many parts of colonized Asia and Africa, societies across the globe were being transformed by the widespread adoption and use of cinema, radio communication, automobiles, and airplanes. Nations are typically conceived of as bounded territories inhabited by a group of people who lay claim to a common culture, language, history, and future. Over the past few centuries, the ideas that inform nationalism have provided the basis for political struggles leading to the establishment of hundreds of nation-states around the world. Although other forms of large-scale social organization and collective identity, such as monarchies and religious groups, continue to be important in many parts of the world, nation-states unquestionably have become the predominant political structure for containing and organizing human societies on a large scale. The fact that nationalism and nation-states emerged and spread during a period of rapid technological advancement has led numerous scholars to suggest that the two historical processes are interconnected. In this article we will describe two ways in which the history of technology and the history of nationalism may be understood to be causally intertwined: technological determinism and social determinism. We will also describe a way of understanding the relation between technology and nationalism that does not focus on their causal links but on the symbolic linkages and associations between the two. Impacts of Technology on Nationalism Technological determinism is the belief that technologies have the power to alter society and to shape peoples’ perceptions of the world they live in. When examining the relation between technology and nationalism, a focus on technological N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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determinism draws attention to the impacts technological changes have had on national societies and nationalist sentiments. For example, it can be shown that new communications and transport technologies break down the boundaries between social groups and unify people in new ways. Print technology, for instance, helped standardize languages through time and space, making it possible for a larger group of people to share both a common language and the awareness that they have a common language. Given the centrality of language to nationalist sentiments, it is easy to understand why the printing press might therefore be seen as having been a major cause for the rise of nationalism. The printing press was not alone in this regard. Various technologies have been shown to help unify people through the formation of a shared national public culture: the modern factory, the modern school, the railway, the automobile, and more. Technologies may be social unifiers, but they may also be dividers. The factory played an important role in the emergence of a mass culture, but it also precipitated the emergence of a society sharply divided along lines of economic class. The railway linked the American coasts together, helping create a relatively seamless national territory, but it also facilitated the devastation of American Indian communities with lasting consequences for the status of first nations groups within the American nation. When examining the effects of technology on nations and nationalism, it is important to recognize that new technologies can both enable and constrain nationalist sentiments, as well as unify and divide nations. Impacts of Nationalism on Technology Social determinism is the belief that social groups and social structures have the power to affect technological innovation and shape technological change. A focus on social determinism draws attention to the effects nationalist sentiments and nation-states have had on the invention and diffusion of technologies. Some of the most important means by which nation-states have affected technological change is through government planning, regulation, and investment. National governments themselves have been deeply involved in technological development, particularly in the construction of national infrastructures. The Canadian National Railway was exactly what its name suggested: a railway commissioned by the Canadian government and designed to serve the transport needs and to unify people across the large and disparate Canadian territory. The impact national governments had on material infrastructures was also evident in other large technological systems; telegraph and telephone networks, road networks, and electricity grids were all organized largely along national lines. Even when these networks were built by private businesses, they were heavily regulated to ensure they served national interests, or at least the interests of the national elite. Telegraphy is a particularly striking example of this tendency. Telegraph networks spread rapidly in the 19th century, wiring nations into systems that could N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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rapidly transmit messages. Such networks often allowed for global connections. By 1874, it took only four minutes to telegraph a message from London to Bombay and receive a reply. Twenty-five years earlier, without the benefit of new technologies, this process had taken 10 weeks. The chief motivation behind Britain’s telegraph network was not to link the metropole to its colony, however; it was to connect the nation. By the late 19th century, telegraph lines linked over 20,000 of Britain’s towns and villages, creating a dense net of domestic communication. Even when technological development is taking place outside the sphere of government authority, nationalist sentiment can have powerful impacts on the direction of technological change. For instance, many radio hobbyists in Java during the 1920s and 1930s viewed their pirate broadcast activities as playing a part in the Indonesian struggle for national independence. It was nationalism— rather than the prospect of personal fame or financial gain—that invested their hobby with historic significance and provided them with the motivation to continue innovating. In sum, whether in conjunction with the state or not, the nation has provided a fertile social and political ground for new technologies to flourish. Technologies as National Symbols The strong historical association between technological progress and nationbuilding has meant that technological achievements have often become viewed as symbols of national strength and power. Technological feats of human ingenuity, such as a tall tower, a big dam, a long bridge, or a fast car, have been used to suggest that the nation that produces them is a powerful, modern nation with a destiny for great things. The more remarkable human-made technologies, such as Paris’s Eiffel Tower or the Brooklyn Bridge, have become veritable icons of their respective nations. The Brooklyn Bridge, completed in 1883, was heralded as a feat of technological engineering and a symbol of collective American identity. On the day of its official opening, Brooklyn schools and businesses were closed, and 150,300 people crossed the bridge. The guest of honor was the president of the United States, highlighting the national significance of the event. The significance attached to the Brooklyn Bridge illustrates how technology entered into the broader repertoire of symbols that nations felt they ought to possess. It was not merely enough to have a language, flag, anthem, or common history; the nation needed a grand technology that would inspire awe in its beholders and confirm its legitimacy and status among nations worldwide. In examining the symbolic importance of technology to nationalism, it is not enough to focus on the meanings that leaders and engineers intended to give particular artifacts. History is replete with examples of technologies, such as the Titanic and the Hindenburg, that came to signify not a nation’s strength and modernity but its vulnerabilities and conceits. People give their own meanings to artifacts. In the case of technologies that serve as national icons, deciphering these meanings may reveal a great deal about how people feel about their nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Origins Modern nationalism could not exist without a shared and relatively uniform public culture. The “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) of the nation depends on each person being able to imagine him- or herself as being one individual among many similar individuals, all of whom share a culture and a set of rights. During the French Revolution, these rights were summed up as the famous triad of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. In the U.S. Constitution, they were summed up as Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness. In explaining the origins of modern nationalism, it is first necessary to explain the emergence of a way of thinking about persons that made them directly comparable to one another and endowed them with the same inherent rights. Prior to the 18th century, large-scale communities took the form of monarchies and religious communities. Neither of these kinds of community endowed their members with inalienable rights. Whereas monarchies imagined persons to be subjects and religious communities imagined them to be believers, nationalism asserted that they were citizens possessed of certain inalienable rights. New technologies played an important part in helping to constitute the kinds of public culture that would ultimately form the basis for nationalist awakenings. The printing press was of central importance in this regard. As Anderson has argued, print technology standardized vernacular language and encouraged mass literacy, making possible the creation of large reading publics. Information could be extended to people across great distances, with the ease of mutual comprehension due to a uniform language that followed standardized rules of grammar and syntax. Newspapers, novels, and other mass-produced, mass-circulated materials thus created a unified field in which ideas could be exchanged and ideologies communicated. Print technology also encouraged people to see themselves as sharing a time and a space with others in the reading public. Newspapers were particularly important in this regard since they reinforced the idea that distant events were happening at the same time as local events, thereby generating a sense that everyone was living in the same place and time. A public that was united could be mobilized for political, social, or religious causes. This unification was essential in the nationalist cause; once people could imagine their fellows as sharing a public culture, it became possible to imagine that this public ought to share certain fundamental rights and freedoms. As the Canadian theorist and technological determinist Marshall McLuhan eloquently put it, print enabled people to see each other for the first time. Print technology was not alone in encouraging the development of a standardized public culture. The modern factory, whose emergence is dated to the mid-18th century, played an important role in creating an urban, industrial culture that differed radically from the culture of work that had come previously. The factory changed the organization of work by increasing regimentation to meet N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Early 20th-century painting by Charles E. Mills of Benjamin Franklin in his print shop. Benedict Anderson has suggested that the printing press allowed “imagined communities” to be established, which formed the basis for nationalist identities. (Library of Congress)

the standardized demands placed on production by new industrial machinery. Factory work was characterized by uniformity and repetition. The development of factories resulted in increasing levels of occupational specialization and a more highly segmented division of labor. From the standpoint of social organization, this resulted in the development of a new breed of worker and a new breed of manager. As Ernest Gellner (1983) has argued, industrial production requires the cultivation of specialists—people trained in a generic set of skills that are easily transferable to a variety of occupations. To support industry, states have historically taken responsibility for manufacturing a literate, numerate workforce. During the 19th and 20th centuries, this was generally accomplished by instituting mass education systems. These education systems in turn produced a homogeneous, competent citizenry fluent in the culture of the nation and “free” to sell its labor power on the open market. This modern, metropolitan, mass culture was the ground in which nationalist consciousness took root. In sum, modern technologies caused people to interact with one another in ways not previously possible and broke down many old divisions, both geographical and social. This in turn precipitated a shift in how people understood their role in society and the place of their society in the broader world. In some cases, the effect of these shifts was to generate and reinforce a standardized public culture that would enable nationalist sentiments to emerge. Beneath the apparent unity created by modern technologies, however, there were also many divisions. The printing press and mass education may have expanded the literate class, but higher education remained the privilege of an elite. Factories may have standardized wage labor and work culture, but they also led N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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to radical social and economic inequalities throughout the industrialized world. Such divisions draw attention to the importance of social factors in shaping technological change. While new technologies may have contributed to the emergence of nationalism, the ways in which they were used often reflected existing social hierarchies and patterns of exclusion.

Dimensions The development and application of new technologies often fall under the purview of political and economic elites, and technologies have often been consciously appropriated by elements of these elites to advance their social and political agendas. The social unification made possible by new technologies should not be considered all-inclusive. Even as it unites people, technology can create new divisions, and such divisions can be intentionally promoted by those in control of particular technological projects. The construction of a railroad in India in the 1850s was initiated by British colonial leaders in an attempt to assert dominance and increase the economic potential of the colony. The British believed that the caste system was a deterrent to economic success, and they intended the railway to act as an equalizer. Members of different castes would travel the rails together, and caste divisions would be temporarily suspended. However, the railroad succeeded only in substituting one form of social hierarchy for another. Although Indians of different castes did indeed travel together, the division that railways emphasized was that between the colonizers and the colonized. A racialized employment hierarchy was established, and the most desirable jobs on the railroad—such as supervisor, driver, and administrator—were held by the British. Despite comprising the majority of the workforce, Indians were excluded from these positions in favor of more menial tasks. The types of rail travel permitted to different groups also revealed the segregation in colonized India. The majority of Indian passengers were relegated to third-class travel, whereas Westerners enjoyed first-class conditions. Second class was where some mixture took place, as it was reserved for low-income Europeans and high-ranking Indians. Through the establishment of the railroad, the British embarked on a project of modernization, intending to alter the existing social structure through technological change. Though the railroad may have temporarily thwarted certain forms of social differentiation, it created new divisions, as race and class divisions replaced those of caste. However, the railway also proved vital to the Indian nationalist project. The extensive rail network stoked Indian nationalism by obliterating obstacles of distance and inspiring Indians to abandon regional particularism in favor of national unification. In addition, the discrimination practiced by colonial railway officials helped strengthen the resolve of Indian nationalists to bring an end to the injustices of colonial rule. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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While the intended aims of technology can be subverted or denied, the control of technology can also be used to political advantage. The use of technology to cultivate nationalist sentiment was often exploited by national rulers, who appropriated technology to promote their authority to an imagined public. In 1932, King George V asserted the legitimacy of the British empire through the first Christmas broadcast. Launched on radio, the holiday broadcast would become an annual event. The first such broadcast was transmitted to Britain, Canada, Australia, India, Kenya, and South Africa. In his speech, King George V explicitly recognized the unifying force of technology: “I speak now from my home and from my heart to you all; to men and women so cut off by the snows, the desert, or the sea, that only voices out of the air can reach them.” The broadcast solidified the notion of an imagined community, linking the British empire in a message of common interest, spoken by a shared head of state. The broadcast also served a symbolic function. E. J. Hobsbawm (1990) suggests that it helped constitute the royal family as a public icon of national identification, both domestically and abroad. It also reinvigorated the status of the British royal family, which had been experiencing decreased public support. By portraying the monarchy as a distinctive symbol of national identity, the holiday broadcast provided the British nation and empire with an emblem of nationhood around which they could coalesce. Technology can be used to galvanize national publics, and it can also be used to mold a public in the image desired by the nation-state. The mass media is a particularly effective tool in this regard; its capacity to reach large numbers of people within a given national territory makes it a popular means by which to spread nationalist ideals in hopes of creating a unified public. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Mexican government undertook a nationalist project through the airwaves by disseminating a national culture to the dispersed and culturally diverse Mexican population. In 1924, the Mexican Ministry of Public Education established radio station XFX (originally CZE). The station offered a variety of programming, but its most significant project was to build a nation based on the transmission of a national musical heritage. Officials were torn between a desire to celebrate indigenous Mexican culture and a desire to establish a more modern, bourgeois, European-style society. Joy Elizabeth Hayes (2000) describes how the tension between these contrary goals was reconciled by the practice of mapping traditional musical forms onto a distinctly European structure. For example, indigenous music was performed by orchestras rather than regional musicians, and the work of Mexican composers was presented alongside that of noted European composers, such as Beethoven or Mozart. These tactics allowed for the celebration of authentic music but assimilated it into a distinctly bourgeois form. Although XFX can be praised for integrating popular cultural forms—actively derided by the Mexican elite—into “high culture,” it is also clear that indigenous music was, for the most part, not accepted on its own terms. It was invested with a specifically European status, and this new hybrid musical form was transmitted to the masses via the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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airwaves in the hopes of shaping peoples’ perceptions of their national culture and heritage. The growing popularity of cinema in the early to mid-20th century made it another valuable medium through which to transmit nationalist ideals. Cinema has an advantage over radio in that it communicates through image and does so in an environment where people are directly aware of being part of a broader public. With cinema, the imagined community becomes tangible; the audience can recognize itself mirrored in the alternate reality of the screen. The use of technology to create a sense of community—defined in this case in racial terms—is illustrated by the Nazi regime’s use of mass media. Joseph Goebbels was appointed minister of public enlightenment and propaganda in 1933 and consequently wielded control over virtually all of Germany’s cultural production. He founded the Reich Chamber of Culture, whose seven divisions regulated cinema, literature, theater, music, fine arts, press, and radio. Such complete control allowed the state to disseminate political ideology through vehicles of mass entertainment. Some of the aims of this propaganda were to emphasize the necessity of war, to impress upon the public the existence of a German culture that needed to be protected, and to unite the German people in the task of protecting this culture. In essence, the Third Reich tried to unite Germans against those who were not welcome in Nazi Germany’s version of an imagined community. While most films produced under the Third Reich were not outright propaganda, most contained tenets of Nazi ideology. Die Degenhardts, produced in 1944 near the end of World War II, has been categorized as a “home front” film. Directed by Werner Klingler, the film espouses a nationalist message while trying to prepare the public for Germany’s looming defeat. The war is represented as vital for the continued existence of German culture. The film tells the story of an ordinary man, Karl Degenhardt, a retired Lübeck civil servant, whose task has been the maintenance of the city’s gardens and parks. Degenhardt spends his retirement enjoying traditional German music and strolling around Lübeck with his family, admiring German architecture and landscape. When the Allied forces begin a devastating bomb assault on the city, Degenhardt voluntarily returns to his post, stoically dedicating himself to the war effort and to his nation. Degenhardt’s children also join the cause to do their part for the “national family.” MaryElizabeth O’Brien (2004) has noted that Degenhardt’s actions affirm the existence of a national community, while providing assurance that this community will continue to exist. The overriding message of the film is that the individual has a responsibility to the nation. By depicting the everyday lives of a German family during the war and touching upon some of the harsh realities of the period, Die Degenhardts illustrated the collective suffering faced by the German people and demonstrated the need for unity and loyalty in the face of hardship. However, this unity was not inclusive—the type of German culture that Nazi-era films attempted to create depended on devastating forms of exclusion. Ultimately, such media N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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helped provide the ideological conditions in which the mass murder of Jews and other minorities could take place. The Symbolic Power of Spectacular Technologies In many instances, technology has functioned as a symbol of national identity. This is best exemplified by a nation’s symbols of pride and power, which commonly include skyscrapers, bridges, and other feats of engineering. The awe associated with new forms of technology at certain points in history has cemented its potential to serve as a key nationalist symbol. Noteworthy human-made achievements such as the Panama Canal, St. Petersburg’s Hermitage Winter Palace, the Eiffel Tower, and the Brooklyn Bridge capitalize on their considerable display value to impress upon the public the technological prowess of the nation. The power of the nation has also been reinforced by the technological embellishment of natural wonders. For example, the images of American presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt, and Abraham Lincoln are carved into the southeast face of South Dakota’s Mount Rushmore, transforming it from a mountain into a national monument of impressive magnitude and scale. Electrical displays nightly illuminate Niagara Falls, often cited as one of the seven natural wonders of the world. These technological interventions highlight nature’s magnificence and demonstrate the capacity of humans to manipulate the natural world. In the interplay between humans and nature, technology establishes humans—usually represented as national subjects—as the privileged. The meanings conveyed by national symbols are sometimes contested. The visions of engineers and architects may conflict with those of the public who, as members of a nation, have a vested interest in the monuments chosen to represent them. Such was the case with the Eiffel Tower, an immediately recognizable landmark that has become synonymous with Paris and, by extension, France. Designed by Gustave Eiffel for the 1889 Exposition Universelle (which celebrated the centennial of the French Revolution), it was the tallest tower in the world at the time of its inauguration. The tower met with initial resistance from the French public, and influential citizens such as Guy de Maupassant, Emile Zola, and Charles Garnier circulated a petition protesting its construction, declaring it “useless and monstrous.” The Eiffel Tower was never intended to be a permanent fixture, and it was due to be torn down in 1909. However, its antenna proved useful for radiotelegraphic communication, and the tower was allowed to stand. During World War I, the Eiffel Tower was used to intercept enemy dispatches transmitted by wireless telegraph. The importance of the tower to the French war effort and its ubiquitous presence ingrained the tower in the public consciousness, securing its place on the Parisian landscape. The symbolism attached to technological achievements can shift over time, as the social or political program of a nation and its citizens may change. Hailed for its ornate architecture and impressive grandeur, the Moscow metro was built in the 1930s under the leadership of Joseph Stalin. The metro was conceived of as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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a state project that would bolster the notion of a socialist society and display the progressiveness of the socialist state. The ideology associated with the metro’s construction emphasized the importance of the citizen collective. The metro was promoted as a service for the proletariat, built by the people and for the people. It was not a project specific to Moscow. The construction of the metro required the resources of the entire Soviet Union, and this widespread financial, material, and human investment was rewarded by granting the public a sense of collective ownership. The complete inclusion of the Soviet public into the ideology of the metro symbolized its participation in the new socialist state and legitimated collective organization as the supreme social form. The collapse of the Soviet Union, however, has gradually precipitated a change in how the Moscow metro is being conceptualized. Mikhail Ryklin (2003) notes that, since the fall of communism, the Moscow metro has been nationalized, or “Russified.” Formerly imagined as a Soviet-wide enterprise and the domain of the proletariat, the metro has been reimagined as a product of the Russian people. The role of the Soviet Union in its creation has been minimized, and the metro has been appropriated as a site of Russian history and an object of Russian pride.

Consequences Technologies of the past three centuries have allowed people to interact in new ways. They have abolished some social divisions while helping to generate others, they have been used by elites to shape public consciousness and to cement existing social hierarchies and systems of political domination, and they have been used to symbolize both national greatness and national shame. As a result, they have affected the ways in which people experience their nationality and their citizenship. Technology facilitates the restructuring of public consciousness, providing not just a way in which to imagine the nation but also the means to do so. The fluidity of technology permits the nation to be imagined, constructed, and experienced in numerous forms. As technology changes, so, too, does the character of nationalism. There is no reason why technology must always be wedded to nationalism. Technologies can also serve to undermine the primacy of the nation and to promote imagined communities on even larger scales. Between the 19th and the mid-20th centuries, the rapid proliferation of communication and broadcast technologies such as the telephone, telegraph, radio, and television aided communications among people living in different nations. By the time of World War II, audiences around the world were able to tune into European and American programming. The growing accessibility of broadcast technologies and the subsequent growth of the media industry increased the pace and scale of globalization by creating audiences that were not necessarily bounded by territory or restricted N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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by national borders. The permeability of borders was reinforced by the increased efficiency and relatively low cost of transport technologies such as trains and steamships, which also served to undermine the hegemony of the nation-state by facilitating travel, movement, and migration between countries. Arjun Appadurai (1996) notes that the nation seeks to monopolize loyalty and to legitimate only one identity. This is constraining in that it does not allow for the fluidity, complexity, or multiplicity of identity that becomes possible through increased international passages. The relationship between technology and nationalism unfolds in myriad ways. Technology is a force of unification and division. It may act as an agent or a tool of national change, and as a powerful symbol. At times, these relationships are enacted simultaneously. Over the past three centuries, technological change has played a critical role in the development of nations, facilitating their creation and the maintenance of their power. It has also helped to initiate forms of communication and contact that may ultimately lead to a more globalized understanding of the interconnections and entanglements among persons and nations. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. 1998. The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World. London/New York: Verso. Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Barker, Joshua. 2005. “Engineers and Political Dreams: Indonesia in the Satellite Age.” Current Anthropology 46: 703–727. Gellner, Ernest. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hayes, Joy Elizabeth. 2000. Radio Nation: Communication, Pop Culture and Nationalism in Mexico, 1920–1950. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Hobsbawm, E. J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1790. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth. 2004. Nazi Cinema as Enchantment: The Politics of Entertainment in the Third Reich. New York: Camden House. Ryklin, Mikhail. 2003. “‘The Best in the World’: The Discourse of the Moscow Metro in the 1930s.” In The Landscape of Stalinism: The Art and Ideology of Socialist Space, edited by Evgeny Dobrenko and Eric Naiman, translated by Abigail Evans, 261–278. Seattle: University of Washington Press.


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Belgium Robert Kerr Chronology 1780 Joseph II becomes Holy Roman emperor. The stability and prosperity enjoyed in the Austrian Netherlands under the rule of Maria Theresa deteriorates as Joseph II institutes policies that are seen as oppressive and intrusive. 1787 Resentment toward Joseph II foments a seven-year revolt in the Austrian Netherlands led by two competing factions: traditionalists who want to retain powers and privileges enjoyed under Maria Theresa, and republicans who want to institute popular sovereignty in the region. 1789 Joseph II responds to the revolt by taking away the power of assembly in the Austrian Netherlands and permanently stationing troops in Brussels. Revolutionaries defeat Austrian troops and declare an independent Republic of the United States of Belgium. 1790 The Austrians retake Belgium and Joseph II dies. His brother Leopold II assumes the title of Holy Roman emperor. 1792 Leopold II launches an offensive against Brussels, and the republicans turn to France for military support. The French declare war on Austria and capture Brussels by year’s end. 1793 The Austrians regain control of Brussels. 1794 The French oust the Austrians from Belgium for good. 1795 The former Austrian Netherlands, along with the Bishopric of Liége, are officially annexed by France. 1799 Napoleon Bonaparte becomes emperor of France. Napoleon institutes policies to Frenchify the Southern Netherlands, effectively relegating the Dutch language dialects spoken in the northern region of Flanders and by the majority of people in Brussels to second-class status. This policy makes French the de facto language of the elite and Dutch the language of the working class and poor. 1814 Napoleon is defeated at the Battle of Leipzig, and Belgium is occupied by the British and the Prussians. After a brief period of 100 days, during which the French regained control of Belgium, Napoleon is defeated at Waterloo in June 1815. The Kingdom of the United Netherlands under William I of Orange is established. William I immediately establishes policies to make Dutch the de jure language of administration. 1830 After 15 years of rule by the Dutch, members of the Catholic clergy, the bourgeoisie, and the liberal, republican intelligentsia organize a revolt. Starting in Brussels and spreading to other Belgian towns, the revolutionaries inflict heavy casualties on the Dutch troops, and an independent Belgian state is declared. 1831 Belgium’s independence is recognized by all European powers but the Dutch, who don’t recognize the state until 1839. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha is named King Leopold I of the Belgians on July 21. 1835 French is established as the language of higher education, administration, and jurisprudence. 1838 Hendrik Conscience publishes The Lion of Flanders, which is to become a major symbol of Flemish nationalism. 1848 The term “Wallonia” is used for the first time in print. Wallonia comes to be used to describe the French-speaking southern region of Belgium. Its use is largely in response to a growing recognition of Flanders as a distinct cultural-linguistic region.

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1856 An official committee is appointed to regulate the use of Dutch in Belgium’s public affairs. 1863 The oath of office for the Belgian Parliament is taken in Dutch for the first time. 1864 Fr. Guido Gezelle, father of the Flemish Nationalist Movement, releases the first volume of his weekly magazine Year 30. The magazine is used as a platform to promote Dutch as a language equal to French in Belgian affairs. He famously states, “Let him be Flemish whom God created Flemish.” 1873 A law stipulating that legal proceedings in Flemish areas are to be carried out in Dutch is enacted. 1878 A law decreeing that public notices are required to be translated into Dutch in Flemish areas is enacted. 1888 A speech is delivered in Parliament in Dutch for the first time.

Situating the Nation Belgium presents a fascinating case study of how national identity is a fluid and dynamic reality. As a country that encompasses two distinct cultural-linguistic regions—a Germanic, Dutch-speaking north and an Italic, Francophone south— many have said it is an experiment in government doomed to fail from the onset. For these people, to speak of Belgian national identity is a contradiction in terms. Yet to assume this attitude is to ignore the reality that a large-scale, collective sense of Belgian national consciousness fueled the push for the country’s independence from the Netherlands in 1830. There is no doubt, however, that Belgian national identity reached its apex in the years immediately preceding Belgium’s independence and weakened considerably over the course of the next 50 years. To understand the raison d’être, or essence of Belgian nationalism, and why Belgian unity wavered rather rapidly after independence, it is necessary to examine the historical context of the period leading up to, and immediately following, the creation of the independent kingdom of Belgium in 1830. From 1770 to the late 1880s, Belgian national identity evolved from its incipient state as a form of resistance against the imposition of exogenous imperialist rule (the Austro-Hungarian empire, France, and the Netherlands) to its climax with the successful revolt against William I of Orange in 1830. Almost immediately after its birth as a state, however, the nation-building process devolved into a project in mediation between the two major culture groups within the newly formed kingdom—the Dutch speakers in the northern region of Flanders, and the French speakers in Wallonia, located in the south of Belgium. In the 50 years after independence, the country’s capital city, Brussels, came to represent a microcosm of the country as French replaced Dutch as the preferred tongue and became the de facto language of court, commerce, and the privileged genteel life. Belgian national identity was born as a form of resistance against what were seen as restrictive policies instituted by the Austrian Emperor Joseph II. His mother, the Empress Maria Theresa, had warned him to take a more laissez faire approach to ruling the Belgians. Her hands-off approach in the region allowed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the Belgians to take great strides toward becoming the first industrialized economy in Europe, and a business-owning elite had proved their loyalty to the Holy Roman Empire. Belgian resistance against Joseph II took the form of an uneasy alliance between upper-class elites wanting to protect the rights and privileges they had come to know in the prosperous years of the early 18th century and a more existentially motivated group of republicans who wanted to open the door for popular sovereignty and a free market economy. The former group, led by a prominent lawyer named Henri Van der Noot called themselves the Vandernootists, and the latter group, the Vonkists, were named after another lawyer, Jean Francoise Vonk. Belgian identity represented a project-oriented movement that focused on achieving self-determination among a wide range of interest groups, each having its own motivation for wanting independence.

Instituting the Nation The push for Belgian independence originated with the clergy and an upper-class elite, which means that the nation-building process centered on Catholicism and rule by an elite oligarchy. Thus, Belgian identity formation came to be defined in fairly narrow terms; to be Belgian in the mid-19th century meant to be Catholic and French speaking. The only commonality that existed among Belgium’s cultural groups, the Flemings, Walloons, and a small German-speaking community in the region centered around the eastern town of Eupen, was religion. For this reason, the Catholic church came to play an influential role in the internal affairs of Belgium, and the clergy played an active role in defining national identity and promoting Belgian unity. In fact, it was the clergy who led the initial push for equal status among the Dutch and French languages, as it was the only influential group to represent the interests of the Dutch speakers in the Flemish lands. The project of ridding Belgium of foreign influence began in 1787. By 1789, in response to actions taken by the Vandernootists and the Vonkists, Joseph II successfully exiled the groups to the Netherlands and the Bishopric of Liége, respectively. While in exile, the traditionalist Vandernootists and the democratic-minded Vonkists formed an alliance and launched a successful offensive against the Austrians, establishing, for a brief period, the Republic of the United States of Belgium. The Vonkists quickly came to regret the partnership, however, as the Vandernootists promptly restored the institutions of privilege they had enjoyed in the Burgundian period. Bitter infighting between the two factions opened the door for the Austrians to regain control of Belgium a year later in 1790. By 1792, inspired by the revolutionary fervor of their southern neighbors, the Vonkists formed an alliance with France, who then declared war on Austria. In 1795, the Austrian Netherlands, along with the Bishopric of Liége, were officially annexed by France. The period of French rule set the stage for what would soon N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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become the dominant issue facing the Belgians: language use. Under Napoleon, a policy of Frenchification was instituted in the Southern Netherlands, and the Dutch language quickly lost favor among the educated and business-owning elite. Families that had traditionally spoken Dutch gave up their mother tongue in favor of the social standing that only the knowledge and use of French could bring under Bonaparte. This was true even in the Flemish cities of Antwerp, Bruges, and to a lesser degree, Ghent. This left a cultural and class division that would come to haunt Belgium and challenge Belgian national identity to this day. Napoleon’s war efforts had a profound impact on life in Belgium. As France found itself increasingly embroiled in military action, taxes were raised and less attention was paid to the needs of the Belgians; support for the French in Belgium quickly deteriorated. After Napoleon’s defeats at Leipzig and Waterloo, Belgium was annexed by the Netherlands. Under the rule of William I of Orange, it did not take long for the French-speaking Belgian elite to become disenchanted and disenfranchised as Dutch was made the official administrative language of the realm. Few educated people in Belgium could speak Dutch, so William appointed government officials from the Netherlands to take care of the day-to-day affairs of the Belgians. For the first time, Belgians were being ruled directly by foreigners who had little interest in preserving the preexisting social structure, and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Southern Netherlands was viewed by the Dutch as little more than a poorly advanced colony. Most of the appointed Dutch officials were Protestant, which immediately put them at odds with the influential Catholic church throughout Belgium, and none of them spoke French, thus isolating the Belgian elite and middle classes who suddenly found themselves powerless, and oftentimes unemployed. While one might speculate that the Dutch-speaking Flemings would have welcomed the elevated status of their language, the increasing role of Protestant Calvinism did not endear them to their Dutch rulers. Despite the differences between the French- and Dutch-speaking Belgians, they were united in their disdain for the rule of the House of Orange, albeit for different reasons. This unity for the sake of self-determination was thus based on the project of establishing independence, although the alliance quickly crumbled once this goal was achieved. Though William’s policies were hugely unpopular in the Southern Netherlands, his desire to promote industrialization and improve infrastructure paved the way for Belgian self-sufficiency. At this stage, the nascent Belgian nationbuilding project was focused on the potential for wealth that the oligarchs saw in freeing themselves from Dutch control. In August 1830 a coalition of Catholic religious leaders, business owners, and a republican intelligentsia defeated Dutch troops in a series of uprisings, beginning in Brussels and radiating throughout the country. As was the case 41 years earlier, the push for independence had more to do with freeing the Belgians from foreign rule than dreams of national destiny. Independence from the Netherlands meant different things for different factions. It is for this reason that almost immediately after independence and the installation of Leopold I as king of the Belgians that the notion of what it meant to be Belgian became contested. Because the Belgians did not have a royal lineage, a German prince, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gothe, was made king. Leopold was seen as a suitable symbol because he had fought against Napoleon in 1813 and 1814, then subsequently married the daughter of the French king, Louise of Orleans. Though Leopold’s mother tongue was German, French was instituted as the de jure language of governance, commerce, and jurisprudence under pressure from the Brussels Francophone elite. Also, Leopold’s favor among the English, Germans, and French was seen as advantageous for the new state.

Defining the Nation It was the educated elite among the clergy, the wealthy, and the intelligentsia that facilitated the successful push for independence from the Netherlands. Feeling that Belgians possessed the resources and skills to function independently of foreign rule, the revolutionaries sought to establish a country that would rival N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the other great powers of Europe. A key factor in the history of Belgian national identity is that it was not until Dutch rule that the Belgians felt completely subjugated by an imperial power. Before the Dutch, the Belgian oligarchs and business class was generally left to govern their own affairs. Even the issues that led to the disillusionment of French rule had more to do with the unmet needs and wants of the Belgian aristocracy than with strong nationalist fervor against an oppressor. The national idea of Belgium was thus born from the subjective argument of self-determination for the disenfranchised upper echelons of society who sought to assert their role as a legitimate European player. The Belgian elite embarked upon uniting under their ranks under the guise of national identity, but the nation-building project faced a serious hurdle. While the de facto (and after 1835, the de jure) language of the aristocracy and middle classes was French, the majority of people in the emerging country spoke various, disparate dialects of Dutch. To achieve any level of prominence or power in Belgian society, the ability to speak French was essential. After 1830, the focus of the new government shifted to the south toward France. This happened for two reasons. First, the Belgian oligarchs wanted to turn their attention back toward the French; they tended to see Flanders as nothing more than a buffer zone between Brussels and the Netherlands. Second, almost all of the new country’s economic

The Brussels landmark Palais de Justice, or Justitiepaleis, was built under King Leopold II between 1866 and 1883. It serves as a symbol of pride for French speakers and a symbol of oppression for the city’s Flemish inhabitants. (Bettmann/Corbis)


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resources were situated in the Sambre-Meuse Valley, in the heart of Francophone Wallonia. The Belgian Parliament had little reason to focus much attention on the largely agrarian and poor northern region of the country. This reality would come to challenge the notion of Belgian unity almost immediately after King Leopold I was coronated in 1831. The city of Brussels in the mid- to late 19th century exemplifies the Francophone desire to create a grand capital and the growing disillusionment of the Flemings toward the nation-building project they felt was increasingly ignoring them. Planners and builders set about the project of building a national capital that was to rival any of the great cities of Europe. Monumental architecture and grand street designs came to characterize the city as the infrastructure for the new kingdom was built outside the historical core of the city. The architectural style of post-1830 was heavily French in style and contrasted sharply with the Dutch style of the city’s core. The Palace of Justice, built between 1866 and 1883, is a good example of the grandeur of the royal architectural style. Brussels’s slowly shrinking Flemish population saw, and to a large extent still sees, this building as a symbol of the triumph of the Francophile elite in the city as well as in the country as a whole. In fact, between the years 1830 and 1860, the very symbols of Belgian national pride were being challenged with a counternarrative created by the Flemings, who increasingly defined themselves as an oppressed nation.

Narrating the Nation The Belgian fight for independence began in earnest August 25, 1830, at the National Theater in Brussels. The theater is thus an important site of memory in the Belgian national narrative. Inspired by a performance of Daniel Auber’s opera La Muette de Portici, which tells the story of an Italian uprising against the Spanish in Naples in the 1600s, crowds poured out of the theater and onto the streets, where they promptly stormed city hall and other buildings that symbolized the Dutch monarchy. In particular, it was a performance of the romantically nationalistic “Amour Sacre de la Patrie” (Sacred Love of the Fatherland), performed by Adolphe Nourrit and Auber himself, that is said to have sent throngs of riotous youth into the streets. This is a moment that plays a central role in the Belgian national consciousness. Belgium is unique in that the counternarrative of Belgian identity is stronger than the Belgian national narrative itself. Immediately after independence, the issue of language was thrust to the forefront of Belgium’s challenges as a country. In 1835, by order of a royal decree, French became the official language of higher education and government. The Belgian government saw this as a logical means of building unity in the country without having to forfeit their powers and privileges. The Flemings saw things differently. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Flemish writers such as Jans Frans Willems, Hendrik Conscience, and Fr. Guido Gezelle set out to elevate the status of Dutch within the kingdom. Although modern interpretations of substate Flemish nationalism identify these early champions of the Dutch language as symbols of the Flemish independence movement, the reality is that they were ardent Belgian nationalists. Conscience’s masterpiece, The Lion of Flanders, and Gezelle’s weekly journal, Year 30, were written to instill pride among Dutch speakers for their language and culture and to pressure the government to give Dutch equal status in Belgium’s internal affairs. Conscience played an active role in the 1830 revolts and envisioned Belgian independence as a way to restore the former glory of medieval Flanders under the support of the king. In short, these Flemish writers sought to enhance Flemish pride through representation in a legitimate kingdom, and when these expectations were not met, the Dutch speakers of Flanders became disenchanted with the Belgian project. The symbols of Belgium are unique in that they represent the ambiguity of Belgian nationalism itself. The national anthem, “La Brabanconne,” has no official lyrics. The author of the stanzas that are most often put to the music was an actor in the National Theater who took part in the 1830 revolution against the Netherlands. There are translations in Dutch and French, and any words critical of the Dutch were removed in the 1840s to appease Flemish nationalists. The flag, adopted in 1830, incorporates the colors of the incorporated territories of Flemish and Walloon Brabant: red, yellow, and black. At independence, the stripes were horizontal with red on top, a yellow center, and a black stripe on the bottom. In 1831 the government decreed that the stripes are to be displayed vertically, with black closest to the flagpole, yellow in the middle, and red at the other end. The switch made the flag appear closer in design to the French tricolor as opposed to the horizontally oriented Dutch flag.

Hendrik Conscience and The Lion of Flanders In 1838 Conscience wrote The Lion of Flanders. The story tells of the 1302 Battle of the Golden Spurs and the events leading up to it. In the battle, the townspeople of Groeninge are said to have driven out the more powerful (and corrupt) army of French knights. After three hours of bloody battle, the French soldiers were reported to have been so overwhelmed with the fight put up by the peasants that they hastily retreated. The next day, Flemish foot soldiers collected more than 500 pairs of golden spurs, thus giving the battle its modern name. Conscience’s version of the tale paints the soldiers of Groeninge, under the leadership of the legendary figure Robert of Bethune, as displaying the perfect virtues of selflessness, loyalty, bravery, and love for the fatherland—traits that Conscience felt every Fleming should possess in the context of the new nation of Belgium. Conscience is known as one of the founders of the Flemish Movement, and his efforts to elevate the status of Dutch within Belgium paved the way for Flemish nationalists to make the case for their own autonomy in the 20th century.


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Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Belgian national effort, mobilized primarily during the 15 years of Dutch rule under William I of Orange, reached its climax with the 1830 revolution. Once independence was achieved, the nation-building project of Belgian national identity met challenges from the country’s Dutch speakers in the Flemish lands. By the end of the 1830s, Flemish intellectuals and clergy members began to push for equal status of Dutch in national affairs. By 1856, these groups had successfully agitated the young monarchy and government to appoint a committee to incorporate Dutch into the country’s legal affairs, and by 1873, a law stipulating that Dutch was to be used in all legal proceedings in Flemish areas was enacted. In 1888 a speech was made to Parliament in Dutch for the first time, but despite these landmarks, Flemings became less and less supportive of the nation-building project of Belgium. Contrary to modern interpretations, the Flemish nationalists of the mid- to late 19th century were not agitating for an independent Flemish nation. Instead, they were challenging the notion that Belgian was synonymous with French language and culture. In the late 1880s, it seemed as though Flemings were content to build a national existence that they envisioned would safeguard the culture and traditions of all the citizens of Belgium. The period after the 1880s would prove otherwise, and further discontent among the Flemings with regard to their status within the kingdom would have serious consequences for Belgian unity in the 20th century. Selected Bibliography Cook, Barnard A. 2004. Belgium: A History. New York: Peter Lang Pub., Inc. de Meeus, Adrien. 1962. History of the Belgians. Translated by G. Gordon. New York: Praeger. Goris, Jan Albert. 1945. Belgium. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hermans, Theo, Louis Vos, and Lode Wils, eds. 1992. The Flemish Movement: A Documentary History, 1780–1990. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: The Athlone Press. Kossmann, E. H. 1978. The Low Countries, 1780–1940. New York: Oxford University Press. Mokyr, Joel. 1976. Industrialization in the Low Countries, 1795–1850. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Murphy, Alexander B. 1988. The Regional Dynamics of Language Differentiation in Belgium. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Whitlock, Brand. 1919. Belgium: A Personal Narrative. New York: D. Appleton and Co. Witte, Els, Jan Craeybeckx, and Alain Meynen. 2001. Political History of Belgium from 1830 Onwards. Brussels: VUB Brussels University Press.


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Denmark Marianne Rostgaard Chronology 1848–1851 The First Schleswigian War (a civil war) over the national allegiance of the dukedoms Holstein and Schleswig. 1849 Enactment of the first constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark, granting suffrage to all male inhabitants who live on their own property. 1864 The Second Schleswigian War, leading to the secession of the dukedoms to Prussia and Austria. 1866 Revision of the constitution, restricting eligibility for election to the upper house to a privileged class consisting mainly of landowners, and sparking a political struggle over the reinstatement of the 1849 constitution and parliamentary rule. 1901 End of the constitutional struggle, the terms of which are acknowledged in the constitution of 1915, granting universal suffrage. 1920 Referendum in Schleswig over national allegiance (to Denmark or Germany). 1940–1945 Denmark is occupied by the Third Reich. 1955 Signing of the Bonn-Copenhagen declarations on the rights of national minorities north and south of the Danish-German border.

Situating the Nation “Denmark” referred to two different geographical and juridical entities in the 1700s and 1800s. It referred first and foremost to the Kingdom of Denmark but also to the United Monarchy of Denmark. The latter was, until 1864, a princely state, or something of a miniature Habsburg empire. It consisted originally of the Kingdom of Denmark, the Kingdom of Norway, and the two dukedoms, Schleswig and Holstein. Norway was ceded to Sweden in 1814 after the Napoleonic Wars, and in return Denmark received another German dukedom, Lauenburg. All three dukedoms were lost in the disastrous war of 1864, which also led to the dissolution of the United Monarchy. The long struggle over the national identity and territorial allegiance of the two dukedoms Schleswig and Holstein had a profound influence on the formation of Danish national identity. One way to differentiate Danishness from Germanness was to stress identification with Scandinavian peoples and countries. A Scandinavian identity reinforced and upheld the Danish nation in conflicts with the German states. Some voices in Danish public debate even called for a united Scandinavia in the crisis years around 1864. A Scandinavian currency union did, in fact, exist from 1875 to 1914. NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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In the 1800s, Denmark was still basically an agricultural country. Exports of agricultural products grew significantly in the last decades of the 1800s, leading to growth in industry as well. Economic growth from the 1870s onward was based on new agricultural products and the export of butter and bacon to the British market, as well as the export of meat to the steadily growing market of a rapidly industrializing Germany. The long wave of growth peaked with the boom years of 1890–1914, during which industrial growth increased urbanization greatly. By 1900 the urban working class was already well organized and represented in Parliament. Nationalist movements working for political nationalism did not emerge until the 1840s and were led by the young members of the bourgeoisie, mainly civil servants, and a tiny intelligentsia in Copenhagen (a Bildungsbürgertum). A parallel movement in Kiel (in Holstein) worked for Schleswig-Holsteinianism, arguing for an independent state consisting of the dukedoms. In Denmark, the bourgeois nationalism of the 1840s was seen as a “for King and Country” nationalism, differentiating it from the type of nationalism that emerged after the 1870s. This “new” nationalism promoted peasants as the true bearers of the nation, perhaps justified by the vital role that agriculture continued to play in the national economy. The industrial workers and their party, the Social Democrats, entered national politics during the years between the two world wars. The crisis years in the early 1930s gave rise to a collaborative democracy, with the Social Democrats as one of the chief architects. A national welfare strategy was adopted by this party in 1935 under the slogan, “Danmark for folket” (Denmark for the people). Liberal movements in opposition to absolutist rule and with active campaigning for a reform of government existed in Kiel and Copenhagen (the two university cities in the United Monarchy) as early as the 1830s. These liberal movements were not nationalist from the outset, in the sense that they were focused upon issues such as a national language, but they became progressively more so. The liberals in Schleswig-Holstein were looking to Frankfurt, where liberals working for democratic reforms had gathered in February 1848 to write a constitution for the German Confederation. The liberals in Copenhagen took over power in March 1848. The irony was that the liberals in both the Kingdom of Denmark and the dukedoms might have agreed on a new joint, liberal constitution through the 1840s, and maybe even later. The question of national belonging, however, became increasingly more important in the process of transformation from subjects to citizens in both the kingdom and the dukedoms. The First Schleswigian War broke out in 1848 and lasted until 1851. The government in Copenhagen fought to keep the United Monarchy together, or at least to keep Schleswig within the United Monarchy. The German-speaking people in the dukedoms fought to form a state of their own, consisting of the two dukedoms as part of the German Confederation. The German Confederation, prominent


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among them Prussia, decided to send troops to help, which led to an intervention by the great powers of Europe—foremost, Britain and Russia. It had never been in the interest of these powers that Prussia rule the area; they preferred that Holstein and Kiel be ruled by the much weaker Danish king. The great powers of Europe became instrumental in the reinstatement of the United Monarchy of Denmark. In the peace treaty of 1851, the Danish government agreed never to incorporate the dukedoms in the Kingdom of Denmark and to consider the dukedoms as an entity. The peace treaty, however, did not solve the original problems of national affiliation and constitutional reform. Endless negotiations about the future fate of the dukedoms, interfered with by the great powers of Europe, led to the Second Schleswigian War of 1864. Much to the surprise of the Danish public, the war ended in a military disaster. In the collective memory of the Danes, the First Schleswigian War of 1848 to 1851 had been won by the bravery of Danish soldiers, not by diplomacy, and the public expected bravery to win the next war as well. Informed people in government knew the risk they ran. By 1864 Prussia had become much more powerful, and Bismarck had embarked upon his project of uniting Germany. The tiny Kingdom of Denmark was no match for the united Prussian and Austrian armies. However, national sentiments had grown in strength, and the majority of the government believed that the only way to solve the national question in the dukedoms once and for all was on the battlefield. They wanted to incorporate Schleswig into the Kingdom of Denmark (Holstein could do whatever it wanted) and cut the Gordian knot by breaking the old bonds between the two dukedoms. The loss in 1864, however, led to the incorporation of the dukedoms into the German empire (1871). The peace settlement, orchestrated by the great powers of Europe, agreed (in clause five) that a referendum to settle the national allegiance of Schleswig could be held sometime in the future. This so-called promissory clause came into use at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, and a referendum was held in Schleswig in 1920. After 1920, Schleswig was divided into two, the northern part integrated into the Kingdom of Denmark, the southern part into Germany, leaving national minorities living on both sides of the border.

Instituting the Nation After the loss of the dukedoms, the Kingdom of Denmark became more or less a one-nation state. Any remaining struggles were internal struggles among the Danes about who represented the nation. The revised constitution of 1866 restricted eligibility for election to the upper house (Landstinget) to a wealthy class of landowners, thus leading to the election of governments whose power base stemmed from the landed aristocracy. With the political right (Hoejre) representN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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N. F. S. Grundtvig (1783–1872) Poet, minister, teacher, philologist, historian, and politician, Grundtvig was the son of a minister and studied theology at Copenhagen University. He became minister in the Danish State Church in 1811. As a young minister and publicist, he experienced several conflicts with the authorities and was subjected to lifelong censorship in 1826 by the then still absolutist Danish state. He was at the same time deprived of his office as minister. In the 1830s he became one of the leading spokesmen for the growing nonconformist movement that formed part of the opposition to king and government in the 1830s and 1840s. He was elected as one of the members of the constituent assembly in 1848, and as a member of Parliament, he voted against the revision of the constitution in 1866. Civic rights and the empowerment of the people, balanced by belonging to a national and Christian community, were at the center of Grundtvig’s political thinking. He was consistently skeptical about state involvement in society. He even argued against compulsory military service, written into the 1849 constitution. His argument was that Denmark would only be worth defending if people voluntarily rose to do so, not forced to do so by the state.

ing the landed aristocracy and the left (Venstre), the peasantry, the constitutional contest was cast as a class struggle between a wealthy elite and “the people,” wherein both parties claimed to speak for the nation. The right wing, in fact, called themselves “the national landowners,” which demonstrated the degree to which Danish politics became permeated by a nationalist discourse during the second half of the 1800s. Romanticized ideas about “the people” as a polity had gained currency among the educated elite prior to 1864, but it was not until after that point that the people —the peasantry—began to organize to represent themselves. The cooperative movement, including dairy cooperatives, folk high schools, nonconformist religious congregations, and numerous other forms of cooperation, constituted a new wave of civic involvement in Danish society. The ideologically most important part of the movement, the state-independent folk high schools, mushroomed after 1864. The founding father of the folk high schools, N. F. S. Grundtvig, was very influential in the development of Danish national identity after 1864. Grundtvig shared Herder’s idea that each nation had a specific character of its own. To be or become a cultural nation, he believed, this specific character should be developed or improved upon, and this was a central task of the folk high schools. The historical task Grundtvig saw before him was to create a new kind of society among freeborn and equal citizens bound together by the nation, which was thus to be understood as a cultural brotherhood. The core value in Danishness of equality, coupled with the idea of a freeborn people, had great appeal for the selfemployed peasantry, making Grundtvig’s teachings especially popular among this group. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation National identity, or what constituted Danishness, was first and foremost culturally defined. Identity centered on a common language and a common history. The rights of the pro-Danish minority in Schleswig were, after 1864, also argued in cultural terms. The issue of a just border was still sometimes argued in juridical terms, referring to coronation charters dating back to the Middle Ages and later peace treaties, which became mixed up with historical arguments about who originally had inhabited Schleswig. The national-conservative argument for Danevirke (Ejdergraensen in German) being the “true” border between Germany and Denmark was basically an historical argument, claiming that this was the “original” southern borderline of the Kingdom of Denmark. This argument carried the day in the 1863 and 1864 controversies, but in 1920 the nationalconservative party, still arguing for Danevirke as the true southern borderline, had clearly become a minority. The work of historian A. D. Joergensen was crucial in the formation of Danish national identity during the late 1800s. He dwelled just as much as any national-conservative historian on the heroic fights of kings back in the early Middle Ages against the evil Germans, but he never argued Danishness on the grounds of old territorial rights of the crown or other juridicalhistorical arguments. Joergensen argued instead for a new border that followed the linguistic borderline. The emphasis put on preservation of the Danish language and culture by the pro-Danish movement in Schleswig after 1864 prepared the ground for the argument of self-determination of national allegiance, which became instituted with the referendum in Schleswig in 1920. Since 1920, a German minority has lived in the southern border region, just as a Danish minority is still found in northern Germany. In the interwar years, people from the German minority demanded a revision of the 1920 borderline, which caused some worry for Danish governments given what was happening at the same time in Sudetenland and on Germany’s eastern border. It was thus not until after World War II that the national question about the border region was finally settled by the Copenhagen-Bonn declarations of 1955, granting the minorities the right to exist as cultural entities.

Narrating the Nation The most important events in the collective memory of the Danish nation were without doubt the First and Second Schleswigian wars. Their significance can be seen in the way Danevirke was symbolized. Danevirke (pronounced Danewerk) is an old fortification, located a few kilometers south of the town of Schleswig (now in Germany). The first fortifications were erected from AD 600 to 800, and over the next 500 years, Danish kings extended these fortifications, which played a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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role in the numerous border area conflicts among Danes, Saxons, and Slavs. In the 1200s and up to the beginning of the 1800s, the old fortifications played no role in border conflicts. After the 1200s, they were situated in what had become Schleswig, after a fiefdom under the Danish king and, from the time of King Christian the First (1460), a dukedom that belonged to the crown of Denmark. Danevirke was rediscovered in the 1830s and 1840s and became for Danish nationalists a cherished symbol of determined defense against the eternal enemy, the Germans. The kings and queens of old who had defended the southern border by building these fortifications also became very popular. Indeed, they were still depicted in historical paintings and in the history books of schoolchildren until the 1960s. Some of the popular stories, especially those of the good queen Thyra, who supposedly died in the 950s, are today known to be nothing more than myth. One such story, widely published in school history books from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s, reports Thyra as having ordered the fortifications of Danevirke built to rescue the Danish people from becoming subjects of the German emperor. Myth or not, Thyra and other medieval kings and queens played a vital role as symbols of national resolve, and the parallel between resisting a German emperor in the 950s and in the 1890s was easy to draw. Danevirke played a minor role in the struggles of 1848–1851. In the Second Schleswigian War, the old fortifications were abandoned without a fight; the commanding general wisely judged them to be indefensible in February 1864, seeing that the parts of the fortification system formed by the estuary Silen and the Rivers Reide and Treene were frozen solid, making it easy to circumvent the old fortifications. The commanding general was, however, dismissed from his post for his unpopular decision. After the military disaster in 1864, Danevirke was no longer seen as a symbol of military resolve and strength but, rather, one of mental strength and resolve. For example, in 1875 Christian Berg, leader of the left wing (Venstre) in the Danish Parliament, invoked Danevirke in a debate about grants for military purposes. What was needed, according to Berg, was a strengthening of “Danevirke in our hearts,” or the mental Danevirke. To defend Denmark militarily had become impossible. The German empire was simply too big and powerful for tiny Denmark. The only way forward was thus “to build a Danevirke in the heart of every Dane,” including the pro-Danes in the lost province of Schleswig. Other figures popular to evoke during the nationalist movement of the 1800s, in addition to Queen Thyra, were Valdemar the Great and Niels Ebbesen. In the early 1300s, noblemen from Holstein had acquired control of large areas of Jutland in return for loans to the financially troubled crown of Denmark. Niels Ebbesen killed the leader of these Holstein noblemen, paving the way for King Valdemar Atterdag to again unify the kingdom and consolidate the king’s rule. Not much is known about the historic figure of Niels Ebbesen, but the story is the stuff myths are made of: the fatherland in dire crisis, a villain (a count from Holstein), and a hero who murders a tyrant and thus saves king and fatherland. Niels N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Ebbesen is normally depicted as a simple man (although he was actually a nobleman), thus symbolizing that it was the people—not the king or state power—that rescued Denmark in the difficult times of the early 1300s. The didactic parallel is once more obvious. The historic events (some of them mere historical myths) commemorated are those symbolic of the “eternal” national struggles on the southern border and the crucial role of the people. As an act of solidarity with the pro-Danish movement in Schleswig, brewer J. C. Jacobsen (the founder of Carlsberg breweries) commissioned historian A. D. Joergensen to write a popular history book. Joergensen’s Forty Tales about the History of the Fatherland gained wide circulation near the end of the 1800s, both in Schleswig and in the kingdom. Historic paintings also became a popular genre for nationalism in the second half of the 1800s. Some of the most well known (later appearing in both magazines and history books) were commissioned for display at the National Historic Museum at Frederiksborg, again by J. C. Jacobsen. He aimed to tell the history of Denmark through paintings, as a kind of picture book for the people. The most cherished symbols of Danishness include, besides historic figures, the language and the land. Here we are speaking not so much of the territory as we are of the landscape. The gentle hills, the green fields, and the open beach woods all contribute to making Danes a friendly, peace-loving people. This opinion fitted in nicely with the kind of Danishness propagated after 1864. The landscape was a cultural one created by the peasants, and its natural aspects were peaceful, with no wild mountains or rivers. Even the language was thought to be soft, a “language of the heart,” as opposed to German, depicted as a hard language (in caricature, mainly suited for military commands). The Danishness to be invoked, especially after 1864, was a country of and for the people. Songs, among them numerous pieces cherishing the landscape throughout the changing seasons and songs commemorating popular incidents in the history of Denmark, were one of the most popular ways to express national identity. They were sung at popular gatherings and in schools. Morgensang (to sing in the morning, at the beginning of the school day) was compulsory, and the songs sung were learned by heart as part of the school curriculum. For generations, until the 1960s, morgensang was practiced to create and express a common identity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Ethnically speaking, the Danish nation-state after 1864 consisted almost exclusively of Danes. The 1849 constitution defined a Dane as a person born of at least one Danish parent; it was therefore not enough to have been born within the territory of Denmark. The latter stipulation would have been troublesome in the 1800s, a period in which the territorial definition of “Denmark” became the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Danish children participate in morgensang (to sing in the morning, at the beginning of the school day). The pupils are obviously very aware of the camera and some have nearly almost stopped singing. (Odense City Archives/Fyens Stiftstidende)

object of two wars. A law concerning citizenship (Indfoedsretsloven) had, in fact, been in existence since 1776, granting citizenship to all people born in the king’s countries, that is, all people born within the United Monarchy. These people and their children were legally the Danes in 1849. The constitution also gave the Danish Parliament the right to naturalize foreigners, the logic being that the Parliament represents the people, and only the people can grant citizenship to foreigners. Since 1849, it has thus been possible for foreigners to apply for Danish citizenship and for Parliament once a year to pass a law naturalizing them as Danish citizens. Immigration rules were very liberal until 1920. The state did not control immigration, and therefore we have no statistics. However, we do know that most immigrants before 1920 came from Sweden and from what are today the countries of Poland, Ukraine, and Lithuania (among them relatively many Jews). We also know that their numbers were relatively small and that nearly all of them became Danish citizens. There were two criteria for granting citizenship: people had to stay out of the criminal records and be able to provide for themselves. Immigration and immigrants played next to no role in symbolizing the obligatory “other” in Danish identity formation, in contrast to the huge role played by the nationality question in Schleswig. The pro-Danes in Schleswig had from the outset mainly consisted of the peasantry, so Grundtvigianism fit the pro-Danish movement in Schleswig like a hand N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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H. P. Hansen H. P. Hansen represents the quintessence of the pro-Danish minority in Schleswig. The son of a small farmer, he expected to become a small farmer, too. He attended Askov Folk High School (one of the “ivy league” folk high schools) and was inspired to start a career as a journalist, later becoming editor of the influential newspaper, Hejmdal. He organized and represented the pro-Danish minority in the German Parliament in the 1890s, firmly defended the principle of national self-determination, and became a minister in the Danish government in 1920 with responsibility for deliberations concerning the 1920 referendum in Schleswig.

in a glove. As a national minority, however, the pro-Danes in Schleswig were much more directly confronted with the nationality question in their everyday lives and their political struggles. They wisely chose the Imperial German state as their opponent, not their German neighbors, so their struggle was first and foremost a political one. Sprogforeningen (the organization for the preservation of the Danish language) was an important organization in this context, just as newspapers for the Danish minority, such as Flensborg Avis and Hejmdal, and children’s magazines in Danish were instrumental in preserving Danish identity and cohesion. Another important movement in Schleswig was to organize a political party to speak for the Danish cause in the German Parliament and in local government. Whether or not the Danes should recognize the German state in this way was heatedly debated among the pro-Danish minority. Most, however, wanted to use Parliament as a platform to criticize Imperial Germany and its policy toward the Danish minority. This and other wise decisions, combined with their position as the weaker minority, allowed the pro-Danish group to adopt a generally constructive approach in their nationalist struggle. As an example, Sprogforeningen founded schools where children could be taught in Danish. Schleswig had long been a mixed area linguistically, but with its incorporation into Imperial Germany, it was no longer possible to learn Danish in the public school system. The songs sung at the folk high schools and talks or addresses such as those delivered at the folk high schools were also very popular when people met in the many proDanish associations. Apart from their ideological mobilization, the Danish minority also organized to ensure that farms and farmland in their communities remained in Danish hands. Again, they were opposing an Imperial Germany that, from the 1890s until 1914, subsidized the relocation of farmers from other parts of Germany to Schleswig to “Germanize” this outpost, exactly the same policy as pursued in Germany’s eastern border regions. The pro-Danes in Schleswig, the many Grundtvigian-inspired organizations, and Venstre formed a very strong alliance, in which a new type of national identity focusing on the people became the cement, explaining why that particular definition of the nation became so deeply embedded in Danish society. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Selected Bibliography Adriansen, Inge. 2003. Nationale symboler i det danske Rige, 1830–2000 [National Symbols in the Danish Realm, 1830–2000]. Vols. 1–2. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanums Forlag. (Contains a 37-page English summary.) Bjørn, Claus. 1994. “A Poor Little Land? The Denmark of the Golden Age.” In The Golden Age in Denmark: Art and Culture, 1800–1850, edited by Bente Scavenius, 14–21. Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Bjørn, Claus. 1995. Co-operation in Denmark. Copenhagen: Danske Andelsselskaber. Borish, Steven M. 1991. The Land of the Living: The Danish Folk High Schools and Denmark’s Non-Violent Path to Modernization. Nevada City, CA: Blue Dolphin. Christiansen, Niels Finn. 2001. “The Dynamics of Social Solidarity: The Danish Welfare State, 1900–2000.” Scandinavian Journal of History [Norway] 26, no. 3: 177–196. Jespersen, Knud J. V. 2004. A History of Denmark. Translated by Ivan Hill. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Østergaard, Uffe. 1996. “Peasants and Danes: The Danish National Identity and Political Culture.” In Becoming National: A Reader, edited by Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny, 179– 201. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Østergaard, Uffe. 1997. The Geopolitics of Nordic Identity: From Composite States to NationStates. Working paper 1997–14, DUPI (Danish Foreign Policy Institute). Rerup, Lorenz. 1993. “Grundtvig and 19th Century Nationalism.” Grundtvig studier [Grundtvig Studies]: 16–26. Rostgaard, Marianne. 2001. “Industrial Management and the Democratisation of Danish Society, 1880–1920.” In The Democratic Challenge to Capitalism. Management and Democracy in the Nordic Countries, edited by Haldor Byrkjeflot et al., 121–150. Bergen: Fakbokforlaget.


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England Ben Wellings Chronology 1775 Outbreak of the American War of Independence leads to the loss of the Thirteen Colonies in 1783. 1780 The “Gordon Riots”: 700 people die during 10 days of anti-Catholic rioting. 1788 Arrival of the “First Fleet” of convicts in New South Wales (Australia). 1789 Outbreak of the French Revolution. 1793 Declaration of war against revolutionary France. 1796 Abortive French invasion of Ireland. 1798 The United Irish rebellion for Irish independence is crushed at the Battle of Vinegar Hill. 1801 The Act of Union joins Ireland to Great Britain and creates the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. 1805 Victory at Trafalgar establishes British command of the seas. 1807 Parliament outlaws the trade in slaves. 1814 The Cape Colony (South Africa) passes from Dutch into British control. 1815 Victory at Waterloo ends the Napoleonic Wars; postwar economic recession begins. 1819 Protestors calling for political reform are attacked by cavalry at the so-called Peterloo Massacre. 1820 The first steam railway opens between Stockton and Darlington. 1829 The Catholic Emancipation (Relief) Act allows Catholics to own property and serve in public office. 1832 The Great Reform Act widens the franchise and arguably averts revolution. 1833 Slavery is abolished within the British empire. 1834 The Tolpuddle Martyrs are convicted of forming a trade union and transported to Australia. 1837 German-born Victoria Sachen Coburg von Gotha crowned Queen Victoria of Great Britain and Ireland. 1839 Violent Chartist uprisings in England and Wales. 1839–1842 The Opium War against the Qing Dynasty forces China to trade with Britain. 1840 The Treaty of Waitangi shares Maori sovereignty over New Zealand/Aotearoa with the British government. 1843 SS Great Britain, the first oceangoing, screw-driven steamship, is launched. 1845 The Repeal of the Corn Laws, representing a great victory for the proponents of free trade. 1846–1848 Famine in Ireland exacerbated by ascendant free-trade ideology. 1848 Peaceful Chartist demonstration at Kennington, London. 1851 The Great Exhibition in the Crystal Palace in Hyde Park, London, showcases Britain’s industrial strength; census shows greater number of urban than rural dwellers in Great Britain for the first time. 1855 Florence Nightingale arrives in Constantinople to tend to British soldiers wounded during the Crimean War, 1853–1856.


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1857–1859 1861 1862 1867

1870 1872 1877 1878–1880 1881 1882 1884 1885 1886 1887

Indian, or Sepoy, Mutiny shakes East India Company rule; ultimate control of British India passes to Westminster. Albert, Queen Victoria’s husband, dies. Victoria enters into mourning for almost 10 years. Sterling is tied to the value of gold, producing currency stability. The Second Reform Act widens the franchise even further to male property owners. Fenian (Irish nationalists) attacks on London and Canada. Canada becomes a selfgoverning confederal Dominion of the British empire. The Education Act (England and Wales) establishes compulsory elementary education for all children in England and Wales. The first international football (soccer) match played between England and Scotland ends in a nil-nil draw. The Delhi Durbar celebrates Victoria’s elevation to empress of India, while famine kills an estimated 7 million Indians in the same year. The Second Afghan War, caused by Anglo-Russian tensions, heightens “jingoistic” atmosphere in England. British defeat in the (First) Boer War in South Africa stems British expansion in southern Africa for 15 years. The Defeat of Arabi Pasha’s revolt establishes effective British control over Egypt and the Suez Canal. The Third Reform Act widens the franchise further, but still only 20 percent of adults can participate in elections. The death of General Sir Charles Gordon in Khartoum checks British expansion along the Nile and creates an imperial martyr. The defeat of (First) Irish Home Rule Bill is a setback in attempting to solve the “Irish Question.” Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee is a pageant of British, imperial splendor.

Situating the Nation Between the 1770s and 1880s, British and English identity became merged, at least for the English. This merged identity was a product of one of the functions of nationalism and national identity, which is to legitimize the existence of the state in the name of the nation. However, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was a state that contained various different nationalities united by a common Crown and Parliament. Furthermore, this particular Crown and Parliament also ruled over a vast empire, comprised of various different nationalities and peoples. Thus, anyone attempting to articulate English national identity during the 19th century could not avoid the fact that England had expanded; the state that governed the English people was British and imperial, and many English people had emigrated overseas. English national identity was therefore increasingly bound up with being British and being the core nationality at the center of the largest global empire the world had yet seen. The period between the 1770s and 1880s was one of the most remarkable in human history and marked perhaps the most profound and rapid social transformation ever known. English people found themselves at the very forefront of this N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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transformation, namely, the Industrial Revolution. But if a link between nationalism and industrialization does exist, then its effect was not to produce an English nationalism, but to further merge English, British, and imperial identities. The Industrial Revolution was a truly British—as opposed to an English—phenomenon. Although the city of Manchester in northwest England became emblematic of the process of rapid industrialization, equally important centers of industry were located in central Scotland, southern Wales, and northern Ireland. In turn, Britain was the center of a global trade and manufacturing network that linked it both to the formal empire (such as India) and to areas under the sway of its economic power (such as the southern states of the United States). All of the above elements combined to generate a sense of national belonging at the very moment of the global transition to modernity. This transition did not lead to the creation of an English state, however. What it did help create was a sense of English nationality that became intimately bound up with notions of Britain and empire. The politics of nationalism in England were therefore not concerned with creating a new nation-state, as was the case in Germany and Italy, but were instead focused on reforming the existing one. Events such as the American and French Revolutions gave a great boost to supporters of “democracy” in England and Britain. National politics were profoundly affected by the increase in the voting public between 1832 and 1884 when the franchise was widened on three occasions: in 1832 (the Great Reform Act), in 1867 (the Second Reform Act), and in 1884 (the Third Reform Act), with male property holders being the main beneficiaries. Nevertheless, the disenfranchised found alternative outlets for their political opinions on a variety of issues. Church politics were particularly important, and the nonconformist and evangelical churches were prominent in antislavery campaigns before the 1830s. The 1830s also saw the creation of the first working-class movement in the world, named the Chartists (who took their name from the Magna Carta, which curbed royal power in the 13th century). During this period, English people called on the authorities to grant them their rights as “freeborn Englishmen” and to restore their “ancient liberties,” which they believed had existed in a bygone era.

Instituting the Nation The English state, the ultimate guarantor of these “ancient liberties,” had been expanding and contracting for almost a millennia by the time the Act of Union created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1801. Danes, Normans, Welsh, French, Cornish, Scots, and American colonists had all been controlled or under the control of the English or British state at some point prior to the 19th century, hence the English, who were apt to venerate their state as the most perfect (or perfectible) form of government yet devised, had to somehow include other nationalities into their own national story. Often this was achieved by N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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simply ignoring them and making the terms “England” and “Britain” synonymous. But despite this tendency, Britishness did have to be articulated in different forms to Englishness, even though English narratives of state formation tended to dominate. Englishness also contained a cultural dimension, often linked to the landscape, which Britishness only started to acquire after the 19th century. For many English people, however, it was the state that reflected and produced a sense of English nationality, characterized, according to its exponents, by toleration and a tendency for compromise as opposed to extremism and ideology. This emphasis on the relationship between national character and the state’s institutions allowed the English to subsume other nationalities into their own historical narrative. Thus it was historians, rather than philosophers, who explained the English character. While early forms of socialism and modern republicanism were being articulated on continental Europe, the English by and large rejected grand theoretical constructs (except the theoretical construct of rejecting theory). This is not to say that there were no philosophical underpinnings to this Anglo-British worldview, which could variously encompass conservative, liberal, and radical understandings of the world. Radicals found a champion in Tom Paine, whose Common Sense (1776) and Rights of Man (1791) became manifestos for reform. Conservatives looked to Edmund Burke, an Anglo-Irishman who set out a defense of the British system in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790). Burke argued that the “ancient liberties” enjoyed by Englishmen (and, by extension, Britons of both sexes) were the product of a gradual evolution of political institutions that should be protected from the type of ideologically driven changes being forced on France. The person who went furthest in attempting to theorize the “gradualism” of the British political system was the founder of The Economist, Walter Bagehot. In 1867, on the eve of the Second Reform Act, Bagehot published The English Constitution. Bagehot divided the operations of the British political system into two parts: the efficient and the dignified. The efficient part was the

The English Constitution This is not a single document outlining the functions of government as in the case of the American or French constitutions. Instead, the English constitution is the customary and accepted way of operating the political-legal system in Britain. It developed over many centuries, which its advocates claim gives it a suppleness and strength not enjoyed by newer, less time-honored political constitutions. Its detractors argued that it was corrupt. Nevertheless, the language of “constitutionalism” has been employed by conservatives and radicals alike. In the conservative view, the constitution was as near perfect a system of government as possible, guaranteeing the rights of “Free-born Englishmen.” For the radicals, the aristocracy had used the state to rob Englishmen of their inherent rights, and thus the constitution had to be reformed to be restored to its function of protecting English liberties. Whether conservative conceit or radical critique, the mixture of history, politics, and law that comprised the English constitution was a central component of English nationality.


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part of the system that actually ran Britain and the empire and was characterized by representative government. The dignified part referred to the monarchy, the means by which the common man and woman could relate to the Anglo-British system, which would otherwise escape the comprehension of the “vacant many.”

Defining the Nation One reason that English and British identities merged was that symbols of nationhood were often shared with other nations. For example, many other nationalities could claim English as “their own” language; Protestantism and even Anglicanism were not unique to England; and the monarch was not just king or queen of England but also ruled over Scots, Canadians, Bengalis and a host of other nationalities. In an era of unprecedented social and political upheaval, British institutions had to be justified by those in control of them as above mere nationality and as serving the best interests of the wider British community. The continuity and success of these institutions helped further merge British and English identities at both a popular and official level as the century progressed. However, the success of these institutions was never a foregone conclusion. In the 1780s, Britain was governed by an unpopular aristocracy, but by the 1880s, Britain was becoming a more recognizably modern democracy. During this period, Britons did not experience revolution in the same way that their American and European contemporaries did, despite the stresses of Britain’s precocious and appalling industrial transition. The conflicting groups in the early part of the period were, broadly, the conservative aristocracy, the liberal middle classes, and the radical working classes. Political contest was focused on reforming the British state to make the institutions of government more representative of Britain’s changing society. Until the 1850s, these contests usually pitted the middle and working classes against the more conservative aristocracy. Anti-Catholicism was also a notable feature of English and British identity for the early part of this period. In 1780, over 700 people were killed in London during the so-called “Gordon Riots.” But a subsequent campaign to allow Catholics to hold public office within the United Kingdom generated huge amounts of popular support and eventually Parliament passed a bill allowing for “Catholic Emancipation” in 1829. Another popular radical cause of the first third of the 19th century was antislavery. The antislavery campaigners won over Parliament, and slavery was abolished in Britain in 1807 and throughout the empire in 1833. Times of economic distress generally fueled radical movements. During the depression that followed the end of the Napoleonic Wars, pressure for reform from the lower classes was great, and the British state enacted various repressive measures against its subjects. The most notorious of these was the so-called “Peterloo Massacre” of 1819, when a public meeting calling for reform was broken up by cavalry, leading to 11 deaths and 421 injuries. The push for reform was quelled N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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until 1832 when a reforming government attempted to widen the franchise in the face of opposition from the aristocratic House of Lords. The Lords eventually acquiesced, and threats of revolution were diverted. But the Great Reform Act of 1832 did not end tensions between the classes. During 1834, six laborers from Tolpuddle, Dorset, were harshly sentenced to transportation to Australia for forming a trade union. The case became a cause célèbre for radicals: here was an instance of the British state denying Englishmen their rights when it should be protecting their liberties. The so-called Chartists also employed the language of English liberties, even though their supporters came from all parts of the United Kingdom. The Chartists were working-class reformers who aimed to improve the British state by the implementation of the “Six Points” of their Charter: manhood suffrage; voting by secret ballot; payment of Members of Parliament (MPs); annual Parliaments; abolition of property qualifications for MPs; and equal electoral districts. Despite the authorities’ fears about the movement’s revolutionary potential, in 1848 the Chartists’ largest show of force petered out, thus confirming for many the notion that the English just weren’t the revolutionary type.

Narrating the Nation Accordingly, the dominant national narrative of this period was very much focused on England’s political development. National heroes were those who helped create or consolidate the Anglo-British state. There was no need to look too far into the past to find these heroes, as Britain was experiencing the pinnacle of its global power and influence at this time. Lord Horatio Nelson, whose spectacular naval victories against France secured British dominance of the seas for over a century, was perhaps the greatest and most lauded of all. During this high era of British sea power, it was not surprising that other maritime figures were also venerated. Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, and other “Sea Dogs” from the late Elizabethan era received a good deal of popular attention. Industrialization created its own heroes, too, none more so than Isambard Kingdom Brunel, the great English engineer. But the 19th-century English pantheon also included several figures that were regarded as “typically English” who were not English at all. The Duke of Wellington, victor of Waterloo in 1815, was Anglo-Irish (although he was quite uncomfortable with this fact), and David Livingston, the explorer of central Africa and another personality adopted by the English, was Scottish. Two women stand out as national figures in this period: Florence Nightingale, the “Lady with the Lamp,” who tended to the British wounded during the Crimean War, and Queen Victoria, who became the figurative “Mother of the Nation” as well as the literal grandmother of many of the crowned heads of Europe. Older heroes were not forgotten, however, and were drawn largely from the ranks of previous monarchs. Queen Elizabeth I (reigned 1558–1603) was lauded N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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for presiding over England’s “Golden Age” when the seeds of greatness were sown. King Richard the Lionheart (reigned 1189–1199) was portrayed as a paragon of good government and manly virtue in contrast to his tyrannical brother, King John (reigned 1199–1216). John’s powers were eventually reduced, in legend by Robin Hood and, in fact, by a coalition of powerful barons in 1215. This early curb on regal power was written down in the Magna Carta, the fount of “English liberties,” which became a central part of the national story. King Alfred the Great (reigned 871–899) was credited with laying the foundations of the English state, whereas the legendary King Arthur was re-mythologized by Victorian romantics. Queen Boudicca (d. 61), leader of the ancient Britons’ resistance to Roman imperialism, occupied an uneasy place in English mythology: Was she an early patriot or should the imperial English identify with the Romans against this barbarian? The notion of England as a Protestant elect saved by divine Providence from Catholic threats in 1588 (the Spanish Armada) and 1688 (the “Glorious Revolution”) increasingly gave way to narratives about Britain and England’s civilizing mission. Historians such as Thomas Babbington Macaulay provided the intellectual explanation-cum-justification of English and British political development and imperial power. The British empire was presented by its apologists as a force for good in the world, bringing the light of civilization and free trade (which were seen as more or less the same thing) to benighted parts of the world. Although there was some criticism of the empire from radicals for being too expensive, the period was characterized by the veneration of imperial heroes, many of whom were entombed in London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral, known to some as the “Parish Church of Empire.” Nothing better expressed English values, however, than England’s contribution to the spread of organized sport around the globe. The rules for cricket were codified in 1788, whereas the rules for football were written down in 1863. But by this time, football was already divided into two different codes—those playing to the Football Association’s rules (soccer) and those playing to the rules laid down at Rugby School (hence, rugby). The Lawn Tennis Association was established in 1888. These sports, adopted by the private schools (notably cricket and rugby) captured the ethos of Englishness best. This ethos emphasized sportsmanship, fair play, amateurism, and accepting victory or defeat graciously, and it taught endurance in the face of adversity, thereby preparing the players to take these attitudes into distant corners of the empire, far from the playing fields of Eton.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The main catalyst for the articulation of English national identity during the 19th century was the legitimization of the British state and empire. Ideas about the symbols of the British state, such as the monarchy and Parliament, as being above nationality but expressive of a wider British identification, were developed in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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response to the multinational nature of the British state and empire. Irish nationalism posed the greatest internal threat to the British state during the 19th century and generated both anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sentiment (although these were not necessarily the same thing). Anti-Catholic sentiment in England shifted during this period from a religious prejudice to one increasingly seen in cultural and, indeed, biological terms. Events such as the Famine, the Fenian attacks on London and Canada, and demands for land and self-government made nationalist Ireland an important “other” for the English. But unlike late-19th-century Germany or Hungary, there was little attempt to standardize the identities of the minority nationalities. Scotland retained its own religious, legal, and education systems, and Wales retained its own religion (and even its language ultimately survived). Only in England, the dominant partner in the United Kingdom, was it difficult to see where the cultural and political boundaries of Englishness ended and Britishness began because language, law, religion, and learning had been exported around the globe. Thus if one goal of nationalists is to attain “their own” state and to maximize its independence and influence within the international system, the English had achieved this by 1815, but via a mixture of state expansion and imperialism. The

Imperial Federation map of the world by Captain J. C. R. Colomb, showing the extent of the British empire in 1886. The illustration is taken from The Graphic, July 24, 1886. (Royal Geographical Society)


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Britishness Britishness was a term first coined in the 1870s but has been used more often in recent decades. It refers to qualities of being British and is used by politicians and academics when reflecting on, or asserting, attributes of British national identity. Historians have used the term more and more often when seeking to understand how a sense of British identity came about in the past and why it appears to be changing, or even under threat, in the present. Historically its main features were taken to be Protestantism, monarchy, empire, constitutionalism, and simply not being French or Catholic Irish. Its meaning varied over time, and ideas such as industriousness and race were also part of what it meant to be British during the long 19th century.

political goal of the people we might term “English nationalists” was certainly not the creation of an English state but, rather, the maintenance and perfection of the preexisting British and imperial institutions in the face of various political challenges, both domestic and external. This goal led to English national identity being increasingly expressed largely in the language of Britishness. The strategy was to convince various different social groups and nationalities within the United Kingdom and the empire that being English was a blessing and that being part of Britain and its empire was an enormous piece of good fortune. Many groups, from Indian princes to Lancashire cotton workers, did indeed acquiesce in this idea. By the 1870s, a sort of imperial patriotism, promoted through music hall songs and other forms of “jingoism,” was common, even if many working men and women knew little, and cared less, about the empire itself. Given all this, state and empire were rarely challenged in England after the demise of Chartism in the late 1840s. The outcome of this mobilization around state and empire was a sense of national identification in England that was significantly merged with, and often indistinguishable from, Britishness. Selected Bibliography Bagehot, Walter. 1867. The English Constitution. London: Oxford University Press, 1936. Burke, Edmund. 1790. Reflections on the Revolution in France and on the proceedings in certain societies in London relative to that event in a letter intended to have been sent to a gentleman in Paris. Dublin: W. Watson. Cobbett, William. 1830. Rural rides in the counties of Surrey, Kent, Sussex, (etc.) . . . with economical and political observations relative to matters applicable to, and illustrated by, the state of those counties respectively. London: W. Cobbett. Colley, Linda. 1992. Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837. London: Pimlico. Dilke, Charles. 1869. Greater Britain. A Record of Travel in the English-Speaking Countries during 1867 and 1868. Vols. 1 and 2. London: Macmillan & Co. Engels, Freidrich. 1844. The Condition of the Working Class in England. Translated and edited by W. Henderson and W. Challoner. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971.


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Kumar, Krishan. 2003. The Making of English National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Macaulay, Thomas Babbington. 1849. The History of England from the Accession of James the Second. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. Paine, Thomas. 1791. Rights of Man: Being an Answer to Mr. Burke’s Attack on the French Revolution. London: J. S. Jordan. Seeley, John. 1883. The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures. London: Macmillan. Smith, Adam. 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. London: W. Strahan & T. Cadell. Wellings, Ben. 2002. “Empire-Nation: National and Imperial Discourses in England.” Nations and Nationalism 8, no. 1: 95–110.


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France Elizabeth Rechniewski Chronology 1775–1790 A serious economic and financial crisis, compounded by agricultural failures. 1788–1789 Preparations for the meeting of the Estates-General. 1789 (June 17) The delegates of the Third Estate declare themselves the “National Assembly.” (August 26) The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen is passed. 1792 (September 21) Declaration of the Republic by the Convention. 1794 (July 28) Execution of Robespierre, who headed the Committee of Public Safety during the Terror. 1795–1799 France is governed by a “Directorate” of five men. 1799 (November 9) Coup d’état by General Napoleon Bonaparte, who is named first consul. 1804 (December 2) Coronation of Napoleon as “Emperor of the French.” 1815 (July) The monarchy (Louis XVIII) is restored after the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. 1824 Succession of Charles X. 1830 (July 27–29) The “Three Glorious Days” of revolt in Paris drives out Charles X and installs the “citizen king” Louis-Philippe on the throne: the “July Monarchy.” 1847–1848 Opposition to Louis-Philippe culminates in the revolution of February 1848 and the declaration of the Second Republic. 1851 (December 2) Coup d’état of Louis-Napoleon. 1852–1870 The Second Empire. 1870 (September 4) Defeat of Napoleon III by the Prussians. 1875 Vote on the constitution of the Third Republic.

Situating the Nation In the 1770s France was still in theory an absolute monarchy. The king, Louis XVI, after 1774 exercised final authority over the state, administration, and law. Beneath him lay the hierarchy of the three orders or estates, derived from the medieval division between “those who worked, those who fought and those who prayed.” The first order was the church, whose doctrines provided the ideological basis of society and legitimated the divine right of the monarchy. The second, the nobles, included some who had, until the 17th century, rivaled the monarchy in territory and power. Finally, the third estate comprised perhaps 97 percent or more of the population. All the orders contained men of extremely diverse condition: the poor parish priests barely survived on their stipends, while the high churchmen might occupy positions of power and influence; many noble families NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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had fallen on hard times; and the third estate included the poorest day laborers and the richest proprietors. But the third estate was uniquely disadvantaged; however wealthy and even influential its members might become, all were subject to the various forms of taxation from which the other orders were exempt. In practice, absolute monarchy had always been subject to countervailing powers, including those of the traditional regional parliaments of nobles that were to prove such a problem to the monarchy during the pre-revolutionary period. The resistance of the parliaments to any encroachment on their rights and privileges led to the Maupeou crisis of 1771, when Louis XV’s chancellor sought to greatly reduce their power. The open warfare declared by the parliamentarians in pamphlets and speeches denouncing the “despotic” power of the king did much to undermine the ideological legitimacy of the ancien régime. Moreover, in this period the seeds of decay and transformation were at work on every level: ideological, political, economic, and financial. Enlightenment thought with its wide-ranging assault on injustice, intolerance, and irrationality culminated with the publication of the final volumes of plates of Diderot’s Encyclopédie in 1772. In this work and in a veritable torrent of publications, philosophers propagated ideas subversive of the authority of church and monarchy and of the social, political, and economic privileges of the first two orders, ideas that were discussed not only by the frustrated elites of the third estate but by liberal-minded members of the nobility and the clergy. Many commentators have argued—though the danger of hindsight is evident —that the closing decades of the 18th century saw the emergence of a new concept of citizenship. The breakdown of hierarchy could be witnessed in public places, whether at Montgolfier’s balloon ascent in 1783 or at the theater, where “high” and “low” drama lost their clear dividing lines (Schama 1989). The new citizenship idea was also visible in the “cult of great men” propagated in the extremely popular biographies and collective biographies that offered highly polished examples of citizenship modeled on the virile duty of the Roman republicans (Bell 2001). Such a model, as feminist historians have argued, tended to exclude women from active membership of the nation. There was an explosion in the use of the terms “nation” and “patrie” in the last decades before the revolution; the evolution in the meanings and use of this vocabulary has been widely studied. “Nation” was defined by various “objective” criteria, although there was little agreement on what those criteria might be. Was a nation a unique product of climate and environment, further defined by its forms of education and government, as Montesquieu had argued in L’Esprit des lois? His ideas were quoted approvingly in every context. Was a nation defined by the “national characteristics” of its people, a traditional idea that was accorded quasiscientific status in the 18th century? Or was the nation a political entity, the expression of the general will as Rousseau argued? The term was born in uncertainty and thrived, it could be argued, because of its ambiguity. But whether in Enlightenment or revolutionary discourse, the “nation” came to be increasingly N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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used as the motive for reform and the source of political legitimacy. Patrie carried an additional connotation: it referred to that ideal country where the citizen would find freedom and happiness. The French nation might not yet be the patrie dreamed of—but perhaps it could become so. The meaning of these terms was the subject of contestation as each interest group sought to legitimize its own claims. For example, the dissident parliamentarians tried to appropriate the vocabulary of patriotism, calling themselves the “parti des patriotes.” But certainly no writer used the new vocabulary with more effect than the Abbé Sieyès who, in January 1789, published his pamphlet Qu’estce que le tiers état? (What is the third estate?), to which his answer was, in a powerful rhetorical denunciation of power and privilege: the very nation itself. On the financial level, the Seven Years’ War in midcentury and the French intervention in the American War of Independence had dramatically undermined the state’s finances; in 1770 the French economy was in crisis, with a budget deficit of 50 million livres, forcing the king’s ministers to propose taxation that exacerbated tensions among the monarchy and the privileged orders. Agriculture, too, was in crisis in the years leading up to the revolution, with bitter weather and bad harvests precipitating many millions of peasants into hunger and despair and forcing up the price of bread for the townspeople. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Such was the context in which the king reluctantly summoned the EstatesGeneral to meet at Versailles in May 1789 to gain approval for tax reform. The Estates-General—the assembly of representatives of all three orders—had last met in 1614, and in its structure and custom, it was dominated by the first two orders. However, in the febrile atmosphere of the months leading up to the meeting, expectations were high that real change was possible. The process of electing delegates and the preparation of the cahiers de doléance—petitions setting out complaints and requests to be presented to the assembly—gave ideological and political expression to the disparate discontents of the three orders and crystallized the hopes of reform. Traditionally, each estate had an equal number of delegates, and each delegate had one vote, rendering inevitable the dominance of the third by the first and second who would unite to retain their privileges. Yet in 1789 the number of third estate delegates was doubled due to a powerful campaign orchestrated by the Committee of Thirty, which included members of the liberal aristocracy and clergy. Indeed, one of the most determined reformers of this period was a churchman, Abbé Grégoire, who campaigned for the rights of all citizens, as well as for equal rights for Jews and the liberation of slaves.

Instituting the Nation On June 17, 1789, the delegates of the third estate, frustrated by the king’s vacillation, declared themselves the “National Assembly” and three days later swore an oath not to part until they had given the nation a constitution. Their appropriation of the term “national” was the culmination of a century of contestation of privilege and an assertion of the equal rights of all to citizenship in the nation. These rights were defined in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, passed after impassioned debate over many different versions on August 26, 1789. It is impossible to overemphasize the significance of this document, which laid the ideological and political foundations of the modern French nation. There were later declarations, but it is the declaration of 1789 that has stood the test of time. Proclaiming in its first article the Rousseauistic principle that men are born free, it enshrined the fundamental rights of freedom of religion and of expression, and of equality before the law. It abolished the legal basis of the three orders, declaring that social distinctions were to be based solely on utility. Most significantly, it declared that legitimate authority could derive only from the nation. It also enshrined the right to own property, a provision that, in the context of the sale of church property, created a climate in which the wealthy and entrepreneurial members of the third estate might make their way in the new nation rather more quickly than the rest. The declaration in practice left many excluded. Olympe de Gouges, recognizing that it did not address the issues crucial to the rights of women, wrote a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Tennis Court Oath (1791), by Jacques Louis David, depicts French delegates swearing to provide a new constitution. (The Gallery Collection/Corbis)

Declaration of the Rights of Women in 1791. She was subsequently executed, as were a number of women who, in campaigning for women’s rights or partaking in political activity, incurred the Jacobins’ displeasure. The Convention in fact formally excluded women from political participation by the decrees of 1793–1794, assigning them an inferior status within the nation, a status that was perpetuated throughout the 19th century by the patriarchal provisions of the Napoleonic Civil Code. Nor did the slaves—many hundreds of thousands of whom worked in the plantations of overseas possessions such as in Guadeloupe and Martinique— benefit from the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly or the declaration of 1789. Finally declared free by the Convention in 1794, they were returned to slavery by Napoleon. The only successful uprising was in Saint-Domingue (Haiti), where capable black generals led a 10-year-long campaign that finally overthrew French control in 1803. The revolution and the First Republic should not be understood as a single unit but as a period during which the assemblies were successively dominated by groups with increasingly radical definitions of what the rights and nature of citizenship should be. After 1792 the external menace of Prussia and Austria and internal threats such as the counter-revolutionary uprising in the Vendée heightened the importance attached to political unity. Rousseau’s theory that the general will permitted no division within the nation was the ideological justification of the Terror of 1793–1794, intended to eliminate internal dissent. ThouN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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sands were denounced as enemies of the Republic and were put to death by the guillotine at the instigation of the Jacobin Committee of Public Safety, increasingly under the control of Robespierre. The Jacobins, whose power was based on the Parisian patriots, the sans-culottes, adopted measures that were politically extreme, savagely repressive of real or imagined opposition, and yet socially advanced. Thus, the 1793 declaration adopted by the Jacobin-dominated Assembly (but never put into effect) proposed rights to education and public assistance. It was also the period of enhanced de-Christianization, with violent attacks on church property and belief, while the republican nation became the object of a quasi-religious cult, celebrated with imagery taken from nature and the ancient world. A new array of symbols to replace those of church and monarchy were developed during the revolutionary period: the tricolor, which officially became the national flag in 1794 and was worn on uniforms and cockades, the red bonnet or Phrygian cap, and the “Marseillaise.” These symbols, finally consecrated by the Third Republic, remain those of the modern French nation. On the administrative level also, the revolution and early years of the Republic laid the basis for the modern nation. The traditional provinces were replaced by a rigorously rational division of the country into 83 départements of similar size, designed to facilitate communication. This new structure might have accommodated some degree of continuing local governance, but the centralizing tendencies of the Jacobins and then Napoleon, who imposed at the head of each département a préfet answerable to Paris, created a powerful administrative structure that successive regimes, of whatever political hue, found too useful to abandon. Thus, the French nation acquired the tendency toward excessive centralization that continued to characterize it well into the 20th century. The early years of the revolution also saw the introduction of a single currency (the franc and centimes) and a standardized system of weights and measures (the metric system), reforms that imposed national uniformity on regional disparity and encouraged the trade and industry that were to lay the basis for France’s economic modernization.

Defining the Nation The myth of a common Gallic ancestry and the dictates of natural landforms and features supported the argument in 1792 for the incorporation of Savoy into the French Republic. Most republicans adhered to the belief that France’s “natural” boundaries were the Rhine in the east, the Atlantic Ocean, the Alps, and the Pyrenees. This vision, temporarily realized under Napoleon, would persist in the 19th century and become the continuing basis of territorial demands. Upon the Restoration, republicans rejected France’s loss of the Rhine territories by the Treaty of 1815, while the loss of Alsace-Lorraine to the Prussians in 1871 rendered the recovery of the provinces occupées the very cornerstone of French nationalism until this goal was realized by the Treaty of Versailles in 1918. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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From the early days of the revolution, the Assembly understood that the new nation required not only the intellectual foundation provided by the declaration but the support of concrete and powerful images provided by spectacle, symbol, and ceremony. On July 14, 1790, the first anniversary of the storming of the Bastille, a massive celebration was organized on the Champ de Mars: the Fête de la Fédération. When the nation became the Republic in September 1792, the leaders, conscious that they were founding a new era for France and indeed for humanity, organized spectacular ceremonies. Apparent already was the confusion of the Republic with nation and nation with patrie, as well as the beginnings of modern forms of nationalism, a word that first came into use during this period. Although the era of the Directorate (1795–1799) saw a retreat from militant republicanism, Napoleon (1769–1821) exploited to the full the association of nation with revolutionary fervor to represent the conquest of Europe to his soldiers as both a patriotic duty and a fight to liberate oppressed peoples. First consul after the coup d’état of 1799, consul for life in 1802, and finally emperor in 1804, Napoleon is perhaps best known for his military genius, his whirlwind conquest of Europe, and his dramatic defeat; however, it could be argued that his legacy of nation-building was more significant and longer lasting. Renowned for his attention to detail and his interest in every aspect of administration and state policy, he pursued a raft of projects, some of which had been initiated by the republicans but not brought to fruition. This was the case with the Civil Code; under Napoleon’s guidance, a committee forged a single, coherent body of law from the many reforms passed after 1789. The code, passed on March 21, 1804, ratified certain basic gains of the revolution, including the abolition of social privilege and the right of equality before the law, but it also entrenched the relegation of women to the status of second-class citizens, subordinate to father or husband, and the power of employers over workers. Its provisions would remain almost unchanged throughout the period under discussion here. A new penal code was also issued in 1810. Under Napoleon’s control, the civil administration was organized along quasimilitary lines, staffed by public servants trained at the new secondary schools, the lycées (1802), and the Imperial University (1806). Religious tolerance survived under state supervision; the four principal faiths were organized into Consistories, with salaried personnel, though the Catholic faith was given a special status as the “religion of the majority of the French.” This situation would remain until the separation of church and state in 1905. Few details of national life escaped Napoleon’s attention, including overseeing the program of the Comédie-Française, for he understood very well the importance of the arts as propaganda. This was hardly a new discovery, of course. From the first years of the Republic, theater, painting, and the arts had been marshaled to instruct the public and instill devotion to the Republic, reaching a high point under the period of the Convention. In the summer of 1793, the government decreed that only suitably republican plays could be staged, and in March 1794, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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every municipality with a stage was ordered to perform “patriotic” productions every 10 days. The prominence of the artist Jacques-Louis David as participant (a member of the Convention), chronicler, and propagandist during the republican and Napoleonic eras is emblematic of the role art might be called on to play in instituting the nation.

