Transnational Social Justice (Global Ethics)

Transnational Social Justice Global Ethics Series Series Editor: Christien van den Anker, Reader, Department of Polit...

Author: Carlos R. Cordourier Real

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Transnational Social Justice

Global Ethics Series Series Editor: Christien van den Anker, Reader, Department of Politics, University of the West of England, UK Global Ethics as a field builds on longer traditions of ethical reflection about (global) society and discusses ethical approaches to global issues. These include but are not limited to issues highlighted by the process of globalization (in the widest sense) and increasing multiculturalism. They also engage with migration, the environment, poverty and inequality, peace and conflict, human rights, global citizenship, social movements, and global governance. Despite fluid boundaries between fields, Global Ethics can be clearly marked out by its multidisciplinary approach, its interest in a strong link between theory, policy, and practice and its inclusion of a range of work from strictly normative to more empirical. Books in the series provide a specific normative approach, taxonomy, or an ethical position on a specific issue in Global Ethics through empirical work. They explicitly engage with Global Ethics as a field and position themselves in regard to existing debates even when outlining more local approaches or issues. The Global Ethics Series has been designed to reach beyond a liberal cosmopolitan agenda and engage with contextualism as well as structural analyses of injustice in current global politics and its disciplining discourses. Titles include: Carlos R. Cordourier-Real TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL JUSTICE Anna Grear REDIRECTING HUMAN RIGHTS Facing the Challenge of Corporate Legal Humanity Shahram Khosravi ‘ILLEGAL’ TRAVELLER An Auto-Ethnography of Borders Ivan Manokha (editor) THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT Darrel Moellendorf GLOBAL INEQUALITY MATTERS

Global Ethics Series Series Standing Order ISBN 978–0–230–01958–4 You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and the ISBN quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Transnational Social Justice Carlos R. Cordourier-Real Professor of Political Theory, Department of Law, Politics and Government, Universidad de Guanajuato, Mexico

© Carlos R. Cordourier-Real 2010 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2010 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–0–230–57912–5 hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental regulations of the country of origin. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Cordourier Real, Carlos R., 1971– Transnational social justice / Carlos R. Cordourier Real. p. cm.—(Global ethics) Summary: “Critically examines theories of cosmopolitan justice grounded in the major traditions of moral philosophy. Drawing upon the international ethics tradition, this book presents an argument for the validity of obligations of social justice between countries” – Provided by publisher. ISBN 978–0–230–57912–5 (hardback) 1. Social justice. 2. International relations. I. Title. HM671.C647 2010 303.3⬘72—dc22 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne

2010007406

To my parents, Ma. Teresa and C. Román

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Contents List of Acronyms

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Epigraph

xii

Introduction 1

2

3

1

On Cosmopolitanism about Justice

13

Introduction Rawls’s justice as fairness: A paradigm of social justice On Rawlsian cosmopolitanism What’s wrong with Rawlsian cosmopolitanism? On O’Neill’s transnational obligations Justice: Obligations or rights? A critique of O’Neill’s project On Singer’s moral obligation to assist Singer’s utilitarian framework The Singer solution to World poverty Is Singer’s argument a fallacy?

13 14 20 32 35 36 41 45 46 48 51

The International Society

56

Introduction The Westphalian and post-Westphalian international society: Two ideal-types of non-anarchic systems The Westphalian international society The post-Westphalian international society

56 59 66 69

The Circumstances and the Primary Agents of Justice

86

Introduction The circumstances of justice States: The primary agents of justice

86 89 99

vii

viii

4

Contents

States beyond the realist archetype States are mutually vulnerable to the effects of interdependence Modern states have a consistent concern for the well-being of their populations Conclusion

102

108 121


123

Introduction Towards a feasible approach of global social justice Transnational norms and social justice The duty of assistance

123 124 129 139

106

Conclusion

152

Notes

157

Bibliography

173

Index

183

Acronyms

CAT CEDAW CERD CESCR CMW DAC ECOSOC FAO GNI GNP GRECO HRC ICISS IFAD IMF INGOs MDG NGOs ODA OECD TI TNCs UN UNDP UNESCO UNICEF

Committee against Torture Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Committee on Migrant Workers Development Assistance Committee UN Economic and Social Council Food and Agriculture Organization Gross National Income Gross National Product Group of States against Corruption Human Rights Committee International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty International Fund for Agricultural Development International Monetary Fund International Non-governmental Organizations Millennium Development Goals Nongovernmental Organizations Official Development Assistance Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Transparency International Transnational Corporations United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Children’s Fund

ix

x

Acronyms

UNIFEM WB WFP WHO WTO

United Nations Development Fund for Women World Bank World Food Programe World Health Organization World Trade Organization

Acknowledgments This book has been possible thanks to the support of many people. First, I am particularly grateful to Dr. Christien van den Anker for encouraging me to carry out this publishing project after she read my first attempt to deal with questions of international ethics and justice. I also wish to thank Prof. Tom Sorell and Dr. David Howarth, who guided my preliminary research on international political theory at the University of Essex . Their critical analysis of my work was both stimulating and constructive. I always found in Prof. Sorell’s sharp observations, rooted in a bright understanding of moral philosophical problems, a source of inspiration. Whereas Dr. Howarth taught me how important it is to engage in ethical debates imaginatively. Many friends have shared time, words, and concerns with me throughout this endeavor of finishing the final draft of the book. They all have reinforced my faith in a bright future. Specially, I wish to thank Cristina Rodríguez, Susy Scherer, Germán Martínez, and Armando Román for their company as I was going through an upsetting interlude in my life. My sisters Tania, Katia, and Gaby (sometimes unconsciously) armored me with the means I needed to face several challenges involved in the process of writing this book. They deserve my deepest gratitude for always strengthening my aspirations. Finally, though I have benefited greatly from the comments I have received about this work, I might not have been able to rectify the limitations of the argument presented here. So, I feel obliged to state honestly that any mistakes or inaccuracies in this book are wholly my responsibility.

xi

“You can resist an invading army; you cannot resist an idea whose time has come.” Victor Hugo

Introduction

Reflection about justice has a long history in the tradition of philosophical analysis inaugurated by Socrates in Western civilization. Ever since then, this concept has accompanied the development of various schools of thought and their following decay. Yet the appeal and strength of the idea of justice has remained unaltered. Justice is not only an important subject-matter of academic treaties that argue for a definite nature or understanding; justice is a value, a standard of social interaction and an aspiration. What is more, as an aspiration, justice has been a concern that has given meaning to the life and death of human beings for centuries. This fact grants justice a distinctive character that sets it apart from other concepts one may investigate theoretically. The idea of justice has a status that carries with it an imprint of transcendence for it has become an engine for social change. Think for a moment how different our lives would have been had it not been for the might this aspiration has exerted on societies. On the other hand, reflecting about justice, as a philosophical concept, may be daunting as one cannot help but feel overwhelmed by the vast amount of relevant literature on the subject and the perplexity of questions it arises. Is there a clear-cut answer to the question what is justice (or what is just)? Most probably there is not, but that constriction should not put us off from speculating about the normative and practical conditions any conception of justice should comprise. Theorizing about justice, I believe, need not resolve once and for all how social arrangements should work comprehensively to be just. Perhaps the most fruitful strategy to make a contribution in 1

2


the understanding of justice is to engage in the debate with the task of investigating how competing perspectives deal with issues of theoretical coherence and practicality. Indeed, justice is one the most important and controversial concepts in Western philosophy. It establishes a category to judge social practices and institutions, as well as represents a fundamental purpose of human communities. There are two broad views of the concept that preliminarily may help us to understand the nature of the debate of this essentially contested concept.1 The first view, sometimes called cynical, is represented by Thrasymachus in Plato’s Republic. According to him, “justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger.” Hence, any attempt to define it is doomed to fail insofar as there is no actual meaning (or nature) of the concept. With obvious variations, this idea has been held throughout the history of philosophy by many thinkers. However, it is historical materialism which articulates this view in a more sophisticated manner in modern political thought. According to the Marxian analysis, the concept of “justice” (like ideology, religion, law, state, and so forth) is determined by the economic structure of societies (i.e. the productive forces and social relations of production). Historical materialism claims that every socio-economic stage in the dialectic of history has defined its own concept of justice whose content has served only to reproduce exploitation. The second view, let us call it ethical, was introduced by Socrates in Plato’s Republic. It opposes the cynical version insofar as it claims that justice has an actual nature, which is essentially good. Socrates’ discourse in Plato’s Republic develops a conception of justice as a moral virtue that both persons and political communities should pursue. 2 This view may be considered as an ethical perspective inasmuch as it defines action-guiding prescriptions for institutions or individuals. Aristotle will follow the path inaugurated by Socrates and will elaborate a comprehensive analysis on the subject in two well-known works: Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. For him, justice represents the perfect social virtue. Moreover, justice is a concept closely related to the idea of equality.3 It is worth mentioning that these two elements of the Aristotelian account – that is, virtue and equality – have exercised a powerful influence throughout the history of political philosophy, and even now post-metaphysical conceptions of justice employ such terms in order to define it.

Introduction 3

The ethical approach to the concept of justice has had many advocates throughout the history of political ideas; however, its diffusion would be hardly explained without acknowledging the role of the scholastic theology (in particular, the work of Aquinas who tried to harmonize the moral philosophy of Aristotle with Christianity). A chief characteristic of the scholastic approaches to justice is the strong association between the concept of the person and the community. Liberal philosophers tried to reformulate the view inherited by the Natural Law tradition, which associated justice with the idea of the common good, as they were concerned with finding a conception of justice under a plurality of equally valid ideas of the good. The main idea behind liberalism, characterized by an ethics centered on the individual, was to defend the view that the good of a person is not the same as the good of the community (or association). Yet, despite this move which changed the way justice had been conceived for centuries, liberalism maintained the idea that justice is a good or a value that societies should pursue. Currently, the range of adherents to the ethical view of the concept of justice in philosophical thinking is wide-ranging and it includes liberals, libertarians, communitarians, and even post-modernist thinkers such as Jean-François Lyotard, who in his Post-modern Condition claimed that contrary to rationality, “justice as a value is neither outmoded nor suspect” (Lyotard, 1984, p.66). Although this book will not engage in a comprehensive inquiry about justice – I am not interested in presenting a complete theory – it is relevant to stress that this work assumes a non-cynical conception of justice. However, I believe that justice is a concept whose meaning is permanently changing, so there are not everlasting definitions of its nature: our standards of reasoning about justice change historically. That is, I assume that the meaning of justice is permanently contestable, though justice itself is a permanent social value that human beings have aspired to in their relations. In particular, this book is a speculation about justice according to a particular set of social circumstances. More precisely, the purpose of this work is to explore whether the international system gives rise to issues of social justice. But let me explain a little further what kinds of questions I am particularly interested in here. It is conventional to follow the Aristotelian conceptual distinction of justice, which establishes two different kinds of “particular

4


justice”4: (1) rectificatory (commutative) and (2) distributive. On the one hand, (1) rectificatory justice is related with the ethical appropriateness of regulation in private transactions, which can be either voluntary (for example, contracts between two members of the community), or involuntary (for instance, crimes such as theft, assault, murder and robbery). On the other hand, (2) distributive justice deals with the question about how honors, wealth or other goods can be divided among members of a community (see Aristotle, 1999, Book V). This book is an inquiry into the extent to which distributive justice issues arise in the international context. Although, certainly, Aristotle’s discussion of distributive justice did not have the complexity that current debates about this conception have – for the type of society he lived in was different from the modern societies from where the notion of social justice emerged – his formal category is quite helpful to understand the types of regulatory relations with which this inquiry is concerned. It is true, as Samuel Fleischacker has rightly pointed out, that the Aristotelian idea of distributive justice differs importantly from the modern sense we attribute to the concept now, which goes back to the work of philosophers such as Rousseau, Smith and Kant (Fleischacker, 2005), but I still find Aristotle’s analytical division helpful. For it clearly lays emphasis on the problem of allocation of goods in a community as opposed to the idea of justice that is concerned with issues associated with restoration or retribution. Moreover, for conceptual clarity, it might be appropriate to mention here that I use interchangeably the concept of both distributive and social justice to refer to the distribution of burdens and benefits in a social scheme. For a long time, philosophical thinking about social justice has approached the subject within the context of politically-bounded communities; thus, a great deal of conceptions of justice has aimed at regulating domestic institutions of states, or else relations between compatriots who share a common cultural identity. This tradition of political philosophy, however, has lately been challenged by a growing number of theorists who draw attention to transnational problems such as hunger, poverty, inequality and social exclusion, which – they have argued – require normative settlement from the perspective of distributive justice. Generally speaking, these approaches that broaden the conventional scope of distributive

Introduction 5

justice, formerly restricted to the nation-state, have been known as theories of global or cosmopolitan justice. The main influence of global justice accounts has been the contractarian theory of justice developed by John Rawls, known as justice as fairness, whose aim is to advance principles for ordering the major social and political institutions of a scheme of social cooperation. Global justice theorists claim that principles of distributive justice should be applied on a world scale as individuals are morally equal and contingencies such as their nationality should not count against their moral claims. Moreover, they argue that there is a set of international institutions (a basic structure, to put it in Rawlsian terms) that allocates goods and burdens among individuals that justifies the view that principles of justice should be called upon to regulate outcomes fairly. On the other hand, there are approaches that deal with problems such as world hunger and poverty from the concept of moral obligation rather than focusing on overarching principles for institutions. These ethical theories, then, vindicate the moral validity of duties of justice towards strangers regardless of their shared membership to a scheme of social cooperation. Whilst theories of global justice are relevant for the functioning of institutions, theories of obligation of a cosmopolitan nature are relevant for individual persons’ morality. Roughly speaking, these are the two main formal strategies that have been employed in the global justice literature to justify distributive transfers that could remedy poverty and redress inequality worldwide. This book, however, takes up the issue of global justice from an unconventional perspective. That is, instead of pushing theories of distributive justice further, whose conceptual framework was originally thought to deal normatively with inequalities among members of a domestic society, it tries to develop a justification for a particular type of obligation of social justice. Moreover, this approach is different from cosmopolitan theories of obligation that are addressed to individuals, for the duties of justice I am concerned about are those that arise from the ethical structure of the international system. It follows that my aim is not developing a theory of justice that establishes a set of principles for the global institutional structure (whatever this might be). Neither have I sought to advance an ethical theory, based on the principle of impartiality, to defend the view

6


that individuals have obligations of distributive justice towards non-compatriots. Properly speaking, this is a perspective that draws upon the international ethics tradition, and as such it is mainly concerned with the nature of obligations that arise from the international system itself. Particularly, my goal has been to speculate about the type of duties an interdependent world gives rise to, and ask whether specific duties of social justice between countries may properly be justified. Consequently, the argument presented here is not a comprehensive theory of international justice capable of assessing normatively international institutions or delineating the scope of rightful interaction between countries. Rather, it presents a case for the moral validity of obligations of social justice between countries and puts forward a specific type of duty of justice (i.e. the duty of assistance) that discharges concretely this moral obligation. It might be argued that the fulfillment of obligations of social justice between countries that I propose still leaves the causes of global injustice intact. A more ambitious project could have certainly developed principles of justice to regulate institutions such as economic and financial markets and bodies of global governance; securing human rights worldwide; as well as guaranteeing a fair access to the world’s resources. Yet, I believe that this task is still far from being realizable both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, we need first to overcome the social justice paradigm that has been translated to the international sphere to deal with the normative issues that arise from it. Employing a conceptual framework originally developed to discuss just social arrangements of politically-bounded societies has been a defective strategy to advance a convincing conception of justice that could justify the validity of global distributive principles. Similarly, from the practical point of view, theories of global justice have failed to notice that (presently) the structure of the international system is not cohesive enough to put together background institutions capable of defining property rights and tax policies globally, which is a conditio sine qua non to implement a conception of distributive justice consistently. This is a fact that, I believe, one needs to take into account to prevent putting forward unfeasible theories of justice, which end up being only the subject-matter of academic debates and fall short in guiding action for change. To put it bluntly, this type of idealized theory of justice offer no grounds to reverse injustice right now.

Introduction 7

Instead of advancing a grand theory of global justice, the account of international ethics developed here defends the moral validity of transnational transfers of resources to promote global welfare. Moreover, this theoretical approach makes a case for justifying that this type of distributive transfers is a proper duty of social justice between states. I answer the objection that my perspective is too conservative to deal with the global challenges we face to end injustice by arguing for a feasible alternative that is based on shared understandings that have already gained moral consensus globally. It is a small step, true; but I think that this type of argument could facilitate a qualitative and quantitative change in how states and publics make sense of transnational transfers of resources to promote the development of the worse-off countries. The idea behind this project is to offer a justification of a transnational duty of social justice that allows us to go beyond the concept of aid. My main goal is, therefore, to investigate whether the international system constitutes an area in which we can sensibly talk about distributive obligations of justice. Put another way, this book tries to answer the following question: are there obligations of social justice between political communities in the current international system? Exploring the existence of potential issues of social justice between political communities brings the state back to the discussion of international justice, for it is the main actor of the international system. Hitherto, focusing on obligations between states has not been a typical way of speculating about justice in cosmopolitan thinking. For classic international relations theories have not engaged in this problem directly (Brown, 1995) and cosmopolitanism is fundamentally an approach that holds the view that duties are owed to individuals not states (Caney, 2001). Moreover, there seems to be a widespread mistrust about the moral nature of these political entities, which has precluded serious attention to them in order to deliver global justice. States are suspicious. I believe, nonetheless, that discussions about the ethical standing of the nation-state in the global justice literature have largely been biased. Most theoretical accounts not only seem to neglect the fact that states are still key actors in the international realm (and will remain so in the near future), but they also attack states for an alleged unrestricted selfish behavior. Though certainly nation-states pursue economic and political power readily, they also act within

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domestic and international normative structures, which influence their interests and actions. Nobody can sensibly say that inter-state relations can only be understood nowadays as a domain characterized by the unrestrained struggle for relative gains. It is a paradox that cosmopolitanism had failed thus far to notice the ethical transcendence of states in the international sphere, when these political entities are the only ones that could actually support background institutions for distributive arrangements. If the idea is not putting up a world government to enforce justice at a global scale, then we have to build upon the capabilities of real nation-states. Even structures of global governance, or any transnational institutions, would have to rely on the means of states to implement legitimately reforms that make this world more just, for the arbitrary construction of a world polity is not morally desirable, nor attainable at this point of human history. This acute cosmopolitan mistrust towards states, I believe, has its origins in a strange concoction of classical liberalism and a distinctive rejection of nationalism. Too often confused with the notion of government, the concept of state has been distrusted by liberals because it represents a constant threat to individual freedoms. Nationalism, on the other hand, seems an oddity for universalistic ethical thinking because particular relationships or attachments should not count against individuals’ moral claims. Contrary to the conventional cosmopolitan view, I argue that states are relevant moral units, whose sphere of interaction can be a proper locus to probe the existence of circumstances of justice that may give rise to distributive obligations. In particular, my approach to international ethics is concerned with exploring the existence of potential issues of social justice in the society of states or international society. Briefly put, I argue that the contemporary international society has an ethical structure that sets it apart from the Westphalian system grounded on the value of autonomy and negative duties – that is, obligations that have the form: do not X. Indeed, the contemporary international system, which I call the post-Westphalian society, has disclosed a new ethical structure, based on value of solidarity, that allows us to recognize the validity of positive duties; in particular, duties of social justice. In order to develop my argument, first, I explore different approaches of global justice to find out whether they are coherent

Introduction 9

and may guide action to tackle injustice. The purpose is to elaborate a critique of these theories to reveal their shortcomings and demonstrate that they fail to justify theoretically either principles or obligations of global distributive justice. And, second, I put forward a different theoretical perspective, based on a distinctive conception of the international system, to justify obligations of social justice between countries. The first chapter, then, introduces John Rawls’s theory of justice and Rawlsian-inspired accounts of cosmopolitan justice. Its main purpose is, on the one hand, to offer a brief overview of the most influential philosophical reflection on social justice – that is, justice as fairness – which has become a solid paradigm in contemporary thinking about justice. On the other hand, Chapter 1 develops a critical analysis of Rawls’s theory itself and, let us say, “post-Rawls Rawlsianism” as it has been developed by a universalistic tradition of contemporary liberal theory known as Rawlsian cosmopolitanism. Studying Rawlsianism is important not only because it represents the most sophisticated theoretical attempt to defend the idea of distributive justice, but also, for present purposes, because “justice as fairness” has inspired one of the most vigorous normative responses to issues such as global poverty, inequality and injustice. The critical analysis of Rawlsianism allows me to discard this paradigm as a proper perspective to justify principles of distributive justice of a global nature. This chapter, then, explores whether in the absence of a coherent international basic structure that could apply overarching principles of justice worldwide, still some kinds of duties of justice can be justified. Hence, it introduces two different ethical theories that, outside the Rawlsian paradigm, have aimed at accounting for distributive obligations beyond national borders: the Kantian-based theory of transnational obligations advanced by Onora O’Neill, and the consequentialist approach of utilitarian theorist Peter Singer, which is known as “the Singer solution to world poverty.” O’Neill’s Kantian constructivism is, then, explained and analyzed to find out how cosmopolitan obligations of justice could be grounded. Even though Onora O’Neill’s universalism is a powerful theory that seems to overcome one crucial issue that, I believe, Rawlsianism has not yet solved (i.e. the problem of the metaphysical foundations of the concept of moral personality), I come to the conclusion that O’Neill’s approach cannot demonstrate effectively the

10 Transnational Social Justice

existence of positive duties of social justice. Next, this chapter analyzes a consequentialist perspective developed by utilitarian thinker Peter Singer that aims at demonstrating the existence of a positive duty to relieve suffering caused by famine and poverty. Although Singer’s account cannot strictly be considered a theory of global justice, I introduce his well-known argument because his account of obligation to assist “strangers” has important repercussions in the allocation of moral responsibilities to end poverty beyond borders. Intuitively, the application Singer’s moral obligation to assist people in need would make this world more just. Thus, I analyze Singer’s solution to world poverty to see whether, contrary to contemporary Kantians, this consequentialist argument can offer a sound justification to the obligation to lift people out of poverty. Singer’s argument is able to allocate a concrete moral responsibility to remedy absolute poverty; however, it does not demonstrate conclusively the validity of the obligation to assist. The argument turns out to be a fallacy. It follows that the principal aim of the opening chapter of this book, which studies some versions of Kantianism (Rawlsianism and Onora O’Neill) and one version of consequentialism (Peter Singer), is to explicate why these accounts of political and moral philosophy cannot justify the validity of global distributive principles or cosmopolitan obligations. Yet, my purpose is not to reject the idea of global social justice altogether. Rather, as was noted earlier, the main purpose of this work is to think about potential issues of distributive justice from a different perspective, which focuses on the ethical structure of the international society of states. Drawing upon the work of international theorist Hedley Bull, then, Chapter 2 introduces an account of the international system that rejects the view that this sphere resembles a state of nature as there are shared values and common interests that shape normatively international interaction. This account of the international system allows me to advance two ideal-types (Idealtypus) to understand how the international society has been transformed by a change of the values that regulate international relations. Whilst in the first ideal-type, which I call the Westphalian society of states, the value of autonomy gave rise to a normative structure made up of mainly negative duties, the second ideal-type (i.e. the post-Westphalian society of states), characterized by the growing importance of human rights- discourses and

Introduction 11

interdependence, contemplates valid positive duties between states as it is grounded on the value of solidarity. In order to establish that among the positive duties contemplated in the post-Westphalian international society there are obligations of social justice, Chapter 3 deals with the circumstances of justice. The circumstances of justice are the conditions required to consider whether a social arrangement is subject to distributive practices. Following David Miller, a strong opponent of global distributive justice theories, I try to demonstrate that, contrary to what he believes, social justice conditions obtain from the international society of states, even according to his conception of the “circumstances of social justice.” On the other hand, Chapter 3 argues that states are the primary agents of justice in any social justice arrangement of a global nature. Hence, I put forward an account that defends the view that states have a moral nature, which stresses that they are purposive political entities concerned with the common good. Next, I propose a “thin” conception of the common good or well-being states pursue. Accordingly, I assume that states are entities concerned with the establishment of a set of conditions that allows their people to satisfy four basic needs: food, housing, basic education and health care. Chapter 4 develops a normative account, based on shared moral understandings and settled norms of the post-Westphalian society of states, which justifies the validity of the duty to assist less-developed countries. Thus, first, drawing upon Mervyn Frost’s conception of domain of discourse (i.e. an area of ethical discussion where participants recognize many norms as settled), I argue that the contemporary international system has given rise to a particular type of norm (transnational norms) based on the value of solidarity. Among the norms that reconstitute the ethical standing of states as purposive entities that pursue well-being, I argue for the validity of a duty of social justice that contemplates the transnational transfer of resources: the duty of assistance. Then, I draw a distinction between this duty of justice and other conceptions that may also consider obligations of this sort, but which erroneously assume that it is a humanitarian or supererogatory duty. Lastly, this work deals with three challenges that the duty of assistance needs to deal with in order to be successful; namely, the existence of corruption in some

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less-developed countries, the lack of enforcement at the international level, and the fair amount of the distributive transfers. In the Conclusion section, I present a short review of the major findings of my approach that may allow us to argue for the validity of duties of social justice in the international society of states.

1 On Cosmopolitanism about Justice

Introduction The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the most prominent theoretical approaches that deal with the issue of international injustice, as well as to analyze how they claim to vindicate distributive principles or duties of a global nature. Yet, it opens with a succinct presentation of the Rawlsian theory of distributive justice, known as justice as fairness. I am interested in Rawls’s approach because it represents a contemporary paradigm5 of social justice reflection. Rawls’s conceptual categories have influenced a vast array of thinkers in how they formulate questions, develop arguments and propose new ways of understanding justice. In particular, Rawls’s theory is relevant to the subject-matter of this book because it has exerted a powerful influence on the development of contemporary liberal theories of distributive justice whose aim is to apply justice as fairness concepts to the world context. This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I explain and criticize Rawls’s justice as fairness and Rawlsian cosmopolitans. My purpose is to analyze the Rawlsian paradigm in order to identify its characteristics and limits. Thus, I examine Rawlsian cosmopolitanism to see whether it succeeds in developing a sound conception of global distributive justice. It is important to point out that my analysis of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism focuses only on two thinkers: Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. Though I am aware that it might be unfair to the important work of other philosophers, notably Simon Caney and Kok-Chor Tan, I think that the analysis presented here of 13

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Rawlsian cosmopolitanism applies, to a great extent, to most Rawlsian-inspired approaches that assume the existence of a global basic structure and, similarly, fail in offering a proper defense of the Rawlsian conception of moral personality. In the other two sections of this chapter, I present and analyze two theoretical perspectives that have not directly drawn upon Rawls (1971), but that claim to account for obligations of justice of a global nature. The first of these approaches developed by Onora O’Neill advances a theory of obligations, grounded on Kantianism, which contemplates duties of justice beyond borders. From a different philosophical position than the Kantian foundation that Rawlsian cosmopolitans and O’Neill draw upon, utilitarian thinker Peter Singer’s consequentialist theory is also examined here to assess how this approach, based on the concept of ethical impartiality, grounds moral obligations to end global poverty. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is twofold. On the one hand, it offers a critical exposition of the Rawlsian paradigm that liberal cosmopolitans have employed to support normatively the implementation of justice as fairness at the global level. On the other hand, this chapter expounds and criticizes two alternative philosophical accounts that do not belong to the Rawlsian paradigm, which have tried to deal with the problem of global injustice and poverty. The idea behind the exploration of these mainstream cosmopolitan approaches is to explain why the type of theoretical framework employed thus far to justify distributive principles or duties of justice is not adequate to tackle global injustice, which allows us to speculate about new methods to validate distributive duties globally.

Rawls’s justice as fairness: A paradigm of social justice The main characteristic of the theory of distributive justice presented by Rawls, justice as fairness, is its contractual nature. According to the author of A Theory of Justice, the aim of the book was “to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and Kant” (Rawls, 1999a [1971], p.10). Rawls’s basic strategy consists in designing a hypothetical situation that he calls original position – which corresponds to the state of nature of classic contractual theories – in which self-interested


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rational agents are placed. These parties of the contract are supposed to choose and agree on the principles of justice that should regulate the basic structure of the society, which in the Rawlsian scheme is the primary subject of justice. In order to guarantee the fairness of the outcome, Rawls introduces a crucial restriction: the parties do not know anything that could lead them to a partial, or biased, choice. Thus, the rational agents are deprived of information such as their conception of the good, social position, natural abilities, intelligence, generation, and the political or economic situation of their society. This particular condition in which the parties are asked to deliberate, known as the “veil of ignorance,” seeks to represent them as Kantian noumenal selves who are capable of formulating ethical norms autonomously. Hence, even though they are assumed to be self-interested, the rational agents of the Rawlsian theory are capable of deriving fair principles of justice because contingencies that could influence subjective options are bracketed out. Likewise, Rawls assumes that the parties have a conception of the good, whose content is unknown due to the veil of ignorance, and have a particular interest in “certain primary goods.” These goods, Rawls claims, are things that any rational person wants irrespective of her conception of the good, and whose preference derives from the conditions of human life and rationality. The a priori preference that the parties have for such goods is explained by what Rawls calls “a thin theory of the good.” Rawls asserts that this “thin” theory, which is supposed to be restricted to “bare essentials,” is a necessary part of justice as fairness inasmuch as it provides the point of reference from which conceptions of justice are evaluated. Therefore, it is assumed that the parties accept this conception of the good and deliberate in accordance with it. The primary goods, according to the Rawlsian account, are: liberty, opportunity, income and wealth, and above all self-respect. Rawls’s strongest assumption is that the parties in his contractual situation are free and equal rational beings who want – or, as Rawls put it, have a desire – to express their nature. As interpreted by Rawls, Kant affirms that a person acts autonomously when she/he is not driven by anything but her/his distinctive nature. Hence Rawls claims that expressing one’s nature “as a being of a particular kind is to act on the principles that would be chosen if this nature were the decisive determining element” (Rawls, 1999a, p.222). The egalitarian

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conception of justice that Rawls advances to regulate social cooperation is formulated at first in the following two principles. First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all. (Rawls, 1999a, p.53) It is important to stress here that the central idea that informs the Rawlsian construction is the notion of equality. Accordingly, there is a philosophical premise that is crucial in the Rawlsian attack on utilitarianism and in the justification of his theory of justice as fairness: persons are morally equal. The idea of moral equality accounts for the representation of the initial situation (that is, the original position) and justifies the result of the deliberation (that is, the principles of justice). The moral personality of the agents is understood as a potential capacity for (i) having a conception of the good, and (ii) having a sense of justice. On the one hand, the good is defined as the most rational long-term plan of life; thus, Rawls affirms that a person’s happiness depends on the successful execution of a rational plan. On the other hand, the sense of justice is the result of certain natural processes – according to psychological laws of moral development,6 which Rawls assumes to be universal – and constitutes the fundamental aspect of the moral personality insofar as it is a “necessary part of the dignity of the person.” Briefly put, the sense of justice is seen as a mental capacity to understand (at least intuitively) and act according to principles of right and justice. Rawls assumes that this capacity is present in the “overwhelming majority of mankind,” and not having it implies lacking “fundamental attitudes and capacities included under the notion of humanity” (Rawls, 1999a, p.428). The so-called sense of justice is a critical conception in Rawls’s account of justice because it allows him to repudiate utilitarianism on the basis that the latter ignores the inherent moral value of each person. Justice as fairness is supposed to represent a better alternative to secure the duty of justice owed to every individual person


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inasmuch as human beings possess a sense of justice, which confers them a particular dignity. Though Rawls, following communitarian criticisms,7 tried vehemently to characterize his liberal conception of justice as political rather than metaphysical (Rawls, 1985), he failed to provide a definition of the meaning of metaphysics with respect to the theorization of justice (Hampton, 1989, p.794; Neal, 1990, p.27; Steinberger, 2000, p.148). Yet, several commentators seem to agree that his understanding of “metaphysical doctrines” is one that characterizes them as accounts that attempt to justify the validity of norms or principles by resorting to controvertible philosophical assumptions. Thus, when Rawls vaguely engages in the distinction between metaphysical versus political conceptions of justice, he does it to safeguard “justice as fairness” from criticisms about its alleged metaphysical foundations, which may threaten its neutrality under the fact of pluralism. In particular, Rawls seems to be interested in explaining why his conception does not rely on the truth of philosophical premises in order to be a valid political framework of a modern constitutional democracy’s basic structure. Consequently, he later intended to base his conception on the assumptions of the democratic political culture as opposed to a clear particular metaphysics of the person. He justifies his theoretical addendum, presented in “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” (1985), as an attempt to clarify that his theory of justice does not depend on “claims to universal truth, or claims about the essential nature and identity of persons” (Rawls, 1985, p.223). However, even though Rawls’s apparent retreat from an unambiguous universalistic position to a contingent one (that is, from a universal theory of justice to a liberal democracy’s conception of justice) could have saved him from some communitarian-inspired criticisms, it does little to reinforce the theoretical strength and appeal of “justice as fairness”. In fact, if Rawls’s theory has a resonance within discussions of social justice, it is because of its universal claims about the nature of moral personality. In what follows, I examine Rawls’s conception of justice prior to the introduction of the contextual mutation; that is, I take it that the parties’ self-understanding as equal moral subjects derives from a “metaphysical” view of the person and not from a contingent view of how contemporary liberal citizens conceive themselves. My aim is to flesh


out the characteristics of “justice as fairness” that provide the theoretical foundations for cosmopolitan approaches of distributive justice. In particular, I want to stress the importance of the “metaphysical” premise (that is, in Rawls’s terms, the controversial true claim) regarding the distinctive equal moral nature of persons as it validates and gives form to the principles of justice. Moreover, this universalistic premise is what allows Rawlsian cosmopolitans to sustain that, regardless of nationality or type of political regime, all human beings are morally relevant persons for distributive arrangements. Certainly, the concept of equal moral personality, understood as the potential capacity of having a sense of justice and a conception of the good, together with the assumption that primary goods are universally wanted, represent the key to understanding the initial position and the content of the two principles of justice of the Rawlsian model. The first principle of justice as fairness concedes an equal right to a scheme of basic liberties inasmuch as every moral person possesses an inherent dignity; whereas the second principle restricts social and economic inequalities (in Rawls’s conception, they require a moral justification given the equal moral standing of individuals). Correspondingly, these inequalities are compelled to work to everyone’s advantage – that is, every member of the social arrangement should be accounted equally in the distribution of benefits. Yet Rawls is not satisfied with the first formulation of justice as fairness,8 specifically with the second principle, because he finds it incomplete or “ambiguous.” In particular, Rawls considers that the phrases “everyone’s advantage” and “equally open to all,” employed to characterize the second principle, require further interpretation. Rawls believes that the first formulation of the second principle is imperfect because it does not take into consideration that persons have different talents and natural abilities, as well as social and economic (dis)advantages. Thus, a rigid application of the equality of opportunity provision would lead to very unequal (and, certainly, unjust) distributions. That is, people better socially or naturally endowed would take arbitrary advantage of a rigid application of the principle of equality of opportunity. In order to prevent that natural and social inequalities bring about unfair social outcomes, Rawls takes further the interpretation of the second principle and introduces a notion that is supposed to single out a particular position from which inequalities are to be judged (see Rawls, 1999a, p.65). He


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comes up, then, with the concept of “least advantaged position” that defines a circumscribed group that should be specifically compensated for (that is, disadvantaged persons that happen to have less social primary goods to carry out their plans of life).9 The “least advantaged position” concept, then, is employed to redefine the second principle of justice. Thus, the reformulation of the Rawlsian account of distributive justice defines the following two principles as follows: First Principle Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. (Rawls, 1999a, p.266) However, although the introduction of the least advantaged group is aimed at mitigating the influence of natural and social contingencies in the distribution of social primary goods, it dismisses the fact that all persons qua equal moral beings should have an equally valid moral claim over the benefits generated by the admissible inequalities. As the first formulation of justice as fairness states: “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are [...] reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage.” The fact that each person should be able to take advantage of inequalities is not fortuitous, but it is explained by the equal standing that moral persons have in the Rawlsian model. Therefore, it seems that there is no ambiguity that needs to be clarified and no favored particular position from which inequalities need to be judged. Moreover, since contingencies (such as the social and economic position and natural endowments) in Rawls’s scheme are morally irrelevant, there is no reason why a contingency, according to which, for example, a person happened to be in a better social position, or better naturally endowed, should count against his/her moral claims.

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Rawls seems to be aware of the theoretical consequences of favoring a specific group, and thus he assumes that the expectations of the members are “chain-connected”; that is, he believes that by raising the expectations of the least advantaged position the expectations of the groups situated above will improve similarly. However, this strong assumption is not upheld theoretically, which I believe is crucial to accepting that the reformulation of the difference principle is effectively fair and does not violate the alleged equal moral standing of the members of the social arrangement. For in the absence of chain connection, the advantages generated by the allowed inequalities would only benefit one group. I believe that Rawls fails in providing a persuasive account of justice because his definition of equal moral personality (understood as the possession of the capacity for a sense of justice and a conception of the good) cannot successfully reconcile the concept of a least-advantaged group with the equal standing of moral claims. Nevertheless, what interests me most here is to highlight the relevance of the conception of moral personality to understand some of the challenges faced by the Rawlsian paradigm. This is necessary in order to comprehend what implicit assumptions Rawls’s cosmopolitan heirs make when they attempt to justify distributive principles of justice globally, which take for granted a contentious conception of moral personality. I turn now to examine a view of distributive justice that can be characterized as Rawlsian cosmopolitanism, which draws upon justice as fairness assumptions but seeks to extend the scope of application of distributive principles of justice to the global level. This is an approach that advances a theoretical argument in favor of global principles of justice according to concepts such as the basic structure and the equal and free moral personality, for which they can be considered as part of the Rawlsian paradigm.

