Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview, Volume 3: 1945 to 1989

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Author: Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan (editors)

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

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volume 3 1945 to 1989

1-800-368-6868

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview V o lume 3 1945 to 1989

GU N T R AM H . H E R B D AV I D H . KA P L A N Editors

S A N TA B A R B A R A , C A L I F O R N I A

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Copyright 2008 by ABC-CLIO, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, except for the inclusion of brief quotations in a review, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Nations and nationalism : a global historical overview / Guntram H. Herb and David H. Kaplan, editors. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-85109-907-8 (alk. paper) 1. History, Modern—18th century. 2. History, Modern—19th century. 3. History, Modern—20th century. 4. Nationalism—History. I. Herb, Guntram Henrik, 1959– II. Kaplan, David H., 1960– D299.N37 2008 320.54—dc22 2008004478

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This book is also available on the World Wide Web as an ebook. Visit abc-clio.com for details. ABC-CLIO, Inc. 130 Cremona Drive, P.O. Box 1911 Santa Barbara, California 93116-1911 Senior Production Editor Cami Cacciatore Production Editor Kristine Swift Production Manager Don Schmidt Media Manager Caroline Price Media Editor Katherine Jackson File Management Coordinator Paula Gerard This book is printed on acid-free paper Manufactured in the United States of America

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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview

volume 3 1945 to 1989

Contents List of Contributors

vii

1016 Czechoslovakia Cynthia Paces

Preface xi

1030 European Union Warren Mason

Acknowledgments xv Introduction xvii

1047 France Philippe Couton

Thematic Essays 875 Nationalism and Environmentalism Paul Hamilton

1058 Northern Ireland Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See

888 Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism Berch Berberoglu 899 Gender, Sexuality, and Nationalism Joane Nagel

1082 Spain Elisa Roller

912 Literature, Language, and Anticolonial Nationalism Kim McMullen

Middle East 1094 Algeria Catherine Lloyd, with Ghania Azzout, Samira Hanifi, and Ouassila Loudjani

929 Nation-Building: From a World of Nations to a World of Nationalisms David Brown

1106 Iran David N. Yaghoubian

942 Nationalism in a World Divided Saul B. Cohen 957 Postcolonial Nationalist Philosophies Brett Bowden 971 Religion, Ideology, and Nationalism Zachary Irwin 991 Sports and Nationalism Alan Bairner

Europe 1005 Britain Stephen Heathorn

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1070 Soviet Union Hugh Hudson

1120 Israel Arnon Golan 1132 Palestine Chris Bierwirth

Africa 1144 South Africa Christopher Paulin and Kathleen Woodhouse 1155 Congo and Zaïre Kevin C. Dunn 1167 Eritrea Fouad Makki

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CONTENTS

1177 Nigeria Bonny Ibhawoh

1261 Vietnam Christopher A. Airriess

Asia

Americas

1190 China Orion Lewis and Jessica Teets

1273 Cuba Antoni Kapcia

1201 India Laura Dudley Jenkins

1287 Québec James Kennedy

1213 Malaysia and Singapore Albert Lau

1299 United States Melanie E. L. Bush and Roderick D. Bush

1227 Pakistan Hooman Peimani

Oceania

1238 Philippines Christine Doran

1313 Fiji Martha Kaplan Index

1249 Taiwan Stéphane Corcuff

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List of Contributors

Marco Adria University of Alberta

Linda Bryder University of Auckland

Christopher A. Airriess Ball State University

Melanie E. L. Bush Adelphi University

Mohammed Hassen Ali Georgia State University

Roderick D. Bush St. John’s University

Stephen Alomes Deakin University

Juan Manuel Carrión University of Puerto Rico

Celia Applegate University of Rochester

Sun-Ki Chai University of Hawaii

Christopher P. Atwood Indiana University

Colin M. Coates York University

Ghania Azzout University of Algiers

Saul B. Cohen Queens College CUNY

Alan Bairner Loughborough University

Jerry Cooney Louisville University (emeritus professor)

Frederic Barberà Lancaster University Joshua Barker University of Toronto Roderick J. Barman University of British Columbia Patrick Barr-Melej Ohio University Berch Berberoglu University of Nevada, Reno Stefan Berger Chris Bierwirth Murray State University Brett Bowden University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

Stella Coram Independent Scholar Stéphane Corcuff University of Lyon Jeffrey J. Cormier University of Western Ontario Ralph Coury Fairfield University Philippe Couton University of Ottawa Kathryn Crameri University of Sydney Ben Curtis Seattle College Patrice M. Dabrowski Harvard University

David Brandenberger University of Richmond

Dev Raj Dahal Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Nepal

David Brown Murdoch University

Gertjan Dijkink University of Amsterdam

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Jason Dittmer University College London

Dennis Hart Kent State University

Chris Dixon University of Queensland

David Allen Harvey New College of Florida

Christine Doran Charles Darwin University

Stephen Heathorn McMaster University

Maria Dowling St. Mary’s College

Ulf Hedetoft Aalborg University

Stéphane Dufoix Universite Paris X–Nanterre

Jennifer Heuer University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Kevin C. Dunn Hobart and William Smith Colleges

Vernon Hewitt University of Bristol

Jordana Dym Skidmore College

Helen Hintjens Institute of Social Studies, The Netherlands

Jonathan Eastwood Washington and Lee University

Yaroslav Hrytsak Central European University

Aygen Erdentug Bilkent University

Hugh Hudson Georgia State University

Kyle T. Evered Michigan State University

Bonny Ibhawoh McMaster University

Søren Forchhammer University of Copenhagen

Grigory Ioffe Radford University

Will Fowler University of St. Andrews

Zachary Irwin Penn State University–Erie, The Behrend College

Michael E. Geisler Middlebury College Paul Gilbert University of Hull Eagle Glassheim University of British Columbia Arnon Golan Haifa University Liah Greenfeld Boston University Jouni Häkli University of Tampere

Tareq Y. Ismael University of Calgary Nils Jacobsen University of Illinois–Urbana-Champaign Laura Dudley Jenkins University of Cincinnati William Jenkins York University Steve Jobbitt University of Toronto

Seyoum Hameso University of East London

Lonnie R. Johnson Austrian-American Educational Commission (Fulbright Commission), Vienna

Paul Hamilton Brock University

Rhys Jones University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Samira Hanifi University of Algiers

Cynthia Joseph Monash University

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CONTRIBUTORS

John E. Joseph University of Edinburgh

Christopher Marsh Baylor University

Gregory Jusdanis The Ohio State University

Warren Mason Miami University, Ohio

Aristotle A. Kallis Lancaster University

John Maynard University of Newcastle, Australia

Antoni Kapcia Nottingham University

John M. McCardell Jr. Middlebury College

Martha Kaplan Vassar College

John McLane Northwestern University

Sharon Kelly University of Toronto

Kim McMullen Kenyon College

James Kennedy University of Edinburgh

Neil McWilliam Duke University

Robert Kerr University of Central Oklahoma

Nenad Miscevic Central European University

P. Christiaan Klieger Oakland Museum of California

Graeme Morton University of Guelph

David B. Knight University of Guelph Hans Knippenberg University of Amsterdam Taras Kuzio George Washington University Albert Lau National University of Singapore Orion Lewis University of Colorado, Boulder Hong-Ming Liang The College of St. Scholastica Catherine Lloyd University of Oxford Ouassila Loudjani University of Algiers

Joane Nagel University of Kansas Byron Nordstrom Gustavus Adolphus College Kevin C. O’Connor Gonzaga University Shannon O’Lear University of Kansas Steven Oluic United States Military Academy Kenneth R. Olwig Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences Brian S. Osborne Queen’s University Cynthia Paces The College of New Jersey

Norrie MacQueen University of Dundee

Razmik Panossian International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development

Paul Maddrell Aberystwyth University

Christopher Paulin Manchester Community College

Fouad Makki Cornell University

Hooman Peimani Bradford University

Virginie Mamadouh University of Amsterdam

Nicola Pizzolato Queen Mary University of London


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Linda Racioppi Michigan State University

Ray Taras University of Colorado

Pauliina Raento University of Helsinki

Jessica Teets University of Colorado, Boulder

Jane M. Rausch University of Massachusetts–Amherst

Anne Marie Todd San Jose State University

Elizabeth Rechniewski University of Sydney

Anna Triandafyllidou Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy

Angelo Restivo Georgia State University Elisa Roller European Commission Luis Roniger Wake Forest University Marianne Rostgaard Aalborg University Victor Roudometof University of Cyprus Mona Russell East Carolina University Jörg Schendel Independent Scholar Conrad Schetter University of Bonn Klaus Schleicher University of Hamburg Katherine O’Sullivan See Michigan State University Nanda R. Shrestha Florida A&M University Daniel Speich ETH Zurich Alberto Spektorowski Tel Aviv University Daniel Stone University of Winnipeg Christine Straehle University of Quebec at Montreal Laszlo Strausz Georgia State University William H. Swatos Jr. Association for the Sociology of Religion

Toon van Meijl University of Nijmegen Neil Waters Middlebury College Peter J. Weber University of Applied Languages (SDI), Munich Ben Wellings The Australian National University George W. White Frostburg State University Joseph M. Whitmeyer University of North Carolina, Charlotte Peter Wien University of Maryland Michael Wood Dawson College Kathleen Woodhouse Rutgers University David N. Yaghoubian California State University, San Bernardino Takashi Yamazaki Osaka City University Antonina Zhelyazkova International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria Research Assistants Gruia Badescu Zachary Hecht-Leavitt Jonathan Hsu Kathleen Woodhouse Cartography Conor J. Stinson Jonathan Hsu


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Preface

What is a nation? What is nationalism? What does it mean to examine them in global perspective? We conceive of a nation or national identity as a form of loyalty. People have a multitude of loyalties: to family, friends, places, clubs, institutions, regions, countries, even to their place of work or brands of products. What distinguishes loyalty to a nation is the primacy it holds on people’s allegiance. It is so powerful that people are willing to give their lives to ensure the continued existence of the group members and territory that make up their nation. By extension, we call nationalism the process that defines, creates, and expresses this essential loyalty to the nation. We view the term nationalism in a neutral sense. While this process can take extreme forms and lead to violent aggression and the extermination of others, nationalism can also be benign and form the basis for peaceful coexistence. Nations and nationalism have found a bewildering range of expressions across the world and through time, and it is this geographic and temporal variation that we seek to address in a systematic fashion. Given the sheer number of nations that exist or have existed historically—some scholars argue that there are as many as 4,000–5,000 in just the contemporary era—our global perspective does not attempt to be comprehensive. Instead we have chosen to follow cross-sections through time and space. We identify major historical eras in the development of nations and nationalism to examine characteristic themes and representative cases from all major regions of the world. Our emphasis is on depth rather than breadth. The 146 entries in this encyclopedia are full-length articles that go in depth to cover major debates and issues instead of brief descriptions of general features. They are authored by reputable scholars and try to provide accessible introductions to topics that are ambiguous, complex, and frequently misunderstood. Because literature on nations and nationalism arguably ranks among the most diverse and convoluted, our goal is to provide students, nonspecialists, and even junior scholars with concise information on this subject. In deciding what cases and themes to use, we take representative examples from each world region. These run the gamut from large powerful nations such as China and Russia to smaller nations that do not enjoy any form of sovereignty, like Tibet and Wales. We try to cover both prosperous nations of the developed world along with ex-colonial nations in the less-developed world. Similarly, some nations only appear during one time period, and others do not appear at all, because the most important consideration for us was that at least one representative example from all major regions of the world was included, even if scholarship has sorely neglected or sidelined that area, such as in Africa. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The selection of specific themes and cases that are treated intensively means that our coverage will have some unavoidable gaps. For example, there are no thematic chapters that treat race independently. This omission is not because we consider the issue to be of little significance, but because we feel that race is so elemental to discussions of nations and nationalism that it cannot be separated out. Similarly, it was not always possible to stick to the neat historical categorization into the four time periods. Some of our entries bridge several volumes to provide the most effective treatment of individual cases and themes. This encyclopedia is arranged chronologically in four volumes. The first volume traces the origins and formative processes of nations and nationalism from 1770 to 1880. The second volume covers the aggressive intensification of nationalism during the age of imperialism, from 1880 to 1945. The third volume deals with the decline of nationalism in the aftermath of the Second World War, from 1945 to 1989. The final volume outlines the transformations of nationalism since the end of the Cold War in 1989. All 104 country essays have the same format, and each is approximately 4,000 words. Each includes a chronology to position the reader in time; a discursive essay on main features; illustrations to help the reader visualize specific issues, situations, or persons; and a brief bibliography to guide additional inquiries. The case study essays also contain sidebars that highlight unique events, persons, or institutions. The main essays all contain five sections that help structure the inquiry and provide a universal key to access the information: (1) “Situating the Nation” places the national case in a historical, political, social, and geographic context; (2) “Instituting the Nation” examines key actors and institutions as well as philosophical foundations; (3) “Defining the Nation” discusses the role of ethno-cultural, civilizational, and geographic markers in creating the us–them distinction that is at the heart of national identity; (4) “Narrating the Nation” addresses particular events, stories, and myths that are used to create a community of belonging; and (5) “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” focuses on actions and strategies that help legitimize the national idea. Our 42 thematic essays address the interplay between national identity, politics, culture, and society and are generally 6,000 words long. They focus on geopolitical contexts and economic conditions, such as postcolonialism and globalization; social relations, such as gender and class; dominant philosophies and ideologies, such as fascism and fundamentalism; and nationalist cultural creations and expressions, such as art, literature, music, or sports. Though specific themes vary in each of the four volumes, each of the thematic essays include bibliographies and illustrations, and touch on the following questions: (1) How were the issues/phenomena under discussion important? (2) What is the background and what are the origins? (3) What are major dimensions and impacts on different groups, societal conditions, and ideas? (4) What are the consequences and ramifications of this issue for the character and future development of nations and nationalism? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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We feel that our encyclopedia makes an important addition to the current reference literature on nations and nationalism. Existing encyclopedias in the field generally contain only very brief entries (Spira 1999, 2002; Leoussi 2001); are dated (Snyder 1990); neglect such civic nations as the United States or Switzerland (Minahan 2002); or are uneven because they combine a few excessively long survey articles with several extremely short entries (Motyl 2001). A universal and significant shortcoming is the lack of maps and illustrations. Except for a limited number of general maps and select illustrations in Minahan, the other works do not have a single map, figure, or image. We believe that an encyclopedia on nationalism must contain visual information for it to effectively convey the contexts within which nationalist movements arose and to depict the important symbology that was used to galvanize national sentiment. Our encyclopedia also offers a unique and novel way to access information on nations and nationalisms. The thematic entries give insights into the larger contexts for the country essays and illustrate linkages among them in regard to general topics such as national education. The individual country entries allow readers to compare and contrast developments in different places and to examine trends in major regions of the world during different time periods. Finally, since some of the places and themes appear in all four volumes, it is possible to trace developments and identify linkages not only among places, but also through time. We hope that this encyclopedia helps to further an understanding of perhaps the most influential set of identities and ideologies in the world today. We also hope that this collection of cases and themes selected across space and time sheds some light on the different ways in which these loyalties are manifested. While this encyclopedia constitutes a very large body of work, it can only scratch the surface of all of the different varieties inherent in a study of nations and nationalism. We encourage the reader to follow up on some of the selected readings that are listed at the end of each entry and to further explore some of the various cases and themes that have not been explicitly addressed. References Leoussi, Athena S. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction. Minahan, James. 2002. Encyclopedia of Stateless Nations: Ethnic and National Groups around the World. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Motyl, Alexander J. 2001. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. San Diego: Academic Press. Snyder, Louis. 1990. Encyclopedia of Nationalism. New York: Paragon House. Spira, Thomas. 1999 (vol. 1), 2002 (vol. 2). Nationalism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Dictionary and Research Guide. Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press.


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Acknowledgments

An enormous undertaking such as this four-volume work could not be accomplished without the help of several individuals. Of course we would like to thank all of our contributors, who were wonderful about following formatting guidelines, making revisions, and cheerfully supplying additional material as the need arose. We are very saddened that one of our contributors, Jeffrey Cormier, did not live to see the publication of this work. We would also like to pay special thanks to the people at ABC-CLIO, among them Ron Boehm, Wendy Roseth, Kristin Gibson, and especially Alex Mikaberidze. The efforts of ABC-CLIO’s publication team have allowed us to complete this project in a sustained and timely manner. Above all we wish to extend our gratitude to those people who have worked tirelessly in assisting us in this endeavor. Their efforts are reflected throughout these four volumes. Kathleen Woodhouse from Kent State University was instrumental in helping to conceive of this project, in identifying and lining up the contributors, and in evaluating and editing each and every entry in Volumes 3 and 4. She also played a major part in the development of three of the essays. She has been an enormous asset and has worked tirelessly to see this project from start to finish. Gruia Badescu, Zachary Hecht-Leavitt, Jonathan Hsu, and Conor Stinson provided invaluable assistance in Middlebury, Vermont. Their contributions would not have been possible without the generous support of Middlebury College, which is deeply appreciated. Zach and Gruia aided in identifying contributors, selecting illustrations, and managing numerous administrative tasks. Zach’s excellent writing and editorial skills ensured that many of the entries authored by non-native English speakers were transformed into stylistically polished pieces. Gruia’s remarkable linguistic skills and knowledge of the scholarship of nationalism allowed him to contribute deep insights to the review process as well as to the drafting of two introductory essays. Jonathan Hsu and Conor Stinson are to be credited for the beautiful cartographic design. Producing maps for these volumes proved to be a challenging and enormous project. The maps needed to vary greatly in scale—from small areas, such as Estonia, to giant regions, such as Russia—but at the same time needed to allow for easy comparisons. The historical maps were particularly difficult given the numerous border changes that took place and the lack of good reference sources, but Jonathan mastered this hurdle with ease. He is not only a gifted cartographer but an excellent researcher. Putting on the finishing touches to turn the massive manuscript and numerous images and maps into a coherent and beautiful set of volumes was also an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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enormous challenge, and we were fortunate to have the able assistance of Cami Cacciatore, Kristine Swift, and Kerry Jackson at ABC-CLIO and of Samuel Lazarus, Caitlin Sargent, and Mithra Harivandi at Middlebury College. Finally, we would like to thank our families for the unwavering support they gave us throughout this giant undertaking. We dedicate this work to the memory of David Woodward.


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Introduction Volume 3: 1945 to 1989

This volume examines nationalism and national identities between 1945 and 1989. The year 1945 marks the end of World War II, the largest, most comprehensive conflict fought in the history of the human race. World War II was also a war of nationalism. The Germans, Japanese, and Italians began the war believing that their own nations should be accorded greater status than that of other nations and peoples. Nazism, fascism, and Japanese militarism exalted nationalism and national ideology above all else. By the end of World War II, these countries were defeated, many of the ideas that had spawned the war were completely discredited, and, with the notable exception of the United States, most of the major combatants lay devastated. The end of World War II signaled a watershed in the development of nationalist thinking and national identities. This volume considers a series of thematic essays and case studies that deal with particular aspects of some of the changes in both thought and identity. We consider in this Introduction four principal changes: (1) the end of the European era; (2) the beginning of superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union; (3) the spread of decolonization as formerly dependent colonies became independent states; and (4) the increased assertion of stateless nations, as manifested in both national separatist and irredentist movements. Before World War II, it was the European powers, particularly Great Britain, France, and Germany, that dominated the world order. These countries were at the top of the global hierarchy, both militarily and economically. After 1945, European influence over world affairs, while still considerable, ebbed. Moreover, most European countries saw their major cities bombed, their resources tapped out, and their populations decimated by six long years of conflict. The major front lines of World War II—at least in the Atlantic theater—were on European soil, but even those countries that were removed from the front paid a heavy price in human and natural resources. For countries in Western Europe, the seeds of a new prosperity were planted in the ruins of warfare. New social welfare systems were developed, new industries were established, and many societies were able to enjoy, over the decades, a standard of living far higher than what they had experienced before the war. Japan enjoyed even greater success as it went from a bombed-out shell to an economic superpower in only 30 years. It is worth mentioning that the major antagonists in World War II—Germany, Italy, and Japan—also adopted new democratic institutions that were stable and enduring. This was not true in Eastern Europe where many societies fell under the umbrella of Soviet domination. Such countries had never been particularly wealthy, but their experience under communism ensured N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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that they would remain stuck at a fairly low standard of living. Truly democratic institutions were not given a chance to thrive, and soon almost all countries fell under the domination of single-party, communist governments. Perhaps in recognition of their altered status, many Western European countries began to form a common market in the 1950s. This European Common Market evolved into a European Union that eventually included most of the countries within Western Europe (and later in the 1990s and early 21st century began to incorporate countries in Eastern Europe as well). This European Union took on certain attributes of a political state and required that each of the member states cede some authority to this larger supranational entity. Although other unions had sprung up in other parts of the world, the European Union represented something quite special and distinct. The second change has to do with the beginning of an intense superpower rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. The so-called Cold War marked not only a struggle between two countries but also a conflict between two ideological systems and those countries that subscribed to either a free-market ideology or an ideology based around communist or socialist principles. To some thinkers this ideological alignment overshadowed the traditional alignments that had been based on national identity, religion, language, and other such expressions of affinity. This ideological struggle helped shape the world. The world became bipolar as the superpowers developed a stable set of allies and military blocs. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization—comprising the United States together with countries in Western and Central Europe and Canada—was an alliance built around the containment of communism, formulated most famously by George Kennan. The United States forged other alliances with Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. For the Soviet Union, most countries in Eastern Europe joined together to form the Warsaw Pact. Beyond these alliances lay a series of client states that each superpower sought to cultivate. The list of such client states is too numerous to mention here but consisted at various times of such countries as China, Vietnam, Cuba, perhaps even Israel. China notably became independent of Soviet influence and began to develop a set of alliances and military interests on its own at odds with the interests of the Soviets. The effect of the Cold War may have been to stifle some aspects of nationalism. Certainly from a military standpoint, it was the first time in history that each power or superpower had the capacity to completely annihilate the other superpower and waste large parts of the world. Thus began the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction,” which kept conflict at an angry simmer. Instead of all-out war, much of the fighting was conducted through a series of proxy wars as each superpower took sides in battles between or within other countries. The Korean War, the war in Vietnam, and the Afghan war were all good examples of proxy wars that were fought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Another consequence of this superpower rivalry was that countries were sometimes N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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partitioned between communist and capitalist sections. The most famous case was, of course, Germany, the preeminent power before the war, now split between a communist East and a capitalist West. The attempt to develop a series of alignments and alliances meant that superpowers would support other countries even if they flouted their ideological ideals. The United States, which prided itself on its democratic institutions, often bolstered military dictatorships if these dictators tended to support the larger struggle against communism. The U.S. support for the Philippines and Chile is a good example of this tendency during this time. The third change has to do with decolonization. Before World War II, much of the world was organized into a series of overseas empires led by European countries, Japan, and the United States. After the war, many of these colonies became independent. This process took some 30 years and began most notably with the huge colony of India, which split eventually into the countries of India, Pakistan, and later Bangladesh. The Dutch colony of Indonesia also gained independence at this time, as did Southeast Asian countries within French Indochina and in the Philippines. Later, several countries within North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caribbean basin also gained their independence. This massive decolonization led to a threefold increase in independent states from 1945 to 1989. When colonies became independent, they were forced to follow existing spatial units rather than the territorial contours of existing nations or ethnic groups. As a result, one of the key challenges for newly independent countries was forging a unified national identity that could transcend ethnic rivalries. In some instances, partition, as was effected between India and Pakistan, was one (imperfect) solution to this dilemma. But in other cases, there was really no clear path by which to create true nation-states, or even multinational states, that felt a common bond. From the outset many of these new countries were riven by major factional struggles, making it very difficult for them to develop politically and economically. The case of Nigeria is instructive, as it comprised three major national regions. Yet efforts to create new states from these disparate regions—as attempted by the proposed country of Biafra in the 1960s—proved impossible. While some countries, like India, were able to create a vibrant democracy, most newly independent countries did not. Military dictatorships sprang up, rapidly fostered by suspicion and a lack of mature institutions. Dissent was often squashed. Governments spent less time attempting to create a viable country than in building up their militaries, looting their country’s resources, and ravaging the national trust. The attempts by the superpowers to enlist some countries in various alignments only made matters worse. The Cold War era together with decolonization spawned the creation of the so-called Third World. These were countries that considered themselves to be nonaligned and outside of the Soviet or American orbit. The term “Third World” later came to mean countries that were less economically advanced and much poorer than countries in North America, Europe, and Japan. Many Third World countries suffered from problems related to uneven development, an explosion in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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their population, excessive urbanization, and environmental degradation. With few resources, they had difficulty just trying to feed their own people, much less developing in any substantive way. A 1950s’ book by W. W. Rostow titled Stages of Development indicated that economic development went hand in hand with cultural, social, and political developments. Yet scholars like Andre Gunder Frank argued that dependent economic relations between former colonies and metropoles continued long after the colonial era, which exacerbated the problem of uneven development. The fourth change was what analysts such as Bernard Nietschmann described as the discovery of a fourth world, a shorthand for nations without political independence and sovereignty. Clearly, this was a problem in those countries recently carved out of colonial territory, but it also affected much of the developed world. In country after country, movements were formed or reignited to claim their rights as a sovereign group of people. National separatist movements, in which a territory desired political independence, or irredentist movements in which members of a territory desired to be reunited with a country across the international boundary, became a feature in much of the stable West. (In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, such movements were suppressed but have become much more prominent in the 1990s and into the 21st century.) In Canada, French Canadians within the province of Québec declared that Québec should be independent, and they successfully pursued part of these goals through the election of an avowedly separatist provincial government. In the United Kingdom, Catholics within Northern Ireland claimed that they should be reunited with their brethren in the southern republic of Ireland. The growth of these nationalist movements belied the major ideological struggles that were going on between the superpowers, but they also suggested that it was possible for smaller groups to assert their rights. Beyond separatist or irredentist movements, many societies in the Western world also experienced a redefinition of their own national identity. In part, this was sparked by immigration or the introduction of guest workers, as prosperous societies saw themselves being “invaded” by ethnically distinct people. Even the United States and Canada —long habituated to the immigration of peoples from Europe—had to contend with rising numbers of immigrants from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Moreover, during this period, national identity was transformed by the promotion of rights among those groups that had previously been marginalized. Civil rights movements sought the emancipation of minorities. Women’s liberation movements improved rights and opportunities for women. That all segments of society should be able to participate in the life of the nation became at least a stated ideal, although perhaps less observed in practice. In any event, these movements changed what it meant to belong to a nation. National identity would never again be the same. david h. kapl an


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Nationalism and Environmentalism Paul Hamilton Relevance Nationalism resists easy comprehensive definition because of its variability across time and space. There are examples of racist, ethnic, civic, and irredentist (Latin for redemptus, “brought back” or restored territory) nationalism, among other things. Nationalism is a blunt instrument, a means of unifying individuals in a political project. If we think of nationalism in this way, then we can see how political entrepreneurs might link identity to salient or relevant contextual factors, like territory or the environment. This does not, of course, imply a commitment to some kind of progressive politics, or to any particular environmental problem, but rather illustrates the extent to which nationalism is a malleable, or flexible, organizing principle. It is not a coherent ideology but, rather, tends to act as an ideological parasite hosted by other ideologies. In other words, while ideologies like liberalism and Marxism contain a program of specific assumptions, goals, and values, nationalism simply implies a political program whose central concern is the nation. Beyond that central concept, nationalisms may vary widely in their specific policy concerns. Nationalism is a political project linked to the aspirations of a community who share one or more “objective characteristics” (language and culture) and a sense of a shared past and future. It is not simply the presence of a commonality; for example, many people speak English, but this is a very unlikely basis of shared national community now that English boasts one of the largest linguistic populations spread across every continent. On the other hand, nationalism can vary in its form and content. There is no single definition of nationalism universally agreed upon, but most would contend that nationalism is concerned with the political aspirations of a defined community and that these aspirations are obviously of political import. Politically loaded, also, is the relationship of communities to the natural world. Almost all political projects have an implicit or explicit place for nature in their worldview. In this essay, I argue that nature is critically important for nationalists, but not necessarily in the same way or in a single ideological fashion. Environmentalism is a rich source of national identity. In settler societies where most of the native population was marginalized by European colonists, the environment is part of the national character embodying the steely resolve of early pioneers engaged in “conquest” of the natural world. In many parts of the world, the character of the society is said to be shaped by the landscape. Think of the central Asian steppe, or the Arabian Peninsula’s vast desert, and how these backdrops shaped national identity. Icelandic nationalism and identity have been N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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characterized by pride in being one of Europe’s last wild spaces, with clean rivers and cheap, clean hydrothermal power. The linkage between the natural environment and national history and character is very frequently observed. In Brazil and the Soviet Union, conquest of the frontiers of Amazonia and Siberia, respectively, was part of a broader mission to master nature, inculcate national pride, and establish sovereignty, especially in recent decades. After World War II, both states emphasized the development of these vast and potentially vulnerable regions to protect them from neighboring states. Part of this project included the migration of people to underpopulated parts of the state. In both cases this settlement was meant to establish sovereignty and to encourage the assimilation of minorities. This practice of population movement is known as transmigration in Indonesia where the large population of the island of Java stands in stark contrast to the relatively empty spaces of Borneo, Sumatra, and the Indonesian half of New Guinea (Irian Jaya). Transmigration is a means to establish the dominant culture of the state, which is both Javan and Islamic. The program serves to establish and protect Indonesian sovereignty over the periphery of the Indonesian state and to further Javanize the society. In “new states,” the impetus to consolidate sovereignty and a shared identity is powerful and practically important. New states are often territorially arbitrary, with many disparate societies residing in the same postcolonial space. In such states, political borders do not reflect cultural borders, and this disjunction can lead to interethnic strife. Population transfers implicitly reveal the aim of the central government to place its stamp on all parts of the national territory. These transfers have not been uncontroversial. Minorities (Christians, Hindus, traditional indigenous communities) have had to face both an influx of alien settlers and the resultant environmental problems, particularly habitat destruction via deforestation and mining. Environmental problems therefore get intertwined with disputes over resources development and distribution. In China, population transfers, aided by the authoritarian nature of that regime, have been used to reduce local distinctiveness in Tibet and Chinese Turkistan with an aim of putting a Han Chinese stamp on the entire territory of China, a state that has a remarkable disparity in settlement, with a sparsely populated center and west and a heavily populated east coast. Brazil and the Soviet Union have similar disparities of population density that governments have attempted to reduce via economic incentives and, in the case of the Soviet Union, the establishment of the infamous prison camp system, the Gulag. It is difficult to discuss the linkages between environmentalism and nationalism without some acknowledgment of the historical backdrop of both phenomena. The political phenomenon of environmentalism, or ecologism, is a particular manifestation of what is sometimes described as part of the “new politics” of the postwar West. This particular political project is usually tied to a critique of bureaucracy, atomizing society, consumerism, and a lack of meaning in everyday life. Ecologists, as manifested in green political parties, have long sought to include the environment on the economic and social balance sheet in modern sociN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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eties. Furthermore, we can see in this movement an appeal to global consciousness and global solutions to what are clearly problems beyond the realm of any single state. A great example of a global environmental problem beyond the control of an individual state is global warming. The only way to combat the climate change associated with greenhouse gas production is a treaty that binds states to a compulsory program of greenhouse gas reduction along with a specific timetable. The Kyoto Treaty was designed to do this, but as often happens with international problems, some countries rejected participation to protect their own economic interests. For example, both Australia and the United States rejected participation in Kyoto out of fear that their economies would be hurt by compulsory targets for greenhouse gases not being applied to developing countries like China and India. It is precisely the global dimension of environmental problems that has led some environmentalists to look to global cooperation (what political scientists call “multilateralism”) between states to move beyond narrow nationalism. The “ecopax” movements demanding peace, ecological consciousness, and human rights clearly emerged after World War II. Their “ancestors” are the conservation movements of the 19th century found in North America and western Europe. The “new politics” that emerged after World War II are hostile to nationalism and to the privileged status of the modern state. This orientation is clear in the antimilitarist, anti-imperial, and antiracist agendas of such movements. There is also a great and consistent commitment to multilateral solutions to complex international problems, which further suggests that this strain of environmental thought is antinationalist. It must be acknowledged, though, that the “new politics” tilt of contemporary ecologism does not imply that environmental issues cannot also be used by reactionary forces of the fascist right and by a variety of nationalists. Andrew Dobson makes a clear distinction between ecologism and environmentalism. In short, ecologism is a holistic perspective that considers important the relations between human beings and nature. Really, we could say that this view erases the cultural border between humans and nature; we are part of nature. This revived self-consciousness is very different from the ethos of environmentalism, which often takes an instrumental view of nature as a resource to be managed like capital. The terminology of environmentalist or green discourse becomes quite laden with political freight. It is tempting to conclude that ecologism is a political project that places nature at the center of human life, whereas environmentalism can be conveniently wedded to almost any political project. Nationalism and environmentalism are most closely joined in two ways. First, nationalists often use biogenetic metaphor to underpin their political demands. In other words, the nation is like a family, all related by ancestry. Second, nationalists will appeal to concerns about natural resources and link them to the overall health and future of the nation. They will contrast their wise and sensitive stewardship of the natural world with the rapaciousness of outsiders. One way that nationalists link biological conservation to the health of the nation is by appealing to concerns about cultural submergence. As with concern N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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over biodiversity, nationalists may point to threats to cultural diversity and raise alarms about the precarious state of the culture of the nation. There is considerable weight to this concern with some national groups. If language is one of the best distinguishing features of a nation, then concern with linguistic diversity becomes very important for nationalists. This is obvious with the minority nationalism of western Europe. The Basques and the Welsh nationalists are just two of the many minority nationalisms that use concerns about cultural survival in their political discourse. Diversity is a core value for environmentalists and for many nationalists. The Basques speak a language unlike any other on Earth, and this gives Basque nationalism an obvious ethnic character. Less obvious is a formal political effort to firmly link Basque national discourse to environmentalism. One does find this with Wales’ nationalist party, Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru is a party dedicated to both the preservation of Welsh culture and of the local and global environment. Plaid Cymru was founded in 1925 by cultural elites (poets, academics, etc.) who feared that the Welsh language was being threatened with extinction. This relatively narrow focus broadened after World War II when the party adopted a pacificist position and embraced a “new left” politics. The party thus made efforts to interact with the local (and urban) peace and ecology movements that flowered in the 1950s and 1960s. The trend toward the adoption of pacifism, environmentalism, and anti-imperialism remains today, along with a commitment to internal Welsh diversity (welcoming immigrants and the descendants of English and other settlers) and decentralization within the European Union. The party’s symbol, the Triban (“three mountains”), is composed of three peaks representing the mountains of central Wales. The symbol fuses the natural and the political but in doing so manages to avoid an essentialist conception of Welshness. This is interesting because environmental themes are flexible enough to link to almost any political agenda. A territorially based nationalism is much less arbitrary than an ethnic one, as residency becomes the primary criterion for membership in the political community. The environment and nationalism come together clearly in pro-natalist (childbirth encouraging) policies, too. Nationalism might be preoccupied with maintaining population that in turn can serve as a pressure on the natural environment. Nationalists may also use the vocabulary of nature conservation when considering their nation’s birthrate. Pro-natalist policies are ones that encourage higher fertility rates via economic or other incentives. In the Stalin era, Soviet women were provided economic incentives to have more children, and medals were awarded to “Heroine Mothers” who had 10 children or more. In postwar Europe, pro-natalist policies have been tried and debated as Europe (and other developed societies) has experienced a decline in birthrates with greater economic growth and individual autonomy. Nationalists are often concerned with diversity, and this concern is certainly justified. The 20th century witnessed mass language extinction. There are 6,000 languages on Earth today, but many are being threatened by the forces of globalN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ization, local assimilation, and marginalization. The majority of languages that are threatened are in regions where modern states were imposed from abroad and the official language is often that of the old colonial power. This is particularly evident in the Western Hemisphere and the South Pacific. Without the platform of a state to preserve the language (many of these are oral languages), the language’s fate mirrors the fate of traditional lifestyles and older generations. Coupled with aggressive assimilative pressures, no more than 200 of the world’s languages can be assumed to be safe from extinction in the coming century. Languages under threat heightens awareness of diversity, and nations with such minorities can become ready allies of environmentalists. This is particularly true in the Western Hemisphere where native languages are threatened alongside natural and native habitats. It is impossible not to see the connection, for example, between the fate of Inuit communities and the global warming that will alter the lifestyles of these societies more, perhaps, than any other groups. In the South Pacific, entire societies will have to be uprooted in anticipation of the submergence of islands such as Tuvalu in the 21st century. As minority nationals are threatened by the environmentally damaging consequences of the activities of outsiders, we can readily see how nationalism will be underpinned or grafted onto concerns about the environment.

Origins Environmentalism has been explicitly linked with nationalism in a variety of contexts. In other cases the connection is subtle and only a component of a broader nationalist discourse. The concept of bioregionalism is one that has a clear connection to nationalism. Kirkpatrick Sale identifies four key elements of bioregionalism: community, self-reliance, knowing the land, and learning and transmitting the lore of the land. These elements can help support a conception of nationalism. Community implies the identification of a group sharing a sense of a shared past and future. The link between group solidarity and environmental health is clear, and groups may be particularly zealous about protecting their local environment when its health is linked to group survival. Self-reliance resembles the Greek term autarky, where nations strive for autonomy from outsiders. True autarchy is impossible in the modern world of political, economic, and cultural integration, but its appeal for nationalists is understandable. Knowing the land is also key to group identity, and one sees knowledge of place as a key component to the identity of groups, particularly indigenous communities. The final principle of bioregionalism is an obvious component of group identity maintenance. The content of the stories and lore of a community help build intergenerational identity and solidarity. All four elements may enhance the receptiveness of a community to a nationalist discourse. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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In societies where there is no core ethnic group, territory and nature may serve as an innocuous and inoffensive basis of unity. In Canada, where there are three “founding nations” (Québécois, Anglo-Saxons, and indigenous people), national myths have the potential to be divisive and controversial. The best option for nation-builders is to focus on the myths of settlement, the invigorating properties of the northern wilderness, and the exploitation of abundant resources. The theme of settlement and triumph over natural adversity is found in Canadian national myth, literature, and culture. The wilderness distinguishes Canada from its European roots and serves as an object of unity. This hasn’t prevented the emergence of a strong nationalist movement in Québec, or a similar revival of indigenous culture and demands for recognition and autonomy, but it does provide a thread of commonality that all Canadians can share regardless of their origins. One might apply the same argument to Australia, another settler society with similar divisions between settlers and indigenous people, and after World War II, between Anglo-Celtic and European and non-European immigrants. In another context, Israel, a settler ethos was coupled with a mission. Zionists (Israeli nationalists) sought a “restorative” project that would restore the fertile, pristine Zion (Israel) with the return of the “chosen people.” This may, in fact, be one of the most intensely connected instances of environmental nationalism, where territory and stewardship are linked fundamentally to the health of the nation and the fulfillment of national/spiritual destiny. Nationalism is often thought to be a European phenomenon like the modern state. Still, the novelty of nationalism in most of the world does not make people less receptive to its call. Nationalism is a means to mobilize and inculcate group loyalty, and so we should not underestimate nationalism’s importance as a political force. Its key strength lies in its flexible character. Nationalists are able to harness the power of preexisting sources of identity and merge them with a political project. Thus we have the veneer of the new Soviet person after 1917, but in reality, this identity was supported by a clear connection with Russian identity and language. The malleability of nationalism makes it convenient for leaders and political entrepreneurs but makes it frustrating for scholars seeking clear, universally applicable definitions. In fact, nature can be prominently featured in the discourse of nationalist movements, with context being the determining factor in whether a nationalist movement is “reactionary” or “progressive.” Andrew Dobson introduces a helpful distinction between environmentalism, which is concerned with the management of human impacts on the planet, and ecologism, which is concerned more deeply with our relationship to nature. The second term implies an ideological outlook; the first, a technocratic one. Environmentalists wish to protect, but this commitment to conservation might be human-centered and concerned with resource management; ecologism, on the other hand, implies treating nature as an end in itself, that is, that nature ought to be preserved and protected regardless of human commercial interests. But both can potentially be wed to some kind of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nationalist discourse. The best example of a nationalism that is consistent with ecologism is that of Plaid Cymru. The policy of Plaid Cymru is so similar to that of the British Green Party that electoral alliances were struck in the early 1990s. There are differences, to be sure, but if contemporary green parties value human rights, pacifism, decentralization, nuclear disarmament, equality, and deep democracy, then they find a ready ally in Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru is a great example of a civic nationalist political party. It is nationalist because it is, literally, the “Party of Wales.” Plaid Cymru seeks to achieve autonomy for Wales in a reconfigured federal European Union. It has long been committed to nuclear disarmament. Plaid Cymru critiques the democratic deficit in the United Kingdom, where permanent minorities like the Welsh are unable to fully achieve their potential and the society they want because of the centralization of the British state. Th ere is a desire to humanize politics by localizing decision making as much as possible. The term subsidiarity is a central concept in Plaid Cymru thought. Subsidiarity is the principle that decision making ought to be made at the lowest possible level except where impractical. This view is in keeping with the ecologist commitment to local democracy and global cooperation in the form of multilateralism. Plaid Cymru seeks a federal Europe of regions in which the smallest jurisdictions exercise power, leaving residual power to the supranational level. An obvious example would be the strategy to address global warming, a problem beyond any single jurisdiction’s reach. The close of World War II ended the prospects of fascism as a model of societal organization and served to discredit one version of nationalism. The two systems that remained enjoyed considerable legitimacy and were buttressed by varying sorts of nationalism. The command economies of the nominally Marxist states provided equality and collective advancement and modernization. Th ese systems also enjoyed the affection generated by military victory. However, the revolutionary project of Marxism-Leninism was reduced mainly to rhetoric and tepid support for like regimes in the developing world. The dominant ethos of the Marxist world was rationality and collective advance via strong states. In environmental terms, these states were not very different from their counterparts in the liberal capitalist world. Resource exploitation and industrial development were seen as the means to leap ahead and modernize. Like in the West, this commitment to growth carried an environmental price. In the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact countries, environmental crisis emerged slowly with a general crisis of legitimacy. States that had derived legitimacy from military victory, economic growth, and individual welfare found themselves confronted with the environmental consequences of industrial society. The linkage to nationalism was most clearly seen in the periphery of the Soviet Union where local populations, already tentative in their allegiance to the state, began to link environmental problems with the dominance of Moscow. Of course, nationalism was already being fueled by fears of cultural submergence, the absence of democracy, and outright oppression of religion and language, but environmental N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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crisis should not be overlooked as a factor in the renaissance of minority nationalism in the Soviet Union. Even before Chernobyl, ecological problems related to pollution and resource depletion encouraged local politicians to blame the center for local problems, and these complaints could then be linked to a general nationalist demand for autonomy. The decline of the Aral Sea in central Asia is a testament to the folly of authoritarian centralization. Karakalpakistan, Uzbekistan’s shoreline on the Aral Sea, has long been in epidemiological crisis, which mirrors the decline of the vast inland sea. Hanks has linked the eco-catastrophe to nationalism in central Asia, as specific ethnic groups encountered health problems, such as disproportionate rates of anemia and cancer. The deplorable environmental practices fueled anger at the abuses of the Soviet system and provided nationalists with arguments for local management of the environment. The Karakalpaks have been disproportionately hurt by the Aral’s problems, caused primarily by huge diversions of water from the Amu Dyra and Syr Dyra rivers to the cotton fields of the Uzbek republic. The mega projects of the Soviet Union undoubtedly aided development and raised living standards, but the capacity of nature to absorb such changes was exceeded, and a witch’s brew of environmental problems has accompanied the shrinking Aral Sea. The sea was greatly reduced in volume and area over the decades, and what remains is hypersalinated, heavily polluted with pesticides, and depleted of fish. Complicating matters since the dissolution of the Soviet Union have been the emergence of two sovereign states (Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) sharing the Aral Sea and the prospect of regional disputes over the primary rivers feeding the sea. One fascinating linkage between environmentalism and nationalism can be observed in the discourse and political thought of the European far right, especially the German far right. Of course, Nazism was the flip side of Marxism-Leninism with its commitment to rational planning, transnational solidarity and equality, and narrative of mastery over nature. Nazism—as distinct from other European fascist movements—was peculiar in its celebration of nature, its observance of ancient Teutonic religious tradition, and its dedication to a sinister, quasi-Darwinist view of the world involving competition and outright conflict between “races.” Moreover, the Nazis demonized enemy ethnic groups with the use of medical terminology—referring to Jews, for example, as parasites and worse. Employing a kind of ideological forensic examination, one can see the origins of far-right German eco-nationalism in the Romanticism of early periods. German nationalist intellectuals appealed to the romantic instincts of their compatriots against the tide of modernization and democratization that surfaced in 19th-century Europe. Because Germany was a relatively young nation-state, it was the site of competing national narratives. The environmentally flavored fascism of the Nazi period was preceded by movements to protect nature and encourage the young to engage in outdoor sports and leisure activities. Although considerably discredited, a strain of this romantic fascism remains in small parties of the right that have clung to life in postwar Germany. Janet Biehl (1993) disN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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cusses the “New” German right and the continuity that is evident with previous manifestations of eco-nationalism. This movement is romantic in that it idealizes a mythical and pure past. It is critical of the metanarratives of monotheism, Marxism, liberal democracy, and capitalism. The Heimat (“homeland”) is vital to the health of the nation and must be protected just as vulnerable ecosystems are. The ideas advanced by these fringe parties of the German far right are a witch’s brew of xenophobia, cultural protectionism, and concerns for the natural world, all infused with a mystical reverence for nature often thought the monopoly of the ecologist greens. Nationalism has been described as “protean,” after the shape-shifting god of Greek mythology. This description nicely captures the nature of nationalism, with its malleable and ideologically promiscuous character. Linked to an ethnic, reactionary, or Marxist project, nationalism serves as a useful complement, especially with its ability to harness the romantic, the irrational, and the passions so important for group mobilization. Much to the dismay of ecologists, nature is not their exclusive issue.

Dimensions It is particularly important not to conflate the “progressive” notion of ecologism with a broader link between nature or the environment and nationalism. What we can assume is that the environment can serve as a powerful means of bonding a group together. It is unlikely that the environment will be the sole binding factor; instead, its relative contribution to group identity will vary according to context. Historically, nationalists have employed biogenetic metaphor to communicate a myth of national descent. This was a powerful feature of early German nationalism, and contemporary movements of the far right often appeal to their audience with a mixture of environmentally informed concerns about population decline, “foreigners,” and competition from other ethnic groups. I. H. Burnley (2003) detects a strain of nativism in Australia linked to ecology. Nativism is a political reaction to immigration in which newcomers to a society are painted as invaders who should be kept out. This new nativism has been manifested in calls for a reduced immigration flow to Australia, a country that only recently (1970) eliminated a ban on non-European immigration. There is a nationalist element in calls for a sustainable Australia unburdened by immigration-led population growth. The fear of observers is that such concerns with the environment are merely a mask for resurgent nativist nationalism. The more problematic impact of the linkage between environmentalism and nationalism is likely to be the use of nationalist rhetoric in competing claims over scarce natural resources. Within existing states, this conflict may emerge when indigenous (“original”) people make claims over resources claimed by the state in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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which they reside. An example would be disputes over logging rights, as have occurred all over the world, especially in sensitive tropical rainforests. In Clayquot Sound on Vancouver Island in Canada, native land claims and the concerns of environmentalists were linked to a protest that prevented logging in the area in 1993. Similarly, linkages have been forged in places like Malaysia, where a minority is threatened by logging in its home territory. The Penan people of Malaysian Borneo are a great example of what happens when environmental conflict raises the profile of ethnic identity in response to threat. For indigenous people around the world, the combination of delicate social bonds, minority status, and fragile environments add to the stakes in contests over development and scarce resources. For indigenous people tied to the land, the connection between identity and environment is clear. One cannot be meaningfully Penan without the physical underpinnings of that society; its social rhythms, food, stories, and religious beliefs are all linked to a particular place and the rhythms of its ecology. With the prospect of worsening environmental conditions, it seems inevitable that conflict over natural resources will take on a nationalist flavor. This adds another dimension to nationalist politics by providing another opportunity to mobilize people based on their real or perceived links to nature. This dimension will be particularly important if the link is made between national survival and access to resources. One could imagine such conflicts becoming more emotionally potent and volatile when resource use is linked to ancient claims and fears of national survival.

Consequences One of the most important connections between nationalism and environmentalism is the proprietary struggle over natural resources that characterizes relations between states in the international system. One of the most obvious sources of conflict is over water. In watersheds like the Tigris-Euphrates, the Nile, and the Jordan, states are experiencing ever-increasing demands for the finite water supplies. This need is intertwined with nationalist discourse because water is the lynchpin of development in the newly developing countries. In the case of the Turkey, the Atatürk dam is a potent symbol of Turkey’s determination to develop a strong economy and enter the European Union. The dam will provide the hydroelectricity needed to develop the relatively poor eastern half of the country and is a critical part of Turkey’s development strategy. Of course, the dam is built on a river that feeds the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and therefore a crucial resource for southern neighbors Syria and Iraq. Turkish sources comprise 88 percent of the volume of the Euphrates River and 50 percent of the Tigris. This gives Turkey a potent potential bargaining chip in its dealings with its neighbors. Both Syria and Iraq are completely dependent on these rivers for their water needs, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Construction of the Atatürk Dam in Sanliurfa, Turkey, in 1990. Named for Mustafa Kemal, known as Atatürk (“father of the Turks”), the controversial dam was designed to harness the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which has resulted in less water for Syria and Iraq downstream. (AP/Wide World Photos)

and existing tensions among these nations are exacerbated by the merging of national security and national identity. Turkish fears of Kurdish separatism in Turkey are underpinned by the fact that the Kurds inhabit this watershed. All three states are growing in population, and there is great demand for water for industrial and agricultural purposes. Similar simmering problems exist between Israel and its neighbors over the Jordan River and between India and Pakistan over the Indus River’s Kashmiri watershed. In each case, scarcity of a basic resource with inelastic demand is straining relations already tense due to prior disputes. It is impossible for water not to become politicized in these disputes, and this can take on a nationalist hue. Water and its use are inextricably intertwined with national pride and territorial disputes. This is particularly true in the smallest of the above-mentioned watersheds, the Jordan. Disputes over scarce resources are not specific to the developing world. There have been important disputes over fishing that have taken a decidedly nationalistic tone over the years. In 1975 Iceland and the United Kingdom experienced a high-profile dispute over fishing stocks in the North Atlantic. Such disputes invariably encourage displays of nationalist bombast by politicians. With unprecedented levels of resource exploitation after World War II, we have seen the “nationalizing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of scarcity” as states employ history, myth, and the law to assert protectionist stances over what remains of natural resources. To some extent, this was the case with whaling when, after the collapse of that industry, some states persisted in fishing after the global regulatory body (the International Whaling Commission) declared a moratorium on hunting whales. States like Japan and Norway linked whaling to national culture and sovereignty and, in doing so, could arouse public support for what was in fact a relatively minor economic activity. The proprietary ethos of the era of state sovereignty ensures that disputes over natural resources will have a nationalist element in the decades to come. Nationalism is a very flexible and open-ended political agenda. At its base it is concerned with the fate of a particular national group. Beyond this, nationalists link their project to other ideological programs like socialism or fascism. In an era of environmental degradation and resource depletion, it is easy to see how conflicts over resources might take on a nationalist flavor. Politicians eager to mobilize public support might appeal to already strong nationalistic feelings by linking the future of the nation to the protection and ownership of a resource. Often, states seek to conquer nature and in doing so extend the territory and sovereignty of their nation. This process can also help shape national identity. The emergence of global environmental problems such as climate change underline the contrast between post-national political programs that seek interstate cooperation and the ongoing politics of nationalism, national interest, and state sovereignty that can hinder state cooperation for mutual interest. Selected Bibliography Biehl, Janet. 1993. “ ‘Ecology’ and the Modernization of Fascism in the German Ultra-right.” Society and Nature 2:130–170. Burnley, I. H. 2003. “Population and Environment in Australia: Issues in the Next Half Century.” Australian Geographer 34 (November): 267–280. De-Shalit, Avner. 1995. “From the Political to the Objective: The Dialectics of Zionism and the Environment.” Environmental Politics 4 (Spring): 70–87. Dobson, Andrew. 1990. Green Political Thought: An Introduction. London: Unwin Hyman. Filho, João R. Martins, and Daniel Zirker. 2000. “Nationalism, National Security, and Amazonia: Military Perceptions and Attitudes in Contemporary Brazil.” Armed Forces and Society 27:105–129. Freeden, Michael. 1998. “Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology?” Political Studies 46:748–765. Hamilton, Paul. 2002. “The Greening of Nationalism: Nationalising Nature in Europe.” Environmental Politics 11 (Summer): 27–48. Hanks, Reuel R. 2000. “A Separate Space? Karakalpak Nationalism and Devolution in PostSoviet Uzbekistan.” Europe-Asia Studies 52 (July): 939–953. Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. 1999. Environment, Scarcity and Violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Johannesson, Ingolfur Asgeir. 2005. “Icelandic Nationalism and the Kyoto Protocol: An Analysis of the Discourse on Global Environmental Change in Iceland.” Environmental Politics 14 (August): 459–509.


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Klare, Michael. 2001. Resource Wars. New York: Owl Books. Lynch, Peter. 1995. “From Red to Green: The Political Strategy of Plaid Cymru in the 1980s and 1990s.” Regional and Federal Studies 5: 197–210. Podoba, Juraj. 1998. “Rejecting Green Velvet: Transition, Environment and Nationalism in Slovakia.” Environmental Politics 7: 129–144. Pritchard, Sara B. 2004. “Reconstructing the Rhône: The Cultural Politics of Nature and Nation in Contemporary France, 1945–1997.” French Historical Studies 27 (Fall): 765–799. Sale, Kirkpatrick. 1991. Dwellers in the Land: The Bioregional Vision. Philadelphia: New Society Publishers.