Narrating the Nation Literature and art continued to celebrate French nationhood under the Restoration (1815–1848), although in more nuanced ways. Historical events were the subject of popular novels, poetry, and theater, as in the works of Victor Hugo (1802–1885), Alfred de Vigny (1797–1863), and Alfred de Musset (1810–1857). But the task of narrating the nation during this period belonged chiefly to the historian, an occupation that would over the century become increasingly professionalized. Many historians found employment in the new state institutions, the grandes écoles or libraries, or were commissioned by the king. Others such as François Guizot and Adolphe Thiers combined careers as historians and politicians. These liberal historians sought to defend the gains of the revolution against the danger of a return to the ancien régime. The historians were faced with a fundamental dilemma: Was the French nation an expression of a universal human aspiration toward civil and political rights, or was it an entity with particular, perhaps unique, qualities and characteristics? One means of bridging this dilemma was to present the French nation as unique in its devotion to the struggle for human enlightenment; more progressive than any other nation, it had a special mission to guide others toward freedom, nationhood, and self-determination. The works of Edgar Quinet (1803–1875), Henri Martin (1810–1883), and Jules Michelet (1798–1874) portrayed this mission as France’s historical destiny. The most lyrical and passionate of these historians, Michelet espoused the idealistic, messianic nationalism of the First Republic. Evoking figures such as Roland and Joan of Arc as incarnations of the spirit of the

Jules Michelet (1798–1874) Born in Paris in 1798 into a sans-culottes family, Michelet taught at the Ecole normale supérieure before being appointed to the National Archives, where he had access to many unpublished documents. He began his monumental Histoire de France in 1833 and was accorded a chair at the Collège de France in 1838. In the heady atmosphere of opposition to the July Monarchy in 1847–1848, he began his Histoire de la Révolution française (1847–1853), whose aim was to demonstrate the progressive victory of man over nature, of liberty over fatality. His work is a veritable hymn to the action of the people in their centuries-long struggle for the unity and greatness of France ( Le Peuple 1846).


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nation, he transformed the history of France into the narration of progress toward universal freedom. The persistence of this narrative throughout the 19th century is evident in Jules Ferry’s justification for French imperialism in the 1880s: that France had the civilizing mission to bring human rights and liberty to backward peoples.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Though theater and the press were both useful tools of civic instruction, and history was the handmaiden of national consciousness, primary education was quickly acknowledged as the key means of inculcating desirable political attitudes and national virtues in the mass of the people, and also of overcoming the considerable regional and linguistic diversity that characterized ancien régime France. The importance of a national language was debated, research carried out, and a report submitted to the Convention by the Abbe Grégoire in 1794, indicating the extent of the problem of linguistic diversity. Only a universal education system could overcome such diversity, and for the next century successive regimes put forward projects for such a system. While universal primary education remained little more than a vision under the Jacobins, the July Monarchy began to establish a nationwide system of public schools (the Guizot law of 1833). Under the Second Empire, in 1863, Minister of Public Instruction Victor Duruy introduced the teaching of history into public schools; four years later, he outlined an ambitious plan to implement universal elementary schooling. But it was the Third Republic (1875) that brought to fruition a century of projects for educational reform when in 1882 Jules Ferry, minister of public instruction, introduced free, obligatory, and secular primary schooling for children between 6 and 13 years. With its aim of forming patriotic citizens instructed in their rights and just as importantly in their duties, Ferry’s school was at the very core of the national project. In the century following the revolution of 1789, nationalism had undergone significant development and change. At first associated with the patriotic fervor of the defenders of the Republic and its legacy of universal human rights, over the course of the 19th century two main currents of nationalism emerged. The dominant liberal current approved the revolution and many of its gains, though within this group republicans were at odds with those supporting a constitutional monarchy. The nationalism of the liberal current was universalist, portraying France as forward-looking, predominantly secular, and inclusive. This outlook was opposed from the end of the 18th century by a counter-revolutionary and conservative current of thought first articulated by Bonald and de Maistre, which placed the monarchy and the church at the heart of French national identity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald The earliest theoreticians of conservative reaction to the revolution of 1789 were Joseph de Maistre (1753–1821) and Louis de Bonald (1754–1840). Echoing Edmund Burke’s fierce criticism of the French Revolution in Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), de Maistre supported the restoration of what he saw as the divinely ordained hereditary monarchy. Denouncing the rationalist progressivism of the revolution, he called for the restoration of ultimate authority to the church. Louis de Bonald, who published his royalist Théorie du pouvoir politique et religieux in 1796, also supported the supremacy of the church and hoped for the restoration of the pre-revolutionary harmony between the social and religious spheres.

For theoreticians who make a broad distinction between two ideal types of nationalism—one open, forward-looking, inclusive, and based on a political project, and the other particularist, exclusive, and emphasizing difference—it is tempting to see these types illustrated in the two strands of French nationalism of the late 19th century. The reality, however, is more complex: Both strains of nationalism generally shared the view that France had a special mission, whether to defend Catholicism or universal human rights. Both currents attached great importance to the army and military glory as constitutive of French identity. And nationalist thinkers from both tendencies were often tainted by the increasing climate of anti-Semitism in the late 19th century and by theories of racial difference. The defeat of 1870 in the Franco-Prussian War marked not only the end of the Second Empire and the eventual installation of the Third Republic (1875) but also crystallized and hardened the existing currents of nationalism. The conservative, counter-revolutionary tendency assumed a virulently nationalist and racist form, turned particularly against Germans and Jews—the army, the means of liberating the provinces perdues, became the symbol of patriotism and national unity; the Catholic church was seen as the only institution capable of holding at bay the moral anarchy glimpsed during the Paris Commune (1871); and the Third Republic was the enemy incarnate and the object of savage attack. Republican nationalism, while sharing some of these aims and characteristics, as we have seen, also included within its ranks those who subscribed to the emerging socialist ideologies that were anathema to the right. Thus by the 1880s, in spite of the centurylong attempts to unify the French nation and encourage patriotism, the country was still marked by deep political divisions as well as by marked regional differences. Paris and the provinces, city and country, north and south, retained distinct identities, whereas areas in the southwest, west, and center of the country, notably the Basque region, Brittany, and French Flanders, resisted attempts at integration. As Eugen Weber has shown, in the late 19th century, there continued to be widespread indifference to or ignorance of the national project among the rural populations. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Selected Bibliography Bell, David A. 2001. The Cult of the Nation in France: Inventing Nationalism, 1680–1800. Cambridge, MA, and London: Harvard University Press. Cranston, Maurice. 1988. “The Sovereignty of the Nation.” In The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, vol. 2: The Political Culture of the French Revolution, edited by Colin Lucas, 97–104. Oxford: Pergamon Press. Crossley, Ceri. 1999. “History as a Principle of Legitimation in France (1820–1848).” In Writing National Histories: Western Europe since 1800, edited by Stefan Berger, 49–56. London and New York: Routledge. Furet, François. 1988. The French Revolution, 1770–1814. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. Jenkins, Brian. 1990. Nationalism in France: Class and Nation since 1789. Savage, MD: Barnes & Noble. Nora, Pierre. 1997. Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer, edited by Lawrence D. Kritzman. New York: Columbia University Press. O’Brien, Conor Cruise. 1988. “Nationalism and the French Revolution.” In The Permanent Revolution: The French Revolution and Its Legacy, 1789–1989, edited by Geoffrey Best, 17–48. Chicago and London: Fontana Press. Schama, Simon. 1989. Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Weber, Eugen. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.


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Germany Celia Applegate Chronology 1792 French revolutionary armies under General Custine invade Germanic states, reaching across the Rhine as far as Frankfurt, inaugurating more than two decades of territorial and political transformation in central Europe. 1803 France undertakes major reorganization of the western half of the Holy Roman Empire, resulting in many fewer states overall in central Europe. 1806 End of the Holy Roman Empire. Napoleon establishes the Confederation of the Rhine and decisively defeats Prussia at the battles of Jena and Auerstadt. 1813 Prussia declares war on France, beginning the so-called Wars of Liberation from French hegemony. The French are defeated at the battle of Leipzig. 1815 Defeat of Napoleon at the battle of Waterloo. The Congress of Vienna establishes future shape of central European states, including the German Confederation. 1817 German student associations (Burschenschaften) hold nationalist festival at the Wartburg Castle in Thuringia. 1819 The Karlsbad Decrees of the German Confederation suppress political activity, especially agitation by nationalist groups. 1830 July Revolution in France, as well as various revolts and nationalist agitation in German states. 1832 Nationalist festival at Hambach in the Rhineland. 1834 Establishment of the German Customs Union (Zollverein). 1848 Revolutions in Europe, including Germany. German National Assembly meets in Frankfurt and begins to write a constitution for a united Germany. 1849 Frederick William IV of Prussia refuses the offer of a German crown from the deputies of the German National Assembly. The Assembly and other democratic associations are dispersed all over Germany by counter-revolutionary forces. 1851 German Confederation officially restored after the disruptions of the revolutionary years. Bismarck appointed Prussian ambassador to the Confederation Diet. 1859 German National Association (National Verein) established as an organization of liberals to agitate for political reform and national unification. 1862 Bismarck appointed minister-president of Prussia in the midst of a constitutional crisis over military reforms. 1864 Austria and Prussia go to war against Denmark over the territories of Schleswig and Holstein. 1866 Prussia (and Italy) go to war against Austria; the Austrians defeated at the battle of Königgrätz. The Treaty of Prague excludes Austria from German affairs. Establishment of the North German Confederation. 1870 Prussia and other German states war with France. 1871 The German Second Empire proclaimed at Versailles as a semi-constitutional monarchy with a modified 1849 constitution.


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Situating the Nation Because of long centuries of political fragmentation, the history of German nationhood has no clear starting point. Unlike France or England, the German lands straddled lines on either sides of which other European nations developed. The northern and eastern boundaries of the Roman empire ran through Germany, as did the eastern and southern boundaries of the Carolingian empire, and finally the roughly north-south division between the lands of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. All the distinctions marked by these lines—between traditions of law and autocracy, small-holder agriculture and serfdom, Protestantism and Catholicism—collided and failed to resolve in the German lands. This central position, which made German Europe a key point of cultural and economic transmission between east and west, north and south, contributed also to a history of constant tension, abrupt change, discontinuity, and attenuated collective identity. It made Germany an incoherent term or, for many a frustrated observer, a mere geographical expression. The ambiguity of German identity found expression in its only collective entity, the Holy Roman Empire, which was established in 962 by a German king who preferred the diffuse imperial grandeur of the Roman precedent to mundane monarchical centralism. Renamed the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation in 1486, the German lands of central Europe saw the steady erosion of centralized authority. During centuries of religious and political conflict, German leaders (princes, bishops, nobles, city patriciates) refrained from reforming the empire’s political constitution, choosing to preserve their own authority, even at the cost of vulnerability to outside powers. The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 marked the end of the most destructive demonstration of German weakness, the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648). It sealed German political fragmentation by ratifying the insignificance of imperial institutions and recognizing the authority of the individual states, large or tiny, as well as the right to oversight by powerful neighbors like France. The empire’s final dissolution in 1806 removed what had long been the mere appearance of German statehood. It made unavoidable a European confrontation with the question of how Germans should be politically organized.

Instituting the Nation But if unified statehood continued to elude the peoples of central Europe until 1871, national identity nevertheless developed. A sense of national identity was not evenly distributed across the population of 18th-century central Europe. Kings and nobility, town guildsmen and peasants, all had, for different reasons, no interest in German nationality or a national state. In social terms, the diffusion of national identity took place among the secular reading public. This group N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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consisted of educated people whose interests in reading and writing for publication created a social network of shared values and concerns that crossed the barriers dividing one locality from another and the privileged aristocracy from all. The German national movement had its origin among people living mainly in cities and with sufficient means to have obtained an education. Their national identity was grounded in the patriotism of language and culture, that is, a passionate interest in the commonalities of speech, history, and custom among the people of central Europe. Searching for a grounding for national consciousness, people began to write about it as something created and secured through language—the “invisible intercourse of spirits and hearts,” in the words of Johann Gottfried von Herder, the greatest 18th-century theorist of national cultures (cited in Giesen 1998, 75). The politics of such national identity were inchoate. People advocated devotion to some common good and expressed defensiveness vis-à-vis outside influences. This latter tendency reflected the actual historical experiences of Germans, expressing their fear of political powerlessness and loss of cultural identity. Literate people were certain that German culture existed but lacked confidence in its ability to survive political turmoil and the changing fortunes of princes. Even though, by the end of the 18th century, a more unified sense of national cultural identity had emerged among the literate public, its members still looked to literature, the visual arts, and (increasingly) music to measure the strength of the German nation. It took the French Revolution to bring focus to the political notions of nationally conscious Germans. The revolutionary wars, which began in 1792 and lasted for more than two decades, altered the political picture of central Europe profoundly and forced German patriots to experience firsthand the political impotence of the old empire—old lessons of history made new. French armies occupied

Ludwig van Beethoven (1770–1827) Probably the most admired composer in the history of Western music, Beethoven lived in the foundational period of German nationalism and was inevitably recruited to the national cause, mainly after his death. He was born in Bonn in the Rhineland but spent most of his years as a performer and composer in Vienna, where he developed the Viennese classicism of Mozart and Haydn with ever more daring, and individual, means of musical expression. By the end of his life, he was composing works that were scarcely comprehensible to his listeners but nevertheless increasingly received, in an era of romantic aesthetics, as being marks of genius, transcendent of everyday experience as great art was meant to be. While much of his music had immediate and lasting appeal among the growing middle-class audiences of music lovers, the mythic Beethoven stood for something beyond popularity or comprehensibility. His status as German hero derived above all from his symphonies, especially the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth, which German nationalists performed as the ultimate expression of German courage, resolve, profundity, and fate.


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the left bank of the Rhine before moving further into south Germany. In 1795, Prussia gave up lands in the west in the hope of securing new ones in the east; in 1797, the Habsburg emperor in Vienna traded away guarantees of the Holy Roman Empire’s future in return for the security of the Habsburgs’ own lands. Meanwhile, the hardships attendant on the presence of French armies in German lands, combined with the catastrophic collapse of Prussia in 1806, sharpened the edges of national discourse. If German national identity had long drawn coherence from a sense of its own vulnerability, the Napoleonic era saw the emergence of a fullblown and violent anti-French rhetoric in discussions of German nationality. National identity, then, crystallized into a national movement in the first decades of the 19th century, though still a national movement without a goal beyond that of strengthening the German people so that they could resist outside incursions. Still, the majority of soldiers in the armies that eventually defeated the French on German soil fought out of obedience to princely authority, not national resolve, and the princes who led them had no intention of laying the foundations for a national state. The national movement was not entirely absent from the struggle, however. Answering the king of Prussia’s appeal to “Prussians and Germans” to join his war against Napoleon, a small number of educated middleclass men, alongside artisans and apprentices, entered the Prussian Volunteer Units, believing them to represent the “nation-in-arms.” The princes themselves, especially the Prussian leadership, also used the rhetoric of national salvation to secure the loyalty of the non-noble classes in their efforts at state rationalization —the modernization of the old monarchies.

Defining the Nation In the course of confronting the challenge of French hegemony, Germans of many different ranks and regions became familiar with the idea of nationhood, and the vocabulary of national identity gained a new forcefulness. For outspoken nationalists, like the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte or the schoolteacher Friedrich Ludwig Jahn, the German people had a special mission to secure the future of Europe on a higher moral plane. The Germans, they believed, were an original, unadulterated people, capable of much greater achievements than their enemies had so far allowed them. New organizations, like the Deutsche Bund (German League), dedicated to disseminating anti-French propaganda, the German gymnastic societies, and the German-wide student fraternities, attempted to mobilize a latent national identity, thereby preparing Germans for armed struggle. As a result of all this, and of victory over Napoleon, Germany’s existence as an idea was secured, without its future as a unified state becoming any more certain. The 1820s brought increasing recognition and encouragement of German cultural achievements, from the apotheosis of Ludwig van Beethoven as German N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Burschenschaften Many student fraternities or corporations, called Burschenschaften, that originated in the early 19th century became caught up in nationalist agitation during the period of Napoleonic domination of central Europe. After 1815, the governments of monarchical restoration did not welcome their continuing calls for national unity. In 1817, student fraternities, led by the fraternity Teutonia at the University of Jena, gathered at the historic Wartburg Castle outside of Eisenach in Thuringia to commemorate the 300th anniversary of Martin Luther’s 95 Theses, which had inaugurated the German Reformation. They used the occasion to call for German unity, denounce political repression, and create a bonfire of things they hated, including a corporal’s cane, symbolizing Napoleon, and so-called reactionary literary works, symbolizing the demoralizing effects of censorship. The Wartburg Festival led directly to the passage of the even more repressive Karlsbad Decrees, but it also served later nationalists as a demonstration of their courage and resolve.

hero, to major projects of history writing and artifact collecting, to the learned treatises of G. W. F. Hegel and his followers. The wartime moment of activism had passed, but the promotion of national identity through scholarship and cultural achievement remained, still imbued with the spirit of nationalist poet Ernst Moritz Arndt’s search for the German fatherland. Nor were the makers and consumers of this self-consciously German music, German history, German art, and German philosophy indifferent to its political shadow—the idea of a single national state. Nationally conscious people did not make neat distinctions between the cultural content of nationhood and its political implications; to believe that Germany existed as a cultural reality was also to believe in a set of political ideals —autonomy or self-government chief among them. As numerous writers said, Germans could only know their identity—and greatness—as a people through involvement in public life. People understood national identity not just as a set of character traits or a dream of brotherhood. To be a German was to participate in building a national community, made real through action and raised to a conscious level of experience. The most sustained collective effort to define what the German nation was, geographically, politically, and culturally, took place in 1848–1849 in Frankfurt among the deputies gathered in those revolutionary years in the hope of shaping a new future. Answering the question of German nationhood proved essential to writing a constitution for this incoherent geographical expression. The rough consensus the Frankfurt deputies endorsed represented agreement on several points. First, they believed that German nationhood could not be defined by a single criterion, whether of language, religion, geography, biology, law, or culture. Germanness was for them a flexible construct that reflected millennia of conflict and struggle, of regional diversity and confessional divergence. Acknowledging historical precedent, the deputies mainly agreed that the new German nation would have the same borders as the soon-to-be-superseded German Confederation N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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established in 1815. The mere existence of a substantial German-speaking population did not, in other words, mean that the new Germany’s borders must encompass it. And by the same token, neither non-German speakers (like the Poles in Prussian Poznan), Jews, nor Catholics forfeited a right to citizenship in this new nation, or a right to speak their language and practice their religion. True to their amalgamation of liberal-progressive and historicist thinking, the deputies of 1848 were sure that participation in the new public life of a German nation would bring about the full assimilation of non-Germans and Jews into this Christian, German-speaking Germany. The deputies believed that German culture represented the most progressive force in Europe, and most remained virulently anti-French. And in common with most Europeans—liberal, radical, or conservative—they had no respect for Judaism as such, considering it a relic of unenlightened times. Nor did they acknowledge the national claims of Poles or Czechs living in the territories of the German Confederation. At the same time, however, they held true to their belief in personal autonomy and self-development (Bildung) and rejected any policy of forceful “Germanization.”

Narrating the Nation Most of the national deputies of 1848–1849 were familiar with contemporaneous history writing, the main goal of which had long been to explain German disunity in the hope of soon overcoming it. The culminating moment in the national stories that historians and publicists of the mid-19th century recounted was the antiFrench campaigns of 1812–1815, refashioned as glorious Wars of Liberation, with their victories all the sweeter for reversing centuries of fragmentation and suffering. Midcentury nationalists developed a kind of obsession with the Thirty Years’ War. As the low point of German fortunes, it provided the perfect contrast to German recovery in the early 19th century and the hoped-for unification in the decades to come. Yet the story of the past and of the Thirty Years’ War in particular also revealed the lines dividing the nationalists, chiefly between Catholics and Protestants. Although the great poet and playwright Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) had characterized the war as a struggle for German liberty, later nationalists saw it in more sectarian terms. For Protestants, it illustrated the aggression and cruelty of international Roman Catholicism in arms. It thus demonstrated the importance of Protestant leadership, specifically from the Prussian kings, to any future German state. The greatest German national hero for such writers was Martin Luther, the leader of the first major revolt against the Roman Catholic oppression of German Europe. The boundaries of a future German nation, in such narrations, encompassed Germany north of the Main River, mainly a Protestant population close to the Protestant nations of Scandinavia and Great Britain and ruled by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Protestant princes. For Catholic nationalists, the 17th-century struggle was epochal in a different way. It had consisted of a noble effort on the part of the Habsburg monarchs to consolidate the fragmented states of central Europe. That effort’s failure could be blamed on many factors, French ambitions chief among them, and the effort to return to its high ideals in the 19th century must necessarily involve Austria and its monarchy as well. Thus, 19th-century efforts to tell the nation’s history were divided between images of a geographically smaller but overwhelming Protestant Germany (the so-called kleindeutsch or small German nation) and a more extensive Germany, evenly divided between Catholics and Protestants (the so-called gross-deutsch or large German nation).

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In 1815, the central European kings and princes, in concert with the great powers surrounding them, had reasserted the principle of monarchy and the geography of multi-statehood. In 1819, reacting to the nationalist agitation of the student fraternities and gymnastics associations, they issued the repressive Karlsbad Decrees, which established a highly circumscribed public sphere. The decrees destroyed the nationalist associations as effective means of popular mobilization and seemed to fulfill the German princes’ desire to depoliticize national identity. The European-wide shock of the July Revolution of 1830 in Paris briefly brought nationalist politics back out into the open again. It took the form of agitation aimed not against the French this time but against the outdated structure of the German Confederation of 1815—a loose association of 39 German states and cities that had inherited all the faults and none of the dignity of the Holy Roman Empire. This era was one of significant social and economic change in central Europe, of a revolutionary rise in literacy rates (reaching 40 percent of the German population by 1830), and of aggressive international posturing on the part of unified nations like England and France. Given all that, Germans expressed their indignation with leaders who seemed unable to understand the need for national strength through unity. Demonstrators in 1832 at Hambach Castle in the Rhineland called for “freedom, enlightenment, nationality, and popular sovereignty,” before being dispersed and arrested by government forces. More staid nationalists wrote articles in favor of monarchical constitutions and limited forms of representation. Both strands of nationalists saw themselves as part of a broader liberal stream in European political development and considered the national identity of Germans as requiring single statehood, sooner rather than later. Meanwhile, the need for real action, of the sort not experienced since 1815, suddenly presented itself in the summer of 1840 when a French international setback, unrelated to German Europe, led to an outbreak of aggressive speechmaking in Paris about the Frenchness of the Rhine frontier. In response, German nationalists found their voices again. Amateur poet Nikolas Becker composed a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Hambach Festival On May 27, 1832, 20,000–30,000 people, mostly from southwest German states but with visitors from as far afield as Paris and Warsaw, gathered in the ruins of an old castle in the Rhenish Palatinate, a part of the Rhineland that since 1816 had belonged to the kingdom of Bavaria, and hoisted the black-red-gold flag of German democracy for the first time. The demonstration reflected general dissatisfaction with Bavarian and German Confederation policies; the main demands of the demonstrators were for freedom of the press, civil rights, and German unification. Speeches from its leaders, Johann Georg August Wirth and Philipp Jakob Siebenpfeiffer, called for the overthrow of monarchies and the establishment of a single democratic Germany, which they predicted would be followed by a democratization of Europe as a whole. Siebenpfeiffer’s closing words were “Long live a free, united Germany! Long live the Poles, our German allies! Long live the Franks, our German brothers, who honor our nationality and our independence! Long live every people, who break their chains and swear fealty with us to the cause of Freedom! Fatherland—People’s Majesty—People’s Union—forever!” These and other sentiments resulted in the leaders’ arrests and a renewed crackdown on political activity in the German Confederation.

poem that stirred its readers with such sentiments as, “They shall not have it, our free German Rhine, though like greedy crows they hoarsely cry for it.” Within weeks, every German-language newspaper had reprinted the verses, and songwriters from Robert Schuman on down had composed melodies for it. Cultural organizations, like choral societies and historical associations, suddenly came into their own as channels for influencing public policy making. Under pressure from below, the German Confederation even drew up defense plans. The Rhine crisis of 1840 dissipated as quickly as it had arisen, but its lasting effect was to demonstrate to the mass audience of literate Germans that the cultural nation and the political nation were one and indivisible and could influence even kings. The 1840s thus intensified expressions of national identity among larger numbers of people than before. Cultural organizations pursued high-profile, Germanwide activities (national monument building, national choral festivals), and political liberals, infused with national consciousness, began to organize within and outside the state assemblies and to talk of the need for national statehood. At the same time, the German population exploded in size (from 22 to 35 million in a 30-year period), and the countryside filled up with landless laborers and the cities with underemployed casual workers. By 1847, the opposition groups had gathered a wide range of unhappy Germans under the guise of a single national movement. German national identity had become a potent force for mobilization. At the same time, however, its leadership had not yet developed any realistic assessment of the powers ranged against its goals. Nor did they show much awareness of the devil lurking in the details of national boundaries and ethnicnational definitions. For nationally conscious Germans, the rapid developments of 1848–1849 amounted to a lesson in power politics, that is, in the limitations of the idea of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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nation without the power of state authority and military force behind it. The news in February 1848 of fighting in the streets of Paris and a king dethroned was welcomed by crowds of thousands, even tens of thousands, in towns and cities across Germany, who began calling for a free press, a free militia, and a national parliament. Liberal opposition leaders seized the moment and achieved wide-ranging concessions from governments in almost every German state, from those as large as Austria and as small as Oldenburg. The Prussian king Frederick William IV graciously acknowledged Prussia as part of Germany and appointed a liberal cabinet. The Austrian court, facing revolutionary nationalism in their non-German territories as well (Hungary chief among them), left Vienna altogether for the time being, holing up at the safe distance of Innsbruck. Liberal nationalists next moved, still without interference from the divided and dithering German princes, to create a parliament for their hoped-for new nation. They organized elections, and on May 18, the German National Parliament gathered in Frankfurt’s Paulskirche to begin deliberations on a new German constitution. Individual state elections to state assemblies also took place across German Europe, and many new associations, publications, and demonstrations made the public sphere of German Europe into a busy arena. The spring and summer of 1848 became the first extended episode of German-wide political activity, and despite its disappointing denouement, the experience of such politics still set a capstone on a hundred or more years of the nation’s existence, if only in the minds of its members. But such great questions of the time turned out not to be answerable through speeches and parliamentary debates. For the non-German powers—Great Britain, Russia, and France—German unity equaled European disorder, all the more so as it would have enthroned the disturbing forces of nationalism and liberalism at the head of the biggest nation-state of Europe. They began pressuring the German princes, who eventually got back their nerve and reasserted the old order, including the German Confederation. Starting in the fall of 1848, the royal leaders of the Confederation states began to counteract the revolution with armies, which quelled demonstrations and armed resistance from radical revolutionaries; eventually they presided over the dispersal of the National Parliament itself. The German revolution collapsed without bringing the legitimacy of statehood to ideas of national identity. It had clarified only that such ideas did not exist comfortably within the existing constellations of states. The spokesmen for German nationalism did not alter their views radically in the years after 1848, but they did alter their emphases. Economic activity had long been a means toward greater national integration, and not just by chance. Since the 1820s, forward-looking ministers of finance, like Prussia’s Friedrich Motz, liberal thinkers, like the economic theorist Friedrich List, and leaders of industrialization had actively promoted customs unions to mitigate the ill effects of multiple border crossings. A German Customs Union, including Prussia and many central and south German states, was established in 1834; by 1848 it N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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included nearly three-quarters of the German federal states. While justified in economic terms, unfettered economic activity within the customs union came to mean something more as well; just as cultural and political definitions of nationhood interacted with each other closely in 19th-century nation-making in Germany, so, too, did economic growth and economic policy form an inextricable part of people’s conception of what their nation was. Telegraph lines, modernized roadways, and above all railway lines, which grew rapidly after a late start in 1835, became the visible signs of the strong bonds that made the diverse German states into a common German home. List considered the railroad a “tonic for the national spirit” and a “tight belt around the loins of the German nation,” which had been “robbed of almost all attributes of nationality by earlier divisiveness” (Sheehan 1989, 468). By the end of the 1850s, Austria’s exclusion from this economic belt that bound the German nation was nearly irreversible, and the major question on the minds of many nationalists—a question discussed but never settled in 1848–1849 —became not whether Austria should be part of the nation but how to keep it out. Austria’s inability to defeat French-backed Italian nationalism in 1859, combined with the usual failure of the German Confederation to do anything, hardened the resolve of German nationalists to center their movement in Prussia. The boldly named German National Society, founded in 1859 by pro-Prussian liberals, hinted that the nation-state must first come from above, by show of strength against external enemies (France chief among them), and only then could the liberalization of a German nation follow. The National Society did not represent everyone’s view of what it meant to be German, but it represented the increasingly dominant view. In it, Germany, led by Prussia, was the land of Protestantism, the land of Prussian probity and resolve over southern dilly-dallying and division, the heirs to Alexandrian Hellenism and Roman virtue, destined to triumph over quarreling and chaos. The army crisis of 1861 in Prussia and its heavy-handed resolution in 1862 by the king’s new activist prime minister, Otto von Bismarck, gave pause to all the hopes invested in Prussian leadership. Anti-Prussian nationalist groups came into being; citizens of the “third states” (neither Prussian nor Austrian) found their voice; Catholics presented alternate views of German historical development; the National Society itself seemed to rethink its position, even on Austria. The remarkable effect, then, of Bismarck’s three successful wars between 1864 and 1871—the war against Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein, the war against Austria over the future of the German Confederation, and the war against France over, essentially, Prussian-led German unity—was to bring most nationalists, except those too far to the left or too firmly committed to Austrian inclusion, into the Prussian fold. Just as important, the wars bestowed an aura of historical inevitability on this answer to the question of what was Germany. After centuries of catching up and delays, most Germans were eager to embrace the so-called Second Reich of 1871 as the long-awaited embodiment of national identity. The N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Otto von Bismarck reads Prussian king Wilhelm I’s Proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles on January 18, 1871, following Prussia’s victory in the Franco-Prussian War. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

achievement was not just that of Bismarck and his armies. Left to his own devises, Bismarck would perhaps have been content to have established a bigger and stronger Prussia. But the power of public opinion, channeled through numerous associations, festivals, newspapers, elections, and parliamentary debates, had secured the identity of this latter-day empire as not just any nation, but the German nation. If the German identity of the Prusso-German state of 1871 was never in question, neither was its content clear. All the issues of German identity that had preoccupied the Frankfurt parliamentarians of 1848–1849 remained unresolved, including the place of Catholicism in the new reich, the possibility of Jewish integration into it, and the role of the smaller states, still in existence but now integrated into a federal council (Reichsrat). Bismarck’s solution had solved the centuries-long problem of outside interference in Germany’s development, without purging Germans of the habit of looking to outsider interference (from the French, the English, the Russians, the Jews) as the explanation for internal difficulties. More than a century of public activity had secured stable sources of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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collective identity in the form of cultural achievements, military victories, and political institutions. The new Germany had become more than a geographical expression but remained inevitably less than the ideal “intercourse of spirits and hearts” that many Germans had once expected it to be. Selected Bibliography Berger, Stefan. 1997. The Search for Normality: National Identity and Historical Consciousness in Germany since 1800. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books. Blackbourn, David. 1997. The Fontana History of Germany, 1780–1918: The Long Nineteenth Century. London: Fontana Press. Breuilly, John. 1996. The Formation of the First German Nation-State, 1800–1871. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Geiss, Imanuel. 1997. The Question of German Unification, 1806–1996. New York: Routledge. Giesen, Bernhard. 1998. Intellectuals and the German Nation: Collective Identity in a German Axial Age. New York: Cambridge University Press. Green, Abigail. 2001. Fatherlands: State-Building and Nationhood in Nineteenth-Century Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press. Levinger, Matthew. 2000. Enlightened Nationalism: The Transformation of Prussian Political Culture, 1806–1848. New York: Oxford University Press. Schulze, Hagen. 1990. The Course of German Nationalism: From Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763–1867. Translated by Sarah Hanbury-Tenison. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sheehan, James. 1989. German History, 1770–1866. New York: Oxford University Press. Vick, Brian E. 2002. Defining Germany: The 1848 Frankfurt Parliamentarians and National Identity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


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The Netherlands Hans Knippenberg Chronology 1572 The “water-beggars” (gueux) capture Brill. Start of the Dutch Revolt against the Spanish king, Philip II. 1579 (January 23) Union of Utrecht among Holland, Zeeland, Groningen, Utrecht, and Gelderland; in the course of the year, this union is joined by Overijssel, Friesland, Drenthe, and the southern cities of Ghent, Ieper, Antwerp, Bruges, Lier, Breda, Venlo, and Mechelen. 1581 Act of Abjuration. Actual start of the Dutch Republic of the United Provinces. 1584 Balthasar Gerards murders William of Orange, the leader of the Dutch Revolt. 1584–1585 Ghent, Ieper, Bruges, and Antwerp are reconquered by Spanish troops. 1588–1590 Consolidation of the Republic by Johan Van Oldenbarnevelt, the Advocate of Holland. 1588–1702 The Golden Age; the source of national pride until the present day. 1590–1609 Recovery of territory from the Spanish troops; the Republic becomes a great power. 1609–1621 The Twelve Years Truce between the Dutch and Spanish troops. 1618–1619 The Synode of Dordrecht (Calvinist church); victory of the Counter-Remonstrants (orthodox Calvinists) under the leadership of Maurits van Nassau over the Remonstrants (liberal Calvinists) under the leadership of Van Oldenbarnevelt; execution of Van Oldenbarnevelt. 1629–1647 Recovery of territory from the Spanish Netherlands, including parts of Flanders, Brabant, and Limburg (the so-called Generality lands). 1648 Peace Treaty of Münster; formal start of the Dutch Republic. 1702–1795 The Age of Decline. 1795 Invasion of the French revolutionary army. 1795–1806 Creation of the Batavian Republic under control of revolutionary France. 1806–1810 Kingdom of Holland under Louis Napoleon. 1810–1813 Kingdom of Holland annexed to the French empire. 1813 Liberation from the French; William I (son of stadholder William V) becomes sovereign monarch. 1814–1815 The Vienna Congress reunites the former Dutch Republic with the Southern Netherlands. 1815–1830/39 United Kingdom of the Netherlands under William I. 1815–1840 Reign of King William I. 1830–1839 Belgian Revolt results in the creation of independent Belgium in the southern provinces of the Netherlands. 1834 First orthodox secession from the Dutch Reformed church (the Afscheiding). 1839–present Kingdom of the Netherlands. 1840–1849 Reign of King William II. 1848 Thorbecke’s Liberal Constitution; the start of the parliamentary system. 1849–1890 Reign of King William III. 1886 The Doleantie (second orthodox secession from the Dutch Reformed church). 1890–1898 Regency of Queen Emma.


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1898–1948 Reign of Queen Wilhelmina; invention of Queen’s Day. 1899–1902 Boer War (South Africa). 1917 New constitution, which ended the school dispute and made universal suffrage possible. Government decision to reclaim the Zuider Zee, the main inland sea. 1917–1960 The high days of Dutch verzuiling (“pillarization”), that is, the segmentation of society in blocs of Protestants, Roman Catholics, Socialists, and Liberals with their own institutions and subcultures. 1940–1945 German occupation during World War II.

Situating the Nation The cradle of Dutch statehood lies in the 16th century, when the Dutch revolted against their king, Philip II, who reigned over the Spanish part of the Habsburg empire, including the Netherlands. His father, Charles V, had centralized his authority in this part of his realm and unified the 17 provinces of the Netherlands (the territory of current Belgium and the Netherlands together). Philip II tended to rule the Netherlands as though they were annexed lands of the Spanish Crown and pursued a decidedly Catholic religious policy, thus implementing a principle of the Augsburg Peace Treaty (1555), cuius regio, eius religio (“who rules the territory decides on the religion of its population”). Since the Netherlands was one of the centers of early Protestantism, a confrontation could not be avoided. Religion, however, was not the only issue. The policies of Philip II reduced the power and autonomy of the local nobility and urban regents and augmented their fiscal burdens. Thus, the Dutch Revolt was also about autonomy—juridical and fiscal. The revolt started in 1572 when the Gueux (“Beggars”) seized the small port of Brill (Brielle) (Israel 1995, 169–178). The leader of the revolt was Prince William of Orange, who was an advocate of religious tolerance and who wanted political unity and autonomy for the Netherlands. After a short period of united action, the southern provinces were reconciled with Philip II, whereas the northern provinces joined together in the Union of Utrecht (1579). Two years later, the Northern Netherlands broke off from the Spanish Crown officially by signing the Act of Abjuration (Plakkaat van Verlatinge) and founded the Republic of the United Provinces with William of Orange as stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht. However, William was murdered in 1584, and after a short intermezzo, his son Maurits succeeded him as stadholder and leader of the revolt. In 1590, Maurits also became stadholder of Gelderland and Overijssel. While in general European state formation was a matter of “coercion and capital” (Tilly 1992), Dutch state formation was a clear example of state formation by capital. The claims of the Dutch Republic on the financiers of Amsterdam and other major trading cities allowed the new state to raise enormous sums rapidly for its armies and navies and to become the dominant European power for a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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time. The outcomes of the military battles with the Spanish troops shaped the territory of the new state, which eventually consisted of seven semi-independent ministates (Groningen, Friesland, Overijssel, Gelderland, Utrecht, Holland, and Zeeland), the landschap Drenthe, and some Catholic territories in Flanders, Brabant, and Limburg, which were occupied in the last phase of the revolt and governed directly by the States General (Staten Generaal), the so-called Generality lands (Generaliteitslanden). The state structure of the Republic was a cross between federal state and confederacy, with “more of the confederacy in form and theory, and more of the federal state in substance and practice” (Israel 1995, 277). A large number of cities enjoyed a relatively autonomous position. The province of Holland and the city of Amsterdam dominated the Dutch Republic, which gained formal independence and international recognition with the Peace Treaty of Münster in 1648. During the Dutch Republic, a national Dutch identity or a consciousness of Dutchness was very limited. Most people were more oriented toward their own local or regional community. After its “golden” 17th century, the republic fell into decline and lost its position as a dominant world power. In 1795, the Batavian Revolution, a less bloody version of the French Revolution, ended the old republic with the assistance of French troops and established the French-inspired, unitary Batavian Republic (1795–1806), followed by the Kingdom of Holland (1806–1810) under the reign of Louis Napoleon, the brother of Napoleon Bonaparte. After a short period as part of the French empire (1810–1813), the Dutch were liberated from the French, and at the Vienna Congress (1814–1815), the great powers unified the former Dutch Republic and the Southern Netherlands into the United Kingdom of the Netherlands under the reign of the House of Orange. The political centralization and nationalization of the Batavian-French periods were continued. William I, the son of the last stadholder of the Dutch Republic, became the first king. His religious and educational policy stimulated much resistance in the southern part of his kingdom, particularly among the Catholic clergy and nobility, who lost much of their influence. Eventually the Southern Netherlands seceded and became the independent Kingdom of Belgium in 1839. From then on, the territory of the Netherlands did not change apart from some minor revisions. Only the German occupation in World War II (1940–1945) interrupted Dutch independence. Apart from the formation of the Dutch state, its colonial expansion is also of relevance. After the successful commercial activities of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), which is considered the world’s first multinational firm, the Dutch state expanded its power in the Dutch Indies (now Indonesia) in the last quarter of the 19th century and became the world’s second imperial power. It lost this position in World War II, and in 1949 Indonesia became independent. Also, in the Western Hemisphere were some colonial possessions: Suriname, which became independent in 1975, and the Dutch Antilles, a combination of six small Caribbean Islands that are still part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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VOC settlements were also established in South Africa. The British took over the Cape Colony in the Batavian-French periods. During the 19th century, descendents of the original Dutch farmers, the Boers, left the colony and founded the independent republics of Transvaal and Oranje Vrijstaat. As a consequence of the second Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902), the Boers lost their independence, but they remained, as Afrikaners, part of South Africa.

Instituting the Nation The Batavian-French period was very important in the institution of the Dutch nation because it ended the federal and decentralized state structure of the Dutch Republic and introduced a centralized, national government (Van Sas 2004). (The term “Batavian” refers to the people who were living in the region [called Insula Batavorum by the Romans] when Caesar conquered this area in the first century BC.) Inspired by the ideas of the Enlightenment and French Revolution, the socalled “patriots” took power from the Orangists (Prinsgezinden) and formulated national programs for the Batavian nation, for instance, in the field of (primary) education, which was instrumental for building the nation. The Society for Public Welfare (Maatschappij tot Nut van ‘t Algemeen), founded in 1784 and the most important among the many (enlightened) societies that were established in the second half of the 18th century, took the lead in elaborating these ideas. The ultimate goal was to build a Dutch (Batavian) nation of equal citizens, linked by feelings of shared identification, loyal to the Dutch (Batavian) state, and legitimizing its authority. In the words of J. H. Swildens, one of the founders of the society: “In each Dutch child, love for his fatherland should be cultivated in such a way, that he always prefers his fatherland over all other countries” (cited in Van Sas 2004, 75). In 1798, the Preliminary Authority appointed an agent of national education, considered as the first minister of education in Europe. National school acts (1801–1806) ended the diversity of local and provincial arrangements, and a national school inspection supervised performances in the whole territory. There was no powerful conservative reaction. An important feudal landed nobility was missing; the Dutch Republic and its successors were foremost a society of urban citizens who made their living by commerce, traffic, and finance. Moreover, although initially many had experienced the Batavian Revolution as liberation, during this period, the growing French oppression encouraged the accommodation of internal Dutch differences and intensified patriotic feelings. Therefore, the liberation from the French was much welcomed, and the House of Orange with William I as its first king became a powerful symbol of the Dutch nation, even among the former “patriots.” In 1848, Prime Minister Thorbecke finished what the Batavian Revolution had started. Under the threat of revolutionary events in other parts of the continent, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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King William II agreed to a very liberal constitution. This constitution limited the power of the king considerably in favor of the Parliament, brought a stronger separation between public and private affairs and between state and church/religion, and provided more freedoms, including freedom of religion and freedom of education. Unity, equality, and rationality became the standard. Further democratization was encouraged, which gradually enlarged the electorate. Eventually, the 1917 constitution paved the way for universal suffrage and introduced an electoral system of proportional representation. In fact, the main elements of the 1848 and 1917 constitutions have been maintained until the present day.

Defining the Nation From an ethno-cultural viewpoint, the bounding of Dutch territory was rather arbitrary. Ethnically, the Dutch people descended from the Frisians, Saxons, and Franks, who also lived outside Dutch territory. Language borders also did not parallel state borders. Both in Germany and in Belgium, dialects were spoken that were cognate to the dialects used inside Dutch territory. Consequently, the “Dutch” language covered a much larger area than the Netherlands. Inside Dutch territory, only the Frisian language held a minority position. From a religious viewpoint, the reverse was the case: the Netherlands was situated on the “fault line Rome-Reformation” (De Kok 1964), and Dutch Protestantism included a rich variety representing the main streams of Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anabaptism. Moreover, the wealth and religious tolerance of the Dutch Republic had attracted many Jews from the Iberian Peninsula (Sephardim) and east-central Europe (Ashkenazim). Within Dutch Protestantism, Calvinism became dominant and was connected with the political elite of the new state very early. Roman Catholics, Protestant dissenters, and Jews had freedom of religious conscience but had not the same public rights as their Calvinist fellow citizens. The Batavian Republic redefined the Dutch nation by giving equal rights to all citizens irrespective of their religion. The dominant Calvinist church lost its privileged position. The new political elite, who predominantly adhered to a kind of liberal Protestantism, tried to compromise with the traditional idea of the Dutch as a Calvinist nation by banning religion from the public sphere. That became particularly apparent in the education policy of the new regime. All kinds of religious dogmatism was banned from the (partly) state-financed public schools. During the first half of the 19th century, this ban led to protests from orthodox Calvinists and Roman Catholics, who wanted more freedom of education. The liberal 1848 constitution brought freedom of education as well as religion. The opportunities for the founding of denominational schools were increased, and churches were no longer obliged to get state approval for their N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Geography of the Protestant-Catholic Divide The traditional divide between Protestants and Roman Catholics had a clear geographical dimension, which can be traced back to the military events during the Dutch Revolt. The military situation during the Twelve Years Truce (1609–1621) in particular has been responsible for the geographical distribution of Protestants and Roman Catholics. The frontline during that period determined most of the border between Protestants and Catholics. In the area south of this border, which was controlled by the Spanish troops, all Protestants were forced to become Catholic again or to leave the country. Many Protestants left the Southern Netherlands and moved to the area controlled by the States General. The city of Antwerp, which had become not only a major center of economic activities but also of the Reformation, serves as an illustration. After its conquest in 1585 by the Spanish troops, more than half of the population of around 100,000 inhabitants left the city for religious or economic reasons, and the remaining Protestants became Catholic again. Similar stories could be told of other Flemish cities. As a consequence, the area south of the demarcation line became homogeneously Catholic. Due to the freedom of religious conscience in the area of the States General north of the frontline, that part of the Netherlands never became entirely Protestant, although Calvinism dominated public life, including education. So, Catholic enclaves remained, and the population of parts of Brabant and Limburg, which were conquered by the Dutch troops after 1621, did not become Protestant. The essence of that geographical pattern has not been changed ever since.

church organizations. Freedom of religion paved the way for the restoration of the Episcopal hierarchy in the Roman Catholic church, which ended the status of the greater part of the country as a missionary territory and increased the opportunities for organizing, mobilizing, and disciplining the Catholic population. New church regulations in the Dutch Reformed church reinforced the impact of orthodox forces, which stimulated conflicts between more liberal and more dogmatic members and eventually resulted in the so-called Doleantie (1886), a secession under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper, and the founding of Gereformeerde (orthodox Calvinist) churches. The constitutional freedom of education paradoxically intensified the conflicts in that sector, which became known as the school dispute (schoolstrijd). The liberal state increased the educational requirements for all schools, which was not a problem for the state-funded public schools but was a great financial setback for the nonsubsidized denominational schools. Consequently, the initial school dispute about more freedom of education changed into a dispute about equal financial rights for public and denominational schools. Orthodox Calvinists and Roman Catholics not only fought against the liberal state but they also fought each other. Essentially, it was a struggle for the character of the Dutch nation between the former dominant group of Calvinists and the emancipating minority of Roman Catholics. That battle became most apparent N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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when the Catholic Episcopal hierarchy was restored in 1853. Orthodox Calvinists were furious. It was as if the bishop of Rome had planted its crosier in the heart of the Netherlands (the city of Utrecht, in the middle of the country, became the seat of the archbishop). In their view, the Dutch nation was still a Calvinist nation under the Calvinist House of Orange. They organized a petition for King William III asking him not to sign the act that settled the restoration of the Episcopal hierarchy (the so-called April Movement). Though William III personally stood at the side of his fellow Calvinists, he could not agree to their request for constitutional reasons. Prime Minister Thorbecke voiced the position of the liberal government: “It is time that in politics, we change the notion of a Protestant nation into the notion of a Dutch nation.” The same 1917 constitution that provided universal suffrage also pacified the school dispute and the struggle for the character of the Dutch nation by institutionalizing the religious differences in the political system. From then on, both N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Distribution of Roman Catholics in 1947 (by municipality). (Map by Hans Knippenberg)

(orthodox) Protestants and Roman Catholics were allowed to establish their own denominational schools, which were financed by the state in exactly the same way as the religiously neutral public schools. Moreover, this financial agreement became the main device for the allocation of government money in other sectors of society such as health care and housing. It was this legal system that would facilitate the founding of mosques and Muslim schools when the Dutch nation encountered a new challenge: the immigration of non-Christians, especially Muslims, from Turkey, Morocco, and the former colony of Suriname from the 1960s onward. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Narrating the Nation The struggle for freedom is a key element in narrating the Dutch nation. That struggle started with the Batavian myth—the struggle for freedom of the Batavians under the leadership of Gaius Julius Civilis against the Romans in the first century, suggesting a continuity in territory and population that never actually existed—and culminated in the struggle for freedom of the Dutch under the leadership of William of Orange, the “father of the fatherland,” against Philip II. The success of that revolt and the following “Golden Age,” when the Dutch Republic became a dominant world power, are still the most glorious periods of Dutch history and provide indispensable elements to Dutch national pride, such as the trading and colonial activities of the Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie; the paintings of Rembrandt, Vermeer, Frans Hals, and many others; the heroic actions of Dutch admirals such as Michiel de Ruyter, Maarten Tromp, and Piet Hein; the writings on international law of Hugo Grotius; or the philosophical ideas of Baruch Spinoza. After the Dutch Republic, there were only two short periods during which foreign powers occupied the Netherlands: the French occupation in 1795/1806–1813 and the German occupation in 1940–1945. In both cases, the Dutch regained their freedom, giving rise to strong nationalistic feelings. At the end of the 19th

People of Amsterdam in the Netherlands celebrate the unconditional surrender of the Germans in May 1945. (Corel)


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century, the South African Anglo-Boer wars also played a part in this strugglefor-freedom myth. The initial success of the Boers encouraged waves of enthusiasm and solidarity in the Netherlands. In a way, these Boers were seen as a pure, moral version of the Dutch nation, which was not yet contaminated by the materialism of modern society. Consequently, the defeat of the Boers in 1902 caused great disenchantment, as if the Dutch nation itself was defeated. The “pacification” of the Dutch Indies, which brought the East Indian archipelago under Dutch control, provided some compensation for the wounded national pride. In the same period, the House of Orange became a strong symbol of the Dutch nation. The accession of the 18-year-old Queen Wilhelmina in 1898 and the invention of Queen’s Day (Koninginnedag, i.e., the celebration of the queen’s birthday) encouraged a wave of nationalist fervor. Even the Catholic part of the population joined this enthusiasm. Until then, Catholics had had a somewhat difficult relationship to the House of Orange. For them the Dutch Revolt against their Catholic Spanish king under the leadership of William of Orange was a less obvious source of identification with the Dutch nation. Catholics preferred to emphasize the greatness of their fatherland in the Middle Ages, when the Netherlands was still Catholic, counterbalancing the three centuries of Protestant domination. Queen Wilhelmina again was a very strong symbol of the Dutch nation during World War II, when she was in exile in London and sent encouraging messages to the Dutch nation in occupied territory through Radio Oranje (Radio Orange). Her daughter Juliana and granddaughter Beatrix would perform the same symbolic function up to the present day. So would the color orange.

Hans Brinker and the Struggle against the Water The story of the legendary Hans Brinker, who put his finger in a hole in the dike to protect his village and its surroundings against inundation and written by the American author Mary Mapes Dodge in 1865, represents a key element in the narratives about the Dutch nation: the perpetual struggle against the water. This struggle was part of the myth of the Dutch nation as gradually organizing and unifying in its struggle against the common enemy, the water, from the Middle Ages, when the first dikes were built, onward. In reality, the Dutch nation has been shaped through interdependent processes of state formation, nation-building, territorial integration, and modernization. The myth originated during the 19th century and became a strong national symbol. The reclamation of the Zuider Zee (the current Lake IJssel) in particular has struck the imagination. This reclamation was a national happening. In the international context of World War I, in which the Dutch stayed neutral, the Dutch nation gave the world an example of how to expand national territory in a peaceful way. It became an object of national pride and a useful symbol of Dutch national identity. After World War II, the Delta Works in the southwestern part of the country, which gained momentum after the 1953 flood disaster, would perform the same symbolic function (Knippenberg 1997).


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Dutch society has never been characterized by a strong nationalism, which would not have been functional for this open economy and society of minorities. When its national culture has been narrated, it often has been described in terms of tolerance, willingness to compromise, and egalitarianism.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The political elite that came to power after the Batavian Revolt (1795) could not foresee that its nation-building activities would eventually contribute to the segmentation of Dutch society. Their attempts to marginalize the religious heterogeneity by banning religious dogmatism from the public to the private sphere had the opposite result: religion became the major political, social, and cultural cleavage of Dutch society. The conflict was focused on the school system, which is understandable since education was very important for transferring the religious subculture to the next generation and maintaining religious identity. The liberal 1848 constitution facilitated the mobilization of the orthodox Protestants and Roman Catholics, as did the expansion and integration of the infrastructure (railways, waterways, roads, telegraph, telephone) and, in general, the socioeconomic modernization in the second half of the 19th century. The orthodox Protestants were the first to organize their demands in a modern mass political party: the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (Anti-Revolutionary Party; 1878) under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper, who could make use of the organizational infrastructure of existing school organizations. The Roman Catholics were mobilized by the church itself, which had gained organizational power after the restoration of the Episcopal hierarchy in 1853. The Catholic leader Schaepman united the Catholic members of Parliament on the same political program in 1896, and it lasted until 1904 before a national Catholic political organization was founded: the Algemene Bond van RK Kiesverenigingen (General Union of RC Voting Associations), the forerunner of the RK Staatspartij (RC State Party) in 1926. Socialists entered the political arena as a third movement. Their main concern was not education or religion but the “social question,” the relationship between capital and labor, which became topical due to the industrialization of society. The laborers were first mobilized in the rather liberal Algemeen Nederlands Werklieden Verbond (General Dutch Workers Union), founded in 1871. In 1888, Domela Nieuwenhuis, the first socialist Member of Parliament, was elected as a representative of the Sociaal-Democratische Bond (Social-Democratic Union), which started six years earlier and was followed by the Social-Democratic Labour Party in 1894. The liberals were eventually concentrated in two liberal parties: the Vrijzinnig Democratische Bond (Liberal Democratic Union) and the more conservative Liberale Staatspartij (Liberal State Party). Those four political movements would N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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represent the four segments of society (later called zuilen, or “pillars”) in the political arena after the 1917 constitution, which settled the two main political conflicts of those days: the school dispute and the struggle for universal suffrage. The segments were characterized by their own subculture and organizations in all sectors of society, particularly for the orthodox Protestant and Roman Catholic “pillars,” to a lesser extent for the “red family” of socialists, and to the least extent for the liberals, which increasingly represented “the general interest” in this divided society. This “pillarized” (verzuilde) society did not fall apart, because the pillar elites were loyal to the Dutch state and nation, and they compromised in Parliament and in their coalition cabinets. No pillar was big enough to politically dominate the others, thus they needed each other. Later, the Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart (1968) would call this system a consociational democracy. The mobilization of the pillars encouraged at the same time national integration and identification and built a nation with both a national and a “pillar” identity. After the 1960s, the traditional pillars crumbled as a consequence of mass secularization, as a result of which the Dutch nation became one of the most secularized nations in the world. In the same period, new religions (Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and the charismatic Evangelical Christianity) encouraged a new multiculturalism that, especially after the 21st-century Muslim terrorist attacks, challenged the unity of the Dutch nation. These developments encouraged many debates on the character of the Dutch nation and the position of the immigrants and the Muslim religion within it. Religion seems to have become a major cleavage again. Selected Bibliography De Kok, J. A. 1964. Nederland op de breuklijn Rome-Reformatie. Assen: Van Gorcum. Israel, J. I. 1995. The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477–1806. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Knippenberg, H. 1997. “Dutch Nation-Building: A Struggle against the Water?” GeoJournal 43:27–40. Lijphart, A. 1968. The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley: University of California Press. Tilly, Ch. 1992. Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992. Cambridge, MA, and Oxford: Blackwell. Van Sas, N. C. F. 2004. De Metamorfose van Nederland: Van oude orde naar moderniteit 1750–1900. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.


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Poland Daniel Stone Chronology 1775 1791 1793 1794 1795 1807 1809 1813 1815 1830–1831 1846 1848 1859–1863 1863–1864 1867 1870s–1880s

First partition of Poland. Enactment of the May 3 constitution. Second partition of Poland. Unsuccessful insurrection. Third partition of Poland. Creation of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. War with Austria and expansion of the Duchy of Warsaw. Abolition of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Congress of Vienna—creation of the Kingdom of Poland (Russia), Grand Duchy of Poznan´ (Prussia), and Free City of Cracow. Unsuccessful insurrection in Russian Poland. Autonomous institutions suspended. Unsuccessful insurrection in Austrian Poland. Free City of Cracow merged with Austrian Poland. Unsuccessful insurrection in Prussian Poland. Grand Duchy of Poznan´ abolished. Reform efforts in Russian Poland. Unsuccessful insurrection in Russian Poland. Congress Kingdom abolished. Home rule in Austrian Poland. “Culture War” in German Poland.

Situating the Nation The destruction of Polish statehood in the Polish Partitions (1772, 1793, 1795) by Russia, Prussia (the German empire after 1871), and Austria (Austria-Hungary after 1867) forced Poles to make extra efforts to survive as a nation. The national movement developed out of the pre-partition Polish-Lithuanian state’s institutions and customs, which were based on extensive noble participation in national and local government, including electing their Polish kings. Despite limiting active citizenship to nobles, Poland-Lithuania was surprisingly democratic, since the nobility comprised 10 percent of the population in the 18th century and perhaps 20–25 percent of all Polish speakers, as a result of policies that attracted and assimilated Lithuanian, Belarusian, and Ukrainian nobles to the Polish identity. To keep the Polish nation alive, the challenge in 1770–1880 and beyond was to bind the rest of the population to the national movement. The first steps were taken in 1789–1794, when reformers extended active citizenship to burghers, acknowledged peasants as members of the nation, and discussed incorporating the large Jewish minority. NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Polish national sentiment was widespread across the educated and politically active Polish element. In the Russian partition, the ethnic core, covering much of contemporary Poland, was always important and stood out during the Napoleonic period and the 1830 and 1863 insurrections. Poles across the vast eastern borderlands (modern Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine) asserted their nationality forcefully. The Austrian partition in Galicia (southern Poland from Cracow to Lwów [Lviv, Ukraine]) received substantial political autonomy and cultural independence in the 1860s, enabling it to provide cultural leadership. Prussian/ German Poland was often an economic leader, where methods of nonpolitical resistance to the partitioners were explored. Polish nationalism developed against the backdrop of the agricultural and industrial revolutions. (“Nationalism” is used in the sense of patriotism open to all and not according to modern Polish usage, which equates nacjonalizm with nativist hostility to minority groups.) Polish industrialization began in the 1820s and accelerated in midcentury Russian Poland as the textile, railway, and mining industries grew. Prussian/German Poland developed agricultural processing industries and railways. Galicia changed more slowly. The growing Polish bourgeoisie was successfully absorbed by the national movement. In contrast, the peasantry mostly remained outside active nationalism until the end of the period. The abolition of serfdom by Prussia (1812), Austria (1848), and Russia (1861–1864) began the process by which Polish peasants came to think of themselves as Poles due to the oppressive nature of the partitioning states and their class-based economic policies, not to mention the ethnic and religious differences. Much of the Jewish business and professional elites became Polish in language, manners, and political allegiance without abandoning their religion, although some converted. The large majority of traditional Jews opted out of Christian disputes and remained politically aloof.

Instituting the Nation Because the Polish-Lithuanian state was divided among three different countries and each partition underwent changes between the 1770s and 1880s, the political history is extremely complex. From 1770 to 1795, the independent Polish-Lithuanian state was governed by a king, parliament, and regional assemblies. After the partitions, Poland was governed from St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin until Napoleon defeated the Prussians and created the Duchy of Warsaw (1807), adding part of Galicia after beating Austria (1809). The Duchy created a Polish-language parliament, administration, and courts. After Napoleon’s defeat, Czar Alexander I established the Kingdom of Poland (the Congress Kingdom) out of the Duchy of Warsaw and ruled it as a constitutional monarch, sharing power with the Polish parliament, administration, and courts. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Nicholas I abolished these autonomous institutions after the 1830 insurrection. Alexander II allowed limited autonomy in 1859–1863, but the outbreak and suppression of the 1863 insurrection led to the formal abolition of the kingdom and the institution of Russian-language institutions at all levels. The eastern sections of the Polish-Lithuanian state (now Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine) became part of Russia after the partitions. Polish nobles often served in the bureaucracy. Austria ruled Galicia directly from 1772 until 1867 (except for the Napoleonic interlude), when it gained the active support of Polish nobles by granting home rule. Poles dominated a Galician legislature (established in 1867), gained appointment to provincial executive offices, and enjoyed cultural self-determination through Polish-language universities in Cracow and Lwów (Lviv). The Free City of Cracow ruled itself under Austrian supervision from 1815 until a revolt in 1846 led to its incorporation into Galicia. The Prussian zone gained autonomy on paper as the Grand Duchy of Posen with little practical effect. Many leaders stand out during this time. King Stanisław August Poniatowski (1764–1795) orchestrated the modernization of Polish culture and stretched the boundaries of political action at a time when Poland-Lithuania was effectively a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Russian protectorate. Other, more forthright political leaders, such as Ignacy Potocki and Hugo Kołła˛taj, challenged Russian domination, creating (with the king’s help) the modernizing constitution of May 3, 1791; in fact, May 3 became a national holiday in independent Poland and throughout the diaspora. Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko led the 1794 insurrection and recruited non-noble soldiers; he is generally considered Poland’s greatest leader. The Polish legions and their generals who fought with Napoleon in Italy inspired the Polish national anthem. Leading 19th-century figures included Prince Józef Poniatowski, who fought in the 1792 war against Russia and became one of Napoleon’s marshals, symbolizing the French (or western) orientation in Polish politics. His cousin, Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski became a personal friend and political advisor to Czar Alexander I, helping to create the Congress Kingdom. He participated in the 1830 insurrection

Tadeusz Kos´ ciuszko A noble of modest means, Tadeusz Kos´ ciuszko (1746–1817) studied at military colleges in Poland and France and served as an important military engineer during the American Revolution; he became a personal friend of Thomas Jefferson. Ko s´ ciuszko distinguished himself in the 1792 Russo-Polish War and commanded the 1794 insurrection, in which he won some significant battles. His Połaniecki Manifesto, reducing serfdom and recruiting peasant soldiers, and his mobilization of urban militia units provided a turning point in Polish social history. After defeat, Kos´ ciuszko spent two years in a Russian prison, visited the United States, and settled in France where he helped organize Polish legions to fight in Italy, but he became increasingly suspicious of foreign powers and rejected invitations to play a role in the Duchy of Warsaw and the Congress Kingdom. Kos´ ciuszko died in Switzerland and was buried in Cracow; his heart was reburied in independent Poland in 1927. Ko s´ ciuszko is generally seen as Poland’s greatest hero. A large memorial mound was Tadeusz Ko s´ ciuszko was the leader of the built outside Cracow in 1820–1823, and nuPolish national insurrection of 1794. (Na- merous literary and artistic portraits celebrate him (notably Jan Matejko’s painting of the 1794 tional Archives and Records Administration) Racławice battle). Poles often memorialized his death by illegal demonstrations, and Polish émigrés celebrated a Kos´ ciuszko cult. There are educational foundations and geographical features named after him around the world.


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and led an important faction afterward. Aleksander Wielopolski tried and failed to establish Polish autonomy within the Russian empire in 1859–1863. An émigré movement with close ties with the homeland was a distinctive feature of Polish nationalism. Life abroad permitted activists to develop political positions that could not be stated openly at home. Émigrés returned to fight in the 1794 insurrection, and the Polish legions fought for Napoleon in Italy in 1797 and Haiti in 1802 to gain support for Polish independence. After the 1830 insurrection, a “Great Emigration” of several thousand Poles dispersed throughout western Europe and North America, where they formed patriotic societies, published newspapers, and corresponded with home. Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, a leader of the 1830 insurrection, became the so-called uncrowned king of Poland at his Parisian residence, where he carried on an active foreign policy to restore Poland with British and French help. Czartoryski’s relative social conservatism was balanced by the Polish Democratic Society, which demanded immediate emancipation of the serfs, a position supported from Brussels by the émigré historian and politician Joachim Lelewel. Fewer Poles went into exile after the 1863–1864 insurrection, but those who did added to existing institutions and brought them up-to-date. Poles served among the leaders of the Hungarian Revolution (1848), the liberation of Italy (1860–1861), and the Paris Commune (1870–1871). Polish socialism emerged when émigrés joined Western socialist movements, forming Polish sections. Artists helped keep the national culture alive. Frédéric Chopin’s use of Polish folk elements in his piano compositions established Poland’s existence in Europe’s consciousness in the 1830s, 1840s, and beyond. A great trio of poets—Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, and Zygmunt Krasiński—wrote poetical epics depicting Polish national struggles against a backdrop of moral questions. Poles used all available arguments to maintain the existence of the nation after partition. Historians demonstrated that Poland had existed since the 900s and that destroying it violated international law. Some Poles stressed Poland’s long history of democratic practices to demand that western Europeans support Poland against the authoritarian Prussian, Austrian, and Russian monarchies. Others appealed to the conservative monarchs on the grounds that Polish landowners could keep liberals and revolutionaries under control more effectively than could Germanic or Russian officials. As ethnic arguments gained currency, it was easy to demonstrate through simple observation backed up with ethnographic scholarship that Poles were neither Russians nor Germans.

Defining the Nation The predominant definitions of the Polish nation were historical and ethnocultural. Historical definitions were based on the extensive historical borders of Poland-Lithuania. There was little objection from the large Ukrainian, Belarusian, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Adam Mickiewicz Generally considered Poland’s greatest poet, Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855) was born in eastern Poland into a poor noble family. He studied at the University of Wilno (Vilnius, Lithuania) and taught school in Kowno (Kaunas). Association with a secret patriotic society led to his arrest in 1823 and exile to Russia, where he met leading Russian liberal intellectuals such as Alexandr Pushkin. Permitted to leave in 1829, Mickiewicz settled in Paris in 1832 where he initiated the teaching of Slavic literature at the College de France (1840–1844), revealing the riches of Polish, Russian, Czech, and Serbian literature to westerners. During the 1848 revolution, he edited a radical newspaper and recruited Poles to fight in Garibaldi’s Italian revolution. Mickiewicz died of cholera in Istanbul in 1855 while raising Polish troops to fight Russia in the Crimean War. He was buried in Paris and, in 1890, reburied in the royal castle in Cracow, Poland. Mickiewicz’s love poems and nature ballads helped establish Polish Romantic poetry. He is best known to foreigners for his verse-novel, Pan Tadeusz (1834), which sympathetically described Polish rural life and ended with the 1812 invasion of Russia; his portrait of a patriotic Jewish innkeeper epitomized Polish liberal attitudes. Sprawling poetical plays, Graz˙ yna, Konrad Wallenrod, and Forefather’s Eve, emphasized patriotic themes and portrayed a deep love for the eastern Polish borderlands. A romantic in politics as well as literature, Mickiewicz espoused mystical values of patriotism and heroic self-sacrifice. Nonfiction writings such as The Books of the Polish Nation and Polish Pilgrimage (1832) called on Poles to participate in a revolution that would create social justice and freedom for all nations.

and Lithuanian minorities, which had not yet developed their own national consciousness. Ethnic arguments provided a straightforward definition of Poles as Polish speaking, mostly Roman Catholic, and conscious of their Polish heritage. Without abandoning their claims to eastern territories, Poles gladly welcomed the growth of national consciousness in midcentury among Polish speakers of Silesia and Mazuria, lands lost to the Polish state in earlier centuries. Because Polish nationalism was virtually universal among educated Poles, their opinions on social, economic, and political questions covered the spectrum from right to left, although the heritage of the Polish-Lithuanian state made even conservatives favor constitutional government. All patriots advocated regaining independence and restoring the pre-1772 boundaries. It should be kept in mind that only a minority worked actively for Polish independence, however. Polish Slavophilism, which antedated Russian Slavophilism, placed Poles at the head of their Slavic brethren in search of national independence and democracy. Slavophilism took the form of scholarly accounts indicating similarities with Poland’s Slavic neighbors as well as political action, such as Czartoryski’s efforts to bring the Slavic peoples of the Balkans under Polish influence in alliance with Britain and France. The myth of rural values was particularly strong as a result of the “Sarmatian” ideology, a 17th- and 18th-centuries concept that glorified the moral superiority N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of grassroots noble democracy. The 19th-century historian Joachim Lelewel went further and established Polish populism, claiming that prehistoric Poland practiced tribal democracy and that peasants still embodied that tradition. Populists developed peasant-based political parties at the end of the period. Unlike their Russian counterparts, Polish populists embraced European traditions and leaned on modern European progressive thought to suggest social and political reforms. Most nobles only slowly accepted the need to abolish serfdom, and it took the abolition of serfdom by the partitioning powers in the mid-19th century to wipe out barriers to attracting the peasantry to the cause of Polish nationalism. Ethnic minorities posed problems to growing Polish nationalism, although few were active before 1880. Progressive Poles generally thought that some, perhaps many, would become Poles in speech, culture, and nationality, and hoped to institute a tolerant multiethnic and multireligious nationality. Others considered this unlikely and often undesirable and expressed their views stridently.

Narrating the Nation Polish nationalism was intensely historical, and historical works informed Poles about their periods of greatness and the causes of decline. The partitioning powers limited coverage in schools, but censorship permitted the publication of patriotic historical works that were widely read. Professional historians led the public in debates over heroes and villains. The first archival-based history appeared in 1782–1785, written by Bishop Adam Naruszewicz and covering Polish history up to 1386 from a liberal monarchist perspective. Politician, playwright, novelist, and poet Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz popularized numerous figures in his 34 short didactic poems, Historical Songs (1816), for both children and adults. Many songs praised warrior kings and generals. Joachim Lelewel, a sophisticated academic scholar, expressed republican and democratic sentiments in studies written between 1825 and his death in 1861. Historians and the general public lionized Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko, the leader of the 1794 insurrection, for his selflessness. Acts of statesmanship were praised, such as the treaties of 1386 and 1569 unifying Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the 1466 treaty incorporating western Prussia. Kazimierz (Casimir) III retained his title “the Great” because the economic, social, and diplomatic results of his reign were positive. Cultural heroes received high praise, such as the Renaissance astronomer Mikołaj Kopernik (Nicholas Copernicus), whose statue was erected in 1810 in Warsaw. Renaissance poets, Jan Kochanowski and Mikołaj Rej, and the Enlightenment poets, Ignacy Krasicki and Adam Naruszewicz, were also recognized. Their 19th-century counterparts, the musician Frédéric Chopin and the poets Adam Mickiewicz, Juliusz Słowacki, and Zygmunt Krasiński, joined the pantheon immediately. Periods of national wealth were also celebrated. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Historical figures who could be blamed for the partitions received merciless criticism, particularly the last king of Poland, Stanisław August Poniatowski, and magnates of the so-called Targowice Confederation, who secured Russian military help to overthrow the May 3, 1791, constitution and precipitated the second partition. Many historians condemned the nobility as a whole for blindness to national needs. Poles saw themselves as an exceptional nation. The pre-partition Golden Liberties such as the liberum veto and the elective kingship had been discredited, but the Polish historical commitment to constitutionalism and democracy was still seen as proof that Poles were modern, progressive, and worthy of west European support. In addition, Poles saw themselves as the historical defenders of Western civilization against Muslims and Orthodox Christians. The loss of independence in the partitions was seen by many 19th-century Poles as proof of Poland’s moral greatness as a suffering Christ-nation. Many expected the act of restoring Polish statehood to bring peace and harmony to all Europe. Polish nationalism was expressed in rich symbolism drawn from historical tradition. Living symbols existed in Polish revolutionaries who returned from Siberian exile or czarist prison after many years. National identity was celebrated by patriotic 18th-century composers such as Michał Ogiński who wrote patriotic

The Polish National Anthem The Polish national anthem was written in 1797 to celebrate General Jan Henryk Da˛browski and the Polish legions, who were leaving their camp in Italy to fight the Austrians under Napoleon Bonaparte. The author, Józef Wybicki, a prominent social reformer and playwright, set the words to a Polish folk dance, the mazurka. The song soon reached Poland and became immensely popular when the legions helped create the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807. Numerous variations in music and text appeared during the 1830 and 1863 insurrections, such as replacing Da˛browski’s name with contemporary commanders. Tsarist and Prussian authorities banned the song but failed to eliminate it, and it became the national anthem of independent Poland in 1926. Translation of the Polish text: Poland lives on As long as we live. We will win back with our sabres What foreign aggressors took from us. We will cross the Vistula and Warta rivers, To become Poles once again. Bonaparte has shown us How to win. (Chorus) March on Da˛browski From Italy to Poland. Under your command We will rejoin the Nation.


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pieces based on folk music including the “May 3 Oberek” and “Farewell to Poland.” In the 1830s and 1840s, Frédéric Chopin created a specifically Polish musical style and made Polish national identity renowned throughout the Western world with his brilliant outpouring of mazurkas and polonaises, mostly for the piano. He also used folk music in other compositions. The midcentury opera composer, Stanislaw Moniuszko, wrote Halka, the story of a peasant girl jilted by a young noble, and The Haunted Manor, a romantic comedy with patriotic overtones. Both operas are full of Polish melodies, speech, costumes, and dances. Throughout the period, ethnographers studied folk customs, including music and dance, most notably Oskar Kolberg who started publishing his encyclopedic 40-volume account in the 1860s. The mass public, both urban and rural, sang patriotic hymns in church and at public demonstrations. Artists depicted landscapes and cityscapes, but political art drew greater attention. Painters and sculptors produced portraits of nobles and peasants in distinctive Polish costume and painted historical battle scenes.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Politically active Poles were united in seeking statehood, even though other goals covered the spectrum from extreme left to the extreme right. Th e left built on the program of the French Revolution, calling for the creation of an egalitarian republic without serfdom and, by the 1880s, adopted socialist positions. The center and right built on late 18th-century Polish democratic reform, with limited concessions to the enserfed peasantry and poorer city dwellers. Monarchist political groups worked for Polish autonomy under the Austrian, Russian, or Prussian/ German emperors. Ethnic minorities were largely ignored, even in the eastern provinces where they outnumbered ethnic Poles, because most had not developed national self-consciousness at this time. Polish nationalists used all available forms of communication. Some produced works of high culture such as novels, poetry, academic scholarship, classical music, and painting. Others preferred works with broader appeal, such as pamphlets and mechanically reproduced art. Some nationalists mixed ethnicity with religion and talked of Poland as a suffering Christ-nation. They identified Polish ethnicity with the traditional rural customs practiced by peasants and the lesser nobility. Supporters of this idea varied from Adam Mickiewicz on the left, who favored armed insurrections against injustice, to Zygmunt Krasiński on the right, who opposed them because he thought they reflected atheistic and materialistic values. Poles began to stage the public commemoration of notable figures around 1880. The long career of patriotic historical novelist Józef Ignacy Kraszewski was celebrated in all three partitions in 1879; 11,000 visitors attended the Cracow N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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festivities, including groups of peasants conducted by patriotic and socially minded priests. Elaborate ceremonies also commemorated the bicentenary of Sobieski’s victory over the Turks at Vienna in 1683. Polish nationalism was an “historical nationalism,” to use a phrase by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, hence the Polish nation did not need to be built as much as expanded to embrace passive social groups, such as the peasants and urban poor. The successful development of nationalism in other countries acted as inspiration, but a greater influence was the assimilationist pressure put on Poles by the growing nationalism of the partitioners, which stirred Poles to resist. Active Poles supported the national cause in any way possible. Linguistic issues were foremost. Poles spoke and wrote Polish. When required to study and work in German or Russian, they became bilingual. Poles used state authority to build educational and economic institutions when they controlled the state, and when they did not, they undertook individual and communal action. Pushing the limits of the possible led to armed insurrections that were suppressed, and the cycle started over again. The archetypical figure was the young noblewoman dressed in widows’ weeds, bringing up her children to venerate their father, who had been lost in an insurrection, and the cause of Polish independence. In middle age, still dressed in black, she lived with her widowed daughter (or daughter-inlaw) who had lost her husband in the next insurrection, and the two women instructed the next generation in the cult of nationalism. Economic and social development also became a conscious strategy aimed at keeping Poland and Poles a modern nation. Adopted first in the late 18th century by Poles who found that Poland had fallen behind the West, the government of the Congress Kingdom used the state to develop banking and manufacturing in the 1820s. The phrase “organic work” was adopted by Karol Marcinkowski, a Poznań noble who opened a department store in 1846 to encourage Poles to move beyond land ownership. Similarly, the Warsaw Positivists responded to the failure of the 1863–1864 insurrection by telling Poles that their patriotic duty lay in developing economic and cultural modernity. During the “Culture War” of the 1870s and 1880s, Poles resisted an organized campaign to Germanize their territories by founding self-help groups, especially credit unions, so Polish farmers could keep their land and expand their holdings. Cultural and educational societies also helped keep the nation alive. The Ossoliń ski Collection (Lwów, 1817), Raczyń ski Library (Poznań, 1829), Polish Library (Paris, 1838), Polish National Museum (Raperswil, Switzerland, 1870), and especially the Czartoryski Collection, taken to Paris in 1831 and brought to Cracow in 1862, were only a few. Cultural societies sought mass support to resist the erosion of Polish language during the “Culture War” with imperial Germany in the 1870s and 1880s. The popular press emerged as a vital force at the same time, leading resistance against Germanization. The effort to maintain and expand Polish nationality between the 1770s and the 1880s was remarkably successful. A strong sense of nationhood survived the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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loss of independence and intermittent efforts by the partitioning powers to assimilate the Poles. Military struggle failed to regain independence in 1794, 1830–1831, 1846, and 1863–1864, but Poles, despite their disappointments, continued to devote themselves to the cause of Polish independence. Nationalists took advantage of any possibilities, legal or illegal, to demonstrate their devotion. They spoke, read, and wrote in Polish, joined legal and illegal organizations, and took part in legal and illegal festivities or parades. Selected Bibliography Goldberg, Halina, ed. 2004. The Age of Chopin. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Kukiel, Marian. 1955. Czartoryski and European Unity, 1770–1861. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Leslie, R. F. 1956. Polish Politics and the Revolution of November 1830. London: Athlone Press. Leslie, R. F. 1963. Reform and Insurrection in Russian Poland, 1856–1865. London: Athlone Press. Lukowski, Jerzy. 1991. Liberty’s Folly: The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the Eighteenth Century, 1697–1795. London: Routledge. Pienkos, Angela T. 1987. The Imperfect Autocrat: Grand Duke Constantine Pavlovich and the Polish Congress Kingdom. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs. Skurnowicz, Joan S. 1981. Romantic Nationalism and Liberalism: Joachim Lelewel and the Polish National Idea. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs. Trochimczyk, Maja. 2000. “Sacred versus Secular: The Convoluted History of Polish Anthems.” In Polish Music History Series, vol. 6: After Chopin: Essays in Polish Music, edited by Maja Trochimczyk, 246–268. Los Angeles: Friends of Polish Music at USC. Trzeciakowski, Lech. 1990. The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland. Translated by Katarzyna Krektowska. New York: East European Monographs, distributed by Columbia University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1982. Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1989. Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosćiuszko. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. Wandycz, Piotr S. 1974. The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Zawadzki, W. H. 1993. A Man of Honour: Adam Czartoryski as a Statesman of Russia and Poland, 1795–1831. Oxford: Clarendon Press.


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Scandinavia Byron Nordstrom Chronology 1730s New histories and extensive descriptive works on Scandinavia are written. 1750s The universities at Copenhagen and Uppsala and the academy at Åbo/ Turku are increasingly centers of research in national history, folk life, geography, topography, and flora and fauna. 1786 Lofthus Rebellion in Norway—in part a protest against Danish rule. 1788 Anjala Conspiracy involving Swedish-speaking officers in Finland opposed to Gustav III’s war with Russia. 1790s Haugean Movement in Norway—largely a religious movement but with some nationalist elements. Jens Svabo develops a Færoese dictionary. 1809 Finland becomes a Grand Duchy of Russia. Jørgen Jørgensen leads a bizarre attempt to establish an independent Iceland, which has virtually no popular support. 1811 The Gothic Society is established in Sweden. 1814 Norwegians draft a constitution at Eidsvoll, elect the Danish prince Christian Frederik as king, and declare their independence on May 17. After a brief war (“The Cats’ War”) with Sweden, the terms of a dynastic union are accepted in November. The Compulsory School Law is established in Denmark. 1816 Icelandic Literary Society is established. 1823 Anders Fryxell publishes his Tales from Swedish History (Berättelser ur svenska historien). 1830 Aftonbladet, Sweden’s first “modern” newspaper, is established. Similar papers appear throughout the area. 1830s Frederik VI moves to establish elected advisory assemblies in absolutist Denmark. 1832–1836 E. G. Geijer publishes his History of the Swedish People (Svenska folkets historia). 1835 Finland’s national epic, The Kalevala, is published. 1840 (Denmark’s) Historisk Tidsskrift is established. 1840s Heyday of Scandinavianism, especially among university students, who hold joint meetings in 1842, 1843, 1845, and 1848. 1841 Finnish Literary Society is founded. 1842 Compulsory Education Law is passed in Sweden. 1843 Iceland’s Althing is restored as an advisory body. 1844 First folk high school is established at Rødding in Denmark. 1848 Absolutism ends in Denmark. A German nationalist rebellion erupts in the Slesvig and Holstein that leads to the Three Years’ War (1848–1852) with the German states over the duchies. Compulsory School Law is enacted in Norway. 1852 The Færoese Lagting is restored as an advisory body. 1854 Venceslaus Hammershaimb’s Færoese orthography is published. 1863 Finnish Parliament meets for the first time since 1809. Language edict guarantees the parity of Finnish with Swedish within 20 years. 1864 Second Danish-German war over Slesvig and Holstein ends in the loss of both duchies. 1866 Swedish National Museum is established. Compulsory School Law is passed in Finland.


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1868 1871 1872 1874 1880 1881 1884 1885 1892 1892–1893 1893 1895 1897 1899 1905 1905–1906 1912 1916 1917 1918

The Norwegian Tourist Association is established. (Norway’s) Historisk Tidsskrift is established. Arthur Hazelius founds the Scandinavian Ethnographic Society in Sweden. A constitution for Iceland is adopted, and autonomy in internal affairs achieved. Sweden’s Nordic Museum is founded (followed by the outdoor museum at Skansen in 1891) by Hazelius. (Sweden’s) Historisk Tidskrift is established. A crisis with Sweden leads to the establishment of genuine parliamentary government in Norway. The Swedish Tourist Association is founded. Nynorsk is given equal status with bokmål in Norway. The Danish National Museum opens. A replica of the Norwegian Viking ship Gokstad sails to America and is on display at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago. (It attracted relatively little attention.) The first celebration in Sweden of June 6 as an (unofficial) national day. Norwegian-Swedish union war scare develops and passes. The Stockholm Exposition opens. The February Manifesto, a statement of the policy of Russification, reduces Finnish autonomy, and the Finns respond with largely passive resistance. The Norwegian-Swedish union is peacefully dissolved, embodied in the Karlstad Conventions. A new Finnish constitution is adopted, and the country enjoys greater autonomy from Russia (for a while). The Stockholm (Summer) Olympics. Finland’s National Museum opens. (Finland’s) Historisk Tidskrift is established. Finland declares its independence from Russia/the Soviet Union in December. Iceland is recognized as a sovereign state in union with Denmark.

Situating the Nations In the late 18th century, the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden were the only fully independent, politically defined states of Scandinavia. Iceland, Norway, the Færoe Islands, Greenland, and the duchies of Slesvig and Holstein were parts of the Danish kingdom; Finland was an integral part of Sweden. This picture changed dramatically between 1809 and 1814. In 1808–1809, Russia defeated Sweden and annexed Finland as a grand duchy of the empire. Five years later, Norway was handed over to Sweden in the Treaty of Kiel, a cynical diplomatic deal struck as part of efforts to build a new anti-Napoleon coalition. The only significant territorial change during the remainder of the 19th century was Denmark’s loss of both Slesvig and Holstein in 1864. Ultimately, Norway gained its independence in 1905, Finland followed in 1917, and Iceland in 1944. To this day, the Færoes remain part of Denmark but have enjoyed local autonomy since 1948. Clearly, the geopolitical simplicity of Scandinavia in this period was complicated by ethnic or nationality complexity. Denmark was a multinational state. Sweden was a binational state. In the years between about 1770 and 1918, Norwegian, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Icelandic, Færoese, German, and Finnish nationalism developed. Beginning as relatively small, mainly intellectual national identity movements in the late 18th century, they became increasingly political and popular during the 19th century and did much to shape the history of the region. In terms of natural resources, this region was relatively rich. Fish were important throughout the area. Denmark’s main economic strengths lay in agriculture and trade. Forest products including timber, charcoal, and pitch and tar were important to Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Iron and copper were particularly important to Sweden. Internal and international trade connections were relatively well developed. Manufacturing was limited; farming was the occupation of most of the area’s people. Although there were many towns, few were large. During the century under review, much of Scandinavia experienced the transformations involved in the process of modernization, including at least the beginnings of industrialization, urbanization, the growth of the middle class and the creation of an industrial working class, intense internal migration and mass emigration, and the beginnings of political democratization. Social class involvement in developing national ideals changed over time. In the 18th century, it was primarily the nobility, growing bourgeoisie, and tiny intellectual class that were most involved. The first two groups were most interested N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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in defining the nation around a hierarchic social structure in which they were predominant. Intellectuals were more interested in definitions based on history, geography, or culture. The social context broadened during the 19th century, when the nobilities of Denmark and Sweden lost influence while the landowning farmers and bourgeoisie gained. At the same time, the national ideals developed an interesting two-level focus. Part was on the peasantry and their folk cultures; the other was on modernity and the emerging industrial societies. All these developments took place in widely differing and dynamic historical contexts. In Sweden they occurred in relative safety and domestic calm. The country’s modern political independence dated to 1523, and, after 1815, it avoided participation in virtually all of Europe’s wars. Denmark was also an old and established state. However, it experienced a great deal of turmoil in the 19th century, much of which developed at the fringes of the kingdom—in Slesvig and Holstein, the Færoe Islands, and Iceland. Because Finland, Iceland, and Norway were not independent states, their nationalisms developed in much more intensely politicized settings.

Instituting the Nations The long period under review can be divided into at least three subperiods. During the first of these, 1770–1800, national identities and nationalism were generally cultivated by the Crown, small elites, and intellectuals acting in what they defined as national interests. Except in times of war, when nationalist rhetoric became more broadly aimed, there were only a few instances of wider, “popular” involvement. During a second period, 1800–1840, political activity aimed at national independence or autonomy based largely on small, politically articulate elites grew, especially in Finland and Norway; extensive and intensive research and publishing flourished in history, folklore, and language centering on (but not limited to) the universities in Copenhagen, Uppsala, and Oslo; and national Romantic schools of painting, characterized by grand landscapes and depictions of folk life, developed. All of this activity contributed to growing senses of national identity in the region, but the portion of the population in any of the Nordic countries actually engaged by these developments remained small. A third period, 1840–1880, was characterized by growing political activity organized by changing elites and aimed at the expanding popular bases generated by the increasingly representative nature of the region’s political systems. At the same time, ongoing intellectual and scholarly work, the development of compulsory elementary education systems that incorporated curricula with important national components, and the expansion of such media as newspapers that played important roles in engaging popular involvement in the nationalist agenda helped define the period. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Gothicism/Göticism Early historical events and institutions, such as representative assemblies as well as myths and sagas such as the Eddas, were incorporated into elaborate national histories written and rewritten during the Medieval and early modern periods. These “histories” resulted in complex national mythologies, such as gothicism/göticism, which had its origins in the 15th century in Sweden. This idea was advanced by Olaus Magnus in the 16th century and by the late 17th-century scholar Olof Rudbeck, who was also one of the discoverers of the lymphatic system. It remained part of Sweden’s historical canon well into the 19th century. Among its claims was that Sweden was the home of the Goths, whose migrations peopled the continent and contributed to the rise of virtually all of Europe’s nations. Equally fanciful was the idea that the lost city of Atlantis was located somewhere off Sweden’s eastern coast.

In all cases, the development of the personal, institutional, intellectual, and cultural foundations that made up national doctrines in the Scandinavian states was part of very long processes. Initially, they took their impetus from the political center. For example, Gustav II Adolf worked to foster a Swedish national consciousness in the early 17th century to bolster support for his wars, and his model was followed by virtually every monarch through the 18th century. The state Lutheran church played a leading part in this effort by carrying the national message to the common people. In the late 18th century, intellectuals played increasingly important roles in the development of national awareness, especially by defining the nation in terms of its people, history, geography, nature, resources, and cultures. This influence can be seen in the new histories, both natural and human, that were written in the period. Also important was the development of groups within the social elites, such as the Swedish-speaking military officers in Finland and the merchant elite of Norway, who adopted increasingly political national agendas. For example, in the summer of 1788, Sweden’s king, Gustav III, started a war with Russia, for which the country was ill prepared. In August of that year, a group of Swedish-speaking army officers stationed in and identifying with Finland joined together to oppose the war in what is called the Anjala Confederation or the Anjala Conspiracy. Declaring themselves to be acting in the interests of the Finnish nation, they took steps to reach a separate peace with the Russian empress, Catherine II. Although their efforts were unsuccessful, their actions indicated a growing sentiment among the noble-military elite in Finland that separation from Sweden was in the Finnish nation’s best interests. The national agenda of the Norwegian merchant elite came to the fore in 1814, one of the most important dates in all of Norwegian history. Separatist interests had been growing for at least a decade, fed by the miseries caused in Norway by the Napoleonic wars. In January 1814, the country’s situation changed entirely when it was transferred to Sweden under the terms of the Treaty of Kiel. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Ignoring this development, a group of upper-class merchants met in Eidsvoll with the Danish prince, Christian Frederik, in February 1814. Agreement was reached to pursue efforts to establish an independent Norway. Two months later, a more broadly representative assembly gathered at Eidsvoll. In a matter of weeks it had produced a constitution. On May 17, that constitution was accepted, and Christian Frederik was declared king. Sweden opposed these moves, tensions increased, and a brief “war” was conducted. In the late fall of 1814, the Norwegians

Gustav II Adolf, King of Sweden from 1611 to 1632. (Courtesy of the Swedish Institute)


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agreed to a union with Sweden. However, the terms of this settlement left Norway largely autonomous and with its own constitution. The union lasted until 1905.

Defining the Nations The Nordic nationalisms of this period were based more on ethno-cultural definitions, and/or on objective arguments (e.g., Norway and Iceland’s histories as independent states, or the threat to Finland that continued Swedish control presented), than on subjective arguments. There were, however, conflicts that complicated the process of national development. Strong regionalism existed throughout the region, determined in part by geography. The seas, fjords, rivers, lakes, marshes and bogs, mountains, and forests of Scandinavia divided the peoples of this region, and resolving differences and determining inclusiveness are themes that recur throughout this period. Finland was a bilingual state composed of Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking peoples. Both considered themselves Finns. The Germans in Denmark and the Danes in the duchies presented a different kind of problem. A central question was about where Denmark did or should end and Germany begin. The two Slesvig-Holstein wars (1848–1851 and 1864) were fought over this question, and even then it was not resolved. It was not until 1920, when a plebiscite was held in the border region of north Slesvig, that a stable border was determined. In northern Norway, Sweden, and Finland, the Sami had been a significant minority for centuries. In the period under review, these indigenous people were subject to laws and policies designed to force assimilation. Language was also a vital element in this defining process, especially in the Færoes, Finland, Iceland, and Norway. Faeroese had to be rescued from virtual extinction—largely through the work of Hans Christian Lyngbye and, especially, Venceslaus Hammershaimb. Language was a major divider of people in Finland. Although Finnish speakers made up about 80 percent of the country’s population, the official language of Finland was Swedish. Around 1860, an intense period of conflict began that did not really end when Finnish won legal parity with Swedish as an official language around 1880. Some people believed that only Finnish speakers were true Finns. In Norway, native dialects had been undermined by centuries of Danish being used as the official language of the church and the state. Norway’s language situation was confused and complex. Most people spoke a local dialect, while the language of officials and the clergy was generally Danish—with Norwegian pronunciation. The desire to have a common, national language became especially strong in the second half of the 19th century. Norway was a particularly interesting case since two languages competed for the designation as the national language of Norway. One was represented by Knud Knudsen, who worked to create a basic Norwegian out of the DanoNorwegian blended language through spelling and pronunciation standardization. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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This language came to be known as bokmål. The other option, advocated by Ivar Aasen, was a new language, nynorsk. It was based on the dialects of the fjord districts of western Norway and the mountain districts of the east. Knudsen’s option was the most popular, but Aasen’s was given legal equality in 1884.

