Strengthening Religious Tolerance for a Secure Civil Society in Albania and the Southern Balkans (Nato Series for Peace and Security)

STRENGTHENING RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE FOR A SECURE CIVIL SOCIETY IN ALBANIA AND THE SOUTHERN BALKANS NATO Science for Pea...

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STRENGTHENING RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE FOR A SECURE CIVIL SOCIETY IN ALBANIA AND THE SOUTHERN BALKANS

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 27

ISSN 1874-6276

Strengthening Religious Tolerance for a Secure Civil Society in Albania and the Southern Balkans

Edited by

James Pettifer Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, Swindon, UK

and

Mentor Nazarko University of Tirana, Albania

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Strengthening and Promoting Religious Co-Existence and Tolerance for a More Secure Civil Society in the Balkans and Beyond Tirana, Albania 29 September – 1 October 2006

© 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-779-6 Library of Congress Control Number: 2007932806 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Strengthening Religious Tolerance for a Secure Civil Society in Albania and the Southern Balkans J. Pettifer and M. Nazarko (Eds.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

v

Preface The NATO Advanced Research workshop “Strengthening and Promoting religious tolerance and co-existence in the Balkans and beyond” that was held in Tirana Albania in September, October 2006, brought together researchers and academics, politicians and theologians from different parts of the Balkans and the world at large. The lively and constructive debate brought a number of new key elements and ideas to the table. Albania and its intereligious relationships and experiences were presented as positive examples of religious co-existence. These and other positive experiences were compared and discussed in relation to other developments in the region and the world. It was a privilege of the Millenium Club Center and myself personally as its Executive Director to have been part of this amazing group of people and discussion. I wanted to give a big heartfelt thank you to all the participants and contributors to the workshop. Without your participation, your insight, and contribution, the workshop would not have been the success it was. I hope that this publication will bring through the fundamental issues and topics discussed at the workshop. Due to the editorial and publishers restrictions, we could not fit all the presentations in the book. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the presentations given at the workshop in Tirana, and this book, will further encourage discussion and debate on what has become one of the most sensitive issues of our time. Mentor Nazarko Executive Director, Millenium Club Center Co-Director, NATO Science for Peace Project Advanced Research Workshop

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Introduction It has long been a commonplace of Balkan Studies and historical writing about the Balkans to state that religion is often a major factor in conflicts. Some contemporary authors have seen it as the decisive factor, either in the framework of American theorist Samuel Huntington within the wider ‘Clash of Civilisations’ that is taking place all over the world, or in more localised terms, where the bloody debacle of the wars of the 1990’s in ex-Yugoslavia was analysed as a conflict between Roman Catholic Croatia and Orthodox Serbia, or the Bosnian war in terms of re-emerging Islam. In that context, the longstanding reputation of Albania and Albanians for tolerance in religious matters is important, and deserves scholarly study and debate. In the period of the emergence of Albania from the chaos and turmoil of the 1989–1992 period and the end of the one-party state, the main priority for Albanians was the reestablishment of religion in Albania after the years of enforced atheism under the Hoxha regieme. In the main this process went very well, and peacefully, with a massive and successful programme of church and mosque construction taking place, with funding from many outside sponsors. By about 1996 this process had been more or less completed as far as making available again religious buildings in all communities for the main confessions. In the world in general, Albania is often seen as a majority ‘Moslem’ community, but there are powerful and growing Roman Catholic and Orthodox Christian congregations, and also new Evangelical churches, and non-Christian religious sects. A sizeable part of the population remains secular, and has not much defined religious identity or practice. Albania, and the southern Balkans in general, is open to strong evangelical influences from both Christian and Moslem neighbours and outside powers. Debate about the nature of the Albanian identity has recently come to incorporate more and more discussion about religion, as witnessed by the vigorous 2006 exchanges between prominent Albanian authors Ismail Kadare and Rexhep Qosja on the subject. The conference that was held in the National Historical Museum conference hall in Tirana in September 2006 sought to illuminate the background to this emerging and complex religious culture in Albania and also subjects of importance in neighbouring nations that are relevant, such as the Muslim minority in northern Greece, and the position of religion in Montenegro. It includes papers by a number of prominent local scholars, and invited foreign experts on Albania and its history. This volume seeks to make available to a wider audience the most important contributions to the conference, and papers submitted to the editors by those scholars unable to attend. James Pettifer


ix

Message from Senator Giulio Andreotti, 70th, 61st and 58th Prime Minister of Italy September 26, 2006 To the Millennium Club Center of TIRANA

I deeply regret having to cancel my participation in the workshop entitled “Strengthening and promoting religious tolerance and co-existence for a more secure civil society in the Balkan and beyond”, especially since today, more than ever, the world needs that all religions bearing different colors, build common ways towards peace and acceptance for all. The meeting that His Holy Highness Benedetto XVI initiated with all the Islamic Ambassadors accredited to the Vatican, offers a strong foundation for debate and discussion. With my best regards, praying to Mother Theresa to help us Yours Truly, Giulio Andreotti


xi

Contributors to the Workshop Sen Giulio Andreotti

Italy, Former Italian President of the Council

Lindita Caci

NATO, Panel Representative

Erica Chenoweth

USA, Research Fellow, Belfer Center for International Security, Harvard University

Dr. Dimitris Christopoulos

Greece, Lecturer at the Panteion University and Coordinator of the EUNOMIA Project of the Greek Ombudsman’s Office

Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham

USA, PhD, University of California, San Diego

Dr. Raffaello Fellah

Italy, Trialogo Foundation

Msgr. George Frendo

Assistent Bishop in the Roman Catholic diocese of Tirana

Ermir Gjinishi

Albania, Former Assistant Chair of Albanian Muslim Community

Gjoko Gjorgjevski

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Orthodox Theologian

Sabri Godo

Politician, Writer and Honorary Board Member of Millenium Club Center

Ermal Hasimja

Albania Lecturer, Tirana University, Faculty of Political Sciences

Aleksa Ivanovic

Montenegro, Lawyer and NGO activist. One of the founders of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights

Ilir Kulla

Albania, Former Head of the Albanian State on Religious Affairs Committee on Cults

Jean Francois Mayer

Switzerland Lecturer, Religious Studies, University of Fribourg (Switzerland) Scientific Advisor, Project Religion and Politics (PSIO, Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva) Editor, Religioscope

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Cardinal Theodore E. McCarrick

PhD, DD, USA, Archbishop Emeritus of Washington

Dr. Rexhep Meidani

Albania, Former President of the Republic of Albania

Beqir Meta

Albania, Professor and Director of the National History Museum

Archbishop Rrok Kola Mirdita

Albania, Head of the Albanian Episcopal Conference

Fitor Muça

Albania, Vice President of the Albanian Evangelical Alliance

Ines Angjeli Murzaku

USA, Associate Professor of Religious Studies, Seton Hall University

Asher Naim

Israel, Former Ambassador to Ethiopia

Albana Orgocka

USA, MS Columbia University

Sheikh Abd al Wahid Pallavicini

Italy, President CO.RE.IS (Italian Islamic Religious Community)

Milena Pavani

Italy, Journalist CAdena Liberamericana de Noticias

Carlos Peralta

Switzerland, Representative of OMPP

Prof. James Pettifer

Great Britain, Professor, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst; Stanley J. Seegers Research Fellow, Princeton University

General Mansur Abu Rashid

Jordan, President Amman Peace Center Muhamed Sytari, Albania Muslim Theologian

Dr. Miranda Vickers

Great Britain, author and Historian

Arben Xhaferri

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Head of the Albanian Democratic Party (ADP) and Philosopher

His Beautitude Anastasios Yannoulatos

Archbishop of Tirana and All Albania, Vice-president of the World Council of the Orthodox Church

Zhivulovic Vladan

Serbia President of the Serbian North Atlantic Council

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Contents Preface Mentor Nazarko Introduction James Pettifer

v vii

Message from Senator Giulio Andreotti, 70th, 61st and 58th Prime Minister of Italy ix Giulio Andreotti Contributors to the Workshop

xi

Opening Remark Sabri Godo

1

Welcoming Speech Rexhep Meidani

3

Part One. General Considerations on Albanian Religion and Its History Albanian Religion Through Judicial Documents Gjergj Sinani

7

Religious Divergences in Albania and Balkan Security Mentor Nazarko

15

“Clash of Civilization” – A Paradox or a Reality!? – The Positive Albanian Model Rexhep Meidani

19

The Development of Religion in Post-Communist Albania Miranda Vickers

27

Religious Cohabitation in Albania: Constructing a Model or Constructing Reality Ermal Hasimja

31

Religions and Religous Tolerance George Frendo

34

State-Religion Relations in Transition Albania Ilir Kulla

38

Towards a Sustainable Peaceful Coexistence in the Balkans Anastasios Yannoulatos

41

The Challenge of Proselytism for Religious Coexistence Jean-François Mayer

45

Truth and Diversity Beyond the Common Ground ‘Abd al-Wahid Pallavicini

52

xiv

Part Two. Local Studies The Historical Background to the Muslim Community in Albania During the Period 1912–1920 Ermir Gjinishi Islam and the Albanian Periphery Lands James Pettifer Islam and State Religion in Greece: From the Formation of the ‘Greek-Orthodox Genos’ to the Era of Migration Dimitris Christopoulos

57 62

66

Intra-Group Differences and the Status of Religious and Ethnic Minorities Kathleen G. Cunningham

74

The Legacy of the Albanian Evangelicals and Its Continuation Post – 1990 Fitar Muca

77

Religious Suspension of the Divine Arben Xhaferri

80

The Inadvertent Effects of Democratisation on Religious Extremist Groups Erica Chenoweth

91

The Jews of Albania During the Zogist Period and the Second World War Bernd J. Fischer

95

Between East and West: The Basilian Monks of Grottaferrata in Albania Ines Angjeli Murzaku

102

Religious Tolerance in Montenegro as a Guarantee of Stability and Security of the Country Aleksa Ivanovic

112

Interfaith Relations in Serbia Vlladah Zivulovic

117

The Bektashi Heritage in Albania Beqir Meta

119

Part Three. Parallels Beyond the Balkans Finding the Common Ground Between the Three Major Religions Asher Naim

123

Love Your Neighbors as Yourself, Love Your Neighbors Like Yourself Mansour Abu Rashid

126

A Project for Peace Raffaelo Fellah

128

xv

Part Four. Conclusions General Conclusions from NATO Advanced Research Workshop Erica Chenoweth

133

Inter-Religious Dialogue Adea Meidani

136

Author Index

139



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Opening Remark Sabri GODO

It is an honor and special pleasure to address this distinguished auditorium. The issue under discussion, religious co-existence, is one of the main issues facing politics and human society. The world has reached an unprecedented level of civilization and is quickly aiming to higher peaks. Nevertheless, there is an almost bold return to the issue of religious co-existence, as if to make it look as if the world is making a sudden u-turn to centuries before. Such a paradoxical and absurd situation was brought about the wars we are experiencing as well as some complicated developments in specific regions of the world. If these processes are not stopped, then we face the danger of darkness spreading, even more at a time when reason and understanding should have been ruling mightily. But is it true that it is the religious ideologies, the element, which in turn ignites confrontation and armed conflicts? Religious beliefs serve only as a cover, under which lie economic and power interests. Typical examples of this are Ireland, Afghanistan, the ten-year long war between Iran-Iraq, as well as terrorist acts perpetrated around the world. The terrorist ideology has as its aim to create the idea of a struggle between the West and the central Asia, on the geographical level, and between Christianity and Islam on the religious level around the world. Such a dangerous development which leads the world to a crossroad may be avoided in three ways: first, the West may discover a new strategy against terrorism, which would remove the use of religion out of the hands of these terrorist leaders; second, all civil organizations anywhere in the world should commit to interfaith harmony; third, the religious communities of all three monotheistic faiths and even further, should walk on the path that gets them closer and toward dialogue, which was marked by the late Pope John Paul. Great works always start from the smaller cells. I, myself as a citizen of the world, see this issue of religious co-existence as totally resolved inside my own family. Me and my wife have been born Sunni while my oldest daughter is married to the nephew of an orthodox priest, while my second daughter’s husband is half-catholic and halforthodox. We have not decided to which religion our four nephews belong to. So it remains for them to make their own decision, if they choose to make it. I apologize for sharing these personal aspects, but it is sure that we are dealing here with a true generalizing example. Families with a mixed religious background like mine are in the tensof-thousands in Albana and they are growing ever further. Albanians are often not at all concerned to discover the specific religion that the other Albanian standing in front of them belongs to. This reality is accepted also by the prelates of all four official religions in Albania. Not only this, but these respected prelates, take great care to preserve the inter-religious harmony in Albania. The Albanian reality stems from our history and traditions, burdened with many problems, but that nevertheless stands higher than some even more civilized countries in terms of its tolerance and inter-religious under-

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S. Godo / Opening Remark

standing. I cannot claim that everything is perfect. Here and there have been some incidents, but these derive from the outside and remain isolated and of little importance. I believe that this is a time to work, and I am also of the conviction that through this seminar thoughts and ideas will be developed which should then be propagated, by turning them into programs. Thus I take the courage to make three proposals. There are some appearances of the radicalization of Islam in Macedonia and in some pockets of Kosova. Thus Albanian Muslims should bear well the responsibility of being a Muslim in our time. The Muslim leaders in Albania, Kosova, Macedonia, Montenegro and those in the U.S.A. as well, should meet to clarify those things that are not as they should be… The Balkans has been troubled often by bloody conflicts with religious connotations. Let us remember Srebrenica. In the Balkans the entangled roots of the past have raised their heads somewhere to entangle the present. I also believe that an inter-Balkan conference with a topic like the one we have would be of great benefit for the internal integration of the peninsula as well as that into Europe. In the vicinity of the Mediterranean there is a waging war, which has religious tones, and that moves from one country to another. Personalities of a global status, like Giulio Andreotti, also through the assistance of Euro-Atlantic organisms may manage to call another conference on the same topic, with scholars and other personalities from the Mediterranean countries. Such a conference would bring about a broader impact and I would envision it as part of a new strategy for the war against terrorism and toward peace of earth. I have definitively given free reign to my fantasy, however, I am of the conviction that there is no ill in expressing these thoughts. The ill would only come from the lack of participation and those things left unsaid. I heartily greet this conference and thank you very much for your patience.


3

Welcoming Speech Hon Rexhep MEIDANI Former President of Albania and member of the honorary board of Millennium Club Center

I am delighted to be here to open the workshop “Strengthening and promoting religious co-existence and tolerance for a more secure Civil society in the Balkans and beyond”. This is an important area of interaction, and I am extremely pleased that the program “NATO-Science for Peace Project” funded it. As an honored member of the Millennium Club Center, joyfully symbolized by Einstein’s formula MC², let me thank the many people who made this gathering possible. At first the executive staff of Millennium Club Center and his director… Six years ago I presented a kind of “presidential speech” on the Albanian model of religious co-existence at the Institute of International Relations and Robert Schuman Foundation, in France. As I concluded, I borrowed a line from Dr. Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech. And my dream was so called universal “religion”, a kind of “philosophy” of Freedom and Human Rights, which guaranties the religious co-existence around the world – the opposite of the Huntington’s “Clash of Civilization”. Also, today I came here with this dream. To achieve any kind of approach to this dream we have to be free, and we would not be free until we had conquered an ancient enemy, both outside and within us – that enemy was and still is religious prejudice. Together, we will talk to each other about religious prejudice and of what it has meant to our life. And because we can talk about it with each other, and share it with each other, independently of our religious belonging, I believe, we could be not finally “free at last”, but we have made another step forward to be free. I was always heartened to see improvement in the religious co-existence in Balkan countries and around the world. I was quite optimist on the Millennium Goal Summit at the eve of year 2001, particularly considering a post-Cold War world that was more free and interdependent than before. But, today, six years later, and five years from the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001, we have still many problems, perhaps more than six years ago. Fortunately, the changes have been mostly positive in Balkans, but there are a lot of serious problems and challenges in other corners of the world, particularly, in the Middle East. I have mentioned that not to give up, but how finding and building bridges everywhere and every time it is possible. I believe, this workshop is a part, only a part, of this wider process of communication and dialog on religious cohabitation and tolerance. It is another effort for building the trust, a confident relationship, among different cultures, which are essential to human security and quality of life. And I hope we can achieve this objective in a way where people did not envy us, but instead wanted to follow us, through our commitment based on deep knowledge and understanding.

4

R. Meidani / Welcoming Speech

Being confident on the success of this very special gathering and careful combination of clerics, politicians and academicians, I take great pleasure in formally declaring the workshop open.

Part One General Considerations on Albanian Religion and Its History



7

Albanian Religion Through Judicial Documents Gjergj SINANI

Considering the historical evolution of religion in Albania it seems that religion was not the ‘pith’ of the Albanian individual consciousness and moreover it was not the content of the ‘spirit’ of social and juridical regulation and the establishment of the social and political institutions.

The Kanun and the Medieval Period Facts from some juridical documents illustrate this thesis. One of the most important and marvelous milestones is The Canon of Lek Dukagjini. It is evident that the chapter on religion in this canon is quite marginal although it is outlined at the very beginning of its corpus. The Mirdita version of the Canon does not have a separate chapter on religion but the matter is spliced in several articles. Religious issues occupy only 6 out of the 219 pages of Scanderbeg’s Canon, the very last part of it. The Canon of Lek Dukagjini defines from the beginning the relations with the church, issues that deal with the shadow of the church, the cemetery, property and possession of the church, the priest, the servant, the workers of the church. “By the shadow of the church is meant the area which borders the land on which is built: a) the church; b) the residence (vicarage) of the priest.” It is worth stressing the fact that “the church makes smoke in the parish”, which means that the church has the right to possess livestock, land, and houses, both inside and outside the parish. Also the church has a share in the woods, the pasturage, the water and the mill of the parish community. The church is entitled to share in the fines of the parish. The church has the right to buy and sell, as well as to take and retain the gifts which come from the generosity of benefactors, and utilize them as it sees fit. (Art. 2, point 1, 2, 3, 4). Article 33 point out the immunity of the church: “The church in not fined.” “The church cannot be distrained.” This article defines the role of Head of the faith and the role of the law of Kanun. “The church is subordinate to the control of the Head of the faith and not to the law of Kanun: therefore, the Kanun cannot place any imposition on the church, but has the duty to defend it when it requires help.” The Kanun described even the resolution of the dispute between church and the parish, where the judgment of the Head of the Faith (Bishop) must submit without appeal. An interesting article is one which concern with the Honor of the Church. Article 4 (point 1) stipulates: “Whoever dishonours the church must pay a fine to: a) the church; b) the parish; c) the Flag (Banner). (The head of the mountain or banner was a hereditary officer, the succession being from father to the eldest son or failing a son to the nearest male kinsman, and was called both by the Turkish authorities and the Albanians

8

G. Sinani / Albanian Religion Through Judicial Documents

Bayraktar or banner-leader.) Whoever quarrels with, abuses, threatens, beats, or kills anyone in the shadow of the church dishonors the church.” At the same time, the parish and not the church, imposes the fine on the guilty party, because the church has neither sword nor rope. If a person is killed or beaten or dishonored in any other way by someone while entering or leaving the shadow of the church, the church does not bear the disgrace, because the church is not considered his host. But if someone fires a weapon outside the shadow of the church and seek the protection of the church, which then acknowledges that protection, and if someone violates the protection of the church, the parish is obliged to avenge the injury. The particularistic nature of the Kanun can be seen in the article concerning the cemetery. “In the cemetery belonging to a brotherhood or a clan, the dead or murdered of another brotherhood or clan cannot be buried. If someone does this without the permission of the brotherhood or clan to which the cemetery belongs, the Kanun requires that the foreign corpse should be disinterred from the cemetery.” In respect of this subject the Kanun is very clear and detailed. So, if a family which does not belong to a brotherhood or a clan comes to a village and settles there, with the approval of the village, a burial place is designated for it in the parish cemetery, and the family is obliged to pay a certain yearly sum to the church for the purchase of candles or other objects for the altar. Concerning the property and possessions of the church the Kanun recognizes that “The property and possessions of the church are inviolable and no one may appropriate them. The property and possessions of the church are under the guardianship of the priest of the church and the parish.” An interesting part is the article on the right and duties of the priest. First of all is specified the appointment of the priest. “The priest is appointed to a parish by the bishop, and only the bishop has the right to remove him from the parish.” The right and duties of the priest are as following: 1.

2. 3. 4.

The priest has the right to teach and reprimand the parish, and to carry out all spiritual work required in matters of faith, and no one in the parish has the authority to interfere in the duties of the priest. “For his service to the parish, the priest has the right to the tithe of the church, in accordance with the laws of the place in which the church is found.” The priest has the right to profit of the church, with respect to the land and livestock, and no one may require accounts from him except his superior. The priest is obliged to render religious services demanded of him by the laws of the church.

On this subject, it worth to point out the items concerning the person of the priest, this is, the person of the priest is inviolable. “The priest is under the protection of the parish.” “The priest does not incur blood (i.e. is not subject to the blood feud).” “The priest is not required to take oath” (Article 10). These means that whoever slanders the priest or insult or threaten him, or places his hand upon him and beats him, or murder him, will be punished by the parish according to the laws of the place. The parish is obliged to avenge the honor of its priest. Whoever kills a priest incurs the blood feud of the parish, the banner, and the family of the murdered man. If the murderer is killed by the parish or the Banner, the family of the priest may not kill anyone else in the family with which it has the blood feud [i.e. the murderer’s family]; otherwise, it incurs the blood feud with that family. If the


9

priest kills someone, neither the church nor the priest is punished, nor does the priest incur a blood feud; the blood feud is incurred by the priest’s family. The priest rarely takes an oath, and then only in very serous cases. In the event that the priest tales an oath, either in his own defence or as a juror, his testimony will be recognized as equivalent to that of twenty for people. In the event that the priest takes an oath, either in his own defence or as juror, his testimony will be recognized as equivalent to twenty four people. When the priest takes on oath, since he is considered to be a just man devoted to eternal Justice, he is not required to touch the Gospels with his hand; it is sufficient for him to say the words of the oath in front of the Gospels. If the priest is guilty of some crime, the Kanun does not punish him; it is the affair of his superior to do so. “But if the priest is guilty of a very serious crime against the parish, he is to be judged by the Kanun. His superior sends another priest to participate in the proceeding of the Kanun as a religious representative.” There are, also, articles on the servant of the church and the workers of the church. In essence this is the content of the three Kanuns we have considered.

The Legal Regulation of Religion During the Albanian Kingdom In Albania, during the reign of King Zog, the relationship between the Albanian political forum and the Church were codified by the Constitution and a law approved in 1929. The law of 1929 was based on two articles of the Constitution, articles 5 and 203, which stipulate: “The Albanian State has no official religion. All religions and creeds are respected, and freedom of worship and religious observances is guaranteed. Religion cannot in any way constitute a legal defence. Religion and creeds shall in no whatsoever be used for political purposes.” Article 203 stipulate: “Freedom of thought and conscience is guaranteed, but the expression of thoughts in one way or another must be in conformity with the Law.” The law of 1929 was very detailed on the legal regulation of the activity of religions in Albania. Among the articles there are some which deserve mention. Article 27 stipulates that the heads of the religions as well as their priests under they direction have to be Albanian citizens, by origin and blood, they have to know, to write Albanian language, to be almost 25 years of age, and not committed antinational deeds. It is worth to stress that the same warring we find in the Project of Albanian Government for a Concordat with the Holy See. Article 5 of the project stipule: “The nomination of the archbishops and bishops belong, in conformity with the canon of the church, only the Holy See; but the Holy See before giving the decree of the nomination has to ask the agreement from the Albanian Government, presenting three candidates, from who the Albanian Government has to give, surely, her agreement for one of them. The candidates offered have to be Albanian from language and blood.” At the same time Albanian Government proposed such formula of oath: “I… make the oath, and promise before God and with my hand on the Gospel that I am an I will always be loyal to the head of the Republic, of the Homeland and of the Status of the Albanian Republic, obliging to make the same oath all other vicars under my own jurisdiction.” Under this preoccupation the Albanian Kingdom was very concerned with the virtues of clergy and their political engagements, as it is proved by the articles 12 and 13. “Art 12. Those who suffered more than two years punishments due to violence against personal freedom, even when holding office cannot be elected or appointed

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clergy and lay officials of the communities, and also lose their pro-jure position in case as above. Also not to be appointed are those who, even in case they are appointed projure, suffer punishment due to falsification, theft, fraud, wrong use of trust, offence towards good customs, or those known as drunkards, gamblers, or those with a bad reputation under the public eye, or those known as villains. Art 13. All clergymen of the religious communities are excluded from ballot or the right to be elected in any political voting, or the right to be appointed in any political mission as long as they are in active service of the clergy. In case they like to exercise the right to ballot or to be elected they must leave the religious service at least six months prior to the ballot. Any election or voting that runs contrary to this disposition is annulled.” At the same time we saw the tendency to put the religion under the regulation of the Ministry of Justice and the positive law, as we sees to the following articles: “Art 17. Based on dispositions defined in their Status and regulations communities exercise the right to introduce disciplinary measures against community officials through a notice to the Minister of Justice. Art 19. In case there is evidence for the clergy official’s guilt during his exercise of duty as forecasted in the Penal Code, they face directly the competent court and faces a process according to the Penal Code dispositions.” Finally, the fear of the King Zog for the influence of the foreigners powers toward the religion is expressed to the article 20 which stipulates: “Communities are not allowed to receive aid from foreign countries in any form and in any way except the cases the Government allows as humanitarian aid. The disposition in the first paragraph covers also aid from foreign citizens. Government permission is required for any philanthropic liberal deeds made from foreigners in favour of communities not matter the sum of cash offered, or such deeds provided by Albanian citizens when the sum is more than 1000 gold Franks, as defined in the Article 562 of the Civil Code.” The causes of the failure of signing a Concordat with Holy See must be put in a hypothetical way. Zog had the fear of strengthening an entity as compact as Catholic Church, as well of financial commitment that would have been necessary for the maintenance of Catholic institutions, and the fear of strengthening the Italian political position in Albania.

The Freedom of Religion After the Collapse of Communism Concerning the fate of religion during the communist time deserve a special study. But, it is worth to mention that from juridical point of view there are two documents; the constitution of 1946 and the constitution of 1976 which promulgated the first atheist country in the world. An analyse of this period is out of the boundaries of this paper. The revival of religion in Albania is a great event in many aspects. Concerning our legal perspective, we have to important documents; the Constitution and the recent agreement between the Republic of Albania and the Holy See. Article 10 of the Constitution stipulate: “1. In the Republic of Albania there is no official religion. The state is neutral on questions of belief and conscience and guarantees the freedom of their expression in public life. 2. The state recognizes the equality of religious communities.


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3. The state and the religious communities mutually respect the independence of one another and work together for the good of each and all. 4. Relations between the state and religious communities are regulated on the basis of agreements entered into between their representatives and the Council of Ministers. These agreements are ratified by the Assembly. 5. Religious communities are juridical persons. They have independence in the administration of their properties according to their principles, rules and canons, to the extent that interests of third parties are not infringed.” At the same time point 2 of the article 18 stipule: “No one may be unjustly discriminated against for reasons such as gender, race, religion, ethnicity, language, political, religious or philosophical beliefs, economic condition, education, social status, or parentage.” In the chapter of personal rights and freedoms we have article 24 which says: “1. Freedom of conscience and of religion is guaranteed. 2. Everyone is free to choose or to change his religion or beliefs, as well as to express them individually or collectively, in public or private life, through cult, education, practices or the performance of rituals. 3. No one may be compelled or prohibited to take part in a religious community or its practices or to make his beliefs or faith public.” On 23 March 2002 the Republic of Albania and Holy See signed an agreement with the intention of regulating through a common understanding the juridical status of the Catholic Church in Albania. According to this agreement the Republic of Albania guarantees the freedom to profess and to practice in public the Catholic Religion. At the same time the Republic of Albania recognizes the juridical capacity of legal persons for such entities of the Catholic Church for which provision is made in the Canon Law, such as Archdioceses, Dioceses or Apostolic Administration, Parishes, religious Communities, Missions, Associations, Seminaries, Schools and Educational Institutions at all levels, health Institutions, after their registration with the organs of justice (Art. 2). The Catholic Church has the right to possess its own means of mass communication and has the right to use the means of public mass communication, in accordance with the laws of Republic of Albania. Article 5, recognize the right of Holy See to “choose an ecclesiastic for the office of Bishop or of Apostolic Administrator, who may be Bishop. Before publishing the appointment of a Bishop or an Apostolic Administrator the Holy See, out of courtesy and in confidence, inform the President of the Republic of Albania through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs”. The Republic of Albania engages to “restore the properties of the Catholic Church in accordance with Albanian laws and will assist in their registration in the name of the Catholic Church in the competent offices of the Republic” (Art. 8).

Tolerance and the Law In many meetings and conferences the tradition of religious tolerance which has existed in Albania has been stressed. We must admit that this tolerance is the result of historical factors and of the activity of the Albanian patriots who considered of a priority

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character the national union and identity. Tolerance is not merely a question of the individual conscience. It is in a close relation with the law, if we want to build the argument on the basis of the model of a democratic society. Because in our language often, instead of the argument, is used ordinarily the expression “so it is in use in Europe or in the world”. I would like to present in short this experience in order to project solutions which could serve tolerance and religious pluralism in contemporary Albania. For the jurists it is very easy to define the law as a rule coming from the state, but it is very difficult to define the term tolerance which took shape gradually during the centuries. Philosophers have stressed that tolerance consists in the free expression of the opinions, beliefs, conducts which spring, originate from individual conscience. As regards the historians they ascertain that the intolerance have been commoner (the inquisition, genocide, the hunting of the witches, ethnic cleansing). History is very rich with such examples. It is known that present-day civilization is indebted very much to the Greek and Roman civilizations, and, nevertheless, since the year 440 BC Anaxagoras was obliged to leave Athens because he said that the sun is a lifeless matter. Socrates was condemned because he did not acknowledge the gods of the City, wanted to introduce new deities and was responsible for the corruption of the youth. As an author writes “His death is an warning for religious wars, and fanaticism in our world.” So, after the death of Alexander, a royal decision prohibited the religion of the Jews. Maybe, there were the great intolerances which made that three thinkers, almost of the same time, Spinoza, Lock and Voltaire, to write about tolerance. According to Spinoza the law should recognize the conviction of everyone, favour the search of the truth, independently from the religious institutions. Rightly he wrote on the necessity of this freedom: “for the progress of the sciences and arts…, which could develop successfully only by those judgments is free and totally liberated”. According to him the men judge their acts as the trees their fruits. “Finally, I arrive at the conclusion that to everyone must be granted the freedom of judgments and the possibility to understand the principles of religion how it is more pleasant for him.” It was a rather revolutionary idea, despite the fact that he did not suggest any change in the legislation to achieve this tolerance. On the same plane was also the idea of Locke in Letter on Tolerance. Lock did cut clearly the temporal from the spiritual, and stressed that “every power of the civil governing is in connection only with civil interests”. But lock put a limit to the tolerance; everyone should act according to his conscience, but, in imperative manner, he must obey the law which ensures the public good. Pierre Bayle, whom Voltaire called “the immortal Bayle” went farther than Locke. This is evident in three directions. Tolerance must be extended to the atheists, too, because atheism does not exclude neither the virtue nor the sense of humour, as it is proved by behaviours of the Epicureans and Spinoza. Under the influence of the new concepts of natural law Bayle put forward the idea that the affirmation of the right of the conscience, even rather dark, goes beyond the distinction of the sphere of the Law State and the sphere of individual judgments. The law is not competent in the field of faith and truth. Faith and truth are personal matters and can be object of advice, but not of obligation. Condemned with banishment to Rotterdam, he rose powerfully against the right to persecution which was in opposition to the spirit of Gospel. Inspired by these ideas Puffendorf in his work The conformity of the Christian Religion with the Social Life (1687) would stress: The State has the tendency to defend


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the public order, but has no one right on the spiritual matters; alike the religion does not overestimate no one temporal authority and should be subjected to law. The XVIII century marks the apogee of the attacks against intolerance. The defence of Calas by the old-ages Voltaire reached to the point to propose changes of the law for the inclusion of tolerance in different forms. The law must prohibit the arbitrary arrests, remove the torture and the capital punishment and have a right ratio between the crime and punishment, etc. Voltaire did not attack all religions, but for him object of tolerance could be a religion which is tolerant in itself. The tolerance is based on natural law, it forgives the mistakes, but not the crimes, therefore “it is necessary that men begin not to be fanatic to deserve tolerance”. In what manner were received by the law these ideas? As example I shall put forward two known historical documents. The American Declaration of Independence of July 4, 1776, declared that all men are endowed by the creator with some inalienable rights. Among these rights are life, freedom and search of happiness. These principles were taken again also in the French Declaration of year 1789. This Declaration which had a great influence in Europe in the 11 article proclaimed that “the free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of most valuable rights of men; every citizen can speak, write, publish freely… exception made of the cases of abuse with these freedoms foreseen by law”, “None must be worried for his opinions, even the religious one as far as their expression does not trouble the public order established by law.” So, the tolerance so insistently demanded by the philosophers of XVIII century did triumph even by law. The freedom of religion was the starting point of the civil and political freedoms. It was just the struggle to worship God according the conscience of every individual that shook the religious – political organization of the Middle Ages. The historical experience has shown that the lack of religious freedom can lead to very heavy consequences for the stability of a country. World history is rich with examples which show how many human lives were sacrificed by the spirit of intolerance. Albania does not know victims of religious intolerance among the Albanians, but knows victims of the neighbouring churches towards the clergymen who have requested the independence of the Albanian Church. Now when a new law is discussed, all should give their contribution to defend the individual against every effort of the state, groups or persons which would aim to violate the freedom defined and guaranteed by law. But, the individual, too, should admit his responsibility towards the State. In a practical plane these duties can be summarized as below: 1. 2. 3. 4.

The presentation of the faith in a positive manner and not with the aim to criticise or swear the other faiths. The respect for the thoughts and acts of the individuals who have different faiths. To recognize to the other fully the freedom asked for oneself. Not to change the spiritual freedom of other individuals in order to accept other convictions through the promise of material and social profits. This is very important and should be taken into consideration because in several cases, during the transitional period, different religious groupings have used the financial incentives to increase the number of the adherents. Such a thing

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5.

not only does not influence on the religious conscience of individuals, but also creates non-sincere adherents. Cooperation -or not- with other organizations, every time that the aim and methods are accepted together and with the spirit of tolerance.

So, the self-praise with the exemplary historical religious tolerance of the Albanians is not a full guarantee even for the future. This tolerance can be preserved and developed through a legal regulation which should take into consideration the above principles and the experience of other countries, including even the experience of Eastern Countries, which though did not take extreme stands against religion, already have worked out laws to regulate the religious relations and have created determined structures for this purpose. The religious tolerance even by the answers of the surveyed is considered as a value deserving to be preserved. So, 89,9% of the surveyed answered that they agree that it should be preserved, 7,4% are rather of the same opinion, 1,2% do not agree and 1,3% answer that they don’t know. The society and its institutions should be concerned that even this small percentage, which does not agree, to become aware for the necessity of religious tolerance. The freedom of religion is one of the fundamentals of society. It implies to dwell on regulation of questions having to do with men and their religious convictions. We must accept the distinctions among each-other and to see each-other as a partner and not as an adversary. This means that it is possible to confront the points of views of each-other calmly and clearly, asserting one’s own identity without the least feeling of superiority. The solution does not reside in compromise, but in the respect of the human being, in the clarity of the defended principles. The religious freedom can be never fully guaranteed, but we must take efforts that our strivings do not encroach the development of this freedom, in conformity with the respect for the happiness of all. In Albania religions have co-existed for centuries, and they have always played an important socio – cultural role. Albania represents a rare case in which different religions beliefs, even though each has its own special and original characteristics and individuality, cannot be assessed except in a integral framework. The relation between Catholics and Muslims, as a rule, and especially among the people, were not characterized by religious hatred and fanaticism. The primacy reason for this should be attributed to the attitudes of religious tolerance in Albania. This tolerance, inherited from antiquity and the middle Ages, not only preserved its characteristics but also consolidated them even after spread of Islam, due to the continued operation of certain interior factors of convergence, such as territory and language shared in common, and a shared ethnic and spiritual heritage. In Heideggerian terms we can say that tolerance is the being of Albanians, which is the product not only of Albanian spirit, but even of historical circumstances in the rivalry between East and West. Maybe Swire was right writing these words: “There are few, if any, races in Europe whose passage through the ages has been more stormy than that of the Albanians. Yet despite differences of religion, social system, dialect, a subdivision of race, historical events which seldom affected all alike, the machinations of their neighbours, conquests which never forced them into the same mould, geographical features which kept them apart, the suppression by the Turks of any movement of national character, and the absence since the death of Skenderbeg of any leader who had been universally respected – in short, despite every conceivable obstacle to national unity – the Albanians have preserved their racial individuality, language, and love of freedom.”


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Religious Divergences in Albania and Balkan Security Mentor NAZARKO

When Millennium Club Centre took upon itself to initiate and organize this project, it was our goal to deal with and address issues in an area that are both important and sensitive. And related directly to the problems of security in Albania as well as in the Balkan region. The problem we have been tackling these last couple of days, relates to the influences that some extreme and intolerant fractions of religious groups are having on the young people. Albania is a country that could be considered a unique example of religious co-existence (the latest census in Albania in 1938, which is way overdue shows that there were three major religions in Albania, Muslim (65–70%), Orthodox (20%) and Catholic (10%). More or less the percentages are the same today. Because of a growing Albanian presence within and outside the legal borders of Albania as well as the religious differences with the other mainly Christian Orthodox neighbouring countries, often Albania and Albanians have become a target of unfair attacks and concerns of it turning into an Islamic extremist heaven and as a result, a terrorist heaven. For the record though, it is worth mentioning that there has never been any Albanian terrorist act on religious grounds and there have not been any mention of any Albanian nationals who have been in the Al-Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan and elsewhere. And it is important that we keep that way. Historically Albania has been characterized by a religious tolerance and co-existence that has been a model for other countries in the Balkans and beyond. During the past 15 years, this religious tolerance and co-existence has been threatened by some growing and disturbing trends that if not dealt appropriately may become a great threat for security not only for the country but for the region. In the next few minutes I will attempt to touch upon some of this trends:

First, Lack of Government Control Taking advantage of the freedom of religion that lapsed during the communism years, a growing number of religious organizations have entered and spread their operations throughout the country. What is more disturbing, is the fact that their activities are almost out of the knowledge and legal control of the government. The only existing government institution in existence is the State Committee on Cults, which has a small number of staff, and a minimal budget. The lack of government control over religious charitable organization has allowed the penetration of some people who were involved in terrorist activities. A few of them (four people) have been forcibly extradited to their

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M. Nazarko / Religious Divergences in Albania and Balkan Security

birthplace Egypt. Another person, Jasin Kadi first entered Albania as director of a charitable organization, the so called Al Haramain (international and Albanian press 2004). After it was discovered that his name and his charity were in the U.S. State Department’s Terrorist Watch list, he was not allowed to enter the country and his assets were frozen.

