Global Inequality Matters (Global Ethics)

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© Darrel Moellendorf 2 0 0 9 All rights reserved. N o reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. N o portion of this publication m a y be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6 - 1 0 Kirby Street, London E C 1 N 8TS. A n y person w h o does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication m a y be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right t o be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2 0 0 9 by PALGRAVE M A C M I L L A N Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, c o m p a n y number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire R G 2 1 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the U S is a division of St Martin's Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, N e w York, N Y 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and M a c m i l l a n ® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 9 7 8 - 0 - 2 3 0 - 2 2 4 5 7 - 5 hardback This book is printed o n paper suitable for recycling and m a d e from fully m a n a g e d and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected t o conform t o the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. 10 18

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

Contents Acknowledgments

viii

1

Inequality and the Inherent Dignity of Persons

1

2

Coercion and the Conditions of Distributive Justice

19

3

Equal Respect in Political and Economic Associations

40

4

Global Equality of Opportunity Defended

68

5

International Trade, Development and I.abor

90

6

Climate Change, Development and Mitigation

106

7

Global Distributive Institutions

132

Notes

154

Index

175

vii

Acknowledgments In writing this book I have been helped greatly by comments from, and discussions with, many colleagues from around the world. It seems appropriate to name them, but I fear that I will neglect to acknowledge my debts to everyone in doing so. At the risk of doing that, I'd like to thank the following people for comments and discussions: Christien van den Anker, Chris Armstrong, Christian Barry, Chris Bertram, Gillian Brock, Christoph Broszies, Luis Cabrera, Simon Caney, Victoria Costa, Ben Crow, Josh Gert, Alan Gilbert, Henning Hahn, Nicole Hassoun, Michael Howard, Jon Mandle, Thad Metz, Michael Pendlebury, Thomas Pogge, Kok-Chor Tan, Mary Tjiattas, Marius Vermaak, Paul Voice and Mark Wheeler. Chapters 2, 4 and 6 of this book draw on material that I have published in journals. I am grateful to the journals for permitting me to use some what was published in following three articles: "Equal Respect and Global Egalitarianism," Social Theory and Practice, 32:4 October 2006, 6 0 1 - 6 1 6 ; "Equality of Opportunity Globalized," Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, XlX:2 July 2 0 0 6 , 3 0 1 - 3 1 8 ; and "Treaty Norms and Climate Change Mitigation," Ethics and International Affairs, 23:3 September 2009. Versions of several of the chapters were also presented at various venues. I would like to thank the organizers for the opportunities and the audiences for enriching my thinking about these matters. My list to thank includes the following: Bennington College; the Political Theory Workshop, Brown University; the Society for International Philosophical Cooperation in conjunction with the American Philosophical Association; the International Capabilities Network Conference in Pavia; the Department Philosophy, University of Maine; the Werkmeister Conference on Cosmopolitanism, FloridaState University; the International Studies Association; the Department of Political Science and International Relations, the University of Birmingham; the Philosophy Department, San Diego State viii

Acknowledgments ix

University; the International Office, Rhodes University; the Departm e n t of Philosophy, University of the Witwatersrand; t h e Department of Philosophy, University of Johannesburg; the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Oxford University; the Philosophy Department, University of Rochester; the Mapping Global Inequalities conference at the University of California, Santa Cruz; the Institut fur Interkulterelle und Internationale Studien, Universitat Bremen; the Workshop on Absolute Poverty and Human Rights, Universitat Erfurt and the Institute for Health and Social Policy, McGill University. I am also grateful for the support that I have received from various institutions and organizations over the period of the several years when I was writing this book. These include the J a m e s Hervey J o h n son Charitable Educational Trust, the International Office of Rhodes University and the Deutsche Akademische Austausch Dienst. I would like San Diego State University for supporting me with a difference-in-pay leave while finishing this book. I am especially grateful to the Institute for Advanced Study and the Friends of the Institute for Advanced Study for hosting and supporting me as I was finishing this manuscript. Finally, my deepest appreciation goes to Bonnie and Marino Friedm a n n for their encouragement and loving c o m p a n i o n s h i p that has sustained me.

1


In this c h a p t e r I set out t o do t w o things. O n e is t o discuss certain c o n c e p t s and c l a i m s t h a t are f o u n d a t i o n a l t o t h e a r g u m e n t s in t h e s u b s e q u e n t chapters. A n o t h e r is t o set s o m e e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t argum e n t s t h a t will c o m e later in t h e b o o k . T h e c h a p t e r serves as an i n t r o d u c t i o n in b o t h respects but I do n o t s u m m a r i z e all the m a j o r c l a i m s or systematically list t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t s

that

I promise to m a k e later in the book. T h a t , I t h i n k , would m a k e for pretty dreary fare. Instead, I h o p e t o tantalize by simply starting with a discussion of the basic features of m y approach to global inequality and t h e reasons that I h a v e for t h i n k i n g that it is u n j u s t , a n d from t i m e to t i m e n o t i n g where certain ideas will be developed later. In t h e n e x t section I highlight various facets of global inequality and n o t e different measures of global inequality t h a t h a v e b e e n developed by empirical researchers. In S e c t i o n III, I introduce m y approach to respect for h u m a n dignity, an approach t h a t is foundational for t h e n o r m a t i v e a r g u m e n t s m a d e in s u b s e q u e n t chapters. I also begin s o m e reflections o n justification in t h a t section. T h e s e are further developed in S e c t i o n IV. Section V introduces t h e view t h a t respect for the dignity of persons establishes an egalitarian justificatory p r e s u m p t i o n , w h i c h is t h e basis o f the criticism o f inequality later in t h e b o o k . Finally, I close t h e introductory c o m m e n t s of this chapter in S e c t i o n VI by distinguishing the approach that I take in this b o o k from the much-discussed approach of T h o m a s Pogge. Pogge's approach h a s deservedly received a great deal of a t t e n t i o n .

2

Global Inequality Matters

It should help m a n y readers to understand my approach by comparing it to Pogge's.

Our world is marked by deep and persistent inequalities. T h e Development

World

Report 2006 offers several examples, w h i c h make terribly

vivid the nature of some of this inequality. O n e comparison is under five mortality rate. 'A baby born in Mali in 2 0 0 1 had an approximately 13 percent c h a n c e of dying before reaching t h e age o n e , with this c h a n c e declining only slightly (to 9 percent) even if the baby were born into the top quintile of the asset distribution. By contrast, a baby born in the United States the same year had a less than 1 perc e n t c h a n c e of dying in its first year." More generally, in 2 0 0 1 t h e mortality rate for children under age 5 was nearly 2 6 times higher in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa t h a n in the Organisation for Econ o m i c Cooperation and Development (OCED) countries. 2 According to the World Health Organization, over 6 0 percent o f deaths in developed countries occur beyond age 70, compared to about 3 0 percent in developing countries. 3 Returning the Mali-USA comparison, consider education inequality: T h e average American born between 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 9 has completed more than 14 years of schooling (roughly the same for m e n and w o m e n , and in urban and rural areas), while the average school a t t a i n m e n t for the same cohort in Mali is less t h a n two years, with w o m e n ' s a t t a i n m e n t less t h a n half t h a t for m e n , and virtually zero in rural areas.' 4 With the onset of adulthood the c u m u lative effects of these c h i l d h o o d inequalities is e n o r m o u s i n c o m e disparity. In 1 9 9 4 the average i n c o m e in Mali was less t h a n $ 2 PPP per day, or $ 5 4 per m o n t h ; in the USA it was more t h a n 2 0 times greater, $ 1 , 1 8 5 per m o n t h . 5 Considering the broader picture, the richest 5 percent of the world's population earns 114 times that of the poorest 5 percent. The total i n c o m e of the richest 1 percent is equal to that of the poorest 5 7 percent. And t h e i n c o m e of 2 5 million richest Americans is nearly as much as that of the 2 billion poorest people in the world. 6 I n c o m e inequality, however, is less severe t h a n wealth inequality. T h e assets of t h e richest three people in the world are m o r e t h a n t h e c o m b i n e d GNP of all o f the least developed countries. 7 There is a great deal of longitudinal

evidence about

income

inequality. Branko Milanovic shows that w h e t h e r the trend is toward


3

greater or less inequality depends crucially on the c o n c e p t s

of

inequality and m e t h o d o l o g y used. W h e n one derives a Gini coefficient from the unweighted (for population size) GDP per capita of all countries, there is a strong trend toward increasing inequality. 8 This is a version of international inequality that he refers to as concept inequality. a version

1

But when t h e GDP per capita is weighted for p o p u l a t i o n — of international

inequality—the

inequality

Milanovic

calls concept

trend is toward decreasing inequality.

9

2

Milanovic

observes that this trend is reversed if C h i n a and India are excluded, and concludes t h a t t h e rapid e c o n o m i c growth in these countries is responsible for the decreasing trend. 1 0 Finally, if the G D P per capita of countries is not used at all, but instead the i n c o m e s of persons are compared, the nature of the c h a n g e over t i m e varies depending o n t h e m e t h o d o l o g y used for gathering t h e data. 1 1 This last approach measures what Milanovic terms concept

3 or global

inequality;

and for

most of this book it will be the most significant measure. He sees an overall increase in global inequality from the late 1 9 8 0 s to the late 1990s, but a decrease from the early to the late 1990s. Despite the differences, b y all measures i n c o m e inequality remains extremely high. As noted in the comparison between persons in Mali and in t h e USA, i n c o m e inequality is only o n e of several kinds of morally salient inequality, but it is quite plausibly causally related to other kinds. Inferior health care and education as a child grows up in Mali predictably leads to less i n c o m e as an adult t h a n the i n c o m e of t h e citizen of the USA. T h e low i n c o m e of the parent in Mali results in fewer resources to devote to t h e health and education of her children. And so it is not surprising t h a t global inequality is so persistent. Our world also c o n t a i n s staggering poverty. A recent World Bank study estimates that 1.4 billion people are living on less t h a n $ 1 . 2 5 PPP a day, and 2 . 4 billion on less $ 2 PPP a day. 1 2 There is controversy surrounding the accuracy of these figures.13 But no o n e denies that billions of people are living in terrible poverty. This is a moral catastrophe t h a t replays itself every day, all the m o r e horrible because the costs o f eliminating it are so paltry. Pogge agues that a program of transfers to the desperately poor, the starving and dying children of the world for example, could be instituted without causing any significant hardship to t h e very wealthy. 1 4 Moreover, according to the United Nations Development Programme in 1 9 9 8 the total assets of the 2 0 0 richest people in the world were $ 1 , 0 4 2 billion. At a cost of

4


$ 7 - 8 billion, less t h a n 1 percent o f t h e net wealth of the world's richest people, access to primary education could be provided t o every child around t h e world. 1 5 Not everyone w h o has studied global inequality judges it to be unjust. Jagdish Bhagwati, for example, c o n d e m n s the absolute poverty that exists in various places around t h e world, but considers it 'lunacy' to c o n d e m n inequality. '[W]hat sense does it m a k e to put a household in Mongolia alongside a household in Chile, o n e in Bangladesh, a n o t h e r in the United States, and still a n o t h e r in C o n g o ? These households do n o t belong to a " s o c i e t y " in which they c o m pare themselves with the others, and so a measure that includes all of t h e m is practically a meaningless construct.' 1 6 Bhagwati's rejection of t h e injustice of global inequalities seems rather quick. But he is not alone in this view. T h e most influential egalitarian political philosopher of the twentieth century, J o h n Rawls, agrees. He is followed in this judgment by several other egalitarian

politi-

cal philosophers; t h e most p r o m i n e n t is T h o m a s Nagel. All these philosophers (and perhaps Bhagwati too) would reject such inequalities as unjust if they were within a single state, but do not do so globally. There are m a n y good reasons to believe that global inequality matters. O n e is that reducing global inequalities could serve as a m e a n s for eliminating absolute poverty under which so many people suffer. T h e fact that poverty could be eliminated by slightly reducing the wealth of the very wealthy—thereby slightly narrowing inequality—supplies a premise to the argument that t h e current level of inequality is unjust. Moreover, if inequality is reduced, e c o n o m i c growth is distributed more equally and poverty is reduced more. Charles Beitz correctly makes the point, however, t h a t this sort of argument against inequality is limited to cases in w h i c h the poverty is great and the costs of eradicating it are comparatively low. 1 7 Another reason that global inequality matters is that inequality makes possible, perhaps even likely, the d o m i n a n c e of poor countries by rich countries in international negotiations and institutions. 1 8 These are instrumental reasons to believe that global inequality matters. T h e y take it to matter because it contributes to other social evils. 1 9 These reasons suggest that inequality matters a great deal when the gap between the rich and the poor is great and the condition of the poor is particularly bad. Indeed it might matter most in these cases


5

because o f the accumulation of reasons. 2 0 But it does n o t follow t h a t t h e only reasons t h a t it matters is because it contributes to other social evils. In this book I shall argue that there is a n o t h e r less instrumental and less limited reason for m a i n t a i n i n g that justice requires reducing global inequality. I say less instrumental

because I shall n o t argue

that equality is a free-standing value, which c o m m a n d s our allegiance apart from all other values. I shall not argue that equality is intrinsically valuable. M y criticism of global inequality is less instrumental in the sense t h a t it does not derive from the service that reducing inequality plays in realizing other morally important social arrangements although it does rely o n other important moral commitments. T h e injustice of absolute poverty is urgent. It demands our attention and best efforts. But I shall argue that if we take seriously the fundamental basis of all m a j o r h u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s of the twentieth century, which affirm t h a t all persons possess inherent dignity, the construction of new institutions that reduce inequality is also a matter of global justice. T h a t such institutions could also eliminate poverty is a strong reason to support t h e m , but it does n o t exhaust the moral reasons in their favor. In the remainder o f this chapter I begin this argument by providing an initial a c c o u n t of the relat i o n s h i p between respect for h u m a n dignity and the presumption of equality under social institutions.

Respect is a pro-attitude, or perhaps more accurately a family of proattitudes. It is an attitude t h a t positively values its object. It is c o m m o n l y distinguished from o t h e r pro-attitudes, such as belief and c o n cern: Although o n e might believe a statement, o n e would not respect it; and although a person might have concern for the f u n c t i o n i n g of her computer, she does n o t respect it. In m a n y of t h e h u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s of the twentieth century the object of respect is presumed to be the inherent dignity of persons. These are d o c u m e n t s that a great m a n y political elites have c o m m i t t e d their regimes to observe and t h a t provide hope for millions ordinary people w h o are seeking m o r e just political, e c o n o m i c and social structures. And these docum e n t s typically explicitly acknowledge their basis in h u m a n dignity.

6


Consider the preamble to t h e Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights: ' W h e r e a s recognition of the i n h e r e n t dignity and of t h e equal and inalienable rights of all m e m b e r s of the h u m a n family is t h e foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.' 2 1 T h e Preambles of both the International C o v e n a n t o n Civil and Political Rights and the International C o v e n a n t o n E c o n o m i c , Social and Cultural Rights postulate a basis in h u m a n dignity: 'Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of t h e i n h e r e n t dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all m e m b e r s of t h e h u m a n family is the foundation of freed o m , justice and peace in the w o r l d . . . . ' 2 2 Also n o t e w o r t h y is Article 5 of T h e African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: 'Every individual shall have t h e right to respect of the dignity i n h e r e n t in a h u m a n being and t h e recognition of his legal status.' 2 3 References to i n h e r e n t h u m a n dignity within h u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s are not surprising since the justified claim that a person has a right is usually taken as support for a policy of directing state resources her way, either as protection or provision, even if it is contrary to t h e will of the majority. 2 4 T h e special status of persons as the basis for this anti-majoritarian position is well captured by the n o t i o n of dignity. Possessors of dignity are entitled to respect even if the m a j o r i t y thinks otherwise. T h e inherent dignity of persons, and the respect that is appropriate to it, is a useful place to start a justification of global egalitarianism because of t h e wide appeal t h a t these ideas have. To be sure, this is a pragmatic reason, appealing to a c o n t i n g e n t l y accepted normative understanding of persons, n o t o n e appealing either to a necessary moral truth or to the c o n c l u s i o n of an argument about deep moral foundations. But it is also a reason appropriate t o t h e task of justifying principles of global justice. In t h e final section of A Theory of Justice, J o h n Rawls distinguishes between justification and proof. [J]ustification proceeds from what all parties to the discussion hold in c o m m o n . Ideally to justify a c o n c e p t i o n of justice to s o m e o n e is to give h i m a proof of its principles from premises that we b o t h accept, these principles having in turn c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t m a t c h our considered judgments. T h u s mere proof is not justification. A proof simply displays logical relations between

propositions.


7

Proofs b e c o m e justification o n c e t h e starting points are mutually r e c o g n i z e d . . .25 To begin an a c c o u n t of justice as Rawls r e c o m m e n d s is to c o m m i t oneself to a view of what an a c c o u n t of justice is about, n a m e l y t h a t it seeks a resolution to practical problems, where there are sufficient values held in c o m m o n for such a resolution to seem possible. Accounts of justice are practical normative c o n c e p t i o n s about how to order h u m a n affairs, suitable to t h e circumstances in w h i c h there is disagreement about such matters, but deeper agreement o n s o m e values. A person seeking a justification then has one eye o n the social c o n text and another o n c o m m o n values, seeking to provide arguments t h a t might provide t h e basis for a reasoned resolution to on-going disputes. O n e implication of this view of justification is t h a t it better n o t start with abstract metaphysical claims about the nature of the moral universe, the source o f moral value, or a delimitation of all objects o f moral c o n c e r n . Justification must be m o r e pragmatic t h a n that. To invoke the inherent dignity of persons is to claim that all persons have a special moral status or standing. T h e attribution of h u m a n rights to persons is an example affirming that standing of persons. Consider, for example, the m a n n e r in which Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constrains the use of power and force: 'Everyone has the rights to life, liberty and the security of person.' 2 6 Observance of t h e article requires t h a t institutions n o t infringe on t h e life, liberty and security of others. Pogge, I believe, correctly argues that w h e n this right is violated the moral d e m a n d t h a t we halt t h e violation is a c o n s e q u e n c e of the negative duty against infringing on life, liberty and security. 2 7 But observance of h u m a n rights not only constrains the use of power, it also directs it. For observing the rights identified in Article 3 requires n o t only the negative duties of non-interference, but also duties to ensure (at least) the requisite institutional f u n c t i o n i n g for policing and prosecuting wrongdoing. 2 8 Human rights d o c u m e n t s w h i c h invoke the inherent dignity of persons, t h e n , take that moral status of h u m a n s to be the reason w h y they can justifiably demand of institutions t h a t their power be constrained and directed in the ways required by the d o c u m e n t s . These constraints and directions are enumerated in the h u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s as fundamental h u m a n rights. Because

8 Global Inequality Matters

i n h e r e n t dignity is a status possessed equally by all persons, h u m a n rights are equal for all persons. Equal t r e a t m e n t under c o m m o n institutions is t h e baseline e x p e c t a t i o n . H u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s assume t h a t t h e i n h e r e n t dignity o f pers o n s m a k e s appropriate t h e attitude of respect. More specifically, respect o f t h e kind t h a t S t e p h e n Darwall distinguishes as recognition respect. '[W]e respect s o m e t h i n g in the recognition sense w h e n we give it s t a n d i n g (authority) in our relations to it.' 2 9 Recognition respect is t h e a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of this authority, w h i c h all h u m a n s have, t o d e m a n d t h a t t h e use o f institutional power t h a t affects t h e m be appropriately c o n s t r a i n e d and directed. W h e n h u m a n rights docu m e n t s state t h a t t h e i n h e r e n t dignity o f persons is t h e n o r m a t i v e basis of t h e rights t h a t t h e d o c u m e n t s e n u m e r a t e , t h e d o c u m e n t s are expressing a kind of r e s p e c t — r e c o g n i t i o n respect—for persons t h a t is t h e attitude appropriate t o the dignity o f persons. T h i s is o n e expression o f r e c o g n i t i o n respect. It m i g h t be t h o u g h t of as kind o f declarative (recognition) respect since it issues in d o c u m e n t s . It is e c h o e d in institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s t h a t constrain a n d direct power toward the fulfillment o f h u m a n rights. This could be distinguished as institutional (recognition) respect.

I have been arguing t h a t a justification of global justice can sensibly start from a premise of t h e i n h e r e n t dignity o f persons. Such a justification seems to presume m o r e t h a n Rawls allows in A Theory Justice.

of

Indeed, t h e r e he apparently specifically rejects this a p p r o a c h :

T believe, however, t h a t while t h e principles of justice will be effective o n l y if m e n have a sense of justice and d o therefore respect o n e another, t h e n o t i o n o f respect or of the i n h e r e n t worth o f persons is n o t a suitable basis for arriving at these principles. It is precisely these ideas t h a t call for i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . ' 3 0 Moreover, w h e n h e discusses t h e moral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are worked into t h e original position these include that t h e deliberation be fair and reasonable and that persons be equal w i t h c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e good and capable of a sense of justice. 3 1 T h i s could be interpreted as a weaker set of moral premises, t h a n the premise that persons possess i n h e r e n t dignity that d e m a n d s respect.


9

Still, c o n t i n u i n g the quotation just cited, it is clear t h a t Rawls also believes t h a t b e g i n n i n g in this m a n n e r sheds light on the d e m a n d s of respect for persons. ' O n c e t h e c o n c e p t i o n of justice is on h a n d , however, the ideas of respect and of h u m a n dignity can be given a m o r e definite m e a n i n g . ' 3 2 Presumably, this is more t h a n just a happy c o i n c i d e n c e . Features of the original position argument, such as the veil of ignorance and justification by agreement, must c o n n e c t up with ideas of respect and h u m a n dignity in order for there to be a n y assurance that the latter will 'be given a more definite m e a n i n g ' by t h e principles derived from t h e former. It is not clear then t h a t resting the justification of principles of justice on a premise of the inherent dignity of persons is more presumptuous than Rawls's attempts in A Theory of Justice;

but it is at least making s o m e t h i n g explicit t h a t is

n o t explicit in Rawls. Rawls's claim in A Theory of Justice t h a t justification must proceed o n the basis of c o m m o n l y accepted premises is related to his c o n c e r n in Political

Liberalism

t h a t t h e a c c o u n t of justice be political and n o t

metaphysical. Two, of the three, requirements of an account being political in t h e right sense (as opposed to the sense of politically expedient) are that the premises invoke values that can be endorsed from within all reasonable comprehensive c o n c e p t i o n s of the good, and that the principles are narrowly focused to the ordering of institutions, rather than to directing the whole of a person's life. 3 3 T h e desideratum of such a political a c c o u n t is that it is plausible to expect t h a t institutions directed by such principles will be legitimate. 3 4 Although in Political

Liberalism

Rawls defends a political concep-

tion that, in addition to satisfying the above two requirements, also employs premises involving c o n c e p t i o n s o f persons drawn from the liberal tradition, there is n o t h i n g about the political approach t h a t restricts it strictly to such premises. 3 5 There is n o reason to rule out in principle the possibility of other approaches, such as t h e e m p l o y m e n t of a moral c o n c e p t i o n of persons and goods drawn from some other kind of association. Such a procedure would be useful for t h e justification of principles of justice appropriate for assessing institutions of that association. An approach based upon the premise of the inherent dignity of persons in c o n j u n c t i o n with an a c c o u n t of t h e goods of t h e global e c o n o m i c association could possibly be well suited to the justification of principles for the institutions of the global e c o n o m i c association. In Chapters 3 and 4 I pursue this kind of argument.


I n o t e d in S e c t i o n III t h a t recognition respect o f t h e i n h e r e n t dignity of persons is t h e a c k n o w l e d g m e n t of t h e authority, w h i c h all persons have, to d e m a n d t h a t use o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l power t h a t affects t h e m be appropriately c o n s t r a i n e d a n d directed. T h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s and directions are e n u m e r a t e d as rights in the h u m a n rights docum e n t s . T h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e c o n s t r a i n t a n d direction o f institutional power is appropriate is a m a t t e r o f justification. To w h a t m i g h t justification appeal in order to be c o n s i s t e n t with h u m a n dignity? T h e answer must be based on an interpretation of t h e premise of h u m a n dignity that is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h it being t h e basis of h u m a n rights. To begin, institutions t h a t observe h u m a n rights offer persons t h e ability to pursue goals and values w i t h o u t interference, even c o n trary t o t h e will o f t h e majority, so long as t h e pursuit observes t h e s a m e institutional rules for other persons. C o n s t r u c t i n g institutions in order t o observe h u m a n rights, t h e n , involves seeing persons as sources o f practical reasons, for e x a m p l e , to limit institutional reach and t o ensure t h a t institutions m a k e a d e q u a t e provisions. Taking pers o n s as sources o f practical reasons has a d o u b l e sense. O n t h e o n e h a n d , w h e n crafting institutions we take persons as sources of practical reasons w h e n they b e c o m e reasons t o constrain and direct t h e power of institutions t h a t we e n d e a v o r to empower. We take t h e m as having c l a i m s on institutional power. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , pers o n s are reasons for us in part at least because they have reasons. T h e y live their lives, or seek to do so, in a c c o r d a n c e with reasons of their o w n . Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights states, 'Everyone has t h e right t o freedom o f t h o u g h t , c o n s c i e n c e and religion; this right includes freedom to c h a n g e his religion or belief, and freedom, either a l o n e or in c o m m u n i t y with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in t e a c h i n g , practice, worship and o b s e r v a n c e . ' 3 6 W e can interpret t h e right t o freedom o f c o n s c i e n c e as m a k i n g a claim on institutions, providing a reason for w h y institutions should f u n c t i o n in o n e way and n o t t h e other, out o f respect for t h e reasons t h a t persons have. Taking persons as sources o f practical reasons serves, t h e n , as an interpretation of our c o m m i t m e n t to the h u m a n rights expressed in Article 18.


11

Respecting h u m a n dignity then can be seen as involving taking h u m a n s as sources of practical reasons in t h e sense outlined above. Rawls states approximately t h e same idea when he takes persons to be 'self-authenticating sources of valid claims.' 3 7 This is a c o n c e p t i o n of inherent dignity as the status to make d e m a n d s o n institutions. But if t h e source of the reason that guides the use of institutional power is the d e m a n d that persons may make to have it so guided, then the principle that underlies the institutional construction must be o n e that persons can reasonably endorse. An institution directed by a principle that persons c a n n o t reasonably endorse is an institution that is not respecting persons as sources of practical reasons. There is, t h e n , a n o t h e r sort o f respect for h u m a n dignity, in addition to t h e recognition respect t h a t institutions can express in their functioning. This I call justificatory

respect. Justificatory respect requires

that t h e principles t h a t guide institutional f u n c t i o n i n g be such that they can be reasonably endorsed by the persons participating within t h e institutions. 3 8 Respect for h u m a n dignity then requires a justification of institutional principles t h a t can be reasonably accepted by those w h o live under t h e m . 3 9 I claim that justificatory respect follows from taking persons as possessing i n h e r e n t dignity. I have not tried to derive a c o m m i t m e n t to justificatory respect from deeper ethical theories. This relative shallowness is a c o n s e q u e n c e of the understanding of justification that I discussed in Section II. A justification must employ premises; it must make assumptions. I assume t h e inherent dignity of persons. Still, it seems to m e t h a t justificatory respect could well be consistent with several ethical theories. Perhaps it could be supported o n rule-utilitarian grounds. It certainly e c h o e s t h e i n j u n c t i o n of t h e Formula of Humanity version of Kant's categorical imperative n o t t o treat persons merely as means. And it could be a piece o f c o n t e m porary contractualism or constructivism, w h i c h take the justification of moral principles to be a function of some kind of constrained c o n sent. Indeed, such accounts fit particularly nicely because they provide the details of what should count as reasonable e n d o r s e m e n t . 4 0 Reasonable endorsement is not equivalent to actual acceptance. T h e justification of principles c a n n o t be held hostage to the unreasonable d e m a n d s o f persons. A full a c c o u n t o f justification must t h e n include an account t h a t distinguishes reasonable from unreasonable acceptance of principles. This is a major philosophical project far exceeding


m y m o r e m o d e s t aims in this book. But, I believe t h a t e n o u g h c a n be said, for present purposes, t o avoid h a v i n g to develop a n y t h i n g like a full a c c o u n t of t h e justification of principles. I shall have m u c h m o r e to say about this, however, in C h a p t e r 3. Let's suppose we h a v e w h a t I call a common

good

association.

This

is an association t h a t by t h e joint effort o f its m e m b e r s produces goods and powers, useful to the m e m b e r s , to w h i c h n o person has a pre-associational moral e n t i t l e m e n t . Let's suppose furthermore that this c o m m o n good association is strong, n o n - v o l u n t a r y , significant for people's lives, and under t h e collective c o n t r o l o f persons. 4 1 Now consider a principle for t h e g o v e r n a n c e of this association. The principle ' i n s t i t u t i o n s should be arranged so as to realize m a x i m a l l y t h e interests of persons in sub-group G ' c a n n o t be reasonably accepted pro tanto by persons w h o are n o t m e m b e r s of sub-group G . In c o n trast t h e principle ' i n s t i t u t i o n s should be arranged so as to realize equally the interests o f all those living under t h e institutions' can be reasonably endorsed pro tanto by e v e r y o n e living under t h e m . T h i s reasoning is c o n s i s t e n t with t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of Article 7 o f t h e Universal Declaration o f H u m a n Rights, w h i c h includes t h e following c o m m i t m e n t : 'All are equal before t h e law and are e n t i t l e d w i t h o u t a n y discrimination to equal protection of the law.' 4 2 T h e r e are four plausible e x c e p t i o n s that could support a difference between the pro tanto e n d o r s e m e n t of a principle o f equality and a c o m p l e t e justification o f a principle in particular cases: (1) S o m e pers o n s could deserve to have their interests treated less well because o f s o m e t h i n g t h e y have d o n e t o harm t h e interests of others; (2) s o m e persons could voluntarily c o n s e n t to lesser realization of their interests or t o taking certain risks of this o u t c o m e ; (3) t h e r e m i g h t be differences in morally relevant needs requiring m o r e resources t o satisfy; or (4) offering i n c e n t i v e s t h a t produce differential o u t c o m e s could benefit e v e r y o n e in c o m p a r i s o n t o their c o n d i t i o n under equality. In a n y particular case t h e prima

facie

principle of equality m i g h t

n o t , t h e n , upon further c o n s i d e r a t i o n , be appropriate because of o n e these e x c e p t i o n s . Taking persons as possessors of i n h e r e n t dignity establishes a prima facie principle of equality under c o m m o n good institutions, including distributive institutions. T h i s suggests a m e t h o d for c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r distributive inequalities between people w h o share c o m m o n and u n a v o i d a b l e i n s t i t u t i o n s are all-things-considered just despite


their violation of the prima

facie

13

equality principle: O n e must c o n -

sider whether the exceptions to equality adumbrated above apply. It is highly implausible to believe that these exceptions apply when considering the bulk of current global inequality. T h e child growing up in Mali, for example, has d o n e n o t h i n g to deserve her inferior health and education prospects. Nor has she voluntarily chosen t h e m or put herself at risk having t h e m by her choices. It is outrageous to suppose that her needs are so m u c h less than the child growing up in an OCED country. Finally, the arguments of Pogge and the UNDP c o n c e r n i n g the relative costs of eliminating absolute poverty also lend credence to the claim t h a t alternative institutions can be devised that would better realize the child's interest in health. It's certainly n o t the case t h a t everyone is benefiting from these massive global inequalities. If we assume the inherent dignity of this child and children like her in t h e underdeveloped world, we have good initial reasons to believe that the inequalities between their life prospects and children growing up in OCED countries are seriously unjust.

Now that I have sketched several of the main features of t h e a c c o u n t that will be m o r e fully developed in subsequent chapters, it might be well to close these introductory arguments by contrasting my approach with Pogge's well-known h u m a n rights-based a c c o u n t of global justice. Pogge's a c c o u n t quite deservedly has received considerable attention. His argument that absolute poverty is a h u m a n rights violation caused in part by structural features of the international syst e m , especially the international borrowing and resource privileges is insightful, plausible, and t h e best moral compass we have for dealing with this urgent global problem. My account differs from his in several ways, however. First, Pogge's account is h u m a n rights based. T h e a c c o u n t I defend here begins with the inherent dignity of persons, which is typically invoked in h u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s , not with h u m a n rights themselves. Rather, the focus will be on social justice, in particular global distributive justice. Second, Pogge's a c c o u n t is sufficientarian; he is c o n c e r n e d mainly with absolute deprivation. T h e a c c o u n t that I defend argues that we have reasons to oppose distributive inequalities, which reasons


are i n d e p e n d e n t of t h e service t h a t reducing inequality c a n play in r e m e d y i n g poverty. M y a c c o u n t is, t h e n , broadly egalitarian. Pogge believes t h a t distributive injustices are ' m e r e s y m p t o m s o f a deeper injustice: t h e i m p o s i t i o n , by our g o v e r n m e n t s in our n a m e , of a coercive global order t h a t perpetuates severe poverty for m a n y w h o c a n n o t resist this i m p o s i t i o n . ' 4 3 Perhaps Pogge merely m e a n s t h a t a t t e n t i o n t o severe poverty is m o r e urgent t h a n a t t e n t i o n t o global inequality. I h a v e n o quarrel with t h a t j u d g m e n t . But his language suggests t h a t his m e a n i n g is n o t that. Rather, t h e c l a i m seems to be t h a t t h e cause of t h e u n j u s t distribution of wealth and i n c o m e is the coercive i m p o s i t i o n o f a poverty causing global order by w e a l t h y and powerful states and persons; distributive inequalities are ' m e r e s y m p t o m s ' of this. Indeed, Pogge points out t h a t his critique is n o t at all leftist. ' T h e political right, t o o , c o n d e m n s poverty caused by an unjust coercive institutional o r d e r . . . . ' 4 4 It is, however, implausible to claim t h a t if t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system did n o t provide powerful i n c e n tives to corruption and a n t i - d e m o c r a t i c power-taking by recognizing t h e legitimacy o f leaders t o b o r r o w and sell n o matter h o w t h e y take power, and if t h e World Trade Organization's ( W T O ) rules did n o t permit massive developed c o u n t r y p r o t e c t i o n i s m , then significant market-generated global inequalities in resources and o p p o r t u n i t i e s would n o t exist. T h i s is n o t to deny t h a t either t h e b o r r o w i n g and resource privileges o r t h e W T O rules are u n j u s t , but merely to d e n y that an a c c o u n t t h a t recognizes these injustices, is necessarily an egalitarian o n e . T h e political right does n o t d o u b t t h a t market-generated inequalities would exist. T h i s is because such inequalities are n o t merely t h e s y m p t o m o f t h e international borrowing and resource privileges, t h e y arise in w e l l - f u n c t i o n i n g markets for labor, resources and goods, markets t h a t reward persons o f certain talents, punish t h e unlucky and allow t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f y o u n g children to be g o v e r n e d by their parents' fortunes in the market. T h e political right a n d t h e political left do n o t generally disagree a b o u t t h e s e empirical claims. T h e disa g r e e m e n t is about their moral significance. T h e political left argues that i n s t i t u t i o n s that permit at least s o m e of t h e market-generated inequalities m e n t i o n e d above are unjust. Unlike, Pogge's criticisms, t h e n , m i n e serve t o align m y a c c o u n t w i t h t h e political left. Third, in keeping w i t h his general a p p r o a c h , w h i c h focuses o n t h e coercive

imposition

of i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions, i n c l u d i n g especially

Inequality and the Inherent Dignity of Persons 15

t h e borrowing and resource privileges, Pogge argues t h a t t h e central feature o f global i n j u s t i c e is t h e h a r m caused by i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions. Again, if h e can succeed at this t h e r e is n o reason why libertarians should not enthusiastically endorse his moral c o n c l u sions. In contrast, t h e a c c o u n t that I defend holds that global social i n j u s t i c e consists in inequalities of t h e global e c o n o m i c association, t h o s e inequalities at any rate that c a n n o t be excused by reasons like t h e four adumbrated in S e c t i o n IV above. O n e m i g h t be inclined t o t h i n k that Pogge's a c c o u n t has a certain justificatory advantage. It, unlike m i n e , holds out t h e h o p e o f bringing libertarians on board because it is based upon t h e m o r e e c u m e n i c a l h a r m - c a u s i n g c o n c e p t i o n of injustice. O n further consideration, however, it is n o t obvious t h a t t h e h o p e is well-placed and t h a t t h e advantage is very substantial. For t h e claim t h a t t h e relevant institutions cause harm is in fact controversial on b o t h empirical (the e x t e n t o f causation) and n o r m a t i v e (the nature of the h a r m ) grounds. Take causation first. T h e global e c o n o m i c association is massively c o m p l e x a n d n o t well understood. How c o n f i d e n t should we be t h a t a particular international institution, w h i c h affects all states, causes poverty especially given t h e a b u n d a n t e v i d e n c e that s o m e states are rapidly decreasing their poverty rates? Pogge, of course, has a n answer for this. O n e way h e puts t h e answer is to distinguish between local factors, w h i c h cause variations in poverty a m o n g states, and global factors, w h i c h negatively restrict the ability o f all states to m o u n t successful anti-poverty programs. 4 5 A World Bank study c o n c l u d e s t h a t c o m p l e t e trade liberalization would lower t h e G i n i coefficient of i n t e r n a t i o n a l (Milanovic's concept

2 inequality)

by 0 . 0 6 percent.

46

inequality

This conclusion,

I take it, is controversial, perhaps in part because if focuses o n l y o n t h e static effects o f c o m p l e t e liberalization. In contrast, J o s e p h E. Stiglitz a n d Andrew C h a r l t o n argue that capital market i m p e r f e c t i o n s m a k e t h e protection of i n f a n t industries in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s a necessity o f a successful d e v e l o p m e n t strategy. 4 7 But in either case we have the bases o f a r g u m e n t s to support t h e claim that W T O rules—which require that developing and underdeveloped

coun-

tries e l i m i n a t e protectionist policies, but w h i c h allow countries with h i g h l y developed e c o n o m i e s t o m a i n t a i n such p o l i c i e s — c o n t r i b u t e to i n e q u a l i t y and poverty. Either of these a r g u m e n t s t h e n could be taken to support t h e role of global factors in causing poverty, despite


t h e e x i s t e n c e of local factors as well. But given t h a t s o m e c o u n tries, m o s t n o t a b l y C h i n a , are rapidly reducing poverty, t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w t o understand t h e causation o f t h e global factors persists. Pogge suggests an analogy t o his students' learning. Individual factors m i g h t explain the variations between their p e r f o r m a n c e , w h i l e a global f a c t o r — h i s t e a c h i n g — m i g h t also exercise an effect o n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of all t h e students. [E]ven if student-specific factors fully explain observed variations in t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f m y students, t h e quality o f m y t e a c h i n g may still play a m a j o r role in e x p l a i n i n g w h y they did n o t o n the w h o l e do m u c h - b e t t e r or worse t h a n t h e y actually did. Likewise, even if c o u n t r y specific factors fully explain t h e observed variations in t h e e c o n o m i c p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h e p o o r countries, global factors m a y still play a m a j o r role in e x p l a i n i n g w h y t h e y did n o t on t h e w h o l e d o m u c h better or worse t h a n t h e y did in fact. 4 8 In the case o f the students there are two p h e n o m e n a that require e x p l a n a t i o n , students' p e r f o r m a n c e relative to o n e a n o t h e r and stud e n t s ' p e r f o r m a n c e relative to a less well-defined o p e n - e n d e d c o m m o n goal o f mastery o f t h e class material. T h e global factor o f t e a c h i n g quality m i g h t have s o m e e x p l a n a t o r y value with respect to t h e second, even if we assume it has n o n e w i t h respect to t h e first. In t h e case o f poverty reduction, t h e r e are also two p h e n o m e n a t h a t require e x p l a n a t i o n , states' success relative t o o n e a n o t h e r and states' success relative to the c o m m o n goal of poverty eradication, as defined by t h e $ 1 . 2 5 PPP/day—or s o m e o t h e r — g o a l . In t h e case o f t h e students, their approach t o t h e c o m m o n goal is quite likely a s y m p t o t i c ; t h e r e is always r o o m for i m p r o v e m e n t in t h e direction o f mastery. Hence, o n e can nearly always sensibly query w h e t h e r all or m o s t of the students would n o t learn m o r e effectively with a different t e a c h i n g approach or a different teacher, in o t h e r words with differe n t global factors. In t h e case of poverty reduction, if s o m e states are realizing s o m e well-defined goal ( $ 1 . 2 5 PPP/day or s o m e o t h e r o n e ) , laying m o r e stress o n the e x p l a n a t o r y value of local factors rather t h a n global o n e s is n o t obviously incorrect. In o t h e r words, we should expect controversy regarding t h e claim that global factors are a significant cause of poverty.

Inequality and the Inherent Dignity of Persons 17

If t h e r e is reasonable controversy regarding t h e empirical claim a b o u t t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h global factors cause poverty, t h e r e is b o u n d to be reasonable controversy regarding t h e n o r m a t i v e claim

that

global institutions are h a r m i n g t h e poor since, of course, t h e harm must be caused. But in addition to such controversy, there is the m a t t e r o f h o w h a r m is even identified. C o n s i d e r our c o m m o n - s e n s e understanding o f h a r m : Fritz's a c t i o n h a r m s Hazel o n l y if Hazel is worse off t h a n she was before Fritz acted. Following Pogge we can refer t o t h e standard e m p l o y e d as the diachronic it c o m p a r e s well-being across t i m e .

49

comparison

since

O n e recent World Bank study

finds t h a t the percentage o f people living below $ 1 . 2 5 PPP/day has been halved, falling f r o m 5 2 percent to 2 6 percent from 1 9 8 1 to 2 0 0 5 . 5 0 T h e s e findings are controversial. 5 1 Indeed, Pogge is a strong critic o f World Bank measures o f poverty. 5 2 T h e fact t h a t t h e r e is c o n troversy here is e n o u g h t o cast doubt o n t h e justificatory advantage t h a t a h a r m - c a u s i n g c o n c e p t i o n o f injustice, w h i c h uses a d i a c h r o n i c c o m p a r i s o n , has over an inequality c o n c e p t i o n . In a n y case, however, t h e international borrowing and resource privileges are long-term features o f t h e global e c o n o m y ; and it would be difficult to measure h a r m in terms o f a c o m p a r i s o n between poverty levels before their e x i s t e n c e and now. An alternative c o n c e p t i o n o f harm e m p l o y s w h a t Pogge h e calls a subjunctive

comparison.53

According to such a c o m p a r i s o n ,

harm

(or benefit) is a measure o f a person's actual c o n d i t i o n in c o m p a r ison either t o her c o n d i t i o n as it would h a v e been in t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e institutional c h a n g e (or individual a c t i o n ) or t o her c o n d i tion as it would have been under a fictional alternative institutional order (or s o m e o t h e r individual a c t i o n ) . W h e n applied to agents, t h e idea is t h a t Fritz h a r m s Hazel o n l y if either she is worse off t h a n she would h a v e been if Fritz had n o t acted or s h e is worse off t h a n s h e would have been had Fritz acted differently. Or if we accept t h e fall in poverty, as asserted in t h e World Bank study cited above, persons would be h a r m e d by global institutions (despite t h e fall in poverty) o n l y if t h e fall would have been greater either in the a b s e n c e of an i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e or under s o m e other (feasible) h y p o t h e t ical institutional a r r a n g e m e n t . The former Pogge calls a

subjunctive

comparison with an historical baseline, the latter a subjunctive comparison with a hypothetical baseline.54 The distinction that Pogge draws between local and global factors in poverty e l i m i n a t i o n allows h i m


t o argue t h a t even a state t h a t is reducing poverty m i g h t n o n e t h e l e s s be harmed by t h e global order if its poverty level would have been even better under o t h e r institutions. Now, Pogge rejects the use o f t h e s u b j u n c t i v e c o m p a r i s o n with an historical baseline because it improperly assumes that the prior historical period was neutral; h e n c e what m i g h t appear t o be an i n s t a n c e o f a benefit in relation to t h e past could suffer from an unappreciated h a r m if there were s o m e causal factor of t h e s a m e kind operating b o t h in t h e past and the present t h a t served to m a k e people worse off t h a n t h e y m i g h t b e . 5 5 T h i s m i g h t suggest t h e appropriateness o f the s u b j u n c t i v e c o m p a r i s o n with a hypothetical baseline, but Pogge Criticizes t h a t t o o for the lack of 'a precise and morally u n i q u e l y appropriate standard for c o m p a r i n g t h e t w o worlds — ' 5 6 T h e p o i n t seems to be t h a t we must c h o o s e s o m e picture o f h o w people m i g h t be t o e m p l o y such a c o m p a r i s o n , but there are m a n y possibilities; and the c o m p a r i s o n provides us with n o standard for c h o o s i n g a m o n g t h e m . Hence, Pogge c o n t e n d s t h a t an assessment of h a r m must rely on a morally justified standard, an a c c o u n t o f people's e n t i t l e m e n t s as clarified by a h a r m - i n d e p e n d e n t c o n c e p t i o n of justice. 5 7 Pogge's preferred c o n c e p t i o n is apparently broadly Lockean. 5 8 In t h e e n d Pogge is left with a n identificatory a c c o u n t of h a r m t h a t is d e p e n d e n t u p o n an a c c o u n t o f distributive justice. T h i s effectively renders null a n y justificatory advantage t h a t an a c c o u n t o f injustice as h a r m - c a u s i n g has over o n e based u p o n distributive i n e q u a l i t y since b o t h rely o n controversial a c c o u n t s o f social justice. T h e p o i n t of this section is n o t t o offer a c o n v i n c i n g critique o f Pogge's a c c o u n t o f global justice. Rather it is t o s h o w that there is n o reason t o suppose t h a t Pogge's apparently e c u m e n i c a l basis o f h a r m causing is any less philosophically controversial t h a n an a c c o u n t based upon distributive inequalities. T h i s clears away o n e source o f resistance to e x p l o r i n g a m o r e t h o r o u g h - g o i n g egalitarian p a t h . T h e r e will, of course, be m a n y obstacles a l o n g t h e way. I h o p e to avoid s o m e and r e m o v e others, a n d thereby advance s o m e distance d o w n the path in t h e chapters ahead.

2

Coercion and the Conditions of Distributive Justice

If t h e moral r e q u i r e m e n t of equal respect for all persons dictates s o m e kind o f an egalitarian distributive principal domestically, then surely it has similar i m p l i c a t i o n s globally. After all, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t c o n t a i n s a universal quantifier. But several p r o m i n e n t c o n t e m p o rary politically philosophers have presented c h a l l e n g e s to this idea. T h e strategy o f their arguments is t o claim that egalitarian justice is required domestically o n l y under c o n t i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s , w h i c h involve centrally t h e e x i s t e n c e of legal c o e r c i o n , and t h a t these c o n ditions do n o t obtain between n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s . 1 I call these a c c o u n t s coercion

accounts.

C o e r c i o n a c c o u n t s tend to c o n c l u d e either that egal-

itarian duties to c o m p a t r i o t s are weightier t h a n to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s or t h a t t h e r e are egalitarian distributive duties to c o m p a t r i o t s but n o t to non-compatriots. As will b e c o m e clear in m y discussion of c o e r c i o n theorists, I take social justice t o be a property o f social a n d political institutions. I agree with a claim stressed by c o e r c i o n theorists t h a t duties o f egalitarian justice require c o n t i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s . But in c o n t r a s t to coercion theorists, I m a i n t a i n that these c o n d i t i o n s are n o t limited to legal c o e r c i o n . In S e c t i o n II, I discuss Richard Miller's patriotic preference. In Section III m y a t t e n t i o n turns t o Michael Blake's claim t h a t duties of distributive justice are egalitarian in c o n t e n t for c o m patriots, but sufficientarian for n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s . Section IV is given over to a criticism of T h o m a s Nagel's claim t h a t duties of distributive justice d o n o t exist in t h e a b s e n c e of a sovereign state authority. 19


In S e c t i o n V, I set out an alternative a c c o u n t o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s of egalitarian justice, including an idea t h a t I call the principle

of

associational

justice. T h a t principle holds t h a t duties o f social justice exist between persons w h o h a v e a moral duty o f equal respect to o n e a n o t h e r if t h o s e persons are co-participants in an association that m e e t s certain c o n d i t i o n s . Because t h e c o n d i t i o n s are n o t limited t o institutions t h a t have coercive legal power, the principle does n o t rule out t h e possibility of global egalitarian justice. I shall n o t argue in this chapter that the global e c o n o m i c association satisfies t h e sufficient c o n d i t i o n s . T h a t a r g u m e n t I leave till Chapter 3. Finally, S e c t i o n VI c o m p a r e s t h e principle o f associational justice to the principle o f fair play for political o b l i g a t i o n , a n d argues t h a t t h e special duties o f justice entailed by principle o f associational justice are n o t vulnerable t o criticisms (whatever their merits) t h a t h a v e b e e n directed at t h e principle o f fair play for political o b l i g a t i o n .

Miller's view is that duties of distributive justice to c o m p a t r i o t s are weightier t h a n t h o s e to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s . He expresses this in terms o f a patriotic bias in favor of c o m p a t r i o t s . He argues for patriotic biases o f two kinds: A priority o f a t t e n t i o n to c o m p a t r i o t s ' needs, and a budgetary bias toward m e e t i n g those needs. 2 Both kinds of bias have fiscal i m p l i c a t i o n s . T h e budgetary bias is m e a n t to defend proportionally m u c h larger e x p e n d i t u r e s o n c o m p a t r i o t needs t h a n o n foreign aid. 3 But a t t e n d i n g t o c o m p a t r i o t s needs also requires e x p e n ditures on aid programs. T h e bias in a t t e n t i o n to c o m p a t r i o t s seems t o support t h e budgetary bias. So, t h e m a i n o b j e c t of m y interest will be t h e priority of a t t e n t i o n t o c o m p a t r i o t s . T h e moral grounds for t h e patriotic biases, a c c o r d i n g t o Miller, are twofold. T h e first is our moral interest in having relations o f mutual respect and trust with persons with w h o m we are especially i n t e r d e p e n d e n t . T h e second is t h a t t h e self-respect o f less privileged c o m p a t r i o t s requires that t h e y have appropriate incentives to follow the laws that are imposed u p o n t h e m . 4 A l t h o u g h these grounds are distinct, b o t h o f Miller's t w o central a r g u m e n t s base an appeal t o t h e first moral ground u p o n a prior appeal t o t h e s e c o n d . Miller's first a r g u m e n t in defense o f priority of a t t e n t i o n to t h e needs of c o m p a t r i o t s is based u p o n a c l a i m about t h e psychological

Coercion and the Conditions of Distributive Justice 21

limits o f trust. It asks us t o consider a 'failure t o provide tax-financed aid sufficient t o relieve serious burdens of inferior

life-prospects

a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s , w h e n this shortfall is due to provision for neediness abroad.' 5 T h e c o n s e q u e n t i a l evils o f this failure, Miller asserts, are reduced c o o p e r a t i o n on t h e part o f the disadvantaged, in w h i c h c o o p e r a t i o n is substituted by m e r e a c q u i e s c e n c e , deference out o f self-abnegation, or c o m p l i a n c e out of i g n o r a n c e . 6 T h u s , for t h e disadvantaged it is 'psychologically insupportable to engage respectfully in t h e political process that ultimately e n f o r c e s these rules.' 7 This, I take it, is an appeal to t h e second ground of t h e patriotic bias c o n c e r n ing the self-respect of the less privileged, as stated in t h e paragraph above. Now, insofar as all persons have 'an interest in having one's relationships o f d e p e n d e n c e be relationships of mutual respect and trust,' 8 t h e first ground above, all persons, n o t merely t h e disadvantaged, have an interest in avoiding t h e social evils described in this paragraph. It is i m p o r t a n t t o appreciate t h a t n o t h i n g t h a t Miller says a b o u t t h e c o n s e q u e n t i a l social evils o f failing t o f u n d aid t o disadvantaged c o m p a t r i o t s d e p e n d s upon t h e cause of t h e failure being a diversion of resources to fund global c o m m i t m e n t s . T h e a r g u m e n t is generalit could be invoked for a n y c o m p e t i n g f u n d i n g interest. If t h e appeal to t h e impossibility o f c o o p e r a t i o n on t h e basis o f respect and selfrespect is plausible, the generality of t h e a r g u m e n t favors w e i g h i n g distributive duties to c o m p a t r i o t s over all o t h e r duties w h o s e fulfillm e n t requires f u n d i n g f r o m t h e state treasury. T h e a r g u m e n t is m u c h m o r e d e m a n d i n g , and perhaps t h e n less plausible, t h a n is apparent at first glance. More i m p o r t a n t l y for present purposes, t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e r e are i m p o r t a n t moral costs associated with failing to realize t h e requirem e n t s o f d o m e s t i c distributive justice does n o t entail t h a t such requirements should be realized at t h e cost of failing to attend o t h e r d e m a n d s of justice, i n c l u d i n g global distributive justice, since these latter failures o f a t t e n t i o n m i g h t also c o m e at high moral costs. In o t h e r words, t h e moral appropriateness o f a t t e n d i n g to c o m p a t r i o t needs does n o t establish the a t t e n t i o n bias. Miller takes up t h e question of t h e c o m p a r a t i v e costs of acting o n d o m e s t i c and global duties in his discussion o f t h e budgetary bias. T h e r e he argues that e d u c a t i o n a l costs increase t h e bill for preventing d o m e s t i c social evils and t h a t international cost sharing reduces


t h e bill for preventing social evils experienced by n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s . 9 T h i s also does n o t entail t h e a t t e n t i o n bias since even if domesticsocial evils are m o r e costly to prevent, we m i g h t still be required by a morality o f equal respect to give t h e m n o greater a t t e n t i o n . Miller c o m e s closest to establishing priority of a t t e n t i o n to c o m patriots w h e n asserting t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f respect a n d trust in c o m patriot relations. Because t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s is 'specially intense and specially vulnerable to distrust and disrespect,' great a t t e n t i o n must be paid t o their relationships. 1 0 Moreover, t h e special valuing of a relationship requires taking one's own participation in t h e relationship as 'a specially d e m a n d i n g reason for appropriate forms of c o n c e r n for t h e other.' 1 1 T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are supposed to be less applicable for relations between n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s . T h e a c c o u n t must, however, establish t h a t t h e r e is n o t h i n g o f equal, greater, or i n c o m m e n s u r a t e moral import at stake in relations between n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s in order to yield t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t relat i o n s between c o m p a t r i o t s deserve greater a t t e n t i o n t h a n relations between n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s . For t h e r e is n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e claim t h a t a person has a special duty to c o m p a t r i o t s that rules out the possibility that she also has a special duty to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s t h a t is n o t easily disregarded because either it is as strong as t h e obligation t o c o m p a triots or rests on i n c o m m e n s u r a t e grounds. 1 2 Miller's first a r g u m e n t is vulnerable, t h e n , to a c h a l l e n g e that gives a plausible a c c o u n t o f the moral i m p o r t a n c e of relationships between n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s such t h a t special duties t o n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s deserve a t t e n t i o n , especially if such an a c c o u n t renders duties t o n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s n o t obviously less i m p o r t a n t morally t h a n duties t o c o m p a t r i o t s . I n o t e this here, but shall try to sketch s u c h an a c c o u n t in Section IV and t o develop it further in Chapter 3. Miller's s e c o n d a r g u m e n t in defense o f priority of a t t e n t i o n to c o m p a t r i o t s alleges a r e q u i r e m e n t to c o m p e n s a t e disadvantaged c o m patriots for the e x i s t e n c e o f coercion in a state's legal system. Selfrespect is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h support for a system o f coercion under w h i c h o n e ' s life prospects are seriously burdened, through n o c h o i c e o f o n e ' s o w n , if that burden could be e l i m i n a t e d at little cost to t h e advantaged. If self-respect is i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e disadvantaged supporting such a system, support for such a system o n t h e part o f the advantaged fails to respect the disadvantaged. 1 3 T h e s e considerations do n o t favor i m p r o v i n g c o m p a t r i o t relationships in states o t h e r


t h a n o n e ' s own if t h e special r e q u i r e m e n t s of respect w i t h i n a syst e m o f c o e r c i o n are specially i m p o r t a n t t o e a c h person in his or her c o m p a t r i o t relationships. 1 4 It is unclear w h y Miller holds that justice requires c o m p e n s a t i n g a person coerced by a system of law.15 If certain laws are otherwise a p p r o x i m a t e l y just w i t h o u t such c o m p e n s a t i o n , suppose for e x a m p l e t h a t t h e criminal law is a p p r o x i m a t e l y just, then the least advantaged h a v e a prima

facie

moral reason to follow it, even if self-respect also

requires a d v o c a t i n g for greater b a c k g r o u n d s o c i o - e c o n o m i c equality. But if s o m e aspect o f t h e c r i m i n a l law is u n j u s t , t h e n perhaps selfrespect requires a d v o c a t i n g for a c h a n g e in t h o s e laws as well as a d v o c a t i n g for greater b a c k g r o u n d s o c i o - e c o n o m i c inequality. In this latter case, a c h i e v i n g greater equality in background institutions in t h e a b s e n c e o f o t h e r reforms t o t h e legal system would n o t m a k e t h e laws t h a t still require reform acceptable t o a self-respecting person. If a set of otherwise just laws, w i t h o u t background s o c i o - e c o n o m i c equality, is with regards t o t h e just laws acceptable t o a self-respecting person, and a set of unjust laws with background equality is unacc e p t a b l e to a self-respecting person, then equality in the background i n s t i t u t i o n s is n e i t h e r necessary nor sufficient for a self-respecting person t o accept t h e rest of t h e legal system. T h e above a r g u m e n t appears devastating to t h e claim t h a t selfrespect requires that coercion necessarily be c o m p e n s a t e d . But suppose for t h e sake o f a r g u m e n t t h a t it is not. Suppose that Miller's p o i n t is generally correct. His second a r g u m e n t would still be vulnerable in t h e way t h a t t h e first is. In o t h e r words, it would be vulnerable to a c h a l l e n g e that gives a plausible a c c o u n t of t h e moral i m p o r t a n c e of relationships between n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s such t h a t special duties t o n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s are n o t obviously less i m p o r t a n t t h a n special duties to compatriots.

T h e coercion a c c o u n t s of Blake and Nagel differ from Miller's in n o t assigning greater weight to distributive duties to c o m p a t r i o t s t h a n to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s — a differential w e i g h t a s s i g n m e n t t h a t in principle is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h duties being identical in c o n t e n t — b u t in c l a i m i n g that moral duties t o c o m p a t r i o t s differ in c o n t e n t or kind from t h o s e to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s .


According t o Blake this is a difference between duties of egalitarian distributive justice and duties o f justice directed toward m a i n t a i n ing a sufficient m i n i m u m level of resources t o allow for a u t o n o m o u s agency. Blake argues that an impartial respect for the a u t o n o m y of all persons yields different principles of distributive justice domestically and i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . 1 6 Domestically t h e principle must be sensitive to relative deprivation and tends toward equality;

internationally

it must be sensitive o n l y to absolute deprivation and requires o n l y sufficiency for a u t o n o m o u s living. 1 7 As Blake recognizes, even a c o m m i t m e n t t o sufficiency c o n d e m n s t h e a b j e c t poverty of nearly half the world's p o p u l a t i o n . Indeed, his sufficiency principle is radical in the current political c o n t e x t a n d , I believe, w o r t h y o f support t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t it finds its way into real political debate. But Blake's argum e n t t h a t equal respect for a u t o n o m y requires o n l y a c o m m i t m e n t t o sufficiency is u n c o n v i n c i n g . Blake's a r g u m e n t involves t h e application of a liberal principle o f a u t o n o m y t o both d o m e s t i c and i n t e r n a t i o n a l cases, but with different results. T h e principle states t h a t , 'all h u m a n beings h a v e t h e moral e n t i t l e m e n t t o exist as a u t o n o m o u s agents, and they h a v e e n t i t l e m e n t s to t h o s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s and c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h this is possible.' 1 8 Insofar as t h e principle e m p l o y s t h e subject 'all h u m a n beings,' it does n o t distinguish between c o m p a t r i o t s a n d n o n c o m p a t r i o t s . S i n c e f a m i n e , abject poverty and serious oppression can severely impair a u t o n o m o u s agency, all persons are entitled, by t h e principle o f liberal a u t o n o m y , t o insurance against these. 1 9 Thus, liberal global justice, according t o Blake, makes significant redistributive demands. Blake takes egalitarian distributive justice t o be a

justificatory

r e q u i r e m e n t o f t h e coercive character o f private and tax law, but c o n c l u d e s t h a t such coercion is a necessary c o n d i t i o n of justified egalitarian distributive justice. 2 0 T h e coercion of private and tax law requires justification in order to be c o n s i s t e n t with t h e liberal value of a u t o n o m y . Blake suggests t h a t t h e justification should appeal t o a version o f h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s e n t . 2 1 In ascertaining w h e t h e r a legal regime m e e t s with t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s e n t o f those governed by it, o n e has t o set aside certain morally arbitrary properties of actual persons t h a t m i g h t influence their willingness t o c o n s e n t . H e n c e Blake takes the Rawlsian original position to be a useful device for ascertaining w h e t h e r h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s e n t exists. 2 2


In o n e passage devoted toward distinguishing t h e differing grounds for distributive justice d o m e s t i c a l l y and globally, Blake m a k e s t h e following a r g u m e n t : T h e liberal principle o f a u t o n o m y requires t h a t coercion be justified t h r o u g h o f this c o n s e n t

h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s e n t , and t h a t t h e

conditions

in t h e arena o f private law may

require—as

Rawls argues they d o — c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f relative deprivation and material equality. It is n o t the case, therefore, that

liberalism

is c o m m i t t e d to an equality o f material shares in t h e global arena. 2 3 Read o n e way this a r g u m e n t is acceptable but trivial. It is t h e case t h a t

from t h e claim t h a t egalitarian

necessary for t h e justification

distributive

justice is

of private law it does n o t

follow

t h a t egalitarian distributive justice is required globally. But Blake's a c c o u n t w a n t s more, n a m e l y t h a t t h e claim t h a t egalitarian distributive justice is a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f justified private law s o m e h o w entails that in the a b s e n c e of private law there is n o justification

for egalitarian distributive

justice.