Narrating the Nations National definitions were created through the history, literature, art, theater, music, language, and folk culture of the Scandinavian countries during what might be called a long 19th century that ran from about 1780 to 1918. A canon of great people and events, geographic and cultural traits, and material evidence was assembled in each country. For the Danes, the high points in this chronicle lay in the exploits of the Viking age, the primacy of Denmark in Scandinavia from the late 14th to the late 16th centuries, its great rulers, its ancient institutions, and its honest and hardworking people. Finns identified with an ancient folklore, their role in making Sweden a great power, the sufferings they endured because of the Swedes, the triumph of a long-repressed language, and, in the 19th century, the struggle to be Finns within the Russian empire. Icelanders treasured their history, their parliament (Althing), the sagas, and their struggle against the Danes. Norwegians looked to their Viking age and medieval achievements, to the richness of their folk culture, to the struggle against oppression at the hands first of the Danes and then the Swedes, and to the events of 1814 that became absolutely central in their national canon. Swedes, too, reveled in the mythical and real of their medieval past, highlighted their 16th- and 17th-century history when the country escaped the tyranny of Denmark and became the leading power in northern Europe, and celebrated the richness of their people and natural resources. Each of the Scandinavian countries had stories of mythical and historical individuals who were considered important institutors of the nation—some of whom lived long before the 18th century. For Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes they included Viking-age kings such as Harald Bluetooth (Denmark), Harald Fairhair and Olav II (Norway), and Olof Skötkonung and St. Erik (Sweden). Also important were monarchs from the Middle Ages whose achievements included law codes and more effective administrative structures, such as Valdemar IV (Denmark), Haakon IV and Magnus VI (Norway), and Birger Jarl, Magnus Ladulås, and Magnus Eriksson (Sweden). Early modern national heroes included Christian III, Christian IV, and Frederick II in Denmark, and Gustav I Vasa, Gustav II Adolf, and Charles XII in Sweden. Each country also had a catalog of important great nobles and religious leaders—first for the Catholic period and then for the Reformation. The Icelanders had in Landnámabók a record of the land claims of the island’s first settlers, dating to the ninth century. Also important were the many real and fictional medieval heroes, such as Egil Skalagrímsson from Egil’s Saga, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Detail of a manuscript containing the Icelandic sagas, written between the 12th and 14th centuries. The sagas described events that took place mainly in Iceland in the 10th and early 11th centuries. (Arctic-Images/Corbis)

whose lives were recounted in the Icelandic sagas, or the characters of orally transmitted folktales such as those that formed the bases for Finland’s national epic, The Kalevala. In addition, there were the legal institutions, such as the representative assemblies common to the entire region (thing or ting), early law codes, historic provinces, pagan religions, and a wealth of folk customs. All of the Nordic countries also defined themselves in terms of their people and their earliest histories. Again, this effort is evident in their use of pre-Christian myths, such as those contained in the Eddas or Ynglinga Saga or in the Icelandic family sagas that dealt with ordinary people and their struggles and achievements. During the 18th century and 19th centuries, ongoing efforts were made to define each of the Nordic countries through history, geography, folklore, biology, sociology, and so on. Enlightenment-era multivolume histories were authored by Ludwig Holberg (ca. 1730) and P. F. Suhm (ca. 1780) in Denmark, Gerhard Schöning in Norway, and Olof Dalin and Sven Lagerbring in Sweden. In the 19th century, the German historian Leopold von Ranke’s emphasis on the nation as the central element in historical studies prevailed throughout Scandinavia. This school was reflected in the works of Marcus Rubin, Kristian Erslev, and F. Troels-Lund in Denmark. The “Norwegian Historical School” developed around faculty at the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Viking Age A very interesting argument centers on how history has been used to define the Scandinavian nations. According to this theory, the whole notion of a “Viking age” was created, mainly in the 19th century. The past, in other words, was “colonized,” or taken possession of, and then exploited. Any evidence for the Viking age, much of it coming from the new discipline of archaeology, was selectively accumulated to support the idea of a period in which some kind of unified Viking culture existed when the peoples from Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden in this case) were important in shaping a world that stretched from Newfoundland in the west to the Caspian Sea in the east. Particularly important for 19th-century Scandinavian nationalists was the connection made between the Vikings and their present. To them, the modern Scandinavian states and their people descended directly from the Vikings.

new university in Christiania/Oslo that included Rudolf Keyser, P. A. Munch, Christian Lange, and Carl Anger. In Sweden, the national perspective shaped the works of Erik Gustaf Geijer, Esias Tegnér, and Harald Hjärne. In each country, associations for historians and academic journals (Historisk tidsskrift) were founded as the discipline became increasingly professionalized. Folklore collections were as important and probably reached larger audiences than the histories. Here, the works of Elias Lönnrot in Finland, Jón Arason (whose 16th-century works became increasingly popular in the 19th century) and Magnus Grímsson in Iceland, and Peter C. Asbjørnsen and Jørgen Moe in Norway were particularly important. Lönnrot’s The Kalevala, first published in 1835, is Finland’s national epic. In addition, writers and intellectuals in various fields in each country contributed to the development of national literatures. Outstanding examples include Adam Oehlenschläger, Søren Kierkegaard, N. F. S. Grundtvig, and Hans Christian Andersen in Denmark; Johan L. Runeberg and Zacharias Topelius in Finland; Bjarni Thorarensen and Jónas Hallgrímsson in Iceland; Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson, Henrik Ibsen, and Johan Welhaven in Norway; and Esias Tegnér, August Strindberg, and Verner von Heidenstam in Sweden. Similarly, composers like Edvard Grieg in Norway and Jean Sibelius in Finland drew upon folk tunes in their works, and national themes appeared repeatedly in paintings from the national Romantic period in the early half of the century and in the naturalistic works from the latter half. Landscapes, national heroes, and scenes from history or everyday life were the frequent themes of artists like C. J. Dahl, Adolph Tidemand, Gustaf Cederström, Carl Larsson, and Otto Bache.

Mobilizing and Building the Nations During this period the targets of national rhetoric shifted over time. The 18thcentury monarchs hoped to arouse patriotic fervor and enlist popular support N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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for short-term policies. They used the pulpit, the press, symbols, pageantry, and grand events as tools in these efforts. On the other hand, the small elites interested in national issues tended to speak to themselves, although their ideas were spread well beyond the group via early newspapers, the tavern, and so on. By the mid-19th century, political groups had been organized to articulate and spread national ideals, such as Denmark’s National Liberals. The growing popular press and greater educational opportunities dovetailed with these developments. By the closing years of the century, every social group was targeted, and nationalism crossed social and political lines. It was an important element in the growing middle-class ideology, and it was a favorite theme of the still large and influential agrarian class(es). Although internationalism was an element of both labor union and socialist movements, the new working classes were well aware of nationalism, were the subjects of barrages of indoctrination, and were attracted by it. Communicating these national identities was accomplished through many means. Already high levels of literacy in much of the region were increased through compulsory school systems that developed mostly in the second half of the 19th century. The curricula of these systems were specifically designed to teach national ideas and values. Concurrently, the number of books, magazines, and newspapers rose, and prices fell. Libraries, fixed and traveling, became more common. Interestingly, in Iceland there was only one printing press until relatively late in the 19th century. However, the number of books was surprising large. Many of them were handmade copies. Also, reading, privately and aloud to others, was part of the rural culture. Another medium for communicating the emerging national canon was the museum. Throughout the region local museums and, more important symbolically, national museums were established, generally around 1880, that were dedicated to collecting and displaying to a general public each country’s national treasures. Paralleling these were museums dedicated to the folk cultures of the region, such as Sweden’s Nordic Museum, founded by the ethnographer Arthur Hazelius in 1880. A very interesting and popular tool for educating the public about the nation and encouraging identification with it were trade expositions. The earliest of these to be held in Scandinavia dates from the 1820s. They were designed to display a country’s economic resources, technological achievements, and industrial products. Gradually, however, they became larger and more complex. By the close of the century, they were truly national (and sometimes international) expositions, designed by middle-class, capitalist organizers to show off the power and productivity potential of the country and to encourage all social groups to accept their definition of the nation, one that focused on modernity, industry, and progress. The Stockholm Exposition of 1897 clearly exemplified these developments. In addition, there was the adoption and popularization of symbols, including flags, currencies, national anthems, and holidays. Denmark’s red and white flag, the Danebrog, carried with it an ancient (and largely mythical) legend about its appearance at the Battle of Volmer in 1219. Norwegians used the issue of a “pure” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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flag rather than the oddly combined Norwegian and Swedish flags of the 19th century as a wedge issue in their struggle for autonomy and then independence. The acts of creating national flags in Finland and Iceland were important national moments. The national anthems gradually adopted included Denmark’s “Der er et yndigt land” (“There Is a Beautiful Land”), Finland’s “Maamme” (“Our Land”), Iceland’s “Lofsöngur” (“Song of Praise”), Norway’s “Ja, Vi elsker Dette Landet” (“Yes, We Love This Land”), and Sweden’s “Du Gamla, Du Fria” (“You Old, You Free”). Celebrated days included Denmark’s Constitution Day, June 5 (1849); Norway’s Constitution Day, May 17 (1814); and Sweden’s June 6—marking Gustav I Vasa’s recognition as king of an independent Sweden in 1523 and the date on which a new constitution was accepted in 1809.

Norway’s National Anthem Yes, we love with fond devotion This our land that looms Rugged, storms-carried o’er the ocean, With her thousand homes. Love her, in our love recalling Those who gave us birth. And old tales which night, in falling, Brings as dreams to earth Norseman, whatsoe’er thy station, Thank thy God, Whose power Willed and wrought the land’s salvation In her darkest hour. All our mothers sought with weeping And our sires in fight, God has fashioned, in His keeping, Till we gained our right. Yes, we love with fond devotion This our land that looms Rugged, storm-scarred o’er the ocean, With her thousand homes. And, as warrior sires have made her Wealth and fame increase, At the call we too will aid her, Armed to guard her peace. The lyrics were written by Bjørnstjerne Bjørnson (1832–1910), one of Norway’s most prolific writers and intellectuals, between 1859 and 1863. The tune was composed by Rikard Nordraak (1842–1866). It was adopted as the national song in 1864 and sung at celebrations at Eidsvoll on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the events of 1814. About the song, Bjørnson wrote: “[T]his National Anthem of ours is free and open as the day, it soars upwards without a threat, it shows determination unmarred by boasting” (see http:// www.national-anthems.org/history.php).


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The years between 1880 and 1918 witnessed the culmination of many of these trends, and they form a crucial period in the development of Nordic nationalisms. The political agendas that were based on nationalism were largely fulfilled. Norway achieved full independence from Sweden in 1905. Finland secured its independence from (Soviet) Russia in 1917. Iceland was granted autonomy by Denmark in 1918 and declared its independence in 1944. The Færoes, probably too small to stand alone, remained part of Denmark but secured local autonomy after World War II. These developments and a kind of consensus regarding national definition in each of the Nordic countries removed national agendas from the politics of Scandinavia. To some degree, however, the situation has changed over the last several decades. The Sami, a people indigenous to northern Scandinavia, have been increasingly assertive in establishing their cultural uniqueness and political autonomy. Also, growing ethnic diversity is replacing the homogeneity of Scandinavian populations. The result of large-scale immigration, this change is opening a new chapter in the history of what it means, especially, to be a Dane, Norwegian, or Swede. Selected Bibliography Barton, H. Arnold. 2003. Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814–1905. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Derry, T. K. 1973. A History of Modern Norway. London: Oxford University Press. Ekström, Anders. 1994. Den utställda världen: Stockholmsutställningen 1897 och 1800-talets världutställningar. Stockholm: Nordisk museets Handlingar 119. (Includes an English summary.) Frängmyr, Tore. 2000. Svensk idéhistoria: Bildning och vetenskap under tusen år. 2 vols. Stockholm: Bokförlaget Natur och Kultur. Hamalainen, Pekka. 1979. In Time of Storm: Revolution, Civil War, and the Ethnolinguistic Issue in Finland. Albany: State University Press of New York. Jespersen, Knud. 2004. A History of Denmark. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Karlsson, Gunnar. 2000. The History of Iceland. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Lagerqvist, Lars O. 2003. A History of Sweden. Stockholm: The Swedish Institute. Lavery, Jason. 2006. The History of Finland. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Nordstrom, Byron. 2000. Scandinavia since 1500. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Nordstrom, Byron. 2002. A History of Sweden. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Singleton, Fred. 1998. A Short History of Finland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Svanberg, Frederik. 2004. Decolonizing the Viking Age. Vol. 1. Lund, Sweden: Acta Archaeologica Lundensia Series in 80 No. 43.


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Scotland Graeme Morton Chronology 1297 1305 1306 1314 1320 1603 1707 1715 1745 1746 1760s 1790s 1814 1832 1852 1856 1861 1869 1885 1886 1892 1894 1900 1913 1918 1919 1926 1928 1934

Battle of Stirling Bridge. William Wallace, Guardian of Scotland, executed. Robert I, the Bruce, accedes to the throne. Battle of Bannockburn. Declaration of Arbroath. Union of Crowns between Scotland and England. Union of parliaments between Scotland and England. First major Jacobite uprising. Second major Jacobite uprising. Battle of Culloden, defeat of the Jacobites. Improvements in the Scottish economy. Republican ideas circulate. William Wallace depicted in first modern statue. Electoral franchise opened to the middle classes in Scotland and England. National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR) formed. National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights dissolved. National Wallace Monument Movement formed. Foundation stone laid for National Wallace Monument, Stirling. National Wallace Monument opened. Scottish Office created. Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA) formed. SHRA splits from Scottish Liberal Party. Scottish Grand Committee created. Scottish Home Rule Association disbanded. Young Scots Society formed. International Scots Home Rule League formed. Scottish Home Rule Association re-formed. Scottish National League formed. Scottish National Movement (SNM) formed. National Party of Scotland (NPS) formed. Scottish National Party formed from SNM and NPS.

Situating the Nation The modern age of nationalism has impressively long roots in Scotland, with key heroes and battles of the 13th and 14th centuries resonating throughout and structuring the political idea of nation. The patriot warrior William Wallace N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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(1270?–1305); the patriot king Robert I, the Bruce (1274–1329); and a key statement, the Declaration of Arbroath (1320), forged the nation for later generations. The declaration made clear that the nobles, barons, and freeholders, the “community of the realm,” entrusted Bruce as their king but vowed to remove him upon betrayal of that community. The divine right of kingship was broken in favor of accountability to the people, and the statement offered a rhetoric so strong and clear that it has inspired later generations (if not contemporaries): “It is in truth not for glory, nor riches, nor honours that we are fighting, but for freedom— for that alone, which no honest man gives up but with life itself.” This period, known by later historians as the wars of independence, is credited with establishing Scotland’s independence from England, never again to be conquered militarily. In the 18th century, these medieval heroes enabled Scotland to enter political union with England in 1707 as a free nation. It was to be a union of equals, where Scotland and England each dispensed of their parliaments to create a new political structure, Great Britain. That union has framed Scottish nationalism thereafter. By the 1770s, once the political and monarchical threat of Jacobitism had truly receded, Scotland developed a sense of national identity and, at times, nationalism within the parameters of regal and political union with England. Political union meant that Scotland was brought into a new British state identity, but it did not result in the nation being undermined. Part of the strength of this British identity has been played out through its empire. Scots found the opportunities of empire to be attractive, more open than the prospects in England, and more lucrative than jobs at home. Access to Britain’s extensive overseas markets was advantageous throughout the 19th century—the market penetration of Scotland’s steel and ship-making industries at the end of the period, as well as the banking and finance sector, were especially notable. Despite this later success, the economic benefits of union were uneven and slow to materialize in Scotland. The anti-union riots that greeted its passage were indications of the political and monarchical instability of the time. The two major Jacobite uprisings in 1715 and 1745, plus the more minor skirmishes of 1708 and 1719, created a difficult environment for cross-border trade and technological transfer. By the 1760s, the Scottish economy was beginning to transform, although it brought with it much dislocation for the weakest land workers. The linen and cattle trades were bringing in valuable income, yet Scotland’s economy had to overcome its relative isolation from the richer markets in England and central Europe. In earlier periods, Scotland benefited from links to the east, to Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and to Poland. In the 1760s and 1770s, the focus was to the west, with the tobacco trade to and from the Americas at the fore. For the Glasgow merchants who dominated all but 2 percent of Britain’s trade in these two decades, and the banks that supported them, it was a “golden” prosperity, producing an elite and architecture to match. Here, geography gave Scotland an economic lead, with shorter sailing routes around the north of Ireland giving it an advantage over the southern ports of England. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Instituting the Nation The second half of the 18th century was one of great intellectual activity and did much to place Scotland in a British and European context. Coming out of a relatively small elite, although an urbanized one, a series of philosophical and historical giants, including Adam Smith (bap. 1723–1790), David Hume (1711–1776), Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), and William Robertson (1721–1793), as well as their acolytes, framed Scotland’s development within the progress of the age. Debating and self-improvement clubs and societies, linked to four ancient universities, produced a vigorous social and political analysis that was of international importance. It was an elite who celebrated the constitutional development of England and embraced the union of 1707 as a means of ensuring Scotland’s own evolution into modernity. It was a discourse that encouraged integration rather than separation from England, although it has been criticized by later nationalists for that stand. At a time when the concept of nationalism was taking on its modern form after the 1789 revolution in France, Scotland’s intellectual elites were taking on the clothes of others. Access to English markets and to those of the British empire, throughout the 19th century in particular, carried Scotland ever deeper into the political structure of Great Britain. But dual national identities were clear to be seen, and they structured who the Scots believed themselves to be. Along with additional legislation later that year, the negotiations that produced the union of parliaments in 1707 put into place a framework that has enabled the Scottish nation to remain distinct. Three key institutions were enshrined. Scotland maintained its own Roman-based legal system rather than being incorporated into the common-law origins of English law. As a result, the parliament of Great Britain legislates separately for Scotland. Sometimes this process has been relatively straightforward, as with the expansion of the electoral franchise in 1832 when the legislation was passed almost concurrently. Sometimes there has been a longer gap, as with the second reform of the franchise that occurred in 1867 in England but in 1868 in Scotland, and some legislation has bypassed Scotland altogether, such as the 1848 Public Health Act (England and Wales). Legislation accompanying the Act of 1707 ensured that the Presbyterian system of Protestantism was maintained in Scotland in contrast to Anglicanism in England. Each was an established religion, the official religion of the state, but they were kept distinct. The Church of Scotland and its governing assembly maintained a significant role in all aspects of Scottish life and welfare, and its centrality to the relief of poverty and pauperism only started to break down after the 1840s. Thirdly, Scotland’s educational system was maintained as institutionally distinct. Built up from a belief—a myth—of egalitarianism embodied in a range of different schools at the elementary level, its universities in the late 18th and 19th centuries gave emphasis to philosophical thought and intellectual breadth over specialization. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The disjunction between a British state and the institutions of the Scottish nation, institutions that the union of 1707 enshrined, has been fundamental. For governance in the 18th century, political managers were employed to oversee the running of Scotland, with local affairs kept local. This constitutional position was favored throughout Britain, with opposition raised to overcentralized government. Parish, county, and ultimately municipal governments were celebrated as the most flexible and responsive form of government; as taxation laws were extended, local government offered the closest tie between taxpayer and expenditure. The impact of this ideology was to encourage Scotland to keep its legislative difference, although it would still complain when it felt it lacked the legislation it needed. By the mid-19th century, the first organized nationalist group, the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR) could warn of the revolutions that had engulfed Europe. It was overcentralized government that had shattered the states of France, Hungary, Poland, and Italy, they argued. It warned that the nations of Britain could experience similar disruption if government were to centralize further. Although in existence for a short period, this group campaigned for more powers to be given to the localities to govern the nation from within. Importantly, these nationalists did not argue for a devolved or in any way separate parliament. Any such structure was regarded as another layer of bureaucracy and too distant from the people who, it was argued, were best served by local power centers in their own communities. Local government was to keep Scotland free within the British state structure. This philosophy, of unionist-nationalism, was the product of a separate nation forged during the medieval period and politically joined with England before the modern age of nationalism.

The National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (1852–1856) This association was established to campaign for equal treatment of Scotland in matters ceremonial and heraldic, and it had a long list of practical complaints, from public spending on palaces and parks, lack of military spending in Scotland (compared to England), the loss of the Scottish Excise Office in 1843, and the loss of the Privy Council to deal with Scottish affairs. The danger of overcentralized government, undermining local issues and local solutions, was deemed a threat to Scotland’s nationhood. The association’s cosecretaries were the Romantic novelist James Grant and his brother John. The Tory peer Archibald William Montgomerie (1812–1861), Earl of Englinton and Winton, was president, and its political support came from the Free Church liberal Charles Cowan (1801–1889), Member of Parliament for Edinburgh. In all its campaigning for the continuing recognition of Scotland as a nation, it declared loyalty to the union with England and to Victoria as queen.


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Defining the Nation Scotland’s territorial borders have been remarkably consistent for a nation with such a long history of warfare with its more powerful land neighbor. The border town of Berwick-upon-Tweed changed hands almost constantly between the Scottish and the English in the medieval and early modern period, finally becoming a “Scottish” town in England after 1482, its English jurisdiction only confirmed in 1885. The border has a long history of skirmishes and raids between the two nations. It created a rich Borders identity that mixes local and national history with monarchical and religious symbolism, but the border has not otherwise framed the Scottish nation. Rather, the Scottish nation has been defined through its institutions and a number of associated identities. One of those identities has been racially constructed. Scotland, along with Ireland and the fringes of England and northern France, was defined at home and abroad as “Celtic” in contrast to


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Anglo-Saxon or “Germanic” England. The Celt fostered a fear of the unknown in the first half of the 18th century, projected as a mysterious and somewhat barbarous people. Following the defeat of the Jacobite forces on the battlefield of Culloden near Inverness in 1746, the Scots were then presented in official accounts and in art and travel writings as no longer a threat but instead were idealized as “noble savages,” a militaristic society of unsophisticated honesty and reliability. In both constructions, and in those that were to follow, the Celt was contrasted to the complexities of urbanizing and industrializing England. Scotland was represented as the land of the poet Ossian (Scotland’s Homer), where an oral culture had precedence over the written form and where the mystical beauty of its landscape inspired music as well as verse. By the 19th century, the Celt was increasingly feminized in distinction to the masculine Anglo-Saxon. Closer to nature, the Celt was melancholy rather than progressive and irrational compared to the conventions and rigid moralities to the south. The notion confirmed Scotland’s culture as being less sophisticated and therefore “inferior” or less advanced along the stages of cultural evolution identified by the Enlightenment philosophers. It was to be an ethnic label applied to all of Scotland, no matter how inappropriate, especially for Lowland and industrial Scotland. Indeed, many of the elites of Lowland Scotland were part of those who propagated this contrast. Aspects of Scotland’s distinctiveness were even absorbed into the wider British culture. Tartan and the kilt, for example, shifted from being the dress of Highland Scotland, crudely characterized as the Celts, to markers of the whole nation and Scotland’s ethnic contribution to Britain. The promotion of all things tartan by Queen Victoria (reigned 1837–1901), at her Aberdeenshire estate Balmoral, was the aristocratic epitome of this absorption.

Narrating the Nation The projection of ethnic differences constructed to fit contemporary mores in England and Lowland Scotland created markers of nationality that would contribute to the better integration of Scotland into Great Britain. The creation of the British Parliament in 1707 gave Scotland a series of state and constitutional structures to call upon in the 1770–1880 period. Its elites chose from England’s (older) constitutional history, made the most of access to the markets of empire, and, as we have seen, the nation retained its own institutional differences, most importantly in law and religion. Within this structure, Scotland produced and celebrated national narratives that commemorated its history. The last land battle fought on British soil, at Culloden moor in 1746, saw the defeat of the “Young Pretender” Charles Edward Stuart’s claim to the British throne. This event marked the political end of Jacobitism, yet the heroic failure of the Stuarts was transformed into a cultural critique of British constitutionalism. Charles Edward N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Jacobitism This is the term derived from the Latin Jacobus, meaning James, given to supporters of the Stuart line of James VII of Scotland, II of England, deposed in 1688. The removal of the Catholic Stuarts for the Protestant rule of William III (reigned 1689–1702) and Mary II (reigned 1689–1694) had mixed support in Presbyterian Scotland. Jacobite-involved uprisings against the British throne followed in 1708, 1719, and 1744 and most directly in 1715 and 1745 with French military support and the loyalty of some Highland chiefs. The failure of Charles Edward Stuart (1720–1788), the “Young Pretender,” to win back the throne of his grandfather, or fulfill the claim of his father, was to be the final act. The Jacobite army of the ‘45 marched to Derby outside London before retreating and being defeated against British forces at Culloden moor outside Inverness in 1746. This brutal rout, the suppression that befell the losers, and Charles’s flight to France disguised as “Betty Burke,” set the parameters for a powerful nationalist narrative. Once the political and military threat had receded in the 1770s, support for the movement was maintained in song, broadside, poem, and story. Often sentimentalized, Jacobitism continues to hold sway over Scotland’s national imagination.

himself was transformed into “Bonnie Prince Charlie,” a reflection of his early handsomeness and fondness for female company, but also gist for the romance of the story. His dramatic escape from the battlefield, then the flight from South Uist for Skye dressed as “Betty Burke,” the servant of Flora MacDonald, before heading for exile in France and Italy was celebrated in poetry and song. From the early 18th century, Jacobite pamphlets circulated throughout society along with songs, broadsides, and squibs. The famed Scottish poet Robert Burns (1759–1796) was a sympathizer who produced some of the most famous Jacobite songs such as “Ye Jacobites by Name” and “The Highland Widow’s Lament.” James Hogg’s Jacobite Relics of Scotland (1819–1821) kept up the elegiac tradition in print. The narrative was then taken over by Sir Walter Scott (1771–1832), who balanced a Romantic Jacobitism with a hard-headed support for English constitutionalism and union, first seen in his novel on the 1745 uprising, Waverley; or ’Tis Sixty Years Since (1814). The first print run of the book, 1,000 copies, was sold out in two days and showed the continued appetite for the Jacobite narrative, even when published by an unknown novelist (Scott kept his authorship secret until 1827). By 1888, the centenary of Charles Edward’s death was marked by a concert and a major exhibition the next year, with over 1,000 artifacts on display and noteworthy for a visit by Queen Victoria. In 1884 “The Skye Boat Song,” commemorating Bonnie Prince Charlie’s escape with Flora MacDonald, was published and remained one of the most popular Jacobite songs of the late 20th century. Matching this trope of loss and sorrow within the British constitutional structure was a renewed emphasis on the martyrdom of the medieval patriot William Wallace. Within what was to become a Victorian obsession with individualism and romantic valor, Wallace was used to celebrate the distinctiveness of the Scottish nation in a way that did not threaten loyalty to the Crown or the political N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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arrangements of the age. Harry’s epic poem The Wallace (ca. 1480) had long popularized Wallace’s deeds, valor, and martyrdom, with sufficient historical truth, intertwined with error and embellishments, to sustain this patriot as the dominant folk hero. A version of his life written in modern Scots by Hamilton of Gilbertfield in 1722 reimagined the story for a new society, especially Burns, and a glossary was compiled by Dr. John Jamieson in 1820 to translate the less well-known Scots words into an anglicized form. The excessive (English) bloodletting, which was a prominent feature of Harry’s verse, was lessened for a Victorian audience. Wallace was depicted in a whole series of chapbooks as a self-made hero, an egalitarian who fought for his people against overwhelming odds and without the support of the aristocratic elite. It was the love of his country, or just for love, that was his motivation. A wildly popular romantic version of his life by Jane Porter (1776–1850), The Scottish Chiefs, first published in 1810, was reissued time and time again throughout the century. Wallace’s deeds against the English foe, his victory at the battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297, his outlaw existence in the early 1300s, his defiance of English rule through his guerrilla actions, all achieved from humble origins (in fact, he was the younger son of a minor knight), made him an inspiration. His betrayal, capture, and execution in 1305 made him a martyr. It was from 1814 that the fashion for commemorating Wallace in stone took grip. As befitted his republican sympathies in the 1790s, David Stuart Erskine (1742–1829), the 11th Earl of Buchan, commissioned the first likeness of Wallace in a 21½-foot-tall statue on his land in the Scottish Borders (despite there being no contemporary likeness to base it upon). Statues to Wallace littered southwestern and Lowland Scotland: in Falkirk (1810), Ayr (1819, 1831), Lanark (1820), Craigie in Ayrshire (1855), Stirling (1855, 1880s), Aberdeen (1888), Robroystone (1900), Elderslie (1912), and Edinburgh (1929). Inability to choose between Scotland’s two largest cities, Edinburgh and Glasgow, for situating a national memorial to Wallace allowed Abbey Craig in Stirling, which overlooked the site of the patriot’s greatest victory in 1297, to be chosen. All these monuments were financed with private money through subscriptions or bequests. The organizing committee for the National Wallace Monument was formed in 1856, struggled to meet the final cost, which doubled the original estimate to become £13,401, but achieved their goal with the inauguration of the monument in 1869. The inspirational story of Wallace affected not just Victorian society at home but also those abroad, with letters in support of the monument from the European nationalists Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872), Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882), Louis Blanc (1811–1882), and Louis Kossuth (1802–1884). Wallace monuments were built by the Scottish communities in Ballarat outside Melbourne in 1889 and in Baltimore in 1893. The Scottish-born American industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie funded a “crown” to set atop the newly completed national monument at Stirling and commissioned busts for a hall of heroes in its tower. Scotland had a national patriot of international importance, but still the union with England was to remain. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Statue of Scottish national hero William Wallace (ca.1274–1305) in Aberdeen, Scotland. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)


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The nationalists were filling a gap where no political organization existed to mobilize Scotland’s patriotism. They kept up with the rhetoric of midcentury: Scotland was not a region but an independent nation in negotiated union with England. Without this union being balanced, the whole structure would be threatened. It was a curious position, with the nationalists warning against breaking the union but predicting its demise if the Scottish nation was ignored.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation There is a perception that because political nationalism pushing for a single unitary state bypassed Scotland in the century after the American Revolution that the idea of nation was somehow weakened. There was no deployment of violence or aggression to demand concessions from the state, and compared to Ireland, Scotland showed solid commitment to the constitution of Great Britain. Its first nationalist grouping, the National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (1852–1856), was relatively powerless and comprised a disparate collection of interests. It came late, if the 1848 revolutions are deemed to be the correct time. Indeed, Scotland did not get a Young Scotland until 1900, well after the uprisings of its supposed counterparts Young Italy (1834, 1844) and Young Ireland (1848). The NAVSR was a product of its time, warning that centralization of government, to the detriment of the localities, would undermine the British constitution—that it would push Scotland toward independence. It lasted only four years before disbanding at the time of Britain’s continuing involvement in the Crimean War (1856), for fear of being disloyal. Thereafter there was an organizational gap in the politicization of the national cause. The Liberal Party, the predominant party in 19th-century Scottish towns, carried nationalist supporters within its ranks. Their four-time British prime minister, W. E. Gladstone (1809–1898), was considering Home Rule for Ireland from as early as 1871. When seeking election in 1880, he offered tepid encouragement to the voters of Midlothian that he would match this for Scotland within a policy called “home rule all round.” It was a commitment he was not keen to keep, fearing it would undermine the case for Ireland and contribute to regional devolution in England. He proposed the first Home Rule bill for Ireland in 1886, although it was defeated. The exclusion of Scotland from the bill led to the formation of the Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA). For nationalists in both countries there was dissatisfaction with the lack of parliamentary time allotted to domestic affairs. Gladstone himself acknowledged that so much of what the “Imperial Parliament” had to attend to was taken up with foreign and colonial affairs. Only once, in 1890, did Gladstone support a bill for Scottish Home Rule in parliamentary debate, part of a federal structure for the whole of Britain. Initially the SHRA campaigned for prospective parliamentary N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Theodore Napier (1845–1924) Theodore Napier was one of the most colorful late Victorian nationalists. As well as penning many letters to the press on behalf of the Scottish Home Rule Association (1886–1900), Napier was a member of the Scottish Patriotic Association, onetime president of the Scottish National Association of Victoria, and campaigner for June 24—the day of the battle of Bannockburn in 1314—to be proclaimed Independence Day and a public holiday. On behalf of the SHRA, he was honorary secretary of the Scottish Petition to Victoria, highlighting the inappropriate use in official terminology of England, when Britain was meant. He claimed 104,647 signatures upon completion of the petition. Napier, who was born in Melbourne, took to wearing the dress of a Highland chieftain and to paying homage annually to Culloden and Fotheringhay Castle.

candidates of the Scottish Liberal Party to pledge in favor of “local national government” for Scotland. Limited in success and alienated by the insistence of Gladstone and the English members of the Liberal Party to reaffirm their efforts to secure Home Rule for Ireland, the SHRA split to go its own way. Between 1890 and 1914, the British Parliament was presented with 13 resolutions on Home Rule for Scotland. On 8 occasions, the bill past its first reading, and 11 times it was supported by the majority of Scottish (but not other) Members of Parliament (MPs), but not one of these proposals became law. Yet administrative changes were forthcoming. What became known as the Scottish Office was opened in 1885, which, along with the re-creation of the Scottish Grand Committee (1894)—a debating group comprising Scottish MPs in Parliament—gave Scotland a distinct administration within the state structure. Archibald Philip Primrose (1847–1929), fifth Earl of Rosebery, who would for a short time succeed Gladstone as prime minister in 1894 and was the first Scottish secretary in this new office, believed that this reform was enough to appease the nationalists. A supporter of constitutional change in the Dominions, Rosebery regarded gradual constitutional change as sufficient political reform at home. The SHRA did not agree and pushed for the creation of a Home Rule parliament in Scotland. But it lacked formal political power and had to rely on a letterwriting campaign in the newspapers and cultural celebrations to sustain its case. Only after a number of false starts and schisms at the start of the 20th century would political nationalism find a relatively stable platform in the Scottish National Party (1934). Selected Bibliography Broun, Dauvit, R. J. Finlay, and Michael Lynch, eds. 1998. Image and Identity: The Making and Re-making of Scotland through the Ages. Edinburgh: John Donald. Dickinson, H. T., and Michael Lynch, eds. 2000. The Challenge to Westminster: Sovereignty, Devolution and Independence. East Linton: Tuckwell Press.


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McCrone, David. 2001. Understanding Scotland. The Sociology of a Nation. 2nd ed. London and New York: Routledge. Mitchell, James. 1996. Strategies for Self-Government: The Campaign for a Scottish Parliament. Edinburgh: Polygon. Mitchell, James. 2003. Governing Scotland: The Invention of Administrative Devolution. London: Palgrave MacMillan. Morton, Graeme. 1999. Unionist-Nationalism: Governing Urban Scotland, 1830–1860. East Linton: Tuckwell Press. Morton, Graeme. 2004. William Wallace: Man and Myth. Stroud: Sutton Publishing. Pittock, Murray G. 2001. Scottish Nationality. London: Palgrave.


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Switzerland Daniel Speich Chronology 1761 Founding of the Helvetic Society as a circle of Enlightenment thinkers. 1798 The Helvetic revolution. The Helvetic Republic is installed as a French sister republic until 1802. 1803 Act of Mediation by Napoleon. The cantons of Aargau, Grisons, St. Gallen, Thurgau, Ticino, and Vaud join the confederation as full members. 1814/1815 End of French period. Cantons of Geneva and Valais join the confederation. Congress of Vienna dismisses Swiss claim on Konstanz. Phase of conservative restoration starts. 1830–1831 Phase of liberal regeneration starts. Eleven cantons introduce liberal constitutions. 1839 Regime change (Straussenhandel) in Zurich leads to anti-liberal change in many cantons. 1847 Liberal forces defeat Catholic-conservative alliance in a civil war (Sonderbund War). 1848 Founding of modern Swiss nation-state. 1857 King Wilhelm IV of Prussia renounces claim on Neuchâtel. 1860 Savoy joins France. The option of joining Switzerland is seriously debated. 1861 Beginning of the democratic movement. Change from representative democracy to direct democratic system in many cantons until 1869. 1874 Revision of the federal constitution, change to semi-direct democratic system. 1882 Opening of the railway tunnel through St. Gotthard. 1883 First national fair held in Zurich. 1891 First national festival commemorates the alleged founding of the Swiss Confederation in 1291.

Situating the Nation During the early days of August 1891, tens of thousands of Swiss citizens attended a festival in the town of Schwyz commemorating the 600th anniversary of the Swiss Confederation. The national event was accompanied by festivities throughout the country, while intense press coverage emphasized the extraordinary historical continuity of the Swiss polity. However, the first national festival of 1891 marked the accomplishment of a rather improbable process of nation-building. To follow Oliver Zimmers phrase, Switzerland was—and to a certain extent still is—a highly “contested nation.” Recent scholarship has accentuated a structural inability of the Swiss case to conform to classic nationalism. In fact, the Swiss nation could not grow out of the political self-discovery of an ethnic people nor could it essentially build upon N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the denigration of other nations. Furthermore, it is not easy to discern any elites using the apparatus of nationalism to consolidate their domestic power, even though marginalized groups can be found. From the late 18th century onward, the formation of a Swiss national sentiment as well as the political process of national unification was exposed to politically, economically, and culturally separating forces. First and foremost, political power had evolved around regional entities, whereas the overarching ties remained weak. In 1836, the political observer Alexis de Tocqueville to his surprise remarked that there was no Switzerland—just cantons. As to the question as to whether a political unity was desirable, he concluded that the Swiss would do just as well without a proper nation-state. In the 1830s the then roughly 2 million inhabitants of the Swiss Confederation were organized into 25 sovereign states of very different size and structure. While 400,000 people lived in the canton of Berne, the state of Appenzell Inner Rhodes counted just less than 10,000. Grisons covered some 7,000 square kilometers of thinly populated alpine landscape, whereas the canton of Basle City was limited to an urban area of 37 square kilometers. Seventeen cantons were Germanspeaking, three, French, one, Italian, and the four remaining were multilingual. Similarly, religious denominations were heterogeneous. In the big midland cantons Protestants dominated, while the alpine area was predominantly Catholic. However, as in the case of Glarus, Catholic congregations could exist in Protestant regions and vice versa. Economic differences also abounded. Some of the alpine communities had gained considerable wealth in cattle trading with Lombardy or by supplying mercenary troops to the big European powers. However, the decline in these trades put their economic outlook in sharp contrast to the booming industrialization of textile production (Glarus, St. Gallen, Appenzell, Zurich, and Basle) and precision mechanics (Geneva, Neuchâtel, parts of Vaud and Berne). Within a still basically agrarian society, commercial enterprises existed whose trade connections reached as far as India, Russia, or the United States. Differences of this sort can be found in many nation-states. What is special about the Swiss case, however, is the fact that differing economic and cultural structures shaped the political culture and the constitutional procedures in the 25 sovereign states. The only way to mold this many-voiced choir into a single dominant interpretation of the Swiss nation was to imagine the community precisely as an alliance of diverse minorities, held together by its territory and its history. Thus, the exceptionality of the Swiss case itself could be used as a marker of national distinction. Such a construction successfully nurtured the first national festival of 1891.

Instituting the Nation Switzerland presents an excellent example for what can be found in most nations: the longing for an impressive pedigree. While the Swiss nation-state was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Halberdiers march through Villars-sur-Ollon on Switzerland’s National Day to commemorate the founding of the Swiss Confederation. (Corel)

founded only in 1848, national historiography went back in time as far as six centuries and linked the modern polity to the medieval defensive alliance of the Swiss Confederation. To unravel this idea of a continuing saga, it is essential to recount the institutional history of the nation-state as a counternarrative to national discourse. In a series of mostly bilateral treaties, the communities in the valleys of Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden (1291), the imperial cities of Zurich (1351) and Berne (1353), the cities of Lucerne (1332) and Zug (1352), and the valley of Glarus (1352) formed an alliance to enhance domestic security and to aid each other against the Habsburg overlord. In contrast to other such confederacies of the 14th century, the Swiss Confederation proved to be surprisingly long-lasting. By the end of the 15th century, the league was enlarged by treaties with Fribourg and Solothurn (1481), Basle and Schaff hausen (1501), and Appenzell (1513) and was supplemented by further alliances of lesser status with such diverse partners as the little village of Gersau, the Prince-Bishop of St. Gallen, the city of Rottweil, or the republic of Geneva, to name just a few. Along with the acquisition of mandated territories, this process ended up in a highly elaborate system of relationships, which existed until 1798. In the course of the centuries, elements of state-building can be observed with all members of the alliance, but the confederation as such rather showed an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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opposite development. Its only body was a regular conference of cantonal delegates called the “diet” (“Tagsatzung”). The meeting was held up to 20 times a year in the early 16th century, but the rhythm slowed down to roughly one meeting a year in the late 18th century. Because of its extremely weak institutional form, the confederation did not qualify as an agent of political unification. Moreover, it symbolized the inequality of the medieval social order. By the end of the 18th century, wealthy inhabitants from the mandated territories and the subordinate countryside of the city states increasingly questioned the system. Uprisings in the Vaud, but also in places such as the Zurich hinterland, paved the way for revolution. When French revolutionary troops invaded the canton of Berne in 1798, these local movements quickly gained strength. Due to the French need for a reliable ally, the Helvetic Republic was instituted. This first central state on Swiss territory was a representative democracy. Under the symbol of William Tell and a tricolor in red, gold, and green, its executive directory instantly began to modernize the country. However, strong resistance from the alpine valley communities and the old urban aristocracies prevailed. Lack of finance and programmatic differences between liberal reformers and radical democrats ended the project. In 1803 Napoleon prevented the escalation of the domestic conflict by once again turning the cantons into sovereign states and reinstalling their joint conference (Tagsatzung). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Democracy National ideology considers democracy to be a Swiss invention. Indeed, direct democratic procedures had existed in the autonomous administration of the small alpine valley communities of the 13th and 14th centuries (Landsgemeinde, first documented for Uri in 1231). And in the larger city states like Zurich and Berne, representative democracies had evolved. But more often than not, the rural popular assemblies excluded a considerable number of people who did not hold the respective privileges. The indirect systems of the cities left the inhabitants of the hinterland without representation and showed strong tendencies toward aristocratic closure by the 18th century. The ideal interpretation of the Swiss democratic tradition generously ignored these facts and depicted the history of the confederation in the terms of political freedom based upon natural law. But the traditional Swiss procedures fundamentally differed from modern political thought by not considering freedom to be a fundamental right of every human being. The introduction of mainly French and American democratic theory into the Swiss context was one of the important sources of domestic conflict throughout the 19th century. However, the result of this difficult process was a political system that offered a degree of influence to the citizen unparalleled in the world. Cornerstones of Swiss direct democracy were the referendum (introduced in 1874) and the popular initiative (1891). While the first mechanism obliged the legislator to submit certain decisions to public vote, the second was more radical. The popular initiative enabled any group of citizens reaching a fixed quorum to demand a referendum on any matter, irrespective of parliamentary deliberation. Despite this level of participation, democratic rights for a long time remained restricted. The Jewish minority gained access to the national polity in 1874. Women suffrage, however, was introduced on the national level only as recently as 1971.

With this “Acte de médiation,” a new confederation was instituted as an alliance of equal partners. The former mandated territories were turned into the five new cantons of Vaud, Aargau, Thurgau, St. Gallen, and Ticino. Allies of lesser status became either full members (like Grisons) or were dismissed (e.g., the city of Mulhouse). All cantons were obliged to draw written constitutions, freedom of trade remained widely guaranteed, and all citizens kept the new freedom of movement and settlement within the territory. The General Staff was formed to coordinate the cantonal troops. These elements were basically confirmed by the confederate treaty of 1815 (Bundesvertrag). Geneva, Neuchâtel, and the Valais joined the league, giving it its modern territorial shape. Nevertheless, the end of Napoleonic rule had led to considerable turmoil. The restored aristocracies of Berne, Solothurn, Fribourg, and Lucerne demanded the liquidation of the new cantons. But their conservative aim was blocked by heavy pressure from Austria. Once again a leading European power interfered. Thus, after the collapse of the Helvetic Republic had made clear that forced centralization was not an option, now also the forced restoration of the old confederation proved to be impossible. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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As after 1803, a de-centered process of nation-building gained momentum, which was well under way when de Tocqueville visited the country in 1836. Advocates of a strong central state could be found with the elites of the new cantons, who embraced radical democratic ideas. The same thinking was prevalent in the formerly subordinate countryside of the city states. But moderate liberals from the old aristocracy of economically booming cantons like Zurich adhered to a quick national unification. Contemporaneously with the French July Revolution, these forces achieved constitutional changes in 11 cantons by 1830/1831. Some of the new constitutions (e.g., Thurgau’s in 1831) defined extremely modern democratic republics with a broad franchise. Public schools were introduced, and the cantons of Zurich and Berne founded universities. A series of multilateral treaties slowly homogenized administrative procedures. The concordat of 13 cantons concerning weights and measures in 1835/1836 is a case in point. In 1832, the liberal movement culminated in the formation of a special league of seven “regenerated” cantons (Siebnerkonkordat), with the aim of turning the treaty of 1815 into a unified state. However, by this time, the conservative opposition to such unification plans had also gained clear contours. The elites of the small alpine cantons as well as conservative aristocracies (e.g., of the city of Basle) put forward a specifically Swiss notion of democracy, which differed from the universalism of the French Revolution. The advocates of this position also referred to a national spirit, but they refused any attempt at building strong central state authorities. Their cause culminated in the formation of another special league of seven “conservative” cantons (Sarnerbund). A stalemate resulted among the sovereign cantons when it came to the question of building a nation. It could only be overcome by military means in a civil war in 1847, in which the liberal cantons enforced their project of a modern Swiss nation upon the conservative cantons. These political events were paralleled by a lively popular debate. Since the 1820s, some of the cantons (e.g., Appenzell) had conceded a level of freedom of the press that was exceptional in Europe at the time. It fostered the emergence of a domestic public sphere, in which the different stances toward national unification gained clear shape. Most importantly, the national project was divided into religious camps. Liberal thought and the will for quick unification of the cantons were increasingly identified with the Protestant denomination, while mistrust toward possessive individualism and the insistence upon local diversity more and more became Catholic positions. At the same time, two conflicting strands of liberalism developed. Put simply, one emphasized economic freedom, while the other stressed equality and called for direct democratic procedures. Thus, the constitution of 1848 initially lacked support in Catholic and alpine areas. Moreover, the emerging state marginalized radical democratic positions until major reforms were carried out in 1874. The consolidation of the unified nation took several decades and was accomplished only by 1891, when for the first time a Catholic conservative was elected a member of the national government and new instruments of democratic rule were established. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation The first attempts at defining a Swiss nation can be traced back to the center of Swiss enlightenment, namely to the Helvetic Society, which was founded in the early 1760s. Within this distinguished circle, members of the local elites from several cantons tried to strengthen the emotional ties among the different parts of the confederation. They did so by redefining the history of the medieval alliance in terms of political emancipation and freedom. Most renowned is Friedrich Schiller’s drama William Tell of 1804. Authors like Jean-Jacques Rousseau idealized Swiss republicanism and merged it with their new aesthetic interest for the alpine landscape. The territory of the confederation and its physical appearance were thus imbued with national significance. Within this frame of time and space, the enlightened patriots set out to document the diversity of Swiss folk culture. Johann Kaspar Lavater’s set of Swiss national songs (Schweizerlieder) of 1767 is a case in point. As a private association, however, the Helvetic Society was anxious not to postulate a need for political action, although several of its members held executive power in their cantons. The club fostered nationalism as an individual sentiment and did not shape itself as a political party. Therefore, its utopian discourse could be used as a reference point by all later national movements. In the course of the following decades, a whole range of elements were created to define Swiss national identity. Six main aspects can be discerned, which were instrumental in binding together the religious, ethnic, and economic separating forces. These were (1) the freedom from foreign dominance, leading to the notion of democracy and self-determination; (2) the high autonomy of communes and cantons,

Pastoral Ideal Swiss nationalism consists of a specific blend of historical and geographical imagination. In this, the idealization of simple rural life, as acclaimed in the pastoral ideal of the Baroque period, became a leitmotif. In the 18th century, intellectuals from all over Europe projected their vision of a pristine society upon the remote alpine valleys. Many visitors stopped at one of the villages on their tours to the classic Italian sites, enjoying the sublime landscape and marvelling at the customs of its inhabitants. Modern tourism heavily built upon these stereotypes. As was the case in Scotland or in Tyrol, the Swiss themselves took up the image of the free herdsman and made it a centerpiece of a national identity. With industrialization, the percentage of farmers within the Swiss workforce quickly dropped to a level that was comparable to England. At the same time, the farmer became the prototype of the democratic Swiss citizen. He should be upright in character, distrust fashionable modernity, and cherish a deep love for the land. Displays of rural villages were highlights at the national fairs of 1896, 1914, and 1938. In the 20th century, the ideology of the pastoral ideal ultimately led to substantial government subsidies for agriculture.


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leading to the notion of federalism; (3) the smallness and political marginality of the country, leading to the notion of neutrality; (4) the pastoral ideal of French Enlightenment, leading to a positive notion of agrarian society; (5) the hostility of the natural environment and its lack of resources, leading to notions of ingenuity and industriousness; and (6) the military tradition of mercenaries, making the confederation’s army a key agent of unity. These somewhat contradictory elements were combined in nationalistic interpretations of the confederation’s history and its territory. With regard to time, Swiss national unity was presented as an historic act of will. Concerning space, the naturally separating mountain range of the Alps was turned into a national landscape and perceived as a source of unity. This succeeded, for example, by defining Switzerland as Europe’s water tank.

Narrating the Nation Freedom from foreign rule has always been the most important strand of the national narratives. Indeed, the medieval defensive alliance had granted its members a certain degree of political autonomy. The intervention of the confederation in the Burgundian wars during the late 15th century provoked bitter reactions with Habsburg aristocrats. They were quick to term the new force in a derogatory way as “Swiss cows” (Kuhschweizer) or to compare them to “wild Turks.” Within the confederation’s elite, an analogous process of collective identification was under way, however, in positive terms of peasant liberation. The Chronicon Helveticum by Aegidius Tschudi, which was composed around 1535, offered an emancipative account of the confederation’s early history, including the legendary figure of William Tell, the destruction of Habsburg castles (Burgenbruch), and an alleged oath on the “Rütli” meadow on the shores of Lake Lucerne by representatives from Uri, Schwyz, and Unterwalden in 1307. The Chronicon saw a great revival in popularity in the 18th century. And from the 1870s onward, scientific historiography took up the theme. Liberal historians like Carl Hilty composed an account that made the constitution of 1848 appear as the culmination of all earlier treaties and alliances among the confederate states. It strengthened an already existing narrative that drew upon an alleged tradition of democratic self-rule. It not only dismissed the deep internal conflicts that had dominated the early decades of the 19th century but it also mystified the direct democratic procedures that had existed in the autonomous administration of the small alpine valley communities since the 13th and 14th centuries (Landsgemeinde, first documented for Uri in 1231). In fact, national historiography tried to merge two distinct concepts of freedom. One concept started from the positive freedom based upon natural law. It included the emancipation from traditional customs and aimed at introducing certain rights N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Swiss Army Switzerland does not have an army—it is an army. This popular dictum brings forward a strong identification of the nation-state with its military organization. It has some truth to it, despite the fact that the Swiss army has never been involved in major war activities. First, the old confederation knew a strong mercenary tradition. The Papal Swiss Guard, which goes back to the year 1506, is a case in point. Many articulations of nationalism in the 19th century, including the popular festivities of the Shooting Associations, drew upon this legacy and put the armed soldier at the core of national identity. When the Swiss National Museum in Zurich was opened in 1898, its centerpiece was a carefully displayed collection of arms. Second, the General Staff was of considerable importance in representing the national idea. It was founded in 1803 to coordinate the cantonal troops. In 1815 it introduced the white cross on red ground as a coat of arms, which later became the national flag. Until the foundation of the modern national state in 1848, the General Staff was practically the only federal administrative body, and its budget was an equivalent to a federal treasury. It tried to homogenize military standards in the cantons; however, this proved to be difficult until the constitution of 1874 considerably augmented its power. Third, the new military organization of 1874 successfully implemented the principle of general conscription. For young adult, male Swiss, the moment of military conscription soon became identical with an initiation ceremony into citizenship. Military training itself was repeatedly regarded as a “school of the nation.”

and institutional rules—such as freedom of speech, popular sovereignty, or the separation of powers. The other notion of freedom was defined in negative terms as freedom from external interference. The two concepts had been roughly associated with the main conflicting parties in the Sonderbund War. Their integration was, therefore, an act of national reconciliation. It is no wonder that this account strongly emphasized the role of national mediators like Niklaus von Flüe, who had successfully arbitrated an internal conflict in 1481 (Stanser Verkommnis). A comparable role was attributed to General Guillaume-Henri Dufour, who had led the liberal troops to victory in the Sonderbund War without humiliating the conservative party. In the course of the 19th century, a second narration arose that integrated national differences. It set out from the harsh conditions of alpine life and thus paid tribute to the mountain valley communities who were otherwise marginalized by the liberal project of nation-building. It did so, however, by emphasizing the moral duty of betterment, as put forward in enlightened philosophy, and it drew upon the notions of republican modesty, Protestant ethics, and technological excellence. Switzerland was depicted as a marginal country lacking natural resources, which could only be led to economic wealth by hard labor. In this narration, freedom basically meant freedom from natural constraints. Typically, in 1914, one author idealized the work of dynamite at the alpine road and railway construction sites as the gunshots of the modern Swiss liberation war. The heroes N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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in this account were engineers like Hans Konrad Escher, who completed a major irrigation scheme in 1816, or Louis Favre, who was responsible for the construction of the Gotthard railway tunnel in the 1870s.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Between 1803 and 1848, with the political perspectives blocked and a public sphere emerging, the main driving forces for instituting the nation were private associations. Many local associations joined forces in national federations, such as the Swiss Association for the Arts (Kunstverein, 1806). Some organizations, like the Confederate Shooting Association (Eidgenössischer Schützenverein, 1824) or the Confederate Gymnastic Society (Eidgenössischer Turnverein, 1832), were explicitly designed as instruments to strengthen the liberal unification project. Their annual festivities became bastions of republican nationalism. Other associations focused on the national heritage to overcome internal differences. They organized shows of traditional dresses, song contests, or sports events in rock throwing or wrestling. Most renowned is the “Unspunnen” festival, held for the first time in 1805 as an attempt at bridging the conflict between the formerly dominating cities and their hinterlands. The first national association of labor also took up the national symbolism. It was founded in 1838 in Geneva under the name Grütliverein, which referred to the alleged oath of 1307. In the absence of a central government, some of these national organizations even took over state functions. The Swiss Association for Public Good (Schweizerische Gemeinnützige Gesellschaft, 1815), for example, was a key actor in the modernization and homogenization of poor laws and welfare politics. And the Swiss Association for Natural History (Schweizerische Naturforschende Gesellschaft, 1815) took up the initiative in making a modern map of the territory. This project was then carried out by the General Staff and completed in the 1860s after three decades of work. Even after the foundation of the modern national state in 1848, central authorities remained extremely weak. Until a direct tax was introduced during World War I, federal income was restricted to a small number of tariffs and to import levies. Important domains such as monetary policy or the judiciary at first mainly remained cantonal concerns. Criminal law for example was homogenized only in 1898, while a national code of civil law followed in 1912. Public schooling still today is a matter of the cantons. The seats of the new federal institutions such as the Parliament (1848, Berne), the Polytechnic School (1854, Zurich), the Supreme Court (1874, Lausanne), or the Swiss National Bank (1905, Zurich) were carefully distributed among the most powerful cantons. Apart from the military organization, the federal state lacked political instruments to mobilize the nation. Major events, such as the first national fair of 1883, were organized by private initiative. However, the federal government did offer N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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financial support and used these exhibitions, which were held again in 1896, 1914, and 1938, to display its growing presence. The first official attempt at coordinated national propaganda by the federal authority took place in the second part of the 1930s. This program was called “spiritual national defence” and can be considered the climax of Swiss national discourse. To conclude, the Swiss development cannot be explained fully by internal forces. Instead, international trends have to be taken into account, most of all the rise of the modern nation-state as the dominant form of political organization. Especially after the German and the Italian unifications, the conservative project of carefully modernizing the Swiss Confederation completely lost its plausibility. As after 1848, national state structures slowly emerged out of an increasing interconnectedness of the sovereign cantons and converged with private national sentiment. Selected Bibliography Gugerli, David. 1998. “Politics on the Topographer’s Table: The Helvetic Triangulation of Cartography, Politics, and Representation.” In Inscribing Science: Scientific Texts and the Materiality of Communication, edited by Timothy Lenoir, 91–118. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Historical Dictionary of Switzerland. 1998–2007. www.hls-dhs-dss.ch (online version in German, French, and Italian). Im Hof, Ulrich. 1988. “Switzerland.” In Nationalism in the Age of the French Revoution, edited by Otto Dann and John Dinwiddy, 183–198. London, Ronceverte: Hambledon Press. Maissen, Thomas. 2000. “The 1848 Conflicts and Their Significance in Swiss Historiography.” In The Making of Modern Switzerland, 1848–1998, edited by M. Butler, Malcolm Pender, and Joy Charnley, 3–34. Basingstoke: Macmillan. Müller, Thomas Christian. 2001. “Switzerland 1847/49: A Provisional, Successful End of a ‘Democratic Revolution?’” In Europe in 1848: Revolution and Reform, edited by Dieter Dowe, Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, and Dieter Langewiesche, 210–241. New York, Oxford: Berg. Sablonier, Roger. 1998. “The Swiss Confederation.” In The New Cambridge Medieval History, edited by Christopher Allmand, 645–670. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Speich, Daniel. 2002. “Draining the Marshlands, Disciplining the Masses. The Linth Valley Hydro Engineering Scheme (1807–1823) and the Genesis of Swiss National Unity.” Environment and History 8, no. 4: 429–448. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1836. “Voyage En Suisse 1836.” In Alexis De Tocqueville Oeuvres Complètes. Tome V: Voyages En Angleterre, Irlande, Suisse Et Algérie, edited by J.-P. Mayer and André Jardin, 173–188. Paris: Gallimard, 1958. Zimmer, Oliver. 2003. A Contested Nation: History, Memory and Nationalism in Switzerland, 1761–1891. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Zimmer, Oliver. 2005. “Nation, Nationalism and Power in Switzerland, c. 1760–1900.” In Power and the Nation in European History, edited by Len Scales and Oliver Zimmer, 333–353. New York: Cambridge University Press.


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Egypt Mona Russell Chronology 1516–1517 Egypt becomes an Ottoman province. 1798 French invasion. 1801 Anglo-Ottoman forces arrive in Egypt. 1805–1848 Reign of Muhammad Ali. 1863–1879 Reign of Ismail. 1875 Egypt is bankrupt; Ismail sells Egyptian shares of the Suez Canal Company to the British. 1877 Abolition of the slave trade in the Ottoman Empire; British and French create Dual Financial Control over Egypt’s budget. 1879 Ismail ends Dual Financial Control and is deposed by the Ottoman sultan at the behest of European creditors. 1879–1882 Urabi Revolt. 1882–1914 British occupation and informal protectorate. 1906 Taba incident; Dinshaway incident. 1907 Lord Cromer retires as high commissioner; death of Mustafa Kamil. 1914 Outbreak of World War I; Abbas II deposed; Egypt becomes a formal protectorate of the British. 1919 A period of strikes and demonstrations commonly referred to as the 1919 Revolution. 1922 Egypt achieves partial independence from the British. 1922–1952 Egypt’s “liberal” era, ruled by a constitutional monarchy. 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty removes British points of control, allows a British presence in the canal zone, and liberalizes entrance requirements to the staff college allowing lower middle-class Egyptians to enter the officer corps. 1952 Egyptian Revolution.

Situating the Nation The existence of the Nile River and the surrounding desert planted the first seeds of Egyptian nationalism. The need to tame the waters of the Nile and to irrigate virtually all agricultural lands meant that Egyptians were bound to the land on either side of the Nile and in the delta, and they were accustomed to bowing down to the authority of a centralized state. Although some southern capitals existed, for much of Egypt’s recorded history the seat of government and significant locations for worship have been at or near the base of the delta. The power that northern-based governments imposed upon upper Egypt is still evident today in the term that native Egyptians use for the capital city. Rather than referring to it N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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as al-Qahira (Cairo), most Egyptians simply say Masr*, the same word they use for Egypt itself. Whether it was for a state emanating from Egyptian lands or as a province of another empire, Egypt’s peasants produced a lucrative agricultural surplus. Historically, wheat, sugar, and textiles were important sources of revenue, as was Egypt’s role as middleman for coffee and spices. By the 18th century, new trading patterns and European production based upon plantation slavery and factories undercut Egypt’s role in coffee, spices, sugar, and textiles. Wheat remained an important source of revenue, and France an important trading partner. While Egypt’s desert did not forestall foreign invaders, it did create a unity among the peoples settled around the Nile. The Arabs who arrived in the seventh century distinguished themselves from previous conquerors by mixing with the local population. Nevertheless, a minority of Egyptian Christians, Copts, maintained their separation from the Arab-Muslim population. By the mid-13th century, Egypt was controlled by yet another group of foreigners known as mamluks. * In this essay, symbols for long vowels have been eliminated and replaced with boldface type for emphatic letters. Since the Arabic language does not capitalize, Arabic words have not been capitalized, with the exception of names and places.


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They remained distinct from the rest of the population by their language, which was Turkish, and their self-imposed privilege of riding horseback. Mamluks were a self-perpetuating dynasty of slaves procured from places such as Georgia and Circassia. They were purchased as boys, trained for the army or the bureaucracy, and manumitted (freed from slavery) before receiving a post. Mamluks formed chains of households that were linked to one another based upon their house of origin. Although the Ottoman Turks toppled the mamluks in the early 16th century, within another 200 years they had become rewoven into the fabric of the ruling elite, serving as tax collectors and/or in military regiments. Although Egypt had a strong territorial basis for a common identity for virtually thousands of years, as was the case worldwide, Egyptian national identity is a modern phenomenon. The factors that fostered the growth of Egyptian nationalism were changes in political structure, bureaucratic reform, economic reorganization, opposition to foreign economic and political interests, changes in the function and composition of elite households, and the rise of a middle class with vested interests in the state. The growth of a middle class was not a slow-building evolutionary process but one in which a middle strata waxed and waned with the economic and political fortunes of the country. The rise of a new leader, changes in the form of government, and the abolition of slavery radically changed the nature and function of elite households, which had previously served as mini seats of government. Years of mamluk infighting, the French invasion, and the Anglo-Ottoman response caused damage to Egypt’s already troubled economy. Egypt’s local notables, long-distance traders, and the upper echelons of the religious establishment (culama’ ) desperately sought for leadership that would restore Egypt’s trade, rather than the multifaceted struggle for power among factions of mamluks, the central Ottoman administration, the British, and the French. Muhammad Ali, a member of an auxiliary force of the Ottoman navy, convinced them that he could do so. In 1805 the culama’ petitioned the Ottoman sultan to request him as the new viceroy of Egypt. Selim III (reign 1789–1806), in the midst of his own crises, ratified the candidate of the culama’. Most likely, Selim never thought that Muhammad Ali would rule until 1848 or that his family would continue to rule for more than 100 years—30 years after the demise of the Ottoman Empire. Muhammad Ali’s first six years of rule were spent consolidating his power. The viceroy did not consider himself an Egyptian, and while he desired greater autonomy for and hereditary control of Egypt, he recognized his position as a vassal of the Ottoman state. After 1811, Muhammad Ali set out on an aggressive program of economic and military expansion, buttressed by a growing central government of technology-savvy officials. This agenda required creating a modern educational system and a new army. His eldest son, Ibrahim, suggested using native Egyptians. Since the time of the expansion in the seventh century, Islamic empires had provided the military, which producers supported through taxation. Now Egyptians would be responsible for their own defense, albeit under the comN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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mand of a Turkish-speaking officer corps. The Ottoman sultan relied upon Egyptian troops for a number of campaigns, including those in the Hijaz and Greece. Muhammad Ali’s troops also undertook campaigns without permission, such as occupying a significant portion of greater Syria. The occupation of the Hijaz and coastal Syria would provide markets for Egypt’s goods. With respect to the economy, Muhammad Ali turned Egypt into a one-man monopoly whereby he was the single buyer and seller of all goods. He dismantled the tax-farming system in Egypt and created private property, distributing land to his family and to rural Egyptian notables, who cemented their loyalty by sending their sons to his new schools, the recruiting ground for the expanding bureaucracy. Much of the land that used to grow wheat was now turned over to growing long-staple cotton, which he put to use in Egypt’s first textile factories. The British saw an aggressive competitor in Muhammad Ali, and they encouraged the Ottoman sultan to ratify the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Convention in 1838, which dismantled Egypt’s monopolies. Within two years, the British forced Egypt out of the Hijaz and coastal Syria; however, Muhammad Ali was given hereditary control of Egypt following the Ottoman pattern of succession of primogeniture (eldest male). During the last years of his reign, many of his greatest accomplishments faded, and Egypt turned into a supplier of raw cotton for Britain. Nevertheless, some schools remained open, a generation of Egyptian students had graduated from his schools, and a rural landowning elite had been created.

Instituting the Nation Muhammad Ali set in motion a series of institutions that would gradually create an Egyptian national identity. His immediate successors did little to maintain those institutions. It was Ismail, a ruler remembered for his desire to turn Egypt into a European nation, who ended up cementing the processes that forged a national identity. Ismail began utilizing Arabic as a language for government, and he revitalized the educational system by restoring closed schools and opening new ones, including a primary school for girls. He built upon Egypt’s economic infrastructure by expanding railroad and telegraph lines, as well as by improving ports and roads. The Suez Canal opened during the reign of Ismail. His reforms were aimed at modernizing Cairo and key cities in the delta, as well as linking sites of production and consumption. Thus, the national identity that was emerging among his bureaucrats and in the educational system did not necessarily extend to the entire country. Another key event occurred during the reign of Ismail: the abolition of the slave trade in 1877. Over the course of the 19th century, sources for male slaves slowly diminished as the Russian empire expanded. Furthermore, with the rise to power of Muhammad Ali and the creation of a national army, the need for mamluks declined. Still prominent in government by midcentury, manumitted N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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mamluks eventually retired, died, or migrated. Their positions in the growing government bureaucracy were gradually filled by graduates from Egypt’s modernized schools. European advisors and government bureaucrats, who had visited or studied in Europe, created a curriculum that forged a national identity. The new school system helped bridge the gap between the old Turkish-speaking elite and the newer Arabophone Egyptian elite. The trade in female slaves continued, however. This practice allowed the male elites to retain their ethnic identity and language, which kept them distinct from ordinary Egyptians. Moreover, the new rural Egyptian elite could demonstrate its entrance into the ruling class by purchasing such women or even receiving them as gifts from the viceroy. While abolition of the slave trade did not entirely stop this practice, it certainly was curtailed. Meanwhile, the curriculum in the government schools encouraged an Egyptian national identity, and the old Turkishspeaking elite began to intermarry with the newer Arabophone Egyptian elite. Curriculum in government schools reflected these changes. During the reign of Ismail, new cultural institutions formed to create a more unified elite. Ismail sponsored a vibrant press culture that debated changes in Egyptian society. He opened museums, libraries, a national opera house, and a geographic society to promote Egyptian culture in Egypt and in colonized portions of East Africa. Although Ismail’s vision of Egyptian culture was extremely Western oriented, ultimately these institutions did promote an Egyptian identity that adopted Western technology but retained core values with respect to religion and morals. Ismail changed his title from viceroy to khedive, a Persian word meaning ruler or prince. Ismail’s support of a state-sponsored postal system helped disseminate emerging Egyptian national culture beyond the delta. Nevertheless, not all Egyptians received the benefits of these institutions.

Defining the Nation Ismail’s improvements came at a large cost to Egypt. He built extravagantly, lived lavishly, and borrowed heavily from European creditors, who engineered his deposition and replacement with his son Tawfiq (reign 1879–1892). Ismail’s program of reform, the increasing power of European creditors at the end of his reign, and Tawfiq’s European-protected reign brought to the fore a national movement sponsored by a party calling itself the Nationalist Party. This movement combined large landowners who wanted a greater say in government affairs, urban bureaucrats and professionals who wanted government accountability, and Egyptians in the army who wanted parity with the Turkish-speaking officer corps. It was the latter issue that created the impetus for the movement, whose rallying cry was “Egypt for the Egyptians!” (Scholch 1981). The outcome of the Urabi Revolt, named after the Egyptian officer who led the movement, was the British occupation in 1882. Although couched in the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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rhetoric of a temporary stay to restore order, the occupation’s aim was to restore Egypt’s financial solvency. The last British troops did not leave Egypt until 1956. The arrival of the British and their extended occupation helped advance the cause of nationalism beyond the upper classes. An incident in 1906 increased Egyptian anger over the occupation and augmented nationalist sentiment. A group of Britons had gone pigeon hunting in the Nile delta village of Dinshaway. After an altercation, one British officer died, and the Egyptians were blamed. The British set up a special tribunal and charged over 50 villagers with the death of the British officer. The penalties were particularly harsh, ranging from hangings and floggings to hard labor. Egyptians of all classes were outraged over the severity of the sentences. The ensuing hostility against British occupation even led to the resignation of Lord Cromer, who had been Egypt’s high commissioner since 1882. The early years of the British occupation brought forth a period of censorship to the lively press that existed during the reign of Ismail. The press was not fully restored until after the untimely death of Tawfiq and the ascension of his teenaged son Abbas II (reign 1892–1914). In his own memoirs, Abbas II identifies himself as an Egyptian ruler and his reign as a watershed moment in Egyptian nationalism. Under Abbas II, new newspapers and journals were founded, including ones targeting women and children. The vision presented by the political press was not unified. Many journalists in Egypt were Syrian Christians. They tended to speak in terms of an “Eastern” identity, which united Muslims, Christians, and Jews, as well as relocated Syrians and native Egyptians. These views were even present in advertising, encouraging Egyptians to patronize “Eastern” establishments rather than “foreign-owned” ones. Other secular Egyptians looked back toward Egypt’s ancient glory rather than its more recent Islamic past. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, an Islamic activist who traveled throughout the Middle East promoting pan-Islamism, arrived in Egypt in 1871. Afghani had numerous disciples who ranged from secular nationalists to Islamic reformers. The idea behind the latter was to update Islam in keeping with changes in the modern world. Afghani encouraged his followers to publish and disseminate their ideas. Although literacy rates in Egypt remained low, newspapers were often read aloud. Writers like Abdullah Nadim wrote in a mix of classical Arabic and Egyptian dialect to facilitate comprehension among barely literate readers and illiterate listeners. As was the case in many parts of the world, law students and lawyers espoused a nationalism rooted in expelling foreign powers, a notion supported by Egyptians (including Syrian immigrants) of all classes. The most famous of these individuals was Mustafa Kamil, the founder of the (re-created) Nationalist Party. Kamil’s death at the age of 33 in 1907 led to the splintering of his party into various nationalist groupings, some of which favored working with Abbas II, some that preferred to maintain ties with the Ottoman state, some that favored pan-Islamism, and some that even desired working either with the British or the French. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Such ambivalence is also revealed in attitudes about the geographic extent of the Egyptian nation. In 1906 the Ottoman government built a fort at Taba on the Sinai peninsula, which was west of the line that the British deemed the Egyptian border. The scant population of the Sinai was not particularly affected by the 19th-century changes that fostered national identity, and most Egyptian nationalists tended to support the Ottoman claim, since it would be Britain that would benefit from this border. However, there was a critical minority that pushed for the expanded frontier. Britain ultimately used the persuasive powers of its navy to impose what is known as the “international line” that gives Egypt most of the Sinai peninsula. A more coherent vision of nationalism was presented by mainstream newspapers, as well as the women’s press, which promoted the nuclear family as the building block of the nation. The abolition of slavery and intermarriage between the old and new elites supported this view of the family. Rather than power emanating from a single (or several) fortresslike homes, it was diffused among middle- and upper-class Egyptian homes with vested interests in the well-being of the state. Curriculum and textbooks in state-sponsored, missionary, private, and foreign community schools encouraged students to create homes and families that were worthy of self-rule. By the early 20th century, Egyptian nationalists advocated other changes in education, including improvement in schools and teachers (quantitatively and qualitatively), more instruction in and better teaching of Arabic, and a greater emphasis on national history, a subject that had been largely replaced by European history since the time of the occupation.

Narrating the Nation World War I changed the landscape of Egyptian nationalism. At the onset of the war, the British deposed the highly popular Khedive Abbas II and replaced him with his great uncle Husayn Kamil. The new title of “sultan” replaced that of khedive. Egypt’s status changed from unofficial to official protectorate, and more British soldiers and bureaucrats arrived in Egypt. Meanwhile, many Egyptians responded enthusiastically to the Ottoman sultan’s call for jihad against the British and the French. Furthermore, the war environment meant that Egyptians ran short of staple items that foreigners acquired more easily. The shortages cut across class lines, which again encouraged a nationalism calling for the expulsion of the British. Unlike most Egyptian historians who look back to 19th-century developments, many American historians mark this moment as the beginning of the nationalist movement. At the close of the war, a delegation (wafd) of Egyptian nationalists went to the residence of the British high commissioner to ask permission to attend the Versailles peace conference (January 1919). Saad Zaghlul, leader of the Wafd Party, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Saad and Safiyya Zaghlul Saad Zaghlul is best remembered as leader of the Wafd Party. He came from a wealthy peasant background and married into the Ottoman-Egyptian elite. His training in law in France and his presence at the salon of Princess Nazli afforded him the opportunity of meeting his future father-in-law, Mustafa Pasha Fahmy. In 1907 he became minister of education and worked toward reform of the educational system. During periods of exile and after his death, his wife, Safiyya, worked hard to preserve his efforts and memory as well as to maintain her own position of power. Saad never lost his ability to speak the language of the peasants, something that neither his opponents nor his successors could do. Saad and Safiyya had no children of their own; instead they promoted themselves as the parents of the Egyptian nation, with their home taking the appellation “home of the nation.” After Saad’s death, the government purchased his home and some nearby land to create a national museum and a memorial.

had been encouraged by Wilson’s 14 points. The British rejected Egypt’s request, and by March 1919, wide-scale rioting in Egypt occurred among all classes. Elite men and women supporting the Wafd Party wanted their protests to appear civilized, yet at the same time they portrayed themselves as speaking for all classes. Workers, peasants, and other ordinary Egyptians undertook spontaneous action in the streets and in the countryside. Demonstrations, the arrest and deportation of leaders, and celebrations marking the return of such leaders characterized the period between 1919 and 1922, when Egypt gained its partial independence. The British retained control of defense, communications, minority affairs, and the Sudan. In theory, Egypt would be a constitutional monarchy with Fuad, a brother of Husayn Kamil, as king. Egypt would now become a battleground between the British, the monarchy, and political parties. Both the Urabi Revolt and the 1919 Revolution have been highly romanticized and misrepresented. Urabi was made to be a villain or at best a well-meaning but

Sudan Sudan was occupied by the Egyptian ruler Muhammad Ali with the hope of providing men for his army and gold. Neither of these aims reached fruition; however, Egypt’s rule continued until the revolt of the Mahdi in 1881. A combined Anglo-Egyptian force finally defeated the mahdists and began a joint occupation of the country in 1898. Time and again, negotiations between the British and the Egyptians over the Sudan ended in an agreement to postpone an agreement. Much in the same way that Britain viewed Egypt as an errant child that needed proper upbringing, Egypt viewed Sudan as its own “special needs” child, justified by the same type of racism that the British applied to its colonies. Sudan did not achieve its independence from both Egypt and Britain until after the Revolution of 1952.


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incapable revolutionary, who was gradually rehabilitated after the Revolution of 1952. While politicians of the liberal era took great pride in the events of 1919, such accomplishments fell short when compared to the aggressive changes that took place after 1952. In her recent study of nationalism in Egypt, Beth Baron sheds light upon a frequently asked question in feminist circles: Why did male nationalists fail to incorporate feminist proposals in the 1923 constitution? Women were active participants in the 1919 Revolution, and they even took over the functions of their fathers, husbands, and brothers during periods of imprisonment or exile. Baron argues that the photographic record, often mislabeled, has served to obscure the collective memory of Egyptians. The women’s protests in 1919 lacked a feminist agenda that later ones in 1922/1923 embodied. Participants and researchers have consolidated a number of the events together and reshaped the public’s memory. Even during times when the male figures of the 1919 era lacked public respect, the female participants remained highly revered. From the turn of the 20th century, images of Egypt in sculpture, artwork, and political cartoons represented Egypt as a woman. Early on Egypt appeared in various forms of pharaonic garb, but after 1919 the New Woman became the model for Egypt, which for men represented an object of adoration and national honor. Simultaneously, men were urged to take on roles that women undertook in their homes to restore domestic order to the country. These lessons could be taught to the children of upper classes by means of civics classes (and home economics for girls), while children of the lower classes learned them in hygiene and morals lessons. The lines between personal hygiene, morals, home economics, and civics were blurred. Literally and metaphorically, clean individuals kept proper homes, which served as building blocks for the nation. With the spread of pictorial magazines, more Egyptians could follow political and social events in Egypt and around the world. Biographies and histories of the national movement and its key figures appeared in the 1920s and 1930s. The advent of radio and movies meant that Egyptians could listen to historical programs or watch footage of significant events or their re-creation in film.

Egypt’s Awakening Mahmud Mukhtar created this sculpture in 1928 to honor the memory of the 1919 Revolution. Egypt appears as a peasant woman, lifting her veil with one arm and resting her other arm on the head of a rising sphinx, connecting Egypt’s rebirth with its glorious past. The creation of an independent Egypt with a solid national identity meant bridging the gap between foreigners on horseback and peasants on donkeys. Mukhtar’s use of the Egyptian peasant in the sculpture represented the metamorphosis in the meaning of the word peasant (fallah). Historically the term was a derogatory slur utilized by the foreign elite; but by the early 20th century, it was turning into a source of pride and authenticity.


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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Between 1882 and 1919, national identity spread among all Egyptians in response to the occupation. Nevertheless, there were class-based distinctions on what or who constituted the nation. The upper classes tended to have a more cosmopolitan outlook and a greater concern for uniting Egypt’s various religious communities. The opinions of the lower classes are not as well documented. Copts were present in the upper track of the educational system in larger numbers than their relative proportion in the population. Many elite Muslims were educated with or worked alongside Egyptian Christians. Egypt’s Jewish community was prominent in urban professions, such as banking, medicine, and commerce. While elite Muslims, Copts (and other Christians), and Jews had high levels of toleration, the same could not be said of the less fortunate among them. These differences would become apparent after the 1952 Revolution, whose leadership came almost exclusively from the lower-middle class. The flag chosen by elite nationalists was Nile green with a crescent and three stars, each representing one of Egypt’s religious communities. The only thing that truly united all Egyptians was their desire to get rid of the British. Even actions taken by nationalist women highlighted the segmentation of the population. Women’s groups organized boycotts of British goods and services in 1922 and 1931; however, only a small segment of the population purchased such goods or services. Egypt’s political parties represented the interests of a small minority. Two percent of Egypt’s population owned about half of its land. Large landowners had been highly critical of the British, particularly with respect to education, a topic that aroused interest across class lines. Once in power, elite nationalists continued to favor policies that improved production of cotton and facilitated its export, at the expense of social, educational, and welfare programs for the masses. The British recognized the power of the Wafd Party and courted its support in negotiating the 1936 treaty, which removed British points of control but allowed a presence in the canal zone. Thus, neither the monarchy (King Fuad and his son Faruq) nor the political parties addressed the fundamental struggles of the country, namely the inequitable distribution of land and the continued presence of British soldiers on Egyptian soil. In July 1952, a group of army officers overturned the nearly 150-year-old monarchy and brought down the parliamentary system. For the first time since the pharaonic period, Egypt would again be ruled by Egyptians. The Free Officers led by Gamal Abd al-Nasir (Nasser) instituted wide-ranging changes, including land redistribution, educational expansion, abolition of political parties, suspension of the 1923 constitution, and British withdrawal from the canal zone. These changes created great hope and stirred the aspirations of Egyptians. Nasser waged an aggressive foreign policy aimed at reducing Egypt’s dependence on foreign powers. He nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956, which prompted N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Muhammad Naguib (second from right), Gamal Abd al-Nasir (third from right), and Anwar Sadat (fourth from left) meet with other Egyptian Free Officers in Cairo in 1952. The Free Officers forced King Farouk to abdicate his throne on July 23, 1952. (AFP/Getty Images)

a war waged by the British, French, and Israelis. Despite the fact that Egypt was the “loser” in the Suez War, Nasser became immensely popular throughout the entire Arab world, indeed throughout much of the Third World, for standing up to the British and the French. In other words, Nasser carried the victory of Egyptian nationalism to the entire Third World. His success in creating a supranationalism was demonstrated in Egypt’s short-lived federation with Syria as the United Arab Republic (1958–1961). Nevertheless, Nasser’s regime ushered in a brutal, authoritarian dictatorship. Arab socialism simply replaced the old bourgeoisie with the state. Although the Jews of Egypt survived the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, the Suez Crisis and the nationalizations that followed forcefully demonstrated that Egypt’s Jewry would not be part of the national family. Other minority groups, for example, Greeks and Italians, felt similarly constrained. Despite the many shortcomings of his regime, Nasser had advanced the cause of Egyptian nationalism above and beyond his predecessors. Selected Bibliography Abbas Hilmi II. 1998. The Last Khedive of Egypt: Memoirs of Abbas Hilmi II. Translated and edited by Amira Sonbol, introduction by Afaf Marsot. Reading, UK: Ithaca. Baron, Beth. 2005. Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.


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Goldschmidt, Arthur. 1990. Modern Egypt: The Formation of a Nation-State. Cairo: American University in Cairo Press. Marsot, Afaf. 1985. A Short History of Modern Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mayer, Thomas. 1988. The Changing Past: The Egyptian Historiography of the Urabi Revolt, 1882–1983. Gainsville: University of Florida Press. Mitchell, Timothy. 1990. Colonising Egypt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pollard, Lisa. 2005. Nurturing the Nation: The Family Politics of Modernizing, Colonizing, and Liberating Egypt, 1805–1923. Berkeley: University of California Press. Reid, Donald. 2002. Whose Pharoahs? Archeology, Museums, and Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I. Berkeley: University of California Press. Russell, Mona. 2004. Creating the New Egyptian Woman: Consumerism, Education, and National Identity in Egypt, 1863–1922. New York: Palgrave. Scholch, Alexander. 1981. Egypt for the Egyptians: The Socio Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878–1882. London: Ithaca Press. Sonbol, Amira. 2000. The New Mamluks. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.


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Argentina Alberto Spektorowski Chronology 1810 (May 25) The cabildo (an especially influential autonomous municipal council and the lowest administrative unit in the Spanish government set up in the early 16th century in imitation of the Castilian ayuntamiento) of Buenos Aires deposes the viceroy and announces that it will govern on behalf of King Ferdinand VII (Fernando VII), who was captured by Bonaparte’s forces after invading Spain. The first Junta de Gobierno was created. 1811 José de San Martín declines his military career in Spain and embarks on the ship George Canning from England to Buenos Aires, where he arrives on March 9, 1812. 1812 The independent government of Buenos Aires accepts the services of San Martín and recognizes his rank of lieutenant colonel. He is commended to create a cavalry corps that soon becomes the glorious regiment known as the mounted grenadiers. San Martín also creates the Lautaro lodge, whose main goal is to liberate South America from the Spanish yoke. 1816 (March) The Tucuman Congress. Representatives of various provinces gather in Tucuman and on July 9 proclaim independence from Spanish rule with provisions for a national constitution, and declare the formation of the United Provinces of South America (later, the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata). 1819–1820 Friction between the Unitarios and Federales culminates in a civil war that ends in 1820. Peace is restored, but the central issue, the formation of a stable government, is not resolved. 1829 General Juan Manuel de Rosas is elected governor of the province of Buenos Aires. 1833 Great Britain occupies the Malvinas Islands (Falkland Islands). 1852 The dictatorial regime of Rosas is defeated by a revolutionary group led by General Urquiza, a former governor of the province of Entre Ríos. 1853 A federal constitution is adopted, and Urquiza becomes first president of the Argentine Republic. The province of Buenos Aires, refusing to adhere to the new constitution, proclaims independence in 1854. The mutual hostility of the two states flares into war in 1859. The Argentine Republic prevails in the conflict. Finally, in October 1859, Buenos Aires agrees to join the federation. 1861 The province of Buenos Aires again rebels against the central government. Headed by General Bartolomé Mitre, the rebels defeat the national army in September. The president of the republic resigns on November 5, and in May of the next year a national convention elects Mitre to the presidency. The city of Buenos Aires is designated the national capital. In this sense, it can be claimed that the province of Buenos Aires, the wealthiest and most populous in the union, achieves temporary control over the remainder of the nation. 1865 Paraguay invades Argentine territory, beginning the bloody War of the Triple Alliance, which ends in complete victory for Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay in 1870. During the next decade, the conquest of the pampas as far as the Río Negro is completed, and the threat of Native Americans from that direction is eliminated.


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1879–1880 The War of the Desert led by General Julio A. Roca opens up vast new areas for farming. After his victory, the city of Buenos Aires is separated from the province and established as a federal district and national capital. In 1880 Roca is elected president of the republic. 1880 In the half century following 1880, Argentina makes remarkable economic and social progress. During the first decade of the 20th century, the country emerges as one of the economically wealthiest nations of South America. 1881 A long-standing boundary dispute with Chile is settled. Through this agreement, Argentina acquires the title to the eastern half of Tierra del Fuego.

Situating the Nation Argentina, or the Argentine Republic, borders Bolivia and Paraguay in the north, Brazil and Uruguay in the east, and Chile in the west. Argentina occupies an area of 766,889 square kilometers (sq km) (1,068,302 square miles), making it the second largest South American country behind Brazil. Its length from north to south is about 3,330 km, and at its widest it spans about 1,384 km. Argentina, however, claims a total of 2,808,602 sq km (1,084,120 square miles), including the Falkland Islands, or Islas Malvinas, and some other southern Atlantic islands, as well as part of Antarctica. Argentina’s capital is Buenos Aires with a population of approximately 12 million in its metropolitan area. That includes the autonomous capital city and its urban extensions. The country declared itself formally independent from Spain in 1816. However, it was not a united country for decades after its independence. The Argentinean rural northwest, for example, resisted Buenos Aires’s attempt to control power, setting the background for a delicate interplay of political identities, trade interests, and interventions from world powers in the process of national independence. In 1806 and 1807, the Buenos Aires estancieros (landlords) and comerciantes (merchants) had to repel a number of British invasions without any military aid from Spain. The porteños (the people of the port city) developed a certain sense of self-reliance and autonomy from Spain. After the Napoleonic invasions of the Iberian Peninsula and as a result of the changing status of Buenos Aires vis-à-vis the Spanish Crown, the porteños took advantage of the crisis in Spain and strove to emancipate from Spain. In 1809 the comerciantes and estancieros forced the kingless viceroy in Buenos Aires to grant free trade to the inhabitants of the region. New economic interests would thus have an open door to trade freely with England. This move amounted to a dismantling of mercantilism and a de facto economic, if not political, independence. Soon thereafter, the struggle for political independence began. It is not strange, therefore, that at the early period of the independence process the estanciero-comerciante alliance favored independence, for they wanted to expand their economic base and their trade with Europe. However, what must N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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be stressed is that this alliance between the rural and the bourgeois parts of society did not prevent clashes of interests among different regions of the country. The rural interior, for example, was protectionist, with no interest in free trade, for the interior of the country did not sell much to Europe and didn’t buy anything from it. Land was used basically as a means to economic and political power. Nonetheless, both the interior and the metropolitan bourgeois classes aspired to emancipate from Spain. While the porteños were free traders who used the language of liberalism to rationalize their own self-interest, the rural caudillos (local magnates) of the interior supported independence because they wanted more political autonomy. However, the war of independence was not even over before conflict broke out between the interior and the littoral regions. The reasons for this conflict were that, with independence, the estancieros and comerciantes controlling the government opened all of Argentina to free trade (with the support of the English government and foreign capitalists). Salted meat exports increased rapidly from 1810 to 1820, and British manufactured goods entered the country. When imported foreign goods entered the interior of the country, however, the manufacturing businesses concentrated there were devastated. Indeed, the handicrafts of the interior could not compete with the cheap European products. Overall, the interior of the country wanted to protect their internal market. Because the rural “interior” areas relied upon protectionism and self-sufficiency, therefore, their interests demanded the political creation of a federal nation-state. Two political/economic positions emerged: that of the Unitarios versus that of the Federales. The Unitarios wanted a unified nation-state without provincial autonomy. They supported central control from Buenos Aires and emphasized free trade. They presented themselves as political “liberals” and used the terminology of democracy and rationalism. The Federales, on the other hand, were for a federalized nation-state, without central control and with provincial autonomy. These two divisions based upon different economic interests would later expand their political and economic contest into one that encompassed culture as well.

Instituting the Nation After Napoleon seized power in Spain and the defeat of the Junta Suprema of Sevilla, a governing junta was formed in Buenos Aires on May 25, 1810, to replace the viceroy. An open town government (cabildo abierto) was formed whose political task was to appoint a political junta to rule in the name of Fernando VII (the deposed king of Spain in Madrid). These urban porteños were actually most interested in an emancipated process of nation-building. Indeed, Buenos Aires formed its own “junta” and invited the other provinces to join. The process of independence from Spain was enhanced by military campaigns led by General José de San Martín between 1814 and 1817, which made independence increasingly a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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José de San Martín (1778–1850) The least controversial national hero of Argentina, José de San Martín was sent at the age of eight to Spain, where he was educated in the college of the nobility. He entered the army in 1791 and served with honor during the French invasion. Attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel, he left the army to offer his services in the cause of South American independence and arrived in March 1812 in Buenos Aires. The government commissioned him to organize a regiment of mounted grenadiers, with whom he took part in the campaign against the Viceroy Vigodet, whom he defeated on January 13, 1813, at San Lorenzo. With the cooperation of Chilean emigrants, he organized the famous army of the Andes. Misleading the Spanish generals by false reports, he crossed the Andes under great difficulties and surprised the Spanish at Chacabuco. He was elected supreme chief of the republic, but he declined and proposed Bernardo O’Higgins, only reserving for himself the command of the auxiliary Argentine army. After a visit to Buenos Aires, he returned in October to Chile and soon began to organize, with O’Higgins, a fleet and army for the invasion of Peru. After a brilliant campaign, he entered Lima, which had been abandoned by the Spaniards on July 12, 1821. On July 27 he proclaimed the independence of Peru after being elected “protector” on August 3 by the municipality chief of the government. He sent the famous regiment of mounted grenadiers to assist Bolivar in his struggle for independence in Ecuador, and, seeing the importance of united action, he met him in Guayaquil on July 25, 1822. Nobody knows what was said in that interview, but upon his return to Lima, San Martín resigned on August 22. Leaving part of his army to assist Gem Sucre, he went to Europe, where he established himself in Brussels. In 1828 he returned to Buenos Aires shortly after the battle of Ituzaingo, only to find his country in the midst of internal discord. He thus returned to Brussels, for he had made a vow never to unsheathe his sword in civil war. In 1830 he settled in Paris.

reality. On July 9, 1816, a congress gathered at Tucuman and finally issued a formal declaration of independence from Spain. Although a so-called supreme director was appointed to head the new state, the congress was unable to reach agreement on a form of government. Many of the delegates, particularly those from the city and province of Buenos Aires, were in favor of a constitutional monarchy, a position that was later modified in favor of a highly centralized republican system. This position was met with vigorous opposition from the delegates of the other provinces, who favored a federal system of government. By 1820 provinces throughout the region centralized their power by replacing the cabildos with provincial governments. Buenos Aires, no longer serving the administrative role of the viceroyalty, started to implement liberal polices within its borders. Led by Bernardino Rivadavia, the province enacted legislation supporting liberal rights. Universal male suffrage, religious toleration, and freedom of press were assured. At the socioeconomic level, tax reform, floating interests, public education, and the policy of enticing immigrants from Europe to establish in Argentina characterized the new political tone. Many of the same acts were carried out in the interior, although to a lesser degree. Th e issue of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Congress of Tucuman In 1810 a town meeting of prominent citizens in Buenos Aires set up an autonomous government (or junta) to administer the viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata (consisting of modern Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and southern Bolivia) in the name of Ferdinand VII, heir to the Spanish throne. In 1813 the viceroyalty was renamed the United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, but the junta remained unable to solidify control over its vast territories in the face of internal anarchy and royalist attempts at reconquest. The 32 delegates to the Congress of Tucuman met in 1816 to devise a new political structure to cope with the disarray in the country. Having formally proclaimed Argentina’s independence from Spain, the delegates appointed Juan Martín de Pueyrredón as supreme dictator, while they conducted a fruitless search for a monarch. European royal candidates and even an Incan prince were considered. The congress moved to Buenos Aires in 1817, and two years later it framed a constitution providing for a strong central government. The breakaway of Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia from the United Provinces was accompanied by separatist movements among the provinces of Argentina itself, spearheaded by the caudillos, who finally forced the congress to disband in 1820. Confusion and disunity reigned in Argentina until the beginning of the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosas in 1829.

national unity was considered in a national congress assembled in 1824. Delegates passed a law that provinces would govern themselves until a national constitution could be signed. Declaring their union the United Provinces, the delegates elected Bernardino Rivadavia to the presidency of the republic. Rivadavia was an early advocate of independence. A convinced liberal ideologue, he joined the meeting of leading citizens that secured virtual independence from Spain. After assuming the presidency, he began implementing many of the liberal measures that shaped Argentina’s liberal identity, although many of those policies, particularly those against the church, turned provincial opinion against him. In 1827 Rivadavia resigned the presidency, effectively ending national and liberal governance for a generation. The political space was filled this time by a Federalist. Manuel Dorrego, the newly elected governor of Buenos Aires, provided a moderating influence upon the tensions between the two rival groups—the Federales and Unitarios. He maintained many of the liberal policies enacted by Rivadavia in Buenos Aires; however, the Unitarios were suspicious of any policies advanced by the Federales and attempted to remove him from office. One of the divisions of the Argentine army, which supported the Unitario cause, mutinied, captured Dorrego in battle, and summarily executed him without trial in 1828. Dorrego, however, had already signed a peace treaty with Brazil that ended the war over the future of the Banda Oriental (now Uruguay). The ensuing political crises thus lessened after the election of General Juan Manuel de Rosas as governor of the province of Buenos Aires. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Painting of Juan Manuel de Rosas, ca. 1890. His controversial legacy shaped the debate on Argentina’s cultural identity for years to come. (Stefano Bianchetti/Corbis)


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Rosas, one of the most important caudillos of Argentina’s political history, spent most of his youth in the cattle country, where he built a huge fortune. His political career was initiated as a gaucho leader in support of federalism. After Dorrego’s execution, Rosas became the Federalist leader. His rise to power was representative of the new power of the estancieros, the new landed oligarchy based on commercial ranching. In 1829 Rosas became governor of Buenos Aires with dictatorial powers and waged a bloody campaign against the Unitarios. Rosas was a manipulative and dictatorial character who defended national sovereignty and acted as a caretaker in foreign relations. As an ambitious caudillo, Rosas could not restrain from getting involved in a dispute with the United States and Britain over the Falkland Islands and interfering in Uruguayan politics, where he supported Manuel Oribe. His suspected designs to reduce Paraguay and Uruguay to dependent Argentine states led to two blockades by France and Great Britain (1838–1840, 1845–1850), greatly hurting Argentine commerce. He ensured support from other provinces and rapidly extended his authority over the United Provinces, which became known as the Argentine Confederation. During his rule, all opposition groups were crushed or driven underground. However, Rosas’s politics were, in practice, actually anti-Federalist, despite his formal allegiance. Indeed, Rosas came to represent the hegemony of Buenos Aires, and he established his dominance there, developing a paramilitary force of his own called La Mazorca (“the Corncob”), a secret political society that degenerated into a band of criminals. Rosas resigned in 1832, although he became governor again in 1835 after successfully manipulating support from other provincial chiefs. However, his manipulative skills did not impede political leaders from organizing successive attempts to revolt against his rule. Finally, Rosas was removed from power. Aided by Brazil and Uruguay, Justo José de Urquiza crushed the dictator’s army at Monte Caseros (1852). Rosas finally fled to England, where he lived in exile until his death. By 1859 the unity of Argentina was generally secured, although it would be two decades before the Unitarios completed their victory over the Federalists. The constitution of 1853, crafted by Alberdi, was Federalist and inspired by the model of the U.S. constitution. According to Alberdi, whose famous “Bases y puntos de partida para la organización política de la República Argentina” (“Bases and points of departure for the political organization of the Argentine Republic”) provided a blueprint for the Argentine constitution of 1853, Argentina must first pass through what he called the “possible republic.” This was to be a period of government featured by limited suffrage and rule by an enlightened, authoritarian state. After Argentina could develop social and economic structures comparable to those of western Europe, it would then be possible for the republic to become a fully functioning democracy. The constitution created a president and a vice president, both with a six-year term, a senate, a house of representatives (Cámara de Diputados), and a supreme court. No property requirements existed for suffrage. Urquiza became Argentina’s first president. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation The struggle for defining Argentina’s national identity can be traced to the civil war between the Unitarios and Federales. These two contesting factions advocated two distinct models of national modernization, but, more than that, they embodied two different cultural and political styles. The Unitarios aspired to create a centralized modern state modeled after Europe. In their account, Argentina was a barbaric country that should become a modern democracy opened to immigrants, especially from Anglo-Saxon countries. Their type of civic nationalism emphasized the unity of the nation in its political institutions. They were forwardlooking; the nation could only be developed by adopting liberal forms of political and economic organization rather than by being imagined by references to a mythical, ethnic past. The Federalists, in contrast, represented by Juan Manuel de Rosas, enhanced the values of tradition and the power of charismatic leadership rather than that of an ordered, modern republic. As described by Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, the clearest representative of the forward-looking discourse portraying economic growth and progress as the culminating point of political legitimacy, this confrontation could be defined as a choice between “Civilization or Barbarism.” It is not strange, therefore, that the defeat of Rosas and the Federalists increased the determination of the Unitarios to erase the political memory of the dictator. This intellectual and political task was promoted by Sarmiento and the liberal elites, that is, those who set the path for Argentina’s transformation into a civilized country based on economic growth and immigration. They portray the image of the gaucho as a character unwilling to work and unable to survive under a rational political order. Prominent figures such as Bartolomé Mitre, Vicente Fidel Lopez, and Juan Bautista Alberdi even regarded Argentina’s backwardness as a result of Spanish colonialism. However, two processes ran counter to the elites’ model of a modern nation. The elites’ understanding of liberal values was far from what we conceive of today as political liberalism. They promoted economic liberalism without much emphasis on democratization. Alberdi, indeed, failed to understand that the liberal state was in reality an obstacle to democratization. Moreover, against the expectations of Argentinean elites, immigrants maintained their ethnic communities and identities and would not assimilate and become the cradle of a new nation. While the liberal Argentinean elites expected immigrants to merge into the nation, the immigrants’ desire to keep their distinctive identity sometimes led to xenophobic reactions. That is why Sarmiento, although a liberal himself and the main proponent of public education as a nation-making tool in 19th-century Argentina, strongly criticized the schools of the Italian community, for they allegedly provided an Italian education. Mass education was therefore initially regarded as the means for creating the republic and consolidating capitalism. Mass education would serve as an effective mechanism for social mobilization. Schools were instrumental in the “ArgenN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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tinization” of children, and the results were most successful when education also became a tool for integrating them into a dynamic capitalism, a development particularly effective in coastal areas. For young immigrants or the children of newcomers, school provided not only the bare language but especially the “idiom” of the “high culture” necessary for upward mobility. In Sarmiento’s mind, there was a necessity to nationalize civic values to promote integration. This ideological and political process was determinant in changing the sociocultural and ethnic character of the nation. It was the culmination of a process of “nationalization” whose particular aspect was the slow and steady disappearance of the “other,” whether indigenous peoples or mulattos. Many indigenous groups disappeared because of harsh forced labor, compulsory resettlement, and diseases introduced by the Spanish conquerors. Those Indians who had maintained their autonomy well into the 19th century were almost exterminated during the military campaigns in the 1880s. Afterward the number of Indians diminished considerably, representing an estimated less than 1 percent of the total population (probably around 300,000 people) by the end of the 20th century. The number of blacks and mulattos of African origin decreased dramatically in the last decades of the 19th century. In 1887 only 8,005 Afro-Argentines lived in Buenos Aires out of a total population of 433,375. Epidemics, participation in civil wars, and intermarriage were the causes for the steady population decline of Afro-Argentines. Important factors in the diminishing presence of mestizo rural workers and Afro-Argentines were the European immigrants, who competed for scarce housing and sources of labor. The politics of labor and immigration enticed foreigners, especially from the Italian south and northern Spain, to arrive in Argentina and work in low-paying jobs formerly performed by Argentines. Immigrants quickly dominated the urban landscape as they outnumbered Argentine nationals and very soon transformed Argentina’s ethnic identity. The social outcome of these policies was that Argentina became the “most European” of Latin American countries, and its citizens felt proud of their European origin.