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Ethnic Conflict and Nationalism Berch Berberoglu Relevance Nationalism, which historically emerged with the rise of the nation-state, has during the course of the 19th and 20th centuries become a potent force that has dominated the political landscape across the globe for over two centuries. During the 20th century, several major factors have given rise to nationalism and ethno-national conflict around the world. First is the dispossession of a people through colonial and imperial domination, occupation, and carving out of their historic homeland, reducing them to a subject population, as in the case of Western colonial domination and enslavement of the African people through the slave trade. Later, the peoples of the Americas, Asia, and the Middle East came under similar forms of domination and rule, culminating in the occupation and partition of various territories through a series of mandates, as in the partition of the Ottoman Empire by the Western powers and the dispersion of its native populations, which led to the current predicament of the Palestinian and Kurdish peoples. Second is the denial of the right to national self-determination to peoples dominated by the imperial state in the advanced capitalist countries. These include the domination of Northern Ireland by Great Britain, of Puerto Rico by the United States, of the Basque country by Spain, and of Quebec by the Canadian state, among others. A related situation within the advanced capitalist countries involves the oppression of immigrants and ethnic and racial minorities, such as Native Americans, African Americans, and Mexican Americans in the United States, and Algerians, East Indians, Arabs, Turks, and others in France, Britain, Germany, and other advanced capitalist countries in Europe and elsewhere. Third, and more recently in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the past decade and a half, we have seen the rise of nationalism and national movements in these regions. Here, the nationalist forces have an opportunity to capture state power through ethnonational mobilization by targeting an increasingly ineffective and weakened socialist state that came under pressure during the Cold War years. As in the case of the former Yugoslavia, the rise of nationalism and ethno-national conflict has led to ethnic strife and civil war across Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics. We will take up each of these cases briefly and highlight the dynamics that affect the nature and forms of national identity and expression, which then culminate in ethno-national conflicts that have fostered the emergence and development of social movements for national self-determination. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ETHNIC CONFLICT AND NATIONALISM

Origins and Dimensions Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the Third World Historically, the Spanish, Portuguese, French, Dutch, British, and, later, U.S. imperial powers confronted indigenous peoples and cultures around the world that more and more came under the control and influence of the dominant Western powers and were suppressed and denied their national identity, autonomy, and self-determination. Spanish expansion to the New World was characterized by the plunder of the newly acquired colonies. As the Indian population declined, Spain accelerated its acquisition of new territory, and it became necessary to secure Indian labor to work the land. The Spanish conquerors destroyed native irrigation systems, incorporated native land into Spanish estates, and forced the evacuation of Indians from their land. In Brazil, an insufficient number of Indians necessitated the importation of slaves from Africa. Feudal Portugal thus set up slavery as the dominant mode of production in its Brazilian colony to facilitate the extraction of precious metals and other raw materials for sale on the world market. Slaves were used first in sugarcane fields and later in mining gold and diamonds. In the Caribbean and along the Atlantic coast of North America, a similar pattern was established. Black slaves from Africa worked the sugar and cotton plantations, while the Native Americans of these areas were displaced or physically eliminated, thus transforming local social structures. In these regions, the British colonialists became the dominant force. Large areas of Asia were colonized by Western powers until the middle of the 20th century. British and European colonists mercilessly plundered these regions at the height of their empires. Through their presence in the region, they effected major changes in the social and economic structures of the societies they came to dominate. Britain assumed political sovereignty in India late in the 18th century. As trade with Britain increased and the demand for Indian goods grew, local capital expanded into crafts, textiles, and industrial production. This expansion of local manufacturing industry and with it the development of national industrial capital came to be seen as competition with British interests, prompting Britain to take steps to crush Indian industry and turn India into an appendage of its colonial economy. Antagonism between the British and local industrial capital led to the alliance of national capital with the peasantry to throw off the British yoke through the independence movement. Much as in North America, but unlike the situation in Latin America, the nationalist forces were able to consolidate power, and the leadership of the movement led them to a victory over the British. By the late 1940s, they had installed a state committed to the development of local capitalism in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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India following independence. Given the relatively weak position of national capital, the victorious nationalist forces were able to utilize the powers of the state and establish a state-capitalist regime to assist in the accumulation of capital in India through state aid. Although not formally colonized, China, too, came under the influence and control of the West as traditional forms of exploitation were reinforced through the link to Europe and other centers of Western power. The Western powers intervened in China and attempted to incorporate it into the world economy at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries. A protracted struggle against the Western powers followed and ushered in a period of intense nationalism that paved the way for the nationalist forces to capture state power by the early 20th century. In Africa, the European colonial powers imposed slavery and spread the slave trade throughout the continent in the 16th century. Slaves became Africa’s major export, as they were sold to masters in various parts of the world, especially in the Americas. During this period, the African economy became highly dependent on the European colonial economy tied to the slave trade. Until the middle of the 20th century, when most African countries won their formal independence, the local economies were a direct appendage of the colonial center, which directed development in the colonies. The pattern was based on a system of production that dominated the economies of the center states and evolved according to its needs of accumulation, resulting in uneven development between the colonial and imperial center and the colonies, and within the colonies. This classic colonial relationship prevailed in a number of African countries after the granting of formal independence and led to the restructuring of socioeconomic relations on a neocolonial basis. Elsewhere in Africa, nationalist forces have taken the initiative to lead the newly independent states along a less dependent path. Utilizing the military and state bureaucracy as supportive institutions to carry out their development programs, middle-class bureaucratic leaders in these countries have opted for a state-capitalist path that has corresponded well with their vision of society and socioeconomic development. Nasser in Egypt, Boumediene in Algeria, Kaunda in Zambia, and Nyerere in Tanzania could be cited as prime examples of nationalist leaders in charge of postcolonial states developing along the statecapitalist path. Historically, the presence of a racist apartheid regime in South Africa has been a great impediment to the development of revolutionary forces in the southern cone of Africa and has had a major impact on the scope and pace of development on the continent in a progressive direction. With the official abolition of the apartheid regime in South Africa in the 1990s, however, the last vestiges of racist colonial and neocolonial oppression were removed so that an open political struggle could be waged by the masses to take control of their destiny and build a new society free of the oppression and exploitation they have suffered for so long. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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In the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire was the major political force until the beginning of the 20th century. After centuries of expansion and conquest, the Ottoman state began to lose ground to rival powers in Europe during the 18th and 19th centuries and became vulnerable to pressures from the West. European powers, taking advantage of the endless wars in the empire’s various provinces, found their way in through direct economic controls and military occupation of large parts of Ottoman territory, which culminated in the occupation of virtually every corner of the empire during World War I. Following the collapse of the empire at the end of the war, Britain, France, Italy, and other European powers colonized its territories and remained in control of its various provinces for several decades. From the Persian Gulf to Palestine, to the Suez Canal, down to the Arabian Peninsula and across North Africa, the Ottoman territories came under the jurisdiction primarily of Britain and France, who divided up these lands to secure trade routes, raw materials, and new markets for the expanding, European-controlled world economy. The Palestinian and Kurdish national questions—two classic cases of ethno-national oppression—are a product of this Western division and occupation of the Middle East. The partition of Palestine and Kurdistan, as well as the rest of the Middle East that came under British and French rule, effectively dispersed or divided these two peoples from their historic homelands. Moreover, it subjected them to the whims of newly emergent postcolonial states that came to power in the aftermath of World War I or following the British and French mandates: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Israel. All were created under treaties that parceled out occupied Ottoman lands among the Western powers that came to rule over the peoples of the Middle East, including the Palestinians and the Kurds. The Palestinians came under the jurisdiction of the British, and the Kurds under the jurisdiction of the French and the British in what later became Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Turkey. The Turkish territories fell to the new Turkish nationalist government, which was able to control the Anatolian portion of the Ottoman Empire and succeeded in salvaging its core into an independent republic. The masses in some Arab territories under French and British control were able to rise up and throw off colonial and imperial rule and declare their independence. In Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, the Kurds came under newly independent states in which they became minorities. Palestine came under the control of Israel, which emerged as an independent state at the end of the British occupation of this old Ottoman territory. Subsequently, many Palestinians were either forced to disperse to neighboring Arab states, becoming a minority immigrant population that constituted the Palestinian diaspora, or remain in Israel as a secondclass minority population under repressive rule of the Israeli state. Today, it is in these independent Middle Eastern states that the Palestinians and the Kurds have been facing the most brutal oppression and are in turn fighting for their national liberation. Because of these two historic events (that is, the division of their homeland by the Western powers and the denial of their rights as minorities in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Palestinian nationalists demonstrate in Ramallah, West Bank, under an Arafat banner in 2002. (Ricki Rosen/Corbis)

the new states in which they now reside), the Palestinians and the Kurds came to face their predicament as oppressed national groups who lack a national homeland and a national state. The parallels between the Palestinian and Kurdish national struggles over the course of the 20th century highlight the similarities in the experience of two ethnic and national communities that have been victims of displacement and dispersion under the rule of dominant political forces. These experiences led to the development of a national identity and national movement that became the expression of the communal will of the respective communities struggling to be free. The Palestinian and Kurdish national movements thus emerged in direct response to the forces that kept them down and relegated them to outright subjugation in states hostile to their struggle for national autonomy. The national movements of both the Palestinian and the Kurdish peoples thus came to represent their aspirations for nationhood and free development of their language, culture, and very being in a setting that promoted all that they stood for as a people. Internal divisions that arose along class and ideological lines were at once a divisive and a unifying expression of maturing movements that focused on the social and political forces that would lead their people to victory in the next phase of the national struggle. However, these efforts to forge unity among various sectors of the Palestinian and Kurdish peoples do not resolve the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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complicated situation regarding the class character of the national movement and its leadership, nor the class nature of the movement’s agenda to establish its sovereignty and the type of state and society it strives to establish after achieving independence. As in other spheres of social life, then, the Palestinian and Kurdish national movements and struggle for national liberation are not immune to the class forces and class dynamics that govern social life. Elsewhere, in my book Turmoil in the Middle East, I provide a further analysis of the origins and development of the Palestinian and Kurdish national movements and examine the dynamics and contradictions of this process at greater length. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the Advanced Capitalist Countries In the advanced capitalist countries, the national question and ethno-national conflict have continued to be central components of racial and ethnic relations for centuries. The slave trade that accompanied the looting and enslavement of Africa by the Western colonial powers transported entire populations of diverse ethnic origin across the oceans to exploit their labor in the vast plantations and mines of the colonies. Africans, Native Americans, and indigenous populations across the world came under this global assault of the colonizers as the latter engaged in the plunder of native lands and the exploitation and oppression of natives in distant outposts, which served to further the economic expansion of the colonial and imperial centers. Thus, a dual process of domination of racial and ethnic minorities began to unfold as the lands and peoples of the conquered territories (as in the case of the Americas) came under colonial control, while other groups were brought in from distant colonial outposts to the imperial heartland to generate wealth through the use of slave labor. The North American Indians became subjugated by the white European colonists, as the indigenous populations of North and South America came under the direct control of the British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and other European colonial powers. During this period, new colonial empires were built on the backs of the exploited and oppressed peoples of the continent, and millions of natives perished through a combination of factors that together resulted in genocide of unprecedented proportions, leading to an enormous decline in native populations throughout the Americas. The conquered Native American populations, north and south, were supplanted by a steady flow of African slaves brought in to labor in the mines and fields across the U.S. South and the Caribbean basin. These peoples in time became part of the local population, albeit as second-class citizens who were counted as three-fifths of their white colonial counterparts. Together, the Native American and black African American peoples came to constitute the basis of the early minority population in North America. Elsewhere in the rest of the continent, a varied combination of mestizo, mulatto, and native populations came under severe discrimination over the course of centuries of exploitation and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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oppression under colonial and imperial rule, first by foreign and later by local ruling classes of European origin. Later, during the Spanish occupation of North America and following the Mexican-American War of the mid-19th century, the United States inherited a Mexican population of native-born Chicanos and Mexican immigrants who came to constitute another major ethnic group in the new nation-state. Hence, the Native American, African American, and Mexican (or Hispanic) American populations form the three main minority populations of the United States. Notwithstanding the steady flow of immigrants from various European, Asian, and other countries who came to America in the 19th and the turn of the 20th centuries, adding to the diversity of the U.S. population, these three major racial/ethnic groups came to define the nature of race and ethnic relations in the United States over the course of the 20th century. While the struggles of colonized peoples like Native Americans, Puerto Ricans, Hawaiians, and others under the U.S. yoke raise the issue of defining the nation, racist oppression and reduction to powerlessness as second-class citizens result in tensions surrounding race and ethnic relations that are a part of domestic, national life within established nation-states such as the United States. The racial/ethno-national conflict that defines the parameters of both the national question and domestic race/ethnic relations confronting the advanced capitalist countries are not restricted to the United States alone. They are, in fact, the creation of the major European colonial and imperial powers like Britain, France, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and others who are responsible for colonial plunder and occupation of distant native lands. The problems that these powers face with their own racial/ethnic minority populations at home, who were either forcefully brought in from the colonies to supplant local labor or have (through their economic, political, cultural, and educational links with the colonies) immigrated to the colonial/imperial centers, stem from the legacy of colonialism. Thus, East Indians, Africans, Middle Easterners, Caribbean islanders, and others in Britain; Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans, and other African and Middle Eastern immigrants in France; and a variety of other peoples from the ex-colonies of Spain, Portugal, Italy, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and other European powers who carved out Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas, all represent the historic end result of colonial and imperial domination that has created this dual problem of the national question, on the one hand, and domestic racial/ethnic oppression, on the other. While the oppression of ethnic minorities in the advanced capitalist centers continues to be the main source of racial/ethnic tensions at home, the occupation of ethno-national territory by the chief imperialist states, such as the British occupation of Northern Ireland, the U.S. occupation of Puerto Rico, Israeli occupation of Palestine, and the domination of the Basques in Spain and the Québécois in Canada, continues to foster struggles for national liberation.


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Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union Transformations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union during the 1990s fueled the upsurge in national rivalries and led to ethnic conflict and civil war. The rise of nationalism and nationalist movements in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism during the past decade and a half came about when right-wing nationalist forces in these countries found the opportunity to capture state power through ethno-national mobilization directed against the weakened socialist states, which had been under constant assault by the West during the Cold War years of Western expansion. Under socialism, the multitude of nationalities and ethnic groups in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union lived together in peace and progressed within the context of a cooperative social environment in which minority culture and values were protected. The customs, traditions, languages, and ways of life of these groups were promoted within the boundaries of socialism and the social life that brought together these diverse nationalities under one roof, cultivating cooperation and diffusing conflict as part of the progress toward an egalitarian social order. With the collapse of socialism and communist rule in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, these former socialist states have been in turmoil and embroiled in violent ethno-national conflict and civil war that has been tearing down their societies. The most violent and bloody of these conflicts have occurred in traditionally peaceful regions of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (namely, Yugoslavia and the Transcaucasian republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan). Why? Why have formerly peaceful regions that lived in harmony for years suddenly erupted in flames and brought wars and destruction and despair? What social forces are responsible for this predicament, and for what results? How and why have these forces succeeded in imposing their rule on society and unleashing a reign of terror over the people to maintain their dominance and to prolong their rule? The social forces that stand to benefit from the recent developments in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have been able to mobilize a considerable amount of support in the wake of the problems created by the post-Soviet transition to a private market-oriented economy. Such mobilization has served a dual purpose: to protect the interests of a newly privileged dominant class and to channel the discontent of the general population in a right-wing, ultranationalist direction that can be controlled and regulated. At the same time, the economic crises that these countries have been facing in this period of transition have led to enormous material deprivation of broad segments of the population, the primary factor for the emergence of ultranationalist movements. Mindful of the declining living standards of the general population, while enriching themselves through legal and illegal means (especially through government corruption), the newly emergent dominant groups have promoted right-wing nationalist activity


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to fan the flames of ethnic strife as a means of social control. But behind the ethno-national conflicts fostered by these forces, it is increasingly becoming evident that they are deeply rooted in socioeconomic relations that are at base political in nature—that is, struggles for political power. Looking at the situation in Yugoslavia, one is struck by the fact that this once peaceful multiethnic and multinational society of diverse cultures and religions was forced into senseless conflict, hatred, and civil war. The Western forces (the United States through NATO) that pushed Yugoslavia into civil war and subsequently caused its destruction wanted Yugoslavia to be dismembered, broken up, and turned into a series of weak dependent states—dependent on the West. The partition of Yugoslavia and the dismemberment of its constituent parts into small independent states served rival capitalist interests in the Balkans and led to an all-out war against the last remaining territory of the former Yugoslav state (Serbia) following the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and BosniaHerzegovina. If one were to examine the Yugoslav case and explore the social forces behind this conflict, one would inevitably draw the following conclusions: (1) the opposition forces fighting the central government were clearly anticommunist; (2) these right-wing reactionary forces used nationalism as a cover to achieve capitalist ends; (3) they were aided by the Western powers to topple the existing socialist state and replace it by a capitalist one; (4) by stirring up entire populations through nationalist propaganda to serve narrow capitalist ends, they were able to pit one segment of the population against another and capture power through the practice of divide and conquer; (5) separatist action and secession from the federation well served the reactionary forces, who wanted to establish their own separate state to exploit the masses for private gain and link their future to the West; (6) the final collapse and disintegration of Yugoslavia came about with the Western intervention in Kosovo and the bombing of Belgrade, forcing the Serbs to surrender; and finally, (7) the Western armies and the internal right-wing opposition cultivated by Western intelligence (as in CIA assistance to the anti-Serbian forces through such criminal organizations as the Kosova Liberation Army, which has been heavily engaged in drug and gun trafficking, prostitution, and sex slavery) were successful in bringing down Milosevic and his regime and thus succeeded in incorporating Yugoslavia into the Western orbit, subjugating the country and its people to Western capital and its internal reactionary agents. Through this process (a process based on intense social conflict), the fate of Yugoslavia was decided in favor of privileged elite interests to the detriment of the masses. The new rulers of Yugoslavia represent the interests of a rising bourgeois elite that has entered the political scene with Western assistance. With the secessionist republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina becoming integrated into the Western orbit, the United States has succeeded in transforming Yugoslavia to serve as a key power broker in the Balkans to advance Western economic and geopolitical interests. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The former Soviet Union likewise went through a similar process of upheaval and ethnic conflict that led to open war in various parts of its vast territories. The war in Chechnya, pitting rebel groups against the Russian army, and separatist violence in Georgia were dwarfed by the all-out war between two former Soviet republics in the Transcaucasian region—Armenia and Azerbaijan. The rapid changes set into motion by the collapse of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s prompted a number of former Soviet republics in the Transcaucasian region and elsewhere to assert themselves in seeking national independence, cultural freedom, and political autonomy. Such political assertion, under the leadership of a series of right-wing nationalist movements, gained these republics their formal political independence in the form of sovereign nation-states. Deep-seated national sentiments throughout the Transcaucasian region, which go back several decades and were kept in check during Soviet times, subsequently led to the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in the territorial dispute over NagornoKarabagh, an Armenian enclave within the boundaries of the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabagh led to much bloodshed and destruction. Ultranationalist forces on both sides fanned the flames of violence to achieve narrow national ends rather than working out a solution to alleviate a situation that did not need to get out of hand and cause so much pain and suffering; instead, they went to war to settle their differences over a piece of territory that cost much in human lives. The intense nature of the conflict between these two newly independent states brought to the surface long-suppressed national aspirations of ethnic identity and self-determination among Armenians and Azeris, which go to the heart of the phenomenon of nationalism. Nationalist movements in this region of the world thus found an opening to give expression to popular national feelings that lie deep in the collective psyche. Ethno-national conflicts, emerging from pent-up popular drives for national identity and self-determination, are thus the outcome of the clash of national interests articulated by organized political forces that are determined to advance their own narrowly defined national agenda. And the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, no less than the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, confirms this particular feature of nationalism and ethno-national strife.

Consequences As the recent experience of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union as well as the Third World and the advanced capitalist countries amply illustrates, nationalism and national movements are often used to advance narrow class interests. Ethno-national conflicts, fostered by age-old hostilities between rival ethnic and national groups have often served to advance the interests of dominant class forces in society. Much like religion, patriotism, and other forms of ideological N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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control and hegemony, nationalism has been used as a tool by powerful social forces to maintain class domination and class rule, hence as a mechanism of social control in favor of the dominant classes. Thus, to develop a better understanding of nationalism and ethno-national conflict in the world today, nationalism must be seen from the vantage point of class and class interests that are rooted in the social structure that defines the parameters of social relations on a national and, ultimately, global level. Selected Bibliography Adam, Jan. 2000. The Social Costs of Transformation in Post-Socialist Countries: The Cases of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. New York: Palgrave. Berberoglu, Berch, ed. 1995. The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and SelfDetermination in the 20th Century. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. Berberoglu, Berch. 1999. Turmoil in the Middle East: Imperialism, War, and Political Instability. Albany: State University of New York Press. Berberoglu, Berch, ed. 2004. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Class, State, and Nation in the Age of Globalization. Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield. Carmichael, Cathie. 2002. Ethnic Cleansing in the Balkans: Nationalism and the Destruction of Tradition. New York: Routledge. Churchill, Ward. 1997. A Little Matter of Genocide: Holocaust and Denial in the Americas, 1492 to the Present. San Francisco: City Lights Books. Farsoun, Samih, and Christina Zacharia. 1997. Palestine and the Palestinians. Boulder, CO: Westview. Gocek, Fatma Muge, ed. 2002. Social Constructions of Nationalism in the Middle East. Albany: State University of New York Press. Goldenberg, Suzanne. 1994. Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder. London: Zed. Kecmanovic, Dusan. 2001. Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia. Westport, CT: Praeger. Marger, Martin N. 2000. Race and Ethnic Relations: American and Global Perspectives. 5th ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Moulder, Frances V. 1977. Japan, China, and the Modern World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Olson, Robert, ed. 1996. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky. Pavkovic, Aleksandar. 2000. The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and War in the Balkans. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Rodney, Walter. 1972. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. London and Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House and Bogle L’Ouverture. Stein, Stanley J., and Barbara H. Stein. 1970. The Colonial Heritage of Latin America. New York: Oxford University Press. Udovicki, Jasminka. 1995. “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the Former Yugoslavia.” In The National Question: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Self-Determination in the 20th Century, edited by B. Berberoglu, 280–314. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.


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Gender, Sexuality, and Nationalism Joane Nagel Relevance Gender and sexuality are building blocks of nations and nationalism. Historically and in most contemporary societies, women and men occupy distinct places in the nation and play different roles in nation-building and governance. Men’s honor and women’s purity are important, though often overlooked, symbols in national ideologies, mobilizations, and conflicts. This chapter examines the intimate intersection of gender, sexuality, and nationalism. We will explore the feminized spaces available to women in the nation, the close connection between ideologies of masculinity and nationalism, and the place of sexuality in shaping national boundaries—in particular, the emphasis on heterosexuality and the condemnation of homosexuality in defining who is and is not a member of the nation. The global system is composed of many new and long-standing nations (peoples) and states (countries) that do not always coincide with one another. Nationalist movements often arise when a national or ethnic group is stateless (e.g., the Palestinians in the Middle East) or when a national group is located in a region of a country from which it seeks independence (e.g., Kashmiris in India or Québécois in Canada). Nationalist movements can be irredentist, where a nation is divided into two or more states and one part seeks to join the other to gain autonomy or independence (e.g., Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey who seek an independent state of Kurdistan or Armenians in Azerbaijan who desire to join territory with Armenia). Nationalist movements also can be secessionist, where a nation seeks independence from a state (e.g., the East Timorese who recently obtained independence from Indonesia or Eritreans who recently obtained independence from Ethiopia). What is important to note, for our purposes here, is that very often these seemingly purely political, economic, cultural, or territorial matters are both gendered and sexualized. Definitions that identify members of the nation (“us”) and exclude nonmembers (“them”) have a moral and sexual dimension that should not be underestimated. Calls to defend the sexual honor of those inside the nation and insults to the sexual purity of those outside the nation are among the strongest “fighting words” that nationalists can speak. The specification of some groups as morally superior and the designation of others as inferior socially, economically, politically, culturally, morally, and sexually are central to nationalism’s mass appeal.


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GENDER, SEXUALITY, AND NATIONALISM

Origins In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson (1983) argues that all nations are embarked on an ongoing journey of self-invention. He notes, for instance, that there is no more evocative a symbol of modern nationalism than the tomb of the unknown soldier. The illustrative power of this icon lies in the fact that the contents of such tombs are unknown, and thus, they are open to interpretation and waiting to be filled. Like tombs of unknown soldiers, “nations” are empty vessels waiting to be filled by the symbolic work of nationalist founders and defenders. In countries around the world today there are arguments over the gender, racial, and sexual contents of national vessels. What is the proper place for women and men, blacks and whites, gays and straights in the nation? Who should vote, who should serve in the military, who should be given a security clearance, who should run for political office? These debates are nationalist discussions about the contours and contents of the national vessel and the places of various gendered, raced, and sexed people in it. Gender has a particularly important place in the nation-building enterprise. All genders are not socially created as equal partners in nation-building. Men and women do not play the same roles on national stages. The idea of the nation and the history of nationalism are intertwined with the idea of manhood and the history of manliness. This is not to say that women do not have roles to play in the making and unmaking of nations and states: as citizens, as members, as activists, as leaders. It is to say that nationalist scripts historically have been written primarily by men, for men, and about men. In these national dramas, women have been relegated to mainly supporting roles—as mothers of the nation, as vessels for reproducing the nation, as teachers passing the national culture to new members, and as national housekeepers maintaining home and hearth for the nation’s men who are out and about on important official business. Men’s national business historically has been to fight wars, defend homelands, represent the nation abroad, and run the government. The prominent role of men in the nation reflects a model of masculinity that closely fits the ideology of nationalism—concepts like patriotism, bravery, and duty are hard to distinguish as being masculine values or nationalist values. While we often think of such values as “natural” characteristics of men or nations, these are social constructions that arose and changed during various historical periods. For instance, in The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity, George Mosse (1996) argues that it is no accident that features of ideal masculinity and ideal nationalism reflect one another since the qualities associated with both were forged in the new nationalist movements of the 19th century—a time when masculinity was being reinvented as well. Nationalist politics is a major opportunity for “men to be men” and “women to be women” for two reasons. First, as noted above, the national state is essenN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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tially a masculine institution. Feminist scholars point out its hierarchical authority structure, the male domination of decision-making positions, the male superordinate/female subordinate internal division of labor, and the male legal regulation of female rights, labor, and sexuality. Second, the culture of nationalism is constructed to emphasize and resonate with the culture of masculinity. As noted above, terms like honor, loyalty, and cowardice are hard to distinguish as either nationalist or masculinist since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and to manhood. The “microculture” of masculinity in everyday life articulates very well with the demands of state-level nationalism, particularly its militaristic side. Many scholars note, for instance, the similarities between sports and war. The playing field can be seen as a micro-level proxy for the battlefield where opposing teams/armies exhibit bravery in the face of danger or injury, and where a premium is placed on strength, daring, loyalty, and fighting or playing through the pain. In different societies at different times, national masculine cultures might be somewhat dissimilar from one another in terms of the class, race, or ethnicity of dominant and privileged manhoods. In all societies, however, there are distinct gender cultures shaping the lives of boys and girls and of men and women. It is male gender culture that tends to dominate nationalism. As Cynthia Enloe observes, nationalism and masculinity are intimate partners: nationalism reflects men’s honor, men’s humiliation, and men’s hopes. As a result, most ideologies of nationalism are both “masculinist” (which privileges men’s points of view and values) and “patriarchal” (which privileges men’s interests and power). Nationalist systems of power typically place men in top positions and relegate women to secondary roles with less influence and access to power. Even though the U.S. political system is based on representative government and political equality, a look at the gender distribution of the U.S. Congress reflects its patriarchal history. In 2008, 86 women served in the U.S. Congress: 16 women in the Senate (16 percent of the 100 seats) and 70 women in the House of Representatives (16.3 percent of the 435 seats). Women remain vastly underrepresented in the U.S. federal government, but their numbers have been growing during the past three decades: from 5 percent in Congress in 1986 to 16 percent in 2008. Although women constitute 51 percent of the U.S. population, the United States has never had a woman president or vice president. Women around the world make strong cases against their historical and contemporary exclusion from power, however, nationalists generally are unsympathetic to feminist efforts to eliminate gender inequality. Nationalist masculinism tends to define women’s rights as secondary and subversive to nationalist goals and struggles. In nationalist discourse, it is the national interest that comes first; the interests of women, ethnic communities, or other groups are only a second thought. Although the “national interest” often reflects mainly men’s agenda and vision, nationalists generally argue that what is good for the nation is good for everyone—whether men or women, ethnic majority or ethnic minority, upper or N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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lower class. Nationalists tend to argue for equality of interests and ignore inequality of outcomes that favor them. For instance, in U.S. history, arguments made by segregationists against the racial integration of schools and workplaces stressed the threat to traditional national values that such changes would pose and underplayed the benefits to privileged whites of superior schools and preferred access to jobs. Similarly, nationalist and masculinist arguments against allowing women and homosexuals to serve in the military stressed the threat to male solidarity and national security that such changes would pose and underplayed the benefits to heterosexual males of sole access to military jobs and service.

Dimensions The male-dominated nature of much nationalism has led some scholars to argue that “woman nationalist” is an oxymoron that reflects the historic contradiction between the goals and needs of women and those of nationalists. Feminists often find themselves attempting to negotiate the difficult, some would say, impassable terrain that separates the interests of women and the interests of nationalists. For instance, Zoya Hasan discusses Hindu and Muslim nationalism in Indian politics and notes the tension between feminist principles and communal religious solidarity in both communities. She observes that sometimes both Muslim and Hindu women resist their community’s nationalist programs because they result in women’s subordination. Religious fundamentalism, whether Christian, Muslim, Jewish, or Hindu, often emphasizes men’s place at the top of decisionmaking bodies such as family or government. As a result, nationalisms based in conservative religions that limit women’s rights generally are inconsistent with feminist goals of equality between women and men. There are spaces available to women in the nation despite limitations created by masculinist nationalism. In their essay on gender and nationalism, Nira Yuval-Davis and Floya Anthias identify five ways in which women have participated in national and state processes and practices: (1) as biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities; (2) as reproducers of the (normative) boundaries of ethnic/national groups (by enacting proper feminine behavior); (3) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture; (4) as signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and (5) as participants in national, economic, political, and military struggles. Although some of these roles involve action, with women participating in or even leading nationalist struggles, the list is short, and the same names tend to be repeated again and again: Joan of Arc, Indira Gandhi, Margaret Thatcher. Indeed, many researchers note the pressure felt by women nationalists to remain in supportive, symbolic, often suppressed and traditional roles lest they be seen as traitors to their community or nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Faced with such constraints, sometimes women attempt to enact nationalism through the traditional roles assigned to them by nationalists—by supporting their husbands, raising their (the nation’s) children, and serving as symbols of national honor. In these cases women can exploit both nationalist and enemy patriarchal views of women’s roles to aid nationalist struggles. For instance, in situations of military occupation, male nationalists seen on the street alone or in groups are often targets of arrest or detention. Women are less likely to be seen as dangerous or “up to something,” so women can serve as escorts for men or as messengers for men who are sequestered inside houses. Similarly, women often are more successful at recruiting support for nationalist efforts because they are seen as less threatening and militant. Lynda Edgerton describes Northern Irish Catholic women’s use of traditional female housekeeping roles as a warning system against British army raids in the 1970s and 1980s; the practice was called “bin [trash can] lid bashing”: “When troops entered an area, local women would begin banging their bin lids on the pavement; the noise would carry throughout the area and alert others to follow suit. . . . At the sound of the bin lids, scores of women would emerge armed with dusters and mops for a hasty spring clean” (Edgarton 1987, 65). In addition to these strategies, which James Scott refers to as “weapons of the weak,” women have participated more directly in various nationalist movements and conflicts by involving themselves in cadres and military units. Despite their bravery, sometimes taking on traditional male military roles, and despite the centrality of their contribution to many nationalist struggles, feminist nationalists often find themselves once again under the thumb of institutionalized patriarchy once national independence is won. A nationalist movement that encourages women’s participation in the name of national liberation often balks at feminist demands for gender equality. Algeria is perhaps the most well-known case of a nationalist movement turning on its female supporters. In 1962 Algeria finally freed itself from French colonial rule. The struggle was a long and bitter one, and the fight for Algerian independence was notable for the involvement of Algerian women. Daniele Djamila Amrane-Minne, who interviewed women veterans of the Algerian liberation movement for her book, Des Femmes dans la Guerre d’Algerie, reports that 11,000 women were active participants in the national resistance movement, and 2,000 women were in the armed wing of the movement. Despite this extensive involvement of women in an armed revolutionary movement, once independence was won, Algerian women found themselves pressured to go “back in the kitchen” and to trade their combat fatigues for the hijab (traditional Islamic dress) and veil. Although the new independent Algeria embraced principles of socialism, few gender equality aspects of that doctrine were institutionalized into the formal or informal politics of independence. While women had the vote, their “place” in Algerian society was dictated more by patriarchal traditionalism than by egalitarian socialism. Four decades after Algerian independence, Algerian women still face the violent enforcement of patriarchal social customs in their daily lives. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Algerian example suggests that women who participate in nationalist movements face the prospect of having contributed to a masculinist repressive system after their brothers are in power. In such cases, women arguing for equality in the new nation often have been told to wait and be patient, that national unity comes first, then their concerns will be addressed. But, as Cynthia Enloe argues, waiting can be a dangerous strategy for women nationalists: “Every time women succumb to the pressures to hold their tongues about problems they are having with men in nationalist organizations, nationalism becomes that much more masculinized” (1990, 60). Women who press their case face challenges to their loyalty, their sexuality, or their ethnic or national authenticity; they are said to be “carrying water” for colonial oppressors, they are labeled lesbians, or they are accused of being unduly influenced by Western feminism. Third World feminists are quite aware of these charges but note the need for an indigenous feminist analysis and agenda that address local concerns not necessarily faced in industrial and/or Western societies. Despite efforts to build an indigenous, not-exclusively Western feminism into nationalist movements around the world, many nationalist movements fail to overthrow patriarchal ancien régimes. Indeed, conservative masculinist notions of men’s and women’s proper roles often become more entrenched during nationalist mobilizations. One example is the human rights violations of Afghani women by the patriarchal nationalism of Afghanistan’s former ruling Taliban party. The Taliban government initially was widely supported when it came to power in 1996, partly because it was reputed to provide protection for women who had become targets of sexual abuse under the previous government. The Taliban’s draconian measures against women, who were required to wear headto-toe coverings and forbidden to work outside the home or to attend school, became an international scandal and a partial justification for the 2002 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan following the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States by members of the Muslim extremist organization, al-Qaeda, whose leadership was based in Afghanistan. The interests of nationalists in “their” women’s sexuality are not unique to Algeria, Afghanistan, and Muslim nationalists, or nationalists in the developing world. Women’s sexuality turns out to be a matter of prime national interest around the world because of their symbolic and reproductive importance. Women as mothers are exalted icons of nationalism. In their discussion of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, for instance, Deborah Gaitskell and Elaine Unterhalter (1989) argue that Afrikaner women appear regularly in the rhetoric and imagery of the Afrikaner “volk” (people) and that “they have figured overwhelmingly as mothers.” Klaus Theweleit (1987) observes that women have been symbolic vessels for men’s utopian dreams and desires throughout history. Women’s sexuality is of further concern to nationalists around the world because, as wives, sisters, mothers, and daughters, women often are considered to be the bearers and incarnations of national and masculine honor. For instance, the physical assaults and murders of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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women suspected of adultery by jealous husbands tend to be taken less seriously or ignored by law enforcement in many countries, including the United States. While there are certainly variations across history and around the world in the extent to which such “honor killings” are tolerated, in all cases they reflect a common connection between men’s and family honor and women’s sexual respectability. Honor is something for men to gain and women to lose. It is not only Third World men whose honor is tied to their women’s sexuality, respectability, and shame. Female fertility is valued in the mothers of most nations, and unruly female sexuality is a potential threat to any nation’s honor. George Mosse describes this duality of purity and fertility in the depiction of women in European nationalist history. On the one hand, “female embodiments of the nation stood for eternal forces . . . [and] suggested innocence and chastity” and, most of all, respectability. On the other hand, the right women need to be sexually available to the right men: “the maiden with the shield, the spirit that awaits a masculine leader [ for] the enjoyment of peace achieved by male warriors” (1985, 98). An example of how women’s sexuality became intertwined with national honor occurred in August 1944, when U.S. army photographers documented the World War II Allied forces’ liberation of France from German Nazi occupation. One photo captured in a now-famous picture of two “shorn women” who were accused of sexually collaborating with the Nazis in occupied France during the war. In the photograph we can see the women’s shaved heads, shoeless feet, stripped clothing, and the swastikas tattooed on the women’s foreheads. Margaret Weitz interviewed a young Frenchwoman whose father was in the French resistance; she described the fate of similar French women who were identified as “Nazi collaborators” in the summer of 1944: “The war was not finished, but in Paris it assumed another form—more perverse, more degrading. . . . The ‘shorn woman’ of rue Petit-Musc . . . walked along with her wedge-soled shoes tied around her neck, stiff like those undergoing a major initiation. Her face was frozen like a Buddha, her carriage tense and superb in the midst of a shouting, screeching mob of faces contorted by hatred, groping and opportunistic hands, eyes congested by excitement, festivity, sexuality, sadism” (1995, 277). This picture was published in a pictorial history of World War II edited by Stephen Ambrose. On the adjacent page of that volume is another photograph. It shows a man on his knees with a blindfold over his eyes; he is just about to be executed with a shot to the head. He is also a French collaborator, but the difference in the images and the treatment of the women and the man speak volumes about the sexualized and gendered nature of patriotism, treason, betrayal, and the relation and relative importance of men and women to the nation. These images and the above account illustrate several important features about national gender and sexual boundaries and show how (in this case hetero) sexual behavior on the margins can strengthen dominant national gender and sexual orders. First, we can see that national, gender, and sexual boundaries are N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Two women, partially stripped, their heads shaved and with swastikas painted on their faces, are marched barefoot down the streets of Paris in August 1944 to shame and humiliate them for collaborating with the Germans during World War II. (Three Lions/Getty Images)

mutually reinforcing. Implicit in the idea of the nation (“Who are we?”) are certain prescriptions and proscriptions for proper gender and sexual behavior—what good male and female citizens should and should not do sexually, and whom they should and should not have sex with. In this case, “our” women should not be having sex with “their” (particularly, “enemy”) men. Second, we can see the ubiquitous double standard that applies to many gender boundaries. Our men can have consensual sex, rape, or even sexually enslave their women and not have their heads shaved and tattooed and be paraded around the town; in fact, men’s sexual misconduct in war is seldom prosecuted. On the contrary, in times of war, our women might even want to do their patriotic duty by making themselves sexually available to our men while the sexual police look the other way. Another lesson to be learned from this tale of punishing women sexual collaborators is that their rule breaking was seized as an opportunity to reinforce and reestablish sexual and nationalist hegemony. By disciplining women collaborators, proper gender and sexual demeanor and approved partners were publicly proclaimed. The N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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national gender and sexual order was reinstated: a place for every man and woman, and everyone in their place. As we know, there are much more familiar images from World War II, the most notorious, of course, being the six-sided Star of David that Nazis forced Jews to wear—an insignia that reflects the ethnic intolerant face of nationalism. Less familiar than the Star of David is the pink triangle that homosexuals in Germany and Nazi-occupied territories were forced to wear—a stigma that reflects the more hidden sexually intolerant face of nationalism. Pink triangles and Stars of David not only served to distinguish publicly outcast non-Aryans from true Aryans, but these symbols also attributed potent and degenerate sexual stereotypes to their wearers. In fact, discredited sexuality is an important part of anti-Semitism. While Jews were not often described as homosexuals in articulations of fascist and European racism, they were considered nonetheless “sexual degenerates.” The Nazis used sexualized racism, homophobia, and misogyny as foils against which to contrast their claims to superior morality and virile, but proper, sexuality. Just as feminism has the capacity to challenge the stability of the masculinist heterosexual order that underlies nationalist boundaries, so, too, does homosexuality. Nationalism is not only a man’s game. It is a heterosexual man’s game. Nationalist ideologies tend to value manliness in the form of virile heterosexuality. Masculinist standards for national conduct are not only misogynist—devaluating women, valorizing men—they also tend to be homophobic—intolerant of gender and sexual diversity, particularly homosexuality. Both homosexuals and feminists are problems for nationalists. This is partly because nationalists almost always are traditionalists. Nationalism, even “revolutionary” nationalism, is inherently conservative because nationalists tend to fix their gaze backward to real or imagined pasts for their legitimation and to mark their paths to the future. Feminists and homosexuals are among the most vocal critics of these histories, and they oppose many retraditionalizing aspects of contemporary nationalist movements since these steps backward usually do not lead to improvements in the rights and options of women and homosexuals. Further, feminists raise questions about the accuracy and justice of patriarchal “golden ages” so often celebrated by nationalist leaders, and homosexuals contradict the core nationalist project of reproducing the nation. Both feminists and homosexuals also tend to be seen by nationalists as potential sources of disloyalty, since their commitment to gender and sexual equality raises doubts in the minds of nationalists about the strength of their allegiance to the nation as the primary unit of identification. Nationalist preoccupation with homosexuality was not confined to the Nazi targeting of homosexuals during World War II. The Cold War witnessed another period of “homosexual panic” when many gay men working in Western governments, particularly in the British Foreign Office and U.S. State Department, were fired or reassigned because they were considered to be “security risks.” In the United States, Senator Joseph McCarthy was not only interested in finding and flushing out communists in various arenas of American life; he was also interested in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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homosexuals, presumably because they were vulnerable to blackmail because of their “lifestyle” and because their weak moral character made them susceptible to communist influence. The fact that one of McCarthy’s most vicious lieutenants, Roy Cohn, was a gay man was one of the McCarthy era’s best-kept secrets and most ironic breaches of Republican security. Another irony of the focus on homosexuals as likely blackmail targets is that heterosexual misconduct was and is a far more common source of government employee vulnerability, since, as history has shown again and again, people frequently engage in, and frequently go to great lengths to hide, heterosexual affairs. In recent years, lesbian and gay rights groups around the world, but particularly in the West, have mounted assaults on exclusionary policies, claiming equal rights to be members of the ethnic community or nation. During the past few decades, both straight and gay sexual rights advocates have asserted equal rights and membership in ethnic and national communities around the world. The integration of Europe is playing an interesting and emerging role in efforts to liberalize conservative nationalism inside European states. In the Republic of Ireland, for instance, both feminist and gay rights groups have appealed outside Irish national boundaries, to the European Union, to claim rights within the Irish state. The notorious case of a pregnant Irish teenager denied an abortion in Ireland in 1997 led feminists opposed to Ireland’s restrictions on abortions to seek support in the more liberal arenas of European legal and public opinion. Irish gay and lesbian rights groups have appealed to the European Convention on Human Rights to force the decriminalization of same-sex acts between consenting adults in Ireland. In eastern Europe, there has been pressure on states seeking admission to the Council of Europe to abandon codes outlawing homosexual relations; for instance, in 1993, Lithuania repealed its laws against same-sex acts.

Consequences What is it about nationalism—mainstream and extremist—that makes imaginings of, judgments about, and the regulation of gender and sexuality such central concerns? Part of the answer to this question can be found in the observations of Émile Durkheim, a sociologist writing at the turn of the last century. Durkheim posed the question: Why do all societies have crime? If crime, deviance, and rulebreaking are socially universal, then is deviance “normal,” and does it serve some important social purpose or function? Durkheim was asking a question about the edges, the periphery, the boundaries of civil society, and also about the relationship between activity on the fringe (deviance, rule-breaking) and the center (“normal” society). His answer was that both trivial and serious rule-breaking are not only common but useful for societies for several reasons. He argued that rulebreaking raises questions about the location of a community’s moral boundaries N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and the content of its core values. Deviance either can challenge the rules (when it becomes widespread), and thus be a useful means of accomplishing social change, or can reinforce the rules (when deviants are punished), and thus be a useful means of affirming the prevailing social order by reminding everyone what is considered right and wrong and what will happen to those who deviate. Durkheim further argued that punishing deviants can create solidarity, a sense of common purpose, and a feeling of renewed community among members who draw themselves together in righteous indignation to pursue and purge deviants. Nationalist boundaries are a specialized form of the moral boundaries Durkheim described. The margins of nations—ethnic frontiers, gender frontiers, sexual frontiers—are locations where rules about citizenship and proper national demeanor are tested and contested. National symbolic boundaries, like all moral boundaries, are sites for the creation and enforcement of the rules of citizenship; the surveillance, apprehension, and punishment of national deviants or “traitors”; and the formation of revised or new definitions of loyalty to the nation. Punishment like that doled out to the shorn women in World War II France reminds everyone in the nation, not just those labeled “deviant,” about the presence and power of national boundaries. Questions about core social categories such as gender and sexuality become questions about the nation and what it signifies. Identifying “outsiders” in the nation is part of the process of designating “insiders” and “citizens,” and thus of defining the nation itself. The building of nations and national identities involves inspecting and controlling the sexuality of citizens and condemning the sexuality of noncitizens and those considered outside the sexual boundaries of the nation. The punishment of women inside national boundaries for disloyal sexual behavior, the sexual exploitation of women considered to be outside the nation, the control of women’s reproduction through official policies regulating contraception and abortion, and suspicions about the patriotism of homosexuals all reflect the sexualized, indeed, heterosexualized envisioning of the nation. Contemporary nationalist ideologies define proper places for men and women and valorize the heterosexual family as the bedrock of the nation. This uniformity in sexualized nationalist discourse is a striking and surprisingly consistent feature of the global system of national states. Whether national sexual ideologies are spoken by nationalists from former ruling colonial powers or by nationalists in former ruled colonies, the similarities can easily be heard. In matters involving sex and nationalism, the apparatus of the state is perhaps most visible in its operation. The tendency for national governments around the world to exclude women and homosexuals from what are defined as the most important national institutions, such as those involved in war-making and governance, illustrates the gendered, sexualized face of nationalism. The points of convergence between gender and sexuality inside nations can be dangerous intersections. The imposition of strict controls on the national meanings and enactments of gender or sexuality can reinforce national identities N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and movements, but such disciplinary regimes can generate resistance and can become the nation’s undoing. Masculinist heterosexuality is a central component of the bedrock upon which nationalist boundaries rest. Feminism, unruly female sexuality, and homosexuality are three cracks in that foundation. Contemporary states must manage both the frontiers of international borders as well as their internal ethnic, gender, and sexual frontiers. Calming gender and sexual restlessness inside national borders represents one of the most controversial challenges facing contemporary nations in the global system. Recent increases in the number of women in national governments and heading national states, the growing presence of women in the military in the United States and elsewhere, and recent expansion of human sexual rights in many countries suggest that the traditional tight grip of masculinity on nationalism might be loosening. Questions remain, however, about the capacity of hypermasculine institutions like the military and national governments to resist change. What will be the consequences of larger numbers of women in the military and government? Will the institutions become feminized—more reflective of women’s perspectives and interests? Or will the women become masculinized—more reflective of men’s perspectives and interests? What will be the effect on changes in the laws governing gender and sexual rights? Will we see a decline in misogyny and homophobia in nationalist rhetoric and culture? Or will there be a masculinist backlash and a retrenchment of traditional patriarchal nationalism? These are all possibilities that can occur sequentially or simultaneously as long as nationalism remains an organizing principle in the global system. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Bederman, Gail. 1995. Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Connell, Robert. 1995. Masculinities. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dudink, Stefan, Karen Hagemann, and John Tosh, eds. 2004. Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Durkheim, Émile. 1938. The Rules of the Sociological Method. New York: The Free Press. Edgerton, Lynda. 1987. “Public Protest, Domestic Acquiescence: Women in Northern Ireland.” In Women in Political Conflict, edited by R. Ridd and H Callaway, 61–83. New York: New York University Press. Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. Bananas, Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Enloe, Cynthia. 2000. Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gaitskell, Deborah, and Elaine Unterhalter. 1989. “Mothers of the Nation: A Comparative Analysis of Nation, Race, and Motherhood in Afrikaner Nationalism and the African National Congress.” In Woman-Nation-State, edited by N. Yuval-Davis and F. Anthias, 58–78. New York: St. Martin’s Press.


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Hasan, Zoya. 1994. Forging Identities: Gender, Communities and State in India. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Kimmel, Michael. 1996. Manhood in America: A Cultural History. New York: The Free Press. Mosse, George L. 1985. Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Mosse, George L. 1996. The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity. New York: Oxford University Press. Nelson, Dana D. 1998. National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Scott, James. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985. Theweleit, Klaus. 1987. Male Fantasies. Vol. 1. Translated by Stephen Conway. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Weitz, Margaret Collins. 1995. Sisters in the Resistance: How Women Fought to Free France, 1940–45. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Yuval-Davis, Nira, and Floya Anthias. 1989. Woman-Nation-State. New York: St. Martin’s Press.


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Literature, Language, and Anticolonial Nationalism Kim McMullen

In the last half of the 19th century, Britain was coloring the map of the world imperial red from South Asia to Africa, to the Caribbean and beyond. At the same time, “English” was developing as an academic discipline, and the study of English literature and language was replacing Greek and Latin classics in the curriculum of the aspiring British. This conjunction might seem like historical coincidence until we look more closely at the ideological tasks literature performed on behalf of the nation. At home, the expanding working classes found educational opportunities through extension schools and mechanics institutes where they learned the moderation and continuity of the English “spirit” and the nobility of English cultural achievement through lessons in Shakespeare and Milton. Literature thus taught national unity and social harmony and helped counter civic unrest. Overseas, when English joined mathematics as a core subject on the new Indian Civil Service exam, literature and language became an explicit part of the “civilizing” burden colonial administrators carried to the edges of empire. English was both a justification for and agent of imperial ideology. In the words of eminent Victorian Thomas Macaulay, British civil servants bore “that literature before the light of which impious and cruel superstitions are fast taking flight on the banks of the Ganges. . . . And, wherever British literature spreads, may it be attended by British virtue and British freedom’” (quoted in Baldick 1983, 71). As this example suggests, nations are constructed, tended, and disputed as linguistic and cultural systems as well as political and economic structures. By circulating literary texts, rituals, visual icons, symbols, and other cultural utterances, each nation constitutes itself as an “imagined community,” in Benedict Anderson’s phrase—even established and powerful states like Victorian Britain. In emergent nations like Ireland, India, Nigeria, Jamaica, Kenya, and Barbados —all former British colonies—the process of imagining a community is more complicated and arguably more urgent. In postcolonial settings, the imperial power systematically constructed native peoples as culturally inferior in order to control them. Colonial rulers may have forced indigenous people of different ethnicities, linguistic groups, religions, and tribal loyalties into the administrative borders of a particular colony, where a divide-and-govern strategy often exacerbated local differences. Subject peoples have thus had to develop a compelling counternarrative to imagine an alternative to their subordinated and fragmented colonial status. They needed to find a way to defy the representations of the infeN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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rior native “other” that are the foundation of colonial rule, and they had to develop new languages (figurative and literal) with which to articulate an autonomous collective identity across ethnic, religious, or linguistic borders. Nationalism has proven to be one such powerful decolonizing discourse, and literature is influential in its project. Postcolonial literature does not merely reflect passively on the historical events leading to national independence. Instead, it can be an instrument for actively confronting colonial discourse and a medium through which a colonized people can voice their sovereignty. The visionary and affective powers of the written and spoken word have been important weapons in many anti-imperial nationalist struggles. Novels can construct a revised history of indigenous peoples to replace imperial distortions. Poems and songs can inspire resistance to foreign rule through images of a precolonial golden age or a liberated future. Theatrical spectacles can awaken a sense of common purpose. Yet even as literature has been a valuable tool for nationalists, it has become critical of nationalism itself in some postcolonial contexts when writers pursue the project of social liberation and cultural decolonization beyond the emergence of a new state.

Relevance Anomalous States Every postcolonial nation is distinctive, shaped by the length of its colonization, the policies and attitudes of the imperial power, the traditions of the native peoples, and the distinct forms of their resistance. Therefore it is dangerous to generalize a master narrative of postcolonial national literature. However, even as we note the historic particularities of one emerging nation’s culture, we can recognize patterns and trends common to many. As we shall see, the decolonizing strategies that were important to Irish writers at the beginning of the 20th century can be found in the work of more recent postcolonial writers like Chinua Achebe (Nigeria), Louise Bennett (Jamaica), Tsitsi Dangarembga (Zimbabwe), ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o (Kenya), and Salman Rushdie George Lamming (Barbados), Ng u (India). Ireland is an “anomalous state.” Often described as Britain’s oldest colony, it is one of the few European countries to experience lengthy colonization. Ireland is also one of the oldest postcolonial states, winning its independence in 1922, decades before the great period of anticolonial national emergence following World War II. Yet the recent violence and political conflict in Northern Ireland suggest that questions of national identity remain unresolved. Many in the former empire may perceive the Irish to be closer to the British than to other colonized people. Yet the Irish and their writers have inspired subject peoples around the world in their struggles for independence. Discussing the challenge of reclaiming Caribbean culture from its legacy of enslavement N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and degradation, St. Lucian poet Derek Walcott borrowed James Joyce’s famous description of the crisis of the native intellectual—“history is the nightmare from which I’m trying to awake”—asserting that the Irish situation was directly analogous to his own. When Indian novelist Raja Rao defended his decision to write Kanthapura (1938) in English rather than his mother tongue, Kannada, he prophesied the emergence of Indian English—“a dialect which will some day prove to be as distinctive and colorful as the Irish” (1963, vii). Nigerian Chinua Achebe, seeking a metaphor for the profound dispossession of the Igbo by British incursion, borrows a phrase from “The Second Coming,” W. B. Yeats’s great poem of apocalyptic change—Things Fall Apart. Positioned between the Third World and the First, Ireland’s precocious emergence marks many of the issues and several of the stages of anticolonial nationalism. After describing the process of cultural subordination used to justify colonization, this essay will examine a sequence of strategies by which Irish literature— and postcolonial literature generally—has been mobilized in the national cause. First, it has offered resistance to imperial policies. Second, “nativists” have used literature and the language question to refute the images of a debased indigenous “other” and have, instead, imagined a resurrected and unitary people by celebrating their folklife, language, and heritage. Third, literature has helped nationalists assert a more politically self-conscious and historically focused analysis of their colonial status. And finally, literature has allowed some postindependence intellectuals to voice their disillusionment with the new state and to extend the process of decolonization beyond independence.

Origins Creating the Colonial Subject Culture itself nourished the empire, as the words of Thomas Macaulay demonstrate. When Derek Walcott asserts that “language [is] the tool that dominates the colonial” (1996, 23), he recognizes that the discourse that arrives with the imperial power regulates what can be known and said about the territory and people it has claimed. Colonial discourse dominates in literal terms when English displaces Gikuyu or Hindi or Irish as the official language of a place. More broadly and subtly, colonial discourse—the ideas, representations, beliefs, and practices of the colonizer—rules by ratifying all knowledge, and particularly any “truths” about the subject people, exclusively through imperial ideology and European values. Literary theorist Homi Bhabha has shown that the general goal of colonial discourse is to make the apparent racial difference of the colonized group the source of its perceived cultural limitations and degeneracy. In turn, the “natural” inferiority of indigenous people becomes the justification for occupation, supervision, and instruction by the “superior” imperial civilization (1994, 70). N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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For example, in Ireland the work of colonial discourse dates back centuries. The English poet and colonial administrator Edmund Spenser argued in A View of the Present State of Ireland (1596) that the Irish were descended from the “barbaric” Scythians. His catalog of their alleged primitive qualities—violence, lawlessness, laziness, duplicity, superstition, filthiness—highlights by contrast the presumed reason and gentility of their English overlords. His description also warrants English ruthlessness by showing that only the sword can cut out “inherent” Irish degeneracies and allow civilization to flourish. Subsequent versions of the inferior Irish “other” were disseminated by English literature and popular media. The stage Irishman invented by such dramatists as Shakespeare and Richard Sheridan was drunken, feckless, and loquacious but comically misspoken; his “fighting Irish” companion was reflexively rebellious but ineffectual. Victorian poet and critic Matthew Arnold described a dreamy, feminized “Celt” during the same period that Punch and other British periodicals circulated vicious caricatures of a subhuman, apelike “Paddy.” These representations naturalized Irish subordination by creating a pseudo-evolutionary scale that categorized them and other colonized peoples as “primitive” races—simple, childish, brutal. Such images argued for the preeminence of British civilization and the necessity of British rule. One 1870 cartoon registers anxieties in Britain over nationalist stirrings in Ireland by casting Prime Minister Gladstone as Shakespeare’s Prospero, protecting Miranda (an idealized Hibernia) from assault by the simian Paddy (Caliban). As with the caricatures of many colonized people, Paddy was everything John Bull was not: irrational in the face of reason, childish before British maturity, lazy and truculent before British industriousness and discipline (Kiberd 1995, 30). Colonial discourse taught the Irish their subject status by denying the integrity and coherence of their native language and traditions. In turn, their presumed inferiority justified British seizure of their lands in the 17th century and of their economic, educational, and social opportunities in the 18th century when Penal Laws were leveled against Irish Catholics. This pattern plays itself out in any number of colonial settings. In Orientalism (1978), critic Edward Said describes how imperial Europe invented its cultural antithesis in the mysterious “Orient” by circulating a discourse that constructed the East as the West’s other, describing it, studying it, judging it, and eventually ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o argues that the effect of colonial ruling over vast regions of it. Ng u discourse in Africa is a “cultural bomb . . . [that] annihilate[s] a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. It makes them see their past as one wasteland of non-achievement. . . . It makes them want to identify with that which is furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other peoples’ languages rather than their own” (1986a, 3). Colonial discourse circulates broadly in such literary texts as The Tempest, when Shakespeare characterizes the “savage and deformed slave” Caliban as a native islander whose inborn unruliness and corruption justify the unyielding N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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John Tenniel’s 1870 cartoon, for the popular British magazine Punch, recycles characters from Shakespeare’s proto-imperialist romance The Tempest to express English anxiety about Irish resistance. The role of Caliban is played by a simian Irishman. (Reproduced with permission of Punch Ltd., www.punch.co.uk.)


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discipline of the Milanese duke, Prospero. Frustrated by the creature’s transgressions, Prospero declares him “a born devil, on whose nature / Nurture can never stick” (IV.i.188–189). However, recently a number of Caribbean writers including Martinican Aimé Césairé and Barbadians George Lamming and Kamau Brathwaite have exposed The Tempest as an imperial fantasy. They rewrite the masterslave relationship to suggest that the latter’s rebelliousness is the revolt of the colonial subject. The rage of their anticolonial Caliban asserts political and cultural resistance, not innate barbarity. Just as the postcolonial Caliban steals the language of his European master to curse his servitude, so many writers use their creative powers to subvert colonial discourse. Excavating lost indigenous societies and examining the methods by which they were undermined is one important motif. Chinua Achebe’s novel Things Fall Apart (1958) and Brian Friel’s play Translations (1980) are both set at a tipping point of territorial and cultural dispossession. The first half of Achebe’s novel offers an intimate collective view of Igbo village life just before European contact. The second section records the accelerating disorientation and fragmentation of this traditional African society when the British impose new religious, educational, economic, and legal systems. The final chapter of Things Fall Apart brilliantly shifts the story’s point of view from that of the Igbo villagers to that of a colonial administrator. Achebe thus symbolizes the abrupt and decisive displacement of Igbo culture by an alien discourse—their literal loss of control over their own narrative—when the British district commissioner proposes to condense the complex tragedy we’ve just read into a single “objective” paragraph in his imperial history, The Pacification of the Primitive Tribes on the Lower Niger. Friel’s play similarly yokes linguistic and cultural disinheritance with territorial loss in Ireland. Translations opens in the 1830s in a remote Donegal village where Irish-speaking children learn the elements of a sophisticated Gaelic civilization in a clandestine “hedge school,” in defiance of the Penal Laws and the colonial government’s Anglocentric curriculum. But this traditional community—and its linguistic relationship with its homeland—is ruptured when cartographers from the British Ordnance Survey intrude and begin to (mis)translate Irish placenames into English. The Anglophone map literally rewrites the Irish landscape and becomes, in turn, the tool by which the imperial army seizes control of this last wild corner of Ireland. In Friel’s play and Achebe’s novel, a web of native “things” (language, tradition, belief, economic power) falls apart when colonial discourse sustains territorial conquest. Even the right to write this history is claimed by the colonizer. Resistance and Revivalism As powerful as colonial discourse and its construction of the native subject could be, it was not absolute. If European imperialism was nourished by literature and other intellectual fare, subsequent anticolonial revolts, revolutions, and independence movements were similarly fed by local cultures of resistance. In N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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17th- through 19th-century Ireland before the emergence of nationalism per se, we can identify covert refusal of English domination in the persistence of Irishspeaking hedge schools and the oral and textual circulation of poetry in Irish, both remnants of precolonial Gaelic culture. More direct—but still coded—opposition can be found in the widespread aisling (“vision”) poems. Typically in these allegorical love lyrics, a beautiful, defenseless woman (emblematically Ireland) laments her captivity by a hated stranger and begs to be rescued by her true Irish protector. But when does the publication of an allegorical poem or the daily use of a local language become a deliberate act of national struggle? In Ireland, it may have happened with the founding of The Nation in 1842, a newspaper that reached hundreds of thousands when it was read aloud in communal gatherings. It circulated a popular history of resistance and rebellion in Anglophone ballads that appealed to middle-class and illiterate mass audiences alike. Later in the century, the founding of a language revival movement marks another nationalist beginning. Poet, playwright, and eventual first president Douglas Hyde delivered “Ireland’s declaration of cultural independence” (Kiberd 1995, 138) in “The Necessity for De-Anglicizing Ireland” (1892). Hyde urged the Irish people to resuscitate the traditions smothered by colonial discourse (“Anglicization”), arguing that, if they recovered their language, they would be reborn. The Gaelic League was founded in 1893 to encourage such revival through a network of local, primarily urban and bourgeois, Irish language clubs that took inspiration from rural Irish-speaking communities. In turn, these clubs encouraged nationalist rebels like Patrick Pearse and educated many postindependence leaders. At the same time, Anglo-Irish writers pursued a vigorous program of Irish cultural renaissance in English. William Butler Yeats, Lady Augusta Gregory, and John Millington Synge directed the Irish Literary Theatre (1897) and eventually the Irish National Theatre (1902) with the express hope of “show[ing] that Ireland is not the home of buffoonery and of easy sentiment, as it has been represented, but the home of an ancient idealism,” as their founding charter asserts (Gregory, quoted by Harrington 1991, 378). In this early stage, Irish writers, like intellectuals in many colonies, sought authority and inspiration for their political aspirations in a nativist rhetoric of rebirth and recovery. Indeed, Yeats’s friend Rabindranath Tagore pursued much the same course in Bengal. They retold sagas and epics, collected folktales, reclaimed the landscape in romantic verse and “peasant” dramas, and learned the native language of the rural people. They thus hoped to authenticate their nation’s autonomy by recuperating the lost essence of a people. When Lady Gregory described her work as theater-founder, folklorist, and translator of Irish epics by claiming “I am not fighting for it [independence], but am preparing for it” (quoted by Kiberd 1995, 87), literary resistance and linguistic recovery blossomed into full-blown cultural nationalism. In Africa, the Négritude movement of the 1930s and 1940s used a similar nativist rhetoric. Founded by an indigenous black elite educated in the imperial N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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metropolis (in this case Paris), Négritude operated through simple inversion of the binary oppositions through which Europeans created the debased African other. If imperialists saw Africa as the primitive, primordial heart of darkness and Africans as childlike and ignorant, writers like Léopold Senghor (Senegal) and Aimé Cesairé celebrated black culture and identity for its elemental emotions, deep spirituality, and organic rhythms. Like Irish revivalists, they revered native values and idealized a precolonial world of coherence and authenticity. Négritude offered an essentializing vision of black unity reaching across Africa and the African diaspora. While not directly part of a particular nationalist movement, it laid the groundwork for later liberation campaigns by challenging the racist foundation of colonialism and constructing a rhetoric of solidarity and common struggle.