For Blake asserts

that, ' C o e r c i o n , n o t c o o p e r a t i o n , is t h e sine qua n o n of distributive justice, m a k i n g relevant principles o f relative But it is n o t

t h e case that

t h e c l a i m that

deprivation.' 2 4

egalitarian

distribu-

tive justice is a necessary c o n d i t i o n of justified private law entails t h a t private law is a necessary c o n d i t i o n

of justified

egalitarian

distributive principles. Nor, for t h a t matter, does t h e

entailment

o b t a i n from t h e premise t h a t the e x i s t e n c e o f egalitarian distributive justice is sufficient for the justification of private law. To t h i n k o t h e r w i s e would seem t o involve c o n f u s i o n a b o u t t h e c h a n g i n g application of t h e predicate justified. ficient

From the claim t h a t E is suf-

for justified C, we may n o t c o n c l u d e t h a t C is necessary for

justified E. Additionally, Blake m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e r e is e x p l a n a t o r y value t o t h e claim t h a t institutions of egalitarian justice require coercion for their justification. Taking c o e r c i o n as a necessary c o n d i t i o n of justified egalitarianism would explain w h y egalitarian principles are required o f states but n o t of c h u r c h e s and universities. 2 5 But traditionally t h e r e is a different e x p l a n a t i o n of this. C h u r c h e s and universities are voluntary organizations and liberals tend to believe the principles of


justice d o n o t govern t h e internal life o f such organizations so strictly. For e x a m p l e , n o t o n l y is it n o t t h e case t h a t such organizations must adhere t o principles o f egalitarian distributive justice in their internal affairs, it is also not t h e case t h a t they must be internally d e m o c r a t i c . Even Robert Nozick's strict r e q u i r e m e n t s of liberty are relaxed for voluntary organizations. 2 6 Blake holds (in t h e q u o t a t i o n cited three paragraphs above) t h a t there is a Rawlsian pedigree to t h e claim t h a t coercive private and tax law require egalitarian distributive justice. O n e way—Blake's way a p p a r e n t l y — t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between private and t a x law a n d egalitarian distributive justice is to take the reasons on b e h a l f of t h e former to be distinct from t h e reasons on behalf of the latter. W h a t e v e r reasons t h e r e are for t h e law—reasons of e n l i g h t e n e d self-interest, for e x a m p l e — t h e y h a v e n o t h i n g t o do with egalitarian distributive justice. But, so t h e a c c o u n t goes, such reasons are insufficient,

morally speaking, for the justification of the c o e r c i o n that

t h e law permits or requires. So, c o m p e n s a t i o n is required t o t h o s e coerced, c o m p e n s a t i o n sufficient t o render morally permissible acting o n the o t h e r (non-egalitarian) reasons for t h e law. S o m e t h i n g like this would explain w h y s o m e o n e m i g h t t h i n k that in the a b s e n c e o f c o e r c i o n t h e r e are n o moral reasons for egalitarian distributive justice. For this view takes apparent re-distribution as actual c o m p e n s a t i o n . But that idea fits rather m o r e c o m f o r t a b l y with Nozick's libertarian a c c o u n t of justice, t h a n with J o h n Rawls's egalitarianism. 2 7 Blake appeals t o t h e fact t h a t Political

Liberalism

is centrally c o n c e r n e d

with t h e justification o f t h e use of coercive political power t o defend the Rawlsian pedigree of his coercion a c c o u n t . But Political

Liberalism

is less c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e justification o f principles o f justice t h a n with their legitimacy. T h e r e is a n o t h e r way t o understand t h e relationship

between

coercive private a n d tax law a n d egalitarian distributive justice. In A Theory

of Justice,

w h e r e Rawls most extensively discusses the rela-

t i o n s h i p between t h e justification o f principles o f justice a n d t h e justification of institutions, such as private law, t h e justification o f i n s t i t u t i o n s requires that t h e y serve principles of justice. Egalitarianism is n o t brought in after t h e fact as a c o m p e n s a t o r y measure for c o e r c i o n . Rawls takes t h e justification of i n s t i t u t i o n s t o o c c u r at t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l and legislative stages, w h i c h presuppose a prior stage at w h i c h principles of justice are d e t e r m i n e d . 2 8


In contrast to Blake's coercion account, let's call Rawls's a c c o u n t institutional.

He distinguishes 'between those institutions or aspects

thereof which must inevitably apply to us since we are born into t h e m and they regulate t h e full scope of our activity, and those that apply to us because we have freely d o n e certain things as a rational way of advancing our ends.' 2 9 He takes us to have natural duties of justice in regard to the first kind of institutions, but not in regard to the second kind. Rawls takes an institution to be 'a public system of rules w h i c h defines office and positions with their rights and duties, powers and immunities, and the like.' 3 0 As examples of institutions, Rawls offers 'games and rituals, trials, and parliaments, markets and systems of property.' 3 1 As his discussion of promising makes clear, a public system of rules need be neither written nor legislated by an official body. 3 2 There is n o t h i n g in this a c c o u n t to suggest t h a t duties of justice require a coercive framework. T h e m o r e plausible tracing of the Rawlsian pedigree the relationship between institutions of coercion and principles of justice, t h e n , does n o t support Blake's thesis.

Although Blake believes that we have duties of distributive justice, differing in c o n t e n t , to both compatriots and n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s , Nagel argues for a higher order difference in kind. Our moral duties to c o m patriots include duties of distributive justice, but to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s they include o n l y duties of h u m a n i t a r i a n i s m . If Miller were to assign a weight of zero to duties of egalitarian distributive justice to n o n compatriots, his and Nagel's views would be extensionally equivalent with respect to w h a t we owe n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s in light of distributive justice, namely n o t h i n g . In contrast as we have seen, Blake m a i n t a i n s that we have duties of distributive justice to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s that are sufficientarian, that require that global institutions ensure that persons have sufficient resources for living minimally autonomously. Nagel's view is, t h e n , the most basic rejection of duties of distributive justice to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s of the three coercion theorists surveyed here. Nagel is fairly tentative about the argument in the article under question, pursuing it partly because it 'is accepted by most people in the privileged n a t i o n s of the world,' and partly because he thinks that 'it is probably correct.' 3 3


For t h o s e w h o accept t h a t duties o f justice are special moral duties, n o t owed t o e v e r y o n e merely in virtue o f their p e r s o n h o o d , it is sensible t o c o n c e i v e o f t h e problem o f giving an a c c o u n t of h o w duties o f justice are generated as the problem of a c c o u n t i n g for ' t h e characteristic in virtue o f w h i c h they [institutions] create obligations of justice a n d p r e s u m p t i o n s in favor o f equal c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . . . ' 3 4 Nagel allows that basic h u m a n i t a r i a n duties require us to ameliorate absolute poverty in w h i c h persons in t h e developing and underdeveloped live, but this is n o t a matter o f justice. T h e g r u e s o m e facts o f i n e q u a l i t y are familiar.... T h e facts are so grim t h a t justice m a y be a side issue. W h a t e v e r view o n e takes of t h e applicability or inapplicability o f standards o f justice to such a situation, it is clearly a disaster f r o m a more broadly h u m a n i t a r i a n p o i n t o f view. I assume t h a t there is s o m e m i n i m a l c o n c e r n w e owe to fellow h u m a n beings t h r e a t e n e d with starvation or severe m a l n u t r i t i o n a n d early death f r o m easily p r e v e n t a b l e diseases, as all o f these people in dire poverty are. 3 5 Nagel does not discuss in great detail what h e takes to be the difference between duties of h u m a n i t y and duties o f justice. He says o n l y that, ' H u m a n i t a r i a n duties hold in virtue o f the absolute rather t h a n relative level of need of t h e people we are in a position to help. Justice, by contrast, is c o n c e r n e d with t h e relations between the c o n d i t i o n s o f different classes of people, a n d t h e causes o f inequality between t h e m . ' 3 6 O f t e n the difference between h u m a n i t a r i a n duties and duties of justice is also taken to incorporate t w o f u n d a m e n t a l distinctions, general versus special duties, a n d imperfect versus perfect duties. T h e first distinction captures t h e idea t h a t duties o f h u m a n i t y are owed t o all persons, wherever t h e y m i g h t be, merely in virtue of their personh o o d whereas duties of justice are special duties owed o n l y t o s o m e persons; such duties are c o n t i n g e n t o n certain pre-existing relations or institutions. If o n e ' s relationship to a n o t h e r is n o t appropriately mediated, then o n e has n o duty of justice to the other. T h e seco n d distinction c o n c e r n s a person's range of c h o i c e in fulfilling t h e duties. Duties o f h u m a n i t y typically, b u t n o t always, present persons with latitude to c h o o s e w h e n to act. Duties o f justice do n o t , and m a y be c o m p e l l e d by a legal system. A l t h o u g h fulfilling duties of


h u m a n i t y m i g h t s o m e t i m e s be best d o n e t h r o u g h collective a c t i o n , it does n o t require institutional m e d i a t i o n . Duties o f justice, however, are fulfilled variously by o b e y i n g , reforming, o v e r t h r o w i n g , or building institutions as t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s require. Indeed, justice is often understood as a property of i n s t i t u t i o n s o f the right sort, whereas b e n e f i c e n c e is a property of actions (individual or collective). Insofar as Nagel affirms this traditional distinction between h u m a n i tarian duties a n d duties of justice, he is d e n y i n g both t h a t t h e moral duties t h a t exist in virtue of global poverty require r e f o r m i n g current i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions or building n e w global o n e s and

that

a n y moral duties exist at all in virtue of the deep global inequality. He is n o t necessarily c l a i m i n g , however, t h a t USA's paltry foreign aid b u d g e t — w h i c h is m e r e l y 0 . 1 8 percent o f its GNI and is often politically directed—suffices t o m e e t duties t o h u m a n i t y to globally poor. 3 7 Nagel's rejection o f duties o f egalitarian justice to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s is based o n t h e claim t h a t t h e r e is a moral p r e s u m p t i o n

against

arbitrary—or morally undeserved—inequalities o n l y if they exist between persons w h o are c o - m e m b e r s o f the s a m e set of coercively imposed rules. But unlike Miller and Blake, Nagel takes t h e morally salient c o n d i t i o n n o t o n l y as the fact t h a t persons are subject to coercively imposed rules, but also t h a t they are the authors o f such rules. [I]t is this c o m p l e x f a c t — t h a t we are b o t h putative j o i n t authors o f t h e coercively imposed system, a n d s u b j e c t t o it n o r m s , i.e., e x p e c t e d to accept their authority even w h e n t h e collective decision diverges from our personal preferences—that creates

the

special presumption against arbitrary inequalities in our t r e a t m e n t by t h e system. 3 8 I call this the subject-sovereign

condition.

T h e salience of t h e c o n d i -

t i o n seems to be t h a t it involves a twofold e n g a g e m e n t o f t h e will, as o b e d i e n t citizen and as legislator—the citizen-subject and the citizensovereign. T h i s twofold e n g a g e m e n t of the will is supposed to be ' t h e characteristic feature' o f state institutions w h e r e b y t h e y give rise to duties o f egalitarian justice. State institutions, and o n l y state institutions, are assumed to satisfy t h e subject-sovereign c o n d i t i o n . But w h y does this limit the


presumption against arbitrary inequalities o n l y to such institutions? T h e following t h r e e s e n t e n c e s appear t o be t h e crux of Nagel's answer: Insofar as those [state] institutions a d m i t arbitrary inequalities, we are, even t h o u g h the responsibility has been simply h a n d e d to us, responsible for t h e m , and we therefore h a v e standing t o ask w h y we should accept t h e m . This request for justification has moral weight even if we have in practice n o c h o i c e but to live under t h e e x i s t i n g regime. T h e reason is t h a t its r e q u i r e m e n t s c l a i m our active c o o p e r a t i o n , and this c a n n o t be legitimately d o n e w i t h o u t justification—otherwise it is pure c o e r c i o n . 3 9 T h i s passage is o n e of a c o u p l e in w h i c h Nagel's reasoning is explicitly laid o u t . Hence, I devote t h e r e m a i n d e r of this section t o discussing it in detail. T h e first s e n t e n c e of t h e passage seems to offer o n e kind o f answer a l t h o u g h Nagel does n o t o v e r w h e l m us with t h e details. As citizen-sovereigns w e are responsible for t h e laws o f t h e state. T h i s responsibility c o n v e y s standing upon us to d e m a n d a justification o f laws promulgated in our n a m e . T h e o n l y kind o f justification that would be a d e q u a t e apparently is o n e t h a t includes a presumption against laws that permit arbitrary inequalities. Two matters are worth n o t i n g here. First, the c l a i m seems to be that the responsibility of a citizen-sovereign is a sufficient c o n d i t i o n for d e m a n d i n g a justification. T h i s , however, is n o t w h a t Nagel's a r g u m e n t needs. It needs an a r g u m e n t establishing t h a t c o - m e m b e r s h i p in a state is a necessary c o n d i t i o n for establishing duties of egalitarian distributive justice. If t h e a r g u m e n t establishes o n l y t h a t it is a sufficient c o n d i t i o n his a r g u m e n t fails in a familiar way—a failure shared by t h e a r g u m e n t s of Miller and Blake. It fails to rule out t h e possibility that t h e global e c o n o m i c association generates duties o f distributive justice. Moreover, by appearances t h e first s e n t e n c e is c l a i m i n g t h a t it is in virtue of their role as citizen-sovereigns t h a t persons have standing to d e m a n d justification. Now, if t h a t is t h e case it is n o t clear w h y t h e justification can be d e m a n d e d o n l y of laws t h a t affect fellow citizens. W h y do citizen-sovereigns have n o standing t o d e m a n d a justification regarding i m m i g r a t i o n policy for w h i c h they are responsible, but a c c o r d i n g to Nagel for w h i c h ' n o justification is required'? 4 0


W h y isn't a justification required for every law for w h i c h a citizensovereign cares t o d e m a n d a justification? In all legislation t h e state is acting in t h e n a m e o f t h e citizen-sovereign. It is, after all, an import a n t t h e m e in discussions o f moral justification, t h a t t h e scope o f justification is n o t necessarily limited o n l y to t h o s e w h o have standing t o d e m a n d it. 4 1 T h e r e is a familiar legal analog. Guardians or possessors of power of attorney, for e x a m p l e , can d e m a n d justification for t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h o s e w h o s e interests t h e y protect. Even if being a citizen is a necessary c o n d i t i o n to have standing in t h e c o u r t of morality t o press for relief f r o m arbitrary inequalities (a claim that I do not believe Nagel has supported), it does n o t follow t h a t it is o n l y arbitrary inequalities a m o n g citizens t h a t require relief. Nagel's third s e n t e n c e in t h e passage above seems t o m a k e a differe n t kind of point. Here t h e c o n c e r n s e e m s t o be a b o u t citizen-subjects rather than t h e citizen-sovereigns. T h e laws claim t h e willing cooperation citizen-subjects. If t h e laws fail t o gain this, t h e y merely coerce t h e citizen-subject. Here it is n o t that responsibility c o n f e r s standing to d e m a n d justification, but that willing c o o p e r a t i o n requires the laws t o be justified to those persons w h o s e activity is c o n s t r a i n e d by t h e laws. O n c e again t h e reasoning is sparse, but an unstated assumption seems to be that t h e o n l y kind o f justification t h a t would be adequate is o n e that includes a presumption against background institutions that permit arbitrary inequalities. If this is Nagel's argum e n t , t h e n it is o n e t h a t I rejected in Section II w h e n discussing Miller. If certain laws are otherwise a p p r o x i m a t e l y just, search and seizure laws for e x a m p l e , in t h e a b s e n c e of b a c k g r o u n d distributive justice, t h e n citizens have a prima

facie moral reason to follow t h o s e

laws. G o o d moral reasons t o follow t h e law stave off t h e threat o f c o e r c i o n . Rut if the laws are unjust, laws t h a t d o n o t require warrants for searches for e x a m p l e , but t h e r e is background distributive equality, t h e moral case for t h e u n j u s t law is n o t s t r e n g t h e n e d by t h e b a c k g r o u n d equality. Distributive justice is n e i t h e r necessary nor sufficient for avoiding coercion in t h e rest o f t h e legal system. Nagel offers n o c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t in defense of the claim that coercive i n s t i t u t i o n s a c t i n g in n a m e o f t h o s e t h e y legally coerce is a necessary c o n d i t i o n for t h e standards o f distributive justice t o apply. Indeed this seems implausible. C o n s i d e r a case in w h i c h o n l y Nagel's first necessary c o n d i t i o n is m e t : A set of institutions u n a v o i d a b l y


structures o p p o r t u n i t i e s and o u t c o m e s for persons, using various features of their natural and social c i r c u m s t a n c e over w h i c h t h e y h a v e n o c o n t r o l , such t h a t from an early age s o m e are m o r e likely t o be privileged t h a n others. Moreover, these privileges dramatically affect their most i m p o r t a n t interests, such as t h e likelihood that they will die before t h e age o f five. T h i s set of institutions serves powerful private a n d collective interests w h o benefit from its system of incentives and disincentives. All o f this is alterable by t h e collective efforts o f persons, by for e x a m p l e pressuring t h o s e w h o speak in their n a m e t o c h a n g e t h e existing i n s t i t u t i o n a l rules and t o establish different institutions t h a t structure incentives and disincentives differently. It is not a matter of natural fate t h a t people's lives must be affected by t h e s e institutions in this way. To deny t h a t a n y standards o f distributive justice apply in t h e case above is t o claim that a l t h o u g h it is possible t o improve t h e well-being o f t h o s e faring the worst under c o m m o n

institutions,

w h i c h t h e y individually c a n n o t avoid, but w h i c h we collectively c a n c h a n g e , w e h a v e n o prima facie duty o f justice t o do so. Yet, in a c o m m o n g o o d association those faring worst do not deserve their worse social fate; and those m o s t privileged have n o special e n t i t l e m e n t to their privileges. Both t h e lack of privileges a n d the privileges result from t h e m a n n e r in w h i c h institutions use persons' social and natural features, w h i c h persons do not c h o o s e . Nor are the c o n d i t i o n s for persons in e a c h group t h e result o n l y o f consensual transactions. Rather, c h o i c e is c o n s t r a i n e d within institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s t h a t individually persons d o n o t c o n t r o l . If t h e differential institutionally conferred o u t c o m e s for t h e worst-off are n o t better t h a n t h o s e o f an institutional rival, if t h e y are n o t deserved, if t h e y do n o t respond t o differential need, or if they are n o t t h e result o n l y o f c h o i c e , t h e n it seems h i g h l y plausible t h a t they are unjust. It s e e m s i n c r e d i b l e — and is in any case not established by Nagel—that the fact t h a t t h e differential o u t c o m e s were not i m p o s e d by a sovereign g o v e r n m e n t speaking in t h e n a m e o f t h e people should bar this j u d g m e n t . 4 2

I allow that justice is a property o f social and political institutions so that duties of egalitarian distributive justice d o n o t exist between pers o n s merely in virtue of their p e r s o n h o o d . 4 3 According to this view,


duties o f justice are special moral duties. In this section, I develop an alternative a c c o u n t of t h e sufficient c o n d i t i o n s of justice, an institutional a c c o u n t t h a t is n o t reliant o n t h e e x i s t e n c e o f c o e r c i o n . T h e strategy then is to refute t h e claim t h a t coercion is a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f egalitarian distributive justice by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t n o n - c o e r c i v e i n s t i t u t i o n s m a y suffice. I wish to uphold what I call the principle

of associational

justice,

w h i c h is t h e following: Duties o f justice exist between persons w h o h a v e a moral duty of equal respect to o n e a n o t h e r if those persons are co-participants in an association of t h e requisite kind, o n e t h a t is relatively strong, largely n o n - v o l u n t a r y , constitutive o f a significant part of the background rules for t h e various relationships o f their public lives, and g o v e r n e d by institutional n o r m s t h a t m a y be subject to h u m a n c o n t r o l . An association is strong to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it is enduring, c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y g o v e r n e d by institutional n o r m s a n d regularly affecting the highest order moral interests o f t h e persons associated. Weak associations blur i n t o mere interactions. And so t h e limit at which an association e n d s and interaction begins is n o t always clear. N o n e t h e l e s s certain applications are. An association is n o n - v o l u n t a r y to the e x t e n t that there is n o reasonable alternative to participation in t h e association. In C h a p t e r 3, I argue t h a t the global e c o n o m i c association c o n stitutes a n association o f t h e sort necessary for g e n e r a t i n g duties o f justice. For t h e t i m e being, n o t i c e that if it is t h e case t h a t we have special duties of justice t o n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s , duties o f global justice, this d o e s n o t gainsay t h e claim t h a t we have o t h e r special duties o f justice to c o m p a t r i o t s in virtue of our shared political association. But because t h e s e t w o kinds o f special duties of justice derive from different associational sources, t h e y m i g h t be based u p o n different sorts o f moral considerations, a n d therefore n o t be obviously c o m mensurable. M i c h a e l Walzer holds that, 'Every social g o o d or set o f goods c o n s t i t u t e s . . . a distributive sphere w i t h i n w h i c h o n l y certain criteria a n d a r r a n g e m e n t s are appropriate.' 4 4 I shall defend s o m e t h i n g similar, albeit perhaps m o r e restricted, with respect to political and e c o n o m i c associations in C h a p t e r 3. T h e r e I shall argue that duties of justice between c o m p a t r i o t s derive from t h e d e m a n d s of justificatory respect applied to t h e c o n t e x t o f shared political institutions and serve to realize the ideal of equal citizenship. Insofar as equal citizenship requires i n s u r a n c e against inequalities in t h e distribution of


wealth a n d i n c o m e , duties of distributive justice a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s are sufficientarian. Duties of egalitarian distributive justice between n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , derive from t h e d e m a n d s o f justificatory respect applied to an e c o n o m i c association a n d an interpretation o f t h e goods that it distributes and affects. Such duties serve t o realize t h e ideal o f reciprocity. In effect, this t u r n s t h e table o n coercion theorists, by c o n c l u d i n g t h a t duties in virtue o f e c o n o m i c i n s t i t u t i o n s rather t h a n political o n e s are egalitarian. T h e c o n s t r a i n t of justificatory respect requires that institutional rules for h o w t o assign t h e benefits and burdens o f a c o m m o n g o o d association be presumptively egalitarian. T h i s is because any rule must receive the reasonable e n d o r s e m e n t of all of t h o s e to w h o m it applies. And, rules t h a t assign benefits a n d burdens differentially will tend t o be rejected, d e p e n d i n g , of course, on t h e criteria o f assignm e n t and t h e c o n s t r a i n t s on c o n s e n t . T h e r e are two aspects o f t h e presumption for equality. T h e first is procedural equality. A proposal for a set o f rules t h a t allows for u n e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n o f persons under t h e operation o f o t h e r rules, or unequal powers o f persons t o operate the rules, will t e n d to be rejected b y t h o s e w h o m i g h t be rendered vulnerable or weak by t h e set of rules. T h e second is o u t c o m e equality. A rule t h a t permits o u t c o m e s that deviate from equality will tend to be rejected b y those w h o m i g h t be placed in inferior positions (relative to others) according to the rules. T h i s p r e s u m p t i o n in favor o u t c o m e equality is neutral w i t h respect to w h e t h e r inequalities o f c o n d i t i o n t h a t are i m p o r t a n t for distributive justice are most plausibly taken t o be, say, either goods and resources or capabilities. A m o n g n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s w h o are associates in an e c o n o m i c assoc i a t i o n , t h e p r e s u m p t i o n against o u t c o m e inequality is directed t o inequalities o f c o n d i t i o n t h a t are material t o t h e goods t h a t t h a t association distributes. T h e p r e s u m p t i o n s in favor o f b o t h procedural and o u t c o m e equality are defeasible, but they have t h e effect o f placing the justificatory burden o n t h o s e w h o advocate rules t h a t establish inequalities. T h e denial o f the claim t h a t equal respect entails p r e s u m p t i o n s o f procedural and o u t c o m e equality allows that persons w i t h n o reasonable alternative to participation in a set of rules t h a t regularly affect their highest order moral interests a n d t h a t regulate their public interaction with others m a y be assigned inferior p r o t e c t i o n , powers and o u t c o m e s by t h o s e rules w i t h o u t any r e q u i r e m e n t that


these inequalities be justifiable t o t h e m . A version o f this denial is entailed by c o e r c i o n a c c o u n t s . T h e c o e r c i o n theorist e m p h a s i z e s t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the m a n n e r in which such rules permitting inequality are imposed ( n o t their mere existence) a n d the existence o f sanctions for rules-breakers. S h e c l a i m s that an egalitarian presumption is o n l y required by rules t h a t are imposed by s o m e sort o f process o f legislation—whatever t h a t m i g h t i n v o l v e — a n d t h a t are backed by legal s a n c t i o n . Anarchic social processes that leave persons w i t h n o reasonable alternative t o c o m p l i a n c e require n o justification, even w h e n such processes c a n be b r o u g h t under social c o n t r o l . T h e difference between t h e coercion a c c o u n t and m y institutional a c c o u n t c a n be analyzed as a disagreement a b o u t the r e q u i r e m e n t s of legislative i n t e n t and legal s a n c t i o n . T h e institutional a c c o u n t holds t h a t legislative i n t e n t o f u n e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n , powers and o u t c o m e s need n o t exist in order for inequality to require justification; rather t h e ability t o exercise social c o n t r o l over, and in particular prevent or remedy, such inequality is relevant. Moreover, t h e institutional a c c o u n t holds t h a t legal s a n c t i o n is n o t necessary; rather t h e lack o f a reasonable alternative for the pursuit of one's highest order moral interests is the issue. According to m y institutional a c c o u n t , t h e n , associates may be involved in an u n j u s t i n s t i t u t i o n w i t h o u t t h e deliberative i n t e n t i o n to s a n c t i o n t h o s e w h o do not accept t h e rules. T h e i n j u s t i c e c a n derive from inequalities in b o t h t h e t r e a t m e n t o f persons by rules and t h e o u t c o m e o p t i o n s t h a t t h e rules afford persons, if t h e s e inequalities are subject t o social c o n t r o l , and if persons have n o reasonable alternative t o living in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e rules. To borrow and adapt a phrase f r o m Karl Marx, c o e r c i o n a c c o u n t s seem t o rely on a fictio juris.45

For a l t h o u g h it is t h e case t h a t where leg-

islation exists h u m a n c o n t r o l is possible, and w h e r e legal s a n c t i o n s exist t h e r e may be n o reasonable alternative t o c o m p l i a n c e , in both cases the legal relation is simply an i n s t a n c e o f t h e morally relevant relationship, n o t a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f it. T h e defeasible presumption in favor o f equality c o n s t r a i n s policy justification in a broadly egalitarian direction. I m a g i n e a rule t h a t would result in massive disparities in life prospects, rendering s o m e significantly worse off t h a n others. Consider as a defense of this rule merely t h a t it would m a k e s o m e persons better off. Justificatory respect would rule out such a defense since it takes the lesser shares o f s o m e to be justified merely by t h e greater shares of others.


T h i s could n o t be reasonably endorsed by t h o s e w h o m i g h t be m a d e worse off. Now, in fact, t h e r e a n u m b e r of r e a s o n s — o t h e r t h a n merely t h a t it makes s o m e people better o f f — w h i c h defenders of such a policy m i g h t have at h a n d . A full a c c o u n t o f the justificatory d e m a n d s of equal respect would require an a c c o u n t of w h i c h kind of reasons are arbitrary from a moral p o i n t of view and therefore t o be disqualified. And a t h o u g h t e x p e r i m e n t , w h i c h disqualified these kinds o f reasons from e n t e r i n g the deliberative process, would be o f great use in d e t e r m i n i n g w h a t equal respect requires. T h i s , I take it, is t h e promise of t h e Rawlsian original p o s i t i o n . 4 6 We need n o t e m p l o y the Rawlsian original position globally, however, to discern, as I h a v e tried t o do here, an egalitarian t e n d e n c y in t h e justificatory requirem e n t s o f equal respect. At t h e level of basic principle, at least, equal respect requires an egalitarian c o m m i t m e n t .

T h e principle o f associational justice is distinct from t h e principle o f fair play or fairness as defended by H.L.A. Hart and Rawls. 4 7 T h e two principles are indeed similar insofar as both purport that certain c o n t i n g e n t c i r c u m s t a n c e s of social life generate moral responsibilities. In the case o f t h e principle o f fair play the fact t h a t s o m e persons c o n strain their a c t i o n s a c c o r d i n g t o rules that g e n e r a t e social benefits (but perhaps o n l y o f a certain kind) is t h e basis o f t h e putative obligation o f o t h e r s w h o e n j o y t h o s e benefits t o constrain their action as well. T h e principle o f fair play is, as Brian Barry points out, conservative in the sense t h a t the obligation it states is to follow t h e rules t h a t are socially recognized. 4 8 T h e principle o f fair play does n o t provide t h e basis for arguing for a c h a n g e in t h e rules of association. In games, however, we are familiar with t w o different kinds o f appeals t o fairness. O n e is an appeal t o play by the established rules. T h e o t h e r is a c h a l l e n g e t o the established rules w h e n it is c o m plained, for e x a m p l e , t h a t they give an unfair advantage t o certain players. W h a t is true o f g a m e s is also true of social life. W h e t h e r an advantage is fair does n o t d e p e n d o n l y on w h e t h e r it results from following s o m e set o f acknowledged rules since t h e rules t h e m s e l v e s c a n treat persons unfairly. 4 9 To claim otherwise is t o c o m m i t oneself to an implausible view that I have elsewhere called

justice-positivism.50

T h e principle of fair play in political obligation is a n a l o g o u s o n l y to


t h e first appeal. T h e principle of associational justice c a n yield c l a i m s a n a l o g o u s t o t h e s e c o n d kind of appeal. For according t o t h e latter principle t h e e x i s t e n c e o f institutions o f t h e requisite kind places t h o s e persons w h o share t h e institutions under duties t h a t may or m a y n o t be recognized by t h e actual rules t h a t govern their c o n d u c t within the institution. T h e principle o f fair play has been t h o u g h t by m a n y to be vulnerable to criticism. Suppose a person receives benefits from the activity o f others, but n o t benefits t h a t she d e e m s t o be w o r t h the costs to her of participating in or o f f u n d i n g t h e activity. W h y does t h e activity o f o t h e r s create in her an obligation o f fair play to constrain her a c t i o n in c o n f o r m i t y with t h a t o f the others? 5 1 W h e t h e r or n o t the critic i s m directed at t h e principle o f fair play is on target (and it is n o t m y purpose here t o d e t e r m i n e this), it would seem n o t if aimed at t h e principle o f associational justice. For t h e p o i n t o f t h e latter is n o t that shirkers have violated an obligation to play by t h e rules, but t h a t institutionally mediated interaction o f certain kinds e n g e n ders duties o f justice a m o n g t h e participants, w h i c h duties are n o t necessarily to act according to the existing institutional rules. M u c h of the spirit o f the criticism of t h e principle of fair play seems to derive from a background suspicion cast on claims of special moral duties arising by m e a n s other than s o m e form o f c o n s e n t or v o l u n tary a c t i o n . And such suspicion might also illuminate a weakness in t h e principle of associational justice. According t o the principle of associational justice, t h e e x i s t e n c e o f duties o f justice is a f u n c t i o n o f t h e justificatory d e m a n d s o f equal respect in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e exist e n c e of an association o f t h e requisite kind. And this latter c o n t e x t m a y be, indeed typically must be, n o n - v o l u n t a r y . T h e suspicion against t h e e x i s t e n c e of n o n - v o l u n t a r y special duties noted in t h e previous paragraph can be expressed s o m e w h a t m o r e c o m p l e t e l y as follows: W e h a v e general moral duties to all persons; but if we have special moral duties or o b l i g a t i o n s it must be because o f s o m e action (for e x a m p l e , including, but n o t limited t o promising) t h a t we have voluntary performed. 5 2 But according t o t h e principle of associational justice, we m a y h a v e special duties of justice to certain persons with w h o m we share an association even if our status as co-associationists is n o n - v o l u n t a r y . It seems h i g h l y unlikely t h a t those w h o share this suspicion, however, affirm that all moral duties arise f r o m v o l u n t a r y actions. Presumably, t h e y affirm t h e e x i s t e n c e of


general moral duties t o all persons t h a t are n o t a f u n c t i o n o f v o l u n tary a c t i o n . Respect for persons, for e x a m p l e , prima

facie

condemns

an a t t e m p t to gain advantage t h r o u g h coercion regardless o f w h e t h e r the person m a k i n g the a t t e m p t has voluntarily stated t h a t she will n o t engage in acts of c o e r c i o n . If this is t h e case, t h e n , there is n o t h ing o n t h e face o f it t h a t should be incredible a b o u t t h e view t h a t t h e duties that respect entails are n o t necessarily d e p e n d e n t upon having voluntarily performed an a c t i o n . Samuel Scheffler holds t h a t voluntary a c t i o n is n o t a necessary c o n dition of special responsibilities o n g r o u n d s t h a t as long as people ' h a v e good reasons for a t t a c h i n g value to t h o s e [special] relations, we m u s t allow that t h e y also h a v e g o o d reasons to see t h e m s e l v e s as h a v i n g such responsibilities.' 5 3 T h i s claim c o n t a i n s an ambiguity. If h a v i n g good reasons for a t t a c h i n g value requires people actually taking their special relations as valuable, t h e reasoning is i n a d e q u a t e to support t h e claim t h a t duties o f justice exist w h e n persons fail t o recognize t h e moral i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e association t h a t t h e y are in. Perhaps, however, we c a n have g o o d reasons to value relations that we do n o t in fact value. Insofar as this is t h e case, t h e n Scheffler's claim m i g h t provide grounds for the view that duties o f justice exist a m o n g n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s w h o are m e m b e r s o f a global e c o n o m i c association, despite t h e fact t h a t t h e s e persons d e n y this a n d do not particularly value the association. T h e a m b i g u i t y of appealing to persons' good reasons for valuing special relationships c a n be avoided by appealing instead t o t h e moral r e q u i r e m e n t s o f basic duties in t h e particular c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h e r e is n o t h i n g incredible about the view that respect entails different duties in different circumstances. For e x a m p l e , I have a duty t o m y n e i g h b o r t o help h i m fix his car, w h i c h duty I do n o t h a v e t o all o t h e r persons, in virtue o f my h a v i n g promised h i m to help. Although t h a t duty exists as t h e result o f a v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n o f m i n e , this is n o t a requirem e n t o f all special duties entailed by equal respect. I m a y h a v e a duty t o t h a t s a m e n e i g h b o r t o p h o n e for help w h e n t h e car falls on h i m even t h o u g h the m i s h a p was n o t the result of a n y action o f m i n e , but have n o such similar duty w h e n , u n b e k n o w n s t to m e , a similar a c c i d e n t befalls s o m e o n e else. If t h e r e may be special duties entailed by equal respect t h a t are n o t t h e result o f voluntary a c t i o n , t h e n it is n o criticism o f t h e principle of associational justice that it entails special moral duties t h a t are n o t t h e product of v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n .


Now it m i g h t be replied t h a t the s e e m i n g special duty t h a t I have cited t o p h o n e for h e l p for my n e i g h b o r is an i n s t a n c e o f t h e m o r e general duty t o help persons in need w h e n it would cost m e n o t h i n g o f moral i m p o r t a n c e , n o t merely a special duty that applies o n l y to m y neighbor. T h i s reply can be accepted w i t h o u t d a m a g e to the view t h a t I a m defending. I m i g h t have a duty t o an associate, for e x a m p l e a c o - m e m b e r o f t h e global e c o n o m i c association, to ensure just global institutions, but have n o such duty to a person on a n o t h e r planet with w h o m I a m n o t associated. Providing an a n a l o g o u s degree of generality is acceptable t o t h e view t h a t I a m defending. For t h e particular duty to m y associate m i g h t be a n i n s t a n c e o f a m o r e general duty to adhere t o principles o f distributive justice t h a t exist between associates. In b o t h this case and t h e case o f t h e duty t o help t h e neighbor, t h e particular duty is generated by application of t h e m o r e general duty to t h e particular case. Respect has different i m p l i c a t i o n s in different c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d t h e r e is n o t h i n g about t h e duties t h a t equal respect entails t h a t necessitates t h a t t h e particular duties t h a t are owed t o s o m e persons and n o t others are necessarily t h e product of v o l u n t a r y a c t i o n . So, a view t h a t takes certain special moral r e q u i r e m e n t s of social life to arise by m e a n s o t h e r t h a n s o m e form o f c o n s e n t or voluntary a c t i o n should not in virtue of t h a t be rejected. T h e discussion o f this c h a p t e r has focused on distinguishing the principle of associational justice from coercion a c c o u n t s , and o n establishing t h e former as a plausible alternative to t h e latter. It has also defended t h e principle against s o m e t h e criticisms t h a t are aimed at special moral duties. I m a k e n o pretense t h a t t h e a r g u m e n t of this chapter has established a well-developed alternative to the c o e r c i o n a c c o u n t . In t h e n e x t chapter, I shall develop m y institutional a c c o u n t further by d e f e n d i n g t h e claim t h a t t h e global e c o n o m i c association generates special moral duties o f egalitarian distributive justice.

3

Equal Respect in Political and Economic Associations

In t h e previous chapter, I argued t h a t coercion a c c o u n t s fail t o provide c o m p e l l i n g reasons t o believe that duties o f distributive justice t o n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s are either less weighty or less d e m a n d ing in c o n t e n t t h a n duties t o c o m p a t r i o t s . Now, s o m e

philoso-

phers w h o affirm t h a t duties o f justice are owed to persons across state borders base their view on an a c c o u n t o f justice t h a t takes its r e q u i r e m e n t s to be largely u n i f o r m between persons a n d n o t affected by their m e m b e r s h i p in political or e c o n o m i c associations. Others m a i n t a i n , on

t h e contrary, t h a t

requirements. Call this thesis membership

membership dependence.

affects

the

Membership

d e p e n d e n c e holds t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f justice between

per-

s o n s are affected by associational m e m b e r s h i p either because t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e duties is in s o m e part m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n t , or because t h e strength of t h e duties is. M e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e is affirmed by s o m e egalitarian liberals as a pivotal thesis in a n argum e n t in defense o f t h e claim t h a t duties of distributive justice t o n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s are n o t egalitarian, even t h o u g h duties t o c o m patriots are. Call this non-compatriot

non-egalitarianism.

Coercion

a c c o u n t s are versions o f n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism.

One

strategy for rejecting n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism is to reject m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e . T h i s is not, however, t h e o n l y possibility. N o n - c o m p a t r i o t

non-egalitarianism

m i g h t be

logical rejected

and egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m affirmed from w i t h i n m e m b e r s h i p dependence. 40

Equal Respect in Political and Economic Associations 41

O n t h e face o f it rejecting n o n - c o m p a t r i o t

non-egalitarianism

w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e m i g h t seem an unpromising strategy. After all, n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism on t h e basis o f m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e has received a fair a m o u n t good press lately, having been d e f e n d e d — i n its coercion

of

account

versions—by several p r o m i n e n t political philosophers, as we saw in C h a p t e r 2. Perhaps these theorists are w r o n g a b o u t m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e , o n e m i g h t suspect, but even so surely this c o n v e r g e n c e around n o n - c o m p a t r i o t n o n - e g a l i t a r i a n i s m is suggestive that even if n o n - c o m p a t r i o t n o n - e g a l i t a r i a n i s m is n o t logically entailed by m e m bership d e p e n d e n c e there are s o m e fairly strong forces p u s h i n g down t h a t hill o n c e o n e sets foot o n the slippery slope o f m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e . T h o m a s Nagel, for e x a m p l e , simply asserts t h a t egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m is based u p o n t h e denial o f m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e . 1 If we accept t h a t m e m b e r s h i p , including citizenship, m a k e s a moral difference, aren't we lead necessarily to an a c c o u n t o f distributive justice t h a t privileges c o m p a t r i o t s ? In this chapter I shall affirm m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e , but reject n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism. I shall be most interested in affirming c o n t e n t d e p e n d e n c e , and shall be silent about strength d e p e n d e n c e . I shall sketch an a c c o u n t of justice that is on t h e universalist f o u n d a t i o n s sketched in Chapter 1, n a m e l y t h a t t h e appropriate attitude to have toward the dignity o f persons is respect, but t h a t takes duties of justice t o be special duties w h o s e existence and c o n t e n t is d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e association in which persons interact. I h o p e t o provide a justification of duties o f global distributive justice t h a t are egalitarian in c o n t e n t , indeed m o r e so t h a n w h a t any person owes a n o t h e r merely in virtue o f c o m m o n citizenship, and t h a t form t h e basis o f an a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e current global e c o n o m i c order c o n t a i n s grave injustices. T h e c h a p t e r proceeds in t h e following seven sections. In S e c t i o n II, I discuss t h e thesis of m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e in contrast to its denial. Section

III defends t h e principle o f associational

a version o f m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e

justice,

introduced in C h a p t e r

2.

In S e c t i o n IV, I apply the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h e previous section to t h e global e c o n o m y , arguing that it is an i n d e p e n d e n t source of duties o f justice. In S e c t i o n V, I argue t h a t duties o f justice based upon the n o r m of equal respect are presumptively egalitarian in c o n tent regardless o f t h e kind o f association that generates the duties,


t h e r e b y establishing t h e case for t h e rejection of

non-compatriot

non-egalitarianism in general (and n o t merely its c o e r c i o n a c c o u n t s versions). Section VI argues t h a t t h e political a n d e c o n o m i c aspects o f a c o m p l e x association are sources of duties o f justice with distinct egalitarian c o n t e n t . In S e c t i o n VII, I distinguish m y a c c o u n t from a n o t h e r t h a t has a similar justificatory a p p r o a c h , but w h i c h defends n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism. Finally, I c o n c l u d e in Section VIII w i t h a c o m m e n t o n t h e egalitarianism defended in this c h a p t e r a n d a pro

tanto

a r g u m e n t t h a t inequalities in t h e global

e c o n o m y are serious injustices.

Philosophers w h o argue for n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism in part on grounds o f m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e do n o t usually offer an i n d e p e n d e n t defense o f t h a t premise, but take it, it seems, t o be at least partially supported b y setting out t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n duties o f distributive justice owed to c o m p a t r i o t s and those owed to n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s . So proceeding, however, exposes a dialectical vulnerability that can be exploited by egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n s w h o are skeptical of m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e . Kok-Chor Tan, for e x a m p l e , presses t h e weakness as follows: Before we can k n o w what it is t h a t citizens o w e t o each o t h e r by virtue o f their status as c o m p a t r i o t s , we need first t o k n o w w h a t it is they m a y distribute a m o n g themselves, and this c a n n o t be d e t e r m i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f what they rightly o w n , w h i c h in turn c a n n o t be d e t e r m i n e d w i t h o u t reference t o w h a t it is t h a t they o w e as a matter o f justice to n o n - c i t i z e n s . 2 T h e force of t h e claim is n o t to reject the m e m b e r s h i p thesis outright, indeed I a m n o t sure that Tan would w a n t to do that, but rather t o assert t h a t unless it is i n d e p e n d e n t l y supported, t h e default position, based upon equal respect or regard for all persons, is t h a t there are duties of distributive justice owed to all persons; and if that is t h e case the a r g u m e n t for special distributive duties to c o m patriots c a n n o t even get going w i t h o u t first settling w h a t is owed t o all persons. Dialectically, t h e n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarians h e l p t h e m s e l v e s to an unearned starting p o i n t in the debate.


S i m o n C a n e y seems t o be c o m m i t t e d to t h e irrelevance of m e m b e r ship d e p e n d e n c e for m a t t e r s o f distributive justice. His a r g u m e n t can be s u m m a r i z e d as follows: Valid moral principles apply to all persons w h o are similarly situated. 3 T h e best a r g u m e n t s for egalitarianism in distributive justice 'all i n v o k e moral personality.' 4 All persons, regardless o f citizenship, are similarly situated in possessing moral personality. 5 H e n c e , if the best a r g u m e n t s for egalitarian distributive justice a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s are plausible, so t h e n is an a r g u m e n t for egalitarian distributive justice globally. If duties of egalitarian justice are owed t o all persons, q u a persons, t h e n t h e n o n - c o m p a t r i o t n o n egalitarians are simply missing the m o r e basic p o i n t by focusing o n t h e u n i q u e nature o f t h e c o m p a t r i o t relationship. Peter Singer's a c c o u n t o f global justice is based upon

impartial

moral reasons. For Singer this is t h e starting p o i n t against w h i c h partial claims must be justified. 6 Impartial justice is global. Singer explores reasons w h y justice m i g h t be limited to states or n a t i o n s by m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e type c l a i m s and finds t h e m generally wanting. M y s y m p a t h i e s are with t h e egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n s on

the

n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n of w h a t we owe n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s but w i t h the n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarians o n t h e n o n - n o r m a t i v e question o f m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e . So, in offering succor t o the latter position in this section, I h o p e n o t to betray the cause that I share with m y comrades. I d o u b t that I can provide a defense of m e m b e r ship d e p e n d e n c e t h a t will be fully c o n v i n c i n g t o all t h o s e w h o take duties of social and political justice t o be n o n - c o n t i n g e n t l y owed t o all persons; but I believe t h a t I c a n , at least, offer reasons t h a t will i n t r o d u c e s o m e of t h e corrosive effects o f doubt. I begin by h i g h l i g h t i n g w h a t I take t o be t h e standard political philosophical m a n n e r of t h i n k i n g a b o u t most duties of social and political justice. Such duties relate at least three terms, at least two persons and o n e policy, practice or institution. T h i s c a n be e x e m plified in t h e case o f an institutional failing. In this case person A o w e s person B a duty o f justice to endeavor to c h a n g e institution X and to repair the h a r m that it has been d o n e to B. Alternatively we m i g h t say, t h a t t h e injustice in the m a n n e r t h a t person B is treated under institution X establishes a duty o n A t o e n d e a v o r t o c h a n g e X and repair B. We see this in the approach that J o h n Rawls takes to duties o f justice. He c o n t e n d s that we h a v e duties to pursue the


justice o f institutions in cases where t h e y ' m u s t inevitably apply t o us since we are born i n t o t h e m and t h e y regulate t h e full scope of our a c t i v i t y — ' 7 He understands an institution t o be 'a public system o f rules w h i c h defines offices and p o s i t i o n s with their rights and duties, powers and i m m u n i t i e s , and t h e like.' 8 As e x a m p l e s of institutions, Rawls offers ' g a m e s and rituals, trials, and parliaments, markets and systems o f property.' 9 I call views such as Rawls's, w h i c h take duties o f justice to mediate relations of persons under institutions,

institutional

accounts. It is possible t o distinguish between t h e source and t h e o b j e c t o f a duty in the following way. T h e source is the n o r m a t i v e ground o f t h e duty, t h a t a b o u t w h i c h t h e duty ultimately is. T h e o b j e c t of the duty is t h a t w h i c h must be preserved, altered, or c o n s t r u c t e d in order t h a t t h e duty t o t h e source is n o t violated. Institutional a c c o u n t s typically hold t h a t t h e sources of duties of social and political justice are pers o n s and that t h e o b j e c t s are institutions. Hence, such a c c o u n t s hold t h a t justice (or injustice) is a property of institutions. I take it t h a t , in part due to t h e great influence o f Rawls, t h e institutional approach is n o w s o m e t h i n g like t h e political philosophical standard of discourse. T h e skeptic of t h e m e m b e r s h i p thesis could, however, remain in the m a i n s t r e a m o f t h e terms o f discourse but m a i n t a i n t h a t n o institutional o b j e c t o f a duty is a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f the e x i s t e n c e o f t h e duty. T h e idea would be t h a t even if duties of justice direct us t o preserve, alter or c o n s t r u c t institutions, it is n o t t h e case that such duties exist o n l y under c o n t i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s of s o m e institutional m i n i m u m . A l t h o u g h this is n o t an absurd position, it seems n o n e t h e l e s s t o be h i g h l y implausible. For it would have us owing duties t o c o n s t r u c t institutions even if we h i t h e r t o h a d n o interact i o n s w i t h t h e persons with w h o m t h e institutions would put us i n t o relation. W e would have duties of justice to persons on distant planets, assuming there are such, as soon as it b e c o m e s possible for us to erect institutions t h a t could m e d i a t e our i n t e r a c t i o n . A l t h o u g h this a r g u m e n t exposes a liability in t h e position

of

t h o s e w h o reject m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e , they m i g h t reply t h a t there is also a liability at least as great associated with m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e : M e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e seems t o entail t h a t persons with w h o m we lack significant interaction h a v e n o moral rights against us. M e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e , however, does n o t imply this. Since justice is n o t the w h o l e of morality, o n l y t h e institutional part,


t h e denial o f duties of justice t o these persons entails n e i t h e r t h e denial o f all moral duties t o t h e m nor t h e denial t h a t t h e y have any moral rights against us. W e m i g h t well have a h u m a n i t a r i a n duty to h e l p t h e m , w i t h o u t h a v i n g a duty of justice that requires establishing institutions to facilitate regular wealth transfers. Because duties o f justice are directed toward institutions a n d because their denial does n o t involve d e n y i n g all moral duties, t h e view that rejects m e m bership d e p e n d e n c e is less plausible. T h e upshot t h e n is to drive a wedge between t h e universal moral f o u n d a t i o n , t h e source o f moral duties generally, a n d t h e universality of t h e n o r m a t i v e r e q u i r e m e n t s of social and political justice.

In t h e previous section, I argued t h a t duties o f social a n d political justice do n o t exist between persons in virtue o f their mere personh o o d . In t h e a b s e n c e o f significant i n t e r a c t i o n , a l t h o u g h o t h e r moral duties m i g h t exist, duties o f justice do n o t . Robert Nozick challenges this approach to duties of justice. Would there be n o p r o b l e m o f justice and n o need for a t h e o r y o f justice, if t h e r e were n o social c o o p e r a t i o n at all, if each person got his share solely by his o w n efforts? If we suppose, as Rawls seems to, t h a t this situation does not raise q u e s t i o n s o f distributive justice, then in virtue of w h a t facts about social c o o p e r a t i o n do these q u e s t i o n s o f justice emerge? 1 0 In this section, I respond t o this c h a l l e n g e by setting out and defending an a c c o u n t o f t h e sufficient c o n d i t i o n s o f justice for t h e standard cases o f moderate scarcity and limited altruism.

In Chapter 2, I introduced the principle of associational

justice,

w h i c h states that duties of justice exist between persons w h o have a moral duty o f equal respect t o o n e a n o t h e r if t h o s e persons are c o - m e m b e r s in an association that is (i) relatively strong, (ii) largely n o n - v o l u n t a r y , (iii) c o n s t i t u t i v e of a significant part of t h e background rules for t h e various relationships of their public lives and (iv) governed by n o r m s that c a n be subject t o h u m a n c o n t r o l . W i t h respect to (i), an association is strong to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it is (a) enduring, (b) c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y governed by institutional n o r m s , and


(c) regularly affecting t h e highest order moral interests o f t h e persons associated. W i t h respect t o (ii), an association is n o n - v o l u n t a r y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e r e is n o reasonable alternative t o participating in t h e association. 1 1 Before r e s p o n d i n g to Nozick, I first n o t e several reasons w h y real-life e m p l o y m e n t o f this principle must be sensitive t o detailed empirical considerations, and their moral salience. O n e is t h a t t h e r e is n o bright line to distinguish associations from mere interactions. A n o t h e r is that n o t all associations generate duties of justice. T h e reas o n s for this are twofold. First, n o t all associations g e n e r a t e effects with sufficient scope and force to structure a person's m e m b e r s h i p in public life. In liberal societies m e m b e r s h i p in a c h u r c h , for e x a m ple, does n o t structure t h e b a c k g r o u n d of one's public relationships, a l t h o u g h it m i g h t c o n t i n g e n t l y be a source o f significant advantage. W h e t h e r an association is sufficiently extensive in its reach or effects to c o n s t i t u t e a significant part o f t h e background o f the public lives o f persons will at t i m e s be difficult t o assess and m a y be relative t o societal institutions a n d n o r m s . For e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r families create duties o f justice between family m e m b e r s will d e p e n d upon t h e e x t e n t o f the effects of family life. S e c o n d , a person's participation in a n association is n o t always n o n - v o l u n t a r y to a sufficient degree. C o n s i d e r a t i o n o f this requires j u d g m e n t s with respect to t h e reasonableness o f various alternatives to participation in the association. A n o t h e r reason w h y c h u r c h e s are n o t g o v e r n e d by duties of social and political justice in liberal societies is t h a t in such societies pers o n s typically h a v e reasonable alternatives t o m e m b e r s h i p in a n y particular c h u r c h or in any c h u r c h at all. Returning n o w t o Nozick's challenge, w h y do t h e four institutional r e q u i r e m e n t s discussed above generate duties o f justice, if such duties would n o t exist in t h e a b s e n c e o f these c o n d i t i o n s ? C o m p a r e t h e situation o f persons in the following two distinct c i r c u m s t a n c e s : O n e in w h i c h the four c o n d i t i o n s u n a m b i g u o u s l y do n o t o b t a i n ; the o t h e r in which t h e y u n a m b i g u o u s l y do. Furthermore, suppose as per t h e a r g u m e n t o f Section II that duties o f justice do n o t exist between persons in t h e first c i r c u m s t a n c e . Person A has n o claim on B for t r e a t m e n t of a n y kind by institutions t h a t m i g h t , but do n o t , m e d i a t e their interactions. In t h e s e c o n d c i r c u m s t a n c e t h e r e are such institutions w h i c h , ex hypothesis,

affect the highest order interests o f A a n d B

in a m a n n e r that c o n d i t i o n s their public lives, but w h i c h a l t h o u g h


c h a n g e a b l e by social effort are escapable for each individual o n l y at u n r e a s o n a b l y high moral expense. Now i m a g i n e t h a t f r o m t h e beginn i n g o f their lives, t h r o u g h n o c h o i c e o f their o w n , t h e life prospects o f A and B are dramatically different under these institutions, with B's being profoundly inferior t o A's. Egalitarians, o f course, would suspect t h a t t h e r e is an injustice in t h e institutional structure t h a t renders B's prospects so p o o r in c o m parison to A's through n o c h o i c e o f her o w n . T h e force of Nozick's c h a l l e n g e is t h a t t h e r e can be n o injustice because if duties of justice did n o t exist between A and B w h e n t h e y were isolated, t h e n t h e y do n o t exist now. But this would be to claim that the rules of t h e institutional order, w h i c h could be c h a n g e d and w h i c h treated B this way, do n o t require a justification on terms t h a t B would find reasonable. Although this m i g h t be t h e case if A had n o pre-existing moral duty at all t o B, it c a n n o t be the case if A owes a duty of respect to B. For part of w h a t respecting t h e dignity o f persons involves, as I discussed in C h a p t e r 1, is justificatory respect, t h a t t h e rules t h a t govern our interactions with o t h e r s be justified on terms t h a t they would find reasonable. Perhaps m y a c c o u n t o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s duties of social justice can be clarified by c o n t r a s t i n g it to two o t h e r a c c o u n t s t h a t have currency in philosophical discussions o f global justice. In C h a p t e r 1, I sought to distinguish t h e position that I would subsequently defend m o r e fully from T h o m a s Pogge's a c c o u n t . Like m i n e , Pogge's a c c o u n t is institutional in taking justice to be a property o f social relations. T h i s limits t h e duties of justice t o a class of special duties t h a t exist between persons w h o are c o - m e m b e r s o f certain c o n t i n g e n t institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s . Unlike m i n e , however, Pogge's a c c o u n t seeks t o limit t h e c l a i m s of justice even further by s u b s u m i n g t h e m all under negative duties. Pogge's a c c o u n t is based f u n d a m e n t a l l y on a duty o f n o n - m a l e f i c e n c e , w h i c h h e takes to be violated by various coercive features o f t h e current i n t e r n a t i o n a l order. T h e Principle o f Associational justice does n o t state t h a t a h a r m - c a u s i n g relationship is a necessary c o n d i t i o n o f an injustice in the global e c o n o m i c association. Peter Singer's a c c o u n t o f global justice is similar t o m i n e in n o t t a k i n g duties o f justice to be limited o n l y t o n o n - m a l e f i c e n c e . But Singer endorses an interactional, rather t h a n institutional, a c c o u n t , w h i c h takes global justice to be based u p o n t h e impartial duty of


individuals t o assist all others, w h o c a n be helped. 1 2 Duties of justice are n o t t h e n limited t o associations o f t h e requisite kind, but are directed t o e v e r y o n e w h o m our actions can assist. This is an a c c o u n t that is significantly m o r e expansive in t h e d e m a n d s of justice t h a n Pogge's in two distinct ways. In scope it is n o t limited by institutional c o n d i t i o n s ; and in c o n t e n t it is n o t limited o n l y t o t h o s e w h o m we h a r m . T h e position that I a m d e f e n d i n g is s o m e t h i n g o f an intermediate p o s i t i o n — t h e r e could be m a n y varieties o f a n i n t e r m e d i a t e p o s i t i o n — i n t h a t it accepts t h e l i m i t a t i o n s of scope t o institutional m e m b e r s h i p , but rejects t h e limits on c o n t e n t t o duties o f n o n maleficence. Unlike Singer, however, I do n o t take the c o n t e n t of t h e duties to be essentially t h o s e of b e n e f i c e n c e . Rather, the duties of persons are t r a n s f o r m e d by institutions. If t h e a r g u m e n t s of Sections V and VI are successful, t h e duties o f justice are directed toward t h e p r o m o t i o n egalitarian distributive institutions. In this S e c t i o n , I have argued t h a t m e m b e r s h i p in associations o f t h e requisite kind makes a moral difference because respecting persons requires t h a t t h e rules o f interaction between persons be justifiable by reasons that t h e y would find reasonable, and such assoc i a t i o n s have profound effects on persons that individually h a v e n o reasonable c h o i c e but t o accept. T h i s is a version o f m e m b e r ship d e p e n d e n c e . It is from within this a c c o u n t o f

membership

d e p e n d e n c e t h a t I shall argue t h r o u g h t h e n e x t three sections to the c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t duties of egalitarian social and political justice exist.

