Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview, Volume 2: 1880 to 1945

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Author: Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan (editors)

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

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volume 2 1880 to 1945

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview V o lume 2 1880 to 1945

GU N T R AM H . H E R B D AV I D H . KA P L A N Editors

S A N TA B A R B A R A , C A L I F O R N I A

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Copyright 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nations and nationalism : a global historical overview / Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-907-8 (alk. paper) 1. History, Modern—18th century. 2. History, Modern—19th century. 3. History, Modern—20th century. 4. Nationalism—History. I. Herb, Guntram Henrik, 1959– II. Kaplan, David H., 1960– D299.N37 2008 320.54—dc22 2008004478

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an ebook. Visit abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 Senior Production Editor Cami Cacciatore Production Editor Kristine Swift Production Manager Don Schmidt Media Manager Caroline Price Media Editor Katherine Jackson File Management Coordinator Paula Gerard This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

volume 2 1880 to 1945

Contents List of Contributors

vii

Preface xi Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii

Thematic Essays 405 Culture and Nationalism Neil McWilliam 419 Education and Nationalism Peter J. Weber 435 Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide Eagle Glassheim 444 Gender and Nationalism in the Age of Self-Determination Katherine O’Sullivan See

555 Baltic Nationalism Kevin C. O’Connor 570 Bulgaria Antonina Zhelyazkova 583 Czechoslovakia Maria Dowling 597 Finland Jouni Häkli 609 Germany Stefan Berger 623 Greece Gregory Jusdanis 635 Hungary Steve Jobbitt

458 Nationalism and Geopolitics Gertjan Dijkink

647 Ireland William Jenkins

471 Language and Nationalism John E. Joseph

663 Italy Nicola Pizzolato

485 Literature and Nationalism Jason Dittmer

678 Poland Patrice M. Dabrowski

499 National Rituals of Belonging Ulf Hedetoft

689 Russia David Brandenberger

512 Perversions of Nationalism Aristotle A. Kallis

702 Spain Frederic Barberà

527 Philosophy, National Character, and Nationalism Paul Gilbert

712 Ukraine Yaroslav Hrytsak

Europe 539 Austria Lonnie R. Johnson

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Middle East and Africa 724 Arab Nationalism Ralph Coury

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736 Ethiopia Mohammed Hassen Ali and Seyoum Hameso

808 Japan Neil Waters

747 Iraq Peter Wien

824 Colombia Jane M. Rausch

760 Turkey Kyle T. Evered

836 Puerto Rico Juan Manuel Carrión

Americas

Oceania

Asia 776 Burma Jörg Schendel

849 Australia Stephen Alomes

787 China Hong-Ming Liang

862 New Zealand Linda Bryder Index

796 India John McLane

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List of Contributors

Marco Adria University of Alberta

Linda Bryder University of Auckland

Christopher A. Airriess Ball State University

Melanie E. L. Bush Adelphi University

Mohammed Hassen Ali Georgia State University

Roderick D. Bush St. John’s University

Stephen Alomes Deakin University

Juan Manuel Carrión University of Puerto Rico

Celia Applegate University of Rochester

Sun-Ki Chai University of Hawaii

Christopher P. Atwood Indiana University

Colin M. Coates York University

Ghania Azzout University of Algiers

Saul B. Cohen Queens College CUNY

Alan Bairner Loughborough University

Jerry Cooney Louisville University (emeritus professor)

Frederic Barberà Lancaster University Joshua Barker University of Toronto Roderick J. Barman University of British Columbia Patrick Barr-Melej Ohio University Berch Berberoglu University of Nevada, Reno Stefan Berger Chris Bierwirth Murray State University Brett Bowden University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Stella Coram Independent Scholar Stéphane Corcuff University of Lyon Jeffrey J. Cormier University of Western Ontario Ralph Coury Fairfield University Philippe Couton University of Ottawa Kathryn Crameri University of Sydney Ben Curtis Seattle College Patrice M. Dabrowski Harvard University

David Brandenberger University of Richmond

Dev Raj Dahal Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nepal

David Brown Murdoch University

Gertjan Dijkink University of Amsterdam

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CONTRIBUTORS

Jason Dittmer University College London

Dennis Hart Kent State University

Chris Dixon University of Queensland

David Allen Harvey New College of Florida

Christine Doran Charles Darwin University

Stephen Heathorn McMaster University

Maria Dowling St. Mary’s College

Ulf Hedetoft Aalborg University

Stéphane Dufoix Universite Paris X–Nanterre

Jennifer Heuer University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Kevin C. Dunn Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Vernon Hewitt University of Bristol

Jordana Dym Skidmore College

Helen Hintjens Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands

Jonathan Eastwood Washington and Lee University

Yaroslav Hrytsak Central European University

Aygen Erdentug Bilkent University

Hugh Hudson Georgia State University

Kyle T. Evered Michigan State University

Bonny Ibhawoh McMaster University

Søren Forchhammer University of Copenhagen

Grigory Ioffe Radford University

Will Fowler University of St. Andrews

Zachary Irwin Penn State University–Erie, The Behrend College

Michael E. Geisler Middlebury College Paul Gilbert University of Hull Eagle Glassheim University of British Columbia Arnon Golan Haifa University Liah Greenfeld Boston University Jouni Häkli University of Tampere

Tareq Y. Ismael University of Calgary Nils Jacobsen University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign Laura Dudley Jenkins University of Cincinnati William Jenkins York University Steve Jobbitt University of Toronto

Seyoum Hameso University of East London

Lonnie R. Johnson Austrian-American Educational Commission (Fulbright Commission), Vienna

Paul Hamilton Brock University

Rhys Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Samira Hanifi University of Algiers

Cynthia Joseph Monash University

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CONTRIBUTORS

John E. Joseph University of Edinburgh

Christopher Marsh Baylor University

Gregory Jusdanis The Ohio State University

Warren Mason Miami University, Ohio

Aristotle A. Kallis Lancaster University

John Maynard University of Newcastle, Australia

Antoni Kapcia Nottingham University

John M. McCardell Jr. Middlebury College

Martha Kaplan Vassar College

John McLane Northwestern University

Sharon Kelly University of Toronto

Kim McMullen Kenyon College

James Kennedy University of Edinburgh

Neil McWilliam Duke University

Robert Kerr University of Central Oklahoma

Nenad Miscevic Central European University

P. Christiaan Klieger Oakland Museum of California

Graeme Morton University of Guelph

David B. Knight University of Guelph Hans Knippenberg University of Amsterdam Taras Kuzio George Washington University Albert Lau National University of Singapore Orion Lewis University of Colorado, Boulder Hong-Ming Liang The College of St. Scholastica Catherine Lloyd University of Oxford Ouassila Loudjani University of Algiers

Joane Nagel University of Kansas Byron Nordstrom Gustavus Adolphus College Kevin C. O’Connor Gonzaga University Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas Steven Oluic United States Military Academy Kenneth R. Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Brian S. Osborne Queen’s University Cynthia Paces The College of New Jersey

Norrie MacQueen University of Dundee

Razmik Panossian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

Paul Maddrell Aberystwyth University

Christopher Paulin Manchester Community College

Fouad Makki Cornell University

Hooman Peimani Bradford University

Virginie Mamadouh University of Amsterdam

Nicola Pizzolato Queen Mary University of London


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CONTRIBUTORS

Linda Racioppi Michigan State University

Ray Taras University of Colorado

Pauliina Raento University of Helsinki

Jessica Teets University of Colorado, Boulder

Jane M. Rausch University of Massachusetts–Amherst

Anne Marie Todd San Jose State University

Elizabeth Rechniewski University of Sydney

Anna Triandafyllidou Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Angelo Restivo Georgia State University Elisa Roller European Commission Luis Roniger Wake Forest University Marianne Rostgaard Aalborg University Victor Roudometof University of Cyprus Mona Russell East Carolina University Jörg Schendel Independent Scholar Conrad Schetter University of Bonn Klaus Schleicher University of Hamburg Katherine O’Sullivan See Michigan State University Nanda R. Shrestha Florida A&M University Daniel Speich ETH Zurich Alberto Spektorowski Tel Aviv University Daniel Stone University of Winnipeg Christine Straehle University of Quebec at Montreal Laszlo Strausz Georgia State University William H. Swatos Jr. Association for the Sociology of Religion

Toon van Meijl University of Nijmegen Neil Waters Middlebury College Peter J. Weber University of Applied Languages (SDI), Munich Ben Wellings The Australian National University George W. White Frostburg State University Joseph M. Whitmeyer University of North Carolina, Charlotte Peter Wien University of Maryland Michael Wood Dawson College Kathleen Woodhouse Rutgers University David N. Yaghoubian California State University, San Bernardino Takashi Yamazaki Osaka City University Antonina Zhelyazkova International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria Research Assistants Gruia Badescu Zachary Hecht-Leavitt Jonathan Hsu Kathleen Woodhouse Cartography Conor J. Stinson Jonathan Hsu


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Preface

What is a nation? What is nationalism? What does it mean to examine them in global perspective? We conceive of a nation or national identity as a form of loyalty. People have a multitude of loyalties: to family, friends, places, clubs, institutions, regions, countries, even to their place of work or brands of products. What distinguishes loyalty to a nation is the primacy it holds on people’s allegiance. It is so powerful that people are willing to give their lives to ensure the continued existence of the group members and territory that make up their nation. By extension, we call nationalism the process that defines, creates, and expresses this essential loyalty to the nation. We view the term nationalism in a neutral sense. While this process can take extreme forms and lead to violent aggression and the extermination of others, nationalism can also be benign and form the basis for peaceful coexistence. Nations and nationalism have found a bewildering range of expressions across the world and through time, and it is this geographic and temporal variation that we seek to address in a systematic fashion. Given the sheer number of nations that exist or have existed historically—some scholars argue that there are as many as 4,000–5,000 in just the contemporary era—our global perspective does not attempt to be comprehensive. Instead we have chosen to follow cross-sections through time and space. We identify major historical eras in the development of nations and nationalism to examine characteristic themes and representative cases from all major regions of the world. Our emphasis is on depth rather than breadth. The 146 entries in this encyclopedia are full-length articles that go in depth to cover major debates and issues instead of brief descriptions of general features. They are authored by reputable scholars and try to provide accessible introductions to topics that are ambiguous, complex, and frequently misunderstood. Because literature on nations and nationalism arguably ranks among the most diverse and convoluted, our goal is to provide students, nonspecialists, and even junior scholars with concise information on this subject. In deciding what cases and themes to use, we take representative examples from each world region. These run the gamut from large powerful nations such as China and Russia to smaller nations that do not enjoy any form of sovereignty, like Tibet and Wales. We try to cover both prosperous nations of the developed world along with ex-colonial nations in the less-developed world. Similarly, some nations only appear during one time period, and others do not appear at all, because the most important consideration for us was that at least one representative example from all major regions of the world was included, even if scholarship has sorely neglected or sidelined that area, such as in Africa. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The selection of specific themes and cases that are treated intensively means that our coverage will have some unavoidable gaps. For example, there are no thematic chapters that treat race independently. This omission is not because we consider the issue to be of little significance, but because we feel that race is so elemental to discussions of nations and nationalism that it cannot be separated out. Similarly, it was not always possible to stick to the neat historical categorization into the four time periods. Some of our entries bridge several volumes to provide the most effective treatment of individual cases and themes. This encyclopedia is arranged chronologically in four volumes. The first volume traces the origins and formative processes of nations and nationalism from 1770 to 1880. The second volume covers the aggressive intensification of nationalism during the age of imperialism, from 1880 to 1945. The third volume deals with the decline of nationalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, from 1945 to 1989. The final volume outlines the transformations of nationalism since the end of the Cold War in 1989. All 104 country essays have the same format, and each is approximately 4,000 words. Each includes a chronology to position the reader in time; a discursive essay on main features; illustrations to help the reader visualize specific issues, situations, or persons; and a brief bibliography to guide additional inquiries. The case study essays also contain sidebars that highlight unique events, persons, or institutions. The main essays all contain five sections that help structure the inquiry and provide a universal key to access the information: (1) “Situating the Nation” places the national case in a historical, political, social, and geographic context; (2) “Instituting the Nation” examines key actors and institutions as well as philosophical foundations; (3) “Defining the Nation” discusses the role of ethno-cultural, civilizational, and geographic markers in creating the us–them distinction that is at the heart of national identity; (4) “Narrating the Nation” addresses particular events, stories, and myths that are used to create a community of belonging; and (5) “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” focuses on actions and strategies that help legitimize the national idea. Our 42 thematic essays address the interplay between national identity, politics, culture, and society and are generally 6,000 words long. They focus on geopolitical contexts and economic conditions, such as postcolonialism and globalization; social relations, such as gender and class; dominant philosophies and ideologies, such as fascism and fundamentalism; and nationalist cultural creations and expressions, such as art, literature, music, or sports. Though specific themes vary in each of the four volumes, each of the thematic essays include bibliographies and illustrations, and touch on the following questions: (1) How were the issues/phenomena under discussion important? (2) What is the background and what are the origins? (3) What are major dimensions and impacts on different groups, societal conditions, and ideas? (4) What are the consequences and ramifications of this issue for the character and future development of nations and nationalism? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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We feel that our encyclopedia makes an important addition to the current reference literature on nations and nationalism. Existing encyclopedias in the field generally contain only very brief entries (Spira 1999, 2002; Leoussi 2001); are dated (Snyder 1990); neglect such civic nations as the United States or Switzerland (Minahan 2002); or are uneven because they combine a few excessively long survey articles with several extremely short entries (Motyl 2001). A universal and significant shortcoming is the lack of maps and illustrations. Except for a limited number of general maps and select illustrations in Minahan, the other works do not have a single map, figure, or image. We believe that an encyclopedia on nationalism must contain visual information for it to effectively convey the contexts within which nationalist movements arose and to depict the important symbology that was used to galvanize national sentiment. Our encyclopedia also offers a unique and novel way to access information on nations and nationalisms. The thematic entries give insights into the larger contexts for the country essays and illustrate linkages among them in regard to general topics such as national education. The individual country entries allow readers to compare and contrast developments in different places and to examine trends in major regions of the world during different time periods. Finally, since some of the places and themes appear in all four volumes, it is possible to trace developments and identify linkages not only among places, but also through time. We hope that this encyclopedia helps to further an understanding of perhaps the most influential set of identities and ideologies in the world today. We also hope that this collection of cases and themes selected across space and time sheds some light on the different ways in which these loyalties are manifested. While this encyclopedia constitutes a very large body of work, it can only scratch the surface of all of the different varieties inherent in a study of nations and nationalism. We encourage the reader to follow up on some of the selected readings that are listed at the end of each entry and to further explore some of the various cases and themes that have not been explicitly addressed. References Leoussi, Athena S. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Minahan, James. 2002. Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Motyl, Alexander J. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. San Diego: Academic Press. Snyder, Louis. 1990. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York: Paragon House. Spira, Thomas. 1999 (vol. 1), 2002 (vol. 2). Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.


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Acknowledgments

An enormous undertaking such as this four-volume work could not be accomplished without the help of several individuals. Of course we would like to thank all of our contributors, who were wonderful about following formatting guidelines, making revisions, and cheerfully supplying additional material as the need arose. We are very saddened that one of our contributors, Jeffrey Cormier, did not live to see the publication of this work. We would also like to pay special thanks to the people at ABC-CLIO, among them Ron Boehm, Wendy Roseth, Kristin Gibson, and especially Alex Mikaberidze. The efforts of ABC-CLIO’s publication team have allowed us to complete this project in a sustained and timely manner. Above all we wish to extend our gratitude to those people who have worked tirelessly in assisting us in this endeavor. Their efforts are reflected throughout these four volumes. Kathleen Woodhouse from Kent State University was instrumental in helping to conceive of this project, in identifying and lining up the contributors, and in evaluating and editing each and every entry in Volumes 3 and 4. She also played a major part in the development of three of the essays. She has been an enormous asset and has worked tirelessly to see this project from start to finish. Gruia Badescu, Zachary Hecht-Leavitt, Jonathan Hsu, and Conor Stinson provided invaluable assistance in Middlebury, Vermont. Their contributions would not have been possible without the generous support of Middlebury College, which is deeply appreciated. Zach and Gruia aided in identifying contributors, selecting illustrations, and managing numerous administrative tasks. Zach’s excellent writing and editorial skills ensured that many of the entries authored by non-native English speakers were transformed into stylistically polished pieces. Gruia’s remarkable linguistic skills and knowledge of the scholarship of nationalism allowed him to contribute deep insights to the review process as well as to the drafting of two introductory essays. Jonathan Hsu and Conor Stinson are to be credited for the beautiful cartographic design. Producing maps for these volumes proved to be a challenging and enormous project. The maps needed to vary greatly in scale—from small areas, such as Estonia, to giant regions, such as Russia—but at the same time needed to allow for easy comparisons. The historical maps were particularly difficult given the numerous border changes that took place and the lack of good reference sources, but Jonathan mastered this hurdle with ease. He is not only a gifted cartographer but an excellent researcher. Putting on the finishing touches to turn the massive manuscript and numerous images and maps into a coherent and beautiful set of volumes was also an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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enormous challenge, and we were fortunate to have the able assistance of Cami Cacciatore, Kristine Swift, and Kerry Jackson at ABC-CLIO and of Samuel Lazarus, Caitlin Sargent, and Mithra Harivandi at Middlebury College. Finally, we would like to thank our families for the unwavering support they gave us throughout this giant undertaking. We dedicate this work to the memory of David Woodward.


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Introduction Volume 2: 1880 to 1945

This second volume traces the development of nations and nationalism from the 1880s to the end of World War II in 1945. This is the period that witnessed the most intense applications of the national idea. It was used to strengthen the internal cohesion of existing nation-states, to justify their territorial expansion, and to expel or exterminate those who were deemed to be outsiders. It was also used by ethnic minorities who felt threatened by this new nationalism to demand selfdetermination in their own nation-states. While these activities continued trends that had started in the preceding period, they now took on an incredible urgency and fervor in a climate of increased power struggles among states; power struggles that culminated in two world wars and genocide. Three major changes were responsible for this accelerated competition and the increased importance of nationalism. First, there was the universal recognition at the end of the 19th century that the world was finite. The world had essentially been mapped. From now on, conflicts between states could no longer be diffused through the discovery of new lands, and competition over territories intensified. Second, the spread of industrialization to an increasing number of states brought in a powerful dynamic: not only was there a greater demand for resources and new markets overall, but some countries advanced more quickly and challenged the established order. Third, the influence of religion further declined and was replaced by new philosophies that were premised on competition, like evolutionary theory. In light of Darwin’s notion of survival of the fittest, struggle (and by extension war) was viewed as endemic to life. Conflict was deemed unavoidable. The first major change during this era was the general realization that the age of discovery and exploration had come to a close. The only blank spaces left on the world map were in the interior of Africa and in such forbidding climatic zones as the polar latitudes and the Australian central desert. Without new spaces to discover, competition for the last remaining portions of land became fierce. This is why the period is often identified as the climax of imperialism. Africa was the biggest price that was left, and in their “scramble for Africa,” European states arbitrarily divided up the continent during a conference in Berlin during 1884–1885. Only Ethiopia and later Liberia were to remain independent states on the African continent. Europeans either encouraged such ethnic divisions as the hierarchization of Hutus and Tutsis in what was to become Rwanda, or lumped together ethnic groups in territorial entities with no historical coherence, both actions creating important challenges for the independent African N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nation-states after the 1960s. Competition for territory also intensified in the Pacific where European states, the United States, and Japan tried to snatch up as many of the remaining islands as possible. These were important stopover points on transpacific trade routes. Increased competition over a finite amount of territory meant that each state had to ensure it maintained control over what it had. In nation-states, the government could simply call on the people, that is, the nation to defend the territory and even to support wars of expansion, regardless of whether they were civic nation-states, like the United States, or ethnic nation-states, like Germany and Italy. Multiethnic empires faced much greater challenges. Calls for the defense of the empire rang hollow with large parts of the population, either because they had little vested interest in supporting a system that treated them as subjects or because they were ethnic minorities that felt little connection with the other groups living in the same empire. Moreover, when the rulers tried to assert control through force, centralized educational policies, and the like, ethnic minorities became more aware of being the “other.” This engendered greater demands for self-determination and helps explain why we see the end of two major multiethnic empires during this period, the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman. The second major change had to do with the uneven spread of industrialization. As more countries became industrialized, some of them, like Germany, the United States, and Japan, industrialized at an accelerated pace. Their later start gave them an edge because their modern factories were more efficient. In addition, there was heavy government involvement because the construction of transport systems, like railroads, canals, and steamships, or public works, like dams, were seen as effective ways to strengthen the cohesion of the nation and to project its power. Finally, these countries were also latecomers to the global imperial game—Germany and Japan only recently had become unified nationstates, and the United States initially had focused on expanding within its own continent—they vigorously started to push for overseas colonies in the late 19th century. This meant that not only was there an overall greater competition for markets and resources but that the balance of power was destabilized in a dynamic fashion. Germany was the most serious threat to the existing distribution of power because it directly challenged British supremacy on the seas. It pursued an aggressive naval buildup under its emperor, Wilhelm II, who had world power ambitions and wanted to give the new nation “a place in the sun.” Japan similarly started to flex its military might in the Far East and, after wars with China and Russia, expanded into the Asian mainland and the Pacific by taking control of Korea and Taiwan. The United States took advantage of the weakening imperial reach of Spain. After defeating Spain in a brief war in 1898, the United States occupied the Philippines and Puerto Rico and asserted more and more power in the Caribbean and the Americas. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The third major change comes from the increasing influence of new philosophies that replaced previously dominant religious world views. Evolutionary theories, such as Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859), offered a convincing way to conceptualize the world of the late 19th century. Th ey postulated that life was based on competition, which was conveniently applied to human societies. Just as animals were engaged in a struggle for survival, so were nations. Rivalries among nations were endemic, which meant that war could not be avoided. Along the same lines, domination of some nations over others was considered a part of the natural order and helped explain and justify the need for imperialism and conquests. These views also inspired such geopolitical or geostrategic schemes as those by Halford Mackinder and Alfred Thayer Mahan, which outlined territories that had to be brought under control to ensure global dominance. Alternative philosophies, like communism, socialism, and anarchism, which argued for an egalitarian society, had less influence because they required a radical restructuring of society. These other world views were vigorously oppressed by those in power and only were adopted in a few places after violent revolutions, such as 1917 Russia. The influence of the new evolutionary world view can be seen in the aggressive arms buildup and naval race during this era as well as increasing military engagements. Apart from border wars in the Americas—the War of the Pacific of 1879–1884 (Bolivia and Peru versus Chile) or the Chaco War of 1932–1935 (Bolivia versus Paraguay)—there were numerous conflicts associated with the imperialist frenzy described above in which Western powers exploited their technological superiority to conquer territory. The development of more and more sophisticated weaponry and greater willingness to engage in wars came to a terrifying climax during the industrialized warfare of World War I with the senseless slaughter of millions of people. The world order that followed World War I was inspired by the principles outlined in U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech. It attempted to pacify the situation by granting self-determination to oppressed national groups in Europe since the trigger event had been the assassination of the archduke of Austria-Hungary by a Serb nationalist. As a result, new nation-states were created in Eastern Europe. However, the peace settlement also already contained the seeds for new conflicts. The principle of self-determination was not applied to the colonized peoples of Africa and Asia. For example, the Middle East was carved into French and British mandates, which remained very unpopular with the local population, who were eager supporters of the independence cause. Moreover, Germany, the main challenger, was humiliated, which created strong domestic support for revisionism and the most powerful nation, the United States, did not take a leadership role, but withdrew into isolationism. In the context of postwar economic hardships and a global recession, more extreme evolutionary philosophies emerged in Germany, Italy, and Japan. Survival N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of the fittest was interpreted in racial terms and the nation took precedence over the individual. These totalitarian philosophies were centered on the preeminence of their respective nations and used to justify aggressive policies of conquest and extermination. They culminated in World War II and crimes of genocide. Nationalism had been taken to its most perverse extreme and the concept of the nation tainted. Gun t ram H. Herb Gru i a B ad e s cu


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Culture and Nationalism Neil McWilliam Relevance Historians and theorists generally recognize the central role played by culture in forming and sustaining the modern nation-state. Whether they subscribe to a belief in the essentially artificial, constructed nature of the nation and national identity or, conversely, understand the nation as a primordial unit within which modern forms of collective consciousness have gradually evolved, scholars agree on the vital contribution of the cultural sphere in forging “imagined communities” or in promoting “the myth of nations.” In its broadest sense, in which it is understood to represent values, beliefs, customs, and practices that bind individuals into groups, culture provides a fundamental foundation upon which ethnic, religious, or territorial communities can emerge. Understood more narrowly as the range of artistic forms that have been developed for individual and collective expression, it is equally clear that culture represents one of the most important ways in which national consciousness has been forged and national interests have been asserted in the modern era. In making such a claim, however, it is necessary to recognize that, in many cases, nationalism is not an unambiguous, clearly recognizable ingredient in a work of art. Nationalism is not a generic category, and we cannot describe a painting or a musical composition as nationalist in the same way that we might identify it as a landscape or a sonata. Rather, in many instances, the nationalist connotations of a particular work are contingent, contextual, or conflicted: the situation in which a work is produced, performed, or displayed, and its reception and interpretation, can all help to shape the meanings attributed to it; these in turn can be challenged and transformed over time. As we recognize the dynamic character of culture’s role within nationalism, it is also important to understand that, through the various ways in which works of art are used, they can actively shape and advance ideological positions, rather than merely reflecting or illustrating beliefs understood to originate on a more authentically conceptual plane. Equally, the part played by cultural activities and forms differs significantly within politically distinct varieties of nationalism. This can range, for example, from the promotion of folk art and popular poetry within secessionist or anticolonial movements to the monumental celebration of established institutions by nation-states intent on solidifying popular allegiance and consent. In the decades roughly bounded by German and Italian unification in the late 19th century, and the crisis inflicted by extreme nationalism in the 1940s, the arts’ potential both as a mouthpiece for subaltern groups seeking a common voice and as an often overbearing spectacle N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of state power or ethnic integrity was widely exploited, even as modernist ideologies repudiated localized traditions, and emerging cultural markets transcended national boundaries.

Origins The conscription of art for the promotion of nationalist ideologies grew out of currents commonly described as “romantic nationalism,” which emerged in reaction to Enlightenment universalism at the end of the 18th century. Crucial to this process was Johann Gottfried Herder’s understanding of culture as a manifestation of identity, elaborated in his Another Philosophy of History for the Education of Mankind (1774). For Herder, the character of a nation depended preeminently on a shared language and customs, rather than on common racial origins. Turning his back on assertions that the classical Mediterranean civilizations represented an unsurpassable paragon of achievement, Herder advanced a pluralist understanding of culture that rejected claims for the innate superiority or inferiority of particular peoples. His interest in folk culture (Volkskultur) pointed the way to a gradual decline in the status of classicism as a cultural language possessing the universal authority that occurred during the 19th century. What took its place was simultaneously more open and potentially more charged: challenges to the classical ideal gave apparently greater authority to the individual artist in varying the style, tone, and range of associations of particular works. In doing so, however, new and potentially controversial cultural references could come into play, prominent among which were those relating to ethnic identity and national history. The study of folklore and vernacular languages played a significant role in directing artists toward national cultural traditions previously overshadowed by interest in classical antiquity. Such figures as Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm in Germany or Elias Lönnrot in Finland recorded popular tales and legends that were later taken up by nationalists intent on asserting the cultural identity of particular peoples to advance political campaigns for autonomy or unification. Such epics as the Finnish Kalevala, edited by Lönnrot in 1835, and the Germanic Nibelungenlied, parts of which were first published in 1748 and, most famously, provided inspiration for Richard Wagner’s cycle of four operas Der Ring des Nibelungen (1848–1874), fueled nationalist sentiment and inspired new artistic interpretations in a variety of media, which themselves bolstered claims to self-determination. At the same time, the obsession with history during the 19th century had profound cultural implications for attitudes toward style and subject matter. As historians across Europe paid increasing attention to the alleged antiquity of individual nations or the transcendent identity of particular ethnic groupings, writers, artists, and musicians celebrated key moments from the past N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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that were often inspired by openly nationalist intent. Artistic forms, too, absorbed vernacular styles carrying national or regional overtones: music, painting, architecture, and the decorative arts all borrowed motifs that were seen to evoke a timeless popular tradition rooted in the shared experience of an organic, ethnically discrete community. Cultural revivalism often carried explicitly nostalgic, anticapitalist connotations. Regionalist styles in the decorative arts, for example, celebrated preindustrial traditions by bringing together a distinctive vocabulary of forms and motifs using handcraft techniques that were disappearing from the wider economy due to mechanization and production-line working methods. The political upheavals that shook the late 19th century were both a response to mounting nationalist pressures and a catalyst for increasingly assertive manifestations of popular nationalist sentiment. The unification of Germany under Prussian leadership in 1871, together with the triumph of the Risorgimento in Italy, had far-reaching consequences for Europe as a whole. The defeat of Austria by Prussia in 1866 heralded the Ausgleich (“compromise”), through which Hungary achieved greater autonomy from Habsburg control, while victory over France in 1871 forced the abdication of Napoleon III and led to the establishment of the Third Republic. From Ireland in the West to Russia in the East, the closing decades of the 19th century witnessed increased nationalist fervor, with varying and often far-reaching consequences for the arts. Nationalist themes in statesponsored projects, prominent in such countries as Germany and France, pointed to a shift away from dynastic conceptions of the state to a more broadly based concern with shaping popular assent rooted in a shared sense of interest and identity. In such cases as the Celtic revival in Ireland, however, where nationalist intellectuals fighting for political independence reasserted a repressed cultural tradition, the arts stirred up memories of former glories as a means of inspiring resistance to foreign domination. In every case, however, it is important to recognize that cultural nationalism was inflected by complex struggles over the meaning of nationhood and by often bitter disputes between countries over historical or symbolic markers of identity. In this way, nationalism was not simply invested in cultural artifacts, but was mediated by the contexts in which these artifacts were framed; educational systems, such institutions as museums or academies, civic rituals like the planning and inauguration of public monuments, and scholarly or popular debate on the history and contemporary state of the arts all set the boundaries for defining and disputing the identity of a nation and its culture.

Dimensions State Sponsorship Well established by the late 19th century, state sponsorship of architectural and pictorial programs was intended to heighten national self-consciousness. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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construction and decoration of such legislative buildings as the Capitol in Washington, D.C. (begun in 1793, with major additions during 1815–1830, 1856–1863, 1904, 1958–1962), or the Palace of Westminster in London (1840–1870), provided the opportunity for complex statements of cultural identity or dynastic genealogy, elaborated through historical illustration and stylistic allusion. In London, the combination of Sir Charles Barry’s Gothic Revival architecture and a program of fresco decorations dominated by chivalric themes favored a patrician version of national history in which monarchy retained a central role. This portrayal of a Christian nation guided by a traditional elite contrasts with the tactical recalibration of France’s past, undertaken by Louis-Philippe in the Historical Museum at Versailles, which was devised following the revolution that brought him to power in July 1830. In an immense suite of history paintings ranging from the era of Clovis to the present day, the Versailles museum represents the first, and most extensive, attempt to shape popular national consciousness through visual narrative. Its interconnected series of scenes, in which France’s emerging identity is closely identified with military prowess, works to legitimize Louis-Philippe’s succession to the throne as marking the resolution of tensions that had divided the nation since 1789. Although the traditional prestige of history painting was hotly contested in the late 19th century, governments continued to recognize its capacity to excite popular enthusiasm and to promote ideologically useful perceptions of the nation’s character and past. The unification of Germany, in particular, offered opportunities for artists to contribute to a new narrative of nationhood, in which the dispersed states brought together under Prussia in 1871 were enlisted in a myth of common origins and shared destiny. Building upon a vigorous tradition of fresco painting promoted by such 19th-century rulers as Maximilian II and Ludwig II of Bavaria, the new state prioritized a public art that at once glorified and helped to define the nation. Monuments to local and federal government, such as the Berlin Reichstag (designed by Paul Wallot between 1884 and 1894), government ministries, law courts, educational buildings, and town halls—more than 200 of which were completed between 1850 and 1914—provided extensive opportunities to elaborate officially sanctioned evocations of a people whose common history was traced back to the medieval era and beyond. Decorative schemes, such as the Hall of the Emperors in Frankfurt City Hall or Wilhelm Camphausen’s murals for the Gürzenich in Cologne—produced to commemorate the completion of the city’s cathedral in 1880—employed a historicist idiom and iconography to promote nationalist sentiment, typically evoking heroic moments from the nation’s past in fresco decorations within a Gothic architectural setting redolent of Germanic cultural achievement. Similarly, in the Romanesque palace at Goslar, restored between 1873 and 1879 to celebrate the new empire, Hermann Wislicenus’s frescoes in the Great Hall suggest associations between Frederick Barbarossa, the 12th-century German king and Holy Roman emperor revered as an early architect of national unity, and Kaiser Wilhelm I of Prussia, under N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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whom unification had been achieved. Unification itself was widely memorialized, most famously by Anton von Werner, a history painter whose fortunes were closely identified with the foundation of the new empire. Summoned to Versailles to witness the proclamation of the German Empire on January 18, 1871, Werner was charged with recording the event in no fewer than four monumental canvases. Completed between 1877 and 1913, these works gave pride of place to Wilhelm and his chancellor Otto von Bismarck as the architects of national renewal (Jefferies 2003, 44–53). The German empire’s use of history painting to foster popular devotion to the nation and its dynastic rulers contrasts with similarly concerted efforts in France to rally opinion behind the new republic after 1870. Following defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, which had allowed a united Germany to emerge, republican leaders were confronted by the urgent task of developing support for a new system of government within an established nation. Their task was complicated by the contested history of republicanism within France, a factor only partially resolved when conservatives sympathetic to the restoration of monarchy were forced into opposition in 1878. German annexation of territory in the eastern provinces of Alsace and Lorraine heightened nationalist sentiment in the decades leading up to 1914 and helped the radical right in militant campaigns intended to destabilize the liberal, secular regime that, despite such crises as the Dreyfus affair, prevailed until the invasion by the Third Reich in 1940. As their commitment to universal elementary education confirms, republicans in France understood that the state could play a crucial role in shaping popular values, not least of which was patriotic devotion to the nation. The secular ideology of civic humanism that formed the core of republican nationalism looms large in public art projects of the period: the new regime was lavish in constructing ministries, municipal buildings, and schools and universities, many of which incorporated extensive decorative programs extolling popular virtues and glorifying the beneficent power of the republic. City halls, in particular, served as secular temples of the republican creed. In Paris, the hôtel de ville (city hall), reconstructed following the Commune in 1871, formed the centerpiece of 20 neighborhood mairies (town or city halls), all of which housed imposing murals devoted to such themes as “The Triumph of the Republic” (Léon Glaize, mairie of the 20th arrondissement, 1891), “In Times of War” (Ferdinand Humbert and Pierre Lagarde, 15th arrondissement, 1886), and “Sacrifice to the Motherland” (Georges Moreau de Tours, 2nd arrondissement, 1882). These celebrations of family, work, and patriotic devotion were replicated across France, often in ambitious new monuments in a historicist style that drew upon indigenous architectural traditions associated with periods of regional or national glory. In the absence of a dynastic focus, such as the German kaiser or the British monarch, the republican cult exalted female personifications of tutelary virtues that were handed down from the 1789 revolution. Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity serve as handmaidens to the imposing figure of the Republic herself, whose youthful features and classical N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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forms connote a quiet authority that apparently transcends the temporary passions of political factionalism. The extraordinary currency of the Republic as a national emblem—found on stamps and coinage, as well as in pictorial and sculptural form in civic buildings and public space—helped transform a remote abstraction into a more familiar focus of collective identification, whose popular nickname Marianne points to the internalization of national ideology into the fabric of everyday life. Public Sculptures Of central importance in this process was the proliferation of public sculpture throughout Europe and beyond, particularly in the half century before World War I. What exasperated contemporaries decried as “statuomania” represented perhaps the most conspicuous arena in which government, as well as municipal and private organizations, intervened to develop national consciousness. Emblematic representations, like the ubiquitous statues of the republic unveiled throughout France after 1880, or triumphalist expressions of German renewal such as the Niederwald monument (1877–1883) overlooking the Rhine at Rudesheim, employed colossal scale to impress the viewer with the moral and physical might of the nation. At the same time, memorials to exemplary citizens helped redefine national prestige in terms of the collective achievement of outstanding individuals, whose separate accomplishments cast reflected glory on the community as a whole and incited emulation among rising generations. By the late 19th century, achievement in a wide variety of political, cultural, scientific, and military fields was considered worthy of such recognition, although acts of public commemoration had previously been restricted to the monarchy and those who had served its interests. Military achievement, for example, determined the transformation in the late 1790s of London’s Saint Paul’s Cathedral into a necropolis that housed fallen commanders from the Napoleonic wars. It was also central to the cults of Wellington and Nelson, which spawned monumental tributes all over Britain in the mid-19th century. More expansively, nationalist considerations came into play with the designation of the Parisian church of Sainte-Geneviève as a revolutionary pantheon in 1791 and with Ludwig I’s construction of the Walhalla temple at Regensburg in Bavaria between 1816 and 1842. Beyond their very different ideological ambitions, both undertakings foreshadowed the glorification of the individual as a means of celebrating—or asserting the identity of—the nation. In newly unified Italy and Germany, this process centered around the figure of the monarch, as evidenced by the colossal monument to Victor-Emmanuel that was erected on the Capitoline Hill in Rome between 1895 and 1911 and by the many commemorations of Wilhelm I, such as the vast Kyff haüser monument in Thuringia that solicited dedication to the nation in the name of its founding father. The architects of national unification— Garibaldi in Italy and Bismarck in Germany—formed the focus of complementary cults of the nation, most fully expressed in the approximately 500 Bismarck towers N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Charles and Léopold Morice: Monument to the Republic, Place de la République, Paris, France, 1879–1883. Contemporary photograph. (Library of Congress)

constructed throughout Germany following the chancellor’s death in 1898 (Michalski 1998, 58–78). This colonizing process, in which a representation—or even the name—of a pivotal leader instilled physical space with national meaning, followed ideologically distinctive paths during the 20th century. In the Soviet Union, early internationalist impulses gave way to the glorification of Lenin and Stalin as personifications of a new social and political order, while in the United States, celebration of the nation as a leading capitalist democracy inspired temples to Lincoln (1915–1922) and Jefferson (1939–1943) in Washington, D.C., and Gutzon Borglum’s colossal carvings of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Theodore Roosevelt on Mount Rushmore, South Dakota (1927–1941). The vogue for commemorative statuary represented an important moment in cultural nationalism, not merely through the vast quantity of works themselves but also through the elaborate array of rituals that surrounded their commissioning and inauguration. Local and national campaigns to win support and financing for memorials to favored sons (and, occasionally, daughters) of the nation often involved a concerted educational program that climaxed with the monument’s unveiling, an event habitually accompanied by speeches, parades, theatrical productions, and concerts. Yet this galvanizing process, in which the historical N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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personality served to embody and promote communal values, could also highlight ideological fault lines compromising national unity. Struggles over the symbolic meaning and identity of such figures from the past as Joan of Arc in France or Giordano Bruno in Italy, set progressive secularists at odds with conservative nationalists, giving rise to often violent disputes over the character and appropriate direction of the nation itself. In the early decades of the 20th century, potential for such disputes diminished as, in much of Europe, the focus of commemorative statuary turned to the memorialization of the numberless dead of World War I. Although memorials had been erected to commemorate combatants of both sides following the Franco-Prussian War, and had often been exploited for overtly nationalist ends (Hargrove and McWilliam 2005, 55–81), the sheer magnitude of the losses suffered on all sides between 1914 and 1918 generally tempered any triumphalist or revanchist sentiment. Exhibitions The blend of nationalist ideology and pedagogical zeal that favored “statuomania” also contributed to the astonishing expansion of museums and exhibitions in the 19th century. Universal exhibitions, which enjoyed worldwide success from London in 1851 to Paris in 1937, provided an opportunity for host nations to flaunt their industrial prowess and cultural heritage, while declaring allegiance to international peace and progress. These gargantuan events (the 1900 Paris exposition covered 277 acres and attracted almost 51 million visitors) became arenas in which participating nations fashioned identities that reconciled tradition and modernity. Pavilions frequently drew upon vernacular architectural styles and presented art works and artifacts that conjured up an essentialized image of a seamless national character. Particularly striking in this regard was the 1896 Budapest exhibition, organized to commemorate 1,000 years of Magyar history. The exhibition, centerpiece of a nationwide public works program designed to assert the Magyar identity of the newly autonomous, multiethnic nation, combined art, industry, and folk tradition to construct a history and culture for Hungary that was distinct from both Habsburg Austria, and the surrounding Slavic peoples. The prominence afforded to indigenous arts and crafts in this process echoed the vogue for displays of apparently authentic regional styles by the many nations participating in worlds fairs during this period (Facos and Hirsh 2003, 160–185). As popular tradition became an integral part of nations’ self-presentation in the international arena, so the universal exhibitions also incorporated primitivistic displays of non-European peoples to suggest the benefits extended by mature Western cultures to their alleged inferiors on other continents through the development of colonial rule. In such a way, culture served both to differentiate among advanced industrial nations and to draw them together in contrast to subaltern peoples who were defined as lacking a viable independent identity. National galleries of art developed across Europe following the opening of the Louvre in 1793 and became symbolically charged spaces in which individual citiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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zens implicitly recognized themselves as sharing in the cultural riches provided by the state. The pride of place that such institutions often accorded to indigenous schools of art—which, indeed, they frequently led the way in designating as such—further contributed to defining the nation as a cultural reality with a distinctive identity and tradition equal, if not superior, to neighboring states. Classical architecture, sculptural decoration, and imposing murals often lent such institutions overtly nationalist connotations (Facos and Hirsh 2003, 16–38). The Nationalgalerie inaugurated in Berlin in 1876, for example, presented the visitor with a decorative program that traced a distinctive cultural lineage extending back to the Germanic tribes. The museum displayed only German works of art, among which battle scenes and celebrations of national history, such as Ferdinand Keller’s Emperor Wilhelm the Victorious (1888), figured prominently. Housed in an imposing classical structure that evoked the Regensburg Walhalla, the inscription on the gallery’s façade—“To German Art 1871”—made no bones about the founding moment of the new state as the realization of an ostensibly transcendent cultural reality (Wright 1996, 79–99). Similar claims inspired museums and art historians to construct nationally based cultural genealogies, not only through the arrangement of permanent collections in major state galleries but also through temporary exhibitions that fashioned narratives of artistic achievement by identifying particular schools with decisive moments of stylistic innovation. In 1902, for example, a path-breaking exhibition of Flemish art in Bruges claimed that artists from the Low Countries, like Memling and Van Eyck, had been in the forefront of stylistic innovation in the 15th and 16th centuries. French scholars were not slow to respond. The 1904 exhibition of Primitifs français, held at the Louvre and the Bibliothèque nationale, assembled no fewer than 580 paintings, sculptures, enamels, and illuminated manuscripts to assert the precocious technical superiority of the French school and the unbroken tradition of cultural achievement to which France could lay claim. In both cases, openly anachronistic interpretations of nationhood and flagrant manipulation of stylistic attribution contributed to the higher imperative of advancing interests rooted in cultural nationalism (Hargrove and McWilliam 2005, 230–233). During the interwar period, Fascist regimes in Italy and Germany mounted exhibitions both at home and abroad to define—and police—the boundaries of an official national visual culture. In Germany, the opening in Munich of Paul Ludwig Troost’s monumental Haus der Deutschen Kunst (“House of German Art”) in 1937 was declared by Hitler as laying “the foundations for a new and genuine German art.” Its inauguration was accompanied by a pageant celebrating “2000 Years of German Culture” that brought together some 6,000 participants, and its first exhibition, devoted to “Great German Art,” provided the blueprint for an ethnically inspired aesthetic renewal, defined all the more trenchantly in contrast to modernist works held up for public ridicule in the celebrated exhibition of “Entartete Kunst” (“Degenerate Art”). The 3 million visitors who saw the proscribed works in Munich, and during a subsequent national tour, far surpassed the numbers N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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that were attracted to the official Great German Art shows, held annually until 1944. However, official backing for exhibitions with such themes as “Pictures of the Homeland” (Oberhausen, 1938), “German Farmer–German Land” (Gera, 1938), and “German Greatness” (Munich, 1940) indicated the state’s commitment to the cultural sphere as a weapon in promoting a nationalist ideology (Hinz 1979, 19). In Italy, too, the Fascist regime was equally alert to the arts’ potential for projecting a sense of italianità, and they exploited the unparalleled prestige of the classical and Renaissance traditions to reinforce unity at home and to win favor abroad. Two major shows were organized—one in London in 1930 and one in Paris five years later—in the expectation that, as the Corriere della Sera (Evening Courier) had commented on the earlier exhibition, the nation’s masterpieces “will be able to support the Italian cause in face of the most obstinate calumniators, the skeptics, and those who are indifferent, and to make it remembered that Italy was always the first to blaze the trail of civilization and of progress” (cited in Haskell 2000, 126). In Italy itself, such enterprises as the Museum of the Roman Empire (opened in 1927), the Augustan Exhibition of Romanness (1937–1938), and the projected Exhibition of Italian Civilization (slated to open in Rome in 1942) complemented initiatives to celebrate the modernity of the Fascist state and posited a transcendent Latin tradition of which Mussolini’s regime was the latest incarnation. Architectural Heritage Mussolini’s Italy also provides a striking instance of the state’s concerted exploitation of architectural heritage for nationalist ends. Dedicated to vitalizing collective consciousness through the exaltation of a national rather than a purely regional past, the regime worked to showcase monuments that embodied the dual spirit of italianità and romanità. Classical and Renaissance sites were conscripted to remind the citizen of an accumulated tradition of cultural and political greatness, and radical measures were taken to reburnish the sometimes faded glories of former days. The 1931 redevelopment plan for Rome led to extensive surgery of the urban fabric in which medieval buildings, deemed irrelevant to the city’s imperial past, were swept aside—the better to reveal the classical legacy to which Mussolini lay claim. Augustan Rome—and notably the famed altar of peace, the Ara Pacis, and the mausoleum of Augustus himself—reemerged as the symbolic heart of the city and of celebrations in 1937 to commemorate the bimillennium of the emperor’s birth (Lazzaro and Crum 2005, 53–65). Elsewhere, Renaissance monuments were extensively restored and often extended or rebuilt to enhance their apparently historic character. Such invasive restoration significantly modified such celebrated sites as San Gimignano and Ferrara, led to the wholesale rebuilding of the walls surrounding Monteriggioni, and transformed Renaissance town halls throughout Tuscany. As the regime refashioned architectural heritage and invented “medieval” festivals in such cities as Florence, Siena, and Arezzo, so it actively promoted domestic tourism to encourage popuN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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lar identification of past glories with the path pursued by the fascist revolution (Lazzaro and Crum 2005, 97–131). Culture and Race The role scholars played in cultural initiatives was significant and, indeed, from the mid-19th century onward, academic debate was crucial in shaping understanding of the relationship between culture and race in general and in identifying different national traditions with a variety of characteristic traits. Philologists, ethnographers, historians, archaeologists, and art historians contributed to an essentialized cultural anthropology, which at times drew heavily on the overtly racist theories that Arthur Gobineau expounded in his Essay on the Inequality of the Human Races (Essai sur l’inégalité des races humaines, 1853–1855). Further indebted to often reductive readings of Ernest Renan’s philological investigations of Semitic peoples and Hippolyte Taine’s determinist theories of the impact of “race, milieu and moment” on cultural production, scholars increasingly sought to explain the history of art and literature according to fixed qualities, ostensibly rooted in, and expressive of, a shared ethnic or national character. In France, the architect and theorist Eugène Viollet-le-Duc adapted Gobineau’s theories to the cultural sphere, insisting that artistic greatness could be achieved only in societies that were racially homogeneous. Viollet contrasted a French nation in which the Franks had restored the ethnic vigor of the native Gauls following the defeat of Rome with an Italian civilization characterized by a decadent cosmopolitanism: the former he credited with evolving Gothic style as the material expression of the Gallic spirit, the latter with a superficial, insincere plundering of the classical past during the Renaissance (Michaud 2005, 60–68). This dichotomy between north and south inspired many nationalists to argue that the true nature of French culture had been fatally compromised by the Valois dynasty’s importation and emulation of Italianate art in the 16th century, though rightwing monarchists defended this classical tradition as marking France’s accession to a transcendent Mediterranean civilization with roots in ancient Greece (Hargrove and McWilliam 2005, 269–291). Debates over the true character of French culture fueled a burgeoning anticosmopolitanism in the early Third Republic. At the same time, claims that Gothic architecture had originated in 12th-century France buttressed critiques of Germany as an inferior and derivative culture advanced by such art historians as Emile Mâle in German Art and French Art in the Middle Ages (L’Art français et l’art allemand au moyen-âge, 1917). In Germany itself, historians had sought to explain the characteristics of particular cultures in racial terms since the Romantic period, and such figures as August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel championed Dürer and his contemporaries for resisting the encroachment of Renaissance classicism. Later, such art historians as Wilhelm Worringer, Alois Riegl, and Georg Dehio attempted to define German art in terms of transhistorical formal qualities that expressed the fundamental character of the German people. This tendency even colored the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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work of Heinrich Wölfflin, a figure best known for elaborating an art-historical method that apparently understood the phases in European artistic development in terms of a common period style based upon historically recurrent formal characteristics. Yet, in works ranging from The Art of Albrecht Dürer (1905) to Italy and the German Sense of Form (Italien und das deutsche Formgefühl, 1931), Wölfflin revisited well-established contrasts between northern and southern cultural traditions, aligning them with innate differences in national character rooted in race. Involvement in Alfred Rosenberg’s Nazi organization, the Combat League for German Culture (Kampfbund für deutsche Kultur), established in 1929, marked the height of this tendency that Wölfflin moderated in later publications. This scholarly endorsement of racial models coincided with tendencies among artists, critics, and politicians to challenge cultural cosmopolitanism and to call for strict controls to preserve indigenous cultural traditions from foreign contamination. In France, students at the Fine Arts Academy in Paris demonstrated against foreigners’ admission into the school, while Franco-German cultural exchange provoked regular protests around 1900. Nationalists spurned foreigninspired art nouveau design, decried challenges to France’s superiority in the decorative arts, and opposed the vogue for such foreign composers and dramatists as Wagner and Ibsen. On the eve of World War I, malcontents on the right promoted ideals of cultural enracinement (“rootedness”), popularized by the nationalist intellectual and politician Maurice Barrès, and expressed mounting hostility toward young immigré artists whose display of often experimental works in major Parisian exhibitions fueled claims that national culture was imperiled. Such cultural nationalism was not confined to France. In Germany, Wilhelm II led the assault on foreign art, describing Paris as “the great whorehouse of the world” (Forster-Hahn 1996, 95). His views were vigorously endorsed by such figures as the sculptor, politician, and director of the Bavarian Academy, Ferdinand von Miller, who warned the Bavarian Parliament in 1874: “French taste, formed by art, and the French sense of beauty have subjugated the whole world, including us Germans” (Lenman 1997, 51). The publication in 1892 of Max Nordau’s international bestseller Degeneration (Entartung) added to the belief that French art was the cultural expression of a deeper national pathology that had to be strenuously excluded from Germany itself. These views encouraged hostility toward such German painters as Max Liebermann or Fritz von Uhde whose modernist style bore the unpatriotic taint of French influence. Cultural chauvinists took further exception to the exhibition or purchase of works by modern French artists for German museums; following an initial skirmish in 1896 over the display of 36 modern canvases in the Berlin National Gallery, this resistance came to a head in 1911 over the Bremen Museum’s purchase of Van Gogh’s Poppy Field. The assault was led by a landscape painter, Carl Vinnen, whose Protest of German Artists (Ein Protest deutscher Künstler), bearing 140 signatures, decried “alien influences” and declared that “a people can be raised to the very heights only through artists of its own flesh and blood.” This desire for cultural autarchy was N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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elaborated during the Third Reich by Alfred Rosenberg, whose Myth of the Twentieth Century (Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts, 1930) set out a racial aesthetic that announced a reaction against modernist internationalism and gave pride of place to German vernacular culture as the embodiment of the Volksgeist (“popular spirit”). Particularly partial to a folkish Heimatkunst (“homeland art”), ostensibly inspired by the values and cultural traditions of the peasantry and artisan classes, Rosenberg railed against Expressionism and the Bauhaus whose modern inspirations he dismissed as steeped in a baleful individualism at odds with the spontaneity and rootedness of popular forms.

Consequences The political appropriation of popular art as distinctively national in origin and wholesome in outlook united regimes of left and right in the mid-20th century, from Stalin’s Russia to the Vichy regime in France. It marked the crisis of a trend that, in the 19th century, had been identified with campaigns for national selfdetermination, in countries like Ireland, or with a politically progressive populism, as in Scandinavia, where Swedish and Finnish artists had embraced popular tradition in opposing academic conservatism (Facos and Hirsh 2003, 207–249). The interest in folktales and popular song among such composers as the Russians Alexandr Borodin and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov, the Scandinavians Edvard Grieg and Jean Sibelius, or the Czech Bedˇrich Smetana stemmed from a romanticism that identified the essence of the nation with an imagined popular soul. Such nationalism tended to be nostalgic in tone and implicitly hostile to the social and political leveling generally associated with encroaching industrial modernity. However, for fascist advocates of a mythic, racially pure culture, such as Rosenberg, popular tradition worked in tandem with a commitment to industrial modernity, providing the mythic, foundational moral values upon which political and economic transformation could be accomplished. Whether articulated through popular folk songs, national epics, public monuments, or the showcasing of architectural heritage, the exploitation of cultural forms proved crucial in promoting nationalist ideologies in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Such works as patriotic history paintings frequently enjoyed an impact that extended far beyond the exhibition hall through reproduction in school primers, encyclopedias, and illustrated periodicals. Ceremonies to inaugurate statues to national heroes, parades celebrating cultural achievement, and tourist visits to monumental sites all contributed to consolidating national identity, and often were explicitly directed toward inculcating assertively chauvinistic attitudes. Such popular forms as the panoramas that flourished in the 19th-century city, press caricatures, and jingoistic songs in music halls and cabarets all provided access to a mass public, which new technologies, like cinema N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and the radio, broadened even further. In such nations as Germany and Italy, whose roots extended back no further than the late 19th century, the exploitation of art for nationalist ends intensified during times of heightened international tension, particularly around the two world wars. At the same time, currents within the cultural marketplace provided points of resistance to such pressure. Modernism, though not reducible to a monolithic political or ideological perspective, frequently bred antipathy to more totalitarian nationalist regimes, as the departure of so many artists from Europe in the interwar years suggests. Artistic individualism, a conspicuous element in cultural life since the Romantic period, further insulated many from the lure of nationalist regimes or mass movements. Yet, perhaps one of the strongest counterweights to cultural nationalism, at least in advanced capitalist economies, has been the growing internationalization of the marketplace. If in more recent years, this has afforded the culture industry of the United States an overwhelming and, at times, overbearing international influence that has carried profound ideological implications, in the decades before the Cold War, the more egregious aspects of such domination still lay in the future. In the period bounded by the Franco-Prussian War and World War II, a growing international market in objects and ideas helped mitigate the detrimental impact of nationalism and foster openness and exchange, at the same time that artists all too often colluded with the more atavistic forces that shaped these fateful years. Selected Bibliography Facos, M., and S. L. Hirsh, eds. 2003. Art, Culture, and National Identity in Fin-de-Siècle Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Forster-Hahn, F., ed. 1996. Imagining Modern German Culture: 1889–1910. Washington DC: National Gallery of Art. Hargrove, J., and N. McWilliam, eds. 2005. Nationalism and French Visual Culture 1870–1914. Washington DC: National Gallery of Art. Haskell, F. 2000. The Ephemeral Museum. Old Master Paintings and the Rise of the Art Exhibition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hinz, B. 1979. Art in the Third Reich. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Jefferies, M. 2003. Imperial Culture in Germany, 1871–1918. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Lazzaro, C., and R. Crum, eds. 2005. Donatello among the Blackshirts. History and Modernity in the Visual Culture of Fascist Italy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lenman, R. 1997. Artists and Society in Germany 1850–1914. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Löfgren, O. 1989. “The Nationalization of Culture.” Ethnologia Europaea 19, no. 1: 5–24. Michalski, S. 1998. Public Monuments. Art in Political Bondage 1870–1997. London: Reaktion Books. Michaud, E. 2005. Histoire de l’art. Une discipline à ses limites, 49–84. Paris: Editions Hazan. Taylor, B., and W. van der Will. 1990. The Nazification of Art: Art, Design, Music, Architecture and Film in the Third Reich. Winchester: The Winchester Press. Wright, G., ed. 1996. The Formation of National Collections of Art and Archaeology. Washington DC: National Gallery of Art.


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Education and Nationalism Peter J. Weber Relevance Nationalism can be understood as the demand for corresponding cultural and state borders. The question is how the state creates the cultural community and the historical traditions by which it legitimizes itself as a nation. This legitimization occurred in the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century because of the social division of labor in industrialized societies, which caused the homogenization of culture in national standard languages. The period between 1880 and 1945 is paradigmatic of the interrelation between education and nationalism, because homogenization in the nation-states took place in particular by means of the then-new national educational systems. However, the expectations of the early national movements, which had predicted that the end of national wars would settle the disputes over national unity and independence and create peace between the states, were not fulfilled. Instead, old and new nation-states were drawn into national rivalry and economic competition in the last third of the 19th century. The aggravation of national rivalry found its peak in imperialism. Through imperialism, nation-states expanded their sphere of influence beyond their own borders by either colonial territorial rule or economic competition. After the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne in Sarajevo on June 14, 1914, World War I began, which put an end to the authority of the monarchy and to the age of the bourgeoisie. In the time between the two world wars, the nation-states experienced a rise in national feelings. The issue of national minorities and border disputes remained unresolved. Additional problems in Europe included the lack of economic growth and the search for a suitable system of government after World War II. The crash of the New York Stock Exchange on October 24, 1929 (“Black Thursday”), started the biggest crisis of the global economy because of the close interrelations among international economies and finances. After the United States, the German empire was the most affected by this crisis. It took until the 1930s to overcome the crisis internationally by different means. After 1933, the totalitarian regimes of Europe—national socialism in the German Reich, fascism in Italy, and Stalinism in the Soviet Union—standardized all educational institutions (Gleichschaltung). After World War II, West Germany and Italy overcame their totalitarian structures and experienced an opening to democratic structures, which increased the democratic orientation in the educational system. Throughout the years between 1880 and 1945, education and educational systems and their institutions played a major role in the achievement of national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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interests of linguistic and cultural standardization. The contention, therefore, is that during this period education was not independent and not future-oriented but, rather, a servant to the modern state, and in some ways it still is. Education for the Nation-State, 1889–1914 During the 18th century, the traditions of the federal system were still supported. In the course of the 19th century, however, the relationship between the individual and the state was reorganized, and the issue of a stable social order gained prominence—although it is still too often viewed as a reaction to the French Revolution rather than as being influenced by developments in Britain and America. For example, in the late 19th and the early 20th centuries, American schools had to adapt to large numbers of immigrants. At that time, one important new use for schools was to socialize immigrant children to the American way of life (Americanization). In this context, a shared identity created through linguistic and cultural homogenization, especially by the educational system, played an important role. This homogenization served economic and political interests, which benefited from a single obligatory language. Since 1920, one-third of the mandatory time for instruction in the national school systems in Europe and abroad was spent on teaching the respective national language, one-sixth on mathematics, and about 10 percent each on social science, natural science, aesthetics, and physical education. For example, at the time of the French Revolution, more than one-third of the population of France did not speak French. Only after the introduction of primary education was it possible to achieve some intellectual and linguistic unity. After the language of Northern France, specifically of Paris (the langue d’oïl), was enforced as the standard, this model of unification was exported to the colonies, where the use of regional languages in state schools had been prohibited for a long time. Education for Colonialism, 1880–1914 In competition with other nations, many European nation-states expanded beyond their own borders in order to have access to more natural resources. With this expansion, the model of the Western educational system also expanded. Substantial influences of British and French colonial educational policy can be observed particularly in Africa. During the course of expansion, Western educational systems were forced upon other countries, because it was essential for the nation-states to be able to depend on a population that supported the state and spoke the respective European national languages. The transfer of the educational system accompanied a linguistic policy, to the disadvantage of local languages, in accordance with the linguistic standardization in Europe. The “acceptance” of the standard language could only be accomplished through pressure and force, especially in the area of education. This Eurocentric assimilation policy can best be observed in the French and Portuguese colonies in Africa. The goal was to use the educational system to achieve identification with the FrenchN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Immigrant children gather around the teacher in Boston, Massachusetts, ca. 1909. (Library of Congress)

or Portuguese-speaking cultures of Europe. This goal was reached mainly by implementing the language of the respective colonial power as the language of instruction and by introducing a curriculum focused on European themes. Cultural and political elites had to focus exclusively on this new system. Colonialism played a major part in the worldwide extension of a mass education system supporting the nation-state. Education as a Modern Force, 1918–1945 There can be little doubt that the movements of educational reform (Reformpädagogik) in Europe and of progressive education in the United States were of great importance in this period. The progressive education movement was part of a broader social and political reform, which developed in the last decades of the 19th and early decades of the 20th centuries. Through this educational approach, the nation-state succeeded in reducing illiteracy and in improving general living conditions by extending primary education. Reformpädagogik began in the 1890s but became more prominent as a reaction to new societal challenges after World War I. In the Weimar Republic, particularly, the most creative discussion about education took place. Despite the strong ties that existed between educators in the United States and Europe—due to the wide acceptance of the ideas of Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Fröbel, and Herbart—these movements had been developing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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separately in accordance with national policies of state since 1930. In the United States, there were the efforts of Dewey, Kilpatrick, Rugg, and Count to turn the school system into an important part of social reform. In Europe, this idea was applied in a distorted manner when the rising totalitarian states tried to benefit from the student-oriented ideals of the Reformpädagogik. Thus, the progressive teaching concepts and a child-oriented style of National Socialism education found a fruitful symbiosis, as seen in the rural elementary school of Tiefensee, Germany. Because of the growing tension between nation-states, the common international trend of progressive education came to an end and lost its meaning as an experimental field of diversity in contrast to the public school system. After World War I, the concept of the early ethnic (völkisch) nationalism was questioned. This concept states that in an ideology of the nation-state, territory and language and/or culture have to be coterminous. On the basis of this concept, bi- and multilingual people had been excluded, thus creating the illusion of a monolingual society. According to the then-new concept of the internationally proclaimed right of self-determination of peoples, however, education policy had to deal with national minorities. In Europe, minority schools developed as a legitimate and independent form of minority schooling in addition to the regular state school system. State-Oriented Education, 1918–1945 In the 1930s, school systems developed independently because nation-states faced different challenges on each continent: Africa endured colonialism, Asia based itself on European models, Europe, in some of its countries, experienced nationalism in the extreme, and North America countered the fast evolution of mass media in the form of radio and television. In fact, in the United States, the debate about education was influenced by movies, radio, and television, and educators and major television stations discussed who should define national culture. In the German Weimar Republic, the relationship between education and nationalism can be called successful in the sense that they experimented with differentiated forms of schools, while school entry age and the duration of education were supposed to be standardized. Hitler’s new totalitarian state after 1933 did not implement any major changes concerning minorities in schools, and minorities were considered an obstacle that slowed down the reconstruction of German society. Refusing enlightenment and rational technical instruction, the Nazis looked for alternative forms of education, which they sometimes found in progressive education. Because of this, institutions of progressive education were not closed until the middle or the end of the 1930s. Many citizens of the United States observed this radical shift in the German and Russian schools while still applauding the use of the Pledge of Allegiance and the singing of nationalistic songs in U.S. schools. Especially in German Nazism, the educational selection became the counterpart to the “biological policy” of selection. The restriction of education was part of the creation of a special elite. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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In order to achieve this, all educational institutions were interspersed with National Socialist ideology and infiltrated by Nazi personnel. These authoritarian structures were replaced by democratic ones in the reeducation program after World War II.

Origins Although it is true that in all nation-states education and its institutions played a major part in the development of nationalism between 1880 and 1945, the degree of the “nationalization of education” was different in Europe, North America, Africa, and Asia. During the 19th century, there was a turning point in European education, and accordingly, a critical position developed that appeared in several ways and with varying degrees of success: in Germany, the school and educational criticism were liberal-progressive and associated with von Humboldt, Mager, Sack, and Dörpfeld; in England and in the United States, however, Owen’s ideas and criticism were very pragmatic and related to class struggle; in France, Fourier designed plans for a free organization of education; and in England, it was Godwin, the first classical author of the modern anarchic state and social criticism, who formulated a libertarian critique that influenced an anarchic pedagogy that is still found today in the Anglo-American context. Education for the Nation-State In western Europe, education in England was less nationalistic than in continental Europe; however, it was strongly influenced by class differences. In the German empire, on the other hand, the focus was on the systematization of education in the Prussian sense. With it, a very differentiated qualifying system was created in which the formal passing of an educational level authorized a student to move on to the next step. All stages had to be completed in a certain order and no changes were to be made—as opposed to the Anglo-American modular system. For many people, the focus of education was still not only literacy but also aimed at piety and morality, efficiency, and last but not least, obedience and discipline. During this time, France expanded its centralism, because the state administration intended to regulate every aspect of education, including curricula, syllabi, textbooks, and teacher education. Other western European countries followed these three models of education, while the eastern European countries followed the Russian communist system. At the very beginning, Russia was the place for the evolution of a progressive emancipative education that was converted under Stalin into an authoritarian school system. In North America, the situation was quite different. U.S. schools were less nationalistic because education was controlled at the state, not federal, level. However, this did not take into consideration the Americanization of immigrants N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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during that time, which the federal government had to regulate. Canada also followed a decentralized educational policy, according to which, the constitution gave no authority to the Canadian federal government in terms of educational issues. Therefore, European and North American educational principles cannot be compared with each other. In Asia, Japan stands out because nationalistic feelings increased between 1894 and 1905 due to their victory in the Russian-Japanese War (1904–1905). At the same time, Japan went through an impressive process of modernization and industrialization, which was carried into the education system in accordance with the new nationalism of the government. The renewal led to a Western orientation of the system, strongly influenced by the German system. The general ideological orientation, however, remained traditional, which was laid down in the “Imperial Rescript on Education” in 1890 (Kyoiku Chokugo). In southern Asia, India—in the course of its rising nationalism—became increasingly critical toward Western educational models, which were imposed by the British. The Indian National Congress and some Muslim organizations interceded against the colonial power in favor of their own language and culture in the educational system. Education for Colonialism After the Russian-Japanese War, a Japanese colonial government was established in Korea, which ended the Korean monarchy. In 1911, this government passed a law on education; Article 5 stated that in the new Korean schools, the “Japanese character” was to be taught and Japanese was to be used as the language of instruction. In Africa, colonialism was equally hard on schools, because before colonialism, it was common to prepare children to take on responsibility in the house, the village, and within the ethnic group. In many colonies, the main forces in the establishment of a European education system were religious missions like the “Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts,” the “Moravian Mission,” or the “Mission of Bremen.” In Nigeria, Protestant missions were founded between 1860 and 1899, and later, the Catholic Church founded its first church and “nonconfessional” primary and secondary schools. Because most schools were not well equipped, the colonial school system was insufficient for the majority of the population. After 1900, the French colonial educational policy started in “French West Africa” (Afrique occidentale française, AOF) and “French Equatorial Africa.” In 1903, the educational system in French West Africa was organized by decree in primary, upper primary, vocational, and common schools. The main function of the colonial educational system was to expand the influence of the French language to establish a common national culture based on the langue d’oïl—the standard of northern French from Paris. This was accomplished on the one hand by educating native teachers and by the special promotion of an elite, and on the other hand by introducing the entire population to French nationalism. The following quote by the governor general of French West Africa shows how important the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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schools were for the formation of a nation (AOF, mailing from June 22, 1897, about the schools in the protectorate territories). This quote also shows the degree of acceptance of the superiority of the European languages, especially of the French language: “School is, in fact, the most certain means that a civilized nation has at its disposal to accustom still primitive populations to its ideas and to bring them gradually up to its level. School is, in one word, the ideal element of progress. It is also the most solid means for the propagation of French ideas and of the French language which the government could have at its disposal” (Turcotte 1983, 11; author’s translation). When the U.S. government subdued the Native American tribes in the 19th century and acquired Puerto Rico (1898), processes similar to those of African colonization occurred. The government used education as a “de-culturalization” process, that is, as a means to eliminate these cultures. This misuse of education as part of the colonization of Puerto Rico could be observed in the annual report of the second commissioner of education, Lindsay (1902): “Colonization carried forward by the armies of war is vastly more costly than that carried forward by the armies of peace, whose outpost and garrisons are the public schools of the advancing nation” (quoted in Spring 1994, 148). Education as a Progressive Force After World War I, the progressive education movement reached its peak. In 1921, the “New Education Fellowship” was founded by Ensor and his colleagues in England. This international organization’s mission was to spread the ideas of progressive education, and they became famous as the “World Education Fellowship.” Its main argument was that schools needed to adapt to the needs of children and not vice versa. Not long before that, the “Progressive Education Association” (PEA) was founded in the United States on the same principle. Worldwide, many individuals who corresponded with one another supported the progressive education movement. One of them, Reddie, combined the English boarding school tradition with the German “educating lessons” (erziehender Unterricht) in the “New School of Abbotsholme.” Other representatives were Decroly and his éducation pour la vie (“education for life”) in Belgium, Morris and his “community education” in England, Dewey and his “learning by doing” in the United States, Freinet and his éducation du travail (“education for work”) in France, Makarenko and his “pedagogy of the collective” in the Soviet Union, Kerschensteiner and his Arbeitsschulbewegung, Steiner and his “Waldorf ” schools and Petersen and his Jena Plan schools in Germany, and Key and her “Century of the Child,” the leitmotif for the entire progressive education movement, in Sweden. However, the influence of progressive education on the public school system at the beginning of the 20th century was rather small compared to developments after World War II. While only a few individual schools were founded, a European dimension as a modern aspect of education was established, for example, during the Weimar Republic in Germany. The educational reform with the greatest (controversial) N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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potential was the “child-centered education” in which Rugg and Schoemaker in the United States gave up curricula and oriented education toward the child’s interest. The reformers were able to implement this progressive education with public consent, although this was an exception in state-dominated education. State-Oriented Education The most prominent characteristic of the time after 1930 is the fact that in some European states the connection between education and nationalism was reduced to the formula of the “education state” (Erziehungsstaat). In this type of state, the Gleichschaltung (“coordination”) of the state’s interests with processes of socialization and education by various means is much more efficient and effective than in democratic societies. It is therefore contrary to progressive education. State education connected to the education state obliges the citizen to follow the interests of the state, suppresses tolerance and protection of minorities, and at the same time institutionalizes a ban on plurality and the rule of indoctrination. Education states can be considered the final product of nationalism, reaching its goal of optimal homogeneity or even coordination of education and its institutions. Forms of education states can be found worldwide during this period in states with demagogic leaders; for example, Stalinist Soviet society’s indoctrination of the masses by political officials, Japan’s imperial educational system, Italy’s fascist education in schools, China’s educational system for national regeneration, and the German Third Reich’s racial theory of the Nazis. Interestingly, the biologically focused education state of the Third Reich did not create its own pedagogy, although its educational policy was structurally determined by new organizations like the Hitlerjugend for boys and the Bund Deutscher Mädel for girls, and by new concepts of socialization. Educators conformed with Nazi educational politicians like von Schirach, Stellrecht, and Decker, who wanted to expand Hitler’s vague idea of education to an education of the “national revolution” in which Gleichschaltung and suppression played a central role. Wilhelm Krieck was instrumental in legitimizing Nazi ideology through his publications on “national socialist education.” Krieck, who was a member of the Nazi Storm Troopers (the SA), assumed a fascist societal model in which education was based on racism. Clearly such a case of overt biological racism is rare; however, even in liberal forms of state there are tendencies to promote national unity through questionable means. The racial policy in the United States or the introduction of a common English school system in the United Kingdom with its suppression of the Celtic language community happened on a different level, although these are examples of a negative connotation of nationalism. The quality of a nation’s educational system was also seen as a factor of its success or failure in World War I. In dictatorial regimes or socialist societies, education was central to the legitimization of these systems, which did not happen through educational specialists, but rather through the governing party and its administration. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Dimensions The pattern of building nation-states spread worldwide, either through independent decision or because of colonialism. The use of education in the development of nationalism can best be described by referring to four periods. The first two periods fall between 1880 and 1914, when education played a major part in the development and implementation of the nation-state, the key elements of which are nationalism, for a homogeneous nation-state, and colonialism, for a competitive nation-state. The second two periods were between 1918 and 1945, when education played an ambivalent role. On the one hand, it was combined with social reform movements as a modernizing force in the Reformpädagogik (“progressive education”) movement, where ethnic minorities were dealt with on an educational level for the first time. On the other hand, state-related obligations, such as the education of citizens loyal to the state, were fulfilled, which was the basis for the totalitarian state systems of Europe. These state-related obligations, which were supported by education and its institutions, changed some national groups and made them “unequal” citizens. It led to a systematic exclusion of individual groups in the nation-states, mostly affecting communities of regional ethnic languages, religious groups, workers, and women. Educational systems deepened class barriers and tried to equalize diversity, which was not always successful. Education for the Nation-State Following the idea of liberalism, European nation-states of the 20th century wanted to provide all citizens with social mobility—regardless of social class and creed. The means to achieve this was to be provided by the educational system, and therefore compulsory education was introduced. The new system did not lead to much social unrest: in theory, anybody could move up, but in reality, the financially strong strata of the bourgeoisie and the nobility had the advantage of being able to give their children a head start in the national educational system. The children of workers, on the other hand, had to leave school early to do their share in supporting the family. Another dividing line was ethnicity. The marginalization of minority languages started with the development and consolidation of the “modern” state, which used educational policy to promote the state language at the expense of other languages, linking educational policy to linguistic policy then and now. This link has a deep impact on minority languages and languages without a state, since languages mark borders, not only between states, but also between societies. In the heated climate of nationalistic agitation in Europe, the question of the language of instruction became a matter of belief, which could not be solved by pragmatic means. The selection of a language of instruction was generally perceived as a symbolic definition of the national identity of a community or region, and many teachers were involved in national policy matters. The situation was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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different in North America; in Canada, for example, the historic principle of maintaining minority languages led to a pluralistic cultural concept, in which differences in schools were accepted to a certain degree. Furthermore, provinces developed independently with a centralized educational policy within each province —comparable to the autonomous provinces of Italy. Nevertheless, education had to refer to the Canadian understanding of a developing multicultural society, as the use of English and French was laid down in Section 133 of the British North America Act in 1867. In 1982, this was changed to the Constitution Act and included the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which protected linguistic and cultural diversity. Multiculturalism and multilingualism had the greatest impact on the educational system and the process of nation-building in Canada. Education for Colonialism In the process of the development of colonial school systems, diversity was suppressed because autochthonous forms of nonformal education (e.g., initiation courses, secret societies) were suppressed and existing indigenous institutions of formal education (e.g., Koranic schools, temple schools) were dominated by the colonial powers. In the Middle East, Asia, and southern Asia, the imposition of the Western school system led to the following consequences: the credibility of teaching material was no longer derived from religion and subjects were no longer taught using religious texts. In this model, religion was perceived as a “new historic subject” that was based on personal experience and practiced during leisure time. Moreover, the colonial educational policy kept local groups from controlling educational developments. The colonial powers only engaged themselves directly in schools that educated second-rate administrative and lower-paid staff who served under European control. Support for secondary education in Africa did not start until the 1930s on the Gold Coast. In spite of the bad results of colonial education, the new “European” model of schooling was accepted in the colonies, since no formal school system had existed before colonialism. The demand for formal education increased in the colonies and the “colonized” used the European schools for their anticolonial resistance, because they could attract a lot more people into the regular school system than in everyday life. After independence, the formal European school system expanded and the now politically independent countries adopted it for use in several attempted reforms. Because of the replication of colonial structures, which were oriented toward nationalism, there was social, regional, ethnic, and sexual discrimination. Education as a Progressive Force Because progressive education was obliged to protect individual diversity, it was a colorful parallel to state schools, even if the reform movement exerted little influence on the state school system. Nevertheless, besides its positive influence on specific student cohorts, progressive education influenced nation building in such institutions of nonformal education as people’s education and the educaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tion of women. The social pedagogy in Germany with its differentiation between education, upbringing, and care belongs in this context. Another important pioneering feat was the reform of juvenile jurisdiction, when juvenile courts were founded in Chicago in 1899, in the early years of the progressive education movement. When Makarenko founded his educational collective for criminal minors in 1920 in the Gorkij Colony in the Soviet Union, he tried to realize the principles of self-determination and self-discipline, which derived from liberalism. Thus, he added a new touch to the authoritarian education state, although he still aimed at developing the socialist personality. Progressive education and workers’ education were interrelated, and in the German Weimar Republic, it was necessary to enable citizens to fulfill their rights and duties in the new republic. Due to internal difficulties, churches and workers’ movements were not able to reach that goal; therefore, the state and communities played a specific role in this process. Meanwhile, the Danish model of the folkeskole by Grundtvig was being accepted worldwide—its core principles being the moral and intellectual development and understanding of local and national traditions. At the beginning, they were independent institutions, which were later supported by community boards of education that could be used by state institutions. This influenced existing forms of adult education in Canada, Kenya, India, and the Netherlands, while independent institutions related to people’s education were established in Finland as workers’ academies, in Germany and Austria as Volkshochschulen (“adult evening schools”), in Great Britain as “adult education centers,” and in the Netherlands, Italy, and Switzerland as “people’s universities.” Adult education as vocational education became the main instrument of the state to influence not just education but also the national values of its citizens. State-Oriented Education The question of minorities was not addressed when the nation-states were founded, and the situation became even more critical during the worldwide economic crisis and the growing totalitarian structures of the nation-state. At the turn of the century in the United States, a distinct racial policy was aimed at Asians, African Americans, and Mexican Americans, and the children of these groups were separated from European American children in schools. The separation of African Americans, especially, shows the connection between economic exploitation and schools as a means of producing cheap labor in this context. Also the de-culturalization of Native Americans in the American school system shows the questionable attitude toward minorities on its own state territory. In the German empire, schools were used for ethnic homogenization between 1871 and 1918. Not until the Weimar Republic did discrimination of minorities end, while at the same time the United States was dominated by a strong racial policy toward African Americans. This policy of the German empire was copied by the Third Reich for a short time after 1933 by reintroducing a law on civil servants (Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums of April 7, 1933), which N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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made it impossible for Jews to work as teachers or professors. Therefore, a German school system was created in which education was implemented in the interest of the German Reich. In addition, a few schools existed for German children who had a limited knowledge of the German language, in which different languages of instruction were used. For the entire school system, the acceptance of new “foreign” (especially Jewish) students to public schools and institutions of higher education was limited to 1.5 percent. After the Kristallnacht (“Pogrom Night”) on November 9, 1938, public schools and universities were entirely closed to “foreigners.” The end of this process was reached in 1942 when all Jewish schools closed. The policy of Gleichschaltung of citizens by the educational system during this time not only affected the school system of the Nazi regime but also, since 1928, the educational policy in the USSR under Stalin. While the school system in the USSR was not much affected by the regime until 1931, the leading majority implemented a restrictive policy after 1932. The educational system corresponded to the political, social, and technological structures of the system in all respects. Stalin’s authoritarian school system was part of an educational concept that was based on emancipative education. He established a number of mechanisms of manipulation to ensure his control of the totalitarian state by means of the school system. Therefore, schools now had little relation to reality, students were committed to Stalin’s leadership, and images of enemies were created. All social groups that could possibly rival the leaders were declared as enemies: religion, church, political opponents, and competing socialist movements. What Hitler’s and Stalin’s totalitarian systems had in common was the misuse of the educational system for the interests of the nation-state, whereas in the biological racism of the Third Reich, the suppression and the elimination of the “other” created a new level of extremism.

Consequences The consequences of education for nationalism between 1880 and 1945 can still be observed today. Without claiming a clear causality and linearity, one can observe the following typical developments characterizing the four periods of education. Between 1880 and 1914, the educational system became a primary domain of the nation-state, and because of colonialism schools worldwide followed the same principles, even in remote areas of the world. In the period between 1918 and 1945, private educational movements frequently made an effort to run alternative forms of schools, often referring directly to progressive education, and maintained educational self-determination of (regional) minorities. The worldwide consensus on state education, how to organize it, and how to improve human capital as a means of economic growth, led to a state-oriented effort of standardization and homogenization, which primarily benefited global economic powers. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Education for the Nation The Stanford research group showed that since 1870, the location of a state and its position in the world has affected its entry into the process of modern education, rather than such factors as urbanization, the cultural and religious composition of the population, the political status of independence, and even the existence of proclaimed compulsory education. The political liberalism of the 19th century led to freedom of choice and the right to education, which has been part of many state constitutions and, since 2005, has been in the draft of the European Constitution. Education is therefore an element supporting the state, although the traditional nation-state transfers certain functions to superior institutions of the global community, without becoming obsolete, as has been predicted many times. In the former Soviet countries, for example, a sense of national identity, which had remained hidden by a unifying socialism and educational system after World War II, is rising again. Education for the Colonies The colonial powers favored specific groups of the population through their educational systems. As a consequence, a class system developed between 1880 and 1914. Parts of the population of some African states were not allowed to participate in Christian education, but some groups were favored in order to support the economy and administration of the colony. Biased preferential treatment of a minority promoted the formation of social classes and increased differences between different groups within the peoples of many African countries. As African nations were gaining independence, they ended racial segregation; however, the educational structures from colonial times remained unchanged. There are two consequences of historic colonialism. On the one hand, a global model of schools has been established worldwide so that schools in formerly remote areas can follow the same principles: state-run, relatively homogeneous classes taught by more or less educated teachers using codified curricula in graded and selective school systems, with grades and evaluations, which can— according to Bourdieu—be used as “cultural capital” on the world market. This development was caused by the fact that before the European invasion hardly any formal educational systems had existed in the colonies, and the continuous use of the European model after independence filled this gap. On the other hand, the result of this period is that the African continent still depends on European nation-states and that European-style nationalism and education prove to be a separating rather than a unifying force. Education as a Progressive Force During the entire 19th century, progressive sectors of established education regularly criticized the existing relationship between state and school. However, no major alternative movement came into existence. Therefore, the dispute about the state controlling schools remained on a purely academic level until the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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beginning of the 20th century, and had hardly any political consequences. While the ideas of the progressive movements were mainly ignored by the state before World War I, many of these ideas became relevant after 1945. Spain, for example, legitimized the former illegal progressive education movements of the Franco dictatorship in the educational reform in 1990 by implementing progressive elements in its national curriculum for primary education. Private movements based on alternative funding were also established; for example, the “progressive reform movement” exemplified in Montessori kindergartens and elementary schools and in Waldorf schools. The motives were similar to the historic ones: international student assessments like PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment), conducted by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), suggested that even today, economic competition between nation-states lead the best human resources to top positions in the world economy. At the same time, the state takes less and less responsibility for the funding of education; therefore, the gap between the (educated) rich and the poor is widening as was the case at the beginning of the last century. The historic progressive education movement that developed around 1900 is, in fact, a rather ambivalent phenomenon in nationalism, since it led to diversity during its successful times, but was never really politically influential. The consideration of ethnic minorities after World War I, however, was modern. It was supported by political elites, and minority school systems, which were legally grounded and independent of the regular school system, played a major role. These minority school systems were the beginning of a multilingual and regionally differentiated school system of modern times, which would not have been possible before democratization. In the European Union before 2005, education was discussed on a regional level, especially in Italy and Spain, but also in Great Britain. Here, nationalistic elements were found in regional identity: in the strong position of the autonomous region of Catalonia in Spain, in the autonomous region of South Tyrol in Italy, and in the regional assemblies in Wales and Scotland in the United Kingdom. These developments were mainly supported by new schools, which were established in addition to the main school system. In this respect, the model of a combination of school and regional nationalism is very current. However, there is a qualitative difference between now and the beginning of the 20th century: due to colonialism and globalization, the development of schools has become international. Not only do nation-states and “national regions” take an active part in education, but so do supranational and international institutions like the European Union (EU), the World Bank, the OECD, and UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization). The attempt to homogenize the population in order to strengthen the nation-state in Europe works like a pendulum, swinging from total suppression, as with Stalinism, to an increasingly heterogeneous population, as in the regionalized EU of today. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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State-Oriented Education A worldwide consensus has been reached on implementing a state-oriented education in which children learn similar contents in similar contexts. This leads to state-oriented standardization and homogenization, which primarily benefits global economic powers. Therefore, the worldwide measurement of pupil assessment in schools is very important, because economic growth is believed to be based on the human capital of nations. After 1945, nationalism and national education formed an alliance, considering the fact that a majority of the population was provided with an education oriented on democratic principles. In the United States, this had already been debated in the 1930s, which led to the use of mass media as a vehicle of education. Some educational shows like Sesame Street have been copied worldwide. In conclusion, between 1880 and 1945, education and its institutions were assistants to the nation-state, to varying degrees. Decentralized states were not as easily affected in a negative political manner, because it was more difficult to reach a consensus for the nation-state. Nowadays, the nation-state is redefining itself because of the increasing importance of global society, while education remains one of its central tasks. Today education is guaranteeing a reproduction of a national identity, which is driven by democratic values and oriented economically, the bases of which were laid between 1880 and 1945. Selected Bibliography Adick, C. 1995. “Formation of a World Educational System.” In Pluralism and Education. Current World Trends in Policy, Law, and Administration, edited by P. M. Roeder, I. Richter, and H.-P. Füssel, 41–60. Berkeley, CA: Institute of Government Studies Pr. Benner, D., J. Schriewer, and H. E. Tenorth, eds. 1998. Erziehungsstaaten. Historisch-vergleichende Analyse ihrer Denktraditionen und nationaler Gestalten [Education states. A historical and comparative analysis of their thinking traditions and national models]. Weinheim: Deutscher Studienverlag. Bousquet, P., R. Drago, and P. Gerbod. 1983. Histoire de l’administration de l’enseignement en France 1789–1981 [History of French Education 1789–1981]. Geneva: Droz. Digby, A., and P. Searby. 1981. Children, School and Society in Nineteenth-Century England. London: The Macmillan Press. European Manual of Continuing Education. Neuwied: Luchterhand, 1994. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalisms. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Helmert, G. 1994. Schule unter Stalin [School under Stalin]. Berlin: Harrassowitz. Keim, W. 2005. Erziehung unter der Nazi-Diktatur [Education under the Nazi regime]. 2 vols. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Knabe, F. 2000. Sprachliche Minderheiten und nationale Schule in Preußen zwischen 1871 und 1933: eine bildungspolitische Analyse [Linguistic minorities and national school in Prussia between 1871 and 1993: an analysis of educational politics]. Münster: Waxmann. Levinson, M. 1999. The Demands of Liberal Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Meyer, J. W., W. Ramirez, and Y. Soysal. 1992. “World Expansion of Mass Education.” Sociology of Education 65, no. 2: 128–149.


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Röhrs, H. 1985. Die Reformpädagogik. Ursprung und Verlauf unter internationalem Aspekt [The Reformpädagogik Origins and process in an international perspective]. Weinheim: Deutscher Studienverlag. Schleicher, K., and T. Kozma, eds. 1992. Ethnocentrism in Education. Frankfurt: Peter Lang. Schleicher, K., and P. J. Weber. 2000. National Profiles, vol. 2: Contemporary History of Education. Münster: Waxmann. Spring, J. 1994. The American School 1642–1993. New York: McGraw-Hill. Turcotte, D. Lois, 1983. Règlements et textes administratifs sur l’usage des langues en Afrique occidentale française (1826–1959) [Laws, regulations and administrative texts about the use of langues in French Western Africa]. Québec: Éditions Presses de ‘Université Laval.


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Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide Eagle Glassheim Relevance In the first half of the 20th century, ethnic cleansing and genocide displaced millions of people and led, directly or indirectly, to the deaths of millions more. Inspired by modern forms of ethnic and racial nationalism, ethnic cleansing and genocide began in the late 19th century as southeastern European states and Ottoman Turkey sought to build homogeneous national states in place of the faltering Ottoman Empire. By the 1930s, the idea of ethnic and racial purity had spread widely in Europe, exploding into vicious ethnic civil wars and the genocide of European Jews during World War II. At the conclusion of the war, east central European countries expelled over 12 million ethnic Germans from their newly reconstituted countries. By 1947, ethnic cleansing and genocide had in fact produced several homogeneous nation-states, including Poland and Germany, where ethnic diversity had long been the norm. Though there was a brief flare-up of renewed ethnic violence in Yugoslavia in the 1990s, ethnic cleansing and genocide largely ended in Europe after 1947 and moved on to new or emerging states in postcolonial Africa and Asia.

Origins Forced migration and mass murder have a long history, but ethnic cleansing and genocide were particularly virulent modern variants that emerged in Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Ethnic cleansing is the forced migration of a group defined primarily by ethnicity or race. The term “ethnic cleansing” emerged only in the 1980s, initially used by Serbs in Yugoslavia to describe perceived persecution by ethnic Albanians in the Kosovo region. During the Yugoslav civil war of the 1990s, the term was widely adopted to describe efforts by Serbs and Croats to expand their ethnic territory in Bosnia at the expense of Bosnian Muslims. “Ethnic cleansing” has since evolved into both a legal and analytical term, defined by the United Nations in 1994 as actions “rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.” Though “ethnic cleansing” is a recent formulation, the idea dates to the late 19th century, when Balkan countries struggled to construct homogeneous national states as the Ottoman Empire declined. In an age of eugenics and racial N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ETHNIC CLEANSING AND GENOCIDE

hygiene, Germans and others commonly used the term “cleansing” in the 1930s and 1940s to refer to the process of creating an ethnically pure nation-state. Frequently extremely violent, ethnic cleansing qualifies as genocide when the goal or outcome of cleansing becomes the physical annihilation of a particular ethnic or racial group. Coined in 1944 by Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer and refugee from Poland, the term genocide was defined by the United Nations in 1948 as acts “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such.” Nationalism, the sanctification of the nation-state that reached its height in the 19th and early 20th centuries, was the underlying cause of the modern forms of violent purification referred to as ethnic cleansing and genocide. Nationalism had its origins during the French Revolution in the late 18th century, when middleclass Frenchmen (the Third Estate) claimed sovereignty as representatives of the people, known collectively as the nation. With the rise of mass politics in the second half of the 19th century, nationalism became particularly popular in Europe as a legitimating ideology for centralizing states or movements seeking such states. Political elites, ranging from Otto von Bismarck in the German empire to Roman Dmowski in partitioned Poland, sought popular legitimacy for their statebuilding projects. The nation-state, a state by and for a particular national group, proved a promising replacement for faltering empires, whose divine-right ideologies were losing legitimacy in secularizing and democratizing Europe. Under tremendous strain during World War I, the German, Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires collapsed during 1917–1918. Waves of sporadic ethnic conflict ensued, as most postimperial European states anchored their legitimacy in the principle of (ethno-linguistic) national sovereignty. The leader of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, Vladimir Lenin, embraced national selfdetermination in an effort to win Russia’s many national groups over to the Bolshevik side. Arguing that the anti-Bolshevik Whites would restore a Russiandominated empire, Lenin claimed that a communist federation would give nonRussians freedom to enact their own social revolutions. American president Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, issued at the height of the war in early 1918, also advanced self-determination as a fundamental goal of the forces arrayed against the Central powers. With the Fourteen Points, Wilson sought domestic and international support for the Entente cause by casting the war as a struggle between freedom and authoritarianism. The effect was explosive, not only undermining the multinational Austro-Hungarian and German empires, but also elevating ethno-linguistic nationhood as the fundamental source of legitimacy for postwar states. In a region with multiple intermixed ethnic groups, this was a recipe for conflict. Already in the years before and during the war, Balkan states and Ottoman Turkey began using ethnic cleansing as a means of consolidating their national sovereignty. The violent pursuit of the nation-state ideal continued into the 1920s in the Balkans and then spread to central and eastern Europe during and immeN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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diately after World War II. Thus, ethnic cleansing and genocide were the culmination of a struggle for a particular kind of sovereignty, that of the homogeneous national state. While ethnic cleansing and genocide were products of the modern ideology of the nation-state, they also tended to involve modern technologies, such as trains, machine guns, radios, and powerful bureaucracies. These technologies enabled not only the rapid spread of nationalist messages, but also the quick removal of large numbers of people. Many of the worst cases of ethnic cleansing and genocide have come during or soon after large-scale wars, when the power and reach of states have attained their highest point. Cleansing occurs, therefore, when a combination of ideology (will) and power (ability) reach a critical threshold.

Dimensions Though the history of ethnic cleansing and genocide in colonial empires is a story of its own, many historians have argued that European and American colonialists honed both ethno-racial ideology and techniques of modern cleansing in their respective empires in the latter half of the 19th century. In the expanding United States, the government invoked the “manifest destiny” of white Americans to justify the forced removal of native peoples to reservations in often inhospitable territory. In the Congo, Belgian representatives tortured and killed (directly or indirectly) millions of natives in order to perpetuate a lucrative system of forced labor in rubber plantations. In South-West Africa in the early 1900s, German forces systematically murdered the majority of the Herero tribe in an attempt to eliminate resistance to colonial rule. In all these cases, colonial rulers looked upon their victims as subhuman, lower life forms in a racial hierarchy inspired by the flourishing ideology of Social Darwinism. In the early 20th century, Europeans and Ottoman Turks applied this same ideology to internal “enemies,” projecting racial qualities onto preexisting social, ethnic, and religious conflicts and prejudices. Opportunistic leaders now turned Social Darwinism and cleansing to the task of constructing or consolidating national states. As the declining Ottoman Empire continued to hemorrhage territory in Europe, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece went to war with Ottoman Turkey and each other in an attempt to expand their national territory. During the so-called Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, hundreds of thousands of Muslim Turks were forced out of Europe in the first large-scale case of modern ethnic cleansing. The battle for southeastern European nation-states continued into the 1920s, as war between Greece and Turkey led to the systematic expulsion of close to 2 million Orthodox and Muslim residents from conquered territory. In the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Greek and Turkish governments agreed to ratify the previous forced migrations and to exchange all remaining Christian Orthodox and Muslim minorities N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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within the new borders of Greece and Turkey. Arranged and overseen by the newly created League of Nations, the Lausanne exchange became a precedent for later population “transfers” during and after World War II. The prototypical genocide of the 20th century also emerged from the context of Ottoman decline, as the revolutionary Young Turk regime sought to remodel the faltering empire on a Turkish national basis. With much of the Ottomans’ European empire gone by 1913, the Young Turk leaders sought to consolidate their rule in Anatolia by isolating and then eliminating their largest remaining minorities, the Greeks and the Armenians. The outbreak of World War I in 1914 was both a trigger and an opportunity for violent deportations of unwanted minorities in Ottoman Turkey. The Turkish state deported a few hundred thousand Greeks and then turned its attention to the Armenians, who were suspected of sympathizing with the Russian enemy. In 1915, Turkish forces began deporting Armenians across Anatolia into the deserts beyond the Euphrates River. The terror, forced marches, crowded boxcars, and frequent violence had all the marks of ethnic cleansing. But the Armenian deportations qualify as genocide as well, as the Turkish government’s intent was to kill off a substantial proportion of the empire’s Armenians. Upwards of 800,000 Armenians died, over 60 percent of the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire. The unsettled aftermath of World War I also proved deadly for vulnerable minorities in the Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish borderlands in the region that is now western Ukraine. During the Russian Civil War of 1917–1921, waves of pogroms took the lives of between 50,000 and 200,000 Jews (Lieberman 2006, 140). Though pogroms are by definition spontaneous and unsystematic, they do share many of the hallmarks of ethnic cleansing and genocide, most notably the violent targeting of an ethnic or racial group as such. The stereotype of the Judeo-Bolshevik that took root among many Poles and Ukrainians during the Russian Civil War had genocidal consequences under the influence of the Nazis during World War II. As Hitler prepared to invade Poland in 1939, he invoked the Armenian precedent for his policy of “physical destruction of the enemy.” After all, he told his generals, who “speaks today about the annihilation of the Armenians?” (Naimark 2001, 57). Noting little international response to the genocide, Hitler drew some important lessons from the case of the Armenians. First, it was possible and desirable to move and/or destroy populations in the name of creating a homogeneous national state. With the elimination of much of its Greek and Armenian population, Turkey had achieved its goal of reinventing itself as a nation-state (the problem of Turkey’s Kurdish minority emerged later). Second, war provided cover and infrastructure for genocidal policies, as both domestic and international attention turned to the exigencies of mobilization for combat. On other occasions, Hitler also cited the forced removal of American Indians as a model for his population policies in Germany and the occupied East. With the defeat of Poland and the subsequent invasion and occupation of significant territories of the Soviet Union in 1941, the Nazis undertook a large-scale N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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reengineering of populations in eastern Europe. With the intent of carving out “living space” (Lebensraum) for Germans in the East, Nazi planners started to create bands of settlements that reflected their Social Darwinist racial hierarchy. Germans would move into what had been western Poland; Poles from those regions would move east into mixed Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish borderlands; and the millions of Jews of eastern Poland and the Russian Pale of Settlement would be deported to a newly created colony in Madagascar. When the Madagascar plan became impracticable, the Nazis started moving Jews in the direction of a socalled Lublin Reservation in the General Gouvernement of occupied Poland. At the same time, Nazi officials developed a series of concentration camps for Jews and other prisoners in the German-controlled east. These camps, including Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, and Belzec, became death factories in late 1941 and 1942, and turned to the task of systematically annihilating European Jews. There is a great deal of scholarly debate surrounding the evolution of Nazi Jewish policy from ethnic cleansing to genocide, from deportation to ghettos and reservations in the east to mass murder. From the day Hitler and the Nazis took power in Germany in 1933, they began to isolate and discriminate against Jews. Nazi ideology was explicitly Social Darwinist and anti-Semitic, identifying Jews with both communist materialism and capitalist exploitation. Nazi leaders looked on Jews, a small, though prominent minority in Germany, as an alien and even subhuman race that was undermining German racial and national purity. In another common Nazi formulation, Jews were a kind of disease that sapped German society of its strength and competitiveness vis-à-vis other nations. Indeed, Hitler used metaphors of cleansing and extermination well before the Holocaust began in 1941. Until at least 1939, though, the Nazis promoted Jewish emigration, not mass murder, as the solution to the so-called Jewish Question. After the onset of war closed off the possibilities for emigration, the German regime turned to a policy of deportation, at first hoping to ship Jews to Madagascar and then turning more realistically to occupied Poland. The invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, created new opportunities and plans for deportations, but it also brought millions more Jews under German control. Already in the summer of 1941, special Nazi SS battalions known as Einsatzgruppen followed the German Army to the east, murdering hundreds of thousands of Jews, communists, and alleged partisans (often equated indiscriminately). In late 1941, the SS began employing gassing techniques from the discontinued T4 euthanasia program in Germany. From 1939 to 1941, the doctors and medical technicians of the T4 program had used lethal injections and poison gas to kill thousands of Germans considered mentally or physically handicapped. First at Chelmno and later at Birkenau, Treblinka, and other camps, the SS drew on T4 experts and experience in constructing gas chambers and crematoria for the rapid murder and disposal of large numbers of deported Jews. Though undergirded by virulent anti-Semitism and a crude Social Darwinism, the deportation of the Jews became genocidal as a technical solution to a perceived population problem. The Holocaust is the most N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Jewish families wait on a Warsaw street for deportation to a concentration camp, Poland, ca. 1944. (Imagno/Getty Images)

prominent of several cases where policies of ethnic cleansing have shaded into genocide. In all, close to 6 million European Jews died during the Holocaust. Nor were the Jews the only targets of Nazi genocidal policies. Over 200,000 Roma (Gypsies) died in Nazi camps, as well as thousands of homosexuals and other persecuted minorities. The Germans also killed close to 3 million Poles, including thousands of priests and other members of the Polish elite. In addition, Soviet forces executed more than 15,000 captured Polish army officers at Katyn in 1940. With the creation of a Croatian fascist state in 1941, Croats began to massacre Serbs and Jews living within their territory. In all, there were over 300,000 victims of the Croatian genocide, the majority of whom were Serbs. World War II also unleashed several other waves of ethnic cleansing, including waves of Soviet deportations of suspect minorities and the postwar expulsion of ethnic Germans from reconstituted Czechoslovakia and Poland. Already in the 1930s, Stalin had deported millions of “class enemies” to Siberia and allowed millions more to starve to death during forced collectivization. Up to 1937, the victims of the Stalinist system were defined more by class than by ethnic criteria, though some ethnic groups, most notably the Ukrainians, suffered disproportionately. But after 1937, and particularly during World War II, Stalin targeted particular ethnic groups considered unreliable, including Poles, Finns, Chinese, and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ethnic Germans. In 1944, the Soviets deported almost 500,000 Chechens and Ingush from the militarily sensitive Caucus region. Over 100,000 died in transit or in the inhospitable landscapes of Soviet Central Asia. During the same year, a similar deportation of around 190,000 Tatars of Crimea led to tens of thousands of deaths and the destruction of long-standing Tatar cultural monuments. In the waning months of World War II in early 1945, the Soviet Red Army and returning Czechoslovak and Polish forces targeted ethnic Germans for looting, reprisals, and ethnic cleansing. The subsequent postwar flight and expulsion of close to 12 million Germans from their eastern homelands was the single largest case of ethnic cleansing in history. This exodus came in three waves. First, over 3 million Germans fled to the west as the Soviet Red Army swept into East Prussia in early 1945. Then in the months after the German capitulation in May 1945, Poles and Czechs forced close to 2 million ethnic Germans across the border into occupied Germany. During this period of indiscriminate violence, hundreds of thousands were killed, and tens of thousands of German women were raped. In August 1945, the Potsdam Agreement called for a stop to violent expulsions and prepared for a so-called Organized Transfer of over 4 million Germans remaining in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Yugoslavia also took this opportunity to deport hundreds of thousands of Germans from their territories. As in other cases of ethnic cleansing, the expulsion of Germans from east central Europe had long-lasting effects on the societies and politics of the expelling countries and the destination countries alike. Cleansed regions of Poland and Czechoslovakia suffered labor shortages for decades, as German workers and experts abandoned the highly developed industrial borderlands of those countries. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia used patriotic propaganda and financial incentives to lure settlers from their interiors, with Poland also relocating around 2 million ethnic Poles forced out of the Lwow/L’viv region, which had been ceded to the Soviet Union. New settlers came from a variety of circumstances and regions and had little connection to the formerly German regions, making them particularly vulnerable to Communist organizational efforts. In the meantime, defeated and occupied Germany struggled to accommodate over 12 million refugees from the East. Expellees lived miserably for years after the war, often met with scorn by native Germans. Though conditions improved in the early 1950s, expellees (particularly those from the Sudetenland) remained a bitter and often revisionist political force in West German politics into the early 21st century.

Consequences Ethnic cleansing and genocide sharply simplified the ethnic map of Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Beyond counting bodies, we can only speculate on N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the cultural and economic potential lost to genocide and ethnic cleansing. Poland and Czechoslovakia lost thriving German and Jewish minority communities, which had long been vital contributors to economic and cultural development. Germany and Austria, once great centers of world Jewish life, lost their storied diversity, not to mention their empires. Turkey, a largely homogeneous nation-state after 1924, lost its most prosperous trading groups with the removal of Greeks and Armenians. In the second half of the 20th century, the Cold War standoff in central and southeastern Europe had the effect of ratifying the ethnic transformation of central Europe. Only in Yugoslavia, which retained much of its ethnic diversity after World War II, would ethnic cleansing return in the 1990s. With most European countries largely rid of minorities and bound by Cold War alliances, ethnic cleansing and genocide moved on to Africa and Asia, where newly emerging postcolonial states adopted national ideologies from their former European masters. Selected Bibliography Browning, C. 1992. The Path to Genocide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dadrian, V. 1995. The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus. Providence, RI: Berghahn Books. De Zayas, A. 1989. Nemesis at Potsdam: The Expulsion of the Germans from the East. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Friedlander, H. 1995. The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Glassheim, E. 2000. “National Mythologies and Ethnic Cleansing: The Expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans in 1945.” Central European History 33, no. 4: 463–486. Glassheim, E. 2006. “Ethnic Cleansing, Communism, and Environmental Devastation in Czechoslovakia’s Borderlands, 1945–1989.” Journal of Modern History 78, no. 1: 65–92. Gross, J. T. 2001. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Hayden, R. 1996. “Schindler’s Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers.” Slavic Review 55, no. 4: 727–748. Hilberg, R. 1985. The Destruction of the European Jews: Student Edition. New York: Holmes & Meier. Lieberman, B. D. 2006. Terrible Fate: Ethnic Cleansing in the Making of Modern Europe. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. Mann, M. 2005. The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marrus, M. 1985. The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century. New York: Oxford University Press. Mazower, M. 1999. Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. McCarthy, J. 1995. Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821–1922. Princeton, NJ: Darwin Press. Naimark, N. M. 2001. Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rieber, Alfred, ed. 2000. Forced Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Frank Cass.


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Suny, R. G. 1993. Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ther, P. 1996. “The Integration of Expellees in Germany and Poland after World War II: A Historical Reassessment.” Slavic Review 55, no. 4: 779–805. Ther, P., and A. Siljak, eds. 2001. Redrawing Nations: Ethnic Cleansing in East-Central Europe, 1944–1948. Harvard Cold War Studies Book Series. Lanham, MD.: Rowman & Littlefield. Wistrich, R. 2001. Hitler and the Holocaust. New York: Modern Library.


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Gender and Nationalism in the Age of Self-Determination Katherine O’Sullivan See Relevance In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, nationalism was shaped by two interlocking ideas: the nation was a self-determining populace with a right to statehood, and the nation was a community of belonging in which common identity would transcend social difference. Constructing the nation, then, had several key tasks, especially to define the citizens of the sovereign state (even if that state had not yet been established) and to articulate a vision of group identity and solidarity in the face of social difference (e.g., class, gender, language, region, religion). Gender was deeply implicated in these two tasks: it served as a marker for defining citizens’ rights, as a means for differentiating social roles within the nation, and as a basis for developing national solidarity. Defining national citizenship and building national identity entailed distinguishing between “us” and “them,” “self ” and “other.” National self-determination necessitated a template for determining who belonged to the nation, who could be a citizen, and how political rights should be constituted and distributed. Building national solidarity also required constructing a sense that national identity would always be implicated in one’s selfhood, that national security and survival would be the responsibility of the nation’s members, and that membership would generate a willingness to adhere to the dominant societal norms. Embedded in each of these tasks were practices of inclusion and exclusion, of dominance and subordination. Would national citizenship be defined by territory? By blood? By language? Would all citizens have the same rights and duties? What would be the relationship between national identity and other communal attachments? For nationalists in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the nation constituted a political community to which all other forms of identity should be subordinated. Both the state-building and community-defining aspects of nationalism were deeply gendered. Nations were often represented in familial terms that made both the nation and its gender relations seem natural and transhistorical. Men were mobilized as fathers and brothers to assert their right to sovereignty and to defend the nation in its wars. Borders were protected and imperialism was legitimated on the grounds of a “natural” hierarchy of nations. Citizens’ political and civil rights and social roles were gendered. At the same time that nationalists made naturalist claims about nations and their gendered practices, however, they intervened in even the most intimate social practices so as to shape political N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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boundaries, ensure national loyalty, and advance their goals. And as the principles of self-determination spread, activists mobilized to challenge gendered national hierarchies and to build transnational movements for women’s rights.

Origins The ideology of the nation-state reached its epitome during this time, legitimating both imperialist hegemonies and national liberation struggles. In claiming the right to sovereignty, nationalists tied notions of a historic populace to visions of a modern state in ways that both naturalized the nation as a timeless entity and envisioned it as an agent of history. Within Europe, the older states sought to mobilize the populace around a standard cultural identity, asserting historical continuity and modern destiny. On Europe’s periphery and colonized empire, aspiring nations sought to overcome domination by stressing their immemorial traditions and language. And outside of Europe and its empire, independent states sought to expand their boundaries in the name of the nation. Nationalists, in this period, constructed images of the nation as a family writ large, deploying metaphors of kinship to emphasize primordial and transcendental connections to place and to one’s national “brothers” and “sisters.” Evoking the nation as natural and timeless fostered national identities and political solidarity at the same time that it legitimated gendered hierarchies. The images of Mother Ireland, Mother India, Broederbond, Uncle Sam, and Vaterland all attest to the power of gendered familial images to define the national homeland and its people. Such images signaled membership in the national family, but they also suggested the appropriate gendered roles within it. Indeed, the nation was seen as both a repository of tradition (linking the people to its history) and a force of progress (leading the people to modernity). This dual purpose was gendered: in most nationalisms, women were seen as the carriers of tradition and men as the agents of history. Thus, women were often depicted as mothers of the nation, not only reproducing the national family but also nurturing its children, embodying its culture, and preserving its traditions. If women were most closely associated with domestic and private domains, men were more often associated with the public realm, responsible for heading the national household, governing and defending its interests. National and regional symbols in late 19th-century Europe, for example, emphasized women as mothers nurturing tradition even as men engaged in activities of transformation and change. Women wore national costumes, thus functioning as symbols of the traditional culture, while men abandoned traditional dress, signaling their move into modernity. In Japan, for example, during the Meiji reform era (1868–1912), the government encouraged Western hairstyles among men, whereas short hair was banned for women. Both within and beyond Europe, as men’s fashions became N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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more uniform, women’s clothing often became the embodiment of the nation, signaling the contest over women as carriers of tradition or as signals of modernity. Although familial images and women as tradition were predominant in nationalist iconography during this period, some nationalists invoked a past in which women were national heroines; for example, Czech nationalists retold the stories of mythic heroines, Libuse and Vlasta, to signify the gender harmony and equality in their national struggle. Similarly, modernizing nationalists outside of Europe constructed mythic pasts where women were heroic and envisioned futures with women as the bearers of modernity: nationalist reformers in Turkey, Iran, India, and Egypt argued for extending women’s rights in order to resist imperialism and strengthen the national family. Greater equality of women was to be part of creating a modern nation. From this perspective, women should be freed from those traditional constraints (from veiling to foot binding to purdah to polygamy). But even in anti-imperial, modernizing nationalisms, the association of women with the family remained paramount. In Vietnam, for example, nationalists opposing French colonialism mythologized the Trung sisters who had led an uprising against Chinese rule. But this call to Vietnamese women was to defend the nation as if they were mothers defending their child. Such calls were particularly compelling in places where the household was the center of production and where colonial policies undermined that economy and thus weakened family structures. Indeed, the image of the nation as a naturally gendered, unchanging family was at its strongest in this period, even as modernizing states were intruding into and absorbing traditional familial and household functions from production to social welfare to reproductive planning. Even though the nation was presented as a natural entity, nationalists sought to regulate its members, ensuring that they would conform to normative expectations in public life, civil society, social intercourse, and intimate relations. Attachments, interests, and allegiances that might have been disruptive of these normative expectations required vigilant monitoring. The policies of nation as nuclear family reinforced normative endogamous heterosexuality (almost always within the confines of marriage) and discouraged exogamy. Although men’s energy could be channeled into fraternal groups, it needed also to be contained within hetero-normative sexuality. In Western and anti-imperial nationalisms alike, the family was increasingly represented as a bourgeois, male-dominated nuclear household where women were, above all, mothers and custodians of culture. The family was not merely a metaphor. As the foundation of the nation, the household and the family became targets of social policy, and women were generally defined in terms of their “natural” roles within the family. At the beginning of this period, women were denied full citizenship rights and were socially and economically subordinated to men in every nation-state. Denied the franchise, the right to hold property, or to marry freely, limited in access to education and to occupations, women’s nationality and political status were identified with that of their fathers or husbands, so that their very political being was circumscribed by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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their social position vis-à-vis men. Not surprisingly, social reformers sought to expand women’s rights, taking advantage of the proliferating discourse about political sovereignty and independence. Feminists and nationalist and anticolonial leaders sometimes questioned the ways in which gender had been organized, generating new ideas of manhood and womanhood. Women’s rights were sometimes embraced as part of efforts at nationalist modernization rather than merely as agents for the preservation of culture traditions. The diversity in the genderings of nationalism in this period suggest the many ways in which gender could be manipulated or mobilized to serve the nationalist cause.

Dimensions Imperialism and Race The emerging racial “sciences” of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were entangled with the imperialist practices and policies, and helped to undermine the egalitarian claims in liberal nationalist traditions. The presentation of social evolution as a scientific finding legitimated claims about the natural hierarchy of the “family of man” and provided an ideological basis for imperial control of European colonies and exclusionary and restrictive immigration regulation. Social Darwinists advocated the need for strong social boundaries and for the regulation of female sexuality to retain the integrity of the nation. A typology of moral attributes was connected to this hierarchy, associating social respectability and moral virtue with those more “evolved” nations and lack of control and social degeneration with groups at the bottom of the “family of man.” Imperialism, racism, and nationalism often defined the outsider or the colonized in blood terms, linking history to nature in claims about the timeless and immutable “other,” who was seen alternately as a child in need of guidance and socialization or as dangerous and sexually threatening. These concepts were highly gendered, associating race with a range in sexual proclivity and selfcontrol. In the United States during this period, racial nationalists legitimated social control over men of color to protect “white womanhood,” by depicting African American men as rapacious and criminally prone and white women as vulnerable and in need of protection. African American women were imagined as either domesticated and maternal or as licentious and loose, thereby rationalizing economic and sexual exploitation. Gendered contradictions in racist stereotypes were evident as well in anti-Semitic images of Jewish men as either inherently effeminate or as lecherous. “Scientific” racists often depicted colonized nations as children governed under the authority of benevolent and paternalist white fathers, guiding the primitive races toward maturity and civilization. These images were inevitably gendered: British imperialists, for example, asserted their own more manly, civilized, and superior racial family, contrasting it to the purportedly more feminine, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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uncivilized, and inferior colonized India. The feminine was naturally subordinate to the masculine; but not all women to all men. Thus, Victorian womanhood, in the British imperialist scheme, represented the ideal; and the ways in which colonies treated their women were taken to constitute their lesser civilization and need for imperial guidance. As advocates of imperial control, British women embraced the ideal of “imperial motherhood,” established female emigration societies to rectify the gender imbalance in the colonies, and ensured a permanent imperial populace. Female emigrants to South Africa were recruited as British mothers who would be dedicated to care for both the national family and the inferior races. In this context, the civilized nations were thought to be especially vulnerable to degeneration, especially if their women reproduced with men from lesser nations. Although its expressions differed among the imperial powers and their colonies, the racialized legitimation of colonial domination was everywhere deeply gendered. Such racialized imagery not only undergirded imperialism and nationalist claims for a “white man’s republic” in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, but it also fueled such social policies as harsh restrictive immigration legislation to keep out the “inferior” races. Marriage laws were crafted to outlaw miscegenation and discourage liaisons across “racial boundaries.” Th e infamous “one drop” rule in the United States proscribed interracial sexuality by defining the progeny and all descendants of such unions as “nonwhite.” Such rules about racial identity reflected efforts to police sexual behavior amid concerns about national “degeneration.” Sexuality and Reproduction By the end of the 19th century, pro-natalism was a key part of nationalism, tying women to their roles as mothers and reproducers of the nation, particularly in Europe and the United States where declining birth rates in the late 19th and early 20th centuries fostered nationalist fears. Pressures on women to have children for the nation were often conflated with eugenic anxieties about the quality of the nation’s bloodlines and hence about class and racial origins and patterns of reproduction. Political leaders like American president Teddy Roosevelt (1858–1919) argued that efforts should be taken to promote reproduction among native-born white American women, lest demographic shifts foster “race suicide.” Over the first decades of the 20th century, contraception was restricted and made illegal in response to nationalist demographic concerns (France, 1920; Soviet Union, 1936; Germany, 1933). And states adopted legislation to promote motherhood and protective legislation limiting the hours and venues for working women. Fertility was encouraged through honorifics that linked heroic mothers to courageous warriors because both sustained national interests: the Medals of the French Family honored women for producing more than 5 children (1920); the Honor Cross of the German Mother was granted to women with more than 4 children (1939); Mussolini (1883–1945) led a campaign in Italy to “win the Battle of MothN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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erhood” (1933); Stalin (1879–1953) instituted a Medal of Honor for mothers of 7 and the title of Heroine Mother for those bearing more than 10 children (1944). No similar honorifics were tied to fatherhood. Rather, reproduction was women’s soldierly duty. Thus, women were reinforced as mothers of the nation and childbearing linked to national responsibility. Militarism and War Nationalism was closely associated with war and militarism, as established states strove to impose their will on foreign territories, and as colonized and stateless peoples mobilized to gain political autonomy. War intensified national consciousness, igniting the belief that the nation and its mission were in danger from threatening and sometimes barbaric national “others.” Building from traditional gender roles, nationalist leaders in many lands called men to fight and die for the nation and women to sacrifice their sons and brothers. These calls often came through invocation of the nation’s historic myths and memories and these too were gendered: “The sacrifices of our forefathers must not be forgotten”; “Our motherland must be returned.” The struggles of the national collective thus became the gendered duty of each man and woman. War is always entwined with gendered norms, and mobilization for the great nationalist wars that dominated this period contributed to the deep reinforcement of the connection between nationalism and the image of the warrior man. Dying for one’s nation could be depicted as the ultimate sacrifice, the quintessential proof of manhood. The Irish nationalist poet Padraic Pearse (1879–1916) thus romanticized the Irish Republican Brotherhood, calling on bloodshed as sanctifying and cleansing and as the route to preserve national manhood. But over the course of this period, women also became more engaged in warfare both directly and indirectly, complicating the dichotomy often made between the citizen soldier and the vulnerable women and children. During the 1899–1902 Boer War, for example, propagandists sought to recruit men as broeder Afrikaners to fight the British in order to protect their vulnerable women. Unsuccessful in this effort, however, Boer women mobilized to shame men for their failure to defend the state, threatened an Amazonian Corps of Afrikander Women, advocated the centrality of mothers for the survival of the volk, and entered politics. The development of the fraternal Broederbond was a partial reassertion of this challenge to masculine hegemony, as the nationalist organization reasserted male authority over Afrikaner nationalism and white women in a male-controlled state. A different pattern emerged in continental Europe during World War I, where popular images of the selfless brotherhood in the trenches mythologized the heroic sacrifice of the citizen soldiers and the natural fraternal bond. At the same time, the war had generated greater opportunities for women to assume nontraditional social roles and to experience more autonomy, even as they contributed to the war efforts. In the interwar period, increasing political rights and educational opportunities for women, sexual freedoms, and changes in fashion N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and mores led to the emergence of the “new woman” that signaled dramatic changes in gendered practices. Political conservatives argued that these changes would undermine national respectability and moral standards, that women should be guardians of the home. Thus, postwar nationalists sought to reinstate the traditional gender order. World War II similarly challenged the ideology that equated women with domesticity, as wartime mobilization and appeals of national interest fostered the recruitment of women into war-related work. In the United States, “Rosie the Riveter” signaled women’s active contribution to the war industries. In Japan, women were recruited to work in factories, and protective legislation laws were relaxed. In the USSR, women replaced men in heavy industry. And in Britain, birthplace of the ideal of Victorian domesticity, close to two-thirds of women worked outside the home during the war. In sharp contrast, Adolf Hitler (1889–1945) held fast to his gendered vision, claiming that national biological (volksiologisch) interests in reproduction were more important than recruiting women to work in industry. Despite crippling labor shortages, only one-third of German women left their homes for the labor market, and some have argued that this short-circuited Germany’s mobilization. Women’s Rights Because they are tied to claims about sovereignty and self-governance, nationalist movements helped to spawn the assertion of women’s political rights, providing both ideological bases for women’s claims to equality and political opportunities for organizing. In some cases, political leaders accepted women’s rights and national rights as coterminous and adopted universal suffrage (e.g., Norway and Finland in their struggles against Sweden and Russia). In others, nationalists explicitly rejected suffrage as undermining the nationalist cause. Both Japanese and Filipino nationalist politicians, for example, argued that women’s suffragists were imitating Western women and thus undermining national culture. In some places, women active in anticolonial and nationalist organizations pressed for equal rights and asserted that their part in the national struggle legitimated their claim to political rights. In Egypt, for example, as part of the struggle against British control, Huda Sha’arawi (1882–1947) established the Wafdist Women’s Central Committee; in 1923, she formed the Egyptian Feminist Union to press the Wafd for female suffrage. Similarly, Malak Hifni Nassef (1866–1918) challenged the exclusive rights of Egyptian men in marriage. But even feminists often disagreed about strategies for gender equality: in response to the rejection of female suffrage, Sha’arawi dramatically cast off her veil, viewing it as a symbol of women’s oppression; in contrast, Nassef opposed the unveiling of women as a Western imposition. Women, then, were nowhere in accord about the contours of nationalism and women’s emancipation, nor were male nationalists. Male nationalists also reflected a variety of views on nationalism and women’s emancipation. In some cases, male leaders of nationalist movements N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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encouraged women’s mobilization and then disregarded their contributions. For example, Irish political leader Michael Davitt (1846–1906) exhorted the anticolonial Ladies’ Land League to mobilize Irish peasants against British landlords but later discounted this defiant group as merely engaged in charity. In other cases, nationalists saw women’s rights as a key part of national development and modernization, as did Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk, the “father of the Turks,” 1881–1938) in his rejection of sharia (Islamic Holy Law) and association of secularism with national progress. Others recruited women to the nationalist cause but argued for the priority of national independence over women’s emancipation. Sinn Fein, for example, absorbed Maud Gonne’s (1866–1953) Daughters of Erin (Tion Inghinidhe na hEireann) while arguing that women’s political rights must await national autonomy. Indian nationalism in the early 20th century embodied these complex dynamics of gendered nationalist politics. Militant nationalists had to refute British views that Indians were not fit to rule, lacking the courage and “manly” virtues to face external challenges. Countering this imperialist masculinist view, Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948) emphasized the Hindu virtues of internal self-reliance and self-control and invoked a nationalist view of manhood that would embrace nonviolence and service as key to self-rule. He also insisted on equal rights and mobilized women as crucial to the success of the nationalist movement. Gandhi recruited women for particular campaigns, including those that rejected traditional Hindu practices of untouchability, child marriage, and purdah. At the same time that Gandhi subverted imperialist gendered claims about Indian men and advocated women’s rights, however, he also embraced essentialist views of men and women, claiming that the sexes differed in their capacity for nonviolence and self-sacrifice, arguing for a clearly gendered division of labor, and asserting that women should focus on domesticity and child rearing. He opposed women’s participation in work outside the home or in important events like the Dandi Salt March because it would take them away from home. And, he insisted that women conform to ascribed roles, appealing to Indian women to support his swadeshi (homespun) movement as part of maternal duty, to picket foreign clothiers and liquor dealers as part of their moral virtue, and to oppose purdah and untouchability as part of their feminine responsibility to purify and reconstruct Hindu traditions. Thus, like many nationalist leaders, Gandhi mobilized women for the nationalist campaign and exhibited a readiness to transform gendered practices, only insofar as these served the nationalist purpose. And like many nationalist campaigns, India’s spawned and spurred greater activism on the part of women, seeking to reframe the nation in more egalitarian directions. Transnationalism and Feminism In public life, nationalists sought to repress or control those movements that could mobilize interests, solidarities, and identities across national boundaries. Among the most important of these were women’s movements. Feminism’s N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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conceptualization of the universal secondary status of women and its recognition of the keen interplay between public and private politics had the potential to undermine nationalist ideologies that relied on a politics of communal exclusivity and gender differentiation. The emergence of feminist movements that explicitly challenged traditional gender roles, promoted transnational ties among women’s groups, and asserted women’s shared interests had the potential to weaken or even sabotage the primacy of national loyalties and the myth of the eternal national family. If women were oppressed worldwide, they might mobilize across state borders and build transnational solidarities and loyalties. Indeed, women’s rights activism reached across national boundaries. Th e International Council of Women, founded in 1888, worked to develop women’s rights organizations throughout the world, establishing committees that would address suffrage, work, public health, child welfare, and issues of sexual exploitation. By 1939, women’s rights activists in 36 countries had organized affiliated councils. Women’s rights activists who focused on suffrage also worked transnationally to push for women’s political rights, establishing the International Women’s Suffrage Alliance (IWSA, later the International Alliance of Women) in 1904. IWSA activists traveled in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East to advocate women’s rights, and by 1929, they had established national suffrage auxiliaries in 51 nations. Suffrage movements simultaneously sought women’s full inclusion in the nation-state and moved beyond the nation, building international advocacy networks and making global comparisons. Nationalism and racism often undermined women’s transnational solidarity in building movements for equal political rights, and suffrage groups sometimes split over the primacy of political goals and the legitimacy of nationalist claims. In Ireland, for example, the suffragist movement was divided over Home Rule, and when propertied women were enfranchised in local elections in 1898, women supporting the Union participated in anti–Home Rule petition drives, in protests, and in political canvassing for male candidates. Thus, perceived national interests were seen as having priority over universal suffrage for women. In the United States, divisions among suffrage activists over women’s exclusion from the Reconstruction Amendments generated a legacy of racialized friction that was felt throughout this period. Many white suffragists argued that the nation needed the votes of educated white women to counter immigrant and black male voters; and the National American Women’s Suffrage Association was structured to attract southern support by allowing individual chapters to exclude African American women from membership. Moreover, suffrage movements, especially those affiliated with nationalists, often had a conservative thrust, aligning women’s rights to social purity movements, blaming social vices (prostitution, alcoholism, truancy) on familial degeneration, and asserting that these ills would be better addressed through women’s suffrage. Intertwined with nationalism and imperialism, these assertions often assumed a racialist cast, especially as doctrines of Social Darwinism were invoked to legitimate colonial domination or immigration restricN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tions. Feminists often presented the colonized women as helpless victims and themselves as “mothers of the race” who could help to advance the imperial project. But colonized women responded, rejecting the patronizing stances of racialized maternalists. For example, in 1920, black women in the United States and Africa formed the International Council of Women of the Darker Races to build an international feminism centered on anti-imperialism and antiracism. Socialist feminism posed a greater set of challenges to nationalism than liberal feminism, for it invoked international solidarity of working women at the same time that it denounced nationalism and imperialism. Such socialist feminist activists as Clara Zetkin (1857–1933), Alexandra Kollontai (1872–1952), and Nadezhda Krupskaya (1869–1939) were at the forefront of efforts to build an international socialist women’s movement. Zetkin, who helped found the Socialist Women’s International, spearheaded the successful effort to designate March 8 as International Women’s Day, and opposed Germany’s entry into World War I as a nationalist and imperialist action. Although women leaders of the Socialist Internationale and the International Women’s Congress called on women to oppose the war and urge its end, these were a distinct minority, and both liberal suffragists and some socialist feminists supported the war and were willing to transform the suffrage organizations into service associations. The militant British suffragists Emmeline (1858–1928) and Christabel (1880–1958) Pankhurst suspended their campaign so as to support the war effort, encouraging British women to work in hospitals, in munitions factories, and in nursing near the front. In Germany, women’s rights leader Gertrude Baumer (1873–1954) organized the National Women’s Services (Nationaler Frauendienst [NFD]) to support the war effort. Its anthem exhorted women to adhere to their roles as domesticators for the nation: “Women’s hands work busily in service to our dear Fatherland. . . . We knit socks for soldiers; we are here for a labor of love.” If the war itself stalled suffrage efforts and undermined transnational feminism, its impact on the gender order was more unsettling, as women were recruited to fill strategically vital jobs when men moved to the front. Indeed, for many, women’s contributions to the war effort were seen as earning their political rights and helped to erode opposition to suffrage throughout Europe (Russian women won the vote in 1915, women in Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Luxemburg, and Germany in 1918 and 1919, English women over 30 in 1918, and American women in 1920). At the same time, international feminism expanded. The effects of World War I, as other wars, generated crises over the social meanings of gender and especially the social roles of men and women, at the same time that national and international feminism expanded. During World War I, an International Congress of Women was held at The Hague in 1915. The participants sought a peaceful resolution to the conflict and asserted support for women’s suffrage. By 1921, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, which was spawned by this conference, had sections in 22 countries and played a key role in advocating international over national loyalty. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Totalitarianism and Fascism The rise of totalitarian militarized states in the 1930s weakened transnational women’s movements, fostered conservative nationalism, and led to the repression of social reform movements and feminism. During the early years of the Soviet Union, feminist Bolshevik leaders Natialia Krupskaya and Alexandra Kollontai had pushed the party to address the “woman question.” As the leader of the Women’s Office (Zhenotdel), Kollontai pressed for greater sexual freedom, legalized abortion, communal housekeeping, and easier divorce as a way to wed socialism and feminism. However, after Stalin’s accession to power in 1927, feminism was quashed in the USSR and the “woman question” was declared to be resolved. Men and women were to devote all of their energies to the collectivization of agriculture and heavy industrial development. Domestic labor was devalued at the same time that explicit efforts were adopted to promote reproduction and “heroic worker mothers,” who combined excellence as workers and mothers. In contrast to Soviet claims about women’s equality, fascists explicitly embraced the ideology of male superiority and the woman’s domain as exclusively maternal. If the Soviets claimed that women’s rights had been fully realized under communism, the Nazis opposed women’s rights as a “product of the Jewish intellect” and called for “emancipation from emancipation.” In the wake of the losses of World War I and the economic uncertainties of the Great Depression, the myth of racial superiority provided solace to many Germans and both Jews and the “New Woman” were encoded as threats to the German nation. The Nazis argued that the state was a masculine sphere and women should return to their true maternal roles. The paradigmatic virtues of National Socialism—toughness, obedience, loyalty to the brotherhood—were associated with men, and qualities assumed to be feminine—emotional expressiveness, vulnerability—were to be expunged from the state. There was no place for women in the Nazi hierarchy, and women’s rights were secured only through marriage. Indeed, Hitler depicted women as belonging to the state and marriage as the route to citizenship for women. Abortion was opposed as a form of race suicide, birth control was made illegal, and motherhood medals were instituted to honor women for bearing children for the nation. Misogyny and National Socialism were of a piece, yet one out of five German women belonged to the Nazi Party, inspired in part by its conflation of family and nation. Crusaders for Hitler and motherhood developed networks of mothers to spread Nazi ideas and established associations like the Fighting Women’s League, which opposed women’s work outside the home and argued that the “female soul” was essential for German national development. At the same time that the state was to constitute the sheltering national family, Nazis demolished the underpinnings of German family life: programs such as Hitler Youth and schools that emphasized the primacy of state interests over family privacy and parental rights undermined the authority and influence of parents, and revisions in divorce laws allowed for the dissolution of marriage on grounds of racial incompatibility, failure N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nazi propaganda poster from 1940 illustrates one of the key concepts of National Socialist and neo-Nazi thought in Germany, describing and transfiguring the desired cohesive, classless, and racially pure society of the Nazi utopia. (Library of Congress)


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to procreate, or eugenic weakness. Thus, even as Nazi propaganda depicted the family as a realm of protection and safety, its practices weakened families and subordinated them to the state. Although feminists had been active in Japan after World War I, developing contacts with European and American suffragists, this work was sharply suppressed as Japanese imperialist militarism increased. The regime adopted very conservative policies, urging women to reproduce for the emperor and to deliver their sons to be soldiers for the glory of the empire. The Women’s Suffrage Conference embraced this patriotic militarism, and nationalism took precedence over women’s rights. Here, too, race, nation, and gender were intertwined as imperial expansion led to full-scale war by 1937. The notorious rape of Nanking and the jugun ianfu system of sexual slavery (“comfort houses”) were examples of the racialized gender dimension of wartime imperialism. To reduce civilian concerns and to regulate soldiers’ behavior in the wake of the rape of Nanking, the Japanese government established “comfort houses” in China and throughout the Asian Pacific region. More than 200,000 women, largely from colonized Korea (but also from China, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies) were abducted or coerced into sexual slavery for Japanese soldiers. The army established regulations with priorities given to officers and fees established in accord with the rank of the soldier and the ethnicity of the sex slave. This jugun ianfu system reflected both the general subordination of women and the racialized hierarchy that were part of nationalist imperialism.

Consequences Nationalism in the 19th and early 20th centuries covered a broad spectrum of political aspirations and social relations. If always gendered, there was no single framework on which gendered purposes and practices could be hung. Sometimes, as in fascism, masculinity and femininity were dichotomized and naturalized and men and women were reduced to social roles in service to the state and its nationalism. More generally, location within the emerging world system and relationship to metropolitan imperial and capitalist powers shaped the context for nationalism and race, religion, and class dynamics infused the processes by which it was organized. And even within any particular locale, there was a contingency to how nationalism was gendered, dependent in part on the intellectual and political leadership and influences. Although socialists in Europe took the “woman question” seriously, for example, and were more open to demands for equal rights for women, they often opposed suffrage, even as nationalists supported it, on the grounds that women would vote more conservatively. Outside the European continent, nationalists embraced European ideas in selective ways, sometimes building a nationalism that emulated aspects of bourgeois life N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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in Europe and adapting this creatively and necessarily to local circumstances, sometimes opposing Westernization and embracing the superiority of indigenous “traditions.” Similarly, anticolonial movements were neither necessarily supportive of nor unequivocally opposed to women’s rights. They sometimes invoked new understandings of men and women, and generated support for women’s rights. But they might also draw from existing gendered roles and expectations claiming that these were more authentic. Hence, there is no simple template for the relationship between nationalism and gendered equity. Rather, nationalist leaders used gendered politics as they strategized about how to best mobilize the populace and address countervailing social forces. Regardless of stance, nationalists sought power and dignity and sovereignty in ways that were deeply gendered, co-opting gendered traditions and images to give legitimacy to their own movements and to mobilize support. The malleability of gendered ideology and practices were thus constrained by the strategic understandings of nationalist leaders. What persisted throughout the world in this age of self-determination—despite changing state systems—were male-dominated polities and nations. But they did not persist unchanged or unchallenged. Selected Bibliography Ahmed, L. 1992. Women and Gender in Islam. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Blom, I., K. Hagemann, and C. Hall, eds. 2000. Gendered Nations: Nationalism and Gender Order in the Long Nineteenth Century. Oxford: Berg. Buckley, M. 1989. Women and Ideology in the Soviet Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Edwards, L., and M. Roces. 2004. Women’s Suffrage in Asia: Gender, Nationalism and Democracy. London: Routledge Curzon. Gilmore, G. E. 1995. Gender and Jim Crow. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Hicks, G. L. 1995. The Comfort Women. New York: Allen & Unwin. Jayawardena, K. 1986. Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. London: Zed Books. Koontz, C. 1987. Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Mosse, G. 1985. Nationalism and Sexuality: Respectability and Abnormal Sexuality in Modern Europe. New York: Howard Fertig. Ranchod-Nilsson, S., and M. A. Tetreault, eds. 2000. Women, States and Nationalism: At Home in the Nation? New York: Routledge. Rupp, L. J. 1997. Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women’s Movement. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. West, L. A., ed. 1997. Feminist Nationalism. New York: Routledge.


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Nationalism and Geopolitics Gertjan Dijkink Relevance Over the course of the 19th century, geopolitics and nationalism have made similar claims about the “natural” foundations of a (vital) state. While early nationalists denounced the “artificial” culture of European empires and their ruling elites with arguments about a pure national identity defined by linguistics, ancient folk songs, and poetry, geopoliticians wanted to exchange the customary juridical discourse about the state for a theory about the “life processes” of the state. Both visions entailed the excitement of a quest for “the truth,” but they suffered equally from a light-hearted handling of facts. Classic nationalism and geopolitics pivot on a typical central principle or normative theory about the necessary boundaries of a nation-state. Nationalism claimed that “the political and national unit should be congruent.” Geopolitics suggested that a specific mode of production and protection requires a specific political territory. These general theories do not likely offer the same solution in a national “emergency.” Nationalism and geopolitics, however, also comprise less disciplined local “narratives” about the national identity of a specific group (national myths), on the one hand, and specific threats or opportunities in the outside world (geopolitical visions), on the other. Such local narratives run more smoothly from the framework of geography/ geopolitics to ethnicity/nationalism and back. Geopolitics as an academic practice in prewar Germany and the racist views of German National Socialism were theoretically hardly compatible, but they met each other in a worldview that fit German feelings of deprivation and resentment. Differently from nationalism, the word geopolitics can indicate an (unofficial) academic discipline but also a way to conduct foreign politics. Statesmen acting geopolitically are supposed to see the material needs of a state and focus on the security problems that are given with a state’s geography. Shocking events in the world around us regularly revive geopolitical awareness. During the course of the Vietnam War, Foreign Secretary Henry Kissinger lamented the “lack of geopolitics” in the American foreign policy tradition. French president Mitterrand expressed the idea that “the politics of a state follows its geography.” The latter was a remarkable statement made by a president who recognized the inevitable reunification of Germany in 1989. Whether such conclusions mean that speakers deny a role to national “identity” as a guiding principle in foreign politics is difficult to say. One might assume that statesmen adhering to geopolitics believe that national identity also follows geography. Nevertheless, in the current academic field of “Critical N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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NATIONALISM AND GEOPOLITICS

Geopolitics” the construction of geopolitical ideas or visions in a state is usually seen as inseparable from the construction of national identity. In the early 20th century, both geopolitics and nationalism proclaimed selfdetermination but on different theoretical grounds. Because intellectuals behind these movements often had the same political goal in mind, the incompatibility between them remained hidden. Both German geopolitics and National Socialism interpreted self-determination as German expansion. In the emerging Soviet Union, national self-determination was “designed” to fit the geopolitical vision of the Soviet Union as a stable communist universe. The incompatibility between geopolitical and national conceptions of self-determination became embarrassingly clear in 1991 when the Soviet Union dissolved. A similar thing underlay the negotiations for the Versailles Treaty (1919). The victorious allies of World War I officially endorsed the ideal of self-determination along ethnic lines, but the actual boundary decisions always went through a strategic and economic sieve that denied self-determination to ethnic groups related to one of the losers of the war (Hungarians in Romania’s Transylvania, Germans in Poland’s Upper Silesia or in the Czech Sudetenland). By the end of the 20th century, ethnic turmoil in central and eastern Europe was a lagged result of the mixing of geopolitics and nationalism during the early 20th century. No wonder today’s global governance does not favor the redrawing of boundaries along ethnic lines. Conflict management and reconciliation are the preferred strategy, while secession in the name of self-determination often is withheld international recognition. An example is the secession of Somaliland, a country that rose from the collapse of the Somali state in 1991. When the leaders of Somaliland applied for help to UNESCO, the UN high representative for Africa made financial aid conditional on the removal of maps in geography and history schoolbooks that indicated the distinctiveness of Somaliland. The presence of maps or maplike qualities of a discourse on international movements, conflicts, or power balances is often subsumed under geopolitics. Because maps can be “deconstructed” as nationally self-serving visions, the term nationalism often pops up as well. Here, we are obviously talking about nationalism as national identity construction or national self-aggrandizing rather than merely a call for political independence of an ethnic group. The diverging practices of both nationalism and geopolitics make this theme sometimes confusing, but during 1880–1945, (classic) geopolitics and nationalism were grand theories about national strength and self-determination that claimed universal validity. Geopolitics

Nationalism

Classic “theory” Organicism Global power balance

≠ Congruence of political and national unit

Local narratives

= Nation(al identity)-building

Geopolitical visions Popular geopolitics

≠ incompatible; = compatible


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Origins Classic Geopolitics Geopolitics as theory about the political significance of geographical arrangements was born from a shock. Its advance toward a distinct academic outlook started only in the last decade of the 19th century. European states, more or less reconciled with the post–Vienna Congress fixed world, were now encountering each other in unchartered territory outside Europe. The landmark event was the Fashoda Incident (1898) at the headwaters of the Nile, where a small French and British army expedition hit upon each other, and the two states found themselves for a short time on the brink of war. The message was that no place on Earth could do without boundaries agreed upon in treaties (the polar areas are the last places to escape this rule), but also that such boundaries were still volatile and that new theaters of war were opening. During the same year in a speech in the British parliament, Lord Salisbury divided the nations of the world into “the living and the dying, the former gobbling up the latter.” A new conception about a struggle for life and space on the earth had become quickly fashionable. Halford Mackinder was the first Briton to frame such ideas in an academic essay about the “geographical pivot of history” (1904), in which he offered the view that the world was in the embrace of a struggle between land power (Eurasia) and sea power (Britain and its colonies, Japan, the United States, South America), and that a new means of transport (railway) was dangerously shifting the balance in favor of land power. Mackinder did not use the term geopolitics, but it was already invented by the Swedish political thinker Kjellén in an obscure publication from 1899. Geopolitics as a distinct academic perspective was born from the awareness of the nearing end to European colonial expansion. In 1897, the German geographer Friedrich Ratzel (1844–1904) published his book Politische Geographie. It dealt with the need for space in modern states, suggesting that a higher level of development requires larger states. Although it did not deal with global confrontations between states, Ratzel’s work was certainly inspired by the colonial race between Britain and France and by emerging new world powers like the United States and Japan. The word “geopolitics” finally became well known and very soon became suspect as a result of the interwar German Geopolitik school of Haushofer that merged its ideas so easily with the worldview of the Nazi’s. Classic Nationalism If we conceive of geopolitics as any idea about political territoriality, then geopolitics started much earlier than the 1890s. According to some interpretations, the emergence of the European (Westphalian) state system already implied geopolitics, meaning that there was a collection of assumptions about territorial security and rules of international behavior. If geopolitics historically started with N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the acceptance of international boundaries (“civilized geopolitics”), then nationalism should be characterized as the second stage in its development. Nationalism sprang from an industrial revolution that tore people away from their rural background and made them painfully aware of cultural differences within the same state, particularly the difference between the “high” culture of those having access to power and the “popular” culture of ordinary people. Nationalism did two things: it demanded general education in order to make everyone a participant in the “high” culture, and it sanctified popular culture as a natural and perpetual territorial marker of the state. According to thinkers like Ernest Gellner, nationalism was a necessary response to industrialization because this social revolution required people that could easily communicate with each other, and it constituted flexible workers in a swiftly changing labor market. General education better satisfied the demands of this labor market than the traditional on-the-job training that farmers and craftsmen underwent for a lifelong occupation. To such a “functional” explanation, one might add that a common culture generates the feeling of solidarity that is essential to modern states. According to Gellner’s well-known definition, nationalism is the principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent, or more simply phrased: political and ethnic boundaries should coincide. While this principle suggests a “natural” logic that should determine state boundaries, it ignores the fact that ethnic or cultural boundaries are far from unequivocal. There are three problems with regard to this principle: (1) differences in culture are not clear-cut (e.g., the gradual transition between dialects, if we consider language as the crucial cultural feature), (2) ethnic groups are not distributed in a spatially contiguous way, and (3) there are simply too many ethnic groups in the world to consider ethnicity as a useful guiding principle in the creation of states. These problems moved state formation in the direction of creating a common culture rather than creating states on the basis of a common culture (whatever that may be). The classic example is France existing for a long time as a strong state before it seriously started (incited by the 1870–1871 war with Germany) to turn its peasant population into Frenchmen. But in the same century, we also see the amalgamation of small states into larger unions (Germany, Italy) and the secession of states from large empires (Ottoman, Austrian), all with a similar appeal to the cultural distinctiveness of the newly emerging political units. In view of the three problems mentioned above we can only conclude that these decisions involved a lot of imagination (and manipulation) to satisfy the requirement of “political and national congruence.” Ratzel developed his political geography (here subsumed under geopolitics) to escape such doubtful ethnic rationalizations and to equate the state with a geographic system of people and land-tied productive activities. Such spatial systems would be coupled with a spirit and culture, according to Ratzel. Although proposed as a “science,” Ratzel’s political geography did not develop a theoretically consistent approach to the origin of such spatial systems. Were they in the end naturally or culturally determined? N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Organicism German geopolitics became particularly associated with the “organicist” approach: the conception of the state as a living organism. This is often attributed to the influence of evolution theory (Darwin, Spencer), but in Germany the term “organic” has much older roots. Like German nationalism, it had roots in the Enlightenment, on the one hand, and the political and mental response in Germany to the events in France at the turn of the 19th century, on the other. Political thinkers of the Enlightenment born in the 18th century, like Rousseau in France and Herder in Germany, saw the world as a natural order of identities and places. Th e discovery (and fraudulent creation) of ancient poetry and songs legitimated the distinctiveness of national territories as different from the dynastic logic of political territories and their “artificial” higher cultures. It soon became an intellectual challenge to discover the “natural” origins of nations, particularly among new elites that distinguished themselves by education rather than descent. James Macpherson’s publication of songs attributed to the ancient bard “Ossian” (1765) caused excitement everywhere in Europe and elicited the “finding” of other ancient evidence of nations. Alexander von Humboldt (1769–1859) was the genius that continued the Enlightenment perspective into the 19th century with a singular geographic enterprise: his four volumes of Kosmos. While this enterprise covered mainly what we call “physical geography” today, it was couched in typical Enlightenment discourse. Humboldt elaborated the natural distinctiveness of any region in the world; a condition that would give each local society a specific character but also a degree of “incompleteness.” Human travel and exchange (trade) would create a new organic unity out of these differences. Humboldt developed the first truly global view in a definitely positive spirit. He pictured variety in nature and in human culture as a promise, a condition leading to ever increasing harmony in the future rather than conflict. The publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859) symbolized the end of evolution as a harmonious concept and the start of a view on nature as conflictridden. Evolutionary changes in Darwin’s theory did not obey a predestined harmonious force but emphasize the advantage of local adaptation. This idea would singularly fit the geopolitics that rose at the end of the century and also the type of nationalism that had developed in Germany at the beginning of the century. German nationalism broke away from Enlightenment positivism as a reaction to the French Revolution and the authoritarian backlash in post-Vienna Germany. While German philosophers initially hailed the French Revolution as the triumph of the age of reason over the ancien régime, the emergence of the revolutionary terror regime in France and the Napoleonic expeditions in Germany soon changed the mood. The humiliation of Germany unleashed the “othering” process that is so characteristic of resentful nationalism. This means that national identity is constructed as antipode of and superior to that of another nation. The mechanism involves an inversion in which weak or shameful aspects of a nation (for example the political weakness of Germany) are presented as strength (Germany N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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does not need a central government like France because it is a distinct and strong Volk)—“making a virtue of necessity,” as the proverb runs. A second disappointment followed in Germany when the restoration of the old order after the Vienna Congress did not yield an open society in which the new educated class (Bildungsbürger) could play a political role. Censorship and downright suppression compelled intellectuals to “internal emigration” and sublimation of their longing for a legitimate and uncorrupted German state in art and literature. Artists from the painter Caspar David Friedrich (1774–1840) to the composer Richard Wagner (1813–1883) were obsessed with the idea of falseness in official culture and society and equated going back to nature (or religion) with recovering the true German identity. With artistic creations that were a smack in the face of established authorities, they had to account for reprisals, but they held their ground because they were driven by an almost religious inner vision. This denial of the established order is generally called romantic nationalism, an outlook that hovered between the cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment philosophers and worship of a utopian (German) nation. The emphasis on the natural foundations of a society was echoed in the “organicism” of Ratzel and Kjellén, who imagined the state as a living being requiring Lebensraum (“space for living”). These ideas, however, were already present in German reactions to “wars of liberation” (1813–1815). During the stirring years of the Napoleonic wars, Adam Müller (1779–1829) attacked the rigid universalism that seemed to underlie the French idea of the state. According to Müller, a state cannot be based on a system of fixed rules or a concept; it rather is the concretization of an idea. The difference is that the latter fits the model of a living phenomenon that will perish if it is not treated and understood according to its own spirit. Life needs struggle (war) and adversity to develop its typical resilience. Friedrich List (1789–1846), the spiritual father of the German customs union, strikes a similar note. In his unfinished treatise titled “The National System of the Political Economy” (1841), he wears himself out criticizing the Adam Smith School of economic liberalism, which identifies the creation of economic value primarily with individual action and considers nations only as an idea, a “grammatical construction.” The current condition of nations, according to List, is a result of the accumulation of discoveries and creations by many generations. Without acknowledging the “cultural capital” of states, one cannot produce a sound economic theory. While Müller’s discourse still echoed the clang of arms of an ongoing war, List represented the practical turn that German politics would take after the failures of nationalist ideals in the previous decades. Yet the idea of an organic supra-individual quality is preserved in the shape of cultural capital, implying an important task for the state in such interindividual affairs as economic exchange. These German ideas about the state, so much influenced by the nationalist mindset of the early 19th century, obviously prefigured the more elaborate geopolitics of the later 19th century. Darwin and the evolutionists may have contributed N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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to the hardening of organicist thinking, but the idea of a struggle between identities had already been firmly planted in the German experience of the world during the “wars of liberation.” It should also be noted that in the nationalist imagination, this struggle was not so much a matter of life and death as a lifebringing experience, a catharsis that would bring to light true national identity. The mixture of these nationalist influences that partly reflected idealistic elements from the Enlightenment philosophers and post-1859 natural science is what makes the interpretation of Friedrich Ratzel’s work so difficult.