Dimensions The Language Question One of the dilemmas that bedevils many postcolonial writers and nations long past independence immediately arises in the Francophone Négritude movement and the Anglophone writings of many Irish nationalists: the language question. The debate over whether to write a new nation into being in the imperial tongue or in the native language(s) is a residue of colonial discourse. It probes the heart of who “we” are as a political and cultural community, often dividing an indigenous elite (educated in the language of the colonizer) from the illiterate, vernacularspeaking masses. It implicitly raises questions of assimilation, authenticity, consistency, and loyalty—as when Hyde used English to argue that the Irish should “de-Anglicize.” In some African nations, the language question is further complicated by the profound differences between orality and its traditional forms (e.g., praise songs and epics) and literacy and its imported genres (e.g., the novel). On the one hand, revival of languages like Irish grows from an attempt by nationalists and others to reconnect with beliefs and traditions untainted by foreign domination. They thus hope to establish a cultural justification for political separatism. From this perspective, a simple, categorical answer to the language question seems imperative: English must be boycotted as the language of subjugation. The new nation must speak the old language. Or, as Patrick Pearse had it, Irish literature must be written in Irish. ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o insists, the power disparity between English Moreover, as Ng u and the language of a subject people remains beyond the latter’s independence. Long after the Union Jack is lowered, images of the cultural inferiority of the colonized circulate in the English lexicon and literary canon. Thus, even given Kenya’s ˜ g˜ı famously rejected the English in which he was educated, independence, Ng u choosing to write his early novels in Gikuyu. He thereby sustains an emotional N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and political connection to rural people and their oral traditions and resists the neocolonialism of international capitalism. Pragmatists might argue, on the other hand, that in many postcolonial nations it would be unwise or even impossible to dismantle an established Englishlanguage educational, legal, and social infrastructure. This outlook might seem especially valid in a global intellectual and commercial marketplace where, for better or worse, English is the lingua franca. In 19th-century Ireland, Daniel O’Connell anticipated this position when he urged Irish speakers to learn English as the language of economic opportunity, even as he worked for repeal of the Union. Such expediency might seem even more pressing in countries like India or Nigeria where the Anglophone colonial administration was overlaid upon hundreds of different local languages. Defending his decision to write in the Nigerian “national language” of English rather than in Igbo or any of the country’s other “ethnic languages,” Achebe observes: “There are not many countries in Africa today where you could abolish the language of the erstwhile colonial power and still retain the facility for mutual communication” (1975, 95). Ironically, the same was true of revolutionary-era Ireland, where centuries of English-language domination left less than 20 percent of the population able to speak Irish, despite the Gaelic League’s activism. Still, many critics condemn the pragmatist defense of the “metropolitan” language that consolidated the bourgeois colonial state because it could extend the same system of cultural domination to class and regional divisions in the independent nation. If the elite speak English, all other utterances become “local,” “uncivilized,” “trivial.” This argument is especially compelling in India, where a small fraction of the population is English literate and where Indian writers working in English are sometimes accused of pandering to Western audiences. Irish versus English; Yoruba, Igbo, Hausa, Efik, Edo versus English; Hindi, Urdu, Gujarati, Bengali, Marathi versus English—the binary opposition of the language question seems to reiterate, but not resolve, a colonial dilemma. A third possibility remains. Over centuries of contact, languages like cultures mix, interact, and cross-pollinate, making it impossible to rescue some “pure” precolonial vernacular language even where a sufficient number of native speakers remain. Moreover, the imperial language itself is reshaped by colonization. Many would argue that such cross-cultural exchange creates a linguistic synergy that gives the postcolonial writer a unique authority over the imperial language. He or she has the power to use it subversively and to adapt it to local, decolonizing purposes. What emerges is a hybrid “de-Anglicized” form of English that claims the ownership and agency of the syncretic language for the postcolonial nation. Its dynamic syntax and distinctive idioms implicitly refute the colonialist logic that ranks the local and native as inferior. As Salman Rushdie proclaims: “English, no longer an English language, now grows from many roots. . . . The empire writes back” (1982, 8). This is the strategy that underlies the rich “HibernoEnglish” of many of Synge’s plays, which draw their linguistic energy from the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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rhythms, idioms, and grammatical patterns of English speakers whose mother tongue was Irish. Similarly, Anglophone novelists like Rao, Rushdie, and Achebe and poets like Brathwaite, Walcott, and Louise Bennett, working in India, Africa, and the West Indies, filter the imperial language through the syntax, lexicons, and cadences of various oral vernaculars. They thereby reinvent their new English not as a substandard “dialect” of the Queen’s English but rather as what Brathwaite calls a “nation language.” Describing the linguistic complexity of the Caribbean, with its Carib and Arawak tongues, the languages of the Ashanti, Congo, and Yoruba people imported as slaves, and the imperial speech of the Spanish, English, French, and Dutch, Brathwaite argues that, even when the European dialect dominated as “the language of public discourse and conversation, of obedience, command and conception,” it “was still being influenced by the underground language, the submerged language that the slaves had brought, . . . [in turn] constantly transforming itself into new forms” (1984, 7). Specific “nation languages” and Creoles—Jamaican English, Indian English, Hiberno-English—manifest the heterogeneity and hybridity of particular postcolonial cultures. They simultaneously challenge the supremacy of a single metropolitan linguistic standard. Louise Bennett wittily flaunts the self-confidence of the Creole speaker in “Dry Foot Bwoy”: Wha wrong wid Mary dry-foot bwoy? Dem gal got him fe mock, An wen me meet him tarra night De bwoy gi me a shock! Me tell him sey him auntie an Him cousin dem sen howdy, An ask him how him getting’ awn, Him sey, “Oh, jolley, jolley!” Me start fe feel so sorry fe De po bad-lucky soul, Me tink him come a foreign-lan Come ketch bad foreign cole! Me tink him have a bad sore-throat, But as him chat-chat gwan, Me fine out sey is foreign twang De bwoy was a-put awn! For me notice dat him answer To nearly all me sey Was “Actually, what oh deah!” An all dem stinting deh.

Just as new nations are born from the history of colonization, so are new “Englishes.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Literary Essentialism Literary theorist Terry Eagleton observes a fundamental paradox at the center of national emergence. The “metaphysics of nationalism” invents an independent and self-authorized subject called “the people” whose organic existence must ironically precede its actual manifestation as a sovereign society (1990, 28). Literature’s capacity for intensely emotional fabrication bridges this conceptual gap by creating “the nation” before one’s very eyes, in a play or a marching song. It can overwrite colonial discourse and conjure an imagined community that joins past and present by contriving an organic essence that is, literally, a fiction. The 1902 premier of Yeats’s and Gregory’s play Cathleen ni Houlihan helped galvanize its audience into a “people” years before the revolution. In it, an allegorical old woman appears to a rural family on the eve of their son’s wedding to lament the loss of her “four beautiful green fields” and her need to put “the strangers out of my house” (Harrington 1991, 7, 9). As the bridegroom vows to defend the old woman, she is transformed into a “young girl” with the “walk of a queen”—a liberated Ireland. The bridegroom’s renunciation of earthly desire is rewarded with the promise of immortality: “They that have red cheeks will have pale cheeks for my sake. . . . They shall be remembered for ever” (11, 10). The onstage performance of patriotic sacrifice enacted for the spectators a vision of communal selfrecognition and modeled a ritual conversion to nationalist ideals. This ideological transfiguration was articulated in Christian terms in the poetry of Patrick Pearse. Pearse glorified heroic sacrifice in a figure that fused Christ, the legendary Irish warrior Cuchulain, and contemporary revolutionaries. Such texts function as secular myths by retroactively authenticating—even sanctifying—the essence of “the people” and by propelling them, through a fantasy of heroic action, into an independent future. Less overtly political, the plays of John Synge were attempts to ground a sense of unitary Irish identity in the vitality and legitimacy of “peasant” culture and especially their Hiberno-English folkways. An extension of nativist strategies, Synge’s search for authentic Ireland in rural communities insulated from colonial distortions and practicing timeless traditions echoes with Raja Rao’s desire to discover the real Indian motherland in pastoral villages like the eponymous Kanthapura. Even as they record such historical events as “this Gandhi business,” texts like Kanthapura seek national identity in the essence of “the folk” and in the unchanging rhythms of life in bucolic market villages. The remote settings of Synge’s plays—on “the wild coast of Mayo” or in “the last cottage at the head of a long glen”—connect the domestic habits, beliefs, and emotions of his characters with the unconquered landscape, a nationalist primitivism that equates “wildness” with spiritual authenticity and cultural vitality. Yet as much as he sought organic community, Synge relished rebellion. His most memorable creation is the “playboy” Christy Mahon—“a fine lad with the great savagery to destroy [his] da” (Harrington 1991, 94). Written less than a de-


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cade before the Irish Easter Rising, The Playboy of the Western World ’s oedipal themes seem to justify the ultimate patricide—anticolonial revolution. Ironically, however, socially conservative Catholic nationalists were appalled by the play’s sexual energy and impiety and the general wildness of the population it discovers on Mayo’s “wild coast.” They rioted at its 1907 premier. These demonstrations pitted an emerging Catholic middle class against an Anglo-Irish elite over the right to define the essence of “the people.” They thus offer a cautionary tale about nationalist metaphysics and the difficulty of generating the “deep horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991, 7) necessary for building an imagined national community across class, caste, and sectarian divisions.

The Nation in History Disagreement over “the people’s” character threatens to widen the very racial, class, or sectarian fissures nationalism needs to bridge. But an alternative decolonizing strategy locates the nation not in mythic time or essential identity, but in history. Historicized literature invents its imagined community by carefully observing the social and political realities of individual lives lived out in specific colonial settings. Benedict Anderson has suggested that, along with the newspaper, the realistic novel “provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imaginative community that is the nation” because it offered a means for portraying “a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous empty time.” The novel thus becomes an analogue for the nation itself (1991, 25). Mimetic narrative can incarnate collectivity without sacrificing heterogeneity; its “people” are not a transcendent entity but one joined by shared history. James Joyce’s Dubliners (1914) approximates this “sociological organism” by describing what Joyce called a “chapter in the moral history of my country.” Taken individually, its 15 stories dissect the economic constraints, emotional fatigue, and imaginative enervation of individual lower-middle-class Catholics in one particular city in the empire. Taken together, Dubliners diagnoses the paralysis of Dubliners as a chronic, communal, social disease spread by their status as colonial subjects. The stories of Hindi writer Premchad offer a similar panoramic view of Indian society, yoking the rise of Gandhi and the independence movement to the sociological realities of the caste system, widespread poverty, and governmental corruption. Decades later, the English-language novels of Anita Desai help to consolidate independent India’s burgeoning urban middle class through realistic accounts of the stress of family, community, religion, modernity, and tradition in individual lives. Such narratives find their imagined community in historic specificity. Less panoramically, the postcolonial Bildungsroman, or novel of development, chronicles the education of an individual native consciousness striving to


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liberate itself. The protagonist journeys across a landscape inside the novel that mirrors the social and political territory outside, and the individual’s story thus becomes a metaphor for the nation’s decolonizing struggle. Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) records the education of Irish-Catholic Stephen Dedalus in 1890s Dublin, where the clash of religion and politics sabotages his family’s Christmas dinner and his debate with an English-born schoolmaster leads invariably to the language question: “The language in which we are speaking is his before it is mine. How different are the words home, Christ, ale, master, on his lips and on mine!” (1992, 205). Stephen’s adolescent rebellions are shaped by his particular subaltern history, rendering his psychological and cultural campaign to invent himself analogous to the nation’s. Portrait anticipates such influential novels of budding postcolonial consciousness as George Lamming’s In the Castle of My Skin (1954), Antiguan Jamaica Kincaid’s Annie John (1985), or more ambivalently, Indian Trinidadian V. S. Naipaul’s A House for Mr. Biswas (1961). Lamming’s autobiographical novel follows its Afro-Caribbean protagonist on a lurching journey into political awareness on an island proud of its status as “Little Britain” yet burdened with the economic and racial legacy of the plantation system. His proper English education may raise his economic prospects, but it leaves him ignorant of the history of slavery and colonization. Worse, his community is betrayed from within by a member of the native elite—a man who belongs to the class to which the protagonist aspires. Only when a friend returning from the United States speaks of “negritude” can the young man recognize the imperial and racist roots of his own oppression and begin to feel political solidarity with other diaspora Africans. In the Castle of My Skin is a powerful story of awakening to anticolonial political awareness, a personal history linked to that of Barbados and the wider Caribbean and, in turn, to the postcolonial world’s history. Yet however emblematic of national emergence the development of the Bildungsroman protagonist might be, nationalism per se is not the focus of such novels. Instead, they gesture toward a later phase of decolonization where national autonomy is assumed. Edward Said, citing Franz Fanon, suggests that, at this stage, liberation moves beyond national independence to focus on the individual and the “transformation of social consciousness beyond national consciousness” (1993, 230). Even as he lays claim to Ireland, Joyce, for one, famously sees nationalism as an impediment to full personal autonomy. When Stephen’s Fenian friend asks him, “Are you Irish at all?” (1992, 219), Stephen self-confidently asserts his identity as a fully empowered Irishman even as he disavows essentialist notions of Irishness: “This race and this country and this life produced me. . . . I shall express myself as I am” (220). Stephen assumes his citizenship even as he identifies nationalism as one of the snares that might check his boundless flight as an artist. He seeks imaginative emancipation beyond the authority of a particular state.


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Consequences Independence and Afterward Indeed, the disillusionment that critics have noted in some postindependence writing may register the suspicion that national liberation has not brought enough freedom or change. Many newly independent postcolonial states remain burdened by economic inequities, social and ethnic tensions, and repressive or corrupt governments. Many writers acknowledge that decolonization does not end with independence and that full liberation from the “nightmare of [colonial] history” requires persistent negotiation with its residues. To develop “social consciousness beyond national consciousness,” the postcolonial writer might need to interrogate the metaphysics that called the nation into being in the first place. Alternatively, he or she may need to analyze how current caste, class, race, or gender oppressions might have been shaped by colonialism and anticolonial struggle. For example, after 1922, the Irish Free State consolidated a homogeneous vision of the essential nation through a Gaelicized Catholic educational system and a “cultural isolationist” policy that included widespread censorship. Immediately, writers like Sean O’Faolain and Mary Lavin countered this monolithic version of official Ireland with stories that detailed the daily struggles of women, the sociocultural disjunctions between city dwellers and rural “folk,” and the chronic emigration of economic exiles to Britain. Such literature pointed toward decolonizing work yet to be done. Moreover, because partition of Ireland suspended, rather than resolved, many pressing political issues, when sectarian violence tore across the North in the late 1960s and afterward, Irish intellectuals felt called upon to revisit questions of cultural identity, language, and community. In particular, the Field Day group (including Brian Friel, Seamus Heaney, Tom Paulin, and Seamus Deane) used poetry, literary analysis, theatrical productions, and other cultural works to address the crisis. Their five-volume A Field Day Anthology of Irish Writing (1991–2002) modeled an ecumenical, multicultural, and inclusive construction of Ireland to bridge the sectarian chasm of the Troubles. In a postindependence African context, novels such as Achebe’s A Man of the People (1966) and Anthills of the Savannah (1987) and Wole Soyinka’s Season of Anomy (1980) have turned their attention to the hard realities of building new societies in the face of poverty, neocolonialism, the tensions between modernity and tradition, and the limits of national consciousness. The ongoing challenges ˜ g˜ı’s A Grain of Wheat of decolonization in independent Kenya are central to Ng u (1967). The novel is set literally on the eve of freedom in 1963, counterbalancing the euphoric public celebration of Uhuru with the private stories of compromise, treachery, weakness, and misunderstanding that, along with heroic sacrifice, are the complex legacy of many liberation struggles. One returning rebel, upon whom the community projects its best hopes and purest motives, reveals that he has


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betrayed a comrade. Another, Gikonyo, learns that independence brings no change in the economic prospects of the common people when he is cheated in a ˜ g˜ı writes in his author’s land deal by a member of the local political elite. As Ng u note: “All the characters in this book are fictitious. . . . But the situation and the problems are real—sometimes too painfully real for the peasants who fought the British yet who now see all that they fought for being put on one side.” Yet whatever the disappointments of independence, the novel implicitly embraces the ongoing process of decolonization with the words of Gikonyo’s mother, who refutes her son’s despair and anger with a command to look to the future: “Let us now see what profit it will bring you, to go on poisoning your mind with these things when you should have accepted and sought how best to build your life” (1986b, 177). ˜ g˜ı scrutinizes independent Kenya in the name of the masses. He thereby Ng u pursues one of the most provocative themes in postindependence literature by asking the question famously posed by Gayatri Spivak: “Can the subaltern speak?” That is, where, in the evolving narrative of the nation, is the space for those subordinate groups who have, historically, been left on the margins of public debate by every ruling elite—specifically, the lower classes, the uneducated, and women? For example, Irish nationalists may have discovered a powerful decolonizing weapon in the metaphor of the nation-as-woman, as in Cathleen ni Houlihan. But this image simultaneously displaced historical Irish women with a symbol of passive suffering and laid the groundwork for gender inequalities in the independent nation. Poet Eavan Boland writes: “At the end of the colonial 19th century, the national tradition operated as a powerful colonizer. It marked out value systems; it politicised certain realities and devalued others. To those it recognised and approved, it offered major roles in the story. To others, bit parts only” (1995, 197). Refusing to play the bit part of “Cathleen,” postcolonial feminists like Boland turn the decolonizing lens on nationalist discourse itself. They simultaneously attempt to portray more historically accurate representations of Irish women and more diverse and heterogeneous visions of their country. Like Boland, Tsitsi Dangarembga relates an alternative story of her nation. Her Bildungsroman, Nervous Condition (1988) is not concerned with the civic events by which Rhodesia became Zimbabwe. Instead, it examines the “nervous conditions” created by postcolonial class and gender relations in Shona society after independence, as the protagonist, Tambu, struggles to liberate herself intellectually and psychologically. The novel chronicles Tambu’s “escape” from the rigidly patriarchal clan structure that “traps” her peasant mother and her universityeducated aunt alike. The success of Tambu’s uncle as a mission-school principal raises the family’s economic and social status, but he is a mimic man whose autocratic control of the clan stems from his emasculated position as a native subject. His rigid rule over his daughter and niece is intensified by his need to raise model children as the “good African” in the mission school. Thus, Dangarembga suggests, residual colonialism distorts traditional Shona gender roles. In contrast, his daughter Nyasha rebels against his patriarchal control, inspired by her growN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ing insight into the politics of colonial oppression. Meanwhile, Tambu naively believes an exclusively European-style convent education will free her from the sexism and poverty of the traditional Shona homestead. Nyasha scorns her cousin’s assimilation and the cultural alienation it demands of Africans, even as she seeks the liberation of a modern woman—a double bind that eventually consumes her. In this pair of cousins, Dengarembga embodies two possible responses to the “nervous condition” of postcolonial engenderment—a theme that engages other writers such as Buchi Emecheta (Nigeria), Bessie Head (Botswana), and Ama Ata Aidoo (Ghana). Similarly ambivalent about the fruits of independence, Salman Rushdie’s Midnight’s Children (1980) is a preeminent novel of postcolonial nationhood for many international readers, although his prominence as an Indo-Anglian writer remains controversial for some Indian critics. Midnight’s Children takes the symbolic relationship between a new nation and its children to a comic extreme by imagining a clan of magical children, born at the hour of India’s independence, whose fantastic powers embody the linguistic, cultural, and social complexity and the infinite potential of the new state. However, as the children mature along with India, their diversity produces not a rich, heterogeneous community but a fractured polity whose capacities are wasted in endless squabbles. They are nearly finished off at last in the “sperectomy”—the excision of hope—performed by the authoritarian regime of Indira Gandhi’s “Emergency.” Yet even if Rushdie believes the initial promises of Indian nationhood have been squandered, he insists it is possible to reimagine that community in some newer, centrifugal, and multivoiced form. The sheer inventive capacity of his narrator, Saleem—his ability to transform the past into a rich metamorphic “chutnification of history”—asserts a continued faith in linguistic plenitude and the regenerative powers of the human imagination. Rushdie’s symbolism also insists that storytelling—literature—remains a critical tool for political transformation. Beyond the Nation Have we reached a post-national moment? Intellectuals like Homi Bhabha might argue that the very idea of “homogeneous national cultures” based in the shared history of a place or in an organic essence of a people is being redefined by migrations across an increasingly cosmopolitan world. Bhabha points to a “transnational and translational sense . . . of imagined communities” that span the globe (1994, 5). Once relatively uniform and isolated, Irish culture is being reshaped by the new global realities of international guest workers and asylum seekers, as Dermot Bolger suggests in his novel Valparaiso Voyage (2001). Similarly, the interwoven histories of the Irish, African, and Latino diasporas create a transnational community in a New York tenement in Jim Sheridan’s film In America (2002). Indeed, the recent flurry of migrant texts on the South Asian and African diasporas —Rushdie’s Satanic Verses (1988), Monica Ali’s Brick Lane (2003), Jhumpa Lahiri’s The Namesake (2003), Caryl Philips’s Crossing the River (1995), Zadie Smith’s White N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Teeth (2000), and Andrea Levy’s Small Island (2004)—attests to the widening circle of global “Englishes” and to the complex proliferation of postcolonial communities beyond the borders of particular nations. Selected Bibliography Achebe, Chinua. 1975. “The African Writer and the English Language.” Morning Yet on Creation Day, 91–103. Garden City, NY: Anchor Doubleday. Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Rev. ed. London: Verso. Baldick, Chris. 1983. The Social Mission of English Criticism, 1848–1932. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bennett, Louise. 1966. Jamaica Labrish. Jamaica: Sangster’s Book Stores. Bhabha, Homi K. 1994. The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. Boland, Eavan. 1995. Object Lessons: The Life of the Woman and the Poet in Our Time. Manchester, UK: Carcanet Press. Brathwaite, Edward Kamau. 1984. History of the Voice: The Development of Nation Language in Anglophone Caribbean Poetry. London: New Beacon Books. Dangarembga, Tsitsi. 1988. Nervous Conditions. New York: Seal Press. Eagleton, Terry. 1990. “Nationalism: Irony and Commitment.” Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature, 23–39. Introduction by Seamus Deane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota. Harrington, John P., ed. 1991. Modern Irish Drama. New York: W. W. Norton. Joyce, James. 1992. A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. New York: Penguin Books. (Orig. pub. 1916.) Kiberd, Declan. 1995. Inventing Ireland: The Literature of the Modern Nation. London: Jonathan Cape. Ngu ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o. 1986a. Decolonizing the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature. London: James Currey. Ngu ˜ g˜ı wa Thiong’o. 1986b. A Grain of Wheat. Rev. ed. Oxford: Heinemann. (Orig. pub. 1967.) Rao, Raja. 1963. Kanthapura. New York: New Directions. (Orig. pub. 1938.) Rushdie, Salman. 1982. “The Empire Writes Back with a Vengeance.” The Times (London), July 3. Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism. New York: Random House. Said, Edward. 1993. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage Books. Walcott, Derek. 1996. “The Sea Is History.” Frontiers of Caribbean Literature in English, edited by Frank Birbalsingh, 22–28. New York: St. Martin’s Press.


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Nation-Building: From a World of Nations to a World of Nationalisms David Brown Relevance Until the 1960s, it was widely assumed that, despite transitional problems, modernization was promoting the national integration of contemporary sovereign states. The cautious optimism of that time was reflected in Dankwart Rustow’s influential book titled A World of Nations. Evidence to the contrary was growing, however. When Anthony Smith’s The Ethnic Revival appeared in 1981, political movements by diverse racial, religious, and linguistic groups were demanding changes to the boundaries, governmental structures, and cultures of numerous states that had until then been regarded as incipient or established “nation-states.” By the end of the 1980s, pessimism about the future of the nation-state was becoming widespread. This was reflected in the warnings by Samuel Huntington in his Clash of Civilizations, by Robert Kaplan in his Coming Anarchy, and by Kenichi Ohmae in The End of the Nation-State. The problems facing nation-states manifested themselves in various ways, most dramatically in the escalation of civil violence. In several countries, including Lebanon, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Ethiopia, major civil wars broke out. In other cases, as in Northern Ireland, Spain, the Philippines, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka, longstanding separatist tensions escalated into terrorist or guerrilla violence. Elsewhere violence erupted in the form of social riots, as occurred in the American civil rights movement in the 1960s and in Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians in the 1980s. By the end of the 1980s, civil conflict had overtaken interstate conflict as the main political cause of death. Even when it did not take a primarily violent form, nationalist contention was clearly increasing from the mid-1960s onward. In the emergent nation-states of Asia and Africa, a clash between “tribe” and nation was seen by some as a necessary “rite of passage” for decolonization and the transition to modernity. However, nationalist conflicts were also increasing in developed countries whose national integration had hitherto seemed well established. Québec separatism erupted in Canada; the United Kingdom faced an upsurge in Scottish, Welsh, and Irish Catholic separatisms; and tensions between Flemish and Walloon communities flared in Belgium. The increased incidence of such disputes in diverse nation-states served to promote the idea that the “nation-state” in general was in crisis. Talk of cosmopolitan globalization on the one hand and of multiculturalist minority rights on N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the other seemed to imply that the nation-state was being squeezed both from above and below by new forces of social change. The implication, for some, was that the end of the nation-state might be in sight and that a transformation into some new form of polity might be in process. The purpose here is first to explain the main line of argument that underlies this view of a structural crisis of the nation-state, and then to suggest a revised view that depicts nationalist contention as more ideological than structural, thence as more variable in its impact on contemporary nation-states.

Origins Role of Modernization and the Ethnic Core Possibly the most influential explanation for the rise and spread of nation-states has been that they emerged out of the commercial and industrial revolutions that began in western Europe in the late 18th century. It was suggested that commercial and industrial development required sovereign and culturally cohesive territorial states to facilitate the control and mobilization of labor. In some cases, for example, Germany and Italy, existing cultural and linguistic communities began demanding their own sovereign states, whereas in other cases, including the United States, existing or emergent states began promoting the cultural and linguistic integration of their populations. World War II then provided a major impetus for the diffusion of the nation-state when it precipitated the replacement of European colonialism by “new nations” in Asia and Africa. Modernization demanded states with coinciding cultural, linguistic, and political boundaries. It also required states whose members felt a strong identification with their nation, since the legitimacy of state elites now depended primarily upon their claims that they represented the common will of all those permanently resident within the state. The implication seemed to be that this sense of national identity would have to focus on “civic” ideas of equal citizenship rather than on any subnational or pre-national ties to “ethnic” community. Few states approximated this civic ideal, but all were seen as being pulled and pushed in this direction. The United States was widely depicted as offering a model for such national integration, in the sense that it seemed to constitute a civic nation-state. It was a state in which people from diverse ethnic backgrounds appeared to be integrating and developing a shared national identity on the basis of commonalities of interest arising from their social interactions within the territorial state, their shared vision of collective development, and their common citizenship. These citizens might retain their ethnic identities for some social purposes, but they had apparently developed an overarching national loyalty that was not ethnically defined and that provided the primary political focus for their identity. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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It was soon remarked, however, most influentially by Anthony Smith and by Walker Connor, that the nation-states of the modern world were rarely completely modern and that the national identities of their citizens were not primarily civic. In most cases, the nationalist symbols, governmental structures, and cultural values of the modern nation-states turned out to be built on premodern ethnic foundations. In some cases, this meant that the modern state was recognized as the inheritor state of an earlier ethnic community or ethnically focused empire (e.g., Thailand, based on the Buddhist kingdom of Sukkothai). Other nation-states arose out of the political unification of hitherto divided ethnie (e.g., Germany). In other cases, as with Britain, the contemporary nation-state developed out of several centuries of ethnic amalgamation. Even in those cases where the population of the modern state clearly included diverse linguistic, racial, or religious communities, the homeland of the ethnic majority was frequently depicted as the historic birthplace of the modern nation, whereas the homelands of the ethnic minorities (Basques in Spain, Scottish in Britain, Moro in the Philippines, Ewe in Ghana) were depicted as marginal, or even antagonistic, to that process. Not all nation-states claimed a historical and status ethnic core in this way, but it was effectively argued that a degree of ethnic distinctiveness was necessary for a nation-state to survive in the modern world. This observation—that successful nation-states must be built on an ethnic core—soon gave rise to the argument that this ethnic bond was intrinsically stronger and more authentic than any civic (nonethnic) attachment to the state. Even those states that claimed a national identity that was ethnically neutral would be found, on inspection, to be using the rhetoric of civic patriotism as a camouflage for the promotion of the values and dominance of an ethnic core. Thus the United States was revealed as an ethno-cultural nation built on a western European (WASP or “white Anglo-Saxon Protestant”) ethnic core. If modern nation-states invariably favored a high-status ethnic core, then it followed that national integration would be crucially dependent upon the progressive assimilation of ethnic minorities. The upward social mobility of minority linguistic, religious, or racial groups depended primarily upon their adoption of the language, religion, or culture of the ethnic core. But such assimilation was always difficult and was, in some cases, blocked, as has been pointed out persuasively by Will Kymlicka. Indigenous minorities, like the Inuit of Canada or migrants like the British Asians, frequently found that a combination of market forces and assimilationist pressures were eroding the viability of their distinctive cultures and social structures. Those who sought social mobility through assimilation into the culture of the ethnic core found themselves trapped between an increasingly unviable ethnic culture and a partially inaccessible national culture. The specific character and intensity of the problem varied, but in a wide range of countries, ethnic minorities began to be increasingly aware of their social, political, or economic marginalization within the nation-state. Their responses took differing forms, depending in part upon whether they were migrant minorities, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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like Turkish workers in Germany; indigenous groups pushed to the margins by subsequent settler communities, like the Aboriginals in Australia; homeland minorities whose political autonomy had been eroded by their encapsulation within the nation-state, like the Acehnese in Indonesia; or ethnic communities divided by state boundaries, like the Kurds divided between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Most members of such ethnic minority communities accepted marginalization or disruption with resignation. They were, however, increasingly being mobilized to various forms of protest by political activists who sought to oppose the entrenched bias of nation-states in favor of their ethnic cores. These political activists sought to achieve mobilization by claiming that the rights of “self-determination” applied not just to territories reclaiming a lost autonomy but also to ethnic minorities. Role of Rising Ethnic Tensions within Nation-States The initial response of state governments to the upsurge of protests against the alleged “hijacking” of nation-states by their ethnic cores was (where possible) to deny the charges. They claimed that their policies and institutions did not promote ethnic discrimination and that the ethnic minority rights protests were therefore subversive of national unity and could legitimately be suppressed. Where the exclusion or “forced assimilation” of ethnic minorities was overt, as in the case of Australia’s treatment of Aboriginals, governments frequently claimed that the assimilation of backward races into the more advanced ethnic cores was both inevitable and beneficial. The coercive response was often strongest in those cases where ethnic minorities claimed territorial autonomy, as with Basque separatism in Spain, since this directly threatened the integrity of the nation-state. Nevertheless, as ethnic minority protests grew in militancy and in moral legitimacy, some states began to offer minimal concessions to appease the activists and facilitate their co-option into state structures. The first concessions to Spanish Basques in the 1970s, the Belgian constitutional reforms toward federalization in the 1970s, and Australia’s enhancement of Aboriginal citizenship status in 1967 were all reactions to these changes. It soon became clear, however, that even minimal concessions to the marginalized ethnicities might be perceived as a threat to disadvantaged or downwardly mobile sections of the ethnic core communities. The latter lacked access to the “ethnic minority rights” argument for state welfare support. The result was the rise of a backlash “majority rights” ethnic nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s, as espoused by the Freedom Party in Austria, the National Front in France, the One Nation Party in Australia, and the Hindu BJP in India. In some cases, governments sought to distance themselves from the more “racist” articulations of such ethnic core unrest while simultaneously adopting some aspects of their agenda. Elsewhere, as in India and Fiji, nationalist advocates of ethnic core prioritization managed by the end of the 1980s to enter government. The danger facing the nation-state was thus clear: the structural bias of nation-states in favor of their ethnic cores engendered a reactive upsurge of ethnic N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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minority rights, which in turn engendered a countervailing upsurge of majority rights ethnic nationalism. The idea that nations had a right to political autonomy, and ultimately to sovereign statehood, was now being employed against the nation-states themselves, as ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities each claimed to embody the nationhood that legitimated their diverse demands. States that had hitherto been depicted as progressing toward national integration were now regularly depicted as endangered by a downward spiral of mutually reactive confrontations between the ethnic core nationalisms of the nation-states and the ethnic minority nationalisms of diverse civil rights, group rights, autonomy, or separatist movements. Even the United Kingdom, according to Tom Nairn, was threatened by the “break-up of Britain.” The very idea of the “nation-state” came under threat, as it began to be claimed that the term “nation” implied ethnic homogeneity and that, since almost all modern states were in fact ethnically heterogeneous, their claims to be engaged in “nation-building” were now surely exposed, in Walker Connor’s words, as exercises in “nation-destroying.” For some observers, the solution was clear, at least at the level of principle. Since most modern nation-states were structurally biased in favor of their ethnic cores, then the only morally and politically effective way to respond to ethnic minority demands was surely to accede to them. Governments should promote “multiculturalism” by giving special rights of autonomy, political representation, or resource allocations to ethnic minorities to correct for and counterbalance the existing bias in favor of ethnic majorities. In those cases where homeland ethnic minorities were demanding separate statehood, as in the Québec case, the “parent” state should avoid bloodshed by acceding. A new and more ethnically homogeneous state could then be formed, either fully independent of the parent state or with “authentic” federated autonomy. Only by moving in this direction could the idea of the nation-state be saved. Since the civic nation was a “myth,” the rescue of the nation-state necessitated moves toward ethnic federalism, toward ethnic power sharing and multiculturalism, or toward a political separatism that would produce new mono-ethnic nation-states.

Dimensions Alternative Approach to Viewing Nation-States This pessimism about the breakup of the nation-state derived from the belief that ethnic loyalty was intrinsically stronger than any civic loyalty to the state. States may claim to promote civic ideas of equal citizenship, but the pervasive reality of ethnic bias would always, it was argued, prove more influential in political practice. This assumption is questionable, however. Several psychologists have shown that the strength of group loyalties does not depend on the organic “naturalness” or authenticity of the group. Even if it were the case that people did feel a primary loyalty to organic or natural family groups, this would not explain loyalties to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ethnic communities, which are socially constructed entities held together by the myth, rather than the reality, of common kinship. Ethnic communities employ myths of common ancestry, ancestral homeland, and cultural sameness so as to offer moral and cognitive certainty to individuals experiencing social change, cultural dissonance, and cognitive confusion. The idea that graded distinctions of linguistic, religious, or racial attributes might give rise to a shared ethnic consciousness and that such an “ethnic community” might constitute a potential nation worthy of political autonomy rights is clearly not a description of social reality, or a definitional equation, but rather an ideological claim. Contending Serb and Kosovar ethnic nationalists, who each demanded a return to a premodern unity or autonomy, were in fact using the language of historicism to construct new political communities with new goals. But this ethnic nationalist ideology is not intrinsically more “natural” or more potentially powerful than are other ideological formulations that offer individuals simplistic and persuasive explanations for complex contemporary disruptions. In particular, those in search of a resolution for contemporary dilemmas might seek it not just in myths of a return to ethnic purity and autonomy but in myths of progress toward a civic vision of equal citizenship. Once we have recognized that the civic bond formed by common residence in a territorial polity might be just as authentic and just as powerful as the ethnic bond, it becomes possible to modify the “ethnic bias” explanation for the crisis of nation-states and, indeed, to explain why the extent of this “crisis” might have been overstated by some observers. Instead of simply assuming that civic nationalism is weaker than ethnic nationalism, we need to explain the particular circumstances that led many of the civic nationalisms that had been strong in the post-1945 period to weaken during the period between the mid-1960s and the late 1980s. The structures, policies, and symbolism of some states did discriminate in favor of ethnic core communities, but this was never completely so. Even in the extreme case of apartheid South Africa, some elements of the constitution and the legal code applied equally to all citizens irrespective of color. Indeed, in most countries, state structures, government policies, nationalist symbolism, and the national identities of citizens have reflected diverse nationalist visions. Some have tended to be characterized by an ethno-cultural nationalist bias in favor of the ethnic core community, some by civic nationalist ideals of ethnically blind equal citizenship, and some by multicultural nationalist ideals advocating the protection of ethnic minority rights. These three distinct nationalist ideals (ethno-cultural nationalism, civic nationalism, and multiculturalist nationalism) each offer differing visions of the character of the nation. They coexist in varying strengths in all countries and influence government policies and contribute to the national consciousness of citizens. All three nationalist ideals have mobilizing and legitimizing power and provide the ingredients from which modern nation-states are built. The insight that modern nation-states are built eclectically on diverse ethnocultural, civic, and multiculturalist structures and values makes it possible to see N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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national integration as being dependent on the successful intertwining of these three types of collectivist visions in nationalist rhetoric and public policies and in the minds of citizens. The language of nationalism is indeed frequently ambiguous. States can employ the symbolism of “founding fathers” in the knowledge that this image will evoke ideas of common ethnic ancestry for some, but ideas of a foundational interethnic alliance or of a civic constitutional contract for others. Moreover, it is perfectly feasible that any one individual might simultaneously hope, for example, that migrants will ethnically assimilate, that they will be accepted as equal citizens irrespective of any ethnic differences, and that they should have their own ethnic cultures protected by the state. This kind of “fudging” of the different ideals of nationalism has depended crucially upon the strength of the civic vision to act as a kind of buffer to defuse the tensions between ethno-cultural and multiculturalist ideals of the nation. Proponents of the ethno-cultural ideal could seek to deploy policies advocating civic integration as a means toward the advancement of their ethno-cultural assimilationist goals. At the same time, proponents of the multiculturalist ideal could seek to adapt civic ideas of equal citizenship toward their goals of interethnic social justice. Both could direct their political energies into reforming ethnically blind civic institutions of the state and civil society in the direction of their ethnically focused ideals. This explains the strength of American nationalism in the post–World War II period. While advocates of WASP dominance and advocates of minority rights both retained faith that they could put pressures on government to bend its policies in their direction, neither could capture the state and its civic constitution so as to significantly reduce their opponents’ hopes of progress. As long as the marginalized members of ethnic minority communities, and those of ethnic core communities, shared a belief that the state structures and government leaders could promote the development of society so as to facilitate their upward mobility, they would, to that extent, retain their loyalties to the variously perceived nation-state and refrain from the ethnic confrontation that would arise out of a direct clash between majority and minorities. It is thus the decline of this state-focused developmental optimism that emerges as the primary reason for the increase in ethnic conflict within and across state boundaries. It provoked, in several states, the disentwining of the diverse civic, ethno-cultural, and multiculturalist visions of nationalism that had previously been at least partially interwoven. This disentwining, in turn, generated the ideological confrontation between these visions and thence acted as the core precondition for ethnic conflict. The period from 1945 to the mid-1960s was one of unprecedented optimism as to the capacity of states both to promote economic development and to achieve progress toward egalitarian social justice. The communist vision still retained some credibility in Eastern Europe. In the Third World, one-party states were mobilizing new nation-states toward modernity through state-led development. In the West, governments were constructing the welfare state. But instead of seeing the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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realization of these social justice promises, the late 1960s saw instead the first stages of what was to become the new wave of economic globalization, characterized by the reduced capacity or willingness of governments to protect individuals and communities against the vagaries of increasingly deregulated markets. Moreover, it was not until the late-1980s that this trend toward deregulation began to boost global economic growth rates. From the late 1960s until the mid-1980s, world per capita income growth slowed down. This was accompanied by rising inequalities between countries and, according to some economists, also within countries. This was significant since people tend to evaluate income disparities not just in terms of objective trends but also in terms of their social justice expectations. Thus even in those cases where inequalities remained stable from the 1960s onward, the disillusionment of those who had been mobilized by the social justice promises of their state elites, but who now felt marginalized, began to increase. The impact of this globalization was not just economic. Various observers have focused attention on the role of cultural and political aspects of globalization in disrupting preexisting social interaction networks, political structures, and moral norms. The implication was that perceptions of economic marginalization were often accompanied by an increase in social dislocation and by the weakening of political authority structures. The responses of those who felt disempowered varied greatly, some adopting a deferential “colonial mentality,” others locating individualistic routes to upward mobility, and still others seeking collectivist forms of protest. Prior to the 1970s, one available resource was the socialist ideal. But by the 1970s, the marginalized were less likely to believe that they could exert pressure on their governments in the name of socialism. Faced with the rise of corrupt and autocratic dictatorships or military regimes in the Third World, the corrosion of Eastern European communist regimes, and the end of the postwar “golden age” in Western Europe, marginalized sections of society began to seek alternative ideologies to those offered by liberal individualism and socialist class movements. Both the established and emergent nation-states of the post-1945 world were in many cases built around a strong civic element in their governmental structures and policies, as well as around the high civic expectations of their populations. The increase in economic inequalities from the mid-1960s to the 1980s meant that those who felt relatively deprived began to lose faith in the civic vision of statefocused development and to look elsewhere for visions of progress. This result was not an inevitable consequence of globalization but rather an ideological variable.

Consequences The Effects of Anti-State Nationalism and Violence From the mid-1960s onward, there were frequent and vociferous protests from those who felt that they had been marginalized by development, that their netN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Falintil (Armed Forces for the Liberation of East Timor) soldiers drill at their guerrilla base in East Timor in August 1999. Falintil was engaged in a guerrilla war for independence since the Indonesian invasion in 1975. (Reuters/Corbis)

works of social interaction had been disrupted, and that they had been betrayed by state elites whose developmental and social justice promises they had believed. The widespread depiction of these protests as primarily an “ethnic revival” should not blind us to the recognition that the alignments, consciousness, and goals of the resultant contentions had a civic as well as an ethnic component. This was partly because feelings of marginalization were not confined to ethnic minority activists. It was also because the decline in faith that existing state structures and elites could promote civic goals did not inevitably mean the abandonment of civic ideals. If the existing state could not promote the civic goals of development and social justice, then perhaps these goals could be pursued through some other route, either by seeking a radical transformation of the existing state (most dramatically in the attempts at the democratization of communist Eastern Europe from the late 1980s onward) or by fighting for the secession of a peripheral region to form a new state (as in the movement for East Timorese secession from Indonesia). Anti-state nationalism was not the only resource available to combat perceptions of marginalization, but it did have specific appeal to those in peripheral regions or from minority linguistic, religious, or racial backgrounds. The depiction of such regional or cultural aggregations as potential nations offered a resolution to feelings of marginalization by ideologically transforming those who had been marginalized into a strong moral community. Once Eritreans, Philippine Moros, or Sri N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Lankan Tamils, for example, came to imagine themselves each as a “nation,” their collective interests could be asserted as the rights of national self-determination. Nationalism offered them a simple explanation for why social and economic networks, which had developed on the basis of linguistic, religious, racial, or territorial affinities, were apparently being unjustly disrupted or deprived of resource benefits by alien “others” who could now be depicted as colonial oppressors. The resultant nationalisms, both ethnic and civic, often had roots in earlier protest movements. These were now revived or radicalized by activists who felt their authority to be under threat and who appealed to constituencies feeling increasingly marginalized from the promised “world of nations.” The marginalization of the Malay minority in southern Thailand, for example, found expression in calls for a “return” to the autonomy of the Patani Sultinate, which would free them from domination by the ethnic Thais. Such anti-state nationalisms were reactive forms of collective identity in which the self-esteem of the marginalized came to be dependent upon the devaluation, or even the demonizing, of a perceived oppressor. As Liah Greenfeld has argued, such nationalisms manifested themselves in an illiberal “collectivist-authoritarian” form, since marginalized communities could only be mobilized to confront the perceived “enemy” if they prioritized their collective interest over the interests of constituent individuals. These nationalisms, structured on the basis of aggressive assertiveness, could not remain intertwined in the service of the existing nation-states. Their explicit absolutisms undermined the eclectic ambiguities of national integration. Thus ideologies of ethnic core nationalism, ethnic minority nationalism, and civic nationalism now began to be constructed in counterpoint to mobilize those who felt most marginalized. Indonesia, for example, began to experience escalating political tensions among claims for the nation-state to be built more strongly on the Islamic values of its ethnic core, claims for a defense of a secular civic nationstate against both Islamic and ethnic minority assertions, and claims for the autonomy rights of its ethno-regional minorities. The U.S. black civil rights movement, which intensified in the early 1960s, was an ethnic nationalist movement in the sense that it depicted the ethno-racial minority as a “nation” deserving of political rights, confronting a “racist” United States dominated by its ethnic core. It argued that these minority rights could only be attained by policies of positive ethnic discrimination embodied in affirmative action programs. But the most influential articulation of the movement’s goals, by Martin Luther King, was in purely civic language. The nation was to move toward a polity where destiny was determined not by race but by the character of an individual. This kind of mixing of civic and ethnic elements is particularly evident in those reactive nationalisms that sought some form of territorial autonomy from the state. Basque nationalism in Spain has been sometimes depicted as a classic case of an ethno-racial movement. However, the claim that the Basque race was culturally disrupted and damaged by the pro-Castilian bias of the Spanish state, and therefore deserves independence, has long been accompaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nied by the claim of the main Basque nationalist movement (ETA) and its political arms that they are seeking independence for, and mobilizing support among, all inhabitants of the Basque country, including its migrant majority. Minority nationalisms have varied as to the weighting of their civic and ethnic elements, but this difference has not correlated closely with variations in the extent and form of violence accompanying nationalist contention. The type of violence, whether social riots, terrorism, or guerrilla warfare, has depended primarily on the character of the society and on the authoritarianism or democracy of the state. The widespread incidence of nationalist violence, in whatever form, is in part merely a reflection of the absolutist language of national rights. But it should be noted that violence derives both from the tendency of the state to respond coercively to perceived threats to its national unity and from the predisposition of some anti-state nationalist activists to deliberately seek confrontation. Faced with the fact that some in their ethnic and civic constituencies adopt positions of dependency, deference, or resignation, minority nationalist elites have sometimes provoked violent repression to generate a siege mentality to unite the ethnic community and legitimate their role as its leaders. This strategy appeared to be particularly evident in the case of the ETA in Spain. The incidence of violence has also clearly depended upon the capacity of the state to concede to reactive nationalist claims. State accommodations have in general been easiest in response to those minority rights movements that have pushed the state in a multiculturalist direction, toward legal protections for minorities, greater shares of national resources, or greater access to power positions, including representation in government. Where migrant minorities have sought to protect their cultures from erosion through assimilation, at the same time as seeking affirmative action to facilitate upward social mobility, state accommodation has often involved little more than a shift to a “soft” multiculturalist position of providing resources to facilitate a more inclusive civic integration of migrants, as was done, for example, in the United Kingdom. State concession has proved more problematical, however, where multiculturalist pressures have come from indigenous minorities, pushed to the social margins by subsequent settlers, who began developing new “pan-ethnic” identities as a legitimatizing basis for their affirmative action demands, as with the indigenous communities of Canada and Australia. In such cases, the multiculturalist pressures have involved claims to various forms of ethnic group rights, to degrees of self-government, and to differential citizenship and have thus been more difficult for nation-states to reconcile with the civic elements in their national identities. Nation-states have faced particular difficulties responding to ethno-regional demands when focused on claims for territorial separatism, as for example in Aceh or Kosovo. One of the factors inhibiting concession to such demands was that it threatened to undermine the balance of existing constitutional arrangements. Once special autonomy was granted to one territorial region of the state, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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other regions would resent the anomaly and make similar demands, thus promoting the potential disintegration of the state. Such fears were evident in Canada in the responses to the 1987 Meech Lake accord. Violence, however, has been greatest when the demand for territorial autonomy is focused on a claim that contemporary state boundaries have deprived a state of some of its ethnic core homeland. This prompted, for example, Pakistani Muslim claims to Kashmir, the Greek attempt to annex Cyprus in 1974, and Palestinian claims to Israeli territory. In such cases, states have manipulated ethnic autonomy claims for territorial expansionist purposes, at the same time as ethnic activists have sought to manipulate the states’ territorial claims for ethnic autonomy purposes. In such cases, violence was particularly prone to become internationalized and to escalate into war. Such upsurges in ethnic minority unrest were accompanied by, and served to exacerbate, the development of majoritarian nationalist movements. State concessions to migrant or indigenous ethnic minorities or to regionalist autonomy movements were depicted as a “betrayal” of the ethnic majority in the nation. The resultant wave of majoritarian nationalism continued into the 1990s. The civicethnic mix of such majoritarian nationalist movements is shown by the frequency with which they have been portrayed by their opponents as “racist” ethno-cultural nationalisms, while their supporters have frequently depicted them as defending the civic virtue of ethnic blindness against divisive claims by ethnic minorities. The widespread portrayal of these various forms of reactive nationalism (multiculturalist, territorial autonomy, and majoritarian) as constituting an “ethnic revival” has followed from the tendency to assume that the weak civic claims of the state would inevitably give way to the stronger bond of ethnicity. The recognition here that these movements have been used by some of their proponents to pursue the civic vision of equal, ethnically blind citizenship in a reconstituted state, and by others to pursue the vision of ethnic autonomy, does not, however, imply that the outcome resulted in strong nationalist movements that intertwined civic and ethnic strands so as to accommodate both constituencies. On the contrary, anti-state nationalisms have been characterized primarily by their internal disunities and cleavages. These schisms have arisen partly from personal power struggles, rivalries between traditional and educated elites, and disagreements between pragmatic instrumentalists and absolutist ideologues. But it is this latter element, the tendency toward the construction of ideologies, which has been crucial in promoting the fragmentation of reactive nationalisms. Once political contention has been imagined in nationalist terms, the language of collective stereotyping becomes endemic, and politics is constructed as a battle between the virtuous Us and the evil Other. This attitude means that even “genuine” concessions by the state will be perceived by some anti-state nationalists as a “trick” by the “alien” state. This distrust inhibits the definitive resolution of ethnic conflicts, as is evident, for example, in Northern Ireland. Ideological construction turns potentially negotiable conflicts of interest into nationalist confrontations. However, it also splits, and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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therefore weakens, the anti-state nationalisms. Those anti-state activists pursuing civic goals can indeed sometimes ally with those pursuing ethnic goals to put pressure on the state. But ideological absolutism increasingly means that their commitment to different goals generates splits between proponents of “racial” purity and proponents of civic equity. Such divisions were evident, for example, in the black civil rights movement, the Basque nationalist parties, and the Moro separatist movements in the Philippines. The result of this tendency to schism is that anti-state nationalist movements are rarely strong enough to impose their will on nation-states. Nationalist contention thus becomes a continuing feature of contemporary politics. The Continuing Salience of Nationalist Ideology The shift from national integration to national disintegration was well under way by the mid-1980s, even before the next upsurge of nationalist conflict triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. But this disintegration has not heralded the death, or even the decline, of the nation-state. Nationalist contentions arose from the disentwining of the civic and ethnic strands of national identities, and the outcome of this disentwining has been the increased salience of nationalism as a mobilizing ideology. Selected Bibliography Brown, D. 2000. Contemporary Nationalism: Civic, Ethnocultural and Multiculturalist Politics. London: Routledge. Connor, W. 1972. “Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?” World Politics 24:319–355. Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell. Greenfeld, L. 1992. Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Horowitz, D. L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Horowitz, D. L. 2001. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley: University of California Press. Huntington, S. L. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations: The Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster. Kaplan, R. D. 2000. The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War World. New York: Vintage. Kymlicka, W. 1989. Liberalism, Community and Culture. Oxford: Clarendon. Kymlicka, W. 1995. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Clarendon. Nairn, T. 1977. The Break Up of Britain. London: New Left Books. Ohmae, K. 1995. The End of the Nation-State: The Rise of Regional Economies. London: HarperCollins. Rustow, D. A. 1967. A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization. Washington DC: Brookings Institute. Smith, A. 1991. National Identity. London: Penguin. Yack, B. 1999. “The Myth of the Civic Nation.” In Theorizing Nationalism, edited by R. Beiner, 103–118. Albany: State University of New York. Young, C. 1976. The Politics of Cultural Pluralism. Madison: Wisconsin University Press.


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Nationalism in a World Divided Saul B. Cohen

The end of World War II and the establishment of the United Nations were widely heralded as marking the onset of a peaceful era, free of the virulent nationalism that had led to the slaughter of so many millions and the widespread suffering and displacement of so many more. Much of Europe, the Soviet Union, and East and Southeast Asia had been devastated, and it was assumed that national energies would be fully applied to the rebuilding of societies and lands. However, considerable energy was invested in other directions.