On Rawlsian cosmopolitanism In what follows, I shall analyze the theoretical coherence of cosmopolitan accounts of distributive justice. This branch of cosmopolitanism about justice10 claims that there is one “global basic structure” that, according to the contractualist tradition, gives rise to obligations of justice. Moreover, this approach believes that the global structure should be governed by comparative11 principles of distributive


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justice (that is, principles that entail comparisons between individuals’ access to certain rights and goods). Furthermore, this type of cosmopolitanism asserts that the individual is the only relevant subject of moral concern (Pogge, 1989, p.247; Tan, 2004, p.1). The purpose of this section is two-fold. On the one hand, it presents the main characteristics of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism by focusing on two leading theorists, Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge. On the other hand, this section elaborates an assessment of their arguments which claim to support principles of global distributive justice. My aim is to show why Rawlsian cosmopolitan approaches are mistaken, and how they fail to justify normatively the existence of principles of social justice at the global level. Moreover, I shall try to explain why cosmopolitan concerns about global poverty and inequality cannot be addressed effectively from a Rawlsian theoretical perspective. Needless to say, this review of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism is not exhaustive. There are more theorists who, according to my analysis, may be considered as Rawlsian cosmopolitans who are not exhaustively considered here. However, I focus mainly on Beitz and Pogge because I believe that their perspective is highly representative of the global application of the Rawlsian paradigm. It is not my aim to enter into the debate on the origin and classification of cosmopolitan approaches in political philosophy. However, as a rough definition that may help us to frame the present discussion, let us say that cosmopolitanism about justice can be defined as a theoretical approach to normative issues, such as the distribution of scarce resources, which advances the idea that individual human beings have an equal moral worth that entitles them to equal moral claims, irrespective of their affiliation to a specific political or national community. Simon Caney (2001) has put the “principal cosmopolitan claim” as follows: “given the reason we give to defend the distribution of resources and given our convictions about the irrelevance of people’s cultural identity to their entitlements, it follows that the scope of distributive justice should be global” (Caney, 2001, p.977). Thus, cosmopolitan justice theorists maintain that there are global distributive principles that should apply among members of different communities regardless of their nationalities. Likewise, Simon Caney distinguishes between “radical” and “mild” approaches of cosmopolitanism. According to this classification, “radical” cosmopolitans deny that there can be any state-wide principles of distributive justice

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(negative claim): they affirm that any principles of justice are to be applied globally (positive claim). On the other hand, “mild” cosmopolitans do not hold the view that all possible distributive principles must be global in scope necessarily; hence, they embrace solely the positive claim (that is, there are global principles of justice). Kok-Chor Tan (2004) has also introduced a distinction between “strong” and “weak” cosmopolitanism. Yet, he emphasizes the egalitarian aspect of the cosmopolitan perspective. Accordingly, strong cosmopolitanism “takes the ideal of equal concern for persons to entail a commitment to some form of global distributive equality, and will aim to regulate inequalities between persons” (Tan 2004, p.11); whereas “weak” cosmopolitanism, though it similarly maintains the equal moral worth of individuals, aims mainly at accounting for normative principles that guarantee that persons are able to live minimally adequate lives (that is, “weak cosmopolitanism” does not aim at regulating inequalities between individuals). According to the previous distinctions, Rawlsian cosmopolitanism may well be classified as a radical and strong version of cosmopolitanism about justice. For this normative perspective maintains both the negative and positive claims, and is concerned primarily about egalitarian principles of justice. That is, Rawlsian cosmopolitanism rejects both the idea of state-wide principles of justice (inasmuch as they propose a single original position), and the idea that justice is concerned only with guaranteeing a minimum level of individual welfare. Moreover, this conception of cosmopolitanism about justice is institutional insofar as it focuses on the principles that should regulate social and economic institutions to deliver fair outcomes, rather than advancing moral obligations of a general nature between individual persons that might well not be affected by the same institutional framework. Hence, I understand Rawlsian cosmopolitanism as an egalitarian conception of global justice that holds the following two core assumptions: (A) the current international system constitutes a “basic structure,” and (B) there is a universal individual moral personality12 that gives rise to equal moral claims regarding the distribution of benefits of the (global) social arrangement. These assumptions are fundamental to accepting the validity of the cosmopolitan argument that asserts that distributive principles of justice have a global scope. If any of these assumptions proves to be wrong, then the soundness of the Rawlsian-inspired approach to


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global justice is threatened. And thus, prima facie social justice obligations in the international realm would have to be grounded from a different theoretical perspective. Now, let us turn to analyze the conceptions of global justice developed by both Beitz and Pogge according to the Rawlsian paradigm. I begin with Charles Beitz’s argumentation as it was presented in his classic treatise of international political theory, Political Theory and International Relations (1979). Beitz’s main contention is that it is wrong to restrict the application of contractarian principles of justice to the level of the nation-state (Beitz 1979; 1983; 1985).13 He considers that, in order to be consistent with the current international circumstances, social principles of justice ought to be applied globally. Beitz argues that the idea of self-sufficient or autarkic systems is outmoded and it cannot be sustained empirically in the contemporary world. Indeed, Beitz’s central claim in Political Theory and International Relations is that the international system constitutes a cooperative arrangement insofar as there is an important degree of economic interdependence among national communities. From his perspective, interaction between national societies creates practices and institutions that allocate benefits and burdens which need to be assessed normatively. Drawing upon contractarian assumptions, Beitz asserts that cooperation gives rise to moral obligations between participants of social arrangements; specifically, to principles of distribution. In the international context, such principles ought to be global insofar as social cooperation takes place internationally. Yet, how theoretically consistent is Beitz’s cosmopolitan Rawlsianism? Beitz’s mistake in his Political Theory and International Relations is that he assumes the existence of a cooperative social scheme, which supposedly ought to apply distributive principles globally. Strictly speaking, however, the Rawlsian conception of the basic structure is conceived essentially as a scheme of a politically integrated community. Moreover, the ideal-type of the basic structure is designed to conform to politically coherent formations. Thus, even though there is definitely interdependence and an important degree of international institutionalization, there is no global basic structure. The fact that the Rawlsian paradigm is centered essentially on the basic structure, which is understood as “the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation”


(Rawls, 1999a, p.6), has important theoretical implications regarding the type of systems that this normative framework is able to evaluate. The international institutional system as such cannot, therefore, be assessed normatively as if it were a basic structure capable of implementing distributive principles. Understandably, Rawls asserts that the scope of his enquiry in A Theory of Justice is limited: not only do his principles not hold for less comprehensive social groups but also he prefers to focus on a different subject when dealing with the international system (see Rawls, 1999b). It is necessary to stress that Rawls’s conception of social justice presupposes the existence of a political constitution in charge of assigning rights and duties comprehensively to the citizenry. Rawls himself puts it as follows: “By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal social and economic arrangements” (Rawls, 1999a, p.6; emphasis added). It follows that in the absence of a global polity, it seems difficult to demonstrate that there is an effective global basic structure capable of distributing rights and benefits derived from social cooperation. To put it bluntly, insofar as the institutions and social and economic arrangements of the world do not constitute a basic structure, principles of justice à la Rawls cannot be applied successfully nor can justice as fairness categories be employed to assess the (in) justice of the international system. In response to criticisms about the fact that the world cannot be considered a cooperative scheme, Charles Beitz (1983) has argued that the validity of global distributive principles is supported rather by the individuals’ possession of the two powers of the Rawlsian conception of moral personality. Beitz reformulates his position thus: I have argued elsewhere that the membership of the original position should be global rather than national because national societies are not, in fact, self-sufficient: the system of global trade and investment, organized within a structure of international institutions and conceptions, constitutes a scheme of social cooperation in Rawls’ sense. Therefore, the principles of justice should be applied in the first instance to the world at large. I now think that this argument misses the point (although I still accept its conclusion). If the original position is to represent individuals as equal moral persons for the purpose of choosing principles of institutional or background justice, then the criterion of membership is possession of


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the two essential powers of moral personality – a capacity for an effective sense of justice and a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. (Beitz, 1983, p.595) Accordingly, Beitz recognizes that international interdependence might not constitute formally a system of cooperation, but still global obligations of distributive justice hold by virtue of the assumption that individuals are equal moral persons. Particularly, he understands moral personality as it was characterized by John Rawls in justice as fairness. Thus, insofar as the assumption that there is a global basic structure – understood as the arrangement of major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation (Rawls, 1999a, p.47) – may prove to be incorrect for the international system, Beitz’s strategy, which seemingly departs from the contractarian method to justify obligations of justice, is to resort to the second core assumption of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism (B). That is, the theoretical justification of the validity of global principles of justice that lies behind Beitz’s formulation is rooted in the contestable Rawlsian conception of moral personality. This conception of moral personality, indeed, stems from a particular metaphysics of the person. Following Rawls’s view of what metaphysical conceptions are, moral personality is, then, defined by the “philosophically controversial” notions of the capacity for a sense of justice,14 which Rawls (prior his anti-universalistic turn) assumes is “possessed by the overwhelming majority of mankind,” and the capacity to form, to revise and rationally to pursue a conception of the good. Thus, the fact that these two moral powers may be contested by different metaphysical conceptions of moral personality leaves the argument for global distributive principles of justice in need of further theoretical development. For this particular metaphysics of the person requires to be argued for more forcefully, as other competing views about what constitutes the moral nature of persons may come up with different answers to the question of the just distribution. However, this necessary step, which would require engaging in a more complex debate about the nature of moral personality, is not taken by Beitz, or other cosmopolitans. As a result, the validity of global justice principles, at first supported on contractarian grounds, is left to rest on an unjustified assumption. That is, the argument for distributive principles can be falsified straight away if one rejects the truth of the claim that the two moral powers advanced by Rawls are


constitutive of the moral personality. Moreover, the conception of a free and equal moral nature of the parties who take part in the hypothetical contract, which gives rise to distributive principles of justice, needs to be developed further against conceptions that advance an alternative way to understand moral personality. For it is reasonable to think that different conceptions of moral personality would derive not only from different principles of justice, but also a specific scope of obligations of justice. This is the case of theoretical approaches that account for obligations of distributive justice in terms of national identity (see Miller 1999). The poor theoretical elaboration of the concept of moral personality in Rawlsian cosmopolitanism is particularly serious insofar as distributive principles of justice stem from the characterization of moral personality. Let us recall that parties in the original position, seen as a hypothetical situation that represents the moral equality among rational agents, seek to find principles of justice consistent with their nature. Thus, if the egalitarian principles of justice are accepted by the parties in the original position, it is because they are consistent with a particular view of what moral nature is taken to be. Thus, if parties were conceived in a different way, the principles of justice derived would be different. That is why it is so important to provide a good justification of the preferred conception of moral personality that accounts for the existence of comparative distributive principles of justice. Yet, Rawls’s heirs have not developed a more sophisticated theoretical defense of their conceptualization of individual moral personality that could secure more firmly their version of distributive justice. On the other hand, Beitz maintained that even if there was no international interdependence (that is, that states were effectively self-sufficient and there was not a global scheme of social cooperation), some redistributive obligations between countries would have to be contemplated. In particular, he claims that the allocation of the world’s natural resources is morally arbitrary in a Rawlsian sense, so inequalities associated with this distribution call for redress. He advances an “international resource redistribution principle” according to which societies, whose allotment of scarce natural resources is comparatively abundant, have an obligation to make transfers to resource-poor societies.15 Beitz’s idea is constructed according to the familiar Rawlsian conception of a fair initial situation. Accordingly,


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he points out that the parties of an ideal international original position would consider that scarce natural-resource endowments are undeserved, and they would propose a mechanism capable of compensating for unequal access to such resources. Beitz argues that the international resource redistribution principle would function as the difference principle does for closed systems (Beitz, 1999a, p.142). Natural resources, then, are seen as a common asset of the social arrangement, which must be distributed along an egalitarian criterion that considers a least advantaged position. The introduction of the discussion about the distribution of natural resources in Political Theory and International Relations has been highly controversial, even within the Rawlsian paradigm.16 I shall not develop an extensive critique on this issue inasmuch as its argumentation departs from the cardinal premise of the book (that is, the empirical claim that states are not self-sufficient). In fact, Beitz later on has considered it a mistake or a distraction from the main cosmopolitan thesis he wants to defend. Why consider the subject at all? Beitz asks in a later article: As an autobiographical matter, I think the case was pressed mainly in the spirit of arguing for an ‘alternative verdict’ – that is, for a position one might find plausible even if one were not persuaded by the subsequent argument for a fully cosmopolitan global principle of distributive justice (Beitz, 2005, p.419). Indeed, the alternative proposed by Beitz is not theoretically robust for the idea that the “international resource redistribution principle” would function as a difference principle requires further elaboration regarding the definition of the worse-off group. That is, if the beneficiaries of the principle of redistribution are supposed to be countries lacking natural resources, it could be the case that developing or poor countries that happen to be rich in unexploited natural resources would have to redistribute part of their income to richer countries. This principle, then, would paradoxically bring about intuitively unfair outcomes. Let us now turn to Thomas Pogge’s version of cosmopolitan distributive justice, which presents a global version of Rawls’s conception of justice. In his work Realizing Rawls (1989), Pogge points out that the commitments of justice as fairness, namely the focus on the basic

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structure and the conception of moral personality, compels him to abandon the idea that distributive principles must have a domestic scope. He argues: “I concede that a criterion of justice for domestic institutions would be sufficient if modern states were indeed closed systems. In this case there simply would not be a global basic structure for principles of global justice to apply to” (Pogge, 1989, p.240). Moreover, he argues that there is a “global institutional scheme” that is unjust, which needs to be changed. Pogge begins his speculation with the same idea as Charles Beitz: the rejection of Rawls’s assumption that current states are closed systems. Likewise, Pogge disputes Rawls’s central assumption that it is possible to develop a reasonable conception of social justice without taking into consideration international interaction. The central idea is that there is a global institutional scheme, or global structure, distributing “morally significant benefits and burdens” among its human participants. This scheme, according to Pogge, is unjust as it distributes advantages unfairly; hence it ought to be changed. The institutional scheme that Pogge advances draws upon Rawls’s theory of justice. Accordingly, the global version of Rawls’s conception of justice advanced by Pogge embraces the theoretical framework of the original position, and proposes a single global original position in which the parties represent individuals. In this sense, Pogge asserts that the basic unit of moral concern is the individual person. Then, in strict Rawlsian terms, nationality is treated as one more contingency that cannot influence the distribution of benefits among the participants of a social scheme of cooperation. For that reason, national membership is put behind the veil of ignorance. Moreover, Pogge considers that a global original position would derive from the same two principles of justice as fairness advanced by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. Does Pogge’s account succeed in justifying any idea of global distributive justice? Again, my criticism of this version of cosmopolitan justice is that the alleged international structure does not constitute a coherent global social scheme that can support the application of Rawlsian principles of justice. It is true that international institutions need to be transformed to bring about justice globally. Yet it is hard to accept Pogge’s solution to deal with the effects that the national and the “global” basic structures have upon individual prospects of life. Pogge argues that “we should think about our basic social institutions


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in general and from a global point of view, thereby aiming for an integrated solution, a just and stable institutional scheme preserving a distribution of basic rights, opportunities, and index goods that is fair both globally and within each nation” (Pogge, 1989, p.286; author’s emphasis). Nonetheless, Pogge fails in considering that the “global institutional scheme” is still highly fragmented and does not constitute a basic structure, properly speaking. For the set of international institutions and practices are not politically coherent. Consequently, the Rawlsian paradigm’s focus on the basic structure does not seem to offer adequate theoretical tools to develop normative critiques of the current international system. This is not to say that normative assessment of international institutions, norms and regimes is not possible, but it means that Rawlsianism may not be the most appropriate framework to deal with issues of global or international injustice. For the Rawlsian paradigm depends crucially on the effective existence of a basic structure determining, indeed, individual life prospects, but also distributing, policing and enforcing rights and duties systematically. Rawls’s assumption that the basic structure of society constitutes a “closed system” is a fundamental theoretical premise of justice as fairness, which determines the nature and limits of the paradigm. Trying to analyze the international system through Rawls’s A Theory of Justice categories, by simply assuming that the world at large should now be considered a “closed system,” is thus an inaccurate way of confronting the normative challenges with which the system presents us. Given this, Pogge, Beitz and others who begin from the postulate that there is a global basic structure, or a global institutional scheme consistently assigning rights and duties and determining inescapably what Pogge calls “institutional inequalities”, do not seem to succeed in developing pertinent normative critiques. For this assumption is highly disputable. In later works, Pogge has somehow abandoned a strict adherence to justice as fairness (though still faithful to a Rawls-inspired egalitarianism), and has developed less ambitious proposals to deal with global poverty and inequality (Pogge 1994, 1999). That is, Pogge no longer seems to defend an orthodox application of the two Rawlsian principles of justice. For example, in his article “A Global Resources Dividend” (1999), he introduces a distributive principle of justice based upon a negative moral responsibility for injustice. The


main idea of his proposal is that people who benefit from the current global structure (or global institutional scheme) have a duty to relieve the poverty of those worse-off individuals of the world. In particular, when he speaks of a negative moral responsibility, he seems to refer generally to citizens of Western developed economies. Pogge’s egalitarian proposal aims at dealing normatively with the radical inequality17 of the world, which he says can be explained by the effect of shared institutions, uncompensated exclusion from the use of natural resources, and effects of a common bloody history. These explanations of global poverty and inequality, Pogge argues, represent competing philosophical traditions about global justice’s rationales. He expects through his proposal to build a consensus amongst different traditions of Western philosophy to reform the current status quo characterized by global injustice. The proposal of a “global resources dividend” (GRD) intends to transform the present global order by advancing the normative idea that “those who make more use of the resources of our planet (these coincide roughly with the affluent) should compensate those who, involuntarily, use very little” (Pogge, 1999, p.510). He considers that his proposal, based on the poor individual’s exclusion from the use of natural resources, is moderate insofar as it accepts the existing state system, and it allows governments to maintain control over their natural resources. Succinctly put, the GRD consists of the establishment of mechanisms to share transnationally a part of the value of the resources that governments actually exploit for both consumption and trade. In particular, Pogge wants to tax the use of scarce natural resources. Yet, he wants to avoid the “odious connotations” of the words tax (Pogge, 1994) or fee; thus he chooses the term “dividend” for the payment rich countries are required to make. The concept of dividend is supposed to express the idea that the “global poor” have an “inalienable” entitlement over the world’s natural resources. Accordingly, the global resources dividend’s target is to raise the living standards of poor people. Although Pogge’s moderate proposal seems to be more feasible than the establishment of a global difference principle, it does not seem to guarantee stable moral obligations to help the global poor. There are two main reasons. On the one hand, it is arguable that poverty and inequality are explained, as Pogge assumes, only by the structure of the global economic order. Though the international


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economic structure certainly influences the distribution of resources among human beings, domestic institutional arrangements could also play an important role in how particular individuals perform. Hence, the moral responsibility of citizens of developed countries needs further elaboration. For the obligations of developing countries’ better-off citizens to raise the living standards of their poor fellow citizens may be greater in some cases than that of average citizens who live in rich countries. Intuitively, it seems that the beneficiaries of unjust domestic arrangements in poor countries are more obliged to distribute resources than, say, low-income citizens of developed countries. Yet, Pogge seems to put the blame generally on citizens of Western developed economies without some necessary qualifications. This is explained by his initial assumption that poverty and inequality are accounted for by an international system divided into rich and poor countries. On the other hand, regarding the operative side of the proposal, assuming that economic agents are rational,18 the idea of charging a tax over the use of scarce natural resources would necessarily lead to incentives to substitute the exploitation of these resources in order to avoid paying the dividend. Thus, developed economies could gradually change their technologies up to the point that the use of certain scarce natural resources would be minimized – for example, instead of using fossil fuel (for which they should pay the “dividends”), industries could introduce solar technology. Certainly, this would bring about important beneficial effects to the global ecosystem, but, at the same time, this technological shift would threaten the stability of transfers to the global poor as Pogge’s proposal grounds them theoretically on the use of natural resources, such as oil. Pogge believes that the idea could be extended to “limited resources” such as water, air and land used in agriculture. Nonetheless, the value and use of these resources is not easy to quantify without highly complex formulas and the establishment of a transnational monitoring system, which seems utterly implausible. In summary, neither Pogge’s global version of justice as fairness nor the so-called “global resource dividend” seem to be a reliable way to deal with global poverty and inequality. For the international institutional arrangement does not constitute a proper basic structure, and global inequality is not necessarily the outcome of the international economic order. Moreover, poverty in developing


nations is also explained by causes other than the international structure: unjust domestic socio-economic or political arrangements in fact play a significant role in the levels of deprivation and social exclusion of particular societies. Strictly speaking, it would not be fair (or sound) to underestimate the domestic causes of poverty by assuming simplistically that the international structure completely determines all of the relevant social outcomes worldwide. What’s wrong with Rawlsian cosmopolitanism? There are two main challenges that cosmopolitan theories of justice, constructed upon the Rawlsian paradigm, need to address, I believe, in order to become a consistent normative account to assess the injustice of practices and institutions of the world. Yet, they have not succeeded in meeting them, and as a consequence their chances of steering institutional change to achieve global justice become irrelevant – no matter how morally reasonable cosmopolitan aims are. First, from the theoretical point of view, cosmopolitan theories of distributive justice need to prove unequivocally the existence of a consistent global basic structure as such. It is not enough to say that there are functioning international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, diverse international agreements, an international market or economic globalization to conclude hastily that there is an articulated basic structure upon which principles of justice can be applied. For this conception, as conceived by Rawls, presupposes the existence of a political constitution that joins together the major social and economic institutions determining effectively the social outcomes of the system through the application of principles of justice. Put differently, despite a considerable degree of interdependence (which includes important levels of global economic interaction) and growing structures of global governance, the world is far from constituting a coherent polity. Hence, global principles of distributive justice could not be successfully implemented. At this stage in the history of humanity, the best way to comprehend how the international structure works is to conceive it as a coexistence of two systems. On the one hand, it is a system of nation-states based on the notion of territorial sovereignty that coheres a great deal of local and international social practices. And, on the other hand, it is a transnational system that is slowly


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revealing shared moral understandings and building up institutions of global governance. It would be inaccurate to dismiss any of these circumstances in order to advance (or snub) accounts of cosmopolitan global or transnational justice. The second challenge that cosmopolitanism about justice has not addressed adequately is also connected with the fallacy that there is a global basic structure, though it refers particularly to the feasibility of putting into practice egalitarian principles of distributive justice in a highly fragmented system such as the current international one. This practical challenge is related to the idea that although there is not a basic structure in place, it would be morally imperative to establish one to tackle global poverty. Thus, apart from the gigantic task of devising legitimate institutions in charge of enforcing basic liberties world-wide (for example, liberty of conscience, freedom of thought, and so on), any radical cosmopolitan project would have to come up with an extensive arrangement of global background institutions for distributive justice capable of operating supranationally. Yet, this is an endeavor that thus far has not been seriously addressed in a great deal of cosmopolitan accounts, even though this task seems to be fundamental in order to make these ideas about distributive justice practicable. Let us develop this point a little further. Drawing upon justice as fairness, let us illustrate the practical impossibility of the application of egalitarian distributive principles in the world at the present time. Thus, insofar as distributive principles are supposed to be applied across countries, it is necessary to count on a set of global institutions aimed at supporting the regulation of outcomes in the social system. The basic idea is that the distributive process can deliver justice exhaustively in the social arrangement through the implementation of general principles. Rawls calls these institutions, in his speculations on the domestic case, “background institutions for distributive justice.”19 For him, these background institutions are arranged into different branches that make up a regulating scheme of distribution. It is important to note that, although egalitarian cosmopolitan approaches have not explicitly endorsed this arrangement, they would have to come up with a similar set of institutions to make their egalitarian principles of justice work globally. These institutions are essential for the distributive processes of any egalitarian theory of justice and can operate effectively only if the social scheme is fully integrated politically and

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economically. Thus, there are, at least, two cardinal issues that require coherence of the structure in order to deliver fair distributive outcomes generally: the definition of property rights and taxation schemes. Yet, it is not clear that the fragmented institutional framework of the international system could actually uphold global mechanisms capable of making use of these policy instruments to regulate distributive outcomes globally. To put it simply, whereas in some parts of the world (for example, local, national or regional economic systems) certain definitions of property rights or tax policy could work successfully to encourage just distributive outcomes and promote efficiency of the markets, in other contexts the very same definitions could not work optimally or fairly. For the integration of the world economic system upon which background institutions for justice could establish effective regulation is still incipient. Accordingly, local variables – as diverse as the level of savings and capital accumulation, income distribution and inflation rates (just to mention a few economic factors) – would demand extremely complex (if not impossible) institutional arrangements to make the principles operative. Moreover, socially just arrangements need to take into consideration criteria of economic efficiency to be stable, and it is the case that efficiency depends, among many things, on the structural configuration of markets, which thus far are not integrated into a single whole. By the same token, schemes of taxation aimed at supporting global distributive principles of justice would have to vary according to the peculiarities of the different regional economic systems; yet, it is far from clear that the unavoidable discrepancy of policies to be applied, so to speak, casuistically could guarantee just and egalitarian outcomes globally. Moreover, it is unrealistic to think that, at present, there are conditions to persuade particular governments and peoples themselves to transfer their jurisdiction over such crucial matters. Can anyone truly believe that current states and their peoples will agree to give up these sovereign powers? Without the relocation of the jurisdictions in charge of the definition of property rights and taxation, any egalitarian conception of global distributive justice is incomplete. No theory of distributive justice that advances egalitarian principles of justice can work successfully without having an appropriate arrangement of these instruments in a coherent whole. Having said this, the only possible way to make global background institutions for distributive


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justice work requires the extinction of sovereign nation-states, and this idea, I believe, is for the moment an illusion. For not only have the conditions that support the existence of nation-states not disappeared – for example, popular attachments to their particular polities is strong – but it will also take a long time to redefine the legitimacy of institutions in charge of enforcing taxation and defining property rights world-wide. Paradoxically, although cosmopolitanism vehemently intends to put an end to global poverty by seeking to introduce revolutionary institutional transformations, its project turns out to be a giant with feet of clay: structural conditions of the world cannot support, at present, the application of global distributive principles of justice. No matter how deep our commitment to equality might be, the international structure cannot uphold egalitarian comparative principles of distributive justice. Bearing this in mind, apart from the valuable identification of the serious inequalities in the world, I find the cosmopolitan project’s idea of fighting global poverty through the application of cosmopolitan principles of justice (founded on the Rawlsian paradigm) counterproductive. For it both overshadows the considerable ethical responsibilities that actual nation-states have right now to end global poverty and grounds social justice on the fallacious premise that there is a global basic structure upon which principles of justice should be applied. I turn now to analyze two different ethical approaches that have tried to justify obligations of a cosmopolitan nature beyond the Rawlsian paradigm: Onora O’Neill’s theory of transnational obligations and Singer’s so-called solution to world poverty.

On O’Neill’s transnational obligations The legion of contemporary Kantian thinkers is not only vast but it is also diverse. Their contribution to social normative theory has been highly influential within the liberal tradition for more than two hundred years. Moreover, after the consolidation of the moral legitimacy of the democratic form of government that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, moral and political philosophers, as well as international relations theorists, have drawn upon Immanuel Kant to make sense of the new era from the normative point of view. Yet the appropriation of Kant’s moral and political philosophy has been

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highly selective as post-metaphysical thinking became a solid paradigm in philosophical reflection. Thus, many contemporary Kantians often reject Kant’s metaphysics and epistemology but still make use of the German philosopher’s notions in order to account for the validity of their intuitions about conceptualizations as varied as autonomy, reason, justice, freedom, human dignity, trade and peace. The pragmatic move aimed at leaving out “metaphysical surroundings” is supposed to serve the purpose of gaining persuasiveness. In her article “Kant’s Justice and Kantian Justice,” Onora O’Neill affirms that this characteristic move designed to arrive at “more or less” Kantian conclusions starting from different background premises has been fundamental in the late twentieth-century Kantian approaches to justice (O’Neill 2000b, chapter 4). In particular, she identifies three Kantian conceptions with which contemporary Kantianism is not comfortable: reason, freedom and action. The agenda of contemporary Kantianism seeks, then, to transform these conceptions by giving them a “more or less” empiricist content and still reach Kantian conclusions. The plan is supposed to succeed if it can formulate new answers to common criticisms addressed to Kantian theory without drawing upon Kant’s metaphysics. This section focuses on an important Kantian approach to the aforementioned challenge, which constitutes an alternative to the Rawlsian paradigm. Specifically, this section examines one major idea of O’Neill’s universalistic philosophical enterprise: the concept of transnational obligations. In particular, I will try to elucidate whether O’Neill’s Kantianism is a philosophically reliable approach to vindicate transnational obligations of a distributive nature. Justice: Obligations or rights? One of O’Neill’s main concerns has been to propose an ethical discourse centered on the concept of obligation rather than rights. O’Neill argues that obligation-based reasoning has the advantage of being universally accessible and critical. According to her, neither consequential nor rights-based reasoning is theoretically effective to tackle the problems of hunger, poverty and, specifically, justice. Moreover, insofar as the rights-based ethical discourse focuses on recipience, determining the scope of moral responsibility becomes more difficult. Hence, the rights-discourse, O’Neill argues, plays


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against the possibility of effective enforcement insofar as the obligation-holders are not always identified clearly. Focusing on the agent’s ethical perspective rather than the recipient’s allows us to account for obligations for which there are no specified allocations. Similarly, whereas the rhetoric of rights frequently obscures the existence of moral duties, obligation-based ethical reasoning guarantees that agents are categorically guided so that they can know what course of action for a particular situation they ought to follow. O’Neill thinks that ethical reasoning in terms of obligation effectively answers the moral agent’s central question what ought I do? Though rights-centered discourse can also guide action, this type of speculation needs to allocate counterpart duties to be effective. Yet, this rarely happens. In fact, when the scope of social justice is expanded beyond the boundaries of the state, one may discover that much of the rights-based reasoning on global justice and human rights falls short in allocating counterpart obligations. Moreover, in the absence of an institutional framework capable of effectively allocating, protecting and enforcing obligations, rights-discourse becomes nothing but an account of good intentions. Thus, O’Neill points out: The most questionable effect of putting rights first is that those rights for which no allocation of obligations has been institutionalized may not be taken seriously. When obligations are unallocated it is indeed right that they should be met, but nobody can have an effective right – an enforceable, claimable or waiveable right – to their being met. (O’Neill, 2000b, p.126) Contrary to a rights-based reasoning, ethical reflection centered on obligations does not depend, O’Neill argues, on the existence of qualified institutions to protect rights in a society: moral agents know what their duties are. Actually, a discourse centered on obligations can help in the creation and transformation of institutions in order to improve the ways in which rights are protected and obligations enforced. Drawing upon Kant, O’Neill establishes that justice is about principles that can be universalized. Yet, the universalization of principles of justice needs to take into account that in human societies there are evident discrepancies between human values. Thus,

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O’Neill assumes that the modern circumstances of justice are characterized by ethical diversity – that is, it is assumed that there is a plurality of agents and ideologies, which do not share the same account of the good. Rawls and O’Neill thus share similar theoretical premises (that is, justice as universality and the acceptance of the fact of plurality). However, O’Neill parts company from her fellow Kantian, John Rawls, when she accuses him of advancing an idealized account to support his principles of justice. In particular, O’Neill considers that Rawls’s presupposition of the existence, within that plurality, of ethical agreement on a certain ideal citizenship creates an evident point of contention (O’Neill, 1988, pp.717–719). O’Neill’s Kantian constructivist solution consists of offering reliable universal principles of justice by avoiding Rawls’s idealization of agency – which non-liberals find contestable. Thus, in her Faces of Hunger (1986), O’Neill introduces two abstract principles of justice that allegedly can be adopted by all (that is, they are universalizable): the principles of non-coercion and non-deception (or, phrased somewhat differently, the principles of rejection of coercion and deception). From the Kantian point of view, principles of coercion and deception cannot be universalizable insofar as their adoption would be irrational. No rational moral being could ever will such maxims to become universal laws. O’Neill considers that if a plurality of agents are supposed to share principles of justice, capacities to reason and act must be safeguarded. In the event that these capacities were undermined, agents could not truly share any principles. As a result, universal principles of justice must begin with the protection of agency. Specifically, as O’Neill put it: “the principles must at least include principles of avoiding coercion and deception, the various modes of which are ways of destroying or subverting others’ agency” (O’Neill, 1988, p.719). What constitutes coercion and deception, she affirms, will have different interpretations: deception and coercion are a matter of deliberation. Moreover, their content is determined by the actual characteristics of the agents and, in essence, their vulnerabilities. Actual agents and their capacities to act and reason are vulnerable in different ways. Hence, since an idealized conception of agency overlooks the existence of actual vulnerabilities it is impossible to find out what actually constitutes coercion and deception. Rather, O’Neill urges us to begin with abstract premises and then look at


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the particular circumstances: abstract principles need to be connected with judgment. In her work Towards Justice and Virtue (1996), however, O’Neill opts for the term injury to rephrase the content of the principles of justice. Accordingly, she speaks about the principle of rejection of injury to define the nature of the principle of justice, which is supposed to embrace the rejection of coercion and deception. Restating the principle of justice in terms of injury allows O’Neill to rearrange the non-universalizable maxims into two main categories: maxims of direct and indirect injury. Accordingly, maxims of coercion and violence are considered to be a source of direct injury, whereas maxims of deceit and fraud are a source of indirect injury. Moreover, reformulating the principle of justice in terms of injury is an effective theoretical way of including issues such as environmentalism and migration, which hardly fit in a formulation entirely centered on coercion and deception. Likewise, the principle of the rejection of injury is intended to be universalizable in a Kantian way inasmuch as agents cannot rationally adopt injury as a maxim of conduct. For the acceptance of a maxim of injury would go against the agent’s capacities for action and deliberation. In O’Neill’s words: Since injuring cannot be an inclusive principle for all, anyone will have reason to reject inclusive principles of injuring, for which they could give no adequate reasons to others. They will therefore have reason to reject systematic and gratuitous injury, whether inflicted directly on others, or inflicted indirectly on them by damaging the social and material structures on which lives depend; they will have reason to condone only injury that is needed to avoid more extensive injury. (O’Neill, 1996, p.190) Moreover, O’Neill’s theory of obligation, as developed in Towards Justice and Virtue, aims to account for two major ethical conceptions that in some contemporary approaches of moral philosophy are seen as irreconcilable notions: justice and virtue. As noted earlier, O’Neill advances the idea that obligations of justice are elucidated by the universalizable principle of the rejection of injury. Yet, she considers that justice does not comprise all of the duties that we have towards those with whom we are connected. Given the vulnerable nature of the agents, O’Neill affirms that capacities and capabilities for action


are undermined even when no actual injury is inflicted. As a result, her ethical account holds that there are analogous obligations of virtue, which can be disclosed by the universalizable principle of the rejection of indifference. The difference between virtue and justice, according to O’Neill, lies in the fact that whereas justice is owed, virtue (or virtuous action) is not. Hence, contrary to virtue, justice can formally give rise to claimable duties. These two principles (that is, the rejection of injury and the rejection of indifference) constitute O’Neill’s core categorical principles. They articulate her ethical enterprise, constructed along Kantian lines, and substantiate the kind of global institutions she envisions for a truly just human society. An interesting characteristic of O’Neill’s work is that she tries to determine the scope of moral obligations through a practical solution. In fact, O’Neill asserts that agents can draw upon constituted structures to know whom they are morally obliged. Briefly put, she accounts for three basic assumptions about moral agency: plurality, connection and finitude. These three assumptions are abstract aspects that structure agents’ actions from a moral point of view. Plurality means that there are “others” who are distinct from the reflecting moral agent; connection refers to the patterns of causality between agents’ actions and, lastly, finitude is an assumption that entails an abstract (non-idealized) conception of others’ capacities, capabilities and vulnerabilities. Obligations to distant strangers, therefore, are based on the existence of these assumptions made in acting. Hence, O’Neill maintains that transnational obligations are justified by the agents’ own practical assumptions. Strangers belong to the sphere of moral concern inasmuch as persons assume that they are agents to whom they are connected (for example through trade, telecommunications, financial markets, and so on) and whose capacities are finite. As put by O’Neill: “Whenever their activity assumes a plurality of finite and connected others, they are also committed to including those others within the scope of their ethical consideration” (O’Neill, 1996, p.113). Although O’Neill’s practical approach does not resolve the issue of what constitutes essentially the basis of moral personality – and, therefore, it is incapable of demonstrating why moral concern ought to be fundamentally cosmopolitan – it is supposed to be able to provide universalistic prescriptions. Thus, O’Neill suggests that her


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practical approach to fix the scope of moral obligations leads us to the theoretical conclusion that we are committed to “more or less cosmopolitan” principles of justice (see O’Neill, 1996, p.121; O’Neill, 2000b, chapter 10). For agents’ assumptions in acting and reasoning point to the conclusion that they have obligations towards distant strangers. In the following section, however, I shall try to elucidate whether O’Neill’s project is a reliable theoretical framework to defend the type of obligations that could address problems such as global poverty and hunger. In particular, I shall analyze the theoretical strength of O’Neill’s argument to justify transnational obligations of a distributive nature. A critique of O’Neill’s project Is O’Neill’s Kantian constructivism a sound theory to substantiate any version of global or transnational justice? More specifically, are transnational obligations of a distributive nature theoretically justified in O’Neill’s account? There are two main criticisms that I want to address regarding O’Neill’s approach: (i) on the one hand, the theoretical treatment of the notion of injury is inconsistent with the premises of her ethical constructivism and, (ii) on the other hand, O’Neill’s principles of justice cannot account for positive obligations of social or distributive justice either domestically or transnationally. Regarding O’Neill’s concept of injury, which constitutes the basis of her principle of justice (that is, rejection of systematic and gratuitous injury), it is worth recalling that this notion is supposed to be a more comprehensive concept to define the scope of wrong than the more familiar Kantian notions of coercion and deception previously employed by O’Neill (see O’Neill, 1986). The notion of injury includes not only coercion and deception (which are obstacles of free will), but it also includes potential damage to the natural and “man-made” environments that provide the material conditions for life and the social fabric (O’Neill, 1996, p.168). However, this crucial element that defines the wrong that justice is supposed to prevent or redress is not properly justified within O’Neill’s constructivist assumptions. Let us further develop this point. O’Neill’s ethical enterprise aims at constructing action-guiding principles that may be followable by others without the need to