In t h e previous section, I defended m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e by laying out a set o f c o n d i t i o n s sufficient for generating duties of political and social justice. In this section, I begin d i s t a n c i n g myself from n o n c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism b y applying t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s to t h e case o f t h e global e c o n o m y in an effort to d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e global e c o n o m y is an i n d e p e n d e n t source o f duties of distributive justice. I do this by l o o k i n g at e a c h o f the four c o n d i t i o n s in turn. First consider strength. I take t h e strength o f an association to be a f u n c t i o n o f its duration, t h e e x t e n t o f its g o v e r n a n c e by n o r m s , and the degree to w h i c h it affects t h e highest order interests o f persons. T h e association created by t h e processes o f e c o n o m i c globalization is


n o t a fleeting p h e n o m e n o n . Rather it is a structural feature of capitalist e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t t h a t has gathered pace recently with t e c h n o l o g i c a l c h a n g e s , but t h a t has been observable since at least t h e early colonial area. It is governed primarily b y t h e n o r m o f c o m petition for market share t h a t requires firms to i n n o v a t e ceaselessly and t o reduce production costs. But n o r m s o f g o v e r n a n c e are also in place t h r o u g h t h e regulatory framework established by the W T O and the municipal e x c l u s i o n a r y property regimes that are implicitly recognized in all i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m e r c e . W T O n o r m s include principles of n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , reciprocity, market access and fair competition.13 T h e globalization of trade, i n v e s t m e n t and

finance

has had pro-

f o u n d effects on t h e highest order interests of persons. I briefly m e n t i o n six such effects. (1) In s o m e cases, state supported exportlead d e v e l o p m e n t strategies have produced significant gains for t h e social d e v e l o p m e n t o f countries. 1 4 (2) Foreign direct i n v e s t m e n t (FDI) is very often a r e q u i r e m e n t of d o m e s t i c ing from third party countries.

15

financing

as well as

financ-

(3) Generally, globalization has been

associated with an increase in j o b insecurity a r o u n d t h e globe. 1 6 (4) Globalization has also been associated w i t h a general trend toward increasing inequality w i t h i n countries. 1 7 (5) S o m e of t h e poorest and m o s t vulnerable people in t h e world h a v e b e c o m e worse-off in c o m parison to t h e rich. In t h e 1 9 9 0 s children in sub-Saharan Africa were 1 9 times m o r e likely to die t h a n children in t h e world's richest countries. By 2 0 0 3 this figure had grown to 2 6 t i m e s . 1 8 (6) W i t h t h e increased globalization o f speculative investing has c o m e t h e increased danger of a generalized e c o n o m i c crisis. C o n s i d e r

the

e f f e c t s — s o m e t i m e s referred t o as network effects—far b e y o n d Asia o f t h e Asian e c o n o m i c crisis in t h e late 1 9 9 0 s . 1 9 T h e crisis did extensive d a m a g e t o e m e r g i n g markets. Eventually, Russia defaulted on its debt and Brazil narrowly avoided c o m p l e t e financial collapse. States with e c o n o m i e s heavily d e p e n d e n t u p o n e x p o r t i n g basic resources such as petroleum and precious metals faced dramatic declines in their G D P as a result o f t h e crisis, 1 4 - 1 8 percent in Angola and Kuwait a n d 9 percent in Z a m b i a . 2 0 And in 2 0 0 8 a global financial a n d e c o n o m i c crisis developed out o f l e n d i n g practices in t h e USA h o u s i n g market. Hence, regardless o f w h e t h e r persons are directly engaged with the global e c o n o m y , their local e c o n o m y is p r o f o u n d l y affected by i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade, FDI, a n d the globalization of

finance.


S e c o n d , consider n o n - v o l u n t a r i n e s s . Although state leaders are formally free either t o deepen e n g a g e m e n t with t h e global market or n o t , t h e fact t h a t nearly every c o u n t r y in the world is a m e m b e r o f the W T O is e v i d e n c e that there is n o reasonable alternative develo p m e n t path. Moreover, in m a n y cases, d e m o c r a t i c institutions are c o m p r o m i s e d or n o n - e x i s t e n t ; so, citizens o f c o u n t r i e s t h a t c h o o s e this d e v e l o p m e n t path h a v e n o c h o i c e in t h e matter. T h i r d , consider the significance of the b a c k g r o u n d rules of t h e global e c o n o m i c association for t h e public rules t h a t affect persons' lives. I have already canvassed several c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relevant t o this matter t w o paragraphs above, in discussing h o w the rules of trade and i n v e s t m e n t affect persons' lives. So, here I'll briefly highlight three additional considerations. O n e c o n c e r n s t h e way t h a t private econ o m i c c o m p e t i t i o n affects public regimes o f regulation. T h e UNDP observes t h a t T h e pressures o f global c o m p e t i t i o n have led c o u n tries and employers to adopt m o r e flexible labor policies, and work a r r a n g e m e n t s with n o l o n g - t e r m c o m m i t m e n t between and e m p l o y e e are on t h e rise.'

21

employer

Deregulation o f t h e labor market

often constitutes a m a j o r transfer o f power to e m p l o y e r s and away from labor. Second, private c o m p e t i t i o n gives rise to n e w international regimes of regulation t h a t affect t h e legal structure of states. For e x a m p l e , W T O rules profoundly affect the d o m e s t i c policies that c o u n t r i e s may pursue. T h e policies t h a t states m a y e m p l o y in t h e pursuit of i n f a n t industry p r o t e c t i o n are limited by W T O rules. T h e r e is a good deal of evidence b o t h historical and recent that such prot e c t i o n is effective in p r o m o t i n g e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . 2 2 Third, the W T O ' s TRIPs provisions dramatically curtail t h e ability of states t o encourage t h e production o f life-saving p h a r m a c o l o g i c a l therapies. According t o TRIPs Article 2 8 , p a t e n t p r o t e c t i o n prohibits for 2 0 years t h e ' m a k i n g , using, offering for sale, selling, or importing' w i t h o u t c o n s e n t o f t h e patent-holder. 2 3

In effect, h o l d i n g a

patent gives the holder m o n o p o l y power in t h e market for t h e period o f t h e patent. In India prior t o t h e W T O , laws provided patent p r o t e c t i o n for p h a r m a c e u t i c a l processes only, n o t products, and for o n l y seven years. 2 4 W i t h o u t product patent p r o t e c t i o n

firms

could legitimately reverse-engineer p h a r m a c e u t i c a l products a n d produce t h e m a c c o r d i n g t o their own processes. S i n c e typically such production

is d o n e w i t h o u t

investing as m u c h

in research

and

d e v e l o p m e n t as is required for i n v e n t i o n , prices for p h a r m a c e u t i c a l


products were driven d o w n , thereby allowing greater access for t h e poor. Finally, consider t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t n o r m s be subject t o c o n t r o l . T h e r e is n o doubt that market c o m p e t i t i o n can be limited, directed or c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d by deliberate public policy. And obviously W T O rules can be a m e n d e d . So, t h e r e is n o d o u b t t h a t the global e c o n o m i c association satisfies this c o n d i t i o n . In sum, t h e n , according to t h e principle of associational justice the global e c o n o m i c association is an i n d e p e n d e n t source of duties of justice.

T h e rejection o f n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism is n o t c o m p l e t e in t h e a b s e n c e o f an a c c o u n t o f t h e duties of justice, w h i c h t h e global e c o n o m i c association i n d e p e n d e n t l y produces, as basically egalitarian in c o n t e n t . In this section, I lay t h e general f o u n d a t i o n for t h a t a c c o u n t by arguing t h a t equal respect for persons establishes a justificatory p r e s u m p t i o n of equality in t h e c o n t e n t o f duties arising in c o m m o n good associations t h a t g e n e r a t e duties o f justice. I n Section III, I argued t h a t respect for persons requires affirming rules that could be justified as reasonable to t h e persons affected. T h i s justificatory c o n s t r a i n t on acceptable rules can perhaps be worked i n t o a justificatory procedure in m o r e t h a n o n e way. But a n apparently direct way t o do so would be in a procedure t h a t e m p l o y s t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s e n t . T h e c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h t h e c o n s e n t would be provided are t h o s e that would ensure t h a t t h e reasons t h a t c o n v i n c e are reasonable. It seems right t o require s o m e such filtering o f reasons since otherwise persons m i g h t in fact be c o n v i n c e d on t h e basis o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are unreasonable. O n t h e o n e h a n d , persons m i g h t endorse rules o n n o o t h e r grounds t h a n that the rules benefit t h e m s e l v e s in light of their c i r c u m s t a n c e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , persons' preferences m i g h t have been adapted to a narrow set of options, o r persons' understanding o f w h a t t h e y deserve might have been deluded by false consciousness, so that t h e y in fact e n d o r s e rules t h a t fail to provide t h e m w i t h w h a t t h e y should reasonably e x p e c t . Contractualist

a c c o u n t s of social

a n d political

justice can

be

e m p l o y e d as devices to m a k e clear t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f h y p o t h e t i c a l


c o n s e n t t h a t it would be reasonable t o require t h e justification o f rules t o observe. O n e could perhaps rely o n an a c c o u n t of reasonable hypothetical c o n s e n t t h a t is n o t contractualism and t h e r e m i g h t be c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h t h e justificatory r e q u i r e m e n t s of respect for pers o n s c a n n o t be m o d e l e d by the use o f a h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n t r a c t . 2 5 But if o n e is c o m m i t t e d t o equal respect for all persons, t h e n a c o n t r a c t u a l ist justificatory procedure has clear attractions since its h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s can be defended on grounds that persons are considered as equals and n o t discriminated against o n the basis o f morally irrele v a n t properties. But it is n o t m y i n t e n t i o n in this b o o k t o work out a justificatory procedure in a n y detail, so I shall not lean heavily on c o n t r a c t u a l i s m . My a r g u m e n t in this and t h e n e x t section is m u c h m o r e s c h e m a t i c . I h o p e o n l y t o s h o w t h a t t h e n o r m o f equal respect involves a justificatory c o n s t r a i n t t h a t establishes a pres u m p t i o n in favor o f egalitarian rules in b o t h political a n d e c o n o m i c associations. If respect requires a c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e justification o f institutional rules such t h a t a rule is justified o n l y if a person can

reasonably

endorse it, t h e n equal respect for t h e dignity o f all persons must observe a constraint t h a t a rule is justified o n l y if each person can reasonably endorse it. Certain kinds of associations t h a t yield duties o f justice are c o m m o n good associations: Associations t h a t coordinate and regulate the e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e joint effort o f its m e m b e r s and t h a t yield goods and powers useful to the m e m b e r s , goods and powers t o w h i c h n o person h a s a pre-associational moral e n t i t l e m e n t . T h e c o n s t r a i n t t h a t t h e rule be o n e t h a t e a c h person can reasonably endorse yields a presumption in favor of equal t r e a t m e n t under t h e rules of a c o m m o n good association. T h i s is because rules t h a t assign benefits and burdens differentially will tend t o be rejected if t h e baseline against which differential burdens are assessed is equality. T h e r e is good reason for such a baseline since there are n o pre-institutional c l a i m s o n the goods and powers generated by the institution. C o n sider t h e alternative o f taking current holdings as t h e baseline. T h e effect of that baseline would be to close the b o o k s on history. It would arbitrarily e n d o w past acquisition w i t h moral significance. Now t h e p r e s u m p t i o n in favor of equality is in principle defeasible. Equal respect for persons does n o t establish t h e principle t h a t t h e r e could be n o morally relevant reasons for diverging from equality. For it is c o n c e i v a b l e that persons m i g h t reasonably agree to inequalities


of certain kinds. Four seem t o be t h e strongest candidates for except i o n s . (1) S o m e persons could deserve t o h a v e their interests treated less well because o f s o m e t h i n g they have d o n e t o harm t h e interests o f others; (2) s o m e persons could voluntarily c o n s e n t to lesser realization of their interests or to taking certain risks of this o u t c o m e ; (3) there m i g h t be differences in morally relevant needs requiring m o r e resources to satisfy or (4) offering incentives t h a t produce differential o u t c o m e s could benefit e v e r y o n e in c o m p a r i s o n to their c o n d i t i o n under equality. T h e r e q u i r e m e n t of equal t r e a t m e n t produces t w o distinct kinds of egalitarianism in rules. T h e first is procedural equality. A proposal for a set o f rules t h a t allows for unequal protection of persons under t h e o p e r a t i o n of t h e rules, or unequal powers of persons t o operate t h e rules, will t e n d t o be rejected by t h o s e w h o m i g h t be rendered vulnerable or weak by t h e set o f rules. T h e s e c o n d is o u t c o m e equality. A rule that permits o u t c o m e s t h a t deviate from equality will tend t o be rejected by t h o s e w h o m i g h t be placed in inferior positions (relative t o others) a c c o r d i n g to t h e rules. T h e denial o f t h e claim t h a t equal respect entails p r e s u m p t i o n s of procedural a n d o u t c o m e equality in c o m m o n g o o d associations allows t h a t persons with n o reasonable alternative t o participation in a set of rules t h a t regularly affect their highest order moral interests and regulate their public i n t e r a c t i o n with others m a y be assigned inferior p r o t e c t i o n , powers, o p p o r t u n i t i e s or o u t c o m e s by t h o s e rules w i t h o u t a n y r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e s e inequalities be reasonably justifiable t o t h e m . Such a denial is i n c o m p a t i b l e with justificatory respect, and therefore w i t h respecting the i n h e r e n t dignity o f persons. Finally, n o t i c e t h a t t h e p r e s u m p t i o n in favor of o u t c o m e equality in matters o f distributive justice is neutral with respect t o w h e t h e r t h e inequalities o f c o n d i t i o n that are i m p o r t a n t are m o s t plausibly taken t o be, say, either resources, o p p o r t u n i t i e s or capabilities. In S e c t i o n II, I n o t e d that I was offering succor t o n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarians against egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n s w h o d e n y m e m bership d e p e n d e n c e . I h o p e that it is n o w o b v i o u s t h a t t h a t was m e r e l y a tactical m o v e to provide an a c c o u n t of egalitarian cosm o p o l i t a n i s m t h a t is n o t burdened by implausibly d e n y i n g m e m b e r ship d e p e n d e n c e . For I have argued in this section t h a t equal respect for all persons requires that t h e basic rules of an association t h a t generates duties of justice be egalitarian.


The

consequences

of

the

egalitarian

justificatory

presumption

d e p e n d upon t h e kind of association for w h i c h principles of justice are sought. In this section, I consider t w o abstractions: O n e is t h e purely political aspects o f an association, t h e o t h e r t h e purely econ o m i c . For theorists w h o accept m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e , t h e claim that a political association generates duties of justice is n o t c o n t r o versial. M y aim in this section is t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e political and e c o n o m i c aspects o f a c o m p l e x association e a c h generate distinct c l a i m s of egalitarian justice. T h i s claim taken t o g e t h e r with t h e a r g u m e n t s o f t h e previous three sections establishes, I believe, t h a t t h e global e c o n o m i c association is an i n d e p e n d e n t source of distinct duties of egalitarian justice. To begin, consider t h e political aspects o f an association. T h e s e are characterized by deliberate processes o f rule e s t a b l i s h m e n t and e n f o r c e m e n t to govern t h e c o m m o n life o f t h e persons w h o c o n s t i tute it as m e m b e r s . M a n y aspects o f a shared life require such rules: Protection from threats, b o t h d o m e s t i c and foreign; t h e education o f c h i l d r e n ; t h e m a n a g e m e n t o f t h e c o m m o n s ; t h e assembly of pers o n s on t h e basis political and religious c o n v i c t i o n ; t h e regulation o f t h e public speech of persons; t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t and e n f o r c e m e n t o f procedures for a t t a i n i n g offices of leadership; and the m a n n e r in w h i c h all t h e rules t h a t govern these a n d o t h e r aspects of life are to be c h a n g e d . Rules such as these affect persons' highest order moral interests and structure their public lives. W i t h regard t o states, for m o s t people t h e costs of e m i g r a t i o n are such t h a t they h a v e n o reasonable alternative t o living in t h e state i n t o w h i c h t h e y are b o r n . If we were t o abstract away from t h e role t h a t t h e m o d e r n state plays in regulating t h e production and distribution of e c o n o m i c goods and services, we would h a v e a set o f activities o f a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e sort described above, w i t h perhaps s o m e additions. States t h e n are associations generating duties o f justice a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s . Political justice involves assigning the various powers a n d benefits o f citizenship. A l t h o u g h pre-modern political views upheld the natural fitness o f s o m e t o rule a n d e n j o y t h e privileges a n d prerogatives o f office, such views are n o w in discredit. T h e r e are n o pre-associational e n t i t l e m e n t s that persons c a n plausibly i n v o k e for a disproportional share o f t h e powers and benefits o f citizenship. T h e justificatory


p r e s u m p t i o n in favor of equality t h a t I discussed in t h e previous s e c t i o n favors an equal a s s i g n m e n t of these powers and benefits, or equal standing under t h e rules o f t h e sort m e n t i o n e d in t h e previous paragraph. In o t h e r words, t h e p r e s u m p t i o n o f equality p r o m o t e s the political ideal of equal and inclusive citizenship. Fully reasonable persons would endorse a strong presumption against rules t h a t treat s o m e persons as h a v i n g a higher c i t i z e n s h i p status t h a n others. T h e y would affirm rules requiring i n s t i t u t i o n s to ensure equal d e m o c r a t i c rights and to prevent d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . In his discussion o f distributive justice in A Theory

of

Justice,

Rawls calls t h e c o n c e p t i o n t h a t seeks to mitigate advantages that m i g h t be gained either f r o m social or natural c o n t i n g e n c i e s cratic

equality.

26

demo-

Now it is significant t h a t this t e r m i n o l o g y is used

for a c o n c e p t i o n comprised o f a set of distributive principles, n a m e l y fair equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y and t h e difference principle. But unders t a n d i n g w h a t is supposed t o be d e m o c r a t i c a b o u t this c o n c e p t i o n is illustrative of t h e c o n t e n t o f d e m o c r a t i c values m o r e generally. T h e t w o distributive principles guide institution c o n s t r u c t i o n so as to m i n i m i z e t h e i n f l u e n c e of social and natural advantages. Likewise d e m o c r a t i c citizenship is a c o n c e p t i o n of citizenship status t h a t permits full m e m b e r s h i p for all regardless o f family background or natural talents. 2 7 T h e d e m o c r a t i c political ideal is o n e of equal a n d inclusive citizenship. T h i s ideal can be e m p l o y e d as an interpretive guide for deriving t h e rules t h a t govern political institutions. We should reject rules t h a t provide favored m e m b e r s h i p status on t h e basis o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s such as family background or natural talents. A political association with institutions of equal and inclusive citiz e n s h i p would ensure b o t h the equal t r e a t m e n t of persons and t h e social bases for equal influence in t h e political process. 2 8 T h e above discussion o f t h e presumption o f equality in rules t h a t govern a political association has focused on equal t r e a t m e n t by t h e rules a n d t h e bases of equal i n f l u e n c e in the process of rule f o r m a t i o n . Ensuring t h e latter requires p r e v e n t i n g t h e purchase o f influence by t h e wealthy and t h e exercise o f influence b y control over i n f o r m a t i o n . M e c h a n i s m s for doing so include public

financing

of political c a m p a i g n s and r e q u i r e m e n t s of equitable media coverage o f candidates. 2 9 This, however, is n o t likely t o be sufficient t o secure the equal social bases to influence the political process. Persons w h o are deterred from fully exercising their rights of participation because


t h e y are impoverished or overworked h a v e n o t b e e n guaranteed t h e social bases of equal i n f l u e n c e . 3 0 Hence, even a purely political association generates duties of distributive justice a m o n g c o m p a t r i o t s . 3 1 Citizens must be assured access to sufficient necessary resources such as e d u c a t i o n , news, i n c o m e , h o u s i n g , food, primary h e a l t h c a r e and leisure t o f u n c t i o n effectively in t h e political process. T h e distributive duties t h a t arise w i t h i n a political association are broadly consistent with t h e politics o f social d e m o c r a c y as it was developed in t h e t w e n t i e t h century. T h e c o n t e n t of t h e distributive d e m a n d s of equal respect w h e n c o n s i d e r i n g a political association, taken in abstraction from t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c association with w h i c h it co-exists, tends in the direction of sufficientarianism. T h e u p c o m i n g a r g u m e n t o n equality in distributive associations applies an approach similar t o t h e a r g u m e n t m a d e above defending political equality a n d its sufficientarian distributive implications. It m i g h t be useful, t h e n , to reflect on that approach before m o v i n g o n . T h e a r g u m e n t above has b o t h universalist and c o n t e x t u a l i s t interpretive e l e m e n t s . T h e universalist e l e m e n t is t h e n o r m o f respect for t h e dignity o f persons that is t h e basis o f the egalitarian political requirements. The contextualist-interpretive e l e m e n t s are threefold. T h e first is t h e application o f t h e principle o f associational

jus-

tice to t h e political aspects o f an association abstracted from o t h e r aspects. T h e p o i n t is that we d o n o t owe duties o f political justice to everyone, but o n l y t o c o - m e m b e r s of associations of t h e requisite kind. T h e second contextualist-interpretive e l e m e n t involves l e n d i n g c r e d e n c e t o t h e c l a i m t h a t political associations are c o m m o n good associations. Third e l e m e n t is t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of w h a t justice is a b o u t in a political association. If there is a justificatory presumption o f equality, we must d e t e r m i n e with respect t o what. W h a t are t h e goods (taken broadly t o include powers) of a political association t h a t justice regulates? In this limited regard, I a m e m p l o y i n g an approach c h a m p i o n e d by Michael Walzer, n a m e l y that, 'Social goods have social m e a n i n g s , and we find our way t o distributive justice through an interpretation o f their m e a n i n g s . ' 3 2 C o n t r a r y t o Walzer, however, I take t h e interpretive task to be primarily about the goods of justice and t h e ideal of equality t h a t regulates t h o s e goods, n o t a b o u t t h e distributive principle, w h i c h I argue m u s t be basically egalitarian in nature in order to be c o n s i s t e n t with respect for h u m a n dignity.


T h e interplay o f the universalist e l e m e n t a n d t h e interpretivec o n t e x t u a l i s t e l e m e n t s gives t h e interpretation m o r e critical force vis-a-vis

c o n v e n t i o n a l n o r m s t h a n Walzer m i g h t want to allow. T h e

interpretive task involves seeing h o w t h e c o m m o n good association m i g h t be u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t a i n i n g an implicit, even if n o t overtly acknowledged, ideal of equality and what t h e goods of t h e association are that are governed b y such an ideal. Such interpretive activity, as Ronald Dworkin claims w i t h respect to social practices, affirms t h e understanding of the association ' w h i c h proposes the m o s t value for t h e p r a c t i c e — w h i c h . . . s h o w s it in t h e better light' in this c a s e — I c l a i m — c a s t from t h e egalitarian perspective. 3 3 This, I t h i n k , is essential to a n y interpretive a c c o u n t that is built up from t h e premise of t h e i n h e r e n t dignity o f persons; and it serves to distinguish t h e a c c o u n t t h a t I defend here from purely c o n t e x t u a l i s t a c c o u n t s , in w h i c h as David Miller puts it t h e ' c o n t e x t d e p e n d e n c e o f principles goes all the way d o w n . ' 3 4 I d o u b t that such a c c o u n t s o f justice can avoid t h e serious p r o b l e m o f c o n v e n t i o n a l i s m , n a m e l y t h e failure t o provide a critical perspective on societies' practices sufficient t o capture adequately intuitively clear cases of injustice, such as racial and gender d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . 3 5 Miller seems to believe t h a t o n e can always find either an internal n o r m a t i v e i n c o n s i s t e n c y or an empirical falsehood in social practices t h a t we judge to be d i s c r i m i n a t o r y in these ways. 3 6 He considers a culture practice o f bestowing h o n o r s , and seems to believe t h a t a practice t h a t h o n o r s o n l y persons o f certain racial or e t h n i c group can always be criticized either because it fails t o base t h e h o n o r s o n achievem e n t s or because it is based o n a false c l a i m a b o u t t h e distribution of t h e relevant h o n o r - w o r t h y virtue o n l y to this racial or e t h n i c group. T h e idea is t h a t a practice o f h o n o r i n g requires s o m e sort of justification

and t h a t t h e justificatory grounds will always c o n d e m n t h e

d i s c r i m i n a t o r y practice. But suppose there is an i n s t i t u t i o n a l rule t h a t distributes t h e privileges and powers of political office o n l y to m e n or o n l y t o o n e e t h n i c group. T h e justification o f t h e n o r m m i g h t be t o protect a traditional way o f life t h a t is c o n s t i t u t e d in part precisely by such a distribution o f political privileges and powers. T h e actual c o n t e x t u a l justification goes n o further down t h a n this. T h i s seems t o be n e i t h e r internally i n c o n s i s t e n t nor based u p o n an empirical falsehood. Hence, Miller's c o n f i d e n c e in the ability to c o n d u c t an interpretation of practices t h a t offers critical purchase o n blatant


cases o f discrimination seems t o m e excessive. In any case, if we base our justification o n t h e i n h e r e n t dignity of persons, for t h e reasons I delineated in C h a p t e r 1, we avoid t h e problem of c o n v e n t i o n a l ism a n d are n o n e t h e l e s s able to engage in political a r g u m e n t w i t h a variety o f m e m b e r s of the global c o m m u n i t y . I take a similar approach, e m p l o y i n g a universalist f o u n d a t i o n and an interpretation o f t h e association, in discussing t h e purely e c o n o m i c aspects of an association. I claim that the justificatory presumption in favor of equality in such a n ideal-type association justifies m o r e robustly egalitarian principles o f distributive justice t h a n does the presumption applied t h e political aspects o f an assoc i a t i o n . T h i s c o n c l u s i o n is n o t trivial in part because it m o r e or less reverses t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e c o n c l u s i o n

of many

coercion

theorists. An e c o n o m i c association involves t h e organization of t h e division o f labor and e n t i t l e m e n t s t o capital assets. It also directs t h e deploym e n t of labor and capital for t h e p r o d u c t i o n of goods and services t h a t benefit its m e m b e r s . Although theories o f natural property rights in persons and products exist, if w e assume that these are n o t c o m pelling, we m a y take t h e e c o n o m y as a c o m m o n good association. An e c o n o m i c association is a n i c e e x a m p l e o f w h a t Rawls refers to as 'a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.' 3 7 Elizabeth Anderson provides a c o m p e l l i n g a c c o u n t of t h e division of labor as a cooperative venture: Each worker's capacity t o labor d e p e n d s o n a vast array of inputs produced by o t h e r p e o p l e — f o o d , s c h o o l i n g , p a r e n t i n g a n d t h e like. It d e p e n d s o n workers in t h e recreation a n d

entertain-

m e n t industries, since e n j o y m e n t o f leisure activities helps restore energy and e n t h u s i a s m for work. In addition, t h e productivity o f a worker in a specific role depends not o n l y on her own efforts, but on o t h e r people p e r f o r m i n g their roles in the division of labor. Michael J o r d o n could n o t make so m a n y baskets if n o o n e kept the basketball court swept clean. Millions o f people could not even work if public transportation workers w e n t o n strike. 3 8 W i t h i n a division of labor persons assume roles in t h e productive process. Such roles s o m e t i m e s c o n f e r significant benefits a l t h o u g h in capitalist societies the greatest benefits c o m e n o t from t h e role


t h a t a person plays in t h e productive process but from t h e capital assets t h a t she o w n s under t h e property rules of t h e system. M o r e often t h e benefits conferred b y t h e role o n e plays in

the

productive process are meager in c o m p a r i s o n to the benefits c o n ferred by o w n e r s h i p . T h e roles c o n f e r powers and privileges; but for m a n y e m p l o y e e s t h e y c o n f e r mostly t h e responsibility to do as t h e boss says. E c o n o m i c systems distribute goods and services with

profound

ramifications for t h e i n c o m e , wealth, o p p o r t u n i t i e s and capabilities o f persons participating as e c o n o m i c agents. T h e s e ramifications significantly influence t h e life prospects of persons. Equal respect for persons in the c o n t e x t o f an e c o n o m i c association t h a t a principle p e r m i t t i n g significant and u n c h o s e n

requires

inequalities

in t h e life prospects o f persons be justified o n t h e basis of reasons t h a t t h e persons would find reasonable. T h i s is t h e basis for affirming the moral ideal of reciprocity w i t h i n t h e c o o p e r a t i v e venture o f p r o d u c t i o n . Reciprocity between persons c o o p e r a t i n g for mutual advantage exists o n l y if t h e terms o f c o o p e r a t i o n are fair and reasonable. W h a t institutional rules does reciprocity require? It seems unreas o n a b l e to claim t h a t it requires full return at t h e market rate for individual c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e productive effort. T h e reason t h a t is m o s t c o m p e l l i n g in light of Anderson's a c c o u n t of the cooperative nature o f t h e division of labor is identified by Rawls: O n e ' s talents, efforts and skills require t h e c o o p e r a t i o n and c o n t r i b u t i o n of others participating in t h e productive process. It would be u n r e a s o n a b l e t o reward a person solely o n the basis of her individual talents, effort and skills w h e n these facilitate her c o n t r i b u t i o n o n l y in c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h o t h e r s w h o support her in various ways. 3 9 O n c e again d e m o c r a t i c equality, w h i c h seeks t o prevent institutionally conferred privileges derived merely from family b a c k g r o u n d or natural talents, appears to be the most appropriate guide to an a c c o u n t o f what equal respect requires. I am n o t arguing here in defense of t h e specific principles of justice that Rawls arrives at by rejecting principles that build up from advantages conferred by f a m i l y background or natural talents. Rather, I a m c o n t e n d i n g t h a t o n c e we take stock o f t h e cooperative nature of e c o n o m i c production a n d t h e advantages t h a t family wealth and natural talents can c o n f e r under s o m e institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s , we will reject rules


t h a t c o n f e r advantages merely o n t h e bases o f family wealth a n d natural talents. T h e p o i n t is t h a t working out t h e d e m a n d s of t h e ideal o f reciprocity in e c o n o m i c institutions involves t h e guiding c o n c e p t i o n o f d e m o c r a t i c equality with its substantial

egalitarian

tendency. T h e idea here with respect t o talents is n o t t h a t t h e r e is s o m e kind o f pre-associational i n j u s t i c e because s o m e people are m o r e tale n t e d t h a n others, so that t h e project o f justice involves c o n s t r u c t i n g institutions to correct for these injustices. M y a r g u m e n t in S e c t i o n II involves rejecting t h a t kind of an approach. Rather t h e idea is t h a t the institutions o f a just association m a y n o t advantage persons merely on t h e basis their natural talents or family backgrounds. In identifying certain natural properties of persons as morally arbitrary, d e m o c r a t i c equality does n o t take t h e u n e q u a l natural distribution o f these properties as an i n j u s t i c e t o be corrected, but as an inappropriate basis upon w h i c h to favor people w i t h i n an institutional system. T h e natural distribution is n e i t h e r just n o r u n j u s t ; nor is it unjust t h a t people are b o r n i n t o society at s o m e particular position. T h e s e are simply natural facts. W h a t is just and unjust is the way t h a t institutions deal with these facts.' 4 0 I d o u b t that t h e d e m a n d s o f reciprocity in an e c o n o m i c association are satisfied merely by the d e m o c r a t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f distributive

jus-

tice. Just as political institutions c a n generate duties o f distributive justice t o ensure equal and inclusive citizenship, so can e c o n o m i c associations generate what otherwise m i g h t seem to be solely political duties t o ensure reciprocity. 4 1 A c o o p e r a t i v e v e n t u r e for mutual e c o n o m i c advantage should n o t merely reward persons fairly for their efforts in t h e productive process. It must also ensure t h a t t h e y are capable o f e n j o y i n g t h e benefits of t h e products produced and o f t h e various roles in t h e productive process. E n j o y i n g t h e benefits o f t h e various roles in the division o f labor requires basic liberties, a m o n g o t h e r s freedom o f c o n t r a c t , m o v e m e n t , and association, including u n i o n i z a t i o n . In order t o exercise o n e ' s own

judgments

about h o w to evaluate t h e fruits o f t h e productive process sufficient e d u c a t i o n and t h e freedoms of c o n s c i e n c e and t h o u g h t are required. Finally, t h e institutions of an e c o n o m i c association do n o t affect o n l y t h e e c o n o m i c interests o f persons (even as broadly c o n c e i v e d in this paragraph). Rather other f u n d a m e n t a l moral interests are also affected, such as t h e general capacity o f persons to live lives t h a t are


in significant ways c h o s e n . Hence, it is implausibly narrow t o limit t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of reciprocity in an e c o n o m i c association o n l y t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f distributive justice. In sum, a l t h o u g h t h e n o r m o f equal respect h a s egalitarian implications for all associations that generate duties o f justice, t h e ideal of equality for t h e political aspects o f an association a n d t h a t for t h e econ o m i c aspects are distinct. In the former t h e ideal is o n e o f equal and inclusive citizenship. In t h e latter it is reciprocity. Although b o t h give rise t o duties of distributive justice, in t h e case o f t h e political aspects of t h e association these are sufficientarian, w h i l e in t h e e c o n o m i c they are broadly egalitarian.

VII M y c l a i m t h a t equal respect requires t h a t t h e rules of an e c o n o m i c association be guided by t h e n o r m of reciprocity is similar t o Andrea S a n g i o v a n n i ' s a c c o u n t of t h e basis o f egalitarian distributive justice. Both a c c o u n t s affirm m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e ; and b o t h a c c o u n t s take reciprocity as an expression of t h e basic c o m m i t m e n t t o egalitarian distributive justice. Yet, S a n g i o v a n n i ' s discussion o f reciprocity is m e a n t to supply t h e decisive premise in an a r g u m e n t for n o n c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism. S a n g i o v a n n i ' s a r g u m e n t is c o m p l e x ; and I c a n n o t h o p e t o respond to it fully in a brief t r e a t m e n t . But it m i g h t prove useful for u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e strengths and weaknesses of each our p o s i t i o n s to see where t h e y differ. S a n g i o v a n n i believes t h a t reciprocity arises as a n o r m to govern i n t e r a c t i o n s in markets o n l y if, or t o the e x t e n t t h a t , t h e y are supported by t h e legal b a c k g r o u n d o f a state. In t h e a b s e n c e o f a global state, t h e c o n d i t i o n s are n o t ripe for g e n e r a t i n g t h e n o r m . It seems i m p o r t a n t t o this a r g u m e n t t h a t as a m a t t e r o f fact market c o o p eration requires state structures. T h i s is evident w h e n S a n g i o v a n n i i m a g i n e s a reply t o a person d e m a n d i n g a full return at t h e market rate for her c o n t r i b u t i o n : Domestic

markets—and,

indirectly,

global

markets

as

well—

require t h e background provided by t h e shared legal corpus of t h e state, w h i c h governs areas ranging from torts to a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o property rights, contracts, c o r p o r a t i o n s and c r i m i n a l law. W i t h o u t such a legal background, your talents and efforts would h a v e been


of little use t o a n y o n e , and would certainly n o t have garnered t h e returns t h e y do now. 4 2 And again: It is your fellow citizens and residents w h o have provided t h e institutional framework in w h i c h you h a v e flourished; it is they w h o have sustained and reproduced t h e basic goods, including t h e legal system, necessary for your successful participation in your society. 4 3 And finally: 'Successful e c o n o m i c production a n d e x c h a n g e o n a societal scale c a n n o t exist w i t h o u t a stable background of state-based civil a n d c r i m i n a l law.' 4 4 T h e moral lesson o f this is exclusive: '[T]hose w h o have submitted t h e m s e l v e s to a system of laws and social rules in ways necessary t o sustain our lives as citizens, producers, and biological beings are owed a fair return for what t h o s e w h o have benefited from their submission h a v e received.' 4 5 I take it that we are to understand this claim as c o n t a i n i n g an implied ' o n l y ' at t h e b e g i n n i n g . I see t w o p r o b l e m s with this approach. First, it is unclear t o m e h o w t h e limited scope of t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n c l u s i o n is drawn from t h e factual claims about the d e p e n d e n c e o f t h e e c o n o m y on the state. W h y does t h e fact that e c o n o m i c associations require t h e support and regulation o f political o n e s entail t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c relations so supported c a n n o t give rise t o i n d e p e n d e n t claims of reciprocity? C o n s i d e r an analogy. T h e i n s t i t u t i o n of marriage requires the support o f a legal framework. N o n e t h e l e s s it would, I take it, be implausible t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e moral duties o f spouses are n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n moral duties o f citizens. S e c o n d , it is n o t clear exactly what t h e sense o f t h e empirical claim about the d e p e n d e n c e o f e c o n o m i c systems o n states is. If we grant t h a t successful e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n requires g o v e r n a n c e structures, and we go looking for t h e g o v e r n a n c e structures o f t h e global e c o n o m y , w e will find a m i x t u r e of state laws and multi-lateral treaties. We have o n e big e x a m p l e of an e c o n o m i c association t h a t is n o t governed by a centralized state structure. So, t h e d e p e n d e n c y o f t h e e c o n o m y o n t h e state c a n n o t plausibly be understood as necessarily a o n e - t o - o n e relationship. But if it is n o t , t h e n a worker in Pakistan m a y have citizens o f t h e USA to t h a n k for t h e


o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t she has t o express her talents under repressive work place c o n d i t i o n s . Roth o f t h e s e p r o b l e m s suggest t o m e t h a t an a t t e m p t t o limit t h e claims of distributive justice m a d e on grounds of reciprocity o n l y to c o m p a t r i o t s is likely to fail. T h e more p r o m i s i n g approach, I believe, is to view t h e institutional structure o f an e c o n o m i c association as an i n d e p e n d e n t source o f duties o f egalitarian distributive justice.

VIII If e c o n o m i c associations generate i n d e p e n d e n t duties of egalitarian distribute justice, there is a basis t o begin an assessment of t h e justice of t h e institutions of t h e process o f globalization. A m o d e l for assessing w h e t h e r a global inequality is an i n j u s t i c e c a n be derived f r o m t h e a r g u m e n t s of S e c t i o n s II a n d V. T h e fact t h a t persons in o n e c o u n t r y are m u c h less well off than persons in a n o t h e r is n o t by itself evid e n c e of injustice. M e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e requires t h e r e t o be m o r e t h a n t h a t . J u s t as Rawls asserts that inequality in t h e distribution o f natural talents is n e i t h e r just nor unjust, but rather that it is what i n s t i t u t i o n s do with these that matter, so also it is w h a t global instit u t i o n s do with inequalities that matters. We are c o n c e r n e d n o t with c o n d i t i o n s o f inequality i n d e p e n d e n t o f e c o n o m i c associations, but w i t h w h e t h e r e c o n o m i c institutions, such as rules that govern trade, i n v e s t m e n t and e n t i t l e m e n t s to intellectual property c o n f e r advantages simply o n t h e basis o f inequalities o f social f o r t u n e , i n c l u d i n g citizenship status and natural talents. I take this kind o f m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e to h a v e two advantages over theories of egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m t h a t d o not affirm m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e . First, according t o t h e s e latter theories any inequality whatsoever is u n j u s t if it does n o t c o n f o r m to w h a t is permitted by justified principles. I argued in S e c t i o n II that t h e claim that duties of justice arise merely in virtue of p e r s o n h o o d is implausible. A n o t h e r piece o f e v i d e n c e in t h e case against t h e view t h a t p e r s o n h o o d a l o n e suffices for duties o f justice is that it would take a person to have a duty to support equalizing distributive institutions even between herself a n d persons with w h o m s h e shared n o c o m m o n institutions. Second, taking m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e seriously allows egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n s t o appreciate and respond intelligently t o certain


moral issues resulting from t h e fact t h a t n a t i o n a l and

regional

e c o n o m i e s still exert profound influences o n t h e lives o f persons. Despite t h e empirical e v i d e n c e t h a t I adduce in S e c t i o n IV, I take it that part o f w h a t reduces t h e plausibility o f a global egalitarian position is t h e awareness o f these n o n - g l o b a l influences. T h e r e are p r o b l e m s o f two different kinds. T h e first is t h a t it is unclear in practice h o w institutionally e x t e n s i v e duties of global distributive justice are since persons are m e m b e r s of, and profoundly affected by their m e m b e r s h i p in, n a t i o n a l , regional and global e c o n o m i c associations. How m u c h of t h e c o n d i t i o n of persons in distant lands is t h e result o f distributive i n j u s t i c e s that place m e under a duty? T h e s e c o n d issue is less obvious but at least as i m p o r t a n t . Familiar a c c o u n t s of social justice were developed for application in t h e state, w h i c h t h e s e a c c o u n t s often assumed for purposes of simplicity to be a closed social and political unit. 4 6 For institutional a c c o u n t s this is signific a n t since the justification o f principles of justice is developed on t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e y will c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y cover t h e b a c k g r o u n d distributive institutions. 4 7 In a partially globalized world t h e global institutions, w h i c h provide the sufficient c o n d i t i o n s for duties egalitarian distributive justice, are far from c o m p r e h e n s i v e . How if, at all, should t h e c o n t e n t of egalitarian distributive principles reflect t h e i n c o m p l e t e coverage o f t h e institutions to w h i c h they apply? Philosophers s y m p a t h e t i c to b o t h global duties of justice and m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n c e have sought responses t o these q u e s t i o n s . In response t o t h e first, A.J. Julius advocates applying egalitarian principles separately t o b o t h d o m e s t i c societies and global institutions, allowing increasing coverage of global principles as global institutions b e c o m e increasingly m o r e e c o n o m i c a l l y

important.48

T h i s approach would seem t o r e c o m m e n d limiting t h e focus t o t h e inequalities caused by e m e r g i n g global e c o n o m i c institutions as t h e institutions e m e r g e . An alternative position claims t h a t all inequality (not o n l y that caused by e m e r g i n g global e c o n o m i c institutions) is within t h e province o f global justice on t h e moral ground t h a t preglobal-institutional inequalities, such as t h o s e deriving from national e c o n o m i e s , should n o t give rise to global i n s t i t u t i o n a l advantages. T h e moral ground of t h e alternative position seems to m e hard t o deny, at least as t h e moral i m p o r t a n c e of global

institutional

advantages increases. But this alternative m i g h t seem to render a version m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n t global egalitarianism e x t e n s i o n a l l y


equivalent t o a n o n - m e m b e r s h i p d e p e n d e n t global egalitarianism. I do n o t t h i n k , however, t h a t practically it goes all t h e w a y down t h e road t o a d v o c a t i n g a c o m p l e t e fix t o all pre-institutional inequality since affirming t h e moral ground does n o t c o m m i t o n e to the view that all pre-existing institutional inequality confers

institu-

tional advantages. It is, in fact, an empirical matter whether, say, wealth generated in a national e c o n o m y confers privileges in certain global institutions. However, t h e possibility that it does allows for t h e possibility of supporting i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions t h a t involve t h e t a x a t i o n of wealth, s o m e o f w h i c h is acquired largely in n a t i o n a l e c o n o m i e s for distribution to relatively p o o r n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s . J o s h u a C o h e n and Charles Sabel—perhaps with s o m e t h i n g like t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h e c o n t e n t of duties o f justice is affected by i n c o m p l e t e i n s t i t u t i o n a l coverage in m i n d — a r g u e t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions establish duties of justice, n o t , however, duties o f egalitarian distributive justice. Instead, t h e duties express a n o r m o f inclusion, w h i c h does n o t require equal consideration o f t h e interests o f all persons but at least 'due c o n s i d e r a t i o n . ' 4 9 C o h e n and Sabel's a r g u m e n t is sensitive t o t h e character o f international institutions, w h i c h as m e n t i o n e d a b o v e are far from c o m p r e h e n s i v e in scope. T h e i r a r g u m e n t seems t o be c o n t e x t u a l i s t all t h e way d o w n . Their p o i n t is that as a matter o f fact i n t e r n a t i o n a l institutions recognize a n o r m o f i n c l u s i o n . T h e i r o n l y riposte to w h a t otherwise looks like a c o n v e n t i o n a l i s t approach is t h e following: 'Of course, t h e practice of i n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l and t r a n s n a t i o n a l bodies is n o t n o r m a t i v e l y authoritative, but t h e fact t h a t they (and their critics) do n o t take t h e m s e l v e s to be o p e r a t i n g in a n o r m a t i v e v a c u u m , or in a world of pure h u m a n i t a r i a n morality is at least suggestive.' 5 0 T h i s seems fine as far as it goes, n a m e l y as piece in t h e a r g u m e n t against Nagel's skepticism a b o u t global justice. But an adequate a c c o u n t o f t h e n o r m s o f global distributive justice must do m o r e t h a n rest on the suggestions provide by c o n v e n t i o n a l n o r m s . Even if C o h e n and Sable's a c c o u n t is theoretically i n c o m p l e t e , it seems correct that s o m e theoretical modesty is appropriate in light of t h e fact t h a t t h e institutions o f the global e c o n o m i c association are far from c o m p r e h e n s i v e . It is simply n o t possible to take t h e institutional bearer o f t h e properties of justice and i n j u s t i c e as a single c o m p r e h e n s i v e system, w h i c h if properly designed a n d m a n aged, could provide all of w h a t distributive justice requires. To this


failure o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l capacity, I suggest, t h e r e corresponds indeterm i n a c y in t h e d e m a n d s of egalitarian distributive justice. If global institutions a l o n e c a n n o t , for e x a m p l e , m a x i m i z e all o f t h e e c o n o m i c advantages to t h e representative m e m b e r o f t h e class of t h e least advantaged, even w h e n pre-institutional (or m o r e precisely perhaps o t h e r institutional) advantages c o n f e r privileges in t h e global association, t h e n such a principle is best taken as an ideal of global justice, but n o t an expression of a duty. It seems rather that t h e c o n t e n t o f distributive duties in a partially globalized world is best characterized as i n d e t e r m i n a t e l y egalitarian. O n c e t h e capacity o f global institutions increases sufficiently, t h e c o n t e n t of the egalitarian duties take o n t h a t o f t h e ideal. M e a n w h i l e , inequalities in global institutions are suspect; t h e y require justification on grounds t h a t those w h o are disadvantaged could reasonably endorse. T h e presumption in favor o f equality can be defeated if o n e o f t h e four e x c e p t i o n s a d u m b r a t e d in S e c t i o n V apply. Now t o those four, I add a fifth, n a m e l y lack o f institutional capacity t o remedy t h e injustice. T h e m e t h o d for c l a i m i n g an injustice c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e a c c o u n t presented in this c h a p t e r involves first identifying inequalities, seco n d assessing w h e t h e r these arise between persons w h o s e activities are mediated by s o m e association o f t h e requisite kind, a n d third c o n s i d e r i n g w h e t h e r they are e x c u s a b l e in light o f o n e o f t h e four e x c e p t i o n s (or s o m e o t h e r o n e ) canvassed in Section V. T h e a r g u m e n t that t h e r e are n o morally plausible excuses for inequalities between institutional m e m b e r s would a m o u n t t o a pro tanto a r g u m e n t for an u n j u s t inequality. But c o m p l e t i n g t h e a r g u m e n t requires c o n v i n c i n g reasons to believe t h a t t h e r e are feasible institutional alternatives t h a t can be realized w i t h o u t disproportional moral costs and t h a t do n o t t h e m s e l v e s e n g e n d e r disproportional injustices. T h i s is a q u e s t i o n o f institutional capacity for, and t h e moral costs of, alternatives. Given t h e requirement o f assessing alternative institutions, I do n o t offer here t h e c o m p l e t e a r g u m e n t for the e x i s t e n c e o f significant injustices in t h e global e c o n o m y . T h e a r g u m e n t will o n l y b e c o m plete in C h a p t e r 7. I close with a pro tanto

a r g u m e n t that involves

recalling s o m e o f t h e features of current global inequalities. T h e richest 5 percent of the world's p o p u l a t i o n earns 1 1 4 t i m e s t h a t o f t h e poorest 5 percent. T h e total i n c o m e of t h e richest 1 percent is equal to t h a t o f the poorest 5 7 percent. And t h e i n c o m e of 2 5 m i l l i o n richest A m e r i c a n s is nearly as m u c h as t h a t o f the two billion poorest


people in t h e world. 5 1 I n c o m e inequality, however, is less severe t h a n wealth inequality. T h e assets o f t h e richest t h r e e people in t h e world are m o r e t h a n t h e c o m b i n e d GNP o f all o f t h e least developed c o u n t r i e s . 5 2 In t h e s a m e world t h a t c o n t a i n s u n i m a g i n a b l e o p u l e n c e there is also desperate poverty. Nearly 1.3 billion people lack access to clean water; and 8 4 0 million children are m a l n o u r i s h e d . 5 3 T h e s e huge inequalities have dramatic effects on t h e life prospects o f persons. O n e i m p o r t a n t e x a m p l e of this is longevity. In 2 0 0 1 the mortality rate for children under 5 was nearly 2 6 t i m e s higher in t h e countries of Sub-Saharan Africa t h a n in t h e O C E D countries. 5 4 According t o t h e World Health Organization, over 6 0 percent of deaths in developed countries o c c u r b e y o n d age 70, c o m p a r e d to a b o u t 3 0 percent in developing countries. 5 5 T h e United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund reports t h a t in 2 0 0 6 , 9 . 7 million children under age five died of m a i n l y preventable causes. 5 6 T h a t is 2 6 , 5 7 5 children dying per day, or 1 , 1 0 7 in t h e hour t h a t it takes to read this chapter. These inequalities appear t o be serious injustices in the global economy.

4

Global Equality of Opportunity Defended

I began this b o o k by citing several cases o f e x t r e m e inequality o f o p p o r t u n i t y across t h e globe. W e do well to recall s o m e o f this as b a c k g r o u n d for t h e present discussion. Consider o p p o r t u n i t i e s for longevity: A b a b y b o r n in Mali in 2 0 0 1 had an a p p r o x i m a t e l y 13 perc e n t c h a n c e of dying before reaching t h e age o n e , while a b a b y born in t h e USA the s a m e year had a less t h a n 1 percent c h a n c e o f dying. 1 Or consider e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t : ' T h e average A m e r i c a n born between 1 9 7 5 and 1 9 7 9 has c o m p l e t e d m o r e t h a n 14 years o f s c h o o l i n g (roughly the s a m e for m e n a n d w o m e n , and in urban and rural areas), while the average school a t t a i n m e n t for the s a m e c o h o r t in Mali is less t h a n two years, w i t h w o m e n ' s a t t a i n m e n t less t h a n half t h a t for m e n , and virtually zero in rural areas.' 2 Finally consider o p p o r t u n i t i e s for i n c o m e : In 1 9 9 4 t h e average i n c o m e in Mali was less t h a n $ 2 PPP per day, or S 5 4 per m o n t h ; in t h e USA it was m o r e t h a n 2 0 times greater, $ 1 , 1 8 5 per m o n t h . 3 T h e c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f persons born in Mali and t h e USA suggests t h a t where o n e is born in t h e world dramatically affects the o p p o r t u n i t i e s that o n e will h a v e for h e a l t h , education and i n c o m e . T h e e x t e n t to w h i c h careful empirical studies c o n f i r m this and permit o n e t o generalize, at least w i t h respect to i n c o m e , is impressive. Branko Milanovic's studies o f global i n c o m e distribution, for e x a m p l e , c o n f i r m t h e strong influence of c o u n t r y o f birth o n a person's o p p o r t u n i t y for i n c o m e . Eighty percent of t h e variability in a person's global i n c o m e percentile rank c a n be explained by 68

Global Equality of Opportunity Defended 69

her c o u n t r y o f birth and her parents' i n c o m e , two factors over w h i c h she has n o c o n t r o l . And, 9 0 percent of her global i n c o m e position can be explained by her i n c o m e in her c o u n t r y , given t h e c o u n t r y ' s m e a n i n c o m e and i n c o m e distribution. 4 Equality of o p p o r t u n i t y requires equalizing opportunities to possess goods o f s o m e specified kind a m o n g persons with a p p r o x i m a t e l y equal e n d o w m e n t s o f s o m e specified sort. Typically, t h e ideal requires mitigation inequalities i n h e r i t e d due to social c i r c u m s t a n c e at birth in order to ensure a p p r o x i m a t e equality of opportunities for t h e equally talented. Typically philosophers h a v e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e relevant social c i r c u m s t a n c e is the social class o f the child's family. 5 But t h e e x a m p l e s above and Milanovic's research m a k e apparent t h a t the c o u n t r y of birth is also relevant. T h e ideal, as I e m p l o y it here, is n o t merely formal. It does n o t require merely t h a t persons n o t be discriminated against in educational e n t r a n c e review or c o m p e t i t i o n for e m p l o y m e n t , but rather that persons with a p p r o x i m a t e l y equal e n d o w m e n t s o f a specified sort (for e x a m p l e , talents, abilities and m o t i v a t i o n ) have a set of equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s in their y o u t h a n d in s o m e cases t h r o u g h o u t their life. 6 Equality of o p p o r t u n i t y is in fact o n l y a m i n i m a l l y egalitarian moral ideal. W h e n applied to certain opportunities, such as opport u n i t y for i n c o m e , it presupposes a b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n of c o m petition t h a t has led s o m e to criticize it. 7 It is also c o n s i s t e n t with inequality w i t h respect to o u t c o m e s . W i t h respect to t h o s e w h o posses a p p r o x i m a t e l y equal e n d o w m e n t s of t h e specified sort, equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is merely a principle o f starting-gate equality, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h differential o u t c o m e s . W i t h respect to t h o s e w h o are u n e q u a l in t h e specified way, equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y does n o t equalize at all. So, it seems fair t h e n t o designate t h o s e w h o criticize it as an ideal o f global justice as anti-global egalitarians. Anti-egalitarians may, of course, reject equality as moral ideal, but still value it instrumentally, insofar as i n e q u a l i t y c o n t r i b u t e s causally to social c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t h e y have reason t o c o n d e m n . It m i g h t be t h o u g h t inaccurate t o classify all those w h o reject the ideal of global equality of o p p o r t u n i t y as anti-global egalitarians. For o n e m i g h t reject t h e m i n i m a l starting-gate principle but affirm s o m e m o r e d e m a n d i n g version o f equality of o u t c o m e . J o h n Rawls briefly discusses a view that includes t h e principle t h a t f u n d a m e n t a l instit u t i o n s o u g h t t o distribute goods such t h a t inequalities are to the


m a x i m u m benefit to t h e least advantaged, but t h a t rejects t h e principle t h a t p o s i t i o n s of privilege with respect t o possession of t h o s e goods s h o u l d be o p e n to all on t h e basis o f equality o f opportunity. He characterizes this view as 'natural aristocracy.' 8 T h e idea is t h a t those w h o are naturally superior should set their talents to work for t h e naturally inferior out o f a sense of noblesse

oblige.

If Rawls's

characterization is correct, then i n t e n s i o n a l l y this position is n o t an egalitarian o n e at all. Still, there need n o t be a n y c o n t r a d i c t i o n in affirming a m o r e robust egalitarian principle, while rejecting t h e ideal o f equality of opportunity. But it is unlikely t h a t o n e would arrive at this position by way o f a c o h e r e n t underlying egalitarian t h e o r y since it would seem natural to apply t h o s e reasons that would limit unequal o u t c o m e s also t o opportunities. In this chapter, I shall defend global equality of opportunity. Global equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is, I believe, an i m p o r t a n t part o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t t o global egalitarianism a l t h o u g h I do n o t a s s u m e t h a t it is t h e w h o l e o f t h e global egalitarian ideal. Global egalitarianism may include other, perhaps even m o r e robust c o m m i t m e n t s as well. 9 But w h e t h e r it does or n o t shall n o t c o n c e r n m e here. T h e modus

operandi

of this chapter is primarily defensive. Anti-global egalitarians h a v e criticized global equality of o p p o r t u n i t y o n a n u m b e r of grounds. Here I h o p e to provide adequate responses. In Section II, I defend t h e claim t h a t citizenship status is morally arbitrary against critics o f t h e view. S e c t i o n s III t h r o u g h VI are devoted t o responding to various criticisms c o n c e r n i n g t h e specific a t i o n o f t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e ideal of global equality o f opportunity. In S e c t i o n III, I argue t h a t the global e c o n o m i c association establishes a reasonably specific range of goods relevant t o an a c c o u n t of global equality o f opportunity. Sections IV and V respond t o t w o different critics w h o charge t h a t t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e ideal o f global equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y c a n n o t be adequately specified because o f the pluralism of values globally. In S e c t i o n VI, I argue that t h e ideas from w h i c h equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is built up are n o t hopelessly r e m o t e from the value o r i e n t a t i o n s o f m a n y people a r o u n d the world. So, there is reason to h o p e t h a t political controversy a b o u t equality of opportunity c a n eventually be superseded. Finally, in S e c t i o n VII, I respond t o t h e criticism t h a t t h e practice of equality of o p p o r t u n i t y would issue in disproportionate moral costs because o f its i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y with t h e ideal o f t h e self-determination of states. By t h e end, I h o p e


to have shown that unlike the doubts that I expressed about institutional capacity for the application of the difference principle at the end of Chapter 3, significant progress could be made in equalizing opportunities within the confines present in global institutions, allowing for minor reforms of policy. II A central claim in the defense of global equality of opportunity is that justificatory respect rules out a principle of distribution that permits persons to be privileged merely because of their citizenship or nationality at birth. Such a principle could not be reasonably endorsed by those whose opportunities would be diminished under the institutions governed by that rule. Claims such as this derive from the treatment that Rawls gives natural talents and abilities, social starting points and characters in the original position. He argues that persons do not deserve the social privileges that they derive from these personal properties because they do not deserve the properties themselves. 10 The central claim in defense of global equality of opportunity seems plausible in the context of a common good association because place of birth is not a matter over which a person exercises control. Assuming that one can claim to deserve an aspect of one's person only if one has intentionally brought it about, then one cannot claim to deserve any advantages that one might enjoy in virtue of one's original citizenship. Original citizenship is undeserved or arbitrary from the moral point of view. Hence, institutional rules should seek to minimize the privileges that it might confer. The claim that certain properties of persons are arbitrary from the moral point of view has often been attacked by anti-egalitarians. Recall Robert Nozick's view that the invocation of arbitrariness is in tension with a political philosophy founded on respect for persons: This [egalitarian] line of argument can succeed in blocking the introduction of a person's autonomous choices and actions (and their results) only by attributing everything noteworthy about the person completely to certain sorts of 'external' factors. So denigrating a person's autonomy and prime responsibility for his actions is a risky line to take for a theory that otherwise wishes to buttress the dignity and self-respect of autonomous beings... 1 1


His, of course, is a general suspicion against setting off any properties o f persons as arbitrary, n o t a specific attack on t h e arbitrariness o f citizenship at birth. But any defense of t h e arbitrariness o f citizenship at birth must be able to w i t h s t a n d his general criticism. Nozick believes that all positive a r g u m e n t s in defense o f t h e arbitrariness o f certain properties of persons fail because either (i) t h e y i n v o k e a c o n c e p t of moral desert that egalitarians reject, (ii) t h e y involve the false a s s u m p t i o n that all natural assets c a n n o t be correlated with non-arbitrary properties of persons, (iii) t h e y require a c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e view t h a t arbitrary properties of persons c a n n o t affect a distribution, w h i c h view is i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e difference principle or (iv) they e m p l o y an inappropriate p r e s u m p t i o n for equality, w h i c h presumption all differences in t r e a t m e n t must be defeat. 1 2 In response t o Nozick, ruling out consideration o f one's citizenship or residential status w h e n considering t h e merits of a principle to distribute o p p o r t u n i t i e s can be defended as an i n s t a n c e o f t h e following general principle: (D) An institutional rule s h o u l d n o t substantially disadvantaged a person, where disadvantage is measure by c o m p a r i s o n to a baseline of equality for all, on t h e basis o f properties o f her that are the result natural or social fortune. W i t h Nozick's criticisms in m i n d , n o t i c e that (D) n e i t h e r (i) invokes moral desert, (ii) relies on the assumption t h a t n o natural assets can be correlated with non-arbitrary properties of persons, nor (iii) is i n c o n s i s t e n t with the difference principle s i n c e the difference principle requires all to improve against a b a s e l i n e o f equality. It does however (iv) e m p l o y a presumption in favor o f equality. Principle (D) e m p l o y s c o m p a r i s o n s against a baseline of equality. It does this because justificatory respect in a c o m m o n good association requires it. Respect for h u m a n dignity requires justification o f differential t r e a t m e n t o f persons by m e a n s o f reasonable e n d o r s e m e n t . In a c o m m o n good association such justific a t i o n supposes a baseline of equal t r e a t m e n t since n o o n e has a n y pre-associational c l a i m s o n the goods produced by t h e association. Deviations f r o m this baseline require justification. A certain class o f reasons to deviate from equality c a n n o t be reasonably endorsed, n a m e l y those reasons t h a t appeal o n l y to properties of persons that are t h e result of natural a n d social fortune. O n e criticism t h a t David Miller makes of t h e principle of global equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is structurally similar to Nozick's. 1 3 Miller c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e egalitarian position requires a c o m m i t m e n t to t h e


following principle: (D') If t w o people are differentiated o n l y by features for w h i c h t h e y are n o t morally responsible, t h e n it is w r o n g t h a t they s h o u l d be treated differently. 1 4 He rejects this principle because it fails t o allow h a n d i c a p p e d persons, or those with greater needs generally, to be given greater resources. Although this c o n c e r n seems appropriate, t h e principle t h a t Miller believes t o be a part of t h e egalitarian rejection of moral arbitrariness is unlikely to find wide appeal a m o n g egalitarians in a n y case since it would, for e x a m p l e , prohibit rewarding talent and effort differentially if it served t o i m p r o v e t h e c o n d i t i o n o f t h e least advantaged. In a n y case, principle (D) is n e i t h e r equivalent to, nor does it entail, principle (D'). For (D) incorporates t h e baseline of equality against w h i c h t o measure disadvantage, while (D') does n o t . So, for e x a m ple, although (D') would n o t allow additional resources t o persons o n t h e basis o f greater needs, (D) could permit this, if in t h e a b s e n c e o f receiving additional resources these people would be rendered worse off in c o m p a r i s o n t o their c o n d i t i o n under equality. A c o m plete discussion o f these matters probably requires an a c c o u n t o f what equality is a measure of, the

distribuand

o f egalitarian justice.