Dimensions The 19th-century nationalist revolution did two things that had an impact on territorial politics: it incorporated ethnic or racial criteria in international politics, and it involved ordinary people in state affairs. Territorial features, however, may be more or less prominent in the myths, narratives, and symbols that we call national identity. This reveals something about the history and type of external relations of a country. The most explicit mix of territorial assumptions and myths developed in Germany after World War I (Geopolitik). “Ethnicization” of International Politics The implementation of ethnic criteria in redrawing the map became for the first time a concrete option with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek struggle for independence (1821–1832) supported by European and American philhellenes, who attributed the identity of classic Greece to this people, unleashed a series of other secessions and struggles (Poland) that were territorially legitimated by a dominant ethnic group (Poles, Serbs, Romanians, Bulgarians). The principle of self-determination is almost exclusively associated with ethnically distinctive groups, although an earlier and sensational example of selfdetermination, American independence, can hardly have been legitimated by ethnic criteria. The next wave of reterritorialization involved national unifications: Italy (1860) and Germany (1871). The third wave occurred in the aftermath of World War I and the break up of the Austrian monarchy and Russia. Th e principle of self-determination was now an explicit guideline of the victorious powers (and particularly of American president Woodrow Wilson) in redrawing the map of Europe. The last wave of important territorial change—decolonization after 1945—on the contrary, put nationalism to the fore as a creator of new postcolonial nations rather than as a determinant of state boundaries. Politicization of the People Education, military conscription, art, and media information moved the vicissitudes of the state to the reality of daily life. History and geography lessons at N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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school propagated the idea of national identity and destiny. Politicians learned how to stir up the masses, and the prospect of war raised hysterical and enthusiastic masses in Berlin and Paris in 1914. Geographical images and visions played an important role. Images and maps were not any longer merely an instrument for military strategists and statesmen, but they were used as a means to raise public support. A novel like Volk ohne Raum (People without Space, 1926) imbued Germans with the idea that the Versailles Treaty had virtually eliminated all life chances for the average young German, both at home and in the world. In the same period, Portuguese citizens looked at maps of Portugal that included the overseas colonies projected on the map of Europe, learning that Portugal was not a small country at all. It is this constructive quality of “popular geopolitics” that has drawn much interest in the academic study of geopolitics since 1990. Apart from representing theories of self-determination that are intellectual weapons on the international political scene, both nationalism and geopolitics create the typical domestic legitimation of politics that appeals to national identities and popular ideas about the mission of a state in the world. In this popular and practical sphere, nationalism and geopolitics are hard to disentangle. The vision of a westward shift of human civilization that gives the United States an advantage over other countries (“Manifest Destiny”) in the world, and justifies its exceptional position in the world of states, is a basic idea that has deeply influenced U.S. identity, and that goes along with a “geopolitical culture” that easily sees the world as a struggle between good and evil. Territorial and Nonterritorial Identities We might distinguish between national identities that adopt a more and a less “territorialized” mode, which means a nationalist discourse can either pivot on pride in national principles like the sovereignty of a people, cosmopolitanism, or social equality (Britain with its Magna Carta, France with the Revolution during a major part of the 19th century, the United States today) or focus on territorial unity and the relations with other states. The change from the first to the second mode of national identity occurs in the wake of shocking or euphoric territorial events. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871 changed the face of French classrooms with the introduction of maps of the entirety of France, and it eventually brought a more thorough nationalization of the people than had happened in the decades before. National identity became defined in terms of contrasts with Germany rather than in terms of the French people as inheritor of the Revolution. Germany’s unification in the course of the same war inevitably implied an obsession with territory, also because part of the German-speaking world was left outside the new state. Secession or independence likely elicits an engagement with territory in the nationalist imagination. But weakness may also incite attempts to dig up more cosmopolitan and humanitarian visions and traditions. The visions that intellectuals had of Czechoslovakia and its place in the world have been characterized as the alternation of geopolitical (territorialized) and nongeopolitical visions. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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aftermath of World War I and the revolutionary events in Russia changed the map of Russia and called up the specter of a territorial breakdown. While the Bolsheviks subsequently suppressed Soviet Union–wide nationalism in favor of socialist internationalism, Russian émigrés found comfort with Eurasianism that imagined Russia as a political unit that covers Europe and Asia but that, in terms of national identity, was distinguishable from both. Eurasianism relied on geographic and anthropological theories. No wonder the demise of the Soviet Union again revived Eurasianism among some nationalists in Russia. Another example of territorial nationalism is Finland. The Finnish experience of different political masters (Sweden, Russia) in the 19th century generated a strongly territorial dimension in the construction of Finland’s national identity. German Geopolitik It is not surprising that Germany, a (powerful) European state that underwent the most significant territorial changes and pressures after 1870, turned out to be the most ambitious in producing geopolitical ideas and in promoting geopolitics into an academic subject. The latter could take advantage of a political discourse on space (Raum) that already existed in popular writings and among intellectuals of statecraft (military, journalists). In 1925, the retired general Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) started the Zeitschrift für Geopolitik ( Journal of Geopolitics), which subsequently became the main medium for launching geopolitical theories. Haushofer was the central figure in propagating the concept of geopolitics, but he ultimately was also responsible for the later taboo on geopolitics that overshadowed academic writing during the first decades after World War II. Geopolitik was primarily a way to overcome the human fixation on the current world map and reveal the great movement of history. This in itself is not very different from other and more recent “respectable” academic enterprises like Braudel’s analysis of the Mediterranean world or Diamond’s discussion on the fate of human civilizations. The difference is that in Geopolitik, the role of German wishful thinking was only too obvious. At first sight, Geopolitik was a kind of geographical craft. It used maps, and its analysts mapped “directions” corresponding to the main interests and external streams of traffic of a state. These they called “lines of force” or “collision lines.” A collection of such lines on a map was a “geopolitical field of force.” When extending overseas, such lines of force were (in a striking similarity with later economic geography concepts) called “growth poles.” The method was thought to provide insight into future military conflicts and boundary changes. War was generally discussed in a neutral way. Certain wars had to be prevented because they were caused by human misconceptions, but other wars were simply an expression of profound forces tending toward equilibrium or their destiny. When German geopoliticians talked of self-determination, they meant respect for such developments rather than the democratic decision of a nation. It is the embedding of such ideas in a wider nationalist (and National Socialist) framework that makes them understandable rather than their inherent logic. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Dr. Karl Haushofer (1869–1946) on his way through Frankfurt Airport to Nuremberg for possible trial on war crime charges, 1945. Haushofer’s geopolitical ideas influenced Nazi leadership. (Bettmann/Corbis)

In discourses around Geopolitik, the idea was aired that the German people were unique in having a special intuition for the spatial requirements of the state or the needs of the state as a living organism. National Socialism was seen as a political breakthrough that for the first time would give this intuition free reign. Although nationalism can be also associated with conservatism in the 20th century, German geopoliticians saw themselves as futuristic and hostile to conservative streams in German politics that also supported the Nazi’s. Geopoliticians did not resist the nationalist slogan “one nation, one state,” which aimed at the unification of Austria and Germany, but preferred to incorporate this ideal in a geopolitical discourse on Mitteleuropa (“Central Europe”). Ethnic criteria were never a leading principle among Geopolitik writers in the period between both world wars.

Consequences The impact of nationalism on historical events in the late 19th and early 20th centuries is more conspicuous than that of geopolitics, which after all involved theories that were only appealing to elites and leaders of strong states bent on N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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enhancing their power. Nationalist leaders, however, also entertained geopolitical narratives or visions from which they gained courage in the struggle for independence. The Italian nationalist Mazzini (1805–1872) expected that the imminent ignition of the national spirit among the Slav nations, particularly Poland, would be the most significant event in bringing the Habsburg empire down. It did not work out like that, but Italian nationalism at least succeeded in unification “at home.” Geopolitik studies helped to underpin the German feeling of paranoia after 1918 and may consequently have contributed to German war plans. Mackinder’s geopolitical analysis of the perils of the British empire, however, did not ring an alarm in the British capital in 1904. The main reason was the strength of the British geopolitical “reflex,” which distinguished sharply between balance of power strategies for continental Europe and liberal politics for the world at large. In France, no clear academic tradition of geopolitics was started before 1976. This does not mean that French statesmen were not guided by geopolitical visions. After 1870, Germany loomed large in these visions and this reverberated in French national identity formation. In the early 20th century, geopolitics was more fatefully present in the shape of strategies for the manipulation of groups, negotiations in peace treaties, and the exercising of international pressure. The consequences of the Versailles Treaty resulted from the impossibility of creating viable mono-ethnic states and from the incompatible strategic (geopolitical) visions of delegates in the conference. The treaty was hardly concluded when British prime minister Lloyd George observed, “We liberated the Poles, the Czechoslovaks, the Yugoslavs and today we have all the trouble in the world preventing them from oppressing other races.” The most curious type of geopolitical strategy in the guise of nationalism was practiced by the new communist rulers in the Soviet Union, who created an entire administrative system based on different degrees of “autonomy” for national groups: Union Republics (Socialist Soviet Republics [SSRs]), Autonomous Republics (Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics [ASSRs]), and other areas. A Union Republic was to be the home of a comparatively advanced (i.e., industrialized) nation that might still cherish memories of former independence (Georgia, Ukraine, Lithuania, etc.). Within their territories, smaller ethnic minorities were given Autonomous Republics (Chechnya, Tatar Republic, Tuva, etc.). It seemed an honest way to do justice to the complexities of ethnic geography. There is much speculation about the motives of Soviet leaders (particularly Stalin) to engage in such practices, because nationalism and communism are ideologically incompatible. However, one should bear in mind that in the early 20th century, nationalism and communism struggled against the same enemy: multiethnic empires and imperialism. The Soviets could not resist the spirit of the times and undoubtedly considered nationalism a transitory stage in the inevitable development to world socialism. A geopolitical interpretation of Soviet nationalities policy is that it was simply a way to wield power by means of divide and rule. This is suggested by certain N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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anomalies in the way boundaries were drawn. The Tatars, faithful allies of the Bolsheviks in the struggle against the old regime and its defenders, were promised a separate Tatar-Bashkir state after the war was over. But Stalin and his fellow rulers seemed to have immediately forgotten this promise, and the Tatars were presented with a very odd national house. The envisaged Tatar-Bashkir Republic was split into two ASSRs. In the one that would bear the name of the “titular” nationality, the Tatar ASSR, Tatars made up actually less than 50 percent of the population. In the other one, the Bashkir ASSR, Tatars were the largest ethnic group but only 24.3 percent of the total population. These administrative creations still accommodated only one-third of the total number of Volga Tatars. In view of the Tatar ethno-geography, such practice can hardly be explained as other than “divide and rule.” Similar goals, but directed at neighboring countries, may have been the rationale for the creation and naming of national republics like Moldavia, Azerbaijan, and others. As conspicuous acts honoring the selfdetermination of Azeri and Moldavian ethnic groups, they may have been a tool in a hidden policy to spread discord in neighboring states (Iran, Romania). The hidden dangers of the Soviet nationalities policy became obvious in the years after 1991 when one after another SSR appealed to the federal constitutional principles to leave the Union. The early 20th-century rhetoric of selfdetermination had born unplanned children that moreover were not ethnically homogeneous at all. The presence of autonomous groups with a lower degree of political competence caused and causes continuous conflicts in the former Soviet areas echoing Lloyd George’s complaint from the early 1920s. Classic geopolitics was right in stressing other principles that integrate states, but ultimately, it never transcended the “ethno-nationalist” and Machiavellian preoccupation of its practitioners. Selected Bibliography Agnew, J. 2003. Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics. London: Routledge. Bassin, M. 1991. “Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space.” Slavic Review 50:1–17. Cairo, H. 2006. “ ‘Portugal is not a Small Country’: Maps and Propaganda in the Salazar Regime.” Geopolitics 11, no. 3: 367–395. Dijkink, G. 1996. National Identity and Geopolitical Visions. London: Routledge. Drulak, P. 2006. “Between Geopolitics and Anti-Geopolitics: Czech Political Thought.” Geopolitics 11, no. 3: 420–438. Gould, S. J., ed. 2004. “Art Meets Science in ‘The Heart of the Andes’: Church Paints, Humboldt Dies and Darwin Writes, and Nature Blinks in the Fateful Year of 1859.” In I Have Landed: The End of a Beginning in Natural History, 90–109. London: Jonathan Cape. Herb, G. H. 1997. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda 1918–1945. London: Routledge. Hooson, D., ed. 1994. Geography and National Identity. Oxford: Blackwell. Kaiser, R. 1994. The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


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Murphy, D. T. 1999. “ ‘A Sum of the Most Wonderful Things’: Raum, Geopolitics and the German Tradition of Environmental Determinism, 1900–1933.” History of European Ideas 25:121–134. Ó’Tuathail, G. 1996. Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space. London: Routledge. Paasi, A. 1996. Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish-Russian Border. Chichester: Wiley. Parker, G. 1985. Western Geopolitical Thought in the Twentieth Century. London: Croom Helm. Rorlich, A.-A. 1986. The Volga Tatars: A Profile of National Resilience. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Roshwald, A. 2001. Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East, 1914–1923. London: Routledge. Valota, B. 2003. “Giuseppe Mazzini’s ‘Geopolitics of Liberty’ and Italian Foreign Policy toward ‘Slavic Europe.’ ” East European Quarterly 37:151–166.


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Language and Nationalism John E. Joseph Relevance Over the last four decades, a consistent theme within studies of nations and nationalism has been the central importance of language in their formation, in determining where the boundaries of a nation lie in terms of both population and territory, and in whether a given individual belongs to a particular nation or not. The matter of what language is spoken has long seemed to offer the surest and most objective criterion. Yet no nation has ever been linguistically homogeneous— bilingualism and multilingualism have always been the norm for most societies— and the way in which languages spread is a cultural matter disconnected from genetic ethnicity. There is, then, a gap between the reliance on language to define the nation, on the one hand, and the heterogeneous nature of language itself, on the other. The gap has always been filled by ideology and myth, and it is precisely here that we can locate the real historical importance of language (or rather, what people believe about language) for nationalism. A number of prominent historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have argued that the existence of a national language is the primary foundation upon which nationalist ideology is constructed. Others have paid more serious attention to the evidence compiled by linguistic historians, who have shown that national languages are not actually a given, but are themselves constructed as part of the ideological work of nationalism-building. This is not, however, to deny languages their place right at the center of how the “people” is conceived of—from the beginnings of recorded history, with a certain intensification toward the start of the 19th century, to the present day. The period from 1880 to 1945 was also one of growing hostility toward nationalism among certain segments of the population—most spectacularly in the working classes, where Marxism was crowding out other versions of international socialist doctrine. Among the bourgeoisie—the class that included Marx and Engels—plenty of “champagne socialists” were to be found, if not adherents of Marx, then of Fabianism or other idealistic doctrines. But even they were far outnumbered by linguistic internationalists, people who believed that the future peace and stability of the human race depended upon the existence and use of the artificial languages Volapük or Esperanto. On a more local level, resistance to particular national identities was being manifested through movements for a return to subnational and pre-national languages, notably Celtic languages in the British Isles, Provençal in the south of France, and newly standardized Scandinavian N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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languages within a vast region where Danish had previously been the “national” tongue. We can divide the nation-states of 1880 into four basic types where language is concerned, remembering, however, that certain countries defy easy categorization. First, there were nations with a well-established standard language (or languages) and no serious threat from rivals. China is perhaps the best example, along with Japan, despite a government proposal in 1872 to make English the national language. The United States and the British Commonwealth nations were linguistically stable, as were the nations of Latin America (despite the fact that most of the populations spoke indigenous languages and knew nothing of the excolonial standard language). In Europe, there were few such stable examples because of movements for the revival of peripheral languages; but Portugal can be put into this category, as well as Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and multilingual Belgium and Switzerland. Second, there were nations with a well-established standard language (or languages) but with significant rivals in certain (often peripheral) areas. This was the usual situation with such multinational states as the United Kingdom, where English was under increasing pressure from the Celtic fringes; the Russian empire, with the twist that French functioned as a suprastandard language in Greater Russia; and Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, though they had always been inherently multilingual. Third, there were new nations where the use of the standard language was not yet widespread. Italy became a nation only in the 1860s, and though a standard form of Italian had been established for centuries, it was not spoken among the middle class, where it competed with the older regional dialects of the working class and peasantry. Norway’s situation was different: their standard language had been modeled closely on the ex-imperial language, Danish; then a new standard Norwegian was created based on local dialects and with an effort to deDanicize it as much as possible. The two standards remained in competition into the second half of the 20th century. Fourth, there were imperial “possessions”—where the imperial language functioned as standard but was not well established among the indigenous population. In 1880, the great age of imperialism—when the entire globe could be color-coded by imperial possession—was still getting under way, and by the end of the decade, it would be nearly complete. When the maps of Europe, Asia, and Africa were redrawn at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, linguistic considerations figured prominently, even if they were often secondary to political ones and sometimes to economic ones (such as which of two neighboring countries would get an area rich in natural resources or that was well developed industrially). Countries that had been on the losing side in World War I and that possessed areas populated by a significant linguistic minority had little chance of holding on to them—a spectacular example being the reassignment of Transylvania from Hungary to Romania. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The period from 1880 onward also saw the apogee of what we can term “language nationalism”—the view that a people and its language are not only coterminous, but that the language embodies the soul of the people, whose cultural responsibility it is to keep the language pure, probe its history, and ensure that its “correct” form is spread throughout the population as much as possible. In fact, a little historical evidence could be stretched a long way; Smith (1998, chap. 8) emphasized how much of the effort of nationalism-construction was aimed at reaching back to the past in the interest of “ethno-symbolism.” As Hobsbawm has pointed out, the national standard language is, like the nation itself, a discursive construction: National languages . . . are the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them to be, namely the primordial foundations of national culture and the matrices of the national mind. They are usually attempts to devise a standardized idiom out of a multiplicity of actually spoken idioms, which are downgraded to dialects. (Hobsbawm 1990, 51)

Hobsbawm defines the standard language as “a sort of platonic idea of the language, existing behind and above all its variants and imperfect versions” (1990, 57). This is in line with what linguists have maintained for decades (for a survey of their views see Joseph 1987), but no one has ever put it quite so succinctly. Hobsbawm argues further that a “mystical identification of nationality” then occurs with this idea of the language, an identification he believes to be “much more characteristic of the ideological construction of nationalist intellectuals, of whom Herder is the prophet, than of the actual grassroots users of the idiom” (1990, 57). But, pace Hobsbawm, while this may be true historically of the period when the national/standard language is initially being constructed, it ceases to be the case once it enters the educational sphere, and once education is widespread. The linguistic ideology then becomes common national property, as least as likely to find firm belief among the working classes who do not control it as among the upper classes who do.

Origins Modern nationalism exhibits continuities with national identities that extend all the way back to the beginning of recorded history. The Old Testament records the oral traditions of the Hebrew nation, not merely as a historical chronicle but as a way to manifest and ensure the nation’s ongoing existence. Developments in nationalism during the 18th to 20th centuries were interpreted via their refraction through the biblical texts, the common base of European culture across national and social divides. Nations make their first appearance in Genesis 10, which lists the sons of Shem, Ham, and Japheth together with the places where they dwelt, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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sometimes with precise specification of borders. Each of the three sets concludes with a passage like the following: “By these [seven sons and seven grandsons of Japheth] were the isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands, every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations” (Genesis 10:5). In more modern times, English national sentiments were obviously present in Shakespeare’s history plays from the end of the 16th and start of the 17th centuries—but to call them “nationalist” is, arguably, anachronistic, when the whole concept of nationalism as a general doctrinal position does not appear until two centuries later. The American and French revolutions were cardinal events in establishing the modern concept of nation as a political reality. Kohn argued that nations are a concept dating back not earlier than the mid-18th century, and that “nationalism is first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has been more and more common to mankind” (1944, 10–11). Kohn’s argument was grounded in an essentialist dualism between a “voluntaristic nationalism,” characteristic of England and France, versus the “organic nationalism” of Germany and central European nations—tied to the empiricist philosophical tradition of the former and the rationalist one of the latter. Kedourie (1960) identified the crucial change as having taken place at the start of the 19th century, triggered by the Napoleonic aftermath of the French Revolution. His book begins with an intentionally provocative opening sentence: Nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. . . . Briefly, the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government. (Kedourie 1960, 9)

Kedourie presented a less essentialist view than Kohn’s, replacing nationalism as an “act of consciousness” with nationalism as doctrine. Between 1804 and 1810, Napoleon was expanding his empire to include most of Europe. Those German Romantic thinkers who had hero-worshiped Napoleon as the embodiment of the possibilities of the human will, now had to come to grips with having their country defeated by him and themselves becoming his imperial subjects. From this experience arose the argument that such imperial rule was unjust, because it is natural for each nation to rule itself. But what were the “natural” boundaries of a nation? The obvious answer was geographical obstacles—seacoasts, mountain ranges, great rivers cutting the nation off from its neighbors. But by that answer, there was nothing in principle to prevent “Europe” being conceived of as a “nation” rather than an empire composed of nations. Internally, only the Alps and the English Channel constituted serious barriers, and neither of these mattered for what concerned the German Romantics, which was to define their nation as distinctive from their neighbors to the west and east. If the German right to autonomy was to be maintained by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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something more fundamental than mere historical difference, something nongeographical yet plausible as a primordial, “natural” boundary had to be identified. The answer was formulated in 1808 by Fichte, who argued that what defines a nation most clearly is its language: The primary, the original, the truly natural borders of states are unquestionably their spiritual borders. Whoever speaks the same language are already linked to one another by a number of invisible bonds through their sheer nature, before any human art; they understand one another, and are capable of reaching ever clearer understanding, they belong together, and are naturally one, and an inseparable whole. (Fichte 1808, Address 13; my translation)

Fichte’s writings are given the principal credit for rousing Germans to rise up against Napoleonic rule. The view he espoused was not just a political one, though. It resonated so loudly because it accorded well with the idea system of German Romanticism in general. Events later in the 19th century put France in a position very like the one that the Germans had been in. The Franco-Prussian War culminated with the siege of Paris in 1870–1871 and ended with the proclamation of the German empire— modern Germany as we know it—and the empire’s annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, territories that had repeatedly shuttled between French and German rule. Here, the local dialects were Germanic, but the political allegiance of the populace was strongly to France. These events had an impact on the French psyche comparable to what the Germans had felt with Napoleon’s victories at the start of the century. Romantic thought had so shaped the modern European conception of nationalism that even Frenchmen who believed wholeheartedly that Alsace-Lorraine must be French could not find an obvious way to counter the argument that, since the territories were German speaking, they belonged naturally to Germany. It was finally a linguist, Renan, who produced a new conception of nationalism in response, and it was this conception that became the basis for the Wilsonian principles by which the world map was redrawn at Versailles in 1919. Renan starts from the Romantic idea of a shared national “soul,” but breaks it down into its component parts, one of which involves the national “will”: A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things that are actually one make up this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common ownership of a rich legacy of memories; the other is the presentday agreement, the desire to live together, the will to continue validating the heritage that has been inherited jointly. (Renan 1882, 26; my translation)

The nation, in other words, exists in the minds—the memories and the will— of the people who make it up. This is the conception that Anderson (1991, 6) returned to in defining the nation as “an imagined political community.” The “legacy of memories” Renan pointed to would dominate future philosophical and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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academic attempts to analyze national identity. The other element, the collective will of the people, would however have the deepest political impact, starting at Versailles. It has continued to be the assumed basis for the legitimacy of the political nation to the present day. For Hobsbawm, the events of 1870–1871, which Gellner had already acknowledged to be transformative, were the truly cardinal moments for modern nationalism. For the first time, ideological notions about nation and language, heretofore restricted to intellectuals and the government elite, spread down through the general populace, eventually even reaching the working class. Hobsbawm points to one further development in this period that would have dramatic consequences. Prior to about 1880, the claims of a group of people to constitute a “nation” would have been taken seriously only if their population met a certain unstated threshold. But from that time onward, any body of people considering themselves a “nation” claimed the right to selfdetermination. . . . [I]n consequence of this multiplication of potential “unhistorical” nations, ethnicity and language became the central, increasingly the decisive or even the only criterion of potential nationhood. (Hobsbawm 1990, 102)

This was the ideology that predominated at Versailles, but it was not actually the case that the older, Romantic belief in a deep, causal link between language and national identity died there. On the contrary, its most powerful realization was yet to come, in a Germany that saw itself as having to overcome unduly harsh treatment in the decisions made in 1919.

Dimensions One Nation, One Language The idea that language and nation reciprocally define one another has ancient roots, including the biblical ones discussed previously, but also classical ones. Epicurus held that a language arises from the exhalation of breath peculiar to each nation from the configuration of their bodies. Starting in the 15th century, momentum spread through western Europe for change in the traditional division of linguistic labor between Latin, used for all prestigious (or as sociolinguists call them, “high”) functions, and local vernaculars, used merely for “low” communication in the family and among the lower classes. Each nation, in the emerging modern sense of the term, required its own national language—which, however, had to be created from among a plethora of very divergent dialects, guided by a myth that somewhere in the past all the members of the nation had shared some unified version of the national tongue. The “one nation, one language” doctrine remained the implicit operating principle of those creating and enforcing the standard version of the national N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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language until the start of the 19th century, when events led to the doctrine becoming politicized. The previous section discussed how Napoleon’s conquests of German lands led Romantic thinkers to theorize that language defined the “natural” boundaries of nations. This theory solidified the doctrine of “one language, one nation” to such an extent that even those like Renan, whom the events of 1870–1871 would lead to discard Fichtean naturalness, nevertheless did not question the implicit assumption that each nation should have one and only one language. All that changed was the basis on which that unique language should be determined. Language Standardization In the second half of the 19th century, those eastern European and Scandinavian nations that had lacked a well-defined standard language of their own acquired one (or two, in the case of Norway, mentioned earlier, and Greece, where one form of the modern standard language was more classical in orientation and the other more demotic). Meanwhile, the older European standard languages, formed during the Renaissance, were subjected to a new wave of nationalistically motivated attempts to eliminate variation by establishing a single “correct” usage, based on scientific study of the language’s history. This was the age of the great modern dictionaries, such as the Oxford English Dictionary, the French Larousse, and their counterparts in every other major language. These same years witnessed the rise of the “history of the language” as a genre, following the plot of national histories, where the modern standard language is treated as the perfect expression of the national soul and its rise as an inevitable historical good. Those who contributed to its rise are portrayed as heroes, while anyone who tried to hold it back, either by sticking conservatively to Latin or by promoting a rival dialect as the vernacular standard, is shown up as a knave or a fool. However, this new wave of standardization also saw the resuscitation of attempts to promote other regional dialects that had lost out in the initial race to emerge as the national tongue. The Félibrège movement in the south of France was a particularly successful example. A new, standardized form of Provençal was promoted through the production of grammars and creative literature, notably by the poet Frédéric Mistral. Many others followed this example, in the Celticspeaking areas of the British Isles and France, the Basque and Catalan areas of France and Spain, and in other regions throughout western Europe. This new linguistic separatism continued to flourish through the 20th century, although states differed in the extent to which they tolerated regional vernaculars or tried to restrict them to private contexts. This was also the period in which the revival of Hebrew was being discussed and planned by European Zionists—though by no means were all of them agreed that Hebrew should be the national language of the eventual Jewish homeland. Attempts at standardizing Yiddish, JudeoSpanish, and Jewish dialects of Slavic and other Semitic languages were also under way. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Outside Europe, in the Americas, Oceania, and South Africa, the period saw growing recognition of national varieties of Dutch, English, French, Portuguese, and Spanish that could legitimately follow norms of their own, independent of those of the European homeland. National language academies sprang up throughout South America in the last two decades of the 19th century. In most cases, what appeared objectively to be very minor differences took on great significance as markers of national identity within the standard written language— which continued to be 99 percent identical with its European counterpart—even when, as in the case of Quebec French or Brazilian Portuguese, the spoken form of the language (except as used by the educated middle and upper classes) had become largely incomprehensible to people in France or Portugal. In Asia, calls were heard for the traditional written languages, with their centuries or even millennia of venerable tradition, to be replaced with an alphabetic system, as modernizers looked generally to Western technological methods. Though these calls met with success in Indonesia and Malaysia, for Chinese there was a particular obstacle to alphabetization. The system of characters transcended differences among the Chinese dialects, which are as linguistically different from one another as are English, German, and Swedish. Alphabetization would have required the choice of one dialect as standard—a political and practical impossibility in China until the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s. In Japan, the modernizers who had proposed the use of English in 1872 had by 1880 shifted their cultural allegiance toward Germany, from which educational models were imported. Universal Education Starting in the 1860s, and running to near completion by the 1890s, universal education spread through Europe and the Americas, and eventually to their colonies. This transformed the very nature of education, from being reserved for a select few to something everyone underwent, to differing degrees—ensuring that the aims of social equality that motivated universal education were partly but never wholly achieved, a fact that class differences in language have continued to reflect. Focusing on this same period, Hobsbawm notes that one social class in particular benefited from universal education: the lower middle class. The children of small tradesmen and artisans could, by passing examinations, enter into civil and colonial service and white-collar professions. As they moved up, the lower middle class was replenished by children of the working class making their ascent by the same process. “The classes which stood or fell by the official use of the written vernacular were the socially modest but educated middle strata, which included those who acquired lower middle-class status precisely by virtue of occupying non-manual jobs that required schooling” (Hobsbawm 1990, 117). These are also the people who become the mainstay of nationalism—not just by active flag-waving on symbolic occasions, but daily in the banal ways pointed to by N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Billig (1995), including their use of “proper language” and their insistence on its norms. The education system provided the mechanism through which a general shift from dialects to the national language could be effected. Children were in the hands of the institution at least five days a week, and there were few legal constraints on what the institution could do with them, stick-wise. Carrot-wise, their local communities were generally in step with the “nationalizing” agenda, proud of the nation and its overseas empire, if it had one (or was part of one), and certain that prosperity and progress lay with national language and identity, and poverty and backwardness with the local. Economics and Modernization Gellner (1964, chap. 7) argued that nationalism was best understood as the result of the uneven way in which modernization had spread, causing massive economic and social changes, disrupting traditional lifestyles, and motivating people to move from the countryside into the cities. Traditional village and tribal structures no longer functioned, and what was available to replace them in the urban context was language and language-based culture, especially print culture. Modern education, funded by the state, grew up around the printed word, and functioned as an institution for creating new social hierarchies based upon literacy and standards of language. But the new hierarchies engendered new tensions, as people struggled to retain old privileges under the new regime. Ethnic alliances took on a new importance in this struggle, and from the new ethnic awareness, nationalist movements developed, “inventing” nations where, in reality, they did not exist. In later work, Gellner (1973, 1983) reformulated this theory to take into account certain facts it could not explain. One of these facts had to do with the central role he had assigned to language: it would predict that nationalisms would not arise in the absence of a recognized national language, yet there were plenty of examples of that happening, for instance, in the Arabic-speaking world and Hispanophone Latin America (as well as the English-speaking world, where separate American, Canadian, and the like subvarieties are recognized, but not as distinct languages). Moreover, relatively stable nations had formed around a multiplicity of languages, as in Switzerland. Gellner therefore shifted the focus away from language, and ever more onto the institutional structure of the public education system and its role in defining and maintaining a culture within which nationalism as a political principle is embedded and enacted in a wide range of ways. Imperialism In this climactic period of European imperialism (and American after 1898, when the United States took over Spain’s possessions), the language of the imperial power was the principal official language, though indigenous languages always N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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had a role, particularly at regional and local levels. Among the powers, France was most firm in its policy of “assimilationism”: government-provided education was in French, and any imperial subject who mastered spoken and written French was, in principle at least, treated like any other French citizen when it came to access to civil employment and the like. Britain was at the other extreme, favoring the development of indigenous languages for use in education, often in the face of strong opposition from the indigenous population, who preferred for their children to be educated in English on account of the opportunities for advancement that it offered. In most places and periods, the British administration ended up providing English-language education to meet the popular demand, even though this then meant opening up civil posts to colonial subjects when one of the empire’s main functions was to provide such well-paying posts for middleclass young men back home. Resistance to British rule in India and South Africa led not just to warfare but to linguistic resistance, through the promotion of languages such as Hindi and Afrikaans for use in high functions. In the main, however, the growing perception from the last decades of the 19th century onward that the United Kingdom and the United States were the dominant world powers fueled the view that English was becoming the dominant world language and would soon become the de facto international language unless something were done to stop it. This gave rise to both nationalist and internationalist reactions. Missionary activity spread as imperial conquest opened the way for it, and often had more direct and profound effects on education at the grassroots level than the official administration did. Missionaries taught the imperial language as part of Christianization; but protestant missionaries especially were also intensely interested in learning the languages of those they lived among, writing them down, composing lexicons and grammars, and ultimately translating the Bible into these languages and training others to preach in them. Evolutionary Theory and Racial Ideology From the mid-19th century, interpretations of Darwin emerged that held that the various human races represent distinct points on the evolutionary scale—in other words, that some races are more evolved than others, with the white race at the top and the black at the bottom, and with any racial mixture seen as bringing out the worst qualities of both. Linguistic evidence was adduced, though almost inevitably the features of the Indo-European languages were taken to be superior to other types. (Not that linguists generally held this view, but the promoters of racial inequality did, and they picked and chose their facts to support their claims.) Within linguistics itself, the assumption at the start of the 19th century had been that the Indo-European languages were descended from a highly complex ancestor tongue that had decayed over the centuries; this gave way to a newer, evolutionary view in which a simple original structure had complexified and progressed over time. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The goal of mainstream linguistics in this period was to reconstruct this original protolanguage, and such reconstruction was always open to interpretation and hence to ideology. By the 1920s, the notion of an original “Aryan” mother tongue, spoken by a race whose most pure descendants were to be found in the northern Germanic lands, had found many adherents and developed a literature that would grow substantially in the Nazi era. Hutton (1999) has shown how, after Nazi anthropologists admitted that no Jewish racial type could be determined on a physical basis, it was linguists who, adducing their own evidence and interpretations, gave the scientific backing to the policies that would produce the Holocaust. Impact on Different Groups It is not so much their language itself as beliefs about their language that serve to identify groups of people relative to one another, whether inter- or intranationally. Within Chinese culture there was and is absolute belief in the existence of a single unified Chinese language, despite the huge variation among dialects. On the other hand, Croatian and Serbian, each comprehensible in its spoken form to speakers of the other, have been maintained culturally as separate languages, in part through the use of the Roman alphabet for the one and the Cyrillic for the other. The cultural mandate for separation is underlain by religious difference, Serbia being predominantly Orthodox and Croatia Roman Catholic. So long as people believe that their way of speaking constitutes a language in its own right, there is a real sense in which it is a distinct language. They will probably find ways to “perform” their distinctive linguistic identity for the benefit of others, but ultimately this does not matter so much as does the existence of the “imagined community” of their language, to adapt the term created by Anderson (1991) to describe the nation. For Hobsbawm, national identity in the sense we usually think of it really goes back to Victorian shopkeepers and clerks who envied the sort of class-belonging enjoyed by the upper classes, with their clubs and aristocratic titles, and the workers, who could locate their identity in socialism. Neither the aristocrats nor the workers needed education to maintain their position; neither worried about their language in the way that the middle class had to do, at least that very substantial portion of the middle class whose standing rested on their command of standard written and spoken usage. “One might suggest that the self-definition of the lower middle classes . . . was not so much as a class, but as the body of the most zealous and loyal, as well as the most ‘respectable’ sons and daughters of the fatherland” (Hobsbawm 1990, 122). In other words, although their real identity was that of a social class, they masked it for themselves and others in a nationalistic guise. And the mask was double-sided: in their obsession with “speaking properly” as a mark of respectability, they were contributing to the linguistic construction of their nation. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Consequences Saussure (1916) discussed the tension in language between its unifying and fragmenting tendencies. A shared language is what makes intercourse possible among all the members of a nation, and without which it is difficult to suspend disbelief in their existence as an imagined community. Features of one’s language that mark regional or local identity—or ethnic, religious, sectarian, generational, or class identity—will serve to fragment the national identity, though not necessarily to weaken it. If, however, other fragmenting tendencies are present, the linguistic tendencies become extremely salient, as every time one opens one’s mouth, one manifests one’s position relative to the split. From 1880 to 1945, the position taken by states was, with few exceptions, to promote the standard form of the national language to the exclusion of any minority languages or nonstandard dialects. In countries undergoing a high level of immigration during this period, such as the United States and Australia, the education of the immigrants’ children in English was assumed to be crucial to the desired “melting pot” effect whereby all of them would take on the shared identity of their adopted homeland. The same policy was applied to aboriginals—their languages would be tolerated, in the assurance that educating their children in English would lead soon enough to their linguistic assimilation. In the event, some of the larger indigenous languages have proved more resilient than anyone might have imagined. Exceptions to the toleration of immigrant languages occurred in parts of the United States during World War I, when the use of German was banned in the Midwestern states with large German-speaking populations, and in World War II, when the use of Japanese was banned in California. In both cases, the rationale was that this was the only way to prevent espionage by “the enemy within.” Backlashes against language nationalism manifested themselves through movements for the promotion of regional languages and artificial international languages. Both were aimed at undermining the growing force of national identity, though only the regional language movements were ever seen as a serious threat to the cohesion of the state. Within the United Kingdom, Welsh- and Gaelic-speaking children were punished for using their mother tongue at school, even in the playground, as, too, were Norman French–speaking children in the Channel Islands and children in Brittany, the Basque country, and other minority language areas. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics portrayed itself as unusually tolerant of its linguistic minorities, particularly in the Caucasus—but in fact, a thorough competence in Russian was necessary for anyone who aspired to be part of the nomenklatura. Much the same was true with regard to Turkish in the multilingual Ottoman Empire. Like every manifestation of nationalism, language nationalism is a doubleedged sword. It gives meaning to people’s lives by marking and manifesting their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Signposts giving original Irish (Gaelic) place names alongside English ones created in the 1820s and 1830s for the British government’s general survey of the island. In 2007 Irish became the 23rd official language of the European Union. (Corel)

identity and allowing them to bond with those who share that identity. But it does so at the price of making it impossible to ignore differences vis-à-vis other groups, thus helping to keep opposition and hostility alive. The “one nation, one language” doctrine, romantic and oversimplified as it was, allowed many oppressed peoples to gain their independence in 1919, in some cases after centuries of foreign domination. Yet it was inseparable from the doctrines that fed into “scientific racism” and Aryan superiority and that were ultimately used to justify genocide. Language nationalism remains no less central an issue today than it was a century ago. In every country of the world, tensions continue between official language and vernaculars, and among groups who do not share a vernacular or who use different dialects of one. Since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989–1991, the perception that English is becoming the de facto international language has once again become as strong as it was in the late 19th century, spawning no less strong reactions against it. The concept of minority language rights, which has emerged in recent years, has made significant legal inroads into the “one nation, one language” doctrine—but has also met with fierce popular resistance, not only from majority language speakers but from within the minority groups themselves, where there are inevitably schisms between those whose primary concern is for their children to assimilate and those more worried about them losing their heritage. Increases in immigration, particularly from eastern to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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western Europe and from the southern hemisphere to the northern, have led many developed countries to resuscitate policies in support of the national language not unlike those of the period covered in this article, policies that had long been thought consigned to the dustbin of history. Selected Bibliography Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 2nd ed. New York: Verso. (1st ed., 1983.) Billig, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Fichte, J. G. 1808. Reden an die deutsche Nation. Berlin: Realschulbuchhandlung. Gellner, E. 1964. Thought and Change. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson. Gellner, E. 1973. “Scale and Nation.” Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3:1–17. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Hobsbawm, E. J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programmes, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hutton, C. M. 1999. Linguistics and the Third Reich: Mother-tongue Fascism, Race and the Science of Language. New York: Routledge. Jespersen, O. 1925. Mankind, Nation, and Individual from a Linguistic Point of View. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Joseph, J. E. 1987. Eloquence and Power: The Rise of Language Standards and Standard Languages. New York: Blackwell. Joseph, J. E. 2004. Language and Identity: National, Ethnic, Religious. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kedourie, E. 1960. Nationalism. London: Hutchinson. (4th ed. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1993.) Kohn, H. 1944. The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background. New York: Macmillan. Renan, E. 1882. Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Conférence faite en Sorbonne, le 11 mars. Paris: Calmann Lévy. Saussure, F. de. 1916. Cours de linguistique générale, edited by C. Bally and A. Sechehaye with the collaboration of A. Riedlinger. Paris and Lausanne: Payot. [English translations by Wade Baskin. 1959. Course in General Linguistics. New York: Philosophical Library; Roy Harris. 1983. La Salle, IL: Open Court.] Smith, A. D. 1998. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism. New York: Routledge.


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Literature and Nationalism Jason Dittmer Relevance By the dawn of the 21st century, the lands of the globe had been divided up into mutually exclusive territories, each marked with a different color on the world political map as a way of visually distinguishing among them. The map makes a particular statement about these territories; the colors of each country neither overlap nor blend together, signifying a fundamental difference between the people on one side of the border and the other. That perception of a fundamental cultural difference is visible in a variety of ways in real, lived space—such as the belief that there are “national” schools of literature that incorporate many authors who are linked together via mutual interaction and influence more than they are interconnected with other “foreign” authors. These authors are seen as ineluctably linked together by their common experience as national subjects, regardless of the other contextual factors that may divide them (such as social class, race, or religion). Indeed, Anderson (1991) pointed to the creation of the printing press and the linguistic standardization it inspired as a turning point in the formation of national communities. This division of Goethe’s Weltliteratur, or literature at the grandest geographical scale, into national schools was but one effect of the processes that have nationalized us all, or rendered us into willing subjects of the nation-state. If the Age of Self-Determination can be defined as the shift from land-based multinational empires to nation-states (at least in some parts of the world, like eastern Europe), then special attention must be paid to this idea of the nationstate itself, and the novel fusion of culture and polity represented by the term. Indeed, much has been made of the formal political processes that take nations and fuse them with political systems (such as the American Revolution), while relatively little attention has been paid to the equally political process of forging the nation and its unifying culture through differentiation from the “other,” or those who should be isolated, literally, beyond the pale. This is an oversight, however, as the formal processes would never have proceeded as they did without the cultural claim required by nationalism being satisfied. Would the American colonies have been able to band together against the British if there had not been a sense of commonality at least partially in place before the conflict? A Marxist explanation for historical events, such as the American Revolution, which are rooted in pure economic determinism, fails to pass muster, as was demonstrated by the failure of the international proletariat to emerge as predicted despite the workers’ alleged common economic interest and 80 years of opportunity. Perhaps this N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was because of Marxism’s ideological blindness to culture in the face of its economic determinism. However, this ideological blindness to culture compelled some of the best analysis of culture and its role in perpetuating a status quo of inequality and national identity. When other intellectuals ignored popular culture for being too low to consider, Italian communist Antonio Gramsci (1971) argued that everyday life is shaped by cultural and political elites in such a way that subjects believe in the state’s legitimate hegemony over them. It is through this top-down establishment of hegemony that literature can be seen as a force in identity formation. Louis Althusser took Gramsci’s idea of hegemony and theorized it more explicitly with his concept of interpellation, which can be directly applied to literature. Althusser (1977) argued that Gramsci’s cultural elites disseminate a discourse of national unity and exclusion of outsiders (in this case, through books or other forms of literature) that incorporates a wide variety of cultural markers found among the people that the elites are hoping to unite. Readers of these books then self-identify with portions of this discourse, and discard the parts that they feel do not apply to them. Nevertheless, the nation is unified through its acceptance of the discourse, even if individuals disagree about which parts are accurate depictions of their way of life. Thus, national identity is constructed by the interpellation of people through various overlapping and contradictory national narratives that all emphasize unique aspects of the peoples’ lived experiences. Once national communities are created, they are sustained through the same interpellation that constructed them in the first place. Articulated through such various literary media as newspapers, novels, and comic books, national identity can vary in meaning, as it is contested by various actors in society, and can vary in intensity, as attitudes become cosmopolitan in response to a faraway disaster or more nationalistic in response to military saber rattling. It is important to remember that interpellation is not an oppressive top-down formulation by which nationality is force-fed to the consuming public. Rather, it is a theorization in which the ability of cultural elites to produce texts (and the power of political elites to co-opt those cultural elites) is counterbalanced by the general population’s ability to reject the various discourses being offered to them, or at least to accept parts of it selectively. Thus, the Marxist idea that citizens are duped into believing in their national identity must be set aside; rather, we must see citizens as participants in the ongoing processes of nation-making and nation-shaping. Theoretically, the processes of nation-making and nation-shaping are similar, as described above; however, during the Age of Self-Determination (and today) they were often set in opposition to each other. That is, the discourses of unity espoused by those aspiring for statehood attempted to differentiate their “nation” from the state in which they were presently situated. The political tension resulting from this anticolonial, nationalist discourse resulted in an imperial, nationalist counterdiscourse in which either the essential cultural unity of metropole and colony were emphasized or the exceptionalism of the metropole (or backwardN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ness of the colony) was such that the status quo had to be preserved. This chapter will focus on both types of nationalism, but mostly on groups seeking to legitimate a new political identity. In either case, cultural claims remained at the heart of the debate over independence and empire. Thus, literature was a battlefield on which cultural claims were contested and substantiated.

Origins Nationalist literature during the colonial period had as its goal the creation of separate categories for colonizers and colonized. While certainly this was already the case in other ways (legal, economic, etc.), the tendency among colonizers was to elide those differences in order to maintain a territorial claim on the land of the colonized and thus justify the modification of that selfsame land. The desire of the colonized to maintain their own specific link to their territory alongside the everyday violation of that territory spurred authors to create a new landscape, even if only in the realm of literature. “The search for authenticity, for a more congenial national origin than that provided by colonial history, for a new pantheon of heroes, myths, and religions, these too are enabled by the land” (Said 1990, 79). Perhaps the earliest of the iconic writers from this time period who can help us understand the principles involved in the broader realm of nationalist literature is William Butler Yeats. Born in 1865, Yeats lived on both coasts of Ireland before moving to London with his family. He returned to Ireland at the age of 15, and shortly thereafter began to write poetry. By 1889, he had begun to move into

Irish poet and playwright William Butler Yeats is one of the earliest examples of a nationalist writer from this era. (Library of Congress)


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themes that could later be looked back upon as nationalist, such as pre-Christian Irish mythology (as in “The Wanderings of Oisin”). This attempt to construct a pre-English Irish landscape dominated his early work, when he argued that writers should play a serious role in the struggle for independence: “Creative work has always a fatherland; . . . there is no fine nationality without literature, and . . . the converse also, . . . there is no fine literature without nationality” (quoted in Tracy 1972, 39). Later, Yeats was to become consumed with the inability of Ireland to liberate itself, largely because of the opening of a significant divide between the workers and the bourgeoisie. The unwillingness of the middle class to assist the revolutionary nationalist workers led Yeats to move away from his earlier, romanticized Ireland. Seamus Deane has argued that Yeats’s emphasis on primordial Ireland was “amenable to his imagination . . . [whereas] he ended by finding an Ireland recalcitrant to it” (quoted in Said 1990, 80). Still, with the Easter Uprising in 1916, Yeats felt that a cycle of continual Irish defeat had been broken and that the requirement of a mythologized origin for the Irish nation was removed, leaving instead an essentialized Irish character rooted in a fundamentally metaphysical consciousness. This acceptance of a fundamental and essentialized national character, such as the “spiritual Irish,” is characteristic of nationalist literature during the Age of Self-Determination. The need to differentiate a group of people from the colonizer requires a rallying point, a set of cultural traits that all in the nation can reasonably have claim to (this is also true of the postcolonial world; see Fanon 1965, for example). Unfortunately, this is the mirror image of the modern colonial process through which groups are identified, classified, and inscribed as part of the hierarchy of peoples within the empire. In this sense, nationalist literature can be seen as co-opting and inverting the systems of knowledge that the colonizer produces. This is visible elsewhere within the empires of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The term “negritude,” as used in the work of Léopold Senghor (Senegal), Aimé Césaire (Martinique), and Léon Damas (French Guiana), engages in the same type of binary identity formation. Négritude refers to a type of African solidarity in the face of French colonialism that included a rejection of assimilation into the French body politic and a reclamation of “blackness” as a positive attribute. Thus, negritude affirmed racial boundaries as being significant, but simply inverted the generally negative normative values associated with them. To return to the Irish prototype, Yeats’s conception of a primordial Irish race dovetailed with an overarching shift in the conception of the nation-state across Europe from a politically liberal one (generally dateable to the beginning of the French Revolution) to an organic form, most clearly enunciated in Friedrich Ratzel’s Politische Geography in 1897. Ratzel’s belief was that the state was but a symbol of the strength of the nation, which was in turn rooted in the spiritual connection between the people and their land. Strong nations, like organisms, would expand at the expense of their weaker neighbors. The idea of the organic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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state was largely adopted by the imperial powers, and later was taken from the metropolitan center to the outposts of the empire where it began to take root in an anticolonial context. In this way, the claim of organic states was essentially apolitical, as Yeats’s primordial fantasy of an essentialized, ethnic Ireland was used to fight against British imperial domination, and Ratzel’s concept of Lebensraum was infamously used to bring the liberatory Age of Self-Determination to an end with the Nazi invasions of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Liberal and organic nationalism differ in the relationship of citizen to state. In liberal nationalism, every citizen is entitled to the same treatment under the law, and citizenship is based on (largely) voluntary association. However, in organic nationalism, treatment by the state is linked to cultural or ethnic traits, which are also the basis for citizenship. The primary unit of analysis under the liberal model of the state is the individual; under the organic model of the state, the nation becomes that primary unit of analysis. This difference is paralleled by a shift in narrative style from the impersonal narrator (representing the universality of the liberal state) in the late 1800s to a more subjective, personal style after 1900. This could be “either a projection of the consciousness of an individual protagonist (as in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man, À la recherche du temps perdu, or Heart of Darkness) or a more generalized projection of a collective consciousness (as in Ulysses or the last novels of Henry James)” (Lewis 2000, 10). Authors writing in this vein helped to explore the question of identity and subjectivity: To what degree are individuals capable of stepping outside of their nationality? Authors such as Conrad, Joyce, Proust, and d’Annunzio had varying answers to that question, but each “focused attention on the shaping of the individual by the nation and on the potential for the individual in turn to redeem the nation in time of war or crisis” (Lewis 2000, 11). The process of interpellation outlined at the beginning of this chapter can be seen to have some flesh on its bones; that is, we can see that even as authors were reacting and contributing to the changing political philosophies around them, through the incorporation of primordial national essences (e.g., Yeats’s Celtic romanticism) or subjective narration (e.g., Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus from A Portrait of a Writer as a Young Man), readers were exposed to a variety of frameworks for the nation, either liberal or organic, appealing to either Enlightenment principles or the new emerging modernity of classifiable differences among peoples. Therefore, whatever type of Ireland, Australia, Finland, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Albania was recognized by readers as ideologically acceptable, there was literature available. Readers with completely opposed visions of the nationstate would nevertheless agree on the existence of that nation-state. Indeed, as F. Scott Fitzgerald pointed out, the truly great thinker is identifiable by his or her “ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function” (1945, 69). Interpellated nationalism can be viewed in this same way—as a mishmash of mutually contradictory ideas that the subject can pull from selectively to make sense of their everyday experience. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Through this process of interpellation, identities formed, solidified, and manifested themselves politically through anticolonial movements, imperial parades, and particular regimes of power and wealth accumulation. The world of literature reified a particular European vision of how the world should be divided up, both territorially and culturally. In other words, the nation-state—this peculiar claim about how the world should be divided into those differently colored boxes on the world map—began to move from the world of ideas into the material world, imaginary yet real at the same time. Of course, the specific ways in which this took place around the world vary greatly, as does the impact of literature on that process. In some places the belief in national organic uniqueness is firmly believed to this day; in others the idea is still found, but only among fringe groups or as an artifact in historical literature. It is to a sampling of these stories that this chapter turns to next.

Dimensions British Nationalism and the Call to Empire British nationalism was of supreme importance during the Age of Self-Determination because it was the British will to power, inspired in part through particular representations in literature, that necessitated anticolonial representations of other places and groups of people, such as those made by Yeats and the Irish. At the beginning of the 20th century, much of British literature was concerned with the twin pulls of traditional insularity and global power. In particular, the work of E. M. Forster reflected this split in British identity: “His narratives, like the protagonists within them, require the symbolic crunch and frisson of cultural difference provided by metropolitan perception as well as the lingering allure of insular landscapes. They require, in other words, the coexistence of British hegemony and Anglocentric idealism” (Esty 2004, 25). For instance, in Howard’s End, the Schlegels are cosmopolitan and modern while the Wilcoxes are more aristocratic and traditional. Similarly, in The Other Side of the Hedge, Forster creates a spatial imaginary in which each side of the hedgerow represents a very different aspect of English identity, either insular or imperial, separated by the material landscape but tangential nonetheless. The British literature of the Age of Self-Determination was often extremely nostalgic for the seemingly lost insular England yet unable to ignore the increasing dominance of their global commercial and imperial relations over everyday life on that island. Between 1880 and 1945, the British imperial project lost steam with opposition forming in southwest Asia from the Russians and in the Caribbean from the Americans. Further, the Boer War at the beginning of the 20th century left the national will to power shaken. Still, this did not necessitate a loss of national identity and superiority. For instance, with the outbreak of war in SepN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tember 1939, Virginia Woolf wrote, “Civilization has shrunk” (1984, 237). Thus, even as the cracks in empire were showing, British identity was able to shift from a process of othering their imperial subjects to another process that identified the Nazis as uncivilized and everything that was not English. German Nationalism and the Rise of Nazism The relatively new country of Germany, in contrast to the British during this period, can be seen as growing in its will to power, particularly as viewed through the lens of literature. No country had embraced the principle of organic nationstates with the depth of the Germans. Following an intellectual lineage from Friedrich Ratzel to his Swedish student Rudolf Kjellén to German nationalist Karl Haushofer, the German school of thought of Geopolitik argued for a Social Darwinist–inspired form of policy formation. Haushofer himself wrote that small states had no right to exist, as their cultures were weak and therefore vulnerable to takeover by the superior German Kultur. This was mirrored in the German press, which not only viewed Germans as superior to those they colonized, but also ethically superior to the other colonial powers: One cartoon [ found in a left-liberal satirical magazine], entitled “Colonial Powers,” compared regimes in four separate pictures: a Belgian administrator is shown roasting an African on a spit; French legionnaires play childish sexual games with heavy-limbed and apparently primitive African women; and a British soldier puts an African through a press in order to squeeze out money from his intestine. German officers, in contrast, are depicted with a line of giraffes, not Africans, which they are teaching to goose-step. (Hewitson 2000, 37)

This sense of superiority rose to a fever pitch in World War I Germany, as it did in other wartime nations. However, as the war ground on, a more humanist perspective began to take root, culminating in the ascendancy of Expressionism after the war (Rose 1964). This Expressionism was tied to the disappointment of the younger generations of Germans with the postwar revolution to enact truly radical change. Over time, however, the intellectuals behind this movement steadily lost ground as tougher censorship laws were enacted in the Weimar twilight. The rise of Nazism cannot be adequately seen through the lens of literature because of the heavy hand of government on the pens of the writers. Japanese Nationalism after the Meiji Restoration Japanese nationalist literature is worthy of study for the same reasons as German literature; it provides insight into the cultural prerequisites of an era of imperial outreach. Japanese nationalist literature at the dawn of the 20th century was inextricably linked to poetry, which was a traditional stronghold of nationalism following the Meiji Restoration of the late 1860s. In the 1890s, there was a concerted effort among cultural elites to create a new nationalist form of poetry that was independent of roots in the archaic form of the Japanese language and stripped of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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loan words from China. This new poetry, known as Shintaishi, would be in the colloquial, everyday language of the people and be explicitly patriotic (Bourdaghs 2003). What is unique about this new form of nationalist literature compared with already-described forms is its absolute disavowal of the past, its rejection of the primordial Japan. Similarly, the traditional forms of poetry, such as haiku and tanka, were transformed by the assertion of more masculine and patriotic themes. Thus, the national identity was sculpted into a masculine, modern form, explicitly rejecting the traditional, more feminine image of the pre-Meiji court in Kyoto. This clearly parallels the rise of Japanese imperialism throughout east Asia and the Pacific. Argentinian Nationalism amid Ethnic Transition The influx of Europeans into Argentina in the late 1800s swamped the ethnic Spanish (criollos), creating an immigrant nation that often despised the uneducated criollos who worked as gaucho cowboys throughout the Pampas. Therefore, the creation of a coherent national identity faced some of the same problems as in Japan: disdain for the ancient (and even recent) past left the primordial Argentina undesirable as the source of identity. Nevertheless, with time, the gaucho culture, which was virtually extinguished under President Sarmiento’s rule (“Fertilizing the soil with their blood is the only thing gauchos are good for”) in the 1870s, was rehabilitated into a mythic source of local identity to differentiate the Buenos Aires intellectual from his peers across the Atlantic. The creation of this idealized synthesis, however, often ignored the realities of native Indian and gaucho culture, which were seen as not being useful in constructing the desired identity: In his [Ricardo Rojas, the “dean of Argentine letters”] collections of essays, The Nationalist Restitution (1909), Argentinidad (1916), and Eurindia (1924), [Rojas] looked for an easy synthesis of what he called “exotismo” and “indianismo,” meaning a European and American heritage. What he failed to investigate was the nature of his “indianismo”—Argentina had no Toltec, Maya, or Quechua civilizations to draw from and the regional culture patterns were European. (Lewald 1972, 306)

Therefore, Argentinian identity came to focus on the land itself as a transformative factor that took European influences and rendered them Argentinian in a way that was similar to the Turner Frontier Hypothesis in the United States. Polish Nationalism during Partition The division of the Polish state in successive partitions culminated in the destruction of the Napoleonic Polish state in the Congress of Vienna. From 1880 on, then, the Polish nation was strongly in need of a literature with which it could maintain identity in the face of political repression, such as the Russification and Germanization of Polish education systems by their occupiers. As would be expected of a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nation with an independent past within its recent history, the Poles intentionally turned to historical models, specifically adventure stories of Polish exploits against the Ukrainians, Turks, and Swedes. The leading author of these novels was Henryk Sienkiewicz, who consciously sought to provide encouragement for Poles in the face of domination. Often compared to Alexander Dumas’s tales of derring-do, Sienkiewicz’s stories (most notably The Trilogy) were simple in narrative form and produced for a general audience, which approved heartily. The impact of his writing was long lasting in the Polish consciousness; during World War II, the names of characters were used as code words by the Polish resistance (Eile 2000). One contemporary reviewer, an aristocrat professor (Count Stanislaw Tarnowski), emphasized the importance of Sienkiewicz’s contrast between Poland and less civilized groups to the east (such as the Cossacks), and indeed, his contrast with any group that was not Catholic: His sympathetic appreciation concerned Sienkiewicz’s emphasis on Polish cultural mission in the East and his religiousness, blended with patriotism. Tarnowski concluded that in the age of materialism and skepticism [Sienkiewicz’s book] promoted the faith and love of fatherland, and at times when understanding of history was becoming smaller, and Polish customs gradually decreasing, it turned attention to the past and its noble greatness. (Eile 2000, 113)

Needless to say, Ukrainian authorities complained about the revisionist history often incorporated into Sienkiewicz’s fiction, but that only made the books more popular in Poland. The construction of a narrative in which Polish individualists unite into a cohesive unit for a collective holy war against outsiders opposed to the Virgin Mary was not only profitable for Sienkiewicz but also helped to create a simplistic national myth understandable by the entire nation as they struggled to retain a sense of collective identity under harsh assimilatory policies by their occupiers. African American Nationalism in the Harlem Renaissance It is important to remember that not all nationalism is tied to success—the examples given thus far all come from successful national movements that either resulted in the creation of a state or the amplification of a particular type of national identity. For African Americans after the Civil War, there was no need to construct a coherent identity; they had had an identity thrust upon them. Despite their legal equality, their perceived racial differences led them to be separated out as a “minority race” within the dominant discourse of white America. This was nothing new for African Americans, as that racial difference had been the basis, both legally and philosophically, of slavery. What was lacking was the ability to invert racial categories so that “blackness” (negritude) could be seen as a normative good rather than a stigma. Thus, discourses of African American liberation dovetailed with the discourses of the Age of Self-Determination around the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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world, often literally. The arrival of Marcus Garvey from Jamaica is just such an example of the transnational nature of the African American nationalist movement. Garvey, although not a literary author, did publish several newspapers that advocated for a return to Africa by motivated and capable African Americans. The inspiration of his movement led many African American authors like Claude McKay and Zora Neale Hurston to focus on the everyday, folk identity of life in the ghetto; in combination with other art forms, this came to be known as the Harlem Renaissance (Emerson 1972). However, these authors were not politically unified: some sought a release from prejudice through Soviet-inspired socialism in the United States, some advocated assimilation under the current regime, and Garvey’s hopes for an independent Africa called to yet others. Nevertheless, despite their different goals, they all harnessed a sense of difference through realism, both in the colloquial form of English that their characters spoke (as in Ralph Ellison’s Invisible Man) and in the types of issues on which they focused (as in Richard Wright’s Native Son). Nationalist Literature in the American South Another form of nationalist literature that never quite achieved its stated goal is that of the American South. Although the Civil War had created a very strong sense of Southern identity among the unreconstructed population—ironically in a way similar to the process that constructed African American identity—a common sense of persecution left no doubt as to who was a (white) Southerner. The question remained, however, as to what that identity meant. Antebellum Southern literature had been very concerned with the representation of the slave-based plantation system as redemptive, that is, the plantation system represented “the static image of a community of chosen people existing in a pastoral dispensation which it is America’s destiny to fulfill” (Simpson 1972, 201). This can be seen in various novels like George Tucker’s The Valley of Shenandoah (1824) and John Esten Cooke’s The Virginia Comedians (1854). The Civil War created a new nation where, arguably, there was not one before, with a new mythology and sense of self that was purged of its need to justify the actual practice of plantation slavery and instead stood for antimodern traditionalism in the face of the spiritual corruption of the American North. In particular, Southern literature incorporated a fusion of Confederate mythology with Christian imagery of purity and a forthcoming resurrection. Simpson (1972, 204) quotes Thomas Nelson Page’s essay published in 1892: “The South was dead, and buried, and yet she rose again. The voice of God called her forth; she came clad in her grave-clothes, but living, and with her face uplifted to the heavens from which had sounded the call of her resurrection.” Interestingly, Page goes on to specifically lament the lack of antebellum writing of the South, which not only makes the antebellum South unrecoverable as anything but an imaginary space but also because this lack of place promotion had material consequences in the lack of support from outsiders. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Page’s call to action remained largely unanswered until after World War I, when writers like William Faulkner and Robert Penn Warren emerged. These authors wrote about the American South in a very depoliticized way, ignoring the Lost Cause imagery that had motivated their predecessors. Instead, they substituted a humanist perspective for the collectivist, nationalist perspective that Page presumably would have preferred. This was enabled by changing geopolitical circumstances, as the United States as a whole began to focus outside its borders in its search of an “other” to construct its identity against. Thus, the Lost Cause narratives began to lose their role as the primary source of identity in the American South. However, that imagery is clearly still resonant, as is the idea of Southern spirituality redeeming the entire nation.

Consequences As we have seen, literature consistently plays a role in the creation and perpetuation of national difference and exceptionalism, even if this sense of national difference and exceptionalism does not always come through identical formulations and does not always result in an independent nation-state of the type described at the beginning of this chapter. However, it should be noted that literature (and literacy itself), in most times and places, has been largely the province of the elite, with very little immediate impact on the vast majority of the population. This is not to deny the efficacy of literature as an agent of social cohesion and identity formation, as literature can shape the discourses that elites then transmit through speeches and other media to the masses. I am arguing, though, that literacy rates provide an outline of the times and places in which nationalist literature has had (or will have) the most impact. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, literacy rates in all parts of the world were very low in comparison to our contemporary situation, and following the Industrial Revolution the literacy rate grew in a very spatially uneven way. In 1970 (the first year UNESCO statistics are available), the world literacy rate was 64.4 percent; it can be safely assumed that during the Age of Self-Determination it was lower and more spatially uneven. Ironically, during the Age of Self-Determination literature was most widely available in the economically privileged societies that were most likely to be independent nation-states already. For example, according to their censuses, Puerto Rico’s literacy rate in 1899 was 18.3 percent and Jamaica’s literacy rate in 1901 was 45.4 percent (Núñez 2005). This bias toward the developed world has already been demonstrated, in a way, through the selection of the nationalist literatures in the preceding section, which come generally from developed countries. Until recently, literacy rates have been low throughout most of the world, and even now, they are highly spatially uneven in ways reminiscent of the past. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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UNESCO map of world adult (15 years +) literacy rates by country, 1995–2005. (UNESCO Institute for Statistics)

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Ironically, as literacy rates have been improving around the world, the reading of literature in the developed world has declined as technological innovations in printing, broadcasting, and film have come to define the new, more visual media of the post-1945 era: comic books, television, and movies. Thus, the ability of writers to disseminate nationalist messages appears to be in relative decline as the reading of literature becomes less prevalent (NEA 2004). Comic book characters like Captain America, besides bringing a highly visual way of framing World War II as a morality tale of conflict between good (the United States) and evil (Germany, the Japanese), also brought the ability to provide nationalist imagery and text to younger audiences who might not have the reading skills or patience to read a novel. Similarly, World War II saw the collaboration of Hollywood with the U.S. government to produce war movies that featured the same simple, moral form of nationalism found in wartime comics. That cooperation has continued, with cinematic representations of the nation proving critical in interpellating an audience into a nation and constructing geopolitical realities (Sharp 1998). Thus, while literature is critical to understanding the birth of the many nationstates created during this period and to the growth of this era’s anticolonial movements, which would flower in the period immediately following 1945, the power of literature to shape national consciousnesses would become circumscribed by changes in the technologies associated with cultural production and with the habits associated with cultural consumption. Selected Bibliography Althusser, L. 1977. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. London: New Left Books. Anderson, B. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso. Bhabha, H. 1990. “Introduction.” In Nation and Narration, 1–8. London: Routledge. Bourdaghs, M. 2003. The Dawn that Never Comes: Shimazaki To¯son and Japanese Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Eile, S. 2000. Literature and Nationalism in Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Emerson, O. B. 1972. “Cultural Nationalism in Afro-American Literature.” In The Cry of Home: Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer, 211–244. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Esty, J. 2004. A Shrinking Island: Modernism and National Culture in England. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Fanon, F. 1965. The Wretched of the Earth. New York: Grove Press. Fitzgerald, F. S. 1945. The Crack Up. New York: New Directions. Gramsci, A. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers. Hewitson, M. 2000. “Nation and Nationalismus: Representational and national identity in Imperial Germany.” In Representing the German Nation: History and Identity in TwentiethCentury Germany, 19–62. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press. Lewald, H. Et. 1972. “Argentine Literature: National or European?” In The Cry of Home: Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer, 303–319. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.


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Lewis, P. 2000. Modernism, Nationalism, and the Novel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. National Endowment for the Arts (NEA). 2004. Reading at Risk: A Survey of Literary Reading in America. Research Division Report 46. Núñez, J. 2005. “Signed with an X: Methodology and Data Sources for Analyzing the Evolution of Literacy in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1900–1950.” Latin American Research Review 40:117–135. Rose, W. 1964. Men, Myths, and Movements in German Literature. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press. Said, E. 1990. “Yeats and Decolonization.” In Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature, 69–95. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Sharp, J. 1998. “Reel Geographies of the New World Order: Staging Post-Cold War Geopolitics in American Movies.” In Rethinking Geopolitics, 152–169. New York: Routledge. Simpson, L. P. 1972. “Southern Spiritual Nationalism: Notes on the Background of Modern Southern Fiction.” In The Cry of Home: Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer, 189–210. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Tracy, R. 1972. “Ireland: The Patriot Game.” In The Cry of Home: Cultural Nationalism and the Modern Writer, 39–57. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. UNESCO. 2002. “Regional Adult Illiteracy Rate and Population by Gender–July 2002.” (Retrieved March 19, 2006), http://www.uis.unesco.org/en/stats/statistics/UIS_Literacy_ Regional2002.xls. Woolf, V. 1984. The Diary of Virginia Woolf. San Diego: Harcourt Press.


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National Rituals of Belonging Ulf Hedetoft Relevance Rituals of belonging are a normal part of the formation and maintenance of national identities; they are particularly crucial in the period from ca. 1880 to the end of World War II. This is a historical era containing important developments involving imperialism and nationalism, fascism and democracy, colonialism and incipient decolonization. It holds within it two world wars. And it is the historical phase encompassing what is often referred to as the nationalization of the masses (Mosse 1975), the cultural process through which national identities are shaped and ordinary people learn to think of their primary site of identification as the state and territory where they were born—rather than, for instance, their familial, local, or occupational ties. In this process, perceptions of the national “other” —nation-states and peoples existing outside of the state border—are formed and deployed in different situations. To both of these mutually dependent processes— creating self-identity and forming images of alterity—rituals of belonging are integral and indispensable. Belonging and feelings of emotional attachment to nation-states become increasingly important as the period progresses and the geopolitical map transforms into one composed of formally symmetrical units, in which the general aspiration is congruity between state and nation (Gellner 1983), and where the units interact with each other in the framework of the international order. The interests in constructing national “imagined communities” (Anderson 1983/1991) were many, varying from one locality and context to the next, and having multiple historical backgrounds. Generally, however, by the end of the 19th century, interstate competition in Europe—the breeding ground of nationalism—had reached a point where the mobilization of the masses in the name of the nation and across internal divides like class, ethnicity, or region was invested with evergreater significance by political and cultural elites. The driving force behind these developments was directly linked to the formation of political regimes competing for the same European and global resources (territory, raw materials, trading outlets, cultural domination, and so forth). Year by year, this competition among European colonial powers pulled them into a political game with inevitable military consequences. This build-up toward confrontation and war called for clear self/other demarcations and popular support of elite objectives on an unprecedented scale. Simultaneously, but for different reasons, people were beginning to demand (and to some extent achieve) social and political rights, that is, to be recognized as citizenries and electorates. State N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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demands for a mentality of sacrifice thus dovetailed with popular demands for influence, rights, and recognition. The result in many cases was powerful forms of identity and belonging, feeding off hostile images of the “other,” and inculcated by means of a combination of materialism (prospects for improved livelihoods) and idealism (identification with national mythologies and “invented traditions” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Rituals and ritualism—public displays of attachment between rulers and ruled in a stylized form—constituted an indispensable part of this political process of mobilizing communities by forging overlapping “vertical” and “horizontal” solidarities, that is, deep-seated sentiments of belonging between state and nation and among different sections of the population. Such forms of repetitive public spectacle assumed extraordinary significance during turbulent periods, in which state confrontations were the order of the day and public mobilization around state objectives could not, like today, rely on the power of the mass media. This core function in turn is related to the nature of rituals as well as the formative process they were being asked to serve. Rituals are symbols in collective practice, social enactments of belonging, faith, and identity, and repeated narratives of communality. They are simple, iterative, and formal displays of “us-ness,” spun into webs of cultural meaning (Geertz 1973). They cannot be decoded without a cultural key, and therefore refuse to give away their secret at first glance. Their meaning can only be grasped by knowing about their historical, cultural, and sociopolitical context. In particular, their core meaning and role are intimately connected with the temporal dimension of the national community, with the present enactment of the past, and with creating an imaginary bridge between past, present, and future. Some scholars argue that in this way, rituals create a suspension of time through the (repeated) enactment of the past in the present and the dramatization of collective memory. It is just as important, however, that rituals—like state funerals, commemorating dead soldiers and heroic deeds, royal parades, or the singing of national anthems—have the capacity to override reason while appealing directly to emotional responses of a sentimental, nostalgic, pitiful, proud, or jubilant nature. Finally, rituals are able to combine the realm of the profane with that of sacrality and faith, and thus the imaginaries of life and death, fatality and eternity. This is partly because humans seem to be generally disposed toward magic, myth-making, and ritualism in order to imbue earthly problems and processes with a higher inscrutable purpose—and partly because ritualism by its very form orchestrates and enacts the elements of self-abnegation, lack of free will, subjection under a collective order, and affective attachment, which national allegiance and religious conviction have in common (Hayes 1960). All of this is significant for understanding the appeal and effectiveness of national rituals in the transformative phase under review. Not only was it shot through with numerous smaller and larger wars demanding extreme sacrifices of ordinary people, but it was also characterized by the decline of collective religiosN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ity, the separation of church and state, the pursuit of market-oriented goals, the belief in science and rationality, and especially the forging of strong, militaristic, and totalitarian states and political cultures in Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the USSR—in other words, by all the stark ideological and cultural contradictions of historical modernity. In this context, nationalism and its rituals offered an alluring substitute for traditional religion and the relativism of modern life as well as a haven of imagined security, order, and existential meaning. Much of this is unquestionably universal and valid across national boundaries. Nevertheless, the specific shape and societal import of ritualism varies relative to the history and political culture of a country: the extent to which countries are culturally and politically unitary or plural; have leaderships that are perceived as indigenous or alien; have been shaped through top-down or bottom-up processes; possess political and cultural elites that mutually support each other or are at loggerheads; can tap into traditions of religious or cultural ritualism to a larger or smaller degree; and can more or less easily mobilize a readiness for collective sacrifice on the part of subjects and citizens. In turn, this relates to the sources, diffusion, and forms of rituals of belonging in this period.

Origins Nationalism in the late 19th century in Europe oscillated between two very different forms, which can be called imperative and imaginary, respectively (Hedetoft 1995). On the one hand, it was a top-down, state-induced, and territorially motivated political and cultural organizing principle—figuratively speaking, an edict by the powers-that-be to “the people” to fall emotionally in line with its ruling cadres. This is the conservative version of nationalism, which ultimately produced European racism and fascism. On the other hand, we find the national imaginary, the push from below toward national-ethnic homogeneity and independence, toward fulfilling both Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s ideal of direct popular representation (Rousseau 1762/1950), Ernest Renan’s image of nationalism as a daily plebiscite (Renan 1882/1990), and the poet Heinrich Heine’s dream of a future unified Germany (Heine 1844/1906). This is nationalism in the imaginary mode: if only it were so, things would be perfect. Importantly, neither of the two forms can confidently take the existence of nation-states and national identities for granted. Nationalism is filled with tension between imperially or aristocratically inspired imperatives from above, and popular-nationalist ardour to create “one’s own” institutions of power by putting pressure on states and rulers for cultural and linguistic concessions from below. The specific blends of imperative and imaginary forms and the different rituals of belonging that follow from them depend on the avenue taken to construct national modernity in particular countries or regions. The German historian Theodor N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Schieder has usefully suggested distinctions between an incorporative, a unifying, and a secessionist path (Schieder 1992). In the first category we find, for instance, England and France, with state structures, institutions, and territorial boundaries reasonably in place before this phase of nationalism. These structures, institutions, and boundaries undergo a politically and socially transformative process in the nation-building phase, violent and fragmentary in France, smoother and more “continuous” in England; in both cases, however, there exists an established state framework that can be tapped into, reformed, or revolutionized. By the turn of the 19th century, political establishments of both countries were engaged with similar problems: how to nationalize the masses of colonial metropoles and win over the hearts and minds of people(s) within their territories. In this context, rituals of belonging tended to consist mainly of highly formalized public displays of stately pomp and circumstance to forge unitary points of reference and a sense of historical continuity for different groups and a variety of social movements—for instance, in the form of celebrating royalty (e.g., the socalled Durbar on the occasion of Queen Victoria becoming empress of India in 1877), imperial successes (e.g., the Empire of India Exhibition in London in 1895), national progress and pride (e.g., celebrations surrounding the completion and opening of the Eiffel Tower in 1889, on the centenary of the Revolution), and the inauguration, in both countries around the turn of the century, of countless public monuments dedicated to the commemoration of long traditions of sacrifice and heroism for the good of the nation. The second type, unifying nationalism, is what we find primarily in Germany and Italy. This is a nationalism marked by violent showdowns between political representatives of institutional modernism and cultural representatives of the national imaginary, as witnessed by the German conflict between a Gross- and a Kleindeutschland, or between the national visions of Mazzini and Garibaldi in Italy. Here, nationalism is imperative and imaginary at the same time, with representatives of the two strands constantly engaged in a struggle to define “rightful” territory, proper institutions, criteria for national citizenship and belonging, and popular influence on state and government. Toward the end of the century, the champions of the raison d’état are at the helm of state in both countries, but both countries are also losing out in the wider intra-European competition for global resources, influence, and colonial control, notably in Africa. These processes point ahead to post–World War I fascist developments in both Germany and Italy, which due to their revanchist and expansionist ideological foundations relied extensively on constructing rituals, myths, and official narratives of racist superiority and unbreakable unity of state and people. The secessionist type, characteristic of most central and east European national paths (and later of independence movements in the colonized part of the world), is different. Here nationalism was predominantly imaginary, represented by ambitious social and regional groups excluded from the opportunity structures offered to the ethno-national core, and therefore locked in a fight against N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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absolutist and agrarian-based “multicultural” empires like those of the Habsburgs and the Romanovs. This third type contains a rupture: the foundations and interests of the state run counter to any modern vision of nationalism, and hence, imaginary nationalism feeds on a combination of powerlessness, marginalization, and cultural resentment. Rituals of belonging and symbolic resistance are here largely based on communal narratives and cultural practices of, for instance, singing, celebrating the changing of the seasons, oral traditions of storytelling, or commemorating local heroes. In combination with the external intervention of World War I, the dissolution of the three great landed empires in Europe, and the adoption of national self-determination as an international norm, these popular nationalist movements in central and eastern Europe managed to achieve independence and statehood, for instance, in the three Baltic nations. Not all nationalist processes ran in parallel. In general, however, the most significant crucible for the creation of European nationalism as an all-societal and all-encompassing phenomenon of political, cultural, and existential identity was the fundamentally imperial processes of international competition and mutual grievances in Europe between ca. 1880 and 1914, the concomitant political discourses of national history, memory, glory, and future goals, and the acceptance by the peoples of the soldiery virtues they were asked to internalize and demonstrate. War and rituals related to war proved to be an invaluable nationalist mobilizer, and the image of particular national self-identities became virtually inseparable from the mental construction and cultural representations of negative “otherness.” Thus, the pacific, nonexclusivist images of national character and culture propounded by Herder, Kant, Locke, Paine, Scott, and other intellectuals in the age of Enlightenment and Romanticism fell prey to the more ferocious “models” put forward or inspired by people like Arndt, Chamberlain, Hobbes, Hegel, Treitschke, and Wagner—and their political incarnations, Bismarck, Disraeli, Franco, Hitler, Kaiser Wilhelm, Stalin, and so forth. Together with the economic promise of modernity, these developments imparted to nationalism and national identity a historically unprecedented legitimacy and paved the way for the effectiveness of state-orchestrated ritualism. Types of Ritualism It emerges from what has been said already that rituals associated more or less directly with states and state interests in the international system were predominant during the period. This applies whether or not we are thinking of liberaldemocratic, fascist, or socialist regimes. The first of these were still in the making, and many were simultaneously colonial powers. The second had a built-in propensity for rituals of power, race, and manliness. And the third, particularly in its Stalinist version, cultivated other forms of authority, sacrifice, and antimaterial discipline. In a context of ruthless international competition, all three forms of rule—empires of different hue—came to rely for popular support and legitimacy on heavily stylized public demonstrations of power and identity, on ritualized N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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cults of personality, and on cultural representations of unity. Only smaller and less powerful states in the developed world (like Denmark or Norway) or countries in the Third World aspiring to emancipation from colonial rule (like India or Senegal) represented more pacific forms of national ritualism, rooted in cultural history and traditions. It is possible to identify five types of rituals of belonging in this period. The first consists of rituals of state proper, that is, rituals directly orchestrating the cult of the ruler, affirming the exceptional virtues of the regime, symbolizing transitions and continuities from one ruler or government to another, or displaying the grandeur and mission of the state in relation to past successes and future goals in the context of international competition. This area would encompass British celebrations of imperial monarchy (for instance, Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in 1897); the personality cult erected around dictators like Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin; military parades and other public displays of power and authority; and regime changes like Norwegian celebrations of new-found statehood in 1905 or the ritual formality of the transition from Weimar to Nazi rule in 1933 (Voigt 1989). These are all examples of the state celebrating and commemorating itself, of projecting and presenting itself to its titular people—or peoples, in the case of colonizing states—and, to some degree, of the people responding and participating of their own accord. The second type encompasses rituals of heroic sacrifice and death in the national cause, such as those related to the cult of the Unknown Soldier, the inauguration of public monuments in honor of heroic acts carried out in wartime and “beyond the call of duty,” the award of medals for bravery, the initiation of national holidays or museums commemorating the wartime dead, and the political use, in demagoguery and inflammatory practices of various kinds, of such extreme idealism to extol the incomparable racial virtues of the nation and highlight the evil nature of the enemy. During this period, this type of ritual practice is no doubt the most significant in a majority of national settings; it squares both with the inclement state of international relations and the objective of shaping an imagined unity of state and nation. Rituals of war, death, and suffering constituted the litmus test of national identity, since they orchestrate this unity as frictionless and popular allegiance to state objectives as absolute. The third type contains rituals of national sportsmanship in international competitive environments. These rituals share certain features with rituals of war: both display national identity in concrete practice, both rely on giving one’s utmost to the national cause, and both can take the form of events where medals are bestowed, the national anthem is played, and the national flag is waved in honor of specific persons or groups and the nation-states they vicariously represent. The difference between the two kinds of national exploit is just as clear, however. In an important sense, the ritualism of sports is not limited to “extraneous” circumstances like spectator behavior, pre-match flag-waving, and postmatch award-winning ceremonies, but centrally consists of the rules and practices N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of the games themselves, which are ritual confrontations between international rivals. Furthermore, the virtues of sacrifice, exertion, and asceticism are, in the case of the sportsperson, intended only to lead to an honorable representation of the nation-state internationally, not physically to the destruction of the opponent. Sports events symbolize and celebrate the successful physical incarnation of national particularities, but within an ideal framework dedicated to friendly relations and peaceful competition—whereas soldiers are expected to apply comparable physical skills and mental courage to a “game” that is deadly serious. In addition, the ritualism of sport could be engineered in such a way that it helped support political goals by cross-fertilizing with political rituals. The Nazi regime’s use of the Berlin Olympic Games in 1936 is only the most blatant deployment of sport for political ends during this period, where sport was often unashamedly subordinated to political interests, as regards preparations for war, the inculcation of masculine virtues (“muscular Christianity”) in young people, and the demonstration of the racial qualities and superiority of the national “stock” (Pearson 1901). The fourth type concerns precisely such ritualism of moral value and national allegiance, notably in institutions of education and socialization. The discipline required of loyal subjects and citizens, the moral virtues of selfless dedication to higher goals, the necessary knowledge of national history, and the balanced

Adolf Hitler, flanked by fellow Nazis, opens the 1936 Summer Games in Berlin, Germany. (Austrian Archives/CORBIS)


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combination of moral and physical skills (“mens sana in corpore sano”) were imparted to young people by means of curricula and learning methods in which ritualism—symbolic and repeated enactments of loyalty, devotion, asceticism, and discipline—played a dominant role. From bodily rigor in physical education, through mechanical repetition of Latin declensions and German prepositions, to oaths of allegiance and displays of admiration for the nation’s founders in history, rituals of belonging were pervasive as a necessary instrument in the formation of national character, political identity, and useful skills—even though the specific combination of these requirements varied from one country to the next. But given such variations and different emphases, inculcation of rituals of belonging applied to all states and all classes within them, and increasingly so as primary education became a common public good during this period. The fifth and last type embraces everyday rituals of cultural symbolism. It intertwines with some of the other areas, for instance, sports and socialization, but also lives an autonomous life of its own in social movements, professional associations, political events (like elections), private gatherings, family circles, and so forth. At stake here are more or less formalized practices like celebrating the nation in song (e.g., the Welsh choir tradition), saluting the flag or using the flag for a variety of everyday purposes, commemorating the local/family dead, observing national red-letter days (Constitution Days, Memorial Days, religious holidays), participating in cultural events (e.g., Hindus collectively bathing in the Ganges river to cleanse themselves spiritually), helping needy people, celebrating personal rites of passage in a national spirit, dressing in a particular “national” way, participating in national movements and associations (e.g., in defense of the national language), or even little things like going about one’s daily routines in a ritualistic way informed by national traditions and cultural habits. Some of these practices originated in the elite cultures of a particular nation-state, others in contemporary national symbols or events, and yet others in folk traditions, which now became attributed with national meaning, sometimes by way of the intermediary of religious allegiance or events—Christmas rituals in Europe during this period providing an illustrative example. Whereas the other four types are indicative of the imperative form of ritualism, this one contains the popular appropriation and practice of belonging and identity in everyday form.

Dimensions So far the discussion has focused on the forms, backgrounds, and intentions of ritualism of belonging. We now turn to the impacts and consequences of these forms of socialization. Were they successful? Did they have differential impacts on diverse groups? And did they entail significant consequences, whether intended or unintended? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The most general assessment to be made is that they were surprisingly successful and rather uniformly imperative across the board. In fact, nationalism as a political project of modernity largely owes its global success to the acceptance and performance of rituals of belonging by ordinary people, as a significant instrument in the forging of imagined communities and state loyalties. Leadership calls for national mobilization, obedience, discipline, devotion, and sacrifice were heeded to a surprising degree and were accepted, indeed often internalized, by ordinary people as moral yardsticks of sound character and loyal behavior. This is true both in liberal, fascist, and socialist regimes, in states formed through incorporation, unification, and secession, and in polities that are ethnically pluralist, homogeneous, or “colonial.” Nevertheless, the specific combination of these different features in each case, coupled with varying political contexts and cultural backgrounds, made for some interesting and meaningful variations of impact. A few examples will have to suffice. In regimes typified by being liberal, colonial, and incorporative, like Britain, common rituals of belonging tended to be unevenly accepted by all subjects and to be unevenly applied within the British geopolitical space. This is to be expected, given the expanse of the British empire and the haphazard and informal types of administrative rule in different parts. However, it was also true for the British Isles. Here, the cultural and to some extent identity-related differences between the English, Irish, Welsh, and Scots presented an obstacle to the creation of one, homogeneous, full-fledged British identity based on the whole range of common rituals. This meant that ritualism of this nature was either connected to overarching symbols of imperial but apolitical rule, like the monarchy, and/or to situations of real or trumped-up national emergency, like war or immigration, where images of the enemy (e.g., “the Jew”; see, for instance, White 1899) could be deployed to galvanize internal unity. Rituals of belonging were in that sense imperfectly integrative, if the measure is one unifying identity and form of allegiance to the British Crown. Conversely, imperative rituals of emergency were surprisingly effective and successful. Many colonial subjects responded positively to the British call to arms both in World War I and World War II. Nazi Germany presents a different case. Fascist and ethnically homogeneous (at least as regards self-projection), historically acting on a basis of very uneven conceptions of what constituted Germanness and the German territory, and intent on vindicating the defeat and humiliation of World War I, rituals of belonging were excessively state-directed (imperative), targeting the genuine “Aryan” elements of the German population. Benefiting from the militaristic culture of the Wilhelmine era and its historical roots, Nazi Germany employed the entire range of ritual types to the full, in the process successfully mobilizing the larger part of the population behind its program of ethnic purification and vindication of German greatness. This had the intended consequence of excluding, ostracizing, and killing millions of Jews and other supposedly “alien elements” in the body politic, who thus became the immediate victims of a German ritualism they were N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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not permitted to embrace. But it had the unintended consequence of creating and exacerbating new internal and external divisions. The demand for a total subjection of the economy, civil society, and the individual will of the citizen under the objectives of the strong state was a cultural project of consolidation and was successful for a time due to the integrative force of the war economy. Eventually, however, it broke down in its efforts to make the unified state into a new multiethnic empire through territorial conquest, in other words, because of its political project of international revenge and domination. Finally, the Russian/Soviet case exemplifies a third pattern. It is strikingly different from the other two by virtue of the fact that the first part of the period (until 1917) represents the gradual disintegration of the landlocked Romanov empire due to internal divisions. Strategies of belonging in this multiethnic and classdivided empire failed, and World War I became a catalyst for the Bolshevik Revolution. The Soviet part of the period is characterized by incorporative and pluralist strategies at the same time, rituals of belonging being focused on the construction of “socialism in one country” and the defense of the fatherland against foreign intervention, but also on the socialist ideal of the “Soviet person” and his or her obligations and allegiance to the system and its leader. Like the other two regimes, ritualism as a means to orchestrate attachment and forge identity was both pervasive and predominantly imperative, since the ethnically plural nature of the USSR precluded it from tapping into a common cultural repository. In addition, state ritualism and propaganda became increasingly militaristic the more we approach the Stalinist purges and deportations of dissidents between the mid-1930s and the end of World War II. The three cases represent the most important patterns, developments, and impacts of national ritualism during this period. All three are predominantly imperative, giving priority to rituals engineered by elites and aimed at forging popular identification with political objectives in situations of national emergency. To the extent that they existed, common cultural traditions and popular imaginaries were here made to serve as sources to be tapped and shaped according to specific goals. Otherwise, traditions and shared cultural origins were “invented” or “rediscovered,” frequently by reference to their opposite, the ominous and threatening outsider (whether “Jew,” “German,” “Irishman,” or “Boer”), and sometimes by harnessing scholarly disciplines like ethnography, geography, history, linguistics, and archaeology to political and military goals, for instance, to justify territorial claims. Clearly, however, the three cases do not exhaust the whole spectrum of different ritual forms. The nationalization of the masses, and the ritualism employed, assumed a somewhat different shape in smaller and less agenda-setting state contexts (e.g., Sweden, Switzerland), in “imaginary states” where nations still dreamt of independence and sovereign statehood (e.g., Finland before World War I, Ireland before 1922), and in states under colonial rule (e.g., Iran, Jamaica). In all three variants, feelings and rituals of belonging derive more immediately from N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the cultural imaginary of popular identifications, collective memories, and common histories. Even in these contexts, however, more official and imperative rituals of belonging had an important role to play. First, because they lent credence to claims for recognition in the context of international comparison and formal symmetry among states after World War I. And second, because few of these nations had been spared the ordeals and sufferings of conflict, war, occupation, and civil unrest, and hence had their own reasons for commemorating their dead, celebrating heroism, or erecting public memorials in honor of past sacrifice. This all implies that rituals of belonging in this turbulent phase of modern history were either (and mostly) highly formalized, orchestrated, and statedirected, very imaginary and culturally informed, or some combination of the two forms, but very rarely just normal, taken for granted, and tacit practices of national identity (the closest approximation being identity formation in the United States, but even there the normality of melting-pot practices and loyalties was punctured by military ritualism, the continuous absorption or rejection of immigrants, the Great Depression, and the divisive question of race). They represent a period where identity processes undergo radical change in a climate of domestic, national homogenization, but also of international anarchy and ferocious political and military competition. Hence, despite the success of the national model of identification that this period symbolizes in a general sense—and in which rituals of belonging played a significant role—the way the model and its identity components were geared to state goals and interstate competition proved to have long-term consequences for the role of nationalism.

Consequences World War II marked the end of the formative years of nationalism and very nearly killed off the idea of nationalism at the same time. This is, of course, a paradoxical statement. The first half implies that nationalism as a template of identity formation between people and state provided a benchmark of legitimate political and cultural organization for the future. The second half says the opposite, namely that nationalism had proved itself to be a destructive principle, and that by the end of World War II, its political legitimacy and usefulness had been eroded and nearly exhausted. What is interesting about the postwar phase is that in a very real sense both propositions are true. There is a direct link between the negative, dysfunctional, and ultimately destructive components of European nationalism and the imperative, directive, and militarized forms of ritualism characteristic of the period between 1880 and 1945. The nationalization of the masses was preponderantly a political, top-down project, simultaneously undertaken in a number of different sovereign entities, for very similar reasons, and in roughly comparable forms. To N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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a large extent it was exclusive, building on clear-cut territorial, political, and cultural demarcations against the “other” and, historically, on mentalities of imperial rule and racially justified hierarchies of superiority and inferiority. On the other hand, its success would not have been possible had it not been able to tap into cultural and historical sources of kinship ties and local belonging. It is little wonder, therefore, that the nationalization of the masses, propped up by stylized rituals of belonging and legitimated by ideologies of race and blood, had chauvinist and revanchist implications like fascism, ethnic cleansing, and all-out international war, but also involved more pacific, imaginary, and seemingly innocuous forms of patriotic attachment to kith and kin, landscapes, traditions, and symbols. Nationalism, after all, is both a political program and a cultural identity, and its global success is largely due to this dual nature. The immediate impact of World War II was to decouple the negative from the positive elements. By virtue of the defeat of Nazism—which was simultaneously the political embodiment of the most imperative forms of national ritualism— it managed to delegitimate, particularly in Europe, the identity of the strong, authoritarian state and the unabashed forms of ritualism connected with the semireligious cult of the dictator, with honorable death in the national cause and explicit racism as an ideology underpinning national identities. On the other hand also, the victors were nation-states proud of their national identities. In addition, a new international order based on national independence and decolonization, formalized in a number of international institutions and underpinned by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948), saw the light of day— adding new moral impetus to nationalism and fueling new symbols and rituals of belonging, eventually in the defeated European states, too. The ideological tenor of this more moderate, open, and democratic form of national identity was less hostile and chauvinist and more egalitarian and cooperative than in the formative phase of national modernity. It did away with the all-dominant militaristic and imperative nature of ritualism in that phase, leading to a significant reshuffle in the order of priority of the different types of rituals of belonging, while embedding these more solidly in the everyday imaginary and practices of people as well as in institutions of democratic governance and civil society (Billig 1995). In many ways, this has implied a normalization of rituals of belonging. Nevertheless, imperative and highly formalized rituals have survived in the form, for instance, of official celebrations and commemorative events; royal pomp and circumstance; births, weddings, and funerals; swearing-in ceremonies for incoming political leaders or oaths of allegiance pledged by immigrants and schoolchildren; national election procedures; the award of medals and distinctions to soldiers, sportspeople, and dignitaries; flagging, singing, marching, and mourning together in one or the other national cause; cults of charismatic personalities; and of course, in reliving and reconstructing the national past and the “collective memory” in innumerable ways. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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In this sense, nearly all the older forms have survived, in some national contexts more than others, but the relationship of dominance and importance among them has shifted, and new forms have been added. What this means is not that national belonging today is perceived as less important than between 1880 and 1945, nor that it no longer depends on ritual acts, but that both the normative and political context has changed significantly. The prime lesson learned from recent history is that rituals are most effective if people are encouraged to shape and execute them in their own interest—rather than merely obeying the powersthat-be or applauding the spectacles they orchestrate in their own honor. Selected Bibliography Anderson, B. 1983/1991. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Billig, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Geertz, C. 1973. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Hayes, C. 1960. Nationalism: A Religion. New York: Macmillan. Hedetoft, U. 1995. Signs of Nations. Aldershot: Dartmouth. Heine, H. 1844/1906. Germany (The Works of Heinrich Heine). Translated by Charles Godfrey Leland. London: W. Heinemann. Hobsbawm, E., and T. Ranger, eds. 1983. The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mosse, G. E. 1975. The Nationalization of the Masses. New York: H. Fertig. Pearson, K. 1901. National Life from the Standpoint of Science. London: Adam and Charles Black. Renan, J. E. 1882/1990. “What Is a Nation?” [original title “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?”]. In Nation and Narration, edited by H. Bhabha. London: Routledge. Rousseau, J.-J. 1762/1950. The Social Contract and Discourses. New York: Dutton. Schieder, T. 1992. “Typologie und Erscheinungsformen des Nationalstaats in Europa.” In Nationalismus und Nationalstaat, edited by O. Dann and H.-U. Wehler, 65–86. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Voigt, R. ed. 1989. Symbole der Politik. Politik der Symbole. Opladen: Leske and Budrich. White, A. 1899. The Modern Jew. London: W. Heinemann.


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Perversions of Nationalism Aristotle A. Kallis Relevance During the 19th century, nationalism was diffused across Europe, motivating revolutionary movements, effecting fundamental boundary changes, and altering the dynamics of state power. In 1848, the continent was seized by revolutionary fever that shook (though did not dismantle) the foundations of the old imperial system, bringing to the fore new nationalist movements and objectives. In the following three decades, the national unification of Italy (1859–1870) and Germany (1866–1871), along with the transformation of the Habsburg empire into a “dual monarchy” in recognition of Hungarian self-determination (Ausgleich, 1866), strengthened the dynamics of nation-statism and added to the overall significance of nationalism. In the years leading to World War I, Europe witnessed the transformation of nationalism into a radical and often aggressive ideology with numerous permutations, revisions, and fatal perversions.

Origins Already in the second half of the 19th century, nationalism had undergone one crucial transformation: while initially it had been deployed by movements against the excesses of state power with a view to attaining self-determination and freedom, it had also become a tool of political legitimacy for the ruling elites. The way in which the Italian and German unifications took place fulfilled very few of the revolutionary aspirations that had been invested in 1848: they were engineered from above, defusing more radical claims for social change and manipulating nationalism for the benefit of the state itself. While stateless national movements continued to invoke nationalism as a platform for liberation from the yoke of an alien ruler, states, too, adapted it to serve their own purposes, not in a revolutionary direction but as a basis for popular mobilization against perceived external or internal “threats.” All this was taking place in a rapidly changing context, in which ideologies battled for political hegemony over the continent. On the one hand, liberalism continued to defend the right of individual and collective (therefore, national) self-determination against repressive imperial rule or state excesses. The ongoing legal emancipation of the Jews across Europe provided a path for a more inclusive, tolerant nationalism that would defend the rights of minorities and promote N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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a culture of peaceful, egalitarian coexistence. On the other hand, socialism gathered momentum in the last decades of the century, offering a new basis for collective identity that not only antagonized state authority but also transcended boundaries of ethnicity, religion, and culture. The internationalist basis of socialist ideology—in itself the product of the radicalism that had been generated in the first half of the century in tandem with revolutionary nationalism claims— now found itself at odds with both nationalism and the interests of the political order. At the same time, the drive toward imperialism—and its escalation during the second half of the century—revived a wider interest in the differences between “white” and “nonwhite” peoples, in social and anthropological terms alike. Increasing contact with colonial populations fueled an “us–them” mentality. The idea of “white superiority” had always been inherent in the history of European colonialism, but it had been primarily articulated in moral, cultural, and civilizational terms, not in racial-biological ones. Now, a growing stress on genetic difference gave rise to fears about miscegenation and, thus, promoted discourses of exclusion/segregation. In this respect, the new colonial experience proved instrumental in engendering discourses of biological (racial) superiority, rooted in heredity, and discourses containing similar “threats” to the biological health of the “white” peoples. Until the 19th century, this sort of discourse had operated on a loose distinction between European (white) and non-European (nonwhite) groups, projecting a universal hierarchy of racial value based on large, loose groupings of the world population. Increasingly, however, in the second half of the century, some racial theories suggested that even within the allegedly superior white bloc there were distinctions of biological value to be made. This shift coincided with a strengthening of nationalist tendencies across the continent and an intensification of antagonisms among European states/nations. The escalation of nationalist feelings and ideas produced centrifugal tendencies within the white/European imperialist bloc, fueling competition for colonial resources and, eventually, for the domination of the continent. Race then gradually provided a new norm for the expression of nationalist ideologies, adding a new (allegedly objective and immutable) element of group identity and a powerful alibi for the violent exclusion of “the other(s).” As nationalism was becoming more and more closely associated with the acquisition of a national state for the whole community, the ideology of “nationstatism” gained currency as the major organizing principle of citizenship and group membership. National minorities in the new states became more visible, more divergent, more isolated. Integration was still possible, but its requirements were becoming increasingly rigid—as were the expectations of the majority group for conformity. At the same time, the idea of unifying the whole community under the aegis of the nation-state provided the pretext for territorial expansionist claims and a more aggressive foreign policy. At the peace negotiations in Versailles in 1919–1920, competing nationalist claims over territories and populations made N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the task of drawing new boundaries along ethnic lines practically impossible. In the end, the compromise solution allowed for the creation of a plethora of new aspiring nation-states, but this was seen by nationalists as the first step toward the realization of their goal of a pure nation-state. Neither complete nor secure, new and old states used a rigid form of nationalism to exclude others, to promote homogeneity (if need be, aggressively), and to demand (again, often with force) the completion of the process that led to a uniform nation-state. Finally, the radicalization of nationalism had an impact on the way in which states related to each other. The last wave of colonial expansion (second half of the 19th century until 1914) coincided with a period of heightened nationalist mobilization. Increasingly vocal and aggressive popular constituencies could successfully force their governments into action in the colonial field purely on the basis of “national prestige.” This is what happened in Germany during the two Moroccan crises of 1905 and 1911, as well as in Italy during the Libyan war (1911–1912). The European colonial powers soon found themselves in a vicious circle of competition against each other in the colonial field, forced into further action by their public opinion at home, and inevitably sinking deeper into a hostile web of international relations. A pan-European war was averted in the 11th hour during the second Moroccan crisis of 1911, but cumulative colonial antagonisms were one of the major factors contributing to the atmosphere that led to conflict in the summer of 1914.

Dimensions The New “Radical Nationalism” The growing capacity of nationalism for popular mobilization was missed by neither political activists nor thinkers or state authorities. This produced a number of variations and revisions of nationalism, the significance of which would be witnessed during the 20th century. One of the variations, ironically, emerged out of a fusion between nationalism and socialism. A group of dissident leftist thinkers in France (e.g., Georges Sorel) in the last decades of the 19th century grew impatient with the slow progress that socialism made in terms of winning over the masses and paving the way for a social revolution, and so they turned to the myth of the “nation” as the primary mobilizing theme. This new form of revolutionary nationalism vehemently rejected socialist internationalism in favor of “nationalizing” all revolutionary potential of socialism. The attraction of this new formula of a “national socialism” found willing adherents across the continent. In Italy, a new breed of avant-garde intellectuals, radical socialists (such as Benito Mussolini), revolutionary syndicalists, and other dissident leftists inspired by Sorel joined forces to articulate a different paradigm of nationally based revolutionary nationalism. They were successful in using a broadly Marxian methodology of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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analysis of inequality, which, however, they transplanted into a national (and not a class-based) context. Thus, Enrico Corradini spoke of Italy as a “proletarian nation,” exploited by the old “plutocratic powers” of the West but capable of spearheading a revolutionary redistribution of power starting from internal “rebirth” and then claiming its allegedly rightful place among the world’s leading nations. To leftists like Mussolini in Italy or Gustave Hervé and Georges Valois in France, this formula paved the way for a spectacular ideological transformation from the fringes of the revolutionary left to a new branch of radical, mass-mobilizing nationalism. In 1911, the Italian Nationalist Association (Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, ANI) was founded, giving expression to this new idiom of nationalism against both the internationalism of the left and the moderation of the liberal establishment. A similar political movement had already been formed in France with the name Action Française. Taken together, the intellectual synthesis of radical nationalism and dissident socialism that took place in France and Italy in the decades before World War I opened up an ideological and political space that would usher in the “era of fascism”—a term pioneered by the German historian Ernst Nolte in the 1960s. The fact that the ANI was totally fused into the Fascist Party (Partito Nazionale Fascista, PNF) by the early 1920s and that the Action Française nurtured a new generation of fascist-leaning movements after 1918 give credence to the idea that fascism was intellectually and politically connected to this earlier form of nationalism. But it was interwar fascism’s diffusion across Europe, its acquisition of power in Italy and Germany, and its influence on right-wing political thought in the 1920s and 1930s that made it the most destructive perversion of nationalism that the continent has ever witnessed. Interwar Fascism Officially, the “fascist” chapter in European history started in October 1922, when Mussolini was appointed prime minister in Italy. From January 1925 until July 1943, he headed a one-party state, with clear totalitarian aspirations and a determination to render the new doctrine, as Benito Mussolini himself declared in the manifesto titled Doctrine of Fascism, “the dominant ideology of the 20th century” (Mussolini 1932, 2). However, the origins of the Fascist movement in Italy lay in the profound impact of World War I that had allowed Mussolini to jump on the bandwagon of nationalism and eventually turn decisively against both socialism and liberalism. It was in the tense atmosphere of 1914–1915 that (the then rogue socialist) Mussolini decided to ally himself with those campaigning for Italy’s intervention in the conflict (the so-called intervento movement), and thus hijack the banner of radical nationalism for his own political ambitions. The eventual decision of the liberal Italian establishment to enter World War I in May 1915 was a triumph for the intervento campaign and marked the beginning of Mussolini’s political ascendancy in the ranks of the Italian radical, ultranationalist right. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Thus, fascism emerged as a revolutionary movement in search of a “third way,” placing the “nation” at the very heart of its ideology and subjugating all other considerations to national interest. Obsessed with the idea of national regeneration and greatness, fascism was inspired by the universal influence of the Roman past and committed itself to creating the new civilization of the “third Rome” that would set once again the foundations for a new European rebirth. This was meant to be a project of revolutionary reconfiguration, where violence, confrontation, and war were seen as natural forces of history. Therefore, fascism embarked upon “remaking the Italians” into a nation of citizen-soldiers whose primary allegiance would be to the whole nation and the national community. In fact, fascism was instrumental in transforming nationalism into a secular religion, based on faith, loyalty, and sacrifice to the collective cause; this is why it was vehemently antiliberal and antibourgeois, in the sense that these ideologies had bred individualism and material egoism. Instead, fascism focused attention on the collective body of the nation, held together in perfect unity by an integral nationalism. The influence of Italian fascist ideology and of the Fascist regime after 1922, in particular, cannot be exaggerated. In the mid-1920s, the Spanish general-cumdictator Miguel Primo de Rivera acknowledged his intellectual and political debts to Mussolini. Oswald Mosley, the former Conservative Member of Parliament that had made an unprecedented switch to the Labour Party, was converted to fascist ideology after a visit to Italy; upon his return to Britain, he founded the British Union of Fascists (BUF) and became the most important representative of this new creed in his country for the whole of the 1930s. At the same time, Mussolini himself was busy cultivating political links with other kindred movements across Europe. His links with (and financial support for) German nationalists— including Hitler’s Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterspartei (National Socialist German Workers Part), or NSDAP—have been documented, as were his contacts with Croat, Macedonian, Hungarian, and other radical nationalist movements, particularly in the Balkans and central Europe. Within a few years from the establishment of the Fascist dictatorship in Italy, fascist-like movements (whether they called themselves as such or not) emerged in Spain (Spanish Falange, headed by the son of General Primo de Rivera, Jose Antonio), in Croatia (the notorious Ustasha, who were outlawed by the Yugoslav government and were given refuge in Italy), in Romania (the Iron Guard under Corneliu Zelea Codreanu), and in Hungary (the Arrow Cross under Ferenc Szálasi). Even right-wing authoritarian regimes emulated many of its practices: Antonio Salazar in Portugal paid lip service to the “regeneration” of the Portuguese nation through his “new state” and devised a clearly corporatist constitution along the lines of the Italian Fascist experiments; corporatism was also implemented by the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, who was blatantly sponsored by Mussolini against the threat of the German-oriented Austrian NSDAP. Even more importantly, the myth of the nation was taken up by new movements in the Netherlands (FlemN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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mish Bloc), in Belgium (Verdinaso), and Latvia (Perkonkrusts), where the slogan “Latvia for the Latvians” echoed fascism’s vision of ethnic homogeneity. Even if gradually after 1933 Italian Fascism was somewhat eclipsed by the dynamism of German National Socialism, it continued to inspire and guide nationalists across the continent in search of a revolutionary “third way.” German National Socialism The National Socialist regime in Germany (1933–1945) has been associated with the most lethal, destructive, and shocking perversion of nationalism. By the time of its shattering collapse amidst the ruins of Berlin, it had left behind around 55 million casualties, including 6 million Jews, up to 500,000 Sinti/Roma, and millions of other nationalities that perished in the death and labor camps. Many have questioned whether the National Socialist regime’s horrifying emphasis on race justifies its categorization as “fascist,” when the Italian Fascist regime displayed an inconsistently—and in any case never strongly—racist orientation. However, the National Socialist regime’s emphasis on “race” was in itself a product of its perverted approach to nationalism, to national homogeneity, and to total rebirth and “health” of the community. Perhaps the uniqueness of National Socialism lies in the way in which it combined the most aggressive form of nationalism with the modern pseudoscientific theories of biological racism. No other interwar ideology or movement accomplished this lethal synthesis, though many subsequently endorsed it for their own purposes (including the initially hesitant Mussolini). Of course, Hitler was not breaking new ground when he invoked an aggressive form of anti-Semitism; the latter had a long autonomous history in most European countries that predated the rise of nationalism. Equally, racism had been an ideology that had gathered momentum since the Enlightenment, fueled by the belief in an alleged European superiority. But Hitler’s movement combined an uncompromising belief in the rebirth of a “pure” national community with a rigid notion of biological “health” and an element of “mission” on behalf of Europe and the whole world. More than any other nationalist/fascist movement, National Socialism saw itself as a revolutionary history-making force that would redo not just Germany but the whole world. In the network of their camps, the National Socialist authorities erected a veritable “industry of death,” a “production line of corpses.” After 1939—and mainly in the 1941–1944 period—Nazi authorities constructed an elaborate network of death camps in the newly occupied eastern territories. These camps soon became the sorting houses of a genocidal campaign against Jews, Sinti/Roma, Slavs, and other groups considered as “unworthy of life” (lebensunwert). This was the moment when ethno-exclusive nationalism, biological racism, and the National Socialist “missionary” tendency came to a horrifying paroxysm. National Socialist racialism may be seen as a projection of internal “cleansing” outwards, on a massive European or worldwide scale. Its roots lay in an obsessive concern N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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with the “health” of the national community (Volksgemeinschaft) and the perceived necessity of eradicating all detrimental racial influences. At this point, science and traditional prejudices came together, feeding off each other. This was also the culmination of a strange atavistic utopia of homogeneity, conceived of and pursued in extreme modern terms. Biological racism provided pseudoscientific legitimacy to cliché prejudices by articulating stereotypes in new terms, by seeking to prove preexisting hypotheses rather than serving an allegedly pure science. When anthropologists, biologists, and medical practitioners engaged with the racialist discourse, they did so overwhelmingly from the viewpoint of a “national” science, partly or fully serving the interests of the state. When German biomedical experts talked of the alleged superiority of the “Aryan race,” they mostly did so in order to give scientific credence to the belief in national superiority; and when they sought to found such claims against the ostensible inferiority of “others,” they turned to traditional stereotypes (e.g., Jews, Sinti/Roma, black peoples, Slavs) in order to draw arbitrary comparisons. The path that led from evolutionary theories, such as Darwinism, or socioeconomic paradigms, such as Malthusianism, to the biological racialism of the 1930s and 1940s passed through aggressive nationalism. Social Darwinism adapted the notion of “survival of the fittest” to the requirements of nationalist antagonisms, first in the colonies and then in Europe. Social Darwinism perceived conflict, war, and violence as natural necessities of each nation’s struggle for survival, while also stipulating pro-natalist measures for the strengthening of the numerical basis of the nation. The Malthusian warning about the emerging disequilibrium between population and resources pointed to two different solutions: either birth-control measures (including restrictions on marriage and procreation as well as sterilization [voluntary or compulsory] in the case of “racially undesirable” or “alien” elements) or acquisition of “living space” (Lebensraum) ideology, whereby the pressure for more resources resulting from pro-natalism would be solved by the appropriation of more usable territory, if need be through war. While Mussolini’s formula “strength in numbers” (il numero come forza) placed almost exclusive emphasis on procreation in order to prepare the nation for its (natural) confrontation with others about resources, National Socialist policy combined pro-natalism (involving “racially valuable” Germans) and anti-natalism (targeting both “aliens”—such as Jews, Slavs, and Sinti/Roma—and “racially unworthy” Germans—such as disabled, “asocials,” and other nonconformist groups) with large-scale Lebensraum expansion, particularly toward the east. Equally, the spreading of the “Aryan” racialist gospel across interwar Europe articulated a sense of national elitism. In Fascist Italy, for example, the previous agnosticism of Mussolini’s regime vis-à-vis biological racism was replaced by a political-scientific agenda that—among other agendas—attempted to prove the “Aryan” origins of the Italian population. Similarly, in Croatia and the Baltic states, a racialist discourse sought to juxtapose a “European” (or even “Aryan”) racial N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nazi racial experts use calipers to measure a man’s facial features in order to determine his “race.” (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

derivation of the indigenous groups against the alleged “eastern” or “Asiatic” characteristics of their opponents (Serbs in Croatia, Russians in the Baltic states). Nationalism underpinned this new discourse in a decisive manner, expressing the most radical and aggressive claims for homogeneity, ethno-exclusivity and nationstatism. And while it is obvious that National Socialist Germany facilitated the expression of such extreme views and policies, their indigenous origins and modality was also evident. Backlash The popularity of nationalism in 19th- and 20th-century Europe was largely dependent on its ability to amalgamate old prejudices and divisions into a new, uniform ideology of inclusion/exclusion. In fact, nationalism attributed historical value and significance to a number of differences and divisions that predated it. Some of them had traditionally been perceived as fundamental and had generated numerous conflicts. Religious clashes among not only Christians and Muslims and Christians and Jews but also among Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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had punctuated the Middle Ages and survived into the modern period. Other differences, however, such as language, culture, or even physical appearance, were given new meaning and importance in the age of nationalism, generating a new awareness of alleged incompatibility where there was coexistence before. Thus, nationalism provided a new basis for inclusion into the community while at the same time more aggressively fostering difference, detecting alleged threats, and building the in-group largely in opposition to other, contestant identities. It also offered a new, powerful “filter” through which to perceive the world, whereby belonging and exclusion, similarity and difference became effectively “nationalized.” From the 19th century onward, nationalism became a mass-mobilizing ideology, seizing the imagination of previously unpoliticized sectors of the population and offering them the opportunity for history-making collective action.

“Nationalized” Prejudice and Stereotypes Anti-Semitism provides one example where old prejudices became “nationalized” and entered the nationalist imagery. For centuries, Jewish communities across Europe had lived under the constant threat of persecution or even pogroms, as second-class subjects or citizens. They had suffered limitations, expulsions, or even random murder. Although liberalism had ushered in a period of legal emancipation, as well as the uncertain promise of a future full integration into European civic societies, nationalism drew new lines of exclusion by presenting the Jews as “nationless” and “stateless,” internationalist and therefore dangerous to their host nation-state. In 1894, France was shaken by the so-called Dreyfus affair, when a Jewish army officer was wrongly accused of stealing national secrets and handing them over to the enemy. Although the accusations proved to be mistaken and Dreyfus was eventually reinstated, the incident divided French society and revealed the extent to which aggressive nationalism and anti-Semitism could mobilize large sections of the population. After the Bolshevik Revolution, nationalist movements seized with anticommunist paranoia openly accused Jews of masterminding the October Revolution as part of a wider international plot to seize control over the world—an idea that had already been articulated since the 1890s with the forged publication of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. During 1918–1919, Hungary and Germany experienced short-lived communist revolutions that fed the prevalent anticommunist hysteria after the Bolshevik seizure of power. The disproportionate participation of Jewish politicians in the movements (Béla Kun in Hungary; Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht in Germany; as well as figures such as Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinovief in the ranks of the Bolsheviks) was used to justify the arbitrary link between Jews and Bolshevism/communist revolution. Therefore, protection of the nation dovetailed with the persecution of internationalist socialism in a way that implicated the Jews and revived traditional notions of anti-Semitism. Laws to restrict Jewish influence on socioeconomic life N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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were implemented immediately after World War I, such as the numerus clausus legislation in Romania and Hungary (legislating a ceiling for Jewish presence in various economic and social activities, such as university enrollment, professional membership, and so forth). These laws became even more aggressive and widespread, however, in the 1930s. Although National Socialist Germany set a powerful precedent by introducing the most wholesale regulation of “Aryan”-Jewish relations, other countries followed a similar path without any Nazi pressure whatsoever. Indigenous anti-Semitic traditions and tendencies—thinly veiled until then —came to the fore, partly emulating the Nazi formula (e.g., restrictions of citizenship, bans on mixed marriages, exclusion from economic and social activities) but giving expression to native political agendas. A similar tendency was observed with regard to Sinti and Roma peoples, scattered for centuries around the continent but still largely committed to a nonsedentary lifestyle. Unlike other ethnic/national minorities, but like the Jews, Sinti/ Roma were regarded as “stateless” communities; but they were unique in both their unconventional approach to life and their lack of interest in acquiring a “national home” (e.g., as in the case of Zionism). Long-standing cultural and racial stereotypes about them had partly been mitigated in the past due to the selfmarginalization of Sinti/Roma communities, whose members usually chose to inhabit the societal fringes and seek minimal contact with the majorities. However, the emergence of a biological racist discourse in the first decades of the 20th century, in conjunction with nationalism’s hostility to any form of internationalism, brought the “Gypsy question” to the fore in many countries. Again, Germany pioneered in the domain of legal persecution: from the turn of the 19th century, there was a powerful movement across the German states to introduce legislation against the so-called Gypsy nuisance, with Bavaria leading the way in 1926 with a special law against the “Gypsy plague.” Other states were more than willing to follow this precedent due to the strength of indigenous prejudices: in the 1920s, Switzerland planned the removal of all “Gypsy” kids from their families and their placement in sedentary foster homes; while in the 1930s and during World War II, a series of states introduced legislation requiring either the expulsion or the confinement of Sinti/Roma communities within their borders. The influence of the German National Socialist precedent should not be discounted, especially since many of these measures were instituted after 1939, under Nazi occupation or in the context of a wartime alliance with Germany. The chronicle, however, of persecution, exclusion, and even pogroms from the medieval times until the 20th century points to a continuity of powerful prejudice that was radicalized under the influence of both aggressive nationalism and biological racism.

Persecution, “Elimination,” Genocide Nationalism developed into an ideology that fetishized inclusion through conformity and overstated the significance of difference. The emergence of the modern N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nation-state derived its legitimacy from the claim over particular groups (bound together by collective cultural, historic, or even allegedly biological ties) and their territories. With the collapse of multiethnic empires in Europe throughout the 19th century, and particularly after World War I, nation-statism became the main form of political, social, and economic organization. The radicalization of both nationalism and ideas of nation-statism resulted in renewed pressure over minorities to either relinquish their difference voluntarily or accept the gospel of uniformity against their will. Thus, nationalism turned its heterophobia (fear of “the other”) into a systematic policy that oscillated between cultural integration, forced assimilation, and, increasingly, persecution. States “nationalized” their citizens through institutions of socialization (such as education) and through symbolic, collective rituals aimed at instilling a sense of collective (imagined) identity. Whether implicitly or explicitly, the expectation was that everyone residing within the jurisdiction of the (nation-)state would respond by adhering voluntarily to the new identity. When this did not happen, voluntarism gave way to systematic, forced assimilationist policies that demanded evidence of compliance and uniformity at the expense of individual or group self-determination. Ironically, it was many new nation-states, created through the post-1918 peace treaties, that proved least amenable to extending protection to their minorities. Post-Versailles Poland subscribed to the League of Nations’ minority treaty only very grudgingly and proved hostile to the cultural rights of its German-speaking minority, withdrawing instruction in the mother tongue. Utopias of national homogeneity (what we may call “ethno-exclusive nationalism”) could not accommodate groups that resisted the gospel of uniformity. The more ethno-exclusive nationalism was becoming in the 19th and 20th centuries, the more the range of solutions to minority problems became restricted and aggressive. In the aftermath of the Turkish-Greek war of 1919–1922, the two states chose the difficult path of population exchange in order to strengthen their individual claim to national homogeneity and forestall future conflicts. Elsewhere, minorities were forced to accept a second-class-citizen status, through discriminatory legislation and/or active persecution. Pogroms were sporadic but violent —instigated, aided, or simply tolerated by state authorities. The utopia of homogeneity passed through the elimination of “the other,” and it was this prospect of elimination that proved horrifyingly open-ended, going far beyond legality or any notion of common morality. The systematic elimination of “the other” had a long history that went back to colonial pursuits and the treatment of indigenous peoples. From the first Spanish conquistador to the German administrators of southeast Africa, colonizers excelled in using violence and murder against whole groups of people who they perceived as dangerous or simply expendable. These instances made a type of violence against groups conceivable in the colonial field and thus opened the way for its deployment in the European context. Arguably the first modern case of physical elimination was the campaign of the Ottoman authorities against the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Armenian communities of Anatolia during 1915–1916. It was World War I that provided the perfect pretext to the new Ottoman government (by then seized by an exclusive form of “Turkish” nationalism) for a radical “solution” to the “Armenian question.” As a result, the authorities organized and executed a systematic campaign of eradicating the Armenian communities from Anatolia. Either directly through murder or indirectly through forced expulsion (during the marches across the inhospitable Anatolian plateau to the “resettlement” camps of Syria, more than half of the people perished before reaching their final destination) a large number of Armenians died (estimates vary from 400,000 to more than a million). It has been alleged that Adolf Hitler mentioned the Armenian genocide in a 1939 conversation (“Who, after all, speaks today of the extermination of the Armenians?”). Whether the quote is accurately reported or not, it was the Nazi regime that embarked on the most “total” genocidal program in history a little over two decades after the plight of the Armenians. A lethal combination of radical nationalist utopias of ethnic homogeneity and biological racialism turned certain minority groups (Jews, Sinti/Roma, Slavs) from unwanted “others” to “threats” to the “health” of the national community (Volk). As a result, Nazi authorities implemented a step-by-step program aimed at banning interactions between “Aryans” and Jews (citizenship and marriage restrictions), removing Jewish influence from the Reich (“Aryanization” of economy and professions; societal marginalization of the Jews), and then removing Jewish physical presence through forced expulsion and “resettlement” eastwards. During the war, the regime embarked upon the expulsion, resettlement, and eventually annihilation of the above groups. From the autumn of 1941, death camps benefiting from modern technology became the sorting houses for the devastatingly effective extermination process. The total figure reached around 5.5 million Jews, 300,000–500,000 Sinti/Roma, 3 million Soviet POWs, and a large number of victims from various categories of “life unworthy of living.” Nationalism and War The Nazi war against the Jews and other alleged forms of “life unworthy of living” was conducted in the context of another campaign, this time about territorial resources and political control. Nation-statism always had an explicit territorial dimension, whether for reasons of acquiring resources, “living space” (Lebensraum), redeeming lands and people that ought to belong to the nation-state (irredentism), geopolitical security, or simply prestige. The escalation of nationalist feeling during the late 19th and early 20th centuries intensified the territorial conflict and caused a series of disputes for control over land. New states were carved out of existing boundaries of larger states or empires, either through diplomatic means (Belgium, Bulgaria, Romania) or through war (Greece). Germany and Italy pursued their national unifications through a combination of negotiations and military force. But it was World War I—and the vacuum that was created in 1918 N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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by the collapse of multinational empires—that whetted the appetite of nationstates for territory. The peace treaties tried unsuccessfully to redraw the map of Europe on the basis of national self-determination, leaving a number of disputes unresolved and creating a plethora of new ones. Defeated nation-states (particularly Germany and Hungary) continued to agitate for “revision” of the borders and for more ample “living space.” When World War II erupted in 1939— predictably using the protection of a minority (German-speaking group in Poland) and the revision of the Versailles border (the Polish Corridor)—nationalist aspirations came to the fore across the continent, causing the most violent and destructive military campaign in history.

Consequences In the aftermath of World War II, people have tried to come to terms with the unprecedented violence and brutality unleashed by the Nazi regime. While some argued that this was the result of an “exceptional” parenthesis in the history of Western (and, indeed, human) civilization, others insisted that the Holocaust was in fact an integral part of the modern world, rooted in the extreme fringes of nationalism and made possible through the spirit of technological innovation. It was in the context of modernity that the possibility of eliminating “the other” became intelligible and desirable, and it was modernity that supplied the necessary infrastructure (communications, planning, effective execution) for the execution of such programs of “total” elimination. This does not mean that nationalism directly causes genocide, but it suggests a path that starts from perceptions of “otherness,” demonization and dehumanization of “the other,” and an impression of deadly “threat” as necessary preconditions for genocide. For all these intermediary steps, nationalism has historically played a crucial, negative role. Its reliance on a “negative” definition of the in-group (us-versus-them), its tendency to place the nation at the heart of every consideration and exclude out-groups, its perpetuation of stereotypes about alien groups, and its populist mobilizing powers proved essential for the execution of every recorded (disputed or not) case of genocide. It is not coincidental that local populations in some European countries eagerly helped the Nazi occupying authorities in exterminating Jews and Sinti/Roma; and it is not a coincidence that the Nazi “death factory” provided the alibi to other state authorities to exterminate their own “others” (e.g., the genocidal campaign of the Independent Croatian State against the Serb minority during 1941–1944). All in all, a perverted, extreme, ethno-exclusive form of nationalism has always been a necessary condition for genocide; necessary but not sufficient per se. This implication of nationalism in the Nazi Holocaust provoked a profound soul-searching in Europe and elsewhere in the postwar period. The refounded N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 was predicated on a “constitutional,” civic form of nationalism, thus burying the ethnic component that had been largely deemed responsible for the atrocities of the 1939–1945 period. This “constitutional nationalism” was intended to be an inclusive, tolerant, and plural basis for the creation of a new German collective identity. At the same time, nationalism was relegated in favor of other considerations in both Western and Eastern Europe: in the former, it gave way to a transnational spirit of cooperation, leading to the establishment of the European Economic Community and later the European Union; in the latter, nationalism was castigated as an evil inherent in the capitalist system and antithetical to the internationalist spirit of socialist solidarity. For four decades after the end of World War II, the world was absorbed in a different kind of confrontation with potentially devastating consequences (Cold War). Extreme bipolarity between East and West nurtured closer ties among the memberstates of each coalition and relegated (perhaps superficially) internal differences, including nationalist tensions. It took the collapse of Eastern communism during 1989–1991 to bring to the fore old divisions—and, with them, the potential for new genocides. The wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s reminded the world that genocide could not be confined in the same historical box as National Socialism. The “era of fascism,” however, did end in 1945. Fascist-like movements did survive the end of World War II (Franco in Spain; Salazar in Portugal), but even in those cases the transition to democracy in the 1970s proved irreversible and remarkably stable. “Neo-fascism”—be that in the form of nostalgic Nazi/Fascist groups or as more respectable, but ideologically hypernationalist and divisive movements/parties in many countries—has remained a fringe phenomenon with unspectacular electoral effects. Nationalism’s capacity, however, for erecting lines of exclusion and constructing “otherness” has not abated, even if the targets of this tendency have changed. Selected Bibliography Bauman, Z. 1993. Modernity and the Holocaust. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. Burleigh, M., and W. Wippermann. 1991. The Racial State. Germany, 1933–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chalk, F., and K. Jonassohn. 1990. History and Sociology of Genocide. Analyses and Case-Studies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Griffin, R. 1993. The Nature of Fascism. New York: Routledge. Hobsbawm, E. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lewy, G. 2001. The Nazi Persecution of the Gypsies. New York: Oxford University Press. Macmaster, N. 2001. Racism in Europe, 1870–2000. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Mussolini, B. 1932. “Doctrine of Fascism.” In The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe, edited and authored by Michael J. Oakeshott, 164–168. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939.


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Nolte, E. 1965. The Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Passmore, K. 2002. Fascism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Payne, S. 1997. A History of Fascism, 1914–1945. London: UCL Press. Smith, A. D. 2001. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Cambridge: Polity Press. Weindling, P. 1993. Health, Race and German Politics between National Unification and Nazism, 1870–1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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Philosophy, National Character, and Nationalism Paul Gilbert Relevance The period from 1880 to 1950 may justly be regarded as the heyday of nationalism. The dissatisfaction of stateless nations and the nationalist fervor of established states led directly to World War I. One of the results was the creation of many new supposed nation-states. Another was a deep wound to the national pride of Germany, which motivated the actions that precipitated World War II. In this it was joined by Italy and, later, Japan, again for nationalist reasons. What, we may ask, created the mindset that could make such horrors seem natural and justified? Its origins lie a century or so before the beginning of our period in the thinking of German Romantic philosophers. They developed the idea that people are naturally divided up into separate nations and that the boundaries of states should reflect this fact. Throughout the 19th century, this idea spread and became the accepted wisdom. Even liberal philosophers like John Stuart Mill embraced it, assuming that, given the freedom to choose, people would naturally prefer political association with fellow members of the same nation. Yet, as the period progressed, nationalism took on an increasingly authoritarian slant, as what people are—as decided by their leaders—assumed a greater importance than what they want. But what is it about what people are that makes them members of a particular nation? On the face of it, the nationalists of different nations suggest different answers to suit their political purposes. For some, nations are supposedly founded on a common language, some on a shared religion, others on attachment to a homeland or to a history, and so forth. As we shall see, however, one of the achievements of philosophical defenders of nationalism in our period was to bring apparent unity to this diversity by returning a single answer. And on this answer, they sought to ground nationalist claims to separate statehood. Toward the end of the period, this answer became discredited, as did the whole nationalist project of making states coincide with nations. What, then, is the answer that nationalists gave to the question, what makes people members of a nation? “An actual nation consists,” writes the philosopher Henry Sidgwick in 1891, “of persons of whom the predominant number have . . . a certain vaguely defined complex of particular characteristics which we call the ‘national character’ of Englishmen, Frenchmen, etc.” (Sidgwick 1891, 11). It is this notion of national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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PHILOSOPHY, NATIONAL CHARACTER, AND NATIONALISM

character that is such a pervasive feature of nationalism in the latter part of the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries. It is shared national character that distinguishes one nation from another, although, as we shall see, this apparently uniform criterion of nationhood is deceptive. Yet the notion plays a number of key roles in nationalist ideologies of the period, as they apply both to established states and to peoples seeking national secession or reunification. Nationalism may be taken to be the belief that there are groups of people— “nations”—united in such a way that they possess a right of shared statehood, other things being equal. The problem for nationalists is to specify what this uniting feature is and why it generates this right. Notoriously, a wide range of answers have been given to this question, leading to difficulties for theorists in providing a single account of what a nation is. The French thinker Ernest Renan’s celebrated paper “What Is a Nation?” which was written at the beginning of the period, runs through a range of suggested criteria. Race, language, religion, common interests, and geography are all considered as what distinguishes one nation from another. Renan dismisses them all as either unnecessary or insufficient for nationhood. His own account is, famously, that “the existence of a nation is . . . a daily plebiscite,” expressing a people’s continued common will to live together. On the face of it, this represents a different movement of thought from that which postulates a shared national character. But this is potentially misleading. For, although Renan explains the common will that generates a right to statehood as deriving from the recognition of a shared history, he glosses it thus: “The Spartan song ‘We are what ye were, and we should be what ye are,’ is, in its simplicity, the abridged version of every national anthem” (Renan 1939, 203). One way of making this identification with past members of the nation is through the invocation of a shared national character, as manifest, for example, in the heroic figures of national history. This, then, is the first role of national character: to persuade those for whom a common national identity is claimed to identify with other members of the nation, past and present. They recognize themselves in the glowing descriptions of the character or aspire to so recognize themselves. Conversely, however, members of the nation distance themselves from the character traits that they ascribe to members of other nations, which are commonly represented in uncomplimentary terms. Recognition of a common character thus binds people into a nation and separates them from the members of other nations. The second role of national character is to provide a ground for loyalty and partiality toward other members of the nation. A possible ground for national partiality is that one’s fellow members possess valuable character traits, and particularly, that they are pursuing values one shares with oneself; therefore, by giving them support, one is furthering those values and expressing the associated character traits of oneself. By contrast, members of other nations lacking these traits and values are relatively undeserving. While this line of argument is of dubious cogency, it does account for much nationalist thinking, especially if comN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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bined with a view of a nation’s mission and of the particular fittingness of its members to fulfill it in virtue of their national character. This is a combination of the views that were common during the period and that we shall explore shortly. The third role of national character is to provide a justification for the right to statehood. This may be because those who are loyal to each other will more readily undertake the obligations of shared citizenship. Or more directly, it may be that those with a common character are apt for shared government in a way that those with divergent temperaments are not. The kind of laws that suit people who want a quiet life, for example, would be different from those that are appropriate for people of a more noisy and excitable disposition. Or, again, it may be because, if character is seen to involve the pursuit of particular values, and one has a right to live one’s life in accordance with one’s own values, then this may only be possible if one can utilize the political organization of a state to advance those values. Yet an appeal to national character offers a justification of the right to statehood that is preferable to the grounds for it—race, language, religion, and so on— which Renan considers and rejects. For the difficulty with these is that they generate different and conflicting claims. The common language criterion that shaped Yugoslavia, for example, was always under challenge by the mainly religious criteria that separate Croats and Serbs. But if a claim to statehood is to carry conviction, it must employ the same criterion as is used by others. Shared national character purports to provide a common yardstick for identifying nations and acknowledging their political rights.

Origins The idea that different peoples have different characters was a commonplace among the Greeks. Plato notes that people are influenced by the climatic conditions in which they live, and Aristotle follows this explanation of their differences by crediting European nations that live in cold regions with spirit but a relative lack of skill and intellect, whereas the reverse is true of Asian nations. This leads to the former being free but lacking political cohesion, while the latter live under tyrants. And there are differences in the relative intellect and courage of the different Greek nations. Assumptions such as these passed naturally into modern thought through philosophers like Montesquieu, who accounts for the English love of liberty by the vicissitudes of the English climate—a style of explanation that recurs in the founder of nationalist thought, Johann Gottfried von Herder, who uses it to show that what distinguishes peoples is what relates them to their particular territories. But why, we may ask, should the idea that the people of different places have different characters lead to the notion that there are distinct national characters —lead, that is, to the view that these differences of character follow national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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lines? A sociohistorical explanation can no doubt be offered in terms of the need, from the latter part of the 19th century onward, to mobilize mass support for nation-states or for national movements, and we have seen how an appeal to national character might achieve this. But a justification for the appeal will require us to consider, in the next section, what accounts of the formation of national character might be offered. Meanwhile, we need to look at two more general philosophical considerations affecting the invocation of character as individuating nations. The first is, of course, the doctrine, enunciated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau, that a state is legitimate if and only if its people are sovereign (i.e., the supreme authority) within it. This leads immediately to the question, “Who are the people?” If our interest in asking it is to arrive at a system of legitimate states, then there are two rather different ways of addressing it. One is to see, with Renan, what groups of people share a common will to live together. This yields what we can call the subjectivist answer, which exploits the current of modern thought in which human beings are represented as essentially rational calculators, able to determine how to achieve happiness individually and collectively. The other way exploits a different current, which is to see peoples as sharing certain human needs but who differ naturally or culturally. This objectivist approach identifies the peoples whose sovereignty would legitimize states as categories picked out by differences that make them apt for separate statehood. Here, the anthropological observations that accompanied late 19th-century colonialism, as well as the study of European folk cultures, which differ more than the cultures of elites, exercised an influence. Indeed, in the subjectivist approach, such observations were used to justify imperialism on the grounds that colonized peoples lacked the psychological attributes required for exercising sovereignty, whereas in the objectivist approach, they served to challenge existing empires by discerning cultural differences between ordinary people who were then recruited to independence movements. In the earlier 19th century, the subjectivist approach was dominant, in the latter part, the objectivist takes over. But the notion of national character is able, to some extent, to span the two. The reason for this is that, in the philosophical psychology of the time, character is seen as the seat of the will. Character, claims the psychologist William McDougall in 1913, can be defined as that from which the will proceeds. Thus, from an objectivist view, national character can be seen as that which gives rise to a common will, particularly if, according to McDougall, an attraction of like to like is postulated as underlying ethical and political groupings. Conversely, from a subjectivist view, a common national character can be attributed to a coincidence of wills, since this must indicate a sharing of the values that are the determinants of character. The emphasis on character, therefore, allows apparent theoretical differences about who a sovereign people might be to be obscured by postulating a correspondence between national will and national character traits. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The second philosophical consideration that explains the invocation of character is its importance in the ethics of the period. The popular influence of the notion of character, not only in Victorian Britain, may be gauged by the fact that Samuel Smiles’s Character, published in 1871, was reprinted no less than 27 times before the turn of the century and continued in circulation well into the middle of the next. “The same qualities which determine the character of individuals,” he remarks, “also determine the character of nations” (Smiles 1939, 32), so character building evidently has a national benefit. However, there are at least two distinct philosophical reasons why one might emphasize the importance of character. Throughout the late 19th and earlier 20th centuries, utilitarianism remained an important theory of ethics. Utilitarianism is the doctrine that something’s moral worth is measured by the amount of happiness it brings. But utilitarianism seems to run counter to common sense and to render the making of moral judgments inordinately difficult. The 19th-century resolution of these problems by philosophers like Henry Sidgwick was to regard the character traits commonly seen as valuable as those that generally lead to the actions that produce the greatest happiness; therefore, those who display them simply follow their virtuous dispositions in deciding how to act. There was, however, another distinct but influential theory of philosophical ethics that measured the goodness of an act by its virtuous motives, and thus its displaying an admirable character, not by its consequences. F. H. Bradley, for example, was an idealist, in the sense that he held reality to be ultimately spiritual rather than material. Bradley’s idealist ethics hold that man’s ultimate end is selfrealization, but that the self to be realized is principally that of the social organism to which someone belongs, since “he is what he is, in brief, so far as he is what others also are” (Bradley 1927, 167). Thus, insofar as he acts in accordance with his community’s moral self, he tends to act well, since this will express the sort of unity that constitutes a man’s character, rather than acting from disorganized instincts. Bradley admits that one may have to look beyond one’s own community, which may be to some extent corrupt; yet it is evident how this view of ethics naturally allies itself with the doctrine of national character as that to which one should aspire to conform.