Second, Lack of Legislation The Albanian Constitution grants freedom of religion and states that all religious and faith communities/entities, old and new, are equal before the law and further reaffirms their freedom of co-existence as long as they abide by the social interest of the country. These religious communities are given the status of non-profit organizations and practically are not supervised or regulated even from the government’s revenue service. To date there have been only 20 Islamic Charitable Organizations that have reported to the State Committee on the Cults, even though it is believed that there are many more. In accordance with the current Albanian legislation the charitable organizations are required to register with the Attorney General’s office as such. According to the latest report from the State Committee on the Cults there are 67 humanitarian and charitable religious organizations in Albania and there are 820 people who operate on their behalf.

3. Lack of Control and Supervision from the Albanian Muslim Authority There are 431 mosques in Albania. Out of these 431, 203 mosques are out of the authority and control of the Albanian Muslim Community (the official authority of Muslims in Albania). The reason: because they are owned, built, and run by different religious organizations. The same problem may exist within the orthodox community, which, based on the information given by the State Committee on Cults has yet to report or give an accurate number of their churches on a national level.

4. Schooling of the Young Albanian Theologians Abroad After the fall of communism, the need for religious personnel, required that a lot of young Albanians go to study theology abroad. The rapid development of the relations between Albania and the Arab countries especially after Albania’s membership to the Islamic World Organization, made that thousands of young Albanians of different ages were recruited and sent to study in different Arab countries. According to official information of the Education department for the Albanian Muslim Community, in 2004 there are 1357 Albanian students currently studying in the Universities of Islamic Countries, such as Turkey (350), Egypt (206), Libya (42), Jordan (20), Malaysia (50), United Emirates (14), Syria (50), Lebanon (70), Qatar (120), Oman (17), Yemen (78), Kuwait (26) and Saudi Arabia (350). It is worth mentioning that these are only numbers of the people that went through the organisation and not an indication of the real number. In an approximate estimation that the State Committee on Cults has done, the number of Albanian students who have studied in those countries in 15 years may have


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reached several thousand without counting the Albanian students who are sent by the Arabic humanitarian organizations working in Albania. Even if this estimation could be far from the real number, still, the number (which is included partially in the above estimation), of Albanian students in the universities of known Islamic countries with harsh orientation need not be ignored. The same holds true with thousands of students going to study in Greece, the US, the Vatican or other religious seminaries across the world.

5. Frustration of the Young Muslim Intelligentsia Many of the young people who have graduated from the schools and universities mentioned above (especially those returning from the Arab countries), feel often at times frustrated and left out and thus try via public debates in the media, public forums via Internet to reassert themselves and their Muslim religion and faith; A positive trend for the country in and on itself, but disturbing and often worrisome since often times there are signs of a growing radical form of religious expression and tendency among this group.

6. Friction Within the Religious Communities The media has reported about several exponents of the Muslim community who have left due to frictions inside that community. Within the Orthodox Community there is a different kind of friction, between those who are trying to maintain and protect the Albanian identity of the Albanian Autocephalous Church and those who support and accept the presence of representatives of the Greek Orthodox Church.

7. Problems with Real Estate and Ownership Up until the end of World War II, Albanian Religious Communities, and especially the Muslim Community were the biggest owners of real estate in the country. Ever since the 1990-s, every government in power, has tried to solve the problem of privatisation in a partial and gradual way, but often has made the problem worse rather than better. There is major conflict also in the high ranks of the Muslim Committee due to the management of the real estate.

8. Involvement of Different New Sects and Their Projects Ever since the fall of communism, many religious sects (often new and previously unknown to Albanians) have entered Albania with allegedly big religious plans, but also often business plans. By being involved in big investment plans and using their propaganda some of them have often times tried to affect the economic and political life in the country. For example in 1994, the German TV station ARD as well as Albanian newspaper DITA denounced the efforts of the Scientology representatives in Albania, who through big investments in Albanian economy were trying to influence Albanian

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political system by establishing special privileged relationships and contacts with Albania’s leadership of the time. In addition, there were allegations that they had tried to store radioactive waste in Albanian territory. These representatives were asked to leave the country as soon as the whistle was blown. (Renate Hartwig, Scientology, Ich klage an, Taschenbuch, Heine, 1994).

9. Pressure on the Most Vulnerable; The Increase in the Number of Suicides During the last couple of weeks of October 2005 (when the staff at Millennium club centre was researching and preparing this project) there was a growing number of suicides by young adolescent girls, ages 11–13 who were members of different religious orders (a couple of them from “Jehovah’s Witness” and one of a protestant order called “Nehemiah” operating in the Pogradec area). Another incident occurred at the end of February 2006; a 28 year old women (believed to be a member of the same religious groups), committed suicide. All these incidents have urged the Attorney General’s office to start a thorough investigation of this and all the other suicides in the past. I have only touched upon a few trends that have been noticed in the past 17 years. What can be done to alleviate some of this negative trends? Better legal institutional and technical support for the different government agencies; increased awareness by the government agencies and its staff of the diverse means by which terrorists co-opt charitable giving; keeping better records, and cooperation between appropriate government agencies and religious groups as well as better understanding and awareness of different religious communities in Albania; encouraging the cooperation and tolerance between different religious groups and communities; and lastly better integration of the young theological Albanian students in the public and political life of the country, are some of the areas that can certainly be a good start. I say a good start because, there is no doubt in my mind that a country as interesting as Albania, who is small in size but has such an immense and important diversity in its population, is worth continuing to look at. Many of you dear colleagues did this during these past couple of days, with such thoroughness and distinction. In a number of your presentations you went deep into some of the problems and issues, that I think may have important implications in the area of security in the region. I am sure that you will all agree with me that it is time to further study and concentrate on this country, that from its geographical position, is today the centre of the most important global developments and as such it can be the epicentre for the creation of a global network that will continue to function even when this workshop is complete.


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“Clash of Civilization” – A Paradox or a Reality!? – The Positive Albanian Model Rexhep MEIDANI

I will begin my speech by using a paradox. There is a famous problem, so called the missing dollar paradox: Three travellers in a hotel are charged $30 for a shared room. They each contribute $10 for it. That evening the hotel manager realizes the men were overcharged. They should have got a group discount and paid $25. So he sends a bellhop up to the room to return $5. The three travellers however cannot equally share the $5, so they give the bellhop $2 of it for a tip and they keep $3 which they split among themselves $1 each. Now each traveller has paid $9, for a total of $27. The bellhop has $2. That makes $29 accounted for. Where has the 30th dollar gone? In all statements before the last question, nothing is wrong. We can see there five truths: 1. Each of the travellers paid $9. 2. Three times 9 is 27. 3. The bellhop has $2 in his pocket. 4. Two plus 27 is $29. 5. The travellers originally handed over $30. Therefore, there is no missing dollar. Simply put, people get confused between the $3 returned to the travellers and the $2 in the bellhop’s pocket. These $2 added to $27 the travellers have paid really make $29. But there is no reason that adding these two different kinds of things should result in $30, because the closed system is composed by three parts, not two. Thus, if we add up just what anyone has at the end, we see it is indeed $30: the hotel has $25 for the room, the bellhop has $2 for a tip and the travellers have $3 left over. Paradox in this case plays with confusion and misdirection. In fact, we must mentally draw a circle around each part of the system, and count everything that goes in and out. Or better draw a circle around all of the parts of the system (in our case, the travellers, the hotel manager and the bellhop). In general, to analyse these sorts of problems, where conservation of anything could be at issue, it is necessary to draw a circular boundary around some collection of things, and measure the amount of “stuff” that crosses that boundary. The skill is to choose the right collection of things. This has to be the case, also, in the today consideration for ensembles of different religions of our civilization. They must be within the same circle of exchanges, applying the principle of inclusion, not that of exclusion, to avoid any “paradox”, as well that of “clash of civilization”. For the EU countries to fuel the myth of a Christian Nations, to cultivate the connection between Christianity and politics as a strong emotional force, is the most wrong thing thought. The same problem does exist in a relative scale in USA. Throughout American History we have seen many cases where the allegiance to God was tending to go hand in hand with American allegiance to country. In many Arabic countries we see also today a powerful trend to the installation of religious states. But, political regimes that heavily refer to Islam, represent national or regional political culture, not the

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R. Meidani / “Clash of Civilization” – A Paradox or a Reality!? – The Positive Albanian Model

embodiment of a modern state, which to be become really democratic needs secular institutions. President Demirel was right noted: “Islam does not foresee a specific system of state”, or “Islam lends itself to evolutionary applications in matters of governance”, and more “Islam does not in and of itself pose an obstacle to the establishment of a democratic regime” [1]. In Albania, having a considerable part of population converting to Islam during ottoman occupation, situation, historically and traditionally, was quite different…

Albanian Model Of the same importance everywhere, Balkans and Albania included, is the perfection of the inter-cultural, inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogues, moving on from a multicultural process to an intercultural one. Also, for a human progress the cultural diversity, linguistic pluralism, preservation of the traditions, etc., should remain factors that everyone would uphold, against the human homogenisation. In this sense, there is a very positive experience in Albania on building relations between the state and religions, and above all the fact that Albanian society has been and remains historically a good model of religious co-existence. Besides the cultural-ethnic opening of Albanians in general, their spirit of solidarity, the mixed, multi-religious, and tolerant composition of their families, the statutory or canonical basis of all religions practiced in Albania have also played a positive role, cultivating a real harmony among three religions: Islam, Catholicism and Orthodoxy, although some strategic centres have worked historically and are working unsuccessfully to instil this. The Albanian national identity is created historically based on the common tolerant tradition that did not fabricate segregation of every kind. And more, the most important element for the national identity was not any specific religion, but the language, the history, culture and traditions. This has helped the Albanian society to push out any kind of fabricated project, which was aiming to provoke religious or ethnic disproportion and conflicts. Illyrians, Arbers, therefore Albanians, being involved in the historical evolution of the religions in Balkans space, forming the new synthesis through pragmatic and harmonic ways, to avoid at maximum different destroying effects; they have tried to amortize such effects, by proposing and applying reconciliation alternatives. Thus, at the beginning of Christianity, during the first crisis between Paganism and Christianity, which was accepted by the ancient Illyrians, the reconciliation formula was found by introducing many Illyrian pagan customs as part of the new religion, preserving in this way continuity and transition from the old ideas to new ones. When the crisis began between the eastern and western church, which divided in two the Illyrian land, again they tried to build ways of communication between the two churches, starting from the first Conciliate to the commitments of the First Orthodox Patriarch in Istanbul. This was the real profile, from ancient Albanians (Illyrians) till the new Albanians. They have played an important role in developing unification in diversity and tolerance in the religion area. The same behaviour was manifested also during the Islam time, f.e., from Muhammad Ali Pasha, in establishing western standards in governing of Egypt, from Pashko Vaso in founding a multi-confessional Lebanon, or more, the diversity and harmony among Sunnis and (Bektashi)-Shiites and so on, up to date, when Albanians did and do their best to reconcile in a model way the Christian Churches, as well as Christianity and Islam in their society, in which Mother


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Theresa is considered as a great mother of all Albanians, independently of their religious belonging.

Some General Views After mentioning this good model of religious coexistence in Albania, I would like to develop some personal views regarding the global order. 1. To Consider the Changes of Spatial and Temporal Contours of Globalisation In science one of the fundamental question was: How is the nature of space and time to be viewed, absolutely (“universally”) or relatively (“individually”)? In ancient time, Aristotle believed that if an object were in motion, then there must be some agent responsible for that motion, when that agent stops, the motion stops. According to Aristotle [2], there is a privileged being: The Prime Mover. He is the first agent, responsible for moving objects, which, in turn, move other objects. The Prime Mover, he argued, must be at Absolute Rest. Later, according to Galileo [3] the “absolute rest” has no universal meaning. And more, for him, the state of “being at rest” has been demoted from being a public, universal concept to being a private, personal concept. Through his Principle of Relativity Galileo establishes a sort of democracy among all inertial observers. Newton [4], from his part, states that there exists an absolute space and time. And this led to the understanding that there is no absolute (“public”) notion of speed, but the speed is a relative (“private”) concept. This is what led us to abandon Aristotle’s notion of absolute rest and replace his Space-Time with Galileo’s Space-Time. For Einstein [5] there is a fall of Absolute Time and Absolute Space. Space and Time are relative. Globalisation has a multidimensional (economic, political and cultural) structure and actually is defining a new framework for the world order. As a phenomenon the globalisation is inevitable and irreversible. As a process the globalisation has been going on for the past 5000 years, but it has significantly accelerated since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. From a humanist perspective, the philosophy of globalisation entails both positive and negative consequences: it is both narrowing and widening the income gaps among and within nations, intensifying and diminishing political domination, and homogenizing and pluralizing cultural identities. Although sharp differences continue to separate different people, there is a contemporary interpretation that endorses the view that globalisation and the “joint revolution” of information and telecommunication technologies are generating fundamental changes in the spatial and temporal contours of social existence. Geographical distance is typically measured in time. As the time necessary to connect distinct geographical locations is reduced (particularly, electronically), distance or space undergoes compression or “annihilation”. Changes in the temporality of human activity inevitably generate altered experiences of space or territory. But those alterations in humanity’s experiences of space and time are undermining gradually the importance of local and even national boundaries in many fields of human endeavour [6]. It embodies itself a transformation in the spatial-temporal organization of social relations and transactions (expressed in interconnectedness, in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power).

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2. To Grow the “Place” of Interdependence in “Face” of Independence In this perspective, to conceive a new world order one of the basic political concepts to be reformed is that of national sovereignty, because in an integrated world all important policies might be global. This is why, it is believed, that instead of the old concept of classic independence or sovereignty, it is necessary to elaborate better the concept of interdependence in order to make compatible the principle of self-determination with the principle of interdependence. This is also the way to make compatible the concept of national sovereignty with the concept of globalisation and its sub-phenomenon – regionalisation. It does not mean the dissolution of national sovereignty, but rather the sovereign choices states are making to devolve more power to regional authorities or to pool their sovereignty within supranational authorities. The establishment of the Euro as a common currency is one of examples of the pooling of sovereignty in certain areas of governance. In the framework of this “twofold” state, there is no sense to permit or “digest” that any kind of domestic issue, Balkans was one illustration, Middle East is another, had the potential to become a source of human conflicts and bloodshed. Also, in the perspective of a balanced binomial: sovereignty-interdependence it is possible to perceive Kosovo as a new state, integrated step by step to NATO and EU. 3. To Convert the Human Rights in a New Space-Time Environment to an “Ideology” The compression of space-time is becoming more trivial through e-communication, eeconomy or e-business. In this process, the national boundaries and separated territories between domestic matters and global affairs are becoming economically fluid, even “transparent”. As a consequence, this new space-time conception of economic activity is inevitably attacking the political fundament of Nation-State Westphalia construction of world order, generating a gradual erosion of the old concept of state sovereignty in many aspects. One of them is the international protection of Human Rights, and its extreme pressure – the international intervention. The international standards of the Human Rights and their implementation are definitely challenging the idea that sovereignty provides governments with insulation against accountability provided that their actions are confined to territorial limits, and that their leaders have an immunity respected throughout the world. The fundamental idea that governments must act within certain prescribed limits – that even political and military leaders might be held accountable of their actions (if they amount to crimes against humanity and severe patterns of human rights abuse) represents an important legal, political and social development. For the most part of them there is no longer any secure place to hide in the world, particularly now with the establishment of a permanent International Criminal Court in Hague (Rome Treaty of 1998). The indictment of such hierarchy as Serb president S. Milosevic, or other political and military leaders of Former Yugoslavia and their judgment in ICTY, for inflicting horror on citizens, applying a policy of ethnic cleansing and genocide to Bosnia and Kosovo populations, is a clear demonstration of a great ethical and Human Rights achievement of the 20-th century. But investigating and penalizing a collective crime, which is now considered as an international justice responsibility, doesn’t mean, by applying the “principle of less action”, to obtain political and ethnic balances by investigating and penalizing individual crimes, which are and have to be countries judicial responsibilities. There are some signs of this kind of “extrapolation” in the case of ICTY…


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Parallel to the action of the International Structures, the significance of human rights is also a consequence of pressures mounted by activists of civil society, at local, national or international level. Particularly, the rise of international human rights NGOs is expressing new modes of transnational political action in this new space-time environment. But, still today, besides the common efforts at each level and structure, there are some deformations, caused by the old conception or misconception of geopolitical priorities, or based on the global fight against terror, which are producing even proauthoritarian interventions and severe deformations, at the expense of human rights and democracy. Another problem, under international optics, is also the fact that the real power still remains at the level of the state, while the international legal enforcement mechanisms associated with the implementation of human rights are relatively weak. For these reasons, the “subversion” of sovereignty by human rights regulations is, in some cases, more apparent than real, while in several key settings becomes real as well as apparent. However, in general, we can speak about a positive trend. Particularly, the transnational NGOs, dedicated to the promotion and implementation of human rights, have created a strong set of non-state political actors onto the global stage. With the norms of human rights having been legitimated by governments, the claims for implementation by these NGOs are difficult to be discounted, especially in the actual space-time environment, joined by a powerful global media. It is “pushing” the politics to resize the essence of the concept of sovereignty. The fundamental question today is: Could we transform the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and respective Conventions to a doctrine, to a kind of ideology, to a “universal religion” for all the humanity? Because, it is believed, that this human doctrine is supporting and will continue to support the democratic and secular building of the state, on one side, and, it makes the citizen equal to each-other (independently of religious, racial, ethnic belonging, etc.), on the other side. And more, related to the human rights, in this general view, it might be useful to transit gradually to the sovereignty of citizen, to his rights, accepted globally, instead of those of ethnic or national size. Perhaps, like that, through a step by step conceptual transformation, within the twofold concept: Sovran and Interdependent, i.e., by less accentuation of the ethnic minority concept in international political–institutional practices, it is possible to go to the concept of Sovran citizens, all equals in front of law. This could be the world order of the Sovran Citizen. G. Soros was right saying: “A world order based on the sovereignty of states, moreover, cannot take care of our common human interests. The main source of poverty and misery in the world today is bad government – repressive, corrupt regimes and failed states. And yet it is difficult to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries because the principle of sovereignty stands in the way… There are penalties for bad behaviour, from trade sanctions to military intervention, but not enough incentives and reinforcements for good behaviour” [7]. And behind these penalties or incentives are living simple people, not only some autocratic leaders. For the human emancipation, to the first group, which is majority, we must pay too much care and attention in our national or international actions. And the simple people need more incentives than penalties, more democracy and normal standards of living than different kinds of sanctions.

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4. To Reduce at Maximum the Poverty and Digital Division Fighting against terror and joined phenomena, increasing human security or guarantying global peace does not mean merely absence of war and conflicts, but absence of all those profound reasons which cause these conflicts and wars. Among them, in the process of globalisation, a very serious question, treated as a human injustice in socioeconomic context, or as a lack of morality and human solidarity, is the poverty in global scale. Actually, much of the world is desperately poor. Over a billion people have been left behind to survive on less than 1–2 dollars a day. But, with modern communication and the aggressive marketing of Western culture the poor are now much better informed about how the other part live. It is hardly surprising that there is widespread hostility to globalisation as a Western ramp. Regarding this question, the answer is not to give up, but how to help the poor countries and to make compatible the globalisation with a new kind of moral meta-capitalism at the international level. Many countries in the world (including Albania and other former communist countries in the region) during this last decade have made a concrete move to good democratic governance, but not yet to a sustainable development and reduction of poverty. Under this optics, also, the experience on the help and assistance of different poor regions has to be changed. Lecturing the poor countries and criticizing their own weak governance, whilst providing little money to support technological advance, public health, education and other needs, is cheap all right. But simply, it does not work. This strategy has to be changed, particularly regarding the international financial institutions or UN bureaucracy, the financial exaggeration on the demands and training, or on parallel “software” projects, including those of the institutions such as IMF and WB (In Albania, the coefficient of “effectiveness” of the “hardware” part is never passing 20–25% in different projects). The humanitarian aids, also, at some extension, are not only uncoordinated and realized through different associations and institutions, but they are conceived, in many cases, as high salaries for their international employees, as profit for donators and their organizations, or more, they are channelled by interests of geopolitical nature. And more, in general, the international “methodology” is much more based on the promises than the concrete steps or real contributions… Another problem is the fact that with the end of the Cold War, old ideological divisions are mostly over, but a more intractable division is taking hold, this time based on technology. A small part of the globe, accounting for about 15% of the earth’s population, provides nearly all of the world’s technology innovations. A second part, perhaps half of the world’s population, is able to absorb and adopt these technologies. The remainder, around a third of the world’s population, caught in a poverty gap, is technologically disconnected. Ironically, this trend is accentuated by the increasing importance of information technology, which puts greater power and economic rewards in the hands of the wealthy and well-educated people. The question is not how to impede the digitalisation of the world, but how to bridge the digital divide, at least how to create the chances for many of the technologically-excluded regions to become technological adopters. This is not only a springboard for further democratic evolution and free trade liberalization, but also a necessary step against the actual technological division. Otherwise we will capitulate in front of this injustice, which could be read as an analogy of the famous expression of George Orwell’s: “All animals are equal but some are more equal than others” [8]. And more, this reflects a kind of crude social Darwinism [9] in which the survival of the fittest depends on competition, not cooperation. In the economy, the competition could be among firms; in international relations, among


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states. But states are not only their institutions, but more their peoples living there. And among peoples, as human beings, what is necessary to be cultivated is not a wild competition, but a good cooperation! This is not only a global moral question but also a way to fight poverty and digital division, to develop democracy at any corner of the world. 5. How to Accelerate the Process of Integration? There is a strong belief that the process of integration to the NATO and EU is the key issue for Western Balkan region. Also, a rapid accession of Turkey to the EU is very important, not only in the process of mutual development, but more, to strengthen a powerful bridge for the reconciliation of different religions and cultures. On the crossroads of several civilizations, as Albright has mentioned, Turkey has much in common with Europeans and great relations with people in the Middle East and Asia – another reason why Turkey should become a member of the EU, as soon as possible (The best example is the NATO membership of Turkey long time ago and the very positive consequences following it). Regarding the positive reflection of this process of integration, it clear that “the successful conclusion of Turkey’s accession process to the EU will represent a higher degree of integration and harmonization of a Muslim society with the peoples of Europe on the basis of common universal and democratic values… In the same vein, millions of Muslims living in Europe today will draw a positive message for integration into their host societies. This will also demonstrate that inclusiveness can prevail over exclusivity, strengthening the European case for the universal applicability of the values it advocates” [10]. Considering the next future of all Western Balkan region, its international collaboration and its association to NATO and EU, the general opinion is that actually more support is needed for the progress of its hardware or material infrastructure (roads, water, electricity, etc.) than for its software or human infrastructure (institutional reforms, training, social projects, etc.). This will contribute to reduce the actual economic gap between the Balkan region and the EU. In this optics, a real regional integration, the implementation of regional policies and joint economic and infrastructure programs are a good approach to the European integration. Also, the creation of a free trade zones, under the mutual free trade agreements, the implementation of a common fiscal legislation and customs unification, the establishment of a regional “common economic space”, or “mini Schengen” are quite welcome. Otherwise, more problems and difficulties will be created towards the free movement for citizens of Albania and other countries, which will be the last ones to be integrated to the EU, particularly after the last “selected” European Big Bang. More dangerous for the region could be the application of the concepts of artificial ranking or states classifications in Europe. On our path forward, the criteria of different democratic reforms must not and cannot be built upon spontaneous or burocratic interpretations of special “models”, but, at the same time, on universal and specific parameters. Also, a mechanic borrowing of the models of other countries is not certain to be successful if it does not consider local conditions or it is not founded on specific political, social, economic, psychological and moral factors. In general, “imposed” models are not giving always the right results, because a positive model could be “exported”, but not the necessary mentality to hold it. And more, the change of mentality is an evolutionary process, not a “revolutionary” one.

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We have seen this kind of problems during the close cooperation with different international institutions. However, independently of positive or negative results, this kind of interaction and overlapping is a necessary correlation in the internal dynamics of two aspects: independence and interdependence. At the same time, there is a need to encourage all the ongoing changes designed to increase effectiveness and dynamism at international level. There is therefore a pressing need for reforms in the international architecture, as well as to ensure that inertia does not gain the upper hand over dynamism, and especially to ensure a better consensus, compatibility or reconciliation of the two simultaneously complementary and contradictory objectives, namely democratisation and effectiveness.

Conclusion In the actual process of globalisation, we are facing terrorism. This is not a “clash of civilization”, but an evil manipulation of different religions, using many lacks of today society, In order to overcome various difficulties in the framework of the human security we must strongly combat the growing poverty in a large part of the world and particularly the technological division. At the same time, it is a necessity to achieve worldwide high human standards, based more fundamentally on several “pillars”, such as: the moral free market economy on a global level; the “ideology” of peace, freedom and human rights as a “philosophy” of this century; the empowerment of international instruments of justice, security and policy-making, a kind of common sense revolution in our space-time thinking and behaviour, referring to dualism interdependencesovereignty, to the relation of the individual with the neighbourhood, community, state or international structures and law.

References [1] Sulejman Demirel, Islam in Turkey, its place in people’s lives and its reflections on politics, Daily New, 15 April, 2004. [2] George Sarton, A History of Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952–66. [3] Galileo Galilei, Le Opere di Galileo Galilei, Edizione Nazionale. 20 vols. Edited by Antonio Favaro. Florence: Barbera, 1890–1909; reprinted 1929–1939 and 1964–1966. [4] Isaac Newton, (Sir, 1642–1727). Isaac Newton’s Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica/Isaak Newton; assembled and edited by Alexandre Koyr and I. Bernard Cohen, with the assistance of Anne Whitman. 3rd ed. [reprinted]: with variant readings. [London], Cambridge University Press, 1972; Newton I, Letter to Boile of 1679, “Isaak Newton”, Acad. Vavilov S.I., published by The Academy of the Sciences of the USSR, Moscow-Leningrad, 1943, in Russian, p. 95–98. [5] Albert Einstein, The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, V. 2 (1989), V. 3 (1993), V. 4 (1995), V. 6 (1996), V. 7 (2002). [6] See, Rexhep Meidani, The traps of Nation-State (in Alb.) Ed. Toena, Tirana 2005. [7] George Soros, America’s Global Role, The American Prospect, Vol. 14, Iss. 6, 2003. [8] Orwell, George, Animal Farm (First Edition). New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946. [9] George Soros, The Atlantic Monthly; February 1997; The Capitalist Threat; Volume 279, No. 2; pages 45–58; America’s Global Role, The American Prospect, Vol. 14, Iss. 6, 2003. [10] Suleyman Demiral, Islam in Turkey, its place in people’s lives and its reflections on politics, Daily New, 15 April, 2004.


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The Development of Religion in Post-Communist Albania Miranda VICKERS

Since the lifting of the ban imposed in 1967 on all forms of religious worship, Albanians have re-embraced religion in the same relaxed manner as their forefathers. Throughout their turbulent history, Albanians have shifted with relative ease from one religion to another – being Catholic, Orthodox or Muslim according to how this best served their interests at the time. In the late Middle ages, their lands became the battlefield between the Catholic West and the Orthodox East. Whenever the West was advancing, the Albanian feudal lords espoused Catholicism, whenever Byzantium was the victor and the West retreated, they embraced Orthodoxy. From the 18th century, the threat posed to the Ottoman Empire by the wars with Russia encouraged the Porte to increase taxes on all non-Muslim subjects, whilst those who converted to Islam had their taxes lowered and were given grants of land and the right to bear arms. These and other incentives led to mass conversions amongst Albanians, who gradually adopted at least the outer signs of the Islamic faith. However, the majority of Albanian converts were men, whilst women, though married to Muslims, often retained their Christian beliefs and were thus a factor in creating good feeling between the adherents of the two faiths. Following the establishment of the independent Albanian state in 1912, no official state religion was recognised during the inter-war period, although freedom to practice religion was guaranteed. After the Communist victory in 1945, there was an intensive drive to educate Albanians towards understanding and accepting the new socialist ideology aimed at destroying the old patriarchal, conservative customs and traditions. This led to the abolition of all religious practices in 1967 when Albania was declared the world’s first totally atheist state. After the collapse of the one-party state in 1991, the ban on religion was lifted, resulting in a gradual revival of religious practice together with the restoration and rebuilding of churches and mosques. In the immediate aftermath of the end of communism, by far the most aggressive manifestation of religious fervour came from the Christian evangelical movement. Missionaries and clerics from a variety of European and American Churches flooded into Albania, much to the bewilderment of Albanians as many of these highly motivated zealots came from the wilder fringes of cultist movements. Hundreds of thousands of Bibles in Albanian were feverishly printed to match a similar number of Korans being sent from the Islamic world. Before long however, many Albanians had become irritated by these insistent, humourless and dogmatic missionaries or “soul buyers”, who were gradually eclipsed by the other three main religions because they could only offer visas to paradise in the next world rather than offer an escape from the grinding poverty of this world by providing a path to obtaining visas to Greece or Italy through conversion to Orthodoxy or Catholicism.

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M. Vickers / The Development of Religion in Post-Communist Albania

By the mid 1990s, representatives of all faiths were flocking to Albania. Islamic and Christian schools were set up and children and young men were sent abroad to study Christian and Islamic theology. Foreign Islamic organisations even funded the expenses of those Albanians wishing to travel to Mecca for the annual Hajj pilgrimage. Under Communism, more severe pressure had been placed upon the Catholic population than on other religious groups. This was due to the wartime heritage when some Catholics had undoubtedly collaborated with the Axis invaders and supported anti-Hoxhaist forces in the resistance movement. As a result, only 31 out of 200 Catholic priests survived the ban on religion in 1967. Most were either executed or died in prison. When the religious ban was lifted, it was the Catholic communities that were first galvanised into religious activity. Since these early days, the Catholic Church in Albania has grown significantly with many young people converting to take up scholarships in Italy and to generally improve their job prospects. Alone of Albania’s four main religions the Orthodox Church is closely linked with the ethnic Greek minority in the south of the country. In the early 1990’s, the Greek Orthodox Church, under the nationalist and extremist late Metropolitan Sevastianos of Drinoupolis, used the newly reviving Albanian Orthodox Church for Northern Epiriot propaganda via his Panhellenic Association of Northern Epirus. The archbishop was in charge of a sprawling diocese in Epirus in Northern Greece, which also includes a substantial part of southern Albania – known to the Greeks as Northern Epirus – part of which is home to Albania’s ethnic Greek minority. Many Albanians saw this Greek involvement as a threat to the independence of the Albanian church, and a plot by Greece to Hellenise and later annex southern Albania. Although the Panhellenic Association of Northern Epirus was very much on the fringe of contemporary Greek politics, its supporters were the first Orthodox personnel to initiate aid distribution to southern Albania in 1991. During this time, hundreds of Albanians changed their names to Greek ones and agreed to be baptized into the Orthodox faith in order not only to receive the precious aid parcels, but also to become eligible for a visa to work in Greece. The dispute between the Albanian and Greek governments over the number, status and rights of the ethnic Greek minority in southern Albania, has inevitably made the resurrection of the Orthodox faith in Albania more controversial than that of the other religions. At present there are relatively few signs of conservative Islam in Albania. Despite a gradual increase in the number of veiled women, and the recently emerged issue of girls wearing head scarves in state schools, the majority of Albania’s Muslims still pride themselves on their tradition of religious tolerance and moderation. Indeed, many are shocked by the overt display of Islamic zeal in the Albanian-inhabited districts of Western Macedonia, where ever more young girls are covering their heads and it is becoming almost impossible to find a bar or restaurant that serves alcohol in some places. However, during the past few years the Albanian Islamic community has witnessed an emerging conflict between older supporters of the country’s traditional, liberal interpretation of Islam known as Hanefi, and younger men who have returned from religious education in Arab countries and are supporters of the far less tolerant and more radical Selefi school of Islam. This has caused particular concern for members of Albania’s Bektashi community, which practices the most liberal form of Islam that has put them in direct confrontation with Selefi supporters. Since the mid-1990s thousands of Albanians have traveled to Arab and Muslim countries on educational scholarships, with many returning to Albania embracing different religious schools other than the Hanefi, which is traditionally predominant in the


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Balkans. These foreign educated students now dominate several Koranic schools, mosques and other Islamic institutions in Albania. There is little doubt that these young men have a stronger sense of Islamic identity than older Albanian Muslims, who are in general less educated in Koranic studies and general Islamic issues. Foreign Islamic relief organisations have substantial aid packages which makes it very difficult for local groups without such funds to try and maintain Albanian Muslim tradition, against those influenced by imported Islamic practices. Such local organizations do not have the financial resources to address the material and spiritual needs of their constituents. As a consequence, older Albanians with their tradition of tolerance risk being marginalized by foreign Islamic groups who prefer to focus their “assistance” on the spiritually malleable youth. Historically, there have been two forms of moderate Islam in Albania – Bektashi and Sunni. Now, however, it could be argued that a third, more radical Islam is slowly being introduced in the country as a growing number of young men return to Albania from studies at Islamic institutions abroad. Since the mid-1990s thousands of Albanians have travelled to Arab and Muslim countries on educational scholarships, with many returning to Albania embracing different religious schools other than the Hanefi, which is traditionally predominant in the Balkans. These foreign educated students now dominate the Koranic schools, mosques and other Islamic institutions in Albania – a fact that is causing concern to older, less conservative members of Albania’s Muslim Community. There is little doubt that these young men have a stronger sense of Islamic identity than older Albanian Muslims, who are less or completely uneducated in Koranic studies and general Islamic issues. There are two rival groups within Albania’s (non-Bektashi) Islamic Community (AIC, formerly known as the Albanian Muslim Community), which is a loose informal representative body of the country’s active mosques. The Selefi faction is an antimodernist school, which is led by the deputy leader of the community, Ermir Gjinishi, and promotes a strict traditional interpretation of Islamic doctrine. The Hanefi school led by Selim Muca, advocates a more traditional Sunni state-controlled Islam. Recently there has been a noticeable change of atmosphere in several mosques in Tirana and other main towns where the Selefi faction has consolidated its control. When once there was an extremely warm welcome for the foreign visitor from young and old alike, one is greeted now, especially if the visitor is female, with downcast eyes and furtive looks. The attractive and once inviting mosque on Tirana’s Ruga Kavaja, and the secretive little mosque hidden in the capital’s old market, now exude an atmosphere of suspicion towards foreigners. Visitors feel less welcome as young men recently returned from study in Saudi Arabia or the Yemen, appear unwilling to sit and chat to foreigners as was the custom in the very recent past. This contrast between older traditionalists and young men educated abroad has created sharp divisions within Albania’s Muslim community as more young men return from training schools in increasingly radical Islamic environments, which is causing conflicts to emerge between the older and younger generations. Many young men who have studied abroad, are not accepted by the older community upon their return to Albania because they are often perceived as “potential terrorists”, who are bringing unwanted and unnecessary attention on Albania’s Muslim Community. There has been strict monitoring of all Islamic associations and foundations in Albania since 1998 when a cell of the radical Egyptian Islamic Jihad was discovered in Tirana and the central Albanian town of Elbasan. Following the September 11 (2001) attacks in the United States, intelligence monitoring of Islamic organisations and per-

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sonnel has significantly increased, creating a more difficult climate for radicals to operate in. As a result, over the past few years a number of Islamic organisations have left Albania. Many Albanian Muslims, however, are angry at the intense scrutiny of their community, whilst the activities of the numerous fundamentalist Christian groups that operate throughout Albania attract little outside attention. Some Albanians believe that one reason Europe appears to be in no rush to embrace Albania is that the majority of the population come from a Muslim background, and that the world is now dominated by what they perceive as anti-Muslim sentiments directed at them. Recent attempts by young Muslims educated in Arab countries to introduce proposals to change religious rituals within the Muslim community have been defeated by moderate elements. The proposals were to change the medh’hebi (the direction of thought of a man well versed in Islamic religious rites), from the traditional Hanefi school to the more radical Selefi. After a long debate, the General Council of the Islamic Community agreed by consensus not to alter the traditional religious rituals in favour of “imported” rituals, which many older Albanian Muslims deem to be extreme and fanatical. This is seen as an encouraging victory for local Muslims who have sanctioned the continuation of a tolerant, liberal stance towards Islam. Supporters of the Selefi, however, are increasing all the time as more young men return to Albania to work for a stricter and more rigorous implementation of the Prophet’s teachings. Today Albania’s Muslims – both Sunni and Bektashi – are facing many difficult issues and pressures as outside influences threaten their traditional beliefs of tolerance and moderation, and evangelical Christian extremists stereotype and distort their beliefs. The attempts by foreign Muslim extremists to impose a very different brand of Islam have been until recently, successfully resisted. But with so many of Albania’s 431 mosques and Islamic NGOs now operating outside the control of the Albanian Islamic Community, it remains to be seen how long the country’s traditional Muslim values can be maintained. Historically, Albanians have demonstrated a relaxed attitude towards religion, and left to their own devices they would probably continue in that vein. Albania’s religious revival has not been without divisions and controversies, but these have all stemmed from foreign influences. The great challenge for Albania’s religious leaders today is to try and maintain the independence of their respective faiths in order to maintain the unique form of Albanian Catholicism, Albanian Orthodoxy and Albanian Islam.