I have sought to avoid this by stating (D) in a m a n n e r t h a t is n o n c o m mittal with respect t o goods t h a t are t o be distributed. An adequate a c c o u n t t h e distribuand

o f egalitarian justice far exceeds w h a t can be

d o n e w i t h i n the c o n f i n e s of t h e focus of this b o o k . So, I shall n o t pursue these matters further. I do, h o w e v e r h o p e to have s h o w n t h a t t h e Nozick-Miller a r g u m e n t against t h e c l a i m t h a t certain properties of persons are morally arbitrary does n o t succeed against t h e c l a i m that a person's citizenship or residential status is morally arbitrary.

In Cosmopolitan

Justice I used the e x a m p l e of t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s avail-

able t o t h e c h i l d of a Swiss b a n k e r in c o m p a r i s o n to t h o s e available to a child in rural M o z a m b i q u e to illustrate t h e d e m a n d s o f the principle o f global equality o f opportunity. I asserted t h a t equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y would require t h a t 'a child g r o w i n g up in rural M o z a m b i q u e . . . be statistically as likely as t h e child of t h e senior executive at a Swiss b a n k to reach t h e position of the latter's p a r e n t . ' 1 5 T h i s s t a t e m e n t of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s n o w strikes m e as imprecise


and insufficiently sensitive to the different equal endowments that different forms equality of opportunity assume. Part of the imprecision derives from the phrase 'the position of the latter's parent,' which is vague. Narrowly construed it could mean the very position of the latter's parent, namely the position of senior executive at a Swiss bank; or more broadly it could mean the social position of a wealthy and powerful member of the global financial system. As an ideal, the narrow construal is certainly implausible. The opportunities of the two children could not be equal with respect to such a specific position, or small set of positions, without virtually identical educations. This would require strict global standards with respect not only to the quality of education, but also the content. Such standards would tend to inhibit positive curricular and pedagogical innovations as well as prohibit education that addresses local or regional concerns. Moreover, it would be consistent only with an implausibly specific and static view of the capacities that primary and secondary education should develop. School education that is directed toward ensuring that students of similar aptitudes are able to assume approximately identical specific jobs and offices would be stunting and myopic. Finally, it seems intuitively implausible to maintain that persons with opportunity sets that differ in the details regarding job responsibilities and location, but that are similar in the degree of responsibility, power, status and income have opportunity sets that are unequal in a morally relevant sense. Moreover, different forms of equality of opportunity assume different equal endowments, for which social arrangements are to equalize opportunities. For example, equality of opportunity for income assumes persons of approximately equal talents, abilities and motivations. Or at least, such an assumption seems reasonable within the context of economies containing labor markets. Whereas equality of opportunity for a statistically normal life span assumes persons of equal states of health. The point is to equalize opportunities with respect to what seem to be morally relevant endowments so as to prevent opportunities from being a function of factors that are morally arbitrary. Although we do not want a principle of equality of opportunity to live a statistically normal life span to allow that a person's talents, abilities and motivation are relevant, we may want a principle of equality of opportunity for income to allow that these are relevant.


I argued in Chapter 3 that duties of social and political justice are associative, and that although egalitarian in form in virtue of respect for the dignity of persons, their content was dependent upon the kind of association. Assuming that conclusion, we may specify the content of the ideal of equality of opportunity with reference to the kind of association that generates the duties of justice and the goods of that association that are a concern of justice. For example, the fundamental category of participation and status in a state, or political community, is citizenship. Equality of opportunity for citizenship is a complex ideal involving several different components, including for example education, liberty and basic well-being. Alternatively, there are several important goods produced and affected by an economic association. Income, wealth, meaningful productive activity, positions of power and status, and leisure time are obvious goods that are distributed by economic associations. The enjoyment of these goods is in part a function of certain others, such as health, security, housing and education. And the ability to select among the available goods in pursuit of one's life goals requires education and basic liberties. Equality of opportunity in the global economic association, then, is directed toward ensuring that differences in initial condition do not affect the opportunities of persons (of the morally relevant equal endowments) across a range of goods, including income, wealth, meaningful productive activity, leisure time, health, security, housing, education and basic liberties. Milanovic's research indicates, however, that currently both citizenship at birth and parental social class determine one's economic opportunities. IV In the previous section, I discussed the content of the ideal of global equality of opportunity. An important line of criticism of the ideal charges that its content cannot be adequately specified because of the pluralism of values globally. The basic idea is that value pluralism makes it impossible to determine whether opportunity sets for persons of different cultures are equal. If we cannot determine when equality of opportunity exists, then we cannot pursue it. The force of such challenges rests on the appearance of a violation of the oughtimplies-can principle, or its contrapositive. In this section and the next I examine two recent versions of this challenge.


Gillian Brock puts the challenge to a global equality of opportunity principle in the form of a dilemma: Either we must try to articulate a version of equality of opportunity that mentions particular social positions that are favored, and opportunities to achieve these are equalized, or we allow much cultural variance on what counts as a favored social position, and the standards or living or levels of well-being that they enable to be equalized. If we go with the first option, we are vulnerable to charges of being insufficiently attuned to cultural difference. If we go with the second and try to equalize standards of living, we may end up with a very weak account of equality of opportunity which permits many cases which do no look at all like a robust account of blocking disadvantage and discrimination on morally arbitrary grounds.16 To be sure, Brock has correctly identified hazards of two different types that must be avoided for a satisfactory account of a principle of global equality of opportunity. Taking the principle of equality of opportunity to be satisfied if persons in culture A have the same opportunities as persons in culture B to achieve positions of privilege as understood exclusively within the context of culture B may beg the question of why that culture's ideals are the proper standard of equality. Alternatively an account that includes values recognized by all cultures, but does not capture forms of inequality of opportunity that intuitively we recognize as important, for example between men and women, would be inadequate to the task at hand. 17 Brock contends that my example of the children of growing up in Switzerland and Mozambique commits the first error.18 Although, as I have already reported, I now see the example as clumsy, I do not think that it commits the error of offering an ideal that can be understood only within the context of the culture of the child in Switzerland. Surely there are children in Mozambique, even rural Mozambique, for whom being a banker is not beyond their cultural frame of reference. I am also not convinced that the hazards that Brock identifies amount to a genuine dilemma. As I discussed in the previous section, an account of the content of the ideal of equality of opportunity cannot require a narrow set of positions that must be open to all


persons over whom opportunities are to be equalized. Brock's challenge would be met if there were an account of the goods—for which opportunities should be equalized—that is both free-standing, that does not derive simply from the cultural understandings of a particular culture,19 and sufficiently sensitive to empirical matters to capture real differences of opportunity. The account that I offered in the previous section seems to satisfy these two requirements. The goods identified in that section are among those that are distributed by an economic association. It is not the case that, for example, income, health and education are valuable only within some particular cultural framework. They are not culturally bound goods in anything but the broadest sense of culture, in which all social phenomena would be cultural. Nor is it the case that these goods cannot capture real inequalities of opportunity. For example, the primary school completion rates provided by the 2005 United Nations Development Programme Report provide prima facie evidence of inequality of educational opportunities between boys and girls in most of the developing world. About 75 percent of girls complete primary school, in comparison to 85 percent of boys. And this disparity is greater at the secondary and tertiary levels.20 This demographic evidence does not help us to understand the mechanisms of inequality of opportunity, nor does it even foreclose the existence of some possible explanation that would serve to make the disparity consistent with equality of opportunity, but because it ranges across several countries it does provide a fairly strong reason to believe that there must be some social processes at work that serve to discourage young girls from completing school. The employment of the good of education, then, would seem to be sufficiently sensitive to the facts at hand to provide a measure of inequality of opportunity. V Miller's criticisms present another possible problem for equality of opportunity. This one associated with the metric against which opportunities, for example education, are to be measured in order to assess whether they are equal or unequal. We might assert that opportunity sets between persons are equal if and only if they are identical; or we might assert that mere equivalence is sufficient and required. Taking my example discussed earlier, the identical


o p p o r t u n i t y sets interpretation would require t h a t , 'a child growing up in rural M o z a m b i q u e would be statistically as likely as t h e child o f a senior e x e c u t i v e at a Swiss b a n k to reach t h e position o f t h e latter's parent,' where 'position o f the latter's p a r e n t ' is understood to m e a n t h e very office t h a t t h e parent occupies. 2 1 Miller takes this as implausible, a n d I agree for t h e reasons presented in S e c t i o n IV. Although I share Miller's rejection of t h e identity of o p p o r t u n i t y sets interpretation, I do n o t find his reasons particularly c o n v i n c i n g . He rejects the interpretation on grounds t h a t it would require u n l i m ited rights of migration and unrestricted admission t o citizenship or a global lingua franca, or perhaps b o t h . 2 2 If t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of the identical o p p o r t u n i t y sets are unrealistic or undesirable, t h e n by

modus

tollens so is t h e view t h a t o p p o r t u n i t i e s are equal just in case t h e y are identical. I agree t h a t neither of t h e s e policies as described is realistic, but progress in t h e s e directions does n o t strike m e as obviously undesirable. T h e a r g u m e n t could equally well be a prima facie o n e via modus

ponens

for liberalizing i m m i g r a t i o n restrictions or global edu-

cational c o m m i t m e n t t o instruction in a c o m m o n s e c o n d language or b o t h . I shall return t o these matters in Section VII below. S i n c e I agree with Miller's p o i n t , if n o t his reasoning, there is n o need to pursue this matter further here. Miller c o n t e n d s t h a t the alternative of taking equality o f opportunity to require persons t o have equivalent o p p o r t u n i t y sets also fails because an uncontroversial international metric of e q u i v a l e n c e is unavailable. In defense o f this view h e invokes a distinction between finer and broader grained metrics. As I understand this d i s t i n c t i o n , metric A is finer grained t h a n m e t r i c B if and o n l y if at least two of t h e distinct categories a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h A groups opportunities are n o t distinguished in metric B. So, for e x a m p l e , o n e m e t r i c is finer t h a n a n o t h e r because t h e first distinguishes o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o learn sculpting from o p p o r t u n i t i e s to learn p a i n t i n g , whereas t h e o t h e r categorizes b o t h o p p o r t u n i t i e s under opportunities to learn art. According t o t h e first metric, t w o groups o f students would have u n e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y sets if t h e o n e had o p p o r t u n i t i e s to learn

sculpting

and n o t p a i n t i n g a n d t h e o t h e r had o p p o r t u n i t i e s to learn p a i n t i n g and n o t sculpting. According t o the s e c o n d metric, their o p p o r t u n i ties would be equal because t h e opportunities in e a c h case are taken as equivalent insofar as b o t h are instances o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to learn art.


According to Miller, a principle of equality of opportunity is unsatisfactory if the metric that it employs is too fine grained because it will make too many morally insignificant distinctions. But it is also unsatisfactory if its metric is too broad grained, for its employment will result in controversy about how different components of the metric should be evaluated relative to one another. 23 Now, Miller maintains that nation states have the political resources to solve the metric problem because they contain national cultural understandings about the kinds of opportunities that are approximately equivalent.24 But globally there is no 'common set of cultural understandings to tell us which metric or metrics it is appropriate to use when attempting to draw cross-national opportunity comparisons.' 25 It is worth pausing to query whether national understandings of the metrics of opportunity sets are supposed to be justified according to Miller insofar as they are national or insofar as they are uncontroversial. Surely, it would be Utopian to expect complete consensus, even based upon national understandings, about a metric of equivalence for opportunity categories. Any real policy of equality of opportunity will be more or less widely supported in comparison to other possible ones even within states. Consider debates about the extent to which religious groups may control the education of children in the USA.26 If national consensus seems Utopian, it also seems unnecessary as a condition of a justified metric. Take the example of a state that contains a minority culture that believes that equality of opportunity in the education of boys and girls can be achieved if boys are educated to pursue employment and civic participation and girls are trained in domestic work because both boys and girls are provided opportunities for appropriate adult activity. This minority culture will not accept the view that equality of educational opportunity requires further distinguishing the category of 'appropriate adult activity.' The state, on the other hand, employs a metric of opportunity sets that provides the basis for a judgment that the opportunities that the minority culture makes available to girls are unequal to those that it makes available to boys. This metric will be controversial. The controversy, if severe enough, could hamper legitimately applying the state's metric, but it is not obvious that the metric is therefore unjustified. Lack of controversy is a desideratum of a legitimate policy, but not—it seems—a requirement of justified principles. Moral progress in social policy is not made without controversy.


Perhaps then, a metric of equivalence of opportunity sets that a state employs is supposed to be justified, even though controversial among some religious or ethnic minorities, just insofar as it employs or incorporates a national understanding of equality. 27 Then, a principle employing a metric of equality of opportunity would be justified if based upon national cultural understandings, even if it were controversial with respect to religious and ethnic identities. If only national cultural understandings provide the basis for justified the metrics of opportunities, and if globally there are different national cultural understandings about the equivalences of various opportunities, then no global principle of equality of opportunity would be possible. In this case, however, the metrics of equality of opportunity based upon nationally derived understandings of equality of opportunity are not superior to a global metric on grounds of lack of controversy. Metrics based upon national understanding may also be controversial internally. Moreover, religious and ethnic identities may have even greater resources to reduce controversy regarding equality of opportunity with respect to their own groups. Rather, an independent reason for preferring the national cultural understandings of equality to other understandings is required. It might be that we have duties of justice based upon national identities, but not based upon religious and ethnic identities. 28 So, the national cultural understanding will trump the understandings of the other cultural groups for reasons that have nothing to do with the content of the former's definition of equality of opportunity. In the example above, the religious understanding of equality of opportunity is not inferior simply because it is sexist since presumably a national cultural understanding could be sexist while a religious minority's understanding was non-sexist; still the national understanding would trump. Notice, however, the paucity of this account of equality of opportunity. It can in principle incorporate all manner of prejudice just so long as it is a national cultural understanding. This is an account that would be disqualified by Brock's sensible requirement that an account of equality of opportunity must reject clear cases of inequality. A more plausible basis of a metric for equality of opportunity within states is, as I suggested above, the political ideal of equal citizenship. To use one of Miller's examples, the reason why a metric that employs the opportunity category of access to enlightenment—a


category that takes opportunities for education to be equivalent to opportunities for religious worship—is unsatisfactory is because of our political understanding of the role of secular education in democratic citizenship. One might respond that there is some deeper level at which even this political understanding is cultural. I accept that this involves an interpretation of a political ideal. That, however, is beside the point. For what is doing the work is the content of the political ideal n o t its status as a cultural artifact. In short, Miller's rejection of the principle of global equality of opportunity in favor of a national one fails because it seems implausible that lack of controversy will accompany any policy of equality of opportunity, even one based on national cultural understandings of equality, and because a principle employing metrics based upon a national understanding of equality cannot plausibly trump others, regardless of content, just because it is national. Controversy is a fact of life with respect to any egalitarian policy. Controversy might be generated either by the egalitarian idea that different groups of people should have approximately equal opportunities or by what counts as an equal opportunity. We should not expect very much precision with respect to the latter issue prior to actual political debates. Moreover, any established policy will be based upon roughly hewn metrics, the kind of measurements that Adam Smith describes as 'that sort of rough equality which, though not exact, is sufficient for carrying out the business of c o m m o n life.' 29 Egalitarian political practice requires involvement in the political controversies that egalitarian principles generate. The hope is that broader agreement about what counts as morally salient aspects of equality and inequality will result. We cannot prejudge the case of how far that agreement will extend without extensive public debate. There may be moral resources available for generating agreements that are not apparent in the absence of considerable local knowledge. But in the next section, I shall try to given some more general reasons to hope for the possibility of agreement. VI There are reasons for believing that significant steps toward crossnational consensus about the broad bases and benchmarks of equality of opportunity are not Utopian. Consider an account of equality


o f o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t relies o n a set of primary goods appealed to in an original position a r g u m e n t . T h e list t h a t I m e n t i o n e d in Section IV, n a m e l y i n c o m e , wealth, m e a n i n g f u l productive activity, positions o f power a n d status, leisure time, h e a l t h , security, housing, education and basic liberties m a y require further r e f i n e m e n t , but these seem t o m e to b e a p p r o x i m a t e l y what we would w a n t in a list of t h o s e goods t h a t should be distributed a c c o r d i n g to the o u t c o m e of deliberations w i t h i n a c o s m o p o l i t a n original position applied to t h e global e c o n o m i c association. T h i s approach m i g h t be criticized as relying excessively on a justificatory process that is tied t o o closely to the liberal d e m o c r a t i c tradition, especially in light of Rawls's a c c o u n t o f primary goods as developed in Political

Liberalism.30

T h e r e Rawls c l a i m s t h a t t h e pri-

mary goods are t o be e x p l a i n e d in terms o f ' t h e h i g h e r order interests we have in developing and exercising our t w o moral powers and in securing the c o n d i t i o n s under w h i c h we can further our determinate c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e good, whatever it is.' 3 1 T h e first person plural p r o n o u n refers t o t h o s e o f us w h o are citizens o f states t h a t h a v e a tradition o f c o m m i t m e n t to liberal d e m o c r a t i c values a n d institutions. Perhaps then a list of goods, such as the o n e I have offered c o n t a i n s goods o n l y for persons w h o s e identities as citizens have been shaped by t h e liberal d e m o c r a t i c tradition since the interests in exercising the two moral powers exist o n l y for persons in t h o s e societies. Indeed, Political

Liberalism

is a response to a c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e

stability o f societies c o m m i t t e d t o Rawls's t w o principle of justice. 3 2 Stability is o f serious c o n c e r n b e c a u s e t h e political and social instit u t i o n s that e m b o d y t h e two principles o f justice will give rise to a citizenry c o m m i t t e d t o multiple and i n c o m p a t i b l e reasonable c o m prehensive c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d . 3 3 Yet t h e principles of justice upon which t h e social and political institutions are f o u n d e d will have to win the u n c o e r c e d allegiance of t h e citizenry in order for the order to be legitimate. 3 4 Rawls's response is, in significant part, ad hominem,

a n d c o n s i s t e n t with his views a b o u t justification expressed

in A Theory

of Justice

t h a t I cited in C h a p t e r 1. T h e response seeks

to s h o w h o w the two principles o f justice c a n be t h e subject of an overlapping c o n s e n s u s of a plurality of reasonable c o n c e p t i o n s o f t h e good, by arguing t h a t t h e principles follow from c o n c e p t i o n s o f pers o n s a n d society that are drawn from the liberal d e m o c r a t i c tradition, w h i c h c o n c e p t i o n s citizens of states with those traditions will have


reasons t o accept. T h e result is 'a political c o n c e p t i o n of justice c o n genial t o our m o s t firmly held c o n v i c t i o n s . ' 3 5 Now, o f course, m a n y states have either n o , or o n l y very short, liberal d e m o c r a t i c traditions. Hence, it m i g h t be urged t h a t the e m p l o y m e n t o f a set of goods and a c o n c e p t i o n o f persons tied closely to t h e Political

Liberalism

a c c o u n t for purposes o f providing a m e t r i c of equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is parochial and insufficiently sensitive to t h e c o n c e p t i o n s o f persons that non-liberal n a t i o n a l cultures e n d o r s e . 3 6 T h e r e are, as far as I can tell, two strategies for responding to this line o f criticism. T h e m o s t a m b i t i o u s is t o argue t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e c o n c e p t i o n of persons employed in Political

Liberalism,

and used there

to support t h e list of primary goods, m a t c h e s c o n c e p t i o n s of citizens in t h e liberal d e m o c r a t i c tradition, t h e r e are g o o d reasons t o t h i n k t h a t t h e truth o f these c o n c e p t i o n s is n o t relative t o t h a t tradition. I have tried a response like that elsewhere. 3 7 In this b o o k I have m a d e a r g u m e n t s that a m o u n t to two different aspects o f a second strategy, b o t h w h i c h could be characterized as ad hominem

insofar as

b o t h argue t h a t certain ideas t h a t h a v e wide currency in t h e international order can be used to justify a c o m m i t m e n t t o equality o f opportunity. T h e first of these ad hominem

a r g u m e n t s appeals to t h o s e w h o

accept i n t e r n a t i o n a l h u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s and t h e c o n c e p t i o n of h u m a n dignity upon w h i c h they are based. Now, appealing to dignity is c o m p a t i b l e with appealing to the Rawlsian c o n c e p t i o n of persons. Dignity certainly c o h e r e s with t h e Rawlsian political c o n c e p t i o n o f f r e e d o m , especially insofar as b e i n g a s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g source o f valid claims is a n aspect of f r e e d o m . T h i s aspect, for e x a m ple, involves the e n t i t l e m e n t t o m a k e claims o n institutions so as t o advance a reasonable c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . 3 8 And this e n t i t l e m e n t would appear t o be entailed by t h e claim t h a t persons possess inherent dignity. T h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t for present purposes, however, is that given the c u r r e n c y o f h u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s a n appeal to a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e dignity o f persons can be t h o u g h t o f as c o m p a t i ble with t h e basic political values of a great m a n y national political cultures. Hence, it seems an exaggeration to claim the impossibility of global moral understandings t h a t m i g h t serve as t h e basis for a principle o f equality of opportunity. The s e c o n d ad hominem

a r g u m e n t c o n t e n d s that persons w h o par-

ticipate in the global e c o n o m i c association also h a v e reason t o value


t h e goods I h a v e listed. C o n s i d e r t h e i m p o r t a n t interests affected by t h e association. T h e global e c o n o m y obviously affects persons' e c o n o m i c interests. T h i s provides o n e i m p o r t a n t category of equal opportunity,

n a m e l y for e m p l o y m e n t

a n d i n c o m e . Education

is

required in order to exercise one's o w n j u d g m e n t s about h o w t o evaluate t h e fruits o f t h e e c o n o m i c association. Equality of e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s is also then a m o n g with the goods t h a t participants in c o n s u m e r and labor markets h a v e reason to value. Additionally, a person's health affects her capability for pursuing market o p t i o n s . Hence, equality of o p p o r t u n i t y for health is also a m o n g t h e goods that participants' markets have reason to value. O n c e again, we h a v e reason to believe t h a t a c o m m o n basis of equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is n o t in principle out o f reach. I have n o t b e e n arguing t h a t globally e v e r y o n e already agrees t o s o m e list of goods and a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e dignity o f persons, any m o r e than Rawls argues that citizens o f liberal d e m o c r a t i c societies already accept his list of primary goods and his c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e moral powers of citizens. M y a r g u m e n t involves an interpretive effort, just as Rawls's does in Political

Liberalism.

In C h a p t e r 1,

I n o t e d t h a t two o f Rawls's r e q u i r e m e n t s for an a c c o u n t being appropriately political are t h a t t h e premises invoke values that can be widely endorsed by reasonable persons, a n d that the principles are narrowly focused to t h e ordering of institutions, rather t h a n directing the w h o l e of a person's life. 3 9 Satisfying these r e q u i r e m e n t s provides reason t o h o p e t h a t practical political controversies will be c o n t a i n e d , and n o t erode t h e basic institutional order. But t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s t h e m s e l v e s do n o t require c o n c e p t i o n s t h a t are parochially tied to t h e traditions o f liberalism. There can be, t h e n , different political c o n c e p t i o n s of justice for different institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s , with t h e c o n c e p t i o n s sharing t h e virtue o f seeking t o prevent practical political controversy from eroding t h e institutional order. I believe that there is reason t o h o p e that over t i m e significant a g r e e m e n t a b o u t global equality of o p p o r t u n i t y will be w i t h i n t h e reach o f reasonable and rational persons. T h e legal and e c o n o m i c c h a n g e s associated with globalization are producing s o m e tendencies toward n o r m a t i v e c o n v e r g e n c e . It m a y be possible t o find c o m m o n n o r m a tive bases even w h e n on t h e surface these appear doubtful. But I have n o illusions that a justified principle o f equality of o p p o r t u n i t y will therefore be t h e basis of a non-controversial policy. I h a v e n o


d o u b t t h a t equality is a controversial moral ideal, particularly in t h e presence o f traditional inegalitarian n o r m s .

VII Miller argues t h a t policies t h a t would serve global equality of opport u n i t y run afoul of t h e ideal o f n a t i o n a l self-determination. Nationality remains, despite globalizing e c o n o m i c tendencies, a powerful source o f identity for m a n y people and t h e state r e m a i n s a signific a n t source o f political decisions. Hence, Miller asserts that, T o s h o w that all of this is morally irrelevant w h e n assessing t h e o p p o r t u n i t y sets e n j o y e d by people b e l o n g i n g to different n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t i e s would require a great deal o f a r g u m e n t . ' 4 0 I t h i n k t h a t it is best to separate t h e c l a i m s a b o u t n a t i o n a l identity and t h e legislative powers of t h e state. Miller seems to believe t h a t moral duties to c o - n a t i o n a l s exist if persons have a strong n a t i o n a l identity. 4 1 But it is unclear w h y an attitude of b e l o n g i n g should always entail a moral duty. It would seem strange, for e x a m p l e , to assert that a person w h o believes that she has special duties to privilege m e m b e r s o f her race does in fact have t h o s e duties simply in virtue of her beliefs. 4 2 O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , if a just global e c o n o m i c association requires global equality of opportunity, this is n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e with the claim that state political associations require o t h e r principles of distributive justice, principles t h a t ensure fair d e m o c r a t i c elections and legislation for e x a m p l e . 4 3 O n e need n o t be c o m m i t t e d t o t h e irrele v a n c e of state g o v e r n m e n t with respect to matters o f distributive justice in order t o endorse global equality of opportunity. However, it does seem t o be t h e case t h a t just as t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e family makes equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y within states an ideal t h a t can never fully be realized, so t h e existence o f states m a k e s perfect global equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y impossible. 4 4 So, if we assume that there is a moral case for s t a t e s — a n d I endorsed this in C h a p t e r 3 — t h e value o f equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y will h a v e t o be set off against the value of self-determination. T h a t n e i t h e r can be fully realized, if both are recognized, is n o t a reason t o reject either. Wise global policy can proceed by b a l a n c i n g t h e respective values. Miller, however, argues that the pursuit o f equality of o p p o r t u n i t y would necessarily destroy self-determination.


To preserve equality

we would

have continually

to

transfer

resources from n a t i o n s t h a t b e c o m e relatively better-off t o t h o s e w h o b e c o m e worse off, u n d e r m i n i n g political responsibility, and in a sense u n d e r m i n i n g self-determination too, insofar as this involves c h o o s i n g between alternative futures and receiving t h e costs and benefits t h a t result f r o m such c h o i c e s . 4 5 O n c e again, Miller's anti-egalitarianism bears a striking r e s e m b l a n c e to Nozick's, w h i c h holds t h a t ' n o end-state principle or distributional patterned principle o f justice can be c o n t i n u o u s l y realized w i t h o u t c o n t i n u o u s interference w i t h people's lives.' 4 6 T h e latter's worry, o f course, is directed t o violations o f individual liberty, n o t n a t i o n a l self-determination, but in form t h e c o n c e r n is t h e same. In each case egalitarianism is criticized because it violates a liberty o f a certain sort, an individual's liberty for Nozick and a n a t i o n ' s for Miller. Two basic egalitarian responses t o Miller in t h e global case are similar t o t h e response to Nozick in t h e d o m e s t i c case. O n e is t o c h a l l e n g e the moral e n t i t l e m e n t o f t h e state t o act in ways t h a t are c o n t r a r y to the d e m a n d s of justice. T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f state sovereignty that assigns a state an u n c o n d i t i o n a l right to establish an u n j u s t basic structure, a right involving a moral claim to n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n , or selfd e t e r m i n a t i o n , is o n e t h a t is t o o permissive of i n j u s t i c e to be morally t e n a b l e . 4 7 Any right t o state self-determination should be c o n s t r a i n e d by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice. T h e s e c o n d response is t o clarify t h e o b j e c t of principles o f justice: Principles of justice are directed toward the basic structure of (in this case) global society. They require fundam e n t a l institutions t h a t will constrain a n d shape policy f o r m a t i o n and d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g . Such i n s t i t u t i o n s need n o t c o n s t a n t l y interv e n e in d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g or take back t h e results o f political deliberation because they establish t h e c o n s t r a i n t s in w h i c h politics occurs. Principles o f justice affect politics o n l y indirectly through the influe n c e t h a t t h e y have on f u n d a m e n t a l institutions. Although institutions p r o m o t i n g equality of o p p o r t u n i t y m i g h t constrain the scope o f state deliberation in c o m p a r i s o n to t h e scope t h a t presently exists, o n c e t h e c o n s t r a i n t s are institutionally secured, deliberation will normally take place w i t h i n such constraints, subject t o external intervention o n l y if t h e c o n s t r a i n t s are disregarded. So, this is not to d e n y t h a t global egalitarianism would constrain n a t i o n a l self-determination in


c o m p a r i s o n t o a n o r m o f nearly c o m p l e t e license in internal affairs, but it is t o deny t h a t egalitarianism would require c o n s t a n t interfere n c e with t h e decisions taken by states o n c e appropriate institutions are in place. There is an additional, and m o r e i m p o r t a n t , response peculiar to t h e global case. Recall t h e discussion f r o m Section V t h a t Miller rejects the identity o f o p p o r t u n i t y sets interpretation of equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y on grounds t h a t it would u n r e a s o n a b l y require u n l i m ited rights o f migration and unrestricted admission to citizenship or a global lingua

franca,

or perhaps b o t h . 4 8 I believe, o n t h e c o n -

trary, that the criticism points in the direction of appropriate reforms for i m p r o v i n g on inequalities of opportunity. Morally

important

progress could be m a d e toward realizing global equality of opportunity by reducing t h e arbitrary i n f l u e n c e o f citizenship status at birth through modestly liberalizing i m m i g r a t i o n s restrictions in

OCED

c o u n t r i e s and e m b a r k i n g o n a global educational plan t o provide instruction in E n g l i s h — w h i c h is already growing as a spoken language at historically unprecedented rates—as a c o m m o n

foreign

language. T h e case of liberalizing i m m i g r a t i o n policy poses n o substantial threat t o self-determination s i n c e it would have t o occur as result o f state policies in a n y case. And even modest liberalization could h a v e very significant effects. According to a recent World Bank report, an increase in i m m i g r a t i o n from d e v e l o p i n g to h i g h - i n c o m e c o u n tries t h a t would increase t h e labor force of t h e latter by 3 percent from 2 0 0 2 t o 2 0 2 5 would generate large increases in global welfare. W h e n adjusted for prices t h e increase in aggregate global i n c o m e would be S 3 5 6 billion or 0 . 6 percent. 4 9 To put this in

perspec-

tive, t h e World Bank c o m p a r e s t h e gains from this m o d e s t increase in i m m i g r a t i o n with t h e c o m p l e t e removal of m e r c h a n d i s e trade barriers. T h e World Bank's trade model suggests t h a t r e m o v i n g all remaining m e r c h a n d i s e trade barriers would yield $ 2 8 7 billion in global real i n c o m e gains in 2 0 1 5 . For t h e purpose o f c o m p a r i s o n , w h e n the gains from the two different s c e n a r i o s — t h o s e from an increase in migration, a n d t h o s e from global trade reform—are scaled t o the s a m e reference year, 2 0 0 1 , the gains from trade reforms are $ 1 5 5 billion versus $175 billion from the migration s c e n a r i o . 5 0


Moreover, t h e aggregate gains o f this policy would g o disproport i o n a t e l y to developing countries, where i n c o m e s would increase by 1.8 percent, c o m p a r e d t o 0 . 4 percent in h i g h - i n c o m e countries. But for the new i m m i g r a n t s to high i n c o m e countries, the cost-of-living adjusted i n c o m e gains would increase o n average by nearly 2 0 0 perc e n t due differences in wages between t h e countries o f origin and d e s t i n a t i o n . I n c o m e gains in d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s would result from decreased labor market c o m p e t i t i o n and increased r e m i t t a n c e s . T h e r e would be losers, however. In t h e a b s e n c e o f c o m p e n s a t o r y policies, existing recent i m m i g r a n t s in h i g h - i n c o m e c o u n t r i e s would lose as a result o f labor market c o m p e t i t i o n . A global c o m m i t m e n t t o provide instruction in English as a foreign language does n o t require m a j o r global institutional c o n s t r u c t i o n . It requires f u n d i n g and s o m e i n t e r n a t i o n a l auditing. T h e r e are interesting questions o f justice, t h a t I will n o t discuss, a b o u t t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h responsibility for t h e funding should c o m e from native English speakers w h o stand t o benefit from greater

communica-

t i o n , n o n - n a t i v e speakers w h o also stand t o benefit, or t h e globally privileged w h o currently benefit from unequal opportunities. 5 1 The

fact

that w i t h i n

the competence

of existing

institutions

significant progress can be made in reducing t h e privileges that original citizenship confers with respect t o o p p o r t u n i t i e s to pursue highly i m p o r t a n t goods generated by the global e c o n o m i c

asso-

ciation is a c o m p e l l i n g reason to distinguish t h e moral status of global equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y f r o m t h e global difference principle. A l t h o u g h b o t h are i m p o r t a n t moral ideals, t h e latter

might

n o t yet be realizable w i t h i n a partially globalized e c o n o m i c associa t i o n . It could be t h a t t o o few aspects o f persons' c o n d i t i o n s can be affected by t h e institutions o f t h e global e c o n o m i c association. N o precise answer can be given, however, a b o u t w h a t degree o f coverage by global institutions is needed. Political j u d g m e n t must be exercised as globalization proceeds. For this reason, I argued in C h a p t e r 3 , for an i n d e t e r m i n a t e egalitarianism for present purposes. In contrast, by liberalizing i m m i g r a t i o n policy and f u n d i n g global e d u c a t i o n in English as a foreign language, significant

improve-

m e n t in t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s for i n c o m e , h e a l t h and e d u c a t i o n

of

t h e globally poor can be m a d e . In C h a p t e r 5, I shall argue t h a t reducing p r o t e c t i o n i s m in t h e developed world would also p r o m o t e equality of opportunity. T w o of these three r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s are


m e r e policy c h a n g e s . T h e English e d u c a t i o n r e c o m m e n d a t i o n would require i n t e r n a t i o n a l funding and auditing but n o t m a j o r international institution c o n s t r u c t i o n . Global equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is t h e n n o t o n l y morally desirable, but also capable o f directing certain state and i n t e r n a t i o n a l policies w i t h o u t m a j o r institution c o n s t r u c t i o n .

international

5

International Trade, Development and Labor

In this chapter, I discuss various aspects o f the moral i m p o r t a n c e i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. T h e r e are m a n y such aspects, i n c l u d i n g efficiency in p r o d u c t i o n , d e v e l o p m e n t facilitation, weak state's vulnerability and strong state's predation and equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y for e m p l o y m e n t a n d i n c o m e . I defend a rules-governed multi-lateral

trade

regime t h a t links a c o m m i t m e n t t o core labor standards t o e n j o y m e n t o f t h e benefits o f liberalized access t o markets. Additionally, I argue that r e q u i r e m e n t s t o liberalize trade in any such regime s h o u l d be a s y m m e t r i c a l , with greater leeway given to p r o t e c t i o n i s m in t h e d e v e l o p i n g world. In Section II, I discuss t h e e x t e n t t o w h i c h free trade can be justified as a m e a n s for efficient p r o d u c t i o n . Section III argues t h a t protectionist policies in rich industrialized

countries

retard the d e v e l o p m e n t of poor countries. Section IV surveys t h e claims m a d e by s o m e e c o n o m i s t s t h a t t h e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c develo p m e n t of developing and underdeveloped societies requires state i n t e r v e n t i o n to support and protect infant industry. In Section V, I argue that a rules-based multi-lateral regime is superior on antipredation grounds t o a series o f bilateral agreements. S e c t i o n VI argues t h a t a l t h o u g h rules that permit p r o t e c t i o n i s m in rich and powerful c o u n t r i e s violate t h e principle o f fair equality of o p p o r t u n i t y for e m p l o y m e n t and i n c o m e , a multi-lateral trade regime t h a t links liberalized m a r k e t access to t h e o b s e r v a n c e of core labor standards c a n be morally justified. 90

International Trade, Development and Labor 91

International trade increases t h e v o l u m e o f goods and services available to c o n s u m e r s . T h e classic a c c o u n t of this invokes t h e efficiency gains of a c o u n t r y d e v o t i n g its production t o w h a t it m o s t efficiently p r o d u c e s — t o t h a t in w h i c h it has a c o m p a r a t i v e

advantage—and

trading with o t h e r c o u n t r i e s for o t h e r goods, even if the goods t h a t t h e first c o u n t r y trades for could be m o r e efficiently produced by it t h a n by others. David Ricardo famously argues t h a t for a c o u n t r y t o do otherwise is t o use its productive power less efficiently t h a n it m i g h t a n d therefore to produce lower returns o n labor. 1 Especially in c o u n t r i e s t h a t are poor, an efficient use o f labor power seems undeniably good. Valuing efficiency is s o m e t i m e s associated w i t h t h e political right. But there is n o g o o d reason to suppose t h a t o n l y the right should value it. Part o f t h e value of efficiency derives from t h e value o f goods produced a n o t h e r part from t h e disvalue of labor e x p e n d e d . Less effic i e n t processes of production either produce less or do so at higher costs or with m o r e work. Hence, less efficient production processes can be t h o u g h t o f as prima

facie

morally inferior to m o r e efficient

o n e s either on grounds t h a t h a v i n g m o r e goods for t h e s a m e a m o u n t o f labor is better t h a n h a v i n g fewer g o o d s — w i t h respect to goods, m o r e is b e t t e r — o r on grounds that h a v i n g t h e s a m e n u m b e r o f goods with less labor is better t h a n with m o r e labor—with respect t o labor, less is better. D e p e n d i n g upon the c o n t e x t , egalitarians may have good reasons either to value m o r e goods, in c o n d i t i o n s of scarcity, or less labor, in c o n d i t i o n s of sufficiency. So, a l t h o u g h valuing effic i e n c y a b o v e o t h e r i m p o r t a n t values such as h e a l t h , child developm e n t and e n v i r o n m e n t a l well-being has o f t e n b e e n rightly criticized by egalitarian political m o v e m e n t s and theorists, 2 there is n o t h i n g anti-egalitarian about asserting t h e prima facie value efficiency. Protectionist policies have t h e effect o f reducing t h e efficiency gains of international trade. T h e r e are a variety o f c o m p l i c a t e d forms of protectionist policies. But the reduction in efficiency can be easily gleaned from u n c o m p l i c a t e d forms of p r o t e c t i o n i s m . W h e n states put a tax on imports or provide a subsidy t o producers m a n u f a c turing for export, they raise the relative costs o f i m p o r t s in their own market or reduce t h e relative costs of their exports t o foreign markets. If d o m e s t i c and foreign-produced goods are substitutes, the


import tax produces decreased d o m e s t i c d e m a n d for t h e import and increased d o m e s t i c d e m a n d for t h e domestically produced g o o d . Again a s s u m i n g t h e goods are substitutes, t h e subsidy

produces

increased foreign d e m a n d for the export and reduced foreign d e m a n d for t h e locally produced good. T h e goods that can be produced m o s t efficiently are n o t t h e n t h e goods t h a t will sell t h e best, and less efficient producers are rewarded. Moreover, powerful and rich states that have greater capacity to tax, subsidize and i m p o s e trade terms will do t h e better j o b of protecting their producers. In bilateral trade negotiations might makes money. T h e efficiency case for free trade, however, must be qualified. T h e two c l a i m s t h a t (i) p r o d u c t i o n processes t h a t are shielded by protectionist policies c o n t a i n inefficiencies, a n d t h a t (ii) t h o s e inefficiencies can be reduced by r e m o v i n g t h e protectionist policies do n o t entail t h e claim t h a t (iii) t h e transition t o a regime o f free trade would result in efficiency gains. A standard c o m p a r a t i v e measure o f efficiency for claims such as (iii) is Pareto superiority. State of affairs X is Pareto superior to Y if a n d o n l y if at least o n e person's welfare is improved in X in c o m p a r i s o n to Y, and n o one's welfare is d i m i n i s h e d . But a n y real world transition from a state o f affairs governed by o n e set o f rules to a n o t h e r is likely to m a k e s o m e people better off and others worse off, and n o t t o yield Pareto superiority. 3 A process of liberalizing a trade regime will produce m a n y disruptions since firms that c a n n o t c o m p e t e well w i t h o u t p r o t e c t i o n will increasingly lose market share. J o b s will be lost in such firms, and created in others t h a t can c o m p e t e better because o f t h e decreasing p r o t e c t i o n . Despite t h e losses t o s o m e in a transition to a free trade regime, Paul S a m u e l s o n has d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t such a regime could, however, be Pareto superior t o a regime of tariffs if t h o s e w h o benefit from t h e transition c o m p e n s a t e t h e losers by a series ideal-sum transfers. 4 T h e r e is a second standard c o m p a r a t i v e measure of efficiency for such cases, n a m e l y Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. State of affairs X is a Kaldor-Hicks i m p r o v e m e n t over Y if t h o s e w h o s e welfare is d i m i n ished in X could in principle be c o m p e n s a t e d by those w h o s e welfare is improved, producing the result that a Pareto superior c o n d i t i o n o b t a i n s . S a m u e l s o n observes t h a t this theoretical c o n c l u s i o n is of little use t o policy f o r m a t i o n , however, because 'ideal l u m p sum redistributions are never really available to us.' 5 Redistribution even if it were t o be pursued, w h i c h is n o t required by t h e Kaldor-Hicks


efficiency claim, itself c o n t a i n s inefficiencies, w h i c h cast d o u b t o n t h e actual Pareto efficiency gains o f a transition t o a free trade regime. It is n o t o n l y t h a t a n y transition from p r o t e c t i o n i s m

to free

trade is costly to s o m e people, however, that d i m i n i s h e s the case for efficiency o f t h e latter. J o s e p h E. Stiglitz and Andrew C h a r l t o n , raise o t h e r limitations, w h i c h derive from various incapacities o f economies and

financial

systems in developing c o u n t r i e s to cap-

ture t h e benefits of free trade. Here are several: M o r e c o m p e t i t i v e firms can be expected t o e x p a n d as less efficient firms d e c l i n e o n l y if resources are fully e m p l o y e d already, w h i c h is rarely the case, especially in developing countries; capital can be efficiently allocated o n l y if t h e r e exists w e l l - f u n c t i o n i n g insurance against t h e risks associated with such i n v e s t m e n t s , but this requires t h a t risk markets and social insurance programs be in place, w h i c h is often n o t t h e case; prices can serve t o c o o r d i n a t e i n f o r m a t i o n efficiently o n l y if there are wellestablished markets, which are often lacking in developing countries. Alternatively, public policies can serve t o create efficient industries t h a t are c o m p e t i t i v e on the global market where no such industries presently exist. So focusing on present c o m p a r a t i v e advantage m a y be less efficient t h a n creating future advantage with public policy tools, w h i c h will typically include p r o t e c t i o n . 6 Moreover, import taxes (a form of p r o t e c t i o n i s m ) can be an i m p o r t a n t source o f reve n u e for poor states seeking to m a k e i n v e s t m e n t s to create future advantage. 7 In sum, despite t h e prima

facie

case t h a t ideally a free

trade regime uses resources m o s t efficiently, a transition from a m o r e protected i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade regime t o a free trade regime c a n n o t be unqualifiedly supported on efficiency grounds.

S o m e t i m e s efficiency is valued because m o r e efficient a r r a n g e m e n t s c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e process o f s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . Even if c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f efficiency do n o t provide unqualified support for free trade, there are good reasons to believe that protectionist policies in t h e rich industrialized world are detrimental t o s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in developing and underdeveloped countries, and t h a t liberalization—properly m a n a g e d a n d s e q u e n c e d — w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e to d e v e l o p m e n t .


Currently industrialized c o u n t r i e s offer substantial p r o t e c t i o n t o their industrial and agricultural producers. In a 1 9 9 9 report t h e United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on Trade and D e v e l o p m e n t (UNCTAD) estimates that underdeveloped countries were losing $ 7 0 0 billion per year in export earnings due to p r o t e c t i o n i s m o n the part o f developed c o u n t r i e s . 8 T h i s a m o u n t s to m o r e t h a n four t i m e s t h e a n n u a l capital inflow into the developing world due to foreign direct i n v e s t m e n t . 9 T h e r e c a n be n o doubt t h a t t h e abolition of protectionist policies that target producers from t h e developing world would result in significant static e c o n o m i c gains for t h e developing world. But what about d y n a m i c gains? W h a t about t h e

relationship

between liberalization and the process o f capitalist e c o n o m i c develo p m e n t ? T h e Marxist tradition has l o n g viewed free trade as serving t o facilitate capitalist e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . O n e line o f support for free trade has t o do with t h e virtues o f intensifying t h e class struggle. Frederick Engels c a n n o t be accused of m i n c i n g words in m a k i n g t h e following strategic c a l c u l a t i o n : [U]nder freedom o f trade the w h o l e severity o f t h e laws of political e c o n o m y will be applied to t h e working classes. Is t h a t to say t h a t t h a t we are we are against Free Trade? No, we are for Free Trade, because by Free Trade all e c o n o m i c a l laws, with their m o s t a s t o u n d i n g c o n t r a d i c t i o n s , will act u p o n a larger scale, upon a greater e x t e n t o f territory, upon t h e territory of the w h o l e earth; and because from t h e u n i t i n g o f all t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n t o a single group, where t h e y stand face t o face, will result t h e struggle w h i c h will itself e v e n t u a t e in t h e e m a n c i p a t i o n of t h e proletariat. 1 0 Karl M a r x expresses a similar strategic vision: '[T]he Free Trade system works destructively. It breaks up old n a t i o n a l i t i e s and carries a n t a g o n i s m of proletariat a n d bourgeoisie t o the uttermost p o i n t . In a word, t h e Free Trade system h a s t e n s t h e Social Revolution. In this revolutionary sense alone, g e n t l e m e n , I am in favour o f Free Trade.' 1 1 Marxists have a n o t h e r development-related reason to support free trade. It is n o t merely t h a t capitalist relations produce class struggle, but also that an increase in productive capacity facilitated by trade is necessary for socialism. '[T]his d e v e l o p m e n t o f productive


f o r c e s . . . i s an absolutely necessary practical premise because w i t h o u t it want is merely m a d e general, and w i t h destitution t h e struggle for necessities and all t h e old filth business would necessarily be r e p r o d u c e d . . . ' 1 2 Marx is impressed with t h e productivity gains t h a t capitalism achieves through c o m p e t i t i o n - i n d u c e d

innovation.

T h e bourgeoisie c a n n o t exist without c o n s t a n t l y revolutionizing t h e i n s t r u m e n t s o f p r o d u c t i o n , a n d t h e r e b y the relations of p r o d u c t i o n , and w i t h t h e m t h e w h o l e relations o f society.' 1 3 Marx is, in o t h e r words, impressed w i t h d y n a m i c productivity gains of capitalism, and insofar as free trade p r o m o t e s t h o s e gains t h e r e is additional reason to support free trade. 1 4 Empirical evidence suggests t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and product i o n for export p r o m o t e s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . International trade encourages t h e adoption o f t e c h n o l o g y - i n t e n s i v e production processes, w h i c h require a m o r e educated and skilled workforce t h a t can fetch h i g h e r wages a n d salaries. This, at any rate, explains t h e correlation, observed by J a y M a n d l e , between exports per capita and three indices o f d e v e l o p m e n t : Adult literacy rates, gross national product (GNP) per capita (PPP adjusted), and percentage o f population living o n less t h a n $ 2 (PPP) per day. 1 5 An e x a m i n a t i o n o f m e r c h a n d i s e exports per capita and adult literacy rates of 13 large p o o r c o u n t r i e s s h o w s 'a positive, statistically significant linear relat i o n s h i p between exports per capita and literacy.' 1 6 M a n d l e suspects t h a t a better e d u c a t i o n a l system helps t o m a k e a society m o r e globally c o m p e t i t i v e and t h e r e b y increases its exports per capita. 1 7 But it is equally plausible t h a t t h e m o r e efficient production t e c h n i q u e s , t h a t increased trade provides incentives for, c o n t r i b u t e causally to develo p m e n t , measured by improved literacy rates. M o r e efficient and t e c h n o l o g y - i n t e n s i v e production requires a better educated workforce and thereby provides a political basis of support for educational expenditures and i m p r o v e m e n t s . A m o n g the countries,

observed

by M a n d l e , t h e three with the m o s t exports per capita also have t h e h i g h e s t GNP per capita; and this relationship generally holds a m o n g t h e o t h e r ten countries. 1 8 T h e r e is also an inverse relationship between exports per capita and t h e percentage o f t h e population living below S2PPP, a m o n g these 13 countries; t h o s e countries with t h e highest exports per capita h a v e lowest percentages living on less t h a n $2PPP per day. 1 9 Insofar as protectionist policies in t h e rich industrialized countries restrict imports from

developing


countries,

they

are

quite

plausibly

retarding

socio-economic

development. T h e r e are g o o d reasons t o t h i n k that liberalizing protectionist policies in rich industrialized c o u n t r i e s would produce b o t h static and d y n a m i c gains for poor d e v e l o p i n g countries, gains t h a t serve to reduce poverty and i m p r o v e e d u c a t i o n a l a t t a i n m e n t .

T h e a r g u m e n t o f t h e preceding section does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a defense o f free trade per se. Rather t h e c l a i m s that protectionist policies in t h e rich c o u n t r i e s are costly to the poor developing o n e s , and that foreign trade c o n d u c e s t o d e v e l o p m e n t , argue in favor o f t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f protectionist policies in t h e rich industrial countries, but is silent o n multi-lateral free trade. In Section II, I canvassed s o m e caveats to t h e power of free trade t o produce efficiency gains in underdeveloped e c o n o m i e s . In this section, I build on t h o s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t o argue t h a t t h e r e are g o o d reasons to believe t h a t a trade regime s h o u l d s e q u e n c e t h e requirement to e l i m i n a t e of p r o t e c t i o n i s m so as t o provide t h e countries in d e v e l o p i n g and underdeveloped world with m o r e t i m e t o develop their i n f a n t industries. 2 0 T h e upshot is t h a t , W T O rules to the c o n t r a r y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s have good reasons t o pursue protectionist policies in an international trade regime w i t h industrialized states. Moreover, these are reasons t h a t are r e c o m m e n d e d by global distributive justice insofar as social a n d e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e underdeveloped world is necessary to eradicate poverty. Friederich List m a k e s t h e classic a r g u m e n t , o n t h e basis o f an historical survey, t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t policies o f Europe and North America relied on measures to protect i n f a n t industry in a l m o s t every successful case o f d e v e l o p m e n t . 2 1 Ha-Joon C h a n g has revived this n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y a r g u m e n t w i t h a wealth o f recent data. C h a n g argues t h a t n o t o n l y did t h e European a n d North American c o u n t r i e s e m p l o y activist industrial and trade t e c h n o l o g y p o l i c i e s — i n c l u d i n g various forms o f p r o t e c t i o n i s m — b u t so did J a p a n a n d t h e newly industrialized countries of East Asia. 2 2 O f course it is n o t obvious t h a t o n e c a n establish causation o n the basis o f a correlation between policies t h a t protect i n f a n t industries and d e v e l o p m e n t a l success in countries. It is possible

that


d e v e l o p m e n t would have been even m o r e rapid in t h e a b s e n c e o f such p r o t e c t i o n i s m . E m p l o y m e n t of, for e x a m p l e , J o h n Stuart Mill's classic m e t h o d s for inferring causation on t h e basis o f correlation does n o t fully establish t h e case. By the nature o f the evidence and t h e m a n i f o l d policies of the m a n y states, we are n o t in t h e position to strictly e m p l o y Mill's m e t h o d o f a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h requires ' i n s t a n c e s w h i c h agreed in t h e given c i r c u m s t a n c e but differed in every other.' 2 3 S u c h a m e t h o d would isolate industrial policy as causally efficacious if all cases of d e v e l o p m e n t had o n l y t h a t feature in c o m m o n . In fact t h e historical record indicates t h a t there were a few e x c e p t i o n s to the rule. C h a n g n o t e s that t h e Netherlands and Switzerland did n o t extensively e m p l o y such activist industrial, trade and t e c h n o l o g y policies. 2 4 It is also t h e case t h a t t h e c o m p a r i s o n t o poorly developing c o u n t r i e s is insufficiently c o n t r o l l e d t o e m p l o y Mill's m e t h o d o f difference, w h i c h requires t h e evidence t o have, 'every i n s t a n c e in c o m m o n save o n e . ' 2 5 C h a n g cites ' t h e p o o r growth records of t h e developing c o u n t r i e s over t h e last t w o decades' w h e n such countries were pressured n o t t o e m p l o y activist industrial, trade and t e c h n o l ogy policies. 2 6 If this were t h e o n l y difference between states t h a t developed and those that did not, t h e case would be c o m p l e t e l y c o m pelling. But there are too m a n y variables. T h e i n a b i l i t y to establish such strong evidence is, o f course, typical w h e n trying to establish causation in the social world. Even so, it does reduce our confid e n c e in drawing a c o n c l u s i o n a b o u t a causal relationship between p r o t e c t i o n i s m and d e v e l o p m e n t merely o n t h e basis of an historical correlation. T h e causal case could, however,

be reinforced by a plausible

h y p o t h e s i s t h a t explained t h e link between t h e p r o t e c t i o n o f i n f a n t industry and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . C h a n g offers t h e following hypothesis: As has been repeatedly observed over t h e past few centuries, t h e c o m m o n problem faced by all such c a t c h - u p e c o n o m i e s is t h a t t h e shift to higher value added activities, w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s the key to the process of d e v e l o p m e n t , does n o t h a p p e n 'naturally.' T h i s is because, for a variety of reasons, t h e r e exist discrepancies between social and individual returns t o i n v e s t m e n t in t h e high-value-added activities, or i n f a n t industries, in the c a t c h - u p economies.27


To assess this we need t o k n o w m o r e a b o u t t h e 'variety o f reasons.' Stiglitz a n d C h a r l t o n c o n t e n d t h a t capital market i m p e r f e c t i o n s are particularly i m p o r t a n t in this regard. In developing high-tech industries t h a t serve to propel d e v e l o p m e n t , there is t r e m e n d o u s risk s i n c e n e w firms in a n e w industry will be pitted against successful firms in established foreign industries. Normally such risk would be born by b a n k s t h a t would provide t h e capital. But ' b a n k s would have to be willing to lend to e n a b l e firms to sell b e l o w cost, in t h e h o p e that by doing so their productivity will increase so m u c h that they will b e c o m e a viable c o m p e t i t o r . It s h o u l d be obvious t h a t such loans would be viewed as highly risky.' 2 8 T h e historical record of d e v e l o p m e n t by m e a n s o f protectionist policies and t h e e c o n o m i c a c c o u n t o f w h y liberalization in c o n d i t i o n s of u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t retard d e v e l o p m e n t lend significant c r e d e n c e t o the claim that a just multi-lateral trade regime s h o u l d permit a s y m m e t r i c a l tariff reduction. In o t h e r words, it s h o u l d n o t require states with developing e c o n o m i e s t o liberalize as s o o n as rich industrialized states. T h e r e is injustice t h e n in t h e W T O ' s opposite asymmetry. It has required d r a m a t i c tariff reduction in t h e developed world but allows massive agricultural p r o t e c t i o n i s m in t h e rich countries.

T h e W T O was f o u n d e d in 1 9 9 5 as a result of t h e Uruguay Round o f m e e t i n g s of t h e signatories t o t h e General Agreement o n Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 9 T h e purpose o f the W T O is to reduce barriers t o trade by administering multi-lateral treaties, especially GATT 1 9 9 4 , w h i c h includes t h e a m e n d e d GATT 1 9 4 7 , t h e General Agreement of Trade in Services (GATS) and t h e Agreement o n TradeRelated Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). T h e W T O ' s f u n c t i o n s include

implementing

multi-lateral

trade agreements,

providing

forums for n e g o t i a t i o n s on trade issues a n d facilitating dispute sett l e m e n t and c o o p e r a t i n g with t h e World Bank and the International M o n e t a r y Fund to achieve greater c o h e r e n c e in global policy-making.

economic

30

M e m b e r s o f t h e W T O are t o abide by negotiated trade rules that are guided by four basic principles: (1)

non-discrimination,

(2) reciprocity, (3) market access and (4) fair c o m p e t i t i o n .

Non-

d i s c r i m i n a t i o n has two aspects. First, m e m b e r s must treat all o t h e r


m e m b e r s as m o s t favored n a t i o n s (MFNs), w h i c h requires t h a t a c o u n t r y treat t h e products originating in or destined for any o t h e r m e m b e r c o u n t y n o better t h a n like products originating in or destined from a n o t h e r m e m b e r country. 3 1 Second, n o n - d i s c r i m i n a t i o n requires c o n f o r m i t y to the n a t i o n a l t r e a t m e n t rule, stipulating that after i m p o r t a t i o n , foreign goods be treated n o less favorably t h a n d o m e s t i c goods in terms o f taxes a n d regulations. 3 2

Reciprocity

requires t h a t trade liberalization between m e m b e r s be a c c o m p l i s h e d on a mutual basis. 3 3 Reciprocity also applies w h e n c o u n t r i e s join t h e W T O , w h i c h in practice m e a n s t h a t c o u n t r i e s t h a t join t h e W T O are required to liberalize access to their markets. Market access requires t h a t m e m b e r s agree to n e g o t i a t e tariff reductions. T h i s

amounts

t o m e m b e r s b e i n g b o u n d t o schedules o f tariff c o n c e s s i o n s agreed t o at multi-lateral trade n e g o t i a t i o n s . 3 4 Fair c o m p e t i t i o n is m e a n t t o ensure c o m p e t i t i o n on level playing field. For e x a m p l e , if a governm e n t subsidizes export of an item, t h e n t h o s e items m a y be subject to an a n t i - d u m p i n g duty by t h e i m p o r t i n g country, t h e r e b y increasing t h e price o f t h e item t o c o m p e n s a t e for t h e subsidy t h a t lowered its price. T h e criticism of the previous section that t h e W T O ' s r e q u i r e m e n t s of a s y m m e t r i c a l tariff reduction is n o t a criticism of a multi-lateral, rules-based trade regime t h a t seeks to reduce p r o t e c t i o n i s m guided b y t h e four principles cited in the previous paragraph. On the contrary, I observed in Section II that in bilateral trade n e g o t i a t i o n s powerful and rich states with greater capacity t o tax, subsidize and i m p o s e trade t e r m s can easily take advantage o f t h e vulnerability o f weak and p o o r states. A multi-lateral, rules-based trade regime t h a t c o n t a i n s disincentives for breaking those rules, offers m o r e p r o t e c t i o n against predation t o weak and poor states. In t h e a b s e n c e o f rules governing trade, t h e richer and m o r e powerful states will be m o r e able to exert pressure to gain a c c e p t a n c e for a r r a n g e m e n t s t h a t protect their producers to t h e d e t r i m e n t o f d e v e l o p m e n t in poor countries. And even if t h e adjudication o f disputes in a multi-lateral regime c o n tained a systematic bias in favor o f t h e powerful and rich countries, poorer countries would still have m o r e p r o t e c t i o n t h a n in bilateral n e g o t i a t i o n s . T h e ability o f a multi-lateral trading system t o deter significant defections or substantial internal revolt requires at least the a p p e a r a n c e o f impartiality in a sizable n u m b e r of disputes. 3 5 T h e r e q u i r e m e n t of m a i n t a i n i n g appearances would provide reason to believe t h a t appeals on t h e basis of legal principle would h a v e a h o p e o f success in a significant n u m b e r of cases.