Dimensions Different nationalisms, we noticed earlier, depend on different criteria for what they take to be their nation—race, religion, language, and so forth. The way these different criteria connect with an apparently uniform conception of national character is by providing different accounts of its formation. One is not, of course, obliged to refer to only one causal factor. Reflecting on national character in his book in 1927, the political philosopher and historian Ernest Barker lists three N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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“material factors”—race, geography, and economy—and four “spiritual factors”— politics, religion, language, and education—seeing all of them as contributing to shaping it. But Barker does not appreciate the political point of seizing upon a single criterion, or a small set of them, namely, that it is this and this only that applies to the group for whom a right to statehood is claimed. For example, the Belgians largely share a religion, Catholicism, while speaking two languages. The Germans, by contrast, share a language but differ in religion. In these circumstances, only one criterion will form a country’s national character, which will be forced upon the group’s nationalists, as will the appropriate philosophical underpinnings. It would be an oversimplification to regard the late 19th and earlier 20th centuries as a battleground between materialist and idealist metaphysics, and even more so to see Barker’s material and spiritual factors captured by the former and the latter, respectively. Nonetheless, it is worth bearing this crude picture in mind when considering what follows. For we shall go on to look at various philosophical frameworks to see what accounts they can offer for national character, and we shall notice to what nationalisms, and hence to what purportedly national groups, they are congenial or not, as the case may be. It is impossible here to do more, however, than to provide a few examples of the philosophical lines of thought that influenced the way particular nationalists conceptualized their national groups in terms of the formation of their national characters. During this period, one influential strand of materialist philosophy was Social Darwinism, though the English thinker Herbert Spencer, who may be considered its most influential exponent, had set out his principle of evolution, by which only the fittest survive, prior to Charles Darwin and with none of Darwin’s scientific method. But Spencer also believed that people came together in a social organism that is grown rather than made and, thus, needs to be left to its own devices to flourish or to perish. Spencer’s ideas were carried forward in Benjamin Kidd’s Social Evolution of 1894, which explicitly presents rivalry between individuals, societies, nations, and races as the mechanism whereby the fittest in each category come to the fore. This sort of thinking sees character—individual, national, or racial—as operative, with the impulsiveness of “Bushmen,” according to Spencer, unfitting them for the social union through which progress is possible. Karl Pearson’s National Life and Character, appearing in the same year as Kidd’s book, advocates war with “inferior races” and competition with “equal” ones for economic advantage. Social Darwinism regards national character as largely an inherited characteristic, shaped in a rivalrous struggle for existence. Its maintenance and improvement therefore depends principally upon eugenic methods and the vanquishing of opponents. The latter militarist conclusion was exposed by Norman Angell’s 1909 volume The Great Illusion, since, he argues, it is the fittest who go to war and they perish rather than survive. The former strategy was generally seen as one of preserving racial purity, although Spencer himself believed that mixing similar N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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stocks will derive the evolved advantages of both. While this sort of eugenic thinking affected most Western countries during the period, each advertising their own national characters as best fitted for survival, it was notoriously in German nationalism and Nazi supranational racism that its most baneful effects were encountered. Germany had long had a racist tradition of thinking about its national character, originating in the 15th-century discovery of the Roman writer Tacitus’s Germania and its portrayal of Germans as morally admirable because they are racially pure. Despite his insistence that the will shaped individual character, the 18th-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant had a physiological view of temperament as manifest in inherited national and racial characters. Kant compares these characters on an evaluative scale, the Germans coming out best, unlike Herder who sees the Germans simply as best fitted to their different conditions. Kant’s successor Fichte, however, also sees the Germans as a superior people, though there is a crucial twist in his argument as to why they are. Certainly they are a racially pure people, but what accounts for their moral superiority is that, unlike other Teutonic peoples, they continue to speak their original uncontaminated language, which becomes the criterion of German national identity. This enables them to understand the thoughts it expresses in a way that speakers of languages that are introduced or have introduced elements cannot. Yet, as Elie Kedourie observes, “there is no clear-cut distinction between linguistic and racial nationalism . . . a nation’s language was peculiar to that nation only because such a nation constituted a racial stock distinct from other nations” (Kedourie 1960, 71), and he goes on to cite the French Fascist Charles Maurras as holding that Jews were unable to understand French as Frenchmen proper can. One cannot, therefore, become a member of a nation by learning its language. It was in this racialized form that linguistic nationalism percolated through Europe and could thus be combined with elements of Social Darwinism. The most notorious example, in our period, of a philosopher embracing racist nationalism is Martin Heidegger, whose inaugural address as rector of Freiburg University in 1933 borrows themes from Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation a century and a quarter earlier. Like Fichte, Heidegger sees himself as speaking at a moment of crisis in which the German people are under threat, while at the same time their position as an original people at the center of Europe gives them a special mission. It is a mission they are uniquely able to discharge because of the peculiar properties of their language. For the German language is, Heidegger claims, especially fitted for the original metaphysical thinking required to resolve the crisis by providing a ground for the new German political order. This grounding is achieved through a fundamental questioning of received assumptions, rather than by a restatement of established values. As a starting point, Heidegger urges a return to the pre-Socratics, particularly Heraclitus, whose dark saying that everything comes about through conflict provides a justification for similar attitudes to Social Darwinism (which, as a philosophical system, Heidegger would N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Martin Heidegger, like Fichte, saw the Germans as a people of a special kind with a special mission. This, notoriously, led him to support Hitler. (Bettmann/Corbis)

have rejected). Although Heidegger’s political ideas had little influence on nationalism, the difficulty is to divine whether features of his more general philosophical system might conduce to acceptance of it or of other objectionable forms of identity politics. The same question can be raised about the idealism that originates in the work of Hegel, another of Kant’s successors, and which continued to exercise an influence in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In fact, in 1945, Karl Popper credits Hegel—probably unfairly—with fathering the “new tribalism” that German nationalism expressed. Yet certainly a Hegelian philosophy of history sees world events as the unfolding of Spirit, and individual nations, through their members’ national characters, as playing a part in this development. This leads directly to a conception of national mission that is potentially dangerous, particularly when allied to Hegel’s doctrine that war preserves the ethical health of a nation. Ideas like these were taken up during our period, and they present a picture of the formation of national character little different from, though even more mysterious than, that of Social Darwinism. But are there not more benign forms of idealism that dispense with the worst of these ideas? Bernard Bosanquet’s idealist work, The Philosophical Theory of the State, exerted considerable influence in Britain. In his introduction to a third edition in 1919 he writes: “‘England’ has always meant the cause of humanity; so has every nation, so far as it saw and fought for a true good. All saw the good differently . . . but all saw some of it . . . and knew darkly that they were there to see it and to champion it” (Bosanquet 2001, 44). Here, a more benevolent construction is put upon the idea of a national mission, a word Bosanquet hesitates to use because it N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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is “too narrow and too aggressive” (Bosanquet 2001, 283). The differences of national character implied in the different missions arise, he thinks, from different experiences and rule out cosmopolitan government (i.e., covering the whole world) for the immediate future. Yet these differences of character are seen, in idealist terms, as reflecting the distinctive Sittlichkeit, or social ethics, of each nation. This is to accord national character a significance it would lack were it to be formed by mere imitation. Bosanquet, therefore, takes issue with this reductive theory, which, we might notice, was taken up by both McDougall and Barker— the latter mentioning the imitation of great men (like Cromwell for the English!) as a feature of national character formation. Bosanquet’s stress on national experiences, however, finds its best expression in the Austrian social philosopher Otto Bauer. Heavily influenced by Marxism, he is not an idealist, but he also rejects an economic materialist view of history, seeing individual consciousness as the unit of social explanation. Bauer was writing in the context of nationalist struggles within the Austrian empire, and he immediately grants significant differences between nations, readily detectable in terms of their national characters, with different ways of thinking and feeling. However, he regards national character not as a causal factor but as marking a type of regularity in acting. Its explanation is neither metaphysical, as an expression of Volksgeist, or national spirit, nor racial. Rather, it reflects the common direction of people’s wills, resulting from their shared historical experiences, so that “a nation can thus be defined as a community of character that grows out of a community of destiny” (Bauer 1996, 52). It is easy to see the greater appeal of this account for subject peoples conducting campaigns of national secession or reunification than of confident stories of national missions. It concedes the possibility of changes in character and places emphasis on the role of the will, though Bauer opposes his basically cultural criterion of nationhood to Renan’s, which, unlike Bauer’s account, requires a national consciousness. National consciousness, Bauer believes, is a secondary phenomenon that develops only when a national group is brought into contact, possibly confrontationally, with other groups. Prior to that, its unity is unreflective. However, Bauer is not, even in our nonpejorative sense, a nationalist, believing that each person’s national identity can be accommodated by the granting of cultural rights within a multinational state, and not justifying separate statehood.

Consequences Up until World War I, most English liberals had been, in our sense, nationalists, conceding nations a right to statehood from the value of freedom, and thus deriving their right to a state from a general right of freedom of association. They assumed that national independence is what groups with distinct national characters N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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would prefer—although practical problems in implementing this liberal program were acknowledged. After the war, however, disillusion set in as a result of the difficulties of redrawing the map of Europe and the widespread unrest and imposition of authoritarian regimes that this occasioned. The attempt to marry a shared political will to cultural distinctiveness in the way that the theory of national character presupposed, and to draw organizational conclusions from it, began to seem unworkable. One casualty was the theory of national character itself. Despite defenses like Barker’s, it came increasingly under attack as a usable criterion of national identity, and it is interesting to see how some political theorists of the day, now largely forgotten, criticized the idea and its political application. One line of criticism was that differences in national character are no more marked than the differences between members of subnational groups, and they are, at best, typical, not a criterion of membership of the nation. They are, furthermore, stereotypes that can be politically manipulated, according to the state of international relations. This last point concerning the malleability of national stereotypes is rather different from another criticism, which sees national character itself changing quite suddenly in response to circumstances. Here, the replacement of German respect for science and learning by the irrationality of Nazism was cited. Such changeable characters could not be the bases of political organization. One influential thinker, A. D. Lindsay, adopted a quite different criterion of what he terms nationality in the political sense: “It is a sentiment, a readiness to act together, a feeling that the organization of government of this area is the common job, something that matters to all” (Lindsay 1943, 163). There is more than a hint of the idea of a national mission here, but it is deliberately separated from any idea of a distinctive national culture and its effect on national character, as these are linked by Bosanquet. Lindsay identifies a nonpolitical sense of nationality as the consciousness of a common culture, which, by contrast with the position in western Europe, preceded shared political institutions in central and eastern Europe. But, he maintains, these nonpolitical nationalities do not have boundaries appropriate to those of modern states, and they look to the past in deciding upon their political associations, not to “the common job” that needs to be done in the future. Nationalism on this basis is unacceptably emotional. Other thinkers went further than Lindsay, denying any principle of a national right to statehood as ethically unacceptable and looking forward to the development of an international community. Yet, even as they wrote, this sort of liberal internationalism itself came under attack as World War II loomed. The quasi-Marxist political thinker E. H. Carr branded it “utopianism” and advocated a more clear-sighted “realism” about power relations and conflicts of interest. He too, though, condemns “the nineteenth century supposition that nation and state should normally coincide” (Carr 1942, 62) and its concomitant equation between the principle of self-determination and the principle of nationality. The right of self-determination, he suggests, is a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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right of individuals to determine their units of political organization in accordance with their socioeconomic interests so that these units change and attract shifting loyalties as conditions change. Carr would no doubt have regarded talk of national character, which seems to stand in the way of this, as a fiction serving the interests of those who benefit from national states. In educated circles, talk of national character did not survive World War II, though it continues to fuel popular fantasies and antagonisms. The reasons for its decline are multifarious. The observed volatility of national characteristics and allegiances and their susceptibility to political manipulation played a part, as did a greater awareness of regional and supranational affiliations. In modern conditions, the kind of cultural homogeneity on which talk of national character was predicated could no longer be assured and individual variations of lifestyle were seen to reflect divergent values. This last point reflected a growing liberal belief that the ethical role of the state, even the nation-state, was limited, allowing maximum scope for the personal choice of values. A philosophical reaction to this position set in, however, which corresponded to a resurgence in nationalism following the end of the Cold War. So-called communitarian thinkers emphasized once more the embeddedness of the individual in a social setting from whose communal practices his or her values derive. This led to a concern about, what came to be known as, cultural identity and the need, sometimes, for separate states to protect it. But national character and cultural identity may be less different than meets the eye, with many of the same questions about what constitutes the former recurring about the latter. Indeed, the notion that nations are culturally shaped has led to a revival of liberal nationalism. Selected Bibliography Barker, E. 1927. National Character and the Factors in its Formation. London: Methuen. Bauer, O. 1996. “The Nation.” In Mapping the Nation, edited by G. Balakrishnan, 39–77. London: Verso. Bosanquet, B. 2001. The Philosophical Theory of the State and Related Essays. South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press. Bradley, F. H. 1927. Ethical Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carr, E. H. 1942. Conditions of Peace. London: Macmillan. Heidegger, M. 1990. “The Self-Assertion of the German University.” In Martin Heidegger and National Socialism, edited by G. Neske and E. Kettering, 5–13. New York: Paragon House. Kedourie, E. 1960. Nationalism. London: Hutchinson. Lindsay, A. D. 1943. The Modern Democratic State. London: Oxford University Press. McDougall, W. 1913. An Introduction to Social Psychology. London: Methuen. Popper, K. 1945. The Open Society and Its Enemies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Renan, E. 1939. “What Is a Nation?” In Modern Political Doctrines, edited by A. Zimmern, 186–205. London: Oxford University Press. Sidgwick, H. 1891. The Elements of Politics. London: Macmillan. Smiles, S. 1939. Character. London: John Murray.


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Austria Lonnie R. Johnson Chronology 1918 (January) U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” state that the “peoples of Austria-Hungary . . . should be accorded the freest opportunity to autonomous development” to pave the way for the subsequent dismemberment of Austria-Hungary at the end of World War I. (November 12) A provisional government for the “Republic of German-Austria” is proclaimed in Vienna, which expressly states its intention to enter a union (Anschluss) with a democratic German state. 1919 Victorious Entente powers forbid the Anschluss of Austria with Germany in the Treaty of Versailles with Germany (June) and reiterate it in the Treaty of St. Germain with Austria (September). 1920 (October) The Constitution of the Republic of Austria (“First Republic”) is enacted. 1934 (February) A three-day “civil war” between the conservative and right-wing forces and social democrats leads to the final demise of democracy in Austria and the consolidation of an authoritarian, one-party regime: the “Fatherland Front.” (July) An unsuccessful putsch is attempted by Austrian Nazis; conservative leader Engelbert Dollfuss is assassinated. 1938 (March) The occupation of Austria by Nazi Germany goes militarily unopposed; Austria is incorporated into the Third Reich. 1943 (November) The Allied “Moscow Declaration” declares the Anschluss “null and void” and formulates the “reestablishment of a free and independent Austria” as a war objective. 1945 (April 27) The provisional government in Vienna declares Austrian independence; the “Second Republic” is established. 1955 (May 15) Allies conclude the Austrian State Treaty in Vienna, which paves the way for the Allied evacuation of Austria and Austria’s declaration of permanent neutrality (October 26). 1989 (July) The Austrian government solicits negotiations with European Economic Community authorities in Brussels that conclude with Austrian accession to the European Union on January 1, 1995.

Situating the Nation Before 1918, “Austria” was not a territorial or political reference to an entity coextensive with the small state established after World War I, but a malleable political, territorial, and dynastic concept that has referred to a wide variety of polities in the past millennium. The first documented use of the term Austria (in Old German, Ostarrichi, in contemporary German, Österreich) dates back to 996 and was a territorial reference to part of the contemporary Austrian province of Lower Austria. The history of the concept of Austria is associated with two dynasties: the Babenbergs, who were appointed margraves of Austria in 976 and ruled until 1246, and the Habsburgs, who ruled from 1278 until 1918. Under the Babenbergs, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Austria was roughly coextensive with the contemporary provinces of Upper Austria and Lower Austria in the Danube Valley. After 1278, the term “Austria” became associated with the Habsburg dynasty (“House of Austria”). By the late Middle Ages, the Habsburgs’ holdings included the medieval forerunners of seven of Austria’s nine contemporary provinces. Although Habsburg Austria was more or less coextensive with contemporary Austria, it also included considerable territories in contemporary Slovenia, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland, too. After 1477, dynastic intermarriage and Habsburg diplomacy provided the basis for the evolution of an Austrian empire. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Habsburg’s dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary was a far-flung, ethnically diverse, religiously heterodox domain of some 52 million inhabitants and included territories of the contemporary Czech Republic, southern Poland, Slovakia, western Ukraine, Hungary, Transylvania in Romania, northern Serbia, BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and provinces of northern Italy. Although Austria is an age-old name and refers to an age-old polity, it is important to recognize that at no point in its long history did “Austria” as a political or constitutional unit correspond to the frontiers of the Austrian state established in 1918. Furthermore, Austria was not a national concept before 1918. Due to its association with the Habsburg dynasty, it had imperial and multinational connotations. Finally, there was no “national program” for Austria in the 19th century: no widespread sentiment among German-speaking Austrians in the Habsburg empire that there was an autochthonous Austrian nation or that German-speaking Austrians should express their political self-determination by establishing a small, independent state. Therefore, although many of the component parts of the contemporary Austrian national narrative are age-old, the Austrian nation is a recent phenomenon.

Instituting the Nation The Republic of Austria emerged from empires in the wakes of world wars twice in the 20th century. When the Habsburg’s dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary began to deteriorate at the end of World War I, German-speaking representatives of the Austrian imperial parliament (Reichsrat) proclaimed a republic, initially called German-Austria, in Vienna on November 12, 1918. However, Austria effectively ceased to exist as an independent state in March 1938 when it was occupied by Nazi Germany and incorporated into the Third Reich. Representatives of Austria’s interwar political parties proclaimed the so-called Second Republic in Vienna on April 27, 1945, during the closing days of World War II and harkened back to the territorial and constitutional precedent of the independent First Republic. During the postwar period, reestablished Austria was divided into four zones and occupied by the Allies until the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955 provided for their evacuation and full Austrian sovereignty. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Karl Renner (1870–1950) Karl Renner was one of the leading representatives of the pragmatic wing of the Austrian Social Democratic Labor Party for over five decades. He served as a member of the Imperial Parliament before World War I, where he promoted the idea of a federal reorganization of the Habsburg’s holdings. He was instrumental in the political and constitutional establishment of a provisional Austrian government in 1918. He led the Austrian delegation responsible for negotiating the Treaty of St. Germain in 1919 and advocated an Anschluss, which was orthodox social democratic policy at the time. He served subsequently as a social democratic member of Parliament in the 1930s, was briefly interned in 1934, and stated his support for the Anschluss in principle in 1938 (as a justification of the historical record) without otherwise advocating Nazi policies. In 1945, he was once again instrumental in establishing a provisional Austrian government and served as its first chancellor. He was elected president of Austria, a predominantly symbolic position, in 1945 and died in office in 1950.

There are a striking number of parallels between the establishment of the Republic of Austria in 1918 and the reestablishment thereof in 1945. In both cases, Austrian independence was preceded by war and the collapse of empires, and achieving independence entailed the dissociation of a small state from an empire under circumstances that were characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. Representatives of political parties from antecedent Austrian states proclaimed Austrian independence, and Dr. Karl Renner (1870–1950), a social democratic politician, was instrumental in the establishment of both provisional governments. Finally, the victorious powers substantially dictated the scope and conditions for Austrian sovereignty after 1918 and after 1945.

Defining the Nation The issues of Austrian national autonomy, the relationship of an Austrian nation to the German nation, and the relationships of Austrian states to German states have been recurrent core-identity issues laden with problems for Austrians. This task of defining the Austrian nation is exacerbated by the fact that the assumption that Austrians were part of one German nation was widespread in the 19th and the first half of the 20th centuries, in the Habsburg empire as well as in the First Republic. Although German is a pluricentric language, a linguistic justification for a distinct Austrian nation is exceptionally difficult insofar as Austrians speak German. In terms of 19th-century linguistic and cultural nationalism, Germanspeaking Austrians considered themselves “Germans,” and educated Austrians and Germans shared an educational and cultural canon to a great extent that was circumscribed as “German science and culture” (deutsche Wissenschaft und Kultur). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Although Austrian culture was characterized by its own set of autochthonous developments, styles, and sensibilities, including the emergence of a specifically Austrian literature, the widespread tendency in the 19th century was to view Austrian culture as a regional manifestation of one German culture instead of an autonomous expression of a distinct Austrian nation. Within the context of the Habsburg’s multinational empire, German-speaking Austrians defined themselves linguistically and culturally as “Germans.” Furthermore, they also identified themselves ideally with a larger German-speaking “linguistic and cultural community” (Sprach- und Kulturgemeinschaft) that was associated in historical and political terms with the “German nation”: the Holy Roman Nation of the German empire that existed as a loose confederation of German states from the early Middle Ages until its dissolution in 1806, with the Habsburgs almost continuously serving as emperors from 1493 onward. Austrians also ethnically identified themselves as part of the German people (Volk)— one people that was subdivided into subgroups anachronistically called “tribes” (Stämme). There were a number of different sets of “national problems” in central Europe during the 19th century. The rise of liberalism and nationalism—or the propagation of the concepts of popular sovereignty and national self-determination— created the “German problem” of how to create one large unified national state N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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out of a series of disaggregate smaller ones. These trends simultaneously aggravated the “nationalities problem” within the Habsburg empire of how to accommodate the increasing demands of various subject peoples for more national autonomy and political equality. The position of German-speaking Austria must be seen in terms of this national double bind. Historically, the Austrian political spectrum has been divided into three “camps”—social democratic, Catholic conservative, and German national-liberal —and pan-Germanism was present to varying degrees in all three political traditions. The premises of 19th- and 20th-century pan-German nationalism and liberalism prescribed that all Germans should be unified in one democratic state. Viewed in these terms, German-speaking Austria was an anomaly both before the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary in 1918 and thereafter. Before 1918, “Germans” in Austria lived in a multinational state that could not (or did not) participate in the process of German national unification. As subjects of the Habsburgs, German-Austrians were excluded from participating in the process of the unification of Germany as a national state under Prussian hegemony in 1871, when Germany became an empire in its own right. After 1918, the predominantly German-speaking inhabitants of the Republic of Austria were not enthused about the prospects of independence and felt that their national interests would be best served by some form of union (Anschluss) with Germany. If the desires of the Habsburgs’ individual subject peoples to exercise national self-determination were the centrifugal forces that ultimately tore Austria-Hungary apart at the end of World War I, German-Austrians represented an exception because they had literally no tradition of seeking national independence for the German-speaking territories of the Habsburg empire. On November 12, 1918, the day after the signing of the armistice that ended World War I, the representatives of the provisional national assembly of German-Austria proclaimed the establishment of the democratic republic of German-Austria (Deutsch-Österreich) and declared an Anschluss with Germany. German-Austria was to be a component of the democratic German state that also was in the process of constituting itself. Two points are particularly noteworthy here. The founders of modern Austria initially called it German-Austria to distinguish it from “old” Austria, which had imperial and multinational connotations, and they saw their political mandate in the same terms as the representatives of the other so-called successor states, such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia, that were in the process of carving themselves out of the Habsburg realms. German-Austrians also justified their political agenda by appealing to the omnipresent postwar principle of national selfdetermination. The assumption of German-Austrian democrats of all political persuasions at that time was that the unification of all Germans into one state, which had been prevented by the dynastic competition of the Habsburgs with the Hohenzollerns in the 19th century under the conditions of imperial politics, would be possible under the conditions of post–World War I democracy and the “deimperialization” or “decolonization” of the Habsburg empire. The GermanN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Austrians saw the end of the war and the collapse of the empire as a political opportunity to exercise the same kind of national self-determination the other subject peoples of the Habsburg were realizing, too: the unification of all Germans in one democratic state. However, in the course of the postwar treaties concluded in Paris, the victorious powers forbade the unification of Austria with Germany in the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain. Furthermore, they informed the German-Austrian delegation present that the name of the state they represented was to be “Austria,” with no hyphenated national reference to being “German.” The Republic of Austria retained its national sovereignty against the expressed will of its political elites. It was—to use a phrase coined by the Austrian journalist Helmut Andic— “a state no one wanted.” Psychologically, the idea of a postwar Austro-German Anschluss was ultimately an asymmetrical concern: an issue of more importance for those Austrians who felt that they were being excluded from participating in a democratic union they considered absolutely vital, than for most Germans, who had grown accustomed to living in one state without Austrians and did not experience the victorious powers’ fiat prohibiting an Anschluss as a loss to the same extent. However, the Anschluss was an obsession of Adolf Hitler, and it became an integral part of Nazi imperial pan-Germanism: ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer. The so-called First Republic of Austria got off to a bad start, faltered, and failed. There was no tradition of its populace striving for “national independence.” It was not a coherent economic unit, and there were widespread doubts about its economic viability, initially aggravated by postwar inflation and later by the economic downturn that accompanied the Depression. Furthermore, its domestic political culture was characterized by a high degree of polarization and confrontation between Austro-Marxists and social democrats on the left and Roman Catholic conservatives and corporatists on the right, augmented by communists, Austro-fascists, and National Socialists at the respective extremes of the political spectrum. There was no overriding commitment of all political parties in interwar Austria to the idea of a democratic and sovereign Austrian state, the kind of which could have contained domestic political confrontation. On the contrary, various brands of ideological fervor treated Austrian democracy, Austrian independence, or both as expendable items. The tenor of political rhetoric was militant. Armed paramilitary organizations of the major political parties postured antagonistically and clashed periodically. Austrian democracy failed in 1934 when Roman Catholic conservatives, corporatists, and Austro-fascists collaborated to ban the communist and Nazi parties in Austria and then, after instigating a three-day “civil war” in February, suspended the Social Democratic Party and all of its suborganizations. This coalition of conservative and right-wing forces—designated as “authoritarian” by some historians but deemed to be “fascist” or “Austro-fascist” by others—created a oneparty regime (the “Fatherland Front”) and an authoritarian state (which defined N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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itself as “Christian Corporate”). However, neither this party nor this state was as popular or as successful as the Italian fascist or German national socialist models they emulated. Nonetheless, this regime was noteworthy in terms of its “national ideology.” It vigorously affirmed the unity of Christian and German (read “Austrian” here) culture and posited the idea of Austrian political independence from Germany based on a distinct Austrian historical mission and a distinct Austrian nation. These ideas were in conscious opposition to the atheism and pan-Germanism of Nazi ideology. However, they met with little popular support not only because of the strength of pan-German traditions in Austria, but also because they were being propagated by a regime that had eliminated political pluralism. This authoritarian regime operated on a very narrow domestic basis in Austria. It was caught between the passive resistance of the social democratic left and the increasingly aggressive agitation of an illegal but growing Nazi movement on the right. In July 1934, the illegal Nazis unsuccessfully attempted to overthrow the regime with an armed putsch: a second brief “civil war” that included the murder of the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss. Austria also was isolated internationally. As an authoritarian regime, it had alienated western European democracies at a time when these states began pursuing an increasingly accommodating policy of appeasement toward Nazi Germany. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Nazi occupation of Austria in March 1938—Hitler’s first big step toward bringing all Germans “home into the Reich”—provoked neither Austrian resistance nor international protest. The majority of Austrians had lost faith in their own state, and the rest of the world was prepared to acquiesce to the territorial expansion of Nazi Germany in order to appease Hitler. Austria literally disappeared from the map. In April 1938, the Nazis held a plebiscite in Austria to legitimize their occupation of the country after the fact, and those Austrians who were allowed to vote overwhelmingly affirmed the Anschluss. The Nazis turned the individual provinces of Austria into provinces (Gaue) of the Greater German Reich and forbade the usage of the word “Austria.” Austrians who fulfilled Nazi racial criteria became German citizens. The German occupation of Austria also was accompanied by widespread pogroms that soon were followed by the systematic discrimination against Austria’s Jews: some 180,000 of which were registered as Jews with Jewish communities of worship and some 30,000 who were either atheists, agnostics, or baptized Christians but designated to be Jews based on Nazi racial criteria. Approximately two-thirds of Austria’s Jews were expropriated in the process of emigration and flight in the years following the Anschluss. Some 65,000 Jews ultimately were “relocated” and killed in the concentration and extermination camps of the Third Reich. Although the idea of an Anschluss with a democratic German state previously had attracted a large number of proponents in interwar Austria, the execution thereof under the auspices of the Third Reich and Nazi policies gave it a specific ideological twist. As in Germany, there were enthusiastic supporters of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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In violation of World War I peace treaties, armed forces of Nazi Germany occupied Austria in March 1938 and executed an Anschluss, or unification. Many Austrians were initially enthusiastic about the union of the two states. (National Archives and Records Administration)

regime as well as a fair number of opportunists and fellow travelers. Austrian Nazi party membership peaked at over 600,000. Some 1.2 million Austrians served in the German armed forces with 250,000 killed or missing in action. Approximately 35,000 Austrians were executed by the Nazis or died in prisons or concentration camps. Some 24,000 Austrian civilians were killed in Allied air raids. The dynamics of public opinion in Austria during the war were complicated. Hitler promised Austrians peace and prosperity in March 1938, but he gave them war and austerity after September 1939. After the Anschluss, the Nazis also apprehended thousands of Austrians as real or potential opponents of the regime. Representatives of the political parties who had opposed each other so bitterly in interwar Austria—social democrats and Catholic conservatives—suddenly found themselves together in the prisons and concentration camps of the Third Reich where they learned to reconcile their differences. Disillusionment with the Anschluss, Nazi policies, and the war became more and more widespread as the war drew on, and they contributed to a retrospective appreciation of those things that many Austrians had lost after 1934 and after 1938 and hoped to achieve or re-achieve thereafter: democracy and domestic peace in the former case and national sovereignty in the latter. The failure of the First Republic and the Anschluss taught Austrians a number of valuable political N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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lessons. The experience of being German in the Third Reich instilled a genuine desire among many Austrians to be Austrian in a small, independent state. Austrian patriotism became the foundation of an unprecedented political program that explicitly broke with pan-German traditions and sentiments. Until late 1943, the conditions under which Austrians might achieve national independence were unclear. Most countries in the world had acknowledged the Anschluss. There was no Austrian government in exile nor was any one group of the Austrian exiles abroad acknowledged by the Allied powers as legitimate representatives of Austria. Resistance in Austria itself was not widespread. However, after a meeting in Moscow, the foreign ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics issued a brief declaration on November 1, 1943, that represented a new and coherent Allied policy toward Austria. The so-called Moscow Declaration referred to Austria as “the first free country to fall victim to Hitlerite aggression,” noted that the “annexation” of Austria by Germany was “null and void,” and stated the reestablishment of a “free and independent Austria” as an Allied war objective. Although there was no Austrian state or Austrian government at the time, the declaration also admonished Austria “that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war” and noted that Austria was responsible for making “her own contribution to her liberation.” It was a fortunate coincidence that the Allied tactical planning for postwar Europe corresponded to the national aspirations of many Austrians. The Allies did not conceive the Moscow Declaration as explicit support for the Austrian national idea nor were Austrians in exile abroad or in resistance at home involved in its articulation. It was inspired partially by the tactics of psychological warfare and reflected broader Allied strategic intentions related to weakening postwar Germany. However, it laid the foundations for the reestablishment of Austria at the end of World War II. It also simultaneously provided Austrians with a framework for articulating their own independence and retrospectively interpreting their relationship to the Third Reich. After the liberation of Vienna by the Soviet Red Army in April 1945, representatives of Austria’s social democratic left and Roman Catholic and conservative right constituted two new political parties: the Socialist Party of Austria and the Austrian People’s Party. Along with representatives of the Austrian Communist Party, these two new parties issued a “proclamation of independence” and established a provisional government on April 27, 1945, that referred to the individual clauses of the Moscow Declaration and established the so-called Second Republic. The Allies had designated Austria a victim of Nazi Germany—a status that corresponded to the disillusionment and psychological disposition of many Austrians at the end of the war—and Austrian politicians of the first hour, many of whom had been active in resistance or interned by the Nazis during the war, understandably wished to take as much advantage as possible of the fortuitous status Allied policy provided. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Austrian diplomats and politicians pursued a strategy of emphasizing the legal continuity of Austria as a state in terms of international law, despite the Anschluss, and the factual or institutional discontinuity of Austria as a state in terms of constitutional law as a result of the Anschluss. The logic of their argumentation was as follows: The Anschluss was an occupation, not an annexation. Therefore, Austria was never legally part of Nazi Germany and subsequently could not be considered a belligerent power or a successor state of Nazi Germany. In 1938, the Republic of Austria had been a victim of German aggression (as had Belgium and the Netherlands, for example, in 1940). As such, it was an occupied state that factually had been deprived of its legitimate organs of government, representation, and volition. Austria was liberated from Nazi Germany and reestablished its sovereignty based on the democratic constitution of the First Republic (which had been abrogated by the Austrian authoritarian regime in 1934). Although the Allied planning for the quadripartite occupation and administration of Austria and Vienna was modeled on the agreements that the four major Allied powers had concluded for Germany and Berlin, Austria’s reentry into the community of sovereign states after the war was not to be regulated by a peace treaty, because Austria had not been an ally of Nazi Germany or a belligerent power. It was to be facilitated instead by a “state treaty” outlining the conditions for ending the Allied occupation and administration of Austria and regulating the reentry of Austria into the community of nations as a sovereign state. The political stakes in occupied postwar Austria were exceptionally high and contributed in their own right to consolidating an Austrian national consensus and a domestic political consensus. Austria had been liberated from Nazi Germany in 1945, but it was occupied by the Allies thereafter: liberated but not yet free. There had been massive collaboration with Nazi Germany in Austria during the war, but according to the occupation-victim theory of the Anschluss, this was an issue of the responsibility of individual Austrians for their actions, not an Austrian state, because Austria had not participated in the war as a state. One of the dilemmas Austrian politicians confronted in the postwar period was to deny Austrian state responsibility for National Socialism in Austria as a principle of foreign policy and, at the same time, to assume domestic responsibility for the prosecution of a considerable number of former Nazis without jeopardizing, in the eyes of the Allies, Austria’s status as a victim or incurring massive reparation obligations in the course of the negotiation of a treaty that would end Allied occupation. The Allied policy of dissociating Austria from Germany based on granting Austria the status of a victim; the Austrian experience during World War II and the psychology of the immediate postwar period; and the genuine desire of Austria’s postwar politicians not only to make the best of Allied policy but also to reestablish a democratic state each contributed in its own way to establishing one of the foundational myths of the Second Republic: Austria (or Austrians) as a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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victim of National Socialism. Although this myth was dismantled substantially as a result of the so-called Waldheim affair in 1986 (when in the course of his campaign for the Austrian presidency, an enormous controversy arose over the wartime past of the former secretary general of the United Nations and the oblique and apologetic manner in which he dealt with it), it initially played a role in the formation of Austria’s new national identity. As long as the conditions of the Austrian State Treaty were negotiable, the pragmatic incentives for Austrian diplomats to downplay Austrian involvement in National Socialism were obvious. Furthermore, the normalization of domestic politics in postwar Austria entailed not only the prosecution of former Austrian Nazis but also the reintegration of the former party rank-and-file into political life. Given the competitive nature of electoral and party politics, former Austrian Nazis represented a considerable reservoir of voter potential that Social Democrats and Conservatives both wished to attract. The deterioration of East-West relations at the beginning of the Cold War also put the negotiation of the Austrian state treaty into a larger and more precarious ideological context, and the occupational regimes of the Western allies in Austria began to focus their attention less on issues related to de-Nazification and more on anticommunism. Within this context, Austrian political parties (with the obvious exception of the Communists) clearly posited Austria’s identity as a “Western” state. A brief “thaw” in the Cold War after the death of Stalin created a window of opportunity for the successful negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty, and neutrality based on a model similar to that of Switzerland was the idea that the Austrians proposed to help break the diplomatic gridlock. The negotiation of the State Treaty entailed important diplomatic trade-offs, and the conclusion thereof on May 15, 1955, paved the way for the end of the Allied occupation of Austria. The Soviet Union and the Western allies were prepared to reestablish full Austrian sovereignty only if neither East nor West would derive tactical advantages from Austrian independence, and they were prepared to accept a permanently neutral Austrian state, if Austria freely chose this status, because Austria would not be allowed to formally ally itself with either side. Austria agreed to unilaterally declare its permanent neutrality after the complete Allied evacuation of Austria and did so on October 26, 1955. The negotiation of the Austrian State Treaty got the allies out of Austria, and the Austrian proclamation of permanent neutrality effectively got Austria out of the Cold War by disallowing Austrian participation in either of the military blocs. It also provided Austria as a small state with a new national role to play: a mediator between East and West and a nonpartisan broker in international affairs. Austrian neutrality initially was conceived as a pragmatic diplomatic trade-off. However, the subsequent Austrian practice of “active neutrality” gradually made it a permanent diplomatic fixture in international affairs as well as a new core component of Austrian national identity. In 1965, the Austrian parliament desigN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nated October 26 as the Second Republic’s national holiday (Nationalfeiertag) to commemorate annually the Austrian declaration of permanent neutrality in 1955.

Narrating the Nation The dissociation of Austria from Germany after 1945 was radical not only in political terms but also in cultural and historical ones. The small republic Austria needed to adopt a new matrix for Austrian national identity, and this required the articulation of “Austrianist” perspectives on Austrian history and culture that countered previously prevalent pan-German and imperial assumptions. In terms of their history and their temperament before 1945, Austrians were —to use a phrase coined by Ignaz Seipel, one of the conservative federal chancellors of the interwar period—Großstaatmenschen: people accustomed to living in large states or, loosely translated, “imperial animals.” After 1945, Austrians articulated a new Austrian national narrative that was not imperial in the Habsburg or the German sense of the word and not German-national. This new national identity was based on affirming the cultural distinctness of Austrians from Germans (or abandoning the traditional pan-German emphasis on commonalities) and combined with an affirmation of smallness and independence (as opposed to largeness, “empire,” or some form of union with Germany). The completely new dimension of neutrality then successfully augmented these ideas of national autonomy and independence. Given the length of Austrian history and the wealth of Austrian culture, there was no shortage of material for a fundamentally new Austrian national narrative. The natural beauty of the country and its cultural heritage became prominent focal points of national identification, and Austrians consistently demonstrated great pride in them. Members of the Austrian academic community increasingly abandoned traditional pan-German perspectives on Austrian history and culture and began to propagate “Austrianist” perspectives more commensurate and compatible with the autonomy of the Austrian nation and the independence of the Austrian state. Historians, for example, noted that the federal provinces of Austria formed the core holdings of the Habsburgs in the late Middle Ages, and they wed the age-old histories of the Austrian provinces with the comparatively new idea of Austrian federalism in a manner that gave the young state and young nation venerable national traditions. Indeed, the relationship between provincialism and federalism is one of the keys to understanding Austria as a political nation. Th e provinces are one of the great continuities in Austrian history, and provincial identities—unlike Austrian national identity—have traditions of strength and stability. However, before 1945 the political identification of the Austrian provinces with the Republic of Austria was weak, the cultural identification of Austrians as “Germans” was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Oaths, Currencies, and Regime Transitions The stability of political and economic institutions enhances the development of national identities. The problems of political commitment and concomitant identity issues that Austrians confronted in the first half of the 20th century is well illustrated by the fact that there were civil servants who took oaths to serve five different political regimes, each of which represented different national ideologies, in the course of less than two decades. They swore to serve the Austrian emperor before 1918, the First Austrian Republic in 1920, the Christian Corporate State in 1934, Adolf Hitler and the Third Reich in 1938, and the Second Austrian Republic in 1945. During the same time span, Austrians also had four different currencies. The imperial crown devaluated dramatically after World War I and was replaced by the Austrian schilling in 1925. The Nazi’s introduced the German reichsmark to Austria in 1938, which, in turn, was replaced by a “new” Austrian schilling in 1945.

strong, and the political desire of Austrians to see Austria unified with Germany was widespread. Since 1945, Austrian provincial identities have been culturally and politically brought into line with the idea of an autonomous Austrian nation and the premises of Austrian federalism and independence in an unprecedented manner. Indeed, the creation of the Austrian nation was not so much a question of inventing new traditions; it was mainly an exercise in the selective reinterpretation and political realignment of preexisting older ones. In this manner, the small state of Austria could disassociate itself from undesirable imperial political traditions but at the same time appropriate equally imperial artistic and cultural ones.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Initially, the concept of the Austrian nation was articulated as a response to the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The realization of the Austrian nation ultimately was a response to 7 years of totalitarian occupation by Nazi Germany from 1938 to 1945 and 10 years of democratic occupation by the Allies from 1945 to 1955 that led to Austrian independence. If the Nazi occupation of Austria helped create the Austrian nation, Allied occupation helped to consolidate and institutionalize it. The political program of Austrian elites in 1945 was relatively straightforward: They wished to establish the continuity between the First Republic and the Second Republic and to treat the Anschluss as an occupation, in order to use these premises to negotiate the Allied evacuation of Austria and to achieve full Austrian sovereignty. They based their strategy on previously unthinkable degrees of domestic political collaboration to strengthen their position over and against the Allies, and they institutionalized cooperation as the feature of postwar political N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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culture in Austria. Coalition governments ruled uninterrupted in Austria until 1966, and this formal power sharing was augmented by the development of a specifically Austrian form of mediating conflicts of interests outside of parliament called social partnership. Occupation created an unprecedented sense of national community in Austria, and reconstruction assumed the role of a national mission. The economic recovery of Austria was just as dramatic as Germany’s “economic miracle,” and it contributed stable postwar growth that lead to genuine national prosperity. Although the social democrats and the Catholic conservatives may have disagreed about some of the ideological details of the Austrian national idea, they agreed on the overriding importance of Austrian independence, and they both propagated the importance of allegiance to the republic and the concept of Austrian patriotism as the means of achieving it. The concept of the Austrian nation was based on patriotism—an explicit commitment to the Republic of Austria. It made no explicit reference to the concept of nationalism because nationalism in Austria historically had been pan-German or German-national (deutsch-national). These terminological distinctions are exceptionally important because not all Austrians readily accepted the idea of an Austrian nation. After 1945, the social democrats and Catholic conservatives embraced the idea of an independent Austrian nation whereas representatives of the national-liberal tradition, including a substantial number of former Nazis, continued to entertain traditional “national” and pan-German views about Austria. They organized themselves in a political party established in 1949 called the Union of Independents, which laid the foundations for the Austrian Freedom Party. These “nationalists” accepted the fact of Austrian state independence but continued to propagate traditional ideas about Austria as part of a German “ethnic and cultural community” (Volks- und Kulturgemeinschaft). Although this form of nationalism was still widespread in postwar Austria, support for it diminished as Austrian national consciousness developed. It is important to recognize that the concept of nationalism in Austria historically has referred to this Germannational tradition and has negative connotations for most Austrians. “Nationalists” in postwar Austria wanted to continue to be included in the German nation, whereas Austrian patriots argued for the existence of an independent Austrian nation. Representatives of this German-nationalist tradition in Austria also were prepared to openly appeal to exclusionary and xenophobic sentiments. One of the most ambivalent manifestations of the success of Austrian nation-building has been that the populist politician Jörg Haider, who originally was a classic second-generation representative of the postwar German-national tradition in Austria, abandoned traditional pan-German references to the German nature of Austria in the early 1990s, and reformulated the contents of the German-national agenda in exclusively Austrian national terms. The first openly nationalistic appeal to Austrian sentiment was an explicitly xenophobic plebiscite that Haider’s Austrian Freedom Party organized in 1993 based on the slogan “Austria first!” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The broad popular affirmation of Austria as a distinct national unit coupled with a wide-ranging popular commitment to the Republic of Austria as a small, independent, and neutral state has been well documented by over 15 national public-opinion surveys since the mid-1950s. In 1956, 49 percent of the Austrians surveyed affirmed the existence of an Austrian nation, 46 percent considered Austrians to be part of the German people, and 5 percent did not know or answer. By 1994, the share of Austrians who believed Austria was a nation had increased to 79 percent (Frölich-Steffen 2003, 106). Eurobarometer surveys conducted in Austria by the European Union’s director general for Education and Culture since 1990 also document that Austrians demonstrate a comparatively high degree of national pride by European standards. This mode of contemporary self-perception provides a strong contrast to the psychological insecurities of interwar Austria just as the political and economic success of the Second Republic provide strong contrasts to the manifold failures of the First Republic. The First Republic of Austria was a state without a nation; the Second Republic is a state that has succeeded in creating an Austrian nation. Selected Bibliography Beller, S. 2006. A Concise History of Austria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bischof G., and A. Pelinka, eds. 1997. Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity, vol. 5: Contemporary Austrian Studies. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publications. Bruckmüller, E. 2004. The Austrian Nation: Cultural Consciousness and Socio-Political Processes. Translated by Lowell A. Bangerter. Riverside, CA: Ariadne Press. Frölich-Steffen, S. 2003. Die österreichische Identität im Wandel. Vienna: Braumüller. Johnson, L. R. 1995. “Interpreting the Anschluss.” In Austria, 1938–1988: Anschluss and Fifty Years, edited by W. E. Wright, 265–294. Riverside, CA: Ariadne Press. Pelinka, A. 1998. Austria: Out of the Shadow of the Past. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Plaschka, R. G., G. Stourzh, and J. P. Niederkorn, eds. 1996. Was heisst Österrreich: Inhalt und Umfang des Österreichbegriffes vom 10. Jahrhundert bis heute. Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenscahften. Pohl, W. 1996. “Ostarrichi Revisited: The 1946 Anniversary, the Millenium, and the Medieval Roots of Austrian Identity.” Austrian History Yearbook, 27:21–40. Steininger, R., G. Bischof, and M. Gehler, eds. 2002. Austria in the Twentieth Century. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Stourzh, G. 1990. Vom Reich zur Republik: Studien zum Österreichbewußtsein im 20. Jahrhundert. Vienna: Edition Atelier. Thaler, P. 2001. The Ambivalence of Identity: The Austrian Experience of Nation-Building in a Modern Society. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.


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Baltic Nationalism Kevin C. O’Connor Chronology 13th century Latvia and Estonia are conquered by German knights. 1236–1263 Reign of Mindaugas, who unifies the Lithuanian tribes. 1386 The marriage of Grand Duke Jogaila to Queen Jadwiga of Poland inaugurates a nominal union between Lithuania and Poland and begins the Christianization of Lithuania. 1525 A Lutheran prayer book is published in Estonian, Livonian, and Latvian. 1547 The first Lithuanian-language book is printed. 1569 The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzeczspospolita) is created. 1710 Russia seizes the Baltic provinces of Estland and Livland from Sweden. 1772–1795 The Commonwealth is partitioned by Russia, Prussia, and Austria; Russia acquires most of Lithuania and the Latvian provinces of Courland and Latgale. 1816–1819 Serfdom is formally abolished in Estland and Livland. 1857–1861 The Kalevipoeg epic is published in Estonia. 1860s The Young Latvia movement is formed. 1862–1865 Pe¯ terburgas av ı¯zes, a weekly Latvian-language newspaper, is published. 1863 Lithuanian peasants participate in a Polish insurrection. 1864–1904 Russian imperial authorities ban the publication and dissemination of Lithuanianlanguage materials. 1869 First Estonian song festival. 1873 First Latvian song festival. 1880s–1990s Russification policies are implemented in the Baltic provinces. 1888 The La¯ cˇ ple¯ sis epic is published in Latvia. 1891 The first Estonian daily newspaper, Postimees, is published. 1905–1907 The revolution in the Russian empire is followed by insurrections in the Baltic provinces. 1918 Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia proclaim independence. 1918–1920 Wars of Independence in the Baltic countries. 1939 Secret protocols to the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact awards the Baltic states to the Soviet sphere of influence. 1940 The Baltic states are annexed to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1941 (June) A massive deportation of the Baltic peoples to the Soviet interior takes place one week before the German invasion. 1941–1944 Nazi occupation and the extermination of the region’s Jews. 1944–1956 Partisans known as the “forest brothers” resist Soviet occupation. 1949 Mass deportation of Baltic rural dwellers.

Situating the Nations Subject to foreign control for most of their histories, the Baltic peoples, in modern times, have experienced only two periods of complete independence: first in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the interwar era (1918–1940), when Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia formed three of the smallest and most vulnerable successor states that were carved from the Russian empire’s western borderlands; and since 1991, as post-Soviet republics struggling to balance their requirements for both security and cultural development. Because of their shared history of sustained foreign domination, the Baltic peoples have always regarded themselves as threatened nations. Indeed, concern for their very survival has been central to the national identities of the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians from the last decades of czarist rule through the Soviet period, and it underpinned their recent rush to join European and international institutions. “The Baltic states” as a category that encompasses the three tiny countries of northeastern Europe dates to the establishment of political independence after World War I; this designation originally included not only Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, but Finland as well. As a geographical descriptor, the appellation is problematic, for Sweden and Denmark surely have an equally legitimate claim (one that has not been exercised) to being “Baltic states.” Moreover, from the first use of the term, “Baltic states” was understood as an outsiders’ construct that blurred the distinctions between these unique countries. In the narrower linguistic sense, only the Latvians and Lithuanians are true “Balts,” as Estonians speak a FinnoUgric language that is similar to Finnish but is entirely unintelligible to the closely related Indo-European languages spoken by Latvians and Lithuanians. (In fact, long before the Latvians and Lithuanians were regarded as “Balts,” the word balten was used as an ethnonym for the Baltic Germans.) Despite the confusion, the term “Baltic states” stuck and was cemented during the era of Soviet rule, during which Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (but not Finland) were welded together into a region that the Russians called Sovetskaia Pribaltika. Although it is common to speak of these three neighboring countries as a unit on the basis of their location and shared political history, Estonia, Latvia,

Baltic Minorities The present-day Baltic countries have historically been home to several other smaller national groups. The population of interwar Estonia included thousands of Finnish-speaking Ingrians (or Ingers) and Setus, the Estonians’ Finno-Ugric cousins. Latvia once had a substantial population of Livs, but their population is nearly extinct. A Finno-Ugric people who once lived in settlements along the Latvian coast, the Livs assimilated into the surrounding Latvian population. Lithuania was (and remains) the home of several hundred Karaites (or Karaim), a Turkic people who practice an ancient, pre-Talmudic form of Judaism. Among the other “foreign” minorities in the Baltic countries were the several thousand Swedes who lived in Estonia, Poles who lived in Lithuania, Germans who arrived in Latvia and Estonia in the Middle Ages and dominated the region until the achievement of independence, and Russians who settled in Baltic cities during the era of czarist rule.


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and Lithuania possess very different cultural backgrounds that have reinforced their sense of national uniqueness. While the Estonians are culturally oriented toward Scandinavia and northern Germany, the Lithuanians, because of a long shared history with Poland within the old Commonwealth (Rzeczspospolita), are culturally oriented toward their larger western neighbor. Latvians share both associations. While sharing the centuries of German rule endured by the Estonians, Latvia’s Kurzeme (Courland) and Latgale regions came under Polish control in the 16th and 17th centuries. All three Baltic countries were ruled by Russia from the 18th century until the end of World War I, and thus were subject to Russian cultural influence. Only the Lithuanians had a prior history of statehood, before the grand duchy’s union with the Polish crown in 1569. The religious diversity of the Baltic states is also significant: while Catholicism has been central to Lithuanian identity for more than 300 years, Estonians and Latvians, like their German overlords, were predominantly Lutherans in a Russian empire whose dominant religion was Russian Orthodoxy. Later, all three Baltic countries were subject to the ideological requirements of the atheistic Soviet state.

Instituting the Nations While the sprawling Grand Duchy of Lithuania existed as an independent state in the Middle Ages, Estonia and Latvia (as well as a considerably diminished Lithuanian state) became political entities as a result of World War I and the Russian revolutions of 1917. Created on the basis of the national self-determination principle, each of the Baltic governments worked to consolidate the young nationstate by (1) striking at the political and economic hegemony of the old German, Russian, and Polish (in Lithuania) elites; (2) encouraging the cultural development of the dominant nationality; and (3) promoting a generally tolerant but culturally exclusive sense of nationhood. While Estonia was the most ethnically homogenous of the Baltic states, Latvia had a significant Russian minority and a smaller Jewish one. Despite the loss of the Vilnius region to Poland during the interwar era, Lithuania had substantial Jewish and Polish minorities. Although minorities were allowed to publish their own newspapers and educate their children in their own minority-language schools, it was clear that only speakers of the native language possessed full membership in the national community. The key attributes of national identity in the Baltic nations, from the era of the national awakenings in the second half of the 19th century through the postSoviet era, are language and culture. Indeed, during the period of national formation, writers and other cultural figures did more to inculcate a sense of national consciousness and patriotism than did political elites. Their poems, plays, stories, and operas often told the story of the origins, struggles, and destiny of their nations. Thus, it is hardly surprising that one of the principal ways that the Baltic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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governments of the interwar era attempted to foster a sense of national feeling was through the creation of various cultural institutions, including museums, theaters, and creative unions. Before 1919 most cultural institutions in the Latvian and Estonian provinces were run by and catered to the German-speaking elite. However, the cultural environment was quickly transformed following the establishment of independence, as new institutions enjoying generous state subsidies were established in each of the Baltic states in an attempt to raise the cultural level—and the national awareness—of the citizenry. In R¯ıga, the Latvian National Theater and the Daile (Art) Theater were established in 1919 and 1920, while Tallinn added the Drama Studio to the existing Vanemuine (originally established in 1906) and Estonia (1913) theaters. In Lithuania, which lost Vilnius to Poland after the war, the main cultural center was Kaunas, where the Lithuanian State Theater was established in 1920. Cultural figures with strong nationalist credentials, such as the poet and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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playwright Ja¯nis Rainis (1865–1929), who directed the Latvian National Theater in its early years, typically played leading roles in these new institutions. Performances often featured national themes: national operas, such as Gražina (1933), by the Lithuanian composer Jurgis Karnavicˇus (1884–1941), and The Vikings (1928), by the Estonian composer Eduard Tubin (1905–1982), were first performed at these new national institutions. Likewise, the new art museums established in the interwar era highlighted the achievement of native artists, who in turn frequently offered their talents in service of the nation, especially as nationalist feelings intensified throughout Europe during the 1930s. The governments of the interwar era were themselves national institutions, and most of the parties that were represented in the parliaments claimed to defend national, rather than class or regional, values and concerns. After a short period of untidy democracy, each of the Baltic countries, beginning with Lithuania in the late 1920s, experienced a political shift to the right that was accompanied by the official lauding of native, rural values. Increasingly isolated from Western Europe, from Soviet Russia, and from each other, the Baltic nations—like other countries in east central Europe—embraced the politics of nationalism while lapsing into a certain cultural narrow-mindedness. While organizations like Iron Wolf (Lithuania), Thundercross (Latvia), and the League of Independence War Veterans (Estonia) promoted extremist nationalism and had some popular appeal, power was seized by the authoritarian governments of Antanas Smetona (1926–1940), Konstantin Päts (1934–1940), and K¯arlis Ulmanis (1934–1940). Each of these leaders saw himself as embodying the values of his country’s dominant ethnic group and partly on that basis justified his seizure of power.

Defining the Nations Language and culture are the core components of national identity for the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. Although their numbers are small today, the Baltic peoples are descendents of some of Europe’s most ancient inhabitants. The ancestors of the Finno-Ugric–speaking Estonians settled in the region as far back as 3000 BC, while the linguistic ancestors of the Latvians and Lithuanians arrived from the Eurasian steppe somewhere around 2200 BC. Once inhabiting a large swath of the east European plain, during the first millennium AD, the proto-Balts and proto-Estonians were pushed into the geographical areas they inhabit today. Lake Peipsi demarcated the natural border between Estonians and Slavs, while the Väina River formed the divide between the Estonians and peoples who spoke Baltic languages. Of course, the peoples living along the Baltic Sea hardly existed as “nations” a millennium ago. The ancestors of modern Latvians, for example, included tribes such as Sels, Latgals, Zemgals, and Kurs. The fact that the Baltic peoples played a unique role in the history of modern national formation in Europe is sometimes overlooked. Living in R¯ıga in the late N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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1760s, Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), a minister from East Prussia and a theorist of German Romanticism, became particularly interested in the nonGerman people who populated the surrounding countryside. As he wrote down the stories and folk songs of the Latvian and Estonian peasants, Herder discovered that beneath the “high culture” of the German overlords there existed a variety of local cultures with their own rich oral traditions. All Völker, or national groupings, he concluded, possessed their own spirit and distinctive characteristics; all were unique expressions of the beauty of God’s creations. Herder’s belief that language was the essence of nationhood is significant, for it is this criterion for nationality, rather than “blood” or ethnicity, which is at the core of national identity in the Baltics today. Herder’s inclusion of several Estonian and Latvian folk songs in The Peoples’ Voice in Song (1787) helped stimulate the scholarly interest of other Baltic Germans who later formed such study groups as the Society of Friends of Latvians (1824) and the Estonian Learned Society (1839). By the middle of the 19th century these friendly scholarly efforts to understand the Baltic peasantry were superseded by the efforts of native but German-educated Estonian and Latvian intellectuals, such as Friedrich Robert Faehlmann (1798–1850) and Krišj¯anis Valdem¯ars (1825–1891), who helped inaugurate the national awakenings of their peoples. Unlike the case in Germany or Poland, where native cultural elites led their respective national revivals, one of the distinguishing factors in the national awakenings of the Baltic peoples was the lack at this early stage of such indigenous political and cultural elites. For the Latvians and Estonians, who never possessed their own aristocracy, the nation had to be created from scratch on the basis of language and peasant traditions. Lithuanian elites, on the other hand, had been largely Polonized and only belatedly began to identify with the language and culture of the Lithuanian peasantry. Indeed, the Lithuanian situation was different in several ways. Unlike Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania had existed as an independent entity for several hundred years. For a time, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the largest country in Europe before it was adjoined to Poland in 1569 and shared the latter’s sad fate in the 18th century. Split for more than a century between Russian-ruled Lithuania proper (the provinces of Kovno, Vilna, and Suwalki) and Lithuania Minor (in East Prussia), Lithuanians faced serious political obstacles that delayed their national formation. Most significantly, because of their role in the Polish-Lithuanian rebellions of 1830 and 1863, the Lithuanians of Russia had to endure a press ban from 1864 to 1904. Thus, Lithuanian-language materials had to be published abroad in Lithuania Minor and smuggled across the border. The national awakenings of the Estonian and Latvian peoples occurred in the context of their rising concerns about Germanization—the somewhat voluntary fate of many upwardly mobile Estonians and Latvians—and Russification, which was St. Petersburg’s response to the sprawling empire’s need for centralization and uniformity. Convinced that their cultural development had been inhibited by N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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centuries of servitude to foreign masters, Estonian and Latvian intellectuals sought to bring their peoples up to the cultural level of the Germans and thereby initiated a discussion about their national pasts and destinies. Sometimes they disagreed. For example, while the Russophile Carl Robert Jakobson (1841–1882) was convinced that a new era of happiness would arise for Estonians only when the Baltic Germans lost their power, Johann Voldemar Jannsen (1819–1890), publisher of the newspaper Eesti Postimees, took the more moderate position that Estonian culture could best be developed under the tutelage of the Baltic German elite. In Latvia, the development of a national consciousness was hindered by the fact that Latvians were spread across three different provinces. Further complicating the situation, there was the anomalous position of the inhabitants of the Latgale region, who practiced Catholicism (most Latvians were Lutherans) and whose dialect was arguably so distinctive as to constitute a separate language. Widespread acceptance of the idea that all Latvians were one people (tauta) would require the education of the peasantry in their own language—a burden that fell largely on the shoulders of the editors of the Latvian newspaper P¯eterburgas av¯ızes. The arguments of Krišj¯anis Valdem¯ars (1825–1891), one of the newspaper’s editors, echoed those of Estonia’s Carl Robert Jakobson: that Latvian culture could best be developed under Russian protection. It is worthwhile to note that whereas Latvian and Estonian nationalists of a later era protested against the Soviet regime’s policies of linguistic and demographic Russification in the late 1980s, many Estonian and Latvian “awakeners” of the previous century actually welcomed the Russification measures of Czar Aleksandr III (reigned 1881–1894) in the belief that these would arrest and reverse the hegemonic role of the Baltic Germans. While the Estonians and the Latvians got more than they bargained for, it was in Lithuania that the Russification decrees were most resented, for it was not until 1904 that Lithuanians were permitted even to publish materials using the Latin alphabet. Despite the lack of clearly delineated national boundaries before 1918, establishing the border between Estonia and Latvia posed little problem once the Latvians and Estonians declared their independence from Russia. The independent Latvian republic that was proclaimed in January 1918 included southern Livland, Courland, and Latgale (western Vitebsk). The following month an Estonian Committee of Elders declared the independence of an Estonia state that included northern Livland and Estland. Although the arrival of German armies and a struggle with the Bolsheviks delayed the full realization of independent Latvian and Estonian states for more than a year, it was along these strictly ethnic lines that the new boundaries were established. Only the small town of Valga/Valka was disputed; it remains divided between Latvia and Estonia even today. Determining the frontiers of the new Lithuanian state was far more problematic, as Lithuania’s claims to independence were compromised by Germany’s creation of a puppet Lithuanian state in 1917. Moreover, Polish leaders, who tended N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Multinational Vilnius The fluidity and impermanent nature of national identity is well-illustrated by the history of Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania. Once the capital of the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilnius became a culturally Polish city as a result of Lithuania’s close political association with Poland and the latter’s cultural dominance. By 1914, more than a century after Vilnius and most of the rest of Lithuania were swallowed up by the Russian empire (where it was called “Vilna”), Jews and Poles each formed about 40 percent of the city’s population. The Poles called their city “Wilno,” to the Yiddish-speaking Jews it was “Vilne,” and to the Belarusian peasants who populated the surrounding countryside it was “Vil’nia.” Under Polish administration from 1921 to 1939, the contested city retained its Polish cultural identity, which was also attractive to most of the city’s Jewish population. A Lithuanian identity developed in Vilnius only during the Soviet era, following the extermination of its Jews between 1941 and 1944 and the repatriation of most of its Polish population at the end of World War II. Although Vilnius is now the capital of a Lithuanian nationstate, this outcome would have seemed most unlikely only a century ago.

to regard Lithuania as a backward Polish province, had every intention of including territory inhabited by Lithuanians in a reconstituted greater Poland. Lithuanian leaders, who took over administration from the Germans only one month before the armistice of November 1918, rejected Polish claims and proceeded to make their own, including the former Russian provinces Kovno (Kaunas), Vilna (Vilnius), Suvalki, and Klaipe˙da ( formerly Memel), a German port city that was also claimed by the Poles. Although both sides made their claims in Paris, the realities on the ground determined the borders of the Lithuanian state. While Lithuania, with German help, was able to hold onto the Kaunas region, Polish forces seized Vilnius, a largely Polish and Jewish city whose surrounding territories included hundreds of thousands of Lithuanian peasants. The Vilnius region came under Lithuanian administration only in October 1939, following the German and Soviet attacks on Poland, and in 1945 it was established as the capital of the Soviet Republic of Lithuania. Kaunas, the interwar capital, meanwhile became a neglected provincial town.

Narrating the Nations Almost everywhere in central and eastern Europe the formation of national consciousness was facilitated by a combination of one or more of the following factors: religion or religious institutions (as in Bulgaria), a shared sense of suffering due to a perceived historical injustice (Serbia), nostalgia for a glorious past (Poland), and language (Germany). For the Baltic peoples, the keys to national identity were their languages and their folk songs and folklore. Jakob Hurt (1839–1907) N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and Krišj¯anis Barons (1835–1923) began the systematic collection of (respectively) Estonian and Latvian folk songs and folklore in the middle of the century, while others shaped these tales into grand epics that told the troubled and sometimes glorious stories of their nations. The Estonian epic, published in 1857–1861 by Friedrich Reinhard Kreutzwald (1803–1882), was titled Kalevipoeg (Son of Kalev). While its inspiration came partly from the Finnish epic Kalevala (1835–1836), Kalevipoeg’s heroes and themes were derived mainly from the Estonian folk tradition: heroic deeds, honesty, and peaceful labor are depicted as supreme virtues, while the German conquerors are portrayed as devils bringing ruin to a once free and prosperous people. Although its importance has diminished over time, Kalevipoeg was the first truly Estonian book—one that profoundly influenced a generation of Estonian intellectuals and became a symbol of the Estonian national awakening. Of more enduring value has been the Latvian national epic, La¯ cˇpl¯esis (The Bear Slayer), published by Andre¯js Pumpurs (1841–1902) in 1888. Set in pagan Latvia in the 13th century, L¯acˇpl¯esis recounts the exploits of a bear-eared giant—the son of a man and a female bear—who defends his homeland from invaders. In the end, the Bear Slayer is defeated and the Latvians are subjected to 700 years of misery. Whatever their literary merits, each of these epics shared the political goal of showing that the oppressed peoples had a history and culture no less grand than those of their German masters. Lacking a true literati and subject to the press ban, Lithuania never created its own national epic. However, Lithuanian nationalists, like their Polish counterparts, could and did revive memories of Lithuania’s glorious past. Lithuanians commemorate the great princes Mindaugas (1230–1263), who fended off the Germans and unified a series of scattered tribes under his leadership; Gediminas (1316–1341), who expanded the grand duchy’s borders deep into Slavic territory; Jogaila (1377–1392), who converted to Christianity and in 1386 became ruler of a partially unified Polish-Lithuanian state; and Vytautas (1392–1430), who along with Jogaila defeated the Teutonic Knights in the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410 and dramatically expanded the territory of the grand duchy. With the formal conclusion of a dynastic union with Poland in 1569, however, the heroic times had passed and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania became the junior partner in the commonwealth until it was dismembered by its neighbors in three stages between 1772 and 1795. During the century that followed, when the bulk of Lithuania and Poland were under Russian rule, Lithuanian nationalists appropriated the traditional Polish portrayal of their country as a crucified nation, thereby cementing the bonds between nationhood and religion (Catholicism) in a way that was alien to the Estonian and Latvian national traditions. With no memory of great kings or warriors, the Estonians and Latvians have focused on their favorite cultural figures. Among the most beloved cultural heroes of Latvia are the writer J¯anis Rainis and the artist Johann Köler (1855–1929); their Estonian counterparts are the poet Lydia Koidula (1843–1886), the prose N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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writers Eduard Vilde (1865–1933) and Anton Hansen Tammsaare (1878–1940), and the artist J¯anis Rozent¯als (1866–1916). Lithuania, too, celebrates cultural heroes ˇ iurlionis (1875–1911) such as the composer and painter Mikolajus Konstantinas C and the romantic writer Jonas Maˇciulis (1862–1932), better known as Maironis. Many of these cultural figures are associated either with the national awakenings of the 19th century or the first era of independence in the 1920s and 1930s. The political figures of the latter period occupy a more uncertain position. Although Antanas Smetona, Konstantin Päts, and K¯arlis Ulmanis are praised for their efforts in helping to create the independent states of (respectively) Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, their roles as authoritarian dictators leave them with somewhat ambiguous political legacies. While their critics hold them responsible for extinguishing liberal democracy in their countries, their defenders point out that these were “soft” dictatorships that may have prevented true extremists (fascists or communists) from taking power. The period of independence between 1918 and 1940 was very important for building national identities in the Baltic countries. This was symbolized through the donning of traditional peasant costumes during festivals and holidays, the celebration of an idyllic, agrarian past, and the rural ideal of the prosperous family farm. Storks, windmills, and oak trees were commonly featured in the rural imagery of interwar Lithuania, and they remain symbols of Lithuanian identity today. A staunchly Catholic country, the cross is a ubiquitous symbol in the Lithuanian countryside. Among Latvia’s most important national symbols are the R¯ıga skyline, L¯acˇpl¯esis (whose name and image has been appropriated by marketers of goods ranging from chocolate to beer), and the Freedom Monument, while Estonia’s most significant national symbol is Tartu University. Founded by the Swedish King Gustav II Adolf (1594–1632), the university was the intellectual center of the Estonian national awakening and is a living connection with the country’s enlightened Scandinavian past. For all three Baltic countries, the wars of independence during 1918–1920, like the “singing revolution” of the late 1980s, were also important symbols and shapers of national identity, for it is believed that the nation coalesced as it liberated itself from foreign rule.

Mobilizing and Building the Nations The first attempts to mobilize the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peoples on behalf of national goals occurred during the era of the national awakenings. In Latvia this role was first assumed by the Young Latvians ( Jaunlatviesi), a group that was inspired by the Young Italy and Young Germany movements of the 1830s and 1840s. Although most of these intellectuals were entirely comfortable in a culturally German milieu, the Young Latvians of the 1860s and 1870s occupied an intermediate space between the Baltic Germans and the Latvian peasantry as N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The spire of Saint Peter’s Cathedral is visible above a square in R¯ıga, Latvia, with the Latvian flag displayed in the foreground. (iStockPhoto.com)


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they worked to gain recognition of limited Latvian rights and popular acceptance of Latvian nationhood. In an era when literacy was rapidly spreading among the Latvian peasantry, the Young Latvians “rediscovered” the Latvian language and Latvian traditions and folklore. Meanwhile, the Estonian Society of Literati, which originated in the mid-1860s and was led initially by F. R. Kreutzwald and then by the journalist Jakob Hurt (it was closed by the czarist government in 1893), spearheaded the Estonian national birth. Its efforts were accompanied by the establishment in the early 1860s of the Estonian Alexander School, whose main purpose was to produce well-educated Estonian-speaking teachers for the growing elementary school network. Later, in the period just before World War I, the intellectuals who formed the Young-Estonia (Noor-Eesti) continued the work of raising the level of Estonian culture while at the same time orienting Estonian national culture toward western Europe: “Let us remain Estonians,” the movement’s founder Gustav Suits (1883–1956) declared, “but let us also become Europeans!” Among the most visible and successful efforts to mobilize the Latvian and Estonian nations was the song festival. While the first all-Estonian song festival was held in 1869, it was repeated, on a growing scale, five times in the last three decades of the 19th century. The first Latvian song festival was held in 1873; although purely a cultural event, as in Estonia, its deep nationalist overtones heralded the emergence of Latvia as an “awakened nation.” Featuring thousands of choir singers and dancers dressed in native costumes, the song festivals were—and remain—a tribute to national pride and cultural distinctiveness. Indeed, it was through the national song festivals that the Baltic nations could, during the years of Soviet rule, give expression to national uniqueness under a regime where any autonomous expression of national distinctiveness was considered suspicious. Under the unique conditions prevailing in Lithuania, there could be no Lithuanian analogue to Young Latvians or the Estonian Society of Literati. There the task of mobilizing the nation fell primarily to Catholic clerics such as Father Jonas Basanáviˇcius (1851–1927), whom many Lithuanians consider the patriarch of the nation. In the mid-1880s, his newspaper Aušra (The Dawn), published abroad and smuggled into Russian-ruled Lithuania, acted as the intellectual center of the Lithuanian movement. While Latvian and Estonian natives grew more literate and began to assume a more prominent position in the larger Baltic cities like R¯ıga and Tallinn, “Lithuanian” cities (such as they are today) like Vilnius (Wilno) and Kaunas (Kovno) remained heavily populated by non-Lithuanians— especially Jews. Indeed, Lithuanians were more economically backward, less literate, and less nationally conscious than their northern neighbors until well into the 20th century. The first opportunity for national mobilization on behalf of explicitly political goals occurred when Russia was rocked by a revolution in 1905, which occurred on the heels of two decades of intensive industrial development and urbanization. While social and class concerns were more important to the Latvian and Estonian rebels (which they expressed by burning down the estates of 184 manor N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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houses), the concerns of the Lithuanians, whose working class was smaller and less radical, were more national. Indeed, unrest in the Lithuanian provinces was directed less at Russo-Polish landlords than at the Russian state, which was forced to make such cultural and political concessions as the use of native languages in the classroom and the legalization of political organizations. While radical newspapers were shut down in the Baltic and Lithuanian provinces, Balts could now voice their concerns in the newly created State Duma. This initial experience with parliamentary politics provided Baltic leaders with the leadership skills and experience necessary to cope with the challenges posed by the Great War, the Russian revolutions of 1917, and the quest for independence. Yet the achievement of independence for the Baltic countries was less the product of intensive national mobilization than it was the fruit of the German government’s wartime efforts to promote “national self-determination” (in an effort to detach Russia’s western borderlands) at a time when the Russian empire was most vulnerable. The latter’s collapse in 1917, followed by the defeat of the Reich in November 1918 and the heroic efforts of the soldiers who fought in the Balts’ wars of independence, made that independence a reality. Once independence was established, it then fell to the new governments to define citizenship. In none of the Baltic countries did citizenship depend on ethnicity; while it was clear that these were Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian national states, all inhabitants regardless of nationality were granted citizenship and cultural rights. However, the fact that the wealthier landowners—primarily Germans in Latvia and Estonia and Poles and Russians in Lithuania—were forced to surrender much of their land in what amounted to perhaps the most sweeping land reforms ever undertaken by democratic governments, may be interpreted as an attempt by the new governments to strike at the political and economic power of the former elites. While members of national minorities were still allowed to publish their own newspapers, organize their own political parties, and participate in public life, these rights were narrowed in the 1930s under the dictatorships of Smetona, Ulmanis, and Päts. Likewise, just as the monuments that were erected in Baltic cities during the interwar era (most notably, the towering Freedom Monument that stands in the heart of R¯ıga) highlighted the cultural and political achievements of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peoples, almost to the exclusion of the national minorities, so was education increasingly patriotic in content, emphasizing the rural values of the native peoples. Selected Bibliography Eglitis, D. S. 2002. Imagining the Nation: History, Modernity, and Revolution in Latvia. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press. Krickus, R. J. 1997. Showdown: The Lithuanian Rebellion and the Breakup of the Soviet Empire. Washington, DC: Brassey’s. Lane, T. 2002. Lithuania: Stepping Westward. New York: Routledge. Lieven, A. 1993. The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.


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Misiunas, R., and R. Taagepera. 1993. The Baltic States: Years of Dependence. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. O’Connor, K. 2003. The History of the Baltic States. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Pabriks, A., and A. Purs. 2002. Latvia: The Challenges of Change. New York: Routledge. Page, S. 1959. The Formation of the Baltic States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Plakans, A. 1995. The Latvians: A Short History. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Raun, T. U. 1987. Estonia and the Estonians. 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Senn, A. E. 1990. Lithuania Awakening. Berkeley: University of California Press. Smith, D. J. 2002. Estonia: Independence and European Integration. New York: Routledge. Vardys, S., and J. Sedaitis. 1997. Lithuania: The Rebel Nation. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.


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Bulgaria Antonina Zhelyazkova Chronology 632–665 Old Great Bulgaria, situated in the lands north of the Caucasus, the Black Sea, and the Sea of Azov. 681–1018 First Bulgarian Khanate/Kingdom on the Balkan Peninsula. 855 Cyril and Methodius invented the Slavonic Script (Church Slavonic Alphabet). 864 Bulgarians accepted Eastern Orthodox Christianity. 918 The Bulgarian archbishopric is promoted to patriarchate; Simeon the Great is crowned as king. 1018–1185 Byzantine rule. 1185 The Petar and Asen uprising; the restoration of the Bulgarian state. 1185–1396 Second Bulgarian Kingdom. 1204 Bulgaria and the Roman Catholic Church unite. 1205 The western knights of the Fourth Crusade are defeated near Adrianople (Edirne) by King Kaloyan’s army. 1396–1878/1912 Ottoman rule. 1406–1409 Uprising against the Ottomans led by Konstantin and Fruzhin. 1443–1444 Crusades led by Vladislaus III of Varna (Władysław Warnen´ czyk). 1651 The first printed Bulgarian-language book Abagar, edited by Philip Stanislavov, is published in Rome. 1688 Chiprovtsi uprising in the northwestern Bulgarian territories as part of the Holy League war against the Ottoman Empire. 18th–19th centuries The beginning of modern Bulgarian history; Bulgarian national revival. 1762 The book Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya (Slavic-Bulgarian History) is written by Father Paisii. 1860 The Bulgarian church separates from the Constanstinople Patriarchate. 1873 (February 19) Vasil Levski is hanged in Sofia. 1877–1878 Russian-Turkish liberation war. 1878 (March 3) Russia and the Ottoman Empire sign the San Stefano Peace Treaty. 1878–1944 Modern Bulgarian history. 1879 (April 16) Founding Assembly in Tarnovo; the Tarnovo Constitution of the Principality of Bulgaria is adopted. 1885 (September 6) Unification of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia. 1908 (September 22) The government of Aleksandar Malinov declares the independence of Bulgaria. 1912 (October 5) Beginning of the First Balkan War. 1913 (June 16) Beginning of the Second Balkan War. 1919 (November 27) Bulgaria and the Allied Powers sign the Peace Treaty of Neuilly. 1940 (September 7) Bulgaria and Romania sign the Craiova Treaty under which Bulgaria regains Southern Dobrudzha. 1941 (March 1) Bulgaria joins the Axis. 1944 (September 9) A coup d’état in Sofia brings a Fatherland Front Government to power.


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1944–1989 1946 1947 1971 1989

1990 1991 2004 2007

Socialist system under Soviet influence. (September 8) The monarchy is abolished through referendum. (December 4) The constitution of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria is adopted. (May 16) A new, third Bulgarian constitution is adopted. (November 10) The Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party removes Todor Zhivkov from the position of secretary general. Democratic changes are seen after 1989. (June 10–17) First democratic elections take place in contemporary Bulgaria. (July 12) The constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria is adopted by the Grand National Assembly. (March 29) Bulgaria joins NATO. (January 1) Bulgaria accedes to the European Union.

Situating the Nation The Ottoman Turks conquered the Second Bulgarian Kingdom in 1396, making it a Balkan province of the Ottoman Empire until 1878. The Bulgarian nation was formed in southeastern Europe, in the regions of Moesia, Thrace, and Macedonia, and populated predominantly by ethnic Bulgarians. The Bulgarian national revival and the consolidation of the Bulgarian nation occurred approximately three centuries after the European Renaissance, being delayed by the rule of the Ottoman Empire over the Balkan Peninsula. The book Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya (Slavic-Bulgarian History), written by Father Paisii in 1762, is considered the starting point of the Bulgarian revival. The Bulgarian revival had its unique features, but there were also similarities with the processes and phenomena among the other nations of central and southeastern Europe, which each had similarly subordinated status under the rule of the Austrian-Hungarian, Ottoman, and Russian empires. During the 18th and 19th centuries, the traditional Ottoman feudal economic system began to disintegrate. Bulgarians and other subjugated peoples in the Balkans, encouraged by influences from western Europe, used these new conditions for their own economic development. As a consequence, social and political changes occurred in the Bulgarian territories and society. Over the early period of the Ottoman rule, there were no specific social or class differences within the Bulgarian society. Regardless of their residence (city, town, and village) and economic status (rich or poor), all Bulgarians had the basic social characteristic of reaya (“conquered subjects”). As a result of economic development, differentiation and stratification began and a bourgeois structure developed. A civil society was born, which started to set up its own educational, cultural, and religious institutions (i.e., schools, cultural centers, and church boards). The newly formed bourgeoisie and intelligentsia understood the desire and need of the Bulgarian nation for, in the first place, education and religious services in the Bulgarian language and, in the long run, for national emancipation (not all were N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Father Paisii Father Paisii was born in the town of Bansko in 1722. In 1745, he became a monk in the Holy Monastery of Hilendarion in Mount Athos. In the libraries of Athos monasteries and during his travels across the Ottoman Empire, he found many documents related to Bulgarian history. As a result of his research, Paisii wrote the book Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya (Slavic-Bulgarian History) in 1762. He started to distribute it among Bulgarians. The book represents an idealized history of Bulgarians. At the time it was written, the book made an enormous contribution to the revival of Bulgarian self-confidence, hope, and patriotism. The book is considered the starting point of the Bulgarian revival.

convinced that independence from the Ottomans was the best solution for Bulgarians). The bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, becoming the main driving force of the Bulgarian nation, entered into conflict with the Ottoman authorities and the Greek Patriarchate, seated in Istanbul. The Bulgarian state was reestablished after the war between Russia and Turkey (1877–1878). A number of wars and armed conflicts among the various actors in the Balkans followed during the subsequent decades. After the end of World War I, Austria-Hungary disintegrated and the territory of the peninsula was divided among Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, and Turkey (only a small part of its former territorial possessions). This relative status quo was not considered as final by any of the Balkan states. All of them were dissatisfied with the outcome and had territorial claims against their neighbors.

Instituting the Nation The modern Bulgarian nation was built on the following foundations: the Bulgarian language, the Eastern Orthodox religion, historical and cultural traditions, a common national consciousness, and a unified national market. These developments occurred while Bulgarians were still under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. After much debate about the future of the Bulgarian nation and the course it should take, the idea that it is essential for Bulgarians to form their own free and independent state was accepted by the Bulgarian intelligentsia. The struggle for education in Bulgarian language and a separate Bulgarian church, independent from the Greek Patriarchate, became a nationwide project and marked the start of the Bulgarian National and Cultural Revival. Bulgarians thus started to fight for national self-definition and separation from the other communities in the Ottoman Empire. For most of the Ottoman period, the only education in Bulgarian language was done in unofficial village schools, known as “chamber schools” due to their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Bulgarians perform in traditional costume during Trifon Zarezan (Vine Grower’s Day) in the village of Ilindenci. This festival celebrates wine and includes rituals for an abundant grape harvest. (EPA Photo/Mladen Antonov)

small size. The first important success in the struggle for Bulgarian education was the establishment of a network of Bulgarian secular schools, starting in the 1820s. Printed media in the Bulgarian language appeared as well. This educational development strengthened the Bulgarian intellectual elite, the nucleus of which became the school teachers. In an attempt to arrest the Bulgarian revival, the Turkish authorities tried to merge Turkish and Bulgarian schools into a unified system of Ottoman schools during the 1860s. The attempt failed because of the resistance of the entire Bulgarian community. The second important step for instituting the Bulgarian nation was the establishment of the independent Bulgarian church. The fight for religious independence was fought against the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul. Creation of a separate Bulgarian church was seen as a necessary step for the recognition of Bulgarians as a separate community in the Ottoman Empire. The third step in the development was the Bulgarian movement for national liberation, which reached its climax in the period after the Crimean War (1853–1856) due to the activity of its four most prominent leaders: Georgi Rakovski, Luben Karavelov, Vasil Levski, and Hristo Botev. In the two decades preceding the national liberation, Bulgarians carried out their most extensive attempts to overthrow the foreign rule. They organized revolutionary committees and armed groups. After the Stara Zagora (1875) and the April (1876) uprisings, numerous N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Bulgarians participated in the war between Russia and Turkey (1877–1878). The result of the war was the restoration of the Bulgarian state. The political representatives of the Bulgarian nation (monarch, government, political parties, other organizations) reached a consensus that the main political objective after the liberation was the restoration of the San Stefano Bulgaria (see below). Gradually, this new national project transformed into a chauvinistic idea of “United” (in fact, Greater) Bulgaria. The idea reached its climax in the 1930s and 1940s. According to liberal-thinking Bulgarians (experts, intellectuals, and common people), the idea of Greater Bulgaria was a manifestation of “Greater Bulgarian Chauvinism.” The historical myth of Greater Bulgaria went even beyond the boundaries of the San Stefano Bulgaria, as it was underlain by the idea to achieve possession of the national territories reigned by Simeon I the Great (893–927). During the reign of Simeon, Bulgaria possessed the largest territories in its history, spreading out to the Mediterranean, Black, and Adriatic seas. The favorite nationalistic and especially extreme chauvinistic slogan during the 1930s and 1940s was “Bulgaria bordering on three seas!” Today this idea does not include aggression or territorial claims against the other Balkan states. It supports the Bulgarian national selfconfidence, especially in periods of crisis, carrying in itself memories of Bulgaria being, even for a short time, the third-largest and strongest state in Europe.

Defining the Nation The San Stefano Bulgaria became a key issue for Bulgarian history, nation, and nationalism, and represented the essence of the so-called Bulgarian National Question. The only time Bulgarian state borders coincided with its real ethnic borders was the period immediately after the conclusion of the peace treaty of San Stefano in March 1878. According to the treaty, the Bulgarian state was reestablished as an autonomous and tributary principality with a Christian government and its own army. The newly liberated state included Northern Bulgaria with the exception of Northern Dobrudja, which became part of Romania; the entire region of Thrace, without the regions of Gümülcine and Edirne; and the entire region of Macedonia, without the regions of Thessaloniki and the Halkidiki Peninsula. On July 1, 1878, the Berlin Peace Treaty was signed. The newly liberated Bulgaria was divided into five parts. The autonomous Principality of Bulgaria included only Northern Bulgaria and the region of Sofia. Southern Bulgaria became an autonomous province within the borders of the Ottoman Empire under the name of Eastern Rumelia. The regions of Thrace and Macedonia remained Turkish territories. The lands in the regions of Niš, Pirot, and Vranje became a part of Serbia. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Before the restoration of the Bulgarian state, the phrase “the Bulgarian National Question” generally stood for the issue of the national unification of all territories that were historically populated by Bulgarians. The main ethno-cultural features, shared by people belonging to the Bulgarian ethnos, were common language (Bulgarian), common religion (Orthodox Christianity), and common historical traditions. During the first decades after the liberation of Bulgaria (1878–1912), the Bulgarian National Question transformed into a struggle for cultural and political emancipation of the Bulgarian nation. The newly liberated state had three objectives: First, the restoration of the Bulgarian monarchy as continuation of the political tradition of the medieval Bulgarian state. Second, the establishment of Bulgarian state institutions to defend national interests and sovereignty. And third, the consolidation of the Bulgarian nation and preservation of its national character based on cultural traditions, historical memory, and self-confidence, all stemming from the tradition of statehood, dating back to the year 681. The San Stefano Peace Treaty came about as a result of Russian efforts. Thus, the majority of Bulgarians viewed Russia not just as a Great Power but also as a liberator to whom respect and gratitude should be paid. In the following decades, Bulgarians and their political leaders started gradually to divide into “Russophile” and “Russophobe” factions. The Russophiles defended the idea that Bulgarians should be forever grateful to Russians for the liberation. The Russophobes were of the opinion that Russia had been pursuing nothing but its own imperial interests and accused it of unwillingness to protect the Bulgarian interests against the other Great Powers. However, both factions supported the idea that the San Stefano Bulgaria had to be restored.

Narrating the Nation The official holidays in Bulgaria can serve as an excellent example of the national ideals of Bulgarians. March 3, 1878, the date on which the San Stefano Peace Treaty was signed, became fundamental to the historical mythology of Bulgarians. The day continued to be commemorated during the Communist rule, but the official state holiday became September 9, 1944 (the date when the Communists took power). After the fall of Communist rule, a debate began on the significance of the date of March 3. Some right-wing politicians considered that on this day, Bulgaria permanently entered the orbit of Russian imperial interests. For them, this date was humiliating because the liberation from Turkish rule had been part of the Russian imperial strategy and had not been achieved through the efforts of Bulgarians themselves. On the other hand, the larger part of the nation had pro-Russian feelings, being grateful to Russia for its war against the Ottoman Empire. Most of the population did not want to forget the date when N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the Bulgarian national project had been accomplished at least for a short period of time. During the democratic changes after 1989, two more dates were introduced as official national holidays: September 6, 1885 (Unification of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia), and September 22, 1908 (Declaration of Independence of Bulgaria). A holiday accepted and loved by the entire Bulgarian nation is May 24, the day dedicated to the Holy Brothers Constantine—Cyril and Methodius. Since the 1850s, May 24 has been officially celebrated as the Day of Bulgarian Education and Culture and of Slavonic Script (initially only as a church holiday and after the liberation as an official state holiday). From the very beginning, the celebration dedicated to St. Cyril and St. Methodius has been the most important holiday in Bulgaria, equally respected and approved by all segments of Bulgarian society. The greatest national hero of the Bulgarian nation is Vasil Levski. His death is commemorated on February 14, when his monument in the center of the capital Sofia—the place where Levski was hanged by the Ottoman authorities in 1873— is covered with flowers. Vasil Levski is the symbol of the national ideal for freedom, chastity, honesty, honor, and loyalty to national interests. The Bulgarian minorities respect Vasil Levski as well, because he was the first to formulate the idea that the future free Bulgaria had to be a republic where all ethnic and religious communities should live in equality and freedom. Two most emblematic and important poets, writers, and journalists from the Revival period are Hristo Botev and Ivan Vazov. Botev is commonly referred to as “the poet and revolutionary” and Vazov as “the patriarch of the Bulgarian litera-

Vasil Levski Considered by many to be the greatest Bulgarian national hero, Vasil Levski, was born on July 6, 1837, in the town of Karlovo. He left school and became a monk. In 1862, he left monasticism and went to Belgrade to join the Revolutionary Legion of Georgi Rakovski. Later, Levski returned to Bulgaria and worked as a teacher, but in 1867, he departed for Bucharest to reestablish relations with Rakovski. Selected to be a standard-bearer of an armed unit that was to be sent to fight for the liberation of Bulgaria, Levski realized that the failures of the liberation movement were caused mainly by the apathy within Bulgaria. He started to travel throughout the country trying to organize the population. Within a period of less than two years, Levski managed to create a network of revolutionary committees (the so-called Internal Revolutionary Organization). According to Levski, the objective of the organization was to start a revolution and to transform the existing tyranny to establish a democratic republic. Levski planned to create a “Chapel of Truth and Freedom,” which would mean an end to the Turkish, economically backward despotism, and the creation of a society where all people would live in agreement, freedom, and fraternity. Levski’s ideas actually introduced the values of the European bourgeois-democratic school in the National Liberation Movement and that made him a political leader of the Bulgarian revival. In 1873, Levski was arrested and sentenced to death by the Ottoman authorities.


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ture.” Botev’s poems glorify, mainly, the heroic efforts of Bulgarians to overthrow the Ottoman rule. As a journalist, he criticized Turkish authorities, on the one hand, and the weakness of the Bulgarian nation, unable to abolish foreign rule, on the other. In his verses, Vazov also praised the heroic resistance of Bulgarians against Turks. In addition, he wrote a novel (Under the Yoke), which is considered a cornerstone of Bulgarian literature. The novel is studied in elementary schools, high schools, and universities. Under the Yoke describes in detail the sufferings of Bulgarians under Ottoman rule, the gradual creation of educational, church, and revolutionary networks, and the enthusiasm and hope of the nation during the April Uprising of 1876 (one of the most important in Bulgarian history), which ended in a bloody defeat. The works of Botev and Vazov mirror general negative stereotypes regarding the period of Ottoman rule. The centuries of Ottoman rule are usually described as “the Five Dark Centuries of Bulgarian history,” and these perceptions played an important role in the formation of the Bulgarian national identity and consolidation of the nation. Their works established a number of national stereotypes that continue to exist in present times. According to these stereotypes, Bulgarians were forcibly prevented from developing their economy and culture; they were for centuries separated from the European, Christian civilization; and they developed a tendency to subordinate to the will of stronger nations. To counter this negative self-evaluation, Bulgarians created a mythical presentation of heroic freedom fighters (haidouks), who personified the Bulgarian resistance against Ottomans. The Bulgarian historiography has rarely made attempts to analyze objectively this period of Bulgarian history. The Ottoman rule over Bulgaria has always been viewed by literature and history from a romantic-sentimental perspective, with a significant degree of distortion of the historical facts of economic, social, and cultural life. Bulgarians have a whole spectrum of stereotypical self-evaluations, most of which are inaccurate. Bulgarians consider themselves to be extremely hardworking and highlight that as their main feature. The official social etiquette requires the individual to complain of poverty and hard life in order not to attract envy. In addition, Bulgarians consider themselves the “Prussians of the Balkans,” which is to say that they are disciplined, diligent, and temperate in emotions, that they strictly follow rules and orders, and that they are good soldiers. They also have pride as the creators of the Slavonic alphabet and view their culture as of one of the most ancient in Europe. The main works of the best Bulgarian social anthropologist, Ivan Hadjiiski (1907–1944), rebut these self-evaluations and describe Bulgarians as rather mediocre and envious, and as having a national inferiority complex. On the other hand, a number of positive qualities of Bulgarians are described: democratic potential, optimism and will for survival, discipline, constructive individualism, will for education and development, and capability of economic management. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation The initial period of building the state-political structure of the Third Bulgarian state was between 1878 and 1885. The period started and finished with remarkable events: the liberation of Bulgaria from Ottoman rule (1878) and the unification of the Principality of Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia (1885). This dynamic and important phase of the Bulgarian nation was marked by the adoption of the Tarnovo Constitution (April 16, 1879), by legislative and administrative activities, which created the foundations of state administration, economy, culture, education, and governance in the Principality of Bulgaria and in Eastern Rumelia, and also by active resistance against the decisions of the Berlin Congress. The Congress of Berlin established two states, both of them Bulgarian by national identity. Activists in Eastern Rumelia established relations with the government of the Principality, and a program for joint action in both formations and in Macedonia was created. A Bulgarian Secret Central Revolutionary Committee (BSCRC) was founded in Plovdiv (capital of Eastern Rumelia) in February 1885. The BSCRC followed the doctrine for joint actions in Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia in order for both territories to become part of the Principality of Bulgaria. On September 6, 1885, the units of the Rumelian militia arrested the governor of the region and disbanded the cabinet. An interim government was created, which declared general mobilization. The prince of Bulgaria, Alexander I (1879–1886), pronounced the unification and arrived in Eastern Rumelia. The 1885–1908 period also started and finished with two very important events for the Bulgarian nation. First, the nation defended the unification of the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia in a short war with Serbia, which convinced the Great Powers to recognize the unification. Second, in 1908, Bulgaria declared its state and political independence. During this period, the Bulgarian national ideology was finally shaped. The evolutionary line followed by prime ministers like Konstantin Stoilov (1887, 1894–1899) and Stefan Stambolov (1887–1894) laid the foundations for constructive foreign policy, systematic diplomatic efforts, and cultural integration of Bulgarians who had remained outside the borders of the Bulgarian state. The state policy for integration of the Bulgarian diaspora was actively supported by the Bulgarian church. Stambolov became one of the first Bulgarian politicians to try to separate Bulgaria from Russian influence and direct it toward Europe, through the implementation of liberal economic policy. In 1908, using the revolution of the Young Turks in the Ottoman Empire, Bulgarians effectively violated the despised Treaty of Berlin and proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria. This act (September 22, 1908) had a great influence over the national history. It was a continuation of the unification and a new step toward the completion of the project for full consolidation of the nation. A period of diplomatic activity preceding the Balkan wars followed. The dynamics of the historical events and the existing attitudes in society encouraged the Bulgarian N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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politicians to try to achieve the national and state project with the help of armed force, triggering the First Balkan War. The First Balkan War resulted in the liberation of a significant part of the peninsula from Ottoman rule and finalized the process of the restoration of the Balkan states. Bulgaria was on the verge of achieving national unification. Then the Second Balkan War started among the former allies. It dealt a heavy blow to Bulgarians, with thousands of victims (over 60,000) and great material damages. The heavy losses determined the foreign policy orientation of the country until the end of World War II. Governments, politicians, and people believed that with the support of foreign allies they could compensate for the defeat and continued to hope that the project of restoring the San Stefano Bulgaria could still be achieved. Along with the attempts to unite the Bulgarian nation—which at times bordered on irredentism—the state (and the Bulgarian nation as well) had to resolve numerous complex issues related to the fact that after their liberation, the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia were inhabited by different ethnic and religious communities. Apart from ethnic Bulgarians, Bulgarian-Muslims (Pomaks), Turks, Jews, Armenians, and Gypsies were recognized as indigenous peoples. The first Bulgarian Tarnovo Constitution included provisions envisaging protection of the interests of the minority members. Until 1989, despite the constitutional guarantees and the ideas of national leaders, such as Levski, the Bulgarian majority had not accepted the minorities, especially the Turkish one, as part of the nation. The minorities themselves felt insecure and marginalized, but they shared the Bulgarian political objectives and had taken part in all wars carried out for the achievement of these objectives. The ethnic and confessional issues were especially important for the Bulgarian nation in Thrace and Macedonia. The complex ethnic and religious relations were further influenced politically by the ambitions of the Balkan states and their intensive ethno-confessional propaganda. The Bulgarian historian Vasil Kunchov stated that religions were trying to substitute for nations. This was the political and ethnic situation in Bulgaria on the eve of World War I. After the outbreak of the war, the Bulgarian government declared neutrality. At the same time, the hope for a restoration of San Stefano Bulgaria was still alive, and the government was driven ever more closely to the Central Powers, which provided guarantees that in the case of military victory, Bulgaria would acquire the entirety of Macedonia. The wrong choice that Bulgaria made had heavy consequences, and the country was punished in the Peace Treaty of Neuilly after the war. This was the worst national disaster for Bulgarians: approximately 100,000 casualties and additional loss of territories. The peace system of Versailles, introduced by the victorious states, changed the very essence of the Bulgarian National Question. The aspirations for the unification of territories were replaced by the necessity for protection of Bulgarians abroad and the preservation of their national identity. For this reason, in the period between the two world wars, the Bulgarian state used diplomatic means to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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try to protect the rights of Bulgarian communities in other states, and it actively supported the international system of minority protection. Hoping to revise the Versailles system, Bulgaria joined the Axis and took the wrong side in World War II. With the support of Germany, Southern Dobrudja (being lost to Romania after the Second Balkan War) was returned to Bulgaria in 1940. On March 1, 1941, the Bulgarian prime minister officially signed the agreement for inclusion of Bulgaria in the war on the side of the Axis. The motivation of the Bulgarian political leaders was the possibility for them to again put on the agenda the resolution of Bulgarian national problems. This was the period when the “Greater Bulgarian Chauvinism” reached its climax. Despite that, there was no extreme anti-Semitism in Bulgaria, which became the only country to prevent the extradition of its 50,000 citizens of Jewish origin to the Nazi concentration camps. During the war, Bulgaria had administrative rule over Macedonia and Western Thrace, but they were not officially included within the borders of the Bulgarian state: 11,343 Jews from these territories were deported to the German concentration camps. As a result of its participation in World War II, Bulgaria managed to achieve only one goal of its utopian national program—it regained Southern Dobrudja. This final attempt for national unification therefore failed as well. Selected Bibliography Crampton, R. J. 1997. A Concise History of Bulgaria. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Daskalov, R. 2004. The Making of a Nation in the Balkans: Historiography of the Bulgarian Revival. Budapest, Hungary: CEU Press. Genchev, N. 1977. The Bulgarian National Revival Period. Sofia, Bulgaria: Sofia Press. Istoriya na Bulgaria. 1999. 3 vols. Sofia, Bulgaria: Izdatelska Kashta Anubis. Jelavich, B. 1983. History of the Balkans: 18th and 19th Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jelavich, B. 1993. History of the Balkans: Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Jelavich, C., and B. Jelavich. 1977. The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Rothschild, J. 1974. East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Roumiyana, Andreeva. 1998. Nacia I Nacionalism v Bulgarskata Istoriya. Sofia, Bulgaria: Paradigma. Stoicho, Grancharov. 2001. Balkanskiyat Sviyat. Iidei za Darzhavnost, Nacionalizmi I Razvitiya ot Nachaloto na XIX vek do Kraiya na Parvata Svetovna Voina. Sofia, Bulgaria: Izdatelstvo Damiyan Yakov. Todorova, M. 1995. “The Course and Discourse of Bulgarian Nationalism.” In Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, edited by P. Sugar, 55–102. Washington DC: American University Press.


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Czechoslovakia Maria Dowling Chronology 1880 Milan Rastislav Štefánik, the Slovak “founding father” of Czechoslovakia, is born. 1881 (June) Opening night of the Czech National Theatre in Prague. 1884 Edvard Beneš, the second Czech “founding father” of Czechoslovakia and its second president, is born. 1896 The Czechoslovak Union is formed. 1897 The Badeni language laws are enacted. 1905 The Slovak National Party is refounded. 1907 The Slovak League is founded in Pittsburgh. 1914 (August) World War I starts. (August 27) The Czecho-American Committee for Independence and the Support for the Czech Nation are formed in New York. (September 2) The Czech National Alliance is founded in Chicago; the Autumn Czech military unit is formed on Russian soil. (December) Masaryk, the founding father of Czechoslovakia, leaves Austria. 1915 (February) The first meetings of the “Mafia” (the home resistance) are held in Czech lands. (April 3) The 28th regiment surrenders to the Russians at Dukla. (November 14) The Czech Foreign Committee is formed in Paris. 1916 (February) The Czech Foreign Committee becomes the National Council of the Czech Lands. 1917 (July) The Battle of Zborov takes place. 1918 (February) Masaryk’s treaty with the Bolsheviks is signed. (May 1) The Slovaks declare at Liptovsky Sväty Mikulas in favor of the union with the Czechs. (May 24) Hlinka declares at Turciansky Sväty Martin in favor of the union with the Czechs. (June 19) Masaryk is received by President Woodrow Wilson. (June 30) The Pittsburgh convention takes place. (July 13) The French recognize the National Council. (August 9) The British recognize the National Council. (September 3) The United States recognizes the National Council. (October 28) The first Czechoslovak Republic is founded. (October 30) The Slovak National Council votes to join the new Republic. (November 5) Kramar proclaims the Republic in Prague. (November 14) The Provisional National Assembly formally deposes the Habsburgs and elects Masaryk as president by acclamation. (December) The eight-hour workday becomes law. (December 19) Scranton convention by Ruthene-Americans. (December 20) Masaryk comes home to the new Czechoslovak state. 1918–1920 Anabasis of the Czechoslovak legion in Russia. 1919 (January) The Paris Peace Conference opens. (April 9) The land expropriation law passed. (May) Štefánik dies. (September 10) Treaty of St. Germain with Austria is signed. 1920 (February) The new constitution of the Czechoslovak state. (February 29) The constitution is approved by the Provisional National Assembly. (April) The land compensation law is passed. (June 4) Treaty of Trianon with Hungary. (July) The child labor law is passed.


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1920–1921 (August to June) The Little Entente is created. 1921 (December) The Treaty of Austro-Czechoslovak friendship is signed. 1924 (January) Treaty of alliance with France is signed. (June) Sickness and accident insurance laws are passed. 1925 (October) Treaty of Locarno is signed. 1934 (September) German Nazis begin to subsidize Konrad Henlein. 1935 (May 16) Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty is signed. (May) Masaryk resigns; Beneš becomes president. 1937 (September) Masaryk dies. 1938 (March) Anschluss of Austria and Nazi Germany. (April 29) Henlein puts forth his Karlsbad Program. “May scare”—Czechoslovak mobilization. (August to September) Runciman mission to Prague. (September 15) Berchtesgaden meeting of Hitler and Chamberlain. (September 2) Godesberg meeting. (September 29–30) Munich conference and pact. (October) Beneš resigns as president, then goes abroad; the “Second Republic” (Czecho-slovakia) is proclaimed. (November 2) First Vienna award. 1939 (March 14–15) The Nazis invade Czech lands and establish the Protectorate of BohemiaMoravia. Slovakia declares independence. (October 28) Celebrations for Czechoslovak national day are broken up by Nazis—Jan Opletal, a student demonstrator, dies. (November 17) Peaceful student protests provide the pretext for Nazi reprisals and for closing Czech universities. 1940 Provisional British recognition of Czechoslovak government-in-exile. 1941 (June) The Nazis invade the Soviet Union. (July) Full British and Soviet recognition of Czechoslovak government-in-exile. (September) Reinhard Heydrich becomes the deputy Reichsprotektor (“imperial protector”). 1943 Heydrich is assassinated; Lidice and Lezahcekasarkaky are destroyed in the reprisal. 1945 (April) Beneš returns home in triumph; (May) World War II ends.

Situating the Nation Most unusually, the Czechoslovak nation was formed out of two close but distinct branches of the Slav family, which had experienced quite different histories. Both Slovakia and the Czech crown lands belonged to the Habsburg empire, which in 1867, transformed itself into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Even before the formal Ausgleich or Compromise, Slovakia formed part of Hungary whereas the Czech lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia were deemed to lie in the Austrian part of the empire. The economic circumstances of the two components of the nation were quite different. Slovakia was a mountainous, mainly agricultural country, while Bohemia had most of the industrial enterprise of the old empire. Indeed, Bohemia and Moravia held between 70 and 90 percent of the empire’s brewing, sugar refining, glass, ceramics, textile, leather, chemical, and paper industries, besides most of the coal-mining and construction industries. For the Czechs, Prague was the key place for the development of the nation; after all, it was the ancient capital of the historic Czech kingdom. Slovaks, too, recognized the importance of Prague. It was here that the Czechoslovak Union N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was founded in 1896, following the inclusion of Slovak displays in the Ethnographic Exhibition in Prague in 1895. The Union did its best to foster contacts between Czechs and Slovaks, encouraging Czech investment in Slovakia and supporting Slovak students in Prague, for example. It also sent books to Slovakia and published a review, Naše slovesnko (Our Slovakia), between 1907 and 1910. Similarly, a journal called Hlas (Voice) was founded by Slovak student followers of Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. For the Slovaks, Liptovsky Sväty Mikulas and Turciansky Sväty Martin came to play key roles in the development of the Czechoslovak nation. The former was the place where a declaration was read out by Vavro Šrobár on May 1, 1918, in which the Slovaks declared themselves in favor of a union with the Czechs. Indeed, this declaration demanded self-determination for all subject peoples of Austria-Hungary, including “the Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak family.” It preceded by more than a month the Pittsburgh Convention between AmericanSlovaks and Czechs. On May 24, 1918, the Slovak National Party met at Turciansky Sväty Martin. Its leader, Andrej Hlinka, declared that the thousand-year marriage with the Magyars had failed, and he urged his followers to seek the Czechoslovak orientation. The Slovak National Council meeting in the same place declared on October 30, 1918, that Slovakia should join the Czechs in the new independent Czechoslovak Republic. It must be said that the social context of the birth of the nation varied between Czechs and Slovaks. With the former, the nationalists were solidly bourgeois; with the latter, whose bourgeoisie was tiny, nationalists were equally to be found among the peasantry. There were strong historic reasons for both sociopolitical developments. In Slovakia, where conditions were not conducive to the formation of a large bourgeoisie, the native aristocracy had long been either Magyar or Magyarone (that is, Slovaks who hoped to pass for Hungarians). In the Czech lands, defeat at the Battle of White Mountain in 1620 had resulted in

Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937) Masaryk was born in 1850 in Moravia to a Czech mother and a Slovak father. His father was a coachman, his mother had been a domestic servant. Accordingly, he was apprenticed in turn to a locksmith and a blacksmith, although his unusual intellectual gifts came to be recognized. He was a pupil-teacher in a high school and spent four years as a student in the grammar school in Brno before going to Vienna. His lowly background meant that he was rejected for a career in diplomacy and politics, so he became a professor, going in 1883 to Prague to teach in the Czech branch of Charles University. He sat in the Austrian parliament from 1891 to 1893 as a delegate for the Young Czech Party, and in 1907, after the introduction of universal manhood suffrage into Austria (though not Hungary), he sat again as a deputy for his own Realist Party. He married a Danish-American, Charlotte Garrigue, and adopted her surname as his middle name. Masaryk was above all a democrat, seeing democracy as the only political system consonant with the dignity of humankind.


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the execution, exile, and dispossession of the native, Protestant nobility and their replacement with foreign Catholics, most of them German-speaking. The historic context of the birth of the Czechoslovak nation is a complex one. On the one hand, the Czechs had a recorded history as an independent entity, with their own king and unique branch of Christianity, Hussitism. Czech independence had ended with White Mountain, when the rebellious kingdom was declared to be a hereditary possession of the ruling Habsburg. With the “national awakening” of the late 18th and early 19th centuries came the desire for Czech independence, or at least autonomy within the Habsburg empire. There arose, too, a desire for union with the Slovaks. On the other hand, the Slovaks had no recorded independent history. Their country had been overrun by the Magyars ca. 1000, when the empire of Great Moravia was destroyed. Thereafter, Slovakia was designated as “Upper Hungary.” During the 19th century, the Slovaks were subject to a particularly brutal program of Magyarization, prompted by fear of pan-Slavism and of increased Russian influence in the region. As a result, from 1867 until the foundation of Czechoslovakia there were no state secondary schools for Slovaks in Slovakia. The Elisabeth University in Bratislava was only for Magyars and magyarized Slovaks. In 1874, the three Slovak gymnasia were dissolved, as was the Matica Slovenska, the national cultural institution. The Slovaks were so poorly represented in the parliament in Budapest that in 1916 Edvard Beneš was able to claim that there was only one parliamentary deputy for 3 million Slovaks.

Instituting the Nation There were three founding fathers of Czechoslovakia, two Czechs and one Slovak. Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk (1850–1937) was the senior member of the triumvirate. In 1918, he became the first president of the new state, and was known as the “president liberator.” In his work of foundation and liberation, he was helped by two younger men, the Czech Edvard Beneš and the Slovak Milan Rastislav Štefánik. Broadly speaking, it might be said that Štefánik helped Masaryk in a military and Beneš in a political and propagandist capacity. Originally, Masaryk was a proponent of Palacký’s theory of Austro-Slavism, which saw the empire as the shelter of small nations caught between the twin giants of czarist Russia and a Germany that seemed to be on the point of unification. As Palacký observed in 1848, if Austria had not existed, it would have been necessary to invent it. Masaryk, however, realized the shortcomings of Austrian and Hungarian justice toward the Slavonic peoples of the empire when he intervened in the 1909 Zagreb “treason trial” of South Slavs, who had allegedly plotted against the empire, to show that evidence against the accused had been fabricated. It can have come as little surprise to Masaryk to learn in December 1914 that the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Edvard Beneš (1884 –1948) Edvard Beneš was a Czech and was born to a peasant family in 1884. He gained two doctorates in law, one in Czech and the other in French, and while studying in Paris wrote for the Czech press. In September 1915, he joined Masaryk in Switzerland after a dramatic escape from Austrian territory. He succeeded Masaryk as second president of Czechoslovakia upon the former’s resignation in 1935, having spent the previous two decades being concerned with Czechoslovakia’s foreign-policy orientation. Although he had a dry temperament very different from Masaryk’s, eventually he won the people’s respect, if not affection, and was accorded the title of “president constructor.” It was Beneš’s fate to preside over the Munich agreement, which in effect sold Czechoslovakia to Hitler, and over the February coup by Czechoslovak Communists in 1948.

war would make no difference to the Habsburg policies toward the Slavonic peoples; he immediately left Austrian soil, never to return. The task facing the Czechoslovaks in building their state during World War I was a daunting one. Technically, both the leadership abroad and any common soldier who defected to the Allied side were considered traitors to Austria-Hungary. Moreover, though their actions might win praise from the Allies, they had at best a nuisance value, and there was a very lively fear that the Allies would make a separate peace with Austria-Hungary in which the rights of the subject nations would be ignored. Consequently, it was essential to earn some form of official recognition for leadership from the Allies. Accordingly, the Czech Foreign Committee was formed in Paris on November 14, 1915. During February 1916, this committee became the National Council of the Czech Lands, with Masaryk as president, Štefánik and Jaroslav Dürich as vice presidents, and Beneš as general secretary. Later that year, however, Dürich set up a rival puppet Czech committee in Petrograd under the auspices of the czarist authorities, though this body was repudiated by the revolutionary Russian provisional government in February 1917. A month earlier, the Allied war aims had included for the first time the liberation of the “Czechoslovaks.” Full recognition of the Paris Council as the legitimate representative of the home populations only came quite late, however. France recognized it as such on July 13, 1918; Great Britain followed suit on August 9. U.S. recognition did not come until September 3, 1918. The final component that instituted the nation was the Czech and Slovak emigration, particularly in North America. Almost 3,000 Czech- and Slovak-Americans joined the Czechoslovak legion in France, with others serving in Italy and Russia. After the entry of the United States into the war in April 1917, about 40,000 Americans of Slovak and Czech origin served in the American armed forces. Even more important than this military contribution was the political role of the emigration. On August 27, 1914, a Czecho-American Committee for Independence and Support of the Czech Nation was formed in New York, and on N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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September 2, the Czech National Alliance was founded in Chicago, its first congress was held in Cleveland, Ohio, on January 15, 1915. The Slovak League had been founded in Pittsburgh as early as 1907. Originally, it had aimed at autonomy for Slovaks within Hungary; but in October 1914, its chairman wrote a newspaper article proclaiming that a “United States” of Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia would be best for the Slovaks. American-Czechs and -Slovaks were influential in determining the shape of the new country. On June 30, 1915, Masaryk signed the Pittsburgh Convention with Czech- and Slovak-Americans. This agreed on the union of Czechs and Slovaks, with an autonomous administration, representative assembly, and judicial system for Slovakia. Similarly, the Ruthene-Americans were determined to free their homeland from Magyar rule. Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia (sub-Carpathian Russia, Carpatho-Ukraine) was a poor and backward region of Hungary inhabited by Slavs who were ethnically close to the Ukrainians. On December 19, 1918, the Ruthene-Americans decided at Scranton, Pennsylvania, to join the new state of Czechoslovakia on a federative basis. The leaders of the home Ruthenes decided to bring their land into the Czechoslovak Republic on May 8, 1919.

Tomas Masaryk signs the freedom declaration from Austria-Hungary at the close of World War I, thus creating the new nation of Czechoslovakia. He would lead the country as its first president from 1918 through 1935. (National Archives and Records Administration)


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Defining the Nation On October 28, 1918, a bloodless revolution took place in Prague. The Austrian authorities bowed to the inevitability of defeat and handed over power to representatives of the new nation. But what was the nation in 1918? The inhabitants of Czechoslovakia in 1918 were about 3 million Czechs, 2 million Slovaks, over 3 million Bohemian Germans, 750,000 Hungarians, 500,000 Ruthenes, and about 80,000 Poles. The provisional constitution of November 13, 1918, defined the nation as the Czechoslovaks, the language as Czechoslovak, with all other ethnicities being defined as national minorities. The national idea was connected with both objective, ethno-cultural arguments and with subjective, voluntaristic arguments, such as the will of the people. There was a fundamental debate in 1918 about the form of government the Czechoslovaks would adopt. Some statesmen, such as Karel Kramáˇr, were in favor of making the new state a principality under a Romanov. In the end, however, Masaryk’s republicanism prevailed, and Kramáˇr himself announced the establishment of the First Czechoslovak Republic on November 5, 1918. There was, however, conflict between different cultural orientations in the development of the national idea; in particular, between Czechs and Slovaks. Naturally enough, the Czechs saw themselves as the “elder brother” of the nation, who would give the benefit of their long experience of self-rule and of parliamentary opposition to the Habsburgs to the “younger brothers,” the Slovaks and Ruthenes. Naturally, too, the Slovaks resented this assumption of superiority and the colonization of Slovakia by well-meaning doctors, nurses, teachers, entrepreneurs, and engineers. The incomers were meant to bring the Slovak economy and standards of living, health care, and education up to Czech levels after the long neglect of all these areas by the dominant Hungarians. Nonetheless, the Slovak People’s Party under Andrej Hlinka continued to campaign vociferously for Slovak autonomy. A Catholic priest and a passionate patriot, Hlinka had spent time in Hungarian jails for his opposition to Magyarization and espousal of Slovak autonomy. Under the Czechoslovak Republic, he felt increasingly bitter that the provisions of the Pittsburgh Convention, which had outlined plans for Slovak autonomy, were not implemented. In August 1919, he tried to raise the question of Slovak autonomy at the Paris Peace Conference, and was jailed briefly for his pains on his return to Czechoslovakia. His relations with the Prague government remained stormy until his death in 1938. His political testament of August 1938, however, stated unequivocally that the Czechoslovak Republic was the natural homeland of the Slovaks. This was at a time when the Republic was under attack, not just from German and Hungarian, but also from Slovak separatists. In spatial terms, Czechoslovakia was composed of the historic Czech lands of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, with Slovakia, and Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Thus, the Czechs utilized both historic-right arguments and romantic nationalism when staking their claim to a homeland with the Slovaks at Paris in 1919.

Narrating the Nation The Czech national myth played a huge part in the narrative of the nation. This posited a “golden age” under the emperor and king of Bohemia, Karel IV, in the far-off 14th century. This happy, prosperous time had been followed by the tempestuous period of the Hussite revolution, when all the forces of Catholic Europe tried unsuccessfully to subjugate the heroic, dissenting Czechs. Indeed, Jan Hus himself was something of a rallying point for Czechoslovaks, or at least for Czechs. July 6, 1915, marked the 500th anniversary of his martyrdom at the Council of Constance; Masaryk took the opportunity to give a public lecture on Hus in Geneva, which would raise the flag of revolt for Slovaks as well as Czechs. The great Hus monument, on Old Town Square in Prague, had been commissioned for this anniversary, but when the Austrians refused permission for an official unveiling ceremony, Czech patriots protested by covering the statue in flowers. The importance of Hus as a national hero to the Czechs was not lost on the Habsburgs nor on the Nazi Germans, who during World War II covered the statue in swastika flags in a particularly insulting gesture. The next major event in the Czech national myth is the Thirty Years’ War, which began in 1618 with the revolt of the Czech Protestant nobility against the Habsburgs. The war ended for the Czechs in 1620, with defeat in the Battle of White Mountain just outside Prague. This defeat was followed by “three hundred years of darkness,” during which (according to the myth) the Austrians tried systematically to wipe out the Czech language and to deprive the Czechs of all national and religious rights. This darkness was only pierced by two things: the national awakening of the late 18th and early 19th centuries and the revolutions of 1848. These were the only two historical memories the Slovaks could share. The national awakening saw the revival of both languages—Czech and Slovak—and the birth of Czechoslovakism. It was the Slovak poet Jan Kollár and the Slovak scholar Pavol Jozef Šafàrík who first outlined the close relationship between Czechs and Slovaks. Ironically, though, the Slovak hero of 1848, L’udvit Štúr, was against the idea of union with the Czechs. Between the wars, Czechoslovakia was presented as the “bridge between East and West”; this accorded well with its foreign policy, which strove for accommodation with Stalin’s Soviet Union as well as with the Western democracies. It was stressed, however, that historically and culturally the country lay in the democratic camp, and it was also presented as a bulwark against Nazi barbarism. By the time of the First Czechoslovak Republic, the sense of identity as Czechoslovaks was expressed by the double national anthem. The first part was N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the haunting Czech air, “Where Is My Home?”; the second part was formed of the stirring “Hymn of the Slovaks.” For Czechs, there was also other music, such as Smetana’s symphonic poem “Ma Vlast” (“My Country”).

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The catalyst for the creation of the nation was the collapse of Austria-Hungary in World War I; in World War II the catalyst was the need to preserve the nation from extinction. During World War I, a key component in mobilizing and building the nation was the behavior of the troops on the Eastern Front, culminating in the celebrated “anabasis” of the Czechoslovak Legion through Russia in 1918–1920. This epic journey, when Czechs fought their way across Russia to Vladivostok, was used as a national symbol of the indomitable nature of the Czechs. A Czech military unit was first formed on Russian soil in the autumn of 1914. These Russians of Czech origin were soon joined by volunteer prisoners of war. Men were surrendering wholesale to the Russians, the most spectacular incident being the desertion of the entire 28th Regiment (“the children of Prague”) at Dukla in Slovakia on April 3, 1915. The czarist authorities were determined that the Czech and Slovak troops in Russia should take Russian nationality and be under the command of Russian officers. All this changed with the February Revolution of 1917. What really established the Czechoslovaks’ right to exist as a separate military force was their performance at the Battle of Zborov in July 1917, which resulted in indisputable victory. The Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917 naturally complicated matters for the legion, which now called itself the “First Czechoslovak Infantry Division of Hussites.” Masaryk, however, was determined that his troops should pass from Russia to the Western Front, and accordingly in February 1918 an agreement was signed with the Bolsheviks. This agreement recognized the legion’s existence as an independent army and guaranteed its armed neutrality and its right to leave for France. Thus began the famous anabasis, later described by Lloyd George as one of the greatest epics of history. The troops journeyed from western Russia and Ukraine to Vladivostok in the far east. The Russian civil war had started, and both Whites and Reds were anxious to make use of Czechoslovak military expertise, though the Czechoslovaks wished to remain above Russian affairs and simply to regain their homeland. Thus, the legion fought its way along the trans-Siberian railway, alternately engaging with Reds and Whites. The first troop transport left Vladivostok on December 9, 1919, and the whole operation was completed by November 30, 1920. Czechoslovaks were seen as the nation; all other ethnic groups, especially the Germans and Hungarians, were merely “national minorities.” The rights of minorities were safeguarded in a minority treaty that every state was bound to sign as part of the settlement of the Paris Peace Conference. It seems that Czechoslovakia N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was more scrupulous than most nations in adhering to this treaty; even so, there were many complaints to the League of Nations at Geneva about infringements of minority rights, largely in terms of language and the land reform. Besides the national minorities, Slovak separatists continued to campaign for independence, or at least autonomy, from the Czechs. Much use was made of national holidays, especially the anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia, October 28. A particular focus of patriotism was the Sokol (“falcon”), a gymnastic movement founded in 1862 by Miroslav Tyrs (1832–1884) and Jindˇrich Fugner (1822–1864). The aim of Sokol, according to its statutes, was the revival of the homeland through the education of spirit as well as body, through physical energy, art, and science. The annual slet, or mass display of gymnasts, held every September, was often an occasion of nationalist and democratic demonstration. This was particularly the case in 1938, and would be again in 1948. Small wonder, then, that it was one of the first national organizations to be banned by the invading Nazis. Most Czech national monuments date from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For reasons of Magyarization, there are no corresponding Slovak national monuments of the same era. The National Theatre (Narodni Divadlo) in Prague demonstrates well the cultural aspect of the Czech national struggle. The building was financed by voluntary subscriptions from all towns and villages throughout the Czech lands, as the Habsburgs declined to fund it. Thus, the motto on the proscenium arch, which states that the theater is a gift from the nation to itself. The foundation stones were gathered from places of historic importance and were laid in 1868 by František Palacký and Bedˇrich Smetana. The latter’s patriotic opera Libu˘se was performed on the opening night in June 1881. Two months later the theater burned down, but the Czechs merely collected more money, and started to rebuild. ˚ m) in Prague was designed as a cultural cenThe municipal house (Obecní du ter for the Czech population (as opposed to the German). Completed in 1911, it is a jewel of art nouveau. The Czechoslovak declaration of independence was signed here on October 28, 1918. Cubism also flourished in Prague on the eve of independence. One of the more notable architectural examples is the House of the Black Madonna on Celetna in the Old Town. Designed as a department store by Josef Gocar, one of the foremost Czech Cubists, it was completed in 1911–1912. The Germans were, of course, a large national minority within Czechoslovakia. Even more than the Austrians proper, the Bohemian-Germans found it hard to accept the reality of defeat in World War I. They refused to participate in the establishment of the new Czechoslovak state, and instead tried to link their fortunes with those of Austria. When this met with opposition from the Allies as well as the Czechoslovaks, the Bohemian-Germans’ attitude was one of reticence, from which they only emerged briefly in the mid-1920s. This period of “activism” saw Germans participating in government, but the economic depression of the 1930s, coinciding as it did with the rise of the Nazis in neighboring Germany, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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made a more extreme reaction to Czechoslovakia much more attractive. Thus, when Konrad Henlein and the Sudeten-German Party, backed politically and financially by Hitler, made increasingly impossible demands for autonomy on the Prague government, the majority of Bohemian-Germans applauded. These demands and Allied diplomatic activity culminated in the infamous Munich Conference of September 29–30, 1938. By the pact of Munich, 11,000 square miles of Czechoslovak territory were ceded to the Third Reich by the French and British. The Czechoslovaks were not consulted, nor even present. From the Munich Pact to 1945, the political goal of the Czechoslovaks was quite simply the survival of the nation. Czechoslovak democracy would be maintained by a government-in-exile led by President Edvard Beneš, even in the face of foreign occupation and dismemberment of the country. The Czech lands were occupied and became, in name and fact, a German protectorate; Slovakia was persuaded to declare independence and became, in fact though not in name, a German protectorate. To this end, Beneš and the government used a variety of propaganda themes: the call to history; the juridical continuity of the First Republic; Czechoslovakia’s standing as a cobelligerent; and its historic role as a bridge between East and West. All of the themes were informed by the lively fear that Czechoslovakia would either be reduced in territory at the end of the war, or worse still, not reconstituted at all. The outcome of all this propaganda activity, along with German atrocities in the homeland that were used to good propaganda effect (such as the wholesale destruction of the villages of Lidice and Lezahcekasarkaky in revenge for the killing of the deputy Reichsprotektor Reinhard Heydrich), was that Czechoslovakia

Sudetenland and Sudeten-Germans Both these names are contentious. The Sudetenland proper was in Silesia and northern Moravia, on the borders with Germany. It was in fact one of four “German provinces” created after World War I in a bid to have the German parts of the Czech lands incorporated into Austria. In fact, these four provinces could not communicate well with each other and were dependent on the Czech areas for food. The resistance of the German population to occupation by the Czechoslovaks was minimal, however, and as the Allies were keen to prevent the aggrandizement of Austria and Germany after the war, the German areas were incorporated into Czechoslovakia in the Treaty of Versailles. It was not until the rise of Konrad Henlein’s Sudeten-German party that the adjective “Sudeten” came to be applied to all ethnic Germans in Czechoslovakia. The name gave a misleading impression of homogeneity, and helped to bolster the claims of Hitler to the “Sudetenland.” During World War II, the “Sudeten-Germans” benefited greatly from the occupation by Nazi Germany. They were counted as Reich citizens, with full legal and civil rights, while the Czechs were merely “subjects.” After the war, the Czechs took their revenge, first in a series of “wild,” often violent, expulsions, then in a series of officially sanctioned and organized transfers of the population to Germany proper.


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Edvard Beneš was founder and president of modern Czechoslovakia (1935–1938, 1945–1948). (Library of Congress)

survived the war, and Beneš returned in triumph. He also achieved his aim of making the nation truly homogenous, by getting Allied agreement to the expulsion of the vast majority of the German population. Selected Bibliography Beneš, E. 2004. Fall and Rise of a Nation. Edited by Milan Hauner. New York: Columbia University Press. Dowling, M. 2003. Czechoslovakia. New York: Oxford University Press. Lukes, I. 1996. Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s. New York: Oxford University Press. Mamatey, V. S., and R. Luza, eds. 1973. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Masaryk, T. G. 1927. The Making of a State, Memories and Observations. London: George Allen & Unwin. Pynsent, R. B. 1998. Questions of Identity: Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality. New York: Central European University Press. Rothschild, J. 1977. East Central Europe between the Two World Wars. Seattle, WA: Columbia University Press. Seton-Watson, R. W. 1943. History of the Czechs and Slovaks. New York: Hutchinson. Taborsky, E. 1981. President Edvard Beneš between East and West, 1938–1948. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. Zacek, J. F. 1969. “Nationalism in Czechoslovakia.” In Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by F. P. Sugar and I. J. Lederer, 182–198. Seattle: University of Washington Press.


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Finland Jouni Häkli Chronology 1809 Finland is annexed to Russia as an autonomous grand duchy after Sweden’s defeat to Russia in the Finnish War. The Diet of Porvoo establishes Finland as a separate political entity for the first time; Finland retains the Swedish system of law and government. 1835 The Finnish national epic Kalevala is first published. 1860 Due to economic liberalization, the paper industry starts to develop. Finland acquires its own currency, the markka. 1863 Finland’s diet convenes and active legislative work begins. The language decree states that Finnish is to have equal status with Swedish as an official language within 20 years. 1870 The first novel is published in Finnish: The Seven Brothers by Aleksis Kivi. 1881 The first youth association is founded in Kauhava. 1883 The Workers’ Association is founded in Helsinki. 1899 The era of oppression begins as Czar Nicholas II issues the February Manifesto, narrowing the legislative power of the diet. The Workers’ Party is founded (later Social Democratic Party). 1900 The Finnish arts gain international attention at the Paris World Fair. The Language Manifesto establishes Russian as the language to be used in certain offices; the Post Manifesto abolishes Finnish stamps. 1905 Revolutionary disorder in Russia brings relaxation to the Russification policies in Finland. 1906 National parliament reform in Finland, equal and universal suffrage. 1909 Oppression resumes, and Czar Nicholas II dissolves the parliament several times. 1917 The revolution begins in Russia. Finland declares independence on December 6. 1918 The conflict between Reds and Whites turns into a civil war. 1919 Finland adopts the republican constitution; Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg is the first president. 1920 Peace of Tartu between Finland and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. The Petsamo area is annexed to Finland. 1921 The League of Nations decrees that the Åland Islands belong to Finland; parliament grants autonomy to Åland. 1932 Finland and the Soviet Union sign a nonaggression pact. 1939 (August) The Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement is signed between the Soviet Union and Germany. The secret protocol states that Finland belongs to the Soviet sphere of interest. (November) The Red Army attacks Finland. The Winter War is fought until March 1940. Finland cedes a large part of Karelia in the peace of Moscow. 1941 Fighting resumes in the Continuation War that lasts until 1944. 1944 (September) Finland signs an interim peace treaty with the Soviet Union. Finland cedes the Petsamo area and pays great war reparations. 1947 The terms of the 1944 armistice are confirmed in the Paris Peace Treaty.


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Situating the Nation The Finnish polity was formed in 1809 when Finland, thus far a collection of provinces under Swedish rule, became an autonomous grand duchy in the Russian empire. This was the direct consequence of Sweden’s defeat in the Finnish War fought between Sweden and Russia from February 1808 to September 1809. The ensuing annexation of Finland to Russia was an important geopolitical change because it established Finland for the first time as a politically viable territorial entity. The province of Viborg was attached to the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1812, and the demarcations of boundaries with Norway and Russia were completed in 1833. After that, Finland’s territorial shape remained virtually intact until World War II. An exception is the annexation of the Petsamo area to Finland in the 1920 Tartu peace treaty. By the end of the 19th century, a vocation had emerged among the mostly Swedish-speaking educated elites to create a sense of common national identity among the Finns, who were linguistically a distinct group in the Russian empire. The years of consolidation until the early 1860s stabilized the autonomous position of Finland in the Russian empire. Finland was ruled by a governor general as the head of senate and a cabinet that also functioned as Supreme Court. From the 1860s onwards, political and economic liberalization invigorated the grand duchy’s societal life. Significant reforms were carried out to give the country a new impetus. Freedom of trade set forth industrialization, and in 1860, Finland was granted a currency unit of its own, the markka (mark). Moreover, in 1863, Czar Alexander II assembled the four representative estates (nobility, clergy, burghers, and peasants) at a diet for the first time in more than five decades, and four years later he made the diet a regularly convening body. With the diet meeting regularly, active legislative work in Finland began. The language decree issued in 1863 by Alexander II stated that Finnish should become an official administrative language alongside Swedish in 20 years. The Primary School Act was issued in 1866, and the Conscription Act of 1878 gave Finland its own army. Consequently, by the early 1880s, Finland had emerged as a state within a state. It was separated from the empire by an official border, and it had its own senate and diet, its own local officials, legislation, army, money, and even postage stamps. The vigorous atmosphere of social, political, and economic reforms strengthened Finnish nationalism that was gaining ground among the Swedish-speaking educated elites during the last decades of the 19th century. While the ultimate goal was broadly accepted, a dispute about the proper language to be used in nationbuilding grew into a conflict between the advocates of Finnish versus Swedish. The Fennoman movement was supported by Swedish-speaking upper classes who cherished the Hegelian nation-state idea and thus chose to promote Finnish culture and language. By Finnicizing their family names, learning Finnish, and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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using it extensively, the Fennoman enthusiasts aspired to bridge the gap between the upper class and the people. The Svecomans, again, were a faction of the Swedish-speaking elite who pursued liberalism and felt that only the Swedish language and culture would guarantee Finland’s place among the Western nations. The “language strife” between Fennoman and Svecoman movements was transcended by consensus about the role of Karelian song lands as the geographical core of the Finnish national identity. The origins of Karelianism were in the rise to prominence throughout the region of the Kalevala, the Finnish national epic collected by Elias Lönnrot from folk poetry and song tradition in northeastern Karelia. The expanded version of Kalevala was published in 1849, and by the 1890s, Karelianism had become a leading romantic movement that celebrated the landscape and people of Karelia. The region was seen to be an undiscovered reserve of poetry where earlier Finnish life ways and culture were preserved. This romantic affair between nationalist elites and Karelian peasantry lasted until the 1920s when the border between Finland and Russia was closed. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Instituting the Nation The Finnish nation was formed under unique circumstances. It can be said that Finland was first a state and only after that a nation. Territorial continuity and juridico-political institutions inherited from Swedish rule, together with strong and extensive political autonomy, made the Grand Duchy of Finland a quasi-state with almost all the attributes of a sovereign state apart from independence. Therefore, the central task that the elites aspiring for national self-determination faced was the production of national consciousness into the population of Finland. It was clear that the goal of the independent Finnish nation-state could only be achieved with the institutionalization of the Finnish nation. Efforts to produce the Finnish nation were led by Fennoman elites whose status was not based on aristocratic land possessions but rather on the professional system and high offices provided by the state apparatus. Simply put, the upper classes were attached to and dependent on the state’s continuing autonomy. However, the area of cultural production was not led by the senate because it could not have been. The Karelianism of prominent painters, authors, poets, and composers was inspired by the broader national romantic movement that could not be reduced to institutional incentives or purposes. Yet, awareness among the Finns concerning the products of Finnish high culture—the much loved songs, books, paintings, and poems—was effectively disseminated through the statecontrolled media of socialization, such as the school system, the military, and mass communication. Moreover, outside the immediate state apparatus, yet in connection with the state, new kinds of social movements emerged that were instrumental in the rise of national consciousness among the broader population. With the breakthrough of mass organization after 1870, various voluntary associations and movements

Jean Sibelius’s Finlandia Composer Jean Sibelius became a national figure during his long life (1865–1957). His career in music took off in the context of the Finnish national awakening. He was recognized as a distinctively original composer with a sound world that was widely seen to reflect the Finnish natural landscape and culture. Sibelius wrote some of his music with a deliberately nationalist sentiment. The symphonic poem Finlandia is a case in point. It was composed at a time when Russia was beginning to tighten its grip on Finnish autonomy by pursuing new Russification policies. With parts titled in a patriotic fashion and haunting music ranging from melancholic to stormy, Finlandia captured the minds and hearts of Finns. Sibelius wrote the music as his image of Finland’s sufferings under Russian oppression, unyielding resistance, and eventual awakening toward statehood. Culminating in a patriotic finale titled “Finland Awakes,” the music became enormously important for the emerging national self-awareness of Finns. Finlandia is one of the unquestioned symbols of Finnish nationalism.


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established themselves as part of the rising Finnish civil society. Ranging from the workers movement to voluntary fire brigades to youth societies to the temperance movement, these new associations disseminated the consciousness of Finland as a political community. Leaders of the Fennoman movement founded the Society of Popular Education (Kansanvalistusseura) and made it into a house organ for the movement’s ideals and organizational activities. The Finnish movement thus gained an organization whose network of representatives extended into all areas of the country. Soon after, a temperance movement followed with an even more effective means of encouraging local organization. For most members, these movements represented the first possibility of political participation. They introduced modern principles of public life to cities and countryside alike. This rapidly gave rise to a modern political field in Finland. The state together with numerous voluntary associations formed the institutional basis for the creation of the Finnish nation. The elites remained dependent on the state apparatus, but in the egalitarian spirit of the time, they wished to come closer to the masses. This was possible through membership and activity in voluntary associations and popular movements that brought together people from different social strata. Finnish nationalism of the late 19th century had both a political and an existential aspect. The dissemination of national consciousness among the population was essential for attempts to secure the continuity of the emerging state and eventually reach the goal of national self-determination. Yet also, the very existence of Finns as a nation among Western nations was at stake. Great efforts were made by protagonists of the Fennoman movement to establish Finnish as a language of poetry, literature, and statecraft. They realized that as long as Swedish

Johan Vilhelm Snellman (1806–1881), a Philosopher and Statesman One of the most influential figures in Finnish nation-building was Johan Vilhelm Snellman. He was a philosopher following Hegel’s thought on the modern nation-state as the end or goal of history and the most comprehensive level of the realization of freedom. Snellman stressed the importance of national awakening by means of raising the Finnish language and culture from peasant status to internationally recognized language and culture. Extending the use of the Finnish language was also part of the resistance to subordination by Sweden and assimilation by Russia. Snellman was appointed professor at the Alexander University of Helsinki, but his chief achievement was a cabinet post in the Senate of Finland. As a senator he worked effectively to achieve the language decree from the czar, eventually giving Finnish the status of an official language along with Swedish. Snellman was one of the leaders of the Fennoman movement, along with Fredrik Cygnaeus, Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen, Johan Ludvig Runeberg, and others. He was also the editor of two newspapers and a strong proponent of Finnish-speaking literature. The Fennoman movement changed the face of the 19th-century Grand Duchy of Finland.


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was the dominant language of culture and politics—when the great majority of the population (some 85 percent in 1880) spoke Finnish only—the nation would remain decisively disunited. The purpose of creating an institutional ground for the Finnish language in education, cultural life, and official use was twofold. First, it would attach the masses to the emerging national polity, and second, it would show the Western world that Finns had an original culture that stands in comparison with that of old European nations. Activities that centered on the Finnish Literature Society (SKS) were key in cultivating the use of the Finnish language. The society funded the excursions to eastern Finland and Karelia made by its first secretary, Elias Lönnrot, and published Kalevala based on these trips. Also, the first novel written in Finnish, Aleksis Kivi’s The Seven Brothers (Seitsemän veljestä), was published by the society.

Defining the Nation The idea of Finns and Finnishness was mainly connected with ethno-cultural distinctiveness from both Swedes and Russians. Aspirations toward national selfdetermination were based on this awareness, well captured by the Fennoman slogan “Swedes we are no longer, Russians we can never become, so let us be Finns” (Engman 1995). Because the territorial setting of Finnish nation-building was fairly stable and clear for more than a century, the challenge for the elite was to foster consciousness of nationhood and territory in the popular realm, rather than to determine the homeland’s territorial extent. For creating popular awareness of Finland and Finnishness, it was necessary to represent the country and nation as a unity. Reference to the territorially defined Finnish space could be made through maps and other representations of the national territory and landscape. These representations made the Finnish lands visible in a manner that had wide popular appeal. For example, the cartographic image of the Finnish territory portrays the contours of the “Maiden of Finland,” which personified and embodied the idea of a unified nation and Finns’ belonging to the Finnish lands. Apart from the rhetorical power of this anthropomorphic image, maps provided a media that was increasingly available to the masses. Various atlases became common items both in home and at school by the early 20th century. Cartographic images, produced mostly by the educated elite for governmental, academic, and educational purposes, were disseminated throughout the country via books, newspapers, education, and such institutions as museums and public offices. In consequence, the sense of Finnishness as rooted in a particular soil gradually emerged as an image of the Finnish territory and cultural sphere. In territorial terms, maps were significant not only in that they portrayed a land that the ordinary people could identify with but also in the sense that they N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Attack, by Finnish painter Edvard (Eetu) Isto, features a depiction of the Finnish Maiden defending the law against an attacking Russian two-headed eagle. (Eetu Istos / The National Board of Antiquities / The National Museum of Finland)


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helped in disseminating the idea of an original link between people and land. Maps with Finnish place names point directly at a historical interlinkage of a people with a particular territory, concrete places, and everyday practices. Place names are a concrete historical testimony to the cultural presence of Finns on the Finnish peninsula and thus help fortify the idea of a territorially confined culture. An important literary work that highlighted national unity by addressing its regional diversity was The Book of Our Land (Maamme kirja), authored by Zacharias Topelius. The book describes Finland and its different landscapes in an idealistic, stereotypical, and easily accessible way. Published in 1875, it quickly became popular reading and a standard bookshelf item both in schools and at home. In territorial terms, the book is significant because it described a land and a landscape that the ordinary people could identify with. It also promoted unity over regional cultural differences and sought to straddle the linguistic barrier between Finnish-speaking and Swedish-speaking populations. Moreover, it was The Book of Our Land that eventually popularized the poetic representation of the Finnish territory as a person, the “Maiden of Finland” as portrayed against the “landscape of the thousand lakes.”

Narrating the Nation Finland was part of the Swedish realm for more than 600 years and the Russian empire for over a century. Reflecting its status as a historical borderland between Western and Eastern Great Powers, the narratives of Finnishness have come to rest on defensive ethos more than anything else. Threats to the country have constituted Finland and Finnishness. The negative definition of the Finnish identity (“we are neither Swedes nor Russians, let us be Finns”) shows that in the turn of the 20th century, Finland had no historical narrative of itself. Liminal borderland identity gave rise to narratives that told what Finns are distinct from, how Finland has been defended, and against what enemy. The collection of Finnish folklore, with the national epic Kalevala as the beacon, was important for building the sense that Finns also have a history. However, in the absence of a “grand narrative” of Finnishness, the oral tradition and folk poetry could not be tied into a preexisting historical storyline. Instead of a glorious narrative of the nation’s path toward a sovereign state, the folklore has been represented in terms of the myth of origins. Here, inspiration has been sought from stories of the Finnish tribe’s early settlement in Finland, as well as the endurance of the original Finnish folk culture in the Karelian song lands. Due to the defensive ethos of the narratives of Finnishness, most national heroes are characters fighting against external threat and oppression (by foreign or domestic lords). The first known Finnish hero is Lalli, a peasant from the region of Ostrobothnia who, according to legend, killed the Catholic bishop Henrik, of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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English origin, on the ice of lake Köyliö in the winter of 1156. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the legend of Lalli became meaningful as the beginning of Protestant Finland and nationally significant heroics. Lalli came to represent the national character of Finns and the will and readiness to protect property, family, country, and own community. Parallel characterizations of Finns were made by national poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg in his description of the peasant Paavo of Saarijärvi (Saarijärven Paavo), and by Zacharias Topelius in his depiction of farmhand Matti in The Book of Our Land. Both characters came to represent the heroic inhabitants of the backwoods. Both also became the enduring icons of hardworking, gutsy, and persistent Finns. Finnish identity was expressed in all forms of art. The years from 1880 to 1910 are known as the golden era of Finnish art. Artists began to depict ordinary people, historic motifs, and the Finnish nature in a realistic way. The Kalevala especially inspired painters, composers, and poets. For example, Akseli Gallen-Kallela made the illustration of Kalevala and used the motifs in several of his paintings. He was part of a group of artists with nationalist ideas, along with composer Jean Sibelius, novelist Juhani Aho, poet Eino Leino, and painters Albert Edelfelt, Pekka Halonen, and Eero Järnefelt, among others. Through the works of these artists, Finns learned to appreciate the particularity of the landscapes of their homeland, the character of its inhabitants, and the soul of its music. The golden era of Finnish art had a constitutive effect on the national consciousness of Finns.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Consciousness of Finnishness had reached all social strata by the early 20th century. The Finnish identity was negotiated in the context of romantic nationalism and defensive ethos, but from 1890 onwards as a response to the direct policies of Russification. During the reigns of Czar Alexander III (1881–1894) and particularly of Nicholas II (1894–1917), the extensive privileges enjoyed by the Grand Duchy of Finland fell under increasing pressure from nationalist circles in Russia. The growing displeasure in Russia with the “Finnish separatism” grew into two eras of Russification policy, first from 1899 to 1905 and second from 1909 to 1917. The 1905 revolution in Russia relaxed the atmosphere in the intervening years and gave Finland some political maneuvering space. The senate carried out a radical parliamentary reform in 1906, moving from a four-estate diet to a unicameral parliament and universal suffrage. This sealed the integration of the masses to the emerging polity and set modern party politics in motion. In 1917, Finland gained independence, and Finnish identity assumed a hegemonic position in the country. This provoked resistance from a section of the Swedish-speaking elite who claimed that the Swedish language and culture were N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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a vital part of the Swedish heritage in Finland and should not be dismissed in favor of the “rustic” Finnish culture. Furthermore, it was held that the Swedishspeaking elite and common people, who were heavily concentrated in the country’s western and southern coasts and in the Åland Islands, formed a separate nation that should not be betrayed by forsaking the Swedish language. The idea of a “Swedish nation” was used in arguments for territorially based Swedishspeaking self-government, even autonomy. Further demands included cultural autonomy in church and education, and a separate military unit. The Swedish movement gained political support through mass organization and the founding of the Swedish People’s Party (Svenska Folkpartiet). However, it failed to realize plans for territorial autonomy, mainly because the Swedishspeakers’ opinions remained divided on the issue. Moreover, guarantees for Swedish cultural autonomy were already being prepared through institutional arrangements and legislation. For example, a Swedish diocese was established, including all Swedish congregations in the country, and a separate Swedish department was instituted at the government board of education. Furthermore, the 1919 constitution decreed that both Finnish and Swedish were the national languages of the republic and that the needs of both language groups were to be satisfied on the same basis. In addition to this, the Language Law of 1922 secured the rights of citizens to use their mother tongue, whether Finnish or Swedish, in their business with the authorities. After the most vital interests of the Swedish-speaking group had become protected, their separatism gradually waned. The Swedish-speaking elite experienced no linguistic difficulties in school any more than in public life. Also, a degree of cultural autonomy had been granted for Swedish-speakers in the form of their own educational and cultural institutions. Hence, the language question did not eventually compromise the goal of forming an independent nation-state accepted by both language groups. War and Nation-Building in Finland The first half of the 20th century was tumultuous for Finland, just as it was for the rest of Europe. The declaration of Finland’s independence from Russia took place in December 1917. For a period of time before and after the declaration, the country lacked a clear political power structure. The revolution in Russia a month earlier had spurred the Finnish workers to begin a general strike on November 14. Local strike committees took the most actual power in the country. Usually there were two competing organizations: white middle class and red working class, both armed with their own forces (the White Civil Guard and the Red Guard). The breakdown of the normal administration and order, especially the police, and their replacement by local strike committees and militias, unsettled the society and led to a growing restlessness. Armed clashes between the White Guards and the Red Guards escalated into a bloody civil war that was waged from January to May 1918. The war ended with N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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victory for the White Guards; more than 24,000 people were killed in the battles and aftermath. The bloody civil war was a traumatic experience to the Finnish society at large, and despite such conciliatory measures as including the Social Democrats in the government, it was only after World War II that the wounds would really start to heal. The “White” and “Red” factions of the population were brought together by common war efforts. First was the Winter War waged by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against Finland (1939–1940), with over 23,000 killed in action, and after that the Finno-Russian War (the Continuation War), waged from 1941 to 1945 with over 60,000 killed in action. Experiences of the hardships of war and a common enemy made the legacy of hatred give way to a more unified political culture. The hard-won national unity of Finns survived the dramatic changes and turns of the young republic’s (geo)political life. Numerous important social (and socializing) practices continued to produce the image of Finland as a unified whole. Finns had become aware of their distinct history, culture, and nationality largely N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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through school education and mass mobilization. They had consistently built the idea of national unity rising above, but not suppressing, regional identities. Thus, from the point of view of the increasingly hegemonic Finnish-speaking national identity, the Swedish-speakers were just as rightful Finns as were the Finnishspeakers themselves. By the end of World War II, the formative years of the Finnish national identity were over. This is not to say that the national identity and its reflections in the narratives of Finnishness had reached an end point by 1945. Quite the contrary, the postindependence time has been characterized as a continuous “search for national identity” (Paasi 1996). For instance, the dramatic changes in the Finnish territory after World War II necessarily affected the Finnish self-image, as the mythic lands of Karelia, which only recently had figured in the aspirations toward “Greater Finland,” had to be ceded to the Soviet Union. However, the foundation of Finnish nationalism created and canonized by the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries has continued to guide the “search” as one of its fundamental layers. It is here that the comfortable and secure images of the Finnish nature, lands, tradition, and territory have been cherished and preserved as part of the continually evolving narrative of the Finnish nation. Selected Bibliography Alapuro, R. 1988. State and Revolution in Finland. Berkeley: University of California Press. Alapuro, R., and H. Stenius. 1987. “Kansanliikkeet loivat kansakunnan” [“Mass Movements Created the Nation”]. In Kansa liikkeessä [Nation on the Move], edited by R. Alapuro, I. Liikanen, K. Smeds, and H. Stenius, 7–52. Helsinki, Finland: Kirjayhtymä. Anttonen, P. J. 2005. Tradition through Modernity: Postmodernism and the Nation-State in Folklore Scholarship. Helsinki, Finland: Finnish Literature Society. Engman, M. 1995. “Finns and Swedes in Finland.” In Ethnicity and Nation Building in the Nordic World, edited by S. Tägil, 179–217. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press. Häkli, J. 1999. “Cultures of Demarcation: Territory and National Identity in Finland.” In Nested Identities: Identity, Territory, and Scale, edited by G. H. Herb and D. H. Kaplan, 123–149. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Häkli, J. 2002. “Mapping the Historical Sense of Finland.” Fennia 180:75–81. Jutikkala, E., and K. Pirinen. 1996. A History of Finland, vol. 5. Rev. ed. Translated by Paul Sjöblom. Porvoo, Finland: WSOY. Lönnqvist, B. 1991. “What Does It Mean to Be a Swedish-Speaking Finn?” Life and Education in Finland 3:25–27. Paasi, A. 1996. Territories, Boundaries and Consciousness. Chichester, England: John Wiley.