Relevance The outbreak of the Cold War initiated a geopolitical system that balanced the competing strategic and ideological interests of the two major powers that had emerged from World War II—the United States and the Soviet Union. They divided the world hierarchically into two global geostrategic realms within which each dominated the geopolitical subdivisions of its realm. Where the realms clashed directly, as in the Middle East and at various periods in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, shatterbelt regions emerged. Shatterbelts are highly fragmented regions characterized by deep internal geopolitical divisions, exacerbated by the intervention of external major powers. South Asia was geographically removed from the grasp of both and remained independent. During the Cold War era, the dynamic structure of the system underwent significant changes, with shifting power relationships. Though the two realms were divided along strategic and ideological lines, they were also differentiated economically and in world outlook. The United States dominated an open, trade-dependent Maritime realm, which included as geopolitical subdivisions maritime Europe, the Asia-Pacific Rim, and, at various periods, sub-Saharan Africa. South America, as a whole, remained under U.S. sway despite serious challenges in Cuba from Fidel Castro’s communist revolutionary nationalism, supported by Che Guevara’s liberation Marxist theology, and in Argentina by Juan Peron’s populist nationalism. The Soviet Union dominated the Eurasian-Continental realm, a relatively self-sufficient, closed, inwardly oriented part of the world, centering around the Eurasian heartland. Th e realm included the Eastern European geopolitical region and, at the outset, China as a second subordinate region. Continental Eurasia was mainly rural and oriented toward the land, not the sea. As the global geopolitical system evolved, China beN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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came the core of its own East Asia geostrategic realm. This included Indochina, which from the 1950s to the early 1970s had been a shatterbelt. Also, during the 1970s and 1980s, sub-Saharan Africa was pulled away from the maritime realm to become a shatterbelt. With the end of the Cold War, this region and South America have become a “Quarter-Sphere of Marginality.” Only the Middle East remained a shatterbelt during the entire Cold War period, as well as today. Since the end of the Cold War, India, the core of the independent South Asia geopolitical region, indicates that it will soon expand this region into a separate realm. Both India and China have developed as powerful maritime industrial trading nations, while the majority of their peoples remain rural and continentally bound. They have maintained strong nationalisms despite these new roles. At the national and local levels, Cold War divisions were intensified as much of the world was freed of colonialism. In shaping their nationalist identities, newly independent states were torn by left- and right-wing struggles for power, sometimes in the face of sharp separatist struggles. In this dynamic geopolitical situation, the United States and the Soviet Union, and to a certain extent Maritime Europe and China, were powerful interventionist forces. Many of the rulers of the new countries, who had frequently led the struggles for independence, corrupted nationalist ideals to serve their own interests. All too often they imposed ruthless, authoritarian regimes upon their peoples, as their Cold War patrons provided the military and economic support for them to gain or keep power. Competing Superpower Nationalisms—Fear of the Enemy Fear of the enemy permeated the nationalisms of both superpowers, reshaping and at times distorting deeply held national values and traditions. Soviet imposition of communist regimes drew an “Iron Curtain” across Europe, from Poland’s Stettin (Szcetin) in the Baltic to Rijeka, Yugoslavia, at the head of the Adriatic. Soviet occupation of North Korea (1947), its backing of the communist insurrection in Greece (1947–1948), the Berlin blockade (1948), and the communist coup in Czechoslovakia (1948) all sparked vigorous U.S. reactions. These included the Truman Doctrine and “Containment” policy (1947), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949), and then the Korean War (1950–1953). These reactions escalated to the U.S. policy of deterrence and massive retaliation through the race for nuclear superiority. Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan (1948) was to establish the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, 1949), which organized industrial production and regional development among its East European satellites. This era is appropriately described as the “Cold War” in the sense that the two superpowers did not engage in direct conflict with one another. However, each became enmeshed in wars—the United States in Korea and Vietnam, and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In these situations, the nonbelligerent superpower used surrogates to further its objectives. Examples are China as a Soviet ally in North Korea and U.S. support of the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan. They provoked N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and supported internal and interstate conflicts in much of the world, as they jockeyed for strategic, ideological, and economic advantage. In the United States, patriotic faith and pride in country infused the national spirit during and immediately following World War II. However, self-confidence and optimism were shaken when the atomic weapons monopoly was challenged by Soviet success in atomic test explosions (1949) and subsequent matching of U.S. hydrogen bomb developments, and later in launching the first artificial satellite, Sputnik (1957), one year ahead of the U.S. Explorer satellite. Fear of communism was exploited in the early 1950s to distort nationalism into a xenophobic hysteria by sensationalist tactics and unsubstantiated accusations. Senator Joseph McCarthy and his allies held the State Department and army hostage to charges of infiltration by communists, extending the investigations to include others in government, the arts, and private industry. In 1954, McCarthy was finally censured by the Senate, bringing the witch-hunt to a close, but only after untold damage had been done to private lives and government agencies, and national unity had been shaken. The Soviet nuclear and space achievements, as well as the Cuban Missile Crisis (1961–1962) brought home to the U.S. public the specter of nuclear warfare and the reality that two oceans no longer guaranteed security. Home air-raid shelters and evacuation route drills increased the sense of insecurity. Patriotism, love of country, democracy, constitutional freedoms, an open society, self-reliance, innovation, and economic opportunity are internal hallmarks of U.S. nationalism. The external manifestation is idealistic moralism based on commitment to the spread of democratic values abroad and the development of impoverished societies. This commitment was reflected during the Cold War in massive U.S. aid programs to Third World countries, governmental institutions such as the Peace Corps founded by John F. Kennedy (1961), and widespread nongovernmental organization overseas activities in health, sanitation, education, and housing. The strain of the nuclear arms and missile race, together with the human and economic costs of the Vietnam War (1965–1973), blocked the fulfillment of many of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society goals, which sought to extend to all the national principles of liberty, equality, and opportunity. These goals included winning the War on Poverty and implementing sweeping economic, social, and educational programs. Despite the bitter opposition of segregationists, he did succeed in implementing the Civil Rights Act of 1954. The Vietnam War triggered massive antiwar demonstrations that eroded the powerful base of patriotism that undergirded American nationalism. While racial desegregation was judicially and politically overcome, the scars left by the bitter struggle and local police brutality were slow to fade. Black nationalism and the Black Power movement, while attracting only fringe support, challenged the unity that was both a real and mythic element of nationalism. The Cold War competition mocked and undermined this idealism. In the interest of defeating Soviet and other communist enemies, democracy was often N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ignored. Washington gave extensive military and economic support to right-wing dictatorships and engineered the toppling of popularly elected leftist regimes. In the Middle East, it propped up despotic, oil-rich monarchies, including that of the Shah of Iran, who was overthrown by religious fundamentalists. During the latter years of the presidency of Ronald Reagan (1980–1988), U.S. nationalism regained many of its traditional values and sense of balance. The bitter internal schisms of the Vietnam War had faded. Soviet nationalism was even more strongly shaped during the Cold War by fear of the enemy. Responding to both real and imagined threats, security became the major rationale for Soviet expansionism, along with the ideological mission of spreading the gospel of communism. This reaction was to lead to the economic and military overstretch that ultimately brought on the destruction of the Soviet state. Fear of invasion was deeply rooted in the Russian national psyche. Memories of Napoleon’s invasion, defeat in the Crimean War, British intervention in the Russian Civil War, and the German invasions in World Wars I and II inspired the need to rally against a hostile outside world. Patriotism, infused with national pride, was another energizing force of Soviet nationalism. The victorious Red Army in the “Great Patriotic War” and the heroic stands of the army and people in the sieges of Leningrad (St. Petersburg) and Stalingrad (Volgagrad) were, for most of the people, accomplishments that overshadowed Stalin’s early wartime strategic blunders that had led to nearly 1 million killed or captured and made possible the deep penetration of Soviet territory by the Nazis. Stalin exploited this combination of patriotic pride and fear, and the memory of the 26 million who had died in the war, to rule with an iron hand, establishing a cult of personality that outlived his death in 1953. He executed dissidents and conducted periodic campaigns of terror against the citizenry to sustain this rule. The principle of economic and social equality intrinsic to Marxism was distorted by the creation of a privileged political class and rewards to the party faithful. Much of the nation’s resources were invested in armaments and economic aid to satellite countries at the expense of the general Soviet populace, for most of whom equality meant low-quality social services and consumer deprivation. Soviet response to the remilitarization of Germany and its admission to NATO was to create the Warsaw Pact (1955). A unified military command, headquartered in Moscow, was established to direct the united forces of the Eastern and Central European countries. This move was part of the Soviet strategy to leapfrog U.S. containment policy, which had initially been proposed by George C. Kennan. Kennan argued that Soviet expansionism could be contained by applying counterforce at constantly shifting geographical and political points by rimming the Soviet heartland through NATO, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO, 1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955). The Soviet response was to support indigenous communist groups in the Middle East and Southeast Asia and to forge alliances with any regime that had an anti-Western tendency. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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While Soviet nationalism was not the same as Russian nationalism, public acceptance of Stalin’s dictatorial and centralized regime had its roots in czarist traditions of authoritarianism and in the hierarchically organized Russian Orthodox Eastern Church that had been under czarist patronage. Pan-Slavism and imperial expansion were integral to Russian nationalism. Pan-Slavism led to the mission of protecting the “Little Slavs” of southeastern Europe. The mission of imperialism in the 19th century had led to expansion in Asia to the Amur Valley and the Pacific and was the impetus for Russia’s entry into World War I. Both of the national drives were instruments to enhance the power and ambitions of the czarist regimes; they were not deep expressions of national feeling. In addition to this heritage, Russian nationalism was expressed by linguistic and cultural Russification and colonization by Russians of non-Russian Soviet Socialist Republics (SSRs). However, the Soviet constitution protected the rights of the different nationalities embraced within the SSRs and some of the Autonomous Oblasts. Though Russian remained the unifying language of the Soviet Union, native languages and cultures enjoyed the protection of the state. The structure also offered the illusion of self-government to these republics, while political and economic decisions remained centralized within the Communist Party, the Politburo, and the Central Committee. Armenian memories of the massacres at the hands of the Turks (1915) and their felt need for protection against Turkey kept in check the nationalist fires of this very ancient, independent, Christian people. Baltic state nationalism, on the other hand, was more assertive. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all regarded Soviet rule as illegitimate and welcomed Nazi occupation during World War II. They were the first to gain independence with the breakup of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and refused to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991 in an effort to bind the former republics in a free association with Russia. More importantly, by the mid-1980s the Soviet Union began to make overtures that would lead to the end of the Cold War. Summits between President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev led to limitations on intermediate nuclear forces (1987) and to Gorbachev’s policies of Glasnost (“openness”) and Perestroika (“economic restructuring”), followed by relaxation of the Soviet hold on its East European satellites. Reagan’s greatly increased defense spending had forced the Soviet Union to try to keep pace, leading to its near bankruptcy. Boris Yeltsin, the first popularly elected president, then dissolved the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, formally ending the Cold War and ushering in an era of chaotic capitalism (1991). From the Ashes of Defeat—Nationalism without Militarism Defeat in World War II was followed by the complete transformation of German, Japanese, and Italian nationalisms. Germany and Italy had had short-lived experiences with democracy—Germany during the socialist-democratic WeiN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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mar Republic and Italy with the republican moderate and liberal values of the 1848 revolution and the Risorgimento, the movement for unity of state and land. Japan had not. Its homogenous, enclosed society had been tightly controlled by feudal nobility and military classes. Traditionally militant Japanese nationalism had been guided by the Confucian concept of loyalty to a system headed by the emperor, descendant of the Sun Goddess, and governed by a highly centralized bureaucracy. Shaken by its defeat, the devastation wrought by the atomic bombs, and U.S. occupation, Tokyo renounced these traditions and its expansionist militarism. The emperor was relegated to a figurehead role, and a democratically based system focused on reconstructing the economy through international trade rather than through control of human and natural resources by seizure of territory. For security, the now heavily pacifist and antinuclear Japanese people turned to the United States for defense. Most recently, however, fear of China has stimulated nationalist efforts to eliminate renunciation of war from the constitution. In addition, some traces of the historic closed system remain in the barriers to foreign ownership of Japanese firms in the homeland and to any immigration of non-Japanese. In emerging from its defeat in World War II, Germany thoroughly renounced all traces of its extreme Nazi racist and militaristic nationalism, including its conservative Prussian Junker traditions of the pre–World War I era. With the help of Marshall Plan aid, and reacting to the threat posed by Soviet control of East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR), West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany, FRG) became strongly committed to liberal democracy under the leadership of Konrad Adenauer, the political architect of its economic recovery. While still under Allied occupation, it adopted a constitution similar to that of the democratic and moderately centralized Weimar Republic, but with more power to the individual states and less to the presidency. The nationalism that emerged fostered a focus on individual freedom, business interests, and a free-market economy, while building a strong social service network. The reconstituted German armed forces under NATO, close political relations with France, and persistent Holocaust guilt engendered a strong indigenous pacifist movement and militated against a reemergence of militant nationalism. This was reinforced by de facto acceptance of Germany’s division and loss to Poland of German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, together with treaties of nonaggression and cooperation with Poland and the Soviet Union (1970). Along with France, Germany has become the leader in the evolving European unity movement. Contradictions between Soviet and Other Communist Nationalisms The Marxist-Leninist philosophy of world revolution had been distorted by Stalin and his successors to serve Moscow’s strategic and economic interests. Their strategies meant seeking defensive depth through creating a buff er of satellites in Eastern and Central Europe and gaining allies in China and North Korea. To N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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bypass the U.S. wall of containment, the Soviet Union supported communist efforts to gain regime control in Southeast Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. This counterencirclement strategy succeeded in Cuba, Angola, and Mozambique. However, in pursuit of this strategy, the Soviets were not loathe to support regimes that outlawed and repressed local communists—Egypt and Libya being prime examples. The greatest contradiction was between Soviet nationalism and that of its two major communist allies, Tito’s Yugoslavia and Mao Zedong’s China. The schism with each of these countries weakened Soviet global power. The antipathy of Tito (Josip Broz) to Stalin was based on Moscow’s denial of military assistance to his partisan guerilla forces during World War II, Soviet opposition to Yugoslavia’s claim to Trieste, and Moscow’s attempt, through the Cominform, to make the Yugoslav Communist Party subservient to Soviet economic and political policies. Stalin’s attempted coup against Tito failed, and the Yugoslav Party was ejected from the Cominform (1948). Tito then succeeded in establishing a neutral position between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and enacted decentralization policies and a modicum of social and economic liberalization. Mao’s China split with its Soviet ally on ideological grounds when Mao strongly opposed Khruschev’s de-Stalinization (1956) and subsequent coexistence policies. Earlier differences between the two powers had developed over Mao’s two-stage revolutionary model of the rural versus urban “war of contradictions” and his opposition to Soviet nuclear policy. Mao’s nationalism was based upon strong, authoritative central government and China’s quest for preeminence within the rural, underdeveloped world through support of revolutionary struggles there. The rift widened when the Soviet Union withdrew all of its technicians and aid, objecting to Mao’s launching of the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” (1962). It became irreparable when the two powers clashed over the Ussuri River borderlands between Manchuria and Siberia (1969), which had been seized by csarist Russia in the previous century. In Eastern and Central Europe, Moscow was able to suppress, but not eliminate, the anticommunist nationalism of its weaker satellites. Popular revolts against communist regimes in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) were ruthlessly repressed. Polish nationalism was fueled by the resentment of the working class and the strength of the Catholic faith, openly supported by Pope John Paul II. Lech Walensa led a worker uprising in the Gdansk shipyards (1980), which succeeded in introducing some liberalization into the Polish communist system. Reconciling European Regionalism with Traditions of Nationalism European unity was initiated by the European Recovery Program (the Marshall Plan, advanced by U.S. secretary of state George C. Marshall). This was followed by a number of supranational European bodies—the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC, 1947), the Council of Europe (1949), the Shuman N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Plan (the European Coal and Steel Community, 1952), and the European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market, 1957). The Western European Union (1954) became the European Union (EU) in 1992. On the military front, the Brussels Pact of Five (1948) was absorbed by NATO the following year. Half a century later, the EU established a separate European Rapid Reaction Force (2004) and deployed its first troops in 2005. Recognizing the advantages of partnership, France and Germany took the lead in promoting European regional unity. This union posed internal dilemmas in balancing the advantages of regionalism with nationalist traditions, especially within France and Great Britain. In France, Charles de Gaulle achieved a constitutionally strengthened presidency. He appealed to the distinctive values of French national history, culture, and language in restoring France’s sense of national grandeur. While supporting the Common Market and fostering strong ties with Germany, de Gaulle promoted independent development of French atomic weapons and argued unsuccessfully for parity between the United States and France in NATO. Britain expanded its national outlook to include European unity, but did so with considerable ambivalence. British nationalism had been reinforced by its heroic struggle in World War II. With its island status and special bond with the United States, which had been strengthened by the wartime partnership, it had never felt fully part of continental Europe. This ambivalence was later expressed in Britain’s refusal to adopt the euro and, most recently, in joining the U.S. war in Iraq to depose Saddam Hussein, despite the opposition of France, Germany, and other western European countries, as well as domestic opposition. Building Nationalism in Newly Independent States Almost 100 states gained independence during the Cold War era. In shaping national values, many were caught up in struggles for power among revolutionary Marxists, right-wing oligarchs, and social/democratic/liberal forces. Many of these states also had a mix of ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities that sought to break away as sovereign, independent states. During the age of colonialism, boundaries had often been drawn up to meet the needs of the colonial powers rather than preserve homogeneity and historic territorial entities. This struggle for the creation of a national consensus over cultural and political values, and a fair allocation of natural resources, continues to this day. A few separatist movements have succeeded in gaining independence, such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Singapore, and Eritrea. Somalia, a failed state, has broken into three malfunctioning units. Pursuing a “Third Way” independent of the Cold War rivalry shaped the nationalism of certain new states such as India, Burma (Myanmar), Indonesia, and Tunisia, where neutrality and pacifism became intrinsic elements of their nationalism. Indian nationalism is secular and democratic in nature, and its economic policy at the onset had a strong statist component. As a predominantly Hindu N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nation with large Muslim and Sikh minorities, nation-building has been plagued by intercommunal violence. It has also struggled with the contradiction between the nonviolence, pacifist teachings of Mohandas K. Gandhi and the bloody fighting that has attended the division that created Pakistan, and in recent years it has tapped a militarist strain in Hinduism that has now become a feature of Indian nationalism. This militarism has been expressed in the continuing conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir, punctuated by three wars and a nuclear weapons competition, two border wars fought with China, and the invasion of rebellious Tamil in northern Sri Lanka at the request of the Sinhalese government.

Origins The immediate origins of the Cold War, a term coined by Walter Lippmann (1947), were in the Yalta Conference of 1945 held by the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. According to secret terms agreed to by all the participants, the Soviet Union would occupy Poland and establish a sphere of control there. Later in that year, at Potsdam, the four powers agreed that east Prussia and northern and southern Silesia would be detached from Germany and annexed to Poland, forming a boundary along the Oder-Neisse line, in exchange for land transfers from eastern Poland that benefited the Soviet Union. This was the beginning of the Soviet dominion over all of Eastern and Central Europe. The unexpectedly rapid advance of Soviet troops deep into Germany at the war’s end took them to the Elbe River, where they met the American forces. This river became a major part of the demarcation line between the Soviet and Allied zones of occupied Germany. It was along this boundary that the “Iron Curtain” (a term coined in 1956 by Winston Churchill in his Fulton, Missouri, speech) was drawn. The stage was set for superpower separation and competition, fueled in the United States by the Truman Doctrine, the containment policy, and the domino theory. The latter had been advanced by Paul Nitze, who warned against Soviet expansion into Southeast Asia through its Chinese ally (1947). Soviet response was the Berlin blockade (1948) and, ultimately, the Berlin Wall, built in 1961 by the East Germans to staunch the flow of escapees, 4 million of whom had already fled to the West. The wall was later extended all along the border. In 1943, there had been a conference in Tehran at which Churchill had promised Stalin (with the acquiescence of Roosevelt) free access through the Turkish Straits. However, in line with the containment policy, President Harry Truman reneged on this commitment and stationed a U.S. naval fleet in the eastern Mediterranean. Soviet resentment of the West was fueled by this act and other expressions of anticommunism. Nationalism was diffused and maintained during the Cold War period by stirring speeches and slogans, recourse to historic memory, parades, holidays, monN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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A group of West Germans peer over the Berlin Wall, a barricade constructed by the East German government in 1961 that closed the border between West Berlin and East Germany for 28 years. The wall, a symbol of communist tyranny during the Cold War, was destroyed in late 1989. (Library of Congress)

uments, literature, art, and symbols. The Soviets rigidly controlled all cultural output, rewarding artists and musicians whose work conformed to communist dogma. Heroes, such as Yuri Gagarin, the first man in space, and Gary Kasparov, the world chess champion, were extolled as epitomizing Soviet national virtues. Dissidents such as the physicist Andre Sakharov, who helped develop the hydrogen bomb and criticized the arms race and repression, for which he was banished to Gorky (1980), were suppressed. Another Nobel Prize winner and dissident, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, whose writings exposed the brutality of the Soviet regime, became an exile. In the United States, anticommunist sentiment was fueled by “red-scare” speeches, writings, and films. Particularly popular was the genre of spy novels involving American and Soviet agents and double-agents, such as those of John Le Carre. Patriotic films of the early Cold War era included The Big Lift (1950), Walk East on Eden (1952), and Strategic Air Command (1955). Red Dawn (1984) was an example of right-wing jingoism. The epitome of Cold War film criticism was Dr. Strangelove (1964). N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The patriotic song and film of the Vietnam War era was Ballad of the Green Berets (1966). However, popular opposition to the war generated considerably more antiwar expressions.

Dimensions My Enemy’s Enemy Is My Friend Washington policy makers were shocked by the overthrow of the U.S. close ally, the autocratic Shah of Iran (1979), and his replacement by the anti-Western regime led by Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini, who carved out a political role for religious fundamentalism. A series of hostile acts by the new Islamic republic culminated in the nationalization of industry and the banks and seizure by militants of the U.S. embassy in Iran, with 52 U.S. hostages being held for 444 days. Approximately a half year later, Iraq invaded Iran, igniting a lengthy, bloody war (1980–1988), the objective of which was to seize the Shatt-al-Arab waterway and the oil-rich southwestern province of Khuzistan, with its largely Arab ethnic population. The Saddam Hussein regime was supported not only by Soviet arms but also by clandestinely supplied U.S. weaponry. The war ended in a stalemate, with Islamist control of Iran being stronger than ever. Three years later, the United States turned on Iraq in the Gulf War to defend its client state, Kuwait. Cult of Personality Many of the leaders of the Cold War period succeeded in developing a cult of personality around themselves that permeated their country’s nationalism—Ho Chi Minh, Nicolae Ceau¸sescu, Enver Hoxa, Kim Il Sung, Fidel Castro, Saddam Hussein. Khrushchev used the term to describe the excessive adulation accorded Stalin, who used all the organs of the state to portray himself as the savior of his people. For none was the personality cult more pervasive than in the case of Mao Zedong. His “greatness and wisdom” were promoted by omnipresent portraits and statues, as well as by the quotations from his Red Book. These quotations were required in all Chinese essays to demonstrate his wisdom as the greatest MarxistLeninist of the era. The book preached that Chinese “democracy” meant centralized government and “freedom with discipline,” as well as plain living and hard struggle. Control of the state propaganda machinery and inculcation of belief in Mao’s infallibility led the people to accept the terror of the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, which led to massive famines and the estimated death of 30 million people. Linking his omniscience to Han ethnocentrism and its traditional view of China as the center of the world enabled Mao to beguile the Chinese people into following policies recognized as disastrous only after his death. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Building a New State through Immigration and Historic Memory Unique to state-building in modern times was the establishment of the state of Israel. Based on “ingathering of the exiles” from over 40 countries, the challenge to nationalism was the absorption of people of diverse culture, language, and social development. The national values of the new state (1948) were articulated by its founding leader, David Ben-Gurion, in the Declaration of Independence—liberty; justice without distinction for creed, race, or sex; freedom of religion; and extension of the hand of peace to the Arabs. A goal of the state was to forge a cooperative society using the instrumentalities of a powerful confederation of labor (Histadrut) and a pioneering vanguard (Kibbutzim) through a controlled, statist approach. Israel’s victory in the war of 1967 marked the beginning of a change in the nature of Israeli nationalism. The very small, cohesive society found itself in control of the Arab Palestinian West Bank and Gaza. At the onset, Israeli settlements in these areas were established on purely strategic, defensive grounds. From 1977 onward, when the right-wing, nationalist Likud government came to power, the settlement movement in the territories became an instrument for realizing its Messianic philosophy of a biblical “Undivided Land of Israel.” An increasing number of the nationalist settlers were ultrareligious, uncompromising in their belief that they were reclaiming their holy birthright. Israeli nationalism has not yet reconciled secular humanism with religious nationalism, nor has it found a place for its now 20 percent Arab populace, which does not have either the full economic benefits or military obligations of the Jewish citizenry. This group has neither a distinct Israeli nor Palestinian Arab identity. The economic policies of both the Likud and Labor parties moved the state from the cooperative vision of the founders to a commitment to private, freemarket principles very much in the mode of the United States. In building a state, the Israeli experience demonstrates that the ideals of its founders can influence, but not control, the future direction of its nationalism. Challenge of Diversity Many states struggle with the challenge of unifying diverse peoples. Indonesia is an example of the triumph of diversity over national unity. The peoples of this 3,000-mile island state included the fundamentalist Islamic Sumatrans and Sulawesians, the “Black Dutch” Ambonese, the Christians of Bali, the several million Chinese and Indians of Java, and the head-hunting Dyaks of Kalimantan. The bold effort of Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, to unite this highly complex, multiracial, multireligious, multiethnic, and multicultural society failed. He offered a syncretic political philosophy that combined Marxism, religion, and representative democracy, based upon five pillars, or the pancasila—nationalism, internationalism, representative democracy, social justice, and belief in a unitary deity (1945). Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism were all recognized as official religions. The differences made the Parliament established by Sukarno all but inoperable, and he soon turned to a government of “guided democracy.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Trying to steer clear of the East-West struggle, Sukarno was a leader of the “Third Way” and played host to 29 Asian-African states at the Bandung Conference (1955), whose goal was to promote economic and cultural cooperation and oppose colonialism. Separatist revolts for independence and Islamic dominance in oil-rich Sumatra spread to Sulawesi (1958–1961). They were quelled by the army, but turmoil continued in Aceh. The Communist Party that Sukarno brought into the government, opening the way to Chinese influence, proved to be a Trojan horse. An attempted communist coup was put down with much bloodshed by a military junta (1963), which later ousted Sukarno and installed General Suharto. Whereas the anti-imperialist Sukarno had managed to maintain Indonesia’s formal neutrality while accepting military aid from the Soviet Union, Suharto immediately turned to the United States for military assistance, erasing any vestige of neutrality. While the country has recently held democratic elections, the military continues to hold it together. Indonesia is a case in which an overall nationalism has not captured the hearts of the diverse peoples, despite the idealism of the five pillars. Loyalty to the individual groups remains primary. Backlash War generally serves as a unifying force, promoting patriotic ardor, faith in national values, and willingness to endure suffering and privation. This, however, was not the case for many Americans during the Vietnam War who felt that this action was the wrong war in the wrong place. The backlash to the war engendered widespread opposition, punctuated by mass demonstrations, draft card and flag burnings, and flights to Canada, dividing the country along ideological lines as never before. The backlash was exacerbated by the crippling of many of the Great Society programs, including deep cuts in antipoverty efforts that touched off widespread rioting in the black ghettos. The peace agreement (1973) by which the United States extricated itself from Indochina did not prevent the North Vietnamese from invading the South and unifying the country (1975). The U.S. people recognized that the United States had lost this war, despite overwhelming superiority in manpower and weaponry. The long-term backlash reverberates still. The “Vietnam Syndrome” haunts Americans as a new crisis of faith grips the nation in the debate over the wisdom of the invasion of Iraq and in the bitterness over the false premises over which the war was initiated. Another backlash can be illustrated by the highly unpopular and ultimately unsuccessful Soviet war to prop up the communist regime in Afghanistan. This effort eroded confidence in the foreign policy of the regime and was one of the factors that eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet state. Another factor in the erosion of patriotic belief in the Soviet government was the incompetence and indifference of the regime in reaction to the Chernobyl disaster. Also, as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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previously noted, Russification of some of the SSRs backfired by arousing fears in the native peoples of becoming minorities in their own homelands. This fear served to strengthen Baltic nationalism, as ethnic, linguistic, and religious identities took on heightened significance, and led to the resolve of the Baltic states to orient themselves to Europe after the Soviet Union was dissolved.

Consequences A ramification of the end of the Cold War has been the erosion of Russian nationalism during a wave of corruption and the despoiling of national resources that followed uncontrolled privatization. The peoples’ high expectations for improving their lives economically have been dashed with the widening of the gap between the poor and the very rich. The pride and faith of the public in the army has been shattered by corruption of the officer class, physical abuse of conscripts, and its general disintegration. Military weakness in the face of the war in Chechnya and terrorism in Dagestan and North Ossetia has further undermined national confidence. Another consequence has been the increase in the number of failed states. Congo, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Moldova, and Haiti are among those states once propped up by one of the superpowers. Loss of external support has undermined their capacities to carry out basic functions of governance, civil order, education, and health. For the most part sub-Saharan Africa and South America have become a vast “Zone of Strategic Marginality.” Efforts to aid these regions are now motivated largely by humanitarian considerations, not by strategic national interests (with the exception of those countries with oil resources). Emergence of the United States as the world’s unchallenged superpower at the end of the Cold War restored the confidence of the public in U.S. “exceptionalism” —pride in the nation’s social, cultural, economic, and political values, expressed in the faith that there is no limit to what Americans can achieve. Support of exporting U.S. democratic and free-market ideals, already at a high pitch, was magnified by the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. The forces sustaining this nationalism are the country’s military strength, wealth, and economic reach. Where exceptionalism has become distorted has been in its recent absolute faith in the right of the United States to protect and enhance its sovereignty by maintaining military and economic supremacy and in spreading its own precepts without reference to their impact upon local cultures, religions, and political sensitivities. In many cases, the attempted imposition has backfired by intensifying local nationalism. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 may prove to be such a case. Supremacy is neither permanent nor static in a dynamic geopolitical world. There are already challenges emerging to U.S. absolute supremacy from China, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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India, and the European Union. Enlightened nationalism will recognize that foreign policy in this multi-polar world requires that the United States consult, negotiate, and seek common ground with others in exporting its values. Selected Bibliography Bassin, Mark. 1994. “Russian Geographers and the National Mission in the Far East.” In Geography and National Identity, edited by David Hooson, 112–133. Oxford: Blackwell. Eisenstadt, S. N. 1967. Israeli Society. New York: Basic Books. Herb, Guntram H., and David H. Kaplan. 1999. Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory and Scale. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Kennan, George F. 1947. “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Foreign Affairs 25:566–582. Lin Piao. 1966. Quotations from Mao Tse-Tung. Peking: Foreign Language Press. Service, Robert. 2005. Stalin—A Biography. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press. Sulzberger, C. L. 1974. The Coldest War: Russia’s Game in China. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1945. Democracy in America, vol. 2. Edited by Phillips Bradley. New York: A. A. Knopf. Tuminez, Astrid S. 2000. Russian Nationalism since 1856—Ideology and the Making of Foreign Policy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Walker, Edward W. 2003. Dissolution, Sovereignty and Breakup of the Soviet Union. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. White, George F. 2000. Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Wilson, Duncan. 1980. Tito’s Yugoslavia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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Postcolonial Nationalist Philosophies Brett Bowden Relevance Nationalist philosophies and nationalist movements in the post–World War II period have been highly influential factors in shaping the turbulent arena of postwar domestic and international politics. In the immediate postwar decades, anticolonial nationalism played a prominent role in shaping state formation across the globe, from the Caribbean to Africa—especially sub-Saharan Africa but also the north—and from the Middle East to the expanses of Asia and the Pacific Islands. Naturally, anticolonial nationalist movements could not help but impact the domestic and international political relations of the former colonial powers, both new and old, from the long-standing colonial powers like Great Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, and the Netherlands to the latecomers such as the United States of America and Australia. At the heart of anticolonial or anti-imperial nationalism are the all-important principles of self-determination and state sovereignty. Th e general argument goes that a self-identified or self-selecting people or nation of a viable size has a legitimate right to the freedom of national self-determination and to govern itself as it sees fit. Regardless of how good or bad the government turns out to be, the principle of state sovereignty has traditionally held that states should be left to govern themselves free from external interference—especially imperialist interference. One way to get a good idea of the significance of post–World War II anticolonial nationalism is to understand the number of people it affected around the globe. And a good way to do this is to look at the number of newly independent sovereign nations that came into existence in the decades immediately after 1945. When the United Nations was founded in 1945, it originally included only 51 member states; by 1955, there were 76 members. This increase was primarily attributable to the inclusion of preexisting states that had not signed on to the UN Charter at its founding. The most dramatic increase came in the next five years, particularly in 1960, when many of the newly independent states of Africa joined the United Nations, bringing its membership total to 99. With further waves of independence in Africa (particularly sub-Saharan Africa), the Middle East, Asia, and the Caribbean, by 1970 the United Nations had 127 member states. In the 1970s, the number of newly independent states was beginning to slow, as many anticolonial fights had been fought and won; by 1980 the number had crept up to 154, and by 1990 only 5 more had joined. In 2007, there are 192 member states of the United Nations. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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POSTCOLONIAL NATIONALIST PHILOSOPHIES

No two colonial powers governed in precisely the same manner or necessarily for the exact same reasons. For most colonizers, various combinations of motivating factors affected governance, such as geopolitical prestige and power, the expansion of trade routes and concomitant economic benefits, among others. However, what colonizing powers did have in common is that they left longlasting scars and divisions in many of the resultant independent states. For instance, colonial governance techniques such as divide-and-rule colonialism practiced by the Belgians and the French, in which indigenous minorities were privileged over majorities—such as the Belgians did with minority Tutsis over majority Hutus in what is now Burundi and Rwanda—continue to have serious ramifications in the successor states. So, too, Britain’s practice of indirect rule, in which the colonial administration worked through what were believed to be long-standing traditional structures of power or authority, continues to be an obstacle to good governance and national unity in many of its former colonies. Another common trait among the colonial powers, particularly the European colonial powers in the 18th and 19th centuries with the rise of Social Darwinism and the advent of disciplines such as ethnography or ethnology, was their treatment of the issue of race. It is painfully evident that the characterization of different peoples as occupying different places on the civilizational hierarchy was undeniably a motivating factor in the subjection of “peoples of color” to colonial rule. In many ways, the colonial powers saw it as their duty to take up the “white man’s burden” and embark on “civilizing missions” in the many so-called “backward” or “uncivilized” corners of the globe. Despite the differences in the various colonial projects, then, common to all anticolonial nationalist movements was the waging of a war, often literal and often very violent, against a ruling regime, an oppressor, who viewed their subjects as racially inferior. One of the most significant achievements of nationalist movements in the former colonial world, then, and perhaps in world history, is that, by opposing imperialism and colonial rule, they struck a blow to such blatantly racist ideas as the “white man’s burden” and concomitant “civilizing missions” that were to save the colored peoples of the world from themselves. As to whether such ideas have received a fatal blow is still open to question; some would argue that similar sentiments endure, albeit far more implicitly, in international humanitarian and development assistance agendas and projects.

Origins Though there were unhappy rumblings among colonized peoples prior to World War II and immediately afterward, it was not until the 1950s that anticolonial nationalist movements really began to gather steam. The event that sparked this off as much as any other, if not more, was the Bandung Conference of April 18–24, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Delegates at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, 1955. (Lisa Larsen/Time & Life Pictures/ Getty Images)

1955. In December 1954, the leaders of Burma, Ceylon (later Sri Lanka), India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, collectively known as the Colombo group, met in Bogor, Indonesia, where they jointly proposed convening an Asian-African conference to be held the following year at Bandung, the capital of the Indonesian province of West Java. According to official accounts, in addition to the conference’s five proposers, the Bandung Conference was attended by representatives of 24 other Asian and African countries, namely, Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Peoples Republic of China (Communist China), Egypt, Ethiopia, the Gold Coast (later Ghana), Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the State of Vietnam (South Vietnam, later reunified with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam), and Yemen. However, other accounts suggest that more than 1,000 representatives from 50 states and 30 anticolonial or nationalist liberation movements also attended the conference. Among them were the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), the Tunisian Neo-Destour movement, and the Moroccan Istiqlal. Notably, South Africa (under apartheid rule at the time), Israel (for obvious reasons given the general sympathy at the conference for the plight of Palestinians), Taiwan (presumably at China’s insistence), South Korea, and North Korea (both at war less than two years earlier) were not invited to attend the conference. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The End of Empire — National Liberations Won Post-1945 Belgian colonies: Belgian Congo (future Congo-Kinshasa, future Zaire, future Democratic Republic of the Congo) gains independence June 30, 1960; Burundi and Rwanda follow on July 1, 1962. British colonies: India wins independence through campaigns of nonviolence and civil disobedience on August 15, 1947. Ceylon, the future Sri Lanka, becomes a dominion on November 14, 1947. Burma gains independence January 4, 1948. Independence is granted to the Gold Coast (future Ghana) on March 6, 1957; Nigeria on October 1, 1960; Sierra Leone on April 27, 1961; Uganda on October 9, 1962; Kenya on December 12, 1963; Tanganyika (and Zanzibar later merged into Tanzania) on December 9, 1961; Malawi on July 6, 1964; Zambia on October 24, 1964; Gambia on February 18, 1965; Botswana on September 30, 1966; Lesotho on October 4, 1966; Mauritius on March 12, 1968; Swaziland on September 6, 1968; Seychelles on June 29, 1976; and Rhodesia (future Zimbabwe) on April 18, 1980. French colonies: Following years of conflict in Indochina, France signs the Geneva Accords on July 21, 1954. Morocco gains independence on March 2, 1956; Tunisia on March 20, 1956; Guinea on October 2, 1958; Cameroon on January 1, 1960 (also part of the British empire); Togo on April 27, 1960; Mali on June 20, 1960; Senegal on June 20, 1960; Madagascar on June 26, 1960; Benin on August 1, 1960; Niger on August 3, 1960; Burkina Faso on August 5, 1960; the Côte d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) on August 7, 1960; Chad on August 11, 1960; the Central African Republic on August 13, 1960; the Republic of Congo on August 15, 1960; Gabon on August 17, 1960; Mauritania on November 28, 1960; Algeria on March 18, 1962; Comoros on July 6, 1975; and Djibouti on June 27, 1977. Dutch colonies: Indonesia wins independence on August 17, 1945. Portuguese colonies: Independence is won by Guinea-Bissau on September 10, 1974; Mozambique on June 25, 1975; Cape Verde on July 5, 1975; São Tomé and Principe on July 12, 1975; and Angola on November 11, 1975. Spanish colonies: The vestiges of a once powerful empire are all but gone when Equatorial Guinea gains independence on October 12, 1968, and Western Sahara follows on February 28, 1976. United States colonies: Washington grants autonomy to the Philippines on March 24, 1934, with true independence coming on July 4, 1946.

The aim of the Bandung Conference was to promote greater economic and cultural cooperation among recently decolonized nations and to further oppose colonialism “on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty.” In his opening address to the conference, the Indonesian president, Ahmad Sukarno, proposed two mottos or catchphrases to rally the delegates: “Live and let live” and “Unity in diversity” were offered as a “unifying force which brings us all together—to seek in friendly, uninhibited discussion, ways and means by which each of us can live his own life, and let others live their own lives, in their own way, in harmony, and in peace.” His speech went on to declare that, despite recent N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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moves toward decolonization, “colonialism is not yet dead. How can we say it is dead, so long as vast areas of Asia and Africa are unfree. . . . Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful [sic] and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing and one which must be eradicated from the earth” (Bandung Conference 1955). The conference began with two days of plenary sessions, after which the delegates were divided into three subcommittees to workshop opportunities for greater economic, cultural, and political cooperation. The final communiqué of the Bandung Conference included sections on economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, human rights, self-determination, problems of dependent people, and promotion of world peace. Among the principles listed within the communiqué was an insistence on racial equality—something that could not be agreed upon following the conclusion of World War I and the establishment of the UN precursor, the League of Nations. Essentially, the African and Asian states and the various anticolonial nationalist movements represented at Bandung sought to reaffirm and strengthen their ambitions for independence from Western imperialism while also seeking to keep the Soviet bloc at a comfortable and manageable distance. Naturally there were some exceptions to this general aim given the varying range of interests represented. For instance, the Indian prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, later stated of the conference: There was the political interplay and backstage intrigues. Quite a number of people there were permanent performers of the UN and they functioned with all due pomposity. A tightly knit group represented, if I may say so, the United States policy. This consisted chiefly of Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Lebanon. Also, of course, the Philippines and Thailand. These two were at least somewhat moderate in their expression. The other four were quite aggressive and sometimes even offensive. A threat was made out that the conference would be broken up if their viewpoint was not adopted. (quoted in Arpi 2005)

Nevertheless, collectively those gathered at Bandung got the ball rolling on a strategic bloc that was intended to be independent from the superpowers and the dangerous machinations of the Cold War. As history shows us, not all of the newly independent postcolonial states were able to stay out of harm’s way during the ensuing East-West antagonism. But this six-day conference effectively marks the beginning of what was to become known as the “Third World” and later gave rise to the “nonaligned movement.” In the following years, issues raised by the Bandung Conference were taken up by the nonaligned movement. With growing representation in the UN General Assembly, in November 1963 the movement urged that body to institute a new international trade and development policy that would assist developing N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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countries in promoting economic development, in facilitating the export of goods to the developed world, and in providing greater financial resources. These demands met with limited success, for they remained very similar to the reforms being sought by many to the existing international trading system in the pursuit of a fairer system. An interesting footnote to the original Bandung Conference is that from April 22–24, 2005, an Asia-Africa summit was held in Jakarta, Indonesia. To mark the 50th anniversary of the conference, on April 24 the participating leaders attended a ceremony in Bandung. The 2005 summit was attended by 106 countries—well over half of the then 191 UN member states— representing 75 percent of the world population. Key players at Bandung in 1955, apart from the host, Indonesian president Ahmad Sukarno, were Egypt’s President Gamal Abdel Nasser; the premier of Communist China, Zhou Enlai; Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru; Kwame Nkrumah, the prime minister of the Gold Coast (later Ghana); Ho Chi Minh, prime minister of Vietnam; and U.S. congressman Adam Clayton Powell of Harlem, New York. Beyond the Bandung Conference, other prominent anticolonial nationalist figures included Julius Nyerere, who studied history and economics at the University of Edinburgh and was well known for his policy of agricultural collectivization known as Ujamaa (“familyhood”). He was a cofounder of the Tanganyika African National Union and worked tirelessly for independence, social equality, and harmonious race/ethnic relations. As prime minister when independence was won in 1961, Nyerere became the first president of Tanzania upon the merger of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Nyerere also played a significant role in the foundation in 1963 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Another prominent African anticolonial nationalist leader was Kwame Nkrumah of the British-ruled Gold Coast. Nkrumah furthered his education in the United States and England, where in 1945 he was active in organizing the Pan-African Congress. Returning to Ghana in 1947, he joined the newly founded United Gold Coast Convention but soon left to establish the Convention People’s Party (CPP). Imprisoned for independence activism, Nkrumah was released to form a government when his CPP was successful in the elections of 1951, subsequently leading Ghana to independence in 1957. Like Nyerere, he was a committed pan-Africanist and also played a prominent role in the foundation of the OAU. In the Belgian Congo, Patrice Lumumba drove the struggle for national liberation as the founder in 1958 of the National Congolese Movement (MNC). Leading strike actions and protests against the Belgian colonial government, he called for immediate independence. Lumumba was also arrested for his activism, but his popularity saw him released. Following parliamentary elections in 1960, Lumumba became prime minister, with his government based in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) in the country’s western region. The former Belgian Congo is a classic case of a nationalist liberation movement not actually having a self-identified “nation” to represent; Lumumba’s government had little or no control over the rich mining N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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province of Katanga, which declared itself an independent republic. The events that ensued are complicated and not without controversy; they involve the United Nations, the death of a UN secretary general, a military coup, and ultimately, the murder of Patrice Lumumba in January 1961, with European and American complicity. The former Belgian Congo has not had a freely elected government since, nor has it come close to stability. Léopold Senghor was a Senegalese poet and intellectual who went on to become the country’s first president, serving from 1960 to his resignation in 1981. He is known in African and black nationalist circles as one of the names behind the concept of Négritude and was a proud spokesperson and defender of African culture and African identity in the face of French colonial oppression. Frantz Fanon is another intellectual and activist whose life and body of written work has left an enduring mark on anticolonial nationalist and black nationalist movements. Educated in Martinique and France and an equally accomplished psychoanalyst and social philosopher, Fanon fought with the French army during World War II and later went on to join the Algerian liberation movement, becoming an editor of its newspaper in 1956. Though his life was cut short by leukemia in 1961, by the time of his death he was an established authority on black consciousness and black identity, the strengths and weaknesses of nationalism as a liberating force, and the violence that liberation almost inevitably demanded. Perhaps no one is more significant in the realm of anticolonial liberation movements than Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, more commonly known as Mahatma Gandhi. Ghandi brought the Indian case for independence from British rule to the outside world. Armed with a philosophy of nonviolence, which he termed Satyagraha, and a law degree from London, Gandhi fought for the cause of Indians in South Africa and at home. Jailed for his activism in 1922, 1930, 1933, and 1942, Gandhi went on a number of highly publicized hunger strikes that attracted worldwide attention to the cause. With the upsurge in nationalist sentiments following World War II, Britain resigned itself to withdrawing from India and granting independence, leaving behind the states of India (Hindu), with Nehru as prime minister, and Pakistan (Muslim). Reluctantly, Gandhi realized that India’s religious divisions ran deep and acquiesced to the partition of his homeland. Within months Gandhi was assassinated by a fanatical Hindu who could not accept Gandhi’s belief that Hindus and Muslims were equals. In speaking of nationalist leaders of the era, it would be remiss to overlook Ho Chi Minh and the case of Vietnam. In 1930, Ho founded the Indochinese Communist Party and then in 1941 established the Viet Minh (“independence”) League as an alliance of communist and nationalist organizations to oppose French and Japanese occupation, and later American forces. After decades of leading a struggle for a Vietnam that was unified and free from occupation, Ho Chi Minh died in September 1969 with the war in Indochina far from resolved. Vietnam’s reunification under a communist government did not take place until July 1976 under the leadership of Pham Van Dong, the North Vietnamese premier, but for many it is N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the leadership and legacy of Ho Chi Minh in opposing foreign occupation that endures as a source of Vietnamese nationalist pride. Many nationalist luminaries of the post–World War II era were both theorists and activists. Some have left behind significant bodies of work that are still studied to this day. Others have left lasting legacies to their nations and peoples, not all of them positive, and some have done both. As we have seen, Gandhi and Lumumba paid with their lives for their respective nationalist causes, while an attempt was made on Nasser’s life. The government of Indonesian president Sukarno was toppled, while Ghana went on to become a one-party state with Nkrumah in effect its dictator, until he was also overthrown by a military coup. Even those who left office of their own choice did not always live up to the promises; deciding not to contest the 1985 election, Nyerere admitted the shortcomings of his Uhuru na Ujamaa (“freedom and socialism”) program, declaring in his farewell speech, “I failed. Let’s admit it” (McDonald and Njeri Sahle 2003).

Dimensions One of the issues central to anticolonial or anti-imperialist nationalist movements —particularly in the way they affected outside states that thought they also had a stake in developments—was whether they were truly just guises for extending the communist or capitalist spheres of influence. This is a question that people still argue about, and it is not one that is easy to separate out and draw clear-cut conclusions about. Even with the benefit of hindsight, there are more shades of gray than black or white. That said, Marxism-Leninism was undeniably an influence for many leaders and adherents of national liberation movements; whether they intended to establish a communist or socialist state having won independence, however, is another matter altogether. Vietnam is the obvious example here, where the West and the United States in particular feared that, should Vietnam be lost to the communist sphere of influence, a domino effect would quickly follow suit across much of southern Asia. While Vietnam and the Vietnam War is the most well-known such scenario, other nationalist liberation movements across Africa and elsewhere spiked similar concerns in the East and West alike. From American and Australian forces fighting in Vietnam to the presence of Cuban troops in southern Africa, the newly identified Third World became the site of a number of Cold War proxy wars that were anything but cold. Another prominent theme in nationalist movements and philosophies of this era involved the various strains of pan-nationalisms, such as pan-Africanism, panArabism, and pan-Islamism. These pan-nationalist movements were in many ways intended to cut across national boundaries and unite even greater collectives with a common cause, which then became a greater struggle. The Bandung Conference N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of 1955 played no small part in breathing life into these movements, although in some cases the idea had been floating around for a good many years prior. The first pan-African conference, for instance, was held in London in 1900. The cause of pan-Africanism was promoted by a number of black leaders and intellectuals from around the world, not just Africa. Its prominent leaders and adherents included W. E. B. Du Bois, Kwame Nkrumah, and Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta. Pan-Africanism also had a distinct influence on some black American civil rights leaders, particularly Malcolm X. At the Sixth Pan-African Congress held in Manchester in 1945, Nkrumah founded the West African National Secretariat, with the aim of forming the United States of Africa. As we have seen, Nkrumah and other African leaders went on to found the Organization of African Unity in 1963, which in turn became the African Union. This intergovernmental body, however, falls well short of approaching the degree of cooperation and integration achieved by the European Union and is not likely to do so any time soon. Of the Bandung Conference attendees, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser is most readily identified as pushing the cause of pan-Arabism and Arab nationalism, and even pan-Africanism. Nasser accused both the West and the United Nations of siding with Israel and of complicity in the displacement of Palestinians from their homeland, a cause that will not lose anyone favor in either the Arab or greater Islamic worlds. Broadly, Arab nationalism rallies around the idea that all Arab peoples share a common heritage, a common history, a common culture, and a common language, and in this they are united in their opposition to a common enemy or enemies. Arab nationalists need not necessarily subscribe to a brand of pan-Arabism that calls for the creation of a single Arab state to which all Arabs should belong; rather, they merely seek an Arab world, particularly the Middle East, free from external interference and influence. Pan-Islamism is a similar idea that extends beyond the Islamic Middle East and North Africa to the broader Muslim world. At the Bandung Conference, Mohammed Natsir, an advocate of Persatuan Islam (“unity of Islam”) and a prominent political figure in the world’s largest Muslim country, Indonesia, proposed the creation of a theocratic pan-Islamic state that would be aligned to neither the capitalist West nor the communist East. The proposal had few takers at the time and is an even less likely event today, although it still has its adherents, some of them radical militant groups. Nevertheless, Muslims and Muslim countries across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa do throw their moral and practical support behind one another when circumstances demand, such as when it is perceived that their common faith is under threat. Impacts on Different Groups When it comes to thinking about subnational groups in the postcolonial world, nationalism and nationalist liberation movements pose some particularly sticky questions. It was noted above that the principle of self-determination generally holds that a self-identified or self-selecting people or nation of a viable size has a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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fundamental right to self-government. However, in the vast majority of postcolonial states, perhaps in all, there is generally no single self-identified or self-selecting collective to speak of. Rather, most postcolonial states are an agglomeration of different groups distinguishable by various combinations of ethnicity, religion, caste, and other such markers. What has bound them together prior to their gaining independence is their common colonial history and a common enemy, their colonial overlords. Once that enemy is defeated or willingly grants independence and national self-determination is achieved, the vexing question then becomes, Who is represented by the “self,” which, if any, collective constitutes the “nation,” and is there a nation at all? In most instances, the postcolonial state is not a freely formed geopolitical space; rather, it is an artificial construct that is the result of arbitrary boundaries agreed to at a roundtable of colonial powers, such as at the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885 at which the European powers sketched some lines upon a map and in the process carved out the future internal borders of Africa. The borders of the states that make up the Middle East were drawn up in much the same way. For instance, part of Iraq’s justification or rationalization for invading and annexing Kuwait as its 19th province in 1990 was based on 19th-century Ottoman maps that showed Kuwait as part of Iraq’s southern province of Basra. It is true that the borders of most modern states are not exactly “naturally” occurring, with the possible exception of island states such as Australia or New Zealand (the issue of archipelagos such as Indonesia is much more complicated, and Ireland offers up another set of problems altogether). In Europe, they were forged—drawn and redrawn—after what were often seemingly endless years of battle and bloodshed. The difference, however, in much of the postcolonial world, and especially in Africa, is that this process did not take place, at least not to any satisfactory conclusion. Instead, the borders were imposed by external forces who neither understood nor cared much about the existing demarcations and subgroup power relations. When this vexing problem of state formation is coupled with the ongoing effects of colonial governance techniques, such as divide and rule and indirect rule, some rather large obstacles remain to be overcome when it comes to forging national unity and establishing stable postcolonial governments. In most colonies, the struggle for decolonization spewed forth a good many liberation movements and leaders who, although they were Indian nationalists, or African nationalists, or Arab nationalists, were also members of particular clans, or followed specific faiths, or adhered to particular ideologies. Once independence was won and the new nationalist elite had been installed in power, the genie could not easily be put back in the bottle, so to speak. A political space and a share in power had to be found for all of these competing forces if there was to be any hope of a smooth transition to independence and “national” self-determination. And as history has shown, sharing the power was not often the case. Hence postcolonial liberation movements gave rise to further secessionist movements, such as that described above in the Belgian Congo. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Biafran secessionist movement in Nigeria in the late 1960s is another prominent case of a postcolonial country whose subsequent history of independence has been anything but smooth sailing. The secessionist movement plunged the country into years of civil war during which untold thousands perished. In fact, Nigeria is a very good example of the problems that are created and the complex sociocultural issues that must be dealt with when national borders are externally imposed to create a “nation” with little appreciation of the array of peoples falling within its borders. For instance, Nigeria’s population is estimated to be close to 134 million (July 2003) and is made up of more than 250 different ethnic groups. The larger of these are the Hausa and Fulani in the north (29 percent), the Yoruba in the southwest (21 percent), and the Igbo or Ibo in the southeast (18 percent). The “nation’s” population is further differentiated in that its people are 50 percent Muslim, 40 percent Christian, including Roman Catholic, Anglican, Baptist, and Methodist, and 10 percent Animist. It should also be borne in mind that many of these ethnic and religious cleavages overlap with and cut across borders with its West African neighbors. (Similar issues confront much of the postcolonial world, from Africa to the Middle East, with Indonesia being a good example in Southeast Asia). Small surprise, then, that throughout its postcolonial independence, the “nation” of Nigeria has rarely chosen its government via electoral consensus; rather, it has more often than not been held together by a brutal dictatorial military regime. Only now, after 40 years of independence, does Nigeria have a civilian government that is trying to come to grips with the issues of nationhood and national stability. One of the real vexing problems for many postcolonial states is that, though they may now be independent and self-governing states, very few, if any of them, are “nation-states.” Backlashes As can be gleaned from the above, nationalism in the postcolonial world is something of a double-edged sword. In the first instance it can serve as a unifying force that brings together disparate groups of peoples when there is a common enemy to be opposed, such as a colonial oppressor. At the same time, however, the sentiments aroused by nationalist fervor can distill into pride and affection for a more discreet and exclusive subgroup that can, in turn, pose a disrupting or fragmenting threat once the common enemy exits the scene. Sometimes these fissures in the “nation” fighting for independence might lie shallowly beneath the surface, continuing to simmer and fester while a seemingly unified struggle is being fought against an occupying force or colonizer. The divisions between Hindus and Muslims in the British colony of India are a good example, although there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this long-existing tension was anything but well hidden. The subsequent contest for political power after the colonizer has departed can play itself out in a number of ways. In the former British India, it resulted in partition and the creation of two states—the Hindu-dominated India and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Muslim-dominated Pakistan. While this outcome has some positives, it also has a downside: the two countries have fought a number of wars in the 50-plus years since gaining independence, and they continue to posture and even fight on and off over the disputed border region of Jammu and Kashmir. Tensions between the two nations is further complicated by the fact that both countries went nuclear in the late 1990s, a source of national pride for many people in both countries. In other postcolonial countries, preexisting divisions have led to exhaustive civil wars in the contest to fill the power vacuum created by the departure of the colonial power. Good examples can be found in the former southern African Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, which did not win their independence until the mid-1970s and only then after fighting a violent and bloody liberation war against their colonizer. Take Angola as an example to illustrate how events become complicated by the existence of competing nationalist groups. In this case, three nationalist liberation movements were involved in the struggle for independence: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, or MPLA), the National Front of Angolan Liberation (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola, or FNLA), and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, or UNITA). In the early days of independence, a tripartite, powersharing transition government was formed by the three nationalist movements. Cooperation was short-lived, however, and conflict soon erupted between the three power-seeking factions. As in some other postcolonial states, the Angolan civil war was complicated and intensified by the Cold War meddling of the superpowers; the Soviet Union and its allies, including a large contingent of Cuban troops backed the MPLA, while the West, through apartheid South Africa, got behind UNITA. The Angolan civil war only ended in 2002, and elections were not scheduled to be held until 2006. The war has been a long and costly one that has rent the country asunder and exposed the deep-seated problems created by the imposition of colonial borders around peoples in a vain attempt to forge a nation that simply does not exist. The presence of a valuable resource, such as diamonds in the case of Angola, further complicates matters and invites yet more foreign meddling. As recent history has shown in often graphically violent detail, Angola does not stand alone in grappling with such issues. The postcolonial era has witnessed many years of civil wars or struggles for control of the state between competing groups in former colonies; some are based on ideological divisions, some religious, some ethnic, and some a volatile mixture of all of the above. Perhaps the most recent and most disturbing depiction of this violent contest for control of the state between competing subnational groups is the genocide in the former Belgian Congo, played out across the borders of Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which destabilized the delicate political balance of the entire region. As in so much of the postcolonial world, the arbitrary drawing of borders by the European colonial powers, the divide-and-rule colonial governance techniques administered by colonizers such as Belgium, and the various naN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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tionalist liberation movements that arose decades later all contributed to a national volatility wherein various forces pulled equally in as many different directions.

Consequences As is evident from the discussion above and the highlighting of a few examples, post–World War II nationalist liberation movements in the former colonial world have had both positive and negative effects. On the upside, by and large those nationalist movements have been successful in fighting for and winning liberation from their various colonial masters. Sometimes independence was necessarily achieved through violent and bloody guerilla-style revolutionary wars. Today very few people argue against a nation’s inherent right to the freedom of selfdetermination and sovereign self-government. The liberation of the former colonial world also gave rise to the nonaligned movement, a loosely allied bloc of states that during the Cold War and afterward neither sided with the East nor the West in intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations. Many would see this development as positive, whereas others argue that it has led to a new set of problems in international relations between states; there is probably some measure of truth to either contention. But nationalist movements in the postcolonial world have obviously also led to more than a few negative outcomes for successor states, the former colonial powers, and the international community at large. As noted, competing nationalist movements have often struggled violently to fill the power void left by the quick exit of colonial governments, governments that left in place an administrative apparatus that was ill-suited to governing after the people became citizens and no longer subjects. The arbitrary demarcation of state boundaries that cut existing collectives in halves and bunched together other collectives into artificially constructed states has posed serious obstacles when it comes to attempts to forge some measure of national unity. There remain questions and contestations over who should lead the state, who is best equipped to hold the reins of state power, who are “the people” over which they will govern, and on whose authority. The problems posed by the postcolonial moment and the often disorderly transition to it are still highly relevant for many postcolonial countries today. Although quite a few of these successor states have been self-governing for close to 50 years, small numbers have had stable governments in which the national leadership is decided on by consensus. All too often national leaders have not represented the nation, and all too often they have come to and held onto power through violence, often using the military as a vehicle. Too many postcolonial nationalist elites have been anything but national leaders; rather, they have represented or acted in the interests of their own distinct subgrouping, or, equally as traumatic for the country, they have acted purely out of self-interest, with corruption and endemic poverty plaguing their so-called peoples. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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As identified at the outset, the problem for so many still relatively newly liberated states is that, though they might in theory be self-governing and sovereign states, they are not actually nation-states. That is, the state is generally not made up of a readily self-identified or self-selecting collective that is bound together by long-standing commonalities. Instead, the state holds a diverse range of different tribal, ethnic, caste, and religious groupings that occupy the same demarcated geographical space and compete for social, economic, cultural, and political power in that space. As relatively new “nations” with very little national history to bind them together, other than the struggle for independence, which can be both a blessing and a curse, they are still working out the best means to peacefully coexist in that geopolitical space. And some subnational collectives for whom the nation is not their primary marker or point of allegiance continue to seek to govern themselves, either through their own state through secession or through autonomous regions. Hence, despite having won national liberation from colonial oppressors, the struggle for national liberation, autonomy, and self-rule goes on. Selected Bibliography Arpi, Claude. 2005. “Was Bandung in Vain?” (Retrieved April 22, 2007), http://www.Rediff.com. Bandung Conference. 1955. Africa-Asia Speaks from Bandung. Jakarta: Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chatterjee, Partha. 1993a. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Chatterjee, Partha. 1993b. The Nation and Its Fragments. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Emerson, Rupert. 1960. From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1965. A Dying Colonialism. New York: Grove Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1967a. Black Skin, White Masks. New York: Grove Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1967b. The Wretched of the Earth. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. Gandhi, Mohandas K. 1951. Satyagraha: Non-violent Resistance. Abmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House. Mamdani, Mahmood. 1996. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mayall, James. 1990. Nationalism and International Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. McDonal, David A., and Eunice Njeri Sahle, eds. 2003. The Legacies of Julius Nyerere: Influences on Development Discourse and Proactice in Africa. Lawrenceville, NJ: Africa World Press. Nandy, Ashis. 1983. The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism. New Delhi, India: Oxford University Press. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1965. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism. London: Panaf Books. Nkrumah, Kwame. 1973. Towards Colonial Freedom: Africa in the Struggle against World Imperialism. London: Panaf Books. Oommen, T. K. 1997. Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Said, Edward. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage. Said, Edward. 1994. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Vintage.