Narrating the Nation Argentine cultural symbols are mostly a 20th-century product of hybridization. Historical figures, sportsmen and sportswomen, politicians, and intellectuals contribute to the elaboration of a common feeling that Argentines identify with. However, the question of who best plays a role in defining who Argentines are and have been is a contested issue. Amid the historical icons who are decidedly noncontroversial is José de San Martín. He is perceived as liberator of the Americas and portrayed as a moral model to be emulated. For Argentines, San Martín sends a message of modernity and freedom, without personal or national ambitions of domination. Juan Manuel de Rosas, in contrast, is a good example of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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schisms in the process of nation-building. Hated by the liberal, modernizing, and urban-oriented sectors of society who regarded him as a tyrant who enjoyed the ignorance of the masses, he was an icon for the traditionalists who saw him as a tough defender of national sovereignty against imperial ambitions. While Rosas was at the center of the disputes around the fate of Argentina in the 19th century, Juan Domingo Perón was the focus of impassioned divisions among Argentines during the last half of the 20th century. Although some analysts draw parallels between Rosas and Perón, insisting that the two have defended the interests of the people against a foreign colonial order, the two are the products of very different societies. Rosas ruled an agrarian society; Perón ruled a predominantly urban society in which internal migrants to cities and the children of immigrants fought for greater participation as well as for recognition to be part of the nation. Another of the most controversial figures of Argentina’s politics is without any doubt María Eva Duarte de Perón, universally known as Evita. Undoubtedly she is the most famous Argentine woman, having played a determinant role in promoting the cause of underprivileged groups, mainly workers and women. Although political opponents dismissed her by stating that she was a bad actress with questionable morals, the popular sectors idolized her, seeing her as a saintly figure. After her death in 1952, people lit candles next to photographs of her, creating a national myth that has lasted to this day. During the 19th century, two authors and two books could be claimed to be the most representative narratives of Argentina’s cultural identity in the making. Both portrayed different visions of society and were to symbolize the conflictive characteristics of Argentina’s cultural identity. Domingo Faustino Sarmiento’s book Facundo is seen by some critics as the cathedral of Argentine culture. It describes a fragmented country torn between civilization and barbarism, with a rural, backward interior dominated by authoritarian, charismatic, populist caudillos who refuse to enter into an orderly, rational, and modern way of life. Sarmiento is held responsible for bringing the country into the modern, literate world; he is the teacher par excellence, the founding father of the Argentine school system, and a role model to be followed. Even today, attending school every day is equated with “being a Sarmiento.” Sarmiento is either glorified or vilified, but no Argentine is indifferent to him. Although Facundo was intended to attack the rural order and gaucho way of life, Sarmiento’s prose ironically continues to mystify the pampas. While Facundo was intended to highlight the backwardness of the mestizo population, another writer, José Hernández, exalted the values of gaucho culture. As a congressman in 1880, and as the leader of the Congress, Hernández defended the federation project, as a result of which Buenos Aires became the capital of the country. His book, El Gaucho Martín Fierro, was published in December 1872 and was an enormous success. In 1879, after the 11th edition, he published La Vuelta de Martín Fierro (The Return of Martín Fierro). Hernández was “painting” with N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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words the life of the gaucho. In El Gaucho Martín Fierro, the protagonist is an impoverished gaucho who is drafted to serve at a border fort, defending the Argentine frontier against the Indians. Hernández demonstrates great skill in narrating Martín Fierro’s life of poverty on the pampas and his military experiences. He pinpoints Fierro’s desertion and his attempt to return home. When he discovers that his house, farm, and family are gone, he enters into a state of tension. He deliberately provokes an affair of honor by injuring a black woman in a bar. That provokes a knife duel with her male companion, whom he finally kills. Fierro becomes an outlaw pursued by the police militia, soon joined by Sergeant Cruz who is inspired by Fierro’s bravery. The two set out to live among the Indians, hoping to find a better life there. However, in La Vuelta de Martín Fierro, Hernández describes a situation that shows that their hope of a better life is not real. When they are accused to be spies, only the cacique (“chief ”) saves their lives. Hernández presents us here with another view of rural life. The book narrates an epidemic, several attempts at a cure, and finally the fatal wrath upon those suspected of bringing the plague, including a young “Christian” boy.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation During Justo José de Urquiza’s term as president, we can perceive the first attempts at national mobilization by way of technological and economic advancement. Transportation services were improved, and new communication and mail services between Buenos Aires and the provinces were encouraged. Free commerce and freedom to engage in economic activities enhanced Argentina’s dynamic economy. While land grants to railroads were centralized by the state, generally people were free to engage in any economic enterprise without governmental interference and get wealthy without limits. The government did impose income taxation, although indirect taxation was extremely small. At the same time, there was virtually no governmental welfare system. One of the most important measures to improve Argentina’s population was the initiative to promote immigration. During Bartolomé Mitre’s presidency (1862–1868), more improvements were made in finance and political order when schools were established, laws codified, and customs laws reformed. However, the clearest attempt to transform the nation into a modern democratic society was made by Sarmiento. His period in power from 1868 to 1874 was characterized by large investments in education and the encouragement of immigration. Teachers were hired (including foreigners in secondary and higher education), books were purchased, and new and modern equipment was introduced into the education system. By 1890 British investments in Argentina reached an estimated £157 million of investment capital. The great symbol of the new British connection was the construction of a burgeoning railroad system, most of it in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the hands of private British companies. The idea was to expand commerce overall with Great Britain. Over 10 million passengers and 5 million tons of cargo were transported. In 1861 total foreign trade, both imports and exports, was valued at 37 million gold pesos. By 1880 it increased to about 104 million, and by 1889 it had expanded to an estimated 250 million gold pesos. The nation’s population increased as well, from an estimated 1.1 million in 1857 to approximately 3.3 million by 1890. Immigrant arrivals increased especially during the last three decades of the century. Between 1871 and 1914, some 5.9 million newcomers arrived, of whom 3.1 million stayed and settled. It can be said that between 1830 and 1950 Argentina absorbed some 10 percent of the total number of immigrants from Europe to the Americas. Without a doubt, Argentina’s economic expansion offered immigrants the illusion of prosperity. That is why at the end of the 19th and early 20th century, belle époque, we can already perceive powerful middle- and working-class constituencies in Buenos Aires, which were among the largest in Latin America. The porteño middle class became an educated, professional middle class that depended on the state for employment. That dependence reflected, despite economic growth, the underdevelopment of manufacturing and the salience of commercial, professional, and bureaucratic occupations typical of peripheral societies. The working class, initially composed of migrants from southern Europe, was largely concentrated in transport and service sectors rather than industry. During Nicolas Avellaneda’s rule (1874–1880), Argentina acquired new land for settlement, expropriated from the Indians during the War of the Desert led by Julio Roca, who was to become president in the next term. By the 1880s, the majority of the indigenous populations had been dominated and pushed to marginal and inhospitable regions. The victory over the Indians of the pampas and Patagonia was described as the Conquest of the Desert by the generation of 1880. Vast tracts of land were distributed among the conquerors. The gauchos, who had roamed in open spaces and sometimes escaped into Indian lands to avoid the militia, gradually disappeared from the countryside as a social group. They competed with the immigrants for salaried work in the ranches that were demarcated with barbed wire fences. Many landowners believed that gauchos were ill suited for agricultural labor and favored the hiring of foreigners. Immigrants arrived by the thousands, to the point that in cities like Buenos Aires foreign-born residents outnumbered the Argentines. During Julio Roca’s presidency (1880–1886), Buenos Aires became the national capital, and La Plata became the state capital of the province of Buenos Aires. His presidency was marked by economic growth as the beef export business grew and by his total alignment with the Argentine oligarchy, especially the great landowners. Roca was followed by Miguel Juárez Celman, another representative of the oligarchy (1886–1890). In general terms it can be said that from 1880 to 1916 Argentina was ruled by the Autonomous National Party or PAN, a party that controlled elections through patronage, intimidation, and fraud and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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dedicated itself to the twin goals of “order and progress.” Argentina under the PAN sounds much like Alberdi’s “possible republic,” and, indeed, in Argentina the segue from mid-19th-century liberalism to fin de siècle positivism was unusually smooth. However, after the 1890s we begin to see a shift in Argentine politics that would lead to political protest and the demand for and process of democratization. In alliance with a dissident military faction, Leandro Alem and his nephew, Hipólito Yrigoyen, rose in revolt in 1890, 1892, and 1893, marking the beginning of the struggle for popular democracy. In September 1889, protest meetings in Buenos Aires saw the emergence of the Unión Cívica de la Juventud (Youth Civic Union). After some splits, it eventually became the Unión Cívica Radical. The Radicales fought for free suffrage and honest elections, finally gaining power in general elections in 1916. This electoral success represented a landmark of democratic mobilization that in the mid-20th century was to be characterized by the appearance of Peronist populism. Indeed, Yrigoyen initiated the period of national populism that was to be continued and radicalized by Perón. Selected Bibliography Botana, N. 1977. El orden conservador. La política Argentina entre 1810 y 1916. Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana. Goodrich, D. S. 1996. Facundo and the Construction of Argentine Culture. Austin: University of Texas Press. Halperin, T. D. 1982. Una nación para el desierto argentino. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina. Halperin, T. D. 2000. De la Revolución de Independencia a la Confederación Rosista. Buenos Aires: Paidos. Luna, F. 1995. Historia integral de la Argentina. Buenos Aires: Planeta. Lynch J. 1981. Argentine Caudillo: Juan Manuel de Rosas. New York: Oxford University Press. Rock, D. 1975. Politics in Argentina, 1890–1930: The Rise and Fall of Radicalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rock, D. 2002. “Racking Argentina.” New Left Review 17 (September/October): 54–86. Romero, J. L. 1965. El desarrollo de las ideas en la sociedad argentina del siglo XX. Mexico/ Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica. Shumway, N. 1993. The Invention of Argentina. Berkeley: University of California Press.


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Brazil Roderick Barman Chronology 1500 1532 1549 1788 1807 1808 1815 1817 1821 1822

1823 1824 1825 1831 1840 1864–1870 1889

Arrival of Pedro Alvares Cabral on the shores of what is now Brazil. First permanent settlement by the Portuguese at São Vicente. Creation of the Estado do Brasil (includes only part of what is now Brazil). The “Inconfidência Mineira,” an aborted plot for political independence in the captaincy of Minas Gerais. Invasion of Portugal by Napoleon I and the flight from Lisbon of the Portuguese government. Establishment of the royal government at Rio de Janeiro, creation of state institutions, and centralization of rule. Creation of the kingdom of Brazil, united with that of Portugal. Short-lived revolt in the province of Pernambuco and the creation of an independent republic there. Army revolt forces King John VI to return to Lisbon, leaving behind Prince Pedro, his elder son and heir, as regent of the kingdom of Brazil. Refusal of Prince Pedro to return to Portugal in January. In May, Prince Pedro assumes title of “Perpetual Defender of Brazil.” In September/October, declaration of Brazil’s independence as a monarchy (empire). Pedro I crowned emperor. Meeting of a constituent assembly, violently dissolved by Pedro I in November. Pedro I issues a constitution that includes a powerful monarch and a legislature. Recognition of Brazil’s independence by Portugal. Abdication of Pedro I in response to popular protests. Pedro II, aged 14, is declared of age and assumes the monarch’s constitutional powers. War with Paraguay. Overthrow of the empire by units of the Rio de Janeiro garrison. Proclamation of a republic.

Situating the Nation Brazil can be said to have begun in 1500 when its Atlantic coasts were “discovered” by Portugal. During the following 300 years, the Portuguese occupied most of the territories now contained within Brazil. They established a system of rule, an official culture, and an export economy. Emperor Napoleon I’s invasion of Portugal in 1807 forced the Portuguese royal family and government to flee across the Atlantic to Rio de Janeiro, where they remained until 1820. During these years, the colonies of Portuguese America for the first time consolidated into a single state, Brazil. In 1822 Brazil gained independence from Portugal. The new empire was a centralized state with a powerful monarch and a representative system N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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that survived until November 1889 when an army coup deposed the regime. By that time, a national identity and a national culture had fully developed. With the establishment of a republican regime, modeled on the United States, Brazil entered a new phase of its development. The traits that we now associate with Brazil as a nation began to emerge during the first three centuries of contact, when the future Brazil was no more than a collection of disparate Portuguese colonies. On April 22, 1500, the second expedition sent out by Portugal to India, following Vasco da Gama’s original voyage, encountered in the South Atlantic an unknown land and its inhabitants. The report sent back to the king of Portugal established three themes that continued to shape Brazilians’ sense of national identity. “The country is so well-favored that if it were rightly cultivated it would yield everything.” In other words, the material resources were rich, even infinite; all that was needed was their exploitation. As to the people, “any stamp we wish may be easily printed on them.” The indigenous people (and the Africans later brought in as slaves) were different, but they were human, capable of being transformed into “us.” Th e third theme simply emphasized that all was possible; the future was Brazil’s. In 1823, for example, a politician, Antônio Gonçalves Gomide, claimed that “the time will come, I am proud to predict, when . . . the south of Brazil alone will rival the United States” (Diário da Assembléa 1823, 726). “O Brasil é o país do futuro” (“Brazil is the country of the future”) resonates to the present day. For a generation after the first encounter, Portugal did not form settlements in the New World but instead exploited the available resources, above all, the stands of red dyewood, o pau brasil, from which the nation-state takes its name. Exploitation of other commodities, notably sugar, tropical produce, gold, diamonds, cotton, and coffee, motivated Portuguese expansion, first along the Atlantic coasts and then into the interior. The indigenous peoples were compelled to provide the labor needed for this resource exploitation. Disease, abuse, and armed resistance rapidly thinned their numbers, and a search for new sources of forced labor underlay both the Portuguese expansion into the interior and their importation, from the second half of the 16th century, of slaves from Africa. So large was this traffic that, when the trade was finally suppressed in the middle of the 19th century, some 3.5 million Africans had been brought to the Portuguese New World. By the late 18th century, Africans and their descendants formed the majority of the population. The Portuguese expansion westward in search of resources and labor continued until, in the late 18th century, it reached the lands to the east of the Andes and to the north of the Río de la Plata, areas already occupied by the Spanish (see map). The Spanish succeeded in preventing a Portuguese attempt to take control of what is now Uruguay, but they made no general attempt to roll back the Portuguese expansion. The only serious challenge to Portugal’s control of its New World colonies occurred between 1630 and 1652 when the Dutch conquered the sugar lands of northeast Brazil, from which they were eventually driven out by the local N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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inhabitants. The territorial extent of Brazil was thus established before it secured independence. The area encompassed seven or eight distinctive regions, stretching from the tropical forests of the Amazon basin in the far north to the rolling hill country with its pastures in the far south. The role played by the Portuguese state, or more precisely the Portuguese monarch, in the formation of Brazil was of considerable importance. On the one hand, the Portuguese monarch was God’s anointed, claiming absolute power over his vassals and their lives. But the revenues and the administrative machinery of the Portuguese state can only be termed scanty. The Portuguese king, lacking the means to take control of the New World territories he claimed, early on delegated the governing task to selected vassals, granting to each one or two “captaincies,” from which derive many of the existing states within Brazil. When that expedient failed to work, the king created in 1549 the “State of Brazil” under a governor-general. Administration in the Portuguese New World never became systematic and effective. The Atlantic was too broad, the territories too vast, the revenues too small, the personnel too limited. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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To retain control of its colonies, the Portuguese government sealed them off, as far as possible, from the outside world, and it prevented the emergence of alternative and therefore rival centers of power. Brazil could trade only with Portugal and Africa, using only Portuguese ships. No printing press, no university, and no professional schools (beyond a few seminaries) were permitted. Those who wished for a higher education had to cross the Atlantic to Europe. The entry of books and other printed matter was controlled as much as possible. Autonomous institutions (save for those of the Catholic church) were prohibited. These factors—resource exploitation, dependence on forced labor, royal claims to absolute authority, the monarch’s incapacity to control local affairs, and lack of cultural and institutional autonomy—combined to produce a deeply rooted and enduring social structure. A ruling minority, those who were Portuguese in culture and mainly so by descent, controlled the sources of wealth and profited from the labor of the subordinate majority, the African and indigenous peoples. While society lacked a network of institutions, there existed mechanisms, exercised mainly through personal ties and kept covert, by which the ruling minority ran local affairs as it pleased, unchecked by what the king might desire and command. It was a society that was hierarchical and oppressive yet also ill organized and sufficiently fluid to permit some individuals, outsiders by origin but talented and industrious, to gain entry, if not for themselves then for their children, into the ruling minority. The virtual absence of a school system created considerable opportunities for the self-instructed. After independence the paucity of educated men made the governing circles willing to accept those visibly not of “pure” Portuguese ancestry. By the end of the 18th century, when the societies that made up Portugal’s American colonies had existed for over two centuries, a sense of local identity was beginning to emerge, an identity manifested in two ways. The first was the image of the índio, the “Indian,” which came to symbolize what was unique and different about Portuguese America. The image was retrospective, focused on the distant past and detached from contemporary reality. It had nothing to do with the indigenous peoples as they actually existed. Linked to the índio was Tupí. This language—a lingua franca developed by the Jesuit order in the 16th century— provided words and phrases that were gradually incorporated into the Portuguese used in the New World, and individuals adopted Tupí words (often place names) as surnames. Tracing one’s descent from one of the original Portuguese settlers and their indigenous wives became proof of good standing in society. From the 1850s onward, with the establishment of weekly illustrated reviews, a Tupí Indian was often used in political cartoons as the image and personification of Brazil as a nation-state. The second focus of identity was loyalty to the pátria rather than to Portugal as such. The pátria was the physical area of the New World in which an individual existed and in which he or she made his life. Identification with the pátria was not incompatible with loyalty to the monarch—in fact, the two existed in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Banner of O Grito Nacional, a radical newspaper published in Rio de Janeiro during the 1850s. The illustration depicts a Tupí Indian, commonly used to personify Brazil and signaling its unique New World character, surrounded by other national symbols of Brazil. (Biblioteca Nacional, Rio de Janeiro)


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tandem—nor did loyalty to the pátria mean loyalty to Brazil as now defined. The local identity manifested in the índio and the pátria was not nationalism, or even proto-nationalism. On the other hand, such identity was not incompatible with nationalism and eventually could and did transmute into loyalty to Brazil.

Instituting the Nation The establishment of the royal government in Rio de Janeiro in March 1808, following its flight from Lisbon in the face of Napoleon’s troops, necessarily reversed the established policies toward the New World colonies. Brazil was allowed to trade directly with the outside world, its ports thrown open to foreign shipping and foreign merchants and professionals permitted to settle there. Books and other literature from abroad circulated quite freely. A further consequence of the royal move to Rio de Janeiro was the establishment there of the institutions of government, including ministries, a treasury board, and a high court of justice. For the first time, printing was authorized, and one or two government newspapers began publication. A military college and two medical schools were founded. Just as importantly, all the colonies in the New World, now renamed provinces, were administered as a single entity from Rio de Janeiro, which became for the first time a capital city with such appropriate cultural institutions as a state library and an opera house. Upon the overthrow of Napoleon in 1814 and the end of warfare in Europe, the royal government did not return to Lisbon but continued in Rio de Janeiro, which had become the de facto center of the Portuguese empire. At the end of 1815, Brazil was raised to the status of a kingdom, equal in status and—on paper—united with Portugal in a single realm. In reality, of course, given the presence of the royal government at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil was the dominant element, and Portugal, the subordinate. This new political order, established in 1808 and legitimized in 1815, lasted until 1820 when the army in Portugal revolted, demanding the return of the royal government to Lisbon and the establishment of a constitutional government. The king returned to Portugal in May 1821, leaving behind his elder son and heir as regent of the kingdom of Brazil. The Lisbon regime adopted policies that threatened to deprive Brazil of its autonomous institutions and its direct trade with the outside world. Brazilian opinion moved rapidly during 1821 and 1822 in favor of a break with Portugal. A radical minority desired immediate independence in the form of a republic. A conservative majority desired no more than the continuation of the existing status quo, although willing to accept independence as a nationstate if no other outcome was possible. When ordered to return to Europe by the Lisbon regime, the prince regent refused and thus identified himself with the cause of Brazil. As his senior minister, he named José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, born in Brazil but a longtime N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Pátria When Brazilians wish to express identity with and loyalty to their country, they refer to it as their pátria, not as their nação (“nation”). The concept pátria, with no direct equivalent in English and perhaps best translated as “native land,” possesses an emotional force for Brazilians that the word nação lacks. Pátria must be treated as a concept distinct from nação, although used as a synonym for it, and indeed it is both more diverse and more complex in meaning than nation. The dictionary published in 1789 by a native of Portuguese America defined pátria as a terra donde alguem é natural, the land or locality of which someone is a native. In terms of the 18th-century Portuguese world, in which most people were illiterate, the locality ( pátria) referred to a fairly small region, the area in which one was born, was brought up, made one’s living, and was married. It was a world that was familiar through direct personal acquaintance, not from abstract knowledge. The pátria could be a village, a town, or a region. It might but did not necessarily coincide with a political or administrative unit, such as a captaincy or a comarca ( judicial district). Individuals perceived the larger, outside world through the lens of their pátria. They could expand their concept of what their pátria was to encompass a larger area, but that larger area retained the characteristics of the original (and smaller) pátria. In sum, the meaning of pátria was and is malleable, depending a great deal on the context in which the word is used. The concept is not limited to a single, agreed-upon meaning. What relationship did the concept of pátria have, in the 18th century, to that of nação and to Brazil? Pátria and nação were quite distinct, and indeed incompatible in meaning because, as the word was then used, nação had no territorial basis. It referred to the totality of the people who owed allegiance to the Portuguese monarch, “a nação portuguesa espalhada nas quartas partes do mundo” (“the Portuguese nation scattered across the world”). References to a nação were accordingly not to Brazil as a potential nation-state but simply to the totality of the Portuguese subjects, regardless of where they resided throughout the world. The relation of pátria to Brazil is extremely complex. The Estado do Brasil was set up in 1549 under a governor-general, with his seat at the port of Salvador. But the State of Brazil only included the captaincies of the eastern Atlantic seaboard. From the 17th to the 18th centuries, there existed the Estado do Maranhão (State of Maranhão), which included the captaincies in the far north of what is now Brazil. In other words, Portuguese America never constituted a unit, a single colony, but rather a congeries of disparate colonies, which the British called “the Brazils.” The Portuguese termed their possessions in the New World sometimes as “o Brasil” (the name of one part serving to identify the whole), sometimes as “a América portugêsa,” and at times as simply “a América.” The important point to stress is that it was not o Brasil or a América portugêsa as such that formed the focus of identity and of loyalty, but the myriad local pátrias. However, individuals could and did use the term o Brasil to refer to their pátria, because it was perceived as a magnification of that pátria. No incompatibility, no contradiction existed. After the royal government settled in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil did become a single state, a potential nation. French political thought, in which the concept of la patrie was synonymous with nation, fostered among the politically conscious the equation of a pátria to nação, but the new usage coexisted with rather than replaced the old sense of the concept.


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government bureaucrat in Portugal, who possessed the political skills, the determination, and the ruthlessness that the task required. The new regime possessed considerable advantages. It could mobilize the resources to create a navy and to arm its supporters on land. It also received tacit support from Great Britain. In September 1822, the prince declared the independence of Brazil as an empire, being acclaimed as Emperor Pedro I. Portugal’s refusal to accept the new regime led to warfare that polarized opinion. Brazilians had no choice but to support either union with Rio de Janeiro or subordination to Lisbon. In March 1824, the emperor promulgated a constitution that gave Brazil a representative government under a strong monarch. In 1825, thanks to pressure from Great Britain, the king of Portugal, Pedro I’s father, recognized the independence of Brazil.

Defining the Nation Brazil began its life as a nation-state with considerable assets. It possessed an established central government, based in the city of Rio de Janeiro, which handled half the foreign trade of the new country. It also had an official language, used by everyone of standing, and a state religion (the Catholic church). The new emperor inherited the tradition of obedience and loyalty to the monarch that existed in colonial times. The new state rapidly established its authority throughout the territories it claimed. The governing circles identified with the new nation-state as the assurance of their continued security and prosperity. Recent graduates from Coimbra University in Portugal and other European universities existed in numbers sufficient to run the state apparatus. The external boundaries of Brazil’s territories were sufficiently well defined (if not actually demarcated) to avoid conflicts with other states, with the sole exception of the far south. There the lands lying to the east bank of the Río de la Plata recently conquered by the Portuguese had been incorporated into Brazil, but in 1825 a rebellion broke out, and three years later Brazil was forced to renounce its claims and recognize the new state of Uruguay. The war in the far south was far from the sole problem faced by the nation. Brazil was so large and communications among its separate parts (particularly with the far north) so difficult that effective government was almost impossible. The existence of slavery and the continued importation of slaves from Africa (despite an official prohibition of the trade enacted in 1831) meant that a large section of the population existed outside the nation. Brazil lacked a social and cultural infrastructure, above all an educational system, indispensable for functioning nationhood. Profound philosophical differences existed as to the nature of the new nation. Traditionalists, desiring a continuation of the status quo created after 1808, perceived the monarch as the legitimate source of authority within the nation and the guardian of its security and well-being. Radicals, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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unable to secure a republic, made the people the source of authority, electing a national assembly to which the monarch was subordinate. During the struggle for independence, compromise on this point prevailed, Pedro I being declared emperor by the Grace of God and the Unanimous Acclamation of the Peoples. However, in 1823, compromise ended when the emperor and José Bonifácio fell out and the fallen minister sided with the radicals in the assembly elected to write a constitution for the nation. The quarrel involved not just the emperor’s role but the question of the rights in the new nation of those born in Portugal (including the emperor himself). The radicals denounced the Portuguese-born as supporters of the colonial order and as potential supporters of renewed rule by Portugal. Since many radicals were in part of African descent, their espousal of the people as the source of authority sprang from their vision of Brazil as an egalitarian nation in which race played no role. The colonial heritage and the Portuguese-born they equated with racial discrimination. The outcome of the quarrel was the emperor’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in November 1823. The regime survived a resulting revolt in the northeast, and the constitution issued by Pedro I in March 1824 entrenched the traditionalist concept of the nation, making the monarch the controller of the political system and supreme representative of the nation. The constitution further recognized as citizens all Portuguese-born residing in Brazil at the time of independence. This success was achieved at high cost. Pedro I lost the confidence of a major section of the governing circles, and his impetuous style of rule and his refusal to share power intensified their hostility and caused them to advocate an extreme form of popular sovereignty. The “Confederation of the Equator,” proclaimed in 1823 by the rebels in the northeast, served as a model for this conception of Brazil: power was to devolve to the autonomous provinces (now equated with the pátria), leaving to the national government the tasks of guarding the pátrias against attack from abroad and preventing anarchy at home. Rather than share power with his opponents, the emperor abdicated in April 1831 and left for Europe, being succeeded on the throne by his son, Pedro II, then aged five. The regency that ruled Brazil in Pedro II’s name lacked both legitimacy and effectiveness. The country was wracked with conflicts, and in the hope of placating disaffected elements, a constitutional amendment was passed in 1834 devolving many powers to newly created legislative assemblies in the provinces. This amendment only intensified conflicts and, in fact, generated a separatist revolt in the far south. There followed a reaction in favor of the traditionalist vision of the nation, which culminated in Pedro II being declared of age in 1840 and made the central element in the nation. The young emperor developed into a capable ruler who, aided by other such developments as the introduction of the steamship, consolidated Brazil as a nation-state. Pedro II’s success as ruler also resided in his establishment of himself as the personification and thus as the definition of Brazil. For Brazilians, the nationN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Pedro II became the second emperor of Brazil after his father, Emperor Pedro I, abdicated, having established Brazil as an independent nation from Portugal. A moderate man with a modern outlook, Pedro II stabilized the new nation. (Library of Congress)

state as developed in revolutionary and Napoleonic France was both the most up-to-date and the most alluring form of political organization for their country. In dress, behavior, outlook, and speech, Pedro II turned himself into the model citizen, the exemplary bourgeois man of letters. He himself referred to his two countries, Brazil and France, the latter the country of his intellect and the former the country of his heart and birth. The emperor exemplified the modern and was accepted as such by literary and scientific circles in Europe. He thus became for Brazilians the definition of what their country was eventually destined to become as a nation-state.

Narrating the Nation In less than 20 years, Brazil was transformed from a collection of disparate colonies, isolated from the outside world, into an independent nation-state. The creation of Brazil was largely achieved through action from the top supported by those elements who equated independence with an end to subordination and discrimination. Among the leaders of the new state, the expectation seems to have been that the achievement of political independence would of itself generate a sense of national identity, a social infrastructure, and an autonomous culture that the colonial order had deliberately prohibited. Th e troubled years following Pedro I’s abdication in 1831 revealed how illusory this expectation was. A national culture, including a national past, would have to be brought into being. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The task of the Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (Brazilian Historical and Geographical Institute) founded at Rio de Janeiro in 1839 was to gather knowledge about Brazil and to promote research on all aspects of the nation. One of its first projects was a competition on the theme, Como se deve escrever a história do Brasil? (“How should the history of Brazil be written?”). The question implicitly admitted that no such history yet existed. The construction of a glorious past stretching back to the first appearance of the Portuguese gave legitimacy and longevity to the new nation-state. As Francisco Varnhagen, the pioneer historian of Brazil, commented to Pedro II in 1857, history would serve to form the public’s mind in a single mold, promoting an identical conception of and so loyalty to Brazil. From the writings of Varnhagen and others there emerged what is called in Brazil a história pátria, a body of writing that is the received orthodoxy regarding Brazil’s past. Recent writers of this school include Caio Prado Júnior, José Honório Rodrigues, and Emília Viotti da Costa. In North America, the leading exponent of this approach was the late E. Bradford Burns. The views of this historical school can be summarized as follows. Brazil began its existence from the moment the Portuguese arrived. A sense of separate identity began to emerge thereafter, being attested to by the local inhabitants battling to expel the Dutch in the 1640s. This sense of identity was essentially anticolonial, brasileiro (Brazilian) being opposed to português (Portuguese). It was also innately republican as opposed to monarchist. In the 18th century, the sense of identity became manifest in literary works, both poems and prose, and in the local literary societies, all of which glorified Brazil and its attributes. In the late 18th century, a number of conspiracies, above all the Inconfidência Mineira (Minas Subversion) of 1788, sought the end of Portuguese rule and the establishment of independence. The start of the 19th century marked, in the view of Caio Prado Júnior (1967), “the moment when the elements that make up Brazilian nationhood—the basic institutions and energies—organized and stored up from the outset of colonization, finally came to flower and reached maturity.” To writers of the história pátria, the movement for independence was the product of a mature Brazilian nationalism, an autonomous and triumphant achievement, of which the hero was José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, chief minister in 1822 and 1823. The empire (1822–1889) is treated as no more than a period of consolidation and preparation for the republic that Brazilians had always aspired to establish. The imperial regime rested upon slavery, so the achievement of abolition on May 13, 1888, necessarily followed the end of the empire. In fact, for many Brazilians, their country history only begins with the establishment of the republic on November 15, 1889. Writers of the história pátria began by focusing on the achievements of the ruling groups, but for the last 60 years, they have extolled the role of the ordinary people, the Portuguese and other foreigners being viewed as exploiters of the nation’s resources. Recently the emphasis has shifted from perceiving the past in economic terms (with the landowners as the ruling group and the working class N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Race and Nation The role that the concept of race has played in defining Brazil as a nation is complex and equivocal, mainly because the Brazilian attitude toward race is itself complex and equivocal. An explanation for the evolving attitudes toward race makes clear the connection between race and nation. The Portuguese came to the New World with long experience interacting (as superiors to inferiors) with non-European peoples. The Portuguese cohabited and accommodated at the same time they exploited and abused. In consequence, their colonies soon contained a population, much of it of mixed ancestry, that spoke Portuguese, was Catholic in religion, and looked Portuguese in dress and culture. Such groups were ancillaries, but not equals, in running the colonies. The Portuguese interacted in precisely this way with the indigenous peoples along the coasts of Brazil. The dividing line was not as much skin color as being “civilized.” In respect to the African slaves imported from the middle of the 16th century, the divide was much greater because they were slaves. Nonetheless, cohabitation with slave women produced a mulatto slave population. The practice of freeing slaves resulted in the appearance of a free population partly or wholly African in descent. By the late 18th century, a considerable section of the Brazilian population was of mixed descent (sometimes from all three races) and Portuguese in speech and culture. For such people, obtaining an education (even at the cost of going to Europe) was a key means of economic and social advancement. The French Revolution with its promise of liberty, equality, and fraternity powerfully attracted the free population of mixed descent. The concept of Brazil as an independent nation-state won enthusiastic support from this group, because in a nation-state the citizens were equal before the law. The 1824 constitution did in fact ordain that talent should be the sole basis for public office. The constitution guaranteed a range of other rights to the citizen, but it was totally silent on the question of slavery and the rights of slaves. The importation of slaves from Africa continued unchecked until 1851. Those born in Africa were foreigners and, even if freed, could not meet the documentary requirements for acquiring citizenship. Freed slaves born in Brazil did, under the provisions of the 1824 constitution, become citizens but with restricted rights. Racial discrimination had no legal basis during the empire, and people of mixed descent could and did play major roles in public affairs. At least two prime ministers during the empire were visibly of African descent, and one was of indigenous descent. However, since citizens in a nation-state were defined essentially as those with an education, owning property, and behaving in accord with European practice, the destiny of Brazil as a nation-state had to rest in the hands of the small minority who were “civilized.” The rest of the population stood outside of national affairs. The civilized minority contained a good many people of mixed ancestry. It was not they, however, but the Emperor Pedro II who epitomized what Brazil as a nation should be. Tall, fair-skinned, and blond-haired with blue eyes, he was fluent in French, knowledgeable about European culture, and the correspondent of many savants there. Physically and culturally he embodied what every member of the ruling circles, regardless of ancestry, wanted their country to become.


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as the eventual victors) to a perception based on social justice, wherein those of African descent constitute a central element in Brazilian nationhood. These changes have not altered the basic assumptions of the história pátria: Brazil is a natural unit, with unique qualities, and its history has unfolded steadily toward the achievement first of political independence and then (but not yet) the creation of the ideal society. The paradox of the história pátria school is that, while it lauds the ordinary people, its writings have been addressed to the literate, who have long formed a distinct and privileged minority among Brazilians. National past has been presented to the ordinary people, insofar as it has been presented at all, in the form of parades, statues, and names (usually those of great men) for streets and buildings, as well as the flag and anthems intrinsic to the nation-state. Unless the individual for whom a street or building is named possesses iconic standing, as does José Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, for example, the practice does little to instill a sense of the national past in the ordinary population. Statues are more visible and more capable of arousing interest and pride in the heroes of the past, but

Flags and Anthems Of the emblems and icons that are integral to the existence of a nation-state, the flag and the anthem are the most visible and perhaps the most significant. In Brazil’s case, both flag and anthem(s) are indicative of the complexity of its national identity. No distinctive emblem or flag was associated with Portugal’s New World colonies. When the kingdom of Brazil was created in 1815, it was given as its official emblem an armillary sphere on a shield, surmounted by a royal crown. At the time of independence, the new imperial government adopted a national flag that, influenced by the design of the flags Napoleon I of France had given to his army units, placed the armillary sphere— encircled with 25 stars, flanked by branches of tobacco and coffee plants, and surmounted by an imperial crown—within a yellow lozenge on a green field. Green and gold, which had no long-standing connection with Brazil, rapidly became identified with the country’s luxuriant vegetation and bounteous resources. In November 1889, upon the overthrow of the empire, this flag was replaced by another that maintained the green field and gold lozenge but replaced the armillary sphere with a blue sphere showing the constellation of the Southern Cross, surmounted with a band reading “Ordem e Progresso” (“Order and Progress”). Brazil has no less than four accepted national anthems. Their tunes, all attractive, are widely known in Brazil, but not so the words. The music of the original national anthem, now called the “Hymn to Independence,” was composed by Emperor Pedro I, a competent amateur composer, with words by a leading journalist of the time. The music to the second anthem, known as the “National Hymn” and played on state occasions, was composed at the start of the 1830s, but the present words were not adopted until 1922. Upon the founding of the republic, a competition was held to select a new national anthem, but the winning entry, now termed “The Hymn to the Proclamation of the Republic,” with its theme echoing that of the “Marseillais,” failed to oust the “National Hymn.” The “Hymn to the National Flag” was composed early in the 20th century.


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here again it is the iconic standing of individual that determines whether the statue connects ordinary Brazilians to their history. More effective are the parades held on national holidays, of which Independence Day (September 7) and the Republic Day (November 15) are the most significant. The pomp and ceremony, with military contingents, bands, and speeches, give the parades a color and a vigor that holds attention, and they form an integral part of the cycle of life. National holidays were established by a law passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1823 and originally included the birthdays of the monarch, his spouse, and his heir. It is not that Brazilians have no sense of their nation’s history or no pride in what it has achieved, but the past does not approach futebol (“soccer”) as a defining element in the national identity. When Brazil plays a match in the World Soccer Cup (and Brazilians expect their team to win), the whole country literally closes down so that everyone can watch the game on television.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation If a sense of separate identity existed in Portuguese America of the 18th century, it was linked to the pátrias and to a widely held perception of the Portuguese New World as unique in terms of environment and people. None of the two or three attempts (which involved so few people that it is more accurate to term them “conspiracies” than “movements”) for independence in the late 18th century were concerned with Brazil in its modern sense. They sought freedom for the pátria. In the case of the one significant conspiracy, the Inconfidência Mineira of 1788, the pátria was the captaincy of Minas Gerais, which wanted to become an independent republic. The other captaincies in the New World might also wish to become republics, but that was their own responsibility. In sum, the evidence may show the emergence in the late colonial period of a sense of separateness, but it does not demonstrate the existence of national sentiment. This sense of separateness began to change into identification with Brazil as a nation following the arrival of the royal government at Rio de Janeiro in 1808, the opening of Brazil to foreign trade and cultural influences, and the creation of a central government at Rio de Janeiro. The decisive event was the creation in 1815 of the kingdom of Brazil, which gave legitimacy to the new status quo. Many groups—bureaucrats, merchants, and intellectuals—embraced the new order and depended upon it for their livelihood. The break with Portugal in 1822, therefore, represented not so much an innovation but the preservation of an existing order, especially since the idea of the nation-state, as exemplified by France, was familiar to educated Brazilians. Establishing a nation-state proved far more difficult than the exponents of the história pátria would allow. Several of the provinces (as the captaincies were known after 1808) were reluctant to abandon self-rule but, faced with the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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necessity of choosing, preferred Rio de Janeiro to Lisbon. The incorporation of the far north into the new nation-state was achieved by strong-arm tactics that boded ill for the future. Emperor Pedro I’s dissolution of the Constituent Assembly late in 1823, the bloody suppression of the Confederation of the Equator revolt in the northeast, and his promulgation of a constitution in 1824 consolidated the new empire but deepened the existing divisions regarding the source of authority within the nation-state and undermined, over the long run, the regime’s legitimacy. The 1824 constitution established a legislature of two houses that first convened in 1826. The Chamber of Deputies, dominated by the emperor’s opponents, embarked on a legislative program designed to provide the new nation with institutions based on popular authority, mainly copied from France. It also sought to create a social infrastructure, starting with two law schools. The magnitude of the task, the legislators’ inexperience, and the deepening conflict with the emperor limited the success of these achievements. After Pedro I’s abdication in 1831, the discord and disorder facing the new government prevented new initiatives beyond the constitutional amendment passed in 1834. The amendment restricted the national government’s ability to engage in nation-building, and in particular it passed control of primary and secondary education to the provinces. In 1840 the legislature passed a law “interpreting” and in practice annulling the provisions of the 1834 constitutional amendment giving the provinces control of law and order. However, the new law did not restore to the national government the other powers it had lost in 1834. A number of developments, including the spread of coffee growing in the hinterland of Rio de Janeiro, the introduction of the steamship, Pedro II’s shrewdness as ruler, and the restoration of order throughout the country—exemplified by the suppression in 1851 of the illegal slave trade with Africa—consolidated the imperial regime. The simple passage of time made the Brazilian nation-state seem the norm, the necessary focus of identity. The government gave cautious support, mainly through the grant of subsidies, to the creation of a national culture—literature, arts, music, and theater. Finally, a long and ultimately victorious war with Paraguay (1864–1871) brought Brazilians from all parts of the country together on the battlefield and through bloodshed strengthened identity with the nation. The consolidation of Brazil as a nation-state, impressive as it was, could not disguise the existence of major problems. The country lacked the material and social infrastructure—railroads, highways, telegraph lines, schools, and universities —that the European nations, the United States, and even Argentina possessed in abundance. Brazil also displayed no economic dynamism, still depending on slavery for agricultural labor and failing to develop manufacturing industries. The imperial regime, which above all feared renewed threats to the country’s unity and disliked the emergence of autonomous centers of power in the provinces, refused to embark on a program of structural development for the nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Further, the governing circles’ support for nation-building was restrained by the complex attitudes toward race existing in Brazil. Too vigorous a program of social integration would put at risk control of the nation by the civilized “white” population, with which the governing circles identified. By the 1870s, the incapacity of the regime to manage the country’s problems was patent, and it was this factor as much as any other that triggered the declaration of the republic on November 15, 1889. By 1889 Brazil possessed all the characteristics of a nation-state—a unified territory, a single language, a common culture, a shared past. Yet, as this entry has shown, there was nothing inevitable about the emergence of a single nationstate out of the diverse territories and peoples that existed in the Portuguese New World. Brazil is living proof that nation-states can be constructed. Selected Bibliography Barman, Roderick J. 1989. Brazil: The Forging of a Nation, 1798–1852. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Burns, E. Bradford. 1968. Nationalism in Brazil: A Historical Survey. New York: Praeger. Costa, Emília Viotti da. 2000. The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories. Rev. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Diário da Assembléa Geral Constituinte e Legislativa do Império do Brasil. 1823. Obra comemorativa do sesquicentenário da instituição parlamentar. 2 vols. Introduction by de Pedro Calmon. Facsimile edition (Brasília, 1973). Kraay, Hendrik. 1999. “Between Brazil and Bahia: Celebrating Dois de Julho in NineteenthCentury Salvador.” Journal of Latin American Studies 32, no. 2: 255–286. Prado Júnior, Caio. 1967. The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil. Translated by Suzette Macedo. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rodrigues, José Honório. 1965. Aspirações nacionais; interpretação histórico-política. 2nd ed. São Paulo: Editora Fulgor. Schwartz, Stuart B. 1987. “The Formation of a Colonial Identity in Brazil.” In Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500–1800, edited by Nicholas Canny and Anthony Pagden, 15–50. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


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Canada Colin M. Coates Chronology 1608 Establishment of a French fort at Quebec. 1713 Treaty of Utrecht: Britain acquires title to peninsular Nova Scotia, and France cedes its claims to parts of Newfoundland and Rupert’s Land; the St. Lawrence Valley and interior of the continent as well as Ile Royale (Cape Breton) and Ile St. John (Prince Edward Island) are still claimed by France. 1759 Battle of the Plains of Abraham, British defeat of French army. 1763 Treaty of Paris, ceding New France to Britain. 1837–1838 Rebellions in Lower and Upper Canada (Quebec and Ontario) against British rule, defeated by British troops. 1840 Act of Union, combining Upper and Lower Canada into one province in the hope of establishing an English-speaking Protestant majority. 1864 Charlottetown meeting to discuss a proposed union of the Atlantic colonies; representatives of the United Canadas bring the issue of a larger British North American federation to the table. 1867 Passage of British North America Act, bringing the United Canadas, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia into a federation; Canada comes into being July 1. 1869–1870 First uprising led by Louis Riel; Manitoba is admitted into Confederation. 1885 Second Riel Rebellion; Execution of Riel; Honoré Mercier’s nationalist Parti national is elected the provincial government in Quebec one year later. 1917 Conscription crisis during World War I, a period of grave division between Englishand French-speaking Canadians. 1939–1945 World War II; the central government establishes key foundations of the Canadian welfare state; the issue of conscription again divides English and French Canadians, though to a lesser extent.

Situating the Nation The Canadian nation originated out of the remnants of two 18th-century European empires in North America. Arguably, no single coherent national identity defined the northern half of North America before 1945, but rather two main parallel and sometimes competing national identities evolved. It is only after the end of the period under study in this volume that two key events occurred in Canadian nationhood: the institution of a distinctive Canadian citizenship in 1947, and the completion of the present boundaries of the country through the integration of Newfoundland and Labrador in 1949. While much of present-day Canada (as well as present-day United States) was claimed by France, the defeat of French forces in 1759–1760 led to a brief political N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Conquest (1759) The first 150 years of European settlement in the region now called eastern Canada was typified by strife between the French and the British. Although the French population in the New World remained much smaller than the British settlements, the strategic position of French forts along the St. Lawrence River helped them resist the various British attacks. The French surrendered significant territorial claims to the British in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, but the key turning point in the history of French Canada was General James Wolfe’s victory over General Louis de Montcalm at Quebec in 1759. Termed the “Conquest,” this battle left the city of Quebec in ruins. A deep scar on the mentality of French Canadians, the forced integration of Quebec into the British empire was nonetheless a key step in the creation of the Canadian nation. But the humiliation of the defeat still serves as a latent cause for some French Canadian antipathies to Canada’s constitutional framework.

unity under the British Crown for most of eastern North America. The regions that became Canada comprise essentially those parts of North America that chose not to join the United States. At the time of the American Revolution, rebel troops invaded the two most populous British colonies in the north, Quebec and Nova Scotia, but the efforts to entice these areas into rebellion were not successful. The majority French-speaking and Catholic inhabitants of Quebec had reason, perhaps, to distrust the Protestant fervor of American colonists. In Nova Scotia, much of the population had roots in New England, but the presence of the sizeable naval base at Halifax enhanced the lack of enthusiasm for rebellion against British authorities. In the aftermath of the American Revolution, many Loyalists fled to the remaining British colonies, their presence leading to considerable constitutional change: the creation of a separate Upper Canada (present-day southern Ontario), the short-lived colony of Cape Breton (1785–1820), and New Brunswick. St. John’s Island (renamed Prince Edward Island in 1799) also enjoyed a distinct colonial status after 1769. In the oldest British overseas colony, Newfoundland, imperial authorities continued to discourage permanent settlement until the 19th century. Despite their common British allegiance from 1760, the colonies did not share much sense of a common destiny. The main population centers were separated by considerable distances, and there were few trading links among the colonies. Moreover, each colony had its distinct history of European settlement. For some British political figures, including some of the appointed governors, the unification of the colonies seemed an entirely logical outcome. The logic was much less apparent to local political figures. At the same time, the British had to deal with an anomalous case: Quebec (Lower Canada after 1791) retained a French-speaking and Catholic majority. Although Catholics enjoyed more political freedoms in Quebec than they did in Britain, tensions festered over the degree of political control that local elected representatives could wield. These issues contributed to political unrest in the 1830s and ultimately to the armed rebellions of 1837–1838. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Ostensibly led by Louis-Joseph Papineau, the rebellions in Lower Canada quickly expanded beyond his control, and he fled to sanctity in the United States. The Scottish-born journalist and politician William Lyon Mackenzie, mistakenly hearing of widespread rebel victories in Lower Canada, led a short-lived uprising in Upper Canada, then he, too, fled south. Both leaders eventually returned to the colonies, assuming active but much less prominent political roles. The British solution was, in part, to unite Upper and Lower Canada in the hopes that the French Canadians would find themselves in a minority and assimilate. However, astute French Canadian leaders strategically allied with reformers from Upper Canada and quickly regained many of their lost political rights. Nonetheless, the United Provinces of Canada East and Canada West proved difficult to manage, and ultimately some politicians saw as a solution a wider federation of the British colonies in North America.

Instituting the Nation In 1864, representatives of the four Atlantic colonies planned to meet in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, to discuss a local union. Politicians from the United Canadas requested to join the meeting and quickly came to dominate discussions, proposing a larger union of the British colonies in the eastern half of the continent. Despite considerable opposition throughout the colonies, an agreement was later reached at Quebec City and then ratified in the form of the British North America Act, passed by the British Parliament in Westminster in 1867. Newfoundland, much more oriented to the Atlantic fisheries and European markets, withdrew from the discussions, and tiny Prince Edward Island declined to join, hoping for an improved financial settlement. One of the key goals of the leading advocates of the Confederation was westward expansion, and the

British North America Act (1867) Passed by the Westminster Parliament in London, England, in 1867, this act created the Dominion of Canada and is the basis of the Canadian constitution. The bill was the outcome of negotiations among political leaders in the three colonies (the United Canadas, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia) that together formed the new federation. The wording of the bill represented a delicate balancing of regional and local concerns, along with the desire to create a larger political entity on the northern half of North America. However, it was not the product of widespread enthusiasm, and it did not show that a new sense of nationality had emerged. French and British Canadian elites held different interpretations of the central logic of confederation, and these views would structure some of the key debates on whether Canada was at heart a federation of many provinces or a pact between two founding peoples, the British and the French.


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new Canadian government planned to purchase from the Hudson’s Bay Company its claim to Rupert’s Land, the vast watershed that drained into Hudson Bay. The local populations in the western prairies were not consulted, and in 1869, Louis Riel on behalf of the métis (people of mixed aboriginal and French or Scottish ancestry) of the Red River settlement declared a provisional government. A hasty negotiation led to the entry of Manitoba (only a tiny area at the time) as a full-fledged province. At the same time, Canada entered into discussion with distant British Columbia, separated from the rest of the continent by the formidable Rocky Mountains. Examining the various options British Columbia faced, local politicians forewent joining the United States or remaining a separate British colony and joined Canada in 1871. Having achieved its better terms (an increase in per capita subsidies and money for a railroad), Prince Edward Island joined in 1873. Much of Canada’s geographical area retained the political status of “territory,” without the full range of powers accorded to provinces. In 1888, Canada acquired title to the Arctic Islands from Britain, and in 1905, the two new provinces of Saskatchewan and Alberta were created. Despite negotiations over the years, Newfoundlanders declined to join Canada until 1949, and even at that point the referendum vote gave only a small margin to the Canadian option. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Therefore, one of the key foundations of Canadian nationhood was the process of expansion. Canada’s official motto of “From Sea to Sea” was implicit in the choice of “dominion” for the country when it still only stretched from the Atlantic to the Great Lakes. Unification involved a series of pragmatic political decisions with no definitive break in allegiance to Great Britain. Transcontinental railways created economic linkages in the nation, the investments benefiting some sectors of society while creating antipathies among other groups.

Defining the Nation It proved very difficult to define Canada in anything other than political terms. With the vast majority of the population of European origin divided between British and French before 1945, it was almost impossible to posit an ethno-cultural unity for the Canadian people. Nonetheless, in the late 19th century, some writers tried to propose a common Norman heritage for both French Canadians and English-speaking Canadians. More typically, Canada remained throughout this period a profoundly local society, and indeed its constitution defined the country in this way. A key feature of the Canadian constitution was the degree of power accorded to the provinces. The provincial governments had jurisdiction over education, health, local welfare, and natural resources, while the central government controlled currency, interprovincial trade and transportation, indirect taxation, and foreign affairs (this last power acquired after a slow evolution away from British control). In other words, the provincial governments had greater influence over many aspects of everyday life than did the central government, even if the latter maintained the right to disallow any provincial laws with which it did not agree. Tellingly, the central government has made only rare use of its veto power. The central government maintained considerable taxation powers, and so was permitted some latitude in developing programs of national scope. But throughout most of the period, the broad liberal consensus on the limited role of the state meant that the central government made few incursions into provincial jurisdictions. French Canadian national identity revolved around themes of a shared Catholic faith and French language, a distinct legal civil code, and a range of Church-run educational and welfare institutions. Within Quebec, where the vast majority of the population was French-speaking, these characteristics were firmly rooted. In French-speaking areas outside of Quebec, the antipathies of English-speakers threatened the minority groups’ schools. In the aftermath of the Great Depression of the 1930s, which profoundly affected the prairie provinces in particular (as well as Newfoundland, which was bankrupted and lost its local control to a British-appointed commission government), and in the context of the exigencies of World War II, the central government expanded both its tax base and its political scope. The creation of the welfareN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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state policies of unemployment insurance (1940) and the family allowance (1945) led to an enhanced role for the Canadian government, and these developments would eventually create resentment in and competition from the government of Quebec.

Narrating the Nation It has proven extremely difficult to develop a national narrative to include the great majority of the Canadian population. In the first place, aboriginal peoples were categorically excluded from any national narrative, except perhaps in the early decades of settlement, for nonaboriginals perceived them to be hostile or irrelevant to Canadian growth. Aboriginal peoples were defined, in the context of Canadian law, as wards of the central government. Consequently, provincial governments did not have to serve this population, and incoming settlers often successfully lobbied governments to remove the aboriginal people from prime agricultural or resource-rich land. Until 1960, aboriginal people were denied the right to vote unless they gave up their official “Indian” status. For their part, French Canadian nationalists perceived that their people had a special status in North America, a staunchly Catholic island in a vast AngloSaxon, materialist sea. French Canadians (the term Québécois was not widely used, except to define people who lived in Quebec City, before the 1960s) argued that Canada was founded on a concept of duality, implying respect for the two “founding peoples” of the country. This respect was to be shown in the right to use both English and French in the national parliament and before federal courts and in constitutional protections for minority religious education (often flaunted by English-majority provinces). Some French Canadians hoped that, although clearly the political power of their people was centered in Quebec, their people could expand across the country and enjoy protection throughout. At the same time, there was a strong sense of the historic distinctiveness of French Canadians. The history of the French colonial period represented the “heroic age,” symbolized by individuals who defended the French colony against British and aboriginal (usually Iroquois) attacks. For French Canadians, the British conquest of 1759–1760 was a shameful event. Survival (“survivance”), often in the face of daunting odds, was the main theme explicating the French Canadian historical narrative, and the key heroes were people such as Dollard des Ormeaux, who gave his life defending the struggling colony, and 14-year-old Madeleine de Verchères, who thwarted a surprise Iroquois attack on her family’s fort. Conversely, for many English-speaking Canadians, the British conquest was the founding moment in the history of the country. English Canadian children learned the unofficial anthem, “The Maple Leaf Forever,” with its panegyric to General James Wolfe, the victor at Quebec. Moreover, for many English-speaking N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Canadians, their political identity was not merely as Canadians but also as British subjects. Unlike the history of all other immigrant groups, British immigrants arrived at fairly regular intervals after 1815, continually providing fresh links to the mother country. (In contrast, the majority of the French Canadian population traced its ancestry back to a small wave of immigrants in the late 17th century, and there was only insubstantial migration after this time.) British immigration was diverse, including Scots and Irish in the early and mid-19th century and large waves of English in the key period of immigration from 1896 to 1911. The reliance on immigration is one of the key defining features of English-speaking Canadian identity, and the roots of this identity can be seen in this period. With the largescale immigration of non-English speakers between 1896 and 1911, English Canadian elites mobilized to inculcate “British” values in the schools. For English Canadians, national narratives attempted to include French Canada by assimilating the history of New France as a romantic precursor to the peaceful political progress under British rule. The rebels of 1837–1838 were dismissed as well meaning but ill advised. The key heroes were those who defended Europeans against aboriginal or “American” attacks. The self-sacrificing generals James Wolfe and Sir Isaac Brock (of the War of 1812) occupied an important place

In this 1903 cartoon, the Canadian Mounted Policeman conducts male immigrants of many nationalities in singing, in English, a Canadian anthem. This image reveals the anxieties and hopes inspired by the massive wave of immigration to western Canada between 1896 and 1911. (Library and Archives Canada)


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in the Canadian pantheon. English Canadian nationalism was defensive, partly celebrating the slow but steady acquisition of political control away from British authorities (an argument that took the form Colony to Nation in Arthur Lower’s widely read history book written in 1946), and partly attributing greater moral weight to English Canadian political practices in contrast to the unbridled democracy of the United States. Furthermore, Canadians celebrated their harsh climate, even though the vast majority of nonaboriginal Canadians have always lived very close to the border with the United States. Canadians located their “manliness,” for the argument was often gendered, in their ability to withstand the cold winters. The rugged landscape of the Canadian Shield came to symbolize the country, even though only a small percentage of Canadians lived there. This imagery was best epitomized by the paintings of the nationalist “Group of Seven,” active in the 1920s and 1930s.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation It proved very difficult to mobilize the nation as a whole. Fortunately, Canada was given a geographical location that allowed it to avoid many of the tensions that other nations have to face. With only one significant neighbor, Canada has seldom had to defend its borders against attacks. The American rebel invasion of 1775 was met with some ambivalence and a certain degree of hostility, but it was essentially defeated by the harsh winter. The American attacks during the War of 1812 were repulsed by a combination of British troops, aboriginal allies, and some local militia. Small Fenian (Irish-nationalist) raids in the mid-19th century also revealed the difficulty of defending a very long border. But Canadians have always realized that they could not withstand a concerted American assault and instead have maintained generally good relations with their closest neighbor. The two uprisings led by Louis Riel in the prairie West revealed some of the fault lines in the country. In 1869, Riel was ostensibly defending the right of the métis to have some say over their political future. In 1885, although the issues were somewhat more complicated and Riel’s mental state was much less solid, he attempted to do the same again. A British Canadian force quickly suppressed Riel’s métis troops, Protestant English Canadians having joined in droves to fight this, the only large-scale, internal battle on Canadian soil. Riel was captured and charged with treason. During his trial, French Canadians rallied to Riel’s defense, whereas English Canadians desired vengeance for his execution of the prisoner Thomas Scott at the time of the 1869–1870 uprising. Riel’s hanging in 1885 led to one of the greatest rifts in Canadian political history since Confederation and contributed to the election of Honoré Mercier’s nationalist Parti national in Quebec. While in some countries, external wars serve as a means to enhance internal unity, the opposite was the case in Canada. The South African War (1899–1902) N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Henri Bourassa (1868–1953) The grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau, leader of the Patriote Party and the most prominent rebel of 1837, Henri Bourassa emerged as one of the key intellectual leaders of French Canadians in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Elected first for the Liberal Party to the Canadian House of Commons in 1896, he differed with party officials over support for the South African War. He left the party and sat as an independent, fighting for the rights of French Canadians across the country. He proposed a thoroughly bilingual and bicultural country, where Catholics would be able to control their own institutions and thus maintain their faith. A brilliant orator and journalist, Bourassa had less success as a politician. His alliance with the Conservative Party led by Robert Borden helped the latter to victory in the 1911 election, but Borden then created a government with little French-Canadian influence as the country prepared for war and faced the wrenching issue of conscription. Bourassa again sat in the House of Commons as an Independent Member of Parliament from 1925 to 1935 but did not enjoy the same influence as he had previously.

provided the first key test of the different views on Canadian involvement in battles of the British empire. Many English Canadians rallied to the British attempt to suppress the Afrikaaners’ uprising in southern Africa, whereas French Canadians opposed financial and military support for the distant campaign and identified with the struggle of the Afrikaaners. Protests in the streets of Montreal presaged the broader division that developed during World War I. French Canadians were willing to defend Canadian interests but did not wish to be compelled to participate in overseas combats. When World War I broke out in 1914, as long as enlistment in the Canadian forces remained voluntary, deeper differences in opinion could be evaded. But in 1917, when conscription was introduced, riots erupted in Quebec City, and the Quebec legislature openly discussed for the first time the possibility of leaving the Canadian federation. The end of the war lessened tensions again, and in World War II, the government of Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King (grandson of the rebel William Lyon Mackenzie) deftly, though confusingly, handled the issue. Initially, King promised that there would be no conscription. As the military commitment deepened, in 1942 King’s government held a plebiscite asking to be released from its promise; the result was strong English Canadian support for conscription in English Canada and strong French Canadian opposition. King delayed committing to conscription until late in 1944. At the same time, the Canadian government invested in more convincing propaganda to advance the national war effort, invoking figures of the country’s heroic past to encourage enlistment. The King government also introduced welfare-state policies, making the central government much more relevant to individual families. Until 1945, Canada remained a fairly regionalized country, with limited connections among the different provinces and territories, and particularly divided N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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by the two main language groups who had few relations outside of national politics. Given the constitutional division of responsibilities, there could be no national curriculum, and the French Canadian and English Canadian views of the nation’s history differed markedly. The 50th anniversary of Confederation, falling in the midst of World War I at a time when French and English speakers were clearly divided, was a muted affair, and even the 60th anniversary in 1927 failed to capture significant popular support. Canada had a limited degree of bilingualism, but the minority French language speakers were assisted by favorable demography and distance from major English-speaking populations. In Canada’s main city, Montreal, the two linguistic groups existed side by side but with little mixing, forming, in the words of author Hugh Maclennan’s important novel, Two Solitudes. Despite the initial reluctance of some of the colonies to join the confederation, there was little serious discussion of secession, and the instances of provincial threats of secession in the early decades can best be understood as bargaining positions. A deeper interest among some of the political elite in Quebec for forming a separate country was propelled in part by the divisions wrought by the two world wars, but no important politicians in the province supported secession in the 1940s. Key changes in state function that occurred in the 1940s led the central government to increase its fields of activities at the expense of provincial jurisdictions. Quebec politicians and intellectuals began to resent these incursions and increasingly saw an opportunity to develop the role of the provincial government along similar lines. In this way, Quebec nationalism, and ultimately secessionism, grew in response to the central government’s decision to modify the terms of the constitutional deal of 1867. In 1931, the Statute of Westminster defined Canada as a self-governing dominion. In the 1940s, the economic and military difficulties of Great Britain forced Canadian politicians to develop stronger links with the United States. Bilateral agreements increased the continental pull on Canadian affairs, to the dismay of many English Canadians who retained a strong emotional attachment to Great Britain. Canadian delegates played an important role in developing the new United Nations, as Canada increasingly saw itself as a key “middle power” on the international stage. Still, with the country’s main constitutional document an act of the British Parliament that could only be modified with the agreement of British politicians, some maintained that Canada still was not fully independent of the imperial power. Selected Bibliography Berger, Carl. 1970. The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867–1914. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Buckner, Phillip, ed. 2008. Canada and the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Coates, Colin, and Cecilia Morgan. 2002. Heroines and History: Representations of Madeleine de Verchères and Laura Secord. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.


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Granatstein, J. L., and J. M. Hitsman. 1977. Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Greer, Allan. 1995. “1837–38: Rebellions Reconsidered.” Canadian Historical Review 76, no. 1: 1–18. Martin, Ged. 1995. Britain and the Origins of Canadian Confederation. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Nelles, H. V. 2005. A Little History of Canada. Toronto: Oxford University Press. Silver, Arthur I. 1982. The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation, 1864–1900. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Trofimenkoff, Susan Mann. 1983. The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec. Toronto: Gage.


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Central America Jordana Dym Chronology 1517–1524

1534–1542 1542

1560s 1759–1808 1778 1784–1789

1793–1816 1808 1808–1814 1811–1812 1812 1820–1821 1821

1821–1823 1822 1824–1826 1824–1839 1825–1829 1829–1838 1831–1838 1838–1839

Conquest of Central American territories and peoples from what is now Chiapas, Mexico, to Panama by Spanish conquistador bands, and the foundation of important cities including San Salvador (El Salvador), León and Granada (Nicaragua), and Guatemala City (Guatemala). Establishment of bishoprics in Guatemala, Chiapas, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Captaincy General of Guatemala established, providing a single executive (captain general) and judicial court (audiencia) for the provinces stretching from Chiapas to Costa Rica; except for 1563–1568, this institution was the central authority until independence in 1821. Establishment of the first permanent Spanish settlements in Costa Rica; founding of Cartago. Bourbon reforms (fiscal, political, military, social). Spanish Crown allows free trade within the empire. Intendancies of Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Chiapas are created, consolidating several smaller districts and approximating the territories of subsequently independent states. Publication of Gazeta de Guatemala, Central America’s first newspaper. Napoleon Bonaparte invades Spain and usurps the Spanish throne. Spanish “War of Independence”; Spain ruled by a junta and regency until the monarchy was restored. Uprisings in San Salvador, León and Granada (Nicaragua), and Tegucigalpa (Honduras). Political constitution of the Spanish monarchy (Constitution of Cádiz) (implemented in Central America from 1812 to 1814, 1820 to 1821). Publication of competing newspapers in Guatemala City, El Editor Constitucional and El Amigo de la Patria. Intendancy of Guatemala decreed (approximately the future republic of Guatemala). Cities and provinces of Central America declare independence from Spain and, in some cases, each other. After November 1821 referendum, Central American provinces join Mexican empire. El Salvador erects its own bishopric, recognized by the Vatican in 1842. Constitutions drafted for a federation (1824), formed by El Salvador (1824), Guatemala (1825), Honduras (1825), Costa Rica (1825), and Nicaragua (1826). Period of the Central American Federation, comprised of five states (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica). The federation president is conservative Manuel José Arce (Guatemala). The federation president is liberal Francisco Morazán (Honduras). The presidency of liberal Mariano Gálvez (Guatemala). Division of Guatemala into two separate states, adding a sixth state, Los Altos (Guatemalan highland area), to the federation; after 1839, Los Altos is reabsorbed into Guatemala.


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1838–1840 Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica secede from the federation; they establish sovereign and independent republics and write national constitutions. 1844–1865 The presidency or indirect rule of conservatives Rafael Carrera (1844–1865, Guatemala), Juan Rafael Mora (Costa Rica, 1849–1859), and Santos Guardiola (1856– 1862, Honduras). 1850 Bishopric of San José (Costa Rica) established. 1856–1857 Costa Rica leads Central American resistance to William Walker, U.S. adventurer who seeks to govern and annex a region from Nicaragua (the “National War”). 1870s–1880s The liberal governments of Tomás Guardia (1870–1882, Costa Rica), Justo Rufino Barrios (1871–1885, Guatemala), Rafael Zaldívar (1876–1885, El Salvador), Marco Aurelio Soto (1876–1883, Honduras) encourage positivist goals of “order and progress,” specifically foreign investment, exports, agricultural reform, reduced church influence, and railway and telegraph construction. 1874 U.S. businessman Minor Keith starts the United Fruit Company, growing bananas on land conceded to his railroad building company. 1885 Battle of Chalchuapa (Barrios’s failed attempt to forcibly re-create the Central American Federation). 1893–1909 The liberal presidency of José Santos Zelaya (Nicaragua) ends with U.S. intervention. 1895–1898 Brief period of the “Grand Republic of Central America” comprised of Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador.

Situating the Nation Central America is geographically an isthmus uniting North and South America. Politically, it comprises the five countries of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, which, from 1542 to 1821, were politically joined in the Captaincy General of Guatemala, an autonomous Spanish colony with its own political, judicial, military, religious, and economic authorities. These territories of the Captaincy General formed the basis for the Federal Republic of Central America (1824–1839) that emerged after the region became independent of Spain in 1821. Subsequently, the federation’s five states became sovereign republics, after 20 years of civil war. From the late 18th to late 19th centuries, Central America had a diverse regional economy. Colonial capital cities, which later became federal and national capitals, were financial and commercial centers supported by a vast hinterland producing foodstuffs and export goods ranging from cattle and sheep to cotton and wool cloth, fruits and vegetables, tobacco, coffee, silver, and indigo. Indigenous and mixed-race communities provided most of the labor that tilled fields, wove textiles, and built houses for the Spanish and later national elites. Similar relations repeated in smaller scale in every administrative district. Varied geography and climate meant that different regions specialized in different products, which led to an important trans-isthmian trade that continued after independence, despite endemic conflicts between the merchants in Guatemala City who N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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controlled access to export trade and the provincial elites who supplied the rest of the colony’s needs. In particular, the cattle industries of Nicaragua and Honduras supported mobility for the men who brought the beasts to market throughout the isthmus, and Pacific Coast coffee plantations and shipbuilding industries throughout the region attracted workers from as far as the Atlantic Coast’s Bay Islands (Honduras), retaining a “Central American” working-class identity at odds with the official national identities of the elites building the states. A complex geography, in which heavy rains might make roads impassable for many months and correspondence from Guatemala could take two months to reach Costa Rica, prompted development of distinct societies in the different regions that grew up in partial isolation, in a landscape that hindered regular and swift communication. About half of Central America’s population lived in what became the country of Guatemala, giving this one state disproportionate representation in federal institutions and contributing to tensions and instability among states. And, between the 1770s and 1880s, Central America’s residency pattern changed with substantial migration from rural settlements to the region’s principal cities. The region’s diverse population—of around 800,000 in 1778 and over 2 million by 1879—also influenced national development. Ethnically, the small number of Spaniards and their American-born descendants, Creoles, made up around 4 percent of the population, but this group dominated politics and the local economy, comprising the vast majority of regional and national leaders and officials, clerks, newspaper publishers, and landowners. The bulk of the population was 65 percent Indian, and the rest was of mixed Indian, European, and African origin (ladinos, castas, mestizos), who were largely small farmers and artisans, although a few climbed social ladders through marriage, education, or patronage networks to join the elite. This working class of indigenous or mixed-race heritage found few of their own leaders or values represented in the new nation-state, which took its cues from the ideals of the Enlightenment and the French and North American revolutions with which the elite national leaders were culturally as well as politically and economically comfortable. Although Guatemala’s predominantly Mayan, Nicaragua’s largely ladino, and El Salvador’s Indian and ladino populations could successfully petition the new national governments for specific and targeted policies, they did so more as communities using traditional identities than as individuals active in building national states or as soldiers whose choices about which leaders to follow toppled more than one government. Indigenous groups that had not accepted Spanish rule, like the Moskitu and Zambo in Honduras and Nicaragua and the Afro-Caribbean Garifuna, retained their political as well as linguistic and cultural autonomy well into the 20th century. The century leading to independence shaped Central America’s early national projects. In particular, reforms implemented by Spain’s Bourbon dynasty (1759–1808) created fractures in this small imperial colony, especially the relative decline of its long-time capital, Guatemala City, and the rise of feuding regional N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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capitals León and Granada (Nicaragua), San Salvador (El Salvador), Comayagua and Tegucigalpa (Honduras), and Cartago and San José (Costa Rica). Royal reforms known for Enlightenment rationality improved colonial defenses and control of mixed-race populations through increased urban policing, education, and militia; introduced new or improved collection of existing taxes and intermittent free trade; and reduced church fiscal and ideological power. Reforms also consolidated multiple districts into four intendancies established in the 1780s in Chiapas, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Honduras and in 1820 in Guatemala, which dispersed political, economic, and religious power from Guatemala City and fortified provincial over colony-wide identities and allegiances. These reforms, as in Mexico and most of South America, undermined relations between the Iberian government and colonial societies, contributing to independence movements, while also driving wedges between the colony’s regions. In 1821, a declaration of independence severed three centuries of ties between the Captaincy General of Guatemala and Spain and also between the former and regional unity. The provinces of Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica did not have to fight Spain for their independence, which meant they had no opportunity to find common cause by opposing a colonial power. After deciding separately to join Mexico (1821–1823), their subsequent federation of five states (1824–1839) was short-lived. Almost immediately, these states found themselves in constant and disruptive conflict over issues ranging from what taxes to pay to which bishoprics to establish to how much power to give the federation or its member states. By the 1840s, the federation’s states separated into independent and often-feuding republics. Although they united to repel U.S. filibuster William Walker from Nicaragua in the 1850s, Central America’s republics ultimately failed to form a nation. From 1839 to 1880, cooperative and reunifying efforts were less pronounced than internal civil wars, invasions, border disputes, imperialist meddling, and incursions by exiled military politicians from refuge in neighboring states. On the one hand, close—if often hostile—national relations meant that each Central American republic suffered if the country on its borders experienced instability, economic crisis, or civil war, offering opportunities to develop unique national identities tied to an individual country. On the other hand, a common past and continuing political, social, and economic connections allowed individuals to seek their destiny in multiple countries, thus giving meaning to a shared Central American identity despite the impossibility of re-creating a single republic.

Instituting the Nation Between 1770 and 1880, Central America experienced three political projects that each redefined the relation of individual to state and nation. From 1770 to 1821, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Depiction of the Battle of Rivas in 1856, where Costa Rican president Juan Rafael Mora gathered a Central American coalition army and defeated American Confederate William Walker, pushing him back into Nicaraguan territory. (Library of Congress)

as part of the Captaincy General of Guatemala, residents were called upon first to be loyal to the Spanish king as individuals and as members of a broader political community that might be municipal or provincial in size. In addition, Spanish America’s caste system provided separate legal codes, and in theory separate towns, for Spaniards and their American-born descendants (Creoles) and the colony’s people of Indian, African, and mixed origin, dividing the colony’s population by race and ethnicity. Under the Spanish constitution of 1812 and after independence in 1821, as members first of the Mexican empire and then of the Central American Federation and its successor republics, individuals were recast from subjects to citizens, who as individuals were equal before the law and owed political allegiance to their state of residence and the federation regardless of race, ethnicity, or class. What bound individuals together was no longer loyalty to a monarch but loyalty to a system of governance whose motto was “God, Union, and Liberty.” Thus, the nation in early to mid-19th-century Central America was not based on race, ethnicity, or language—for the population was heterogeneous, descending from Spaniards, indigenous peoples, and Africans—but rather was based on a supposed sharing of common ideals, from the belief in a central government that would govern through democratically elected executive, legal, and judicial N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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authorities to a shared Catholic identity. This national ideal, meant to bury remnants of a colonial system that had depended on loyalty to corporate entities such as guilds or family and patronage networks, was promulgated principally by the isthmus’s elite residents, such as José Cecilio del Valle (Honduras) and Pedro Molina (Guatemala). Although the populations of Central America quickly adapted to electoral politics, voting in many elections for local, regional, and national authorities in the first unstable decades following independence, they did not necessarily adopt these ideals. While Indian villagers and their scribes wrote petitions in the language of republican liberty, they behaved in traditional fashion, joining factions or insurrections based on local grievances and allegiances rather than in the name of unity among peoples of similar ethnic or state origin. Establishing federal and national capitals undermined rather than fostered identities, stability, and unity. Colonial capital Guatemala City was a controversial choice for the federal capital, as other states wanted to decrease the political and economic influence of the merchants who lived there and who had controlled much of the colonial export trade. Thus, the federal capital eventually moved to Sonsonate, San Vicente, and eventually San Salvador in El Salvador. Serving as federal capital meant that Guatemala and El Salvador had temporary state capitals in Antigua (1825–1826) and San Vicente (1834–1839), limiting the stability of state governments until Guatemala City and San Salvador resumed their traditional political roles in the 1840s. Equally disruptive were capital-rotating provisions in Costa Rica and Honduras, established to prevent civil war between competing cities, which is what happened when Nicaragua’s León and Granada became so competitive that, after unsuccessfully splitting government functions, the state eventually named Managua as state capital in 1857. After the federation failed, conservative presidents including Rafael Carrera (Guatemala), Santos Guardiola (Honduras), and Juan Rafael Mora (Costa Rica) kept constitutional order but favored more traditional and centralized relations among state, church, and society. They achieved the stability necessary for national roots to begin to develop. In the 1840s through 1860s, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador began to export coffee, Guatemala’s cochineal and El Salvador’s indigo dye markets grew slowly, Honduran silver mines lured in foreign speculators, regional cattle markets continued, and Nicaragua and Panama hosted North Americans headed toward the California gold rush. As the region’s economy recovered, institutions in the five Central American republics began to deliver a national education program, collect taxes with some regularity, establish national police and military forces, and enforce the provisions of whatever constitutions and legal codes endured more than a few months or years. By the 1870s and 1880s, as railroads and telegraphs connected isthmian plantations with Atlantic and Pacific ports and facilitated communication for governments and individual Central Americans traveling and working throughout the region, a sense of Central America as a pátria grande, a place of shared opportunities for individuals, had reemerged. Liberal governments returned, encouraging N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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positivist goals of “order and progress,” specifically foreign investment, exports, agricultural reform, reduced church influence, and railway and telegraph construction. Re-creating a Central American national polity, however, was the dream of only a few elites, whose efforts in 1852, 1896–1898, and 1921–1922 produced only ephemeral three-state federations. Since the early 20th century, such Central American connections continue with a Central American Court of Justice (1907) and, with the exception of Costa Rica, a Central American Common Market (1960) and Parliament (Parlacen, 1991). Parlacen serves as a forum for debate and for harmonizing policies for Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Panama, and, since 2004, the Dominican Republic.

Defining the Nation Defining the national territory of Central America principally meant incorporating former colonial districts into countries, with the exception of the province of Chiapas, which joined Mexico. Several provinces that had been autonomous annexed themselves to the new states, most notably Sonsonate joined El Salvador and Nicoya joined Costa Rica in 1824. Guatemala’s highlands briefly engineered the status of a sixth state for the largely Mayan area of 200,000 residents, joining the federation in 1838 only to be reabsorbed by force into Guatemala when the federation failed a year later. Constitutions listed the districts within countries, largely adopting colonial jurisdictions. Helping to consolidate the identification of people with specific territories, border disputes between most of the countries and their neighbors remained irritants in regional relations until the early 20th century, when many were settled in binding arbitration. Within the federation and later the independent states, people influenced politics in “factions” or early political parties that divided either along ideological, class, or community lines. At independence, liberales and serviles represented the “liberal” and “conservative” ideals of free trade versus protectionism, a reduced versus continued church role in politics and economy, individual versus communal rights, and, most importantly, decentralized governments versus a strong central state. Sometimes the split into factions happened within a single community, as in Guatemala City at independence, where Pedro Molina and José Cecilio del Valle’s competing newspapers, El Editor Constitucional and Amigo de la Pátria, presented the two philosophies to the men who later participated in drafting the federation’s 1824 constitution. Sometimes the split was between cities, as when Nicaragua’s conservative León and liberal Granada dragged the new state into civil war in 1824. Over the course of the 19th century, liberals emerged as the first leaders, but their ideals provoked such opposition from Creole elites and skeptical indigenous and mixed-race lower classes that the federation failed in a welter of bitter wars. Conservatives took power in the 1830s, governing the five indepenN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Mariano Gálvez Mariano Gálvez (Guatemala), chief of state from 1831 to 1837, is perhaps the best exemplar of the liberal executive and his goals. He enacted and implemented a series of reforms, ranging from free trade, export development, freedom of religion, universal education, and development of a civil registry and state-controlled hospitals. He also introduced judicial reforms, including trial by jury, and welcomed European colonization projects on unexploited state lands. His program tried to reduce the influence of three basic aspects of colonial society: church political, ideological, and economic influence; the separation of indigenous and Hispanicized communities; and economic isolation. Indigenous communities, concerned about land reform and a new direct tax on individuals, and the Catholic church, concerned about its loss of influence, resisted such reforms, and Gálvez was ousted when a cholera outbreak in 1837 allowed his opponents, which included the church and conservative politicians, to orchestrate an uprising that brought conservatives to power for the next 30 years.

dent states as they built themselves into durable countries. The reins of power returned to liberals by the 1870s, when more industrialization and connection to international commerce produced a second major political shift.

Narrating the Nation Between the 1770s and 1880s, the number of events shaping the political future of what became five separate countries can seem infinite, particularly given the number of internal crises and conflicts that emerged. However, certain moments stand out as, if not decisive, then at least important. The crisis in the Spanish empire provoked by Napoleon Bonaparte’s invasion of Spain in 1808 and the subsequent response of Peninsular and American Spaniards demonstrated both the fragility of American ties to Spain as well as to each other. Central America’s response of loyalty and insurrection included participating in the election of representatives to Spain’s interim governments, including deputies to the Spanish Parliament of 1810–1814, whose experience in helping to draft the Political Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy (1812) influenced Central America’s own constitution-writing a decade later. Men like Father Antonio Larrazábal (Guatemala), Father Florencio Castillo (Costa Rica), and Mariano Robles (Chiapas) are remembered in each country as founding fathers who fought for greater representation in the Cortes as well as for benefits for their own provinces—from recognition for putting down insurrections to new educational institutions and bishoprics. Similarly, others worked for autonomy, as when Mariano José Arce, Federation president from 1825 to 1829, led an 1811 insurrection to oust Spanish officials in San Salvador and set the precedent for local selection of governors, military N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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officials, and tax collectors by the principal men of the city, both European and African in origin. The 1824 Central American National Constituent Assembly (ANC), comprised of 34 delegates from throughout the isthmus, included these and other constitutional legislators as well as the region’s most erudite businessmen, clerics, and ranchers. The 1824 constitution of the Federal Republic of Central America became the model for most subsequent area constitutions, and its constituent body is remembered as the most distinguished legislative assembly of the era. Other events are remembered by individual states as part of their struggle for eventual sovereignty. Principal among these is the 1822 Salvadoran decision to erect a bishopric independent of the Guatemalan bishopric upon which they had depended throughout the colonial period. Although the Vatican did not recognize the bishopric until 1842, El Salvador’s first bishop, Matías Delgado, is a national hero for his role in establishing a separate identity for his fledgling country. Each country has its own national heroes and villains from among the early leaders. Honduras celebrates Francisco Morazán, federation president from 1829 until its dissolution, by naming districts after him. Costa Rica recalls the presidency of Juan Rafael Mora, attached to the “myth” of Costa Rica’s unique heritage of unity. Although this myth ignores evidence of internal strife prior to 1840, it does anchor 20th-century Costa Rica’s self-identification as a country of stable democracy, without the civil wars or foreign occupations that its northern neighbors experienced more frequently. Conservative leaders, including Guatemala’s Rafael Carrera, whose mixed race and humble origins proved problematic for celebrating his accomplishments and contributions to creating stability, have not been as fully adopted into the national pantheon of heroes. Even after the failure of union, Central American leaders and people came together in 1856 and 1857 to oust North American William Walker from his position as dictator of Nicaragua, a country whose government institutions he seized in 1855 with plans to establish and control the isthmus. Although the conservative heads of state who allied to expel the intruder did not see their effort as a precursor to restoring a Central American country, the successful effort provided residents with a rare moment of regional and national pride. It also provided a military opportunity for Central American leaders to express antiforeign sentiment that included rejection of liberal projects of secularization and individuality, which were perceived as foreign in origin, as well as British interference in or control of trade from bases such as Belize. Governments worked to weave these moments into national symbols and narratives. Federation leaders created a flag that put a white band, representing land, between two blue stripes, representing the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, with the national seal in the center. From the dissolution of the federation until today, the emergent countries retained the federal colors, although Guatemala made the stripes vertical rather than horizontal, and Costa Rica added red stripes in honor of the French tricolor. Individual countries customized their flags to emphasize their own histories by placing different seals between the blue and white N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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bands. Guatemala adopted the quetzal bird as its national symbol in 1871, and Nicaragua’s flag now displays the federation’s volcanic seal. Thus, as in many other areas, unity within diversity and the retention of a regional identity as well as national affiliation remains. Similarly, all five countries have adopted September 15, the defunct federation’s date of independence, as their own. This national Independence Day recognizes the region’s separation from Spain, celebrating the day that Guatemala City’s royal officials, churchmen, and city council declared independence rather than the dates on which many of the current national capitals issued separate declarations. By retaining the common date, a regional identity continues. Although there was little in literary production to symbolize the national characters of the new states, by the 1830s governments did take care to build the tools of national governance through law, histories, and cartography. The accomplishments of and challenges faced by the federation were celebrated in the region’s first two histories meant to memorialize the “national” revolution and provide a unifying narrative to bind the competing states into a permanent unit: conservative Manuel Montúfar’s 1832 Memorias para la historia de la revolución de Centro-América and liberal Alejandro Marure’s 1837 Bosquejo histórico de las revoluciones de Centroamérica. After the federation dissolved, national histories such as Felipe Molina’s Bosquejo de la República de Costa Rica (New York, 1851) emerged. El Salvador published its first compilation of national laws in 1856, followed by Nicaragua (1867), Guatemala (1869), and Costa Rica (1886), while Honduras compiled its state constitutions in 1878. States also commissioned national maps starting in the 1830s. The maps’ emphasis on surveys of mountains and elevations bespoke the national and political interest in using cartography to encourage foreign investment in canals, railroads, and telegraphs. Sometimes

Declaration of Independence, September 15, 1821 All five nation-states of Central America celebrate their Independence Day on September 15, thus marking the date that royal and local authorities jointly declared independence in the colonial capital of Guatemala City. The independence process actually began, however, with declarations in the principal towns of Chiapas in August 1821. Provincial capitals and villages throughout Central America responded in multiple ways to Guatemala City’s declaration, which included an invitation to participate in a constituent assembly. Later in the fall, Comayagua (Honduras), Quetzaltenango (Guatemala), and León (Nicaragua) declared independence from both Spain and Guatemala, seeking separately to join Mexico. León also expressed a wish to “wait until the clouds pass” to determine its next steps. Tegucigalpa (Honduras) and Granada (Nicaragua) sought union with Guatemala and independence from Spain. Costa Rica’s principal cities issued a joint declaration of independence in late October. Thus, the date recognized by all Central American nation-states as that of their independence reflects the constant tension between unity and division that prevented Central America from remaining a single political territory.


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governments used local talent, like Miguel Rivera Maestre, the author of Guatemala’s first atlas. Most often, however, they drew upon the expertise of entrepreneurial foreigners like German surveyor Maximilian von Sonnenstern, author of the first national maps of Nicaragua (1858) and El Salvador (1858). Between the 1830s and 1870s, the history, geography, and laws of the five countries became important expressions of national identity for both citizens and foreigners.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Bourbon reforms of the late 18th century and Central America’s independence in 1821 mobilized the region’s elite to develop a political identity for Central America. The Gazeta de Guatemala (1793–1816), the colony’s first newspaper and first colony-wide publication, emphasized for its elite readership that a shared geography and a 250-year history bound all residents to a shared pátria, whose boundaries were neither local nor imperial but those of the Captaincy General. Although not claiming national status, the reliance on geography and history to provide identity would be picked up in Domingo Juarros’s Historia de la ciudad de Guatemala, Central America’s first complete history that incorporated pre-Columbian civilizations into its formula. The Gazeta further fomented a sense of homogeneity by proposing to bring Indian and mixed-race residents into a modern form of production and by recasting the divided ethnic and social groups of colonial Central America as a single “public” that, through adopting Spanish language education and accepting profit as a motive, would improve both individual prosperity and the regional economy. These ideals were adopted by the elites who wrote the state and federal constitutions and legal codes. These leaders, however, failed to anticipate the hostility that their vision of a modern future that sidelined the church and traditional communal values and landholding would generate. From the earliest days of an independent Central America, representatives of the fledgling federation sought to provide the tools to join the country and its people into a unified whole. Without disputing the ethnic, linguistic, economic, and regional distinctions of Mayan Indians in Guatemala and Afro-Caribbean residents of the Nicaraguan and Honduran Mosquito Coasts, early legislators shared an Enlightenment philosophy that it was not race or class that created a national community but acceptance of a shared government. Thus, in addition to making all adult men citizens with equal rights (regardless of race, literacy, or property) in the first federal and state constitutions, the ANC in 1825 adopted a state motto, “God, Union, and Liberty,” that reflected their republican ideals. The leaders also developed a national seal of five volcanoes, one for each state, under a Phrygian cap, the emblem of the French Revolution that symbolized breaking


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with the old monarchic and corporate order of Europe. The gains to be achieved by joining a Spanish-speaking, capitalist, individualist society were, in their eyes, so obvious that holding on to traditional religious, communal, and corporate values, as well as customs and languages, could only hurt the nation. The conservatives of this period, who were less prepared for a wholesale rejection of colonial institutions and social norms, shared values closer to those arguing for multiethnic, multicultural, and multilingual forms of nationality today. At a time when the word “nation” was still associated more with birthplace than with a volitional political allegiance, Central American leaders used the language of a united “people,” or peoples. This language of unity probably reached the masses through legislation and broadsides addressed to “fellow citizens,” “Centroamericanos,” “Guatemaltecos,” and “Salvadoreños,” modified to fit the needs of the occasion, such as calls to support secessionist movements or national defense. The term thus encouraged individuals to see themselves as belonging to a national state rather than to a district, whether the unity was of Central Americans opposing Walker after the federation had failed or Guatemalans helping keep Salvadoran troops off “national” soil. The changing demands meant that individuals might continue to identify with multiple polities or ideals, even after the states originating them ceased to exist. Thus, for residents of Central America who lived between 1770 and 1880, a series of moments, policies, and institutions linked them as Spanish subjects, Central American citizens, and national citizens of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica. Because of enduring cultural and economic divisions and ties, an individual might consider himself a “citizen” of a particular municipal community or of the entirety of Central America as opportunities and governments came and went. An individual’s identity could thus officially be at odds with legal political divisions, although perhaps this was perfectly acceptable in practice. By the time the liberal governments of the late 19th century took office, they led countries whose legal framework, geographical reach, national symbols, and principal institutions had been recently put in place. Although the institutions did not reach fully into the countryside or all urban neighborhoods, and though many residents continued to view all of Central America and not just their home country as the land of professional development and opportunity, the national states of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica were en route to consolidating national institutions and confirming distinct identities. These identities were based either on existing ethnicities—Guatemala’s substantial indigenous population—or on emerging efforts to “create” homogeneous populations by developing an ideal of a mixed-race nation, as El Salvador and Nicaragua increasingly claimed at the turn of the 20th century. Such national and homogenizing projects were unevenly implemented and achieved limited popular acceptance, offering new challenges to the leaders of the early 20th century.