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assume a particular metaphysics of the person. Her approach, then, rejects defining the moral agent’s ethical standing according to a metaphysical view (that is, O’Neill offers a practical solution), and similarly proposes the principle of the rejection of injury. However, it seems that in order to be accepted by different ethical discourses and prescribe action, her principle of the rejection of injury needs to explain what sort of injury should be prevented. For the rejection of all injury is not a sound principle as there must be some scope for rightful injury capable of securing justice. It is true that O’Neill makes a distinction between the commitment to non-injury and her proposed principle of the rejection of injury aimed at accepting the possibility of permissible injury. She argues that whereas a rigorous commitment to “non-injury” could potentially accept unjust practices only for the sake of not injuring, the principle of rejection of systematic and gratuitous injury accepts the possibility that not all injury ought to be discarded. As put by O’Neill: “In general terms, justice is in the first instance a matter of living lives and of seeking and supporting institutions and policies that reject injury: to do so justly is a matter of shunning both gratuitous and systematic injury, but may be compatible with and even require some unavoidable injury” (O’Neill 1996, p.179). Nevertheless, the distinction between avoidable and unavoidable injury is not theoretically useful because, as O’Neill herself recognizes, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between them. Hence, O’Neill’s approach fails to provide a formal criterion to determine the scope of rightful injury. The paradox is that unjust injury and the conditions of rightful injury can only be defined insofar as one assumes, at least intuitively, a metaphysics of the person: without this metaphysical backing O’Neill’s principle of justice is too abstract, or, plainly put, empty. Thus, whereas some philosophical accounts that assume a conception of moral personality based on the possession of a capacity or distinctive ontological characteristic (for example, rationality, sentience, dignity, and so on) may define precisely what is injury, O’Neill’s account seems unable to offer an argument to determine which capacities and capabilities for action ought to be protected from harm. In strict Kantian ethics, “injury” could sensibly be understood as coercion and deception. For coercion and deception are impediments


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for the agents to become self-legislating beings who can freely choose the moral law: coercion constitutes a heteronomous cause of the will and deception brings about delusion. Both obstacles contradict the idea of free will. In fact, they are circumstances that go against Kant’s concept of humanity.20 Furthermore, coercion is permissible only to protect moral agents’ autonomy. Kant offers a powerful explication of the rationale of the right to use coercion grounded in his concept of freedom,21 which O’Neill endorses. Yet, it is not clear why, after having repeatedly disapproved Kant’s concept of freedom (cf. O’Neill 1996, p.6; O’Neill, 2000b, p.65), O’Neill tries to hang onto it in order to justify the necessity of coercion for the realization of justice (O’Neill, 2000b, chapter 9). On the one hand, she says that her Kantian project “in fact rejects most of the basic claims of Kant’s practical philosophy, including in particular his conceptions of action, reason, and freedom” (O’Neill, 1996, p.6). And, on the other, she justifies the permissible use of coercion (or permissible injury), which is a necessary condition for justice, drawing entirely upon Kant’s preoccupation with securing respect for external freedom. O’Neill seems to forget that Kant’s concern with protecting external freedom is explained by his particular metaphysics of the person. In particular, it is Kant’s conception of humanity and its inherent dignity (or absolute worth), which lead him to authorize coercion (that is, a type of permissible injury in O’Neill’s terms). Moreover, according to Franceschet (2002), if Kant escapes Hegel’s criticisms about the pure formality of Kantian ethics, it is by resorting to his concept of humanity.22 That is, a metaphysical notion that confers dignity to human beings. For they are the only beings that can set ends rationally. It is, therefore, an inconsistency that O’Neill rejects Kant’s metaphysics to define the scope of ethical standing – opting for the so-called practical approach – and, at the same time, she surreptitiously endorses it to account for permissible coercion to secure justice. Hence, O’Neill’s constructivist endeavor cannot justify by itself the legitimate use of coercion, which is necessary for justice, as she needs to rely on Kant’s transcendental idealism. As regards my second criticism of O’Neill’s theory, I believe that it is not able to secure positive duties of social justice either nationally or transnationally because her principle of rejection of injury does not commit us to take part in systematic redistributive practices. For moral agents may reject direct and indirect injury without being

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obliged by the principle of justice to distribute part of their wealth. It is important to notice here that the duties of justice derived from the rejection of injury are essentially negative – that is, they have the form, do not do X: do not injure directly or indirectly. The principle of the rejection of direct injury, understood as systematic or gratuitous violence, coercion and other actions that affect capacities for action, is guiding only in that it prohibits harming human capacities or exploiting vulnerabilities. Hence, whereas it could be an important action-guiding ethical principle to establish fairer international practices in trade and finance (for example, institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund would, indeed, benefit from the application of such a principle), this principle does not offer any support for practices of transnational or global redistribution, which require duties far more demanding. That is, O’Neill does not elaborate a solid argument to justify positive duties of social justice. Part of the explanation is that, contrary to other liberals, she refuses to ground her account of justice on the idea of equality. She argues that this strategy is “unpromising because equality is a radically incomplete predicate, so hospitable to countless differing completions” (O’Neill, 1996, p.162). Having discarded both liberty and equality as building blocks of her theory of obligation, O’Neill fails to develop other conceptions (for example, solidarity) which could help her to go beyond negative duties of justice and thus justify duties of redistribution. Similarly, the rejection of indirect injury – such as fraud, deceit or the damage to the natural environment – only prohibits certain actions that injure agents and agencies but prescribe no action to directly assist people in need. Then again, the principle of the rejection of indirect injury might, certainly, help challenge some current international practices and institutions, but it does not offer any theoretical support for any kind of duties of social justice. It is, then, the case that neither the rejection of direct injury nor the rejection of indirect injury (that is, O’Neill’s principles of justice) can effectively account for duties of assistance or distributive obligations as fully claimable duties. O’Neill is aware that, “[i]n a world of vulnerable beings who rejected only principles of injury in their dealings, yet were wholly indifferent to one another, many capacities and capabilities for action would falter and fail” (O’Neill, 1996, p.200). However, her solution to this condition is beyond the scope


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of justice as she locates it in the realm of virtue. She proposes the rejection of indifference or neglect as an obligation of virtue, not as an obligation of justice. These two principles, the rejection of injury and the rejection of indifference, constitute O’Neill’s comprehensive framework to reconcile justice and virtue within a universalistic ethical project. However, it is clear that O’Neill is able to account for a positive duty to assist people in need in transnational terms – that is, agents would be required to reduce the vulnerabilities of strangers. This duty is not properly arrayed to be a claimable duty of justice. For principles of virtue and justice are not equally enforceable. O’Neill has put the difference between justice and virtue as follows: The difference between virtue and justice may then be not that justice is principled and virtue unprincipled, nor that justice is always and virtue never a matter of requirement. Rather it may be that justice is not only required but owed, hence claimable and waivable, while virtuous action, even if required, is not owed, hence neither claimable nor waivable, and in many cases not even tied to any particular role, or status or office. If certain virtues are required, they will be a matter of obligation or duty, but will simply lack counterpart rights. (O’Neill, 1996, p.139) Consequently, any duty derived from the rejection of indifference would not be claimable by needed people. Given this, if O’Neill’s project somehow accounts for any redistributive duty, it is essentially a duty of charity, for this duty is not fitted with a counterpart right, which could make it really enforceable. Particularly, as regards global distributive obligations, the challenge is not accounting for them as a question of charity but as a fundamental concern of justice – that is, as a problem where enforceability and accountability need to be theoretically demonstrated.

On Singer’s moral obligation to assist One of the best-known accounts of transnational moral obligations to assist people in need is the one proposed by the utilitarian thinker Peter Singer. Though not strictly a global (or cosmopolitan) distributive justice approach, Singer’s argument supports a redistribution of resources from affluent countries to the global poor. As a result,

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Singer’s work on the subject can certainly be included in the wide scope of “global justice” literature. However, one must always be aware that the theoretical background Singer draws upon is different from deontological-based accounts (for example, O’Neill’s Kantian international justice or Rawlsian cosmopolitanism). Perhaps, as regards global distributive accounts, the most important difference between deontological and consequentialist arguments is that the latter justifies transfers between individuals or countries without appealing to any idea of duty of justice. The rationale of the obligation to distribute (or assist, in Singer’s terms) is admirably simpler but, as we shall see in this section, still less promising. Indeed, one of the most outstanding characteristics of the argument presented by Singer is its simplicity to account for a positive duty to help people in need: we have a moral obligation (that is, giving money away) to prevent something bad (that is, poverty or hunger) from happening. If one adds to the former formula the characteristic utilitarian idea of moral impartiality, then, the outcome is a version of “justice” across boundaries, or global justice. Singer’s utilitarian framework Mostly known as a pioneer in the “animal rights movement,”23 Peter Singer’s ethical views draw upon the consequentialist tradition. Briefly put, consequentialism is a conception of ethics that asserts that an action must be assessed in terms of its consequences. As put by Samuel Scheffler: Consequentialism in its purest and simplest form is a moral doctrine which says that the right act in any given situation is the one that will produce the best overall outcome, as judged from an impersonal standpoint which gives equal weight to the interest of everyone. (Scheffler, 1988, p.1) In contrast with deontological ethics, which maintains that the moral value of an action is connected with definite duties, consequential ethics affirms that there are not intrinsically right or wrong actions. The only relevant criterion is the evaluation of the consequences, which might clash with principles such as virtue, justice, autonomy, and so on. One of the best known branches of consequentialism is utilitarianism, which is an ethical perspective


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originally developed by the social philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism asserts that moral agents should be concerned about the maximization of human welfare. Utilitarian moral agents, as it were, seek the best consequences of their actions and institutions because they are moved by a feeling of benevolence. Thus, in his classic defense of utilitarianism J.J.C. Smart affirms: In setting up a system of normative ethics the utilitarian must appeal to some ultimate attitudes which he holds in common with those people to whom he is addressing himself. The sentiment to which he appeals is generalized benevolence, that is, the disposition to seek happiness, or at any rate, in some sense or other, good consequences, for all mankind, or perhaps sentient beings. (Smart, 1973, p.7) For a long time, utilitarianism has been associated with a hedonistic ethical perspective insofar as some of its most influential versions imply that the right action is the one that maximizes aggregate pleasure (or reduces suffering). According to this utilitarian tradition, defended originally by Jeremy Bentham, pleasure is assumed to be a good thing in itself, which should be maximized. However, there are more sophisticated varieties of utilitarianism that reject that “pleasure” is the good that utility functions should maximize. Thus, other notions such as “contentment” have been introduced in the utilitarian language to define the kind of good that utility functions need to maximize. According to J.C.C. Smart, contentment consists roughly of “relative absence of unsatisfied desires.” Drawing upon this allegedly non-hedonistic formulation of utilitarianism, Singer’s ethical views correspond to the so-called “preference utilitarianism.” Singer’s preference utilitarianism maintains that the good that ought to be maximized is the satisfaction of individual preferences, wishes or interests. Thus, its focus on interests allows Singer to contend one of the most crucial criticisms on utilitarianism: its disrespect for individual dignity. 24 Accordingly, preference utilitarianism rejects any uniform definition of happiness in which the individual person’s interests could be disregarded insofar as they might not match with the social utility function’s end. That is, in the hypothetical function of social utility, the individual’s own conception of welfare is taken into account. Actions and institutions

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are ethically assessed according to their capacity to satisfy individual moral subject’s interests. Thus, according to preference utilitarians, frustrated preferences constitute a bad thing in itself. Classical utilitarianism’s conception of general happiness, as it were, is substituted by the notion of individual interest satisfaction. Thus, the consequences on which preference utilitarianism focuses are those connected with the fulfillment of personal desires. The right action or institution is the one that satisfies more preferences, wishes or interests. The equal value of interests constitutes an important characteristic of Singer’s ethical views. As understood by Singer, equality is a basic ethical principle that must be expressed in equal consideration of interests: “an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may be” (Singer, 1993, p.21). According to Singer, the persuasiveness of utilitarianism lies in the fact that it provides an impartial ethical framework, which is consistent with the “universal aspect of ethics.” The Singer solution to World poverty Following a critical humanitarian crisis that took place at the beginning of the 1970s in which millions of people were at serious risk of dying of starvation in East Bengal, Singer decided to write an article appealing for a transformation of affluent societies’ way of life. According to the utilitarian thinker, moral schemes had to be altered to solve an avoidable condition in which people were condemned to perish due to famine, lack of shelter and medical care. His article “Famine, Affluence and Morality” (1972) published in the journal Philosophy and Public Affairs advanced a rather simple argument aimed at justifying the moral obligation to assist people in need. The so-called “Famine Relief Argument” (also known as the “Singer Solution to World Poverty”25) is addressed to people living in affluent countries (developed economies). It condemns, from a moral point of view, inaction for letting poor people die of preventable causes. To prove his case, Singer makes three premises – two moral and one factual – which he believes are practically incontrovertible. The first moral premise is put as follows: P1: [S]uffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad. (Singer, 2001a, p.106)


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This assumption is central to Singer’s argument insofar as he considers that it is virtually impossible to challenge it, unless one holds an “eccentric” position; hence, he does not attempt to demonstrate its validity. According to Singer, those who do not agree with his first assumption will very likely find the whole argument unpersuasive. He then goes on to propose: P2: [I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it. (Singer, 2001a, p.107) Singer considers that the argument of the obligation to assist rests substantively on this premise. Likewise, he believes that it can be endorsed by different ethical positions, not only utilitarianism. To illustrate the moral validity of this premise, Singer provides the following application. If a person sees a child drowning in a shallow pond, she ought to wade in and pull the child out, even if this means that she will get her clothes muddy. The person’s loss (that is, getting her clothes ruined) is not comparable with saving the child’s life. If she decides not to help the child in order to keep her clothes neat, she would perform a morally wrong action. The cut-off point of sacrifice, suggested by Singer’s assumption, is reached when any more unit of sacrifice would mean that the potential rescuer would fall into a state similar to the person he is trying to save. Following his analogy, a person who might drown herself because she does not how to swim would not be morally obliged to help the drowning child. Singer considers that this second premise presumes moral impartiality. That is, people are obligated to prevent something bad from happening irrespective of particular relationships or identities. Phrased somewhat differently, the validity of the obligation does not depend on factors such as membership in a political community, nationality, race, and so on. Singer thinks that the obligation to assist is a general moral obligation, which cannot be neglected by appealing to the lack of particular bonding ties, or the identity of the subjects. Actually, impartiality, according to Singer’s utilitarian version, seems to imply that moral obligation is always general.26 Following his example of the drowning child, the potential rescuer is equally required to act (that is, pulling the child out) regardless of the identity of the child, or the existence of any relationship with him like kinship or nationality.


Singer’s last premise is “factual,” and it consists of the affirmation that affluent people can actually help insofar as they have the economic means to do it. In Singer’s words: The factual premise is that we in the affluent nations can do something to reduce the number of people starving in the world. We can do something because we are affluent. This means that we have income that we can dispose of without giving up the basic necessities of life. (Singer, 1977, p.37) Thus, the conclusion is that people living in developed countries have a positive duty to alleviate suffering from famine or poverty, and they are required to do so up to the point of marginal utility. That is, the argument establishes that sacrifice ought to be made until people living in affluent countries put themselves in a situation, in terms of utility, close to the one in which poor persons live. Only by doing that can they prevent as much suffering as possible: if they cannot relieve all the suffering from poverty, they certainly are able to prevent “some.” Singer believes that this fact would certainly transform the way of life of well-off people as their available income would be used to save people from starving rather than spending it in cars, new clothes or dinners in expensive restaurants (Singer, 1997, p.37). It is worth mentioning that despite considering that the right amount of sacrifice is the level of marginal utility, Singer introduces a “moderate” version of his second premise according to which people ought to prevent bad occurrences unless doing so represents sacrificing something morally significant. Hence, the moral action is triggered only if nothing morally significant is at stake. Likewise, the level of sacrifice required does not need to reach the level of marginal utility to prevent as much suffering as possible; that is, people in affluent countries, under the “moderate” version, can stop their assistance before they are about to sacrifice something of comparable moral importance: they would not be obligated to give money away until they virtually reduce themselves to poverty. According to Singer, the sacrifice must not be seen as supererogatory – that is, an act that it is right to do, but not wrong not to do – but morally compulsory. For lifting people out of poverty is not an act of charity but a moral obligation. Therefore, a person who chooses not to sacrifice himself to prevent something bad from happening is


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doing something wrong. Singer affirms that the current moral categories are then challenged insofar as giving money away is no longer an act of generosity but a moral duty. Thus far, I have introduced Singer’s ethical argument, which accounts for the obligation to assist people in need given three premises. I turn now to assess the validity of such premises and analyze whether they lead to the conclusion that the positive duty to prevent something bad from happening is theoretically justified. Is Singer’s argument a fallacy? To recall, the first assumption that Singer advances is that “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care are bad.” Though a blatant truth at first glance, this moral statement needs to be scrutinized in order to corroborate that the obligation to assist is supported theoretically. Singer believes that since we can arrive at the same conclusion (that is, that suffering and death from absolute poverty are bad) by different routes, we could follow him immediately to the second premise. However, contrary to Singer’s belief, the acceptance of the validity of P1 leads us to admit a priori a particular ethical perspective (that is, hedonistic utilitarianism). As a matter of fact, the original phrasing of P1 does not put forward that absolute poverty (that is, the lack of food, shelter, medical assistance) is bad for reasons other than the suffering it causes. So it seemed that if absolute poverty, famine and disease caused no suffering it would be morally irrelevant. That is why the phrasing of the premise presupposes a hedonistic utilitarian framework, which is based on the idea of the maximization of pleasure (or minimization of suffering). Moreover, the correspondence of a sensual experience such as suffering or joy with moral categories of badness or goodness is far from being evident for different ethical frameworks. A Rawlsian, for example, could not accept that suffering from, let us say, absolute poverty is properly speaking bad. Rather, he would be inclined to think that poverty (and not suffering itself) is wrong (or unjust) insofar as, according to the Rawlsian “thin theory of the good,” a person who lacks primary goods (for example, income to buy food) will not be able to carry out his rational plan of life. Furthermore, a Rawlsian or a virtue ethics theorist could argue that absolute poverty is a morally relevant issue irrespective of the suffering it causes.27 A relatively poor person might not suffer for his lack of goods or liberties to carry

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out a plan of life, and still there is a wrong that needs to be redressed by a particular kind of obligation or social institution. Regarding the second premise (P2),28 granting that suffering (and death) from absolute poverty is something bad – that is, even accepting the validity of P1 – the moral responsibility to prevent something bad from happening is not fully justified. Think of the theoretical possibility of introducing analogous premises (P1a, P1b, P1c ... .P1n), all of them in accordance with Singer’s ethical views: P1a Suffering from disease is something bad P1b Suffering from animal “exploitation” is bad P1c Suffering from physical disabilities is bad P1n ... Suffering from______is bad Does everyone have a concrete moral responsibility to prevent all those things from happening? I am inclined to think that, even if nothing morally important is at stake, we do not. If we did, moral agents would be overwhelmed by an infinite number of positive obligations, which would be impossible to fulfill. As Colin McGinn points out in his critical analysis of Singer’s argument: Why should we act so as to equalize the suffering in the world? Only some kind of impartial utilitarianism could sustain that injunction: that we all have a duty to maximize the general well-being and minimize ill-being. I think that this kind of view is generally indefensible – and certainly not self-evident. (McGinn, 1999, p.154; his emphasis) Singer disregards the fact that suffering from absolute poverty stands alongside other types of suffering (as illustrated by P1a, P1b ...). If Singer believes that the obligation to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care must prevail over other obligations, he should explain why. Otherwise, this type of moral argumentation could impose an infinite number of positive obligations without any structure of priority. It is true that utilitarians argue that the hierarchy of the obligations is determined by the amount of suffering one might actually prevent. Nevertheless, this seems to be a mistaken strategy inasmuch as suffering is incommensurable. Furthermore, Singer cannot offer any structure of


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moral priority of obligations due to the fact that according to his preference utilitarianism all interests are homogeneously treated. Hence, following strictly his ethical approach, the interest of the starving person should be balanced with the interest of an extremely obsessive person who strongly desires a luxurious item, and suffers (as much as the person who lacks food) for not having his preference fulfilled. Intuitively, it seems that not all interests deserve the same treatment even if they cause the same suffering or anxiety. On the other hand, according to the strong version of P2, an agent is compelled to prevent something bad from happening up to the level of marginal utility; in Singer’s words: “the level at which, by giving more, I would cause as much suffering to myself or my dependants as I would relieve with my gift” (Singer, 2001a, p.115). However, it is not clear how the calculation can be made. In the particular case of the famine relief argument, Singer seems to ask affluent people to give money away progressively and stop only when they are about to make themselves hungry. Is this a sound principle? I do not think that reaching such levels of sacrifice is wrong, but it seems to me that the principle falls into the category of supererogation (that is, a category of moral acts according to which an act is morally good but not morally mandatory: it is good to do and, at the same time, not bad not to do). If we accepted Singer’s reasoning there would be only one supererogatory act in a world of rampant poverty: suicide by starvation. Indeed, James Fishkin (1982) has pointed out that whereas the principle of minimal altruism required from an agent is fully justified at the small scale (for example, saving a child from drowning), it is unsustainable for the solution of large-scale problems such as global poverty. In his elaboration of the extent of obligations, he argues that there are two important criteria that need to be considered to understand the degree of individuals’ moral responsibility: First, the principle of (at least) minimal altruism (if we can save a human life at minor sacrifice, we are obligated to do so) and second, the cutoff of heroism, which specifies some limit on the sacrifice that can be demanded as a matter of obligation (some sacrifices are beyond the call of duty). These two criteria coexist perfectly well at the small scale. But when the number of acts falling under the first principle becomes large enough, then those acts also fall under the second. The coexistence of the two criteria

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breaks down at the large scale, for we end up classifying the same acts as both obligatory, on the one hand, and beyond the call of duty, on the other. (Fishkin, 1982, p.7) Fishkin recognizes that there are sacrifices we all are obligated to make to alleviate suffering, yet he also identifies several theoretical problems when large numbers are involved, for people cannot be obliged to be heroes.29 As regards the moderate version of the principle, Singer advances the idea that moral agents ought to prevent suffering until, according to their particular ethical theory, something morally important is at stake. However, the moderate version is theoretically unsustainable inasmuch as “something” morally important can always be at stake. Take the example of a person who promised to take his girlfriend out for a fancy dinner. While waiting for her in the living room, he comes across The New York Times Sunday Magazine, and he starts reading “The Singer Solution to World Poverty.” Persuaded by the argument, he tells his girlfriend that they will stay in because he has decided to give all his money to a charity and not to spend it on frivolous things. Nonetheless, aware of the moderate version of Singer’s argument, the woman explains to her boyfriend that by doing that he would break his promise and in so doing something morally important would be at stake (that is, keeping promises). The man agrees and they cheerfully go out. Is he acting morally from Singer’s moderate standpoint? Apparently he is inasmuch as keeping promises is something morally important. As this case illustrates, something important may always be at stake, not only ethical principles such as keeping promises but also other moral norms that agents might attach importance to. For example, an agent might think that special obligations derived from particular relationships (say, nationality) override general obligations such as the one proposed by Singer. Lastly, the argument’s factual premise is defective because there are in fact a huge range of alternatives to prevent suffering from absolute poverty, and money donations to a charity might not always be the most effective moral action. Why is the moral agent asked to give away money to a charity fund instead of doing something else in compliance with P2? That is, a person could pay a lobbying firm to persuade law-makers to increase the development aid budget; invest


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his money in the stock market so as to accumulate wealth and afterwards save more poor people than those he can save now; funding scientific research on genetically modified crops that could improve agriculture productivity; becoming a modern Robin Hood, and so on. According to the utilitarian framework, the right action would be the one which has the best consequences (more reduction of suffering). But how is it possible to make the calculation between a set of alternatives if agents always have incomplete information about the likely level of utility of outcomes? Singer, however, does not answer this problematic issue. In his book One World (2002), drawing on some statistical figures about poverty, Peter Singer has advanced the idea that people with spare income (after meeting basic needs) should give away one percent of their money to alleviate current global poverty. Though an uncomplicated solution to the problem of how much (and what) to give, this principle seems to be also flawed. First of all, it does not consider income differentials between persons. That is (strictly in utilitarian terms), the marginal utility of one percent of income cannot be the same between a person making hardly above the poverty line and a millionaire. Then, it is not understandable why they are treated with the same standards. Moreover, assuming Singer’s own preference utilitarianism, if a person happens to love money (and places all his interests, desires, wishes in accumulating it) a tiny one percent donation would be a great loss for him, indeed much bigger than that of a pious philanthropist. Therefore, the principle suggested by Singer cannot account for differentials that could have an effect in the particular individuals’ utility: the principle is unfair in strict utilitarian terms. In summary, Singer’s solution to world poverty does not succeed in proving that the moral obligation to assist people in need is general and categorical: Singer’s argument is a fallacy.

2 The International Society

Introduction One of the most important debates in post-Rawlsian philosophical reflection focuses on the limits or boundaries of our obligations of justice. As a good initial approach to the discussion, we can say that the debate deals with the question: do we have obligations of justice towards non-members of our political community? Or, somewhat rephrased along Rawlsian lines, what is the scope of the application of the principles of justice? The theoretical dispute has been explored by two major traditions of moral and philosophical thought that are widely referred to as ethical universalism and ethical particularism. In a nutshell, particularist thinkers argue that membership in a community (be this political or ethical) – as well as our particular relationships (for example, family or friendship) – determine the existence and content of our moral obligations; universalists30 instead claim that boundaries and contingent factors of the moral personality, such as our cultural membership, our place in history, our personal attachments, or the relationships we are embedded in, are morally irrelevant to determine the existence of duties. Likewise, whereas universalists advance moral impartiality (this is a significant coincidence between consequentialist and deontological ethics) as a condition of morality, particularists reject impartiality and claim that it is repudiated thoroughly by common-sense morality. To an important extent this dispute between particularism and universalism can be understood as a disagreement about an essentially contested concept: moral agency. In what follows, I will not 56


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engage in the debate over the nature of obligations that arise from any particular conception of moral agency for I believe that it is possible to approach the debate about the existence of global (cosmopolitan, transnational) duties of social justice from a different perspective. In particular, I will try to explore the idea that obligations of justice can be derived from a different moral unit: the international system. Therefore, my main concern is not explicating why individuals, as moral agents, have obligations of justice – specifically, distributive obligations – to strangers. Nor will I attempt to prove wrong that individual moral agents have special obligations to compatriots in order to validate the idea of cosmopolitan obligations of justice. Rather, what I propose is to render a different way of reflecting about global justice by focusing on the constitutive characteristics of the current international system of states to find out what sort of duties it validates, so to speak, pragmatically. Moreover, this chapter will try to offer a description of the international system that may help us to reconstruct a normative framework immanent in international interaction. This will be the first step prior to accounting for the circumstances of justice in the international society and defending the validity of states as primary subjects of justice arrangements, which I will develop in the next chapter. The underlying assumption of my approach is that there is an international ethical sphere that gives rise to rights and duties between states on non-contractual grounds. Moreover, there are shared moral understandings in the international society of states that provide a normative framework to assess actions and substantiate duties of international justice. Particularly, I will try to explicate that during the prevalence of the Westphalian international society – an ideal-type of the society of states ruled by the value of autonomy – a normative framework of essentially negative duties governed international interaction; whilst in the current post-Westphalian society – that is, an international society characterized by interdependence – a new normative framework, based on positive duties, has emerged. What is more, among the types of duties that stem from the prevailing international society, there are, distinctively, duties of social justice between states. My approach, needless to say, will not be a theoretical account capable of rendering the scope of justice precise (i.e. it will be unqualified to determine exhaustively whether obligations of social


justice are either national or global). That is not my purpose. My intention is simply to demonstrate that there are circumstances of justice in the international system that allows us to engage in speculation about positive duties of justice without relying on the existence of an international basic structure. Put another way, I take for granted that there are different situations or relations that raise questions of social or distributive justice, and that the international system presents us with one. In sum, I propose, on the one hand, to shift the moral unit of analysis from the individual to the international system of states and, on the other hand, to reject the concept of the basic structure as the primary subject of justice. My driving intuition is, therefore, that the international system needs to be approached from a perspective different from that currently employed by cosmopolitan approaches. The fact that the international structure does not resemble the configuration of the domestic major social institutions (for which Rawls elaborates his principles of justice) does not mean that there are no other possible ways to validate global duties of social justice. Thus, my theoretical framework will seek to set the foundations of an account of duties of social justice between countries that discard both the notion of a hypothetical contract and the idea that the primary subject of social justice is the basic structure. What I purport to do is to speculate about duties of social justice for the international case beyond the mainstream cosmopolitan approaches analyzed in the previous chapter. This move will frame the discussion in terms of international political theory. It is well known that mainstream international relations theories, such as Realism31 and Pluralism,32 have chiefly been interested in explaining the international system from a positivist-oriented perspective; however, a significant number of theorists, drawing upon various intellectual traditions, have pointed out the need to address ethical inquiries of international relations.33 This task of evaluating the international system from a normative perspective has been carried out by a somewhat fragmentary International Political Theory.34 This discipline has traditionally focused on a particular set of questions such as the just war, the right of intervention and, lately, human rights issues, which are analyzed from the perspective of justice. International political theorists, as Chris Brown says, “share with International Relations theorists a central concern with the state, but


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couple this with a concern that inter-state relations be understood as potentially governed by relations of justice” (Brown, 1997, p.280). Though, certainly, most international political theorists have engaged in the normative analysis of international justice from a point of view that frequently sidesteps issues of distributive justice, my approach seeks to explicate why obligations of social justice between states can be properly justified under the current system. My central aim in this chapter is, then, elaborating an account of the international system capable of showing how its normative framework has changed over the last years, which has paved the way for positive duties between states. This will be the first step in order to validate obligations of social justice of a transnational nature. Unquestionably, approaching this issue from the level of the international system has not been a conventional mode of speculating about global justice. For classic international relations theories have not engaged in this problem directly. However, I believe that it is relevant to investigate whether the international system can effectively offer a sound alternative to address the problem of global injustice that could overcome the theoretical problems that we have identified in the first chapter of this work.

The Westphalian and post-Westphalian international society: Two ideal-types of non-anarchic systems Let us begin by asking whether, in a context characterized by the absence of a global Leviathan, states have any kind of duties to each other. To put this matter simply, we want to know how normative principles of conduct or obligations between states can be grounded in a prototypical state of nature, which inhibits the development of a common normative framework capable of assessing the righteousness of actors’ behavior. At first glance, it seemed difficult to prove that in a representation as such there could be any valid or legitimate justification to base obligations. Yet, not only political theorists35 but also actors of the international system have recognized that political communities do owe certain things to one another – an assumption widely accepted for centuries, at least, since the establishment of the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which brought into being the Modern European state system.36

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The system established after the Treaty of Westphalia, which put an end to the ascendancy of the Holy Roman Empire over the Western Christian world, redefined the understanding of the legitimate source of authority and the distribution of power. Indeed, to an important extent, the modern international system can be understood as an extension of the European system of international relations that emerged after the Peace of Westphalia. In essence, the Westphalian system of international relations was arranged by the idea that the scope of sovereignty should be grounded along the perimeters of particular territorial political units. These units were, then, conceived as the primary loci of supreme authority, as opposed to the supranational authority of the institutions that made up the politico-religious conglomerate of the Holy Roman Empire. Although it is difficult to classify them all in the same way inasmuch as their characteristics varied geographically and over time, for analytical simplicity it will be convenient to refer to these territorial political communities, generically, as states (i.e. political communities that claim for themselves internal and external sovereignty). Accordingly, it is sound to say that the political units that make up the Westphalian model of international relations are sovereign states. It is important to stress, though, that the notion of sovereignty of the Westphalian model is fundamentally an assumption about the right of states to be free from external interference. That is, it is recognized that states are the ultimate source of authority regarding domestic issues and no other secular or religious authority can rightfully supersede them without their sovereign’s consent. In his work on the meaning of the concept of sovereignty, Stephen Krasner (1999) has rightly defined Westphalian sovereignty in terms of autonomy. According to his elaboration of the concept, there are four main understandings of the notion of sovereignty (i.e. international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty). Westphalian sovereignty – Krasner affirms – “refers to political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory” (Krasner, 1999, p.4). Thus, the concept of Westphalian sovereignty refers to what is conventionally known as external sovereignty. Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty,37 along with Krasner’s typology, refer particularly to issues of authority and legitimacy, as opposed to the issues of control of both domestic38 and


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interdependence sovereignty.39 This difference determines distinctive logics to comprehend political outcomes in a system. Drawing upon an institutional conceptualization of the logics of action by which human behavior can be interpreted, developed by James March and Johan Olsen (1989, 1998), Krasner claims that both Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty are associated with the “logic of appropriateness” (i.e. actions are assumed to be rulebased). In other words, in contrast with the so-called “logics of consequences,” which understands action as the product of a rational calculus (given a set of preferences), the outcomes of political and social environments characterized by the logics of appropriateness are explained by rules, roles, and identities. The logic of appropriateness, according to the approach Krasner draws upon, “involves cognitive and ethical dimensions, targets, and aspirations. As a cognitive matter, appropriate action is action that is essential to a particular conception of the self. As an ethical matter, appropriate action is action that is virtuous” (March and Olsen, 1998, p.951). In particular, following Krasner, the logic of appropriateness associated with Westphalian sovereignty could be understood as the rule or principle of non-intervention.40 Krasner, nonetheless, notes that in the history of international politics this basic normative assumption of interaction has not been respected by domestic political elites: “[t]he multiple pressures on rulers have led to a decoupling between the norm of autonomy and actual practice. Talk and action do not coincide” (Krasner, 1999, p.8). This alleged discrepancy leads Krasner to conclude that “organized hypocrisy” has been a characteristic of the system of international relations arranged by the idea of Westphalian sovereignty. Moreover, his main contention is that the international system is an environment in which the logics of consequences prevails over the logics of appropriateness; that is, outcomes in this system can be better understood as the product of a rational calculating behavior than as the result of principled conduct. For the moment, I shall not address the problem of compliance with the normative framework regarding the violation to the principle of non-intervention that Krasner identifies; it suffices to say that evidence of violations to international interaction does not corroborate the inference that norms are extensively disregarded.41 Rather my interest here is to point out that the notion of Westphalian


sovereignty gives rise to a body of commonly recognized norms that shape the confines of rightful action. This shared recognition of the, as it were, pre-political authority of norms allows us to challenge the idea that the international system is strictly anarchical. Historically, this normative background has allowed nation-states to agree not only on a corpus of international law, but also on an essential qualification of inter-state relations: legitimacy. Although, certainly, there is no effective authority to enforce rules (i.e. there is no monopoly of coercive power), still actors can rely upon the concept of legitimacy to challenge other states’ foreign policy. Moreover, legitimacy constitutes a referent that sets clear limits to states’ possible courses of action. Thus, the fact is that, as Thomas M. Franck affirms in his study of international legitimacy, “rules are not enforced yet they are mostly obeyed” (Franck, 1990, p.3). This is explained by the power of the idea of legitimacy in international relations and foreign policy. Following Franck, then, I argue that legitimacy42 plays an important role in understanding actions in the international system beyond the international Realist paradigm, which has overemphasized the role of self-interest and the alleged existence of a state of nature. International relations have been consistently embedded in a normative structure that places great importance on the idea of legitimacy to judge international actors’ interactions, and which penalizes – both formally (when there are multinational institutions to do so) and informally – deviations. Hence, regardless of the absence of a global Leviathan, there have been systemic mechanisms that hinder morally defective actions. Nation-states can act normatively and, most importantly, they are forced to incorporate ethical considerations in foreign policymaking. The idea of the immediacy of national interests, consequently, needs to be pondered against the de facto normative background operating in the international system. Even a strictly power-seeking foreign policy would have to include in its maximizing calculus the costs of being perceived as illegitimate by the international system’s constituted ethos. Realist assumptions about the nature of the international realm, I believe, need to be challenged by the existent normative premises of action, which include legitimacy. Somewhat mordantly, Franck voices his concern about the widespread international theorist’s disregard for the normative dimension thus: “It may strike as odd, but it is probably


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demonstrable that there is even more of a fashion for ‘hard-nosed realism’ among academics, and especially among those specializing in the international rule system, than in the foreign ministries” (Franck, 1990, pp.6–7). To an important extent, the idea of legitimacy, along with shared understandings about rightfulness and justice, frames international interaction between state actors. It is arguable, then, that outcomes of interaction can be explained satisfactorily by assuming falsely that the absence of a worldwide sovereign authority hinders the development of an effective normative framework. Indeed, concepts such as legitimacy and norms are extremely relevant to understand not only why the international system is not anarchic, but also how actors are effectively constrained by the ethical structures. Accordingly, my main assertion is that, following the Grotian tradition of international relations and the international political theorist Hedley Bull43 (1977), the Hobbesian interpretation of the international realm as a pre-social (or anti-social) condition where effective duties and rights cannot possibly develop is unsound. For the actors’ recognition of criteria of legitimacy sets the international system apart from a prototypical state of nature. In his major work The Anarchical Society (1977), Hedley Bull points out that far from international anarchy, the modern international system is characterized by order. Indeed, he affirms that in practice there is an international society (or a society of states) that provides order – that is, a pattern of international activity that upholds the society’s fundamental goals – to international politics. An international society, Bull asserts, “exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Bull 1995 [1977], p.13). The most important goals or values that Bull identifies in the modern international society are: the preservation of the system; the goal of maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states; the maintenance of peace; and a complex of basic goals for which any social arrangement aims, which includes the limitation of violence, keeping of promises, and the stabilization of possession by rules of property (Bull, 1995 [1977], pp.16–18). However, Bulls argues that this list is certainly not exhaustive and it can also be arranged in a different way.