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Religion, Ideology, and Nationalism Zachary Irwin Relevance Any effort to discuss this subject must start by suggesting introductory definitions. By ideology we are referring to any system of thought that seeks to expose or criticize an existing explanation of social reality in favor of one more in accord with “real” social forces, whether psychological, historical, or material. Our concern will be less to consider ideologies as examples of critical thought than as efforts to reconstruct society, like the use of Marxist principles to shape “socialist” or social democratic policies. Also, nationalism may be understood as a doctrine and a movement that is a type of ideology. Nationalism elevates the nation as a core value by emphasizing its place as the primary source of communal identity and social value. Nationalism is evident in movements that pursue self-determination for a group of people that consider themselves a “nation.” Nationalistic values may be easy to recognize, but exactly what constitutes a nation may be little more than an act of will uniting a collectivity. Nationalism, like most ideologies, claims a “higher” level of rationality, often expressed in some notion of human nature, history, or current politics. Because national identity has often been distinguished by a distinctive religious identity, it is necessary to consider religion’s place in both nationalist and ideological movements. Religion may also claim a higher notion of reality, but one founded in the faith of transcendental revelation. Ideologies are intended to alter secular public values and policies and are of diminished purpose beyond public life. By contrast, religion has an independent meaning and purpose that may be expressed through private and collective organizations. The Christian writer C. S. Lewis has remarked that religion and law differ fundamentally. Although both are concerned with outward human conduct, religion is also concerned with the inner state of human motivation and ultimate destiny. In a sense, totalitarian ideologies, like Nazism and communism, may count as “political religions” because of their goal of human transformation in some novel sense. Other ideologies, like nationalism, may seek to borrow religious symbols and values to win popular respect and gain a deeper sense of identity, but primarily they emphasize behavior. Some religious leaderships may seek political power independently and appeal to religious feeling for that purpose. Religion and ideology also differ in the ways that they seek justification for their claims for loyalty. Ideologies often claim tangible social results through a system of self-selected values, whereas religion asserts ideals of social rectitude whose values are ends in themselves and refer to a transcendental reality expressed in faith. Occasionally, some N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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RELIGION, IDEOLOGY, AND NATIONALISM

nationalist movements link national identity with religion. For example, Christian Arabs have been active in both Arab and Palestinian nationalism, but the Islamic Palestinian movement Hamas considers its goal of an Islamic state identical to Palestinian self-determination. The rise of mass national movements since 1945 is inseparable from the rise of mass political consciousness. Typically, the nation that did not govern itself was considered to have forfeited its natural right to be free of foreign domination. Moreover, two world wars mobilized the great majority of peoples throughout the world who were subject to foreign rule. World War I defeated the German, Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian empires. U. S. president Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” promised a new era of peace through “autonomous development” of former subject nations in independent states. During and after World War II, a similar idealism animated the language of the Four Freedoms (1941), the United Nations Charter (1945), and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (1948). Although these documents do not refer to nationalism, they imply that selfdetermination is a prior condition of all rights. The relation of ideology and religion in global politics since 1945 suggests that each has evolved distinctively. Marxism, for example, has continued to develop as an ideological critique of capitalism after the general collapse of communist party rule, but its historical impact as a political movement has been shaped by changes in technology and communication. For example, the development of Stalinist totalitarianism was as dependent on modern technology as the collapse of the Soviet Union was a consequence of developments in communications and the global economy. Religious involvement in politics, either in social movements, statecraft, or in some combination, is a staple of most historical periods, but the postwar decades have differed from earlier times in important respects. Through the development of “mass” political activity, religious claims have broadened to ideas of collective identity and popular legitimacy. As we have mentioned, religion and national identity have become more closely identified. For example, Slavic peoples have considered a self-governing (autocephalous) Orthodoxy as much the basis for identity as a distinctive homeland and language. Varieties of Buddhism have been identified with political identity in some Asian nations. Moreover, whether or not we choose to consider some aspects of modern thought to be “ideological,” that is, as a critique or rationale of state claims and actions, ideological movements are as traditionally transnational as their religious counterparts. This transnational character makes possible generalizations about religion and nationality beyond the experience of a certain political culture or a religious tradition. Apart from this shared attribute, several distinct developments distinguish the interaction of religion and ideology within recent decades. First, the authority of both has been challenged in a way comparable to the challenge posed to religion following the destructive wars of the 17th century. Peoples have found ideologies like fascism and communism insufficient for public purposes, whether owing to the consequences of even more deadly wars or N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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from the criteria of political legitimacy. Traditional religious institutions have fared somewhat better in preserving their moral claims through charismatic leadership or their perceived exceptional rectitude. Second, whether one chooses Ortega y Gasset’s notion of the “revolt of the masses” or a more appealing description, the democratic character of postwar politics has narrowed the public space between categories of religious and political action (Revolt of the Masses). Religion has become too popular to evade secular public values, and politics, too transparent to escape the criticisms of the religious. Finally, within the last two decades, religion and ideology have arrived at a condition of mutual influence, if not tolerance. Thus, by the 1990s, a clear delineation of religion from ideology might beg the question of recognizing the separate attributes of each. In relatively secular European societies, religious identities have been pervasively influenced by “ideologies” like feminism and notions of egalitarian justice. Conversely, political leaders in some developing countries in and out of power have justified violence on religious grounds. Secular ideologies have not fared well within the last decade. For example, for decades the state of Israel realized a political compromise between secular and religious ideas of Jewish identity. More recently, the consensus behind that compromise has decayed as different groups assert a more exclusive politics of identity and an uncompromising sense of rectitude. This development is characteristic of a more general political phenomenon. Whatever their motive, religious and secular leaders alike have found the pursuit of “identity” a badge of political legitimacy, group cohesion, and mutual obligation. Not only has the distinction between religion and ideology eroded, but their political expressions include a diverse lot of parties, movements, associations, and violent insurgencies. This diversity is quite recent, but its origins lie in the postwar era. Arguably, the present would be unintelligible without an appreciation of the immediate postwar era, since events in those years have cast a long shadow. The European Postwar Era Understanding political parties is central to understanding the place of religion and ideology in postwar politics. Whether parties are open and democratic or self-selecting and totalitarian, their purpose is to govern. The most significant ideological feature of the postwar era is the destruction of fascism and most authoritarian ideologies of the right. Postwar Spain, under the authoritarian rule of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, represents an exception, yet Franco’s rule survived until the dictator’s death by avoiding war with the Allies. In Western Europe, the political vacuum of defeated Italy and Germany was filled both by the left and the democratic right. In both countries, Christian Democratic parties were led by the surviving leaders of interwar Roman Catholic parties. Alcide De Gasperi (1881–1954) and Konrad Adenauer (1876–1967) were both imprisoned by the fascist authorities as political leaders of interwar Catholic parties in opposition to fascism. With the defeat of Italian fascism and Nazism, their Christian N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Democratic past provided a credible democratic basis for new political leadership, acceptable both to fellow citizens and to the victorious Allies. The heritage of nationalism was too closely associated with the defeated regimes to have influenced Christian Democracy in a positive sense. Instead, national identity was associated with the larger project of European identity, expressed through such institutions as the Council of Europe (1949), the European Coal and Steel Community (1952), and the European Economic Community (1957). Neo-fascist parties, such as Italy’s “Italian Social Movement” (MSI) or the British National Party (BNP), remained marginal to the political process, and many considered them to be extremist rather than nationalist in the conventional sense. Ideologically, Christian Democracy offered a program of policies and ideas expressing social conservatism, individual rights, and capitalism, modified for social welfare and economic reconstruction. The Catholic element emphasized the moral heritage of Christianity and, in the case of Italy, the Vatican’s influence in political life. Both were “catch-all” or mass parties that adapted their programs to national conditions in Italy, West Germany, and other European countries and sought to appeal to the center and right of the political spectrum. The Christian Democratic approach to foreign policy came to stand for two enduring features of postwar Europe: a close military alliance with the United States and consistent support for European reconciliation and unity. This meant becoming founding members of NATO (1949) and a united Europe. The association of Christian Democracy with Europe’s remarkable economic success is an important theme of postwar Europe. However, as with all parties, prolonged responsibility for government may undermine effectiveness. Italy’s Christian Democrats collapsed and created a wholly new party in the early 1990s after a series of scandals. Christian Democracy continues as the dominant form of democratic conservatism in continental Europe and in Latin America. Although parties in other countries have not replicated Italian and German Christian Democratic dominance, Christian Democracy represents a common and enduring political expression. The Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International comprise more than a hundred allied parties. The International provides a forum to make common ideas and experience public. That the organization includes major parties in Chile, Mexico, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand shows the adaptability of Christian Democracy. Parties in Sweden, Estonia, and Norway are members of the International despite their Protestant tradition of state Lutheranism. Within the European Parliament, the European Peoples Party (EPP), elected at the all-European level, is the Parliament’s largest party and describes itself as a family of political center-right parties from across the 27-member European Union (EPP-ED Group). Its program of empowering local government (subsidiarity) and promoting political transparency as well as human rights is difficult to oppose. Formulating a common and distinctive response to issues that have challenged the European right in each country has been more difficult for the EPP. What, for example, distinguishes a Christian Democrat from a traditional nationalist on N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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issues like Turkey’s membership in the European Union or wearing religious symbols in state schools? Despite differences on such controversial issues among member parties of the International, its chairman, Wilfred Martins, has supported the right of Muslim girls to wear headscarves in French schools as an expression of religious freedom, a view contrary to the ruling Gaullist Party. Despite its diversity and breadth, Christian Democracy has not lost a distinctive identity.

Origins Communism and Ideological Conflict The postwar destruction of fascism simplified the problem of unity on the political right and center, and, perhaps as important, the impending Cold War compelled a common response from democratically elected parties on the left. As the defeat of the Axis powers greatly reduced the appeal of fascism, so the victorious Soviet Union raised the prestige of the left. But the “left” remained a house divided. Communist and socialist parties agreed about the need for a “united front” against fascism, but soon after 1945 the deep division created by the Russian Revolution between the Communist and Social Democratic parties returned. The writings of Karl Marx and Frederich Engels never offered much guidance in settling the differences between communist and socialist parties, and both might be considered legitimate heirs to Marx’s legacy. There has been some confusion about the meaning of the phrases “socialist” and “communist.” Marx wrote that “socialism” was in fact a lower and transitory order of a communist society of freedom and material abundance. The Soviet doctrine known as “Marxism-Leninism” does not dispute this distinction, but in practice “socialism” justified the claims and decisions of ruling communist parties, while “communism” was left to an indefinite future. Social Democrats emphasized economic planning and public ownership but became reconciled with a version of capitalism, complemented by social guarantees of medical care and welfare. Also, they were willing to yield power if voted out of office. In the immediate postwar world, the same could not be said of communist parties. Other differences distinguish communism from socialism. Communists and some Social Democrats consider capitalism a system doomed to self-destruction, but communist parties claimed that only violent revolution on the Soviet model could ensure the victory of socialism. Second, Social Democrats looked forward to peaceful elections to realize their goals of public ownership and state planning. They insisted on open party membership and that major party decisions be made by majority vote among all members. Although Stalin dissolved the Communist International in 1943, non-Soviet communists insisted that there could be no conflict between loyalty to their own country and to the Soviet Union, the “homeland of socialism.” Social Democrats remain loyal to their national state. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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One consequence of the Cold War was that the conflict compelled a more rapid accommodation between capitalist economics and the Social Democrats. For example, the West German Social Democrats emerged as the primary opponent of the Christian Democrats. Willy Brandt was elected chairman of the Social Democratic Party in 1964 and chancellor in 1969. Brandt’s previous experience as mayor of Berlin had involved cooperation within a coalition of other parties. One of his first decisions as party leader was to promote the adoption of the “Bad Godesberg Program,” a party manifesto that ended any reference to Marxism, the nationalization of private property, and neutrality in the Cold War. Social Democracy increasingly came to stand for greater equality and better working conditions, as it had in the Scandinavian countries since the prewar period. Brandt’s experience in Berlin left him no reason to identify Social Democratic goals with the Soviet Union. Understanding the Cold War is central to understanding postwar ideological conflict. While European politics was increasingly polarized between Soviet and American policies about Europe’s future, colonial areas emerged as a center of nationalist activity. By the mid-1950s, newly independent states had become a focus of Cold War rivalry. However, most newly independent states sought to avoid economic dependence on the West and political dependence on the Soviet Union and native communist parties. India’s experience demonstrates the priority of an authentic “Indian” style of independent political institutions and nation-building. India’s National Congress Party was among the first political movements in colonial areas closely identified with anti-imperialist movements in Asia and Africa, in a way similar to that of anticolonialism in the Americas a century earlier. India’s National Congress Party was founded in 1885, and by the interwar period the party had developed both the experience and the vision to govern an independent India. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869–1947) first organized nonviolent “passive resistance” (Satyagraha) against British rule and a boycott of imported goods in favor of those produced by hand within India. Gandhi was assassinated the year of India’s independence by a religious fanatic who sought to undermine Gandhi’s ideal of an independent India equally acceptable to its different national and religious groups. Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) and the Muslim League advanced a movement for an independent Muslim nation that eventually became Pakistan. Partition of India became inevitable as the two sides could not agree on a single government. Tragically, many thousands died in communal riots at the time of independence. The consequences of India’s independence demonstrated the critical problems of identity and nationalism. Specifically, the Congress Party’s idea of a secular “allIndia” movement avoided a more narrow notion of nationalism, as it sought to govern an independent federal India with some 14 “mother tongues” and significant religious minorities, including 12 percent Muslim (123 million people). Ultimately, the party was vulnerable to the political challenge of seeking to appeal to the Hindu identity of 82 percent of the population. Pakistan emphasized territory as well as its Islamic identity. The country’s name was derived from the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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names of British India’s northern provinces: Punjab, Afghan, Kasmir, Sind, and Baluchistan. India and other developing countries became the focus of Soviet-American rivalry for political influence. Economically, the two sides sought to demonstrate the respective superiority of their economic systems and their capacity to create wealth. As an ideological conflict, the “free” and the “socialist” countries sought to appeal to the peoples of the world through fundamental arguments about the relevance of their respective systems to the world’s problems of war and peace, human rights, and economic development. Some historians have considered the United States to be “imperialist” in its military defense of autocratic capitalist regimes and its alleged protection of commercial interests before all other values. However, variations in the practice of “capitalism” were not a source of conflict among capitalist countries, whereas Chinese, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav versions of “socialism” became at times sources of open and violent conflict with the Soviet Union. Intellectual conflict regarding the origins of war in the abstract was a marker of ideological conflict. In turn, debate about the responsibility for the Cold War became a staple of ideological conflict. U.S. involvement in the overthrow of leftist governments in Iran, Guatemala, Congo, Chile, and elsewhere was rationalized ideologically. Among socialist countries, communist parties sought a monopoly on power wherever other political forces were unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Noncommunists were prosecuted, harassed, or driven into exile. Only in Czechoslovakia in 1948 did a communist party win an electoral plurality in a free election, but within two years the government had arrested noncommunist party leaders. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, communist parties were installed with the support of Soviet force. The idea of a communist “bloc” of states was considered especially threatening in the United States, Western Europe, and parts of Asia. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao Zedong drove the defeated nationalist Guomindang to the island of Taiwan. The following year, North Korean forces invaded the South in an apparent effort to unify the peninsula under communist power. Significantly, communist Chinese and Yugoslav forces acted independently of Soviet command. After the first Soviet nuclear test in 1949, the threat of a vastly more violent conflict became even greater. Without doubt, some American decisions, for example, the suspension of lend-lease supplies to the Soviet Union and support for anticommunist parties, provoked Soviet mistrust. Stalin spoke about World War II as an “inevitable” result in the development of capitalism. The thought echoed an earlier idea of Lenin’s and suggested that future wars were a result of capitalism, whose hostility toward socialism was unchanged by the wartime alliance against fascism. The origins of the Cold War emerged under specific circumstances, in certain personalities, and whether or not Stalin believed that another world war was “inevitable”; he seemingly sought to promote communist domination by any means possible to enforce an ideological conformity. Any leadership that attempted to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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act independently was expelled from all communist institutions with the clear expectation that it would be overthrown from within or invaded by the United States. Tito’s Yugoslavia was one example of expulsion from the Stalinist “Communist Information Bureau.” Josip Broz Tito (1892–1980) sought to act independently in the Balkans and resisted Soviet domination of Yugoslav politics. Until the final collapse of socialist Yugoslavia in 1990, Yugoslav communism evolved separately from the socialist bloc. Similarly, Mao Zedong sought to shape Marxism in a way appropriate for conditions in China. Mao explained his approach to nationalism in one of his most important theoretical works, On New Democracy (1940), emphasizing “the dictatorship of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat.” The revolution of the Chinese Communists would create a “new democracy” fundamentally different from the “bourgeoisie” democracy of his opponent, the nationalist Guomindang. Mao’s distinction of “revolutionary classes” enabled him to explain the Chinese revolution from a Marxist viewpoint. Identifying the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the petty bourgeoisie as “revolutionary” classes offered a theoretical justification for a socialist revolution in a country whose proletariat was vastly outnumbered by the peasantry. Lenin had resolved a comparable problem in explaining Russia’s revolution by redefining the nature of capitalism in his 1914 work, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. After Lenin’s death and the consolidation of Stalin’s power, any initiative on the part of local communist leaderships was considered unacceptable. Stalin distrusted Mao or any Communist who acted independently of Moscow, but because of Mao’s success and China’s importance, Stalin did not criticize Mao publicly. After Stalin’s death, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated at the state and party levels and remained embittered until the mid-1980s. Regardless of Chinese policy, the Soviet Union could not intervene with military force, especially after China developed nuclear weapons in 1964. Communist leaderships in Eastern Europe were not as secure as China’s. Efforts to create distinctive socialist regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were understood in the Kremlin as a threat to world socialism and Soviet primacy. The communist leaderships of Imre Nagy (1896–1958) in Hungary and Alexander Dubcˇek (1921–1992) in Czechoslovakia were overthrown after Soviet invasions in 1956 and 1968, respectively. The priority of political and military cohesion arrested the development of Marxism outside the Soviet Union. However, Mao Zedong’s approach to insurgent political organization has proven more durable. “Maoism” was both a revolutionary doctrine, adapted to conditions where communists were dependent on the peasantry, and a military doctrine of guerilla warfare. Mao’s writings about the political organization of the peasantry and defeat of a stronger adversary have influenced insurgent movements in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Not all have claimed any connection to Mao or Marxism. For example, the Islamic Palestinian movement Hamas has sought to increase its support by providing welfare (Da’wa) in a strategy similar to Mao’s. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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However, some insurgent movements, like those in Nepal and northern India, are avowedly “Maoist” in their approach to organizing the poorest people in their poor regions for prolonged, irregular warfare. Maoism started as a war against Japan’s occupation of China, became a strategy in civil wars, and is now a general approach to insurgency. After Stalin’s death in 1953 and a brief instability in the Soviet leadership, Nikita Khrushchev (1894–1971) denounced Stalin’s “cult of the personality” in 1956. “De-Stalinization” became a theme of reform in Soviet politics. Although Stalin’s totalitarian regime did not survive the dictator, serious efforts to alter Soviet socialism did not take place prior to the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931). Gorbachev’s ideals of perestroika (“reconstruction”), glasnost (“openness”), and democratizacia (“democratization”) introduced late in the 1980s raised a central question about whether the reforms were responsible for the collapse of the Soviet Union, whether that collapse was inevitable, or whether Gorbachev’s reforms could have been successful were they introduced a decade earlier. Khrushchev’s innovations in foreign policy were as important as his criticism of Stalin. His proclamation of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalism and a vast “zone of peace” in former colonial areas provided a new political agenda in the Cold War and stimulated nationalism in developing countries. “Peaceful coexistence” meant neither the end of conflict with the West nor surrender in contested areas, but a willingness to negotiate areas of mutual interest in an era of “ideological struggle.” In fact, improved relations were associated with major disarmament treaties concerning the reduction and limitation of nuclear weapons, and with the Helsinki process, a series of treaties that sought resolution of outstanding issues in territorial, economic, and human rights relations. The idea of a “zone of peace” identified Soviet potential allies in developing countries that had taken the “noncapitalist” path of development or were “nationalist democracies.” As a rationale for supporting anticolonial regimes, like Nasser’s Egypt, Sukarno’s Indonesia, and Nkrumah’s Ghana, Khrushchev’s innovation sought to reconcile nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, but in fact only regimes that became fully Communist Party dominated like Cuba proved to be sufficiently stable to become reliable allies. Leaderships in such countries seldom accepted the argument that Soviet Central Asia offered a serious model of development. Moreover, after the Cuban revolution, Soviet policy not only confronted a more aggressive American rival but also Chinese Communist influence. Ironically, Chinese spokesmen denounced Soviet Marxism as “revisionist” as a result of Khrushchev’s accommodation with the West, and Soviet sources dismissed Chinese Marxism as “dogmatism.” The “Sino-Soviet conflict” remained a defining feature of international politics until the 1980s. What began as a public debate about the nature of socialist practice assumed the character of an embittering military and territorial conflict that polarized the socialist bloc and threatened open warfare. Not even the common cause of defending communist Vietnam against the United States created a basis for cooperation between the two states. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Dimensions The Rise and Decline of Ideology in Less Developed Countries By the late 1960s, it became commonplace to conceptualize global politics as three distinct “worlds of development”: Western democratic (first), socialist (second), and developing (third). In its less complex form, the division became a means of ideological simplification that remained prevalent until the collapse of communism. The Third World resembled a residual category whose members shared little except their former colonial status, yet ideologically they expressed common themes. Many Third World leaderships identified with general antiimperialism and a future of equality, justice, and modernization, a rhetorical style similar to that of Soviet communism. But unlike communist party leaderships, those in developing countries are better understood as espousing nationalist rather than socialist ideologies. By “nationalism,” we are implying that the ultimate point of political reference is the nation-state and the promotion of its interests. In this sense, the nationalism of developing countries differed fundamentally from 19th-century ideals of “pan-nationalist” movements that sought to unite political interests. The “pan” movements sought to emphasize the common identity of such peoples as Slavs, Germans, and Italians who were the citizens of one state and the ethnicity of another. These movements envisioned an ideal of the “nation” over the more transitory organization of a particular state. Postwar nationalism in developing countries differed in that the “nation” was closely identified with inherited boundaries of former colonial administrations, regardless of ethnic composition. The “nation” was a creation that won its meaning through the pursuit of political independence. Developing and socialist countries also differed in that the claims of communist party leaderships were based on a universal idea of “socialism,” while developing countries often created “Indian” or “Arab” socialism. Developing countries were especially vulnerable to the difficulty of political development. Many such states were undermined by internal rivals, external dependence, and pervasive corruption. Nevertheless, “national” was not to be understood in the simple sense of the values in an existing national community, especially in multinational societies. For example, in Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonization and Development, Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah denied, contrary to Marx, that socialism could have developed from capitalism and that instead its origins lay in communalism, an idea consistent with the values of African society. But “African” meant a social construct suitable for Nkrumah’s image of socialism rather than an actual group of people. Elsewhere, a common nation suggested the ideal of a socialist-nationalist synthesis. Like most African states, Ghana was a multiethnic society, and similar ideals of an authentic precolonial identity compatible with “socialism” and modernization existed in other developing countries. Julius Nyerere (1922–1999) in Tanzania and Léopold Senghor (1906–2001) in Senegal N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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sought to refashion traditional ideas of African identity into the basis for a common identity promoted through a centralized state. Arguably, nationalist leaders, especially in former British colonies, were influenced by the ideas of Harold Laski (1893–1950), English Labor Party member and university professor. Most shared ideas of nationalism, collectivism, and anticolonialism, but their actual practice differed widely. We have mentioned the example of India. After Gandhi’s death, “socialism” in India became identified with the Congress Party and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964). Prior to independence, India had developed distinctive democratic institutions, including a professional bureaucracy, a legitimate multiparty legislature, and nonpolitical armed forces. The country would eventually liberalize its economy, abandoning the effort of state planning, and unlike the authoritarianism of most postcolonial leaderships, India retained a democratic government. Arab efforts to synthesize socialism and nationalism took a different course. Arab areas had been divided into separate states following the creation of mandatory regimes under the League of Nations in 1920. The goals of Arab nationalism were necessarily different from those of Africa. In the postwar era, the founders of the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party (Ba ’ athist), Michel Aflaq (1910–1989) and Salah al-Din al-Bitar (1912–1980), authored a party constitution proclaiming the “special merit” of the Arab nation and its historic “tendency towards reform and resurgence,” recognizing in nationalism a “sacred sentiment” uniting nation and individual party (Sigmund 1972, 175–177). Pan-Arab nationalism found in socialism an “exemplary system” that allowed the “realization of the Arab character in history.” The Ba ’ athist program understood “socialism” to mean state policies, that is, social welfare, land reform, equality, and free expression “within the limits of Arab nationalist ideology.” Thus the subordination of national to socialist goals was explicit. Nkrumah and the Ba ’ athists confronted problems that Lenin would have understood: the task of explaining how socialism was politically possible in a society that was not yet fully capitalistic and how to reconcile the universal ideals of socialism with those of the nation. In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin argued that revolution was possible in Russia because the nature of capitalism had changed since Marx, that is, it had become a world system vulnerable to revolution at its “weakest link”—Russia. Third World socialists owed no such allegiance to an interpretation of Marx, for a “socialist” state depended on the values of political leadership rather than the forces of production. The question of nationalism was also vexing. Lenin had emphasized that the “bourgeois” or “class” nature of nationalism was intrinsically hostile to transnational, revolutionary socialism, but Lenin’s enemies were Russian nationalists. Third World leaderships sought to create a stable political order within the boundaries of a colonial legacy, regardless of the pan-Arab ideals of the Ba ’ athists. Instead, Ba ’ athism’s pan-Arabism separated into deeply hostile regimes in Iraq and Syria once the Ba ’ athists came to power. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Moreover, other approaches to the problem of nationalism emerged. As the most popular Arab leader, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s (1918–1970) version of Arab nationalism presumed Egypt to be the preeminent leader of the Arab countries. Nasser emphasized anticolonialism and unity among Arab states, an idea exemplified by his negotiation of British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone and its subsequent nationalization in 1956. Nasser considered that Arab unity was the path to Arab influence, but his union with Syria failed after three years owing to Syrian resentment of Egyptian domination and a ban on political parties. A coup d’état in Syria brought to power a regime that seceded from the United Arab Republic. Within Egypt, Nasser’s version of “Arab socialism” emphasized land reform and state-sponsored industrial projects under the leadership of a single party. A core problem of Nasser’s leadership is common to other “charismatic” leaders. The German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920) considered “charisma” a unique set of personal qualities that identified the leader as “set apart from ordinary men and treated as though he were endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or, at least exceptional qualities” (1968, 48). By comparison with other political leaders in the area, Nasser enjoyed exceptional loyalty from most Egyptians, but it would be an exaggeration to separate his personal qualities from his performance. Nasser’s “Arab socialism” created little wealth or productive investment. Similarly his success in resisting an Anglo-French-Israeli attempt to overthrow his regime greatly increased his popularity but did not create lasting security. For example, Nasser’s popularity attracted diplomatic attention to the 1961 meeting of developing countries in Belgrade that created the “nonaligned” group of states. Nasser, Nehru, and Yugoslavia’s Tito led the group, which met periodically supposedly to coordinate policies among states that considered themselves outside Cold War alliances. However, apart from broad themes of anti-imperialism, nonalignment was seldom a barrier to whatever any of its members declared it to mean. By the late 1970s, the nonaligned meetings had become ineffective and quarrelsome. Domestic problems left little attention for foreign policy initiatives. Nasser’s own authority never recovered from the catastrophic defeat to Israel in 1967. He died three years later. Significantly, Nasser was among the first Arab leaders to confront the challenge of religious opposition.

Consequences The Rise of Religion in Postwar Politics Prior to discussing the place of religion in postwar politics, it is useful to remember that its impact varies widely among regimes and faith traditions. For example, we have mentioned the emergence of Christian Democracy in postwar Europe. Generally speaking, Protestant Christianity offered no basis for a political movement comparable to that of Roman Catholicism. Catholicism could draw on a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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history of relations with secular authority since the legalization of Christianity in the Roman Empire in AD 325. Papal Encyclicals (circular letters) have routinely dealt with significant political issues, and some, such as Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum (Concerning New Things), entail a developed political theory. Finally, with the exception of those within the Anglican Communion, the public role and responsibility of Roman Catholic bishops offer no precise counterpart among Protestant clerical orders. Martin Luther’s distrust of secular politics set a precedent in the Reformation that has influenced Protestantism generally. Of course, there are exceptions. American Evangelical Protestants have often supported conservative political issues in the United States, and interpreting the role of Catholicism and Presbyterian Christianity in the political conflict of Northern Ireland requires careful qualification. In addition, the traditional identification of church and state in Christian Orthodoxy creates a distinctive relationship between the Orthodox church in postcommunist Russia and the Balkans. Russia’s postcommunist governments have enjoyed good relations with the Orthodox church. The Russian patriarch and president have taken part in consecrating the remains of the last czar and his family, have jointly promulgated legislation concerning nonOrthodox churches, and have restored church property seized or destroyed under communism. Such a relation helps to enhance government legitimacy. Clearly, the impact of “Christianity” in these cases demands examination of both a particular tradition and the character of public life. We might draw similar contrasts between the varieties of Buddhism and the political cultures of Japan, Tibet, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar or of Sunni Islam and Shiite Islam in Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively. In these cases, the syntheses of political culture and religious tradition are relevant to such basic questions as national identity, party formation, and protest. The level of political development is as relevant. Religion has been more influential in the public life of developing countries than in developed ones for several reasons. In developing countries, political institutions are generally less effective, so rivals to government might emerge from the military, state-owned firms, or religious establishments. Second, religious groups often enjoy a reputation for rectitude and trust that the state does not. Finally, for many the relation of religion and personal identity is sometimes more comprehensible than identification with a nation-state or an ethnicity. Indeed, the idea of a state separate from religious principles is unacceptable to many Muslims. Islamic influence on politics is especially present wherever Muslims are a majority. One important consideration concerns the difference between Sunni and Shiite Muslims. Both share a fundamental devotion to the Koran and the “pillars” of common belief and practice but differ concerning the legitimacy of the early caliphs. “Sunna,” literally the “way of the Prophet,” is used to describe the majority of Muslims (Sunni) that accept the historical caliphate of the Dynasty of Umayyad (661–750), whereas Shiite Muslims consider Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali (599–661), to have been both the first Imam after Muhammad and the last of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the “rightly guided” (legitimately chosen) caliphs. These historical differences remain as important for each group of believers as their role in shaping separate communities, their different ideas about legitimate rule, and their different styles of political activity. In the case of Iran (Shiite) and Saudi Arabia (Sunni), faith tradition is the basis of each state’s claim to legitimate rule. In Turkey, Iraq, and Bangladesh, Islamic parties have taken part in electoral politics. In Egypt and Palestine, Sunni Islam has been a basis of protest as well as of electoral politics. The use of Islam as a means of expressing political protest and terror has been a distinctive feature of its role since 1945. Egypt’s “Muslim Brotherhood” was among the first modern Sunni groups to be called an “Islamist organization.” The phrase implies any political party that seeks political power for the purpose of changing public life according to what it considers the principles of the Koran and Shar’iat law. Unlike other religious traditions, historic Islam does not recognize the distinction between public policy and private practice where Muslims are a majority. It is important to recognize that all Islamist groups are neither illegal nor violent, although they oppose traditional nationalism and Western influence. The Islamic legacy includes a complex of movements and personalities that offer a rich assortment of precedents. Saudi Arabia and Iran offer a useful contrast. The 18th-century reformer Muhammad ibn Adb al Wahhab (1703–1792) is considered the founder of “Salafism” (Islam of “pious ancestors”) and the Islam of the Saud dynasty in Saudi Arabia. The methods and doctrine of al Wahhab resembles present-day revolutionary Islamist movements, each of which may claim historical legitimacy. The conservative Saudi ruling dynasty, however, is well accommodated with Western states, if not with Western values. Thus, the political significance of Islam within Saudi Arabia is as much about the character of Islam within the region as about its relation with the non-Islamic world, and the same could be said about terrorist Islamist movements. Most often, radical or violent movements seek to alter or overthrow conservative parties and regimes, claiming they have made too many concessions to Western values and practice. Recent radical Islamic movements have been shaped by several distinctive factors: disappointing performance of secular leaderships, the strain of socioeconomic change in Muslim countries, and the perceived postcolonial aggression by Western culture and states. Individual leaders have played a decisive role. The Egyptian Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, typifies these modern features. His first effort to organize workers of the Suez Canal Company in 1928 was driven by resentment of British influence and a perceived drift away from Islam among Egyptians. Although Egypt had been formally independent since 1922, al-Banna and other devout Sunni Muslims believed that the “Koran as constitution” was a far more legitimate basis for rule than Egypt’s corrupt monarchy, and they bitterly opposed large, foreign-owned companies’ exploitation of Egyptians. In a decade, membership in the Muslim Brotherhood had increased to over 200,000 in Egypt, while branches of the group were established N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Hundreds of protestors from the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and opposition movement Kefaya demonstrate in Cairo as they protest against the government and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak on September 1, 2005. (Mona Sharaf/Reuters/Corbis)

in other Arab countries. The Brotherhood was popular among Egyptians who migrated from villages to large cities because it offered important material support. In 1948, the Brotherhood was outlawed, and the following year Egypt’s prime minister was assassinated by one of its members. Al-Banna himself was murdered in 1950, probably by Egyptian intelligence. The early years of the Brotherhood were important for establishing a pattern of violence against the government that did not cease under Nasser’s rule. Nasser’s pan-Arabism avoided any endorsement of Islamic principles as a basis for unity. Since Nasser’s death, Egyptian governments have sought to deal with the organization by its partial legalization. Anwar Sadat attempted to mollify the group by releasing its imprisoned members who pledged nonviolence. However, an extremist branch of the group, Islamic Jihad, assassinated the Egyptian president in 1981 after he made peace with Israel. Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak (b. 1928), has also compromised: on the one hand, by outlawing the organization and, on the other hand, by allowing its members to run in Egypt’s 2005 parliamentary N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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election, where they received about 20 percent of the vote, becoming the primary opposition party. Although the Palestinian organization Hamas represents an offshoot of the Brotherhood, Islamic groups have tended to divide over inspiration and tactics. It is significant that both Hamas and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood have contested parliamentary elections despite their terrorist heritage. In the 2006 elections, Hamas won 56 percent of the vote in the West Bank and Gaza, a comfortable majority that allowed the party to form the Palestinian Authority Government. Hamas’s refusal to recognize Israel leaves uncertain its evolution as a responsible political actor, while in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has been repressed and cannot perform the functions of an opposition party. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 inspired a general support for Islamic involvement in politics despite the fact that most Iranians belong to the minority Shiite Muslims. Shiite (the party of Ali) Muslims believe that Muhammad’s cousin Ali (d. 661) should have succeeded the prophet as “Leader of the Faithful,” but in fact Ali accepted the caliphate of Muhammad’s successor, Abu Bakr. Nevertheless, Shiite Islam developed distinctly from Sunni Islam. On religious conversion, the ideal of a ruling Islamic dynasty was compatible with Persian political tradition. Prior to the 20th century, Iran had been governed by a series of ruling dynasties. A military officer, Reza Pahlavi, seized power in 1921, seeking to create a new dynasty, but his son, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–1980), failed to create a legitimate regime based on his own rule and Iranian nationalism. Th e Shah’s dependence on the United States was especially unacceptable to much of the Islamic leadership, who long opposed foreign interference in Iranian affairs. The military and political organization Hezbollah has a strong following among Lebanon’s Shiite population and is considered an Iranian client. Elsewhere, the impact of the Iranian Revolution outside Iran is difficult to judge, but within the country its revolutionary fervor has decayed among the majority of Iranians born after 1978. Like other revolutionary regimes, Iran’s has sought to create a set of parallel institutions to those of a formal parliamentary democracy. Following the 1989 death of Ayatollah (“Sign of God”) Khomeini, the Islamic “Council of Experts” selected a new “Supreme Spiritual Leader,” whose duties include serving the “Guardian Council of the Constitution,” a body with powers to review and overturn the elected parliament. A variety of Islamic terrorist groups have attacked both Islamic opponents and Western targets. For example, in 1997 a previously unknown Islamic group, unrelated to the Muslim Brotherhood, murdered 68 foreign tourists in Egypt. This group considers the regime of President Hosni Mubarak an enemy. In 1995, with the support of neighboring Pakistan, the Taliban (“students of Islamic knowledge”) emerged in Afghanistan as an Islamic reformist alternative to the Mujahideen (“holy warriors”) who fought the Soviet occupation. Their differences have less to do with interpretations of Islam than with the Taliban’s support among Pashtun people in southern Afghanistan and rivalry among Mujahideen warlords. In fact, Al Qaeda (“the base”) emerged under the leadership of Osama bin-Laden N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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in Afghanistan as a close ally of the Taliban, but the global reach of the organization has brought its style of terrorism outside the Middle East. Apart from the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, there is evidence of Al Qaeda in places as diverse as Chechnya in the Russian Federation, the southern Philippines, Somalia, Bali, and Uzbekistan. The future and durability of these groups are difficult to assess. It is unlikely that consistent central direction exists among groups that claim some association with Al Qaeda. There are many instances of religious influence apart from Islam in the politics of developing countries, and there is considerable evidence of its flexibility. One of the most impressive examples of this influence is the rise of Hindu nationalism in India. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has emerged as the primary parliamentary opposition to the Indian Congress Party. The main ideals of the BJP are both its relative political, social, and economic conservatism and its emphasis on Hindutva (“Hinduness”). The party won a plurality of votes in 1998 and retained power in alliance with other parties until 2004. Founded in 1980, the party gradually built its power base as popular dissatisfaction with the Congress Party increased. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the government privatized most of India’s state industries, increased the power of the police to fight terrorism, tested India’s nuclear weapons, and promoted Indian identity as a Hindu nation. Unfortunately, BJP followers became associated with violence against India’s Muslim minority, some 12 percent (123 million) of the population. The most important incident of these was the 1992 destruction of a 16th-century mosque in the city of Ayodhya that had been the site of an earlier Hindu temple. The BJP has not encouraged attacks on Muslims. Nevertheless, some BJP followers and those of more extremist Hindu groups have exploited the party’s success as an occasion for violent anti-Muslim riots reminiscent of those at the time of India’s partition. Many observers faulted the BJP for indirectly encouraging a climate of intolerance and for its failure to effectively prosecute those responsible for violence, especially following a 2002 riot in the state of Gujarat. The party’s defeat in the 2004 parliamentary and local elections is a likely consequence of this perception. The experience of the BJP demonstrates the importance of religious parties mastering electoral politics in countries where they can be effective. Other religious traditions have been important sources of political opposition. In Latin America, rural poverty and Roman Catholicism after the Vatican II sessions inspired a 1968 meeting of Latin American bishops in Medellín, Columbia. The bishops held that, in the absence of social justice, widespread violence would be inevitable. Consequently, the church must throw its influence squarely on the side of the poorest. The foundation of “base communities” in rural areas became a locus of mobilization for political action. Apart from its larger achievements, “liberation theology” was both a consequence of the influence of the Cuban revolution and the potential of Christian teaching. Elsewhere, clergy became involved in opposition to military government in Central and South America. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Vatican under John Paul II accepted the pursuit of social justice but rejected the notion of Christ as a political figure and the influence of Marxism on theology. Both Buddhism and Christianity show the capacity of religious doctrine to adapt to social and religious conditions. Buddhism seems intuitively less serviceable as a belief system in politics because of its cultivation of “nonattachment” to worldly goals, yet the Tibetan Buddhist resistance has been effective against Han Chinese domination, whether through the influence of the exiled Dalai Lama or its survival in a repressive political climate. Altogether differently, the Buddhist Soka Gakkai Organization in Japan created the New Komeito or Clean Government Party. The party has shared power with the dominant Liberal Democratic Party. It has come to represent a particular version of “humanitarian” politics that emphasizes a less materialistic policy, a more transparent political style, and greater administrative decentralization.

Conclusion Broader consideration of belief structures over the postwar decades suggests a few conclusions. Since the failure of communism, the future of religion, ideology, and nationalism in the world has been a matter of great attention. No single account of the postwar era has provided a completely satisfactory explanation of postwar development, but efforts to create a general theory remain instructive. For example, the noted scholar Francis Fukuyama has forecast the “end of history.” The phrase implies that ideological conflict characterizing the Cold War has become irrelevant to questions about the purpose and design of human progress. The apparent triumph of liberal capitalism is synonymous with a world in which the achievement of material progress will eliminate the irrational violence of war about human purpose and destiny. Although Fukuyama has since acknowledged that Islamic societies are anti-Western in a way that differs from simple opposition to the United States, he continues to maintain that radical Islam can never be an alternative to liberal democracy. The thesis of a “clash of civilizations” created by the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington has been an even greater source of debate about the future of nationalism, ideology, and religion. Huntington considers that the end of the Cold War marked the end of traditional political and ideological conflict. Instead, conflicts that center on the “fault lines” of “civilizations” become dominant locations of international conflict. Although national, territorial, and linguistic factors might shape the identity of civilizations, Huntington considers religious identity to be the “most important.” Such “fault lines” might exist within individual states, such as the former Yugoslavia or China, or between existing states. For example, the war in former Yugoslavia involved Islamic (Bosnian), Christian Orthodox (Serb), and Roman Catholic (Croat) peoples. Conflict in China has involved the dominant Confucian majority (Han) with Islamic (Uighur) and Buddhist (Tibetan) minorities. The “clash” might emerge between terrorist movements, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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such as Al Qaeda and the West, or states, such as Pakistan and India or Israel and some of its neighbors. There has been much criticism of Huntington’s thesis. Huntington did not claim that conflicts based in civilizations would be the exclusive form of conflict, that “civilizations” would replace nation-states, or that cooperation between civilizations would be impossible. In addition, Huntington’s thesis requires careful qualification. For example, Donald Horowitz has studied “the deadly ethnic riot,” without regard to “civilizations” or the postcommunist era. He determined that such communal violence can be relatively minor or as vast in scope as the 1993 Rwandan genocide. Regardless of its impact, the “deadly ethnic riot” often conforms to a set of characteristics, or a “process” concerning the impact of place, time, rumor, economic class, and prior group relations. Although the two authors would seem to discuss different forms of conflict, in individual cases they appear to offer different explanations of similar phenomena. More explicit criticism of the “clash of civilizations” theory involves examining the premises that seemed apparent to Huntington and others in 1993. It is unlikely that any single theory can account for the nature and violence of recent conflict, but several considerations seem beyond dispute. First, secular ideologies of nationalism in the sense of “nation-building” have been eclipsed for communal notions of identity. Whether one speaks of divisions among “Hispanic voters” in the United States or the consequences of “nationalism” in China, the politics of group identity must be carefully qualified by more specific values that are often “religious.” Second, major differences exist in the way Western societies perceive themselves and are perceived by others, especially by Islamic societies. Finally, Charles Taylor, winner of the 2007 Templeton prize, noted that the depth of religious belief and intolerance for the beliefs of others “do not correlate” and, rather, the “opposite” may be true (“Templeton Winner” 2007). It seems unlikely that group identity, regardless of its form, will become less politically important. Selected Bibliography Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso. Barber, Benjamin, Peter Singer, Orlando Patterson, Akeel Bilgrami, et al. 2006. “Jihad, McWorld, Modernity: Public Intellectuals Debate ‘the Clash of Civilizations.’ ” Salmagagundi (Saratoga Springs), no. 150–151 (Spring). Burleigh, Michael. 2007. Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics, from the Great War to the War on Terror. New York: HarperCollins. Drachkovitch, Milorad M. 1965. Marxism in the Modern World. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. EPP-ED Group in the European Parliament. http://www.epp-ed.eu/home/en/default.asp. Fukuyama, Francis. 1992. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press. Gehler, Michael. 2004. Christian Democracy in Europe since 1945. New York: Routledge. Gutierrez, Gustavo. 1973. A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.


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Horowitz, Donald L. 2001. The Deadly Ethnic Riot. Berkeley: University of California Press. Horowitz, Irving Lewis. 1972. Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification. New York: Oxford University Press. Huntington, Samuel P. 1997. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Karpat, Kemal H. 1982. Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East. New York: Praeger. Lenin, Vladimir Ilich. 1969. Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism. Moscow: International Publishers. Levitt, Matthew. 2006. Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism the Service of Jihad. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Mao Tse-Tung. 1940. “On New Democracy.” http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/ selected-works/volume-2/mswv2_26.htm. Ortega y Gasset, Jose. 1985. The Revolt of the Masses. Notre Dame, IL: University of Notre Dame Press. Sigmund, Paul E., ed. 1972. The Ideologies of the Developing Countries. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger. Stalin, J. V. Speech delivered by J. V. Stalin at a meeting of the voters at the Stalin Electoral District, February 9, 1946. http://www.marx2mao.com/Stalin/SS46.html. “Templeton Winner Stresses Balance of Spirituality.” 2007. All Things Considered. National Public Radio. (Retrieved March 6, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? storyId=8904420. Weber, Max. 1968. “The Nature of Charismatic Authority and Its Routinization.” In On Charisma and Institution Building, edited by S. N. Eisenstadt, 48–65. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.


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Sports and Nationalism Alan Bairner Relevance At the most basic level of analysis, it is easy to see the extent to which sport, arguably more than any other form of social activity in the modern world, facilitates flag waving and the playing of national anthems, both formally at moments such as medal ceremonies and informally through the activities of fans. Indeed, there are many political nationalists who fear that, by acting as such a visible medium for overt displays of national sentiment, sport can actually blunt the edge of serious political debate. No matter how one views the grotesque caricatures of national modes of behavior and dress that so often provide the colorful backdrop to major sporting events, one certainly cannot escape the fact that nationalism, in some form or another, and sport are closely linked. It is important to appreciate, however, that the precise nature of their relationship varies dramatically from one political setting to another and that, as a consequence, it is vital that we are alert to a range of different conceptual issues. For example, like the United Nations, sport’s global governing bodies, such as the International Olympic Committee or the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), consist almost exclusively of representatives not of nations but rather of sovereign nation-states. It is also worth noting that pioneering figures in the organization of international sport, such as Baron Pierre de Coubertin who established the modern Olympics in 1896, commonly revealed a commitment to both internationalism and the interests of their own nation-states. Thus, while de Coubertin could write enthusiastically about a sporting event that would bring together young (male) athletes from across the globe, he was also specifically concerned with the physical well-being of young French men in the wake of a demoralizing defeat in the Franco-German War. Although in most cases these nation-states that constitute international sporting bodies are coterminous with nations, the fact remains that numerous nations throughout the world, as well as other forms of collective belonging, are stateless and are consequently denied representation in international sporting competition, just as they are in the corridors of global political power. When considering the relationship between sports and nationalism, therefore, it is important to think in terms both of nation-states and of nations. This also provides the means whereby sport’s connection with nationality and also with national identity can be separately explored. It is also useful to bear in mind that sport often acts as a window through which we are able to examine a whole range of social developments and to test a variety of theoretical concepts and perspectives. With specific reference N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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to the relationship between sports and nationalism, observing the world of sport offers insights into the relevance and reliability of such concepts as ethnic and civic nationalism and the validity of explanatory approaches to the rise of nations and nationalism such as primordialism and modernism. Sport can also provide important insights into varieties of imperialism, the cultural politics of anti-imperialist struggle, and postcolonial legacies.

Origins Sport, Imperialism, and Postcolonial Legacies Britain, and in particular England, is usually credited with the “invention” of modern sport, in general, and of numerous specific sports. The global diffusion of sport certainly owes much to the imperial exploits of the British, with sports such as cricket and rugby union becoming rapidly and firmly established in various corners of the British empire. Furthermore, even in those parts of the world that did not constitute elements of that empire, British citizens played a major role in the diffusion of sports such as soccer. The evidence remains to the present day in the names of clubs in Spain (Athletic Bilbao) and in Italy (AC Milan), with English usages still preferred to Spanish (or Basque) and Italian equivalents. Thus, through informal business connections as well as through the mechanisms of the formal empire, sport operated, alongside Christianity and the works of William Shakespeare, to provide cultural support to Britain’s expansionist ambitions in the second half of the 19th century. In the case of sport, it would be easy to assume that its role consisted solely of ensuring that first indigenous elites and later entire native populations would accommodate themselves to British games and by extension to British rule. But sport’s legacy in this respect is double-edged. While playing the imperialist masters’ games might well be conceived of as an indication of cultural inferiority, it has also given colonial peoples opportunities to measure themselves against their present and former rulers. Nowhere is this more apparent than in that most quintessential of English sports, cricket, which became hugely important as a marker of identity in many corners of the former British empire—perhaps most notably in Australia, the Indian subcontinent, and the English-speaking Caribbean. Victory over the English cricket team in such countries became one of the most convenient and visible ways of measuring the extent to which the colonial mantle had been lifted. It is no accident that one of the most influential books on the relationship between sport and politics was written by a Trinidadian, C. L. R. James. It is also worth noting that cricket, in the shape of the West Indies test team made up of players from a number of islands and island groups as well as from mainland Guyana, demonstrates that sport can from time to time transcend national and nation-state boundaries. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Cricket in England, 1949. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Today, at least one nation-state that was formerly part of the British empire and remains a member of the Commonwealth appears to be partaking in its own kind of sporting imperialism. Rugby union has long been regarded as being of massive symbolic importance for New Zealand. In recent years, however, the national team, the All Blacks, has drawn increasingly upon players from various Pacific islands, such as Samoa and Fiji, arguably with serious, detrimental consequences for the further development of the game in these countries. Meanwhile Canada, another Commonwealth member, far from investing any energy in competing with the British, has sought to establish a sporting national identity in part by distancing itself from the United States, for example, through a fierce determination to retain symbolic ownership of hockey, but also by competing against its more powerful neighbor to the south, sometimes with “real” Canadians or, on other occasions, with proxies such as the predominantly American baseball players at the Toronto Blue Jays. Since the end of World War II, sport has also played its part in the development of new “empires.” The Soviet Union, for example, increased its sphere of influence in part by helping to support sport and also individual athletes in a number of African countries. Meanwhile the diffusion of baseball can be seen as part of a wider process of Americanization, especially in the Caribbean, Central N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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America, and Japan. In this particular case, comparisons can be made with the trajectory of cricket, with baseball bats being used quite literally (although without causing physical damage) by some countries to challenge their neocolonial status. The issue of the use of sport for the purposes of nationalist struggle is one that will be returned to. First, however, it is necessary to establish how sport is used in the world of constitutional politics. Sport, Nation-States, and Constitutional Nationalism Much of the literature on the relationship between sport and politics has been concerned with the ways in which nation-states seek to promote themselves, or simply carry out their business, using sport as a useful and highly visible medium. During the Cold War, for example, it was apparent that the Soviet Union and most, if not all, of its East European neighbors used sport in general and especially the Olympic Games to advertise their particular brand of communism. In addition, international rivalry was not only acted out on the athletics track or on the high beam but also impacted the wider context of events, such as when the United States sought to lead a boycott of the Moscow games in 1980 and the Soviet Union and its allies responded in kind when the Olympics moved to Los Angeles in 1984. Related to this is the fact that nation-states also put considerable efforts into acquiring the right to host major events, which are then turned into spectacular exercises in self-promotion by the successful bidders. There can be little doubt that most national leaders in the modern world are highly conscious of the role that sport can play in boosting confidence and gaining markers of esteem. In some cases, most notably that of the United States, the role of sport in relation to national feeling need not even depend upon the scale or even the availability of international competition. Baseball acquired the status of a national pastime precisely because it was regarded as America’s game, and the rivalries that for so long helped maintain its place in the country’s popular mythology involved cities and even neighborhoods in the same cities rather than other nationstates. Thus, American isolationism, rather than any felt need to take on the rest of the world, has been crucial in the formation of a sense of sporting nationalism. Another use of sport that is connected to the political interests of nationstates relates to diplomacy. There exists a school of thought in certain governmental circles and even more obviously at the level of sports administration that sport is a valuable tool in assuaging international tension and, in some cases, even helping to broker peace. The process has been referred to as “ping pong diplomacy,” a nod in the direction of American attempts in the 1960s to improve relations with the People’s Republic of China by establishing contact through the use of table tennis players as quasi envoys. More recently, qualified claims have been made with respect to the integrative role that sport has played or can play in peace processes in such places as Northern Ireland and the Middle East. While claims of this sort need to be viewed with a certain amount of caution, what is N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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not in doubt is the extent to which many nation-states have invested substantial amounts of money in sport and leisure facilities in an effort to lessen antisocial behavior in general and especially the violence that is associated with intercommunal tension. Nevertheless, this kind of social engineering through sports has been viewed with considerable skepticism not least by those who argue that, by their very nature, sports are more likely to be catalysts for violence than vehicles for spreading harmony. According to George Orwell, international sporting competition can best be described as war minus the shooting. The statement is sufficiently ambiguous as to be open to two radically different interpretations. On the one hand, Orwell could be understood to be arguing that international sporting competition acts as a safety valve that makes warfare increasingly less likely. Alternatively, he may have meant that international sporting competition actually keeps alive those very tensions out of which violent conflict is often the inevitable consequence. In fact, from other observations that Orwell expressed about sport, the latter reading of his comment gets closest to an accurate understanding of his meaning. Sport is necessarily competitive and, by implication, conflictual. It is also an important element in the construction and reproduction of social identities. It brings people together. About that there can be no question. It does so, however, in contexts that are arguably more likely to exacerbate tensions than to help resolve them. This “fact” of sporting life can be particularly problematic for newly established nation-states, the rulers of which may be inclined to look to sport in their endeavors to foster a sense of national unification. This has been a common practice in many sub-Saharan African nation-states. It is often the case that alongside national flags and anthems, sporting heroes are of vital importance in promoting unity among people who have been brought together within the same constitutional entity that owes its existence far more to the mapmakers of various European empires than to any collective sense of a shared history. But using national sporting representatives to this political end can be a difficult strategy to manage where people retain deep affinities for their own tribal, ethnic, or linguistic groups. Perhaps nowhere is this more apparent, and certainly more discussed, than in the “new” Republic of South Africa where sport has frequently been saluted as the actual, or at least the potential, repository of the collective identity of the Rainbow Nation. It is true that at the symbolic level few gestures have had more impact than Nelson Mandela donning the shirt of the Springboks rugby union team, so long regarded as the main sporting medium of Afrikaner nationalism. Such gestures notwithstanding, subsequent events in South Africa have demonstrated how difficult it is to unite divided peoples around the banner of national sport. This becomes all the more apparent when one turns one’s attention to sport’s relationship with unofficial nationalism. It should be noted that politicians in Africa who now seek to use sport to help establish and consolidate a sense of unified national purpose are the successors of those anti-imperialists who, as mentioned above, also harnessed sport for their N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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particular political purposes. On one level, applying the games of their colonial masters could have given the impression that indigenous peoples were willing to accept cultural assimilation. At the same time though, sports clubs became important centers for the dissemination of anticolonial sentiments. Most of the discussion so far relates to constitutional or proto-constitutional nationalism, that is, whatever is bound up with the politics of nation-states, either already in existence or in embryonic form. However, before considering further the relationship between sports and nationalism, it is essential to reiterate and elucidate the distinction between the nation and the nation-state. The latter features prominently in the formal organization of international sporting competition. Representatives of nation-states constitute sport’s world governing bodies and take part as athletes in global events such as soccer’s World Cup and the Olympic Games. To do so, these competitors need to be in possession of a nationality—a designation that is itself bound up with the idea of the nationstate. Many nation-states, however, are comprised of more than one nation. In some instances, identification with those nations is relatively weak and has long since been transcended by a national identity that accords legitimacy to the nation-state. In other cases though, primary identification relates to the nation, with the nation-state being accorded secondary importance except in formal situations. As far as sporting competition is concerned, however, regardless of the depth of feeling that exists for submerged nations, nation-states alone are granted international recognition. One obvious exception to this rule is to be found in the United Kingdom, the example of which helps explain more fully the diverse relationships that can exist between nations and nation-states, nationalities, and national identities. Sport, Nations, and Submerged Nationalism Britain is in itself a nationless entity. Nowhere is this demonstrated more publicly than in the world of international sport. With a single Olympics squad, four “national” soccer teams, and three “national” rugby teams, together with Northern Ireland’s share in the Irish team, the United Kingdom’s sporting landscape is testimony to the complex relationship between nations and nation-states. In addition, the Commonwealth Games allow all of the United Kingdom’s four nations —England, Scotland, Wales, and, more contentiously, Northern Ireland, which, in the eyes of most Irish nationalists, is merely a political entity isolated from the nation, Ireland, to which its six counties properly belong—to participate in a major international sporting event. Indeed, their presence at this event is further bolstered by the participation of three offshore islands—the Isle of Man, Guernsey, and Jersey. The reasons the nations of Britain are given opportunities to compete at the Commonwealth Games and in international soccer in their own right and not as part of the United Kingdom can largely be traced to Britain’s pioneering role in the development of modern sport. Not surprisingly, the current situation, particularly as it relates to international soccer, has long been a source N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of some disquiet among other nation-states, which resent the fact that one of their peers is allowed to retain four places in competition for the World Cup and the European Championship. Certainly this is not a privilege extended to other nation-states, such as Spain, which, it could be argued, is similarly a state made up of a number of nations. Furthermore, no such allowance could ever be made to incorporate the sense of collective belonging that is felt by the members of tribal, ethnic, and linguistic groups that are scattered throughout the world of nation-states. What the British example underlines is that, when we refer to the prestige that nations can derive from sport, it is important to think in terms not only of internationally recognized states whose politicians seize upon sporting success for ideological and propagandist reasons but also of submerged nations (Scotland, Wales, the Basque country, Catalonia, Québec perhaps, and so on) for which sport has commonly been one of the most effective vehicles for cultural resistance by both cultural and political nationalists. Sport provides both athletes and fans with opportunities to celebrate a national identity that is different from and, in some cases, opposed to their ascribed nationality. The two forms of engagement need not be mutually exclusive. It is possible to support both British teams and Scottish ones, or to represent Wales and also the United Kingdom. Another example is provided by Spain where football fans from Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia find it possible to support the selección (that is, the Spanish “national” soccer team) without necessarily identifying with the Castillian version of Spanishness. It can be argued, however, that national identity (which often equates to nationality) tends to take priority in the minds of sports fans—hence the passion for those soccer clubs that represent the submerged nations of Spain such as Celta de Vigo and Deportivo de la Coruña in Galicia, Athletic Bilbao and Real Sociedad in the Basque country, and FC Barcelona in Catalonia. Nationality, however, is normally what matters to athletes since this alone guarantees the right to compete on behalf of nation-states, which, unlike many nations, can be represented in international sport just as they are at the United Nations itself. It is worth noting, of course, that nationality rules have become increasingly flexible in sport as a response to labor migration. This trend is taken up later in the discussion of globalization and its consequences for nations and nationalism. The desire, particularly on the part of fans, to express their national identity in the realm of sport is clearly linked to nationalism in the broadest sense or, at the very least, to patriotism. Former British member of Parliament Jim Sillars dismissed the attitude of his fellow Scots toward national sporting representatives as “ninety-minute patriotism.” Similar views are also held, in certain quarters, with regard to some Irish supporters of sport. Thus, Irish support for national representatives in global sporting activities such as golf, rugby union, and soccer is seen by some followers of the Gaelic games tradition as patriotic rather than nationalistic and, by implication therefore, relatively politically shallow. The relationship between Gaelic games and Irish nationalism, on the other hand, is, as we N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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shall see, regarded as much more profound. In general, however, attempts to distinguish the passions aroused by international sport from “real” nationalism miss the point. It is undeniable that expressions of solidarity for players and teams that represent one’s nation are closely linked to cultural nationalism. Whether or not they are also bound up with political nationalism is a different question, the answer to which necessarily varies from one individual to the next. For many people, even those whose national identity is associated with a submerged nation, cultural nationalism is enough. They may well feel that they could not become any more Scottish or Welsh or Catalan than they already are, even with the formation of a nation-state that would correspond to their sense of national identity. For others, though, cultural nationalism is nothing more than the emotional embellishment of a strongly held political ideology that will settle for nothing less than national sovereignty. For most sportsmen and women, even in an era when money is a major incentive for sporting success, representing the nation remains important. It is not inconceivable that they might represent more than one nation, with neither ethnic origin nor even well-established civic connections being necessary for a move from one to another. However, for the overwhelming majority of athletes engaged in international sport, the matter is still relatively clear-cut. For fans, things are arguably even simpler. In the modern era, following one’s “proxy warriors” into international competition is one of the easiest and most passionate ways of underlining one’s sense of national identity, one’s nationality, or both. Needless to say, not everyone wishes to celebrate his or her national affiliation in this way, in most instances, simply through lack of interest in sport, the nation, or the relationship between the two. But just as for most active participants, for the majority of sports fans, the choice is relatively straightforward. This is not to deny, of course, that in certain circumstances athletes and fans alike may well understand their nations in different ways. Furthermore, it is not only sporting individuals who demonstrate the contested character of most, if not all, nations. Sports themselves also do so to the extent that they become “national” in the popular imagination for a variety of reasons.