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Selected Bibliography Bushnell, David, and Neill Macaulay. 1988. The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Dym, Jordana. 2006. From Sovereign Villages to National States: City, State, and Federation in Central America, 1759–1839. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. Dym, Jordana, and Christophe Belaubre, eds. 2006. Politics, Economy and Society in Bourbon Central America, 1759–1808. Boulder: University Press of Colorado. Gudmundson, Lowell, and Hector Lindo-Fuentes. 1995. Central America, 1821–1871: Liberalism before Liberal Reform. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. Hale, Charles R. 1994. Resistance and Contradiction: Miskitu Indians and the Nicaraguan State, 1894–1987. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hall, Carolyn, and Héctor Pérez-Brignoli. 2003. Historical Atlas of Central America. John V. Carter, Cartographer. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Holden, Robert H. 2004. Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America, 1821–1960. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Karnes, Thomas. 1961. Central America: The Failure of Union, 1824–1960. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Langley, Lester D. 2001. The Banana Wars: United States Intervention in the Caribbean, 1898–1934. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Perez-Brignoli, Hector. 1989. A Brief History of Central America. Translated by Ricardo B. Sawrey A. and Susana Stettri de Sawrey. Berkeley: University of California Press. Stansifer, Charles L. 1966. “E. George Squier, and the Honduras Inter-Oceanic Railroad Project.” Hispanic American Historical Review 46, no. 1: 1–27. Williams, Robert G. 1994. States and Social Evolution: Coffee and the Rise of National Governments in Central America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Woodward, Ralph Lee Jr. 1999. Central America: A Nation Divided. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford University Press.


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Chile Patrick Barr-Melej Chronology 1808 Napoleon Bonaparte, emperor of France, invades Spain, and Ferdinand VII renounces the Spanish throne, creating a political crisis in Chile and elsewhere in the Americas. 1810 Led by the city council of Santiago and revolutionaries like Bernardo O’Higgins, proindependence Chileans seek separation from Napoleonic Spain. September 18, 1810, is remembered as Independence Day. 1810–1814 The period of the Pátria Vieja (“Old Fatherland”) —the first attempt at self-rule in Chile — ended in 1814 when Ferdinand VII returns to the throne and seeks to squash independence movements throughout Spanish America. 1818 Chilean revolutionaries defeat Spanish loyalists and realize full independence. 1834 The government sets forth an official coat of arms and a national motto: “By Reason or by Force.” 1836–1839 War against Peru and Bolivia fan the flames of Chilean patriotism and reinforce national identity. 1879 Chile again battles Peru and Bolivia. The spoils of war for victorious Chile comprise all of what is today northern Chile, including the cities of Antofagasta, Iquique, and Arica. More importantly, Chile secures very lucrative nitrate and copper deposits.

Situating the Nation When conquistador Pedro de Valdivia first gazed upon central Chile in the early 1540s, he saw before him a fertile land with a rather agreeable climate—the ideal place where his seignorial vision of large feudal-like estates, paternalistic landowners, and subservient laborers could be realized. Thousands of miles from the seat of colonial authority in Spanish South America—Lima, Peru—a nascent colonial society took root, always in danger of destruction at the hands of Araucanian Indians and the violent convulsions that often shook the very earth under their feet. Chilean society during the colonial period evolved on the very fringe of Spanish administration in the New World, entering the 18th century with an economically powerful class of native-born whites (criollos, or Creoles), a politically powerful contingent of peninsulares (Spanish-born whites), and a large underclass of agricultural and pastoral laborers. Criollos and peninsulares were united in their loyalty to the Spanish monarchy, which based its rule on the notion of divine right and, more importantly, on an ornate and stable system of bureaucracy and administration. NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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However, all was not well in Chile and elsewhere in Spanish America at the beginning of the 18th century. Spain’s Habsburg monarchs had waged costly wars in Europe, mercantilist economic policy had restricted economic growth in a globalizing marketplace, and many Chilean criollos, in a region bereft of significant gold and silver deposits, complained that Chile’s economic interests were ignored by a colonial government interested in more profitable areas of Spanish America. Under the Bourbon Spanish monarchs of the mid- and late 18th century, criollos grumbled about their lack of political power, as those native-born whites were, by law, excluded from positions of colonial authority. Despite their secondclass political status, and regardless of the Bourbon’s more rigorous tax policy, Chilean criollos remained loyal to the monarchy, even when Spain’s Ferdinand VII was captured by the invading armies of Napoleon in 1808, which created a power vacuum in the Americas and forever altered the course of Spanish colonialism. Soon, though, many criollos in Chile chose to chart a new political path for their nation—their pátria, or fatherland—and the development of a Chilean national identity was a most important aspect in their journey.

Instituting the Nation As early as the 16th century, criollos in Chile and elsewhere in the Americas were conscious of their American roots in a hemisphere controlled by Europeans. Early conflicts between the monarchy and the heirs of the conquistadors and other early settlers produced the first signs of the development of an American identity in the New World, which, over time, fragmented into the many national identities that were prevalent by the 18th century, if not earlier. Thus began an intellectual tradition based on regionalist and localist tendencies that persisted and matured alongside colonial institutions and administration for nearly three centuries. A so-called “Creole patriotism” spread quickly during the latter half of the 18th century in Chile, as native-born whites claimed an American identity and began seeing themselves more and more as Chileans and less like Spaniards. Interestingly, while relations with Chile’s indigenous population remained combative well into the 19th century, Creole patriots of the colonial period seized on the image of the heroic Araucanian Indian as they sought to firmly define what was autochthonous and what was not. One example of the Creoles’ interest in nativist imagery as part of their growing focus on “national” themes in the 18th century was their attention to Alonso de Ercilla’s 16th-century epic poem “La Araucana.” Unlike other literature of the early conquest era, Ercilla’s poem focused on the native element of the great encounter and, specifically, the Araucanian Indians of the southern region who heroically defended their land and life ways against the Spaniards for much of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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colonial period. The poem, a result of Ercilla’s personal recollections of the events he witnessed in the 1540s, describes the Araucanians as freedom fighters who thrived on the valiant struggle against the Iberian invaders and Spanish colonial oppression of the indigenous population, which Governor Pedro de Valdivia was unable to curb. The execution of Caupolicán, a leading Araucanian war chief, is among many instances of Spanish excess decried in the poem. Ercilla’s poem was out of print for a century before Chilean criollos began reading it again in the 18th century, and those criollos found in the poem a strong sense of “American-ness” because, after all, criollo and Araucanian alike faced the same challenge: Spanish colonial rule. Criollo loyalty to the monarchy prevailed for only a short time after Napoleon’s overthrow of the Spanish monarchy in 1808, as criollos increasingly became concerned about the practicality of government. It was clear, too, that Creole patriotism, though tempered by a lingering loyalty to the monarchy, had taken firm root in Chile by 1810. Led by the cabildo, or city council, of Santiago—the only segment of government in which criollos enjoyed some political power—many liberal-minded criollos formulated a revolutionary solution to the crisis: independence. While still expressing loyalty to the monarchy, criollos like Bernardo O’Higgins (the son of a former governor) and José Miguel Carrera forged what became the Pátria Vieja (1810–1814), Chile’s first experiment in sovereign government. But when the monarchy sought to reestablish its authority after Ferdinand

Chilean and Argentine soldiers, led by Chilean General Bernardo O’Higgins and Argentine General José de San Martín, fight for their independence from Spain in 1817 at the Battle of Chacabuco. Their army of 5,000 men routed the Spanish in this decisive battle. (Library of Congress)


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VII returned to power in late 1813, liberal criollos fought to preserve their independence. Criollos eventually won their hard-fought independence from Spain in early 1818.

Defining the Nation From the time of independence to the 1880s, Chile was only about one-third the size it is today. The far north, or Norte Grande, belonged to Peru and Bolivia until the Chilean victory in the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). The Treaty of Ancón (1884) officially ceded the region to Chile, along with its vast nitrate and copper resources. The far south, meanwhile, remained largely under the control of indigenous peoples who had resisted conquest since the 1540s. The Chilean population was concentrated largely in the Central Valley—a 300-mile valley with Santiago at its northern end. The geographical compression of Chile’s population, which was made even more real by the towering Andes mountains on its eastern frontier and the Pacific Ocean to the west, fostered intermarriage between powerful elite families (even between those with different political loyalties) and conditioned the development of a relatively tightly knit landowning class that remained powerful in both the economy and politics until the second half of the 20th century. Linked by a common language and living in a relatively small geographical region, where social and cultural idiosyncrasies developed, criollos sought to build a state at a time when the concept of “nation” was shared largely by only those of the highest social stratum. Also, criollos faced the challenge of creating a broader citizenry that would remain loyal to the country’s nascent democratic institutions. Clearly, by the 1870s the Chilean political and cultural elite—criollos and others of European ancestry—had forged the basic outline of a national identity that tied citizens to the state and, in general, championed the idea of Chilean exceptionalism. As a means of legitimizing hegemony immediately after independence, the emergent state made sure that pageantry was an important aspect of a developing Chilean national identity. Vibrant and colorful celebrations of the dieciocho, or Independence Day (September 18), drew large crowds from all social classes as early as 1811—only a year after the criollos declared independence. The Chilean flag was unveiled for the first time at the 1817 dieciocho celebration. In 1834 the country’s coat of arms and motto—“By Reason or by Force”—were introduced, underscoring the notion that Chile would be an active force in South America and would zealously defend its national interests. Soon, “By Reason or by Force” was applied geopolitically, as a victorious war against the Peru-Bolivia Confederation (1836–1839), which included the long-remembered Battle of Yungay ( January 20, 1839), fanned the flames of Chilean patriotism and national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Dieciocho What Chileans call the dieciocho, or the independence celebrations on and around September 18, commemorates the country’s first provisional junta’s declaration of separation from Spain in 1810. The declaration gave birth to so-called Pátria Vieja (1810–1814), which ended with Spain’s campaign to regain the colony. The dieciocho immediately became a central element of national identity. The government added the tradition of a military parade to the annual festivities in 1832.

identity. Out of the Battle of Yungay, moreover, there emerged in Chilean culture the image of the brave roto, or lower-class ruffian soldier, who was heralded by the state and by citizens as a heroic warrior. Strong anti-Peruvianism and anti-Bolivianism after the war also reinforced Chilean national identity, and, by the end of the century, there were signs that Chilean national identity was becoming more racialized in its depiction of its Andean and heavily indigenous neighbors. Despite such clear signs of a national identity, notions of nationality largely remained confined to the upper reaches of Chile’s social layers throughout the 19th century. To the elite, “Chile” simply meant the upper class, despite the more “popular” components like the image of the roto or popular participation in the annual dieciocho festivities. But even within elite circles the presence of a national identity did not necessarily mean that those Chileans seriously thought about what it meant to be Chilean; that is to say, chilenidad, or Chilean-ness, went largely unexplored in the 19th century. In fact, it is not entirely clear just how strong national identity was among the elite, who modeled their cosmopolitanism and cultural tastes on Europe and longingly gazed across the Atlantic to France and England for inspiration of every sort. Nevertheless, the Chilean elite of the 19th century extolled the virtues of their republic—a relatively stable and democratic constitutional system and a solid economy—on a continent that otherwise suffered from political instability and severe economic problems. By

Coat of Arms The coat of arms, designed in 1834, boasts one of the most memorable national mottos in the world: “By Reason or by Force.” It also depicts one of the rarest animals in Chile, the huemul—a small, deerlike animal—and the Andean condor. The animals are positioned on either side of the national colors: red, white, and blue. The coat of arms also is found on the official flag of the presidency and has made regular appearances on Chilean coinage since the 19th century, including the 100-peso coin currently in circulation. Interestingly, an English artist, Charles Wood Taylor, designed this most recognizable symbol of the Chilean nation.


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the middle of the 19th century, the Chilean elite routinely identified their country as “a model republic” and as the “England of South America.”

Narrating the Nation Although Ercilla’s “La Araucana” was a cornerstone of early nation-building literature in Chile, a well-developed and specifically Chilean national literature did not coalesce until well after the independence war. Led by such figures as José Victorino Lastarria and José Joaquín Vallejo, a circle of Chilean writers—the socalled Generation of 1842—crafted a Chilean romanticism that borrowed a European literary style but brought to bear Chilean subject matter, including but not limited to the struggle for independence from Spain. Along with the founding of the University of Chile in 1842, the 1840s were fecund years for intellectual and literary production, as the Chilean elite enjoyed a good economy and civil and regional peace. In this context, romanticist stories tended to focus on the early stages of nation-state formation, marking a fundamental shift away from European domination in matters of literary content. By the 1860s, Chilean national literature became more complex in style and in subject matter, as the celebrated Alberto Blest Gana—the best novelist of 19thcentury Chile—adopted the “realist” style of Balzac to create detailed stories about elite life in Santiago. His Martín Rivas (1862) captured the everyday life and cultural texture of Santiago’s well-to-do in a way that no other Chilean author had. The elite and, to some extent, an emergent middle class saw themselves in the novel—virtues and vices—as Blest Gana further developed what Lastarria and others started decades earlier: the formation of a Chilean national literary tradition. Still, chilenidad went without definition and inspection in the work of Blest Gana. But writers like Lastarria, Vallejo, and Blest Gana produced literature with Chilean themes and Chilean characters that certainly reinforced a national identity among their literate compatriots. As noted above, the “national” literature of the 19th century did not examine the lives of the common Chilean, nor did it pause to reflect on chilenidad. Indeed, despite the heroic image of the roto, the social underbelly was largely ignored by the leading writers of the era; the common Chilean stood outside what the elite considered to be the Chilean national community. “Nation” essentially meant “the elite” during the 19th century. It was not until the early 20th century that a new social layer—the urban middle class—sought to explore chilenidad and, in doing so, included lower-class peoples into a new and more democratized conception of “nation” through the novels, short stories, and essays of the genre known as criollismo, or Creole-ism. By that time, too, the very meaning of the term “Creole” had been transformed; it no longer meant “American-born Spaniard” and had become synonymous with all things native to Chile. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Chilean national identity from the late 18th century to the late 19th century was influenced by external events in no small way. The Napoleonic invasion of Spain and Chile’s conflicts with its Andean neighbors conditioned the development of the spirit of nationality. Geography, too, played an important role, as Chile’s colonial population developed on the edge of the Spanish empire, away from the most important centers of the colonial bureaucracy, and in the Central Valley, which fostered a relatively tight-knit criollo society. The creation of stable political and administrative institutions after independence was also a source of pride among the Chilean elite, as they were fully aware of the civil wars and other sociopolitical and economic strife that gripped much of the rest of Latin America. The power of that state was most evident during the War of the Pacific. The notion of Chilean exceptionalism ruled the day among national leaders of the 19th century, as the rhetoric of Chilean national identity championed the “model republic.” However, a clear and conspicuous national identity did not filter into the lower reaches of Chilean society—not before the 20th century, at least. The concept of “nation” remained restricted to the elite; the imagined community remained small until new voices emerged in the 1920s and 1930s that expanded the definition of what “Chile” was and who “Chileans” were. The Chilean elite of the 19th century deployed a national identity for the purposes of nation-building while, at the same time, they enjoyed the splendors of a relatively open economy and relished cultural cosmopolitanism. They enjoyed the finest of French perfumes, the latest continental literature, and regularly traveled to the Old World as they emulated Europeans in their patterns of consumption. This dualism was the subject of great criticism after the turn of the century, when patriotism and nationalism—fueled and sharpened around the globe by World War I—grew strong in Chile and non-elites who attacked the political and cultural sensibilities of the old aristocracy sought new political, social, and cultural formulae for their nation. Chilean national identity after the 1870s became more complex, mirroring the increasing complexity of Chilean society. The emergence of the middle class by the end of the 19th century, and the concurrent expansion of print culture, created new conditions that greatly affected the spirit of nationality. The elite no longer held a monopoly on defining the nation and its people, and strongly nationalistic critics of the elite, including Tancredo Pinochet Le-Brun and Alberto Cabero, argued that the elite had a rather weak sense of nationality, as evidenced by their cultural and economic cosmopolitanism, among other things. By the 1920s and 1930s, as economic problems gripped the country, what amounted to a national introspection took place, as a great many Chileans paused to assess the very nature of their imagined community. The common worker, for example, became a laudable example of chilenidad in the pages of criollista literature, creating a new image of the nation that included the lower N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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classes. This paved the way for later movements, including Salvador Allende’s “Chilean road to socialism,” which located the worker at the very heart of the nation and of Chilean national identity and nationalism. By the mid-1970s, Chilean national identity had taken another turn, as the military regime of General Augusto Pinochet sought to rally patriotic Chileans to the “national” cause: economic restructuring and the end of party politics. Above all, one thing was made clear during the Pinochet years: no longer was Chile a “model republic.” Selected Bibliography Barr-Melej, Patrick. 2001. Reforming Chile: Cultural Politics, Nationalism, and the Rise of the Middle Class. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Bethel, Leslie, ed. 1993. Chile since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brading, David. 1993. The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492–1867. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Burr, Robert. 1974. By Reason or by Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Collier, Simon. 1967. Ideas and Politics of Chilean Independence, 1808–1833. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Collier, Simon. 2003. Chile: The Making of a Republic, 1830–1865: Politics and Ideas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Halperin, Ernst. 1965. Nationalism and Communism in Chile. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Miller, Nicola. 1999. In the Shadow of the State: Intellectuals and the Quest for National Identity in Twentieth-Century Spanish America. London: Verso. Solberg, Carl. 1970. Immigration and Nationalism: Argentina and Chile, 1890–1914. Austin: University of Texas Press. Sommer, Doris. 1991. Foundational Fictions. Berkeley: University of California Press. Whitaker, Arthur Preston. 1962. Nationalism in Latin America: Past and Present. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.


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Haiti Chris Dixon Chronology 1791 (August) Outbreak of slave rebellion, precipitating the revolution. 1804 Haiti declares independence, the world’s first independent black republic, under JeanJacques Dessalines. 1806 Assassination of Dessalines; Haiti divides into a mulatto-ruled south and a black-controlled north. 1820 Reunification of Haiti under President Jean-Pierre Boyer. 1821 Boyer invades Santo Domingo after it declares independence from Spain. Haiti controls the entire island until 1844. 1825 France recognizes Haitian independence. 1847 Faustin-Elie Soulouque becomes president. 1849 Soulouque proclaims himself “emperor for life.” 1859 Fabre Geffrard becomes president. 1860 A concordat is signed between Haiti and the Vatican.

Situating the Nation “Discovered” by Christopher Columbus in 1492, the Caribbean island of Espanola (Hispaniola) was a Spanish colony until 1697, when Spain ceded the western third of the island to France, which named its new colony Saint-Domingue. The boundaries of this territory, which later became the republic of Haiti, underwent significant changes from the 1770s to the 1880s. Under the terms of the 1795 Treaty of Basel, Spain ceded the rest of the island to France, but the formal transfer of possession did not proceed due to the continuing war in Europe. In late 1799, however, the Haitian revolutionary leader Toussaint-Louverture led a military expedition into Santo Domingo, ousting the Spanish forces and establishing Haitian control over the entire island of Espanola. Taking advantage of the power struggle between rival factions in Haiti, in 1809 Spain reestablished its rule in neighboring Santo Domingo. Spain’s colonial authority, however, remained tenuous, and in 1821 Santo Domingo declared its independence. The following year, Haitian forces conquered Santo Domingo. The Haitian presence in the eastern part of the island was welcomed by some Dominicans, but the majority regarded the Haitian presence as an occupation. During the 1830s, amid growing resentment toward the Haitian presence, an independence movement developed, particularly among the Spanish-speaking population. Perhaps emboldened by the demise of the long-serving Haitian leader N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Jean-Pierre Boyer, in 1844 military chiefs in Santo Domingo launched a coup and declared their nation’s independence. Haiti’s 19th-century military ventures into Santo Domingo contributed to the strains on the Haitian economy. Like many other postcolonial societies, 19thcentury Haiti experienced considerable economic privation. Colonial SaintDomingue, however, had commonly been regarded as the most lucrative jewel in the French colonial crown, and during the 18th century its economy and population grew apace. Based largely on the ruthless exploitation of slaves imported from Africa, a majority of whom toiled on sugar cane—and increasingly coffee— plantations, the island made a significant contribution to French prosperity. By the 1780s, it was estimated that two-thirds of France’s colonial foreign commercial interests were based on Saint-Domingue, earning the colony the label “the pearl of the Antilles.” It was not surprising, then, that even during the tumult of the French Revolution, successive French leaders endeavored to retain authority over their prized colony. From the inception of the republic in 1804, Haiti was beset by economic woes. Despite occasional attempts to develop the nation’s industrial base, economic life continued to revolve around the agricultural sector. But notwithstanding earnest attempts on the part of some Haitian leaders to improve agricultural outputs, the rural economy never achieved the same yields as during the colonial period. Haiti’s economic problems were compounded by the indemnity that France demanded—and received—in return for its recognition of the black republic. In 1825 Boyer’s government agreed to pay an indemnity of 150 million francs. Although the amount was subsequently renegotiated to 60 million francs, the price for recognition of Haitian independence and acknowledgment of the black nationalism that it embodied proved a serious impediment to the economic development of the black republic.

Instituting the Nation At the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, Saint-Domingue’s population consisted of 500,000 black slaves, 24,000 free mulattoes and blacks, and approximately 32,000 whites. Black slaves were situated firmly at the bottom of the prevailing racial hierarchy. A majority of these slaves were relatively recent arrivals from Africa; it has been speculated that their fresh memories of freedom in Africa made them more likely to rebel against colonial authority. Brutally mistreated, and subject to the indiscriminate cruelty of their owners, black slaves enjoyed scant protection under the law. Escape was a difficult proposition in SaintDomingue, but some slaves fled to the interior of the island, where they established Maroon colonies, some of which engaged in guerrilla warfare against the colonial authorities. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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As in other slave societies, free mulattoes and blacks in colonial SaintDomingue occupied an ambiguous position in the social and racial hierarchy. Some of these affranchise or gens de couleur (free mulattoes or, less commonly, free blacks) achieved financial independence and success; some, indeed, owned slaves. Yet commercial achievements did not translate into political or social equality with the white minority, and a range of legal prescriptions ensured the mulatto minority was constantly reminded that while its condition was superior to that of the slaves, its social and political status was far below that of the dominant white minority. That white minority enjoyed the most privileged position within colonial Saint-Domingue. But there were also deep divisions within the white community, between those born in the colony and those who lived and worked there temporarily, and among the elite, or grands blancs, whose ranks included landowners and wealthy merchants, the petits blancs, a group that included craftsmen and other members of what amounted to a white “middle class,” and the lower class, or blancs menants, whose ranks included peasants and laborers. The French Revolution had a direct and dramatic impact on Saint-Domingue. Discussions of “freedom” in the mother country, and the turmoil of the revolutionary era, inevitably encouraged the slaves in Saint-Domingue to demand their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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own freedom. In the short term, however, much of the criticism of the French colonial authority was manifested by the free mulattoes and blacks, who resented their second-class status. In May 1791, following an uprising against French colonial authority led by a gens de couleur, Vincent Oge, the French government sought to quell the growing restlessness in Saint-Domingue by granting rights of citizenship to prosperous free mulattoes and blacks. By July 1791, after the white colonists in SaintDomingue refused to comply with the revolutionary government’s law, fighting had broken out between the whites and the gens de couleur. The following month, the slaves rose in rebellion. Desperate to retain control, and apprehensive about a possible alliance between the slaves and the gens de couleur, the white colonists sought to appease the latter group. In April 1792, the rights of citizenship were extended to all gens de couleur. But this gesture was too little, too late, and the island was soon beset by conflict among rival factions. Exacerbating this confused situation were attempted interventions by Spanish colonists from neighboring Santo Domingo, and by British troops dispatched from nearby Jamaica. These proved to be merely the first occasions in which foreign powers intervened in Haiti. In 1793, realizing that the black majority could no longer be held in thralldom, the French authorities offered freedom to those slaves who agreed to join their army. They then took the dramatic step of abolishing slavery altogether. These concessions, however, did not mollify all the blacks and former slaves. From the confusion and turmoil, two powerful figures emerged: General Andre Riguad, a mulatto whose base of support rested on those who formerly comprised the gens de couleur; and the former slave, Toussaint-Louverture, who became the hero to

Toussaint-Louverture, leader of the Haitian Revolution. (Ridpath, John Clark, Ridpath’s History of the World, 1901)


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the black majority. By the late 1790s, Toussaint-Louverture had secured control of several areas of Saint-Domingue. Blessed with an astute military mind, and willing to concede at least a nominal allegiance to France, Toussaint-Louverture also negotiated with the British to advance his own political objectives. In May 1801 he designated himself “governor-general” for life. Napoleon, unwilling to yield control of France’s prized colony, dispatched his brother-in-law, General Charles Leclerc, to restore control in Saint-Domingue. By April 1802, Leclerc’s army had seized the initiative, and Leclerc had persuaded Toussaint-Louverture to put himself in French hands. A year later, after imprisonment and interrogation by the French, Toussaint-Louverture died of pneumonia. His death, widely regarded by Haitians as evidence of French perfidy, did not detract from his reputation as a formidable military leader and symbol of black revolution. That reputation extended well beyond Haiti, and Toussaint-Louverture’s achievements soon became a model and inspiration for black resistance to slavery and colonialism around the world. Yet the French presence in Saint-Domingue remained precarious. With Leclerc’s army beset by yellow fever and realizing that France could not afford the high price required to secure and maintain control in its former colony, Napoleon decided to relinquish the last vestiges of control. The leaders of the revolutionary forces in Saint-Domingue recognized Jean-Jacques Dessalines as their leader. On January 1, 1804, adopting the name originally used by the island’s native inhabitants, Dessalines proclaimed independence for the new nation. Haiti was the world’s first independent black republic. But the young nation faced vast problems. In a very real sense, the Haitians had nothing but freedom. Much of the infrastructure had been destroyed, the impoverished population was largely unskilled, and there were grave doubts about whether the experiment in black government would long survive. Postrevolutionary Haiti was plagued by political instability. There were three real sources of political power in 19th-century Haiti. The legislature, or Assemblee Constituante, was an often unruly and disorganized forum, characterized by conflicts between personal cliques rather than ideological differences expressed though formal political parties. Until 1843 the franchise was very narrowly restricted, with the vote largely restricted to army officers and the descendents of the prerevolutionary gens de couleur. Yet the assembly did provide a modicum of participatory democracy and served as a focus of political debate and opposition to presidential power. And successive Haitian leaders antagonized or alienated the army at their own peril. During the mid-1820s, when the Haitian population numbered fewer than 800,000, the regular army was comprised of 32,000 men. Although mulattoes occupied some important posts within the military, the army was largely dominated by black Haitians. Notwithstanding the importance of the legislature and the army, 19thcentury Haitian political life was largely dominated by its presidents. Having assumed the title of Emperor Jacques I, Dessalines died in 1806 while attempting to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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thwart a mulatto uprising. Henry Christophe then assumed control of Haiti, but his rule—centered in the northern part of the country—was soon challenged by Alexandre Sabes Petion from his base in the capital, Port-au-Prince, situated in the south. Lauded by some as an effective and dynamic leader, Christophe was a black, former slave who had established his military reputation, and honed his political skills, during the revolution. Petion, a light-skinned mulatto, was unable to overthrow Christophe’s reign in the north, and for the next decade, Haiti was divided between these two factions. Tensions between black and mulatto Haitians were an ongoing source of political conflict and disruption during the 19th century. After Petion’s death in 1818, the mulatto Jean-Pierre Boyer assumed control in the southern part of the country, where political and economic life was largely determined by the mulatto minority. Following Christophe’s suicide in 1820, Boyer established control over the entire nation. With a bloated civil service— whose senior ranks were dominated by mulattoes—and a large army—upon which much of Boyer’s authority rested, but which was dominated by blacks—his administration was characterized by inefficiency and corruption. His long tenure in office reflected both the absence of a coherent opposition and his ability to overcome prospective challenges to his authority rather than any significant achievements or measure of popularity. In 1843, however, Boyer was ousted by a coup d’état led by Charles Riviere-Herard. The overthrow of Boyer ushered in a period of political instability. For the next four years, Haiti was governed by a succession of short-lived regimes, led, in turn, by Riviere-Herard, Philipe Guerrier, Jean Louis Pierrot, and Jean Baptiste Riche. None of these governments enjoyed real legitimacy, and all proved incapable of either establishing themselves or addressing the nation’s profound economic and social challenges. In 1847 Faustin-Elie Soulouque became president; two years later, he was named “emperor for life.” That title proved less than prophetic, however, and after turning on his mulatto power base and engaging in repression that was brutal even by Haitian standards, in 1859 Soulouque was overthrown by General Fabre Geffrard, who governed until 1867. Endeavoring to reduce tensions between black and mulatto Haitians, Geffrard sought also to improve the nation’s economic situation by increasing production of cotton to capitalize on the rise in cotton prices resulting from the American Civil War. Yet Geffrard faced rebellion from the earliest stages of his presidency. A series of crop failures during the mid-1860s compounded public discontent, and following a mutiny among army troops in 1867, Geffrard fled to Jamaica. His departure ushered in a new era of political instability, characterized by a succession of shortlived regimes and by rivalry and tension between the largely black National Party and the Liberal Party, whose power base rested on the mulatto minority. Whereas Nationalist leaders appealed to the black majority with the slogan “the greatest good for the greatest number,” Liberal leaders advocated “government by the most competent.” Although the differences between them were not ideological, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Liberals and Nationalists vied vigorously for power and contributed to the continuing instability in political life. As had been the case after Boyer’s demise, Geffrard’s fall from power precipitated a renewed period of political instability: Sylvain Salnave ruled from 1867 until 1869; Nissage Saget then ruled until 1874, when he took the uncharacteristic step of retiring from political life; Michel Domingue ruled until 1876; and Boisrond Canal’s presidency, lasting from 1876 until 1879, was notable for the way in which he frequently deferred to the legislature. But the legislature—divided between the Liberals and Nationalists—was largely ineffectual. In 1879, at the conclusion of Canal’s presidential term, Louis Lysius Felicite Salomon was appointed president. He remained in power until 1888, after which two rival governments— one in the north led by General Florville Hyppolite, and the other in parts of the south led by Francois Legitime—vied for supremacy. Hyppolite triumphed in this struggle, but like those who had preceded—and succeeded—him, he was unable to establish a political system or culture that provided for orderly transitions of power. For the rest of the 19th century and well beyond, Haitian politics was characterized by instability and inefficiency. All too often, political life, and the culture that underpinned it, was an unruly and violent affair, marked by half-hearted attempts to instill democratic practices and culture.

Defining the Nation “Race” has always stood at the center of constructions of Haitian nationality, and transnational racial politics loomed large in Haiti during the 19th century. Notwithstanding the factionalized and contested nature of political life, there was wide consensus among Haitian leaders that the nation stood as an example of the capacities of the African race. Haitian nationality rested firmly on the abolition of slavery, and from the inception of the republic in 1804, the rights of citizenship were reserved for people of African descent. And although Haitian rulers acknowledged the importance of foreign trade, there were explicit attempts to control the foreign ownership of property. Dessalines decreed that whites could not own land in Haiti—a decree that remained in place until the early 20th century. The diplomatic isolation to which the nation was long subjected reinforced the notion that Haiti was a tangible, national expression of opposition to colonialism, racism, and slavery. Describing Haitians as “regenerators of Africa,” Noel Colombel—Petion supporter and a principal propagandist of the young republic—spoke for many Haitians when he stated that their efforts to secure and maintain independence and liberty constituted a struggle on behalf of two-thirds of the world’s people. Successive generations of Haitian writers denounced theories of racialism, repudiating both the conclusions of those who regarded darkN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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skinned people as inferior as well as the “science” upon which such conclusions were supposedly premised. Successive Haitian administrations remained vigilant about the prospect of foreign intervention. In 1861 Geffrard’s administration became embroiled in a diplomatic dispute with Spain, which—at the request of the president of the Dominican Republic—had recently re-annexed Haiti’s neighbor. Declaring that Haiti would never acknowledge the annexation and supporting an anti-Spanish insurgency in the Dominican Republic, Geffrard’s government incurred the wrath of the Spaniards, who demanded that the Haitians end their support for the Dominican rebels. With Spanish gunboats stationed off the coast of Port-au-Prince, Geffrard was compelled to back down. Haitians of all hues rejected notions of white superiority and agreed that their nation represented a tangible expression of the capacity of the African race. Yet an enduring theme in Haitian history—reflected in the turbulent nature of 19thcentury Haitian political life—was the tension between the largely rural, black majority, and the smaller, urban-based, and light-skinned mulatto population. These groups were also linguistically divided: the black majority generally spoke in Creole; the mulatto minority typically spoke French. These distinctions tended to correspond to the class divisions within Haitian society, with much of the nation’s wealth and economic power concentrated in the hands of the mulattoes. The language issue also proved to be an impediment to the incorporation of the Dominican Republic into Haiti; although Haitians appreciated their neighbors’ common experiences with European colonialism and racism, and although they viewed their own experiences in black government as an experiment on behalf of dark-skinned peoples everywhere, the fact that Spanish was the lingua franca in the Dominican Republic was a significant impediment to any long-term union between the two peoples. Dominican constructions of nationalism, moreover, were less explicitly racial than in Haiti, and attempts on the part of the latter group to foment a common, racially based sense of nationalism were met with little enthusiasm in the Dominican Republic. Despite their unequivocal rejection of colonialism and white racism, 19thcentury Haitians often understood “civilization” and “culture” in Eurocentric terms. This trait was reflected in the ambivalent attitudes toward Africa. Mulattoes valued their connections to Europe, and some regarded Africa in a negative light. Even among black Haitians there was a tendency to discuss Africa in condescending terms. Constructions of Haitian nationalism were also shaped by the nation’s particular religious values and culture. As a French colony, Catholicism was the dominant religion among the white minority. Among the slave community, too, Catholicism was a significant influence. In the wake of the revolution, although many of Haiti’s leaders were wary of the Roman Catholic Church, which many Haitians believed functioned as an expression of European colonial authority, Catholicism remained the dominant Christian denomination. It was not until N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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1860, however, when a concordat was signed between the Haitian government and the Vatican, that relations were officially restored. Apprehensive that the church might seek to exercise undue influence, not all Haitians welcomed the concordat. Those concerns notwithstanding, the Catholic church became an increasingly important and influential participant in the nation’s public life. At the same time that Catholicism was an important part of Haitians’ lives, however, popular religion in the country continued to revolve around Vodou (Voodoo). Derived largely from West African religious systems, Vodou was typically denigrated by Europeans as a form of superstition, which both perpetuated and symbolized the backward nature of the black republic’s rural populace. Such representations, however, understated the extent to which Vodou was a comprehensive system of religious beliefs and practices that played a part in encouraging the racial consciousness that underpinned the revolution and helped sustain the black republic. During the revolutionary era, the shared belief in Vodou and the meetings associated with Vodou worship functioned as unifying forces among the black majority. Early black leaders of Haiti—Toussaint-Louverture, Dessalines, and Christophe—understood, however, that Vodou was also potentially disruptive to the newly established black political order and could serve as a vehicle for political discontent. Their attempts to control Vodou worship and the Vodou priests were unsuccessful, however. Subsequent Haitian leaders, including the mulattoes Petion and Boyer, were less troubled by Vodou, which they probably regarded as further evidence of the black majority’s inferiority. Foreigner observers, including James Theodore Holly, an African American Episcopalian who in 1861 led a colony of black American emigrants to Haiti, interpreted Haitians’ attachment to Vodou as evidence of the black republic’s state of underdevelopment. Yet during the 19th century, many foreign observers— particularly white Southerners in the United States—realized that Haiti stood as a symbol of black power. Haiti was commonly viewed and represented in two contradictory ways. On the one hand, abolitionists on both sides of the Atlantic lauded Haiti as representative of the possibility of black emancipation and independence. Others, however, depicted the island republic’s political and social instability, and economic woes, as a foretaste of what would follow precipitous emancipation, or black rebellion, in other slave societies. Those fears underpinned international responses to the Haitian revolution. Apprehensive that the Haitian example might encourage slave rebellions elsewhere, European powers, and the United States, isolated the black republic. France did not recognize Haiti until 1825 (after the Haitians agreed to pay a sizeable indemnity); Britain granted recognition in 1833; and the United States eventually followed suit in 1862, following the secession of the southern slave states. It was only during the Civil War that the United States lifted the trade embargo on Haiti, which had been in place since 1806. The international reaction to the Haitian revolution compounded the young nation’s economic, political, and social difficulties. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Narrating the Nation Nineteenth-century Haiti was characterized by a vigorous, sometimes boisterous, cultural life. Haitians’ constructions of their history emphasized the significance of their successful break from colonial power and their ability to maintain their independence in the face of diplomatic and international hostility. At the same time as Haitians celebrated their nation’s status as tangible proof of the capacities of the black race and as an example of anticolonial rebellion, a Francophile tendency was evident within 19th-century Haitian culture. Much of Haitian culture, therefore, reflected this fusion of European and African civilizations. The fusion also reflected many educated Haitians’ distaste for, and sense of superiority over, Africa. Conscious of their nation’s role as an exemplar of antiracist and anticolonial sentiment, 19th-century Haitian historians self-consciously emphasized the significance of their nation’s achievements. Inevitably, however, there were competing narratives of that story of achievement—and of the nation’s often violent past. Historian David Nicholls has described the competing ideologies that emerged in 19th-century Haiti as the “black legend” and the “mulatto legend.” These mulatto and black versions of Haitian history were often at odds. Perhaps predictably, mulatto versions of the black republic’s past emphasized the roles played by mulattoes in establishing and maintaining Haitian independence and liberty and were sometimes critical of the excesses of black leaders such as ToussaintLouverture and Dessalines. And although mulatto writers shared black Haitians’ sense of racial pride, an undercurrent of color prejudice toward their more darkskinned compatriots was evident among many mulatto Haitians. Accordingly, while Toussaint-Louverture remained a hero to the nation and the focus of the black republic’s collective memory of its revolutionary past, Haitian history was always a contested field. The competing versions of Haitian history and culture were expressed in a range of ways. Beginning in 1836, Le Republicain (later succeeded by L’Union) served as both an avenue by which opponents of Boyer’s regime could articulate their political grievances as well as a forum for literary, economic, and cultural debate. Mulatto writers such as Beauvais Lespinasse (1811–1863) and Emile Nau (1812–1860) emphasized Haiti’s unique status, which they contended grew from its African and European origins. Most of the contributors to Le Republicain and L’Union were mulattoes, yet they regarded Haiti as the “cradle of African independence.” It was Haiti’s destiny, they contended, to serve as the pinnacle of African civilizations and to take the lead in advancing the black race. Students were taught, for example, that it was their duty to help develop Haiti, partly because such development was an essential ingredient of the process of modernization and partly because such development would play a part in overcoming prejudice against the black race. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Without demeaning the significance of those formal expressions of Haitian culture and nationality, much of the collective sense of national identity was constructed and reinforced outside schools or other formal institutions. Education, for example, was reserved for a tiny minority of Haitians. It is estimated that during the 1830s, only 1,000 children attended school. Fewer than 300 people subscribed to periodicals such as Le Republicain and L’Union. Yet despite their alienation from national politics, with its violence, corruption, and contempt for the well-being of the masses, the largely illiterate, uneducated, rural majority did understand and appreciate the significance of Haitian independence and nationality. Much of that nationalistic sentiment was expressed through folktales— passed down via a vibrant oral tradition—that emphasized the significance of their forefathers’ achievement of black independence and that provided a shared sense of history and national pride.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation With Haitian economic life centered on the rural sector, and with agricultural development impeded by political instability, the question of land ownership was a recurring theme in 19th-century Haiti. Prior to the revolution, land ownership was inevitably concentrated in the hands of the white minority. Following the bloodshed of the revolutionary era and the expulsion of the French, successive administrations in Haiti grappled with the issue of how to ensure that the agricultural lands were most efficiently—and, in some cases, fairly—distributed and exploited. Toussaint-Louverture, and then Dessalines, adopted a policy known as fermage, by which government-owned land was leased out to managers, who in turn used workers who were required to stay on the land. In return, the peasants received one-quarter of the crops that were produced. Haitian peasants remained unenthusiastic about fermage, which seemed little different from the serfdom under which millions of Europeans toiled. Building upon a policy initiated by Petion’s government, Boyer’s administration set about distributing small parcels of land, principally to members of the Haitian army and Haitians to whom the government owed a debt. Historians have questioned both the motives and the impact of this policy. Was this a means of pacifying the potentially unruly Haitian masses and protecting the elite’s access to the resources necessary to protect their own wealth, or did it reflect a genuine desire to ensure a more equitable distribution of resources? Did it stifle development of the vital agricultural sector and have a negative impact? What is clear is that a majority of 19th-century Haitians lived a subsistence or nearsubsistence existence, and that the nation’s development continued to be impeded by an underdeveloped agricultural sector. Concomitant with Boyer’s distribution of land was the 1826 “Code Rural.” This convoluted policy sought to redress the decline of the rural economy by compelling N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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peasants to remain on plantations. Rural workers were prohibited from leaving the land, moving to towns, or establishing farms or businesses of their own. To enforce these controversial measures, a rural constabulary was established. Ultimately, however, the Code Rural failed to arrest the decline in rural production. Nineteenth-century attempts to consolidate the agricultural sector in Haiti were compromised by the environmental degradation to which the land was subjected. This not only entailed the continuing destruction of natural vegetation— compounding problems of soil erosion—but also the ongoing degradation of agricultural lands. The declining fertility of the land, in conjunction with increased population pressures and an ongoing inability to manage land use in a sustainable manner that would benefit the rural majority, further exacerbated the nation’s economic difficulties. The malaise of the rural sector and the consequent state of almost perpetual economic crisis, in conjunction with endemic political instability, portended the continuing problems Haiti would confront during the 20th century. Selected Bibliography Dubois, Laurent. 2004. Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Fick, Carolyn E. 1990. The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Geggus, David Patrick. 2002. Haitian Revolutionary Studies. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Girard, Philippe R. 2005. Paradise Lost: Haiti’s Tumultuous Journey from Pearl of the Caribbean to Third World Hot Spot. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Heinl, Robert Debs, and Nancy Heinl. 1978. Written in Blood: The Story of the Haitian People, 1492–1971. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. James, C. L. R. 1980 (New Edition). The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution. London: Allison and Busby. Leyburn, James G. 1980. The Haitian People. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. (Orig. pub. 1941.) Nicholls, David. 1974. “A Work of Combat: Mulatto Historians and the Haitian Past, 1847–1867.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 16, no. 1: 15–38. Nicholls, David. 1996. From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan. Rotberg, Robert I. 1971. Haiti: The Politics of Squalor. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.


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Mexico Will Fowler Chronology 1492 1519 1521 1521–1821 1524 1531 1648 1759–1788 1767 1780–1781 1788–1808 1792 1808 1810–1821 1812 1814 1821 1822 1823 1824 1824–1835 1829 1832 1835 1835–1836 1835–1846 1836 1838–1839 1841 1843 1845 1846 1846–1848 1847–1852 1848

Christopher Columbus “discovers” the New World. Hernán Cortés leads expedition to Mexico. Fall of Tenochtitlán, end of the Mexica empire. Colonial era (Mexico is a Spanish colony). Twelve Franciscan monks arrive in Mexico and allegedly baptize over 1 million Indians. Virgin of Guadalupe allegedly appears to an Indian convert, Juan Diego, on the hill of Tepeyac, near Mexico City. Miguel Sánchez publishes in Spanish his Image of the Virgin Mary, Mother of Guadalupe. Reign of Charles III, period of Bourbon reforms begins. Expulsion of the Jesuits from Spain and its colonies. Francisco Xavier Clavigero composes his Ancient History of Mexico. Reign of Charles IV, king of Spain. Antonio de León y Gama publishes his Historical and Chronological Description of Two Stones. Napoleonic occupation of Spain. Mexican War of Independence. Spanish congress in Cádiz drafts first liberal constitution of Hispanic world. Rebel congress of Chilpancingo drafts first Mexican constitution of Apatzingán. Independence of Mexico and Central America. Mexican empire is forged. Mexican empire ends; Central American provinces (with the exception of Chiapas) secede from Mexico and become the United Provinces of Central America. First federal constitution. First federal republic. Spanish invasion of Tampico is repulsed; slavery is abolished in Mexico. Federalist civil war. Constitution of 1824 is abolished. Texan revolt (leads to secession of Texas and forging of the Lone Star Republic). First central republic. First central constitution (The Seven Laws). French Pastry War. Constitution of 1836 is abolished and replaced with Bases de Tacubaya. Second central constitution (Bases Orgánicas). U.S. annexation of Texas. Constitution of 1843 is abolished, and the 1824 constitution is reinstated. Mexican-American War. Caste war in Yucatán. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo brings Mexican-American War to an end, and Mexico loses half of its national territory to the United States.


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1849–1853 Lucas Alamán publishes his History of Mexico, five volumes. 1853 Gadsden Purchase (the United States buys the Valley of La Mesilla in present-day Arizona and New Mexico). 1854–1855 Revolution of Ayutla. 1857 Second federal constitution. 1858–1861 Civil War of the Reform. 1862–1867 French intervention in Mexico. 1864–1867 Reign of Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, emperor of Mexico. 1867 Liberal restoration. 1872 President Benito Juárez dies and is replaced by Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada. 1876–1910 General Porfirio Díaz is president (with the exception of 1880–1884). 1887–1889 Vicente Riva Palacio edits his Mexico over the Centuries.

Situating the Nation Mexico was and remains a country of extraordinary contrasts. It is one of the 10 nations with the greatest biodiversity in the world. The territories that the Spanish Crown conquered between 1519 and 1542 included deserts, daunting mountain ranges, dry and moist forests, arid plains, volcanoes, and jungles. Mexico’s many varied political, economic, social, and historical contexts, characterized by their plurality and heterogeneity, would in a way mirror the country’s vast and contrasting landscapes. Its lands, extending from Central America to the south to as far north as Utah, were populated by a plethora of different and, in many cases, warring indigenous tribes. At the time of the European incursion, the Mexica, popularly described as the Aztecs, controlled this vast empire from their capital city Tenochtitlán (present-day Mexico City). However, their control had not resulted in the emergence of a uniform Mexica entity. The Mayas, the Tlaxcaltecs, the Mixtecs, and the Zapotecs, to name but a few, were communities with their own distinct cultural, linguistic, and religious identities. To this day, there are 56 different indigenous ethnic groups in Mexico, all of whom speak different languages. It is not surprising that Mexican national identity was, as first expressed in the latter half of the 18th century, a highly contested and controversial subject. The society that resulted from the conquest and 300 years of Spanish domination (1521–1821) was one that was profoundly hybrid and syncretic, the product of the uneasy (and not always peaceful or desired) mix of the indigenous and Spanish peoples and cultures of the 16th century. Slavery would add an African dimension to the question of Mexican ethnicity, in particular on the Caribbean coast of the nascent nation. According to the 20th-century intellectual and poet Octavio Paz (1914–1998), awarded the Nobel Prize for literature in 1990, much of Mexico’s tragic past could be blamed on the violent, mystical, and authoritarian temperaments of their Aztec and conquistador forebears. Modern Mexico N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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was perceived, in this sense, as a culture founded upon a particularly sanguinary and traumatic past: to coin Paz’s view, a culture bred from the figurative rape their Spanish father Hernán Cortés committed on their Indian mother La Malinche. In real terms, the Spanish conquest resulted in the end of Mexica domination, in a demographic collapse of the indigenous population (described by some as genocide), and a diverse population that was deeply heterogeneous. Conquistador Hernán Cortés led the ultimately successful military and political conquest of the Mexica empire. Disease, systematic killing, overwork, and ill treatment resulted in the Indian population of central Mexico falling from 20–25 million people in 1519, to 6 million in 1548, to 2 million in 1580, and to 750,000 in 1630. The painful legacy of the conquest, especially for the descendants of the indigenous population of Mexico, is one that continues to figure prominently in present-day indigenous political discourse. The Spanish incursion also resulted in a spiritual conquest whereby the religion of the Mexica and their contemporaries, with their notorious human sacrifices, was replaced with the Roman Catholic faith. With time most Mexicans would come to use Spanish as their first language and become practicing Roman Catholics. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Instituting the Nation The church was a key institution in establishing the foundations of what would become the Mexican nation. From the perspective of the 19th century, the Mexican church, with its autochthonous calendar and saints, was perceived by many as the sole and true representative of Mexican identity. This identification would be reflected in the way that the first four Mexican constitutions (1814, 1824, 1836, and 1843) officially described Mexico as a Roman Catholic country and forbade the toleration of any other religion. Following the traumatic Mexican-American War (1846–1848), a number of Mexican conservatives would go as far as to claim that Roman Catholicism was the only tie left that bound the Mexican people together vis-à-vis the increasing power and influence of the Protestant United States. For the anticlerical Mexican liberals of the mid-19th century, this association between the nation and the Catholic church would prove problematic. Existing similarities between Mesoamerican religion and Roman Catholicism certainly facilitated the conversion of the native population of Mexico. It also resulted in the emergence of a distinct and unique religious community with a very particular identity. Indian gods were equated with the saints. For example, Quetzalcóatl was equated with Saint Thomas; the Zapotec god, Cocijo, with Saint Peter. Catholic churches and shrines were erected on the sites of the old Indian cults. Where possible, the Catholic calendar was made to coincide with the preColumbian one. Probably the most evident example of this synthesis was the way in which the Mexicas’ ritual of the Day of the Dead was assimilated by the Mexican church

Our Lady of Guadalupe The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe ( guadalupanismo) was and remains the most powerful expression of Mexican national identity. Following the publication of Miguel Sánchez’s 1648 study on the apparition of the Virgin Mary on the hill of Tepeyac in 1531, the Creole clergy of New Spain propagated the belief that Our Lady of Guadalupe was the Queen of Mexico. She provided the Creole priesthood with an autonomous sacred foundation for their church and mother country. Her image, miraculously imprinted on the cape of a humble Indian, Juan Diego, preserved and venerated at the holy mount of Tepeyac, was a clear sign that the Virgin Mary would protect the Mexican people. Her mestizo features and her associations with the Indian goddess Tonantzin served to transform her into the object of devotion for Indians and Creoles, rich and poor alike. The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe became widespread over time as a result of the intertwining of religious fervor and patriotic enthusiasm. In a country divided by race, class, customs, and language, the inhabitants of Mexico had little to bind them together except for their shared identity as children and subjects of Our Lady of Guadalupe. Guadalupanismo and Mexican nationalism became one and the same thing.


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A huge banner displays the original image of the Virgin of Guadalupe in Mexico City on December 11, 2000. The Virgin is said to have appeared in 1531 on a blanket owned by the Indian Juan Diego. She is a key figure to the Catholic indigenous people of Mexico and has been venerated since her appearance. (Wesley Bocxe/Liaison/Getty Images)


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and incorporated into the festivity of All Saints. Similarly, the Indian goddess Tonantzin was equated with the Virgin of Guadalupe, whose apparition in 1531 was witnessed precisely on Tonantzin’s sacred hill of Tepeyac. The Virgin of Guadalupe even inherited from her pre-Columbian incarnation a mystical association with the cactus-based drink pulque. The fact that she presented herself to an Indian, Juan Diego, and that her complexion, miraculously imprinted on his cape, had indigenous traits, gave her an emblematic significance in the syncretic culture that developed in Mexico, one that no other figure or myth came to espouse. In a sense, she epitomized what would become one of the core aspects of mexicanidad, Mexican identity: mestizaje (the fusion of Spanish and Indian cultures). For those leading intellectuals who came to formulate a concept of Mexican nationhood in the late 19th and 20th centuries, mestizaje was an essential aspect of their identity, since the majority of Mexicans were, after all, mestizos (racially mixed Spanish Americans of Spanish-Indian descent). The Virgin of Guadalupe symbolized mestizaje beautifully. She embodied a Roman Catholic tradition that retained characteristics of a preceding Indian goddess. The fact that she had chosen to make her apparition to a poor Indian just outside Mexico City spiritually transformed Mexico’s indigenous-mestizo people into something akin to a chosen race. The Indian Juan Diego became a Mexican Moses, with the Virgin’s miraculous image representing the Mexican Ark of the Covenant. The cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe, defined as guadalupanismo, would become a powerful expression of Mexican national identity after Miguel Sánchez (1596?–1674) published in Spanish in 1648, and in Náhuatl a year later, his Image of the Virgin Mary, Mother of Guadalupe. It is no coincidence that, when the Mexican War of Independence

Mestizaje Mestizaje is the term used in Spanish to describe crossbreeding or miscegenation. In the case of Mexico, it was specifically used to refer to the mix of the Spanish and Indian races. Mestizos were those Mexicans descended from Spanish-Indian parents. During the colonial period, a profoundly hierarchical (and racist) caste system was drawn up in which there were, in order of importance, a whole range of socio-ethnic categories, including, to name but two examples, castizos (the children of criollos and mestizos) and zambos (the children of Indians and blacks). Although Creole patriotism stressed that the origins of the emergent Mexican nation were to be found in preconquest America, its proponents could be deeply mistrustful of their contemporary Indians. By the end of the 19th century, however, mestizaje had become the cornerstone upon which subsequent interpretations of Mexican nationhood were hinged. Albeit contested, in the sense that European, Indian, and African Mexicans are excluded from the mestizo notion of mexicanidad, mestizaje has become the most enduring and hegemonic ethno-cultural interpretation of lo mexicano. To be Mexican is thus to be mestizo, hence cultural expressions of the Mexican nation tend to be hybrid and syncretic, with elements that can be traced to both a Spanish and an Aztec heritage.


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erupted on September 16, 1810, Father Miguel Hidalgo y Costilla’s rallying call to arms was: “Long live the Virgin of Guadalupe and death to the Spaniards!” One of the first Mexican-born intellectuals to develop the idea of a Mexican mother country that was at odds with, and different from, that of “mother Spain,” was Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora (1645–1700). Sigüenza championed the idea of a Mexican pátria by promoting the cult of the Virgin of Guadalupe and by arguing that Mexico’s Aztec past was where their antiquity originated from, rather than from Europe. Sigüenza’s writings would subsequently influence key 18th- and early 19th-century thinkers such as the Jesuit Francisco Xavier Clavigero (1731–1787), the revolutionary priest Servando Teresa de Mier (1763–1827), and the prolific diarist, journalist, and politician, Carlos María de Bustamante (1774–1848). However, the need to actually define the Mexican nation would not surface until the Bourbon reforms of the latter half of the 18th century challenged the social bases and political values that had characterized the Spanish empire for over two and a half centuries.

Defining the Nation Under the Habsburgs, Spain’s policy toward its colonies could almost be described as one of abandon. Centuries of inertia on the part of the monarchy had resulted in the colonies enjoying a high degree of autonomy. It was Charles III (1759–1788), a member of the Bourbon dynasty that had taken hold of Spain’s destiny, replacing the Habsburgs in the wake of the Spanish War of Succession (1702–1713), who changed all of that. Determined to impose his own brand of enlightened despotism, Charles III energetically set about reforming his domains, determined to encourage social and agricultural improvement while tightening his administration’s control over the empire. The changes he promoted, the so-called Bourbon reforms, resulted in acute discontent in the colonies and included a determined assault on church wealth and privileges. In a bid to wrest power away from priests who were deemed to be reactionary or who obeyed the Pope rather than the Crown, Charles III implemented a range of anticlerical legislation. One specific decree that had strong repercussions in the collective imagination of Spanish America was the expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767. Over 2,500 Jesuits, most of them criollos (white Spanish Americans of Spanish descent) were forced to abandon their homelands. These exiles were the individuals who began the intellectual process of defining the particularity of the oppressed nations they had been forced to leave. Ostracized in Europe, the criollo Jesuits pined for their homelands and, to start with, reminisced about their favorite dishes, craved for the fresh spring water of their province’s mountains, and begged the king to allow them to die in their homelands. However, it was not long before their writings N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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acquired a political dimension as they began to refute the views generally accepted in Europe that the New World was an inferior continent. European philosophers and scientists such as Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon, Guillaume-Thomas Raynal, William Robertson, and Corneille de Pauw were arguing that the animals, plants, and even the people of the Americas were inferior to their European equivalents. The exiled Jesuits’ response was to write works of outstanding scholarship that defended their homelands’ geography and history. It was the first and clearest expression of something that could be described as national pride. In the case of Mexico, Francisco Xavier Clavigero played a fundamental role in initiating a process of national reappraisal that soon caught the imagination of Europe as well as the Americas. Exiled in Italy, he wrote his Ancient History of Mexico (1780–1781), which he described as “a history of Mexico written by a Mexican.” It was not long before the exiled Jesuits’ works inspired other criollo intellectuals to challenge European prejudices. In Mexico City, Antonio de León y Gama (1735–1802), a criollo professor of scholastic theology, used the discovery of two pre-Hispanic monoliths to demonstrate that, contrary to the views espoused by European philosophers, the pre-Columbian Indian nation was a truly advanced society. One of these monoliths was the huge stone representing the monstrous goddess Coatlicue. The other was the great disc carved with the glyphs of a calendar, the piedra de sol (sun stone), which, partly thanks to León y Gama’s Historical and Chronological Description of Two Stones (1792), was to become an acclaimed monument, an enduring emblem of Mexico, and the most dramatic proof that the Indian peoples of pre-Cortesian Mexico had forged a civilization comparable to that of ancient Greece or Rome. With this emergent Creole (criollo) patriotism came a vigorous attempt to rescue the Indian past of the continent. In Mexico, home to the Aztecs and the Mayas, Creole patriotism acquired a particularly strong indigenista (Indianist) streak. At a political level, this orientation became a means to condemn everything Spain had brought to the Americas. Regardless of the fact that the main

Creole Patriotism The origins of Mexican nationalism are to be found in Creole patriotism. The Creoles (criollos) were the white descendants of the Spaniards who, having been born in Mexico, were discriminated against by the Spanish Crown, in particular during the latter half of the 18th century. Unable to rise in the colonial political hierarchy for the simple reason that they had been born in the Americas, it was the Creole intelligentsia who first formulated a proto-nationalist discourse. Intellectuals such as Francisco Xavier Clavigero, Antonio de León y Gama, and Servando Teresa de Mier developed a view of nationhood that distinguished the nascent Mexican nation from Spain by highlighting the Aztec past of “their” forebears, and the foundational myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe. Creole patriotism would become a powerful creed after the War of Independence erupted in 1810.


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proponents of Creole patriotism were Creoles of Spanish descent, political writers, such as Father Servando Teresa de Mier and later Carlos María de Bustamante, argued that the Spanish conquest of the Americas had resulted in 300 years of oppression and that it was their duty to renew the struggle of the Aztecs where it had been left off—with the execution of the last Aztec emperor, Cuauhtemoc, in 1521. They even found a way of refuting the view that the Spaniards were responsible for bringing Christianity to Mexico. They argued that the white-bearded god Quetzalcóatl was none other than the apostle Saint Thomas and that, therefore, the Aztecs were Christians before the Spaniards arrived. The Aztecs’ cannibalism was explained as a particularly literal interpretation of the Holy Communion, eating Christ’s body, drinking Christ’s blood. The Spaniards had corrected the Aztecs’ liturgy, but they had not evangelized the Americas. Needless to say, the Creoles’ indigenismo was strictly historical. They regarded their contemporary Indians with as much contempt as the Spaniards did. Nonetheless, however contradictory their emergent nationalism was, their condemnation of everything Spanish and their affirmation of an emergent national identity that had its roots in preconquest America became a very powerful creed after the Wars of Independence erupted. For many Mexican nationalists of the 19th and even 20th centuries, the Aztec inheritance became an integral and fundamental part of nationhood. It was what distinguished them from other Spanish American nations. It also distinguished Mexico from the United States. And the argument that Mexico had existed as a nation before the conquest in 1521 was critical in undermining the legitimacy of Spanish rule. Having said this, the contradictions that clearly figured in the writings of Creole patriots such as Carlos María de Bustamante would keep this version of Mexican national identity from becoming hegemonic. In fact, for the greater part of the 19th century, there was not one single national idea that might have been seen as dominant. Political writers and historians such as conservative ideologue Lucas Alamán (1792–1853) and liberal thinker José María Luis Mora (1794–1850) saw in Hernán Cortés the true father of the Mexican family and rejected the indigenista interpretation of Mexican identity. For them, the real foundations of their nation had been set during the colonial era. The conquest was what had led to this Roman Catholic, Spanish-speaking nation. Although Alamán played a key role in helping salvage and restore many of the Aztec antiquities that can be found today in the Anthropology Museum of Mexico City, he had little time for his contemporary Indians. The importance he gave to the Spanish legacy, moreover, would be shared by many of his contemporaries. Hispanophilia would become particularly prominent following the Mexican-American War (1846–1848), and again 50 years later, following the U.S. involvement in the Cuban War of Independence in 1898. Faced with the threat of U.S. expansionism, many Mexicans rejected their American affinities by emphasizing their Spanish and, by default, European heritage. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Mexicans’ real and imagined bonds with Spain and the United States were, and still are, recurrent themes in most definitions of Mexican identity. In both instances, there was always a certain ambivalence expressed, what could be described figuratively as a kind of schizophrenia. The Spanish Crown’s refusal to acknowledge Mexico’s independence until the late 1830s, paired with its attempt to reconquer its former colony in 1829, resulted in Hispanophobia becoming a common feature in most early expressions of mexicanidad. This attitude can be seen in literary works such as Xicoténcatl (1826), as well as in some of the legislation that was passed, such as the 1827–1829 laws that resulted in the expulsion of Spaniards from Mexico. There was a need for Mexicans to distinguish themselves from Spain as they consolidated their independence. To be Mexican entailed claiming the Aztec past as their own and condemning all things Spanish, even if they were white criollos. For the radical anticlerical, liberal Mexican politicians who filled the corridors of power following independence, the United States represented a role model. Their rejection of their Spanish heritage, interpreted as the cause of their backwardness and their reactionary traditions, entailed a desire to emulate their northern neighbor. One politician and thinker, Lorenzo de Zavala (1788–1836), N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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went as far as turning against Mexico during the 1835–1836 Texan revolution. However, with time, as the expansionism of the United States resulted in the loss of half of the national territory in 1848, most Mexicans found themselves developing a contradictory love-hate feeling toward the United States. As was noted by the 20th-century Mexican historian Edmundo O’Gorman, the Mexicans of the 19th century wanted the benefits of U.S. modernity, but they did not want modernity itself, preferring to retain their traditional Hispano-Indian Catholic customs. Thus, definitions of Mexican identity went from rejecting the Spanish heritage to embracing it, in tandem with periods of admiration and revulsion toward the American way of life.

Narrating the Nation Indicative of the failure of the elite to develop a coherent narrative of nationhood is that the majority of Mexicans were notoriously apathetic during the MexicanAmerican War (1846–1848). It could be argued that it was only after the defeat that Mexicans started to think seriously about who they were. Mexican politician and thinker Mariano Otero (1817–1850) was of the view that Mexico’s lack of a sense of national identity was the real cause of the 1847 defeat: “There has not been nor could there have been, a national spirit, for there is no nation.” The loss of half of their national territory did stir, however, an attempt to instill a sense of patriotism among the population. The intelligentsia resorted to writing histories of Mexico; the political class looked into other ways of achieving this goal. The 1853–1855 dictatorship of Antonio López de Santa Anna dedicated significant attention to organizing patriotic festivities, public holidays, and parades. The Mexican national anthem was commissioned by Santa Anna in 1854 as part of his drive to tackle the ostensible lack of patriotism in the Mexican people.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Nevertheless, despite the actions taken in the 1850s to mobilize the nation and develop a coherent set of myths that could provide the disparate communities of the republic with a unifying sense of nationhood, it was not until the late 19th century that something close to a hegemonic narrative emerged. Partly to blame, of course, was the size of Mexico and the poor communications that prevailed at the time. The sheer vastness of the country, paired with its geographical and climatic diversity, proved immensely difficult to overcome. Communications were poor, and even when news from the capital did reach the distant rural provinces, it did not necessarily mean much to the population. Behind vast mountain ranges, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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hidden in the depths of the jungle, or amid the desert, names of faraway presidents paired with abstract concepts such as “nationhood” bore little significance to the everyday lives of a majority whose allegiance was to their village, hacienda, or perhaps region. The burning issues that divided the political class in the congresses and Masonic gatherings of the main cities were just foreign words to the average campesinos and Indians of the countryside. In addition, the dramatic disparities of wealth between the few and the many, between the white minority and the colored majority, were not conducive to the establishment of a homogeneous sense of community, be that national or regional. The abysmal levels of literacy and education in 19th-century Mexico also meant that the majority did not participate in the intellectual debates that the intelligentsia became engaged in over what was lo mexicano, what it meant to be Mexican. In many regions, the Indian population quite simply did not speak Spanish and was not included in the criollos’ nation-building exercise. Federalism, centralism, republicanism, freedom of speech, free commerce, and liberalism meant so much in the big urban centers, but meant so little elsewhere. Why should an Indian in Yucatán care whether, in some distant place called Mexico City, an emperor by the name of Agustín I had abdicated and a constituent congress was to be formed? What could it matter whether in an even remoter place called Texas a large contingent of U.S. immigrants was being allowed to settle? It is worth remembering that the War of Independence was never a clear-cut conflict between nationals and Spaniards but a violent social revolution and civil war in which criollos, mestizos, and Indians fought for both sides. It would take the overthrow of Maximilian’s empire (1864–1867), the definitive triumph of the liberal reform laws of the 1860s, and the stability of the porfiriato (the 1876–1910 regime under Porfirio Díaz) for the Mexican intelligentsia and government to finally formulate and develop a more successful and long-lasting vision of Mexican identity. Once the regional and political factions established a relative status quo, the Porfirian political class saw the need to forge a comprehensive nationalistic history to consolidate the nation and to prove to the international community that Mexico was a stable country that belonged to the civilized world. Along with the so-called pax porfiriana, Mexico benefited from a technological revolution. The railway and the telegraph united the republic for the first time in ways that had been impossible before. Furthermore, Porfirio Díaz’s government took it upon itself to create an effective and far-reaching educational system that started to develop a unifying mestizo interpretation of nationhood. The nation, the government claimed, would be consolidated in the classrooms. The 1880s witnessed the publication of the first concise liberal histories of the nation. A fundamental work was Vicente Riva Palacio’s (1832–1896) five-volume compendium Mexico over the Centuries (1887–1889), which set the tone for subsequent Porfirian works such as historian Justo Sierra’s (1848–1912) textbook Patriotic History, widely used in schools at the beginning of the 20th century. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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most salient aspect of late 19th-century Mexican nationalism was its reconciliatory focus. Mexico had become a proud rather than a torn mestizo nation. The paradoxical paradigms of Mexican identity with the trauma of its conflicting Spanish-Mesoamerican origins appeared to be temporarily resolved in the Porfirian cultural landscape. Riva Palacio believed that with the conquest a mestizo nation had been born. Although he acknowledged the pain of the conquest, he stressed that the encounter of these two great cultures, the Spanish and the Aztec, had resulted in the birth of an even greater race and nation. The mestizos were, in his mind, set to become a chosen race that enjoyed the best features of its two constituents and the true representatives of the Mexican nation. Although Riva Palacio’s and his generation’s mestizo interpretation of mexicanidad continues to be contested, it would prove extremely resilient. In fact, it could be argued that the official 20th-century mestizo definition of Mexican nationhood originates from the popular works of the liberal historians of the porfiriato. Mexican nationalism would evolve and go through a number of substantial changes in the 20th century; nevertheless, many of the issues that concerned those Mexican thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries who attempted to define their national identity would remain the same, to a lesser or a greater degree. Whether conciliatory or divisive, the discussion of Mexican national identity would and continues to revolve around the importance of the Spanish and indigenous past, the importance of the Mexican church together with the emblematic role played by the Virgin of Guadalupe, the importance or meaning of mestizaje, and a need to either distinguish or find similarities between Mexican national identity and that of Spain and the United States. Selected Bibliography Anna, Timothy E. 1998. Forging Mexico, 1821–1835. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press. Brading, D. A. 1984. Prophecy and Myth in Mexican History. Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies. Brading, D. A. 1985. The Origins of Mexican Nationalism. Cambridge: Centre of Latin American Studies. Brading, D. A. 1991. The First America. The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots, and the Liberal State, 1492–1867. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brading, D. A. 2001. Mexican Phoenix. Our Lady of Guadalupe: Image and Tradition across Five Centuries. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Florescano, Enrique. 1994. Memory, Myth, and Time in Mexico. From the Aztecs to Independence. Austin: University of Texas Press. Fowler, Will. 1998. Mexico in the Age of Proposals, 1821–1853. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Guardino, Peter F. 1996. Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico’s National State: Guerrero, 1800–1857. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Hamnett, Brian. 1999. A Concise History of Mexico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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Knight, Alan. 2002. Mexico: The Colonial Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Santoni, Pedro. 1966. Mexicans at Arms. Puro Federalists and the Politics of War, 1845–1848. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press. Tenorio-Trillo, Mauricio. 1996. Mexico at the World’s Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Thomson, Guy P. C., and David G. LaFrance. 1999. Patriotism, Politics, and Popular Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Juan Francisco Lucas and the Puebla Sierra. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources. Van Young, Eric. 2001. The Other Rebellion. Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810–1821. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.


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Paraguay Jerry Cooney Chronology 1811 (May) Overthrow of Spanish authority in Paraguay. 1813 (Winter) Proclamation of independence of the Republic of Paraguay. 1814–1840 Dictatorship of Dr. José Gaspar de Francia. Isolation of the republic. 1844–1862 Dictatorship of Don Carlos Antonio López. Economic modernization. 1862–1870 Dictatorship of Francisco Solano López. 1864–1870 War of the Triple Alliance or Paraguayan War. Near destruction of Paraguay. 1870–1936 The liberal era: reconstruction of Paraguay and the imitation of European liberalism in the economic, political, and social restructuring of the republic. 1932–1935 Chaco War. Paraguay gains great extent of territory west of the Paraguay River. Resurgence of Hispano-Guaraní nationalism.

Situating the Nation Paraguay’s origins are found in the Spanish conquest of the 1540s. The conquerors, finding no precious metals, turned to subsistence agriculture and pastoral pursuits, commanding the labor of the conquered Guaraní Indians. Very few Spanish women accompanied the conquest, and soon the offspring of Spanish males and Indian women outnumbered the original settlers. These hijos del país (“sons of the country”) accepted the material, social, and religious culture of their fathers but in daily life spoke Guaraní in preference to Spanish. By the 1590s, the children of the conquerors, regardless of their mixed origin, had acquired the full rights of Europeans. Spreading from the region of Asunción, the first area conquered by the Spanish, the hijos del país carried a unique Hispano-Guaraní culture into the fertile territory of what is now eastern Paraguay. Beset by nomadic Indians from the north and across the Paraguay River from the Gran Chaco, as well as by Brazilian slave raiders, Paraguayans from the 17th century on developed a self-reliant, frontier culture. Neglected by the Crown and forced to defend themselves, the hijos del país were often a troublesome folk, paying little attention to law or royal authority. Land was available to all classified as Spanish, and a population of small-to-middling independent peasants and small ranchers formed the backbone of the rural Paraguayan society and economy, the latter being mainly of a barter type. The small number of large landholders also gained wealth and prestige by grants of Indian labor for the extraction of yerba, the raw material for yerba maté, a popular tea in the Río de la Plata. And until the mid-18th century, yerba was Paraguay’s only important export to the outside N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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world. Only after 1760, as a result of important economic reforms, did Paraguay show moderate prosperity. At the same time, with the introduction of capable governors, the province secured its southern and eastern border at the Alto Paraná, established its northern border along a mountain range and a no-man’s land touching on the Brazilian Mato Grosso, and even exercised a shadowy authority over the eastern fringes of the Gran Chaco. Paraguay declared its independence in 1813 after three years of confusion, beginning with the rebellion against Spanish authority by the inhabitants of the vice regal capital of Buenos Aires. That event was followed by the Paraguayan militia fending off an attempt by the leaders of Buenos Aires to incorporate Paraguay into their new political system, a bloodless revolt by the militia against the last royal governor, and then the institution of a ruling junta. Essentially, from that declaration of independence until 1870, the new republic was ruled by three dictators. The first isolated his country almost completely to preserve its independence. The second opened Paraguay somewhat to the outside world and presided over economic progress and modernization (including the strengthening of the armed forces). The third led his nation into a disastrous war against the empire of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. By 1870 Paraguay was in shambles with a great loss in population, economic dislocation, and occupation by the


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Population Catastrophe, 1864–1870 The Paraguayan devotion to country is no better revealed than by the tragic population disaster resulting from the Paraguayan War. From available census records, Paraguay possessed a prewar population of about 470,000, and an immediate postwar figure of about 170,000. Battlefield and disease losses, particularly in the two-year struggle for Humaitá, so reduced available manpower by 1867 that the government ordered conscription of boys 14 years of age. Two years later, in an 1869 battle to effect the escape to the northeast of Marshal López’s army, the victorious Brazilians were shocked to discover that they had been fighting cork-mustached soldiers of 11 and 12 years old—the “children martyrs” of Acosta Ñu. This demographic disaster, of course, had great implications for the ability of postwar governments to fund their operations, as well as the near collapse of the rural economy and a Paraguay in which females greatly outnumbered males.

victors. Only the victors’ contention over the spoils saved the nation from disappearance. From the 1870s to the 1930s—the liberal era—leaders adopted European models for economic and political reconstruction of the republic. The old Paraguay of the three dictators was scorned as an evil, “uncivilized” period. The Guaraní portion of the Hispano-Guaraní heritage was looked upon as an impediment to progress, as Paraguay strived to be part of the “civilized” world. Most members of the formerly independent peasant class became no more than agricultural laborers. Only by the 1920s was there a greater appreciation of the unique historical inheritance of Paraguayans by various historians, politicians, and publicists. In 1932, Paraguay again found itself at war; this time against Bolivia for possession of the Chaco. Emerging victorious from that war (1932–1935), and wracked by the strife caused by a realization that the old liberal republic had ignored the economic and social plight of the majority of Paraguayans, political confusion ensued for the next 20 years. However, from that war did emerge a consensus of pride and acceptance of the Hispano-Guaraní culture and the Guaraní language as defining characteristics of being Paraguayan, and a conviction that the republic must find some path to social, political, and economic modernization.

Instituting the Nation Paraguayan independence was an offshoot of the Buenos Aires May 1810 revolt against Spanish authority. The port city then called upon all the viceroyalty to recognize its authority, a demand that the royalist-dominated cabildo (town council) of Asunción and Paraguay’s governor rejected. Twice in early 1811, Paraguay’s militia defeated an invading Buenos Aires army. However, the officer class N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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of the militia, mainly important landowners, had no real loyalty to Spain but rather a distrust of the motives of Buenos Aires. Shortly after the Paraguayan victories, a bloodless militia coup d’état overthrew the governor, removed the royalist cabildo, and installed a civilian-militia junta to govern Paraguay. After the purge of the royalists, the junta entered into diplomacy with Buenos Aires. A member of the junta, Dr. José Gaspar de Francia successfully conducted that negotiation, by which Buenos Aires recognized the autonomy of Paraguay, if not its complete independence. At about the same time, a persecution of those elements that might contest the junta’s power ensued. Spanish-born merchants were cowed by fines and threats of imprisonment, partisans of Buenos Aires were expelled downriver, and the bishop of Asunción meekly accepted the junta’s assumption of the Crown’s power over the church. Internally, the junta experienced power struggles between 1811 and 1813, wherein Dr. Francia revealed an unexpected political skill. This university-educated, middle-aged lawyer had enjoyed minor cabildo positions since the 1790s but, as a native-born Paraguayan, was never associated with the favored Spanish-born royalists. Now he skillfully neutralized both civilian and militia opponents on the junta. In 1813 at a congress that declared Paraguayan independence, he became a co-ruler with a militia officer, and then the next year another congress named him president and dictator of Paraguay, an office he held until his death in 1840. Dr. Francia gained complete power by wooing the rural small and medium cultivators and ranchers, and with this class he gained power in the various congresses of the independence era and then utilized them in his governance of Paraguay. In reforming the provincial militia into a national army, he replaced many of the former officers of the landholding elite with his loyal adherents. In return for support, he gave those cultivators and ranchers security against the rapacity of the old landholding elite. He assured them that there would be no more military adventures outside of Paraguay such as the 1806–1807 disastrous expedition to Buenos Aires to repel a British invasion—an action that also created turmoil within the province. There was no interference with the traditional life of the countryside, and they understood that Dr. Francia would defend fanatically the sovereignty of the new republic. Only once in his generation-long rule was he threatened by a conspiracy—by discontented former militia officers in 1820. The plot was discovered and crushed without mercy. The dictator proclaimed a noninterference policy with regard to Paraguay’s neighbors, and when in 1818–1819 violent political difficulties to the south threatened to spill over into Paraguay, he isolated the republic diplomatically and politically. Paraguayans were barred from leaving their country, and very few foreigners were admitted. Only through two minor ports was commerce with neighbors permitted, and the dictator carefully monitored and controlled that trade. Paraguay was now a hermit nation, but one in which the belief in an independent republic became fully accepted. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation By the late colonial era, geography, culture, and language had all combined to create a common Paraguayan identity. Not only was the province, then the nation, far distant from other centers of power in the Río de la Plata, but it possessed well-defined natural boundaries. To the south and east, the Alto Paraná River served as the limit of Asunción’s authority, although until 1870 the Paraguayan Republic did claim a shadowy power over the old Jesuit province of Misiones between the Alto Paraná and Uruguay rivers. To the west of the Paraguay River, the forbidding territory of the Gran Chaco proved an effective guardian, and to the northwest and north, a mountain range and unsettled region protected Paraguay from Brazilian expansion. Internally, most Paraguayans lived within a 70-mile semicircle around Asunción. That compact area facilitated centralized government and forestalled regional rivalries that may have jeopardized political and cultural unity. Transportation was easy—both overland and by the many rivers draining west into the Paraguay River. By independence Paraguayans shared a common peasant culture based on many small rural villages. Large landowners did exist, but small- to medium-sized cultivators and ranchers were the economic and social backbones of society. Upon independence, no real ethnic differences troubled the new republic. Even those still legally classified as Indians shared the same culture, economic pursuits, and language as other Paraguayans. And the Indian classification, by a simple decree in 1848, was abolished. Nomadic Indians of the far north and the Gran Chaco were relatively few and had little impact upon the common HispanoGuaraní culture that had been forged through the centuries. In the last 30 years of the colonial era, a few Spanish-born merchants had made their way to Paraguay, but they were significant only in an economic sense, and then for just a short period. After the 1870s, some European agriculturalists did immigrate to Paraguay, although not enough to affect in any large manner the cultural and racial makeup of the republic. Descendants of those late 19thand early 20th-century immigrants often prospered but still melded easily into Paraguayan society.

Narrating the Nation Through oral transmission and political discourse in the 19th century, and then augmented by literary efforts and education in the 20th, Paraguayans were continually reminded of Dr. Francia and the independence of their nation, Carlos Antonio López’s modernization efforts (1844–1862), and then the era of Francisco Solano López and the “Great Epic” of the Paraguayan War (1864–1870). The N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Francisco Solano López, who became president of Paraguay upon the death of his father in 1862, is closely associated with the Paraguayan War, during which the army of his small country fought the forces of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay for more than five years. (Library of Congress)

grandsons of those who survived that war then experienced the bloody Chaco War against Bolivia (1932–1936). Carlos Antonio López’s “Golden Age” of peace and economic progress (1844–1862) is still celebrated, and even Francisco Solano López—for all his faults—became a controversial nationalist icon for devotees in the 20th century who honored his valiant defense of Paraguay against the combined forces of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. Tragic as the Paraguayan War and Chaco War were, Paraguayans are proud that national sacrifices in these conflicts proved them, both men and women, courageous and patriotic. There are many “hallowed grounds” in Paraguayan memory: the fortress of Humaitá, where a generation of Paraguayans died in the 1860s; Cerro Corá, where President-Marshal Solano López in 1870 perished crying “I die with my country!”; the Asunción railroad station, emblematic of national progress under Carlos Antonio López; and the battlefields of the Chaco War, from which outnumbered Paraguayans emerged victorious. All of these have been celebrated in poetry, ballads, monuments, and holidays, their apotheosis being the Pantheon of Heroes in the center of Asunción, where the remains of honored heroes and leaders of Paraguay are interred. Poetry, both in Spanish and Guaraní, has played a large role in the literary narration of the nation, and some fine works were published soon after the Paraguayan War. The historical narration of Paraguay, however, had to await the rise of scholars and publicists in the first decade of the 20th century. For political reasons, Paraguayans produced very few accounts of their nation during the eras of Dr. Francia and the two Lópezes. Additionally, from 1870 to the 1890s, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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reconstruction of the nation and incessant political turmoil precluded such efforts. Given recovery by the 1890s, the appearance of some memoirs of war survivors, and then the availability of documentation from the National Archive, Paraguayan scholars began to reflect upon and reconstruct their nation’s past. While national biography was dominant, there were also studies of the independence movement and, because of contention with Bolivia over rights to the Gran Chaco, administrative and legal histories of the late colonial era. By 1942, with the publication of Julio César Chaves’s masterful biography of Dr. Francia, historical studies of Paraguay’s past had reached a respectable maturity. Ignored by many, however, has been the great contribution of the Guaraní tongue and folk memory to the narration of the nation. By songs and oral transmission, the common folk kept alive their vision of Paraguay. For instance, generations of Paraguayans respectfully referred to Dr. Francia as el difunto—“the one who has passed.” Balladeers composed songs in Guaraní celebrating leaders and great events in the nation’s past. Especially notable was the popular composer Emiliano R. Fernández, whose ballads of the Chaco War are still sung some 70 years after that conflict. For many Paraguayans, particularly in the countryside, folk narration of the national experience is as important as any literary or official account.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation From independence onward, the primary goal of Paraguayan leaders was to defend sovereignty and national territory. For Dr. Francia, this meant isolation of the republic; for Don Carlos, economic progress fueled by the state and military preparedness; for Francisco Solano López, recourse to war. During the regimes of these three leaders (1814–1870), Paraguayans received information from the government through written orders and proclamations to rural subordinates in the countryside, who then read the communications to villagers in Guaraní after mass. For two generations, the governments carefully controlled the dissemination of news, and in the official communications emphasized the duty of Paraguayans to defend their nation, the beneficence of the government, and dangers from outside. Weakened as they were and subject to the victors, the postwar Paraguayan governments still tenaciously defended Paraguay’s rights to the Chaco in the face of Argentine claims. The leaders of the liberal era of 1870–1930, however, in their imitation of European liberalism, found little value in the Guaraní portion of prewar Paraguayan culture. For them, the use of the native language was an impediment to educational, cultural, and economic progress. Furthermore, for many of the new elite, any recourse to Hispano-Guaraní populism reminded them uncomfortably of the “evil” days of the three great dictators. Nationalism came to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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mean Paraguay’s progress and integration into the Atlantic world of 19th-century liberalism. In contrast to the economic nationalism of Don Carlos, foreign investment was encouraged. And in the countryside, the many formerly independent peasants became laborers, subject to the great landowners who arose during the confusion of postwar Paraguay. Yet by the 1910s and 1920s, with a growing belief that liberalism was not working and had marginalized too many Paraguayans, a growing number of intellectuals and artists rediscovered the importance of leaders of the First Republic (1813–1870) and the “popular sectors” in Paraguay’s culture and past. Agustín Barrios, a great Paraguayan composer, celebrated Paraguay’s Guaraní inheritance in many of his works. Juan O’Leary glorified Francisco Solano López as a great patriotic defender of Paraguayan nationalism. Somewhat later, Juan Natalicio González furthered his semifascist political ambitions by both intellectual and polemical populist championing of Paraguay’s unique culture. By the 1920s as tensions with Bolivia grew over the ownership of the Chaco, so did HispanoGuaraní nationalism. In the Chaco War (1932–1935), Guaraní, as in the past, was the language of the Paraguayan Army. Officers, drawn from the educated class, became more appreciative of the worth of their soldiers from the lower classes, whom they led to victory. Out of the war emerged a populist movement to change Paraguay by integrating the “popular sectors” into Paraguayan society, economy, and politics. Land should be returned to the common rural Paraguayan. The Guaraní tongue must be respected as a common inheritance of all Paraguayans. The political and economic structure of the liberal state must be changed so as to benefit all Paraguayans, not just the liberal elite. Political turmoil from the late 1930s to the 1950s defeated most economic aspects of this populist and nationalistic movement. However, the realization that the Guaraní-speaking countryside was the true repository of Paraguayan identity became an article of faith among nationalists. The native tongue finally achieved official recognition as a national language, just as important as Spanish. And for

Agustín Barrios (“Mangoré”) (1885–1944) Agustín Barrios, born in a small village in southern Paraguay, has been recognized as one of the great guitarists and guitar composers of the 20th century. A musical prodigy, his earliest influences were the traditional rural music and dance of his homeland. Befitting the duality of Hispano-Guaraní culture, however, he quickly mastered the classical guitar of Europe and other Latin American nations. He never lost, though, his love for Paraguay and its culture. Indeed, at the height of his career in the 1930s, he adopted a second name of “Mangoré” after a Guaraní chieftain of the early 1500s. In many of his works, one also perceives a strong influence of Catholicism, but that religious theme is often influenced by a deep Guaraní mysticism. Few Paraguayans in the 20th century were as important as “Mangoré” in displaying to the outside world the culture of their country.


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political reasons or otherwise, the idea of the familia paraguaya (the “Paraguayan Family”)—the view that all Paraguayans were unified by their unique culture and identity—was widely promulgated and accepted. As this isolated republic became more integrated into the greater world in the 20th century, nationalism still found its justification through an acceptance of and appreciation for Paraguay’s Hispano-Guaraní culture, present and past. Selected Bibliography Centurión, Carlos R. 1961. Historia de la cultura paraguaya. 2 vols. Asunción: Biblioteca Ortiz Guerrero. Chaves, Julio César. 1964. El Supremo Dictador: Biografía de José Gaspar de Francia. 4th ed. Madrid: Atlas. Chaves, Julio César. 1968. El Presidente López: Vida y Gobierno de Don Carlos. 2nd ed. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Depalma. Cooney, Jerry W. 2004. “The Many Faces of El Supremo: Historians, History, and Dr. Francia.” History Compass (online publication) 2, LA 119: 1–18. Ganson, Barbara. 1990. “Following Their Children into Battle: Women at War in Paraguay, 1864–1870.” The Americas 46, no. 3: 335–371. Lustig, Wolf. 1999. “Chacore purahei–canciones de Guerra. Literatura popular en guaraní e identidad nacional en el Paraguay.” In El espacio interior de America del Sur: Geografía, historia, cultura, edited by Barbara Potthast, Karl Kohut, and Gerd Kohlhepp, 363–379. Frankfurt/Main: Vervuert. Potthast-Jutkeit, Barbara. 1996. “Paraíso de Mahoma” o “País de las mujeres”? El rol de la familia en la sociedad paraguaya del Siglo XIX. Asunción: Instituto Cultural Paraguayo-Alemán Editor. Rubin, Joan. 1968. National Bilingualism in Paraguay. Paris: Mouton. Warren, Harris Gaylord. 1949. Paraguay: An Informal History. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. Whigham, Thomas L. 2002. The Paraguayan War, vol. 1: Causes and Early Conduct. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Whigham, Thomas L., and Barbara Potthast. 1999. “The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone: New Insights into the Demographics of the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870.” Latin American Research Review 34, no. 1: 174–186. Williams, John Hoyt. 1974. “Race, Threat and Geography: The Paraguayan Experience of Nationalism.” Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism 1, no. 2: 173–191. Williams, John Hoyt. 1979. The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1800–1870. Austin: University of Texas Press. Zook, David H. 1960. The Conduct of the Chaco War. New York: Bookman Associates.


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Peru Nils Jacobsen Chronology 1759–1789 Reign of the reforming Bourbon king Charles III of Spain. 1780–1782 “Great Rebellion” (of Tupac Amaru II) postulates Andean autonomy. 1791–1796 Publication of enlightened, proto-nationalist Mercurio Peruano in Lima. 1808 Napoleon’s occupation of most of Spain; constitutional crisis in the Spanish empire. 1810 Governing juntas replace colonial authorities in major Spanish American cities, including Quito and Chuquisaca (Bolivia), but not in Peru. 1814 Anti-Spanish Pumacahua Rebellion in Cuzco under Creole leadership. 1820 General José de San Martín’s army of liberation invades Peru from the south. 1821 On July 28, San Martín declares the independence of Peru in Lima; the highlands are still controlled by strong Spanish armies. 1821–1845 Early republic: extreme political instability, with 24 regime changes and six constitutions. 1824 (December 9) The defeat of the Spanish troops at the battle of Ayacucho, Peru, terminates Spanish control over mainland America. 1836–1839 Peru-Bolivian Confederation under General Andrés de Santa Cruz. 1840s–1870s “Age of Guano”: Peruvian state reaps bonanza from bird dung sales for fertilizer; nearly 100,000 Chinese “coolies” (indentured servants) are brought to Peru. 1854 President Ramón Castilla abolishes slavery and the Indian head tax. 1866 Spanish navy bombards Lima’s port Callao in a brief war with Ecuador, Chile, and Peru. 1879–1883 The War of the Pacific ends in the loss of Peru’s southernmost territories to Chile and in a severe, decade-long domestic crisis. 1889 Publication of Peru’s first indigenista novel, Clorinda Matto de Turner’s Aves sin nido (Birds without a Nest). 1895–1919 “Aristocratic Republic”: period of rapid economic growth based on agricultural and mineral exports, relative political stability under exclusive oligarchic governments, rising nationalism, and labor organizing. 1900 “Generation of 1900”: group of young elite intellectuals calling for spiritual renewal of the nation. 1918–1919 Worker and student strikes lead to an eight-hour work day and university reform. 1919 “Generation of 1919,” lead by Marxist essayist José Carlos Mariátegui and populist politician Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, ushers in mass politics and progressive nationalism.

Situating the Nation What would become the Republic of Peru had previously been the center of two far-flung empires: the Inca empire, stretching for more than 4,000 kilometers NATIONS AND NATIONALISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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from the south of modern Colombia to northwest Argentina and central Chile; and Spain’s Viceroyalty of Peru, the formal juridical authority for all territories claimed by Spain in South America between the 16th and the early 18th centuries, from Panama to the River Plate and Chile. This legacy would leave two problems for Peruvian nationalisms. First, the bipolarity of the Inca capital at Cuzco high in the southern Andes and the Spanish colonial capital at Lima on the central coast exacerbated the distinct Hispanic and Andean visions of the nation in Peru. The differences between those visions owed much both to a colonial order hierarchically segmented along socio-ethnic lines and the unusually difficult conditions of communication and transportation posed by the exceptional geography of the Andes. Second, due to Peru’s “imperial avocation” and the gradual forging of shared socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural patterns throughout the central Andes between the countries of modern Ecuador and Bolivia by Incas and Spaniards, postindependence Peruvians would at times find it difficult to accept the nation’s southern and northern boundaries. More narrowly defined Peruvian nationalisms competed with projects to recompose the Incaic or colonial “Andean space.” With the rapid rise to dominance of foreign merchant communities (especially British, French, and North American) in Peru’s foreign trade during the 1820s, early economic nationalism was increasingly directed against foreigners. During the first quarter century after independence, Peru experienced economic stagnation and realignment of commercial circuits, fiscal penury, a weak state, and civil wars among military caudillos (strongmen). Fear of competition and the destruction of domestic manufacturing led a coalition of Creole merchants and craftsmen to successfully push for prohibitive tariffs on strategic imports and for severe restrictions on the distribution and retail activities of the foreigners in Peru. This coalition was able to slow the advance of economic liberalism until about 1850. With the strong rise of exports during the following quarter century (especially the guano bonanza but also the growth of sugar, cotton, and wool exports and the installation of associated rail lines and port facilities), the modernizing coastal elites opted for close association with foreign merchants, bankers, and engineers and embraced some of the tenets of economic liberalism. But this alignment prompted further protests by craftsmen and the rise of economic nationalist elite sectors, both among provincial elites and intellectuals in the capital. By the time the economic boom turned into a bust in 1876, numerous articles and pamphlets were blaming foreigners and Lima’s elite financiers for the debacle and calling for protectionism and the development of national industries (Klarén 2000). The period from 1895 to 1919 is known as the “Aristocratic Republic” in Peruvian history. The power of the social and economic elites was greater than it had ever been since independence. As a consequence of a sustained and diversified export boom, the social fabric, lifestyles, and consumption patterns of Peruvians were changing rapidly, in the city and in the countryside, on the coast and in the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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sierra; communications, associational activities, and literacy rates were increasing. These social, economic, and cultural changes would have a major impact on imagining the nation and on the strength of nationalist movements.