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In what follows, I would like to draw upon Bull’s concept of society of states or international society to elaborate a distinction between two conceptual constructs or ideal- types44: the Westphalian and the post-Westphalian international society. The aim is to discover the types of norms they give rise to in accordance with the common values embedded in their interaction. The central assumption is, consequently, that any change in the values upheld by the members of the international society will have an impact on the types of norms that shape interaction. Moreover, the transformation of the constitutive values of the society will define the nature of duties of international justice. It is important to mention that the ideal-type of the Westphalian society of states bears an important resemblance to Bull’s notion of the modern society of states. Yet, I rearrange the common values or goals of the society of states in order to accentuate the role of external sovereignty (i.e. Westphalian sovereignty) in determining the specificity of the shared normative framework. Thus, although to some extent I agree with the delineation of central values proposed by Bull, I believe that it is possible to characterize the modern international society to which he refers by focusing mainly on the first two primary values: (a) the preservation of the system and of the society of states itself, and (b) the protection of external sovereignty. The third and the fourth goals suggested by Bull are universal values present in any historical configuration of international or domestic relations. In other words, the maintenance of peace and the primary goods of any social arrangement, defined by Bull, are not distinctive values of the modern international society. On the other hand, there is a major difference between the ideal-type of the society of states that I develop here and Bull’s modern society of states, which sets both approaches apart in terms of their normative dimension. In particular, it refers to the role of the notions of order and justice. Bull’s The Anarchical Society (1977) struggles to accommodate both concepts in a consistent way. The problem, as I see it, is that he fails to incorporate the notion of justice in the understanding of the society of states due to an undeveloped analytical treatment of order, which is treated both as a fact and as a value. As Harris points out: “His writing treated order as a value but neither situated it within an ethical explanation nor isolated it from a specific (as distinguished from a general) location among subsisting facts” (Harris, 1993, pp.726–727). Thus, when treated as a fact,


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order is a pattern of activity that sustains elementary, primary or universal goals of the society of states (Bull, 1995 [1977], p.16); when assumed as a value, order is a value prior to justice. Bull argues: Order in social life is desirable because it is the condition of the realization of other values [...] International order, or order within the society of states, is the condition of justice or equality among states or nations; except in a context of international order there can be no such thing as the equal rights of states to independence or of nations to govern themselves. (Bull, 1995 [1977], p.93) This ambivalence is aggravated by Bull’s remark that order should not be taken as an overarching value. So he leaves us with an unsatisfactory account of the proper role of order in his notion of international society. Moreover, the potential tensions between order and justice are not addressed appropriately because Bull endorses a pluralist conception of the international society, which supposes that cultural heterogeneity cannot allow moral consensus between states beyond the mutual recognition of sovereignty and the principles of non-intervention. Wheeler and Dunne (1996) have explored how, over his fruitful career as an international relations theorist, Bull struggled to accommodate successfully both order and justice. Though the idea of a thicker moral consensus between states was very appealing to Bull, he consistently refused to embrace a theory that could support justice over order: Bull’s doubts about whether it was possible to mount a philosophical defense of justice led him to make the case for justice in terms of its contribution to order. The reason he buttressed this appeal with the claim that all states have an interest in order was that this would be more persuasive to Western states than a simple appeal to moral solidarity. (Wheeler and Dunne, 1996, p.106) My account of the society of states seeks to reappraise the role of justice and order as follows. Firstly, order is only treated as a backdrop for international interaction based on shared understandings. It is only a conception that opposes the notion of international aparchy (understood as a lack of any authoritative referent in the international system capable of restricting agents’ actions). Consequently, the conception of

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order in the society of states aims only at representing the fact that states are capable of identifying common shared understandings that frame their interactions. It does not necessarily mean stability. Bull defines order as a “pattern of action,” which brings connotations of regularity and hence predictability; my approach, on the other hand, defines it as a premise of morally meaningful action. Secondly, justice is a value of the international society that sets the boundaries of legitimate action. What justice is can be presented in the well-known abstract formula: giving to each what is due. And “what is due” is determined by the values and expectations that bond a social arrangement. It is worthy of note that as the values change so does the substantive meaning of justice. The previous clarifications about the differences between Bull’s society of states and the one submitted here concerning the notions of order and justice are necessary to provide a theoretical background that could account for change in the values commonly held in the international society, which, correspondingly, give rise to a distinctive type of duties of justice. To recall, the purpose is to explicate the characteristics and predominant values of the two ideal-types (i.e. the Westphalian and post-Westphalian international society) in order to discern the nature of duties of justice appropriate for each construction. Moreover, I suggest that the current international system is a society of states that has experienced an important change, which has brought about a new normative framework. The Westphalian international society The Westphalian society of states is a system that has been constructed to protect the external sovereignty of states. This concern, accordingly, has arranged a normative framework that aims at protecting what I consider to be the cardinal value of this model: autonomy (i.e. the capacity of self-rule of the territorial political units). In this respect, what distinguishes the Westphalian society of states is the shared understanding that autonomy is valuable and norms and institutions are built upon this foundation. In particular, it is important to mention that the value of autonomy substantiates the idea of justice of Westphalian norms, and sets the limits of legitimate action of states. The value of autonomy provides the foundations for


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a normative framework constructed upon the principle of non-intervention, which becomes the central settled norm that shapes international interaction. At this point I would like to make a brief excursus to introduce the notion of settled norm that I borrow mainly from Mervyn Frost’s theory of international ethics. The idea is, then, to distinguish my understanding of what a norm is from the frequently employed notion of a norm as a “behavioral uniformity.” That is to say, as far as this study is concerned, norms are not regular practices that help to predict outcomes of social interaction. Rather, norms are defined essentially by a moral component that introduces a sense of obligation.45 Norms, according to this understanding, “[r]ather than representing ‘average’ behavior in a statistical sense, [...] are regularities commonly believed to oblige general conformity by the members of the state system” (Raymond, 1997, p.218). Thus, a settled norm should not be understood as an inexorable pattern of action, but as a commonly held moral understanding that demands a special justification when it is violated (see also Sikkink and Finnemore, 1998, p.892). Indeed, the way in which certain shared moral understandings are violated by states – that is, clandestinely or through elaborate deception – provides, as Frost correctly points out, a prima facie proof that a norm has been settled (Frost, 1996, p.106). Regarding the settled norm (or principle) of non-intervention that characterizes the Westphalian model, it should be clear that actual violations do not contradict the normative authority of a shared understanding. Frost puts it as follows: that many states infringe the norm prohibiting one state from interfering in the domestic affairs of another state does not undermine [the] contention that non-interference is a settled norm [...] It would undermine [the] assertion if it could be shown that states do not even attempt to provide special justifications for their interferences in the domestic affairs of other states. (Frost, 1996, p.105) Frost argues that there is a body of norms in international relations that define a specific domain of discourse, which is an area of discussion that incorporates settled rules generally recognized by the

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participants of the system. He then advances the idea that the primary good of the modern domain of discourse is the preservation of the system of sovereign states. In fact, his understanding of the system resembles the ideal-type of the Westphalian society presented here insofar as its normative framework aims at safeguarding states’ sovereignty (i.e. the autonomy of these territorial political formations). I appraise Frost’s conceptualization of the modern domain of discourse with more detail when I deal with the content of duties of transnational justice, so I shall say no more about Frost’s outmoded representation of the international system. Suffice it to say that I challenge the idea that contemporary international relations can comprehensively be characterized in accordance with the idea of Westphalian sovereignty – in short, I raise the issue of the existence of an emerging set of settled norms (i.e. transnational norms) that creates tensions within the system, so it is appropriate to talk about a different model of the international sphere: the post-Westphalian society of states. Now, according to the body of settled norms of the Westphalian international society, states ought not to intervene in the internal affairs of other political communities insofar as intervention is considered to be illegitimate or a violation of just international relations. The value protected by this normative principle is clearly the autonomy that states are supposed to have. Historically, since the consolidation of the society of states that followed the Peace of Westphalia and, then, centuries later with the expansive processes of decolonization, non-interference in states’ domestic issues became a constitutive principle of the international system. This cardinal settled norm, rooted in the idea of autonomy, shaped international interaction and provided a backdrop against which transgressions could be morally framed in terms of their illegitimacy. It is, then, the case that the existence of an overarching center of political power has not been a necessary condition for the establishment of a sphere of right capable of evaluating the justice of international interactions. In particular, regarding the Westphalian international society, it is important to note that, given the role of autonomy as an overarching value of the system, the normative framework gave rise to a particular type of duties of justice: negative duties. These duties, which analytically have the form “do not do X,” characterized the ethical structure of a system that aims at protecting the autonomy of


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states. Specifically, negative duties of justice in a Westphalian society stipulate definite prohibitions to interfere in the domestic issues of other states. Historically, states may have certainly violated this general obligation; yet, they are obliged to give reasons to justify the transgression (normally through the use of another shared value). On the other hand, although the notion of positive duties is not altogether strange in the Westphalian society of states (for example, the international humanitarian law46) its role is marginal. For the most important set of Westphalian norms are negative duties that are designed to enforce the value of autonomy of the units (i.e. sovereign states). Moreover, values, the nature of the actors, and the system are not exempt from change, which, straightforwardly, has an effect on the make-up of the settled norms. That is, the normative framework that sets the limits of legitimate action in the international system is not permanently fixed, but varies according to new circumstances. My main contention here is that a reconfiguration of the values and settled norms brings about a distinctive form of duties of justice. It follows that duties of justice in the international system do not have to be negative per se. For the value they protect may well change over time, which generates a different form of obligation. The idea advanced by my framework is that international relations can no longer be understood according to the model of the Westphalian society of states. Though still crucial to make sense of an important number of practices of international relations, and to comprehend the content of settled norms of international interaction, autonomy is being increasingly challenged as a leading value of the system by other values. As a result, it is possible to talk about a new model of international relations: the post-Westphalian international society. This model, I believe, recognizes the existence of positive duties of international justice between states as legitimate. But let us elaborate the structural conditions that are determining the displacement of the value of autonomy and, consequently, the emergence of a fresh normative framework of the international system. The post-Westphalian international society Up to this point, the argument has attempted to show three things: first, that the international system cannot be represented as a state of nature inasmuch as actors extensively recognize a common set of


moral understandings that influence their behavior; second, the Westphalian model of international relations is assembled by the overarching value of the autonomy of states, which is embodied in the notion of freedom from external interference; and third, duties derived from a normative system arranged in accordance with the idea of Westphalian sovereignty are essentially negative. Then, I introduced the assumption that shared values and norms change over time. Accordingly, I suggested that the international society has been transformed; although still relevant to understand inter-state relations, the notion of autonomy is being challenged by the nature of current interaction. Moreover, it is possible at present to speculate on legitimate new norms; specifically, positive duties of justice between countries. My purpose in this section is precisely to flesh out an argument that attempts to demonstrate that there are new circumstances of international interaction that have led to a rearrangement of the systemic values that assemble the international system. The conclusion is that duties of social justice between countries are justified in the new model of international relations. There are two main factors that redefine the make-up of international society and thus displace the Westphalian model: (a) the expansion of human rights-discourses, and (b) interdependence. These two factors are neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, I believe that this rough classification is useful to understand the most important issues at stake that are shaping a new international society: a post-Westphalian international society. In what follows I will explicate how these issues, likewise, are transforming the normative framework so as to constitute an essentially different model from the Westphalian ideal-type grounded on the value of autonomy. Human rights The emergence of human rights-discourses is a contemporary phenomenon of global scale that has gradually changed the normative framework of the world since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) was proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations. At no other point in human history have the concept of basic rights of the individual been so widely studied,47 supported48 and institutionalized49 internationally. Human rights concerns have thus expanded the scope of international law, created new


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international institutions of governance, and shaped countries’ foreign policy. Similarly, human rights issues have increasingly amalgamated a global network of civil society initiatives that promote values such as the respect for human dignity, which advocate for rights of children, indigenous peoples, women, and other groups that suffer from social exclusion. By and large, human rights issues infuse meaning into the daily activities of both governments and civil society organizations. Although we are still very far from a situation in which one could fairly say that basic human rights are generally respected across the world, it is beyond doubt that the current condition offers a more suitable framework to tackle violations to the human dignity that basic rights aim to safeguard. Not only do domestic and international institutions of governance provide legal mechanisms to enforce human rights, but also there is a developing awareness of the uncontested legitimacy of individuals’ basic rights, which explains both the increasing involvement of particular individuals in the promotion of human rights, and the need of non-democratic states to address this normative issue in one way or another. Respect for human rights has become a settled norm of the international society. Thus, it is important to stress that a growing moral consensus on the legitimacy of human rights has developed over the last sixty years, which has had an important impact on domestic legislation and foreign policy of states. This is not to say that the establishment of this new set of shared moral understandings has been exempt from conflicts, and that respect for human rights is firmly secured. For this has been a process that, together with other issues connected with international justice, has sometimes left a sense of disappointment. Moreover, though some governments have failed to comply with human rights conventions and resolutions that bind their states, there is widespread consensus about the validity of human rights. As Harold K. Jacobson affirmed more than twenty years ago, the point is that “broad agreement on goals have been achieved, not that the goals themselves have been realized” (Jacobson, 1982, pp.320–321). Accordingly, it is worthy of note that, despite the fact that institutional mechanisms are still deficient, it is possible to affirm that the current international society is already addressing moral issues that are reconfiguring the make-up of the international normative


framework. Consequently, the protection of human rights has evolved into a legitimate concern of the society of states as a whole. Moreover, the challenges that settled norms of human rights are raising are acute in that they defy the foundations of the Westphalian society of states; in particular, both human rights monitoring and enforcement of these rights challenge fundamental ideas about states’ autonomy and the system of sovereign states (Sikkink, 1998). To put it simply, the effective adoption of norms of human rights places constraints on the exercise of state sovereignty in two ways. First, domestically, governments are compelled to recognize the legitimacy of supranational structures of governance in charge of protecting human rights. That is, internal sovereignty is challenged by the fact that states are required to recognize the authority of supranational jurisdictions, globally (for example, the International Criminal Court) and regionally (for instance, the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights). Second, states’ external sovereignty is challenged by the novel idea that intervention is legitimate when human rights are extensively violated in any particular sovereign state.50 As a result, Westphalian settled norms have been shaken by the emergence of a new set of normative categories that aim at setting limits to the autonomy of the states regarding human rights issues. Indeed, as pointed out by Nardin and Slater (1986) the tension between the principle of non-intervention and the concern for human rights is one of the more difficult problems of international morality (see also Fixdal and Smith, 1998). It is, then, the case that the notion of states’ autonomy that defined the Westphalian international society is being fractured by another value that sets limits to the idea of sovereignty: individual human dignity. The consequence is that states’ duties to safeguard the overarching value of autonomy of the Westphalian society of states conflict with duties of “humanitarian intervention” triggered by extensive violations of human rights such as genocide and crimes against humanity. Hence, the confrontation is not only about two contesting values of the society of states, but it is also, in a fundamental way, a clash between two distinct types of duties: negative and positive duties of international justice. Whereas in the Westphalian model, autonomy imposes, through the principle of non-intervention, constraints to action on the part of states, the post-Westphalian society’s ethical


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structure contemplates duties to perform certain actions, including in extreme cases waging war against repressive regimes. Accordingly, the scope of just war principles has been expanded beyond the categories of the traditional Westphalian society of states. It is now the case that the justice of war can be justified on moral grounds other than the sovereign states’ right of self-defense. It is quite true that actual interventions based on human rights violations have been sporadic and cast out by prudential reasons. Yet, it is important to recognize that, regardless of effective fulfillment of the alleged duty, a new type of reasoning regarding international justice has emerged, which redefines the way in which international society needs to be understood. For it is now revealed that positive duties can be justified legitimately according to normative criteria consistent with the set of values that assemble the society of states. We are, therefore, witnesses to the emergence of a post-Westphalian international society where positive duties of international justice have a place in the ethical speculation about international relations. Consequently, the most important modification that the conception of sovereignty in the twentieth century has undergone is the downfall of its paradigmatic character of absolute as classically portrayed by an intellectual tradition inaugurated by Jean Bodin’s work. Nation-states through the mediation of international institutions are directly obliged by these emerging settled norms to act whenever systematic violations of human rights take place. Likewise, nation-states are morally responsible for not doing something when extensive human rights violations can be prevented. Take the example of the Rwandan genocide in the 1990s. Although it may be difficult to allocate definite moral responsibilities for the failure of the international community to intervene and stop the massacre that was taking place, it seems clear that inaction is not morally justified according to the contemporary international normative framework. Centuries or decades ago, tragedies like the Rwandan genocide certainly occurred, yet apart from an elementary (and quite obvious) sense of moral scandal, no compelling positive duty to intervene was felt by the international community as a whole. For example, it seems clear that the Nazi Holocaust, which sought to exterminate, among others, Jewish, Roma and Sinti peoples, and people with disabilities, could have never become a reason to wage war against Nazi Germany in an international society


normatively arranged in accordance to Westphalian principles. It was, indeed, the threat to the states’ sovereignty that the German expansion represented what made, to the Allies’ eyes, the war just. This is not the case, however, nowadays. In fact, there is certainly a sense of moral shame amongst the international community for failing to intervene when serious human rights violations occur, which cannot be explained without assuming that state actors accept thoroughly the validity of an ethical reasoning that imposes positive duties of international justice. This explains why Belgium, Rwanda’s former colonial power, and South Africa, the major geopolitical power of the African continent, have expressly apologized for their inaction to prevent the massacre of an estimated 800,000 human beings (Tutsis and moderate Hutus). Global interdependence The most important development regarding the characteristics of the current international society is a multifaceted phenomenon that has been gradually known as interdependence. The term “interdependence” has been abused in international relations discourses by both scholars and diplomats. For many, contemporary phenomena have been explained or justified by the alleged existence of interdependent relations between the actors of the system. Hence, the concept has become an easy target for its critics, notably theorists of mainstream traditions of international relations theory, whose aim is to challenge the idea that the nature of the system of international relations has changed since the end of World War II. Moreover, not only the lack of consensus about the meaning of interdependence in contemporary international relations, but also the dispute about the most adequate indicators to measure its evolution has obscured the usefulness of the concept. The result, not surprisingly, is an important degree of skepticism about the explanatory power of interdependence within some traditions of international relations theory, and a quite palpable absence of normative analyses regarding the implications brought about by the existence of an interdependent world.51 The arrival of Keohane and Nye’s works, Transnational Relations and World Politics (1972) and Power and Interdependence (1977), represented an important step towards defining the concept. Moreover, Keohane and Nye developed an ideal-type, “complex interdependence,” aimed


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at challenging the outmoded realist view of world politics.52 Yet, despite the indisputable significance of their investigation – which tries to bring realist and liberal perspectives into an integrated analysis – the theoretical treatment of their proposed ideal-type of “complex interdependence” is, as they have recognized, incomplete and to some extent tautological (Keohane and Nye, 1987, pp.737–738). Thus, the diagnosis that Holsti presented, just after the publication of Power and Interdependence, about the lack of an appropriate theory of interdependence remained correct. Indeed, “[t]he major preoccupation of scholars has not been to develop a theory of interdependence, but rather to describe the extent of interdependence” (Holsti, 1978, p.517). Certainly, Keohane and Nye’s contribution to the literature on interdependence is important as they succeeded in shifting the focus from the strictly technical issue of measurement to theoretical questions associated with the conceptualization of the notion – even though, as a matter of fact, they “did not pursue complex interdependence as a theory, but as a thought experiment about what politics might look like if the basic assumptions of realism were reversed” (Keohane and Nye, 1987, p.737). Unfortunately, their conceptualization of interdependence is largely presented in terms of international organization (Shaw 2000), which makes it more useful for explaining bargaining outcomes than exploring pressing issues of transnational politics and morality in a new set of circumstances characterized by the erosion of the Westphalian sovereignty. By the same token, in a context of complex interdependence, cooperation between actors is uncertain.53 This view of interdependence differs significantly from the work of political theorists such as Charles Beitz (1979), whose purpose is to employ the concept of interdependence, mainly explained in its economic dimension, to account for normative principles in a context defined by cooperation.54 As we have seen earlier in Chapter 1, Beitz’s argument in his Political Theory and International Relations (1979) attempts to demonstrate that global interdependence indicates the existence of an appropriate scheme of social cooperation that justifies the establishment of Rawlsian global distributive principles. Beitz explicates: States participate in complex international economic, political, and cultural relationships that suggest the existence of a global scheme of social cooperation. As Kant notes, international


economic cooperation creates a new basis for international morality. If social cooperation is the foundation of distributive justice, then one might think that international economic interdependence lends support to a principle of global distributive justice similar to that which applies within domestic society. (Beitz, 1999a [1979], p.144) Though especially significant to the speculation of the hitherto unexplored normative consequences of interdependence, Beitz’s work turned out to be an unsuccessful attempt to associate interdependence with global principles of justice. For his conceptualization of international economic interdependence, as some sort of idealized cooperative scheme aimed at justifying ad hoc Rawlsian distributive principles, has been proved to be inaccurate. In his later writings, as pointed out in my analysis of Rawlsian cosmopolitanism, Beitz drops the emphasis on interdependence to favor a cosmopolitan approach grounded in a Rawlsian conception of individual moral personality, which is not sufficiently grounded to support global principles of distributive justice. Mindful of the relevance of the concept of interdependence to make sense of normative change in the current international society, my approach seeks to present a conception of interdependence capable of accounting for duties of justice beyond, on the one hand, the moral neutrality of Keohane and Nye’s “complex interdependence” and, on the other hand, the difficulties posed by the Rawlsian cosmopolitan paradigm. Hence, my conceptualization of interdependence begins with the following premises. First, interdependence should not be equated or confused with a scheme of cooperation, but it is a process of transnational social integration that erodes the idea of states’ self-sufficiency. Second, interdependence is a feature of the international society as a whole and not a relational attribute of single states’ interaction. Although there are particular relations of interdependence between specific countries covering an important variety of issues (for example, regional trade agreements or security alliances), which define a precise set of sensitivities and vulnerabilities, bargaining capabilities, power distribution, and other outcomes of interaction, this type of interdependence is only a subset of a larger systemic phenomenon.


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Global interdependence is a conception of the structure of the world that puts the emphasis on the existence of a significant extent of dynamic density (i.e. the degree of concentration of individuals and communities). It is important to mention, though, that the term “dynamic density,” introduced by sociologist Emile Durkheim, refers not to physical concentration but to social and moral concentration of individuals and groups of individuals. Durkheim defines it “as a function of the number of individuals who are effectively engaged not only in commercial but also moral relationships with each other, that is, who not only exchange services or compete with one another, but also live their life together in common” (Durkheim, 1982 [1895], p.136). Moreover, the notion of dynamic density aims at describing a social fact characterized by relationships that affect the collective existence of individuals and communities. Durkheim uses the concept of dynamic density to explain how societies change; in particular, how traditional “mechanical societies,” characterized by the resemblance amongst the members, are transformed into modern “organic societies” where the division of labor gives rise to a new type of social solidarity, which is a consequence of the mutual dependence of increasingly differentiated units. Contrary to Kenneth Waltz (1986), who employs Durkheim’s conceptual categories as developed in The Division of Labor in Society (1893) to characterize the international system as a “mechanical society” in order to justify the static nature of the system, I argue that important transformations are taking place in the nature of the international society, which allow us to assert that the ethical order is changing (i.e. new norms have been settled). In what follows, then, I shall not develop a critique of Waltz’s unsatisfactory interpretation of the international system, which seems to misuse Durkheim’s conceptual framework (see Ashley, 1986; Ruggie, 1986; Barkdull, 1995). Rather, my purpose is to present a sketch of how interdependence, defined by the notion of dynamic density, is expressed in the post-Westphalian international society and, similarly, to suggest that a new international normative framework is gaining legitimacy. Moreover, apart from the frequency of economic transactions, the intensity of mutual dependence between countries, and the expansion of networks of global communication, I want to stress that there are systemic elements in the international society that have activated

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a growing awareness of the existence of a human community. Accordingly, this recognition of common ties established by interdependence reconfigures the type of settled norms that are recognized as valid. Interdependence, therefore, is understood here as an increasing fusion of social groups and issues that originate common moral foundations. What emerges from this process is not cooperation in a strict sense, but solidarity. For I assume that cooperation is a concept that describes action of prototypical self-interested individual agents that are linked merely by contingent relations, whereas solidarity describes a systemic quality of a social arrangement formed by mutually constitutive relations. In particular, I argue that global interdependence is bringing about important changes associated with the development of a particular type of solidarity (i.e. transnational solidarity), which is becoming an important value of the international society. It is important to stress, then, that I am not concerned with demonstrating the view that interdependence is growing in the world as measured by the number of economic transactions, such as trade. Whether the world is comparatively less or more interdependent in terms of the number of economic and financial transactions than it was thirty years or a century ago55 does not affect the basic tenet of the argument, which is that the dynamic density of the international society is radically different from the society of states corresponding to the Westphalian society. The dynamic density of the post-Westphalian society is characterized by an important degree of inter-connectedness between actors across economic, social, political, ecological and cultural issues, an extensive body of shared understandings about the meaning of systemic dependence, and a growing recognition that there is a community of destiny for humankind. Moreover, the dynamic density in the post-Westphalian model is paving the way for the articulation of the value of solidarity within the normative and institutional framework. But let us flesh out the characteristics of current interdependence, which redefine the ethical foundations of the international society. There are three major areas in which global interdependence finds expression in the post-Westphalian international society: political, economic and environmental. Similarly, these areas are potential sources of systemic instability, which demand normative consideration at the global level.


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Political interdependence To some extent, the idea of political interdependence is already present in the Westphalian international society insofar as the existence of any state depends on the recognition of other states. This kind of political interdependence, which I call constitutive, is a basic type of mutual dependence of states that grants a status of political equality. Consequently, constitutive political interdependence establishes an ethic of reciprocity amongst equally sovereign states, which has repercussions in the way they expect to be treated. Yet, apart from this type of political interdependence, there is a characteristically different type of political interdependence in the post-Westphalian international society: organic political interdependence. This kind of interdependence stems from the erosion of states’ self-sufficient political means to secure some of their primary functions – specifically, the enforcement of domestic laws and the provision of security and justice. As an illustration of these new circumstances, take the case of current threats to national security such as terrorism and global crime (for example, counterfeiting, traffic of arms and drugs, money laundering, human trafficking, high-tech crime, and so on). No longer can states accomplish their purposes associated with the provision of security to their populations without the active collaboration of other states. A UN report on collective security56 has put it as follows: Today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats. And it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibility to protect its own peoples and not to harm its neighbors. (AMSW, 2004, p.9) States have become politically interdependent because their actual territorially-based powers have been overcome by the nature of contemporary challenges. In particular, the incapacity of states to enforce laws independently is clearly exposed in domains where science and technology play a crucial role. Thus, for example, contemporary issues such as genetic engineering and the protection of intellectual property rights prove that isolated states’ action cannot

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guarantee the enforcement of their local applicable legislations. There is organic political interdependence between nation-states because they cannot provide substantive protection of rights relying exclusively on their discrete sovereign powers. This fact, however, does not mean that states have been overcome irremediably. States can still be agents of justice and be able to provide security and well-being to their populations as long as they reconstitute themselves politically upon different moral foundations. In order to do so, however, states need to recognize the significant degree of dynamic density of the international society, expressed by the commonality of challenges, threats and purposes, which require transnational normative and legal settlement beyond the Westphalian value of autonomy. That is, the only way to re-establish the moral standing of state formations under current circumstances is through the recognition of transnational norms of interaction based on solidarity (I will develop this point further in Chapter 4). The notion of solidarity is relevant here because it is meant to convey the idea that states are mutually obligated to support one another in securing their purposes. In fact, in its origins, the term solidarity in the Roman Law refers precisely to a joint responsibility – that is, an obligatio in solidum – to pay a debt regarded as common, so “[e]veryone assumes responsibility for anyone who cannot pay his debt, and he is conversely responsible for everyone else” (Brunkhorst, 2005, p.2). Moreover, the idea of organic political interdependence gives rise to an ethics of co-responsibility insofar as states’ purposes cannot be properly achieved autonomously. Furthermore, the new circumstances that characterize the postWestphalian international society, in which co-responsibility establishes a particular body of settled norms divergent from the Westphalian overarching value of autonomy, correspondingly, pave the way for the legitimacy of potential positive duties between countries. That is, states are compelled to look beyond the settled norms of Westphalian sovereignty – as well as the corresponding negative duties – and recognize the legitimacy of positive duties between states that could guarantee not only the stability of their political formations, but also the coherence of the international society as a whole given the current degree of dynamic density.


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Economic interdependence The next form of interdependence is economic and it has been largely explored by the literature on “globalization.”57 Irrespective of its relative extent, as compared to other times, contemporary economic interdependence is indisputable: no country could prevail nowadays in conditions of effective autarchy. Economic self-sufficiency is simply impossible given the structural characteristics of modern technology and prevailing modes of production. Moreover, the emergence of a transnational information society sets contemporary interdependence apart from previous modes of international mutual dependence. Hence, technological developments are pushing the integration of the world towards a single system. As pointed out by Douglas Kellner: The transmutations of technology and capital work together to create a new globalized and interconnected world. A technological revolution involving the creation of a computerized network of communication, transportation, and exchange is the presupposition of a globalized economy, along with the extension of a world capitalist market system that is absorbing ever more areas of the world and spheres of production, exchange, and consumption into its orbit. (Kellner, 2002, p.287) Thus, local societies become interconnected by a complex technological infrastructure that cannot be severed by an act of sovereign will. Though sometimes imperceptible, dense networks of technological interdependence support the functioning of national economies and their integration into the world economy. Technology has become so specialized that no single country could successfully produce all the techniques (for example, computing software) necessary for the production of goods and services. Similarly, the expansion of international trade seems to be an irreversible process and, progressively, it is fostering the cohesiveness of a global economy by integrating national markets horizontally. Moreover, it is clear that current transnational economic relations give rise to a corresponding sphere of right at the international level, whose function – at this primary level – is to settle conflict of interests


between partners both peacefully and cost-effectively. This is the rationale behind the creation of an increasingly complex network of organizations of global governance and multilateral economic institutions. Thus, the existence of a dense web of economic exchange affecting social outcomes globally fosters the creation of norms aimed at assessing the fairness of interactions, which is a necessary stage to guarantee the reproduction of the global economic system. For the existence of potential exploitative economic relations between countries cannot guarantee the stable expansion of the global economy. Furthermore, normative categories conceived to address problems such as the fairness of global economic interaction push the redefinition of the scope of states’ responsibilities beyond the Westphalian ethical structure. Hence, the prima facie responsibility of actors over the functioning of the economic system emerges as a legitimate issue of the international society. This is the case of the larger economies of the planet, whose internal sovereign policies can alter the equilibrium of the global economy, as well as the prospects of individual developing economies. As an illustrative example of that, consider the case of some developed countries’ agricultural subsidy policies which, by affecting the international prices of certain goods (for example, cotton, sugar and grains), bring about adverse outcomes to the economies of the developing world. The problem, and indeed degree of responsibility, is amplified by the rich countries’ advantageous positions in the world’s financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which press developing countries to open domestic markets in order to gain access to financial resources. Within a strict Westphalian model of international relations, internal policies such as subsidies to agricultural exports would be morally neutral insofar as they would not violate the principle of the autonomy of states. Nation-states would be liable exclusively in terms of their positive interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Yet, if we assume the existence of interdependence, the normative assessment of this kind of action changes insofar as states can inflict harm on other states, which induces the idea of a potential responsibility which has to be assessed ethically. Ecological interdependence An important sphere in which interdependence has become crucial is linked to the sustainability of the relationship between the human


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species and the planet. On the one hand, there is an obvious interdependence to guarantee a sustainable exploitation of natural resources, which is related to the problem of the diminishing biodiversity of the Earth.58 The devastating effect of one side of modern technology has revealed the unity of the global ecosystem. No longer can particular ecosystems be thought of as discrete units which can be protected independently, so issues of responsibility come to light as regards the duties to prevent global harm caused by the domestic overexploitation of natural resources. This has been recognized by the Convention of Biological Diversity (1992) that followed the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro: States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. (CBD, Article 3) Individual nation-states are unable to safeguard their ecological resources successfully without the active participation of other states. Thus, not only contaminants such as chemical pesticides, fertilizers and industrial pollutants, but also the consumption habits of rich countries affect the global ecosystem. 59 The effects associated with the overexploitation of natural resources, as well as the intensive use of polluting technologies, go beyond place and time. This brings to the fore issues of transnational and transgenerational justice inasmuch as some current practices cause preventable harm in the lives of others. Hence, ecological interdependence broadens the scope of due responsibility, and consequently the nature and content of both transnational and domestic obligations of justice. A sovereign country that decides autonomously either to overexploit its biological resources or to approve highly polluting practices should be morally accountable for the damage caused globally. An international normative framework founded on the principle of autonomy proves, therefore, to be insufficient to assess the wrongfulness of certain sovereign actions that alter the sustainability of the global ecosystem.


On the other hand, a different type of interdependence of the world is revealed through the transnational nature of human health risks such as pandemic diseases. This problem has been heightened by the increased mobility of persons. Amongst the global health issues, certainly, AIDS represents the most important challenge nowadays by virtue of its high mortality rates, regional distribution, and the fact that a cure has not yet been found. However, other viral diseases such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), the Ebola virus, and different types of influenza viruses also highlight the need for global responses in order to secure that each individual state can effectively protect itself from human health risks. Thus, it is apparent that particular polities cannot rely on their national health mechanisms to guarantee some sort of immunity from global human diseases. This explains to some extent the current rich countries’ concern about the alarming expansion of AIDS in Africa. To recapitulate, the post-Westphalian international society, characterized by the different types of interdependence discussed above (i.e. political, economic and ecological) discloses one fact: the intensity and concentration of common issues faced equally by national societies, which reveal the existence of an extensive, dense network of active interconnections between societies that make up a shared social life. Thus, the degree of dynamic density of the contemporary international society sets the foundations for a normative framework different from that constructed upon the Westphalian society of states. Hence, not only interdependence discloses the exhaustion of the ideal of self-sufficiency of the states, but also it explicates the emergence of a transnational solidarity. By the same token, it is simply implausible to think that individual nation-states can endure as effective political formations for the provision of justice without the active solidarity of other states. Accordingly, these new conditions of interdependence reveal that the principle of autonomy and derivative negative duties cannot account for a conception of international justice capable of securing the stability and welfare of both particular political systems (i.e. nation-states) and the world as a whole. Now that I have developed a conception of the international society that reveals the emergence of positive duties between states under the conditions of world interdependence, it becomes necessary to


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establish the specific circumstances under which duties of social justice are justified. That is, as a subset of positive duties, distributive obligations of justice require a special substantiation to demonstrate that they should now be regarded as part of the international normative framework. I shall, then, turn in the next chapter to examine with more detail the circumstances of justice that allow us to affirm that the international society should contemplate some sort of distributive obligations between countries. Similarly, I shall defend the idea that the states are morally relevant units of any potential distributive arrangements of global justice.

3 The Circumstances and the Primary Agents of Justice

Introduction Social justice is a conception that evolved within the framework of domestic societies, and whose main original concern was to critically assess social and economic institutions of bounded political communities. Social justice theorizing deals with the appropriate domestic allocation of duties and rights amongst members of a political community according to principles such as need, equality, utility, merit, and so on. The first academic work on the particular concept of social justice60 was published in 1900 by Westel Willoughby whose work was deeply influenced by an idealist conception of society as an organic whole (see Miller, 1999, p.4). Yet, the theorization of social justice would become a mainstream topic of political and moral philosophy only after the arrival of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971). One of the most important ideas that Rawls employs to develop his theory of distributive justice is the concept of the “circumstances of justice,” originally developed by David Hume.61 The circumstances of justice refer to the conditions under which the concept of justice can be called upon to assess social practices and institutions. Rawls considers that: the circumstances of justice obtain whenever persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity. Unless these circumstances existed there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice, just as in the 86

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absence of threats of injury to life and limb there would be no occasion for physical courage. (Rawls, 1999c [1971], p.110) Rawls’s endorsement of Hume’s concept of the circumstances of justice has been criticized for his lack of inspection of the consequences that this theoretical framework brings about; in particular, regarding the appropriate scope of justice. D. Clayton Hubin (1979) has shown, for example, some of the theoretical implications of the discussion of the circumstances of justice developed by Hume. He points out five interpretations of what David Hume might have meant, given a “multitude of obscurities” in his discussion of the conceptualization in both the Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.62 Hubin concludes that the most accurate interpretations are those essential to the strategy of grounding duties of justice on considerations of utility. He affirms that Hume’s intuition is that if rules of justice are obligatory only when they are generally useful, there is a good (or conclusive) reason for thinking that the duty of justice is founded on utility. Accordingly, he argues that when his conditions are not fulfilled, justice is neither socially useful nor morally obligatory. (Hubin, 1979, pp.16–17) Yet, the most important idea Hubin introduces in his examination of Hume’s circumstances of justice is that there are situations not characterized by the conditions enumerated by Hume, which still are relevant for assessment in terms of justice. That is, the circumstances of justice are not an exhaustive set of conditions that set clearly the scope of justice. Similarly, he criticizes Rawls for endorsing Hume’s account uncritically and for believing that the circumstances of justice are the conditions that make cooperation possible and necessary. Both Hume and Rawls, then, according to Hubin, fail to give a complete account of the scope of justice because they do not recognize that there are other circumstances of social life in which justice can be called for. Hubin summarizes his view as follows: “Neither the application of the concept of justice nor the existence of institutions of justice is restricted by Hume’s conditions. Having admitted this we are free to consider what is required by justice under conditions other than those Hume lists” (Hubin, 1979, p.24).


To an important extent, I agree with Hubin’s provocative conclusions. Moreover, I believe that approaches to global justice could benefit from challenging the theoretical foundations of conventional liberal theories of justice largely biased towards the domestic application of the circumstances of justice. Likewise, an important current of cosmopolitanism would have profited more from challenging the characteristics of the Humean circumstances of justice endorsed by Rawls than from stretching “justice as fairness” to make the international system fit the model. The criticism raised by Hubin is very accurate because it clarifies that the conceptualization of the circumstances of justice is not comprehensive, and there might well be other situations in which distributive justice principles should also apply. In particular, issues of international and intergenerational justice become less problematic. Furthermore, Hubin’s examination of the Humean circumstances of justice makes explicit how the domestic society is only one case amongst many in which social justice criteria is relevant. In the previous chapter, I tried to show that the post-Westphalian international society, certainly, contemplates positive duties between polities insofar as states become increasingly interdependent. Yet, it is still necessary to establish whether amongst those post-Westphalian positive duties there are effectively duties of social justice. Thus, at this point, there are two main strategies that I could follow to do that. On the one hand, following Hubin’s challenge, I could object to the Humean-inspired notion of the circumstances of justice in order to develop an alternative way of accounting for duties of social justice. On the other hand, I could draw upon the Humean-inspired tradition and explicate why duties of social justice in the international system are still consistent with it. In what follows, I opt for the latter strategy. However, I shall not follow Hume’s circumstances of justice directly as later theoretical developments on social justice theorizing are better suited to expound the background conditions under which social justice arrangements are possible. Therefore, I shall draw upon David Miller’s “circumstances of social justice,” largely influenced by the Humean perspective, to analyze whether the current international society allows us to think that arrangements of social justice across boundaries are theoretically feasible between states (not individuals). My main idea is to demonstrate that the kind of international interaction in which


states are contemporarily embedded is such that even Miller’s particularistic theoretical account should allow for speculation about duties of social justice of a transnational nature. Thus, I shall not be interested in developing an alternative conception of the circumstances of justice, but I will try to show that the theoretical conditions established by Miller are relevant for the international society. Moreover, I find Miller’s account especially appealing by virtue of his emphasis on the notion of solidarity, which is a fundamental value of the current international society (i.e. the post-Westphalian society). Similarly, in the second part of this chapter, I shall try to defend the idea that states are the primary agents of any potential arrangements of international justice. I argue that all states have a moral nature that makes them (1) morally responsible for their wrongdoings, and (2) relevant subjects of moral concern, for they have morally reasonable interests. In particular, states are understood here as political entities whose main purpose is the common good. Moreover, I advance a “thin” version of the common good as a country’s set of social conditions that allows its people to fulfill four universal basic needs: food, housing, basic education and health care.