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Religious Cohabitation in Albania: Constructing a Model or Constructing Reality Ermal HASIMJA

Around 1920, three American women and a 12 years old Muslim Albanian travelled in the heart of the northern mountains. They find shelter in a Catholic house, being sure that the traditional local hospitality will not deceive them. But something’s going wrong. The guests are waiting but the dinner is not coming. At two o’clock in the morning the “dinner” finally comes, and with it the explanation of the unusual delay: they had nothing but pork to offer to the guests, but knowing that the 12 years old Muslim boy can’t eat pork they sent someone to find food in the other side of the mountain. That’s why the dinner came so late. This episode is described in first person by a well-known libertarian writer, Rose Wilder Lane, and is part of her travel book on Albania. The symbolic event takes its meaning from a code that speaks about man, honor, and hospitality. This code does not speak about Catholics, Muslims or others. The separation of Albanians into these categories were traditionally operated by foreigners and not by Albanians themselves. In our days a lot has changed: communism came and fell apart, churches and mosques were destroyed and rebuilt, people saw 9/11 on TV and some even read Samuel Huntington while looking for cues to explain the mess all around us. But something didn’t change: the code. In Albania, we speak about poor and rich, abused citizens and corrupted politicians, Madonna’s latest album and the next match of national football team. But we don’t speak distinctively about Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox or Bektashis. Most of Albanians don’t even know the religion of their friends or colleagues, except when the religious names are evident. The common feature of the two chronological stages is the way we use our language. The limits of our language are the limits of our world. We build the world around us by our language. Something that is not formulated linguistically simply does not exist. That’s why a vocabulary that does not produce antagonist terms, does not produce conflicts. There is only one way to forge religious conflicts through linguistic tools: manipulating the communication code and giving a dominant position to a certain discourse, or to put it in different terms: to monopolise language and leave outside the others. Inversely, there are two main ways to prevent conflicts: avoid or destroy religious terms or create the conditions for their legitimate plurality. The Albanian nationalist Renaissance avoided the religious language in order to overcome centrifugal forces, the communist regime destroyed it to impede ideological competition, and finally the democratic transition has encouraged plurality to assure freedom and stability. Let’s focus on the latter. Today we have all the necessary religious freedom guaranteed by the constitution. This is enough for Albania, but apparently is not enough for

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E. Hasimja / Religious Cohabitation in Albania: Constructing a Model or Constructing Reality

other countries, which, just like Albania, have many religious communities. Does that mean that we keep somehow the secret or the formula to religious cohabitation? Many are tempted to answer by a strong “yes”. I am not. Albanian and international authors have emphasized what they call the “Albanian model of religious cohabitation”. However we should be careful while playing with words. A model of cohabitation is very different from a model of explanation of cohabitation. And what we have in Albania is the second rather than the first. A model of cohabitation supposes that there exists an intentional strategic project that aims to ensure cohabitation. Well, in Albania we didn’t need to wait for democracy to coexist peacefully with each other. We “performed” quite well even in such regimes like the Ottoman Empire or the King Zog’s autocratic regime. Several explanations have been given to argument what has been called a “model of cohabitation”. All of them strive to define what has been done to avoid conflict. Very few have looked to what actually... wasn’t done. I personally think that what wasn’t done explains far better the religious cohabitation in Albania. And what wasn’t done is precisely the unilateral shaping of the political language. Our language shapes us at the same time we spell words out. The discussion on religious conflicts in the Albanian case is the best illustration of that. While we speak of ways to avoid religious conflicts, we create the idea of religious conflicts. We create the idea that conflict is the almost natural state of religious relationships. This would certainly surprise the Albanian highlanders that welcomed Rose Wilder Lane and her Albanian Muslim translator. There was no law and no police to enforce the law in that mountain house. But this wasn’t a good reason to kill each other. There are no natural tendencies to conflict. The conflict is constructed. Or to put it differently, a conflict is written or spoken out in order to be read or listened to. In Albania, there is no conflict because no one is writing or speaking out the conflict, and from the logic of the political market, because no one would read or listen to. But, the absence of the conflict is not the product of a strategic project or a model that we could copy/paste in conflicting situations. In these situations, the conflict has been spoken and written and the language has already been raped, polarized and monopolized by each conflicting community or group. Every side is already speaking its own language and has its own Truth. It is only here that we could think about a model of cohabitation as a response to a situation of conflict. This model would imply the creation or the return to a common plural language and the abolition of the Truth. In a peaceful democratic society, religious Truth is a point a view, and everybody has the fundamental right to believe in it without impeding other to believe in their own Truth. The Albanian case gives us tips about two preconditions of a peaceful natural cohabitation: First, a strong separation of politics from religion. Behind religious conflict usually lie political reasons, because religious differences are high mobilizers. Second, the liberalization of language and the legitimate inclusion of all vocabularies in social deliberation, except those of racist or other discriminatory nature. The most important feature of Albanian political functioning was actually to expel religious vocabulary from party ideologies. One of the main reasons was the impossibility of capitalizing the votes of the Muslim majority (which is in fact a virtual majority, in absence of religious practice) in the only country in the Balkans which fully supports in the same time the US and E.U. policies. As in neighbouring Kosovo, religious parties are insignificant from the electoral point of view. However the fundamental condition for a peaceful coexistence remains the expulsion of unilateral religious lan-

E. Hasimja / Religious Cohabitation in Albania: Constructing a Model or Constructing Reality

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guage from the political confrontations and from the public space debates. From this point of view, attempts to interpret Albanian history or religious traditions as connected to specific religious identities are far more dangerous than any ordinary conflict.

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Religions and Religous Tolerance George FRENDO

1. Religion Can we still speak of religion in a secularized society? In a meeting for European Dominican Provincials in 1993, at which I was present, Hervé Légrand, a French Dominican theologian, said that we must give up speaking of secularization, which, he said, is a very ambiguous term. Let us rather speak of social change, and consequently of the need of the inculturation of religion. Without entering into discussion about the difference between secularization and secularism and about the different definitions attributed to either of them, I only want to point out to the way the process of secularism is usually defined. It is generally defined as that process by which God is gradually excluded first from public life, then from family life, and finally also from personal life. But can we state that in actual fact we are living in a world from which God, or rather belief in God, is excluded? Many contemporary sociologists of religion, like Peter Berger, Francis Fukuyama and Grace Davie, argue that this is not the case. It is true that religious practice is dwindling in many western countries, but that does not mean that contemporary man has become a non-believer. At the most we can say that this is a non-practising society, but not a non-believing society. Grace Davie, who first used the phrase “believing without belonging” to depict the religious situation of contemporary Europe, illustrates her point by referring to two events: the 11th September in New York, and the sinking of the Baltic ferry, the Estonia, off the shores of Sweden. In both cases, where did the people go? “Straight to their churches.” Sweden is supposedly the most secular society in Europe. Yet the Swedish people went to the churches; “they expected them to be there, they expected the Archbishop to articulate on their behalf the meaning of that terrible event”. When, more than a decade ago, Jacques Delors spoke of the need “to give a soul to Europe”, and when, only two years ago Nicolas Sarkozy, Minister for the Interior in France and candidate for next year’s presidential elections, in his interesting book La République, les Religions, l’Espérance spoke of religion as furnishing man with that spiritual hope which the State cannot give, they were both, in my opinion, expressing man’s unquenchable thirst for God and man’s basic need to enter into communion with God. No one and nothing, not even Enver Hoxha’s militant anti-theism, can eradicate man’s spiritual yearning for God. Man cannot deny God without, at the same time, denying himself. St Augustine described this yearning for God in that famous expression of his: “You have made us for yourself, Lord, and our heart is restless, until it rests in you.”

G. Frendo / Religions and Religous Tolerance

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2. Religious Tolerance Pope John XXIII, in his Encyclical Letter Pacem in Terris, published in 1963 (shortly before his death) considered religious freedom as one of the fundamental human rights, and based on the dignity of the human person. The Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom goes on to explain that this freedom means that nobody is forced to act against his convictions in religious matters in private or in public. Moreover, it states that “this right of the human person to religious freedom must be given such recognition in the constitutional order of society as will make it a civil right” (n. 2). The Declaration also welcomed the fact that “religious freedom has already been declared a civil right in most constitutions and has been given solemn recognition in international documents” (n. 15). Is it still necessary to speak of religious freedom and tolerance in the post-modern and post-1989 pluralistic world? Is religious intolerance compatible with a pluralistic society? Or rather, is it imaginable that in a pluralistic society religious intolerance be still possible? I think that only until not more than 60 years ago (that is, until the end of World War II; and some would say even until 1960) a definition of society necessarily included community of ideas. And this community of ideas included common religious beliefs and moral standards. Religious non-conformity was allowed only so long as it was private. This is still the case today with some countries. But the new epoch of post-modernism brought with it what we now call “pluralism”, not only political, but also cultural, religious, etc. So long as this means tolerance in the face of political, cultural, and religious differences, that is well and good. But there are many side-effects of pluralism. I shall refer to only two of them. First, pluralism tends to relativise moral principles and the very concept of religion itself. This eventually leads to a neutral attitude in the face of values. But this is a misunderstanding of tolerance. Tolerance and peaceful cohabitation do not mean sacrificing moral absolutes and religious beliefs. A second side-effect of pluralism is what I consider as the great paradox or irony of pluralism: the birth of new forms of conflicts and intolerance. Jonathan Sacks, the Chief Rabbi of the Hebrew communities of the British Commonwealth, in his very interesting book The Persistence of Faith, makes this observation: “Pluralism leads us to expect a growth of tolerance, while in fact it lays the ground for new forms of intolerance. By dismantling and privatising the concept of a common good, it means that no one position is forced to come to terms with the reality of any other. It is no accident that as pluralism has gained ground, there has been a sharp increase in racial tension and anti-semitism.” And as a matter of fact, we have seen this happen in many excommunist, but also in some western European countries, where new forms of fundamentalisms, dangerous nationalisms, and racisms and nazism have emerged. Can religions be sources of conflicts and intolerance? John Lennon’s popular song Imagine dreams of a world where there will be no religion, and this, he says, will lead to a peaceful life. As if religion is the sole or main stumbling block for a peaceful society! The ex-Archbishop of Canterbury Dr George Carey affirmed that religion “is often a potent binding agent for societies and cultures, part of their fundamental sense of self. And in situations where conflicts arise between communities so defined, politicians and others will often use religion as a way of justifying and even sharpening the conflict.”

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And in our own times we have witnessed the truth of this statement. Just think of the conflicts in the Balkans, where religion has been instrumentalised by politicians who have given a religious physiognomy to the wars they were waging, as if these were conflicts between Muslims and Orthodox Christians. Or the conflicts in Northern Ireland, where conflicts between pro-Britain and pro-Ireland assumed the form of conflicts between Protestants and Catholics. Prince El Hassan bin Talal was certainly right when he affirmed, in the general assembly of the World Conference on Religion and Peace held in Amman, Jordan, in November 1999: “What are described as ‘religious conflicts’ usually have little to do with religion and even less to do with religious doctrine.” And in a similar vein Bodo Hombach, in an address given in Budapest just one year after the conflict in Kosovo, at the time when he was Special Co-Ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, made this bold statement: “Peace and reconciliation are key religious themes of our times. But we should be conscious that very recently, and not at all far from here, cynical and greedy people instrumentalised religion to help fan the flames of conflict to achieve their brutal – usually in some from economic – ends.” Religions are for peace, because religions are expressions of belief in and communion with God, creator of all mankind. And this lays the basis for true brotherhood and genuine peace. If in certain circumstances it would seem that this is not true, then we must admit that there is a misconception or instrumentalization of religion and of God himself. No war can ever be waged in the name of God.

3. Beyond Tolerance Albania has always boasted of its tradition of peaceful inter-religious coexistence, and rightly so. Prior to his visit to Albania, on the 25th April 1993, Pope John Paul II said: “I earnestly desire that this visit will serve to strengthen the traditional bonds of fraternal cohabitation which have characterized the relations among the different religions in your country.” And Excellency Alfred Moisiu, President of the Republic, in his address to Albanian Ambassadors serving in different countries, on the 30th August 2002 made this comment: “We cannot ignore the existence of different religions in our country, rather we appreciate their role for the creation of an atmosphere of tolerance in our society. Albania can boast of the harmonious co-existence among religious communities. A fundamental characteristic of Albanian civilization is its religious tolerance, and this leaves no room for fundamentalists of any religion whatsoever.” But to what extent are we giving witness of a peaceful co-existence that goes beyond mere tolerance? Tolerance is the bare minimum required for a peaceful coexistence. I’m ok, you’re ok; I mind my own business, and you mind yours. But religion demands more than that. It is not enough just to have a drink together with the Orthodox, Muslims, and Bektashians on the occasion of Easter or Bajram. I here refer to a Russian Orthodox theologian, Olivier Clément, who coined the phrase prophetic partnership. In other words, we must make a common effort to discover the common prophetic role of our religions. And here we need to stress the importance of an interreligious dialogue, And by “dialogue” I do not mean a road to relativism, ideological or doctrinal compromise, or syncretism, nor just finding a way towards a passive acceptance of our “being different”, a modus vivendi, nor even just a peaceful co-existence. As Joseph Ellul has duly observed: “Inter-religious dialogue is based on mutual respect, but also upon sincerity


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and frankness, Its role is not that of suppressing differences, but at looking at them as a means for creating mutual understanding, respect and enrichment. It implies maintaining one’s religious identity while respecting that of the other, it demands listening as well as speaking. It is an ongoing challenge to deepen one’s own faith while appreciating that of the other.” Discovering our common prophetic role demands first of all an act of faith in the one true and living God who is love; an act of faith in our common dignity as human beings created by God in his own image; and an act of faith in our common vocation to know God, to love him and to know he loves us, and to enter in communion with him and listen to him. In his message for the World Day of Peace, 1st January 2002, Pope John Paul II emphasized the specific responsibility of religious leaders, whether Christian or non-Christian. He said that they must collaborate to eradicate the social and cultural causes of terrorism as they teach the dignity of the human person, and to jointly engage themselves in the promotion of peace. And I would like to conclude this short talk by quoting from the final message of the Inter-religious Assembly held in the Vatican City in October 1999: “We appeal to religious leaders to promote the spirit of dialogue within their respective communities and to be ready to engage in dialogue themselves with civil society at all levels. We appeal to all the leaders of the world, whatever their field of influence, to refuse to allow religion to be used to incite hatred and violence; to refuse to allow religion to be used to justify discrimination; to respect the role of religion in society at international, national and local levels; to eradicate poverty and strive for social and economic justice.” And I think that these words provide us with an excellent programme for further inter-religious dialogue and collaboration!

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State-Religion Relations in Transition Albania Ilir KULLA

The experience of the ex-communists countries with religion was really an epoch which for years will be more and more interesting for the researchers, historians and politicians. Countries, which for the reasons of their ideology constricted the freedom of the religion belief, punished the freedom of the belief and even in the case of Albania they prohibited the freedom of religion belief and constructed the state on principles that were totally atheistic, so denying God. Paradoxically, as much as God was denied, in human terms was raised the parameter of the personality cult, turning the religion instinct in this way, in the ex-dictatorial communist regimes. In other words, on this basis was raised the religion life in the countries of the ex-communist East block after ’80 and during ’90. For that reason, it had a strong power interrelating from one side with the power of a new strong society which was coming into being and in the other side in the divine force, which for the common (ordinary, modest) people had won the struggle with communism. For those people and for those societies the All-powerful Creator had done what missiles and bombs were incapable of doing, destroying communism. This is why in almost all the east European governments from the Balkan as far as the Russian Federation, a very special attention was given to the relations with religious authorities. For a major part of the politicians of that time, communism started to decline after 1978, the time when Cardinal Vojtila became Pope. Commencing from these bases the post communist governments saw their priority as not only the return of religious beliefs, but also preparing the necessary basis for their religious practice of the respective congregations. A priority was the reversion of the mobile and immobile properties, which clerical institutions had lost during the dictatorship. Special treatment was dedicated to the recognition of the sacrifices of the clerics killed or imprisoned where the pressure of the state was higher, as in the case of the Croat archbishop Aljosha Stepinaç or the Albanian Cardinal Koliqi. To summarise, men of the state after ’90 in all the east countries, felt the moral responsibility through which they not only had to return freedom at their citizens, but in the same time was important that justice for the past was done without revenge. In most of the ex-communist countries this period passed without problems, even where the political transition was difficult. In general, this happened in countries with unified religious beliefs such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania and even Bulgaria where the Muslim Turk minority which has had problems. But in other countries such as in ex Yugoslavia, reawakening of religious beliefs came with strong and violent social and political confrontations at the base of which was religious and ethnic division. Reawakening of religious beliefs was manipulated by the

I. Kulla / State-Religion Relations in Transition Albania

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politicians and despite of the creation of the necessary laws that guarantied the freedom of the religious beliefs, the manipulation of religious beliefs brought that result that we all know in ex Yugoslavia, with about 300.000 killed persons in 4 years. The return of the freedom of religious beliefs, coincided with the returning of violence and religious conflicts, gave arguments to the supporters (not small in number )of the previous ex communist and atheistic regimes. They justified the restrictions on religion in their time in power, explaining that it was necessary to maintain social cohesion, which according to them could be always in danger for the reason of disunity caused by the religious ideologies. In reality the crises of the religious factor in ex Yugoslavian countries came for three reasons: Some of those who used to be atheistic extremists, returned as religious extremists. These persons generated religious and social violence continuously. In the chaotic situation a lot of them used these conflictions only to be enriched. Political powers turned to religious powers for support and on the other side religious powers turned to the political powers. The results of this we all saw in Yugoslavia. But, what were the official relations between the governments and religious communities in the countries in transition after ’90? In general these governments created special state agencies to manage the relations with the religious communities. Sometimes, these state or governmental agencies were pure Ministries and almost all the time under the direct dependence of the Chairmen of these governments, which for the reasons that we stressed above, have preferred to delegate more than necessary their powers in relations to the religious communities. In the experience of Albania this state agency was called first the State Commissariat then the State Committee for Religious Issues or Religious Cults. At the beginning it was under the authority of the Ministry of the Culture and after under the Council of the Ministers and lastly, it is again returned under the Ministry of the Culture. However, this agency has never had sufficient lawful powers to perform a more concrete and active role. It has played a coordinative role in the State-Religious Belief relations, but it never had the necessary funds to realize its work. Financing is one of the most delicate and important issue of this field. Often, lack of transparency of origin and their real destination of money, creates not only problems of fiscal type, but also problems affecting the national security of a country. In countries like Albania, the state didn’t finance religious work or activity. This was partly because of the financial weakness of the state, but also for the fact that the religious communities do not always want such a relation with state or government, which might lose the autonomy they regained after 1990. But, if in the absence of participation of the state in financial activities of Religious Communities ensured the all-around independence of these communities, the problem of external financing from abroad soon appeared. So, the fear of losing of the sovereignty gained after 1990 in relation with the state, led to these communities sometimes facing big problems inside them and in the relations Religious Community-State. In my opinion, it would have been good for respective states to have financed these communities partly from their budgets. It would has been good for the religious communities, not only for their stability, but also for national and public security. In general relations between governments, institutions and religious Communities have been good but beyond the smiles at Festivals and in public, there have often been not a few important tensions.

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I. Kulla / State-Religion Relations in Transition Albania

To conclude, we can say that in general in the countries in transition the freedom of Religious Belief has returned. Religious institutions have been strengthened, but they still are not as powerful as they used to be and often in their relations with respective countries they are not based on a true partnership basis. Governments often saw the relations with Religious Communities not as a civil obligation, but as a political obligation, unfortunately not escaping from the past atheistic communism mentality, at the basis of which was violence. The lack of a clear strategy has brought often the strengthening of religious conservationism in the ex communist societies. This has often isolated the religious institutions from the problems and perspectives of the poor, and may open a space for new radical influences. It is better for the security of a country, at least as in the case of Albania that a society is educated with the love and respect for God. In this way stability is increased, unlike society that under secularism often produce chaos and turbulence. In this sense religious communities could be not only a very good educator, but also a very good partner for states in transitions.


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Towards a Sustainable Peaceful Coexistence in the Balkans Anastasios YANNOULATOS

An essential contribution towards a peaceful cohabitation in the Balkans needs a systematic, ongoing and patient effort in four main areas: 1) fostering harmonious coexistence among different religious communities, 2) overcoming every form of violence, 3) re-evaluating the meaning and importance of nationhood, and 4) striving for authentic reconciliation and sustainable peace.

1. Fostering Harmonious Co-Existence Among Different Religious Communities Intolerance among co-existing religious communities can grow from either religious seeds (e.g. extreme fundamentalism) or non-religious roots (e.g. political, nationalistic, psychological or selfish factors). All these roots have played powerful role in the past, and continue unabated in the Balkans. On the other hand, peaceful co-existence of religious communities can also derive from two opposite starting points: an indifference to the religious experience, or a conscious experience of the inner-most essence of religion, as represented in the lives of many distinguished personalities of all religions. The position I want to emphasize is that in today’s Balkan world, the foundation for the development of a harmonious co-existence among religious communities, as well as along with non-religious groups, is a respect for the Declarations on Human Rights and a regard for one’s freedom of conscience. Nowadays, both Christian and Muslim scholars more or less approve of these Declarations. All religious communities must search for the principles of a healthy anthropology from the depths of their teaching and the best pages of their tradition. They should emphasize a sincere respect for every human being, and struggle for the development and prevalence of these principles to penetrate the ethos of their leadership and the education of their members. They can also collaborate in filling the great spiritual vacuum that has been created recently in many Balkan countries. Speaking again from our context, I have noticed that in the transitional period of the last years, a more general crisis in the system of values has emerged in our society, creating a crisis of confidence in all forms of authority, as well as an uncertainty about what is genuine. While slogans of utopian collectivism prevailed in the past, today’s message of self-centred capitalism bombards the youth. Within this spiritual vacuum, the religious communities are called to cultivate a faith in a supreme reality, in God and open new spiritual horizons that will strengthen moral ideas and inner discipline, as well as invigorate the endurance and creativity of the people. Of course, this can only happen under conditions of friendly co-existence with one another. By the grace of God, in today’s Albania this harmonious

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A. Yannoulatos / Towards a Sustainable Peaceful Coexistence in the Balkans

co-existence is a reality. And perhaps, this can become, in certain aspects, a positive model of religious co-existence within the Balkans.

2. Overcoming Every form of Violence Usually, those most tempted to violence are those who have power – whether it be political, financial, military or administrative power. These are able to impose their intentions through manipulation, misinformation, Violence, however, is found not only where the mass media points our attention. It also settles on smaller cities and communities – those thought to be safe. Violence often surprises us by its various forms of crime. It frightens us by destroying the human person through drugs, xenophobia and racism. And, tragically, some people do not hesitate to bring religious slogans and arguments into this wild dance of violence. An essential thing to recognize, however, is that this virus of violence lurks within each one of us, and in critical moments, infects our relations with others. Let us take care not to underestimate the aggressivity that hides within every human heart. In the struggle to overcome violence, religious communities can offer an important contribution, such as principles of eternal value, a vision of peace and reconciliation, living examples of peacemakers, and the power of continuous self-criticism and renewal. Please allow me to refer specifically to one case from our own situation in Albania. When in 1999, hundreds of thousands of victims of violence from Kosovo overran the country, the Orthodox Church rallied to embrace as many people as she could with practical love, never asking about their religious identity. The Church mobilized all her members, especially the youth and women. She motivated friends from all over the world, collecting more than $12 million, and developed a very wide outreach of affectionate care that relieved the suffering of more than 33,000 refugees.While voices from several circles tried to add religious tones to the war in Kosovo, we protested strongly, saying repeatedly that, “No one has the right to use the holy oil of religion to intensify the flame of armed conflicts; instead should use it as a divine gift to sooth the hearts, heal the wounds.”

3. Re-Evaluating the Meaning and Importance of Nationhood One surely needs great courage and spiritual strength to address this issue, since it has been the most complicated problem facing the Balkans in the last century. Religion has played a fundamental role in forming the culture, self-consciousness, and national identity of the peoples of the Balkans. The well-known words of the Bible, “Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord, the people whom he has chosen as his heritage” (Ps 33:12) have been used in many cases. Even people indifferent to religion, or those who profess themselves “atheists”, today support traditional religious bodies simply to justify and maintain their nationalistic interests. The Bible does not confine itself to the blessing and happiness of a pious nation. It opens a horizon of blessings to the entire world. It sees within this framework the development of a nation. No nation, regardless of how devout it is, can possess exclusively the infinite love of God. More specifically, being intimate with a faith does not mean that any nation or group of nations can claim the right to monopolize God, and to


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think of other peoples as second-class nations. St. Paul clearly stated that, God “made from one every nation of men” (Acts 17:26). All nations belong to the same humanity created by the same God. In this new era of globalisation, nations must confront the great problem of how to keep their identity and to resist uniformity imposed from the outside. Every nation may have an ambition and even the right and obligation to maintain its own identity. This argument, however, cannot be used at the expense of our neighbour, at the expense of truth and justice. For centuries, the people of the Balkans have lived together under powerful empires – the Roman, Byzantine, and Ottoman – creating their own culture under the influence of the other. This ability to live and develop together may continue in the new upcoming reality – the European Community. We must prepare the way by correcting the false, distorted image that we have of the other – xenophobic images that various nationalistic regimes have created through biased education and history. We must recognize the positive qualities of the other, and learn to cooperate together. The development and prosperity of one country can help the progress of her neighbour. The “other” must not be viewed as a threat; under certain circumstances it can be a blessing.

4. Striving for Authentic Reconciliation and Sustainable Peace Religion was used in the past, during critical times, to strengthen national identity and resistance. Today, religious leaders and people should fulfill a different high calling – to work, with enthusiasm and perseverance, for the reconciliation among nations and peoples, and to establish a sustainable peace in the Balkans and in the entire world. The great common enemy is hatred, and it is this that we must confront. Only through an intense and common effort can we hope to diminish and even heal this great disease. Like a serpent’s venom, suspicion and hatred have poisoned the hearts of thousands of people in the Balkans today. Authentic religious teaching and examples can cultivate the only antidote to this danger – the antidote of forgiveness and love within the hearts of people. Sustainable peace can not be established only with diplomatic and political negotiations. It is achieved mainly through the hard work of inspired people of faith, people who believe in the God of love and dedicate their lives to the struggle for creative initiatives for “The different religious communities must draw from the deepest and most genuine layers of their teachings and traditions, becoming inspired workers of reconciliation and peace. We should take the initiative to build a free and just society that respects the religious freedom and particularity of the other. We must build a society where the other does not cease to be God’s creation, and our own brother and sister, regardless of what he or she believes.” (Public Appeal 24. 6. 1999). The borderline between good and evil cannot be found among persons, social groups or peoples. It is located within the heart of every human being. Therefore, it is necessary that the light of love penetrate the innermost folds of our conscience and thought. Our common responsibility lies here. In summary, new initiatives, with creative thinking and wider perspectives, are necessary for a vision of peaceful coexistence among the peoples of the Balkans to become a reality. It must be stressed in particular, that every type of conflict and war in the name of religion is an offence against religion. We believe deeply that in this historic time, the only antidote to the hatred that has been sown in and threatens our region, and that is as dangerous as radioactivity in the

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long term, is initiatives of sincere love, carried out with boldness and persistence. Our ongoing proposal is this: With the active contribution of all religious communities and every person of good will, let us proceed toward a greater commonwealth of peace and solidarity that secures justice and human dignity for every person, every people, and every minority, ultimately leading to a deeper human culture.


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The Challenge of Proselytism for Religious Coexistence Jean-François MAYER

On 18 April 2007, three people – one German and two Turkish citizens – were savagely murdered at the offices of a Christian publishing house in Malatya, Turkey. The victims were found with their hands and legs bound and their throats slit. One was still alive when police arrived, but died later in hospital. According to the autopsy reports, there were a total of 156 knife wounds in the victims’ bodies, and their fingertips had been sliced repeatedly.1 Five men, all aged 19 or 20, were arrested on the spot, some while attempting to flee. Turkish newspapers said that all the suspects were carrying copies of a letter that read: “We did it for our country. They are trying to take our country away, take our religion away.” Prior to this incident, the publishing house had already been a target of nationalist protest. German chancellor Angela Merkel called on the Turkish authorities to combat the “climate in which such terrible murders are possible”.2 The previous year, Rahsan Ecevit, the wife of the late Turkish prime minister, Bulent Ecevit, who was a paragon of the Turkish secular left, told the press that missionaries were trying to divide Turkey, while a professor of history and sociology at the state-run Inonu University in Malatya said he believed that missionaries working in Turkey are focusing “on destabilization, manipulation and propaganda”.3 In response to this crime, Ziya Meral, a Turkish Christian convert and author in an op-ed, commented that “every non-Muslim is viewed as a potential traitor and conspirator that seeks to divide our country under the leadership of the Western powers”,4 while Pastor Isan, leader of an Ankara-based Protestant church, said on the BBC on 18 April 2007: “Yes, we are doing missionary activities. We are sharing our faith. Turkey’s supposed to be a secular country. We are free to share our faith just like Muslim people and other religious groups.” While unexpected, the savage crime did not come as a complete surprise to observers who had been observing controversies and suspicions surrounding Christian missionaries in Turkey in recent years. If one visits bookstalls around Turkish mosques, it is not difficult to find pamphlets critical of missionaries. Moreover, it is known that even some state agencies are paying close attention to missionary activities: in the previous year, Turkish intelligence agencies were reported to have prepared a document stating that foreign missionaries were promoting Kurdish separatism.5 Thus, the question of Christian missionaries in Turkey does not merely reflect religious prejudices: issues of national security and identity are also seen as being at stake. However, most people who read or heard this news in the media in April 2007 probably thought that the tragic event was primarily related to Turkish circumstances. This is not the case: in many places around the world, in various religious surroundings, and definitely not only in the Muslim world, there are tensions over proselytism. 6 Even in those

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J.-F. Mayer / The Challenge of Proselytism for Religious Coexistence

societies where religious affiliation tends to overlap with ethnic identity and where atheists are still assigned to a particular religious community, there are individuals who – out of dissatisfaction with their original faith or for other reasons – switch religious affiliations. Converts can make such a decision in a spontaneous way, responding to teachings that they have encountered in written form: one can thus meet converts to various new and old religions who had heard the call to their new beliefs without entering into any direct interaction with their chosen community prior to their conversion. In other cases, however, conversion derives from a personal interaction with friends or acquaintances, or with missionaries preaching some religious message. The faithful of several religions are indeed convinced that it is their sacred duty to share their truth with other people in their vicinity or in places far away from their homes. While contacts between religions have not always been peaceful, and proselytism has met with opposition in the past, one might have expected that, in a time of globalization, increased contacts between cultures and religions might lead to an acceptance that religion is a private, individual matter, and that people are bound to be exposed to a growing variety of religious messages that sometimes result in conversion. At least in the West, but in other places as well, the metaphor of a religious market has never been more appropriate. However, not only can adverse reactions to conversions be observed in different parts of the world, but they often show strikingly similar patterns, despite widely different contexts: Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims often express similar criticisms when facing proselytizers. Such reactions have had a long history in some places: in South Asia, for instance, one cannot understand the current debates on proselytism without some understanding of the nineteenth and twentieth century religious history of that region. Moreover, it is obvious that in areas that experienced colonial rule, anti-missionary reactions usually are part of a wider reaction against “unfinished decolonization”: the claim will be that independence was indeed gained, but minds remained colonized and now should be freed. It is not difficult to include “foreign” religions as one element in such a mindset: former colonial powers or other hostile forces are then suspected of attempting to achieve their old colonial goals through other means, and to make minds and spirits subservient to outside rulers. Despite the context of globalization and individualization, such debates do not disappear: rather, they take on new forms, and globalization may even add new dimensions to the perceived threats. More than ever, ideas and beliefs are circulating, communication has become easier than ever and the Internet increases accessibility to a huge variety of worldviews. In several cases, the religious players coming under fire are not representatives of traditional religious groups in the areas in question, but newcomers. Especially in places where religious and ethnic identities are closely connected, it is neither easy nor attractive to change one’s skin, so to speak, and to go over to the “other” side.7 It may often happen that conflicts over proselytism involve new missionary groups. In other cases, mainstream religions can also come under criticism when they are suspected of attempting to make inroads in new areas where they used to be poorly represented or not represented at all: such are the issues regarding Roman Catholic proselytism raised in countries of the Orthodox tradition, which has become one of the serious bones of contention between some Orthodox churches (especially the Moscow Patriarchate) and the Vatican,8 despite other factors that could bring them closer together. Whatever the type of religious group denounced (rightly or wrongly) for proselytizing, in several cases one can observe an alliance of so-called “traditional religions” within a given area against outsiders/competitors; this happens, for instance in Central Asia, where Muslim and Orthodox leaders present a united front against


47

challenges to their dominance. In several post-communist countries, both enthusiastic evangelical activists (not always culturally sensitive, although there have been improvements) and preachers of various new religious movements have been met with suspicion and opposition. In India, several states have implemented or are planning to implement legal measures against unethical conversions.9 In Sri Lanka, the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress established a committee of enquiry into conversions in the summer of 2006, while the Sri Lankan Parliament is to discuss a bill related to these issues. In March 2006 Algeria passed a law prohibiting efforts to convert Muslims to another religion. In early 2007 there was a sudden (and strangely simultaneous) eruption of accusations of Shi’ite proselytism targeting Sunnis in several Muslim countries, including several Middle East countries, Sudan, Egypt and Algeria.10 In the West, reactions against some new religious movements have also questioned their proselytism – and even French reactions against Muslim headscarves and other visible religious signs in schools were partly based on the claim that pupils should be protected against expressions of “proselytism”. The Balkans have not been immune to such discussions: Mojzes remarks that “the fear of proselytism... is almost universal” in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia and that “[t]he gradual intensification of the symbiotic union of ethnicity and religion resulted in the increasing fear of and aversion to proselytism, ending into the notion that proselytism ultimately denationalizes converts”. 11 As a Turkish scholar, Emre Öktem, wrote a few years ago,12 all the cases of proselytism that the European Court of Human Rights had had to deal with came from the Balkans, especially from Greece, since Article 13 of the Greek Constitution prohibits proselytizing. Of course, it remains to be seen what one understands as “proselytizing”, and we will return later to this issue. Greek jurisprudence does not ban any kind of missionary efforts, but only what are seen as abusive and intrusive practices; the report International Religious Freedom 2006 remarks that the law does not “seriously hinder” the activities of religious groups today, but it does nevertheless remain on the books. Since principles of religious freedom are currently widely accepted, people who are critical of missionary efforts rarely claim that they do not want to see other religions present, nor do they say that religious freedom should be abolished. Two main lines of arguments are presented and show remarkable similarities across countries and cultures: 1.

2.

While propagation of other religions is said to be perfectly acceptable, some religious groups are accused of using deceptive methods or abusing people in a situation of economic or psychological distress; consequently, such conversions are described as “unethical”, but the principle of conversion itself is not rejected (although one can often sense an unspoken tendency to do so behind such protestations). Other religions are said to have the right to exist and to preach their faith to anybody willing to listen. But missionaries are accused of concealing other interests and of having a double agenda: they are seen as tools of foreign interests, and their actions are seen as potentially divisive and weakening for the receiving country: “[T]oday’s Russians who denounce Protestant and Roman Catholic ‘spiritual invasions’ see themselves as defending an entire way of life, not just a religion,” writes Lawrence Uzzell.13

Such discussions have not left legal experts and representatives of missionary religious traditions indifferent. In the current pluralistic context, the right to convert people may be seen by some as potentially intolerant and as a violation of one’s private sphere or of the right of specific communities to preserve their cultural heritage, 14 leading

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some experts to question the inclusion of proselytism among the basic rights that make up religious freedom.15 The concern of many Christian religious bodies is a dual one: not to be all lumped together, on the one hand (i.e. not to be all accused of the dubious practices that may have taken place in some cases); and, on the other hand, to take into account new theological approaches to other religions as developed in recent decades, putting the emphasis on dialogue as much as on convincing others to change their beliefs. Consequently, there have been several church documents in recent years making a distinction between proselytism (which is seen as something negative) and evangelization (seen as legitimate). Proselytizing is then seen as “an unethical encroachment on the spiritual center of another person or community”, and is contrasted with evangelism as a way to share the faith with respect for “the otherness of the other” – but still likely to have disturbing effects.16 Thus, one could say that proselytism has become, as it were, the dirty side of missionary activities. A report of a seminar jointly sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church and the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Italy in May 2006 said: “All should heal themselves from the obsession of converting others”. 17 The meeting marked the beginning of an effort to issue a shared code of conduct on religious conversion and proselytizing.18 Moreover, on the threshold of the 100th anniversary celebrations of the 1910 Edinburgh World Mission Conference, the WCC general secretary has called for a peaceful, “ecumenically responsible”, “nonaggressive evangelism”.19 Whatever the vocabulary and the level of respect extended to the evangelized, it is not certain that such steps will be sufficient to appease the concerns and reactions of many of those who resent attempts at conversion.20 Where they are controversial, missionary activities are indeed not just seen as a private matter of conversion from one religion to another, but become a political issue. As Martin Marty perceptively summarized the situation nearly 20 years ago, “[w]hen people proselytize, they represent not just an impulse or an emotion but a world. Through their agency, one world advances and encroaches upon another”.21 From India to Turkey, the present author has repeatedly heard people tell him that missionary activities are subversive, that they undermine not so much religion, but national interests and state security, that they promote secessions, and that they ultimately support the agendas of foreign powers. “We found out that in addition to Islam [i.e. Islamic militants], Christianity has also been used as a tool to destabilize the country during the last bloody decade,” explained the director of the Algerian Ministry of Religious Affairs in April 2006, accusing some Christian sects of calling for a revolt in the Berber ethnic areas. 22 The fact that some missionary organizations present their approach in a systematic way and express it in voluntarist language does not assuage such fears and suspicions, 23 even more so at a time when such material can easily be found on the Internet. 24 And an era of globalization does not mean that such concerns will disappear: global developments may give even more threatening features to proselytism in the eyes of those who oppose it, especially when it is perceived as advancing the imperial agenda of the United States in particular25 or of the West in general. It can easily be interpreted as part of a wider struggle between “the West” and various religious entities, as a manifestation of the expansion of imperialist aspirations. Since it becomes increasingly easy for missionaries of every faith to travel, to the extent that there is now what are known as “short-time missionaries”, i.e. people who just go to a mission field for a few weeks or months (for instance, during summer holidays), we may expect such cases of frictions around missionary activities to remain an issue. The fact that missionary work has sometimes been mixed with humanitarian relief, without clearly distinguishing between them (as most mainstream religious groups do these days), also feeds suspicions and


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concerns.26 Probably the people in Tennessee who designed an Evangecube27 and distributed it along with aid to children in areas affected by the December 2004 tsunami meant well – but Buddhist activists who showed it to the present author in Sri Lanka in August 2006 were definitely not pleased. In an interesting and well-researched article on proselytism and human rights, Natan Lerner conceded that proselytism and the right to change one’s religion are not absolute rights,28 but need to be protected.29 There are border areas, however, where the limit between legitimate sharing of faith and unethical proselytism is not easily drawn: At which point is privacy infringed? Which kinds of support provided to a convert should be seen as illicit enticement? How far should rights of groups (e.g. fragile indigenous cultures) be protected? These are not easy issues on paper, and much less so in real life. As Lerner observed, issues of proselytism can become a clash between different rights.30 Proselytizing may be one of those elements creating tensions for a harmonious religious coexistence, especially in those places where religion and national identity are strongly connected. The response to such reactions and concerns is certainly not to impose a purely secular order as a preliminary condition to coexistence. The purpose of a constructive approach should rather be: 1.