M y discussion t h u s far has focused o n t h e relationship between trade and d e v e l o p m e n t , in particular w h a t justice requires of a system o f trade rules so t h a t it will c o n d u c e t o d e v e l o p m e n t . In this final section, I a m c o n c e r n e d with t h e relationship between t h e rules o f trade regime and t h e c o n d i t i o n s of work in t h e developing world. I begin by arguing t h a t p r o t e c t i o n i s m in the developed world is unfair because it results in inequalities of o p p o r t u n i t y for e m p l o y m e n t and i n c o m e that are detrimental t o workers in t h e d e v e l o p i n g world. This, t h e n , makes t h e a r g u m e n t against protectionist policies in rich and industrialized countries o n t h e basis o f t h e s a m e moral value as t h e a r g u m e n t s for liberalized i m m i g r a t i o n policies a n d a global e d u c a t i o n a l program in English as a foreign language that I m a d e in C h a p t e r 4. But, o n e a r g u m e n t for p r o t e c t i o n i s m is t h a t it provides a disincentive t o states t h a t permit inferior work c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s suggests t h a t t h e r e are c o m p e t i n g c l a i m s of fairness at work in discussions o f at least s o m e protectionist proposals. T h e r e is w a y around this apparent impasse t h a t involves endorsing certain proposals for linking liberalized market access in a multi-lateral trade regime t o a c o m m i t m e n t t o core labor standards. Protectionist policies, such as import tariffs and export

subsi-

dies, create differential d e m a n d for substitute goods d e p e n d i n g u p o n w h e t h e r t h e y were domestically or foreign produced.

Differential

d e m a n d affects e m p l o y m e n t opportunities. A worker w h o s e state e m p l o y s protectionist policies is advantaged in market c o m p e t i t i o n against a worker in a similar industry in a state that is t h e o b j e c t of t h e protectionist laws. O p p o r t u n i t i e s for e m p l o y m e n t and i n c o m e , t h e n , are d e p e n d e n t u p o n a worker's citizenship or at least her residential status. T h i s serves to reduce o p p o r t u n i t i e s for i n c o m e for workers w h o are already poor relative to workers in advanced industrialized countries. Hence, a trade regime t h a t permits p r o t e c t i o n i s t policies in developed c o u n t r i e s directed against producers in developing c o u n t r i e s is unfair. O n e should n o t , however, overstate t h e relative e x t e n t o f t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s lost t o workers in p o o r c o u n t r i e s as t h e result of prot e c t i o n i s m t h e developed o n e s . Recall t h e World Bank's estimates, w h i c h I cited in Chapter 4, that the gains from modest i m m i g r a tion liberalization over a period of 15 years would be $ 1 7 5 billion;


in c o m p a r i s o n t h e gains from c o m p l e t e trade liberalization over t h e s a m e period would be $ 1 5 5 b i l l i o n . 3 6 If these figures are taken t o represent aggregate lost o p p o r t u n i t i e s re-captured by t h e t w o reforms, they suggest t h a t t h e case on grounds o f equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y for symmetrically reducing p r o t e c t i o n i s m is n o t as strong as t h e case for m o d e s t i m m i g r a t i o n liberalization. In contrast the a r g u m e n t t h a t p r o t e c t i o n i s m is a source o f unfairness, the charge of unfairness is often used to justify p r o t e c t i o n i s m . A criticism t h e A F L - C I O a n d others m a k e o f trade liberalization is t h a t market c o m p e t i t i o n with producers in c o u n t r i e s where wages are very low and workplace c o n d i t i o n s are p o o r is unfair. 3 7 If so, then developed countries reducing c o m p e t i t i o n t h r o u g h protectionist policies directed against producers in developing countries, c o n t r a r y to m y a r g u m e n t , would seem t o serve fairness. Now, a charge o f unfairness o f this sort could be directed at c o n d u c t t h a t c o n t r a v e n e s c o n v e n tionally established rules. If, for e x a m p l e , t h e r e is a trade rule against d u m p i n g — s e l l i n g goods in foreign markets at less t h a n cost. Or it could be directed at institutions t h a t c o n t r a v e n e a moral standard, such as w h e n a law is called unfair. T h e AFL-CIO seems to h a v e the latter idea in m i n d since they oppose the i n t r o d u c t i o n of laws to liberalize trade with certain countries, especially C h i n a . Trade unfairness o f this sort would be a property o f t h e institutions o f trade a n d n o t , or not only, the c o n d u c t of the employer. In keeping with the associational c o n c e p t i o n o f justice t h a t I defended in C h a p t e r 3, this is a charge of injustice. T h e r e is m o r e t h a n o n e way t o understand t h e claim t h a t market c o m p e t i t i o n with producers in c o u n t r i e s where wages are very low and workplace c o n d i t i o n s are p o o r is unfair. T h e t e r m

producers

is a m b i g u o u s between t h e capitalists w h o own t h e p r o d u c t i o n processes and t h e workers engaged in t h e p r o d u c t i o n . Moreover, t h e unfairness could be either to capitalists in developed countries or workers. Suppose t h e claim is t h a t market rules give workers in t h e developing world an unfair c o m p e t i t i v e advantage over workers in the developed. O n e way to assess this charge o f unfairness is to c o m p a r e it to paradigm cases o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y s a n c t i o n e d unfair d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in e m p l o y m e n t , such as laws p e r m i t t i n g racial or gender discrimination in e m p l o y m e n t that provide t h e beneficiary o f those laws with an unfair market advantage in e m p l o y m e n t . 3 8 Do market rules t h a t


permit t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f workers at low wages a n d in poor workplace c o n d i t i o n s provide such workers with unfair market advantage in e m p l o y m e n t ? T h i s is implausible. Any analogy between t h e b e n eficiaries o f institutional racism and sexism and low wage workers is implausibly strained. T h e beneficiaries o f racially or sexually discriminatory e m p l o y m e n t laws are u n e q u i v o c a l l y advantaged b y b e i n g protected from full labor market c o m p e t i t i o n . But low-wage workers in poor c o u n t r i e s are n o t u n e q u i v o c a l l y advantaged by global labor market c o m p e t i t i o n . Surely, for t h o s e workers in societies marked by poverty and by little or n o public insurance almost a n y j o b is better t h a n n o j o b , but ceteris

paribus

it would be m u c h better to

be receiving higher wages and to be living in a society t h a t provided i n c o m e support for u n e m p l o y m e n t . Additionally, t h e victim o f racially or sexually discriminatory laws is u n e q u i v o c a l l y disadvantaged by t h o s e laws. T h e r e are e m p l o y m e n t a n d

educational

o p p o r t u n i t i e s that simply are n o t available t o her. Although worker in a higher wage c o u n t r y — t y p i c a l l y with a m o r e

the

robust

system of public support—is put at a c o m p e t i t i v e disadvantage by workers w h o are willing t o work for less in low-wage countries, she also e n j o y s certain advantages associated with working in a developed c o u n t r y that are n o t available t o her colleagues in t h e low-wage country. Let's take the charge of unfairness differently t h e n . The charge could be that it is n o t t h e market rules that allow such c o m p e t i tion between workers t h a t are unfair, but t h e o n e s t h a t allow poor r e m u n e r a t i o n and workplace c o n d i t i o n s in t h e developing world. T h e unfair advantage could be t h e market advantage t h a t capitalists in t h e developing world have over capitalists in t h e developed world in virtue o f t h e former's ability t o exploit their workers. It is a double unfairness, t h e n , vis-a-vis

b o t h capitalists in t h e developed

world and workers in the d e v e l o p i n g world. Presumably, the moral force of t h e first unfairness is d e p e n d e n t on that o f t h e second. S i n c e t h e r e is n o t h i n g about taking advantage of lower costs in market c o m p e t i t i o n per se that is unfair. But if t h e low costs are in virtue o f exploiting the desperate poverty of persons t h r o u g h e m p l o y m e n t either of under age children or of adults by force, through a failure t o m a i n t a i n safe working c o n d i t i o n s , or t h r o u g h policies t h a t do n o t permit t h e right to u n i o n i z e , t h e n t h e low-cost advantage could reas o n a b l y be t h o u g h t of as unfair. T h e claim t h a t it is unfair, however,


has to be in virtue of appalling or exploitative work c o n d i t i o n s n o t merely low-wage c o n d i t i o n s ; and t h e requisite c o n d i t i o n s will typically exist w h e n t h e r e arc o t h e r b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s o f injustice t h a t drive people out o f desperation to work in terrible c o n d i t i o n s . T h e r e is n o t h i n g intuitively u n j u s t a b o u t an e m p l o y e r offering low wages in a society t h a t offers g o o d o p p o r t u n i t i e s for e d u c a t i o n and a robust program of social support. According to t h e charge of unfairness as delineated above, protectionist trade policy t h a t discourages imports f r o m countries in w h i c h appalling or exploitative workplace c o n d i t i o n s are wide spread could be based o n the reasonable moral claim t h a t e m p l o y m e n t practices in the targeted c o u n t r y are unfair. Notice that this justification

does n o t i n v o k e t w o empirical c l a i m s s o m e t i m e s m a d e o n

b e h a l f o f p r o t e c t i o n i s m . O n e is t h a t globalization is producing a global race to t h e b o t t o m in workers' wages and work c o n d i t i o n s . T h e other, w h i c h depends on t h e first, is that free trade is i n c o m patible with a welfare state, or a social democracy, t h e institutions o f w h i c h , I argued in Chapter 3, are required by justice in political associations. Both o f these c l a i m s are empirically controversial, and it is a virtue o f t h e present moral a r g u m e n t that it is n o t depend e n t on such empirically controversial claims. With respect to t h e first empirical claim, Jagdish Bhagwati argues that a survey of the evid e n c e does n o t support it. 3 9 Dani Rodrik, o n t h e other h a n d , argues t h a t increased e c o n o m i c o p e n n e s s puts pressure o n b o t h e m p l o y e r provided non-wage benefits a n d wages. 4 0 Christian Barry and Sanjay Reddy m a k e t h e i m p o r t a n t p o i n t t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l labor market c o m p e t i t i o n need n o t produce a race to b o t t o m in order t o exert downward pressure on benefits and wages. 4 1 Such pressure would exist even if t h e r e were i m p r o v e m e n t s in b o t h if t h i n g s could be even better in the absence o f such c o m p e t i t i o n . In response to t h e s e c o n d empirical claim, it is s o m e t i m e s observed t h a t the Nordic countries produced stable social d e m o c r a c i e s and m a i n t a i n e d o p e n economies.42 Protectionist policies in response to unfair worker t r e a t m e n t and c o m p e t i t i o n would t h e n be understood as policies wielded by rich and powerful states on behalf of t h e v i c t i m s o f the

unfairness,

n a m e l y t h e exploited workers in t h e d e v e l o p i n g world. If such protectionist policies decreases the market d e m a n d for goods produced in exploitative c i r c u m s t a n c e s a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y reduce e m p l o y m e n t


o p p o r t u n i t i e s for workers in t h e targeted country, then t h e y also h a p p e n t o preserve inequality of o p p o r t u n i t y for e m p l o y m e n t and i n c o m e . But this would be a negative externality of t h e policies. This, however, raises the bar for t h e moral justification o f such policies. In t h a t case, the moral justification of bilateral p r o t e c t i o n i s m requires an a r g u m e n t either t h a t alternative available m e a n s could n o t serve justice as well or that they could, but o n l y at higher moral costs. In what follows I argue that n e i t h e r c l a i m seems plausible. A better alternative would involve linking t h e a c c e p t a n c e of core labor standards to participation in a multi-lateral

rules-governed

trade regime. T h e r e are a variety o f s t a t e m e n t s o f core labor standards. T h e International Labour Organization's (ILO) 'Declaration o n F u n d a m e n t a l Principles and Rights at Work' c o n t a i n s a modest set o f standards, stating t h e following four principles: Freedom o f association a n d t h e effective recognition o f t h e right to collective bargaining; the e l i m i n a t i o n o f all forms o f forced or c o m p u l s o r y labor; t h e effective abolition of child labor and t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f discrimin a t i o n in respect o f e m p l o y m e n t and o c c u p a t i o n . 4 3 T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n f e d e r a t i o n of Free Trade U n i o n s ' s 'Basic C o d e o f C o n d u c t ' states a m o r e robust set of standards: Freely c h o s e n e m p l o y m e n t ; n o discrimi n a t i o n in e m p l o y m e n t ; n o use o f child labor; freedom of association and t h e right t o collective bargaining; p a y m e n t o f living wages; n o r e q u i r e m e n t to work m o r e t h a n 4 8 hours in week, w i t h at least o n e day off per week; safe and h y g i e n i c w o r k i n g c o n d i t i o n s and the establ i s h m e n t o f regular e m p l o y m e n t relationships. 4 4 For present purposes t h e r e is n o need t o c h o o s e between these t w o sets o f standards. Linking state a c c e p t a n c e of a set of core labor standards t o liberal access t o markets in o t h e r states in t h e c o n t e x t of a multi-lateral trade regime would establish an i n c e n t i v e for states with low-wage workforces, seeking liberal access to markets in t h e developed world, to c o m p l y w i t h such standards, thereby serving t h e s a m e goal as t h e bilateral protectionist policies discussed above. Moreover, a multilateral linkage a r r a n g e m e n t has a significant advantage over bilateral p r o t e c t i o n i s m aimed at i m p r o v i n g work c o n d i t i o n s . As I n o t e d in Section II, powerful a n d rich states have superior capacity to tax, subsidize a n d i m p o s e trade terms in bilateral trade a r r a n g e m e n t s . Such superior capacity reduces t h e reliability t h a t

protectionism

would be used o n l y to improve workplace c o n d i t i o n s rather t h a n less c o m m e n d a b l e goals.


Still it m i g h t be pressed t h a t a multi-lateral a g r e e m e n t would have moral costs. W o u l d n ' t a multi-lateral a g r e e m e n t linking c o r e labor standards t o liberalized market access reduce e m p l o y m e n t by increasing the cost o f p r o d u c t i o n , a n d therefore have t h e s a m e negative effect o n equality of o p p o r t u n i t y for e m p l o y m e n t and i n c o m e t h a t bilateral p r o t e c t i o n i s m has? In response we should first n o t e t h a t n e i t h e r set o f standards listed above c o n t a i n s a r e q u i r e m e n t establishing pay equity across c o u n t r i e s and regions. S u c h a r e q u i r e m e n t m i g h t be criticized as t h r e a t e n i n g t h e c o m p a r a t i v e advantage of lowwage countries, a n d therefore t h r e a t e n i n g t h e e m p l o y m e n t prospects of workers in t h o s e countries. A similar criticism could, of course, be m a d e a b o u t standards p r o h i b i t i n g child labor and ensuring safe working c o n d i t i o n s . Indeed, Bhagwati argues t h a t , 'If h i g h e r standards are i m p l e m e n t e d a n d raise t h e cost o f production (as several would), t h e n exports a n d jobs will be adversely affected in the market place. But if they are n o t i m p l e m e n t e d , t h e n trade s a n c t i o n s will kick i n — t h a t is, exports will be u n d e r m i n e d by induced p r o t e c t i o n . ' 4 5 Barry and Reddy provide a c o m p e l l i n g answer t o t h e sort of challenge t h a t Bhagwati makes. If the labor codes apply multi-laterally, countries t h a t are parties to the a g r e e m e n t c a n n o t gain c o m p e t i t i v e advantage over o t h e r countries that are also parties by p e r m i t t i n g exploitative practices. M e a n w h i l e countries that are n o t parties will lose s o m e of t h e advantage o f cheaper production costs by losing the m o r e liberal market access. So, it is n o t obvious a priori

t h a t there

would be significant e m p l o y m e n t losses t o c o u n t r i e s observing labor standards as a result of such linkage. 4 6 Moreover, if increased production costs were predictably likely t o result from c o m p l i a n c e to labor codes, with t h e result t h a t u n e m p l o y m e n t would increase in develo p i n g states, t h e n linkage a r r a n g e m e n t s could c o n t a i n — a n d if t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t this u n e m p l o y m e n t would c o n s t i t u t e an inequality o f o p p o r t u n i t y is plausible, t h e a r r a n g e m e n t should c o n t a i n — a m e c h a n i s m w h e r e b y p r o d u c t i o n subsidies flow from the rich industrialized states to t h e poor developing o n e s . 4 7 T h e r e are good reasons then t o t h i n k t h a t a multi-lateral trade regime t h a t included linking observ a n c e of core labor standards to liberalized market access would be a m o r e just a r r a n g e m e n t t h a n a regime that allowed t h e protectionist policies in separate states t o develop in t h e c o n t e x t o f bilateral trade negotiations.

6

Climate Change, Development and Mitigation

In previous chapters, I h a v e argued against s o m e o f t h e skeptical c h a l l e n g e s t o t h e idea t h a t principles o f egalitarian distributive justice apply globally. Two p r o m i n e n t kinds o f challenges have especially c o n c e r n e d m e , t h e c l a i m s o f c o e r c i o n theorists in C h a p t e r 2 and t h e claims o f cultural pluralists in C h a p t e r 4. M y criticisms o f these views in the earlier chapters focused o n the e x t e n t to w h i c h principles of egalitarian justice could be applied globally in light o f increasing global e c o n o m i c integration. T h e case against inequality is, however, m u c h stronger t h a n t h o s e arguments acknowledged. A n t h r o p o g e n i c c l i m a t e c h a n g e has created a c o n t e x t in w h i c h questions of t h e justice o f global burden sharing c a n n o t plausibly be ignored. Indeed, I shall argue t h a t a n t h r o p o g e n i c c l i m a t e c h a n g e is i m p o r t a n t t o global justice b o t h because of the effects t h a t c l i m a t e c h a n g e will h a v e on t h e poor and vulnerable o f t h e world a n d because of t h e threat t h a t a treaty t o mitigate c l i m a t e c h a n g e poses t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a i m s o f t h e developing a n d underdeveloped world. In Section II, I canvass t h e threat t h a t c l i m a t e c h a n g e poses to s o c i o - e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . In Section III, I argue that the effects of c l i m a t e c h a n g e on t h e poor and vulnerable of t h e world are matters o f justice, and that this discredits p r o m i n e n t skeptical a c c o u n t s global justice. S e c t i o n IV argues that primarily due to t h e extent of emissions reductions required, a c h i e v i n g c l i m a t e c h a n g e mitigation goals will require a new global c l i m a t e regime; t h e goals c a n n o t be achieved 106

Climate Change, DevelopmentandMitigation 107

by leaving states free t o pursue their own policies. In S e c t i o n V, I e x a m i n e principles for distributing t h e burden of c l i m a t e c h a n g e m i t i g a t i o n . And S e c t i o n VI is devoted to considering t h e threats to justice that exist in a process o f selecting a principle t o mitigate climate change.

At t h e dawn o f t h e industrial revolution t h e a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a tion o f C O 2 was about 2 8 0 p p m . 1 Since then h u m a n beings have been e m i t t i n g C O 2 i n t o t h e a t m o s p h e r e in u n p r e c e d e n t e d a m o u n t s , causing t h e a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n s t o increase steadily. From 1 9 9 4 to 2 0 0 5 the rate of this increase was 1.9 p p m per year, t h e largest since direct m e a s u r e m e n t began in 1 9 6 0 . By 2 0 0 5 t h e a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f C O 2 had reached 3 7 9 p p m . 2 Scientific knowledge o f an increasing C O 2 c o n c e n t r a t i o n and o f t h e possibility t h a t it would cause w a r m i n g is n o t new. In 1 8 9 6 S v e n Arenius was the first to argue t h a t increased c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of C 0 2 would produce global m e a n temperature increases. In 1 9 5 9 Bert Bolin predicted t h a t t h e a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f C O 2 would increase by 2 5 perc e n t , and argued t h a t the increasing c o n c e n t r a t i o n

was causing

warming.3 T h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f increased c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of C O 2 t o c l i m a t e c h a n g e has been t h e subject o f a broad international c o n s e n s u s for over 2 0 years. In 1 9 8 8 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 4 3 / 5 3 , ' N o t i n g w i t h c o n c e r n t h a t t h e e m e r g i n g e v i d e n c e indicates t h a t c o n t i n u e d growth in a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f " g r e e n h o u s e " gases could produce global w a r m i n g w i t h an eventual rise in sea levels, t h e effects of w h i c h could be disastrous for m a n k i n d if t i m e l y steps are n o t taken at all l e v e l s . . . ' 4 Since t h e 1 9 9 2 drafting o f t h e United N a t i o n s Framework C o n v e n t i o n on C l i m a t e C h a n g e ( U N F C C C ) t h e r e has been an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s that, h u m a n activities have been substantially increasing the a t m o spheric c o n c e n t r a t i o n s o f g r e e n h o u s e gases, t h a t these increases e n h a n c e t h e natural g r e e n h o u s e effect, and t h a t this will result on average in an additional w a r m i n g o f t h e Earth's surface and a t m o s p h e r e and m a y adversely affect natural ecosystems humankind...

5

and


The

final

clause of t h e

UNFCCC

affirms t h a t

the

parties

are,

' D e t e r m i n e d t o protect t h e c l i m a t e system for present and future generations. ..'6 Despite this international c o n s e n s u s , from t h e t i m e of the 1 9 8 8 reso l u t i o n to t h e Kyoto Protocol in 2 0 0 5 t h e global c o m m u n i t y failed to establish an i n t e r n a t i o n a l regulatory regime requiring a n y parties t o reduce C O 2 e m i s s i o n s . Instead C O 2 e m i s s i o n s were treated largely as unregulated externalities of energy production a n d land use, w h i c h externalities were regulated, or n o t , under municipal e n v i r o n m e n t a l and property law. Under such institutional g o v e r n a n c e , it is hardly surprising t h a t global C O 2 emissions steadily increased since in t h e a b s e n c e of c o o r d i n a t i o n e a c h state is likely t o c o n t i n u e to e m i t at present or increased rates in pursuit of its energy goals rather t h a n pursue costly mitigation policies. In 1 9 8 8 , at t h e t i m e o f UN Resolution 4 3 / 5 3 global e m i s s i o n s totaled 2 0 , 9 9 8 . 0 4 Mt C O 2 ; in 1 9 9 2 , w h e n U N F C C C expressed a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o protect the c l i m a t e system, t h e y were 2 1 , 2 4 6 . 7 5 Mt C O 2 ; and by 2 0 0 5 t h e y were 2 8 , 1 9 2 . 7 4 Mt C O 2 . 7 T h i s a m o u n t s t o a 3 4 percent increase in emissions from 1 9 8 8 to 2 0 0 5 , a n d nearly a 3 3 percent increase from 1 9 9 2 to 2 0 0 5 alone. Although land use—especially deforestation—is a significant cause o f C O 2 emissions, well over 5 0 percent o f emissions in 2 0 0 0 were caused by b u r n i n g fossil fuels. 8 T h e current trend o f increasing emissions risks grave danger. In its recent Fourth Assessment Report (AIM) t h e I n t e r g o v e r n m e n t a l Panel o n C l i m a t e C h a n g e (IPCC) summarizes t h e observational e v i d e n c e and c o n c l u d e s t h a t between 1 8 5 0 a n d 2 0 0 5 there was an average increase in air temperature o f 0 . 7 6 ° C , and that during t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y sea levels rose by 0 . 1 7 m. T h e 155-year w a r m i n g trend, t h e IPCC c o n c l u d e s , 'is very likely due t o t h e observed increase in a n t h r o p o g e n i c g r e e n h o u s e gas c o n c e n t r a t i o n s . ' 9 T h e AR4 also assesses t h e likelihood that a n t h r o p o g e n i c influences have already caused a variety c l i m a t e c h a n g e s . It judges as m o r e likely t h a n n o t t h a t such influence is responsible for t h e greater f r e q u e n c y o f h e a v y precipitation events, drought in various regions and an increase in tropical c y c l o n e activity. T h e IPCC holds that, absent additional m i t i g a t i o n , it is likely t h a t such events will c o n t i n u e i n t o t h e twenty-first century. 1 0 A c c o r d i n g t o t h e AR4, 'Projected c l i m a t e change-related exposures are likely to affect t h e health status o f m i l l i o n s of people, particularly t h o s e w i t h low adaptive c a p a c i t y . . . ' 1 1 T h e report lists likely effects


across several health d i m e n s i o n s : Increased m a l n u t r i t i o n , especially for c h i l d r e n ; increased deaths, disease a n d injury due h e a t waves, floods, storms and droughts; increased burden o f diarrheal disease; increased f r e q u e n c y o f c a r d i o r e s p i r a t o r y disease and the altered spatial distribution o f s o m e infectious disease vectors. T h e IPCC predicts t h a t by 2 0 8 0 , as a result of sea-level rise, millions m o r e people will be flooded each year especially in the mega deltas o f Africa and Asia and small low-lying islands. ' T h o s e densely-populated a n d low-lying areas where adaptive capacity is relatively low, a n d w h i c h already face o t h e r c h a l l e n g e s such as tropical storms or local coastal subsistence, are especially at risk.' 1 2 T h e United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme's (UNDP) Development

Report 2007-2008

Human

is wholly given over t o t h e effects o f

c l i m a t e c h a n g e on t h e global poor. It discusses several aspects of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of persons in severe poverty t h a t increase their risk for terrible c o n s e q u e n c e s . 1 3 Droughts and heat waves will threaten t h e revenues and food security o f dry-land farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, resulting in an additional

6 0 0 million persons facing acute m a l n u -

trition by t h e 2 0 8 0 s . Accelerated glacial melt in t h e Himalayas will initially produce flooding in n o r t h e r n C h i n a , India and Pakistan, but eventually reduce t h e flow of water available t o m a j o r river systems for irrigation. Similar m e l t i n g in Latin America will threaten water supplies for drinking, irrigation and t h e hydro-electricity g e n e r a t i o n . Rising sea levels will i n u n d a t e low-lying areas o f Bangladesh, Egypt and V i e t n a m . Globally 2 2 0 - 4 0 0 million people could be at increased risk for malaria, with exposure rates in sub-Saharan Arica increasing by 1 6 - 2 8 percent. In short, according t h e UNDP, c l i m a t e c h a n g e poses serious risks of n o t o n l y of slowing t h e processes o f h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t but o f m a j o r h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t reversals—not o n l y slowing t h e process o f lifting billions out of misery, but o f increasing t h e misery of millions.

T h e disastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s are n o t f o r e g o n e c o n c l u s i o n s . T h e clim a t i c c h a n g e s t h a t would bring t h e m about are a n t h r o p o g e n i c ; and at least s o m e of t h e m can be averted and o t h e r s mitigated by our policy c h o i c e s a n d institutional c o m m i t m e n t . T h a t it would be morally c o m m e n d a b l e to mitigate such i m m e n s e suffering c a n n o t credibly


be d o u b t e d . But is m i t i g a t i o n a h u m a n i t a r i a n c o n c e r n to distant needy strangers, which c o m p e t e s with o t h e r duties o f b e n e f i c e n c e for our scarce aid resources? Or is it a response t o an injustice, which we o u g h t not to fail t o make, a n d w h i c h requires the reform and reconstruction of our regulatory institutions? If o n e believes t h a t coercive state institutions are a necessary c o n dition o f justice, as does T h o m a s Nagel, then given t h e a b s e n c e o f a global state our duties of mitigation are h u m a n i t a r i a n i n character. Alternatively, if o n e believes that a c o m m o n n a t i o n a l culture is required t o give c o n t e n t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of egalitarian justice, as does David Miller, t h e n a n y a c c o u n t o f w h a t justice requires by way of global c l i m a t e c h a n g e mitigation m u s t be based u p o n a standard o t h e r t h a n equality. Since t h e risk t o w h i c h t h e global poor are exposed is due t o an institutional failure t o properly regulate C O 2 , even after there was broad international c o n s e n s u s t h a t a n t h r o p o g e n i c c l i m a t e c h a n g e is dangerous, it would be preposterous to m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e duties t o mitigate c l i m a t e c h a n g e are n o t matters o f global justice. And, since c l i m a t e c h a n g e affects persons a r o u n d t h e globe, it would strain credibility to insist that egalitarian standards for g o v e r n i n g t h e justice of regulatory institutions can be devised o n l y from t h e n o r m s of n a t i o n a l political cultures. In contrast t o t h e limits placed upon an a c c o u n t o f egalitarian global justice by Nagel and Miller, the a c c o u n t of t h e sufficient c o n d i t i o n s of justice that I defended in C h a p t e r s 2 and 3 takes c l i m a t e c h a n g e mitigation as a m a t t e r of justice. T h a t a c c o u n t m a i n t a i n s t h a t duties of justice exist between persons w h o have a moral duty o f equal respect if t h o s e persons are c o - m e m b e r s in an association that is (1) relatively strong, (2) largely non-voluntary, (3) c o n s t i t u t i v e of a significant part o f t h e background rules for t h e various relationships o f their public lives and (4) governed by n o r m s t h a t can be subject to h u m a n c o n t r o l . W i t h respect to (1), I held t h a t an association is strong t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t it is (a) enduring, (b) c o m p r e h e n s i v e l y governed b y institutional n o r m s and (c) regularly affecting t h e highest order moral interests o f t h e persons associated. With respect t o (2), I held that an association is n o n - v o l u n t a r y to the e x t e n t t h a t there is n o reasonable alternative t o participating in t h e association. C O 2 emissions enter i n t o t h e a t m o s p h e r e and disperse m o r e or less evenly around t h e globe; unlike some o t h e r forms o f air pollution, they d o n o t c o n c e n t r a t e locally. In effect, C O 2

emissions

produce a global association of person affected by t h e m . T h i s is a


strong association. Indeed, it is intergenerational, stretching back to t h e dawn of t h e industrial revolution and forward i n t o t h e foreseeable future. T h e association created by emissions has been g o v e r n e d in large part by market n o r m s , w h i c h h a v e permitted t h e emissions as externalities of e c o n o m i c a l l y productive activity and land use, but also by municipal e n v i r o n m e n t a l and property law, and t h e n o r m s o f state sovereignty, w h i c h grant states the right t o set their own regulatory s c h e m e s . 1 4 T h e association affects h i g h l y i m p o r t a n t h u m a n interests in life, h e a l t h , shelter and food and water security. T h i s is an association t h a t is n o n - v o l u n t a r y for individuals; t h e y simply h a v e n o alternative but to live w i t h t h e a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n of C O 2 and the effects t h a t it has o n t h e c l i m a t e system. T h e associat i o n ' s effect on people's lives is pervasive. T h e n o r m s g o v e r n i n g C O 2 affect t h e production of capital and c o n s u m e r goods, e m p l o y m e n t opportunities, land use a n d t h e i m p o r t a n t h u m a n interests just m e n tioned. T h e s e n o r m s are subject t o h u m a n c o n t r o l , as t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e Kyoto Protocol demonstrates, even t h o u g h t h e political hurdles and collective a c t i o n p r o b l e m s associated with exercising c o n t r o l are considerable. T h e r e are good reasons to t h i n k , t h e n , t h a t t h e duty to mitigate c l i m a t e c h a n g e is a r e q u i r e m e n t of global social justice to t h e poor and vulnerable o f t h e world w h o will either spend proportionally a great deal of their resources t o protect their highly i m p o r t a n t interest by strategies of a d a p t a t i o n , or w h o will simply have insufficient resources to do so and suffer terribly as a result, or perhaps b o t h . J u s t i c e requires a global regulatory s c h e m e t h a t serves to mitigate clim a t e c h a n g e . Indeed, an i m p o r t a n t effect o f c l i m a t e c h a n g e is that it is t r a n s f o r m i n g our response to ' n a t u r a l ' catastrophes from an ethics o f rescue t o a r e q u i r e m e n t of justice. M u c h o f t h e c o n f i d e n c e t h a t we m i g h t h a v e had t h a t distant strangers plagued by drought, f a m i n e and flooding are t h e u n f o r t u n a t e v i c t i m s o f bad brute luck is unsustainable. Now t h e role o f t h e h u m a n h a n d in bringing about their dire c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t be ruled o u t . Acts o f G o d are increasingly b e c o m i n g o v e r d e t e r m i n e d by acts o f h u m a n i t y . 1 5

Why, it m i g h t be pressed, does t h e problem of c l i m a t e c h a n g e require n e w global regulatory institutions? W h y c a n ' t we rely o n individual state leaders with appropriate knowledge of t h e moral situation


t o establish their o w n state regulatory regimes, perhaps w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of n o n - b i n d i n g targets? Miller seems c o n v i n c e d t h a t this is an appropriate response. 1 6 T h e lessons o f history in this regard are n o t at all c o m f o r t i n g . Recall that from t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the U N F C C C in 1 9 9 2 , w h i c h did n o t include b i n d i n g e m i s s i o n s reduction targets, till Kyoto went i n t o force in 2 0 0 5 C O 2 emissions increased by nearly 3 3 percent. In large part this is b e c a u s e CO2 emissions result from n o r m a l e c o n o m i c activity. Even t h o u g h there is a collective r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e problem increasing c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of C O 2 , leaders c o n c e r n e d about t h e e c o n o m i c well-being of their c o u n t r i e s have n o i n c e n t i v e to reduce emissions. In the a b s e n c e of adopting additional mitigation strategies, emissions are projected t o increase by an additional 4 0 - 1 1 0 percent between 2 0 0 0 and 2 0 3 0 . 1 7 Moreover, two-thirds t o three-quarters o f the increase is e x p e c t e d t o c o m e from developing countries, where e c o n o m i c growth is highest. 1 8 In t h e a b s e n c e o f a c o o r d i n a t e d global effort, that s a n c t i o n s n o n c o m p l i a n c e and requires developed c o u n t r i e s to incur significant costs, t h e s e developing c o u n t r i e s can be fully e x p e c t e d t o c h o o s e d e v e l o p m e n t over mitigation; and given t h e e x t e n t of misery caused by severe poverty, such a c h o i c e c a n hardly be c o n d e m n e d . In addition to t h e lessons of history, an appreciation for t h e e x t e n t o f emissions reductions required in order to mitigate appropriately

Table 1

IPCC C O 2 stablization targets

Atmospheric

Peaking year Range of global Range of global for CO 2 average sea-level average

Change in CO 2 emissions in

concentrations in ppm

emissions after which total

2 0 5 0 as percent of 2 0 0 0 emissions

co2

emissions decline

temperature increase above

rise above pre-industrial

p re-industrial levels at

levels at temperature

temperature equilibrium in °C

equilibrium in meters

350-450 400-440 440-485 485-570

2000-2015 2000-2020 2010-2030 2020-2060

2.0-2.4

570-660 660-790

2050-2080 2060-2090

4.0-4.9 4.9-6.1

2.4-2.8 2.8-3.2 3.2-4.0

0.4-1.4 0.5-1.7

- 8 5 to - 5 0

0.6-1.9 0.6-2.4

- 6 0 to - 3 0 - 3 0 to + 5 + 1 0 to + 6 0

0.8-2.9 1.0-3.7

+ 2 5 to + 8 5 + 9 0 to + 1 4 0

Climate Change, Development and Mitigation 113

m a k e s it seem exceedingly unlikely t h a t t h e appropriate mitigation will o c c u r in t h e a b s e n c e o f b i n d i n g states t o an e n f o r c e a b l e e m i s s i o n s reduction treaty. T h i s can be seen by observing t h e IPCC's scenarios for long-term c l i m a t e c h a n g e . In the AR4 the IPCC presents six different stabilization targets for C O 2 c o n c e n t r a t i o n s along w i t h the range of likely l o n g - t e r m c l i m a t i c effects and t h e required level o f CO2 emissions.19 Appreciating the relationship between the c o l u m n s in

Table 1

requires t h a t several matters be elaborated. First, there are signific a n t t i m e lags in t h e c l i m a t e system. C O 2 m o l e c u l e s are long-lived. Half of every ton e m i t t e d r e m a i n s in t h e a t m o s p h e r e hundreds, even t h o u s a n d s , of years. T h i s is captured vividly by the UNDP: [T]races of t h e C O 2 released w h e n the first coal-powered steam e n g i n e s designed by J o h n N e w c o m e n were o p e r a t i n g in t h e 18th C e n t u r y are still in t h e a t m o s p h e r e . So are t h e traces o f t h e emissions generated by t h e world's first coal-fired power station, designed by T h o m a s Edison and o p e n e d in lower M a n h a t t a n in

1882.20 T h u s , t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f C O 2 in t h e a t m o s p h e r e will c o n t i n u e t o increase for s o m e t i m e after emissions have reached their peak. Additionally, t h e c l i m a t e s y s t e m — i n c l u d i n g global m e a n temperatures and sea levels—will c o n t i n u e to be affected even after c o n c e n t r a t i o n s have stabilized. With respect t o a c h i e v i n g temperature equilibrium, AR4 states t h a t , ' A p p r o a c h i n g equilibrium can

take

several centuries, especially for scenarios with higher levels of stabilisation [of c o n c e n t r a t i o n s ] . ' 2 1 T h e r m a l e x p a n s i o n of the seas and m e l t i n g of glaciers and ice c a n c o n t i n u e even after temperatures have equilibrated. T h e r m a l e x p a n s i o n would c o n t i n u e for m a n y centuries after GHG [green h o u s e gases) c o n c e n t r a t i o n s h a v e stabilised, for a n y o f t h e stabilisation levels assessed, causing an eventual sea level rise m u c h larger t h a n projected for the 21 s t c e n t u r y . . . . T h e long t i m e scales of t h e r m a l e x p a n s i o n and ice sheet response t o w a r m i n g imply t h a t stabilization o f G H G c o n c e n t r a t i o n s at or above present levels would n o t stabilize sea level for m a n y centuries. 2 2


Additionally, t h e range and i n s t a n c e s o f u n c e r t a i n t y lurking b e h i n d t h e n u m b e r s in t h e c o l u m n s need t o be appreciated. O n e

mat-

ter o f u n c e r t a i n t y c o n c e r n s t h e equilibrium level of average surface w a r m i n g that would be produced b y d o u b l i n g (from pre-industrial levels) the c o n c e n t r a t i o n s of C O 2 in t h e a t m o s p h e r e ; this relation between average surface w a r m i n g and t h e doubling o f c o n c e n t r a tions is referred t o as climate

sensitivity.

T h e AR4 holds that c l i m a t e

sensitivity is likely to be in t h e range of 2 - 4 . 5 ° C , with its best estim a t e b e i n g 3°C. 2 3 U n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t c l i m a t e sensitivity is the basis for u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t t h e relationship between t h e values in c o l u m n o n e and in c o l u m n three of Table 1. C l i m a t e sensitivity u n c e r t a i n t y necessarily e x t e n d s t o t h e t h e r m a l e x p a n s i o n of the seas at that c o n c e n t r a t i o n level; this results in u n c e r t a i n t y regarding t h e relationship between t h e values in c o l u m n o n e a n d c o l u m n four. Because t h e d y n a m i c s o f ice sheet collapse are also n o t well understood by c l i m a t e scientists, the estimates o f sea-level rise in c o l u m n four exclude any c o n t r i b u t i o n t o sea levels f r o m ice sheet collapse. T h e estimates could t h e n be significantly low. T h e u n c e r t a i n t y o f climate sensitivity and of t h e d y n a m i c s of ice sheet m e l t i n g a l o n g with the fact that the t i m e scale is e n o r m o u s all c o m b i n e to produce a d i s c o n c e r t i n g degree of u n c e r t a i n t y about long-term sea-level rise. [T]he risk o f additional c o n t r i b u t i o n s to sea level rise from b o t h the G r e e n l a n d and possibly t h e Antarctic ice sheets m a y be larger t h a n projected by the ice sheet m o d e l s and could o c c u r on c e n t u r y t i m e scales. This is because ice d y n a m i c a l processes seen in recent observations but n o t fully included in ice sheet m o d e l s assessed in AR4 could increase t h e rate o f ice loss. C o m p l e t e deglaciation o f t h e G r e e n l a n d ice sheet would raise sea level by 7 m and could be irreversible. 2 4 G i v e n t h e present state of c l i m a t e s c i e n c e there is n o way to escape t h e s e uncertainties. A full

discussion

of

what

constitutes

appropriate

mitigation

involves p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y c o m p l i c a t e d matters o f intergenerational justice since t h e t i m e scale of t h e effects of c l i m a t e c h a n g e is in centuries. For present purposes it is best t o set such matters aside in order to m a i n t a i n our focus o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of global justice due to c l i m a t e c h a n g e . 2 5 Instead of a fully justified


philosophical a c c o u n t of w h a t present g e n e r a t i o n s must do to mitigate c l i m a t e c h a n g e o n b e h a l f of futures g e n e r a t i o n s , m o s t mitigation policy has proceeded on an understanding of Article 2 of t h e U N F C C C , t h e "stabilization o f g r e e n h o u s e gas c o n c e n t r a t i o n s in the a t m o s p h e r e at a level that would prevent dangerous a n t h r o p o g e n i c interference with t h e c l i m a t e s y s t e m . " 2 6 T h e standard o f

dangerous

is, o f course, b o t h vague a n d value-laden. How great must t h e probability be? W h o must be at risk? How severe m u s t t h e effects be? W h o decides? T h e UNDP and t h e European U n i o n (EU) endorse t h e goal of h a l t i n g w a r m i n g at 2°C over preindustrial levels in order to avoid dangerous c l i m a t e c h a n g e . 2 7 T h i s j u d g m e n t m a k e s n o r m a tive a s s u m p t i o n s about w h a t constitutes dangerous c h a n g e , and is plagued by t h e u n c e r t a i n t y associated w i t h c l i m a t e sensitivity. As Table 1 indicates, t h e IPCC view is t h a t h a l t i n g w a r m i n g at 2°C probably requires stabilizing C O 2 c o n c e n t r a t i o n levels in t h e range o f 3 5 0 t o 4 5 0 p p m . T h i s is a very a m b i t i o u s target. Recall that t h e levels in 2 0 0 5 were 3 7 9 p p m and rising by 1.8 ppm per. Table 1 also states IPCC projection t h a t achieving c o n c e n t r a t i o n s in this range requires reductions in overall C O 2 emissions from 5 0 to 8 5 percent by 2 0 5 0 . T h e EU is c o m m i t t e d to t h e goal of 2 0 percent reductions by 2 0 2 0 , currently t h e m o s t a m b i t i o u s c o m m i t m e n t to emissions reductions by a n y g o v e r n i n g body. But this m i g h t n o t be a m b i t i o u s e n o u g h to achieve the 2°C w a r m i n g limit. S o m e c l i m a t e scientists argue that if t h e c l i m a t e sensitivity is 3 . 5 ° C (only 0 . 5 ° C higher t h a n t h e IPCC's best estimate), a c h i e v i n g t h e 2°C w a r m i n g limit would require global e m i s s i o n s t o d e c l i n e t o 0 by 2 0 2 0 . 2 8 T h e IPCC scenarios give good reason to believe t h a t e x t r e m e l y deep reductions in C O 2 e m i s s i o n s will be needed t o avoid dangerous clim a t e c h a n g e . T h i s will be b u r d e n s o m e and costly. T h e history o f e m i s s i o n s growth prior t o t h e UNFCC adopting t h e Kyoto Protocol m a k e s it unrealistic to e x p e c t that states will assume the necessary burdens in an u n c o o r d i n a t e d and w h o l l y v o l u n t a r y m a n n e r .

For t h e purposes o f discussing the distribution o f intra-generational, or global, burdens of m e e t i n g t h e d e m a n d s of m i t i g a t i o n , I accept t h e UNDP a n d EU goal of l i m i t i n g temperature increase t o 2°C increase by 2 0 5 0 as the appropriate response to the threat of dangerous


c l i m a t e c h a n g e . O t h e r temperature goals h a v e been considered by c l i m a t e experts. 2 9 There are two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in favor o f t h e 2°C goal. O n e is risk aversion. T h e prospect o f saving several million people from the miseries of disease, draught and flooding must weigh heavily in any j u d g m e n t o f t h e temperature goal. T h e s e c o n d is t h a t it has significant i n t e r n a t i o n a l legitimacy. Little t h a t is practically relevant will be gained by moral a r g u m e n t s o f proposals that are not w i t h i n t h e range o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l negotiations. T h e 2°C goal is, however, d a u n t i n g , given t h e global e m i s s i o n s reductions required. M a n y reasonable people judge it t o be t o o a m b i tious; and this might t h e correct j u d g m e n t . But it is i m p o r t a n t to understand that such a j u d g m e n t is a moral o n e , n o t merely a t e c h nical o n e . J u d g i n g t h a t t h e goal of l i m i t i n g t e m p e r a t u r e increase t o n o m o r e t h a n 2°C is t o o a m b i t i o u s a m o u n t s t o affirming t h a t t h e costs that t h a t limit would i m p o s e on persons for t h e next several decades outweigh t h e risks that a higher target poses for persons over t h e course of t h e n e x t several centuries. In this section, I consider t h e merits o f various principles for t h e assignment o f e m i s s i o n s reductions to meet t h e 2°C goal. I do this first according to the m o r e o p t i m i s t i c scenario that by 2 0 5 0 only a 5 0 percent reduction in global C O 2 emissions from 2 0 0 0 levels would be required. T h e n I consider an 8 5 percent reduction scenario.

Equal A m o u n t s : Each state is required t o limit its emissions by an a m o u n t equal t o t h a t o f all o t h e r states' reductions. Equal A m o u n t s is rejected on g r o u n d s o f impossibility, n o t moral inappropriateness. According t o t h e US Energy I n f o r m a t i o n A d m i n istration (EIA) in 2 0 0 0 global C O 2 emissions from t h e c o n s u m p t i o n o f energy was 2 3 , 7 5 1 . 0 1 Mt C O 2 . 3 0 T h e goal o f h a l v i n g t h a t would require c u t t i n g emissions by 1 1 , 8 7 5 . 5 1 Mt C O 2 . T h e EIA has year 2 0 0 0 data for 2 0 8 countries. 3 1 Dividing t h e global net reduction by the n u m b e r o f countries, we arrive at a per c o u n t r y reduction requirem e n t of 5 7 . 1 Mt C O 2 . T h i s would be a reduction requirement greater t h a n t h e present ( 2 0 0 5 is t h e m o s t recent year for data) emissions of 159 countries, 7 6 percent o f t h o s e in t h e EIA data set. 3 2 Hence, t h e first principle makes an impossible d e m a n d o n over three-quarters o f the c o u n t r i e s . 3 3


Moral considerations, however, p r e d o m i n a t e in t h e rest of this discussion, as we see w h e n considering t h e n e x t principle. E q u a l P e r c e n t a g e s : Each state is required to limit its e m i s s i o n s by a percentage equal t o t h a t of all o t h e r states' reductions. T h e r e is n o t h i n g c o n t r a d i c t o r y about requiring e a c h state t o reduce its C O 2 e m i s s i o n s by 50 percent. But such a requirement

places

an u n r e a s o n a b l e d e m a n d o n poor people in underdeveloped and developing countries. Driven by e c o n o m i c and population growth, total electricity c o n s u m p t i o n in N o n - O C E D c o u n t r i e s is projected to d o u b l e between 2 0 0 5 and 2 0 5 0 and with this c o m e s increased C O 2 e m i s s i o n s . 3 4 Currently, a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1.6 billion people in the world lack access t o electricity. 3 5 Unequal access t o m o d e r n energy sources results in inequalities o f o p p o r t u n i t y for h e a l t h , e c o n o m i c a d v a n c e m e n t , and o t h e r goods. T h e H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t Report 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 reports t h a t t h e i n d o o r pollution caused by t h e b u r n i n g o f wood a n d a n i m a l d u n g — b e c a u s e of a lack o f electricity—results in 1.5 million deaths per year, mostly children under t h e age o f 5, e x c e e d i n g the n u m b e r of deaths from malaria a n d rivaling t h o s e from tuberculosis. 3 6 T h e Report c o n t i n u e s , 'Electrification is often associated with advances in health status. For e x a m p l e , in Bangladesh, rural electrification is estimated to increase i n c o m e by 11 p e r c e n t — a n d to avert 2 5 child deaths for every 1 0 0 0 h o u s e h o l d s c o n n e c t e d . ' 3 7 In 2 0 0 0 in Bangladesh a n average of 0 . 2 2 Mt C O 2 per person was emitted, c o m p a r e d t o over 2 0 Mt in t h e USA. 3 8 Were Bangladesh t o halve its total emissions, its per capita C O 2 emissions would be merely 0 . 1 1 Mt, an a m o u n t that given current t e c h n o l o g i c a l capacity would ensure its persistent u n d e r d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e proposal for c u t t i n g emissions by 5 0 percent in underdeveloped and developing countries would result in delaying or even reversing rural electrification because electricity g e n e r a t i o n in m u c h of the underdeveloped world is reliant o n the use of coal facilities. Henry S h u e offers a c o m pelling moral reason t o reject o f any such a proposal: '[T]hose living in desperate poverty o u g h t n o t to be required to restrain their emissions, t h e r e b y r e m a i n i n g in poverty, in order t h a t those living in luxury should n o t have t o restrain their e m i s s i o n s . . . Any strategy o f m a i n t a i n i n g affluence for s o m e people by keeping o t h e r people at or b e l o w subsistence is, I take it, patently unfair because so extraordinarily u n e q u a l — i n t o l e r a b l y u n e q u a l . ' 3 9


T h e a r g u m e n t based o n fairness is strong. But t h e r e is a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t a r g u m e n t based on legitimacy. T h e U N F C C C establishes several c o n s t r a i n t s on t h e legitimacy o f any c l i m a t e a g r e e m e n t . O n e c o n s t r a i n t is that an a r r a n g e m e n t must n o t i n h i b i t t h e capacity o f states to develop. In its preamble the U N F C C C affirms that, 'that responses t o c l i m a t e c h a n g e should be c o o r d i n a t e d with social and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t in an integrated m a n n e r with a view to avoiding adverse impacts o n t h e latter, taking i n t o full a c c o u n t t h e legitimate priority needs of developing c o u n t r i e s for t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f sustained e c o n o m i c growth and t h e eradication of p o v e r t y . . . ' 4 0 And Article 3 states t h a t , ' T h e Parties have a right to, and should, p r o m o t e sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t . ' 4 1 Insofar as the U N F C C C is the framework in w h i c h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c l i m a t e c h a n g e treaty must be negotiated, n o proposal can be legitimate t h a t fails t o observe its n o r m s . But Equal Percentages would require e m i s s i o n s reductions in underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s that are blatantly c o n t r a r y to the accepted upon right t o d e v e l o p m e n t . T w o additional U N F C C C n o r m s are i m p o r t a n t in t h e discussion o f the legitimacy of principles. T h e s e are t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s to recognize differentiated responsibilities and capabilities. Article 3 states that Parties must n e g o t i a t e c l i m a t e c h a n g e policy 'on t h e basis of equity and in a c c o r d a n c e with their c o m m o n but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.' 4 2 T h e language here is vague, but t h e distinction between responsibility and capability seems to involve distinguishing between agents w h o bring about an o u t c o m e and agents with t h e resources required t o remediate t h e o u t c o m e . 4 3 T h e U N F C C C seems to be recognizing that these are differentiated in t h e sense t h a t n o t all states are equal c o n t r i b u t o r s t o t h e o u t c o m e and n o t all are equally able t o fix it. N e x t consider t h e following principle: Equal Burdens: Each state is required to reduce its emissions by a share of the burden o f t h e overall emissions reductions that is equal to t h e burden of every o t h e r state. A version o f Equal Burdens is defended by M a r t i n o Traxler as t h e fairest a s s i g n m e n t

of t h e burdens o f reducing C O 2

emissions. 4 4

Traxler argues t h a t a treaty should equalize t h e burdens of emissions r e d u c t i o n s — r a t h e r t h a n the a m o u n t or percent of r e d u c t i o n s — across states. 4 5 Equalizing the burden is equivalent to equalizing t h e


marginal disutility o f c o m p l i a n c e . So, t h e proposal also m a x i m i z e s utility a l t h o u g h Traxler does n o t defend it on t h a t g r o u n d . Traxler's a c c o u n t o f t h e proposal is expressed in terms o f equalizing of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y costs o f c o m p l i a n c e . O n t h e face o f it this is an attractive idea. W h e n asked t o carry a burden, and guided by the idea of equality, it seems plausible t h a t t h e burdens s h o u l d be equalized, if all o t h e r t h i n g s between parties are equal. T h e idea is t h a t t h e opportunity that o n e party foregoes in sharing t h e burden should be n o greater t h a n the o p p o r t u n i t y t h a t a n o t h e r forgoes in sharing in t h e burden. To see h o w this would work it m i g h t help to i m a g i n e a simple e x a m p l e from a n o t h e r c o n t e x t rather than the c o m p l i c a t e d world of c l i m a t e treaty n e g o t i a t i o n s a b o u t C O 2 emissions. Two people must share t h e burden of repairing t h e building in w h i c h t h e y live. T h i s costs 2 0 . According to Traxler, this principle holds t h a t their c o n tribution should be based on t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s that they forgo b y c o n t r i b u t i n g . In particular t h o s e f o r g o n e opportunities should be equalized. Millie is rich with 4 0 and Dolly is poor w i t h 10. Due to her poverty, Dolly would forgo e n o r m o u s o p p o r t u n i t i e s if she c o n tributes m o r e t h a n 1. Suppose t h a t t h e value to Dolly o f her lost opportunities w h e n she pays 1 is a b o u t equal to t h e value t o Millie o f her lost t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s w h e n s h e pays 19. Happily, they can agree to a distribution of burdens, t h e n , t h a t leaves Dolly with 9 a n d Millie with 2 1 after m a k i n g t h e repairs. S u c h a distribution of the burden of p a y m e n t seems t o respect t h e differentiated capacities o f Millie a n d Dolly. From e a c h a c c o r d i n g t o her ability. Traxler argues t h a t t h e proposal is also attractive o n i m p o r t a n t pragmatic grounds: It gives e a c h state ' n o stronger reason t o defect from d o i n g its (fair) share t h a n it gives a n y o t h e r . . . ' 4 6 According t o Traxler, t h e principle equalizes reasons for defection, if t h e following three c o n d i t i o n s are m e t : 1) It is publicly k n o w n t h a t each state is carrying a burden identical to t h a t of every o t h e r ; 2) c o o p e r a t i o n and detection can be publicly m o n i t o r e d and 3) each state is satisfied t h a t t h e burdens are equal. As long as the a c c o u n t i n g is clear between Millie and Dolly and they understand t h e equality of their burdens, n e i t h e r has m o r e reason to c o m p l a i n t h a n the other. Despite t h e attractions of this proposal t h e r e are significant moral and pragmatic p r o b l e m s with it. First consider three moral problems. O n e is t h a t the proposal assumes present holdings as the


moral b e n c h m a r k against w h i c h t o equalize burdens. Present holdings establish present o p p o r t u n i t i e s and therefore t h e opportunities t h a t will be lost if t h e burden is carried. But if t h e b a c k g r o u n d is o n e o f injustice, if t h e holdings are n o t necessarily justly held, this b e n c h m a r k loses its credibility. If rather t h a n paying for c o m m o n provisions, Millie and Dolly are repaying a debt incurred by a c r i m e that they c o m m i t t e d , it is seems implausible to e n d o w their present holdings with t h e moral a u t h o r i t y to set their c o n t r i b u t i o n levels. Perhaps, for e x a m p l e , Millie was far m o r e involved in the c r i m e a n d benefited m u c h m o r e f r o m it. In t h e case c l i m a t e c h a n g e m i t i g a t i o n , given t h e failure to reduce C O 2 e m i s s i o n s over a 20-year period in w h i c h t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s was that they should be reduced for t h e sake of future generations, it is n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e t o take current e m i s s i o n s as unjustly high in t h e aggregate. T h e y are increasing C O 2 c o n c e n t r a t i o n s at a rate t h a t for decades has been understood as productive of significant suffering for future generations. If it is t h e case t h a t present e m i s s i o n s levels are g e n e r a t i o n a l l y unjust, it is inappropriate t o treat t h e various e m i s s i o n s levels o f t h e various states as the u n q u e s t i o n e d b e n c h mark against w h i c h a burden is measured. In o t h e r words, under b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n s of i n j u s t i c e differentiated responsibility m i g h t appropriately play a role in establishing payment. T h e r e is a n o t h e r related moral problem with t h e proposal, o n e w h i c h Traxler is aware of a n d ready with a response. Equal Burdens c a n in principle weigh t h e losses o f luxuries to t h e rich m o r e heavily t h a n t h e loss o f essentials t o t h e poor. Rich states m i g h t n o t be asked to forego expenditures o n matters such as h e a l t h c a r e research for restoring hair loss or erasing facial wrinkles since such research is very expensive. If o p p o r t u n i t i e s lost are measured by their market value, t h e n t h e loss of funds for c o s m e t i c research could a m o u n t to greater opportunities foregone than the loss o f funds for t h e provision of primary medical care, even if we take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n decreasing marginal utility. Equalizing o p p o r t u n i t y costs, t h e n , could in principle require poor c o u n t r i e s t o forgo comparatively i n e x p e n sive essentials, rather t h a n rich c o u n t r i e s forgoing expensive luxuries. T h e r e is n o guarantee t h e n t h a t t h e proposal respects t h e right to development. As m e n t i o n e d above, Traxler is aware of this problem. He responds to it by asserting t h a t a non-welfarist c o n c e p t i o n o f well-being,


such as Amartya Sen's capabilities c o n c e p t i o n , could be e m p l o y e d instead o f t h e market value of t h e o p p o r t u n i t y cost, and t h a t s o m e such non-welfarist c o n c e p t i o n could be agreed upon in tional negotiations.

47

interna-

T h e idea, presumably, would be to equalize the

marginal loss o f average (non-welfarist) well-being across states participating in t h e mitigation s c h e m e . A p r o p o n e n t o f this view m i g h t claim t h a t burdens are equal if they result in equal marginal losses to a country's H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t Index (HDI). 4 8 But it is implausible to believe t h a t equality is best served by Sierra Leone, in last place o n t h e 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 rankings, losing an HDI value equal t o t h a t of first-ranked Iceland. 4 9 T h i s implausibility also casts doubt o n the larger project of seeking to equalize marginal losses t o well-being a m o n g very unequal parties. For t h e problem in t h e e x a m p l e is n o t t h e particular measure used, t h e HDI, but t h a t desperately poor parties s h o u l d be subject to losses of well-being, however construed, t h a t are equal to very rich parties. Finally, t h e third moral problem with Equal Burdens is related t o t h e preceding a r g u m e n t . Equal Burdens requires all countries, even t h e underdeveloped o n e s , t o share s o m e part o f t h e b u r d e n — i t is after all burdens t h a t are equalized—of reducing C O 2 emissions. But recall Shue's p o i n t that it is unfair to ask very poor countries to pay costs that would reduce the progress t h e y are m a k i n g in develo p i n g i n order to m a i n t a i n m o r e privileged lifestyles in developed countries. T h i s is the p o i n t o f asserting a right t o d e v e l o p m e n t . In order t o permit d e v e l o p m e n t in poor underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s

and

achieve t h e 5 0 percent in overall emissions, states with a high degree of social and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t will have to reduce their emissions by m u c h m o r e t h a n 5 0 percent in order t o allow for b o t h lesser reductions in developing c o u n t r i e s a n d even increases in e m i s s i o n s in t h e least developed c o u n t r i e s . T h i s is t h e o n l y morally plausible interpretation o f t h e right to d e v e l o p m e n t in t h e c l i m a t e c h a n g e mitigation c o n t e x t . Equalizing marginal losses

to well-being, however

measured, is i n c o m p a t i b l e with allowing s o m e c o u n t r i e s t o

increase

their emissions. Consider the pragmatic advantages t h a t Traxler attributes to his proposal. Recall that h e argues that n o state would have greater reason t h a n any o t h e r t o defect if 1) it is publicly k n o w n t h a t e a c h state is carrying a burden identical to that o f every other, 2) c o o p eration and d e t e c t i o n can be publicly m o n i t o r e d and 3) e a c h state


is satisfied t h a t t h e burdens are equal. But t h e first a n d third o f t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s s e e m e x c e e d i n g hard t o satisfy in light of t h e moral p r o b l e m s presented above. If t h e r e is significant controversy about w h a t constitutes h u m a n well-being, then it is unlikely to be widely agreed publicly t h a t states are sharing equal marginal losses to their average well-being, and it is unlikely t h a t states t h e m s e l v e s will be satisfied t h a t t h e y are e x p e r i e n c i n g equal losses. Moreover, relying o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i o n s , in a world marked by huge inequalities in wealth a n d power, seems like a very unreliable w a y t o arrive at a n o n - c o n t r o v e r s i a l measure o f well-being. Hence, Equal Burdens is implausible on b o t h moral and pragmatic grounds. Let's consider a fourth principle. Polluter Pays: Each state is required to reduce its emissions in proportion to its historic c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the global excess in emissions. T h e distinguishing feature o f this principle is t h a t it assigns responsibility for e m i s s i o n s reduction considerable prima

in proportion

to fault. T h e r e is

facie plausibility to a fault-based principle. In part

this is due to t h e e x i s t e n c e o f the U N F C C C n o r m of differentiated responsibility. But t h e plausibility goes deeper: T h e c o n t e n t of t h e n o r m itself is plausible. S i n c e t h e goal is a reduction of C O 2 e m i s s i o n s , the idea t h a t recent and present g e n e r a t i o n s are at fault for exceeding sustainable e m i s s i o n s seems plausible, given t h a t there has been i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s g o i n g back t o t h e 1 9 8 8 United Nations G e n eral Assembly Resolution 4 3 / 5 3 t h a t e m i s s i o n s reductions are needed. But overall emissions have c o n t i n u e d t o grow. If it seems plausible t h a t fault is appropriate generally, t h e n it also plausible t h a t a proportional division o f fault is appropriate. Polluter Pays, however, distributes t h e burden of emissions reductions w i t h o u t any distribution of permissions for emission increases. W h e r e there is n o significant c o n t r i b u t i o n to the p r o b l e m , presumably emissions reductions would be zero, but there would be n o positive a l l o t m e n t for emissions growth either. As I argued above, with respect to Equal Burdens, a principle that does n o t permit emissions growth in underdeveloped states is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e right t o d e v e l o p m e n t . This, t h e n , renders Polluter Pays implausible. It is w o r t h considering w h e t h e r there is a modified version o f Polluter Pays, o n e t h a t provides permission for poor countries to emit


in t h e process o f d e v e l o p m e n t could be m o r e plausible. Here is o n e version o f such a principle: Modified Polluter Pays: Each state t h a t is required t o reduce its e m i s s i o n s must reduce t h e m in proportion t o its historic c o n t r i b u t i o n to the global excess in emissions, but the overall reduction required of each of these states is sufficient t o offset emissions increases by poorer states. T h i s principle has several advantages. It seems t o c o n f o r m to all three U N F C C C n o r m s requiring t h e respect for the right t o d e v e l o p m e n t and assigning burdens o n t h e basis of differentiated responsibility and capability. It, therefore, merits serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n to c o n s i d e r w i t h respect t o Modified Polluter Pays is w h e t h e r t h e r e is a n o n - a d h o c way t o m a k e t h e distinction between states t h a t must reduce and states w h o s e e m i s s i o n s m a y grow. T h e Kyoto Protocol does this by distinguishing between Annex-1 n o n - A n n e x - 1 countries as developed in U N F C C C .