The circumstances of justice According to Miller, the “circumstances of social justice” are assumptions that we have to make before we can elaborate any theory of social justice. He defines them as “the circumstances in which social justice can function as an operative, policy-guiding ideal, an ideal with political relevance rather than an empty phrase” (Miller, 1999, p.2). The circumstances of social justice are, thus, conditions for the speculation about justice and about the feasibility of social justice accounts. They determine the existence of a scope where obligations or principles of justice may be applicable but not necessarily the content and nature of them. That is, the circumstances of social justice do not directly derive from the type of principles relevant to a community, but they are premises for distributive arrangements. Social justice, Miller argues, “requires the notion of a society made up of interdependent parts, with an institutional structure that affects the prospects of each individual member, and that is capable of deliberate reform by an agency such as the state in the name of


fairness” (Miller, 1999, p.4). Does the contemporary international society meet these conditions? Contrary to what Miller thinks, I believe that it does, and consequently there are transnational obligations of social justice whose content need to be determined. But let us develop the argument. First of all, Miller asserts that it is necessary to assume a universe of distribution; that is, a bounded community on which the principles are to be applied. He considers that national communities, specifically nation-sates, are the appropriate scope of social justice. However, it seems clear that this political formation (i.e. the national community) is not the only possible universe of distribution. As Miller himself points out, it “is not that justice formally requires this particular scope restriction, but that the principles we use are always, as a matter of psychological fact, applied within bounded communities, and that the integrating power of national identity is sufficiently great to make national community our primary universe of distribution” (Miller, 1999, p.18; Miller’s emphasis). Miller maintains that national communities are appealing because national identities create strong bonds of solidarity among those who share them. The social solidarity created by the idea of nation is important in modern societies because they are meant to support social justice institutions. Miller argues that there is a tendency to social atomization derived from the functioning of economic markets, which prevents cooperation for the provision of collective goods; national identity, as a main source of solidarity, on the opposite side, brings people together creating a sense of belonging to a community that can support successfully duties of justice. It is then the case that the importance of the idea of nationality in Miller’s account derives from its power to create the solidarity required to uphold social justice institutions. Yet, contrary to what Miller believes, there is no reason to think that nationality is the only source of solidarity capable of supporting social justice arrangements. In fact, there is an emerging sense of supranational solidarity, derived from international interdependence, operating in the global sphere whose existence cannot be easily dismissed. Contemporary solidarity on a global scale has no precedent in the history of human civilization. Indeed, this type of solidarity is explained by a greater interdependence (i.e. an important degree of dynamic density), the existence of extensive transnational


communication networks, and a growing sense of a community of destiny of humankind derived from shared interests and vulnerabilities. At the inter-state level, such solidarity is expressed globally in the works of multinational programs and UN bodies that work on development, health, human rights and disaster response issues. Likewise, transnational solidarity is expressed by the growing legitimacy of financing development in the poorest regions of the world through development aid and international cooperation for development projects. Though there is no doubt that these institutions and mechanisms are highly defective, my purpose is to show that they actually reveal the emergence of a new kind of solidarity of a global nature, which represents a turning point in the history of inter-state interaction. Any cynical reading of these expressions of transnational solidarity would struggle to explain convincingly that they only reflect self-interested behavior. The fact is that at any other point of world history there has been a denser network of institutions and organizations based on the principles of cooperation and solidarity. Moreover, whilst harsh critics of multinational institutions and programs (such as those that are part of the United Nations Development Group) are right in pointing out that these bodies perform poorly, it is necessary to stress that the critics’ expectations are, indeed, a manifestation of the moral validity that transnational solidarity has just gained in the public sphere. Furthermore, the expansion and growth of civil society initiatives after World War II concerned with human rights, poverty relief and sustainable development issues across boundaries is clear evidence that solidarity among individuals is not a politically-mediated phenomenon. Indeed, according to Boli (2006), there has been an impressive growth in the number of international non-governmental organizationss (INGOs) over the last decades. Thus, whilst in the beginning of the twentieth century there were less than 400, by the year 2000 its number had reached over 25,000.63 The existence of transnational solidarity should not be seen as a phenomenon involving some sort of isolated commitment of philanthropists and a few NGOs working globally as this type of solidarity is present as a new ethical category that justifies transnational commitments to assist non-compatriots. This explains why there is no hard opposition to humanitarian and poverty relief assistance among the affluent countries’ publics.64 There might be disagreements about the way in

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which aid budgets should be allocated, or perhaps about the efficiency of the programs, yet only a minority could object to the moral validity of aid policies. Political or ideological views that reject such commitments have no significant place in contemporary public discourses. Transnational solidarity is therefore a new assumption of public reasoning in national polities, which is giving rise to conceptions of due responsibility across borders. The fact that transnational solidarity is a growing phenomenon in the international society shows that there is no need to assume a notion of common identity of the sort proposed by Miller. As Craig Calhoun accurately points out: [H]owever common in political argument it may be to treat cultural similarity as the basis of solidarity, this is not a sociologically adequate account. Common membership of such category may be one source of solidarity but hardly the only one. Functional integration, concrete social networks, and mutual engagement in the public sphere are also sources or dimensions of solidarity. (Calhoun, 2000, p.284) Hence, if we assume that solidarity does not depend exclusively on the existence of a shared cultural identity but can be built through interdependence, then, there are grounds to believe that there is room for supranational moral commitments; in particular, global duties of social justice. In The Division of Labor in Society (1893), Émile Durkheim points out that there are two forms of solidarity, which at the same time constitute the foundation of the moral order of a society: mechanical and organic. Mechanical solidarity comes from a certain type of “likeness” between the members of a community, a common state of conscience – collective conscience – that is expressed in shared beliefs and sentiments; that is, mechanical solidarity comes from some sort of identity that makes individuals resemble one another. This is the type of solidarity, I believe, that Miller assumes in his nationality-based account on the premises of social justice. For duties of justice between citizens of a particular polity are founded on the notion of shared national identity. The social division of labor, on the other hand, Durkheim maintains, produces organic solidarity. Through the division of labor, “the individual becomes cognizant of his dependence


upon society; from it come the forces which keep him in check and restrain him” (Durkheim 1964, p.401). Indeed, the process of economic interdependence is, to an important extent, fostering a global division of labor, and reinforcing international interdependence. Moreover, a sense of global interdependence is growing due to the characteristics and diversity of international interactions, which is giving rise to the idea that there is a single human community. As put by Frank Garcia: If we disaggregate the notion of community, we can see that globalization is creating certain elements of community at the global level, such as knowledge of inter-connectedness and the circumstances of the other; and creating community in certain areas of global social relations, such as humanitarian relief and economic relations, by establishing that degree of social bond necessary to support justice. (Garcia, 2005, p.13; Garcia’s emphasis) The emergence of a global community, consequently, is effectively encouraging the expansion of a type of solidarity that goes beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Hence, there are no grounds to assume that social solidarity is restricted to the boundaries of the nation. Craig Calhoun (2000) rightly asserts that organic solidarity (he renames it “functional interdependence”) fundamentally includes market relations and other ways of social and institutional dependence. Thus, as he put it in his inquiry about the prospects of Europe, “it is important to conceive solidarity not only in terms of common economic interests but in terms of a range of mutual interdependence, including engagement in shared projects of constituting a better future” (Calhoun, 2000, p.304). Similarly, Durkheim anticipates that the social processes of recognition of mutual dependence are capable of constituting solidarities between nations, which is why he affirms that “the ideal of human fraternity can be realized only in proportion to the progress of the division of labor” (Durkheim, 1964, p.406). Miller seems to dismiss the fact that globalization and interdependence are bringing about a widespread recognition of a transnational solidarity along with new responsibilities. No matter how asymmetrical interdependence between countries is, there are issues that matter to all nation-states and peoples equally. For example,


economic, ecological and security threats disclose a common human vulnerability that transcends political borders. Moreover, they reveal that there is a specific scope of shared human problems, and this reinforces a sense of non-particularistic human identity, so to speak. Thus, even granting that the only way in which solidarity emerges is through the notion of cultural identity, there are global issues that have become the building blocks of a global public sphere, which shape a universal human culture. And this, at the same time, gives rise to categories, meanings and understandings equivalent to those hitherto relatively exclusive to national formations. If there is a scope for a transnational solidarity – explained by the current mutual dependence – then, the idea of positive duties of social justice seems altogether plausible. It is true, as Miller argues, that national identities define a particular type of solidarity that historically has made possible the existence of redistributive practices in political communities. But that fact does not mean that national solidarities preclude other forms of personal or collective solidarity. The emergence of national solidarities that justified, for example, welfare policies in some European states did not imply the cancellation of familiar, religious, parochial or any other type of distinctive solidarities and correlative duties. Thus, it is perhaps the case that transnational solidarity might not lead to the same type and intensity of duties of social justice as the ones found in national states. But that is different from saying that transnational obligations of social justice do not exist. Indeed, both the national and the international societies might generate singular obligations of social justice, which can coherently coexist: obligations of social justice are not mutually exclusive. The second premise that defines the circumstances of justice, following Miller, is the existence of an institutional framework capable of applying principles of justice. This is the framework that allocates the outcomes of social cooperation. As Miller puts it, “an identifiable set of institutions whose impact on the life chances of different individuals can also be traced” (Miller, 1999, p.5). Although public institutions influence greatly the benefits of social cooperation that are distributed between individuals, there are other social institutions and practices that are relevant for distributive arrangements. Amongst the most important institutions we find the market, the family, corporations (educational institutions, firms), and other


social arrangements that affect the sort of expectations each person can have as part of a community. As Miller himself points out: “[i]f we are genuinely concerned about social justice, therefore, we must apply its principles to substate institutions that individually or together produce distributive effects that range across a society” (Miller, 1999, p.12). Having said that, it seems clear that there are institutions other than public institutions that affect the life chances of individuals, which should be subject to assessment from the point of view of social justice. If “substate institutions” such as the family as well as social practices are accepted as relevant settings for normative assessment from the perspective of justice, there seems to be no reason why any supranational practices and institutions should be discarded a priori from social justice considerations. Hence, given the interdependence of the world, which distributes unevenly the costs and benefits of global interaction, it seems unreasonable to discard the validity of duties of distributive justice between individuals or countries. In particular, interaction in the international society could be analyzed normatively in terms of justice to determine if it is negatively influencing the prospects of particular states’ development, which is a morally valid interest of all members of the international society. Unfair trade regimes, countries’ unequal participation in global financial institutions, international law’s failure to protect basic rights, lax regulations on arms trade, and environment-harming industrial practices are all practices and institutions that influence how a national community and its individuals perform. The success or failure of certain practices and institutions operating transnationally has consequences in the way that states perform their functions with respect to the provision of well-being. As an illustration, take the example of the large number of developing countries that depend mainly on agricultural exports which are affected by developed countries’ export subsidies on farm products. An issue of justice would not arise if there was not a global market capable of influencing the life prospects of citizens of particular communities; however, this is not the case. Developing countries’ economies are more vulnerable because there is a supranational institutional framework that affects the shares of benefits brought about by international trade. Miller overlooks the importance of the structure of the international system (including international law, trade regimes, financial

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framework, etc.,) and the degree of interdependence between states. In so doing, he unjustifiably disregards the effects that certain supra-state institutions and national states’ practices have on individual states’ chances to prosper. Thus, his conclusions about the feasibility of global justice arrangements are pessimistic. He justifies his reservations about global duties of social justice by denying the existence of an appropriate institutional framework at the global level to determine social outcomes and affecting the lives of people living in different political communities. In Miller’s words: My claim about global justice is only that we have not reached the point where we can speak meaningfully of a world community or see people’s life chances as the effect of a common “basic structure” of rules and institutions, to borrow Rawls’s term. It would be foolish to deny that we might get there sometime in the future. (Miller, 2003, p.368) Yet, it seems that the “future” is here. Though it is certainly the case that the international structure cannot be thought of as an archetypal Rawlsian basic structure (i.e. there is no Rawlsian basic structure in place at the global level because national societies are not politically articulated into a single scheme), there is a world community taking shape. This is demonstrated by the existence of numerous issues that affect the human community at large, which intensify the awareness of living common experiences. Moreover, the degree of interaction between states brings about social outcomes which ought to be analyzed from the theoretical perspective of justice. However, insofar as Rawls’s concept of the “basic structure” as a closed system isolated from other societies is not appropriate for the international context, the problem of social justice needs to be reconsidered from a different approach. For the lack of a comprehensive global institutional framework allocating the shares of resources between individuals makes it impossible to apply principles of distributive justice of the Rawlsian type. My proposal, then, assumes that there are two distinctive spheres that may generate duties of social justice: national and global. Hence, the content and characteristics of duties of social justice in each domain could indeed be different. What is important to stress here is that there are two levels on


which social justice categories are relevant: one is strictly domestic and calls for distinctive principles and duties; the other is global and, similarly, demands principles and duties according to the nature of the international society. Finally, the circumstances of justice are completed, according to Miller, if “there is some agency capable of changing the institutional structure in more or less the way our favored theory demands” (Miller, 1999, p.6). Miller is clearly thinking of the state inasmuch as this agency can easily carry out general policies that follow the criteria of social justice in a domestic society. Quite naturally, the state is the institution that first comes to mind if we have already taken for granted that the scope of application of the principles of social justice is any bounded national polity. However, if we think about the international system: what sort of agency could effectively fit the ideal-type advanced by Miller in the third premise? Moreover, if we do not find any comprehensive institution like the state at the global level, does that mean that we cannot evaluate practices and institutions from the perspective of social justice? I believe that practices and institutions can be evaluated from the point of view of social justice as long as they influence the social expectations of agents regardless of whether there is a political authority enforcing a given conception of justice. The state certainly provides a suitable framework to enforce a particular type of distributive principle, namely the egalitarian ones; but this concept is not an a priori condition to speculate about particular obligations of social justice. After all, we can determine whether international interactions are just or unjust according to the values embedded in the international ethical framework. Critics of global justice theories often distrust social justice arrangements in the international system because they believe that potential duties of social justice amongst countries stem necessarily from comparative principles such as equality – which would require an apparatus such as the state to make the conception of justice a feasible ideal in the world. This skepticism is partially explained because cosmopolitan approaches repeatedly jump from the existence of inequality between individuals to the assertion that international institutions should apply principles of distributive justice. Thus, drawing upon a Rawlsian theoretical framework, liberal cosmopolitans address the problem of injustice in


the international system by calling for the global application of egalitarian principles, which may allow individuals to perform better regardless of their nationality. However, this type of cosmopolitan account certainly requires a centralized political authority and suitable background institutions to enforce the egalitarian principles of justice, which for critics makes it easier to reject the idea of global social justice altogether. Indeed, Miller casts out thoroughly global obligations of distributive justice because he believes that the third premise is not fulfilled by these cosmopolitan accounts. Yet the deduction is flawed, for there are accounts of social justice which do not require the existence of that type of agency in order to derive duties of social justice applicable transnationally. Thus, if we postulate that any potential social justice arrangements in the international system are not necessarily grounded on comparative principles such as equality, then the type of agencies required need not be as complex as a global state. Particularly, I would like to put forward the idea that arrangements of social justice and derivative duties of a transnational nature can be grounded on solidarity rather than equality. This premise should not strike us as something strange insofar as this is the way in which welfare state’s provisions, as well as derivative social justice rights, came into being. As Albert Weale points out, “the immediate occasion for the development of welfare states was not a concern with equality but, rather, with a different value which we might term social solidarity” (Weale, 1990, p.477). At the international level, likewise, the idea of organic solidarity could effectively give rise to duties of global justice that require less demanding institutional structures than the ones egalitarian principles of justice call for. Hence, the third premise could positively be satisfied if we recognize that there is an international set of institutions that already work under the principle of solidarity between nations, which focuses on global welfare issues. This is, I believe, the case of several United Nations funds and programs, such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Food Program (WFP), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and so on; financial institutions such as the World Bank,


regional development banks (African Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Inter-American Development Bank); and the OECD Development Assistance Committee that deals with issues related to Official Development Aid. It is important to stress, however, that while it is true that these types of institutions are multinational bodies that quite imperfectly may coordinate solidarity-based policies and actions, they actually exemplify that there is a network of global institutions which could constitute themselves as vehicles of duties of social justice amongst countries. Moreover, certainly the aforementioned institutions lack the capacities to enforce duties globally, yet they are an early groundwork on which duties of transnational social justice may work operatively. Once that I have tried to show that there are effectively circumstances of justice in the international society that may allow us to speculate about global duties of social justice, I will engage in a defense of the states as primary agents of justice of any potential distributive arrangements, which is a preliminary step to introducing the duty of social justice this work endorses: the duty of assistance.

States: The primary agents of justice My account of social justice duties between countries conceives states as the main agents of the contemporary international system. Contrary to both John Rawls and Rawlsian cosmopolitans – such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge and Simon Caney – my approach does not dispute the legitimacy of state formations to bring forth a proper conception of international justice. Moreover, there are two reasons to rely on the relevance of actual states when theorizing about duties of social justice. On the one hand, states are central in reasoning about social justice arrangements because distributive transfers can only be mediated and legitimized by these agents. Individual national-states are currently the most appropriate institutions to perform the function of levying taxes required to gather the resources to be transferred between countries. At present, it seems very unlikely that any global institution with this capability would succeed in performing successfully such a task. For the background social and political conditions


necessary to support the legitimacy and coercive force of any prospective taxing global (or supranational) institution are absent and cannot be established soon. Given the fact that, most certainly, nation-states and individual citizens would oppose the establishment of an institution of that nature, it is sound to propose that particular polities legitimize, according to their peculiar conceptions of right and justice, the way in which the resources subject to redistribution are to be collected. For example, countries that might have an unqualified egalitarian conception of justice could impose a poll tax on its citizens (irrespective of any other consideration), whereas other countries with a different conception of justice could take into account categories such as fairness or utility. Thus, criteria according to which individual states levy the resources necessary to fulfill their duties of international justice should be legitimized domestic political institutions. Moreover, insofar as there are various economic systems in the world responding to different social and economic circumstances (for example, recession, stagnation, overheating, inflation, and so on), it seems reasonable that states maintain an important degree of selfrule regarding fiscal policy, and find their own ways to tax their citizens to accomplish any transnational distributive transfers. On the other hand, the characteristics of the current international system demand us to reason in terms of non-ideal theory if we aim to assess prevailing practices from the point of view of justice and, similarly, to suggest context-reasonable institutional reforms that could be implemented right away. The world is still politically structured in terms of state formations, which is a fact that theory cannot set aside to make speculation about justice pertinent. As put by Hedley Bull in an article that highlights the positive role of the states for world order, “it seems likely that the state, whether we approve of it or not, is here to stay” (Bull, 1979, p.112). Rather than abolishing the state, Bull rightly remarks, we have to build upon it. Theoretical approaches developed along idealized cosmopolitan institutions seem to be inadequate inasmuch as they tend to overlook the circumstances in which normative arrangements are politically possible. In particular, it is sensible to begin from the concept of state as the central moral agent of international justice because this standpoint will allow us to highlight right away how current nation-states are failing to accomplish their responsibilities.


My concept of states assumes that these political entities have a moral nature, which needs to be taken into account when dealing with issues of international justice. Though John Rawls followed the same strategy to develop his political conception of justice for regulating international relations (see his The Law of Peoples, 1999), there is an important difference between these two approaches, which influences the type of international justice arrangements they support: contrary to Rawls’s conception, I argue that all states have a moral nature. In his attempt to dissociate his approach from the Realist theory of international relations, Rawls advances the concept of peoples as opposed to states that is supposed to emphasize that the former are not moved by a pursuit of power but they act under the criterion of reciprocity. This move to distinguish peoples from, say, conventional states, however, fails to incorporate political communities to the so-called Society of Peoples that do not fit his concept as relevant moral subjects. That is, the Law of Peoples is applicable exclusively to the contracting parties of the original position (i.e. liberal democratic and decent peoples), whilst other political societies are excluded from the normative framework for living under different regimes.65 It is true that Rawls discusses this problem when he introduces his non-ideal theory to deal with the right to war and the existence of societies burdened by unfavorable conditions. Yet, rights and duties of the Law of Peoples are not relevant to non-well-ordered societies (i.e. non-liberal or non-decent peoples). Although in a world of little international interaction this situation could raise no moral problems save the issue of war and intervention, restricting the scope of application of international principles of justice only to liberal and decent peoples is untenable due to the circumstances of interdependence, which give rise to numerous issues that need to be settled normatively. Moreover, it is important to stress that the international system may well influence how countries perform, and this consequently should bring to the fore issues of distributive justice – regardless what type of political regime societies have. Rawls, however, dismisses distributive justice arrangements between societies because (quite surprisingly) he explains countries’ wealth entirely by domestic factors such as the political culture, moral traditions, and the industriousness of citizens (Rawls, 1999a, p.108). Rawls, nevertheless, fails to

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notice that the wealth or poverty of nations might also be influenced by the international structure, which is an idea that has been brought to light by a large amount of literature of international political economy that has contributed to the understanding of underdevelopment. Furthermore, regarding Rawls’s conception of the duty of assistance – which aims at helping societies burdened by unfavorable conditions to establish either liberal or decent institutions – poor societies do not have, properly speaking, a claimable right to be assisted inasmuch as they lack moral nature. Not only does Rawls’s approach lead him to exclude certain states from duties of international justice, but it also dismisses the moral status of societies that happen to be ruled by authoritarian governments. For Rawls considers that only societies which he classifies as peoples have a moral nature because they have “a firm attachment to a political (moral) conception of right and justice” (Rawls, 1999a, p.24). It follows that, according to this idea, other societies that might be oppressed by a despotic regime have no right whatsoever in the international sphere. Contrary to this conception that distinguishes between societies in the international system, my approach defends the idea that all states have a moral nature insofar as: I. states can recognize moral understandings and act according to them, II. states are mutually vulnerable to the effects of interdependence, and III. states have morally reasonable interests; in particular, they have a consistent concern for the well-being of their populations.

States beyond the realist archetype This claim challenges the assumption made by Realism about the type of interests and motivations for action that states have. Although power maximization and self-interest can certainly account for state action, it is important to point out that states are significantly limited by both domestic and international normative constraints: Realpolitik explanations do not tell the whole story regarding states’ actions, interests and policymaking. Thus, commitments to a peculiar conception of right not only impose limits on the power-maximizing


behavior of states, but they also shape foreign policy. Let us illustrate this with a specific practice of international relations: foreign aid. In an interesting quantitative analysis of the level of countries’ foreign aid (measured in terms of percentage of GNP), Alain Noël and JeanPhilippe Thérien have shown that the level of foreign aid is related to the kind of welfare institutions that states have. Following the lead of David Lumsdaine’s important study about how domestic beliefs, values and practices have an impact on the understanding and content of foreign policy (Lumsdaine, 1993), Noël and Thérien demonstrate that aid policy of affluent countries is not systematically determined in terms of egotistical interests. A domestic commitment to the value of economic and social equality has, indeed, an effect on the foreign policy of particular states. As these authors point out in the conclusions of their analysis: [T]he values and principles embodied in social democratic institutions created at the domestic level had a clear impact on the foreign aid regime. The acceptance of nonmarket income distribution at home proved effective in shaping the international conduct of states. Hence, institutions promoting domestic and international justice stood less in opposition than in a relation of complementarity. In this way, domestic politics played a role in the definition of international cooperation. (Noël and Thérien, 1995, p.551) Similarly, in another quantitative study, the same authors show that the level of foreign aid is also correlated, through a cumulative effect, to the type of party in power: social-democratic parties tend to institutionalize welfare and social spending policies which have a positive relationship with the level of foreign aid (Noël and Thérien, 2000). These findings, I believe, support the idea that states’ practices and foreign policy are not determined necessarily by a Realist type of reasoning, but they can be influenced significantly by domestic principles, values and shared moral understandings. It is true that there are counterexamples that seemed to support the idea that states’ actions can be explained only by a power-maximization rationale.66 However, it is worth noticing that there are actual moral reasons accounting for states’ actions; hence, if one wants to comprehend how the international system works it is necessary to incorporate the normative variable. It is true that authoritarian regimes’ foreign

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policy might not take into account any values or principles of the oppressed society. Nevertheless, even these regimes are able to identify and act in accordance with principles held to be legitimate in the international community; even more so when, in the current circumstances of interdependence, the effects of violations of the international normative framework can hardly be ignored. Thus, one can affirm that states act within authentic normative structures that seriously limit the scope of a strict selfish rationality, and this applies to both democratic and authoritarian states. The current picture of the international system is far from the paradigmatic state of anarchy that Realism often assumes, and which allows it to affirm that morality plays no major role in understanding international relations. There are normative restrictions operating through formal mechanisms such as international regimes and agreements, as well as shared moral understandings that states can readily identify. Hence, for example, even though there are no formal institutions that impose special obligations of assistance to former colonial powers, it is expected that these countries step up first to offer support when a former colony suffers a catastrophe. The same is true for many other criteria such as vicinity and common cultural heritage, which highlights the fact that states can effectively recognize moral relationships and act accordingly irrespective of the power-maximizing matrix. Similarly, growing international interaction is shaping a complex of governance institutions, as well as a dense structure of norms, that consolidates and expands the scope of international legitimacy, which makes explicit that states’ action is morally mediated. Hence, both institutions and moral understandings show that states are competent for reasoning in normative terms. The critic might insist, however, that authoritarian regimes, as a matter of definition, cannot possibly recognize either domestic or international normative constraints. Yet these states are embedded in structures that to a great extent limit their choices. On the one hand, despotic regimes cannot consistently overlook international moral understandings when dealing with their internal politics. The global human rights-discourse, for instance, has proved to have an important restraining power over the policies and actions that these regimes can freely perform. It is true that human rights abuses still occur in many countries, yet a long-standing state policy of human


rights violations is increasingly less likely to occur due to the existence of international pressure. Moreover, to some degree, authoritarian rulers are becoming aware of the fact that there might be consequences for their acts as there are operative international bodies, such as the International Criminal Court, in charge of prosecuting violations extraterritorially. Furthermore, international economic and political sanctions constitute an effective deterrent for those rulers inclined to violate the international normative framework, especially in connection with human rights issues. It follows that the view that asserts that states do not incorporate normative shared understandings in their policymaking can easily be challenged. For there are active international norms, principles and values that consistently shape international interaction beyond the prototypical state of nature. Moreover, as organic interdependence grows stronger, there is less scope for states’ categorical selfish policies as the borders of “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” actions become increasingly blurred. As it was acknowledged by the signatories of the UN Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, after the 1973 world oil shock that dramatically revealed the extent of interdependence: Current events have brought into sharp focus the realization that the interests of the developed countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from each other, that there is a close interrelationship between the prosperity of the developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries, and that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent parts. International co-operation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries. (UN Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 1974, p.3) What is more, after the first global oil crisis that revealed explicitly the nature of interdependence, there have been numerous events, ranging from security threats issues (such as terrorism) to systemic economic problems (for example, the global financial crisis of 2008–2009), which have exposed that international interaction does not always resemble a zero-sum game: states’ interests have become closer.

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On the other hand, the fact that the concept of legitimacy is relevant in foreign policy-making reveals that principles and values count in international relations for they provide the means to assess the rightfulness of states’ actions. Thus, it seems clear that states are capable of identifying ethical structures and employ them accordingly. It is true that states quite often do not comply with the appropriate normative framework; however, that does not mean that they are not competent to act morally. In the end, as can any moral agent, they choose not to abide by the relevant principles of rightfulness and justice. In highly institutionalized ethical communities, such as the nation-state, these violations are translated into effective legal sanctions, whilst in developing ethical communities, such as the current international system, punishment (when not dealt out by the apposite international institutions) is applied informally. Moreover, infringements to the international normative framework by states cannot be a long-term strategy in a world of wide-ranging interaction and interdependence. And this applies also to hegemonic countries that have been tempted to exploit their military power. Summing up, states are embedded in both domestic and international ethical structures, which they can identify and whose content exert an influence on their policymaking: real politics cannot account entirely for the actions of states. Moreover, there are shared moral understandings in the international society that shape interaction between states, which are the foundation of institutional regimes that regulate relations according to the idea of legitimacy. Actual infringements to the international normative framework are not an expression of a representative state of nature, but only show that states, as moral agents, are capable of wrongdoing. Denying the moral status of states for their transgressions would entail exempting them from their actual moral responsibilities. Yet both democratic and authoritarian states should be held responsible for their actions involving violations to the international normative framework, which is only possible if they are assumed to have a moral nature. States are mutually vulnerable to the effects of interdependence One of the most important effects of interdependence is that actors in the international society become more vulnerable. Hence, the resonance of particular states’ autonomous actions can be felt across


borders. By either deliberate action or sheer negligence, current states are able to affect one another’s welfare, interests or viability in an unprecedented manner. No longer is war to be considered the only means by which states can cause immediate injury to other states. As global interdependence expands, new forms of interaction pave the way for distinctive types of wrongdoing between states. Consequently, just as in a past world of little interaction (where physical violence constituted the main form of transgression between polities), political theorists reflected on the justice of war; analogously, nowadays it becomes inevitable to speculate about the normative implications of other interactions that can also inflict harm upon other agents. In particular, it becomes urgent to think about the effects of the connectedness of the world in terms of both rectificatory and distributive justice.67 It follows that there are grounds to speculate about, prima facie, obligations of justice that arise from the type of interdependence prevalent in the world. Likewise, vulnerabilities can also stem from systemic causes where the deliberate action of states does not play an immediate role. That is, where moral responsibility is not easily determined, but even so it is necessary to establish moral obligations to assist the agents that co-participate in the system. For example, the process of economic globalization has generated new problems, whose origin can be traced back to the swift integration of highly differentiated markets across countries. Insofar as there are enormous asymmetries among the particular economies of the world – in particular, in terms of capacities – it becomes more likely that the economic system distributes unevenly the effects of crises and other shocks. Thus, the question of potential special obligations towards the most vulnerable co-members of the international community emerges.68 Similarly, non-economic transnational phenomena, such as health risks, environmental deterioration, international crime and security threats, generate vulnerabilities that may raise normative issues regarding the proper distribution of responsibility, even when it is practically impossible to establish a direct causal link between states’ actions and an inflicted harm. These problems, then, bring to the fore several moral issues connected with the establishment of mechanisms to redress a wrong by allocating special obligations; this is what David Miller has called remedial responsibility (see Miller, 2001). Moreover, as interdependence becomes more evident, members of


the international society of states increase their expectations about the degree of shared responsibility for supporting one another regardless of whether a causal responsibility has been singled out. Insofar as states have a moral nature, they are morally responsible for their wrongdoings (i.e. they can be accountable for those actions and omissions that have a negative effect on others), and they become relevant subjects of moral concern – that is, states’ interests need to be taken into account by one another (even when the source of harm is systemic or not easily identifiable). It might be argued, however, that not all states’ interests should be regarded as morally valid (or reasonable), and consequently they should not always be considered subjects of moral concern. For example, an expansionist state’s interest in invading a neighboring country to exploit its wealth is not a morally valid interest. Yet, even outlaw states have a moral status that does not fade away as a result of their violations to the international normative framework. For the international community owes them certain basic duties. This is clear even in the case of war, where there are moral constraints as to what can be done that implicitly recognize a moral status to aggressive states. To put it bluntly, all states have a moral nature because (a) they all have morally reasonable fundamental interests (for example, their interest to subsist as a political community), and (b) they are morally responsible for their actions. Amongst the reasonable fundamental interests that states have regardless of the nature of their regime, there is one which has particular relevance for present purposes insofar as it is related to issues of social justice. That is, states consistently pursue economic and social development or, in other words, they seek to bring about wellbeing to their populations. This claim, which surely is highly contestable by state skeptics, takes us to the last reason that supports the idea that states have a moral nature. Modern states have a consistent concern for the well-being of their populations In order to justify the assumption that states have a moral nature because they pursue the welfare of their societies, which is an indisputable morally valid purpose, I will proceed as follows: (A) I will explain succinctly what I understand by well-being, and (B) I will develop a theoretical and an empirical argument aimed at showing


that states effectively have an interest in the well-being of their populations. The concept of well-being This account advances a thin conception of well-being understood as a country’s set of social conditions that allows its people to satisfy universal basic human needs. These needs are food, housing, basic education, and health care. In the economic literature, the process through which countries establish the social and economic conditions that allow the fulfillment of basic needs is broadly referred to as development. A developed society is, then, one that guarantees its participants fair access to the goods (or functionings, see Sen, 2001) necessary to subsist and carry out a rewarding plan of life. In contrast, a developing (or an underdeveloped) society lacks the social and economic institutions that can effectively guarantee all of its participants the satisfaction of their needs. Hence, not only do persons become incapable of exercising basic human capabilities or realizing a plan of life, but they face an actual threat to their possibilities of survival. As a result, the lack of fulfillment of self-evident basic needs threatens the primary good of any human being: life. It is important to stress that throughout this work, when I refer to the well-being of a community, I do not mean the aggregate satisfaction of each particular individual’s basic needs, but the social conditions, understood as a complex set of shared institutions, that allow a community to guarantee that present and future members can satisfy their basic needs. In other words, what concerns me is a type of common good of the community as a whole: members of a community are united in purpose because they all share a common interest in establishing a stable framework of social conditions that can allow them to fulfill their basic needs. There are two main traditions of social philosophy that endorse the notion of common good as a telos of communal life: natural law theory and British idealism.69 In his book Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980), natural law theorist John Finnis, for example, defines common good – which is the object of all justice – as follows: “a set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively and/or negatively) in a community” (Finnis,

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1980, p.155). On the other hand, the tradition of British idealism, broadly speaking, associates the common good, via Hegel, with Rousseau’s notion of General Will, as opposed to the Will of All.70 Moreover, general will, common will, public good, common good and well-being are all terms that in this tradition try to reconcile individual (abstract) freedom with the moral character of a community. Thus, as Panagakou points out, even though the philosophy of British idealists did not represent a unified project, “they regarded the common good and the self-realization of the individual as mutually kcompatible ideas which are essentially and logically interrelated” (Panagakou, 2005, p.2). Despite important differences in the way natural law theory and British idealism conceive the nature of rights, they both share the idea that justice is fundamentally connected with the common good, which sets them apart from another tradition of social thought: individualistic liberalism. As pointed out by Simhony in his article on the British idealist thinker T.H. Green: Nothing strikes more terror in the hearts of the liberals than the proposition that the common good is the basis of justice, that the system of rights which display justice is derivative of and conditioned by, the common good. The role of justice – in a society conceived by the lights of classical liberals – is to ensure that individuals are able to live a life governed by their own thinking, and based on their own conception of the good, with the only proviso that their pursuits do not violate the rights of others. (Simhony, 2005, p.127) In essence, the main concern of the theories that advance the concept of the common good is to reconcile the particular with the universal; specifically, they seek to vindicate the idea that the individuals’ selfrealization (or flourishing) cannot be dissociated from the community (which is an idea with a long pedigree in social thought that can be traced back to Aristotle). My conception of well-being, which is a type of primary common good, is indeed inspired by this intellectual background, and thus it stands in opposition to individual-based approaches; however, contrary to both natural law theory and British Hegelianism, I restrict the content of the common good to the social conditions that guarantee general access to the four basic universal needs already mentioned that protect the self-evident value of life.


Moreover, the fact that my version of well-being is even less substantive than liberal Rawls’s “thin theory of the good,” which he intends to restrict to the “bare essentials” (Rawls, 1999c [1971], p.348), allows me to assume that all states have a minimum of decency that grants them a moral nature. Thus, it seems reasonable to say that regardless of the nature of the regime, economic system, principles and values, and the particular conception of justice held by a political community, all states seek to achieve the satisfaction of these four basic needs (i.e. food, housing, basic education, and health care) through processes of social and economic development. Well-being as a purpose of states The claim that affirms that states, irrespective of the nature of their regimes, try to achieve well-being is founded on two theses: theoretical and empirical. The first thesis consists of the assertion that modern states are political entities defined by their purposive nature: the common good. In contrast, the empirical thesis seeks to prove that there is no reason to affirm that non-liberal states should not qualify as having a minimum of decency inasmuch as roughly all contemporary states pursue development. I will develop each of these theses below; yet, before that, let us make two important clarifications. On the one hand, it is important to stress that the state is not to be confused with the government, ruling-class, bureaucracy, or political institutions. As noted by Stephen Krasner and Howard H. Lentner (see Krasner 1984; Lentner 1984), among others, a good deal of the literature that distrusts the conception of the state fails to recognize these differences, and in so doing they overlook the theoretical usefulness of the concept. In particular, suspicions about the concept of state have come from two important traditions of social thought: liberalism and Marxism. Lentner rightly points out that both “Marxists and liberals devalue the state, the former trusting that it will wither away, the latter believing that public purposes are fulfilled by private means” (Lentner, 1984, p.370). Moreover, he argues, these traditions of social thought reject the idea of a whole community that could effectively carry out the common good. Similarly, in his analysis of the major theoretical tendencies of international relations that followed the Realist paradigm, Martin Shaw has warned us about “over-economic” interpretations of world politics

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such as liberal-pluralist theories (for example, Keohane and Nye’s complex interdependence theory) and Marxist approaches (such as the ones developed by Robert W. Cox or Stephen Gill), which tend to dismiss the importance of the state. Shaw argues that in trying to escape Realism, these theories reproduce reductionist views of the state by dissolving it into market and class relations (Shaw, 2000). Moreover, as economic interdependence grows, it becomes necessary to count on the political means of the state to address both local and global injustice. It is, therefore, important to keep the focus on states in order to be clear about who is failing to accomplish obligations of justice. Ignoring the importance of the role of states in contemporary international relations theory could in effect mislead the discussion of justice, and facilitate that states disdain their responsibilities. This was clearly put by Devetak and Higgot when they claimed that in the context of globalization some governments seek to get rid of the states’ responsibilities for the effects of this process; yet, states have capabilities and institutional assets: “they are not merely passive or reactive actors” (Devetak and Higgot, 1999, p.497). On the other hand, given a considerable mistrust of “real states,” some current theoretical approaches have overemphasized the role of civil society’s corporations – in particular non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – to carry out obligations of justice. Yet, I believe, they fail to identify the practical problems and theoretical inconsistencies that ruling out states from any conception of global justice would create. Let us take a closer look at this issue by focusing on Onora O’Neill’s reasoning, which summarizes the main ideas behind the view that overestimates the role of non-state actors in bringing about transnational or global justice, given the general disappointment with concrete states. In her article “Global Justice: Whose Obligations?” (2004), O’Neill expresses her misgivings about the role of states to secure global justice as follows: “Assigning obligations to secure justice beyond their borders to states may be no more sensible than assigning obligations to supervise hen houses to foxes” (O’Neill, 2004, p.243). Then, she goes on to propose an alternative view that rejects the idea that states should be the primary agents of justice. As a result, O’Neill postulates that obligations of justice could be carried out conveniently by non-state agents and agencies such as (some) religious groups, (some)


professions, (some) non-governmental organizations, and (some) transnational corporations (TNCs). Without much justification, she picks out the last two as major candidates. According to O’Neill, the fact that there are “many bad states” and too “many weak states” gives us enough reason to justify that other agents should be called upon to bring about (economic) justice if they choose to do so. This idea is certainly odd because obligations of social justice are dislocated from the political arena and put at the level of the civil society where they become, rigorously speaking, private.71 Although O’Neill does not go so far as to call for the substitution of states, she seemingly misunderstands the problem inasmuch as the very same reasons that are employed to reject states could be used to disqualify corporations: if one were to follow her line of reasoning, “there are many bad” corporations and “too many weak” corporations. O’Neill argues that the idea that non-state agencies should take up obligations of justice – basically to secure the respect of human rights and deliver (public) services such as educational provision and health care – is explained by the urgency to deliver economic justice in the world. However, it is not clear how this strategy could effectively work to deliver social justice globally if corporations straightforwardly decide, and justifiably so, not to engage in becoming primary agents of justice. Moreover, on what grounds could any ethical reasoning demonstrate that these agencies have such obligations plainly because states have not proved enough competence? As a matter of fact, if, as O’Neill seems to imply, NGOs and TNCs are simply, as it were, invited to take part voluntarily to tackle injustice, there would not be any difference between justice and charity inasmuch as these corporations could not be held accountable. Otherwise, and quite paradoxically, if their obligations are supposed to be rigorous duties of justice, obligations of the civil society’s corporations should have to be enforced by those state institutions whose lack of capabilities brought about the reallocation of responsibilities to deliver justice. Furthermore, if civil society’s corporations should take on obligations of economic justice due to the lack of success of states, there does not seem to be a reason to reject that corporations should also undertake other obligations that weak states fail to carry out, such as those of criminal justice, which is plainly unreasonable. Likewise, it is clear that corporations of the civil society would require some sort of legitimacy in order to carry out their alleged obligations of justice globally.