2.

3.

4.

to create among the people an awareness that pluralism is a reality to live with – whether we like it or not, whether we see other religions as spiritually legitimate or not – and not to be escaped, since it won’t go away; to make clear to governments and other people in a position of power (civil or religious) that discrimination and attempts to preserve a monopoly are losing strategies in the long term, while the only proper answer is an intensification and renewal of the religious life of one’s own community; to encourage media to report accurately and responsibly on religion, including new or minority groups, something that first requires journalists to be wellinformed on religious topics – the role of the media in spreading distorted views in some cases or inciting suspicions should not be overlooked, as well as their potential for positive contributions; and to further awareness among missionary-inclined groups for the need to be culturally sensitive and that the perceived duty to spread one’s religious message should take into account a wider context in order not to become inflammatory. Strong links between religious legacies and national identities make such issues more complex, while rapid changes and the impact of globalizing forces necessarily engender strong reactions. This should not just be seen as an infringement on religious freedom, as is often the case: one should pay attention to the fears and concerns that such reactions express. Perceptions matter as much as facts. Reactions against both legitimate missionary work and questionable proselytizing won’t disappear: a proper understanding of religious dynamics and a sound knowledge of religious diversity may, however, limit overreactions. Appropriately designed teaching on the range of world religions in schools (and not only religious teaching within one’s own faith group) can make a useful contribution for furthering mutual understanding and preventing related tensions (not only those tensions related to issues considered in this article, but many others as well). It is not by chance that the shape of such teaching has been and continues to be a topic of heated discussions in various countries. High-profile summits and gatherings of religious leaders for dialogue may have their usefulness, but their impact sometimes remains

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limited, since it is not always an easy task to spread such ideas to wider constituencies. Teaching on religions, if done properly, has a significant potential for preventing future conflicts through educating people, at a time when we know there is no other way than coexistence.

Endnotes 1 Elizabeth Kendal, “Turkey: German seminary investigates Malatya murders”, ASSIST News Service, 1 May 2007, http://www.assistnews.net/Stories/2007/s07050002.htm. 2 Quoted by BBC News, 23 April 2007. 3 Yigal Schleifer, “Murders shine spotlight on evangelical activity in Turkey”, Eurasianet, 25 April 2007, http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav042507.shtml. 4 Ziya Meral, “The banality of the murders of three Christians in Turkey”, Turkish Daily News, 21 April 2007. 5 Cumhurriyet, 11 June 2006. 6 For a collection of essays on various cases (including a comparative overview by the author of the present article), see Rosalind Hackett (ed.), Proselytization Revisited: Rights Talk, Free Markets and Culture Wars, London: Equinox, forthcoming, January 2008. 7 This remark should, however, be nuanced: in an article, Paul Mojzes emphasized the fact that there have also been ambitions in the Balkans to convert other ethnoreligious groups into one’s own community, and that evangelical missionary work or the spread of new religious movements are not the only forms of proselytism that should be considered (Paul Mojzes, “Proselytism in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia”, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1–2, 1999, pp. 221–42). 8 The Roman Catholic Church strongly rejects the accusations of proselytism in Russia and other Orthodox countries. For an interesting analysis and refutation from a Roman Catholic perspective (while defending the right to welcome converts), see Walter Kasper, “Was heisst Proselytismus?”, Glaube in der 2. Welt, Nov. 2002, pp. 16–19 (the article was originally published in Italian in La Civiltà Cattolica, No. 153, 2002, pp. 531–41). 9 This is nothing new: the voluminous Niyogi Commission report on missionary activities in the state of Madhya Pradesh was prepared in the 1950s. However, there has obviously been an increase in reactions in recent years, a development probably linked to the impact of Hindu nationalist trends and ideas. 10 “Monde musulman: craintes de prosélytisme chiite”, Religioscope, 15 April 2007, http://religion.info/ french/articles/article_309.shtml. Obviously, such fears cannot be separated from the current concerns about the development of a so-called “Shi’ite crescent”. 11 P. Mojzes, op. cit. 12 Emre Öktem, “Les affaires de prosélytisme dans les Balkans portées devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, Turkish Review of Balkan Studies, Vol. 7, 2002, pp. 79–105. 13 Lawrence A. Uzzell, “Politics, propriety, and proselytism in Russia”, Review of Faith and International Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 2, Fall 2005, pp. 11–18. 14 “I am concerned by those dimensions of proselytizing religions that claim a right not merely to persuade individuals or groups of people of the truth as they see it but rather actively demonize, systematically discredit, and forcibly destroy and eventually replace nonuniversalist, noncompetitive indigenous religions. Quite often, indigenous religions, like all religions, anchor a total worldview, and their destruction usually entails a fundamental distortion of ethnic identities and histories” (Makau Mutua, “Proselytism and cultural integrity”, in Tore Lindholm et al. (eds.), Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004, pp. 651–68). 15 See Silvio Ferrari, “La liberté religieuse à l’époque de la globalisation et du postmodernisme: la question du prosélytisme”, Conscience et Liberté, No. 60, 2000, pp. 9–23. 16 John C. Haughey, “The complex accusation of sheep-stealing: Proselytism and ethics”, Journal of Ecumenical Studies, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1998, pp. 257–68. 17 “Vatican/World Churches study warns of conversion ‘obsession’”, Ekklesia, 17 May 2006, http://www. ekklesia.co.uk. 18 Such efforts are not new: in 1995, a joint working group of the Roman Catholic Church and the WCC had already prepared a document, “The Challenge of proselytism and the calling to common witness” (http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/ecumenical/jwgpr-e.html), “in response to concerns expressed by some of our churches in regard to the missionary outreach of other churches that would seem to bear some of the characteristics of proselytism”.


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19 “WCC leader calls for peaceful, non-aggressive evangelism”, Ekklesia, 2 May 2007, http://www. ekklesia.co.uk. 20 “[T]he discussion on proselytism [among Christian Churches] is not meant to downplay or hinder evangelization, but rather to help it” (Veli-Matti Karkkainen, “Proselytism and church relations”, The Ecumenical Review, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2000, pp. 379–90). 21 Martin E. Marty, “Proselytism in a pluralistic world”, in M. E. Marty and F. E. Greenspahn, Pushing the Faith: Proselytism and Civility in a Pluralistic World, New York: Crossroad, 1988, pp. 155–63. 22 “Algeria forbids efforts to convert its Muslims”, The New York Times, 6 April 2006. 23 Two Indian journalists who wrote a long report for an Indian investigative magazine on evangelical activities in India explained their amazement at what they discovered: “God and his messenger ... had scientifically mapped the Christian population areas down to every district level and block. Frightening and equally sinister was the revelation that US trans-national organisations had personal data down to the last man, important because he was the vehicle who would get the next convert” (Tehelka, 7 February 2004, p. 7). 24 See, for instance, the website of the Strategic Resource Group (http://www.srginc.org): “In order to determine what specific initiatives or projects to undertake to see the Kingdom advanced, a planning process that functions like a ‘radar screen’ needs to be developed. It should continuously monitor or survey the ‘landscape’ to identify problems and look for opportunities.” 25 “U.S. evangelicalism does not represent Christianity but does represent the Bush administration’s agenda for global hegemony”, wrote a correspondent of the respected (leftist) Indian magazine Frontline (25 February 2005, p. 64). 26 “Handing out food is a perfect time to talk about Jesus Christ with nonbelievers”, says a pastor working in Iraq (Charles Duhigg, “Evangelicals flock into Iraq on a mission of faith”, Los Angeles Times, 18 March 2004). 27 http://www.evangecube.org. 28 It is obvious that not everything can be done in the name of propagating one’s religious faith, for instance, in public space, even in the most liberal societies in matters of religious freedom: see Howard O. Hunter & Polly J. Price, “Regulation of religious proselytism in the United States”, BYU Law Review, Vol. 2001, No. 2, pp. 537–74. 29 Natan Lerner, “Proselytism, religion, and international human rights”, Emory International Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, Winter 1998, pp. 477–561. 30 Moreover, one should also remain aware of tensions between religions and the human rights movement on a variety of issues, as analysed in a document published in 2005 by Human Rights Watch: Jean-Paul Marthoz and Joseph Saunders, “Religion and the human rights movement”, http://www.hrw.org/wr2k5/ religion/religion.pdf.

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Truth and Diversity Beyond the Common Ground Sheikh ‘Abd al-Wahid PALLAVICINI

I would like to thank the organization that has invited me here, so that I am once again amid the representatives of the Abrahamic Monotheistic religions. I have made every effort to seek, in accordance with the theme planned for today, the common ground of our respective doctrines, but, in the strictly theological sphere, I must confess I have only found one: God! Besides, while Judaism is the only religion to base itself on the etymological meaning of Abrahamic Monotheism, Christianity, without renouncing the unitary concept of God, includes this in the creed of the Holy Trinity, which Judaism cannot recognize, and Islam adds – in its witness of faith asserting that ‘there is no God other than God’ (this is the meaning of the word Allah) – the statement that ‘Muhammad is his messenger’, something that neither Jews nor Christians want to accept. But if we do not wish that, as a result of the culture of peace, everything is reduced to a new humanism among believers in the various religions, we cannot only refer to the common ground, which may be found at the level of good intentions, moral ethics or emotional feelings, but we must accept the doctrinal differences that necessarily exist between the various theologies. We cannot, in fact, recognize one another just because we are all people in search of a truth that may meet our needs, but we must return to the absolute truth represented by the one God who has revealed himself in different places and forms and at different times, in order to communicate to us the way to salvation that is the only reason for not only religion but also for human life itself. It is necessary, therefore, to accept the differences between the various revelations of the one God and to recognize their relative truth: ‘relative’ not in the sense of a ‘dictatorship of relativism’, but with respect to the absolute truth, and in the sense of ‘inherent’ in a people chosen among the peoples, the Jews, and a woman chosen among women, the Virgin Mary, and a man, intellectually virgin, chosen among men, the Prophet Muhammad, in order to receive the Word that has become Law for the Jews (the Torah), Man for the Christians (Jesus) and Book or Holy Scripture for Muslims (the Holy Koran). This means we must once again return to God and put him back in the centre of the universe, unlike the modern tendencies that instead seek to put man there, despite the adage of the Orthodox Church that states: ‘If God became man this is so that man should become God’, certainly not in order to worship himself with the affirmation of the individual, as certain atheist-secularist concepts would have it, but through the spiritual dimension inherent in all the orthodox religions. And in each of them there is the other common ground that is often forgotten, as I myself did at the beginning – that is, eschatology, the Messianic expectation of our

A. al-W. Pallavicini / Truth and Diversity Beyond the Common Ground

53

Jewish brothers, which corresponds to the second coming of Christ for the Christians and Muslims, apart from the fact that, for the former, he is the ‘Son of God’ and, for the latter, the ‘Spirit of God’, Ruh-Allah, the Hebrew ruah, recalling the life breathed by God into Adam, the first man and the first Islamic prophet, made in his own image. But the time of the Garden of Eden is remote, as is the knowledge that Adam wanted all for himself, rather than keep it for God in accordance with the prohibition that was imposed on him, and so modern man relapses into the original sin of pride, thinking he knows everything without needing religion. Instead he listens to the serpent that is still present in the form of the Antichrist who will come before the Messiah, as the Gospel says, ‘so as to deceive, if possible, even the chosen’ with regard to the end of the world, which will be, after all, nothing more than the end of ‘a world’ and for which we must prepare those seeds of the Ark of the Covenant – and not the ‘seeds of the Word’, as we Muslims are accused of being – that they may be the hope of a new cycle of the existence of man on this earth. In this regard, I would like to quote Andre Malraux’s famous dictum: ‘The twentyfirst century will be religious or it will not be at all!’. We could agree with this statement so long as it is not intended to exclude the fact that also the previous millennia would not have existed if they had not been religious, because religion is the only reason for the existence of this world and for the life of man on earth. But who will guarantee that, even if it is religious, the third millennium will be actually, when absolutely all the doctrines contained in the holy texts of all the traditions foresee instead an end of time of which today there are increasingly evident signs, almost as if to confirm the medieval prophecy ‘a thousand and not another thousand’? Fortunately for all of us, we can date the beginning of the first millennium not from the birth of Christ (aleyhi as-Salam, may peace be on him), but from 313 after Christ, the year of the Edict of Constantine, that is the establishment of Christian jurisdiction in the West, and conclude it in 1312, the date of the trial of the Templars and the end of the official presence of the Christian initiatory and contemplative organizations linked to Catholicism. This calculation, compared with the one that terrorized the medieval millenarians and those of the year 2000, would push back the ‘not another thousand’ before the final date of 2312, thus giving us a respite of more than three hundred years, the same period that must be added to the Aztec calendar, which predicted the end of the world in 2012. In fact, the Inquisition opposed those who, outside the walls of Jerusalem, also sought to fight for a Holy Land in a war that was equally holy for both sides, insofar as they were devoted to the reconquest or defence of the holy places, which it should be remembered are such for Judaism, as they are for Islam. In Islam today the Inquisition is instead contemporary with and a consequence of the present fundamentalism – originally a Western ideology – and it is, therefore, still possible for us to realize the true meaning of the jihad, that of an inner effort that may, in the words of ‘a Sufi saint of the twentieth century’ – such is the title of his biography – ‘raise our spirit above ourselves’.


Part Two Local Studies



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The Historical Background to the Muslim Community in Albania During the Period 1912–1920 Ermir GJINISHI

The clear picture of the Islamic model in Albania during those years has three main elements which constituted its challenges at the time: a) b) c)

The stance on the movement for independence. The relations with the mother institution (Khalifat) and establishing the framework for institutional independence. The relations with the other religious communities in the country.

The contribution of the different religions during the national Renaissance and towards the question of independence is undoubtedly a rare historic product not only in the Balkans but elsewhere as well. All the state intellectuals and patriots residing in and outside Albania became involved in the movement to gain independence. Naturally, religion and its clerics did not keep aloof either but were part of this great era and I’d single out these key moments: The cooperation between the religions based on national criteria which had initiated with the Prizren League, whose meeting was held in the mosque of the flag, was followed by their active participation in the independence movement and the foundation of the Albanian state. The religions set an example par excellence of presenting a united front in those difficult times when it would appear that all the Albanians were looking for was an excuse to separate. Muslims and Christians grouped together to take part in the national attempts to gain independence. The Independence Fetfa. Being a multi-religion country with a Muslim majority under O ottoman rule the verdict the Muslim clergy in Albania gave was an important influence on the people in taking its stance in favour of independence and also a response to those who regarded the separation from Turkey as a “fatality”. Hence, they judged it wise for the Declaration of Independence on November 28, 1912, a politicalhistoric act for the Albanian people, to be greeted by Vehbi Dibra (Agolli) who, according to sheriat, presented the well-known fetfa (a response after a judicial consultation in compliance with the provisions of sheriat) related to the Declaration of Independence and the flag. He called the act “God’s gift”. The country’s independence was empowered by the religious independence as well. Prior to the Declaration of Independence, the clergy operating in Albania depended on three universal centres (the Caliphate, the Patriarchate and the Papacy). This dependency was reflected in the religious, political, cultural, linguistic and administra-

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E. Gjinishi / The Historical Background to the Muslim Community in Albania

tive life. In the context of organizing the newly-declared independent Albanian state the religious independence was established as well. The Muslim Congress I, attended by delegates from all around Albania, declared the sessions closed on March 12, 1923 and among other things marked two important events: a) b)

The foundation of the Muslim Community of Albania, its forums and statutes. The Declaration of the independence de jure of the Albanian Islamic institution from Istanbul, as there had been no official contact de facto with Khalifat following 1912.

Prejudice and religious hatred are unknown phenomena for the Albanian society. Even though the fate of Albania following the London Conference was sealed in the chancelleries of European countries, the injustice done to the Albanian territories was not seen as a consequence of religious diversity. On the contrary, with a clear understanding of the state-religion relations, having no prejudices and nurturing no religious hatred, the Muslim clerics criticized and evaluated the west based on the policies they followed with respect to Albania. In 1915, H.I. Dalliu wrote: ...for Europe sought mockery making us a state on the one hand coveting a piece on the other ...if ever peace comes to this land it will come from the new world alone the United States alone this comforting thing shall come from. The Spiritual union was the emblem of the national union during the national independence movement. Elected chair of the Council of Elders (the first Albanian Senate) in 1912, V. Dibra Head Mufti of Albania addresses the people using the following words: “The question of religion is a special matter and everybody is free to ensure the strengthening of their own religion. Be them Christians or Muslims, Albanians are inseparable brothers… let’s hold hands and tread the same path. Let’s show the whole world Albanians are brothers, sons of our beloved Albania, no matter what their religion.” Despite the peculiarities, distinct features and individuality in the attitude held towards historical and social events but the same tendencies they displayed on several national matters, the religious beliefs were part of a constant which in different ways marked the Albanian life, especially during the twentieth century. Tolerance and coexistence in a multi-religion state with a Muslim majority, where the existence of three religious beliefs was seen as a threat of a rift and a schism posed by the Turkish, Greek and Serb invaders, provided a religious immunity on the irrevocable road to the nation-oriented consolidation of the religious institutions and Albanian state. Albania sets an example par excellence to other countries being one where religion has not taken on a divisive role in social and political relations. The election of an orthodox bishop as prime minister in 1924 is an indicator of the parameters set for a religious coexistence. Noli himself stated: “Although the Muslim element has the majority in Albania, I don’t think there is another civilized state where the religious tolerance reigns as much as it does in Albania... rightfully, all Albanians take pride in the fact that I am to lead the present government, an orthodox bishop, an unknown phenomenon to orthodox states.”


59

Therefore, we conclude that: The Muslim Community carried out its activity at a time when the Albanian state itself was being founded and accompanied it on the road to emancipation and progress. Its activities in the recent years have been deeply national and in compliance with the existing socio-political background outlining a community primarily Albanian, with theological and intellectual potential. Regulating the activities of the Muslim Community by law, creating a solid religious educational system with contemporary curriculum, giving a national colour to the religious ceremonies by using the Albanian language when preaching, coming to an understanding about the organization of the justice system on civil bases, establishing relations with the state based on a modern understanding of a secular state, religious co-existence and tolerance and above all autocephaly as an original product, are gems of a well-deserved crown. The Islamic Model in Albania after the ’90s and the problems accompanying it. The model of Islam after the ’90s in Albania includes: • •

The reorganization of the Muslim Community in Albania. The reorganization of the structures of the Muslim Community throughout the country. Two elements feature prominently: a)

b)

c) d) e)

The fact that the Muslim Community, even though in difficulty, based its activity on the national theological framework, turning down the offers received from abroad to provide help which shows the institutional will to preserve the traditional characteristics. Formalization of the traditional hanefij school as a shield against the imported influences which could interfere with the model. Madrasas, which adopt the curriculum of a high school, base the cultivation of traditional religious education on: The religious curriculum approved by the Muslim Community. The national religious teaching staff, the acute shortage of which at first created anomalies that they managed to overcome. Sending students off to pursue their studies abroad was another important step undertaken by the Muslim community which aimed at raising the standards and providing the theological staff.

In 1967 at a time when the communist dictatorship prohibited the freedom to practice their own religion there were approximately 1667 mosques in Albania of which about 30 escaped destruction. Nowadays there are approximately 600 mosques in Albania.

Relations with the Donors and Charities The religious foundations and donors have played an important role in the religious life but it must be emphasized that their relations with the Muslim Community, from time to time, leave much to be desired. The vision and donations made by these foundations have created somewhat contradictory as well as antagonistic relations with the Muslim Community. This is a factor which has been treated in the media as “Albanian Islam and Arab Islam”. The tense relations between the parties have been noticed in:

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Having focused the sponsoring of religious activities outside the Albanian Muslim Community which has created the idea of a rivalry or parallelism. The sponsorship has covered mainly the organizing of campsites for the young, publications, religious as well as cultural courses etc. Clashes from time to time between the believers regarding issues of a religious character are attributed to the sponsorship. This way of operating of the foundations has undermined the leading role of the Muslim Community and has been used by them as an argument to achieve the primary goal which is guaranteeing the longevity and continuance in Albania. Some of these foundations register as officially closed but in reality they exist under a different name and form and under the pretence of being run by Albanian executives. Building religious shrines without preserving traditional architectural values, without financial transparency, 80% of which being non-compliant with the standard parameters, makes these donations suspicious. The main reason the Muslim Community has no property papers yet is one and the only: the Foundations refuse to deliver the bill of quantities. A simple question arises: Why this hesitation? Sending students off to schools abroad without consulting with the Muslim Community brought about the importation of law schools (mainly hanbeli) previously unknown to the Albanian Muslims, which, nevertheless, belong to the Islamic culture. The State, the politics, the media and the relations with the religious communities. When evaluating politicians, the Muslims don’t do it on the grounds of their religion and they have shown no tendency to give politics a religious character. In this context, the fact that there is a Christian party here has not bothered the Muslims so as to want to have an Islamic party. This spirit is important since the concept of Islamicreligious partisanship in the world has incited militaristic religiously-deformed movements (as in Egypt, Pakistan, etc) which legitimise even violence as a means of achieving their entirely political aims and objectives. On the other hand, our country being marked from time to time in the map of countries that pose a risk of terrorism shouldn’t be attributed to the local Muslim believers, and the Albanian government should as soon as possible complement the legal framework concerning the religious communities, foundations and foreign missionaries to minimize the potential for such occurrences. Actually, no foreigner, be them from the west or not, has ever felt unsafe in Albania on the grounds of his/her religious belief or nationality. The Albanian Muslims do not view the west as the enemy, on the contrary, being a majority of a different religion than that of the majority in Europe doesn’t prevent them from feeling European. The elements which make the difference in addition to the historical and geopolitical factors are: 1.

2.

Inter-religious relations in Albania where the Muslims based on the Koranic verses: “You have got your own religion and I have got mine” have undoubtedly set an example of an excellent performance of inter-religious tolerance and harmony, as a dimension of emancipation and citizenship, thus offering to the East as well as the West the model for establishing the inter-religious relations they need. Not being infected by the viruses of the religious global developments. Indoctrination, instrumentalism and misuse of the religion have not landed up in the Albanian reality. The 11th of September was a wholesale slaughter religiously unjustifiable, that’s why it was condemned publicly and in the mosques with no hesitation by the Muslim clerics and believers, which is a key indicator


3.

4.

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that the religion here remains intact and distances itself from any infection or misuse it undergoes in some other country. The published religious literature contains no misinterpretations, distortions and infringes no other religions. The religious ideology being a widely-spread phenomenon in the world is unknown here. The Islamic preaching in mosques does not incite ethnic, religious, and national hatred and violence. The religious global developments are handled according to their characteristics. The debate caused by the publication of the cartoons was a clash of the boundaries of the freedom of speech with religion. The reaction in the case of the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad or the Pope’s declaration, apart from the indignation and pronouncements made in public and mosques did not deteriorate into ugly scenes, which shows maturity, discretion, moderation and the consolidation of the peaceful traditional religious culture in Albania.

However, the climate of harmony and tolerance lacks inter-religious dialogue. Inter-religious debates in the media indicate the lack of this dialogue. Despite the improvements noticed recently, the media, does not pay due attention to the role and contribution of religion to society. It usually receives widespread media coverage when it comes to black chronicles or when there are heated debates. The fact that the majority is Muslim here has often been treated harshly by the media as an obstacle to the integration of the country. The true reason for all this anger, allergy to the Muslim majority even though apparently religious, must be sought in old inherited mentalities, where religion was treated like an enemy, and which the media resists divorcing totally from. No matter what the religious convictions are, the Albanian model of harmony and tolerance is a rare relic, which all Albanians should take credit for and which makes us feel proud of our identity and culture. In conclusion, I’d like to say that debates and inter-religion issues in the world involve us all in different ways. With globalisation the world is getting smaller and smaller each day and the events in one corner of the world affect the life of those who live in the other corners. We just can’t stand there doing nothing about these problems, which whether we like it or not, are our problems, too.

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Islam and the Albanian Periphery Lands James PETTIFER

Since the division of the Albanian people at the time of the emergence of the national state during and after World War I, the problem of religion within the Albanian people has rarely been important to Albanians themselves. Yet at the same time, majority Muslim Albanians have interacted with their mostly Christian Orthodox neighbours in Greece, Montenegro, Macedonia and Serbia in a variety of ways, involving coexistence, minor conflict and local violence, up to and including major wars, as in Kosova in 1996–1999. These have been the periphery lands, where the settled patterns of generally tolerant religious adherence in the national state based on Tirana have not been of relevance. Albanian national aspirations have crossed religious boundaries, as in Kosova where Roman Catholic and Muslim Albanians have always cooperated in promoting the national agenda, but their Orthodox neighbours have generally seen the threat of Albanian nationalism as a predominantly or exclusively ‘Islamic’ movement. In general this remains the case today, certainly as popular level in society, in Greece, Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia. Even within the educated elites, little is generally known of Albanian history or culture, and there is little incentive for attitudes to change.1 The periphery lands could be defined as the margins of northwest Greece, Threspotia in Greek terminology, Cameria in Albanian, the interface between the overwhelmingly Muslim ethnic Albanian communities of western Macedonia and their Slavophone and Orthodox neighbours, the Serbian-Albanian nexus in Kosova, and the ethnic Albanian communities of southern Montenegro (mixed Roman Catholic and Muslim). In some cases, a de facto periphery stretches much further, particularly in Greece and Italy, where the very large numbers of Albanian migrant workers interact on a minority community basis with Christians in most of the larger Greek and Italian cities and in many rural areas. In the instance of migrants, research and anecdotal evidence suggests that religion is not very important at popular level, where Albanians are simply seen as an inferior group on the basis of culture and behaviour but religion enters the calculations of state definition, with a much easier visa regieme for Christian Albanian migrants than Moslems to Greece. These settlement patterns depend, of course, on both recent and distant historical events. Albanians became converts to Islam under the Ottoman Empire, although the methods used and the degree of coercion applied has been the subject of much recent debate among historians.2 Albanian historians have tended to stress the factors linked to coercion, while outsiders have seen more value in emphasising the economic and social advantages attached to profession of Islam. The most important element in the 1

See, for instance, the problems of school and university history teaching investigated in ‘Clio in the Balkans – The Politics of History Education’, Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South East Europe, Thessaloniki, 2002. 2 For background see ‘Islam in the Balkans’, H.T. Norris, C. Hurst and Co, London, 1991.

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heritage for modern life is that undoubtedly the sixty per cent or so Muslim Albanians held onto both their Islamic belief and also their commitment to the failing theocratic Empire more longer than some other groups. These nationals, such as Serbia and Greece, attracted much support from foreign Christian nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a result. This was, of course, largely as an element in the geopolitical calculations of British and French imperial expansion in the development of colonial empires, the fabled ‘Eastern Question’ of what was to happen to the lands in the Balkans of the failing Ottoman Empire. The development of the national movement in the late-Ottoman period was a highly complex process, but many of the Diaspora centres which were so important in the national revival Rilindja period after about 1860 were actually still within the Ottoman world, primarily Constantinople itself, and some of the earliest leaders of the new Albanian state, including King Zog, had been partly or wholly educated there. Virtually all these people were from the Ottoman bey class, and were Muslim landlords in Albania, and some, such as Ismail Quemal, had held high rank in Imperial officialdom. There was thus a continual tension between the religious assumptions of the old theocratic state and modern national development, something the enemies of the Albanian people have not been slow to exploit.3 Personal profession of Islam was not an obstacle to Albanian political elite activity in the national agenda in the late-Ottoman period, unlike the situation in most neighbouring states which had already freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Yet in Albanian eyes, in this period, the national agenda was never fulfilled, with the disastrous results of the international conferences before and after the First World War leading to a truncated national state and the consequent division of the Albanian inhabitants of the southern Balkans between no less than six future state entities, namely Albania itself, Kosova, Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and what later became the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, after World War II, and the Republic of Macedonia in 1991.4 In later, communist eyes, one justification for this came to be seen as the lingering presence of Islam and religion generally, in the Albanian consciousness and social practice. The Muslim beys who were the social foundation of the Zogist state and were left undisturbed by Mussolini in the annexation period in the 1930’s were in the end ruined by World War II, Axis occupation and finally the Albanian communists. The history of the repression of all religion by Enver Hoxha after 1967 has yet to be written in even a mildly professional way, but it is clear that it was not simply the whim of an eccentric dictator (although that element was certainly present) but also the culmination of certain deep rooted tensions in national life. Hoxha believed that the end of religion was part of the process of constructing communism, at a public level, but he also said that it was a factor in the unification of Albanians.5 However grotesque, this concept did indicate the displacement of nationalism under communism into the false chimera of the ‘atheist state’. He also clearly feared the development of oppositional movements based on religion, which given the politics of the nation, were likely to be 3 Thus, as an example, in both the Cham expulsions in 194344 in northwest Greece, and in much of the popular discourse of the early ex-Yugoslav wars after 1991, the Muslim protagonists, whether of Albanian or Slav ethnicity, were often referred to as ‘Turks’ in conventional discourse. Even educated Greeks with some knowledge of the subject sometimes refer to the Chams as ‘Turks’ and are unaware that many Chams of Albanian ethnicity were actually Christian Orthodox i.e. the Suliot tribes who were so important in the Greek War of Independence. 4 See Stavro Skendi ‘The Albanian National Awakening 18681913’, Princeton University Press. 5 See ‘Our Enver’, by his successor, Ramiz Alia, 8 Nentor, Tirana, 1985, and Hoxha’s own writings n religion.

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focussed on the Catholics of the northwest.6 The eventual collapse of the one-party state in and after 1990 bore out these fears, with the violence in Shkodra in December 1990 with its large Catholic population a harbinger for what was to come elsewhere during the next twelve months. While there was never a clerical-led opposition to communism of the Polish type in Albania, there was always a strong input of Catholic energy into the opposition, something that was aided by the elevated status of Mother Teresa throughout the Albanian world.

Displacement and the Nation After 1990, the role and institutions of religion in both Albania and the periphery lands began to revive, but with very different experiences in different places for the Islamic majority of the Albanians. In Albania itself there was notable cooperation between Moslems and Christians in reopening mosques and churches for public use, even involving the shared use of buildings for a time if there were problems of physical dilapidation of some buildings. Hundreds of new and restored churches and mosques appeared on the landscape in the 1992–1996 period, without any local controversy in the vast majority of instances. In western Macedonia, the historic experience was different, with the most formally Islamic part of the Albanian world having had formal constitutional rights but many practical conflicts with the communist authorities during the late-Titoist period, and an awkward relationship with the neo-communist government of President Kiro Gligorov after 1991. In Kosova the repression of Islam was a central ideological factor in the Serbian martial law regieme under Milosevic after 1990, and although Moslem practice was not formally banned or attacked, the mosques existed in an atmosphere of the general repression of all ethnic Albanian and cultural institutions, and against the background of the so-called ‘Karic’ programme of politically inspired Serbian Orthodox church building. In Montenegro, the more Moslem parts of the Albanian polity are the hilly regions around Plav and Gusinje, while the coastal areas, such as Tuzi municipality are more Roman Catholic. In Greece, the growing number of Albanian migrant workers after 1991 did not have any opportunity at all to go to a mosque if they wished to, apart from a few rural areas such as Thrace. A name changing practice soon developed, with many of those who wished to become migrant workers ‘converting’ to Orthodoxy and losing the Muslim forms of their names, and often any sense of a Muslim cultural identity. Thus all generalisations about the nature of Islam among Albanians in the periphery lands which interface with Christian Orthodox majorities and state power are likely to be doomed to be wrong, or at least highly misleading. In the years since the end of the one-party state there has been a rich variety of historical experience of Islam in the periphery regions, but within a general framework of tolerance and respect for secular state institutions. Even when in situations of extreme stress, as in the Kosova and Macedonian armed conflicts between 1996 and 2001, there was a noticeable absence of any ethnic Albanian turn to Islamic radicalism, and the ‘outsider Islamic fighter’ element of the Bosnian war between 1993 and 1995 never appeared in Kosova. The Kosova Liberation Army was never included on international lists of terrorist or quasi-terrorist organisations, and managed to be seen in most of the international community as a legitimate local de6 The Greek Minority of the southwest were all Orthodox, and also fought for religious freedom at that time, but on a much more integrated basis within the political elite than the northern Catholics.


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fence force against Yugoslav security apparatus aggression. Offers of help from more radical Islamic sources were refused by the Kosova Liberation Army leadership, even in terms of issues like small arms transfers which could probably have been conducted without outside discovery. But this did not stop the mosques, Moslem schools and Islamic libraries from taking the brunt of the Yugoslav army offensive and many buildings and archives were completely destroyed. After the war, much reconstruction work was financed by the Saudi Joint Relief Committee but although there were disputes about Wahabi influences on new mosque design and decoration in some places, on the whole the rebuilding programme went smoothly and the buildings were returned after reconstruction to local communities without external interference in the religious practice within them.7 Quite a significant number of young men and a few women are now recipients of scholarships to study in Islamic states, and some religious schools have been developing, largely, it would appear, modelled on those in Turkey. Such activity is of course known in the neighbouring majority Christian states, and gives rise to current views that the emergence of an independent Kosova state will be a new ‘Muslim’ state in the region. This would appear to be very unlikely given the very strong influence of the United States in all Albanian communities in the Balkans. In the same way, in the conflict in Macedonia in spring and summer 2001, the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army has a strictly secular character and modus operandi, although no doubt the great majority of its soldiers would have had at least a nominal Muslim cultural and religious identity. As in Kosova, there has never been any demand for a party in Macedonia with a radical Islamic identity, or which might want to try to include elements of a programme for a restoration of Sharia law or practice. The culturally conservative moderate Islam of those rural communities has always included both Bektashi and Sunni Moslems (and other minor sects), who have coexisted peacefully for a very long time. The strong support current in the contemporary international community for the independence of Kosova is a recognition of these realities, and it indicates that the risk of displacement of the national agenda in an Islamic radical direction in the event of independence being refused has been well understood, particularly in Britain and the United States. In this context of the hoped-for and long delayed resolution of this major regional problem, there is reason to hope that ethnic Albanian Islam will retain its current complex and multi-faceted nature and be a barrier to religious extremism in the future. But in a world climate of Islamic revival, it is foolish to suppose that the Balkans will be immune from radical influences, and the future may also depend on the adoption of satisfactory development and financial models for the Albanian polity within Euro-Atlantic institutions that recognises the unique political experience of the Albanian people and the difficulties that have often been experienced with their neighbours.

7 See ‘Kosovo/Kosova As Seen As Told’, OSCE, Vienna, 2000, and various publicationsof the Kosova Council of Mosques.

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Islam and State Religion in Greece: From the Formation of the ‘Greek-Orthodox Genos’ to the Era of Migration Dimitris CHRISTOPOULOS

Any discussion on interfaith relations in Greece is irrelevant if it does not take in consideration the specific role of the Orthodox church not only throughout modern Greek history and society but also its privileged links with the State. Greece belongs to the group of European countries where church and state are one body: the state is a religious ‘actor’, according to the preamble of the Constitution the church land belongs legally and substantially to the state. Let me start with a recent event, rather illustrative of the above: From the era of the creation of the Greek State Council, the country’s higher administrative court, under the Venizelos government of 1928, there has never occurred any Holy Water rite to consecrate the Court’s work. The Holy Water rite is a rather usual custom in Greek public life at the beginning of the year. 78 years after the creation of the State Council, its newly elected president invited the Greek archbishop to accomplish this rite in 2006. 31 judges of the Court reacted to the invitation addressed by the court’s president to the archbishop. In their common statement, the judges emphasised that “the Holy Water rite is not a meaningless social event, but an act of religious worship which reasonably gives the impression that the court is a religious institution”. This rite puts in question the religious neutrality of the court, since it presents the basic guarantor of protection of individual rights as acting in conformity to the rites of one religion, whereas there are several cases pending before the court related to the freedom of religion. Despite this strong reaction from within the court, and also the political class and the press, the president of the State Council insisted on the invitation, justifying himself by saying that this rite is just a “custom”. On September 15th 2006, Archbishop Christodoulos performed the first Holy Water rite after 78 years functioning of the State Council. Greece is maybe the only European Union’s member state where Islam is present under two forms: A minority group, which has been treated as such since the foundation of the state, and a population of immigrants of late settlement. Greek law regulates this coexistence under a rather different point of view. The basic idea of the legal framework dealing with Islam in Greece is founded on the existence- or not of Greek citizenship. In this perspective, the legal regulations adopted to deal with similar phenomena in the two above mentioned categories come to controversial solutions, as we are going to examine further in this paper. Religious coexistence has always been deeply rooted in Greek history. The presence of Islam in the Balkans is undoubtedly linked to the Ottoman suzerainty. Since the formation of the Greek State (1830–31) Greek Orthodoxy is the predominant religion of the country. Christian Catholics, Jews and Muslims were legally protected. Follow-

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ing the annexation of Thessaly (1881), Crete and the New Territories (1913, 1920), Islam became the most important minority religion among Greek citizens. After the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey regulated by the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) the number of Greek Muslims was considerably increased. The Muslim population increased slightly after the annexation of Dodecanese (1947), which was Greece’s last territorial alteration. During the 1990’s a strong immigration wave moved towards Greece. This happened for three main reasons: The collapse of the communist regimes, the instability in the Kurdish areas in Middle-East and the strengthening position of Greece as the nearest European Union country in the region. Thus, Greece-became a host country for immigrants seeking refuge for economical and political reasons. Nowadays more than 10% Greece’s inhabitants are aliens, a considerable number being Muslims.