Dimensions A discussion of the concept of national sports has particular value for the study of nationalism more generally, inasmuch as it necessitates some reference to the main debates in this area. For example, a primordialist interpretation of the origins of nations would allow for the possibility that national sports are bound up with the various criteria that legitimate historic nationhood—blood ties, language, topography, the soil, and so on. According to theories linking the rise of nationalism to the exigencies of modernization, on the other hand, national sports are N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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simply part of a panoply of elements that serve to legitimize the nation-state. In addition, concepts such as “imagined community” and “invented tradition” can then be invoked in an attempt to explain how attempts are made to bestow some historic legitimacy on what are essentially modern responses to particular political necessities. Furthermore, the distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism may also be invoked to advance the case that the national sport is about true belonging, whereas other sports that are played within the nation can be linked to what constitutes the civic nation or, more properly, the nation-state but lack the stamp of authenticity. In reality, however, no single approach can fully explain how specific sports acquire national significance. National sports take different forms, and in so doing, they provide us with interesting insights into the character of particular nations. Indeed, the concept of a “national” sport not only illuminates the relationship between the various terms listed above, which are associated with the nation, but also helps us begin to understand how it is that nations resist globalization even in a global era. Some “national” sports are peculiar to specific nations. Their “national” status is fenced in by their exclusivity—echoes here of ethnic nationalism. National sports and games of this type are in some sense linked to the essence of the nations in question, even though their actual origins may be pre-national or at least prior to the emergence of nation-states. They represent “the nation” symbolically, despite the fact that they may well have demonstrably failed to capture the interest of most of the people who constitute the civic nation and/or the nation-state. It should be noted that those activities most likely to be fenced in because of their specific cultural resonance do not always find favor with members of particular nations’ cosmopolitan elites, who may well believe that the nation is better represented by sports that are both modern and transnational. Certainly the corrida de toros, the classic form of the bullfight, is not universally popular throughout Spain, nor does it even take place at all in some Spanish regions. In the “Spanish” context, one should also mention the sport of pelota, played and watched enthusiastically in the Basque country together with numerous arcane, rustic types of competition. Nevertheless, in terms of popularity, the “national sport” of Spain is almost certainly soccer (association football). Yet, at least as much as taurine activities, soccer also makes us appreciate the extent to which Spain is at best a divided nation and, at worst, not a nation at all—merely a nation-state. In part, this reality explains morbo, the disease that infects football rivalry between FC Barcelona and Real Madrid CF, for example, and, perhaps above all, between clubs located in the Basque “nation” (Euskadi) and those at the “center” (understood both physically and metaphorically) of Spain. In Ireland, while hurling may well be the sport of choice in the eyes of Bord Fáilte (the Irish Tourist Board) or the advertising executives responsible for selling a variety of Irish products, including stout and whiskey, the sport’s popularity varies considerably from one county, and even one parish, to another. Gaelic football is more uniform in terms of the support it receives throughout the 32 counties, yet N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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there are isolated pockets where it loses out to hurling. Furthermore, the right of any Gaelic game to be assigned “national status” is considerably weakened not only because some Irish nationalists opt for other sports, such as rugby union and soccer, but also because the overwhelming majority of the Protestant community in the north of Ireland have resolutely set their faces against the whole Gaelic games movement. It might seem easy to dismiss this difficulty by simply taking these people at their word and accepting that, since they do not consider themselves to be truly Irish, their sporting preferences need have no impact on what does or does not constitute an Irish national sport. But this would be to ignore the basic precepts of Irish republican ideology, which has consistently sought to embrace not only Catholics but Protestants and dissenters as well. Games such as rugby union and soccer have some claim on the right to be called “national” in the Irish context. Despite their British origins, they are played throughout the island. Moreover, although rugby tends to be played by Protestants rather than Catholics in Northern Ireland, both football codes enjoy considerable support from both traditions on the island as a whole. They offer Irish sportsmen the opportunity to represent the nation at an international level. Indeed, rugby, unlike soccer, allows northern unionists the chance to acknowledge their sporting Irishness while retaining a political allegiance to the union of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It should be noted, however, that regardless of any claims that either sport may have to be recognized as “national,” neither has escaped the influence of globalization. The two Irish “national” soccer teams have both fielded players whose ethnic “right” to belong has been relatively weak. The same thing has happened in rugby union, which in recent years has witnessed a flood of antipodean coaches and players, some of whom have qualified to play for Ireland despite having accents that conjure up images of Dunedin or Durban, not Dublin or Dungannon. Gaelic games have been less affected by the movement of people commonly linked to globalization, except in the sense that Irish migrants have taken their traditional activities to other parts of the world, most notably to North America. This is not to deny that changes taking place beyond the shores of Ireland have had an impact on the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA). Nevertheless, the factors that have been most influential are best understood in terms of modernization and capitalism as opposed to the more specific category of globalization. Gaelic games have been relatively unscathed by the latter. As a result, the GAA offers rich insights into the processes whereby the nation has been able to resist the global in sport as in much else. In terms of national sports, the United States and Canada also provide interesting food for thought. One could plausibly argue that the various games and pastimes engaged in by the continent’s aboriginal peoples are the true national sports of what became known as North America. Of these, however, only lacrosse has acquired a wider popularity (and that fairly minimal), whereas baseball has achieved the status of “the national pastime” in the United States, and ice hockey N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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has been similarly elevated in Canada. In the former, however, it would be foolish to ignore the rival claims of football and basketball. Physical activities originating in the Far East have had their own particular trajectories. The martial arts of Japan and Korea have been adopted enthusiastically in the West and imbued with more easily accessible characteristics, whereas sumo wrestling, though attracting participants from other parts of the world, remains very much a Japan-based sport. Meanwhile, in both Korea and Japan, the global sport of soccer and the American national pastime, baseball, have become hugely popular. Such examples are common enough in an increasingly globalized world sporting order.

Consequences Despite the resilience of traditional pastimes such as pelota and sumo and of organizations such as the GAA in Ireland, there are strong grounds for believing that the link between nationalism and sports is becoming weaker and that the very existence of international competition is threatened by the twin forces of globalization and consumer capitalism. Athletes migrate from one nation-state to another in rapidly increasing numbers, and not only to play for different clubs. In many cases, the move also involves the adoption of a new sporting nationality. This process has been notably exemplified in the global movement of Kenyan runners—representing their “real” nation at one major event and Qatar, for example, at the next. In this way, Stephen Cherono became Saif Saeed Shaheen and won a gold medal for his new nation in the 3,000-meter steeplechase at the World Athletics Championships in Paris in 2003, pushing a “true” Kenyan, Ezekiel Kemboi, into second place. Furthermore, it is increasingly believed that, although most professional athletes in team sports continue to represent the nation-states of their birth, their true feelings of loyalty are for their clubs and even for their corporate sponsors. This leads to concerns that in soccer the European Champions’ League has now virtually surpassed the World Cup in terms of its significance for players and that, in most sports, major competitions will in the long run involve representatives of Nike, Adidas, and a host of other corporations, with nations and even long-established sports clubs having greatly reduced importance. At present, the Ryder Cup in golf pits golfers from various European nation-states against their counterparts from the United States, providing a relatively rare opportunity for the expression of American sporting nationalism prompted by international, or more accurately intercontinental, competition. But how realistic are fears that competition between nations is in the process of being superseded by a transnational, global sports culture? First, we should always be cautious when we talk about the transformation of modern society into a globalized postmodernity. Throughout the history of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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modern sport, which is itself not much older than that of most of the world’s nation-states, players have moved from one country to another. Furthermore, “national” teams have always reflected the movement of peoples and the creation of diasporas. Indeed, the fact that some nation-states now select representatives on the basis of the place of birth of one or more of their grandparents is little more than a reversal of that particular trend. If the host state’s national selectors show little interest in a particular athlete, then it becomes increasingly likely that another set of selectors will. All of this suggests that, though there may indeed be more anomalies than ever before with respect to who represents the nation, the phenomenon of representing a nation that is not fully one’s own (whatever that actually means in relation to the idea of authenticity) is in no way new. Between the 1940s and 1960s, it was possible for one of the greatest soccer players of his time, Alfredo Di Stefano, who was born in Argentina into a family of Italian immigrants, to play for three different national teams—Argentina (7 caps), Colombia (4 caps), and Spain (31 caps). The life of this one sportsman alone is indicative of the extent to which modern sport has always thrown up issues surrounding the concepts of nationality and national identity. It should be added, however, that for the most part throughout this period, the overwhelming majority of people who have represented their countries at sport have had remarkably strong ties with the nation-state in question. In most instances, that is where they (or at least their parents) were born, or they have come to live there at some stage in their lives and have acquired citizenship and with it a legally recognized nationality. In addition, as suggested earlier, an even greater majority of fans have always been irrevocably tied to their respective national teams and representatives. This is not to deny that it is easier than ever before for sports fans to watch, to support, and to wear the colors of nations other than their own. Yet most choose not to do so. As a Scot, I could conceivably have enjoyed soccer’s World Cup Finals over the years far more than has been the case had I chosen to support Brazil, Italy, or Germany rather than my own country. But it is not something that I have ever seriously contemplated. This is not to say that, were I offered a large sum of money to transfer my allegiance, I would find it physically or indeed psychologically impossible to do so. To that extent, one can understand the action of a Kenyan athlete who opts to represent Qatar. However, I would still find more meaning in watching a losing Scottish team than in giving my support to another, more successful football nation to which I feel no emotional attachment whatsoever. Sports fans who are in any manner motivated by the relationship between sport and nationalism are largely stuck with the nation or the nation-state to which through nationalist identity or nationality they can be said to belong. It should be added, though, that this type of fan is also most likely to be attracted to team sports or to major events, such as the Olympic Games, at which athletes compete as representatives of their nation-states. For more individualistic, highlevel competitions—tennis, for example, or golf—it becomes easier for a fan to celebrate the achievements of a chosen player regardless of his or her place of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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origin. Once again, it is fair to say that this has always been the case; it is not the consequence of increasingly influential forces of globalization or of the chaos believed by some to characterize the postmodern condition. There is no denying that sport is constantly affected by social change. Sports that were once played only in certain places—national sports, according to one set of criteria—are now played throughout the world. American influence, although insufficient to allow sports such as baseball and American football to supersede soccer in most parts of the world, has clearly impacted the ways in which a sport such as soccer is now played, packaged, mediated, and observed. The fact remains, however, that sport is still far more likely to contribute to the perpetuation of strongly held local, regional, and national identities than to the construction and consolidation of a homogeneous global culture. This is scarcely surprising since sport is so central to the construction and reproduction of particularistic identities so different from the idea of a global culture, which is so often heralded but which evokes so little emotion. For the time being, the relationship between sports and nations remains strong, although it is equally apparent that this relationship manifests itself in a wide variety of ways. Sport can help to promote the image of a nation-state, but it may also bring shame and financial ruin. Sport can unite a nation-state, but, then again, it may not. Sport can often be the most important symbol of the continued existence of a submerged nation. Sport can allow nations and nation-states alike, as well as regions and other localities, to resist cultural homogenization. Yet it can also serve the purposes of global capitalism. Like nationalism itself, sport is Janus-faced. Perhaps for that reason alone, their continued relationship is secure. Selected Bibliography Allison, Lincoln. 2000. “Sport and Nationalism.” In Handbook of Sports Studies, edited by J. Coakley and E. Dunning. London: Sage. Allison, Lincoln, ed. 2004. The Global Politics of Sport: The Role of Global Institutions in Sport. London: Routledge. Bairner, Alan. 2001. Sport, Nationalism, and Globalization: European and North American Perspectives. Albany: State University of New York Press. Bairner, Alan, ed. 2005. Sport and the Irish: Histories, Identities, Issues. Dublin, Ireland: University College Dublin Press. Ball, Phil. 2001. Morbo: The Story of Spanish Football. London: When Saturday Comes Books. Billig, Michael. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. Cronin, Michael. 1999. Sport and Nationalism in Ireland: Gaelic Games, Soccer and Irish Identity since 1884. Dublin, Ireland: Four Courts Press. Douglass, Carrie B. 1997. Bulls, Bullfighting, and Spanish Identities. Tucson: University of Arizona Press. Hoberman, John. 1984. Sport and Political Ideology. London: Heinemann. Houlihan, Barrie. 1994. Sport and International Politics. Hemel Hempsted, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf. James, C. L. R. 1963. Beyond a Boundary. London: Stanley Paul and Co.


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Levermore, R., and A. Budd, eds. 2004. Sport and International Relations: An Emerging Relationship. London: Routledge. Maguire, Joseph. 1999. Global Sport: Identities, Societies, Civilizations. Cambridge: Polity Press. Miller, T., G. Lawrence, J. McKay, and D. Rowe, eds. 2001. Globalization and Sport. London: Sage. Orwell, S., and I. Angus, eds. 1970. The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, vol. 4: In Front of Your Nose. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin. (First published in the Tribune, December 14, 1945.) Porter, D., and A. Smith, eds. 2004. Sport and National Identity in the Post-War World. London: Routledge. Silk, M. L., D. L. Andrews, and C. L. Cole, eds. 2005. Sport and Corporate Nationalisms. Oxford: Berg.


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Britain Stephen Heathorn Chronology 1945 End of World War II. Labour Party wins majority in July elections. 1947 India gains independence. 1948 British Nationality Act passed, creates common citizenship rights for all empire and Commonwealth subjects. 1951 Labour outpolls Conservative Party but loses election; Winston Churchill becomes prime minister. 1952 King George VI dies; Elizabeth II becomes queen. 1955 Churchill retires as prime minister; Conservatives increase their majority in May election. 1958 Notting Hill race riots. 1959 Conservative prime minister Harold Macmillan announces “wind of change” policy of decolonization in Africa. 1961 Britain’s first application to the European Economic Community (EEC). 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act restricts entry to Britain. 1964 Labour wins election; Harold Wilson becomes prime minister. 1969 British send troops to Ulster to quell sectarian violence. 1970 Conservatives win election; Edward Heath made prime minister. 1974 Labour narrowly wins in two general elections; Wilson returns as prime minister. 1975 Referendum in Britain on EEC membership passes (after success of third application, 1973). 1979 Referendums on Scottish and Welsh devolution fail to garner sufficient votes. Conservatives win general election; Margaret Thatcher becomes prime minister. 1981 Race riots in Toxteth and Brixton; British Nationality Act reverses provisions of 1948 act. 1982 Britain goes to war against Argentina over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. 1983 Conservatives win general election with increased majority.

Situating the Nation The period from 1945 to 1983 was one of considerable transition for Britain as a nation and as a state. Britain emerged victorious from World War II with tremendous international prestige but with a ravaged infrastructure and economy, and without the resources to resume its prewar position as a global imperial power. Since 1707, Great Britain had actually been the political union of the English, who by dint of demographic preponderance and economic development predominated, and the Scottish and Welsh. To this union was grafted an increasing number of imperial dependencies, including the old empire of white settler colonies in the Americas that had been founded in the 17th century (the United States N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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formally leaving the empire in 1783, but the Canadian colonies remaining), and the newer settlements of Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Ireland, dominated by English landlords for centuries, formally became incorporated into the Union of Great Britain and Ireland only in 1801. Nonsettler dependencies were also added to the empire, most significantly the Indian subcontinent in the 18th century, African and other Asian territories in the late 19th century, and several Middle Eastern territories at the end of World War I in 1918. After the American colonies, Ireland was the first major territory of the British empire to become independent, a feat accomplished only through a partition of the southern three provinces of Ireland from the northern province of Ulster in 1922. Between the late 1860s and the late 1940s, the white settler colonies and India gained increased status and a degree of self-rule within the empire, first as “Dominions” and then as sovereign states bound to Britain through the institution of the Commonwealth and the person of the British monarch. The remaining colonial possesN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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sions of the empire retained their status as dependent territories until the major wave of decolonization in the late 1950s and early 1960s. This process of decolonization was achieved largely without the major wars that marred French and Portuguese decolonization, but it did not occur without considerable violence. This breakup of the empire had profound consequences for British nationalism and the nation-state. Two of the immediate and unanticipated but deep changes that resulted from the loss of empire was the subsequent rise of postcolonial immigration to Britain —which fundamentally transformed the ethnic composition and cultural assumptions of the nation—and the simultaneous recognition that Britain’s future lay with continental Europe through membership in the European Economic Community (EEC). The retreat from empire had reduced much of the coherence of Britain’s composite national identity as it had evolved over the previous two and half centuries, and there was a corresponding loosening of the bonds of the union of national cultures at the center. Latent, but until the 1960s relatively minor, nationalist movements in Scotland and Wales were reinvigorated by postcolonial developments, and a violent clash developed between Irish nationalists and supporters of continued union with Britain in Northern Ireland. With the dismantling of empire came a reduction of Britain’s international power, at first not fully perceived, which ultimately led successive British governments to seek integration with Europe. In less than 40 years, then, Britain was transformed from one of the largest imperial powers on the planet, centered on a number of distinct but integrated national cultures within a largely unified state structure, to a more fractured and increasingly multiethnic nation ensconced within the political and economic structures of the supranational European Union.

Instituting the Nation While Britain’s decline as an empire was the main catalyst for the nation’s transformation from 1945 to 1983, institutional and philosophical continuities from the pre-1945 era helped ease the process to postcolonial nation-state. In particular, the monarchy and parliamentary democracy remained the key touchstones of national continuity and identity. For many, the continued existence of the monarchy gave Britain national prestige, moral leadership, and a focus of national identification that was supposedly above politics. Seen as the head of the national family, the monarchy was thought by many commentators to be key in overcoming internal social and geographic divisions within Britain. Royal tours of Britain’s various regions were a regular feature of the monarchy’s calendar throughout the period and were intended to project a sense that the monarchy was in touch with the entire population. Overt criticism of the monarchy between the 1940s and early 1960s was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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beyond the pale of acceptable behavior, but criticism and even hostility to the idea of monarchy did develop in some quarters over the later 1960s and 1970s. Still, the Queen’s Silver Jubilee in 1977 was genuinely popular and seems to have temporarily masked the extent of social tensions and regional divisions within Britain. If the monarchy appealed to the social and cultural continuities of the British nation, then parliamentary democracy remained the major institution providing coherence to the British political nation between 1945 and the mid-1980s. Despite the fact that 1945 saw the election of a socialist party intent on fundamentally transforming Britain’s polity and economy through the establishment of universal welfare programs and state-run, “nationalized” industry, these goals were envisaged and attempted entirely through parliamentary means. Similarly, at the end of the period, after 1979, when an economically laissez-faire but socially authoritarian-inclined Conservative government set about dismantling large parts of the welfare state, parliamentary means were used and longstanding traditions and customs respected. In both cases, despite deep social and political divisions, British parliamentary democracy fundamentally moderated the measures that could be debated and enacted. Moreover, just as the political class affirmed by its actions that loyalty to parliamentary democracy trumped social divisions like class, gender, or ethnicity, acceptance of the sovereignty of parliamentary democracy was key in easing, though by no means eliminating, social tensions and allowing for the incorporation of new migrants to the British polity.

The Monarchy The extraordinary prominence of the monarchy in British society since World War II suggests that the Royals personify what the British—over the last couple of centuries at least —regard in themselves as unique and special. The monarchy remains the supposed repository of many values that the British hold near and dear: values like decency, pragmatism, solidity, and moderation. In Long to Reign over Us? (1966), Leonard Harris explained the importance of the monarchy to British identity: “Its existence means safety, stability and continued national prestige: it promises religious sanction and moral leadership; it is ‘above party’ focus for group identification; . . . it is an important, and perhaps increasingly important, symbol of national prestige” (quoted in P. Ward 2004, 31). Despite calls to modernize this institution, for many the thought of doing so offends the very basic principles of the national character. It goes against the image that many Britons have fashioned for themselves: as the plucky, stiff-upper-lipped people of a small and rainy land that conquered an empire and won a world war so that they might spread throughout the world their ideals of civilized life. In the faint afterglow of imperial decline, the British people as a whole have had to come to terms with their diminished stature. Deferential reverence for the monarchy, once the very symbol of imperial power, ultimately serves as a culture of consolation for faded national glory.


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Defining the Nation Historian David Cannadine has rightly quipped that the British empire disappeared rapidly from the map, but much less quickly from the British national imagination. The 1948 British Nationality Act reflected a sense of Britishness anchored in an older imperial worldview that was expected, but failed, to match reality. The act gave all citizens of Commonwealth countries and the remaining colonies guaranteed right of entry into Britain as empire subjects. It was hoped this would help cement ties between Britain and the Commonwealth. Contrary to expectations, however, it was nonwhite postcolonial migrants that chose to exercise their rights under the act rather than the white populations of the former dominions. The arrival of nonwhite migrants to Britain challenged traditional definitions of Britishness. On the one hand, the presence of large nonwhite communities led to calls for a new multicultural definition of national identity. But on the other, postcolonial immigration led to an anti-immigration backlash, evident in the violent race riots of 1958 in Nottingham and in the Notting Hill district of London. At first the government tried to stem the influx of nonwhite immigrants by using informal controls, but in 1962 restrictive legislation was passed enforcing a system based on employment vouchers. Subsequent immigration restrictions would be enacted in 1968 and 1971; race relations legislation was passed throughout the 1970s in an effort to stem racial discord; and even more severe legislation, effectively reversing the provisions of the 1948 act, was passed by Margaret Thatcher’s government in 1981. After 1981, overseas British citizens no longer had the right to enter Britain, and the children of recent immigrants lost the right to automatic British nationality. Ironically, Thatcher’s government went to war with Argentina over one of the few remaining British imperial outposts— the Falkland/Malvina Islands—the following year. Support for this controversial war among a wide swath of the British population, along with the turnabout in the Thatcher government’s electoral fortunes that followed in the election in 1983, indicates a deep vein of nostalgic imperial nationalism that well demonstrates the kernel of truth in Cannadine’s quip. At the same time, the shrinking of the empire and of the imperial state resulted in the various national regions of Britain taking on more prominence in political discussion, as did the future place of Britain within Europe. The importance of the national and regional components of the British union were highly touted in the 1951 Festival of Britain celebrations, but they were defined in terms of four contributing cultures to the nation (English, Northern Irish, Scottish, and Welsh) rather than a unified imperial Britishness as had been the case in exhibitions prior to World War II (such as at Wembley in 1924). By the 1970s, there were increasing demands for actual decentralization and the devolution of administrative and political power to the national regions, particularly to Scotland and Wales. However, a referendum on devolution in 1979 failed to garner enough support to be enacted. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Dancers perform in traditional Irish attire during the Festival of Britain in London, May 16, 1951. (Hulton-Deutsch Collection/Corbis)

Initial, post–World War II talk of Western European federation made little headway in Britain, primarily due to the belief that Britain remained a major power in global affairs and had a special relationship with the United States. Consequently, Britain played no significant part in the discussions that led to the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the founding of the EEC. By the end of the 1950s, however, it was evident to many policy makers that Britain’s economic future was tied to Europe, and the British applied to join the EEC in 1961, only to see their application vetoed by the French in 1963. Two more applications were required before Britain was accepted into the EEC in 1973, a decision ratified in the 1975 referendum.

Narrating the Nation In 1945 the British state was about 240 years old, but the national cultures of Britain traced their histories back much further. The past was a source of great pride and satisfaction for the postwar nation, as demonstrated in the remarkable foregrounding of British history in the 1951 Festival of Britain. But the heritage of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Festival of Britain, 1951 The 1951 Festival of Britain was planned by the resource-strapped, postwar moderate socialist Labour government as a reward for 12 years of war and reconstruction austerity and as a declaration of national recovery under socialist planned leadership. The festival was presented as a narrative of the British national character, past and future, and set forth many of the values of the new, modern nation that would dominate British conceptions of themselves until the 1970s. The story told by the festival celebrated the distant, transhistorical past, particularly the imagined ancient ancestry of the peoples of the British Isles, and also the innovations of modernity embraced by the Labour Party–supporting, middleclass technocrats that planned the various exhibitions. This presentation effaced the industrial, class-conflicted past (and indeed present) in favor of a timeless social harmony that was leading inexorably toward a more rational, educated, and scientific future. Approximately 2,000 communities organized their own activities, and nine government-funded regional and traveling exhibits took the festival’s message across the land. For the organizers, Britain’s imperial legacy was an embarrassment that could not be easily incorporated into the dominant narrative of the festival. Thus, although the diversity of Britain’s regions and national groups was celebrated in a myriad of ways, ultimately the festival was inward-looking and chauvinistic and presented a fundamentally white conception of Britishness—a perception that was echoed by those opposed to postimperial immigration later in the 1960s and 1970s.

distant past and Britain’s glories as an empire, while often referred to in political discourse and popular culture, had to compete with the more recent mythic narrative of the “People’s War”—the story of Britain standing in unity against fascism between 1939 and 1945. The populist narrative of the war years was part of the ideological underpinning of the postwar Labour government’s socialist experiment to consolidate on the perceived social consensus for a managed economy through nationalized key industries and a policy of government-contrived full employment, a social safety net of welfare provisions, and the maintenance of “fair shares” and income equalization. Labour had to pursue these measures in the teeth of economic hardships and a policy of enforced austerity between 1945 and 1951. The Conservative Party, however, also had a national narrative that utilized the image of the indomitable wartime leader, Winston Churchill, in the early 1950s to mobilize support for its own platform of eliminating austerity measures and reasserting Britain’s international prestige. Both Labour and the Conservatives thus traded on narratives of Britain’s former glories and of recent wartime triumph to mobilize the nation behind their respective polices.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The transition from an imperial British nation to a multiethnic and multicultural one was the product of both contingent circumstance and deliberate state policy. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Winston Churchill (1874 –1965) Although his most significant accomplishment was undoubtedly his leadership of wartime Britain (1940–1945), Winston Churchill’s shadow fell across most of the period 1945–1983 primarily as a symbol of British national prestige. After being defeated by the Labour Party in the 1945 elections, Churchill resumed his lifelong opposition to decolonization of the British empire and encouraged stiff resistance to the Soviets during the Cold War. He returned to office as prime minister in 1951 and set about removing the remaining austerity measures—rationing and price and wage controls—that had first been instituted during World War II and were then continued under Labour to ensure “fair shares” in the distribution of goods. Churchill rebuilt the Conservative Party, and although Labour’s policy of nationalizing industries was reversed, Churchill’s government did not dismantle the welfare state that had been created by Labour, thereby ensuring that these policies were considered beyond party politics and a permanent feature of British life until the economic pressures and an ideological sea change in the late 1970s. Churchill retired as prime minister in 1955 and thereafter only occasionally sat in the House of Commons until 1964 when he fully retired. He died the following year. Although he was on the losing side of many policy decisions after the war, Churchill’s significance was still immense, as he was the physical embodiment of the nation’s “finest hour” (a phrase coined by Churchill himself) during the darkest days of World War II — the national hero whose leadership during the war helped determine not only British, but world, history.

Initially, successive British governments after 1945 tried to retain and retool the empire for metropolitan needs. Colonial nationalism within the empire and the politics of the Cold War, however, forced the hand of British governments from the late 1940s. The loss of India and other Asian colonies was a severe blow to British prestige, but further attempts to act like an imperial power ran into the reality of the changed international situation, in particular the 1956 crisis with Egypt over the Suez Canal. Britain’s forced retreat over Suez was a diplomatic humiliation and national crisis that prompted a dramatic shift in British government thinking about its imperial role. Macmillan undertook to reexamine the “balance sheet” of empire and decided it was in the nation’s best interest to divest itself rapidly of the vast majority of its remaining imperial territories. The socalled “winds of change” policy swept most of Britain’s dependencies out of the imperial fold and into independence between 1959 and 1964. While the very substance of the empire was being taken apart, British nationality laws were adjusted to preserve the illusion of imperial unity. Between World War I and World War II, emigration from, rather than migration to, Britain was the more typical population flow. Despite being faced with a severe labor shortage, the postwar British government continued to encourage emigration schemes to the former dominions in an attempt to strengthen the ties between the “mother country” and the postimperial Commonwealth. Altogether over 1.5 million citizens emigrated from Britain between 1945 and 1960, with about 80 percent of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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them going to the former dominions. To ease the labor shortage within the British Isles, the government recruited immigrants from the displaced persons camps of war-torn Europe and from the Republic of Ireland. Together more than a million migrants from Europe and Ireland settled in Britain after 1945. In the 1950s, employers within Britain also sought labor from existing and former colonies. London Transport, for example, set up a recruiting office for bus drivers in Barbados; cotton and wool mills in Yorkshire recruited labor from South Asia, especially for the night shift and for lower-paying jobs. Unassisted immigration from the West Indies accelerated after 1952 when the United States restricted entry to its own labor market. A second wave of immigrants from eastern Africa—many of them of Indian descent who had originally been encouraged to settle in Africa by the British—started arriving in the later 1960s, pushed out of former British colonies like Kenya, which had embarked on “Africanization” policies after gaining independence. Between 1948 and 1971, Britain gained approximately 1.5 million new residents from the former colonies, a little under 3 percent of the total population. Over half the immigrants were from India and Pakistan or were East African Asians. Most of the remainder came from the British Caribbean. Almost all the newcomers settled in London and in a few major towns in the midlands and north of England. Rural and suburban England, and most of Wales and Scotland, were home to very few of the new arrivals prior to the 1980s. Growing resistance to the multicultural transformation of Britain, however, reflected lingering imperial prejudices based on race and color. A few politicians, such as Enoch Powell, tried to capitalize on anti-immigrant feeling for political purposes, and while there is no doubt that a sizable minority of the population felt some sympathy with his views, Powell’s blatant appeal to racism effectively ended his ambition to lead the Conservative Party. Still, poor race relations in the cities became an established fact over the course of the 1970s. Between 1976 and 1981, for instance, at least 31 black people in Britain were murdered because of racist motives. In 1977, the National Front, an extreme right-wing party formed in 1967, secured 120,000 votes in the election for Greater London municipal government, although it failed to win a national parliamentary seat. This latter fact is partly explained by how Conservative leader Margaret Thatcher mobilized antiimmigrant sentiment, suitably moderated, in 1978 with claims that the white British feared “their” country was being “swamped” by people with a different culture. This not-so-veiled attack on postcolonial immigrants helped Thatcher form a government in 1979, despite failing to get an absolute majority of votes in the general election. Race relations reached their postwar nadir soon afterward with more race riots in various cities. Although in the first two decades of the period under review the key policies for building the nation were those that surrounded Labour’s promotion of nationalized industry and the welfare state, from the 1960s renewal of the nation tended to take the form of decentralization through demands for devolution. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Such demands were those of a minority, however, as deep social and economic divisions prevented strong nationalist movements from developing. Welsh attitudes were divided between the rural north and industrial south of Wales. The Welsh-speaking and largely nonconformist north was opposed to the liberal social policies favored in the south. The postwar efforts of Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist Party) to create a unified nationalist movement failed largely because of this divide. Plaid Cymru won its first by-election seat in 1966, only to lose it in the general election of 1970. A further blow to Welsh nationalism was the 1979 referendum on devolution of the British state (the idea was to provide Scotland and Wales their own national assemblies to debate domestic policy), in which 46.5 percent of the vote opposed devolution (as opposed to 11.8 percent in favor). And Plaid Cymru won only two seats in the 1979 election, with the Conservative Party gaining 11 and Labour, 24. In fact, the Labour Party was clearly the most powerful political force in Wales throughout this period. Scottish nationalism also remained surprisingly weak for most of this period. Discontent with the postwar economic depression in Scotland and the increasing alienation from the south led to a rise in votes for Labour, not for the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP). Support for the Union of Great Britain remained strong in Lowland Scotland, fortified by militant Presbyterianism, perhaps stronger than anywhere else in the British Isles except Ulster itself. The industrial west of Scotland consistently voted for Labour, and even in the more rural and conservative east and north, Labour did well in the 1950s and 1960s. The SNP did win the occasional seat, but it was not until the discovery of North Sea oil in the early 1970s that the SNP found an issue that they could use effectively in elections. The demand of “Scottish Oil for Scotland” breathed new life into the SNP, which capitalized on this economic nationalism in the 1974 election by winning 22 percent of the Scottish vote and gaining seven seats in Parliament. As with Wales, devolution became a growing demand over the course of the 1970s, and in the 1979 referendum, 52 percent of the Scottish electorate voted in favor of devolution, although this amounted to only 33 percent of the total electorate and the government had laid down as a prerequisite for legislation a minimum of 40 percent of the total vote. In the 1979 election, there was also a decisive swing against the SNP, which lost all but two of its seats; Labour regained its position in Scotland, largely due to the strong protest vote against the Conservatives registered in Scotland. The situation was radically different in Northern Ireland, where the longstanding patterns of political and religious divisions remained. The Protestant community in Northern Ireland had been badly hurt by the collapse of the linen industry and the decline of the Belfast shipbuilding industry. Among the Catholic population in Ulster, there were rising expectations after the 1944 Education Act, which made higher education more accessible to the poorer sections of the population throughout Britain, and promises of further reform. In 1967 members of the Catholic middle class founded a Civil Rights Association along the lines pioneered in the United States and began actively protesting Protestant discriminaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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tion against the Catholic minority. A fierce Protestant backlash ensued, turning to violence in 1969 and a prolonged crisis involving the direct intervention of the British army. The British government took over direct governing responsibility for Northern Ireland in 1972, and for the next 25 years, republican activists in the Irish Republican Army waged an urban guerilla insurgency against Ulster loyalists (and their paramilitary organizations) and the British authorities and symbols of British rule in Ulster and in Britain itself. This situation remained until agreement was reached for a cease-fire in the late 1990s. Selected Bibliography Conekin, Becky. 2003. “The Autobiography of a Nation”: The 1951 Festival of Britain. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.. Gilroy, Paul. 1987. There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Kearney, Hugh. 1995. The British Isles: A History of Four Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kumar, Krishnan. 2003. The Making of English National Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Marwick, Arthur. 1996. British Society since 1945. London: Penguin. Paul, Kathleen. 1997. Whitewashing Britain: Race and Citizenship in the Postwar Era. Cornell, UK: Cornell University Press. Robbins, Keith. 1998. Great Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness. London: Longman. Ward, Paul. 2004. Britishness since 1870. London: Routledge. Ward, Stuart, ed. 2001. British Culture and the End of Empire. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press Webster, Wendy. 1998. Imagining Home: Gender, Race and National Identity, 1945–64. London: Routledge.


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Czechoslovakia Cynthia Paces Chronology 1918 1935 1937 1938 1939 1940 1945 1946 1948 1952 1953 1955 1968 1969 1977 1989 1990 1991 1993 1997 1998 2003 2004

Republic of Czechoslovakia is proclaimed. Tomáš G. Masaryk is elected president. Masaryk is succeeded as president by Edvard Beneš. Death of Masaryk. Munich Accords grant the Sudetenland to Germany. Beneš resigns. Nazi Germany invades Czechoslovakia, establishing the German protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and an independent Slovakia under pro-fascist puppet leader Jozef Tiso. Beneš establishes a government-in-exile in London. Leading Communist Party members escape to the Soviet Union. Red Army liberates Prague. Beneš returns and issues decrees ordering the expulsion of over 2.5 million Sudetan Germans and more than 500,000 ethnic Hungarians. Czechoslovak Communist Party leader Klement Gottwald becomes prime minister in a coalition government following national elections. February Revolution: Communists organize a wave of mass protests and take over the government. Gottwald succeeds Beneš as president and institutes a Stalinist-style dictatorship. Leading Communist figures, including former party secretary general Rudolf Slanský, are falsely convicted of treason and espionage and are executed. Gottwald dies of pneumonia just days after attending Stalin’s funeral. Warsaw Treaty Organization is founded, including the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania. (January) Alexander Dubcˇ ek becomes party leader and ushers in the Prague Spring reform movement. (August) Warsaw Pact troops invade Czechoslovakia. Student Jan Palach burns himself to death in protest of the occupation by Warsaw Pact armies. Gustav Husák replaces Dubcˇ ek as party leader. Dissidents sign Charter 77 demanding civil and political rights. “Velvet Revolution” brings about the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia. Václav Havel elected president. Country is renamed Czech and Slovak Federative Republic. The first free elections since 1946 establish a coalition government. Havel is reelected president. Withdrawal of all Soviet troops. Czechoslovakia’s “velvet divorce” results in two independent countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The Czech Republic joins NATO. Havel is reelected for a second five-year term. Former prime minister Václav Klaus is elected president succeeding Havel. Czech Republic and Slovakia join European Union. Slovakia joins NATO.


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Situating the Nation Czechoslovakia was a multiparty democracy that formed from the vestiges of the Austro-Hungarian empire at the end of World War I. Founded on October 28, 1918, on the principle of national self-determination, the independence of the state was ratified by the 1919 Versailles Treaty. The multinational state, which had strong, democratic institutions and universal suffrage nonetheless, had profound weaknesses that contributed to its fate during and after World War II. The major difficulty was that much of the ethnically diverse population did not feel equally represented in the state dominated by Czech speakers. Of a population of approximately 13.5 million, 3 million citizens were German speaking. Also, the state did not recognize the nearly 9 million “Czechoslovaks” as comprising two national groups, although many of the approximately 2 million citizens living in Slovakia saw themselves as distinct from the Czechs. Except for small Hungarian, Polish, Roma, and Jewish minorities, the remaining population was Czech speaking. The main geographic entities of Czechoslovakia were the Bohemian Crown Lands (sometimes known as the Czech Lands) of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, plus Slovakia and Ruthenia in the east. These regions had different ethnic makeups and histories. The western part of the country loosely conformed to the 10thcentury historic borders of the lands of St. Wenceslas. The population of Bohemia-Moravia was approximately two-thirds Czech speaking and one-third German speaking. Before the late 19th century, German was the language of commerce, government, and education, but the Czech national revival reintroduced the Czech vernacular to the public sphere. Slovakia was historically part of the Hungarian Crown lands of St. Stephen. The region was Slavic speaking but long known simply as “northern Hungary.” During the 19th century, intellectuals worked to create a Slovak literature and were closely associated with Czech revivalists. “Czechoslovakism” proposed that Czech and Slovak were dialects of the same language and that the two groups constituted one nation. During World War I, Czech politicians Tomáš G. Masaryk and Edvard Beneš worked closely with Slovak patriot Milan Štefánik to propose a Czechoslovak state. Masaryk and Beneš became the first two Czechoslovak presidents, but Štefánik was tragically killed in May 1919 in an airplane accident while flying to the Slovak capital, Bratislava, from the Paris Peace Conference. The loss of the Slovak patriot led some nationalists to create conspiracy theories accusing Czechs of ridding their community of a political leader. During the interwar period, many Slovaks as well as German and Hungarian minorities felt disgruntled by Czech political domination. When the Great Depression hit, minorities became further angered with the uneven economic structure of the state. In Slovakia, right-wing politics, often associated with the Roman Catholic Church, took hold. Many Germans in the Sudetenland (the western border region) looked toward the Nazi movement for inspiration. The German citizens’ N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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protests against Czechoslovakia gave Hitler the ammunition he needed at the Munich Accords, which ceded the Sudetenland to Germany in March 1938. When the Germans invaded Czechoslovakia in September 1938, they incorporated Bohemia and Moravia into the Reich and established a pro-fascist independent Slovakia, led by Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. President Edvard Beneš left for London, where he established a Czechoslovak government-in-exile, and leading communist politicians fled to the Soviet Union. Beneš also visited the Soviet Union during the war and proposed Czechoslovakia as a bridge between East and West. Beneš was hopeful that this metaphor could serve as a new identity for his small, vulnerable state. An agreement among Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt called for the Red Army to liberate Prague in May 1945. American troops freed the western corriˇ eské Budˇejovice (Budweis). Beneš returned dor of Czechoslovakia, from Pilsen to C shortly after the war’s end and resumed his presidency. In 1946, parliamentary elections resulted in a power-sharing agreement among the five major political parties. The Communist Party won 38 percent of the vote, not a majority but nearly double what any other party received. The head of the Communist Party, Klement Gottwald, became prime minister, and Beneš remained president. In February 1948, the Communist Party encouraged mass demonstrations and strikes. When leaders of the other political parties resigned in protest, the Communists quickly filled the empty positions and declared themselves the sole leaders of the state. Beneš resigned as president, and Gottwald assumed the position. Beneš died later that year. The Communist Party held power from 1948–1989, and Czechoslovakia was in effect a Soviet satellite state. In 1955, Czechoslovakia joined the Warsaw Treaty Organization, along with the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, East Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Albania. As a state founded on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, the working class was celebrated as the true Czechoslovak citizenry.

Instituting the Nation In the postwar era, Czechoslovakia had to be reinstituted rather than instituted as a nation. There were several tasks for the party in instituting a postwar, communist regime: creating a command economy, asserting the supremacy of the Communist Party, and ensuring a loyal citizenry. Instituting the “nation” involved recasting Czechoslovakia as a nation of workers. To do this, the primary enemies of a Marxist state had to be eliminated. While large-scale industries were nationalized before the Communists assumed total power, smaller businesses and personal property were targeted after 1948. Business owners were labeled as “class enemies,” and many served jail time. Middle-class families fled Czechoslovakia in large numbers. From 1948 to 1967, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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approximately 250,000 Czechoslovaks illegally emigrated, and from 1968 to 1989, another 250,000 left the country. Beyond targeting capitalist leaders, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia sought to expose its supposed enemies. From 1948 until 1953 (the year of Stalin’s and Gottwald’s deaths), the Czechoslovak Communist Party ruled with a Stalinist style, which included show trials, political purges, and actions against business owners and the Catholic Church. Propaganda against the Catholic Church was widespread, and many church leaders were imprisoned. The church’s allegiance to the pope and its pre-1918 associations with the Habsburg monarchy were cast as antinational conduct. Even after communism fell, organized religion remained unpopular, particularly in the Czech regions. In the 2000 census, nearly 60 percent of Czechs listed themselves as “nonreligious” and just over a quarter of the population called itself Roman Catholic. The Czech Republic has one of the lowest church attendances in Europe. Not only did the Communist Party root out enemies such as Catholics and capitalists, but they also turned inward. The pinnacle of this “Stalinist” era was the Slanský trial, which accused former general secretary Rudolf Slanský and 12 Communist Party associates of treason. The state executed 11 men, 9 of whom, including Slanský, were Jewish. The anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist overtones of the trial contrasted with the Communist Party’s inclusive national message. Numerous Czechoslovaks, including many Jewish survivors, had joined the party after the war since it promised equality and a remedy for right-wing politics. The trial also called into question how “national” or independent the Czechoslovak party was from the Soviet Union. The show trials that took place in several Eastern Bloc countries were used to demonstrate loyalty to Stalin, as opposed to the betrayal by Tito’s Yugoslavia. Thus, instituting a definition of a particular nation always had to include loyalty to the new Eastern Bloc.

Defining the Nation Whether Czechoslovakia could be called a nation had been debated since 1918. During the interwar period, approximately 30 percent of the country was German speaking. Despite some attempts to integrate the Germans into the interwar government, the Slavic population was assumed to constitute the true nation. In the 1930s, particularly when German-speaking north Bohemian industry suffered disproportionately from the collapse of the world economy, many German citizens of Czechoslovakia turned toward Germany and Hitler’s Volksdeutch call to unite Europe’s Germans. Following the war, the Beneš decrees ordered the expulsion of approximately 2.5 million Germans and 500,000 Hungarians as a collective punishment for support of the Nazi annexation. The Holocaust also eliminated the majority of Czechoslovak Jews from the population. Sub-Carpathian Russia, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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with high Hungarian and Ukrainian populations, was ceded to the Soviet Union. Before the war, Czechs and Slovaks made up approximately two-thirds of the population, but by 1950 they represented 94 percent of the country. The Czechoslovakia that the Communists inherited, thus, was more closely aligned to a nation-state than its interwar predecessor. Whether “Czechoslovak” could be considered one nation was the primary question in defining the nation. The Czech and Slovak national movements began as linguistic enterprises in the 19th century, and early nationalists claimed the languages were dialects, not separate entities. During the Communist period, however, linguistic parity between the Czechs and Slovaks was considered important. For example, the national television news was read in both languages, the stories alternating between Czech and Slovak newscasters. As with the former German population, the experiences of each group during World War II accounted for the difficulty in defining the nation. The Czech regions had been incorporated into the Reich, whereas the Slovaks gained their N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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own state, albeit one subservient to Nazi goals. On the other hand, though, the Slovaks could argue that their wartime resistance movement was more widespread and effective than the Czech counterpart. Geographic, political, and economic disparity marked the relationship between the two components of the Czechoslovak nation. Much of Slovakia is mountainous, dominated by the High Tatras. The majority of the population was in the agricultural sector. In the Czech lands, there was a strong agricultural economy as well. Yet, Bohemia also had a long history of industrialization and was noted for its car factories, glass industry, and breweries along the western border of the country. The Communists’ ideological focus on industry led to the placement of industry throughout the country, and Slovakia became the site of a national arms industry. Prague remained the capital city. This emphasized Czech domination of the state and fueled resentment among the Slovak population. Despite promises of equality, Czechs still dominated the state, to the disappointment of Slovaks. Not until 1968 was a Slovak, Alexander Dubcˇek, chosen as secretary general of the party. The reformer Dubcˇek, who was ousted by the Soviet leadership for his liberal policies, called for political parity between the Czechs and Slovaks, and the lasting outcome of his brief reign was the federalization of the Czechoslovak state. In 1969 an amendment to the 1960 constitution that declared the Communist Party’s leading role in the state restructured the political institutions of Czechoslovakia, replacing the National Assembly with a Federal Assembly and creating separate Czech and Slovak national councils. In practical terms, however, the state remained largely centralized. Other groups remained on the margins of the Czechoslovak nation-state. Anti-Semitism and prejudice against Roma (Gypsies) were widespread. Holocaust survivors reported resentment by their former neighbors when they returned to their homes, and later Jews became targets of Communist Party purges. The Communist Party’s solution to the Roma population was to integrate them into a national community by preventing certain cultural behaviors, such as migration. Thus, Roma were forcibly settled in large numbers in the Sudetenland, where they worked in coal mining and heavy industry. To this day, the largest settlements of Roma are in the border regions, where they remain the most economically disadvantaged citizens.

Narrating the Nation Two main themes constituted the official “national memory” of Czechoslovakia during the Communist period: Bohemia’s Protestant heritage and the Red Army’s role in saving their younger Czech brothers during World War II. While the state promoted these topics, various dissident movements posited their own definitions of the true Czechoslovak nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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View of Prague at sunrise, featuring the landmark St. Vitus Cathedral. (PhotoDisc, Inc.)

Minister of Education and Public Enlightenment Zdenˇek Nejedlý, a scholar of medieval music, argued that early communist ideology prevailed in Hussitism, the Bohemian church reform movement of the late Middle Ages. This unique history in Bohemia had attracted 19th-century nationalists and interwar politicians. By continuing the promotion of Hussite ideology, Nejedlý demonstrated that the communist movement was a continuation, rather than a rupture, of Czechoslovakia’s historic arc. In 1415, Bohemian priest Jan Hus was executed for preaching against official church teachings. Hus advocated use of the vernacular in Mass, translations of the Bible, and the opportunity for laypeople to receive both Eucharistic wine and bread. Nejedlý saw in Hus’s teachings an emphasis on equality and a critique of the excessive wealth of the medieval church. After Hus’s death, Bohemia erupted into the Hussite Wars, led by Jan Žižka (ca. 1370–1424), a brilliant military tactician and one-eyed general (who eventually lost the second eye as well). Žižka’s followers, known as the Taborites, lived with their families in communities in southern Bohemia and relinquished their property upon entering the military encampments. Nejedlý argued that this was an early form of socialism, predating communist experiences elsewhere in Europe. A convenient aspect of the Hussite legacy was that it enabled the party to create historical justifications for the persecution of Roman Catholic leaders. AntiCatholicism had been associated with Czech nationalism since the 19th century. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Although over 90 percent of Czechoslovakia was nominally Catholic, nationalists blamed the Habsburg’s 17th-century Counter-Reformation and exile of Bohemian Protestants for a loss of a distinct Czech national culture. The party further pointed toward the betrayal of the Czechoslovak unified nation by Slovak priests and Catholic pro-fascist politicians in the 1930s. Of course, the irony of Nejedlý’s promotion of Hus and Žižka was in the religious implications, as atheism was the official teaching of the Communist Party. Nejedlý claimed that, if Hus were born in the 20th century, he would not have been a priest; he used the only means available to him in medieval Europe to promote his message of equality. Nonetheless, two of the most important projects of the Stalinist 1950s embraced this religious and national heritage. One ambitious project was the rebuilding of Bethlehem Chapel, where Hus had preached. Spearheaded by Nejedlý, the project involved archeological studies and reconstruction of a building that had been long destroyed. Nejedlý planned the chapel as a secular meeting place for national events. The Communist state completed the National Memorial on Vítkov Hill, the site of Žižka’s victorious Prague battle in 1420. The First Republic government had begun the modernist structure during the 1930s, but the project was halted by the Nazis, who used the building as a weapons armory. In 1950, the state unveiled a statue of Žižka, reportedly the largest equestrian statue in the world, in front of the memorial. The memorial was originally planned to honor Czech legionnaires who deserted the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I and fought alongside their Russian brothers. After the Russian Revolution, many Czech legionnaires sided with the Whites, and the Communist government needed to rid the monument of these associations. With Gottwald’s death, in March 1953, the party declared that the monument would become a mausoleum for party leaders. Gottwald’s poorly embalmed body was displayed for years, even though it began to disintegrate and parts had to be replaced with wax. The national monument was decorated with new works of art, including Socialist Realist statues of Soviet soldiers. A series of bronze friezes highlighted the connection between the Hussite armies and the Red Army by showing corresponding scenes from both wars. The Žižka memorial linked the Protestant narrative to the pro-Soviet ideology. The Czechoslovak Communist Party celebrated the nation’s saviors in the Red Army, who liberated most of the country. The Soviet soldiers, officers, and Stalin himself became national heroes. As fellow Slavs, the Russians were portrayed as the protective big brothers of the Czechoslovaks. The Communist Party used symbolic forms to legitimate its national leadership but also used the important connection between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The most elaborate project relating to this theme was the Stalin monument in Letna Park overlooking Prague’s Vltava River. The monument featured an enormous (15.5 meters) standing figure of Stalin, who led a procession of fellow statues representing soldiers and workers. The statue was unveiled in 1955, shortly after its sculptor, Otakar Švec, committed suicide. However, following Khrushchev’s denunciation N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of Stalin, Moscow ordered the destruction of the statue, and the granite behemoth was blown up in 1962.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation As in all Communist countries, May 1 became the premier holiday of the state and featured parades and military exercises. Victory in Europe Day was celebrated on May 8, and gratitude for the Red Army’s liberation of Czechoslovakia was particularly emphasized. The anniversary of Hus’s death was acknowledged on July 6. As a communist state, one method of assuring loyalty to the nation was through social services. Health care, education, and the economy were state planned and administrated. Major improvements were made in medicine, and the state profoundly increased the rural population’s access to reliable health care. The state also worked to promote gender equality in education and career choice and provided support for maternity leave and daycare. However, little was done to reduce women’s “double burden” in the home, and many Czechoslovaks considered women’s domestic knowledge part of the national heritage. The symbol of the New Workers, both male and female, was central to mobilizing the nation around the party’s goals of industrialization and economic modernization. As with all communist states, the mythology of the happy, strong, and patriotic worker played an enormous role in shaping a new national identity. This image was popularized in Socialist Realist poster art of the late 1940s and 1950s. One important use of this mythology was to recruit citizens willing to resettle the Sudetenland, which had been depopulated with the expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s German citizens. Emphasizing the need for patriotic workers and families to build the future industrial infrastructure of the nation, the state also gave incentives to those willing to relocate to the border regions. Socialist Realist poster art was a major propaganda method to encourage the resettlement project. Education at all levels was infused with communist ideology and a revised historical narrative. In higher education, Marxist-Leninist philosophy dominated the discourse. The numerous attempts to bring the public firmly into the new nationalcommunist ideology could not counter the fact that Czechoslovakia had one of the most rigid regimes in Eastern Europe. During the mid-1960s, however, Czechoslovakia experienced some liberalization, which culminated in the Prague Spring of 1968 (see sidebar). The 1970s were called a period of “normalization” during which the party attempted to regain the loyalty of citizens by providing more consumer products and forms of popular culture, such as television programming. However, strict censorship was enforced, religious practice was severely curtailed, and the party purged its reformist elements. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Prague Spring The period of January through August 1968 was characterized by a liberalization of Communist Party practices and became known as the “Prague Spring.” Slovak Alexander Dubcˇ ek, who was appointed secretary general of the party in January 1968, called “for Socialism with a Human Face,” and through his Action Program restored freedom of expression, promised a greater availability of consumer goods, and proposed a federal political system. The population responded with displays of patriotism, such as traditional ethnic costume and dance, and calls by intellectuals like Ludvík Vaculík to revive a creative national culture. Although Dubcˇ ek worked to assure the Soviet leaders that Czechoslovakia’s experiment did not signal disloyalty, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev feared that Dubcˇ ek was going the way of Tito and parting from the Soviet Bloc. Warsaw Pact troops invaded Czechoslovakia, and tanks entered Prague on the morning of August 21, 1968. Street fighting ensued, resulting in the deaths of approximately 72 Czechs and Slovaks, the arrest of Dubcˇ ek, who was brought to Moscow, and the crushing of the Prague Spring. In January 1969, university student Jan Palach immolated himself in front of the statue of King Wenceslas on Wenceslas Square in protest of Soviet troops and tanks occupying the city. Palach became a national icon for dissidents, who saw his action as a means to display national sovereignty in the face of Soviet domination.

The atmosphere of the 1970s led to the formation of a small but active dissident movement comprised of intellectuals, artists, priests, and reform communists. The goal of the dissidents was to mobilize the nation in a different way. Intellectuals who once supported the party resented the dulling of a once vibrant, national creative culture. Others decried the desecration of the environment from heavy industry or the loss of true religious freedom. Under the leadership of Václav Havel and others, intellectuals created a “civil society” or parallel community that claimed to be a more authentic representation of the Czechoslovak nation. Havel’s writings particularly focused on the regime’s attempts to “mobilize” the nation with consumer goods, spa holidays, and dull popular culture to distract the population from the losses of freedoms the nation endured. By 1989, fueled by Gorbachev’s glasnost policy and revolutions throughout the region, Prague erupted into peaceful mass demonstrations and a general strike. The culmination of the 10-day “Velvet Revolution” of November 1989 was the resignation of the Communist Party and the selection of dissident leader Václav Havel to lead a new Czechoslovakia. Despite the initial euphoria, the Czechoslovak nation could not sustain itself through the initial years of adjustment to a capitalist market. Suddenly nationalists, particularly in Slovakia, sought to mobilize the population to support a breakup of Czechoslovakia, and they pointed to continued disparity between the economies of the Czech lands and Slovakia. Further, Slovak nationalism took a turn toward the right, as some Slovaks looked back to wartime Slovak independence as a golden era. By 1992, Slovak prime minister Vladimir Meˇciar was advocating a looser confederation within N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Czechoslovakia or a total break from their Czech counterparts. Negotiations between Meˇciar and Czech prime minister Václav Klaus proved fruitless, and the two politicians agreed to divide the country. Though President Havel profoundly opposed this breakup, he promised not to use force to keep the country unified. On January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic and Slovakia became independent countries. The “velvet divorce” prevented the ugliness and violence of Yugoslavia’s demise, but the Czech and Slovak republics were not immune to the postcommunist wave of racist nationalism. Roma were targets of skinhead attacks and employment discrimination. In 1999, Ustí nad Labem, a resettled Sudeten city, built a wall to divide its Roma citizens from the Czech population. The opposition of President Havel and international institutions led to its swift dismantlement, however. The Czech-Slovak split raised the question of citizenship. The Czech citizenship law required those of Slovak descent to prove two years of residency in a single domicile, a clean criminal record for five years, and fluency in Czech. Since many Roma in the Czech Republic were originally from Slovakia and frequently moved, they often did not qualify for citizenship in the new state. International pressure finally persuaded the Czech Parliament to liberalize their citizenship law in 1996. By the mid-1990s, the Czech Republic and Slovakia focused more on integration with Europe rather than with creating unique national narratives. Where

Mass demonstration against the Communist regime in Czechoslovakia during the Velvet Revolution, November 25, 1989. (Peter Turnley/Corbis)


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Velvet Revolution Stimulated by Solidarity’s victory in Poland and the fall of the Berlin Wall, citizens flocked to Wenceslas Square in November 1989 demanding regime change. A catalyst for the protests was a ceremony marking the anniversary of a student killed by the Nazis, which then led to a remembrance of Jan Palach. In late November, the party relinquished its leading role in Czechoslovak politics, and the democracy movement became known as the “Velvet Revolution” for its peaceful character. Dubcˇ ek returned to Prague and stood on a balcony overlooking Wenceslas Square with Havel, who was chosen and later elected as the first noncommunist president of Czechoslovakia since 1948. A wave of emotional national feeling swept the country as people spontaneously sang national anthems and the medieval hymn to Saint Wenceslas and waved Czechoslovak flags. The movement’s leaders called upon familiar national images and sayings. For example, Havel proclaimed in his New Year’s speech to the nation on January 1, 1990, “My people, your government has returned to you,” paraphrasing first president Masaryk, who in turn had used the words of the 17th-century Protestant exile and follower of Hussite ideology, Jan Amos Comenius.

one can see Czechs and Slovaks continuing to embrace their national histories is in the tourist industry. Tourism accounts for 5.5 percent of the gross national product and employs 2 percent of the population. Prague has become a leading European tourist destination, and the Czech Republic invests heavily in its historic capital to attract foreign visitors. To distance themselves from the communist past, Slovaks and Czechs frequently cite their place in “Central” as opposed to Eastern Europe. In 1997 the Czech Republic joined NATO, and Slovakia joined in 2004. In 2003 both countries overwhelmingly voted to join the European Union and entered in 2004. However, President Václav Klaus, who succeeded Havel in 2003, is a Euro-Skeptic (or in his terms a Euro-Realist) who has warned that the smaller states have little power in comparison to the large founding members. An awareness of the perils of the “small nation” continues to inform the political views of the citizenry of both countries. Selected Bibliography Abrams, Bradley F. 2004. The Struggle for the Soul of the Nation: Czech Culture and the Rise of Communism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Connelly, John. 2000. Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Havel, Václav. 1990. Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in East-Central Europe. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Innes, Abby. 2001. Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Kovaly, Heda Margolius. 1986. Life under a Cruel Star: A Life in Prague, 1941–1968. New York: Homes & Meier. Kraus, Michael, and Allison Stanger, eds. 2000. Irreconcilable Differences? Explaining Czechoslovakia’s Dissolution. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.


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Long, Michael. 2005. Making History. Czech Voices of Dissent and the Revolution of 1989. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Mamatey, Victor S., and Radomír Luža. 1973. A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Mlynar, Zdenek. 2003. Conversations with Gorbachev: On Perestroika, the Prague Spring, and the Crossroads of Socialism. New York: Columbia University Press. Renner, Hans. 1989. A History of Czechoslovakia since 1945. London and New York: Routledge. Pontuso, James F. 2004. Václav Havel: Civic Responsibility in the Postmodern Age. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Williams, Kieran. 1997. The Prague Spring and Its Aftermath, Czechoslovak Politics 1968–1970. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.