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Yet, what could possibly grant them such legitimacy if not their becoming state-like institutions? Thus, if these corporations were to become modern primary agents of justice, they should, I believe, introduce institutional mechanisms to make themselves accountable, and that would imply radical transformations such as counting on democratic representative procedures. Current NGOs and TNCs are, nevertheless, quite far from being considered democratic institutions (which in the realm of civil society is not wrong in itself). Another crucial matter that O’Neill does not address successfully is the fact that, in the end, developed countries’ corporations (either NGOs or TNCs) would prevail over those of the poor countries’ to “deliver justice” inasmuch as they have more resources.72 The latter, however, could in fact reproduce a system of demeaning dependence; impose (institutionally and culturally) decontextualized developmental policies; and obstruct the enhancement of local state institutions suitable to deliver justice. All of which, consequently, would frustrate the development of poor countries’ sense of self-respect. Moreover, it is not clear how these agencies, such as NGOs and TNCs, could displace their own interests, including the reproduction of their own organizations, to unreservedly take up obligations to secure justice and conduct themselves like states. Hence, the idea of a “sponsored-like justice” that a proposition such as O’Neill’s would bring about should be rejected categorically.73 It is important, therefore, to be wary of accounts that, in an attempt to redress global economic injustice, idealize the role of private initiatives. O’Neill’s approach, which disregards states as primary agents of justice, is unconvincing: it is not certain that NGOs and TNCs could do much better than (weak) states to secure obligations of justice. In fact, as O’Neill herself seems to recognize, the authentic solution to the problem of injustice is the establishment of competent states. As she puts it, “[w]hat those in weak states need is a process of institution building by which justiciable rights are increasingly secured. Much of this process may indeed aim to strengthen state institutions, and to secure a greater degree of political justice, which in turn may deliver economic justice” (O’Neill, 2004, p.258). Yet, it is not understandable why she ostensibly shows so much contempt for these political formations and idealizes the role that corporations of the civil society could play. Putting O’Neill’s strategy into practice could, as a matter of fact, encourage libertarian-like responses to the


problems of social justice (social justice would end up being a matter to be resolved between particulars through the establishment of strictly private transfers), which I believe is not a reasonable response to the challenges we face now to end global poverty. The assumption that states should be considered the main actors of international justice’s arrangements does not mean, however, that individuals are secondary or that they could be “sacrificed” for the state’s sake. Nor that civil society’s initiatives and NGOs are irrelevant – on the contrary, civic and cosmopolitan activism is crucial in the realization of justice. Rather, the proposition simply assumes that justice is necessarily mediated through political entities like the state. Giving each person his due is a process that involves the participation of the state because it is the only entity that nowadays can legitimately secure the enforcement of obligations of justice (either singly for domestic justice or collectively for international justice), and they have the adequate institutional means to establish the conditions in which well-being can be achieved; for the most part, justice requires the employment of policymaking tools to improve consistently the life chances of poor people. On the other hand, though it is true that the circumstances of interdependence erode states’ capacities to achieve their purposes autonomously, thus affecting their ethical standing as vehicles of the common good, the exclusion of states to bring about justice is not a sound alternative. In fact, I believe that the maintenance of the purposive nature of the states, which grants them a moral nature, can be preserved through their ethical reconstitution according to a new international normative framework. I will deal with this topic in the next chapter where I develop an account of transnational justice. For the moment, however, l will only introduce two theses that may allow us to recognize that states are valid moral agents for any international justice arrangement. The theoretical thesis. Now, once the two previous clarifications have been made, let us turn to the theoretical thesis that justifies the idea that states have a moral nature by virtue of their fundamental interest in well-being. Accordingly, it is important to stress that the concept of state defended here is an analytical abstraction which defines it as a purposive political entity whose end is the common good; in particular, I limit the content of the common good to my definition

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of well-being – that is, a country’s set of social conditions that allows its people to satisfy universal basic human needs (food, housing, basic education, and health care). As a result, the type of regime (for example, democratic, autocratic, or oligarchic), the form of the state (monarchic or republican), the mode of economic relations (free-market or centrally planned), and the particular conceptions of right and justice (liberal, meritocratic, utilitarian, egalitarian, and so on) that states have do not affect their moral nature, which depends on having a morally reasonable purpose of pursuing well-being. That purpose grants them a minimum of decency sufficient to be subjects of moral concern in the allocation of rights and duties of international justice. This does not imply, however, that it is not possible to challenge concrete historical states, but rather that it is possible to do so according to the way in which the aforementioned variables, most notably a particular government or regime, hinder the realization of the common good. As a matter of fact, as pointed out by British idealist T.H. Green, there may well be a duty of resistance “where no law, acknowledged or half-acknowledged, written or customary, can be appealed to against a command (general or particular) contrary to the public good” (Green, 1900, p.422). Thus, as put by David Boucher in his analysis of the British idealists’ conception of the state and international relations, for British idealism “the moral purpose of the state is the criterion by which the acts of states may be judged” (Boucher, 1994, p.678). That is why the sovereignty of states is only justifiable when their institutional and legal frameworks contribute to the common good. Moreover, if a particular state is not accomplishing its purpose, one will have to look at the type of economic system, kind of government, conception of justice – and nowadays, in the post-Westphalian society, at the conformation of inter-state relations – in order to disclose which factor (or combination of them) might be preventing the realization of the common good. Concrete state formations can, indeed, be challenged for their inability to provide for the conditions individuals need to carry out a rewarding plan of life. Yet, the concept of state endorsed by my account must be understood according to its moral background as a purposive entity that aims at establishing an institutional economic and social framework that seeks to satisfy universal basic human needs. Apart from this type of well-being, there are certainly other dimensions of the concept of common


good; yet they will not be discussed in detail in this account insofar as my interest is centered on the four basic needs already mentioned, which are shared by all political communities. Following Lentner in his critique of Krasner’s analysis of the conceptualizations of state, my approach puts forward an idea of the state that highlights the continuity of existence and purpose as an essential characteristic of this concept. According to Lentner, then: The state is a complex political organization consisting of the following components: (1) territory, (2) population, (3) continuity, (4) government, (5) functions (security, order/justice, welfare), (6) resources, (7) finances, (8) bureaucracy, (9) sovereignty, and (10) existence as part of a society of states. (Lentner, 1984, p.368) The function that Lentner calls “welfare” is equivalent to what I have generically called well-being, and whose meaning has been previously defined. In a nutshell, a state is a purposive political entity for the common good. This is what gives the state its moral nature, and what my approach shares with the tradition of British Idealism, as opposed to the conventional liberal and Marxist perspectives that tend to distrust the concept of the state. However, I part company with the British idealists as regards the way in which the international community should be understood in order to account for moral obligations between states. To a certain extent, this is explained by the development in the last fifty years of a type of interdependence and interaction that British idealists could not possibly witness – and somehow they could not anticipate. While my approach claims that the interdependence has paved the way for positive duties of justice that should be translated into international law, British idealists had problems in finding a solid theoretical groundwork for international law inasmuch as, following Hegel, they maintain that “international law” is not properly speaking law because it lacks a sovereign to enforce it (see Boucher, 1994, p.687). The latter view, on the other hand, does not mean that the British idealists rejected at once the existence of moral obligations between nations. In fact, they tried to found them theoretically on the existence of a common will, which they struggled to recognize in the make-up of the international community at the time. Consequently, not only the strength but also the definition of current international duties in the speculations on the

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subject remained feeble. It is important to stress, though, that theoretically, British idealism is capable of accounting for duties between different countries. For the appropriate content of rights and duties is connected with the scope of a community, which does not have to be national or restricted to the borders of the state. The so-called common will that shapes the community’s conception of justice – and consequently gives rise to particular moral obligations – is not itself attached discretely to particular state formations but can transcend them. What the British idealists believed, though, was that the conditions were not present as such in the international community. Indeed, as Boucher points out, they did not deny that in the international sphere there is a basis for obligations, which are grounded in the existence of a wider community: “[w]here they differ amongst themselves is not over the question of the possibility of a world community, but over the question of the extent to which it already exists” (Boucher, 1994, p.688). The existence of this wider community where moral obligations could be firmly secured and become explicit is linked to the development of a coextensive consciousness between different polities. I part company with British Hegelians because I believe that there is a growing awareness of a community of humankind in what I have called the post-Westphalian international society, which gives rise to a transnational common good, or global welfare, that contemplates morally valid duties of justice. I shall develop these ideas in the next chapter where I introduce a conception of transnational social justice. For present purposes, it suffices to say that some form of common will has developed through the realization of the existence of shared interest, mutual vulnerabilities, and a growing sense that there is a community of destiny. But let us turn now to the empirical argument that defends the idea that all states have a moral nature, which enables them to become the primary agents of any global social justice arrangements. The empirical thesis. The empirical thesis affirms that all modern states, regardless of the nature of their regimes, are concerned with the well-being of their populations. It is important to insist, however, that the definition of well-being that this approach is concerned with is a “thin” conception. It might be argued, indeed, that any conception of well-being should presuppose that individuals are


treated with dignity and have their basic human rights protected. Moreover, a comprehensive notion of well-being should include a concern for an effective exercise of freedom by its members as well as the absence of social exclusion. According to these more substantive definitions, a state working for the well-being of a community would entail democratic institutions and provisions capable of guaranteeing civil and political rights. If these institutional conditions related to the political regime were not present, supporters of, say, “thicker” conceptions of well-being would not agree that states should be thought of as entities concerned with their population’s well-being, and therefore no moral nature should be granted to them. Although these more substantive conceptions of well-being are correct in pointing out the importance of including certain fundamental rights and opportunities, it would be wrong to assume that political regimes that do not respect a certain set of civil and political liberties have no concern whatsoever for the common good of their populations. Moreover, the empirical fact is that nowadays the number of actual states in the world that unequivocally are at odds with basic democratic values – and therefore would not classify as relevant moral subjects by stricter definitions of well-being – has been in constant decline for the last three decades. Although it is certainly difficult to determine beyond a doubt which countries should be considered as fully democratic, and thus be regarded as authentically concerned with the well-being of their populations, it is possible to assume that a democratic state would guarantee a minimum set of political rights and civil liberties. Let us take, then, as a rough measure of the degree of states’ democracy the classification of the survey Freedom in the World (elaborated by the non-governmental organization Freedom House) which evaluates the levels of freedom in the world – measured in terms of political rights and civil liberties.74 Whilst in the year 1972 there were 69 countries defined as not free, in 2008 that figure had dropped to 42. Likewise, the number of countries defined as free and partially free rose in the year 2008 to 89 and 62 respectively, from 43 and 48 in 1972. These figures show that if we applied a relatively stricter criterion to identify which states effectively have an institutional framework designed to promote their populations’ comprehensive well-being, 46 percent of states (i.e. 89 states out of the 193 independent countries75 surveyed) should be considered to have a moral


nature. That is, states that without doubt (unless one holds a radical cynical view of real state formations) can be recognized as agents supporting the provision of well-being to their members. Moreover, a relaxation that included “partially free” countries which do not satisfy entirely the criteria set by the Freedom House’s survey but that, to a considerable degree, roughly secure basic civil and political rights would take the number to 151 countries worldwide. This indicates that, under a relatively “thicker” conception of well-being than the one proposed in this study, more than three quarters of the total number of states that make up the international system are concerned with their populations’ well-being. Moreover, this strategy to estimate the number of states concerned with well-being should not lead us right away to the conclusion that all the remaining states are insensitive as regards the common good of their populations. In fact, if we employ now a thin version of well-being like the one advocated in this study, which focuses primarily on the state’s interest in creating the social conditions to satisfy basic human needs, a good deal of non-democratic countries would have to be considered as morally relevant insofar as they show credibly a concern for the well-being of their people. That is, they are states with morally valid interests that deserve consideration in any international normative framework. States’ interest in well-being is expressed and made explicit as an interest in development, trade, partaking in multinational organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and so on. Indeed, although a good deal of non-democratic countries (i.e. for the most part, countries that lack effective institutional mechanisms for the citizenry’s participation in law-making processes) fail to recognize some important human rights, still they strive for establishing the social conditions required to satisfy basic needs. This is illustrated by some non-democratic countries’ decent performance regarding social development indicators,76 as well as their commitment to the Millennium Development Goals – adopted unanimously by the United Nations member states in the year 2000 – which by the year 2008 seemed to be achievable.77 It is true that there is no excuse whatsoever to justify the repressive rule under which citizens of these countries live. As a matter of fact,


following Amartya Sen’s line of reasoning (Sen, 2001), the lack of freedom could be one of the variables hindering their processes of development. However, it is necessary to insist that the idea that non-democratic states cannot possibly be concerned with the well-being of their populations is ill-grounded. That is, some states’ regimes might not show a significant commitment to the democratic institutions needed to protect individuals from oppression, but still they show an interest in creating certain conditions to satisfy their citizens’ basic needs. Phrased somewhat differently, insofar as states, both democratic and non-democratic, have an interest in development – understood not as gross income growth but as the establishment of the social conditions that allow the satisfaction of basic human needs – they are concerned about their populations’ well-being. This interest grants states a moral nature that deserves protection from external wrongs: states’ concern for development needs to be considered morally relevant when assigning duties of international justice in the international normative framework. Nevertheless, my assumption regarding states’ moral nature does not lead us to affirm straightforwardly that they always act ethically – or according to a particular conception of right and justice – but that: (1) they hold morally reasonable interests, and (2) they are fully accountable for their actions and omissions and are fully capable of having duties (i.e. states are morally responsible).

Conclusion This chapter has tried to show that there are circumstances of justice in the post-Westphalian society, which allow us to speculate about global duties of social justice. In particular, the growing transnational solidarity that stems from the conditions of interdependence of the post-Westphalian society of states supports the feasibility of distributive duties between political communities. Moreover, it was argued that there are actually two types of solidarity coexisting, which may give rise to distinctive arrangements of distributive justice at the domestic and global level. Likewise, the intensity and type of principles or duties of social justice that derive from each type of solidarity may be different. Then, at the global scale, distributive schemes may well not be anchored on comparative principles as egalitarian conceptions of justice. On the other hand, this chapter


defended the idea that states are the main moral agents of any transnational social justice arrangements. States are purposive political entities with morally reasonable interests; in particular, all states are concerned with the well-being of their populations, which has been defined as the social conditions that establish a set of background institutions that guarantee the satisfaction of universal basic needs (food, housing, basic education, and health care). This “thin” definition of well-being, which is a form of common good, then, allowed us to introduce a threshold of minimum decency that makes it possible to uphold the idea that states are primary agents of international social justice.


Introduction Thus far this approach has tried to establish that: (1) there are circumstances of justice in the international sphere that suggest that it is possible to speculate about distributive duties, and (2) states are relevant moral agents in any feasible arrangement of international justice as they have a moral nature, which entitles them to rights and makes them morally responsible for their wrongdoings. Moreover, this work has tried to develop an argument about the moral nature of states, which is associated with their purposive character as vehicles of the common good. States aim, as a matter of definition, at securing well-being, understood as the establishment of the social conditions that guarantee the satisfaction of basic human needs. Yet it is still necessary to elaborate further on the nature of duties of social justice that this approach advocates, compared to that of mainstream egalitarian cosmopolitanism. Also, it is important to offer an explanation of the background theory that accounts for the type of duties of transnational justice that states owe to each other in the post-Westphalian society. Accordingly, this chapter is structured as follows. First, I define the nature of this project of social justice. It is argued that the scope of concern of this approach is circumscribed by the problem of positive duties of social justice at the global level; then, I elaborate a theoretical distinction between the Rawlsian paradigm that inspires mainstream cosmopolitanism and the theory of transnational social justice derived from the notion of solidarity. It is argued that accounts 123


of global distributive obligations of justice grounded on the assumption that there is a global basic structure are wrong. Hence, cosmopolitanism cannot consistently secure obligations of social justice beyond borders. The main reason is that the fundamental premise that could justify the validity of cosmopolitan principles is unsound – that is, there is no global social scheme that could successfully apply principles of distributive justice nor can it realistically be constructed. Likewise, the current structure of the world prevents the establishment of background institutions for distributive justice, which are required by any theory that advances comparative distributive principles. Put in a nutshell, the Rawlsian paradigm is not relevant to discussions of global justice today. This, however, does not mean that it is not possible to account for obligations of social justice between states. My approach, then, focuses on organic solidarity to account for a new type of norms of the post-Westphalian international society, which reconstitute the ethical standing of states as purposive entities in circumstances of interdependence: transnational norms. These norms allow me to put forward a normative account of global justice, which I call transnational social justice, that contemplates distributive obligations between states. This conception is not, properly speaking, a general theory of global justice, but it is a normative account of social justice that seeks to demonstrate the validity of distributive arrangements between countries. Accordingly, this project elaborates a sketch of the transnational duty of assistance as a positive duty of justice that contemplates transnational transfers of resources. And, lastly, I speculate briefly on possible institutional reforms that could support the application of the duty of assistance under the current circumstances.

Towards a feasible approach of global social justice It is not my purpose to work out a comprehensive conception of international justice capable of assessing exhaustively, from the normative point of view, the interaction between states and other relevant actors of the international system. There are different contentious issues within the international system that require assessment from the point of view of justice, and it is not clear whether it would be theoretically workable to come up with overarching ethical principles capable of evaluating such diverse phenomena


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appropriately. Andrew Linklater (1999) identifies at least seven spheres of concern for international justice theorists. In his article “The Evolving Spheres of International Justice,” he identifies the following relevant realms. Briefly put, they are related to (1) the distribution of the world’s resources, (2) the existence of transnational harm and subsequent legal redress and compensation, (3) the access to decision-making in the global institutions which show a democratic deficit, (4) global environmental issues, (5) questions regarding migration and resettlement, (6) justice between different cultures, and (7) the topic of so-called “speciesism,”78 or justice between different species (see Linklater, 1999). The scope of my argument deals primarily with the first two spheres of justice identified by Linklater (i.e. the distribution of the world’s resources and transnational harm), which are closely linked with the idea of transnational transfers of resources that my approach supports. However, it is worth recalling, in contrast with theories of cosmopolitan justice that assume the existence of a global basic structure, understood as a cooperative social arrangement,79 that I begin from the assertion that interdependence has brought about a body of settled norms based on solidarity, which include positive duties of social justice. This distinction is important because it provides different rationales for transnational distributive transfers. Thus whereas, for example, Rawlsian cosmopolitanism can unmistakably advance a much more ambitious transformation of the world by proposing global distributive practices that would aim at equalizing opportunities and primary goods between individuals, my endeavor seeks merely to account for the justice of transfers of resources between states. Moreover, duties of social justice are not grounded on the existence of commonly held resources (such as natural resources), which require a principle of distribution, but these duties are based upon the notion of transnational solidarity. It follows that the groundwork of my account of social justice in the international realm does not rely on the existence of a basic structure. Although there are certainly some global and regional institutions affecting the social outcomes and expectations of individuals and communities, this fragmented institutional framework cannot possibly be thought of as a scheme capable of applying overarching principles of distributive justice of the Rawlsian type. Instead of employing the concept of “basic structure,” conceived as a comprehensive social scheme of cooperation, this

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approach advances the idea of organic interdependence, which gives rise to positive duties. The move towards discarding the concept of the basic structure has also been taken by some late Rawlsian cosmopolitanism, yet I believe unsuccessfully. Thus, in order to demonstrate the validity of principles of justice of the Rawlsian type, some approaches have switched the emphasis, on the one hand, from the basic structure (understood as a cooperative system) to economic interdependence and, on the other hand, from the value of equality to the problem of global poverty by maintaining that the latter is causally linked to the international structure. This type of cosmopolitanism argues that global distributive principles of justice are justified insofar as deprived people are affected by the make-up of the international system (regardless of whether there is an effective basic structure. Cosmopolitan thinker Simon Caney, for example, drawing upon Pogge and Beitz, addresses this issue by affirming that global interdependence generates comparative principles to be applied by institutional schemes (Caney, 2003). He claims that insofar as individuals are exposed to the same global socio-economic forces, any just arrangement should incorporate global principles of justice. In Caney’s words: “The ‘causal interdependence’ conception of an association stipulates that comparative principles apply to people who causally affect and are affected by others or who are subject to the same economic forces” (Caney, 2003, p.295; my emphasis). The reason advanced by this moral argument is that people who are exposed to the same major institutions in an association should not do worse simply because they happen to live in a certain place (namely, a poor country). Although cosmopolitan thinkers are correct in pointing out that contemporary world poverty has some of its roots in the characteristics of the international structure80 (an issue appropriately raised by approaches of political economy such as the dependency theory81), they fail to explain clearly why egalitarian principles of distributive justice should follow from these circumstances and not, say, a duty of compensation. In the end, global distributive principles would have to be justified by the existence of a single comprehensive basic structure effectively determining all social outcomes globally. Moreover, poverty is explained also by causes other than the international structure; in fact, unjust domestic socio-economic institutions may play a significant role in the levels of deprivation and social


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exclusion of particular societies.82 Strictly speaking, it would not be fair (or sensible in order to remedy poverty) to underestimate the domestic causes of poverty by assuming simplistically that the international structure completely determines all of the relevant social outcomes worldwide. Although certainly exploitation and asymmetrical power relationships between countries partially explain global poverty, social exclusion is also caused by the domestic institutional framework of poor countries. Furthermore, even accepting the idea that global poverty (or radical inequality) stems entirely from the international structure, causal responsibility does not always bring about distributive or moral responsibilities – and much less so, comparative principles. Take the following simple example that, I believe, can help to shed some light on the issue. Think of a developing country that decides to improve its labor force’s productivity through the establishment of human capital programs and, as a result of its successful policies, this country affects directly the allocation of capital in other countries where many people are left unemployed. Although the developing country’s actions affected directly the interests of other countries (i.e. it is causally responsible for bringing a state which over time may make other countries poorer), it would not be sound to say that the successful country is morally obliged to redistribute part of its benefits or to compensate them. Things, it is true, are not as simple in the international system as they are in the example: for it is not the case that rich countries are affluent only because they are more productive or efficient than poor countries. Yet the point of the earlier example is to raise the issue that causal responsibility is not necessarily connected with moral responsibility. The fact that sometimes moral responsibility does not follow immediately from causal responsibility does not imply, however, that it is not possible to attribute specific moral responsibilities (and, accordingly, duties) to countries for harm they may have inflicted upon others. For example, issues such as the outrageous famine in Sub-Saharan Africa in the eighties that, according to recent scientific findings, could have been caused by a climatic effect produced by industrial pollutants called global dimming,83 raises irrefutably an ethical issue about the moral responsibility of the most industrialized countries to do justice and become accountable for their negligence. Yet this type of case, I believe, would better be dealt with


through the employment of conceptions other than the ones proposed by the cosmopolitan ethical framework; in particular, this kind of harm should be addressed via a duty of compensation. Similarly, unfair trade practices that harm particularly poor countries (for example, through rich countries’ subsidized exports) and inequitable financial relationships between countries (for example, through the plutocratic procedures of the world’s financial institutions) which impose unsuccessful economic models to vulnerable countries with balance of payments problems could indeed trigger reparations of different sorts. I will not address normative issues of the international system in which the duty of compensation could be applied because my main purpose is to focus on an obligation of social justice based on the value of solidarity, which I call the duty of assistance; it suffices to say that it would be possible to develop ethical critiques of the current system without deriving Rawlsian conclusions.84 For present purposes, it is important only to stress that developing far-reaching ethical critiques about the international system is feasible without suggesting improperly that any type of wrong can be redressed by the application of principles of justice of the Rawlsian type. It follows that it is necessary to overcome the Rawlsian framework based on the basic structure and flawed theoretical derivations, and develop fresh approaches to elaborate critiques about the international system. This work tries to do so by advancing the idea that obligations of social justice are not tied up either to the theoretical background assumed by social contract-based theories or to the metaphysical assumptions about individuals’ moral personality. Similarly, there is an important distinction to make in the way obligations of justice are justified in both approaches: whereas in my account, transnational obligations of social justice are based on the concept of solidarity derived from organic interdependence, radical cosmopolitanism about justice is grounded on the premise that membership in cooperative arrangements,85 or the existence of an association characterized by causal interdependence,86 immediately bring about egalitarian principles of distributive justice. In practical terms, this reflects two different types of institutional arrangements and correlative responsibilities. Whilst cosmopolitanism aims at changing the global major institutions responsible for the social outcomes through the establishment of egalitarian principles of justice, my


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approach seeks to insure that solidarity between states is properly arranged through a duty of assistance. Thus, apart from the clear divergence from the role of state formations in bringing about justice, the main difference in the type of supranational (or global) institutions envisioned by these two accounts is that the cosmopolitan ones would operate with the objective of equalizing a determined set of rights and goods between individuals, whereas the ones derived from my account would be mainly concerned with the improvement of global welfare and not fighting inequality in itself, at least directly. It is my assumption that poverty (understood as the lack of human basic goods) is seen as an axiomatic wrong – according to the shared moral understandings of the international system – which calls for redress, whereas inequality of resources in itself is not. The latter does not mean that this project is insensitive to the issue of inequality in the world. However, it seems more reasonable, at present, to ground distributive obligations of justice on solidarity rather than on equality for the moral consensus about egalitarian principles of justice is not sufficiently strong. Likewise, there are no appropriate structural conditions to support background institutions of justice such as those that define taxation policies and property rights. Although my account is much more moderate in that it rules out the application of egalitarian principles of distributive justice as there is not a coherent global basic structure, it is appropriate to deal with the existing circumstances of the world. Moreover, it allows the allocation of responsibilities of social justice to specific actors of the international system (i.e. states) by basing obligations on solidarity and shared moral understandings of the post-Westphalian domain of discourse (namely, the area of ethical discussion where participants recognize many rules as settled).

Transnational norms and social justice Drawing upon Mervyn Frost (1996), I assume the existence of a domain of discourse in the sphere of international affairs that constitutes a reasonable basis to solve pressing normative issues. In his book Ethics in International Relations (1996), he lists at least 13 issues87 that are formulated within the context of a given normative framework, which demand responses as to what ought to be done. Following


Frost, “normative issues only arise as such within the context of certain shared understandings” (Frost, 1996, pp.77–78); thus, I argue that the lack of fulfillment of basic human needs constitutes an issue that has come forward in the context of the post-Westphalian society, which requires international normative settlement. It is not, then, my purpose to elaborate here a comprehensive list of settled norms of the international system capable of dealing with every potential problem, but only to assert the relevance of settled norms derived from organic interdependence, which may substantiate normative responses regarding issues such as poverty and the promotion of global welfare. Specifically, this proposal tries to supplement rather than challenge Frost’s framework in order to account for a particular type of obligations of justice (i.e. transnational obligations of social justice). I believe that Frost’s analysis is incomplete because it does not seem to take into account the strength of norms that stem from interdependence, and which are shaping to an important extent the current domain of discourse. But let us develop this argument a little further. Frost maintains that there is an operating modern-state domain of discourse which defines a set of settled norms in the international system; namely, sovereignty norms,88 international law norms,89 modernization norms90 and domestic norms.91 Although Frost recognizes that his proposed list of norms is not exhaustive, he argues that, in fact, all of them can be encapsulated into a single formula: “the preservation of a system of sovereign states is the primary good” (Frost, 1996, p.112). Then, after discarding theories that could justify the validity of this system because it promotes order, he explains that the preservation of this system is accounted for by a theory of individual human rights. That is, the most plausible justification for the preservation of a system of sovereign states relies on the fact that it is the most appropriate arrangement to protect human rights. According to Frost, the necessary reconciliation between the modern-state domain of discourse and individual human rights, which are seemingly in opposition, cannot be achieved through contractarian justifications. For the notion of consent, on which these theories are based, is highly problematic.92 Consequently, he proposes a Hegelian-based approach that he calls the constitutive theory of individuality. This background theory aims at reconciling the current domain of discourse – specifically, the idea that state sovereignty is good – with individual


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human rights by suggesting that rights are not entitlements of individuals that precede their relationships. Frost claims that contrary to all rights-based theories, his constitutive theory assumes that rights cannot be conceived abstractly; a person’s rights do not exist outside social and political institutions. For the existence of rights presupposes a special type of reciprocal recognition between individuals who see one another as members of a community. Though the family and the civil society are arrangements where individuality is constituted and valued,93 it is only in the state in which it can be fully realized. The state resolves the tension between the individual and the whole by overcoming alienation. Following Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1821), the constitutive theory of individuality advanced by Frost endorses the idea that in the state, “citizens come to self-conscious appreciation of the way in which they constitute the whole and are constituted by it” (Frost, 1996, p.149). According to this perspective, states provide the appropriate framework for the reciprocal recognition of rights-holders as free individuals. Or, put another way, the state is a type of constitutive association that, through the mutual recognition of individuals, leads to the citizens’ consciousness of their freedom as something that transcends their particularity. As put by Hegel: The state is the actuality of concrete freedom. But concrete freedom consists in this, that personal individuality and its particular interests not only achieve their complete development and gain explicit recognition for their right (as they do in the sphere of the family and civil society) but, for one thing, they also pass over of their own accord into the interest of the universal, and, for another thing, they know and will the universal; they even recognize it as their own substantive mind; they take it as their end and aim and are active in its pursuit. (Hegel, 1967 [1821], p.260) Along the same lines, Frost elaborates his understanding of the state in more familiar terms as follows: “An autonomous state is one in which the citizens experience the well-being of the state as fundamental to their own well-being, just as a member of a family experiences the well-being of the family as essential to his (or her) own well-being” (Frost, 1996, p.153). Although, to an important extent, the idea that sovereign states represent the right ethical


framework for the proper understanding and realization of free individuality is a compelling idea, it seems to me that Frost overlooks the fact that the nature of the state (and, as a result, its ethical standing) is changing due to interdependence. Frost’s main concern is to reconcile free individuality and the system of sovereign sates (a settled norm or good), so he attempts to justify the latter by saying that free individuals can only flourish within a state that is recognized as autonomous (see Frost 1996, p.151). He argues that without the proper mutual recognition of sovereign states, individuals cannot be effectively constituted. That is why, according to him, the preservation of the system of sovereign states is “the primary good” of the international system. Thus far the reconciliation Frost attempts could seem to be consistent; nevertheless, states can no longer be conceived as self-sufficient political formations that can accomplish their purposes by themselves, which has an immediate effect on their success to protect individuality and promote freedom autonomously. The fact that states depend on one another to achieve their purposes brings about important repercussions in the way states need to be conceived in what I called the post-Westphalian international society. Thus, I believe that it is necessary to incorporate a new type of settled norms into the international society based on the emerging value of solidarity. I call these norms that can deal effectively with the challenges posed by organic interdependence transnational norms. The rationale of these types of norms in the present domain of discourse, which stresses the need for shared responsibility and solidarity, is accounted for by the fact that without them the system of sovereign states becomes inadequate to protect individuality or guarantee well-being. Put another way, this approach pushes Frost’s account a bit further by pointing out that free individuality is no longer protected by the fundamental principle that “sovereignty is good.” Rather, persons can only flourish if the autonomy of the states is reconstituted by the acceptance of settled norms of a non-particularistic nature. That is, it is only through the acceptance of the validity of transnational norms that states can effectively re-constitute themselves ethically as purposive entities. It is important to stress, though, that the acceptance of these types of norms, which certainly limit the scope of the autonomy of states, should not be confused with subjugation. For the latter presupposes a


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violent negation of a community’s right to exist as a purposive political entity, whilst transnational norms, on the contrary, try to restore the ethical significance of particular states through the establishment of relations of solidarity between them. Moreover, the “disruption” of states’ autonomy brought about by acceptance of the validity of transnational norms aims at framing sovereignty within a universalistic normative framework in order to prevent states becoming redundant. Frost’s account is unsatisfactory because it fails to go beyond Hegel’s conception of autonomous states as “wholes whose needs are met within their own borders” (Hegel 1967 [1821], p.213). My criticism of Frost, then, resembles that of modern natural law theorists to Aristotle regarding his notion of the polis as a “complete community” (see Finnis, 1980, p.148; George, 1999, p.234). According to Finnis, “Aristotle, by a premature generalization from incomplete empirical data, declared that the Greek polis was the paradigmatic form of complete and self-sufficient community for securing the all-round good of its members” (Finnis, 1980, p.148). Yet, as clearly observed by Finnis, this is not the case nowadays insofar as individual human beings’ well-being cannot be secured completely within the boundaries of states due to different types of interdependence. This conception of the constitution of current human interaction which I endorse, therefore, in some way, brings my theoretical account closer to natural law theory;94 hence, I adhere to Finnis’s following conclusion which, I believe, corroborates the legitimacy of transnational norms: If it now appears that the good of individuals can only be fully secured and realized in the context of international community, we must conclude that the claim of the national state to be a complete community is unwarranted and the postulate of the national legal order, that it is supreme and comprehensive and an exclusive source of legal obligation, is increasingly what lawyers would call a ‘legal fiction’. (Finnis, 1980, p.150) Moreover, although Frost distinguishes international norms as a set of important settled norms within the current domain of discourse, he fails to give an account of their nature in circumstances of interdependence. The fundamental distinction between transnational and international norms that I suggest, then, arises from the fact


that the latter aim at regulating relationships between strictly self-sufficient states. In contrast, transnational norms, based on solidarity, are meant to rebuild the ethical standing of mutually dependent states. Consequently, I conceive contemporary inter-state relationships in the organically interdependent system very much as Frost himself understands individuals’ constitutive relationships in a state: in order to become effectively free (autonomous), agents (states) require seeing themselves as constituted by “the whole” in a fundamental way. Hence, in an organically interdependent system grounded on transnational norms, if I may paraphrase Frost, states experience the well-being of the system (i.e. some sort of transnational common good), as fundamental to their own well-being just as a member of a family experiences the well-being of the family as essential to his (or her) own well-being. Thus far, I have outlined a theoretical framework which aims at justifying the validity of transnational norms by extending Frost’s theory of constitutive individuality. To recapitulate, following Mervyn Frost’s constitutive theory of individuality, I defend the idea that there is an area of substantial agreement in the international system – structured by settled norms and shared understandings – that provide the foundations for normative settlement between actors. Yet, contrary to Frost’s modern state domain of discourse, I argue that the primary good is not the preservation of a system based on state sovereignty. Rather, I suggest that a set of transnational norms based on solidarity is better suited to protect individuality and uphold the ethical standing of states in the circumstances of organic interdependence. The idea is to introduce a particular set of settled norms that are gradually emerging in the international society of states that can account for duties of social justice between states. Consequently, I will not go any further into the development of an alternative theory of international ethics capable of solving diverse normative issues such as war, global pollution, global terrorism, intervention, human rights, and so on, which also call for positive duties. The validity of duties of social justice between countries stems from shared understandings within the post-Westphalian society of states; distinctively, a broad consensus that poverty is a wrong that represents a normative challenge. Although, to an important extent, poverty had surely been recognized as a wrong before, it has notuntil recent years been seen as an issue relevant for the international