Instituting the Nation A cultural proto-nationalism gradually developed among Creoles (Americanborn Spaniards) between the 17th and late 18th centuries. Born out of a defense against European authors who dismissed America, its climate, flora, fauna, and native peoples as naturally inferior, Peruvian authors praised their environment for its bounty and promise; some authors portrayed the Andes as a providential land that re-created the biblical Eden. Late 18th-century, enlightened studies of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Andean geography and nature focused on economic and social improvement projects for their pátria. The editors of Lima’s Mercurio Peruano (1791–1796) proclaimed in its first issue, “We love Peru because it is right to do so, because of our natural inclinations, and because of its particular character” (Lynch 1986, 33). In spite of Spanish censorship, French and Anglo-American enlightened or revolutionary texts by authors like Voltaire, the Marquis de Condorcet, Thomas Jefferson, and Thomas Paine circulated among a small group of Peruvian elite Creoles. Peruvian Jesuit Juan Pablo Vizcardo y Guzmán, exiled in Europe after the expulsion of his order from the Spanish domains in 1767, published a Letter to the Spanish Americans in 1799, in which he called for independence, without imagining specific nations as Peru, Mexico, or Bolivia. Yet most Peruvian Creoles continued to imagine themselves as part of a Spanish nation right up to the achievement of independence, even while calling for more privileges, power, or autonomy for themselves. Few Creoles incorporated the indigenous majority into their concept of the nation. Creole nationalism surfaced broadly at the very moment of independence, and it immediately defined itself in juxtaposition to both the “Spanish tyrants” and the “foreign intruders” who dominated Peruvian politics between 1820 and 1826. The final campaigns liberating Peru from Spanish domination were led by generals and troop units from other parts of South America: José de San Martín and his Argentine and Chilean troops between 1820 and 1822, and Simón Bolivar and his Venezuelan and Colombian troops from 1823 through the decisive battle of Ayacucho on December 9, 1824, and beyond. These forces were accompanied by Peruvians officers, troops (many conscripted), and guerrilla groups, but at least as many Peruvians kept fighting for the royalists until the very end. The resulting notion of a “conceded independence” has been a problem for Peruvian nationalists and national identity ever since. Nationalists can justly point to a series of local and regional plots and rebellions, which fought for autonomy between 1809 and 1814. Their leaders expressed hatred of peninsular Spaniards and forged alliances between Creoles, indigenous caciques, and important sectors of the clergy, but not always under the leadership of Creoles. Some insurgents rallied indigenous peasants around the vision of reconstituting Inca rule.

Defining the Nation The Great Rebellion of 1780–1782, originally led by Tupac Amaru II, was the most serious challenge to Spanish rule in the Americas since conquest. Now seen as part of the revolutionary fervor sweeping the Atlantic world in the last quarter of the 18th century, the rebellion was also nourished by Inca nationalism, an 18thcentury cultural and intellectual movement in which native lords exalted their Inca ancestry, emphasized Inca dress, music, and oral traditions, and boasted of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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the wise rule of the Inca emperors. Reacting both against the heavy-handed modernizing reforms of the Spanish Bourbon court and long-standing colonial abuses, rebels espoused social reforms such as the abolition of slavery, Indian tribute, and forced labor drafts (mita). While Tupac Amaru envisioned an autonomous Andean realm within a universal Spanish monarchy, more radical rebel leaders espoused complete independence from Spain. Tupac Amaru’s project foresaw the creation of a multi-ethnic nation made up of Indians, mestizos, people of African descent, and Creoles; but more radical rebel leaders envisioned nations of native Andean ethnic groups that excluded people of Spanish or African descent. The defeat of the rebellion owed much to the unwillingness of colonial Peruvian elites to accept a polity with native Andeans in leadership positions and a growing hysteria about “race wars” involving the extermination of the whites. This would remain a trope used against indigenous pretensions of inclusion throughout the first century of Peruvian independence. Many historians view the Great Rebellion of 1780 as the last serious chance for the construction of a multi-ethnic Peruvian nation before the mid-20th century. Before the arrival of San Martín’s liberating army in 1820, the colonial Creole elite of merchants, large landholders, and bureaucrats, especially in Lima and the coastal region, was unwilling to forge a national project that could bring unity to regional and social movements against the Spanish Crown. They remained royalists until the end—in spite of their cultural nationalism and growing resentment of their Spanish overlords—for fear of renewed Indian insurgencies and of rebellions among their Afro-Peruvian slaves and freedmen, who worked their lands and did much of the manual labor in the coastal cities. After independence, nationalists remained divided on the role of Spanish residents, on church-state relations, and on the social and ethnic dimensions of the nation. Nationalist discourse was intermingled with the debates and conflicts among conservatives and liberals and diverse regional elites. Within days of Peru’s declaration of independence on July 28, 1821, San Martín decreed the expulsion of the peninsular Spaniards and the confiscation of their property and that of Creole royalists. In all 19th-century Peruvian constitutions, place of birth defined native citizenship, and it became a political tool to denounce one’s adversaries as foreigners if they happened to be born in what became Bolivia, Ecuador, or Colombia. These constitutions also protected the Catholic church as the only legal religion in the land. The territorial dimensions of the Peruvian nation remained in dispute for decades. Peru fought border wars with its new republican neighbors Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, and Bolivia (conflicts with Brazil remained more diffuse due to lack of effective state control over the vast Amazon territories). Especially in southern Peru and the neighboring Bolivian altiplano, most elites envisioned a nation reintegrating the south Andean space (southern Peru and Bolivia) that had flourished during the prosperous silver cycle (in the 16th and 17th centuries). This vision briefly resulted in the formation of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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(1836–1839) under the leadership of Bolivian president Andrés de Santa Cruz, which reflected the shared culture, environment, commercial circuits, and crossborder family ties. The confederation was militarily defeated due to both opposition from within Peru (especially in northern Peru) and fear among neighboring republics of the formation of a neo-imperial state on the west coast of South America. But the idea of uniting Peru and Bolivia continued to play a role at least until the late 19th century. A less imperial vision of confederating the South American republics emerged under the presidencies of Ramón Castilla (1845–1849, 1855–1862). He promoted defensive alliances among them to safeguard their sovereignty and territorial integrity both against cross-border caudillo wars and the increasing threat of U.S. imperialism. Reflecting on U.S. invasions in Mexico and Nicaragua, Castilla wrote in 1860 that “the relative weakness of the South American republics, divided and isolated among themselves, is . . . the deplorable cause of the fact that on many occasions we have been treated with grave lack of respect, as if for the great international potentates there did not exist a common law of nations” (Pike 1967, 111). Most Creoles portrayed Indians as degenerate and savage. Many writers soon regretted the “democratic” measures of the liberators in granting citizenship rights to Indians and viewed the Indians as the major obstacle to the nation’s achievement of its full potential (Mendez 1996; Flores Galindo 1986). Recently historians have stressed that it was precisely the enlightened, universalist principles and policies of Peru’s Creole founding fathers that impeded inclusive nationstate formation in Peru, for the republic undermined the autonomous political traditions of the indigenous communities (Thurner 1996). But indigenous farmers, their communities, and their leaders often embraced the republic from the beginning and saw themselves as legitimate citizens of the nation. Their idea of the nation built upon specific, locally varying notions of governance derived from both colonial and precolonial norms, practices, and customary law. Often this idea entailed the reciprocal exchange of taxes, labor, and military services for protection and localized privileges, ranging from autonomous community rule to guarantees for communal property and benevolent treatment by local and provincial authorities. Indigenous communities made extensive use of republican institutions, such as court cases, petitions, and complaints to authorities, to safeguard those privileges. Especially during the height of liberalism between the 1850s and 1870s, legislators and authorities were blind to these ethnic, multicultural forms of the nation-state and pressed the need for uniform, essentially European structures of governance. The foundation of the Sociedad Amiga de los Indios (Friends of the Indians Society) in 1867 by a handful of elite liberal politicians and intellectuals combined the call for the integration of the Indian into the nation along the lines of Western cultural norms (Spanish language, education, Western-style clothing, modern hygiene) with a paternalist call for the protection of their property and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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citizenship rights against abusive bosses and authorities (Thurner 1996, Jacobsen 1997). In February 1915, Victor Andrés Belaúnde (1883–1966) and José de la Riva Aguero y Osma (1884–1944) were among the founders of the Partido Nacional Democrático. The party attracted writers, educators, artists, and university students in Lima and the provinces who were deeply concerned about the “moral decadence” of the Peruvian nation. The party rejected materialism and advocated the integration of the Peruvian nation through common spiritual values. It considered the ruling parties and national elites in government, the military, the church, and business as corrupt, yet it was unwilling to embrace the mass politics around urban workers and rural peasants that began to preoccupy the ruling elites. The party thus proposed nationalism as a moralization campaign to uplift and perfect the “collective soul” of all Peruvians, and condemned itself to political insignificance. Before 1919, no nationalist political mass movement would emerge (McEvoy 1997; Pike 1967).

Narrating the Nation During the wars of independence, the young romantic poet Mariano Melgar wrote fervent revolutionary poems expressing notions of fraternity and liberty and paternalistic love for the Indians. His execution by colonial authorities in 1815 made him a martyr for the nationalist cause. In their search for the roots of the nation, early republican writers and politicians often put forward a romantic vision of the pre-Hispanic indigenous past of Peru. The victory over Spain was portrayed as Atahualpa’s (the last reigning Inca’s) revenge for 300 years of enslavement by the foreign invaders. Some Creoles were influenced by colonial native Andean myths about Inkarri, a beheaded Atahualpa and his host, slumbering under an eastern piedmont mountain, who would reemerge to rule the Andes again once his body was fully restored. Early republican heraldry widely utilized symbols for pre-Hispanic civilizations. Creoles delighted in intonations of yaravies and other mournful songs about the honor and glory of the Incas. Peru’s early republican Creoles found the origins of the nation both in Andean pre-Hispanic civilizations and in the bravery, honor, and religion of their conquistador ancestors, both subsequently subjected by the tyranny of imperial Spain. Yet early nationalist representations of the Incas remained abstract for the most part and never extended to the contemporary indigenous majority of the nation. Manuel González Prada, Peru’s most influential radical essayist of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, in sharp-tongued speeches and newspaper columns combined a chauvinist nationalism with a condemnation of the entire republican political class and a call for militant empowerment of Peru’s indigenous citizens. In Peru’s first important indigenista novel, Aves sin nido (Birds without a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Manuel González Prada (1844–1918) Poet, essayist, and sharp-tongued social critic, Manuel González Prada became Peru’s most influential progressive intellectual in the aftermath of the War of the Pacific (1879–1883). Born into an impoverished family of the large landholding elite, González Prada sought to emancipate himself from the orthodox Catholicism of his upbringing, although never losing a moralist tone even in his most radical pronouncements. During the 1880s, he condemned Peru’s entire political elite for its factionalism, opportunism, and venality, and called for a militant nationalism to reclaim the territories lost to Chile during the War of the Pacific. “Old men to the grave, and young men to the task at hand!” he proclaimed in an 1888 speech. During a seven-year stay in Europe, González Prada turned from positivism to anarchism. Upon his return to Lima in 1898, he founded radical protest papers, helped organize anarchist labor unions, and called for the emancipation of the Indians through their own revolution. He became a major influence on a younger generation of Marxist and populist politicians and intellectuals who would carry on his attempts to combine nationalism with radical social thought.

Nest, 1889), Clorinda Matto de Turner focused the nation’s attention on the exploitation of the Indians in the highland by the “trinity” of the local priest, governor, and hacendado; redemption would come from Lima in the form of enlightened, humanitarian public and private elites. Influenced by the ideas of positivism, influential mainstream intellectuals of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such as the sociologists Carlos Lisson and Mariano H. Cornejo, the social historian and diplomat Javier Prado, and the legal scholars and reformist legislators Manuel Vicente Villarán and Matias Manzanilla, rejected the colonial regime for its exploitation of the indigenous majority and called for increased popular education as a means for progress and national integration. While certain groups of elite intellectuals embraced hard-line versions of “scientific” racism, these men believed that the indigenous majority could become valuable citizens of the nation, albeit through relinquishing their Andean cultural traditions. The generation of Peruvian intellectuals that came of age around the turn of the 20th century reacted against the increasing preoccupation with material progress and science and looked to Peru’s past for sources of the nation’s moral regeneration. While their family backgrounds and the political cultural atmosphere in which they grew up imbued them with a certain elitism, these writers were the first to focus on the Indian and social issues as central for developing a strong Peruvian nation. José de la Riva Aguero y Osma, descendant of an aristocratic colonial family and of Peru’s first nationalist president, saw Peru as an ancient nation with roots in the pre-Hispanic civilizations. These ancient roots gave Peru the right to hegemony on South America’s west coast, and Riva Aguero y Osma envisioned reestablishing the Peru-Bolivian Confederation. He saw the Andean highlands with their indigenous population as the “true Peru,” “the cradle of nationhood,” whereas Lima and the coast where the elite resided was merely a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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place for easy life, gaiety, and pleasure. Though he wanted to base Peruvian nationalism on the “solidarity and confraternity between whites, mestizos and Indians,” Riva Aguero y Osma essentially portrayed the Indians as passive: they were good soldiers and agriculturalists but in need of rule by white intellectual elites. Victor Andrés Belaúnde (1883–1966), who had a brilliant career as essayist and scholar, educator, and diplomat—becoming president of the UN General Assembly in 1959—defined the nation as “a community of ideals and aspirations.” The Peruvian nation had its beginning with the Spanish conquest and colonization, as the Inca empire lacked the spiritual values that form a nation. The perfection of the Peruvian nation required the synthesis among the different cultures it contained, and this synthesis would be achieved through the “liturgy,” through which the spirit of Catholicism would be spread among all citizens. The Indians would be redeemed through the ethical-religious metaphysics that occidental culture had brought to the Andes. Belaúnde called this spiritual synthesis of the different cultures in Peru peruanidad. For Belaúnde, as for Riva Aguero y Osma, race in itself was not a central consideration in forging the Peruvian nation, since socio-ethnic and cultural differences would be overcome by solidarity and the spirit of peruanidad. But race was crucial in the definition of the nation for the third major writer of the generation of 1900, Francisco García Calderón (1883–1953). For García Calderón, the base of the Peruvian nation had to be the Latin race since, following Le Bon, he believed that Indians, blacks, mestizos, and mulattoes slowed down the nation’s transformation and modernization. Peru still had not become a full-fledged nation due to the formlessness of the colonial regime and the errors and inappropriate borrowings of the first republican century. National integration could be achieved through a policy of making the state stronger, through selective population policies— including the stimulation of European immigration—and by imbuing the citizens with the values characteristic of the Protestant nations—capitalist enterprise and hard work. For all of these authors, integrating Peru’s subaltern ethnic and social groups into the nation was not tied to a call for democratizing Peru. By the late 1920s and 1930s, Riva Aguero y Osma would flirt with Italian and Spanish fascism, Belaúnde would promote aspects of Catholic corporatism, and García Calderón would remain constant in his advocacy of a mixed authoritarian-democratic regime (Peña 1987; Pike 1967).

Mobilizing and Building the Nation During the 50 years after independence, Peruvian nationalism maintained an ambiguous relationship with Catholicism and the church. Many Peruvians perceived a strong anchor for their regional identity in their religion and in their devotion to a range of Peruvian-born saints and revered images; vernacular Andean N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Catholicism had been an important ingredient in regional pride and the rejection of Spain’s claims over Peru. But none of these devotions gained a status of national devotion comparable to the Virgin of Guadalupe in Mexico. During the festivities for the third centenary of her birth in 1886, Santa Rosa of Lima, “patron saint of America” and the first American to be canonized by the Vatican (1670), drew the largest crowds the city had ever seen. Yet most indigenous Peruvians in the highlands did not share this devotion. The diversity of Peruvian folk Catholicisms expressed the limits of a shared national imaginary. But liberal politicians and intellectuals deemed it necessary to restrict and regulate the functions of the church and sought to diminish ecclesiastic interferences in the civil sphere, which could undermine loyalty to the nation-state. During the 1820s and early 1830s, they closed many monasteries and some religious educational institutions, and after 1855 the state assumed control over payment of the church hierarchy. During the 19th century, there was a strong strain of Gallicanism (assertion of national control) in the Peruvian church, and—against Vatican opposition—the national state assumed the Spanish monarchs’ patronage over the church, for example, by intervening in the selection and appointment of bishops. The most radical of Peru’s numerous liberal Catholic priests, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Francisco de Paula González Vigil, in the 1850s rejected centralist authority of the pope and Roman curia as violations of the spirit and practices of pristine Christianity altogether (Pike 1967). Yet by midcentury the Peruvian church was turning more conservative. Bartolomé Herrera, a brilliant priest, politician, orator, and later bishop of Arequipa, railed against the moral and political decay of the republic and against the interference of the military in politics. He envisioned a hierarchical society that reflected his call for an ultramontane church to be led by an “aristocracy of intelligence.” As rector of the Colegio de San Carlos, he trained a generation of proclerical conservative nationalists who would exercise considerable influence during the late 19th century (Pike 1967). The debate over the role of Catholicism for Peru’s national identity would only become more contentious during the late 19th century. Coming soon after the collapse of the guano export economy, Peru’s bloody war against Chile and the subsequent defeat and occupation by the southern neighbor between 1879 and 1883 ushered in the most severe crisis of national identity prior to the late 20th century, fueled by 20 years of political, social, and economic turmoil. White officers killed in battle, such as army captain Francisco Bolognesi and Admiral Miguel Grau, together with the leader of the anti-Chilean highland guerrilla resistance, General Andrés A. Cáceres, have been consecrated as Peru’s supreme national heroes in official memory. Their statues today grace plazas in Peruvian towns from the Ecuadorian border to the Amazon and Lake Titicaca. The war prompted some soul-searching about the reasons for the defeat. Many in the elite blamed the indigenous majority for its supposed lack of modern skills and patriotism. Popular groups and critical intellectuals pointed to a self-serving, corrupt, and greedy elite, who had failed to prepare the nation for

Peru’s Crisis of 1876–1895 Between 1876 and 1895, Peru went through a multifaceted crisis of unprecedented dimensions. The collapse of the guano bonanza brought national bankruptcy. When three years later Peru was pulled into the War of the Pacific against Chile as an ally of Bolivia, the country was totally unprepared. After a series of battles on land and on sea in the south, Chilean forces landed close to Lima and defeated the Peruvian forces on the outskirts of the capital. The government withdrew into the Andes; the Chileans occupied the capital and many of the most important towns along the entire 2,000-kilometer coast, dismantling sugar refineries and other installations and looting Peru’s cultural patrimony (for example, the holdings of the National Library). Peru’s political system collapsed, with internecine factional fighting over resistance or acceptance of defeat. State revenues shriveled to one-third their peak level in the early 1870s, external trade was halved, and private fortunes vanished. The ensuing civil wars combined issues of power and fair elections with native Andeans’ struggles for autonomy and better conditions. The long crisis of 1876–1895 greatly heightened nationalist rhetoric and mobilization in Peru.


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the challenge from a confident Chile. There is little doubt that the war, and the subsequent social and economic crises, spread an awareness of a common national destiny among large segments of the Peruvian population. The intensification of communications, of civil society and the public sphere since the 1850s facilitated such outcomes. The war produced a shrill nationalism filled with anxieties about the future of Peru; papers and pamphlets often voiced the fear that the nation was in imminent danger of dismemberment through both the aggression of its neighbors and internal corruption and decay. The Sociedad Patriótica collected funds for the “rescue” of the southern territories occupied by Chile. During a brief war scare produced by border conflicts with Ecuador in early 1894, citizens in hundreds of towns and villages across Peru signed manifestos declaring their willingness to fight for the pátria “until the last drop of our blood.” Presidential administrations from 1886 to 1899 labeled their work as “national regeneration.” They emphasized institution building and strengthening the state. In sum, the War of the Pacific and the subsequent crises mobilized increasingly numerous middle- and lowerclass citizens around the concept of making the nation strong. During the following 40 years, until the end of the “Aristocratic Republic” (1895–1919), a gamut of popular diversions, arts, and food ways found widespread acceptance in Lima and other coastal cities. This cultural medley was dubbed criollo and constituted the core of an emerging Peruvian national culture. It selectively borrowed and reconfigured cultural traditions from Afro-Peruvians, native Andeans, and Europeans and began to be shared by people from different classes and ethnic backgrounds. The marinera (an Afro-Peruvian version of the Spanish zamacueca) and the vals (adapted from the Viennese Walzer) became identified as typically Peruvian dances, played at private parties and in public places from brothels to upscale cafés, accompanied by guitar and cajón (an AfroPeruvian percussion instrument). The sancochado, papa rellena, and olluquito con charqui at this time became widely consumed dishes identified with comida criolla and incorporated European, African, and Andean culinary traditions. Football (soccer) passed from being an elite pastime in Lima’s British country club to a popular sport promoted by bosses for the cohesion of their workers and to a daily practice on empty lots in popular urban barrios. Between the 17th and late 19th centuries, El Señor de los Milagros (“Our Lord of the Miracles”) had been a devotion exclusively of Lima’s population of African descent. But between the 1880s and 1920s, it became Lima’s most popular religious festivity, embraced by people from the middle and upper classes as well as Afro-Peruvians and mestizos. By the 1920s, the stage was set for the emergence of powerful nationalist popular movements and interventionist state policies exalting a strong, integrated nation.

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Devotees walk near an image of “Our Lord of the Miracles” during a procession along Lima’s streets in 2001. (AP/Wide World Photos)


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Selected Bibliography Flores Galindo, Alberto. 1986. Buscando un Inca. Havana: Casa de Las Américas. Jacobsen, Nils. 1997. “Liberalism and Indian Communities, 1821–1920.” In Liberals, the Church and Indian Peasants: Corporate Lands and the Challenge of Reform in Nineteenth Century Spanish America, edited by Robert H. Jackson, 123–170. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. Klarén, Peter F. 2000. Peru: Society and Nationhood in the Andes. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lynch, John. 1986. The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808–1826. 2nd ed. New York: Norton. McEvoy, Carmen. 1997. La utopia republicana: Ideales y realidades en la formación de la cultura política peruana (1871–1919). Lima: Pontifícia Universidad Católica del Perú. Mendez, Cecilia. 1996. “Incas Si, Indios No: Notes on Peruvian Creole Nationalism and Its Contemporary Crisis.” Journal of Latin American Studies 28, no. 1: 197–225. Peña, Antonio. 1987. “José de la Riva Aguero, Francisco García Calderón y Victor Andrés Belaúnde: Visión y propuesta conservadora.” In Pensamiento politico peruano, edited by Alberto Adrianzen, 135–150. Lima: DECO. Pike, Fredrick B. 1967. The Modern History of Peru. New York: Praeger. Thurner, Mark. 1996. From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of Postcolonial NationMaking in Andean Peru. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Walker, Charles F. 1999. Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780–1840. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.


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United States John M. McCardell Jr. Chronology 1774 First Continental Congress. As relations with Britain worsen, 13 American delegates convene in Philadelphia to discuss united action. 1776 Declaration of Independence. On July 4, 1776, 13 American colonies in “Congress Assembled” formally declare their independence from Great Britain. 1781 Articles of Confederation. After more than four years of debate, and while the Revolutionary War continues, the American states ratify the Articles of Confederation, thereby creating a new national entity, “The United States in Congress Assembled.” 1787 Federal Constitution. Meeting to revise the Articles of Confederation, delegates instead draft a new constitution, substantially strengthening the national government. The requisite 9 (of 13) states ratify the new constitution by June 1788. 1798–1799 Virginia and Kentucky resolutions. First articulation of doctrine of “state interposition,” based on the theory that the Constitution is a compact voluntarily created and joined by previously independent and sovereign states, thus the states are “duty bound” to interpose themselves to arrest any unconstitutional acts by the national government. 1814 Hartford Convention. Reiteration of the “state interposition” theory in response to alleged unconstitutionality of government policies during the War of 1812. 1820 Missouri Compromise. Congress sets the southern boundary of Missouri (36°30’), extended westward to the limit of the Louisiana Purchase, as territory into which slavery would be permitted to expand. Slavery is prohibited in all territory north of that line. 1828 “South Carolina Exposition and Protest.” In response to what is thought to be a discriminatory protective tariff, John C. Calhoun of South Carolina invokes “state interposition” and, ultimately, “nullification” as a remedy for unconstitutional acts committed by a majority against a minority. 1850 Compromise of 1850. Congress decides the question of slavery in territory acquired as a result of the Mexican War. California is admitted as a free state; the remaining territories are to determine the legality of slavery at the time of application for admission to the Union (“popular sovereignty”). 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act. Congress decides to apply the principle of “popular sovereignty” to the Kansas and Nebraska territories, from which slavery had been barred by terms of the Missouri Compromise, thus rendering that compromise “superseded.” 1857 Dred Scott decision. The Supreme Court determines that a slave is not free when transported by his master into a free territory, that slaves are the property of their masters, that any attempt to deny an owner his property is unconstitutional, and that therefore the Missouri Compromise, and any attempt by the national government to limit slavery, violates the Constitution. 1860–1861 Secession of the southern states, formation of the Confederacy. In response to the election of Abraham Lincoln to the presidency on a platform of prohibiting the extension of slavery, seven states (South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas) withdraw from the Union and create a separate southern nation. Four additional states (Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas) join


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the Confederacy after Lincoln calls for 75,000 volunteers to put down the “rebellion,” precipitated by the Confederacy’s firing on Fort Sumter. 1861–1865 Civil War. As a result of the war, the Union is restored, the presidency and the national government are strengthened, and slavery is formally ended by the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 1865–1877 Reconstruction. The southern states rejoin the Union. The last federal troops are withdrawn from the South as part of the settlement of the disputed 1876 presidential election.

Situating the Nation On November 19, 1863, at a ceremony dedicating the cemetery at Gettysburg, President Abraham Lincoln, in a mere two minutes, delivered an address that defined and fixed, perhaps for all time, the essence of American nationality. “Four score and seven years ago,” he began, “our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” “Now,” Lincoln continued, “we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated can long endure” (Adler 1976, 9:462–463). At the time Lincoln spoke, the outcome of the Civil War was far from certain. A southern Confederacy, formed in 1861, had declared its independence, had written a constitution, had established a government, and had managed, through three years of war, to maintain its separate national existence in the face of repeated attempts militarily to subdue it and restore it to the old Union from which it had seceded. These Southerners thought of themselves as Americans. Secession, they believed, represented a legitimate response to the threat of a hostile, sectional majority. They had voluntarily joined the Union and could just as voluntarily choose to withdraw from it. Indeed, those southern states that had been among the original 13 British colonies that had declared independence from the mother country in 1776 did not specifically vote to break up the Union. Rather, meeting in special conventions called for a particular purpose, they repealed their ratification of the federal constitution. And, when they later assembled to create a new nation, they adopted with only minor revisions that same constitution as their own, repeating the document’s purpose of establishing “a more perfect Union.” The Union from which Southerners claimed to be withdrawing dated, in their view, not from 1776 but rather from 1787. The Declaration of Independence established no nation. The nation as presently understood had been the creation of the founders who met in Philadelphia in 1787 and produced a wholly new charter of government. The Union, according to this interpretation, represented not a fragile “proposition” but rather a contract, or compact, among sovereign states. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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U.S. president Abraham Lincoln delivers the Gettysburg Address on November 20, 1863, commemorating the Battle of Gettysburg fought the previous July. (Library of Congress)

The story of American nationalism thus begins from multiple starting points, defined by multiple understandings. To some Americans, “nation” had an almost mystical meaning; it was an idea—or at least a proposition—that, in Lincoln’s words, stood as “the last best hope of earth” (Adler 1976, 5:518–537). To others, it was a rather more formal, almost legalistic arrangement involving checks, balances, and the division of sovereignty, based upon the novel idea of federalism between state and national government. To still others—enslaved Americans, for example—America, as either North or South defined it, appeared unsatisfying, even fraudulent; slavery seemed a denial of the idea, its perpetuation a requirement of constitutional unity. And for those Americans inclined, in whatever age, to dissent, the “test” of the proposition had much more to do with its tolerance of competing ideologies than with its insistence that it said all and spoke for all. One group found the essential source of American nationality in the lofty rhetoric of the Declaration of Independence. Another traced the beginning of true nationhood to the ratification of the Constitution. A “proposition” subject to testing? Or a contract incurring mutual obligation? Or something else entirely? Upon the answer to these questions rested fundamental understandings. Thus, the American nation, from the very beginning, found itself situated not in social or economic or ethnic or religious conflict; not in some contained or circumscribed geographical area; and not in the stream of a long, troubled, contentious history. The American nation, as its currency stated, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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was something altogether different and new. It was novus ordo saeclorum—a “new order of the ages.” It was also, wherein lay the tension that Americans must muster sufficient genius to withstand, e pluribus unum—“out of many, one.” Reconciling the one and the many would constitute the recurrent test of American nationalism and its durability.

Instituting the Nation Soon after declaring independence, the Continental Congress set to work preparing, according to a resolution introduced by Richard Henry Lee of Virginia, “a plan of Confederation,” which would be “transmitted to the respective Colonies for their consideration and approbation” (Tansill 1927, House Document No. 308). Only after protracted debate, in November 1777, did the Congress agree on a draft document, which it referred to the states with a request to act on it by March 10, 1778. Not until March 1781, however, did the last state act. Until that time, the Continental Congress served as the national government. The debates over framing and then ratifying the Articles raised the most fundamental issues of power and authority, of representation and consent, and of territorial boundaries and jurisdiction. Suspicion of executive abuse, rooted in fears of monarchy, ensured that power would continue to reside in an elected legislature. The relationship of population to representation pitted large states, which sought proportional representation, against small states, which advocated giving each state a single vote in Congress. The unwillingness of states claiming vast landholdings based upon their colonial charters to divest themselves of “sea to sea” entitlements raised serious questions of how the territorial domain of the new nation was to be organized and administered. Only after Virginia agreed to cede to Congress its land north and west of the Ohio River did Maryland, the lone holdout, agree to ratify the Articles. Indeed, the most significant accomplishment by Congress under the Articles involved a series of territorial ordinances providing for the orderly admission of additional states to the Union. These enactments defined exactly how new states were to be incorporated: once the population of a territory reached 60,000, the inhabitants could create a government and apply for admission. Th e Northwest Ordinance of 1787 explicitly declared that the new states of the Northwest Territory (eventually the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin) would enter “on an equal footing with the original states in all respects whatsoever” (Adler 1976, 3:191–196). Slavery, however, would not be permitted. These ordinances addressed one of the major causes of the revolution—the relationship between a national government and its territorial dependencies—and set a precedent for the admission, as full and equal members, of all future states. Otherwise, however, the Articles of Confederation proved unworkable. The new national entity bore the name “The United States of America in Congress N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Assembled,” fairly describing how the new government was meant to function. On the one hand, the Articles envisioned a “perpetual union,” but on the other, that union was to be “a firm league of friendship” among sovereign states rather than a consolidated, integrated nation-state (Adler 1976, 2:555–560). It was to be a confederation, and nothing more. And as a confederation, its weaknesses were immediately apparent. Legislative government (the first president of the United States—in Congress Assembled—was John Hanson of Maryland, who served as presiding officer in the Congress and lacked executive authority) proved no more effective, and no less potentially tyrannical, than executive government. Congress could make “requests” of states but had no authority to enforce them. Some states were fi scally responsible, others, reckless. Congress had little ability to deal with foreign affairs. Amendments to the Articles required unanimous consent, which meant that the smallest state, Rhode Island, could thwart the will of 12 other states. When, in the winter of 1786–1787, a group of debtor farmers in western Massachusetts under the leadership of Daniel Shays rose up in rebellion against the policies of the state’s legislature (known as the General Court), it became clear that the Articles of Confederation needed to be revised. With that purpose in mind, delegates from the states gathered in Philadelphia in May 1787. By this time a large number of influential Americans, most conspicuously Alexander Hamilton of New York and James Madison of Virginia, had discovered, in the words of a call to convention drafted by Hamilton himself, the need “to render the constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies of the Union” (Adler 1976, 3:68–70). Between May and September, in deliberations held entirely behind closed doors, an extraordinary group of men laid the groundwork for a new national government or, as the Preamble to the new Constitution put it, “a more perfect Union.” The Constitution represented a remarkable balancing of interests: a House based on population; a Senate, with each state having an equal presence; a Supreme Court along with “such inferior courts” as Congress might choose to establish; a strong chief executive. The powers of the national government were strengthened—to create a currency, to impose duties, to conduct foreign affairs— while limited and staggered terms of service and the principle of “advice and consent,” along with the system of “checks and balances,” reduced the chance that any one branch of government would become too powerful. Even so, to secure ratification of the new charter, its supporters promised to add a Bill of Rights once the new Congress assembled. The tenth article in that document expressly reserved to the states all powers not specifically enumerated in the Constitution itself. This new nation would be neither a democracy nor a monarchy, neither a unitary state nor a confederation. It would be something altogether different, and new, a federated republic that sought institutionally to balance the multiplicity of interests while holding in check humanity’s baser impulses. The Old World claimed it could never succeed. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The Constitution attempted to codify what the Declaration of Independence had stated to be the essential principles of a nascent American nationality. The period 1776–1787 witnessed repeated, and ultimately successful, attempts to give a proper structural translation of the Declaration’s lofty ideals. Thus, the United States based its assertion of independence on a “proposition.” At the same time, it surrounded that proposition with a structure intended to preserve and protect it for all time, or, as the Preamble put it, to “establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.”

Defining the Nation As the new nation began its life, its leadership realized its incompleteness. Every ritual, every enactment, every word publicly uttered would set a precedent. As president, George Washington strove to balance his belief in the dignity of his office with a republican population’s expectation of accessibility and a common touch. Debates arose almost immediately about the proper role of government and the degree to which a transcendent national interest could be made harmonious with regional, state, or local concerns. The principals in this debate were Hamilton who, as secretary of the treasury, envisioned an energetic government actively involved in developing the nation’s economy, and Madison and Thomas Jefferson who, as congressman and secretary of state, respectively, feared a strong central government and the potential tyranny majorities might wield over minorities. These debates recurred over the next century. They involved the appropriateness of a national bank, the need for revenue, and the role of government in actively sponsoring internal improvements, as well as mechanisms for restraining the national government whenever it seemed to overreach. During the first decade of nationhood, though Hamilton’s continental vision largely triumphed, it aroused organized opposition in the form of a competing political party, which took the name “Republican.” Attacking the “Federalist” Washington administration, the Republicans advocated strict interpretation of the Constitution and states’ rights as the most effective antidote to governmental encroachment on individual liberty. By 1800 these disagreements had brought the country to a dangerous crossroads. War between England and France challenged America’s proclamation of neutrality. A widening rift over the country’s international role combined with continuing divisions over economic policy had produced a crisis. Equating dissent with disloyalty, and believing that organized opposition posed a factional threat to the government’s stability, the Federalist Congress enacted a Sedition Act in 1798, which severely curtailed free speech and led to the closing of opposition N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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newspapers and the imprisonment of dissenting editors. To the Republicans, the Sedition Act was unconstitutional, but how to arrest such behavior remained a matter of great uncertainty. Jefferson and Madison concluded that only the states could effectively halt the abuse of government power. They drafted, and the legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky approved, resolutions that viewed the Constitution as a compact among the states, freely entered into. By this reasoning, a state or states, as parties to the constitutional contract, were “duty bound” to “interpose” themselves to thwart unconstitutional behavior by the national government (Adler 1976, 4:62–67). This doctrine of “state interposition” never moved beyond assertion in this particular crisis, but its concept of the weak nature of the federal Union would resurface in subsequent political debates and would represent the chief threat to the durability of that Union. Within another decade, by 1812, the European conflict engulfed America, and once again the country found itself at war with England. Opponents of the war, chiefly New England merchants, assembled in Hartford in 1814 and adopted the identical wording of the Virginia and Kentucky resolutions to express their dissent. The coming of peace, however, halted any further action. And Americans everywhere hailed the victory over England as the harbinger of future glory. The Revolution had been secured. Still, in the several decades after 1815, the local and familiar were the national: trees, climate, animal life, history, economy, social organization, religious and educational institutions, food, manners, clothing. No matter how much these things may in fact have differed, in a federated republic seeking definition, nothing could be excluded from the category “American.” This included domestic institutions and, more especially, slavery. Slavery had vexed the nation from the start. The territorial ordinances of the 1780s had set boundaries to the institution. The Constitution had outlawed the international slave trade after 1808. Gradually most states north of Maryland and Kentucky had abolished slavery. But for those states to the south, whose agricultural economies required a large labor force to produce tobacco, cotton, rice, and sugar, slavery had become a necessary evil.

Narrating the Nation By 1815 partisan division had disappeared and a remarkable political consensus had emerged. The erstwhile Republican, now president, James Madison, called for the creation of a new national bank (Hamilton’s bank had dissolved in 1811 at the end of its 20-year charter and had not been renewed), the adoption of a tariff to support domestic manufacturing, and the development of the country’s transportation and communication network through a series of major internal improvements. A rising young nationalist, Congressman Henry Clay of Kentucky, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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would embrace this platform and, for the next generation, give it a simple, powerful name—the American System—which would be the defining blueprint for the nation’s economic development. The year 1815 marked a sharp dividing line in the nation’s history. Free for the first time from any serious possibility of foreign entanglements, Americans turned inward and began to consider those things that made them unique. The period 1815–1860 has aptly been called the “quest for nationality,” and the effort was intense. Wherever one turned, within politics and government but more especially outside them—in art, music, literature—the search for those things uniquely “American” had taken on a peculiar urgency. What, other than a constitution and the “proposition” that informed it, made America distinctive? In fact, there was little in this new nation that was not apparently derivative. Thus, Noah Webster advocated an American language and published, in 1828, his monumental American Dictionary of the English Language. Edward Tyrell Channing and, later, Ralph Waldo Emerson, declaring “literary independence,” urged the creation of an American literature. George Bancroft undertook the serious writing of American history, while Washington Irving, James Fenimore Cooper, and William Gilmore Simms chose American historical incidents and characters as the basis for imaginative fiction. Meanwhile the vast and varied continent became a subject worthy of great artists, from Thomas Cole’s and Asher Durand’s Hudson River landscapes to George Caleb Bingham’s depictions of frontier life, to Albert Bierstadt’s monumental western paintings, to Audubon’s remarkable birds. Immensely popular, these artists found in the natural environment surrounding them, and the tough, hardy human subjects usually dwarfed but never intimidated by that environment, themes quintessentially American. Add to this the simple, sentimental musical forms pioneered by Stephen Foster, the harmonious hymnody of Lowell Mason, and later the slavery-inspired compositions of Louis Gottschalk, and the outlines of an American culture begin to emerge. Public events also contributed to Americans’ sense of their distinctive national selves. Creating a sense of historical memory, especially for a people who had so little history, mattered. Independence Day was universally celebrated with speeches, picnics, parades, and fireworks. Politics was the great spectator sport of the time. Large crowds turned out for partisan gatherings, complete with indigenous barbecue and whiskey. States and communities held other annual observances to commemorate significant events from the colonial or revolutionary days.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation If the nation was culturally incomplete, it was also, in what in modern times would be called infrastructure, primitive. Roads were poor. Long-distance transportation N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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was mostly by water. Communication largely depended on newspapers, which in more remote areas paid more attention to immediate concerns than to national or international developments. Yet here, too, Americans set themselves to what they believed to be a national task. Canals—most notably the Erie Canal across New York, which opened in 1823—river and harbor improvements, railroads, and, in 1844, the invention of the telegraph bridged distances, bound the Union more tightly together, and made it easier for Americans to travel and thus get to know more of their country and their countrymen. By the late 1820s, slavery was coming to be, as Senator John C. Calhoun of South Carolina would put it in 1837, a “positive good” (Adler 1976, 6:346–350). Upset by what he believed to be a discriminatory tariff, which favored the manufacturing North over the agricultural South, Calhoun feared the long-term consequences of a hostile northern majority, not only in matters of economic policy but also concerning slavery. In 1828, attacking the so-called “Tariff of Abominations,” Calhoun once more employed the doctrine (and the exact language) of “state interposition” (Adler 1976, 5:282–283), which he called “Nullification,” to urge his state to resist the execution of the unconstitutional act. Before confrontation could occur, however, Congress voted to lower the tariff gradually. At almost the same time, however, an abolition movement began in the North, thus posing a new, if still small and marginal, threat to the South’s peculiar institution. Until 1803, slavery’s boundaries had been set. In that year, however, President Jefferson engineered the Louisiana Purchase, which added 838,000 square miles to the national domain and extended the nation’s boundaries west of the Mississippi River. In 1819 Missouri applied for admission to the Union as a slave state, and a new debate arose. Some Northerners, and their representatives in Congress, did not want slavery to expand beyond its current borders, even though the acquisition of Florida in 1819 had added more slave territory. Many Southerners argued that prohibiting slavery, against the will of Missourians, was unfair. For the first time slavery had become an “interest,” defended by the South, opposed (and occasionally attacked) by the North. The Missouri Compromise, by which the southern boundary of Missouri, 36°30', extended westward to the boundary of the Louisiana Purchase and became the northern boundary of slave territory, settled the question. That is, until the 1840s. The annexation of Texas, where slavery existed, by Congress in 1845 set off a new round of debate, which was aggravated by the acquisition of territory following victory in the Mexican-American War in 1846–1847. Once again, in 1850, a compromise allowed for the admission of California as a free state but left open for future “popular sovereignty” the decision about slavery in the rest of the Mexican Cession. The matter seemed settled until Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois in 1854 reopened the question and persuaded the Senate to pass the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which allowed the settlers in those territories, previously barred to slavery by the Missouri Compromise, to determine whether the institution was to be permitted. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The ensuing chaos made slavery a defining political issue and threatened the federal Union. Civil war broke out in Kansas in the mid-1850s. In 1857 the Supreme Court issued the Dred Scott decision, which ruled the Missouri Compromise, and any legislative enactment prohibiting Americans from taking their property in slaves wherever they chose, unconstitutional. This decision further roiled the political system and hastened the emergence of a sectional, antislavery, Republican Party. In 1860 that party, and its presidential nominee, Abraham Lincoln, won election. The threat of federal interference with slavery and the fact that a hostile northern majority now seemed to control the national government prompted South Carolina to repair to the old principle of state interposition. In December 1860, the state repealed its ratification of the Constitution, thereby taking itself out of the Union. Within six weeks, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas had followed suit. Meeting in Montgomery, Alabama, in February 1861, these states created a new, separate nation, the Confederate States of America. The nature of the Confederacy, and the impulses that led to its formation, could be immediately discerned in its constitution, which was a virtual duplicate of the U.S. Constitution. These states viewed secession as consistent with the actions of their forebears in 1776 and believed that the election of Lincoln, supported by a hostile majority (even though he had received only 40 percent of the vote), put the constitutional relationship at fatal risk. Secession, and separate nationhood, became a reluctant last resort to these Southerners, who continued to think of themselves as Americans. When the Confederate military fired on Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor in the spring of 1861, Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers to put down the rebellion. In response, four more states—Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas —withdrew from the Union. Four years of bloody civil war followed, which ended with the demise of slavery and the readmission of the defeated states to the Union. War had accelerated the trends toward consolidation that made the United States, by 1865, a much stronger nation. Under the pressure of war, the national government had assumed new powers, from the creation of a national currency to the setting of a standard rail gauge and the chartering of a transcontinental railroad, to the creation of a federal Department of Agriculture. The demands of war led to mass production of weapons and equipment, standard sizing of boots and uniforms, and a general growth of manufacturing and industry. The reintegration of the erstwhile Confederate states was remarkably swift and smooth, and in this respect, the outcome of the American Civil War was unique. There were no mass executions of rebel leaders, no confiscation of property, no obliteration of old boundaries, no wholesale destruction of symbols. At the same time, there was no genuine integration of the 3.5 million ex-slaves into American life. They were largely left on their own. Speedy reunion took precedence over massive reconstruction. Most white Americans understood that it could be one or the other, but not both. The modern American nation would be a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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racially segregated nation for another 100 years. The contours of that nation had in every way, by the mid-1870s, been fixed. “The American nation has not been determined by ‘natural’ factors of blood and soil,” wrote the great historian of nationalism, Hans Kohn, in 1944, “nor by common memories of a long history. It was formed by an idea, a universal idea” (p. 324). Whether based upon an “idea,” as Kohn would have it, or “dedicated to a proposition,” as Lincoln expressed it, America can indeed claim to be the first new nation. By the 1870s, the idea had prevailed, and the proposition had endured, against heavy odds. The “deed of gift,” Robert Frost wrote in The Gift Outright, “was many deeds of war,” including civil war (Lathem 1968, 348). The result became evident in the most ordinary of ways. Before 1861, it was customary, when speaking about the country, to say “the United States are . . . .” After 1865 the usage changed, and the now familiar formulation—“the United States is . . .”—spoke volumes. A modern, integrated nation-state had emerged, the offspring, as Lincoln had fervently anticipated in his address at Gettysburg, of “a new birth of freedom.” Selected Bibliography Adler, Mortimer J., ed. 1976. The Annals of America. 19 vols. London and Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. Basler, Roy P., ed. 1953. The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. 8 vols. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Dangerfield, George. 1965. The Awakening of American Nationalism, 1815–1828. New York: Harper and Row. Gruver, Rebecca Brooks. 1970. American Nationalism, 1783–1830: A Self-Portrait. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. Hayes, Carleton J. H. 1926. Essays on Nationalism. New York: Macmillan Company. Kohn, Hans. 1944. The Idea of Nationalism. New York: Macmillan Company. Kohn, Hans. 1961. American Nationalism: An Interpretative Essay. New York: Collier Books. Lathem, Edward C., ed. 1968. The Poetry of Robert Frost. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. McCardell, John. 1979. The Idea of a Southern Nation: Southern Nationalists and Southern Nationalism, 1830–1861. New York: W. W. Norton. Nagel, Paul C. 1971. This Sacred Trust: American Nationality, 1798–1898. New York: Oxford University Press. Potter, David M. 1968. “The Historian’s Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa.” The South and the Sectional Conflict, 39–83. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Spencer, Benjamin T. 1957. The Quest for Nationality: An American Literary Campaign. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Tansill, Charles C., ed. 1927. Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the American States. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Waldstreicher, David. 1997. In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Wilson, Major L. 1974. Space, Time and Freedom: The Quest for Nationality and the Irrepressible Conflict, 1815–1861. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.


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Uruguay Luis Roniger Chronology 1680 Colonia do Sacramento is founded by the Portuguese. 1726 Montevideo is founded by the Spanish governor of Buenos Aires. 1749 The governorship of Montevideo is set, to be ruled as part of the Spanish Viceroyalty of Peru. 1763 By the treaty of Paris, Colonia returns to Portuguese control after a short Spanish occupation. The Portuguese move the Brazilian capital from Salvador da Bahia southeast to Rio de Janeiro. 1776 Spain creates the new viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, with Buenos Aires as its capital. The governorship of Montevideo is included in its jurisdiction. Portuguese bands move southward, regaining control of São Pedro. 1777 By the treaty of San Ildefonso, the Portuguese relinquish control of Colonia. 1801 The Portuguese take control of the Ibicuy area of the Eastern Missions in the northwestern Banda Oriental. 1806–1807 British forces attempt twice to take control of the port cities of Buenos Aires and Montevideo. 1808 Napoleon invades the Iberian Peninsula. King Charles IV of Spain abdicates, and his heir, Ferdinand VII, is taken prisoner by the French. Under British protection, the Portuguese Crown flees to Brazil, making the latter the center of its empire. 1810 An autonomous junta is established in Buenos Aires to rule in the name of the imprisoned king. Montevideo becomes the center of royalist rule in the South Atlantic. 1811–1820 Revolutionary wars in the Banda Oriental of the Uruguay River: Spanish, Portuguese, Uruguayan, and Buenos Aires forces clash with one another. Artigas structures a federal league that includes the littoral provinces of Argentina, suspicious of Buenos Aires’s centralism. 1814 With the fall of Montevideo comes an end to Spanish rule in the River Plate. 1816 The United Provinces of the River Plate declare their independence. Buenos Aires centralists begin clashing with the regional caudillos (power lords). The Portuguese move into Uruguay and by January 1817 occupy Montevideo. 1820 Artigas loses his hold in Uruguay and the neighboring littoral provinces. He moves to lifelong exile in Paraguay. 1820–1822 Portuguese control of Uruguay. 1821 The Uruguayan Congress votes for the incorporation of the country as the Cisplatine State into the Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and Algarve. 1822 Brazil becomes an independent empire, separated from Portugal yet ruled by an heir of the same Bragança dynasty. 1825 A group of exiles, known as the “33 Orientals,” land in Uruguay and rekindle resistance against the Brazilians. Buenos Aires supports their struggle against Brazil. (August 25) Patriot representatives declare Uruguayan independence, joining the United Provinces of the River Plate. 1825–1827 Uruguay becomes a battleground for Brazilian, Platine, and Uruguayan forces.


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1828 (August) Brazilian-Argentine peace agreement leading to the final proclamation of Uruguayan independence. (October) Brazil and Argentina ratify the peace agreement and recognize Uruguayan independence. 1830 A republican constitution is promulgated (to prevail until 1919). 1831 First massive extermination of indigenous populations, former allies of the Patriot forces, in Salsipuedes. 1839 The so-called Great War of the South Atlantic begins. Uruguayan forces are backed either by Buenos Aires or by Brazil. 1843–1851 Siege of Montevideo by General Manuel Oribe, with the backing of the powerful governor of the Buenos Aires province, Juan Manuel de Rosas. 1850s After a short period of reconciliation, renewed party intrigues and continued rebellions in Uruguay. 1851 Rosas is defeated by the governor of Entre Ríos, General Urquiza, ending the Great War. 1865 The dictatorial rule of Venancio Flores marks the beginning of a long series of Colorado governments lasting for nearly a century. 1865–1870 War of the Triple Alliance, during which Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay defeat Paraguay. 1870–1872 Revolution of the Lances in Uruguay, an uprising led by rural Blanco caudillo Timoteo Aparicio. 1872 Reconciliation of the two parties, the Blancos and the Colorados, and the start of “coparticipation” or sharing of roles in the public administration. 1876 The end of the civil wars and the start of more stable centralized power. 1877 Law of education minimizing religious formation in state schools. 1879 Creation of a civil state register. 1885 Establishment of civil matrimony as obligatory and previous to religious marriage. Promulgation of a law of secondary and higher education. Law sanctioning the closure of monasteries.

Situating the Nation Uruguay crystallized as a separate country in the early 19th century, following the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, the ensuing crisis of authority in the Americas, and the subsequent disintegration of the Spanish empire. Its development as a separate nation-state was, in the words of historian Tulio Halperin Donghi, an awkward creation that few expected would last. From a systemic perspective, the emergence of the Uruguayan state and nation was due to the confluence of several macro-historical factors. First, the late colonial development of the region, shaped amid fragmented jurisdictions and conflicting authority claims, led to civil and transnational wars in the first half of the 19th century. Unlike many regions in Spanish America that were subject to the control of urban centers by the 16th century, the region was largely left to the control of the indigenous populations until the late 17th and 18th centuries. The native residents lived mostly from hunting and fishing and some agriculture and included groups as diverse as the fierce Charrúas and the more N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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peaceful Guaraníes. Only in 1680 did the Portuguese establish their first major settlement in Colonia do Sacramento, to be followed in 1726 by the founding of Montevideo by the Spanish authorities of Buenos Aires in an attempt to protect the South Atlantic basis of their empire against an Anglo-Portuguese alliance. Sparsely populated, the territories soon to become independent were divided among several jurisdictions. Buenos Aires held authority over the southern districts of the eastern bank of the Uruguay River; the military domain of the Missions ruled over the northern districts of the eastern bank, as well as over large areas of contemporary northeastern Argentina and southern Paraguay (including large tracks transferred in the 19th century to Brazil); and the navy governorship of Montevideo governed the port city and its rural hinterland. These internal boundaries were soon the object of struggle and became blurred in the wake of the imperial crisis. The second factor was the location of some of its major cities and ports on strategic trade routes, which prompted the early interest of the maritime hegemonic power, England, as well as of France, in the region. Connected with this strategic maritime location, especially the walled, fortress port city of Montevideo, was a growing antagonism with Buenos Aires. Although Buenos Aires was made the imperial capital of the Viceroyalty of the River Plate, which was carved out of the early Viceroyalty of Peru, Montevideo became increasingly aware of its


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Plaza Constitución in Montevideo, Uruguay, in the late 19th century. (Library of Congress)

own rival claims and endorsed ideas of prosperity through trade following the short-lived British occupation in 1807. Montevideo had supported Buenos Aires’s resistance against the British, and this commitment was advanced to argue claims of well-deserved autonomy, ending the “humiliating dependence” on Buenos Aires, as stated in a letter by the cabildo (city council) of Montevideo to the Spanish king following the British defeat. That letter asked the king to make Montevideo the headquarters of an intendancy, to give it a consulado (“commercial council”) of its own, and to extend the limits of its authority to include the whole Banda Oriental. The third factor was the fertility of the land, a land of moderate hills and an extended plateau covered by tall prairie grass, which supported large numbers of cattle and horses, thriving from those left by the early Spanish settlers. The cattle served as a basis for the export of salted beef to industrialized Britain, where it would sustain the poor working classes, and to Cuba and Brazil, where it would be the basis of the diet of a slave working class. Leather and wool were also exported, primarily to Britain. The fertility of the land also served to support the mobility of the armies wrangling for control of Uruguay in the early 19th century. Finally, the Banda Oriental or eastern bank of the Uruguay River was a territory in constant dispute and the target of mounting intervention by the Portuguese and Spanish crowns, and later on by the Brazilian empire and the United N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Provinces of the Río de la Plata, which replaced them, respectively. The Portuguese wanted to extend Brazilian control to its “natural” frontier in the River Plate, while the Spanish and later on the Buenos Aires authorities considered the region one more province in their disintegrating jurisdiction, to be kept or relinquished according to tactical considerations. These conflicting demands and the constant predation on local resources triggered the early emergence of local landed interests willing to master their own affairs and eventually attain self-determination. It was the combination of these factors rather than the mere willful role played by any of these multiple forces alone that led to Britain’s successful mediation, bringing Argentina and Brazil, both exhausted by the war, to renounce their claims to the Banda Oriental. British diplomats played a crucial role in creating a buffer state between Brazil and Argentina, relying on their country’s maritime hegemony in the South Atlantic Ocean and motivated by the interest to maintain some stability for the sake of British trade. In 1828 an independent state was established, officially known as the Republic to the East of the Uruguay River (República Oriental del Uruguay), a state soon recognized by its neighbors, the rival regional countries.

Instituting the Nation In the wake of Spanish imperial disintegration and as the region became the borderline arena of successive territorial conflicts, two main sets of actors emerged to play a protagonist role in creating the nation. One had its stronghold in the walled fortress city of Montevideo, where Spanish royalists, imperial Brazilian forces, and Uruguayan factions defended the city from recurring sieges by the other main force of local revolutionaries based in the countryside. Even before a nation existed in contemporary minds, these collective actors would dominate the public life of Uruguay—the patrician and learned circles of Montevideo, the landed and mercantile classes, the officers in the armed forces and the rural militia, as well as the lower classes. These groups learned to define themselves by reacting to one another and coalescing with one another as they faced the contrasting pressures put forward by the Spanish royalists (and then Buenos Aires) and by Portugal (and then Brazil). The major figure galvanizing the rural population into a collective actor was a native-born second commander of a rural gendarmerie founded by the authorities in Montevideo in the 1790s to keep order in the countryside. José Gervasio Artigas served under Spanish royalist authorities and later shifted his allegiance to the authorities in Buenos Aires. He soon became disappointed when Buenos Aires, under mounting pressure, negotiated a truce that returned the Banda Oriental to royalist control. Resenting the decision, Artigas led in November 1811 the retreat of over 4,000 Oriental militia and an equal number of fleeing civilians N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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on a month-long trek beyond the armistice lines, across the Uruguay River, to an eight-month encampment in the future Argentine province of Entre Ríos. Fearing Spanish reprisals and Portuguese depredations, the civilians had joined massively the withdrawing militias in what at that time people called a defeat (redota, a rustic transposition of the Spanish word derrota). Later generations identified it, however, as the “exodus of the Oriental people,” and many observers view it, with some justice, as the earliest visible sign of the birth of the Uruguayan nation, born out of defeat and expatriation. In fact, one can trace the earliest forms of the construction of the Uruguayan nation back to the declarations and statements of Artigas. The emerging leader was influenced by ideas on the resumption of popular sovereignty in cases of an acephalous royalty. These ideas can be traced back to a 16th-century Spanish school of thought. They were expressed in the pages of the Gazeta de Buenos Ayres by the radical autonomist Manuel Moreno, who also translated parts of Rousseau’s Contrat Social. In 1812 Artigas popularized these ideas in Uruguay and the neighboring provinces, as he stressed the “primitive [that is, original] rights” of sovereignty of the Orientales, who constituted themselves as a people by electing him as their jefe. A people left to fend for themselves had the right to organize themselves. As “Protector of the Free Peoples” in the region, however, his ideas evolved during the next several years. He first explicitly supported selfdetermination and federalist ideas, leading to a still undefined confederacy of peoples. That confederacy was to involve not only the Banda Oriental but also parts of contemporary Argentina, primarily the littoral provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes, and eventually was to include Santa Fe and even Córdoba (1813). He then moved to a more autocratic and paternalist attempt to keep control of the unruly population of his own native territory (by 1815). Ultimately he was defeated and spent a 30-year-long exile and isolation in Paraguay. It took a long time to define the “national” realm as distinguished from the “foreign” realms. At least until the end of the Great War in the Southern Cone of the Americas in 1851, the distinctions were largely irrelevant as the parties that waged civil war in Uruguay continued to mobilize the support of coalitions reaching to the radical autonomists of Rio Grande do Sul in southern Brazil, to the imperial house in Rio de Janeiro, or to the caudillos in Buenos Aires and other Argentine provinces. Yet, state independence implied an important shift by creating long-standing institutions that increasingly focused the rival energies of the Orientales on the shared public arena and, in this process, managed to constitute the nation. The promulgation of a constitution in 1830 was conceived as an anchor of stability, in the spirit of the Enlightenment. That constitution—which remained the institutional charter until 1919—made the legislature the dominant authority of the Oriental Republic, whose president it elected. The intention was to create a patrician, oligarchic rule led by a political class anchored in the patrician and learned circles of Montevideo. And yet, very early on, political parties crystalN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Statue of José Gervasio Artigas, forefather of Uruguayan self-determination, in the Plaza Independencia, Montevideo, Uruguay. (Jon Hicks/Corbis)

lized, which were led by caudillos (military warlords), who had the necessary rural followings and political stature to impose presidential authority. A gap was thus created between the legal structure and the “real” structure of power, which prompted recurring rebellions, assaults on power, and civil wars. The Catholic church and the army, which were the institutional pillars of conservatism elsewhere in Spanish America, were weak in Uruguay. The foci of real power turned out to be the competing political factions or parties of the Blancos, headed by General Juan Antonio Lavalleja and soon by General Manuel Oribe, and the Colorados, initially headed by General Fructuoso Rivera. These parties, which in a simplistic way can be characterized as built around the conflicting interests of Montevideo versus the countryside districts, soon became the focal galvanizers of popular commitment and were instrumental in institution-building and nationbuilding—after they almost exhausted themselves and the country during the civil wars. By the mid-19th century, the parties were tired of waging war and had to recognize that they were almost undistinguishable in terms of their ideologies, blending classical republicanism and modern liberalism. Yet, an attempt to abolish them for the sake of national reconciliation in the 1850s proved ephemeral. As pointed out in the classic study by historian Juan E. Pivel Devoto, the political parties persisted, albeit under new physiognomy, as the most powerful defining institutions of public life in Uruguay, a trend unrivaled until recently in South America, with the exception of Colombia. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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Defining the Nation Viewed in terms of its ethnic or socioeconomic composition, Uruguay closely resembled the structure of neighboring Río de la Plata or the Brazilian region of Rio Grande do Sul. In cultural terms, nothing distinguished the Orientals from the inhabitants of some of the future Argentine provinces. The notion of a “national” territory emerged only protractedly. Even as late as 1851 Uruguay renounced its claims over the Eastern Missions, an area equaling nearly 100,000 square kilometers or 37 percent of its territory, in favor of imperial Brazil. Uruguayan collective identities were structured as part of the process of consolidation of the state, without resemblance to any processes of ethnicities crystallizing into nationalities, as described by Anthony Smith and other scholars. Following the establishment of the “Oriental State” and in a progressive manner, collective identities were shaped in Uruguay along the lines of a code of civility and citizenship rather than along any primordial, ethno-cultural argument. The focal point for defining the nation turned out to be the republican virtues of citizenship and the principle of political order and rights guaranteed by the state. By the late 19th century and the 20th century these images were constructed in rather universal terms. The National (Blanco) Party leader Wilson Ferreira Aldunate expressed this view when emphasizing the role of the state and its principles on the definition of the nation, as he addressed the Chamber of Deputies of Ecuador in 1983, speaking from exile during military rule in his home country: This is why we are a most authentic country, . . . not due to the influence of a common race, in a genetic sense; neither as a result of geography, but rather by being a spiritual community. It consists in the cult of certain things: equality before the law, the representative character of the organs of government, the periodic election of the rulers, the subordination of any authority and power center to the civilian government, the strict obedience to the guarantees of freedom, of political freedom and individual freedom. . . . Among us, when there is an attack against the survival of these spiritual values the very existence of the country is put under risk, since the country is that and if [these elements are] absent, it is not a country. (cited in Demasi 1995, 29, 47–48)

Even though there are still open debates and controversies about the role played in the 19th century by individuals and institutions in the constitution of the Oriental nation, this view has become widely accepted. By the 20th century, it became “routinized” as part of the process of socialization and universal education carried out by the Uruguayan state and its leading political and cultural elites. It is important to remember, however, that the initial criteria of citizenship were rather restrictive, limiting representation according to several marks: personal status (slaves and dependent workers were not granted electoral rights), N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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gender ( females were excluded), age (minors until the age of 21 did not enjoy franchise), and education (analphabets were precluded from the electoral process after 1840). Moreover, even if formally abolished, slavery and indebted work continued into the second half of the 19th century.

Narrating the Nation It is perhaps not surprising that the turmoil and swift changes of political fate and shifting territorial boundaries of the early 19th century did not encourage the elaboration of any systematic project to “narrate” the nation at that time. And yet, already in the 1810s and 1820s, there were incipient signs of the construction of new collective identities as part of the political struggle. The first such signs are visible in the 1810s in the use of official papers, still carrying the signs of Spanish imperial rule, with the added inscription “4th and 5th years of The Liberty.” A similar token of the construction of a new collective identity in the Artigas camp was the use of playing cards with the written mottos, “Long live the Fatherland” (viva la Pátria) or “With persistence and fatigue, Artigas liberated his Fatherland” (con la constancia y fatigas, libertó su Pátria Artigas). These were part of a conscious attempt to strengthen the inner conviction of the rebellious camp. Equally illustrative was the January 1816 decision of the “Governing Cabildo” called by Artigas, which admonished against suspicious activities and forced support by demanding that “every Patriot citizen should use a ribbon [with the colors] of the Oriental Province.” A reading of the subsequent political developments indicates how fragile and unstable such popular support was. By the mid-1830s, shortly after independence, we witness popular expressions of nation-building, most significantly led by poets. Similarly to other Spanish American territories emerging into independent life, these expressions were shaped by the publication of anthologies of poetry. El Parnaso Oriental was the name of an anthology compiled by Luciano Lira in 1835. Following the neoclassical style of similar anthologies in Argentina (1824) and Brazil (1829), it attempted to create the nation by the word. It started with a song that would eventually be recognized as the national anthem: “Orientales, la Pátria o la tumba! Libertad o con Gloria morir! ” (“Orientals, the Fatherland or the Tomb! Freedom or a Glorious Death!”). The subject of its discourse was the citizen, envisaged as a universal and public category, from which most feminine voices and all black and indigenous voices were absent. The community was discursively constituted by the act of liberation, signaled by the autonomous subject singing the glory of the free people born in the territory of the Eastern Band of the Uruguay River. Thorny dissent and polemics were silenced, and an image of the unity and harmony of those belonging to the nation and struggling for its freedom was projected as mimicry to reality. A nation in the making seems already under way. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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The role of Artigas, the jefe of the Orientales between 1811 and 1820, as founder of the nation was particularly open to controversy. Starting with denigration led by his enemies in Buenos Aires, a black legend was constructed of Artigas as a failing autocratic and even a despotic caudillo. In Uruguay, with few exceptions, the leader in exile was mostly ignored until his death in 1850. During the demands for the repatriation of his remains and the ceremonies surrounding his reburial on Uruguayan soil in 1856, his image was brought to apotheosis as “the founder of the Oriental independence,” the “patriarch of Liberty,” and finally “the founder of the Oriental nationality.” The latter term was of relatively recent coinage, having been used for the first time by the young intellectual Andrés Lamas in 1838, under the influence of new Romantic ideas. The black legend of Artigas was reinvigorated by the 1880s, especially with the publication of the work of Francisco Berra (1866–1895). It was paralleled by the defense and near beatification of Artigas in some official and academic circles. By September 1884, the Congress declared the day of his death a day of national mourning. By the early 1950s these early trends crystallized into a national cult of Artigas, soon to be critically evaluated by works of historical revisionism, which were drafted with renewed strength after the end of the military interregnum and the return to democracy in 1985.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation After independence, the ruling elites encouraged immigration. In the period 1835–1842 alone, an estimated 30,000 to 48,000 immigrants arrived to join a country that had only 74,000 inhabitants in 1830. The influx of immigrants contributed to population growth: the number of inhabitants grew to 132,000 by 1852 and to 438,000 by 1879. Immigrants constituted 48 percent of the population in 1860 and 68 percent in 1868. Large landed estates or latifundias still predominated in the countryside, and husbandry recovered after its decline in the civil wars. Yet society became more differentiated, especially in the urban centers. By 1853 there were in Montevideo 2,200 merchants and manufacturers, 80 percent of whom were “foreigners,” that is, had been born abroad. Worker unions and philanthropic and philosophical organizations proliferated, especially after 1870. In parallel, the city modernized: gas services were installed in 1853; the first bank opened its doors in 1857; sewage works were initiated in 1860; a telegraph was run in 1866; railroads to the interior were started in 1869; running water was available in 1871; an arts section was created in the National Museum in 1872; and a society for the promotion of science and the arts was founded in 1876. A new generation came of age in the 1860s and 1870s and combined new models of bourgeois privacy and public activism, replicating European upper-class claims and standards. Modernizing landowners established in 1871 a Rural Association charged with the task of improving livestock-raising techniques, and they soon gained considerable influN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 1 (1770–1880)

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ence on policy makers. A huge gap separated the upper classes from the lower classes, who lived in rented quarters and multiroom, crowded buildings (casas de inquilinos and conventillos). A similar gap persisted separating natives from immigrants and rural from urban sectors. The 1870s and 1880s witnessed a plethora of decisions aimed at the creation of some sort of “civil religion” to support an increasingly secularized state and society. Civic institutions were created to replace the role played by religious ones, and civic liturgies and rituals were launched. Sacredness was transferred from the religious to the secular public realm with, for example, legislation aimed at minimizing religious formation in state schools, creation of a civil state register, establishment of civil matrimony as obligatory and previous to religious marriage, the law of secondary and high education that established state control over educational institutions, and the decision to close monasteries. In parallel, the political class promoted a melting-pot vision through an expanding educational system that raised the standards of literacy. They aimed at instilling a sense of nationality and common destiny, constructed in terms that traced the notion of Oriental nationality back in history to Artigas and the founding fathers of the independent state. This project came to its completion under the rule of José Battle y Ordóñez in the early 20th century, which upheld civilian rule and instilled the values of citizenship, republicanism, and consensus across all segments of the population. Selected Bibliography Achugar, Hugo, ed. 1998. La fundación por la palabra: Letra y nación en América Latina en el siglo XIX. Montevideo, Uruguay: Universidad de la República, FHCE. Ardao, Arturo. 2001. ¿Desde cuando el culto artiguista? Montevideo, Uruguay: Biblioteca de Marcha. Barran, José Pedro, Gerardo Caetano, and Teresa Porzecanski, eds. 1996. Historias de la vida privada. Vols. 1 and 2. Montevideo, Uruguay: Santillana. Demasi, Carlos. 1995. “La dictadura militar: un tema pendiente.” In Uruguay: Cuentas pendientes, edited by Alvaro Rico, 29–55. Montevideo, Uruguay: Trilce. Halperin Donghi, Tulio. 2002. “Party and Nation-State in the Construction of Collective Identities: Uruguay in the Nineteenth Century.” In The Collective and the Public in Latin America, edited by Luis Roniger and Tamar Herzog, 158–173. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press. McLean, David. 1995. War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire. Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836–1853. London: British Academic Press. Pivel Devoto, Juan E. 1994. Historia de los partidos políticos en el Uruguay. 2 vols. Montevideo, Uruguay: Ediciones de la Cámara de Representantes. Street, John. 1959. Artigas and the Emancipation of Uruguay. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vázquez Franco, Guillermo. 1994. La historia y sus mitos. Montevideo, Uruguay: Cal y canto. Verdesio, Gustavo. 2001. Forgotten Conquests : Rereading New World History from the Margins. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.


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Index

Note: Page numbers in bold indicate a main entry for that subject, and numbers in italic refer to the sidebar text on that page. Aasen, Ivar, 226 Abacha, Sani, 1188 Abayomi, Kofo, 1180 Abbas, Ferhat, 1099 Abbas, Gulam, 1763 Abbas, Mahmoud, 1142 Abbas II (Egypt), 261 Abbas the Great, Shah, 1108, 1113 Abd-ul-Ilah, 1745 Abdallah, King (Transjordan), 728, 729 Abdelkader, Emir, 1098, 1099, 1102 Abduh, Muhammad, 731 Abdülhamid II (Ottoman Empire), 764, 765 Abdullah, Farooq, 1767, 1768, 1770 Abdullah, King (Jordan), 1142 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad, 1761, 1761, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766–1767 Abiola, Moshood, 1188 Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 1847, 1851 Aborigines, Australian, 932. See also Pan-Aboriginalism Abrams, Lynn, 53 Abyssinia, 736–737, 739 Aceh, 954, 1468, 1734 Achebe, Chinua, 913, 914, 917, 920, 921, 925 Acton, Lord, 687 Adams, Abigail, 50 Adenauer, Konrad, 947, 973–974, 1549 Adivar, Halide Edib, 770 Afghanistan, 1683–1695, 1684 (map) and education, 1388–1389 Germany and terrorists in, 1554 invasion of, 1497 and music, 1440 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Soviet Union, 954 and terrorism, 1488 and women, 904, 1457 Aflaq, Michel, 731, 732, 733, 981, 1740 Africa and colonialism, 890 education in, 39–40, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 431 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence/separatist movements in, 1461, 1464, 1468–1469

literature/language in, 919–920, 925–927 and music, 1440 and religion, 108 and socialism, 980–981 supranational organizations and, 962, 965 See also specific African nations African Americans, 493–494 Afrikaner nationalism, 1144–1153 Afzelius, Arvid August, 73 Agathangelos, 1706 Aghulon, Maurice, 49 Agoncillo, Teodoro, 1245 Aguirre, José Antonio, 1515–1516 Ahmad, Kamal Mazhar, 1741 Ahmad Shah, 1686, 1691 Ahmadinejad, Mahmmoud, 1117 Ahmed, Imam, 739, 743 Aho, Juhani, 605 Aidoo, Ama Ata, 927 Aizawa Seishisai, 810–811, 813–814, 814, 815 Akbar, 802 Akçura, Yusuf, 766, 770, 771, 773 Akhmatova, Anna, 1074 Akhmetov, Renat, 1625 Aksakov, K. S., 692 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 261 al-Alayili, Shaykh Abdallah, 732, 733 al-Azmah, Yusuf, 728 al-Azmeh, Aziz, 725 al-Bakr, Ahmed Hasan, 756 al-Banna, Hassan, 984, 985 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 731, 981 al-Bustani, Butrus, 731 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 1135, 1136, 1138, 1139 al-Husayni, Musa Kazim, 1136 al-Husri, Sati, 730, 732–733, 751 al-Jawahiri, Mohammad Mahdi, 1740 al-Jazairi, Amir Abd al-Qadir, 727 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 753 al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman, 727 al-Miqdadi, Darwish, 734 al-Nashshashibi, Raghib, 1136 Al Qaeda, 986–987, 1484, 1488, 1492 and Pakistan, 1232 al-Qaysi, Nuri Ali Hammudi, 1741 Al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, 1488–1489


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I-2 al-Said, Nuri, 753 al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Adb, 984 Alamán, Lucas, 352 Albéniz, Isaac, 1437 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 275, 276 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 840, 840 (illus.), 841, 844, 845, 846 Alem, Leandro, 281 Alevi, 1650–1651, 1653, 1654–1655 Alexander I, Czar (Russia), 20–21, 209, 211, 1576 Alexander I (Bulgaria), 578 Alexander II, Czar (Russia), 210, 598 Alexander III, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Alford, Kenneth J., 1442 Alfred the Great, King (England), 165 Algeria, 1094–1105, 1096 (map) and colonialism, 48 diaspora population of, 1371 and France, 1050–1051 and independence, 1464, 1490 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1496 and women, 903 Ali, Monica, 927 Ali, Muhammad, 258–259, 263 Aliyev, Heidar, 1715, 1720 Aliyev, Ilham, 1715 Allende, Salvador, 331 Almirall, Valentí, 703, 710 Alsace, 475, 1501–1510, 1503 (map) Althusser, Louis, 486, 1052 Amami Island, 1754 Amanullah, King (Afghanistan), 1684, 1686, 1688, 1689 Amazon basin, 1827–1831, 1829 Ambedkar, B. R., 802, 1204–1205 Ambrose, Stephen, 905 American Revolution, 21 and Canada, 299 and education, 32 gender roles and, 45–46, 50 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 Americanization, and Puerto Rico, 841 Americas and language, 478 and music, 75–76, 1432 nationalism and gender in, 44 See also Central America; North America; South America Amharanization, 739, 741, 742 Amin, Hafizullah, 1687 Amir, Yigal, 1400, 1403 Amrane-Minne, Daniele Djamila, 903 Anatolian movement, 1646, 1646 Andersen, Hans Christian, 228 Anderson, Benedict, 25 and diaspora populations, 1368–1369, 1370

INDEX

and the “imagined political community,” 475, 481, 912, 1342 and Latin America, 826 and national symbols, 122, 900 on print technology, 129, 485, 1475 on the realistic novel, 923 on “young” and “youth,” 1859 Andic, Helmut, 545 Andrade, Mário de, 1662, 1662 Angell, Norman, 532 Anger, Carl, 228 Anglo-Boer Wars, 198, 204, 449, 490, 1146 and Canada, 305–306, 306 Anglo-Burmese wars, 776 Anglo-Chinese war, 27 Anglo-Nepal war, 1805 Angola, 968, 1657–1667, 1658 (map) and Cuba, 1285 and independence, 1464 Anjala Conspiracy, 223 Ankara, Turkey, 770–772 Anthem, national, 68, 116, 117, 1430, 1431, 1442–1444 and Basques, 1521 and Belgium, 145 and Brazil, 294 and Burma, 782 and Canada, 303 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and the EU, 1042 and France, 175, 1502 and Germany, 619 and Indonesia, 1732 and Japan, 1756, 1757 and Mexico, 354 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 1184, 1186–1187 and Poland, 211, 215 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 230, 230 and the United States, 1308 and Uruguay, 401 Anthias, Floya, 902 Anti-Catholicism, and England, 163, 166 Anti-free-trade movements, 1448 Anti-Semitism, 439, 447, 517, 520–521, 907 and Bulgaria, 582 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and France, 179 and Hungary, 639, 645 in Turkey, 1649 and Ukraine, 1078 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Zionism as reaction to, 1121, 1128 Antiabortion movement, 1446


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Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism, 912–928, 957–970 and Algeria, 1095, 1100 and Angola, 1658, 1664 and Burma, 777, 779, 780–781, 782, 783 and China, 1191, 1193, 1196, 1198–1199, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157–1158, 1163 and Gandhi, 1203 and India, 131, 796, 800–801 and Iran, 1110, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 753, 1739, 1740 and Malaysia, 1216 and nationalism, 26–27, 47–48, 486–487, 1461–1465 and Nigeria, 1178–1179 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 840 and Vietnam, 1269 and women’s rights, 457 Anticommunism, 520, 1310, 1394 Anticosmopolitanism, 415 Antinuclear-power movements, 1449 Antiracist movements, 1457 Antislavery, 161, 163 Antwerp, Belgium, 200 Apartheid, 1151–1153 Appadurai, Arjun, 136, 1374–1375 Aquino, Benigno, 1242, 1242 Aquino, Corazon (Cory), 1242, 1242, 1244 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 729, 1125, 1129, 1135, 1136, 1139–1140 Arab-Israeli War (1967), 1137, 1394–1395 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 1039 Arab League, 726 (map) Arab nationalism, 724–734, 726 (map), 965, 981 and Iraq, 751–752, 753, 754, 754, 757–758, 1739 Arabs, in Turkey, 1650–1651 Arafat, Yasir, 1136–1137, 1141, 1142, 1488–1489 Aral Sea, 882 Arana, Sabino de, 704, 709, 710, 1515 Arason, Jón, 228 Araucanian Indians, 323, 324–326 Arcand, Denys, 1294 Arce, Mariano José, 317–318 Architecture, 30, 37, 407–408, 409, 413, 414–415 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Brussels, 144 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1024 and Malaysia, 1224 and Russia, 692–693 and Turkey, 770–771 Arena y Goiri, Sabino, 1294 Argentina, 268–281, 270 (map) and film, 1335 immigration and national identity in, 492 and music, 1439, 1443 national identity and education in, 39 Arif, Abd al-Rahman, 755 Arif, Abd al-Salam, 754–755 Aristocracy, 5–9

Aristotle, 529 Armageddon, 1394 Armenia, 1696–1711, 1698 (map) and Azerbaijan, 1719 and diaspora populations, 1376 and the Soviet Union, 946 Armenian Apostolic Church, 1699–1700, 1701 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 1718–1719. See also Gharabagh conflict ethnic cleansing/genocide of, 438, 523 and the Ottoman Empire, 764, 765 and Turkey, 1648–1649 Arminius (Hermann), 618 Armstrong, John, 1368 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 187, 1504 Arne, Thomas, 1438 Arnim, Achim von, 73 Arnold, Matthew, 915 Árpád (chief), 643 Art, 16–17, 49, 405–409, 412–417 and Australia, 859–860 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1522 and Canada, 305, 1841 and Finland, 605 and France, 177 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569 historic paintings of Denmark, 154 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127 and the Maori, 1860 and Mongolia, 1794 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Poland, 212, 216, 682 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 402 and Wales, 1637 See also Culture; Landscape Artigas, José Gervasio, 397–398, 401, 402 Asbjørnsen, Peter C., 228 Ashoka, Emperor (India), 802, 1815–1816 Asia and education, 39–40, 428 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence movements in, 1461–1463, 1465–1468 and language, 478 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Asian countries Asquith, Herbert, 868 Assimilation, 29, 522, 931–932 and Australian Aborigines, 858 and China, 1196, 1199 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 and Ethiopia, 744–746


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INDEX

Assimilation (continued ) and Hungary, 644 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 866 and Poland, 685 and the Sami, 1612–1613 and Turkey, 768, 1647, 1652 and Ukrainians, 716 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Education Asylum and the EU, 1042 and Germany, 1556, 1557, 1558–1559 See also Immigrants/immigration; Refugees Atahualpa, 373 Atatürk. See Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) Atlee, Clement, 1461 Atwood, Margaret, 1841 Auber, Daniel, 144 Audubon, John James, 389 Augustina of Aragon, 51 Aung San, 784, 785 (illus.) Aung San Suu Kyi, 784 Austin, John, 1372 Australia, 849–860, 851 (map) and Aborigines, 932, 1844–1853 communication in, 1473 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1375 and education, 1379, 1382 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigration, 883, 1420–1421 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 Macedonians in, 1415 and music, 1439 and new social movements, 1448 and New Zealand, 865 Austria, 539–554, 543 (map) education and, 33–34, 35, 36, 429 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 442 fascism in, 516 and German unification, 192 and Hungary, 638 and Poland, 210 politics and political philosophy in, 535, 1410 Austro-Hungarian empire. See Habsburg empire Autonomy, 899, 939–940 and Armenia, 1698 and Basques, 1516, 1517, 1522 and Catalonia, 1536, 1544–1547 and China, 1200 and the EU, 1041–1042 and Greenland, 1562–1563 and minorities, 1357–1358 and Nepal, 1805 and Pakistan, 1232 and Poland, 679 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 843, 845–847 and Spain, 707, 707–708, 708, 711, 1084–1085, 1088, 1090–1091

Avellaneda, Nicolas, 280 Awolowo, Obafemi, 1180, 1182, 1182, 1183 Ayala, Julio César Turbay, 833 Ayubi, Nazih, 734 Azaña, Manuel, 705 Azerbaijan, 469, 1713–1721, 1714 (map) and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1710 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1078–1079 and Turkey, 769 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 1180, 1180, 1183 Aznar, José María, 1544 Aznavour, Charles, 1707 Aztecs, 345–346, 351–352 Ba Maw, 779–780, 785 Ba’ath Party, 731, 981 and Iraq, 753, 754, 756, 1740–1741, 1743, 1745, 1746 Babangida, Ibrahim, 1188 Babenberg monarchy, 539–541 Babenco, Hector, 1334–1335 Babeuf, François-Noël, 1489 Bache, Otto, 228 Bachyns’kyi, Yulian, 722 Bacon, Sir Francis, 61 Bagehot, Walter, 162–163 Bahais, 1113, 1118 Bainimarama, Frank, 1324, 1325 Bakongo, 1660–1664, 1664 Bakshi, Gulam Mohammad, 1766 Baku, 1716 Bakunin, M., 38 Balakirev, Mili, 75, 79, 80, 82, 1437 Baldorioty de Castro, Román, 839 Balearic Islands, 1546 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 1183, 1185 Bali, 1440 Balkan nations, 435, 436 Balkan Wars, 437 and Bulgaria, 572, 580 and Turkey, 1645 Baltic states, 555–568, 559 (map), 1573 (map) independence, 503 and new social movements, 1449 racism in the, 518 and the Soviet Union, 946, 955, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1581–1582 Bancroft, George, 389 Bandaranaike, Nathan, 1467 Bandera, Stepan, 718, 1624 Bandung Conference (1955), 958–962, 964–965, 1206 Bangladesh, 1201, 1234, 1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1466 Bano, Shah, 1209 Bao Dai, 1264 Barassi, Ron, 857 Barbosa, José Celso, 839, 841 Barceló, Antonio, 840 Barcelona, 1539–1540


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I-5

INDEX

Barker, Ernest, 531–532, 535 Baron, Beth, 264 Barons, Krišj¯anis, 564, 1577, 1577, 1578 Barrès, Maurice, 416 Barrios, Agustín (“Mangoré”), 365, 365 Barruel, Abbé, 45 Barry, Brian, 97 Barry, Sir Charles, 408 Barthes, Roland, 1052 Bartók, Béla, 1435 Basanáviˇcius, Father Jonas, 567 Basarab, 1592 Basedow, Johann, 34 B˘asescu, Traian, 1589 Basques, 1512–1524, 1514 (map) concessions to, 932 and cultural survival, 878 and the ETA, 1090, 1091–1092 and language, 477, 482 and the mixing of ethnic and civic nationalisms, 938–939 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1470, 1471 and Spain, 702–711, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1496 Batavian Republic, 197, 198 Batista, Fulgencio, 1276, 1277 Batman, John, 1845 Battle of Kosovo (1389), 100 Battle of Maysalun, 728 Battle of Yungay, 327–328 Battle y Ordóñez, José, 403 Bauer, Otto, 535, 1071 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1368 Baumer, Gertrude, 453 Bavaria, 621, 631 Beatrix, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Becker, Nikolas, 189–190 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 16, 117, 185, 186–187, 1431, 1432 Beg, Mirza, 1763 Begin, Menachem, 1488–1489 Bejarano, Jorge, 830 Belarusia, 1079 Belaúnde, Victor Andrés, 373, 375 Belgian Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Belgium, 137–146, 141 (map) colonialist policies of, 958, 968, 1464 and Congo/Zaïre, 437, 1156–1158, 1160 fascism in, 517 and language, 472 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1678 secession from the Netherlands, 197 Bello, Ahmadu, 1182, 1185 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 1099, 1100 Ben Bouali, Hassiba, 1099 Ben-Gurion, David, 953, 1123, 1128 Bendjedid, Chadli, 1099 Beneš, Edvard, 587, 588, 588, 596, 596 (illus.), 1017 and World War II, 595, 1019

Bengalil, 1466 Benkheddda, Benyoucef, 1100 Bennett, Louise, 913, 921 Bennett, Robert Russell, 1433 Bentham, Jeremy, 19, 855 Berbers, 1101 Berg, Christian, 153 Berkl¯aus, Edvards, 1578 Berlin, Isaiah, 97 Berlioz, Hector, 1431, 1435 Bernstein, Leonard, 1439 Berra, Francisco, 402 Betances, Ramón Emeterio, 839–840, 841 Bethlen, Count István, 638 Bhabha, Homi, 914, 927 Bhanubhakta Acharya, 1807 Bhimsen Thapa, 1806–1807 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh, 1466 Bhutto, Benazir, 1231, 1398 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 1231, 1767 Biafra, 1469 Biblical texts, 473–474 Biculturalism, and the Maori, 1858–1859 Biehl, Janet, 882–883 Bierstadt, Albert, 65, 389 Billig, Michael, 121, 479 bin-Laden, Osama, 986–987, 1399, 1400 Bingham, George Caleb, 389 Biogenetics, 883 Bioregionalism, 879 Birendra, King (Nepal), 1808, 1809 Bismarck, Otto von, 24, 150, 192–193, 436, 611 and Alsace, 1505 monuments to, 410–411 and Poland, 678 Bjørnson, Bjørnstjerne, 78, 228, 230 Blake, Christopher, 1439 Blanc, Louis, 239 Blest Gana, Alberto, 329 Block, Alexander, 1602 Bluetooth, Harald, 226 Boer Wars. See Anglo-Boer Wars Boers. See Afrikaner nationalism Bohemia, 584, 1022 and Hussitism, 1023 and music, 1435–1436 Boland, Eavan, 926 Bolger, Dermot, 927 Bolivar, Simón, 16, 272, 370, 825, 831 Bolivia, 371–372, 1443 Bolognesi, Francisco, 377 Bolshevik Revolution, 436, 520, 593 Bolsheviks, and religion, 106 Bonald, Louis de, 178, 179 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 16, 26, 34, 175, 176–177, 474 as father figure, 51 and the French national anthem, 1443 and Haiti, 336 and Switzerland, 248


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I-6

INDEX

Boniface, Pope, 100 Bonifacio, Andres, 1245–1246 Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José, 287–289, 290, 292 Borden, Robert, 306 Borders, 460–461, 966, 967, 968 and Afghanistan, 1684–1685, 1689 in Africa, 1464, 1469 and Algeria, 1096 and Armenia, 1697–1699, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 562–563, 1582 and Basque Country, 1513, 1514 (map) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 289, 1831 and Bulgaria, 574 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 298 in Central America, 316 and the collapse of communism, 1413 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Denmark, 152 and Egypt, 262 and Ethiopia, 740, 742 and the European Union, 1042 and Fiji, 1318 and Finland, 598 and France, 175 and Germany, 187–188 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 639–640 and Indonesia, 1729–1730 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1738–1739 and Ireland, 655 and Israel, 1124–1125, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1771 and Japan, 1753 and language, 471, 474–475, 477 Mexican, 353 (map) and Mongolia, 1792 and Nepal, 1805 and the Netherlands, 199 and Paraguay, 359, 362 and Peru, 368, 371 and Poland, 212–213, 685 and Romania, 1591 and Russia, 1599 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669 and Scandinavia, 225 and Scotland, 236 and South Africa, 1145 Spain/France, 1513 and Taiwan, 1255 and Turkey, 768, 769, 1647 and Ukraine, 713–714, 719, 1620 and the United States, 390, 1390 and Uruguay, 395 and Wales, 1636 and the War of the Pacific, 376 (map)

after World War I, 514, 524 See also Expansionism Borglum, Gutzon, 65, 411 Borneo, 1218–1220 Borodin, Aleksandr, 78–79, 82, 417, 1437 Bosanquet, Bernard, 534–535 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 806 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1358, 1409, 1525–1535, 1526 (map) Bosse, Abraham, 62 Botero, Fernando, 832 Botev, Hristo, 573, 576–577 Botha, Pieter Willem, 1152 Botswana, 1443 Bouchard, Lucien, 1292 Boudiaf, Mohammed, 1099 Boudicca, Queen (England), 165 Bouhired, Djamila, 1099 Boumaza, Djamila, 1099 Boumedienne, Houari, 890, 1099, 1100, 1100 Boundaries. See Borders Boupacha, Djamila, 1099 Bourassa, Henri, 306, 1289, 1293–1294, 1296 Bourassa, Robert, 1291 Bourbon reforms, 350, 371 Bourgeoisie, 12, 585, 626. See also Elites Bourguiba, Habib, 1464 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 1099, 1100 Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 333, 337, 340, 342 Bracken, Thomas, 868 Bradley, F. H., 531 Bradman, Sir Donald, 857 Brahms, Johannes, 117 Brandt, Willy, 976 Brathwaite, Kamau, 917, 921 Brazil, 282–297, 284 (map), 1824–1832, 1826 (map) and the Amazon, 876 and the arts, 1334–1335, 1439 and colonialism, 889 and Uruguay, 396–397 Brazilian Portuguese, 478 Brentano, Clemens, 73 Bretagne, 1490 Brezhnev, Leonid, 1026, 1076–1077 Brinker, Hans, 204 Bristow, George, 76 British North America Act, 300, 300 Britishness, 159, 162, 167 and Scotland, 233 Britten, Benjamin, 1434 Brock, Sir Isaac, 304 Brooklyn Bridge, 128, 134 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom, 164 Brussels, 144 Buddhism and Asian political identity, 972 and Burma, 779, 780 and Japan, 106 and Mongolia, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1798


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I-7

INDEX

and politics, 983, 988 and Tibet, 1815–1817, 1821, 1822 Buenos Aires, 395–396, 397 Buhari, Muhammadu, 1187 Bulgakov, M. A., 697 Bulgaria, 437, 570–582 Bull, John, 117 Burghers, Thomas, 1150 Buriats, 1784, 1785, 1788–1795, 1791 Burke, Edmund, 89, 162, 1489 Burlington, Lord, 62 Burma, 776–785, 1370 Burnley, I. H., 883 Burns, E. Bradford, 292 Burns, Robert, 73, 238 Burschenschaften, 187 Burundi. See Rwanda and Burundi Bush, George H. W., 1306, 1395 Bush, George W., 1306, 1347, 1395–1396, 1453 Bushnell, David, 834 Bustamante, Carlos María de, 350, 352 Byron, Lord, 631 Cabero, Alberto, 330 Cabinda, 1660 Cabral, Amílcar, 1661 Cáceres, Andrés A., 377 Cady Stanton, Elizabeth, 53, 57 Cakobau, King (Fiji), 1318 Calhoun, John C., 390 Caliphate, 760–761 Cambó, Francesc, 706, 710 Cambodia, 1463 Camden, William, 61 Camphausen, Wilhelm, 408 Canada, 298–307, 301 (map), 1289 (map), 1372, 1834–1842, 1836 (map) communication in, 1473 education and, 424, 428, 429, 1383–1384 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigrants/immigration, 1415, 1418–1419, 1420 and indigenous groups, 1566 and music, 1441 and national symbols, 1344, 1346, 1347–1348 and natural resources, 884 and Nunavut, 1562 and Québec, 1288–1297 railroad in, 127 and sports, 993, 1000–1001 and technology, 1477–1478 Canal, Boisrond, 338 Cannadine, David, 1009 Capitalism and Korea, 1778–1779 and Social Democrats, 976 See also Economy; Globalization Captaincy General of Guatemala, 310, 314 Carbó, Eduardo Posada, 834 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 1829

Carducci, Giousè, 671 Carey, Henry, 117 Caribbean, 838 (map), 1274 (map) Carmichel, Franklin, 1841 Carnegie, Andrew, 239 Carpathian Ukraine, 716 Carr, E. H., 23, 536–537 Carr, Emily, 1841 Carrera, José Miguel, 326 Carrera, Rafael, 315, 318 Carretero, Luis, 711 Carter, Jimmy, 1395 Cartier, Georges-Etienne, 1288 Cartography. See Maps Castile, 1083, 1537 Castilla, Ramón, 372 Castillo, Florencio, 317 Castro, Arturo, 830 Castro, Fidel, 834, 942, 952, 1276, 1278–1279, 1278 (illus.), 1279, 1286 Castro, Raúl, 1279, 1286 Catalonia, 1413, 1415, 1536–1547, 1538 (map) and language, 477 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1091 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and Spain, 702–711, 708, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1490 Catherine the Great, 19–20 Catholicism. See Eastern Orthodox Church; Roman Catholicism Caupolicán (chief), 326 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 669, 673 Ceau¸sescu, Nicolae, 952, 1585, 1589, 1591, 1594 Cederström, Gustaf, 228 ˇ Celakovský, František Ladislav, 73 Celis, Carlos Uribe, 832 Celman, Miguel Juárez, 280 Celtic languages, 471, 472, 477 Celts, 236–237 Central America, 309–321, 312 (map), 838 (map), 1274 (map) Central American Common Market, 316 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 896, 1746, 1821 Ceremonies, 1347–1348 and Burma, 782 and France, 176 and Iran, 1114–1115 and nationalistic art, 411, 417 See also Holidays/festivals Cervantes, Ignacio, 76 Césaire, Aimé, 488, 917, 919 Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de, 1275, 1282 Chabrier, Emmanuel, 1437 Chaco War, 360, 363, 365 Chadwick, George, 76 Chamberlain, H. St., 41 Channing, Edward Tyrell, 389 Charents, Yeghishe, 1707 Charles III (Spain), 350