1. Historical Background The presence of Islam is closely linked to the Greek State since its initial foundation. The Protocols signed in London in 1829, 1830 and 1831 expressed the will of the Great Powers to protect the Muslims as a minority living in the newly emerging independent national Greek state. The new state fostered the idea of national Greek identity as a product of the Ottoman concept of millet, which already separated Christians from Muslims. Actually, the term “genos” which in Greek is used alternative to “nation” reflects exactly the reaction against the Ottomans ‘millet’. Thus, the Muslims who remained in Greece became subject to a special regime of protection after obtaining Greek citizenship. At the end of the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922 the Lausanne Conference established a new era for the neighbouring countries. The concept of a “clear national state” was enhanced by adopting official ethnic cleansing measures under the auspices of the League of the Nations – a mandatory exchange of population. About 360,000 Muslims of Greece had to abandon their home country and to move to Turkey. Far more Greek-Orthodox residents in Turkey had to follow the opposite way towards Greece. The mandatory exchange of population was organised on the basis of religion. The Lausanne Treaty (January 1923), stipulated the mandatory exchange of all Muslim residents of Greece with Turkey’s Greek-Orthodox residents, establishing officially; an ethnic cleansing of controversial legality, as pointed out by some international lawyers at the time. For political reasons envisaged by both sides, articles 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne exempted from the exchange the Muslims of Western Thrace. This region became Greek territory; along with the Greek-Orthodox land in Istanbul (Constantinople). Informally, the Albanian Muslims of Epirus (in northwest Greece known in Albanian as Chams) and the Greek-Orthodox Arabs of Kilikia (in Turkey) were also exempted from the exchange of population. The exchange and subsequent liquidation of property comprised both those who had left their homes during the period of time between the beginning of the Balkan Wars and the date of signature of the Convention and those who had been left in situ. About 848,000 Greeks had fled Anatolia after the withdrawal of the Greek army, while 115,000 Muslims had left Greece already in 1914. By the middle of 1925, 192,000 Greeks and 355,000 Muslims had been exchanged. Due to the exchange of population with Turkey, after 1925 Muslims did not exceed 2% of the Greek population, being concentrated in the prefectures of Thrace and Epirus. The languages used by Muslims

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are the following: Albanian, Bulgarian (the term is used in the census of 1928 and 1940) or Pomak (term of the census of 1951), Romanesh, and Turkish. The Treaty of Lausanne has to be considered as the most important legal binding text: It regulates the status of modern Turkey, determines the Greek-Turkish border by attributing Western Thrace to Greece and Eastern Thrace to Turkey. The whole minority protection process in Greece was set up under the auspices of the League of Nations and the supervision of its competent organs. After the achievement of the exchange of population, the Muslim presence among the Greek citizens was affected by two major events: Firstly, the persecution of the Albanian-speaking Muslims of Epirus (Chams) in 1944, as a result of which the presence of Islam in Epirus has been almost eliminated. Secondly, due to the annexation of the Dodecanese islands in the aftermath of II World War (by the Treaty of Paris, 1947) more than 10,000 more Muslims became Greek citizens. According to the official data, there were altogether 134,722 Moslem Greeks citizen in 1940 and 111,990 in 1951. In addition to the legally recognised Muslim minority, Islam is now present in Greece in a new form, due to the important immigration flow after the geopolitical international changes since 1991. Several Muslim communities have been established in the largest Greek cities, mainly Athens and Thessaloniki. Muslim immigrants have the legal status of aliens, unless, they obtain Greek citizenship. Subsequently, as far as religious and educational issues are concerned, the framework for life provided by Greek law is very limited.

2. Islam in Greece Muslim from the traditional settlement are mainly followers of Sunnism and to a quite limited extend of Bektashism, which comprises mystic branches of Shi’sm. The Muslims of Greek citizenship residing in Greece are fewer than 120,000 (90,000 in Thrace, 15,000 in Athens, 5,000 in Thessaloniki, 4,000 on Rhodes and Kos islands, and some thousands of Muslim Gypsies living in the main towns of Northern and Central Greece and a few families in Epirus). Islam’s new settlements are related to a very important flow of immigration settled in Greece mostly in the 1990’s. A few Bektashis are living in the mountainous area of Thrace in the Western part of the Rhodopi Mountains. There are less than 3,000 Pomaks and Turks. More than 800,000 immigrants have been recorded in Greece in the last national population census. Around 200,000 of them are Muslims, without taking into consideration the Albanian community, the majority of which is of Muslim tradition, but not expressing not a strong active adherence to Islam. Sunnism is the most popular form of Islam followed by immigrants coming from Africa and the Arab countries. Shiism is far less represented, mainly by Alevis Turks and Kurds. Bektashism is equally represented by tiny communities of Albanian migrants from Korce which have contributed to the revitalisation of at least one Bektashi tekke in Central Greece which serves also as a chapel for local Greeks. It is rather unusual to see a holy place serving both Orthodoxy and Islam, at least in Greece. Several Islamic monuments can be visited in modern Greece as remnants of the past presence of Islam. Most of them are badly maintained. Only in Thrace and in the Dodecanese islands are several mosques functioning for the needs of the Muslims.


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3. Freedom of Religion The status of freedom of religion in Greece is closely connected with the status of religious minorities and the position of the powerful Greek Orthodox Church in the Greek legal order. Article 13 of the Greek constitution protects the freedom of worship of all religions, which are deemed “known”. This term refers to religions whose doctrines and rituals are accessible to anybody, as opposed to sects of secret initiation. Article 13 of the Constitution reads as follows: 1.

2.

3. 4.

Freedom of conscience in religious matters is inviolable. The enjoyment of personal and political rights shall not depend on an individual’s religious beliefs. There shall be freedom to practice any known religion; individuals shall be free to perform their rites of worship without hindrance and under protection of law. The performance of rites of worship must not prejudice public order or public morals. Proselytism is prohibited. The ministers of all known religions shall be subject to the same supervision by the State and to the same obligations to it as those of the dominant religion. No one may be exempted from discharging his obligations to the State or refuse to comply with the law because of his religious beliefs.

Although there is a contradiction between article 13 Para. 1 and article 33 Para. 2 according to which the President of the Greek Republic has to give the President’s oath according to the Greek-Orthodox rite without any alternative. Furthermore, the President has to be descended from a father or mother of “Greek origin”, the latter being a very ambiguous term under legal scrutiny. On the contrary, the religious oath according to the Islamic rules is guaranteed in the judicial procedures. The exemption from military service, which is obligatory for all male Greek citizens, is guaranteed for all religious ministers of “known religions” and consequently for the Muslim ministers. The Mufti, the Imam and the Muezzin are exempted from military service. The exemption concerns two Muslim ministers per mosque. School students of other religion or dogma than the Greek-Orthodox are not obliged to follow any religious education, which is incorporated in the first and secondary education curricula. According to article 6, para 1. of Law 4862/31, “It is forbidden in Greek public and private schools to teach the Greek-Orthodox religion subject to pupils of other dogma or religion.” Greek legislation required until March 2006 a special permit for the opening and building of places of worship. The procedure concerns any religion or dogma except the Greek Orthodox Church. The mandatory law of the Metaxas dictatorship of 1938 imposes special requirements such as: an application of at least 50 families who are in close proximity with each other and the place of worship. The application must be properly signed and submitted to the closest ecclesiastical authorities. The police must forward the application to the Ministry of Education and Religions. At this stage, the Orthodox bishop gives his opinion to the Minister who is competent to accept or to reject the application. The difficulties in opening a mosque commence with the procedure needed to get a permit for opening or built a place of worship. Thus, the GreekOrthodox church has had until a few months ago the power to control the construction of places of worship for other religions in Greece. This raised an obvious question on

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the constitutionality of the aforementioned provisions and stressed the issue of the institutional equity among the religions. The Council of State stated in one relevant case that the opinion of the GreekOrthodox Church is only a recommendation, and not binding on the Minister of Education and Cults. In case of discrepancy the Minister has only to justify his decision. Moreover, if the Ministerial Decision is not in compliance with the law, then the Council of State can change it. The Council has examined a case related to the right to establish a place of worship in Greece. The Court found a violation of article 9 of the ECHR and stated that “the system of issuing a license by the Minister is in accordance with article 9 of the ECHR, only in the context that its purpose is to secure the control by the Minister of the existence of the formal preconditions required by the Mandatory Law”. According to Greek civil law two types of wedding ceremonies are optionally available: civil and the religious, having equal legal effects. Weddings of the Muslim ceremony, in front of the Mufti have legal effects. So, I come to a paradox. Greece is the only European state recognising the Islamic holy law. The Government recognises Shari ‘a (the Muslim religious law) as regulating family and civic issues of the Muslim minority in Thrace. The First Instance Courts in Thrace routinely ratify decisions of the muftis who have judicial powers on civic and domestic matters. The National Human Rights Committee, an autonomous human rights body that is the Government’s advisory organ on protection of human rights, has stated that the Government should limit the powers of the muftis to religious duties and should stop recognising Shari ‘a, because it can restrict the civic rights of citizens. There are arranged marriages among underage Roma and Muslims, although Greek civil law forbids marriages of children under the age of eighteen. A parent or legal guardian, however, may apply for a judicial-permit for the marriage of an underage person from a First Instance Court in cases of “extraordinary circumstances,” such as pregnancy. In November 2005, the appointed mufti of Komotini instructed all imams under his jurisdiction not to conduct underage marriages. In November 2005, the mufti refused permission for two minors (a twelve-year-old girl and a fourteen-year-old boy) to marry. In January 2006, he advised the guardians of a thirteen-year-old girl, who insisted on marrying despite his prohibition, to turn to the First Instance Court. The court granted her permission to marry. Controversy between the Muslim community and the Government also continued over the management and self-government of the waqfs.1 This involved the Government’s appointment of officials to advise on administrative boards that govern each waqfs and the degree and type of administrative control, which prior to the 1960s was exercised by the Muslim community. In response to objections from some Muslims that the Government’s appointment of these officials weakened the financial autonomy of the waqfs and violated the terms of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, a 1996 presidential decree placed the waqfs under the administration of an oversight committee appointed by the Government for three years as an interim measure pending resolution of outstanding problems. The interim period has been extended every two years by presidential decree. Islamic holidays are respected in public sector as far minority education is concerned. Minority schools have to follow the Christian and the Islamic holiday schedule cumulatively. In the private sector Muslims are free to celebrate Islamic feasts, although they are obliged to respect Christian holidays as well. 1

Islamic charitable endowments.


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4. Islam in the Greek Legal Order There is sufficient number of mosques in Thrace and the Dodecanese functioning for everyday needs. Other mosques in Greek territory are preserved as monuments, under better or worse conditions. Muslims of Thrace or Rhodes and Kos islands have minimum opportunities to enjoy freedom of religion. No official mosque operates from these areas. A place of worship has been created within the Hotel Caravel in Athens for its Muslim clients. In Athens and Thessaloniki mosques operate by private initiative without the official permit of the state. One mosque operates at the premises of the Theological School of the University of Thessaloniki. Despite the negligence of the Greek government, Muslims are opening unofficially places of worship all over Athens. The first Mosque was founded by a Sudanese in the 1980’s. More mosques have been founded in the 1990’s mainly by Arab immigrants and in some cases also by Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. Muslims are gathering there independent of their ethnic community affiliation. Nowadays twenty-two mosques are informally functioning in Athens and one in Thessaloniki, in the premises of houses or shops, which are transformed into mosques for the needs of worship. The possibility of building a mosque in Athens where more than 200,000 Muslims are living (included 10,000 Muslims of Greek citizenship) has been always been regarded by the states authorities with suspicion if not hostility. This attitude is shared by an important part of Greece’s public opinion and the majority of the political parties. The problems focussed on a total lack of political will to create places of worship for the Muslims. In a unique situation, the Greek State attempted to facilitate the building of a mosque, right from 1880 to 1934, and again, finally just before the Olympics in 2004. All attempts over the years met with failure. In practice the control exercised by the Greek Orthodox church affects the right to create a mosque by the operation of double standards within Thrace and in the rest of the country. In Thrace, where Muslims are considered as a minority governed by the Treaty of Lausanne and the relevant Greek laws, the local Christian bishop very rarely denies to grant a positive opinion in case of claim for mosque renovation. In one quite revealing case the bishop of Komotini denied to grant such an authorisation for the construction of a minaret and the case became an issue of major importance for the relations between the Greek State and the minority. In the rest of Greece are Muslims Greek citizens suppose not to be covered by the Treaty of Lausanne and the Muslim newcomers who have never so far have been granted a license to create a place of worship. The settlement of tens of thousands of Muslims mainly in Athens defined the problem since early 1980’s. The claim has been reconsidered with the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. The Greek government intents to facilitate the establishment of a single mosque within a Islamic Cultural Centre. This was going to be built in Paiania area, close to the Athens international airport but the Synod of the Greek Orthodox Church had constantly opposed to such a perspective: as the local bishop put it: “it is not fair for us, nor it’s possible for visitors to come in Greece, and the first thing they see is a minaret”. Let me begin the last part of my presentation, by offering a number of examples illustrating the privileged position of the Orthodox church in Greek society. Its representatives would argue that this position is an objective fact related to the strong historical links between the church and the nation.

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This, however, is only a part of the truth. The other, and more important part, is that this position is much more the result of the strong political and economic links of the church with the state. To Sum Up –

– –

The Orthodox Church as well as 6700 churches and monasteries are all legal personalities of public and not private law which entail two fundamental privileges. They are exempted from any obligation to pay taxes even from their profitable activities such as renting their very large property portfolio. About 10.000 priests of all levels have their entire salaries paid by the Greek public sector as civil servants. That means, for example, in the 2005 budget the amount of 161 million euros. Until the end of 2005 they were all exempted from the military service.

In 2001, Greek society went through a serious internal conflict regarding the famous issue of the inclusion of religion in the Greek ID’s. Even if since then, religion does not figure in the new ID’s, that is not the case with school pupils or soldiers ID’s. The instruction at primary and secondary schools is not an instruction on religions but of a religion: Orthodoxy. It is mandatory for all Orthodox children. Non-Orthodox children are exempted from it but schools do not offer any alternative during the period of religious instruction. Every morning all schools start with prayer and icons figure everywhere in public buildings: from school class to courtrooms where the religious oath is the rule. If one does not want it, it is necessary to ask to be excepted and not vice-versa. Cremation is allowed only after a law that passed in June 2006. The Orthodox church-forbids cremation for believers and the state allows cremation only for NonOrthodox. Behind all the above lies the common assumption in Greece, that being a Greek means that one is also an Orthodox believer. Migration after the end of the cold war in the country shows that this pattern is historically exhausted. According to the tradition of 1789, the Greek polity is indelibly sealed by the classical pattern of Jacobinism. Belonging to this polity signals the suppression of any mediating body between the state and the individual with the sole exception of (one) nation. Nevertheless, Greek Jacobinism is imperfect If in its traditional form this ideology sees the nation as the exclusive mediator between state and individual, the Greek version has an additional pretension: the interference of the (Orthodox) genos. The Greek political community resorts to assimilation strategies, because it cannot conceive of non-assimilated members. That has been the essence of the country’s policy towards minorities and vis-à-vis migrants all during the twentieth century. However, the Greek political community cannot conceive that some individuals are in position to be assimilated and, therefore, potentially entitled to Greek nationality. To put it simply: anybody can become French, as long as he or she is inspired by the ideals of the French revolution, nation, etc. For the Greek perception, ‘Turks cannot become Greeks, unless they convert to Christianity’. In conclusion, I would argue that the above-mentioned Greek model presents the symptoms of definite historical exhaustion. The major challenge of its redefinition has already matured. The reason for this is the recent massive migration phenomenon in the


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country. The structural contradiction of this model lies in that, on the one hand, it regards assimilation as an absolute condition for the social integration of migrants, while, on the other hand, it obstinately refuses Greek nationality to the overwhelming majority of these people, in the name of the pro-national and static category of the Orthodox genos. In other words, adherence to the rights-oriented 1789 ideology is undermined by a purely religious ethno-cultural, ontological perception of the foundations of the political community. On the threshold of the twenty first century the Greek political community finds itself facing new tormenting dilemmas and in quest of brave new inclusion strategies. This is its inescapable point in time.

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Intra-Group Differences and the Status of Religious and Ethnic Minorities Kathleen G. CUNNINGHAM

1. Understanding Intra-Group Difference 1.1. What Are the Fault Lines? Much of the scholarship focused on understanding disputes between minority religious and ethnic groups assumes that these groups are more or less homogenous. However, many such groups are internally divided over a number of issues. There are several dimensions on which minority groups, which appear to share an identity, can in fact differ. Clearly, differences between religious sects play an important role in determining relevant differences among religious minority groups. Additional factors that can constitute critical intra-group differences are demands made on the government, tactical choices to achieving goals, and a willingness to engage in open negotiations over contentious issues. 1.2. Identity Politics The relevance of these differences for politics depends in large part on the extent to which the minority population has engaged in identity politics. If the minority participated in local or national politics as a group – with politicians appealing to their shared identity as the basis for support – differences within these groups will be politically important for their interaction with others. 1.3. Empirical Patterns Though some minorities groups are homogenous along the dimensions mentioned in section one, many are not. To illustrate, we can examine the Palestinians, who epitomize a minority with strong and politically relevant internal divisions. Despite a common overarching identity, organizations with the large Palestinian movement for selfdetermination differ in a number of ways. These include differences in the goals of both militant and non-militant organizations, their willingness to use violence, the necessity of using violence, and, among those factions seeking independence, differences in what a Palestinian state should look like. The Palestinian case illustrates the multitude of internal differences that can exist with an ethnic or religious minority. Many other groups share this internal diversity and both scholars and practitioners must recognize how these differences affect the dynamics of disputes between minority groups and between these groups and the state.

K.G. Cunningham / Intra-Group Differences and the Status of Religious and Ethnic Minorities

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2. Theoretical Framework 2.1. Internal Dynamics The first step in integrating our recognition of intra-group difference into theories of communal and rebellious conflict is to specify how these divisions affect both conflict and political processes. 2.1.1. Intra-Groups Factions The number of internal factions that differ on these key dimensions will affect how easy it is to gain consensus among them. A greater number of internal factions with different goals or preferences over strategy will make. 2.1.2. Relative Status The relative status of internal factions with respect to one another will also help determine how easy it is for the group to act as a whole when dealing with other minority groups or the state. If one internal faction is dominant, it may be able to act as a leader in interacting with others and perhaps create consensus among disparate factions. If, however, there are two or more equally strong internal factions that disagree over major issues, it is unlikely that one can take the lead in creating internal consensus. 2.2. Types of Interaction In addition to the number and relative status of internal factions within minorities, the type of interaction these factions have is important for understanding their effect of larger political processes. The relevant types of interaction are: violent, non-violent unstructured and non-violent structured. If internal factions are fighting one another, there can be hope for consensus or coordinated action among factions without the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, there will be a lack of trust among factions with a history of conflict even if peace can be achieved between them in the short term. Among factions that do not engage in violence against each other, there are two types of interaction they can have. First, they can interact in an unstructured fashion – engaging in informal talks and contact. Second, they can interact in a structured way. This can occur through local political or cultural institutions that facilitate communication within the community. It can also occur when factions engage in participatory government, such as elections or local government based collaboration in deliberative democracy. 2.3. Multiple Representatives In addition to the difficulty that internally divided minorities have in gaining consensus when dealing with others, the existence of multiple internal factions creates multiple outlets of representation. When minority groups have multiple internal factions, there is often competition among them to be seen as the legitimate representative of the population. To this end, each faction presents itself as the one that other minorities and the state should deal with. This has two primary consequences for dealings between the divided minority and others.

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K.G. Cunningham / Intra-Group Differences and the Status of Religious and Ethnic Minorities

First, multiple representatives create uncertainty for governments and other minorities. These actors often cannot be certain which faction is dominant among those claiming to represent the group. This is also true to any evaluation of legitimacy. Each faction in the minority group has an incentive to claim that then are legitimate and strongly supported by the population in general. Second, groups with multiple internal factions have difficulty making credible commitments to others. Because there is no consensus among the internal factions, a deal made by one of them may not be honored by others. This will limit the willingness of other ethnic or religious minorities or the state to put faith in agreements made with specific factions of the minority group. This inability to make commitments credibly may constitute a significant barrier to peaceful interaction among groups that have a history of conflict.

3. The Role of Extremists In addition to the challenges discussed in the preceding pages, internal divisions within ethnic and religious minority groups increase the likelihood that extremists in the group will try to effect politics and society through the use of violence. The emergence of extremists that try to subvert peace processes or engender conflict has been addressed in a number of scholarly works, though there is no consensus on when these actors will succeed. However, the deeper and more prevalent the divisions within a group, the more likely one of more factions will be disaffected are resort to this type of tactic.

4. Designing Solutions There are a number of steps that can be taken to address the challenges presented here. First, both scholars and practitioners need to explicitly recognize intra-group difference, be mindful of the dimensions on which these groups can be heterogeneous, and try to anticipate how this will affect attempts to promote peace. To this end, practitioners can focus on creating more structured interaction among internal factions when minority groups are internally divided. This should be aimed at avoiding or limiting violence between factions by facilitating alternative means of interaction. Finally, practitioners should explore the possibility of parallel processes when promoting negotiation among distinct groups. A parallel process would entail facilitating negotiations within divided groups as well as between these groups and others.


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The Legacy of the Albanian Evangelicals and Its Continuation Post – 1990 Rev Fitar MUCA

The name evangelical (protestant) is connected to the prominent Renaissance figures, such as Gjerasim Qiriazi and his sisters, Sevasti and Parasheqevi, as well as Kostandin Kristoforidhi, Petro Nini Luarasi. Recognizing this activity is important because not very few people consider the Evangelical (Protestant) Faith in Albania as “a new religion” by brining in the thought that its existence threatens the equilibrium or the religious harmony of the country. But, to describe the religious and patriotic activities of Qiriazi and its collaborators as harmful to the national cause is ungrounded, when it’s a well known fact that Qiriazi was granted in 1987 the title “Professor of the People”, while in year 1992 “Order of Liberty of the First Class”. Thus, Gjerasim planted in the dimension of that time Christian Protestant faith by raising above the difficulties, persecutions and objections. The first evangelical community was named the Evangelical Brotherhood of Albania, founded in Korce in 1892 – resulting in three centuries of Albanian evangelicals. The Communist period testifies of the great spiritual vacuum which brought about changes in the religious map of Albania. Though there is no statistics that would display this in figures in favour of atheism, the communist reality taught that while dictators erect their statues, the political machinery of the time brutally hit all Christian and Muslim clergy in order to uproot their faith. For 45 years it weakened religion in a tangible way by leaving as its ‘inheritance’ a constitution in which religion was legally forbidden. Thus, it can be stated that post communistic social developments found themselves expressed not only in the political pluralism, but also in the religious freedom as part of a new system, where people do not think the same, and where they know how to respect one-another, though they may not share the same opinions on some issues. The evangelicals, as the other religious groups, tried to re-start where it was interrupted during communism time, in its roots as the Albanian Evangelical Brotherhood. To date, 120 churches in the entire country carry out their religious services by transmitting the message of love and of peace. This leitmotiv not to want to do to unto others, what you would not want to be done unto you, is the healthiest basis to move towards real and sustainable tolerance. The historical values that the evangelicals brought in Albania as a part of the Renaissance are numerous, but we would like to mention: • •

Publishing of the New Testament in Albanian, edited later in Athens in 1858. Kostandin Kristoforidhi compiled a short grammar handbook on the Albanian language which was published in 1882.

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F. Muca / The Legacy of the Albanian Evangelicals and Its Continuation Post – 1990

• •

The first Albanian women’s school, and The first Newspaper written in Albanian and published in Albania with hectograph, etc.

We do not brag about these, but we would like to show that we have offered and continue to offer to the Albanian society, to the country and those around us our ministry of values, both in the past and in the present. The values of this community were also revealed ruing the Kosova Crises in 1999. No one asked to which religion belonged those in need, but all the Albanian evangelicals welcomed, helped, took care to raise funds that exceeded the amount in millions in USD, and in cooperation with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) led the Transit Centre in the Palace of Sports in Tirana welcomed approximately 98,000 kosovars. The action of blood donation organized in the end of December 2005 saw in a single day 250 evangelical believers donating their blood for the children suffering with thalassemia, by making an appeal to life and bypassing religious affiliations. Furthermore, we see ourselves as a positive factor in the Albanian religious climate. Albania has ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in article 18 we read: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance. As an evangelical community we try to understand and fulfil it. To go against such statement, it means to go against freedom, to go against tolerance, to go against coexistence to its fullest meaning. Any type of violence, of any form, coming from any religious age towards a group or individuals does not serve freedom, and where freedom is truncated – peace is at crises. Simon Wiesenthal stated: “Tolerance and human rights search for one another.” We should not forget that “without tolerance there is no religious liberty, no freedom of conscience and no freedom of thought”, stated by Dr. Thomas Klestil, President of the Federal Republic of Austria. Continuing in this direction I would add that understanding tolerance, teaching about it, protecting and conveying it from one generation to the other, should change from a personal standpoint into a social obligation so that whenever intolerance appears the individual or the society will be ready to fight against it. The freedom that our constitution provides should oblige us to strengthen and preserve this value. These 15 post-communism years have showed that evangelicals have known how to understand and serve to tolerance and harmony in Albania. But, we should not forget. Evil tries to always make its way. And when evil appears we should not complain to the religious freedom, instead, our society should become such that would overcome the evil whenever it tries to lift its head in any part of the religious spectrum, through dialogue, dialogue and dialogue, tolerance, and understanding, and any other good. The Bible says “overcome evil through good”. There are so many bridges of cooperation for us all, independently of the religious affiliations.

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We can just ask: • • • • • • • • •

How many youth are entering every day under the snare of HIV/AIDS and what are we doing? How many girls have become victims of prostitutions and what are we doing? How many children feel abused suffering valance of all kinds, and what are we doing? How many others wonder in the streets of the capital city begging, by abandoning schooling and knowledge and what are we doing? How many women are victims of violence and what are we doing? How many young people commit suicide and what are we doing? How many others are being killed by drugs and what are we doing? How many families feel threatened by divorce and what are we doing? How many babies are being aborted and what are we doing?

Pain has no religion. It seeks the touch of any type of love. It does not ask from what side it comes or to what religion in belongs. Because real faith should be an instrument of love. In conclusion I would like to add. Being part of this dialogue, I hope it will lead into thoughts of peace and understanding among religions, that it will create space and bridges to understanding one-another and to put love into practice, while we are part of the same society, and of the same nation. Serving these values, we serve at the same time to coexistence and as such to the nation and other neighbouring countries.

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Religious Suspension of the Divine Arben XHAFERRI

“Can Prime Minister (Indra Gandhi) explain the causes why Hindus progress economically while being governed by foreigners and not by their own people?” This same question (quoted from the book of Farid Zakarias “The Prospect of Freedom”) was asked of the Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, by the famed parliamentarian of that nation, Pilo Modi. This question however creates the great historical dilemma over the role of culture in many historical processes and in governing. Obviously, culture plays an important role at all times and in any segment. In the integration process toward the European Union, countries with a western culture, i.e. Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, etc., showed with much success how peoples with different cultures, and other historical experiences which did not have the fate to experience the marvellous breeze of the Renaissance, Classicism, Barouche, Romanticism, Illuminism, Modernism, etc, that however adopt these values and cultural experiences as theirs. However, this assertion cannot be an absolute because it cannot be used to explain all the processes that do happen in the different historical and geographical contexts. Several analysts rightly confirm that some countries with a protestant culture, through the moral discipline and commitment to work, have developed much more than other countries. However, this assertion may not be generalized, because in the last decade of the 20th century, Italy and catholic France, or other far East countries, of the Confucius culture were developing faster than countries of a protestant culture. And it can be fully affirmed that the Islamic religion has not become a hindrance to the economic development on this cultural dimension, as, at the same time, this religion cannot be blamed that through terrorism brings about anarchy of global proportions. This is not true because it is contradicted by an empirical simple fact: the Islamic religion was the bearer of the overall societal progress, where it has also shown a greater tolerance toward ethnic and religious minorities than other systems have. That is why, the imposed question is why the same factors during a historical process produce different results, why different cultures some time become a hindrance and at other times become bearers of the whole societal development? Nevertheless, the answer should not be sought in the dimension of the ideology, which in a systematic and vulgar manner defends the one and blames the other. Any propaganda interpretation of the positive or negative role of culture, which includes here religion, also, does not only fail to solve the problem, but furthermore it complicates it. Thus, keeping this understanding in mind, and the changeability of the impact of culture, including that of religion in different socio-historical contexts, I think that, from the start of this commentary it is important that the constructing premises of the global policies should be analysed on a cognitive level, more specifically, the standards which aim at providing order to international relations, in order to be able to control and avert inter-country, inter-ethnic, and inter-religious conflicts, etc. Without an

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analysis of the dominating political-historical trends on a global level, it is difficult to define the factors which stimulate or hinder such a process. The 20th century, since its beginning was impregnated with the great ideas of liberty, of progress, scientific development, cultural, etc. The politicians of this period, especially after the great, absurd, tragical and debilitating wars, were in search of models which would avoid such irrational and useless conflicts in the future. After the First World War, in the different conferences of Paris and London, they would investigate and consider ideas about the creation of global institutions which in principle would help regulate/order inter-country relations, as well as avoid the different ethnic, religious, linguist conflicts anywhere in the world. At this time the American president, Woodrow Wilson, introduced two great illuminist ideas to the political scene, the right of countries to self-determine and the creation of an international institution which would manage such processes. Out of this second idea was then born the League of Nations, the forerunner of the UN. The illuminist spirit of this period defined the first premise of the global policy of the century: the right of people for freedom and self-determination which set about replacing the traditional European premise of balancing the inter-country interests and other factors. It was at this time, for the first time that moral principles started to take the place of technical ones, the sublime freedom of countries instead of the balancing of profane inter-country interests. The bearers of this idea were very clear about the distinction of the notion of people (nation) and country that was why they named this international institution as the League, or the United Nations organization. If they would have defined it as an organization of countries, then the illuminist idea of the people’s freedom would find itself in a vicious cycle and would never be attained. But thanks to the wisdom of the illuminist politicians of this period, the first premise of the macro-politics of the 20th century, or that of global politics, became the inalienable right, people’s inherent right for freedom and self-determination. The idea of unchangeable borders, the Helsinki Paper come much later and does not have an inherent importance, but rather a technical value because it talks about how the borders may (not) be changed. Through this illuminist principle for the freedom of peoples, two effects were reached: decolonisation, and prevention of new decolonisation. Decolonisation freed many countries; however it did not automatically bring new values and freedom. The regimes of these decolonised countries governing with recently liberated peoples were not very efficient, but rather more despotic and cruel than those of the former colonizers. Therefore the question of the famed Indian parliament deputy directed to Prime Minister Gandhi is essential to understand the need to find a second premise which would in turn narrow the opening for these cruel rulers in these decolonised countries, of recently freed peoples. Misuse of the people’s natural right for freedom, decolonisation, again we saw the appearance of wise politicians with new and concrete ideas. It was in this sociopolitical context that the second standard of macro-politics was forged, which in effect narrowed the opening of these despots of different colours, and their voluntarianism: the human rights standard. In this way the peoples would attain their right for freedom, for the establishment of new countries, but at the same time would be obligated to respect human rights and those of minorities. The countries and regimes, which did not

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fulfil these requirements very quickly, became object of criticism, condemnation, isolation, embargos and even international military interventions. The human rights standard became the virus, which started to debilitate the despotic, totalitarian, nondemocratic regimes. It was a result of this that the different communist ideological formations fell off of the historical scene due to the fact that they were not able to discipline reality through their coercive ideological schemes. However, the meaning of different notions is not the same to all the people and cultures. In the same way that the inalienable standards for the freedom and selfdetermination were misused, which were bent and transfigured by despotic regimes, in the same way the correcting standard of human rights was led to terrorism. The efforts to achieve with any means freedom and for human rights to be respected also brought about irresponsible ideas and actions in the historical scene. The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, where the New York Twin Towers were destroyed, brought about the need to restrict even this sublime standard of human rights. Terrorism will not earn the right for the respecting of any value that is why different political activities should be held which highlight the breaking of human rights and that at the same time provide models how these issues can be solved. This assessment is accepted by majority of peoples and countries in the world today that is why it should not be doubted that it will in turn be accepted as a global premise in international relations. That is why at this moment we should assess in passing, the status of democracy in non-liberal societal formations. In the western context liberalization of society was set up as a character of society and then the path was opened for the implementation of democracy as an acceptable procedure of political legitimation. According to different analysts in non-liberal societies, democracy does not always bring about freedom. Many dictators like Hitler, Mussolini, Milosevic, Sad am Hussein and their alterations in Latin America, Africa and Asia has utilized democracy as a means of legitimation, as burning fuel to come to power and then have established a despotic order which does not have to do anything with democracy or freedom. Surely, after the elimination of terrorism as a legitimate means and solution in different contexts, the issue of the misuse of democracy will be opened (pseudo-democracy) in non-liberal societies, or to put it more correctly, in societies with non-liberal constitutions. As it is known in these systems of authoritarian values, where the exclusive mentality is tolerated, the mindset that excludes the other, then very easily, and without serious turmoil democracy is changed into a procedure for the elimination of the other, be it of the ideological ethnic or religious opponent. For a long time terrorism has become fearful for majority of the world. It is not a new idea, however through the globalisation mechanisms it has been transformed an intimidation for all. As a formatted political idea, anarchy appeared through the political actions of Russian communists, led by Bakunin (Michael Aleksandrovic 1814–1876), who, while opposing Marks, dispersed the idea for the effective overthrowing of old societal systems by means of anarchic methods of terrorism. He and his followers, both in the past and now in the present cannot come to understand that anarchy, after it has plunged into a society cannot afterward be controlled with democratic-political means, but only with a merciless dictatorship. Bakunin and his anarchic ideas did not bring about freedom, but instead the one-century communist dictatorship. The similar variants in Europe, i.e. “Red Brigades” and others were not able to set roots in genuine democratic countries. In the liberal-democratic social formations massive frustrations are not formed, that is why such revolutionary adventures remain isolated.


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Therefore, terrorism as a means of war, used for the purpose of taking care of political needs has existed even before, in any historical or cultural context and there fore it cannot be imputed as an attribute of a specific culture, nation or religion. After the latest historical development, after the isolation of the socialist camp, after the end of the Cold War, it became clear that the only superpower of global proportions was the U.S.A. and the now on it will be very hard to contest the leading status of this political, military, economical, scientific, etc., superpower. But instead of going in support of the leading position of the U.S. which objectively said, better than at any other time in history is spreading the standards of freedom, human rights, and democracy as a legitimate means and as an instrument for the deterioration of terroristanarchic systems, many factors have once again resolved to the idea of challenging this superpower with terrorist-anarchic means. These ideas relate mainly to the appearance of the so-called Islamic fundamentalism. Instrumentalization of religion as a means of challenging the leading role of the U.S. has a diabolical political logic, because it bears the confrontation/challenge on a religious rhetoric level where all may be considered equal. Therefore, often even madness has its own logic. The global terrorism ideologies are self-conscious that progress in the democratic states has been reached through the development of science, technology, freedom, human rights, legal state, secularisation, etc., and that it takes much time, efforts and sacrifice to reach that level of social development. Therefore, by avoiding the confrontation with the harsh reality, the religious antagonism between Christianity and Islam is diabolically constructed. By utilizing the religious polarization method, the global terrorism ideologies aim at achieving several effects: • • • • • •

to be legitimised as the incontestable leaders of the Islamic world through force and not the tiresome democratic procedures; to push out of the rails the legal representatives by declaring them as servants of the enemies of Islam; to declare, totalise, ideologise religion as the most important issue in any social activity. To this end the globalizing mechanisms are used, that it media, internet, international institutions, etc; to blame others, other religions as being the ones guilty for the lack of development/backwardness of Muslim peoples; to polarize people according to religious convictions; to easily create a global unity based on religious grounds which have never existed before, etc.