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Germany Stefan Berger Chronology 1871 (January) The German nation-state is founded at the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles. The assembled heads of the German lands declare the king of Prussia the new German emperor, Wilhelm I. (July) Kulturkampf begins in Prussia. 1878–1890 (October to October) Antisocialist Laws are in force. 1888 (June) Wilhelm II becomes emperor, after his father, Frederick III, ruled for only “100 days.” 1890 (March) Otto von Bismarck resigns as chancellor of the German Reich. 1898 (April) First Naval Law is passed. 1905 (March) Wilhelm II lands at Tangiers. 1914–1918 World War I. 1918–1923 The revolution in Germany leads to a prolonged period of civil war. 1919 (January) Elections for the National Assembly are held. (June) The Versailles Peace Treaty is signed. 1923 The Ruhr is occupied. 1933 (January) Adolf Hitler is appointed chancellor; the National Socialist dictatorship begins. 1934 (August) Hitler proclaims himself Führer and Reich chancellor. 1935 (September) Nuremberg laws are passed. 1938 (March) Law for the Reunification of Austria with the German Reich. (November) Reichskristallnacht. 1939 (October) Heinrich Himmler is appointed Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of Germandom. 1939–1945 World War II. 1941 (June) The Soviet Union is invaded. 1942 (January) Wannsee conference. 1943 (February) Joseph Goebbels gives his “Total War” speech in Berlin. 1945 (May) The last Reich government is dissolved by the Allies.

Situating the Nation During the 70 years of its existence between 1871 and 1945, the German nationstate underwent three important political transformations. Imperial Germany, between 1871 and 1918 was a constitutional monarchy incorporating aspects of semi-absolutist rule. The Weimar Republic between 1918 and 1933 was a parliamentary democracy. And National Socialist Germany between 1933 and 1945 was the worst fascist dictatorship in the 20th century. In this relatively short time span of 70 years, Germany underwent massive socioeconomic change and its N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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geographical shape altered significantly. Such lack of a stable national framework produced highly contested and diverse constructions of national identity. For a start, predominantly Protestant north Germans produced different ideas of the nation than predominantly Catholic south Germans. The diversity of the German lands before 1871 meant that strong local and regional identities had to be reconciled with the ethos of the nation-state. Notions of Heimat were crucial in mediating between the region and the nation. Imperial Germany remained a highly federated nation-state that gave a great deal of autonomy to its constituent parts. Strong regional divides were accompanied by major social divisions. The national movement of the 1860s had been a predominantly middle-class movement, actively attempting to keep workers before the gates. Thereby, the national question played an important role in the comparatively early division between what Gustav Mayer called “bourgeois” and “proletarian” democracy in the 1860s. Protestant, urban workers formed the bulwark of support for the German Social Democratic movement, which was vilified in Imperial Germany as antinational. The Social Democratic Party was banned between 1878 and 1890, and its followers were routinely described as “fellows without a fatherland.” Persecution of Social Democrats was particularly nasty in Prussia, the state that had taken the lead in unifying Germany. Its strong economic performance just as much as its military muscle made Prussia an obvious candidate and gave it the edge over its closest competitor in the German Federation, Austria-Hungary. Between 1871 and 1914, Germany pushed Britain into second place as the leading industrial nation of Europe. World War I was only a temporary setback, as Germany remained an economic powerhouse. “Made in Germany” soon became a hallmark of high-quality industrial products on the international markets. German national identity had strong economic overtones. Economic instability in the interwar period contributed significantly to the rise of National Socialism. Hitler’s mirage of a united German people standing behind one Führer in a united German Reich (ein Volk, ein Reich, ein Führer) appealed to a growing number of Germans from all social classes, including workers. The promotion of social welfare and the beginnings of a consumer revolution in the racial state of the Nazis was, however, stopped in its tracks by the second consecutive attempt of Germany to gain hegemony in Europe and the wider world.

Instituting the Nation The shape of the first German nation-state was devised by its founding father, the “iron chancellor,” Otto von Bismarck. The dualism, enshrined in its constitution, between a strong monarchy and a parliamentary system based on adult male suffrage produced significant tensions and was at the heart of Imperial Germany’s N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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political instability. A strong civil society, of which agile mass parties were an important part, produced considerable synergies but also conflicted with the semiabsolutist aspirations of the emperor. The democratic revolution of 1918 instituted a republic and a parliamentary democracy. The most fervent republicans were those who had been politically isolated in Imperial Germany, the Social Democrats. The “outsiders” of Imperial Germany now became the “insiders” of the Weimar Republic, as Peter Gay put it. But Weimar has often been described as a “republic without republicans.” The republican parties had command over a majority in the Reichstag only during 1919–1920. They faced powerful antirepublican forces to the left and right. The German Communist Party was the largest and most successful Communist Party outside of the Soviet Union in the interwar period, and they celebrated the Soviet Union as the true fatherland of the proletariat. On the political right, monarchist parties, such as the German People’s Party and the German National People’s Party, were soon challenged by a variety of Völkisch groups, among them the National Socialist Workers’ Party of Adolf Hitler. As the republic was rocked by political and economic crises, the right attacked republican politicians for signing the Versailles peace treaty and “stabbing the German army in the back” in 1918 by supporting the revolution. A complex amalgam of factors—among which the antirepublicanism of the social elites, the legacy of the long civil war between 1918 and 1923, and the massive economic crises are the most important—allowed Adolf Hitler to come into power in 1933. His fascist dictatorship produced a racial state that culminated in war and genocide. Radical Völkisch nationalism formed an important part of the National Socialists’ Weltanschauung (“world view”). If nationalism had been relatively weak in Germany before 1871, it flourished after the creation of the nation-state and was actively promoted by the institutions of that state, especially schools, universities, and the army. But civil society

Stab-in-the-Back Myth The “stab-in-the-back” myth was one of the most powerful weapons of the political right in its fight against the Weimar Republic. It argued that the German army had never been defeated militarily, but that it was stabbed in the back by the socialists who were responsible for the revolution of 1918. It was the revolution that had led to Germany’s defeat in the war. This myth was put into circulation by Paul von Hindenburg, the former head of the Imperial German armies, in November 1919. But the text of his speech was written by his former assistant, Erich Ludendorff, and a prominent politician of the German National People’s Party (DNVP), Karl Helfferich. In reality, Ludendorff had urged the German government in October 1918 to sign an unconditional armistice as soon as possible, as he could no longer guarantee that the Allies would not be able to overrun German lines at the Western front at any moment. The stab-in-the-back myth cleared the army leadership of all responsibility for the lost war and shifted it to the republican politicians.


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Völkisch Nationalism Völkisch groups emerged in Germany during the last decade of the 19th century. The Deutschbund, formed in 1894, and the journal Heimdall, founded in 1896, were among the most influential institutions of the Völkisch movement. Language, race, and religion were the three key concepts in the Völkisch Weltanschauung (“world view”). A crude Social Darwinism posited that racial characteristics decided between success or failure in the inevitable struggle for the “survival of the fittest.” Concern over the purity of racial stock led Völkisch groups to propagate selective breeding and euthanasia. They perceived the German people, above all, as a manly and courageous warrior people superior to all other peoples in Europe. After 1918, Völkisch paramilitary organizations gave anti-Semitism a militancy that had been largely absent before 1918. Calls to kill Jews like one would kill vermin were now being heard regularly in Völkisch propaganda. National Socialism built on Völkisch ideas and can be seen as the most successful of Völkisch groups, putting into practice many of their ideals and ideas.

was also thoroughly nationalized and contributed much to the “making of Germans” after 1871. If there was a strong identification with the nation among all sections of society by 1914, different groups in society tended to identify with different things. Dynastic, authoritarian, and militaristic allegiances intermingled with democratic, liberal, and participatory identities. On the political left, the “citizens’ nation” was a popular concept and Social Democratic ideas of the nation stressed social progress and democratic rights. On the political right, the Völkisch movement developed ideas of racial belonging to the nation. The majority of the German middle classes stressed cultural definitions of Germandom. Overall, notions of Germany were built on a baffling variety of ethno-cultural, religious, and voluntary-political ideas that often formed curious alliances and hybrids. The republican Germany after 1918 found it very difficult to create powerful national symbols and narratives of its own. The revolution of 1848 was one of the few events in 19th-century German history that could be mobilized on behalf of the republic. By contrast, Nazi Germany after 1933 fell back on and developed Völkisch ideas. The National Socialists portrayed themselves as the logical successors to 1,000 years of German history. They loved to point out the alleged continuities between their own ambitions and those of Frederick the Great, Otto von Bismarck, and Wilhelm II—something that was also picked up and mocked outside the borders of Germany.

Defining the Nation Nationalists everywhere had a tendency of declaring their particular nation “exceptional.” German exceptionalism took shape in the form of the German Sonderweg. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Cover of Le Rire satirical magazine from September 1939, depicting Joseph Goebbels as Frederick the Great, Hermann Goering as Otto von Bismarck, and Adolf Hitler as Kaiser Wilhelm II. (Mary Evans Picture Library)


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Germany’s path in history was postulated as different from that of its Western neighbors, in that its idea of freedom was one of inner freedom, which allowed the individual to develop its full potential. Politics was left to a strong executive. This, in Thomas Mann’s unforgettable phrase, machtgeschützte Innerlichkeit (“inner freedom protected by power”), formed a marked contrast to “Western civilization” with it revolutionary (French) and parliamentary (British) traditions. Political pluralism was vilified as “un-German,” as cultural superiority became the rallying cry of German nationalists. Germany as a country of culture was juxtaposed in particular to Slavic, eastern European “barbarity.” German nationalism identified strongly with an alleged German colonizing mission in eastern Europe. Prussia incorporated millions of Polish speakers in its territory who were subjected to stark Germanization policies, as were other ethnic minorities in the German Reich. At the same time, millions of ethnic Germans lived outside the borders of the German Reich, provoking calls to extend the German borders as far as German “culture” had reached. The problem of what to do with ethnic German minorities in eastern Europe was exacerbated by the Versailles Treaty, which left millions of Germans belonging to new-found states in east central Europe, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. Attempts to justify incorporation of particular territories into the German state produced veritable map wars: many maps were produced to demonstrate that particular territories belonged to particular nations. National Socialist expansionism in the 1930s was built on the notion of bringing ethnic Germans back to the Reich (heim ins Reich). In World War II, the National Socialists attempted to solve the problem through ethnic cleansing. Germans in eastern Europe were moved into the Reich. The borders of the Reich were extended as far as possible eastwards. Those populations, in particular, Poles, that were in the way were either killed or transported eastwards. The Holocaust was part and parcel of such reconstitution of ethnic borders in eastern Europe. Territorial instability characterized the German nation not only in the east. Austria to the south, Alsace and Lorraine to the west, and Schleswig to the north all produced considerable tension and conflict, as the question of Germany’s borderlands was crucial to German national identity throughout the period under discussion here.

Narrating the Nation Tracing the nation back in history as far as possible was an important means of legitimating the nation. Constructions of Germanness thus frequently harked back to the ancient Roman writer Tacitus who had described the Germanic tribes in AD 98 as a natural warrior people characterized by honesty, openness, decency, love of liberty, and purity of morality. In AD 9, German tribes under the leadership N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of Arminius, also known by his Germanic name Hermann, defeated the Roman legions in the Teutoburg Forest. The forest itself, and the oak, as holy tree of the Germanic tribes, became powerful symbols of Germanness. Hiking (preferably through dark forests) became a national obsession (next to gymnastics), as young Germans made it the first mass sport in the 19th century. In 1875, a monument to Hermann was opened near the town of Detmold. The memorial featured a 26-meter-high Germanic warrior figure. Just four years after the Franco-Prussian war, which had culminated in the foundation of the German empire, this warrior symbolized German unity in battle: against the Romans in ancient times and against the French, both in the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the 19th century and during 1870–1871. Yet Hermann’s sword was also directed against Rome. At the height of the Kulturkampf of Prussia against the Catholic Church, Hermann symbolized the Protestant German nation. The close identification of Germany with Protestantism was particularly obvious in the cult surrounding Martin Luther and his seminal role in the German Reformation. The 400th birthday of Martin Luther in 1883 was the high point of a public symbiosis of Protestantism and nationalism. Innumerable historical paintings and illustrations showed Luther burning the papal bull. He was celebrated as liberator from Rome (i.e., foreign domination), as founder of Germany’s national religion, and as incarnation of middle-class virtues. The Reformation was Germany’s revolution and, as such, it was frequently juxtaposed against the French ideas of 1789. The German nation was not only constructed as opposing the ideals of liberté, egalité, fraternité, but it was also celebrated as having been reborn in the struggle against Napoleon. Th e Wars of

Kulturkampf Liberal and Protestant nationalists saw Catholicism as backward, reactionary, and antinational. Their struggle to curb the powers and independence of the Catholic Church became known as Kulturkampf. This literally means “cultural struggle,” and it was very much perceived as a fight of the forces of culture against the forces of superstition and ignorance. It saw the banning of the Jesuit order from Germany and various attempts by the state to control the church and abolish as much autonomy over its internal affairs as possible. The freedom of movement of Catholic priests was severely restricted; many were forcibly expatriated and imprisoned, including, at one point, 5 of the 11 Prussian bishops. The Catholic press and associations were placed under permanent police supervision. Civil marriages became obligatory, but the attempt to freeze the Catholic Church completely out of school education was eventually unsuccessful. Catholics reacted by withdrawing into a Catholic milieu that ranged from educational associations to women’s and youth groups, from a political party (the Centre Party) to trade unions, and from leisure-time organizations to associations for specific occupations. The attitude of Catholics toward the foundation of the German nation-state remained an issue for debate throughout much of Imperial Germany’s existence.


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Liberation were a crucial foundational moment for Germany’s national consciousness. On the centenary of the Battle of the Nations (Völkerschlacht) in 1813, Kaiser Wilhelm opened the megalomaniac Völkerschlacht monument in Leipzig. The biggest memorial in Europe at the time, its symbolic language emphasized sacrifice, courage, manliness, and all the values of the German warrior people. Those values, the monument alleged, had contributed directly to the foundation of Imperial Germany in 1871. The empire was also referred to as the “Second German Reich.” The first German Reich was the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, and opinion on that first empire was divided. Whereas nationalists widely criticized its extreme federalism and its unwieldy political and administrative structures for being responsible for the divisions and weaknesses of the fatherland, the same nationalists were content in locating periods of glorious strength and greatness in that first empire. None was greater and more glorious than the reign of Frederick I, also nicknamed Barbarossa (Red Beard). One of the most potent national myths was that the spirit of Barbarossa was haunting one of his castles, the Kyff häuser. He himself was supposed to be sitting inside the rock on which the castle had been built, seated at a stone table with his red beard growing through the table, awaiting the completion of the German Reich. German nationalists depicted 1871 as the moment when the Reich had indeed been completed by Wilhelm I, duly nicknamed Barbablanca (White Beard). Dynastic nationalism in Imperial Germany found expression in a number of monuments, such as the huge Kyffhäuser memorial built between 1892 and 1896, or the bombastic avenue of marble statues of Hohenzollern monarchs in the Avenue of Victory (Siegesallee), dedicated by Wilhelm II in 1901. The glories of the medieval past of the Holy Roman Empire could be set side by side with the triumphs of the present. But the 400 memorials built in Imperial Germany to celebrate Barbablanca were dwarfed by the over 700 memorials built to the founder of the Reich, Bismarck. While narrations of the nation in scholarly tomes, novels, monuments, the fine arts, and, last but not least, the most German of all the arts, music, successfully linked the state of 1871 to a long, continuous, and proud national past, the new state nevertheless had its difficulties with national symbols. Thus, Imperial Germany never had a national anthem. One of the most popular national songs, the “Deutschlandlied,” was widely associated with the 1848 revolution and thus deemed unsuitable. It became the national anthem in 1919 and the National Socialists combined its first stanza, celebrating German greatness, with the “HorstWessel-Lied.” The national flag was a similarly tortured story: the black, red, and gold of the 1848 revolution could not be adopted in 1871. Instead a red stripe was added to the black and white of Prussia. In 1919, red, black, and gold became the colors of the republic, but in March 1933, President Hindenburg decreed that both the old imperial black, white, and red and the National Socialist swastika flag should serve together as national flags. However, in 1935, Hitler made the swastika flag the sole national flag in the Third Reich. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation The German nation came into existence through three wars, or at least that was one of the stories that nationalists liked to tell. Prussia, in order to fulfill its German mission, first had to defeat Denmark in 1864, then Austria-Hungary in 1866, and finally France in 1871. Only then could the German nation-state be founded at Versailles. Given the strong link between nation-building and war, the military was to have a special place in the pantheon of German nationalism. Military service became a mark of distinction and German civilian society became heavily militarized. The Sedan celebrations, commemorating the defeat of the French army at the Battle of Sedan on September 2, 1870, were an annual national festival with a strongly Protestant flavor. During national festivals, weapons, military uniforms, insignia, and flags were everywhere. The War Associations (Kriegervereine) were the focus of national festivities in each and every city, town, and village. The army as creator of the nation also became the school of the nation. Military service was the precondition not only to full manhood, but also to full citizenship. Only by serving in the army did one earn the right to become a citizen, which is also the reason why women remained excluded from citizenship until 1919, when the republic granted them the vote. But the nation and the national movement gave women a broad field of potential activities. National women’s associations flourished. One of the biggest, the Patriotic Women’s Association (Vaterländischer Frauenverein), had 600,000 members in 1914. Many of the associations focused on social work and social welfare issues. Motherhood was often glorified as duty to the nation. Family and domesticity played major roles in the construction of Germanness. In wartime, women acted as nurses in hospitals and generally performed jobs in factories and public life that were reserved for men in peacetime. After 1918, the Weimar Republic witnessed ferocious debates surrounding the politics of the body, which included the question of whether motherhood should be redefined as a more voluntary concept. On the political right, Völkisch women’s groups fought not for women’s rights, but idealized an alleged female vocation to serve their Volk. The Nazis tapped into that and promoted womanhood as “motherhood to the Volk” (Volksmütter). Mother’s day was made into a national holiday and a “cross of honor” was given to women who had been particularly fertile. The Weimar Republic had given 19 million women the right to vote. The republic was widely seen as one of the most democratic political systems in Europe at the time. Democratic politics undoubtedly had a mobilizing function already in Imperial Germany. The first national elections in the German Empire demonstrated only lukewarm support for the nation. For a start, only half of those eligible to vote actually turned out, and of those, 50 percent voted for parties that were skeptical of the newly unified state. However, over the next decades, enthusiasm for national politics grew. The democratic male franchise for national elections N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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mobilized voters and contributed to the emergence of a dynamic political culture based on a vibrant interest in politics. Germans rightly gained a reputation for joining associations (Vereinsmensch). A vibrant civil society underpinned the further mobilization of the populace. However, it also increased a perception among Germans that they were hopelessly divided. Such divisions were not accepted as part and parcel of a pluralist society and produced longings for organic harmony and greater unity. Hence, party politics was frequently denounced as divisive and antinational. The party political system in the Weimar Republic suffered under such antipluralism that contributed to the unpopularity of “system politics” among the Weimar electorate—a fact skillfully exploited by National Socialist propaganda. From the 1890s onward, the Imperial German elites, led by Kaiser Wilhelm II, mobilized the nation around the issue of Weltpolitik (world policy). Germany had become a nation-state to fulfill a world political mission. To this end, it had to acquire colonies. Germany’s “search for a place under the sun” did not result in an impressive empire, but it led to considerable tension with other colonial powers in Europe, notably Britain. The decision to build a navy that would rival the British one and challenge British domination of the seas led to the rising Anglo-German antagonism before 1914. Navalism was popular in Germany; little boys were dressed in naval uniforms and the Navy League was a powerful and popular pressure group, as was the Colonial Association. Yet the German overseas empire remained an episode. The Versailles Treaty took all colonial possessions off Germany, and although the many voices who clamored for a revision of that “treaty of shame” in the Weimar Republic and Nazi Germany also included those who wanted Germany reinstated as a colonial power, this issue was hardly at the forefront of debate in the Weimar Republic. The Nazis searched for Lebensraum in eastern Europe and concentrated on the European map—with little interest in colonialism. Imperial Germany was highly successful in making Germans between 1871 and 1914. The state in conjunction with civil society produced powerful myths of the nation and a strong national culture, which blended the local and regional allegiances into a greater federal whole. Even those areas of Germany that had the potential of developing into separate national entities (especially Bavaria and Austria) did not. But Germans constructed multiple and highly contested national identities in the empire. The divisions within the German nation were painfully recognized and produced a longing for greater unity. World War I was widely welcomed as providing the focus for such unity. Germans of all creeds, beliefs, and political orientations were supposed to rally to the cause of an allegedly beleaguered nation. “The ideas of 1914” were celebrated by an entire generation of intellectuals and juxtaposed against the double betrayal of the nation during 1918–1919: the political right argued that the revolution and the Versailles Treaty had brought the nation to its knees. It contrasted the squabbling of the political parties with the unity of the German population in wartime. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The idea of the Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community) gained a wide currency during World War I and influenced constructions of national identity in the interwar period. It also contributed to the success of the National Socialists in 1933. They built their entire state on the idea of a Volksgemeinschaft based on criteria of race. Their radical racial nationalism, however, was not so much the end point of German nationalism per se. It was the end point of one of several 19thcentury traditions. The Völkisch idea of the nation was a distinct minority position in Imperial Germany. In the interwar period, it served as a focal point for those who felt that the more mainstream concepts of cultural nationalism and statism were no longer sufficient. World War I and its aftermath radicalized German nationalism. The Weimar Republic and its version of modernity, symbolized by the urbanity of the city of Berlin, stood for everything that Völkisch groups, including the National Socialists, hated. Yet the Nazis were not simply reactionaries. Their idea of the nation endorsed notions of a highly modern, industrial nation at the cutting edge of technology. But their modernism was “reactionary” (Herf 1984) in that the ultimate aim of the National Socialist “revolution” was the realization of a racial utopia. Europeans glimpsed the horrendous implications of that utopia during World War II, which saw ethnic cleansing on a hitherto unprecedented scale, the systematic murder of European Jewry, and unspeakable atrocities. Selected Bibliography Applegate, C., and P. Potter, eds. 2002. Music and German National Identity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Berger, S. 2004. Inventing the Nation: Germany. London: Edward Arnold. Frevert, U. 2004. A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society. Oxford: Berg. Fritzsche, P. 1998. Germans into Nazis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Herb, G. H. 1997. Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945. London: Routledge. Herf, J. 1984. Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. James, H. 1990. A German Identity 1770–1990. Rev. ed. London: Routledge. Jarausch, K., and M. Geyer. 2003. Shattered Past: Reconstructing German Histories. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Koshar, R. 1998. Preservation and National Memory in the Twentieth Century: Germany’s Transient Past. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Smith, H. W. 1995. German Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870– 1914. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Umbach, M., ed. 2002. German Federalism: Past, Present and Future. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan. Verhey, J. 2000. The Spirit of 1914: Militarism, Myth and Mobilisation in Germany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wildenthal, L. 2001. German Women for Empire, 1884–1945. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.


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Greece Gregory Jusdanis Chronology 1453 1806 1814 1821 1822 1827 1833 1866 1881 1912 1913 1919 1922 1923

Constantinople falls to the Ottoman Turks. Elliniki Nomarchia, an influential revolutionary tract, is published. Formation of “Philiki Etairia,” secret “society of friends” that lays program for independence. The War of Independence erupts. The first constitution is proclaimed. British, French, and Russian ships sink the Ottoman fleet in Navarino. King Otto arrives in Nafplion, the provisional capital. There is an outbreak of rebellion on Crete. Greece acquires Thessaly and the Arta region of Epirus. First Balkan War. Second Balkan War; Greece acquires southern Macedonia. Greek troops arrive in Smyrna (Izmir). Greek forces are routed from Asia Minor. Treaty of Lausanne, compulsory exchange of populations.

Situating the Nation Modern Greece offers a paradigmatic case of nationalism. The War of Independence against Ottoman rule (1821–1832) was an event whose meaning reached beyond Greece itself. It was the first nationalist struggle against the Ottoman Empire, becoming a model for subsequent insurrections in the Balkans and the Near East that ultimately led to the dissolution of the empire. Beyond this, the war constituted an early case of nationalism and the first victorious struggle for sovereignty since the American Revolution 50 years earlier. Why were the Greeks the first people in the Ottoman Empire to launch a war of independence? Why did the significance of this confrontation transcend the limits of Greek history itself ? The answer to these questions has to do with the special position of the Greeks within the Ottoman Empire and the particular place of Hellenism within Western culture. The Greeks were able to take advantage of their privileged situation within the empire and then to exploit the favorable image of Hellenism in the imaginings of the West. They thus converted their individual conflict to a struggle between West and East, between Christianity and Islam, between freedom and despotism, between modernization and backwardness. In the minds of philhellenes around the world, the Greek War of Independence was a modern version of the conflict between the ancient Greek city-states and the Persian empire. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Greeks had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire since 1453 with the downfall of Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine empire, to Ottoman forces, the last piece of Byzantine territory to succumb to the Turks. The mass of the population was peasants, which the Ottomans grouped administratively into the Orthodox (or Rum) millet, an ethno-religious but not territorial mode of social organization. (There was a Muslim millet and a Jewish millet.) In short, all Orthodox subjects belonged to this millet no matter where they lived in the empire. Headed by the patriarch of Constantinople, the millet enjoyed considerable autonomy in religious, cultural, and social matters. During the 17th century, two clusters within the Orthodox millet began to differentiate themselves from the bulk of the population: (a) an upper class of government officials known as Phanariots, as well as rich merchants and landowners, and (b) a middle class of merchants, tradesmen, and manufacturers. These two classes were instrumental in the War of Independence ever since they had become aware of economic, technological, and political developments in Europe. The government officials, for instance, often represented the Ottoman state to outside powers. The merchants had formed extensive trading contacts throughout Europe. Both groups had come into contact with Western modernity and realized that they had to reform Greek society and make it part of Europe. Specifically, they sent their sons to study in European cities, where they were introduced to Western progress. This confrontation with the West, as in so many cases of nationalism in the last two centuries, was momentous, for in Europe, these Greeks encountered the advance of the host countries and the belatedness of their own society. The comparisons they made between Greek and Western polities were so devastating that they undertook a complete transformation of Greece along Western prototypes. The establishment of an independent nation-state became one of their highest priorities. As is often the case, nationalism became a way of modernizing society, of making it able to compete with the West economically, militarily, and culturally. Rather than dragging society into darkness and backwardness—the manner in which nationalism is often portrayed—it represented a way of pushing society forward.

Instituting the Nation By the 18th century, a series of internal and external changes led to the dissolution of traditional social networks, creating much instability. The centralized state grew weaker, unable to control the provinces. Ever more powerful landlords exploited this lack of authority and took advantage of the peasants by appropriating their land. A large number of peasants felt tossed aside by social and economic


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changes. Many resorted to banditry. Although originally their brigandage was a response to arbitrary taxation and impoverishment rather than an expression of a nationalized fervor, these bandits, or klephts, became receptive to revolutionary messages coming to them from political and intellectual elites. As a result, they joined the independence movement in great numbers. At the same time, Greek merchants themselves became dissatisfied with the volatility and uncertainty within the empire. They feared that the general absence of law was undermining their business pursuits. They also became anxious about the extent to which capitalist states of the West penetrated Ottoman markets, destroying traditional craft industries. They felt, in other words, a double insecurity. It was in such a climate that such diasporic intellectuals as Adamantios Korais (1748–1833) and such revolutionaries as Rigas Velestinlis (1757–1798) began to draft a program for revolution against Ottoman rule. Residing in the cosmopolitan centers of Europe and having become aware of liberal political institutions, Enlightenment ideals, and Western progress in general, they undertook a grand project to seek national independence for the Greeks from the Ottoman N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Empire. In this effort, they found the merchants as allies for they too saw the nation-state as a legitimate area to exercise their interests. To be sure, this diaspora of intellectuals, revolutionaries, and merchants played a decisive role in the nationalist enterprise. Crucial to this effort in 1814 was the formation of the Philiki Etairia (The Society of Friends), a clandestine revolutionary organization in Odessa, by three members of the mercantile diaspora. Its aim was the overthrow of Ottoman rule through armed revolt. It recruited members, disseminated revolutionary and nationalist ideas, and laid out a program of rebellion. This society provides an example of the active role played by the diaspora, in its mercantile and intellectual dimensions, in the period prior and during the revolution. Many diasporic Greeks who were not involved in seditious activities made their contributions in other ways. Wealthy individuals and entire families subsidized the foreign study of deserving pupils, sponsored the publication of books and journals, and set up schools and other cultural institutions in Greece, all with the aim of disseminating ideas on Greek culture, nationalism, and Enlightenment. The aim that seemed to bind them together was education—the enlightenment of the Greek nation. To be sure, the investments made by the diaspora in education were vast, even after the establishment of the state. It should be added that these intellectuals had a double-pronged strategy, to arouse the passions of Greeks for revolution and to stir the philhellenic sympathies of Europeans. Exploiting the place of ancient Greece as a fountainhead of Western civilization, they argued that it was the duty of Europeans now to aid their fellow Christians in their struggle against Ottoman despotism. As the original Europeans, they claimed, the Greeks were now deserving of help from Europe. These intellectuals, often militantly anticlerical, came into conflict with the upper ecclesiastic authorities, who had been suspicious of the Catholic West ever since the Crusaders sacked Constantinople in 1204, rendering it ultimately vulnerable to Ottoman conquest. Many thus saw the Catholic West as a greater threat to Orthodoxy than Islam because it sought to absorb Orthodoxy or compel it to recognize the ultimate authority of the pope as the leader of all the Christians. These Orthodox authorities regarded Orthodoxy’s opposition to Catholicism as one of the great repudiations of history, that is, a supreme example of how one culture resisted assimilation into another. They also recognized that the multiethnic, multilingual, and multiracial Ottoman Empire ultimately ensured the universality of the patriarchate and of Orthodoxy in general. Th ey rightly feared the prospect of independence movements each forming their separate nations with their own national churches. To be sure, nationalism among the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire undermined the universality of the patriarchate as it led to the establishment of independent churches. The modernizers, in contrast, developed a different conception of the West, as something to be emulated, rather than be rejected, to be embraced rather than be feared. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Defining the Nation The Greek War of Independence was a nationalist event. Unlike the French Revolution, which was conducted against internal despotism, it was launched against a foreign foe, different in terms of religion, language, and ethnicity. The Greeks, therefore, defined themselves against an external, rather than a domestic, “other.” Although it is impossible to distinguish cultural from political factors in any nationalist movement, we can say that issues of language, tradition, history, ethnicity, and race loomed large in discussions leading to and after the War of Independence. Enlightenment intellectuals, such as Adamantios Korais, and the anonymous author of the political tract known as Elliniki Nomarchia (the Greek Constitution, 1806) stressed the ideas of freedom and sovereignty that are due any peoples. Korais repeatedly argued in his speeches and writings that all oppressed peoples have the right to break away from the yoke of tyranny. He and others foresaw the creation of an independent Greek state governed by liberal, democratic institutions. At the same time, they stressed the features shared by the Greeks on the basis of which they sought their independence—their language, history, religion, traditions, and customs. The Greek case illuminates the interplay between culture and politics in the formation of nation-states. Culture becomes the foundation of the states because cultural uniqueness becomes a way of justifying the creation of a new polity. Th e Greeks claimed that, insofar as they constituted a separate people, they deserved to have their own state. But it is wrong to see this nationalism as a completely cultural phenomenon, devoid of political dimensions. Nationalist movements, such as the Greek, German, and many cases of postcolonial struggles, are often dismissed as merely cultural. The Greek situation demonstrates that this is not the case. The Greeks argued for freedom not just because they were Greeks but

Adamantios Korais (1748–1833) Adamantios Korais was one of the primary figures in the cultural revival that led to the War of Independence in 1821. Born in Smyrna (Izmir) to a merchant from the island of Chios, he was sent to Montpellier in France to study medicine. As his true interests lay in classical studies, he turned his attention to editing classical texts and writing commentaries on them. His greatest passion, however, was the enlightenment of his homeland to which he dedicated all his life. He tried to convince his fellow Greeks that they were descendants of classical Greece and to rouse in them a revolutionary spirit. At the same time, he attempted to persuade Europeans that the Greeks, as descendants of this glorious tradition, were the original Europeans and thus deserving of Europe’s attention and aid. Distrustful of the church’s influence in Greek life, he became a fierce critic of what he saw as its subservience to Ottoman rule.


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also because they were humans. They wanted to break away from the Ottoman Empire both in the name of liberty and Greekness. The two went together. The fact that the peasants may have had a vague sense of parliamentary democracy does not diminish the political aspect of their struggle. They saw their uprising as a conflict between self and other, between Christian and Muslim, between Greek and Turk, but also between light and darkness and between freedom and tyranny. Greek nationalism, like so many other cases of nationalism, emphasized cultural models not because of some obsession with the self but because of the discovery of Greece’s belatedness vis-à-vis Western powers. Culture was a way of making sense of this belatedness. It encouraged the population to enter the frightening world of modernity by ensuring the preservation of indigenous ways of life. National culture—the domain of identities, religion, language, traditions, and the arts—served as a space that protected valuable symbols of traditional life from modernity. The aim of the elites, therefore, was as much cultural as political. Not only did they have to rouse the Greeks to rebellion but they also had to ensure that they saw themselves as a separate people. This was a daunting task as the Greeks were dispersed in the multinational empire in which faith, rather than nationality, was the dominant mode of distinction. Moreover, these Greeks had intense regional loyalties and a vague notion of national identification. What the intellectuals created was a common sense of destiny. They had to make Greek-speaking, Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire into Greeks, a long complex process that continued well into the 20th century. Although the intellectuals themselves may not have been directly involved in the armed struggle, they had bequeathed upon the nation a shared sense of identity, history, and culture. One of the first topics of their concern was the classical patrimony. They had to do this for two reasons: to grant the nation an illustrious history, far more distinguished than any other European nation, and to solicit aid from the Europeans. They therefore gave much energy to publishing classical texts, learning about the classics, and disseminating knowledge about classical antiquity. It should be kept in mind that ordinary Greeks knew little of this antiquity, the evidence of which they could see in the countryside. At the same time, Greek schools were in the grips of neo-Aristotelian philosophy that discouraged new ways of thinking. Intellectuals thus had to rethink the link with classical Greece, instill pride in the ancients as ancestors, but also demonstrate that the moderns were equally capable of wisdom. They also devoted considerable attention to language, one of the most hotly contested attributes of Greek nationalism. As heirs to one of the longest linguistic traditions in the world, Greek intellectuals had to consider the language of the new nation. This was not a straightforward task as a number of registers were available: the ancient language known to scholars; ecclesiastical Greek, based on the Koine of the Christian Bible; and demotic, the language of everyday speech N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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used in a myriad of dialects by Greeks throughout the empire. After much debate, they settled on a compromise, the katharevousa, a puristic form of Greek. Based on the vernacular, it was “purified” of Turkish words and expressions and “embellished” on the model of the ancient language. This compromise may have temporarily settled the debates, but language continued to be the apple of discord in Greek life, often dividing intellectuals as well as ordinary people into opposing camps. For instance, riots broke out in the streets of Athens in 1901 with the appearance of a demotic translation of the New Testament and again in 1903 when the National Theater performed Aeschylus’s Oresteia in modern Greek. These examples once again highlight the interplay of culture and politics in nationalism.

Narrating the Nation The intellectuals created a sense of collective destiny, which they politicized. In other words, they fashioned a shared identity that they then made an object of political struggle. Identity, along with liberty, became one of the motivations for revolutionary struggle. The national story they fashioned went like this: Oppressed, humiliated, and denied enlightenment, Greeks should realize that rather than toiling subjects of a decaying and unjust Ottoman Empire, they should strive to become citizens of an independent Greek state, itself an integral part of Europe. Greeks should modernize and catch up with Europe. Intellectuals began to endow Greeks with a sense of cultural, linguistic, historical, geographical, ethnic, and political integrity. They did this by publishing works of criticism, geography, and history; by collecting folk songs and tales from around the country, such as the song “The Bridge of Arta” and the tale Ours Once More; by establishing newspapers and magazines, such as O Ermis o Logios; by sponsoring poetry contests; and by printing pamphlets. The identity they created is still valid today. Greeks are still trying to catch up with Europe. Opposition by the church, aristocrats, and local notables frustrated the realization of their plans. Therefore, the grand dream of reconstruction did not succeed in the forms originally imagined. To be sure, the introduction of European institutions and ideologies in a stratified, traditional society largely incapable of integrating them was long and the process imperfect and incomplete. But the project of modernization did not fail either. Even though the Enlightenment intellectuals were far removed from the fighters on the plains and in the mountains, most of whom did not share with them the same belief in progress and constitutional government, they bequeathed on the nation a common sense of purpose. They had set the terms for debates for the next two centuries. Of course, the War of Independence was hardly a unified movement. Different parties sought different ends. Some intellectuals strived for an independent N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Rigas Velestinlis (1757–1798) Considered one of the heroes of the Greek War of Independence, Rigas Velestinlis served first as secretary to Alexander Ipsilantis, a Greek general in the service of Czar Alexander of Russia, and then worked for the Greek princes of Wallachia. A passionate revolutionary, he wrote his Declaration of the Rights of Man, “Thourios” (a war song), and a constitution for a state that was to be built on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. In all three texts, he had been influenced by French republican and revolutionary ideas. Not a nationalist strictly speaking, he had envisioned a multinational state, comprising the various peoples of the Balkans, but with Greek as the official language. With 3,000 copies of his revolutionary tract in hand, he intended to travel in 1797 to the Balkans to preach the overthrow of Ottoman rule. Captured by Austrian forces in Trieste, he was surrendered to the Ottoman authorities in Belgrade who executed him in 1798. He died a martyr for the Greek cause.

state with liberal institutions. Others, like Rigas Velestinlis, wanted the resurrection of the Byzantine empire but united by Greek culture. The brigands, highly factional and local, did not have a homeland beyond their own regional identification nor a strong sense of national identity. The landowners, who profited from the absence of state authority, were ambivalent about independence, rightly fearing the peasants demand for land reform and justice after the departure of the Turks. The peasants, the largest bloc, joined the effort as much to ameliorate their deteriorating economic lot as to seek freedom from the Turks. The revolution was thus marked by ideological differences among the participants and lacked a true central authority. Crucial to its ultimate success was the involvement of the then superpowers, England, France, and Russia. Because of Greece’s position in the eastern Mediterranean, the revolution became a major diplomatic conflict. Sensing the imminent dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the European powers strived to gain as much advantage as possible. They finally intervened in 1827 by entering the conflict and sinking the Ottoman fleet in Navarino. The powers may not have been motivated by the same philhellenic intentions that had brought the likes of Lord Byron to fight and die for Greece, but they did ensure victory for Greece. Paradoxically, they then imposed a “hereditary” monarch on the Greeks, Prince Otto of Wittelsbach, the 17-year-old, second son of King Ludwig of Bavaria. It is perhaps ironic that the recently independent Greeks did not participate in the treaty signed by Britain, France, Russia, and Bavaria in 1832 that established the terms of Otto’s ascendancy to the throne and guaranteed Greece’s sovereignty. The imposition of a foreign ruler underlined the limited sense of sovereignty that the powers had intended for Greece. The British minister in Athens, in 1841, emphasized this very point when he claimed that an independent Greece was an absurdity. While independent from the Ottoman Empire, Greece became an appendage to western Europe to which it continued to compare itself. Moreover, the lasting internal divisions, the clientelistic networks, and resistance to change N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Artist Panagiotis Zografos’s depiction of the Battle of Navarino, ca. 1827, during the Greek War of Independence. (Stapleton Collection/Corbis)

made it difficult to incorporate foreign political and cultural institutions in a traditional, stratified society. The most damaging division was that between culture and state—the fact that the majority of the Greek population resided outside the borders of the unstable Greek kingdom and that Greeks had been scattered throughout the Balkans and Anatolia.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation If one of the tenets of nationalist doctrine is that there must be an overlap between nation and state, between territory and nation, this did not apply to Greece until 1922. When the state was established in 1832, it comprised only a fraction of its current size and about a third of the then Greek population. To redress this imbalance, the country embarked on an aggressive irredentist campaign to “redeem” the land that was historically Greek. The ideology motivating this crusade was called the “Megali Idea” or Great Idea. Proclaimed by Ioannis Kolettis in 1844, it stated that a native of the Greek kingdom is not just someone who lives within its borders but also in any land “associated with Greek history or the Greek race.” This meant that it was the duty of the state to bring these Greeks within its bosom N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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by expanding its borders. The ultimate aim was the capture of Constantinople, which for Greeks remained their spiritual capital. Despite the fractional divisions among political parties and the population, Greeks in general were united in the support of this policy throughout the 19th century. The country’s foreign relations were determined in part by this dream and its identity was solidified by it. Thus, the country launched a series of campaigns to obtain more territory. As a result, it acquired the Ionian Islands in 1864, Thessaly in 1881, Crete in 1913, Macedonia in 1913, Thrace in 1923, and finally the Dodecanese Islands in 1947. The Megali Idea continued to inspire the country until it was burned in the flames of Smyrna in 1922. As a reward for joining the allies in World War I, the Greeks were allowed in 1919 by Britain, France, and the United States to land Greek troops in Smyrna to protect the Greek population in the region. Rather than remaining in the area, as the foreign powers had agreed, the troops pushed further inland in pursuit of additional territory, committing atrocities along the way. There they confronted a nascent Turkish nationalism, led by Mustafa Kemal, which sprung out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek forces were routed, leaving the Greek population defenseless. A fire destroyed most of the city, and about 30,000 Greeks and Armenians were killed. For the Greeks, this was the Asia Minor Catastrophe, the end of the mission for a Greater Greece, and, more important, the end of the 2,000-year-old Greek presence in Asia Minor. A peace conference was organized in Lausanne in 1923 by the superpowers that enforced an exchange of populations. As a result, about 1.1 million Greeks had to leave their homes and move to Greece, and 380,000 Turks had to make the opposite journey. The influx of such a large number of Greeks changed the ethnic makeup of the country, making Greeks, for instance, the majority in Macedonia. Greece became one of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the Balkans, if not the world, with small minorities of Macedonians, Muslims, Vlachs, and Albanians. The coming of this huge number of refugees, many of whom did not know Greek, posed tremendous problems of assimilation. But they arrived into a state that was 100 years old. During that time, the country had achieved a relatively cohesive nation-state. This is remarkable when one considers that the bulk of the population did not have a strong sense of national consciousness by the War of Independence. Greek identity served as a foundation of the state, a fusion of Orthodoxy, ancient Greek elements, and modern forms: the Greeks are Europeans, Orthodox by faith, and heirs of an illustrious, ancient tradition. This identity was for the most part a product of the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Although the edifice of this national identity has not really changed, it is increasingly challenged today by waves of migrants from eastern Europe, the Near East, and Africa. As a country that until the recent past was a net exporter of labor, Greece has to come to terms with a large number of residents that are of a different race and nationality. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Selected Bibliography Clogg, R. 1973. The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence. London: Macmillan. Gallant, T. W. 2001. Modern Greece. London: Arnold. Gourgouris, S. 1996. Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Herzfeld, M. 1982. Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece. Austin: Texas University Press. Jusdanis, G. 1991. Belated Modernity and Aesthetic Culture: Inventing National Literature. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press. Jusdanis, G. 2001. The Necessary Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lambropoulos, V. 1988. Literature as National Institution: Studies in the Politics of Modern Greek Criticism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. St. Clair, W. 1972. That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Woodhouse, C. M. 1952. The Greek War of Independence: Its Historical Setting. London: Hutchinson’s University Library.


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Hungary Steve Jobbitt Chronology 1825–1847 Hungary’s Reform Period; characterized by modest social and economic reforms and hopes for the gradual as well as peaceful acquisition of national independence from Austria. 1848–1849 (March–August) The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence; defeated by a combined Austrian and Russian invasion and followed by two decades of Habsburg absolutism. 1867 The Ausgleich, or Austro-Hungarian Compromise; the Habsburg empire officially becomes a Dual Monarchy. 1881 A group of opposition politicians run on an anti-Semitic platform in the national election, reflecting a general shift in Hungarian politics toward a more chauvinist definition of national identity. 1896 The Hungarian Millennium; Hungary celebrates 1,000 years of conquest and settlement in the Carpathian Basin. 1918 (November) Count Mihály Károlyi assumes power as the head of the short-lived Chrysanthemum Revolution, a coalition of moderate leftists and liberals. 1919 (March) The Communist Party comes to power under the leadership of Béla Kun. (November) Counter-revolutionary forces under the command of Miklós Horthy, a former rear admiral in the Austro-Hungarian navy, march into Budapest and assume power; Horthy goes on to serve as regent from 1920 to 1944. 1920 (June) the Treaty of Trianon is ratified; Hungary loses two-thirds of its former territory and roughly one-third of its prewar population. 1921–1931 Count István Bethlen serves as prime minister of a relatively moderate conservativenationalist government. 1932–1936 Under Prime Minister Gyula Gömbös, leader of the so-called Szeged fascists, Hungarian politics moves further to the right. 1938 First Vienna Award restores southern Slovakia to Hungary. 1940 Second Vienna Award; Hungary reoccupies parts of Transylvania. 1941 (April) Hungary enters the war as an ally of Germany and Italy, joining in the Nazi invasion of Yugoslavia. 1944 (March) Germany occupies Hungary, meeting no resistance. (October) Horthy is arrested and the national socialist Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi is named prime minister by the Nazis. 1945 (April) The war ends with the Soviet occupation of the country.

Situating the Nation Hungarian nationalism and nation-building in the 19th and 20th centuries was shaped by a combination of factors common to east-central Europe as a whole. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Situated between aggressive imperial powers in the West and East, Hungary was very much constrained by the Great Power politics that shaped the region. Though Hungarians enjoyed much more autonomy than other east-central European nations in domestic affairs in the decades leading up to World War I and, as part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, even engaged in imperialist projects of their own, the nation itself was saddled with the burden of political and economic backwardness, and with the influx of foreign ideologies and cultural movements that often resulted in radical social and political upheaval. Of all east-central European nations, however, the Hungarian experience was most similar to that of the Poles. Much like Poland, which had been a sovereign state prior to its partition in the late 18th century, Hungary had been an independent kingdom until the early 16th century and, like its northern neighbor, even had a limited tradition of representational government. This memory of former territorial and political unity provided an important basis for Hungarian and Polish nationalism, and even helped to fuel collective fantasies of “the martyred nation” in both countries. Moreover, as in Poland, where nation-building was effectively a top-down process guided by the szlachta (Poland’s aristocratic class), Hungarian nationalism owed much to the combined efforts of the nation’s aristocrats and lesser nobles, an admittedly heterogeneous grouping of individuals who, in the absence of a true middle class, were largely responsible for outlining the social, political, and symbolic parameters of Hungarian nationalism in the modern period.

Instituting the Nation In the decades leading up to World War I, Hungarian nationalism was influenced by two divergent and often conflicting tendencies. The first was one of conservative pragmatism. Generally associated with the reform program initiated by Count István Széchenyi in the mid-1820s, and later institutionalized under the terms of the Ausgleich or Compromise Agreement signed with the Austrians in 1867, conservative pragmatists argued that Hungary’s future lay within the Habsburg monarchy, and thus promoted compromise and cooperation rather than revolution as the best way to ensure Hungarian development and prosperity. Though essentially liberal in its economic outlook, the conservative reforms articulated by Széchenyi and implemented by the pro-Compromise liberal governments of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were intended to enhance, rather than undermine, the privileged social, cultural, and political position of the nation’s ruling political and economic elite. The second tendency was revolutionary rather than cautiously pragmatic and was initially led by members of Hungary’s lesser nobility or gentry, a subclass whose ranks were augmented throughout the 19th century by the inclusion of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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assimilated Swabians (Germans), Croats, Slovaks, and others. Often associated with the name and image of Lajos Kossuth, the charismatic leader of the successful but short-lived insurrection of 1848–1849, Hungary’s liberal revolutionaries pressed for more radical social and economic reforms and ultimately called for full independence from Austria. Though crushed by the combined imperial forces of Austria and Russia in 1849, and further undermined by the terms of the Compromise Agreement of 1867, the demand for greater Hungarian autonomy experienced a resurgence at the end of the 19th century. Frustrated with their peripheral socioeconomic status, a growing number of the nation’s gentry and educated professionals began appropriating the legacy of Kossuth and the liberal revolution of midcentury in their call for a more equitable Hungary free from Austrian control. Intersecting as it did with a more aggressive form of integral nationalism, the renewed independence movement quickly acquired culturally and ethnically chauvinist overtones, and was subsequently denounced by an emergent group of bourgeois radicals and avant-garde intellectuals who, at the turn of the century, were only beginning their ultimately abortive struggle for a truly liberal reform of Hungarian society and politics. World War I and its immediate aftermath marked a definite watershed in Hungarian history. With the empire’s ethnic minorities in open revolt, and the Austro-Hungarian monarchy threatened by imminent military, economic, and social collapse, the stage was set for revolution. In the autumn of 1918, Count Mihály Károlyi led a coalition of moderate leftists and liberals in what came to be known as the Chrysanthemum Revolution. Lasting only four and a half months, Károlyi’s leftist revolution gave way in March 1919 to a full-fledged communist revolution that, with its monumental social and economic reforms marred by violence and terror, collapsed after only 133 days. The dramatic failure of both revolutions paved the way for Admiral Miklós Horthy’s march into Budapest in November 1919 and for the subsequent consolidation of his counter-revolutionary regime, which remained in power until 1944. During the 1920s, Hungarian politics was dominated by the government of Count István Bethlen, a moderate conservative-nationalist politician who served as prime minister from 1921 to 1931. Bethlen’s work to consolidate the nation politically and economically, however, along with his desire to revise the Treaty of Trianon diplomatically rather than militarily, was ultimately challenged by the rising popularity of such right-wing politicians as Gyula Gömbös, an ex-army officer of Swabian descent who served as prime minister from 1932 until his death in 1936. Yet, although the right wing tended to dominate Hungarian politics throughout the 1930s and early 1940s, the more moderate conservative nationalists still exerted a great deal of social and political influence, and it was not until Hitler deposed Horthy in October 1944, and then appointed the Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi as head of the government, that Hungary finally succumbed to fascism. The defining event of the Horthy era was beyond a doubt the ratification of the Treaty of Trianon in 1920, an especially punitive treaty that uprooted a large N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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number of Hungarians, and that created the uncertain social, economic, and geopolitical conditions that haunted Hungary between the wars. Humiliated by the harsh terms of the treaty, and deprived of both human and natural resources, the attempted revision of Trianon served not only as the focal point of Hungarian foreign policy until 1945 but also as a symbolic pretext for defining and narrating the nation between the wars, a process of identity formation that became progressively more fascistic and anti-Semitic by the outbreak of World War II.

Defining the Nation With the exception of the brief revolutionary period during 1918–1919, Hungarian politicians and nationalists tended to define the nation in cultural rather than political terms between 1880 and 1945. Reflecting in part a growing Europeanwide trend toward exclusivist definitions of the nation, the rise of essentialist and ultimately racialist definitions of Hungarian identity was also a response to an existential paranoia felt by Hungarians at large, one which was amplified by the prevailing ethnic tensions in the region and, after World War I, by the threat not only of German and Soviet expansion but also of Czechoslovak, Romanian, and Yugoslav aggression. More than anything, however, the tendency to define the nation in cultural and later racial terms was a reflection of the influence that right-wing political factions were able to exert in Hungarian politics. Between 1880 and 1918, for example, the largely optimistic and conciliatory attitude that had existed toward the nation’s ethnic and religious minorities at the time of the Compromise was effectively undermined by right-wing elements at work within both the ruling Liberal Party (1875–1905) and the neo-liberal National Party of Work (1910–1917), and also by the growing momentum and political consolidation of the nation’s parliamentary opposition, a loose coalition of conservatives and radicals who eventually succeeded in forming a brief government between 1906 and 1910. Though the liberal parties may have dominated the country politically in the decades leading up to World War I, their cultural, educational, and assimilationist policies reflected the spirit and aspirations of Hungary’s conservative right-wing factions. Between 1880 and 1945, the idea of the nation as an historically and territorially integrated geographical body was central to every project of identity formation in Hungary. Though a territorial awareness of the historic Kingdom of Hungary had persisted in one form or another for nearly 1,000 years, it was not until the end of the 19th century that the image of the nation as an integral geographic unit began to take shape in the nationalist imagination. Overlapping with an earlier belief that the Kingdom of Hungary was a historic reality guaranteed by God and blessed and protected by the Virgin Mary, the work of cultural, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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historical, and economic geographers suggested to Hungarians that their country was an ideal natural unit as well. Drawing on often sophisticated geographical and hydrological arguments, geographers amassed an impressive, if heavily biased, body of scientific evidence to suggest that Hungary was an integrated organic entity whose historical boundaries corresponded perfectly to the natural geographical contours of the Carpathian Basin. This territorial conceptualization of Hungary as an unbreakable organic unit served as one of the chief defenses employed by the Hungarian government at the Paris Peace Conference after World War I, and later became the basis for the more passionately articulated revisionist arguments of the interwar period. Maps stressing the naturalness as well as the territorial integrity of pre-Trianon Hungary proliferated in the 1920s and 1930s, and were often accompanied by the irredentist slogans “No! No! Never!” “We’ll Never Forget!” and “Justice for Hungary!” Clinging to the conviction that the dismemberment of the country broke the very laws of nature itself, Hungarians were virtually unanimous in their belief that the continued survival of the nation depended on the revision of the Treaty of Trianon and the return of all or at least most of the nation’s former territory. Hungary, however, was not defined by mere geography alone, and though Hungarian nationalists and nation-builders both before and after Trianon largely agreed on the territorial extent and geopolitical importance of historic Hungary, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Turanism Turanism originated in Germany as a linguistic hypothesis in the early 19th century. In the narrowest sense of the term, the Turanian idea included speakers of Magyar, Finnic, and Turkic languages. In its broadest sense, however, the Turanian hypothesis came to embrace cultural-linguistic groups as far-flung as the Japanese and the Dravidians of the Indian subcontinent. German scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries tended to describe Turanians in negative terms, seeing them as barbaric warlike peoples who were, at best, merely half-developed Aryans. In Hungary, however, the idea of the nation’s supposed Turanian roots became a source of pride for many nationalists, and eventually evolved into a central nation-building myth, especially among conservative and right-wing thinkers and ideologues. Though Turanism had been largely discredited by serious scholars as a linguistic theory by the 1880s, it nevertheless continued to have great cultural, political, and ideological appeal. In the interwar period, Turanism fed essentialist fantasies of Hungarian uniqueness and racial strength, and quickly became the basis of an increasingly aggressive foreign policy in the Balkans.

they by no means agreed on the political, or even cultural, definition of the nation itself. In fact, the construction of Hungarian identity was a hotly contested political project, one that tended to play itself out on the symbolic level as a polarized struggle between Western and Eastern conceptualizations of the nation. On the Western side of the ledger was a vision of Hungary as a modern, or rather modernizing, multiethnic nation-state with a long history of defending Christian Europe against Asiatic barbarism and tyranny. Insisting that the nation embodied the progressive Western principles of rationalism, cosmopolitanism, and humanism, proponents of this vision suggested that Hungary had earned its rightful place in Europe. On the Eastern side of the ledger, however, was a more essentialist, and ultimately chauvinist, conceptualization of the nation, one that was diametrically opposed to Hungary’s Western self-image. Thus, where the Western vision promoted values such as Christian civilization and material progress, the Eastern vision stressed not only Hungary’s pagan roots and its nomadic warrior traditions, but also its cultural and linguistic affinity with other so-called Turanian peoples of the Near and Far East.

Narrating the Nation The conceptual distinction between West and East that dominated the politics of identity formation in Hungary from the late 19th century to the end of World War II found expression in the various myths, symbols, and historical figures and events that different groups of nationalists utilized to express their particular political or ideological vision of the nation. Liberals and conservative nationalists, for instance, largely adhered to a Western vision of the nation (in part because N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Statue of Saint Stephen (István), the first King of Hungary, standing in Heroes’ Square in Budapest. (iStockPhoto.com)


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they sought political, diplomatic, and economic support from western European governments), and thus tended to rely on images and narratives that stressed Christian monarchy, Habsburg loyalty, and European integration. The opposition and radical-right factions that promoted an Eastern vision of the nation, however, often countered with symbolic references to pre-Christian tribalism, ancient blood ties, and a fierce tradition of conquest and independence. Thus, it was that the memory of Széchenyi and the Compromise of 1867 was countered by that of Kossuth and the Revolution of 1848, or that the reign of King István (997–1038), Hungary’s first Christian monarch, was offset by that of Árpád, chieftain of the pagan Magyar tribes that conquered Hungary in the late ninth century AD. Despite the heavily polarized positions expressed by the binary representations of West and East, compromise and independence, and royal legitimacy and tribal history, Hungary’s various political factions, and especially the ruling government parties, often found it politically expedient to include opposing images and symbols into their narrative of the nation. At the end of the 19th century, for example, the ruling Liberal Party incorporated Árpád into the official celebration of the nation’s millennium, commemorating his pagan state-building legacy alongside the civilizing efforts of King István. Though in part perhaps a sincere reflection of the complex and even contradictory nature of identity formation, the inclusion of Árpád was undoubtedly a carefully calculated political strategy on the part of the ruling liberal elite. Interwar conservative nationalists, in turn, though they idealized conservative nation-building personalities like Széchenyi and enlightened Westernizing figures like King István, could not resist drawing upon the rich nationalist heritage provided by the liberal revolution of the mid-19th century, nor could they ignore the essentialist fantasies being spun by the radical right, or the Völkisch narratives being produced by emergent groups of agrarian populists. Much like the discourse and imagery that characterized Hungarian

Populism In the 1920s and 1930s, various forms of agrarian populism rose to challenge the dualistic character of national consciousness that had dominated Hungarian political thinking for much of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Building on the work of nation-building ethnographers from the fin de siècle, and promoting themselves as harbingers of a “third way” in Hungarian politics and culture, groups of sociologists and disillusioned poets and artists ventured out of Hungary’s major cities to engage in so-called village research. Driven by the belief that Hungary’s peasants were living incarnations of an authentic Hungarian spirit, representatives of the growing populist movement sought to offer what they felt was a much more accurate definition of Hungarian history and identity. Though populism gained momentum as an aesthetic and even moral alternative in the interwar period, its political base was undermined by conservative nationalists and right-wing radicals alike, two competing factions that were able to appropriate the moderate and more extreme forms of populism, respectively.


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nation-building at the turn of the century, the nationalist narratives that emerged in the interwar period often represented a synthesis, or at least a compromise, between otherwise divergent symbolic regimes.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Throughout most of the 19th century, many Hungarian nationalists clung to the notion of Hungary as a multiethnic entity and sought to develop nation-building strategies that would not only rally ethnic Hungarians to the national cause but would also accommodate the country’s ethnic minorities. By the 1880s, however, the more moderate federalist solutions to Hungary’s ethnic question fell by the wayside, with the government committing itself to an aggressive languageoriented policy of assimilation. With ethnic Hungarians comprising little more than 50 percent of the total population, and with nationalist agitators gaining momentum among the nation’s minorities, this appeared to many as the only sensible course of action. Hungary’s policy of aggressive assimilation, or Magyarization, produced mixed results. The assimilation of large numbers of Hungary’s Jewish population, for example, was very much a success, albeit a tragically limited one. Though assimilation had little to offer the Hasidic Jews who lived primarily in outlying rural areas of eastern Hungary, a vast majority of Hungary’s “Western” and predominantly German-speaking Jews jumped at the opportunity to assimilate. Living primarily in Budapest and other urban centers, these newly integrated Hungarian Jews quickly rose in social, political, and economic status, and tended to become passionate advocates of Hungarian nationalism and assimilation. This success, however, was tempered by the general failure to assimilate the large numbers of Slovaks, Ruthenians, Romanians, Serbs, Croats, and others who lived within the historic boundaries of the Kingdom of Hungary. Though some of the educated elite among the nation’s ethnic minorities were successfully integrated into Hungarian society, the assimilationist efforts of Hungarian nationalists quite often met with either indifference or resistance. Aggravating existing tensions between Magyars and non-Magyars, Hungary’s assimilationist programs ultimately fanned the flames of ethnic nationalism within the Kingdom of Hungary and the surrounding region at large. The overt failure of the government’s assimilationist policies to unify the nation was amplified by a growing rift within Hungarian society and politics itself. The self-interested, short-sighted, and often insincere socioeconomic policies of the ruling liberal elite served to alienate, rather than mobilize, certain elements of Hungarian society. Hungarian workers, for example, were largely ignored by the government, while the peasant class, though it assumed an increasingly central symbolic role in nationalist discourse and imagery, continued to suffer from N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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poverty and exploitation, with large numbers of them emigrating to the West prior to World War I. Hungary’s aristocratic class of conservative landowners, in turn, openly rebelled against the materialism and secularism of the age. With their traditional agrarian power base threatened by Hungary’s rapid modernization and urbanization, this group began to develop and embrace a form of reactionary nationalism that would become dominant in the interwar period. Despite the growing influence of right-wing elements at the turn of the century, the question of Hungarian identity did not officially acquire an overtly racialist character until after World War I. Though Trianon had more or less created a culturally and linguistically homogenous nation-state in which ethnic Hungarians comprised roughly 95 percent of the total population, the conservativenationalist and later openly right-wing governments of the Horthy regime pursued comprehensive cultural and educational programs that stressed not only the territorial integrity of the historic Kingdom of Hungary but also the unique racial character of the Hungarian people. Driven by the perception that Hungary had been abandoned by the West, betrayed by its national minorities, and undermined by the Communists, counter-revolutionary nationalists and nation-builders sought to mobilize ethnic Hungarians as a means of furthering their irredentist ambitions, and of steeling the nation’s resolve against a host of perceived enemies, both internal and external. The resulting desire to purge the nation of its undesirable foreign elements ultimately targeted Hungary’s Jewish population, a highly visible social group that was denounced both for its ties to Western capitalism and its overrepresentation in socialist and communist circles. In 1921, the government moved quickly to pass the Numerus Clausus, Europe’s first explicitly anti-Jewish law. Intended in part to make room for the influx of educated middle-class Hungarians from the dismembered regions of the country, the legislation limited Jewish participation in the professions and universities. Though the law was regarded by Bethlen and many other conservative nationalists merely as a symbolic gesture, one that was tacitly ignored on many levels during the 1920s, its intolerant and ultimately destructive spirit was revived in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Pressured in part by Nazi Germany, the Hungarian government passed a series of three Anti-Jewish Laws between 1938 and 1941. Though historians may not agree on the extent to which this anti-Jewish legislation accurately reflected a widespread anti-Semitism in Hungary, there can be no doubt that the open articulation of racist attitudes legitimated an already-present anti-Jewish sentiment in Hungary, and ultimately contributed to the rapid deportation and murder of over 500,000 Hungarian Jews during the German occupation of Hungary at the end of World War II. Selected Bibliography Freifeld, A. 2001. “The Cult of March 15: Sustaining the Hungarian Myth of Revolution, 1849–1999.” In Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present, edited by M. Bucur and N. M. Wingfield, 255–285. West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press.


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Frey, D. S. 2002. “Aristocrats, Gypsies, and Cowboys All: Film Stereotypes and Hungarian National Identity in the 1930s.” Nationalities Papers 30, no. 3: 383–401. Ger˝o, A. 1995. Modern Hungarian Society in the Making: The Unfinished Experience. Translated by James Patterson and Enik˝o Koncz. Budapest, Hungary: Central European Press. Hanebrink, P. 2006. In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890–1944. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Hofer, T., ed. 1994. Hungarians between “East” and “West”: Three Essays on National Myths and Symbols. Budapest, Hungary: Museum of Ethnography. Janos, A. 1982. The Politics of Backwardness in Hungary, 1825–1945. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Lampland, M. 1994. “Family Portraits: Gendered Images of the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Hungary.” East European Politics and Societies 8, no. 2 (Spring): 287–316. Nagy-Talavera, N. M. 2001. The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Romania. Oxford: The Centre for Romanian Studies. Romsics, I. 1999. Hungary in the Twentieth Century. Budapest, Hungary: Corvina. White, G. W. 2000. Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. (See in particular Chapter 4.) Winternitz, J. 1983. “The ‘Turanian’ Hypothesis and Magyar Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century.” In Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe, edited by R. Sussex and J. C. Eade, 143–158. Columbus, OH: Slavica Publishers.


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Ireland William Jenkins Chronology 1879–1882 The economic pressures that instigate the Land War promote political activity among the rural population through the Land League and its clubs; a new Land Act is instituted and the League is eventually outlawed. 1882 Political energy is now channeled into the campaign for Irish self-government (Home Rule) at the local level through National League clubs and at the parliamentary level through the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP). 1884 The Gaelic Athletic Association is established to promote and organize Gaelic sports. 1885 Electoral reform gives the vote to many small farmers and agricultural laborers, more than trebling the Irish electorate from about 226,000 to about 738,000; the IPP wins four-fifths of Irish representation in the general election. 1886 The first Home Rule Bill is introduced in the House of Commons; a group of “Liberal Unionists” break from Gladstone’s party, ensuring its failure. 1890–1891 The political downfall of Irish Party chairman Charles Stewart Parnell divides the IPP; less than a year later, he is dead. A Land Purchase Act in 1891 creates the Congested Districts Board to rehabilitate the economies of the poorest regions. 1893 The Gaelic League is founded to preserve and promote the ailing Irish language; the second Home Rule Bill passes the Commons but is rejected by the Lords. 1900 The IPP reunite under the leadership of the Parnellite John Redmond. 1905 The Ulster Unionist Council is organized. 1909 The Land Commission is empowered to acquire land compulsorily for the relief of population congestion, further accelerating the decline of landlordism in rural Ireland. 1910 The IPP gain the balance of power in Westminster in both general elections. 1911 The Parliament Act removes the absolute veto of the House of Lords. 1912–1913 The third Home Rule Bill is introduced in the Commons; the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant is signed by more than 200,000 Ulster Protestants to resist any imposition of Home Rule; the Ulster Volunteer Force and Irish Volunteers are formed as armed paramilitary groups representing unionist and nationalist interests, respectively. 1914 The Home Rule Bill passes the Commons in May and is enacted in September, though the issue of Ulster exclusion remains unresolved; the Ulster volunteers are channeled into the 36th Ulster Division for World War I; Irish volunteers also enlist under the name National Volunteers with those opposing enlistment retaining the name Irish Volunteers. 1916 The Easter Rebellion in Dublin is followed by the swift execution of 15 of its leaders; the 36th Ulster Division is decimated at the Battle of the Somme on July 1. 1918 John Redmond dies in March; the general election at the end of the year reflects the dramatic rise in support for the Sinn Féin party (who win 73 seats) outside of Ulster and the disintegration of the IPP (who win 6 seats). 1919–1921 The Anglo-Irish War is fought initially between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the police (Royal Irish Constabulary); the latter are subsequently reinforced by the notorious “Black and Tans,” escalating the conflict.


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1920 The Government of Ireland Act, also known as the “Partition Act,” provides for two parliaments: one for a 6-county “Northern Ireland” based in Belfast, the other for the remaining 26 counties based in Dublin; the Unionists agree, but Sinn Féin disregard the act; sectarian riots follow in Belfast. 1921 Following a truce between the IRA and British, the Anglo-Irish Treaty provides for the creation of a 26-county Irish Free State (IFS) as a dominion within the British empire. 1922–1923 A civil war is fought between pro- and anti-treaty forces; the pro-treaty forces prevail and the Irish Free State settles into a period of relative peace. 1926 The anti-treaty Sinn Féin, led by Eamon de Valera, enter the political scene in the IFS through the Fianna Fáil (Soldiers of Destiny) party; Sinn Féin are now a marginal political force. 1937 The Irish Constitution includes a territorial claim to the whole island and recognizes the “special place” of the Roman Catholic Church in the Irish nation. 1938 The IRA, now declared unlawful by the IFS, begins a bombing campaign in Britain; World War II breaks out; Ireland declares neutrality, while Northern Ireland enters as a member of the United Kingdom. 1941 Bombing raids by German aircraft kill approximately 1,000 people in Belfast.

Situating the Nation By the early 1880s, Ireland remained an integral part of the United Kingdom through the Act of Union (1801). Divided into 4 provinces and 32 counties, the island’s 103 elected representatives sat in the House of Commons in London. With such appointed figures as the chief secretary and lord lieutenant in place in Dublin, the administrative apparatus in Ireland was not typical within the United Kingdom; Wales and Scotland, for example, had no such figures. Ireland’s religious geography, a product of centuries of migration, land confiscation, and plantations, remained distinctive in the late 19th century: the population was more than 80 percent Roman Catholic with the remainder adhering to various Protestant denominations. The social and political force of the Protestant minority was especially evident in the northeastern province of Ulster. Ireland remained a largely agrarian society whose economy was tied closely to the urban and industrial British market. Agricultural modernization was limited. On the land, social relations revolved around a mostly Protestant landlord class and a tenant farming population. The agricultural laboring class, hit hard by the potato famine of the late 1840s, continued its decline as crops gave way to increased cattle production. By 1870, less than 800 landlords owned half the country and more than 13 percent of landowners resided elsewhere, mostly in England. Industry was confined to the northeastern region around Belfast where the engineering, shipbuilding, and textile industries were closely linked to Britain’s imperial markets. This economic particularity, coupled with the region’s intense Protestantism, contributed to the latter population’s self-conception as hardworking and thrifty in contrast to the population of the nonindustrial south, whom many Protestants considered to be unduly influenced by the “backward” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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doctrines of Roman Catholicism. These religious sensibilities ultimately informed disagreements regarding Ireland’s “national” status as Protestant “unionists” organized to retain the Act of Union with Britain. Emigration to Britain and North America, having peaked during the midcentury famine, remained significant. Irish-born passengers left United Kingdom ports for destinations beyond Europe and the Mediterranean at rates ranging between 60,000 and 100,000 per annum during the 1880s. The United States remained the key destination. Although emigration affected all parts of the island, out-migration was most prominent in western and southwestern regions, areas scarred badly by the potato famine where small-scale agriculture and the Irish language remained features of everyday life. Since economic realities now discouraged farm subdivision, most rural families could not hope to retain all their offspring in Ireland. Political subversion against British rule in Ireland had been low for most of the 1870s. The last years of the 1860s heightened the public’s awareness of the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) or “Fenian” organization. Though gaining notoriety with their risings, raids, and other public disruptions in Ireland, Britain, and Canada between 1866 and 1870, their activities did not reflect popular sentiment in Ireland. In striving to achieve an Irish republic, the IRB upheld the “physicalforce” tradition pursued in earlier rebellions by the United Irishmen (1798), Robert Emmet (1803), and Young Ireland (1848). During the period 1870–1916, however, the idea of Irish self-government or “Home Rule” emerged as a credible alternative for realizing Irish “nationhood.” This “constitutional nationalism” was promoted through the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) in the House of Commons, with Charles Stewart Parnell as its formidable leader throughout the 1880s.

Charles Stewart Parnell, Irish nationalist and leader of the struggle for Irish Home Rule in the late 19th century. (Library of Congress)


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A banner of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (Fenian) organization ca. 1866 with a swordwielding Erin at the center with green flag and shamrock-ringed skirt, and surrounded by earlier generations of national heroes such as politicians O’Connell and Grattan, poet Moore, and rebellion leader Emmet. (Library of Congress)


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Charles Stewart Parnell (1846 –1891) Charles Stewart Parnell was an Irish landlord and politician born into the Church of Ireland (Anglican) faith. In 1875, he was elected to Westminster as a supporter of Irish Home Rule where his long speeches contributed to the strategy of “obstruction” pursued by the Irish members to ensure discussion of Irish issues. Active in the land agitation, Parnell became the first Land League president in 1879 and was elected chairman of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) the following year. In 1881, he was jailed for treasonable offenses for more than six months. Through the subsequent decade, Parnell was roundly hailed as the “uncrowned king of Ireland” at home and abroad. He modernized the Irish Party, incorporated the physical-force nationalists of the Irish Republican Brotherhood into his constitutional strategy, and in 1885, he “converted” Liberal leader William Gladstone to the idea of Home Rule for Ireland. In 1887, a letter in the Times linking Parnell with the 1882 political murders in Dublin’s Phoenix Park was found to be a forgery, and he won an outof-court settlement that further enhanced his political standing. In late 1890, however, the citing of Parnell as co-respondent in the divorce papers of Mrs. Katherine O’Shea heralded the beginning of his political downfall. Repudiating Gladstone and the Liberals for withdrawing their support of his chairmanship, Parnell then lost the support of the majority within the IPP. His marriage to O’Shea in 1891 brought condemnation from the Catholic Church. He died in the south of England in October of that year. Home Rule, meanwhile, remained in place as the key imagined reference point of Irish nationhood until the aftermath of the 1916 rising.

Despite the harnessing of popular support for Home Rule in most of Ireland by the mid-1880s, these constitutional initiatives failed. Parnell’s political downfall in 1890–1891 split the IPP, and despite reunion in 1900, it was not until 1910 that their grip on the balance of power in the Commons once again forced the Liberals into action. The House of Lords veto, which had short-circuited the second Home Rule Bill of 1893, was removed in 1911. This was significant in stirring Protestant Ulster to act in unison against incorporation into a self-governing Ireland. In 1912, more than 200,000 Protestants signed a covenant pledging their determination to resist Home Rule, while an armed Ulster Volunteer Force was formed early in 1913. The Catholic south responded later that year with the Irish Volunteers. World War I intervened to prevent what seemed a likely civil war in Ireland. With the outbreak of war, IPP leader John Redmond encouraged the enlistment of the Irish Volunteers as a gesture of loyalty to Britain that would not only copper-fasten Home Rule but also bring an end to sectarian tensions within Ireland. The majority, renamed the National Volunteers, supported him while the minority, now infiltrated by the IRB, remained at home. Though Home Rule passed into law in the autumn of 1914, it had effectively been postponed until the cessation of hostilities while the issue of Ulster exclusion was still to be resolved. As the war dragged on, disillusion set in and the radical minds among the Irish Volunteers and IRB who felt that “England’s difficulty was Ireland’s opportunity” took a decisive step. On Easter 1916, a rebellion took place in central Dublin where N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Easter Rising of 1916 With Britain at war in Europe, those advocating a physical-force solution to Ireland’s long search for nationhood seized their opportunity, though with little in the way of public support. Their numbers held variously overlapping memberships in the anti-enlistment Sinn Féin Party, the Gaelic League, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Irish Volunteers, and the Citizen Army, the latter grouping formed by the socialist James Connolly. Although failing to secure adequate German weaponry, and with imperfect communication between its leaders about whether to press for rebellion or not, a “minority of a minority” took to the streets of central Dublin on April 24, seizing key buildings and factories and declaring themselves to be the “provisional government” of an Irish Republic. About 1,600 insurrectionists, women as well as men, participated. Doomed from the beginning, British firepower brought the rebels to surrender unconditionally after six days. Most of the 450 deaths and 2,600 casualties were civilian. Martial law was imposed by the British and by mid-May, 15 of the rebel leaders had been executed, elevating them to the ranks of political martyrdom. The belief in “blood sacrifice” by the executed proclamation reader, Patrick Pearse, has added emotional force to interpretations of the rising by subsequent generations of Irish nationalists and republicans.

a proclamation was read declaring an Irish Republic. The rebellion was suppressed within a week and the swift execution of 15 of its leaders inspired antiEnglish revulsion across the island. The search for the “Irish nation” was not now to be found in the scheme of political devolution within the empire that Home Rule promised. The massive resistance to conscription in nationalist Ireland in the spring of 1918 was one indicator that the tide had turned, but more concrete proof came in the general election later that year that gave a decisive mandate to the Sinn Féin (Ourselves) party, who had opposed enlistment and now supported the republican ideal. They won 73 seats compared with the IPP’s 6 and the Unionists’ 26. The Sinn Féin members abstained from Westminster and set up an independent Irish government (the Dáil), which was subsequently declared illegal by the British. The scene was set for a return to physical-force nationalism. In the aftermath of World War I, a guerilla war pitted the Royal Irish Constabulary and British military forces in Ireland against the reorganized Irish Volunteers, now known as the Irish Republican Army (IRA). In the midst of this, the Government of Ireland Act (1920) provided for two separate administrations, one in Belfast for the 6 northeastern counties and the other in Dublin for the remaining 26. Following protracted negotiations, the northern Unionists accepted this partition of the island; the Sinn Féin Dáil did not. With the introduction of the “Black and Tan” reinforcements from Britain inspiring new levels of brutality from both sides in the AngloIrish War, it was not until July 1921 that a truce was reached. The resulting treaty, signed in December 1921, confirmed the partition of the island, establishing the 26 counties of the Irish Free State as a dominion within the British empire with a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Dublin parliament. Not all were satisfied with this proposed “national design.” During the acrimonious Dáil debates of January 1922, dissenters in Sinn Féin famously objected to taking the Oath of Allegiance to the British monarch before sitting in the new Irish parliament. With the IRA also divided by the treaty, a bitter civil war followed that lasted until May 1923. The years between 1923 and 1940 thus witnessed the building of two separate states in Ireland. In Northern Ireland, the Unionists were now in effective control of a state that remained within the United Kingdom in which one-third of the population was Catholic in religion and nationalist in political outlook. The latter would remain a stranded minority. In the south, the emphasis turned toward the building of a state where an exclusive interpretation of Irishness, rooted in Gaelic and Catholic culture, would predominate. With minorities comprising scarcely more than 10 percent of the population, such a project met with little opposition. In 1937, the new Constitution of the Irish Free State renamed it as “Eire” in Irish and “Ireland” in English. With cross-border relations characterized by mutual suspicion rather than cordiality during the interwar period, partition seemed assured for the long term.

Instituting the Nation The key actors in late 19th-century Irish nationalism were politicians, tenant farmers, Catholic clergymen, and urban middle-class intellectuals. In 1879, the Irish Land War commenced as cheap beef and grain imports from the Americas flooded the British market and potato fungus reappeared on farms in the west and southwest. With declining incomes, over 14,000 tenants were evicted between 1879 and 1883, more than had been evicted over the previous 30 years. Tenant interests were defended by the Irish National Land League, whose first president, Parnell, was, ironically, a landlord himself. The Land League brought together a broad coalition of small and large farmers as well as town and village shopkeepers. IRB elements were also brought on board by Parnell. The upper Catholic hierarchy remained opposed to the IRB presence, but given the League’s overall popularity, the response of priests varied at parish level. The League agitated for fair rents, provisions for land purchase by tenants, and an improvement to the latter’s security of tenure. Large tenant farmers, though less pressed economically, also sought ultimate ownership of the land, and their social and kin ties to the town merchant class brought the latter into the movement. Clubs were set up in towns and villages, aided in no small part by the national reach of road and rail systems. While the Land Acts of 1881, 1885, 1903, and 1909 were to ultimately facilitate the transfer to “peasant proprietorship” in Ireland, the rural unrest of the early 1880s served to firmly mobilize the nationalist consciousness of rural Catholic Ireland behind Parnell and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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IPP in their mission to obtain Home Rule. Given their economic and demographic importance, it was the tenant farmers in particular who came to see themselves as the backbone of the Irish nation. But politicians and parties in both Ireland and Britain were also critical power brokers. With Land League clubs reconstituted as branches of the “National League” in the autumn of 1882 and thereafter, the IPP’s Home Rule campaign won the support of the Catholic Church with pledges to support Catholic education. Despite Parnell’s own Protestant background, the latter move did not attract Ireland’s Protestants to constitutional nationalism. Although Home Rule did not involve the separation of Ireland from the imperial realm, Protestants feared the social and economic effects of the Catholic majority in a Dublin parliament and were furthermore convinced that Home Rule was merely a “stepping-stone” to an Irish republic. The countermovement of unionism thus gathered strength, finding its natural home in Ulster where such slogans as “Home Rule will be Rome rule” struck a popular chord. In 1885, an expanded franchise helped the IPP to win four-fifths of Irish representation in the Commons and hold the balance of power. Requiring their support, William Gladstone endorsed Parnell’s Home Rule initiative to bring his Liberal Party into government. Unionists in turn formed a wing in the Conservative Party. Despite the failure of Home Rule bills in 1886 and 1893, these political alignments remained in place until the aftermath of the 1916 rebellion. In the Irish Free State, the rural farming population would continue to be envisioned as the critical building block of the new nation. Other political collectives became established in urban Ireland over the period 1900–1914 whose ideas of political reform ranged from socialism and feminism to republican separatism, yet these continued to live in the shadow of the IPP until the aftermath of the 1916 rising. Though socialists like James Connolly and women’s rights campaigners such as Countess Markievicz participated in the rising, the endurance of the Catholic Church’s institutional power in the postrevolutionary era would severely constrain the political possibilities of those advancing modern or liberal ideas. With the structure of another key institution, the civil service, remaining largely intact as the Free State era began, the new dispensation followed a strongly conservative line. Institutions promoting Irish nationalism were not confined to Ireland itself. Financial support for representatives of the Irish Party in London was critical, and Irish communities in Britain and the United States were an important source of this. A key figure in rallying support among the Irish in Britain, T. P. O’Connor, became the only Irish Party candidate to win a seat in an English constituency, Liverpool’s Scotland division, which he held for more than 40 years. Branches of the Land and National leagues were instituted in American and Canadian centers of Irish settlement in the 1880s for fundraising and agitational purposes. In the period before World War I, the United Irish League of the United States performed a similar function. Cultural revivalists such as the Gaelic League’s Douglas Hyde and the poet William Butler Yeats, among others, also undertook wellN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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publicized North American tours. With continued in-migration from Ireland, Irish identities remained prominent in cities such as New York, Boston, and Chicago, and not all the American-born Irish were unresponsive to events in the homeland. At the same time, institutionalized opposition to Irish nationalism within Ireland strengthened itself. In 1905, the Ulster Unionist Council was formed, adding depth to that group’s alignment with the British Conservatives. Ulster’s Protestants were not necessarily denying their Irishness; sports such as rugby continued to be organized at the all-Ireland level after partition, for example. Their sympathies with unionism, however, revealed a preference for the “big nationalism” of Britishness and the security of British citizenship. They repudiated the idea of a distinctive “Irish nation” and predicted economic disaster should it become a reality. At the local level, the fraternal Orange Order lodges, open only to Protestants, mobilized against nationalist interests from the 1880s onward and were a key outlet of recruitment for the paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force in 1913. Their annual rituals and processions reaffirmed the spirit of “loyalty” to the British monarchy and its Protestant legacy. With the advent of the Northern Ireland state, these unionist and loyalist institutions remained pervasive, while Catholic nationalism lived on in the guise of the church-aligned Nationalist party. Faced with a future of permanent opposition, however, the options for Catholic nationalists remained limited. They pursued a haphazard pattern of parliamentary abstention, agreeing only in 1965 to become the official opposition to the Unionists.

Defining the Nation For Irish nationalists, the island of Ireland was the ideal national unit. It had the ultimate natural boundary. Even with the Government of Ireland Act in 1920 and the treaty of 1921, nationalists on both sides of the border remained convinced to various degrees that political reintegration would eventually occur. This has so far failed to materialize. Although unionists were clearly strongest in Ulster, both they and the nationalists in the IPP operated on an island-wide basis up until World War I. While partition made Unionism anachronistic in the southern state, Catholic nationalism retained its presence north of the new border. The nonacceptance of partition by anti-treaty Sinn Féin, led by Eamon de Valera, ultimately resulted in a bloody civil war. In its aftermath, a Boundary Commission investigated minority populations in border areas and recommended territorial transfers between Northern Ireland and the Irish Free State. However, the premature leaking of its findings to the newspapers in 1925 resulted in its collapse. The two Irish governments along with the British formally agreed to keep the border in place. In official quarters within the Irish Free State, however, the reality of partition was supplanted by an imagined future of reintegration. The first series of Irish N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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stamps circulated in 1922 depicted a borderless island. With the election of the archnationalist de Valera in 1932, Articles 2 and 3 of the 1937 constitution defined the entire island as the “national territory,” specifying that the laws of the Irish Free State would apply only to the 26 counties “pending the reintegration” of the two states. These articles only added to the sense of distrust felt by the Belfast government toward Dublin, and the articles remained unamended until 1999. The geographical divisions of province and county also added to popular conceptions of the Irish nation, with the four ancient provinces comprising the “four green fields” of the mythical figure of Mother Ireland. Northern Irish Protestants for their part resented nationalist labelings of their state as the “six counties” or the “fourth green field,” and their own politically risky attempts to rename their state as “Ulster” did not succeed. Cultural imaginings of Ireland and Irishness connected to those of territory. In the 1880s and 1890s, various middle-class groups promoted initiatives geared toward Irish cultural recovery as the political idea of nationhood via Home Rule gained popularity. In 1884, the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) was established island-wide to promote Gaelic field sports such as football and hurling at the local, intercounty, and provincial level. In 1893, the Gaelic League was formed as a nonpolitical organization to revive the flagging Irish language. Though cognizant of the status of English as the language of commercial life and social mobility in Ireland, “de-Anglicization” through cultural revival was identified as a primary goal of the organization’s leaders. For them, Ireland had become excessively saturated by a materialistic and shallow English culture whose followers they denounced as shoneens (a diminutive of Seán that described those who mimicked the airs of the English ascendancy) and/or “West Britons,” terms that spoke to the apparent crisis of identity embodied in the “non-Irish Irishman.” Almost 60 branches of the League were set up within five years, while a weekly newspaper appeared in 1899. With the GAA actively discouraging the playing of such “foreign” (English) sports as rugby, cricket, and association football, these institutions sought to police the boundaries between authentically “Irish” and “(West) British” cultural practices. Cultural nationalism was advanced in other contexts. Playwrights and poets sought to bring the mysteries of Ireland’s Celtic past into the literary and artistic sphere. In 1899, Yeats and his associates established the Irish Literary Theatre in Dublin. The “Gael” or “Celt” had by this time emerged as a racial category in popular discourse in opposition to the “Anglo-Saxon”; in the Irish context, this added to popular notions of an ancient Irish race that justified the political arguments of nationalists. Though Protestants such as Yeats and Hyde were to the fore in many of these revivalist movements, it was all too easy for many Catholics to deny them an equivalent sense of “Irish” belonging. The hyphenated labeling of the Protestant “Anglo-Irish” spoke to this idea of being less than fully “Irish”; their privileged class position, particularly in the south, also fed such perceptions, while northern unionists were denounced by some as little more than “Saxon invaders.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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With priests now at the center of social life in rural Irish communities, equations of an “Irish Ireland” with a “Catholic Ireland” became prevalent though such narrow views of Irish nationality were also notably challenged in works such as James Joyce’s Ulysses (1922). Successive Free State governments reinforced the cultural ethos of the Irish nation as “Gaelic” and “Catholic” during its first two decades. Though it remained a language spoken fluently by an ever-declining minority of the population, Irish was designated the “first official language” of the nation in the 1937 constitution, with the “special position” of the Catholic Church as the majority church also acknowledged. In Northern Ireland, Catholics remained hostile to partition and continued to see themselves as legitimate members of the Irish nation despite their now-impotent political situation. Fearing future attempts at forced reunification from either Dublin or Westminster, Unionists in turn emphatically proclaimed their Britishness. Royal visitors such as the Prince of Wales and King George VI were predictably given rousing receptions, while displays of the Irish “tricolour” flag were banned from public display.

Narrating the Nation Ideas of a distinctive Irish nationhood were communicated to audiences throughout the period not simply through speeches, but also through literature, art, and public performance. By the late 19th century, a relatively coherent “story” of the historical evolution of the “Irish nation” was successfully advanced by nationalist writers to galvanize a popular patriotism. Here, the “golden age” of an ancient Irish nation was typically rooted in the island’s Celtic past prior to contact with English-speaking peoples. The revival of the myths and legends of heroic chieftains and other warriors lent credibility to this image of an earlier Irish nation with its own sophisticated government, laws, and language. English involvements in later centuries were thus depicted as negative disruptions to the island’s cultural life that served only to frustrate all subsequent attempts at Irish unity. The confiscations of Catholic lands in the 17th century, the anti-Catholic Penal Laws of the 18th century, and the famine of the late 1840s were identified as “dark moments” that demanded ultimate redress. Rebellions such as those of 1798, 1803, and 1848 were presented as courageous failures with the agitation for Catholic emancipation (1829) by Daniel O’Connell (“the Great Liberator”) constituting a rare political triumph. The realization of a separate Irish nationhood was thus conceived as the inevitable and morally just outcome of the story. Works such as the journalist A. M. Sullivan’s The Story of Ireland illustrated this narrative tradition. First published in 1867, the 25th edition was released in 1888, by which time at least 50,000 copies were sold. While Sullivan was by no means the last to publish a book with this title, he and his brothers were also responsible for publishN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ing the popular Speeches from the Dock, or Protests of Irish Patriotism in 1868. More than 20 editions of this were published within 10 years, along with a version for the increasingly important American market. Images and symbols of Irish nationhood accompanied the written words of nationalists. The allegorical representation of Ireland as a woman became widespread. Political cartoonists commonly featured “Hibernia” as the innocent virginal figure vulnerable to corruption and trickery from all sides, while the legendary figure of “Mother Ireland,” also known as “Kathleen Ni Houlihan” or the “Poor Old Woman,” was the subject of a play by Yeats and appeared on the first set of Free State currency notes in 1928, among other places. Other key symbols such as harps, shamrocks, and wolfhounds that had been resuscitated by early 19th-century revivalists appeared variously on IRB flags and Irish Party campaign posters, as well as in nationalist songbooks, newspapers, and other publications. Green was recognized as the color of Irish nationalism. The everyday landscape provided opportunities for further national narration. Streets and squares became host to a variety of statues commemorating Irish heroes, especially once nationalists gained control of town and city councils after local government reform in 1898. While Dublin’s central thoroughfare Sackville Street (later renamed O’Connell Street) had statues to Parnell and O’Connell located in its central median prior to World War I, those towns and villages in eastern Ireland affected by the 1798 rebellion also erected monuments to their local heroes. A symbolic landscape was now in place to challenge the prevailing pattern of statues to British royalty and war heroes, and it was one that would receive further embellishment in the decades following 1923. Landscapes could also summon the national imagination through art. In the pre- and postrevolutionary period, the paintings of Paul Henry, depicting the “mountain and cottage” landscape of the west of Ireland, connected with arguments about that region as the location of an ancient, noble, and unadulterated Gaelic-speaking culture. This ordered and simple peasant world contrasted sharply with the reality of the west as a region of endemic poverty and high outmigration, but it was nevertheless a critical part of the Free State’s efforts to set the antimaterialistic Catholic virtues of the national population against the soullessness and vulgar excess of metropolitan England. The “cottage landscape” became a staple of Free State handbooks and tourist posters in the 1930s and in many ways continues to inform popular visions of Ireland. In the north, the narration of “loyal” identities to crown, monarch, and empire had been the business of the Orange Order since the late 18th century. These narrations centered on the Battle of the Boyne in 1690 when the last Catholic king of England, James II, was defeated by his son-in-law, the Protestant Dutchman, William III. While the July 12 parades by the Order had been banned for a time, they were back and larger than ever from the late 19th century onward, first in the mobilization against Home Rule and then in the efforts to solidify the dominant British-Unionist culture in Northern Ireland. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The events of 1914–1918 were remembered differently in the Free State and Northern Ireland. In the former, the memory of World War I fitted awkwardly into the “foundation story” of the new state; the returning Catholic veterans were not easily viewed as heroes to the Irish nation. The 1916 Rising thus served as the principal moment to commemorate the “birth” of the new Ireland with its 15 executed leaders entering the hallowed halls of political martyrdom. Those who believed that their surviving the horrors of the trenches would be rewarded with a peaceful transition to Home Rule were marginalized. The 25th anniversary of the rising was commemorated on Irish stamps, and the 50th anniversary in 1966 was the high point of 20th-century Irish nationalist remembrance. In Northern Ireland, 1916 commemorated the tragedy of the Ulster division at the Somme and the sacrifices of Protestant Ulster for the British nation and empire. Exservicemen were given preferential treatment in the labor market of the new northern state, something that did not happen south of the border.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Once emerged from the ravages of civil war, the Free State government set about the task of building a nation that would distinguish itself from its English neighbor. Recalling the “Irish Ireland” initiatives of the prerevolutionary era, this process emphasized Gaelic and Catholic values and traditions. Foremost among the Gaelic traditions was the issue of language. Though the majority of the population now spoke only English, compulsory programs were introduced to restore pride and proficiency in the language through the education system; it also became a prerequisite for employment in the civil service. This linguistic shift was also observable in official documents and on stamps, currency, and street signs, while de Valera’s 1937 constitution named the head of government as the taoiseach (chief). These various efforts, however, added up to tokenism at best and delusion at worst. English could not now be dislodged as the predominant language of communication and conversation in Ireland, and with England becoming favored as a migrant destination over the depression-ridden United States in the 1930s, few could afford not to know how to speak the language of the “old enemy.” Ireland’s farming population, key players in the nationalist mobilization of the Home Rule era, was once again central to the national vision in the postrevolutionary decades. Drawing sustenance from the traditional images of a “cottage landscape” and a noble peasantry, de Valera’s vision remained especially fixated on a landscape of self-sufficient farming families whose contented home lives would faithfully reproduce the Gaelic-Catholic ethos. This romantic vision was at odds with the persistence of emigration from rural Ireland, a fact that sharply indicated the limits to which independence could deliver economic prosperity. More than 350,000 people left the 26 counties between 1926 and 1946, and Britain N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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also remained Ireland’s main trading partner throughout the period. Such realities did not deter de Valera from launching import-substitution initiatives as well as an “economic war” with Britain in the 1930s, however, but such gestures were a clear attempt to mask the economic problems of the fledgling Irish state. These acts of “economic nationalism” had their political and cultural equivalents. In 1923, the Irish Free State joined the League of Nations. A 1929 censorship act limited the circulation of British newspapers and literature in Ireland, while in the countryside, the GAA continued to channel youngsters into Gaelic sports and repudiate “foreign” influences. A 1935 citizenship act removed the words “British subject” from Free State passports. By the 1930s, the powers of the governor-general had been reduced, the Oath of Allegiance to the king abolished, and all constitutional references to “the Crown” removed. The return of the “treaty ports” in 1938 enabled de Valera to declare Irish neutrality during World War II, though this did not prevent tens of thousands of his fellow citizens serving on the British side. Subsequent Irish history books would term this the era of “the Emergency.” The Catholic dimension to building up the new state was not simply reflected in its control of most of the education system. The church’s moral teachings also heavily influenced social legislation. The Free State courts did not grant divorces, the sale of contraceptives was prohibited, and the “traditional” role of women as homemakers was articulated in the 1937 constitution. The fact that women had played a role during the revolutionary era, including the pivotal rising of 1916, was conveniently forgotten. Even “immoral” forms of dancing, such as jazz, were cleansed from Irish dance halls. Opposition to these measures was on the whole marginal and poorly organized. Preserving law and order was also an important challenge in the aftermath of a civil war. In the Irish Free State, lingering animosities and distrust led to drastic reductions in the size and influence of the national army by the late 1920s. Following the abolition of the Royal Irish Constabulary, an unarmed police force of Gardaí Síochána (Guardians of the Peace), commonly known as “the guards,” was in place by 1923. Northern Ireland faced its own economic challenges. Its key industries of shipbuilding, engineering, and textiles all declined during the 1920s and 1930s, their revival coming only (and temporarily) with the onset of war in 1939. The northern munitions factories thus became key targets for German bombers, notably during the “Belfast blitz” raids of 1941. Unlike the Free State, Northern Ireland had no military but rather two armed layers of policing, the full-time Royal Ulster Constabulary (1922) and the part-time “B” Specials. Many of the latter were recruited from the old Ulster Volunteer Force. Given the sectarian violence of 1920–1922 (reprised in 1935) and persistent accusations of “disloyalty,” northern Catholics had little incentive to represent themselves in these bodies at a level that reflected their share of the population. Their response to such everyday experiences of political exclusion and alienation would remain muted until the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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1960s. In the meantime, the IRA, largely underground since 1923, reappeared on the scene with their bombing campaign in British cities in 1939. If Eamon de Valera’s gestures toward a united Ireland had now become merely symbolic and aspirational, the IRA retained the old belief in physical force as a more immediate route toward its attainment. Selected Bibliography Boyce, D. G. 1995. Nationalism in Ireland. 3rd. ed. New York: Routledge. Clark, S. 1979. Social Origins of the Irish Land War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cusack, T. 2001. “A ‘Countryside Bright with Cosy Homesteads’: Irish Nationalism and the Cottage Landscape.” National Identities 3, no. 1: 221–238. Duffy, S., ed. 1997. Atlas of Irish History. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan. Edwards, R. D., with B. Hourican. 2006. An Atlas of Irish History. 3rd. ed. New York: Routledge. Fitzpatrick, D. 1984. Irish Emigration 1801–1921. Studies in Irish Economic and Social History. Pamphlet no. 1. Dundalk, Ireland: Dundalgan Press. Fitzpatrick, D. 1998. The Two Irelands, 1912–1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Foster, R. F. 1989. Modern Ireland 1600–1972. London: Penguin. Foster, R. F. 2002. The Irish Story. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hennessey, T. 1997. A History of Northern Ireland 1920–1996. London: Macmillan. Hoppen, K. T. 1984. Elections, Politics, and Society in Ireland 1832–1885. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Hutchinson, J. 1987. The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State. Boston: Allen and Unwin. Jackson, A. 2003. Home Rule: An Irish History 1800–2000. London: Phoenix. Johnson, N. C. 2003. Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kennedy, B. P. 1994. “The Irish Free State 1922–49: A Visual Perspective.” In Ireland: Art into History, edited by R. Gillespie and B. P. Kennedy. Dublin: Town House. Laffan, M. 1983. The Partition of Ireland, 1911–1925. Dundalk, Ireland: Dundalgan Press. Loughlin, J. 1995. Ulster Unionism and British National Identity since 1885. New York: Pinter. O’Day, A. 1998. Irish Home Rule 1867–1921. New York: Manchester University Press. Sheehy, J. 1980. The Rediscovery of Ireland’s Past: The Celtic Revival 1830–1930. London: Thames and Hudson. Whelan, Y. 2003. Reinventing Modern Dublin: Streetscape, Iconography and the Politics of Identity. Dublin: University College Dublin Press.


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Italy Nicola Pizzolato Chronology 1870 The capture of Rome: when French troops defending Rome are called back home, the Italian army enters through the breach of Porta Pia and conquers the city. 1871 Rome is made the capital of the Kingdom of Italy. This is the final event of the process of unification. 1896 Battle of Adowa—a disastrous defeat for the Italians that halts their colonial ambitions for 20 years. 1915 Italy joins the Triple Entente in World War I against the Central powers. Italy aims at acquiring Italian territory under foreign control. 1922 Following the March on Rome, King Victor Emmanuel III hands the government to Mussolini, who goes on to install a dictatorship. 1936 The Italian invasion of Ethiopia boosts Mussolini’s colonial ambitions; however, the Italian empire will be short-lived. 1938 Anti-Semitic laws exclude Jews from the military, the administration, and the Fascist Party and open the way to a hate campaign against them. 1940 Italy’s intervention in World War II undermines what support remained to the fascist regime. 1943 (September 8) Collapse of the Italian state after the Allies’ invasion. Italian generals surrender, but the country remains occupied by both the Germans and the Allies. 1946 Italy becomes a republic after a popular referendum. The House of Savoy is banned from the country. 1948 After being approved by the Constituent Assembly, the republican constitution—democratic and anti-fascist—is enacted. 1950 Italy enters NATO and will support the Western coalition throughout the Cold War. 1963 Emergence of the first center-left government, which includes the Socialists alongside the Christian Democrats. 1969 Bombing of Piazza Fontana opens a period of instability in the Italian state, threatened by neo-fascist plots and extreme-left terrorism. 1978 Kidnapping and murder of former prime minister Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades brings to an end the experiment of national solidarity between the Christian Democrats and the Communists. 1992 The judicial enquiry Tangentopoli (Bribesville) brings to an end the party system dominated by the Christian Democrats. 2003 In the bombing of Nassirya (Iraq), 19 Italian soldiers lose their lives.

Situating the Nation In 1861, Italy became a nation after centuries of political fragmentation dur ing which the peninsula was under foreign domination and divided into states N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of different importance and size. Th e House of Savoy, whose realm originally included only Piedmont and Sardinia, led a process of unification by conquest— Risorgimento (“resurgence”)—that came to an end in 1870 with the entry of Italian troops into Rome. On that occasion, Pope Pius IX declared himself a prisoner of the new state and refused to recognize it until the Lateran Pacts of 1929. The Risorgimento had created, out of seven states, a single political entity that had never existed before. In fact, although the Roman empire was centered in the peninsula, it was universal in its scope rather than national. Therefore, the construction of a national identity was a primary concern for Italian leadership at the end of the Risorgimento. They saw it as the necessary requirement for Italy to grow as a powerful nation and compete with France or Britain. Since the onset of the unification process, in the early 19th century, the way Italy compared to the advanced countries of Europe was an incessant concern of the patriotic elites. Patriot Massimo D’Azeglio’s dictum “We have made Italy, now we must make Italians” summarized the widespread opinion that Italians lacked a sense of belonging to the newborn nation and had a local, rather than a national, identity—a phenomenon often referred to as campanilismo, or belonging to one’s own bell tower. Italians had lived under different political and judicial institutions and did not share a single language. Standard Italian was a language that the elites slowly adopted only after unification, while the rest of the population identified mainly with regional dialects well into the second half of the 20th century. Th ere were no habits and customs that could be said to be typically Italian; instead, they differed markedly throughout the peninsula according to local, not even regional, variance. After unification, this issue was further complicated by a profound division between north and south, one wealthy, and the other impoverished, one represented as a land of civilization, and the other as a land of barbarism that needed reform, with military intervention if necessary. As we will see, the cleavage between the north and south of Italy continued to play an important role in national politics and the economy, as well as in Italians’ own self-representation, during the 20th century. During the liberal era—the first 60 years of the Italian nation—the state faced a number of important problems: a low rate of industrialization, an uneven tax structure and legislation, high rates of poverty and illiteracy, and social and political protest against the new state that often took the form of banditry and peasant revolt. Notwithstanding these internal problems, the country aimed at acquiring an international role. It did so by joining Germany and Austria in the Triple Alliance in 1882 and by initiating its own colonial expansion. A first attempt to conquer Ethiopia ended up in the disastrous defeat of Adowa (1892), which curtailed Italy's aspirations to great-power status and halted her colonial ambitions until 1911, when it waged war against the remnants of the Ottoman Empire to appropriate Libya. Another area of possible expansion concerned the so-called Italia irrendenta, “non-emancipated” Italy. The irrendenta comprised all those territories, such as Trentino, Trieste, Dalmatia, Istria, Gorizia, Ticino, Nice, and Malta, where the Italian language was at least partially spoken. The possibility of annexing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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some of these territories lay behind Italy’s entrance into World War I on the side of the Triple Entente (the United Kingdom, France, and Russia). Due to its lack of preparation for a major war, however, Italy suffered disproportionate human losses and a huge budget deficit. At the Paris Peace Conference, Italian diplomats led by Vittorio Emanuele Orlando could secure only a part of the promised territories. In the aftermath, the disappointment over a “mutilated victory” caused a wave of nationalist sentiment against the Allies and the liberal political class. At the same time, the postwar economic crisis increased the influence of the Socialist Party among northern workers, and of the Catholic Italian Popular Party among southern peasants. Both movements were critical of Italy as a nation. Th e Socialists believed that the propaganda of a national myth served the rule of the bourgeoisie over the proletariat. Eventually, they argued, with the coming of international socialism, the nation would be transcended. On the other hand, because of the strong anti-ecclesiastical outlook of the Risorgimento, Catholics, too, opposed the liberal government and the lay cult of the fatherland. They insisted that only the Catholic tradition could be the basis for a national identity and could lead the nation’s development and mission. Against this background, Mussolini could claim that the rise of fascism (1922) would restore the primacy and importance of the nation among the populace against the “Internal enemies”— Catholics and, in particular, Socialists and Communists. The identification of fascism with the nation was all encompassing, and the myth of the Grande Italia, the Great Italy, imbued every aspect of its policy. Fascist ideology maintained that only within the fascist state could Italy become a complete nation. As a result, all the opponents of fascism were treated as enemies of the country. In the 1930s, as fascism consolidated itself into a totalitarian regime, the idea of the nation became instrumental, and subordinate, to the accomplishment of the fascist state. Paradoxically, the nation was also central to the creation, through warfare, of a new European political order. This order, under the rule of fascism and Nazism, was to overcome the principle of nationalism. By the time the regime fell, fascism had erased any common notion of belonging to one country among Italians with different political ideas. On September 8, 1943, the withdrawal from the war and the flight of the king from Rome left the country occupied by the Germans and the Allies and divided between fascists and anti-fascists, both convinced of the need to save a nation to which the other did not belong. Although most Italians joined neither the fascists (after 1943 under the rule of the Republic of Salò) nor the Partisans, they were utterly disenchanted with the regime, and, to get rid of fascism, they preferred the nation’s defeat. As the Allies were advancing through the country, they were welcomed as “liberators.” They reached the northern cities only in April 1945, almost two years after their landing in Sicily. In May 1946, Italy became a republic, and the royal house, considered too complicit with fascism, was forced to leave the country. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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In 1948, the Christian Democrats, with the strong backing of the United States and the Catholic Church, won the general elections and led the country toward American influence by joining NATO (1949). Subsequently, with the Treaty of Rome (1950), Italy became one of the protagonists of European integration. Therefore, for the first time, Italy’s development as a nation was both constrained and supported by international institutions and alliances. Although the war cost Italy all its colonies and some territories, such as Istria, Trieste (regained in 1954), and the Dodecanese islands, its economic development greatly benefited from the Marshall Plan and from the increase of free trade in Western Europe. The “economic miracle” of the late 1960s finally put Italy on a par with the other major European nations, although not in the way that the leaders of unification had expected.

Instituting the Nation Although the myth of national origins propagated in the 19th century described the Risorgimento as a grassroots political movement, its protagonists were actually a group of moderate politicians from the center and north of Italy who identified themselves with the policies of Camillo Benso di Cavour, the architect of Italian unification. This political leadership, known as the Destra storica (“historical right”), embraced liberalism in its most conservative form. Cavour, Quintino Sella, Bettino Ricasoli, Stefano Jacini, and Marco Minghetti were the leaders of this ruling class made up of large estate owners, many of whom were of aristocratic descent. Central to their interests was the defense of the right of property and the principle of free bargaining between workers and employers, unhindered by any kind of social legislation, trade unions, or the right to strike. Consequently, a main feature of the first decades of unity, those crucial for the consolidation of the nation-state and the formation of a homogenous national identity, was government protection of bourgeois prerogatives, a repressive and illiberal attitude vis-à-vis the popular classes. After the fall of the Destra storica (1876), the progressive liberal opposition, the Sinistra storica (“historical left”), became the dominant coalition in Parliament. Progressive liberals achieved an extension of the suffrage (1882) by giving the ballot to all males older than 21 with two years of primary school education. In practice, however, this still excluded from the benefits of full citizenship the 75 percent of the population made up of peasants and workers who could not read or write. The liberal elite that unified the country saw the birth of the nation as the first step toward achieving the goal of modernity for a country that they considered to be socially and economically backward. In their view, political unification must produce an overall development that, eventually, would allow Italy to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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impress its mark of civilization on the modern world. However, at a political level, the practice of trasformismo—the formation of a changeable centrist coalition in Parliament that reshuffled members of opposite parties into the majority and was often associated with corruption—hindered this modernization by cementing the alliance of traditional power groups, the rich bourgeois of the north and the large landowners of the south. Trasformismo has been a constant and distinguishing feature of Italian politics both in the liberal and republican eras. In 1911, 50 years after unification, the country was still divided and lacked a shared national identity. There was a gap between the paese legale (“the legal country”)—the segment of the population whose interests were represented by the institutions—and the paese reale (“the real country”)—the Italian masses, by then increasingly organized within the Socialist and Catholic movements. Socialists and Catholics did not join the celebration for the 50-year anniversary of unification because—for different reasons—they did not identify with the monarchic and liberal Italy. World War I was a collective experience that—although ending with disastrous consequences—merged Italians of different classes and regions who, for the first time, were regimented by a state until then considered distant. In the aftermath of the conflict, nationalist movements greatly increased their sway among the population. At the same time, in the eyes of the bourgeoisie, the liberal state was no longer able to control the upsurge in social conflict driven by the Socialist movement. In the postwar period, the masses finally entered politics when universal male suffrage was first granted (1919), and they made the Socialist Party and the Catholic Italian Popular Party the two main political forces in Parliament. In the same year, Gabriele D’Annunzio, with an irregular army of 2,000 nationalists, occupied the city of Fiume in Dalmatia, inhabited by a majority of Italians but excluded from the war reparations to Italy, and proclaimed an independent state. This political experiment, which lasted until 1920, prefigured many ideological and choreographic elements later incorporated by Benito Mussolini into his regime. The Fiume episode acted as a catalyst for a further growth in the nationalist movement—the necessary background for the rise of fascism in the following years. Fascists presented themselves as the genuine continuators of the Risorgimento. The liberal ruling class had left unification unaccomplished by failing both to integrate the masses, workers, and peasants into national politics and to infuse them with patriotic sentiments. At the time of the March on Rome (1922), many mistrusted the ability of the parliamentary regime to modernize the country and believed the myth of the coming of a “saviour of the country” that Mussolini built around himself. However, fascism’s nationalism expunged the Risorgimento of its stress on individual liberty and on peaceful cohabitation among nations and instead used it to legitimate its claim against parliamentary democracy and to argue for Italy’s primacy in the international context. Although it claimed to assimilate the masses into national politics, fascism excluded them by suppressing N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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democratic political representation and by concentrating every decision in the government headed by the duce. After World War II, the Socialist, Communist, and Catholic parties returned to the center of political life and remained key protagonists in the development of the nation until 1992, when the entire party system was shaken by the scandal of widespread corruption. In the face of quickly changing governments (the average length was 11 months), political parties were the only institutions that offered continuity in political life and that incorporated the issues that arose from society. However, because of the ideological cleavage of the Cold War, the governing coalition, led by Christian Democrats, and the opposition, led by the Communist Party, did not acknowledge each other as legitimate actors in the political arena. Therefore, even during the republic, there was no common view of what it meant to be Italian. Each Italian’s predominant allegiance was to a party or political faith rather than to the nation. Italy was two Italies: one Communist, one antiCommunist. At the same time, during the 1950s and 1960s, economic development integrated the national labor market and spurred an intense internal migration that brought millions of southerners to the industrial north within a decade. Internal mobility transformed the century-long isolation of the population of the south and, together with the spread of television, increased the usage of Italian— as opposed to dialects—as a shared language, thereby promoting a general national integration.

Defining the Nation In 1847, the Austrian statesman Klemens von Metternich described Italy as a “geographic expression” to characterize its lack of common institutions, language, and customs and to undermine the patriots’ claim to unification. The nationalist Italian poet Giousè Carducci responded that Italy was rather a “literary expression,” meaning that, although never a political entity, Italy had existed in the minds of scholars and writers at least since Dante. Culture in fact was one of the key ideas deployed during the Risorgimento, and afterward, to define the new nation. The nation-builders of the Risorgimento strived to emphasize that Italian high culture gave continuity and consistency to the national identity, in spite of the cultural and linguistic diversity of the peninsula’s population. Nationalists turned writers such as Alessandro Manzoni and Carducci and musicians such as Giuseppe Verdi into icons of the Risorgimento and used their work to establish a common notion of pátria, the fatherland, for which to fight. For instance, the famous “Va, pensiero” chorus sung in the third act of Verdi’s Nabucco—the Hebrew slaves’ hymn to their homeland—was long considered a national anthem for the Risorgimento. Historians such as Mary Ann Smart (2001) have lately demystified the equation of Verdi with the Risorgimento and shown that his patriotic commitment was constructed after unification. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807–1882) Garibaldi was a leading military figure and popular hero of the Risorgimento. He participated in the revolution of 1848 and led the defense of the short-lived Republic of Rome in 1849. He was originally a republican and a follower of Mazzini, but in 1859 he agreed to lead a military unit for the Piedmontese monarchy in the Second Italian War of Independence, assuming that only the House of Savoy could achieve unification. His most famous endeavor was the Expedition of the Thousand (1860) in Sicily, where he led about 1,000 volunteers, joined by the local population, in a conquest of the main cities of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, then under the absolutist rule of the Bourbon. In 1862, a similar attempt against the Papal states was halted by the newborn Italian state. On that occasion, Garibaldi was shot and wounded in the foot by Italian soldiers. Garibaldi enjoyed a worldwide reputation as a sympathizer of the nationalist cause. He fought for independence in Uruguay and was dubbed the “Hero of the Two Worlds.”

On the one hand, the stress on the importance of culture as a basis for national identity was used throughout Italian history (until 1954, when the city of Trieste finally returned to Italy) to legitimize claims to territories where populations spoke Italian or its dialects. On the other hand, neither race nor ethnicity could be used to define who belonged to the nation. In fact, it was widely recognized that, because of the several foreign invasions that had occurred throughout the centuries, Italians were a blend of different ethnic groups. Only for a brief period, during fascism, did race become a crucial component of Italianness. Then, the enactment of the racial laws (1938) defined certain races, Jews in particular, as foreign to the nation. This ideology was in stark contrast to the approach that had been dominant in the liberal era and the early fascist period, one that regarded the nation in voluntaristic terms, that is, it emphasized the will to be part of a nation among people who for centuries had inhabited the same territory. The division between the north and south of Italy has been, since unification, an important component of national identity, making it difficult to define national features that would apply to the whole peninsula. The incorporation of the south took on racialized and colonial overtones. The ruling elite deemed southern Italy a wound on the nation and a region inhabited by a different race. They mistrusted the local elite and used military occupation to consolidate the new Italian state. They responded to the challenge of widespread banditry, which emerged as a reaction both to the failed social revolution promised by Garibaldi and to the enactment of military conscription. At the turn of the century, the discourse on the “otherness” of the south was reinforced by anthropologists such as Alfredo Niceforo, who characterized southerners as “barbarians” and stressed their moral depravity and incapacity for self-government, together with physical and racial features that made them inferior. The existence of “Two Italies,” one “European” and the other “African,” cast serious doubt upon the solidity of Italy as a nation, although nationalists claimed that the two Italies would merge into one single, national conscience. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The identification of the south with backwardness, barbarism, and violence persisted into the postwar period, when the influx of southerners into the northern industrial cities raised issues of social difference that were perceived as ethnic. For instance, municipal census data and sociological surveys in many northern cities kept track of “mixed marriages” between northerners and southerners. In the late 1980s, the emergence and electoral success of the Northern League, a coalition of parties that aimed ultimately at separating the Padanian region from the center and south, showed the persistent relevance of this issue and its capacity to pose a challenge to national unity.

Narrating the Nation As has been demonstrated so far, the Italian case reinforces the theory of the constructed nature of modern nations. At the time of unification, national identity did not exist. It had to be invented. During the Risorgimento, the nation-builders gave prominence to events in the past that proved the existence of an Italian “national character” and that could serve as a source of inspiration for the revolt against the “oppressor,” the foreign powers or dynasties ruling in the peninsula. Medieval episodes such as the Lombard League (1162) and the Sicilian Vespers (1282), interpreted out of their historical contexts, provided inspiring evidence of cooperation and rebellion against foreign enemies (the Lombard League against Emperor Frederick Barbarossa and the Sicilian Vespers against the Angevin Charles I) and were heralded as precursors of a national sentiment. After 1870, the Risorgimento—despite having occurred in recent history— became an essential part of a mythical national narrative that downplayed the stark contrasts among the different protagonists (for instance, Cavour, Mazzini, Garibaldi), called “heroes” and “fathers of the country,” and obscured the fact that

Giuseppe Mazzini (1805 –1872) Born in Genoa, then part of the Kingdom of Sardinia, Mazzini was a patriot who argued for Italian unification under a republic. At the age of 25, he joined the Carbornari, a revolutionary society sympathetic to the nationalist movement. In 1831, while in exile in Marseille, he founded Young Italy (La Giovine Italia), a society that aimed at the political unification of the peninsula. From abroad, where he had to live almost all his life, Mazzini organized several insurrections against the House of Savoy, and other Italian states, in attempts to establish a republic. They failed but established him as a leader and inspirator of the Risorgimento. Mazzini advocated unification through popular revolt rather than through military conquest; his actions were crucial in advancing the idea of Italy as a nation. He was the founder of the Italian Republican Party, which was active until the 1990s and, for a period, part of the government coalition.


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The military hero behind the unification of Italy, Giuseppe Garibaldi became one of the icons of Risorgimento and an internationally known figure. (Perry-Castaneda Library)

unification had been achieved by chance rather than by design. In particular, the Expedition of the Thousand (1860), the campaign that started with Garibaldi’s landing in Sicily and ended with the annexation of the Kingdom of Two Sicilies, has traditionally been considered a founding event of the nation. The traditional interpretation of this event, centered on the heroism of Garibaldi and his followers, who were joined by local volunteers, against the Bourbon regular army, stressed popular participation to counteract the claim that Italian unification was a façade for Piedmontese expansion. In the past decades, historians such as Dennis Mack Smith (1990) have reconsidered the episode by revealing the important roles of Sicily’s great landowners and of British diplomacy in explaining the Bourbons’ defeat. As we have seen, the fascists elaborated an image of historical continuity with the Risorgimento and absorbed the cult of national heroes such as Giuseppe Garibaldi and his wife, Anita, into the cult of the regime. Next to the Risorgimento, another recurrent theme in fascist propaganda was the myth of Roman history and grandeur, which was especially suited to justifying Italy’s imperial ambitions. Worthy of its past as the capital of the Roman empire and, with the Pope, of Christianity, Rome, Mussolini claimed, would be at the center of the world for the third time as the capital of the fascist empire. After World War II, the anti-fascist parties that dominated the political scene could not draw on the national myth of the Risorgimento; it had been compromised by its “fascistization,” and Catholics, Socialists, and Communists had never associated themselves with that movement anyway. The decade following the debacle of September 8, 1943, when the collapse of the nation and its leadership N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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left Italians at the mercy of former allies (the Germans) and occupiers, was one of profound division in which no attempt was made to create a unifying national narrative. Only in the 1960s did the official political rhetoric, both from the government and the opposition, propose a mythic narrative of the resistance to the Germans as a moment of popular revolt against the invader. Some even called this the “Secondo Risorgimento,” thereby concealing the civil war between fascist and anti-fascist Italians and precluding a national awareness of the motives that had allowed the fascist regime to persist for 20 years.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The process of nation-building presented the challenge of “constructing” a national past that could be shared by a very diverse population, a national past that could instill the idea that Italy was destined to be united since the Roman empire or, at least, the Middle Ages. The political leadership sought to legitimize the new state after unification by affirming that only as a nation could Italy progress toward modernization and gain its place among countries such as Britain or France. A negative comparison to these advanced European countries was a constant of the liberal era, although it coexisted with the constructed image of Italy as a “cradle of civilization,” reborn through acquired independence, whose universal “mission” was to civilize the world. This myth was used in official rhetoric to mobilize the country during its colonial enterprises in Ethiopia and Libya. Precisely to offset Italy’s former division, the constitutional order achieved in 1870 introduced a highly centralized state that did not grant former states a territorial representation in the Parliament. Because the political elite believed that decentralization would undermine the newfound unity of the state, they also adopted the French administrative model of prefects—state representatives nominated by the central government in Rome. Only with the advent of the republic in 1946 did the constitution distinguish between “ordinary” and “special” regions (Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino Alto-Adige, Friuli Venezia Giulia, and Valle d’Aosta) that, for historical and geographical reasons, were granted a level of autonomy. Finally, in 1970, regional governments were created throughout Italy with a degree of fiscal and legislative autonomy. As in other newly formed nation-states, education was seen as a crucial field of intervention for the construction of a national identity. The education system, from primary school to university, was rigidly centralized. Government bodies controlled teaching methods and the appointment of teachers and professors, while the minister determined the national curricula for schools at every level. Centralization increased during fascism, when it was seen as the best possible method to modernize the country and to inculcate fascist ideals in the population. Fascism aspired to regiment the population beyond the school and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB) A fascist youth organization founded in 1926, the Opera Nazionale Balilla enrolled boys and girls between the ages of 8 and 18, divided—according to age—among Balilla and Avanguardisti (for the girls, Piccole Italiane and Giovani Italiane) aimed at providing military and political education to the youth. This institution was an essential part of the fascist project to create a “new Italian” and the “fascists of tomorrow.” Boys wore a uniform with a black shirt, gray trousers, a fez, and an azure handkerchief, and were armed (either with toys or real weapons, according to their age). Girls wore white shirts and black skirts, and their education was focused on domestic economy. However, for both boys and girls, physical exercise was the foremost activity. Meetings of the ONB took place during “fascist Saturdays” and in summer camps. Enrollment in the ONB was not mandatory until 1937, when it was absorbed into the Gioventù Italiana del Littorio, the youth branch of the Fascist Party.

military service. For instance, workers and employees were encouraged to belong to a dopolavoro, a leisure and recreational organization that the Fascist Party attempted to use for indoctrination. Children and teenagers were organized into the Opera Nazionale Balilla, which used practical training to inculcate the values of Italianness, fascism, and the cult of Mussolini. Mussolini succeeded in associating the idea of nation with fascism. As a consequence, the fall of the regime and the chaotic period following September 8, 1943, left Italians uncertain about what the nation was and whether there could be a national identity dissociated from one’s own ideology. According to Enrico Galli della Loggia (1996), September 8, 1943, represented “the death of fatherland.” Postwar patriotic discourse was inevitably tainted with fascist overtones and could not be used to mobilize a country in which the main political parties offered a universal ideology, such as Catholicism or communism. The 1960s offered a generation raised without a common national sentiment, while the aggregation of party politics favored local rather than national interests. In 1969, the neo-fascist bombing of Piazza Fontana and the increased use of terrorism by both the extreme right and left showed that Italians shared neither a collective memory of the national past nor a vision of its future. In 1978, the kidnapping of Christian Democrat leader Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades coincided with an attempt to create a government of national solidarity supported by the Communists, the so-called “Historic Compromise,” which could have been the first step toward rebuilding a national identity. The assassination of Moro put an end to this experiment. In the 1980s and 1990s, widespread consumerism and the further secularization of society have reduced the appeal of opposing ideologies. However, Italy still lacks a common sense of national cohesion. Since the birth of the so-called “Second Republic” (1992), which followed the crisis of the party system brought on by a scandal of political corruption, Italian parties have been split on a left/right N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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axis that discourages the practice of trasformismo. In this new system, right-wing parties such as Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale have tried to appeal to patriotic sentiments in their rhetoric and outlook, for instance, by incorporating the flag colors into their symbols. Lately, right-wing parties have used the bombing of Nassirya (2003), when 19 Italian soldiers lost their lives in Iraq, to reinvigorate nationalism and the cult of the fatherland, but with mixed results. Today, 150 years after unification, the question of a unitary national identity is still unsolved. Selected Bibliography Bosworth, R. J. B., and P. Dogliani, eds. 1999. Italian Fascism: History, Memory and Representation. London and New York: MacMillan and St. Martin’s Press. Galli Della Loggia, Ernesto. 1996. La morte della patria: La crisi della idea di nazione tra Resistenza. Antifascismo e Repubblica, Italy: Bari-Roma, Laterza. Gentile, Emilio. 2000. La Grande Italia: Il mito della nazione nel XX secolo. Roma, Italy: Laterza. Lanaro, Silvio. 1988. L’Italia Nuova: Identità e sviluppo 1861–1988. Torino, Italy: Einaudi. Levy, Carl. 1996. Italian Regionalism: History, Identity and Politics. New York: Berg. Mack Smith, Denis. 1990. Italy and Its Monarchy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Moe, Nelson. 2002. The View from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the Southern Question. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Romanelli, Raffaele. 1979. L’Italia liberale (1861–1900). Bologna, Italy: Il Mulino. Smart, Mary Ann. 2001. “Liberty On (and Off ) the Barricades: Verdi’s Risorgimento Fantasies.” In Making and Remaking Italy: The Cultivation of National Identity around the Risorgimento, edited by Albert Russell Ascoli and Krystyna von Henneberg. New York: Berg.


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Poland Patrice M. Dabrowski Chronology 1905–1907 1918

1920–1921 1926 1939 1940 1944

1945

Revolution in Russian Poland, sparked by the defeat of Russia in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and discontent with czarist rule. (January) Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points Speech, in which the U.S. president advocates national self-determination and supports the creation of an independent Polish state. (November) The establishment of the Second Polish Republic. Polish-Soviet war. The Polish victory serves to keep the Bolsheviks at bay and prevent the spread of communism westward. (May) Józef Piłsudski’s coup d’état. Piłsudski rules Poland until his death in 1935. (September) Outbreak of World War II. Poland is invaded first by Germany (September 1), then by the Soviet Union (September 17). (Spring) Massacres of Polish prisoners of war by the Soviet NKVD in the Katyn´ forest; designed to decimate the ranks of the Polish intelligentsia. (August–October) Warsaw Uprising. The defeat of the Polish underground army results in the death of over 200,000 Polish civilians and soldiers. (July) Establishment of communist rule in Poland. (February) Yalta agreement confirms new borders (westward shift) for the postwar Polish state. Poland is transformed into a homogeneous, ethnically Polish state.

Situating the Nation As in the period prior to the 1880s, the Polish nation persisted in a state of partition. The lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the premodern multiethnic and multidenominational Polish state, remained under the control of the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian empires. Imperial rule, thus, was the reality for the Poles, even as this reality varied in each partitioned zone. The situation of Poles deteriorated in the German lands after German unification in 1871; it became increasingly difficult to be a loyal “Prussian” Pole (Prussia being the kingdom where most Poles resided) when the new state was aiming to turn its citizens into Germans. However, economically the Poles were fairly well off, with, for example, a solid agricultural base in the area around Poznań, the center of Polishness under German rule; and the Poles of Silesia were employed in mining and industry. For the most part lacking a native Polish nobility, the Poles in German Poland cooperated across the social divide, making this partitioned region unique. This cooperation was facilitated by Bismarck’s Kulturkampf of the 1870s, which affected all Catholic Poles regardless of social status. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Under Russian rule, the memory of the last Polish insurrection (of 1863) was too fresh for any concessions to be made there, either in the central Polish lands (the former Kingdom of Poland, 1815–1830) or in the multiethnic eastern borderlands, always a bone of contention between Poles and Russians. Within the former, industry was developing apace, especially in the centers of Warsaw and Łód´z, leading to the rise of a Polish working class, which absorbed déclassé (or former) gentry in addition to peasants and townsfolk. Within the latter region, Wilno remained the most important political and cultural center. Only under Habsburg rule—that is, in Austria-Hungary, after the compromise of 1867 that resulted in the establishment of the Dual Monarchy—did Poles find a more congenial existence. In the years following the compromise, the Poles of Galicia—the Austrian province in which Poles resided—gained a degree of autonomy; the Polish language replaced German in the administration, schools, and public life. Although Galicia was the province most advantaged politically and culturally—witness the blossoming of the cities of Lwów and Cracow—it nonetheless remained economically behind the regions under German and Russian rule. “Galician misery” was proverbial, especially as regarded the situation of the peasantry. The nobility and intelligentsia fared relatively better; they dominated


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in the bureaucracy and government of the province. Still, not until World War I saw the undoing of empire was there a “Poland” on the map; it existed only in the minds of Polish activists, which explains why there arose such a wealth of conceptions as to what the nation should be. In the wake of World War I, a Polish state was reestablished, after 123 years of foreign rule. This meant that Poles could rule themselves at last, although not all Poles were enamored of the fact that there was a significant minority population within the new interwar state. Rather than social differences, thus, ethnic ones became paramount. In the Second Republic, the Polish state established after World War I, Warsaw became the capital and the true seat of power. Economically, Poland faced tremendous challenges, given the devastation of the war, the fact that it was a new state created out of lands formerly under the control of three different empires (with three different systems), not to mention the advent of the Great Depression. During World War II, the Polish state was once again obliterated. It was occupied by both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union until the Germans’ invasion of the latter in July 1941. Poles experienced many hardships under occupation: some were expelled from their homes or deported to Siberia, and others were shot or imprisoned. All experienced the privations of war as a people low on the Nazi scale of humanity—or seen as undesirable inhabitants of Soviet-occupied lands. The social fabric of the country was changed drastically by World War II, not the least because Poland’s numerous Jewish population was decimated in the Holocaust. Repercussions extended to the state as well as to the nation. The Soviet occupation (“liberation”) at the end of the war and the agreement of the Big Three at Yalta resulted in Poland coming under the Soviet sphere of influence as well as its territory being changed: Poland lost its eastern borderlands to the Soviet Union while gaining other territories at Germany’s expense. The ethnic cleansing and population exchanges that took place during and after the war rendered the citizenry of the new Polish Peoples Republic more homogeneous, comprised almost entirely of ethnic Poles.

Instituting the Nation The 1880s witnessed the beginnings of new thinking about the role of peasants in the Polish nation, in which Jan Ludwik Popławski and Bolesław Wysłouch figured prominently. In the following decade, increasing industrialization and the passage of time since the emancipation of the peasantry facilitated the advent of mass politics; the key actors and institutions for the Poles tended to be politicians and political parties. They ranged across the entire political spectrum, with two parties worthy of particular notice. On the left, the most important party was the Polish Socialist Party, under the leadership of Józef Piłsudski, founded in 1892. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Ignacy Jan Paderewski (1860–1941) Paderewski was a Polish pianist, composer, and politician. He made a career for himself as a dynamic concert pianist, touring Europe and America, but he did not forget the Polish community back home. His most famous gift to the nation was the bronze Grunwald monument unveiled during the 500th anniversary of the famous battle in 1910. During World War I, the pianist actively campaigned for the Polish cause abroad, thus gaining it allies in the White House and elsewhere. Paderewski was a signatory to the Treaty of Versailles that re-created a Polish state; he was also premier and foreign minister of the new interwar state in 1919. His story is but one example of how men of the pen, the paintbrush, or even the keyboard became leading national figures when there was no Polish state.

On the right, the National League (later to become National Democracy) of Roman Dmowski was established the following year. There were already conservative and liberal democratic parties operating in Galicia prior to the 1880s; peasant parties emerged there in the mid-1890s as well. Other national activists were not immediately associated with concrete parties. Artists, musicians, and writers likewise could be considered key actors, given their influence. Consider, for example, the painters Jan Matejko and Henryk Siemiradzki, whose donations of important canvases came to grace the National Museum in Cracow; the pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski, who served as an unofficial Polish diplomat abroad prior to independence and later became Poland’s premier for a spell; and the Nobel Prize–winning writer Henryk Sienkiewicz, whose historical novels provided a historical education for many Poles during the age of imperial rule. National institutions such as the Peoples School Society, Sokół gymnastic club, and scouting and paramilitary organizations also helped foster a sense of national identity among the broader public. During World War I, key actors were Dmowski and Paderewski in the west, both of whom agitated for an independent Poland and ultimately signed the Treaty of Versailles in the name of the new Polish state. Piłsudski could be found on the battlefields closer to home, demonstrating with his forces that Poles were willing and able to fight for their independence. Not to be underestimated, however, was the “General Committee of Assistance for the Victims of War in Poland,” founded by

The First Brigade Piłsudski’s first fighting force to see battle, the First Brigade of the Polish Legions was created out of the paramilitary organizations that had been forming in the last years before World War I. It invaded Russia—the first Austro-Hungarian force to do so—on August 6, 1914. The First Brigade became a potent symbol of Poles fighting for an independent Poland, completing the work of the unsuccessful insurrections. Its soldiers became the political and military elite in interwar Poland during and after Piłsudski’s rule.


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Polish pianist Ignacy Jan Paderewski served as prime minister of Poland in 1919. (Library of Congress)

Paderewski and Sienkiewicz in Switzerland after the war broke out; it gained funds and support for Poles and the Polish cause in western Europe and America. In the interwar period, one witnesses a true proliferation of parties across the political spectrum involving not only ethnic Poles but Poland’s minority populations: Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, Lithuanians, and the like. The ethnic Polish parties of the right and center essentially ruled Poland until 1926. After his coup d’état, Józef Piłsudski established a new umbrella organization, the Nonpartisan Bloc for Cooperation with the Government (BBWR), to dominate the political field. The country again shifted right after Piłsudski’s death, with the rule of the “colonels,” a group of officers that had close ties to Piłsudski. During World War II, the key institutions were the Polish government-inexile and the Polish underground army, the so-called “Home Army.” The most famous Poles included heads of state Władysław Sikorski (d. 1943) and Stanisław Mikołajczyk. That said, there were other underground groups, most notably the Soviet-inspired “People’s Army.”

Defining the Nation Already in the 1880s, Jan Ludwik Popławski drew a sharp distinction between the former gentry nation and what he considered the new foundation of a modern Polish nation, the peasant nation. With the beginnings of mass politics in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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1890s, the national idea was increasingly identified with the masses. This resulted in the new mass parties of the right and left (the National Democrats and social democrats/socialists) gaining the upper hand. As mentioned above, the most influential parties were identified with the politicians Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski. Dmowski took Popławski’s idea that the ethnic Polish peasantry was the foundation of the modern nation and augmented it with other productive members of society; he rejected the heritage of the old commonwealth, which he saw as disastrous for the modern Polish nation. In contrast, Piłsudski’s vision of the Polish nation took its cue from the old commonwealth; in particular, he valued its rich multiethnic heritage and chivalric traditions. The way the Polish nation was mapped or imagined in space—insofar as it was so imagined—varied according to political views. For example, the populist Bolesław Wysłouch saw a sharp discontinuity with the past Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth: for him, each peasant nation—whether Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, or Lithuanian—was to have its own state. Most of the political orientations, however, built their vision of the nation on a variation of the territory associated with the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Piłsudski saw a federation of people within the boundaries of the former state, which would make room for the other ethnic groups who had always lived there. In contrast, National Democrats combined historic and ethno-linguistic criteria: they thought Poland should be a nation-state for ethnic Poles but that a modern Poland must be a great power with access to the sea. As regards the full extent of its territory, it should encompass territories inhabited by Poles whether or not they had been part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (for example, Silesia) while extending only as far to the east as was feasible for assimilating the ethnic minorities living there. The National Democrats were consequently ready to give up some of the eastern territories—which they did when National Democrat Stanisław Grabski negotiated the border with Bolshevik Russia in the Treaty of Riga in March 1921. Still, interwar Poland struggled to cope with these borders and populations, a struggle that did not foster unity among the citizenry. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that ethnic Poles were favored within the state. Germans and Jews found themselves singled out as essentially unassimilable, while the assimilationist policies directed toward the Slavic ethnic minorities in the east generally served to alienate them from the Poles, thus sharpening ethnic conflict in that region.

Narrating the Nation The historical novels of writers like Józef Ignacy Kraszewski and Henryk Sienkiewicz helped teach the Poles their own history at a time when it was not being taught in the schools. The latter in particular painted a heroic picture of the Polish past. Such images were also furthered by a spate of anniversary celebrations N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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feting historic events and illustrious Poles, which also helped to reinforce various myths or stereotypes of the Poles. These commemorations included the 200th anniversary of the Relief of Vienna of 1683, which depicted Polish knights as defenders of Western Christendom. Poland’s greatest poets—important sources of inspiration for a stateless nation—were celebrated, especially Adam Mickiewicz, whose remains were reburied in the crypt of Wawel Cathedral, much like the kings and military leaders who preceded him. The centennials of the constitution of May 3, 1791, and the Ko´sciuszko Insurrection of 1794 served to remind Poles that they had engaged in serious reform and fought valiantly for their independence. Commemorations of military leaders like Tadeusz Ko´sciuszko and Prince Józef Poniatowski as well as the 19th-century insurrections underscored the Poles’ history of fighting for their freedom. These events and individuals continued to be celebrated after the Poles regained their independence. In the process of commemoration, various symbols traditionally came to the fore: the red-andwhite flag and the crowned Polish eagle (and, for those of a Piłsudskiite leaning, the Lithuanian Chase and Ruthenian archangel); insurrectionary songs and religious hymns; and the musical compositions of Chopin and Moniuszko. Important aspects of Polish national consciousness were framed in religious terms, Catholicism being a crucial component of Polish national identity. This heritage was particularly visible in Marian devotions, as seen in the traditional cults of and pilgrimages to the Marian icons of Our Lady of Cze˛stochowa and Our Lady of Ostra Brama (and lesser madonnas) throughout the entire period. For the Poles, Mary was queen of Poland, and they saw themselves (for the most part) as faithful children of the Catholic Church. This conviction was particularly important as a means of gaining the devout but nationally unconscious peasantry for the nation. In regard to other characteristics identified as “Polish,” most were still connected to Poland’s noble and chivalric heritage. According to stereotype, the aristocratic Poles were individualistic to the point of anarchy, they valued honor more than industry, they were ultrapatriotic, and they raised freedom to a supreme virtue and demonstrated the courage to fight for it, at least in spurts (particularly on the battlefield). Such stereotypes prevailed in Europe; in the Americas, Poles were more closely identified with the peasant masses—illiterate and uneducated—that emigrated there.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation During the period of partition, the ultimate aim of the Poles was political independence. The last third of the 19th century saw a move away from insurrections to more peaceful means of creating a Polish constituency from the broad swaths of nationally unconscious masses. It was imperative for the Poles, historically a nation of the nobility, to win over townspeople and especially peasants (and later workers) N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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to the cause. For the most part, those targeted were ethnic Poles, although other groups considered assimilable were also targeted, especially in the period before World War I. These included Ruthenians (today’s Ukrainians) and even Jews, albeit the latter—referred to as Poles of the Mosaic persuasion—were targeted to a lesser and limited extent. Noteworthy is the fact that, under Habsburg rule, sons of Austrian bureaucrats sometimes grew up to become patriotic Poles. What led such individuals and others to identify with the Polish nation? Here the attractiveness of being Polish, of belonging to a nation that valued freedom and justice and was ready to fight, as the slogan went, “for our freedom and yours,” was key. Also attractive was the messianic romantic nationalism that saw a mission for the Poles in the east. As regarded the lower classes, a shared religious faith could cement the nation, as both nobles and peasants were Catholic. Others were won over by the Poland they saw represented in Polish commemorations. With the attainment of political independence and the popularization of the doctrine of national self-determination, many Poles assumed that the new Poland should be the country of ethnic Poles. This attitude left over a third of the population—Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Germans, Lithuanians—relegated to minority status. Although on paper they were equal under the law, reality was rather less comfortable. These populations, one could argue, were for the most part demobilized by the new Polish state; if they were to become mobilized, it was to be as members of different nations. The modern nation had been in the process of construction, some scholars would warrant, since the period of the partitions. Indeed, Lord Acton maintained that the partitions of Poland had “awakened the theory of nationality in Europe” (Acton [1956], 146). Many aspects of nation-building—seen in how the nation was narrated, institutionalized, and mobilized—have already been mentioned. Were Poles to regain their independence—the desired outcome—that national cause would need to be supported by the masses, something that these various activities fostered. Once statehood was achieved, Polish activists pressed to consolidate these gains, that is, to strengthen the Polish element within the newly formed state.

Assassination of Gabriel Narutowicz A close friend of Józef Piłsudski, the scientist Gabriel Narutowicz was selected to become the first president of interwar Poland on December 9, 1922. It took five ballots and the help of minority parties in the Parliament to get him elected. This election proved to be a death sentence for the president, for a fanatical right-wing nationalist who objected to his socialist convictions, his friendship with Piłsudski, and the fact that Jews and others had supported him assassinated Narutowicz on December 16. This act widened the gulf between Piłsudski and the National Democrats; it also helped to marginalize minority parties within the new Polish state, keeping them from playing any significant role in the ruling of the country.


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This proved quite a challenging proposition for a state in which over 30 percent of the population was not ethnically Polish but, rather, Ukrainian, Belarusian, German, Jewish, Lithuanian, and the like. The attainment of independence was also no small shock for the masses of ethnic Poles, many of whom had grown used to empire. The task awaiting Polish activists—as in the preceding period— was to make ethnic Poles identify with the Polish nation and not just with their village/town, their caste, or their region. The enforcement of Polish as the national language and the establishment of Polish schools (and bilingual schools) helped with this identification, as did the fact that eastern Europe was now the home to a multitude of “nation-states.” Polish state holidays were established and celebrated annually. It should be added that opposition to this new view of the nation-state—whether political or ethnic—was for the most part ill countenanced; those who could be considered “enemies of Poland” (however defined) felt the hand of the government and/or of the nationally conscious masses, most notably, nationalistic students. This process of nation-building was interrupted by World War II, devastating for both state and society. The war brought the Poles back under foreign rule, resulting in a situation where Poles once again had to fight for their freedom—a situation that, some would argue, persisted through the next period, that of communist rule. Selected Bibliography Acton, Baron John Emerich Edward Dalberg. 1956. Essays on Freedom and Power. London: Thames and Hudson. Brock, Peter. 1969. “Polish Nationalism.” In Nationalism in Eastern Europe, edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, 310–372. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press. Brubaker, Rogers. 1996. “Nationalizing States in the Old ‘New Europe’ and the New.” In Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, edited by Rogers Brubaker, 79–106. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dabrowski, Patrice M. 2004. Commemorations and the Shaping of Modern Poland. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Davies, Norman. 1982. God’s Playground. Vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press. Porter, Brian. 2000. When Nationalism Learned to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in NineteenthCentury Poland. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Prizel, Ilya. 1998. National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tomaszewski, Jerzy. 1993. “The National Question in Poland in the Twentieth Century.” In The National Question in Europe in Historical Context, edited by Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, 293–316. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1994. Poland between East and West: The Controversies over Self-Definition and Modernization in Partitioned Poland. The August Zaleski Lectures, Harvard University, April 18–22, 1994. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Walicki, Andrzej. 1999. “Intellectual Elites and the Vicissitudes of ‘Imagined Nation’ in Poland.” In Intellectuals and the Articulation of the Nation, edited by Ronald Grigor Suny and Michael D. Kennedy, 259–287. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.