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I-8

INDEX

Charles V (Habsburg), 196 Charles XII (Sweden), 226 Charrúas Indians, 394 Chartists, 161, 164 Chatterji, Bankimchandra, 800 Chaudhry, Mahendra, 1323, 1324 Chaves, Julio César, 364 Chávez, Carlos, 76, 1439 Che Guevara, Ernesto, 942, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1286 Chechens, ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 441 Chechnya and Russia, 897, 1080, 1597, 1605–1607 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 Chen Duxiu, 789, 793 Chen Shui-bian, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1259 Chenrezig (God of Compassion), 1816, 1817 Chernobyl disaster, 954, 1078, 1457 Cherono, Stephen (Saif Saeed Shaheen), 1001 Chiang K’ai-shek, 791, 792, 794, 1250, 1251, 1251 (illus.) Chibás, Eduardo, 1282 Chile, 39, 323–331, 325 (map) and Peru, 377 China, 787–795, 788 (map), 1190–1200, 1192 (map) and Angola, 1664 anticolonialism in, 27 and the Cold War, 942–943 and colonialism, 890 and communism/Maoism, 952, 977, 978 and diaspora populations, 1372–1373 education and, 426, 1386–1387 and film, 1339 and India, 1210 and Indonesia, 1729 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762 and Japan, 809, 815, 1749, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 and Korea, 1780, 1781 and language, 472, 478, 481 and Mongolia, 1784, 1785, 1786–1788, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1794, 1795–1796 and music, 1440 and population transfers, 876 and religion, 108 separatism within, 1468 and the Soviet Union, 948, 979 and Taiwan, 1251, 1252–1253, 1256, 1256, 1257, 1259, 1462 and Tibet, 1813, 1814–1815, 1818–1821, 1823 and the United States, 1395 and Vietnam, 1263, 1266 Chinese in Japan, 1753 in Malaysia, 1215, 1216, 1385, 1463 in New Zealand, 867 See also Singapore Chipenda, Daniel, 1662, 1662 Cho Man Sik, 1773

Choibalsang, Marshal (Mongolia), 1789, 1792, 1797, 1798 Choinom, R., 1794 Chopin, Frédéric, 74, 81, 212, 214, 216, 686, 1434–1435 Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 1078, 1626 Chou Wen-chung, 1440 Choueiri, Youssef, 730 Christian III (Denmark), 226 Christian IV (Denmark), 226 Christian Coalition, 1395 Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International, 973–975 Christianity and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1706 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and Fiji, 1318 and fundamentalism, 1392, 1393 and the Philippines, 1239 and South Africa, 1148–1149 See also specific Christian religions Christophe, Henry, 337, 340 Chrysanthemum Revolution, 638 Chubais, Anatoly, 1597 Church, Frederic Edwin, 65 Churchill, Winston, 950, 1011, 1012, 1033, 1034, 1461 Cienfuegos, Camilo, 1283 Cinema, 133, 417–418, 497, 1327–1340 and Algeria, 1102 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and France, 1053 and Mongolia, 1794 and Québec, 1294 related to World War II, 1434 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1675 and the Soviet Union, 1075–1076 and the United States, 951–952 See also Theater Cintrón, Rosendo Matienzo, 841, 845–846 Citizenship, 930, 934–936 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 1851 and the Baltic states, 568 and Brazil, 293 and Canada, 298, 1835 and Central America, 320 and Czech Republic, 1027 and Denmark, 154–155 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1366, 1371–1372, 1374, 1376 and the EU, 1041, 1042 and forms of nationalism, 488, 1354 and France, 171, 1050 and gender/sexuality, 444, 446, 909 and Germany, 188, 620, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559 and globalization, 1409


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I-9

INDEX

and Haiti, 335, 338 and immigration, 1419–1420 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 669 and Japan, 1752, 1753 and Malaysia, 1216, 1217, 1223 and Mongolia, 1796, 1798 and Peru, 371, 372–373 and Poland, 207 and Puerto Rico, 836, 843 and Ukraine, 1624 and the United States, 1398, 1401 and Uruguay, 400–401 and Wales, 1639 ˇ Ciurlionis, Mikolajus Konstantinas, 565 Civil rights movement, U.S., 124, 944, 965, 1300–1303, 1304, 1305, 1310 Civil war and Angola, 968, 1658–1659, 1663, 1666 and China, 790 and collapse of communism, 895, 896 and Colombia, 829, 833, 834 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Iraq, 757 and newly independent states, 968 and Nigeria, 967, 1185, 1185 and Palestine, 1142–1143 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and Spain, 707, 711, 1088 and the United States, 382, 391 See also Conflict/violence Civilis, Gaius Julius, 203 Class, 1–12 and Afghanistan, 1692–1693 and Angola, 1661 and Argentina, 280 and Brazil, 285 and Bulgaria, 571 and Catalan nationalism, 1537–1538 and Central America, 311 and Chile, 323, 327, 328, 329, 330–331 and China, 1194–1195, 1195, 1196, 1197 education, nationalism, and, 423, 427, 431, 478–479, 481 and Egypt, 265 and ethnic conflict, 892–893, 895, 897–898 and Finland, 601 gender, nationalism, and, 55–56 and Germany, 611 and Great Britain, 163–164 and Greece, 625 and Haiti, 334, 339 and Hungary, 644–645 and India, 131, 1204–1205 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 755, 1739 and Italy, 669–670 and Mongolia, 1795 and Québec, 1292–1293 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222

and social movements, 1452, 1454, 1456 and Soviet ideology, 693–694 and Spain, 709 and the United States, 1305 and Uruguay, 397, 403 Clavigero, Francisco Xavier, 350, 351, 351 Clay, Henry, 388–389 Clientelism, Iraq and, 750, 750–751, 755, 755, 756 Clifford, James, 1368 Clinton, William, 1408 Cloots, Anacharsis, 86 Clos, Joan, 1541 Coates, Eric, 1433 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 516 Cohen, Leonard, 1296 Cohen, Robin, 1672 Cohn, Roy, 908 Cold War, 525, 942–956, 975–979 and Angola, 1658 and Austria, 550 and Canada, 1840 and Eritrea, 1174 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 442 Europe and the end of the, 1043–1044 and Great Britain, 1012 and Indonesia, 1733, 1734 and Italy, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750 and Korea, 1772, 1773 and the Philippines, 1241 and separatist movements, 1465 and sexuality, 907–908 and sports, 994 and Tibet, 1821 and the United States, 1039, 1303, 1310 See also Nonaligned movement Cole, Thomas, 389 Collins, Bob, 1849 Colombel, Noel, 338 Colombia, 39, 824–834, 827 (map) Colonialism/imperialism, 25, 26, 489, 530, 958, 1301, 1303 and Algeria, 1098 and Angola, 1659 and Arab nationalism, 728–729, 734 and Australia, 855 and Basques, 1513 and Brazil, 283–285 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 299 and Chile, 323–324 and China, 1190 and Congo/Zaïre, 1156–1158, 1160 and diaspora populations, 1364 education and, 419, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 430, 431 and England/Great Britain, 161, 165–167, 490–491, 1005–1007 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737–740


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I-10

INDEX

Colonialism/imperialism (continued ) and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889, 893 and European nationalism, 513–514 and Fiji, 1314–1316 and France, 178, 1050–1051, 1056 and gender, 54–55, 447–448 and Germany, 621 and Greenland, 1566, 1568 and Haiti, 339 and indigenous cultures, 1337 and Indochina, 1264 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1730 and Iraq, 749 and Italy, 665, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 815, 821–822, 1749, 1751 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language/literature, 479–480, 912–913, 914–917 and the Maori, 1859 and the Netherlands, 197–198 and Nigeria, 1178 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 and sports, 992 and Taiwan, 1253 and technology, 1478–1480 and terrorism, 1490 and Third World nationalisms, 1776 and the United States, 1310 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Expansionism Comenius, Jan Amos, 1028 Commonwealth Games, 996–997 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 1079, 1715 Communication, 1473–1476 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 279 and Australia, 852 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and Basques, 1521 and Central America, 311, 315 and Colombia, 833 and globalization, 1414, 1416–1417 and ideologies, 972 and immigrants/diaspora populations, 1370, 1427 and India, 800 and Iraq, 1738 and Mexico, 354, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and New Zealand, 865 and Paraguay, 364 and Peru, 368

and the Philippines, 1238, 1247 and Polish nationalism, 216 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavian nationalism, 229 symbols in, 112, 122–123 technological advances in, 127–128, 129, 132, 135–136 and the United States, 388–389, 390 and Wales, 1639 See also Media Communism, 468–469, 944 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1689, 1690, 1693 and Angola, 1663 and anticolonial nationalism, 964 and Armenia, 1706, 1707 and Burma, 780 and China, 789–790, 791, 792, 793, 1190–1200, 1191, 1197 and the Cold War, 947–948, 976, 977–979 collapse of, 1413 and Cuba, 1276–1277, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020, 1022–1026 and France, 1053 and Indonesia, 1727, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733 and Iraq, 753, 754, 755–756, 1745 and Korea, 1773 and Malaysia, 1216, 1223 and Romania, 1587–1588, 1589 and Singapore, 1218 versus socialism, 975–976 and Ukraine, 718 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1266, 1267, 1269 Companys, Lluís, 708 Compromise Agreement of 1867, 638 Conder, Charles, 859 Condorcet, Jean Marquis de, 53, 86, 370, 1351, 1362 Conflict/violence, 14–28, 436, 888–898, 929 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Algeria, 1095 and Basque nationalism, 1518, 1521 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527 and Brazil, 1831 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and competition among nation-states, 1032–1033 and education, 1388–1389 and Eritrea, 1172–1173, 1174–1175 and Finland, 606–607 and gender roles, 50–52, 449–450 in Germany, 1555, 1556–1557, 1559 and Gharabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh), 897, 1706, 1707–1709, 1711, 1715, 1718–1719 and ideological differences, 943–944, 977, 988–989 and India and Pakistan, 804–806, 950, 987, 1201, 1203, 1228, 1234–1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1461–1462, 1762, 1769


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I-11

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and Indonesia, 1734 and instability in postindependent nations, 1469 and Iraq, 1742, 1746–1747 and Ireland/Northern Ireland, 649, 651–652, 662, 1058, 1059, 1060–1062, 1068 in Italy, 665 and the loss of optimism, 935–936 and Malaysia, 1216, 1220–1221, 1223 and minority issues, 939–940, 1412 and Mongolia, 1795–1796, 1796–1797 and natural resources/territory, 523–524, 883–886 in New Zealand, 1856–1857 and Nigeria, 1185 and the Ottoman Empire, 763–764 Palestinian/Israeli, 1129–1130, 1141 and the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 985–986, 1403 and rituals of belonging, 499, 503 role of diaspora populations in, 1365, 1415 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1673–1674, 1676–1677, 1679, 1680–1681 and separatism, 1460, 1465–1470, 1470–1471. See also Separatism/secession and South Africa, 1152–1153 and the Soviet Union, 1075, 1078–1079 and sports, 995 and Taiwan, 1256, 1256 and Tibet, 1823 in Turkey, 1649, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 722 and Vietnam, 1463 See also Civil war; Genocide; specific conflicts and wars; Terrorism Confucianism, 1270 Congo and Zaïre, 962–963, 1155–1165, 1156 (map), 1667, 1671–1672 and Angola, 1662 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and music, 1440 and separatist movements, 1469 Congress of Berlin, 578 Congress of Tucuman, 272, 273 Connolly, James, 652, 654 Connor, Walker, 931, 933 Conrad, Joseph, 489 Conscience, Hendrik, 145, 145 Constantinescu, Emil, 1589 Constantino, Renato, 1245 Consumerism and education, 1380 and image technology, 1339 and Korea, 1778–1779 and sports, 1001–1003 “Contract of the Century,” 1720–1721 Cook, James, 1855 Cook, Ramsay, 1842 Cooke, John Esten, 494

Cooper, James Fenimore, 389 Cooper, William, 1851 Copland, Aaron, 1439 Copps, Sheila, 1839 Copts, 265 Corbin, Margaret, 50 Cornejo, Mariano H., 374 Corradini, Enrico, 515 Corruption and Angola, 1665, 1666–1667 and Armenia, 1710 and the collapse of socialism, 895–896 and Congo/Zaïre, 1160 and Cuba, 1275, 1277, 1283 and Iran, 1111 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1768 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Palestinians, 1140, 1142 and the Philippines, 1243, 1244, 1247 and Québec, 1290, 1292 and Russia, 955 and the Soviet Union, 1076, 1079 and Spain, 704, 705, 1088 and Turkey, 1645, 1651 and Ukraine, 1628 Corsica, 1490 Cortés, Hernán, 346 Cosmopolitanism, 86–88, 97, 1350–1362 and Alsace, 1510 challenging cultural, 416 and Chile, 330 and globalization, 1409 and immigration, 1427–1428 versus national identities, 1342 and Russia, 82 Cossacks, 1620–1621 Costa, Emília Viotti da, 292 Costa Rica, 318, 321 Costa y Martínez, Joaquín, 705, 705 Coubertin, Pierre de, 991 Coulanges, Fustel de, 1502 Council of Europe, 1715 Counterterrorism, 1496–1498, 1757 Cowan, Charles, 235 Cox, Oliver, 1301 Coyer, Abbé, 32 Creole patriotism and Chile, 324, 326, 329 and Mexico, 349, 351, 351–352 and Peru, 369–370 Crete, 1440 Crime and Brazil, 1831 and Colombia, 834 and Iraq, 757 and Mongolia, 1797 and Pakistan, 1232 and the Philippines, 1243 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675


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I-12

INDEX

Crime (continued ) versus terrorism, 1485, 1486. See also Terrorism and women, 904–905 See also Corruption Crimea, 1078, 1625 Crispi, Francesco, 737 Croatia borders of, 1413 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440, 524 fascism in, 516, 518 and language, 481 and new social movements, 1449, 1453 Croats, in Bosnia, 1527–1535 Cromer, Lord, 261 Cross, James, 1291 Cuba, 1273–1286 and Angola, 1658, 1663, 1665 and film, 1335 and music, 1441 Cui, Cesar, 82, 1437 Cultural diversity, 877–879. See also Multiculturalism Cultural revivalism, 407 Culture, 88–90, 92–93, 405–418, 506 and Alsace, 1509 and Argentina, 276, 277–279 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 854–856 and the Baltic states, 558–560, 558–561, 1578 and Basques, 705 and Brazil, 291–295, 296, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 575–577 and Canada, 1837–1842, 1843 and Catalonia, 706, 1537, 1542, 1543–1544 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Danish folk high schools, 151 education and standardization of, 420. See also Education and Egypt, 260, 264 and Ethiopia, 741, 742 and Finland, 599, 600 and France, 1050, 1052–1053 geopolitics and national, 461 German versus Austrian, 542–543 and Germany, 184, 186–187, 617–620 globalization and world, 1407. See also Globalization and Greece, 628, 629 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1728 and Ireland, 657–659 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 671–673 and Korea, 1778 and Malaysia, 1223 and the Maori, 1858, 1860 and Mongolia, 1790, 1793–1794, 1797 music in establishing national, 72–73, 76–83

and nationalism, 31, 47, 53, 129–130, 485–487, 1355 and Nepal, 1801 and the Netherlands, 205 and Nigeria, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Paraguay, 358, 362, 365, 365 and Peru, 369–370, 373, 378 and Poland, 212, 214–216, 217 and Puerto Rico, 841–843, 846–847 and Scandinavia, 226–228 and Scotland, 237–239 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 692–696 and technology, 132–134, 1474–1475 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 400, 402 See also Art; Folk culture; Language; Literature; Music Currency and Austria, 552 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, 1039 the euro, 1039, 1043, 1044, 1549, 1551 and Finland, 598 and globalization, 1392 and Tibet, 1818 Cuthbert, Betty, 857 Cygnaeus, Fredrik, 601 Cyprus, 1648 Cyrus the Great, 1107, 1113 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 211–212, 213 Czech Republic, 446, 584 and music, 82, 1435–1436, 1441 See also Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, 583–596, 1016–1028 breakup of, 1413 and communism, 977 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441, 442 and geopolitics, 465 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Da˛browski, Jan Henryk, 215 Dahl, C. J., 228 Dahl, Jens Christian, 67 Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso), 988, 1816, 1816, 1819–1820, 1821–1823 Dalin, Olof, 227 Damas, Léon, 488 Dame Te Atairangikaahu, 1857 Dance, 81, 114 and Angola, 1665 and Catalonia, 1543 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Peru, 378 and Wales, 1637


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I-13

INDEX

Danevirke, 152–153 Dangarembga, Tsitsi, 913, 926–927 Danilevski, Nikolai, 93, 94 D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 489, 670 Darcy, Les, 858 Darius the Great (Persia), 1107, 1113, 1697 Darwin, Charles, 40, 462, 532 Dashbalbar, O., 1794 Daud Khan, Mohammad, 1687, 1689, 1690 David, Jacques-Louis, 177 Davis, H. O., 1180 Davitt, Michael, 451 Dayananda, Swami, 798–800, 802 Dayton Peace Accords, 1527, 1530, 1533 D’Azeglio, Massimo, 665 de Gaulle, Charles, 949, 1038, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1053–1054 de Klerk, Frederik Willem, 1151, 1152–1153, 1489 de Maistre, Joseph, 178, 179 De-Stalinization, 1077 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 245 de Valera, Eamon, 655, 657, 660–661 Deakin, Alfred, 853, 859, 859 Deane, Seamus, 488, 925 Debray, Regis, 61–62 Declaration of Arbroath, 233 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 173 Decolonization and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Eritrea, 1168 and Fiji, 1316, 1320 and Great Britain, 1006–1007, 1012, 1012 and Malaysia, 1216–1217 and the United States, 1303 See also Colonialism/imperialism Decommissioning, 1063 Dehio, Georg, 415 Delacroix, Eugene, 49 Delgado, Matías, 318 Delors, Jacques, 1040 Demchugdongrub, Prince (Mongolia), 1789–1790 Demirchian, Karen, 1707 Democracy, 66, 1360–1361, 1362, 1399–1400, 1488 and Afghanistan, 1686, 1687, 1689–1690 and Angola, 1663 and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Argentina, 275, 276, 281 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 853, 854 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Brazil, 1831 and Canada, 1843 and Central America, 314–315, 318 and Chile, 328–329 and China, 789, 791, 794 and the Cold War, 944–945 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England/Great Britain, 163, 1008 and Eritrea, 1175 in Europe, 419

and Germany, 190, 613, 614, 620–621, 1556, 1559–1560 and India, 981, 1208, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Mongolia, 1784 and Nepal, 1809 and the Netherlands, 199, 206 and Nigeria, 1188 and the Philippines, 1248 and Poland, 214, 215 and Romania, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1594 and Russia, 1596 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1678–1679 and Spain, 1082, 1084, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 248, 249, 250 and Taiwan, 1253–2354, 1259 and Turkey, 1647 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 385, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1311 See also Voting franchise Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Demonstration effect, 1477–1478 Deng Xiaoping, 1200 Denmark, 147–156, 220–222, 226–228 education and, 429 and the European Union, 1038 flag, 229 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1566, 1572 language and, 225, 472 national anthem/music of, 68–69, 230, 1443 Derrida, Jacque, 1052 Desai, Anita, 923 DeSica, Vittorio, 1334 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 336–337, 340, 342 Determinism social, 127–128 technological, 126–127 Deutsch, Karl, 1474–1475 Devolution, and Great Britain, 1013–1015 Devoto, Juan E. Pivel, 399 Dewey, John, 422, 425 Dialectical materialism. See Marxism Diamonds, 968 and Angola, 1659–1660 and South Africa, 1145–1146 Diaspora populations, 1364–1377 and Algeria, 1097 and Armenians, 1698, 1699, 1700–1701, 1703, 1704, 1704, 1707, 1708–1709, 1710, 1711 and discrimination, 1426–1427 and homeland politics, 1414–1415 and India, 1211 and the Internet, 1482–1483 Jews, 1125–1126 and Latvians, 1581 and Nepal, 1807


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I-14

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Diaspora populations (continued ) and new social movements, 1455 and Nigeria, 1179 and Russians, 698 and supporting terrorism, 1488 Díaz, Porfirio, 355 Diderot, Denis, 102, 171 Die Degenhardts, 133 Diefenbaker, John, 1838, 1839 Diego, José de, 839, 841, 846 Diego, Juan, 347, 349 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 1264, 1264–1265, 1271, 1463 Diffusion of innovations theory, 1477 Dion, Céline, 1296 Discrimination/prejudice and Afghanistan, 1690, 1692 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 858 and Czechoslovakia, 1022, 1027 and Ethiopia, 741 and Fiji, 1316 against immigrants, 1420, 1423–1427 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1729 and Iran, 1113, 1118 and New Zealand, 867 and Nigeria, 1179 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Turkey, 1653, 1655 and the United States, 1304 See also Racism Dixon, Thomas, 1328 Djaout, Tahar, 1100 Djebar, Assia, 1100 Dmowski, Roman, 436, 682, 685 Dobson, Andrew, 877, 880 Dodge, Mary Mapes, 204 Dodson, Mick, 1848 Dodson, Pat, 1848 Dollard des Ormeaux, Adam, 303, 1294 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 516, 546 Domingue, Michel, 338 Dominican Republic, 339. See also Santo Domingo Donskoi, Dmitrii, 696 Dontsov, Dmytro, 718 Dorrego, Manuel, 273 Dorzhiev, Agwang, 1793 Dostoyevski, Fedor, 93, 105–106 Dostoyevski, Mihailo, 93 Dostum, Rashid, 1695 Douglas, Stephen A., 390 Douglas, Tommy C., 1839–1840 Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 718 Drake, Sir Francis, 164 Du Bois, W. E. B., 965, 1179, 1301, 1303 du Toit, Daniel, 1149 Dubˇcek, Alexander, 978, 1022, 1026, 1028 Duchy of Warsaw, 209

Dufour, Guillaume-Henri, 253 Dugin, Alexander, 1601 Duke, James, 1399 Duplessis, Maurice, 1290, 1294 Durand, Asher, 389 Dürer, Albrecht, 415 Dürich, Jaroslav, 588 Durkheim, Émile, 5, 99, 111–112, 120, 908–909, 1054 Duruy, Victor, 178 Dutch Antilles, 197 Dutch Reformed church, 1145, 1148, 1149 Duyvendak, Jan Willem, 1446 Dvoˇrák, Antonín, 75, 1436, 1438 Dyer, Reginald, 804 Eagleton, Terry, 922 East Germany, 1449. See also Germany East Slavic nationalism, 716 East Timor, 1381, 1468, 1729, 1731–1732, 1734 and Christianity, 1239 Easter rising of 1916 (Ireland), 651–652, 652 Eastern Europe and communism, 977 development of nationalism in, 26 ethnic conflict and, 888, 895–897 and new social movements, 1449, 1456 Eastern Orthodox Church, 946 and Eritrea, 1171 and Greek independence, 627 and national identity, 103 and politics, 983 and Russia, 105–106, 1080, 1602–1603, 1605 and Serbs, 1529 and Slavic peoples, 972 Ebbesen, Niels, 153–154 Ecologism versus environmentalism, 877, 880–881, 883 Economic liberalism, 19 and Argentina, 276 and Central America, 316 and India, 1211 and Peru, 368, 372 and Turkey, 1645 See also Liberalism Economy, 18–19, 433, 895–896, 1359, 1380, 1407, 1474, 1496, 1939 and Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1095–1096 and Alsace, 1502, 1510 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Arab nationalism, 729 and Argentina, 269–271, 279, 280 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 850–851 and Austria, 545, 553 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1719–1721 and Basques, 1513, 1522 and Brazil, 296, 1825, 1827, 1828–1832 and Burma, 777


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I-15

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and Canada, 302, 1477–1478, 1837, 1842 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 310–311, 315 and Chile, 324, 330 and China, 1198, 1372–1373, 1387 and Colombia, 826 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Denmark, 149 and Egypt, 257, 258, 259 and the European Union, 1044 and Fiji, 1322–1323 and France, 172, 175, 1047, 1054 and Germany, 191–192, 611 and Greenland, 1563, 1568 and Haiti, 333, 337, 342–343 and India, 1206, 1211 and Indonesia, 1723, 1733 and Iraq, 756, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 653, 660–661 and Israel, 1130 and Italy, 665, 669, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755–1756, 1757 and Korea, 1778–1779, 1781 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 and Mongolia, 1784–1785, 1796 and Nepal, 1801, 1808, 1811 and the Netherlands, 205 and New Zealand, 863 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1059–1060 and Pakistan, 1227–1229 and Paraguay, 358–359 and Peru, 368, 377 and the Philippines, 1247–1248 and Poland, 217, 678, 679, 680 and Puerto Rico, 837, 847 and Romania, 1585 and Russia, 692, 1597, 1599, 1604 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670–1671 and the Sami, 1609–1610, 1613 and Scandinavia, 221 and Scotland, 233 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1077 and Spain, 706, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1644–1645, 1651, 1656 and the United States, 388–389, 1395 and Uruguay, 396 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Economic liberalism; Globalization Edelfelt, Albert, 605 Edgerton, Lynda, 903 Education, 9–10, 29–41, 81–82, 130, 419–433, 461, 464–465, 478–479, 482, 504–505, 1379–1390 and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Arab nationalism, 731

and Argentina, 276–277, 279 and Armenia, 1703 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 287, 289, 293, 296 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 303, 1477–1478, 1843 and Central America, 315 and China, 1193, 1198, 1199 and Colombia, 833 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 746 and Finland, 608 and France, 178, 409, 1049 and Greek independence, 627 and Greenland, 1566, 1571–1572 and Haiti, 342 and India, 796, 798 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 751–752, 755, 756, 1740, 1741, 1743, 1745 and Italy, 675, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 811, 816, 1749, 1757 and Korea, 1776–1777 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1785, 1796, 1797, 1798 and Nepal, 1808 and the Netherlands, 197, 198, 199–200, 205 and New Zealand, 865–866 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Paraguay, 362 and Poland, 217, 688 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and the Sami, 1613, 1615 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 and Scotland, 234 and Singapore, 1225 and Slovakia, 587 and South Africa, 1148–1149 and the Soviet Union, 696, 1073 and Spain, 708–709 and Switzerland, 250, 254 and Taiwan, 1254 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1646, 1652, 1656 and Ukraine, 714, 1621, 1625 and the United States, 1305–1306 and Uruguay, 400, 401, 403 and Vietnam, 1271 Eelam, 1467, 1491 Egypt, 256–266, 257 (map), 982 anticolonialism in, 26 and Arab nationalism, 725, 728, 729–730, 734


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Egypt (continued ) and gender, 446, 450 and new social movements, 1452 and religious fundamentalism, 984–986, 1396 and terrorism, 1490 Eicher, Carolyn, 56 Eiffel, Gustave, 134 Eiffel Tower, 134 Einstein, Albert, 1350, 1362 Eisenstein, Sergei M., 697, 700, 1330 El Salvador, 318, 321 Elchibey, Abulfaz, 1715 Elgar, Edward, 1438 Elias, Norbert, 1369 Elites and Afghanistan, 1689 and Angola, 1665 and Belgium independence, 142–143 and Colombia, 826–827, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 of Ethiopia, 739–741 and Finland, 598, 600, 601 in Hungary, 637–638 and Iraq, 749, 750–751 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 1751 and new social movements, 1453 and Peru, 368, 371 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Russia, 690, 692–697 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672, 1676 and Spain, 707 and sports, 999 technology and the authority of, 1480 in Turkey, 1651, 1653 and Vietnam, 1269 and Wales, 1633 See also Intellectuals Elizabeth I, Queen (England), 164–165 Elizabeth II (Great Britain), 870 Ellison, Ralph, 1303 Emecheta, Buchi, 927 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 59, 389 Emigration and Afghanistan, 1687 and Algeria, 1095, 1097, 1102 and Alsace, 1505, 1507 and Basques, 1513 and Cuba, 1277 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1365–1366, 1371 and Fiji, 1325 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Ireland, 649, 660–661 and Korea, 1781 and Mongolia, 1798 and Poland, 212 and Puerto Rico, 847

and Turkey, 1648 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Diaspora populations; Immigrants/ immigration Eminescu, Mihai, 1592 Emmet, Robert, 649 Enculturation. See Assimilation Engels, Friedrich, 217 England, 158–167 constitution of, 162 and counterterrorism, 1496 economic liberalism and nationalism in, 18–19 education and, 423 and Greek independence, 631 and music, 1432 nationalism in, 5–6, 502 nationalistic art in, 408, 410 and Uruguay, 395 See also Great Britain English language, 480, 483 Enlightenment, the and the American Revolution, 21 erosion of religious power in the, 102 and France, 171 and liberalism, 1350–1351 and organicism, 462 and origins of nationalism, 9–10 and romantic nationalism, 406 Enloe, Cynthia, 901, 904 Ensor, Robert, 425 Environment and Brazil, 1825, 1827–1831, 1832 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and Haiti, 343 and Latvia, 1575–1576, 1581 and the Sami, 1615 and Tibet, 1814 See also Environmentalism/environmental movements; Natural resources Environmentalism/environmental movements, 875–886, 1446–1458 Eötvös, Jószef, 96 Epicurus, 476 Erben, Karel Jaromír, 73 Ercilla, Alonso de, 324–326, 329 Eriksson, Magnus, 226 Eritrea, 1167–1175, 1168 (map), 1469 diaspora population of, 1370 and Ethiopia, 742 Erk, Ludwig Christian, 73 Erkel, Ferenc, 79 Erskine, David Stuart, 239 Erslev, Kristian, 227 Escher, Hans Konrad, 254 Eskimo. See Inuit Estonia, 1078, 1374. See also Baltic states Ethics. See Morality Ethiopia, 736–746, 738 (map) and Eritrea, 1171–1172, 1174, 1175, 1469


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I-17

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Ethnic cleansing, 435–442, 522–523 and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1507 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530, 1531, 1532 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 596, 1020 and Germany, 617, 622 and Hungary, 645 and Jews in Iraq, 756 and Poland, 681 and Turkey, 1648–1649 in Ukraine, 722 See also Conflict/violence; Genocide Ethnic conflict. See Conflict/violence Ethnicity, 931, 1354 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688–1689, 1693, 1694–1695 and Angola, 1660, 1664 and Argentina, 276, 277 and Armenia, 1703, 1709 and Austria, 543–544 and Azerbaijan, 1716, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528–1530, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 580 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 1836 and Catalonia, 1542–1543 and Central America, 311, 314 and China, 1193–1197, 1196, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1020–1021 and education, 35, 36, 39, 40, 1379 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 741, 742–743 and Fiji, 1314 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1412–1413, 1415, 1416 and Greece, 633 and Greenland, 1570–1571 and Hungary, 644 and immigrants, 1424 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 672, 673 and Japan, 1753 and Latvia, 1574–1575 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1213–1215, 1225 and Mongolia, 1790–1791, 1797–1798, 1798–1799 and music, 1431–1432 and nationalist movements, 10, 11, 27, 46, 1460, 1464, 1465, 1468, 1469–1470 and Nepal, 1808, 1809–1810 and the Netherlands, 199 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 967, 1178, 1185, 1186

and Northern Ireland, 1063 and the Ottoman Empire, 101–102 and Pakistan, 1231–1232, 1236 and Paraguay, 362 and the Philippines, 1243–1244 and Poland, 209, 212, 213, 214, 216 in political philosophy, 88–90, 95, 461, 464 and Québec, 1296–1297 and religion, 103–105, 107–109 and Romania, 1592–1594 and Russia, 1079–1080, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669–1670 and Scotland, 236–237 and South Africa, 1144, 1145 and the Soviet Union, 1076 and Taiwan, 1254, 1257–1258 and Turkey, 1650 and Ukraine, 712–713, 1621 and the United States, 1309 See also Minorities; Religion Eto Shin’pei, 820 Eurasianism, 466 Europe borders after World War II, 581 (map), 591 (map), 616 (map), 668 (map), 684 (map), 1018 (map), 1550 (map), 1590 (map) borders from 1914 to 1938, 170 (map), 184 (map), 540 (map), 556 (map), 579 (map), 586 (map), 612 (map), 624 (map), 636 (map), 656 (map), 666 (map), 680 (map), 762 (map) borders in 1815, 139 (map), 148 (map), 182 (map), 208 (map), 246 (map), 610 (map), 664 (map) colonialism and, 420–421 and cultural identity in, 445 development of nationalism in, 26, 31 education and, 33–36, 38–39, 422, 427 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 437, 441–442 and gender/sexuality, 44, 908 and immigration, 1418, 1421, 1424, 1425 imperative and imaginary forms of nationalism in, 501–503 and landscape art, 64 and language, 472, 477 and music, 73–75, 1432 nationalism and class in, 4, 11 nationalism and conflict in, 16, 23–26 and new social movements, 1447 perversions of nationalism in, 512–525 revolutions of 1848 in, 24–25, 47, 52 supranational bodies in, 948–949, 974 systems of governance in, 419 and terrorism, 1494, 1495, 1497 and transnationalism, 1509–1510 women’s suffrage in, 453 and xenophobia, 1412 See also European institutions; specific European countries and organizations


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I-18

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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1034–1035, 1037 European Convention on Human Rights, 908 European Court of Justice, 1035 European Economic Community (EEC), 1010, 1036, 1038, 1049, 1509–1510 European institutions, 1034–1036, 1039, 1040 and Great Britain, 1007, 1010 See also European Union (EU) European Parliament, 974, 1035, 1039 European Union (EU), 948–949, 1021 (map), 1030–1046, 1032 (map), 1532–1533, 1551 (map) and Algeria, 1095 and Alsace, 1510 and Armenia, 1704 and Basques, 1517, 1522 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528 Committee of the Regions, 1043, 1541 and Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1028 education and, 432 flag, 1410 (illus.) and France, 1048 and Germany, 1549–1551, 1555 and globalization, 1407, 1409, 1410–1411 and indigenous groups, 1610 and Ireland, 1060 and Latvia, 1582 and minorities, 1412–1413 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Spain, 1092 and Turkey, 1645, 1648, 1650, 1656 and Ukraine, 1623 Europeanization, 1406 Evans, Gwynfor, 1633, 1635 Evans, Robert, 1434 Evatt, H. V., 858 Evolutionary theory. See Social Darwinism Exhibitions, 412–414. See also Holidays/festivals Exile and diaspora populations, 1365, 1369, 1370 Expansionism affect on Hungary of, 639 and Brazil, 283–284 and Canada, 300–302, 1837 and geopolitics, 459 and Germany, 617, 621 Herder on, 88 and Italy, 665–667 and manipulation of ethnic autonomy claims, 940 nationalism as justifying, 40 and Nazi Germany, 518 and perversions of nationalism, 523–524 Soviet, 945 and the United States, 22, 37, 39, 465, 1308 See also Colonialism/imperialism Expedition of the Thousand, 672, 674 Expressionism, 491

Fabianism, 471 Factionalism and the Maori, 1857 and nationalist movements, 940–941 See also Conflict/violence Factory, 129–130 Faehlmann, Friedrich Robert, 561 Fairhair, Harald, 226 Faisal I, King (Iraq), 727, 728, 728, 749–750, 750, 1742, 1743, 1745 Falkland Islands, 275, 1009 Falla, Manuel de, 1437 Fallersleben, Hoffmann von, 117 Falwell, Jerry, 1395 Fanon, Frantz, 963, 1100 Færoe Islands, 220–222, 225, 231 Fascism, 515–517, 525, 973, 1301 and gender, 454–456 and Hungary, 638, 639 and imperative nationalism, 502 and Italy, 419, 667, 670–671, 674–675, 675–676 and Japan, 817 and nationalistic art, 413–415, 417 and the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 and race, 672 See also Nazism Fashoda Incident, 460 Fatah, 1137, 1142–1143 Faulkner, William, 495 Favre, Louis, 254 Federal Republic of Central America, 310, 313, 316 Federalism and Australia, 850, 852–853 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1171–1172 and India, 1205–1206, 1766 and Indonesia, 1723 and Malaysia, 1216, 1218 and Nigeria, 1183, 1185 as solution to minority demands, 933 and Ukraine, 721–722 and the United States, 383 Feminists, 451–453, 454 versus nationalists, 902, 907 See also Women’s rights Fennoman movement, 598–599, 600, 601, 601 Feraoun, Mouloud, 1100 Ferdinand, Franz, 1490 Ferdinand, King (Romania), 1586 Ferdinand of Aragon, 709 Ferdowsi, 1107, 1113–1114 Ferguson, Adam, 234 Ferguson, William, 1851 Fernández, Emiliano R., 364 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 400 Ferry, Jules, 178 Festival of Britain, 1011 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 17, 34, 90–92, 186, 475, 533


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I-19

INDEX

Fidelis, Malgorzata, 53 Fiji, 1313–1325, 1315 (map), 1441 Film. See Cinema Film noir, 1333 Finland, 220–222, 597–608, 599 (map) education and, 429 and gender, 54, 450 and independence, 223, 231 language and, 225 and music, 1432, 1436, 1443 national identity and culture of, 226–228, 466 and national symbols, 230 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1614, 1616 Finno-Russian War, 607 Firley, Barker, 1841 (illus.) First Schleswigian War, 149, 152 Fischer, Joschka, 1555 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 489 Fitzpatrick, Brian, 857 Flag(s), 112–113, 116–117 Australian, 855 Basque, 1521 Belgium, 145 Brazilian, 294 and Burma, 781 Canadian, 1835 Catalonian, 1538–1539 and Central America, 318–319 Chilean, 327 Colombian, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 Egyptian, 265 and the European Union, 1042, 1410 (illus.) French, 175 German, 619 and Greenland, 1569, 1570 Indonesian, 1732 Irish, 659 Japanese, 1756, 1756 (illus.), 1757 Maori, 873 and New Zealand, 866 Nigerian, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 Polish, 686 Puerto Rican, 842 (illus.), 844 and Québec, 1294 Romanian, 1592 Russian, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 229–230 Swiss, 253 and Tibet, 1818 Turkish, 1646, 1647, 1653 and the United States, 1308 Flemings, 144–145, 146, 200, 413 Folk culture, 406, 462, 530 and Alsace, 1510 and the Baltic states, 561, 563–564 and Cuba, 1280

and Finland, 599, 604 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 Haiti and folktales, 342 and Hungary, 643 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1797 and music, 73, 76, 77, 80–82, 417, 1434–1435, 1436, 1437, 1444 and Paraguay, 364 and Poland, 212, 216 and Russia, 693 and the Sami, 1612, 1614–1615 and Scandinavia, 226, 228, 229 and Switzerland, 251 and Turkish folklore, 774 and Ukraine, 721 and Wales, 1634 See also Culture; Indigenous groups Food insecurity and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Peru, 378 Ford, John, 1337 Foreign intervention and Angola, 968, 1658 and China, 793 during the Cold War, 943–944, 945, 947–948, 977 and Cuba, 1275, 1277 and globalization, 1408–1409 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117 and Turkey, 1652 and the United States, 1305 See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign policy and Armenia, 1710–1711 and Brazil, 1831 and China, 1200 and Cuba, 1285–1286 and the European Union, 1040, 1042 and geopolitics, 458 and Germany, 1554, 1555 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1751, 1757–1758 and Latvia, 1576 and Mongolia, 1798 and New Zealand, 871 and post-World War II Europe, 974 and the Soviet Union, 979 and sports, 994–995 terrorism as, 1488 and Ukraine, 1622–1623 and the United States, 955–956 Forster, E. M., 490 Forster, Georg, 86 Fortuyn, Pim, 1453, 1486 Foster, Stephen, 389 Foucault, Michel, 1052 Four Freedoms, 972 Fourier, Charles, 423 Fowler, Robert, 1839


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I-20

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France, 102, 169–179, 172 (map), 502, 1047–1057, 1048 (map) and Algeria, 1097, 1098 and Alsace, 1502–1504, 1505, 1507 and Arab nationalism, 727–728 aristocracy and nationalism in, 5–8 and Basques, 1513, 1513, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Belgium, 140–141 and Canada, 298 colonialism and, 424–425, 958, 1463–1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the Dreyfus affair, 520 education and, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 423 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1034, 1038 fascism in, 515 and film, 1336 and gender, 43, 48–49, 448 and geopolitics, 468 and Greek independence, 631 and Haiti, 333, 335–336, 340 and Indochina, 1263–1264 and Iraq, 1739 and language, 420, 480, 482 and the Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities/immigrants, 1412, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1424 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1437, 1441, 1443 and national identity, 461, 465 national symbols of, 134 nationalistic culture/art in, 407, 408, 409–410, 413, 415, 416 and new social movements, 1448, 1457 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and political philosophy, 14–17, 475 and the Rhine crisis of 1840, 189–190 and the Suez War, 266 and Syria, 728 and Uruguay, 395 See also French Revolution Francia, José Gaspar de, 361, 364 Franco, Francisco, 705–706, 707, 709, 973, 1088–1089, 1089 (illus.), 1471, 1515, 1519, 1536 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 409, 412, 465 Francophonie, 1056–1057 Franklin, Benjamin, 21 Franko, Ivan, 720 Franks, 1537 Fraser, Dawn, 857 Frederick I (Holy Roman Empire), 619 Frederick II (Denmark), 226 Frederick William IV (Prussia), 191 Frederik, Christian, 224 Freinet, Célestin, 425

French Canadians and the defeat at Québec, 299 and duality in Canada, 303, 306 identity and, 302 tensions over political control in, 299–300, 303 See also Québec French Revolution, 34, 174 and Alsace, 1502 and the aristocracy, 7 and Basques, 1513 gender and symbols in the, 45–46, 49, 50–51 and Germany, 185–186 impact on Haiti of the, 334–335 influence in Brazil of, 293 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 and popular sovereignty, 15–16 and terrorism, 1489 French West Africa, 424–425 Friedrich, Caspar David, 67, 463 Friel, Brian, 917, 925 Fröbel, F., 36 Frost, Robert, 392 Fry, William Henry, 76 Fuad, King (Egypt), 263 Fucik, Julius, 1441 Fugner, Jindrich, 594 Fukuyama, Francis, 988 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 9 Furnivall, J. S., 783 Furphy, Joseph, 857 Gagarin, Yuri, 951 Gaidar, Yegor, 1597 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 833 Gaitskell, Deborah, 904 Galicia, 209, 210, 1088 and Ukrainians, 715, 716, 718 Gallen-Kallela, Akseli, 605 Gálvez, Mariano, 317 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 1079 Gance, Abel, 1328 Gandhi, Indira, 1207, 1207–1208, 1466, 1766, 1767 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma), 798, 801, 802–804, 803, 805 (illus.), 950, 963 and gender issues, 451 and India’s social structure, 1205, 1208 and nonviolent resistance, 976, 1203, 1822 Gandhi, Priyanka, 1207 Gandhi, Rahul, 1207 Gandhi, Rajiv, 1207, 1209, 1211, 1492, 1767, 1768 Gandhi, Sanjay, 1207 Gandhi, Sonia, 1207 García, Calixto, 1282 García Calderón, Francisco, 375 García Márquez, Gabriel, 832 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 502, 672, 673, 674, 674 (illus.) monuments to, 410 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Garnier, Charles, 134


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I-21

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Garrigue, Charlotte, 585 Garvey, Marcus, 494, 1179, 1850 Gasperi, Alcide De, 973–974 Gaudí, Antoni, 706 Gay, Peter, 613 Gediminas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Geffrard, Fabre, 337, 339 Gégoire, Abbé, 34 Geijer, Erik Gustaf, 73, 228 Gellner, Ernest, 130, 461, 476, 479, 1475, 1835 Gender, 43–57, 444–457, 899–910 and colonialism, 926–927 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Uruguay, 401 Genocide, 435–442 and American indigenous groups, 893 and Armenians, 765, 1699, 1704, 1704, 1706, 1709, 1711, 1718 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Hungary, 645 and Kurds in Iraq, 756 and Nazi Germany, 517, 622 and perversions of nationalism, 522–523, 524, 525 and Rwanda and Burundi, 968, 1671, 1672, 1674, 1676, 1677, 1678, 1679, 1680 and Tibet, 1820 See also Conflict/violence; Ethnic cleansing; Holocaust Geoffrin, Madame de, 7 (illus.) Geopolitics, 458–469 George, Lloyd, 468, 593 George, Terry, 1674 George V (Great Britain), 132, 870 Georgia, 897, 1071, 1079, 1080, 1710 German Confederation of 1815, 149–150, 189, 191 German Customs Union, 191–192 German National Society, 192 Germanization, 617 Germans, in Czechoslovakia, 594–595, 595 Germany, 181–194, 525, 609–622, 1548–1560 and Alsace, 1504, 1505, 1507, 1508 anti-Semitism in, 520 and Austria, 544, 546–548 citizenship in, 1354 and colonial ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and democracy, 946–947 education and, 34, 35, 36, 38, 419, 421, 422–423, 426, 429–430 and the environment, 882–883 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and the European Union, 949 and expansionism, 524 and film, 1330–1331 and France, 1051 and gender, 448, 453 and geopolitics, 458, 459, 462–464, 466–467, 468 and immigration, 1419, 1424

and language, 472 and minorities, 1374 and the Moroccan crises, 514 and music, 1431, 1432 and national identity, 465 National Socialism/Nazism in, 133–134, 517–519 nationalism and political philosophy in, 9–10, 17–18, 90–93, 474–475, 491, 502, 533–534 nationalistic art of, 408–409, 410–411, 413–414, 415–417, 418 and new social movements, 1450, 1453 and Poland, 678 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 and rituals of belonging, 507–508 Soviet advancement into, 950 symbols in, 49, 114, 117 unification of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 512 and World War II, 1309 See also East Germany; West Germany Gershwin, George, 1439 Geser, 1791 Gettino, Octavio, 1335 Gezelle, Guido, 145 Ghana (Gold Coast), 962, 964, 980 and independence, 1464 and music, 1443 Gharabagh conflict, 897, 1078–1079 and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1716, 1718–1719 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 1589, 1594 Gibbs, Pearl, 1851 Gilgamesh, 1738 Ginestera, Alberto, 1439 Gladstone, William E., 241–242, 651, 654 Glaize, Léon, 409 Glinka, Mikhail, 75, 78, 79, 694, 1437, 1602 Global institutions and globalization, 1412 for governance, 1359–1362, 1406, 1456 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 sports, 991 and transnationalism, 1407 and values, 1392 See also United Nations (UN) Globalization, 1405–1417 and Brazil, 1826, 1830, 1832 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1374, 1376 and education, 1380, 1389 and the environment, 877 and global governance, 1359 and image technology, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1427–1428 and India, 1211 and Japan, 1750 and the loss of optimism, 936 and minorities, 1547 versus nationalism, 1392


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I-22

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Globalization (continued ) and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and religious fundamentalism, 1397–1404 and sports, 999, 1000, 1001–1003 technology as facilitating, 135–136 and Vietnam, 1271 Glyndwr, ˆ Owain, 1637 Gobineau, Arthur, 40 Gocar, Josef, 594 “God Save the King,” 117 Godard, Jean-Luc, 1336 Goebbels, Joseph, 133, 1332 Goh Chok Tong, 1384 Gökalp, Mehmet Ziya, 766, 766, 770, 774 Gömbös, Gyula, 638 Gómez, Máximo, 1282 Gonçalves, Gomide, Antônio, 283 Gongaze, Georgiy, 1628 Gonne, Maud, 451 González, Juan Natalicio, 365 González Prada, Manuel, 373, 374 González Vigil, Francisco de Paula, 377 Good Friday Agreement, 1062, 1062, 1063 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 946, 979, 1039, 1079, 1581, 1582 and the Baltic states, 1078 Gordon, Andrew, 815 Gordon, Walter, 1842 Gorodetskii, S. M., 700 Görres, Joseph, 92 Gothicism, 223 Gottschalk, Louis Moreau, 76, 389, 1438 Gottwald, Klement, 1019, 1024 Gouges, Olympe de, 173–174 Gouldner, Alvin, 1473 Gounod, Charles, 117 Government(s) and Afghanistan, 1686, 1686–1687, 1692 and Algeria, 1099 and Angola, 1663 and Argentina, 272, 275 and Armenia, 1699 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 282–283, 284, 287, 289–290, 296 and Bulgaria, 578 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 302–303 and Catalonia, 1538–1539 and China, 795, 1192–1193 and Colombia, 828 and Czechoslovakia, 590 and England, 162, 163 and Ethiopia, 740, 741 European systems of, 419 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1317, 1317, 1321, 1323, 1323 and Finland, 598 and France, 169–171, 175, 176, 1048–1049, 1053–1054 German, Italian, Japanese postwar, 946–947

and Germany, 609, 611–613 and Great Britain, 1007–1008 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1565, 1567 Haiti and instability in, 336–338 and India, 1204 instability of postindependence, 1469 and Iran, 986 and Iraq, 750, 1747 and Ireland, 648 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1766 and Japan, 812 and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and Nigeria, 1183, 1186 and Northern Ireland, 1059, 1063 and the Ottoman millet system, 761 and Palestinians, 1142 and Romania, 1588, 1588–1589 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Scotland, 234–235 and Spain, 702–703, 1084–1085, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 247–250, 249, 254–255 Tibetan exile, 1821, 1822 and the United States, 383–387, 391 and Uruguay, 398–399 and Vietnam, 1270–1271 and Wales, 1632 See also Democracy; Federalism Govineau, Arthur, 415 Gowon, Yakubu, 1185, 1186 Goya, Francisco de, 1437 Grabski, Stanisław, 685 Gracia, Gilberto Concepción de, 845 Gramsci, Antonio, 486 Granados, Enrique, 1437 Granatstein, Jack, 1842 Grant, George Parkin, 1838 Grant, James, 235 Grant, John, 235 Grau, Miguel, 377 Grau San Martín, Ramón, 1276 Great Britain, 236 (map), 1005–1015, 1006 (map), 1061 (map) and Arab nationalism, 727–728, 729 and Argentina, 269, 275, 279–280 and Australia, 850–851 and Brazil, 289 and Burma, 776–777, 781, 783, 783 and Canada, 299–300, 300, 307 and Central America, 318 and colonial divestment, 1461, 1464 and colonialism, 27, 490–491, 889, 958 communication and technology in, 128, 132, 1473 and Denmark, 150 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 36, 38–39, 426, 429, 432, 1381–1382 and Egypt, 259, 260–261, 262–263, 265


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I-23

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and Eritrea, 1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1036, 1038, 1040 fascism in, 516 and Fiji, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1317, 1319 and film, 1337 and gender, 447–448, 450 and geopolitics, 468 and Haiti, 335, 340 and immigration, 1419, 1420 and India, 55, 131, 797, 798, 804–806, 1203 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 749–750, 752–753, 1739, 1742, 1745 and Ireland, 915 Irish in, 654 and Israel/Palestine, 1123, 1125, 1129, 1133, 1134–1135, 1140, 1402 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762, 1763, 1764 and landscape art, 61, 62–64 and language, 472, 480, 482, 912 and Malaysia, 1213–1215, 1216, 1217, 1218 and the Maori, 1856 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities, 1412 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1438, 1442, 1443 national anthem of, 117, 1431 and natural resources, 885 and Nepal, 1805 and New Zealand, 863, 868, 872 and Nigeria, 1178, 1181, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1058–1068 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and Pakistan, 1227, 1231 political philosophy in, 534–535 and Québec, 1288 and rituals of belonging, 507 and Scotland, 233–242 and South Africa, 1145–1146, 1150 and sports, 992, 996–998 symbols of, 114 and terrorism, 1488 and Tibet, 1818 and Uruguay, 396, 397 and Wales, 1631–1633, 1632 Great Depression and Burma, 777, 777 and Canada, 302 and Japan, 810, 821 Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 (Peru), 370–371 Greece, 623–633, 626 (map) and diaspora populations, 1374 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437–438 and the European Union, 1040 independence of, 46, 53, 464 and language, 477 and minorities, 1424 and Turkey, 1648

Greeks ethnic cleansing of, 438 Greek independence and diasporic, 627, 632 in Turkey, 1648 in the United States, 1427 Greenfeld, Liah, 938 Greenland, 220, 1561–1572 Greenpeace, 1361, 1362, 1448 Grégoire, Abbé, 173, 178 Gregory, Lady Augusta, 918, 922 Grenfell, Maria, 1439 Gretzky, Wayne “The Great One,” 1842 Grieg, Edvard, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 228, 417, 1436–1437 Griffith, David Wark, 1328 Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm, 67, 406 Grímsson, Magnus, 228 Grofé, Ferde, 1439 Grotius, Hugo, 203 Groulx, Abbé Lionel, 1290, 1293, 1294 Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap, 1637 Grundtvig, N. F. S., 151, 151, 228, 429 Guantánamo Bay, 1280 Guaraní Indians, 358, 395 Guardiola, Santos, 315 Guatemala, 318, 319, 321 Guernica, 1515, 1519–1521 Guerrier, Philipe, 337 Guindon, Hubert, 1293 Guiteras, Antonio, 1282, 1283 Guizot, François, 177 Gulf War (1990–1991), 756, 952, 1408–1409, 1746–1747 and Germany, 1554 Gumilev, Nikolai, 94, 1601 Gustav I Vasa (Sweden), 226, 230 Gustav II Adolf, King (Sweden), 223, 224 (illus.), 226, 565 Gustav III (Sweden), 223 Gyanendra, King (Nepal), 1809 Haakon IV (Norway), 226 Habermas, Jürgen, 97, 1481, 1556 Habibullah II, 1686, 1688, 1691 Habsburg empire, 512, 541 and Austria, 539, 541, 543–544 and Belgium, 138–139 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Czechoslovaks, 584, 587–588 and the formation of Austria-Hungary, 512 and Germany, 189, 191 and Hungary, 407, 637 and language, 472 and Mexico, 350 nationalistic philosophers from the, 96 and the Netherlands, 196 and Poland, 679–681 and Switzerland, 252 Habyarimana, Juvenal, 1677


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I-24

INDEX

Hadj, Messali, 1097, 1099 Hadjiiski, Ivan, 577 Haegy, Xavier, 1508 Hagemann, Karen, 52 Haider, Jörg, 553 Haile Selassie, 740, 742, 743 Hailu, Kasa (Emperor Tewodros), 739, 743, 744 Haiti, 26, 174, 332–343, 334, 1414 Halbwachs, Maurice, 1343 Hallgrímsson, Jónas, 228 Halonen, Pekka, 605 Halperin Donghi, Tulio, 394 Hals, Frans, 203 Hamas, 972, 978, 986 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1142–1143 Hambach Festival, 190 Hamilton, Alexander, 22, 386, 387 Hamilton of Gilbertfield, 239 Hamitic hypothesis, 1678 Hammershaimb, Venceslaus, 225 Hansen, H. P., 156 Hanson, John, 386 Haq, Abdul, 1690 Harb, Talat, 729 Harlem Renaissance, 494 Harris, Lawren, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Harris, Leonard, 1008 Harry (Scottish minstrel), 239 Hasan, Zoya, 902 Hashshashin, 1489 Hatta, Mohammad, 1463 Haushofer, Karl, 460, 466, 467 (illus.), 491 Havel, Václav, 1026, 1027, 1028 Haydn, Franz Joseph, 117, 1432 Hayes, Joy Elizabeth, 132 Hazaras, 1693 Hazelius, Arthur, 229 Head, Bessie, 927 Health, and the environment, 882 Health care and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Canada, 1840 and New Zealand, 871, 871 and Pakistan, 1228 Heaney, Seamus, 925 Hebrew, 477 Hecht, Abraham, 1400, 1403 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17, 92–93, 187, 534 Hegemony Anglo-American, 1393 and Baltic nationalism, 558, 562 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1534 of Buenos Aires in Argentina, 275 and Chilean identity, 327 and Ethiopia, 738, 741 and Finnish nationalism, 605, 608 and gender issues, 445, 906 of German music, 80, 82

and Germany, 611 Germany and French, 186 and Great Britain, 397, 490 Japan and U.S., 1754, 1757 and literature, 486 and Mexican identity, 349, 352 nationalism in maintaining, 898, 1481 nationalist music as reaction against, 79 and Nepali nationalism, 1809 and Peru, 374 of political ideologies, 512 Prussian, 544 and Spain, 702, 711 technology as undermining, 136 and Turkey, 1646 and the United States, 837, 1300, 1301, 1309, 1310, 1742-1743 and World War I, 713 Heidegger, Martin, 533–534, 534 (illus.) Heidenstam, Verner von, 228 Heimat, 611, 883, 1344 Heimatbund, 1508 Heimatkunst, 417 Hein, Piet, 203 Heine, Heinrich, 501 Helfferich, Karl, 613 Hellenism, 623 Helvetic Republic, 248–249 Henderson, Paul, 1842 Henlein, Konrad, 595, 595 Henry, Paul, 659 Heraclitus, 533 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 17, 30–31, 73, 88–90, 89 (illus.), 185, 406, 529, 533 and the Baltic states, 561 and organicism, 462 Hernández, José, 278–279 Herndon, Angelo, 1303 Heroes/heroines, 446, 504, 1345 and Afghanistan, 1690 and Algeria, 1098–1099, 1099, 1102 and Armenia, 1706 and Australia, 857, 857 of the Baltic states, 564–565 and Bulgaria, 576, 577 and Burma, 782, 784 and Canada, 304–305 and Central America, 318 and Colombia, 831, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164 and Cuba, 1282, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England, 164–165 and film, 1331, 1332, 1333 and Finland, 604–605 and Great Britain, 1012 and India, 1209 and Indonesia, 1725, 1727 and Iran, 1113–1114, 1115, 1116 and Ireland, 658, 659


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I-25

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and Korea, 1779–1781 and Latvia, 1578–1579 and Mongolia, 1786, 1789–1790, 1791, 1797, 1798 and New Zealand, 870 and Nigeria, 1187 and Palestinians, 1137 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 377 and the Philippines, 1245–1246 and Poland, 211, 214 and Québec, 1294 Russian, 1074 Scandinavian, 226–227 and Scotland, 232–233 and the Soviet Union, 694, 695, 696, 700, 951 and sports, 995 and Switzerland, 253–254 and Syria, 728 and Turkey, 1643, 1646–1647, 1653 and Uruguay, 402 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637 See also Leaders; Symbols Herrera, Bartolomé, 377 Herrera, Enrique Olaya, 830 Herries, William, 869 Hertzog, James Barry Munnik, 1148 Hervé, Gustave, 515 Herzl, Theodor, 1121, 1123, 1127 Hezbollah, 986 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel, 350 Higgins, H. B., 859 Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 1693 Hilden, Patricia, 56 Hilty, Carl, 252 Hindenburg, Paul von, 613 Hinduism and fundamentalism, 1393 and India, 107, 797, 803, 803, 987, 1204–1205, 1208–1210 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Nepal, 1806 Hindutva, 107, 108 Hirata Atsutane, 815 Hispanophilia versus hispanophobia in Mexico, 352–353 and Puerto Rico, 841 Historiography, 121, 406, 477, 880, 1343 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Algeria, 1098–1099 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 733–734 and Armenia, 1702, 1705–1708 and Australia, 855–858 and Austria, 551 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 564 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531 and Brazil, 292–295

and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 303–305, 1840 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 320 and China, 1195–1197, 1199–1200 and Colombia, 831–832 and colonialism, 917, 923–924 and Congo/Zaïre, 1162, 1163–1164 and Cuba, 1277–1278, 1281–1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1022–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Ethiopia, 742–744 and Fiji, 1318 and film, 1327–1328, 1336–1338 and Finland, 604 and France, 177–178, 1051–1052 and Germany, 188–189, 614, 617–619 and Great Britain, 1010–1011, 1011 and Greece, 629 and Greenland, 1568 and Haiti, 341 and India, 802–803, 1209 and Indonesia, 1727, 1728, 1730 and Iran, 1107, 1107, 1113–1116 and Iraq, 752–754, 757, 1741 and Ireland, 658–660 and Israel, 1125–1127 and Italy, 673–675 and Japan, 1750–1751 and Mexico, 354, 355–356 and Mongolia, 1788 and New Zealand, 864–865, 868–870 and Nigeria, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and Palestinians, 1139–1140 and Paraguay, 362–364 and the Philippines, 1244, 1245–1246 and Poland, 212, 214, 685–686 and Puerto Rico, 843–844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and Romania, 1592 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1677–1678, 1679 and the Sami, 1618 and Scandinavia, 223, 223, 226–228, 228 and Scotland, 234, 237–239 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 700, 1076 and Spain, 708–709, 1086 and Switzerland, 247, 251, 252–254 and Taiwan, 1252, 1255–1256 and Turkey, 771, 773–774, 1646 and Ukraine, 721, 721 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637–1638 Hitler, Adolf, 413, 611, 613 and anti-Semitism, 517 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and Austria, 545, 546, 547


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Hitler, Adolf (continued ) and Czechoslovakia, 1019 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438, 439 and gender, 450, 454 and Hungary, 638 and music, 1431 ties with Mussolini, 516 Hiwet, Addis, 737 Hjärne, Harald, 228 Hlinka, Andrej, 585, 590 Ho Chi Minh, 952, 962, 963–964, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1267 (illus.) Hoad, Lew, 857 Hobbes, Thomas, 63 (illus.) Hobsbawm, Eric, 19, 23, 132, 473, 476, 478, 481 Hobson, William, 863 Hodge, John R., 1773 Hofmeyr, Jan, 1149 Hogg, James, 238 Holberg, Ludwig, 227 Holidays/festivals, 116, 504, 1346 and Australia, 855–856 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 567 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 295 and Bulgaria, 575–576 and Burma, 782 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 319 and Chile, 327, 328 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1025 and France, 1053 and Germany, 620 and India, 800, 1204 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 754 and Israel, 1129 and Japan, 1752 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 and the Maori, 1857 and Mexico, 347–349, 354 and the Netherlands, 204 and New Zealand, 869, 873 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1067–1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 211, 216–217, 685–686, 688 and Romania, 1586 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 and South Africa, 1150 and the Soviet Union, 695 and Spain, 709 and Switzerland, 244, 254 and Taiwan, 1256 and Turkey, 1651, 1652–1653, 1653

and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637, 1638 Holly, James Theodore, 340 Holocaust, 439–440, 517–518, 523, 524 and Austria, 546 and Czechoslovak Jews, 1020 and German guilt, 1555–1556, 1557–1558 guilt and the foundation of Israel, 1402 and immigration to Israel, 1121 and legitimacy of Zionism, 1128 as reconstituting ethnic borders, 617 remembrances of the, 1345 See also Genocide Holst, Gustav, 1432 Holstein, 147, 149, 150, 220, 222 Holy Roman Empire, 183, 186, 543, 619, 1816 Homosexuality, 907–908, 909–910 Honduras, 318, 321 Hoover, J. Edgar, 1304 Horowitz, Donald, 989 Horthy, Miklós, 638 Hosokawa, Toshio, 1440 Hotel Rwanda, 1674, 1675 Hou Hsaio-hsien, 1338 Hoxa, Enver, 952 Hozumi Yatsuka, 816 Hrushev’skyi, Mykhailo, 721, 721 Hsaya San, 777, 782 Hu Shi, 789, 793 Hua Guofeng, 1200 Hueber, Charles, 1509 Huggins, Jackie, 1849 Hugo, Victor, 177 Humanism, 41, 86, 87 Humbert, Ferdinand, 409 Humboldt, Alexander von, 34, 64, 65, 423, 462 Hume, David, 18, 234 Hume, John, 1062 Hunedoara, Iancu de, 1592 Hungary, 635–645, 640 (map) anti-Semitism in, 520, 521 and the Austro-Hungarian empire, 24 autonomy and, 407 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441 and expansionism, 524 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and music, 1432, 1435 and nationalistic art, 412 and Slovakia, 587 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Huntington, Samuel, 929, 988, 1374 Hurston, Zora Neale, 494 Hurt, Jakob, 563–564, 567 Hus, Jan, 592, 1023 Husayn, Imam (Iran), 1115 Hussein, Saddam, 756–757, 758, 952, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Iran, 1115–1116 Hussein, Sharif, 727, 749, 750, 1739


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Hussitism, 1023 Hutton, C. M., 481 Hutus, 1669, 1675, 1677, 1678 Hyde, Douglas, 654–655, 657, 918 Hypernationalism, 1389–1390. See also Xenophobia Hyppolite, Florville, 338 Iancu, Avram, 1592 Ibn Sina, Abu Ali, 1113 Ibn Taymiyyah, 725 Ibsen, Henrik, 228 Iceland, 220–222, 226–228 and the environment/natural resources, 875–876, 885 independence and, 231 and national symbols, 230 reading and, 229 Icelandic Sagas, 227 (illus.) Idealism, 534–535 Identity, 27, 405, 528, 537, 930–932, 1351, 1418–1429 and Afghanistan, 1693–1695 and Algeria, 1100–1101, 1105 and Alsace, 1504 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 276–279 and Armenia, 1698, 1699–1700, 1701–1705, 1704, 1708 and Austria, 550, 551, 554 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1716–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 558, 561–562, 563, 563–565, 1576, 1577, 1577–1578, 1581 and Basques, 1519–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527, 1528–1530, 1531, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 283, 285–287, 288, 292–295, 294, 1826–1827 British versus English, 159–161, 162, 163, 167 and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 780–781 and Canada, 298, 302, 303–305, 1835–1843 and Catalonia, 1536–1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Central America, 313, 319–321 and Chile, 324–326, 327–329, 328 and China, 1198–1200 civic versus ethnic, 933–936 and Colombia, 832, 833, 834 and communications, 1474 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1158–1159, 1160–1165 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1282–1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1025 Dutch, 197, 198, 204 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 265 and the environment/landscape, 875–876, 879–880, 883, 884, 886 and Eritrea, 1174 and Ethiopia, 741–743, 744–746 European, 974, 1045–1046 and film, 1327, 1338–1340

and Finland, 598–605, 608 and France, 1056, 1057 and gender/sexuality, 43–45, 444–447, 909–910 and geopolitics, 458–459, 464–466 and Germany, 183–187, 190, 192–193, 611, 613–620, 621–622, 1549, 1552, 1555–1556, 1558 globalization and de-territorialization of, 1416 and Greece, 630, 633 and Greenland, 1565, 1567–1568, 1570 and Haiti, 341–342 and Hungary, 639–644, 645 after independence, 1465 and India, 797, 803 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726–1728, 1732, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 757, 758–759, 1740, 1743 and Israel, 1124, 1127–1130 and Italy, 665, 670–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and Japan, 809–810, 813, 815, 820, 822, 1750–1751, 1755–1756, 1757–1578 and Korea, 1773, 1775–1776, 1778–1781 and landscape art, 59, 60–71 and language/literature, 482, 486, 492–495, 922–923 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1225 Maori, and intertribal unity, 1856, 1858, 1859–1860, 1863 and Mexico, 345, 347, 347–350, 351–356 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788–1789, 1792, 1793–1794, 1797, 1798 and music, 78–83 and national symbols, 113, 122–123, 1342–1348 in nationalist political philosophy, 97, 473–476 and Nepal, 1803, 1804, 1805–1806, 1807, 1811 and New Zealand, 863, 864–870 and Northern Ireland, 1065–1066 and overdetermination, 121 and Palestinians, 1133, 1134, 1138–1139 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1849 and Paraguay, 360, 362, 365–366 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 209, 213, 682, 686–688 and Puerto Rico, 839, 841–843 and Québec, 1293–1294 and religion versus ideology, 972–973 religious, 99, 103, 109, 983, 988–989. See also Religion and rituals of belonging, 499, 509. See also Rituals of belonging role of education in, 29–41 and Romania, 1589–1591 and Russia/Soviet Union, 690–701, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672–1673, 1677, 1679 and the Sami, 1614, 1615, 1617 and Scandinavia, 222–225, 226–228 and Scotland, 233, 234


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Identity (continued ) and social class, 1, 3–4 and South Africa, 1149–1150 and Spain, 1083, 1085–1087, 1092 and sports, 995, 996, 997–998, 1002–1003 and Switzerland, 251, 251–252, 253 and Taiwan, 1253–1255, 1257–1260 and technology, 134–135, 1476, 1481 and Tibet, 1815, 1817–1818, 1821–1823 and Turkey, 761–763, 764–765, 766, 768–770, 1645–1647, 1650 and Ukraine, 718–721, 720, 1622–1623 and the United States, 389, 392, 1307, 1307–1308 and Uruguay, 400, 401–402, 403 and Vietnam, 1266–1269, 1271 and Wales, 1636, 1640 Ideology, 971–989 and China, 794–795, 1193, 1194–1197, 1195, 1197 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1280–1281 globalization, disillusionment, and, 936–941 and Iraq, 752 and Malaysia, 1223 and nationalist movements, 940–941 and Russia, 692–697 and the United States, 1307–1308 and Vietnam, 1269 See also Communism; Fascism; Nationalism; Philosophy, political Igbo, 1469 Iglesias, Santiago, 839 Ileto, Reynaldo, 1245 Iliescu, Ion, 1586, 1587, 1589 Iliolo, Ratu Josefa, 1325 Immigrants/immigration, 1418–1429 and Alsace, 1510 and Argentina, 276, 277, 279, 280, 492 and Australia, 850 and Basques, 1517 and Burma, 777, 783 and Canada, 304, 1837 and Catalonia, 1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Colombia, 833 and cosmopolitanism, 1362 and Cuba, 1275 and Denmark, 155 education and, 420, 423–424 and the European Union, 1042 and France, 1055–1056, 1056 and gender, 448 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1409, 1411–1412, 1415 and Great Britain, 1007, 1009, 1013 and Greenland, 1566 and homeland politics, 1414–1415, 1416 and Indonesia, 1729 and Israel, 1121, 1129, 1130 and Japan, 1749, 1753, 1753 and language, 482, 483–484

and Latvia, 1575 and Malaysia, 1215 and Mongolia, 1797 and nativism, 883 and the Netherlands, 202, 206 and New Zealand, 864, 867, 868, 1856 and Pakistan, 1237 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Québec, 1296–1297 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Scandinavia, 231 and sports, 1000 and Turkey, 1650 and the United States, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1311 and Uruguay, 402 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnicity; Minorities; Refugees Imoudu, Michael, 1181 Imperialism. See Colonialism/imperialism Incas, 367–368, 370–371, 373 Income distribution and Australia, 853 and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Iran, 1111 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 955 and the United States, 1307, 1308 Independence and Afghanistan, 1684 in Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1098, 1099, 1100 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 728 and Argentina, 269–273 and Armenia, 1709–1710 and Austria, 542, 548–550, 552–553 and the Baltic states, 556–557, 562, 568, 1575, 1577–1578 and Belgium, 140, 142–143 and Brazil, 282, 287, 289, 295 and Bulgaria, 573–574, 578–580 and Burma, 777, 782–785 and Central America, 313, 319 and Chile, 326–327, 328 during the Cold War era, 949–950, 960, 969 and Colombia, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1161 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1277 and developing countries, 980 and Eritrea, 1173, 1173–1175 and Fiji, 1316–1317, 1320 and Finland, 223, 231, 605, 606 and Greece, 46, 53, 623, 625–631 and Greenland, 1571 and Haiti, 336 and Hungary, 638 and Iceland, 231 and India, 804–806, 889–890, 1201–1203 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1725, 1727, 1733–1734


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and Iraq, 750, 752–753 Latin America and, 46, 272 and Mexico, 349–350 and Mongolia, 1790, 1795 and New Zealand, 872 and Nigeria, 1181–1183 and Norway, 223–225, 231 and Pakistan, 1229–1231 and Paraguay, 359, 360–361 and Peru, 370, 371 and the Philippines, 1240–1241 and Poland, 681, 687–688 and popular nationalist movements, 503 to protect national culture, 1355 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 841, 843, 844–847 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Santo Domingo, 332–333 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and Taiwan, 1256–1257 and technology, 1479 and Tibet, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 767–768 and Ukraine, 722, 1626, 1626–1627 and Uruguay, 397 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Separatism/secession; Sovereignty India, 796–806, 799 (map), 943, 949–950, 1201–1211, 1202 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and colonialism, 48 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1373 education and, 424, 429 and gender, 446, 451, 902 government in, 981 and Great Britain, 889–890 and independence, 963, 1006, 1461–1462 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1771, 1765 and the Khalifat Movement, 1763 language/literature in, 920, 922, 923, 927 and music, 1440, 1441, 1443 and Nepal, 1802 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 967–968, 1229–1231, 1234–1235, 1235 politics in, 976–977, 987 railroad in, 131 and religion, 107 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 and terrorism, 1495 and the Tibetan government-in-exile, 1821, 1822 and water, 885 Indians, in Malaysia, 1215, 1216 Indigenismo, 352 Indigenous groups and Argentina, 277, 280 and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 283, 285, 293, 1826, 1828

and Canada, 303, 1837, 1840 and Central America, 310, 311, 317 and Chile, 324–326, 327 and Colombia, 829, 830 colonialism and, 889, 893, 912–913, 914–917 and education, 1383, 1385 and the environment/natural resources, 879, 883–884 and Fiji, 1314–1325 influence on music of, 1438–1439 Inuit, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 and language, 472, 482 and Malaysia, 1213–1215 and Mexico, 345–346, 351 and new social movements, 1448, 1451–1452 and Peru, 370–371, 372–375 and Québec, 1297 and Taiwan, 1252 and the United States, 1309 and Uruguay, 394–395 See also Maori; Pan-Aboriginalism; Sami Indo-Fijians, 1314–1325, 1318 Indo-Pakistan War, 1767 Indonesia, 1722–1735, 1724 (map) aircraft industry in, 1476 diversity and government in, 953–954 and independence, 1462–1463 and Malaysia, 1220 and the Netherlands, 197, 204 political tensions in, 938 radio hobbyists in, 128 separatist movements in, 1468 and technology, 1479–1480 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and transmigration, 876 Industrial Revolution, 161 Industrialization and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Basques, 1514–1515, 1517 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 317 and class, 55–56 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and England, 161 and Eritrea, 1169 and the European revolutions of 1848, 47 and Finland, 598 and geopolitics, 461 and Germany, 611 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 648, 661 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 424, 1748–1749 and Korea, 1778 and Mongolia, 1785 and nationalism, 1475, 1480 and Pakistan, 1228 and Poland, 209, 679, 681 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Québec, 1293–1294


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Industrialization (continued ) and Romania, 1585, 1587 and Russia, 699 and Scandinavia, 221 socialism and, 205 and the Soviet Union, 1075 and Spain, 703–704, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Ukraine, 714–715 and the United States, 1309 See also Economy Inequality and education, 1382, 1385–1386 and gender, 901–902, 903–904 and globalization, 936 and oil revenues in the Middle East, 1396 See also Income distribution; Rights Infrastructure and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 296, 1829 and China, 1193, 1200 education, 1381 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1169 and Indonesia, 1723 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 205 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1680 and Spain, 706, 708 and technological advances, 127–128, 131–132 and Tibet, 1814 and the United States, 389–390 Ingrians (Ingers), 557 Ingush, 441 Injannashi, 1788, 1789 Innis, Harold Adams, 1474, 1475 ˙Inönü, ˙Ismet, 768 Inoue Nissho, 816–817 Intellectuals, 1707 and Algeria, 1100 and Arab nationalism, 725, 730–733, 734 and Armenia, 1706 and Bulgaria, 571–572, 573 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1842 and China, 789–790, 792, 793, 793 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and France, 1052 and Germany, 183–185 independence and Greek, 626–627, 629–630 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 1741, 1745 and Latvia, 1575, 1577 and Mongolia, 1785–1786 and Nigeria, 1180 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222, 223

the Soviet Union and disciplining, 1074–1076 and Ukraine, 718 Young Ottomans/Turks, 763, 763, 764–765, 767, 771, 774 See also Elites International institutions. See Global institutions International Labour Organization (ILO), 1610 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1229, 1829, 1829 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 1359–1361 Internationalism, 536 and Angola, 1663 and Germany, 1551, 1559–1560 and globalization, 1408–1410 issue-specific, 1361–1362 versus nationalism, 418, 1342 and sports, 991 See also Post-nationalism; Transnationalism Internet and Armenia, 1709 and diaspora populations, 1370 and national identity, 1476, 1481–1483 and transnationalism, 1339 Interpellation, 486, 489–490 Intervention. See Foreign intervention Intifada, 1141 Inuit, 879, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 Ioann, Metropolitan, 106 Iqbal Lahori, Muhammad, 1229–1230, 1230, 1233 Iran, 1106–1118, 1108 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714 and gender, 446 and Iraq, 758, 1743 and Islamic fundamentalism, 986 and new social movements, 1452 and Palestine, 1142 and religious fundamentalism, 1396–1397 and terrorism, 1488 and the United States, 952 See also Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 756, 757, 952, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1746 Iraq, 747–759, 748 (map), 1736–1747, 1738 (map) borders of, 966 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1389 and Iran, 1115–1116 U.S. invasion of, 954, 955, 1497 water, 884–885 See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ireland, 647–662 Celtic revival in, 407 and colonialism, 915 and diaspora populations, 1374, 1375–1376


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economy of, 1060, 1408 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 112–113 and gender/sexuality, 452, 908 and immigration, 1424 and independence, 166, 1006 language and literature in, 488, 913–914, 918, 919, 920, 922–925 and Northern Ireland, 1060–1062, 1062, 1068 and sports, 997–998, 999–1000 Irian Jaya, 1734 Irish National Land League, 653–654 Ironsi, Johnson Aguiyi, 1185 Irving, Washington, 389 Isabella of Castile, 709 Islam and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1690, 1694 and Arab nationalism, 731, 733 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and the caliphate, 760–761 and India, 797 and Indonesia, 1728, 1734 and Iraq, 755, 1737, 1743–1745 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and national identity, 103–105 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763, 764 and Pakistan, 1236 and the Philippines, 1239 and politics, 983–987 in Russia, 1605–1607 and Turkey, 768, 1653–1654 See also Islamic fundamentalists; Shiism/ Shiites; Sunnis Islamic fundamentalists, 984–987, 1392, 1393, 1396–1400 and Algeria, 1101, 1102–1103 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1769 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1141–1143 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 in Turkey, 1649 Islamization, 1397–1400 Ismail, King (Egypt), 259, 260 Israel, 953, 1120–1130, 1122 (map) and counterterrorism, 1496 and diaspora populations, 1367 and education, 1387–1388 and environmental nationalism, 880 and minorities, 1374 and music, 1443 and Palestinians, 1133–1143 and religious fundamentalism, 1394, 1398, 1401–1402 and the Suez War, 266 symbols of, 114, 116 and water, 885 Isto, Edvard (Eetu), 603 (illus.) István, King (Hungary), 643

Itagaki Taisuke, 820 Italy, 663–677 and democracy, 946–947 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 426, 429, 432 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737, 740, 740 fascism in, 419, 514–516, 518–519 and film, 1333–1334 form of nationalism in, 502 and gender, 448–449 and language, 472 and the Libyan war, 514 and minorities, 1374, 1412, 1424 and music, 1437–1438, 1441 and nationalistic art, 410, 413, 414–415, 418 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and terrorism, 1491 unification (Risorgimento) of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 468, 512 Ivan the Terrible, 700 Ives, Charles, 1439 Iwakura Mission, 818–820 Izetbegović, Alija, 1527 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev (Vladimir), 1123 Jacini, Stefano, 669 Jackson, A. Y., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jacobitism, 175, 233, 238, 238 Jacobsen, J. C., 154 Jacobus, Stephanus, 1149 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 92, 186 Jakobson, Carl Robert, 562 Jamaica, 495 James, C. L. R., 992, 1301 James VI (Scotland)/James I (England), 61 Jamieson, John, 239 Jammu and Kashmir, 1462, 1759–1771, 1762 (map) conflict in, 1203–1204, 1234–1235, 1235, 1465–1466 Jang Bahadur, 1807 Jangghar, 1791 Jannsen, Johann Voldemar, 562 Japan, 808–822, 811 (map), 819 (map), 821 (map), 1748–1758, 1750 (map) and Burma, 777, 784–785 and China, 791, 792, 795, 1190 colonialism and, 1462 and democracy, 947 education and, 38, 40, 424, 426 and gender, 445, 450, 456 and India, 806 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language, 472, 478 and the Meiji Restoration, 27 and Mongolia, 1792, 1795, 1796 and music, 1439–1440, 1441 nationalism and literature in, 491–492 origins of nationalism in, 9


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Japan (continued ) and politics, 988 and religion, 106–107 and sports, 1001 and Taiwan, 1250, 1251 and terrorism, 1491 Jargalsaikhan, D., 1794 Jarl, Birger, 226 Järnefelt, Eero, 605 Jefferson, Thomas, 22, 32, 65, 211, 370, 387, 388 Jesuits, 350–351 Jews and Austria, 546 in the Baltic states, 563 in Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and the Diaspora, 1366, 1367 as discredited sexuality, 907 and Egypt, 265, 266 and establishment of Israel, 1402 ethnic cleansing and genocide in Russia, 438 and Germany, 188, 193, 430 and the Holocaust, 439–440, 523 and Hungary, 644, 645 in Iraq, 755–756 in Macedonia and Thrace during the Holocaust, 582 and the Netherlands, 199 and pogroms in Ukraine, 722 and Poland, 207, 209 in Romania, 1594 and Switzerland, 249 in Turkey, 1649 in the United States, 1398, 1400 See also Anti-Semitism; Israel; Judaism Jibzundamba Khutugtu, Eighth, 1788, 1792 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 804, 976, 1229, 1230, 1230–1231, 1233, 1461 Joergensen, A. D., 152, 154 Jogaila (Lithuanian prince), 564 John, King (England), 165 John Paul II, Pope, 948, 988 Johnson, Barry, 1399 Johnson, James, 73 Johnson, Lyndon, 944, 1310 Johnson, Samuel, 60 Johnston, Frank, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jones, Aneurin, 1637 Jones, Inigo, 61 Joseph II (Austria-Hungary), 138, 140 Jospin, Lionel, 1510 Joubert, Piet, 1146 Joyce, James, 489, 658, 914, 923, 924 Juan Carlos I, King (Spain), 1087 Judaism and fundamentalism (Ultra-Orthodoxy), 1124, 1392, 1393, 1395, 1400–1403 and national identity, 103 See also Jews Juliana, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Júnior, Caio Prado, 292

Kabila, Joseph, 1165 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 1165 Kagame, Paul, 1674 Kalaallit. See Greenland Kalevala, The, 227, 228, 406, 599, 602, 604 Kallay, Benjamin von, 1529 Kalmyks, 1784, 1790–1791, 1792, 1794–1795 Kamenev, Lev, 520 Kamil, Husayn, 262 Kamil, Mustafa, 261 Kangxi, Emperor, 1252 Kant, Immanuel, 14, 17, 86, 87–88, 533, 1352 Kaplan, Robert, 929 Karaites (Karaim), 557 Karamzin, Nikolai, 94 Karavelov, Luben, 573 Karel IV, king of Bohemia, 592 Karelia, 599, 600, 608 Karlsbad Decrees, 187, 189 Karmal, Babrak, 1687 Karnaviˇcus, Jurgis, 560 Károlyi, Count Mihály, 638 Karzai, Ahmed Wali, 1694 (illus.) Karzai, Hamid, 1686, 1695 Kasavubu, Joseph, 1158 Kashmir. See Jammu and Kashmir Kasparov, Gary, 951 Katanga, 1158, 1469 Kaunitz, Chancellor (Austria), 33–34 Kayibanda, Gregoire, 1677 Kazakhs, 1798 Kazakhstan, 1079, 1798 Kazimierz (Casimir) III (Prussia), 214 Keane, John, 1446, 1456 Kedourie, Elie, 474, 533 Keller, Ferdinand, 413 Kellerman, François, 1504 Kelly, Edward “Ned,” 857, 857 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 451, 633, 767–770, 1643, 1646–1647, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653 and Turkish identity, 766 Kemal, Namik, 763, 763, 766, 770, 774 Kemboi, Ezekiel, 1001 Kennan, George C., 945 Kennedy, John F., 944 Kent, William, 62 Kenya education and, 429 and literature, 919–920, 925–926 and music, 1440, 1441 Kenyatta, Jomo, 965 Kerber, Linda, 50 Kerkorian, Kirk, 1707 Key, Francis Scott, 117, 1443 Keyser, Rudolf, 228 Khachaturian, Aram, 1707 Khalifat Movement, 1763 Khan, Abatai, 1791 Khan, Abdul Qadir, 1236 Khan, Altan, 1817


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Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 1786, 1786, 1791, 1798, 1816 Khan, Dayan, 1786 Khan, Ishaq, 1232 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 1232 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 801 Khan, Yahya, 1232 Khan, Yaqub, 1690–1691 Khan Khattak, Khushal, 1690 Khatami, Mohammad, 1117 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 952, 986, 1111, 1114, 1396, 1397, 1399, 1400 Khomiakov, A. S., 692 Khorenatsi, Movses, 1702, 1708 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 948, 952, 979, 1076, 1077, 1603 Khutugtu, Jibzundamba, 1790 Khyvliovyi, Mykola, 718 Kidd, Benjamin, 532 Kierkegaard, Søren, 228 Kim Dae Jung, 1779 Kim Il Sung, 952, 1773, 1779–1781, 1780 Kim Jong Il, 1780 Kincaid, Jamaica, 924 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 123, 938, 1203, 1304 King, Michael, 869 King, Rodney, 1339 King, Sir Frederic Truby, 871 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 306 Kireevskii, I. V., 692 Kiribati, 1443 Kissinger, Henry, 458 Kivi, Aleksis, 602 Kjellén, Rudolf, 460, 463, 491 Klaus, Václav, 1027, 1028 Kléber, Jean-Baptiste, 1504 Klingler, Werner, 133 Knudsen, Knud, 225–226 Kochanowski, Jan, 214 Kodály, Zoltán, 81, 1432, 1435 Kohl, Helmut, 1549 Kohn, Hans, 23, 392, 474 Koidula, Lydia, 564 Koirala, B. P., 1803, 1807 Koizumi, Prime Minister (Japan), 1755 Kolberg, Oskar, 216 Köler, Johann, 564 Kolettis, Ioannis, 632 Kollár, Jan, 592 Kołła˛taj, Hugo, 211 Kollontai, Alexandra, 453, 454 Konovalets, Yevhen, 718 Kopernik, Mikołaj (Nicholas Copernicus), 214 Korais, Adamantios, 626, 628, 628 Korchynsky, Dmytro, 1628 Korea, 1467, 1772–1781, 1774 (map) education and, 424 and independence, 1462 and Japan, 809, 810, 815, 818, 1749 and sports, 1001

Koreans, in Japan, 1753 Körner, Theodor, 73 Korppi-Tommola, Aura, 54 Ko´sciuszko, Tadeusz, 96, 211, 211, 214, 686 Kosovo, 1409, 1554, 1555 Kossuth, Lajos, 638, 643 Kossuth, Louis, 239 Kostecki, Platon, 716 Koyama Eizo, 822 Kozyrev, Andrei, 1597 Kracauer, Siegfried, 1330–1331 Kramáˇr, Karel, 590 Krasicki, Ignacy, 214 Krasiński, Zygmunt, 212, 214, 216 Kraszewski, Józef Ignacy, 216–217, 685 Kravchuk, Leonid, 1078, 1597, 1621, 1622, 1626 Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhard, 564, 567 Krieck, Wilhelm, 426 Kronvalds, Atis, 1577 Kruger, Paul, 1146, 1150–1151 Krupskaya, Nadezhda, 453, 454 Kuchma, Leonid, 1080, 1621, 1622, 1625, 1628 Kun, Béla, 520 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 1079 Kunchov, Vasil, 580 Kurds and European partition, 891–893 and Iraq, 752–753, 755, 756, 1737, 1741–1742, 1745 and terrorism, 1491 and Turkey, 769, 885, 1646, 1650, 1653, 1655 Kushner, Barak, 822 Kutuzov, Dmitrii, 696 Kutuzov, Mikhail, 1074 Kuwait, 1743 Kuyper, Abraham, 200, 1149 Kymlicka, Will, 97, 931 Kyoto treaty, 877, 1447, 1456, 1457 Kyrlylenko, Vyacheslav, 1626 Labor/employment and Australia, 852 and Burma, 777, 781 and England, 164 and Fiji, 1314–1315 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Iraq, 1746 and the knowledge worker, 1380 and migration, 1422, 1424 and Nigeria, 1181 shortages and ethnic cleansing/genocide, 441 slavery, 889. See also Slavery and South Africa, 1145–1146 specialization of, 130 and the United States, 1304, 1309 Ladulås, Magnus, 226 Lagarde, Pierre, 409 Lagerbring, Sven, 227 Lahiri, Jhumpa, 927 Laicism, 769


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Lal, Brij V., 1322 Lalli (Finnish hero), 604–605 Lamanskii, Vladimir, 1601 Lamas, Andrés, 402 Lamming, George, 913, 917, 924 Land ownership and Australia, 1851–1852 and Fiji, 1314, 1322 and Haiti, 338, 342 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Ireland, 648, 653 and Japan, 811–812 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1861–1863, 1862 and Paraguay, 358 and Puerto Rico, 845 and South Africa, 1151 Land rights/claims and Afghanistan, 1692 and the Baltic states, 568 and Burma, 783 and the Inuit, 1567 and new social movements, 1450, 1451–1452 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846 and the Sami, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1617 Land sacralization, 100, 103 Landes, Joan, 49 Landsbergis, Vytautus, 1078 Landscape, 59–71 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Canada, 1841 and Denmark, 154 and England, 162 and Finland, 599, 604 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127–1128, 1129 and music, 78–79 and national identity, 875–876, 1342, 1344–1345 and Russia, 698 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 228 and Switzerland, 251, 252 as symbols, 114–115 and Turkey, 770 and Ukraine, 1621 and Wales, 1633 See also Environment Lange, Christian, 228 Language, 471–484, 912–928 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1692 and Afrikaner nationalism, 1147 and Algeria, 1095, 1101 and Alsace, 1502–1503, 1509, 1510 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 733 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703 and Austria, 542 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 560, 561, 562, 563 and Basques, 704, 710–711, 1092, 1512, 1514 (map), 1516, 1522

and Belgium, 138, 141–142, 144–145, 146 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 289, 1825 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Canada, 303, 307, 1840 and Catalans, 706, 1537, 1542, 1544, 1546 and China, 1199 and cultural survival, 878–879 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1021 and Denmark, 154 dictionaries and standardizing, 477 education and, 420, 424–425, 427 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1170, 1172, 1173–1174 and Ethiopia, 741, 746 and Europe, 1031 and Fiji, 1320 and Finland, 598–599, 601, 601–602, 605–606 and France, 34, 178 and Germany, 185 and globalization, 1392 and Greece, 629–630 and Greenland, 1565, 1566, 1568, 1570–1571 and Haiti, 339 and Hungary, 641 and immigration, 1420, 1421 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723–1725, 1728 and Ireland, 657, 660 and Israel, 1124, 1127, 1129 and Italy, 665, 671 and Japan, 813 and Latvia, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1582 and Malaysia, 1217, 1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 345, 346 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1796, 1798 and national boundaries, 461 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 16, 533, 1355–1356 and nationalistic music, 78, 80 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 199 and New Zealand, 1383 and Pakistan, 1233, 1235–1236 and Paraguay, 358, 364, 365 and the Philippines, 1247 and Poland, 217, 679, 688 and political philosophy, 88–89, 91 and print technology, 1475 and Puerto Rico, 841, 845 and Québec, 1291, 1293, 1296 and Romania, 1588, 1589–1591 and the Sami, 1613–1614 and Scandinavia, 225–226 and Singapore, 1224–1225 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Spain, 707


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and Switzerland, 245 and Taiwan, 1258 and Tibet, 1815, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 772–773, 1646, 1646, 1652, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 719, 719, 720, 721, 1621, 1623–1624, 1625, 1627 and the United States, 389 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 and Wales, 1632, 1634–1636, 1635, 1638 Laos, 1463 Lapage, Robert, 1294 Laporte, Pierre, 1291 Laqueur, Walter, 1489, 1498 Larrazábal, Antonio, 317 Larsson, Carl, 228 Laski, Harold, 981 Lassale, F., 38 Lastarria, José Victorino, 329 Latin America development of nationalism in, 8, 9, 16, 26, 46 and film, 1335 and language, 472 and nationalistic music, 76 and new social movements, 1450–1452 See also specific Latin American countries Latvia, 1573–1582, 1573 (map) fascism in, 517 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, 399 Lavater, Johann Kaspar, 251 Lavin, Mary, 925 Lawson, Henry, 854 Laxman, Adam, 810 Le Carre, John, 951 Le Corbusier, 1206 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 1054, 1056, 1447, 1453, 1510 Le Republicain (L’Union), 341, 342 Leaders and Africa, 890 and Angola, 1661–1663, 1662 anticolonial nationalist, 962–964 and Arab nationalism, 730–731, 732, 732–733 and Argentina, 277–278 and Armenia, 1699 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532 and Canada, 306, 1837 and Central America, 317–318, 320–321 and China, 790, 794, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158, 1160 and Denmark, 153 and Egypt, 258–259 and France, 1051, 1052 and Germany, 189, 190 and Haiti, 336–337, 338 and India, 1206–1207, 1207, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1726, 1727 and Iraq, 758 Islamic attacks on Muslim, 1397–1398

and Islamic movements, 984–985 and Israel, 1121, 1123, 1123, 1128 and Japan, 818–820, 1751–1752, 1752 and Korea, 1775, 1780 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1857, 1858 and Mongolia, 1789–1790 monuments to, 410–411 and national identity, 1345 as national symbols, 114, 116 and Nepal, 1803, 1806 and new social movements, 1453 and Nigeria, 1180, 1180–1181, 1182, 1187 and Pakistan, 1230 and Palestinians, 1134, 1136–1137, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1848, 1848, 1851, 1853 and Paraguay, 364 and the Philippines, 1241–1242, 1242, 1244 and Poland, 210–212, 681–683, 682 and Puerto Rico, 839–840 qualities of, 982 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1597 and the Sami, 1616, 1616–1618 and separatist movements, 1464–1465 and Singapore, 1221 and South Africa, 1150–1151, 1152 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1075 and Taiwan, 1253 and Uruguay, 398 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Heroes/heroines League of Arab States, 729 League of Nations failure of the, 1402 and Iraq, 750, 1739 and Israel, 1123 Mandates, 728, 1461 and New Zealand, 872 Lebanon, 728 Lechner, Frank, 1392 Leclerc, Charles, 336 Leclerc de Buffon, Georges-Louis, 351 Lee, Richard Henry, 385 Lee Kuan Yew, 1220, 1221 Lee Teng-hui, 1253, 1253–1254, 1255, 1256, 1258, 1259 Legal system/institutions and Central America, 314, 315, 319 and France, 174, 176 and the Netherlands, 202 and Scandinavia, 227 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 254 Legitimacy and Angola, 1666 and Chinese communists, 1196, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1370–1371 and ideologies and religions, 972–973 and Iran, 1109