There exists a paradoxical coincidence between the Islamists (fundamentalists) and the anti-islamist who in turn blame the Islamic religion for the appearance of terrorism as a mean of achieving political goals. The Islamists of different colours whom are identified under the logo of Al-Qaeda claim that the crisis (the overall economic and social lack of development/ backwardness) that is so prevalent in Islamic societies is closely related to the fact that Qur’anic principles are not being respected and that without the suspension of the laws of man and a return to the system of values stemming from the holy revelation, these countries will never come out of their crisis. However, as it is known, this postulate of theirs is the source of the crisis, because in the history of mankind there has never been

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a state which has operated strictly based on pure religious principles, be it Islamic, Christian, or Buddhist. It is known to all how the Afghanistan experiment ended. It is very easy to come up with a utopian idea, but it is very hard to implement it, almost impossible. This is also well know to the leaders of the Muslim nations in the 20th century, who took upon themselves the heavy duty of reforming society according to contemporary standards. At the start of the 20th century the ideals of freedom and democracy which came from the West, began to give their effect on the Arab states also, or better said, the Muslim nations. The amazement with these ideas was so great that they encouraged not only the decolonisation, but also the ideas of secularism, a term which is used in parallel in some European and Muslim countries (i.e. France, Turkey, etc.). Kemal Ataturk, otherwise called the father of the Turks (Ataturk), in his speech held in the great Assembly of March 3, 1924 declared his unwavering determinism for the construction of the new social formation based on pure secular premises. In that speech he explained his motives why he had refused without a dilemma the offer to be declared the Caliph of all Muslims. His explanation is not only political (his determination for secularism), but also pragmatic: other Muslim countries have their own leaders and boundaries; therefore they would not be willing to forego their power to the new Caliph. After the Second World War, the political scene of Muslim nations saw the appearance of politicians with liberal concepts and occidental appearance, manners and convictions as was the nationalistic charismatic prime minister, Gamal Abdul Nasser, king Hussein, the Algerian Ben Bela, the Iranian Pahlavi, or the even Saddam Hussein, who fought to identify his Iraqi people not only with the Muslim tradition, but also with the Babylonian one. Since the start of the 20th century up to the late 70s, the Islamic world had the conviction that Islam should be modernized. As is known about Turkey, which not only became a parliamentarian republic, but also carried out drastic reforms in all the segments of society starting from the alphabet and up to the minimization of the role of religion in society: the “a la turka” culture began to change to the “a la franka” one. The measures undertaken by the Turk reformist Kemal Ataturk were so drastic that today they look unbelievable. May be no one will believe that in Turkey even today it is restricted to imams to wear their religious clothing in public spaces which were declared secular. On the other side in these same streets of Istanbul you can see priests walking freely with their religious clothing on. This liberal spirit was existent in almost all the Islamic nations, except for Saudi Arabia. However, in the latter 70s the situation started to change. The modernization of Islam maxim slowly started to be substituted by the modern islamization. According to Farid Zakarias, religion in the western world today is the source of spiritual inspiration and not the everyday scheme of life. Very quickly their liberal leaders lost their credibility and began to be substituted by Islamic ideologists. The first among these ideologists was the Pakistani scholar, Abdul Ala Maududi, who using the experience of the prophet Mohammed, began to compare the colonialists, the westerners with the then unbelievers (pagans), against whom the prophet fought. His most faithful and successful follower was the Egyptian, Sajid Kurtb, who in his book which has become a sort of a manual for islamists, The Road Signs, formulates his concept of Jihad, as a war against the unbelievers (pagans) and the non-religious Muslims. The impact of all of them, especially the later, in the Muslim world, is greater than that of any legitimate politician. All of these ideologists or disciplined soldiers of these movements, have a common denominator: return to the roots of the Islamic faith, or complete islamization of


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the society, transforming thus Islam into to manual for daily life. In fact, these ideas are brought back to life by communitarian concepts, which usually end up as restricting totalitarian doctrines. The truth is that the role of religion in society is made evident in its mild form, as in the west. According to the Swiss sociologist, Urs Altermat, the concealed return of the divine appears not only in the Islamic world, but it is a general occurrence. Urs finds the beginnings of this restorative trend in the 70s: • • • •

In the year 1976, the recently elected American president, Jimmy Carter declared that he would be involved in politics as a ‘reborn Baptist’; In the year 1977 the Israeli Likud conservative right block won the elections, affected by religious circles, and led by Menahem Begin; In the year 1979, Karol Vojtila was elected pop and declared the evangelisation of the world as the primary duty; In the year 1979 the Iranian revolution triumphed. The place of the prowestern Shah was taken by Ayatollah Khomeini who declared it an Islamic Republic and the ideology of Islamic fundamentalism and Jihad as the means to achieve this objective.

This resurrection of religion, the French, Gilles Kepel, called it the revenge of God (La Revenche de Dieu). However, this definition is valid more for the post-communist courtiers, than the liberal ones where religion was never forbidden. Despite the fact that these processes develop in parallel, nevertheless they produce another dilemma: why does not the evangelisation of the world produce concerns as the Islamic fundamentalism? This dilemma cannot be solved with conspiracy theories, but by conducting rational and neutral analysis of the phenomena. I think that the answer should be sought in our historical experience, the democratic qualities of society, the structuring of religion and the legitimisation procedures. The history of Christianity differs from that of Islam and Judaism. The process of separation of church and state starts from the 4th century A.D. with the departure of Constantine from Rome and the creation of the capital in Phosphorus. From that moment the religions leader of the church was relieved from the shadow of the emperor, to start the construction of his own independence. As may be deduced from this sentence, the notion of church has an institutional meaning, which cannot be said about the mosque or the synagogue. It would be meaningless to say the Eastern Mosque or the Western Synagogue. From this special historical experience, the western church, liberated from under the tutelage of the emperor, created a hierarchical structure, which in essence reflected that of the Roman Empire. Such a structure does not exist neither in the Islamic religion nor in the Judeo one, not even the doctrinal basis. The religious hierarchical structure existent in Iran does not have Qur’anic basis, that is why according to the Islamic tradition and doctrine for the Fatwa (accusation, curse), as the renowned American publicist, a Muslim originating from Bombay, Farid Zakaria, may be declared, from any Al-Qaeda member, as well as a Pakistani taxi driver in New York. Despite the fact that the Christian and Islamic religion are universal, in contrast to the Judeo one which is valid only for the chosen people, the Hebrews, the problem of being a universal religion for Islam is trapped and often creates frictions/frustrations, irresponsible voluntarianisms due to a lack of a structure and hierarchy which would bring this aim to life. This problem does not appear in the Catholic Church which has an effective structure and hierarchy.

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The distinguished role of religion in the Islamic society speaks about the quality of democracy in these states. The absence of an able opposition is utilized by Islamist movements whom in the name of divine authority, God, contest/oppose the earthly authority of their different political leaders. From time to time this phenomenon becomes evident even in Christian societies. Absence of an opposition in communist states, i.e. Poland, was used by the Catholic Church which then created a greater authority than the communist nomenclature. In the same way the issue of legitimisation for the right to represent the interests of any group, is itself a problem almost unsurpassable in Islam. How can someone be legitimised to speak in the name of all Muslims in the world, or, what is even more important, in the name of God? How has God given the authorization for anyone to kill (Allahu Ekber) someone else in His name, whom at the same time is His creature and believes also in Him. Muslims, Christian, and Jews believe in one God and they are convinced to be His creatures. Therefore, in the Catholic church there exists a hierarchy and a legitimising procedure for someone to be able to represent the interests of believers, good or bad, so that the Catholic church may have a single address. The other faiths do not have this distinction, furthermore in the Islamic religion; the way the Caliph is selected is not even described, which in turn became the reason behind the great schism of the Sunni and Shiites. The idea that the return to the divine principles would provide almost like a magic wand solution to difficulties with which the Muslims are faced, but even for all the Christians in the world, goes against not only today’s reality, but also the historical truth. Such a state build on pure Qur’anic principles or those of the Gospel, has never existed in history. The difficulties in principle that are faced by the radical religious movements, without moral, religious or political dilemmas, provide a challenge every day and on every occasion. In an interview for CNN, the media figure of this movement, Osama Bin Lade, when asked if the killing of innocent children was in accordance with the principles of Islam, said without hesitation that it was not, but we will kill their children as long as they continue to kill ours. It is in this answer that the essence of the issue hides: the non-legitimate takeover of the political and religious representation of Muslims. He perceives himself as one of the inter-fighting parts, as a representative of all Muslims and as one sent by God. Every act that he commits he links it with the interests of Muslims and those of God, while not being conscientious that no one has authorized him to do these missions. And as it is known, the Islamic world has been facing this problem for a long time now. According to the Sunni doctrine, the right of representation, and that of undisputable interpretation of the Qur’an has been given only to their scholars, respectively to the consensus of the community (in Arabic igma, in Latin consensus omnium). Meanwhile, for the Shiite this is not sufficient therefore they have involved/introduced also the institution of the Imam, the infallible, the direct descendants of the prophet Mohammed, of the Caliph Ali branch. On the other side the anti-islamists claim that the Islamic dogma is the one that produces the lack of development, conflict and the other forms of confrontation with the non-Islamic world. By analysing the Islamic notion of Jihad and the separation of the world into two categories, “dar al Islam” and “dar al harb”, these analysts unjustly declare the Islamic doctrine as the foundation for an inevitable conflict of planetary proportions, between the Muslims and non-Muslims. Part of this category are those that create caricatures that blaspheme against the prophet Mohammed, by at the same time


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stepping on the dignity of Muslims and those who after improved analyses ask for reforms to the Islamic dogma, without which there cannot be secularised states dominated by Muslim people. This reform is sought after continually by Muslim scholars, even leaders of states, starting from the Caliph Ma’mun (at the time of his Caliphate 813–833) and even up to the charismatic leader of Turkey, Kemal Ataturk, but without success. This category of thinkers who treat the Islamic doctrine as the crisis generator in the relation between the two civilizations, Muslim and Christian, do not take into consideration the different historical experiences. The developments in the Christian world, as was said above, are not the same as those in the Islamic world. Since the introduction of monotheistic religions in the occidental world there has also been an introduction of the antagonism between the power-bearer, the king, and the spiritual leader, the pope. According to the American publicist, Farid Zakaria, the starting point of secularism in the west should be searched since the time of Constantine the Great. As it is known, he not only made Christianity the state religion, but in the year 324 began to move the empires administration from Rome to Constantinople, creating thus the new epicentre of the Roman Empire, Constantinople. According to the chronicles of that time he had brought with him all the material and people’s values, except the Bishop of Rome, the first among the equals (Primus inter pares) whom would later be known as the pope. This happenstance, may ......to some degree, influenced in such a way so that the processes in the western sphere of the Roman Empire would take another turn whose final product would be secularism. This notion was used for the first time in Great Britain in the 19th century and carried with it the idea that the moral guaranty should not be the authority of God, but that of reason. This topic was present at that time in intellectual circles, so much that it obliged the German philosopher Niche to write the famed treatise on the genealogy of morals. All the other clerics who followed Constantine to the east, where trade was booming, remained nevertheless in a submitted role under the authority of the emperor; meanwhile the one that was left in Rome did not have to submit to anyone. Since at that time in the Western Europe there was not an emperor, but only kings, princes and small leaders, the forsaken bishop, which later became the pope, took over that space to balance them out. In an almost accidental way he was saved from the shadow of the Roman Emperor and started to get under his shadow all the different kings with limited powers and authority. In these fortuitous situation in history a historical process of relativity between the spiritual leader of the people, the pope, and the different power-bearers, the kings. According to the renowned German philosopher, Peter Sloterdijk, the European kings with a military mindset were interrelated with the proto-fascist heritage, the knights whose morals did not agree with the merciful doctrine of Christianity. The Christian doctrine propagated love for each-other, modesty, chastity, patience, meanwhile the classes of power-bearers did not relinquish the old military traditions, from the model of the Olympic athlete, or of wanting to be above the others. These antagonisms would produce not only constant frictions, but also the different philosophic-theological meditations so that by doctrinal means they could eliminate the conflicts. Saint Augustine, may be based on the Gospel according to Mathew (12:21 “Give to Cesar what is Cesar’s and to God what his God’s”) finally found the solution, the share of authorities” the king was given the earthly; meanwhile the pope had the divine. Nevertheless, often these doctrinal solutions would not suffice, but new formulas would have to be in-

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vented through which the military energies proto-fascist energies would be channelled. It was such a formula which allowed the war against the pagans, or the non-Christians, which in history are known with the name ‘the Crusades’ as well as the ‘Inquisition’, the punishment of these demonised creatures. Then throughout their history these roles would be interchangeable, to where at times the pope would oblige the emperors or kings to humble themselves, while at other times it was the kings who would challenge the authority of the pope. By challenging each-other they were obliged through agreement and laws to regulate their relations, broadening thus the opening of freedom. These clashes, especially those among protestant sects, brought to the western world the concept of freedom. This antagonist process, 1500 years old, between the spiritual leader, the pope, and the political one, the king, which started in the 4th century with the departure of Constantine from Rome, ended with the Second Vatican Council that started in 1962 to 1965, where secularism was accepted as the definitive solution to the old challenge. Some venture to say that in this Council Catholicism was made Protestant. After this, Christianity was then focused on reforming itself, meanwhile Islam still holds on to the idea of social reform on the basis of religion. This secularising process was never implemented in the Islamic world because in these societies there has never existed an antagonism between the spiritual leader and the political one. The Caliph, who is viewed as the shadow of God on earth, is at the same time the spiritual leader as well as the leader of the state, which is why in these societies there has never been such type of antagonism. The request for the secularisation of these societies can be accepted may be on the level of reason, but not that of emotions. The problems that surface in the Islamic world are not a result of the refusal of occidental values and standards, but rather a result of the internal structural discontinuity: because of the fading of the Caliphate, or the “sheh’ul Islam” from the ottoman period. There is a strange relation exchange between the western and eastern world: the west exports in the east the ideology (then communism, today democracy), meanwhile the east accepts the religion. Due to the fact that they have different mental constructs, the east – religious mentality, the west – ideological one, or said differently, they have different historical experiences, therefore both parts make different modifications. In the western world all the more the imported religion is made relative, both in its doctrinal and practical aspects, meanwhile in the east religion is transformed more and more into the way of life, while ideology is made relative, were in democratic states more and more attention is given to ideology (democracy, liberal and open society, freedom of the individual, human rights, the harmony between political and moral principles by making the ethical values universal), while in eastern countries there is the tendency to make the state into a theocracy, whereby religious principles become everything. In this way, the western liberal societies are democratised, while the eastern ones become theocracies. In the west, after the deep disillusion brought about from the violence of the Inquisition which imposed the Bible as the only source of truth, more specifically after the disillusion from the non-scientific truths in the holy books, the uniting role of religion began to be taken by nationalism. This process would then end up with the creation of nation states, which in the Arab world do not exist in practice, but not even as a notion. In his book entitled “Ethnonacionalism in Europe”, Urs Altermati affirms that in the Arab language the notion of nation does not even exist. These remarks are most probably true, therefore in the Arab world there does not exist not even a federation state


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established over foundations of ethnic, religious and language diversities. The eastern mentality has exclusivist characteristics for the other which it assimilates, meanwhile the western mentality more and more is characterized by inclusive, tolerant and cosmopolite form. For example, it has become natural that in all the western countries mosques may be built, and cultural and religious values are tolerated, while in the east, for example Saudi Arabia, the construction of a Christian object is not tolerated, not even different types of clothing styles, as is the case in Iran. In the Ottoman Empire the status of millet (population) was given only to Christian populations and not to Muslim populations with a different ethnic background. If the ottoman rule would have stayed on Albania lands, they would most probably have experienced the fate of the Kurdish people today. As is known, the Turks tolerate the requests of the Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, etc, to speak in their own language, to open their own schools, meanwhile to the Muslim Albanians this right was denied. This position had a negative effect, especially during the dissipation of the Ottoman Empire where the Turk administration would refuse to approve the request of Albanians for autonomy and later for independence. Secularism in the western world had another essential motive. As is known every religion has in itself an utopian dimension, which is an idea common to all people. When Christianity was first spreading out, the disciples and apostles had taken upon themselves the duty to build heaven on earth. When they noticed that reality was very hard to change, and then they selected the heavenly/ after death dimension, meanwhile the profane, the earthly was delivered up to the political leaders, and kings. In the Muslim world, where the different ideologists impose the idea of the suspension of all human and foreign laws, which do not agree with the Shari’ a, we see again the struggle to create heaven on earth. This is not a new idea, since even during the ottoman period the figure of the earthly, profane, judge that had to enforce the laws of man, the kadiu was often represented in comical tones. The western mindset that produces ideologies, has since the time of Hobs till that of Marks been trying through different forms of totalitarianism to bring about a utopia on earth. Such ideas are noble in themselves, but the results are inhumane because a reality may not be violated through an ideological mould. Rhetoric may not of itself change reality. The failure of such concepts starts when the new system of values excludes with different repressive methods competing ideas. The growing failure of such totalitarian projects which try to kill the multiple diversity of ideas, value and interests, is accompanied with a growth in the number of enemies and as a result of victims also. The end of such concepts that try to violate reality is well known, as is the case recently with communism. However, it is hard for totalitarianism and authoritarianism to disappear. Today we are faced with the phenomenon of the mutation of these ideas. Despite the fact that the ideological totalitarianism has collapsed, that does not mean that it will not be recycled in other variations of differing sizes. According to all estimations, the totalitarian concept, which kills out the diversity in society, takes other shapes which can be ethnical, religious, etc. The main distinguishing characteristic of totalitarianism is the denial and punishment of diversity. Ethnic totalitarianism produces a degeneration which ends up with punishment and exclusion of the other. Ethnic or religious cleansings appeared anywhere where there was a lack of liberal traditions, both in Europe, Asia or Africa. Today totalitarianism and authoritarianism set roots anywhere where there is a lack of liberal concepts of democracy. As was said earlier, the democracy which is developed in non-liberal societies produces authoritarian and charismatic

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leaders, whom in turn cause wars, break legal, moral and religious norms by committing crimes which they justify by different ideas. The recycling of the different forms of totalitarianism, ideological (“Proletarians of all countries unite”), national (“Freedom, brotherhood, equality”), religious (“the Islamic integration-Umma”) constantly bring up issues that have to do with moral principles. As is known the main attribute of moral principles is their universal value. All the different types of totalitarianisms paradoxically emphasize, while at the same time limiting the value of moral principles: they are valuable only for the members of the group and not for the others, whom in turn are punished for their ethnic, ideological or religious diversity. Taken as a whole, the differences between Christianity and Islam are not of doctrinal nature, but rather social, historical and epistemological. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have one source: the prophet Abraham (Ibrahim). The different historical experiences then brought about the different sensibilities and mindsets. Christianity accepted to its separation from the state, meanwhile Islam started this process later and will conclude it with secularisation of some other form. The remarks made by islamists toward Christians do not regard religious dogmas at all, which at their most important point are identical, but they have to do with the western civilization. The distinguishing characteristic of the western civilization is doubt (scepticism) which is used as a method to discover the truth; meanwhile the distinguishing characteristic of the eastern civilization is the unlabeled trust in the authority. The main problem for the Muslim world is not the western regimes, but rather the despotic ones which suffocate the freedom of Islamic societies. So instead of challenging these regimes, the ideologists of terror spill their hate on the regimes of countries with a genuine democracy. There are however, big distinctions between the Christian doctrines and the western civilization’s system of values. This may be led philosopher, Erich From, to ascertain that Western Europe became Christian only during the middle ages, 13th–15th century, then after the Renaissance this situation changed. As is known today, the EU refuses to acknowledge in its preamble the role of Christianity in the formation of the European identity. Another sad problem in the inter-religious relations: is the prominence that is given to elements, norms and native customs to the detriment of divine ones. These religious clashes exclude God; they suspend the idea of the absolute Creator, for whom all human beings are equal. In the dimension of God there is no distinction between people, however in the religious dimension these distinctions appear due to the emphasis put on them by earthly interests, to the detriment of divine values. In the Islamic theology it is forbidden to identify God with the artefacts of the created world. When religions suspend the divine, then the sound of the bell or the muezzin is heard as a declaration of war…


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The Inadvertent Effects of Democratisation on Religious Extremist Groups Erica CHENOWETH

This project examines a pressing issue in international security – the growing threat of terrorism in democratic states. Specifically, I seek to inform the following questions: 1) why are religious extremist groups likely to emerge in new democracies, and 2) what steps can emerging democracies and the international community take to reduce the threat of violence among such groups? For centuries, terrorist groups have been regarded as groups of crazed individuals whose pathology prevents them from participating in conventional political processes. Lately, they have been described as individuals who “hate democracy”, or “organizations whose use of violence is intended to circumvent or destroy the democratic political process”. However, empirical evidence suggests that terrorism is more common in democracies than in nondemocracies. Since 1995, 76.1% of new terrorist groups have emerged in democracies. Many of these groups use religion for three main purposes: 1) To use extreme doctrinal interpretations to justify violence; 2) To offer divine incentives to attract new members to their groups; and 3) To provide a convenient venue by which to recruit new members. Societies with substantial religious minorities or religious cleavages are particularly vulnerable to such manipulation. Why does terrorism thrive in democracies? A common answer is that due to their observation of civil liberties, democracies provide the permissive conditions within which terrorist groups flourish. In addition, I contend that terrorism grows in democracies due to the competitive nature of democratic systems, which creates incentives for terrorist groups to organize and commit atrocities in order to gain access to the public agenda. Groups are therefore compelled into a cycle of competition with one another in which they constantly escalate their tactics to obtain status and influence amid a transitioning polity.

Democratisation and Terrorist Activity Before democratic transitions, terrorist groups typically contain large memberships and oppose the domestic regime. Otherwise, they are state-supported or state-sponsored as arms of foreign policy. Repressive regimes usually find it easy to crush internal opposition because they are unconstrained by civil liberties. However, once a state begins to democratise, terrorist group proliferation is likely to occur for several reasons. First, as the society opens, rival groups may compete for power. Violence may seem the most immediate and effective expression of power, so groups will be tempted to engage in violent acts to achieve status within the new gov-

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E. Chenoweth / The Inadvertent Effects of Democratisation on Religious Extremist Groups

ernment. Second, as a formerly repressive regime begins to observe civil liberties, it is less likely to be able to crush terrorist groups. And finally, foreign terrorist groups may move to the emerging democracy in order to protect a minority – especially a religious minority whom the new order may threaten. Once the democratic transition has occurred, would-be terrorist groups exploit new civil liberties, such as freedom of expression, freedom to practice religion, and freedom of assembly. The open media also permits terrorists to exploit public attention, especially since most media favours reporting spectacular news such as terrorist violence. Combined with these new freedoms, terrorists are further driven by competitive dynamics, which are now fairly obvious due to media reporting of other terrorist attacks. Because the agenda-setting process is highly competitive, various political organizations or interest groups are pitted against one another, even if they have similar interests at stake. Often, these groups are in direct conflict with one another and may even be hostile at times. Due to the incentive to gain political influence relative to other groups, terrorist groups proliferate similarly to legal interest groups. Although many argue that democratic states effectively cannot crack down on terrorists due to legal constraints, historical evidence suggests otherwise. For instance, the United Kingdom and the United States have often circumvented civil liberties in order to combat domestic and international terrorism (i.e. the Emergency Powers Acts in Northern Ireland from 1922-current, and detention and wiretapping programs in the United States after 2001). In democracies, however, such counter terrorism campaigns are seldom successful; instead, the terrorists perceive their grievances against the government to be justified. Moreover, some members of the public may begin to sympathize with the terrorists, leading to a recruitment boost. When terrorists provoke democracies to utilize indiscriminate violence against a population, the long-term result is usually an increase of the terrorist group’s strength.

Implications for Religious Coexistence in the Albania Due to recent democratic transitions in the Balkans, it is likely that certain terrorist groups will develop and begin to use violence to affect politics. This violence may possess a religious character, as terrorist leaders attempt to exploit existing religions within Albania and other Balkan countries to find recruits, resources, and sympathy. Moreover, existing constitutional constraints on the executive do not prohibit democracies from adopting counter terrorism policies that are strict or even “draconian” in many ways. In fact, democratic publics often demand such measures when confronted with terrorism precisely because terrorists attempt to circumvent normal procedures for redress of grievances and are therefore in conflict with acceptable norms and standards of democratic governance. Hence democratic publics are even more likely to reject terrorism and to call upon the government to address terrorism with full force. If terrorist groups begin to attack in Albania, the government will be tempted to use violent and indiscriminate counter terrorism tactics in order to extinguish the threat. This would be a mistake, since such activities can actually generate sympathy for the “repressed group” among the wider population, leading to both short- and long-term strategic gains for the terrorists. Furthermore, if terrorism contains a religious character in countries like Albania, widespread polarization may result. Such polarization could lead to hate crimes, social discrimination, segregation, and other sorts of negative side effects that could threaten


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the tradition of peaceful religious coexistence in Albania. Governments should take care to separate religion from counter terrorism campaigns so as to avoid such polarization.

What Can Be Done? Some Policy Recommendations This analysis concludes that terrorist groups proliferate within democracies because they are competing with other groups for influence while exploiting civil liberties. Such terrorism often possesses a religious character. Since many countries in the Balkans are experiencing a democratic transition, religious extremism may threaten the security and stability of this region while also disrupting the multi-religious tranquillity in states such as Albania. There are several practical recommendations that new democracies can adopt to reduce the threat of terrorism during and after a democratic transition. First, states undergoing a transition to democracy should anticipate and prepare for intense terrorist violence as various extremist factions within the polity spar for hegemony on the public agenda. Such processes are arguably underway in both the Palestinian Territories and Iraq, where inter-group competition among terrorists has caused the fledgling democracies to appear especially vulnerable. It is not necessarily the case that terrorists “hate freedom,” as is often touted in foreign policy; rather, they thrive on and exploit democracy. Next, all democratic states should anticipate and prepare for the escalation effects of terrorist group competition by fortifying possible domestic targets. Such measures are currently underway in major cities in Europe and the United States, but they should be accelerated. Especially if highly capable international terrorist groups are able to infiltrate democratic borders and begin the cycle of escalation so common among domestic terrorist groups, the effects could be disastrous. Counter terrorism officials should be aware of and prepare for the dynamics of terrorist group competition and anticipate cycles of activity among groups. Efforts to improve homeland security should include not only the public sector, but also the private sector, since its interests in maintaining security overlap. Third, new democracies should take great care to avoid responding to terrorist violence with indiscriminate repression of a minority group, especially a religious minority. Resisting the temptation to overreact will yield benefits in the fight against terrorism, since the terrorists will continue to appear illegitimate to observers. Democratic righteousness will undermine the grievances of the terrorists and reduce their appeal to public sympathies. Steps to reduce the chance of overreaction include staging simulations where law enforcement and emergency personnel respond to mass casualty incidents and deal directly with terrorist “suspects”. In addition, strict penalties should be in place for personnel who deviate from lawful protocol to deter them from committing atrocities vis-à-vis the target population. Finally, there should be open, national and international discussions concerning the limits of democracy in combating terrorism. New democracies especially must decide – with the consent of their populations – whether they are willing to sacrifice some security to maintain their civil liberties, or whether the government should be able to cast off these restraints in response to terrorism. Emerging democracies in the Balkans have important roles to play here, as their experiences will be invaluable assets in the discussions to come. The international community must develop effective standards by which

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to reduce the appeal of extremism while maintaining democratic principles and practices. Key leadership within the United Nations and other international organizations should establish special commissions or directorates to further investigate the relationship between democracy and terrorism.


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The Jews of Albania During the Zogist Period and the Second World War Bernd J. FISCHER

Religious tolerance in the West in our time is often gauged by the treatment of Jews – in this respect Albanians have acquitted themselves very well. While others in the Balkans – and obviously in the rest of Europe – have institutionalised discrimination, participated passively or often enthusiastically in some of the most horrific crimes against humanity in relation to Jews, Albanians, often at personal risk, have opened their country and often their homes to not only Albanians Jews but to foreign Jews as well. It is the purpose of this short paper to examine some aspects of this issue in terms of the interwar and World War II periods – specifically I would like to focus on a number of interrelated issues. First I plan to explore King Zog’s policy of religious nationalization and his encouragement of further religious diversity in terms of motives, policy and impact. The remainder of the paper will focus specifically on Jews in Albania during the Second World War, in terms of their experience in Albania, concluding with a brief discussion of some of the possible motives behind the various attitudes that Jews in Albania encountered during the war.

1. Zog – Religious Nationalization and the Encouragement of further Religious Diversity in Albania It is clear when looking at King Zog’s religious policy as a whole, that he saw religion as a potentially divisive force that might stand in the way of the creation of the modern, western, unified state he sought. Zog was determined to reduce the potentially divisive effect of religion in Albania by following a policy of religious nationalization, by urging and supporting administrative and political independence for Albania’s various religions from any foreign influence, and by following a policy of what may be described as furthering religious diversity. In terms of religious nationalization, Zog’s policy towards the majority churches is well known but let me briefly summary. Zog was to a certain extent guided by his monarchical constitution of 1928 and his own law on “Albanian Religious Communities” passed by his controlled parliament in January 1930 which declared Albania to be non-sectarian, which reserved for the state the right of controlling religious communities, requiring that – based on article 8 of the law that – “religious leaders, their immediate subordinates, the coadjutors and their vicars, should be of Albanian descent and language”. At the same time, however, Zog also proclaiming individual religious freedom for Albanians. The 1928 constitution guaranteed that “All religions and faiths are honoured and their liberty of practice assured. Religion can in no way form judicial barriers and cannot be used for political purposes.”

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B.J. Fischer / The Jews of Albania During the Zogist Period and the Second World War

Much of the work of nationalization had already been done prior to the establishment of the monarchy but Zog contributed in important ways. Let us briefly survey the road towards religious independence followed by Albania’s principal religious communities. 1.

2.

3.

4.

Sunni Moslems had separated themselves from outside control at the Congress of Tirana in 1923. The work of the Congress included the election of a new national leadership, as well as various reforms including the severing of ties with many traditional practices, detaching the church from the caliphate, abolishing the title of bey along with the practice of polygamy, and doing away with the compulsory veiling of women. Bektashi Moslems, too, sought independence and were encouraged in their efforts by the state. In 1922 in Prishta, Albanian Bektashi declared themselves independent of the Turkish Bektashi. A new leader of the Bektashi was nominated by Zog’s royal decree in March 1929. The Orthodox community, where the efforts of Fan Noli were of importance, held the Congress of Berat in 1922. Here is was declared that the Albanian Orthodox church would henceforth be autocephalous, and that Albanian instead of Greek would be used for liturgical purposes. The Congress appealed to the ecumenical Patriarch in Istanbul to legalized the projected severance, but this step was delayed, at least in part because of the lack of a hierarchy and, so Zog argued, because of the Patriarch’s obstructionism. Zog reopened negotiations in 1926 but to no avail, but in 1929 he took matters into his own hands and created a synod that was finally recognized by the Patriarch only in 1937 after Zog had relieved Bishop Vissar, a member of the synod. After considerable delay then, Zog had achieved his goal and another of Albania’s major churches had been essentially nationalized. Albanian Catholics were considered a special problem by Zog, because of their perceived connection with the Italians. Zog argued that through Catholic schools, Italians were politically and culturally influencing Albanian students. Zog’s minister of education even suggested that portraits of Albanian heroes were being replaced by those of Victor Emmanuel and Mussolini. Zog was particularly concerned about Italian inroads in the north, and felt the Italians were attempting to replace his influence with their own. In an attempt to deal with this problem, Zog, as he often did, overreacted. While his motives might have been reasonable enough, his policy was ill-conceived and poorly implement, resulting in the closing of religious schools without careful enough preparation to insure that the damage this move created, in terms of education in Albania in general, would be kept to a minimum. After several years, and new agreements with Italy, the schools were for the most part reopened. With the Catholics, then, Zog was less successful but then effective Catholic resistance (both from the indigenous hierarchy and the Vatican) to state control was not limited to Albania.

This leads us to the acceptance of religious diversity and the creation of further religious diversity. In terms of the former Zog launched extensive programs including improved communications and transportation that was intended to allow for cultural and religious mixing among Albania’s various religious groups. Zog also put greater emphasis on national education. He used the army to integrate Albanians religiously by insisting that units be constructed of individuals from different regions and different


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religions. He also introduced some coercive measure with regard to dress codes. The best example here would be his prohibition on the wearing of the veil. His own marriage to Geraldine, who was a practicing Roman Catholic, while motivated by many factors, can also be seen in light of his emphasis on accepting religious diversity. In terms of encouraging further religious diversity, Zog’s policy with regard to Jews stands out. First, Zog fully accepted Albanian Jews as part of the religious community. The Jewish community was officially recognized in April 1937. The 1930s witnessed the first Orthodox-Jewish intermarriage that took place in the large Jewish community in Vlora, something which became more common in subsequent years. But Zog went even further and even seemed willing to accept Jewish immigration into Albania. As a result of both of these policies of tolerance, members of the Albanian Jewish community have labelled the period of Zog as the “Golden Age of Jews in Albania”. Important in the process of the acceptance of Jewish immigration was the American minister Herman Bernstein who served in Albania between 1930 and 1933. Bernstein was himself Jewish and was able to take some time to conduct research on Albania’s Jews. He published articles as a result of his research and remained active in Jewish affairs in Albania until his death in 1935. His principal contribution to the Jewish community in Albania was his negotiations with Zog for the resettlement of Jewish families from Austria and Germany, once the rise of Hitler made it clear to many that Jews were in danger all over Europe. Bernstein’s efforts resulted in many central European Jews coming to Albania in 1933 on their way to the United States, South America, Turkey and elsewhere. This was made possible by Albanian consulates that issued tourist and transit visas. Records indicate, for example, that 100 Jews and their families came from Vienna in February 1939, and in March 1939, 95 Jewish families came to Albania, mainly from Austria and Germany. Once in Albania the new immigrants received support from the Albanian Jewish community, but many were also given residency permits so that they could work. Zog’s government, then, actively participated not only in bringing these Jews to Albania but was also concerned with their welfare once they had arrived. It is true that Zog imposed some restrictions on further Jewish immigration in 1938–1939, as a way to appease the Italians. The Albanian consulate in Rome reported to the Albanian foreign ministry that “We have the impression that Italy does not see with a benevolent eye the congregation of Jews in our soil, especially their settling down in our country.” In response tourist visas were limited to 30 days, the minimum amount of money Jewish immigrants were to have in their possession was increased and eventually consuls were instructed not to issue more visas – although even this seems to have been ignored in some instances. Numbers are somewhat difficult to verify but in 1938 there were officially about 300 Albanian Jews but probably hundreds of foreign Jews. Of the latter few had intended to stay in Albania but once the war began were no longer able to leave. The number of those who had successfully used Albania as a transit station is unknown because the rescuing networks were clandestine but estimates run anywhere between 600 and 3,000. Further religious diversity in Albania would have taken a significant step forward had Zog been able to successfully negotiate a plan he developed while in exile in England during the course of the war. In January of 1944 in an interview with members of the Anglo-Jewish Association, Zog offered to sponsor a plan for a large Jewish settlement in Albania – apparently on the order of some 50,000 families to be given land owned by the state – if the British Jews helped him to regain his throne. The associa-

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tion seems to have taken this seriously enough to consult the British Foreign Office which quickly dismissed the notion. Zog at this point was of course desperate, considering that no official entity had allowed him to form a government in exile or indeed had recognized him as anything more than a private citizen. Still this was certainly a unique offer and perhaps can be considered as an indication of Zog’s commitment to religious diversity.

2. The Jews in Albania During the Second World War With the Italian invasion in April 1939 the situation for both foreign and Albanian Jews changed. Officially of course, religion was free in Albania and the revised constitution of 1939 maintained that all religions were to be respected and their external practices guaranteed by law. But fascists, as we know, often had difficulty with the concept of the rule of law.The Italians clearly favoured the Catholics and Catholics often benefited from Italian largess. Italians appealed to Albanian Catholics by bringing them priests, sending Albanian Catholic children to seminaries and of course by giving the Albanian Catholic church a great deal of money. During the Italian period the Albania Catholic church received nearly half of the funds given to the much larger Moslem community. In general it is safe to say that Italian policy was both socially and religiously divisive. For the foreign Jews in Albania under the Italians, emigration became much more difficult. This left possibly thousands stranded. There was also pressure put on the Albanian puppet regimes for the expulsion of the foreign Jews, as well as other restrictions. In July 1940 the Italian Viceroy General Francesco Jacomoni in Albania ordered that “all Jews of foreign citizenship… must be returned to their countries of origin as soon as possible.” But these new restrictions seem to have been administered in a rather half-hearted manner since not a single Jew was apparently expelled. While emigration became more difficult, immigration into Albania continued apace. Albanian frontier authorities caught dozens of Jews coming from Yugoslavia and Bulgarian occupied areas using false documents. With few exceptions, they were released to find shelter among Albanian families. So instead of expulsion, Albania, during the Italian period experienced an influx of Jews during three major periods – – –

September 1941, a second influx from Kosova in April 1942, and a third also from Kosova in July of 1942.

These statistics are in sharp contrast to the situation in Bulgaria – which also claims to have saved its Jews. In Bulgaria, however, foreign Jews, as well as the Jews in Bulgarian occupied Macedonia were handed over to the Germans. Albanian Jews under Italian occupation were certainly subjected to new restrictions. Jews were cut off from cultural, social and political activity. They were, for example not allowed to join the Albanian fascist party – which, I imagine was not considered much of a hardship – and could not join the Albanian army. Jews were occasionally removed from sensitive areas. In July 1940 the Viceroy General ordered, for example, that all Jews living in the port of Durres be relocated to inland towns like Berat, Lushnja, Fier and elsewhere. Documents suggest that 26 families were sent to Berat and 6 to Lushnja. But still, in very general terms, the lives of Jews in Albania during the Italian period were ordinary enough. Financial hardship was often a serious problem but at least some of this hardship was mitigated by aid from Jews abroad. Italian


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documents note that Jews in Spain, Switzerland, Italy and even Bulgaria sent monetary aid to Jews in Albania. Many were offered employment by Albanians. Jews in Albania during the Italian period apparently felt little need to hide and Jewish holy days were openly celebrated. With the coming of the Germans the situation for the Jews deteriorated somewhat. The new German occupiers began by asking for lists of all the Jews in Albania from both the Jewish community and from the puppet regime of the regent Mehdi Frasheri. This request was of course an ominous sign because in other instances such action was the first step in the arrest, deportation and eradication of Jewish communities. But the Germans were denied the lists by the Albanian Jewish community, the Albanian puppet regime, and local prefectures, communes and villages. In some instances, even the Italians would not cooperate as in Kavaja where lists of resident Jews had been produced. The Italian commander apparently destroyed the lists on the eve of the German invasion. But it is significant to note that the Germans did not pursue the matter. Their reluctance to do so can be attributed, in part, to Hermann Neubacher, a former mayor of Vienna, who became the German foreign office’s special representative for the Balkans and German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop’s personal representative in Albania. For a time during the German occupation he was the most powerful figure in Albania. His charge was to hold Albania with a minimum number of troops which, he recognized, required genuine collaboration. He insisted on a new Albanian declaration of independence and insisted that Germany respect this independence whenever possible. Neubacher came up with what he considered to be two new categories in international law, “relative neutrality” and “relative sovereignty”. While some of this was certainly a sham – the Germans clearly did in Albania as their interests dictated – the German occupation of Albania had relatively few signs of fascism. The local press had considerable leeway, Reichsfuhrer Heinrich Himmler was temporarily prevented from creating an Albanian Waffen SS division, there were no fascist organizations, and no forced labor was required. And what is important for our purposes, Jews were not hunted. They naturally felt much less safe under the Germans so many – particularly the foreign Jews (estimated in 1943 to be approximately 800 from Austria, Germany but also from Poland, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia) – remained in hiding, often moved from location to location and always protected by Albanian Moslems, Orthodox and Catholics alike. There is no known case of this trust being betrayed, no known case of a Jew being exposed, and no known case of an Albanian host requiring payment for the service. The Jews of Kosova – or “new Albania” as it was called during the war – were less fortunate. With the destruction of Yugoslavia in 1941, many Jews from Croatia and Serbia sought refuge in Kosova. While initially well treated, most were eventually returned to Belgrade where many were simply executed. And the Italians complied with German demands in Kosova and complied lists of Jews who were identified and then required to wear white armbands with the word “Jud” written in black letters and had their identity cards stamped with a red “J.” The Germans subsequently required the Italian authorities to arrest and transfer Jews in Kosova to German control. But local Albanian authorities in Prishtina and elsewhere often resisted these efforts by providing false documents. Particularly active in this regard was Preng Uli, the Secretary of the Prishtina Municipality, whose efforts have been recorded in Italian documents. Local Albanian authorities also appealed to the Italian command in Prishtina to help at least some Jews to either simply flee or be relocated to Albania. After consulting with Rome and with Viceroy Jacomoni in Tirana, Italian authorities sent many

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Jews to Albania, under various ruses including apparently, that the Albanian Jews in Kosova had typhus and needed to be sent to a hospital in Albania. In his memoirs, Jacomoni tells us that he was encouraged in his decision to allow Kosova Jews entrance into “old” Albania by the Albanian puppet Prime Minister Mustafa Kruja. The transfer was accomplished quite rapidly with the first group of 100 Jews arriving in Berat, followed by 79 Jews sent to Preza, all during the month of April 1942. In July 1942 a further 88 Jews were removed from prison in Prishtina and sent to Kavaja, Burrel, Kruja and elsewhere. Those who were fortunate enough to be included in these groups were almost immediately released. Many others were not so fortunate. The SS Skanderbeg division, which Himmler organized in Kosova in the spring of 1944, arrested 281 Albanian Jews and sent them to a camp in Prishtina before they were transported into the Reich. Other non-Albanian Jews joined them later – of the 400 Jews from Kosova sent to Bergen Belsen concentration camp, only about 100 survived. Conditions for Jews in old Albania would also become more dangerous. By September the German civilian administration had essentially dissolved and power – what little was left – devolved to SS General Joseph Fitzhum, who like Neubacher was from Vienna where he had been police chief. Unlike Neubacher, however, Fitzhum was a particularly arrogant racist whose venom was directed against not only Jews but also Albanians in general. Fitzhum had frequently bitterly objected to Neubacher’s insistence on respecting Albania’s “relative independence”. Ultimately Fitzhum apparently did order that the Jews of Vlora be arrested and be transported to the Reich with the retreating Germans. Apparently, however, the partisan advance interfered with this plan and the Jews of Vlora were saved. In the final analysis 100% of Albania’s Jews survived the war – even 60% of the Jews of Kosova survived. In Yugoslavia, excluding Kosova, the rate of survival was a mere 18–28% and in Greece no more that 14–22% of the Jewish population survived. Because Albania became known as a haven, there were many more Jews in the country as the end the war then there had been at the beginning. The Wannsee conference, where the holocaust was planned, estimated that there were 200 Jews in Albania in 1941 which was likely an underestimation. By the end of the war it is estimated that there were 1800 Jews in Albania – a remarkable development unrivalled in the Balkans and possibly even in Europe as a whole.