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Russia David Brandenberger Chronology 1682–1725 Peter the Great presides over the Europeanization of Russia. 1762–1796 Catherine the Great inaugurates the Russian Enlightenment (until 1789). 1772, 1793, 1795 Three partitions of Poland, incorporating Polish and Jewish minorities into the Russian empire. 1812 The Patriotic War against the invasion of the Napoleonic Grande Armée leads to Russia’s participation in campaigns against Napoleonic France in 1813–1815. 1825 Decembrist Rebellion of Westernized officers. 1825–1855 Reign of Nicholas I. 1826 Imposition of strict censorship. 1830–1831 A Polish rebellion is inspired by French unrest. 1849 Suppression of Hungarian Kossuth revolt. 1853–1856 Crimean War. 1855–1881 Reign of Alexander II, “the Liberator.” 1861 Emancipation of the serfs. 1863–1864 Polish rebellion is suppressed. 1865 Abolition of censorship. 1881 Assassination of Alexander II. 1881–1894 Reign of Alexander III. 1894–1917 Reign of Nicholas II. 1904–1905 Russo-Japanese war. 1905 First Russian Revolution (forces Nicholas to allow the Duma, a pseudo-constitutional system, and the relaxation of censorship). 1913 The 300th anniversary of Romanov rule. 1914–1918 World War I. 1917 February Revolution (Nicholas II’s abdication results in an unstable Provisional Government under Alexandr Kerenskii); the October Revolution (the Bolshevik overthrow of Provisional Government, and the formation of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic). 1918–1921 Civil War and War Communism. 1920 Soviet-Polish war. 1922 Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1924 Death of Lenin. 1927 War scare with Great Britain. 1928 Onset of the first Five Year Plan. 1936 “Stalin” constitution. 1936–1938 The Great Terror. 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty with Nazi Germany. Partition of Poland with Nazi Germany. 1939–1940 Soviet-Finnish Winter War. 1941–1945 Great Patriotic War with Nazi Germany. 1953 Death of Stalin.


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Scholars have traditionally contended that educated Russian elites experienced the dawn of national consciousness as early as the 18th century. The same cannot be said for the rest of the society, whose transition to modernity was complicated by poverty, illiteracy, autocratic governance, late industrialization, war, and revolution. These factors conspired to delay the emergence of a mass sense of national identity in Russian society until midway into the 20th century.

Situating the Nation Although the idea of a “noble nation” circulated within the Russian elite as early as the 18th century, this sense of identity was as much a product of caste and imperial patriotism as it was evidence of true national consciousness. Elsewhere in Europe, such “noble nations” frequently gave rise to a broader, more modern sense of national identity during the 19th century under the influence of the Industrial Revolution, print capitalism, mass politics, and the advent of the mobilizational state. In Russia, however, a variety of factors stymied this catalytic reaction. Russia was a multiethnic imperial state long before the age of nationalism, and its domain straddled the eastern European and Eurasian steppe in a way that made it impossible to disentangle nation from empire. What’s more, the autocratic rulers of this vast realm—whether Romanov czars or Soviet commissars —had nothing but distrust for nationalist mass politics. An ideology grounded in ideals of self-determination and popular sovereignty, nationalism threatened the dynastic legitimacy of the Romanov autocracy and, subsequently, the MarxistLeninist authority of the Soviet Communist Party. As a result, neither proved willing to lend state resources to the task of Russian nation-building. These factors, along with mass illiteracy, underdevelopment, and war, account for the striking lateness of Russian national identity’s formation within society at large.

Instituting the Nation Although 18th- and early-19th-century Russian rulers were willing to entertain limited discussion of elite identity in Russian society, events such as the 1789 French Revolution and the more local 1825 Decembrist Revolt suggested to them that such talk posed a direct threat to the autocracy. Coming to power amid the latter rebellion, Nicholas I (1825–1855) declared war against all manifestations of nationalist sentiment. Abroad, he earned himself the moniker “Gendarme of Europe” for his eagerness to suppress popular rebellions during eastern Europe’s period of national awakening (Poland, 1831; Hungary, 1849). At home, he countered elite interest in European Romanticism and national identity with police repression, censorship, and “official nationalism,” a monarchist ideology that linked N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Romanov legitimacy to national and religious principles that were summarized in S. S. Uvarov’s formula: “orthodoxy, autocracy, nationality.” Although such tactics preserved the Nicholaevan regime at the same time as national movements were destabilizing the old order in countries to the west, they were probably not as necessary as Nicholas I believed. Widespread domestic poverty, serfdom, and an unprofitable agrarian economy had limited the growth of trade and the Russian middle class, retarding the expansion of print culture, transportation, and mass communication. This left a massive divide between the empire’s educated elite and the isolated, illiterate peasantry that precluded the formation of national movements like those found elsewhere in eastern and central Europe. Underdevelopment, heavy-handed autocratic governance, and censorship drove Russian elites to look to the West for a sense of identity, whether during the Decembrist era, the 1830s (P. Ia. Chadaaev), or the 1840s and 1850s (V. G. Belinskii, T. N. Granovskii, K. D. Kavelin, B. N. Chicherin). In time, these Westernizers’ frustration with native Russianness precipitated a countervailing Slavophile tendency that idealized Russian orthodoxy, the traditional family, and the peasant commune. Originating among Polish thinkers such as J. Lelewel, J. Woronicz, and A. Mickiewicz, Slavophilism in its Russian variant counted I. V. Kireevskii, A. S. Khomiakov, K. S. Aksakov, and Iu. F. Samarin among its adherents. During the second half of the 19th century, the Westernizers fragmented under the influence of a variety of European ideologies, gravitating first to positivism and utopian socialism (the Petrashevites, A. I. Herzen) and then following their Polish contemporaries to populism (N. G. Chernyshevskii, N. A. Dobroliubov, M. A. Bakunin, P. L. Lavrov, N. K. Mikhailovskii) and Marxism (G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Lenin). The Slavophiles, too, collapsed into a variety of nativist pan-Slavic factions during the latter half of the 19th century (K. N. Leont’ev, M. N. Katkov, N. Ia. Danilevskii). Important to note in discussions of such intellectual currents is the unofficial nature of this search for identity and the degree to which it was often at odds with the autocracy’s view of proper imperial subjecthood. Equally important to note is the relatively small scale of the groups involved, which grew from a few dozen active members in the 1820s and 1830s to a few hundred during the 1860s and 1870s. Within the realm of elite opinion, salon culture and literary journals probably played at least as significant a role in defining a sense of Russianness during these years as either “official nationalism” or the philosophical writings of the Westernizers and Slavophiles. This is because in the wake of the Nicholaevan censor’s crackdown on political and philosophical self-expression, Russian elites were obliged to conduct their discussions and debates about identity in Aesopian terms within the context of nominally apolitical literary works and criticism. In time, expansion of these forums and the relaxation of censorship in the 1860s transmitted such ideas to a significant portion of the urban reading public. Soon, the subject of national identity came to rival other vital topics of the day, from positivism to socialism, and encouraged critics to identify a national literary canon, a national style of artistic representation, and a national “gingerbread” N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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form of architectural design. By 1900, public interest in folk culture had even led to the commercialization of village handicraft and the co-option of folk motifs into the symbolic vocabulary of the Russian art nouveau. That said, the importance of urban trends in what was still a largely agrarian society should not be exaggerated. Although notions of group identity were passionately contested within the elite and reading public during these years, these ideas’ unofficial status and their dependence on the printed word for publicity limited their impact within the society as a whole. As a result, enormous stretches of the empire’s ill-educated rural population were simply never challenged to imagine a larger political community than those defined by traditional regional, confessional, and kinship ties. Far from all Russians were content with this state of affairs, of course. Elites yearned to contribute to a truly national government similar to that of their Western contemporaries. State officials in non-Russian regions of the empire tried to Russify their jurisdictions to standardize law, education, and commerce under a single imperial lingua franca. Czars Alexander III (1881–1894) and Nicholas II (1894–1917) even augmented the reigning imperial aesthetic of neoclassicism with aspects of a pseudo-Muscovite style of design and architecture. But these initiatives were never implemented broadly or consistently enough to have a truly nationalizing effect for two fundamental reasons. First, the formulation of a Russian “national idea” was such a contentious issue that it proved to be more divisive than unifying. Second, even late in the 19th century, the czarist autocracy refused to do more than flirt with the developing national canon or lend its support (and its educational system) to the task of whole-hearted nation-building due to its abiding mistrust of populist nationalism. Even the army was forced to settle for a banal and simplistic form of jingoistic sloganeering (referred to in Russian as shapkozakidatel’stvo) to maintain morale within the ranks. Change on these fronts came only in 1914 at the start of World War I, but even then, too little effort was invested too late to make a real difference before the fall of the old regime. Revolution, class war, and internecine strife between 1917 and 1921 further confused the situation, scattering the elites, officials, and armies that might have ultimately succeeded in rallying the society together. As a result, when ethnographers associated with the first Soviet census went out into the provinces during the mid-1920s to look for evidence of an articulate mass sense of Russian national identity, they found ethnic self-awareness among Russians to be vague and defined more by negative characterizations of other ethnic groups than by a positive understanding of what it meant to be Russian. Such a weak and inconsistently felt sense of national identity was aided and abetted by the early Soviet regime, which focused on fostering a mass sense of class consciousness rather than national consciousness, even after the inauguration of I. V. Stalin’s famous “Socialism in One Country” thesis (1924). Marx and Engels, after all, had denounced nationalist and patriotic loyalties in the Communist Manifesto, declaring that “the workers do not have a fatherland”—class conflict, rather than nationhood, lay at the core of their materialist vision of the world. Exceptions N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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were made for underdeveloped non-Russian cultures, but even as Soviet ideologists invested in various sorts of compensatory “indigenization” (korenizatsiia) programs, they remained distrustful of national sentiments that threatened to distract the society from more fundamental class identities. Russian nationalism was seen as particularly divisive, leading the party hierarchy to condemn positive appraisals of Russianness as “Great Power chauvinism” and exclude Russians from korenizatsiia programs. A shift away from this heavy focus on materialism and class occurred late in the 1920s. Turbulence and social unrest—particularly in the aftermath of the 1927 war scare—led Soviet ideologists to look with increasing urgency for a way to complement the party’s arcane, abstract Marxist-Leninist propaganda with slogans that would be more understandable and compelling to the Soviet Union’s poorly educated citizenry. This need for accessible, easy-to-relate-to propaganda led to the revival of practices that were rather questionably Marxist involving the celebration of individual hero cults and a newfound sense of loyalty to the socialist motherland known as “Soviet patriotism.” A major ideological turnabout, this new set of emphases—augmented by official endorsement of socialist realism in literature and the arts—led to the rise of what was essentially a new genre of agitational propaganda oriented around Soviet heroes, socialist myths, and modernday fables during the early 1930s. This “search for a usable past” focused not only on shock workers in industry and agriculture but on prominent old Bolshevik revolutionaries, Komsomol officials, Comintern activists, Red Army heroes, and even famous members of the secret police. Virtually silent on the issue of Russianness, this propaganda promoted an official line that might anachronistically be called “multiculturalist,” insofar as it popularized a diverse array of heroes from the center and periphery who worked together harmoniously under the official “Friendship of the Peoples” ethic. Interest in individual heroes, patriotism, and the “usable past” led some propagandists to expand this line in the mid-1930s in the direction of folklore and the selective use of prerevolutionary imagery. New attention to popular literacy and the precursors to socialist realism led to the rehabilitation of folkloric epics by the 12th-century Georgian bard Shota Rustaveli as well as renewed attention to the 19th-century classics in literature, the arts, and science—a largely Russian pantheon dominated by A. S. Pushkin, N. A. Nekrasov, I. S. Turgenev, M. I. Glinka, V. M. Vasnetsov, M. V. Lomonosov, and others. By late 1936, Soviet mass culture resembled a colorful and complex pageantry revolving around the multiethnic Soviet people’s past, present, and future—a patriotic rallying call with greater social appeal than the previous decade’s narrow and impersonal focus on materialism and class. The revival in 1936 of prerevolutionary Russian literary, artistic, and scientific reputations was in large part facilitated by Stalin’s announcement in December 1935 that 18 years of socialism and the “Friendship of the Peoples” had rendered the Soviet Union’s longstanding distrust of Russianness unnecessary. Although N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Stalinist Olympus Pantheon of Russian National Heroes Aivazovskii, I. K. (1817–1900), painter Aleksandr Nevskii (1220–1263), prince Antokol’skii, M. M. (1843–1902), sculptor Bakunin, M. A. (1814–1876), anarchist, populist Belinskii, V. G. (1811–1848), social critic Bolotnikov, I. I. (d. 1608), peasant rebel Borodin, A. P. (1833–1887), composer Chekhov, A. P. (1860–1904), playwright Chernyshevskii, N. G. (1828–1889), social critic Davydov, D. V., peasant partisan (1784–1839) Decembrists, noble-born mutineers (1825) Dmitrii Donskoi (1350–1389), grand prince Dobroliubov, N. A. (1836–1861), social critic Glinka, M. I. (1804–1857), composer Gogol’, N. V. (1809–1852), writer Herzen, A. I. (1812–1870), social critic Igor’ Sviatoslavich (1151–1202), prince Iurii Dolgorukii (d. 1157), prince Ivan I, “Kalita” (d. 1340), grand prince Ivan III, “the Great” (1440–1505), grand prince Ivan IV, “the Terrible” (1530–1584), czar Kotsebu, A. E. (1815–1889), painter Krylov, I. A. (1768–1844), writer Kutuzov, M. I. (1745–1813), marshal Lermontov, Iu. M. (1814–1841), writer Lomonosov, M. V. (1711–1765), scientist Mendeleev, D. I. (1834–1907), chemist Michurin, I. V. (1855–1935), geneticist Minin, Kuz’ma (d. 1616), merchant, militia commander

Musorgskii, M. P. (1839–1881), composer Nakhimov, P. S. (1802–1855), admiral Nekrasov, N. A. (1821–1878), writer Novikov, N. I. (1744–1818), social critic Ostrovskii, A. N. (1823–1886), playwright Pavlov, I. P. (1849–1936), scientist Perov, V. G. (1834–1882), painter Peter the Great, (1672–1725), czar Polzunov, I. I. (1728–1766), scientist Popov, A. S. (1859–1906), scientist Pozharskii, Dmitrii (1578–1642), prince, militia commander Pugachev, Emelian (1742–1775), peasant rebel Pushkin, A. S. (1799–1837), writer Radishchev, A. N. (1749–1802), social critic Razin, Stepan (1630–1671), peasant rebel Repin, I. E. (1844–1930), painter Rimskii-Korsakov, N. A. (1844–1908), composer Saltykov-Shchedrin, M. E. (1826–1889), satirist Surikov, V. I. (1848–1916), painter Susanin, Ivan (d. 1612), peasant partisan Suvorov, A. V. (1729–1800), generalissimo Tchaikovsky, P. I. (1840–1893), composer Timiriazev, K. A. (1843–1920), scientist Tolstoi, L. N. (1828–1910), writer Tsiolkovskii, K. E. (1857–1935), scientist Turgenev, I. S. (1818–1883), writer Ushakov, F. F. (1744–1817), admiral Vasnetsov, V. M. (1848–1926), painter Vereshchagin, V. V. (1842–1904), painter Zhukovskii, V. A. (1783–1852), poet

Epic Events Christening of Rus’, 988 Tale of Igor’s Host, purported 1202 account of Igor’ Sviatoslavich’s campaign Battle on the River Kalka, clash with Tatar-Mongol forces, 1223 Battle on the Ice, defeat of Teutonic Knights, 1242 Battle of Kulikovo Field, clash with Tatars, 1380 Time of Troubles, 1605–1613 interregnum Battle of Poltava, defeat of Swedes and Ottoman forces, 1709 Battle of Chesme, Russo-Ottoman naval clash, 1770 Battle of Borodino, engagement with Napoleon, 1812 Patriotic War of 1812, versus Napoleonic Grande Armée


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this rehabilitation of prerevolutionary Russian creative genius was obscured by a series of celebrations of non-Russian cultures during 1936, it became more visible after the centennial commemoration of Pushkin’s death in February 1937. This expansion, in turn, was trumped later that year with the introduction of an exclusively Russian pantheon of political and military patriots—Aleksandr Nevskii, Dmitrii Donskoi, Peter the Great, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Dmitrii Kutuzov—a development that appears to have been predicated in part by the destruction of more conventional Soviet heroes during the Great Terror. By 1938, this celebration of Russianness was even designating the Russian people as primus inter pares—the most historic and revolutionary of the peoples of the Soviet Union. In marked contrast to the confused and disorganized identity politics of the old regime, this newly Russocentric line and its emphasis on Russian national heroes, myths, and iconography was instituted “from above” to play a central role in Soviet mobilizational propaganda. Complementing a long-standing stress on Marxism-Leninism, it scripted educational efforts in the public schools, party study circles, and Red Army ranks, as well as broader discussions of patriotic identity throughout Soviet mass culture (for example, popular literature, the press, theater, film). Ubiquitous, this Russocentric line was consistent as well, thanks to

A World War II–era Soviet propaganda poster serves to remind Red Army soldiers of the military successes of the past. Leading the battle charge are images of, from left, Aleksandr Nevskii, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Vasilii Chapaev. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)


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tight state control and the censor. Members of the creative intelligentsia like A. N. Tolstoi and S. Sergeev-Tsenskii were rewarded for writing about prerevolutionary themes in an ideologically correct manner at the same time that M. A. Bulgakov, S. M. Eisenstein, and others were prevented from publicizing nonconformist views, even concerning such controversial figures as Ivan the Terrible. Few countries in the world can rival the coordination and consistency that the Stalinist Soviet Union brought to its promotion of Russianness.

Defining the Nation Under the old regime, unofficial opinion concerning the nature of Russian national identity ranged widely from liberal, civic models to conservative, chauvinistic interpretations based on ethnicity and Russian orthodoxy. In the end, this diversity of views (and their lack of official endorsement) precluded the catalysing of a coherent sense of mass identity. When Soviet ideologists revived public interest in the subject in the mid- to late 1930s, they formulated their propaganda in a more narrow and consistent fashion to guarantee results and ensure its compatibility with overarching Soviet values. Obviously, this meant that Russianness would have to conform to the “national in form, socialist in content” principle that governed all Soviet ethnic self-expression. Less obviously, it also meant that Russian national identity would have to embrace other Soviet priorities revolving around working-class populism, personality cults, and political, economic, and cultural autarchy. But how could something that had been labeled “Great Power chauvinism” during the 1920s become so central to Soviet propaganda less than 10 years later? Stalin’s 1935 call for an end to Russophobia certainly played a role. Equally important was the revival of a long-forgotten thesis of Lenin’s in which he argued that, within every nation, there are progressive elements as well as reactionary ones. This idea allowed Stalinist ideologists to selectively rehabilitate examples of native Russian genius in the arts and sciences from the prerevolutionary period without legitimating the old regime itself. Ultimately, even czars like Ivan the Terrible managed to qualify for “progressive” status. Lenin’s thesis also allowed for a celebration of primordial traits that Russians had supposedly acquired over a millennia: modesty, bravery, loyalty, resourcefulness, generosity, hospitality, and stubborn determination. Russians were singled out as a heroic people capable of great things, possessing enormous endurance, and willing to undergo agonizing trials and sacrifices in the name of the national community. Not accidentally, Stalin incorporated many of these characteristics into his famous toast to the Russian people in 1945: “I raise a toast to the health of the Russian people not just because they are the leading people [in the Soviet Union], but because they have a clear mind, hardy character, and patience.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Narrating the Nation If popular Russian historical myths during the prerevolutionary period tended to vary widely from region to region, the Stalinist canon was necessarily more consistent. Historical narratives celebrated the service of a dozen “great men of history” as well as the sacrifices that common Russians had made while valiantly shielding European civilization from invading juggernauts such as the TatarMongol horde, Napoleon’s Grande Armée, and the German Wehrmacht. Aside from this martial prowess and staying power, the Russian people were also mythologized for their genius and ingenuity, apparently having been responsible for the invention of the steam engine, the radio, the airplane, and the lightbulb, only to have these advances squandered by the old regime. The national canon in literature and the arts, while somewhat better defined than other aspects of popular Russian culture during the 19th century, was also revised by Soviet ideologists during the 1930s to strip it of its religious messianism (F. M. Dostoyevskii), its Silver Age symbolism (A. Belyi), and its bourgeois obsession with love, sex, and social status (A. Verbitskaia). Sanitized in this way, it still focused on political, social, and martial themes but drew particular attention to the superfluousness of the elite during the 1830s and 1840s (I. A. Goncharov) and the social criticism of the 1860s (Turgenev, V. G. Perov). The latter subject, which included graphic depictions of humble rural life, backbreaking labor, and dignified poverty, set within a bleak landscape of endless flat steppe, wheat fields, birch forests, and wooden huts, served as an effective complement to the sterile industrial modernism of Soviet culture. Paradoxically, although the landscape of the steppe was romanticized as being uniquely Russian, little effort was made to further characterize the Russian nation in geographical terms. Before 1917, the empire was described in inclusive nonethnic terms (Rossiiskaia imperiia, or “all-Russian empire”) rather than in particularistic terms (Russkaia imperiia, or “ethnic Russian empire”). Moreover, as a contiguous land empire, it proved impossible to distinguish where the ethnically Russian heartland ended and the non-Russian periphery began. This situation remained ambiguous after 1917, even after the demarcation of national republics. Russians were encouraged to call the All-Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) home, but they were not granted special status within this federal structure like the Ukrainians were within Ukraine or the Georgians were within Georgia. What’s more, Russians were encouraged to serve as a mentor and “elder brother” to the other Soviet nations throughout the non-Russian republics, leading to the formation of a significant Russian-speaking diaspora from the Baltics to central Asia. This had the effect of creating considerable confusion over the Russians’ proper place in the Soviet Union, as they were encouraged to feel at home throughout the country at the same time that they were the sole Soviet nation to be denied a geographically bounded national territory. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Why was Russian nation-building so idiosyncratic? Because wherever Russocentrism won official endorsement, whether during World War I or during the middle to late 1930s, the resulting propaganda attempted to instrumentally mobilize Russian speakers for industrialization and national defense without engaging in truly nationalistic sloganeering. Czarist efforts advanced a message that was more successful at vilifying the Germans than it was at formulating a positive sense of a Russian national community. Soviet efforts, while considerably more successful in constructing a compelling case for what it meant to be Russian, attempted to fuse Russian national consciousness to a greater sense of Soviet identity. In theory, this allowed for popular participation in national culture without giving rise to nationalist sentiments that might pose a threat to the Soviet Union. In reality, it meant that the Soviets were engaging in a high-stakes gamble to tame and bureaucratize the revolutionary process of nation formation. Although many scholars contend that the Stalinist regime’s embrace of Russocentrism stemmed from nationalist sentiments within the party hierarchy, it is better understood as part of a new ideological line that aimed to mobilize Soviet society for industrialization and war by any means necessary. This is clear from N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the fact that massive investment in Russocentric propaganda did not result in official support for Russian state-building within the Soviet Union, inasmuch as this would have required a degree of institutional, political, and cultural autonomy that the Bolsheviks never had any intention of extending to the Russian people. This stance on Russian state-building signaled similar reservations on the subject of Russian nation-building. Although the party hierarchy revived a vast array of heroes, legends, and myths associated with the Russian national past after 1937, its efforts were selective and cautious, subordinating Russocentrism to the cause of Soviet state-building and national defense. Leaders like Peter the Great were revived to legitimate the party’s preference for charismatic one-man rule, while Ivan the Terrible came to stand for the state’s right to suppress its internal enemies. Ivan I “Kalita” symbolized the importance of the centralization of power, while the medieval warlords Aleksandr Nevskii, Kuz’ma Minin, and Dmitry Pozharsky illustrated Russia’s eternal struggle with Polish and German irredentism. Other traditional priorities with no relevance to the communist future were deemphasized, like popular religiosity and monarchism. Thus, Eisenstein rehabilitated Aleksandr Nevskii as a military commander but not as a saint, and S. M. Gorodetskii revived Glinka’s A Life for the Tsar as Ivan Susanin, but only after recasting the opera around the defense of the Russian motherland instead of the Romanov dynasty. Little more than a mobilizational ploy, this instrumental relationship is best understood as a function of Stalin’s peculiar regard for the Russian people as a whole. Although famous for his valorization of Russianness and the Russians, Stalin was not a Russian nationalist and historically opposed all efforts to promote Russian self-determination. Stalin instead viewed the Russian nation as a “state-bearing people,” the backbone of the Soviet Union’s multiethnic society. The Russians, in Stalin’s mind, were the vanguard people of the Soviet Union just as the workers were its vanguard class, and he aspired to harness their culture, history, and demographic strength to reinforce the authority and legitimacy of the Soviet Union. Russian state- and nation-building never figured into his agenda at all. Ultimately, it must be conceded that Stalin’s attempt to co-opt the Russian national past without encouraging Russian nation- and state-building did not translate particularly well from theory into practice. Analysis of the resonance that the regime’s official line evoked among Russian speakers during these years indicates that they assimilated Russocentric propaganda idiosyncratically, internalizing the most familiar, epic dimensions of the propaganda (Pushkin, Peter the Great) while ignoring the arcane and less compelling “Soviet” elements of this line (historical materialism, socialism, etc.). This selectivity should come as no surprise—after all, audiences rarely accept ideological pronouncements wholesale, tending instead to simplify, essentialize, and misunderstand them in ways that are difficult to anticipate. In this case, however, the specific nature of the Russians’ assimilation of national imagery and iconography during the Stalin N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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era allowed them to acquire a much more coherent and articulate sense of who they were in ethnic terms than they had ever enjoyed before. Indeed, the party’s attempt to reinforce popular loyalty to the Soviet Union through the selective cooption of Russianness resulted in something Stalin never seems to have anticipated: the formation of an independent sense of Russian national identity. As such, although the emergence of a mass sense of Russian national consciousness can be tied to one of the greatest Soviet propaganda campaigns of the mid-20th century, it should also be regarded as an unintentional and even accidental by-product of Stalin’s flirtation with the mobilizational potential of the Russian national past. Selected Bibliography Brandenberger, David. 2002. National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ely, Christopher. 2002. This Meager Nature: Landscape and National Identity in Imperial Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Hosking, Geoffrey. 1996. Russia: People and Empire, 1552–1917. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Hosking, Geoffrey. 1998. “Empire and Nation-Building in Late Imperial Russia.” In Russian Nationalism, Past and Present, edited by Geoffrey Hosking and Robert Service, 19–34. New York: Palgrave. Hosking, Geoffrey. 2006. Rulers and Victims: The Russians in the Soviet Union. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jahn, Hubertus. 1995. Patriotic Culture in Russia during World War I. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Lohr, Eric, 2003. Nationalizing the Russian Empire: The Campaign against Enemy Aliens during World War I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Raeff, Marc. 1994. “At the Origins of a Russian National Consciousness: Eighteenth Century Roots and Napoleonic Wars.” In Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia, edited by Marc Raeff, 65–75. Boulder, CO: Westview. Rogger, Hans. 1962. “Nationalism and the State: A Russian Dilemma.” Comparative Studies in History and Society 4, no. 3: 253–264. Tolz, Vera. 2001. Russia: Inventing the Nation. New York: Oxford University Press. Walicki, Andrzej. 1975. The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in NineteenthCentury Russian Thought. Translated by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka. New York: Oxford University Press. Weeks, Theodore R. 1996. Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.


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Spain Frederic Barberà Chronology 1875 Establishment of a parliamentary monarchy through the restoration settlement. 1895 Sabino de Arana creates the political bureau of the Basque Nationalist Party. 1898 Spanish-American War, which results in Spain’s loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and some minor Pacific islands. 1901 First victory in the local elections of the Lliga Regionalista, which breaks the electoral monopoly of Spanish political parties in Catalonia. 1914 Creation of the Mancomunitat of Catalonia, an institution with limited autonomy formed through the union of the four Catalan diputacions, or provincial councils. In 1925 it is dismantled by the dictator Primo de Rivera. 1923 (September) The coup d’état carried out by General Primo de Rivera installs a dictatorship that lasts until 1930. Repression of Basque and Catalan nationalism. 1931 (April) Establishment of the Second Spanish Republic. The coup d’état attempt by General Sanjurjo (1932) paradoxically speeds the process of approval for the Catalan statute of autonomy (1932). The Basque statute of autonomy is passed in 1935. 1933 Creation of Falange Española, the Spanish fascist party, by José Antonio Primo de Rivera, son of the dictator. 1936 (July) Outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. 1939 (April) General Franco’s victory. He installs a military dictatorship that lasts until 1975. Catalan and Basque autonomy are suppressed, and Spanish is imposed as the only official language in a new National-Catholic Spain conceived as a greater Castile.

Situating the Nation From the 1880s onward, Spain underwent a crisis as a nation-state that was related to the political emergence of two main peripheral nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque country. Following the failure of the First Spanish Republic (1873–1874) and its short-lived monarchic sequel, the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 1875 was modeled on the British bicameral system, with liberals and conservatives as political parties. Its goal was to provide Spain with political stability, thus putting an end to civil war in 1876 and favoring industrial growth. However, political corruption based on the intervention of local bosses or caciques, and political centralism (which ignored demands for autonomy within Spain and overseas) soon proved the state to be dysfunctional. The political system also frustrated the ambitions of the Catalan industrial bourgeoisie, who wanted to modernize Spain and become her hegemonic political actor. In addition, this parliamentary monarchy offered no room for two important politiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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cal options that had gathered strength after the fall of the monarchy (1868): republican federalism and anarchism. Instead, the official policies of the restoration were based on three pillars: the Crown, which experienced a vacuum of power following the death of Alfonso XII (1885), the army, used to intervene in politics throughout the 19th century, and the Catholic Church, which had an active influence on state affairs and great control over elite education. This tight structure was supported by an agricultural oligarchy from central and southern Spain opposed to social change, decentralization, and genuine democracy. Possibly the greatest paradox in this traditional Castilian-centered Spain lay in that the only two industrial areas were far removed from the center. These culturally and politically distinct territories had lost their political liberties and institutions, the Catalans in 1714, and the Basques only in 1876. The Catalan industrial bourgeoisie proved incapable of influencing state politics and acquiring the political predominance required by their economic might. This frustrated the ambitions of a class that in the 1860s had already demanded protectionist measures for their textile manufactures. In 1898, with the loss of the main Spanish colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines in the Spanish-American War, it became clear that the state could not even defend the Catalan colonial markets. A section of that same disenchanted bourgeoisie was behind the emerging Catalan regionalism, which drew on the federalist ideas of Valentí Almirall’s Lo Catalanisme (1886). The first electoral success of their political formation, the


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Lliga Regionalista (1901), led to a new period of consolidation of Catalan nationalism. In the Basque country, the liberalizing economic measures passed after 1876 by the restored monarchy allowed the export of mineral resources, but this meant that the traditional small industries were replaced by a large steel industry, which was tied to the establishment of the major Spanish banks. For the children of the alienated petite bourgeoisie, like Sabino de Arana, the founder of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), economic liberalization brought political corruption and persistent centralism while leading to the loss of Basque traditional culture and values. In 1921 the Spanish liberal-conservative José Ortega y Gasset interpreted the formation of Basque and Catalan nationalism as a result of the weakness of the common Spanish project. For Ortega, Basque and Catalan culture had been subjugated by Castile in an early process of incorporation. Yet in Catalonia, the development of a cultural Renaixença (“revival”) had preceded the formation of nationalism. Indeed some historians point to that revival as an immediate cause leading to Catalan nationalism, although other scholars argue that the mid-19thcentury patriarchs of the Renaixença not only did not challenge the Spanish status quo but endorsed it by limiting their cultural production in Catalan to specific disciplines. The Catalanization of all spheres of cultural and scientific life proved, instead, to be a task for the following generation. In the Basque country, Arana himself acknowledged the precarious state of the Basque language. The early

A statue of Basque Nationalist Party founder Sabino de Arana is erected in November 2003, 100 years after his death, in the northern Spanish Basque city of Bilbao. (Rafa Rivas/AFP/Getty Images)


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Joaquín Costa y Martínez (1846–1911) Joaquín Costa y Martínez was the main voice behind Spanish regeneracionismo. His works pinpoint the problems that affected Spain before and after the colonial disaster of 1898, from political corruption to illiteracy and poverty. Promotion of education, public investment in infrastructures, and the creation of agricultural cooperatives were the main pillars of his ambitious program of modernization, through which he hoped to transform Spain into a country that once again attracted international respect. He had favored the granting of autonomy to Cuba, and later advised abandoning Morocco. His idea of an “iron surgeon” to resolve the problems of Spain, which he retracted in his later years, was adopted with enthusiasm by some of his conservative followers. However, his republican leanings and active political life on this front granted him great popular support. Historians have demonstrated that his burial in Madrid was discouraged by the central government to avoid a republican demonstration.

revival of Basque culture was mostly circumscribed to poetical contests like the Floral Games, with their more popular sequels including traditional sports, oral poetry, and singing. The colonial disaster of 1898 highlighted the complaints from Catalonia and the Basque country of an inefficient, corrupt, and centralized state and prompted the setup of new administrative and economic frameworks that would accommodate non-Castilian aspirations. The 1898 disaster also demonstrated, however, the willingness to reconstruct a Castilian-centered Spain that had once held together a large empire and had now been humiliated in the international arena. A trend of thought, regeneracionismo, intended to modernize the country through education, the improvement of infrastructures, and the creation of wealth, but without challenging the concept of Spain as a greater Castile. This set of goals was mostly incarnated in the far-reaching program of Joaquín Costa. In the decades to come, his reformist agenda found followers within both the right and the left, from republicans in the moderate left like Manuel Azaña to antidemocrats like José Antonio Primo de Rivera and liberals like Ortega y Gasset. Given its modernizing project, some scholars also consider Catalan nationalism as belonging to a broader stream of regeneracionismo.

Instituting the Nation The three institutions on which the parliamentary monarchy relied—the Crown, the army, and the Catholic Church—dated back to imperial times. This traditional framework could hardly be overturned by the weak and short-lived federal republic of 1873. Instead, it continued to exist under General Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship (1923–1930) and peaked under Franco (1939–1975). Franco’s military rebellion N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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overthrew the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939), thus frustrating an attempt to modernize, decentralize, and socially transform Spain. These two military dictatorships appropriated the traditional idea of a unified Spain as a greater Castile, with its language, institutions, myths, and heroic past. Yet those dictatorships also embodied in their programs the legacy of regeneracionismo, if only in part. For some historians, Primo de Rivera’s economic program coincided to a great extent with that of the Catalan Lliga Regionalista. It was no coincidence that the dictator, an admirer of the Lliga’s economic agenda, was captain general of Catalonia at the time of his coup in 1923. Indeed the Lliga was present in the amalgamation government formed in 1917 after the general strike, alongside the Crown, the old institutional parties (liberals and conservatives), and the army. After 1917, the Lliga’s presence in Spain’s national government and its hesitant attitude concerning class issues (that is, the protection of their factories with the help of state police) had halted their demand for further autonomy. Facing a similar dilemma, several years later the Lliga’s leader, Francesc Cambó, contributed to financing Franco’s war effort during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). In the late 1950s, Joan Sardà, a reputed economist from the Lliga, became a key figure in the economic modernization of Franco’s Spain. Yet the institutionalization of Catalan culture launched in the early 20th century by Enric Prat de la Riba had a deep social impact and remained a constant feature of political life until the 1930s. Thus, first from Barcelona’s diputació since 1906 and then from Catalonia’s Mancomunitat after 1914, Prat de la Riba’s conservative Lliga Regionalista launched an ambitious program of cultural development that endorsed the creation of a network of cultural infrastructures. These included the Institut d’Estudis Catalans (1907) and the Biblioteca de Catalunya (1914). The standardization of the Catalan language played a central role through the publication of Pompeu Fabra’s Normes Ortogràfiques (1913) and Gramàtica Catalana (1918). This process, which aimed at the full public presence of a language that was a suitable vehicle for culture, shows the crucial importance of language in Catalan nationalism. A new intellectual movement, Noucentisme ( from Nou-cents, meaning “NineHundred”), emerged based on a rationalist cult of the urban world and a new aesthetic neoclassicism. This movement further enhanced cultural life and national pride in a territory whose capital city, Barcelona, was already culturally thriving. Noucentisme replaced Modernisme, which in turn had completely rejected the literary amateurism and historicist nostalgia of the Renaixença and had attained the professionalization of a new generation of writers. Artists and architects later branded by critics as modernistes also thrived, taking advantage of a new wave of urban expansion. Some of them like Antoni Gaudí succeeded in marrying Catalan tradition with universal innovation. Although the Mancomunitat was suspended by Primo de Rivera in 1925, Catalan cultural life continued to expand. Paradoxically, the repression of Basque and Catalan national identity further ignited political activism. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Defining the Nation Basque and Catalan nationalism appeared at the turn of the century as complex projects trying to balance modernization and tradition while providing political power to these two industrial territories. Indeed, various governments had failed to provide the country with a secular state structure capable of dealing with the emergence of a new society and granting autonomy to its emerging nations and overseas colonies. This multiple confrontation was still alive when civil war broke out in 1936 as a reaction by the ruling elites against social reform and decentralization designed to recognize national plurality. Those elites, consisting of a promonarchic oligarchy, the army, and the Catholic Church, considered Catalan and Basque national assertion as a further blow to traditional Spain. In this context we must understand the common interests shared by the defenders of the Spanish Republic, keen on modernization and social change, and the peripheral nationalisms, which saw the republic as a framework that could grant their autonomy. An anti-republican reaction suddenly broke out in 1936, with the key contribution of the Falange Española, the Spanish fascist party founded in 1933, siding with those traditional elites. This union represented the bulk of Spanish nationalism, which won the war in 1939. Even many liberals shared with those elites the concept of Spain as an indivisible, greater Castile, with Spanish as the only common official language. The adaptation of some of Ortega y Gasset’s ideas and slogans under Franco became a dramatic example of how those common denominators were used, particularly since he had favored the proclamation of the republic, accepted Catalan autonomy, and was one of the few Spanish intellectuals known abroad. Back from exile, his postwar agenda of re-nationalization was appropriated by the regime within its National-Catholic parameters to justify the cultural and political cleansing of elements of non-Castilian identities.

Antonio Maura’s Plan: A Precedent for Autonomy The “plan for reform of local administration” proposed by Antonio Maura as secretary of the interior (December 1902 through July 1903) and as prime minister (January 1907 through October 1909) was presented as a legal platform to grant autonomy. Though never approved by Parliament, this plan was favored by the Lliga in Catalonia, despite the rejection of the Catalan republicans, but was considered insufficient in the Basque country. The spirit of this plan, potentially granting administrative autonomy to all Spanish territories, was resurrected by Ortega y Gasset in the republican constitution of 1931. Experts in constitutional law have pointed out that the spirit of strictly administrative autonomy present in Maura’s plan, which disregards national rights, is also present in the 1978 Spanish constitution and was put into practice in the 1980s to water down a state model that had initially respected what this constitutional text calls “historic nationalities.”


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Catalonia and the “Revolution of October 1934” On October 6, 1934, Lluís Companys, president of the Catalan autonomous government, proclaimed in Barcelona the “Catalan Republic within the Spanish Federation” as an act of rebellion against the conservative government of Madrid. It was a common view among the forces of the left that the conservative government formed in 1933 was dismantling the republic from within with antidemocratic measures, particularly by means of abolishing any progressive laws with a social or autonomic content passed prior to 1933. As a part of this “Revolution,” the miners of Asturias also rebelled. Both rebellions were militarily suffocated, and Catalan autonomy was suspended. Autonomy was reestablished after the victory of the left-wing Popular Front coalition in February 1936.

Thus, the same brutal political repression carried out against left-wing activists across Spain, resulting in execution, torture, imprisonment, and exile, also affected Catalan and Basque nationalists. Moreover, all institutions through which political autonomy was being exerted were dismantled, as were all infrastructures, from education to newspapers, which allowed the normal development of an identity and culture that differed from the new norm. The public presence of Catalan and Basque, beyond what was accepted as innocuously picturesque remnants, was also forbidden. These radical measures condemned these divergent national identities and their cultures to clandestine life and exile. The concept of the political and cultural “normality” lost after Franco’s victory, still in currency to this day, was forged in those circumstances.

Narrating the Nation Scholars explained the origin and expansion of the medieval myth of the Spanish nation as being forged on the blood link between the Visigoth monarchs, which held control over a unified Spain prior to the Moorish invasion (711), and the rulers of the new Christian territories of Asturias. Unlike the fickle motivation lying behind the crusades in the rest of Christian Europe, this plausible invention would have efficiently served the political purpose of ousting the Moors. Not only were they disloyal, but they had also invaded and segmented the Spain of its ancestors, hence the re-conquest. This myth of a united Christian Spain was spread throughout the medieval Castilian chronicles and was further reinforced in literature, particularly through the epic poem on the life of El Cid. Thus the gothic myth, fueled through historiography and literature, reached the 20th century in good health and was diligently used to shape the sense of belonging for millions of young children in post-1939 National-Catholic Spain. In their compulsory class of Formación del Espíritu Nacional, students learned a long string of Gothic kings N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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as historical backing to a Spain that was a unidad de destino (“united destiny”), above “local separatisms.” This united destiny found a symbol in the 15th-century union of the crowns of Catalonia-Aragon and Castile with the marriage of Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castile, the Catholic Monarchs, referred to as “national unity” in the official National-Catholic historiography. The yoke and arrows in the coat of arms of these monarchs, also allegedly descendant from the Gothic kings, became the symbol of the Falange, and Franco adopted it to represent Spanish unity. In the regime’s narrative in reconstructing the Spanish “united destiny,” which for José Antonio Primo de Rivera was threatened by political parties and “local separatisms,” the humiliation of 1898 in the Spanish-American War was considered the concluding tragedy that did away with the glory of imperial Spain. Not surprisingly, October 12, the day Columbus set foot on American soil, was declared a national holiday and branded “Day of the Race.” The celebration coincided with the day of Our Virgin del Pilar, made patron saint of the Hispanics. The implementation of these official celebrations and symbols were detrimental to the cultural traditions of Spain’s non-Castilian nations, which were prohibited. Thus, in Catalonia, in addition to the banning of the public use of the Catalan language, the Catalan flag and anthem were prohibited, as was the celebration of September 11, the Catalan national day in remembrance of the fall of Barcelona to the Franco-Castilian troops in 1714. In the Basque country, the ikurriña, or Basque flag, the Basque anthem, and the new name for the Basque nation, Euskadi, all invented by Arana, as well as the aberri eguna, the day of the Basque fatherland, were all banned. What proved more harmful for Catalan and Basque national cohesion under Franco, though, was the dismantling of their cultural and political institutions and infrastructures, which had been put in place between the late 19th century and the 1930s.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Socially, the birth of Catalan and Basque nationalism is clearly linked to a section of the bourgeoisie that initially failed to attract the working classes to their political positions. At the turn of the century, these workers were mostly under the influence of socialism in the Basque country and of anarchism and republicanism in Catalonia. Although it took longer for Basque nationalism than for its Catalan counterpart to become dominant in the polls, in both cases bridging the gap between nationalism and the lower classes was a complex and long process. Some historians place the evolution from Catalan regionalism to nationalism in the early 20th century. Yet the decisive incorporation of the popular classes into Catalan nationalism did not materialize until 1931, with the creation of the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC; Republican Left of Catalonia) and its N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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subsequent electoral successes under the republic, which benefited from the anti-republicanism of Cambó, from the Lliga, and from Cambó’s support of the dictatorship. The ERC had finally incorporated secular republicanism, whose electoral monopoly had been held by Alejandro Lerroux’s republican parties, which were opposed to Catalan nationalism. In a way, this new predicament brought Catalan nationalism back to its roots, as even Catalan regionalism had originated in the secular federal republicanism of Valentí Almirall. Here lies a crucial difference with Basque nationalism, which kept intact the religious component of the carlista cause defeated in 1876, with “God, king and fueros [Basque liberties]” as its logo. Indeed, religion is closely linked to the birth of the Basque Nationalist Party, created single-handedly in a messianic way by Sabino de Arana, himself the son of a carlista activist. After his own nationalist revelation on Easter Day 1882, he designed a political agenda with a missionary goal and a Christian logo. Moreover, his early death following imprisonment (1903) was interpreted as martyrdom by his followers. Not surprisingly, the original Basque Nationalist Party, for which Arana founded the political bureau in 1895, was later renamed Basque Nationalist Communion (1910). In the background of Basque nationalism is foralismo, or the defense of the Basque liberties suppressed in 1876. In that same year, the Euskara Association was founded in Pamplona, with the purpose of studying the Basque language, history, and institutions. The rural nature of Navarrese society and the monarchic leanings of many of its members might explain why this association never evolved beyond regionalism. The divergent background of another association, Euskalerria, founded in 1878 in Bilbao, the capital of industrial Biscay, with a considerable liberal input from its members, may also explain why most of them joined the Basque Nationalist Party shortly after Arana founded its political bureau in 1895. Arana’s early background as a Basque activist was in the field of culture as a philologist. His efforts in this field, from his grammar of Biscayan Basque (1888) to his amateurish attempt at linguistic purification, proved fruitless, however, as he acknowledged the irreparable recession of Basque and the impossibility of assimilating Castilian immigrants. Paradoxically, he considered the Basque language a barrier to protecting his race and culture from the invasion of industrial workers. Indeed, for Arana race was central. His racialism, rather than racism, however, must be understood in its context, a time when European scientists often linked race with language; and at any rate, he did not proclaim the Basque race to be biologically superior. In the tenth issue of Bizkaitarra, a paper he founded in 1893, Arana launched a plan to create Euskaldun Batzoki, or Basque centers. At the time of Arana’s death (1903), the Basque nationalists were the second political force in Biscay. Their political dominance, however, was only attained after Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship. As happened in Catalonia, in the years that followed the general strikes of 1917 and 1919, social conflict overshadowed Basque national claims, and the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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number of nationalist seats in Madrid decreased. In 1918, the creation of the Society of Basque Studies and the Academy of the Basque Language launched the scientific study of the past and the normalization of the language, opposing the earlier amateurish purification. With the political hegemony attained under the Second Republic, the Basque nationalists enjoyed a harmonious relationship with other political forces, and when the Spanish Civil War broke out, they provided committed fighters to defend the republic as a means to protect their statute of autonomy, which had only been approved in October 1936. The governments of the Spanish Republic, the Basque country, and Catalonia went into exile and gradually lost hope when their members realized after 1945 that the Allies did not intend to overthrow Franco’s regime. Thus, the triumph of Franco’s National-Catholic Spain in 1939 truncated the consolidation of Basque and Catalan nationalism, but also interrupted the development of a secular multinational Spain. In 1947, from his Mexican exile, the Castilian federalist Luis Carretero reminded his readers that, during the Spanish Civil War, the autonomous Basque and Catalan nations did not choose to become independent but defended the Spanish Republic instead. Selected Bibliography Agranoff, R. 1996. “Federal Evolution in Spain.” International Political Science Review 17, no. 4: 385–401. Alvarez-Junco, J. 1996. “The Nation-Building Process in Nineteenth-Century Spain.” In Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula, edited by C. Mar-Molinero and A. Smith, 89–106. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Balcells, A. 1995. Catalan Nationalism: Past and Present. London: Macmillan. Carr, Raymond. 1980. Modern Spain, 1875–1980. London: Oxford University Press. Conversi, Daniele. 1997. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst & Company. Dobson, Andrew. 1989. An Introduction to the Politics and Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marfany, Joan-Lluís. 2004. “ ‘Minority’ Languages and Literary Revivals.” In Past & Present. Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Past and Present Society, no. 184 (August): 137–167. McRoberts, Kenneth. 2001. Catalonia: Nation Building without a State. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Núñez, Xosé-Manoel. 1993. Historiographical Approaches to Nationalism in Spain. Fort Lauderdale, FL: Breitenbach. Núñez, Xosé-Manoel. 1996. “Region-Building in Spain during the 19th and 20th Centuries.” In Region und Regionsbildung in Europa. Konzeptionen der Forschung und empirische Befunde, edited by Gerhard Brunn, 175–210. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.


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Ukraine Yaroslav Hrytsak Chronology 1905 1917–1918 1918 1918–1919 1918–1920

1919 1922 1923

1923–1933 1929 1932–1933

1938–1939 1939 1941–1944 1942–1943 1943–1944 1945

During the Russian Revolution of 1905, the ban on Ukrainian language publications is lifted. (June–April) Leftist Ukrainian People’s Republic claims control over Ukrainian provinces of the Russian empire. (April–December) Conservative Ukrainian State (Hetmanate) is under the control of the German and Austro-Hungarian occupational army. (December–December) Leftist Ukrainian People’s Republic reclaims control over Ukrainian provinces of the Russian empire. (December to December) Ukrainian territory becomes a major military theater in the conflict among the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Russian Red and White armies, the Polish republic, French occupational forces, and local peasant guerrillas. (January) Leftist Ukrainian People’s Republic is joined by Ukrainian provinces of the Austro-Hungarian empire. (December) Creation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, with the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic as the largest non-Russian republic. (March) The Paris Peace Conference hands the former Austrian Galicia to Poland; other parts of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy integrates into Romania and the Czechoslovak Republic. Policy of Ukrainization in the Soviet Ukraine. (January–February) Founding congress of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in Vienna. Stalin-engineered famine causes 2–7 million deaths in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic; the famine is part of large-scale repressions in the 1930s heavily affecting all strata of society, including ethnic minorities. (October–March) Carpathian Ukraine, a Ukrainian state proclaimed in Transcarpathia is crushed and annexed by Hungary. (September) Soviet annexation of western Ukraine. (June–October) The Ukraine is under Nazi occupation. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) is created under the auspices of the OUN. (August–October) Soviet Army reoccupies Ukrainian territory. (February) Yalta agreement confirms the new borders of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. (August) At a San Francisco conference, the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic is granted the status of a founding member of the United Nations.

Situating the Nation The territory Ukrainian nationalism was claiming as its own was marked by strong ethnic diversity. Besides Ukrainians who made up 70–80 percent of the population, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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it included one of the largest Jewish communities in the world; Poles formed a large share of the population in the western and central parts; Russians, in the south and the east; southern Ukraine had Christian migrants (Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Gagauzes) from the Ottoman Empire; Crimea was the homeland of Crimean Tatars; in the west and south there were large pockets of German colonizers; and in the southwest borderlands Ukrainians lived mixed with Hungarians and Romanians. Ethnic diversity was a legacy from previous states that had ruled different parts of Ukrainian ethnic territory: Rzeczpospolita, the Crimean Khanate, and the autonomous Cossack state. Each of these states had ceased to exist by the end of the 18th century. From then until 1914, this territory was divided between the Romanov and Habsburg monarchies: the Russian empire had 85 percent of the area, and the Austro-Hungarian empire held the remaining 15 percent in the west. By the late 19th century, the local population had undergone a demographic transformation. The change was characterized by a decline in death rates, especially among children. As a result, all ethnic groups—and Ukrainians above all—were steadily becoming more numerous, younger, and prone to ideologies that promised radical change. Ukrainian nationalism was one those ideologies. The significance of the Ukrainian position increased during World War I. Both the Entente and the Central powers considered control over rich local human and natural resources to be a key factor in their hegemony over central and eastern Europe. War led to the collapse of both empires and to the emergence of several national states in 1917–1920: the Ukrainian People’s Republic, Ukrainian Statehood (Hetmanate), and the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. These were, however, Bolsheviks who managed to get control over the major part of Ukrainian territory. They proclaimed the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, and in 1922 it was integrated into the Soviet Union (1922–1991). It comprised most of the former Russian provinces of Ukraine except for Volhynia in the west, which fell under the rule of the reborn Polish state. Poland also annexed the largest former Austrian province (Galicia), while two other Habsburg parts—Transcarpathia and Bukovyna—were incorporated, respectively, into the Czechoslovak Republic and Romania. World War II led to the unification of the territory through Soviet annexation of Polish and Romanian-controlled parts in 1939–1940. This territorial integration was interrupted by the Nazi occupational regime (1941–1944). It reinstated the pre-1918 divisions: the former Russian imperial provinces were reintegrated into Reichskommisariat Ukraine, while the former Austrian part was revived as General Gouvernement (other smaller parts were given to the Nazi satellites, Hungary and Romania). The Soviet victory led to a final unification of all ethnic territory in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Transcarpathia was the last territory to be “reunited” in 1945. Only small strips of ethnic territory were left outside, within the borders of communist Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia, and Belarus. The frequent shifts of political borders reflected the status of Ukrainian territory as highly contested borderlands between European superpowers. For the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Russian empire, possession of the Ukrainian provinces also had an important symbolic meaning: Ukrainians (“Little Russians”), Belarusians (“White Russians”), and Russians (“Great Russians”) were each considered a tribal group of the “greater Russian” ruling nation. Without the Ukrainians, the Russians could barely form a majority inside the Russian empire. Small wonder that the Russian imperial authorities in 1863, and then again in 1876, outlawed the Ukrainian language to prevent the development of a separate Ukrainian identity. The ban was lifted during the Russian Revolution of 1905, but until the very end of the Russian empire in 1917, Ukrainian nationalism was systematically repressed. The geopolitical vulnerability of the Ukrainian territories is reflected, among other things, by the high level of casualties: between 1914 and 1945, every second male and every fourth female there perished violently. This level of violence had consequences for nation-building; its prospects would have been more propitious under peaceful circumstances. Nation-building was further undermined by the feeble penetration of education, railroads, and national markets from the cities to the countryside. Pre-1914 Russian sections and pre-1939 non-Soviet sections were among the least literate on the European continent. This factor hindered the transformation of “peasants into nation.” Ukrainian nationalism was also losing ground to rapid industrialization and urbanization in southern and eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian peasants were less inclined to enter local factories and cities. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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As a result, the highly industrialized and urbanized regions were within Ukraine but not of Ukraine. Competition over Ukrainian territory had, however, one positive effect: it prevented the Ukrainian national project from being fully absorbed by either side. Ukrainian nationalism made full use of this opportunity in Galicia, the largest Austrian province controlled by the Polish ruling elite with a predominately Ukrainian (Ruthenian) population. Because the Habsburg regime was more liberal than the Russian one, in the 1880s–1910s, Galicia and its capital Lviv were chosen by Ukrainian leaders as their “national Piedmont,” that is, the territory from which cultural and political influence could emanate to their fellow Ukrainians in the Russian empire. Of the three interwar states that annexed formerly Habsburg parts of Ukrainian territory, the Czechoslovak Republic maintained a liberal policy on ethnic minorities, whereas Poland and Rumania embraced assimilation policies. Ukrainian nation-building gained a large success in the Soviet Union during the 1920s with the Soviet affirmative action policy of Ukrainizatsia (Ukrainization). This coincided with a large-scale industrialization that brought many peasants to the city and exposed them to modern culture. The Soviet regime tried to foster Ukrainian irredentism for exporting the revolutionary mood to Poland. This elicited a positive response from many Ukrainian patriots there; many of them regarded N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the Ukrainian Soviet Social Republic in the 1920s as the Ukrainian national state; some went so far as to immigrate into the Soviet Union to contribute to the Ukrainian nation-building. The 1930s brought a dramatic change in Soviet policies: Ukrainization was curtailed, Ukrainian elites were harshly repressed, and Ukrainian peasants’ resistance against collectivization was broken by the large-scale, Stalin-engineered famine of 1932–1933. Under these circumstances, Galicia renewed its Piedmont mission. Ukrainian nationalists managed to expand their influence to the neighboring western Ukrainian territories of Transcarpathia and Volhynia. In the former, there emerged an ephemeral state of Carpathian Ukraine (November 1938–1939); the latter became, during World War II, the main base of the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army. In the long run, the Soviet incorporation of western Ukraine contributed to the collapse of the Soviet regime. Between 1940 and the 1980s, the region served as a base of anti-Soviet dissent, and in 1989–1991, together with Baltic Soviet republics, it took the lead in the secessionist movement of non-Russians away from the Soviet Union.

Instituting the Nation Given the political fragmentation, the ethnic diversity, and the contested character of the Ukrainian lands, local populations faced several possible scenarios of national identification: they could form a unified East Slavic nation with Byelorussians and Russians (the so-called “greater Russian nation”); be assimilated into the modern Polish, Russian, Hungarian, and Rumanian nations; assert their separate national identity as Ukrainians; or coin smaller-scale (e.g., Ruthenian in the Ukrainian-Hungarian-Slovak borderland) identities. By late 19th century, not all of these options had equal chances of success. With the advent of mass politics, some were losing their relevance. At the dawn of the 20th century, the idea of voluntary assimilation into the Polish nation was fading away along with the death of its last propagator, the poet Platon Kostecki (1832–1908). The East Slavic project was relatively strong; it was represented by the Russophile orientation inside the Austro-Hungarian empire and the Little Russian orientation in the Russian empire. It combined local patriotism with loyalty to the ruling monarchies and displayed strong conservatism. In Austrian Galicia, Russophiles relied on their network of cultural institutions (such as the Kachkovs’kyi society established in 1874 under the leadership of Ivan Naumovych [1826–1891]). The Little Russian orientation never built institutions of its own under the Russian empire, but it dominated the Ukrainian State (Hetmanate) (1918) under Pavlo Skoropad’kyi (1873–1945). With the collapse of the ancien régime, both Russophile and Little Russian trends lost their legitimacy, and in 1920s–1930s, they seemed anachronistic. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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World War I–era film poster showing a ring closing around Ukraine. Despite progress by leaders like Pavlo Skoropadsky toward Ukrainian independence, the country was under constant threat of invasion by Poland and Russia. (Library of Congress)


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The strength of the Ukrainian national movement lay in its strong populist and leftist orientation. Within the Russian empire, the Ukrainian national movement was represented by hromady (“communes”), semi-legal or illegal institutions formed by national intelligentsia. By the beginning of the 20th century, they had been transformed into political parties (like the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party in 1900). Their attempts to create an exile center in Geneva under the auspices of Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895) expired in the mid-1880s. The Ukrainian national movement flourished in Austrian Galicia, where it relied on a dense network of cultural, economic, and political institutions, such as Prosvita (Society for Enlightenment, 1868–1939), the Shevchenko Society (1873–1940), peasant cooperatives (beginning in the 1880s), and modern parties (like the Ukrainian National Democratic Party, 1899). Gradually, Ukrainian nationalism prevailed there over rival Russophile organizations and challenged Polish political domination. “The Ukrainian conquest of Galicia” was manifested by, among others, the shift of the local Greek Catholic Church under metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts’kyi (1865–1944) from a Russophile to an Ukrainophile orientation. The failure of Ukrainian nationalism to maintain a national state during the turmoil of 1914–1923 led to a critical reconsideration of ideological tenets. In Soviet Ukraine, there emerged a trend of Ukrainian national communism that was opposed both to the “bourgeois” values of older Ukrainian patriots and to the imperial policies of Russian Bolsheviks. Some of them, such as Mykola Skrypnyk (1872–1933) and Oleksander Shums’kyi (1890–1946), held high positions in the Soviet Republic’s apparatus; others, such as writer Mykola Khyvliovyi (1893–1933), were vociferous on the cultural scene. Ukrainian national communism was wiped out by the Stalinist repressions of the 1930s. Its defeat also undermined the Communist Party of Western Ukraine (1919–1938), which had enjoyed relatively strong support among the Ukrainian minority in interwar Poland. The local political scene was increasingly dominated by a new rightist and xenophobic Ukrainian nationalism that emerged in the 1920s. Its main ideologist was Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973), and its major institution was the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) founded in 1929 under Yevhen Konovalets (1891–1938). From 1930 to the 1940s, the OUN split into antagonistic camps led by Andrei Melnyk (1890–1964) and Stepan Bandera (1909–1959). In 1942 the Bandera faction was instrumental in creating the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) that conducted guerrilla warfare in western and in some areas of central Ukraine against Nazis, Soviets, and Poles. From 1920 to the 1930s, there emerged a conservative-liberal trend within Ukrainian nationalism that criticized both the radical left and the radical right. This trend was limited to several dozen émigré intellectuals and politicians, the most prominent among them, Viacheslav Lypyns’kyi (1882–1931). Despite their political insignificance, they made an important contribution to Ukrainian political thought: they restored liberal and democratic traditions in the Ukrainian national movement. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Shevchenko Society The Shevchenko Society was established in Lviv in 1873 on the initiative of Ukrainian patriots from the Russian empire to foster modern cultural production in the Ukrainian language. In 1892, it was reformed into the Shevchenko Scientific Society as an all-Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. The society was instrumental in establishing the national paradigms of history, philology, geography, and economics, and coined Ukrainian academic terminology in natural sciences. It was disbanded in 1940 in the aftermath of Soviet annexation but was revived in 1947 in Western Europe.

Ironically, the Soviet regime—the chief enemy of all Ukrainian nationalists since the 1930s—made the largest contribution to the institutionalization of Ukrainian identity. It integrated ethnic Ukrainian territories within unified political borders, established the Ukrainian capital (until 1934, Kharkiv, then Kyiv), introduced Ukrainian language into school curricula, and, finally, raised the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to the status of a founding member of the United Nations (1945). It stripped Ukrainian identity, however, of all vestiges that could possibly hint of Ukraine as an independent nation. Before Stalin’s death (1953), no ethnic Ukrainian was allowed to head the Communist Party of Soviet Ukraine; collective memory and literary language were purged to minimize the distance between Ukrainians and Russians. The ambivalent character of this nationbuilding was probably best summarized in a book published outside Ukraine in 1953: Ukraine was a “subjugated, but state nation.”

Defining the Nation The boundaries of Ukrainian territory were outlined through ethnographic studies conducted by the Kyiv hromada. The studies were a detailed elaboration of the lapidary formulation of Ukraine “from San do Don” in the Ukrainian national anthem “Shche ne vmerla Ukraïna” (“Ukraine Has Not Perished,” 1862); that is, the Ukrainian homeland stretched from the river San on the Polish-Ukrainian ethnic border in the west to the river Don on the Ukrainian-Russian border in the east. The “natural” character of the ethnic borders was further reinforced by overlapping ethnic and social lines: Ukrainians were thought to be a “plebeian nation” (Mykhailo Drahomanov) composed only of peasants. The depiction of Ukraine as a “peasant” nation led to numerous problems, despite its alleged simplicity and persuasiveness. Politically, its populist thrust alienated many educated classes. Socially, Ukrainian nationalism relied on a group that displayed a low level of national awareness and whose loyalties fluctuated. Even though the term “Ukraine” was popular among peasants, they rarely thought of themselves as Ukrainians. They identified themselves as tuteishi (“local”), N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Rus’-Ukraine There are, probably, no terms other than Rus’ and Rus’ki (Ruthenian/s) that reflect as vividly the complexity of nation-building in eastern Europe. Originally, the name Rus’ was used for a small region around Kyiv; later, it developed a broader meaning as a term for the entire East Slavic territory or Eastern Christian world. Depending on the circumstances, the term could both include and exclude Russians. At the end of the 19th century, Ukrainian patriots replaced Rus’ki with Ukraïns’kyi/Ukraïntsi (Ukrainian/s) as an exclusive selfdefinition. The choice of Ukrainian as an ethnic description was accepted by the Soviet regime (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic). Many ordinary people, peasants above all, did not have a clear idea about their nationality and did not distinguish it from religious orientation. Rus’ki as a self-description persisted in Ukraine until World War II, and even later in the Ukrainian-Slovak-Hungarian borderlands.

muzhyky (“peasants”), khokhly (nickname for Ukrainians), or Little Russians or “Rus’ki”/ “Rusyny” (Ruthenians). The latter usually signified not ethnic but religious affiliation with Eastern Christianity and, in that sense, included other East Slavic groups. Religion presented another problem; what was thought to be the Ukrainian nation belonged to two different churches—Orthodox in the Russian empire and Greek Catholic (Uniate) in the Austro-Hungarian empire. This religious and cultural split between two parts of their imagined nation was of extreme concern to Ukrainian leaders; they were afraid that, if allowed to develop unhampered, it might lead to a Serbo-Croatian scenario.

Narrating the Nation Ukrainian nationalism evoked the image of Ukraine as a peasant utopia, as it was reflected in the local folklore of both the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires —a Cossack land free of any oppression. This vision was popularized in and by Ukrainian belles lettres. Late 19th- to early 20th-century generations of Ukrainian writers broadened the repertoire of Ukrainian literature by introducing new topics and genres, making it more modern and sophisticated. This trend was epitomized by Ivan Franko (1856–1916), a prolific writer, versatile scholar, and public activist. Still, attempts to create a literature outside the national paradigm, “art for art’s sake,” were not tolerated. Ukrainian nationalists worked hard to bridge numerous differences between Austro-Hungarian “Ruthenians” and Russian “Little Russians” by making necessary compromises. This was especially evident in forging the modern Ukrainian language; it was developed from peasant vernaculars spoken in the Ukrainian provinces of the Russian empire and supplemented by grammars and academic terminology developed in Austrian Galicia. Simultaneously, Ukrainian nationalN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi (1866–1934) Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi is considered the dean of modern Ukrainian historiography. He graduated from Kyiv University and in the 1890s moved to Lviv, where he occupied the chair of East European History at the local university and headed the Shevchenko Scientific Society. At the outbreak of World War I, Hrushevs’kyi was arrested by Russian authorities and sent to Siberia. In 1917–1918, he headed the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. After that government was defeated by Bolsheviks and disbanded by Germans, he emigrated to Prague. In 1924 he returned to Ukraine, attracted by the Soviet policy of Ukrainization. He died in 1934 as a celebrated Soviet Ukrainian academician. After his death, his name and works were banned by the Soviet regime.

ists insisted on crucial differences between Ukrainian and Russian peasant cultures; the former was purportedly exceptionally rich and fundamentally different, especially given the popularity of the Ukrainian Cossack heroic epos, and Ukrainian villagers were believed to display a greater degree of “individualism” (manifested in the absence of land communes in Ukraine). The peasant-Cossack character of the Ukrainian identity was reflected in national symbols: the peasants’ embroidered shirt, woolen hats for males and head scarves for females, and Cossack wide trousers (sharovary) became central elements of the national costume; peasant and Cossack folklore were integrated into modern Ukrainian music; and, above all, modern Ukrainian language, based on peasant vernaculars, was considered the epitome of modern Ukrainian identity. Of all efforts to forge a unified national identity, the most important was a new scheme of east European history launched by Mykhailo Hrushevs’kyi. In his History of Rus’-Ukraine (10 vols., 1899–1936), Illustrated History of Ukraine (1911), and other works, he integrated major historical phenomena that took place on Ukrainian ethnic territories since the early medieval state of Kievan Rus (the 9th–13th centuries) until the 20th century into a single narrative of a national past. Though he was criticized for his political activity by both the far left and the far right, his historical scheme was unanimously adopted by all factions of the Ukrainian national movement. It is now considered the foundation myth of modern Ukrainian identity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Ukrainian nationalism addressed above all ethnic Ukrainians. Regarding neighboring nations externally and ethnic minorities internally, relations had to be regulated within the framework of a federation: Ukrainians and other nations of the (reformed) Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires were to form a federated N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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union based on mutual recognition of the right to national self-determination. The implementation of this concept in 1917–1920 by the Ukrainian People’s Republic led to starkly contradictory results: on the one hand, Ukrainian leaders granted the fullest possible national autonomy to Russian, Polish, and Jewish minorities; on the other hand, the short historical record of that republic was marked by eruptions of xenophobic violence, above all by large-scale Jewish pogroms in 1919. An alternative concept of full political independence did not progress much before the end of World War I. It was launched relatively late (1895 by Yulian Bachyns’kyi in the Austro-Hungarian empire and 1900 by Mykola Mikhnovs’kyi in the Russian empire) and was regarded by many Ukrainian activists as a necessary but transitory step toward future federation. The defeat of Ukrainian national strivings in 1917–1920 begot a xenophobic nationalism. It proclaimed a full political independence of the Ukrainian nation as an absolute must. On the one hand, this was a response to assimilation politics of interwar states and Soviet repression. On the other hand, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists drew its inspiration from programs and activities of the Italian Fascists and German Nazis. The situation was extremely tense in western Ukraine, where in 1943 the UPA initiated Polish ethnic cleansing (known as the Volhynian massacre). The ethnic concept of the Ukrainian nation was challenged by the conservativeliberal trend in Ukrainian nationalism of the 1920s–1930s. It gave birth to the idea of a Ukrainian political nation that was to comprise all social and ethnic groups on Ukrainian territory provided they were loyal to the idea of a Ukrainian state. During World War II, the shift from an ethnic to a territorial model of the Ukrainian nation was also evident among some factions of the OUN. This resulted from nationalist encounters with former Soviet Ukrainians who were overtly hostile to xenophobic nationalism. The Soviet and Nazi repressions led to the elimination of large ethnic groups long present on Ukrainian territories. Jews were exterminated by Nazis; Poles, Germans, and Crimean Tatars were driven away by Soviets. These ethnic changes both alleviated and aggravated Ukrainian nation-building. They undermined non-Ukrainian domination in strategically important sectors of political and economic life. At the same time, the Ukrainian question became an internal issue of solely the Soviet Union. The final success of Ukrainian nationalism was dependant on whether its claims were to be recognized as legitimate by the major superpowers. Before World War II, an intrinsic weakness of the Ukrainian national project was that too often it failed to find a wider recognition. During World War II, the Soviets proved the most skillful in playing the Ukrainian card: they not only integrated Ukrainian ethnic lands but legitimized this integration on the international arena. However, their victory, as shown by subsequent events, proved to be problematic. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Selected Bibliography Abramson, Henry. 1999. A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times. Cambridge, MA: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Ukrainian Research Institute and Centre for Jewish Studies. Berkhoff, Karel C. 2004. Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule. Cambridge, MA, and London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Graziosi, Andrea. 1996. The Great Soviet Peasant War: Bolsheviks and Peasants, 1917–1933. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Kappeler, Andreas, Zenon E. Kohut, Frank E. Sysyn, and Mark von Hagen, eds. 2003. Culture, Nation, and Identity: The Ukrainian-Russian Encounter (1600–1945). Toronto: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press. Magocsi, Paul R. 1996. A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Miller, Alexei. 2003. The Ukrainian Question: The Russian Empire and Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century. Budapest and New York: Central European University Press. Rudnytsky, Ivan L. 1987. Essays on Modern Ukrainian History. Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. Szporluk, Roman. 2000. Russia, Ukraine and the Breakup of the Soviet Union. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University.


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Arab Nationalism Ralph Coury Chronology 1860 Butrus al-Bustani publishes Nafir Suriyyah (The Syrian Clarion), promoting the idea of the unity of Greater Syria on the basis of language. 1868 Ibrahim al-Yaziji publishes the first Arab nationalist poem, “Arise, O Arabs and Awake!” 1875 Christian, Muslim, and Druze Arabs establish a secret society at the Syrian Protestant College demanding an Arab national state. 1877 A group of notables from Greater Syria approaches the Amir Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi, hero of the Algerian resistance living in Damascus, to see if he would lead an independent Syrian Arab state should the Ottoman Empire collapse. 1911 Arab nationalists from Greater Syria and Iraq establish the Society of the Young Arab Nation in pursuit of a secret Arab nationalist program. 1912 A group of Syrian émigrés in Egypt establish the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralization (OPAD). 1913 OPAD convenes an Arab congress in Paris. 1916 Sharif Hussein launches the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. The secret Sykes-Picot agreement divides the Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent into spheres of British and French influence. 1917 The Balfour Declaration promises British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine. 1918 Prince Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussein, establishes an Arab government in Syria. 1920 Britain and France establish themselves as mandatory powers in the Fertile Crescent, and France occupies Syria. 1931 Arab delegates to the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem meet separately and proclaim a new pan-Arab covenant. 1933 Middle-class professionals from Greater Syria and Iraq establish the League of National Action. 1934 A Syro-Lebanese group of Arab nationalists and Marxist intellectuals meet in Lebanon and issue a program for progressive nationalists. 1937 In Syria, 524 Arab delegates attend the Bludan Conference to discuss the Palestinian issue. 1941 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden expresses British support for greater Arab unity. 1945 The League of Arab States is founded. 1948 The Arabs lose the Arab-Israeli War, Israel is established, and the remains of Palestine are occupied (Gaza by Egypt and the West Bank/East Jerusalem by Transjordan).

Situating the Nation The idea that all Arabic speakers belong to an ethnic national group that constitutes a nation had its roots in the 18th century when breakaway movements


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among Arabic speakers under Ottoman rule assumed an anti-Turkish dimension. Such revolts occurred as the term Arab was extended to all Arabic speakers, in contrast to the medieval usage in which the term was used largely for the bedouin and the phrase abna or awlad al-arab (the children of the Arabs) was applied to the settled populations. A consolidated sense of cultural and ethnic Arab identity, and then of political nationalism, became manifest in the late 19th century in areas that were still under Ottoman rule (present-day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine/ Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and western Saudi Arabia) or that had fallen under direct European control. Cultural and ethnic Arabism was promoted by three social groups: religious scholars and leaders who claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad and who represented their communities to foreign dynasties and non-Arab ruling families; new, middle-class intellectuals (teachers, bureaucrats, journalists, doctors, and translators), including a high percentage of Christians in Lebanon and Syria, who established literary associations, newspapers, and European-style schools; and urban leaders from large landowning and merchant families who represented their communities to the reformed Ottoman state and/or who served as its civil servants. These groups focused upon the celebration of Arab historical achievements, the promotion of the idea that a purified Arab culture was fully compatible with modernity, and the forging of a new Arabic literary language. The social groups who promoted cultural and ethnic Arabism later promoted political Arabism, as champions of Arab autonomy or actual independence in the waning years of Ottoman rule, and then as champions of Arab independence and unity vis-à-vis European colonialism after the Ottomans’ collapse in 1918. Although leaders from great landowning and merchant families remained dominant until the late 1940s and beyond, significant socioeconomic changes affected the nature of Arabism in the interwar period. First, the expansion of the professional and intellectual middle classes contributed to a revolutionary Arabism that would mount a formidable challenge to the conservative-liberal Arabism of the upper classes in the post–World War II period. Second, the leaders of Egyptian industrial and commercial capital appeared as new actors in the promotion of Arabism in the middle and late 1920s as they began to realize the value of opening Arab markets to Egyptian capital, products, and labor. Arab nationalism was constructed on the basis of shared language, traditions, and customs that cut across religious and class boundaries. As Aziz al-Azmeh notes, Arab nationalism was the expression of growing Arab social and cultural coherence and of the need for collective defense, and it was able to draw upon a sense of unity that already existed. A sense of Arabness extended back into the medieval period, as is reflected in Ibn Taymiyyah’s assertion in the 13th century that the Arabs of his time could be classified as such linguistically or biologically or territorially (that is, as speakers of Arabic, or descendants of the Arabs of the Arabian Peninsula, or as inhabitants of the peninsula).


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Instituting the Nation Secret Arab nationalist societies calling for an independent Arab state developed in the 1870s among Lebanese students (predominantly Christian) in the Syrian Protestant College (later the American University of Beirut) and missionary schools. Although this political Arabism had little immediate influence among Arab Muslims, who were then more attracted to Ottoman/Islamic nationalism, the appearance of such groups reflected growing hostility to the Turks in the Fertile Crescent and the wider Arab East. In 1877 a group of Muslim notables from Greater Syria went so far as to approach the Amir Abd al-Qadir al-Jazairi, the hero of Algerian resistance against the French who was then living in Damascus, to see if he would agree to lead an independent Syrian state should the Ottoman Empire collapse (he accepted on condition that he would be elected by the Syrian people and that the Sultan would retain the spiritual leadership of Muslims). Arab nationalist organizations with broader impact appeared after the Young Turk coup d’état of 1908, which transferred power from the Sultan Abdul Hamid to the Committee of Union and Progress. The Turkification of schools and official proceedings, Ottoman defeats in the Balkans, the lifting of publishing restrictions, and revival of the parliament that had been suspended by the Sultan, stimulated, and provided for the venting of, Arab discontent. Developments in political practice had their parallels in political ideology as intellectuals and activists such as the Syrian civil servant Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1849–1902) publicly embraced the idea that the Arabs as a national entity deserved their own separate and democratic political institutions. Most organizations established before World War I sought equal rights for Arabs, the establishment of local Arab assemblies, and the use of Arabic as the legal, administrative, and educational language of Arab areas. Such were the demands of the Ottoman Party for Administrative Decentralization, which was founded in 1912 and which sponsored an Arab congress of Christian and Muslim delegates in Paris in 1913. Although more radical secret societies (demanding an Arab-Turkish dual monarchy or Arab independence) appeared in the first decade of the 20th century, an actual break did not occur until the Ottomans joined the side of Germany and Austria in World War I. Sharif Hussein, spiritual leader of western Arabia and ruler of Mecca, who had allied with the British and Arab nationalists of the Fertile Crescent, proclaimed a revolt in 1916 that was able to drive the Ottomans from Syria and establish Arab rule. Hussein’s son Faisal was proclaimed king of a united Syrian Arab Kingdom by a Syrian General Congress in March 1920, and Arab nationalism, which now enjoyed the support of most Syrians, became the new government’s official ideology. Faisal’s government was destroyed by the French, with British acquiescence, inasmuch as the Allies had no intention of honoring the promises of independence N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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that they had made to obtain Arab cooperation. The Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent were divided between Britain and France as League of Nations mandates. Iraq and Transjordan were placed under British mandate, with Faisal and his brother Abdallah as their respective monarchs; Palestine was ruled directly as a British mandate and was opened to Jewish immigration in keeping with Britain’s declaration of support for a Jewish national home in the Balfour Declaration of 1917; and Syria and Lebanon became republics under French mandate. These arrangements contributed to the further politicization of pan-Arab sentiment, as feelings of unity were drawn upon in a political struggle against Zionism and the division and colonialism effected by the Europeans. A series of strikes, demonstrations, riots, and revolts (Iraq in 1920, Morocco in 1921–1926, Syria in 1925–1927, Palestine in 1936–1939, and Iraq in 1941) were directly or partly inspired by the Arab nationalism of the Arab East. Resistance to the Europeans was enhanced through the establishment of many political organizations: the Arab Independence Party of Palestine in 1932; the League of Nationalist Action of Greater Syria and Iraq in 1933; the Arab Liberation Society of Greater Syria and Iraq in the early 1930s; the Muthanna Club, centered in Iraq, in 1935; and the clandestine Red Book Group of Arab Asia and North Africa in 1934. The formation of such groups was complemented by numerous formal and informal meetings, such as the pan-Arab gathering (the first to bring representatives of North Africa and the Arab East together) that met within the context of the General Islamic Conference in Jerusalem in 1931, or the conference in Bludan, Syria, in 1937, which was attended by 524 delegates from all over the Arab world. The limited political independence gained by certain Arab countries (Egypt in 1922, Iraq in 1932) inspired programs that addressed the Arab world as a whole. The meeting in Jerusalem in 1931 was typical in its assertion that the Arab countries constituted an integral whole and that the Arab nation should resist colonialism with all the means at its disposal. Centrifugal movements, such as the

The Battle of Maysalun The Battle of Maysalun was fought at the Maysalun Pass near Damascus between French and Syrian troops on July 23, 1920. The battle took place as France moved to claim the League of Nations mandate over Syria that had been promised to her in the Sykes-Picot agreement with Great Britain in 1916. Although King Faisal, whose father had rebelled against the Ottomans as an ally of the British, and who had become king of Syria after the war, submitted to French demands and went into exile, General Yusuf al-Azmah, his minister of defense, refused to surrender. Al-Azmah was killed in battle, and the French took Damascus later in the day. The general is a major hero in Syria and throughout the Arab world. Many Syrian streets bear his name, and his statue dominates a major square in central Damascus. He died at the age of 36.


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Lebanese nationalism of Maronite Christians, mounted challenges, but the idea of Arab unity became paramount and was to be embodied in a range of liberal, socialist, and communist ideological options. As the enthusiasm for greater Arab unity grew stronger, the British sought to strengthen conservative and reactionary elements that would accept a weak form of unity under British domination. This policy culminated in the creation of the League of Arab States in 1945, which included Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Egypt, the Arab countries that had obtained legal independence by that time. Although the League played a positive role in the realms of culture, economics, and administration, it had great difficulty effecting common political policies. States were at variance with one another on a number of critical issues, including, as the Arabs’ defeat in the war against Israel in 1948 so tragically illustrated, the question of Palestine. Egypt, Syria, and Iraq were drawn into this war, at least in part, to resist the ambitions of King Abdallah, the ruler of Transjordan, to incorporate the West Bank into his territory. Although the regular Arab armies had long-range plans of attack, they were unable to occupy all of the territory allotted to the Palestinian Arab state by the UN partition plan. By July 1948, 40,000 Arab soldiers, with little military experience and fewer weapons and munitions than their opponent, faced 60,000 Jewish soldiers. The failure of the League of Arab States in Palestine was compounded by the shadow of British influence. Evident from the first and widely opposed at a popular level, this influence remained strong into the 1950s. In spite of the inadequacies of the League and of Arab unitary movements more generally, this overview of the political history of Arab nationalism up to 1948 should not end on a negative note. Two developments—growing Egyptian attraction to Arabism and the radicalization of young, middle-class activists and thinkers—broadened and strengthened Arabist perspectives. Egyptians manifested interest in Arabist possibilities as early as the mid1920s. As has already been mentioned, there was the perception that the Arab world was a potential market for Egyptian industry and labor and a field for other economic activities. Bank Misr (Bank Egypt) established banks in Syria and Lebanon in 1927, and the Misr industrial group was active in countries of the Arab East, especially Saudi Arabia. In the late 1930s, Talat Harb, the head of Bank Misr and its group, even began to plan the exploration and distribution of petroleum products, an endeavor that he kept secret from the imperialists and that was in any case aborted by the outbreak of World War II. Noneconomic influences were also at work. Arab political movements increasingly sought Egypt’s political, financial, and moral support in their struggle against colonialism. Non-Egyptian pan-Arab nationalists argued that Egypt was destined to lead the Arabs and that this would benefit Egyptian interests. Egyptians of varying orientations began in turn to perceive the possibilities of a larger ensemble within which Egypt would be paramount. The issue of Palestine, more particularly, forced Egyptians to think within an Arab context, and for a number N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Council of the League of Arab States meets in Bludan, Syria, on July 11, 1946, to discuss the migration of Jews to Palestine. The Arab League, formed in 1945, is considered the equivalent of the United Nations for the Arab world. (Bettmann/Corbis)

of interrelated reasons: sympathy with the Palestinians and fear of Zionism as part of a broader strategy of imperial control; fear that a Zionist state might threaten Egypt’s position as the Arab world’s potential industrial, technological, and financial center; and fear of a Palestinian popular revolution that might inspire disturbances in Egypt or elsewhere in the Arab East. The eminent Syrian Arab nationalist theorist Sati al-Husri said that the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s conversion to Arabism in the early 1950s was the happiest moment of his life. Egypt’s full embrace of Arabism came relatively late, but the seeds of Nasser’s Arabism, the Arabism of the greatest Arab leader of modern times, were nevertheless sown in the interwar period. As for the radical Arabism that drew upon an expanding audience, it emerged in the 1930s as the product of an encounter between Marxist and Arab nationalist intellectuals contemptuous of traditional nationalism. As Youssef Choueiri writes, a meeting of Syro-Lebanese Arab nationalists and Marxist writers, jourN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nalists, and schoolteachers in the spring of 1934 in the Lebanese town of Zahle can be taken as a turning point. Attendees included the Syrians Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (the future founders of the Ba ’ ath Party) and a number of Lebanese communists who had become dissatisfied with their party’s subservience to the Soviet Union. At the end of the meeting, the delegates issued a statement that called for the unity of the Arab nation, the establishment of a unified party, and a journal to serve as a platform for all progressive pan-Arabists. Many who gathered in Zahle were men of courage, a courage born of anger but also of hope and love, and this was also true of a large number of the activists in the unified Arabist party that came into existence a decade later. In the first years of the Syrian Ba ’ ath, members who were physicians traveled on foot to provide free medical treatment to peasants in remote and neglected villages, and party activists sent the promising sons of peasant families to secondary schools in the cities at their personal expense or tutored them without charge.

Defining the Nation During the period under consideration, Arabism was predominantly liberal and dedicated to parliamentary democracy. Such liberalism had its origins in two strains of thought—the reformism of 19th-century Christian and Muslim secular intellectuals, and that of 19th-century Islamic ulema or clerics. Butrus al-Bustani and Muhammad Abduh can be taken as examples. The Syro-Lebanese al-Bustani (1819–1883) was the first well-known Christian intellectual of his day to embrace Arab nationalist perspectives. Disturbed by the religious strife in Mount Lebanon between 1840 and 1860, he promoted Arab identity and the revival of Arab culture in Greater Syria as a vehicle for unity and a bullwark against European cultural domination. He published Nafir Suriyyah (Syrian Clarion), the first Arab nationalist journal, in 1860, and established al-Madrasah al-Wataniyyah (the National School), which taught in Arabic and was open to students of all faiths. Although al-Bustani believed that the Ottoman state should remain intact, he regarded Greater Syria as Arab, basing this identity on its use of the Arabic language. The second example, the Egyptian Sunni cleric Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), the most famous of Islamic modernists, contributed to an Arabist version of Islam that was incorporated into the secular Arab nationalism of a later period. Abduh argued that there was no contradiction between Islam and reason, that the early Islamic community had acted according to this assumption, and that it had therefore laid the basis for Islam’s Golden Age (in contrast to the Turks who had presided over Islam’s decline). This proto-political Arabism was related to the development of patriotic loyalties to particular territories—Tunisia, Greater Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. A largely secular loyalty to particular Arab places and peoples, a shift from religion and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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dynasty, was later incorporated into a broader loyalty to the Arab peoples in their entirety. The “intellectual father” of this liberal nationalist tradition as it reached its maturity in the interwar period was the Syrian Christian Qustantin Zurayq (1909–2000) who, as political activist, professor of history, and university administrator, served as mentor to an entire generation of Arab nationalist youth. Zurayq argued that religion could not be set apart from Arab culture but that the state must be absolutely separated from religious institutions. Social reform had to be based on the promotion of individual initiative, scientific knowledge and culture, and political, social, and intellectual liberties. Although the commitment to liberal democracy persisted until the mid1950s, the 1930s witnessed efforts to develop more coherent theories of nationalism, which set the stage for socialism and the idea of the nation as a social entity in need of radical transformation. Here, again, certain prominent thinkers —Sati al-Husri, Shaykh Abdallah al-Alayili, Michel Aflaq, and Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar—can be regarded as representative. The Syrian Sati al-Husri (1879–1968) had been one of the Ottoman Empire’s foremost liberal educators, and he remained an educator as a theorist of Arabism after the empire’s demise (he was minister of education in Faisal’s government from 1918 to 1920, director general of education in Iraq from 1923 to 1927, and head of the League of Arab States’ Institute of Higher Arab Studies from 1953 to 1957). According to al-Husri, national identity was based on the unity of language and history. He rejected religion and race as foundations and argued that there were no pure races in any case. A common will was the result of nationhood

Qustantin Zurayq The Syrian Christian Qustantin Zurayq (1909–2000) was the most eminent liberal theoretician of Arab nationalism in the interwar period. Born in Damascus, he received his PhD (at the age of 21) from Princeton University. Apart from a short time as Syrian ambassador to the United States and the United Nations, he devoted his professional life to education, serving as an administrator (rector of the University of Damascus, vice president and acting president of the American University of Beirut) and professor of history (also at the American University). Zurayq argued that the Arabs had possessed a sense of national identity in medieval times and that it had been established by the Prophet Muhammad. Nevertheless, nationalism as a cultural and political bond, superior to all others and capable of shaping a nation of equal citizens irrespective of religion, is a modern phenomenon. Independence and unity based on Arab spiritual development are not enough. The Arab nation must incorporate the science, philosophy, and industrial systems developed in the modern West. Zurayq’s works (beginning with National Consciousness in 1939) had broad influence, but his role was not limited to the promotion of Arabism through scholarly and theoretical efforts. He participated in the formation of a clandestine Arab nationalist organization (the Red Book) in 1934, and served as mentor to an entire generation of Arab nationalist students.


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and not its source. Although he began with a rather romantic understanding of language, he ultimately came to view it as a mode of communication necessary to carry out the practical tasks of a modern nation-state in the service of all its citizens. The Lebanese Sunni Muslim cleric Shaykh Abdallah al-Alayili (1914–1996) promoted social democracy based on a new concept of individual immortality (he believed the old concept was selfi sh, whereas the new hoped for the survival and prosperity of society). National identity—he spoke of an “imagined community”—is derived from the unity of language, territory, common interests, and ideals. True nationalists must reject imperialism, dictatorship, and a racism that stems from the desire for power and domination or the need for a substitute faith in an age of religious decline. Although religion can play a secondary role, it does not qualify as a primary factor. Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) believed that nationality is acquired as a destiny, just as one acquires a name, but that the regeneration of the nation depends on a radical break from the past. Conservatives—capitalists, feudalists, politicians opposed to unity, and rigid religious leaders—are arrayed against the rest of the nation and its revolutionary youth. Nationalism is democratic and a form of love, but it does not flinch from confronting the enemies of the people. Islam as a universal faith is an expression of Arab humanism. It represented the renewal of Arab life in the seventh century, but Arab nationalism, the ideal of the present age, represents the renewal of Arab life today. The Syrian Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar (1879–1940) provided a bridge between the old and new generations. A medical doctor by profession, he was minister of foreign affairs in Faisal’s government and founder of the Syrian People’s Party during the mandate. According to Shahbandar, political activity proceeds from the interaction of cultural, social, and economic realities. The Arab revolt was dominated by medieval notions and crippled by weak political organization. Religion represents a universal moral code, and all religions are united by a common core. Although communism is not in accord with the Eastern heritage, a moderate socialism could be established.

Narrating the Nation As in the case of other nationalisms, an idealized understanding of the nation developed during this period at a popular level. The great deeds of the Arab people were exalted, while decline was attributed to foreign corruptions. Modern values were projected into the Arab past, and history was conceived as tending, inevitably, toward the rebirth of a unified Arab nation that had allegedly once existed or that had fallen into decline. Such popular idealizations coexisted with the sophisticated and nuanced understanding provided by scholars and intellectuals who N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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recognized and did not flinch from considering provincial differences and subdivisions, the plurality of coexisting identities, and Arab responsibility for Arab failures. In History of the Arab Nation (1939), for example, the Iraqi Darwish al-Miqdadi assumes that historical developments are reactions to the particular needs of the moment, and that this is as true of Islam (seen as a response to the collapse of Arab states and a loss of trade) as of everything else. Even if left to their own devices, the Arabs are no more immune to shortcomings than others. The great Arab revolt of 1916 was itself superficial; true nationalism at that time was limited to a few organizations of young people, and the Arab masses remained loyal to the Ottoman caliph as a religious duty.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Paul Noble likens the contemporary Arab world to a vast sound chamber in which ideas resonate with little consideration for state borders. This sound chamber, which is linked to a sense of common identity and interests, began to take shape during the period under consideration. It owes its existence, at least in part, to two phenomena: intellectuals and activists who promoted cultural and political Arabism within the context of Arab civil societies, and the acculturation effected by the Ottoman state and its Arab successors. Even the local patriotisms of individual Arab areas (and later states) drew upon a common pan-Arab heritage that could be associated with the national territory by various state institutions, and in particular by the new secular educational systems. In spite of all this, no significant institutional unity at the state level, other than the weakly constituted League of Arab States, was achieved during the period under consideration. Although the interwar generation developed a common Arab nationalist discourse, by 1948 movements for Arab unity implied the self-assertion of individual states. How is this to be explained? The answer lies in two primary factors: the hostility of European imperial powers that pursued a policy of divide and rule within and between Arab states, and, as Nazih Ayubi argues, the weakness or indifference of the Arab ruling classes who were unable and/or not interested in bringing about greater institutional unity. Arab nationalism had great resonance among the urban merchants (and their professional offspring) who resented the artificial separation of their traditional markets when the British and the French divided up the Arab East after World War I; such nationalism also had resonance for the Egyptian capitalists who discovered the wider Arab world in the 1920s. Yet the Arabist commercial/intellectual elite of the Fertile Crescent was too weak to penetrate the new borders, and Egyptian capital was soon subordinated to foreign capital in Egypt itself. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Selected Bibliography al-Azmeh, Aziz. 1993. Islams and Modernities. London: Verso. Ayubi, Nazih. 1997. Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London: I. B. Taurus. Batatu, Hanna. 1999. Syria’s Peasantry, the Descendants of Its Lesser Rural Notables, and Their Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Choueiri, Youssef. 2000. Arab Nationalism: A History. Oxford: Blackwell. Coury, Ralph M. 1998. The Making of an Egyptian Arab Nationalist: The Early Years of Azzam Pasha, 1893–1936. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. Nafi, Basheer M. 1998. Arabism, Islamism and the Palestine Question, 1908–1941. Reading, UK: Ithaca Press. Noble, Paul. 1991. “The Arab System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities.” In The Foreign Policies of Arab States, edited by Bahgat Korany et al., 47–48. Boulder: University of Colorado Press. Rodinson, Maxime. 1981. The Arabs. Translated by Arthur Goldhammer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Salem, Paul. 1994. Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.


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Ethiopia Mohammed Hassen Ali and Seyoum Hameso Chronology 1855–1867 1865–1888 1872–1889 1880s–1890s 1889 1889–1913 1890 1896 1906 1916 1930 1931 1936–1941 1941

Reign of Emperor Tewodros II of Begemeder. Reign of Menelik II, king of Shawa. Reign of Emperor Yohannes of Tigray. Menelik II’s colonial expansion to the southern regions. The Treaty of Wuchale is signed by Menelik and Italy. Reign of Emperor Menelik II of Abyssinia. The creation of the Italian colony of Eritrea. The battle of Adwa, in which Menelik II defeats Italian forces. Menelik II is incapacitated and dies in 1913. Tafari Makonnen is appointed regent with the title of Ras. Ras Tafari is crowned as Emperor Haile Selassie. Ethiopia has its first modern written constitution. Italian occupation of Ethiopia. Haile Selassie returns to power.

Situating the Nation The name Ethiopia is of Greek origin. It first applied to the region of Nubia, which was mentioned by classical writers and in biblical references to Ethiopia. Arabs referred to Habashat, which was closer to Habasha, Abasha, and Abyssinia. The name Ethiopia was linked with Abyssinia in Kebra Negast, an Abyssinian politicoreligious epic compiled during the last quarter of the 13th century. Despite the strong link the epic established, Abyssinian leaders rarely referred to the country as Ethiopia. Internationally known as Abyssinia, it became a member of the League of Nations in 1923 as such. It was the 1931 constitution that made Ethiopia the official name of the country and defined the people as Ethiopians. And yet, until 1942, the British Foreign Office records continued to refer to Ethiopia as Abyssinia. Historic Abyssinia constituted only one-third of modern Ethiopia. The nationhood of historic Abyssinia had been based on Christianity, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, the monarchy, and the solidarity of the Abyssinians in their common opposition to the expansion of Islam in the region. As such, it excluded not only Muslims but also believers in traditional African religions who lived in Abyssinia. More importantly, entire peoples of the south were not part of historic Abyssinia. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: ETHIOPIA

Contemporary Ethiopia achieved its current geographical configuration and political expression in the last two decades of the 19th century. Prior to this period the Abyssinian state was situated in the northern and central highlands. It was Menelik II (reigned 1889–1913) who created the modern Ethiopian state. Menelik saw himself as a conscious participant in the scramble for colonies. Menelik expressed his imperial intentions as early as 1891. In his letter of April 10, 1891, to the heads of states of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, and Russia, he stated that “I have no intention of being an indifferent looker-on if the distant powers have the idea of dividing up Africa” (quoted in Packenham 1991, 470). These were also times when he signed different border treaties with European states. One example is the Treaty of Wuchale (also Ucciali, Wechale, and Wichale) with Italy on May 2, 1889. Italy then claimed a protectorate over Ethiopia in October 1889 on the basis of Article 17 of the treaty. The Italian version of Article 17 bound Emperor Menelik to use the Italian foreign office as an intermediary for Ethiopia’s foreign relations. The Amharic version of the same article, however, “contained no obligation but permitted the possibility of requesting Italian assistance” (Marcus 1994, 89). Menelik rejected this interpretation of the treaty, and the dispute developed into war and eventually the defeat of Italian forces in Adwa (also spelled Aduwa and Adowa) in 1896. In the wake of the defeat, the government of Francesco Crispi collapsed, and Italian forces retreated to Eritrea. The moral and material boost of this victory encouraged Menelik to complete the Abyssinian expansion to the south by conquering the Borana Oromo in 1896 and the kingdom of Kafficho in 1897. In other words, although Menelik’s representatives did not participate in the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, Ethiopia embarked on its own scramble for colonies and greatly expanded its territory between 1882 and 1906 (Keller 1991, 36). According to Addis Hiwet (1975, 1), “Ethiopia’s existence as a ‘modern state’ does not extend beyond the 1900s and into the limitless and ever-remote millennia. The same historical forces that created the ‘Gold Coast,’ the ‘Ivory Coast,’ the Sudan and Kenya, were the very ones that created modern Ethiopia too.”

Emperor Menelik II (1844 –1913) The son of King Haile Melekot, who died in 1855, Menelik was born in 1844 and named Negus Sahle Maryam at the age of 11. He was soon captured and put under house arrest by Tewodros of Gondar in the fortress of Magdalla, but in 1865 he escaped and became the king of Shawa (1865–1888). When Yohannes II of Tigray died following the battle with the Dervishes in Sudan in 1889, he proclaimed himself Emperor Menelik II. In 1896, he led the war against the Italian army and successfully defeated the latter. In the subsequent years, he signed treaties with European powers and created the basic configuration of contemporary Ethiopia. He was incapacitated by illness in 1906 and died in 1913.


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The colonial expansion took shape with the religious zeal of a “civilizing mission.” Emperor Menelik pursued this mission to conquer the peoples of the south, transforming Abyssinia into what became Ethiopia and the historic Abyssinians (namely Amhara and Tigray people) into what is described as “the true Ethiopians” (Levine 1974, 8). In effect, Ethiopian nationalism, which is governmental nationalism, became a metaphor for the political and cultural hegemony of the Amhara elites in Ethiopia. Thus, Ethiopian nationalism was the product of Abyssinian cultural heritage rather than being based on the collective achievements and pride of all the peoples of Ethiopia. The political structures constraining Ethiopia included but were not limited to factors such as the prohibitive, rugged, and mountainous terrain, semidesert areas, lack of modern transport facilities, inequality of power between the northern and southern peoples, a political culture based on tyranny, the desire of European colonial empires for expansion and influence, and the existing ethnonational structures in Oromia, Sidama, Ogaden, and other areas. The factors enabling Abyssinia included the earlier adoption of Christianity, the alliance of the Abyssinian rulers with Portugal in the 1520s, and similar alliances with European powers during the 1870s and 1880s. It was just such an alliance that provided N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Emperor Menelik with the arsenals of modern weaponry that made imperial expansion to the south possible. Menelik used the same weapons to defeat Italian imperialism at the battle of Adwa in 1896. The core regions for launching imperial expansion were in historic Abyssinia, which included the regions of Tigray, Begemeder, Gojam, Wollo, and Northern Shawa. Tigray was the birthplace of the Axumite civilization that flourished from the 1st to the 10th centuries, which had since seen perpetual decline. Between the 12th and 13th centuries, the Abyssinian state had slowly expanded from Tigray to the region of Wollo and Northern Shawa, until it was curtailed by the jihadic war of Imam Ahmed (1529–1543), civil wars, and the feudal anarchy that led to the decentralization of power within the core Abyssinian region. For over two centuries, the core regions of Abyssinia were divided into four autonomous regions that were engaged in endless wars with each other. The social context that gave birth to the national idea of uniting the core Abyssinian regions included the fear of external invasion, the spread of Islam, and the rise of Oromo power in the region of Wollo, which was part of the core region of Abyssinia. The leader who articulated Christian nationalism and mobilized the Abyssinian society on an anti-Islam and anti-Oromo platform was Kasa Hailu of Begemeder, who defeated various Abyssinian warlords and crowned himself Emperor Tewodros (1855–1867). Though Tewodros united the core Abyssinian region, his vision had been limited to historic Abyssinia, as he considered the vast region of the south to be populated by different nations. After Tewodros’s force was destroyed by the British in 1868, Emperor Yohannes of Tigray (1872–1889) held Abyssinia together. Emperor Menelik (1889–1913) expanded the territorial conception of the nation by conquering and incorporating the vast and rich regions of the south into Abyssinia. In the process, Menelik shifted Shawa (also referred to as Shoa) from the periphery of Abyssinian politics into the center of the Ethiopian colonial empire. Menelik and the Abyssinian ruling class—mainly the Shawan Amhara elite—believed they had a historic mission “to civilize” the peoples of the south. It was in the name of the civilizing mission that hundreds of thousands of southern people were killed and their property plundered. It was in the name of the same mission that the conquerors expropriated the southern peasants, turning them into their tenants (Markakis 1994, 231). Menelik gave two-thirds of all the conquered land to his armed settlers known as Naftanya and to the Orthodox church. In the land of their birth, the conquered people of the south lost their land, their rights, and their human dignity, becoming landless serfs (gabars) without legal protection against armed settlers, who became governors, soldiers, policemen, tax collectors, and judges and jury at the same time. It was also in the name of the “civilizing mission” that Amharanization—the policy of spreading the Amharic language as well as the Amhara culture, way of life, and beliefs—was imposed on the conquered people of the south. In short, Menelik and his successors developed and propagated the imperial idea, and Ethiopia was officially N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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known as an empire until 1974. From the time of Menelik’s conquest until 1991, the Amhara elite dominated the Ethiopian political landscape.

Instituting the Nation After defeating and thwarting the Italian colonial ambition at Adwa in March 1896, Menelik completed the conquest of the south. He negotiated boundary treaties with Italy (October 26, 1896) and France (March 20, 1897) in the north and east, and then with Britain (May 14, 1897) in the south and west (Hameso and Hassen 2006). Created by conquest, Menelik’s empire was maintained by soldiers; thus by 1900, there were around half a million armed settlers in the south. When Menelik suffered a stroke in 1906, he appointed a cabinet, the first modern governmental institution to be established in Ethiopia. In 1908, the first modern school was set up in Finfinne (renamed Addis Ababa when Menelik moved his seat from Ankober), followed by the establishment of the first financial institution, the Bank of Abyssinia, and the building of the Franco-Abyssinian railway, which reached Addis Ababa in 1917. After the death of Menelik in 1913, his grandson Lej Iyasu succeeded at the age of 15. In 1916, he was removed from power by a coup instigated by the Shawan Amhara elite, which favored Ras Tafari Mekonnen. Menelik’s daughter Zawditu was named empress, with Ras Tafari as regent and successor to the throne. Taking on the mantle of power, Ras Tafari saw the need for basic infrastructure, the expansion of primary schooling (Ethiopia did not have a single university until 1950), police and security services, military training, centralized

Lej Iyasu Born in 1898, Lej Iyasu was an offspring of a political marriage that the invading elite entered into with some of the indigenous Oromo elites of Wollo. His father was an Oromo leader, and his mother was the daughter of Emperor Menelik. He succeeded Menelik in 1913, but his government was overthrown in 1916 mainly due to the opposition of the Abyssinian nobility and clergy. The overthrow caused internal displacement of a significant number of people, mainly Oromos. The coup was supported by the British, the French, and the Italians, who accused Iyasu of allying with the Germans and the Ottomans in World War I. Fearing that Iyasu’s cooperation with the Muslim populations of their colonies in Africa would prove subversive, these countries cooperated with the Amhara elite, providing them assistance to bring him down. He was hunted down and unable to seek asylum in the neighboring colonial territories ruled by the British, the French, and the Italians. He roamed the inhospitable Afar lowlands for five years until he was captured in 1921. He was kept in prison until 1935, and at the onset of the Ethiopian-Italian War, he was killed by the order of Emperor Haile Selassie who was fleeing into exile in 1936.


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governmental bureaucracy, and municipal administrations. These and other programs of modernization focused on centralizing and consolidating power. Throughout the period under consideration, the philosophical guiding principle of the Ethiopian ruling elite was the policy of Amharanization through the system of education, governmental bureaucracy, the military, police, and security services. The Amhara ruling elite considered the Amhara culture superior to all other cultures and instituted it as the national culture of Ethiopia. The national project was first and foremost motivated by economic domination and politically guided by the imposition of Amhara language, culture, religion, and way of life on the peoples of the south. There was no distinction between Amhara and Ethiopian nationalism since Amhara national characteristics were rendered synonymous with pan-Ethiopian traits. The goal of the national project was to consolidate the power of the Amhara elite “through the establishment of the hegemony of the Amhara culture masked as ‘Ethiopian culture’” (Keller 1998, 121). The project of nation-building failed to produce a cohesive Ethiopian nation. Instead, it produced Amharanized non-Amhara individuals who were despised because of their different ethnic background, ridiculed because of their Amharic language accent, and looked down upon with contempt by the members of the Amhara ruling class. Non-Amhara individuals were assimilated without being accorded equality of status with members of the Amhara ruling elite. Their predicament is complex. On the one hand, they were Ethiopian nationalists and they believed in the Ethiopian nation, identity, the state, and its institution. On the other hand, they felt a humiliating sense of exclusion from important decisionmaking processes within the Ethiopian political establishment. Because of its cultural and historical foundations, the contemporary Ethiopian state is a multinational state. State here is defined as “a legal and political organization, with the power to require obedience and loyalty from its citizens” (Seton-Watson 1977). The main ethno-linguistic groups in post-1890s Ethiopia were Cushitic, Semitic, Nilotic, and Omotic. The Cushitic groups constituted the majority, but they remained a political minority. They include, among others, Oromo, Sidama, Afar, Somali, and Hadiya, and they live in the southern, western, eastern, and central areas of Ethiopia. Semitic groups, who form the other major group, include Amhara, Tigre, Gurage, and Adere. With the exception of the last two, most Semitic groups live in the northern and north-central parts of Ethiopia. The Nilotic and Omotic groups live in the western and southwestern regions.

Defining the Nation From the 1890s to 1945, the national idea of Ethiopia did not find expression in a common understanding of social groups belonging “together by birth and/or through familially inherited language and culture” (Kellas 1991, 2), but rather N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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through the policy of assimilation and homogenization known as Amharanization. This policy produced Amharized educated individuals who sought recognition of their ethnic groups’ identity as an integral part of the national idea. The failure to accord respect for such individuals hastened their politicization, thus giving birth to rival nationalisms. There were also internal rifts in regard to culture and religion. The hierarchical, largely authoritarian culture of northern Ethiopia was in opposition to the egalitarian Gada- and Luwa-based practices in the southern regions, especially Oromia and Sidama. Religious differences were pronounced between Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity (with its unique ritual and a calendar that differed from the rest of the world and other Christian denominations), Islam, and followers of traditional religious beliefs. These conflicts put the stability and logic of Ethiopian nationhood into question and hence challenged its legitimacy—at least in the eyes of the conquered peoples. The contemporary proliferation of national popular liberation fronts is a poignant reminder that these tensions have not yet been overcome. The type of boundaries advocated and implemented in Ethiopia between the 1890s and 1945 ranged from natural to political. The Amhara regions of Abyssinia were divided into four: Begemeder, Gojam, Wollo, and Northern Shawa. The boundaries among the four regions were marked by mountains and rivers. Following the conquest and incorporation, the south was divided into several regions and controlled mainly by Amhara governors. Prior to World War II, Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie was divided into 13 provinces: Tigray, Begemeder, Gojam, Wollo, Shawa, Arsi, Bale, Hararge, Sidamo, Gamo Gofa, Kafa, Illubabor, and Wallaga. None of these territorial entities reflect the ethnic composition of Ethiopian societies. Only the provinces of Tigray and Arsi refer to the Tigrayans and Arsi Oromo national groups. Often natural terrain, especially rivers such as the Awash, Wabishebelle, Ganale, and Abay, divided provinces. Political boundaries also divided the Somalis in Somalia and Ethiopia, the Borana Oromo in northern Kenya and south Ethiopia, and several Nilotic groups in eastern Sudan and western Ethiopia. Eritrea, which was an Italian colony from 1890 to 1941, came under British military administration from 1941 to 1951. The United Nations federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952, and a decade later Ethiopia annexed Eritrea as its 14th province. Mapping exercises in Ethiopia started during the Italian occupation and expanded during and after the 1940s. Apart from geography, social perceptions divided the Abyssinian peoples. For example, there were differences among the Amhara of the four regions. The Amhara of Begemeder felt that they were superior to the Amhara of Northern Shawa. The Tigrayans in the north believed that Tigray was the seat of Abyssinian civilization, while the Amhara to the south, especially the Shawan Amhara, believed that they had created modern Ethiopia. Yet, both groups believed in their superiority to the conquered people of the south. Christianity, the institution of the monarchy, and a common culture united the Amhara and connected them, albeit N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Haile Selassie Born in 1892 as a Tafari to Ras Makonnen, a relative of Emperor Menelik and the first governor of Harar, the young Tafari grew up in the palace of Menelik. In 1916, he engineered a coup against Lej Iyasu and effectively became a de facto ruler. In 1923, he made Abyssinia a member of the League of Nations; in 1928, he declared himself king, and in 1930, emperor. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia (1936–1941), Haile Selassie fled to Jerusalem, then to Bath in England where he stayed until 1941. In 1936, he made impassioned pleas to the League of Nations in Switzerland for intervention on behalf of Ethiopia. He returned to Ethiopia after the Italian forces were defeated and expelled from Ethiopia in 1941. He ruled until 1974, when he was overthrown by a military committee known as the Derg; he was detained and died in September 1975. For more than a half century, Haile Selassie dominated the Ethiopian political landscape. His reign was characterized by consolidation of imperial rule, intensification of the policy of Amharanization, and unsuccessful attempts at modernizing a feudal empire.

loosely, with the Tigrayans. The Abyssinian elites also shared the historical myth that their nation had existed for 3,000 years, a claim that would make Ethiopia one of the oldest nations on Earth. The irony of this myth is that Ethiopia still lacks national consensus on the nature of the state and nation. The conquered peoples of the south viewed the supposed superiority of the Abyssinians as a perverted colonial invention. This is because, on the eve of Menelik’s conquest and colonization, the Abyssinian society and the people of the south such as the Oromo states of the Gibe region, the kingdom of Kafficho, and the city state of Harar were at similar stages of material culture.

Narrating the Nation The history of the Amhara and Tigrayan people has been taught as the history of Ethiopia throughout the Ethiopian educational system. In school and government propaganda, the capital of the ancient Axumite kingdom is presented as the birthplace of Ethiopian civilization. Ethiopian Orthodox Christians believe that Axum is the holiest place where the true Ark of the Covenant is kept. The city of Axum, the churches of Lalibela, the palaces of Gondar, and the monasteries, which are all located in Abyssinia, are presented as the centers of Ethiopian civilization. The 16th-century jihadic war of Imam Ahmed is recalled as a tragic event that nearly destroyed Christianity in Ethiopia. The era of the princes (1769–1855) is remembered as a time of chaos and anarchy. The reign of Emperor Tewodros (1855–1868) is regarded as the time of the rebirth of the nation. The wars against the Egyptians in 1875 and 1876 and against the Sudanese in 1889 are presented as saving Ethiopia from external aggression. The memory of the famous battle of Adwa in 1896 is replayed extensively in the nationalist discourse as an example N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of Ethiopian unity, greatness, and Emperor Menelik’s extraordinary leadership. The great Ethiopian famine of 1888–1892 and the Italian occupation of Ethiopia are recalled as times of national hardship and great suffering. The war of conquest that incorporated the southern regions into Ethiopia is celebrated as the reunion of the Ethiopian nation. The myth of descent from the so-called Solomonic dynasty (1270–1974) is perpetuated to create images of national continuity and of a unique and godly nation. Kebra Negast graphically depicts the Ethiopians as the chosen people and provides legitimacy for the same dynasty. Ethiopian Christians usually attributed their victories to God’s kindness toward them and explained their defeat as his lesson for their repentance. In Emperor Tewodros’s letter of 1863 to Queen Victoria of Great Britain, and in Emperor Menelik’s letter to European heads of states in 1891, Ethiopia is depicted as a “Christian Island” surrounded by a sea of “pagans.” Successive governments’ propaganda cited Ethiopia as a symbol of African independence and characterized its people as beautiful, hospitable, God-fearing, patriotic, proud, and brave, who have humiliated their enemies from far and near. Ethiopian identity is expressed through historic landmarks in Abyssinia, through the Ethiopian Orthodox Church paintings of Christ and his disciples, Mary, angels, saints, and martyrs, through prayers, through Amharic literature, theater, proverbs, war and love songs, music, and hymns, through the Ethiopian flag, national anthem, the 1931 constitution, the symbol of the cross, lion, and rare animals and birds that are found only in Ethiopia, the coffee tree, and the calendar of 13 months of sunshine.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The catalysts for the mobilization of the Ethiopian nation include Abyssinian solidarity and Christian nationalism. The people were mobilized against invading enemies, while external support was deployed toward the same end. Victory against foreign invaders is depicted as a true expression of Ethiopian unity, the foundation of its nationalism and nationhood. Patriotism and militarism are often exalted as the means of attainment and maintenance of autonomy and independence from some foreign authorities, while at the same time the state system depends on other forms of foreign advice and support to help build the historic Abyssinians’ ideological cohesion as a social group. The key characteristic of Ethiopian identity has been the extent to which it has been recognized or identified with the core elements of cultural homogeneity, traditional heritage, and beliefs and value systems of the Abyssinians. The groups targeted for assimilation and marginalization were the Oromo (who, until 1974, were officially called by the derogatory name Galla), Sidama, and many other southern peoples. Ethnic homogenization in a physical sense has rarely taken N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Obelisk of Axum, hewn from one entire granite stone to mark the reign of the Kings, Queens, and Emperors of Abyssinia. (UNESCO Photobank/Maureen Dunne)


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place, but there have been concerted and widespread efforts to assimilate and suppress non-Amhara identities. There were also peoples who resisted domination. In areas such as Sidama and parts of Oromo, people resisted forced baptisms and conversions and were receptive to non-Orthodox Christian missionaries and even to Italian intervention as it relieved the burden of exploitation and suffering. Conversions to Islam were also seen as a way of resisting Abyssinian domination. The emerging Ethiopian identity is the outcome of conquest and concomitant migration, cultural assimilation, and religious conversions, all of which account for the creation and promotion of an Ethiopian identity. Language, as one of the markers of national identity, was exploited to the fullest, and the Amharic language was made the official national language as well as the language of education. From 1917 onward, Amharic was promoted in schools, through the mass media, and within the bureaucracy. This process was only briefly interrupted by the Italian occupation of the 1930s. Both the education system and feudalistic marital arrangements enabled the adoption and co-option of a limited number of elites from conquered nations to legitimize the national idea. The print media, radio, imperial tours, and selective adoption of children orphaned through wars were also used in this process. While this enabled social mobility for a very few, large segments of constituent societies from the south were left out. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities. London: Verso. Hameso, Seyoum, and Mohammed Hassen, eds. 2006. Arrested Development in Ethiopia: Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and Self-Determination. Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press. Hiwet, Addis. 1975. “Ethiopia: From Autocracy to Revolution.” Review of African Political Economy 2, no. 4: 1–115. Hobsbawm, J. 1990. Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Program, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kellas, J. 1991. Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. London: Macmillan Press. Keller, Edmond. 1991. Revolutionary Ethiopia: From Empire to People’s Republic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Keller, Edmond. 1998. “Regime Change and Ethno-Regionalism: The Case of the Oromo.” In Oromo Nationalism and the Ethiopian Discourse: The Search for Freedom and Democracy, edited by Asafa Jalata, 109–124. Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press. Levine, Donald. 1974. Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multi-Ethnic Society. Chicago: The University Press of Chicago. Marcus, Harold G. 1994. A History of Ethiopia. Los Angeles: University of California Press. Markakis, John. 1994. “Ethnic Conflict and the State in the Horn of Africa.” In Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa, edited by Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, 217–237. Athens: Ohio University Press. Pakenham, Thomas. 1991. The Scramble for Africa. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson. Seton-Watson, Hugh. 1977. Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism. London: Methuen.


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Iraq Peter Wien Chronology 1914–1918 British troops occupy the three Ottoman provinces of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul. 1920 The San Remo Conference assigns the mandate over Iraq to Great Britain. A countrywide revolt against British occupation forces the mandate power to rethink its position in Iraq. 1921 Under the auspices of Winston Churchill, the Cairo conference decides to create a monarchy in Iraq. Prince Faisal Ibn Hussein becomes first king of Iraq. 1924 A constituent assembly passes the Organic Law as the first constitution of Iraq. 1930 An Anglo-Iraqi treaty prepares the release of Iraq into independence. 1932 Iraq joins the League of Nations and becomes officially independent. 1933 Death of King Faisal. His son Ghazi succeeds him on the throne. 1936 First in a series of military coups, initiating a period of instability and indirect military rule. 1939 Ghazi I dies in a car accident; his minor son is crowned as Faisal II. 1941 A British-Iraqi war breaks out in May after a “Government of National Defense” has ousted the pro-British regime in a further military coup. 1951 Most Iraqi Jews leave the country for Israel. 1958 Iraqi Revolution: the monarchy falls, Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim becomes Iraq’s first dictator. 1963 Colonel Abd al-Salam Arif and the Ba’ath Party remove Qasim in another military coup. 1966 President Arif dies in a helicopter crash; his brother Abd al-Rahman succeeds him as military dictator. 1968 The second Ba’athist coup makes party leader Hasan al-Bakr president, backed by his associate Saddam Hussein. 1973 World oil crisis. Iraq’s oil revenues multiply. 1979 Al-Bakr steps down, giving way to Saddam Hussein. 1980 President Hussein declares war on Iran.

Situating the Nation Iraq is not an obvious nation. It has neither long established nor clear natural boundaries, and it has never had a homogeneous population. Since the foundation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921, its citizens have always referred to different national, ethnic, or religious groups as important, if not crucial, for the formation of their identity. Iraqis could be Sunni Muslims and at the same time either Arab or Kurdish nationalists, or Shiite Muslim clerics with strong ties to the religious establishment of Iran. To different degrees, this phenomenon has dominated the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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formation of Iraqi society since the creation of the Iraqi state in the wake of World War I, and this still holds true today. The geographical core of Iraq is ancient Mesopotamia, the land between the Rivers Tigris and Euphrates. From 749 to 1258, Baghdad was the residence of the Abbasid caliphs. The modern state of Iraq was formed out of three former Ottoman provinces, with Basra as a capital in the south, Baghdad in the center, and Mosul in the north. The provinces were first placed under Ottoman rule in the 16th century but remained a frontier land between the Ottomans and the Iranian Safavid empire. Mesopotamia was of strategic and symbolic importance for both. The rivers were important waterways, and Basra, controlling the access to the Persian Gulf, was an important hub of Indian Ocean trade. Moreover, the country hosts the most important shrines of Shia Islam in the towns of Najaf, Kerbala, and others. The struggle between the Sunni Ottomans and the Shiite Safavids over Mesopotamia lasted until 1639 when the provinces fell finally into Ottoman hands. The complex Ottoman system of central control and local autonomy was bound to eventually give way to local forces. In the 18th century, the Ottoman provinces of Iraq became virtually independent under the rule of local dynasties, but in the early 19th century, the growing threat of European imperialism prompted reform efforts in the Ottoman Empire to strengthen the state apparaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tus. Starting from 1831, the Ottomans made efforts to integrate Iraq into a more centralized state system, but they were only partially successful against local resistance. The elite Ottoman bureaucrats had to enter arrangements with urban notable families and the tribal leaders. Nevertheless, the Ottoman reforms introduced the concept of modern statehood for the first time in Iraq, just like in the other Arab provinces of the empire. Increasing numbers of influential people started to accept a state-centered system of power sharing, not yet a national society but ways of running political and economic affairs within a patronage system overviewed by state authorities. A majority of the population of the three Mesopotamian provinces, however, remained largely untouched by these developments, especially those who lived far from the provincial capitals in the countryside or provincial towns. As a state, Iraq was initially a colonial construct. For Great Britain, Mesopotamia had already been a region of vital interest in the 19th century because it provided a land bridge from the eastern Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean and thus British India, and it was close to the Iranian oilfields. After the Ottoman Empire entered World War I as an ally of Germany in 1914, British troops occupied the three provinces step by step until 1918. After the war, both U.S. president Woodrow Wilson’s plans and the secretly negotiated Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 between Great Britain and France envisaged a partition of the Ottoman Empire into smaller nation-states. The mandate system designed at the Paris Peace Conferences was, however, a means to reconcile colonial interest with the Wilsonian idea of self-determination. Iraq was already under British military rule when Great Britain was assigned the mandate over Iraq. Now it was responsible for preparing the country to become independent, with viable institutions. After a large countrywide revolt in 1920 absorbed a large number of British troops and financial resources until it was suppressed, London decided that indirect rule of the country through a dependent national government should meet a dual interest: to uphold British control of the country to secure vital communication lines, and to fulfill the tasks of a mandate power.

Instituting the Nation The groups that had been involved in the first stage of the state formation under Ottoman rule formed a part of the elite of the newly founded state as well. Even though there was no dynastic tradition in Iraq, in 1921 London put Prince Faisal on the throne of a constitutional monarchy. He was the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca and had been the military leader of the British-sponsored Arab revolt of World War I. London believed that Faisal’s family origin as a descendant of the Prophet would give him authority among the diverse groups of the country. Faisal, however, was aware that he was entirely dependent on British support, and while the urban N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Faisal I (1883–1933) Faisal I was the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca. Faisal was the military commander of the British-sponsored Arab revolt that his father had initiated during World War I. From 1918 to 1920, he headed an Arab government in Syria and was crowned king of the country in 1920. Shortly afterward, a French occupying force ousted him. The British considered their wartime ally a suitable choice for the foundation of a dynasty in the new kingdom of Iraq in 1921. Being an alien to the country, his reign was a continuous struggle for full recognition by its diverse groups. By the time of his early death in 1933, he had become a unifying symbol of the new state, a position that none of his successors could ever achieve. Nevertheless, Faisal’s policy of putting the former officers of his World War I Arab army into influential government positions contributed to the lack of transparency and the clientelism that have shaped Iraqi governments ever since.

notability soon acquiesced to the new state structures, the tribal realm of Iraq did not comply. Despite the constitutional structures imposed on the state, the new government needed British military force to coerce the tribes into obedience. During the first years after the foundation of the state, the majority of the population outside the larger cities remained indifferent if not hostile toward the government. The traditional power elites—tribes, notables, former Ottoman administrative elites—however, chose mostly to acquiesce to the government structures, which were dominated by a foreign king together with a military elite that had no stake in the traditional patronage networks of the country. These so-called Sherifian officers of Iraqi origin had fought under Faisal’s command during the Arab revolt and formed his entourage when he came to Iraq. Consequently, they entered high government posts. Until the end of the 1920s, the old and new elites of the country joined interests as one landholding class. The Organic Law of 1924 gave the overwhelming power to the executive, and in a society that lacked a developed public sphere, elections to the Parliament could be easily manipulated. An abstract institutional power of constitutional structures therefore never emerged. A treaty of independence between Iraq and Great Britain was signed in 1930 and became effective with Iraq’s entry to the League of Nations in 1932. The treaty remained contentious, though, because it maintained a strong British position in the country. The British ambassador remained highly influential, and Britain virtually controlled the Iraqi military and economic development.

Defining the Nation During the 1920s, the new state elite of the Sherifian officers did not deem it contradictory at all to work for the formation of a state according to their Arab nationalist ideals while, at the same time, they created a patronage system. In N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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this system, the elite safeguarded its control over state and state resources by making it easy for those who were influential in the tribal and urban spheres to acquire land. Thus, the Sherifians contributed to the emergence of a landholding class with common interests. This policy, however, prevented the emergence of abstract state power in the form of reliable and functioning institutions. The resulting paradox between constitutionally guaranteed state structures and parallel networks of informal power virtually continued to dominate Iraqi politics until the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. During the 1920s, there was only a very small group of people who actually accepted and identified with the state. Those in power were mostly of Sunni background, and many had gone through military education at Ottoman officer and staff academies, where they took on the panArab nationalist ideas rampant among Arab officers in Istanbul and Baghdad during World War I. Faisal’s comrades, now ministers and high-ranking army functionaries, had turned this inclination into a myth during the Arab revolt. There were other returning soldiers of Iraqi provincial origin who after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had nowhere else to go but home. Many of them were of Kurdish or Turkmen origin and therefore very critical of the pan-Arab tendencies that dominated the upper echelons of the state. Yet, this state needed trained and experienced officers of all kinds because the newly founded army was supposed to be the backbone of the state. The Sherifian idea of the Iraqi military as the “school of the nation” has often been ascribed to the influence of German nationalist philosophy. The growing self-esteem of the Iraqi officer corps as an avant-garde of the Arab nation that had to build a national core in Iraq to become the cradle of the pan-Arab nation-state —a “Prussia of the Arabs”—seems to confirm this view, as do the writings of the Arab nationalist theoretician Sati al-Husri. Husri was the long-term director general for education in Iraq and therefore responsible for the nationalist orientation of the schooling system, which he helped build in the 1920s. He referred to German nationalist thinkers such as Fichte in his works. The fact that the Sherifian officers had been trained by German teachers in Ottoman military academies during their earlier careers arguably exposed them to these lines of thought, too. This line of thought should, however, not be overexaggerated. The nationalist tendencies in the newly founded Iraqi officer corps corresponded equally to the centralized and coercion-oriented ideas that the former Ottoman officers had internalized during their education under the rule of the Turko-Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress in Istanbul. For the officers, the relation of the subject to the state was one of obedience and discipline, with the army as the most formidable institution, state education as a carrier of nationalist ideas, and the youth as the harbinger of a new age. State education had to be Arab nationalist, although the majority of the population (Shiite Arabs, Sunni Kurds) rejected this ideology. The state was thus a chimera during the 1920s and much of the 1930s in confrontation with a tribal majority, a paradox that did not apparently concern the carriers of the state institutions. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nationalist doctrine, however, took deep root among those who adhered to the state and were produced by the new state: the graduates of state schools, universities, and military academies, that is, the new generation that emerged in the late 1920s and early 1930s. When those who belonged to this generation discovered the public sphere of the young state as their domain and became publicists, teachers, and parliamentarians, they pointed out the deficits of the state leadership and started to criticize the oligarchic, authoritarian state structures that served the interests of a few and secured their grip on power and their economic benefits. The opposition of the younger generation found expression in a desire for change in the inherited structures and paradigms, based on the realization that the elders would not give way to their sons. Their desire was first of all to be liberated from the inherited power structures and to create a “modern” society, falling somewhere between individual freedoms and desires and the authoritarian formation of a “strong and determined society.” The nationalist discourse in Iraq of the later 1930s thus took recourse to models of society formation as promoted by Turkey under Atatürk, and sometimes came close to emulating fascist principles of a charismatic leadership that would unite and guide the nation. The nation was strongly identified with the youth, and the idea that a strong nation had to be authoritarian was widespread among politicians and publicists of the time. The mainstream of Iraqi politicians and those who were visible in the public sphere were pan-Arab nationalists. Publicists had close ties with colleagues in neighboring Arab states and published in Egyptian or Syrian newspapers. An alternative strain of national identity became popular among younger urban Iraqis, who were mostly of non-Sunni origin and social-liberal oriented. During the 1930s, this position implied opposition to the dominant Arab nationalist and Sunni narrative of the state and therefore produced an inclination toward “Iraqism,” in the sense of local patriotism as opposed to Arab nationalism. In 1936, this group found support from the popular Iraqi army general Bakr Sidqi, who was of Kurdish origin. He staged the first military coup of Iraqi history, but his government soon fell in 1937 when the Arab nationalist and Sunni-dominated wing of the officer corps removed him in another coup.

Narrating the Nation The 1920 revolt against the British presence in the country turned into the founding myth of the Iraqi nation in the course of time. It was no national effort, however. First, Shiite tribes rose after clerics of the shrine cities Najaf and Karbala called for resistance against the infidels. They were also worried about the prospect that new national boundaries could exacerbate the traffic of pilgrims and financial support that they traditionally received from Iran. Only later did Kurdish N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tribes from the north join the effort, as well as some units led by former Ottoman officers. Baghdad and the core areas of British control remained quiet, in spite of large, peaceful demonstrations in the city that called for Iraqi independence. What had been primarily a Shiite tribal uprising was later reinterpreted in Iraqi nationalist history as the “Great Iraqi Revolt.” The failure of the revolt resulted in the temporary withdrawal of the Shiite clerics from the forefront of politics, but it remained an initiating moment for a relatively small group of Shiite youth who had participated and therefore experienced it as their first opportunity to take part in collective action. Arab nationalist state education turned this group into a core of Shiite supporters of the state, who reached maturity in the 1930s, while the majority of their coreligionists remained outside the national paradigm. During World War II, the Arab nationalist trend in Iraq once more took a different turn. The so-called Rashid Ali Movement of 1941 became a key element of the nationalist narrative of the state in the following decades. Rashid Ali al-Kailani was a member of an old Baghdad notable family and had held key positions in Iraqi politics in the 1920s and 1930s. During the war years, he became the figurehead of a group of nationalists rejecting the continuing British presence in the country. In April 1941, a military coup removed the pro-British regent of Iraq and installed a “Government of National Defense” under Kailani, with a considerable number of extreme nationalists among its members. The government established contacts with Nazi Germany, but in early May, British troops landed in southern Iraq and subdued Iraqi resistance within one month. Hitler had pledged support, but it arrived too late and was insufficient. What happened in 1941 was in fact not a movement but a rather loose federation of political extremists, ambitious officers, and representatives of the old guard of politicians. The time of restoration that followed turned the events into a national myth. The British reinstalled the regent and supported the pro-British politician Nuri al-Said as the strong man of Iraq. Until the demise of the monarchy in 1958, he controlled politics and headed several governments. His pro-British course turned the members of the Kailani group into martyrs of anticolonial resistance. After World War II, a growing trend of urbanization and industrialization, as well as national education, created a broader basis for the integration of a national society. The old nationalists, Iraqi or Arab, were not able to attract a lot of followers. The future seemed to belong to the communist movement and the nascent Ba ’ ath Party. The communists were less internationalist than their support by Moscow would have suggested but, rather, adhered to an Iraqi perspective. The strongly pan-Arab Ba ’ ath was founded in Syria in the 1940s, with a branch in Iraq soon after. The nationalist parties of the 1930s were too attached to the bourgeois and elite state circles to be attractive within the emerging mass society. The Egyptian revolution under Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952 left a deep impression on the officer corps, which was, however, ethnically quite heterogeneous and therefore internally split. The pro-British monarchy came to be seen as the main obstacle to true national independence. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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When the monarchy fell in 1958, the entire pattern of Iraqi politics changed. Like under many other Arab revolutionary regimes, the day of the revolution became a national holiday to be appropriated by all successive rulers, although under different pretexts that mirrored once more the rifts in Iraqi society.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation A wide popular movement supported the revolution, which had been preceded by several instances of public protests. The Iraqi Communist Party had the greatest capacities for mass mobilization. The coup itself, however, was a military putsch under the command of a Free Officers cell, including pan-Arab Nasserites, Ba’ath Party sympathizers, and Iraq-first promoters. Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qasim, the most senior officer of the group, managed to gain the upper hand in a power struggle inside the officer corps and successfully claimed the presidency for himself. For this purpose, he managed to rally the support of the communists. His dictatorial tendencies, together with his anti-Arab nationalist, Iraq-first policy— his father was Sunni Arab and his mother, a Shiite Faili Kurd—alienated important factions among the officers. Consequently, he was removed in another military coup in 1963 and replaced with his former ally, Abd al-Salam Arif. The latter had managed to gain the backing of the Ba ’ ath Party, which had gained a strong foothold among important sections of the Iraqi population through its combined appeal of a moderate socialism and Arab nationalism. This political philosophy, however, could not conceal the Sunni dominance in the party and among its group of supporters in the officer corps. Arif was not willing, though, to share power with a political movement and therefore removed Ba ’ ath representatives from government to establish one more personal rule in Iraq. In fact, the forma-

Abd al-Karim Qasim (1914–1963) Abd al-Karim Qasim, first president of the Iraqi Republic, represents two contradictory trends of Iraqi society in the post–World War II period. He was the senior soldier in a group of conspiring army officers that staged the military coup leading to the 1958 revolution. The “Free Officer” conspiracy of Iraq used the Arab nationalist example of Nasser’s revolution in Egypt in 1952 as a model to organize opposition to the monarchy. A strong faction of the Iraqi “Free Officers,” mainly of Sunni Muslim background, were Nasserites and considered the revolution a pretext to the foundation of a larger Arab nation state. Qasim, however, took on an Iraq-first policy after the revolution and gained the support of the Communist Party. He thus represented a faction in the Iraqi public and the military that considered Arab nationalism a threat to the position of non-Arabs and non-Sunni Muslims in the country. This stance, however, alienated the greater part of the officer corps and led to his downfall and assassination in 1963.


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Sunni-Shiite Divide The Sunni-Shiite divide has always been a determining factor of social and political interaction in Iraq. In the 19th century, the religious differences reflected a divide between urban space and countryside. While not the majority, Sunni Arabs dominated politics in the Ottoman provincial capitals, whereas the majority of the population in the tribally organized countryside was mostly Shiite. After the foundation of the state, a class divide began to supersede the religious one because the urbanization of the rural Shiite population led to the growth of impoverished shanty towns with a strong Shiite component. Sunnis were largely able to profit better from the clientele networks that dominated politics. Nevertheless, the increased importance of state education and the growth of the public sector in the economy after the oil boom in the 1970s led to a leveling of social differences and a better integration of the population.

tion of an integrated society identifying with the state as a forum for shared political activity had not made much progress because the dictatorial nature of the military regimes rested on very personalized networks and closed client circles. Politics remained the affair of a clique. The unwillingness to broaden the basis of politics contradicted Arif ’s public appeal to enter into unity talks with the Arab brother state of Egypt, which served to placate the Nasserite tendencies of Arif ’s supporters in the officer corps. Continuing struggles with the Kurds in northern Iraq reflected the lack of national unity in Iraqi society and weighed heavily on all Iraqi governments from the 1920s until the downfall of Saddam Hussein in 2003. Qasim’s reputation in the armed forces had suffered from his inability to quell Kurdish unrest, and when Abd al-Rahman Arif became Iraqi president after his brother’s death in a helicopter crash in 1966, he was once more confronted with the growing disenchantment of the officer corps due to setbacks in Kurdistan. Kurdish nationalism contradicted the Arab nationalist doctrine of the limited Sunni elite circles. The Arif brothers emphasized Sunni dominance when they mobilized the bonds of clan solidarity to strengthen their networks in the armed forces. While Iraqi Kurds had a clear pattern of identity to adhere to, Iraqi Shiites became an integral part of the new Iraqi mass society that emerged after World War II, albeit in an uneasy position. Nationalist state education emphasized their Arab nature, and urbanization intensified their contacts with Iraqis of other denominations. However, their experience was that sectarian background determined one’s possibilities to participate in the game of clientelism. Activities in the emerging revolutionary parties provided an alternative, especially the Communist Party that was explicitly antisectarian. In the 1950s, Islamic political associations emerged, such as the Daawa Party. Its radical activist approach was popular among young and disillusioned Shiites, while traditional clerics perceived it with suspicion. For similar reasons, the Communist Party was attractive for young Iraqi Jews as well. The origins of the Iraqi Jewish community date back to antiquity, and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Zionism remained weak in the community even until the forced mass exodus that started in the early 1950s. Under the British mandate as well as in the young Iraqi administration, Jews gained influential positions relatively easily due to their superior skills, which they had gained through modern education at reformed denominational schools that first opened in the 1860s. The state therefore seemed a favorable institution, and many middle-class Jews developed a strong sense of Iraqi patriotism. With the growing strength of Arab nationalist trends among the young non-Jewish intelligentsia, Iraqi Jews became more and more a target of hostility, however. The outbreak of the anti-British and antiZionist revolt in Palestine in 1936 reverberated in nationalist circles of Iraq. They distinguished less and less between Zionists in Palestine and Iraqi Jews. The climax of this growing hostility was a pogrom, the so-called “Farhud,” in Baghdad in early June 1941, immediately after the British-Iraqi war. Approximately 150 Jews of the poorer quarters of the city fell victim to a mob of looters and soldiers as well as roaming youth bands that took advantage of the power vacuum after the Iraqi defeat. Nevertheless, when the Iraqi Jews were finally forced to leave Iraq in large numbers in 1951, most of them were still strongly attached to Iraq, and only a few left out of a Zionist commitment. Until the 1960s, identification with the state and a national society in Iraq remained limited due to continuing sectarian differences and the elitist nature of the Iraqi political system. In spite of the fact that the coups of 1958 and 1963 had been backed by more or less popular movements such as the Communist Party and the Ba ’ ath Party, the shifts in government had only served to modify existing clientele networks and redirect patronage loyalties. Even though the Ba ’ ath Party, assuming power under Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein after a further coup in 1968, followed essentially the same patterns, the 1970s brought drastic changes. The oil crisis of 1973 and the dramatic rise of oil prices multiplied state revenues within a few months. All of a sudden, the rulers could extend the patronage system to an unprecedented extent. This resulted in a huge expansion in the public sector. State education and the growth of towns due to expanded employment opportunities brought people closer together and made them identify more with the state, regardless of its authoritarian nature. Eight years of war against Iran from 1980 to 1988 under the presidency of Saddam Hussein added to the shared experiences of the different religious groups of the country. Even though Iraq was fighting a Shia country, there were only insignificant numbers of defectors among Iraqi Shiites. But the war also triggered the darkest episode in the history of the Iraqi Kurdish community. In 1988, Saddam Hussein’s war machinery turned against Kurdish villages in the north and took revenge for Kurdish collaboration with Iran. The use of poisonous gas against the town of Halabja will long be a symbol of unbridgeable hostility between Iraqi Kurds and the state. After the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi state largely ceased to exist. Northern Iraq became virtually autonomous, and the UN sanctions made normal conduct in administration and economy impossible. Power remained inside the circles around N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Saddam Hussein and turned more and more into a regime of organized crime dominated by the president’s family. Hussein used real or revived tribal structures to control the Iraqi population and uphold his patronage system, which turned into an even more effective means of control in a time of dire shortage. The 1970s middle class of civil servants and employees in the large public sector lost its economic basis. Yet, even after the U.S. occupation of the second Gulf War, it still made up a large part of the population as a group that no longer defined its identity through religious or ethnic adherence only, but through Iraqi nationality. The fact that, beside the old Ba ’ athist networks, diverse opposition groups of Shiite and Sunni Islamist nature have gained decisive power in state and society since 2003 suggests, however, that identities and contradictions are forcibly being imposed again on the population in a civil war situation, even after ethnic and sectarian rifts had been considered overcome. From the outset, the precarious nature of the Iraqi state made it difficult for rulers and elites to form a single national narrative that would enter school curricula and textbooks. Politics determined how tradition had to be invented and the community to be imagined. While Hashemite rule over Iraq favored a clear panArab orientation due to the imposed nature of the dynasty, postrevolutionary regimes put emphasis on an Iraqi national identity linked back to the Mesopotamian heritage, because pan-Arab nationalism had been challenged as the exclusive basis of political designs. The fact that Baghdad had been the center of Islamic culture before the Mongol conquest in 1258 remained very important for the self-perception of the modern Iraqi state. When Muslim armies first conquered Mesopotamia, an important battle took place near Qadisiyya in 636, close to today’s Kufa, which resulted in the defeat and submission of the Persian empire. Arab nationalists referred to the battle in the early 1940s as an example of the spirit of manhood in Arab Muslim warriors to provide a model for the youth of the state. During the war against Iran in the 1980s, Saddam Hussein took up this topos again. In 1986, he commissioned two huge Qadisiyya triumphant arches to be erected in Baghdad. They each consist of two forearms with crossing swords in their hands. Thus, the struggle between Iraq and Iran was symbolically presented as the continuation of an ancient confrontation between the Arabs and the Persians. Only from the 1930s onward did Iraqi political circles start to develop a sense for the usefulness of the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian past to construct a national identity, a trend that reached its climax under Ba ’ ath Party rule. It remained a problem, though, to reconcile the Arab nationalist claim of Ba ’ ath ideology with the Iraqi past of great civilizations, including non-Semitic ones such as the Sumerians. Iraqi academics argued that all Mesopotamian civilizations together were in fact forefathers of the Arabs, a somewhat distorted version of the Semitic Wave theory, which lacked credibility. The emphasis on the Iraqiness of all ancient civilizations contradicted the Arabness of modern Iraqis (the rebellious Kurds aside) that went without question. A possible bridge between the two poles was to refer N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Ceremonial Arches, in the form of hands holding swords, stand at either end of the Baghdad Parade Grounds. This site was built to honor Iraq’s victory over Iran in the eight-year war. The hands are said to be molded after Saddam Hussein’s forearms. (U.S. Department of Defense)

to a shared Iraqi civilization rather than to a blood link among the different peoples that represented it. The linkage between modern Iraq and ancient Mesopotamia made it possible to create a continuity from such ancient rulers as Hammurabi and Nebuchadnezzar to the leadership cult of Saddam Hussein. Moreover, the claim that in ancient times the peoples of Iraq had been in a position of world leadership justified Iraq’s claim to a leading role in the Arab world. The Babylonian exile of the ancient Israelites was portrayed as an example of Iraq’s responsibility to defend Arab Palestine. Iraqi uniqueness in the framework of the Arab world had to brace all Iraqis, a primordial cultural unity preceding the split between Sunna and Shia after the rise of Islam. This latter claim became increasingly important after the Shiite Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979 that could potentially weaken Saddam Hussein’s authority in Iraq. The above reference to the battle of Qadisiyya is a proof for the wide array of stories that had to be blended into one single national narrative. During the 1991 Gulf War, Saddam Hussein started to refer to Islamic images of holy war and destiny as propagandistic means of mobilization, too. In spite of all, this discourse remained only a component of state propaganda. Even though it entered school and university curricula, it is hard to say to what extent it appeared legitimate enough to become an integral part of individual N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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identities among the vast majority of Iraqi citizens living under a dictatorial regime with totalitarian aspirations. By the time the regime fell apart in 2003, the hardships of the post-1991 period had probably jeopardized much of the efforts toward state-society integration of the 1970s and 1980s. Selected Bibliography Baram, Amatzia. 1994. “A Case of Imported Identity: The Modernizing Secular Ruling Elites of Iraq and the Concept of Mesopotamian-Inspired Territorial Nationalism, 1922–1992.” Poetics Today 15, no. 2: 279–319. Batatu, Hanna. 1978. The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba ’ thists, and Free Officers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cleveland, William L. 1971. The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sati’ al-Husri. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Davis, Eric. 2005. Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dodge, Toby. 2003. Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation-Building and a History Denied. London: Hurst. Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett. 2001. Iraq since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship. London, New York: I. B. Tauris. Haj, Samira. 1997. The Making of Iraq, 1900–1963: Capital, Power and Ideology. Albany: SUNY Press. Luizard, Pierre-Jean. 1991. La formation de l’Irak contemporain: Le rôle politique des ulémas chiites à la fin de la domination ottomane et au moment de la construction de l’Etat irakien. Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique. Nakash, Yitzhak. 1994. The Shi’is of Iraq. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Simon, Reeva S. 2004. Iraq between the Two World Wars: The Militarist Origins of Tyranny. New York: Columbia University Press. Sluglett, Peter. 2007. Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country, 1914–1932. New York: Columbia University Press. Tarbush, Mohammad A. 1982. The Role of the Military in Politics. A Case Study of Iraq to 1941. London: Kegan Paul. Tripp, Charles. 2007. A History of Iraq. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wien, Peter. 2006. Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932–1941. London, New York: Routledge.