50

and

In order t o allow

subsequent admission i n t o t h e A n n e x - 1 group, so as t o include m o r e c o u n t r i e s in t h e group required to m a k e reductions after they achieve a threshold o f d e v e l o p m e n t , Modified Polluter Pays m i g h t be understood as requiring c o u n t r i e s t o begin reducing o n c e t h e y reach t h e level o f per capita emissions o f t h e Annex-1 c o u n t r y with t h e least per capita emissions. But that s e e m s arbitrary insofar as it is develo p m e n t t h a t Modified Polluter Pays is m e a n t to allow, n o t emissions for t h e sake of emissions. Instead, t h e n , perhaps t h e principle could be understood as permitting countries u n l i m i t e d emissions until t h e y reach t h e UNDP's threshold of a high h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t , w h i c h is an HDI of 0 . 8 0 0 . As o f 2 0 0 8 this is a group o f 7 0 countries, a m u c h larger set t h a n t h e 3 8 A n n e x - 1 countries. 5 1 In o t h e r words, t h e suggestion would be t o assign all o f t h e reductions t o m e m b e r s o f t h e high h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t group, a n d allow u n c h e c k e d e m i s s i o n s in t h o s e c o u n t r i e s outside of this group. T h i s second suggestion has two problems. First, it loses grip on t h e original m o t i v a t i o n for t h e proposal to assign reductions o n the basis o f fault. For e x a m p l e , at rank 7 0 Brazil, with and HDI o f 0 . 8 0 0 just makes it i n t o t h e high h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t group. But Brazil's total a n d per capita emissions o f C O 2 are comparatively low; in 2 0 0 5 t h e y were 3 6 0 . 5 7 million M t and 1 . 9 4 Mt. S e c o n d , the suggestion suffers from t h e defect of false n o n arbitrariness. After all, w h y draw the line between high and m e d i u m


h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t at the i n d e x of 0 . 8 0 0 rather t h a n 0 . 7 9 9 ? T h e s e two c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c o m p o u n d w h e n we c o m p a r e Brazil t o St. Lucia, with an HDI o f 0 . 7 9 5 and a rank o f 72. St. Lucia is nearly at t h e t o p o f the m e d i u m H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t group but has h i g h e r per capita C O 2 emissions, 2 . 2 2 , t h a n Brazil. Or c o m p a r e Brazil to C h i n a , near t h e t o p of t h e m e d i u m d e v e l o p m e n t group, with an HDI o f 0 . 7 7 7 and a rank of 8 1 , with perhaps the highest total emissions in t h e world. It seems unlikely that a n y principle t h a t would distinguish t h o s e states t h a t m u s t reduce their emissions from t h o s e w h o s e emissions m a y g r o w — i n order t o permit d e v e l o p m e n t — c a n survive t h e charge of being ad h o c if t h e p o i n t is to assign responsibility for reductions o n t h e basis of fault. T h i s has b o t h moral and pragmatic implications. Insofar as t h e principle would assign d e v e l o p m e n t benefits and b u r d e n s arbitrarily it c o n t a i n s an injustice. Moreover, insofar as it is reasonably suspected o f doing this it will be unable serve well as t h e basis of an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t between parties w h o are willing t o accept burdens o n l y if t h e y are part of a just overall c o m m i t m e n t to global reductions. Despite t h e initial strong plausibility of principle Modified Polluter Pays, it seems unlikely to be able to o v e r c o m e the charge o f b e i n g ad h o c w h e n it c o m e s to m a k i n g its crucial dist i n c t i o n between t h o s e states t h a t are allowed to increase e m i s s i o n s and those are required to reduce t h e m . A fourth principle is the following: Equal Shares: Each state is required t o reduce its e m i s s i o n s t o the level that is attained by multiplying its 2 0 5 0 forecasted population by t h e average per capita emission permissible given t h e global reduction required. T h e idea b e h i n d Equal Shares is s o m e t i m e s characterized as t h e c o n tract and c o n v e r g e principle. 5 2 W h e n assigning per capita burdens an i n c e n t i v e for states t o increase their p o p u l a t i o n s in order to increase total e m i s s i o n s a l l o t m e n t can be avoided by i n d e x i n g t h e a l l o t m e n t to the p o p u l a t i o n at a particular year. Peter Singer argues sensibly that t h e year should be a p p r o x i m a t e l y 5 0 years in t h e future rather t h a n present or t h e recent past so as n o t to place heavier burdens o n states that presently have p o p u l a t i o n s that are y o u n g e r t h a n average ( s o m e t h i n g that c a n n o t n o w be c h a n g e d by policy) and can therefore


be expected t o grow m o r e quickly. 5 3 I do this here using a p r o j e c t i o n o f t h e global p o p u l a t i o n in 2 0 5 0 . Assigning burdens o n an equal per capita basis is a plausible interpretation o f w h a t equality requires with respect to t h e use o f a c o m m o n resource to w h i c h n o o n e can claim a natural or pre-existing individual e n t i t l e m e n t . I argue b e l o w t h a t it also goes further t h a n t h e o t h e r principles toward satisfying the n o r m s of t h e U N F C C C . And finally it has pragmatic appeal. For it undercuts t h e claims that a state is being asked t o take o n heavier responsibilities t h a n others; states are treated o n an equal per capita basis. T h e per capita a m o u n t is the product o f halving the year 2 0 0 0 total e m i s s i o n s and dividing t h a t by the projected 2 0 5 0 global population. T h i s n u m b e r is t h e n multiplied by t h e projected p o p u l a t i o n o f a given state t o get its total emissions a l l o t m e n t . T h e US Census Bureau projects global p o p u l a t i o n in 2 0 5 0 t o be 9 , 5 3 8 , 9 8 8 , 2 6 3 . 5 4 Half t h e total C O 2 emissions for 2 0 0 0 is 1 1 , 8 7 5 . 5 1 million Mt C O 2 . Using t h e s e n u m b e r s , t h e 2 0 5 0 average per capita C O 2 emissions should be 1 . 2 4 Mt C O 2 . I use t h e year 2 0 0 0 as t h e reference year for reductions simply to c o n f o r m t o t h e analysis of the AR4. I have n o deeper c o m m i t m e n t to t h e appropriateness of using that year. In light of the criticisms t h a t I have pressed against Equal Percentages, Equal Burdens a n d Polluter Pays, t h e d e m a n d s of this view on developing and underdeveloped countries must be assessed. W h a t sort of permission for increased e m i s s i o n s does a 1 . 2 4 Mt CO2 per capita limit establish? C o n s i d e r t h e e x a m p l e o f Bangladesh

men-

t i o n e d above. T h e 2 0 0 5 per capita e m i s s i o n s for Bangladesh were 0 . 2 8 M t C O 2 . 5 5 A 1 . 2 4 Mt C O 2 per capita limit would allow for per capita emissions in Bangladesh in 2 0 5 0 t h a t were 4.5 t i m e s t h o s e o f 2 0 0 5 . T h e 2 0 0 5 per capita C O 2 e m i s s i o n s for India were 1.07 M t . 5 6 India would, t h e n , be allowed just under a 2 0 percent e m i s s i o n s increase between 2 0 0 5 and 2 0 5 0 . But several d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s would be required to reduce their emissions by 2 0 5 0 . Brazil's 2 0 0 5 e m i s s i o n s were 1 . 9 4 M t C O 2 ; St. Lucia's were 2 . 2 2 M t C O 2 and C h i n a ' s were 4 . 0 7 M t C O 2 , over t h r e e times t h e limit allowed b y 2 0 5 0 . 5 7 T h e biggest hits, o f course, g o to t h o s e states in w h i c h per capita CO2 emissions are n o w c o m p a r a t i v e l y h i g h . T h e USA's 2 0 0 5 per capita emissions were 2 0 . 1 4 Mt C O 2 . According t o t h e s e requirements, t h e n , the USA would have to reduce its e m i s s i o n s by nearly 9 4 percent by 2 0 5 0 .


Insofar as C O 2 e m i s s i o n s strongly correlate with wealth product i o n , by assigning t h e biggest reductions t o t h e largest per capita producers, Equal Shares c a n plausibly been seen as c o n f o r m i n g t o t h e n o r m s of both differentiated responsibility and capability. Moreover, to the e x t e n t that it gives permission to increase emissions to states t h a t are below t h e 2 0 5 0 per capita requirements, it a c c o m m o d a t e s , in part at least, t h e right t o d e v e l o p m e n t . The r e q u i r e m e n t that s o m e states carry out large emissions reductions f r o m year 2 0 0 0 levels by 2 0 5 0 is s o m e w h a t softened by three considerations. First, scenarios for t h e stabilization o f C O 2 c o n c e n trations do n o t require i m m e d i a t e global CO2 emissions reductions in all states. Global emissions must, however, peak by a b o u t 2 0 1 5 according t o IPCC scenarios of keeping w a r m i n g under 2°C. S e c o n d , Equal Shares is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a market in e m i s s i o n s permits. States for w h i c h it would be m o r e efficient t o e m i t less t h a n their target and sell t h e r e m a i n i n g e n t i t l e m e n t could be permitted to do so to states for w h i c h it would be m o r e cost-effective t o purchase t h e e n t i t l e m e n t t h a n t o cut e m i s s i o n s more. S i n c e C O 2 dissipates u n i f o r m l y in t h e a t m o s p h e r e , it is appropriate to attend to m e e t i n g the global reduction target rather t h a n t h e target of a n y individual state; a n d a trading s c h e m e is c o n s i s t e n t with that. For underdeveloped states w i t h very low per capita emissions, such sales could also significantly a u g m e n t their treasury. And third, since the goal is a global reduction, it could be permissible for states to earn credit against their target by investing abroad in a way t h a t lowers emissions elsewhere, just so l o n g as this reduction is n o t d o u b l e - c o u n t e d as reduction both for t h e investing and host country. T h i s could be a m o r e cost-effective m a n n e r for s o m e states t o achieve their required reductions. S u c h institutional m e c h a n i s m s also a u g m e n t t h e capacity o f Equal Shares to satisfy t h e right t o d e v e l o p m e n t . T h e analysis above o f t h e d e m a n d s o f Equal Shares in c o n j u n c t i o n with a 2°C w a r m i n g limit makes t h e o p t i m i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n t h a t such a w a r m i n g limit requires only a 5 0 percent reduction in e m i s s i o n s . T h e IPCC's projected reduction range for t h a t w a r m i n g limit e x t e n d s to 8 5 percent. T h e IPCC associates an 8 5 percent reduction in emissions w i t h a n a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n target o f 3 5 0 p p m . Recently, J a m e s Hansen has argued t h e 3 5 0 ppm target is t h e m o s t realistic o n e 'to m a i n t a i n t h e c l i m a t e to w h i c h h u m a n i t y , wildlife, and the rest o f the biosphere are adapted.' 5 8 An 8 5 percent reduction of year 2 0 0 0


emissions, divided by t h e 2 0 5 0 projected population, yields a per capita emissions limit of 0 . 3 7 Mt C O 2 . All of t h e 4 0 c o u n t i e s w h i c h had per capita e m i s s i o n s t h a t were less t h a n this limit in 2 0 0 0 were in the b o t t o m half o f UNDP's HDI. 5 9 It is doubtful t h e n that Equal Shares could satisfy the U N F C C C n o r m o f a right to d e v e l o p m e n t if m e e t i n g t h e goal o f limiting w a r m i n g t o 2°C requires an overall emissions reduction of 8 5 percent. For then Equal Shares would require emissions reductions of 9 9 percent in the USA, but 6 5 percent in India, 8 1 percent in Brazil and 9 1 percent i n C h i n a by m i d century. If avoiding dangerous c l i m a t e c h a n g e requires l i m i t i n g w a r m i n g to 2°C, and if m e e t i n g that limit requires reducing

atmospheric con-

c e n t r a t i o n s of CO2 by m o r e t h a n would be achieved by m e a n s of a 5 0 percent emissions reduction, t h e n in order t o satisfy t h e U N F C C C n o r m o f right to d e v e l o p m e n t even greater reductions o f C O 2 emissions must m a d e b y developed industrialized countries, in order to relax t h e d e m a n d s placed on developing and underdeveloped c o u n tries. In light o f this it is useful to c o n s i d e r a fifth principle, developed by Paul Baer, Tom Athanasiou, Sivan Kartha and Eric Kemp-Benedict. T h e y develop it for t h e goal of keeping a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n of C O 2 under 4 2 0 p p m , according to t h e assumption that d o i n g so requires a reduction of emissions of 8 0 percent below 1990 levels. 6 0 Greenhouse an

emissions

Development entitlement

Rights: that

Each

state

is a f u n c t i o n

is of

assigned both

its

responsibility—taken to be its total emissions m i n u s t h e total o f t h o s e arising f r o m productive activity under a developm e n t t h r e s h o l d — a n d its c a p a c i t y — u n d e r s t o o d as its aggregate i n c o m e m i n u s t h e aggregate o f people b e l o w a d e v e l o p m e n t threshold. M y s t a t e m e n t o f the G r e e n h o u s e D e v e l o p m e n t Rights principle is deliberately general. In fact, however, its authors advocate a specific d e v e l o p m e n t threshold, a particular t i m e period for assessing responsibility for emissions, and a w e i g h t for b o t h

responsibility

and capacity. T h e y take t h e d e v e l o p m e n t threshold to be a personal a n n u a l i n c o m e o f $ 7 , 5 0 0 PPP, t h e t i m e period of responsibility to be 1 9 9 0 t o 2 0 0 5 , and t h e weight of responsibility and capacity t o be equal. T h e general framework can, however, a c c o m m o d a t e different a m o u n t s for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t threshold, m o d i f i c a t i o n s to the t i m e


frame a n d alternative weightings of t h e t w o factors. I shall refer, h o w ever, t o t h e authors' specific interpretation o f t h e principle simply as

the Greenhouse Development Rights principle. I believe that the Greenh o u s e D e v e l o p m e n t Rights principle merits serious consideration t h a t includes an assessment of the general framework, i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e authors' specific interpretation, but t h a t assessment is b e y o n d the purposes o f this chapter. The product o f multiplying t h e responsibility factor by the capacity factor (in b o t h cases m i n u s t h e portion of t h e p o p u l a t i o n b e l o w t h e d e v e l o p m e n t threshold) is t h e Responsibility-Capacity Index (RCI) or t h e share, as a percent of t h e total, that e a c h state must c o n t r i b u t e to t h e global emissions reduction required. The G r e e n h o u s e Develo p m e n t Rights principle assigns t h e USA an RCI o f 3 3 . 1 for 2 0 1 0 , decreasing t o 2 5 . 5 by 2 0 3 0 . For C h i n a these are 5.5 and 15.2, for India 0 . 5 and 2 . 3 . 6 1 T h i s is a plausible interpretation o f t h e U N F C C C n o r m s differentiated responsibilities and capacities. T h e c h i e f virtue o f G r e e n h o u s e D e v e l o p m e n t Rights is t h a t , by m e a n s of subtracting t h e d e v e l o p m e n t t h r e s h o l d from b o t h

the

capacity and responsibility factors, it is capable o f satisfying

both

the U N F C C C n o r m o f the right to d e v e l o p m e n t and the 2°C warming limit even if t h e latter requires overall reductions larger t h a n 5 0 percent. Of course, it a c c o m m o d a t e s both o f these desiderata by requiring even larger emissions reductions in rich industrialized c o u n t r i e s t h a n Equal Shares requires. W h i l e C h i n a is allowed to increase by 2 0 3 0 its emissions nearly threefold a b o v e 1 9 9 0 levels, and India nearly t h r e e - a n d - o n e - h a l f fold, t h e USA is required t o reduce its e m i s s i o n s by about 1 2 0 percent less t h a n its 1 9 9 0 levels, and t h e EU is required t o reduce by nearly 140 percent. T h e practical force o f t h e negative emissions r e q u i r e m e n t is t h a t t h e USA and EU must steeply reduce their d o m e s t i c e m i s s i o n s a n d c o n t r i b u t e t o emissions reductions in o t h e r c o u n t r i e s in order to achieve their total e m i s s i o n s reductions r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h e e m i s s i o n s reduction d e m a n d s o f G r e e n h o u s e

Development

Rights on rich industrialized countries are o n e r o u s indeed. If, however, t h e r e is sufficient reason to believe that a mere

5 0 percent

global emissions reduction is i n a d e q u a t e for r e m a i n i n g w i t h i n t h e 2°C w a r m i n g limit, t h e n t h e r e d u c t i o n s required by t h e Equal Shares principle to remain w i t h i n t h a t limit will be unlikely to satisfy t h e right to d e v e l o p m e n t . A n o t h e r alternative would be an i n t e r n a t i o n a l


a g r e e m e n t relaxing 2°C threshold in order t o allow rich industrialized c o u n t r i e s t o e m i t m o r e C O 2 . For e x a m p l e t h e IPCC p r o j e c t s t h a t global warming m i g h t be kept under 3°C by global e m i s s i o n s in t h e range o f 3 0 percent less to 5 percent m o r e than 2 0 0 0 levels. It m i g h t be t h o u g h t that an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t could simply be purchased at t h e price of increasing t h e w a r m i n g limit. But a c l i m a t e treaty based on a higher limit, say 3°C, is o n e t h a t is m o r e permissive o f t h e risks caused by warming, these include t h e suffering and deaths o f hundreds o f m i l l i o n s of people caused by i n u n d a t i o n due t o river flooding and sea-level rise, h u n g e r and f a m i n e due t o droughts, a n d increased i n c i d e n c e o f topical disease. Events like these befalling underdeveloped and developing c o u n t r i e s would c o n s t i t u t e serious h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t set-backs. So, increasing t h e w a r m i n g limit to bring rich industrialized c o u n t r i e s i n t o an a g r e e m e n t , poses significant risks t o d e v e l o p m e n t . If a 5 0 percent global reduction is insufficient, there may be n o way for an a g r e e m e n t t o satisfy t h e right t o d e v e l o p m e n t w i t h o u t m a k i n g very heavy d e m a n d s o n rich industrialized states.

Currently the international c o m m u n i t y is discussing the regulatory framework to replace the Kyoto Protocol after 2 0 1 2 . A 2 0 0 7 confere n c e of the parties t o the UNFCCC in Bali agreed u p o n a Road Map, w h i c h c o n t a i n s an Action Plan t h a t establishes t h e Ad Hoc Working G r o u p on Long-term C o o p e r a t i v e A c t i o n . 6 2 T h e Ad Hoc Working G r o u p is tasked w i t h d e v e l o p i n g 'A shared vision for long-term cooperative a c t i o n , i n c l u d i n g a long-term global goal for emissions r e d u c t i o n s . . . ' as well as a plan o f action t h a t includes b o t h 'Measurable, reportable, a n d verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation c o m m i t m e n t s o f a c t i o n , including quantified emission

limitation

and reduction objectives, by all developed c o u n t r y P a r t i e s . . . ' and 'Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing c o u n t r y Parties in t h e c o n t e x t o f sustainable d e v e l o p m e n t . ' 6 3 T h e discussion o f the principles in t h e previous section, I trust, m a k e s it clear that a c h i e v i n g a g r e e m e n t on a plan t h a t includes specific r e d u c t i o n s f r o m specific c o u n t r i e s will be very difficult. T h e USA has refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol; a n d it has per capita emissions o f over 2 0 M t C O 2 . M e a n w h i l e C h i n a ' s e c o n o m y is growing very


fast, and it is a c h i e v i n g remarkable d e v e l o p m e n t gains. A l t h o u g h currently C h i n a ' s per capita e m i s s i o n s are o n l y a b o u t 2 5 percent o f t h e USA, t h e y are m o r e t h a n what would be permitted by Equal Shares. T h e possible proposals that UNFCCC's Ad Hoc Working G r o u p could m a k e seem to fall i n t o o n e of t h r e e categories: (A) An emissions reduction regime that is sufficiently d e m a n d i n g of global reductions to be reasonably likely to satisfy t h e n o r m of avoiding dangerous c l i m a t e c h a n g e , but that is insufficiently permissive o f emissions in underdeveloped and develop c o u n t r i e s t o be able t o satisfy t h e right to d e v e l o p m e n t ; (B) an emissions reduction regime that is sufficiently d e m a n d i n g o f global reductions to be reasonably likely t o satisfy t h e n o r m o f avoiding dangerous c l i m a t e c h a n g e , and t h a t is sufficiently permissive o f e m i s s i o n s in underdeveloped a n d develop c o u n t r i e s t o satisfy t h e right t o d e v e l o p m e n t a n d (C) an e m i s s i o n s reduction regime t h a t is sufficiently permissive o f emissions in underdeveloped and develop c o u n t r i e s t o satisfy t h e right t o d e v e l o p m e n t , but t h a t insufficiently d e m a n d i n g o f global reductions to be reasonably likely to satisfy t h e n o r m o f avoiding dangerous c l i m a t e c h a n g e . T w o aspects o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s of the richest c o u n t r i e s lend t h e m strategic bargaining advantages that could m a k e an a g r e e m e n t o n a proposal o f type (A) seem m o s t likely. T h e s e are their geographic location a n d their greater capacity to fund adaptation. T h e USA and EU will n o t suffer m a n y of the worst effects of droughts and even sea-level rise. Moreover, t h e wealthiest c o u n t r i e s have m u c h greater m e a n s t o develop infrastructural plans for a d a p t i n g t o clim a t e c h a n g e . Wealthy c o u n t r i e s m i g h t t h e n decide t h a t it is in their interest to forego a strong i n t e r n a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t and spend o n adaptation instead, or at least t o pose t h e credible t h r e a t of d o i n g so. Such threats could make weaker and poorer c o u n t r i e s m o r e willing to accept a proposal of type (A). At the 2 0 0 7 U N F C C C talks in Bali it is n o t so surprising t h a t t h e USA sought o n c e again t o avoid language a b o u t b i n d i n g limits. Although as a party t o t h e U N F C C C , t h e USA has affirmed ' t h e legitimate priority needs of developing c o u n t r i e s for the a c h i e v e m e n t of sustained e c o n o m i c growth and t h e eradication of poverty,' 6 4 there is little in t h e recent history o f its approach t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l c l i m a t e c h a n g e n e g o t i a t i o n s to suggest t h a t it would let such an affirmation stand in the way of its pursuit o f e x a c t i n g c o n c e s s i o n s from others.


In c o n t r a s t t o t h e sober analysis o f t h e

previous

paragraph,

s o m e see reason t o h o p e . As long as t h e c o u n t r i e s o f developed world see t h e p o i n t o f reaching an effective mitigation a g r e e m e n t , t h e y will be eager t o draw in the c o u n t r i e s o f t h e developing world, especially those with large a n d quickly growing e c o n o m i e s p r o d u c i n g a great deal o f C O 2 . T h i s gives at least s o m e developing countries m o r e barg a i n i n g power t h a n t h e y would have in other kinds o f n e g o t i a t i o n s in w h i c h their participation is less needed. T h e A n n e x - 1 countries, for e x a m p l e , need t h e participation o f C h i n a for there t o be any m e a n ingful path toward a global emissions reduction. S o m e observers o f t h e situation take this to be a reason for o p t i m i s m that an a g r e e m e n t on a proposal of type (B) could be achieved. 6 5 According t o t h e optimists, c l i m a t e c h a n g e f u n d a m e n t a l l y re-alters global power relations, m a k i n g realistic t h e possibility of m o r e just global institutions. T h e hopeful c o n c l u s i o n is n o t , however, t h e o n l y o n e t h a t could be drawn from t h e analysis above. A reason for t e m p e r i n g the optim i s m derives f r o m a structural feature o f t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , w h i c h by metaphysical necessity renders m e m b e r s o f distant future g e n e r a t i o n s unable to v e t o proposals of type (C). But representatives o f states that would be m a d e to carry significant burdens are at t h e table to v e t o proposals of type (A) and (B). 6 6 Given the heavy global burden o f t h e proposals m o s t likely t o avert dangerous c l i m a t e , t h e r e m i g h t be significant pressure on t h e Ad Hoc Working G r o u p to produce a proposal of type (C). Indeed the t h r e a t s t o b o t h global a n d intergenerational justice t h a t an a g r e e m e n t o f type (C) pose could well be t h e o n e s t h a t we should m o s t guard against. If t h e negotiators take their responsibility to be t h e pursuit t h e interests o f their p o p u l a t i o n s w i t h i n a fairly limited t i m e horizon, t h e r e may be considerable pressure toward an agreem e n t o f type (C). It is n o t , however, a foregone c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h i s is h o w they will c o n c e i v e their m a n d a t e . A lively sense o f justice in t h e m i n d s o f citizens in countries in w h i c h the popular will can be given voice could produce sufficient pressure on t h e negotiators for t h e m t o c h a n g e their understanding o f their role to include serving the interests of future g e n e r a t i o n s .

7


In Chapter 3, I offered a pro tanto

argument to t h e c o n c l u s i o n that

the i n t u i t i o n s of t h e global e c o n o m i c association t h a t are permissive o f deep inequalities are u n j u s t . T h e global e c o n o m i c association is a c o m m o n good association w h o s e rules fail t o treat persons as equals, and this failure is not justified by a n y o f t h e following four reasons: (1) S o m e persons deserve t o h a v e their interests treated less well because o f s o m e t h i n g t h e y have d o n e t o h a r m t h e interests o f o t h ers; (2) s o m e persons voluntarily c o n s e n t t o lesser realization o f their interests or to taking certain risks o f this o u t c o m e ; (3) differences in morally relevant needs require more resources to those persons w h o in fact have more or (4) offering incentives t h a t produce differential o u t c o m e s benefit e v e r y o n e in c o m p a r i s o n t o their c o n d i t i o n under equality. T h e failure c a n n o t t h e n be reasonably accepted b y t h o s e w h o are treated u n e q u a l l y under its rules. In order for t h e inequalities o f t h e global e c o n o m i c association to be just, respect for h u m a n dignity requires t h a t t h e y be reasonably accepted because t h e global e c o n o m i c association is a c o m m o n g o o d association, w h i c h is relatively strong, largely n o n - v o l u n t a r y , c o n s t i t u t i v e of a significant part o f t h e background rules for t h e various relationships of persons' public lives and governed by n o r m s t h a t can be subject t o h u m a n c o n t r o l . It is appropriate to hold t h e association to t h e prima

facie standard o f

equality under its rules. And, in light o f t h e kind of c o m m o n good association t h a t it is, t h e r e q u i r e m e n t o f equal t r e a t m e n t is properly understood as a r e q u i r e m e n t o f reciprocity.

132

Global Distributive Institutions 133

In this chapter, I discuss s o m e possible i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s t o t h e existing global institutional order t h a t m i g h t be appropriate in light o f t h e injustice of global inequality. Identifying institutions t h a t reduce global inequality, w i t h o u t u n r e a s o n a b l e moral costs, would be significant because it would c o m p l e t e t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t existing inequalities are u n j u s t a n d would provide guidance in eradicating t h e injustice. O n e m i g h t naturally t h i n k that t h e i n j u s t i c e justifies new global institutions t h a t reduce t h e inequalities. Not e v e r y o n e agrees however. S o m e of t h e disagreement is due t o a belief t h a t egalitarian distributive institutions would be illegitimate; I argue against that belief in S e c t i o n II. And s o m e of the disagreement derives from an ideal of a n o t h e r kind o f order, a deglobalized o n e in w h i c h states or groups of states exist in relative isolation from t h e global e c o n o m i c order. I criticize t h a t ideal in Section III. Section IV discusses responsibility, specifically h o w t o assign responsibility for global distributive injustices for t h e purpose of remedying t h e injustices t h r o u g h new institutions. Finally, in Section V, I discuss the merits o f t h r e e proposals that h a v e been m a d e for new distributive institutions t h a t would reduce global inequality; all of these proposals are superior to the inequality of the global status q u o . Before proceeding to the substantive a r g u m e n t s o f t h e chapter, however, I would like to m a k e a terminological p o i n t that has moral i m p o r t a n c e . T h r o u g h o u t this chapter, I deliberately use terms such as

distributive institutions and institutions of egalitarian distribution rather than redistributive institutions or institutions of egalitarian redistribution. T h i s m i g h t strike s o m e as inappropriate since t h e institutional proposals t h a t I discuss effect redistributions o f current i n c o m e s in order a c h i e v e greater equality. I have n o quarrel with using tribution

redis-

a n d its c o g n a t e s to describe that process. But t o speak o f

institutions of egalitarian redistribution can mislead since it suggests that t h e existing distribution is the moral baseline against w h i c h redistributions must be justified, as, for e x a m p l e , is suggested by t h e q u e s t i o n ' w h e n is redistribution justified?' If t h e arguments o f t h e earlier chapters of this b o o k are c o n v i n c i n g , this is a misleading q u e s t i o n t o ask with respect to t h e current global distribution since t h e r e is n o reason t o suppose t h a t unless redistributions are justified the current distribution is just. Still, t h e q u e s t i o n is o f t e n put that way and rhetorically it wrongly suggests t h a t there is s o m e kind of


presumption against redistribution t h a t would reduce inequality. O n t h e contrary, I have argued t h a t t h e justificatory p r e s u m p t i o n favors egalitarianism.

T h e injustice of absolute poverty is widely, a l t h o u g h u n f o r t u n a t e l y n o t universally c o n d e m n e d . Eradicating it seems particularly urgent t o most morally serious persons. Few people d o u b t t h a t there is s o m e reform to our global i n s t i t u t i o n s and or c h a n g e o f policy that would be appropriate w h e n t h e y are c o n f r o n t e d w i t h stark facts of depriv a t i o n , pre-mature death and illiteracy t h a t characterize so m u c h o f the world. In contrast, T h e r e is m u c h less a g r e e m e n t that deep global inequalities are unjust, and even less a g r e e m e n t about w h y and what sort of reductions to t h e m would be morally appropriate. O n e m i g h t t h e n t h i n k t h a t even t h o u g h global inequality is unjust, remedying this injustice o u g h t n o t t o be t h e goal o f a proposal for global distributive i n s t i t u t i o n s as long as there is such disagreement. S i m o n C a n e y makes t h e following a r g u m e n t t o t h a t effect: [A]bove a certain basic m i n i m u m , there is p r o f o u n d disagreement a b o u t global distributive justice a m o n g reasonable and reflective persons. T h i s can be seen by considering t h e array of different ideals t h a t are defended

S o m e m a i n t a i n t h a t there should be a

global difference principle. Others, t h o u g h , t h i n k t h a t laissez faire principles should be affirmed by institutions such as t h e W T O . Closely related to this view is that o f Friedrich Hayek, w h o argued for t h e need for a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l legal authority t o e n f o r c e market principles o f justice. S o m e wish t h e W T O t o e n f o r c e labor standards and e n v i r o n m e n t a l controls, b u t o t h e r s find this o b j e c tionable. T h i s diversity o f views a m o n g reasonable persons poses two p r o b l e m s for a w h o l l y i n s t r u m e n t a l view. First, it requires us to be able t o decide which o f these c o m p e t i n g reasonable views really is the best. O n e needs s o m e m e c h a n i s m for filtering out plausible but w r o n g views and d e t e r m i n i n g w h i c h is best. S e c o n d , a w h o l l y instrumental view can be accused o f failing t o s h o w respect to o t h e r reasonable persons. T h e t h o u g h t is t h a t simply coercively i m p o s i n g o n e view (in preference to o t h e r reasonable views) fails to respect t h o s e w h o reasonably disagree. 1


C a n e y refers to t h e position t h a t institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s should be designed simply t o satisfy principles o f justice as the wholly mental

view.

instru-

His a r g u m e n t against institutionalizing t h e difference

principle (or a n y robustly egalitarian principle o f distributive justice) serves as an i n s t a n c e of his broader a r g u m e n t against t h e w h o l l y i n s t r u m e n t a l view. T h e a r g u m e n t in its m o s t general f o r m seems to be t h a t merely relying on the claim that distributive justice requires the difference principle (or a n y robustly egalitarian principle) c a n n o t justify t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f global institutions t h a t realize it; therefore t h e wholly i n s t r u m e n t a l view is incorrect. Caney, however, allows t h a t under t h e right c o n d i t i o n s it m i g h t be appropriate to be guided by t h e difference principle (or a n y robustly egalitarian principle) w h e n c o n s t r u c t i n g global institutions: |I|nternational institutions should provide a c o n t e x t in which c o m p e t i n g views are adjudicated b e t w e e n , and it m a y (or m a y n o t ) be t h e case t h a t egalitarian liberal o n e s will be adopted. So whereas t h e Rawlsian [Law of Peoples]

model puts an absolute ban

on international institutions furthering egalitarian liberal ideals, the model sketched here does n o t . It allows this possibility if it c o m e s a b o u t in a fair and legitimate way. 2 Caney's view o f w h e n it is appropriate to be guided by egalitarian principles in c o n s t r u c t i n g global i n s t i t u t i o n s t h e n seems to be t h a t it is appropriate o n l y if t h e decision t o construct the institutions according t o t h e principle was t h e product of an appropriately fair and legitimate process. An egalitarian principle m a y t h e n guide institution c o n s t r u c t i o n , but apparently it must m e e t a h i g h e r threshold t h a n o t h e r principles o f justice since C a n e y distinguishes t h e requirem e n t s for letting egalitarian principles guide institution c o n s t r u c t i o n from t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of institution c o n s t r u c t i o n guided b y principles that require either that persons' f u n d a m e n t a l interests are protected or t h a t fair procedures for deciding b e t w e e n o t h e r institutional proposals are followed. 3 An instrumentalist view is appropriate for t h e latter, but not t h e former. There are at least t w o possible versions of Caney's view. O n e is t h a t a r e q u i r e m e n t o f legitimacy t r u m p s justice for egalitarian principles, but not for principles of protecting persons' f u n d a m e n t a l interests and ensuring fair procedures. T h e o t h e r is t h a t legitimacy m a y play a


t r u m p i n g role in all t h r e e cases but t h a t t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s o f legitimacy are m o r e d e m a n d i n g in t h e case o f egalitarian principles. I find it difficult to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h of these is Caney's view. He takes his view t o be mixed, c o m b i n i n g a c o m m i t m e n t t o i n s t r u m e n talism (by requiring i n s t i t u t i o n s to protect f u n d a m e n t a l interests) with c o m m i t m e n t t o ensure d e m o c r a t i c proceduralism. 4 Perhaps, h e would advocate establishing institutions that protect basic interests even if they are illegitimate, for e x a m p l e even if d o i n g so requires considerable c o e r c i o n because of recalcitrant states and political disa g r e e m e n t . He is after all aware t h a t disagreement exists about w h a t constitutes basic interests, but t h i n k s that n o reasonable position can repudiate such interests. 5 Is t h e view t h a t because t h e disagreement is u n r e a s o n a b l e c o m p l i a n c e can be forced? Alternatively, h e m i g h t hold t h a t such imposition o f basic interest protecting institutions in t h e face disagreement, albeit unreasonable, would be illegitimate. But t h e n w h a t more d e m a n d i n g requirement of legitimacy must t h e difference principle satisfy? In t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e o f disagreement a b o u t global institution building, rather t h a n m a i n t e n a n c e , I a m doubtful that l i m i t i n g the reas o n a b l e disagreement to o n l y s o m e kinds of institutions will provide m u c h practical help in resolving t h e disagreement. First, it is n o t obvious that differences of o p i n i o n regarding w h e t h e r the

WTO

s h o u l d e n f o r c e labor standards (Caney's e x a m p l e of a reasonable disa g r e e m e n t ) a n d regarding w h a t constitutes basic interests differ in moral kind. T h i s distinction seems to rest on t h e d u b i o u s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t p r o h i b i t i o n s against child labor do n o t protect basic interests. In any case, C a n e y does not provide an a r g u m e n t t h a t such disagreements differ in moral kind. S e c o n d , it is n o t o b v i o u s t h e differences o f o p i n i o n regarding w h e t h e r t h e r e should be a global difference principle (Caney's e x a m p l e o f a reasonable disagreement) and w h i c h i n s t i t u t i o n s would support fair proceduralism (which C a n e y believes should guide i n t e r n a t i o n a l institution c o n s t r u c t i o n ) differ in moral kind. Third, as a matter o f a d v a n c i n g justice in a world marked b y egregious injustice, t h e kind o f intellectual and political

projects

needed w i t h respect t o all of these controversies seems a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same, n a m e l y moral-political debate a b o u t t h e

requirements

o f justice, w h i c h eventually issues in broad international

support

a m o n g political leaders, policy makers, activists and citizens. T h e


i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of any proposals for new global institutions will require a c o m b i n a t i o n of political pressure from states, m o v e m e n t activists a n d citizens and t h e c o n f e r r i n g o f legitimacy by m e a n s o f whatever imperfect institutions exist prior to the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f the n e w ones. T h i s , however, is n o reason to suppose that egalitarian institutions will require different standards o f legitimacy t h a n o t h e r institutions. 6

S o m e critics of t h e current form a n d pattern of globalization argue t h a t t h e appropriate response is n o t reforms to t h e global order t h a t include reducing inequalities, but rather a different kind o f international order in which states are largely a u t o n o m o u s or perhaps integrated s o m e w h a t according to ideological o r i e n t a t i o n . T h e r e are several versions of this anti-globalization view. In this section, I e x a m i n e and reject t w o influential versions. T h e first version advises underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s t o de-link from i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and i n v e s t m e n t relations (to whatever degree possible) as a m e a n s of erecting e c o n o m i e s based u p o n t h e socialization o f p r o d u c t i o n . Samir A m i n , t h e most p r o m i n e n t intellectual p r o p o n e n t of de-linking r e c o m m e n d s , t h e political o p t i o n o f a u t o c e n t r i c national d e v e l o p m e n t starting from abolition o f the d o m i n a n t forms of private o w n e r s h i p o f land and factories, a n d taking agriculture as its base, that is, n o t envisaging a n y forced appropriation from t h e peasants to 'hasten industrialization' a n d opting for the m o s t egalitarian possible income distribution....7 A crucial problem for t h e prescription, however, is that t h e feasibility of socialism, or at least a desirable form of it, i n underdeveloped c o u n t r i e s is doubtful. Karl Marx offers reason t o be pessimistic about t h e prospects for socialism in t h e a b s e n c e o f well-developed capitalist relations; and his is obviously n o t a pessimism a b o u t socialism per se. M a r x claims t h a t in order for a desirable form of socialism t o be successful, t h e forces o f p r o d u c t i o n , especially t h e t e c h n o l o g y of p r o d u c t i o n , must be h i g h l y advanced and this requires capitalist relations of p r o d u c t i o n . '[T]his


d e v e l o p m e n t o f productive f o r c e s . . . is an absolutely necessary practical premise b e c a u s e w i t h o u t it want is merely m a d e general, a n d with destitution t h e struggle for necessities and all t h e old filthy business would necessarily be r e p r o d u c e d . . . . ' 8 G.A. C o h e n offers a defense o f Marx's pessimism in the form o f an argument t h a t class oppression of workers by t h e owners o f capital is required for successful e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . If this is t h e case, and if we c o n c e i v e o f a socialist society as o n e in w h i c h a ruling class does n o t oppress producers, t h e n there is n o feasible socialist path to e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . I re-construct C o h e n ' s a r g u m e n t as follows: 9 1. If socialism is t o be desirable, t h e n a massive social surplus, w h i c h c a n uplift everyone, n o t merely (as in societies marked by class oppression) t h e ruling class, is a p r e c o n d i t i o n . 2. Working c o n d i t i o n s like t h o s e t h a t prevail in large-scale industry are necessary to attain a massive social surplus. 3. Workers will accept such c o n d i t i o n s o n l y if t h e y are m e m b e r s o f an oppressed class, in particular

proletarians.

4. Therefore, capitalist class oppression is necessary to attain t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n of socialism. T h e first premise—a r e s t a t e m e n t o f the M a r x q u o t a t i o n a b o v e — c a n have b o t h moral a n d empirical interpretations d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e sense o f 'desirable.' As a moral proposition it suggests t h a t a society t h a t allows s o m e people significant relief from toil and access t o leisure and culture (as in capitalism) is better t h a n o n e t h a t offers this t o n o o n e ('want m a d e general'). Empirically construed, the first premise suggests t h a t if a society t h a t allows s o m e people signific a n t relief f r o m toil is a viable o p t i o n , t h e n a society t h a t allows n o o n e such relief will generate defections, rendering socialism as 'want m a d e general' unstable. T h e second premise is n o t m e r e l y an i n v o c a t i o n of e c o n o m i e s of scale associated with large-scale p r o d u c t i o n , but also t h e d y n a m i c productive capacity associated w i t h a division o f labor (including a division between m a n a g e m e n t a n d labor) a n d assembly-line prod u c t i o n . T h e proper contrast is between production arranged so t h a t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f efficient o u t p u t are a m o n g t h e m o s t d o m i n a n t consideration and production arranged so that c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of c r a f t s m a n s h i p or e n j o y m e n t are d o m i n a n t . The claim is that o n l y


t h e first sort o f a r r a n g e m e n t o f production generalized t h r o u g h o u t society yields sufficient surplus t o m a k e possible an a r r a n g e m e n t o f society t h a t eventually allows e v e r y o n e significant relief from toil. T h e third premise requires a bit m o r e a t t e n t i o n , a n d is, I believe, t h e most controversial. T h e force of the third premise is that the c o n d i t i o n s of work in m o d e r n large-scale industrial production are sufficiently grueling, m o n o t o n o u s and unsatisfying that generally people would n o t accept t h e m were it n o t for the fact that they had n o reasonable alternative. But a lack of a reasonable alternative does n o t suffice for class oppression. 1 0 By class

oppression

Cohen means

'an a n t a g o n i s t i c relationship in w h i c h producers are subordinated to non-producers.' 1 1 C o h e n m a i n t a i n s t h a t m e m b e r s of class X are subordinate t o m e m b e r s of class Y if a n d o n l y if 1. m e m b e r s o f class X produce for m e m b e r s o f class Y, w h o control the p r o d u c t i o n and do n o t produce for m e m b e r s of class X 2. m e m b e r s o f class X are subject t o t h e authority o f m e m b e r s o f class Y in t h e production process, but n o t vice

versa;

3. insofar as their i n c o m e is d e p e n d e n t on their e m p l o y m e n t , m e m bers of class X tend to be poorer t h a n m e m b e r s o f class Y. 12 Proletarians h a v e n o reasonable alternative to s u b o r d i n a t i o n

to

owners o f capital in capitalist society because a l t h o u g h proletarians own their labor power they do n o t o w n t h e m e a n s of p r o d u c t i o n , and so t h e y must sell their labor power in order to obtain t h e m e a n s o f life. 1 3 For reasons t h a t I shall n o t discuss here, C o h e n t h i n k s t h a t large-scale industrial production would n o t be possible with a n o t h e r form of class oppression, such as slavery. 1 4 T h e plausibility of t h e third premise depends upon t h e r e b e i n g n o m e a n s o t h e r t h a n class oppression t o bring workers t o accept t h e c o n ditions o f m o d e r n industrial p r o d u c t i o n . But consider this o b j e c t i o n . T h e r e is a c o n c e p t i o n of socialism, such as that advocated by David Schweickart, t h a t includes public c o n t r o l o f i n v e s t m e n t s , a market in goods and services and workplace democracy, w h i c h is as at least as capable of producing e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t as is capitalism. 1 5 Schweickart c o n t e n d s t h a t b o t h t h e market distributive m e c h a n i s m and workplace d e m o c r a c y are efficiency g e n e r a t i n g . 1 6 Moreover, public c o n t r o l over i n v e s t m e n t would lead to a m o r e egalitarian and ecologically sensitive pattern of i n v e s t m e n t . 1 7 If t h e r e is reason to


believe t h a t Schweickart's m o d e l presents an alternative to capitalist d e v e l o p m e n t , t h e n t h e r e is reason t o d o u b t C o h e n ' s third premise. Now,

it

is

noteworthy

that

the

conditions

of

workers

in

Schweickart's model would seem t o satisfy C o h e n ' s three c o n d i tions o f s u b o r d i n a t i o n , for even t h o u g h m a n a g e m e n t is elected, o n c e elected m a n a g e r s exercise c o n t r o l and a u t h o r i t y over p r o d u c t i o n , and a market for managerial labor would probably produce salaries that exceed those of workers. If t h e first t w o premises of t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of C o h e n ' s a r g u m e n t are plausible, and if workers in Schweickart's model satisfy C o h e n ' s necessary a n d jointly sufficient c o n d i t i o n s for class s u b o r d i n a t i o n , ironically this m i g h t be good n e w s for the cause of socialism. For such subordination allows for the possibility of relat i o n s of production t h a t are c o n d u c i v e t o d e v e l o p m e n t , but n o t based upon capitalist property relations. T h e g o o d news o f t h e possibility socialist d e v e l o p m e n t , Marx's views t o t h e c o n t r a r y n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , is n o t however, g o o d news for t h e proposal o f de-linking. For even if it is t h e case t h a t Schweickart's model provides good reasons t o d o u b t t h e third premise o f t h e reconstruction o f C o h e n ' s a r g u m e n t , it is highly doubtful that t h e model establishes a rival to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t capacity o f capitalist m o d e s o f production unless it participates in a network of wide i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade. As I discussed in Chapter 5, most impressive recent success stories o f social and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t have relied o n the establ i s h m e n t of large export industries, supported by appropriate state policy. 1 8 T h e e v i d e n c e is t h a t production for export, and n o t delinking, is a necessary m e a n s for social and e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . So, either socialism is n o t possible in the developing world (as Marx and C o h e n argue) a n d thus t h e r e is n o social basis for t h e strategy o f de-linking, or it is possible (as Schweickart c o n t e n d s ) but requires e x t e n s i v e i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade and t h u s de-linking as d e v e l o p m e n t strategy is implausible. The second version

o f anti-globalization,

which

recently

has

b e e n m o r e popular t h a n de-linking, involves a d v o c a t i n g for deglobalization, in o t h e r words for a world o f relatively self-sufficient states in w h i c h p r o d u c t i o n is geared toward t h e s u s t e n a n c e o f populations and adapted to the ecological c o n s t r a i n t s of local geography. T h e strategy o f de-globalization calls for e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n primarily by and for the citizens of the state in w h i c h

it occurs.

According to Walden Bello, de-globalization centrally includes a


c o m m i t m e n t to ' e n c o u r a g i n g p r o d u c t i o n o f goods t o take place at t h e c o m m u n i t y a n d n a t i o n a l level if it can be d o n e at a reasonable c o s t in order to preserve c o m m u n i t y . ' 1 9 J o h n C a v a n a u g h and Jerry M a n d e r r e c o m m e n d that, 'All systems should e m p h a s i z e local production and c o n s u m p t i o n rather t h a n be deliberately designed to serve long-distance trade.' 2 0 A philosophical defense o f this vision is offered by O m a r Dahbour, w h o also takes there to be an ecological r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t the model should satisfy: ' [ A ] u t o n o m o u s c o m m u n i t i e s would be o n e s t h a t have f o u n d t h e m e a n s for producing t h e basic social goods necessary for survival and

flourishing

w i t h i n t h e specific local e n v i r o n m e n t s . ' 2 1

D a h b o u r understands t h e n o t i o n o f c o m m u n a l self-reliance t h a t is e m b o d i e d in this vision t o stand in t h e tradition o f t h e political c o m m u n i t i e s advocated by J e a n - J a q u e s Rosseau a n d G.W.F. Hegel. 2 2 In light of t h e d r a m a t i c reduction in the kinds o f c o n s u m e r goods t h a t would be available if t h e w h o l e e c o n o m y were to be limited to t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f t h e local geography, t h e vision also seems t o stand in t h e tradition o f t h e political c o m m u n i t y t h a t Socrates refers t o as the true city in b o o k 2 o f t h e Republic.

To Socrates's description of that

city, w h i c h forgoes delicacies, Plato has G l a u c o n reply, 'You m a k e your people feast, it seems, w i t h o u t c o o k e d dishes or seasonings.' 2 5 Now it is n o t so clear t h a t duties of social j u s t i c e — a n d thus duties to limit inequalities—would exist at all a m o n g n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s in this de-globalized world since associational ties across borders would be quite weak. Indeed, they would be i n t e n t i o n a l l y so, a c c o r d i n g t o Dahbour. Realizing t h e de-globalized goal would require

'the

s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f borders, less capital and labor mobility, restrictions on trade, a w e a k e n i n g of global c o m m u n i c a t i o n networks, r e d u c t i o n s in travel and tourism and so f o r t h . ' 2 4 But even if duties o f social justice a m o n g n o n - c o m p a t r i o t s would n o t e x t e n d across borders in a deglobalized world, t h e r e are t h r e e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f justice t h a t argue against m o v i n g from a globalized world to a de-globalized o n e . T h e first is a c o n c e r n a b o u t liberty in, a n d t h e stability of, t h e m o d e l . T h e s e c o n d is about its capacity for g e n e r a t i n g e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t . And the third c o n c e r n s its c a p a c i t y for r e m e d y i n g global poverty. First, t h e r e are good reasons t o d o u b t t h a t such

communities

could tolerate b o t h liberty and stability. Presumably standards o f living of citizens in different societies will vary greatly d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e ecologically usable resource bases o f societies a n d u p o n


their degree of t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t . In t h e a b s e n c e o f trade and foreign i n v e s t m e n t there will be n o t e n d e n c y for t e c h n o l o g i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t t o equalize. D a h b o u r is aware o f this, but t h i n k s t h a t c o m p a r i s o n s between, say, Angola and Switzerland (Dahbour's e x a m ple) are fatuous. 2 5 Moreover, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Dahbour's e m p h a s i s o n self-determination, t h e organizing ideals o f t h e various political c o m m u n i t i e s would no doubt be m u l t i t u d i n o u s . If a free press is to be tolerated, t h e n knowledge o f t h e material and moral differences o f societies will exist. T h i s will be t h e basis for s o m e persons preferring o n e way o f life t o another. Societies t h a t recognize e m i g r a t i o n rights would e x p o s e t h e m s e l v e s to t h e risks of creating a kind of market instability, as significant p o r t i o n s o f the citizenry m a y c h o o s e to leave, and o f o p e n i n g t h e door t o the very globalizing t e n d e n c i e s t h a t are t o be avoided. Alternatively, societies m i g h t restrict e m i g r a t i o n , but at t h e risk of creating d o m e s t i c political instability as people agitate for political and e c o n o m i c c h a n g e . A third policy o p t i o n would be t o curtail press and speech freedoms. In any case, t h e r e is good reason t o believe t h a t societies in a highly unequal and pluralistic global order would have to c h o o s e between stability and liberty. S e c o n d , there are good e c o n o m i c reasons to t h i n k t h a t the m o d e l would restrict social e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t and therefore standards o f living. Across the board restrictions on c o m p e t i t i o n from foreign producers, w h e t h e r importers of goods or capital, would shield d o m e s t i c firms from m u c h c o m p e t i t i v e pressure, resulting in a loss of possible efficiency gains, higher prices and less capital available for i n v e s t m e n t . It is implausible t h a t such effects would serve t h e a i m s of d e v e l o p m e n t . J a y M a n d l e develops this criticism well: Localism bars firms from taking advantage o f t h e cost reducing characteristics o f advanced t e c h n o l o g i e s in international c o m m u nications, control, and

transportation....

In favoring relatively

small firms that are c o n f i n e d to local markets, the advocates of localization are c h o o s i n g t o c o n f i n e p r o d u c t i o n t o lower a m o u n t s of a smaller range o f goods at higher prices t h a n would be the case in a globally integrated e c o n o m y . . . . Because localization involves abandoning an important mechanism of contemporary economic d e v e l o p m e n t , there c a n be little d o u b t that it puts downward pressure on t h e well-being o f the p o o r in w e a l t h y n a t i o n s and in the underdeveloped world. 2 6


Finally,

the

model

seems

far

too

tolerant

of

global

De-globalizers are o f t e n skeptical o f centralized global

poverty. economic-

institutions o f any kind. Bello advocates ' d e c o n c e n t r a t i o n and decentralization o f institutional power and t h e creation o f a pluralistic syst e m of institutions and organizations i n t e r a c t i n g with o n e a n o t h e r , guided by broad and flexible a g r e e m e n t s and

understandings.' 2 7

But given that t h e character o f global poverty is t h a t deprivation is c o n c e n t r a t e d in the per capita poor states and n o t evenly distributed across states, decentralization will m a k e it nearly impossible t o address t h e problem t h r o u g h wealth transfers from t h e rich t o t h e poor. In this section, I have argued that t h e politics of r e j e c t i n g globalizat i o n in favor of w i t h d r a w i n g i n t o a world c o m p r i s i n g o n l y regional or state i n s t i t u t i o n s is to be rejected on moral grounds. If o n e accepts t h e a r g u m e n t s against global inequality, t h e n n e i t h e r de-linking nor de-globalization offer appropriate institutional alternatives.

T h e r e are various morally legitimate purposes for w h i c h a c o n c e p tion of responsibility m a y be put t o use, and a m o n g t h e s e purposes there are c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s . T h e purposes for w h i c h responsibility is assessed include, but are not limited to, t h e following: (1) To d e t e r m i n e w h o should ensure t h a t s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n s or does n o t h a p p e n ; (2) to d e t e r m i n e w h o s e action or i n a c t i o n was especially relevant in bringing a b o u t s o m e t h i n g t h a t has h a p p e n e d but should n o t have or t h a t has n o t h a p p e n e d but should have; (3) t o d e t e r m i n e w h o s h o u l d act t o bring a b o u t a c h a n g e of c i r c u m s t a n c e or create an institution or t o prevent a c h a n g e or t h e creation o f an institution and (4) to d e t e r m i n e w h o should bear t h e costs or n o t of an action or a new institution. Part of w h a t m a k e s discussions of responsibility c o n f u s i n g is that people are o f t e n speaking at cross purposes. For e x a m p l e ,

when

T h o m a s Pogge discusses responsibility for absolute poverty h e is often a d v a n c i n g purpose (2). For e x a m p l e , consider this fairly typical invo-

cation of responsibility from his World Poverty and Human Rights: 'At least t h e m o r e privileged and influential citizens o f t h e m o r e powerful and a p p r o x i m a t e l y d e m o c r a t i c countries bear t h e n a collective responsibility for their g o v e r n m e n t s ' role in designing and i m p o s i n g


t h e global order a n d for their g o v e r n m e n t s ' failure to reform it toward greater h u m a n rights fulfillment.' 2 8 With purpose (2) in m i n d it is n o t surprising t h a t Pogge's language s o m e t i m e s involves t h e use o f terms referring to i n n o c e n c e and guilt. For e x a m p l e , h e criticizes an e x a m ple t h a t Peter Singer uses o f a professor h a p p e n i n g to c o m e upon a child d r o w n i n g in a p o n d because it 'reinforces t h e c o m m o n moral j u d g m e n t t h a t t h e citizens and g o v e r n m e n t s o f t h e affluent socie t i e s . . . are as i n n o c e n t in regard to the persistence o f severe abroad as t h e professor is in regard t o t h e child's p r e d i c a m e n t . ' 2 9 S u c h terms would be entirely inappropriate in Iris Marion Young's assessment o f responsibility for sweat shops. [M]any of t h o s e w h o are properly t h o u g h t to be v i c t i m s of h a r m or i n j u s t i c e m a y nevertheless share political responsibility in relation to

it....