3. Motivations Let us take a few moments and examine the possible motivations for these various at least benign policies towards both Albanian and foreign Jews. Zog’s motivation in terms of all of his religious policies was I think nationalism, and his own political survival – not necessarily in that order. Zog has seen accused of anti-Catholicism but I not sure that is the case. I think he did believe in his concept of a modern western state in which there was no role for religious bigotry and in which religion would play no political role. The motivation of the fascists during the Second World War varied. For the Italians their somewhat benign attitude stemmed in part from little in the way of a tradition of anti-Semitism. The Italians were also willing to thwart the Germans whenever given the chance. Further, the Italians were aware that anti-Semitism simple did not resonant with the Albanians and they were clever enough to realize that active anti-Semitism would therefore have provided little in the way of political capital. German motivation


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was principally expediency. Neubacher was likely not particularly interested in saving Jews but felt that his job would be made easier and the German position strengthened if he was able to live up to the notion of “relative independence” and “relative neutrality”. But what of the motive of the Albanians who took not only Albanian Jews but foreign Jews into their homes, protected them and kept them safe for often months, even years – what was the motive there? Part of the answer was the lack of a threat. Albanian Jews – even augmented by the Jewish refugees – were certainly few in number and they were therefore not a threat. But I believe there is more in explaining this attitude. The Albanian tradition of hospitality and besa certainly plays a very important part. Albanian custom requires that guests be protected and provided for. But at least part of the motivation was inspired by a deeper religious tolerance, encouraged by Albania’s long-term religious diversity. Many voices lend credence to this assertion. Myrteza Studenica, who identifies himself as the president of the Kosovar Jewish Committee has written that “Among the Albanians, both inside Albania and outside its state borders, as well as among those living in the Albanian Diaspora, there is no anti-Semitism. Religious prejudices have never deteriorated into hysterical hatred against Jews… Since the time of the Roman invasions, when the Jews left their territories and settled in the Illyrian territories, up to the present day not a single case of Albanians murdering a Jew had been recorded.” American Minister Herman Bernstein, writing in the early 1930s argued that “there is no trace of any discrimination against the Jews in Albania because Albania happens to be one of the rare lands in Europe today where religious prejudice and hate do not exist.” In her book Escape through the Balkans Irene Grunbaum, who enjoyed Albanian protection during the war, writes “Farewell Albania… You have given me so much hospitality, refuge, friends, and adventure. Farewell Albania. One day I will tell the world how brave, fearless, strong, and faithful your sons are; how death and the devil can’t frighten them. If necessary, I’ll tell how they protected a refugee and wouldn’t allow her to be harmed even if it meant losing their lives. The gates of your small country remained open Albania. Your authorities closed their eyes, when necessary, to give poor, persecuted people another chance to survive the most horrible of all wars. Albania, we survived the siege because of your humanity. We thank you.”

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Between East and West: The Basilian Monks of Grottaferrata in Albania Ines Angjeli MURZAKU

Over the last fifty years, the world has changed so much that we are required, even obliged to look around us with new eyes. How can one stay indifferent to the religious transformations that are happening in Europe since the fall of communism? No human being is an island, and this goes not only for the individual for but also for nations or religious communities. Since we must live with others, it is best to see them as our journey partners in whose company we are called to grow. It must be an experience which respects other beliefs and even unbelief. We are living in an age of major paradigm-shifts, when humankind is moving out of a multi-millennia long “Age of Monologue” into the newly breaking “Age of Dialogue,” to be exact “An Age of Global Dialogue.”

Albanians of Southern Italy Southern Italy, and especially Sicily, is the meeting ground of various civilizations such as Greek, Latin, and Arab. The region provides an unequalled presence of two parallel millennia-old religious traditions, Latin and Byzantine, which makes the area’s history more involved and exceptionally interesting to the scholar of Byzantine history and the ecumenist. The Byzantine presence in southern Italy knows two phases: ItalianGreek and Italian-Albanian. These developments are clearly explicit for historical, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic reasons, reflecting the general consciousness of Italy’s Byzantines. Lower Italy and Sicily had strong connections with Greece in antiquity, long before the arrival of Christianity. Since the 9th century B.C. Greeks began to plant colonies all around the Mediterranean. In fact, many Greek writers and heroes were Greeks of Italy or Sicily. In the early centuries of Christianity, the area was included in the Roman Patriarchate, and a gradual but incomplete process of Latinization began. During the 8th century, Byzantine Emperor Leo III removed southern Italy from papal jurisdiction and placed it within the Patriarchate of Constantinople. There followed a renaissance of the Byzantine tradition. But the Norman invasion of the 11th century resulted in southern Italy’s return to the Latin Patriarchate. This marked the beginning of a process which led to the almost total osmosis of the Byzantine faithful into the Latin church. In the 15th century, just as the Byzantine tradition in Italy seemed to be at its end, it received new life from Byzantine Albanians who fled their country of origin following its conquest by the Turks. At first Byzantine Albanians met with little discernment from the local Latin bishops. The situation improved in the 18th century, with the publication of Pope Benedict XIV bull Etsi Pastoralis. The papal bull paved the way for more open-minded legislation and the ensuing acknowledgment of parity

I.A. Murzaku / Between East and West: The Basilian Monks of Grottaferrata in Albania

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of the Byzantine rite with the Latin rite in the next century. Today there are two dioceses of equal rank for the Italian-Albanians: the Diocese of Lungro in Calabria; and the Diocese of Piana degli Albanesi, which covers all Sicily. Alongside these dioceses is the Monastery of Grottaferrata, founded in 1004, which has always been one of the most important centres of Byzantine monasticism in Italy. Currently there are fifty Albanian centres in southern Italy with an Arbëresh-speaking (ancient Albanian dialect) population of more than 100.000. It is the two eparchies, however, that properly constitute the Italo-Albanian Catholic Church. Grottaferrata has its own unique history: however, it draws vocations from the Italo-Albanian community and renders spiritual service to it. Thus the monastery at Grottaferrata is also included in the historical and spiritual reality of the Italo-Albanian Church. This modern, Albanian phase of the Byzantine tradition in southern Italy began when the Ottoman Turks moved through the Balkans in the 14th and 15th centuries and wiped out the Albanian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Serbian states. The Albanian resistance collapsed after the death of George Kastrioti Skanderbeg, the chief of the Albanian insurgency. Rather than serve the Ottoman sultan, thousands of Albanian refugees poured into such diverse Italian regions as Abruzzi and Molise, Basilicata, Calabria, Puglia and Sicily. Those Albanians from the northern portion of the country – primarily Latin Catholics – were quickly absorbed into Italian culture. Southern Albanians were Byzantine Christians who maintained ties to the Church of Constantinople, which was reduced to a subordinate condition following the collapse of Constantinople in 1453. The immigration of these Byzantine Albanians to the south of Italy was an ideal complement to the preceding Italo-Greek community.The reception was rather positive, economically and spiritually. The new immigrants filled the population void precipitated by disease and the effects of an earthquake that devastated southern Italy in the 15th century. Spiritually this new wave of Byzantine Christians settled in an area open to the Byzantine tradition; the memory of the Greek Church was still alive. Are the Greek churches of southern Italy and the Greek Monastery of Saint Nilo in Grottaferrata uniates? Did they enter any union with the Latin Church that denied their Orthodox identity and Eastern heritage? Based on primary, archival sources, the Byzantine churches of southern Italy were not Orthodox and later converted to Catholicism, but just stayed Orthodox. At the time, these churches were placed under the Patriarchate of Rome the church, that is, East and West were not yet divided. Furthermore, before 1054, the so-called schism between East and West, the line of demarcation between the Greek and the Latin traditions was not very translucent, and it made less difference then than it would today because then both Greeks and Latins felt and in fact were part of the one universal church. The same happened with the Abbey of Grottaferrata, which was founded in 1004 by Sts. Nilo and Bartolomeo, fifty years before the so-called schism between the Eastern and Western Churches. The monastery has always been united to the see of Rome, nonetheless maintaining and preserving the Byzantine-Studite liturgical tradition. This unique characteristic makes the Monastery of Grottaferrata an unicum in ecclesiastical history, because there are no other Byzantine monasteries in the Catholic Church prior to 1054; in addition, there are no monasteries united to Rome in the tradition of the Byzantine Churches that are not uniate. Consequently, there is no reason – according to results in source material studied so far – to call the idiorhythms, that is, the Italy’s Byzantines who follow their own particular rite, and the Greek monks of Grottaferrata uniates. The Albanians migrated to Italy after the Council of Florence (1439) declared the union between the Church of Rome and several Eastern churches, including the Church

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of Constantinople. This movement of population came at the time of an “existing union,” which facilitated a positive acceptance of the Orthodox Albanians. And it explains the fact that the “capitulations” (contracts between the local feudal powers and the representatives of the new immigrants) were often signed by abbots of monasteries or by local Catholic bishops. Thus, the unique case of the presence of two ecclesiastical traditions within the direct jurisdiction of the pope continued.

The Basilian Monks of Grottaferrata and Their Special Mission in Search of Christian Unity For a thousand years a Greek Monastery has existed on the outskirts of Rome, maintaining an unbroken communion with the West. The Abbey of Grottaferrata, founded in 1004 by Sts. Nilo and Bartolomeo, fifty years before the so-called schism between the Eastern and Western Churches, was established in the metropolitan territory of the Roman Patriarchate. The monastery has always been united to the apostolic see of Rome, nonetheless maintaining and preserving the Byzantine-Studite liturgical tradition. These unique characteristics make the Monastery of Grottaferrata an historical unicum in ecclesiastical history, because there are no other Byzantine monasteries in the Catholic Church prior to 1054; in addition, there are no monasteries united to the Petrine See in the tradition of the Byzantine Churches that are not Uniate. Eleuterio Fortino explains that Saint Nilo founded his oriental community before the division, in the ancient time, or at the time when Rome and Constantinople shared a full communion. It is interesting to observe that the division between Western and Eastern Churches did not involve this particular monastic community. On the contrary, the Monastery of St. Mary of Grottaferrata is a uniting bridge or as Paolo Giannini calls it a trait d’union between Eastern and Western Church, a living memory of the undivided church of the first Christian centuries. The primarily ecumenical value of the monastery lies in the fact that this is a pervetustum coenobium (ancient monastery) and the monastic life itself. Indeed, prayer and sanctity of life is the spirit of the ecumenical movement. For a millennium this monastery ab exordio adhuc usque Byzantinum ritum servavit has preserved and guarded the principle of unity of faith in the diversity of the theological formulations and expressions, liturgical traditions and disciplinary particularities is fundamental for a tangible search of full communion and unity between Orient and Occident. The very presence of this single Greek monastery, prope urbem ipsam positum, at the gates of Rome and among Latinas gentes has certainly helped to keep alive this perspective even at times when the temptation for uniformity was pressing and dangerous. The Greek Monastery of Grottaferrata has been a constant reminder at the gates of Rome and has raised Rome’s consciousness regarding ecclesial legitimate variety, for the very fact that it has remained in essence an Eastern-Greek monastery despite some periods of forced Latinization. Furthermore, the monks of Grottaferrata as well as the Italo-Albanians have never completed an official act of rottura, or breaking, with the Orthodox Church. During the course of integration with Italian culture and with the Catholic communion, the Italo-Albanians have always maintained a rapport of congeniality – not just sentimentality – with the Orthodox Church. The Italo-Albanians consider themselves in solidarity with the great Eastern traditions of which they feel themselves a part, not only with the Orthodox people of Albania, with whom they share their ethnic and cultural origin, but with the entire Byzantine commonwealth. One must


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also keep in mind that the Italo-Albanian Church, which now celebrates the liturgy in its own Albanian language, regularly used Greek as a liturgical language and continues to use regularly some books of Greek origin in its liturgy. For together with its own Albanian tradition, the Italo-Albanian Church refers to her Byzantine Greek and patristic past. The Basilian monks of Grottaferrata had ancient historic relations with the Christian East, particularly with Albania as early as in the 16th century. In 1622, Pope Gregory XV with the bull Inscrutabili Divinae, established the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of Faith or Propaganda Fide. The main focus of Propaganda Fide was to foster the spread of Catholicism, to regulate Catholic ecclesiastical affairs in nonCatholic countries, and to halt the spread of Islam in Catholic lands, as was the case in Albania. Beginning in the 16th century, Propaganda Fide sent Basilian missionaries to help revive Catholicism especially in central and southern Albania. The monks were for the most part of Albanian descent, Italian-Albanians of southern Italy, especially from Sicily and Calabria, or, as Nilo Borgia explains, the Basilian missionaries who went to Albania were “Italians by adoption, Albanians by origin, and monks by profession.” The monks accelerated their Albanian missions especially during the 16th and 17th centuries in southern Albania, especially in the mountainous region of Himarrë, which, according to the local bishop, “had an innate proclivity and devotion towards the holy church of Rome, from the time of the blessed memory of Gregory XIII, when the Greek Seminary of Saint Athanasios was established, its first student was a Himarriot.” Furthermore, Himarrë had kept frequent contacts with the Catholics of the west, especially with the Venetians, with whom they shared a common enemy the Ottomans. As for the relations of the Christians of Himarrë with Greece, Nilo Borgia comments that they were never cordial, and Greek religion did never profoundly pervade their hearts. Basilian missions were especially successful in the region, resulting in the people of Himarrë falling under the jurisdiction of the pope. In 1577, representatives from the people of Himarrë wrote a letter to Pope Gregory XIII, requesting the rebuilding of the Episcopal residence, which was destroyed by the Ottomans, and seeking unity with the Roman Church, with the condition that their priests, bishops, prelates, and patriarchs would be able to administer the sacraments and celebrate according to the GreekByzantine liturgical tradition, because the majority of the people did not know Latin. Furthermore, the Basilian colleges of Grottaferrata in Rome and Mezzojuso in Sicily played important roles in training the future Byzantine Catholic clergy targeted for missions in Albania. As for the most recent history directly connected with Greek Catholic mission of Albania, in the spring of 1920, under special recommendation from the pope and the Congregation for the Oriental Churches to succour the Albanian Greek Catholic mission, Nilo Borgia from the Abby of Grottaferrata and Papas Paolo Matranga, parish priest in Piana dei Greci, both Italian-Albanians of Greek Catholic tradition, toured central and northern Albania. The cities of Durrës, Shkodër,Tirana, Elbasan, Berat, Fier, and Vlora were part of their visitation. Then, in the summer of 1938, only a few months before beginning his long-heldposition of archimandrite, Isidore Croce, accompanied by Lorenzo Tardo from Grottaferrata, visited southern Albania evaluating the possibility of establishing a permanent Basilian mission in the country. The cities of Durrës, Fier, Metan, Berat, Kuçovë, Vlora, Korce, Elbasan, and Tirana were part of their visitation. Besides meeting the local Catholic authorities, Croce met with the Orthodox Bishop of Berat, Monsignor Agathangjel Çamçe, and the Mitrophor Vasil Marko of Korçë. From his encounters

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with Orthodox leaders and faithful, Croce got the impression that they still deplored the derangement of their Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which did not at that time have the energies and means to remedy the situation and fill the spiritual void of the Orthodox faithful. The individuals Croce talked to held the Catholic Church and the Catholic organization in high esteem. Croce remarked that Albanians in general and Albanian elites in particular tended to separate themselves from the Orient and an Oriental culture and looked toward Occident as more conventional and sophisticated. Additionally, Croce noticed that this disposition toward Western ideas was shared by Christians and probably more by Sunni Muslims. Croce, according to his detailed report to Cardinal Eugenio Tisserant in Rome, thought that an immediate Basilian establishment in southern Albania was necessary and that time was running out, “as the monks needed to get used to Albanian traditions and language and the Albanian people needed to get used to the monks.” According to Croce, the ideal place to initiate the Basilian mission was the city of Elbasan, where the first Greek Catholic Church and mission in Albania had its beginnings, and later the monks could stretch out their mission to other cities such as the neighboring city of Fier. In Elbasan the monks would dedicate their energies not only to the apostolate in general, but they would also teach young people for one or two years, concentrating especially on those individuals who were considering an ecclesiastical vocation before they were sent to the seminary in Grottaferrata for advanced theological studies. On March 25, 1938, the Archimandrite Isidore Croce informed the monastic chapter of Grottaferrata based on an insistent invitation from the Congregation for Oriental Churches to open a missionary station in central Albania between the cities of Berat and Fier. The Congregation for Oriental Churches considered the current situation more than favorable with clear inclinations of a movement of Orthodox Albanians toward the Catholic Church. The city of Fier was a good candidate for a Basilian mission, because many Catholic families there were for a long time lacking a Catholic priest. Croce, who had just returned from a missionary trip to Albania, informed the monks of the difficulties the Basilian mission had to face in dealing with the highranking Orthodox clergy and especially the Albanian government, in case they were going to open a new house of mission. Consequently, Croce proposed to the Congregation for Oriental Churches that rather than Fier, the monks station their mission in the already established house of Elbasan, and judging from the circumstances, they could in the future extend Basilian missions to other Albanian cities such as Fier. Croce’s proposal was approved by the Congregation for Oriental Churches and the Apostolic Delegate. Moreover, the monastic chapter of Grottaferrata, in its meeting of August 20, 1938, voted in favor of establishing an Albanian mission of the Basilian monks of Grottaferrata in the city of Elbasan. In typical monastic spirit and discipline, two Basilian monks of Grottaferrata, Daniele Barbiellini Amidei, and Flaviano La Piana, after receiving a special blessing from Pope Pius XI in the audience of August 24, 1938, departed for Albania on August 26, and arrived the next day in the coastal city of Durrës. After celebrating mass in the Catholic Church of Durrës, the monks departed for their final destination, the city of Elbasan. A few months later, on December 22, 1938, it was officially communicated that the Catholic Mission of Elbasan was entrusted to the Basilian Monks of Grottaferrata. According to Danielle Barbiellini’s detailed report to the Congregation for Oriental Churches two months after their sojourn in Elbasan, the major challenges the Basilian mission in Albania had to face were the Albanian government, with a majority of Mus-


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lim officials, and the high-level Orthodox clergy. As Barbiellini explicated in his report, the government at first sight might give the impression of being indifferent to religious matters in general and to Catholic activity in particular, but when practical issues came to the discussion, the government carried out a systematic policy of opposition against every Catholic missionary work of apostleship. This can be attributed to two principal causes: the influence of Orthodox clergy who were in governmental circles and who opposed every Catholic activity and reprimanded – sometimes with cruelty – every movement of Orthodox Christians to unite with the Catholic Church. To this end they used the local papas, who for the most part were uneducated and blind instruments in the hands of their superiors. Furthermore, the government was uncomfortable with a Catholic empowerment in Albania and with the rising of a strong Catholic or Christian party in the case of a successful collective union between the Orthodox and Catholic Church, which would endanger the actual Muslim supremacy. That was the reason why the government entertained the Orthodox intrigues and favored dissent among Christians. As a consequence, every Catholic activity was viewed with suspicion and closely monitored. So, the Basilian mission to Albania was not a simple one. It required a lot of experience, prudence, and local expertise on the part of the missionaries. When the Basilian monks reached Elbasan, the Greek Catholic mission was languishing, because local governmental authorities had forbidden both Italian-Albanian priests Scarpelli and Matranga from officiating in the Byzantine-Greek tradition. Only Latin rite liturgical celebrations for Latin rite Catholics were tolerated. The Basilian monks, in concert with the Apostolic Delegate, Della Pietra, tried a fresh approach in their apostolate among the Albanian orthodox faithful thus putting an end to what was called a disgraceful business. The first thing the monks noticed was the shallow spiritual level of the faithful of the Greek Catholic mission as well as the profound religious indifference among Albanians, the lack of catechetical instruction, and the dearth of teaching of every principle of Christian life. The monks were very reproachful of the quality of the Greek Catholic faithful, who thought of their membership in the Greek Catholic Church as a means to make a living or as a mode to resolve economic issues. They deplored the reversal of the Greek Catholic mission of Elbasan to a commercialtype agency which administered scholarships, aid, and all sort of favoritisms to the faithful, and they took immediate measures to eradicate the corrupted system. According to Barbiellini, who did not spare harsh language in his detailed report to Rome, the Greek Catholic mission had simply bought the faithful, who in turn thought of their church membership as a legitimate right to live at the expense of the mission or at least as a means to raising their family income. However, uprooting the unprincipled modus operandi of the mission was not enough for the Basilian monks. They thought it essential to educate people in the Catholic faith. To meet this objective, the monks introduced Sunday catechetical instruction and Scripture study in the church. Moreover, locals invited the monks to their homes to give catechetical instructions to their daughters, as young girls – candidates for engagement – were not allowed to frequent the church. The monks were straightforward in stating that the “conversion should be spontaneous, and not motivated by any other interest.” Furthermore, both Orthodox and Muslim local youth were attracted by the monks’ zeal, and, according to Barbiellini’s report, more local young people were going to be attracted to the mission after the establishment of the library, which was in the planning stages. Church participation for the Christmas celebrations was sizable, with the participation of several Orthodox families. The monks paid a visit to

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Prof. Shuteriqi, an Orthodox intellectual who expressed interest in conversion to Catholicism, but “found it impossible to make the first pass in that direction for family reasons.” Against their intentions and following the advice of the most experienced in the region, the monks did not make an effort to contact the local Orthodox clergy who were very conscious of their inferiority compared to the Catholic or Western sophistication. However, they were able to establish friendly relationship with the local clergy, both Bektashi and Orthodox, in the following months of their Albanian mission. It was interesting how the monks did not hesitate to respond to the local Bektashi’s invitation to visit the Bektashi Grand Teqe and the Grand Baba, Mustafa, to welcome them to the city. The visit with the Bektashi was more than cordial. The Grand Baba Mustafa was interested in the Basilian organization and explained the Bektashi organization and their way of religious life. The monks were invited and participated in the Orthodox Christmas Mass, and after the mass they paid a visit to the houses of the local clergy to deliver their Christmas greetings in person. Albeit the Monks of Grottaferrata tried hard for unity with the Orthodox Albanians, their mission was a product of pre Vatican II theology and praxis. They did not overcome the limitations of their time. In the post-Tridentine period a very one-sided ecclesiological way of thinking became widespread in the Catholic centers of formation. This way of thinking was determined by the idea that the church was led by its head. As a consequence, the authority of the successor of Peter as the conspicuous representative of the true invisible Head of the Church was accentuated more and more. There was the awareness that the Church cannot be where Christ, its head, was not. It was believed that the church of Christ could be acknowledged only in the environs where the successor of Peter carried out his office. (Suttner, Ernst, C., Church Unity: Union or Uniatism. Catholic-Orthodox Ecumenical Perspective (Centre for Indian and Inter-religious Studies, Rome, 1991), p. 80.) So, the leading idea of the monks who were convinced of the truth of this new ecclesiology or ecclesiological exclusivism was conversion to the true Church of those who were extraneous, as was the case of Orthodox Albanians. This was exactly the persuasion of the monks of Grottaferrata who went to Albania to establish the Greek Catholic Church and reconstitute church unity. Robert Taft, in his analysis of the pre-Vatican II Catholic ecclesiology regarding the return of Eastern Christians to Rome, explicates that in “doing so the Catholic Church was true to its evolving exclusivist ecclesiology in which there was one valid Christendom, its own, entirely under the sway of the bishop of Rome, who could use his minions to do more or less what he pleased everywhere.” (Taft, Robert, F., “The Problem of Uniatism and the Healing of Memories: Anamnesis, not Amnesia,” Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies, Vol. 41–42, 20002001, p. 160.) Ecclesiological exclusivism was related to soteriological exclusivism. The monks of Grottaferrata were genuinely concerned about the prospects of salvation of outsiders, as salvation was monopolized by Rome and was its exclusive dominion. As a consequence, Eastern Christians should be placed under the control of Rome in order to attain salvation. The Basilian monks of Grottaferrata educated in the spirit of ecclesiological and soteriological exclusivism, were genuinely imbued and theologically convinced that the Lord himself demanded the conversion of all those not baptized to the Catholic Church. They understood that they were responding faithfully to their vocation and their conscience, so they truthfully meant what they came to build in Albania. The case of Albania showed Rome that other avenues such as dialogue, finding a common ground, mutual understanding, and the education of future Latin clergy on Eastern history and theology, in order to establish church unity were necessary. Rome


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realized that the method applied in Albania for church unity was outdated and in need of serious consideration. Due to its unique history, this Byzantine Monastery witnesses with its continuing prayers, kept form almost thousand years, the unity of the Church in its several traditions of spirituality and culture. It is a place of meeting and dialogue between the Latin West and the orthodox East, open to any people who desire to live, to think about and to go deep into the spirituality of Byzantium.

The Second Vatican Council Theology and Praxis As the history of the monks of Grottaferrata illustrates, Albanians and ItalianAlbanians or Arberesh of Italy have a tradition of co-existence and a dialogue of life with other religious traditions. This ecumenicity became a life fact after the Second Vatican II, and the theology and praxis the council introduced. The Council rightly defined the division among Christians as a ‘scandal’ that ‘openly contradicts the will of Christ’ (Unitatis redintegratio, n. 1). In fact, through the gift of the Spirit, Jesus made his disciples one body, of which he himself is the Head. The Council Fathers felt the need to beg pardon of God and of their brethren for the sins committed against unity, and together they promised forgiveness for the sins of others (Unitatis redintegratio, n. 7). They urged Catholics ‘to take an active and intelligent part in the work of ecumenism’ (Unitatis redintegratio, n. 4), so that the imperfect communion which already exists between the Churches and Ecclesial Communities might soon be brought to its fullness. Above all, the Council asks us to cultivate an authentic “spiritual ecumenism”, which consists in a continuous effort of prayer and conversion (Unitatis redintegratio, n. 8). Another conciliar Decree, Orientalium Ecclesiarum, dedicated to the Eastern-rite Churches in full communion with the Apostolic See, is not in opposition to this spirit but, on the contrary, strengthens it. With this Decree, the Council wanted to honour ‘the Eastern Churches’ institutions... liturgical rites, ecclesiastical traditions and ordering of Christian life’ (Orientalium Ecclesiarum, n. 1), declaring that they, like the Churches of the West, ‘have the right and duty to govern themselves according to their own special disciplines’ (Orientalium Ecclesiarum, n. 5). Their ancient tradition is a real treasure for the whole Church, as was apparent at the same Council in the significant contribution made precisely by Eastern Catholics. How can we forget the deep impression made by Maximos IV, Melkite Patriarch of Antioch, when he passionately invited the Council Fathers to ‘keep a place for the Absent, that is, our Orthodox brethren, while waiting for full communion? With Orientalium Ecclesiarum it was made clear that the longed-for goal of full unity must not lead to a dull uniformity, but rather to the integration of all legitimate diversity in an organic communion, of which the Successor of Peter is called to be the servant and guarantor.

Dialogue of Life This dialogue of life took on a sharp reality during the conflict in Kosovo a few years ago, when many Muslim refugees crossed into Albania. The arrival in Albania of 450,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees has been putting incredible strains on a country already suffering from 70% unemployment, widespread poverty and a lack of infra-

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structure. Yet the Albanians have welcomed the refugees into their country and, often, into their homes. In late March, when refugees began to arrive by the thousands every day, the Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania immediately responded to the emergency through its office on social, development and emergency relief, Diaconia Agapes. Diaconia Agapes was founded in 1992 to serve the needs of disadvantaged and marginalized people in Albania. Over the years, it has developed a full range of assistance programs, including agricultural programs, children’s nursery schools, teachers’ training, health clinics, women’s rural health programs, national youth programs, and a radio station, among others. In light of the emergency, Diaconia Agapes, with the support of churches around the world mobilized by Action for Churches Together (ACT), began to build and manage refugee camps and to provide assistance to families hosting refugees. It has been a beautiful model of inter-religious collaboration. With support from Protestant and Orthodox churches and concrete assistance from Polish Catholics, the church is responding to the needs of suffering Muslim refugees (WCC June 16, 1999). The Orthodox church of Albania collected $12m and organized support for 33,000 Muslim refugees. As Albanians this tradition runs in the veins. Albanians should be proud to have produced an ecumenical figure, at the statue of Mother Teresa of Albania. Who better than Mother Teresa embodies the spirit of Albania, and its century’s old experience of the dialogue of life, sharing between Muslims and Christians. She came from a multiethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious city and, without that, she would never have become the woman she was. Those first 18 years were vital. Mother Teresa came of a tolerant country, and touched the world with her love. Mother Teresa also believed in ecumenism. Let me offer some examples taken from a recently-released book, Everything Starts From Prayer, Mother Teresa’s Meditations on Spiritual Life for People of all Faiths. In the foreword, Anthony Stern points out the ecumenical spirit of Mother Teresa’s work by praising her oft-quoted statement: “I’ve always said we should help a Hindu become a better Hindu, a Muslim become a better Muslim, a Catholic become a better Catholic.” She is lauded as a great ecumenical teacher of prayer. Here is one of those “kernels.” Mother Teresa stated: “Some call Him Ishwar, some call Him Allah, some simply God, but we have to acknowledge that it is He who made us for greater things: to love and be loved. What matters is that we love. We cannot love without prayer, and so whatever religion we are, we must pray together.” Stern recounts the following as another example of her ecumenical spirit in action: Once, when Mother Teresa was ministering to a dying Buddhist man, a visitor overheard her whisper, “You say a prayer in your religion, and I will say a prayer as I know it. Together we will say this prayer and it will be something beautiful for God.” When Mother Teresa died, her longtime friend and biographer Naveen Chawla said that he once asked her bluntly, “Do you convert?” She replied, “Of course I convert. I convert you to be a better Hindu or a better Muslim or a better Protestant. Once you’ve found God, it’s up to you to decide how to worship him” (“Mother Teresa Touched other Faiths,” Associated Press, Sept. 7, 1997).

Inter-Religious Dialogue and Tolerance Tolerance is neither indifference nor concession nor condescension; it is openness, respect, solidarity and acceptance of our diversity as human beings. Tolerance is facilitated through direct contacts, communication and education. In place of fear and rejec-


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tion of the unknown, tolerance is mutual understanding through active interest in the traditions and beliefs of others and the sharing of common ideas. The role of education is crucial. It can help to shape lifelong attitudes and furnish young people with the interpersonal skills they will need to live at peace with one another for years to come. This requires an integrated approach to education for peace, human rights, democracy and international understanding. Among its basic components are rights and values education, foreign language teaching, multicultural and intercultural curricula, new approaches to the teaching of history and citizenship, specialized teacher training and the creation of a democratic and tolerant climate in the classroom itself.

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Religious Tolerance in Montenegro as a Guarantee of Stability and Security of the Country Aleksa IVANOVIC

Even today, at the beginning of the third Millennium and like so many times in the past, the human race is searching for paths that lead to religious tolerance. The question of religious tolerance is posed both as a global and a local issue. It is particularly stimulating for thinking for someone like me, coming from a small state. It is not present only as an intellectual question looking for answers, but keeps the consciousness awake that those answers must be identified without delay, because everyday life quietly makes it more and more open and a possibility of volatile manifestation can never be excluded. Montenegro is the smallest country in the Balkans and it regained its statehood at the referendum held on 21 May this year. Its population is slightly more than 600,000, out of whom about 80% feel they are Eastern Orthodox, about 15% Muslim, and about 3% Catholic. Religious equality is guaranteed by the 1992 Constitution. A new constitution is currently being drafted and it is justly expected that those guarantees can only be additionally strengthened. For a thousand years, from the first Montenegrin state to the internationally recognized again this year, one of the special values Montenegrins are proud of, when compared to other examples in the region, is evident religious tolerance. We should remember that some decisive historical events also left their trace in the geographic area covered by small Montenegro during that long period, such as the division of Christianity, destruction of the Bogomils, conquests of the Ottoman Empire. There has never been a single longer period on the Montenegrin soil without movement, and for most of the time three religious circles being intertwined. Notwithstanding all political turbulences, when that whole period or only some of its fragments are viewed from this historical distance, the common denominator is quite perceptible: religious tolerance is more perceptible as a mainstream even in that melting pot than brutal intolerance and conflicts based on religious differences. It should particularly be emphasized that from early 18th century until the second half of the 19th the free Montenegrin territory was ruled by Prince Bishops, who used to combine both earthly and spiritual supreme authority. The fact that prerequisites for a modern state were put in place in that period is fundamental, primarily due to the fact that first regulations were passed and some literary works of critical importance for Montenegrin culture were written in those days. Although written by Montenegrin Prince Bishop Petar II Petrović, the importance of those works is such that it far exceeds the circle of the adherents of the Eastern Orthodoxy.

A. Ivanovic / Religious Tolerance in Montenegro

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Before I look at the current times, which are certainly the most important for the future, please let me give you some shining examples of religious tolerance and coexistence from the past, which are still alive in present days: • • • • • • •

•

The cult of St. Vladimir, accepted by all three religions, originates from before the division of Christianity and into the Eastern Orthodox Church and Catholic Church; St. Ozana, 15th century, Orthodox Montenegrin shepherdess famous for her good deeds, canonized as a Catholic saint, highly respected in Montenegro; Reformer of the Talmud, Sabataj Zevi decided to spend his exile in Ulcinje, where he lived under the name of Mehmed Effendi, carved the David’s star on his home’s wall and prayed in front of it; In 1878, the first Islamic Association in the Balkans was established in Montenegro; Prince Bishop Petar I, Montenegrin ruler, famous for spreading enlightenment, his wisdom and desire for reconciliation, canonized by the Orthodox Church; The Concordat of Montenegro with the Vatican took place in 1886; The 1905 Constitution of Montenegro which made all three religions equal, the most important legal act and very modern for those days, recognizing the importance of tolerance and equality in the country that did not inherit a long tradition of a civil society; Leopold Mandić, canonized in late 20th century as a Catholic saint was wellknown for his commitment to cooperation between Catholic and Orthodox Christians.