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Turkey Kyle T. Evered Chronology 1839–1871 1877–1878 1914–1918 1915 1916 1918–1923 1919 1919–1923 1920 1922 1923 1924 1927 1928 1933 1934 1938 1952

Ottoman Empire’s Tanzimat reform era. Russo-Turkish War results in an Ottoman defeat. World War I. Battle of Gallipoli. Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France. British and Triple Entente occupations of Istanbul. Amasya Agreement; Erzurum Congress; Sivas Congress. Turkish War of Independence. National Pact declared; Grand National Assembly formed in Ankara; Treaty of Sèvres. Sultanate is abolished. Treaty of Lausanne. Also, a recently re-seated assembly proclaims a new Turkish Republic and declares Atatürk as its president and I˙nönü as its prime minister. The caliphate is abolished. Atatürk delivers his famous 36-hour “Speech” (or Nutuk) to a Republican Peoples Party congress. Introduction of a new Turkish alphabet. Universal suffrage is declared. Turkish assembly confers surname/title “Atatürk” (or “father of the Turks”) upon Mustafa Kemal. Death of Atatürk. Turkey joins NATO.

Situating the Nation Today linked inextricably to the modern Republic of Turkey, variations of Turkish nationalism actually arose in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire (1290s–1922). This political precursor to the Turkish nation-state was not, however, an entity that could be defined essentially as just “Turkish.” Though led primarily by a ruling Ottoman Turkish dynasty, the Ottoman state was a vast land-based empire that was notable for a populace of diverse ethnicities, languages, and religions. It was also an Islamic state that had claimed control of the caliphate since as early as the 15th century. As an institution, the caliphate originated in the seventh century following the death of the Prophet Muhammad (ca. 570–632). It was the only institution in history that authorized a unified religious and political leadership over the Islamic world, as recognized at least by most Sunni Muslims, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA: TURKEY

and it thus became a major prize for empires of the Middle East to control since the time of the Umayyad dynasty in the later seventh century. For the Ottomans, reliance on the authority and symbolisms of the sultanate and the caliphate were not the only means to rule an empire that included many non-Turks and non-Muslims. Practical governance of this pluralistic society functioned through the establishment of the millet system. Initially, a millet was defined roughly as a religious community, but concepts of ethnicity became integrated over time, as well. This system implied a centralized, imperial order within which local communities existed in a semi-autonomous state that both allowed them to express their own religious, cultural, and linguistic identities at a local scale and empowered them to manage related institutions (especially for religion and education). In this manner, the millet system was a safeguard against the empire’s potentially disruptive heterogeneity; rather than immediately assuming that unfavorable policies resulted from ethnic or religious discrimination, individuals were limited to making less politically volatile assumptions focused on their own communities, its leaders, and its representatives and liaisons in the imperial system. In depicting periods prior to the late Ottoman era, many historians have represented the millet system as a successful means of governing an extremely diverse society. Already in a sustained period of decline since the 17th-century economic crisis, the Ottoman Empire of the 19th century experienced serious challenges to its legitimacy and its very existence. Problems faced by the Sublime Porte (i.e., the Ottoman state) included the particularization of ethnic and religious groups into nationalisms that would seek total autonomy, competition with other global empires (such as the expanding Russian empire), economic and technological marginalization, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Identifying many of these problems as stemming from failures to modernize, the Ottomans initiated the Tanzimat reforms in 1839. The reform era that followed (1839–1871) witnessed an emphasis on modernizing—and further centralizing and empowering—the empire’s bureaucratic institutions and the ways that state and society were managed. It was also a period marked by state efforts to enhance loyalty to the troubled empire by moving beyond requiring simply allegiance from its subjects and millets to actually promoting identification with the empire. This state-fostered identity construct known as “Ottomanism” thus evolved in a context of reform that was both inspired by connections—and competition—with Europe, on the one hand, and devised to prevent internal ethno-nationalist fragmentation by substituting an imperial identity, on the other. In dealing specifically with its Muslim populace, the empire also emphasized “Islamism” as an identity subject to the Ottomanheld caliphate. Lacking anything approaching a robust economy, many of the ambitious Tanzimat reforms were instituted piecemeal and partially, at best. Moreover, Ottomanism, interpreted by many non-Turkish citizens as an assertion of Turkish identity over other ethnic identities, often contributed more to ethno-national development among the empire’s ethnic minorities, and Islamism N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was viewed both as divisive by many non-Muslims and as illegitimate by many Arab Muslims who had long doubted the appropriateness of a non-Arab caliphate ruling over the umma (the collective Islamic community). This era also gave rise to the Young Ottomans, a disparate group of intellectuals who were comprised mostly of educated sons of the elite and lesser officials. Media savvy, they were the first in Turkey to employ a press for their own ends. Though their interests were diverse, they generally regarded the Tanzimat reforms as hollow approximations of European ideals that were applied autocratically and were essentially disloyal to Ottoman traditions and Islamic sensibilities. Advocating an alternative Ottomanism that was not just articulated from above, they were staunch critics of the state, committed to promoting alternative paths of modernization that would be true to their Ottoman heritage, to Islam, and to their desire to learn from Europe without being subordinate to it politically, culturally, or intellectually. Historically, the most prominent from this loose grouping of early nationalists was Namik Kemal. His contemporaries likely appreciated his powerful emphasis on the supreme importance of vatan (“fatherland”), a concern due to the ongoing territorial dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Having already lost much of what would become Greece in the preceding decades, the Ottoman state was confronted throughout the 19th century both by other global empires and by rebellious ethno-nationalisms and religious groups. The most notable of these international conflicts was the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, which resulted in large losses of lives on both sides. Russia’s immediate geopolitical gains from the war were largely reversed later by other European powers at the 1878 Congress of Berlin, while the Ottoman Empire lost most of its territories in the Balkans and a great deal of prestige and legitimacy. Additional events that would contribute to the eventual decline and collapse of the empire included the following: Austria

Namik Kemal (1840–1888) Namik Kemal was among the first foundational figures contributing to an emergent Turkish national identity. He was a writer of plays, poems, and prose, a newspaper columnist, and a publisher. Heavily associated with—directly or otherwise through the influence of his words—the Young Ottomans and later the Young Turks, he was also distinguished from many as he never sought to thoroughly renounce Islam, even being associated especially with Sufism in his later years. As such, he is sometimes identified as an early model thinker for representing the compatibility between maintaining the Islamic faith alongside secular politics, as well as for advancing the ideas and agendas of a nascent Turkish nationalism. He is most credited with embedding the territorial idea of vatan in the collective Turkish nationalist consciousness. His early 1870s dramatic play Vatan yahnut Sillistre is associated most often with Kemal’s popularization of this term and the sentiments of territoriality.


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seizing Bosnia-Herzegovina; a French occupation of Tunisia; a British occupation of Egypt; Bulgaria’s annexation of East Rumelia; the rise of Armenian nationalism amid Russian intervention; the Greco-Turkish War; and the Macedonian question. Prior to—and especially after—such conflicts, the Ottoman Empire was regarded by Western powers as the so-called “Sick Man of Europe.” Such losses also contributed to the further actualization of Turkish national identification. The outcome of both the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the other losses that preceded it, plus the ascension of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1842–1918, reigned 1876–1909) to the throne, marked the end to the brief five-year period of constitutional experimentation, when the Young Ottomans exercised varying degrees of influence over Ottoman policies. In the subsequent decades, Abdülhamid II reverted to autocratic rule, although he sought to realize many of the reformist promises of the Tanzimat, applying his own versions of Ottomanism among the empire’s citizenry and Islamism among its Muslims. Accordingly, education became an important state tool in promoting these ideals—though fiscal limitations often inhibited opening and expanding schools. Schooling was also a sphere of foreign penetration, with other empires and Christian missionaries opening schools throughout the empire— especially in territories of ethnic and religious minorities. As a leader, Abdülhamid II was not at all averse to employing severe—even violent—repression to perceived resistance, as was particularly true in policies toward the empire’s increasingly nationalistic and pro-Russian Armenian minority. In reaction to Abdülhamid II’s rule, as well as from a desire to revive the constitutionalism that was considered briefly in the Young Ottoman period prior to his ascension, the so-called Young Turks (also known as the Committee of Union and Progress, or CUP, and by similar names) articulated many alternative expressions of Ottomanism. As with manifestations of Ottomanism that were voiced by the Young Ottomans, the visions of Ottomanism expressed by the Young Turks expressed evocatively and appreciably a nascent Turkish nationalism. Almost without exception, historians of this period have depicted the rise of the Young Turks as influenced—at least partly—by liberal ideologies in the West, as were many Young Ottomans. With respect to Islamism, some were quite devoted to its adoption and application, others were less enthusiastic, and some were even opposed to its emphasis. Many also manipulated ethnic and religious differences within Ottoman society to acquire support against Abdülhamid II—sometimes creating enduring intergroup animosities. Others attempted to define variously distinct Turkish nationalisms; some expressions had profoundly racial overtones, others were based more on ethnicity, and others integrated both approaches in defining “Turkish-ness.” Additionally, some Young Turks’ views went far beyond the realms of the Ottoman Empire and promoted pan-Turkism—seeking to unify all Turkic peoples from eastern Europe to eastern Turkestan (today, China’s Xinjiang province). Thus, while notions of an Ottoman or Turkish territory might have been a growing N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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concern, specific expressions of its location ranged from the European and Anatolian territories of the modern Turkish nation-state to the various territories claimed by the Ottoman Empire throughout its long histories, and even to the central southern core of Eurasia. Given such variabilities, it is difficult to make appropriate generalizations about the Young Turks collectively. Indeed, it would be more appropriate to distinguish between the political program followed by those who would later rise to power, on the one hand, and the individual works of this broad movement’s main luminaries, on the other. In sum, their profound diversity has sometimes been overshadowed by their unity of opposition to Abdülhamid II and their stated desires to restore a constitutional system. Disenchantment in the empire with Abdülhamid II and his tight control of the state was widespread. In 1908, a Young Turk leadership asserted control by gaining the support of troops stationed in Macedonia. They reinstated the 1876, pre-Abdülhamid II constitution and marched toward Istanbul. Despite a counterrevolution led by Abdülhamid II in April 1909, the Young Turks established themselves, deposed Abdülhamid II, and set up a constitutional monarchy that they led. The sultanate, under Mehmed V (1844–1918, reigned 1909–1918), would be little more than a figurehead for the state throughout the remainder of the empire’s history. Focused on acquiring internal control, the Young Turks made the Ottoman state extremely vulnerable to external powers—even promoting cooperation among them (especially Britain and France). In recalling the territorial losses and insecurity that the empire endured during the previous century, this focus was both foolhardy and dangerous. This characterization was especially true of the Ottoman Empire’s involvement in World War I. Seeking to alleviate their most immediate concerns over Ottoman territories with the British and the French and reflecting the sympathies of many with the plight of Turkic Muslims in the Russian empire, the Young Turk political leadership entered eagerly into an alliance with Germany. The overzealous application of their political leadership’s policies within the empire was also counterproductive. Despite the hardships that instability and friction with external powers caused, the Young Turks attempted to achieve internal control by any means possible. When not preoccupied with foreign challenges along their borders, the Young Turks attempted to quell any dissension within them. For instance, shortly before Erzurum was captured by Russia in 1916, many Armenians were massacred or died amid deportations from Eastern Anatolia, making the massacres of Armenians under Abdülhamid II seem little more than a prelude in scale. Despite the deaths of many Turks in the interethnic violence that ensued, Armenian claims of “genocide” persist to the present day and still frustrate the Turkish nation-state internationally in its conduct of foreign affairs and domestically as various parties seek to address the matter publicly. Though the Ottoman Empire’s demise is often associated with World War I in prosaic general histories, this banal view only accounts for the last scenes of a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mehmet Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924) Ziya Gökalp, as he is more commonly known, is widely regarded as the most significant voice of an emergent Turkish nation prior to the rise of Atatürk. Born in Diyarbakir—most likely of Kurdish ancestry—educated in veterinary science in Istanbul, and a self-taught philosopher and sociologist, he was influenced strongly by the works of Durkheim and other European notables. Advocating a centralized system of education, he viewed it as a chief vehicle for integrating Western ideas with Turkish national culture, and both with Islam. He held only minor political offices during the Young Turk era and served in the new republic’s assembly for only a short time until his death. Gökalp’s major accomplishment was the construction of an ideological foundation that facilitated both the transition from the Young Turks’ version of the Ottoman state to the modern Turkish republic and the creation of a national image that functioned as the theoretical counterpart to what would be Atatürk’s national policies.

rather long drama involving many internal dynamics. The internal histories of identity construction—not only of Ottomanism, Islamism, pan-Turkism, and Turkish nationalisms but also of many ethnic and religious minorities’ nationalisms— and of conflicting views of governance and the proper paths to modernization were at least as decisive in bringing about the empire’s eventual collapse. In both the histories of the final days of the empire and of the republic that would follow, the works of writers and philosophers from the Young Ottoman era, like Namik Kemal, and from the Young Turk era, like Mehmet Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, would prove decisive in articulating the lexicon and imageries that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938) would draw upon in defining the Turkish nation-state.

Instituting the Nation While debates over the eventual division of Ottoman territories—and especially the Bosporus—had been ongoing among European powers for almost a century, the eventual demise of the so-called “Sick Man of Europe” was especially a matter of concern amid the hostilities of World War I. Britain and France’s attempt to gain a foothold in Anatolia that could be used as a base for a push toward Istanbul and the Bosporus—the prolonged Battle of Gallipoli that took place throughout much of 1915—was thoroughly unsuccessful. This battle did, however, enable the meteoric rise of a mid-level officer named Mustafa Kemal. Later known as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, he distinguished himself as one of the heroes of the fatherland in leading troops against this considerable invasion force. In the following year, the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 formally divided the Ottoman lands. The plan effectively carved up not only much of the remaining Arab lands of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Ottoman Empire between Britain and France, it also partitioned considerable lands in what would emerge—despite this plan—as the modern Turkish republic. Earlier agreements also made territorial offerings within Anatolia to Italy and even offered the Bosphorus and Istanbul to Russia. With the Ottoman defeat in World War I, Sultan Mehmed VI (1861–1926, reigned 1918–1922) was briefly in a position of symbolic leadership over what remained of the empire, while the British and then the Triple Entente began an occupation of Istanbul that would last from 1918 to 1923. At this time, the sultan had the remaining members of the top CUP/Young Turk leadership arrested— some had already fled—and they were then convicted of various crimes, several of them in absentia. In May 1919, Atatürk and others began the Turkish War of Independence—recognizing the failed Ottoman state for the European puppet state it was beginning to become. The presence of foreign forces in Istanbul and Anatolia helped Atatürk acquire support with the call to arms that came in the form of the June 1919 Amasya Agreement. This movement for an independent nation-state was further galvanized by the subsequent 1919 congresses held in both Erzurum and Sivas. At these congresses, among many other issues, the territorial shape of an eventual Turkish nation-state was envisioned. This idealized Turkish national homeland was officially declared in January 1920 the Misak-ı Millî (National Pact). The operative capital for this new homeland was designated N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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in the small, central Anatolian city of Ankara in April 1920 when a national assembly was established there. The earlier proposed Sykes-Picot partition would seem minor, however, in contrast with the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres and its division of Anatolia. Though accepted by the marginalized Ottoman sultanate, this treaty was rejected by—and also contributed to further support for—Atatürk’s alternative government, which also abolished the sultanate in November 1922. Atatürk’s rejection of the Treaty of Sèvres and his leadership during the ongoing Turkish War of Independence forced an eventual replacement of the original treaty with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. This agreement roughly fixed international recognition of the boundaries largely associated with the modern Turkish republic. In October 1923, already possessing a state structure from the War of Independence, the new state’s assembly proclaimed the new Republic of Turkey, appointed Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as its new president, and declared that the military leader—and Atatürk’s key representative at the Lausanne peace talks— ˙Ismet ˙Inönü (1884–1973) would be prime minister. Upon this history of national struggle, the nation-state of Turkey would be established—as would a vision of its membership and the singular national narrative that was directed largely by Atatürk. In this manner, Kemalism—named for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—became the singular definition of Turkish nationalism, the ideological basis of the nationstate, and the doctrine of the republic. In this context, too, we see why Mustafa Kemal would later acquire “Atatürk” (or “father of the Turks”) as his surname/title from a 1934 act of Turkey’s assembly.

Defining the Nation As noted above, there was a rich and diverse tradition of defining “Turkish-ness” —and, recalling pan-Turkism, even “Turkic-ness”—since as early as the Tanzimat era (if we include early, state-led Ottomanism) and the Young Ottomans. The new republic under Atatürk’s leadership sought to define itself as a modern nationstate, and it thus circumscribed a Turkish nationalism that purged notions of Ottomanism and Islamism. Alternative Anatolian identities, such as those of the Armenians, Greeks, Kurds, Laz, and others, were also not included in visions of the new nation’s membership. While some of these groups had been previously expelled—or would be shortly amid population exchanges with Greece, for example—others were expected to assimilate ethnically and linguistically. In this sense, the vision of a Turkish nation that was being employed was one of an elective identity; through education and personal choice, people could become Turkish. Indeed, racial views of identity—especially when they were associated with pan-Turkish ideals and agendas—were characterized as fundamentally racist and even fascist, and advocates of such perspectives were later targets of proseN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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cution in the Anatolian republic. While this view of a national identity was fine for everyone who was inclined to comply with it, it created particular problems for those who were not. Indeed, Atatürk’s euphemistic characterization of Kurds as simply “mountain Turks” reflected not only intolerance for alternative inclinations of ethnic identification (not to mention either ignorance or ambivalence toward a people who are Irani, and not Turkic) but also a pejorative view of alternative ethnic identities within the republic as primitive and ignorant. Given such perspectives, it is also understandable why the relatively poor republic that emerged from the Ottoman state’s collapse and World War I pursued policies of nation-building and education with such rigor. Meanwhile, Kurdish identity and political agendas were suppressed by the state, thus beginning the basis for the Kurdish question—and the associated problem of insurgency—that persists to this day in southeastern Anatolia. The geographic definition of the Turkish nation also remained consistent with the vision articulated in the so-called National Pact of 1920, though with some exceptions; the former Ottoman vilayet (or province) of Mosul was relinquished to the British as part of Mandate Iraq, and there were some other less significant changes as well. This geopolitical organization of the state was viewed as critical to the Turkish state in a number of ways. Initially, with the exception of claims by Kurds and other minority ethnic groups and by Armenians and Greeks who had been expelled or were being “exchanged,” it was not a territory that could be viewed as particularly threatening to others or as irredentist. Indeed, it is often noted in Turkish national histories that Atatürk sought to safeguard Turkey by avoiding such territorial ambitions and opportunities, as in the case of his reported rejection of Azerbaijani invitations for him to annex Azerbaijan so that it would be under fellow Turkic peoples and not under Russo-Soviet control. Later, this geographic decisiveness created what many Turks viewed as an ideal Anatolian core upon which the national narrative could be established. The matter of religion was also a great concern. While Turkey is often characterized as supporting “secularism,” some scholars of the early republic prefer to describe it as endorsing “laicism.” As a concept, laicism was borrowed from constitutional developments in 19th-century France and had little to do with thoroughly suppressing any particular religion. Rather, it was a more explicit statement affirming that the state would not support—or even simply favor—any particular religion. The removal of Islam from the political sphere began at least as early as Atatürk’s 1924 abolishment of the caliphate and the abolishment of Islamic courts, and it continued politically with the 1937 incorporation of “secularism” in the republic’s constitution and with related social reforms, such as the prohibition of veiling or covering by women and girls who worked for the state or attended its schools. Still, characterizations of the Turkish republic as “secular” or “laicist” are overstatements. Indeed, though Atatürk tried to keep the politicization of Islam and the Islamicization of politics in check, the state also neither aspired to eliminate religion entirely nor entrust it to nonstate entities. In keeping with the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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corporatist Kemalist state, religion was to be managed by state institutions that would control theological education, staffing of clergy, mosques and other infrastructure, and so forth. This arrangement would endure until changes in the administration of religion in Turkey came about due to manifestations of political Islam that emerged over the past two decades. As with state repression of political expressions of ethno-linguistic identities, suppression of religion and dealing with its resurgence became an enduring challenge for the state. In addition to ethno-linguistic, geographic, and religious aspects of national identity, defining the Turkish nation and the Kemalist state in a way that was inclusive for women was also a major concern. Though Atatürk made women’s rights and opportunities a priority, the issue was not entirely new. During the later period of imperial decline, the roles of women both in the family and within a wider society were topics that were commonly discussed by supporters of the Ottoman state and by its array of critics, alike. Thus, even prior to the creation of a secular Turkish republic, symbolisms of the place of women in Ottoman society constituted powerful discursive weapons in struggles against both tradition and conservative Islam. For Ziya Gökalp, the woman was employed symbolically in consonance with imagery from idyllic Turkic communities of ages past. In such contexts, women and men were idealized as having equal rights and privileges in both the home and society. Therefore, notions of parity between the sexes were quite integral in the fusions of Turkic mythologies and political ideals that would emerge in most manifestations of Turkish nationalism. Among the key proponents of women’s roles in the emergent Turkish nation and nation-state was the prominent woman writer Halide Edib Adivar (1884–1964). In 1933, universal suffrage was declared in Turkey—ahead of similar declarations in some Western states.

Narrating the Nation While an abundance of “Turkish” literature—novels, short stories, plays, songs, poetry, histories, essays, and so forth—emerged after the time of the Young Ottomans by writers such as Namik Kemal, Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura, and Halide Edib Adivar, among others, perhaps the most profound statement of the new nation-state was written on the Anatolian landscape rather than on paper. The designation of Ankara as the nation’s capital was a profound statement about what the Turkish nation was—or at least what it should be—and what it was not. Rejecting Istanbul, the centuries-long seat of both the Ottoman sultanate and the caliphate, Ankara would remain the center of the new Anatolian and secularist Turkish nation-state. As with many forward capitals, the planning for Ankara was ambitious and involved an international competition to select the ideal design for the modernist republic. Incorporating the usual state buildings and monuments— ones that were grandiose in scale and ultramodern and masculine in style—the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935) Of both Volga and Crimean Tatar heritage, Akçura was one of the few figures associated with the Young Turk movement who was not only influenced by European thought but who actually studied for a number of years in France. A prodigious writer, his pan-Turkish influence on the Young Turks is often explained by his parentage, his sustained connections with and sympathies for the Tatars of Kazan, and family connections to the distinguished Tatar Jadidist Ismail Bey Gaspirali. With the emergence of the Turkish state, he was a member of the Turkish assembly, but was perhaps most noted for being tapped by Atatürk to head the republic’s historical society—what would emerge to be the Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Foundation).

chosen plans also included significant green spaces and elements like an urban farm for research. Such designs revealed how the Kemalist state intended to instruct its citizenry on how their lives should be lived, not only in work but in recreation, and how the state intended to reach out and modernize what was still an essentially agrarian, rural society. The selection of Ankara was also telling about how the nation would define its membership. Abandoning the cosmopolitan, world city of Istanbul, Ankara was reinvented as a quintessentially Anatolian hearth for an Anatolian Turkish nation. The ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity of Ottoman society was thus rejected, as was any identification with ambitions beyond the borders roughly identified by the National Pact of 1920—with some subsequent modifications. The seat of the new nation-state thus spoke to its intentions of neutrality—as would be demonstrated in the subsequent World War II era—and its introspective orientation. Indeed, rather than looking to other Turkic societies to define the nation, the Kemalist state incorporated pre-Turkic symbols of Anatolia—such as those of the Hittites and other early Anatolian-based civilizations. As a matter of state historiography, the Ottoman past was thus relegated to a far lesser status than the evolving histories of the republic would be. While Ankara as a tableau for the presentation of this idealized Anatolian Turkish state was a sound choice, the presentation’s mythic appropriations of past civilizations and its exclusions of contemporary identities still present in Anatolia (like those of the Kurds, Laz, remaining Armenians and Greeks, Alevis, and other ethnic and religious constituencies) would create profound obstacles for future generations. Though such excluded ethno-linguistic and religious “others” would confront the state in later years of the republic, other types of alternative narratives did emerge in the early period. In such cases, too, the urban landscape provides us with an ideal view of such discordant narrations of the nation. Although the Kemalist state was ambitious, populist, and corporatist—not only out of a desire to control but also out of sincere convictions of inclusivity in the program of modernization—its resources were seriously limited. This became immediately N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Major intersection in Ankara with the city’s former Hittite-derived symbol prominently displayed. Since the rise of Islamism in contemporary Turkey, this symbol was replaced by a symbol incorporating a mosque. (Courtesy of Kyle T. Evered)

apparent in the dynamics of rural-to-urban population shifts. Despite its remarkable planning, Ankara—and other large cities—simply could not foresee or effectively absorb the numbers of people arriving from the countryside. Thus, encircling and interspersed with the ornately planned landscape of the capital emerged gecekondu (Turkish squatter settlements) that would endure in various forms up to the present day. These neighborhoods of the disenfranchised in the capital and in other key cities would form the basis of a sort of Islamic populism that would manifest itself in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In addition to the populism and corporatism that the state employed—and its written and unwritten policies of inclusion/exclusion, as indicated above—the Kemalist state also found particular nation-building institutions to be of paramount importance. Beyond just a centralized system of education that largely excluded private schools and universities—at least until recent decades—the state would also craft a distinct notion of “Turkishness.” This goal would depend upon controlling language, history, and notions of tradition, among other things. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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At the time of the empire’s collapse, the common written language was Ottoman Turkish. It was a hybrid of Turkish, Arabic, and Persian and was written in variations of the Arabic script. For the vast majority of peoples in Anatolia, this language was not only inaccessible on account of their mass rates of illiteracy, but much of its vocabulary was also foreign. To foster nation-building projects, one of the immediate priorities involved both standardizing a Turkish language and the promotion of literacy. In 1928, Turkey adopted a modern Turkish alphabet—a move that also implied severing connections with its Ottoman and Islamic past and more closely approximating a European/Western future. In 1932, Turkey established what would eventually become the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Foundation). Initially guided by the so-called “Sun-Language Theory,” language reforms began that would endure and continue long beyond the immediate interests generated by this bizarre view on the Turkish language and its derivation. In scope, the reforms generally entailed the replacement of Arabic and Persian words with Turkish words and/or neologisms. Words that were unique inventions for this particular Anatolian Turkish replaced words common throughout most Turkic languages. Geoffrey Lewis’s book, The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success, provides a wonderful account of how the actions and results of the project far exceeded the original expectations of its mandate. As indicated in the previous section, the formative Kemalist state sought to further solidify the legitimacy of the republic in the minds of its citizens—while sharply differentiating itself from its not-so-distant Ottoman and Islamic pasts. It thus created and fostered its own academic institutions that were devoted to the history of the Turkish nation. In this exercise, an unlikely mixing of the Anatolianbound Kemalism with a revamped pan-Turanian notion of ethno-genesis could be witnessed. As it became institutionalized, however, it was entirely apparent that the alluring pan-Turanian myths of Turkic origins would only be employed to the extent that they would reify the exclusively Anatolian imagery of the Turkish nation-state. While appeasing some citizens’ fantasies of the pan-Turanian, they would refocus attention back toward Anatolia. In short, a co-optation of Turkists was sought through the deployment of mythic histories of the nation. Yusuf Akçura was appointed to lead this movement and establish what would become the Türk Tarih Kurumu (Turkish Historical Foundation). At its 1932 gathering— and with the enthusiastic support of Atatürk—the so-called “Turkish historical thesis” was advanced as the singular paradigm of the nation’s history. Blending aspects of the mythic, the historic, and the fantastic, this thesis purported that the origins of all Turkic peoples could be traced to central Asia. The “Turkish historical thesis” was based on notions concerning the Turkic cultural hearth in central Asia, from which Turkic peoples diffused in successive waves outward to Europe, the Middle East, east Asia, and even to the Americas. According to this thesis, the civilizations that would later emerge were all culturally and biologically derivative, at least in part, of an early Turkic people of one ethnic type or another. This insinuation of a Turkic contribution to, or at least a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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presence within, the major civilizations of the world was an idea that was not promoted outside Turkey, but it was further developed and taught from early childhood on within the republic. The Anatolian Turkish nationalism of the Kemalist period thus depicted earlier peoples of the region as ancestral brethren— sometimes in a rather extreme fashion. The earliest of Anatolia’s prehistoric agriculturalists and pastoralists, the Hittites, the Phrygians, the Lydians, the Galatians, the Sumerians, the Byzantines, and the Seljuk and Osmanlı/Ottoman Turks were thus all rooted in the soil of Anatolia and were alive in the present day in the Turkish nation and its political manifestation, the Kemalist state. Monuments of a romantic Anatolia would be erected subsequently, even in prominent locations within the nation’s capital. Indeed, images from Hittite art have been common motifs in government publications and textbooks throughout the nation-state era. Their contemporary usage has been in decline, however, as they have been increasingly replaced—sometimes even amid contestations regarding claims as to their authenticity/legitimacy. The earlier, Kemalist-era icon for Ankara featured one such Hittite statue, and its departure is but one example of the declining symbolic relevance of Anatolian icons. Finally, within the Turkish republic, the question as to whether or not to employ folk culture as a medium for nation-building was never an issue. Indeed, that question seems to have been resolved by Young Ottoman and Young Turk theorists, like Namik Kemal and Ziya Gökalp, respectively. Moreover, the message was not at issue either; the state would promote the Anatolian ideal of Turkish nationalism as fostered by the Kemalist state. The main questions concerning folk culture, therefore, tended to center around the forms to be promoted and how they might complement—or how they might require modification in order to complement—the historical and linguistic projects of the new nation-state. Of the varieties of folk culture that the Turkish state actively promoted, folklore could easily be identified as having been among the most prominent. Indeed, as a crucial component of nation-building, folklore studies in Turkey enjoyed the status of a discipline unto itself for many years. In 1927, the Halk Bilgisi Derne˘gi (Folklore Association) was established. Publications, such as the association’s journal Halk Bilgisi Mecmuası, soon followed. Building upon some of the earlier works of figures like Gökalp, many initial works were devoted to the epics of heroic figures or popular tales. Under the Kemalist leadership and institutions of the early republic, the Turkish nation developed along a largely singular trajectory within Turkey until the final days of World War II and Turkey’s increased contacts with the West through programs like the Truman Doctrine and its entry into NATO in the early 1950s. While divergence from this trajectory did occur—as was the case with panTurkish or Kurdish activists—it was policed and repressed by the state. In this isolated and controlled context, histories of Turkish national identity and the Kemalist state traveled roughly the same path until the republic increased oppor-


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tunities for political dissent within its borders—as with the adoption of a multiparty system—and allowed increased contacts beyond them. Selected Bibliography Ahmad, Feroz. 2001. The Making of Modern Turkey. London: Routledge. Berkes, Niyazi. 1998. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Introduction by Feroz Ahmad. New York: Routledge. Bozdo˘gan, Sibel. 2001. Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Bozdo˘gan, Sibel, and Re¸sat Kasaba, eds. 2003. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Evered, Emine Ö. 2007. “An Educational Prescription for the Sultan: Hüseyin Hilmi Pa¸sa’s Advice for the Maladies of Empire.” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 3: 439–459. Evered, Kyle T. 2005. “Regionalism in the Middle East and the Case of Turkey.” Geographical Review 95, no. 3: 463–477. Gökalp, Ziya. 1968. The Principles of Turkism. Translated and annotated by Robert Devereux. Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill. Kandiyoti, Deniz, and Ay¸se Saktanbar, eds. 2002. Fragments of Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Karpat, Kemal H. 2001. The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Landau, Jacob B. 1995. Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Lewis, Bernard. 2001. The Emergence of Modern Turkey. 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lewis, Geoffrey L. 1999. The Turkish Language Reform: A Catastrophic Success. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mardin, ¸Serif. 2006. Religion, Society, and Modernity in Turkey. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. White, Jenny B. 2003. Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Zürcher, Erik J. 2005. Turkey: A Modern History. 3rd ed. London: I. B. Tauris.


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Burma Jörg Schendel Chronology 1824–1826; 1852–1853; 1885 Three Anglo-Burmese wars: gradual British conquest and administrative integration into British India. 1906 Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA) is founded; develops from initial cultural and religious concerns into a political organization. 1920 General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA) emerges from the YMBA; promotes noncooperation with the British but suffers many organizational splits. 1923 So-called dyarchy constitution is in force; the departments of education and forestry are headed by Burmese ministers and are responsible to the legislative council. 1930 Foundation of Dobama Asiayoun, a nationalist organization promoting independence. 1930–1932 Hsaya San Rebellion, built on earlier noncooperation campaigns in the Burmese countryside. 1937 Separation of Burma from British India; Burmese prime minister and ministers are responsible to the legislative assembly, British governor with special powers. 1942–1945 Japanese occupation of Burma. 1943 Formal independence under the wing of the Japanese. 1944 Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO, later AFPFL) is formed—parts of the Burmese army, communists, and socialists combine in resistance against the Japanese. 1945 British recapture Burma. 1947 Aung San–Attlee Agreement; Great Britain agrees to independence. 1948 Independence from Great Britain; subsequent civil war.

Situating the Nation Burma has been host to a succession of large-scale political formations since the 11th century. The area’s most powerful rulers controlled the full length of the Irrawaddy basin, establishing varying degrees of supremacy over adjacent territories—namely, Arakan in the west, Tenasserim in the southeast, the Chin and Kachin hills in the north and northwest, and the Shan hills and northern Thailand in the east—and repelling Thai and Chinese armies. Repeated defeats by the British Indian army in three Anglo-Burmese wars (1824–1826, 1852–1853, 1885), subsequent annexation, and a decade of “pacification” campaigns, incorporation into British India, and British governance resulted in a sharp break with the past. The dismantling of political and administrative institutions in the lowlands was followed by direct British administration. Successive constitutional changes, directed from British India, led to the introduction of a lieutenant governor of Burma (1897), an enlarged legislative council (1909), and two ministerial posts N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Hsaya San Rebellion (1930–1932) This movement of rural violence and resistance was inspired and partly led by the eponymous former activist of the GCBA. Amid plummeting rice prices, widespread land foreclosures, and pressing tax demands in the early stages of the Great Depression, the rebellion was directed against landlords, moneylenders, tax collectors, and other institutions of the colonial state and economy. The rebellion was a culmination of pre-nationalist rural resistance, elements of Buddhist millennialism, and the grassroots resistance tactics of the GCBA and the wunthanu athin, where Hsaya San as well as many of his lieutenants and supporters had been active earlier. The British military defeated the rebels, thus demonstrating the limits of rural resistance, and Hsaya San was tried and hanged. Along with U Ottama and others, the nationalist movement held him up as a paragon of national spirit.

for the Burmese, responsible to a partially elected legislative council (1923). By 1937, Burma had separated from British India, had a Burmese prime minister elected by a legislative assembly, and had a cabinet deciding most issues. Foreign affairs, defense, monetary policy, and the administration of border areas remained the prerogative of the British governor. From 1942 to 1945, Burma was under Japanese control, even though it had a Burmese administration and was nominally independent from 1943 onward. After the British recaptured Burma, it attained independence on January 4, 1948. Socioeconomic change under colonial rule was massive. Rice agriculture, particularly in the Irrawaddy delta of Lower Burma, became largely export-oriented and was driven by the swift extension of cultivated land and rapid population growth. Under British laissez-faire economic and immigration policies, a rigid ethnic division of labor emerged. The Burmese largely focused on agriculture and left most positions in trade, the learned professions, and the civil service to Indian and Chinese immigrants. The British occupied the commanding heights of politics and economics. As Burmese cultivators were exposed to fluctuating rice prices in the world market, the pressures of taxes, debts, and interest payments mounted. The Great Depression of the 1930s triggered a wave of debt recall and foreclosures, exacerbating Burmese discontent with the colonial political and socioeconomic system. Meanwhile, Western education helped a Burmese middle class emerge and shift into new urban professions, including civil service jobs—a prerequisite for organizing and articulating Burmese national interests.

Instituting the Nation The emergence of Burmese nationalism and an independent nation-state was reflected in institutional and conceptual shifts, from religious and cultural associations operating within the confines of British colonialism, to political parties and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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student unions, and finally to a broad-based independence movement. The Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA), patterned after the YMCA, was founded in 1906 by Rangoon students and soon included high-ranking Burmese civil servants. Initially loyal to the British and mainly promoting cultural and religious institutions, they soon championed the cause of Burmese rights and liberties, such as more and higher-ranking civil service posts and a dyarchy constitution. In 1920, a younger, more expressly anticolonial group carved a mass organization, the General Council of Burmese Associations (GCBA), out of the YMBA. Soon, however, the GCBA split, due to personal rivalries and different approaches toward key issues such as participation in elections. The leading nationalist figure of the 1920s was U Chit Hlaing (1879–1952), the son of a successful merchant, trained as a barrister in England, who spent most of his wealth on the GCBA. In the 1930s, he became dependent on Indian financial support and lost his influence. The Buddhist monkhood (sangha) resented Christian proselytizing, missionary and secular education, and the new ways of life, considering them threats to Burmese moral and religious values. Monks (pongyis) had led anti-British uprisings in the 19th century, and in the 1920s, politically active monks (dhammakatikas, a term including nonpolitical Buddhist teachers) sought to link Western-educated and urban-based nationalists with the rural masses. The dhammakatikas supported rural protest organizations (wunthanu athins) at the village, circle, and district levels, which were, in turn, affiliated with the GCBA. The monks themselves formed unions (sangha sammeggis, later subsumed within general councils for Upper and Lower Burma, respectively) and at times controlled the GCBA. The most prominent figure was U Ottama (1897–1939), who had previously been active in the Indian National Congress. He spoke out for self-rule and nonviolent noncooperation, which earned him and many other dhammakatikas several spells in prison as part of a British campaign against the wunthanu athins. University students and their unions, especially at Rangoon University, came to play important roles in nationalist organizations, and the university strikes of 1920 and 1936—both directed against British academic control and educational policies that sought to produce pliable civil servants—were important catalysts of the nationalist movement. By 1930, young intellectuals had founded the Dobama Asiayoun (“We Burmese Association”), a secular organization addressing a wider audience, including workers and peasants. Although very anti-Indian, the Dobama was strongly influenced by the concepts of the Indian National Congress and favored an independent Burma. The Dobama turned into a movement with a broad ideological spectrum, reflecting the influences of the teachings of Marx, Nietzsche, Sinn Féin, Fabianism, and Burmese Buddhism. A number of political parties split from the GCBA or developed independently in the 1920s and 1930s to contest elections to the legislative assembly. Several organizations had their own paramilitary corps (tats). In this period, two party politicians stand out. First, Dr. Ba Maw (1893–1977), trained as a barrister in London, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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was at the helm of the Hsinyetha Wunthanu Ahpwegyi (Poor Man’s Nationalist Party), which promoted tax reductions, the protection of farmers from moneylenders, and depended heavily on pongyi support. Ba Maw served as minister of education (1934–1937) and as prime minister (1937–1939). He joined the student leaders of the Dobama Asiayoun and founded the antiwar Burma Freedom Bloc— an activity that led to his arrest by the British. He led the Burmese government while the country was under Japanese occupation. U Saw (1900–1948), another significant party politician, founded the rightwing Myochit (Patriotic) Party. Japanese funding and his share in the Thuriya newspaper helped his self-promotion and rise to power. During his spell as prime minister (1940–1942), he furthered the interests of the Burmese landowners and businessmen supporting him and pressed for full self-government. The British arrested him because of his Japanese contacts. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB) was founded in 1939 by a few intellectuals, including Thakin Soe, Burma’s foremost Marxist theoretician. Than Tun (1911–1968) later became the party’s long-time leader. The CPB fought the Japanese occupation and supported the British. It split in early 1946, and its radical wing, the Red Flag, under the leadership of Thakin Soe, went underground. The majority White Flag CPB under Than Tun was expelled from the multiparty nationalist movement, the AFPFL, in October 1946. They began a civil war in March 1948.

Defining the Nation In its early stages, Burmese nationalism was largely defined in terms of a “fixed” cultural, religious, and ethnic Burmese identity, as shared by all indigenous inhabitants of Burma. Besides the central role of Theravada Buddhism, Burmese identity was conceptualized around references to country, language, and literature. In the context of a multiracial colonial society, the younger and more radical nationalist movement of the 1930s included voluntarism in their concept of nationalism, encouraging people of mixed ethnic heritage to identify with Burma and to become part of “Dobama” or “our Burma,” instead of belonging to “ThudoBama” or “their Burma,” the Burma of the collaborators and the enemy. Patriotism was thus viewed as the crucial element for “true” members of the emerging Burmese nation. Burma and Burmese identity were partly defined in contradistinction to the Indians in the country and to British India, of which Burma was a province. The topic of separation dominated the nationalist discourse for decades. This discussion touched upon the question of Burmese identity as well as on tactical issues of how best to continue the anticolonial struggle, a subject complicated by the wealth of Indian businessmen financing Burmese politicians. Further, South Indian N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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migrant laborers depressed land rents and rural wages and competed with indigenous Burmese workers seeking new sources of urban employment. The resulting Burmo-Indian riots in 1930 and 1938 sharpened the ethnic basis of Burmese nationalism, as did the loss of land to Indian moneylenders; the role of Indians diminished with mass emigration in 1938 and 1942. One conundrum of the nationalist movement was the relationship between the Burman majority—Burman being the term for the ethnicity dominant in Burma—and the indigenous minorities distinct in ethnicity, language, and religion. Whereas the Shans, Mons, and most Arakanese were Theravada Buddhist like the Burmans, others were animist, and many had been converted to Christianity by European and American missionaries. The minority areas at the periphery of the Irrawaddy basin also experienced much slower socioeconomic change, and Chins, Kachins, Karennis, and Shans were administered by established indigenous elites and not by the British colonial bureaucracy—an arrangement that left open to discussion the borders of an independent Burma. Even where minority settlements were interspersed with those of the Burmans, such as in the case of the Karen community in the delta, the British gave them (and immigrant Indians and Chinese) special political representation. Finally, military recruitment focused on Chins, Kachins, and Karens and virtually excluded all Burmans. During the war, the anti-Japanese resistance of several ethnic minorities widened the gap between them and the Burman cooperators. Hence, the ethnicities of Burma experienced colonialism and war very differently, and the Karens in particular developed a separate nationalist ideology. The difficulty of defining Burmese nationalism is reflected in the terminology used to describe the concept. Thus, the term Dobama Asiayoun (“We Burmese Association”), which drew upon the example of the Irish nationalist organization Sinn Féin (“We Ourselves”), sought to avoid the more rigorously ethnically fixed “Myanma” (“Burman”) and instead used the older term “Bama,” which was then meant to include all “Burmese” ethnicities. Even though nationalist organizations made token efforts to appeal to all ethnicities and claimed all their territories as part of an independent Burma, the nationalist movement remained largely a Burman affair. An agreement at Panglong in February 1947 on the self-administration of the Shans, Kachins, and Chins did not prevent the rebellion of the Karens in early 1949 and of other groups thereafter.

Narrating the Nation Burma’s glorious precolonial past was central to its nationalist narrative. Often, strength, pride, and valor of the Burmese people were held up as national traits. Thus, in the newly created tricolor, based on the Irish flag, yellow represented the (Buddhist) religion, green, the peasants, and red, Burmese valor. The Dobama N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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song, created in 1930 and adopted as the national anthem in 1948, valorized the heroic moments of the former Burmese kingdoms, such as victories over Thailand, and contrasted Burma’s past with the lamentable present under British rule in an effort to point toward a better future. Performances of the Dobama song and the hoisting of the flag played important roles in most rallies. Finally, the Dobama Asiayoun assumed the title thakin (“master”) for its members, referring to the independent precolonial past, rejecting British claims of superiority, and promoting the revival of a Burmese-Buddhist cultural tradition. The Burmese, it was implied, were masters of Burma and, consequently, “a race of masters.” In a more specific reference to the past, the annual conferences of the GCBA adopted elements reminiscent of the precolonial royal court protocol. The promotion of the Burmese language, history, and patriotism was also one of the objectives of the national school movement of the 1920s. The new textbooks emphasized the achievements of the former kings, and popular histories, historical novels, and royal biographies picked up these themes. For example, the picture of a 19th-century Burmese general was used at a nationalist meeting; U Saw laid the foundation stone for a new mausoleum of King Alaungpaya (1752–1760), founder of the last Burmese dynasty; and the last king, Thibaw (1878–1885), formerly dismissed by many as an inept ruler, came to be seen as a victim of British cunning. In 1937, the anniversary of King Thibaw’s exile was commemorated. Significantly, in 1941 Premier U Saw performed the annual plowing ceremony, a task hitherto preserved for the British governors and, before them, the kings. Over time, the anticolonial struggle itself became part of the nationalist narrative. Individual resistance fighters achieved fame and were held up as examples of the national spirit. In particular, those who died in the wave of strikes and agitation in 1938–1939 were venerated as heroes. U Saw adopted the Galon, a mythical bird, as the primary symbol of his organization, drawing a link with Hsaya San. Finally, the anniversary of the first strike at Rangoon University in 1920 was celebrated as the National Day, just as other important events of the national movement were given importance—often as a front for public mass meetings that would otherwise have been illegal.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The process of creating the Burmese nation was largely synonymous with the struggle against British colonial rule. Burmese demands developed from very specific and limited issues in the early decades of the 20th century. Only later did they encompass self-rule, separation from India, and finally, by the 1930s, the call for full independence. World War II and the Japanese occupation became key catalysts on the road to independence and constituted the primary historical watershed for Burmese nationalism. This period also saw a variety of means N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The Shoe Question This question flared up in 1916 and epitomized the cultural side of the conflict between British rulers and Burmese subjects. Burmese religion and custom require everyone to remove his shoes inside a monastery or on the grounds of a temple as a token of respect. European visitors frequently disregarded this rule, much to the outrage of Burmese monks and laymen. Many of them vented their anger in books and pamphlets, and the YMBA sent several memorials to the British authorities. Monks attacked shoed Europeans and were arrested. In 1919, the British administration confirmed the right of abbots and pagoda trustees to define the proper attire for visitors—except for soldiers. The shoe question galvanized early nationalist sentiment and led to the first concession to Burmese sentiment, even if it was largely symbolic. Europeans, however, virtually stopped visiting Burmese pagodas.

deployed by Burmese nationalists: from outright military confrontation with the British in World War II over mass protests after the British return in 1945, to participation in the administration and negotiating the political transition to independence in 1946–1947. All of the major nationalist institutions sought to educate and raise the consciousness of their activists and potential supporters. Lectures, discussions, and instructions, both in closed circles and before a wider audience, in the towns and in the countryside, addressed religious, philosophical, cultural, and political issues. The YMBA, for example, organized lessons in Buddhist scriptures, publishing both an English-language weekly and, from 1911, the Burmese-language Thuriya (The Sun). Other nationalist periodicals and publications followed thereafter. The Burma Book Club, initiated by scholar J. S. Furnivall and nationalist U Nu, and the Nagani (Red Dragon) Book Club provided translations of socialist, Fabianist, and Marxist writings. In addition, major institutions sought to mobilize their troops in rallies and large-scale national conferences. Cooperative activities, such as those of the YMBA, included petitions to and negotiations with the British administration to protect religious and cultural institutions, to promote Burmese participation in the administration and government, and to further constitutional reform. The parties contesting the elections for the legislative bodies of the 1920s and 1930s hoped to attain control of the colonial administration. Most parties promoted some variant of land reform and opposed Indian immigration. The British governor, however, often obstructed such measures by using his reserve powers and by enlisting ethnic minorities against the Burmese parliamentarians. Some rural reforms were instituted after 1937, but they came too late to improve the lot of the cultivators before World War II. Legislative work was widely regarded as ineffective, if not corrupting, and even the Dobama’s platform of entering the assembly to “wreck it from within” failed to garner much electoral support. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Aung San (1915–1947) Aung San dominated the nationalist movement from the late 1930s until his death. Descended from the rural gentry of Upper Burma, he attended Rangoon University, where he was editor of the student newspaper and president of the Rangoon University Student Union and of the All-Burma Students Union, and where he organized a nationwide student strike in 1936. In 1938, he became general secretary of the Dobama Asiayoun. One of the founders of the CPB in 1939, he led the Thirty Comrades into Japanese military training and the BIA into Burma and took a major role in the wartime administration of the country. He then helped found the AFO/AFPFL. As its key non-communist leader, he became deputy chairman of the executive council and led the delegation that negotiated independence in London. Before he could become the first prime minister of independent Burma, an assassin’s bullet ended his life on July 19, 1947 (“Martyrs’ Day”) and made him a national hero. He was seen by many as the one man who could have prevented decades of civil war. In popular historiography, he is considered the fourth “unifier” of Burma, after kings Anawrahta (1044–1077), Bayinnaung (1551–1581), and Alaungpaya (1752–1760). His daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), has earned a Nobel Peace Prize (1991) and years of house arrest for her efforts to replace the present military regime of Burma with an elected government.

Many of the localized or nationwide confrontations were legitimized by Buddhist political theory and leaned on Gandhi’s concept of nonviolent noncooperation, or ahimsa. In the 1920s, the wunthanu athins opposed British taxes and the wholesale punishment of villages for withholding revenue. They also turned against local officials and elections, opposed the auctioning of fisheries, and objected to the Indian moneylenders’ rates of interest, thus challenging the colonial socioeconomic structure. However, even such confrontational tactics lacked a clear agenda and remained disconnected from the objective of independence. In the towns, the All-Burma Youth League, affiliated with the Dobama, encouraged a boycott of British goods and a return to homemade textiles in the wake of Gandhi’s swadeshi (self-sufficiency) movement. In this context, they called for a more austere and less Anglicized style of life and for Burmese entrepreneurship. The Dobama sought to appeal to intellectuals, workers, and peasants alike and promoted aggressive agitation that, in 1938, led to labor and race riots and a wave of labor strikes in oilfields, transport facilities, rice processing, and offices. By 1939, the Dobama joined the Burma Freedom Bloc to campaign against cooperation with the British war effort. The nucleus of the Burmese nationalist army and active rebellion lay in the “Thirty Comrades.” This group of mostly student nationalists was trained abroad by the Japanese in 1941 and formed the core of the Burma Independence Army (BIA), later the Burma National Army (BNA), which supported the Japanese invasion and boosted nationalist morale as the first largely Burman force since 1885. Disillusioned by Japanese rule in Burma, the leaders of the BNA, together with the communists and one socialist group, formed the Anti-Fascist Organization N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Aung San (1915–1947). (Library of Congress)

(AFO) in August 1944, which was later renamed the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). Open revolt, coordinated with the British advance, broke out on March 27, 1945. After the war, parts of the BNA were integrated in the British army, and other parts, such as the People’s Volunteer Organization (PVO), remained connected with the AFPFL. After participating in British colonial governance, the Burmese set up local administrations in the wake of the BIA’s advance, in concert with the Japanese. Ba Maw formed a government in August 1942. Within one year, Burma became formally independent, without gaining true sovereignty, however. When the Japanese withdrew in May 1945, Burmese forces, dominated by members of the AFPFL, filled the power vacuum. The AFPFL used mass mobilization, protests, and strikes to buttress their demand for independence. By September 1946, strong pressure on the British administration had earned the AFPFL the majority of seats in the Council of Ministers. The elections in April 1947 gave the AFPFL a majority in the Constituent Assembly and, consequently, control over the government of independent Burma in 1948. Selected Bibliography Aye Kyaw. 1993. The Voice of Young Burma. Southeast Asia Program Monographs, no. 12. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program. Beˇcka, Jan. 1983. The National Liberation Movement in Burma during the Japanese Occupation Period (1941–1945). Dissertationes Orientales, no. 42. Prague, Czech Republic: Academia Praha.


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˘ sîj A ˘ yôum: A Study of the Evolution of BurBeˇcka, Jan. 1986. “The Ideology of the Dou B˘amá A · mese Nationalism (1930–1940).” Archív Orientální 54: 336–358. Khin Yi. 1988. The Dobama Movement in Burma (1930–1938). 2 vols. Southeast Asia Program Monographs, nos. 2–2A. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program. Maung Maung. 1980. From Sangha to Laity: Nationalist Movements of Burma, 1920–1940. Australian National University Monographs on South Asia, no. 4. Delhi: Manohar. Maung Maung. 1989. Burmese Nationalist Movements 1940–1948. Edinburgh, Scotland: Kiscadale. Moscotti, Albert D. 1974. British Policy and the Nationalist Movement in Burma, 1917–1937. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Nemoto, Kei. 1987. “The Doubama-Asiayon and the Shweibou Bye-Election (1933).” In Burma and Japan: Basic Studies on Their Cultural and Social Structure, edited by Burma Research Group, 247–256. Tokyo: Burma Studies Group. Nemoto, Kei. 2000. “The Concepts of Dobama (‘Our Burma’) and Thudo-Bama (‘Their Burma’) in Burmese Nationalism, 1930–1948.” Journal of Burma Studies 5: 1–16. Smith, Martin. 1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. 2nd ed. London: Zed. Taylor, Robert H. 1987. The State in Burma. London: Hurst. Zöllner, Hans-Bernd. 2000. Birma zwischen ‘Unabhängigkeit zuerst—Unabhängigkeit zuletzt.’ Die birmanischen Unabhängigkeitsbewegungen und ihre Sicht der zeitgenössischen Welt am Beispiel der birmanisch-deutschen Beziehungen zwischen 1920 und 1948. Demokratie und Entwicklung, no. 38. Münster, Hamburg, and London: LIT.


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China Hong-Ming Liang Chronology 1879 Japan annexes Ryukyu, formerly a tributary state to China. 1880 Prior to 1880, foreign and domestic challenges include unequal trade agreements, the Taiping Rebellion (1851–1864), the Nian Rebellion (1853–1868), the Panthay Uprising (1855–1873), and the Muslim Rebellion in northwest China (1862–1873). 1885 China makes a concession to Japan over its former tribute state of Korea. 1894–1895 China is defeated in the Sino-Japanese war. 1898 An attempt at thorough reforms by the Qing government during the One Hundred Days’ Reform is aborted after a palace coup by court conservatives. 1898–1900 Boxer uprising. 1905 Qing dynasty abolishes the examination system. Revolutionary Alliance is formed by Sun Yat-sen and other anti-Qing revolutionaries in Japan. 1910 Japan annexes Korea. 1911 The 1911 Revolution successfully overthrows the Qing dynasty and establishes the Republic of China. 1915 Japan presents 21 demands of privilege and dominion over China. 1915–1919 The New Culture and the May Fourth movements. 1920 Founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 1924 Sun Yat-sen reorganizes the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, or GMD), with aid and advice from the Soviet Union. 1925 Death of Sun Yat-sen. 1926–1927 Northern Expedition and the purge of CCP members from the GMD. 1928 Unification of China under the GMD’s Nationalist government. 1931 Manchurian Incident and the fall of the northeastern provinces (Manchuria) to Japanese occupation. 1934 Chiang K’ai-shek’s attempt to pursue regulated mass mobilization with the largely unsuccessful New Life movement. 1934–1935 The Chinese Communist Party, in spite of the GMD forces’ pursuits, survives the Long March. 1936 Chiang K’ai-shek is arrested by General Zhang Xueliang during the Xi’an Incident and pressured to halt his campaigns against the CCP and focus instead on the Japanese. 1937–1945 War of resistance against Japanese aggression.

Situating the Nation The Qing Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty of China, ruled from 1644 to 1911. During its reign, China underwent unprecedented prosperity and geographical N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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expansion. Yet, by the 1800s, the traditional dynastic order began to encounter social, economic, and demographic pressures from within. It also faced an increasing number of foreign encroachments from without. Each of the challenges from within and without severely depleted the national government’s treasury and, hence, degraded its ability to effect substantial changes. The Manchu rulers, an ethnic minority reigning over the Han majority of the empire, also faced the unenviable task of maintaining their legitimacy in the face of these challenges while an entirely new world order evolved around them. From 1880 to 1945, a consensus within China developed concerning the severity of domestic and foreign challenges facing the country. Rhetorical descriptions of China’s position in the world and its existence as a nation frequently bordered on the hysterical, with cries that China was teetering on the edge of national extinction. Yet despite the consensus on the severity of China’s plight, there was no uniformity in proposed solutions. The Manchu ruling elite could not agree on the feasibility of efforts to restore China’s former world order or, as the Japanese had with their Meiji reforms, accept the premise of a new European world order. Nor did the leadership agree on whether reforms should lead to Westernization or a preservation of traditional Chinese national identity. Likewise, forces outside Manchu leadership disagreed on the ideal pathway toward change; some favored a slower, reformist constitutional monarchy, while others favored more radical changes, ranging from anarchism to liberal democracy. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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This pattern of deep pessimism over China’s status and a general desire for rapid and comprehensive national change, coupled with a lack of consensus over concrete methods and objectives, persisted throughout this period. The 1911 Revolution overthrew China’s last imperial dynasty, yet the new republican government quickly sank into an abysmal paralysis. China did not attain the unity and rapid transformations revolutionary leaders envisioned. Instead it fragmented into semi-autonomous fiefdoms ruled by regional military authorities. In response to this perceived failure of parliamentary democracy, different groups and leaders sought to save the nation through radically different strategies. Sun Yat-sen sought aid and advice from the Soviet Union and reorganized his Nationalist Party along Leninist lines. Sun also retooled this party into a vanguard organization capable of leading mass movements. Others such as New Culture intellectuals Chen Duxiu and Hu Shi sought a thorough cultural revolution. Reasoning that the “quality” of the common people in China had stagnated, Hu, Chen, and others called for a radical departure from Confucian social order and an embrace of the perceived universal values of science and democracy. Still others began to seek radical options, such as following the model of the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. By the end of the 1920s, three main forces existed in China: Sun’s modified socialism, the New

Portrait of Chinese leader Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925). (UPI/Bettmann/Corbis)


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Culture intellectuals, and the newly founded Chinese Communist Party. In essence, efforts to create a unifying modern Chinese nationalism had returned to square one.

Instituting the Nation From 1800 to the 1890s, the key actors were the Qing government and Western and Japanese powers. Within China the important actors could be further disaggregated to include leading government and intellectual leaders who advocated preserving the status quo and officials and leaders who advocated various levels of reforms and changes. By the late 1800s, a near consensus was reached on the fact that both domestic and international forces made change necessary, yet methods and objectives were still very much contested. Some, such as leaders of the Self-Strengthening movement, advocated importing Western technology while steadfastly maintaining the essence of Chinese culture. Others advocated modifications to cultural and political institutions as well as the use of Western technology. Still others began to look toward Meiji Japan and Western powers as models to emulate and called for even more thorough changes to China. During the early 1900s, Chinese revolutionary groups were formed abroad and at home, while the Qing government began to contemplate more thorough changes. Chinese anarchists were organized by overseas students in Tokyo and Paris. By 1905, Sun Yat-sen had formed the Revolutionary Alliance, an umbrella group of anti-Qing revolutionaries. These groups utilized racialist anti-Manchu rhetoric coupled with Social Darwinian worldviews and called for the embrace of constitutional republicanism and the creation of modern citizens. Within China as well, local provincial elites, provincial governors, and leaders of the Chinese military began to fill in the power vacuum left by an atrophying national government. The period from 1911, when the Qing dynasty was overthrown and the republic established, to 1928 was one of great opportunity and chaos. A national government was established in Beijing after the revolution, yet China was in fact still paralyzed by fragmentation and perpetual civil war. The parliamentary government in Beijing was rife with corruption and intrigue. Notorious assassinations of prominent political figures ensued. China itself was effectively controlled by powerful regional military leaders known otherwise as warlords. Essentially, the “national” government in Beijing was national in name only. The political chaos created by the 1911 Revolution was a profound disappointment to the revolution’s leaders, yet ironically the relative ineffectiveness and ineptitude of the new republican order also enabled a great variety of experimentation and debate at local and regional levels. Other forces also emerged during this period of fragmentation. For example, Western-educated and -inspired N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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students and intellectuals called for even more radical cultural changes. Sun Yatsen’s party, exiled from the Beijing republican government that they had helped to establish, eventually ended up in a southern enclave in the Guangdong province. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1920 and added another militant voice to the national debate over the fate of the nation. During his years of internal exile, Sun Yat-sen concluded that a multiparty parliamentary democracy, as evidenced by experiences since 1911, was unworkable in the Chinese context. Therefore, in 1924 Sun reorganized his Nationalist Party (Guomindang, or GMD, also known as the Kuomintang, or KMT) along Leninist lines. With Soviet advisors and aid, Sun revised his revolutionary ideology with the Three Principles of the People (Principles of Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood) and the concept of an orderly, three-staged national revolution. An alliance was also formed between the GMD and the Chinese Communist Party. Sun posited that the remedy to China’s chaotic transition from dynastic to republican rule was an armed, disciplined, revolutionary party that would lead China through the stages necessary for a new national order. As a direct reaction to the perceived failure of the 1911 Revolution, Sun devised a plan for a national revolution wherein China would proceed from a period of military rule, through a period of political tutelage, to a final period of constitutional rule. The period of political tutelage, Sun envisaged, would remedy the chaos and distortions encountered by the 1911 order. During this period, the GMD would rule as a benevolent one-party dictatorship and “teach” the Chinese people to become modern, suitable citizens. Sun’s sudden death in 1925 left the Guomindang in disarray. The reorganization of 1924, particularly the alliance with the CCP and the plans for radical social and economic changes, was controversial within the GMD. Sun also died without designating a successor or providing an orderly institutional mechanism to produce one. Chiang K’ai-shek, head of the party’s military academy, eventually emerged as the paramount leader of the GMD, but his claim was never truly satisfactory to many senior members of his party. Between 1927 and 1928 Chiang sought to consolidate his leadership over the GMD. Chiang also embarked on the Northern Expedition, wherein the GMD swept north from its enclave and sought to reunify China under GMD rule. He also formed an alliance with the conservative wings of the party and purged the Chinese Communists in what some considered a bloody coup. By 1929, the communists had been driven underground, local warlords had either been defeated or co-opted by the GMD, and the Chinese Nationalists announced the formation of the Chinese Nationalist government in the city of Nanjing. The Nanjing Nationalist government faced external and internal threats in the 1930s similar to those faced by the Qing dynasty in the 1880s. Japan’s ambitions as a regional and world power soon encroached upon Chinese territories, culminating in the loss of the northeastern provinces (Manchuria) in 1931. Domestically, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the GMD faced intraparty disunity, rising disenchantment over incessant civil wars and the lack of human rights, and student protests. The most serious concern, as perceived by the GMD leadership, was that the Chinese Communist Party had been driven underground and become a militarized and rural opponent. China was nominally unified under the leadership of the Nationalist government from 1928 to 1949. The GMD declared the commencement of the period of political tutelage, which represented a transitory period of one-party dictatorship with an eventual transfer to a democratic constitutional republic. During this period, the party proposed the inculcation of Sun Yat-sen’s ideological principles in every citizen, the mobilization of the masses, and the creation of a unified, modernized, and strengthened new China. The Guomindang, however, was composed of a motley collection of party elders, regional leaders, and co-opted former warlords. Although the party planned and promulgated ambitious national policies of political and economic modernization, the party and government remained fragmented. Chiang’s leadership was questioned at every turn, and significant portions of China effectively remained under the rule of local power brokers. From 1928 to 1931, significant political and military struggles were waged between Chiang and his opponents north and south of Nanjing. Beyond the struggles among GMD leaders, the GMD’s plan for an orderly, party-led mobilization of the masses toward building a new, unified China came under severe criticism from leading Chinese intellectuals almost from the very beginning of its inception. Leaders within the GMD questioned Chiang’s claim to be Sun Yat-sen’s revolutionary disciple. Critics outside the party questioned the GMD’s right to assert a period of party dictatorship. Moreover, GMD leaders proved indecisive over the extent to which the national revolution would be truly revolutionary. The seesaw battles at the top over direction undercut the morale of the local party cadres. The perception that the Guomindang was a revolutionary alternative to the corrupt and selfish northern warlords quickly dissipated. Chiang K’ai-shek’s meek reactions against increasing Japanese encroachments and the establishment of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in the northeastern provinces (Manchuria) in 1932, plus his preference for pursuing the CCP at all costs, led to a series of escalating student protests, protests that belied his government’s attempt to position itself as the sole and leading arbiter of modern Chinese nationalism.

Defining the Nation The process of redefining China was ongoing and full of conflict throughout this period. China suffered as much as it benefited from its lengthy and impressive history, insomuch as the weightiness of its history made calls for fundamental N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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changes that much more difficult. By the 1880s, China had successfully existed as a leading empire in the world for over 2,000 years. Dynasties rose and fell, changes came about, but the fundamental supposition that China’s existential reality was fundamentally sound gained great credence because of the empire’s longevity and its history of adaptability. Such adaptability appeared evidenced by China’s ability to essentially maintain much of its political, cultural, social, and emotional unity even while being ruled by foreign invading forces, such as during the period of Mongol rule during the Yuan dynasty. Surges in pressures from Western powers and Japan were coupled with a series of increasingly successful domestic rebellions and posed a greater challenge to China’s sense of nationalism and identity. The Qing government attempted tactical maneuvers around foreign and domestic challenges in hopes of returning to the status quo ante. However, by the 1880s it became clear to many inside and outside the government that such a return was difficult at best, and that China might require more thorough changes to respond adequately to domestic and foreign crises. The goal of defining China’s modern nationhood became more and more contingent on the ability of the nation to survive and thrive in a world whose terms were set by wealthy and powerful foreign nations. By the 1920s, the mantle of national renewal and national identity had been taken up by the intellectuals of the New Culture movement and the student protesters of the May Fourth movement. The New Culture leaders called for a radical departure from China’s traditional cultural/social order. The May Fourth students introduced an important new element of student activism and patriotism, which served as a model for students through ensuing decades. By the late 1920s and 1930s, however, disciplined vanguard political parties with armed forces emerged, in the form of the Guomindang and the Communist Party, as the leading forces in the articulation of Chinese nationalism. Significantly, these two Leninist parties possessed the forces necessary to push their agenda beyond the realm of ideas and into policies enforceable through coercion.

New Culture / May Fourth Movements Western-educated intellectuals such as Hu Shi, writers such as Lu Xun, as well as future CCP cofounder Chen Duxiu led the calls for an iconoclastic new culture that included a total critique of Confucianism, questioning the existing socioeconomic order, criticism of gender inequalities, and promoting vernacular rather than the florid, inaccessible classical Chinese. The New Culture movement started around 1915 and was composed of a loosely collected series of magazines and writers. These intellectuals sought cultural revolutionary answers to problems that political entities appeared powerless to resolve. By 1919, when students and faculty from major Chinese universities poured onto the streets to protest China’s meek acceptance of its loss of rights at the end of World War I, the intellectual/ student movements had taken a decidedly more militant, organized, and political turn.


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Narrating the Nation Throughout the period of the GMD rule, the party-state made concerted efforts to portray the interests of all sectors of the nation as one and the same and as those of the party, as demonstrated by its efforts to recast Sun Yat-sen, founder and leader of the GMD, as “Founder of the Republic.” This conflation of the interests of the party with the interests of the nation can also be illustrated by the efforts to teach party ideology in China’s education system on all levels. However, the Guomindang’s attempt to create China’s nationalism and identity was at best incomplete and uneven. The GMD had less than three years, from 1928 to 1931, to formulate and carry out national policies before foreign (Japanese) and domestic (intra-GMD and CCP) challenges came to the fore. In ideological terms, the GMD’s assertion that it was a mass party representing all interests of all segments of China was belied by the fact that it had turned its back on earlier policies of social revolution and mass mobilization. Even the party’s own leadership could not agree on the direction or leadership of the national revolution. As the period of GMD rule continued, the assertion that the party represented the interests of the nation became more adamant and shrill, in direct opposition to the party’s popularity nationwide. Moreover, challenging critiques of the GMD’s policies on Chinese nationalism came from intellectual leaders, alternate parties (ranging from socialists to liberals to nationalists), as well as from the CCP.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Guomindang used two strategies to mobilize and build the nation. From the 1900s to 1924, the GMD believed modern Chinese nationalism would be best served by emulating the leading Western powers as models of liberal parliamentary democracy. When the GMD was driven from the republic that it had participated in creating, Sun turned away from the multiparty democratic model and considered the vanguard revolutionary party of the newly founded Soviet Union to be the latest and best path for weaker, “backward” nations such as China to emulate. Although Sun’s successor, Chiang K’ai-shek, broke off both the policy of radical socioeconomic revolution and the alliance with the CCP, the overarching goal of one-party dictatorship and rapid national transformation via mass mobilizations and a strong national state was maintained. Throughout the 1930s, the GMD did manage, despite its problems, to reconstitute the national government. This process was greatly hampered by disunity within the GMD party as well as by foreign and domestic challenges. A great impediment to the GMD’s ability to mobilize the masses was its inability to communicate and understand the socioeconomic forces at work in a vast and populous N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nationalist Government This Guomindang-led government, established in 1928, adopted the institutional model provided by the Soviet Union wherein the GMD party had parallel institutions along all levels of the government. Sun Yat-sen’s model of three stages of transition, from a period of military rule, to a period of political tutelage, and toward a period of constitutional rule, provided the ideological basis to justify this period of one-party dictatorship. The Nationalist government was the most organized and unified governing authority of this period.

nation. Hence, instead of activating and leading genuine mass movements, the GMD hampered its relationships with localities (and hence, its role as the guardian and leader of Chinese nationalism and new national identity), because its policies were designed as much to stifle dissent and perpetuate one-party dictatorship as to truly create and nurture new, active Chinese citizens. The Sino-Japanese war of 1937–1945 accomplished for the GMD what it was unable to do by itself. Although the Japanese invasion devastated the nation and over half of China fell into occupation, this severe threat to China momentarily unified the nation under Nationalist leadership and temporarily halted the conflict between the two Chinese Leninist parties. The mass mobilization and national unity caused by the invading Japanese, however, did not resolve the GMD’s own ideological and institutional limitations. Instead, the war only postponed problems, and soon after China’s victory over Japan in 1945, the GMD’s problematic role in the articulation and leadership of China returned to the fore. Selected Bibliography Bergere, Marie-Claire. 1998. Sun Yat-sen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Boorman, Howard L., ed. 1967. Biographical Dictionary of Republican China. 4 vols. New York: Columbia University Press. Coble, Parks M., Jr. 1986. The Shanghai Capitalists and the Nationalist Government. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Dirlik, Arif. 1989. The Origins of Chinese Communism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Eastman, Lloyd E. 1974. The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eastman, Lloyd E. 1984. Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937–1949. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Fairbanks, John K., ed. 1983/1986. The Cambridge History of China, vols. 12 and 13: Republican China 1912–1949. London: Cambridge University Press. Fitzgerald, John. 1996. Awakening China: Politics, Culture, and Class in the Nationalist Revolution. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Schoppa, R. Keith. 2000. The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History. New York: Columbia University Press. Twitchett, Denis, and John K. Fairbank, eds. 1978. The Cambridge History of China, vols. 10 and 11: Late Ch’ing 1800–1911. London: Cambridge University Press.


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India John McLane Chronology 1526–1707 Rise, consolidation, and early decline of the Mughal empire. 1757 English East India Company defeats the Nawab of Bengal and establishes its headquarters at Fort William, later called Calcutta. 1857 The Indian Revolt of 1857–1858 spreads across north India. 1885 The Indian National Congress is founded to represent Indian grievances. 1905–1908 Extremist nationalists experiment with new forms of protest, including the boycott of foreign goods and assassination of British officials. 1920 Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi is elected leader of the Congress Party, starts civil disobedience campaign, and reaches out to Muslims and non-elite Hindus. 1930 Gandhi leads the march to the sea to manufacture salt illegally to demonstrate the Congress Party’s concern for the poor and resistance to oppressive British practices. 1937–1939 Congress Party wins provincial elections and forms governments; Muhammad Ali Jinnah accuses the Hindu Congress leaders of persecuting Muslims. 1940 Jinnah and Muslim League demand separate, autonomous states for the Muslimmajority areas. 1947 Britain partitions India and transfers power to the independent states of India and Pakistan.

Situating the Nation Under British colonial rule (1757–1947), a nationalist movement grew that aimed to create a sense of unity and pride in being Indian, as well as loosen the hold of colonial rule so that India would be governed in the interest of Indians. British dominance gradually provoked anticolonial sentiments that produced a sense of shared identity where it had been weak. British rule also brought some of the institutional and technological means that contributed to the integration of communities, including the printing press, English-language schools and colleges, the railway and telegraph, and a strong government and army. It is conventional to say that South Asia contains as much cultural variation as Europe. The peoples of colonial India did not make an automatic nation. The regions of India possessed their own separate identities or characteristics, with distinct languages, literatures, cuisines, and dress. For centuries prior to the Mughal empire, each region was governed by its own state or states, not by an imperial government. Nevertheless, India was a geographic and cultural unit of sorts, hemmed in on the north by the Himalayas and on the sides by the Indian Ocean.


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Early British scholar-administrators who studied Indian history, law, and languages discovered that early Indian civilization had been highly developed. Indians educated in colonial-era schools learned to take pride in the major precolonial achievements in ethics and religion, in mathematics and astronomy, and in many other fields. Many confidently assumed that a country that produced the Upanishads, Buddhism, the decimal system, and an international market for its handicraft textiles, for example, could be great once again. From the British perspective, India’s poverty, slow economic development, and civil wars in the 18th century led them to see the country in “Orientalist” terms as essentially backward, static, and autocratic. The multiplicity of languages, castes, and religious affiliations raised doubts that India could ever be a single nation. But that was a self-interested view. Pan-Indian consciousness was widespread as a result of shared cultures and such common experiences as pilgrimages, long-distant trade, and living under imperial governments. North India had been the seat of many political powers with imperial ambitions, including the Maurya dynasty in the third century BC, the Gupta dynasty (AD 320–550), and the Mughal empire (AD 1526–1707). Multiregional languages such as Sanskrit (the classical language of the Brahmans), Persian (used by both the Mughal and early British states as an administrative language), and Hindi allowed for communication and some sharing of values between regions. The pan-Indian spread of Hinduism, Islam, and their numerous hybrid offshoots had a similar effect. The devotional forms of Islam (Sufi) and Hinduism (Bhakti), with personal attachment to a sheikh or guru, resembled each other. Hindus in the far reaches of India typically worshipped the same gods (Shiva, Krishna, Rama, Kali, etc.); they went on pilgrimages to the same sacred temple towns where one or more of those gods and goddesses were worshipped; they read or listened to the same epic stories, such as the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, about India’s mythical kings; and they used the same Sanskrit vocabulary to express moral and ritual ideas. The Muslim population, mostly descended from converts from indigenous Buddhism and Hinduism and maybe a fifth of the whole population by the 19th century, also had strong ties across regional boundaries. They often were exposed to the Hindu epics at the same time they were linked to fellow Muslims by the Qu’ran, by a sacred history centered on the Prophet’s life and the duty of pilgrimage to Mecca, by membership in a Sufi (Islamic mystic) brotherhood, and in some cases by a memory of Muslim expansion and conquest of India. Both Hindus and Muslims were recruited into the same armies and civil services and typically shared the same regional languages and some festivals. Indians, in other words, came under British rule already in possession of complex, multiple identities that bridged many boundaries created by religion, class, language, and region. Those overlapping identities qualified but rarely eliminated a sense that India was home to a distinctive if plural civilization.


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Instituting the Nation British rule enlisted the cooperation of numerous Indians. As the British penetrated into the interior after 1757 from their original trading stations at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, they employed thousands of Indians in government service, including the army. While some Hindu and Muslim ruling elites and their followers violently resisted British usurpation of their ruling privileges, many Indians joined the British colonial army and civil services where they greatly outnumbered Europeans in the middle and lower ranks. Even the bloody Indian Revolt of 1857–1858 was put down with the help of Indian soldiers, including recently conquered Punjabis. The willingness of Indians to work and fight for the British led Gandhi to write ruefully in 1909 that the British had not conquered India as much as Indians had delivered it to them. After the British replaced Persian with English as the pan-Indian administrative language in the 1830s, more Indians sought education in English-language schools. Over many decades, the English-language schools produced a small, influential minority of high-caste or high-status intellectuals and professionals who often simultaneously admired British democratic practices and modern technology while criticizing colonial racism and what increasingly seemed to be economic exploitation. Working in British colonial institutions and being educated in the language of the rulers led to an ambivalence common among colonial elites. In the last three decades of the 19th century, Indians literate in English began to form numerous voluntary associations to discuss how Indians might reform their cultures and politics. A civil society developed outside of governmental control, with voluntary societies with formal meetings and written rules and competitive elections. In 1885, English-speaking, high-caste college graduates founded the Indian National Congress, the political party that led India to independence. They traveled on the railways and steamships built by their colonial masters; they spoke to each other in English, now the pan-Indian language for elites; and they addressed complaints to their rulers in the same language of rights they had learned in colonial schools. Many early Congress members regarded British rule as beneficial because of its orderliness and modernity. But they also increasingly saw their rulers as autocratic, racist, and impoverishing as Britain used India as a producer of raw materials rather than manufactured goods, drained wealth overseas, and restricted Indian access to higher posts in the civil and armed services. Many more Indians were literate in their vernacular languages than in English. Regionally based vernacular politics also bloomed in the late 19th century. Less concerned with constitutions and questions of political rights, these politics drew on culture, often mixing religion with politics in provocative ways that the secular Congress leaders resisted. One example of these regional groups was the Arya Samaj, a movement to reconstruct Hindu society. Swami Dayananda started the Arya Samaj in 1875, and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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it attracted widespread support in north India among upper castes, with its modern-sounding attacks on Brahman authority and caste inequalities. The Arya Samaj explicitly competed with Christian missions and Muslims for converts, and its Hindu-oriented school system, aid to famine victims, and protection of cows attracted Hindu support and increased religious tensions. In Bengal, vernacular politics produced Bengali-language plays, novels, and newspapers that were openly or covertly anti-British. Bankimchandra Chatterji wrote a popular Bengali novel, Ananda Math, about a community of Hindu ascetics who rebelled against an oppressive Muslim government, which readers often understood to stand for the English government, after taking vows to the goddess Kali. Bengali-vernacular newspapers and theaters represented Europeans as an “Occidentalized other,” materialistic, greedy, sex-crazed, and arrogant. In a third region, Maharashtra, vernacular nationalism was particularly strong. Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), the most popular Congress leader in its preGandhian years, started a public, patriotic festival to honor the Hindu deity Ganesh, hoping to draw illiterate Marathi-speakers into nationalist politics. With his Marathi-language newspaper and another public festival, he celebrated the heroism of the 17th-century warrior Shivaji who rebelled against the Mughal empire. This was controversial in part because it glorified a Hindu killing Muslims. Tilak’s justification of Shivaji’s murder of a Mughal officer also led the British to convict and imprison him for seeming to encourage anticolonial violence. This increased the popularity of the extremist Tilak.

Defining the Nation For nationalists, showing how colonialism impoverished India and robbed Indians of self-respect was easier than identifying what elements of culture made Indians a nation. With over a dozen separate linguistic regions and distinct literary traditions, language often impeded communication. Religions increasingly worked against feelings of shared citizenship, as suggested by the examples of the Arya Samaj, Bankimchandra Chatterji’s novel, Tilak’s Shivaji festival, and emerging Muslim separatist sentiment. Without one shared language, religion, or historical narrative, what besides the experience of colonialism might provide a common patriotism, a national identity? This problem dogged the Indian National Congress, the major nationalist party, from its beginning in 1885. The founders tried to focus on a core set of political grievances, such as complaints about the economic drain, the absence of representative institutions, and the exclusion of Indians from high office. But the early Congress proceedings, largely in the English language, loyalist in tone, and deliberately secular, were inaccessible and unappealing to many Indians who might have sympathized with the basic project of loosening the foreign hold. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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After 1900, a chorus of extremist critics expressed discontent with both the moderateness and the English or foreign tone of the Congress movement. Th ey called for a politics of self-sacrifice and direct action to replace the politics of polite petitions and collaboration. In 1905, nationalists in Bengal and elsewhere adopted a boycott of foreign imports and swore preference for swadeshi or India-made goods and indigenous cultures. The Congress movement began to fragment. Moderate leaders feared that mixing religion with politics might drive Hindus and Muslims apart. But Hindu extremist critics were pessimistic about attracting Muslims as allies in the anticolonial movement, and some openly asserted their preference for a national identity defined in Hindu cultural idioms. Outside the Congress, starting in 1908 in the provinces of Bengal, Maharashtra, and the Punjab, small terrorist groups began to assassinate British colonialists and their Indian supporters. Often they did so in the name of Kali, a Hindu goddess of destruction. These developments increased Muslim anxieties about the Congress and the Hindu majority. Soon after the Congress was founded in 1885, Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817–1898), an aristocratic Muslim who had started a college for Muslims so that they would not ignore the study of English and modern science, openly attacked the Hindu-led Congress as dangerous to Muslim minority interests and declared that India contained two nations, not one. In 1906, elite Muslims organized their first all-Indian party, the Muslim League, and demanded special electoral protections for Muslim minority voters. When Mohandas (Mahatma) Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1948) returned to India in 1915 after years in South Africa as a lawyer and activist, he faced HinduMuslim, moderate-extremist, and elite-popular polarizations. He tried to unite and expand the political classes. He set out to make the nationalist movement more inclusive, militant, and indigenous. He persuaded the Congress to use the vernacular languages locally and to adopt Hindi eventually as the pan-India language in place of English, which was spoken by less than 2 percent of the population. He reached out to peasant groups as previous Congress leaders had failed to do. His boldest move was toward Muslims. During World War I, Muslims in India learned of European imperialist threats to the Ottoman Empire’s hold on the sacred cities of Islam. Indian Muslims joined a pan-Islamic movement to preserve the Ottoman ruler’s control of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. Gandhi seized upon Muslim anxiety about European encroachment on the Ottoman Empire as an opportunity to enlist them in a multiethnic alliance with the Congress. Congress and Muslim leaders in the early 1920s worked together briefly in a noncooperation movement against the British to seek more self-rule for India and to protect the authority of the Ottoman caliph in Istanbul. These friendly relations faltered after Turkey abolished the office of caliph and adopted a secular constitution in 1924. After Congress-Muslim cooperation unraveled, the only nationalist narrative shared generally was one of colonial autocracy and exploitation. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Other groups raised their voices against the Congress and the dominance of its high-caste Hindu leaders. In the southern province of Madras, non-Brahmans formed the Justice Party to resist Gandhi’s insistence on Hindi as the national language and to undermine the traditional dominance of Brahmans who led the Congress. The Justice Party evolved into an anti-northern regional movement promoting Tamil culture and non-Brahman empowerment. It defeated the Congress in elections during the 1920s and formed an anti-Congress government in the province of Madras under the 1919 constitution. Another example of countermobilization was the untouchable movement led by B. R. Ambedkar (1891–1956). In 1932 discussions about India’s future constitution, Ambedkar agitated to obtain separate electorates for untouchables, but Gandhi fasted in protest, saying that it would separate untouchables from the rest of Hindu society, and thereby forced Ambedkar to abandon this demand. Ambedkar was deeply bitter about the failure of India to end discrimination as Gandhi promised, and after independence, he and thousands of other untouchables converted to Buddhism.

Narrating the Nation Few events or periods in India’s precolonial history offered the potential to excite either unambiguous pan-Indian pride or a narrative of common victimhood. Details about the admirable and humane emperor Ashoka (269–232 BC) were hazy. The history of the great Mughals was far better known, but the fact that the Mughal rulers were Muslim conquerors from central Asia limited their appeal to many non-Muslim nationalists. The Mughal ruler Akbar (1555–1605) was championed by some Hindus as a tolerant and broadminded ruler, but Akbar failed to attract popularity. The search for historical figures to represent a unified nation was elusive. By the time Gandhi assumed leadership of the Congress movement in 1920, religious thinkers such as Swami Dayananda (1824–1883), Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902), and others had persuaded a broad swath of political India that what was distinctive about Indian, or at least Hindu/Buddhist, culture was its spirituality. Ironically, European scholars were the first to spread the notion that India was otherworldly and spiritual, compared to the practical and scientific West. Indian spirituality, Gandhi and others taught, was modern in its universalism and tolerance, while it was also a humane cure or antidote for self-centered competitiveness, which Gandhi considered the curse of Western modernity. Gandhian nationalists commonly took pride in claims of superiority for Indian spirituality and village solidarity over Western materialism and individualism. However, this view was by no means universal. Some Indian politicians and businessmen disagreed with Gandhi and argued that India needed more materialism and industry, that is, more modernity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Tactically and ideologically, Gandhi dominated the diverse Congress movement from 1920 to independence in 1947. In his efforts to persuade Muslims, untouchables, and peasants that they belonged to one nation, he relied selectively on Hindu moral-philosophical traditions of tolerance and nonviolence. His universalistic, inclusive teaching embraced the idea that variations among religions in rituals, as well as among castes, were superficial differences. He said all human beings embodied god within them, regardless of the name they used for the deity, and thus society as a whole deserved our respect and selfless service. To demonstrate the inclusion of untouchables in the Indian nation, he personally and repeatedly performed the conventionally polluting work of untouchables such as removing excrement. He gave the untouchable castes a new name—Harijans, or children of god. Gandhi also perfected a new form of nonviolent political resistance or disobedience called satyagraha (“holding firmly to truth”), which was based on the Hindu concept of ahimsa, or nonviolence, and which asked its practitioners, in an effort to win over their opponents, to neither harm nor hate them during acts of resistance. His anti-urban vision of the future Indian nation was one of self-dependent villages producing food and handicrafts. Under his leadership, Congress members spun their own cotton thread. Nationalist India changed visibly as Congress members wore the distinctive, rough, hand-woven white cloth. Among the problems Gandhi faced was that the idiom of satyagraha and his other activities had a specifically Hindu character that appealed less to Muslims. Ahimsa attracted few Muslims who understood the Islamic notion of jihad (the struggle to become a better Muslim) to imply violence; reverence for the cow meant less to meat-eating Muslims than to Hindus. The challenge for Gandhi and the Congress in building a single nation was deeper than that the Hindus themselves were split and that Hindus and Muslims often did not share a national narrative.

A Hindu Nation? Gandhi’s political vocabulary was often Hindu, which aroused suspicions among some Muslims. Ahimsa, cow protection and vegetarianism, and glorification of Lord Rama—the warrior/king deity of the epic Ramayana—were all exclusively embedded in Hindu life. Moreover, an influential body of Hindus did not share Gandhi’s inclusive Indian nationalism or his interest in mobilizing Muslims and/or untouchables. Hindu extremists saw nonviolence as a Hindu weakness rather than a strength. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Society, or RSS), founded in 1925, promoted an ethnic nationalism focused on the history of Hindu resistance to Muslim conquest and temple destruction centuries earlier. The RSS was a Hindu self-strengthening movement focused on patriotic cultural, paramilitary, body-building, and self-defense activity. Thus, while Gandhi preached that India offered humane tolerance, nonviolence, and antimaterialism to a violent, competitive world, Hindu extremists were constructing a history of Hindu victimhood, internal division, and martial bravery in the examples of Shivaji and Lord Rama.


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Mobilizing and Building the Nation Despite these divisions, the Congress movement after 1920 gained broad popularity. Over a million Indians served in World War I. This service and international discussion of the rights of self-determination raised nationalist hopes for more self-government. But the 1919 legislative council reforms failed to meet nationalist expectations. Public opinion was inflamed in 1919 when General Reginald Dyer ordered soldiers to fire on an unarmed nationalist demonstration in Amritsar in the Punjab, killing 369 people. The Congress also attracted support from its concern for the welfare of overtaxed peasants and depressed untouchables and from Gandhi’s reputation as a self-sacrificing spiritual leader of great purity and moral standing. Neither Hindu extremists nor the Muslim League matched the ability of Gandhi and the Congress to mobilize mass agitations or organize election campaigns. Gandhi’s flair for dramatizing colonial injustice to a largely illiterate population was remarkable. For example, his 1930 civil disobedience march to the sea to break the government monopoly over the manufacture of salt, a necessary ingredient in the diet, captured popular imagination around the world. Gandhi and his 78 followers trained in nonviolent techniques marched 241 miles in 24 days with the widely publicized intention of breaking British-Indian law. The police brutally clubbed his followers to the ground, igniting massive protests. By the end of the year, Gandhi and over 60,000 Indians had been imprisoned. Nevertheless, Muslim leaders remained wary of the Hindu majority as independence approached, as self-government was conceded to the provinces, and as the Congress Party in some regions became not merely an opposition movement but also the governing party. After the first elections under the new 1935 constitution, Congress won such a large part of the Hindu vote that it formed governments in 7 of India’s 11 provinces. Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) and the Muslim League claimed that schools and police under the Congress provincial ministries, largely composed of Hindus, discriminated against members of the Muslim minority and that Islam was in danger. Fear of Hindu majority rule in a free India led the Muslim League to adopt the “Pakistan Resolution” in 1940, calling for the creation of separate and autonomous states for Muslims. World War II raised nationalist anger to new levels. But it also provoked separatist passions. The British government in 1940 committed India to fighting in the war without consulting Indian leaders. The Congress regional ministries resigned in protest, leaving the Muslim League a clear field during the war to mobilize Muslims in favor of one or more autonomous Muslim states. The Congress focused on obtaining immediate independence instead of winning Muslims over to the idea of a united India. The Congress defiantly declared the “Quit India” movement in 1942 after Winston Churchill’s government refused to promise independence. The movement and its repression led to much violence and over 90,000 arrests. In the administrative confusion caused by the war and civil unrest, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Mahatma Gandhi, leader of the Indian civil disobedience revolt, marches to the shore at Dandi to collect salt in violation of the law in 1930. (Bettmann/Corbis)


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over 2 million died in the 1943 Bengal famine. A clearer sign of the erosion of British colonial authority occurred in the Indian army, which since 1857–1858 had been mostly free of anti-British political activity. When the Japanese army defeated the Indian army defending Singapore in its advance toward the borders of India in February 1942, they recruited many of the 60,000 imprisoned Indian soldiers into the Indian National Army (INA) and placed it under the command of Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945), a popular, former president of the Congress movement. The INA achieved minimal military success against the British-led Indian army, but its formation and the 1945 sedition trials of its members created a sensation in India. Most importantly, by 1945 most Muslims who participated in Indian elections were voting for Muslim League politicians who advocated a separate state of Pakistan. Two nations, not one, were about to be born. Selected Bibliography Akbar, M. J. 1988. Nehru: The Making of India. New York: Viking. Arnold, David. 2001. Gandhi. London: Longman. Brown, Judith M. 1985. Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chatterjee, Partha. 1994. The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories. Delhi: Oxford University Press.


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Embree, Ainslee T. 1972. India’s Search for National Identity. New York: Knopf. Hardy, Peter. 1972. The Muslims of British India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hay, Stephen, ed. 1988. Sources of Indian Tradition, vol. 2: Modern India and Pakistan. New York: Columbia University Press. Jaffrelot, Christophe, ed. 2005. The Sangh Parivar: A Reader. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. McLane, John R. 1977. Indian Nationalism and the Early Congress. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mukherjee, Rudrangshu, ed. 1996. The Penguin Gandhi Reader. New York: Penguin. Sarkar, Sumit. 1989. Modern India, 1885–1947. New York: St. Martin’s Press.


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Japan Neil Waters Chronology 1825 Expulsion edicts issued, ordering that foreign ships be driven away from Japanese waters. Aizawa Seishisai writes New Theses. 1854 Commodore Matthew Perry secures Treaty of Peace and Amity. 1858 Townsend Harris negotiates Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and the United States. It is the first of a series of unequal treaties. 1868 Tokugawa regime is overthrown; Meiji era begins. 1871–1873 The Iwakura Mission, which includes key government leaders, travels to the United States and Europe to assess conditions in the West and evaluate the prospects for renegotiating unequal treaties. 1889 The emperor grants a constitution. 1890 National Diet is convened. 1895 Sino-Japanese war ends. 1905 Russo-Japanese war ends. 1918 First party cabinet marks transition from political control by Meiji oligarchy to political party rule. 1920–1930 “Imperial Democracy,” characterized by growing political liberalization at home, clinging to empire abroad. 1931 Manchurian Incident: an explosion on Japan’s South Manchurian Railroad, secretly set off by Japanese army officers but blamed on the Chinese, leads to the Japanese takeover of Manchuria (renamed Manchukuo in 1932) and Japan’s withdrawal in 1933 from the League of Nations. 1937 All-out war with China. 1941–1945 Japan participates in World War II, fighting the United States in the Pacific. The war ends with the Japanese surrender and occupation by the United States in 1945.

Situating the Nation In 1825 Japan would seem to have had most of the geographical ingredients associated with a nation-state. Its island boundaries were stable, although the northern island of Hokkaido was regarded as the land of the barbarian Ezo, under the loose control of the lord (daimyo) of the Matsumae domain in Northern Honshu, who in turn owed his allegiance to the Tokugawa government in Edo (modern Tokyo). Nevertheless, Japan was not the primary, nor even the secondary, unit of identity for most Japanese. The Japanese islands during the Tokugawa period (1603–1868) were politically and socially fragmented. The samurai class, consisting of about 7 percent of the population, included all who were armed, from the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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lowliest spear-carrier to the shogun in Edo. Most lived in castle-towns in one of about 250 domains, or han, comprising most of the land of Japan. Peasants lived in villages on those domains, physically separated from their samurai superiors in the castle-towns. Each domain, in turn, was headed by a daimyo, who for most purposes was absolute lord of his domain, commanding the personal allegiance of all samurai of lesser rank. He in turn owed a combination of feudal and bureaucratic allegiance to the Tokugawa house, and through it to what passed as a central government—the shogun’s administrative apparatus, or bakufu (literally, “tent government”) in Edo. Foreign relations, which did imply a “national” level, were restricted to the port of Nagasaki, where limited trade under careful bakufu scrutiny was allowed solely with the Dutch, who were permitted to live on a quarteracre artificial island called Dejima in Nagasaki harbor, and with Chinese traders, who had a few warehouses on shore. In addition, 12 official missions from Korea were permitted to land in Nagasaki and proceed on foot to Edo during the 265-year Edo period. Other “foreign relations” were handled at the domain level: Satsuma han in southern Kyushu claimed suzerainty over the Ryukyu Islands (which also labored under similar and simultaneous claims by Ming and then Qing, China). Hokkaido, under the daimyo of Matsumae, was regarded as not quite foreign, not quite integral to Japan, but somewhere in between. Most samurai saw themselves as housemen attached to a particular daimyo; the highest allegiance they normally encountered was the han level, although some would accompany the daimyo on his alternate-year sojourns in Edo. Most peasants, constituting approximately 85 percent of the population in the 19th century, parked the lion’s share of their identity in their home villages, which in all but a few domains contained no samurai. For them, even the han level seldom mattered, except as a collector of taxes, and the national level was at best an abstraction. For samurai attached directly to the Tokugawa house, and for merchants and peasants who lived in and around Edo or Osaka, life was more cosmopolitan (Edo was the largest city in the world by 1720). Classes mixed more freely than on the domains, but allegiances were still personal for samurai (to a houseman of the Tokugawa clan, for example) and tied to the local sphere of everyday life. All that changed, repeatedly, over the next 125 years. In 1840 the Japanese learned that British fleets had defeated China in the Opium War, and when Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into Uraga Bay in 1853 and returned in 1854, the Tokugawa bakufu was powerless to drive him away. National identity, such as it was, had been primarily antiforeign and reflexively pro-Tokugawa; now it became for many samurai detached from loyalty to the Tokugawa regime and grounded instead in loyalty to the Japanese emperor. After the Tokugawa regime was overthrown in the Meiji Restoration in 1868, it became quickly apparent that the new state, centered on the symbol of the emperor, was no more capable of driving out foreigners than the Tokugawa bakufu had been. If Japan was to survive, it would need a national identity that was not simply antiforeign and not only the concern of the samurai class. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Efforts to craft such an identity were primarily top-down and in response to continually changing conditions. The most important events that altered and expanded the idea of the Japanese nation included the following: 1. The Sino-Japanese war of 1894–1895. Japan won and emerged from the conflict with a foreign possession, Taiwan. 2. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905. Also won by Japan (albeit barely), it gave Japan holdings on the Asian continent, augmented five years later by the annexation of Korea. 3. The Great Depression in 1929 and the London Naval Conference of 1930. These convinced many ordinary Japanese that elected politicians were incompetent and only military leaders could be trusted to act in Japan’s best interests. 4. The Manchurian Incident of 1931. This event led to the takeover of all Manchuria and the inculcation of the idea that Manchuria was indispensable to Japan’s survival. 5. War with China in 1937. This war led to disputes with the United States and to efforts to define Japan as the natural “liberator” of an empire large enough to be autonomous.

Instituting the Nation What we might call national identity began to emerge almost exclusively among members of the samurai class in the face of contact with foreigners outside the official channels in Nagasaki. A series of “incursions” by Russian explorers and merchants (Adam Laxman in 1792, Nikolai Rezanov in 1804) into, respectively, the Nemuro region in Hokkaido and Japanese settlements in Sakhalin and the Kuriles prompted the bakufu to commission a map of Japan that, for the first time, included Hokkaido, as well as Kunashiri. A shocking incident occurred during the Napoleonic wars in 1806 when the British ship Phaeton, seeking Dutch enemies, sailed into Nagasaki harbor and abducted Dutch officials on Dejima. Mortified, the Nagasaki bugyo (the bakufu-appointed commissioner of the port of Nagasaki) committed hara-kiri. In 1824 shipwrecked British sailors appeared in Mito han, an event that helped prompt the Tokugawa bakufu to issue the following year an exclusion edict ordering daimyo in coastal areas other than Nagasaki to attack and drive away all Western ships. These events did not yet evoke even a proto-nationalist consciousness. But they did prompt Japanese scholars to lay the intellectual foundations for such a development. Aizawa Seishisai, a scholar from Mito han, is the best-known example. He envisioned a national polity grounded in the Japanese emperor, whose direct descent from Amaterasu, the son goddess, assured a spiritual unity of all N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Japanese with him. The result would be a moral community capable of resisting the West and assuring that Japan was morally superior to all other nations. Moral superiority was one thing, national survival was quite another. Japan’s leaders after the Meiji Restoration concluded very early that Japan would have to learn to adhere to Western international norms if it was to avoid the sort of domination by Western nations that had befallen China and other Asian countries. That effort in turn would require wholesale transformation of Japanese society. A spate of reforms followed the Meiji Restoration and bracketed the return of the Iwakura Mission in 1873. Some of these were implemented before the return of the mission: abolition of the domains and establishment of prefectures headed by governors appointed by the central government in Tokyo (haihan chiken) was completed in 1871; an elementary education system, mandatory for four years (on paper) to all children, was enacted in 1872; and a “universal” conscription ordinance was promulgated early in 1873. Others, notably those restricting the privileges of samurai, awaited the return of the mission. Samurai stipends were commuted to single payments, and the right to bear swords was revoked in 1876. In 1873 peasants were converted to farmers; their taxes were based on the assessed N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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A group of ex-samurai pose for a photograph in late 19th-century Japan. Samurai warriors were the driving force behind the Meiji Restoration of 1868, but they disappeared as a legally recognized class after 1876, when they lost their stipends and their right to carry swords. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

value of the land they worked rather than the value of the harvest, and they were given the right to buy and sell land. Finally, and more slowly and carefully, venues of political participation and legal rights were established. Prefectural assemblies with limited powers were inaugurated in 1878 throughout Japan; delegates could be elected by males over 25 years old who paid at least 5 yen per year in taxes, a wealthy minority of the population. The government promised in 1881 that a National Diet would be established by 1890; it was, although the electorate was confined to males over 25 years old who paid at least 15 yen in taxes. In 1889 the emperor “granted” a constitution. In 1898 a new civil code was promulgated, in general, conformity with Western legal standards. There is no doubt that these far-reaching reforms were enacted in an atmosphere of fear, but it was not mindless fear. Japan’s new leaders were determined to forge a centralized nation-state from the remains of the Tokugawa order that was physically capable of resisting foreign incursions and capable of dealing as an equal in an international world order defined by the legal and economic norms of the West. The underlying goal of the Iwakura Mission—to revise the unequal treaties—remained perhaps the top priority of the Meiji government long after the mission returned, until it was largely realized in 1899. But achieving that N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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goal would require a transformation of Japanese society and of its economic, educational, legal, and status-based foundations. A transformation on that scale would in turn require the inculcation of a sense of national identity involving the whole of Japan’s population. The Meiji oligarchs needed a population not just compelled but willing to serve in a national army and navy, to pay taxes in good times and bad, to send their sons and even daughters to school long enough to become minimally literate, and to work in textile mills and steel mills for the good of the nation as well as for their own benefit. The result was by no means a full democracy, but it did involve a degree of participation by very gradually increasing percentages of the male population in elections to prefectural assemblies and, after 1890, to a national assembly. National identity in the early Meiji period (1870s) was what many would term proto-nationalism; in 1908 the journalist and intellectual Tokutomi Soho said of the 1870s, “The concept ‘foreign nations’ brought forth the concept ‘Japanese nation’ ” (quoted in Maruyama 1974, 342). But Tokutomi was speaking of the past; in 1908 there was a participatory element to Japanese nationalism, and it might be more properly regarded as a form of modern nationalism.

Defining the Nation Despite local variants, the Japanese spoke a common language that was, for the most part, mutually intelligible from Kyushu to Northern Honshu. A common writing system, history, literature, culture, and religious mind-set bound the inhabitants of Japan’s three main islands (Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu) even more tightly, and the degree of genetic variation was so small (with the exception of the Ainu on Hokkaido) that no real distinction was made between being ethnically and culturally Japanese. Early efforts during the Tokugawa period to articulate what it meant to be Japanese were motivated in large part by a desire to explain why Japan was more important than its inferior position in the Chinese view of the world order implied. But such efforts took on a new note of urgency in the early 19th century in response to Western incursions. The Mito scholar Aizawa Seishisai congratulated the bakufu on its exclusion edict but insisted in his New Theses, written in 1825 in response to the edict, that the English, the Russians, and other Western seafarers represented a deep spiritual threat to all of Japan. His greatest fear was that Japan’s non-samurai, the “stupid commoners” (gumin), would fall prey to Christianity, the religion of the Western barbarians, and thus pave the way for the downfall of Japan’s spiritual polity and, thence, of Japan itself. To counter such developments, Aizawa sought a variety of reforms, and he used the efforts of the Mito school of scholarship to construct a rearticulated version of the “national polity” (kokutai) that could, he hoped, serve as a counterweight to the seductions of Christianity. He was not the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Aizawa Seishisai (1782–1863) Aizawa Seishisai was born in the Mito domain, a major center of Confucian learning and Japanese historical studies. He is best known for writing his New Theses in 1825, two months after the Tokugawa bakufu issued its expulsion decree ordering Japan’s daimyo to drive away all foreign vessels approaching Japanese territory at any location other than Nagasaki. The tract, written in reaction to the expulsion decree, was addressed to Tokugawa Narinobu, the daimyo of Mito, in the hope that it would be sent on to bakufu officials in Edo. Instead, Narinobu prohibited its dissemination, fearing that its far-reaching recommendations would elicit retribution from Edo. There was reason for Narinobu’s concern. New Theses was a prescription to save and enhance the power of the Tokugawa regime in the face of the increasing appearances of ships from Western nations. It was virulently antiforeign, yet advocated the study and adoption of Western military equipment, techniques, and coastal fortifications. Aizawa called for stronger control over the daimyo so that they could be forced to contribute to the common defense. Above all, he saw a growing spiritual threat from the West, manifested in Christianity, which he viewed as the major source of Western strength. He sought a counterweight to the potential seductive appeal of Christianity among the “stupid commoners” of Japan. He recommended the vigorous establishment of a “national polity” (kokutai ) focused on the Japanese emperor, whose blood connection to Amaterasu, the sun goddess, made him the source of moral superiority in which all Japanese could partake. That moral community, in turn, made Japan the true “middle kingdom,” superior to all other nations. In 1829 there was a new daimyo in Mito, Tokugawa Nariaki, whose views on national defense were very close to those expressed in New Theses. He promoted Aizawa and ordered the dissemination of his work. Decades later, when the Western threat was far more serious, Aizawa’s views, originally presented to strengthen the Tokugawa regime, were used as a rationale for toppling it and “restoring” the emperor to power.

first Tokugawa thinker to use old texts dating to the eighth century to establish a case for Japan’s superiority over all other places in the world, but he did so with a particular sense of urgency. Aizawa denounced Buddhism as a foreign import and forcefully reminded his readers that Japan’s native roots were Shinto. He reemphasized the old creation stories in the eighth-century works Kojiki and Nihon shoki, noting especially that the first Japanese emperor, unlike his Chinese counterpart, was the direct blood descendant of Amaterasu, the sun goddess, and that all subsequent Japanese emperors shared her divine bloodline. He retained the Confucian idea that international relations were a hierarchical analogue to familial relationships, but he strongly maintained that the fact that Japanese emperors had never been overthrown proved Japan’s superiority to China, as well as to all other countries; hence Japan, not China, was the true “middle kingdom,” regardless of its diminutive physical size. After the Meiji Restoration, and particularly after half of Japan’s new leaders studied Western international law in preparation for the Iwakura Mission, JapaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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nese leaders were convinced that they must adopt Western concepts of national sovereignty and that they must master Western international law to make sure that Japan’s sovereignty was recognized. The first priority was territorial. Almost immediately after the Restoration, the new government promoted Japanese migration to Hokkaido to lay the framework to a legal claim, in Western terms, over the northernmost of Japan’s main islands. Similarly, an expedition to Taiwan was mounted in 1874 to chastise native tribes who had killed some shipwrecked Japanese fishermen and, in the process, won international recognition of Japanese claims to the Ryukyus, the “tradition” of Chinese suzerainty notwithstanding. Concerns about sovereignty partially, but not totally, explain Japan’s gradual acquisition of an empire. In 1876 the Japanese government insisted on redefining its relationship to Korea by means of a classic, Western-style unequal treaty. In 1894 Japan went to war with China partly because of fears that Chinese Confucianbased relations with Korea could lead to a Western power taking over the Korean peninsula, thereby threatening Japan’s security. When it appeared like Russia might actually do so, Japan attacked Port Arthur, precipitating the Russo-Japanese war. These conflicts left Japan in possession of Taiwan, of Korea itself in 1910, of concessions in China and Manchuria, and of southern Sakhalin. How did the existence of an empire influence national identity in Japan? By the end of the Meiji period in 1912, Japan’s place at the head of an empire dovetailed nicely into the carefully fostered view that Japan, alone among Asian nations, was a successful, modern nation and a natural model for the rest of Asia. For “liberals” fighting hard for political rights at home, the annexation of Korea in particular demonstrated Japan’s suitability to undertake a mission civilisatrice, redounding, eventually, to the benefit of the Koreans. Others looked to the empire less altruistically as a source of national prestige and/or of potential economic benefits. Across the political spectrum, there were very few Japanese voices raised against colonial possessions and spheres of influence, even during the relatively liberal 1920s, an era that historian Andrew Gordon calls “imperial democracy.”

Narrating the Nation The tumultuous period from 1853 to 1868 was vital to the formation of Japanese national identity. Aizawa’s treatise, which was supported by Tokugawa Nariaki, the daimyo of Mito from 1829, was dusted off, made available in a more accessible, less scholarly form of Japanese, and applied to paradoxical circumstances: Aizawa’s views (and those of other scholars associated with “national learning,” such as the philologist Motoori Norinaga and the reactionary/romantic Hirata Atsutane) served to remind his readers that the primary mission of the shogun, and the reason the emperor appointed a shogun at all, was to suppress barbarians, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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and yet this set of barbarians could not in the end be driven away. For many samurai, the logical conclusion was that the shogun had failed and should be removed from power, and in his place the emperor, whose actual political role since the time of Emperor Go-Daigo in the 1330s was confined to figurehead legitimizer of a series of shoguns, should be “restored” to power. That development, many samurai fervently hoped, would lead to the sort of kokutai (“national polity”) envisioned by Aizawa or the national learning scholars: drawn from Japan’s distant past, grounded in Shinto, and led by an emperor descended from Amaterasu who would perform rites and ceremonies to cement the loyalty of the people. The Meiji version of this national narrative did not derive exclusively or even primarily from Aizawa, yet elements of his thought persisted. The virulent antiforeignism was stripped away, but the idea that Japan’s natural place was high in the hierarchy of nations remained and was used to explain the need to sacrifice, through taxes and military service, so Japan could assume its proper place. The Meiji emperor was no longer hidden away to perform rites; he was put on a fine white horse in a splendid military uniform, and his portrait was placed in every school in the country. In the 1890s, Hozumi Yatsuka, a law professor at Tokyo University, seemed to echo Aizawa and even Hirata by explaining that, through the emperor’s connection to the sun goddess and the Japanese people’s descent from lesser deities, the Japanese were not like a family, they were a family. Japan, he maintained, was a family-state (kokka kazoku Nihon). By the time of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–1905, several “generations” of Japanese schoolchildren had passed through the elementary education system and had listened to a reading of the emperor/subject-centered Imperial Rescript on Education every Monday morning of their schooldays. Most could read newspapers, and most of those newspapers enthusiastically supported the war effort. “Official nationalism” would henceforth be augmented, and occasionally contradicted, by popular nationalism. Popular nationalistic views sometimes escaped government control. In the wake of the Russo-Japanese war, for example, the “failure” of Japanese negotiators at Portsmouth to secure an indemnity from Russia (an unrealistic expectation stoked by a popular press unable to forget the indemnity collected from China in 1895) to pay for the war meant that high wartime taxes would continue. Riots erupted in Tokyo and other major cities, fueled by the conviction that inept negotiators had sold out Japanese interests. More ominously, the public reaction to the 1933–1934 trials of the army, navy, and civilian defendants in the assassinations on February 9, March 5, and November 15, 1932, of former finance minister Inoue Junnosuke, the director-general of Mitsui, Dan Takuma, and Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi, respectively, demonstrated that popular nationalism could far outstrip the official variety. The conspirators were rightists determined to attack Japan’s business and political elites and thus shock the Japanese into ridding the emperor of bad advisors and establishing a more egalitarian order, based on, as the leader of the conspiracy Inoue N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Nissho stated, “all these things that made us Japanese, things that have been washed aside in the mad fascination for modern ways” (quoted in Large 2003, 63). By the time the intensely reported trials were over, much of the public came to see the assassins as patriots acting in the interests of ordinary Japanese, and the beleaguered prosecutors and judges imposed much lighter sentences than were initially proposed. During the next few years, an increasingly militaristic government seized tighter control of the national narrative. By the mid-1930s, Japan was a far more authoritarian place than it had been in the 1920s or even in the Meiji period. The emperor cult was revived and intensified, and domestic opponents to militarization, especially Japanese communists, were imprisoned. Mobilization of industry and labor followed the outbreak of all-out war with China in 1937. The Special Higher Police took pains to monitor public opinion for any signs of wavering in popular support for the war effort. Government propaganda in the 1930s and 1940s portrayed Japanese soldiers down to the lowest-ranking private as heirs to the spirit of the samurai. Newspaper and magazine cartoons depicted the Pacific war as a purification ritual, cleansing the rest of Asia of Anglo-American infestation. Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang

Fascism An unresolved debate still continues among historians over whether Japan from about 1936 to 1945 can be considered fascist. Despite mobilization of the economy and the populace, intolerance of dissent, brutal disregard for rights, and other signposts of fascism, Japan differed in some ways from its Axis allies. There certainly was no Führerprinzip (“leadership principle”), and Japan’s political parties continued to exert some influence even after their official dissolution in 1940. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, initiated in 1940, was never the totalitarian mass party it was envisioned to become because its constituent elements refused to dissolve. The Way of Subjects (Shin’min no michi ), assigned by the Ministry of Education in August 1941 as required reading in secondary schools and universities, took approving note of fascist dictatorships in Germany and Italy, but took pains to distinguish Japan from its Axis allies: Germany . . . has succeeded in achieving thoroughgoing popular confidence in, and obedience to, the dictatorship of the Nazis, and is adopting totalitarianism. Italy’s ideals are the restoration of the great Roman Empire, and her policy for realizing that is not different from Germany. The country stands on the dictatorial totalitarianism of the Fascists. In contrast to these, Japan, since the founding of the Empire, has been basking under a benign rule of a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal, and has been growing and developing in an atmosphere of great harmony as a nation, consisting of one large family, . . . united under the Emperor, the center. . . . Japan is the fountain source of the Yamato race, Manchukuo is its reservoir, and East Asia is its paddy field. (Japanese Ministry of Education, Shin’min no michi [The Way of Subjects], reprinted in Lu 1997, 435–440)


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K’ai-shek were portrayed as demons. At the same time, the nobility and necessity of Japan’s mission was constantly emphasized: Japan had to fight to survive; Japan was Asia’s most advanced country, its natural leader, and its potential liberator; Japan’s new order in Asia would set the stage for world peace. Yet it is clear that wartime propaganda was not broadcast to an unreceptive public. In 1941 Japan had controlled Taiwan for 46 years, had held interests in Manchuria for 36 years, and had maintained total control over Korea for 31 years. The Japanese had become used to regarding their country as the natural head of an Asian empire, an advanced, modern nation that had earned its special place because it had avoided colonization and Western domination. It was not a great leap of faith to believe that Japan had a special mission to extend its own blessings—a product of its unique history—to its more benighted neighbors by freeing them from the yoke of Western imperialism and materialistic communism. It was also easy to believe that Western nations, in alliance with the Chinese Guomindang, sought to strip Japan of its empire and seize it for themselves, destroying Japan in the process, and that therefore Japan had to vastly expand its empire to construct an entity capable of self-sufficiency and of resisting its enemies. The execution of that vision was horribly flawed, and most of Japan’s Asian neighbors suffered far more under Japanese overlords than they had under Japan’s Western predecessors, a fact that continues to elude Japanese rightists who prefer to remember a noble cause over its hideous consequences.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Most samurai who backed the Meiji Restoration were looking for just that—a restoration of the past, not a nation in pursuit of Western-style modernity. In the final years of the Tokugawa bakufu, however, it was apparent that no one, not even under orders from the emperor, could actually drive the foreigners away. In 1825 foreign vessels under attack actually left; after 1853 they did not. The Meiji Restoration leaders who actually came to power in 1868 realized almost immediately that the Western nations would hold Japan in its entirety responsible for the implementation of treaties, so the autonomy of the han could not be sustained. The only way to keep foreigners at bay and someday roll back the concessions made in a series of unequal treaties was to learn and adapt to the Western international order and change Japan enough for the country to be accepted within it. Incredibly, almost half of the new Meiji government ministers left Japan in 1871 and went on a two-year fact-finding tour of Europe, Russia, and the United States, returning to Japan in 1873 (the Iwakura Mission). Accompanying the mission were about 60 students who were left in Europe and the United States to study. The other purpose of the mission was to renegotiate the unequal treaties, but those efforts were dropped in 1872 when it became apparent that N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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they could not succeed. Of far more lasting value to Japan was that the time members spent preparing for the negotiations gave them a crash course in Western diplomacy and international law (Mayo 1967, 389–410). The trip was undertaken just as the Industrial Revolution was in full swing, and the members of the Iwakura Mission realized that the economic, technological, and military gap between the nations of the West and Japan was far greater than they had imagined, although they also took heart at the realization that the industrial wonders they saw were of recent vintage. Two other realizations were key prerequisites in determining the shape of the Meiji state: (1) that wealth and power in the West were based on the labor and loyalty of the population as a whole, not just that of an elite class; and (2) Western dominance was based not only on technology but also on the institutions and beliefs that supported the technology. A few of the Meiji leaders who had remained in Japan during the Iwakura Mission, most notably Saigo Takamori, hoped to launch a war with Korea as a means to preserve and even enhance the supremacy of the samurai class. When their returning peers refused to allow this, Saigo, Itagaki Taisuke, and Eto Shin’pei left the government, effectively leaving the field to those most impressed with the need to reform Japan. When a rebellion, led reluctantly by Saigo, was put down in 1877, many samurai who retained hopes of a reactionary outcome to the Meiji Restoration were either killed or profoundly discouraged. Most of the rank and file in the pro-Meiji forces involved in the 1877 uprising were commoner-draftees, not samurai, and from then on Japan’s wars would be fought primarily by commoners. Accordingly, the effects on national identity of the Sino-Japanese war in 1894–1895 and the Russo-Japanese war in 1904–1905 among ordinary Japanese were enormous. The armies were manned by draftees— perhaps 250,000 in the Sino-Japanese war and over a million in the Russo-Japanese war. Organized “home-front activities,” from packing care packages, rolling bandages, and seeing off departing soldiers to taking care of bereaved families, gave new life and new, nation-oriented purposes to village-based youth groups and women’s associations. The enormous casualty rates in the Russo-Japanese war assured that almost every family was directly affected or knew somebody who was. With the end of the Russo-Japanese war, most of the raw ingredients in Japan’s changing pre-1945 national identity already existed, although they would be blended in various ways over the next 40 years. Japan had succeeded in identifying itself, and seeing itself recognized, as one of the “powers,” not as one of the colonizable nations. The sacrifices of millions of ordinary Japanese had led to demands for more rights, leaving the financially strapped government looking for ways to keep the spirit of sacrifice alive. Above all, Japan had an empire, which would mean different things to different people, but almost no one was inclined to give it up. Japan by most objective measurements was a success story by the end of the Meiji period in 1912, but the same forces that had made it a success turned it into N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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a mass society, alive with new groups—workers, students, women’s associations, tenant’s associations—holding aspirations that went far beyond survival in a hostile world. The success of the Russian Revolution in 1917, the victory of the “democratic” forces in World War I, the rice riots in 1918, and the rise of party government and the end of the domination of the Meiji oligarchs all contributed to a greater diversity and intensity of domestic expectations. Japan did not become a democracy in the broadest sense of that term, but during the 1920s most popular attention was on the politics of the Diet and its constituent parties, not on the authoritarian aspects of the Meiji constitution. All that changed in the 1930s. The quadruple impact of the Great Depression; the 1930 London Naval Conference agreement, which was attacked in the press as a demonstration of the venality of civilian politicians and the rapacity of Western powers; resurgent Chinese nationalism, countered by the Manchurian Incident; and right-wing terrorist incidents in 1932 and 1936 led to a consensus, of sorts, that Japan could no longer put its faith in a Western-dominated world order. Instead, it would essentially have to defend its empire against Chinese nationalists (portrayed as puppets of the West), Western imperialists, and Soviet communists. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Defense, it was argued, required expansion, because the only way that tiny Japan could defend an empire was to make it large enough to be self-sufficient in all the materials needed in wartime and in peace. Whether one interprets subsequent events as the unfolding of the logic of regional autonomy or as evidence of an irrational element in Japanese government decision making, the events themselves are well known. In 1937 a nighttime shooting incident near Beijing led to an all-out war with China. Two years later at Nomonhan, Japan’s Kwantung Army was sharply repulsed by the Soviet Union. In 1940, reassured by the recent nonaggression pact between Germany and the Soviet Union, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and then turned its attention, and its search for autonomy, southward, moving troops into northern Indochina. In April 1941, Japan signed a five-year neutrality pact with the Soviet Union, only to be shocked when its ally Germany attacked the Soviet Union two months later. In July the United States imposed an oil embargo, and Japanese troops entered southern Indochina. In December Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor and followed immediately with attacks on the Philippines and Malaya. Rationally or not, Japan was at war simultaneously with the United States, Britain, and Holland, while its war in China continued to drag on. In 1945 Japan lost the war, and with it every shred of its empire, even including, until 1972, Okinawa. Militarism and emperor-worship in the minds of most Japanese were thoroughly discredited by the fact of Japan’s defeat. A new national identify had to be crafted almost from scratch, in the presence of American occupiers. Yet a study by Barak Kushner suggests at least one element of continuity. Concerned above all with social stability, Japan’s American occupiers hired some of Japan’s best professional wartime propagandists, notably Koyama Eizo, to help smooth the transition. He and others reinforced the wartime message that Japan was the leading example of Asian modernity, worthy of pride and of emulation by others, by proclaiming that it must become so again. Despite the trauma of defeat, the physical devastation of Japanese cities, the deaths of 1.7 million soldiers and approximately 400,000 civilians, the millions of returning deactivated, unemployed soldiers, and the food shortages, the message was clear: Japan could and must recover, and the way to do so was to work with, rather than against, the American occupation forces. Selected Bibliography Dudden, Alexis. 2005. Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Fujitani, Takashi. 1996. Splendid Monarchy: Power and Pageantry in Modern Japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Gordon, Andrew. 1991. Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.


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Kushner, Barak. 2006. The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Large, Stephen. 2003. “Substantiating the Nation.” In Nation and Nationalism in Japan, edited by Sandra Wilson, 55–68. London: RoutledgeCurzon. Large, Stephen. 2007. “Oligarchy, Democracy and Fascism.” In A Companion to Japanese History, edited by William M. Tsutsui, 156–171. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing. Lu, David, ed. 1997. Japan: A Documentary History. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Maruyama, Masao. 1974. Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan. Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press. Mayo, Marlene J. 1967. “A Catechism of Western Diplomacy: The Japanese and Hamilton Fish, 1872.” Journal of Asian Studies 26, no. 2: 389–410. Steele, M. William. 2003. Alternative Narratives in Modern Japanese History. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Wakabayashi, Bob Tadashi. 1986. Anti-foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies. Wilson, Sandra, ed. 2002. Nation and Nationalism in Japan. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon.


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Colombia Jane M. Rausch Chronology 1830 Venezuela and Ecuador withdraw from the supra state (known as Gran Colombia) created by Bolívar, which included Venezuela, New Granada (Colombia), and Ecuador. 1832 Constitution of 1832 establishes the Republic of New Granada. Francisco de Paula Santander becomes president. 1843 The constitution of 1843 is adopted. 1853 The constitution of 1853 is adopted, which provides for separation of church and state. 1858 The constitution of 1858 establishes the Grenadine Confederation. 1861 Adoption of Colombian flag. 1863 The Convention of Rionegro adopts the constitution of 1863, creating the United States of Colombia. 1886 The constitution of 1886 is adopted, creating the Republic of Colombia. The Catholic Church regains its former influence. 1887 President Rafael Núñez writes the national hymn of Colombia. 1899–1902 Colombia is immersed in a bloody conflict known as the War of the Thousand Days. 1903 Panama declares its independence. 1920 The national hymn is officially adopted. 1921 The United States recognizes Panama and by the Urrutia-Thompson Treaty agrees to pay Colombia for the loss of Panama. 1930 Enrique Olaya Herrera, a Liberal, is elected president, ending five decades of Conservative rule. 1932–1934 Peru invades the Colombian Amazon outpost of Leticia. After two years of fighting, Colombia is victorious. 1934 Alfonso López Pumarejo, a Liberal, becomes president and begins the “Revolution on March,” an effort to promote radical economic and social reform. 1936 Codification of 1936 modifies the constitution of 1886 to ensure that labor enjoys the protection of the state and is entitled to the right to strike, that public assistance is a function of the state, that possession of property carries social obligations, and that the state might intervene in the conduct of private and public businesses where the general social welfare is concerned. Other provisions restrict the role of the Catholic Church in public affairs. 1944 López Pumarero resigns from the presidency; Alberto Lleras Camargo becomes interim president. 1946 Mariano Ospina Pérez, a Conservative, is elected president. 1948 Assassination of Liberal populist leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán sets off the bloody civil war known as La Violencia (1948–1964).


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Situating the Nation The modern nation of Colombia can trace its beginnings to the Spanish colonial viceroyalty of New Granada, but it achieved its present territorial boundaries as the result of the Wars of Independence (1810–1824) and the disintegration of Simón Bolívar’s confederation known as Gran Colombia. In 1739, with the goal of rationalizing political control, Charles III removed from Lima’s jurisdiction the northern portion of the Viceroyalty of Peru to create the Viceroyalty of New Granada, which, with its capital in Bogotá, encompassed present-day Ecuador, New Granada (Colombia), and Venezuela. In 1810 patriot resistance to imperial rule and the outbreak of the War of Independence forced the viceroy of New Granada to flee, but the royalists reinstalled his regime in Bogotá after defeating the rebels in 1816. This reprieve was short-lived, for the patriot victory at the Battle of Boyacá on August 7, 1819, ended Spanish control over the region once and for all. In that year Simón Bolívar proclaimed the entire former viceroyalty an independent republic to be known as Colombia but generally referred to by historians as Gran Colombia. To his despair, it was soon clear that geographic, political, and economic tensions made this unwieldy state unworkable. When Venezuela and Ecuador withdrew from Bogotá’s control in 1830, Bolívar accepted that he had failed. Determined to go into exile, he succumbed to tuberculosis at the port of Santa Marta while waiting for a ship to take him to Europe. In 1832 a constitution was adopted creating the Republic of New Granada. This new state, which occupied approximately 440,000 square miles, was a conglomeration of regions, isolated from each other by three branches of the formidable Andean Cordillera. Surrounding the highland core were five peripheral

The Colombian Flag Colombia’s flag is similar to those of Ecuador and Venezuela because all three countries, between 1819 and 1830, formed part of the confederation known as Gran Colombia. The Gran Colombian flag had yellow-blue-red stripes horizontally arranged at a 3:2:1 ratio —that is to say, yellow was larger than blue, and blue was larger than red. After the federation was dissolved, Colombia adopted a new flag in 1834, keeping the same three colors but with vertical stripes, all of the same width. The present flag, adopted on November 26, 1861, restored the horizontal stripes, yellow-blue-red, but at a 2:1:1 ratio. There are three explanations about the meaning of the flag’s colors. The first states that yellow symbolizes sovereignty and justice; blue stands for nobility, loyalty, and vigilance; while red represents valor, honor, generosity, and victory through bloodshed. The second states that yellow stands for universal liberty, blue for the equality of all races and social classes before God and the law, and red means fraternity. The third, coming from a children’s song, states that yellow represents Colombia’s gold, blue is the vast sea, and red is the blood that brought freedom.


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lowland regions including the Pacific coast, the Isthmus of Panama, the Caribbean coast, the eastern tropical plains or Llanos Orientales, and a large portion of the Amazon basin. During Spanish rule, gold and silver mined in Antioquia represented New Granada’s principal economic value, but livestock and commercial agriculture—cacao, sugar, tobacco, salt, and flour—flourished in other regions. Thanks to the variations in altitude, most regions were self-sufficient in food production, and until the development of tobacco, followed by coffee, as export crops in the mid-19th century, internal trade was more important than transatlantic trade. According to the census of 1778, New Granada had a population of 826,550. There were 277,068 whites and 368,093 mestizos who together comprised 80 percent of the whole. Indians numbered 136,753, or 15 percent, and African slaves, 44,636, or 5 percent. By 1830 it is estimated that the population had increased to 1.5 million, with the racial proportions remaining more or less the same. With regard to spatial arrangement, approximately 60 percent of the people lived in or around Bogotá, Tunja, and Socorro in the Eastern Cordillera at altitudes of more than 7,000 feet. Another 15 percent, including most of the slaves, resided in the agricultural and pastoral areas of Popayán and the Cauca Valley. The northern coastal regions, including Panama, and the seaports of Cartagena, Santa Marta, and Barranquilla accounted for 15 percent of the people, while 9 percent were living in mineral-rich Antioquia. As Benedict Anderson has pointed out in Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, the national consciousness that sprang from the ruins of the Spanish empire in Latin America was a “Liberal nationalism” influenced by the French Revolution and limited to the Creole elite. The lat-

Francisco de Paula Santander (1792–1840) Santander was born in Cúcuta on the eastern border of New Granada to a family of upperclass provincial landowners. The outbreak of the independence movement interrupted his formal education, and he subsequently saw active service both in the civil conflicts between New Granadan patriots and against Spain. After the royalists reconquered most of the colony in 1815–1816, Santander helped organized patriot resistance in the eastern plains. Eventually joining forces with Simón Bolívar, he took part in the campaign of 1819 that culminated in the decisive victory of Boyacá. In 1821 Santander was elected vice president of Gran Colombia (which included Venezuela, Ecuador, and New Granada) and governed effectively from Bogotá while Bolívar was defeating the Spanish in Peru. After Bolívar’s death and the breakup of this confederation in 1830, Santander became the first constitutional president of the separate Republic of New Granada in 1832. Known as the “Man of Laws,” he was a firm and capable administrator. In 1836 he turned the presidency over to his successor, but he continued to serve in Congress until his death in 1840. His supporters later formed the nucleus of the Liberal Party that has conventionally claimed Santander as its founder.


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ter, who sought to displace their Spanish oppressors, were equally determined to prevent “lower-class” political mobilizations: to wit, Indian or Negro-slave uprisings. As in the other newly formed states, in New Granada Francisco de Paula Santander and other independence leaders were rallying points for what may be described as nationalism, but for many years, the collective memory of their deeds inspired patriotism rather than nationalism. New Granada was spared the emergence of caudillos (dictators) such as Juan Manuel de Rosas in Argentina or José Antonio Páez in Venezuela. Instead, the division of the elites into two competing parties after 1840—the Liberals and the Conservatives—proved to be the primary way of mobilizing the masses. These parties were unique in Latin America in the sense that they went beyond being solely elite creations. Members of the so-called lower classes also developed deeply partisan identities. In addition, the Roman Catholic Church continued to wield enormous influence at all social levels. With some notable exceptions, the Liberals were anticlerical and supported federalism and free trade, while Conservatives were pro-clerical and favored unitary government and protectionism. Numerous civil wars were fought to promote these ideological goals, and the promulgation of five different constitutions (and subsequent changes of the name N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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of the state) in 1843 (New Granada), 1853 (New Granada), 1858 (Granadine Confederation), 1863 (United States of Colombia), and 1886 (Republic of Colombia) reflected the temporary dominance of one party over the other. Each constitution reconfigured regional divisions so that, for example, in 1853 the country was divided into 36 provinces, whereas in 1863 it was consolidated into 9 states and the Federal District of Bogotá. In short, despite the fact that a national flag was adopted in 1861, during most of the 19th century, regional and party loyalties far outstripped any sense of Colombian national identity. To cite an extreme case, Panama, geographically isolated by the impenetrable Darien forests that make up the eastern part of the isthmus, remained free from Bogotá’s control, in spite of the fact that it was officially declared a state in 1863. This isolation contributed to the Panamanians’ sense of abandonment and was undoubtedly a factor in their separation from Colombia (with help from the United States) in 1903.

Instituting the Nation There is general agreement among historians that President Rafael Núñez was the key figure in establishing the basis for a centralized state in Colombia. Although he began his career as a Liberal who believed in federalism, he gradually became convinced that only a centralized government based on an alliance with the Catholic Church could hold the country together. The constitution of 1886, which he endorsed, provided for a powerful president elected for a six-year term and reduced the regions, which had been classified as “states” under the previous charter, to the status of departments. The constitution declared Roman Catholicism the religion of the nation, and a concordat signed with Pope Leo XIII in 1887 specified that Roman Catholicism was indispensable to the social order. Núñez also wrote the national hymn, “¡Oh Gloria inmarcesible! ” (“O Unfading Glory!”), a poetic recollection of the wars for independence consisting of 11 verses and a chorus. The hymn, set to music composed by Orestes Sindici, an Italian music teacher living in Bogotá, was first performed in 1887 (though not adopted as the official national anthem until October 18, 1920). It is significant that in the first verse, Núñez included the lines, “And all humanity, which groans in chains, understand the words of Him who died on the cross,” thus associating Colombian independence with an orthodox version of Roman Catholic Christianity. The nationalism that Núñez championed was cultural and aristocratic. It emphasized that Colombia was a nation because it was Spanish, in language and religion, a definition that embraced the “white” population while rejecting the mestizo, African, and Native American elements. By strengthening control of the central government and cementing an alliance with the Catholic Church, Núñez hoped to weaken the ideological divide between the two political parties and to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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overcome regional allegiances that for most Colombians remained far stronger than their commitment to the “nation” as a whole. This effort, however, seems only to have exacerbated regional and political divisions, for the 19th-century cycle of civil wars continued, reaching a horrific climax with the War of the Thousand Days (1899–1902) that ended in a Liberal defeat, cost an estimated 100,000 lives, and set the stage for the first major loss of Colombian territory, the secession of Panama in 1903.

Defining the Nation Until the early 20th century, the “nation” in terms of effective territory included the Colombian highlands and the Caribbean coastal regions, inhabited by 97 percent of a population that had grown to nearly 8 million people. The lowland peripheral regions still contained less than 3 percent of the population, although they accounted for over half of Colombian territory. The loss of Panama alerted the Conservatives, who dominated the central government from 1910 to 1930, to the critical need to extend more effective control over these neglected areas. To achieve this end, they designated these territories either as intendencias or comisarías especiales, depending on the size of their populations, and they created a special bureaucracy to administer them until their populations grew large enough to justify their elevation to departmental status. Since their inhabitants were primarily Native Americans, the government regarded these regions as mission territories. In 1902 it signed with the Vatican a Convention on Missions that gave the Catholic Church absolute authority to govern, police, educate, and control the Indians, including jurisdiction over primary education for all people in these territories—white and Indians—as well as unlimited access to public lands to promote colonization. Although the government also assigned civil officials to administer the territories, the missionary orders easily superseded their authority. In the 19th century, writers such as José María Samper celebrated Colombia’s regional differences by describing the mixed racial and cultural characteristics of the people who lived in the different parts of the country and creating vivid regional stereotypes. By the beginning of the 20th century, however, the ruling upper class rejected these “romantic” idealizations. Undeterred by the fact that the vast majority of the population was mestizo, they condemned mestizaje (racial mixture) as a sign of racial degeneration. Viewing themselves in the mirror of North American materialism and racism, they stressed that the only true Colombians were whites. The 1920s saw the emergence of a more militant nationalism in reaction to the threat of U.S. economic imperialism and U.S. approval of the unpopular UrrutiaThompson Treaty (originally signed in 1914) by which the United States paid Colombia an indemnity of $25 million as compensation for the loss of Panama. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Urrutia-Thompson Treaty of 1914 In August 1903, during the aftermath of the War of the Thousand Days, the Colombian Senate refused to approve the Hay-Herrán Treaty, by which the United States would have received permanent control over a narrow strip of the Isthmus of Panama to build a canal, because they regarded the terms of the agreement as a breach of Colombian sovereignty. Panama’s subsequent revolt in November 1903, aided and abetted by the United States, has been the only territory lost by Colombia in its 200-year history. Although Colombians felt no deep cultural ties to Panama, its separation was an ignominious defeat difficult to accept. Nevertheless, in 1914 Colombia signed the UrrutiaThompson Treaty in which the United States expressed regret for its actions in Panama and agreed to pay Colombia a $25 million indemnity. Opposition to the treaty came not from Colombians but from U.S. senators, who, influenced by Theodore Roosevelt, objected to the inclusion of the “regret” clause in the treaty. It was not until the Colombians agreed to exclude this clause that the U.S. Senate approved the treaty in 1921. At that time, Colombia recognized Panamanian independence and received its $25 million indemnity from the United States.

During this decade, some intellectuals such as Jorge Bejarano, Arturo Castro, and Armando Solano strongly defended Colombian mestizaje. Without abandoning racial stereotypes completely, they argued that Africans, Indians, as well as mestizos had made unique contributions to the country, and that through education they could be redeemed. Nevertheless, the indianismo, or championing of native culture as the bedrock of nationalism, embraced by Peruvian and Mexican intellectuals found no resonance among Colombian scholars. In 1932 an invasion by a group of Peruvians into the Colombian Amazon territory of Leticia provoked a Colombian declaration of war and an outpouring of patriotic fervor. Perhaps for the first time, Liberals and Conservatives set aside their ideological differences to defend the fatherland. As President Enrique Olaya Herrera mobilized the army to confront the Peruvians, Bogotanos belonging to both parties held an enormous demonstration on September 18 to support the war effort. In one day, the government, strapped to find funds for basic economic reforms, received pledges of 10 million pesos from individuals to buy war bonds. The Colombians were able to defeat the Peruvians by 1934, but the war underscored the fragility of Bogotá’s control over the eastern half of the country. To correct this deficiency, the government recognized the need to incorporate more fully under its rule Colombia’s Orinoco and Amazonian frontiers. In 1934 the Liberal president, Alfonso López Pumarejo, made clear that his commitment was to the entire nation. Adopting the slogan, “Rediscovering Colombia,” he stated: “We have neglected Colombian territory which remains unknown to us, and we have left its people in a miserable and anguished condition. . . . In my view, it is not necessary to regenerate the country but to discover it. . . . It is necessary to awaken all the human energies that have been abandoned. . . . It is necessary N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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to make an economic conquest of national territory. And especially to liberate captive minds that have never been stimulated” (López Pumarejo 1937, 1:9–12). López Pumarejo’s policies of instituting tax reforms, labor laws, church restrictions, and land partitioning are collectively known as “the Revolution on March.” His goal was to broaden Colombian nationalism beyond the upper class and the highland regions to encompass the middle and laboring classes as well as the peripheral territories that previous regimes had largely ignored. López Pumarejo embraced economic nationalism by taking a strong stand against foreign investment and by legalizing the seizure of large landholdings for the public good. Finally, his energetic support of territorial reforms represented an important step in consolidating government control over all Colombian territory.

Narrating the Nation Without doubt, the heroes of the wars for independence provide the bedrock of Colombian national memory. Antonio Nariño, “The Great Precursor,” who the Spanish exiled in 1794 for publishing the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, Policarpa Salvarrieta, the first woman executed by the Spanish in New Granada for her work with the patriot underground, Francisco de Paula Santander, the “Man of Laws” who helped defeat the Spanish and gave New Granada its first constitution, and, of course, Venezuelan-born Simón Bolívar, whose genius made independence possible but whose enmity with Santander delayed his apotheosis until the mid-19th century, are just a few of the patriots enshrined in the Colombian pantheon. The national flag, emblem, and hymn all recall this glorious era.

Hailed as the true founder of Colombia, Francisco de Paula Santander was a soldier and statesman who fought beside Simón Bolívar in the Spanish-American Independence War. (Library of Congress)


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Because of the absence of a prolonged 19th-century dictatorship and the weakness of the military, early on the Colombian elites emphasized the country’s record of civilian and constitutional rule. Likewise, they embraced the title of the “Athens of South America.” With great political skill, they stressed what Carlos Uribe Celis has called a “fantasy of high culture” to maintain their political domination, disregarding the fact that the vast majority of the population remained destitute and illiterate. The elites pointed out that Colombian presidents were not just politicians but also humanists, grammarians, and writers, all characteristics that helped neutralize the military. Even in the 20th century, Colombian cultural prowess continued to be internationally acclaimed thanks to novelist and Nobel laureate Gabriel García Márquez and artist Fernando Botero, not to mention fine universities and thriving publishing houses. Another manifestation of the “Athens of South America” image is the importance of ideology. Historians commonly refer to Colombia’s frequent 19th-century wars as struggles over ideas, in which attitudes regarding the importance of the Catholic Church played a more important role than did individual caudillos striving for personal power. Underscoring this point is the fact that in no other Latin American country have the two traditional parties, founded in the 19th century, continued to dominate politics in the 21st century. At the popular level, Colombian identity was and is most clearly expressed in regional and national beauty contests and in folk music and dance, reflecting the country’s mixture of ethnic and regional influences. Perhaps most characteristic is the black-influenced cumbias, begun by African slaves in Cartagena and Barranquilla, that at different times have been all the rage elsewhere in Latin America. Equally familiar are the vallenato, salsa, bambuco, and the joropo. While each of these musical types is native to a specific region, they are widely known throughout Colombia. With regard to sports, only in bicycle racing and soccer have Colombians gained world attention, and in recent years these activities have been vitiated by infusions of money from illegal drug trafficking cartels.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Colombia emerged from the breakup of “Gran Colombia” in 1830 as a product of the liberal idealism born of the French Revolution. Fragmented by ethnic and regional differences, it was first held together by loyalties to the heroes that emerged from the war with Spain. By the late 19th century, the adoption of the constitution of 1886 imposed a centralizing framework on its territory, half of which was still largely unpopulated. The loss of Panama in 1903 awakened the leadership to the threat of U.S. imperialism, and the Peruvian invasion of 1932 provided the impetus for the radical reforms undertaken by President López Pumarejo to bind the disparate classes together and reclaim abandoned regions. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Unlike Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, Colombia has never attracted large-scale European immigration and thus was spared the challenge of transforming huge numbers of Italians and Germans into Colombian citizens. Individual immigrant families from northern Europe, however, have achieved prominence in various fields. The other substantial immigrant group is from the Middle East, known collectively in Colombia as turcos. Often discriminated against, they are found everywhere, and a few such as Julio César Turbay Ayala, who was president from 1978 to 1982, have managed to infiltrate the closed political system. The elite largely ignored the sizable minorities of Afro-Colombians and Native Americans even after protests by these groups began in the 1920s and 1930s. Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the mestizo Liberal populist, was the first to directly appeal to these marginalized people, and his assassination on April 9, 1948, initiated the bloody civil war known as La Violencia that lasted until 1964. By the 1980s, formerly neglected ethnic groups were better organized, and the new constitution of 1991 recognized their existence by giving them special representation in the Congress. From the 19th century onward, campaigns by political parties and leaders of the Catholic Church were the principal methods of rallying the middle and working classes. In addition, newspapers, based in the capital and principal cities, were a key source of information for the small percentage of literate Colombians. By the 1930s, the development of a national airline and radio communication began to breech geographic barriers that for so long had blocked the development of a sense of national unity. The availability of airplanes cut travel time between Bogotá and the most distant regions from weeks to a few hours. The first commercial radio, La Voz de Barranquilla, began transmission on December 8, 1929, and by 1935 there were 5,000 radios receiving signals. Not only were radios important in popularizing the music of different regions and developing a huge following for the radionovelas or soap operas, but the technology also provided a way for officials in Bogotá to communicate their programs to every corner of the country. The accelerated modernization of these decades encouraged the growth of the middle class and the expansion of public schools that, even though they reached only 30–40 percent of the population, began to inculcate patriotism by teaching the history of the independence movement, observing national holidays, and acquainting children with the national hymn and other symbols of collective identity. Gradually the division between the European culture of the elite and the traditional, folkloric culture of the people became blurred, giving way to a mass-based cultural consumption. Outlook As noted earlier, the political centralization imposed by Nuñez and the constitution of 1886 ultimately proved insufficient to override regional and political ideologies. After 30 years of uneasy peace under the Conservatives (1900–1930) and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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15 years of uneasy change under the Liberals, uncompromising political ideologies, barely held in check during World War II, broke out again after the assassination of Gaitán. The ensuing civil war, known as La Violencia, touched nearly all Colombians, regardless of their class, race, or region. Although the initial violence abated in the early 1960s, it sprang up again at the end of the decade as guerrilla groups such as the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), inspired by Fidel Castro, began their 40-year militant struggle to refashion Colombia in a way similar to Castro’s Cuba. In the 1980s, the emergence of competing drug cartels intensified the ensuing mayhem, and in recent years, efforts by the army and paramilitary groups to eliminate narco-trafficking and the guerrillas have only increased the plethora of kidnappings, massacres, and violations of human rights. In 1968, historian Gerhard Masur examined Colombia’s lack of a strong sense of nationalism and concluded that the country offered a unique case where national identity had failed to overcome the centrifugal pull of regional loyalties. Thirty years later, upon surveying the decades of civil warfare that have afflicted Colombia since 1945, other scholars have concluded that a culture of violence defines Colombian national identity. In 1999 Eduardo Posada Carbó observed that a common trend among Colombian intellectuals has been to systematically deconstruct the nation. He added that, having scrutinized every aspect of Colombian identity, these scholars have ended up by denying the very existence of the nation and the value of its democratic and civil advances. Rejecting this gloomy assessment, David Bushnell, the dean of Colombian studies in the United States, has argued that, while it is commonplace to say that Colombians lack a proper spirit of nationalism, for better or worse, the country does exist as a nation. He asserts that time and time again, Colombians have exhibited the ability to recover from terrible catastrophes and continue their daily activities under circumstances that others might regard as hopeless. Since it is clear that even without developing a strong sense of nationalism the Colombian state has endured for nearly 200 years, maintaining a constitutional government and creating a unique history and a rich culture, it is difficult not to agree with Bushnell that Colombia is indeed “a nation in spite of itself.” Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. ed. New York and London: Verso. Bushnell, David. 1993. The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Earle, Rebecca. 2005. “Sobre Héroes y Tumbas: National Symbols in Nineteenth-Century Spanish America.” Hispanic American Historical Review 85, no. 3: 375–416. Herring, Hubert. 1968. A History of Latin America. 3rd ed. New York: Knopf. Jaramillo Uribe, Jaime. 1998. “Perfil Histórico de Bogotá.” In Travesías por la Historia, 323–349. Bogotá, Colombia: Imprenta Nacional.