O n t h e social c o n n e c t i o n m o d e l . . . t h o s e w h o can

properly be argued to be v i c t i m s o f structural i n j u s t i c e can also be said t o share responsibility with o t h e r s w h o perpetuate t h e u n j u s t structures, and can be called o n t o engage in a c t i o n s directed at t r a n s f o r m i n g t h o s e structures. 3 0 Clearly, Young's purpose is n o t t o ascribe i n n o c e n c e or guilt, but to m o b i l i z e t h e appropriate persons for c o n c e r t e d a c t i o n . S h e has purpose (3) in m i n d . I do not m e a n to cast d o u b t on either purpose, but t o avoid the c o n f u s i o n t h a t m i g h t otherwise be involved in arguing a b o u t apparently c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s o f responsibility w h e n in fact their c o m p e t i t i o n m i g h t be illusory because t h e purposes for e m p l o y i n g c l a i m s a b o u t responsibility are different. After we distinguish between purposes, t h e r e is still p l e n t y of r o o m for disagreement over c o m p e t i n g c o n c e p t i o n s o f responsibility w i t h i n a single purpose. A m o n g t h e desiderata t h a t global distributive institutions should satisfy there at least two t h a t involve c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of responsibility. T h e work of c o n s t r a i n i n g global inequalities should be lodged with an agency, institution or set o f practices t h a t are reliable and effective. And, these institutions s h o u l d assign t h e costs o f c o n s t r a i n i n g inequalities appropriately. T h e s e are c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f purposes (1) and (4). I call t h e former role responsibility in referring t o t h e latter as remedial

a n d follow David Miller

responsibility.31

T h e m o r e serious

disagreements regarding responsibility and distributive institutions are likely to be with regard to the d e m a n d s o f remedial responsibility


since t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s involve burden a s s i g n m e n t . I shall have m o r e t o say a b o u t this presently, but first a brief discussion of role responsibility is in order. Role responsibilities can apply to persons or institutions. For ease e x p o s i t i o n , I shall use the t e r m agent

to cover both and the neuter

p r o n o u n t o refer t o t h e t e r m . An agent fulfills its role responsibility if it has been c o n v e n t i o n a l l y assigned to carry out certain tasks a n d carries t h e m out in a m a n n e r that is generally t h o u g h t to be satisfactory. Because such responsibilities are c o n v e n t i o n a l , t h e standard o f assessm e n t is ultimately t h e j u d g m e n t of persons. A role can be fulfilled, however, w i t h o u t u n a n i m o u s a g r e e m e n t that t h e agent has carried out its assigned tasks appropriately. Although j u d g m e n t in the court of o p i n i o n is authoritative, t h e jury need n o t be u n a n i m o u s . M u c h o f social life requires such social a g r e e m e n t . Recall J o h n Locke's description o f m o n e y as t h e a g r e e m e n t t h a t 'a little piece o f yellow metal, w h i c h would keep w i t h o u t wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece o f flesh or a w h o l e heap of c o r n . ' 3 2 In application t o t h e assessm e n t o f proposals for distributive institutions, it is appropriate t o ask w h e t h e r t h e institution would be capable of carrying out distributive tasks reasonably effectively and w h e t h e r its activity would c o n d u c e to persons judging t h a t it has carried t h e m out sufficiently. T h e matter o f remedial responsibility is t h e m o r e pressing o n e in t h e present c o n t e x t because t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f institutions t h a t would i m p r o v e u p o n present global distributive inequalities will probably n o t benefit e v e r y o n e in c o m p a r i s o n to t h e present distrib u t i o n ; t h e new distribution is unlikely t o be Pareto superior t o t h e present o n e . 3 3 Insofar as this is t h e case, it is i m p o r t a n t t o ask w h o should pay t h e costs. W h o is (remedially) responsible for t h e m o r e egalitarian distributive order? Unless t h e costs are assigned appropriately, even if the new order m i g h t be an i m p r o v e m e n t over t h e old o n g r o u n d s o f distributive justice, there would n o n e t h e l e s s be reasons for moral criticism o f the new institutional order. In assessing institutional proposals, all o t h e r t h i n g s b e i n g equal, we prefer an institutional order t h a t m a k e s t h e appropriate parties (remedially) responsible for the reduction in inequalities. T h i s gives rise to two questions: W h a t is the appropriate c o n c e p t i o n of remedial responsibility for our purposes? W h a t a b o u t w h e n all o t h e r t h i n g s are n o t equal, w h e n i n e q u a l i t y is better reduced by a proposed remedy t h a t imposes costs (remedially) irresponsibly? I shall try to address b o t h


o f these questions, but I'm m o s t c o n c e r n e d for present purposes with t h e first. Miller sets out six intuitively plausible c o n c e p t i o n s of remedial responsibility, assesses t h e m primarily by c o n s i d e r i n g e x a m p l e s o f injury t h a t would be at h o m e in tort law and finds t h a t there is n o plausible way to rank t h e c o n c e p t i o n s so as t o d e t e r m i n e which is m o s t appropriate to use in particular c i r c u m s t a n c e s . 'We h a v e to rely o n our i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t the relative i m p o r t a n c e of different sources of c o n n e c t i o n . ' 3 4 I ' m n o t c o n v i n c e d t h a t Miller's m e t h o d is suitable t o t h e task. Although tort law-like e x a m p l e s of people b e i n g k n o c k e d i n t o t h e water or of workers dropping apples o n t o n e i g h b o r i n g property can elucidate a variety of c o n c e p t i o n s remedial responsibility appropriate for tort-like cases, t h e y are less i l l u m i n a t i n g in t h e case o f institutional t r a n s f o r m a t i o n in w h i c h we d o n o t a s s u m e t h a t t h e persons involved were necessarily morally entitled t o their prior holdings. Miller focuses on s i m p l e interactional p r o b l e m s in w h i c h t h e a s s i g n m e n t o f costs for remediating an event should be guided by t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t before t h e tort-like event h o l d i n g s were just. T h a t assumption c a n n o t guide us w h e n t h e b a c k g r o u n d institutions, w h i c h establish holdings, are in q u e s t i o n . So, t h e application o f c o n c e p t i o n s o f remedial responsibility useful to tort-like e x a m p l e s will be strained w h e n there is n o prior order o f holdings t h a t serves as a moral base line. If the base line for injustices in background distributive institutions c a n n o t be t h e prior order o f h o l d i n g s , it must be s o m e h y p o t h e t i cal order. Any selection from a m o n g t h e m a n y possible orders m i g h t seem hopelessly arbitrary, but I do n o t believe t h e situation to be hopeless. S i n c e we are trying t o affect a m o r e just order, our guide for remedial responsibility s h o u l d be t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f justice itself. Here t h e terms remedial

responsibility

can mislead. T h e remedies for which

there is remedial responsibility c a n n o t plausibly involve remediating in a p p r o x i m a t i o n to prior holdings, but rather involve taking o n new b u r d e n s in order t o realize justice. In C h a p t e r 3, I argued t h a t as a c o m m o n g o o d association t h e global e c o n o m i c association is appropriately governed by the n o r m a tive ideal of reciprocity. W h e n Rawls defends egalitarian distributive principles in A Theory

of Justice,

h e argues t h a t reciprocity requires

that i n s t i t u t i o n s mitigate the effects of social fortune and ral advantage.

35

natu-

He p o i n t s t o several reasons for w h y it m i g h t be


reasonable t o disallow social fortune and natural t a l e n t from c o n ferring associational advantages. O n e is t h a t persons c a n n o t claim t o deserve t h e good fortune o f b e i n g b o r n i n t o a privileged family or with natural talents. Therefore, institutions that would reward persons merely o n these grounds fail on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f desert. 3 6 But m o s t interesting for purposes o f remedial responsibility a s s i g n m e n t is Rawls's a r g u m e n t t h a t reciprocity requires that social institution should preserve fair terms of mutual benefit a m o n g persons. In this regard Rawls says the following: [I]f we give a n y weight to t h e m o r e fortunate, we are valuing for their own sake t h e gains t o t h o s e already m o r e favored by natural a n d social c o n t i n g e n c i e s . N o o n e had an a n t e c e d e n t claim to be benefited in this way

T h u s the m o r e advantaged, w h e n

they view the matter from a general perspective, recognize t h a t t h e well-being o f each depends on a s c h e m e o f social c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h o u t w h i c h n o o n e could have a satisfactory l i f e . . , 3 7 Each person is d e p e n d e n t u p o n a s c h e m e of social c o o p e r a t i o n to make use o f her good social fortune and natural talents. Such g o o d fortune is itself undeserved, and therefore c a n n o t support a claim to a moral e n t i t l e m e n t t o particular share o f t h e fruits o f social coopera t i o n . It would t h e n be reasonable for o n e to be willing t o forego the full market return t h a t she m i g h t be able to receive from the exercise of her talents in order t h a t greater returns m a y go to t h e less fortunate and less talented w h o s e c o o p e r a t i o n was necessary for her t o m a k e use of her advantages. In seeking t o o v e r c o m e distributive injustice, assigning remedial responsibility t o t h o s e w h o h a v e benefited from marketable talents or f o r t u n a t e social starting positions would be reasonable. Moreover, this a s s i g n m e n t o f remedial responsibility also serves t h e just e n d o f reducing inequalities thereby avoiding conflict between satisfying t h e d e m a n d s o f justice and laying down responsibility appropriately.

In C h a p t e r 3 , I argued t h e pro tanto

case for significant injustices

in t h e global e c o n o m i c association. In Section III of this chapter, I rejected two kinds o f responses t h a t argue for t u r n i n g back from


globalization. In this section, I briefly canvas a n d assess t h r e e o f t h e institutional reforms for r e m e d y i n g inequality t h a t h a v e received t h e m o s t a t t e n t i o n in t h e literature. Establishing t h a t such remedies can be realized w i t h o u t disproportional moral costs in t h e transition, and w i t h o u t e n g e n d e r i n g disproportional injustices, would support t w o significant c o n c l u s i o n s . It would c o m p l e t e t h e a r g u m e n t for t h e e x i s t e n c e of global distributive injustice s i n c e it would then be implausible to argue that t h e inequalities are necessary either because o f t h e lack of a realistic alternative or because t h e moral costs of eradicating t h e m are t o o h i g h . And it would provide guida n c e for real institutional reform for t h e purposes o f eradicating this injustice. Before discussing the particular proposals, I set out t h e criteria t h a t I believe are i m p o r t a n t for their assessment. T h e first criterion is role responsibility. Would an institutional a r r a n g e m e n t be c a p a b l e o f effectively carrying out distributive tasks a n d would it be likely to carry t h e m o u t in a m a n n e r t h a t would c o n d u c e t o persons judging t h a t it has d o n e so appropriately? T h e second criterion is politically feasible. Is there any reason to h o p e that the remedy is achievable given t h e current b a l a n c e o f political forces? In general e a c h of the proposals discussed suffer f r o m significant feasibility burdens. A system that taxes s o m e forms o f i n c o m e or wealth and transfers it to t h e global p o o r either directly as i n c o m e or indirectly as public goods or service provision seems best suited to address inequality. Although e c o n o m i c growth can h e l p raise people out o f poverty, it will do a better j o b o f reducing inequality t h e m o r e equal t h e distribution already is since generally t h e pre-growth distributive institutions affect t h e distribution of t h e growth. Tax and transfer programs help t o ensure t h a t growth reduces inequality. But t a x a t i o n of i n c o m e or wealth will be politically difficult. Branko M i l a n o v i c describes the current state of affairs this way: '[M]ost of t h e power is currently held by t h e rich countries, and to t h e e x t e n t t h a t in these c o u n t r i e s themselves, it is t h e rich people that are politically the most active and powerful, global power t o o is held by a relatively small n u m b e r of very rich people.' 3 8 In light o f this perhaps n o n e o f t h e following proposals has great strategic feasibility. It is probably t h e case t h a t t h e o n l y h o p e for a c h i e v i n g a n y o n e of t h e m is a c o m b i n a t i o n of poor c o u n t r y support and significant social m o v e m e n t activism.


T h e third criterion is w h e t h e r a proposal adequately assigns remedial responsibility. Proposals t h a t assign b u r d e n s appropriately in a c c o r d a n c e with remedial responsibilities are t o be preferred. Taxes t h a t lay down burdens unrelated to t h e g o o d pursued are morally deficient even if they fund w o r t h y social goals. An e x a m p l e is a tax o n cigarettes to pay for primary and secondary e d u c a t i o n . It is preferable to h a v e a tax and a benefit that are internally related, b o t h the tax and the benefit are directed toward t h e s a m e o b j e c t i v e , or if t h e objectives are different t h e y h a v e a clearly u n d e r s t a n d a b l e moral c o n n e c t i o n . T h i s is n o t primarily an efficiency c o n c e r n . Instead, t h e goal is an institutional c o m p l e x o f t a x a t i o n and benefit provision that satisfies c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of justice and remedial responsibility. O n grounds of remedial responsibility, we ask t h e following q u e s t i o n : W h i c h appropriately beneficial tax and transfer s c h e m e best assigns t h e burdens t o t h o s e w h o have benefited from marketable talents o r fortunate social starting p o s i t i o n s ? A great m a n y global tax and transfer plans have surfaced in t h e a c a d e m i c literature a n d policy papers. 3 9 I shall limit myself t o a brief discussion of three p r o m i n e n t o n e s : Pogge's Global Resources Dividend (GRD); t h e Tobin Tax and a progressive global i n c o m e tax, primarily c h a m p i o n e d by M i l a n o v i c . Pogge's G R D involves t a x i n g t h e extraction o f natural resources. 4 0 Pogge argues that properly administrated (for e x a m p l e by using it o n l y with respect t o resources w h o s e e x t r a c t i o n is easy t o m o n i t o r ) t h e G R D would possess several virtues: It would be easy t o understand and apply; it could be i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h o u t high c o l l e c t i o n costs; it would n o t greatly increase t h e costs of c o n s u m e r goods t h a t satisfy basic needs and it could discourage resource use where it is especially i m p o r t a n t t o do so. 4 1 T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggest t h a t t h e G R D would satisfy t h e criterion of role responsibility. T h e GRD, however, seems especially vulnerable t o t h e charge o f political infeasibility. In a world marked by a history of colonial plunder and all-too-persistent military conflict financed by t h e rapacious grab for natural resources, as for e x a m p l e in the D e m o c r a t i c Republic of C o n g o , a practice based on an e n t i t l e m e n t that vests in all of h u m a n i t y to s o m e o f t h e i n c o m e derived from natural resource o w n e r s h i p is likely t o meet with significant opposition in developing countries. W i t h o u t significant support from such states it is difficult to see h o w any proposal for the G R D would be politically feasible.


A n o t h e r c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e G R D is t h a t t h e tax would be passed down t o c o n s u m e r s by raising t h e price for all goods w h o s e production e m p l o y s natural resources t h a t h a v e been e x t r a c t e d . Pogge supports t h e G R D in part b y invoking ' t h e moral claim o f t h e poor to partake in t h e benefits from the use o f planetary resources.' 4 2 But it is n o t clear t h a t t h e G R D would be entirely g o o d news for t h e poor given its potential for raising t h e price of food stuffs. T h i s raises c o n cerns about remedial responsibility. T h e r e is n o reason o n reciprocity grounds t o pick out c o n s u m e r s as a group t o w h i c h t o assign t h e costs of reducing inequality. Additionally, insofar as t h e proportion o f the i n c o m e of poor people that goes to c o n s u m p t i o n is higher t h a n t h e proportion of the i n c o m e of wealthy people t h a t goes to c o n s u m p t i o n , a c o n s u m p t i o n s tax is regressive. T h e GRD t h e n seems rather weak o n grounds o f b o t h remedial responsibility and political feasibility. T h e Tobin Tax, initially proposed by J a m e s Tobin as a disincentive t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l currency speculation, involves t a x i n g short-term speculative i n v e s t m e n t s in i n t e r n a t i o n a l m o n e y markets. 4 3 Tobin and o t h e r s s u b s e q u e n t l y suggested that t h e proceeds t h a t t h e tax generated could be used for global poverty reduction. 4 4 To t h e e x t e n t that t h e funds ameliorate poverty, t h e y could reduce s o m e inequality. Insofar as it can be calibrated to tax o n l y short-term speculative i n v e s t m e n t s in currency, t h e tax would not deter long-term capital i n v e s t m e n t m a y serve d e v e l o p m e n t ends. T h e r e is reason t o believe t h a t a very low tax could be effective at generating considerable sums o f m o n e y . T h e tax t h e n seems t o satisfy at least o n e aspect o f role responsibility. It is less clear, however, w h e t h e r it would be available t o public scrutiny s i n c e it would be applied as often as such shortt e r m speculation occurs and m e m b e r s of t h e general public do n o t necessarily h a v e strong capabilities for assessing t h e workings o f t h e world of high finance. In this regard t h e GRD has an advantage. T h e Tobin Tax proposal is m o r e politically feasible t h a n t h e G R D , however, s i n c e t h e tax is directed at an activity t h a t has little social value a n d is k n o w n to have t h e capacity to be detrimental to t h e process of d e v e l o p m e n t . C u r r e n c y speculation can produce destabilizing fluctuations in t h e value of currencies in developing c o u n t r i e s . Such fluctuations c a n affect t h e ability o f a c o u n t r y t o export its goods, to pay for imports and to pay its debts. Insofar as t h e fluctua t i o n s are unforeseen, t h e capacity to develop rational d e v e l o p m e n t


plans utilizing export and debt calculations is c o m p r o m i s e d . Moreover, given t h a t short-term c u r r e n c y speculation serves n o great social g o o d , t h e r e is unlikely t o be a popular coalition t h a t seeks to preserve it. T h e Tobin Tax is also stronger t h a n the G R D o n g r o u n d s of remedial responsibility. T h e benefits o f global equality reduction are derived from an activity that produces negative e c o n o m i c externalities, to w h i c h a disincentive seems appropriate. It is certainly better to lay t h e tax o n c u r r e n c y speculators, t h a n on t h e poor purchasing basic food stuffs. M i l a n o v i c proposes a progressive global i n c o m e tax s c h e m e t h a t could be e x p e c t e d t o be effective in reducing global

inequality

because o f b o t h t h e burden it places on high earners and t h e dist r i b u t i o n s it directs t o low earners. 4 5 If t h e revenue is gathered in a c c o r d a n c e with public criteria that are relatively simple, such as progressive a s s i g n m e n t a c c o r d i n g to i n c o m e bracket w i t h o u t loopholes, and if t h e distribution o f proceeds is received by t h e poor, t h e n there are reasons t o believe t h a t such a system would be judged t o be effective and thus satisfy the criterion o f role responsibility. A proposal that involves t a x i n g politically powerful high earners probably suffers m o r e severely f r o m p r o b l e m s o f political feasibility t h a n the Tobin Tax, especially since the latter is also likely t o affect a smaller class of people. The i n c o m e tax, however, is probably m o r e feasible t h a n t h e GRD, w h i c h resource rich but i n c o m e poor c o u n tries can be expected t o resist. T h e feasibility p r o b l e m s of t h e global i n c o m e tax are s o m e w h a t mitigated by t h e fact t h a t t h e tax could be partially i m p l e m e n t e d before all o f t h e per capita rich countries participated in it. T h e successful e x a m p l e of partial i m p l e m e n t a t i o n m i g h t build political support for t h e proposal. Milanovic's i n c o m e tax proposal involves t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n o f state institutions for t a x a t i o n . Participating states with high per capita GDPs add a small levy t o their already existing i n c o m e tax s c h e m e s . T h e funds are collected by participating rich states and transferred to an i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , w h i c h oversees their distribution to participating per capita poor states. Transfers of this sort would satisfy t h e criterion remedial responsibility well insofar as persons w h o h a v e been successful in using their natural or social g o o d fortune t o their market advantage would be required to provide s o m e support to others w h o are less advantaged.


T h e r e is, however, a potential d r a w b a c k — o n remedial responsibility g r o u n d s — t o t h e a r r a n g e m e n t outlined a b o v e . In states t h a t h a v e lower t h a n average per capita GDPs, but high inequality, t h e r e m a y be s o m e persons w h o are wealthier t h a n persons in states with higher t h a n average per capita GDPs. So, a s c h e m e t h a t simply sent tax reve n u e from t h e h i g h e r t h a n average per capita countries t o t h e lower than average could carry out regressive transfers from a poorer person in a rich state to a richer person in a poor state. In order to reduce t h e possibility of this, M i l a n o v i c advocates transfers f r o m per capita rich c o u n t r i e s o n l y t o per capita poor o n e s t h a t are also relatively egalitarian. T h i s would render it less likely t h a t there would be rich people w h o would benefit from t h e transfers of t h e poor in a m o r e w e a l t h y country. Milanovic's proposal avoids t h e i n j u s t i c e of regressive t a x a t i o n , t h e n , at t h e price o f failing t o be entirely global in scope. T h e poor w h o have t h e m i s f o r t u n e of living in very inegalitarian states, such as Brazil and S o u t h Africa, have n o e n t i t l e m e n t against t h e rich of t h e per capita rich states. T h i s limitation is not, however, all bad. It could have positive effects on political d e v e l o p m e n t s within states. It provides an i n c e n t i v e for political elites to address inequality, a n d it gives an additional a r g u m e n t to d o m e s t i c social m o v e m e n t s on b e h a l f o f egalitarian causes. I argued in C h a p t e r 3 t h a t there are good reasons deriving from the value o f political equality for a broadly social d e m o cratic set o f institutions w i t h i n states. T h i s proposal encourages such institutions by offering m o r e internally egalitarian states m e m b e r s h i p in globally egalitarian regime. T h e r e is m o r e t h a n o n e w a y in w h i c h t h e distribution of t h e i n c o m e tax revenues could be effected. It could be sent t o t h e treasuries of participating poor states, w h i c h agree t o periodic audits o f their disbursements t o citizens. Alternatively, an international tax organization could be charged with the disbursement t o citizens in participating poor states. Any system of global redistribution must be realistic a b o u t the difficulties of institution building, support and staffing in p o o r c o u n t r i e s t h a t suffer from capacity shortages. In this regard distributive regimes that include i n c o m e grants are far superior to t h o s e m a k e deposits i n t o t h e general treasury of developing world states. An i n c o m e grant involves cash p a y m e n t s or credits i n t o savings a c c o u n t s , and is therefore m o r e institutionally modest t h a n proposals i n v o l v i n g t h e provision o f physical goods. 4 6 Capacity


p r o b l e m s also argue in favor of m a k i n g such a grant u n c o n d i t i o n a l . T h i s would obviate t h e need for a bureaucratic apparatus t o c o n d u c t m e a n s testing. An a r g u m e n t against m a k i n g t h e grants u n c o n d i t i o n a l is based upon t h e possibility o f regressive transfers. T h i s m i g h t n o t be decisive for were such transfers t o occur, m u c h of t h e i n c o m e would be retrieved by t h e treasury o f t h e per capita poor state t h r o u g h progressive i n c o m e t a x a t i o n . The global i n c o m e tax satisfies role responsibility a b o u t as well as t h e G R D . Like t h e GRD, t h e global i n c o m e tax is n o t particularly strong according t o t h e criterion o f political feasibility. But it is m u c h better t h a n t h e G R D on grounds o f remedial responsibility. So, the global i n c o m e tax is superior to t h e G R D o n o n e of t h e grounds and at least n o worse o n t h e o t h e r two. T h e global i n c o m e tax is superior to t h e Tobin Tax according t o role responsibility, but t h e global i n c o m e tax is probably less politically feasible t h a n t h e Tobin Tax. Both t h e global i n c o m e tax and the Tobin Tax are superior to t h e G R D o n remedial responsibility grounds. And t h e global i n c o m e tax appears s o m e w h a t superior to t h e Tobin Tax o n these grounds because t h e i n c o m e tax burdens t h o s e w h o have benefited from marketable talents or f o r t u n a t e social starting positions and benefits t h o s e w i t h o u t such advantages. But, w h e t h e r o n e ranks t h e i n c o m e tax higher t h a n t h e Tobin Tax m a y d e p e n d upon h o w m u c h weight o n e gives to political feasibility for practical political purposes. It seems reasonable to give it a great deal of weight. Precisely because t h e progressive global i n c o m e tax is progressive, it suffers m o r e t h a n t h e Tobin Tax from t h e weakness t h a t all three proposals possess. T h e rich and powerful c a n use their private wealth acquired t h r o u g h institutional rules t o resist redistributive s c h e m e s t h a t assign remedial responsibility t o t h e m . Both c l i m a t e c h a n g e and e c o n o m i c inequality pose significant political p r o b l e m s for o v e r c o m i n g global inequality. Rich and powerful states m i g h t block a just c l i m a t e a g r e e m e n t , w h i l e rich and powerful persons m i g h t resist redistribution. Perhaps, however, t h e r e is still reason to h o p e t h a t t h e injustices o f global inequality can be remediated. T h e r e is after all t h e n o b l e e n j o y m e n t — w h i c h t h e rich also could e x p e r i e n c e — o f a d v a n c i n g t h e cause o f relief from suffering. And t h e r e is t h e power o f intelligently c o o r d i n a t e d c a m p a i g n s o f ordinary people pursuing justice.

Notes 1

I n e q u a l i t y a n d the I n h e r e n t D i g n i t y o f Persons

1. World Bank, World Development Report 2006, 56. http://www-wds.world bank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027 &piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64154159&searchMenu PK =64258546&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000112742_200509201108 26& searchMenuPK=64258546&theSitePK=523679. Accessed 27 April 2009.

2. UNDP Human Development Report 2003, 38-39. http://hdr.undp.org/en/ media/hdr03_complete.pdf. Accessed 23 September 2008. 3. World Health Organization, Discussion Paper 54; Colin Mathers et al., Global Burden of Disease in 2002: Data sources, methods and results, 44.

4. World Bank, World Development Report 2006, 56.

5. Ibid. 6. Branko Milanovic, True World Income Distribution, 1998 and 1993: First Calculataions Based on Household Surveys Alone,' Economic Journal 112 (2002): 51-92. 7. United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report (1999), 38. http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_1999_EN.pdf. Accessed 23 September, 2008.

8. Branko Milanovic, Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global

Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 39, see Figure 4.6. The Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure. It is a ratio of two areas on a graph, which has income percentiles as the vertical axis and population percentiles as the horizontal axis. One line used in the graph is a line sloping at a 45-degree angle from the lower left corner to the upper right. It represents equality. At each point on the line the percent of the population (horizontal axis) is equal to the percent of total income (vertical axis). A second line used is the Lorenz curve, which is the actual distribution of incomes percent per population percent. It curves below the 45-degree angle line, showing that income is not equally distributed, for example that, say, 50 percent of the population receives 30 percent of the income. It curves sharply up at the top to intersect with the 45-degree line to show that 100 percent of the population receives 100 percent of the income. The Gini coefficient is the ratio. The numerator is the area between these two lines; and the denominator is the total area below the line. It measures inequality because if the Lorenz curve is identical to the 45-degree line then, the ratio is 0, or equality. The highest value, 1, is complete inequality, one person receiving all income. 9. Ibid., 86, see Figure 8.1.

10. Milanovic, Worlds Apart, 87.

154

Notes 155

11. Ibid., 127. 12. S h a o h u a C h e n a n d Martin Ravallion, T h e developing world is poorer t h a n we t h o u g h t , but n o less successful in t h e fight against poverty,' Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank, 2 0 0 8 . Available at http://go.worldbank.Org/5V41ZlVVRI.0. Accessed 1 0 N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . 'PPP' stands for 'purchasing power parity,' w h i c h is m e a n t to be a measure of the equivalent in the local currency o f w h a t $ 1 . 2 5 or $ 2 would buy in the USA, i n this case at 2 0 0 5 prices. T h e enterprise of establishing such equivalencies is, o f course, very c o m p l e x and controversial. T h e report by C h e n a n d Ravallion is in fact based upon a newly revised PPP. 13. For criticisms o f t h e World Bank's a p p r o a c h see S a n j a y Reddy, T h e New Global Poverty Estimates: Digging Deeper i n t o a Hole,' International Poverty Centre: One Pager 6 5 , S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . Available at http://www. u n d p - p o v e r t y c e n t r e . o r g / p u b / I P C O n e P a g e r 6 5 . i x i f . Accessed 2 2 S e p t e m ber 2 0 0 8 . For a reply see Martin Ravallion 'Global Poverty Reassessed: A Reply to Reddy,' International Poverty Centre: One Pager 6 6 , S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . Available at h t t p : / / w w w . u n d p - p o v e r t y c e n t r e . o r g / p u b / IPCOnePager66.pdf. Accessed 2 2 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . 14. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty' and Human Rights ( L o n d o n : Polity Press, 2002), 7 - 9 & 205. 15. United N a t i o n s D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e , Human Development Report 1998, 3 8 . Available at h t t p : / / h d r . u n d p . o r g / e n / m e d i a / H D R _ 1 9 9 9 _ E N . p d f . Accessed 2 3 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . 16. J a g d i s h Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: O x f o r d University Press, 2 0 0 4 ) , 6 7 . 17. Charles Beitz, ' D o e s I n e q u a l i t y Matter?' Thomas Pogge, ed., Global Justice (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2 0 0 1 ) , 1 0 6 - 1 2 2 . 18. Although this seems o b v i o u s to m a n y w h o write a b o u t global inequality. There is very little that is being d o n e about it in the c o n t e x t o f intern a t i o n a l n e g o t i a t i n g . For e x a m p l e s o f this criticism see David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 8 ) , 7 6 ; Thomas W. Pogge, ' W h y Inequality Matters,' in David Held a n d Ayse Kaya (ed.), Global Inequality (Cambridge: Polity Press), 1 3 7 - 1 3 9 ; Robert H. Wade, ' S h o u l d We Worry a b o u t I n c o m e Inequality,' in Held a n d Kaya (ed.), Global Inequality, 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 . 19. I have o n l y m e n t i o n e d t h e role that reducing inequality can play in c o m bating poverty a n d p r o m o t i n g fairness in international negotiations. But there are a n u m b e r o f o t h e r social goals that reducing inequality generally can serve. For a seminal discussion of this see T.M. S c a n l o n , T h e Diversity o f O b j e c t i o n s to Inequality,' in his The Difficulty of Tolerance (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 2 0 0 3 ) , 2 0 2 - 2 1 8 . 2 0 . See also Larry S. T e m k i n , Inequality (Oxford: O x f o r d University Press, 1993), 1 5 7 - 1 6 3 . 2 1 . Universal Declaration o f H u m a n Rights, United Nations Office o f t h e High C o m m i s s i o n e r for H u m a n Rights. Available at http://www.un.org/ Overview/rights.html. Accessed 17 September 2 0 0 8 .

156 Notes

22.

23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

International C o v e n a n t o n Civil a n d Political Rights. Available at h t t p : / / w w w . u n h c h r . c h / h t m l / m e n u 3 / b / a _ c c p r . h t m . Accessed 17 September, 2 0 0 8 . And International C o v e n a n t o n E c o n o m i c , Social and Cultural Rights. Available at h t t p : / / w w w . u n h c h r . c h / h t m l / m e n u 3 / b / a _ c e s c r . h t m . Accessed 17 September, 2 0 0 8 . ' T h e African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,' in Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on Human Rights, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 5 5 3 . There are various formulations of this idea. See for example, J o h n Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (clip, v) in J o h n Stuart Mill and J e r e m y B e n t h a m , Utilitarianism and Other Essays ( H a r m o n d s w o r t h : Penguin Books, 1987), p. 3 2 7 , and Cf. H. L. A Hart, 'Are T h e r e a n y Natural Rights?' The Philosophical Review 64 ( 1 9 5 5 ) : 1 7 5 - 1 9 1 . J o h n Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 5 0 8 . Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights. Pogge, World Poverty, 7 0 - 7 3 , 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 . Henry Shue, Basic Rights, 2 n d ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press). Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2 0 0 6 ) , 123.

30. Rawls, Theory, 513. 31.

Rawls,

32. Ibid.

Theory,

10-19.

3 3 . Cf. J o h n Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1993), 1 1 - 1 3 . 3 4 . Ibid., 136. 3 5 . Ibid., 1 3 - 1 5 . 3 6 . Universal Declaration on H u m a n Rights. 3 7 . J o h n Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Erin Kelly ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2 0 0 1 ) , 2 3 . 3 8 . On t h e idea that respect for h u m a n dignity has implications for both institutional operation and the justification of principles according t o which they operate, see also Darwall 2 0 0 6 , 2 4 4 . 3 9 . T h i s idea o r its kin have popped up in several different places. See Stephen Darwall: '[O]ne d e m a n d that a n y o n e has t h e authority to make is that he n o t be subject to d e m a n d i n g (coercive) c o n d u c t that c a n n o t be justified by second-personal reasons." Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint, 2 7 2 . C o m p a r e also to Rainer Forst's a c c o u n t of a right to justification in his 'Die Wurder des M e n s c h e n and das Recht auf Rechfertigung,' Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Philosophie 5 3 (4) ( 2 0 0 5 ) : 5 8 9 - 5 9 6 and in his Recht auf Rechfertigung (Frankfurt a m Main: Surkamp Verlag, 2 0 0 7 ) , 2 9 1 - 3 2 7 . And see Stefan Gosepath, Gleiche Gerechtigkeit: Grundlagen eines liberal en egalitarianismus (Frankfurt a m M a i n : Surkamp Verlgag, 2 0 0 4 ) , 2 0 0 - 2 1 1 . C o m p a r e to Thomas Nagel's c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e kind of moral equality t h a t supports egalitarianism: 'An a r r a n g e m e n t must be acceptable first from the point o f view of everyone's m o s t basic claims, t h e n from t h e point of view

Notes 157

of everyone's next most basic claims, etc.' T h o m a s Nagel, Mortal Questions (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1979), 117. And finally see Rawls: '[R]espect for persons is shown by treating t h e m in ways that they can see to justified.' Rawls Theory, 5 1 3 . 4 0 . Constructivist a c c o u n t s of moral justification take t h e provision o f such an a c c o u n t to be a primary task. See for e x a m p l e Jurgen Habermas, 'Discourse Ethics' in Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen, trans. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1990), 4 3 - 1 1 5 ; Jurgen Habermas, Wahrheit and Rechfertigung (Frankfurt a m M a i n : S u r k a m p Verlag), 3 2 4 - 3 5 6 ; J o h n Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Edition. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 1 5 - 1 9 and 1 1 8 - 1 2 3 ; J o h n Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,' Journal of Philosophy 7 7 : 9 , 5 1 5 - 5 7 2 ; T.M. S c a n l o n , ' C o n t r a c t u alism and Utilitarianism,' in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds. Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 1 9 8 2 ) ; and T.M. S c a n l o n , What We Owe Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1 9 9 8 ) . 4 1 . These properties will be further discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 4 2 . UDHR. 4 3 . Pogge, World Poverty, 2 3 . 4 4 . Ibid., 2 4 . 4 5 . T h o m a s W. Pogge, ' " A s s i s t i n g " t h e Global Poor,' in Deen K. C h a t e r j e e (ed.) The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 2004), 263. 4 6 . Francois Bourguignon et al, 'Global Redistribution o f I n c o m e , ' World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3 9 6 1 , July 2 0 0 6 . 4 7 . Joseph E. Stiglitz and Andrew C h a r l t o n , Fair Trade For All: How Trade can Promote Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 5 ) , 3 2 . 4 8 . Pogge, 'Assisting,' 2 6 3 . 4 9 . Pogge, World Poverty, 1 5 - 1 6 and Pogge, 'Assisting,' 2 7 3 . 5 0 . C h e n and Ravallion, ' T h e developing world is poorer than we t h o u g h t . ' 5 1 . For criticisms of t h e World Bank's approach see Reddy 'The New Global Poverty Estimates.' For a reply see Ravallion 'Global Poverty Reassessed.' 5 2 . See T h o m a s W. Pogge, 'A C o n s i s t e n t Measure o f Real Poverty: A Reply to Ravallion,' International Poverty Center One Pager 54, May 2 0 0 8 . Available at http://wttw.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/IPCOnePager54.pdf. Accessed 10 N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 8 and T h o m a s Pogge, ' W h e r e t h e Line is Drawn. A Rejoinder to Ravallion,' International Poverty Center One Pager 6 9 , O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 Available at http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/pub/ IPCOnePager69.pdf. Accessed 10 N o v e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

Pogge, World Poverty, 1 6 - 2 0 and Pogge, 'Assisting,' 2 7 3 - 2 7 4 . Pogge, 'Assisting,' 2 7 3 - 2 7 4 . Pogge, World Poverty, 1 6 - 1 7 and Pogge, 'Assisting,' 2 7 3 - 2 7 4 . Pogge, 'Assisting,' 2 7 4 . Ibid. Pogge, World Poverty, 1 3 7 - 1 3 9 .

158 Notes

2

Coercion a n d the C o n d i t i o n s of Distributive Justice

1. I use 'compatriots' as s h o r t h a n d for fellow citizens o r long-term residents residing in t h e same country. 2. Richard W. Miller, ' C o s m o p o l i t a n Respect and Patriotic C o n c e r n , ' Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 7 ( 1 9 9 8 ) : 2 0 6 .

3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 204 & 210. 5. Ibid., 2 1 1 . Emphasis 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., 211. 8. Ibid., 212. 9. Ibid., 2 1 9 - 2 2 0 . 10. Ibid., 213. 11. Ibid., 214.

added.

12. I agree with Samuel Scheffler's claim that an a c c o u n t of special duties that does n o t reduce t h e m to acts of voluntary a c c e p t a n c e is c o m p a t i b l e with t h e view that s o m e of those c a n be outweighed by o t h e r duties, w h e t h e r general or special. See Samuel Scheffler, 'Relationships and Responsibility,' in his Boundary and Allegiances (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 1 ) ,

102.

13. Miller, ' C o s m o p o l i t a n Respect,' 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 .

14. Ibid., 217.

15. See also Richard J . Arneson, 'Do Patriotic Ties Limit Global Justice Duties?' The Journal of Ethics 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) : 1 2 7 - 1 5 0 . 16. Michael Blake, 'Distributive Justice, State, Coercion, and Autonomy,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 0 ( 2 0 0 2 ) : 2 5 7 - 2 9 6 . 17. Ibid., 2 5 8 - 2 6 1 .

18. Ibid., 267. 19. Ibid., 271. 20. Ibid., 265, 274, 276, 280, 283, and 289. 2 1 . Ibid., 2 7 4 f f . 2 2 . Ibid., 2 8 2 - 2 8 3 . 23. Ibid., 284 24. Ibid., 289. 25. Ibid., 288.

2 6 . C o n s i d e r Nozick's a c c o u n t o f his framework model o f Utopian. Cf. Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 2 9 7 - 3 3 4 .

27. Ibid., 114.

2 8 . J o h n Rawls, A Theory of Justice rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass: University Press, 1999), 1 7 2 - 1 7 5 . 2 9 . Rawls, Theory, 3 0 2 .

30. Ibid., 47. 31. Ibid., 48. 32. Ibid., 303.

3 3 . T h o m a s Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice,' Affairs 3 3 ( 2 0 0 5 ) : 126.

Harvard

Philosophy and Public

Notes 159

34. Ibid., 142. 35. Ibid., 118. 36. Ibid., 119. 3 7 . O C E D , Development Cooperation Report 2007, Statistical Annex, 134. http://miranda.sourceoecd.org/pdf/dac/432008011e-06-statisticalannex. pdf. Accessed 16 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . 3 8 . Nagel, ' T h e Problem of Global Justice,' 129.

39. Ibid. 40. Ibid., 130.

4 1 . See for e x a m p l e Stephen Darwall, The Second Person Standpoint ( C a m bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2 0 0 6 ) , 2 8 - 2 9 . 4 2 . l or a penetrating critiques of Nagel's view see A.J. Julius, 'Nagel's Atlas,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 4 ( 2 0 0 6 ) : 1 7 6 - 1 9 2 and Michael Pendlebury 'Global Justice a n d the Spectre o f Leviathan,' The Philosophical Forum 3 8 (2007): 4 3 - 5 6 . 4 3 . See also my 'Persons' Interests, States' Duties, and Global G o v e r n a n c e , ' The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism, Harry Brighouse and Gillian Brock eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 5 ) , 1 4 8 - 1 6 3 and my 'La Justice et les Associations,' Philosophiques 3 4 ( 2 0 0 7 ) : 6 1 - 7 5 . 4 4 . Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 10. 4 5 . Karl Marx, Capital, A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (New York: T h e Modern Library, 1906), 6 2 8 . Marx uses the phrase in c h a p t e r 2 3 in a related sense to describe to ' t h e appearance of i n d e p e n d e n c e [of the wage l a b o r e r ] . . . kept u p . . . by t h e . . . [labor] c o n t r a c t . ' T h e point, I take it, is that the morally salient relations are not necessarily t h e legal ones, but the social relations that underlie t h e legal ones. 4 6 . S o m e t h i n g like this a c c o u n t o f the original position is defended by Ronald Dworkin in 'The Original Position' in N o r m a n Daniels ed. Reading Rawls (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 1 7 - 5 3 . 4 7 . See H.L.A. Hart, 'Are T h e r e Any Natural Rights?' Philosophical Review 6 4 ( 1 9 5 5 ) : 1 7 5 - 1 9 1 , esp. 185, and Rawls, Theory, esp. 9 3 - 9 8 . 4 8 . Brian Barry, ' H u m a n i t y and J u s t i c e in Global Perspective' Nomos XXIV: Ethics, Economics, and the Law, J . Roland P e n n o c k and J o h n W. C h a p m a n , eds. (New York: New York University Press, 1982), 2 3 1 . 4 9 . See Michael J . Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1 0 6 - 1 0 9 . 5 0 . See my Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder: Westview Press, 2 0 0 2 ) , 3 8 - 3 9 . 5 1 . There is wealth of literature o n this subject b e g i n n i n g with the criticisms first raised by Nozick, Anarchy, 9 0 - 9 5 . For a representative sample of the discussion that Nozick's criticism produced see A. J o h n S i m m o n s , ' The Principle o f Fair Play,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 ( 1 9 7 9 ) 3 0 7 - 3 3 7 ; Richard J. Arneson, T h e Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems,' Ethics, 9 2 ( 1 9 8 2 ) : 6 1 6 - 6 3 3 ; George Klosko, T h e Principle of Fairness and Political O b l i g a t i o n , ' Ethics 9 7 ( 1 9 8 7 ) : 3 5 3 - 3 6 2 ; Garrett Cullity, 'Moral Free Riding,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 24 ( 1 9 9 5 ) : 3 - 3 4 . 5 2 . Samuel Scheffler calls this the voluntarist objection. See his 'Relationships a n d Responsibilities,' 9 8 .

53. Ibid., 108.

160 Notes

3

Equal Respect i n Political a n d E c o n o m i c Associations

1. T h o m a s Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 3 ( 2 0 0 5 ) : 1 1 9 . 2. Kok-Chor Tan, ' T h e Boundary o f Justice a n d the J u s t i c e o f Boundaries,' The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence X I X , n o . 2 (July 2 0 0 6 ) : 3 4 1 . See also his Justice without Borders (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 2 0 0 4 ) , 175. 3. S i m o n Caney, Justice Beyond Borders (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 37.

4. Ibid., 121. 5. Ibid. 122.

6. Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2 0 0 2 ) , c h p . 5. 7. J o h n Rawls, Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 3 0 2 .

8. Ibid., 47. 9. Ibid., 48.

10. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 185. 11. This a c c o u n t o f non-voluntariness reads like a stipulation but I believe t h a t there are good reasons t o accept it. See G.A. C o h e n , 'Are Disadvantaged Workers W h o Take Hazardous J o b s Forced to Take Hazardous J o b s ? ' in his History, Labour, and Freedom: Themes from Marx (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 2 3 9 - 2 5 4 . 12. T h e n o w classic expression of this is Peter Singer, ' F a m i n e Affluence and Morality,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 ( 1 9 7 2 ) : 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 . It is updated, reconsidered, but n o t essentially c h a n g e d in Peter Singer, 'Outsiders: our obligations to those b e y o n d o u r borders,' in Deen K. C h a t e r j e e (ed.), The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 4 ) , 1 1 - 3 2 . 13. GATT 1 9 9 4 Article 1:1 http://www.wto.org/engIish/docs_e/legal_e/ i n d e x _ g _ e . h t m . Accessed 2 9 July 2 0 0 9 . 14. See t h e thorough discussion of such strategies in Ha-Joon C h a n g , Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective ( L o n d o n : A n t h e m Press, 2 0 0 2 ) . 15. Victor S.F. Sit, 'Globalization, Foreign direct I n v e s t m e n t , and Urbanization in Developing Countries' in Shahid Yusuf, S i m o n Evenett, and Weiping Wu, eds. Facets of Globalization: International and local Dimensions of Development, World Bank Discussion Paper No. 4 1 5 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2 0 0 1 ) , 1 2 - 1 3 . 16. Cf. G u y Standing, Global Labour Flexibility: Seeking Distributive Justice (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1 9 9 9 ) , pt. III. 17. See G i o v a n n i Andrea Corina, 'Globalization and the Distribution o f I n c o m e Between and Within Countries,' in Ha-Joon C h a n g , ed., Rethinking Development Economics ( L o n d o n : A n t h e m Press, 2 0 0 3 ) , 4 2 3 - 4 5 0 . 18. UNDP Human Development Report ( 2 0 0 3 ) 3 9 h t t p : / / h d r . u n d p . o r g / e n / m e d i a / h d r 0 3 _ c o m p l e t e . p d f . Accessed 2 9 July 2 0 0 9 .

Notes 161

19. Robert K e o h a n e and Joseph Nye Jr., ' G o v e r n a n c e in a Globalizing World' in Robert K e o h a n e ed., Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (New York and L o n d o n : Routledge, 2 0 0 2 ) , 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 . 2 0 . UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, 4 1 . http://hdr.undp.org/en/ reports/globaI/hdr1999/. Accessed 17 September 2 0 0 8 . 2 1 . United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme, Human Development Report 1999, 3 7 . h t t p : / / h d r . u n d p . o r g / r e p o r t s / g l o b a l / 1 9 9 9 / e n / . See also Standing,

Global Labour Flexibility, pt. II.

2 2 . T h e classic statement o f the infant industry protection a r g u m e n t is by Friederich List in The National System of Political Economy, trans. Sampson S. Lloyd, M.P. (New York: Augustus M . Kelley Publishers, 1966), bk. 1. It has been updated by C h a n g , Kicking Away the Ladder. 2 3 . TRIPs A n n e x 1C of the Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization ( 1 9 9 4 ) http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27trips_03_e.htm. Accessed 2 9 July 2 0 0 9 . 2 4 . Bernard M . H o e k m a n a n d Michel M . Kostecki, The Political Economy of The World Trading System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 154. 2 5 . Derek Parfit argues that intergenerational justice is such a c o n d i t i o n , but I a m not c o n v i n c e d . See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 3 9 1 - 3 9 3 and my 'Justice and t h e Intergenerational Assignment o f the Costs o f C l i m a t e C h a n g e , ' Journal of Social Philosophy 4 0 ( 2 0 0 9 ) . 2 6 . Rawls, Theory, 6 5 . 2 7 . There are alternative interpretations of what is democratic a b o u t the d e m o c r a t i c c o n c e p t i o n . I take m y a c c o u n t to b e consistent with J o s h u a C o h e n ' s , w h o argues that the d e m o c r a t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f equality results from the e x t e n s i o n of our firmer moral c o n v i c t i o n s about political d e m o c r a c y to s o c i o - e c o n o m i c justice. See his ' D e m o c r a t i c Equality,' Ethics 9 9 (July 1 9 8 9 ) : 7 2 7 - 7 5 1 . N o r m a n Daniels asserts t h a t ' T h e modifier " d e m o c r a t i c " points to the c o n n e c t i o n between t h e S e c o n d and the First Principles a n d their j o i n t role in meeting our needs as citizens.' See his 'Rawls's C o m p l e x Egalitarianism,' in Samuel Freeman, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (Cambridge: C a m b r i d g e University Press, 2 0 0 3 ) , 2 4 5 . I take my a c c o u n t to be consistent with Daniel's first c o n j u n c t , but not the second. I think that we can appreciate the d e m o c r a t i c nature of the distributive principles taken in isolation o n c e appreciate that they are based upon a c o n c e r n to mitigate social and natural fortune that is similarly expressed in d e m o c r a t i c citizenship. 28.

Harry Brighouse, for example, argues that the equal availability of political influence is a requirement of equal respect for persons q u a fellow citizens. Cf. His 'Egalitarianism and Equal Availability of Political Influence,' The Journal of Political Philosophy 4 ( 1 9 9 6 ) : 123. 2 9 . Cf. J o h n Rawls, Justice as Fairness, Erin Kelly ed., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2 0 0 1 ) , 149. 3 0 . Cf. Henry Shue, Basic Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 9 6 ) . 3 1 . This certainly is not a novel c l a i m . See N o r m a n Daniels, 'Equal Liberty and t h e Unequal Worth o f Liberty,' in N o r m a n Daniels, ed., Reading

162 Notes

Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice

32.

33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41.

42.

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 2 5 3 - 2 8 1 . Daniels, however, takes t h e d e m a n d s equalizing the worth of liberties as requiring a significantly more egalitarian s o c i o - e c o n o m i c distribution than I understand the d e m a n d s o f equal and inclusive citizenship to require. Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 19. Walzer, I take it, would not endorse t h e universalist e l e m e n t of this a c c o u n t . And I a m n o t endorsing his a c c o u n t of c o m p l e x equality. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 5 2 - 5 3 . David Miller, 'Two Ways to T h i n k About Justice,' Philosophy, Politics, and Economics 1 ( 2 0 0 2 ) : 7. In fairness to Miller, it should be noted that he states that a middle ground position between c o n t e x t u a l i s m and universalism might turn out to be t h e most defensible. Cf. Ibid., 9. Ibid., 2 2 - 2 3 . Rawls, Theory, 74. Elizabeth Anderson, ' W h a t is the Point o f Equality?' Ethics 9 0 ( 1 9 9 9 ) : 322. Rawls discusses reciprocity in this regard in Theory, 8 8 - 9 0 and various point in J o h n Rawls, Justice as Fairness, Erin Kelly, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2 0 0 1 ) but see especially pages 64, 7 6 - 7 7 , and 126. See also T.M. S c a n l o n , 'Rawls' Theory of J u s t i c e , ' in Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls, 199; a n d Andrea Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice, Reciprocity, and t h e State,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 5 , n o . 1 ( 2 0 0 7 ) : 2 5 - 2 9 . Rawls, Theory, 8 7 . T h e a r g u m e n t o f this paragraph draws on o n e that I made in 'Persons' Interests, States' Duties, and Global G o v e r n a n c e , ' in Harry Brighouse and Gillian Brock, eds., The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 5 ) . Sangiovanni, 'Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State,' 2 5 .

43. Ibid., 26. 44. Ibid., 29. 45. Ibid., 26.

4 6 . At the b e g i n n i n g of A Theory of Justice Rawls famously assumes 'that a society is a more o r less self-sufficient association o f p e r s o n s . . . . ' See Rawls,

Theory, 4.

47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

Rawls states that, ' T h e principles o f justice apply to t h e basic structure and regulate h o w its m a j o r institutions are c o m b i n e d into o n e s c h e m e . ' Rawls, Theory, 2 4 2 . A.J. Julius, 'Nagel's Atlas,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 4 ( 2 0 0 6 ) : 191. J o s h u a C o h e n and Charles Sable, 'Extra Rublicam Nulla Justitia?' Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 4 ( 2 0 0 6 ) : 173. Ibid., 1 7 2 - 1 7 3 . Branko Milanovic, "True World I n c o m e Distribution, 1 9 9 8 and 1993: First Calculataions Based o n Household Surveys Alone,' Economic Journal 1 1 2 (2002): 51-92.

Notes 163

52.

United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme, Human Development Report ( 1 9 9 9 ) , 3 8 . h t t p : / / h d r . u n d p . o r g / e n / m e d i a / H D R _ 1 9 9 9 _ E N . p d f . Accessed 23 September 2008.

53. Ibid., 28. 54. 55. 56.

UNDP Human Development Report 2003, 3 8 - 3 9 . h t t p : / / h d r . u n d p . o r g / e n / m e d i a / h d r 0 3 _ c o m p l e t e . p d f . Accessed 2 3 S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . World Health Organization, Discussion Paper 54, C o l i n Mathers et al., Global Burden o f Disease in 2 0 0 2 : Data sources, m e t h o d s a n d results, 4 4 . United Nation's International Children's Emergency Fund, The State of the World's Children ( 2 0 0 8 ) . Available at http://www.unlcef.org/publications/ files/The_State_of_the_Worlds_Children_2008.pdf. Accessed 3 D e c e m b e r

2008.

4

G l o b a l Equality of O p p o r t u n i t y Defended 1. World Bank, World Development Report 2006, 5 6 . http://www-wds.worW bank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027 &piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64154159&searchMenu PK=64258546&theSitePK=523679&entityID=000112742.200509201108 2 6 & s e a r c h M e n u P K = 6 4 2 5 8 5 4 6 & t h e S i t e P K = 5 2 3 6 7 9 . Accessed 2 7 April 2009.

2. World Bank,

3. Ibid.

World Development Report 2006,

56.

4. Branko Milanovic, 'Global Inequality of Opportunity.' Available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/ EXTPROGRAMS/EXTPOVRES/EXTDECINEQ/0„contentMDK:20553509~ menuPK: 1 3 5 9 5 7 1 - p a g e P K : 6 4 1 6 8 4 4 5 - p i P K : 6 4 1 6 8 3 0 9 ~ t h e S i t e P K : 1 1 4 9 3 1 6 , 0 0 . h t m l . Accessed 4 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8 .

5. See for e x a m p l e J o h n Rawls, A Theory of Justice revised ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 6 3 - 6 4 . 6. J o h n Rawls refers to this principle as fair equality of opportunity in contrast to formal equality of opportunity. Cf. Ibid., 6 3 - 6 4 & 7 3 - 7 8 . 7. J o h n Baker, Arguing for Equality ( L o n d o n : Verso, 1987), 4 3 - 5 2 . 8. Rawls, Theory, pp. 57 & 6 4 - 6 5 . 9. Several writers defend a globalized difference principle. See for e x a m p l e Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 2 8 - 3 3 ; Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princet o n : Princeton University Press, 1979); Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder: Westview Press, 2 0 0 2 ) ; T h o m a s Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1 9 8 9 ) ; R.G. Peffer, Marxism, Morality and Social Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); David A.J. Richards, 'International Distributive Justice,' in J.R. P e n n o c k and J o h n W. C h a p m a n , eds., Ethics, Economics and the Law (New York: New York University Press, 1982); and T.M. Scanlon, 'Rawls' T h e o r y of Justice,' in N o r m a n Daniels, ed., Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls' A Theory of Justice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 8 9 ) . As my a r g u m e n t

164 Notes

10. 11. 12. 13.

14. 15. 16.

17.

18. 19.

toward the end of c h a p t e r expresses, my o w n support for a global differe n c e principle as stating a duty of global justice has b e c o m e c o n t i n g e n t on an e x t e n t of global e c o n o m i c institutional coverage that I believe does n o t yet exist. See for e x a m p l e Rawls, Theory, 8 9 . Nozick, Anarchy, 2 1 4 . Ibid., 2 1 6 - 2 2 4 . A set of important criticisms are offered by Miller in David Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' Journal of Ethics 9 ( 2 0 0 5 ) : 5 5 - 7 9 and David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6 2 - 7 5 . Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' 6 8 . Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, 4 9 . Gillian Brock, 'Egalitarian Ideals, a n d C o s m o p o l i t a n Justice,' The Philosophical Forum, X X X V I : 1, Spring 2 0 0 5 , 1 8 - 1 9 . See also her ' W h a t Does C o s m o p o l i t a n i s m D e m a n d o f Us' Theoria 104, August 2 0 0 4 , especially 180-184. Brock argues that S i m o n C a n e y c o m m i t s this error. See 'Egalitarian Ideals,' 1 6 - 1 9 . But although C a n e y argues that global equality o f o p p o r t u n i t y should focus o n t h e general ideal equalizing opportunities 'to attain an equal n u m b e r of positions o f a c o m m e n s u r a t e standard of living.' He unpacks 'standard living' so that it includes a list of specific goods that may have more purchase in various cultures than Brock admits, (p. 121) See his ' C o s m o p o l i t a n Justice a n d Equalizing Opportunities' in Metaphilosophy 3 2 ( 2 0 0 1 ) : 1 2 0 - 1 2 1 . Brock, 'Egalitarian Ideals,' 16. T h e term 'free-standing' in this c o n t e x t is analogous to Rawls's requirem e n t for domestic justice. 'Political Liberalism, then, aims for a political c o n c e p t i o n of justice as a freestanding view. It offers n o specific metaphysical o r epistemological doctrine b e y o n d w h a t is implied by the political c o n c e p t i o n itself. As an a c c o u n t of political values, a freestanding political c o n c e p t i o n does n o t deny there being o t h e r values that apply, say, to the personal, the familial and the associational; nor does it say that political values are separate from, or discontinuous with, o t h e r values.' J o h n Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1993), 10.

2 0 . UNDP, Human Development Report 2005, 2 5 . 2 1 . T h e e x a m p l e is drawn from Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, 4 9 . 2 2 . Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' 5 9 - 6 0 and Miller, National Respon-

sibility, 63.

2 3 . Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' 6 0 - 6 1 and Miller,

sibility, 64.

National Respon-

Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' 6 2 and Miller, National Responsi65-66. 2 5 . Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' 6 2 . 2 6 . See J a m e s G . Dwyer, Religious Schools v. Children's Rights (Ithaca and L o n d o n : Cornell University Press, 1998). 24.

bility,

Notes 165

27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

Miller distinguishes nations from e t h n i c groups in On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1 5 - 2 1 . Miller seems t o have this view in On Nationality, 1 5 - 3 1 & 4 9 - 8 0 . Adam S m i t h , An Inquiry Into The Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations (New York: T h e Modern Library, 1937), 3 1 . T h e list o f primary goods that I e m p l o y is more extensive t h a n Rawls, but more or less Rawlsian. I c a n n o t defend this list here. J o h n Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1993), 106. Ibid., xvii-xviii.

33. Ibid., xvi. 3 4 . Ibid., 1 3 6 - 1 3 7 . 35. Ibid., 8.

3 6 . This line of criticism is probably n o t o n e that Miller would endorse since he advocates a non-authoritarian c o n c e p t i o n of national identity, w h i c h requires a procedural c o m m i t m e n t to liberal freedoms to facilitate the o p e n - e n d e d discussion o f what constitutes t h e national identity. Cf. Miller, On Nationality, 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 . 3 7 . See Cosmopolitan Justice, 2 0 - 2 3 . 3 8 . Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 2 3 . 3 9 . Cf. J o h n Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 1993), 1 1 - 1 3 . 4 0 . Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' 70. 4 1 . Miller, On Nationality, 4 9 - 8 0 . 4 2 . Peter Singer stresses this point in his One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2 0 0 2 ) , 1 5 3 - 1 6 7 . 4 3 . Cf. Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, 3 9 - 5 0 , and Moellendorf, 'Persons' Interests, States' Duties and Global G o v e r n a n c e . ' 4 4 . Rawls is aware that t h e family makes perfect equality of opportunity impossible, but he neither advocates the dissolution of the family nor disavows equality of opportunity. See Rawls, Theory, 6 4 and 4 4 8 . T h e tensions between equal educational opportunity and t h e family are thoroughly explored in Harry Brighouse's School Choice and Social Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 0 ) , see especially 1 5 1 - 1 6 1 . 4 5 . Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' 7 1 . 4 6 . Nozick, Anarchy, 1 6 3 . 4 7 . See also m y Cosmopolitan Justice, 1 0 2 - 1 2 7 , and 'Is t h e War in Afghanistan Just?,' Imprints 6 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , available on line at h t t p : / / e i s . b r i s . a c . u k / ~ p l c d i b / imprints/moellendorf.html. 4 8 . Miller, 'Against Global Egalitarianism,' 5 9 - 6 0 a n d Miller, National Respon-

sibility, 63.

Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration 2006 (New York: The World Bank, 2 0 0 6 ) ,

4 9 . T h e World Bank World, chp. 2.

50. Ibid., 41.

5 1 . T h e distribution of responsibilities between native English speakers and English learners is discussed in Philippe van Parijs, T a c k l i n g the Anglop h o n e s ' free ride: Fair linguistic c o o p e r a t i o n with a global lingua franca,' AILA Review 2 0 ( 2 0 0 7 ) : 7 2 - 8 6 .

166 Notes

5

I n t e r n a t i o n a l Trade, D e v e l o p m e n t a n d Labor

1. Cf. David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy (J.M. D e n t & Sons LTD.: L o n d o n , 1973) 8 2 - 8 3 . 2. Peter Singer makes this charge against t h e W T O in One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2 0 0 2 ) , 5 7 - 7 0 . 3. T h e r e are additional c o m p l i c a t i o n s associated with a n y such judgment that have to with interpersonal utility c o m p a r i s o n a n d the c o n t e x t d e p e n d e n c y of preferences, but these can be ignored for present purposes. For more o n these issues see Allen Buchanan's Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market (Totowa: Rowan & Allanheld, 1985), 3 7 - 3 9 . 4. P. A. Samuelson, The Economic Journal 7 2 ( 1 9 6 2 ) : 8 2 0 - 8 2 9 .

5. Ibid., 827.

6. J o s e p h F.. Stiglitz and Andrew C h a r l t o n , Fair Trade For All: How Trade can Promote Development (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 5 ) , 2 4 - 3 3 . J o s e p h E. Stiglitz cites t h e e x a m p l e of Korea creating a c o m p a r a t i v e advantage in steel w h e n it had been rice. Cf. J o s e p h E. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2 0 0 6 ) , 7 0 - 7 1 . 7. Stiglitz discusses t h e e x a m p l e of M e x i c o in this regard. Cf. Stiglitz, Making

Globalization Work, 66.

8. United Nations C o m m i s s i o n on Trade and D e v e l o p m e n t , 'Industrial Countries Must Work Harder For D e v e l o p m e n t If Globalization Is To Deliver O n Its Promises,' 1 9 9 9 . Available at http://www.unctad.org/ T e m p l a t e s / w e b f l y e r . a s p ? d o c i d = 3 0 8 2 & i n t l t e m I D = 2 0 2 1 & l a n g = 1 . Accessed 8 December 2008.

9. Ibid.

10. Frederick Engels, ''The Free Trade Congress at Brussels,' ( 1 8 4 7 ) in Karl Marx Frederick Engels Collected Works, vol. 6 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 2 9 0 . 11. Karl Marx, 'Speech o n t h e Question o f Free Trade,' in Ibid., 4 6 5 . 12. Karl Marx, The German Ideology ( 1 9 3 2 ) in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 . 13. Karl Marx, The Communist Manifesto ( 1 8 4 8 ) in Ibid., 2 2 4 . 14. V.I. Lenin also expressed approval of free trade, especially after the Bolsheviks c a m e to power. This might have been due to a c o n c e r n about being vulnerable to the protectionism o f the more powerful and hostile capitalist countries. Cf. V.I. Lenin, 'The E c o n o m i c C o n t e n t o f Narodism' ( 1 8 9 5 ) , in Collected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1960), 4 3 6 and 'Re t h e M o n o p o l y of Foreign Trade' ( 1 9 2 2 ) , in Collected Works, vol. 3 3 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1 9 6 6 ) . 15. See Jay Mandle, Globalization and the Poor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 3 ) , pp. 1 9 - 2 3 . 'PPP' stands for purchasing power parity. $ 2 PPP m e a n s the local currency equivalent o f what o n e could purchase with $ 2 in the USA.

16. Ibid., 19. 17. Ibid., 18. 18. Ibid., 19.

Notes 167

19. Ibid., 22.

20.