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community as a whole that demands working collectively. Moreover, furthered by an important number of civil society’s initiatives, the states’ shared interest in some sort of world common good has been expressed in several Global Conferences on development 95 and lately on the Millennium Development Goals Declaration (2000), which aim at improving the quality of life of those worse-off in the world by reducing poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation, and discrimination by 2015.96 Accordingly, shared understandings regarding development are being settled along with a new allocation of responsibilities. Whilst it is true that there are still limited commitments of developed countries to assist poorer states, the moral validity of the duty to support developing and less-developed states in achieving the social conditions to fulfill basic human needs has been properly settled as a norm. It is important to notice that a settled norm is not, properly speaking, a norm strictly followed by agents, but a norm whose denial of validity requires special justification. Frost rightly argues that the “claim that a given norm is settled cannot be disputed by pointing out instances where people (or states) have not in actual fact acted according to the norm” (Frost, 1996, p.105). The point of bringing in Frost’s notion of settled norms is to advance the idea that, as regards basic human needs, improving the levels of well-being globally is being settled as a transnational norm of the post-Westphalian international society. Accordingly, peoples and states are expected to be co-responsible for the well-being of non-compatriots, and not engaging in that transnational endeavor requires justification. Even though there has been a good deal of skepticism about the sincerity of purposes of some developed economies – for some countries thus far have shown a lack of commitment, for instance, in increasing their Official Development Assistance (ODA) transfers97 – it is worth noticing the emerging transnational nature of the ethical discourse chosen to outline the UN Millennium Declaration (September 2000). Thus, in the section of “Values and Principles” the signatory states affirm: We recognize that, in addition to our separate responsibilities to our individual societies, we have a collective responsibility to uphold the principles of human dignity, equality and equity at the global level. As leaders we have a duty therefore to all the world’s people, especially the most vulnerable and, in particular,


the children of the world, to whom the future belongs. (UN Millennium Declaration, 2000) This type of shared understanding, such as the idea of a collective responsibility and the duty to all the world’s people, shows that the norms of the international society are gradually changing, which is explained by the fact that interdependence generates an enormous pressure to transcend an ethos focused exclusively on the concept of autonomy: the achievement of well-being is no longer seen as a matter in which only particular states have relevance. To put it bluntly, a strictly Westphalian normative framework is not able to deal adequately with the new structural circumstances of the world. The difference of scope between the principles stated in the Charter of the United Nations (1945), and those established in the UN Millennium Declaration 55 years after is then comprehensible. Whereas in the former, the historical concern to prevent wrongful interventions to the autonomy of states, after the devastation of World War II, brought about a set of principles anchored in the idea of sovereignty; the latter, faced with the historical circumstances of interdependence, has generated supplementary principles that go beyond the understanding of the world as a cosmos of discrete autonomous units capable of dealing with their interests on their own. Hence, the transnational solidarity that stems from organic interdependence is furthering a fresh (yet embryonic) normative framework that transcends the idea of nationality and stresses conceptions such as common humanity. Accordingly, a broader set of ethical categories has developed to understand contemporary international relations. And, not surprisingly, concepts that go beyond the Westphalian formal equality of sovereign states are made explicit. Though still timid, this is the case of the principle of fairness which is called upon in Article 5 of the UN Millennium Declaration where the signatories affirm: We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people. For while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. We recognize that developing countries and countries with economies in transition face special difficulties in responding to this central challenge. Thus, only through broad and


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sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can globalization be made fully inclusive and equitable. These efforts must include policies and measures, at the global level, which correspond to the needs of developing countries and economies in transition and are formulated and implemented with their effective participation. (Article 5, UN Millennium Declaration, 2000) As a result, solidarity is considered to be one of the “fundamental values” that the Declaration considers being “essential to international relations of the twenty-first century.”98 Along these lines, solidarity is understood in the following terms: “Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. Those who suffer or who benefit least deserve help from those who benefit most” (Article 6, UN Millennium Declaration, 2000). It might be argued that the content of the Millennium Declaration, signed by all 189 member states of the UN General Assembly,99 is sheer rhetoric with no consequence whatsoever to the allocation of concrete responsibilities. Yet I believe that this cynical interpretation is wrong insofar as it would imply the presumption that these shared ethical understandings could not possibly shape states’ practices nor provide categories to assess them normatively. Moreover, even if the Millennium Declaration is taken as political leaders’ empty words, its content would in fact reflect a structure of values and norms deemed to be valid in public discourses worldwide (i.e. the Millennium Declaration would reflect the existence of settled norms of a domain of discourse). Indeed, to an important extent, the content of the Millennium Declaration is actually the expression of an emerging normative framework that pinpoints new issues and responsibilities of justice in a transformed world. Moreover, this agreement is the expression of an ethical discourse that is gaining legitimacy at the global level, and which paves the way to allocating specific duties of transnational social justice. The Millennium Declaration thus provides a rough framework to apprehend the contemporary ethical structure of the international society: for nowadays, no one could reasonably argue that the fundamental values expressed in that document are wrong or need further justification. From the philosophical side, I believe, contemporary Aristotelians, Utilitarians, Kantians,


Hegelians, and advocates of post-metaphysical approaches would accept, at least prima facie, that freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for Nature and shared responsibility should become central principles of interaction between communities. Similarly, most political ideologies and world religions would agree about the validity of the aforementioned values. In any case, it is true that there could be disagreements about their meaning and rightful implementation in specific social arrangements, yet the validity of values such as freedom, equality, solidarity, and so on, cannot be questioned reasonably. For present purposes, however, what is important to stress is that as regards the satisfaction of universal basic needs, there is, by and large, moral consensus about the wrongfulness of poverty and the validity of the states’ interest in development. Similarly, there is a broad agreement about the need to address these issues collectively through the establishment of relations of transnational solidarity between different political communities. It might be said that at this point in human history, two different types of solidarity coexist: one is particular (i.e. patriotic) and the other is universal (i.e. human), as they are expression of the nature of the world’s structure in which interdependence has expanded the scope of solidarity. Accordingly, there are two spheres in which duties of social justice are applicable: the domestic state and the international society of states. However, the latter has not found a proper institutional expression since international law and global governance institutions have not been brought up to date. Consequently, the nature of duties that stem from organic interdependence has not been recognized adequately as they have normally taken the form of duties of charity by the so-called donor countries. The concept of Official Development Aid (ODA) reflects neatly this confusion. However, the type of duties that emerge from organic solidarity in the current international society should no longer be thought of as “aid” because this concept implies that “help” is optional and not due as a matter of justice. Obligations of justice beyond borders, consequently, need to be conceived as strict duties of transnational social justice, which have a different nature than the conventional concept of “aid.” Obligations of transnational social justice are positive duties from the normative point of view even if presently there is no global political institution to enforce them. It follows that the concept of “aid” should be substituted by a new category capable of accounting


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for the compulsory nature of transnational positive duties of justice: I advance the conception of the duty of assistance. Yet, what kind of assistance is owed between countries under the new circumstances of organic interdependence? Far from advancing overarching principles of justice to be applied globally or cosmopolitan comparative principles of distributive justice, this account advances a transnational obligation of social justice aimed at improving the well-being of all societies worldwide. It is a duty established between political communities (i.e. states) to ensure that they are able to set up the social conditions through which human beings can successfully satisfy universal basic human needs.

The duty of assistance In his The Law of Peoples (1999), John Rawls similarly contemplates a duty of assistance as a principle of international justice; however, the characteristics and nature of his notion and the one advanced here differ importantly. I shall briefly flesh out Rawls’s conception to highlight the differences between his duty to assist living under unfavorable conditions and my conception of the duty of assistance. On the one hand, as noted in a previous chapter, Rawls’s conception of peoples leads him to exclude non-well-ordered societies from the international normative framework. Non-well-ordered societies have no claimable rights to the Society of Peoples because they are not contracting partners in the hypothetical two-staged original position between liberal and decent peoples. This means that non-well-ordered societies cannot rightfully demand assistance from decent and liberal societies in terms of justice, which is an apparent ambiguity in the Rawlsian conception of international justice. For the alleged beneficiaries of the duty of assistance and the peoples responsible for the assistance are not morally equal. Thus, although, according to the principles of justice, well-ordered peoples would be theoretically obliged to assist non-well-ordered societies, the latter are not formally entitled with any rights for they lack moral nature. On the other hand, Rawls establishes a cut-off point where the assistance that is political in nature has no relationship with the actual necessities of a country in terms of achieving adequate levels of well-being. Dismissing any ideas of global distributive principles, Rawls holds that the duty of assistance is aimed fundamentally at

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creating either liberal or decent regimes in those societies “burdened by unfavorable conditions.” As put by Rawls in his “guidelines” for carrying out the duty of assistance: [I]ts aim is to help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples. This defines the “target” of assistance. After it is achieved, further assistance is not required, even though the now well-ordered society may still be relatively poor. (Rawls, 1999a, p.111) Moreover, according to Rawls, the duty of assistance may lack the “motivational support” to be fulfilled inasmuch as there is a lack of “affinity” between peoples, which he understands as a sense of social cohesion and closeness. Yet Rawls fails to recognize that there are different grounds other than affinity to support transnational obligations such as the duty of assistance. One of them, indeed, is systemic and develops alongside the characteristic international interdependence of our current world (a phenomenon clearly unnoticed by Rawls’s analysis), which increasingly is defining a global community of destiny: solidarity. Rawls’s account cannot identify this type of backdrop of the duty of assistance inasmuch as it assumes that the only possible shared understandings and cooperative practices between peoples are those derived from liberalism and decency. Contrary to this belief, I advance the idea that the so-called motivational support for a duty of assistance may well derive from the realization that there are shared interests between states regardless of particular conceptions of right and justice. Moreover, although having similar conceptions of justice, indeed, could strengthen cooperative practices between political communities (not only between democracies but also between authoritarian regimes), being subject to identical threats and sharing equal constitutive interests (for example, territorial integrity or social development) also can further the acceptance of normative principles of interaction amongst states. Rawls recognizes that the relations of affinity are not fixed; however, he attributes most of what he calls “mutual caring” amongst peoples to the acceptance of well-ordered peoples’ principles and ideals. Yet I believe that the development of relations of solidarity


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amongst all states depends more on the recognition that they are mutually dependent to achieve their purposes, which is clearly seen in environmental, health, and security issues. Hence, as a matter of fact, the range of countries of the world that are capable of endorsing principles of international justice is certainly wider than the one conceived by Rawls. A concrete manifestation that states, regardless of conceptions of right and justice, are able to subscribe to equal basic principles and values is provided by the fact that, to an important extent, all member-countries of the United Nations recognize the validity of international law and its institutions. It is true that there are certain issues that make agreement between nations difficult inasmuch as they threaten contingent particular interests; nonetheless, there is a broad consensus in many issues regarding the normative settlement of issues brought about by interdependence. Moreover, at present, it has been possible to work out a shared normative framework and practices for issues such as trade and environmental protection. Skeptics might argue that quite often states’ actions contradict the alleged endorsement of the international normative framework (i.e. settled norms), say by dumping in trade or by persisting in practices that harm the global environment. Yet it is important to notice that even when particular governments break agreements or decide not to endorse them, they seem to acknowledge the moral validity of core normative principles. In any case, the justification of their breaches appeals to the right application of the principles, which shows an implicit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the normative framework. In the particular case of the eradication of poverty, there is nowadays an extensive recognition that the lack of basic human goods is a wrong in itself for which there is a shared remedial responsibility.100 To an important extent, it is worth noticing that this idea is new in the history of humankind inasmuch as, prior to the economic development of current affluent countries and the rise of interdependence, world poverty had not been a systemic concern in spite of its seriousness. Both greater levels of well-being in some parts of the world and the progression of the idea of a human community of destiny have disclosed new circumstances of international justice, which calls for the introduction of principles of social justice beyond political or cultural borders. The fact that developed societies have sufficient resources to distribute (without major costs to their levels

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of well-being) to the worse-off people of the world, together with their growing solidarity, have made possible thinking about transnational social justice. The duty of assistance introduced here stems from the transnational norms of the post-Westphalian society aimed at improving the levels of well-being world-wide. Consequently, the duty of assistance can be characterized as a transnational obligation of justice concerned primarily with well-being, general in nature, and accounted for by the solidarity that coheres an important number of norms and practices between states. The purpose of the duty of assistance is to help states create the social conditions to guarantee the common good of their peoples; in particular, to satisfy the basic needs of their populations. At first, it is aimed at eradicating extreme poverty wherever it exists as this condition constitutes a fundamental wrong according to the contemporary normative framework of the international society. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that eradicating extreme global poverty does not constitute the target itself of the transnational duty of assistance but rather, improving the levels of well-being of societies. Bearing this in mind, as people are lifted up out of extreme poverty, increasing the levels of welfare of all societies will follow to naturally adjust asymmetries of well-being between states. This is an intrinsic consequence of transnational solidarity. For the nature of what welfare is changes as societies develop and the solidarity established between political communities does not disappear as long as there is interdependence. Put differently, insofar as the world will continue to be integrated through different processes – which correspondingly create an increased awareness of a transnational community of destiny – transnational solidarity will continue to support the development of comparatively poorer countries. It is therefore clear that, even though the duty of assistance does not start from the conception of equality but from solidarity, the fulfillment of this obligation of justice progressively brings about egalitarian outcomes. The conception of the duty of assistance advanced here and the one proposed by Rawls in his Law of Peoples are different inasmuch as my version does not envisage a cut-off point of transfers. As a consequence, in an international interdependent system where disparities between countries regarding life expectancy, access to health services, literacy rates, mortality rates for preventable diseases, and so on,


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continue to exist, there is room for a concrete manifestation of solidarity through the transnational duty of assistance. There is no reason to think that the duty of assistance has a definite target (for example, ending extreme poverty or the accomplishment of the Millennium Development Goals) because the conception of well-being evolves over time. On the other hand, it is crucial to point out that the duty of assistance derived from transnational solidarity should not be confused with the so-called duty of humanitarian assistance. Cosmopolitan thinkers, who conceive global justice along the lines of justice as fairness, tend to draw a clear-cut distinction between duties of distributive (social) justice and duties of assistance. They dispute fundamentally that duties of assistance are for the most part supererogatory and concerned with subsistence aid (in cases such as famine and natural catastrophes). Moreover, some cosmopolitans believe that these types of duties are barely demanding as they have a definite target such as Rawls’s The Law of Peoples principle, whereas duties of distributive justice aim at regulating inequalities between individuals. For example, in his criticism about the conception of duties of assistance, as opposed to the notion of egalitarian duties of distributive justice, strong cosmopolitan Kok-Chor Tan has expressed the differences between both conceptions as follows: Duties of global justice would be [...] more encompassing and would operate at a more fundamental level than what we may call duties of humanitarian assistance. Instead of only demanding that richer states (through direct income transfers, technology transfers, relief funds, and so on) provide needy states with development aid and assistance, duties of justice call for standards by which to evaluate, and to correct if necessary, the “distributive aspects” of our global institutions. (Tan, 2004, p.21) The confusion of strong cosmopolitanism, I believe, originates in the idea that social justice can only be conceived formally in terms of regulative distributive principles to be applied in a comprehensive basic structure. However, as I have tried to show earlier, this conception of social justice is inappropriate for the world’s structure. For the international institutional system is still fragmented and it is not politically integrated so as to be capable of applying cosmopolitan

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principles of distributive justice à la Rawls. The conception of the duty of assistance defended here is to be able to deal adequately with the current structural circumstances of the international system characterized by the coexistence of two systems: one increasingly interdependent, and the other still based on the idea of autonomous sovereign states. It should, therefore, be clear that my conception of the duty of assistance, as an obligation of justice, is applicable to schemes where institutions are not fully integrated from the political point of view (i.e. it is appropriate to systems that do not formally constitute a polity). I assume that in spite of the lack of legitimate coercive mechanisms and the lack of full integration of economic markets and political jurisdictions, the current international system in fact raises issues of social justice, which need to be considered transnationally. The duty of assistance should not, then, be confused theoretically with “humanitarian assistance.” Whilst the duty of assistance is an obligation of justice accounted for by the acknowledgement of positive duties between countries in the post-Westphalian society, “humanitarian assistance” represents a moral obligation of a system ruled essentially by negative duties of international justice (that is the reason why humanitarian assistance is supererogatory). Although, indeed, principles of cosmopolitan distributive justice are more demanding than the duty of assistance proposed here, they are more vulnerable to criticism for lacking a robust theoretical base. Thus, their being stringent does not mean that they represent a better alternative to deal with global poverty or the social injustice in the world. By the same token, principles of cosmopolitan justice are supposed to be applicable to a set of global institutions that in fact do not exist as a coherent structure and cannot realistically be constructed soon. Cosmopolitan thinkers who assume that the international structure is the main cause of world poverty need, therefore, a better theoretical framework to justify comparative egalitarian principles of justice. For not only do they fall short of explaining that the international economic arrangements authentically represent a basic structure (i.e. a global single set of social institutions) but they also fail in proving conclusively that rich countries’ inhabitants are morally responsible for poor peoples’ hardships.101 Moreover, I do not believe that placing the responsibility on the citizens of affluent countries for benefiting from the characteristics of the international


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structure rather than in the states themselves is a reliable strategy to allocate duties that could effectively deal with global poverty.102 Although the duty of assistance is abstractly conceived as a general duty of justice, it falls primarily upon those countries with the actual capacity to make transfers of certain resources, which does not mean that duties are exclusively relevant to rich countries. There are two main types of resources that can be transferred in order to promote the well-being of those countries that need them: technical assistance and wealth (cash transfers). Technical assistance is broadly understood here as the transfer of pertinent knowledge, technology or information that could help a country to cope with a whole range of particular problems related to the adequate provision of basic human goods, or the process of development itself. For example, a country could need certain “know-how” regarding the best way to improve the infrastructure that may support its social development process. Hence, it could rightfully request the expertise of other countries whose own experience might have encouraged the development of efficient schemes applicable to the case. The duty of assistance in its technical version is an important tool of transnational social justice inasmuch as it aims at developing poor countries’ institutional capacities to successfully provide basic goods to their populations. The idea is that individual states themselves, through the principle of subsidiarity (i.e. an organizing principle of government which asserts that functions ought to be allocated to the lowest competent authority), become capable of setting up the conditions in which the common good can flourish in their societies. Put somewhat differently, technical assistance seeks to “empower” developing and less-developed countries to solve, through the improvement of their own capacities, the technical challenges that emerge from a process of social development. Hence, technical assistance is an important element to cultivate a sense of self-respect in the developing communities. A world in which affluent states decided to directly provide basic goods to poor countries’ citizens, or unilaterally create the social conditions for local development, would not be just. On the contrary, that sort of patronizing arrangement would be the expression of injustice itself (no matter how much suffering it could possibly prevent), for it neglects that the sense of self-respect is a constitutive part of a community.

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Moreover, the duty of assistance in its form of technical assistance can help to build up a sense of self-respect in developing countries by contemplating their participation, according to their capacities, in the fulfillment of the obligation. That is, there are some developing countries that could share their successful experiences in overcoming particular problems related to the provision of basic goods or the creation of the social conditions for development. Being a developing country does not mean absolute incapability. As a matter of fact, it could be the case that developing countries themselves could offer one another the most appropriate technical assistance they need inasmuch as they may face similar circumstances. In any event, the lack of a proper global infrastructure to share relevant knowledge is the reason why this type of cooperation has thus far been limited. This point takes us to the other dimension of the duty of assistance, without which technical assistance is not feasible: wealth transfers. Wealth or cash transfers refer to the assignment of cash flows aimed at funding social policies of poor countries (for example, the construction of schools and hospitals, poverty-reduction programs, rural infrastructure, microloans, and so on). Currently, there are rich countries’ transfers, such as the Official Development Assistance103 (ODA), that provide monetary help to poor countries in the form of concessional grants and loans. Although these transfers may constitute an expression of solidarity, there are fundamentally two problems with the current conception of ODA that affect their moral legitimacy. First, these transfers are for the most part granted on a bilateral basis,104 which has the effect of putting poor countries in a situation of potential vulnerability insofar as the donor countries can exert pressure on the recipient ones to make them comply with certain conditions, which are not necessarily aimed at monitoring the efficient use of the resources. For example, a poor country may potentially be forced to adhere to the donor country’s foreign policy so as to prevent the end of aid flows. Similarly, resources may be tied to purchases of goods and services from the donor country,105 which often makes the deals onerous for the poor country and gives rise to inefficiency in the use of funds. Secondly, instruments such as the ODA are not entirely composed of cash flows (some packages can contain an important proportion of technical aid or they may include debt relief programs). Although some progress has been made as regards the definition of this type of assistance (for example, military


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aid is no longer considered part of ODA), we are still far away from a definition that could measure transfers by their net purchasing impact. According to my proposal, it is necessary to come up with an alternative definition of assistance that includes, on the one hand, technical assistance and, on the other hand, only cash flows. This clear distinction would make more transparent the actual amount of economic resources that affluent countries are effectively transferring. Similarly, wealth transfers need to be pooled together in order to distribute the resources according to criteria associated with human needs and thus prevent a perverse use of transfers in the form of political extortion. The idea consists precisely in distributing the resources according to the criterion of need, and any transnational institution in charge of administering the resources should incorporate appropriate decision-making procedures to be accountable to all states. In a non-ideal world, certainly, the transnational transfer of resources poses several challenges. I would like to address three of them, which I consider to be the most relevant: (a) the existence of corruption in some developing countries, (b) the lack of enforcement at the international level to secure the accomplishment of these type of obligations of justice, and (c) the establishment of the fair amount of resources (particularly cash) to be requested from affluent countries to fulfill their duty of assistance. Regarding the existence of corruption in developing and less-developed countries, although rich countries’ governments andcitizens have a point in highlighting the issue, this argument cannot consistently be employed to justify the lack of commitment to transfer resources. It is true that there is a serious problem of corruption in some of the poorest countries of the world.106 However, one should not fail to notice that poverty, together with the problem of weak state institutions, explains corruption. Similarly, many corrupt practices would not be feasible without the negligence of some rich countries’ governments and a deficient international legal framework. Hence, the solution to the problem is not giving up assistance to poor countries because the resources might be diverted but trying to establish efficient international mechanisms to prevent the misuse of funds and monitor their proper spending. That is precisely the issue at stake: constructing institutional devices to minimize the probability of corruption and an effective monitoring of the use of

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resources. Ruling out transnational transfers straightforwardly because there are corrupt government officials in poor countries is a simplistic strategy to sidestep responsibilities. Moreover, one cannot dismiss the relative progress in fighting corruption globally and regionally through legal mechanisms and cooperative schemes – for example, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), the Anti-corruption Initiative for Asia-Pacific 2000, the Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies, and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 2003 – which increasingly are making it more difficult for corrupt elites to reproduce local “kleptocracies.” Thus, there is general awareness of the problem, and initiatives are being taken, so corruption can realistically be tackled in order to prevent resources ending up in the wrong hands. Nevertheless, one should always bear in mind that corruption in many countries is an expression of poverty itself, so the best solution to end corruption is by fighting poverty. As for the international system’s lack of institutional capabilities to enforce duties of social justice, one should acknowledge that a duty of assistance such as the one proposed here would have to operate under a different framework than state-like arrangements. Whilst in modern states duties of justice work under the premise of state coercion – that is, if a citizen does not redistribute part of his wealth (through taxes) he could legitimately be forced to do so by a range of coactive means – any duty of global justice would lack this type of institutional support as there is no sovereign set of institutions at the global level. Yet there could be various mechanisms to make non-compliance costly for states, which is quite workable given the current integration of the world. For example, one mechanism might be linking non-compliance with restrictive trade access of goods and services from the defiant country(ies) to the different national markets. Imports from a non-compliant state would be subject to high tariffs in other countries fully participant in the, let us say, transnational welfare system. This type of mechanism, certainly, would challenge some rules of free trade as they are currently conceived in the World Trade Organization (WTO) for it would introduce a “discriminatory principle.” However, apart from the fact that the WTO already accepts certain exceptions to the non-discriminatory trade regime based on the idea of fairness (for example, in the case of dumping), these sanctions would not require a global agreement to


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transform international trade according to a new paradigm. The discriminatory trade sanction, triggered by non-compliance with the duty of assistance, would work as a dissuasive resource. The formal idea behind this proposal is that any state’s refusal to comply with the global normative framework that imposes positive duties – specifically, the duty of assistance – brings about a negation of certain rights in the international system, in particular in its cooperative economic interactions, such as trade.107 I believe that the costs of missing out on global trade for any country are far heavier than the cost of transfers themselves, so the discriminatory sanction could potentially work as a deterrent. As a matter of fact, certain economic actors in the non-compliant country would try to make sure that the government carries on with its duties of transnational justice in order to prevent sanctions that could harm their commercial interests. Likewise, incentives for compliance would be strong because the level of demandingness of the transnational duties of social justice will not be as overwhelming as egalitarian principles of justice; hence the activation of sanctions would not be usual. The former takes us to the last challenge that I want to address: the definition of the amount of resources that countries should be obliged to transfer in order to comply with the duty of assistance. In spite of the apparent difficulty of defining the fair amount of transfers required to assist the social development of worse-off countries, I believe that it would be possible to start from a relatively consensual figure amongst states; specifically, from the compromise agreed upon by states regarding Official Development Assistance in 1974, after the UN General Assembly’s resolution Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order108 that sets a share of 0.70 percent of the Gross National Income (GNI). Indeed, this figure is, under current circumstances, moderate for it does not reflect the current level of interdependence.109 In fact this idea to transfer income from developed to developing countries, originally advanced by the World Council of Churches in 1958 when the relative interdependence of the world was lower, had suggested one percent of donor countries’ income. It seems clear that that the proportion of income transferred should be increased as the 0.70 percent of GNI seems meager if one looks at the level of interdependence. Nonetheless, I suggest starting from that suboptimal amount for strictly practical reasons. On the one hand, insofar as this figure (0.70 percent of GNI) derives from

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agreements formulated in the context of legitimate multinational institutions (specifically UN General Assemblies), its validity is less contestable by potential opponents of the duty of assistance. This is important because first and foremost the aim is to bring about a qualitative change – that is, turning a voluntary transfer, aid, into a positive duty of transnational social justice. So, the level of demandingness should be set (at least in the beginning) according to already consensual practices. The idea is to establish first the discursive and institutional foundations of the duty of assistance and, afterwards, adjust the fair amount to be distributed transnationally. It would not make sense to begin from a rather ambitious target and then realize that its demandingness in fact brings about negative consequences in terms of compliance. Taking the 0.7 percent of national income as an initial baseline to accomplish with the duty of assistance may seem disappointingly conservative; however, I believe it is important to take into consideration the non-ideal circumstances in which the duty of assistance would have to be introduced in the world. As transfers become more institutionalized and transnational solidarity is reinforced, the amount may well be revised to reflect an appropriate level. On the other hand, even though 0.70 percent of the GNI is, indeed, a moderate figure, a redefinition of the type of transfers that fulfill the duty of assistance could effectively have an important impact on the welfare of the beneficiaries. The idea would be to transform the definition of the transfers so that the 0.70 percent of the GNI includes, predominantly, cash flows. It follows that the duty of assistance in its technical variety can be generally carried out by both developed and developing countries, whereas income transfers are mainly the responsibility of relatively well-off countries. For practical purposes, the latter countries are those with the highest incomes per capita in the world. It might be convenient to identify them as the ones that take part in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD.110 The duty of assistance, as a transnational obligation of justice, would require the transformation of multinational institutions, but it is fair to recognize that there are already some mechanisms and organizations in place that could ease the costs and difficulties to successfully carry out this obligation of justice. For example, institutions, agencies, funds and programs that take part in the United Nations Development Group already perform activities related to the


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coordination of technical assistance for development. Though these institutions are certainly underfunded to face effectively the challenges posed by global poverty, they might serve as a basic framework to support the establishment of the duty of assistance. Likewise, a transformed World Bank, currently owned by 185 countries, could also administer the cash transfers derived from the duty of assistance to finance development, which would, indeed, require changing its structure of governance to make it fully democratic. It has not been my purpose here to develop a proposal about the institutions required to carry out transnational obligations of social justice; however, it is necessary to point out that an effective and fair fulfillment of the duty of assistance, as both technical assistance and income transfers, will not have to start from scratch but can take advantage of current international institutions such as the UN agencies. Moreover, I believe that the duty of assistance could call for the creation of a multinational council sponsored by the United Nations – or a new mandate of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) – in order to oversee states’ accomplishment of transnational transfers. This proposal, I believe, is workable as there are already multinational mechanisms that monitor the completion of other obligations of states (for example, the UN Security Council). It is true that their record should not raise high expectations about the possibility of having an institution that could escape easily from the influence of the world’s superpowers. Without a doubt, the transformation of the world order will have to pass through the transformation of the United Nations to ensure that this institution does not simply mirror the power structure of the world. However, it is also true that, even under the current circumstances, the issues that would be at stake in a possible “UN Social Development Council” are less contentious than the ones that, for example, both the UN Security Council and the UN Human Rights Council normally deal with. There is, after all, hope to make this world more just.

Conclusion

The realization of justice is a permanent endeavor of human societies that, encouraged by reason, aims at arranging social life according to values such as equality, liberty, and peace. Though it is true that our conceptions of justice have changed over time, hence one can hardly come with conclusive theories about its nature, still it is possible to advance reasonable approaches that may define criteria to assess the justice of specific types of human interaction. This is particularly important in a world whose ever-increasing interconnection has made explicit the unity of humanity beyond national attachments. We might not live in a fully integrated globe, but there is certainly a growing interdependence between states that raises ethical issues that need to be dealt with through the allocation of responsibilities. Not only has the range of global challenges and aspirations been extended, but there is also an increasing awareness that countries live a common life, which brings to the fore the need to reflect about potential issues of justice. This book set clear limits about the extent of its inquiry: the approach developed here did not try to give a conclusive answer as to what global justice is, neither did it seek to solve once and for all what is the scope of distributive justice arrangements. Rather, this work offered a distinctive account of international ethics to think about social justice in the world beyond the Rawlsian paradigm. Similarly, it tried to demonstrate that mainstream cosmopolitan theories, inspired in both Kantian and consequentialist ethics, have failed in presenting sound arguments to justify obligations of a transnational nature. Briefly put, I found that Rawlsian cosmopolitanism 152

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misconceives the international system by arguing falsely that there is a global basic structure, which leads this egalitarian approach to advance comparative principles of distributive justice that are inapplicable under the current institutional background; O’Neill’s principle of justice (i.e. the rejection of injury) cannot account for positive duties of the kind transnational distributive practices require; and Singer’s argument is a fallacy. The critical analysis of cosmopolitanism about justice helped us, then, to recognize that normative reflection about issues such as global hunger and poverty might need other types of theoretical tools to address these problems than the ones hitherto employed by mainstream cosmopolitanism. My response to the challenge of finding a proper foundation to distributive arrangements beyond borders was to shift the moral focus to the international system. Then, I offered an account of this system that reconstructed the normative framework immanent in international interaction. Drawing upon Hedley Bull’s concept of the international society (or society of states), I examined what type of duties are validated by shared values and moral understandings. In particular, this account proposed an ideal-type (Idealtypus) of the international society characterized by the notion of organic interdependence – that is, the post-Westphalian society of states. It was argued that contemporary organic interdependence in the current international society is expressed in three main areas: political, economic and ecological. Briefly put, political interdependence means that states cannot accomplish their purposes (for example, the provision of security and justice) without the active involvement of other states. Economic interdependence means that autarchy, or economic self-sufficiency, is a chimera given the characteristics of modern technology and prevailing modes of production, which are fostering global processes of integration. And ecological interdependence means that national societies depend on one another to successfully address threats to the sustainability of particular and global ecosystems. These phenomena have revealed the emergence of a transnational shared social life, a human community of destiny, which brings about a whole new set of normative issues. The post-Westphalian society of states, I argued, has given rise to norms and shared moral understandings that go beyond the overarching principle of autonomy and derivative negative duties of the preceding type of international society (i.e. the Westphalian society of

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states). For the type of interdependence in which states are engaged in cannot be adequately apprehended, from the normative point of view, through the principle of non-intervention that ruled the system until very recently. Moreover, interdependence in the post-Westphalian society has paved the way for the emergence of norms based on solidarity and mutual responsibility between states. Amongst the new settled norms of the contemporary system, there are now various positive duties of international justice that have gained indisputable legitimacy (for example, the duty to intervene when severe human rights violations occur in a sovereign state). Moreover, these duties are supported by the characteristic transnational solidarity that has emerged from the growing dynamic density of the system, which is changing the nature of settled norms of the society of states. No longer is the international ethical sphere a domain of strictly negative duties. Likewise, I proposed that there are circumstances of justice in the international system that determine the existence of duties of social justice, which are a subtype of the positive duties. Drawing upon a harsh critic of global distributive justice, David Miller, I tried to prove that, contrary to what he believes, it is not only domestic societies that are subject to social justice arrangements. There are conditions in the current international society that allow us to speculate about social justice issues beyond borders. The types of duties or principles of distributive justice that arise under these circumstances might not be as demanding as those of national societies, but there is certainly room for social justice obligations in the international sphere. In this sense, the international structure might not support comparative principles of justice such as egalitarian ones, which would require cohesive background institutions that could comprehensively allocate goods and burdens of the social scheme amongst individuals, yet it does have the capacity to uphold effectively other types of distributive arrangements. I argue, then, that social justice obligations can be grounded in solidarity rather than equality, which requires less complex distributive mechanisms. Similarly, I tried to justify that states are the primary agents of justice. For states have a moral nature as purposive entities with reasonable moral interests and are mutually vulnerable to the effects of interdependence. Thus, contrary to several approaches of political philosophy that play down the role of states, I tried to explain why these purposive political

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units are still crucial actors in thinking about justice. One of the most important reasons that support the idea that states have a moral nature is their morally reasonable interest in well-being. Thus, I put forward a thin conception of “well-being” (a set of social conditions that allows persons to fulfill basic human needs) in order to establish a threshold of decency of, say, real states. On the other hand, I developed a normative framework that tried to supplement Mervyn Frost’s theory of international ethics in order to account for a conception of transnational social justice. First, I argued that there is a contemporary domain of discourse of the international system that contemplates transnational norms, based on solidarity, which reconstitute the ethical standing of states as purposive entities in an interdependent world. Insofar as states are no longer self-sufficient to achieve their aims, they have come to recognize the validity of a type of norms that are grounded on the idea of shared responsibility. Moreover, there is a growing international recognition of problems such as world poverty and hunger, which require normative settlement according to the shared moral understandings of the contemporary domain of discourse. The moral response, however, has thus far been based on a normative framework that still considers “distributive” transfers between countries as humanitarian duties. My approach claimed that these transfers should not be considered as an expression of a non-compulsory duty of charity; rather, transnational transfers of resources are duties of social justice of the contemporary society of states. Accordingly, I argued for a duty of assistance that aims at supporting the states’ purpose to guarantee well-being to their populations. The duty of assistance proposed in this work seeks to increase the levels of well-being of all human beings irrespective of cultural or political memberships. Contrary to comparative principles of distributive justice, such as the ones derived from the Rawlsian paradigm, the duty of assistance is not anchored in equality. The reason is not so much a lack of commitment to this important value of human communities, but the fact that the structure of the international system is not yet fitted to accommodate comparative principles of distributive justice. The establishment of background institutions for distributive justice necessitates a particular type of coherence that the international system has not yet reached. This may seem to contradict the idea

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that the world is organically interdependent in many respects. However, it is important to stress that the particular set of global institutions for egalitarian distributive principles of justice is so complex that it requires an extremely high level of political and economic integration to work efficiently. We are not still there, though I believe that we shall reach such levels of integration at some point in human history. The duty of assistance, then, is grounded on a shared value and an actual constituent of the current post-Westphalian society of states: solidarity. Solidarity is therefore the building-block of the duty of assistance, which is expressed in two forms: technical assistance and income transfers. On the one hand, technical assistance was defined as the transfer of knowledge, technology or information that could help a particular country to solve problems related to the adequate provision of basic human goods. On the other hand, income transfers is understood as cash flows aimed at funding social policies of developing countries such as those concerned with the eradication of extreme poverty. Though there are several challenges that need to be addressed to make these mechanisms work effectively, I argued that it is feasible to strengthen international institutions in order to gradually achieve more just outcomes in the current post-Westphalian society of states. Finally, I would like to mention a potential concern that may have arisen throughout the assessment of this work’s argument: the moderate character of the normative proposal. Most approaches of transnational, cosmopolitan or global justice are far more demanding than the one presented here. Moreover, to some extent my approach might be considered disappointingly conservative by some thinkers who would like to see more radical changes in the way hunger, poverty and inequality are eradicated from the world. Far from elaborating an argument aimed at defending the status quo, the purpose of this work has been to make sense of the changes that are taking place in the world from the ethical point of view. Thus, my speculation has been grounded on the idea that, after all, the aim of political philosophy is not actually building up everlasting idealized pictures of how the world ought to look like without taking into account the concreteness of social life. Perhaps, as noted by Hegel in his preface to the Philosophy of Right, quite often philosophy fails at giving instruction as to what the world ought to be; it always comes on the scene too late (or too early) to give it: the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only with the falling of the dusk.

Notes Introduction 1. See W.B. Gallie (1962). 2. Broadly speaking, Socrates’ defense of justice consists of giving reasons why a person is better-off when he (she) is just. Accordingly, Socrates considers that justice belongs to the class of goods that not only are good in themselves but they are also good for the consequences arising from them. 3. There is an interesting dispute over the egalitarian nature of Aristotle’s concept of justice. The debate is partly motivated by the linguistic similarities in old Greek between the words justice and equality. See Vlastos (1962). 4. Broadly speaking, Aristotle’s division comprises the distinction between universal justice concerned with the whole morality; that is, justice as a complete virtue. And particular justice concerned with achieving equality in both distributive and regulatory justice. See Aristotle’s Book V (1999).

1 On Cosmopolitanism about Justice 5. I understand paradigm here as a theoretical framework shared within an intellectual community that maintains certain core assumptions, brings in a determinate type of question and employs a distinctive methodology. Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) uses the term “paradigm” mainly to provide an explanation of how scientific advancement occurs; hence, he focuses mainly on the notion of “paradigm-shifts.” Though my definition is certainly influenced by Kuhn’s conceptualization, for present purposes I simply would like to introduce the term “paradigm” to characterize a theoretical way of thinking about issues of social justice. In particular, the term Rawlsian paradigm is meant to characterize an approach to derive distributive principles of justice as presented in A Theory of Justice (1971), which include the use of concepts such as the basic structure, the veil of ignorance, and the original position, as well as a defense of the individualist and egalitarian position. 6. Rawls asserts that a person’s sense of justice is derived from guilt feelings: authority, association guilt, and principle guilt. The first form of guilt (authority) appears when a child violates injunctions originated by those for whom there is a tie of love and trust, and who hold a position of authority (for example, parents); the second is connected with fellow-associates: the guilt feeling arises when a person violates duties or obligations of the associative arrangement. In both cases, it is assumed that guilt feelings are

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158 Notes

7. 8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

13. 14.

15.