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López Pumarejo, Alfonso. 1937. La política official: Mensajes, cartas y discursos del presidente López. 4 vols. Bogotá, Colombia: Imprenta Nacional. Lynch, John. 1986. The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826. 2nd ed. New York: W. W. Norton. Masur, Gerhard. 1966. Nationalism in Latin America: Diversity and Unity. New York: Macmillan. Melo, Jorge O. 1992. “Etnia, región y nación: El fluctuante discurso de la identidad.” In Predecir el pasado: Ensayos de historia de Colombia, 81–107. Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Lealon. Posada Carbó, Eduardo. 2003. “El regionalismo político en el Caribe colombiano.” In El desafío de las ideas: Ensayos de historia intellectual y política en Colombia, 139–165. Medellín, Colombia: Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT. Samper, José María. 1861. Ensayo sobre las revoluciones políticos y la condición de los repúblicas colombianas (hispano-americanas). Paris: Imprenta de E. Thunot Y ca, Calle Racine. Uribe Celis, Carlos. 1992. Mentalidad del Colombiano: Cultura y sociedad en el siglo XX. Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Alborada. West, Robert C. 1962. “The Geography of Colombia.” In The Caribbean: Contemporary Colombia, edited by A. Curtis Wilgus, 3–21. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.


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Puerto Rico Juan Manuel Carrión Chronology 1887 The Autonomist Party is founded. The Spanish colonial government carries out a campaign of massive repression (“Los Compontes”). 1895 Puerto Rican section of the Cuban Revolutionary Party is founded, and the Puerto Rican flag is created. 1897 Spain grants autonomy to Puerto Rico. 1898 Puerto Rico is invaded during the Spanish-American War. 1900 The Foraker Act establishes a civilian colonial government, and Puerto Rico becomes a “non-incorporated territory.” 1901–1922 “Insular Cases” decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. 1904 The Unionist Party is formed. 1915 The Socialist Party is formed. 1917 With the Jones Act, Puerto Ricans become U.S. citizens while remaining “foreign in a domestic sense.” 1922 The Nationalist Party is formed. 1930 Pedro Albizu Campos is elected president of the Nationalist Party. 1937 Ponce Massacre. 1938 The Popular Democratic Party is formed. 1946 The Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) is formed. 1947 Albizu Campos returns to Puerto Rico from federal jail, and special political repressive laws are passed (“la ley de la mordaza”). 1948 Luis Muñoz Marín is elected governor in the context of new political reforms. 1950 The Nationalist Party carries out a last-ditch armed rebellion. 1952 The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is established.

Situating the Nation Puerto Rico is a nation with a long history of colonial subjection. For four centuries it was a colony of Spain, and since 1898, as a consequence of the SpanishAmerican War, it has been a possession of the United States. After the American invasion, a limited form of colonial self-government was established and justified by defining the island as an unincorporated territory, “domestic in a foreign sense.” The U.S. Supreme Court sustained the political definition that Puerto Rico “belongs to but does not form part of the U.S.” in a series of important constitutional decisions known as the “Insular Cases.” These decisions remained unmodified even after Puerto Ricans were made U.S. citizens in 1917. After World War II, several important political reforms were carried out that led to the creation of a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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new political structure in 1952, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, “Estado Libre Asociado” in Spanish. Under this new regime, Puerto Rico was granted internal self-government. Given the colonial status, politics in Puerto Rico have for more than a century revolved around what is locally called the “Status Question,” defined in terms of three traditional options to solve it: independence, autonomy, and annexation (U.S. statehood). In the last decades of the 19th century, Puerto Rico experienced some economic growth, but only to a limited degree given the backwardness of the Spanish metropolis. After the American invasion, the island went through a rapid economic transformation. Puerto Rico was integrated into the U.S. economy through American-owned sugar corporations. Puerto Rico became an American outpost in the early stages of U.S. ascent to world hegemony. This was a time when ideologies of “White Supremacy” and visions of a “White Man’s Burden” were common in the United States. The racially mixed population of Puerto Rico was seen with condescending eyes, that is, as clearly inferior, but at the same time there was some optimism concerning the positive effects that Americanization could have on the local population. The perception of the United States as the epitome of democracy and modernity cast a spell among wide sectors of the population and generated support for American rule. In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, many people welcomed the new rulers, hoping they would bring modernization of the economy and society. But by the 1930s, many of these hopes had been dashed, and some critics were calling Puerto Rico the “Poor House of the Americas.” At that time, some of the New Deal programs started in the United States by President Franklin D. Roosevelt began to be applied to Puerto Rico, and in the late 1940s the local government, controlled by a new political party, carried out a program of industrialization with the help of U.S. authorities. This program, called Operation Bootstrap, was a success, and by the 1950s Puerto Rico was in official government parlance the “Showcase of Democracy” in the Caribbean. Puerto Rico is a small island in the Caribbean, but by 1900 it had a population close to a million. As in other parts of the region, a significant part of the population was black or racially mixed, but it also had a large number of whites. The typical social-racial stratification found throughout the Caribbean, with whites at

Insular Cases The U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of decisions from 1901 to 1922 known as the Insular Cases. They provide the basic legal framework that defines the political relationship between the United States and Puerto Rico. These rulings have characterized Puerto Rico as an unincorporated territory that “belongs to but does not form part” of the United States. Puerto Rico was also defined as “foreign in a domestic sense” in spite of the U.S. citizenship given to Puerto Ricans in 1917.


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the top, was also typical of Puerto Rico, but whites were also significantly present among the poor, and some blacks like José Celso Barbosa, founder of the U.S. statehood movement, were able to achieve the highest status in society. The large demographic increase that was experienced in the 19th century was mostly due to natural growth. Some important immigration flows also took place during this period, but immigrants in general were a small total of the population in Puerto Rico when the Americans arrived.

Instituting the Nation In the 19th century, national consciousness started to emerge among the socioeconomic elite in Puerto Rico. The name and definition of that group is subject to debate. The precapitalist elements present in its makeup have led some authors to talk about an “Hacendado” class. This group, which perhaps could better be called a proto-bourgeoisie, expressed elements of a new national identity through different cultural manifestations and through its political aspirations for autonomy. In 1887 an Autonomist Party was formed under the leadership of Román Baldorioty de Castro. The idea of autonomy was expressed in different ways. For some, autonomy just meant a different administrative arrangement. But for others, the idea of autonomy entailed an emotional attachment to Puerto Rico as a unique community that demanded political loyalty. Important contradictions and fissures within the Puerto Rican socioeconomic elite affected these autonomist aspirations. The ideas of “country” (pátria) that had developed within the elite had limited resonance among the illiterate masses. Under the leadership of Santiago Iglesias, a Spanish-born carpenter, a Socialist Party was founded in 1915 that developed antinational and pro-American political postures. The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, became divided into two sectors, the antinational bourgeoisie linked more closely to the sugar industry, and the autonomist bourgeoisie that on some occasions would flirt with independence. For José Celso Barbosa, leader of the pro-American Republican Party, the separate Puerto Rican nation or culture did not exist. The Unionist Party, which was formed in 1904, had independence as its long-range goal and autonomy as its immediate goal. For some leaders of the Unionist Party such as José de Diego, independence took precedence, but for the main leader of the party, Luis Muñoz Rivera, independence, although beautiful, was impossible due to weaknesses he attributed to the Puerto Rican people. There’s a long history of links between independence and autonomy advocates that goes all the way back to the early 19th century. Separatists and autonomists came from the same socioeconomic sector and shared similar liberal political ideals. The big difference laid in their understanding of the relationship between reform and revolution. For separatist leaders like Ramón Emeterio Betances, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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reforms were impossible under Spanish colonialism. He advocated a revolutionary overthrow of Spanish power not only in Puerto Rico but in Cuba as well. Betances died in 1898, the year of the invasion, extremely worried that, without an armed rebellion against the Spanish, Puerto Rico would become an American colony for all eternity. After the great setback of 1898, a radical anticolonial nationalism emerged again in Puerto Rico in the 1930s under the leadership of Pedro Albizu Campos. This Harvard-educated mulatto transformed the Nationalist Party, which had been founded in 1922, into a militant organization that preached resistance to foreign domination. This radical nationalism was mostly supported by a heterogeneous petty bourgeoisie with some links to the lower strata of society. The upper-class members abandoned the Nationalist Party when Albizu Campos was elected president, alarmed by his militant rhetoric. In the 1930s, the Liberal Party, which was also in favor of independence, became the largest political organization under the leadership of Antonio Barceló. But in the 1940s, Luis Muñoz Marín, scion of the late patrician leader of the Unionist Party, founded the Popular Democratic Party (PPD) and thwarted the growing push for independence. Initially, this new party, which had grown out of the Liberal Party, was identified by many as being in sympathy with independence, but after 1945 it quickly changed its orientation. Under the leadership of Muñoz Marín, the PPD rejected political dimensions of Puerto Rican nationalism and instead advocated a separate Puerto Rican culture, albeit one that legitimated the continued colonial relationship with the United States.

Puerto Rican nationalist Pedro Albizu Campos waves from his prison cell after talking to reporters, November 1950. (Bettmann/Corbis)


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Defining the Nation In the 19th century, liberalism was the dominant ideology both among revolutionaries like Betances and reformists like Muñoz Rivera. In the next century, Hispanophilia also was a common feature of leaders in favor of autonomy and independence. This was in contrast to the Hispanophobia that prevailed among annexationists and socialists. Before the invasion, the nation that was forming was defined in territorial and political terms and not in terms of ethnicity. But after the invasion and in opposition to the campaigns of cultural Americanization, the nation started to affirm ethnic elements through Hispanophilia. This cultural orientation had conservative and radical expressions. In its conservative version, the imagined Puerto Rican nation emphasized the lost links to the Spanish “Mother Country.” In the radical nationalism of Pedro Albizu Campos, Hispanophilia meant claiming cultural superiority vis-à-vis the invaders and belonging to a widespread community of nations that were mainly Latin American. Albizu Campos proposed a “voluntarist” break with the colonial status quo and an end to the policy of “good manners” toward the “colonial oppressors.” By contrast, Muñoz Marín argued that there was disjuncture between the “abstract nation” cherished by nationalists and the “really existing people” (pátria-pueblo), which made it impossible to achieve independence. The officially sponsored process of Americanization and informal influence of American culture have been decisive factors in the making of Puerto Rican collective identities. Until the late 1940s, the official policy sponsored by colonial authorities was the substitution of the Spanish language with English. This was reflected in the public school system where instruction was carried out in the new language. Resistance to this policy led to early manifestation of cultural nationalism. José de Diego distinguished himself in the defense of the vernacular. For José Celso Barbosa, on the contrary, Americanization was openly accepted, including the linguistic change it encompassed. Early pro-independence leader Rosendo Matienzo Cintrón proposed a conditioned acceptance of Americanization and welcomed the influence of American civic and republican values while rejecting cultural impositions. Albizu Campos, on the other hand, presented a radical critique of the whole Americanization process, arguing that a fully formed Puerto Rican nation existed that did not require the condescending mentoring process defended by Americanization advocates. National identity has been a contested issue in Puerto Rico. For Albizu Campos it was clear that a choice had to be made: “Yankee or Puerto Rican.” But this has been a difficult choice, because cultural identity has not always been congruent with national identity. A Puerto Rican ethnic identity grew in strength during the first half of the 20th century, but the Americanization process also had a deep impact on the political loyalties of Puerto Ricans. The U.S. statehood movement in Puerto Rico can be seen in some of its aspects as a Creole version of American N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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The flag of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico flies alongside the U.S. banner atop a building in San Juan following the official observance of Puerto Rico’s Constitution Day in 1952. (Bettmann/Corbis)


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nationalism. Its advocates may feel ethnically Puerto Rican but consider their nation to be the United States. Autonomists, on the other hand, have given support or have made use of cultural nationalism but limit the political demands that could possibly be drawn from it. Sharing many aspects of the cultural nationalism that is present in the autonomist movement, pro-independence advocates defend a political nationalism that seeks the creation of a Puerto Rican national state. In spite of the strength of ethnic identities, the independence movement has been relatively weak. Factors that help explain the divergence between a strong ethnic identity and a weak national identity include the interplay between ethnic and racial distinctions, the effects of economic conditions, and the influence of political measures, such as educational policies and repression of political dissidents.

Narrating the Nation The interpretation of past events is used as a political tool in contemporary struggles to define present-day power arrangements. The interpretation of this “social past” (as opposed to what “actually happened”) in Puerto Rico is refracted in the prism of the colonial legacy of the country. For political nationalists, the past that is emphasized deals with the 1868 rebellion in the town of Lares and the numerous conspiracies and acts of defiance that have taken place first against Spain and then against the United States. For autonomists, the past represents the sufferings and achievements of the 19th-century struggle for autonomy and the struggles for self-government in the 20th century. Of special significance to them is the year 1897 when Spain granted autonomy to Puerto Rico. For U.S. statehood advocates, the “true” history begins in 1898. The other significant date is 1917 when U.S. citizenship was “obtained.” Autonomists and pro-independence advocates evaluate the Spanish past with mixed sentiments. Spanish political abuses are denounced, but at the same time Spanish cultural heritage is valued as a very important element in the cultural (“national”) definition of what it means to be Puerto Rican. By contrast, advocates of U.S. statehood view the Spanish past in overwhelmingly negative terms and correspondingly praise the American influence in Puerto Rico. Different myths are articulated in narrating the nation. One of the most common myths is that of the three roots. According to this myth, the Puerto Rican people are the result of the cultural and racial blending of three main groups: Taino Indians, Spaniards, and Africans. It is similar to other Latin American myths of “racial democracy,” which seek to hide the reality of racial inequality and to sponsor a desire for racial harmony. Another major Puerto Rican myth is the notion of the “Jibaro” or Puerto Rican peasant as the predominant national icon. It has been pointed out that Jibaros were mostly racially mixed whereas the iconic Jibaro has N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Pedro Albizu Campos (1891–1965) Albizu Campos was the most important exponent of Puerto Rican nationalism in the 20th century. Born as the illegitimate son of a white landowner and a black domestic servant, he became an orphan very early in his life. In spite of the shortcomings of his social origins, he was able to acquire a law degree from Harvard University. From 1930 until his death he was the main leader of the Nationalist Party, an organization that practiced a very militant anti-imperial form of nationalism. After spending many years in jail, he was pardoned by the government shortly before his death in 1965.

been presented in most cases as white. This clearly points to the limitations and contradictions of the racial democracy myth. But at the same time, one should not overlook the use of this myth as a tool of nationalist resistance. Just like in other countries, the peasant has been considered a depository of authentic national values in Puerto Rico. A Puerto Rican national identity has shown itself through many different cultural expressions. A great variety of symbols are associated with the nation, some in a more nonconformist fashion than others. Besides the iconic Jibaro, the Puerto Rican flag, originally designed by Puerto Rican separatists in 1895, has wide currency. Like the flag, the Puerto Rican national anthem originates in 19thcentury anticolonial struggles. In contrast to more traditional national anthems, “La Borinqueña,” as this anthem is called, is set to music that invites one to dance. It is based on a type of music called la danza that originated among the higher strata of 19th-century society but whose rhythms and compositions incorporate many elements of popular culture. Significantly, the nationalist-inspired flag was declared the official flag in 1952 when the Commonwealth was established. “La Borinqueña” was also adopted as the anthem of the new self-governing regime but was modified to purge its separatist connotations. The original revolutionary lyrics of “La Borinqueña” were changed to an innocuous rendition of the country’s beauty.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Nineteenth-century Puerto Rican separatism was ideologically related to Cuban separatism, and in more than one way, there were instances of collaboration. But in Puerto Rico, separatism was not able to obtain deep-rooted popular support. In some respects, Puerto Rico was still a nation in the making when it became an American colony. This youth is reflected in the contradictory features of the first manifestations of national affirmation that took place early in the 20th century. In its beginnings, the Unionist Party included independence in its political platform, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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although together with what were considered other options for self-government: autonomy and U.S. statehood. Later on, the Unionist Party dropped U.S. statehood as a possible option and declared independence its maximum goal but still without giving emphasis to that objective. The Unionist Party had in the beginning some success in appealing to wide sectors of the population with its message of unity, addressed to the “Puerto Rican Family.” But early success was followed by a prolonged failure in achieving a cohesive popular bloc capable of negotiating with a strong hand with U.S. authorities. The “country” (pátria) that Unionist Party leaders were trying to achieve met opposition from the emerging labor leadership and from the local bourgeois sectors that prospered under U.S. rule. The imagined political community expounded by Unionist Party leaders was seen as socially conservative and in conflict with the desires for social improvement of the impoverished masses. On the other hand, the policy of U.S. governments was to convince Puerto Ricans of the need of the American connection for their well-being. In its moderate version, nationalism was hesitant. Pro-independence and autonomist variants coexisted but in a tense relationship that eventually had to be resolved against independence. In its radical version, the one introduced by Pedro Albizu Campos, nationalism was daring and defiant. Its message had its greatest resonance among individuals belonging to what could be described as a petty bourgeoisie, which attempted to confront the strong impact of proletarian processes. Besides the demands for self-government there were attempts to mobilize the nation around economic and cultural demands. Economic demands dealt mostly with defending local land ownership and denouncing the power of the sugar corporations. Cultural demands had as their main concern the defense of the Spanish language. The economic demands were planned to appeal to small Puerto Rican proprietors and to the proletarian sectors of society, but this objective in many occasions conflicted with the interests of the Creole bourgeoisie and their connections with the sugar corporations, interests that had to be satisfied in the Unionist and Liberal parties. This compromise limited the more radical demands necessary to appeal to wider social sectors. Luis Muñoz Marín and his Popular Democratic Party were able in the 1940s to momentarily connect successfully the nationalist surge of the previous years with demands for social reforms. But this conjoining of forces broke apart in the process that led to the establishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in 1952. In 1946 Muñoz Marín’s party abandoned independence as a goal, and shortly afterward a breakaway group under the leadership of Gilberto Concepción de Gracia formed the Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP). The final goal of Puerto Rican nationalism has always been the creation of a national state, defined in republican terms and “spiritually” linked to the “Brother Republics” of Latin America. These links had been proclaimed in Betances’s idea of an “Antillean Confederation,” and in other ways they were expressed by nationalist leaders in the first half of the 20th century, such as Rosendo Matienzo N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Cintrón, José de Diego, Pedro Albizu Campos, and others. The goal of the autonomist movement, on the other hand, has always had a “fuzzy” quality to it. For some of its leaders, autonomy has been defined as something close to independence, but for many others it could be interpreted as a possible stepping-stone to full annexation. The evolution of Luis Muñoz Marín’s political position is a case in point. He started in the 1930s as, in his own words, a “radical nationalist.” In the 1940s he started to attenuate his political position and emphasized social reforms that could be carried out within the existing colonial regime. By the late 1940s, in the context of the early years of the Cold War, Muñoz Marín reached a deal with U.S. authorities that allowed an expansion of self-government with the creation of the Commonwealth. At that time, nationalism was denounced as demonic, and measures of political repression were inaugurated that coincided with McCarthyist political repression in the United States. Nationalists in Puerto Rico have used a variety of means to propagate their goals, such as political rallies, newspapers, and public protests. In the 1930s Albizu Campos gave weekly radio addresses, and in the last years of that decade, Muñoz Marín introduced American-style “grassroots” political campaigning in Puerto Rico. Under the leadership of Albizu Campos, the Nationalist Party carried out a propaganda campaign in the 1930s that advocated resistance to colonial rule. Although the Nationalist Party participated in the elections of 1932, its relationship with U.S. colonial authorities grew increasingly volatile and resulted in violent confrontations until the arrest of its political leadership resulted in the practical destruction of the organization. The most notorious case of political repression in this period was the Ponce Massacre of 1937 where 19 people were killed and more than a hundred wounded when police stopped a Nationalist Party march with machine-gun fire. After the ideological change in the Popular Democratic Party pushed by Muñoz Marín, nationalism was on the one hand coopted and on the other hand strongly repressed. Nationalism was co-opted through the incorporation of many traditional nationalist symbols such as the flag and the adoption of state-sponsored forms of cultural nationalism, such as the establishment of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture as a state agency. This went together with an unprecedented campaign of political repression that included special laws against dissidents and an intense and prolonged campaign of fear that preached that independence meant hunger and starvation. The Commonwealth established in 1952 is the closest that Puerto Rico has been to complete the process of nation-building. With this change, local elites were able to achieve local self-government, but it left Puerto Rico’s final relationship with the United States unresolved: annexation as a U.S. state or an independent republic? In spite of the many contradictions, a nation was built—culturally and politically—during the first half of the 20th century. Since the 19th century the nation started to take shape culturally through diverse learned and popular cultural expressions that were increasingly defined and presented as national. Artists, writers, and cultural workers from several fields, as well as political leadN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ers, contributed to a growing feeling of national identity through activities such as the defense of the vernacular language and the celebration of symbols and rituals of national affirmation. Politically the nation has been built through the demands of autonomy and independence, demands that in diverse and often contradictory fashion defined the local political space as Puerto Rican. Politically the nation has been built through diverse practices of active resistance, including armed struggle. In October 1950, a much smaller Nationalist Party made a last-ditch effort to stop the process that led to the establishment of the Commonwealth, which for them meant an attempt to legitimize colonialism. They carried out an armed rebellion that forced the mobilization of the U.S. National Guard and that included an attempt to kill U.S. president Harry Truman. While culturally the nation was an established fact in 1952, politically many unresolved issues remained. Building the nation politically has been a difficult struggle against the pressures and tendencies that want to define the political space as American. The political status of Puerto Rico is still an unresolved issue at the beginning of the 21st century. Puerto Rico is today one of the few remaining colonies in the world. There’s much irony in being a colony of the world’s paramount democracy. In the last decades of the 20th century, the Puerto Rican model of economic development lost the luster it once had. Since the 1970s, the Puerto Rican economy has experienced very low levels of economic growth and is no longer a success story. The territorial coordinates of the Puerto Rican nation is today a much more complicated question because, after more than 50 years of emigration, there are almost as many Puerto Ricans in the United States as in Puerto Rico. The strength of ethnic Puerto Rican identities is now stronger than ever, and it is much more common presently to speak of Puerto Rico as a nation. At the same time, however, the pro-U.S. statehood movement has become the strongest political force, and the pro-independence movement has been unable to overcome its minority status. Selected Bibliography Acosta, Ivonne. 1987. La mordaza. San Juan, PR: Editorial Edil. Burnett, Cristina, and Burke Marshall, eds. 2001. Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and the Constitution. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Cabán, Pedro. 1999. Constructing a Colonial People: Puerto Rico and the United States, 1898–1932. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Carrión, Juan Manuel. 1996. Voluntad de Nación: Ensayos sobre el nacionalismo puertorriqueño. San Juan, PR: Ediciones Nueva Aurora. Carrión, Juan Manuel. 2005. “Two Variants of Caribbean Nationalism: Marcus Garvey and Pedro Albizu Campos.” Centro: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 17, no. 1: 26–45. Fernandez, Ronald. 1992. The Disenchanted Islands: Puerto Rico and the United States in the Twentieth Century. New York: Praeger.


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Ojeda Reyes, Félix. 2001. El desterrado de Paris: Biografía del doctor Ramón Emeterio Betances (1827–1898). San Juan, PR: Ediciones Puerto. Quintero Rivera, Angel G. 1977. Conflictos de clase y política en Puerto Rico. San Juan, PR: Ediciones Huracán. Rivera Ramos, Efrén. 2001. The Legal Construction of Identity: The Judicial and Social Legacy of American Colonialism in Puerto Rico. Washington DC: American Psychological Association. Rosado, María. 1998. Las llamas de la Aurora: Acercamiento a una biografía de Pedro Albizu Campos. San Juan, PR: Editora Corripio. Trías Monge, José. 1997. Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.


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Australia Stephen Alomes Chronology 50,000 BCE Aboriginal occupation of the continent. Australia’s first nations. 1642 European explorers “discover” Australia—Abel Tasman in 1642, William Dampier in 1688, and James Cook in 1770. 1788 British invasion/settlement begins: Sydney, New South Wales, convict colony. 1788–1836 British invasion/settlement in port cities: Moreton Bay (later Brisbane) colony, which later becomes Queensland in 1824; Perth, Western Australia, in 1829; Melbourne, Victoria, in 1834; Adelaide, South Australia, in 1836. 1803–1804 Napoleonic wars: fear of French invasion. Hobart, Van Diemen’s Land (later Tasmania), is settled. 1850s Responsible government is granted to colonies, for example, to New South Wales in 1855. 1854 Eureka Stockade miners’ rebellion in Ballarat, Victoria, during the gold rushes. 1899–1902 Colonial and federal contingents fight in Britain’s South African War. 1901 A federation of six colonies forms the Commonwealth of Australia. White Australia policy is enacted through federal Immigration Restriction Act. 1908 New protections are instituted for labor and industry; tariff walls are linked to regulated wages. 1914–1918 World War I — 331,000 volunteer troops, 62,000 dead. 1915 Australian troops land at Gallipoli in Turkey; the event is later commemorated as Anzac Day, which becomes a national day. 1916–1917 Conscription for war service is rejected at two referendums. 1927 The federal parliament is established in Canberra, the new national capital. 1931 Statute of Westminster passed in the United Kingdom, adopted by Australia in 1942. 1939–1945 World War II—Australian troops are in Greece, North Africa, New Guinea, and the Pacific. 1940s Labor government institutes social nationalism and national projects. Labor government supports the United Nations. 1941 Labor prime minister John Curtin looks to the United States for defense. 1942 Singapore, a bastion of British naval defense, falls to Japan. 1949–1972 Cold War: the Liberal Party (conservative) governments stress the U.S. alliance; Australian troops are engaged in four regional conflicts—Korea, the Malayan Emergency, Confrontation (Borneo), and Vietnam. 1972–1975 Labor government of Gough Whitlam formulates a “new nationalism” regarding the Asia-Pacific region, Aboriginal rights, and Australian culture and national symbols. 1975–2006 Globalization weakens official nationalism and fosters popular nationalism, particularly sporting nationalism. 1990s–2000s Australian forces are engaged in three regional conflicts—the Gulf War, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq.


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Situating the Nation In 1788, Aboriginal Australia was invaded and settled by the British, founding the convict colony of Botany Bay, later renamed Sydney. Consequently, Australian nationalism was a product of imperial time, Pacific place, and contemporary ideologies. The hopes and fears of an imperializing era, ranging from a dominant British empire to fears of racial conflict, shaped Australia. They influenced the national policies and the nationalism of the settler colonies created by the invasion of Aboriginal land. By the late 19th century, the colonies exported wool, wheat, agricultural products, and minerals to Britain. Australia entered into the excitement of “New Imperialism” from the 1880s. A few “Australian Britons” dreamed of an imperial federation. More middling opinion aspired to the political, demographic, economic, and defense advantages of a federation. A smaller number of radicals, as well as Social Darwinians who believed in the centrality of race, had varying dreams of “A Nation for a Continent.” The six colonies federated as the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, but Australia remained within the orbit of British empire foreign policy, defense, and trade. The racial conception of the nation and national defense was manifested in racial immigration restrictions after 1901, known as the “White Australia Policy,” which included the exclusion of the Aboriginal race from the census. Radical and republican nationalist sentiment diminished due to imperial sentiment and invasion scares in the 1900s and during World War I. The Royal Navy was the basis of defense. Australia saw itself as a “dominion” within the British empire, complemented in the 1920s by links between “Men, Money, Markets” (British immigrants and capital and markets for primary products). During the Great Depression, imperial trade preference was strengthened by the 1932 Ottawa Agreement, aiding British manufacturers and helping primary produce exporters such as Australia and Canada gain access to the British market. During the 1930s, as international tension grew, a minority of foreign policy commentators argued for a realistic Asian-Pacific defense reorientation, a change that only occurred after Japan entered the war in December 1941 and Singapore fell in February 1942. Now Australia looked to the United States as the primary “great power” supporting its defense. Economically, before 1788 Australia was a hunter-gatherer society. Despite the prison foundation, the settler/invader colony became a small capitalist urban and rural society, never having had a peasant or serf economy. Commercial cities and population concentrations characterized Australia even though its major exports came from the land. Economic prosperity, among the highest in the world, was challenged by the depressions of the 1890s and 1930s and by recurring droughts. Twentiethcentury nation-building included industrial development behind tariff walls and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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within the British sphere. Post–World War II diversification came through American and European capital investment and Asian trade. Port cities and inland movement by rivers and later railways shaped Australian development. Paradoxically, given the frontier national image, urban capital was central in the development and export of wool, wheat, and minerals. A littoral pattern of settlement in capital cities and hinterlands encouraged varying responses, including a national myth based on the “Bush” image that contradicted the urban reality. Pioneering nurtured a rural or frontier myth of the Australian character. In contrast, a related consciousness of trade, the empire, and a wider world emerged in the six small capitals separated by hundreds of miles, or more in the case of Perth. Geographical isolation and the geopolitical reality of European empires ruling Asia ( from the Dutch East Indies to French Indochina) encouraged a Eurocentric racial orientation and fear of China, Japan, and, later, independent Asian nations. Fear of the “North” shaped defense and foreign policy nationalism. From the 1880s, racial ideology, formed by dominant pseudoscience, encouraged ideas of “survival of the fittest” regarding racial difference and of superior or inferior races. Populationism argued that to survive as a nation Australia must “Populate or Perish,” peopling the “Vast Empty Spaces.” If not, it would be invaded by the “teeming races of Asia.” Populationism, though illogical, was reinforced by fear of the “Yellow Peril” and later the “Red Peril” (communism). In the 1920s, the geographer T. Griffith Taylor challenged popular ideology regarding how large a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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population an arid land with thin soil could productively carry and was pilloried as a traitor and an out-of-touch “expert.”

Instituting the Nation A political federation was appealing in the 1850s when the colonies were granted self-government and convict transportation ended, except to Western Australia. However, rights were won regionally without the need for rebellion, and regional loyalty remained strong, as did the barrier of distance. The ease with which “responsible government” was achieved and Britain’s provision of external defense also diluted interest in unity. By the 1880s, confidence engendered by greater national wealth and the anxieties aroused by international insecurity revived the idea. International events, improved communications (including the 1872 telegraph cable to London and the 1880s train services linking Adelaide, Melbourne, Sydney, and Brisbane), and increased intercolonial trade reinvigorated debates about national unity. The tyranny of distance was being conquered. Intercolonial conferences, in spheres from science and communications to trade unions, suggested national possibilities. So did several problems. New imperialism created imaginary fears and a more dangerous world as Britain, France, and Germany scrambled for Pacific colonies and Japan, China, and Russia strengthened their forces. Queensland attempted to annex New Guinea in 1883 after German activity in the island. An 1889 report argued that Australian defense demanded a federation of the colonies. The economic crash of the 1890s reinforced the urgency of national union. The six colonies had varying fears about the economic implications of federation, however, and protectionists (especially in Victoria) and free traders (especially in New South Wales) were anxious about a future nation’s economic policies. Bitter strikes, reflecting deep divisions between capital and labor, also made Labor Party and trade union principals anxious about the future polity. Sports enhanced the national spirit through shared enthusiasm for the Australian cricket team’s victories over England. While radicals, a very small republican minority, and progressive labor supporters opposed imperialism and the values of class society, most Australians appreciated Australia’s British and English traditions, from Shakespeare to the British empire. Political nationalism resulted in the creation of the Commonwealth of Australia on January 1, 1901. A Federal Council to deal with larger national matters, proposed in 1880 by New South Wales premier Henry Parkes, was established by an imperial act in 1885. In an 1889 speech, later called the “Tenterfield Oration,” Parkes argued that a strong central and federal parliament to control national matters should replace the Federal Council. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Federation, either a great national idea or a national market, took time. The proposal progressed through federal conventions, conferences, and colonial premiers’ meetings in 1891, 1893, 1895, 1897–1898, and 1899. It gained impetus from the 1893 Australian Natives Association (ANA) conference and from the campaigning of Alfred Deakin. Despite a poor voter turnout in 1898, particularly in New South Wales, five colonies passed the 1899 referendum. Western Australia finally said “yes” in July 1900. Federation’s vicissitudes confirmed that, in a difficult continent in a country “founded” as a convict colony, the people did not see the state and the nation as one. They did not invest meaning or authority in the political nation nor venerate its founding fathers or revere “sacred documents” as did more tradition-oriented countries. Cynicism about politicians and politics in a country with 14 houses of parliament coexisted with formal respect for authority. Radicals and writers dreamed romantically of a young, pure, unsullied Australia separate from “Old World” evils of caste, class, and social hierarchy and the European evil of war. However, for most people federation was a political project to strengthen defense and the troubled economy. Philosophical or romantic conceptions of Australian nationalism had continuities with everyday social nationalism. Central was the archetype of the “coming Australian man,” later the male image of the frontier sheep drover or shearer, Digger (soldier), or sportsman or surfer. Amid the national hopes of the 1900s, visionaries recognized that Australia was leading the world in democracy—the secret ballot, male and female suffrage (the last in South Australia in 1894, and throughout the Commonwealth in 1902) —and as a “social laboratory” in social reform—from the first eight-hour workday (achieved by Victorian building workers in 1857) to welfare benefits and pensions, and to one of the first Labor governments in the world (1904). Australia also had one of the most egalitarian distributions of income in the developed world. Working-class progressives and middle-class social liberals supported reform, acknowledging that city and bush (country) Australia was not without poverty, inequality, or disease. Some radical populist journalists expressed another view opposite to patriotic jingoism. Their popular antidote to imperial hyperbole was cynicism about politicians’ aspirations for an imperial knighthood or for personal gain. Many Australians asked, echoing Bernard O’Dowd’s 1900 poetic imagery, if the nation’s future would bring “millennial Eden” or “a new demesne [domain] for Mammon to infest” (Alomes and Jones 1991, 104).

Defining the Nation Australia is a paradoxical society. Settler/invader Australia was even more a product of the era of modernization than of the parallel era of nationalism. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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transmission of institutions created a derivative society, a variant on a Western model. An urban, immigrant, materialist, and increasingly secular society, with a liberal capitalist democracy on the Westminster model, Australia resembles other modern Western societies. Perhaps social and cultural variations, isolation, a small population, distinctive continent and fauna and flora, an evolving social democracy of manners (supplanting Victorian-era class distinctions and “respectability”) made Australia socially and culturally different. However, the ideal of an “egalitarian” society has often been a popular social myth rather than a socioeconomic reality. Political federation was only one evolving national idea during late-19thcentury nation-building. A second idea was that of the Australian Legend (known also, through the Australian term for the inland country as “the bush,” as the “Bush myth”). This radical social ideal of the Australian “type” as a bushman, the egalitarian bush (or country) worker who supported his mates (later termed mateship) appealed to bush trade unionists, Labor Party progressives, and literary nationalists. Both ideas gained from an increased native-born population. In this modern society, the national idea was not the product of traditional blood and soil nationalism. A thin soil and deracinated immigrant people, who took too little account of the indigenous people and nature, had no such confidence in nationhood, in spite of their contemporary race fantasies. The national idea’s reform dimensions had their roots in two different, but related, traditions: the Australian Legend frontier idea of social egalitarianism and urban, middleclass liberal ideas of justice and social progress that had British origins. These radical and reform ideals contrasted with contemporary British imperial ideas and monarchical rhetoric. The radical idea of an Australian egalitarian democracy, free of English and European class hierarchies, was influenced by English radical and Whig traditions of parliamentarism and civil rights and popular Chartism. Australian ideals merged with English liberalism and progressivism in the nation-building and social reforms of the 1890s–1900s. The national-type idea, “the coming Australian man,” from the 1870s also reflected the literary imagination and contemporary rudimentary science. The male archetype’s social attributes and even physiognomy differed from perceived English characteristics. Russel Ward (1958) discerned the origins of what became by the 1890s the “Australian Legend” about the difficult frontier and the bush workers’ traditions of mateship and solidarity. A national tradition arising from the oral culture of the bush workers found literary expression in radical newspapers, including the national Bulletin weekly. The Bulletin also published the new Australian short-story writers and ballad poets, including Henry Lawson and “Banjo” Paterson, known for “The Man from Snowy River.” Stronger British traditions also shaped the new nation into the new century: new imperialist romance, Social Darwinian ideas of racial conflict, and even the


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laissez-faire or individualist economic ideologies of the economics of Adam Smith, modified by the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham. The “crimson thread of kinship” (shared British blood), became central to contemporary jingoism. Social and cultural nationalism were less powerful than the bond of empire, nation, and colonies—federation occurred as Australian troops fought in Britain’s war in South Africa (1899–1902). In another paradox, because Australians won democratic political rights early, the idea of the sovereignty of the people was weak. A pioneering society valued roads and bridges more than philosophical social thought. Textbooks inculcated the duties of the citizen posited on loyalty: colonies loyal to the “Mother Country” and citizens loyal to the monarch. The war memorials of the 1900s and 1920s in every town and suburb were sacred monuments to “our glorious dead.” Sovereignty, vested in the throne, was manifested through loyalty rather than emanating from the will of the Australian people. Colonial nationalism was an element of imperial nationalism, even when ideas of “Independent Australian Britons” (Hancock 1930) suggested difference. In reaction, an Australophile intellectual tradition, enlarging the Australian Legend, found significance in Australian culture. Progressive and left intellectuals and cultural nationalists pursued a social conception of Australianism. Politically conservative elitists preferred the idea of “British civilization” (or by the mid-20th century, “Australian civilization”), looking to derivative culture to “civilize” the rough and ready colonials. Such tensions underlie continual agonizing over national identity. Its continuing expression has a related color confusion: history’s red, white, and blue flag contrasting with nature’s legacy, the green and gold sporting colors. The fusion of official, imperial Britannic and popular folk nationalism occurred after the Gallipoli invasion of World War I. The ANZAC myth, named after the acronym for the Australian and New Zealand troops, became the dominant national ideology, a secular religion that drew on Australian Legend ideas of the resourceful Australian soldier animated by feelings of mateship for his comrades. The myth had its storied beginnings in the soldiers’ bravery in the monumentally unsuccessful landing on Turkey’s Dardanelles peninsula on April 25, 1915. Australia redefined its national tradition as expeditionary nationalism after the World War I force of over 400,000 was sent to Europe and the Middle East, resulting in over 60,000 dead, the ultimate sacrifice for “King and Country.” The immediate cause of this changed view of nationalism was the expeditionary force loyally serving a larger power, also seen as Australia’s down payment on a national defense policy. The underlying cause was a settler colony conception that significance came from elsewhere, reinforced by a search for the sacred in a modern society. Anzac Day became the national day, seen as the “birth of Australian nationhood” and “national manhood” and “Australia’s coming of age” national myth, as well as a commemoration of this baptism of fire on the “world


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Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) dig in at Gallipoli in 1915 during World War I. The Allies ultimately failed in their ambitious plan to conquer Turkey by sea. (Bettmann/Corbis)

stage.” Far more important than Anzac Day in New Zealand, it supplanted Australia Day (January 26) and Empire Day (May 24), which lacked resonance. ANZAC began the erasure of the idea of an inferior national character due to the convict stain, although Australians maintained a “colonial cultural cringe” due to the assumption that their culture was lacking compared to metropolitan nations. ANZAC also made expeditionary nationalism the servant of imperial nationalism. As in other gestures of independence (the anger in the 1930s over English bad sportsmanship in cricket and the celebration over the defeat of the Americans in the 1950s Davis Cup tennis tournaments and the 1983 America’s Cup yachting race), symbolic statements of difference became a substitute for independent national policies. The ANZAC legend’s fusion of imperial and popular nationalism benefited conservative political forces. In a related 1920s transition, the small farmer as pioneer became an exemplar of the bush legend. A noble spirit, he was a successor to early inland explorers. Both were memorialized in cairns and monuments, in pioneers’ memorials, and in women pioneers’ gardens. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Narrating the Nation The historian Brian Fitzpatrick argued that “the Australian people made heroes of none and raised no idols, except perhaps an outlaw, Ned Kelly, and Carbine, a horse” (Fitzpatrick 1956, 209). Ned Kelly, the 1870s bushranger, became a hero of Australian myth in a way never achieved by explorers or politicians, governors, scientists, or businessmen or -women. Another popular story, the 1854 Eureka Stockade, combined the drama of a rebellious gold miners’ fight against high license fees, their oaths of solidarity, their adoption of the Southern Cross flag as a symbol of rebellion, and their defense of a fort. In both stories, failed rebellion against authority is an inversion that acknowledges an authoritarian society: a coded recognition of unequal power in a class society despite the myth of egalitarianism. Heroic figures connoting Australian success have been few. They include a World War I general, General Monash, and a rare specific myth of bravery—the small force of new soldiers who stopped the Japanese advance over the Kokoda Track in New Guinea in World War II. Most Australian heroes have come from sports, including the great cricketer Sir Donald Bradman, the tennis champions Lew Hoad and Ken Rosewall, Olympic swimmers and runners such as Dawn Fraser and Betty Cuthbert, stars of the original Australian sport, Australian football, such as Ron Barassi, and the heroes of Rugby Union and Rugby League. Australians prefer such heroes despite the earnest efforts of curriculum planners and historians. Relative economic success and social harmony characterized one of the oldest continuous democracies, despite the fatal impact and ongoing legacy of the invasion. However, the Australian national story emphasizes defeat and difficulty more than success. Stories of defeat permeate Australian history: the first settlers/ invaders facing starvation; the violence of the convict era; explorers lost in the

Ned Kelly (1855–1880) Edward “Ned” Kelly, son of an Irish convict, grew up among small land selectors. Brushes with the law and a sense of injustice led him to become a bushranger, the Kelly gang robbing banks in Victoria and New South Wales from 1878 to 1880. Captured after a hotel siege, despite metal armor, he was tried, and then executed on November 11, the same fateful day as Armistice Day (1918) and the Whitlam government dismissal (1975). The Kelly gang symbolized the “battling” little man’s resistance against big farmers and the banks. The bushranger, whose gang also killed a policeman, became an iconic national hero, the subject of seven films (including the first feature film, The Story of the Kelly Gang, 1906), plays and songs, stories and biographies. “Game as Ned Kelly” is a popular phrase for courage, while Kelly’s last words, “Such is life,” became the title of Joseph Furphy’s great novel (1903). Kelly’s iron mask, captured in Sidney Nolan’s iconic 1940s paintings, symbolizes the dramatic folk hero of national myth.


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desert, some perishing or naming landmarks “Mt. Disappointment”; the Gallipoli defeat; unemployment and poverty; the 1917 death of the Australian boxer Les Darcy and the 1932 alleged poisoning of the champion racehorse Phar Lap in the United States; and the 1942 Japanese defeat of the Allied forces at Singapore and the prisoner of war experience of Changi prison and the Burma railway. Belatedly, Australians have recognized the survival of indigenous Australians and the violence, discrimination, and deprivation they have faced. Aboriginals experienced the physical, social, and cultural degeneration resultant from invasion, imported disease, policies of “Protection,” and confinement in special areas, as well as assimilationist schemes that “removed” light-skinned children from their communities.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In 1901, the monarch was at the apex of the symbolic pyramid, the governor general was titular commander of the armed forces, the state governors and Government House were the peaks of polite society, and knighthoods were marks of honor. The Privy Council was above the High Court of Australia, while Westminster parliamentary forms reflected Australia’s closeness to Britain. Royal tours, from the Duke of Cornwall (1901) to the reigning monarch, Queen Elizabeth II (1954), vied in importance with Australian national events. After federation, assumed racial homogeneity led to the political and social exclusion of Aboriginals, continued prejudice against the Chinese, and the sending back of Pacific islanders (Kanakas). Official assimilationist ideals strengthened in the 1950s and were applied to light-skinned Aboriginals and immigrants. These policies were officially abandoned when the nation embraced multiculturalism in the 1970s. Language services and multicultural policies turned national traditions on their head, despite continuing peer group social pressures. Citizenship and loyalty, qualified by popular indifference or cynicism, became the Australian norm after federation. Imperial popular culture was soon diluted by Australian films and radio, by Hollywood and American popular songs. By the 1950s, Empire Day had become “Cracker Night”; bonfires and fireworks had exploded imperial patriotism. Homogeneity and isolation (the lack of borders with foreign countries) encouraged complacent nationalism. The only major qualifications were bitter Irish Australian opposition to conscription proposed for World War I, class conflict in the 1930s depression, and regional patriotism, whipped up by state premiers over economic development and in sports. Political nationalism has been associated with Labor governments’ independent policies and regional awareness. External Affairs Minister H. V. Evatt supported the United Nations in the 1940s, and the Whitlam and Keating govN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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ernments (1970s and 1990s) brought Australia closer to Asia. However, conservatives asserted national interests within an imperial framework: Prime Minister Deakin opposed French colonial aspirations in the New Hebrides (1906), and W. M. Hughes, speaking for the 60,000 dead Australians at the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference, argued for Australian control of the German southwest Pacific territories. While both major parties claimed loyalty to the great power, conservatives effectively used such themes in the “fear” elections of the 1920s and 1950s–1960s when loyalty was associated with preventing invasion by the “Yellow” or “Red” peril, even though the continent had only experienced one invasion, the one that began in 1788. In the early 1900s, practical nation-building established the institutions of the new Commonwealth, including the Parliament, the High Court, the currency, the postal system, taxation, and the defense forces. Over time federal taxing powers saw the Commonwealth grow at the expense of the states, especially from World War II. The shared social vision of the Deakinite Liberals and Labor was also expressed in the Harvester Judgment (1907), which established a “basic wage” minimum for Australian workers. Justice H. B. Higgins created “A New Province for Law and Order”—a “fair and reasonable” wage for the average employee “living in a civilized community.” This “New Protection,” linking fair wages and industrial tariffs, became the settled national policy for the next seven decades (Alomes and Jones 1991, 152–154). Nation-building’s symbolic culmination, the new Parliament House in Canberra (1927), was delayed by years of war, bitter division, and postwar economic difficulties. During the next decade, the 1930s Great Depression, the Western Australia electorate voted to secede (1933), but this required larger support beyond the state, which it would never obtain. Despite social nationalism and the cultural nationalism of writers and the 1880s Heidelberg school of impressionist painters such as Arthur Streeton, Tom Roberts, Frederick McCubbin, and Charles Conder, who discovered the light of

Alfred Deakin Alfred Deakin, premier of Victoria (1883–1890) and prime minister of Australia (1903–1904, 1905–1908, 1909–1910), was both typical and unique. The son of British immigrants, a middle-class nationalist, lawyer, and silver-tongued orator, and an important 1890s advocate of federation, he was also a spiritualist and an author. Deakin’s social vision of a better Australia was manifested in the New Protection policy. A supporter of the British empire, he argued for the Australian Monroe Doctrine regarding the South Pacific, challenging French domination of the New Hebrides (now Vanuatu), and, without approval from London, invited the American Great White Fleet to visit Australia in 1908.


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Australian grasslands, coasts, and beaches, nationalism was predominantly shaped in a British and imperial context. The culture of public display symbolically expressed the imperial relationship in Union Jacks and Australian flags, bunting, crowns, ceremonial and welcoming triumphal arches, illuminations, slide and lantern shows, and advertising. School history books and adventure stories romanticized the heroes of empire—“Wolfe of Canada,” “Clive of India,” “Gordon of Khartoum”—stories more colorful than those of Australian explorers such as Burke and Wills who perished in the desert. Young Australians learned less about their own history than about other peoples’, a situation that has never changed. The paradox of being English-speaking was that, as the imperial and world systems of the great English-speaking powers—Britain and the United States— facilitated the distribution of books, film, and then television, language opened up Australia to overseas influence. A colonial underdevelopment of cultural institutions was thus stronger than a differentiated national culture. Contemporary Australian Nationalism The Whitlam Labor government’s new nationalism of the 1970s supported Australian cultural industries, introduced a new national anthem, withdrew Australia from the Vietnam War, recognized China, and legislated for the first Aboriginal land rights and for multiculturalism and nondiscriminatory immigration. The changes illuminated the contrasting character of Australian nationalism from the 1880s to the 1940s and 1950s: the older Australia with a worldview that was imperial and British, Eurocentric, and racially based, fearful, and protectionist. There was also continuity. After the three Whitlam government years, traditional policies returned: loyal colonial reliance on a great power for defense (the United States), anxiety about the region, invasion fears, and fear of foreigners. In addition, however, traditional national policies linking protection for wages and industries and the major government role in utilities and services were abandoned, and neoliberal economics (termed “economic rationalism”) reduced government and deregulated capitalism. Paradoxes continued in the globalizing era. A symbolic form of national independence in the form of a republic rather than the monarchy was rejected at a 1999 referendum because the proposed model specified a president chosen by Parliament rather than elected. Social nationalism grew, as national sovereignty in policy and culture diminished. Recent immigrants expressed a more emotional nationalism, once seen as not the Australian way. Indigenous nationalism—Aboriginal movements for land rights, equity, and recognition—also redefined nationalism. Both tendencies were paralleled by banal nationalism, popular sporting nationalism, and a rediscovery of the continent. The journey to the Red Centre (to Uluru, or “Ayers Rock”) challenged the odyssey across the waters as a national rite of significance.


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Selected Bibliography Alomes, Stephen. 1988. A Nation at Last? The Changing Character of Australian Nationalism 1880–1988. North Ryde, Australia: Angus & Robertson. Alomes, Stephen, and Catherine Jones, eds. 1991. Australian Nationalism: A Documentary History. North Ryde, Australia: Angus & Robertson. Birrell, Bob. 2001. Federation. Potts Point, Australia: Duffy & Snellgrove. Day, David. 2001. Claiming a Continent. Pymble, Australia: HarperCollins. Dunn, Michael. 1984. Australia and the Empire: From 1788 to the Present. Sydney, Australia: Fontana. Fitzpatrick, Brian. 1956. The Australian Commonwealth. Melbourne, Australia: F. W. Cheshire. Hancock, W. K. 1930. Australia. London: Ernest Benn. Irving, Helen, ed. 1999. The Centenary Companion to Australian Federation. Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. McLachlan, Noel. 1988. Waiting for the Revolution: A History of Australian Nationalism. Ringwood, Australia: Penguin. Powell, J. M. 1991. An Historical Geography of Australia: The Restive Fringe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Seal, Graham. 2004. Inventing Anzac: The Digger and National Mythology. St. Lucia, Australia: University of Queensland Press. Trainor, Luke. 1994. British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century. Cambridge/Melbourne, Australia: Cambridge University Press. Ward, Russel. 1958. The Australian Legend. Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press.


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New Zealand Linda Bryder Chronology 1642 Dutch voyager, Abel Tasman, sites New Zealand. 1769 British Captain James Cook “rediscovers” New Zealand. 1840 Treaty of Waitangi signed between British Crown and chiefs of New Zealand. First planned settlement, Port Nicholson (Wellington), is founded. 1848 Otago Settlement (Dunedin) is founded. 1850 Canterbury Settlement (Christchurch) is founded. 1852 Constitution is written. 1860 European population size surpasses Maori population. 1866 Telegraph cable is laid between North and South islands. 1870s Sir Julius Vogel improves communications through public works schemes. 1876 Abolition of provinces established under the 1852 constitution. “God Defend New Zealand” first performed publicly. 1877 Compulsory primary education is introduced. 1880s National sports teams are formed. 1881 A series of anti-Chinese immigration is introduced. 1882 Refrigerated shipping is introduced. 1886 Census shows for first time more New Zealand–born Europeans in New Zealand than immigrants. 1890s Kotahitanga movement establishes Great Council or Kauhanganui. 1891–1912 Liberal government in office. 1892 New Zealand Rugby Union formed. 1892–1906 Richard John Seddon becomes premier (“prime minister” from early 20th century). 1893 Women are granted the vote. 1898 Old-age pensions are introduced. 1899–1902 New Zealand sends troops to support Britain in its South African war. 1900s Maori population shows first increase since early contact (1769). 1901 Australian Federation is formed, but New Zealand refuses to join. The Duke and Duchess of York, future King George V and Queen Mary, tour New Zealand. 1902 New Zealand flag is officially adopted. 1905 The All Blacks rugby team tours Britain; an overwhelming win to All Blacks. 1907 Royal New Zealand Plunket Society is founded. 1914–1918 New Zealand sends troops to support Britain in World War I. 1915 Gallipoli defeat of ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps). 1916 Conscription is introduced. Gallipoli Day, April 25, becomes a national holiday, now called Anzac Day. 1935–1941 Michael Joseph Savage becomes prime minister. 1935–1949 First Labour government in office. 1936 New Zealand is elected to the League of Nations. 1938 Social Security Act. 1939 New Zealand declares war on Germany. 1939–1945 New Zealand supports the Allies in World War II.


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1941 The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and U.S. entry into the war changes New Zealand foreign policy. 1947 Statute of Westminster is signed by New Zealand, granting independence from Britain. 1951 ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand, U.S. defense agreement) is signed. 1972 Britain joins the European Economic Community. 1977 “God Defend New Zealand” becomes the national anthem. 1985 New Zealand refuses to allow U.S. nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships into ports. 1986 The United States abrogates ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand. 2004 Supreme Court is established in New Zealand, ending appeal to the United Kingdom Privy Council.

Situating the Nation New Zealand became a British colony on February 6, 1840, when the British government’s representative, William Hobson, and a group of 50 Maori chiefs gathered at Waitangi to sign the Treaty of Waitangi. The treaty ceded sovereignty to the British Crown in return for protection of lands, forests, fisheries, and other property possessed by the Maori, collectively or individually. Under the treaty, the Maori became British subjects. New Zealand moved from colony to dominion status in 1907 and to national sovereignty in 1947, though it remained a constitutional monarchy. Economically New Zealand was closely tied to Britain from the 1880s to 1945. In the 1930s, 80 percent of its exports went to Britain. British investors supplied most of the overseas capital borrowed by the New Zealand government or by private concerns. New Zealand’s economy rested primarily on sheep and the dairy industry, and its prosperity was greatly assisted by the introduction of refrigerated shipping in 1882. Though situated in the South Pacific, New Zealand identified so closely with Britain that it saw itself as an outpost of Britain and Europe rather than identifying with its Pacific and Asian neighbors. This perception helped define its sense of identity. New Zealand’s nationalism was also promoted by the determination to remain distinct from neighboring Australia.

Instituting the Nation The first “planned” British settlement was established by Edward Gibbon Wakefield and his New Zealand Company at Port Nicholson (Wellington) in 1840, the same year that the Treaty of Waitangi was signed. Colonizing on systematic principles was continued by two other associations, which founded Otago (a Scottish Presbyterian settlement) in 1848 and Canterbury (an Anglican settlement) in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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1850. Five of the six provinces set up under the 1852 constitution were systematic settlements, comprising about 15,000 British immigrants. Auckland, by contrast, was a garrison town, dominated by the presence of Maori and British troops, and half of its population in the 1850s had come from Australia. The total non-Maori (“European” or “Pakeha”) population in New Zealand increased from about 2,000 in 1840 to 32,500 by 1854. The Maori population had declined from 100,000 at the time of Captain James Cook’s visit in 1769 to around 70,000 by 1840. It continued to fall in the late 19th century. In 1860 the European population surpassed that of the Maori for the first time. By 1881 the Pakeha population was 470,000 whereas the number of Maori had dropped to 46,000. When colonial New Zealanders of the 1890s looked back to their origins, they fostered certain myths and stereotypes about the “founding fathers” of the mid19th century, which contributed to their own sense of identity. First, early settlers were cast in an heroic mold, with their work of clearing the bush and “breaking in” the land considered central to nation-building. Early pioneering life was portrayed as harsh, tough, and lonely, and physical prowess and ingenuity were considered a mark of the New Zealander. Women shared in this pioneering feat as “colonial help-meets.” Moreover, it was believed that those who populated the planned settlements and other pioneers were hand-picked, the highest-quality immigrants; unlike their Australian neighbors with their convict roots, the New Zealand settlers were “the best of British.” As the authors of Progress of New N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Australians as the “Other” New Zealanders were determined not to be Australian, despite the close connections between the two countries. In 1891, 23,000 New Zealanders were living in Australia, and 16,000 Australians in New Zealand, and trade unions and churches had connections. However, much of the talk about the pioneers being of “selected stock” and “the best British” was an implicit slight on the convict origins of Australians. New Zealanders liked to see themselves as distinct from, and maybe even better than, Australians. When the idea of an Australian federation came up in the 1880s and the 1890s, New Zealand expressed little interest in joining. There were concerns about a loss of political identity and the swamping of local interests by Australia’s size, population, and resources. Basically, most New Zealanders did not want to become Australians.

Zealand in the Century (1902) wrote: “The stock from which New Zealanders are sprung is not only British but the best British” (cited in Sinclair 1986, 12).

Defining the Nation By the 1890s, three specific developments had helped contribute to New Zealand’s sense of nation. One was an improvement in communications. Mid-19thcentury New Zealand settlements were extremely isolated, separated by mountain ranges, rivers, and dense bush, and almost all travel was by coastal shipping between a large number of small ports. The public works schemes initiated by Sir Julius Vogel in the 1870s vastly improved communications, particularly in the South Island with its new railway line. The telegraph cable laid between the North and South Islands in 1866 also facilitated closer communication. Second, Vogel’s abolition of the provinces as geographical boundaries and separate administrative units in 1876 aided a sense of national identity. With enhanced mobility and interaction, people began to think of themselves as New Zealanders rather than as members of separate settlements or provinces. A third factor that contributed to a distinctive identity was the recognition in the late 19th century that there were now more New Zealand–born Europeans than immigrants, first shown in the 1886 census. One result was the founding of New Zealand native associations “to stimulate patriotism and national sentiment; to provide for social intercourse, and unite all worthy sons of New Zealand in one harmonious body throughout the colony” (Sinclair 1986, 37). These groups were in fact not tremendously successful, and the key determinant of the new identity was instead the school classroom. Compulsory primary education had been introduced in 1877. By the 1890s, 63 percent (440,000 out of 700,000) of the European population was native-born, and 300,000 of those were under the age of 21. It was in the classrooms that a distinctive New Zealand voice was developing. By the turn of the century, a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Saluting the Flag Schools contributed to nationalism through their enthusiasm from the 1890s in raising the New Zealand blue ensign or flag, with the Union Jack and four stars symbolizing the Southern Cross. The New Zealand flag was officially adopted in 1902, five years before the colony attained dominion status. Although the weekly saluting of the flag became compulsory in public schools in 1921, a practice that persisted for many years, schools could still choose whether to salute the Union Jack or the New Zealand flag. An oath of loyalty to the Crown was also required of all teachers at this time. Schools taught “civics,” or how to be a good citizen of the British empire and of New Zealand. A hallmark of Kiwi kids was their preference for wearing no shoes.

recognizable dialect had been adopted by the native-born and by schoolchildren wherever born—it did not seem to matter where their parents had come from. This “colonial twang” caused a great deal of concern among their elders and schoolteachers, but they had no success in checking it. New Zealand’s environment was regarded as important in molding the New Zealander. Much 19th-century writing focused on New Zealand’s natural abundance, good climate, and spaciousness, portraying it as a laborers’ paradise where those who were prepared to work hard would prosper. The opportunities for working-class people in New Zealand to become materially independent were celebrated and contrasted with the “Old World.” This was the beginning of a strong component of New Zealand’s nationalism—the belief that it was an egalitarian society with fair opportunities for all. The typical New Zealander was the self-made man, hardworking and self-sufficient; New Zealand was proud of the fact that there was no aristocracy, no social hierarchy—it was, so the myth went (and it was a myth), a classless society, or at least a society in which all who were sober and hardworking could get on. The New Zealand of the late 20th century defined itself as bicultural and multicultural. However, this was not the view of the white majority during the late 19th century and first half of the 20th century. The dominant belief around 1900, based on Social Darwinism, was that the Maori were a dying race. The first natural increase in the Maori population, which occurred shortly after 1900, challenged that belief. If the Maori were to survive, it was believed that they needed to be converted into “brown skinned New Zealanders” and assimilated into the dominant culture. The Maori themselves did not always share that view; for example, some Maori in the Waikato (central North Island) would not fight in World War I on the grounds that they did not recognize the king of England as their king. Maori separatist movements date back to the 1850s. A separate destiny was the goal of the Great Council or Kauhanganui set up under the Kotahitanga movement of the 1890s. The dominant Pakeha population of New Zealand, however, was not really forced to confront the issue of race relations until the rapid urbanization of the Maori following World War II. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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Many colonists defined themselves by what they were not, leading to an unrelenting racial hatred directed against Asians or “Asiatics,” especially Chinese people who formed a small but visible ethnic minority. There were only 4,000 Chinese in New Zealand in the 1890s, and they were generally hardworking and lawabiding, yet New Zealanders convinced themselves that the Chinese were prone to all sorts of vices and were a threat to the purity of the Anglo-Saxon race. From 1881 a series of anti-Chinese immigration acts were passed; measures included a £10 poll tax on Chinese entering the country, a sum raised to £100 in 1896. The Liberal government of the 1890s felt it was necessary to restrict the number of Chinese, fearing that there were countless millions waiting to swarm down from Asia to the thinly populated lands of the South Pacific, a threat dubbed the “Yellow Peril.”

A Maori teacher conducts a class of mixed white and Maori children outdoors in 1946. (George Silk / Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)


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In the first half of the 20th century, most New Zealanders defined themselves as British New Zealanders and Britain as “Home.” In 1927 Alan Mulgan, a renowned New Zealand–born novelist, wrote a book about his travels in Britain that he called Home. Only after World War II, and more intensely from the 1980s, did this attitude change. By then New Zealand welcomed Asian immigrants and had a significant Pacific Island population. By the turn of the century, the ethnic makeup of New Zealand’s 4 million population was 73 percent Pakeha, 18 percent Maori, 6 percent Asian, and 5 percent Pacific Island.

Narrating the Nation New Zealand’s national anthem, “God Defend New Zealand,” was composed by a poet, Thomas Bracken, in the 1870s and first performed in 1876. Despite recurring criticism of its lack of musical and lyrical distinction, the hymn caught on and was made New Zealand’s national song during the 1940 centennial celebrations. In 1977 it was accorded equal status to the British “God Save the Queen” as a national anthem for New Zealand. By the 1890s, New Zealand was popularly known as “God’s Own Country,” a catchphrase variously attributed to Bracken and the Liberal premier Richard John Seddon. The phrase referred to New Zealand’s natural resources and abundance, its high living standards at the time, and also the determination of the Liberal government (1891–1912) to implement a social and economic program to promote equal opportunities for all. New Zealand was proud of the fact that British prime minister Herbert Asquith at the time described New Zealand as a “laboratory in which political and social experiments are every day made for the information and instruction of the older countries of the world” (cited in Sinclair 2000, 195). Although New Zealand did not set out to be a “social laboratory,” this reputation became a mark of its identity. Nationalism was also narrated in terms of the bravery of New Zealand men at war. The country sent 6,500 men to fight alongside Britain in the South African War of 1899–1902. In proportion to its population, New Zealand contributed more men than any other British colony, a source of national pride. In South Africa, the New Zealanders were said to be excellent soldiers who shone in riding and shooting, and the British generals were apparently effusive in their praise of the New Zealanders. The troops themselves constantly drew comparisons with other national groups, as this was the first time that a significant group of New Zealanders had been placed in contact with other nationalities. The New Zealanders were especially disparaging of the British Army hierarchy; they criticized the way the British officers treated their men and prided themselves on the good relations between New Zealand officers and men. However, it was World War I, and in particular the events at Gallipoli in 1915, that saw New Zealand “born as a nation.” The Australian and New Zealand ExpediN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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tionary Force (ANZAC), comprising 8,500 New Zealanders and 20,000 Australians, suffered heavy losses in this campaign on the Turkish coast—the New Zealanders suffered an 88 percent casualty rate. New Zealand’s prime minister William Massey said that the soldiers’ heroism at Gallipoli had made New Zealand a respected country with all the nations of the Earth. To commemorate the tragedy of Gallipoli, a national holiday was declared on April 25, 1916, with a set ceremony evolving during the 1920s that was as fully military as possible. The celebration of Gallipoli, as historian Jock Phillips noted, signaled a culture that identified nationalism with virility and successful performance in war (Phillips 1987, 164–165). There were other ways in which the war contributed to a sense of nationalism. On a larger scale than during the South African War, New Zealanders were thrown into contact with others. The labeling of New Zealanders as “Kiwis” originates from World War I, derived from New Zealand’s native flightless bird. Historians have analyzed letters and diaries and concluded that the troops often compared New Zealand men favorably with the others they encountered. Good relations between officers and men were noted by other nationals, which the New Zealanders took pride in, as in the South African War. The New Zealanders (and the Australians) showed resentment at the intrusion of the British class system into its army and prided themselves on having citizen’s armies, where social equality ruled as far as possible. The New Zealanders disliked saluting officers and parade ground discipline. Another part of the image of the troops was one of racial harmony. Despite the refusal of some Waikato Maori to participate in the war, in 1916 Maui Pomare (the first Maori to train as a doctor) claimed that misunderstandings between the Pakeha and Maori were swept away forever when their blood comingled in the trenches of Gallipoli. Maori participation in World War I was perceived to be crucial to their acceptance by Pakeha as full partners within the New Zealand nation. Historian Michael King wrote that, as a result of the Maori contribution to the war effort, “it became more difficult for Pakeha leaders to discriminate against Maori” (King 1992, 302). In the early 20th century, there was a widespread belief that New Zealand had the best race relations in the world. The vision of ideal race relations was a myth, but it was a powerful and nation-building one. The situation prevailed, historian Michael King wrote, because Our Nation’s Story, the school text of the 1920s and 1930s, claimed that the Treaty of Waitangi had been “the fairest treaty ever made by Europeans with a native race.” It was also because, in the words of William Herries, minister of native affairs between 1912 and 1921, the Maori constituted “the finest coloured race in the world” (King 2003, 468). New Zealand was proud to compare its race relations with those prevailing elsewhere. World War II reinforced images created during World War I, in particular the concepts of an egalitarian army, good relations between officers and men, and good race relations. General Freyberg fought and drank with the men. The Maori Battalion, all volunteers, won the admiration of other New Zealand units, of other N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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allied troops, and even of the Germans, for their bravery, a source of pride for all New Zealanders. Nationalism was also fostered by New Zealand’s sporting activities and heroes. Many of the national sporting bodies were formed in the late 1880s and 1890s. They included those for athletics, mountaineering, bowling, golf, horse racing, cricket, soccer, rowing, swimming, and tennis. The silver fern leaf became the emblem of many sports organizations. The New Zealand Rugby Union was formed in 1892, and rugby soon emerged as New Zealand’s national sport. New Zealanders began playing overseas teams in the 1890s, but the most famous was the United Kingdom tour of 1905. The All Blacks scored over 800 points against Britain’s 20odd. The only game they lost was against Wales—a loss described by historian Keith Sinclair as “the Gallipoli of New Zealand sport” and as “a major episode in the mythology of New Zealandism” (Sinclair 1986, 147). Explaining the success of the 1905 tour, one newspaper reporter claimed that the New Zealander lived a more natural life than the Englishman, that he took more exercise, that he was resourceful, and that he was full of an “overflowing vitality and virility. . . . He beats the Englishman because he lives nearer to nature” (Sinclair 1986, 150). It was the country life, the lack of urban decadence, that produced the superior physical manhood. In colonial conditions the transplanted Briton was made better. The sense of their own identity as New Zealanders was combined with a pride in being of British stock. This included an intense loyalty to the British Crown. When the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York, the future King George V and Queen Mary, toured New Zealand in 1901, there were endless scenes of enthusiasm, as there were for later royal tours, including the visit by Queen Elizabeth II in 1953–1954.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The 19th-century image of New Zealand as a land of milk and honey had been propagated for the express purpose of attracting new immigrants to the country from Britain. When this image was challenged by the development of large sheep runs and capitalist interests in the depression years of the 1880s, the Liberal government rose to power and passed extensive legislation in favor of the ordinary worker/settler. Through their land legislation, they broke up the large estates and converted the land into small family farms. They introduced labor and social legislation to protect the workers and the underprivileged. The Liberals were famous for their radical social legislation, and the international acclaim that they received as a “social laboratory” was a source of great pride to New Zealanders. Premier Richard Seddon (or “King Dick”), a self-made man from Lancashire who had managed a hotel on the west coast of the South Island of New Zealand, was a national hero. New Zealand was the first country in the world to grant women N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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the vote in 1893 (only the American states of Wyoming and Utah had preceded it), and the second country in the world (after Denmark) to grant old-age pensions out of general taxation in 1898. When the well-being of the people was again threatened by the 1930s depression, the first Labour government rose to power and legislated for social security “from the cradle to the grave,” paid for out of general taxation, in its famous Social Security Act of 1938. Again, New Zealand attracted international attention, and Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage also became a national hero. The legislation of the 1890s and 1930s had a major impact on New Zealand’s sense of nationalism, defining its society as fair and just. Other welfare initiatives contributed to that image, such as the world-famous Royal Society for the Health of Women and Children (the Plunket Society) and its founder Sir Frederic Truby King. The Plunket Society, set up in 1907, took the credit for New Zealand having the lowest infant death rate in the world. New Zealand also attracted international attention for its health camps, school dental service, and the first state-funded maternity hospitals in the world. The Labour government played another important part in nation-building through its foreign policy. Although Britain had encouraged its dominions to build their own defenses from the 1920s, New Zealand was still totally reliant on Britain strategically. The Labour government, elected to office in 1935, was intensely nationalistic; one of its election pamphlets declared that its foreign policy came from New Zealand citizens with a lifetime study of New Zealand problems, implying that the (Conservative) opposition’s foreign policy was dictated by British interests. As part of this nationalism, Labour aimed to “insulate” New Zealand economically from the world market and Britain in particular by making the country more self-sufficient. Local manufacturing was consequently heavily subsidized. In foreign policy, Labour claimed to be international in outlook rather than oriented toward Britain and the Commonwealth. Australian-born Michael Joseph Savage was New Zealand’s first prime minister to bring to the office a distinct lack of enthusiasm for the British monarchy.

Royal New Zealand Plunket Society The Royal New Zealand Plunket Society was founded in 1907, initially as the Society for Promoting the Health of Women and Children. Its name “Plunket” came from the patronage of Lady Plunket, the wife of the then governor of New Zealand. It was a voluntary organization run by women, though heavily subsidized by the government. Local Plunket committees were set up all around the country that employed Plunket nurses (who were trained in infant care) to visit mothers of newborn babies in their homes and run health clinics for older babies. By the 1950s, over 90 percent of mothers availed themselves of this free service, and it had attained iconic status in New Zealand society. Most New Zealanders born after 1920—or their mothers—have kept their Plunket Baby Record Book as a memento of an important phase of their life.


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Labour believed that collective security was the answer to international disputes. In its endeavor to support this policy through the League of Nations, the new Labour government adopted positions that brought New Zealand into conflict with Britain. In 1936 New Zealand was elected to the League of Nations Council and supported the Soviet Union’s proposals for collective security. At the close of the 1937 Imperial Conference, a left-wing British paper, the New Statesman, reported that New Zealand had had the courage to criticize severely the British attitude to the League and to the Spanish war: “New Zealand, once Britain’s white-headed boy, has now, under a Labour Government taken Australia’s place as the most intractable member of the family” (McKinnon 1993, 25–26). In the Spanish Civil War of 1936–1939, while Britain remained neutral, New Zealand looked to the League to settle it. In 1939 the British recognized the fascist dictator in Spain, General Franco; New Zealand did not. While New Zealand leaped to the support of Britain when World War II broke out in 1939, the Labour government maintained a sense of independence from Britain by declaring war on Germany independently, unlike Australia, which claimed to be bound by the British declaration of war. World War II was to signal a direct break with Britain. Historian Keith Sinclair wrote that “New Zealand history changed dramatically in a few days in December 1941” (Sinclair 2000, 292). He explained that previously New Zealanders had often acted as though their country lay somewhere near Europe and had given little thought to the Pacific. Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the fall of the supposedly impregnable British base in Singapore in 1942, New Zealand felt much more vulnerable in the Pacific and looked to America for support. This trend was to continue in the postwar years, for example with the signing of the ANZUS treaty (the Australia, New Zealand, and U.S. defense agreement) in 1951. However, New Zealand’s refusal in 1985 to allow U.S. nuclearpowered or nuclear-armed ships to enter its ports caused the United States to abrogate its ANZUS responsibilities toward New Zealand in 1986. Through its antinuclear stance, New Zealand was standing up to the major world powers. In 1947 the Statute of Westminster was adopted in New Zealand, giving legal fulfillment to the fact of sovereignty or independence from Britain, though New Zealand continued to owe allegiance to the British Crown as a member of the British Commonwealth. This trend away from Britain accelerated during the second half of the 20th century. It was stimulated in part by Britain joining the European Economic Community in 1972, which brought to an end New Zealand’s privileged position in trade with Britain and forced it to look elsewhere for markets. A further major move away from traditional dependence on Britain occurred in 2004 when the Supreme Court was established in New Zealand, bringing to an end the right of appeal from New Zealand–based courts to the United Kingdom– based Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Recently debates have occurred as to whether New Zealand should adopt a new flag, in particular whether it should abandon the Union Jack as part of its flag. For the time being at least, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 2 (1880–1945)

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there is not much support among the New Zealand public for republicanism, either among Maori or Pakeha. Though separatist Maori movements stemmed back to the 1850s and led to the setting up of a separate parliament (the Kauhanganui) in the 1890s, as noted earlier, most Maori leaders by the early 20th century sought to work within existing structures. For example, the Ratana movement allied itself with the Labour Party in the 1920s. A long-standing goal of Ratana was, however, to have the Treaty of Waitangi recognized in law as a binding document of partnership and protection of Maori rights. This goal became more politicized in the 1970s and must be seen in the context of international civil rights movements. In 1975 the Treaty of Waitangi Act was passed (amended in 1985) to compensate Maori for land losses in the 19th century and to protect Maori rights. All government departments thereafter had to acknowledge the principles of the treaty in policy making. In 1974, the day the treaty was signed, February 6, was declared a national holiday. Instituted to celebrate a bicultural society, this day has been marked by Maori protest movements. In 1990 the Tino Rangitiratanga (“self-determination”) flag was adopted as a symbol of Maori identity. Protests have, however, remained a minority movement within New Zealand society. Many Maori, along with other New Zealanders, now celebrate New Zealand’s ethnic diversity. Selected Bibliography Belich, James. 1996. Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders from Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century. Auckland, New Zealand: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. Belich, James. 2001. Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders from the 1880s to the Year 2000. Auckland, New Zealand: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press. Fairburn, Miles. 1989. The Ideal Society and Its Enemies. The Foundations of Modern New Zealand Society, 1850–1900. Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press. King, Michael. 1992. “Between Two Worlds.” In The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd ed., edited by G. W. Rice, 285–307. Auckland, New Zealand: Oxford University Press. King, Michael. 2003. The Penguin History of New Zealand. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Books. McKinnon, Malcolm. 1993. Independence and Foreign Policy. New Zealand in the World since 1935. Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University Press. Mein Smith, Philippa. 2005. A Concise History of New Zealand. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Orange, Claudia. 2004. An Illustrated History of the Treaty of Waitangi. Wellington, New Zealand: Bridget Williams Books. Phillips, Jock. 1987. A Man’s Country: The Image of the Pakeha Male, A History. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Books. Sinclair, Keith. 1986. A Destiny Apart: New Zealand’s Search for National Identity. Wellington, New Zealand: Unwin. Sinclair, Keith. 2000. A History of New Zealand. Rev. ed. Auckland, New Zealand: Penguin Books.


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Index

Note: Page numbers in bold indicate a main entry for that subject, and numbers in italic refer to the sidebar text on that page. Aasen, Ivar, 226 Abacha, Sani, 1188 Abayomi, Kofo, 1180 Abbas, Ferhat, 1099 Abbas, Gulam, 1763 Abbas, Mahmoud, 1142 Abbas II (Egypt), 261 Abbas the Great, Shah, 1108, 1113 Abd-ul-Ilah, 1745 Abdallah, King (Transjordan), 728, 729 Abdelkader, Emir, 1098, 1099, 1102 Abduh, Muhammad, 731 Abdülhamid II (Ottoman Empire), 764, 765 Abdullah, Farooq, 1767, 1768, 1770 Abdullah, King (Jordan), 1142 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad, 1761, 1761, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766–1767 Abiola, Moshood, 1188 Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 1847, 1851 Aborigines, Australian, 932. See also Pan-Aboriginalism Abrams, Lynn, 53 Abyssinia, 736–737, 739 Aceh, 954, 1468, 1734 Achebe, Chinua, 913, 914, 917, 920, 921, 925 Acton, Lord, 687 Adams, Abigail, 50 Adenauer, Konrad, 947, 973–974, 1549 Adivar, Halide Edib, 770 Afghanistan, 1683–1695, 1684 (map) and education, 1388–1389 Germany and terrorists in, 1554 invasion of, 1497 and music, 1440 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Soviet Union, 954 and terrorism, 1488 and women, 904, 1457 Aflaq, Michel, 731, 732, 733, 981, 1740 Africa and colonialism, 890 education in, 39–40, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 431 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence/separatist movements in, 1461, 1464, 1468–1469

literature/language in, 919–920, 925–927 and music, 1440 and religion, 108 and socialism, 980–981 supranational organizations and, 962, 965 See also specific African nations African Americans, 493–494 Afrikaner nationalism, 1144–1153 Afzelius, Arvid August, 73 Agathangelos, 1706 Aghulon, Maurice, 49 Agoncillo, Teodoro, 1245 Aguirre, José Antonio, 1515–1516 Ahmad, Kamal Mazhar, 1741 Ahmad Shah, 1686, 1691 Ahmadinejad, Mahmmoud, 1117 Ahmed, Imam, 739, 743 Aho, Juhani, 605 Aidoo, Ama Ata, 927 Aizawa Seishisai, 810–811, 813–814, 814, 815 Akbar, 802 Akçura, Yusuf, 766, 770, 771, 773 Akhmatova, Anna, 1074 Akhmetov, Renat, 1625 Aksakov, K. S., 692 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 261 al-Alayili, Shaykh Abdallah, 732, 733 al-Azmah, Yusuf, 728 al-Azmeh, Aziz, 725 al-Bakr, Ahmed Hasan, 756 al-Banna, Hassan, 984, 985 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 731, 981 al-Bustani, Butrus, 731 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 1135, 1136, 1138, 1139 al-Husayni, Musa Kazim, 1136 al-Husri, Sati, 730, 732–733, 751 al-Jawahiri, Mohammad Mahdi, 1740 al-Jazairi, Amir Abd al-Qadir, 727 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 753 al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman, 727 al-Miqdadi, Darwish, 734 al-Nashshashibi, Raghib, 1136 Al Qaeda, 986–987, 1484, 1488, 1492 and Pakistan, 1232 al-Qaysi, Nuri Ali Hammudi, 1741 Al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, 1488–1489


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I-2 al-Said, Nuri, 753 al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Adb, 984 Alamán, Lucas, 352 Albéniz, Isaac, 1437 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 275, 276 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 840, 840 (illus.), 841, 844, 845, 846 Alem, Leandro, 281 Alevi, 1650–1651, 1653, 1654–1655 Alexander I, Czar (Russia), 20–21, 209, 211, 1576 Alexander I (Bulgaria), 578 Alexander II, Czar (Russia), 210, 598 Alexander III, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Alford, Kenneth J., 1442 Alfred the Great, King (England), 165 Algeria, 1094–1105, 1096 (map) and colonialism, 48 diaspora population of, 1371 and France, 1050–1051 and independence, 1464, 1490 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1496 and women, 903 Ali, Monica, 927 Ali, Muhammad, 258–259, 263 Aliyev, Heidar, 1715, 1720 Aliyev, Ilham, 1715 Allende, Salvador, 331 Almirall, Valentí, 703, 710 Alsace, 475, 1501–1510, 1503 (map) Althusser, Louis, 486, 1052 Amami Island, 1754 Amanullah, King (Afghanistan), 1684, 1686, 1688, 1689 Amazon basin, 1827–1831, 1829 Ambedkar, B. R., 802, 1204–1205 Ambrose, Stephen, 905 American Revolution, 21 and Canada, 299 and education, 32 gender roles and, 45–46, 50 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 Americanization, and Puerto Rico, 841 Americas and language, 478 and music, 75–76, 1432 nationalism and gender in, 44 See also Central America; North America; South America Amharanization, 739, 741, 742 Amin, Hafizullah, 1687 Amir, Yigal, 1400, 1403 Amrane-Minne, Daniele Djamila, 903 Anatolian movement, 1646, 1646 Andersen, Hans Christian, 228 Anderson, Benedict, 25 and diaspora populations, 1368–1369, 1370

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and the “imagined political community,” 475, 481, 912, 1342 and Latin America, 826 and national symbols, 122, 900 on print technology, 129, 485, 1475 on the realistic novel, 923 on “young” and “youth,” 1859 Andic, Helmut, 545 Andrade, Mário de, 1662, 1662 Angell, Norman, 532 Anger, Carl, 228 Anglo-Boer Wars, 198, 204, 449, 490, 1146 and Canada, 305–306, 306 Anglo-Burmese wars, 776 Anglo-Chinese war, 27 Anglo-Nepal war, 1805 Angola, 968, 1657–1667, 1658 (map) and Cuba, 1285 and independence, 1464 Anjala Conspiracy, 223 Ankara, Turkey, 770–772 Anthem, national, 68, 116, 117, 1430, 1431, 1442–1444 and Basques, 1521 and Belgium, 145 and Brazil, 294 and Burma, 782 and Canada, 303 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and the EU, 1042 and France, 175, 1502 and Germany, 619 and Indonesia, 1732 and Japan, 1756, 1757 and Mexico, 354 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 1184, 1186–1187 and Poland, 211, 215 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 230, 230 and the United States, 1308 and Uruguay, 401 Anthias, Floya, 902 Anti-Catholicism, and England, 163, 166 Anti-free-trade movements, 1448 Anti-Semitism, 439, 447, 517, 520–521, 907 and Bulgaria, 582 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and France, 179 and Hungary, 639, 645 in Turkey, 1649 and Ukraine, 1078 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Zionism as reaction to, 1121, 1128 Antiabortion movement, 1446


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Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism, 912–928, 957–970 and Algeria, 1095, 1100 and Angola, 1658, 1664 and Burma, 777, 779, 780–781, 782, 783 and China, 1191, 1193, 1196, 1198–1199, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157–1158, 1163 and Gandhi, 1203 and India, 131, 796, 800–801 and Iran, 1110, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 753, 1739, 1740 and Malaysia, 1216 and nationalism, 26–27, 47–48, 486–487, 1461–1465 and Nigeria, 1178–1179 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 840 and Vietnam, 1269 and women’s rights, 457 Anticommunism, 520, 1310, 1394 Anticosmopolitanism, 415 Antinuclear-power movements, 1449 Antiracist movements, 1457 Antislavery, 161, 163 Antwerp, Belgium, 200 Apartheid, 1151–1153 Appadurai, Arjun, 136, 1374–1375 Aquino, Benigno, 1242, 1242 Aquino, Corazon (Cory), 1242, 1242, 1244 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 729, 1125, 1129, 1135, 1136, 1139–1140 Arab-Israeli War (1967), 1137, 1394–1395 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 1039 Arab League, 726 (map) Arab nationalism, 724–734, 726 (map), 965, 981 and Iraq, 751–752, 753, 754, 754, 757–758, 1739 Arabs, in Turkey, 1650–1651 Arafat, Yasir, 1136–1137, 1141, 1142, 1488–1489 Aral Sea, 882 Arana, Sabino de, 704, 709, 710, 1515 Arason, Jón, 228 Araucanian Indians, 323, 324–326 Arcand, Denys, 1294 Arce, Mariano José, 317–318 Architecture, 30, 37, 407–408, 409, 413, 414–415 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Brussels, 144 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1024 and Malaysia, 1224 and Russia, 692–693 and Turkey, 770–771 Arena y Goiri, Sabino, 1294 Argentina, 268–281, 270 (map) and film, 1335 immigration and national identity in, 492 and music, 1439, 1443 national identity and education in, 39 Arif, Abd al-Rahman, 755 Arif, Abd al-Salam, 754–755 Aristocracy, 5–9

Aristotle, 529 Armageddon, 1394 Armenia, 1696–1711, 1698 (map) and Azerbaijan, 1719 and diaspora populations, 1376 and the Soviet Union, 946 Armenian Apostolic Church, 1699–1700, 1701 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 1718–1719. See also Gharabagh conflict ethnic cleansing/genocide of, 438, 523 and the Ottoman Empire, 764, 765 and Turkey, 1648–1649 Arminius (Hermann), 618 Armstrong, John, 1368 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 187, 1504 Arne, Thomas, 1438 Arnim, Achim von, 73 Arnold, Matthew, 915 Árpád (chief), 643 Art, 16–17, 49, 405–409, 412–417 and Australia, 859–860 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1522 and Canada, 305, 1841 and Finland, 605 and France, 177 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569 historic paintings of Denmark, 154 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127 and the Maori, 1860 and Mongolia, 1794 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Poland, 212, 216, 682 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 402 and Wales, 1637 See also Culture; Landscape Artigas, José Gervasio, 397–398, 401, 402 Asbjørnsen, Peter C., 228 Ashoka, Emperor (India), 802, 1815–1816 Asia and education, 39–40, 428 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence movements in, 1461–1463, 1465–1468 and language, 478 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Asian countries Asquith, Herbert, 868 Assimilation, 29, 522, 931–932 and Australian Aborigines, 858 and China, 1196, 1199 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 and Ethiopia, 744–746


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INDEX

Assimilation (continued ) and Hungary, 644 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 866 and Poland, 685 and the Sami, 1612–1613 and Turkey, 768, 1647, 1652 and Ukrainians, 716 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Education Asylum and the EU, 1042 and Germany, 1556, 1557, 1558–1559 See also Immigrants/immigration; Refugees Atahualpa, 373 Atatürk. See Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) Atlee, Clement, 1461 Atwood, Margaret, 1841 Auber, Daniel, 144 Audubon, John James, 389 Augustina of Aragon, 51 Aung San, 784, 785 (illus.) Aung San Suu Kyi, 784 Austin, John, 1372 Australia, 849–860, 851 (map) and Aborigines, 932, 1844–1853 communication in, 1473 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1375 and education, 1379, 1382 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigration, 883, 1420–1421 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 Macedonians in, 1415 and music, 1439 and new social movements, 1448 and New Zealand, 865 Austria, 539–554, 543 (map) education and, 33–34, 35, 36, 429 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 442 fascism in, 516 and German unification, 192 and Hungary, 638 and Poland, 210 politics and political philosophy in, 535, 1410 Austro-Hungarian empire. See Habsburg empire Autonomy, 899, 939–940 and Armenia, 1698 and Basques, 1516, 1517, 1522 and Catalonia, 1536, 1544–1547 and China, 1200 and the EU, 1041–1042 and Greenland, 1562–1563 and minorities, 1357–1358 and Nepal, 1805 and Pakistan, 1232 and Poland, 679 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 843, 845–847 and Spain, 707, 707–708, 708, 711, 1084–1085, 1088, 1090–1091

Avellaneda, Nicolas, 280 Awolowo, Obafemi, 1180, 1182, 1182, 1183 Ayala, Julio César Turbay, 833 Ayubi, Nazih, 734 Azaña, Manuel, 705 Azerbaijan, 469, 1713–1721, 1714 (map) and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1710 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1078–1079 and Turkey, 769 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 1180, 1180, 1183 Aznar, José María, 1544 Aznavour, Charles, 1707 Aztecs, 345–346, 351–352 Ba Maw, 779–780, 785 Ba’ath Party, 731, 981 and Iraq, 753, 754, 756, 1740–1741, 1743, 1745, 1746 Babangida, Ibrahim, 1188 Babenberg monarchy, 539–541 Babenco, Hector, 1334–1335 Babeuf, François-Noël, 1489 Bache, Otto, 228 Bachyns’kyi, Yulian, 722 Bacon, Sir Francis, 61 Bagehot, Walter, 162–163 Bahais, 1113, 1118 Bainimarama, Frank, 1324, 1325 Bakongo, 1660–1664, 1664 Bakshi, Gulam Mohammad, 1766 Baku, 1716 Bakunin, M., 38 Balakirev, Mili, 75, 79, 80, 82, 1437 Baldorioty de Castro, Román, 839 Balearic Islands, 1546 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 1183, 1185 Bali, 1440 Balkan nations, 435, 436 Balkan Wars, 437 and Bulgaria, 572, 580 and Turkey, 1645 Baltic states, 555–568, 559 (map), 1573 (map) independence, 503 and new social movements, 1449 racism in the, 518 and the Soviet Union, 946, 955, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1581–1582 Bancroft, George, 389 Bandaranaike, Nathan, 1467 Bandera, Stepan, 718, 1624 Bandung Conference (1955), 958–962, 964–965, 1206 Bangladesh, 1201, 1234, 1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1466 Bano, Shah, 1209 Bao Dai, 1264 Barassi, Ron, 857 Barbosa, José Celso, 839, 841 Barceló, Antonio, 840 Barcelona, 1539–1540


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I-5

INDEX

Barker, Ernest, 531–532, 535 Baron, Beth, 264 Barons, Krišj¯anis, 564, 1577, 1577, 1578 Barrès, Maurice, 416 Barrios, Agustín (“Mangoré”), 365, 365 Barruel, Abbé, 45 Barry, Brian, 97 Barry, Sir Charles, 408 Barthes, Roland, 1052 Bartók, Béla, 1435 Basanáviˇcius, Father Jonas, 567 Basarab, 1592 Basedow, Johann, 34 B˘asescu, Traian, 1589 Basques, 1512–1524, 1514 (map) concessions to, 932 and cultural survival, 878 and the ETA, 1090, 1091–1092 and language, 477, 482 and the mixing of ethnic and civic nationalisms, 938–939 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1470, 1471 and Spain, 702–711, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1496 Batavian Republic, 197, 198 Batista, Fulgencio, 1276, 1277 Batman, John, 1845 Battle of Kosovo (1389), 100 Battle of Maysalun, 728 Battle of Yungay, 327–328 Battle y Ordóñez, José, 403 Bauer, Otto, 535, 1071 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1368 Baumer, Gertrude, 453 Bavaria, 621, 631 Beatrix, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Becker, Nikolas, 189–190 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 16, 117, 185, 186–187, 1431, 1432 Beg, Mirza, 1763 Begin, Menachem, 1488–1489 Bejarano, Jorge, 830 Belarusia, 1079 Belaúnde, Victor Andrés, 373, 375 Belgian Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Belgium, 137–146, 141 (map) colonialist policies of, 958, 968, 1464 and Congo/Zaïre, 437, 1156–1158, 1160 fascism in, 517 and language, 472 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1678 secession from the Netherlands, 197 Bello, Ahmadu, 1182, 1185 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 1099, 1100 Ben Bouali, Hassiba, 1099 Ben-Gurion, David, 953, 1123, 1128 Bendjedid, Chadli, 1099 Beneš, Edvard, 587, 588, 588, 596, 596 (illus.), 1017 and World War II, 595, 1019

Bengalil, 1466 Benkheddda, Benyoucef, 1100 Bennett, Louise, 913, 921 Bennett, Robert Russell, 1433 Bentham, Jeremy, 19, 855 Berbers, 1101 Berg, Christian, 153 Berkl¯aus, Edvards, 1578 Berlin, Isaiah, 97 Berlioz, Hector, 1431, 1435 Bernstein, Leonard, 1439 Berra, Francisco, 402 Betances, Ramón Emeterio, 839–840, 841 Bethlen, Count István, 638 Bhabha, Homi, 914, 927 Bhanubhakta Acharya, 1807 Bhimsen Thapa, 1806–1807 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh, 1466 Bhutto, Benazir, 1231, 1398 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 1231, 1767 Biafra, 1469 Biblical texts, 473–474 Biculturalism, and the Maori, 1858–1859 Biehl, Janet, 882–883 Bierstadt, Albert, 65, 389 Billig, Michael, 121, 479 bin-Laden, Osama, 986–987, 1399, 1400 Bingham, George Caleb, 389 Biogenetics, 883 Bioregionalism, 879 Birendra, King (Nepal), 1808, 1809 Bismarck, Otto von, 24, 150, 192–193, 436, 611 and Alsace, 1505 monuments to, 410–411 and Poland, 678 Bjørnson, Bjørnstjerne, 78, 228, 230 Blake, Christopher, 1439 Blanc, Louis, 239 Blest Gana, Alberto, 329 Block, Alexander, 1602 Bluetooth, Harald, 226 Boer Wars. See Anglo-Boer Wars Boers. See Afrikaner nationalism Bohemia, 584, 1022 and Hussitism, 1023 and music, 1435–1436 Boland, Eavan, 926 Bolger, Dermot, 927 Bolivar, Simón, 16, 272, 370, 825, 831 Bolivia, 371–372, 1443 Bolognesi, Francisco, 377 Bolshevik Revolution, 436, 520, 593 Bolsheviks, and religion, 106 Bonald, Louis de, 178, 179 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 16, 26, 34, 175, 176–177, 474 as father figure, 51 and the French national anthem, 1443 and Haiti, 336 and Switzerland, 248


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I-6

INDEX

Boniface, Pope, 100 Bonifacio, Andres, 1245–1246 Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José, 287–289, 290, 292 Borden, Robert, 306 Borders, 460–461, 966, 967, 968 and Afghanistan, 1684–1685, 1689 in Africa, 1464, 1469 and Algeria, 1096 and Armenia, 1697–1699, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 562–563, 1582 and Basque Country, 1513, 1514 (map) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 289, 1831 and Bulgaria, 574 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 298 in Central America, 316 and the collapse of communism, 1413 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Denmark, 152 and Egypt, 262 and Ethiopia, 740, 742 and the European Union, 1042 and Fiji, 1318 and Finland, 598 and France, 175 and Germany, 187–188 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 639–640 and Indonesia, 1729–1730 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1738–1739 and Ireland, 655 and Israel, 1124–1125, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1771 and Japan, 1753 and language, 471, 474–475, 477 Mexican, 353 (map) and Mongolia, 1792 and Nepal, 1805 and the Netherlands, 199 and Paraguay, 359, 362 and Peru, 368, 371 and Poland, 212–213, 685 and Romania, 1591 and Russia, 1599 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669 and Scandinavia, 225 and Scotland, 236 and South Africa, 1145 Spain/France, 1513 and Taiwan, 1255 and Turkey, 768, 769, 1647 and Ukraine, 713–714, 719, 1620 and the United States, 390, 1390 and Uruguay, 395 and Wales, 1636 and the War of the Pacific, 376 (map)

after World War I, 514, 524 See also Expansionism Borglum, Gutzon, 65, 411 Borneo, 1218–1220 Borodin, Aleksandr, 78–79, 82, 417, 1437 Bosanquet, Bernard, 534–535 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 806 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1358, 1409, 1525–1535, 1526 (map) Bosse, Abraham, 62 Botero, Fernando, 832 Botev, Hristo, 573, 576–577 Botha, Pieter Willem, 1152 Botswana, 1443 Bouchard, Lucien, 1292 Boudiaf, Mohammed, 1099 Boudicca, Queen (England), 165 Bouhired, Djamila, 1099 Boumaza, Djamila, 1099 Boumedienne, Houari, 890, 1099, 1100, 1100 Boundaries. See Borders Boupacha, Djamila, 1099 Bourassa, Henri, 306, 1289, 1293–1294, 1296 Bourassa, Robert, 1291 Bourbon reforms, 350, 371 Bourgeoisie, 12, 585, 626. See also Elites Bourguiba, Habib, 1464 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 1099, 1100 Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 333, 337, 340, 342 Bracken, Thomas, 868 Bradley, F. H., 531 Bradman, Sir Donald, 857 Brahms, Johannes, 117 Brandt, Willy, 976 Brathwaite, Kamau, 917, 921 Brazil, 282–297, 284 (map), 1824–1832, 1826 (map) and the Amazon, 876 and the arts, 1334–1335, 1439 and colonialism, 889 and Uruguay, 396–397 Brazilian Portuguese, 478 Brentano, Clemens, 73 Bretagne, 1490 Brezhnev, Leonid, 1026, 1076–1077 Brinker, Hans, 204 Bristow, George, 76 British North America Act, 300, 300 Britishness, 159, 162, 167 and Scotland, 233 Britten, Benjamin, 1434 Brock, Sir Isaac, 304 Brooklyn Bridge, 128, 134 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom, 164 Brussels, 144 Buddhism and Asian political identity, 972 and Burma, 779, 780 and Japan, 106 and Mongolia, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1798


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I-7

INDEX

and politics, 983, 988 and Tibet, 1815–1817, 1821, 1822 Buenos Aires, 395–396, 397 Buhari, Muhammadu, 1187 Bulgakov, M. A., 697 Bulgaria, 437, 570–582 Bull, John, 117 Burghers, Thomas, 1150 Buriats, 1784, 1785, 1788–1795, 1791 Burke, Edmund, 89, 162, 1489 Burlington, Lord, 62 Burma, 776–785, 1370 Burnley, I. H., 883 Burns, E. Bradford, 292 Burns, Robert, 73, 238 Burschenschaften, 187 Burundi. See Rwanda and Burundi Bush, George H. W., 1306, 1395 Bush, George W., 1306, 1347, 1395–1396, 1453 Bushnell, David, 834 Bustamante, Carlos María de, 350, 352 Byron, Lord, 631 Cabero, Alberto, 330 Cabinda, 1660 Cabral, Amílcar, 1661 Cáceres, Andrés A., 377 Cady Stanton, Elizabeth, 53, 57 Cakobau, King (Fiji), 1318 Calhoun, John C., 390 Caliphate, 760–761 Cambó, Francesc, 706, 710 Cambodia, 1463 Camden, William, 61 Camphausen, Wilhelm, 408 Canada, 298–307, 301 (map), 1289 (map), 1372, 1834–1842, 1836 (map) communication in, 1473 education and, 424, 428, 429, 1383–1384 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigrants/immigration, 1415, 1418–1419, 1420 and indigenous groups, 1566 and music, 1441 and national symbols, 1344, 1346, 1347–1348 and natural resources, 884 and Nunavut, 1562 and Québec, 1288–1297 railroad in, 127 and sports, 993, 1000–1001 and technology, 1477–1478 Canal, Boisrond, 338 Cannadine, David, 1009 Capitalism and Korea, 1778–1779 and Social Democrats, 976 See also Economy; Globalization Captaincy General of Guatemala, 310, 314 Carbó, Eduardo Posada, 834 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 1829

Carducci, Giousè, 671 Carey, Henry, 117 Caribbean, 838 (map), 1274 (map) Carmichel, Franklin, 1841 Carnegie, Andrew, 239 Carpathian Ukraine, 716 Carr, E. H., 23, 536–537 Carr, Emily, 1841 Carrera, José Miguel, 326 Carrera, Rafael, 315, 318 Carretero, Luis, 711 Carter, Jimmy, 1395 Cartier, Georges-Etienne, 1288 Cartography. See Maps Castile, 1083, 1537 Castilla, Ramón, 372 Castillo, Florencio, 317 Castro, Arturo, 830 Castro, Fidel, 834, 942, 952, 1276, 1278–1279, 1278 (illus.), 1279, 1286 Castro, Raúl, 1279, 1286 Catalonia, 1413, 1415, 1536–1547, 1538 (map) and language, 477 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1091 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and Spain, 702–711, 708, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1490 Catherine the Great, 19–20 Catholicism. See Eastern Orthodox Church; Roman Catholicism Caupolicán (chief), 326 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 669, 673 Ceau¸sescu, Nicolae, 952, 1585, 1589, 1591, 1594 Cederström, Gustaf, 228 ˇ Celakovský, František Ladislav, 73 Celis, Carlos Uribe, 832 Celman, Miguel Juárez, 280 Celtic languages, 471, 472, 477 Celts, 236–237 Central America, 309–321, 312 (map), 838 (map), 1274 (map) Central American Common Market, 316 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 896, 1746, 1821 Ceremonies, 1347–1348 and Burma, 782 and France, 176 and Iran, 1114–1115 and nationalistic art, 411, 417 See also Holidays/festivals Cervantes, Ignacio, 76 Césaire, Aimé, 488, 917, 919 Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de, 1275, 1282 Chabrier, Emmanuel, 1437 Chaco War, 360, 363, 365 Chadwick, George, 76 Chamberlain, H. St., 41 Channing, Edward Tyrell, 389 Charents, Yeghishe, 1707 Charles III (Spain), 350


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I-8

INDEX

Charles V (Habsburg), 196 Charles XII (Sweden), 226 Charrúas Indians, 394 Chartists, 161, 164 Chatterji, Bankimchandra, 800 Chaudhry, Mahendra, 1323, 1324 Chaves, Julio César, 364 Chávez, Carlos, 76, 1439 Che Guevara, Ernesto, 942, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1286 Chechens, ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 441 Chechnya and Russia, 897, 1080, 1597, 1605–1607 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 Chen Duxiu, 789, 793 Chen Shui-bian, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1259 Chenrezig (God of Compassion), 1816, 1817 Chernobyl disaster, 954, 1078, 1457 Cherono, Stephen (Saif Saeed Shaheen), 1001 Chiang K’ai-shek, 791, 792, 794, 1250, 1251, 1251 (illus.) Chibás, Eduardo, 1282 Chile, 39, 323–331, 325 (map) and Peru, 377 China, 787–795, 788 (map), 1190–1200, 1192 (map) and Angola, 1664 anticolonialism in, 27 and the Cold War, 942–943 and colonialism, 890 and communism/Maoism, 952, 977, 978 and diaspora populations, 1372–1373 education and, 426, 1386–1387 and film, 1339 and India, 1210 and Indonesia, 1729 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762 and Japan, 809, 815, 1749, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 and Korea, 1780, 1781 and language, 472, 478, 481 and Mongolia, 1784, 1785, 1786–1788, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1794, 1795–1796 and music, 1440 and population transfers, 876 and religion, 108 separatism within, 1468 and the Soviet Union, 948, 979 and Taiwan, 1251, 1252–1253, 1256, 1256, 1257, 1259, 1462 and Tibet, 1813, 1814–1815, 1818–1821, 1823 and the United States, 1395 and Vietnam, 1263, 1266 Chinese in Japan, 1753 in Malaysia, 1215, 1216, 1385, 1463 in New Zealand, 867 See also Singapore Chipenda, Daniel, 1662, 1662 Cho Man Sik, 1773

Choibalsang, Marshal (Mongolia), 1789, 1792, 1797, 1798 Choinom, R., 1794 Chopin, Frédéric, 74, 81, 212, 214, 216, 686, 1434–1435 Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 1078, 1626 Chou Wen-chung, 1440 Choueiri, Youssef, 730 Christian III (Denmark), 226 Christian IV (Denmark), 226 Christian Coalition, 1395 Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International, 973–975 Christianity and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1706 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and Fiji, 1318 and fundamentalism, 1392, 1393 and the Philippines, 1239 and South Africa, 1148–1149 See also specific Christian religions Christophe, Henry, 337, 340 Chrysanthemum Revolution, 638 Chubais, Anatoly, 1597 Church, Frederic Edwin, 65 Churchill, Winston, 950, 1011, 1012, 1033, 1034, 1461 Cienfuegos, Camilo, 1283 Cinema, 133, 417–418, 497, 1327–1340 and Algeria, 1102 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and France, 1053 and Mongolia, 1794 and Québec, 1294 related to World War II, 1434 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1675 and the Soviet Union, 1075–1076 and the United States, 951–952 See also Theater Cintrón, Rosendo Matienzo, 841, 845–846 Citizenship, 930, 934–936 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 1851 and the Baltic states, 568 and Brazil, 293 and Canada, 298, 1835 and Central America, 320 and Czech Republic, 1027 and Denmark, 154–155 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1366, 1371–1372, 1374, 1376 and the EU, 1041, 1042 and forms of nationalism, 488, 1354 and France, 171, 1050 and gender/sexuality, 444, 446, 909 and Germany, 188, 620, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559 and globalization, 1409


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I-9

INDEX

and Haiti, 335, 338 and immigration, 1419–1420 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 669 and Japan, 1752, 1753 and Malaysia, 1216, 1217, 1223 and Mongolia, 1796, 1798 and Peru, 371, 372–373 and Poland, 207 and Puerto Rico, 836, 843 and Ukraine, 1624 and the United States, 1398, 1401 and Uruguay, 400–401 and Wales, 1639 ˇ Ciurlionis, Mikolajus Konstantinas, 565 Civil rights movement, U.S., 124, 944, 965, 1300–1303, 1304, 1305, 1310 Civil war and Angola, 968, 1658–1659, 1663, 1666 and China, 790 and collapse of communism, 895, 896 and Colombia, 829, 833, 834 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Iraq, 757 and newly independent states, 968 and Nigeria, 967, 1185, 1185 and Palestine, 1142–1143 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and Spain, 707, 711, 1088 and the United States, 382, 391 See also Conflict/violence Civilis, Gaius Julius, 203 Class, 1–12 and Afghanistan, 1692–1693 and Angola, 1661 and Argentina, 280 and Brazil, 285 and Bulgaria, 571 and Catalan nationalism, 1537–1538 and Central America, 311 and Chile, 323, 327, 328, 329, 330–331 and China, 1194–1195, 1195, 1196, 1197 education, nationalism, and, 423, 427, 431, 478–479, 481 and Egypt, 265 and ethnic conflict, 892–893, 895, 897–898 and Finland, 601 gender, nationalism, and, 55–56 and Germany, 611 and Great Britain, 163–164 and Greece, 625 and Haiti, 334, 339 and Hungary, 644–645 and India, 131, 1204–1205 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 755, 1739 and Italy, 669–670 and Mongolia, 1795 and Québec, 1292–1293 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222

and social movements, 1452, 1454, 1456 and Soviet ideology, 693–694 and Spain, 709 and the United States, 1305 and Uruguay, 397, 403 Clavigero, Francisco Xavier, 350, 351, 351 Clay, Henry, 388–389 Clientelism, Iraq and, 750, 750–751, 755, 755, 756 Clifford, James, 1368 Clinton, William, 1408 Cloots, Anacharsis, 86 Clos, Joan, 1541 Coates, Eric, 1433 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 516 Cohen, Leonard, 1296 Cohen, Robin, 1672 Cohn, Roy, 908 Cold War, 525, 942–956, 975–979 and Angola, 1658 and Austria, 550 and Canada, 1840 and Eritrea, 1174 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 442 Europe and the end of the, 1043–1044 and Great Britain, 1012 and Indonesia, 1733, 1734 and Italy, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750 and Korea, 1772, 1773 and the Philippines, 1241 and separatist movements, 1465 and sexuality, 907–908 and sports, 994 and Tibet, 1821 and the United States, 1039, 1303, 1310 See also Nonaligned movement Cole, Thomas, 389 Collins, Bob, 1849 Colombel, Noel, 338 Colombia, 39, 824–834, 827 (map) Colonialism/imperialism, 25, 26, 489, 530, 958, 1301, 1303 and Algeria, 1098 and Angola, 1659 and Arab nationalism, 728–729, 734 and Australia, 855 and Basques, 1513 and Brazil, 283–285 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 299 and Chile, 323–324 and China, 1190 and Congo/Zaïre, 1156–1158, 1160 and diaspora populations, 1364 education and, 419, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 430, 431 and England/Great Britain, 161, 165–167, 490–491, 1005–1007 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737–740


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I-10

INDEX

Colonialism/imperialism (continued ) and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889, 893 and European nationalism, 513–514 and Fiji, 1314–1316 and France, 178, 1050–1051, 1056 and gender, 54–55, 447–448 and Germany, 621 and Greenland, 1566, 1568 and Haiti, 339 and indigenous cultures, 1337 and Indochina, 1264 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1730 and Iraq, 749 and Italy, 665, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 815, 821–822, 1749, 1751 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language/literature, 479–480, 912–913, 914–917 and the Maori, 1859 and the Netherlands, 197–198 and Nigeria, 1178 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 and sports, 992 and Taiwan, 1253 and technology, 1478–1480 and terrorism, 1490 and Third World nationalisms, 1776 and the United States, 1310 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Expansionism Comenius, Jan Amos, 1028 Commonwealth Games, 996–997 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 1079, 1715 Communication, 1473–1476 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 279 and Australia, 852 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and Basques, 1521 and Central America, 311, 315 and Colombia, 833 and globalization, 1414, 1416–1417 and ideologies, 972 and immigrants/diaspora populations, 1370, 1427 and India, 800 and Iraq, 1738 and Mexico, 354, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and New Zealand, 865 and Paraguay, 364 and Peru, 368

and the Philippines, 1238, 1247 and Polish nationalism, 216 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavian nationalism, 229 symbols in, 112, 122–123 technological advances in, 127–128, 129, 132, 135–136 and the United States, 388–389, 390 and Wales, 1639 See also Media Communism, 468–469, 944 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1689, 1690, 1693 and Angola, 1663 and anticolonial nationalism, 964 and Armenia, 1706, 1707 and Burma, 780 and China, 789–790, 791, 792, 793, 1190–1200, 1191, 1197 and the Cold War, 947–948, 976, 977–979 collapse of, 1413 and Cuba, 1276–1277, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020, 1022–1026 and France, 1053 and Indonesia, 1727, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733 and Iraq, 753, 754, 755–756, 1745 and Korea, 1773 and Malaysia, 1216, 1223 and Romania, 1587–1588, 1589 and Singapore, 1218 versus socialism, 975–976 and Ukraine, 718 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1266, 1267, 1269 Companys, Lluís, 708 Compromise Agreement of 1867, 638 Conder, Charles, 859 Condorcet, Jean Marquis de, 53, 86, 370, 1351, 1362 Conflict/violence, 14–28, 436, 888–898, 929 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Algeria, 1095 and Basque nationalism, 1518, 1521 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527 and Brazil, 1831 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and competition among nation-states, 1032–1033 and education, 1388–1389 and Eritrea, 1172–1173, 1174–1175 and Finland, 606–607 and gender roles, 50–52, 449–450 in Germany, 1555, 1556–1557, 1559 and Gharabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh), 897, 1706, 1707–1709, 1711, 1715, 1718–1719 and ideological differences, 943–944, 977, 988–989 and India and Pakistan, 804–806, 950, 987, 1201, 1203, 1228, 1234–1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1461–1462, 1762, 1769


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I-11

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and Indonesia, 1734 and instability in postindependent nations, 1469 and Iraq, 1742, 1746–1747 and Ireland/Northern Ireland, 649, 651–652, 662, 1058, 1059, 1060–1062, 1068 in Italy, 665 and the loss of optimism, 935–936 and Malaysia, 1216, 1220–1221, 1223 and minority issues, 939–940, 1412 and Mongolia, 1795–1796, 1796–1797 and natural resources/territory, 523–524, 883–886 in New Zealand, 1856–1857 and Nigeria, 1185 and the Ottoman Empire, 763–764 Palestinian/Israeli, 1129–1130, 1141 and the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 985–986, 1403 and rituals of belonging, 499, 503 role of diaspora populations in, 1365, 1415 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1673–1674, 1676–1677, 1679, 1680–1681 and separatism, 1460, 1465–1470, 1470–1471. See also Separatism/secession and South Africa, 1152–1153 and the Soviet Union, 1075, 1078–1079 and sports, 995 and Taiwan, 1256, 1256 and Tibet, 1823 in Turkey, 1649, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 722 and Vietnam, 1463 See also Civil war; Genocide; specific conflicts and wars; Terrorism Confucianism, 1270 Congo and Zaïre, 962–963, 1155–1165, 1156 (map), 1667, 1671–1672 and Angola, 1662 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and music, 1440 and separatist movements, 1469 Congress of Berlin, 578 Congress of Tucuman, 272, 273 Connolly, James, 652, 654 Connor, Walker, 931, 933 Conrad, Joseph, 489 Conscience, Hendrik, 145, 145 Constantinescu, Emil, 1589 Constantino, Renato, 1245 Consumerism and education, 1380 and image technology, 1339 and Korea, 1778–1779 and sports, 1001–1003 “Contract of the Century,” 1720–1721 Cook, James, 1855 Cook, Ramsay, 1842 Cooke, John Esten, 494

Cooper, James Fenimore, 389 Cooper, William, 1851 Copland, Aaron, 1439 Copps, Sheila, 1839 Copts, 265 Corbin, Margaret, 50 Cornejo, Mariano H., 374 Corradini, Enrico, 515 Corruption and Angola, 1665, 1666–1667 and Armenia, 1710 and the collapse of socialism, 895–896 and Congo/Zaïre, 1160 and Cuba, 1275, 1277, 1283 and Iran, 1111 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1768 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Palestinians, 1140, 1142 and the Philippines, 1243, 1244, 1247 and Québec, 1290, 1292 and Russia, 955 and the Soviet Union, 1076, 1079 and Spain, 704, 705, 1088 and Turkey, 1645, 1651 and Ukraine, 1628 Corsica, 1490 Cortés, Hernán, 346 Cosmopolitanism, 86–88, 97, 1350–1362 and Alsace, 1510 challenging cultural, 416 and Chile, 330 and globalization, 1409 and immigration, 1427–1428 versus national identities, 1342 and Russia, 82 Cossacks, 1620–1621 Costa, Emília Viotti da, 292 Costa Rica, 318, 321 Costa y Martínez, Joaquín, 705, 705 Coubertin, Pierre de, 991 Coulanges, Fustel de, 1502 Council of Europe, 1715 Counterterrorism, 1496–1498, 1757 Cowan, Charles, 235 Cox, Oliver, 1301 Coyer, Abbé, 32 Creole patriotism and Chile, 324, 326, 329 and Mexico, 349, 351, 351–352 and Peru, 369–370 Crete, 1440 Crime and Brazil, 1831 and Colombia, 834 and Iraq, 757 and Mongolia, 1797 and Pakistan, 1232 and the Philippines, 1243 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675


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I-12

INDEX

Crime (continued ) versus terrorism, 1485, 1486. See also Terrorism and women, 904–905 See also Corruption Crimea, 1078, 1625 Crispi, Francesco, 737 Croatia borders of, 1413 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440, 524 fascism in, 516, 518 and language, 481 and new social movements, 1449, 1453 Croats, in Bosnia, 1527–1535 Cromer, Lord, 261 Cross, James, 1291 Cuba, 1273–1286 and Angola, 1658, 1663, 1665 and film, 1335 and music, 1441 Cui, Cesar, 82, 1437 Cultural diversity, 877–879. See also Multiculturalism Cultural revivalism, 407 Culture, 88–90, 92–93, 405–418, 506 and Alsace, 1509 and Argentina, 276, 277–279 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 854–856 and the Baltic states, 558–560, 558–561, 1578 and Basques, 705 and Brazil, 291–295, 296, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 575–577 and Canada, 1837–1842, 1843 and Catalonia, 706, 1537, 1542, 1543–1544 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Danish folk high schools, 151 education and standardization of, 420. See also Education and Egypt, 260, 264 and Ethiopia, 741, 742 and Finland, 599, 600 and France, 1050, 1052–1053 geopolitics and national, 461 German versus Austrian, 542–543 and Germany, 184, 186–187, 617–620 globalization and world, 1407. See also Globalization and Greece, 628, 629 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1728 and Ireland, 657–659 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 671–673 and Korea, 1778 and Malaysia, 1223 and the Maori, 1858, 1860 and Mongolia, 1790, 1793–1794, 1797 music in establishing national, 72–73, 76–83

and nationalism, 31, 47, 53, 129–130, 485–487, 1355 and Nepal, 1801 and the Netherlands, 205 and Nigeria, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Paraguay, 358, 362, 365, 365 and Peru, 369–370, 373, 378 and Poland, 212, 214–216, 217 and Puerto Rico, 841–843, 846–847 and Scandinavia, 226–228 and Scotland, 237–239 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 692–696 and technology, 132–134, 1474–1475 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 400, 402 See also Art; Folk culture; Language; Literature; Music Currency and Austria, 552 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, 1039 the euro, 1039, 1043, 1044, 1549, 1551 and Finland, 598 and globalization, 1392 and Tibet, 1818 Cuthbert, Betty, 857 Cygnaeus, Fredrik, 601 Cyprus, 1648 Cyrus the Great, 1107, 1113 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 211–212, 213 Czech Republic, 446, 584 and music, 82, 1435–1436, 1441 See also Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, 583–596, 1016–1028 breakup of, 1413 and communism, 977 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441, 442 and geopolitics, 465 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Da˛browski, Jan Henryk, 215 Dahl, C. J., 228 Dahl, Jens Christian, 67 Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso), 988, 1816, 1816, 1819–1820, 1821–1823 Dalin, Olof, 227 Damas, Léon, 488 Dame Te Atairangikaahu, 1857 Dance, 81, 114 and Angola, 1665 and Catalonia, 1543 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Peru, 378 and Wales, 1637


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I-13

INDEX

Danevirke, 152–153 Dangarembga, Tsitsi, 913, 926–927 Danilevski, Nikolai, 93, 94 D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 489, 670 Darcy, Les, 858 Darius the Great (Persia), 1107, 1113, 1697 Darwin, Charles, 40, 462, 532 Dashbalbar, O., 1794 Daud Khan, Mohammad, 1687, 1689, 1690 David, Jacques-Louis, 177 Davis, H. O., 1180 Davitt, Michael, 451 Dayananda, Swami, 798–800, 802 Dayton Peace Accords, 1527, 1530, 1533 D’Azeglio, Massimo, 665 de Gaulle, Charles, 949, 1038, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1053–1054 de Klerk, Frederik Willem, 1151, 1152–1153, 1489 de Maistre, Joseph, 178, 179 De-Stalinization, 1077 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 245 de Valera, Eamon, 655, 657, 660–661 Deakin, Alfred, 853, 859, 859 Deane, Seamus, 488, 925 Debray, Regis, 61–62 Declaration of Arbroath, 233 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 173 Decolonization and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Eritrea, 1168 and Fiji, 1316, 1320 and Great Britain, 1006–1007, 1012, 1012 and Malaysia, 1216–1217 and the United States, 1303 See also Colonialism/imperialism Decommissioning, 1063 Dehio, Georg, 415 Delacroix, Eugene, 49 Delgado, Matías, 318 Delors, Jacques, 1040 Demchugdongrub, Prince (Mongolia), 1789–1790 Demirchian, Karen, 1707 Democracy, 66, 1360–1361, 1362, 1399–1400, 1488 and Afghanistan, 1686, 1687, 1689–1690 and Angola, 1663 and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Argentina, 275, 276, 281 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 853, 854 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Brazil, 1831 and Canada, 1843 and Central America, 314–315, 318 and Chile, 328–329 and China, 789, 791, 794 and the Cold War, 944–945 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England/Great Britain, 163, 1008 and Eritrea, 1175 in Europe, 419

and Germany, 190, 613, 614, 620–621, 1556, 1559–1560 and India, 981, 1208, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Mongolia, 1784 and Nepal, 1809 and the Netherlands, 199, 206 and Nigeria, 1188 and the Philippines, 1248 and Poland, 214, 215 and Romania, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1594 and Russia, 1596 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1678–1679 and Spain, 1082, 1084, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 248, 249, 250 and Taiwan, 1253–2354, 1259 and Turkey, 1647 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 385, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1311 See also Voting franchise Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Demonstration effect, 1477–1478 Deng Xiaoping, 1200 Denmark, 147–156, 220–222, 226–228 education and, 429 and the European Union, 1038 flag, 229 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1566, 1572 language and, 225, 472 national anthem/music of, 68–69, 230, 1443 Derrida, Jacque, 1052 Desai, Anita, 923 DeSica, Vittorio, 1334 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 336–337, 340, 342 Determinism social, 127–128 technological, 126–127 Deutsch, Karl, 1474–1475 Devolution, and Great Britain, 1013–1015 Devoto, Juan E. Pivel, 399 Dewey, John, 422, 425 Dialectical materialism. See Marxism Diamonds, 968 and Angola, 1659–1660 and South Africa, 1145–1146 Diaspora populations, 1364–1377 and Algeria, 1097 and Armenians, 1698, 1699, 1700–1701, 1703, 1704, 1704, 1707, 1708–1709, 1710, 1711 and discrimination, 1426–1427 and homeland politics, 1414–1415 and India, 1211 and the Internet, 1482–1483 Jews, 1125–1126 and Latvians, 1581 and Nepal, 1807


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I-14

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Diaspora populations (continued ) and new social movements, 1455 and Nigeria, 1179 and Russians, 698 and supporting terrorism, 1488 Díaz, Porfirio, 355 Diderot, Denis, 102, 171 Die Degenhardts, 133 Diefenbaker, John, 1838, 1839 Diego, José de, 839, 841, 846 Diego, Juan, 347, 349 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 1264, 1264–1265, 1271, 1463 Diffusion of innovations theory, 1477 Dion, Céline, 1296 Discrimination/prejudice and Afghanistan, 1690, 1692 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 858 and Czechoslovakia, 1022, 1027 and Ethiopia, 741 and Fiji, 1316 against immigrants, 1420, 1423–1427 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1729 and Iran, 1113, 1118 and New Zealand, 867 and Nigeria, 1179 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Turkey, 1653, 1655 and the United States, 1304 See also Racism Dixon, Thomas, 1328 Djaout, Tahar, 1100 Djebar, Assia, 1100 Dmowski, Roman, 436, 682, 685 Dobson, Andrew, 877, 880 Dodge, Mary Mapes, 204 Dodson, Mick, 1848 Dodson, Pat, 1848 Dollard des Ormeaux, Adam, 303, 1294 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 516, 546 Domingue, Michel, 338 Dominican Republic, 339. See also Santo Domingo Donskoi, Dmitrii, 696 Dontsov, Dmytro, 718 Dorrego, Manuel, 273 Dorzhiev, Agwang, 1793 Dostoyevski, Fedor, 93, 105–106 Dostoyevski, Mihailo, 93 Dostum, Rashid, 1695 Douglas, Stephen A., 390 Douglas, Tommy C., 1839–1840 Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 718 Drake, Sir Francis, 164 Du Bois, W. E. B., 965, 1179, 1301, 1303 du Toit, Daniel, 1149 Dubˇcek, Alexander, 978, 1022, 1026, 1028 Duchy of Warsaw, 209

Dufour, Guillaume-Henri, 253 Dugin, Alexander, 1601 Duke, James, 1399 Duplessis, Maurice, 1290, 1294 Durand, Asher, 389 Dürer, Albrecht, 415 Dürich, Jaroslav, 588 Durkheim, Émile, 5, 99, 111–112, 120, 908–909, 1054 Duruy, Victor, 178 Dutch Antilles, 197 Dutch Reformed church, 1145, 1148, 1149 Duyvendak, Jan Willem, 1446 Dvoˇrák, Antonín, 75, 1436, 1438 Dyer, Reginald, 804 Eagleton, Terry, 922 East Germany, 1449. See also Germany East Slavic nationalism, 716 East Timor, 1381, 1468, 1729, 1731–1732, 1734 and Christianity, 1239 Easter rising of 1916 (Ireland), 651–652, 652 Eastern Europe and communism, 977 development of nationalism in, 26 ethnic conflict and, 888, 895–897 and new social movements, 1449, 1456 Eastern Orthodox Church, 946 and Eritrea, 1171 and Greek independence, 627 and national identity, 103 and politics, 983 and Russia, 105–106, 1080, 1602–1603, 1605 and Serbs, 1529 and Slavic peoples, 972 Ebbesen, Niels, 153–154 Ecologism versus environmentalism, 877, 880–881, 883 Economic liberalism, 19 and Argentina, 276 and Central America, 316 and India, 1211 and Peru, 368, 372 and Turkey, 1645 See also Liberalism Economy, 18–19, 433, 895–896, 1359, 1380, 1407, 1474, 1496, 1939 and Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1095–1096 and Alsace, 1502, 1510 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Arab nationalism, 729 and Argentina, 269–271, 279, 280 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 850–851 and Austria, 545, 553 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1719–1721 and Basques, 1513, 1522 and Brazil, 296, 1825, 1827, 1828–1832 and Burma, 777


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I-15

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and Canada, 302, 1477–1478, 1837, 1842 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 310–311, 315 and Chile, 324, 330 and China, 1198, 1372–1373, 1387 and Colombia, 826 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Denmark, 149 and Egypt, 257, 258, 259 and the European Union, 1044 and Fiji, 1322–1323 and France, 172, 175, 1047, 1054 and Germany, 191–192, 611 and Greenland, 1563, 1568 and Haiti, 333, 337, 342–343 and India, 1206, 1211 and Indonesia, 1723, 1733 and Iraq, 756, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 653, 660–661 and Israel, 1130 and Italy, 665, 669, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755–1756, 1757 and Korea, 1778–1779, 1781 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 and Mongolia, 1784–1785, 1796 and Nepal, 1801, 1808, 1811 and the Netherlands, 205 and New Zealand, 863 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1059–1060 and Pakistan, 1227–1229 and Paraguay, 358–359 and Peru, 368, 377 and the Philippines, 1247–1248 and Poland, 217, 678, 679, 680 and Puerto Rico, 837, 847 and Romania, 1585 and Russia, 692, 1597, 1599, 1604 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670–1671 and the Sami, 1609–1610, 1613 and Scandinavia, 221 and Scotland, 233 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1077 and Spain, 706, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1644–1645, 1651, 1656 and the United States, 388–389, 1395 and Uruguay, 396 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Economic liberalism; Globalization Edelfelt, Albert, 605 Edgerton, Lynda, 903 Education, 9–10, 29–41, 81–82, 130, 419–433, 461, 464–465, 478–479, 482, 504–505, 1379–1390 and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Arab nationalism, 731

and Argentina, 276–277, 279 and Armenia, 1703 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 287, 289, 293, 296 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 303, 1477–1478, 1843 and Central America, 315 and China, 1193, 1198, 1199 and Colombia, 833 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 746 and Finland, 608 and France, 178, 409, 1049 and Greek independence, 627 and Greenland, 1566, 1571–1572 and Haiti, 342 and India, 796, 798 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 751–752, 755, 756, 1740, 1741, 1743, 1745 and Italy, 675, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 811, 816, 1749, 1757 and Korea, 1776–1777 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1785, 1796, 1797, 1798 and Nepal, 1808 and the Netherlands, 197, 198, 199–200, 205 and New Zealand, 865–866 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Paraguay, 362 and Poland, 217, 688 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and the Sami, 1613, 1615 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 and Scotland, 234 and Singapore, 1225 and Slovakia, 587 and South Africa, 1148–1149 and the Soviet Union, 696, 1073 and Spain, 708–709 and Switzerland, 250, 254 and Taiwan, 1254 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1646, 1652, 1656 and Ukraine, 714, 1621, 1625 and the United States, 1305–1306 and Uruguay, 400, 401, 403 and Vietnam, 1271 Eelam, 1467, 1491 Egypt, 256–266, 257 (map), 982 anticolonialism in, 26 and Arab nationalism, 725, 728, 729–730, 734


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Egypt (continued ) and gender, 446, 450 and new social movements, 1452 and religious fundamentalism, 984–986, 1396 and terrorism, 1490 Eicher, Carolyn, 56 Eiffel, Gustave, 134 Eiffel Tower, 134 Einstein, Albert, 1350, 1362 Eisenstein, Sergei M., 697, 700, 1330 El Salvador, 318, 321 Elchibey, Abulfaz, 1715 Elgar, Edward, 1438 Elias, Norbert, 1369 Elites and Afghanistan, 1689 and Angola, 1665 and Belgium independence, 142–143 and Colombia, 826–827, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 of Ethiopia, 739–741 and Finland, 598, 600, 601 in Hungary, 637–638 and Iraq, 749, 750–751 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 1751 and new social movements, 1453 and Peru, 368, 371 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Russia, 690, 692–697 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672, 1676 and Spain, 707 and sports, 999 technology and the authority of, 1480 in Turkey, 1651, 1653 and Vietnam, 1269 and Wales, 1633 See also Intellectuals Elizabeth I, Queen (England), 164–165 Elizabeth II (Great Britain), 870 Ellison, Ralph, 1303 Emecheta, Buchi, 927 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 59, 389 Emigration and Afghanistan, 1687 and Algeria, 1095, 1097, 1102 and Alsace, 1505, 1507 and Basques, 1513 and Cuba, 1277 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1365–1366, 1371 and Fiji, 1325 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Ireland, 649, 660–661 and Korea, 1781 and Mongolia, 1798 and Poland, 212 and Puerto Rico, 847

and Turkey, 1648 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Diaspora populations; Immigrants/ immigration Eminescu, Mihai, 1592 Emmet, Robert, 649 Enculturation. See Assimilation Engels, Friedrich, 217 England, 158–167 constitution of, 162 and counterterrorism, 1496 economic liberalism and nationalism in, 18–19 education and, 423 and Greek independence, 631 and music, 1432 nationalism in, 5–6, 502 nationalistic art in, 408, 410 and Uruguay, 395 See also Great Britain English language, 480, 483 Enlightenment, the and the American Revolution, 21 erosion of religious power in the, 102 and France, 171 and liberalism, 1350–1351 and organicism, 462 and origins of nationalism, 9–10 and romantic nationalism, 406 Enloe, Cynthia, 901, 904 Ensor, Robert, 425 Environment and Brazil, 1825, 1827–1831, 1832 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and Haiti, 343 and Latvia, 1575–1576, 1581 and the Sami, 1615 and Tibet, 1814 See also Environmentalism/environmental movements; Natural resources Environmentalism/environmental movements, 875–886, 1446–1458 Eötvös, Jószef, 96 Epicurus, 476 Erben, Karel Jaromír, 73 Ercilla, Alonso de, 324–326, 329 Eriksson, Magnus, 226 Eritrea, 1167–1175, 1168 (map), 1469 diaspora population of, 1370 and Ethiopia, 742 Erk, Ludwig Christian, 73 Erkel, Ferenc, 79 Erskine, David Stuart, 239 Erslev, Kristian, 227 Escher, Hans Konrad, 254 Eskimo. See Inuit Estonia, 1078, 1374. See also Baltic states Ethics. See Morality Ethiopia, 736–746, 738 (map) and Eritrea, 1171–1172, 1174, 1175, 1469


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I-17

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Ethnic cleansing, 435–442, 522–523 and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1507 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530, 1531, 1532 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 596, 1020 and Germany, 617, 622 and Hungary, 645 and Jews in Iraq, 756 and Poland, 681 and Turkey, 1648–1649 in Ukraine, 722 See also Conflict/violence; Genocide Ethnic conflict. See Conflict/violence Ethnicity, 931, 1354 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688–1689, 1693, 1694–1695 and Angola, 1660, 1664 and Argentina, 276, 277 and Armenia, 1703, 1709 and Austria, 543–544 and Azerbaijan, 1716, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528–1530, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 580 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 1836 and Catalonia, 1542–1543 and Central America, 311, 314 and China, 1193–1197, 1196, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1020–1021 and education, 35, 36, 39, 40, 1379 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 741, 742–743 and Fiji, 1314 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1412–1413, 1415, 1416 and Greece, 633 and Greenland, 1570–1571 and Hungary, 644 and immigrants, 1424 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 672, 673 and Japan, 1753 and Latvia, 1574–1575 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1213–1215, 1225 and Mongolia, 1790–1791, 1797–1798, 1798–1799 and music, 1431–1432 and nationalist movements, 10, 11, 27, 46, 1460, 1464, 1465, 1468, 1469–1470 and Nepal, 1808, 1809–1810 and the Netherlands, 199 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 967, 1178, 1185, 1186

and Northern Ireland, 1063 and the Ottoman Empire, 101–102 and Pakistan, 1231–1232, 1236 and Paraguay, 362 and the Philippines, 1243–1244 and Poland, 209, 212, 213, 214, 216 in political philosophy, 88–90, 95, 461, 464 and Québec, 1296–1297 and religion, 103–105, 107–109 and Romania, 1592–1594 and Russia, 1079–1080, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669–1670 and Scotland, 236–237 and South Africa, 1144, 1145 and the Soviet Union, 1076 and Taiwan, 1254, 1257–1258 and Turkey, 1650 and Ukraine, 712–713, 1621 and the United States, 1309 See also Minorities; Religion Eto Shin’pei, 820 Eurasianism, 466 Europe borders after World War II, 581 (map), 591 (map), 616 (map), 668 (map), 684 (map), 1018 (map), 1550 (map), 1590 (map) borders from 1914 to 1938, 170 (map), 184 (map), 540 (map), 556 (map), 579 (map), 586 (map), 612 (map), 624 (map), 636 (map), 656 (map), 666 (map), 680 (map), 762 (map) borders in 1815, 139 (map), 148 (map), 182 (map), 208 (map), 246 (map), 610 (map), 664 (map) colonialism and, 420–421 and cultural identity in, 445 development of nationalism in, 26, 31 education and, 33–36, 38–39, 422, 427 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 437, 441–442 and gender/sexuality, 44, 908 and immigration, 1418, 1421, 1424, 1425 imperative and imaginary forms of nationalism in, 501–503 and landscape art, 64 and language, 472, 477 and music, 73–75, 1432 nationalism and class in, 4, 11 nationalism and conflict in, 16, 23–26 and new social movements, 1447 perversions of nationalism in, 512–525 revolutions of 1848 in, 24–25, 47, 52 supranational bodies in, 948–949, 974 systems of governance in, 419 and terrorism, 1494, 1495, 1497 and transnationalism, 1509–1510 women’s suffrage in, 453 and xenophobia, 1412 See also European institutions; specific European countries and organizations


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I-18

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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1034–1035, 1037 European Convention on Human Rights, 908 European Court of Justice, 1035 European Economic Community (EEC), 1010, 1036, 1038, 1049, 1509–1510 European institutions, 1034–1036, 1039, 1040 and Great Britain, 1007, 1010 See also European Union (EU) European Parliament, 974, 1035, 1039 European Union (EU), 948–949, 1021 (map), 1030–1046, 1032 (map), 1532–1533, 1551 (map) and Algeria, 1095 and Alsace, 1510 and Armenia, 1704 and Basques, 1517, 1522 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528 Committee of the Regions, 1043, 1541 and Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1028 education and, 432 flag, 1410 (illus.) and France, 1048 and Germany, 1549–1551, 1555 and globalization, 1407, 1409, 1410–1411 and indigenous groups, 1610 and Ireland, 1060 and Latvia, 1582 and minorities, 1412–1413 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Spain, 1092 and Turkey, 1645, 1648, 1650, 1656 and Ukraine, 1623 Europeanization, 1406 Evans, Gwynfor, 1633, 1635 Evans, Robert, 1434 Evatt, H. V., 858 Evolutionary theory. See Social Darwinism Exhibitions, 412–414. See also Holidays/festivals Exile and diaspora populations, 1365, 1369, 1370 Expansionism affect on Hungary of, 639 and Brazil, 283–284 and Canada, 300–302, 1837 and geopolitics, 459 and Germany, 617, 621 Herder on, 88 and Italy, 665–667 and manipulation of ethnic autonomy claims, 940 nationalism as justifying, 40 and Nazi Germany, 518 and perversions of nationalism, 523–524 Soviet, 945 and the United States, 22, 37, 39, 465, 1308 See also Colonialism/imperialism Expedition of the Thousand, 672, 674 Expressionism, 491

Fabianism, 471 Factionalism and the Maori, 1857 and nationalist movements, 940–941 See also Conflict/violence Factory, 129–130 Faehlmann, Friedrich Robert, 561 Fairhair, Harald, 226 Faisal I, King (Iraq), 727, 728, 728, 749–750, 750, 1742, 1743, 1745 Falkland Islands, 275, 1009 Falla, Manuel de, 1437 Fallersleben, Hoffmann von, 117 Falwell, Jerry, 1395 Fanon, Frantz, 963, 1100 Færoe Islands, 220–222, 225, 231 Fascism, 515–517, 525, 973, 1301 and gender, 454–456 and Hungary, 638, 639 and imperative nationalism, 502 and Italy, 419, 667, 670–671, 674–675, 675–676 and Japan, 817 and nationalistic art, 413–415, 417 and the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 and race, 672 See also Nazism Fashoda Incident, 460 Fatah, 1137, 1142–1143 Faulkner, William, 495 Favre, Louis, 254 Federal Republic of Central America, 310, 313, 316 Federalism and Australia, 850, 852–853 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1171–1172 and India, 1205–1206, 1766 and Indonesia, 1723 and Malaysia, 1216, 1218 and Nigeria, 1183, 1185 as solution to minority demands, 933 and Ukraine, 721–722 and the United States, 383 Feminists, 451–453, 454 versus nationalists, 902, 907 See also Women’s rights Fennoman movement, 598–599, 600, 601, 601 Feraoun, Mouloud, 1100 Ferdinand, Franz, 1490 Ferdinand, King (Romania), 1586 Ferdinand of Aragon, 709 Ferdowsi, 1107, 1113–1114 Ferguson, Adam, 234 Ferguson, William, 1851 Fernández, Emiliano R., 364 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 400 Ferry, Jules, 178 Festival of Britain, 1011 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 17, 34, 90–92, 186, 475, 533


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I-19

INDEX

Fidelis, Malgorzata, 53 Fiji, 1313–1325, 1315 (map), 1441 Film. See Cinema Film noir, 1333 Finland, 220–222, 597–608, 599 (map) education and, 429 and gender, 54, 450 and independence, 223, 231 language and, 225 and music, 1432, 1436, 1443 national identity and culture of, 226–228, 466 and national symbols, 230 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1614, 1616 Finno-Russian War, 607 Firley, Barker, 1841 (illus.) First Schleswigian War, 149, 152 Fischer, Joschka, 1555 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 489 Fitzpatrick, Brian, 857 Flag(s), 112–113, 116–117 Australian, 855 Basque, 1521 Belgium, 145 Brazilian, 294 and Burma, 781 Canadian, 1835 Catalonian, 1538–1539 and Central America, 318–319 Chilean, 327 Colombian, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 Egyptian, 265 and the European Union, 1042, 1410 (illus.) French, 175 German, 619 and Greenland, 1569, 1570 Indonesian, 1732 Irish, 659 Japanese, 1756, 1756 (illus.), 1757 Maori, 873 and New Zealand, 866 Nigerian, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 Polish, 686 Puerto Rican, 842 (illus.), 844 and Québec, 1294 Romanian, 1592 Russian, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 229–230 Swiss, 253 and Tibet, 1818 Turkish, 1646, 1647, 1653 and the United States, 1308 Flemings, 144–145, 146, 200, 413 Folk culture, 406, 462, 530 and Alsace, 1510 and the Baltic states, 561, 563–564 and Cuba, 1280

and Finland, 599, 604 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 Haiti and folktales, 342 and Hungary, 643 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1797 and music, 73, 76, 77, 80–82, 417, 1434–1435, 1436, 1437, 1444 and Paraguay, 364 and Poland, 212, 216 and Russia, 693 and the Sami, 1612, 1614–1615 and Scandinavia, 226, 228, 229 and Switzerland, 251 and Turkish folklore, 774 and Ukraine, 721 and Wales, 1634 See also Culture; Indigenous groups Food insecurity and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Peru, 378 Ford, John, 1337 Foreign intervention and Angola, 968, 1658 and China, 793 during the Cold War, 943–944, 945, 947–948, 977 and Cuba, 1275, 1277 and globalization, 1408–1409 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117 and Turkey, 1652 and the United States, 1305 See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign policy and Armenia, 1710–1711 and Brazil, 1831 and China, 1200 and Cuba, 1285–1286 and the European Union, 1040, 1042 and geopolitics, 458 and Germany, 1554, 1555 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1751, 1757–1758 and Latvia, 1576 and Mongolia, 1798 and New Zealand, 871 and post-World War II Europe, 974 and the Soviet Union, 979 and sports, 994–995 terrorism as, 1488 and Ukraine, 1622–1623 and the United States, 955–956 Forster, E. M., 490 Forster, Georg, 86 Fortuyn, Pim, 1453, 1486 Foster, Stephen, 389 Foucault, Michel, 1052 Four Freedoms, 972 Fourier, Charles, 423 Fowler, Robert, 1839


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I-20

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France, 102, 169–179, 172 (map), 502, 1047–1057, 1048 (map) and Algeria, 1097, 1098 and Alsace, 1502–1504, 1505, 1507 and Arab nationalism, 727–728 aristocracy and nationalism in, 5–8 and Basques, 1513, 1513, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Belgium, 140–141 and Canada, 298 colonialism and, 424–425, 958, 1463–1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the Dreyfus affair, 520 education and, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 423 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1034, 1038 fascism in, 515 and film, 1336 and gender, 43, 48–49, 448 and geopolitics, 468 and Greek independence, 631 and Haiti, 333, 335–336, 340 and Indochina, 1263–1264 and Iraq, 1739 and language, 420, 480, 482 and the Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities/immigrants, 1412, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1424 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1437, 1441, 1443 and national identity, 461, 465 national symbols of, 134 nationalistic culture/art in, 407, 408, 409–410, 413, 415, 416 and new social movements, 1448, 1457 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and political philosophy, 14–17, 475 and the Rhine crisis of 1840, 189–190 and the Suez War, 266 and Syria, 728 and Uruguay, 395 See also French Revolution Francia, José Gaspar de, 361, 364 Franco, Francisco, 705–706, 707, 709, 973, 1088–1089, 1089 (illus.), 1471, 1515, 1519, 1536 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 409, 412, 465 Francophonie, 1056–1057 Franklin, Benjamin, 21 Franko, Ivan, 720 Franks, 1537 Fraser, Dawn, 857 Frederick I (Holy Roman Empire), 619 Frederick II (Denmark), 226 Frederick William IV (Prussia), 191 Frederik, Christian, 224 Freinet, Célestin, 425

French Canadians and the defeat at Québec, 299 and duality in Canada, 303, 306 identity and, 302 tensions over political control in, 299–300, 303 See also Québec French Revolution, 34, 174 and Alsace, 1502 and the aristocracy, 7 and Basques, 1513 gender and symbols in the, 45–46, 49, 50–51 and Germany, 185–186 impact on Haiti of the, 334–335 influence in Brazil of, 293 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 and popular sovereignty, 15–16 and terrorism, 1489 French West Africa, 424–425 Friedrich, Caspar David, 67, 463 Friel, Brian, 917, 925 Fröbel, F., 36 Frost, Robert, 392 Fry, William Henry, 76 Fuad, King (Egypt), 263 Fucik, Julius, 1441 Fugner, Jindrich, 594 Fukuyama, Francis, 988 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 9 Furnivall, J. S., 783 Furphy, Joseph, 857 Gagarin, Yuri, 951 Gaidar, Yegor, 1597 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 833 Gaitskell, Deborah, 904 Galicia, 209, 210, 1088 and Ukrainians, 715, 716, 718 Gallen-Kallela, Akseli, 605 Gálvez, Mariano, 317 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 1079 Gance, Abel, 1328 Gandhi, Indira, 1207, 1207–1208, 1466, 1766, 1767 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma), 798, 801, 802–804, 803, 805 (illus.), 950, 963 and gender issues, 451 and India’s social structure, 1205, 1208 and nonviolent resistance, 976, 1203, 1822 Gandhi, Priyanka, 1207 Gandhi, Rahul, 1207 Gandhi, Rajiv, 1207, 1209, 1211, 1492, 1767, 1768 Gandhi, Sanjay, 1207 Gandhi, Sonia, 1207 García, Calixto, 1282 García Calderón, Francisco, 375 García Márquez, Gabriel, 832 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 502, 672, 673, 674, 674 (illus.) monuments to, 410 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Garnier, Charles, 134