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European Union Warren Mason Chronology 1946 Winston Churchill’s speech in Zurich calling for a United States of Europe encourages European leaders to take steps toward political union. 1947 Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program) is proposed by U.S. secretary of state George Marshall. 1948 Start of the Benelux Union—a customs union formed by Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The Treaty of Brussels links the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries in a security agreement. The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) is formed by 16 European countries, the United States, and Canada to administer and coordinate Marshall Plan grants. The Congress of Europe meets in Den Haag, the Netherlands, with 750 delegates from 16 countries and observers from the United States and Canada. No agreement is reached on a federal Europe, but the decision is reached to form the Council of Europe as an ongoing forum for discussion among European governments. 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is formed to confront the Soviet Union, link the United States with Europe, and organize the defense of the Western Bloc of nations. 1951 The Treaty of Paris is signed by France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands to establish the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 1954 A proposal to establish a European defense community and European political community is abandoned when the treaties are defeated in the French Parliament. The Treaty of Brussels is expanded to create the West European Union (WEU). The WEU will be linked with the European Union (EU) by the Treaty on European Union (1992) and become the embryo of the EU’s own security organization. 1957 Treaty of Rome is signed by the six signatories to the Treaty of Paris. The European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or EURATOM) are established. 1961–1963 First application by the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland to join the EEC (1961) is vetoed by French president de Gaulle in 1963. 1965–1966 Conflict among member states about supranational powers of the EEC results in the Luxembourg Compromise, which left the national veto effectively intact. 1967–1968 Second veto by de Gaulle of British application to join the EEC (1967). Three communities—the ECSC, EEC, and EURATOM—merge to form the European Community (EC) (1967). The EC begins a customs union and reaches agreement on Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) (1968). 1969–1970 EC member states meet at a summit conference in Den Haag to “relaunch” European integration (1969). Agreement is subsequently reached on financing for CAP, EC enlargement, and formation of a monetary union (initially proposed for 1980). Foreign policy cooperation is formalized with the creation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) (1970). 1973 The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland accede to the EC, bringing membership to nine.


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EUROPE: EUROPEAN UNION

1979 First direct elections to the European Parliament and since then, every five years. European Monetary System is established. Twenty years later, cooperation in this field results in the Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the euro as a common currency. 1981 Greece joins the EC to bring membership to 10. 1985 France, Germany, and the Benelux countries sign the Schengen Agreement. 1986 Single European Act (signed 1986) consolidates EC institutions, brings the EPC and nonmilitary aspects of security into the treaty, and sets the goal of a single market by the end of 1992. Spain and Portugal joins the EC to bring membership to 12. 1992 Treaty on European Union is signed. It creates a three-pillar structure—the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Justice and Home Affairs—under the umbrella of a European Union (EU), including EU citizenship. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) authorizes EU activity in all aspects of security. Later revised and extended by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and Nice Treaty (2001). 1993 The Treaty on European Union comes into effect, and the European Union comes into being. 1995 Austria, Finland, and Sweden join the EU. 1997 The Stability and Growth Pact sets criteria for economic discipline in advance of a monetary union. The Amsterdam Treaty is signed. 1998 The European Central Bank begins its work in Frankfurt. 1999 The final stage (Stage III) of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) begins with 11 participating countries agreeing on a single monetary policy and irrevocable fixed exchange rates. 2001 The Nice Treaty is agreed. Greece adopts the euro. 2002 Euro notes and coins are introduced in all 13 EMU member states. The Convention on the Future of Europe begins in Brussels. 2003 The Nice Treaty comes into effect. 2004 Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia join the European Union. The Constitutional Treaty is signed in Rome. 2005 French and Dutch voters reject the Constitutional Treaty in referenda. EU leaders agree on a “period of reflection” to consider the future of the Constitutional Treaty. 2007 Bulgaria and Romania join the European Union. Lisbon Treaty signed.

Situating the European Union The landscape of European nationalism is that of a relatively small continent that has, over the past several thousand years, become densely packed with tribes, ethnic and regional communities, small and large states, federations, and empires. In the course of centuries of migration, trade, conquest, revolt, assimilation, and annihilation, modern Europeans have inherited deep memories about themselves and their experience with the other communities that share the continent. This long evolution has left Europe with a complex and multilayered human geography. Even after the elimination of many early cultures and languages, there remain at least nine major cultural and language groups (Germanic, Latin, Slavic, Celtic, Hellenic, Ibero-Caucasian, Turkic, Magyar, and Finnish-Estonian), most with multiple subdivisions. Five major religious communities (Roman Catholic, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Protestant, Eastern Orthodox, Muslim, and Jewish) and numerous ethnic groups overlap with the cultural-linguistic groupings to add other dimensions of complexity. All of these combinations are organized into no fewer than 49 sovereign states and hundreds of political subdivisions. In such an environment, it is not difficult to understand why Europe became the spawning ground of nationalism. Indeed, the modern history of Europe is the story of nations and nationalism; the very concepts of nation and nation-state emerged first in Europe. Some historians have argued that it was the coexistence of many more or less equally powerful political authorities in close proximity to one another that created the competitive environment that stimulated both innovation and conflict in Europe. One of those innovations was the mobilization of popular loyalties toward the nation and away from parochial attachments and religious commitments. Political authorities that could draw on popular loyalty to the abstract and often mystical idea of the nation were better suited to the competitive struggles N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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that were constantly increasing in Europe. So, once nationalism appeared in one state, competitive survival required that it develop elsewhere as well. By the 20th century, the modern nation-state had subordinated nearly all other forms of identity and loyalty, and it claimed absolute sovereignty—as a matter of principle if not necessarily of fact—over its territory and population. The problem for nation-states, however, is that they exist in an inherently competitive and insecure environment of similar states, each claiming to pursue values linked with its sovereignty. The increasingly destructive and uncompromising conflicts among national states that resulted from this competition are the outstanding features of the history of Europe in the past several centuries, especially since the French Revolution of 1789.

Instituting the European Union What we know today as the European Union emerged in the last half of the 20th century in the complex European landscape of communal identities and political loyalties. After the vast and destructive “world wars” of 1914–1918 and 1939–1945, there was a broad consensus that nationalism had brought Europe to the edge of total ruin and that it must be contained or suppressed. Indeed, the memory of conflict and ruin would be the ghost in the room at all the subsequent discussions of Europe’s future. Speaking in 1946 at the University of Zurich in Switzerland, Winston Churchill attempted to rally the flagging spirits of the European continent and to mobilize people toward a cooperative and democratic Europe. He held out the vision of a United States of Europe that could take its place alongside the United States of America and the British empire and Commonwealth and make its contribution to a better future. It was a call that sent a current of political electricity through Europe and reinforced the drive to form a congress of representatives from throughout the continent for the purpose of shaping some kind of political federation for postwar Europe. In the troubled setting of post–World War II Europe, the initial interest in a political reconstruction of Europe—Churchill’s idea of a United States of Europe —gave way to a more modest effort to draw European economies together as a precondition for a more distant political union. The United States supported this approach in 1948 with the Marshall Plan, a program of economic grants to help Europe rebuild its economic strength. The United States also helped to set the future direction of European integration when it required that European states receiving grants under the Marshall Plan form an organization to direct Marshall aid. The result was the pioneering Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which later evolved to become the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Churchill Sets a New Vision for Europe In 1946, Britain’s famous wartime leader and former prime minister, Winston Churchill, gave a speech at the University of Zurich in Switzerland that electrified Europe with excitement and hope about a different kind of future. The essence of that vision and Churchill’s characteristically inspiring language is reflected in the following excerpts from his speech: I wish to speak to you today about the tragedy of Europe. . . . And what is the plight to which Europe has been reduced? . . . Over wide areas a vast quivering mass of tormented, hungry, careworn and bewildered human beings gape at the ruins of their cities and homes, and scan the dark horizons for the approach of some new peril, tyranny or terror. Among the victors there is a babel of jarring voices; among the vanquished a sullen silence of despair. That is all that Europeans . . . have got by tearing each other to pieces and spreading havoc far and wide. Indeed, but for the . . . great Republic across the Atlantic Ocean . . . the Dark Ages would have returned in all their cruelty and squalor. They may still return. Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally . . . adopted, would as if by a miracle transform the whole scene. . . . What is this sovereign remedy? It is to recreate the European Family . . . and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe.

During the same period, the chief of economic planning for postwar France, Jean Monnet, came to the conclusion that the revival and expansion of the French economy required the economies of scale that a larger economic area could provide and that this would, in turn, mean reconciliation with France’s long-time adversary, Germany. Monnet’s concept, a functional approach to unity, was formally articulated by the French foreign minister of the period, Robert Schuman, and became known as the Schuman Plan. The practical strategy of this plan was to start to build a more prosperous and stable Europe by integrating the French and German coal and steel industries— then the primary energy source and the key component of manufacturing, respectively, and both essential components of the war machine. The real brilliance of the plan, however, was that it set out to solve both the economic and security problems of Western Europe by moving control over two of the essential ingredients for economic growth and military mobilization to a new set of supranational institutions located in Luxembourg. In the process, a European political and economic context was created for the new and much reduced German state. Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg joined to give the plan an initial group of six participating countries. The new initiative of “the six” was called the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), formally outlined by the Treaty of Paris (1951) and designed from the outset by Jean Monnet to be “the first expression of the Europe that is being born.” The ghost of Europe’s past national conflicts is clearly visible in the preamble of the treaty, which makes it clear that its goals are to “substitute for ageN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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old rivalries” among people “long divided by bloody conflicts” the merging of interests and the building of institutions “which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared.” Yet, just as Churchill had pointedly omitted Britain from his vision of a United States of Europe, Monnet’s plan invoked a destiny that the United Kingdom declined to share in 1951. Europe’s first effort at integration outlined all the core institutions that continue to serve the modern European Union. An executive authority, the High Authority, became the European Commission that today has the primary responsibility for both initiating and implementing EU policies. The commissioners, one from each of 27 member states, are assisted by a staff of nearly 25,000 officials based mainly in Brussels. The Treaty of Paris also created a Council of Ministers to represent the member states. All EU legislation proposed by the Commission requires the approval of the Council to become law, a role that it shares increasingly with the European Parliament. The Parliament, in turn, has evolved from the Common Assembly of the original Coal and Steel Community, and since 1979, it has been directly elected by the citizens of each member state. The most recent revisions of EU treaties have given the Parliament extensive powers of co-decision with the Council. The fourth core institution designed by Monnet was the Court of Justice headquartered in Luxembourg. The Court serves as the highest court in the EU for all matters concerning EU treaties and the laws and regulations based

European Parliament building in Brussels, Belgium. (iStockPhoto.com)


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upon them. Among the most important decisions of the Court have been those establishing the doctrine of Direct Effect, which established the right of individuals (and not just member states) to sue under EU law, and the doctrine of Primacy, which confirmed the supremacy of EU law over the national laws of the member states. The European Central Bank, European Investment Bank, and Court of Auditors are among the other institutions that have been created in the decades since 1951. The treaties and institutions of the European Union (see below) as well as its laws, agreements, procedures, judicial rulings, and bureaucratic practices are all part of the accumulated political and legal structure of the EU known as the acquis communautaire.

Defining the European Union The political life of modern Europe has been shaped by the creative tension between the drive to achieve the benefits of unity—security, prosperity, stability, influence in the world—and the commitment to preserve the autonomy and distinctive characteristics of its national states. It was to resolve that tension that the project to build a European Union was begun after World War II, and continues to be built. But what is the nature of the European Union, and who is to be included within it? For the original six countries that formed the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community in 1957, Europe was to achieve a steady advance toward “an ever closer union.” For this core group, economic integration was a means by which to reach an eventual political union. For the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, and their allies, on the other hand, the benefits of free trade and other forms of cooperation were attractive, but those countries were very hesitant about creating a political union that would limit national autonomy. For a time, the “inner six” were united in the EEC under the Treaty of Rome, while the “outer seven” created a European Free Trade Association (EFTA). In the end, the economic opportunities offered by the Treaty of Rome proved strongest. After more than a decade of exclusion, Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined the EEC in 1973. (Norway declined to join, and Sweden and Finland did not apply because of concerns about issues of Cold War neutrality.) The new Europe of nine member states was united in seeking better economic conditions but fundamentally divided about the ultimate goal of European integration. In the following decade, Greece (1981), Spain (1986), and Portugal (1986) became members and brought the membership of the European Community to 12. Once the Cold War ended in 1990–1991, the accession of Sweden, Finland, and Austria (1995) gave the European Community a total of 15 members. The “big bang” enlargement of 2004 brought in 10 former Communist Bloc countries as new member states. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Member States of the European Union The Original Six Belgium France Germany Italy Luxembourg The Netherlands

First Enlargement (1973) Denmark Ireland United Kingdom Second Enlargement (1981) Greece Third Enlargement (1986) Portugal Spain Fourth Enlargement (1995) Austria Finland Sweden

Fifth Enlargement (2004) Cyprus Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Malta Poland Slovakia Slovenia Sixth Enlargement (2007) Bulgaria Romania

By that time, the 25 member European Community had been renamed the European Union and had, in the process, taken on important new responsibilities. The rejection in 2005 by voters in France and the Netherlands of a new treaty, the so-called Constitution of the European Union, put the ratification process for that treaty on hold and signaled deep popular doubts about the scope and pace of EU enlargement and about the ever-expanding arena of competitive economic liberalism it has created. The prospect of further enlargements to the east, even including Turkey with its profoundly different cultural and economic characteristics, has stimulated a new debate about what Europe is about and who should be included in it. The creative tension between national values and the benefits of union is still strongly felt, and the definition of the European Union is still evolving.

Narrating the European Union In view of deeply rooted national identities in Europe and a history of conflict among the nation-states representing them, even the relatively modest goals of the Schuman Plan were unprecedented at the time. Nonetheless, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) created in 1951 did set out the procedures and central institutions that have driven Europe’s long march toward increased unity. The experience of working together under a set of common institutions also created a new degree of trust and shared interest that shaped later steps toward integration. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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After an unsuccessful attempt in the early 1950s to move integration back onto the political track by creating new defense and political communities for Europe, the six nations of the ECSC agreed to extend integration among them from coal and steel to the entire economy. With the Treaty of Rome (1957), they decided to create the European Economic Community (EEC), a common market with at least some elements of an economic union, and the European Atomic Energy Community or EURATOM. Once again, Britain opted not to join the six in either venture. During the initial decade of European integration in the 1950s, national interests and national values continued to be the bedrock of European political life, but what is remarkable is the degree to which overt expressions of nationalism were muted. By 1958, however, unremitting colonial warfare had inflamed national sentiments in France, and the strains of conflict in Algeria created a political crisis that brought to power a long-time advocate of the supremacy of national values, General Charles de Gaulle, as president of France. Initially, de Gaulle’s nationalism was focused on the domestic reintegration of France, but within a few years, that style of leadership came into conflict with the supranationalism that inspired the treaties of Paris and Rome. While the booming prosperity of the 1960s smoothed the way for the successful completion of the customs union two years ahead of schedule in 1968, the further political development of the EEC was largely put on hold by French-led resistance. The most notable of President de Gaulle’s efforts to reassert national interests was his 1963 “veto” of Britain’s belated application for membership in the EEC. To slow down or stop the movement toward a more supranational structure for the EEC, including a move away from unanimous to weighted majority voting, France forced the so-called Luxembourg Compromise that, in effect, left the national veto intact for important EEC decisions. With the coming of the Vietnam War, civil discord and protest everywhere, the death of Charles de Gaulle, and the breakdown of the world’s monetary system, Europe turned again toward building a structure of integration that could transcend competitive nationalism and create a European zone of stability. Such a Europe, it was anticipated, would be a more persuasive partner to the United States, a stronger influence in world economic councils, and a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing world. The Den Haag Conference of December 1969 was called to recapture the momentum of the European project, and in short order, a remarkable series of steps toward further integration were taken. Britain’s renewed application for membership—along with those of Ireland and Denmark—was quickly approved, and the original six became a Europe of the nine in 1973. Norway also applied and was accepted for membership at that time, but eventually it decided not to join. Meanwhile, a system of financing for the community’s most ambitious and complex policy initiative, the Common Agricultural Policy, was agreed upon. Yet more significant was the approval of a plan to achieve an Economic and Monetary N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Union by 1980, an ambitious goal that indicates the sense of urgency that animated Europe’s leaders at the beginning of the 1970s. The Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the first oil price crisis followed the 1971 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, the anchor currency of the world system. At the same time, American political leadership was in retreat under pressure from the disintegrating situation in Vietnam, the Watergate crisis, and the eventual resignation of President Richard Nixon. The 1970s was also a decade in which the democratic and capitalist values of every European country were being challenged by a militant counterculture—most dramatically with the emergence of urban terrorism in Germany, France, Italy, and Britain. The collapse of established dictatorships in Greece, Portugal, and Spain also opened the prospect of serious instability in the Mediterranean, an instability that the Soviet Union seemed well poised to exploit. Underlying this political turmoil, the European and American economies were mired for a decade in high inflation and stagnant economic growth. In spite of and perhaps because of the domestic and international pressures of the 1970s, European leaders were prepared to move forward with new efforts at integration. By 1979, the European Monetary System emerged with a new proto-currency, the ECU, at its core. Two decades later, it would evolve into the Economic and Monetary Union and the replacement of most national currencies by the euro. Important new European institutions were created, prominent among which were the European Council that brought together on a regular basis the heads of state and government of the nine member countries. A new structure called European Political Cooperation began to coordinate the foreign policies of member states. The Court of Auditors was created to give the Parliament a practical means to oversee the community’s growing finances, and the first direct elections for the European Parliament were held in 1979. The climate of external threat that characterized the 1970s did not abate but took a different form in the 1980s. Concerns about oil prices gave way to alarm about severe economic competition from Japan and other trading partners in East Asia. As one European market after another—motorcycles, watches, cameras, and electronic equipment—was taken over by foreign competitors, the member states of the EEC began to discuss new steps to deal with a more intensely competitive global economy. As the trade pressures on Europe were increasing, the member states of the EEC were also confronted with new political challenges. The United States under the Reagan administration increased the intensity of Cold War conflict with a fresh campaign of confrontation with the Soviet Union, a policy change that profoundly affected both the security and economic interests of Europe but that was launched without significant European input. Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev’s leadership was taking the Soviet Union in a new direction with a program of internal reforms and loosening controls over Central European nations allied with the Soviet Union. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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During the same period, the community faced two internal challenges. Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was aggressively demanding a renegotiation of Britain’s role and responsibilities and even a rollback in aspects of European integration. At the same time, three new and not very stable Mediterranean democracies—Greece, Portugal, and Spain—joined the community, bringing the total membership to twelve. Since other European countries were also preparing for eventual membership, it was becoming clear that the internal structure of the community would have to change. With pressure mounting on every side, the member states reached agreement on the first major treaty revision since 1957 when they signed the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986. Besides streamlining the institutions and regulations that the member states had created over the previous 30 years, the new treaty launched a program to complete the single market by removing all remaining barriers to the free movement of goods, capital, people, and business enterprise. At the same time, the unanimity principle that had been enshrined in the Luxembourg Compromise since the mid-1960s was set aside, and weighted majority voting was authorized for nearly all decisions about the single market. The Single European Act broke another taboo of the older European system when it incorporated in the treaty the procedures for foreign policy cooperation and nonmilitary aspects of security cooperation. Almost before the SEA came into effect, the rigid structure of the Cold War began to crumble. In spite of strong opposition in the 1980s from Britain’s prime minister, the majority of member states were convinced that deeper cooperation leading to political union was the only route to security and prosperity for Europe. Led by the new Commission president, Jacques Delors, what was now called the European Community began to prepare for the future by assembling two conferences of the member states, one on economic union and another on political union. The recommendations of both conferences became the basis for the new Treaty on European Union, a truly comprehensive revamping and extension of the Treaty of Rome.

Mobilizing and Building the European Union The Treaty on European Union (TEU), or “Maastricht Treaty” (after the Dutch city in which the treaty was signed), significantly changed the balance between national autonomy and shared European interests. The European Community that had been created by the Treaty of Rome and expanded by the Single European Act, along with the accumulated body of tens of thousands of pages of institutional details, legislation, regulations, legal precedents, and procedures, was left in place as Pillar I of the new treaty. To it were added Pillars II and III empowering joint action in the fields of “Common Foreign and Security Policy” and “Justice N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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New Citizens and New Rights in the European Union When the Treaty on European Union (TEU, also called the Maastricht Treaty after the Dutch city in which it was signed) came into force in November 1993, it introduced a new citizenship of the European Union without replacing the existing national citizenship of individuals. The concept of EU citizenship, as well as the rights that attach to it, are specified within the TEU in the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC), articles 12, 17–22, and 255. With the new treaty, EU citizens acquired certain new rights: the right to be considered a national in any EU member state and therefore not to suffer discrimination on the basis of nationality [article 12 of the TEC; most other rights derive from this fundamental right]; the right to move and reside freely within the EU [article 18 of the TEC]—subject to certain limitations introduced by community law; the right to vote for and stand as a candidate at municipal and European parliament elections in whichever Member State an EU citizen resides [article 19 of the TEC]; access to the diplomatic and consular protection of another Member State when outside the EU [article 20 of the TEC] if his/her Member State is not represented there; the right to petition the European Parliament and to complain to the European Ombudsman [article 21 of the TEC]. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in May 1999, extended the rights of citizens by: allowing EU institutions to take action against discrimination on the basis of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation; reinforcing the right of citizens to move freely within the EU by bringing the Schengen Agreement into the treaty. The Treaty of Nice, which came into force in February 2003, further strengthened the right of citizens to move and reside freely within the EU by: allowing qualified majority voting for decision making within the Council of Ministers. In addition to the rights specifically laid out in the treaties, EU citizens also enjoy a set of related rights derived from other provisions of the treaties, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the constitutions of the EU member states.

and Home Affairs,” respectively. With characteristic caution, the member states decided to restrict majority voting and other practices that limited national prerogatives to Pillar I. Decision making in Pillars II and III would preserve the autonomy of members as much as possible. The treaty was signed by the member states in 1991 and later extended and modified by two revising treaties signed at Amsterdam (1997) and Nice (2001). The diplomatic language and bureaucratic jargon of these new treaties could not conceal that the balance had been reset between integration and national autonomy N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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in the EU—between the protection of national interests and national identity, on the one hand, and the pursuit of common goals and further integration, on the other. Henceforth, more important decisions would be taken jointly within the European framework than ever before. Among the important changes was the creation of the European Union to encompass the three pillars set up by the treaty: the European Community (Pillar I), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Pillar II), and Justice and Home Affairs (Pillar III). The flag and the anthem of the new European Union became prominent symbols of a new political identity that has come to be recognized all over Europe and the world. The treaty also created citizenship of the European Union for all persons who are citizens of one of the member states. In effect, all citizens of member states of the EU also have a second layer of citizenship that confers European rights to supplement national rights. Partly as a reaction to the more ambitious European agenda of the EU, the new treaties also stressed the principle of subsidiarity: the need to keep decisions as close as possible to the citizens and to move policy to the level of the EU only when that is essential for effectiveness. Making subsidiarity a principle of the treaty reemphasized the creative struggle between the benefits of integrated policy and the preservation of national autonomy. Pillar II of the new treaties significantly extended the capabilities of the new European Union to make policy and take joint action via a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Bureaucracies supporting both activities, including a High Representative for CFSP, were created under the Council of Ministers, with administrative support from the European Commission. The well-practiced system for consultation and cooperation in foreign policy already in place was brought into the Treaty on European Union and its subsequent revisions. What was original to the new treaties was authorization to create institutions and procedures designed to support the field operations of the EU Rapid Reaction Force and EU Battle Groups, created in 1999 under the so-called European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). These forces have already been deployed in humanitarian, crisis management, and peacekeeping and peace making missions in former Yugoslavia, Africa, and elsewhere. Under Pillar III for Justice and Home Affairs, the new treaties brought for the first time the sensitive areas of immigration, asylum, and control of borders, as well as police and judicial coordination, within the framework of EU bargaining and policy making. Open internal borders among most member states have made movements across the external border of the EU a concern for all. With the new treaties, at least two procedures for so-called “variable geometry decisions” open the way for joint action that does not include the entire membership of the Union. Constructive Abstention allows member states to abstain on a given decision without blocking action by the rest of the Union. Enhanced Cooperation allows a small group of member states to apply to the Council of Ministers for approval to undertake an initiative or action for the Union without involving, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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at least initially, other members. The clear implication of both procedures is that individual member states may find themselves part of a Union that undertakes actions against their interests or wishes, but that they cannot stop. The creation of the Committee of the Regions by the new treaties resulted in the representation for the first time at the EU level of hundreds of subnational regions. It is a change that has encouraged the emergence of new regional leaders and given a new sense of regional empowerment. The continuous dialogue in search for a workable balance between the capabilities and efficiencies of union, on the one hand, and the preservation of national and regional values, on the other, is still at the center of politics in the European Union. Beyond the changes introduced by the new treaties, the political and security environment of Europe has been transformed in several ways that affect the relationship between the European Union and its member states and citizens. A truly fundamental change came with the end of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a decompression of European politics that has given more latitude for the expression of national and regional values than was possible in the constrained political environment of the Cold War. A second shift in the geopolitical environment was produced by the large-scale instability that arose from the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the economic disruptions, migration flows, and security threats resulting from it. Another unprecedented change occurred with the emergence of the Economic and Monetary Union and with the replacement of the national currencies of member countries by a new currency, the euro, created and managed by the European Union, a change that illustrates the degree to which economic decisions have migrated to the EU level. The dramatic enlargement of the European Union between 2004 and 2007 to include 12 new member states was another set of transformative events that changed the landscape of politics within the Union and gave voice to national communities that are far less assimilated to EU norms than the older member states. The End of the Cold War When the Soviet Union broke apart at the end of 1991, residual fear about the menace of Soviet military power began to fade in Western Europe and with it the need to be especially vigilant about maintaining national political solidarity as well as the cohesion of NATO and the Atlantic Alliance. The high stakes of the Cold War confrontation had tended to suppress divisive political activity by most regional, ethnic, and other communities. The decompression that followed the end of the Cold War allowed groups and communities of all kinds to express themselves, often in ways that challenged the authority of the nation-state. Some of these communities found in the European Union an opportunity to appeal for material and moral support beyond the framework of the member states, as well as the possibility to interact with other subnational groups and with a nonnational bureaucracy in Brussels. Some communities even saw the prospect of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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greater regional autonomy under the EU political roof. Without much doubt, a more robust period of subnational politics emerged in Europe after the Cold War ended, and that mobilization of more decentralized interests, in turn, has begun to change both national- and Union-level politics. At the same time, the political demise of the former Soviet Union has confronted the European Union with a less threatening but also much less stable set of neighbors in eastern Europe. Instability and Conflict in Former Yugoslavia One of the many effects from the civil war in Yugoslavia and its tragic culmination in strife-torn Bosnia and Kosovo has been a renewed awareness of the intensity and vitality of subnational identity communities. Few had anticipated the capacity for ethnic mobilization in a country like Yugoslavia or suspected the intensity with which subnational identities were held or the violent effects they could produce. After Yugoslavia, no policy maker could comfortably assume that, given the right opportunity, similar strife might not emerge in other parts of the former communist world. It was a lesson that argued strongly for EU enlargement on a more, rather than less, rapid schedule. Another effect of the same conflict was the mass migration of refugees from the Yugoslav regions. Italy, Austria, and Germany absorbed the first wave of such refugees, but the ripple effects were felt throughout the EU. The sudden appearance of a large and mostly destitute population, a visible minority of whom turned to illegal activities of various kinds, won few recruits in western Europe for a policy of open immigration. This was especially true among working-class citizens who often saw themselves in competition with the refugee population for jobs, status, and benefits. At least some of the backlash in national politics against EU enlargement and open borders was a reaction to negative experiences arising from the disintegration of the Yugoslav political system. The Emergence of the Economic and Monetary Union From the point of view of relations between the EU and its national and subnational communities, two consequences emerged from the establishment of an economic and monetary union within the EU. The shifting of the “commanding heights” of economic policy to the Union level has tied the policy hands of member state governments in ways that tend increasingly to focus the attention of subnational groups upon Brussels and to create pressure for EU action. The replacement of national currencies with euro notes and coins in member states is a demonstration of Union presence in mundane affairs and a powerful symbol of EU solidarity. An important psychological distinction among member states has disappeared, with long-term consequences difficult to predict. The Enlargement of the European Union The decision to pursue a policy of enlargement in Central Europe and the Balkans was driven at least in part by the fear of further instability in that region. It N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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may also have been a way of embracing a challenge of political and economic assimilation that could not be avoided if members of the European Union wanted to safeguard regional stability and secure the benefits of an expanded economic zone in the long run. Whatever the reasons, the decision to take in 12 additional member states between 2004 and 2007 had major implications for the political environment of the Union. Each of the new states was in a very different phase of political and economic evolution. Among the older members of the EU, national identity had become less salient as the Union had become more established. For the newer members, however, a renewed emphasis upon national identity was a positive reaction to decades of Soviet control and a necessary support to the legitimacy of the new postcommunist political systems. The entry of the new members —and those yet to enter—seems most likely to have the effect of encouraging a renewed emphasis on national issues and the importance of preserving national values. Such different priorities and needs makes constructive bargaining and decision making among 27 or more member states much more difficult than in the past. Such a situation could erode the cohesion of the Union, but ironically, it could also promote greater EU effectiveness by encouraging more variable geometry decision making and forcing the increased use of qualified majority voting. The Future of National Identity within the European Union There seems little question that the emergence of the European Union has transformed the political environment of the entire European continent. Member states that may once have thought in terms of autonomous action no longer do so. Officials confess that it has become impossible to conceive of the national interest apart from the interest of at least the closest collaborators of the member state in question. Over and over, political elites and ordinary citizens alike can be heard to link the success or failure of EU policies with the well-being of their national community and their own personal circumstances. Public opinion research indicates that ordinary citizens are becoming increasingly more attentive to EU policies and the behavior of EU institutions. The consequences for the politics of both member states and the European Union are not easy to predict, but there are indications that the increasing mobilization of citizens and citizen groups into awareness and action about Union affairs is forcing change in decision-making processes that have previously been dominated by political and economic elites. Partly as a consequence of these trends, the era of deliberate centralization in the European Union appears to be coming to an end. The commitment to take decisions at the level of the lowest effective unit (subsidiarity) has come to mean returning decision making to the national level wherever possible. In some cases, subnational regions exert pressure to devolve decisions still further. In any case, it is possible to see a genuine concern with preserving the autonomy of national communities in those policy areas where centralization is not essential. Moreover, there is a concern among many that, in a union with nearly 500 million citizens, excessive centralization may lead to rigidity and undermine the legitimacy N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of the Union. A continuous dialogue in search of a workable balance between the capabilities and efficiencies of union, on the one hand, and the preservation of national and regional values, on the other, is still at the center of politics in the European Union. Selected Bibliography Baun, M. 2000. A Wider Europe. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield. Dinan, D. 2004. Europe Recast: A History of the European Union. London: Palgrave. Dinan, D. 2006. Origins and Evolution of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Duchene, F. 1994. Jean Monnet: First Statesman of Interdependence. New York: W. W. Norton. Duff, Andrew. 2005. The Struggle for Europe’s Constitution. London: Federal Trust. Gartner, H., A. Hyde-Price, and E. Reiter. 2001. Europe’s New Security Challenges. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Haas, E. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Economic and Social Forces 1950–1957: Challenge and Response. London: Macmillan. Hix, S. 1999. The Political System of the European Union. London: Macmillan. Moravcsik, A. 1998. The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Nelson, B., and A. Stubb, eds. 2003. The European Union: Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Nugent, N., ed. 2000. At the Heart of the Union: Studies of the European Commission. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s. Nugent, N. 2006. The Government and Politics of the European Union. 6th ed. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Rodriguez-Pose, Andres. 2002. The European Union: Economy, Society, and Polity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sbragia, Alberta, ed. 1992. Euro-Politics: Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community. Washington DC: Brookings. Wallace, H., and W. Wallace. 1996. Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


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France Philippe Couton Chronology 1945 The end of World War II. France is liberated, the puppet Vichy government having collapsed the year before. 1945–1975 Sustained efforts at economic reconstruction is marked by active involvement of the state, leading to 30 years of rapid economic growth (“the glorious thirty”). 1946 Reinstatement of a republican form of government, the Fourth Republic. 1952 France, Italy, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and Germany form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), based on the 1951 Treaty of Paris. 1957 Signature of the Treaties of Rome creating the European Economic Community (EEC), further unifying the six founding countries. 1958 Stabilization of French republicanism in the Fifth Republic (with a strong presidency), led by de Gaulle. 1962 End of the Algerian war, marking the end of France’s colonial era. 1968 Student uprising and national strike challenges France’s political and cultural establishment. 1973 Oil shock triggers a worldwide depression, with profound social and political ramifications in France (unemployment and inflation, a halt to immigration, etc.). 1981 François Mitterrand is elected president; the left also wins a strong majority in the National Assembly, opening a new political era.

Situating the Nation France emerged from World War II considerably weakened but also poised to regain its place as one of the world’s great nation-states. Despite having suffered the worst defeat in its history at the hands of Germany, it was still a major economic and political power, in possession of a vast empire. The participation of French forces in the liberation under General de Gaulle allowed France to position itself as an active participant in the demise of fascism. Economic conditions were of course disastrous after years of war and occupation, with about a quarter of the national wealth destroyed, but national reconstruction was rapidly under way, with the prospect of generous American aid. A new set of political institutions was put in place under the Fourth Republic, formally constituted in 1946 to replace the collaborationist Vichy regime. French women were liberated in two senses of the term: from German occupation but also from political subordination, winning the right to vote and be elected in 1945. In France, as in the rest of Europe, there was a sense that democracy had triumphed over fascism and that a new phase of history was opening. And indeed, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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over the next 30 years, France would be transformed from a colonial empire into an ethnically diverse part of the European Union. One of France’s enduring national characteristics, the belief in the importance of a single, homogenous national identity, would endure but would also be greatly expanded both from within (immigrant-induced cultural diversity) and from without (European unification and the forces of the globalizing economy).

Instituting the Nation The key institutions of this period were first and foremost the Fourth and Fifth Republics and the rise of what would become the European Union. These three institutions represent both the continuity of the French republican-national tradition and an ongoing transition to a wider, European model of nationhood. Republicanism is the political doctrine that had the strongest influence on the development of France as a nation during the two centuries that followed the 1789 Revolution. In many ways, republicanism continued to define French national identity during the postwar period, but it was modified by political forces N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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(socialists, for instance, attempted to widen and diversify the scope of the Republic) and by social change (with new constituencies claiming to become part of the republican community of citizens, including women and immigrants). The Fifth Republic, a semi-presidential democratic regime, provided the political stability for evolving republicanism, proving much more resilient than previous parliamentary versions. The birth of the European Economic Community in 1958, which strengthened the ties established among the six founding nations of the 1952 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), marked the beginning of a completely new era for France. Its national sovereignty was partly delegated to a supranational institution for the first time in its history. Still an imperial nation, France was joining a multinational economic and political structure, in close cooperation with its old enemy and now close ally, Germany. This contribution to European integration was perhaps the single greatest transformation French nationalism underwent during this period. Despite the hesitation of more traditional nation-statist political forces (Gaullism in particular), France proved ready to join a supranational framework and to relinquish some of its national prerogatives. The role of the state, independently of particular regimes, also changed rapidly during this period. Reconstruction on an unprecedented scale demanded centralized intervention. Postwar nationalization (of financial, transport, and other companies) and central planning played a key role in the economic recovery but also signalled a new alignment of state and nation; the tragedy of war strengthened the nation-statism that had been the object of struggles since the Revolution. Keynesianism provided the economic and ideological justification of this increased role of central institutions, in France as in most of the West, until its slow demise from the 1970s onward. Keynesianism, in the French case, was filtered through a particular national tradition; it became part of egalitarianmeritocratic republicanism, a statist translation of the ideals of what the French nation should be. Other institutions also mattered during this period. Public education, for instance, was central to republicanism, ever since at least the birth of the Third Republic at the end of the 19th century. It continued to play a significant role in French social, cultural, and political life during the postwar period, but it, too, was challenged and transformed by student movements, democratization, and increasing cultural diversity.

Defining the Nation Attempts at defining the French nation have generally focused on political rather than strictly ethnic terms (see Brubaker 1992, for a classic treatment of this question). The main legacy of the Revolution was the institutionalized belief in a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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universal political subject, the idea that anyone could become a French citizen if she or he adopted French political values. This definition of French nationhood was largely maintained during the period examined here but experienced a number of serious challenges, from which it emerged vastly transformed. One of the first threats to French self-understanding in the immediate postwar period was U.S. cultural and political domination. As part of a set of conditions for providing aid under the Marshall Plan, the United States demanded the removal of import barriers. As a result, the United States increased its cultural and economic influence through films, magazines, comic books, and food exports. This led to some open musings about whether France was becoming a U.S. colony or, at the very least as some put it, a “Coca-Colony.” The threat of U.S. cultural imperialism is still perceived to be significant today, but an uneasy arrangement has emerged wherein French national culture lost some ground but managed to maintain key strengths as well. A second, equally great challenge was the radical transformation of the French social structure. The peasantry, often described as the foundation of French national identity, was disappearing, as in much of the West, but so was the traditional working class. The dominant industrial occupations of the 19th and early 20th centuries, including textile, mining, and metallurgy, were being displaced by new manufacturing activities and the service sector, a world of semi-skilled workers, technicians, engineers, and managers, marking the “end of the working class” (Gildea 1997, 103). This decline was marked by the weakening of unions and their growing institutionalization as partners of the government rather than direct opponents. The traditional family was also fast disappearing. Birth rates climbed during the postwar era but quickly declined in the 1970s and 1980s. This was due in part to women’s entry into the labor force and economic development in general, as in most other industrialized countries. Women were also challenging their traditional role in the nation. Although they had been granted the right to vote and to participate in electoral politics in 1945, women organized into a coherent movement only in the late 1960s. Loss of empire was the third great challenge of the period. France at first attempted to continue defining itself as a major colonial power. The significance of France’s overseas possessions was increased by the role colonies had played during the war, remaining out of German hands. This of course highlighted a major contradiction: having just fought to free itself, and claiming to defend national ideals of freedom and democracy, France nevertheless wanted to cling to its own colonies. Disastrous wars ensued: Indochina (Vietnam) quickly turned from a colonial war to a part of the larger, unfolding Cold War. Weak French forces were decisively defeated and left in 1954. Algeria launched an insurrection that same year, opening one of the worst episodes in French history. Algeria was considered by many as an integral part of France, in no small part because of the about 1 million French settlers who lived there. The brutality of the war, and especially the widespread use of torture by French troops, forever demolished one of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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De Gaulle and Gaullism The leader of the Free French forces and of the forces that participated in the liberation in 1944, as well as provisional president in 1945–1946, de Gaulle was a leading figure of French politics from the 1940s to the 1960s. In 1958 he acceded to executive power amid threats of the seizure of power by the military and a political crisis over Algeria. De Gaulle was able to draft a constitution with strong presidential powers, approved in a landslide referendum, and was elected president. Amid controversy, he finalized France’s postcolonial transition by allowing Algerian independence. He also initiated the drive for France to acquire a powerful nuclear arsenal, withdrew from parts of NATO, and removed Allied bases from French soil, arguing that France needed to be an independent national power subordinated to no other government. De Gaulle also initially resisted European unification, considering it a threat to national sovereignty. He came to embody one of the defining traits of the French nation: a near-mystic belief in national unity and in the messianic role of a strong leader. This national-Bonapartism is of course highly authoritarian but also draws on a Rousseauist idea of the nation as a single body. His legacy survived as Gaullism, the core ideology of the French right.

defining myths of French imperialism: its civilizing, liberating mission. De Gaulle played the leading role in the liberation of Algeria, attempting to rescue France’s image in the process. The last key aspect to profoundly alter France as a nation during this period was its relationship with Germany. Since 1871, Germany in particular had provided the backdrop to the very definition of French nationalism: the need for revenge after the 1871 defeat, punishment and looming danger after World War I, and of course the shame of collaboration and the mythologized resistance after 1940. Despite this bloody past, France and Germany became close allies after World War II and jointly redefined Europe. As a result, French nationalism has become far less oppositional and militaristic, although other, less directly ominous threats have replaced it, including U.S. cultural imperialism, immigrant pluralism, and the fear of absorption into a nebulous a-national Europe.

Narrating the Nation An important narrative of that era was that of France as innocent victim of and fierce resister to the Nazi invaders. During the immediate postwar period, this was solidified into orthodoxy by governmental and other forces, in no small part because of de Gaulle’s influence. But during the 1970s and 1980s, a counteranalysis emerged that depicted a large section of the French as German sympathizers and Vichyite collaborationists. Filmmakers, historians, and journalists debated both the role of the resistance and the influence of Vichy. Even Mitterrand was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Resistance and Collaboration: France and World War II The role of the French government and French citizens during the war remains to this day a controversial topic. France suffered a quick and humiliating defeat, followed by the emergence of the collaborationist Vichy government led by former war hero Marshall Pétain. But a number of loosely organized armed groups emerged and fought occupying Germany and were eventually coordinated by General de Gaulle, leader of the exiled resistance. This role allowed him to emerge as one of the leading political figures of the postwar era and allowed France to reconstruct its wartime history as one of innocence, defeated by Nazi cruelty followed by fierce resistance. Pétain and a number of key Vichy figures were put on trial and convicted of treason. The reputations of other leading political figures, including Mitterrand, were affected by their often ambiguous role during the war.

found to have harbored Petainist sympathies in the work of his biographer Pierre Péan. Postcolonialism became another important and highly controversial cultural theme during that period. Boris Vian’s 1954 song “Le Déserteur,” for instance, became an antiwar classic, highlighting the futility of colonial war, and was banned as were a number of films thought to promote similar ideas. One of the leading figures in French social and political life has been the intellectual, at least since the coining of the term during the Dreyfus affair in the late 1800s. The second half of the 20th century was no exception, and a number of important intellectuals emerged, eager to participate in emerging social and political debates. Sartre was the emblematic intellectual of the immediate postwar year. His own writings—philosophical, journalistic, and literary—generally excoriated the conformist bourgeoisie and deployed the leading philosophical thought of the day, existentialism. He later moved closer to the other great system of ideas of that era—communism—embraced by other major intellectuals, especially Althusser. Both communism and existentialism were later displaced by the emergence of structuralism and post-structuralism, led by the now canonical Foucault and Barthes. The main idea of post-structuralism was the importance of larger social and especially discursive structures in determining social life. This was taken further by later intellectuals, chiefly Derrida, who emphasized the discontinuities and fragmentation of texts and social products. It came to embody French intellectual culture both domestically and abroad. French literature continued to be influential as well, picking up some of the intellectual trends noted above with, for instance, the emergence of the “new novel,” spearheaded by Claude Simon, who went on to win the Nobel Prize for literature in 1985. Emblematic of new French intellectual movements, Simon’s work broke with literary tradition and emphasized fragmentation and social arbitrariness. Despite these developments, French national culture was felt to be under attack during this period more than during any other. The global dominance of Hollywood was perceived as a direct threat to the integrity of French cultural proN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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duction. But French film held its own, particularly after the launching of the new wave movement in the late 1950s. French directors, including Truffaut, Goddard, and others were spearheading a new type of filmmaking, using new cinematic techniques and dealing with controversial topics. This did not prevent French films from losing market shares during the 1970s and 1980s, but it did establish an influential cinematic voice. With a strong tradition of singer-songwriters who partly resisted and partly adopted the influence of English and North American popular music, French musical expression also found its own national voice. Alongside popular culture, French authorities continued to promote and develop institutional, traditional cultural forms, including museums, theater, and art education. The events of 1968 gave official cultural policy a welcome renewal, symbolized in the controversial Beaubourg center built in Paris, which aimed to revitalize culture by making it more dynamic, interactive, and open. The socialists gave this new tendency even more vitality in the 1980s, creating a number of new national festivals (the now well-known Music Day every June 21, for instance). The result was a wide-ranging diversification of the voices participating in the narration of French culture, which became both more inclusive and more complex.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation One of the first political forces to emerge from the war was the Communist Party. Communism had lost much credibility when the Soviet Union signed the 1939 pact with Nazi Germany, but French communists played a leading role in the resistance. There was a very good chance that the communists would be in a position to instigate a revolution in 1944. But the strategic choices of both the United States and the Soviet Union, as well the preference of most French communists for participation in a renewed nation, put the revolution on hold. National patriotism, especially after a period of fierce armed resistance, trumped revolutionary political mobilization. The other mobilizing force of the period was the autocratic nationalism of de Gaulle. His drive for the restoration of the national greatness of France was based first and foremost on restoring the power of the state. The divided parliament of the prewar period was to be replaced by a strong presidential regime, where much of the authority resided in the executive. De Gaulle at first lost his bid and resigned as provisional head of state in 1946, and a parliamentary constitution was passed by referendum that same year. The Fourth Republic was born, continuing to define the French nation as a politically divided entity. It oversaw the dismantling of the French empire and experienced high political instability (26 different governments between 1944 and 1958). But it was also stable, though coalitions shifted to ward off the political sirens of revolution and dictatorship that had marked N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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large parts of French history in preceding centuries. De Gaulle nevertheless eventually triumphed, imposing his vision of a strong executive in 1958. Another facet of France’s national identity was expressed by politician Pierre Mendes-France, whose ideology and party mirrored that of earlier thinkers, Rousseau and Durkheim in particular, who emphasized the importance of the collective will, above parties and petty disputes. A recurrent feature of French social and political identity from the 1789 Revolution to the beginning of the Third Republic, the collective will again proved only partially reflective of French reality. The vitality of another contemporaneous movement, Poujadism, named after populist politician Pierre Poujade, made that very clear. Poujadism had the support of shopkeepers and other members of the petty bourgeoisie, who mobilized in 1953 to oppose taxes and government regulation. The movement veered to the extreme right, incubating later extremists like Jean-Marie Le Pen. He rose to prominence in the 1970s, incarnating a narrow, xenophobic version of French nationalism that would remain a significant political force for decades to come. One of the great political turning points of this period was the election of François Mitterrand in 1981 and the control of the legislative assembly that same year by his Socialist Party. Mitterrand himself interpreted his election as being part of the radical tradition of the French left and as an attempt to create a clear break with capitalism. But by 1983, the initially bold economic and institutional reforms (including large-scale nationalizations) were abandoned, and the socialists resigned themselves to accepting the reality of a market economy. In any case, socialist control of political power was short-lived. They lost the 1986 legislative elections, forcing a prolonged period of the “cohabitation” of a socialist president with a conservative assembly and ministers. This combination, however, worked relatively well and ushered in a new, moderate form of politics. France was new to political moderation, having experienced more spectacular regime changes than most Western countries over the preceding two centuries, to the point where revolution had become part of France’s national identity—recently expressed in the near-revolutionary events of 1968, which hastened the demise of de Gaulle’s rule. Unrest had been simmering for some time and exploded in May 1968, first led by students who were joined by workers in a general strike aimed at the Gaullist regime and its strict hierarchy. In 1969, de Gaulle lost a referendum and resigned. The 1980s introduced a new form of politics, where forces from the right and the left had to coexist and share power. This also, of course, implied a softening of political positions, which facilitated the emergence of extremism given dissatisfaction with the “soft center,” particularly the resilient National Front. In addition to these political movements, the period of hyperactive national rebirth that followed the war was marked by several major trends, the first of which was the “trente glorieuses,” the glorious 30 years of nearly uninterrupted economic growth between 1945 and the global economic slump of the mid-1970s. Second, France experienced one of its fastest periods of demographic growth (from 40 to 52 million inhabitants during that period). For the century that preN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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A crowd looks at cars destroyed in the 1968 Paris riots. In May, angry students and workers took to the streets to protest widespread poverty, unemployment, and the conservative government of Charles de Gaulle. (Alain Nogues/Corbis Sygma)

ceded the war, France had been among Europe’s slowest-growing populations. Increasing birth rates and high levels of immigration put an end to this sluggishness. France had, in other words, become a dynamic, diversifying, growing nation, which had several consequences. France had long defined itself as a predominantly rural nation but was fast becoming heavily urbanized. The new urban centers were also home to large groups of immigrants (mostly from North Africa), often concentrated in impoverished neighborhoods. Immigrants have been an integral part of French history, particularly during the industrial era (see Noiriel 1996, for a classic work on the topic). But immigration as a key political issue emerged during the 1970s and 1980s and became a central part of France’s national self-understanding. This is largely due to the fact that immigrants were from a few, largely postcolonial source countries, were culturally more distant than previous immigrant groups, and were concentrated in a few urban centers (Paris, Marseille, etc.). France also failed to manage this new diversity adequately, often concentrating recent immigrants in poorly conceived public housing complexes and hiding a fairly homogeneous idea of French nationhood behind a veil of universal republicanism. Worsening economic conditions after the 1973 oil shock and subsequent restrictions on immigration further aggravated the situation. This led to the first and largest uprising of immigrants in French history, the short-lived but influential movement of the early 1980s, which N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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France and Its Colonies Although France lost its colonial possessions during the period examined here, it did retain a few small overseas territories, and it maintained close, and often conflictual, relations with the independent countries that were once under its control. The largest immigrant peoples who established themselves in France during the postwar, postcolonial era were former inhabitants of former French colonies. They played a major role in the reconstruction of the country, but their presence also generated both a virulent form of xenophobic nationalism and a countervailing antiracist movement that sought to redefine the contours of French citizenship and identity. Like other European colonial powers, France’s national identity was profoundly marked by the legacy of its colonial era.

coincided with the coming to power of the socialists and renewed hopes for radical social change. North African immigrants were particularly active in the movement that culminated in the 1983 march on Paris, which exacted concessions and more liberal immigration regulations from the government. The movement was successful at challenging the racism inherent to much of French society and redefining French identity as more diverse and open. But it evolved into a more particularistic movement at the end of the 1980s, in part because of the tension over some Muslim practices (the wearing of headscarves by women). This evolution of the movement was in part the product of a backlash that took place in the late 1980s in favor of a hard line on immigration and more restrictive access to citizenship. Fear of the rise of the extreme right led by Jean-Marie Le Pen led even moderate politicians to adhere to this perspective and to simply ignore some of its racist implications. But despite the danger of extremism, France was evolving politically toward a form of pragmatic, pluralist liberalism. Totalizing ideologies had largely failed, and new interest groups were emerging (students, immigrants, women) and claiming their place within the nation. Despite these changes, French national identity continued to be affected by political centralization. A number of regionalist groups (in Brittany and Alsace, for instance) had hoped German occupation would be in their interest and, as a result, were thoroughly discredited during the postwar era. Centralizing Jacobinism, historically one of the great ideological currents to come out of the 1789 Revolution, emerged that much stronger. It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that regionalist movements became more vocal and assertive, to the point of occasional political violence. Some demanded local autonomy, others (Corsica in particular), outright independence. Some of these movements contributed to the partial reversal of Jacobinism in the 1980s. The newly elected socialists granted a local (albeit only consultative) assembly to Corsica and implemented a large measure of regional decentralization throughout France. France also played an active role in the development of the Francophonie, the network of countries where French is spoken. Various summits were organized N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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where France and Canada played key organizational roles. The Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique (ACCT) was created in 1970, which would become the Agence de la Francophonie in 1995. This network was a way for France to preserve some of its cultural and political influence over what were largely former colonies (from Africa to Québec), but also a way to transcend its own national borders and become a global actor within a French-influenced global domain. In sum, France during this period developed a new pluralistic view of the nation while preserving many of the basic aspects that had come to define it historically. The threefold transformation identified above—the decline of traditional social categories, European integration, and demographic and cultural diversification—durably transformed French national identity. Selected Bibliography Birnbaum, Pierre. 1997. Sociologie des nationalismes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Couton, Philippe. 2004. “A Labor of Laws: Courts and the Mobilization of French Workers.” Politics and Society 32 (Fall): 3. Gildea, Robert. 1997. France since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Girardet, Raoul. 1996. Nationalismes et nations. Paris: Éditions Complexes. Noiriel, Gerard. 1996. The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship and National Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Rosanvallon. 1990. L’État en France. Paris: Seuil. Schnapper, Dominique. 1998. Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nationality. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. Simmons, Harvey G. 1996. The French National Front. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Tilly, Charles. 1986. The Contentious French. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Weber, Eugen. 1976. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Winock, Michel. 1997. Le Siècle des Intellectuels. Paris: Seuil.


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Northern Ireland Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See Chronology 1981 Republican prisoners undertake hunger strike to demand political status. 1982 Northern Ireland Act establishes a power-sharing assembly. 1984 Irish Republican Army (IRA) bombing at the Conservative Party conference targets the prime minister. Anglo-Irish summit held. 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement signed. 1986 Unionist Day of Action to protest Anglo-Irish Agreement. Northern Ireland Assembly dissolved. Riots in Portadown at the Drumcree Orange Order Parade. 1988 Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader John Hume and Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams begin series of meetings to seek a nationalist consensus. 1991 IRA launches a mortar attack on 10 Downing Street. 1993 Downing Street Declaration affirms that any change to Northern Ireland’s status requires a majority consent. 1994 IRA and Loyalist paramilitaries declare cease-fires. 1996 Canary Wharf bombing ends IRA cease-fire. Elections are held to a peace forum. 1997 IRA renews cease-fire. 1998 Referendum held on the Good Friday Agreement to establish a power-sharing government. Elections to new assembly held. Splinter IRA group bombs Omagh, killing 29. Nobel Peace Prize awarded to John Hume and David Trimble. 1999 Direct Rule ends. 2000–2001 Controversies over decommissioning, parades, and policing disrupt the assembly. 2002 Direct Rule reimposed. 2005 IRA announces end to armed campaign, and the Monitoring Commission confirms successful decommissioning.

Situating the Nation Northern Ireland is the site of the longest-running nationalist conflict in Europe: more than 3,500 people have been killed and about 48,000 injured in sectarian violence since the late 1960s. Given the small size of the province’s population, these numbers make the conflict, known euphemistically as the Troubles, one of the world’s most violent. The Troubles have their roots in the partition of Ireland in 1922, which left the north with a Protestant majority, dedicated to union with Great Britain (Unionists) and a Catholic minority, many of whom desired the reunification of the island (Nationalists). Britain devolved political power to Northern Ireland, allowing development of a Unionist-dominated government whose practices of gerrymandering, cronyism, and favoritism advanced Protestant unity and interests. Rejecting the legitimacy of the regime, Nationalists abstained from N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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participation in the government, and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) undertook a campaign to destabilize the government and force the British out. However, in the 1960s, civil rights activists took to the streets to demand an end to discrimination and sociopolitical exclusion of Catholics. British army intervention in the face of Loyalist backlash fragmented the civil rights movement, led to the imposition of Direct Rule, and ushered in the Troubles. For the next three decades, warring paramilitary groups and increasing numbers of British troops and of largely Protestant police forces created a highly militarized and polarized society. Efforts to forge a negotiated settlement to the conflict were unsuccessful until the 1998 Good Friday Agreement and resultant power-sharing assembly. But even today, the outcome of the peace process is uncertain. The nations and nationalisms of Northern Ireland must be understood in the context of the conflict that persisted from the onset of the Troubles. Throughout this period, paramilitaries mobilized not only to fight the enemy but also to define and police ethnic boundaries. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos), the military wing of Sinn Féin, undertook a campaign of violence against the British state and its representatives as well as against symbols and centers of Unionism. Loyalist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) targeted the Catholic community more broadly. The actions of paramilitaries contributed to the militarization and polarization of Northern Ireland politics and society, ensuring that the Green-Orange (Irish-Ulster) nationalist divide would dominate provincial politics. However, despite the seeming intractability of this ethno-nationalist divide, this period witnessed changes in the political and economic contexts of bilateral British-Irish relations, of the regional and Europe-wide environment, and of transatlantic involvement that helped generate the peace process in the 1990s. The economic decline and deindustrialization that occurred during the Troubles weakened the relative economic advantages of the Protestant working class over its Catholic counterpart. It also fostered a socioeconomic climate in which ethnic competition was seen in zero-sum terms, especially as long-term unemployment grew among working-class men and as the unemployment rate was higher and income levels were lower than in the rest of Britain as a whole.

Direct Rule The system of governance imposed throughout the Troubles whereby the province was ruled by London through the secretary of state and the Northern Ireland Office was called Direct Rule. Although elected councils continued at a local level, their powers were quite limited. The Northern Ireland Office sought to eliminate practices of ethnic discrimination through regulations and also through the establishment of organizations such as the Central Community Relations Unit and Equal Opportunity Commission. Despite these efforts, it was criticized by both Unionists and Nationalists for creating a “democratic deficit.”


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Although both Ireland and Northern Ireland were targeted by the European Union (EU) for their economic disadvantage and provided substantial funding for economic development, United Kingdom membership in the European Union did not redress Northern Ireland’s economic woes. In contrast, the Republic of Ireland was able to take advantage of its EU connections and, during the late 1980s and 1990s, was transformed from economic backwater to Celtic Tiger, with economic growth over twice the European average and increasing wages, low unemployment, and low inflation. By the end of the century, Ireland’s economic success undermined the historic Unionist claim that Irish unification would burden the Northern economy. Long-standing patterns of social segregation of Catholics and Protestants persisted throughout the Troubles. Paramilitary violence increased residential segregation, particularly in urban ethnic enclaves with high rates of poverty, intensified ethnic polarization, and reinforced Nationalist identities. Throughout the province, residents mark their national territories with flags, murals, and curb paintings. Communally distinct churches, social clubs, sports teams, and schools, often located in ethnic neighborhoods, ensure that social interactions are largely limited to members of the same ethno-national group. Against this backdrop of ethnic conflict, economic stagnation, and social segregation, the governments of Britain and Ireland pushed forward a process for negotiated settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland. Beginning in the 1980s, they sought to involve political parties from both communities, including those associated with paramilitary groups. In 1982, elections were held for a powersharing assembly. Subsequently, in 1985, Westminster signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement that recognized Ireland’s legitimate interest in the North and indicated that the boundaries set up by partition were not necessarily inviolable. The agreement was seen by Unionists as a direct repudiation of the premises of the Union and a sign that Britain was not committed to the Loyalist population in Northern Ireland. In the wake of this agreement, many Unionists began mobilizing to assert their province’s intrinsic Britishness and to try to halt what they saw as government appeasement of Irish interests. A month after the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, all Unionist members of Parliament resigned in protest. In the following year, Unionist opposition mounted, including a “day of action.” By the summer of 1986, the Northern Ireland Assembly was dissolved. Although Sinn Féin ended its policy of abstaining from electoral politics, Republicans remained suspicious of British government motives. IRA violence continued throughout this period, including major attacks on Enniskillen and Downing Street. At a series of meetings beginning in 1988, the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) sought to persuade Sinn Féin to engage in a peaceful political process. These were followed by talks between the British and Irish governments about how to include the major political parties in a negotiated settlement; these talks were known as Brooke/Mayhew, after the British secretaries of state for Northern Ireland. In 1993, to encourage the IRA to abandon its armed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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campaign, the British government issued the Downing Street Declaration, reasserting its position of no change in Northern Ireland’s status without majority consent but leaving open the possibility that the status of Northern Ireland could change (i.e., that it would not necessarily remain within the Union). The strategy seemed successful when in August 1994 the IRA unilaterally announced a ceasefire, followed by cease-fire declarations by Protestant paramilitary groups. In the wake of these cease-fires, the United States appointed a special envoy to help promote a negotiated settlement, and the European Union announced it would invest significant funds through the introduction of a Special Support Programme. While the citizens of Northern Ireland welcomed the cease-fires, the Unionist community was suspicious about the intentions of the IRA and its political arm, Sinn Féin, and the creeping influence of Dublin over Northern Irish affairs. Their anxieties were hardly relieved in 1995 when the British and Irish governments issued a Joint Framework Document, addressing relations between Ireland and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Northern Ireland, Britain and Ireland, and by the renewal of the IRA campaign of violence, which later intensified with the dramatic Canary Wharf bombing in London in February 1996. Despite this escalation in violence, elections were held for a peace forum that included representatives from the major political parties as well as smaller paramilitary-affiliated parties and even a new Women’s Coalition. Despite vociferous resistance from many Loyalists and Republicans and despite paramilitary cease-fires that were broken and reinstituted, the process produced the 1998 Good Friday Agreement that laid the basis for the establishment of a consociational form of government. David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, and John Hume, leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party, were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for their successful efforts in bringing the peace negotiations to fruition. The Good Friday agreement, which was affirmed by referenda in Northern Ireland and Ireland, created a power-sharing assembly and executive that were to replace Direct Rule with devolved government. This government would no longer be propped up by British troops, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary would be revamped into an integrated police service that would be neutral to ethno-nationalist orientation. The agreement stipulated that the union with Britain would be maintained as long as a majority desired it. However, it also established cross-border bodies to foster economic and social linkages with the Republic of Ireland. It committed paramilitary groups to decommissioning weapons, and the polity to a process of reconciliation and social inclusion. Part of that process would entail the release of many paramilitary prisoners and the regulation of contentious ethnic (largely Protestant) parades. From the outset, the Nationalist community was more supportive of the agreement than were Unionists, who were sharply divided and particularly suspicious of the motivations of Sinn Féin and the IRA. The decommissioning process did not proceed as quickly as Unionists expected and undermined Protestant confidence in the agreement. Although paramilitaries maintained the cease-fire, intra-ethnic violence proliferated as some engaged in drug trafficking and neighborhood vigilantism. And both Nationalist and Loyalist splinter groups continued to target their ethnic enemies. As the

Good Friday Agreement The result of talks between political parties in Northern Ireland and the governments of Britain and Ireland, the Good Friday Agreement was signed in April 1998 and supported by a majority of voters in Ireland and Northern Ireland in a referendum the following month. It established a power-sharing executive and legislative assembly in Northern Ireland and cross-border bodies between Ireland, Northern Ireland, and Britain to address common political and economic matters. It committed Northern Ireland’s government to address key issues of decommissioning weapons, regulation of parades, and reform of the police service and to policies of nondiscrimination, social inclusion, and reconciliation.