These caveats arc also discussed in m y ' The World Trade Organization and Egalitarian J u s t i c e . ' Metaphilosophy 36 ( 2 0 0 5 ) : 1 4 5 - 1 6 2 . 2 1 . See Friederich List, The National System of Political Economy, trans. Sampson S. Lloyd, M.P. (New York: Augustus M . Kelley Publishers, 1966), bk. 1. 2 2 . Ha-Joon C h a n g , Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective (London: A n t h e m Press, 2 0 0 2 ) , 5 0 . 2 3 . J o h n Stuart Mill, A System of Logic ( L o n d o n : L o n g m a n G r o u p Ltd., 1 9 7 0 ) , 255.

24. Chang, Kicking Away, 127. 25. Mill, Logic., 256.

2 6 . C h a n g , Kicking Away. 128. 27. Ibid., 126. 2 8 . Stiglitz and C h a r l t o n , Fair Trade, 3 2 . 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

Marrakech Agreement ( 1 9 9 4 ) . Available at http://www.wto.org/engIish/ docs_e/legal_e/04-wto_e.htm. Accessed 8 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . Benrard M . H o e k m a n a n d M i c h e l M . Kostecki, The Political Economy of The World Trading System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3 8 . GATT 1 9 9 4 Article I: available at 1 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/ legal_e/legal_e.htm#finalact. Accessed 8 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . Ibid., Article III: 1, 2 and 4. H o e k m a n and Kostecki, The Political Economy of The World Trading

System, 27. 34. Ibid., 31.

3 5 . This idea is drawn from E.P. T h o m p s o n ' s discussion o f class interests in the law in Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (New York: P a n t h e o n Books), 2 6 3 .

36. Ibid., 41.

3 7 . Cf. AFL-CIO, ' C a m p a i g n for Global Fairness.' Available at http://www. a f l c i o . o r g / a b o u t u s / t h i s i s t h e a f l c i o / e c o u n c i l / e c 0 2 1 6 2 0 0 0 . c f m . Accessed 6 December 2 0 0 8 . 3 8 . Cf. also Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice (Boulder: Westview Press, 2 0 0 2 ) , 55-61. 3 9 . Jagdish Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 4 ) , 1 2 7 - 1 3 2 . 4 0 . Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (Washington, D.C: Institute for International E c o n o m i c , 1997), 1 6 - 2 7 . 4 1 . Christian Barry and S a n j a y Reddy, International Trade and Labor Standards: A Proposal for Linkage (New York: C o l u m b i a University Press, 2 0 0 8 ) , 178, fn. 7. 4 2 . See for e x a m p l e J a m e s K. Galbraith, ' W h y Populists Need to Rethink Trade,' The American Prospect 10 May 2 0 0 7 . Available at http://www. prospect.org/cs/articies?article=why_populists_need_to_rethink_trade. Accessed 8 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . For t h e various social d e m o c r a t i c programs in a globalized world are discussed in Samuel Bowles, 'Egalitarian Redistribution in Globally Integrated E c o n o m i e s , ' in Pranab Bardhan, Samuel

168 Notes

47.

Bowles a n d Michael Wallerstein eds., Globalization and Egalitarian RedistriYork and Princeton: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press, 2 0 0 6 ) , 1 2 0 - 1 4 7 . International Labor Organization, 'Declaration o n Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work,' 1 9 9 8 . Available at http://www.ilo.org/ d e c l a r a t i o n / t h e d e c l a r a t i o n / t e x t d e c l a r a t i o n / l a n g - e n / i n d e x . h t m . Accessed 7 December 2008. T h e International Confederation of Free Trade U n i o n s , 'Basic C o d e of Labour Practice.' Available at http://www-old.itcilo.org/actrav/actravenglish/telearn/global/ilo/guide/icftuco.htm. Accessed 7 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . Bhagwati, In Defense of Globalization, 2 4 5 . There is an excellent a r g u m e n t in support o f this point in Barry and Reddy, International Trade and Labor Standards, 3 6 - 4 2 . An astute proposal for such transfers is made in Ibid., 3 7 .

6

Climate Change, Development a n d Mitigation

bution (New

43.

44.

45. 46.

1. ' p p m ' stands for parts per million, which is the ratio of the n u m b e r greenhouse gas molecules to the total n u m b e r of molecules of air. 2. See Intergovernmental Panel o n C l i m a t e C h a n g e , Contribution of Work-

ing Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, 2 0 0 8 , 2. Available

at http://www.ipcc.ch/ixlf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl/ar4-wgl-spm.ixif. Accessed 15 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . 3. Denis Hevisi, 'Bert Bolin, 8 2 , Is Dead,' The New York Times, 4 J a n uary 2 0 0 8 . Available at h t t p : / / w w w . n y t i m e s . c o m / 2 0 0 8 / 0 1 / 0 4 / o b i t u a r i e s / 0 4 b o l i n . h t m l . Accessed 2 2 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . 4. United Nations General Assembly, resolution 4 3 / 5 3 , 1988. Available at http://wvNw.un.org/Depts/dhl/res/resa43.htm. Accessed 15 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . 5. United Nations Framework C o n v e n t i o n o n C l i m a t e C h a n g e , 1 9 9 2 . Available at h t t p : / / u n f c c c . i n t / e s s e n t i a l _ b a c k g r o u n d / c o n v e n t i o n / b a c k g r o u n d / i t e m s / 1 3 4 9 . p h p . Accessed 15 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 .

6. Ibid.

7. United States Energy Information Association (USEIA) data. Available at h t t p : / / w w w . e i a . d o e . g o v / e n v i r o n m e n t . h t m l . Accessed 15 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . ' M t ' stands for million metric tons. 8. United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Program, Human Development Report 2007-

2008, 40.

Climate Change 2007: The Physical Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, S. S o l o m o n , D. Qin, M. M a n n i n g , Z. C h e n ,

9. IPCC, 2 0 0 7 :

M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tigor and H.L. Miller eds. (Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA), 4 1 . Available at h t t p : / / w w w . i p c c . c h / p d f / a s s e s s m e n t - r e p o r t / a r 4 / w g l / a r 4 - w g l spm.pdf. Accessed 16 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 .

10. Ibid., 61.

Notes 169

for Policy Makers. In: Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and

11. IPCC, 2 0 0 7 : S u m m a r y

C.E. Hanson eds. (Cambridge University Press, UK), 12.

12. Ibid.

13. See UNDP, Report, 2007-2008, 2 7 - 3 0 . 14. O n t h e role of sovereignty in this regard see Henry Shue '1'he Eroding of Principle,' in Robert McKim and J e f f M c M a h a n eds., The Morality of Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 9 9 7 ) , 3 4 0 - 3 5 9 . 15. This is thesis is the t h e m e o f Bill M c k i b b e n , The End of Nature (New York: R a n d o m House, 2 0 0 6 ) . 16. David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 7 ) , 2 6 8 - 2 6 9 . 17. IPCC, 2 0 0 7 : S u m m a r y for Policy Makers. In: Climate Change 2007:

Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer eds., (Cambridge United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press), 4. Available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3spm.pdf. Accessed 15 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 .

18. Ibid.

19. Intergovernmental Panel o n C l i m a t e C h a n g e , Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report: Summary for Policy Makers, 2 0 - 2 1 . Available at http://www. ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr_spm.pdf. Accessed 15 October 2008. 2 0 . UNDP, Report 2007-2008, 3 6 . 2 1 . IPCC, 2007: Synthesis, 2 1 , text to figure SPM 11.

22. Ibid., 20. 23. Ibid., 38. 24. Ibid., 65. 25.

26. 27.

28.

29.

I discuss these matters intergenerational justice in 'Justice and t h e Distribution of the Intergenerational Costs of C l i m a t e C h a n g e , ' Journal of Social Philosophy 4 0 ( 2 0 0 9 ) : 2 0 4 - 2 2 4 . UNFCC, Article 2. For UNDP' advocacy of this goal see UNDP, Report 2007-2008. See also the 2 0 0 8 WIDER lecture by UNDP head, Kemal Dervis. Lecture available at h t t p : / / w w w . w i d e r . u n u . e d u / h o m e / n e w s / e n _ G B / a n n u a l - l e c t u r e - o n l i n e print/, accessed 16 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . For t h e EU's view see http://eurlcx.europa.eu/LcxUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0002:EN: NOT. Accessed 17 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . J a e E d m o n d s and Steven J. S m i t h , 'The T e c h n o l o g y o f Two Degrees,' in Hans J o a c h i m et al. eds., Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 6 ) , 3 8 8 . Stephen H. S c h n e i d e r and Jessica Lane discuss mitigation u n d e r 3 . 5 " C as t h e goal in t h e i r 'An Overview of 'Dangerous' C l i m a t e C h a n g e ' in J o a c h i m et al. eds., Avoiding, 7 - 2 4 . Yu. A. Izrael and S.M. S e m e n o v advocate a

170 Notes

goal o f 2 . 5 ° C in their 'Critical Levels of G r e e n h o u s e Gases, Stabilization Scenarios, and Implications for Global Decisions,' in J o a c h i m et al. eds., Avoiding, 7 3 - 7 9 . 3 0 . United States Energy Information Administration. Available at http:// www.eia.doe.gov/environment.html. Accessed 13 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 .

31. Ibid. 32. Ibid.

3 3 . T h e impossibility o f this proposal is s o m e t i m e s missed. For e x a m p l e see M a r t i n o Traxler, 'Fair C h o r e Division for C l i m a t e C h a n g e , ' Social Theory and Practice 2 8 ( 2 0 0 2 ) : 124. 3 4 . USEIA data. Available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html. Accessed 9 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . 3 5 . UNDP 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 , 4 3 . 3 6 . UNDP 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 , 4 5 .

37. Ibid. 38. 39.

USEIA data. Henry Shue, 'Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions,' Law and Policy 15 ( 1 9 9 3 ) : 4 2 . 4 0 . United Nations Framework C o n v e n t i o n o n C l i m a t e C h a n g e , 1992. Available at h t t p : / / u n f c c c . i n t / r e s o u r c e / d o c s / c o n v k p / c o n v e n g . p d f . Accessed 2 October 2008.

41. Ibid. 42. Ibid.

4 3 . T h e first n o r m seems t o be applying t o states w h a t T o n y H o n o r e refers t o as o u t c o m e responsibility, 'being responsible for the good and harm we bring a b o u t by what we do.' Tony Honore, Responsibility and Fault (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 1999), 14. 4 4 . M a r t i n o Traxler, 'Fair C h o r e Division for C l i m a t e C h a n g e , ' Social Theory and Practice 2 8 ( 2 0 0 2 ) : 1 0 1 - 1 3 4 . 4 5 . Traxler's principle o f burden equalization in eschewing equalizing percentages o f C O 2 reductions is distinct from J o h n Stuart Mill's principle of equality of sacrifice in taxation, w h i c h holds that people should be taxed at equal rates. See J o h n Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Pt. II, Bk. V, c h p . II: 'Setting out, then, from t h e m a x i m that equal sacrifices ought to be d e m a n d e d from all, we have next to inquire w h e t h e r this is in fact done, by making each c o n t r i b u t e t h e same percentage on his pecuniary m e a n s . ' Mill c o n t e n d s that generally it is so d o n e . T h e Mill text is available in T h e Collected Works of J o h n Stuart Mill, Volume III. Available on line at h t t p : / / o l l . l i b e r t y f u n d . o r g / ? o p t i o n = c o m _ s t a t i c x t & s t a t i c f i l e = s h o w . p h p % 3 F p e r s o n = 2 1 & I t e m i d = 2 8 . Accessed 2 5 April 2 0 0 9 . 4 6 . Traxler, 'Fair C h o r e , ' 129.

47. Ibid., 133.

4 8 . T h e Human D e v e l o p m e n t Index was developed by the United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme under the guidance o f Sen's capabilities framework. It assesses average h u m a n well-being within states by c o m b i n i n g measure of i n c o m e , health and e d u c a t i o n . The UNDP's Measuring Human

Notes 171

Development: A Primer

49. 50.

51. 52.

is available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/ p u b l i c a t i o n s / t i t l e , 4 1 8 2 , e n . h t m l . Accessed 2 1 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . T h e 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 Human D e v e l o p m e n t Index rankings are available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. Accessed 2 1 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . Annex-1 countries are the countries indentified by the Kyoto Protocol as having a responsibility to reduce emissions. These are o n l y countries o f the developed world. UNDP 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 , 2 2 9 - 2 3 2 . This principle is advocated by several N G O s and climate activists. T h e Centre for Science and the E n v i r o n m e n t (see http://www.cseindia.org/) and the Global C o m m o n s Institute (see http://www.gci.org.uk/) have spearheaded support for the idea that each person should have an equal e n t i t l e m e n t to e m i t greenhouse gases. T h e view is defended in Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World: The case for environmental colonialism (New Dehli: Centre for Science and t h e Envir o n m e n t , 1 9 9 1 ) a n d in Tom Athanasiou and Paul Baer, Dead Heat: Global Justice and Global Warming (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2 0 0 2 ) . T h e principle has received some, but not a great deal of, philosophical a t t e n tion. For s o m e discussion of it see for e x a m p l e Dale J a m i e s o n , 'Climate C h a n g e and Global E n v i r o n m e n t a l Justice' in Clark A. Miller and Paul N. Edwards eds., Changing the Atmosphere: Expert knowledge and environmental governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 1 ) , 2 8 7 - 3 0 7 ; and Peter Singer One World: The Ethics of Globalization (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2 0 0 2 ) , 1 4 - 5 0 .

5 3 . Singer, One World, 3 6 . 5 4 . United State Census Bureau, International Data Base. Available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpop.html. Accessed 2 0 O c t o ber 2 0 0 8 . 5 5 . USEIA data.

56. Ibid. 57. Ibid.

5 8 . J a m e s Hansen, et al. 'Target Atmospheric C 0 2 : W h e r e Should H u m a n ity Aim?' p. 13. Available at h t t p : / / w w w . c o l u m b i a . e d u / ~ j c h l / 2 0 0 8 / T a r g e t C 0 2 _ 2 0 0 8 0 4 0 7 . p d f Accessed 3 0 J a n u a r y 2 0 0 9 . 5 9 . For the year 2 0 0 0 per capita emissions cf. For UNDP H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t Index cf. http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ Accessed 2 2 O c t o b e r 2 0 0 8 . For the per capita emissions see t h e USEIA data. 6 0 . See Paul Baer et al., The Greenhouse Development Rights Framework:

The Right to Development in a Climate Constrained World, rev. 2nd

ed. (Berlin: T h e Heinrich Boll Foundation, Christian Aid, EcoEquity and t h e S t o c k h o l m E n v i r o n m e n t Institute, 2 0 0 8 ) . Available at h t t p : / / www.ecoequity.org/docs/TheGDRsFramework.pdf. Accessed 9 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 8 . T h i s is a particularly important proposal in virtue o f its explicit a t t e m p t to satisfy the three UNFCCC n o r m s that I have been employing. 6 1 . Baer et al., Greenhouse Development Rights, 5 5 . 6 2 . UNFCC, 'Report of the C o n f e r e n c e o f the Parties o n its t h i r t e e n t h session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 D e c e m b e r 2 0 0 7 . ' Available at

172 Notes

h t t p : / / u n f c c c . i n t / m e e t i n g s / c o p _ 1 3 / i t e m s / 4 0 4 9 . p h p . Accessed 21 October

2008. 63. Ibid., 3.

64. UNFCC, Preamble. 65. See for e x a m p l e Tom Athanasiou and Paul Baer, Dead Heat: Global justice and global wanning (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2 0 0 2 ) . 66. Stephen M. Gardiner has perspicaciously analyzed this intergenerational collective action problem in a set o f papers. See his 'The Real Tragedy of C o m m o n s , ' Philosophy and Public Affairs 3 0 ( 2 0 0 1 ) : 3 8 7 - 4 1 6 a n d 'The Dangerous Illusion o f Kyoto,' Ethics and International Affairs 18 ( 2 0 0 4 ) : 23-39.

7


1. Simon Caney, ' C o s m o p o l i t a n Justice and Institutional Design: An Egalitarian Liberal C o n c e p t i o n of Global G o v e r n a n c e , ' Social Theory and Practice 3 2 ( 2 0 0 6 ) : 7 3 0 - 7 3 1 .

2. Ibid., 755. 3. Ibid., 733. 4. Ibid., 733-734. 5. Ibid.

6. T h e requirements of legitimacy are an important matter for consideration that I set aside here in my effort to reject the view that egalitarian institutions should be held to a different standard. For more on what legitimacy might (uniformly) require, see Allen Buchanan a n d Robert O. Keohane, ' T h e Legitimacy o f Global G o v e r n a n c e Institutions,' Ethics & International Affairs 2 0 ( 2 0 0 6 ) : 4 0 5 - 4 3 7 .

7. Samir Amin, Deliniking: Towards a Polycentirc World ( L o n d o n : Zed Books Ltd, 1990), 6 3 . 8. Karl Marx, The German Ideology ( 1 9 3 2 ) . In Karl Marx Selected Writings ed. by David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 1 7 0 - 1 7 1 . This quotation features centrally in Trotsky's critique of the ideology of socialism in o n e c o u n t r y in his The Revolution Betrayed (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1972), especially chapter 3. Marx's view certainly impressed Bolshevik leaders in 1917 as they sought an escape from the requirements o f advanced development by p i n n i n g their hopes on a successful revolution in the more advanced Germany, w h i c h could then lend developmental assistance to the fledgling Soviet state. Lenin for example claimed that, 'Regarded from the world-historical point o f view, there would doubtlessly be no hope of the ultimate victor}' of our revolution, if we were to remain alone, if there were n o revolutionary m o v e m e n t s in o t h e r countries, the our position would be hopeless.' 'Seventh Congress o f the R.C.P. (B.),' March 6 - 8 , 1 9 1 7 in Collected Works, vol., 27 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964), 9 5 . 9. G.A. C o h e n , Marx's Theory of History, expanded ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 0 ) , 2 0 4 - 2 1 5 , but especially page 2 1 4 .

Notes 173

10. Cohen's own version of this premise is 'No group of producers will impose such conditions on themselves.' See Ibid., 2 1 4 . That may be a more plausible premise for reasons 1 discuss in the following paragraphs, but to the extent that it is, it renders the argument invalid.

11. Ibid., 208. 12. Ibid., 69. 13. Ibid., 6 5 - 7 3 . 14. Ibid., 1 0 1 - 1 0 3 .

15. David Schweickart, Against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3 0 7 . 16. Ibid., 8 8 - 1 0 3 . 17. Ibid., 3 0 7 and David Schweickart, After Capitalism (Lanham: Roman and Littlefield, 2 0 0 2 ) , 1 1 3 - 1 2 3 . 18. Cf. Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder and Jay Mandle, Globalization and the Poor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 3 ) . 19. Walden Bello, Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy (London: Zed Books, 2 0 0 2 ) , 114. 2 0 . J o h n Cavanagh and Jerry Mander, Alternatives to Economic Globalization (San Francisco: Berrett Koehler Publishers, Inc., 2 0 0 2 ) , 107. 2 1 . Omar Dahbour, 'Three Models of Global C o m m u n i t y ' Journal of Ethics 9: (2005), 2 1 7 .

22. Ibid., 217. 2 3 . Plato, The Republic, 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31.

32.

33.

trans, by G.M.A. Grube (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1974),

42, at 3 7 2 c . Dahbour, 'Three Models,' 2 1 8 . Dahbour, "Three Models,' 2 1 9 . Mandle, Globalization and the Poor, 51. Bello, Deglobalization, 115. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (London: Polity Press, 2002), 172-173. T h o m a s W. Pogge, '"Assisting" the Global Poor,' in Deen K. Chaterjee, ed., The Ethics of Assistance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 265. Iris Marion Young, 'Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social C o n n e c tion Model,' Social Philosophy and Policy 2 3 (2006): 2 3 . David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 7 ) , 84. Miller's term captures well the idea that this sort of responsibility has to do with remedying injustices. But as will be seen in my discussion of Miller's treatment of remedial responsibility I do not believe the responsibility can be to remediate in the sense of returning to an approximation o f holdings to prior to the injustice. J o h n Locke, Two Treatise of Government, Bk. II, chp. 5, para. 37. Available on line http://wvm.lonang.com/exlibris/locke/loc-205.htm. Accessed 2 9 April 2 0 0 9 . Distribution A is Pareto superior to B if and only if everyone is better off under A than under B.

174

Notes

Miller, National Responsibility, 107. The interesting survey of t h e c o n c e p tions runs from 9 7 - 1 0 4 . 3 5 . This is the defense o f w h a t Rawls calls d e m o c r a t i c equality. See Theory, 6 5 . 34.

36. Ibid., 87. 37. Ibid., 88.

3 8 . Milanovic, Worlds Apart, 149. 3 9 . Gillian Brock discusses a great m a n y o t h e r tax proposals in her 'Taxation and Global Justice: Closing the Gap between T h e o r y and Practice,' Journal of Social Philosophy 3 9 ( 2 0 0 8 ) : 1 6 1 - 1 8 4 . 4 0 . Pogge, 'A Global Resources Dividend,' in World Poverty, 1 9 6 - 2 1 5 .

41. Ibid., 206.

42. Ibid., 207.

4 3 . J a m e s Tobin, 'A Proposal for International M o n e t a r y Reform,' in Essays in Economics: Theory and Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), 4 8 8 - 4 9 4 . 4 4 . Barry Eichengreen, J a m e s Tobin, and Charles Wyplosz, 'Two Cases for Sand in the W h e e l s o f International Finance,' The Economic Journal 105, no. 4 2 8 (1995): 1 6 1 - 1 7 2 . 4 5 . Milanovic, Worlds Apart, 1 5 9 - 1 6 2 . 4 6 . Michael Howard makes this point in 'NAFTA Dividend: A Guaranteed M i n i m u m I n c o m e for North America,' Basic Income Studies: An International Journal of Basic Income Research 2, ( 2 0 0 7 ) : 16. Standing suggests e l e c t r o n i c deposits that c a n be accessed o n a credit card as part of such a s c h e m e . T h e suggestion is made as a matter of d o m e s t i c distributive just, but it might serve t o mitigate capacity problems as part of a global tax and transfer s c h e m e . Cf. Global Labour Flexibility, 3 6 8 - 3 6 9 .

Index

NOTE: Locators followed by " n " refer note n u m b e r absolute poverty, 4, 5, 13, 28, 134, 143 Ad Hoc Working G r o u p o n Long-term Cooperative Action, 129 AFL-CIO, 101 Agreement o n Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights ( TRIPS), 9 8 Amin, Samir, 137, 173 n 7 Anderson, Elizabeth, 5 8 , 5 9 ,

an association, e c o n o m i c aspects of, 58-61 d e m o c r a t i c equality, 5 9 reciprocity, 5 9 - 6 0 roles, 5 8 - 9 an association, political aspects of, 54-8 bestowing honors, culture practice of, 5 7 d e m o c r a t i c citizenship, 5 5 , 161-2 n27

democratic equality, 55

162 n38 Annex-1 and n o n - A n n e x - 1 countries, distinguishing between, 123 a n t h r o p o g e n i c c l i m a t e c h a n g e , 106,

d e m o c r a t i c political ideal, the, 5 5 ,

162 n28

goods o f justice, 5 6 political justice, 5 4 - 5 states, 5 4 - 8 Athanasiou, Tom., 127, 171, 172 n52 Averyt, K. B., 169 n 9

108, 1 0 9 - 1 0 , 115 AR4, see Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) Arenius, Sven, 107 Article 3 o f t h e Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights, 7 Article 5 of T h e African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 6 Article 7 o f t h e Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights, 12 Article 18 o f t h e Universal Declaration of H u m a n Rights, 10 Asian e c o n o m i c crisis, 4 9 an association, climate c h a n g e , 110-111

Baer, Paul, 127, 171 n 5 2 , 172 n 6 0 , 1 7 2 n 6 1 , 172 n 6 5 Barry, Brian, 3 6 , 1 6 0 n 4 8 , 164 n 9 Barry, Christian, 103, 105, 168 n 4 1 , 168 n 4 6 Barry, Eichengreen, 174 n 4 4 Beitz, Charles, 4, 155 n l 7 , 1 6 4 n 9 Bello, Walden, 1 4 0 - 1 , 143, 173 n 1 9 , 174 n 2 7 B e n t h a m , Jeremy, 1 5 6 n 2 4 bestowing honors, culture practice of, 5 7 Bhagwati, Jagdish, 4, 103, 105, 155 n 1 6 , 168 n 3 9 , 168 n 4 5

175

176 Index

Blake, Michael, 19, 2 3 , 24, 2 5 , 2 6 , 27, 2 9 , 3 0 , 1 5 8 n 1 6 coercion and c o n d i t i o n s of distributive justice, 2 3 - 7 ; c h u r c h e s and universities, 2 5 - 6 ; c o e r c i o n of private and t a x law, 24, 26; c o m p e n s a t i o n , 2 6 ; egalitarian distributive justice, 2 4 ; egalitarianism, 26; hypothetical c o n s e n t , 24; institutional (Rawls coercion a c c o u n t ) , 2 7 ; liberal principle o f a u t o n o m y , 2 3 , 2 4 ; versus Miller, 23; sufficiency principle, 2 4 Bolin, Bert, 107, 169 n3 Bourguignon, Francois, 157 n 4 6 Brazil, 4 9 , 123, 124 average per capita C O 2 emissions, 125 Brighouse, Harry, 159 n 4 3 , 1 6 2 n 2 8 , 163 n48, 1 6 6 n 4 4 Brock, Gillian, 7 5 - 7 , 8 0 , 159 n 4 3 , 163 n 4 1 , 164 n 1 6 , 164 n 1 7 , 1 6 4 n18, 174 n 3 9 Brownlie, lan, 156 n 2 3 B u c h a n a n , Allen, 166 n 3 , 173 n 6 Caney, Simon, 43, 1 3 4 - 6 , 1 6 0 n 3 , 1 6 4 n l 7 , 172 n1 Canziani, O. F., 1 6 9 n11 Cavanagh, J o h n , 173 n 2 0 Cavanaugh, J o h n , 141 C h a n g , H a - J o o n , 124, 127, 130, 131, 133, 134, 142, 143, 153, 161 n 1 2 , 161 n 1 4 , 161 n 1 7 , 161 n 2 2 , 161 n 2 5 , 167 n 2 2 , 167 n 2 4 , 167 n 2 6 , 168, 169 n 2 , 1 6 9 n5, 169 n 9 , 169 n 1 1 , 169 n 1 7 , 1 7 0 n 1 9 , 170 n25, 170 n28, 170 n29, 170 n33, C h a p m a n , J o h n . W., 1 6 0 n 4 8 , 164 n 9 C h a r l t o n , Andrew, 15, 9 3 , 9 8 , 157 n 4 7 , 1 6 6 n 6 , 167, 2 8 Charter of the United Nations, 6

Chaterjee, Deen. K., 157 n 4 5 , 161 n12, 174 n29 C h e n , S h a o h u a , 155 n 1 2 , 157 n 5 0 , 169 n 9 C h e n , Z., 1 6 9 n 9 citizen-sovereigns, 3 0 - 1

class oppression, 139

c l i m a t e change, 1 0 6 - 3 1 155-year w a r m i n g trend, 108 Ad Hoc Working G r o u p o n Long-term Cooperative Action, 129, 130 a n t h r o p o g e n i c climate change, 106, 108, 1 0 9 - 1 0 , 115 AR4, 1 1 3 Article 2 of the UNFCCC, 115 association generating duties of justice, 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 climate c h a n g e mitigation, see climate c h a n g e mitigation

climate sensitivity, 114

CO2, atmospheric concentration of, 1 0 7 - 8 C O 2 emissions, projected increase, 112 emissions association, 1 1 0 - 1 1 equilibrium level of average surface warming, 114 EU, C O 2 emissions reduction, 1 1 5 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), 108 glacial melt, results of, 109 global justice, 1 1 4 - 1 5 greenhouse gases, 1 0 7 - 8

Human Development Report 2007-2008, 109

Intergovernmental Panel on C l i m a t e C h a n g e (IPCC), 108 IPCC C O 2 stabilization targets, 1 1 2 table 1, 115 Kyoto Protocol ( 2 0 0 5 ) , 108 malaria, 109 matters of justice, 1 0 9 - 1 1 new global c l i m a t e regime, 1 1 1 - 1 5 overview, 1 0 6 - 7 sea levels, 107, 108, 114

Index 177

socio-economic development, threat to, 1 0 7 - 9 sub-Saharan Africa, 109 thermal e x p a n s i o n , 1 1 3 - 1 4 threats to justice, 1 2 9 - 3 1 UNDP, 1 1 3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate C h a n g e (UNFCCC), 1 0 7 - 8 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 4 3 / 5 3 , 107, 108 c l i m a t e c h a n g e mitigation, 1 1 5 - 2 9 2°C goal, 1 1 5 - 1 6 Annex-1 a n d n o n - A n n e x - 1 countries, distinguishing between, 123 C O 2 emissions, reduction of, 1 1 6 electrification, 117 equal a m o u n t s principle, 1 1 6 - 1 7 equal burdens principle, 1 1 8 - 2 2 ; Amartya Sen, 121; e x a m p l e , 119; Human D e v e l o p m e n t Index (HDI), 121; moral problems with, 1 1 9 - 2 1 equal percentages principle, 117-18 equal shares (contract and coverage) principle, 1 2 4 - 7 , 1 7 1 - 2 n 5 2 ; 2°C w a r m i n g limit, 1 2 6 ; average per capita C O 2 emissions, 125; global population, 2 0 5 0 projection, 125; per capita a m o u n t , 125fairness argument, 117 g r e e n h o u s e d e v e l o p m e n t rights (GDR) principle, 1 2 7 - 9 Human D e v e l o p m e n t Report 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 , 117 IPCC's projected reduction range for 2°C warming limit, 1 2 6 - 7 Kyoto Protocol ( 2 0 0 5 ) , 123 modified polluter pays principle, 123-4 polluter pays principle, 1 2 2 - 3 principles, legitimacy of, 1 1 7 - 1 8 , 171 n 4 3

Responsibility-Capacity Index (RCI), 1 2 8 temperature goals, 1 1 5 - 1 6 trading scheme, 1 2 6 UNDP's threshold o f a high h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t , 123 UNFCCC, 118 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 4 3 / 5 3 , 1 2 2 US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 1 1 6

climate sensitivity, 114

C O 2 , a t m o s p h e r i c c o n c e n t r a t i o n of, 107-8 C O 2 emissions projected increase, 1 1 2 reduction of, 116 coercion and c o n d i t i o n s o f distributive justice, 1 9 - 3 9 coercion accounts, 19 compatriots, defined, 158 n1 overview, 1 9 - 2 0

the principle of associational justice, 32-6

principle o f fair play, 3 6 - 9 international institutions, 1 4 - 1 5 C o h e n , G . A., 138, 139, 160 n 1 1 , 173 n 9 C o h e n , J o s h u a , 6 5 , 140, 161 n 2 7 , 163 n 4 9 , 173 n10 c o m m o n good association constraint o f justificatory restraint, 3 4 definition of, 12 duties of justice, 5 2 e c o n o m y as, 5 8 global e c o n o m i c association, 132 global equality of opportunity, 71 interpretive activity, 5 7 justificatory presumption of equality, 51 political associations, 5 6 presumptions of procedural and o u t c o m e equality in, 5 3 privileges, 3 2

coercive imposition of

178 Index

compatriots, defined, 1 5 8 n1 contractualism, 12, 5 2 Corina, G i o v a n n i Andrea, 161 n l 7 Cullity, Garrett, 1 6 0 n 5 1 Cosmopolitan Justice ( M o e l l e n d o r f ) , 73-4 Dahbour, Omar, 141, 141, 142, 173 n 2 1 , 174 n 2 4 , 1 7 4 n 2 5 Daniels, N o r m a n . , 159, 162 n 2 7 , 162 n 3 1 , 1 6 2 n 3 1 , 1 6 2 n 3 9 , 164 n9 Darwall, Stephen, 8, 156 n 2 9 , 1 5 6 n 3 8 , 157 n 3 9 , 159 n 4 1 Declaration o n Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 104 de-globalization, 1 4 0 - 3 de-linking, 137, 139, 1 4 0 d e m o c r a t i c citizenship, 5 5 , 8 1 , 161-2 n27 d e m o c r a t i c equality, 55, 5 9 - 6 0 , 174 n 3 5 d e m o c r a t i c political ideal, the, 5 5 dumping, 101 duties o f social justice, 20, 4 7 , 141 Dworkin, Ronald, 5 7 , 159 n 4 6 Edison, T h o m a s . , 113 Edmonds, Jae, 1 7 0 n 2 8 educational opportunities, inequality of, 77 egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m , 4 0 , 4 1 , 53, 72 egalitarian distributive justice, Andrea Sangiovanni's a c c o u n t of, 6 1 - 3 egalitarian justificatory presumption, 10-13, 35-36, 5 1 - 5 2 justificatory respect, 11, 3 5 - 6 , 5 2 , 157 n 3 9 persons as sources of practical reasons, 10, 11 principle of equality, 12-13 reasonable e n d o r s e m e n t , 11 right to freedom o f c o n s c i e n c e , 1 0

prima facie

self-authenticating sources of valid claims (Rawls), 11 EIA, see US Energy Information Administration (EIA) Eichengreen, Barry, 1 7 4 n 4 4 electrification, 117 equality o f opportunity defended, 68-89 citizenship status, 7 1 - 3 ; arbitrariness, 7 1 - 2 , 73; distribuand of egalitarian justice, 73; original citizenship, 71; place o f birth, 71 controversy, 70, 7 9 , 80, 81 cross-national consensus, steps toward, 8 1 - 5 ; ad hominem arguments, 8 2 , 8 3 - 4 David Miller's criticisms, 7 7 - 8 1 Gillian Brock's criticisms, 7 5 - 7 , 1 6 4 n l 7 , 165 n l 9 global e c o n o m i c association, 7 3 - 5 ; citizenship, 75; Cosmopolitan Justice ( M o e l l e n d o r f ) , 7 3 - 4 ; 'the position of t h e latter's parent', 74; s c h o o l education, 74 national self-determination, 8 5 - 9 ; c o n c e p t i o n o f state sovereignty, 86; destruction of, 8 5 - 6 ; English education recommendation, 88, 89; global lingua franca, 87; immigration policy, liberalizing, 8 7 - 8 overview, 6 8 - 7 1 ; income, o p p o r t u n i t y for, 68; longevity,

68; noblesse oblige, 70

Engels, Frederick, 9 4 , 167 n 10 EU, see European U n i o n (EU) European U n i o n (EU), 115, 128, 1 3 0 Evenett, S i m o n , 161 n 1 5 FDI, see foreign direct i n v e s t m e n t (FDI)

fictio juris, 35, 159 n45

Index 179

foreign direct investment (FDI), 4 9 Formula of Humanity (Kant), 11 Forst, Rainer, 157 n 3 9 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), 1 0 8 - 9 , 113 free-standing, 77, 165 n l 9 fundamental h u m a n rights, 7 - 8 Galbraith, J a m e s K., 1 6 8 n 4 2 Gardiner, Stephen M., 6 6 GATT, see General Agreement o n Tariffs and Trade (GATT) General Agreement o n Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 9 8 G i n i coefficient, 3, 15, 1 5 4 n 8 glacial melt, results of, 109 global distributive institutions, 132-53 anti-globalization view, 1 3 7 - 4 3 egalitarian distributive institutions, legitimacy of, 1 3 4 - 7 , 173 n6; de-globalization, 1 4 0 - 3 ; de-linking, 137, 139, 140; socialism, feasibility of, 137-40 inequality, institutional reforms for remedying, 1 4 7 - 5 3 ; assessment, criteria for, 1 4 8 - 9 ; global tax and transfer plans, 1 4 9 - 5 3 ; tax and transfer programs, 148 overview, 1 3 2 - 4 responsibility, c o n c e p t i o n of, 143-7

distributive institutions, 133; institutions of egalitarian distribution, 133; institutions of egalitarian redistribution, 133; redistributive institutions, 133

terminological p o i n t :

global e c o n o m y , inequalities in, 63-7

egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m , 63-4 global inequalities, current, 6 6 - 7

injustice, m e t h o d for c l a i m i n g an, 6 6 membership dependence, 63 global egalitarianism, 6, 6 4 - 5 , 7 0 , 8 6 - 7 , 164 n 9 global inequality, 2 - 5 absolute poverty, injustice of, 5 education equality, 2 under five mortality rate, 2 G i n i coefficient, 3, 15 i n c o m e inequality, 2 - 3 injustice of, rejection of, 4 international inequality: concept

1

inequality, 3; concept 2 inequality, 3; concept 3 or global inequality, 3

Organisation for E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n and D e v e l o p m e n t (OCED), 2 poverty, 3 - 4 reasons it matters, 4 - 5 United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme (1998), 3 wealth inequality, 2

World Development Report 2006, 2

World Health Organization, 2 global justice (Pogge's a c c o u n t ) , 13-18 coercive imposition of international institutions, 1 4 - 1 5 distributive inequalities, reasons to oppose, 1 3 - 1 4 G i n i coefficient o f international inequality, 15 global distributive justice, 13 global institutions, h a r m i n g t h e poor, 17 global social injustice, 15 harm, 17, 18 international borrowing and resource privileges, 13, 14, 15, 17 libertarians, 15 political left, 14 political right, 14 poverty, 15

180 Index

global justice - continued poverty, global factors as significant cause of, 1 6 - 1 7 poverty reduction, 16 student performance, analogy to, 16

a subjunctive comparison with a hypothetical baseline, 17, 18 a subjunctive comparison with an historical baseline, 17, 18

sufficientarian, 13 trade liberalization, 15 World Trade Organization ( W T O ) , 14 global lingua franca, 78, 87 Global Resources Dividend (GRD), 149-50

global tax and transfer plans, 1 4 9 - 5 3 currency speculation, 1 5 0 - 1 Global Resources Dividend (GRD), 149-50 i n c o m e grants, 1 5 2 - 3 , 174 n 4 6 progressive global i n c o m e tax (Milanovic), 1 5 1 - 3 t h e Tobin Tax, 1 5 0 - 1 GNP, see Gross National Product (GNP) goods o f justice, 5 6 Gosepath, Stefan, 157 n 3 9 GRD, see Global Resources Dividend (GRD) greenhouse gases, 1 0 7 - 8 , 115

the Greenhouse Development Rights principle, 127-9

Gross National Product (GNP), 9 5

Habermas, Jurgen, 157 n 4 0 , 157 Ha-Joon C h a n g , 9 6 , 9 7 - 8 Hansen, James., 126, 1 7 2 n 5 8 Hanson, C. E., 1 6 9 n11 Hart, H. L. A., 36, 1 5 6 n 2 4 , 159 n 4 7 , 171 n 4 3 Hayek, Friedrich, 134 HDI, see h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t Index (HDI) Hegel, G . W. F., 141

Hevisi, Denis, 169 n 3 Hoekman, Bernard M., 161 n 2 4 , 167 n 3 0 , 168 n 3 3 Honore, Tony, 171 n 4 3 h o n o r i n g , practice of, 5 7 Howard, Michael., 174 n 4 6 H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t Index (HDI), 121, 171 n 4 8 H u m a n D e v e l o p m e n t Report 2 0 0 7 - 2 0 0 8 , 117 h u m a n dignity, 6 hypothetical c o n s e n t , 24, 2 5 , 5 1 - 2 ILO, see International Labour Organization (ILO) i n c o m e grants, 1 5 2 - 3 , 174 n 4 6 i n c o m e inequality, 6 6 - 7 inherent dignity of persons, 5 - 8 contrast with Rawls, 9; and egalitarian justificatory presumption, 1 0 - 1 3 , 3 5 - 3 6 , 5 1 - 5 2 ; global inequality, 2 - 5 h u m a n rights d o c u m e n t s , 6 - 7 justification, 8 - 9 justificatory respect, 11, 3 5 - 6 , 5 2 , 157 n 3 9 overview, 1 - 2 Pogge's h u m a n rights-based a c c o u n t of global justice, contrasting view, 1 3 - 1 8 Respect for, 5 - 8

institutional accounts, 44, 64

institutional (recognition) respect, 8 Intergovernmental Panel on C l i m a t e C h a n g e (IPCC), 108 international borrowing and resource privileges, 13, 14, 15, 17 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions's 'Basic C o d e of Conduct', 104 International C o v e n a n t on Civil and Political Rights, preamble to, 6 International C o v e n a n t on E c o n o m i c , Social and Cultural Rights, preamble to, 6

Index 181

international inequality

concept 1 inequality, 3 concept 2 inequality, 3 concept 3 or global inequality, 3

International Labour Organization (ILO), 104 International M o n e t a r y Fund, 9 8 international trade, 9 0 - 1 0 5 AFL-CIO, 101 Agreement o n Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (T RIPS), 9 8 asymmetrical tariff reduction, 9 9 core labor standards, 1 0 4 fair c o m p e t i t i o n , 9 9 free trade, 9 1 - 3 ; import taxes, 9 3 ; Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 9 2 - 3 ; Pareto superiority, 9 2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 9 8 market access, 9 9 most favored nations (MFNs), 9 9 multi-lateral linkage, 1 0 4 - 5 ; advantage of, 1 0 4 - 5 ; core labor standards, 104; Declaration o n Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 104; International C o n f e d e r a t i o n of Free Trade Unions's 'Basic C o d e of C o n d u c t ' , 104; International Labour Organization's (ILO), 104 overview, 9 0 predation, 9 9 protectionism, 1 0 0 - 1 protectionist policies, 9 3 - 6 ; Gross National Product (GNP), 9 5 ; Marxist tradition, 9 4 - 5 ; socio-economic development, p r o m o t i o n of, 9 5 - 6 ; United Nations C o n f e r e n c e on Trade and D e v e l o p m e n t (UNCTAD), 9 4 protectionist policies, effects of, 91-2, 93-6

reciprocity, 9 9 rules-based multi-lateral trade regime, superiority of, 9 8 - 9 ; WTO, 9 8 - 9 state intervention, 9 6 - 8 ; capital market imperfections, 9 8 ; e m p l o y m e n t , 97unfairness, 1 0 1 - 4 ; AFL-CIO, 101; 1 0 3 ; dumping, 101; e m p l o y m e n t , unfair d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in, 1 0 1 - 2 ; globalization and, 103; low-wage workers, 102; Nordic countries, 103, 168 n 4 2 ; producers (the term), 101; racially or sexually discriminatory laws, victim of, 102; right to unionize, 103; unfair worker treatment, protectionist policies in response to, 1 0 3 - 4 IPCC, see Intergovernmental Panel o n C l i m a t e C h a n g e (IPCC) J a m i e s o n , Dale, 171 n 5 2 J o a c h i m , Hans, 1 7 0 n 2 8 , 170 n 2 9 J o r d o n , Michael., 5 8 Julius, A. J., 6 4 , 159 n 4 2 , 163 n 4 8 justice-positivism, 36justification, 8-9 contextualist-interpretive elements, 5 6 i n h e r e n t dignity o f persons, 8 i n h e r e n t worth o f persons, 8 justificatory respect, 11, 3 5 - 6 , 5 2 , 157 n 3 9 universalist e l e m e n t , 56, 5 7

justificatory respect, 11, 35-6, 52, 157 n 3 9 Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 9 2 - 3 Kartha, Sivan., 127 Kaya, Ayse., 1 5 6 n 18 Kemp-Benedict, Eric., 127 Keohane, Robert O., 161 n l 9 , 173 n 6 Klosko, George., 1 6 0 n51

182 Index

Kostecki, Michel. M., 161 n 2 4 , 167 n 3 0 , 168 n 3 3 Kyoto Protocol ( 2 0 0 5 ) , 108, 123, 129 Lane, Jessica, 1 7 0 n 2 9 Latin America, glacial melt, results of, 1 0 9 Lenhardt, Christian, 157 Lenin, V . I , 167 n 1 4 , 1 7 3 n 8 liberal principle of a u t o n o m y , 23, 2 4 libertarians, 15 List, Friederich, 9 6 Lloyd, S a m p s o n S., 161 n 2 2 , 167 n21 Locke, J o h n , 18, 145, 1 7 4 n 3 2 longevity, 67, 6 8 malaria, 109, 117 Mander, Jerry, 141, 141, 173 n 2 0 Mandle, Jay, 9 5 , 142, 167 n l 5 , 173 n 1 8 , 174 n 2 6 M a n n i n g , M., 169 n 9 Marquis, M., 1 6 9 n 9 Marx, Karl, 3 5 , 94, 9 5 , 1 3 7 - 8 , 140, 159 n45, 1 6 0 n i l , 1 6 4 n9, 167 n 1 0 , 167 n 1 1 , 167 n 1 2 , 167 n 1 3 , 173 n 8 , 173 n 9 Mathers, Colin, 154 n 3 , 163 n 5 5 McKim, Robert, 1 6 9 n 14 McLellan, David, 167 n 1 2 , 1 7 3 n 8 M c M a h a n , Jeff, 169 n 14 m e m b e r s h i p dependence, 4 0 - 4 1 , 42-5 defense of, 4 3 - 5

institutional accounts, 44

moral personality, 4 3 moral rights, 4 4 - 5 t h e source a n d the o b j e c t of a duty, distinguish between, 44 MFNs, see m o s t favored nations (MFNs) Milanovic, Branko, 2 - 3 , 15, 6 8 - 9 , 75, 1 4 8 - 9 , 1 5 1 - 3 , 154 n 6 , 154 n 8 , 155 n 1 0 , 163 n 5 1 , 163 n 4 , 174 n 3 8 , 174 n 4 5 Mill, J o h n Stuart, 9 7 , 1 5 6 n 2 4 , 167 n 2 3 , 167 n 2 5 , 171 n 4 5

Miller, David, 5 7 , 7 2 - 3 , 7 7 - 8 7 , 110, 112, 144, 146, 155, 1 6 2 n 3 4 , 1 6 2 n 3 5 , 1 6 4 n l 3 , 1 6 4 n l 4 , 165 n 2 2 , 165 n 2 3 , 165 n 2 4 , 165 n 2 5 , 165 n 2 7 , 165 n28, 165 n 3 6 , 165 n 4 0 , 165 n 4 1 , 1 6 6 n 4 5 , 1 6 6 n 4 8 , 169 n 1 6 , 1 7 4 n 3 1 , 174 n 3 4 Miller, H. L., 169 n9, 169 n11 Miller, Richard, 19, 20, 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 158 n2, 1 5 8 n 1 3 coercion and c o n d i t i o n s o f distributive justice: budgetary bias, 2 1 - 2 ; patrioticpreference, 2 0 - 3 ; psychological limits of trust, 2 0 - 1 ; relations, between c o m p a t r i o t s and non-compatriots, 2 2 ; self-respect, 2 2 - 3 ; self-respect o f the less privileged, 2 0 - 1

modus ponens, 78 modus tollens, 78

Moellendorf, Darrel., 1 6 4 n 9 , 1 6 4 n l 5 , 165 n21, 1 6 6 n 4 3 , 1 6 6 n 4 7 , 168 n 3 8 moral duties, 3 7 - 9 moral personality, 4 3 m o s t favored nations (MFNs), 9 9 Nagel, T h o m a s , 4, 19, 2 3 , 2 7 , 28, 2 9 , 3 0 , 3 1 , 3 2 , 4 1 , 6 5 , 110, 157 n 3 9 , 159 n 3 3 , 1 5 9 n 3 8 , 1 5 9 n 4 2 , 159 n 4 2 , 1 6 0 n1, 1 6 3 n 4 8 coercion and c o n d i t i o n s o f distributive justice, 2 7 - 3 2 ; absolute poverty, 2 8 ; citizensovereigns, 3 0 - 1 ; critiques of, 1 5 9 n 4 2 ; duties of distributive justice, 2 7 - 8 ; duties of h u m a n i t a r i a n i s m , 2 7 , 28; example, 3 1 - 2 ; h u m a n i t a r i a n duties and duties o f justice, difference between, 2 8 - 9 ; state institutions, 2 9 - 3 0 ; the subjectsovereign condition, 2 9 - 3 0 egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m , 4 1

Index 183

network effects, 4 9 N e w c o m e n , J o h n , 113 Nicholsen, Shierry Weber., 157 n 4 0

noblesse oblige, 70

n o n - c o m p a t r i o t non-egalitarianism, rejection of, 5 1 - 3 c o m m o n good associations, 5 2 contractualism, 5 2 hypothetical c o n s e n t , 5 1 - 2 inequalities, 5 2 - 3 o u t c o m e equality, 5 3 procedural equality, 5 3 Nozick, Robert, 26, 4 5 - 7 , 7 1 - 2 , 1 6 0 n 1 0 , 164 n 1 1 , 1 6 6 n 4 6 , 1 6 0 n 5 1

principle of associational justice, 45

Nye Jr, J o s e p h , 161 n 1 9

global justice, contrasting view of, 1-2, 13-18 Global Resources Dividend (GRD), 149-50

principle of associational justice, 47 responsibility, c o n c e p t i o n of, 143-4

World Poverty and Human Rights, 143-4

political and e c o n o m i c associations, 40-67 c o n t e n t dependence, 41 egalitarian c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m , 4 0 , 41 global e c o n o m y , inequalities in, 63-7 membership dependence, 4 2 - 5

O C E D , see Organisation for E c o n o m i c C o o p e r a t i o n and D e v e l o p m e n t (OCED) opportunity sets, 74, 75, 7 7 - 8 0 , 8 5 Organisation for E c o n o m i c Cooperation and D e v e l o p m e n t (OCED), 2, 159 n 3 7 ought-implies-can principle, 75 o u t c o m e equality, 3 4 - 5 , 5 3 P a l u t i k , J . P., 169 n11 Pareto superiority, 9 2 Parfit, Derek, 161 n 2 5 Parry, M . I.., 1 6 9 n11 p a t e n t protection, 5 0 - 1 Peffer, R. G., 1 6 4 n 9 Pennock, J. Roland, 160 n 4 8 , 164 n 9 persons as sources of practical reasons, 10, 11 Plato, 141, 174 n 2 3

the Republic, 141

Pogge, T h o m a s , 1 - 3 , 7, 1 3 - 8 , 4 7 - 8 , 1 4 3 - 4 , 1 4 9 - 5 0 , 155 n 14, 155 n l 7 , 156 n 18, 1 5 6 n 2 7 , 157 n 4 3 , 157 n 4 5 , 157 n 4 8 , 157 n 4 9 , 158 n 5 2 , 158 n 5 3 , 158 n 5 4 , 158 n59, 158 n 5 6 , 158 n 5 8 , 164 n 9 , 1 7 4 n 2 8 , 174 n 2 9 , 174 n 4 0

non-compatriot non-egalitarianism, rejection of, 5 1 - 3 overview, 4 0 - 2 political and e c o n o m i c associations, 5 4 - 6 1

principle of associational justice, 45-8

principle of associational justice, institutional requirements, 45-51 reciprocity, 6 1 - 3 strength d e p e n d e n c e , 41 Political Liberalism (Rawls), 9, 2 6 , 82, 8 3 poverty, 3 - 4 PPM, 168 n1 PPP, see purchasing power parity (PPP) predation, 9 9

prima facie

principle of equality, 12-13, 53, 66 primary school c o m p l e t i o n rates, 77

principle of associational justice, 37, 45-8 duties of social justice, 4 7 institutional requirements, 4 6 - 7

184 Index

principle of associational justice, institutional requirements background rules, significance of, 5 0 foreign direct investment (FDI), 4 9 globalization o f trade, i n v e s t m e n t a n d finance, effects of, 4 9 network effects, 4 9 non-voluntariness, 5 0 strength, 4 8 - 9 TRIPs Article 28, 5 0 principle of fair play, 3 6 - 9 appeals to fairness, 3 6 criticism, vulnerable to, 3 7 , 160 n51

justice-positivism, 36 moral duties, 3 7 - 9 non-voluntary special duties, 3 7 , 160 n52 in political obligation, 3 6 - 7 principle o f associational justice, 3 7

the principle of associational justice, 32-6 coercion a c c o u n t and institutional a c c o u n t , difference between, 3 5 definition of, 20, 3 3 duties o f egalitarian justice, 34 duties o f justice, 3 3 global e c o n o m i c association, 3 3 presumption o f equality: o u t c o m e equality, 3 4 - 5 ; procedural equality, 3 4 - 5 see also principle of fair play procedural equality, 3 4 , 3 4 - 5 , 5 3 progressive global i n c o m e t a x (Milanovic), 1 5 1 - 3 protectionism, 1 0 0 - 1 protectionist policies, 9 1 - 2 , 9 3 - 6 purchasing power parity (PPP), 155 n12 Qin, D., 169 n 9

racially o r sexually discriminatory e m p l o y m e n t laws, 102 Ravallion, Martin, 155 n 1 2 , 155 n 1 3 , 157 n 5 0 , 157 n 5 1 , 1 5 8 n 5 2 Rawls, J o h n , 4, 6 - 9 , 11, 2 5 - 7 , 4 3 - 5 , 5 5 , 5 8 - 9 , 6 3 , 6 9 - 7 1 , 8 2 , 84, 1 4 6 - 7 , 1 5 6 n25, 156 n 3 0 , 1 5 4 6 n 3 1 , 1 5 6 n33, 1 5 6 n 3 7 , 157 n 3 9 , 157 n 4 0 , 159 n 2 8 , 159 n 2 9 , 159 n 4 6 , 1 5 9 n 4 7 , 1 6 0 n 7 , 161 n 2 6 , 162 n27, 162 n29, 162 n31, 162 n 3 7 , 1 6 2 n39, 1 6 2 n 4 0 , 163 n 4 6 , 163 n 4 7 , 164 n 5 , 164 n 6 , 164 n8, 164 n9, 165 n 1 9 , 165 n 3 0 , 165 n 3 1 , 165 n 3 8 , 1 6 6 n 4 4 , 174 n 3 5 equality of opportunity defended, 69-70 institutional coercion a c c o u n t , 2 7 membership dependence, 4 3 - 4

Political Liberalism, 9, 26, 82, 83

reciprocity, 1 4 6 - 7 self-authenticating sources of valid claims, 11

A Theory of Justice, 6-7, 8, 9, 55 Rawlsian, 2 4 , 26, 2 7 , 3 6 , 8 3 , 135, 165 n 3 0 RCI, see Responsibility-Capacity I n d e x (RCI) reciprocity, 5 9 - 6 0 , 6 1 - 3 , 99, 1 4 6 - 7 recognition respect, 8 Reddy, Sanjay, 103, 105, 155 n 1 3 , 157 n 5 1 , 1 6 8 n 4 1 , 168 n 4 6

remedial responsibility, 144, 145-7 t h e Republic (Plato), 141 respect, 5 - 8 an a c c o u n t of justice, 7 Article 3 of the Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, 7 Article 5 of T h e African Charter o n Human and Peoples' Rights, 6 C h a r t e r of t h e United Nations, 6 fundamental h u m a n rights, 7 - 8 h u m a n dignity, 6

Index

institutional (recognition) respect, 8 I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o v e n a n t o n Civil a n d Political Rights, preamble to, 6 International Covenant on E c o n o m i c , Social and Cultural Rights, preamble to, 6

justificatory respect, 11, 35-6, 52, 157 n 3 9 pro-attitude, 5 recognition respect, 8 niversal Declaration of Human Rights, preamble to, 6 Responsibility-Capacity Index

(RCI), 128 responsibility, c o n c e p t i o n of, 1 4 3 - 7 agent (term, use of), 145 purposes of, 1 4 3 - 4 reciprocity, 1 4 6 - 7

remedial responsibility, 144, 145-7 role responsibility, 144, 145 s w e a t s h o p s , 144

World Poverty and Human Rights

(Pogge), 1 4 3 - 4 Ricardo, David, 9 1 right to freedom of c o n s c i e n c e , 1 0 right to unionize, 1 0 3 Rodrik, Dani, 103, 168 n 4 0

role responsibility, 144, 145

Rosseau, Jean-Jaques, 141 Russia, Asian e c o n o m i c crisis, 4 9 Sabel, Charles, 6 5 Samuelson, Paul, 9 2 , 1 6 6 n 4 Sandel, Michael. J., 1 6 0 n 4 9 Sangiovanni, Andrea, 6 1 - 3 Scanlon, T. M., 1 5 6 n l 9 , 157 n 4 0 , 1 6 2 n 3 9 , 164 n 9 Scheffler, Samuel, 3 8 , 158 n 1 2 , 160 n 5 2 Schneider, S t e p h e n . H., 1 7 0 n 2 9 Schweickart, David, 139, 1 4 0 , 173 n 1 5 , 173 n 1 7 sea levels, rise in, 107, 108, 109, 1 1 2 table 1, 113, 114

185

Sen, Amartya, 117, 121, 157 n 4 0 , 171 n 8 , 1 5 6 n 2 8 , 162 n 3 0 , 1 6 9 n14, 170 n39 Shue, Henry, 117 S i m m o n s , A. J o h n , 1 6 0 n 5 1 Singer, Peter, 4 3 , 4 7 , 4 8 , 124, 144, 1 6 0 n 6 , 1 6 0 n 1 2 , 161 n 1 2 , 165 n 4 2 , 166 n2, 172 n 5 2 , 172 n 5 3 equal shares (contract and coverage) principle, 1 2 4 - 5 global justice, 4 7 - 8 , 160 n 1 2 responsibility, c o n c e p t i o n of, 144 Sit, V i c t o r s . R, 161 n 1 5 S m i t h , Adam, 8 1 , 165 n 2 9 Smith, Steven. J., 1 7 0 n 2 8 socialism, feasibility of, 9 4 - 5 , 1 3 7 - 4 0 Socrates, 141 Stiglitz, J o s e p h E., 15, 9 3 , 9 8 , 157 n 4 7 , 166 n6, 166 n 7 , 167 n 2 8 the subject-sovereign condition, 2 9 - 3 0 sufficientarian, 13, 19, 2 7 , 34, 5 6 , 61 Tan, Kok-Chor, 4 2 - 5 , 1 6 0 n 2 Temkin, Larry. S., 1 5 6 n 2 0 A Theory of Justice (Rawls), 6 - 7 , 8, 9, 26, 5 5 , 8 2 - 3 , 163 n 4 6 reciprocity, 1 4 6 - 7 thermal e x p a n s i o n , 1 1 3 - 1 4 the Tobin Tax, 1 5 0 - 1 T h o m p s o n , E. P., 168 n 3 5 Tigor, M., 169 n 9 Tobin, J a m e s , 149, 150, 151, 153, 174 n 4 3 , 174 n 4 4 Traxler, Martino, 1 1 8 - 2 1 , 1 7 0 n 3 3 , 171 n 4 4 , 171 n 4 5 , 171 n 4 6 TRIPS, see Agreement o n Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) TRIPS Article 2 8 , 5 0

the true city, 141

UNCTAD, see United Nations C o n f e r e n c e o n Trade a n d D e v e l o p m e n t (UNCTAD) under five mortality rate, 2, 6 7

186 Index

UNDP, see United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme (UNDP) UNDP's threshold of a high h u m a n d e v e l o p m e n t , 123 unfairness, 1 0 1 - 4 , 168 n 1 2 UNFCCC, see United Nations Framework C o n v e n t i o n o n C l i m a t e C h a n g e (UNFCCC) United Nations C o n f e r e n c e o n Trade and D e v e l o p m e n t (UNCTAD), 9 4 United Nations Development Programme Report ( 2 0 0 5 ) , 77 United Nations D e v e l o p m e n t Programme (UNDP), 3, 109 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 1 0 7 - 8 , 118 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 4 3 / 5 3 , 107, 108, 1 2 2 United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, 67 Universal Declaration o f Human Rights Article 3, 7 Article 7, 12 Article 18, 10 preamble to, 6 Universal Declaration o f Human Rights, preamble to, 6

US Census Bureau, 125 US Energy Information Administration (EIA), 1 1 6 value pluralism, 75 van der Linden, P. J., 169 n11 van Parijs, Philippe, 1 6 6 n 5 1

the voluntarist objection, 160 n5 2

Wade, Robert H., 1 5 6 n 1 8 Walzer, Michael, 3 3 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 159 n 4 4 , 162 n 3 2 wealth inequality, 6 7 Williams, Bernard., 157 n 4 0 World Bank study c o m p l e t e trade liberalization, 15 immigration, 8 7 , 1 0 0 - 1 poverty, 3, 17, 155 n 1 3 , 157 n 5 1 World Bank, W T O and, 9 8

World Development Report 2006, 2

World Health Organization, 2 World Trade Organization (WTO), 14, 4 9 , 5 0 , 9 8 - 9 W T O , see World Trade Organization (WTO) Wu, Weiping., 161 n 1 5 Wyplosz, Charles., 1 7 4 n 4 4 Young, Iris Marion, 144, 174 n30 Yusuf, Shhid., 161 n 1 5

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