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I-21

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Garrigue, Charlotte, 585 Garvey, Marcus, 494, 1179, 1850 Gasperi, Alcide De, 973–974 Gaudí, Antoni, 706 Gay, Peter, 613 Gediminas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Geffrard, Fabre, 337, 339 Gégoire, Abbé, 34 Geijer, Erik Gustaf, 73, 228 Gellner, Ernest, 130, 461, 476, 479, 1475, 1835 Gender, 43–57, 444–457, 899–910 and colonialism, 926–927 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Uruguay, 401 Genocide, 435–442 and American indigenous groups, 893 and Armenians, 765, 1699, 1704, 1704, 1706, 1709, 1711, 1718 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Hungary, 645 and Kurds in Iraq, 756 and Nazi Germany, 517, 622 and perversions of nationalism, 522–523, 524, 525 and Rwanda and Burundi, 968, 1671, 1672, 1674, 1676, 1677, 1678, 1679, 1680 and Tibet, 1820 See also Conflict/violence; Ethnic cleansing; Holocaust Geoffrin, Madame de, 7 (illus.) Geopolitics, 458–469 George, Lloyd, 468, 593 George, Terry, 1674 George V (Great Britain), 132, 870 Georgia, 897, 1071, 1079, 1080, 1710 German Confederation of 1815, 149–150, 189, 191 German Customs Union, 191–192 German National Society, 192 Germanization, 617 Germans, in Czechoslovakia, 594–595, 595 Germany, 181–194, 525, 609–622, 1548–1560 and Alsace, 1504, 1505, 1507, 1508 anti-Semitism in, 520 and Austria, 544, 546–548 citizenship in, 1354 and colonial ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and democracy, 946–947 education and, 34, 35, 36, 38, 419, 421, 422–423, 426, 429–430 and the environment, 882–883 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and the European Union, 949 and expansionism, 524 and film, 1330–1331 and France, 1051 and gender, 448, 453 and geopolitics, 458, 459, 462–464, 466–467, 468 and immigration, 1419, 1424

and language, 472 and minorities, 1374 and the Moroccan crises, 514 and music, 1431, 1432 and national identity, 465 National Socialism/Nazism in, 133–134, 517–519 nationalism and political philosophy in, 9–10, 17–18, 90–93, 474–475, 491, 502, 533–534 nationalistic art of, 408–409, 410–411, 413–414, 415–417, 418 and new social movements, 1450, 1453 and Poland, 678 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 and rituals of belonging, 507–508 Soviet advancement into, 950 symbols in, 49, 114, 117 unification of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 512 and World War II, 1309 See also East Germany; West Germany Gershwin, George, 1439 Geser, 1791 Gettino, Octavio, 1335 Gezelle, Guido, 145 Ghana (Gold Coast), 962, 964, 980 and independence, 1464 and music, 1443 Gharabagh conflict, 897, 1078–1079 and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1716, 1718–1719 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 1589, 1594 Gibbs, Pearl, 1851 Gilgamesh, 1738 Ginestera, Alberto, 1439 Gladstone, William E., 241–242, 651, 654 Glaize, Léon, 409 Glinka, Mikhail, 75, 78, 79, 694, 1437, 1602 Global institutions and globalization, 1412 for governance, 1359–1362, 1406, 1456 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 sports, 991 and transnationalism, 1407 and values, 1392 See also United Nations (UN) Globalization, 1405–1417 and Brazil, 1826, 1830, 1832 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1374, 1376 and education, 1380, 1389 and the environment, 877 and global governance, 1359 and image technology, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1427–1428 and India, 1211 and Japan, 1750 and the loss of optimism, 936 and minorities, 1547 versus nationalism, 1392


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I-22

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Globalization (continued ) and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and religious fundamentalism, 1397–1404 and sports, 999, 1000, 1001–1003 technology as facilitating, 135–136 and Vietnam, 1271 Glyndwr, ˆ Owain, 1637 Gobineau, Arthur, 40 Gocar, Josef, 594 “God Save the King,” 117 Godard, Jean-Luc, 1336 Goebbels, Joseph, 133, 1332 Goh Chok Tong, 1384 Gökalp, Mehmet Ziya, 766, 766, 770, 774 Gömbös, Gyula, 638 Gómez, Máximo, 1282 Gonçalves, Gomide, Antônio, 283 Gongaze, Georgiy, 1628 Gonne, Maud, 451 González, Juan Natalicio, 365 González Prada, Manuel, 373, 374 González Vigil, Francisco de Paula, 377 Good Friday Agreement, 1062, 1062, 1063 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 946, 979, 1039, 1079, 1581, 1582 and the Baltic states, 1078 Gordon, Andrew, 815 Gordon, Walter, 1842 Gorodetskii, S. M., 700 Görres, Joseph, 92 Gothicism, 223 Gottschalk, Louis Moreau, 76, 389, 1438 Gottwald, Klement, 1019, 1024 Gouges, Olympe de, 173–174 Gouldner, Alvin, 1473 Gounod, Charles, 117 Government(s) and Afghanistan, 1686, 1686–1687, 1692 and Algeria, 1099 and Angola, 1663 and Argentina, 272, 275 and Armenia, 1699 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 282–283, 284, 287, 289–290, 296 and Bulgaria, 578 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 302–303 and Catalonia, 1538–1539 and China, 795, 1192–1193 and Colombia, 828 and Czechoslovakia, 590 and England, 162, 163 and Ethiopia, 740, 741 European systems of, 419 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1317, 1317, 1321, 1323, 1323 and Finland, 598 and France, 169–171, 175, 176, 1048–1049, 1053–1054 German, Italian, Japanese postwar, 946–947

and Germany, 609, 611–613 and Great Britain, 1007–1008 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1565, 1567 Haiti and instability in, 336–338 and India, 1204 instability of postindependence, 1469 and Iran, 986 and Iraq, 750, 1747 and Ireland, 648 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1766 and Japan, 812 and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and Nigeria, 1183, 1186 and Northern Ireland, 1059, 1063 and the Ottoman millet system, 761 and Palestinians, 1142 and Romania, 1588, 1588–1589 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Scotland, 234–235 and Spain, 702–703, 1084–1085, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 247–250, 249, 254–255 Tibetan exile, 1821, 1822 and the United States, 383–387, 391 and Uruguay, 398–399 and Vietnam, 1270–1271 and Wales, 1632 See also Democracy; Federalism Govineau, Arthur, 415 Gowon, Yakubu, 1185, 1186 Goya, Francisco de, 1437 Grabski, Stanisław, 685 Gracia, Gilberto Concepción de, 845 Gramsci, Antonio, 486 Granados, Enrique, 1437 Granatstein, Jack, 1842 Grant, George Parkin, 1838 Grant, James, 235 Grant, John, 235 Grau, Miguel, 377 Grau San Martín, Ramón, 1276 Great Britain, 236 (map), 1005–1015, 1006 (map), 1061 (map) and Arab nationalism, 727–728, 729 and Argentina, 269, 275, 279–280 and Australia, 850–851 and Brazil, 289 and Burma, 776–777, 781, 783, 783 and Canada, 299–300, 300, 307 and Central America, 318 and colonial divestment, 1461, 1464 and colonialism, 27, 490–491, 889, 958 communication and technology in, 128, 132, 1473 and Denmark, 150 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 36, 38–39, 426, 429, 432, 1381–1382 and Egypt, 259, 260–261, 262–263, 265


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I-23

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and Eritrea, 1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1036, 1038, 1040 fascism in, 516 and Fiji, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1317, 1319 and film, 1337 and gender, 447–448, 450 and geopolitics, 468 and Haiti, 335, 340 and immigration, 1419, 1420 and India, 55, 131, 797, 798, 804–806, 1203 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 749–750, 752–753, 1739, 1742, 1745 and Ireland, 915 Irish in, 654 and Israel/Palestine, 1123, 1125, 1129, 1133, 1134–1135, 1140, 1402 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762, 1763, 1764 and landscape art, 61, 62–64 and language, 472, 480, 482, 912 and Malaysia, 1213–1215, 1216, 1217, 1218 and the Maori, 1856 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities, 1412 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1438, 1442, 1443 national anthem of, 117, 1431 and natural resources, 885 and Nepal, 1805 and New Zealand, 863, 868, 872 and Nigeria, 1178, 1181, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1058–1068 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and Pakistan, 1227, 1231 political philosophy in, 534–535 and Québec, 1288 and rituals of belonging, 507 and Scotland, 233–242 and South Africa, 1145–1146, 1150 and sports, 992, 996–998 symbols of, 114 and terrorism, 1488 and Tibet, 1818 and Uruguay, 396, 397 and Wales, 1631–1633, 1632 Great Depression and Burma, 777, 777 and Canada, 302 and Japan, 810, 821 Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 (Peru), 370–371 Greece, 623–633, 626 (map) and diaspora populations, 1374 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437–438 and the European Union, 1040 independence of, 46, 53, 464 and language, 477 and minorities, 1424 and Turkey, 1648

Greeks ethnic cleansing of, 438 Greek independence and diasporic, 627, 632 in Turkey, 1648 in the United States, 1427 Greenfeld, Liah, 938 Greenland, 220, 1561–1572 Greenpeace, 1361, 1362, 1448 Grégoire, Abbé, 173, 178 Gregory, Lady Augusta, 918, 922 Grenfell, Maria, 1439 Gretzky, Wayne “The Great One,” 1842 Grieg, Edvard, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 228, 417, 1436–1437 Griffith, David Wark, 1328 Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm, 67, 406 Grímsson, Magnus, 228 Grofé, Ferde, 1439 Grotius, Hugo, 203 Groulx, Abbé Lionel, 1290, 1293, 1294 Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap, 1637 Grundtvig, N. F. S., 151, 151, 228, 429 Guantánamo Bay, 1280 Guaraní Indians, 358, 395 Guardiola, Santos, 315 Guatemala, 318, 319, 321 Guernica, 1515, 1519–1521 Guerrier, Philipe, 337 Guindon, Hubert, 1293 Guiteras, Antonio, 1282, 1283 Guizot, François, 177 Gulf War (1990–1991), 756, 952, 1408–1409, 1746–1747 and Germany, 1554 Gumilev, Nikolai, 94, 1601 Gustav I Vasa (Sweden), 226, 230 Gustav II Adolf, King (Sweden), 223, 224 (illus.), 226, 565 Gustav III (Sweden), 223 Gyanendra, King (Nepal), 1809 Haakon IV (Norway), 226 Habermas, Jürgen, 97, 1481, 1556 Habibullah II, 1686, 1688, 1691 Habsburg empire, 512, 541 and Austria, 539, 541, 543–544 and Belgium, 138–139 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Czechoslovaks, 584, 587–588 and the formation of Austria-Hungary, 512 and Germany, 189, 191 and Hungary, 407, 637 and language, 472 and Mexico, 350 nationalistic philosophers from the, 96 and the Netherlands, 196 and Poland, 679–681 and Switzerland, 252 Habyarimana, Juvenal, 1677


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I-24

INDEX

Hadj, Messali, 1097, 1099 Hadjiiski, Ivan, 577 Haegy, Xavier, 1508 Hagemann, Karen, 52 Haider, Jörg, 553 Haile Selassie, 740, 742, 743 Hailu, Kasa (Emperor Tewodros), 739, 743, 744 Haiti, 26, 174, 332–343, 334, 1414 Halbwachs, Maurice, 1343 Hallgrímsson, Jónas, 228 Halonen, Pekka, 605 Halperin Donghi, Tulio, 394 Hals, Frans, 203 Hamas, 972, 978, 986 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1142–1143 Hambach Festival, 190 Hamilton, Alexander, 22, 386, 387 Hamilton of Gilbertfield, 239 Hamitic hypothesis, 1678 Hammershaimb, Venceslaus, 225 Hansen, H. P., 156 Hanson, John, 386 Haq, Abdul, 1690 Harb, Talat, 729 Harlem Renaissance, 494 Harris, Lawren, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Harris, Leonard, 1008 Harry (Scottish minstrel), 239 Hasan, Zoya, 902 Hashshashin, 1489 Hatta, Mohammad, 1463 Haushofer, Karl, 460, 466, 467 (illus.), 491 Havel, Václav, 1026, 1027, 1028 Haydn, Franz Joseph, 117, 1432 Hayes, Joy Elizabeth, 132 Hazaras, 1693 Hazelius, Arthur, 229 Head, Bessie, 927 Health, and the environment, 882 Health care and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Canada, 1840 and New Zealand, 871, 871 and Pakistan, 1228 Heaney, Seamus, 925 Hebrew, 477 Hecht, Abraham, 1400, 1403 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17, 92–93, 187, 534 Hegemony Anglo-American, 1393 and Baltic nationalism, 558, 562 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1534 of Buenos Aires in Argentina, 275 and Chilean identity, 327 and Ethiopia, 738, 741 and Finnish nationalism, 605, 608 and gender issues, 445, 906 of German music, 80, 82

and Germany, 611 Germany and French, 186 and Great Britain, 397, 490 Japan and U.S., 1754, 1757 and literature, 486 and Mexican identity, 349, 352 nationalism in maintaining, 898, 1481 nationalist music as reaction against, 79 and Nepali nationalism, 1809 and Peru, 374 of political ideologies, 512 Prussian, 544 and Spain, 702, 711 technology as undermining, 136 and Turkey, 1646 and the United States, 837, 1300, 1301, 1309, 1310, 1742-1743 and World War I, 713 Heidegger, Martin, 533–534, 534 (illus.) Heidenstam, Verner von, 228 Heimat, 611, 883, 1344 Heimatbund, 1508 Heimatkunst, 417 Hein, Piet, 203 Heine, Heinrich, 501 Helfferich, Karl, 613 Hellenism, 623 Helvetic Republic, 248–249 Henderson, Paul, 1842 Henlein, Konrad, 595, 595 Henry, Paul, 659 Heraclitus, 533 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 17, 30–31, 73, 88–90, 89 (illus.), 185, 406, 529, 533 and the Baltic states, 561 and organicism, 462 Hernández, José, 278–279 Herndon, Angelo, 1303 Heroes/heroines, 446, 504, 1345 and Afghanistan, 1690 and Algeria, 1098–1099, 1099, 1102 and Armenia, 1706 and Australia, 857, 857 of the Baltic states, 564–565 and Bulgaria, 576, 577 and Burma, 782, 784 and Canada, 304–305 and Central America, 318 and Colombia, 831, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164 and Cuba, 1282, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England, 164–165 and film, 1331, 1332, 1333 and Finland, 604–605 and Great Britain, 1012 and India, 1209 and Indonesia, 1725, 1727 and Iran, 1113–1114, 1115, 1116 and Ireland, 658, 659


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I-25

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and Korea, 1779–1781 and Latvia, 1578–1579 and Mongolia, 1786, 1789–1790, 1791, 1797, 1798 and New Zealand, 870 and Nigeria, 1187 and Palestinians, 1137 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 377 and the Philippines, 1245–1246 and Poland, 211, 214 and Québec, 1294 Russian, 1074 Scandinavian, 226–227 and Scotland, 232–233 and the Soviet Union, 694, 695, 696, 700, 951 and sports, 995 and Switzerland, 253–254 and Syria, 728 and Turkey, 1643, 1646–1647, 1653 and Uruguay, 402 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637 See also Leaders; Symbols Herrera, Bartolomé, 377 Herrera, Enrique Olaya, 830 Herries, William, 869 Hertzog, James Barry Munnik, 1148 Hervé, Gustave, 515 Herzl, Theodor, 1121, 1123, 1127 Hezbollah, 986 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel, 350 Higgins, H. B., 859 Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 1693 Hilden, Patricia, 56 Hilty, Carl, 252 Hindenburg, Paul von, 613 Hinduism and fundamentalism, 1393 and India, 107, 797, 803, 803, 987, 1204–1205, 1208–1210 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Nepal, 1806 Hindutva, 107, 108 Hirata Atsutane, 815 Hispanophilia versus hispanophobia in Mexico, 352–353 and Puerto Rico, 841 Historiography, 121, 406, 477, 880, 1343 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Algeria, 1098–1099 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 733–734 and Armenia, 1702, 1705–1708 and Australia, 855–858 and Austria, 551 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 564 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531 and Brazil, 292–295

and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 303–305, 1840 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 320 and China, 1195–1197, 1199–1200 and Colombia, 831–832 and colonialism, 917, 923–924 and Congo/Zaïre, 1162, 1163–1164 and Cuba, 1277–1278, 1281–1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1022–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Ethiopia, 742–744 and Fiji, 1318 and film, 1327–1328, 1336–1338 and Finland, 604 and France, 177–178, 1051–1052 and Germany, 188–189, 614, 617–619 and Great Britain, 1010–1011, 1011 and Greece, 629 and Greenland, 1568 and Haiti, 341 and India, 802–803, 1209 and Indonesia, 1727, 1728, 1730 and Iran, 1107, 1107, 1113–1116 and Iraq, 752–754, 757, 1741 and Ireland, 658–660 and Israel, 1125–1127 and Italy, 673–675 and Japan, 1750–1751 and Mexico, 354, 355–356 and Mongolia, 1788 and New Zealand, 864–865, 868–870 and Nigeria, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and Palestinians, 1139–1140 and Paraguay, 362–364 and the Philippines, 1244, 1245–1246 and Poland, 212, 214, 685–686 and Puerto Rico, 843–844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and Romania, 1592 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1677–1678, 1679 and the Sami, 1618 and Scandinavia, 223, 223, 226–228, 228 and Scotland, 234, 237–239 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 700, 1076 and Spain, 708–709, 1086 and Switzerland, 247, 251, 252–254 and Taiwan, 1252, 1255–1256 and Turkey, 771, 773–774, 1646 and Ukraine, 721, 721 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637–1638 Hitler, Adolf, 413, 611, 613 and anti-Semitism, 517 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and Austria, 545, 546, 547


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Hitler, Adolf (continued ) and Czechoslovakia, 1019 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438, 439 and gender, 450, 454 and Hungary, 638 and music, 1431 ties with Mussolini, 516 Hiwet, Addis, 737 Hjärne, Harald, 228 Hlinka, Andrej, 585, 590 Ho Chi Minh, 952, 962, 963–964, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1267 (illus.) Hoad, Lew, 857 Hobbes, Thomas, 63 (illus.) Hobsbawm, Eric, 19, 23, 132, 473, 476, 478, 481 Hobson, William, 863 Hodge, John R., 1773 Hofmeyr, Jan, 1149 Hogg, James, 238 Holberg, Ludwig, 227 Holidays/festivals, 116, 504, 1346 and Australia, 855–856 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 567 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 295 and Bulgaria, 575–576 and Burma, 782 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 319 and Chile, 327, 328 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1025 and France, 1053 and Germany, 620 and India, 800, 1204 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 754 and Israel, 1129 and Japan, 1752 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 and the Maori, 1857 and Mexico, 347–349, 354 and the Netherlands, 204 and New Zealand, 869, 873 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1067–1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 211, 216–217, 685–686, 688 and Romania, 1586 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 and South Africa, 1150 and the Soviet Union, 695 and Spain, 709 and Switzerland, 244, 254 and Taiwan, 1256 and Turkey, 1651, 1652–1653, 1653

and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637, 1638 Holly, James Theodore, 340 Holocaust, 439–440, 517–518, 523, 524 and Austria, 546 and Czechoslovak Jews, 1020 and German guilt, 1555–1556, 1557–1558 guilt and the foundation of Israel, 1402 and immigration to Israel, 1121 and legitimacy of Zionism, 1128 as reconstituting ethnic borders, 617 remembrances of the, 1345 See also Genocide Holst, Gustav, 1432 Holstein, 147, 149, 150, 220, 222 Holy Roman Empire, 183, 186, 543, 619, 1816 Homosexuality, 907–908, 909–910 Honduras, 318, 321 Hoover, J. Edgar, 1304 Horowitz, Donald, 989 Horthy, Miklós, 638 Hosokawa, Toshio, 1440 Hotel Rwanda, 1674, 1675 Hou Hsaio-hsien, 1338 Hoxa, Enver, 952 Hozumi Yatsuka, 816 Hrushev’skyi, Mykhailo, 721, 721 Hsaya San, 777, 782 Hu Shi, 789, 793 Hua Guofeng, 1200 Hueber, Charles, 1509 Huggins, Jackie, 1849 Hugo, Victor, 177 Humanism, 41, 86, 87 Humbert, Ferdinand, 409 Humboldt, Alexander von, 34, 64, 65, 423, 462 Hume, David, 18, 234 Hume, John, 1062 Hunedoara, Iancu de, 1592 Hungary, 635–645, 640 (map) anti-Semitism in, 520, 521 and the Austro-Hungarian empire, 24 autonomy and, 407 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441 and expansionism, 524 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and music, 1432, 1435 and nationalistic art, 412 and Slovakia, 587 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Huntington, Samuel, 929, 988, 1374 Hurston, Zora Neale, 494 Hurt, Jakob, 563–564, 567 Hus, Jan, 592, 1023 Husayn, Imam (Iran), 1115 Hussein, Saddam, 756–757, 758, 952, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Iran, 1115–1116 Hussein, Sharif, 727, 749, 750, 1739


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Hussitism, 1023 Hutton, C. M., 481 Hutus, 1669, 1675, 1677, 1678 Hyde, Douglas, 654–655, 657, 918 Hypernationalism, 1389–1390. See also Xenophobia Hyppolite, Florville, 338 Iancu, Avram, 1592 Ibn Sina, Abu Ali, 1113 Ibn Taymiyyah, 725 Ibsen, Henrik, 228 Iceland, 220–222, 226–228 and the environment/natural resources, 875–876, 885 independence and, 231 and national symbols, 230 reading and, 229 Icelandic Sagas, 227 (illus.) Idealism, 534–535 Identity, 27, 405, 528, 537, 930–932, 1351, 1418–1429 and Afghanistan, 1693–1695 and Algeria, 1100–1101, 1105 and Alsace, 1504 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 276–279 and Armenia, 1698, 1699–1700, 1701–1705, 1704, 1708 and Austria, 550, 551, 554 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1716–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 558, 561–562, 563, 563–565, 1576, 1577, 1577–1578, 1581 and Basques, 1519–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527, 1528–1530, 1531, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 283, 285–287, 288, 292–295, 294, 1826–1827 British versus English, 159–161, 162, 163, 167 and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 780–781 and Canada, 298, 302, 303–305, 1835–1843 and Catalonia, 1536–1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Central America, 313, 319–321 and Chile, 324–326, 327–329, 328 and China, 1198–1200 civic versus ethnic, 933–936 and Colombia, 832, 833, 834 and communications, 1474 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1158–1159, 1160–1165 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1282–1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1025 Dutch, 197, 198, 204 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 265 and the environment/landscape, 875–876, 879–880, 883, 884, 886 and Eritrea, 1174 and Ethiopia, 741–743, 744–746 European, 974, 1045–1046 and film, 1327, 1338–1340

and Finland, 598–605, 608 and France, 1056, 1057 and gender/sexuality, 43–45, 444–447, 909–910 and geopolitics, 458–459, 464–466 and Germany, 183–187, 190, 192–193, 611, 613–620, 621–622, 1549, 1552, 1555–1556, 1558 globalization and de-territorialization of, 1416 and Greece, 630, 633 and Greenland, 1565, 1567–1568, 1570 and Haiti, 341–342 and Hungary, 639–644, 645 after independence, 1465 and India, 797, 803 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726–1728, 1732, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 757, 758–759, 1740, 1743 and Israel, 1124, 1127–1130 and Italy, 665, 670–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and Japan, 809–810, 813, 815, 820, 822, 1750–1751, 1755–1756, 1757–1578 and Korea, 1773, 1775–1776, 1778–1781 and landscape art, 59, 60–71 and language/literature, 482, 486, 492–495, 922–923 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1225 Maori, and intertribal unity, 1856, 1858, 1859–1860, 1863 and Mexico, 345, 347, 347–350, 351–356 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788–1789, 1792, 1793–1794, 1797, 1798 and music, 78–83 and national symbols, 113, 122–123, 1342–1348 in nationalist political philosophy, 97, 473–476 and Nepal, 1803, 1804, 1805–1806, 1807, 1811 and New Zealand, 863, 864–870 and Northern Ireland, 1065–1066 and overdetermination, 121 and Palestinians, 1133, 1134, 1138–1139 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1849 and Paraguay, 360, 362, 365–366 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 209, 213, 682, 686–688 and Puerto Rico, 839, 841–843 and Québec, 1293–1294 and religion versus ideology, 972–973 religious, 99, 103, 109, 983, 988–989. See also Religion and rituals of belonging, 499, 509. See also Rituals of belonging role of education in, 29–41 and Romania, 1589–1591 and Russia/Soviet Union, 690–701, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672–1673, 1677, 1679 and the Sami, 1614, 1615, 1617 and Scandinavia, 222–225, 226–228 and Scotland, 233, 234


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Identity (continued ) and social class, 1, 3–4 and South Africa, 1149–1150 and Spain, 1083, 1085–1087, 1092 and sports, 995, 996, 997–998, 1002–1003 and Switzerland, 251, 251–252, 253 and Taiwan, 1253–1255, 1257–1260 and technology, 134–135, 1476, 1481 and Tibet, 1815, 1817–1818, 1821–1823 and Turkey, 761–763, 764–765, 766, 768–770, 1645–1647, 1650 and Ukraine, 718–721, 720, 1622–1623 and the United States, 389, 392, 1307, 1307–1308 and Uruguay, 400, 401–402, 403 and Vietnam, 1266–1269, 1271 and Wales, 1636, 1640 Ideology, 971–989 and China, 794–795, 1193, 1194–1197, 1195, 1197 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1280–1281 globalization, disillusionment, and, 936–941 and Iraq, 752 and Malaysia, 1223 and nationalist movements, 940–941 and Russia, 692–697 and the United States, 1307–1308 and Vietnam, 1269 See also Communism; Fascism; Nationalism; Philosophy, political Igbo, 1469 Iglesias, Santiago, 839 Ileto, Reynaldo, 1245 Iliescu, Ion, 1586, 1587, 1589 Iliolo, Ratu Josefa, 1325 Immigrants/immigration, 1418–1429 and Alsace, 1510 and Argentina, 276, 277, 279, 280, 492 and Australia, 850 and Basques, 1517 and Burma, 777, 783 and Canada, 304, 1837 and Catalonia, 1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Colombia, 833 and cosmopolitanism, 1362 and Cuba, 1275 and Denmark, 155 education and, 420, 423–424 and the European Union, 1042 and France, 1055–1056, 1056 and gender, 448 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1409, 1411–1412, 1415 and Great Britain, 1007, 1009, 1013 and Greenland, 1566 and homeland politics, 1414–1415, 1416 and Indonesia, 1729 and Israel, 1121, 1129, 1130 and Japan, 1749, 1753, 1753 and language, 482, 483–484

and Latvia, 1575 and Malaysia, 1215 and Mongolia, 1797 and nativism, 883 and the Netherlands, 202, 206 and New Zealand, 864, 867, 868, 1856 and Pakistan, 1237 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Québec, 1296–1297 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Scandinavia, 231 and sports, 1000 and Turkey, 1650 and the United States, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1311 and Uruguay, 402 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnicity; Minorities; Refugees Imoudu, Michael, 1181 Imperialism. See Colonialism/imperialism Incas, 367–368, 370–371, 373 Income distribution and Australia, 853 and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Iran, 1111 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 955 and the United States, 1307, 1308 Independence and Afghanistan, 1684 in Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1098, 1099, 1100 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 728 and Argentina, 269–273 and Armenia, 1709–1710 and Austria, 542, 548–550, 552–553 and the Baltic states, 556–557, 562, 568, 1575, 1577–1578 and Belgium, 140, 142–143 and Brazil, 282, 287, 289, 295 and Bulgaria, 573–574, 578–580 and Burma, 777, 782–785 and Central America, 313, 319 and Chile, 326–327, 328 during the Cold War era, 949–950, 960, 969 and Colombia, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1161 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1277 and developing countries, 980 and Eritrea, 1173, 1173–1175 and Fiji, 1316–1317, 1320 and Finland, 223, 231, 605, 606 and Greece, 46, 53, 623, 625–631 and Greenland, 1571 and Haiti, 336 and Hungary, 638 and Iceland, 231 and India, 804–806, 889–890, 1201–1203 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1725, 1727, 1733–1734


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and Iraq, 750, 752–753 Latin America and, 46, 272 and Mexico, 349–350 and Mongolia, 1790, 1795 and New Zealand, 872 and Nigeria, 1181–1183 and Norway, 223–225, 231 and Pakistan, 1229–1231 and Paraguay, 359, 360–361 and Peru, 370, 371 and the Philippines, 1240–1241 and Poland, 681, 687–688 and popular nationalist movements, 503 to protect national culture, 1355 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 841, 843, 844–847 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Santo Domingo, 332–333 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and Taiwan, 1256–1257 and technology, 1479 and Tibet, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 767–768 and Ukraine, 722, 1626, 1626–1627 and Uruguay, 397 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Separatism/secession; Sovereignty India, 796–806, 799 (map), 943, 949–950, 1201–1211, 1202 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and colonialism, 48 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1373 education and, 424, 429 and gender, 446, 451, 902 government in, 981 and Great Britain, 889–890 and independence, 963, 1006, 1461–1462 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1771, 1765 and the Khalifat Movement, 1763 language/literature in, 920, 922, 923, 927 and music, 1440, 1441, 1443 and Nepal, 1802 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 967–968, 1229–1231, 1234–1235, 1235 politics in, 976–977, 987 railroad in, 131 and religion, 107 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 and terrorism, 1495 and the Tibetan government-in-exile, 1821, 1822 and water, 885 Indians, in Malaysia, 1215, 1216 Indigenismo, 352 Indigenous groups and Argentina, 277, 280 and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 283, 285, 293, 1826, 1828

and Canada, 303, 1837, 1840 and Central America, 310, 311, 317 and Chile, 324–326, 327 and Colombia, 829, 830 colonialism and, 889, 893, 912–913, 914–917 and education, 1383, 1385 and the environment/natural resources, 879, 883–884 and Fiji, 1314–1325 influence on music of, 1438–1439 Inuit, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 and language, 472, 482 and Malaysia, 1213–1215 and Mexico, 345–346, 351 and new social movements, 1448, 1451–1452 and Peru, 370–371, 372–375 and Québec, 1297 and Taiwan, 1252 and the United States, 1309 and Uruguay, 394–395 See also Maori; Pan-Aboriginalism; Sami Indo-Fijians, 1314–1325, 1318 Indo-Pakistan War, 1767 Indonesia, 1722–1735, 1724 (map) aircraft industry in, 1476 diversity and government in, 953–954 and independence, 1462–1463 and Malaysia, 1220 and the Netherlands, 197, 204 political tensions in, 938 radio hobbyists in, 128 separatist movements in, 1468 and technology, 1479–1480 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and transmigration, 876 Industrial Revolution, 161 Industrialization and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Basques, 1514–1515, 1517 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 317 and class, 55–56 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and England, 161 and Eritrea, 1169 and the European revolutions of 1848, 47 and Finland, 598 and geopolitics, 461 and Germany, 611 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 648, 661 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 424, 1748–1749 and Korea, 1778 and Mongolia, 1785 and nationalism, 1475, 1480 and Pakistan, 1228 and Poland, 209, 679, 681 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Québec, 1293–1294


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Industrialization (continued ) and Romania, 1585, 1587 and Russia, 699 and Scandinavia, 221 socialism and, 205 and the Soviet Union, 1075 and Spain, 703–704, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Ukraine, 714–715 and the United States, 1309 See also Economy Inequality and education, 1382, 1385–1386 and gender, 901–902, 903–904 and globalization, 936 and oil revenues in the Middle East, 1396 See also Income distribution; Rights Infrastructure and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 296, 1829 and China, 1193, 1200 education, 1381 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1169 and Indonesia, 1723 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 205 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1680 and Spain, 706, 708 and technological advances, 127–128, 131–132 and Tibet, 1814 and the United States, 389–390 Ingrians (Ingers), 557 Ingush, 441 Injannashi, 1788, 1789 Innis, Harold Adams, 1474, 1475 ˙Inönü, ˙Ismet, 768 Inoue Nissho, 816–817 Intellectuals, 1707 and Algeria, 1100 and Arab nationalism, 725, 730–733, 734 and Armenia, 1706 and Bulgaria, 571–572, 573 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1842 and China, 789–790, 792, 793, 793 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and France, 1052 and Germany, 183–185 independence and Greek, 626–627, 629–630 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 1741, 1745 and Latvia, 1575, 1577 and Mongolia, 1785–1786 and Nigeria, 1180 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222, 223

the Soviet Union and disciplining, 1074–1076 and Ukraine, 718 Young Ottomans/Turks, 763, 763, 764–765, 767, 771, 774 See also Elites International institutions. See Global institutions International Labour Organization (ILO), 1610 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1229, 1829, 1829 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 1359–1361 Internationalism, 536 and Angola, 1663 and Germany, 1551, 1559–1560 and globalization, 1408–1410 issue-specific, 1361–1362 versus nationalism, 418, 1342 and sports, 991 See also Post-nationalism; Transnationalism Internet and Armenia, 1709 and diaspora populations, 1370 and national identity, 1476, 1481–1483 and transnationalism, 1339 Interpellation, 486, 489–490 Intervention. See Foreign intervention Intifada, 1141 Inuit, 879, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 Ioann, Metropolitan, 106 Iqbal Lahori, Muhammad, 1229–1230, 1230, 1233 Iran, 1106–1118, 1108 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714 and gender, 446 and Iraq, 758, 1743 and Islamic fundamentalism, 986 and new social movements, 1452 and Palestine, 1142 and religious fundamentalism, 1396–1397 and terrorism, 1488 and the United States, 952 See also Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 756, 757, 952, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1746 Iraq, 747–759, 748 (map), 1736–1747, 1738 (map) borders of, 966 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1389 and Iran, 1115–1116 U.S. invasion of, 954, 955, 1497 water, 884–885 See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ireland, 647–662 Celtic revival in, 407 and colonialism, 915 and diaspora populations, 1374, 1375–1376


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economy of, 1060, 1408 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 112–113 and gender/sexuality, 452, 908 and immigration, 1424 and independence, 166, 1006 language and literature in, 488, 913–914, 918, 919, 920, 922–925 and Northern Ireland, 1060–1062, 1062, 1068 and sports, 997–998, 999–1000 Irian Jaya, 1734 Irish National Land League, 653–654 Ironsi, Johnson Aguiyi, 1185 Irving, Washington, 389 Isabella of Castile, 709 Islam and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1690, 1694 and Arab nationalism, 731, 733 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and the caliphate, 760–761 and India, 797 and Indonesia, 1728, 1734 and Iraq, 755, 1737, 1743–1745 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and national identity, 103–105 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763, 764 and Pakistan, 1236 and the Philippines, 1239 and politics, 983–987 in Russia, 1605–1607 and Turkey, 768, 1653–1654 See also Islamic fundamentalists; Shiism/ Shiites; Sunnis Islamic fundamentalists, 984–987, 1392, 1393, 1396–1400 and Algeria, 1101, 1102–1103 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1769 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1141–1143 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 in Turkey, 1649 Islamization, 1397–1400 Ismail, King (Egypt), 259, 260 Israel, 953, 1120–1130, 1122 (map) and counterterrorism, 1496 and diaspora populations, 1367 and education, 1387–1388 and environmental nationalism, 880 and minorities, 1374 and music, 1443 and Palestinians, 1133–1143 and religious fundamentalism, 1394, 1398, 1401–1402 and the Suez War, 266 symbols of, 114, 116 and water, 885 Isto, Edvard (Eetu), 603 (illus.) István, King (Hungary), 643

Itagaki Taisuke, 820 Italy, 663–677 and democracy, 946–947 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 426, 429, 432 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737, 740, 740 fascism in, 419, 514–516, 518–519 and film, 1333–1334 form of nationalism in, 502 and gender, 448–449 and language, 472 and the Libyan war, 514 and minorities, 1374, 1412, 1424 and music, 1437–1438, 1441 and nationalistic art, 410, 413, 414–415, 418 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and terrorism, 1491 unification (Risorgimento) of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 468, 512 Ivan the Terrible, 700 Ives, Charles, 1439 Iwakura Mission, 818–820 Izetbegović, Alija, 1527 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev (Vladimir), 1123 Jacini, Stefano, 669 Jackson, A. Y., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jacobitism, 175, 233, 238, 238 Jacobsen, J. C., 154 Jacobus, Stephanus, 1149 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 92, 186 Jakobson, Carl Robert, 562 Jamaica, 495 James, C. L. R., 992, 1301 James VI (Scotland)/James I (England), 61 Jamieson, John, 239 Jammu and Kashmir, 1462, 1759–1771, 1762 (map) conflict in, 1203–1204, 1234–1235, 1235, 1465–1466 Jang Bahadur, 1807 Jangghar, 1791 Jannsen, Johann Voldemar, 562 Japan, 808–822, 811 (map), 819 (map), 821 (map), 1748–1758, 1750 (map) and Burma, 777, 784–785 and China, 791, 792, 795, 1190 colonialism and, 1462 and democracy, 947 education and, 38, 40, 424, 426 and gender, 445, 450, 456 and India, 806 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language, 472, 478 and the Meiji Restoration, 27 and Mongolia, 1792, 1795, 1796 and music, 1439–1440, 1441 nationalism and literature in, 491–492 origins of nationalism in, 9


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Japan (continued ) and politics, 988 and religion, 106–107 and sports, 1001 and Taiwan, 1250, 1251 and terrorism, 1491 Jargalsaikhan, D., 1794 Jarl, Birger, 226 Järnefelt, Eero, 605 Jefferson, Thomas, 22, 32, 65, 211, 370, 387, 388 Jesuits, 350–351 Jews and Austria, 546 in the Baltic states, 563 in Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and the Diaspora, 1366, 1367 as discredited sexuality, 907 and Egypt, 265, 266 and establishment of Israel, 1402 ethnic cleansing and genocide in Russia, 438 and Germany, 188, 193, 430 and the Holocaust, 439–440, 523 and Hungary, 644, 645 in Iraq, 755–756 in Macedonia and Thrace during the Holocaust, 582 and the Netherlands, 199 and pogroms in Ukraine, 722 and Poland, 207, 209 in Romania, 1594 and Switzerland, 249 in Turkey, 1649 in the United States, 1398, 1400 See also Anti-Semitism; Israel; Judaism Jibzundamba Khutugtu, Eighth, 1788, 1792 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 804, 976, 1229, 1230, 1230–1231, 1233, 1461 Joergensen, A. D., 152, 154 Jogaila (Lithuanian prince), 564 John, King (England), 165 John Paul II, Pope, 948, 988 Johnson, Barry, 1399 Johnson, James, 73 Johnson, Lyndon, 944, 1310 Johnson, Samuel, 60 Johnston, Frank, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jones, Aneurin, 1637 Jones, Inigo, 61 Joseph II (Austria-Hungary), 138, 140 Jospin, Lionel, 1510 Joubert, Piet, 1146 Joyce, James, 489, 658, 914, 923, 924 Juan Carlos I, King (Spain), 1087 Judaism and fundamentalism (Ultra-Orthodoxy), 1124, 1392, 1393, 1395, 1400–1403 and national identity, 103 See also Jews Juliana, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Júnior, Caio Prado, 292

Kabila, Joseph, 1165 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 1165 Kagame, Paul, 1674 Kalaallit. See Greenland Kalevala, The, 227, 228, 406, 599, 602, 604 Kallay, Benjamin von, 1529 Kalmyks, 1784, 1790–1791, 1792, 1794–1795 Kamenev, Lev, 520 Kamil, Husayn, 262 Kamil, Mustafa, 261 Kangxi, Emperor, 1252 Kant, Immanuel, 14, 17, 86, 87–88, 533, 1352 Kaplan, Robert, 929 Karaites (Karaim), 557 Karamzin, Nikolai, 94 Karavelov, Luben, 573 Karel IV, king of Bohemia, 592 Karelia, 599, 600, 608 Karlsbad Decrees, 187, 189 Karmal, Babrak, 1687 Karnaviˇcus, Jurgis, 560 Károlyi, Count Mihály, 638 Karzai, Ahmed Wali, 1694 (illus.) Karzai, Hamid, 1686, 1695 Kasavubu, Joseph, 1158 Kashmir. See Jammu and Kashmir Kasparov, Gary, 951 Katanga, 1158, 1469 Kaunitz, Chancellor (Austria), 33–34 Kayibanda, Gregoire, 1677 Kazakhs, 1798 Kazakhstan, 1079, 1798 Kazimierz (Casimir) III (Prussia), 214 Keane, John, 1446, 1456 Kedourie, Elie, 474, 533 Keller, Ferdinand, 413 Kellerman, François, 1504 Kelly, Edward “Ned,” 857, 857 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 451, 633, 767–770, 1643, 1646–1647, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653 and Turkish identity, 766 Kemal, Namik, 763, 763, 766, 770, 774 Kemboi, Ezekiel, 1001 Kennan, George C., 945 Kennedy, John F., 944 Kent, William, 62 Kenya education and, 429 and literature, 919–920, 925–926 and music, 1440, 1441 Kenyatta, Jomo, 965 Kerber, Linda, 50 Kerkorian, Kirk, 1707 Key, Francis Scott, 117, 1443 Keyser, Rudolf, 228 Khachaturian, Aram, 1707 Khalifat Movement, 1763 Khan, Abatai, 1791 Khan, Abdul Qadir, 1236 Khan, Altan, 1817


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Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 1786, 1786, 1791, 1798, 1816 Khan, Dayan, 1786 Khan, Ishaq, 1232 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 1232 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 801 Khan, Yahya, 1232 Khan, Yaqub, 1690–1691 Khan Khattak, Khushal, 1690 Khatami, Mohammad, 1117 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 952, 986, 1111, 1114, 1396, 1397, 1399, 1400 Khomiakov, A. S., 692 Khorenatsi, Movses, 1702, 1708 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 948, 952, 979, 1076, 1077, 1603 Khutugtu, Jibzundamba, 1790 Khyvliovyi, Mykola, 718 Kidd, Benjamin, 532 Kierkegaard, Søren, 228 Kim Dae Jung, 1779 Kim Il Sung, 952, 1773, 1779–1781, 1780 Kim Jong Il, 1780 Kincaid, Jamaica, 924 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 123, 938, 1203, 1304 King, Michael, 869 King, Rodney, 1339 King, Sir Frederic Truby, 871 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 306 Kireevskii, I. V., 692 Kiribati, 1443 Kissinger, Henry, 458 Kivi, Aleksis, 602 Kjellén, Rudolf, 460, 463, 491 Klaus, Václav, 1027, 1028 Kléber, Jean-Baptiste, 1504 Klingler, Werner, 133 Knudsen, Knud, 225–226 Kochanowski, Jan, 214 Kodály, Zoltán, 81, 1432, 1435 Kohl, Helmut, 1549 Kohn, Hans, 23, 392, 474 Koidula, Lydia, 564 Koirala, B. P., 1803, 1807 Koizumi, Prime Minister (Japan), 1755 Kolberg, Oskar, 216 Köler, Johann, 564 Kolettis, Ioannis, 632 Kollár, Jan, 592 Kołła˛taj, Hugo, 211 Kollontai, Alexandra, 453, 454 Konovalets, Yevhen, 718 Kopernik, Mikołaj (Nicholas Copernicus), 214 Korais, Adamantios, 626, 628, 628 Korchynsky, Dmytro, 1628 Korea, 1467, 1772–1781, 1774 (map) education and, 424 and independence, 1462 and Japan, 809, 810, 815, 818, 1749 and sports, 1001

Koreans, in Japan, 1753 Körner, Theodor, 73 Korppi-Tommola, Aura, 54 Ko´sciuszko, Tadeusz, 96, 211, 211, 214, 686 Kosovo, 1409, 1554, 1555 Kossuth, Lajos, 638, 643 Kossuth, Louis, 239 Kostecki, Platon, 716 Koyama Eizo, 822 Kozyrev, Andrei, 1597 Kracauer, Siegfried, 1330–1331 Kramáˇr, Karel, 590 Krasicki, Ignacy, 214 Krasiński, Zygmunt, 212, 214, 216 Kraszewski, Józef Ignacy, 216–217, 685 Kravchuk, Leonid, 1078, 1597, 1621, 1622, 1626 Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhard, 564, 567 Krieck, Wilhelm, 426 Kronvalds, Atis, 1577 Kruger, Paul, 1146, 1150–1151 Krupskaya, Nadezhda, 453, 454 Kuchma, Leonid, 1080, 1621, 1622, 1625, 1628 Kun, Béla, 520 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 1079 Kunchov, Vasil, 580 Kurds and European partition, 891–893 and Iraq, 752–753, 755, 756, 1737, 1741–1742, 1745 and terrorism, 1491 and Turkey, 769, 885, 1646, 1650, 1653, 1655 Kushner, Barak, 822 Kutuzov, Dmitrii, 696 Kutuzov, Mikhail, 1074 Kuwait, 1743 Kuyper, Abraham, 200, 1149 Kymlicka, Will, 97, 931 Kyoto treaty, 877, 1447, 1456, 1457 Kyrlylenko, Vyacheslav, 1626 Labor/employment and Australia, 852 and Burma, 777, 781 and England, 164 and Fiji, 1314–1315 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Iraq, 1746 and the knowledge worker, 1380 and migration, 1422, 1424 and Nigeria, 1181 shortages and ethnic cleansing/genocide, 441 slavery, 889. See also Slavery and South Africa, 1145–1146 specialization of, 130 and the United States, 1304, 1309 Ladulås, Magnus, 226 Lagarde, Pierre, 409 Lagerbring, Sven, 227 Lahiri, Jhumpa, 927 Laicism, 769


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Lal, Brij V., 1322 Lalli (Finnish hero), 604–605 Lamanskii, Vladimir, 1601 Lamas, Andrés, 402 Lamming, George, 913, 917, 924 Land ownership and Australia, 1851–1852 and Fiji, 1314, 1322 and Haiti, 338, 342 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Ireland, 648, 653 and Japan, 811–812 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1861–1863, 1862 and Paraguay, 358 and Puerto Rico, 845 and South Africa, 1151 Land rights/claims and Afghanistan, 1692 and the Baltic states, 568 and Burma, 783 and the Inuit, 1567 and new social movements, 1450, 1451–1452 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846 and the Sami, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1617 Land sacralization, 100, 103 Landes, Joan, 49 Landsbergis, Vytautus, 1078 Landscape, 59–71 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Canada, 1841 and Denmark, 154 and England, 162 and Finland, 599, 604 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127–1128, 1129 and music, 78–79 and national identity, 875–876, 1342, 1344–1345 and Russia, 698 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 228 and Switzerland, 251, 252 as symbols, 114–115 and Turkey, 770 and Ukraine, 1621 and Wales, 1633 See also Environment Lange, Christian, 228 Language, 471–484, 912–928 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1692 and Afrikaner nationalism, 1147 and Algeria, 1095, 1101 and Alsace, 1502–1503, 1509, 1510 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 733 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703 and Austria, 542 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 560, 561, 562, 563 and Basques, 704, 710–711, 1092, 1512, 1514 (map), 1516, 1522

and Belgium, 138, 141–142, 144–145, 146 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 289, 1825 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Canada, 303, 307, 1840 and Catalans, 706, 1537, 1542, 1544, 1546 and China, 1199 and cultural survival, 878–879 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1021 and Denmark, 154 dictionaries and standardizing, 477 education and, 420, 424–425, 427 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1170, 1172, 1173–1174 and Ethiopia, 741, 746 and Europe, 1031 and Fiji, 1320 and Finland, 598–599, 601, 601–602, 605–606 and France, 34, 178 and Germany, 185 and globalization, 1392 and Greece, 629–630 and Greenland, 1565, 1566, 1568, 1570–1571 and Haiti, 339 and Hungary, 641 and immigration, 1420, 1421 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723–1725, 1728 and Ireland, 657, 660 and Israel, 1124, 1127, 1129 and Italy, 665, 671 and Japan, 813 and Latvia, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1582 and Malaysia, 1217, 1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 345, 346 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1796, 1798 and national boundaries, 461 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 16, 533, 1355–1356 and nationalistic music, 78, 80 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 199 and New Zealand, 1383 and Pakistan, 1233, 1235–1236 and Paraguay, 358, 364, 365 and the Philippines, 1247 and Poland, 217, 679, 688 and political philosophy, 88–89, 91 and print technology, 1475 and Puerto Rico, 841, 845 and Québec, 1291, 1293, 1296 and Romania, 1588, 1589–1591 and the Sami, 1613–1614 and Scandinavia, 225–226 and Singapore, 1224–1225 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Spain, 707


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and Switzerland, 245 and Taiwan, 1258 and Tibet, 1815, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 772–773, 1646, 1646, 1652, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 719, 719, 720, 721, 1621, 1623–1624, 1625, 1627 and the United States, 389 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 and Wales, 1632, 1634–1636, 1635, 1638 Laos, 1463 Lapage, Robert, 1294 Laporte, Pierre, 1291 Laqueur, Walter, 1489, 1498 Larrazábal, Antonio, 317 Larsson, Carl, 228 Laski, Harold, 981 Lassale, F., 38 Lastarria, José Victorino, 329 Latin America development of nationalism in, 8, 9, 16, 26, 46 and film, 1335 and language, 472 and nationalistic music, 76 and new social movements, 1450–1452 See also specific Latin American countries Latvia, 1573–1582, 1573 (map) fascism in, 517 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, 399 Lavater, Johann Kaspar, 251 Lavin, Mary, 925 Lawson, Henry, 854 Laxman, Adam, 810 Le Carre, John, 951 Le Corbusier, 1206 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 1054, 1056, 1447, 1453, 1510 Le Republicain (L’Union), 341, 342 Leaders and Africa, 890 and Angola, 1661–1663, 1662 anticolonial nationalist, 962–964 and Arab nationalism, 730–731, 732, 732–733 and Argentina, 277–278 and Armenia, 1699 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532 and Canada, 306, 1837 and Central America, 317–318, 320–321 and China, 790, 794, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158, 1160 and Denmark, 153 and Egypt, 258–259 and France, 1051, 1052 and Germany, 189, 190 and Haiti, 336–337, 338 and India, 1206–1207, 1207, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1726, 1727 and Iraq, 758 Islamic attacks on Muslim, 1397–1398

and Islamic movements, 984–985 and Israel, 1121, 1123, 1123, 1128 and Japan, 818–820, 1751–1752, 1752 and Korea, 1775, 1780 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1857, 1858 and Mongolia, 1789–1790 monuments to, 410–411 and national identity, 1345 as national symbols, 114, 116 and Nepal, 1803, 1806 and new social movements, 1453 and Nigeria, 1180, 1180–1181, 1182, 1187 and Pakistan, 1230 and Palestinians, 1134, 1136–1137, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1848, 1848, 1851, 1853 and Paraguay, 364 and the Philippines, 1241–1242, 1242, 1244 and Poland, 210–212, 681–683, 682 and Puerto Rico, 839–840 qualities of, 982 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1597 and the Sami, 1616, 1616–1618 and separatist movements, 1464–1465 and Singapore, 1221 and South Africa, 1150–1151, 1152 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1075 and Taiwan, 1253 and Uruguay, 398 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Heroes/heroines League of Arab States, 729 League of Nations failure of the, 1402 and Iraq, 750, 1739 and Israel, 1123 Mandates, 728, 1461 and New Zealand, 872 Lebanon, 728 Lechner, Frank, 1392 Leclerc, Charles, 336 Leclerc de Buffon, Georges-Louis, 351 Lee, Richard Henry, 385 Lee Kuan Yew, 1220, 1221 Lee Teng-hui, 1253, 1253–1254, 1255, 1256, 1258, 1259 Legal system/institutions and Central America, 314, 315, 319 and France, 174, 176 and the Netherlands, 202 and Scandinavia, 227 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 254 Legitimacy and Angola, 1666 and Chinese communists, 1196, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1370–1371 and ideologies and religions, 972–973 and Iran, 1109


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Legitimacy (continued ) and modern nation-states, 930 and national sports, 998–999 and North versus South Korea, 1776, 1778–1779 and the Qing Dynasty in China, 788 Legitime, Francois, 338 Leino, Eino, 605 Lej Iyasu, 740, 740 Lelewel, Joachim, 212, 214, 692 Lemarchand, Rene, 1676 Lemieux, Mario “The Magnificent,” 1842 Lemkin, Raphael, 436 Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov), 436, 697, 978, 981, 1072 and ethnicities, 1599 and film, 1330 on nationalism, 1071 León y Gama, Antonio de, 351, 351 Leopold I (Belgium), 142 Leopold II (Belgium), 1156 Lepeletier, L. M., 34 Lerroux, Alejandro, 710 Lesage, Jean, 1290, 1290 Lespinasse, Beauvais, 341 Lester, Richard, 1337 Lévesque, René, 1290, 1290, 1291, 1291 (illus.), 1294 Levitt, Kari, 1842 Levski, Vasil, 573, 576, 576 Levsky, Vasil, 96 Levy, Andrea, 928 Lewis, C. S., 971 Lewis, Geoffrey, 773 Lewis, Saunders, 1635 Liberalism, 14–15, 23–28, 535–536, 537 and Australia, 854 and Brazil, 1830 as detached from democracy, 1306 and European nationalism, 512–513 and Finland, 598 German, 17 and Indonesia, 1732 and Italy, 669 versus nationalism, 1350–1351. See also Nationalism, liberal and Paraguay, 364–365 and Puerto Rico, 841 and Spain, 704 See also Economic liberalism Liberties. See Rights Liborio, 1283 Libyan war, 514 Liebermann, Max, 416 Liebknecht, Karl, 520 Liechtenstein, 1443 Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 Lijphart, Arend, 206 Lilburn, Douglas, 1439 Lincoln, Abraham, 382, 391

Lindeman, Ludvig Mathias, 73 Lindsay, A. D., 536 Linguistic internationalists, 471 Lippmann, Walter, 950 Lira, Luciano, 401 Lismer, Arthur, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Lisson, Carlos, 374 List, Friedrich, 18, 191, 192, 463 Liszt, Franz, 74, 81, 1432, 1435 Literacy rates, 495–497, 496 (map) and Pakistan, 1228 Literature, 465, 485–497, 912–928 and Argentina, 278–279 and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703 Austrian, 543 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Brazil, 285, 287 and Bulgaria, 576–577 and Canada, 1841 and Catalonia, 1543 and Chile, 329, 330 and Colombia, 832 and Finland, 602, 604, 605 and France, 177, 1052 and gender, 49 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and India, 800, 1209 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1740 and Ireland, 657, 658–659 and Mongolia, 1789, 1794 and Nepal, 1807, 1808 and the Philippines, 1244–1245 and Poland, 682, 685 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavia, 228 and Scotland, 238–239 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 1075–1076, 1077, 1077 and Spain, 708 and Turkey, 763, 770 and Ukraine, 720 and the United States, 389, 951 See also Poetry Lithuania, 561 and gender/sexuality, 908 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Livingston, David, 164 Livs, 557 Localism and globalization, 1411 nationalism as, 1415 and subsidiarity, 881 See also Regionalism Loggia, Enrico Galli della, 676 Lomonosov, M. V., 694 Lönnrot, Elias, 228, 406, 599, 602 López, Carlos Antonio, 362, 363, 364


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López, Narciso, 1282 Lopez, Vicente Fidel, 276 López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 830–831, 832 Louis-Philippe, 408 Louis XVI, King (France), 1489 Louis XVIII, King (France), 1443 Louisiana Purchase, 390 Lower, Arthur, 305 Loya jirga, 1686, 1687, 1690, 1691 Lu Xun, 793 Lubbe, Marinus van der, 119 Luce, Henry, 1309 Ludendorff, Erich, 613 Lumumba, Patrice, 962–963, 1158, 1158, 1159, 1159 (illus.), 1160–1162 heroicizing of, 1164 Luther, Martin, 188, 618, 983 Luxemburg, Rosa, 520 Lyngbye, Hans Christian, 225 Lypyns’kyi, Viacheslav, 718 MacArthur, Douglas, 1751 Macartney, C. A., 1368 Macaulay, Hebert, 1179–1180, 1180 Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, 165, 912 MacCunn, Hamish, 1438 MacDonald, J. E. H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Macdonald, John A., 1837 MacDowell, Edward, 76, 1438 Macedonia and Bulgaria, 580, 582 and diasporic communities, 1415 Germany and peacekeeping in, 1554 Maceo, 1275, 1282 Machado, Gerardo, 1276 Maˇciulis, Jonas, 565 Mackenzie, Alexander, 300, 1438 Mackinder, Halford, 460, 468 Maclennan, Hugh, 307 Macpherson, James, 462 Mada, Gajah, 1727 Madison, James, 386, 387, 388 Magna Carta, 165 Magnus, Olaus, 223 Magnus VI (Norway), 226 Magsaysay, Ramon, 1241, 1242 Magyarization, 644 Magyars, 587 Maharaja (of Jammu and Kashmir), 1764–1765 Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, 1803, 1807–1808 Maimonides, 1402, 1403 Maistre, Joseph de, 92 Majoritarian nationalist movements, 940 Makarenko, Anton, 425, 429 Malan, Daniel François, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1151 Malawi, 1440 Malay(s), 1213–1215, 1217, 1219, 1225 as dominant culture in Malaysia, 1220–1222 and education, 1384–1385 and the Philippines, 1243

Malaysia, 1213–1225 and education, 1385–1386 and independence, 1463 and Indonesia, 1729, 1733 and natural resources, 884 Malcolm X, 965 Mâle, Emile, 415 Malthusianism, 518 Mamluks, 257–258, 259–260 Mammeri, Mouloud, 1100 Manchester, England, 161 Manchuria and independence, 1462 and Japan, 810, 818 Manchurian Incident (1931), 810, 821 Manchus, 1818 Mandela, Nelson, 995, 1148, 1152, 1153, 1488–1489 Mandukhai, Empress, 1786 Manifest destiny. See Expansionism Mann, Horace, 37 Mann, Thomas, 617 Mansell, Michael, 1848 Manzanilla, Matias, 374 Manzoni, Alessandro, 671 Mao Zedong, 948, 952, 977, 1191, 1816, 1819, 1821 economic and political programs, 1198–1199 ideology of, 978, 1194–1197, 1197 influence of, 1192–1193 Maoism, 978–979 and Angola, 1664 and Nepal, 1810–1811 Maori, 866, 1855–1863 and education, 1383 and music, 1439 and New Zealand, 873 population, 864 and the Treaty of Waitangi, 863 and the world wars, 869–870 Maps, 465 and Central America, 319–320 and Finland, 602–604 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 640 and Japan, 810 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 1320, 1324 Maragall i Mira, Pasqual, 1539, 1540, 1541 (illus.) Marcinkowski, Karol, 217 Marcos, Ferdinand, 1241–1242, 1244, 1246 Marcos, Imelda, 1242, 1244, 1245 Margalit, A., 97 Marginalization, 935–941 Maria Theresa (Austria-Hungary), 138 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 1469 Maritz, Gerrit, 1150 Markievicz, Countess, 654 “Marseillaise,” 175 Marshall, George C., 948 Marsland, David, 114


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Martí, José, 1275, 1276, 1282, 1283 Martin, Henri, 177 Martins, Wilfred, 975 Marure, Alejandro, 319 Marx, Karl, 1–3, 17–18, 217, 1195 and gender roles, 56 and religion, 1397 on socialism versus communism, 975 Marxism, 1–3, 12 and Angola, 1661, 1662 and Arab nationalism, 730–731 and culture, 485–486 and the environment, 881 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 471 See also Communism Mas, Artur, 1539 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 585, 585, 587–588, 589, 589 (illus.), 592, 593, 1017, 1028 Masculinity, 900–901. See also Gender Mashtots, Mesrop, 1701 Mason, Lowell, 389 Masood, Ahmad Shah, 1690, 1693 Massey, Vincent, 1838 Massey, William, 869 Masur, Gerhard, 834 Matejko, Jan, 682 Mathews, Robin, 1843 Matto de Turner, Clorinda, 374 Maude, Sir Stanley, 1742 Maupassant, Guy de, 134 Maura, Antonio, 707 Maurits of Orange (the Netherlands), 196 Maurras, Charles, 533 May, Glenn, 1246 May Fourth movement, 793, 793 Mayer, Gustav, 611 Maynard, Charles Frederick, 1848 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 24, 90, 94–95, 468, 502, 673, 673 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Mbundu, 1660, 1664, 1665 McCarthy, Joseph, 907–908, 944 McCubbin, Frederick, 859 McDougall, William, 530, 535 McKay, Claude, 494 McLuhan, Marshall, 129 McVeigh, Timothy, 1492 Meˇciar, Vladimir, 1026–1027 Media and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Alsace, 1509 and Armenia, 1709 and Azerbaijan, 1719 and the Baltic states, 567 and Brazil, 287 and Bulgaria, 573 and Burma, 783 and Canada, 1839 and Central America, 316, 320

and China, 1193, 1199 culture and forms of, 1474–1475 education and, 422, 433 and Egypt, 261, 262 and Eritrea, 1172 and Ethiopia, 746 and globalization, 1412 in Haiti, 341 and immigration, 1427 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iraq, 1738, 1745 and Korea, 1781 as maintaining psychological stability, 123 manipulation of, 1480–1481 and national identity, 30, 31, 38, 464–465, 486, 1473 and Nepal, 1808 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1853 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 217 and Québec, 1296 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 technological advances and, 129, 132–134, 135–136 in Turkey, 1649 and the United States, 390, 1308 See also Cinema; Literature; Newspapers; Print technology; Radio; Television Megali Idea, 632–633 Mehmed V (Ottoman Empire), 765 Mehmed VI (Ottoman Empire), 767 Meiji Restoration, 818, 1748, 1751 Meiren, Gada, 1789 Mekhitarians, 1700 Melgar, Mariano, 373 Mella, Julio Antonio, 1282, 1283 Melnyk, Andrei, 718, 1624 Melucci, Albert, 1446 Men and gendered role in conflict, 449 nationalist imagery and, 445–446 See also Gender; Masculinity Mendelssohn, Felix, 1431 Mendes, Chico, 1829 Mendes-France, Pierre, 1054 Menelik II (Ethiopia), 737, 737–740, 744 Mercantalism, 18–19 Merchants. See Bourgeoisie Mercier, Honoré, 305, 1288–1289 Merse, 1789 Mesopotamia, 748, 757–758 Messiaen, Olivier, 1434 Mestiço, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1665 Mestizaje, 349, 349, 356 Mexican-American War, 347, 352, 354, 390 Mexico, 344–356, 346 (map), 353 (map) and communications, 1475 and music, 1439 national identity and education in, 39 national radio of, 132–133


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and politics, 1414 and terrorism, 1491 Zapatista movement in, 1412, 1451–1452 Meyer, John, 1392, 1397 Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 117 Michael the Brave (Romania), 1585, 1592 Michelet, Jules, 102, 177, 177–178 Mickiewicz, Adam, 212, 213, 214, 216, 686, 692 Micombero, Michel, 1677 Middle East and education, 428, 1387–1388 and European colonization, 891 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Mier, Servando Teresa de, 350, 351, 352 Migration and consolidating sovereignty, 876 globalization and international, 1414–1415 and sports, 1001–1002 See also Emigration; Immigrants/immigration Mikhalkov, Sergei, 1602 Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola, 722 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 683 Military and Algeria, 1100 and Angola, 1667 and Armenia, 1710 and Brazil, 1827, 1828–1829, 1830–1831, 1832 and Burma, 781 and China, 790 and Ethiopia, 740 and Fiji, 1314, 1324 and gender/sexuality, 903, 910 and Germany, 620, 621 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726 interventions and terrorism, 1497 and Iraq, 751, 753, 1743, 1745 and Ireland, 661 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1748–1749, 1752 music, 1430, 1431 and New Zealand, 868–869 and Nigeria, 1185, 1188 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Russia, 955 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1679, 1680 and Spain, 703, 705, 706 technology, 1473 and Turkey, 1646, 1647 Mill, Harriet Taylor, 57 Mill, John Stuart, 19, 57, 85, 95, 527 and cosmopolitanism, 1356 Miller, Ferdinand von, 416 Mindaugas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Minghetti, Marco, 669 Minin, Kuz’ma, 700, 1602 Minorities and Afghanistan, 1689–1690, 1692–1693, 1694 in the Baltic states, 557

and Basques, 1516–1517 and Bulgaria, 580–582 and Burma, 781 and China, 1193, 1199–1200 and citizenship, 1374 and Colombia, 833 and concerns about cultural survival, 878–879 cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and, 1356, 1357–1362 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and demands for rights, 932–933, 936–941. See also Rights and discrimination, 1420, 1425. See also Discrimination/prejudice education and, 419, 422, 427, 429–430, 431, 432 and the environment, 882 and Ethiopia, 741 and Germany, 617 globalization and mobilization of, 1412–1413, 1414 and Hungary, 639, 644 and India, 976, 1203 and Indonesia, 1728–1729 and Iran, 1112–1113, 1117–1118 and Iraq, 1741–1742 and Israel, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and Japan, 1753, 1756, 1758 and Latvia, 1575 and the legacies of colonialism, 894 and Malaysia, 1463 marginalization in modern states of, 931–932 and Mongolia, 1798 and nationalist ideologies, 513 and Nepal, 1804, 1809–1810 and new social movements, 1448, 1453, 1457, 1458 and New Zealand, 866–867 and Nigeria, 1182–1183 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and Poland, 683, 685, 687 and Romania, 1587, 1591, 1593–1594 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672 and state terrorism, 1488 and Turkey, 1648–1651, 1654–1655 and Ukraine, 1625 and the United States, 1307, 1308 and Vietnam, 1271 and Wales, 1636 See also Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnicity; Genocide; Language Missionary activity, 480 Mistral, Frédéric, 477 Mitre, Bartolomé, 276, 279 Mitterrand, François, 458, 1051–1052, 1054 Mixed race descent and Brazil, 293 and Central America, 311 and Paraguay, 358


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I-40 Mobutu, Joseph (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga), 1158–1159, 1160, 1161, 1162–1165 Modarres, Hassan, 1114 Modernization and Afghanistan, 1686, 1688 and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Australia, 853–854 and China, 792, 1191–1192, 1197, 1198–1199, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1372 and Ethiopia, 740–741 and film, 1337 and Greece, 625, 630 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Italy, 669–670 and Japan, 1753 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 as necessitating the nation-state, 930–932 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Spain, 705, 705, 706 and Turkey, 771 Moe, Jørgen, 228 Mohammad, Mahathir bin, 1223–1224 Mohammed, Murtala Ramat, 1186, 1187, 1187 Mohaqeq, Mohammad, 1695 Moldavia/Moldova, 469, 1414 Molina, Felipe, 319 Molina, Pedro, 315, 316 Molotov, Viacheslav, 1077 Moluccans, 1491 Monarchy and France, 169–171 and Great Britain, 1007–1008, 1008 Mondlane, Eduardo, 1661 Mongolia, 1783–1799 and independence, 1818, 1819 Mongols, and Tibet, 1816–1817 Moniuszko, Stanisław, 74, 216, 686 Monnet, Jean, 1034 Montcalm, Louis de, 299 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, 62–64, 171, 529 Montevideo, 395–396, 397, 402 Montgomerie, Archibald William, 235 Montilla Aguilera, José, 1539, 1541 Montúfar, Manuel, 319 Monuments, 117–120 and Algeria, 1102 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 294–295 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 594, 1024–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Germany, 618, 619 and Indonesia, 1732, 1733, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Ireland, 659 and Japan, 1754–1755

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and Latvia, 1580 and Mongolia, 1798 and national identity, 1342, 1345–1347 and nationalism, 408, 409, 410–412, 414–415, 417 and Nigeria, 1187 and rituals of belonging, 502, 504 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1603 Scottish, 239 and Turkey, 774 Mora, José María Luis, 352 Mora, Juan Rafael, 315, 318 Moral Majority, 1395, 1446 Morality and cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, 1351–1353, 1356–1357 and Cuba, 1283 and gender and sexuality issues, 447, 899, 908–909 and national character, 531 U.S. idealistic, 944 See also Values Moravia, 584 Morazán, Francisco, 318 Moreno, Manuel, 398 Moro, Aldo, 676 Moroccan crises, 514 Morocco, 1096–1097, 1464 Moros, 1243 Moscow Declaration, 548 Moscow metro, 134 Mosley, Oswald, 516 Mossadegh, Muhammad, 1109, 1109, 1111, 1114 Mosse, George, 905 Motoori Norinaga, 815 Mott, Lucretia, 53, 57 Motz, Friedrich, 191 Mount Ararat, 1702 Mount Rushmore, 134 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 1765 Mourer, Jean-Pierre, 1509 Mozambique, 968, 1464 Mubarak, Hosni, 985 Muhammad V, 1464 Mujahideen, 1687, 1688, 1693 Mukhtar, Mahmud, 264 Mulgan, Alan, 868 Müller, Adam, 92, 463 Multiculturalism and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 1826 and Canada, 1838, 1840, 1843 and education, 1379, 1382–1384, 1386 and Fiji, 1325 as a form of nationalism, 934, 935 and globalization, 1411–1412 and Great Britain, 1011–1013 and immigration, 1367


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and India, 1765 and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 1784 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and the Netherlands, 206 and Poland, 685 and Romania, 1589 and Singapore, 1224 as solution to minority demands, 933, 939 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 1306 Multilateralism, 877, 881 Multinationality, 1358 Munch, P. A., 228 Munich Conference, 595 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 840, 841, 845, 846 Muñoz Rivera, Luis, 839, 841 Museums, 31 and the Baltic states, 560 and France, 1053 in Germany, 1558 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Latvia, 1578 and nationalistic art, 412–414 and Scandinavia, 229 Musharraf, Pervez, 1232 Music, 72–83, 1430–1445 and Angola, 1665 Baltic folk songs, 561, 567 and Basques, 1522 and Brazil, 1826 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Finland, 600, 605 folk songs and nationalistic, 417 and France, 1053 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569–1570 in Indonesia, 1479 and Israel, 1127, 1128 and Italy, 671 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and national identity, 31, 132–133, 407 and Paraguay, 364, 365 and Poland, 214, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 songs in Denmark, 154 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637 See also Anthem, national Musical instruments, 1440–1441, 1442 Muslim Brotherhood, 984–986, 1396

Muslim League, 801, 804, 806, 976, 1761 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171 and Pakistan, 1230, 1231 Muslims and Egypt, 265 and India, 801, 803, 804, 806, 1203, 1209 and the Netherlands, 202 See also Islam Musset, Alfred de, 177 Mussolini, Benito, 448–449, 514–516, 518, 667, 670, 676 and Roman history, 674 Mussolini, Vittorio, 1334 Mussorgsky, Modest, 75, 75 (illus.), 78, 82, 1437 Nadim, Abdullah, 261 Nadir Shah, Mohammed, 1686, 1688 Nagorno-Karabakh. See Gharabagh conflict Naguib, Muhammad, 266 (illus.) Nagy, Imre, 978 Naipaul, V. S., 924 Nairn, Tom, 933 Naji, Dr., 1740 Najibullah, Mohammad, 1687 Napier, Theodore, 242 Napoleon, Louis, 197 Napoleon III, 407, 1443 Napoleonic Civil Code, 174, 176 Napoleonic wars, 463 and Central America, 317 and Germany, 186, 618–619 music and resistance in the, 73 as stirring nationalism, 14, 16, 26, 46 Nariño, Antonio, 831 Naruszewicz, Adam, 214 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 687 Nassef, Malak Hifni, 450 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 265–266, 266 (illus.), 730, 890, 964, 1396 and the Bandung Conference, 962 and pan-Arabism, 965, 982 Nation-building, 929–941 National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), 235, 235, 241 National character, 527–537. See also Culture; Identity National Socialism, 419, 422, 513, 514, 517–519. See also Nazism Nationalism defining, 4–5, 85, 1351 ethnic-genealogical versus civic-territorial, 1353–1354 forms of, 5–12, 934–935 and geopolitics, 458–469 as an ideological political project, 875 imperative and imaginary forms of, 501–503 and language, 473, 482–484. See also Language as a legitimating ideology, 436 liberal, 488–490, 1355–1359, 1362


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Nationalism (continued ) and masculinity, 900–901 origins of, 473–474 particularistic, 90–94 versus patriotism, 45 perversions of, 512–525 religious, 100–101. See also Religion technological, 1478 transnational, 1407, 1414–1415 universalistic culture-based, 88–90 See also Identity; Philosophy, political; Politics Nativism, 883 Natsir, Mohammed, 965 Natsugdorji, D., 1794 Natural resources and Azerbaijan, 1714 and Brazil, 283, 1827–1828, 1832 and Canada, 1842 and conflict, 883–886 and India, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 877 and the Philippines, 1247 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1671 and Scandinavia, 221 and Wales, 1632 Nau, Emile, 341 Naumovych, Ivan, 716 Navarra, 1516, 1517, 1523 Nazism and Austria, 545, 546, 550, 552 and Czechoslovakia, 592 education and, 426 and the environment, 882 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438–440, 523, 622 and expansionism, 621 and film, 1331 and gender, 454–456 on German national character, 533 and Iran, 1110–1111 and language, 481 and music, 1431 nationalism of, 1353 propaganda of, 133–134 and rituals of belonging, 505, 507–508 and sexuality, 907 Ndadaye, Melchior, 1673, 1679 Negritude movement, 488, 918–919 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 981, 1207, 1461, 1761, 1764, 1765, 1766 and the Bandung Conference, 961, 962, 1206 and the Dalai Lama, 1820 economic policies of, 1206 and Indian federalism, 1205 and the nonaligned movement, 982 Nehru, Motilal, 1207 Nejedlý, Zdenˇek, 1023–1024 Nekrasov, N. A., 694

Nelson, Lord Horatio, 164 Neo-fascism, 525, 974 Neo-Nazis and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557, 1558 and the Soviet Union, 1078 Neo-Stalinism, 1077–1078 Neoliberalism, in education, 1381–1382 Neorealism, 1333–1335, 1336, 1337 Nepal, 1800–1811, 1802 (map) Netherlands, the, 195–206, 201 (map), 202 (illus.) and Belgium, 141–142 and Brazil, 283–284 and colonialism, 1479 education and, 34, 429 fascism in, 516 and immigration, 1420 and Indonesia, 1463, 1723, 1733, 1734 and Japan, 809, 810 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 and music, 1443 national anthem, 117 and Taiwan, 1252 and technology, 1480 and terrorism, 1486–1487, 1491 See also Afrikaner nationalism Neto, Agostinho, 1661–1662, 1662 Nevskii, Aleksandr, 696, 700 New France, 1288 New Guinea, 852 New Zealand, 862–873, 864 (map) and education, 1382, 1383 and the Maori, 1855–1863 and music, 1439, 1441 and sports, 993 Newspapers and Algeria, 1103 and Arab nationalism, 752 and Australia, 854 and Colombia, 833 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and Iraq, 1740, 1745 and Irish resistance, 918 and Japan, 816, 817 in Latvia, 1576 and nationalism, 1473, 1475–1476 and Nigeria, 1179, 1181 and Québec, 1296 and the Sami, 1613 and Wales, 1639 Ngata, Sir Apirana, 1858, 1859 Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, 1818 Ng˜ ug˜ı wa Thiong’o, 913, 915, 919–920, 925–926 Niagara Falls, 134 Nibelungenlied, 406 Nicaragua and national identity, 321 symbols of, 319 and William Walker, 318


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Niceforo, Alfredo, 672 Nicholas I, Czar (Russia), 210, 690–692 Nicholas II, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Nicholls, David, 341 Nichols, Terry, 1492 Niemcewicz, Julian Ursyn, 214 Nietzsche, F., 10 Nieuwenhuis, Domela, 205 Nigeria, 1177–1189, 1178 (map) Biafran secessionist movement in, 967 education and, 424 and literature, 920 Nightingale, Florence, 164 Nitze, Paul, 950 Nixon, Richard, 1039, 1395 Nkrumah, Kwame, 962, 964, 965, 980, 1161 Noble, Paul, 734 Nolan, Sidney, 857 Nolte, Ernst, 515 Nonaligned movement, 961, 969, 982 and Algeria, 1095 and Cuba, 1285 and India, 1206 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 944, 1359–1361, 1412 and Brazil, 1830 and Fiji, 1322 and new social movements, 1453 Nora, Pierre, 121–122, 1343 Nordau, Max, 416 Nordraak, Rikard, 230 North America and immigration, 1421, 1425 and terrorism, 1494 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1294, 1407, 1412, 1451 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 943, 974, 1532–1533 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Germany, 1549, 1555 and international interventions, 1409 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Russia, 1604 and Turkey, 774 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 1303 North Borneo (Sabah), 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 North Korea, 977, 1757. See also Korea Northern Ireland, 1014–1015, 1058–1068 conflict in, 1470–1471 and counterterrorism, 1496 symbols in, 113 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1492 Norway, 220–222 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 229–230 and gender, 450 independence and, 223–225, 231 and language, 225–226, 472, 477

and music, 1432, 1436–1437 national anthem, 230, 230 national identity and culture of, 226–228 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1617 Notari, Elvira, 1327 Nourrit, Adolphe, 144 Novalis, 92 Nuclear weapons/energy and India, 1210, 1236 and Iran, 1117, 1117 and Pakistan, 1235, 1236 Nunavut, 1562 Núñez, Rafael, 828 Nussbaum, Martha, 97 Nyerere, Julius, 890, 962, 964, 980–981 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 1186, 1188 O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth, 133 Öcalan, Abdullah, 1655 Oceania, and language, 478 O’Connell, Daniel, 658, 920 O’Connor, T. P., 654 O’Donoghue, Lowitja, 1848 O’Dowd, Bernard, 853 Oehlenschläger, Adam, 67–69, 70, 228 O’Faolain, Sean, 925 Oge, Vincent, 335 Ogiński, Michał, 215–216 O’Gorman, Edmundo, 354 O’Higgins, Bernardo, 272, 326 Ohmae, Kenichi, 929 Oil/gas and Algeria, 1095 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Armenia, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1715, 1719–1721 and Canada, 1837 and Egypt, 729 and Iran, 1109, 1111 and Iraq, 755, 756, 1742, 1746 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 Oirat Mongols, 1797–1798 Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 1185, 1185 Okinawa, 1757 Olav II (Norway), 226 O’Leary, Juan, 365 Olympic Games, 991, 994 O’Neill, Onora, 97 Onn, Hussein, 1223 Oommen, T. K., 1393 Opera, 79–80 Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 Oral traditions, and the Sami, 1615. See also Folk culture Orange Free State, 1145 Organicism, 462–464 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1033, 1380, 1706 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 1095, 1742


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Oribe, Manuel, 275, 399 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 667 Ortega y Gasset, José, 704, 705, 707, 707 Orwell, George, 995 O’Shea, Katherine, 651 Oslo Accords, 1137, 1141 Ossian, 237 Otero, Mariano, 354 Otto of Wittelsbach, Prince, 631 Ottoman Empire, 760–767 and Algeria, 1097 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 734 and Armenia, 1704, 1704 and Armenian genocide, 522–523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Bulgaria, 571, 573, 577 collapse of the, 891 and Egypt, 258–259 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 436, 437–438 and Greece, 623–625 and India, 801 and Iraq, 748–749, 1737, 1739, 1742 and language, 472, 482 religion and the, 101–102 and Turkey, 1643, 1645 Ottomanism, 761–763, 764, 766, 768 Overdetermination, 120–121 Ovimbundu, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1664 Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 682, 682, 683, 683 (illus.) Padmore, George, 1179, 1301 Page, Thomas Nelson, 494–495 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 952, 986, 1109, 1111, 1114, 1396–1397 coronation ceremony of, 1114–1115 and minorities, 1113 Pahlavi, Reza, 986, 1110–1111, 1114 Paine, Thomas, 162, 370 Paisii, Father, 571 Paisley, Ian, 1065 Pakistan, 976–977, 1227–1237, 1228 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1689 creation of, 1201–1203, 1461–1462 and India, 950 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1767, 1768–1769, 1771 and religion, 107 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 and terrorism, 1488 and water, 885 Palach, Jan, 1026, 1028 Palacký, František, 96, 587, 594 Palais de Justice, Belgium, 143 (illus.), 144 Palestine, 1132–1143, 1134 (map) and Arab nationalism, 729 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1387

and Israel, 1120–1121 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1492 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 1137, 1140–1142 Palestinians and European partition, 891–893 and Israel, 1125, 1129–1130 Pamuk, Orhan, 1649 Pan-Aboriginalism, 1844–1853 Pan-Africanism, 965, 1161, 1179 Pan-Arabism, 965, 981, 982 and Iraq, 1740–1741, 1743 Pan-ethnic identities, 939 Pan-Germanism, and Austria, 544, 545 Pan-Islamism, 965 and Egypt, 261 and Turkey, 1645 Pan-Mongolian nationalism, 1790, 1792–1793 Pan-nationalist movements, 964–965, 980 Pan-Slavism, 93–94 and Russia, 20 and the Soviet Union, 946 Pan-Turkism, 764–765 Panama, and Colombia, 828, 829, 830 Pancasila, 953, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1731, 1732 Panchayat system, 1803, 1807–1808 Panchen Lama, 1821 Pandita, Zaya, 1791 Pankhurst, Christabel, 453 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 453 Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 300, 306, 1288, 1292 Paraguay, 358–366, 359 (map) and Argentina, 275 Paraguayan War, 296, 359–360, 360, 362, 363 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 472, 1790 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and Hungary, 640 Parizeau, Jacques, 1201, 1297 Park Chung Hee, 1778, 1780 Parkes, Henry, 852 Parlacen, 316 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 649, 649 (illus.), 651, 651, 653–654 Parry, Hubert, 1438 Parry, Joseph, 1438 Parsons, T., 1399 Pashtuns, 1688–1689, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1693 Pasternak, Boris, 1074 Pastoral ideal, 251 Pat, Joe, 1853 Patel, A. D., 1318, 1319 Paterson, “Banjo,” 854 Pátria, and Brazil, 285–287, 288, 295 Patriarca, Silvana, 52 Patriotism and Austria, 553 and China, 1195 and France, 172 Iraq and local, 752


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and Mongolia, 1794 and national symbols, 1347 versus nationalism, 45 and Nigeria, 1186–1187 and political philosophy, 86, 91 and the Soviets, 945 and sports, 997 and the United States, 1308 Päts, Konstantin, 560, 565, 568 Patten, Jack, 1851 Paulin, Tom, 925 Pauw, Corneille de, 351 Paz, Octavio, 345–346 Peace movements, 1447–1448 Peace of Westphalia (1648), 183 Péan, Pierre, 1052 Pearse, Padraic, 449 Pearse, Patrick, 652, 918, 919, 922 Pearson, Karl, 532 Pearson, Lester B., 1838, 1839, 1840 Pearson, Noel, 1848 Peck, Raoul, 1674 Peckinpah, Sam, 1337 Pedro I, Emperor (Brazil), 289, 290, 294, 296 Pedro II, Emperor (Brazil), 290–291, 291 (illus.), 293, 296 Pelletier, Gerard, 1290 Penderecki, Krzysztof, 1434 Peres, Shimon, 1400, 1488–1489 Performance, and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 Perkins, Charles, 1846, 1848, 1851 Perlee, Kh., 1794 Perón, Juan Domingo, 278, 281, 942 Perón, María Eva Duarte de (Evita), 278 Perry, Matthew, 809 Persia, 1106–1107, 1700. See also Iran Peru, 367–379, 369 (map) and Colombia, 830 independence and, 272 and terrorism, 1491 Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 371–372 Pestalozzi, J. H., 34, 36 Pétain, Marshall, 1052 Peter the Great, 8, 20, 105, 696, 700 Peterloo Massacre, 163 Peters, Janis, 1575 Petion, Alexandre Sabes, 337, 340 Pham Van Dong, 963 Philip II (Netherlands), 196 Philippines, 1238–1248, 1240 (map) and gender, 450 and independence, 1462 separatist movements in, 1468 and terrorism, 1495 Philips, Caryl, 927 Phillips, Jock, 869 Philosophy, political, 85–97 and defining national identity, 474–476 and fascism, 514–517 and France, 171–172

and geopolitics, 460–464, 466–467 and Lenin, 1072 and national character, 527–537 and post-World War II France, 1052 postcolonial nationalist, 957–970 and Scotland, 234 See also Cosmopolitanism; Ideology Phuc Anh Gia Long, 1263 Picasso, Pablo, 1519 Pierrot, Jean Louis, 337 Pikul, Valentin, 1077 Piłsudski, Józef, 681, 682, 682, 683, 685, 687 Pinochet, Augusto, 331 Pinochet Le-Brun, Tancredo, 330 Pius IX, Pope, 665 Place names and Afghanistan, 1692 and Basque Country, 1513 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Turkey, 1652 Plato, 529 Platt Amendment, 1277, 1282 Poetry Chilean, 324–326 and Finland, 599 and forming national identities, 31, 32 and Greenland, 1570 and Japan, 491–492 and landscape, 67–69 and language, 78 and Latvia, 1577 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and Nepal, 1808 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 213, 214, 686 and Uruguay, 401 Pogge, Thomas, 97 Pogroms. See Genocide Poland, 207–218, 210 (map), 678–688, 679 (map) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and gender, 53 hostility toward German-speaking minority in, 522 Kingdom of, 209–210 and Lithuania, 558, 561, 562–563, 563 nationalism and literature in, 492–493 partition and, 21–22, 207, 209 and the Soviet Union, 948, 950 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716 uprisings against Russia in, 46 Poland-Lithuania, 207, 209, 212–213 Poles in the Baltic states, 563 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440 and Germany, 617, 1557 Political participation and Finland, 601 and France, 174


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I-46

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Political participation (continued ) and gender, 46, 49–50, 53 and Germany, 620–621 and Japan, 812, 813 and Nigeria, 1188 and Northern Ireland, 1059 See also Voting franchise Political power and Afghanistan, 1685, 1686, 1686–1688 and Angola, 1666 and Armenia, 1710 and the Baltic states, 560 and Chile, 324 and China, 792 collapse of socialism and struggles for, 895–896 and Fiji, 1317 and Finland, 606 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iraq, 756–757, 1739, 1741, 1745. See also Clientelism, Iraq and and Malaysia, 1220–1223 and nationalist movements, 940 and newly independent states, 966, 967–968, 969 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Spain, 707 and the United States, 385 and Uruguay, 399 Political system. See Government(s) Politics and Afghanistan, 1686–1687, 1689–1690 and Algeria, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1101 and Alsace, 1507–1509, 1508, 1509, 1510 and Angola, 1660, 1661, 1665–1666 and Arab nationalism, 728–731 and Argentina, 271, 275, 280–281 and Armenia, 1703, 1704, 1706, 1708, 1709, 1711 and Austria, 544–546, 548–553 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1515, 1516, 1517–1519, 1521–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1535 and Brazil, 1827 and Burma, 777–780, 783–785 and Catalonia, 1539, 1539–1541 and Central America, 316–317 and China, 791–792, 793, 794 and Colombia, 827–828, 832, 833 and communications technology, 1480 and Cuba, 1275–1276, 1277, 1285–1286 and Czechoslovakia, 1017–1019 Danish, 150–151 and Egypt, 260, 261, 265 and England, 161, 162–163 and the environment, 876–877, 882–883 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171, 1172–1175 and Fiji, 1319, 1320–1322 and Finland, 605–606 and France, 178–179, 1054

geopolitics and legitimizing, 465 and Germany, 190–191, 611, 613, 620–621, 1552–1557, 1555, 1557, 1558 and Great Britain, 1011 and Greece, 628–629 and Haiti, 337–338 and Hungary, 638, 639, 641–644, 643 and hypernationalism, 1389 and the ideology of nationalism, 875 and immigration, 1427 and India, 798–802, 987, 1206–1207, 1207, 1208, 1209–1210, 1461–1462, 1763 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726, 1730 and international migration, 1414–1415 and Iran, 1109–1112, 1117 and Iraq, 754, 755, 1745–1746 and Ireland, 649–657 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 667–671, 676–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764–1765, 1768–1771 and Japan, 988, 1751, 1752, 1757 and Korea, 1780 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 and Malaysia, 1216–1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1857, 1858–1860, 1862 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1789 and Nepal, 1810–1811 and the Netherlands, 205–206 and new social movements, 1446, 1453, 1455–1456, 1458 and Nigeria, 1179–1183, 1185 and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1062–1063, 1064–1065, 1066, 1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846–1847, 1848–1849, 1850–1853 and Peru, 372–373 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 213–214, 681–685, 687 post-World War II, 973–976 and Puerto Rico, 837, 839–840, 844–847 and Québec, 1288–1289, 1290–1292 and religion, 982–989, 1064, 1112, 1394, 1395–1396 and Romania, 1586–1587, 1587, 1589 and Russia, 1597, 1597–1599, 1604, 1605 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678–1679 and the Sami, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1616 and Scandinavian nationalism, 228–231 and Scotland, 241–242, 1014 and South Africa, 1147–1149, 1148, 1152–1153 Soviet, 979 and Spain, 702–703, 709–711, 1086 and Switzerland, 250 and Turkey, 1645, 1654 and Ukraine, 718, 1621, 1622–1629, 1623, 1624, 1626, 1629 and the United States, 387–388, 389, 391, 1304, 1306


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and Uruguay, 398–399 and Wales, 1014, 1633, 1633–1635, 1639–1640 See also Government(s); Ideology; Leaders; Political power Pomare, Maui, 869 Ponce de Leon, Ernesto, 1375 Poniatowski, Józef, 211, 686 Poniatowski, Stanisław August, 210, 215 Popławski, Jan Ludwik, 681, 683 Popper, Karl, 534 Population and Algeria, 1096, 1098 and Argentina, 269, 277, 280 and Armenia, 1699 and Australia, 851–852, 1382 and Brazil, 1825, 1831 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 1836 and Central America, 311 and Colombia, 829 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Fiji, 1314 and France, 1054–1055 and Germany, 190 and Gharabagh, 1706 and Haiti, 333, 336 and Indonesia, 1723 and Israel, 1121 and Latvia, 1574 and Mexico, 346 and the Middle East, 885 and Native Americans, 893 and New Granada, 826 and New Zealand, 864, 865, 868 and Nigeria, 967 and Paraguay, 360 and the Philippines, 1247 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Russia, 1604 and the Sami, 1609 and Turkey, 1645 and Uruguay, 402 U.S., 1836 See also Ethnicity; Immigrants/immigration; Migration Population transfers. See Migration Populism, 281, 643 Porter, Jane, 239 Portugal and Angola, 1666 and Brazil, 282, 283–285, 287–289, 293 and colonialism, 889, 1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 and geopolitics, 465 and immigration, 1424 and language, 472 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397

Post-nationalism and Germany, 1555 and globalization, 1406, 1408–1410, 1411 See also Multilateralism; Transnationalism Poster, Mark, 1476 Potatau Te Wherowhero, 1856 Potocki, Ignacy, 211 Poujade, Pierre, 1054 Poverty and Brazil, 1831 and Fiji, 1322 and Pakistan, 1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 and the United States, 1308 See also Income distribution Powell, Adam Clayton, 962 Powell, Enoch, 1013 Power. See Political power Pozharsky, Dmitry, 700, 1602 Prague, 584–585 Prague Spring, 1025, 1026 Prat de la Riba, Enric, 706 Prejudice. See Discrimination/prejudice Premchad, 923 Press. See Media Pretorius, Marthinus, 1146 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 516, 705, 706, 709 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 516 Primrose, Archibald Philip, 242 Print technology, 127, 129 and Armenia, 1701 and diaspora populations, 1370 and India, 796 and Japan, 1749 and language, 479, 485 and national identity, 1474, 1475 See also Newspapers Prithvi Narayan Shah, 1803, 1803–1804, 1804, 1806 Pro-natalist policies, 878 Propaganda and Angola, 1665-1666 the arts and, 83, 176 and Australia, 1852-1853 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306 and China, 952, 1193, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 1020, 1025 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and ethnic cleansing, 441 and Germany, 186 and Greenland, 1571 and Indonesia, 1727, 1734 and Iran, 1115, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 758 and Italy, 667, 674 and Korea, 1781 and the Jacobins, 31 and Japan, 817, 818


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Propaganda (continued ) and Nazis, 133, 455 (illus.), 456, 614, 621, 1332 and Nigeria, 1181 and the Philippines, 1246 and Puerto Rico, 846 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and the Soviet Union, 508, 694, 696, 696 (illus.), 697, 699-701, 1074, 1708 and Switzerland, 255 and terrorism, 1490 and Yugoslavia, 896 Protectionism, 25, 316 and Amazonia, 1827–1828, 1831 and Argentina, 271 and Canada, 1837, 1839, 1842 and film, 1331–1332 and natural resources, 886 and new social movements, 1448 and Peru, 368 Protestantism and Czechoslovakia, 1023–1024 Dutch, 199, 200, 200–202 and fundamentalism, 1393, 1398 and Germany, 188–189 and politics, 982–983 Proust, Marcel, 489 Provençal, 471, 477 Prussia, 611, 617 and Denmark, 150 and education, 34 and German unification, 186, 191, 192 national anthem of, 117 and Poland, 210 resistance to Napoleon and women, 52 Puerto Rico, 836–847 colonialism and, 425 literacy rates in, 495 and terrorism, 1491 Pueyrredón, Juan Martín de, 273 Pujol, Jordi, 1539, 1539, 1541, 1542 Pumpurs, Andr¯ejs, 564 Punjabi Muslims, 1231, 1236, 1764–1765 Purcell, Henry, 117 Pushkin, Aleksandr, 78, 213, 694, 1437 Putin, Vladimir, 1080, 1597, 1601, 1602, 1604, 1605 Qanuni, Yunus, 1695 Qarase, Laisenia, 1324–1325 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 754, 754, 1742, 1746 Québec, 478, 1287–1297 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and separatism, 306, 307, 1470, 1471, 1836–1837, 1843 and terrorism, 1490–1491 Québec City, 299 Quezon, Manuel, 1241 Quinet, Edgar, 177 Rabin, Yitzhak, 1141, 1400–1401, 1488–1489 Rabuka, Sitiveni, 1321, 1321, 1323, 1323

Race and Afghanistan, 1688–1689 and Alsace, 1504 and Arab nationalism, 732 and Argentina, 277 and Australia, 850, 851 and the Bandung Conference, 961 and Basques, 710 and Brazil, 290, 293, 297, 1826 and Central America, 314 and Colombia, 826 and colonialism, 958 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1281 and Darwinism, 480 and Fiji, 1317, 1319, 1321, 1323, 1325 and France, 179 and gender, 47–48, 54–55, 447–448 and Haiti, 333–336, 337–339, 341 and India, 131 and Italy, 672 and Malaysia, 1222 and Mexico, 349 and Mongolia, 1792 and nationalist ideologies, 415–417, 513, 517 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 866–867, 869 and Peru, 373–375 and Puerto Rico, 837–839, 843–844 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and South Africa, 1151–1153 and the United States, 391–392, 894, 1300–1303, 1307 and Völkisch nationalism, 614, 614, 622 See also Ethnicity; Minorities Racism and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1510 and anticolonialism, 958 and Colombia, 829 education and, 429–430 and Egypt, 263 and film, 1328 and France, 1056, 1097 and gender, 447, 452–453 and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557 and Great Britain, 1013 and Hungary, 645 and immigration, 1424–1426 and imperative nationalism, 502, 510 and India, 798 and nationalism, 533–534 and Nazism, 426, 517–518 and new social movements, 1448 and Nigeria, 1179 and perversions of nationalism, 518–521 and Puerto Rico, 837 and the United States, 1310, 1339–1340 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnic cleansing; Genocide


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Radio and Canada, 1839 and Colombia, 833 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and Indonesia, 1727 in Indonesia, 1479 in nationalism, 132–133, 1474, 1475 and promoting nationalistic art, 418 and Puerto Rico, 846 Rahman, Abdul, 1218–1219, 1222 Rahman, Abdur, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1691, 1692 Rahman, Mujibur, 1466 Railroads and Argentina, 279–280 and Canada, 302, 1837 and Central America, 315 and Ethiopia, 740 and Germany, 192 in India, 131, 796 and Mexico, 355 and New Zealand, 865 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Rainis, J¯anis, 560, 564 Rakovski, Georgi, 573 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 164 Rangihau, John, 1860 Rao, Raja, 914, 921, 922 Rapp, Jean, 1504 Ras Tafari Mekonnen, 740 Rasputin, Valentin, 1077 Ratzel, Friedrich, 460, 461, 463, 488–489 Ravel, Maurice, 1437 Rawls, J., 97 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, 351 Razak, Tun Abdul, 1222, 1223 Reagan, Ronald, 945, 946, 1039, 1244, 1310–1311, 1395, 1453 Rebet, Lev, 1624 Reddy, Jai Ram, 1323 Redmond, John, 651 Reeves, Sir Paul, 1322 Reformation, 618, 1502 Refugees and Europe, 1044 and the Gharbagh conflict, 1716, 1719 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Korea, 1781 and Pakistan-Indian violence, 1234 Palestinian, 1135, 1140 Sahrawi in Algeria, 1096–1097 and Taiwan, 1257 and Tibet, 1813, 1821–1822 See also Asylum; Immigrants/immigration Regionalism, 407 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 271 and Australia, 852 and Austrian provincialism, 551–552

and Basques, 1518–1519 and Canada, 306–307, 1837, 1843 and Central America, 311–313 and Chile, 324 and Colombia, 828–829, 834 education and, 432 and the European Union, 1043, 1044 and Finland, 608 and France, 1056 and Germany, 611 and globalization, 1413, 1415 and India, 1205 and Italy, 665, 672–673 and language movements, 482 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1808, 1811 and Nigeria, 1181–1183, 1185 and Romania, 1591 and Scandinavia, 225 and Spain, 1083, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 245 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 1623 and Vietnam, 1263 See also Separatism/secession Reich, Robert, 1407–1408 Reichsland, 1505 Rej, Mikołaj, 214 Religion, 971–989 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1692, 1693–1694 and Algeria, 1095, 1102–1103 and Arab nationalism, 725, 731–732, 733 and Armenia, 1700, 1701 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Basques, 710 and Belgium, 140, 142 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1525–1526, 1528–1530 and Brazil, 289, 1825–1826 and Bulgaria, 573, 580 and Burma, 781 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1280–1281 and Czechoslovakia, 1020 and discrimination against immigrants, 1423–1424 education and, 424, 428 and Egypt, 265 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 736, 741, 742, 746 and Europe, 1031–1032 and Fiji, 1314, 1315 and France, 176 and gender, 902 and Germany, 188–189, 618 and Greece, 627 and Haiti, 339–340 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1203, 1461–1462 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728


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Religion (continued ) and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 657–658, 1470–1471 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1768 and Japan, 813–814 and Malaysia, 1217, 1223 and Mexico, 346, 347, 347–350, 356 and Mongolia, 1785, 1786, 1788, 1790, 1792 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 99–109, 519–520 and Nepal, 1806 and the Netherlands, 196, 197, 199–202, 200, 202 (illus.), 205, 206 and Nigeria, 967 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233, 1236, 1461–1462 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1243 and Poland, 216, 686 and Québec, 1293 ritualism and nationalism as substitutes for, 500–501 and Russia, 1603, 1605 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 245, 250 and terrorism, 1487, 1494–1495, 1498 and Tibet, 1816–1817 and Turkey, 769–770, 1653–1654 and Ukraine, 720 and Uruguay, 403 and Vietnam, 1270 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 See also specific religions Religious fundamentalism, 1392–1404 and the United States, 1306 Rembrandt, 203 Renan, Ernest, 95–96, 415, 475–476, 477, 501, 528–529, 1504 Renner, Karl, 542, 542 Repression and Afghanistan, 1685, 1694 and Australia, 1845–1846 and Congo/Zaïre, 1165 and counterterrorism, 1496–1498 and Eritrea, 1172 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Korea, 1773, 1775 and Latvia, 1576, 1578, 1581 and the legacies of colonialism, 893–894 and Mongolia, 1784, 1794 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Russia, 690–692 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675, 1680 and the Sami, 1615

and the Soviet Union, 1074–1075, 1075 and Spain, 708, 709, 1089, 1092 and Tibet, 1820 and Turkey, 769 and Ukraine, 722 and the United States, 1310 and women, 904 Republic of the United Provinces, 196 Republicanism, French, 409 Resettlement, forced. See Ethnic cleansing Resnick, Philip, 1842 Retief, Piet, 1150 Reventós, Joan, 1539 Revueltas, Silvestre, 76 Reyntjens, Filip, 1675 Rezanov, Nikolai, 810 Rhee Syngman, 1780 Rhodes, Cecil John, 1151 Ricasoli, Bettino, 669 Richard, Maurice “Rocket,” 1842 Richard the Lionheart, King (England), 165 Riche, Jean Baptiste, 337 Richler, Mordecai, 1296 Riefenstahl, Leni, 1332 Riegl, Alois, 415 Riel, Louis, 301, 305, 1289 Rights, 14, 129, 444 Argentina and political, 272 and Armenia, 1703, 1708 and Australia, 852, 855 Brazil and political, 290 Central America and political, 316 Colombia and human, 834 demands for, 499–500 and diaspora populations, 1371 England and political, 161, 164 and the European Union, 1041 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1325 and forms of nationalism, 1352–1354 France and, 34, 173–174, 176, 179 free speech and the United States, 387–388 Greenland and civil, 1570 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 812 and the Maori, 1858 minority verus majority, 932–933 and Nepal, 1809 the Netherlands and political, 199 and New Zealand, 873 and Nigeria, 1183 Rwanda and Burundi and human, 1675, 1679, 1680–1681 and the Sami, 1612 Switzerland and political, 249, 252–253 and Turkey, 1648, 1650 Ukraine and human, 1626 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Liberalism; Minorities Riguad, Andre, 335 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 82, 417, 1437


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Rinchen, B., 1794 Rinchino, Elbek-Dorzhi, 1793 Risorgimento, 663–665, 669, 672, 673 culture and identity and the, 671, 673–674 Rituals of belonging, 499–511. See also Ceremonies; Symbols Riva Aguero y Osma, José de la, 373, 374–375 Riva Palacio, Vicente, 355 Rivadavia, Bernardino, 272, 273 Rivera, Fructuoso, 399 Rivera Maestre, Miguel, 320 Riviere-Herard, Charles, 337 Rizal, Jose, 1245 Robert I, the Bruce, 233 Roberto, Holden, 1662, 1662 Roberts, Hugh, 1101 Roberts, Tom, 859 Robertson, Roland, 1393, 1399 Robertson, William, 234, 351 Robespierre, 175, 1489 Robinson, Mary, 1375–1376 Robles, Mariano, 317 Roca, Julio A., 280 Rodgers, Richard, 1433 Rodrigo, Joaquín, 1437 Rodrigues, José Honório, 292 Roma. See Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies) Roman, Petre, 1587 Roman Catholicism and Alsace, 1507–1508, 1508 and Belgium, 140 and Brazil, 1825–1826 and Central America, 317 and Colombia, 827, 828, 829, 832, 833 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1023–1024 and France, 179 and Germany, 189, 192, 193, 618 and Haiti, 339–340 and Ireland, 654, 661 and Mexico, 346, 347–350 and the Netherlands, 199, 200, 200–202, 202 (illus.), 204, 205 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 686 and politics, 982–983, 987–988 and Québec, 1292 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Spain, 703, 705, 707 and Uruguay, 399 Romania, 1584–1594, 1586 (map) anti-Semitism in, 521 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Romantic nationalism, 31, 406, 463, 474–475, 476 German, 10, 92 Romanticism, 527, 882, 1352–1353 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 950, 1276, 1277 Roosevelt, Theodore, 448

Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 273–275, 274 (illus.), 276, 277–278 Rosenau, James, 1368 Rosenberg, Alfred, 416, 417 Rosewall, Ken, 857 Rossé, Joseph, 1509 Rossellini, Roberto, 1333–1334 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 15, 22, 30–31, 86–87, 171, 501 and the collective will, 1054 and organicism, 462 and sovereignty of the people, 530 and Switzerland, 251 and the Terror, 174 Rozent¯als, J¯anis, 565 Rubin, Marcus, 227 Rubinstein, Anton, 82 Rubriks, Alfr¯eds, 1582 Rudbeck, Olof, 223 Runeberg, Johan Ludvig, 228, 601, 605 Rusesabagina, Paul, 1674 Rushdie, Salman, 913, 920, 921, 927 Russell, Bertrand, 1676 Russia, 689–701, 691 (map), 1596–1607, 1598 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714–1715 and the Baltic states, 562, 567–568 and the Bolshevik Revolution, 436 and Bulgaria, 575 and Denmark, 150 education and, 423 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438 and Eurasianism, 466 and Finland, 598, 605 and Greek independence, 631 and Hungary, 638 and indigenous groups, 1566 intelligentsia and nationalism in, 8 and Iran, 1110 and Japan, 815 and language, 472 and Latvia, 1576, 1582 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790–1791, 1791–1792, 1796 and music, 82, 1432, 1433, 1437, 1441 national symbols, 134–135 and new social movements, 1449 and Orthodoxy, 105–106, 983 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and Poland, 209–210, 679 and political philosophy, 93–94 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1594 and Russian nationalism, 1079–1080 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 and Scandinavia, 220 Slavophilism versus Westernizers in, 19–21 and terrorism, 1489, 1495


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Russia (continued ) and Tibet, 1818 and Ukraine, 714, 1621 See also Soviet Union Russian nationalism, 1074, 1076–1078 Russians in Latvia, 1575, 1582 in Ukraine, 1627–1628 Russification, 946, 955 and Finland, 605 versus Germanization in the Baltic states, 561–562 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), 810, 816, 820 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), 574, 763, 764 Rustaveli, Shota, 694 Rustow, Dankwart, 929 Ruthene-Americans, 589 Ruyter, Michiel de, 203 Rwagasore, Prince (Burundi), 1670 Rwanda and Burundi, 1668–1681, 1670 (map) genocide in, 968–969 Ryan, Claude, 1296 Ryckman, Pierre, 1157 Ryklin, Mikhail, 135 Ryukyu Island, 1754 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 1080 Saba, Isak, 1614 Sadat, Anwar, 266 (illus.), 985, 1398 Sadiq, G. M., 1763 Šafàrík, Pavol Jozef, 592 Safavid Dynasty, 1107–1109 Saget, Nissage, 338 Sahak, Catholicos, 1701 Said, Edward, 915, 924 Saigo Takamori, 820 Saint-Domingue. See Haiti Saint Paul’s Cathedral, 410 Sakharov, Andre, 951 Salanga, Alfredo Navarro, 1245 Salazar, Antonio, 516 Sale, Kirkpatrick, 879 Salisbury, Lord, 460 Salnave, Sylvain, 338 Salomon, Louis Lysius Felicite, 338 Salvarrieta, Policarpa, 831 Samarin, Iu. F., 692 Sami, 225, 231, 1608–1618, 1610 (map) Samper, José María, 829 Sampson, Deborah, 50 San Martín, José de, 271, 272, 277 and Peru, 370, 371 San Stefano Peace Treaty, 575 Sánchez, Miguel, 347, 349 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 354 Santa Cruz, Andrés de, 372 Santander, Francisco de Paula, 826, 827, 831, 831 (illus.) Santo Domingo, 332–333

Santos, José Eduardo dos, 1662 São Tomé e Príncipe, 1667 Sarawak, 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 Sardà, Joan, 706 Sarmatian ideology, 213–214 Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino, 276, 277, 278, 279 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1052 Saryan, Martiros, 1707 Saudi Arabia, 984, 1492 Saussure, F. de, 482 Savage, Michael Joseph, 871 Savimbi, Jonas, 1659, 1662, 1662–1663 Savoy, 175 Sayad, Abdelmalek, 1370, 1419 Sayeed, Mufti, 1769, 1770–1771 Scandinavia, 219–231, 221 (map) languages of, 471–472 Schaepman, Herman, 205 Schefferus, Johannes, 1615 Schelling, Friedrich, 67 Schieder, Theodor, 501–502 Schiller, Friedrich, 188, 251 Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 7, 415 Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, 67, 92, 415, 1110 Schleswig, 147, 149, 152, 155–156 Schmid, Alex, 1484 Schoenberg, Arnold, 1434 Schoenfeld, Eugen, 1393 Schöning, Gerhard, 227 Schumacher, John, 1245 Schuman, Robert, 190, 1034, 1509 Scotland, 166, 232–242, 1413, 1415 and communication, 1639 and devolution, 1014 and music, 1442 Scott, James, 903 Scott, Robert, 1434 Scott, Sir Walter, 238 Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 241–242, 242 Sculpture. See Monuments Sculthorpe, Peter, 1439 Second Schleswigian War, 150, 152, 153 Secularism and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Azerbaijan, 1713 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527 and France, 175, 409 and globalization, 1401–1402 and India, 1765 and Iraq, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1761, 1769 legitimacy and, 973 and Mongolia, 1796 and the Netherlands, 206 and Pakistan, 1233 and Palestinians, 1139, 1141–1142 and Québec, 1292, 1294 and religious fundamentalism, 1403


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role of symbols in, 115 and Turkey, 769, 1647, 1651–1652, 1653–1654 and Uruguay, 403 Seddon, Richard John, 868, 870 Sedition Act (U.S.), 387–388 Segregation and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1064 and South Africa, 1151–1152 Séguin, Maurice, 1294 Seipel, Ignaz, 551 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 1662 Self-determination and Austria, 544–545 and the Baltic states, 558 ethnic conflict and denial of, 888 and ethnicity, 464 and Fiji, 1317 and forms of nationalism, 1354–1355 and Israel, 1402 and Mongolia, 1790 and the Napoleonic wars, 474 and nationalistic philosophy, 476, 524 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1845 in political philosophy, 536–537, 965–966, 969 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 as a precondition of rights, 972 See also Independence; Sovereignty Self-government. See Autonomy Selim III (Egypt), 258 Sella, Quintino, 669 Senegal, 963 Senghor, Léopold, 488, 919, 963, 980–981 Separatism/secession, 1460–1472 and Angola, 1660 and Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and Burma, 780–781 and Catalonia, 1540–1541 during the Cold War, 949 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and cultural distinctiveness, 461 and gender and sexuality issues, 899 and Georgia, 897 and global governance, 459 increases in, 929 and India, 800, 804, 806 in Iran, 1112 and Ireland, 649–657 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764, 1766, 1769 and Latvia, 1581–1582 linguistic, 477 and Malaysia, 1222 and minorities, 933, 1359 and Mongolia, 1784, 1798 and New Zealand, 866 and newly independent states, 966–967 and Nigeria, 1185 in the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 844

in Russia, 1600 and Swedish speakers in Finland, 606 and Taiwan, 1259 and terrorism, 1487, 1490–1492, 1494–1495, 1494 (table) in Turkey, 1655 and Ukraine, 716, 1625 See also Civil war; Independence Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 119, 955, 1399, 1410, 1457, 1488, 1492, 1493 (illus.), 1496 casualties, 1495 Serbia, 437, 481, 1413 Serbs in Bosnia, 1527–1535 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440, 524 Sergeev-Tsenskii, S., 697 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 1368 Setus, 557 Sevak, Paruir, 1707 Sexuality, 446, 899–910 Sha, Mirwaiz Yusuf, 1764 Sha’arawi, Huda, 450 Shagari, Shehu, 1187 Shah, G. M., 1768 Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman, 732, 733 Shakespeare, William, 474, 915–917 Sharif, Nawaz, 1232 Shatterbelts, 942 Shays, Daniel, 386 Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 1626 Sheng Bright, 1440 Shepstone, Theophilus, 1145–1146 Sheptyts’kyi, Andrei, 718 Sheridan, Jim, 927 Sheridan, Richard, 915 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 1080 Shevchenko Society, 718, 719 Shiism/Shiites differences from Sunnis, 983–984, 986 and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112, 1115–1116 and Iraq, 748, 752–753, 755, 755, 757, 1745, 1747 and Pakistan, 1236 Shinto, 106–107, 108 Shostakovich, Dmitri, 1074, 1432, 1433 Shums’kyi, Oleksander, 718 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 1597 Sibelius, Jean, 79, 228, 417, 600, 605, 1436 Sidgwick, Henry, 527, 531 Sidqi, Bakr, 752 Siebenpfeiffer, Philipp Jakob, 190 Siemiradzki, Henryk, 682 Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 493, 682, 683, 685 Sierra, Justo, 355 Sieyès, Abbé, 172 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 350 Sikhs, 1466 Sikorski, Władysław, 683 Silesia, 584


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Sillars, Jim, 997 Silva, Lula da, 1829, 1830, 1831 Simeon I the Great, 574 Simms, William Gilmore, 389 Simon, Claude, 1052 Simpson, L. P., 494 Sin, Cardinal Jaime, 1246 Sinai peninsula, 262 Sinclair, Keith, 870, 872 Sindici, Orestes, 828 Singapore, 1218–1219, 1220–1221, 1221, 1224–1225 and education, 1384–1385, 1386 and Indonesia, 1733 Singh, Gulab, 1763 Singh, Hari, 1465, 1764 Singh, Manmohan, 1207 Singh, V. P., 1769 Sinhalese, 1466–1467 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), 810, 820, 1774 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 795, 810, 817, 822 Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies), 440, 517, 521, 523, 1022, 1027 Skalagrímsson, Egil, 226 Skoropad’kyi, Pavlo, 716 Skötkonung, Olof, 226 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 718 Slanský, Rudolf, 1020 Slave rebellions, Haitian, 335–336, 340 Slavery, 1301 and Brazil, 283, 289, 292, 293 and colonialism, 889, 890, 893 and Cuba, 1275 and the development of nationalism, 47 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 262 and France, 174 and Haiti, 333, 334–336 and Mexico, 345 paternalistic justifications of, 54 and Peru, 371 and the United States, 383, 385, 388, 390–391 and Uruguay, 401 Slavophilism, 20, 213, 692 and religion, 105, 108 Slesvig, 220, 222, 225 Slovakia, 584, 1017, 1021–1022, 1026–1028 and separatism, 590, 594 See also Czechoslovakia Slovenia, 1450 Słowacki, Juliusz, 212, 214 Smart, Mary Ann, 671 Smetana, Bedˇrich, 74, 74 (illus.), 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 417, 593, 594, 1435–1436 Smetona, Antanas, 560, 565, 568 Smiles, Samuel, 531 Smith, Adam, 19, 234, 855 Smith, Anthony D., 113–114, 400, 473, 929, 931, 1368–1369

Smith, Dennis Mack, 674 Smith, Zadie, 927–928 Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 1151 Smyrna, 633 Snellman, Johan Vilhelm, 601 Social Darwinism, 437, 439, 518, 532–533 and gender, 447, 452–453 and language, 480–481 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Social Democrats, 149, 975–976 Social mobility and ethnic minorities, 931 and nationalism, 5–6, 11 and technology, 1475 and the United States, 1305 See also Class Social movements and Finland, 600–601 new, 1446–1458 and the United States, 1303–1304, 1305 Social policy education reform as, 421–422, 428–429 and gender, 448–449 and women’s rights, 446–447 Social structure and Eritrea, 1170–1171 and France, 1050 and India, 1204–1205 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1676, 1680 See also Class Socialism and Alsace, 1508 and Arab nationalism, 732, 733 and Canada, 1839 and China, 789 versus communism, 975–976 and developing countries, 980, 981 disillusionment and discredit of, 936 and Egypt, 266 and France, 179, 1054 and gender, 453, 456 and Great Britain, 1011 and Iraq, 754 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and the Netherlands, 205 and Poland, 212 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Communism; Marxism Socialization and Finland, 600, 607–608 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 See also Assimilation Sokol, 594 Solanas, Fernando, 1335 Solano, Armando, 830 Solano López, Francisco, 362, 363, 363 (illus.), 364 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, 951, 1077, 1601 Somalia, 949


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Somaliland, 459 Sonam Gyatso, 1817 Songtsen Gampo, King (Tibet), 1815, 1816, 1821 Sonnenstern, Maximilian von, 320 Sontsen Gyatso, 1816 Sorel, Georges, 514 Soulouque, Faustin-Elie, 337 Sousa, John Philip, 1441 South Africa, 1144–1153, 1146 (map) and Angola, 1664, 1665 and apartheid, 890 and education, 1386 and language, 478 and music, 1440, 1441 and the Netherlands, 198 and sports, 995 and terrorism, 1491 South America and language, 478 national identity and education in, 35, 37, 39 See also specific South American countries South Korea and Japan, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 See also Korea South Tyrol, 1490 South-West Africa, 437 Southeast Asia, 778 (map), 1214 (map), 1262 (map), 1724 (map) Southern Mindanao, 1468 Sovereignty and Australia, 855 and Brazil, 1830–1831 and the environment, 886 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1718, 1719 versus globalization, 1406, 1408 and Greenland, 1571 and Japan, 814–815 and the Maori, 1856 nationalism and popular, 5, 15 and Nepal, 1805 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 and Québec, 1291–1292 See also Independence; Self-determination Soviet Union, 699 (map), 714 (map), 1070–1080, 1072 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Angola, 1663 and Armenia, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709–1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714, 1716–1717, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 563 breakup of the, 888, 895–897, 972, 1413, 1596 and China, 1197 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Cuba, 1276 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 education and, 419, 426, 430 and the environment, 881–882 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440–441

and film, 1330, 1332 and gender, 449, 450, 454 and geopolitics, 459 and Japan, 822, 1754 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780 and language, 482 and Latvia, 1575, 1576, 1578, 1581–1582 and Mongolia, 1785, 1789, 1794–1795, 1795–1796 and national identity, 693–701, 880 nationalistic art of the, 411 nationalities policy, 468–469, 946, 1599 and new social movements, 1449 and Poland, 681 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1588, 1591 and Siberia, 876 and sports, 993 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716, 719, 722 See also Russia Soyinka, Wole, 925 Spain, 702–711, 703 (map), 1082–1092, 1085 (map), 1540 (map) and Argentina, 269 and authoritarianism, 973 and Basques, 1514, 1517, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Catalonia, 1536–1537, 1544–1547 and Central America, 311–313, 314, 317–318 and Chile, 323–327 and Colombia, 825 and colonialism, 889 education and, 36, 432 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 interventions in Haiti by, 335 and Mexico, 345–346, 350, 353 and minorities, 1412 and music, 1437 and the Philippines, 1239, 1243 resistance to Napoleon, 51–52 and Santo Domingo, 332–333. 339 separatist movements in, 1471 and sports, 997, 999 symbols in, 49 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397 Spanish-American War, 1086 Speight, George, 1323–1324 Spencer, Herbert, 532–533 Spengler, Oswald, 70 Spenser, Edmund, 915 Spinoza, Baruch, 203 Spivak, Gayatri, 926 Sports, 991–1003 and Australia, 852, 857 and Canada, 1841, 1842 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and England, 165


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Sports (continued ) and Ireland, 657 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 870 and Peru, 378 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 soccer and Brazil, 295 and Turkey, 1651 and Wales, 1637 and war, 901 Sri Lanka, 1466–1467 and terrorism, 1484, 1491, 1492 St. Erik (Sweden), 226 St. Gregory, 1700 St. Laurent, Louis, 1838 Stalin, Joseph (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), 945, 1075, 1603, 1603 (illus.) and China, 978 and the Cold War, 977–978 cult of personality, 952 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 440 and gender, 449 and nationalism, 1071, 1076 nationalities policy of, 469 and Russianness, 693, 694, 697, 700–701 and Yugoslavia, 948 Stambolov, Stefan, 578 Stanford, Charles Villiers, 1438 Stanley, Henry Morton, 1156, 1160 “Star-Spangled Banner,” 117, 118 (illus.) Starˇcević, Ante, 96 Statue of Liberty, 119 Steele, James, 1843 Štefánik, Milan Rastislav, 587, 588, 1017 Stefano, Alfredo Di, 1002 Steffens, Henrik, 66–68, 69–70 Stein, Freiherr von, 34 Stephen the Great (Moldavia), 1592 Sternberger, Dolf, 1556 Stetsko, Slava, 1624 Stoilov, Konstantin, 578 Strasbourg, France, 1510 Stratification. See Class Streeton, Arthur, 859 Strindberg, August, 228 Stuart, Charles Edward (“Bonnie Prince Charlie”), 237–238, 238 Stubbs, Paul, 1450 Štúr, L’udovit, 96, 592 Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 589 Subsidiarity, 881, 1042, 1045 Sudan, 263, 1468–1469 Sudeten-Germans, 595 Sudetenland, 595, 1017–1019, 1025 Suez Canal, 259, 265–266 Suez Canal crisis, 1012 Suffrage, women’s, 446 and Australia, 853 and Germany, 620 and nationalist movements, 450

and New Zealand, 870–871 and transnational movements, 452–453 and Turkey, 770 See also Voting franchise; Women’s rights Suharto, President (Indonesia), 954, 1723, 1725, 1726, 1728, 1730–1731, 1733 Suhm, P. F., 227 Sukarno, Ahmad, 953–954, 964, 1463, 1725, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1734 and the Bandung Conference, 960–961, 962 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 1734 Sükhebaatur, General (Mongolia), 1789, 1797, 1798 Sukuna, Ratu Sir Lala, 1318 Sullivan, A. M., 658–659 Sultan, Ibrahim, 1171 Sun Yat-sen, 789, 789 (illus.), 790, 791, 794 Sunnis differences from Shiites, 983–984 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 748, 751, 754, 755, 755, 757 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1764 Suriname, 197 Suvorov, Aleksandr, 696, 1074 Švec, Otakar, 1024 Svecoman movement, 599 Sweden, 220–222 communication in, 1473 and Finland, 598 and language, 472 national anthem and holidays, 230 national identity and, 223, 226–228 and Norway, 224–225 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 Swildens, J. H., 198 Swiss army, 253 Swiss Confederation, 245, 247–248 Switzerland, 244–255, 248 (map) education and, 429 flag of, 114 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 national identity and education in, 35 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 Symbols, 111–124, 1342–1348 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Armenia, 1702 and Australia, 856, 860 and the Baltic states, 565 and Basques, 1519–1521 and Belgium, 144, 145 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Brazil, 285, 286 (illus.), 294–295 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 305 and Catalonia, 1543–1544 and Central America, 318–319, 320–321 and Chile, 327–328, 328 and Colombia, 825, 831 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 and Cuba, 1283–1284


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and England, 163 and Ethiopia, 744 and the European Union, 1042 and Finland, 600, 602, 604 and France, 175 gender and familial, 43–45, 46, 48–50, 54, 445–446, 449, 904–905, 907 and Germany, 618, 619 and Greenland, 1568–1569, 1570 and Hungary, 641–644 and Indonesia, 1732–1733 and Iran, 1114–1115 and Iraq, 757 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 1752, 1757 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 in literature, 917, 926, 927 and Mongolia, 1786, 1793–1794, 1797 and national identity, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 465 and national self-invention, 900 and Nepal, 1803 and the Netherlands, 204, 204 and Nigeria, 1184 and Northern Ireland, 1066–1067 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847, 1850 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 215, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844, 846 and Québec, 1297 religious, 99, 102, 115–116 and rituals, 500. See also Rituals of belonging and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and Scandinavia, 229–230 and Singapore, 1225 and South Africa, 1150 and Spain, 709 and Taiwan, 1258 technologies as national, 128, 134–135 and Tibet, 1818 transnational, 115 and Turkey, 766, 770, 774, 1646–1647 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 1308 and Wales, 878, 1633, 1637–1638 Syncretism and Mexico, 347–350, 349 and Paraguay, 358 Synge, John Millington, 918, 920–921, 922 Syngman, Rhee, 1773 Syria and Battle of Maysalun, 728 and Egypt, 982 as French Mandate, 728 water, 884–885 Syrian Arab Kingdom, 727–728 Szálasi, Ferenc, 516, 638 Széchenyi, Count István, 637, 643

Tacitus, 64, 617 Tagore, Rabindranath, 918 Taine, Hippolyte, 415 Taiping Rebellion, 101, 108 Taiwan, 1249–1260, 1250 (map) and film, 1337–1338 and independence, 1462, 1468 and Japan, 810, 818, 1749 Tajiks, 1692–1693, 1694–1695 Takemitsu, T¯oru, 1439–1440 Taliban, 986–987 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1691, 1692, 1693–1694 and Pakistan, 1232, 1233 Tamils, 1385, 1466–1467, 1492 Tamir, Yael, 97 Tammsaare, Anton Hansen, 565 Tan Dun, 1440 Tanzania, 962 Tarai, 1801–1802, 1804, 1808, 1811 Taraki, Mohammad, 1687 Tardivel, Jules-Paul, 1290 Tarnowski, Count Stanislaw, 493 Tartars, 1621 Tatars, 441, 469 Tawfiq, King (Egypt), 260, 261 Taylor, Charles Wood, 328, 989 Taylor, T. Griffith, 851–852 Tchaikovsky, Piotr, 82, 1432, 1437 Technology, 126–136, 1473–1483 Cold war and weapon, 944 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1370, 1376 as enabling ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and the Holocaust, 524 and ideologies, 972 image, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1428 and Iraq, 1738 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and promoting nationalistic art, 417–418 See also Internet Tegnér, Esias, 228 Telegraphy, 127–128 and Central America, 315 and Germany, 192 and Mexico, 355 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Television and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Angola, 1666 and Canada, 1838 and Catalonia, 1546 education and, 422, 433 versus film, 1336, 1339


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Television (continued ) and India, 1209 and language in Italy, 671 and Québec, 1296 and Wales, 1635, 1639 Tenzin Gyatso. See Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso) Terre’Blanche, Eugène, 1148 Territory and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532, 1532 and Israel, 1125 See also Borders; Expansionism Terror, French (1793–1974), 174–175 Terrorism, 1484–1498 and Armenia, 1707 and the Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and hypernationalism, 1389, 1410–1411 and India, 801 and Indonesia, 1728, 1729 and Italy, 676 and Japan, 821 and Pakistan, 1232 and religious fundamentalism, 986–987, 1400 and Russia, 955, 1607 and the 1970s, 1939 and Turkey, 1651, 1655 in the United States, 955 and Wales, 1637 See also Conflict/violence Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), 1493 Thailand, separatism in, 938, 1468 Thakin Soe, 780 Than Tun, 780 Thatcher, Margaret, 1013, 1040, 1453 The Birth of a Nation, 1328, 1329 (illus.) Theater and the Baltic states, 559–560 and France, 176–177 and Ireland, 918 and Québec, 1294 See also Cinema Theweleit, Klaus, 904 Thibaw, King (Burma), 782 Thiers, Adolphe, 177 Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), 115, 183, 188, 592 Thomas, Harold, 1850 Thomas, W. I., 1403 Thompson, Tom, 1841 Thomson, James, 32, 1438 Thorarensen, Bjarni, 228 Thorbecke, Johan, 198, 201 Thrace, 580, 582 Thubden Gyatso, 1818, 1820 Thyra, Queen (Denmark), 153 Tibet, 988, 1468, 1813–1823, 1815 (map) Tidemand, Adolph, 228 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 800 Tiso, Jozef, 1019 Tito, Josip Broz, 948, 978, 982, 1530 Tokugawa Nariaki, 814, 815

Tokugawa Narinobu, 814 Tokutomi Soho, 813 Tolstoi, A. N., 697 Tone, John, 51 Topelius, Zacharias, 228, 604, 605 Toronto, Canada, 1837 Totalitarianism education and, 429–430 and Europe, 419 and gender, 454–456 and imperative forms of nationalism, 501, 502, 510 Touraine, Alain, 1446, 1456 Tourism, 1028 and Cuba, 1285 and Iran, 1115 and Tibet, 1823 Tours, Georges Moreau de, 409 Toussaint-Louverture, 332, 335–336, 335 (illus.), 340, 341, 342 Toynbee, Arnold, 1368 Trade Argentina and, 269–271, 280 and Brazil, 285, 287 expositions and Scandinavia, 229 and Peru, 368 Transjordan, 728 Transnationalism and diaspora populations, 1369 and globalization, 1407 and identity among immigrants, 1427–1429 and ideologies, 972 and image technology, 1339 and literature, 927–928 versus national identities, 1348 and new social movements, 1447, 1455 and sports, 1001–1003 and women’s rights, 451–453 See also Cosmopolitanism Transportation and Argentina, 279–280 and Colombia, 833 and immigration, 1427 and Iran, 1112 and Malaysia, 1224 and Nepal, 1807 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 technological advances in, 127, 131, 136 and the United States, 388–389, 389–390 See also Railroads Transvaal, 1145–1146 Transylvania, 472 Trautmann, Catherine, 1510 Trdat III, King (Armenia), 1700 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1549 Treaty of Kiel, 220, 223 Treaty of Lausanne, 437–438, 768, 1647, 1648 Treaty of Maastricht, 1549


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Treaty of Nice, 1549 Treaty of Rome, 669 Treaty of St. Germain, 542 Treaty of Trianon, 638–639, 645 Treaty of Utrecht, 299 Treaty of Versailles, 459, 468, 476, 513–514 and Bulgaria, 580 and Czechoslovakia, 595 and Germany, 613, 617, 621 Treaty of Waitangi, 863, 873 Tremaglia, Mirko, 1372 Tremblay, Michel, 1294 Trimble, David, 1062 Troels-Lund, F., 227 Trofimenkoff, S. M., 1294 Tromp, Maarten, 203 Troost, Paul Ludwig, 413 Trotsky, Leon, 520 Trubetskoy, Prince, 94 Trubetzkoy, N. S., 94 Trudeau, Pierre, 1291, 1835, 1836, 1837–1838, 1838, 1840 Truman, Henry, 950, 1309 Tsai Ming-liang, 1338 Tschudi, Aegidius, 252 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin, 1798 Tshombe, Moise, 1469 Tsongkhapa, 1817 Tubin, Eduard, 560 Tucholsky, Kurt, 111 Tucker, George, 494 Tuheitia, 1857 Tunisia, 1464 Tupac Amaru II, 370, 371 Turanism, 641, 773–774, 1645 Turgenev, I. S., 694 Turia, Tariana, 1862 Turina, Joaquín, 1437 Turkey, 760–775, 767 (map), 1642–1656, 1644 (map) and Armenia, 1704, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1714 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438, 442 and the European Union, 1411 and gender, 446 and new social movements, 1452 water, 884–885 Turkish-Greek war (1919–1922), 522 Tutsi, 1669, 1670, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1678 Tuvan Republic, 1792 Twa, 1669, 1672, 1678 Twelve Years Truce, 200, 201 (map) Ty-Casper, Linda, 1245 Tymoshenko, Yulia, 1629, 1629 Tyrs, Miroslav, 594 U Chit Hlaing, 779 U Nu, 783 U Ottama, 779 U Saw, 780, 782

Uhde, Fritz von, 416 Ukraine, 712–722, 715 (map), 1619–1629, 1620 (map) borders of, 1413 and new social movements, 1449 and the Orange Revolution, 1080 and the Soviet Union, 1071, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1079 Ulanfu, 1790, 1794 Ulmanis, K¯arlis, 560, 565, 568, 1576, 1578 Unifications, national, 464 Union of Utrecht, 196 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Monarchy of Denmark, 147 United Nations (UN) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1533 and Canada, 307 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171 and Fiji, 1322 and Germany, 1554 High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1535 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 and interventions, 1469 and Iraq, 756, 1743 and Israel, 1121, 1125, 1135 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1765, 1767 and Korea, 1780, 1781 membership, 957 and Mongolia, 1795 and new social movements, 1456 and the nonaligned movement, 961–962, 969 and peacekeeping, 1412 and the self-determination doctrine, 972 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 510 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 273 United States, 381–392, 384 (map), 1299–1311, 1302 (map) and Afghanistan, 1690 and African Americans, 493–494 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 275 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 850 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1533 and Canada, 305, 307, 1835–1836, 1842 and China, 1191 and the civil rights movement, 938 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Colombia, 829, 830 and colonialism/expansionism, 22, 1462 and counterterrorism, 1497–1498 and Cuba, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1280 Czechoslovaks in the, 588–589 and decolonization policy, 1320 and diaspora populations, 1372 economic policy and globalization, 1407–1408, 1409 education and, 32–33, 35–39, 420, 422–426, 429, 433, 1381–1382


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United States (continued ) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and European integration, 1033 and film, 1328–1330, 1332–1333, 1337, 1339–1340 and France, 1050 and gender and sexuality, 447, 448, 450, 452, 901, 902, 907–908 and Greenland, 1563 and Haiti, 340 and immigration, 1412, 1418–1419, 1420–1421, 1424, 1428 and indigenous groups, 1566, 1845 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117, 1117 and Iraq, 1742–1743, 1746–1747 Irish in the, 654–655 and Israel, 1398, 1401 and Japan, 810, 822, 1749–1754, 1756–1757 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780, 1781 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 and landscape art, 64–66, 70 and language, 472, 482 and the League of Nations, 1402 and Mexico, 353–354 and minorities, 894, 935 and Mongolia, 1796 and music, 76, 117, 118 (illus.), 1433, 1438–1439, 1441–1442, 1443 and national identity, 465, 930, 931 nationalistic art of the, 411 and new social movements, 1446, 1448 and New Zealand, 872 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Pakistan, 1229, 1235, 1236 and Palestine, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 372 and the Philippines, 1239, 1240–1242, 1243, 1248 and Puerto Rico, 836–837, 837, 845, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1394–1396, 1400 and rituals of belonging, 509 and Russia, 1604, 1607 and Southern identity, 494–495 and sports, 994, 1000–1001 symbols of the, 114, 119, 124, 128, 134, 1346, 1347 terrorism and xenophobia in the, 1410, 1488, 1490, 1492 and Vietnam, 954, 1264–1265, 1265 and Yugoslavia, 896 See also American Revolution Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 972 Unterhalter, Elaine, 904 Urabi, Ahmed, 263–264 Urabi Revolt, 260, 263–264 Urbanization and Argentina, 278 and Basques, 1515

and Central America, 311 and Denmark, 149 and France, 1055 and Iraq, 753, 755, 755, 1737 and Korea, 1778 and language, 479 and the Maori, 1860–1861 and Scandinavia, 221 and Turkey, 772 and Ukraine, 714–715 Urquiza, Justo José de, 275, 279 Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, 829, 830 Uruguay, 393–403, 395 (map) and Argentina, 275 Argentine-Brazilian war over, 273 and Brazil, 289 and Garibaldi, 672 Utilitarianism, 531 Uvarov, S. S., 692 Uvin, Peter, 1680 Uygur, 1468 Uzbekistan, 1079 Uzbeks, 1693 Vaculík, Ludvík, 1026 Vagris, Janis, 1581 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 987, 1208 Vakatora, Tomasi, 1322 Valdemar IV (Denmark), 226 Valdemar the Great (Denmark), 153 Valdem¯ars, Krišj¯anis, 561, 562 Valdivia, Pedro de, 323, 326 Valencia, 1546 Valera, Eamon de, 1294 Valle, José Cecilio del, 315, 316 Valle-Riestra, José María, 76 Vallejo, José Joaquín, 329 Valois, Georges, 515 Values and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 1830 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1839 and Cuba, 1283 in education, 1381 exporting U.S., 944, 955–956 and Great Britain, 1008 and India, 797 and Iran, 1116 and Japan, 1754 and Latvia, 1576, 1580 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mongolia, 1793 and national character, 528–529, 530–531, 537 and nationalism, 901 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847–1848 and Poland, 686 post-materialist, 1454 and Puerto Rico, 844 and religion versus ideology, 971


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I-61

INDEX

and religious fundamentalism, 1397, 1399 and rituals of belonging, 504–506 See also Morality; Religion Van der Noot, Henri, 140 van Gogh, Theo, 1486–1487 Van Thieu, Nguyen, 1265 Vanessa-Mae, 1440 Varikas, Eléni, 53 Varley, Fred H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Varnhagen, Francisco, 292 Vasnetsov, V. M., 694 Vaughan, Olufemi, 1180 Vazov, Ivan, 576–577 Velestinlis, Rigas, 626, 631, 631 Velvet Revolution, 1026, 1028 Verchères, Madeleine de, 303 Verdi, Giuseppe, 75, 77, 79, 80, 671, 1437–1438 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 197, 203 Vermeer, Johannes, 203 Vertov, Dziga, 1330 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch, 1152, 1152 Vian, Boris, 1052 Victoria, Queen (England), 164, 237 Vieira, Luandino, 1665 Vienna Congress of 1815, 46, 197 of 1819, 35 Vietnam, 963–964, 1261–1271 and France, 1050 and gender, 446 and independence, 1463 Vietnam War, 944, 952, 954, 1265, 1265, 1310 and the United States, 1304 Vigneault, Gilles, 1294 Vigny, Alfred de, 177 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira, 1579 Vikings, 228 Vilde, Eduard, 565 Villa-Lobos, Heitor, 76, 1439 Villarán, Manuel Vicente, 374 Vilnius, Lithuania, 563, 563 Vinnen, Carl, 416 Violence. See Conflict/violence Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène, 415 Virgin of Guadalupe, 347, 348 (illus.), 349–350, 356 in Peru, 376 Visconti, Luchino, 1334 Vivekananda, Swami, 802 Vizcardo y Guzmán, Juan Pablo, 370 Vlad the Impaler (aka Dracula), 1592 Vodou (Voodoo), 340 Vogel, Sir Julius, 865 Volhynia, 716 Völkisch nationalism, 613, 614, 614, 622 Voltaire, 14–15, 370 Voluntarism, 1196, 1197, 1198–1199 von Flüe, Niklaus, 253 von Metternich, Klemens, 671

von Ranke, Leopold, 41, 101, 227 Vonk, Jean Francoise, 140 Voting franchise and Argentina, 275 and Australia, 853 and diaspora populations, 1365, 1366, 1371–1372 and England, 161, 164 and Finland, 605 and Germany, 611 and Haiti, 336 and Italy, 669, 670 and the Netherlands, 199 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 250 and Uruguay, 401 See also Democracy; Suffrage, women’s Vramshapuh, King (Armenia), 1701 Vytautas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Wade, P., 1450 Wagner, Richard, 74, 77, 79, 406, 463, 1431 Wagner, Robert, 1508 Wais, Mir, 1690 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 863 Walcott, Derek, 914, 921 Waldheim, Kurt, 550 Walensa, Lech, 948 Wales, 166, 1631–1640, 1634 (map) and devolution, 1014 nationalism and environmentalism in, 878, 881 Walker, William, 313, 318 Wallace, Henry, 1303, 1309 Wallace, William, 232–233, 238–239, 240 (illus.) Wallot, Paul, 408 Walser, Martin, 1558 Walton, William, 1433, 1438 Walzer, M., 97 Wang Xilin, 1440 War of 1812, 388 War of the Pacific, 327, 330, 376 (map), 377, 377–378 Ward, Russel, 854 Warren, Robert Penn, 495 Warsaw Pact, 945 Wartburg Festival, 187 Washington, George, 387 Water, 884–885 Watkins, Melvin, 1842 Weber, Carl Maria von, 73, 74, 117, 1431 Weber, Eugen, 9, 102, 179 Weber, Max, 3–4, 40, 982, 1399, 1402 Webster, Noah, 32–33, 389 Weimar Republic, 613, 613, 620–621 and film, 1330–1331 See also Germany Weissman, Stephen, 1676 Weitz, Margaret, 905 Weizmann, Chaim, 1123, 1123


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I-62

INDEX

Welfare state and Canada, 302–303, 306, 1290 and New Zealand, 870–871 and the United States, 944, 1300, 1309 See also Socialism Welhaven, Johan, 228 Wellington, Duke of, 164 Werner, Abraham, 67 Werner, Anton von, 409 West Germany, 976, 1448, 1490. See also Germany West Papua, 1468 Western, the ( film), 1332–1333, 1337 Western Sahara, 1468 Westernization and India, 1211 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Russia, 692 Wetterlé, Emile, 1508, 1508 Whitehead, Gillian, 1439 Whitlam, Gough, 1845 Wielopolski, Aleksander, 212 Wilhelm I (Germany), 619 Wilhelm II (Germany), 416, 621 Wilhelmina, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Willems, Jans Frans, 145 William I of Orange (the Netherlands), 141, 142, 196, 197, 203 William II (the Netherlands), 199 William III (the Netherlands), 201 Williams, Edward (Iolo Morgannwg), 1638 Williams, Kyffin, 1637 Williams, Ralph Vaughan, 1434 Wilson, A. T., 1742 Wilson, Woodrow, 464, 1328 Fourteen Points Speech, 436, 972 and Iraq, 749 principle of self-determination, 1790 Winter War, 607 Wirth, Johann Georg August, 190 Wislicenus, Hermann, 408 Wolfe, James, 299, 303, 304, 1840 Wölfflin, Heinrich, 416 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 53 Women and Afghanistan, 1457, 1690, 1694 and Algeria, 1105 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 264, 265 Eritrean, 1173 and fascism, 454–456 and France, 1047, 1050 and Germany, 620 and India, 1209, 1210 and Ireland, 661 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1065 and the Philippines, 1246 and postcolonial gender roles, 926–927 and social policies, 448–449 as symbols, 445–446, 926, 1345

and Turkey, 769, 770, 1653, 1654 and the United States, 901, 1304 and Wales, 1636 and war, 449–450 See also Gender; Women’s rights Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 453 Women’s movements, 1449, 1450, 1452–1453 Women’s rights, 53–54, 57, 446, 450–451 and France, 173–174, 176 and Germany, 620 and Greece, 53 revolution and, 46, 50–52 social policy and, 446–447 and socialism, 56–57 and Switzerland, 249 transnationalism and, 451–453 See also Suffrage, women’s Wood, Henry, 1438 World Bank, 1610 World divided. See Cold War World War I and Arab nationalism, 727–728 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and assassination of Habsburg heir, 1490 and Australia, 855–856 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529–1530 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306, 1835 colonialism and the causes of, 514 and the Czechoslovaks, 588–589, 593 education and, 426 and Ethiopia, 740 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 438 and fascism, 515 gender roles and, 449 and Germany, 613, 621–622 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 638 and India, 804 and Iraq, 1739, 1742 and Ireland, 651, 660 and Italy, 667, 670 and New Zealand, 868–869 and the Ottoman Empire, 765 and Poland, 682, 682–683 results of, 419, 436, 527 and South Africa, 1150 and statuary, 412 and Turkey, 1643, 1649 and Ukraine, 713 World War II and Alsace, 1507, 1508 and Australia, 857 and Austria, 547–548 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Bulgaria, 582 and Burma, 781, 784–785 and Canada, 302, 1835 and China, 1197


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I-63

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Yassin, Ahmad, 1137, 1138 Yeats, William Butler, 487–488, 487 (illus.), 489, 654–655, 657, 659, 914, 918 Cathleen ni Houlihan, 922 Yeltsin, Boris, 946, 1079, 1080, 1597, 1597, 1605 Yohannes, Emperor (Tigray), 739 Yrigoyen, Hipólito, 281 Yrjö-Koskinen, Yrjö Sakari, 601 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 1725 Yugoslavia civil wars of, 525, 896, 1044, 1413–1414 common language versus religious difference in, 529 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and international interventions, 1408–1409 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Yushchenko, Viktor, 1080, 1622–1623, 1623, 1626, 1628 Yuson, Alfred A., 1245 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 902

and Czechoslovakia, 594–596 and Eritrea, 1170 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 435, 437–441. See also Holocaust and expansionism after World War I, 524 and Fiji, 1318–1319 and France, 1051–1052, 1052 and gender roles, 450 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 645 and India, 804–806 and Indonesia, 1733 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 667, 674–675 and Japan, 817–818, 822, 1749, 1751 and Malaysia, 1215–1216 music related to, 1433–1434 and nationalism, 509–510, 1490 and New Zealand, 869–870, 872 and Nigeria, 1181 and Palestinians, 1135 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1851 and Poland, 681, 683, 688 role of religion in, 106–107 and Russia, 1603 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and sexualized imagery, 905–907 and the Soviet Union, 1073, 1074, 1075 and Taiwan, 1250–1251 and terrorism, 1496 and Ukraine, 713, 722 Woronicz, J., 692 Worringer, Wilhelm, 415 Wright, Erik Olin, 2 Writing/alphabets, 481, 577, 1529 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703, 1706 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788, 1793, 1798 and Romania, 1591 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Tibet, 1815 and Turkey, 773, 1652 Wybicki, Józef, 215 Wysłouch, Bolesław, 681, 685 Xenophobia, 1411–1412, 1415. See also Hypernationalism Xenophon, 1697 Xu¯ant˘ong, Emperor, 1818 Yacine, Kateb, 1100 Yamin, Muhammad, 1727, 1727–1728 Yanaev, Gennadii, 1582 Yang, Edward, 1338 Yanukovych, Viktor, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625

Zaghlul, Saad, 262–263, 263 Zaghlul, Safiyya, 263 Zahir Shah, Mohammed, 1687, 1689 Zaïre. See Congo and Zaïre Zanabazar, 1791 Zavala, Lorenzo de, 353–354 Zealots, 1489 Zeroual, Liamine, 1099 Zetkin, Clara, 453 Zhamtsarano, Tsyben, 1793 Zhdanov, Andrei, 1075–1076 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 1078, 1079–1080 Zhou Enlai, 962, 1816, 1821 Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, 1232 Zimbabwe, 1441 Zimmers, Oliver, 244 Zinnermann, J. G., 41 Zinovief, Grigory, 520 Zionism, 103, 104 (illus.), 1120–1121, 1121, 1123–1125, 1126 and agricultural settlements, 1122 and Arab nationalism, 730 and the arts, 1127 and forming national identity, 1127–1130 and language, 477 and Palestinians, 1133 Žižka, Jan, 1023 Zografos, Panagiotis, 632 (illus.) Zola, Emile, 134 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 1074 Zta-Halein, Kathinka, 52 Zulus, 27, 1150 Zurayq, Qustantin, 732, 732 Zyuganov, Gennady, 1079–1080, 1597


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About the Editors

Guntram H. Herb, Ph.D., is associate professor of geography at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. In addition to peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, his published works on nationalism include Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945 and the collection of essays co-edited with David H. Kaplan, Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. David H. Kaplan, Ph.D., is professor of geography at Kent State University in Ohio. He is an editor of the journal National Identities. His six books include Boundaries and Place (with Jouni Häkli) and Nested Identities (with Guntram Herb). He has also published over 30 peer-reviewed articles and chapters, many of them in the field of nationalism.


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