16.

explained by the existence of certain natural attitudes such as love, trust, confidence and friendship towards particular persons (for example, parents or fellow-associates). In contrast, the principle guilt is originated in the absence of actual natural attitudes; there is guilt inasmuch as one fails to comply with a just scheme (see Rawls, 1999c [1971], pp.405–434; Rawls, 1999b [1963], pp.100–105). See, for example, MacIntyre (1981) and Sandel (1982). First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others. Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls, 1999c [1971], p.53). For the evolution of the concept in Rawls’s work, see Weatherford (1983). For an account of conceptions of cosmopolitanism in moral and political philosophy, see Scheffler (1999). According to Scheffler: “Cosmopolitanism about justice is opposed to any view that posits principled restrictions on the scope of an adequate conception of justice. In other words, it opposes any view which holds, as a matter of principle, that the norms of justice apply primarily within bounded groups comprising some subset of the global population” (Scheffler, 1999, p.256). Following Joel Feinberg (1974), comparative principles of justice, such as the egalitarian ones, entail comparisons between the various persons. In contrast, non-comparative principles of justice (for example, principles of human rights) do not take into account the situation of other individuals. See also Miller (1998, p.170). It is worthy of note that not all Rawlsian cosmopolitans define moral personality according to the orthodox Rawlsian manner (that is, in terms of the sense of justice and the conception of the good). Caney (2005b), for example, talks about persons’ “common morally relevant properties” (that is, they have some common needs and vulnerabilities, and they have some common goods). However, the premise that lies at the heart of all Rawlsian cosmopolitan definitions of moral personality, which allows them to extend the scope of justice at the global level, is that certain universal properties are held by all human beings equally. This identifies Beitz’s theory with the “negative claim” of cosmopolitanism. I believe that when Rawls argues that “one who lacks a sense of justice lacks certain fundamental attitudes and capacities included under the notion of humanity” (Rawls, 1999b [1963], p.111), he is, to an important extent, making a true claim about human nature, which may well be considered as a metaphysical view. For a criticism about Beitz’s interpretation of the parallel between Rawls’s conception of individual natural endowments and a country’s natural resources, see Pogge (1989, p.251). See Pogge (1989) and Caney (2005a).

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17. Pogge understands radical inequality according to five elements that can be observed in the current phenomenon of global poverty. Very succinctly, inequality is persistent, pervasive, avoidable, and those worse-off live in bad conditions in absolute and relative terms. See Pogge (1999, pp.502–503). 18. By “rational” I mean here that economic agents take decisions according to a cost-benefit calculus. 19. Rawls’s discussion of these supporting institutions is relevant to understanding the operative side of distributive justice. Without a proper understanding of these institutions, one could not possibly envision the way in which the principles of justice effectively work almost mechanically in order to guarantee the just nature of the social scheme in its totality. For an elaboration on the background institutions, see Rawls (1999c [1971], pp.242–251). 20. According to Kant’s conception of human nature, humanity is one of the three fundamental capacities (or original predispositions) which enable us to set ends through reason. For a detailed explanation of Kant’s conception of human nature, see Wood (1999). 21. By definition, coercion is opposed to freedom. Freedom being the foundation of the formal existence of moral law in Kant’s ethics, coercion negates the moral (universal) law and, in so doing, it opens the possibility of negating the “freedom” of those who wrongly coerce others’ freedom: only that type of coercion is, then, permissible. In Kant’s words: “Resistance that counteracts the hindering of an effect promotes this effect and is consistent with it. Now whatever is wrong is a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws. But coercion is a hindrance or resistance to freedom. Therefore, if a certain use of freedom is itself a hindrance to freedom in accordance with universal laws (i.e. wrong), coercion that is opposed to this (as a hindering of a hindrance to freedom) is consistent with freedom in accordance with universal laws, that is, it is right. Hence there is connected with right by the principle of contradiction an authorization to coerce someone who infringes upon it” (Kant, 1996 [1797], p.389). 22. Franceschet points out that “[t]he humanity principle states that the person is an objective end and must be treated only as an end per se and never as mere means: ‘Now morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in himself; for only through this is it possible to be a law-making member of a kingdom of ends. Therefore morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity.’ It is because the human is the only creature that can set ends undetermined by the natural, phenomenal world and its material causes that he or she is capable of morality” (Franceschet, 2002, pp.30–31). 23. See his Animal Liberation (1975). 24. See Rawls (1971). 25. See Singer (1999).

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Notes

26. Following Fishkin, “[a]n obligation is general if it would be unaffected by changing the identity of the agent and the identity of the recipients with those of any other persons (who could satisfy the required prescriptions)” (Fishkin, 1982, p.27). 27. Although Singer changed the phrasing of the first premise in his book Practical Ethics (1993) by eliminating the word “suffering” – he then says: “[a]bsolute poverty is bad” – the premise is still controversial. For some ethical perspectives might consider that poverty is rather a wrong than a bad, which might demand different moral responsibilities to redress it. 28. “[I]f it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it” (Singer, 2001a, p.107). 29. See also McGinn (1999) for a critique of Singer’s argument on required levels of self-sacrifice.

2


30. By universalists here I refer mainly to liberal cosmopolitans (for example, Pogge, Beitz, Caney, Tan, O’Neill) and utilitarian thinkers such as Peter Singer and Peter Unger. 31. Concisely put, Realism is one of the mainstream traditions of international relations theory that assumes: (1) that the international system is anarchic, (2) that states are the main actors of the international system, and (3) that states are self-interested rational agents concerned with the maximization of power. Realists draw upon classical political thinkers, such as Thucydides, Hobbes and Machiavelli, to develop a theoretical approach that seeks to explicate how the international system actually works, as opposed to normative approaches, such as Wilsonian idealism and democratic peace theory, that aim at setting the foundations of principled foreign relations between states. The most prominent realist theorists are E.H. Carr (1939), Hans Morgenthau (1948) and Kenneth Waltz (1959, 1979). For present purposes, I do not distinguish between the classical Realist and the neo-Realist schools inasmuch as they both share an anti-normative perspective. 32. Pluralism is an approach to international relations that, drawing upon liberalism, challenges Realism by assuming that: (1) non-state actors are relevant to understanding international interaction, (2) states are not unified agents acting on their own, but rather an assortment of interest groups define the outcomes of a particular state’s foreign policy, and (3) national security and the maximization of power do not exhaust the issues at stake in international relations; other issues such as the economy and the environment are also relevant to comprehend the nature of international interaction and interdependence. The most influential pluralist account currently is “neoliberal institutionalism,” which shares with the realist tradition the assumptions that states are rational selfish actors and that the international system can be considered anarchical. For a summary of the debate between neorealism and neoinstitutionalism see David Baldwin, ed. (1993).

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33. To name just a few seminal works, see Charles Beitz (1979) from the liberal tenets; Cox (1981, 1983) from the Marxist and Gramscian critical theory; Mervyn Frost (1986) for a Hegel’s Philosophy of Right-inspired account; and Finnis, Boyle and Grisez (1987) from the natural law theory. See also Nardin and Maple (1993) and Chris Brown (1992) for a useful introduction to traditions of international ethics and normative political theory of international relations. 34. For an excellent review of international political theorists’ work, see Brown (1997). 35. Here I refer to the Grotian tradition of international relations that challenges the Hobbesian-inspired perspective that the international system resembles a state of nature. The Grotians, as pointed out by Bull, “contend that states are not engaged in simple struggle, like gladiators in an arena, but are limited in their conflicts with one another by common rules and institutions” (Bull, 1995 [1977], p.25). 36. The so-called “Peace of Westphalia” is a representation of the international system after the “Thirty Years’ War.” It identifies a milestone in the history of international relations inasmuch as it established the new political and religious foundations of the European Christian world. In essence, the Treaties of Westphalia – signed in Münster and Osnabrück – recognize the political independence of the United Provinces (Netherlands) and the Swiss Confederation (Switzerland); and acknowledge the right of the German monarchs to freely determine their religious Christian denomination, a principle known as cuius regio, eius religio (“whose the region is, his religion”). Moreover, it might be said that the main consequence of the Peace of Westphalia was the territorial reconfiguration of the distribution of sovereign power in Europe by virtue of the breakdown of the medieval conception of the unity of Western Christianity. 37. The term “international legal sovereignty” is employed by Krasner to define a conception mainly concerned with the establishment of the status of a political entity in the international system: it identifies the practices associated with mutual recognition between entities that have formal, juridical independence. Hence, international legal sovereignty is the notion of sovereignty mostly employed in the international legal scholarship. 38. “Domestic sovereignty” refers to the way in which public authority is arranged within a polity (i.e. it defines whether the authority is centralized or divided). See Krasner (1999, pp.11–12). 39. “Interdependence sovereignty,” according to Krasner, is connected to issues of control insofar as it defines the actual capacities of a state to regulate flows of goods, people and ideas across a territorially defined space. See Krasner (1999, pp.12–14). 40. Krasner considers that the norm of non-intervention in internal affairs derived from what has been known as the Westphalian model, in fact, does not have to do with the Peace of Westphalia. He argues that it is historically inaccurate to associate them inasmuch as the norm was not “clearly articulated until the end of the eighteenth century” (Krasner,

162

41.

42.

43.

44. 45. 46.

Notes

1999, p.20). I believe, however, that there is an unambiguous connection between the de facto collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, made explicit by the Treaties of Westphalia, and the emergence of this principle. For the Peace of Westphalia actually redefines the locus of legitimate authority by negating the “right” of the politico-religious institutional conglomerate represented by the Reich to interfere in the Reichsstände (imperial states). The clearest indication of this is the recognition of the German monarchs’ freedom to determine which of the three Christian denominations (Catholic, Lutheran or Calvinist) should be practiced within their sovereign territory (cuius regio, eius religio), as well as the recognition of their freedom to form independent alliances. The fact that the norm of nonintervention in internal affairs of states was only formally articulated at the end of the eighteenth century might well be explained by the revolution of political categories that, by the hand of Napoleon, brought about the definite dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire. One could argue that, given the substantial extent of international interaction, violations are certainly sporadic; in fact, it seemed that adherence to the principle of non-intervention is more widespread than Krasner believes. Moreover, the general level of compliance, as pointed out by Chayes and Chayes (1993) in their study focused on international agreements, cannot be empirically verified; yet there are strong reasons to assume that there is a propensity to comply. For now, I shall not elaborate on the definition of international legitimacy; suffice it to say that it is a referent whose meaning is constantly challenged, but which has the powerful effect of generating obedience among the actors of the international system. Franck understands international legitimacy procedurally; he postulates that “[l]egitimacy is a property of a rule or a rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with generally accepted principles of right process” (Franck, 1990, p.24). Hedley Bull raises three criticisms of the idea of international anarchy: first, the international system does not resemble a state of nature because such a condition entails no development of economic activities (trade, agriculture, industry, etc.), no legal or moral rules, and a state of war (or disposition to it); second, fear of a supreme government is not the only source of order; and third, the analogy between the international system and the domestic case is limited as states are unlike human individuals. See Bull (1995 [1977], pp.44–49). For a useful introduction of this concept (Idealtypus) developed by Max Weber, see Swedberg (2005, p.119). For an excellent review of the different approaches to the study of international norms, see Raymond (1997). For instance, any occupying power is responsible for providing food and medical supplies to the population of the occupied territory. These duties are not only binding due to the existence of consented treaties, such as

Notes 163

the Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations, but also because there are shared moral understandings of what belligerent states are obliged to do; hence, customary law rules are also an important source of international humanitarian law. 47. According to Symonides and Volodin in their preface to UNESCO’s A Guide to Human Rights (2001), at the turn of the century there were more than 600 institutions throughout the world specializing in human rights education and research. 48. Although it is certainly difficult to find an accurate indicator of the level of international support for human rights, I believe that the expansion and influence of human rights non-governmental organizations seems to show, to an important extent, the relevance of the issue in the global public sphere. At the end of the twentieth century, Smith et al. (1998) identified at least 300 transnational NGOs working specifically on human rights issues globally. 49. The United Nations system of governance for the protection of human rights consists of institutions created under the UN Charter and institutions created to monitor the implementation of international human rights treaties. Charter bodies include institutions such as the Human Rights Council and Special Procedures. On the other hand, there are other global institutions that monitor the implementation of human rights treaties: Human Rights Committee (HRC), Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Woman (CEDAW), Committee Against Torture (CAT), Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), and Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW). These institutions together with other agencies that are not serviced by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (for example, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, the Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women, and so on) work to implement a composite corpus of human rights international law that includes mainly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, amongst other international treaties. Similarly, there are additional instruments that, despite not having a legally-binding status, exert pressure on governments to abide by shared understandings regarding human rights issues. They include several declarations, guidelines and recommendations regarding the rights of women, children, migrants, refugees, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and minorities. Lastly, the International Criminal Court deals with individual criminal responsibility, as opposed to the International Court of Justice, which deals with states’

164

50.

51.

52.

53. 54.

55.

Notes

responsibilities, for egregious violations of human rights such as crimes against humanity (extermination, enslavement, enforced disappearance of persons, torture, apartheid, and so on), genocide and war crimes. This idea of the legitimacy of intervention (sometimes called the right of intervention) is relatively recent and has gained significant recognition due to the events in Kosovo and Rwanda, where the responsibility of Western countries to intervene to stop atrocious human rights violations has been forcefully asserted. In response to the normative challenges raised by humanitarian intervention and the notion of sovereignty of states, the government of Canada established an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in the year 2000 to produce a report on these issues. See “The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” (2001). Perhaps with the exception of Charles Beitz’s Political Theory and International Relations (1979), most analyses of interdependence have come from a different discipline than international relations theory itself; for instance, political theory and sociology. The ideal-type complex interdependence is characterized by three elements: “1) state policy goals are not arranged in stable hierarchies, but are subject to trade-offs; 2) the existence of multiple channels of contact among societies expands the range of policy instruments, thus limiting the ability of foreign offices tightly to control government’s foreign relations; and 3) military force is largely irrelevant” (Keohane and Nye, 1987, pp.737–738). See Keohane and Nye (1987, p.730); Keohane (2001, p.1). Chris Brown (1996) refers to this strategy, employed by Beitz, as an “ethical ‘spin’.” Moreover, Brown seems to be skeptical of this theoretical move insofar as mutual dependence between countries is not equal. He points out that “interdependence is clearly compatible with some kinds of domination.” So, the idea that interdependence suggests the existence of a cooperative arrangement does not seem to have the normative implications Beitz might have wanted to draw in his Political Theory and International Relations (1979). Following several criticisms (see Barry, 1982), Beitz tried to clarify his argument by pointing out that his conclusions about the validity of cosmopolitan distributive principles do not rely on the existence of interdependence, as a mutually beneficial arrangement, but on the idea that all individuals, irrespective of nationality, are morally equal in the Rawlsian sense (that is, they have a sense of justice and they have the capacity to form, revise and pursue a conception of the good); so membership to the original position should be global (Beitz, 1983). Kenneth Waltz, for example, is very skeptical about how the alleged increasing globalization and interdependence is changing the structure of world politics; he affirmed at the end of the twentieth century: “What I found to be true in 1970 remains true today: The world is less

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56. 57.

58. 59.

interdependent than is usually supposed” (Waltz, 1999, p.696). Likewise, there is a vast amount of literature whose purpose is to demonstrate the opposite view through the employment of quantitative analysis focused, mainly, on economic indicators (for example, the size of commercial transactions). A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, UN Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004). Hereafter, AMSW. Though specialists say that it is difficult to trace the origin of the term, “globalization” was not employed in academic literature until the 1980s (Robertson, 1992). Yet its use has increased substantially in almost every field of science; according to Malcolm Waters (2001), “in February 1994 the catalogue of the Library of Congress contained only 34 publications with the term or one of its derivatives in the title. By February 2000 this number had risen to 284. None of these was published before 1987” (Waters, 2001, p.2). Moreover, by June 2008, the number of titles containing the word “globalization” increased exponentially to 4235. See Scholte (2000) and Held (2000), which are two useful references on globalization. See Yamin (1995) for a discussion on the ethical dimensions of the problem of global biodiversity. For example, the enormous demand for meat in rich countries drives an unsustainable relocation of the earth’s arable land in favor of the production of grain for livestock as well as pasture land, which has pervasive environmental side-effects. See Durning and Brough (1991).

3 The Circumstances and the Primary Agents of Justice 60. Some earlier reflections, motivated by the social effects of industrialization, were undertaken from a non-academic perspective by the Catholic Church; see, for example, the encyclical Rerum Novarum (1891) issued by Pope Leo XIII. 61. According to Hume these conditions are: (a) moderate scarcity of goods, (b) limited generosity, (c) rough equality of capacities and aptitudes, and (d) interdependence. 62. Succinctly put, on the one hand, two interpretations of Hume’s circumstances of justice (that is, the logical presuppositional interpretation and the epistemic presuppositional interpretation) relate them to the concept of justice; on the other hand, three other interpretations (that is, the ontological presuppositional, the deontic presuppositional and the utility interpretations) relate the circumstances of justice to institutions or rules of justice. See Hubin (1979, pp.8–19). 63. This figure, taken from various editions of the Yearbook of International Organizations, includes different types of organizations such as Federations, Universal, Intercontinental, Regional and other types of conventional INGOs. See Boli (2006, p.334).

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64. To give an example, according to a European Commission survey, 91 percent of respondents to a survey conducted in December 2004 expressed their recognition of the importance of helping people in poor countries develop. See “Attitudes Towards Development Aid” (February 2005). Special Eurobarometer 222, European Commission. 65. Although Rawls’s concern with the protection of human rights could be seen as an oblique way to impose obligations on non-well-ordered societies, he does not offer theoretical grounds (from his contractual point of view) to account for such duties effectively. Let us look at this issue closely. Rawls affirms that the human rights protected by the Society of Peoples should be understood as universal rights. Thus, he says: “they are intrinsic to the Law of Peoples and have a political (moral) effect whether or not they are supported locally. That is, their political (moral) force extends to all societies, and they are binding on all peoples and societies, including outlaw states (Rawls, 1999a, pp.80–81). However, Rawls grounds the right to punish (or interfere with) outlaw states that violate human rights in the nature of well-ordered liberal and decent peoples themselves: they are not supposed to tolerate these regimes due to their conceptions of right and justice. This refusal, according to Rawls, to tolerate outlaw states is “a consequence of liberalism and decency.” That is, Rawls’s contractarian approach does not contemplate that either outlaw states should have an immediate obligation to respect human rights, or that oppressed societies have a moral dignity which deserves to be protected. For Rawls’s defense of these societies’ human rights is entirely grounded in the moral nature of well-ordered peoples, which are the only relevant moral subjects of his contractual model. 66. For instance, the United States’ foreign aid has been employed as a tool to advance political-military interests. See Lebovic (1988). 67. I borrow this conventional classification of the types of justice that arise from communal relationships from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics (1999). 68. As we shall see in the next chapter, this idea is increasingly gaining international legitimacy. In particular, it has been formally articulated in the UN Millennium Declaration (2000). 69. British Idealism was an influential intellectual tradition of philosophical thought (mid nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century) which, drawing upon Hegelianism, aimed at challenging atomistic individualist conceptions of the social and political, as well as empiricism and its derivative positivist methodologies. Amongst the most remarkable exponents of British Idealism are Thomas H. Green, Robin George Collingwood, Michael Oakeshot, F.H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, David G. Ritchie, John Watson and William R. Sorley. According to David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, two of the most recognized experts in this tradition, “Idealism fulfilled a number of roles in societies that were experiencing the effects of rapid industrialization, modernization and secularization. It acted as a counterbalance to the individualism of the more brash variants of utilitarianism, offering a philosophy that gave a much needed emphasis to social cohesiveness

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70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75. 76.

77.

and to the closeness of the relation between individual and collective responsibility” (Boucher and Vincent, 2000, pp.21–22). See also Panagakou (2005) for a concise and informative account of British idealists’ distinctive philosophical theorization. For a development of the concept “General Will” (as opposed to the “Will of All”) which plays a crucial role in the Hegelian branch of Idealism, see Bosanquet (1899, chapter 5), T.H. Green (1900, pp.386–426) and Collingwood (1942, chapter XXI). This confusion leads O’Neill to speak about the privatization of power. As she put it: “[w]here power is dispersed and in part privatized, in the sense that it is in large part non-statal, the distinction between primary and secondary agents of justice falters” (O’Neill, 2004, p.254). According to O’Neill, the allocation of obligations of justice only arises when an agency or an individual has already been qualified as capable in terms of resources. As put by O’Neill, “both institutions and individuals can have obligations if but only if they have adequate capabilities to fulfill or discharge those obligations” (O’Neill, 2004, p.251; O’Neill’s emphasis). A topical illustration that O’Neill’s favored agencies (that is, NGOs and TNCs) cannot escape their interests is graphically provided by those promotional images, by all means denigrating, of a poor country’s classroom filled with school desks with a printed logo of a company or an NGO. The Freedom in the World survey defines freedom as “the opportunity to act spontaneously in a variety of fields outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination.” The survey focuses mainly on two main variables: political rights and civil liberties. Accordingly, political rights are defined as those that “enable people to participate freely in the political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate”; on the other hand, civil liberties “allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state.” Freedom House’s annual survey has been published since 1973 to the present. The 2008 survey included reports on 193 countries and 15 related and disputed territories. For a detailed description of the Freedom in the World survey’s methodology, see www. freedomhouse.org. The survey includes also the analysis of “disputed territories” but they are not considered to be, properly speaking, state formations. For example, according to the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Report, states such as Cuba, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and United Arab Emirates, which are non-democratic countries, have a “high human development index.” The latter indicates that, to a considerable extent, these states are creating the social conditions that allow their peoples to have adequate access to basic goods. See UN, “The Millennium Development Goals Report, 2008.”

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Notes


78. The term “speciesism” was coined by utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer, early promoter of the animal rights movement, to mean a wrongful exploitation or mistreatment of sentient species (that is, species capable of experiencing suffering) different than the human one. See Singer (1977, 1979). 79. See Beitz (1999a [1979], p.133). 80. Pogge (1989, 2004); Tan (2004). 81. See Frank (1975, 1978, 1981); Cardoso and Faletto (1979); Prebisch (1981). 82. Although, evidently, I do not endorse what Pogge (2004) has labeled the “Purely Domestic Poverty Thesis” (PDPT) – which is a reference to arguments that explain poverty (and world inequality) only in terms of domestic factors (see Rawls, 1999a) – I believe that there are indeed local variables ranging from informal institutions to geographical peculiarities which account for some countries’ failure to develop. 83. Global dimming is the decline of the levels of solar radiation that reach the earth due to the reflecting effect of air pollution (where chemicals components, like sulphates, float in the air blocking the penetration of sunlight), which affects climatic phenomena such as rainfall, winds and air temperature. The extensive drought in SubSaharan Africa that brought about the famine in the eighties with particular catastrophic consequences in Ethiopia, it is argued, could have been caused by the effect of global dimming and the failure of seasonal rains in that part of the planet. (On global dimming, see Stanhill and Cohen, 2001.) 84. It is worthy of note that even some Rawlsian cosmopolitans have opted for this strategy to deal with global injustice and have somewhat abandoned the paramount idea of the global basic structure that originates distributive principles of justice à la “justice as fairness.” Thus, for example, Thomas Pogge’s proposal of the “Global Resources Dividend” (Pogge, 1999) (or “Global Resource Tax,” Pogge, 1994) not only accepts the existing state system but also formulates a scheme along the lines of a duty of compensation – cf. Pogge (1994) in which he proposes a globalized version of Rawls’s conception of justice. 85. See Beitz (1999b). 86. See Caney (2003, p.295). 87. Among the most important normative issues of international politics, Frost includes war, terrorism, global ecology, intervention, human rights, and the distribution of world resources (Frost, 1996, pp.76–77). 88. Briefly put, Frost’s sovereignty norms are: (i) the preservation of the society of sovereign states is itself a good, (ii) it is good for states to be accounted as sovereign over a territory, (iii) it is bad to subjugate other states, (iv) the preservation of the “balance of power” is good, (v) patriotism is good (understood as the citizens’ feeling of loyalty to their state), (vi) the first duty of a state’s government is to protect the interests of its own citizens, (vii) non-intervention is good. See Frost (1996, pp.106–109).

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89. International law norms are, succinctly: (i) the body of international law is good; (ii) peace is good: war requires a special justification; (iii) ius in bello, or the rules concerning the conduct of war, is good; (iv) it is a good thing to establish a collective security arrangement to maintain peace when a state threatens it; (v) in order to support collective security measures, economic sanctions can be established against the offending state; and (vi) diplomacy is good. See Frost (1996, pp.109–110). 90. Modernization norms: (i) modernization of methods of production, division of labor, technology, infrastructure and so on, is a goal of states; (ii) economic cooperation between states is a good. See Frost (1996, pp.110–111). 91. Domestic norms: (i) democratic institutions are preferable than nondemocratic ones; (ii) human rights are good and they need to be protected nationally and internationally. See Frost (1996, p.111). 92. In essence, Frost argues that reconciliation between rights and sovereignty is not possible in contractarian theories because “most people have never made a contract” and the notion of “tacit consent” cannot adequately elucidate which actions in effect express consent – in particular, people’s obedience to the law does not specify the existence of consent inasmuch as this could be induced by coercion. See Frost (1996, pp.128–136). 93. Drawing upon Hegel, the value of these institutions is put by Frost as follows: “within the family what individuals gained was consciousness of themselves as valued members of a whole. Within civil society the individuals gained a consciousness of themselves as independent persons distinct from the whole” (Frost, 1996, p.147). 94. However, I do not go as far as Robert P. George, who suggests that natural law theory would envisage the institution of a world government, provided that a principle of subsidiarity is firmly established. See George (1999, pp.234–241). 95. The most influential Global Conferences thus far have been: The World Summit for Social Development (1995), The Millennium Summit (2000), The International Conference on Financing for Development (2002), The World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002), several World Conferences on Women (1985, 1995, and the Special Session of the General Assembly Beijing+5, 2000) and the Millennium +5 Summit (2005). Regarding the major multinational institutions one could include: United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Food and Agricultural Organization of the UN (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), and to a certain extent the World Bank (WB). 96. The UN Millennium Project, launched after the UN Millennium Declaration adopted by the General Assembly of the UN (September 2000), puts forward eight goals (Millennium Development Goals, MDG): (1) eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieve universal primary education; (3) promote gender equality and empower women; (4) reduce

170 Notes

97.

98.

99. 100.

101.

child mortality; (5) improve maternal health; (6) combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) ensure environmental sustainability; and (8) develop a global partnership for development. (See UN “Road Map towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration” A/56/326, September 2001.) Following the UN Millennium Declaration (September 2000), an “International Conference on Financing for Development” (Monterrey, Mexico, March 2002), was organized to discuss the mechanisms to mobilize resources for development. Amongst the most important instruments recognized in that conference to support the achievement of the MDG were the Official Development Assistance (ODA) transfers, which had been falling steadily during the nineties. Rich countries acknowledged that increasing their resource mobilization in the form of ODA was an essential part of realizing the MDG (see “UN Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development,” 2002, pp.9–11). However, this pledge has not been equally honored by all the developed countries. For example, the United States is still far below the 0.7 percent of the Gross National Income (GNI) that the United Nations has fixed as an optimal target; thus, in the year 2007 the United States’ ODA scarcely reached 0.16 percent of its GNI, which makes this country’s performance the worst of the developed world. On the other hand, although still below the UN target, some countries such as Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom have all set timetables to reach the 0.7 percent UN target. By the year 2008, only five developed countries, members of the DAC-OECD, had already achieved that figure (Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden). See DAC-OECD, www.oecd.org/dac/stats The “fundamental values” affirmed by the UN Millennium Declaration are: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance, respect for nature and shared responsibility (see Art. 6, UN Millennium Declaration, 2000). At the moment, there are 192 member states following the incorporation of Switzerland (2002), Timor-Leste (2002) and Montenegro (2006). Even political philosopher David Miller, well-known critic of theories of global distributive justice, recognizes that there are two important reasons for which a rich nation has a “remedial responsibility” to relieve poverty of another society through the transfer of resources: either poor countries might not be strictly responsible for their condition of having been subject to an autocratic rule, or they might be only partially responsible since other nations affect poor societies’ living standards through their actions and decisions (for instance, exploitation). See Miller (2004). Rawlsian heir Thomas Pogge, for instance, points out that citizens of rich countries have a moral responsibility for the pervasive effects of the international structure as they bring about “radical inequality.” As presented by Pogge to his affluent countries’ readers: “we are – both causally and morally – intimately involved in the fate of the poor, in particular by imposing upon them an economic order that regularly

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102.

103.

104.

105.

106.

107.

produces severe poverty and/or by effectively excluding them from the benefits of natural resources and/or by upholding a radical inequality that resulted from an historical process pervaded by massive crimes. In light of this involvement, we have a strong, negative responsibility and duty to stop contributing to, and profiting from, the maintenance of the status quo, and also to help work out and implement plausible reforms” (Pogge, 1999, p.523). Although from a different perspective (that is, consequentialism), Peter Singer, I believe, also misunderstands the question when he allocates indistinctively an overwhelming responsibility to help people suffering from extreme poverty to the individual citizens of rich countries and not to the political communities. See Singer (1972). It is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which defines the concept. Accordingly, ODA “consists of flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following test: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent)” (Führer, 1996, p.24). According to the latest data (2007), the total shares of bilateral aid of its member-countries are as follows: Australia 85 percent, Austria 73 percent, Belgium 63 percent, Canada 77 percent, Denmark 64 percent, Finland 60 percent, France 63 percent, Germany 65 percent, Greece 50 percent, Ireland 69 percent, Italy 32 percent, Japan 75 percent, Luxembourg 67 percent, Netherlands 75 percent, New Zealand 77 percent, Norway 77 percent, Portugal 57 percent, Spain 65 percent, Sweden 68 percent, Switzerland 75 percent, United Kingdom 57 percent, and United States 87 percent. (Source: OECD DAC, www.oecd/dac/aid/stats). The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) has recognized the importance of untying aid at the DAC High Level Meeting in April 2001, which resolved to take some steps towards reducing the share of tied aid provided, see “DAC Recommendation on Untying Official Development Assistance to the Least Developed Countries” (2001). Although corruption is a social practice extremely difficult to measure, there are some analyses that provide a rough idea of the degree of the problem globally. In particular, the organization Transparency International (TI) has developed a survey that assesses the general public’s perceptions and experiences of corruption in 60 countries. According to this survey, as could be expected, corruption is more rampant in poor countries. See TI, “Global Corruption Barometer 2007.” An analogy is provided by the citizen in a society who breaks the law: by negating the normative framework the individual brings about consequences that negate her liberties, so she could rightfully lose her freedom.

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Notes

108. UN General Assembly (Sixth Special Session), A/RES/3201 (S-VI), 1 May 1974. See also, Program of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, A/RES/3202 (S-VI) and International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, 24 October 1970 (A/8124 and Add 1). 109. The UN Resolution itself talks in the following terms regarding the emergent global interdependence revealed by the 1973 oil crisis: “The present economic international order is in direct conflict with current developments in international political and economic relations. Since 1970, the world economy has experienced a series of grave crises which have severe repercussions, especially on the developing countries because of their generally greater vulnerability to external economic impulses. The developing world has become a powerful factor that makes its influence felt in all fields of international activity [ ... ] All these changes have thrust into prominence the reality of all the members of the world community. Current events have brought into sharp focus the realization that the interests of the developed countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from each other, that there is a close interrelationship between the prosperity of the developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries, and that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent parts. International co-operation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries” (UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, 1 May 1974, A/RES/3201 [S-VI]). 110. DAC members are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United Sates, and a Commission of the European Communities.

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Index Aid, 6, 85–86, 97, 130–131, 135, 141 Alain, Noël, 97 Anarchy (international), 58, 60, 62, 98 Aquinas, Thomas, 2 Aristotle, 2–3, 104 Autonomy, Autonomy of moral persons, 33, 40 Autonomy of states, 8, 10, 54, 57–58, 63–66, 68–69, 76, 125, 128, 145 Basic needs, 84, 103–104, 110, 114–115, 130 Basic structure, Domestic basic structure, 13, 22 Global (international) basic structure, 12, 19, 21–23, 26–30, 33, 54, 90–91, 116, 118–119, 122, 136, 144 Beitz, Charles, 12, 19, 21–26, 71–72, 93 British idealism, 103–104, 110–111 Brown, Chris, 55 Bull, Hedley, 60–62, 94–95 Calhoun, Craig, 86–88 Caney, Simon, 12, 20, 119 Common good, 2, 10, 84, 103–105, 109–113, 126–127, 134, 137 Consequentialism, 43 Cosmopolitanism, 7, 20, 116, 135, Rawlsian cosmopolitanism, 8, 12, 18, 21–33, 118, 144 Dependency theory, 119 Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 142

Domain of discourse, 11, 64, 122–124, 126, 146–147 Durkheim, Emile, 72–73, 87–88 Duties of social justice, 5, 12, 22, 41, 53–55, 80–81, 89–94, 116, 118, 127, 129–131, 135–136, 140 Duty of assistance, 11, 93, 96, 117, 120–121, 131–143 Duty of compensation, 119–120 Dynamic density, 72–74, 76, 80, 85, 145 Equality, 2, 14, 32, 41, 45, 92, 97, 118, 121, 130, 134, 146 Equality of opportunity, 17 Moral equality, 24 Political equality, 75, 128 Finnis, John, 103, 125–126 Fleischacker, Samuel, 4 Foreign aid, 97 Franck, Thomas M., 58–59 Frost, Mervin, 63–64, 122–127 Global justice, 4–9, 21, 23, 26, 82, 90, 92, 106, 117, 135, 144 Globalization, 76, 87–88, 101, 106, 128 Global resource dividend, 27–29 Green, T.H., 104, 110 Hegel, G.W.F., 40, 103–104, 111, 123–125, 148 Hubin, Clayton D., 81–83 Humanitarian assistance, (duty of), 11, 135–136, 147 Human rights, 86, 98–99, 107, 112, 114, 123 Hume, David, 81–83 183

184

Index

Impartiality, 5, 13, 43, 46, 53 Interdependence (international), 10, 22–24, 30, 54, 57, 66, 70–74, 79–80, 87–90, 96, 99–102, 111, 115, 117–122, 128, 132–133, 141, 144 Complex interdependence, 71–72, 105 Economic interdependence, 7, 21, 71–72, 76–78, 118, 145 Organic interdependence, 99, 118, 121–122, 124, 126, 130, 131, 145 Political interdependence, 74–76, 145 International nongovernmental organizations, (INGOs), 86 International political theory, 21, 55 International resource redistribution principle, 24–25 International society, 53–80

Kant, Immanuel, 4, 9, 13–14, 33, 40–41, 71 Kantian constructivism, 9, 33–38, 144 Keohane, Robert, 70–72, 105 Krasner, Stephen, 57–58, 105, 110

Justice, Background institutions for distributive justice, 6–7, 31–32, 116, 121, 147 Circumstances of justice, 8, 10, 35, 54, 81–93, 116, 146 Comparative principles of justice, 19, 24, 32, 92, 115, 117, 119, 131, 136, 144, 146–147 Distributive justice, 3–6, 8–10, 12–19, 24, 31–32, 54–55, 81–82, 101 Global justice, 4–9, 21, 23, 26, 30, 34, 43, 54–55, 80, 82, 90, 92, 106, 117, 135, 140, 144, 148 International justice, 5, 7, 43, 54–55, 60, 65, 69, 80, 83, 94–97, 109, 114–117, 131, 133, 136, 145 Justice as fairness, 4, 8, 12–18, 22–23, 25–27, 29, 31, 81, 135

Natural Law, 2, 103–104, 125 Non-compliance, 58, 140–141 Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), 86, 106–108 Norms, 14–15, 27, 50, 58–59, 63–64, 66, 68, 73, 99, 128, 134, 145 Settled norms, 10–11, 63–65, 68–69, 73, 118, 127, 129, 133, 145–146 Transnational norms, 11, 64, 76, 117, 122–126, 133, 146 Nye, Joseph, 70–72, 105

Law of Peoples, (The), 95–96, 131–132, 134–135 Liberalism / liberal philosophy (ers), 2–3, 7, 104–105 Linklater, Andrew, 117–118 Lumsdaine, David, 97 Lyotard, Jean-François, 3 March, James, 57 Marxian analysis, 2 Metaphysics, 15–16, 23, 33–34, 39–40 Millennium Development Goals (MDG), 114, 127, 134 Miller, David, 10, 24, 81, 83–92, 101, 146

Official Development Assistance, (ODA), 127, 130, 138 Olsen, Johan, 57–58 O’Neill, Onora, 9, 12, 33–42 Original position, 13, 15, 20, 22–26, 95, 131 Peace of Westphalia, 56, 64 Plato / Plato’s Republic, 1

Index 185

Pogge, Thomas, 12, 19, 21, 25–29, 93, 119 Post-Westphalian society, 122, 124, 127, 133, 136, 145, 147–148 Poverty, 4–5, 8–9, 13, 19, 27–30, 32–34, 38, 43, 45–51, 86, 96, 108, 119–122, 127, 130–136, 142, 144, 147–148 Rawls, John, 4, 8–9, 12–19, 35, 55, 81–82, 90–91, 93, 95–96, 104, 131–135 Rawlsian cosmopolitanism, 8–9, 19–33, 43, 71–72, 93, 118, 121, 144 Rawlsian paradigm, 9, 12–13, 18–19, 21–22, 25, 27, 30, 33–34, 116–117, 144, 147 Realism, 55, 59, 71, 96, 98, 105 Scheffler, Samuel, 43 Self-respect, (sense of), 14, 108, 137 Sen, Amartya, 103, 114 Sikkink, Kathryn 63, 68 Singer, Peter, 9, 42–51 Social cooperation, 4–5, 14, 21–24, 71, 89 Society of states, 54, 60–66, 68–69, 74, 80, 110, 126–127, 145–148 Socrates, 1–2 Solidarity, 8, 10–11, 62, 73–74, 76, 83, 85–88, 92–93, 115–116, 118, 120–122, 124–125, 129–130, 132–133, 138, 145–147 Mechanical solidarity, 73, 87 Organic Solidarity, 87–88, 117, 130

Transnational solidarity, 80, 88–89, 115, 118, 128, 134–135, 141 Sovereignty, 30, 56–64, 68–71, 76, 110, 122–123, 125–126, 128 Tan, Kok-Chor, 12, 20, 135 Thérien, Jean-Philippe, 97 Transnational, Transnational obligations, 9, 33–42, 55, 79, 84, 89, 121, 134, 142 Transnational common good, 112 Transnational corporations, (TNCs), 106 Transnational norms, 11, 64, 76, 117, 122–131, 146 Transnational solidarity, 74, 80, 85–86, 88–89, 115, 134–135, 145 Transnational transfers, 6, 11, 94, 117, 118, 139, 147 Treaty of Westphalia, 56 UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 142 UN Human Rights Council, 143 UN Millennium Declaration, 128–129 United Nations, 67, 78, 93, 114, 128, 133, 142–143 Universalism, 9, 53 Utilitarianism, 14–15, 43–51 Weale, Albert, 92 World Council of Churches, 141 World Trade Organization (WTO), 30, 41, 140

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