Another extremely important fact enriches the examples of religious tolerance in Montenegro: in two churches, St. Lukas in Kotor and St. Petka in Sutomore, there existed two altars and both were used for services by both the Catholics and the Orthodox. If listeners heard only these facts from the Montenegrin history, they could think that there is an Arcadian society over there in the Balkans. Some events from the recent past, however, advise us that that is not the case and warn us that work on establishing religious tolerance should not be only the task of representatives of three religions but also, likewise, should actively involve the state, its bodies and the civil society. In the next few lines I will be looking for positive lessons learned from negative events, predominantly from early but also from late nineties. Before the tragic drama in former Yugoslavia unfolded, the death of Communism was characterized by the expansion of citizens’ religious feelings. I would look at this post-communist phenomenon only from the perspective of events in Montenegro. The loudest demonstration of the newly awakened “spirituality” took place among a part of Montenegrin citizens who belong to the Orthodox circle. This trend occurred in the form of continued insistence on ethnophilia instead on meeting individual spiritual needs. We should mention that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Montenegro recognized only Serbian national identity among Orthodox citizens of Montenegro. This post-communist phenomenon in Montenegro manifested itself in two directions: the first, represented by citizens who longed for spiritual fulfilment, and the second, represented by those who received the need for spiritual betterment as infusion and in ra-

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tions, through a symbiotic activity of a part of the political elite that was in agreement with representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church. A reputable Montenegrin political analyst said that same people who were in the system of Tito’s Yugoslavia and later on affiliated themselves with the alliance of the political elite with the Serbian Orthodox Church, depending on the period in question and on which government they were loyal to, whether to that from the period of Tito’s rule or to the one from early nineties, displayed their Janus’ face. This group of politically and religiously influential people played an actual role in events I will speak about. Highly competent authors have said and written a lot about the wars in former Yugoslavia, particularly about wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will refer only to the part related to events in Montenegro, events that wore signs of religious intolerance and sometimes of violation of the right to religious affiliation. Thus, for example, in 1991 and 1992 irrational reasons of religious prejudice, hatred and supposed threat were used during the recruitment of like-minded people for the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, although the political reasons were unrelated directly to religious affiliation. The fact that groups of people incited with religious aims went to kill other people, somebody else of different religion, and in this case those were Muslims or Catholics, warns us that due attention must have been paid to the phenomenon of religious tolerance. Although Montenegro was luckily spared of war, still there were some violent actions primarily directed at citizens of Islamic religion. Victims were mostly from the ranks of esteemed citizens of that religion from the north of Montenegro. Luckily, only their property was damaged, which was accompanied with mental suffering caused by fear. For this occasion, I will mention the most drastic cases that happened in Pljevlja in 1992. The common feature for all attacks was that they were all carried out on properties owned by esteemed Muslims or on Islamic religious facilities, with the aim to cause fear and panic among the victims and thus encourage them to leave Montenegro. Hand-grenades were thrown on Hussein Pelida’s shop in Pljevlja on several occasions. Several days before that, the hairdresser’s owned by Raza Šabotic from Podgorica was destroyed. An explosive device was thrown at Najo Ajanović’s shop on 10 July 1992. The attack had been announced a day before from a vehicle that had stopped in front of the shop. A person asked “Are there any Turks here?” in the presence of a large crowd. The offender was not identified and, with exception of anonymous interlocutors, no one was willing to testify. Explosives were activated under the car of the Hussein Pasha’s Mosque mullah, in front of the Islamic community stand, in Anko Karahmet’s café, in “Hekala” shop, in “Kambera” kebab restaurant, in Fiko Delić’s and Kerim Selmanović’s shops, in Cosain’s bakery (four times), in Mušovićs’ shop, etc. I believe that all these criminal acts had the character of terrorism, primarily because of the fear they caused among a large number people of not only Islamic religion but also among those who supported different political views and religious tolerance, which was not in line with the ideas of people who inspired and encouraged commission of those acts and offenders themselves, who were manipulated and used for the purpose of other political goals owing to their religious hatred. Investigations were conducted about these criminal acts, from the legal point of view, but none of them was completed with charges for terrorism. This fact is important for our analysis of these


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cases. In those days, as an anti-war activist and tolerance devotee, I insisted on an efficient action of the judiciary in which all those cases would be named properly and offenders punished. Maybe those who considered things with more information available did not want to fight the offenders to the last, having estimated that the people who inspired and encouraged the events were very powerful and that such action could bring the war over to Montenegro. The depth and duration of the war developments and ultimate, necessary involvement of the western countries’ military power supported the argument of those who backed the thesis that hesitation policy in fighting extremists was the right decision, if you take into consideration that eventually civil peace was preserved in Montenegro and that country is heading to Euro-Atlantic integrations. Anyway, it was the experience of a small state, which in those days made a union with much larger Serbia ruled by Slobodan Milošević. Violence caused by religious intolerance in Montenegro occurred also between representatives of two Eastern Orthodox Churches in Montenegro: Serbian and Montenegrin. Leaving canonical issues aside, the right of the Orthodox Montenegrins to practice their religious beliefs with the Montenegrin Orthodox Church (MOC) is undisputable. Still, that group was often not allowed to do that. Those conflicts even had bloodletting as a consequence, but luckily no life was lost. The first of those bloody events took place on 12 July, on St. Peter’s Day, in Cetinje in 1991. During an exchange of fire, a member of MOC was wounded by a follower of SOC. Another event that could have ended with tragic consequences was the celebration of Christmas in Cetinje in 1992, when the paramilitary army of Željko Ražnatović Arkan, who was indicted for war crimes, was allowed to stay in Cetinje Monastery. Luckily, the conflict did not ensue. The most dangerous incident took place during the celebration of the Christmas Eve in Berane in 2003, when the followers of the SOC prevented followers of the MOC from making a Christmas bonfire, traditional way of celebrating among the Orthodox. The police stopped the members of the SOC from attacking the supporters of MOC, but some police officers were injured. One of the most extremist participants in the event is follower of the SOC and at this moment is in the penitentiary, being charged for committing criminal offences related to organized crime. Even in early nineties there were warnings that some protagonists of religious intolerance were not connected with the church that much but rather with criminal activities. Some small-size harassments of Jehovah’s Witnesses and Pentecost Church carried out by members of the SOC were also recorded. Given their consequences and threats, however, they did have the level of social threat as the aforementioned. Finally, what are the things that can be observed as direction taken towards tolerance among religions in Montenegro at this point? We may say that it is the positive response of the state and society to negative actions from 90-ties. The first positive action would be the plan of state authorities to remove an illegally erected church on Rumija Mountain, near Bar. It would not be only about correcting an illegal act, since that little church was illegally put there, but it would also be a message that the Montenegrin society opposes all kinds of provocations from a group of followers of one religion directed at followers of others. In this case, it was a provocation from the followers and representatives of the Serbian Orthodox Church directed primarily at Islam followers, because the top of Rumija Mountain is famous as a cult place where St. Vladimir’s cross was carried to every year by a Muslim family that has traditionally safeguarded

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the cross and carried it to the top of the mountain together with followers of other religions. Thus, the message would be sent to everybody that the mountain is a gathering place for all people and that no religious group can usurp it. The second instance is a case conducted before the Court of Bar, which is deciding about returning the Catholic altar into a small church near Bar and thus allowing both Catholics and Orthodox to have their services there, as it was the case in the past illustrating the richness of interreligious co-existence. This good tradition was interrupted by members of the Serbian Orthodox Church in early nineties. I believe, though, that the forthcoming joining of Montenegro to the NATO through Partnership for Peace is the most important guarantee of peace, both in Montenegro and in the region. The joining of all Balkan states to the NATO will represent a framework for ensuring peace and preventing interreligious and ethnical conflicts. However, I should underline that I still deem the role of civil sector and church representatives very important, regardless of all security related regional guarantees and guarantees offered by each state through their rule of law systems. The crisis of 1990s in Montenegro is the best example for that. Actions of the civil sector in the broadest possible sense, and I am primarily referring to NGOs, independent media etc, are wishes and inclinations of citizens of Montenegro who wanted to defend the religious tolerance by spreading ideas and giving support to members of some religious groups who were under threat. At the same time, by doing so the members of the civil sector sent messages to extremists from their own religious circle they did not accept hatred, intolerance and putting other in danger. This spirit of tolerance should be strengthened, knowing that it is a continuous and endless process.


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Interfaith Relations in Serbia Vlladah ZIVULOVIC

The essence of every religion is to preach and support peace, love and forgiveness. Therefore it is a paradox to have terms like religious war, religious intolerance etc. The New Testament reads the words of Jesus Christ: Love thy enemy and pray for those that persecute you. Only divine, selfless and true love can give peace to this world. For if you love those who love you, what satisfaction do you have? Only the love that surpasses self-sufficiency is the love of faith. Perhaps it is the best to start speaking of religious relations, and in wider field national, by love and mutual respect, for this is the only way to understand religious relations. We will be able to understand these relations objectively if we learn religious principles and goals unrestricted by religious fanaticism and intolerance. These harmful restrictions often dominated in recent and further past misusing religion by the mechanisms of the government, force and influence. Because of the negative experiences among peoples of different religious confessions and nationality, all that led to the identification of religious principles with politics and actions of their socalled members. This feeling is particularly emphasized for those who survived the tragedy of conflict. Good example for the collective memory is Balkans, especially former Yugoslavia. Throughout the history this area was West in the East and East in the West. Various events that happened there, especially since the World War II (to stay in relatively recent history) up to the recent wars, were marked by total ignoring the Church and contacting it only for misuse in order to reach certain political goals. Seeing all destructions, killings, hate and pogroms, the Church called for peace and reconciliation because evil makes more troubles. Religious representatives point out to hatred and war as defeat and tragedy for everyone and say that reconciliation and forgiveness lead to freedom for all and everyone. A person who hates is never free. True freedom is when one serves God by serving every person regardless of his/her religious confession, nationality and any other belonging. In such a scope, the issue of interfaith relations and life of religious minorities of different religious confessions becomes vital, especially during the process of integration of this region into European Union. In order to enlighten interfaith relations in Serbia, I will present the number of members of the traditional religions in percentage. According to the last census in 2002, the Republic institute of statistics published these facts: • • • • •

Orthodox 84,98% Roman Catholic 5,48% Muslims 3,20% Protestants 1,07% Jews 0,01%.

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The census showed that 95% of citizens were believers in spite of the fact that atheism in Serbia was state religion for almost half a century. These facts clearly show that Serbian Orthodox Church has the majority of believers and confidence of the citizens but also the greatest obligations. SOC understands it sincerely and paternally points to the road of peace, love, and respect for every person to keep and gain back his/her human dignity. Therefore, His Holiness the Patriarch Pavle calls for us to be worthy of the time we live in. Christians do not live just side by side but also for each other because one recognises alive God’s icon in every person and loves one’s godlike brother or sister regardless of his/her religion, nationality and social status. These principles condemn all ways of violence and extremism. When it comes to spiritual field, deep and efficient moral and existential effort is started in Serbia, in order to surpass recent and earlier traumatic historical experiences and spiritually enlighten difficult historical heritage. SOC and other religious communities want and ask for negative historical experience to be spiritually enlightened and in such manner prevailed. Confrontation and animosity of peoples and religions are completely unknown to spiritual essence and humane ideals of every religion. When religion is turned to its essence it cannot be an instrument of anyone’s temporary state and narrow national politics. Mutual dialogue of religious communities opens a new page in the relations of the regional peoples and countries and thus helps understanding and reconciliation of conflicted nations that recently lived in the same country. An example of such dialogues and cooperation are very friendly relations of the representatives of different religious communities in Serbia. Religious instruction is now a school subject and every child can attend the classes according to his/her religious confession. Lectures are given at universities and faculties with lecturers from several religious communities. There are frequent radio and TV talk shows on the topic of religious dialogue. There are also many projects especially for the young and every other interested person. Conferences are organized on high academic level. The example is recently finished dialogue of all representatives of Orthodox and Roman Catholic Church in Belgrade. Then a conference was organized in May, in Patriarchate in Pec on the topic of contribution of Churches to religious, cultural and international cooperation. It was the first event after the events in March in Kosovo and Metohija. The representatives of all religious communities participated. This meeting represents very important step not just spiritually but for the peace in the region because those representatives have the confidence of their believers. Due to the limited speech, I cannot mention all the activities in this field. Living in the third millennium, we have to realize that only the dialogue on healthy basis is the chance for all of us to open a new chapter for peoples and countries in the region. A dialogue means two sides. It is not a fiction but means live participant equally precious and relevant.


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The Bektashi Heritage in Albania Beqir META

The Bektashian sect in Albania, during the whole history of the Albanian State has had a strong autonomous and liberals character. In fact, all Albanian religious communities generally had had a liberal, coexistive character, which has been a great value of the Albanian society and have had a strong and very important impact in the Albanian politics, especially in the stabilization of the Albanian state during the first. But, also here we need to underline the fact, that in the first years of the life of the Albanian state, the situation was not as it was three decades after and as it today. In some communities like muslim Sunnites, Albanian orthodoxies, and Catholics, demonstrated some fundamentalist, intolerant and antinational behaviour. Those events in those times had some reasons: First: Albanians for five hundred years had been under foreign yoke and hadn’t the possibility to cultivate the co-existence, tolerance and the common idea of being a nation with different religious beliefs. This time (so at the two first decades of twentieth century) the foreign intervention of the foreign countries (especially the neighbouring countries) in the Albanian politics, society and also, in the religions maters was very strong. This interference had an severe character and an very negative impact on the co-existence and harmony of the different religions of Albania. Some of Albanian religions were connected with foreign centres. (During two first decades of twentieth century). Only the Bektashis did not. This is an specific character of this belief. Also are some less important reasons. Bektashism as a ideology and religious community every time was the spirit and core of the process of Albanian independence. About fifty percent of the first National Albanian Government had a Bektashian belief. During the first very difficult years of the Albanian state and after, Bektashian never become a destructive factor for the Albanian National Movement, but always stood in its side. At 1920, they was the first religious community, who proclaimed independence from the foreign religious centres. After them, all other Albanian religious communities proclaimed the independence. This actions was the logic consequence of the religious philosophy of Bektashians. Deciding to separate from the legacy and identity created in the Ottoman time and perceiving the need to come closer with West, they adapted religious liberal concepts and oriented powerfully toward Albanian Nationalism. I would mention here that Bektashians were the strongest supporters of Latin alphabet for Albanian language. Our great national poet, Naim Frasheri, expressed the essence of Bektashian doctrine in these words: “Not only between them, but with all other peoples, Bektashians are spiritual brothers. They love their muslim or Christian neighbour in same manner and be-

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haved in the same manner with them. But, above all they loved their country and their co-nationals, because this is their virtue.” Albanian nationalism was developed in the specific conditions. Essential is the fact that it grew in the conditions of the existence of three religious beliefs. In the beginning (during the end of nineteen century) some distinguished Albanian Bektashians, have a dream for the religious unification of the Albanian Nation, with the aim, to make it more homogeneity. Surely, this dream was an Utopia, because the religious identity can not change easily. So, they very soon, understood that only tolerance and coexistence of all religious beliefs under the aegis of Albanian patriotism, was the only way for national strengthening and Bektashians become the champions of this national liberal ideology. This way Bektashism was also became an alias, a connecting tie for the nation, which was strengthening and institutionalising its identity. Bektashism was also, an “amortising, or a buffer zone” in the relationships between different religions beliefs, strengthening the coexistive and tolerant character of the Albanian society. I concluded, that, we can evaluate the Bektashian legacy as very positive.

Part Three Parallels Beyond the Balkans



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Finding the Common Ground Between the Three Major Religions Asher NAIM

We are all children of Abraham and I am sure he will not be happy to learn that his children use his name to spread animosity, disharmony and hatred. Moreover, consider King David, and the prophets as representing our values that we all should share. No one is above or better than the other. The better ones are those that preach and practice brotherhood of Man and peace on earth. The Old Testament tells us that man created in God’s image, Jesus is the son of God and his greatest attribute is love. You never say Allah without mentioning that he is all-merciful and compassionate. Surely, then, nobody can kill in their name. Great part of misconception of our faith is the use of religion as a political tool, to reach a political end. That is basically wrong. The second wrong is when one religion questions the authenticity of the other religion. One should only talk about his own religion and explain his own faith, but never explain other religions. Religion is a private affair between man and his creator. “ADAM BEEMUNATO YEHIE” says the wise: A MAN LIVES BY HIS FAITH. What he does in this world, is an affair between him and his creator. As Professor Martin Buber says “I and Thou”, that is a man and his God is the essence of our lives and the rest is history. Therefore, those who kill other human beings with a religious excuse are actually working against their religion, no matter what faith they represent. My observation says that much of the outrageous acts done in the name of religion are based on two things: The misinterpretation of religion and the ignorance and misunderstanding of the other religion. Therefore, conferences like this are essential to promote understanding. I want to make some comments on the issue of interfaith activities. Interfaith dialogue, I believe, needs to be about fostering greater understanding and mutual acceptance among the many adherents of religion – and not just a handful of leaders or acolytes. The most successful are those that focus on the community they serve than those that are focused on the service they are performing. The Mosaic and Melting pot systems: During my long experience, I have found that the most successful interfaith collaborations have both Mosaic and Melting pot components. In other words, they may have an overall melting pot objective that each faith community can affirm. At the same time, they allow each faith to express its specific point of view or scriptural context for the issue. For example, The United States has a “melting pot” policy that acts as a crucible in which all values and cultures are melted into an evolving homogeneous whole, Canada on the other hand, holds the Mosaic approach, which is, unity is built on allowing each piece or culture in the Mosaic to retain and reinforce its own identity, which in turn creates a heterogeneous whole. One should add however, that even in a Melting point

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you will find individual groups, faiths, and cultures that are desirous of holding onto some sense of identity matters. Some groups have instituted “multi literacy courses” where people from different faiths learn about the other religions exercised in his/her community. Much of the mistrust stems from ignorance of other people’s religion, values and practices. But if one is to learn that a Kippa religious Jewish wear is a sign of respect to God, then it does not look strange to his neighbor. The same thing with Hejas that Muslim women wear. One more way of acquenting people with other religions is to allow people of other faiths to visit a place of worship of the other neighbor. The visits wouldn’t necessarily have to be for worship and liturgy. In each house of worship, the visitors familiarize themselves with “what happens behind the wall” of the place of worship. The host may render explanation of the different objects at the worship hall. Workshops on religions are an important instrument for people to familiarize themselves on the values and principles of the religion. One is surprised how similar those principles and values are. Teachers are shown that world religion can be taught without bias. Those in society who hold orthodox single-faith viewpoints and atheists alike are made to understand that teaching world religions is as important as teaching geography. After all, when you choose a profession or live in a community, you cannot avoid coming in contact with people of different faiths. That by itself increases familiarity with the other religion and therefore becoming less threatening, and with less friction. Often we ignore the young in this important interfaith undertaking. Actually the young are very important in this process. Bring the youths out of the young person’s ghetto. Confide in them. Listen to them. And have them lead your group to undertake projects that address the faith concerns of young people. Ask them to help you develop projects that appeal to the young and will help them to identify the pernicious influence of hatred and bigotry. Ask them to come forth and become leaders in the community, examples of interfaith understanding.

The Antidefamation Network Example: A Muslim woman is sent home from her job or school because she is wearing Hejjab, (a traditional modest head covering). This has happened many times in the West. In this case the best action is the very next day the interfaith group calls a news conference with a real difference. Instead of having a Muslim step up to the podium to defend a Muslim, you ask a Roman Catholic nun with head covered to act as your spokes-person. Can you appreciate the instantaneous impact of such a gesture? What if the next time a Jewish cemetery was defaced in your community, I propose that a Muslim or a Christian come forward to denounce the act. What kind of a message would this send to those who would divide us all? This can help unify a community with different religious believes.

Current Events Beware of politics. Religion and politics are a dangerous mix. Never have an interfaith conference discuss something that is highly topical and current like world-wide mone-

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tary policies, the quality of political leader-ship, the Middle East situation, and so on. One is looking for conflict. Politics generally spells trouble for interfaith dialogue. Israeli-Palestinian Conferences By now there have been thirteen Israeli-Palestinian conferences of interfaith encounter. The first conference took place in October 2002 with many participants, from both sides. None of them had ever met the others before and for nearly two years, all they knew about the others was only through the media, namely: that the other only wishes to kill them. The effort started with a lot of hesitation and suspicion. Very quickly the two groups strongly connected and during the social event in the evening, after a bit more than 24 hours from the first contact, they all started singing together, danced together and were telling jokes to each other. When the time came to say farewell, everybody hugged each other and were sad to go back to the outside reality. It was really like Alice going into Wonderland and back. With time, the most striking element was the fact that it was not surprising any more and all the tension before the retreats was completely gone. We KNEW for sure that this is how the process goes when people come together with an opportunity for interaction and discovery of one another, despite of what is constantly going on in the “outside” world.

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Love Your Neighbors as Yourself, Love Your Neighbors Like Yourself General Mansour ABU RASHID

Bismillah Al-Rahman Al-Rahim. In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. I pray that our humble efforts will be an important step towards building better relations between the citizens of the world. The Prophet Muhammad – God’s peace and blessings be upon him – once said: “None of you truly believes until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself.” As all of you know, the Torah the Bible and all the believers in this world says: love your neighbors as yourself, love your neighbors like yourself. In this spirit we are here All of us faith in the one God. All the believers are tied together by culture and history as well. For over a thousand years our people have contributed to the complex tapestry of Middle Eastern civilization. Throughout the Middle Ages, Jews, Christians and Muslims borrowed a great deal from each other in the areas of philosophy, science, and law. It cannot be denied that the relationship between Jews, Christians and Muslims has been very difficult in recent years. Nonetheless, at this moment in history, we have no choice to take bold strides towards mutual forgiveness and reconciliation. We face a common threat: extremist distortions of religion and the wanton acts of violence that derive there from. Such abominations have already divided us from without for far too long. We all too often fail to acknowledge that they also threaten to destroy us from within. This is not simply a matter of importance to Jews, Christians Muslims and spirituals people, it is something that confronts and threatens the whole of humanity. The only antidote is that we work together in a spirit of mutual co-operation and respect to defeat this common enemy. We must move beyond the language of mere tolerance toward true acceptance. Our common faith in the One God and our shared history are the greatest asset in combating the forces that threaten to undo everything that is sacred to us all. We should thus strive not only for tolerance and co-existence, but for true acceptance. Our communities must see each other as sharing a common heritage, and a common future. It is only by adopting this attitude that we can combat the extremist threat and live in peace with each other. It is my hope that we go forth from this gathering with a common mission, to work together towards peace, justice and reconciliation. I hope that our common message is one that will be heard far beyond this gathering. Today we face many challenges and choices; we are facing a Middle East that was divided 2000 years ago between three of Abraham’s sons, the Judaism, Christianity and Islam. I would like to ask you today, my friend, where are we going with our culture and heritage? Capitalism and the Globalization are invading the world; there are many changes in the small and big cultures in the world, and we are baffled by small disputes which are bringing us years of pain and hurt. Definitely, peace is the best solution to the world – and war, for wherever reason, will damage human beings. We are seeing what is happening in the world, and increase our pain and

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sorrow as we observe innocent people from all religions and races dying for mistakes made by the leaders of the world. Each day there is more violence and killing in the name of religion, racism and economic greed. It sounds so easy to talk about peace while I am standing here, but I would like to address to you all, a peace of justice is the only solution for us all, we should all share and contribute to this peace, as a Jordanian and the people of Middle East. We need to unite everyone in this peace process, poor and rich in order to share the peace for the future of our children. The peace will flourish our economy and people will come from all over the world to see our culture and history. The money we now spend on weapons will be spent on our schools, hospitals and to protect our environment – we can see how the pollution is affecting our children everyday. We will all benefit from this peace as we have the culture, the dialogue, the ethics and the principles. We owe it to each other. “Treat me the way I want to be treated”; this sentence comes from all religions, and if we make a mistake, let us ask for forgiveness and apologize to each other – this is for a better and bright future for us all. Yes I am standing here before you to convey from the bottom of my heart, let’s reject all kinds of extremism, violence and poverty. We should support social well being, an open economy, building better schools for our children and modernizing our public and private sectors – those things won’t happen without PEACE. Its my hope that we as can go forth from this gathering with a common mission, to work together towards peace, justice an reconciliation. I hope that our common message is one that will be heard far beyond this gathering.

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A Project for Peace Raffaelo FELLAH

Each one of us during the cycle of earth’s development brings a part of our own history. This history is often a source of inspiration, but at other times, it can be a source of conflict or sometimes also a source of complex issues. I am Jewish by birth. Even though I am not religious, I have chosen to respect my family’s tradition, but without thinking of it as something special and superior from other religions. The Jewish community, I belonged to, was expelled from Libya between 1967 to1969, even though it had lived in there for 2000 years. My community’s drama, which was ignored by the media, the world powers and organizations, isn’t any different from all the other dramas experienced by so many other religions or nations. My own personal story, includes the killing of my father in an Arab pogrom in 1968 (as cited by the British), loss of all the Fellah family property and goods, (product of the hard work of many generations of Fellah), and the expulsion from a land which, I, just like my Muslim countrymen, considered and still consider as my homeland. Meanwhile, I learned a different lesson which goes in the opposite direction of the well known, (but little understood) saying: “eye for an eye and tooth for a tooth”. I say that it is not understood because in the Hebrew tradition, this verse does not represent the apologetics of vengeance. On the contrary, it is the retaining of this feeling which encourages the victim not to harm, or offend others, simply because of what have happened to them. Simply said, I have tried to go over this distinction, because, I believe, that we should not be engulfed by the metabolism of hate, but instead should commit ourselves to not look down on those that think differently from us. It was this conviction that made me decide to contribute my own little stone to the building of peace, through a project which I call “AL SHARKIA” “The Community”. Its aim is to help solve the issues and problems of the refugees by trying at the same time to bring about understanding of the peace process between Israel and Palestine. It was this conviction that made me decide to contribute my own little stone to the building of peace, through a project which I call “AL SHARKIA” “The Community”. Its aim is to help solve the issues and problems of the refugees by trying at the same time to bring about understanding of the peace process between Israel and Palestine. Let us say for instance that there were 650,000 (UN sources) refugees from the first Arab-Israel war. Meanwhile, the number of Hebrews who lived in various Arab nations during the same time period and who were also forced to leave their courtiers of origin reached about 1 million (UN sources). All of their possessions and property were taken away from them. The Arab governments asked that these possessions be given to the Palestinians as a compensation for the lands taken over by Israel. And that is what happened as a result, but one could easily say that the Palestinians were never able to enjoy these possessions. One of the unresolved issues of the Oslo Agreement and then later on of the Camp David Agreement is the issue of the refugees. Israel is willing to provide compensation for the damages and to accept in its territory a maximum of 150,000 original refugees. The Palestinian Au-

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thorities have asked that Israel accepts 4 million (which is what the number of refugees has reached from that original number of 650,000). For Israel the acceptance of such a large number of refugees, which by the way, equal the number of its population, would mean the eradication of its own existence. And that is the reason Israel opposes this demand strongly. We all understand and know that for over 50 years, the Palestinian people have the long lasting dream of returning to their lands, but no leader, despite their strongest convictions, would be able to bring them to reality. Al Sharkia offers several proposals, with the goal of providing parallel solutions for the rights of the Palestinian refugees, as well as Israeli Hebrews in Arab countries. Instead of continuing to debate about these issues for another 2–3 generations, it would make more sense to entrust an independent international institution, whose goal on the first phase of the project, would be to appraise and determine the value of all the properties claimed by the so called legal owners, whether they are Hebrews or Palestinians. Then, at a second phase a Trust is set up, which would administer the above mentioned properties on behalf of the legal owners, while at the same time with the investments they can promote profitable activities in the sensible border between Palestine, Jordan, Syria, Libya and Egypt. The ultimate goal and hope being that through recognition and interest, all the animosity and hatred built from the decades of suffering, to be replaced by friendship and peace. Injustice generates violence. Violence subsequently generates vengeance. Vengeance ends up in retaliation, and all this goes on inside a spiral in which even the possible winners are losers. Let us learn from your country. In 1362, Albania under the Balshaj Dynasty, reached its peak in terms of a united state. Its territories included, not only what is Albania today, but also Bosnia, Herzegovina, half of Dalmatia, Montenegro, and a part of Macedonia, up to Thessalonica. In reality those territories were in size, five times larger than the ones recognized to Albania at the London Conference in 1913. These territories were gradually lost in favor of the border enemies and the invading European powers, (first the Serb-Bosnians, the Turks, and the Venetians and then the Franco-Napoleonians). Even when a strong nationalistic wind crashed on the Balkans and on Kosovo in particular, Albania choose not to take vengeance for Kosova as an Albanian territory. Albania’s choice was wise, as it trusted the international institutions and more specifically NATO, which also is credited with having the initiative. I would like to highlight here that Albania, a small country, could be an example for other larger countries, especially in terms of promoting peaceful co-existence between different religions and ethnicities. Peace, Salaam, Shalom


Part Four Conclusions



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General Conclusions from NATO Advanced Research Workshop Erica CHENOWETH

The purpose of this workshop was to advance knowledge and understanding concerning a growing concern to Albanians – the threat to peaceful coexistence between religious communities in Albania and the possible security implications this threat has for the Balkans and the world. Despite the fact that Albania is often described as a model for religious coexistence, the many changes over the past fifteen years may threaten this coexistence. Such changes include the fall of communism – an atheist system – and the inflow of ideas, money, and influence from abroad into the emerging democracy. For instance, turbulent political events in the mid-1990s led many Albanians to seek refuge in foreign countries, including Arab and Muslim countries, for work and education. Returning to Albania, some radical youth may influence the relative peaceful coexistence enjoyed in previous years. Additionally, foreign states such as Saudi Arabia are interested in spreading Wahabbism to Albania and may attempt to build more radical mosques and schools. In addition to foreign Muslim influence, additional foreign religious groups such as Scientologists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Mormons have moved to Albania for mission work. The presence of these groups has created considerable controversy about the nature and limits of religious freedom, especially due to the perception that they often force conversion on young or vulnerable people. Finally, factions within Albania’s traditional religious groups continue to argue over doctrine and property, such as identity and doctrinal disagreements between the Albanian Autocephalous Church and the Greek Orthodox Church. Given the fact that the state has not produced adequate legislation to address the ongoing changes in the nature of religious coexistence in Albania, such developments may threaten the peaceful coexistence of Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox followers in Albania. A breakdown of religious tolerance may have profound implications not only for security in Albania and the greater Balkan region, but also for European security – especially given the tenuous negotiations regarding the status of Kosovo, the possibility of increasing terrorism, and the geostrategic importance of maintaining stability in the Balkans in avoiding wider conflicts.

Workshop Conclusions In an attempt to address these issues, scholars, researchers, clergy, and other observers joined in a two-day workshop resulting in several important conclusions. In general,

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participants reached a consensus on the general nature of the challenges facing Albania today. These conclusions are summarized in the points below. Various moderate churches can aid in the development of Albanian society, but if they are not able to fill this vacuum, there is a possibility that radical religious influences from elsewhere will fill it. For instance, given the great potential for economic development in Albania, many foreign influences have begun to invest in its youth – especially religious organizations. Institutions of many faiths have begun to infiltrate the Albania polity with political, economic, and social influence. Maintaining the autonomy of Albanian religious groups is the best way to ensure that youth do not become radicalised by outside influences. This will be difficult, however, without ample funding to support local churches. For example, Albania lacks a Muslim theological university, causing many Albanian youth to seek training in more radical universities abroad. Because of lack of funding, relying on foreign money to develop a Muslim university may be appealing in the short term but would be ultimately detrimental. Creating theological faculty positions at state universities in Albania is a cost-effective first step in reducing the appeal of more radical foreign universities. Some other religious groups, such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and Scientologists, often provide material incentives (i.e. goods, money) in exchange for conversion. Reducing the friction caused by such controversial activities may require major steps by domestic moderate religious groups or the state committee on religion. The potential for terrorism, while yet unrealised, is quite strong in Albania due to its recent democratisation. This is especially true if extremist factions develop within religious groups – a process that radical religious forces from abroad may exacerbate. If these groups do develop, the most important steps that the government can take involve co-opting moderates from related ideological groups so that maximum efforts toward peaceful reconciliation are met. Moreover, if terrorist attacks do occur the Albanian government may be tempted to use repressive measures to counter the threat. The government should avoid succumbing to this temptation in order to maintain its own legitimacy and find a more reconciling way to diminish the appeal of terrorism among disaffected individuals. The media can play an important role in spreading a message of trust between religious and other social, political, and economic groups. Those interested in building unity, co-opting moderates, and obtaining trust should access the many resources within the media. Watchdog groups, such as NGOs or state committees, can provide oversight of religious group activities and recommend appropriate legislation to meet these challenges. However, there are few resources available to support such NGOs or state committees. Many participants identified trust as essential – if trust is lacking from interfaith dialogue, reconciliation, and counter terrorism efforts, then progress is impossible.

Remaining Challenges and Avenues for Further Inquiry In the brief period allotted, workshop participants were able to identify the major challenges facing Albanian society in maintaining and sharing its model of religious coexistence. In addition, participants raised several important questions that remain unanswered. Remaining challenges for further investigation appear below.

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How can Albanian society satisfy young Muslims (and other religious groups) so that they do not resort to radicalisation? What steps can Albanians and others take to ensure that their youth – especially Muslim youth – remain active, moderate, and productive in society? Several participants identified mutual trust as a necessary condition for success in both creating and maintaining effective dialogue between groups. Thus, what are the best ways to achieve trust? What is the role of the media? How can we take advantage of their many resources to effectively engage the public and regional governments? How can interested parties bring these important issues to the attention of authorities effectively and efficiently? What practical recommendations can we suggest to governments and NGOs for applying these findings in practice? These questions focus on solutions to the challenges identified during the workshop. More research and discussion will be required to design actionable recommendations related to these solutions.

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Inter-Religious Dialogue Adea MEIDANI

I am very pleased and honoured to participate to this important workshop, which deals with an essential topic that is today part of the general concern of our mankind: interreligious tolerance. Two weeks ago, 250 key figures of Mediterranean and Golf Region were gathered in Paris, under initiative of President Chirac in promoting “Dialogue among Peoples and Cultures”. This initiative was another real step done to realize Chirac’s idea of last November on creation of a long “atelier cultural”. Among others, President Chirac has emphasized that “The Mediterranean region is becoming a focal point of incomprehension among peoples.” A part of this region, is also the Balkans. After dissolution of Former Yugoslavia, has suffered nearly one decade of war, bloodshed, ethnic cleansing and genocide, particularly exerted by Milosevic regime, in Bosnia and Kosova, against Muslim population. I consider a very important choice the fact that this international meeting is decided to be held in Albania, in a Mediterranean country, that is a historical example of harmony, tolerance and religious coexistence. Indeed, Albania’s population is composed of three main faiths (Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox) living historically and traditionally in perfect harmony. I will stay a little longer on the subject of the inter-religious tolerance, because if fear of globalisation is one general concern that many people express in dealing with cultural liberty and tolerance, the dread of a “clash of civilizations” is another that has received considerable articulation in recent years. This conception of “clash of civilizations” was proposed by Mr. Samuel Huntington. According to him the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural, i.e. the chief cultural fault line in the war of cultures occurs where the West meet the Islam. In fact, in the actual word, we are “exposed” to the aggravation of the relations among different populations and religions. We are assisting to racial conflicts and ethnical tensions. Some people think that we are today threatened by a “clash of civilizations”: occident against Islam, lay people against religious, North against South, rich against poor. However, the Huntington’s thesis maximizes the significant of cultural factors. Adhering to this conception means that we should then admit that cultural and religious differences are more important then the common human interests, as for example the respect of Freedom and Human Rights. But, actually, we understand very well that the clash of civilizations hypothesis is just that – a hypothesis. And Huntington himself has emphasized the hope that the West and Islam can find ways to peacefully exist. As he

A. Meidani / Inter-Religious Dialogue

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wrote in his book “In the final analysis, however, all civilizations have to learn to tolerate each other.” Indeed, the tolerance and very idea of democracy and dialogue are not new issues. They have appeared in different civilizations at different periods in world history: in early 7-th century in Japan, with the same spirit as the Magna Carta (decreed by English King 6 centuries later, in 1215). In this Japanese document is mentioned: “Decision on important matter should not be made by one person alone. They should be discussed with many.” On the subject of tolerance, it says: “Nor let us be resentful when others differ from us. For all men have hearts, and each heart has its own leanings. Their right is our wrong, and our right is their wrong.” Notions of tolerance and participatory decision-making on important public issues have been not only an exception of city of Athens, Rome, etc., but also a central part of many traditions in Africa and elsewhere. And more recent findings of the World Values survey show that people in Muslim countries have as much support for democratic values, tolerance and cultural dimension, as do people in non-Muslim countries. In this framework, the specific claim that respect of cultural dimension and tolerance are special and very unique features of Western civilization, extending way back into history, are particularly hard to sustain. This is not to deny that liberty and tolerance are among the most important achievements of modern Europe, despite some historical aberrations. The world indeed has much to learn from recent history of Europe and the Western world, particularly since the period of the European Enlightenment. But to see a unique line of historical division there, going back through history, is remarkably fanciful. The history of the world does not suggest anything like a division between a long run history of Western civilization and toleration and those of non-Western “despotism”. This becomes less logic when it is closely connected to religious lines, influencing in this way of reasoning the right political decisions as it might be the acceleration of the process of Turkey integration to EU. In this sense, I think, the Albanian example of cultural and religious tolerance is very important. The Albanian society has been and remains historically a real model of religious co-existence, promoting the same rights and respect towards various religious groups. Furthermore, the opinion of many foreign lawyers is that, in certain directions, our legal basis, as the case is with the articles of our Constitution on minorities, religion, etc., contains a more democratic drafting compared not only with that of other countries emerging from communism, but also of some other democratically developed countries, in which the principles of inclusion and exemption are in certain cases applied through covered forms of religious, historical, geographic, legal, or institutional “patriotism”. Actually, Albanian people do not only respect and accept the different faiths like all occidental countries do, but, for instance, children, part of what Albanians call “mixed families”, living under the same roof, can choose spontaneously the faith they want to belong to. My example is one of them. This is very rare, very special, but at the same time very strong model, to be considered and studied carefully. These are sufficient reasons to believe that for a human progress, the cultural diversity, linguistic pluralism, preservation of the traditions, etc. should remain factors that everyone would uphold, against the human homogenisation. Of the same importance everywhere, Balkans and Albania included, is, also, the perfection of the intercultural, inter-ethnic and inter-religious dialogues, a cultural approach to political governance, moving on from a multicultural process to an intercultural one.

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A. Meidani / Inter-Religious Dialogue

Generally speaking, in order to avert the choc of ignorance, stupidity and arrogance, we ought to find the path to dialogue, and reach a wide consensus upon the principals of tolerance and mutual respect. This is possible. This is our barrier and frontier; we must pass over them, through contacts and mutual understanding. If we wish to ensure peace in the world we leave in, then we have to understand that peace cannot be separated and is inseparable from dialogue and more integrated relations among the countries of different religions. John Kennedy was entirely right to say: “Peace is a daily, a weekly, a monthly process, gradually changing opinions, slowly eroding barriers, quietly building new structures.” To “build” this new way of “thinking” and those “new structures”, we need to focus on the values that unite us, not differentiate us. Because, at the end, we all aspire to the same goal: peace on earth. And I believe with this important workshop we will do something positive.


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Author Index Abu Rashid, M. Andreotti, G. Chenoweth, E. Christopoulos, D. Cunningham, K.G. Fellah, R. Fischer, B.J. Frendo, G. Gjinishi, E. Godo, S. Hasimja, E. Ivanovic, A. Kulla, I. Mayer, J.-F.

126 ix 91, 133 66 74 128 95 34 57 1 31 112 38 45

Meidani, A. Meidani, R. Meta, B. Muca, F. Murzaku, I.A. Naim, A. Nazarko, M. Pallavicini, ‘A.a.-W. Pettifer, J. Sinani, G. Vickers, M. Xhaferri, A. Yannoulatos, A. Zivulovic, V.

136 3, 19 119 77 102 123 v, 15 52 vii, 62 7 27 80 41 117


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