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Legitimacy (continued ) and modern nation-states, 930 and national sports, 998–999 and North versus South Korea, 1776, 1778–1779 and the Qing Dynasty in China, 788 Legitime, Francois, 338 Leino, Eino, 605 Lej Iyasu, 740, 740 Lelewel, Joachim, 212, 214, 692 Lemarchand, Rene, 1676 Lemieux, Mario “The Magnificent,” 1842 Lemkin, Raphael, 436 Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov), 436, 697, 978, 981, 1072 and ethnicities, 1599 and film, 1330 on nationalism, 1071 León y Gama, Antonio de, 351, 351 Leopold I (Belgium), 142 Leopold II (Belgium), 1156 Lepeletier, L. M., 34 Lerroux, Alejandro, 710 Lesage, Jean, 1290, 1290 Lespinasse, Beauvais, 341 Lester, Richard, 1337 Lévesque, René, 1290, 1290, 1291, 1291 (illus.), 1294 Levitt, Kari, 1842 Levski, Vasil, 573, 576, 576 Levsky, Vasil, 96 Levy, Andrea, 928 Lewis, C. S., 971 Lewis, Geoffrey, 773 Lewis, Saunders, 1635 Liberalism, 14–15, 23–28, 535–536, 537 and Australia, 854 and Brazil, 1830 as detached from democracy, 1306 and European nationalism, 512–513 and Finland, 598 German, 17 and Indonesia, 1732 and Italy, 669 versus nationalism, 1350–1351. See also Nationalism, liberal and Paraguay, 364–365 and Puerto Rico, 841 and Spain, 704 See also Economic liberalism Liberties. See Rights Liborio, 1283 Libyan war, 514 Liebermann, Max, 416 Liebknecht, Karl, 520 Liechtenstein, 1443 Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 Lijphart, Arend, 206 Lilburn, Douglas, 1439 Lincoln, Abraham, 382, 391

Lindeman, Ludvig Mathias, 73 Lindsay, A. D., 536 Linguistic internationalists, 471 Lippmann, Walter, 950 Lira, Luciano, 401 Lismer, Arthur, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Lisson, Carlos, 374 List, Friedrich, 18, 191, 192, 463 Liszt, Franz, 74, 81, 1432, 1435 Literacy rates, 495–497, 496 (map) and Pakistan, 1228 Literature, 465, 485–497, 912–928 and Argentina, 278–279 and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703 Austrian, 543 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Brazil, 285, 287 and Bulgaria, 576–577 and Canada, 1841 and Catalonia, 1543 and Chile, 329, 330 and Colombia, 832 and Finland, 602, 604, 605 and France, 177, 1052 and gender, 49 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and India, 800, 1209 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1740 and Ireland, 657, 658–659 and Mongolia, 1789, 1794 and Nepal, 1807, 1808 and the Philippines, 1244–1245 and Poland, 682, 685 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavia, 228 and Scotland, 238–239 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 1075–1076, 1077, 1077 and Spain, 708 and Turkey, 763, 770 and Ukraine, 720 and the United States, 389, 951 See also Poetry Lithuania, 561 and gender/sexuality, 908 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Livingston, David, 164 Livs, 557 Localism and globalization, 1411 nationalism as, 1415 and subsidiarity, 881 See also Regionalism Loggia, Enrico Galli della, 676 Lomonosov, M. V., 694 Lönnrot, Elias, 228, 406, 599, 602 López, Carlos Antonio, 362, 363, 364


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López, Narciso, 1282 Lopez, Vicente Fidel, 276 López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 830–831, 832 Louis-Philippe, 408 Louis XVI, King (France), 1489 Louis XVIII, King (France), 1443 Louisiana Purchase, 390 Lower, Arthur, 305 Loya jirga, 1686, 1687, 1690, 1691 Lu Xun, 793 Lubbe, Marinus van der, 119 Luce, Henry, 1309 Ludendorff, Erich, 613 Lumumba, Patrice, 962–963, 1158, 1158, 1159, 1159 (illus.), 1160–1162 heroicizing of, 1164 Luther, Martin, 188, 618, 983 Luxemburg, Rosa, 520 Lyngbye, Hans Christian, 225 Lypyns’kyi, Viacheslav, 718 MacArthur, Douglas, 1751 Macartney, C. A., 1368 Macaulay, Hebert, 1179–1180, 1180 Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, 165, 912 MacCunn, Hamish, 1438 MacDonald, J. E. H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Macdonald, John A., 1837 MacDowell, Edward, 76, 1438 Macedonia and Bulgaria, 580, 582 and diasporic communities, 1415 Germany and peacekeeping in, 1554 Maceo, 1275, 1282 Machado, Gerardo, 1276 Maˇciulis, Jonas, 565 Mackenzie, Alexander, 300, 1438 Mackinder, Halford, 460, 468 Maclennan, Hugh, 307 Macpherson, James, 462 Mada, Gajah, 1727 Madison, James, 386, 387, 388 Magna Carta, 165 Magnus, Olaus, 223 Magnus VI (Norway), 226 Magsaysay, Ramon, 1241, 1242 Magyarization, 644 Magyars, 587 Maharaja (of Jammu and Kashmir), 1764–1765 Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, 1803, 1807–1808 Maimonides, 1402, 1403 Maistre, Joseph de, 92 Majoritarian nationalist movements, 940 Makarenko, Anton, 425, 429 Malan, Daniel François, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1151 Malawi, 1440 Malay(s), 1213–1215, 1217, 1219, 1225 as dominant culture in Malaysia, 1220–1222 and education, 1384–1385 and the Philippines, 1243

Malaysia, 1213–1225 and education, 1385–1386 and independence, 1463 and Indonesia, 1729, 1733 and natural resources, 884 Malcolm X, 965 Mâle, Emile, 415 Malthusianism, 518 Mamluks, 257–258, 259–260 Mammeri, Mouloud, 1100 Manchester, England, 161 Manchuria and independence, 1462 and Japan, 810, 818 Manchurian Incident (1931), 810, 821 Manchus, 1818 Mandela, Nelson, 995, 1148, 1152, 1153, 1488–1489 Mandukhai, Empress, 1786 Manifest destiny. See Expansionism Mann, Horace, 37 Mann, Thomas, 617 Mansell, Michael, 1848 Manzanilla, Matias, 374 Manzoni, Alessandro, 671 Mao Zedong, 948, 952, 977, 1191, 1816, 1819, 1821 economic and political programs, 1198–1199 ideology of, 978, 1194–1197, 1197 influence of, 1192–1193 Maoism, 978–979 and Angola, 1664 and Nepal, 1810–1811 Maori, 866, 1855–1863 and education, 1383 and music, 1439 and New Zealand, 873 population, 864 and the Treaty of Waitangi, 863 and the world wars, 869–870 Maps, 465 and Central America, 319–320 and Finland, 602–604 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 640 and Japan, 810 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 1320, 1324 Maragall i Mira, Pasqual, 1539, 1540, 1541 (illus.) Marcinkowski, Karol, 217 Marcos, Ferdinand, 1241–1242, 1244, 1246 Marcos, Imelda, 1242, 1244, 1245 Margalit, A., 97 Marginalization, 935–941 Maria Theresa (Austria-Hungary), 138 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 1469 Maritz, Gerrit, 1150 Markievicz, Countess, 654 “Marseillaise,” 175 Marshall, George C., 948 Marsland, David, 114


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Martí, José, 1275, 1276, 1282, 1283 Martin, Henri, 177 Martins, Wilfred, 975 Marure, Alejandro, 319 Marx, Karl, 1–3, 17–18, 217, 1195 and gender roles, 56 and religion, 1397 on socialism versus communism, 975 Marxism, 1–3, 12 and Angola, 1661, 1662 and Arab nationalism, 730–731 and culture, 485–486 and the environment, 881 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 471 See also Communism Mas, Artur, 1539 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 585, 585, 587–588, 589, 589 (illus.), 592, 593, 1017, 1028 Masculinity, 900–901. See also Gender Mashtots, Mesrop, 1701 Mason, Lowell, 389 Masood, Ahmad Shah, 1690, 1693 Massey, Vincent, 1838 Massey, William, 869 Masur, Gerhard, 834 Matejko, Jan, 682 Mathews, Robin, 1843 Matto de Turner, Clorinda, 374 Maude, Sir Stanley, 1742 Maupassant, Guy de, 134 Maura, Antonio, 707 Maurits of Orange (the Netherlands), 196 Maurras, Charles, 533 May, Glenn, 1246 May Fourth movement, 793, 793 Mayer, Gustav, 611 Maynard, Charles Frederick, 1848 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 24, 90, 94–95, 468, 502, 673, 673 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Mbundu, 1660, 1664, 1665 McCarthy, Joseph, 907–908, 944 McCubbin, Frederick, 859 McDougall, William, 530, 535 McKay, Claude, 494 McLuhan, Marshall, 129 McVeigh, Timothy, 1492 Meˇciar, Vladimir, 1026–1027 Media and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Alsace, 1509 and Armenia, 1709 and Azerbaijan, 1719 and the Baltic states, 567 and Brazil, 287 and Bulgaria, 573 and Burma, 783 and Canada, 1839 and Central America, 316, 320

and China, 1193, 1199 culture and forms of, 1474–1475 education and, 422, 433 and Egypt, 261, 262 and Eritrea, 1172 and Ethiopia, 746 and globalization, 1412 in Haiti, 341 and immigration, 1427 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iraq, 1738, 1745 and Korea, 1781 as maintaining psychological stability, 123 manipulation of, 1480–1481 and national identity, 30, 31, 38, 464–465, 486, 1473 and Nepal, 1808 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1853 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 217 and Québec, 1296 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 technological advances and, 129, 132–134, 135–136 in Turkey, 1649 and the United States, 390, 1308 See also Cinema; Literature; Newspapers; Print technology; Radio; Television Megali Idea, 632–633 Mehmed V (Ottoman Empire), 765 Mehmed VI (Ottoman Empire), 767 Meiji Restoration, 818, 1748, 1751 Meiren, Gada, 1789 Mekhitarians, 1700 Melgar, Mariano, 373 Mella, Julio Antonio, 1282, 1283 Melnyk, Andrei, 718, 1624 Melucci, Albert, 1446 Men and gendered role in conflict, 449 nationalist imagery and, 445–446 See also Gender; Masculinity Mendelssohn, Felix, 1431 Mendes, Chico, 1829 Mendes-France, Pierre, 1054 Menelik II (Ethiopia), 737, 737–740, 744 Mercantalism, 18–19 Merchants. See Bourgeoisie Mercier, Honoré, 305, 1288–1289 Merse, 1789 Mesopotamia, 748, 757–758 Messiaen, Olivier, 1434 Mestiço, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1665 Mestizaje, 349, 349, 356 Mexican-American War, 347, 352, 354, 390 Mexico, 344–356, 346 (map), 353 (map) and communications, 1475 and music, 1439 national identity and education in, 39 national radio of, 132–133


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and politics, 1414 and terrorism, 1491 Zapatista movement in, 1412, 1451–1452 Meyer, John, 1392, 1397 Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 117 Michael the Brave (Romania), 1585, 1592 Michelet, Jules, 102, 177, 177–178 Mickiewicz, Adam, 212, 213, 214, 216, 686, 692 Micombero, Michel, 1677 Middle East and education, 428, 1387–1388 and European colonization, 891 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Mier, Servando Teresa de, 350, 351, 352 Migration and consolidating sovereignty, 876 globalization and international, 1414–1415 and sports, 1001–1002 See also Emigration; Immigrants/immigration Mikhalkov, Sergei, 1602 Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola, 722 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 683 Military and Algeria, 1100 and Angola, 1667 and Armenia, 1710 and Brazil, 1827, 1828–1829, 1830–1831, 1832 and Burma, 781 and China, 790 and Ethiopia, 740 and Fiji, 1314, 1324 and gender/sexuality, 903, 910 and Germany, 620, 621 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726 interventions and terrorism, 1497 and Iraq, 751, 753, 1743, 1745 and Ireland, 661 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1748–1749, 1752 music, 1430, 1431 and New Zealand, 868–869 and Nigeria, 1185, 1188 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Russia, 955 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1679, 1680 and Spain, 703, 705, 706 technology, 1473 and Turkey, 1646, 1647 Mill, Harriet Taylor, 57 Mill, John Stuart, 19, 57, 85, 95, 527 and cosmopolitanism, 1356 Miller, Ferdinand von, 416 Mindaugas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Minghetti, Marco, 669 Minin, Kuz’ma, 700, 1602 Minorities and Afghanistan, 1689–1690, 1692–1693, 1694 in the Baltic states, 557

and Basques, 1516–1517 and Bulgaria, 580–582 and Burma, 781 and China, 1193, 1199–1200 and citizenship, 1374 and Colombia, 833 and concerns about cultural survival, 878–879 cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and, 1356, 1357–1362 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and demands for rights, 932–933, 936–941. See also Rights and discrimination, 1420, 1425. See also Discrimination/prejudice education and, 419, 422, 427, 429–430, 431, 432 and the environment, 882 and Ethiopia, 741 and Germany, 617 globalization and mobilization of, 1412–1413, 1414 and Hungary, 639, 644 and India, 976, 1203 and Indonesia, 1728–1729 and Iran, 1112–1113, 1117–1118 and Iraq, 1741–1742 and Israel, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and Japan, 1753, 1756, 1758 and Latvia, 1575 and the legacies of colonialism, 894 and Malaysia, 1463 marginalization in modern states of, 931–932 and Mongolia, 1798 and nationalist ideologies, 513 and Nepal, 1804, 1809–1810 and new social movements, 1448, 1453, 1457, 1458 and New Zealand, 866–867 and Nigeria, 1182–1183 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and Poland, 683, 685, 687 and Romania, 1587, 1591, 1593–1594 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672 and state terrorism, 1488 and Turkey, 1648–1651, 1654–1655 and Ukraine, 1625 and the United States, 1307, 1308 and Vietnam, 1271 and Wales, 1636 See also Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnicity; Genocide; Language Missionary activity, 480 Mistral, Frédéric, 477 Mitre, Bartolomé, 276, 279 Mitterrand, François, 458, 1051–1052, 1054 Mixed race descent and Brazil, 293 and Central America, 311 and Paraguay, 358


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Mobutu, Joseph (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga), 1158–1159, 1160, 1161, 1162–1165 Modarres, Hassan, 1114 Modernization and Afghanistan, 1686, 1688 and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Australia, 853–854 and China, 792, 1191–1192, 1197, 1198–1199, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1372 and Ethiopia, 740–741 and film, 1337 and Greece, 625, 630 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Italy, 669–670 and Japan, 1753 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 as necessitating the nation-state, 930–932 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Spain, 705, 705, 706 and Turkey, 771 Moe, Jørgen, 228 Mohammad, Mahathir bin, 1223–1224 Mohammed, Murtala Ramat, 1186, 1187, 1187 Mohaqeq, Mohammad, 1695 Moldavia/Moldova, 469, 1414 Molina, Felipe, 319 Molina, Pedro, 315, 316 Molotov, Viacheslav, 1077 Moluccans, 1491 Monarchy and France, 169–171 and Great Britain, 1007–1008, 1008 Mondlane, Eduardo, 1661 Mongolia, 1783–1799 and independence, 1818, 1819 Mongols, and Tibet, 1816–1817 Moniuszko, Stanisław, 74, 216, 686 Monnet, Jean, 1034 Montcalm, Louis de, 299 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, 62–64, 171, 529 Montevideo, 395–396, 397, 402 Montgomerie, Archibald William, 235 Montilla Aguilera, José, 1539, 1541 Montúfar, Manuel, 319 Monuments, 117–120 and Algeria, 1102 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 294–295 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 594, 1024–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Germany, 618, 619 and Indonesia, 1732, 1733, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Ireland, 659 and Japan, 1754–1755

and Latvia, 1580 and Mongolia, 1798 and national identity, 1342, 1345–1347 and nationalism, 408, 409, 410–412, 414–415, 417 and Nigeria, 1187 and rituals of belonging, 502, 504 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1603 Scottish, 239 and Turkey, 774 Mora, José María Luis, 352 Mora, Juan Rafael, 315, 318 Moral Majority, 1395, 1446 Morality and cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, 1351–1353, 1356–1357 and Cuba, 1283 and gender and sexuality issues, 447, 899, 908–909 and national character, 531 U.S. idealistic, 944 See also Values Moravia, 584 Morazán, Francisco, 318 Moreno, Manuel, 398 Moro, Aldo, 676 Moroccan crises, 514 Morocco, 1096–1097, 1464 Moros, 1243 Moscow Declaration, 548 Moscow metro, 134 Mosley, Oswald, 516 Mossadegh, Muhammad, 1109, 1109, 1111, 1114 Mosse, George, 905 Motoori Norinaga, 815 Mott, Lucretia, 53, 57 Motz, Friedrich, 191 Mount Ararat, 1702 Mount Rushmore, 134 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 1765 Mourer, Jean-Pierre, 1509 Mozambique, 968, 1464 Mubarak, Hosni, 985 Muhammad V, 1464 Mujahideen, 1687, 1688, 1693 Mukhtar, Mahmud, 264 Mulgan, Alan, 868 Müller, Adam, 92, 463 Multiculturalism and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 1826 and Canada, 1838, 1840, 1843 and education, 1379, 1382–1384, 1386 and Fiji, 1325 as a form of nationalism, 934, 935 and globalization, 1411–1412 and Great Britain, 1011–1013 and immigration, 1367


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and India, 1765 and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 1784 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and the Netherlands, 206 and Poland, 685 and Romania, 1589 and Singapore, 1224 as solution to minority demands, 933, 939 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 1306 Multilateralism, 877, 881 Multinationality, 1358 Munch, P. A., 228 Munich Conference, 595 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 840, 841, 845, 846 Muñoz Rivera, Luis, 839, 841 Museums, 31 and the Baltic states, 560 and France, 1053 in Germany, 1558 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Latvia, 1578 and nationalistic art, 412–414 and Scandinavia, 229 Musharraf, Pervez, 1232 Music, 72–83, 1430–1445 and Angola, 1665 Baltic folk songs, 561, 567 and Basques, 1522 and Brazil, 1826 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Finland, 600, 605 folk songs and nationalistic, 417 and France, 1053 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569–1570 in Indonesia, 1479 and Israel, 1127, 1128 and Italy, 671 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and national identity, 31, 132–133, 407 and Paraguay, 364, 365 and Poland, 214, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 songs in Denmark, 154 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637 See also Anthem, national Musical instruments, 1440–1441, 1442 Muslim Brotherhood, 984–986, 1396

Muslim League, 801, 804, 806, 976, 1761 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171 and Pakistan, 1230, 1231 Muslims and Egypt, 265 and India, 801, 803, 804, 806, 1203, 1209 and the Netherlands, 202 See also Islam Musset, Alfred de, 177 Mussolini, Benito, 448–449, 514–516, 518, 667, 670, 676 and Roman history, 674 Mussolini, Vittorio, 1334 Mussorgsky, Modest, 75, 75 (illus.), 78, 82, 1437 Nadim, Abdullah, 261 Nadir Shah, Mohammed, 1686, 1688 Nagorno-Karabakh. See Gharabagh conflict Naguib, Muhammad, 266 (illus.) Nagy, Imre, 978 Naipaul, V. S., 924 Nairn, Tom, 933 Naji, Dr., 1740 Najibullah, Mohammad, 1687 Napier, Theodore, 242 Napoleon, Louis, 197 Napoleon III, 407, 1443 Napoleonic Civil Code, 174, 176 Napoleonic wars, 463 and Central America, 317 and Germany, 186, 618–619 music and resistance in the, 73 as stirring nationalism, 14, 16, 26, 46 Nariño, Antonio, 831 Naruszewicz, Adam, 214 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 687 Nassef, Malak Hifni, 450 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 265–266, 266 (illus.), 730, 890, 964, 1396 and the Bandung Conference, 962 and pan-Arabism, 965, 982 Nation-building, 929–941 National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), 235, 235, 241 National character, 527–537. See also Culture; Identity National Socialism, 419, 422, 513, 514, 517–519. See also Nazism Nationalism defining, 4–5, 85, 1351 ethnic-genealogical versus civic-territorial, 1353–1354 forms of, 5–12, 934–935 and geopolitics, 458–469 as an ideological political project, 875 imperative and imaginary forms of, 501–503 and language, 473, 482–484. See also Language as a legitimating ideology, 436 liberal, 488–490, 1355–1359, 1362


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Nationalism (continued ) and masculinity, 900–901 origins of, 473–474 particularistic, 90–94 versus patriotism, 45 perversions of, 512–525 religious, 100–101. See also Religion technological, 1478 transnational, 1407, 1414–1415 universalistic culture-based, 88–90 See also Identity; Philosophy, political; Politics Nativism, 883 Natsir, Mohammed, 965 Natsugdorji, D., 1794 Natural resources and Azerbaijan, 1714 and Brazil, 283, 1827–1828, 1832 and Canada, 1842 and conflict, 883–886 and India, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 877 and the Philippines, 1247 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1671 and Scandinavia, 221 and Wales, 1632 Nau, Emile, 341 Naumovych, Ivan, 716 Navarra, 1516, 1517, 1523 Nazism and Austria, 545, 546, 550, 552 and Czechoslovakia, 592 education and, 426 and the environment, 882 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438–440, 523, 622 and expansionism, 621 and film, 1331 and gender, 454–456 on German national character, 533 and Iran, 1110–1111 and language, 481 and music, 1431 nationalism of, 1353 propaganda of, 133–134 and rituals of belonging, 505, 507–508 and sexuality, 907 Ndadaye, Melchior, 1673, 1679 Negritude movement, 488, 918–919 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 981, 1207, 1461, 1761, 1764, 1765, 1766 and the Bandung Conference, 961, 962, 1206 and the Dalai Lama, 1820 economic policies of, 1206 and Indian federalism, 1205 and the nonaligned movement, 982 Nehru, Motilal, 1207 Nejedlý, Zdenˇek, 1023–1024 Nekrasov, N. A., 694

Nelson, Lord Horatio, 164 Neo-fascism, 525, 974 Neo-Nazis and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557, 1558 and the Soviet Union, 1078 Neo-Stalinism, 1077–1078 Neoliberalism, in education, 1381–1382 Neorealism, 1333–1335, 1336, 1337 Nepal, 1800–1811, 1802 (map) Netherlands, the, 195–206, 201 (map), 202 (illus.) and Belgium, 141–142 and Brazil, 283–284 and colonialism, 1479 education and, 34, 429 fascism in, 516 and immigration, 1420 and Indonesia, 1463, 1723, 1733, 1734 and Japan, 809, 810 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 and music, 1443 national anthem, 117 and Taiwan, 1252 and technology, 1480 and terrorism, 1486–1487, 1491 See also Afrikaner nationalism Neto, Agostinho, 1661–1662, 1662 Nevskii, Aleksandr, 696, 700 New France, 1288 New Guinea, 852 New Zealand, 862–873, 864 (map) and education, 1382, 1383 and the Maori, 1855–1863 and music, 1439, 1441 and sports, 993 Newspapers and Algeria, 1103 and Arab nationalism, 752 and Australia, 854 and Colombia, 833 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and Iraq, 1740, 1745 and Irish resistance, 918 and Japan, 816, 817 in Latvia, 1576 and nationalism, 1473, 1475–1476 and Nigeria, 1179, 1181 and Québec, 1296 and the Sami, 1613 and Wales, 1639 Ngata, Sir Apirana, 1858, 1859 Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, 1818 Ng˜ ug˜ı wa Thiong’o, 913, 915, 919–920, 925–926 Niagara Falls, 134 Nibelungenlied, 406 Nicaragua and national identity, 321 symbols of, 319 and William Walker, 318


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Niceforo, Alfredo, 672 Nicholas I, Czar (Russia), 210, 690–692 Nicholas II, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Nicholls, David, 341 Nichols, Terry, 1492 Niemcewicz, Julian Ursyn, 214 Nietzsche, F., 10 Nieuwenhuis, Domela, 205 Nigeria, 1177–1189, 1178 (map) Biafran secessionist movement in, 967 education and, 424 and literature, 920 Nightingale, Florence, 164 Nitze, Paul, 950 Nixon, Richard, 1039, 1395 Nkrumah, Kwame, 962, 964, 965, 980, 1161 Noble, Paul, 734 Nolan, Sidney, 857 Nolte, Ernst, 515 Nonaligned movement, 961, 969, 982 and Algeria, 1095 and Cuba, 1285 and India, 1206 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 944, 1359–1361, 1412 and Brazil, 1830 and Fiji, 1322 and new social movements, 1453 Nora, Pierre, 121–122, 1343 Nordau, Max, 416 Nordraak, Rikard, 230 North America and immigration, 1421, 1425 and terrorism, 1494 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1294, 1407, 1412, 1451 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 943, 974, 1532–1533 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Germany, 1549, 1555 and international interventions, 1409 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Russia, 1604 and Turkey, 774 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 1303 North Borneo (Sabah), 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 North Korea, 977, 1757. See also Korea Northern Ireland, 1014–1015, 1058–1068 conflict in, 1470–1471 and counterterrorism, 1496 symbols in, 113 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1492 Norway, 220–222 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 229–230 and gender, 450 independence and, 223–225, 231 and language, 225–226, 472, 477

and music, 1432, 1436–1437 national anthem, 230, 230 national identity and culture of, 226–228 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1617 Notari, Elvira, 1327 Nourrit, Adolphe, 144 Novalis, 92 Nuclear weapons/energy and India, 1210, 1236 and Iran, 1117, 1117 and Pakistan, 1235, 1236 Nunavut, 1562 Núñez, Rafael, 828 Nussbaum, Martha, 97 Nyerere, Julius, 890, 962, 964, 980–981 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 1186, 1188 O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth, 133 Öcalan, Abdullah, 1655 Oceania, and language, 478 O’Connell, Daniel, 658, 920 O’Connor, T. P., 654 O’Donoghue, Lowitja, 1848 O’Dowd, Bernard, 853 Oehlenschläger, Adam, 67–69, 70, 228 O’Faolain, Sean, 925 Oge, Vincent, 335 Ogiński, Michał, 215–216 O’Gorman, Edmundo, 354 O’Higgins, Bernardo, 272, 326 Ohmae, Kenichi, 929 Oil/gas and Algeria, 1095 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Armenia, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1715, 1719–1721 and Canada, 1837 and Egypt, 729 and Iran, 1109, 1111 and Iraq, 755, 756, 1742, 1746 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 Oirat Mongols, 1797–1798 Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 1185, 1185 Okinawa, 1757 Olav II (Norway), 226 O’Leary, Juan, 365 Olympic Games, 991, 994 O’Neill, Onora, 97 Onn, Hussein, 1223 Oommen, T. K., 1393 Opera, 79–80 Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 Oral traditions, and the Sami, 1615. See also Folk culture Orange Free State, 1145 Organicism, 462–464 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1033, 1380, 1706 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 1095, 1742


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Oribe, Manuel, 275, 399 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 667 Ortega y Gasset, José, 704, 705, 707, 707 Orwell, George, 995 O’Shea, Katherine, 651 Oslo Accords, 1137, 1141 Ossian, 237 Otero, Mariano, 354 Otto of Wittelsbach, Prince, 631 Ottoman Empire, 760–767 and Algeria, 1097 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 734 and Armenia, 1704, 1704 and Armenian genocide, 522–523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Bulgaria, 571, 573, 577 collapse of the, 891 and Egypt, 258–259 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 436, 437–438 and Greece, 623–625 and India, 801 and Iraq, 748–749, 1737, 1739, 1742 and language, 472, 482 religion and the, 101–102 and Turkey, 1643, 1645 Ottomanism, 761–763, 764, 766, 768 Overdetermination, 120–121 Ovimbundu, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1664 Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 682, 682, 683, 683 (illus.) Padmore, George, 1179, 1301 Page, Thomas Nelson, 494–495 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 952, 986, 1109, 1111, 1114, 1396–1397 coronation ceremony of, 1114–1115 and minorities, 1113 Pahlavi, Reza, 986, 1110–1111, 1114 Paine, Thomas, 162, 370 Paisii, Father, 571 Paisley, Ian, 1065 Pakistan, 976–977, 1227–1237, 1228 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1689 creation of, 1201–1203, 1461–1462 and India, 950 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1767, 1768–1769, 1771 and religion, 107 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 and terrorism, 1488 and water, 885 Palach, Jan, 1026, 1028 Palacký, František, 96, 587, 594 Palais de Justice, Belgium, 143 (illus.), 144 Palestine, 1132–1143, 1134 (map) and Arab nationalism, 729 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1387

and Israel, 1120–1121 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1492 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 1137, 1140–1142 Palestinians and European partition, 891–893 and Israel, 1125, 1129–1130 Pamuk, Orhan, 1649 Pan-Aboriginalism, 1844–1853 Pan-Africanism, 965, 1161, 1179 Pan-Arabism, 965, 981, 982 and Iraq, 1740–1741, 1743 Pan-ethnic identities, 939 Pan-Germanism, and Austria, 544, 545 Pan-Islamism, 965 and Egypt, 261 and Turkey, 1645 Pan-Mongolian nationalism, 1790, 1792–1793 Pan-nationalist movements, 964–965, 980 Pan-Slavism, 93–94 and Russia, 20 and the Soviet Union, 946 Pan-Turkism, 764–765 Panama, and Colombia, 828, 829, 830 Pancasila, 953, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1731, 1732 Panchayat system, 1803, 1807–1808 Panchen Lama, 1821 Pandita, Zaya, 1791 Pankhurst, Christabel, 453 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 453 Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 300, 306, 1288, 1292 Paraguay, 358–366, 359 (map) and Argentina, 275 Paraguayan War, 296, 359–360, 360, 362, 363 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 472, 1790 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and Hungary, 640 Parizeau, Jacques, 1201, 1297 Park Chung Hee, 1778, 1780 Parkes, Henry, 852 Parlacen, 316 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 649, 649 (illus.), 651, 651, 653–654 Parry, Hubert, 1438 Parry, Joseph, 1438 Parsons, T., 1399 Pashtuns, 1688–1689, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1693 Pasternak, Boris, 1074 Pastoral ideal, 251 Pat, Joe, 1853 Patel, A. D., 1318, 1319 Paterson, “Banjo,” 854 Pátria, and Brazil, 285–287, 288, 295 Patriarca, Silvana, 52 Patriotism and Austria, 553 and China, 1195 and France, 172 Iraq and local, 752


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and Mongolia, 1794 and national symbols, 1347 versus nationalism, 45 and Nigeria, 1186–1187 and political philosophy, 86, 91 and the Soviets, 945 and sports, 997 and the United States, 1308 Päts, Konstantin, 560, 565, 568 Patten, Jack, 1851 Paulin, Tom, 925 Pauw, Corneille de, 351 Paz, Octavio, 345–346 Peace movements, 1447–1448 Peace of Westphalia (1648), 183 Péan, Pierre, 1052 Pearse, Padraic, 449 Pearse, Patrick, 652, 918, 919, 922 Pearson, Karl, 532 Pearson, Lester B., 1838, 1839, 1840 Pearson, Noel, 1848 Peck, Raoul, 1674 Peckinpah, Sam, 1337 Pedro I, Emperor (Brazil), 289, 290, 294, 296 Pedro II, Emperor (Brazil), 290–291, 291 (illus.), 293, 296 Pelletier, Gerard, 1290 Penderecki, Krzysztof, 1434 Peres, Shimon, 1400, 1488–1489 Performance, and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 Perkins, Charles, 1846, 1848, 1851 Perlee, Kh., 1794 Perón, Juan Domingo, 278, 281, 942 Perón, María Eva Duarte de (Evita), 278 Perry, Matthew, 809 Persia, 1106–1107, 1700. See also Iran Peru, 367–379, 369 (map) and Colombia, 830 independence and, 272 and terrorism, 1491 Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 371–372 Pestalozzi, J. H., 34, 36 Pétain, Marshall, 1052 Peter the Great, 8, 20, 105, 696, 700 Peterloo Massacre, 163 Peters, Janis, 1575 Petion, Alexandre Sabes, 337, 340 Pham Van Dong, 963 Philip II (Netherlands), 196 Philippines, 1238–1248, 1240 (map) and gender, 450 and independence, 1462 separatist movements in, 1468 and terrorism, 1495 Philips, Caryl, 927 Phillips, Jock, 869 Philosophy, political, 85–97 and defining national identity, 474–476 and fascism, 514–517 and France, 171–172

and geopolitics, 460–464, 466–467 and Lenin, 1072 and national character, 527–537 and post-World War II France, 1052 postcolonial nationalist, 957–970 and Scotland, 234 See also Cosmopolitanism; Ideology Phuc Anh Gia Long, 1263 Picasso, Pablo, 1519 Pierrot, Jean Louis, 337 Pikul, Valentin, 1077 Piłsudski, Józef, 681, 682, 682, 683, 685, 687 Pinochet, Augusto, 331 Pinochet Le-Brun, Tancredo, 330 Pius IX, Pope, 665 Place names and Afghanistan, 1692 and Basque Country, 1513 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Turkey, 1652 Plato, 529 Platt Amendment, 1277, 1282 Poetry Chilean, 324–326 and Finland, 599 and forming national identities, 31, 32 and Greenland, 1570 and Japan, 491–492 and landscape, 67–69 and language, 78 and Latvia, 1577 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and Nepal, 1808 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 213, 214, 686 and Uruguay, 401 Pogge, Thomas, 97 Pogroms. See Genocide Poland, 207–218, 210 (map), 678–688, 679 (map) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and gender, 53 hostility toward German-speaking minority in, 522 Kingdom of, 209–210 and Lithuania, 558, 561, 562–563, 563 nationalism and literature in, 492–493 partition and, 21–22, 207, 209 and the Soviet Union, 948, 950 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716 uprisings against Russia in, 46 Poland-Lithuania, 207, 209, 212–213 Poles in the Baltic states, 563 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440 and Germany, 617, 1557 Political participation and Finland, 601 and France, 174


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Political participation (continued ) and gender, 46, 49–50, 53 and Germany, 620–621 and Japan, 812, 813 and Nigeria, 1188 and Northern Ireland, 1059 See also Voting franchise Political power and Afghanistan, 1685, 1686, 1686–1688 and Angola, 1666 and Armenia, 1710 and the Baltic states, 560 and Chile, 324 and China, 792 collapse of socialism and struggles for, 895–896 and Fiji, 1317 and Finland, 606 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iraq, 756–757, 1739, 1741, 1745. See also Clientelism, Iraq and and Malaysia, 1220–1223 and nationalist movements, 940 and newly independent states, 966, 967–968, 969 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Spain, 707 and the United States, 385 and Uruguay, 399 Political system. See Government(s) Politics and Afghanistan, 1686–1687, 1689–1690 and Algeria, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1101 and Alsace, 1507–1509, 1508, 1509, 1510 and Angola, 1660, 1661, 1665–1666 and Arab nationalism, 728–731 and Argentina, 271, 275, 280–281 and Armenia, 1703, 1704, 1706, 1708, 1709, 1711 and Austria, 544–546, 548–553 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1515, 1516, 1517–1519, 1521–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1535 and Brazil, 1827 and Burma, 777–780, 783–785 and Catalonia, 1539, 1539–1541 and Central America, 316–317 and China, 791–792, 793, 794 and Colombia, 827–828, 832, 833 and communications technology, 1480 and Cuba, 1275–1276, 1277, 1285–1286 and Czechoslovakia, 1017–1019 Danish, 150–151 and Egypt, 260, 261, 265 and England, 161, 162–163 and the environment, 876–877, 882–883 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171, 1172–1175 and Fiji, 1319, 1320–1322 and Finland, 605–606 and France, 178–179, 1054

geopolitics and legitimizing, 465 and Germany, 190–191, 611, 613, 620–621, 1552–1557, 1555, 1557, 1558 and Great Britain, 1011 and Greece, 628–629 and Haiti, 337–338 and Hungary, 638, 639, 641–644, 643 and hypernationalism, 1389 and the ideology of nationalism, 875 and immigration, 1427 and India, 798–802, 987, 1206–1207, 1207, 1208, 1209–1210, 1461–1462, 1763 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726, 1730 and international migration, 1414–1415 and Iran, 1109–1112, 1117 and Iraq, 754, 755, 1745–1746 and Ireland, 649–657 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 667–671, 676–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764–1765, 1768–1771 and Japan, 988, 1751, 1752, 1757 and Korea, 1780 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 and Malaysia, 1216–1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1857, 1858–1860, 1862 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1789 and Nepal, 1810–1811 and the Netherlands, 205–206 and new social movements, 1446, 1453, 1455–1456, 1458 and Nigeria, 1179–1183, 1185 and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1062–1063, 1064–1065, 1066, 1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846–1847, 1848–1849, 1850–1853 and Peru, 372–373 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 213–214, 681–685, 687 post-World War II, 973–976 and Puerto Rico, 837, 839–840, 844–847 and Québec, 1288–1289, 1290–1292 and religion, 982–989, 1064, 1112, 1394, 1395–1396 and Romania, 1586–1587, 1587, 1589 and Russia, 1597, 1597–1599, 1604, 1605 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678–1679 and the Sami, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1616 and Scandinavian nationalism, 228–231 and Scotland, 241–242, 1014 and South Africa, 1147–1149, 1148, 1152–1153 Soviet, 979 and Spain, 702–703, 709–711, 1086 and Switzerland, 250 and Turkey, 1645, 1654 and Ukraine, 718, 1621, 1622–1629, 1623, 1624, 1626, 1629 and the United States, 387–388, 389, 391, 1304, 1306


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and Uruguay, 398–399 and Wales, 1014, 1633, 1633–1635, 1639–1640 See also Government(s); Ideology; Leaders; Political power Pomare, Maui, 869 Ponce de Leon, Ernesto, 1375 Poniatowski, Józef, 211, 686 Poniatowski, Stanisław August, 210, 215 Popławski, Jan Ludwik, 681, 683 Popper, Karl, 534 Population and Algeria, 1096, 1098 and Argentina, 269, 277, 280 and Armenia, 1699 and Australia, 851–852, 1382 and Brazil, 1825, 1831 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 1836 and Central America, 311 and Colombia, 829 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Fiji, 1314 and France, 1054–1055 and Germany, 190 and Gharabagh, 1706 and Haiti, 333, 336 and Indonesia, 1723 and Israel, 1121 and Latvia, 1574 and Mexico, 346 and the Middle East, 885 and Native Americans, 893 and New Granada, 826 and New Zealand, 864, 865, 868 and Nigeria, 967 and Paraguay, 360 and the Philippines, 1247 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Russia, 1604 and the Sami, 1609 and Turkey, 1645 and Uruguay, 402 U.S., 1836 See also Ethnicity; Immigrants/immigration; Migration Population transfers. See Migration Populism, 281, 643 Porter, Jane, 239 Portugal and Angola, 1666 and Brazil, 282, 283–285, 287–289, 293 and colonialism, 889, 1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 and geopolitics, 465 and immigration, 1424 and language, 472 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397

Post-nationalism and Germany, 1555 and globalization, 1406, 1408–1410, 1411 See also Multilateralism; Transnationalism Poster, Mark, 1476 Potatau Te Wherowhero, 1856 Potocki, Ignacy, 211 Poujade, Pierre, 1054 Poverty and Brazil, 1831 and Fiji, 1322 and Pakistan, 1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 and the United States, 1308 See also Income distribution Powell, Adam Clayton, 962 Powell, Enoch, 1013 Power. See Political power Pozharsky, Dmitry, 700, 1602 Prague, 584–585 Prague Spring, 1025, 1026 Prat de la Riba, Enric, 706 Prejudice. See Discrimination/prejudice Premchad, 923 Press. See Media Pretorius, Marthinus, 1146 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 516, 705, 706, 709 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 516 Primrose, Archibald Philip, 242 Print technology, 127, 129 and Armenia, 1701 and diaspora populations, 1370 and India, 796 and Japan, 1749 and language, 479, 485 and national identity, 1474, 1475 See also Newspapers Prithvi Narayan Shah, 1803, 1803–1804, 1804, 1806 Pro-natalist policies, 878 Propaganda and Angola, 1665-1666 the arts and, 83, 176 and Australia, 1852-1853 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306 and China, 952, 1193, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 1020, 1025 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and ethnic cleansing, 441 and Germany, 186 and Greenland, 1571 and Indonesia, 1727, 1734 and Iran, 1115, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 758 and Italy, 667, 674 and Korea, 1781 and the Jacobins, 31 and Japan, 817, 818


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Propaganda (continued ) and Nazis, 133, 455 (illus.), 456, 614, 621, 1332 and Nigeria, 1181 and the Philippines, 1246 and Puerto Rico, 846 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and the Soviet Union, 508, 694, 696, 696 (illus.), 697, 699-701, 1074, 1708 and Switzerland, 255 and terrorism, 1490 and Yugoslavia, 896 Protectionism, 25, 316 and Amazonia, 1827–1828, 1831 and Argentina, 271 and Canada, 1837, 1839, 1842 and film, 1331–1332 and natural resources, 886 and new social movements, 1448 and Peru, 368 Protestantism and Czechoslovakia, 1023–1024 Dutch, 199, 200, 200–202 and fundamentalism, 1393, 1398 and Germany, 188–189 and politics, 982–983 Proust, Marcel, 489 Provençal, 471, 477 Prussia, 611, 617 and Denmark, 150 and education, 34 and German unification, 186, 191, 192 national anthem of, 117 and Poland, 210 resistance to Napoleon and women, 52 Puerto Rico, 836–847 colonialism and, 425 literacy rates in, 495 and terrorism, 1491 Pueyrredón, Juan Martín de, 273 Pujol, Jordi, 1539, 1539, 1541, 1542 Pumpurs, Andr¯ejs, 564 Punjabi Muslims, 1231, 1236, 1764–1765 Purcell, Henry, 117 Pushkin, Aleksandr, 78, 213, 694, 1437 Putin, Vladimir, 1080, 1597, 1601, 1602, 1604, 1605 Qanuni, Yunus, 1695 Qarase, Laisenia, 1324–1325 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 754, 754, 1742, 1746 Québec, 478, 1287–1297 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and separatism, 306, 307, 1470, 1471, 1836–1837, 1843 and terrorism, 1490–1491 Québec City, 299 Quezon, Manuel, 1241 Quinet, Edgar, 177 Rabin, Yitzhak, 1141, 1400–1401, 1488–1489 Rabuka, Sitiveni, 1321, 1321, 1323, 1323

Race and Afghanistan, 1688–1689 and Alsace, 1504 and Arab nationalism, 732 and Argentina, 277 and Australia, 850, 851 and the Bandung Conference, 961 and Basques, 710 and Brazil, 290, 293, 297, 1826 and Central America, 314 and Colombia, 826 and colonialism, 958 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1281 and Darwinism, 480 and Fiji, 1317, 1319, 1321, 1323, 1325 and France, 179 and gender, 47–48, 54–55, 447–448 and Haiti, 333–336, 337–339, 341 and India, 131 and Italy, 672 and Malaysia, 1222 and Mexico, 349 and Mongolia, 1792 and nationalist ideologies, 415–417, 513, 517 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 866–867, 869 and Peru, 373–375 and Puerto Rico, 837–839, 843–844 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and South Africa, 1151–1153 and the United States, 391–392, 894, 1300–1303, 1307 and Völkisch nationalism, 614, 614, 622 See also Ethnicity; Minorities Racism and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1510 and anticolonialism, 958 and Colombia, 829 education and, 429–430 and Egypt, 263 and film, 1328 and France, 1056, 1097 and gender, 447, 452–453 and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557 and Great Britain, 1013 and Hungary, 645 and immigration, 1424–1426 and imperative nationalism, 502, 510 and India, 798 and nationalism, 533–534 and Nazism, 426, 517–518 and new social movements, 1448 and Nigeria, 1179 and perversions of nationalism, 518–521 and Puerto Rico, 837 and the United States, 1310, 1339–1340 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnic cleansing; Genocide


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Radio and Canada, 1839 and Colombia, 833 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and Indonesia, 1727 in Indonesia, 1479 in nationalism, 132–133, 1474, 1475 and promoting nationalistic art, 418 and Puerto Rico, 846 Rahman, Abdul, 1218–1219, 1222 Rahman, Abdur, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1691, 1692 Rahman, Mujibur, 1466 Railroads and Argentina, 279–280 and Canada, 302, 1837 and Central America, 315 and Ethiopia, 740 and Germany, 192 in India, 131, 796 and Mexico, 355 and New Zealand, 865 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Rainis, J¯anis, 560, 564 Rakovski, Georgi, 573 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 164 Rangihau, John, 1860 Rao, Raja, 914, 921, 922 Rapp, Jean, 1504 Ras Tafari Mekonnen, 740 Rasputin, Valentin, 1077 Ratzel, Friedrich, 460, 461, 463, 488–489 Ravel, Maurice, 1437 Rawls, J., 97 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, 351 Razak, Tun Abdul, 1222, 1223 Reagan, Ronald, 945, 946, 1039, 1244, 1310–1311, 1395, 1453 Rebet, Lev, 1624 Reddy, Jai Ram, 1323 Redmond, John, 651 Reeves, Sir Paul, 1322 Reformation, 618, 1502 Refugees and Europe, 1044 and the Gharbagh conflict, 1716, 1719 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Korea, 1781 and Pakistan-Indian violence, 1234 Palestinian, 1135, 1140 Sahrawi in Algeria, 1096–1097 and Taiwan, 1257 and Tibet, 1813, 1821–1822 See also Asylum; Immigrants/immigration Regionalism, 407 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 271 and Australia, 852 and Austrian provincialism, 551–552

and Basques, 1518–1519 and Canada, 306–307, 1837, 1843 and Central America, 311–313 and Chile, 324 and Colombia, 828–829, 834 education and, 432 and the European Union, 1043, 1044 and Finland, 608 and France, 1056 and Germany, 611 and globalization, 1413, 1415 and India, 1205 and Italy, 665, 672–673 and language movements, 482 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1808, 1811 and Nigeria, 1181–1183, 1185 and Romania, 1591 and Scandinavia, 225 and Spain, 1083, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 245 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 1623 and Vietnam, 1263 See also Separatism/secession Reich, Robert, 1407–1408 Reichsland, 1505 Rej, Mikołaj, 214 Religion, 971–989 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1692, 1693–1694 and Algeria, 1095, 1102–1103 and Arab nationalism, 725, 731–732, 733 and Armenia, 1700, 1701 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Basques, 710 and Belgium, 140, 142 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1525–1526, 1528–1530 and Brazil, 289, 1825–1826 and Bulgaria, 573, 580 and Burma, 781 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1280–1281 and Czechoslovakia, 1020 and discrimination against immigrants, 1423–1424 education and, 424, 428 and Egypt, 265 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 736, 741, 742, 746 and Europe, 1031–1032 and Fiji, 1314, 1315 and France, 176 and gender, 902 and Germany, 188–189, 618 and Greece, 627 and Haiti, 339–340 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1203, 1461–1462 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728


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Religion (continued ) and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 657–658, 1470–1471 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1768 and Japan, 813–814 and Malaysia, 1217, 1223 and Mexico, 346, 347, 347–350, 356 and Mongolia, 1785, 1786, 1788, 1790, 1792 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 99–109, 519–520 and Nepal, 1806 and the Netherlands, 196, 197, 199–202, 200, 202 (illus.), 205, 206 and Nigeria, 967 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233, 1236, 1461–1462 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1243 and Poland, 216, 686 and Québec, 1293 ritualism and nationalism as substitutes for, 500–501 and Russia, 1603, 1605 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 245, 250 and terrorism, 1487, 1494–1495, 1498 and Tibet, 1816–1817 and Turkey, 769–770, 1653–1654 and Ukraine, 720 and Uruguay, 403 and Vietnam, 1270 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 See also specific religions Religious fundamentalism, 1392–1404 and the United States, 1306 Rembrandt, 203 Renan, Ernest, 95–96, 415, 475–476, 477, 501, 528–529, 1504 Renner, Karl, 542, 542 Repression and Afghanistan, 1685, 1694 and Australia, 1845–1846 and Congo/Zaïre, 1165 and counterterrorism, 1496–1498 and Eritrea, 1172 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Korea, 1773, 1775 and Latvia, 1576, 1578, 1581 and the legacies of colonialism, 893–894 and Mongolia, 1784, 1794 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Russia, 690–692 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675, 1680 and the Sami, 1615

and the Soviet Union, 1074–1075, 1075 and Spain, 708, 709, 1089, 1092 and Tibet, 1820 and Turkey, 769 and Ukraine, 722 and the United States, 1310 and women, 904 Republic of the United Provinces, 196 Republicanism, French, 409 Resettlement, forced. See Ethnic cleansing Resnick, Philip, 1842 Retief, Piet, 1150 Reventós, Joan, 1539 Revueltas, Silvestre, 76 Reyntjens, Filip, 1675 Rezanov, Nikolai, 810 Rhee Syngman, 1780 Rhodes, Cecil John, 1151 Ricasoli, Bettino, 669 Richard, Maurice “Rocket,” 1842 Richard the Lionheart, King (England), 165 Riche, Jean Baptiste, 337 Richler, Mordecai, 1296 Riefenstahl, Leni, 1332 Riegl, Alois, 415 Riel, Louis, 301, 305, 1289 Rights, 14, 129, 444 Argentina and political, 272 and Armenia, 1703, 1708 and Australia, 852, 855 Brazil and political, 290 Central America and political, 316 Colombia and human, 834 demands for, 499–500 and diaspora populations, 1371 England and political, 161, 164 and the European Union, 1041 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1325 and forms of nationalism, 1352–1354 France and, 34, 173–174, 176, 179 free speech and the United States, 387–388 Greenland and civil, 1570 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 812 and the Maori, 1858 minority verus majority, 932–933 and Nepal, 1809 the Netherlands and political, 199 and New Zealand, 873 and Nigeria, 1183 Rwanda and Burundi and human, 1675, 1679, 1680–1681 and the Sami, 1612 Switzerland and political, 249, 252–253 and Turkey, 1648, 1650 Ukraine and human, 1626 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Liberalism; Minorities Riguad, Andre, 335 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 82, 417, 1437


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Rinchen, B., 1794 Rinchino, Elbek-Dorzhi, 1793 Risorgimento, 663–665, 669, 672, 673 culture and identity and the, 671, 673–674 Rituals of belonging, 499–511. See also Ceremonies; Symbols Riva Aguero y Osma, José de la, 373, 374–375 Riva Palacio, Vicente, 355 Rivadavia, Bernardino, 272, 273 Rivera, Fructuoso, 399 Rivera Maestre, Miguel, 320 Riviere-Herard, Charles, 337 Rizal, Jose, 1245 Robert I, the Bruce, 233 Roberto, Holden, 1662, 1662 Roberts, Hugh, 1101 Roberts, Tom, 859 Robertson, Roland, 1393, 1399 Robertson, William, 234, 351 Robespierre, 175, 1489 Robinson, Mary, 1375–1376 Robles, Mariano, 317 Roca, Julio A., 280 Rodgers, Richard, 1433 Rodrigo, Joaquín, 1437 Rodrigues, José Honório, 292 Roma. See Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies) Roman, Petre, 1587 Roman Catholicism and Alsace, 1507–1508, 1508 and Belgium, 140 and Brazil, 1825–1826 and Central America, 317 and Colombia, 827, 828, 829, 832, 833 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1023–1024 and France, 179 and Germany, 189, 192, 193, 618 and Haiti, 339–340 and Ireland, 654, 661 and Mexico, 346, 347–350 and the Netherlands, 199, 200, 200–202, 202 (illus.), 204, 205 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 686 and politics, 982–983, 987–988 and Québec, 1292 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Spain, 703, 705, 707 and Uruguay, 399 Romania, 1584–1594, 1586 (map) anti-Semitism in, 521 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Romantic nationalism, 31, 406, 463, 474–475, 476 German, 10, 92 Romanticism, 527, 882, 1352–1353 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 950, 1276, 1277 Roosevelt, Theodore, 448

Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 273–275, 274 (illus.), 276, 277–278 Rosenau, James, 1368 Rosenberg, Alfred, 416, 417 Rosewall, Ken, 857 Rossé, Joseph, 1509 Rossellini, Roberto, 1333–1334 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 15, 22, 30–31, 86–87, 171, 501 and the collective will, 1054 and organicism, 462 and sovereignty of the people, 530 and Switzerland, 251 and the Terror, 174 Rozent¯als, J¯anis, 565 Rubin, Marcus, 227 Rubinstein, Anton, 82 Rubriks, Alfr¯eds, 1582 Rudbeck, Olof, 223 Runeberg, Johan Ludvig, 228, 601, 605 Rusesabagina, Paul, 1674 Rushdie, Salman, 913, 920, 921, 927 Russell, Bertrand, 1676 Russia, 689–701, 691 (map), 1596–1607, 1598 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714–1715 and the Baltic states, 562, 567–568 and the Bolshevik Revolution, 436 and Bulgaria, 575 and Denmark, 150 education and, 423 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438 and Eurasianism, 466 and Finland, 598, 605 and Greek independence, 631 and Hungary, 638 and indigenous groups, 1566 intelligentsia and nationalism in, 8 and Iran, 1110 and Japan, 815 and language, 472 and Latvia, 1576, 1582 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790–1791, 1791–1792, 1796 and music, 82, 1432, 1433, 1437, 1441 national symbols, 134–135 and new social movements, 1449 and Orthodoxy, 105–106, 983 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and Poland, 209–210, 679 and political philosophy, 93–94 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1594 and Russian nationalism, 1079–1080 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 and Scandinavia, 220 Slavophilism versus Westernizers in, 19–21 and terrorism, 1489, 1495


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Russia (continued ) and Tibet, 1818 and Ukraine, 714, 1621 See also Soviet Union Russian nationalism, 1074, 1076–1078 Russians in Latvia, 1575, 1582 in Ukraine, 1627–1628 Russification, 946, 955 and Finland, 605 versus Germanization in the Baltic states, 561–562 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), 810, 816, 820 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), 574, 763, 764 Rustaveli, Shota, 694 Rustow, Dankwart, 929 Ruthene-Americans, 589 Ruyter, Michiel de, 203 Rwagasore, Prince (Burundi), 1670 Rwanda and Burundi, 1668–1681, 1670 (map) genocide in, 968–969 Ryan, Claude, 1296 Ryckman, Pierre, 1157 Ryklin, Mikhail, 135 Ryukyu Island, 1754 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 1080 Saba, Isak, 1614 Sadat, Anwar, 266 (illus.), 985, 1398 Sadiq, G. M., 1763 Šafàrík, Pavol Jozef, 592 Safavid Dynasty, 1107–1109 Saget, Nissage, 338 Sahak, Catholicos, 1701 Said, Edward, 915, 924 Saigo Takamori, 820 Saint-Domingue. See Haiti Saint Paul’s Cathedral, 410 Sakharov, Andre, 951 Salanga, Alfredo Navarro, 1245 Salazar, Antonio, 516 Sale, Kirkpatrick, 879 Salisbury, Lord, 460 Salnave, Sylvain, 338 Salomon, Louis Lysius Felicite, 338 Salvarrieta, Policarpa, 831 Samarin, Iu. F., 692 Sami, 225, 231, 1608–1618, 1610 (map) Samper, José María, 829 Sampson, Deborah, 50 San Martín, José de, 271, 272, 277 and Peru, 370, 371 San Stefano Peace Treaty, 575 Sánchez, Miguel, 347, 349 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 354 Santa Cruz, Andrés de, 372 Santander, Francisco de Paula, 826, 827, 831, 831 (illus.) Santo Domingo, 332–333

Santos, José Eduardo dos, 1662 São Tomé e Príncipe, 1667 Sarawak, 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 Sardà, Joan, 706 Sarmatian ideology, 213–214 Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino, 276, 277, 278, 279 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1052 Saryan, Martiros, 1707 Saudi Arabia, 984, 1492 Saussure, F. de, 482 Savage, Michael Joseph, 871 Savimbi, Jonas, 1659, 1662, 1662–1663 Savoy, 175 Sayad, Abdelmalek, 1370, 1419 Sayeed, Mufti, 1769, 1770–1771 Scandinavia, 219–231, 221 (map) languages of, 471–472 Schaepman, Herman, 205 Schefferus, Johannes, 1615 Schelling, Friedrich, 67 Schieder, Theodor, 501–502 Schiller, Friedrich, 188, 251 Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 7, 415 Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, 67, 92, 415, 1110 Schleswig, 147, 149, 152, 155–156 Schmid, Alex, 1484 Schoenberg, Arnold, 1434 Schoenfeld, Eugen, 1393 Schöning, Gerhard, 227 Schumacher, John, 1245 Schuman, Robert, 190, 1034, 1509 Scotland, 166, 232–242, 1413, 1415 and communication, 1639 and devolution, 1014 and music, 1442 Scott, James, 903 Scott, Robert, 1434 Scott, Sir Walter, 238 Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 241–242, 242 Sculpture. See Monuments Sculthorpe, Peter, 1439 Second Schleswigian War, 150, 152, 153 Secularism and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Azerbaijan, 1713 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527 and France, 175, 409 and globalization, 1401–1402 and India, 1765 and Iraq, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1761, 1769 legitimacy and, 973 and Mongolia, 1796 and the Netherlands, 206 and Pakistan, 1233 and Palestinians, 1139, 1141–1142 and Québec, 1292, 1294 and religious fundamentalism, 1403


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role of symbols in, 115 and Turkey, 769, 1647, 1651–1652, 1653–1654 and Uruguay, 403 Seddon, Richard John, 868, 870 Sedition Act (U.S.), 387–388 Segregation and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1064 and South Africa, 1151–1152 Séguin, Maurice, 1294 Seipel, Ignaz, 551 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 1662 Self-determination and Austria, 544–545 and the Baltic states, 558 ethnic conflict and denial of, 888 and ethnicity, 464 and Fiji, 1317 and forms of nationalism, 1354–1355 and Israel, 1402 and Mongolia, 1790 and the Napoleonic wars, 474 and nationalistic philosophy, 476, 524 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1845 in political philosophy, 536–537, 965–966, 969 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 as a precondition of rights, 972 See also Independence; Sovereignty Self-government. See Autonomy Selim III (Egypt), 258 Sella, Quintino, 669 Senegal, 963 Senghor, Léopold, 488, 919, 963, 980–981 Separatism/secession, 1460–1472 and Angola, 1660 and Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and Burma, 780–781 and Catalonia, 1540–1541 during the Cold War, 949 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and cultural distinctiveness, 461 and gender and sexuality issues, 899 and Georgia, 897 and global governance, 459 increases in, 929 and India, 800, 804, 806 in Iran, 1112 and Ireland, 649–657 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764, 1766, 1769 and Latvia, 1581–1582 linguistic, 477 and Malaysia, 1222 and minorities, 933, 1359 and Mongolia, 1784, 1798 and New Zealand, 866 and newly independent states, 966–967 and Nigeria, 1185 in the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 844

in Russia, 1600 and Swedish speakers in Finland, 606 and Taiwan, 1259 and terrorism, 1487, 1490–1492, 1494–1495, 1494 (table) in Turkey, 1655 and Ukraine, 716, 1625 See also Civil war; Independence Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 119, 955, 1399, 1410, 1457, 1488, 1492, 1493 (illus.), 1496 casualties, 1495 Serbia, 437, 481, 1413 Serbs in Bosnia, 1527–1535 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440, 524 Sergeev-Tsenskii, S., 697 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 1368 Setus, 557 Sevak, Paruir, 1707 Sexuality, 446, 899–910 Sha, Mirwaiz Yusuf, 1764 Sha’arawi, Huda, 450 Shagari, Shehu, 1187 Shah, G. M., 1768 Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman, 732, 733 Shakespeare, William, 474, 915–917 Sharif, Nawaz, 1232 Shatterbelts, 942 Shays, Daniel, 386 Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 1626 Sheng Bright, 1440 Shepstone, Theophilus, 1145–1146 Sheptyts’kyi, Andrei, 718 Sheridan, Jim, 927 Sheridan, Richard, 915 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 1080 Shevchenko Society, 718, 719 Shiism/Shiites differences from Sunnis, 983–984, 986 and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112, 1115–1116 and Iraq, 748, 752–753, 755, 755, 757, 1745, 1747 and Pakistan, 1236 Shinto, 106–107, 108 Shostakovich, Dmitri, 1074, 1432, 1433 Shums’kyi, Oleksander, 718 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 1597 Sibelius, Jean, 79, 228, 417, 600, 605, 1436 Sidgwick, Henry, 527, 531 Sidqi, Bakr, 752 Siebenpfeiffer, Philipp Jakob, 190 Siemiradzki, Henryk, 682 Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 493, 682, 683, 685 Sierra, Justo, 355 Sieyès, Abbé, 172 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 350 Sikhs, 1466 Sikorski, Władysław, 683 Silesia, 584


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Sillars, Jim, 997 Silva, Lula da, 1829, 1830, 1831 Simeon I the Great, 574 Simms, William Gilmore, 389 Simon, Claude, 1052 Simpson, L. P., 494 Sin, Cardinal Jaime, 1246 Sinai peninsula, 262 Sinclair, Keith, 870, 872 Sindici, Orestes, 828 Singapore, 1218–1219, 1220–1221, 1221, 1224–1225 and education, 1384–1385, 1386 and Indonesia, 1733 Singh, Gulab, 1763 Singh, Hari, 1465, 1764 Singh, Manmohan, 1207 Singh, V. P., 1769 Sinhalese, 1466–1467 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), 810, 820, 1774 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 795, 810, 817, 822 Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies), 440, 517, 521, 523, 1022, 1027 Skalagrímsson, Egil, 226 Skoropad’kyi, Pavlo, 716 Skötkonung, Olof, 226 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 718 Slanský, Rudolf, 1020 Slave rebellions, Haitian, 335–336, 340 Slavery, 1301 and Brazil, 283, 289, 292, 293 and colonialism, 889, 890, 893 and Cuba, 1275 and the development of nationalism, 47 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 262 and France, 174 and Haiti, 333, 334–336 and Mexico, 345 paternalistic justifications of, 54 and Peru, 371 and the United States, 383, 385, 388, 390–391 and Uruguay, 401 Slavophilism, 20, 213, 692 and religion, 105, 108 Slesvig, 220, 222, 225 Slovakia, 584, 1017, 1021–1022, 1026–1028 and separatism, 590, 594 See also Czechoslovakia Slovenia, 1450 Słowacki, Juliusz, 212, 214 Smart, Mary Ann, 671 Smetana, Bedˇrich, 74, 74 (illus.), 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 417, 593, 594, 1435–1436 Smetona, Antanas, 560, 565, 568 Smiles, Samuel, 531 Smith, Adam, 19, 234, 855 Smith, Anthony D., 113–114, 400, 473, 929, 931, 1368–1369

Smith, Dennis Mack, 674 Smith, Zadie, 927–928 Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 1151 Smyrna, 633 Snellman, Johan Vilhelm, 601 Social Darwinism, 437, 439, 518, 532–533 and gender, 447, 452–453 and language, 480–481 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Social Democrats, 149, 975–976 Social mobility and ethnic minorities, 931 and nationalism, 5–6, 11 and technology, 1475 and the United States, 1305 See also Class Social movements and Finland, 600–601 new, 1446–1458 and the United States, 1303–1304, 1305 Social policy education reform as, 421–422, 428–429 and gender, 448–449 and women’s rights, 446–447 Social structure and Eritrea, 1170–1171 and France, 1050 and India, 1204–1205 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1676, 1680 See also Class Socialism and Alsace, 1508 and Arab nationalism, 732, 733 and Canada, 1839 and China, 789 versus communism, 975–976 and developing countries, 980, 981 disillusionment and discredit of, 936 and Egypt, 266 and France, 179, 1054 and gender, 453, 456 and Great Britain, 1011 and Iraq, 754 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and the Netherlands, 205 and Poland, 212 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Communism; Marxism Socialization and Finland, 600, 607–608 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 See also Assimilation Sokol, 594 Solanas, Fernando, 1335 Solano, Armando, 830 Solano López, Francisco, 362, 363, 363 (illus.), 364 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, 951, 1077, 1601 Somalia, 949


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Somaliland, 459 Sonam Gyatso, 1817 Songtsen Gampo, King (Tibet), 1815, 1816, 1821 Sonnenstern, Maximilian von, 320 Sontsen Gyatso, 1816 Sorel, Georges, 514 Soulouque, Faustin-Elie, 337 Sousa, John Philip, 1441 South Africa, 1144–1153, 1146 (map) and Angola, 1664, 1665 and apartheid, 890 and education, 1386 and language, 478 and music, 1440, 1441 and the Netherlands, 198 and sports, 995 and terrorism, 1491 South America and language, 478 national identity and education in, 35, 37, 39 See also specific South American countries South Korea and Japan, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 See also Korea South Tyrol, 1490 South-West Africa, 437 Southeast Asia, 778 (map), 1214 (map), 1262 (map), 1724 (map) Southern Mindanao, 1468 Sovereignty and Australia, 855 and Brazil, 1830–1831 and the environment, 886 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1718, 1719 versus globalization, 1406, 1408 and Greenland, 1571 and Japan, 814–815 and the Maori, 1856 nationalism and popular, 5, 15 and Nepal, 1805 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 and Québec, 1291–1292 See also Independence; Self-determination Soviet Union, 699 (map), 714 (map), 1070–1080, 1072 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Angola, 1663 and Armenia, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709–1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714, 1716–1717, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 563 breakup of the, 888, 895–897, 972, 1413, 1596 and China, 1197 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Cuba, 1276 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 education and, 419, 426, 430 and the environment, 881–882 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440–441

and film, 1330, 1332 and gender, 449, 450, 454 and geopolitics, 459 and Japan, 822, 1754 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780 and language, 482 and Latvia, 1575, 1576, 1578, 1581–1582 and Mongolia, 1785, 1789, 1794–1795, 1795–1796 and national identity, 693–701, 880 nationalistic art of the, 411 nationalities policy, 468–469, 946, 1599 and new social movements, 1449 and Poland, 681 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1588, 1591 and Siberia, 876 and sports, 993 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716, 719, 722 See also Russia Soyinka, Wole, 925 Spain, 702–711, 703 (map), 1082–1092, 1085 (map), 1540 (map) and Argentina, 269 and authoritarianism, 973 and Basques, 1514, 1517, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Catalonia, 1536–1537, 1544–1547 and Central America, 311–313, 314, 317–318 and Chile, 323–327 and Colombia, 825 and colonialism, 889 education and, 36, 432 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 interventions in Haiti by, 335 and Mexico, 345–346, 350, 353 and minorities, 1412 and music, 1437 and the Philippines, 1239, 1243 resistance to Napoleon, 51–52 and Santo Domingo, 332–333. 339 separatist movements in, 1471 and sports, 997, 999 symbols in, 49 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397 Spanish-American War, 1086 Speight, George, 1323–1324 Spencer, Herbert, 532–533 Spengler, Oswald, 70 Spenser, Edmund, 915 Spinoza, Baruch, 203 Spivak, Gayatri, 926 Sports, 991–1003 and Australia, 852, 857 and Canada, 1841, 1842 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and England, 165


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Sports (continued ) and Ireland, 657 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 870 and Peru, 378 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 soccer and Brazil, 295 and Turkey, 1651 and Wales, 1637 and war, 901 Sri Lanka, 1466–1467 and terrorism, 1484, 1491, 1492 St. Erik (Sweden), 226 St. Gregory, 1700 St. Laurent, Louis, 1838 Stalin, Joseph (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), 945, 1075, 1603, 1603 (illus.) and China, 978 and the Cold War, 977–978 cult of personality, 952 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 440 and gender, 449 and nationalism, 1071, 1076 nationalities policy of, 469 and Russianness, 693, 694, 697, 700–701 and Yugoslavia, 948 Stambolov, Stefan, 578 Stanford, Charles Villiers, 1438 Stanley, Henry Morton, 1156, 1160 “Star-Spangled Banner,” 117, 118 (illus.) Starˇcević, Ante, 96 Statue of Liberty, 119 Steele, James, 1843 Štefánik, Milan Rastislav, 587, 588, 1017 Stefano, Alfredo Di, 1002 Steffens, Henrik, 66–68, 69–70 Stein, Freiherr von, 34 Stephen the Great (Moldavia), 1592 Sternberger, Dolf, 1556 Stetsko, Slava, 1624 Stoilov, Konstantin, 578 Strasbourg, France, 1510 Stratification. See Class Streeton, Arthur, 859 Strindberg, August, 228 Stuart, Charles Edward (“Bonnie Prince Charlie”), 237–238, 238 Stubbs, Paul, 1450 Štúr, L’udovit, 96, 592 Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 589 Subsidiarity, 881, 1042, 1045 Sudan, 263, 1468–1469 Sudeten-Germans, 595 Sudetenland, 595, 1017–1019, 1025 Suez Canal, 259, 265–266 Suez Canal crisis, 1012 Suffrage, women’s, 446 and Australia, 853 and Germany, 620 and nationalist movements, 450

and New Zealand, 870–871 and transnational movements, 452–453 and Turkey, 770 See also Voting franchise; Women’s rights Suharto, President (Indonesia), 954, 1723, 1725, 1726, 1728, 1730–1731, 1733 Suhm, P. F., 227 Sukarno, Ahmad, 953–954, 964, 1463, 1725, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1734 and the Bandung Conference, 960–961, 962 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 1734 Sükhebaatur, General (Mongolia), 1789, 1797, 1798 Sukuna, Ratu Sir Lala, 1318 Sullivan, A. M., 658–659 Sultan, Ibrahim, 1171 Sun Yat-sen, 789, 789 (illus.), 790, 791, 794 Sunnis differences from Shiites, 983–984 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 748, 751, 754, 755, 755, 757 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1764 Suriname, 197 Suvorov, Aleksandr, 696, 1074 Švec, Otakar, 1024 Svecoman movement, 599 Sweden, 220–222 communication in, 1473 and Finland, 598 and language, 472 national anthem and holidays, 230 national identity and, 223, 226–228 and Norway, 224–225 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 Swildens, J. H., 198 Swiss army, 253 Swiss Confederation, 245, 247–248 Switzerland, 244–255, 248 (map) education and, 429 flag of, 114 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 national identity and education in, 35 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 Symbols, 111–124, 1342–1348 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Armenia, 1702 and Australia, 856, 860 and the Baltic states, 565 and Basques, 1519–1521 and Belgium, 144, 145 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Brazil, 285, 286 (illus.), 294–295 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 305 and Catalonia, 1543–1544 and Central America, 318–319, 320–321 and Chile, 327–328, 328 and Colombia, 825, 831 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 and Cuba, 1283–1284


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and England, 163 and Ethiopia, 744 and the European Union, 1042 and Finland, 600, 602, 604 and France, 175 gender and familial, 43–45, 46, 48–50, 54, 445–446, 449, 904–905, 907 and Germany, 618, 619 and Greenland, 1568–1569, 1570 and Hungary, 641–644 and Indonesia, 1732–1733 and Iran, 1114–1115 and Iraq, 757 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 1752, 1757 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 in literature, 917, 926, 927 and Mongolia, 1786, 1793–1794, 1797 and national identity, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 465 and national self-invention, 900 and Nepal, 1803 and the Netherlands, 204, 204 and Nigeria, 1184 and Northern Ireland, 1066–1067 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847, 1850 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 215, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844, 846 and Québec, 1297 religious, 99, 102, 115–116 and rituals, 500. See also Rituals of belonging and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and Scandinavia, 229–230 and Singapore, 1225 and South Africa, 1150 and Spain, 709 and Taiwan, 1258 technologies as national, 128, 134–135 and Tibet, 1818 transnational, 115 and Turkey, 766, 770, 774, 1646–1647 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 1308 and Wales, 878, 1633, 1637–1638 Syncretism and Mexico, 347–350, 349 and Paraguay, 358 Synge, John Millington, 918, 920–921, 922 Syngman, Rhee, 1773 Syria and Battle of Maysalun, 728 and Egypt, 982 as French Mandate, 728 water, 884–885 Syrian Arab Kingdom, 727–728 Szálasi, Ferenc, 516, 638 Széchenyi, Count István, 637, 643

Tacitus, 64, 617 Tagore, Rabindranath, 918 Taine, Hippolyte, 415 Taiping Rebellion, 101, 108 Taiwan, 1249–1260, 1250 (map) and film, 1337–1338 and independence, 1462, 1468 and Japan, 810, 818, 1749 Tajiks, 1692–1693, 1694–1695 Takemitsu, T¯oru, 1439–1440 Taliban, 986–987 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1691, 1692, 1693–1694 and Pakistan, 1232, 1233 Tamils, 1385, 1466–1467, 1492 Tamir, Yael, 97 Tammsaare, Anton Hansen, 565 Tan Dun, 1440 Tanzania, 962 Tarai, 1801–1802, 1804, 1808, 1811 Taraki, Mohammad, 1687 Tardivel, Jules-Paul, 1290 Tarnowski, Count Stanislaw, 493 Tartars, 1621 Tatars, 441, 469 Tawfiq, King (Egypt), 260, 261 Taylor, Charles Wood, 328, 989 Taylor, T. Griffith, 851–852 Tchaikovsky, Piotr, 82, 1432, 1437 Technology, 126–136, 1473–1483 Cold war and weapon, 944 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1370, 1376 as enabling ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and the Holocaust, 524 and ideologies, 972 image, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1428 and Iraq, 1738 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and promoting nationalistic art, 417–418 See also Internet Tegnér, Esias, 228 Telegraphy, 127–128 and Central America, 315 and Germany, 192 and Mexico, 355 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Television and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Angola, 1666 and Canada, 1838 and Catalonia, 1546 education and, 422, 433 versus film, 1336, 1339


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Television (continued ) and India, 1209 and language in Italy, 671 and Québec, 1296 and Wales, 1635, 1639 Tenzin Gyatso. See Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso) Terre’Blanche, Eugène, 1148 Territory and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532, 1532 and Israel, 1125 See also Borders; Expansionism Terror, French (1793–1974), 174–175 Terrorism, 1484–1498 and Armenia, 1707 and the Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and hypernationalism, 1389, 1410–1411 and India, 801 and Indonesia, 1728, 1729 and Italy, 676 and Japan, 821 and Pakistan, 1232 and religious fundamentalism, 986–987, 1400 and Russia, 955, 1607 and the 1970s, 1939 and Turkey, 1651, 1655 in the United States, 955 and Wales, 1637 See also Conflict/violence Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), 1493 Thailand, separatism in, 938, 1468 Thakin Soe, 780 Than Tun, 780 Thatcher, Margaret, 1013, 1040, 1453 The Birth of a Nation, 1328, 1329 (illus.) Theater and the Baltic states, 559–560 and France, 176–177 and Ireland, 918 and Québec, 1294 See also Cinema Theweleit, Klaus, 904 Thibaw, King (Burma), 782 Thiers, Adolphe, 177 Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), 115, 183, 188, 592 Thomas, Harold, 1850 Thomas, W. I., 1403 Thompson, Tom, 1841 Thomson, James, 32, 1438 Thorarensen, Bjarni, 228 Thorbecke, Johan, 198, 201 Thrace, 580, 582 Thubden Gyatso, 1818, 1820 Thyra, Queen (Denmark), 153 Tibet, 988, 1468, 1813–1823, 1815 (map) Tidemand, Adolph, 228 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 800 Tiso, Jozef, 1019 Tito, Josip Broz, 948, 978, 982, 1530 Tokugawa Nariaki, 814, 815

Tokugawa Narinobu, 814 Tokutomi Soho, 813 Tolstoi, A. N., 697 Tone, John, 51 Topelius, Zacharias, 228, 604, 605 Toronto, Canada, 1837 Totalitarianism education and, 429–430 and Europe, 419 and gender, 454–456 and imperative forms of nationalism, 501, 502, 510 Touraine, Alain, 1446, 1456 Tourism, 1028 and Cuba, 1285 and Iran, 1115 and Tibet, 1823 Tours, Georges Moreau de, 409 Toussaint-Louverture, 332, 335–336, 335 (illus.), 340, 341, 342 Toynbee, Arnold, 1368 Trade Argentina and, 269–271, 280 and Brazil, 285, 287 expositions and Scandinavia, 229 and Peru, 368 Transjordan, 728 Transnationalism and diaspora populations, 1369 and globalization, 1407 and identity among immigrants, 1427–1429 and ideologies, 972 and image technology, 1339 and literature, 927–928 versus national identities, 1348 and new social movements, 1447, 1455 and sports, 1001–1003 and women’s rights, 451–453 See also Cosmopolitanism Transportation and Argentina, 279–280 and Colombia, 833 and immigration, 1427 and Iran, 1112 and Malaysia, 1224 and Nepal, 1807 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 technological advances in, 127, 131, 136 and the United States, 388–389, 389–390 See also Railroads Transvaal, 1145–1146 Transylvania, 472 Trautmann, Catherine, 1510 Trdat III, King (Armenia), 1700 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1549 Treaty of Kiel, 220, 223 Treaty of Lausanne, 437–438, 768, 1647, 1648 Treaty of Maastricht, 1549


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Treaty of Nice, 1549 Treaty of Rome, 669 Treaty of St. Germain, 542 Treaty of Trianon, 638–639, 645 Treaty of Utrecht, 299 Treaty of Versailles, 459, 468, 476, 513–514 and Bulgaria, 580 and Czechoslovakia, 595 and Germany, 613, 617, 621 Treaty of Waitangi, 863, 873 Tremaglia, Mirko, 1372 Tremblay, Michel, 1294 Trimble, David, 1062 Troels-Lund, F., 227 Trofimenkoff, S. M., 1294 Tromp, Maarten, 203 Troost, Paul Ludwig, 413 Trotsky, Leon, 520 Trubetskoy, Prince, 94 Trubetzkoy, N. S., 94 Trudeau, Pierre, 1291, 1835, 1836, 1837–1838, 1838, 1840 Truman, Henry, 950, 1309 Tsai Ming-liang, 1338 Tschudi, Aegidius, 252 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin, 1798 Tshombe, Moise, 1469 Tsongkhapa, 1817 Tubin, Eduard, 560 Tucholsky, Kurt, 111 Tucker, George, 494 Tuheitia, 1857 Tunisia, 1464 Tupac Amaru II, 370, 371 Turanism, 641, 773–774, 1645 Turgenev, I. S., 694 Turia, Tariana, 1862 Turina, Joaquín, 1437 Turkey, 760–775, 767 (map), 1642–1656, 1644 (map) and Armenia, 1704, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1714 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438, 442 and the European Union, 1411 and gender, 446 and new social movements, 1452 water, 884–885 Turkish-Greek war (1919–1922), 522 Tutsi, 1669, 1670, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1678 Tuvan Republic, 1792 Twa, 1669, 1672, 1678 Twelve Years Truce, 200, 201 (map) Ty-Casper, Linda, 1245 Tymoshenko, Yulia, 1629, 1629 Tyrs, Miroslav, 594 U Chit Hlaing, 779 U Nu, 783 U Ottama, 779 U Saw, 780, 782

Uhde, Fritz von, 416 Ukraine, 712–722, 715 (map), 1619–1629, 1620 (map) borders of, 1413 and new social movements, 1449 and the Orange Revolution, 1080 and the Soviet Union, 1071, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1079 Ulanfu, 1790, 1794 Ulmanis, K¯arlis, 560, 565, 568, 1576, 1578 Unifications, national, 464 Union of Utrecht, 196 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Monarchy of Denmark, 147 United Nations (UN) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1533 and Canada, 307 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171 and Fiji, 1322 and Germany, 1554 High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1535 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 and interventions, 1469 and Iraq, 756, 1743 and Israel, 1121, 1125, 1135 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1765, 1767 and Korea, 1780, 1781 membership, 957 and Mongolia, 1795 and new social movements, 1456 and the nonaligned movement, 961–962, 969 and peacekeeping, 1412 and the self-determination doctrine, 972 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 510 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 273 United States, 381–392, 384 (map), 1299–1311, 1302 (map) and Afghanistan, 1690 and African Americans, 493–494 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 275 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 850 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1533 and Canada, 305, 307, 1835–1836, 1842 and China, 1191 and the civil rights movement, 938 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Colombia, 829, 830 and colonialism/expansionism, 22, 1462 and counterterrorism, 1497–1498 and Cuba, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1280 Czechoslovaks in the, 588–589 and decolonization policy, 1320 and diaspora populations, 1372 economic policy and globalization, 1407–1408, 1409 education and, 32–33, 35–39, 420, 422–426, 429, 433, 1381–1382


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United States (continued ) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and European integration, 1033 and film, 1328–1330, 1332–1333, 1337, 1339–1340 and France, 1050 and gender and sexuality, 447, 448, 450, 452, 901, 902, 907–908 and Greenland, 1563 and Haiti, 340 and immigration, 1412, 1418–1419, 1420–1421, 1424, 1428 and indigenous groups, 1566, 1845 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117, 1117 and Iraq, 1742–1743, 1746–1747 Irish in the, 654–655 and Israel, 1398, 1401 and Japan, 810, 822, 1749–1754, 1756–1757 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780, 1781 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 and landscape art, 64–66, 70 and language, 472, 482 and the League of Nations, 1402 and Mexico, 353–354 and minorities, 894, 935 and Mongolia, 1796 and music, 76, 117, 118 (illus.), 1433, 1438–1439, 1441–1442, 1443 and national identity, 465, 930, 931 nationalistic art of the, 411 and new social movements, 1446, 1448 and New Zealand, 872 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Pakistan, 1229, 1235, 1236 and Palestine, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 372 and the Philippines, 1239, 1240–1242, 1243, 1248 and Puerto Rico, 836–837, 837, 845, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1394–1396, 1400 and rituals of belonging, 509 and Russia, 1604, 1607 and Southern identity, 494–495 and sports, 994, 1000–1001 symbols of the, 114, 119, 124, 128, 134, 1346, 1347 terrorism and xenophobia in the, 1410, 1488, 1490, 1492 and Vietnam, 954, 1264–1265, 1265 and Yugoslavia, 896 See also American Revolution Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 972 Unterhalter, Elaine, 904 Urabi, Ahmed, 263–264 Urabi Revolt, 260, 263–264 Urbanization and Argentina, 278 and Basques, 1515

and Central America, 311 and Denmark, 149 and France, 1055 and Iraq, 753, 755, 755, 1737 and Korea, 1778 and language, 479 and the Maori, 1860–1861 and Scandinavia, 221 and Turkey, 772 and Ukraine, 714–715 Urquiza, Justo José de, 275, 279 Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, 829, 830 Uruguay, 393–403, 395 (map) and Argentina, 275 Argentine-Brazilian war over, 273 and Brazil, 289 and Garibaldi, 672 Utilitarianism, 531 Uvarov, S. S., 692 Uvin, Peter, 1680 Uygur, 1468 Uzbekistan, 1079 Uzbeks, 1693 Vaculík, Ludvík, 1026 Vagris, Janis, 1581 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 987, 1208 Vakatora, Tomasi, 1322 Valdemar IV (Denmark), 226 Valdemar the Great (Denmark), 153 Valdem¯ars, Krišj¯anis, 561, 562 Valdivia, Pedro de, 323, 326 Valencia, 1546 Valera, Eamon de, 1294 Valle, José Cecilio del, 315, 316 Valle-Riestra, José María, 76 Vallejo, José Joaquín, 329 Valois, Georges, 515 Values and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 1830 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1839 and Cuba, 1283 in education, 1381 exporting U.S., 944, 955–956 and Great Britain, 1008 and India, 797 and Iran, 1116 and Japan, 1754 and Latvia, 1576, 1580 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mongolia, 1793 and national character, 528–529, 530–531, 537 and nationalism, 901 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847–1848 and Poland, 686 post-materialist, 1454 and Puerto Rico, 844 and religion versus ideology, 971


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I-61

INDEX

and religious fundamentalism, 1397, 1399 and rituals of belonging, 504–506 See also Morality; Religion Van der Noot, Henri, 140 van Gogh, Theo, 1486–1487 Van Thieu, Nguyen, 1265 Vanessa-Mae, 1440 Varikas, Eléni, 53 Varley, Fred H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Varnhagen, Francisco, 292 Vasnetsov, V. M., 694 Vaughan, Olufemi, 1180 Vazov, Ivan, 576–577 Velestinlis, Rigas, 626, 631, 631 Velvet Revolution, 1026, 1028 Verchères, Madeleine de, 303 Verdi, Giuseppe, 75, 77, 79, 80, 671, 1437–1438 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 197, 203 Vermeer, Johannes, 203 Vertov, Dziga, 1330 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch, 1152, 1152 Vian, Boris, 1052 Victoria, Queen (England), 164, 237 Vieira, Luandino, 1665 Vienna Congress of 1815, 46, 197 of 1819, 35 Vietnam, 963–964, 1261–1271 and France, 1050 and gender, 446 and independence, 1463 Vietnam War, 944, 952, 954, 1265, 1265, 1310 and the United States, 1304 Vigneault, Gilles, 1294 Vigny, Alfred de, 177 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira, 1579 Vikings, 228 Vilde, Eduard, 565 Villa-Lobos, Heitor, 76, 1439 Villarán, Manuel Vicente, 374 Vilnius, Lithuania, 563, 563 Vinnen, Carl, 416 Violence. See Conflict/violence Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène, 415 Virgin of Guadalupe, 347, 348 (illus.), 349–350, 356 in Peru, 376 Visconti, Luchino, 1334 Vivekananda, Swami, 802 Vizcardo y Guzmán, Juan Pablo, 370 Vlad the Impaler (aka Dracula), 1592 Vodou (Voodoo), 340 Vogel, Sir Julius, 865 Volhynia, 716 Völkisch nationalism, 613, 614, 614, 622 Voltaire, 14–15, 370 Voluntarism, 1196, 1197, 1198–1199 von Flüe, Niklaus, 253 von Metternich, Klemens, 671

von Ranke, Leopold, 41, 101, 227 Vonk, Jean Francoise, 140 Voting franchise and Argentina, 275 and Australia, 853 and diaspora populations, 1365, 1366, 1371–1372 and England, 161, 164 and Finland, 605 and Germany, 611 and Haiti, 336 and Italy, 669, 670 and the Netherlands, 199 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 250 and Uruguay, 401 See also Democracy; Suffrage, women’s Vramshapuh, King (Armenia), 1701 Vytautas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Wade, P., 1450 Wagner, Richard, 74, 77, 79, 406, 463, 1431 Wagner, Robert, 1508 Wais, Mir, 1690 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 863 Walcott, Derek, 914, 921 Waldheim, Kurt, 550 Walensa, Lech, 948 Wales, 166, 1631–1640, 1634 (map) and devolution, 1014 nationalism and environmentalism in, 878, 881 Walker, William, 313, 318 Wallace, Henry, 1303, 1309 Wallace, William, 232–233, 238–239, 240 (illus.) Wallot, Paul, 408 Walser, Martin, 1558 Walton, William, 1433, 1438 Walzer, M., 97 Wang Xilin, 1440 War of 1812, 388 War of the Pacific, 327, 330, 376 (map), 377, 377–378 Ward, Russel, 854 Warren, Robert Penn, 495 Warsaw Pact, 945 Wartburg Festival, 187 Washington, George, 387 Water, 884–885 Watkins, Melvin, 1842 Weber, Carl Maria von, 73, 74, 117, 1431 Weber, Eugen, 9, 102, 179 Weber, Max, 3–4, 40, 982, 1399, 1402 Webster, Noah, 32–33, 389 Weimar Republic, 613, 613, 620–621 and film, 1330–1331 See also Germany Weissman, Stephen, 1676 Weitz, Margaret, 905 Weizmann, Chaim, 1123, 1123


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INDEX

Welfare state and Canada, 302–303, 306, 1290 and New Zealand, 870–871 and the United States, 944, 1300, 1309 See also Socialism Welhaven, Johan, 228 Wellington, Duke of, 164 Werner, Abraham, 67 Werner, Anton von, 409 West Germany, 976, 1448, 1490. See also Germany West Papua, 1468 Western, the ( film), 1332–1333, 1337 Western Sahara, 1468 Westernization and India, 1211 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Russia, 692 Wetterlé, Emile, 1508, 1508 Whitehead, Gillian, 1439 Whitlam, Gough, 1845 Wielopolski, Aleksander, 212 Wilhelm I (Germany), 619 Wilhelm II (Germany), 416, 621 Wilhelmina, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Willems, Jans Frans, 145 William I of Orange (the Netherlands), 141, 142, 196, 197, 203 William II (the Netherlands), 199 William III (the Netherlands), 201 Williams, Edward (Iolo Morgannwg), 1638 Williams, Kyffin, 1637 Williams, Ralph Vaughan, 1434 Wilson, A. T., 1742 Wilson, Woodrow, 464, 1328 Fourteen Points Speech, 436, 972 and Iraq, 749 principle of self-determination, 1790 Winter War, 607 Wirth, Johann Georg August, 190 Wislicenus, Hermann, 408 Wolfe, James, 299, 303, 304, 1840 Wölfflin, Heinrich, 416 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 53 Women and Afghanistan, 1457, 1690, 1694 and Algeria, 1105 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 264, 265 Eritrean, 1173 and fascism, 454–456 and France, 1047, 1050 and Germany, 620 and India, 1209, 1210 and Ireland, 661 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1065 and the Philippines, 1246 and postcolonial gender roles, 926–927 and social policies, 448–449 as symbols, 445–446, 926, 1345

and Turkey, 769, 770, 1653, 1654 and the United States, 901, 1304 and Wales, 1636 and war, 449–450 See also Gender; Women’s rights Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 453 Women’s movements, 1449, 1450, 1452–1453 Women’s rights, 53–54, 57, 446, 450–451 and France, 173–174, 176 and Germany, 620 and Greece, 53 revolution and, 46, 50–52 social policy and, 446–447 and socialism, 56–57 and Switzerland, 249 transnationalism and, 451–453 See also Suffrage, women’s Wood, Henry, 1438 World Bank, 1610 World divided. See Cold War World War I and Arab nationalism, 727–728 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and assassination of Habsburg heir, 1490 and Australia, 855–856 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529–1530 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306, 1835 colonialism and the causes of, 514 and the Czechoslovaks, 588–589, 593 education and, 426 and Ethiopia, 740 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 438 and fascism, 515 gender roles and, 449 and Germany, 613, 621–622 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 638 and India, 804 and Iraq, 1739, 1742 and Ireland, 651, 660 and Italy, 667, 670 and New Zealand, 868–869 and the Ottoman Empire, 765 and Poland, 682, 682–683 results of, 419, 436, 527 and South Africa, 1150 and statuary, 412 and Turkey, 1643, 1649 and Ukraine, 713 World War II and Alsace, 1507, 1508 and Australia, 857 and Austria, 547–548 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Bulgaria, 582 and Burma, 781, 784–785 and Canada, 302, 1835 and China, 1197


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Yassin, Ahmad, 1137, 1138 Yeats, William Butler, 487–488, 487 (illus.), 489, 654–655, 657, 659, 914, 918 Cathleen ni Houlihan, 922 Yeltsin, Boris, 946, 1079, 1080, 1597, 1597, 1605 Yohannes, Emperor (Tigray), 739 Yrigoyen, Hipólito, 281 Yrjö-Koskinen, Yrjö Sakari, 601 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 1725 Yugoslavia civil wars of, 525, 896, 1044, 1413–1414 common language versus religious difference in, 529 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and international interventions, 1408–1409 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Yushchenko, Viktor, 1080, 1622–1623, 1623, 1626, 1628 Yuson, Alfred A., 1245 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 902

and Czechoslovakia, 594–596 and Eritrea, 1170 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 435, 437–441. See also Holocaust and expansionism after World War I, 524 and Fiji, 1318–1319 and France, 1051–1052, 1052 and gender roles, 450 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 645 and India, 804–806 and Indonesia, 1733 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 667, 674–675 and Japan, 817–818, 822, 1749, 1751 and Malaysia, 1215–1216 music related to, 1433–1434 and nationalism, 509–510, 1490 and New Zealand, 869–870, 872 and Nigeria, 1181 and Palestinians, 1135 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1851 and Poland, 681, 683, 688 role of religion in, 106–107 and Russia, 1603 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and sexualized imagery, 905–907 and the Soviet Union, 1073, 1074, 1075 and Taiwan, 1250–1251 and terrorism, 1496 and Ukraine, 713, 722 Woronicz, J., 692 Worringer, Wilhelm, 415 Wright, Erik Olin, 2 Writing/alphabets, 481, 577, 1529 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703, 1706 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788, 1793, 1798 and Romania, 1591 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Tibet, 1815 and Turkey, 773, 1652 Wybicki, Józef, 215 Wysłouch, Bolesław, 681, 685 Xenophobia, 1411–1412, 1415. See also Hypernationalism Xenophon, 1697 Xu¯ant˘ong, Emperor, 1818 Yacine, Kateb, 1100 Yamin, Muhammad, 1727, 1727–1728 Yanaev, Gennadii, 1582 Yang, Edward, 1338 Yanukovych, Viktor, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625

Zaghlul, Saad, 262–263, 263 Zaghlul, Safiyya, 263 Zahir Shah, Mohammed, 1687, 1689 Zaïre. See Congo and Zaïre Zanabazar, 1791 Zavala, Lorenzo de, 353–354 Zealots, 1489 Zeroual, Liamine, 1099 Zetkin, Clara, 453 Zhamtsarano, Tsyben, 1793 Zhdanov, Andrei, 1075–1076 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 1078, 1079–1080 Zhou Enlai, 962, 1816, 1821 Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, 1232 Zimbabwe, 1441 Zimmers, Oliver, 244 Zinnermann, J. G., 41 Zinovief, Grigory, 520 Zionism, 103, 104 (illus.), 1120–1121, 1121, 1123–1125, 1126 and agricultural settlements, 1122 and Arab nationalism, 730 and the arts, 1127 and forming national identity, 1127–1130 and language, 477 and Palestinians, 1133 Žižka, Jan, 1023 Zografos, Panagiotis, 632 (illus.) Zola, Emile, 134 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 1074 Zta-Halein, Kathinka, 52 Zulus, 27, 1150 Zurayq, Qustantin, 732, 732 Zyuganov, Gennady, 1079–1080, 1597


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About the Editors

Guntram H. Herb, Ph.D., is associate professor of geography at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. In addition to peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, his published works on nationalism include Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945 and the collection of essays co-edited with David H. Kaplan, Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. David H. Kaplan, Ph.D., is professor of geography at Kent State University in Ohio. He is an editor of the journal National Identities. His six books include Boundaries and Place (with Jouni Häkli) and Nested Identities (with Guntram Herb). He has also published over 30 peer-reviewed articles and chapters, many of them in the field of nationalism.


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