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Decommissioning Decommissioning refers to the elimination of weapons among paramilitary groups. Decommissioning became a key problem for the peace process after the Good Friday Agreement, which was ambiguous about whether paramilitary-affiliated parties could participate in power-sharing until decommissioning was completed. Sinn Féin saw the agreement as providing a long-term process for decommissioning that required building confidence in new institutions, including a reformed police system, and external monitoring of all paramilitary groups. Unionists insisted that the IRA decommission its weapons as a condition of Sinn Féin’s participation in the power-sharing government. Hardliners within the Ulster Unionist Party joined the DUP to force the suspension of the new political institutions. As late as 2004, the Independent Monitoring Commission established by Britain and Ireland stated that it had no evidence of decommissioning, and it was not until September 2005 that it confirmed that the IRA had completely disposed of its weapons.

gains of the peace process seemed to falter, the electorate shifted its political support toward the more extreme political parties. The Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin surpassed their more moderate counterparts in the 2003 and 2005 elections, making devolved government unworkable. In the face of political infighting, the British government was forced on several occasions to reimpose Direct Rule in Northern Ireland. Despite efforts to reinvigorate the peace process, the assembly was suspended from 2002 to 2007.

Instituting the Nation Throughout this entire period, political and social relations in Northern Ireland have been shaped by ethnic identities and interests; nearly every important public institution in the province, from government and political parties to churches and civic organizations, has been strongly linked to ethnicity. Direct Rule removed responsibility for all major areas of public policy from the Unionistcontrolled Stormont political system that clearly favored the Protestant populace. London established the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) at the old Stormont to oversee the province’s various administrative departments. Over the next several decades, the NIO managed Northern Ireland’s economy, legal system, health care, and social services through its bureaucracy and through a growing body of quasi-nongovernmental organizations (QUANGOs). District councils had little power, exercising decisions only over the most local matters, such as trash removal. Both Nationalists and Unionists therefore critiqued Direct Rule for generating a democratic deficit. At the same time, the NIO worked to rectify some of the most obvious inequities of the Stormont system, adopting policies to redress discrimination in public N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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housing, civil service jobs, higher education, and provision of health services. Although the NIO developed nondiscrimination policies and invested in crosscommunity initiatives, it was unable to overcome sectarian alignments. For example, even under Direct Rule, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, Northern Ireland’s police force, remained overwhelmingly Protestant. This was due in part to recruitment practices but also to IRA targeting of Catholic officers, whom it deemed to be colluding with the British. The educational system has also remained segregated. Despite the presence of a small integrated school movement, Catholics and Protestants have continued to attend and support the system of separate primary and secondary educational institutions that thrived under the Stormont regime. And attempts to develop integrated public housing have also failed, as paramilitaries and neighborhood vigilantes intimidate “outsiders” in ethnically marked territories. Indeed, in Belfast, a barrier known euphemistically as the peace line was built to separate working-class neighborhoods to limit inter-ethnic violence. Not surprisingly, neighborhoods on either side remain ethnically homogenous, and social relations are limited to members of the same community. Civil society has also been marked by ethnic separatism. Despite denominational differences among Protestants, religious identity has been closely linked to ethnic identity, demarcating Protestants from Catholics. Church affiliation and attendance in Northern Ireland are higher than in most countries of Europe, and much social and civic life revolves around parishes. Among the most important of the religious and sectarian organizations has been the Orange Order. A Protestant, Loyalist fraternity that crosses class and denominational lines, the Order is politically significant. It was formally affiliated with the Ulster Unionist Party, holding seats on its decision-making council. Its influence permeates Protestant communities throughout the province, through a system of local lodges and sponsorship of official holidays and commemorative events that advance the Protestant identification with the Union. The annual Orange parades celebrating Protestant ascendancy from the 17th century and the union with Great Britain have become major political flashpoints. However, even secular organizations, such as charities that serve all needy populations in Northern Ireland, tend to draw their membership along confessional lines. Ethnic identities are reinforced by a wide range of ethnically specific leisure activities from athletic teams and sports clubs to bands and bars. Even organizations that have been open to moving across the ethnic divide have been trapped in this social environment. Women’s centers, for example, have not been explicitly ethnic; however, because they are oriented to serving the needs of local women, they have been constrained by the social relations of the often segregated neighborhoods in which they are located. Nonetheless, the network of women’s centers has been at the forefront of organizations and associations combating sectarianism. During the Troubles and the postagreement periods, four major parties dominated Northern Ireland politics. Among Unionists, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) is considered more moderate, secular, and upper and middle class comN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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pared to the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which is more militant, Protestant, and middle and working class. The Ulster Unionist Party was established in 1905 as the official voice of Unionism at the time of partition, and it remained in power throughout the Stormont era (1921–1972). The Democratic Unionist Party was established by Reverend Ian Paisley, a fundamentalist Protestant minister, in 1971 to oppose any compromise with Irish Nationalists or Catholics. Among Nationalists, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) is considered more moderate and middle class than Sinn Féin (SF), which is more militant and working class. The SDLP was established in 1970 by constitutional Nationalists and was until recently the dominant party among Catholics. Sinn Féin, now Northern Ireland’s largest Catholic party, has its roots in the early-20th-century armed struggle for independence from Britain and has only recently cut its ties to the IRA. In addition to these four major parties, a range of smaller parties compete in elections, among them parties identified as cross-community. Alliance is the oldest of these. Founded in 1970, this largely upper middle-class party has consistently adopted the position of majority rule on the constitutional question and garnered modest support in elections since its inception. A more recent attempt at cross-community political mobilization is the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition. Created in 1996 by community activists to ensure that women’s voices and interests would be incorporated into the peace process, it secured two seats in the 1998 assembly elections but lost them in 2003.

Defining the Nation National identities have remained fairly consistent since the onset of the Troubles. Surveys over this period document strong differences between the two populations: Catholics largely identify themselves as Irish Nationalists (Green) and Protestants as Unionists (Orange). It might seem that confessional and theological differences are what shape the national boundaries in Northern Ireland. Yet, differences in religious belief have political significance for only a small minority of largely fundamentalist and evangelical Protestants, such as Reverend Ian Paisley. Rather, national identities are largely defined by orientation toward the constitutional question and reinforced by patterns of social segregation and of marriage within groups. Moreover, variations within each populace complicate the apparent Green-Orange uniformity. Although a British identity has become increasingly strong among Protestants, some working-class Unionists continue to identify themselves as Northern Irish or Ulsterite. And although the predominant identification of Catholics regardless of social class is Irish, a significant minority identifies as Northern Irish. Of course, what being Northern Irish means to these two communities is quite different: for Protestants, it signals distinctiveness from other regions of Britain, whereas for Catholics, it suggests a particular region of Ireland. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Northern Ireland’s long relationship with Republicanism has had a major impact on Irish nationalism. As the Provisional IRA undertook the defense of Catholic urban enclaves during the early Troubles, Sinn Féin promoted its vision of nationalism, which legitimated armed struggle, glorified its martyrs, and propagated an anti-imperialist, socialist ideology. The SDLP offered an alternative vision of Irish nationalism, rejecting armed struggle and arguing for peaceful, democratic change. As the peace process developed, Sinn Féin shifted to an assertion that reunification could be achieved through political means. Among Protestants, Unionist identity is broadly shared; but Unionism as a political movement has fragmented over the past 25 years, and political parties do not necessarily offer clear indicators of the boundaries of nationalist ideologies. Secular Unionists who embrace a view of a civic and multicultural British identity may support the UUP or the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). Religious Unionists and ethno-nationalists who see their identity as Protestant and defend the Union as necessary to protect that identity are likely to affiliate with the DUP, the UUP, or the PUP.

Narrating the Nation In this situation of protracted conflict, political parties have been important in narrating the nation but so, too, have social organizations that seek to advance and develop cultural identities. During the last several decades, cultural associations have mushroomed, advocating particular versions of history and seeking to revive either Irish or Ulster-Scots languages and traditions. In neighborhoods and towns throughout the province, flags and their colors, the Union Jack for Unionists and the Tri-Color for Nationalists, are used to signify political allegiance and to mark ethno-political boundaries. Each group invokes historic events to emphasize their national valor and heroic sacrifice. For Unionists, these include the Siege of Derry, at which Protestant apprentice boys held back a charge by those loyal to the Catholic King James; the Battle of the Boyne, at which William of Orange defeated James; the World War I Battle of the Somme, at which scores of Ulster Protestants were killed; and the Stormont period during which the Protestant Ascendancy was preserved. For Nationalists, they include the Easter Rebellion of 1916; Bloody Sunday in 1972 when Catholics in Derry were shot down by British troops; and the hunger strikes in the 1980s when IRA prisoners starved themselves, sometimes to death, in a collective demand that the British government recognize them as political prisoners. Northern Ireland is well known for the political murals that mark ethnic territories, especially in working-class enclaves of Belfast and Derry. In Nationalist neighborhoods, images of Mother Ireland, Celtic symbols, and Gaelic words prevail, as well as depictions of British imperialism and Unionist intransigence and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Loyalist mural in Belfast, Northern Ireland. (Alain Le Garsmeur/Corbis)

of Republican support for Third World liberation struggles. In Unionist neighborhoods, murals depict paramilitaries as the descendants of the Ulster Volunteer Force during World War I and often combine symbols of Protestantism, such as an open Bible with Masonic symbols that have been long used by the fraternal Orange Order.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Political parties and paramilitary organizations have been important in mobilizing national sentiments. However, even at the height of the Troubles, paramilitary organizations were relatively small. Although few Catholics or Protestants engaged in party activism during the Direct Rule period, parties were able to mobilize substantial voter turnout, generally higher than the United Kingdom average. Ethnic festivals and parades became increasingly important vehicles for mobilizing national political loyalties. The Sinn Féin stronghold of West Belfast has sponsored an annual Feile en Phobaile (Festival of the People) to underscore Irish national identity in the North, and parades are held to mark traditional Irish Catholic holidays such as St. Patrick’s Day. But the parades that have had the greatest political impact in the last several decades have been those of the Loyalist fraternal associations and especially the annual summer marches of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Orange Order. Held in July and August, members of the Order gather to celebrate the Union and to cement Protestant solidarity. Men in traditional Ulster garb and bands playing Loyalist songs march the Queen’s highways, carrying banners that reinforce key elements of Protestant identity and assert their vision of Ulster history. Many of the parade routes are controversial as they pass through Nationalist neighborhoods, banging massive drums and playing music that is sometimes explicitly anti-Catholic. During the 1980s and 1990s, there was an exponential increase in the number of parades, and conflicts over parade routes and behaviors became an important impediment to the peace process. The annual parade at Drumcree in Portadown became a flashpoint for ethnic mobilization, as the Orange Order and its sympathizers would “stand off ” against Catholic residents and even against British troops. The frequent crises generated by these parades made the regulation of marches a key controversy during the peace process. Conclusion Since the 1960s, Northern Ireland has been wracked by a conflict rooted in ethnonationalist identities and claims. Politics and society have been shaped by the competition between Unionism, which insists on maintaining the province’s connection to Britain, and Nationalism, which seeks the reunification of the island and an end to British rule. Both of these nationalisms are reinforced by religious affiliations, with Unionists primarily identifying as Protestants and Irish Nationalists as Catholics. However, the conflict is driven by political belief and perceived ethno-national interest rather than theological differences. Political parties, military and paramilitary organizations, and civic associations all mobilized around these competing visions of the nation, drawing upon collective narratives and symbols to reinforce loyalties to a specific ethno-national identity. These national loyalties are replicated in the social patterns of housing segregation and group separatism in social relations and civil society. Nonetheless, throughout the Troubles, activists and political actors have sought to work across the ethnic divide. Repeated attempts to find a negotiated solution to the conflict and establish power-sharing institutions were resisted by paramilitaries and political parties. However, paramilitary cease-fires in the 1990s opened the door to a renewed peace process, and the governments of Ireland and Britain, supported by the European Union and the United States, took advantage of this opportunity. The peace process resulted in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, and the establishment of a power-sharing government. The peace process, however, has been shaky, and the future of Northern Ireland’s constitutional arrangements and national identity remains uncertain. Selected Bibliography ARK, Northern Ireland Social and Political Archive. http://www.ark.ac.uk. CAIN (Conflict Archive on the Internet). http://www.cain.ulst.ac.uk.


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Cochrane, Feargal. 1997. Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism since the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Cork, Ireland: Cork University Press. Coulter, Colin. 1999. Contemporary Northern Irish Society: An Introduction. London: Pluto Press. Darby, John. 1997. Scorpions in a Bottle: Conflicting Cultures in Northern Ireland. London: Minority Rights Publications. English, Richard. 2003. Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hennesey, Thomas. 2001. The Northern Ireland Peace Process. New York: Palgrave. Jarman, Neil. 1997. Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Displays in Northern Ireland. Oxford: Berg. O’Leary, Brendan, and John McGarry. 1996. The Politics of Antagonism. 2nd ed. London: Athlone. Ruane, Joseph, and Jennifer Todd. 1996. The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sales, Rosemary. 1997. Women Divided: Gender, Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland. London: Routledge.


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Soviet Union Hugh Hudson Chronology 1914–1918 World War I. The czarist regime, essentially defeated by Germany, collapses during the winter of 1917. 1917 The Russian Revolution. The monarchy falls in February. In October, the Bolsheviks lead a coup to overthrow the all but defunct Provisional Government. 1918–1921 Civil War between the “Reds,” “Whites” (czarist supporters), and “Greens” (peasant anarchists). A military intervention in support of the Whites is led by Great Britain and France but includes the United States and others. 1921–1928 New Economic Policy attempts to restore devastated country through mixed capitalistsocialist economy. Great experimentation in arts, literature, and culture. 1924 Lenin dies in January. A three-year political struggle over succession begins. 1928–1939 Stalinism is established. Collectivization of peasant private lands begins in 1928, leading, together with climatic conditions, to famine in 1932–1933. First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932) attempts rapid industrialization. Massive influx of peasants into cities. 1936–1938 Height of Stalinist terror. Show trials of former Soviet leaders, purge of the party, repression of large segments of society. 1939–1945 World War II. September 1939 invasion of Poland by Germany; June 1941 invasion of Soviet Union by Germany. War leads to some 25 million deaths in the Soviet Union. Cold War with the West, led by the United States, follows the end of World War II and lasts until the end of the Soviet Union. 1953–1964 Stalin dies, and Khrushchev emerges as the new leader. Attempted de-Stalinization of Soviet system. The power of the secret police is severely curtailed. 1964–1982 Brezhnev years of initial growing prosperity, followed by economic stagnation. 1985–1991 Gorbachev emerges as the leader of the reform movement, centered on cultural reform ( glasnost) and economic reconstruction ( perestroika). Economy falters. National separatism leads to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. 1991–present Efforts to establish a new political system and economy in Russia under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin is plagued by corruption and growing authoritarianism.

Situating the Nation The post–World War II Soviet Union confronted the issue of nationalism within a complex theoretical and practical universe. The question of some form of “Soviet nationalism” emerged as a result of the October Revolution, which left the theoretically internationalist Bolsheviks in charge of some 90 percent of the old Russian empire. The westernmost reaches of the empire, the Polish, Baltic, and Finnish provinces, established themselves as independent countries, but at the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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end of the civil war, most of the empire remained under a single government. This country contained some 100 separate language groups and cultures ranging from hunting and gathering groups to emerging industrial societies. The problem of nationalism had bedeviled the Bolsheviks prior to the October Revolution, with Lenin engaged in polemics with the Austrian Social Democratic Party, especially Otto Bauer. In a simplistic rejection of modern reality, Lenin took his lead from Marx, who had declared nationalism to be a product of the feudal mode of production. Lenin thus concluded that nationalism was already being undermined by modern imperialism with its disregard for national borders, and thus a problem that was withering away. Until that final withering, every particular case had to be individually analyzed. The general principle, however, remained: the national question (including self-determination) remained subordinate to what the party defined as the general interests of the proletariat and world revolution. To the extent that the national liberation movements of “oppressed” nations, that is, nations living within multinational empires or under colonial domination, were seen as directed against imperialism, those movements should be supported by the party (and “the proletariat”). But no concessions could be made to national sentiments directed against “the revolution.” This philosophy thus justified armed opposition to nationalist movements in Ukraine and Georgia. The young Soviet state was simply too weak to effectively resist independence movements in Finland, the Baltic states, and Poland.

Instituting the Nation The belief that nationalism was a doomed ideology did not prevent Lenin from recognizing Russian nationalism, renamed Great Russian Chauvinism, as one of the primary “distortions” plaguing the young Soviet state. This came to a head in the so-called Georgian Affair. In 1920, Georgia had been recognized by the Soviet state as an independent country. However, in 1921 Stalin and his allies staged essentially a coup in Georgia, purging the Georgian Mensheviks and removing any Georgian Bolshevik leaders who protested this move. But before anything meaningful could be done to address Stalin’s coup, Lenin suffered a series of strokes and then died. Lenin’s death did little to end the problem of nationalism within the Soviet Union. In a manifestation of the logo-centric universe of emerging Stalinism, Stalin solved the problem of nationalism by repeating Lenin’s argument that, in the Soviet Union, nationalism would be “socialist in content and national in form.” In effect, this meant the direction of all political and economic matters from Moscow, where the party and state bureaucracy was overwhelmingly Russian. It further meant that the charge of “national deviation” would play a significant role in the Stalin terror, with particular vengeance in Ukraine. The permitted national N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov (Lenin) Lenin was born the son of a provincial nobleman. Having graduated from the university with the gold medal in law, he quickly established himself as the head of the most radical wing of the Russian Social Democratic Workers’ Party (later the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), the Bolsheviks. Lenin, while claiming to be an orthodox Marxist, actually added two constructs unknown to Marx: the concept of the party as the creative historymaking force and general staff of the world revolution; and the theory of imperialism, wherein European imperialism in the 20th century had been able to buy off European workers through expropriation from the colonies, thereby changing revolutionary dynamics from European to world revolution. Lenin successfully led the new Soviet state during the civil war (1918 –1921) through centralizing and militarizing policies dubbed War Communism. Confronted with peasant resistance and economic collapse, he was able to convince the party and government to accept the New Economic Policy (1921–1928), which attempted a mixed capitalist-socialist economy and permitted great experimentation in culture and the arts. The economy gradually improved during the New Economic Policy. He suffered a series of strokes during 1922 and 1923 that limited his ability to direct policy. During that period, Joseph Stalin was able to gradually accumulate power through control of the party bureaucracy and the political police. Lenin’s last efforts in the winter of 1923–1924 to limit Stalin’s influence failed. Lenin died on January 21, 1924, setting off a struggle for power among the Bolshevik leadership.


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“form” included language and cultural traditions, the content of which nonetheless could still be deemed anti-Soviet or bourgeois.

Defining the Nation Under Stalin, and particularly during World War II, Russian patriotism and nationalism became more acceptable. The Russian language remained the respectable lingua franca of the union, and the history of the Great Russian people was presented as the foundation for the unity of the state. In the eastern republics, the Cyrillic alphabet forcibly replaced the Latin in the written form of native languages. In education, the Russian language was emphasized union-wide and became de rigueur for higher education. During the war, cases occurred of Soviet populations initially welcoming the German invaders, most notably in the recently annexed Baltic republics and in Ukraine, where anti-Soviet guerilla units would continue to operate for years after the war. But the vast majority of Red Army and partisan units vigorously and heroically resisted the Nazis, as did the citizens of Leningrad who, despite three years of encirclement and huge losses to starvation, maintained their defenses and loyalty to the country.

Poster from 1951, Stalin as Father of the Nation: “The Great Friend of Children.” (Library of Congress)


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Narrating the Nation Although World War II in many ways provided a definition of “Sovietness”—a sense of shared identity—the Soviet Union emerged from the war as a country where Western influences had penetrated, a situation defined as a major problem by the Stalinist leadership. The war brought a reawakening of various nationalisms that the party could not but theoretically disdain. This was especially true among the non-Russian peoples. A greater sense of local chauvinism was experienced than had been in existence since the Revolution. These instances were especially true in the “new territories”—the Baltic states that reentered the empire in 1940 and western Ukraine. The Russian intelligentsia had also suffered from dislocations. During the war, the intelligentsia had been permitted to receive and develop Western contacts on a level not seen since the mid-1920s. This association was regarded by the party as a type of virus within the body politic. The Russian intelligentsia, in addition, was affected by the new “Russian” nationalism fostered by Stalin during the war, having been permitted to infuse their works with patriotism and to direct them against the enemy. In many ways, the war had seen a return of the nationalism of the old empire. This nationalism included the recognition of the military heroes of the Old Regime, such as Catherine the Great’s commander Gen. Aleksandr Suvorov and Gen. Mikhail Kutuzov, the hero of 1812. The military revisited the old marks of rank, including epaulettes for officers. Saluting once more was required, and discipline was returned to the officers. In all these ways, the intellectual elites were susceptible to what the party labeled infections from the West that were clearly of a nonrevolutionary, if not counterrevolutionary, nature. These developments led the party to draw certain conclusions, among which was a drive for orthodoxy against the dissidents and future possible dissidents. A new orthodoxy had to be asserted quickly and effectively, driving underground those who opposed it if the damage of the war was to be repaired. Thus in 1946 the party was prepared to announce the intense disciplining of the country. The process began in a public way in August and September 1946 when rulings were issued for “Disciplining the Intelligentsia.” The first declaration appeared on August 14 in the name of both the Central Committee of the party and the government. On the surface it chastised two Leningrad literary periodicals, Leningrad and The Star (Zvezda), for having published pieces of literature of no obvious educational or propaganda value. They were accused of portraying the Russian people as crude and of other sins of defaming the people. Two of the country’s leading intellectuals were singled out for special criticism—the satirist Mikhail Zoshchenko and the poet Anna Akhmatova—who were labeled “anti-Soviet, underminers of socialist realism, and unduly pessimistic.” Along with others such as the poet and author Boris Pasternak, the filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein, and great composers Sergei Prokofiev and Dmitrii Shostakovich, they were condemned for N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili (Stalin) Having been expelled from seminary, Stalin joined the revolutionary movement in Georgia, where he engaged in “expropriations” to fund the Social Democratic Party’s Georgian branch. By 1912 he had obtained membership in the Central Committee. He played a minor role in the 1917 Revolution, but because he was a member of a national minority, he was appointed the first commissar of nationalities. He was then named general secretary of the party in 1922, a post none of the intellectual leaders of the party desired or considered particularly important. Using the appointment powers of that office, Stalin came to dominate the growing party machine and used that bureaucratic power to gradually eliminate political opposition within the party. A skillful and ruthless politician, he consolidated his authority through a series of party purges that, particularly in the years 1936–1938, spread into the general population. Although debate exists regarding how much of the violence of the purges was planned by Stalin and how much resulted from general social dislocations and fear of renewed warfare within society, there is no disagreement that the violence was enormous and that millions of people suffered some form of repression. Stalin’s two major policy innovations were the replacement of the New Economic Policy by the Five-Year Plan, focused on rapid industrialization, and the elimination of private peasant farming through collectivization. The latter was violently resisted by many peasants, resulting in millions of casualties amid famine and mass repression. Stalin’s bumbling performance early in World War II almost led to the defeat of the Soviet Union in the early months of the war. Competent generals managed to save the country, although Stalin then claimed credit for victory. Over 25 million Soviet citizens died as a result of the Nazi invasion. In the midst of planning a new purge, Stalin died on March 5, 1953. He still remains a hero to some in the former Soviet Union, while despised by others.

“neglect of ideology and subservience to Western influence” (Postanovlenie Orgbiuro TsK VKP(b) 1946). Andrei Zhdanov, a party hack and one of Stalin’s long-time thugs, led this assault. Juxtaposed to “bourgeois cosmopolitanism”—in reality, a “crime” invented to disguise officially sanctioned anti-Semitism—Zhdanov trumpeted “Soviet patriotism.” According to the official party journal Bolshevik, Soviet patriotism “expresses the devotion of the soviet people to their socialist fatherland and serves to cement the foundation of the soviet multinational state, rallying all the peoples and nationalities of our country into a united, fraternal family.” Zhdanov queried, “Where can one find another people like ours, or a country like ours? Where can one find such wonderful human qualities?” (Chernov 1949). In many ways, Zhdanov was harkening back to earlier discussions on creating a new Soviet man, one who was freed from such atavistic emotions as “family” and who was able to understand the necessity of working for the benefit of the group (class) as opposed to the individual. Soviet architects and urban planners of the 1920s and 1930s had debated how to build an environment that would help create this new type of person who lived for the collective good, while literature and film of the period provided the image of the new Soviet hero as an essentially N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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desexualized being who lived only for production or defense. For Zhdanov, the new Soviet man was stripped not only of family and sex but also of nation, or at least previously existing loyalties to “bourgeois” constructs of nation.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The postwar drive for Soviet/Russian patriotism and the use of the term soviet narod (“people”) did not displace the theoretical position shared by Lenin and Stalin that nations (natsii) indeed existed and had rights. Stalin (1913) had written: “A nation may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the right to complete secession. Nations are sovereign and all nations are equal.” In the postwar period, this equality was expressed in the continuation of the prewar celebration of the “friendship of the peoples.” The translation of literary works, the production of histories of the Soviet Union that attempted to incorporate the histories of all the peoples, and traveling cultural exhibitions served to laud the achievements of the various nations. The number of nations that were now determined as appropriate for inclusion in this celebration was reduced from the initial 192 officially recognized languages with corresponding bureaucratic rights, but the principle of nationalities as the legitimate foundation of a multinational state remained. So, too, did the practice of indigenizing local party and managerial bureaucracies. So strong was this “right” to fill local jobs with local elites that when Khrushchev attempted to moderate the corruption associated with it by promoting an ethnically neutral personnel policy he encountered determined resistance. The Stalinist nationalities policy thus became the basis for some of the worst corruption of the postwar period. The continued use of ethnic quotas meant that members of nationalities residing within their national republics received the greatest advantages. In the postwar Soviet Union, most Union republics were controlled by native elites, whose ability to obtain educational and job preferences rested with their claims to ethnicity. This was particularly true among intellectuals, whose job it was to produce national histories, linguistic studies, and literature. Thus the major cultural creation of the postwar period was that of the cult of the nation, which until the Gorbachev reforms merely had to be semihidden within some ill-defined “socialist” content. Under Brezhnev, nationalist sentiments and claims of discrimination and repression were brewing among Russians and non-Russian nationalities. Russians were quick to argue that the other nationalities were being mollycoddled at their expense. Anxieties were expressed regarding population growth rates among Muslims, who were depicted as threatening to overwhelm European Russia. The Brezhnev regime permitted manifestations of Russian nationalism that exalted N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the supposed virtues of Russia’s rural life as well as the czarist past and even the Orthodox religion. This was most pronounced in the works of the village prose writers, who manufactured a simple, honest, family-centered, even God-fearing past. The writers Valentin Rasputin and Valentin Pikul headed this literary movement, with Pikul throwing in anti-Semitism for good measure. Other manifestations of Russian nationalism could be seen in religious observance and even in the emergence of preservation and environmental societies and movements. The currents of Russian nationalism that had flowed during the Brezhnev years became ever stronger under Gorbachev. The village-prose nationalism of the 1960s and 1970s was surpassed by neo-Stalinists who dreamed of a mythical lost past of strong government, patriotism, law and order, and patriarchal obedience. The group Memory (Pamiat’ ) took center stage in this commingling of Stalinism

De-Stalinization De-Stalinization came to describe the efforts of Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, who emerged as leader of the Soviet Union following Stalin’s death, to restructure the Soviet Union away from the Stalinist system of repression and secret police control. Specifically, Khrushchev declared an amnesty for some political prisoners and closed many of the forced labor camps, increased availability of consumer goods at reduced prices, and relaxed restrictions on the peasants’ private plots used to produce food for the market. The symbolic act of de-Stalinization was Khrushchev’s so-called secret speech to the 20th Party Congress that denounced the Stalin cult of personality and condemned many of the crimes of the period. With the power of the Stalinists thereby undermined, Khrushchev further attacked the concentration camp system ( gulag). In what is undoubtedly the most significant act of the post-Stalin period, Khrushchev closed down two-thirds of the prison camps and freed a majority of the roughly 2.5 million people in internment. He further curbed the power of the political police and gave more attention to “socialist legality” by revitalizing the legal codes. Khrushchev also attempted to de-Stalinize the economy by pressing for the production of consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry. An effort by the Stalinists within the leadership to remove Khrushchev failed in 1957, and Khrushchev’s reaction demonstrated that de-Stalinization was more than empty words: none of the so-called “antiparty group” was shot. The 22nd Party Congress in 1961 saw additional efforts: the “hero city” Stalingrad was renamed Volgograd; Stalin’s body was removed from the mausoleum on Red Square; and Stalin’s prime henchman, Viacheslav Molotov, was expelled from the party. Along with greater personal freedom and more consumer goods came a cultural thaw. Writers were freed from the restrictions of socialist realist literature and were permitted to publish works that reflected the problems of Soviet life. Aleksander Solzhenitsyn’s portrayal of life and death in a Stalinist camp, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich, was the most famous product. Toward the end of the Khrushchev period (1953–1964), some of this limited freedom was restricted as the conservatives in the party became increasingly uncomfortable with change and as many in the party came to fear Khrushchev’s economic and political reorganizations. But the Soviet Union was a far better place in 1964 than it was in 1953, and the concept of bringing socialism back to its humanistic roots would reemerge under Mikhail Gorbachev 20 years later.


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and 19th-century official nationality. Even more disturbing was the so-called “Red-Brown” alliance between the neo-Stalinist and neo-Nazis gangs who had first emerged in the 1970s. Russian ultranationalism found its parliamentary expression in the Liberal Democratic Party headed by the demagogue Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Among the non-Russian peoples, the Gorbachev period saw the revitalization of nationalist movements on a scale not witnessed since the 1920s. Glasnost fed discussions of matters from history to the environment with a common claim that “freedom” for the nation would somehow make it all better. The Baltic republics led the way with cultural manifestations of nationalism in such forms as songfests, leading rapidly to demands that the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939 be renounced (and thus the justification for Latvia’s, Estonia’s, and Lithuania’s inclusion in the Soviet Union). Popular fronts emerged in all three republics, bringing together nationalists and independence-minded local communists. In the rosy picture of Baltic history being produced, the infatuation with fascism and the emergence of large, powerful fascist parties in the 1930s were conveniently ignored. With genuine voting opportunities, nationalists filled the Baltic parliaments. In 1987, the Estonian government declared economic autonomy, followed the next year by a claim of “sovereignty.” In 1989 both Lithuania and Latvia also claimed sovereignty, leading to a “war of laws,” with the Baltic states declaring that republics’ laws had precedence over Soviet law. In Lithuania, the Sajudis Party under Vytautus Landsbergis won a majority in the Lithuanian parliament in 1990 and declared independence, which Moscow rejected. Bloody confrontations with Soviet forces broke out in January 1991 in Lithuania and Latvia, but Gorbachev refused to unleash massive force, and the violence was limited. Ukrainian nationalism, maintained among intellectuals since the 19th century, received another boost with the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986. The Ukrainian Popular Front for Perestroika (Rukh) emerged in 1989 calling for economic and cultural autonomy with an emphasis on Ukrainian language. The following year, former dissident Vyacheslav Chornovil was elected mayor of Lviv. In 1991 a referendum asked whether voters desired an “independent Ukraine”; the proposition passed. The former communist leader turned Ukrainian nationalist, Leonid Kravchuk, was elected president. But an independent Ukraine soon saw expressions of ethnic violence against Jews and conflict between Orthodox and Uniate Christians in western Ukraine. It further saw conflict with Russia over the Red Navy’s Black Sea Fleet, which the Ukrainian government sought to claim, and over the Crimea, which had been presented by Khrushchev to Ukraine in a relatively meaningless gesture while the Soviet Union existed but which took on significance now, especially for much of its highly Russified population. In the Caucasus, nationalism expressed itself first and foremost in inter-ethnic conflict, which the Soviet government had until then held in check. In 1988 a nationalist majority of the Armenian-dominated, autonomous Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijan Republic demanded reunification with Armenia. Azeris responded by murdering dozens of Armenians in the Azerbaijani town of Sumgait. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Conflict between Armenians and Azeris followed over the course of the next two years, all in the name of the nation. In 1990 Soviet troops fired on demonstrators in Baku, the capital of Azerbaijan, to suppress a nationalist movement there, adding fuel to an already volatile situation. In Georgia conflict emerged between the Georgians and the Abkhazian minority demanding its independence from Georgia at the time when Georgians were demanding theirs from the Soviet Union. Georgian nationalists called for the restoration of the brief independence the republic had experienced from 1917 to 1921. In April 1989, Soviet troops broke up with significant loss of life an independence rally in Tbilisi directed as much against Abkhazian demands as for Georgian independence. In 1990 former dissident Zviad Gamsakhurdia, leader of the nationalist coalition “Round Table–Free Georgia,” headed a new government that declared its independence. But almost immediately this government was at war with an autonomous republic in its territory—South Ossetia—that also demanded independence from Georgia. In central Asia a similar pattern unfolded. In 1986 Gorbachev attempted to rein in the endemic corruption in Kazakhstan by removing the Brezhnev-era party chief Dinmukhamed Kunaev. Gorbachev selected a Russian as the party replacement, which became the excuse for nationalist riots directed against Russians. Soon ethnic riots broke out in neighboring Uzbekistan, this time directed by Uzbeks against Meshkhetian Turks who had been deported to Uzbekistan from Georgia in 1944. Then in 1990, Kirgizs murdered Uzbeks in the town of Osh. The stimulation of nationalist emotions had become by 1990 an excuse for significant violence within the Soviet Union. In most cases, with the Baltic republics being the primary exception, these emotions were manipulated by communist leaders turned nationalists. They sought to seize control over the government of the former republics, using mass demonstrations and threats of violence, and to proceed to establish systems of corruption. No one manipulated the nationalist sentiment more than Boris Yeltsin who, as president of Russia, met in December 1991 with the presidents of Ukraine and Belarusia to divide up the spoils of the Soviet Union and create a new “Commonwealth of Independent States” in its place. In Ukraine and Belarusia, old party hacks had emerged as presidents of independent countries, waving the banner of nationalism while instituting regimes of corruption and repression. Former party bosses re-created themselves as presidents in central Asia as well. The 1990s in the former Soviet Union was a period of cronyism and corruption, with those seduced by the siren song of nationalism left to wonder what had actually been achieved. Even within Russia the creation of a true national identity proved difficult, as Russia had never truly been a modern nation-state but, rather, an imperial power. Some 21 ethnic national republics remained within its borders, comprising approximately 15 percent of the population. Zhirinovskii’s right-wing Liberal Democratic Party spent most of the decade contesting with the supposedly left-wing new Communist Party under Gennady Zyuganov to see N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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who could beat the drum of wounded national pride the loudest. But nationalism expressed itself in the decade primarily in the war between Russia and the breakaway Chechnya region. First Boris Yeltsin and then his hand-picked presidential heir, former KGB agent Vladimir Putin, dragged the country into two wars against the Muslim rebels in the Caucasus. Anti-Islamic and growing anti-Western sentiments, in part sponsored by the revived Orthodox church (itself engaged in its own war against Catholics and Protestant missionaries), seemed to give Russian nationalism some definition by the end of the decade. By 2005 nationalism could perhaps be seen as taking a new and more democratic turn in Ukraine with the overturning of the rigged election concocted by outgoing president and accused murderer Leonid Kuchma by forces allied with Viktor Yushchenko, who eventually was elected president. The so-called Orange Revolution spoke to desires within the country to end police repression, crony capitalism, and pseudo-democracy. By 2007, however, the Orange Revolution had disintegrated among petty political bickering and continued social dissention over whether Ukraine should look primarily to the West or to Russia for its identity. Even less promising was the so-called Rose Revolution of 2003 in Georgia that saw the ouster of president Eduard Shevardnadze by forces led by Mikheil Saakashvili. The new president appeared primarily concerned about Georgia’s territorial integrity, determined to restore Georgian control over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and engaged internationally in condemnations of Russia as the primary source of Georgia’s multiple economic and social problems. In many ways, Saakashvili appeared a throwback to early-20th-century nationalist leaders in central and eastern Europe, with a single-minded focus on foreign affairs. The problem of creating a unifying “national” consciousness and mythology thus remained following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The attempt by the Stalin regime to amalgamate older Russian nationalism with a new “Soviet” consciousness had generated ethnic hostilities across and within the former Soviet republics. The experience of World War II had indeed provided a sense of interdependence for that generation, and for a brief period one might well have been able to speak of a new Soviet nationalism. But with the emergence of a new post– World War II generation to positions of cultural and political leadership, the consciousness of interdependence provided by the war evaporated. How does one create a sense of community, of shared values and goals, among peoples as varied as those of the former Soviet Union? The former Soviet Union of the first decade of the 21st century looks all too much like the hostile, embittered land of czarist Russia, where national hatreds were glorified as political principles. Selected Bibliography Beissinger, Mark R. 2002. Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State. New York: Cambridge University Press. Brandenberger, David. 2002. National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931–1956. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.


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Chernov, F. 1949. “Burzhuaznyi kosmopolitizm i ego reaktsionnaia rol’.” Bol’shevik 5 (March 15): 30–41. Golovenchenko, F. 1949. “Vysoko derzhat’ znamya sovetskogo patriotizma v iskusstve i literature.” Bol’shevik 3 (February 15): 39–48. Goldman, Marshall I. 1992. What Went Wrong with Perestroika. New York: W. W. Norton. Gorenburg, Dmitry P. 2003. Minority Ethnic Mobilization in the Russian Federation. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hough, Jerry F. 1997. Democratization and Revolution in the USSR, 1985–1991. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Jack, Andrew. 2004. Inside Putin’s Russia. New York: Oxford University Press. Lewin, Moshe. 1985. The Making of the Soviet System. New York: Pantheon Books. Miner, Steven Merritt. 2003. Stalin’s Holy War: Religion, Nationalism, and Alliance Politics, 1941–1945. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Postanovlenie Orgbiuro TsK VKP(b) o zhurnalakh “Zvezda” and “Leningrad.” 1946. Pravda (August 14 and 21). Stalin, I. 1913. “Marksizm i natsionalnyi vopros.” Prosveshchenie 3–5 (March–May), republished in I. V. Stalin, Sochineniia (1946), vol. 2: 290–367. Suny, Ronald Grigor. 1993. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Suny, Ronald Grigor, and Terry Martin, eds. 2001. A State of Nations: Empire and NationMaking in the Age of Lenin and Stalin. New York: Oxford University Press. Taubman, William. 2003. Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: W. W. Norton. Tucker, Robert C. 1969. The Marxian Revolutionary Idea. New York: W. W. Norton. Von Geldern, James, and Richard Stites, eds. 1995. Mass Culture in Soviet Russia: Tales, Poems, Songs, Movies, Plays, and Folklore, 1917–1953. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.


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Spain Elisa Roller Chronology 1479 Union of the Crowns (Aragón and Castile) by the marriage of King Ferdinand and Isabelle. This marks the origins of the Spanish state in its present form. 1898 Spain loses its last colonies, including Cuba, with its defeat against the United States in the Spanish-American War. 1923 Spain becomes a dictatorship led by Gen. Primo de Rivera. 1931 Second Republic established in Spain. 1936 Beginning of Spanish Civil War. Catalonia and the Basque country side with the Spanish Republican forces and suffer heavily for their opposition during the ensuing Franco regime. 1939 Spain becomes a dictatorship led by Gen. Francisco Franco. 1975 Death of Gen. Francisco Franco. Restoration of the monarchy—Juan Carlos I is proclaimed king. 1977 First democratic elections held in Spain. 1978 Spain adopts its first democratic constitution. 1980 Jordi Pujol, leader of Convergència i Unió (CiU), wins the first elections to the Generalitat de Catalunya. The CiU remains in power until 2003. 1981 Failed attempt of a coup d’état by Civil Guard Antonio Tejero following the resignation of Spain’s first democratically elected prime minister, Adolfo Suarez. 1982 In the first alternation of power since the advent of democracy, the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), the Spanish Socialist Working Party, is elected by absolute majority in a general election. Felipe González becomes prime minister until 1996. 1996 The center-right Partido Popular (PP), Popular Party, is elected to office for the first time in Spain’s democracy, with José María Aznar as prime minister. 1998 The Basque separatists, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), unilaterally declare a cease-fire that ends 10 months later. 2006 ETA declares a cease-fire.

Situating the Nation Spain has been a constitutional monarchy with a democracy in place since the death of Gen. Francisco Franco in 1975. It is made up of 17 regions, or “autonomous communities” as they are commonly referred to. Some regions, like Catalonia (in northeast Spain, bordering France) and the Basque country (in northern Spain, also bordering France), have strong yet very different nationalist movements. While the Catalan nationalism movement is moderate and nonviolent, Basque nationalism has evolved as a movement divided by those that advocate violence as a means to achieving Basque independence and those that embrace a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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more moderate form of separatism. The presence of these two strong nationalist movements has been instrumental in shaping Spanish national identity. Thus, national identity in contemporary Spain is a product of a long process of struggle to establish a democratic Spanish state combined with a strong set of regional identities. Consequently, Spanish national identity has been forced to coexist with a strong sense of regional identity. For many Basques and Catalans, being “Spanish” is seen as something artificial, imposed by the Spanish state and the product of centuries of political turmoil. Thus, defining what it means to be “Spanish” is very much linked to how these different regional identities and the Spanish state itself have evolved over time. As ever, history provides us with clues to some of these answers. The historical context within which Spanish national identity has evolved has helped shaped attitudes both toward the Spanish state and the nations and regions that comprise it. For Spain’s “historic communities” such as Catalonia and the Basque country, the evolution of Spanish national identity has been characterized by the parallel development of two very different forms of minority nationalism: the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements. Although the presence of strong nationalist movements has certainly influenced Spanish national identity, particularly in the 20th century, it has also been accompanied by a political, economic, and social transformation of Spain as both a nation and a state. The 20th century saw Spain undergo two dictatorships, one democratic republic, one civil war, a postwar economic miracle, and a successful transition to democracy. These events have certainly influenced how Spanish national identity has changed.

Instituting the Nation The modern Spanish state, as we know it today, had its origins in the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469 and the subsequent Union of the Crowns of the Catholic kings in 1479. Catalonia, which had until then belonged to the Crown of Aragón, and the Basque country, which had belonged to the Crown of Castile, thus became part of a new Spanish state. Unity was guaranteed in the short term by a united front against Muslim aggression. After the Muslims had been driven out of Spain, Castile remained the dominant unifying force despite growing resistance in the peripheries of the Spanish state. The unity of the Spanish state, as well as a new notion of Spanish national identity, was thus based on concepts of conquest and occupation of the various regions that make up the Iberian peninsula. Despite the territorial unification that followed the Union of the Crowns of Castile and Aragón and the conquest of the Kingdom of Granada with the expulsion of the Moors, a peculiar situation developed in which territorial unification did not necessarily coincide with complete political unification. Different regions of Spain, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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notably Catalonia and the Basque country, were allowed to keep their own administrative arrangements, although they technically belonged to the Spanish state. During the 16th and 17th centuries, Spain established a presence throughout the world, but regions like Catalonia and the Basque country remained fairly marginalized from the rest of Spain’s imperial ambitions. During the 18th century, the Spanish monarchy attempted to further unify the country by exerting greater control over economic, political, and social matters. The traditional model of a highly centralized state favored by the French was adopted and was designed to assimilate all of Spain’s regions into a structure modeled on traditional Castilian cultural and political practices. While the rest of Spain continued to suffer from inherent poverty, corruption, and the inefficient administration of the Bourbon dynasty, the Basques and Catalans continued to enjoy growing economic prosperity, becoming one of the cores of the uneven and overdue process of industrialization. The Catalans’ successful economy and their modern, outward-looking views contrasted sharply with their limited participation, like the Basques, in the Spanish political process. This lack of incorporation into the political process contributed to many Catalans’ and Basques’ sense of differentiation. It also hindered the development of a uniform Spanish national identity. By the 19th century, some Basque and Catalan intellectuals even began to question the existence of the Spanish state. Thus, by the beginning of the 20th century, the process of state-building in Spain had not succeeded in completely integrating other existing communities, something that had succeeded in the unification of city states elsewhere in Europe, most notably in Germany and Italy. As would occur during the latter part of the Franco regime (1939–1975), the Restoration (1876–1923) and the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–1930) were characterized by the state forcibly trying to assimilate the different regions and cultures that made up Spain. These policies generated a backlash in the form of growing Basque and Catalan nationalist sentiment, as well as increasing demands for democratization and regional autonomy. Thus, by the time the Spanish democratic transition began in 1975, the Spanish state faced two fundamental problems. The first and perhaps most important problem was on how to embark on a successful transition to democracy, an experience that had not been successful in Spain’s history. A second problem regarded how to persuade many Spaniards, particularly Basques and Catalans, to both embrace this new political system but continue to be loyal to the Spanish state. A sense of a united Spanish national identity seemed far away. The answer came with Spain’s 1978 Constitution. The Constitution lays out a nontraditional model of territorial organization for the Spanish state. It is neither a centralized model (like France) nor a federal model (like Germany or the United States). Instead, it comprises a multilayered system of 17 regions or “autonomous communities” (comunidades autónomas) but retains some of the traditional administrative units in the form of 50 provinces (diputaciones). Thus, the Spanish state is neither a multinational state (such as Canada) nor a single nation-state N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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(such as France). The Constitution is also very much a product of compromise. On the one hand, the Constitution recognizes the various regions’ right to autonomy for either political or historical reasons. Cultural and regional differences are recognized within a constitutional framework that guarantees regional governments a certain degree of self-government. At the same time, it emphasizes the unity and indivisible nature of the Spanish state. The political and institutional arrangements provided by Spain’s 1978 Constitution have very much shaped Spanish national identity in the post-Franco era. This unique system of governance allows Basques and Catalans to have their own regional autonomy yet provides for the unity of the Spanish state. In a sense, this allows for multiple forms of identity; in other words, you can be Catalan and Spanish or Basque and Spanish at the same time, without one identity threatening the other.

Defining the Nation Although the origins of the Spanish state go back to the Union of the Crowns in 1479, the formation of contemporary Spanish national identity had its origins in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the 19th century. The French invasion in the early part of that century would shape Spanish national identity in the century to come by providing it with myths and references to draw from. These myths would frequently be referred to during both the Primo de Rivera and Franco dictatorships and used to glorify Spain’s position abroad and its sense of historical continuity. Along with the unstable political situation that characterized the first few decades of the 20th century, the growth of nationalist movements in various regions led to the emergence of a conservative authoritarian right-wing movement that would dominate Spanish politics for much of the 20th century with its own strand of nationalist discourse. Second, with the loss of the Spanish empire, notions of a Spanish national identity were weakened by the emergence of nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque country with a strong social base. Spanish national identity toward the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries continued to revolve around its imperial identity. The loss of the Spanish empire and particularly Spain’s 1898 defeat in the Spanish-American War exposed the inherent weaknesses of Spanish national identity. The imperial nature of Spanish identity, while sustainable for several centuries, proved unable to adapt to the needs of a modern state. In addition, the disastrous political and economic consequences of the Spanish-American War weakened the Spanish state and its control over its population by breaking the links between the state and Spanish identity. The Spanish state lacked the resources to effectively carry out policies that could lead to a greater sense of national identity and loyalty. With this separation between state and national identity, a new multiple form of national identity began to emerge in Spain’s regions. Thus, the loss of the Spanish empire and the events of 1898 contributed to the prolonged disintegration of Spanish identity in Catalonia and the Basque country. Although by no means the single most important factor, it was no coincidence that the rapid development of many of the nationalist movements in both Catalonia and the Basque country coincided with the events surrounding the 1898 tragic defeat. In Catalonia, the events of 1898 marked the moment when a growing group of Catalan intellectuals and bourgeoisie began to refer to Catalonia as a “nation” rather than as a “region” and to Spain as the “state.” The loss of Cuba also significantly hurt the Catalan economy, for which exports to the former Spanish colony had constituted a valuable part. In addition, the ensuing taxes levied by the central government on commerce and industry to finance the debts accrued by the costly conflict affected important sectors of the Catalan and Basque economies, primarily its upper and middle classes. Thus, the rapid industrialization and economic success of Catalonia and the Basque country helped reassert Catalan and Basque identity, to the detriment of an emerging Spanish national identity. This new sense of distinctiveness, and the growing instability that seemed to characterize Spanish politics, would prevent a sense of uniform Spanish identity to develop throughout the 20th century. During the Franco regime (1939–1975), N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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King Juan Carlos I King Juan Carlos I, grandson of King Alfonso XII who was exiled after the establishment of the Second Republic in Spain (1931–1936), is largely credited with guiding Spain through its transition to democracy following the death of Gen. Francisco Franco in 1975. King Juan Carlos faced a difficult task for two reasons. First, Spain had never experienced a successful transition to a democracy; the short-lived Second Republic was marked by widespread chaos and instability leading to the Spanish Civil War. Second, by the time of Franco’s death in 1975, many sectors of Spanish society, notably Basque and Catalan nationalists, no longer believed in the unity of the Spanish state. Through skillful negotiation and a form of consensual politics based on a series of pacts, King Juan Carlos managed to steer Spain’s political forces to a successful democratic transition. He is highly popular in Spain, and the royal family generally is seen as an important symbol of Spanish identity.

Spanish national identity was very much imposed from above, but by 1975, the skepticism of what it meant to be “Spanish,” which had characterized the late 19th century and 20th century, returned in full force. It was only with a successful transition to democracy in the late 1970s that a new sense of Spanish national identity began to form.

Narrating the Nation As described above, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many Basque and Catalan intellectuals began to view the Spanish state as one composed by regions, each possessing a unique national identity, culture, and language that, it was argued, should benefit from a high degree of autonomy. They began to advocate a policy of national solidarity and compromise, with mutual respect for other cultures and languages, by resisting demands for total assimilation within the Spanish state. On the cultural and linguistic fronts, the latter part of the 19th century was characterized by a “renaissance” of regional cultures with a renewed emphasis on regional languages and literature. This cultural revivalism along with the role of economic interests and disenchantment with the Spanish state detailed above combined to form the leading impetus behind the development of nationalist movements within the Spanish state. This movement was partially inspired by nationalist movements elsewhere in Europe promoting Romanticist ideas and a new form of cultural nationalism. By the beginning of the 20th century, the so-called Catalan and Basque “problem” increasingly began to preoccupy the Spanish political elite, especially with the introduction of universal male suffrage, and even led to the proposal of a military N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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“solution” during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. The Catalan and Basque bourgeoisie had grown increasingly bewildered at the inability of the Spanish state to foster industrial development and economic restructuring and were frustrated with the Spanish state’s inherent corruption and inability to impose law and order. The debate on the chaotic condition of the Spanish state intensified, with a growing sense that autonomy was preferable to enduring the corruption and misadministration of the Spanish central government. Thus, the conflict between centralist-unitary forms of statehood and a more decentralized arrangement played a key role in the consolidation and transformation of the Spanish state. This conflict crystallized in the ongoing power struggle among a variety of movements within Spanish society, which proved to be continuous obstacles to the creation of a modern nation-state. Furthermore, and in spite of the internal ideological divisions of Basque and Catalan nationalism, the proclamation of the Second Republic in 1931 led to an intensification of the “regional problem.” The Constitution established by Spain’s Second Republic provided for autonomy statutes for the three historic nationalities—Catalonia, the Basque country, and Galicia—with the recognition that the previous state-building and political integration had failed to include these communities. This brief period of regional autonomy was abruptly interrupted by the political disintegration of the country with the eruption of the civil war, followed by the Franco dictatorship. The recognition by the Spanish republican government that the regional problem was inseparable from the need to transform the Spanish state ensured the loyalty of many Catalan and Basque nationalists to the Second Republic, until its demise at the end of the civil war. Following the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939), the dictatorship set up by Gen. Francisco Franco dealt with the decentralizing efforts of the Second Republic by imposing a regime that refused to recognize national, cultural, or linguistic differences among the Spanish regions. A single language, culture, administrative structure, political system, and economic structure based on the “sacred unity of the homeland” were implemented to consolidate the centralist grip of the regime. Fear of social chaos led to the adoption of a strict, state-imposed ideology based upon the purist notion of “one state, one homeland, one nation.” This thinking was to remain one of the untouched foundations of the regime’s ideology throughout its existence, part of a long-standing political tradition in Spanish history to reject any attempts at internal territorial, political, and cultural reconciliation. By the end of the Franco regime, demands for regional autonomy went hand in hand with demands for the political liberalization of the Franco regime. Nevertheless, it was during this period that the Spanish state began to undergo an intense process of state-building, with the creation of a large administrative and bureaucratic network designed to carry out the regime’s policies and ensure the maintenance of opposition-free law and order. This process of statebuilding was justified by the regime’s continual references to a Spanish pátria, or fatherland, rather than to a Spanish nation. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Considered by many to be the most dominant figure in Spanish history since the 16th century, Francisco Franco was the generalissimo of the Spanish armed forces and the authoritarian leader of Spain from 1936 until his death in 1975. (Library of Congress)

Despite an official government policy of cultural and linguistic censorship, Catalan and Basque civil society flourished, particularly during the last few years of the regime. Clandestine opposition groups, students, and intellectuals met on a regular basis to try to coordinate some sort of opposition to the Franco regime. The state’s refusal to acknowledge existing cultures and languages within Spain that did not conform with the so-called Castilian model, the attempt to homogenize Spanish society by forcefully imposing a culture and ideology linked to the Castilian history and language, and the excessive centralized nature of the state led to the emergence of nationalist movements with two main objectives. On the one hand, these groups wanted to overthrow the dictatorship and restore democracy. On the other, these groups denounced the Franco regime’s offensive against Spain’s diverse makeup of varying ethnic identities and cultures as well as its objection to the demand for autonomy for Spain’s “historic” regions. Experiences in exile and of the excesses of both the Spanish Civil War and World War II led many of the opposition democratic forces, particularly on the left, to incorporate the demand for the recognition of Spain as a multicultural state into the struggle for democracy. Resistance to the regime was particularly fierce in Catalonia and the Basque country. The state-sponsored repression directed against particular core values ingrained in the Catalan and Basque nationalist movements, such as language, only served to strengthen their mobilization. Demands for autonomy began to go hand in hand with demands for democratization of the Spanish state and protection of regional languages and cultures. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ETA ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) is a Basque separatist group that has fought a violent campaign for independence since 1959. The ETA’s main objective is the establishment of an independent state in northeastern Spain in the mountainous northeastern Spanish provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarra and the southwestern French departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule. It was founded in 1959 when it broke away from the larger Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) and claimed its first victim in 1968. It has subsequently killed over 800 people in its violent campaign against the Spanish state. ETA, whose name is a Basque-language acronym for Basque Homeland and Freedom, has also kidnapped around 100 individuals and wounded thousands. During the Franco regime (1939–1975), it mainly carried out attacks against members of the regime or security forces. ETA’s strategy has been less focused post-Franco, resulting in its use of car bombs against civilians. In 1980 alone, ETA’s operations claimed 118 lives. In 1998 it declared a short-lived cease-fire, but its influence has rapidly declined.

With the death of Franco in November 1975, the Catalan and Basque problems emerged at the forefront of Spanish politics and would continue to do so throughout the democratic transition, playing a prominent role in the consolidation of the democratic process. By this time, certain sectors of Spanish society, most notably in the Basque country, no longer believed in the legitimacy of the Spanish state. Clearly, the attempts by much of Spain’s political elite during the 19th and 20th centuries to impose a centralized, uniform vision of the Spanish state had backfired. Nevertheless, the only real precedent for the concession by the central government of significant measures of political and institutional autonomy to the regions had been set during the Second Republic with well-known, unfortunate consequences. By the 1970s, however, the general consensus among most political forces opposing the Franco regime was that the status quo would merely perpetuate the out-of-date administrative and institutional structures of the Franco regime. It was thus felt that something new was needed. The transition to democracy resulting from the death of Franco in 1975 has often been described as dominated by consensual politics and cooperation among the negotiating political forces. One of the most contentious issues became the question of regional autonomy and the political and administrative arrangements that would have to be made to accommodate regional demands for decentralization. With varying degrees of enthusiasm, most politicians accepted the idea that, unless the issue of the nations and nationalities that made up the Spanish state was addressed, little progress would be made to achieve a widespread acceptance of the Constitution and its political arrangements. It was widely acknowledged that a refusal or reluctance to address the issue of regional autonomy and cultural, linguistic, and historical differentiations would endanger the consolidation and establishment of the post-Franco democratic regime. This new awareness helped political leaders find a stable solution to the conflict. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Finding the solution proved to be a difficult task since it entailed an entirely new way of conceptualizing the Spanish state. It also meant cooperating with nationalist forces in Catalonia and the Basque country, something some of Spain’s political elite were reluctant to do. This new conceptualization of the Spanish state involved the formal recognition of nationalist demands for regional autonomy (to preserve the freedom of the “historic” nationalities and other regions) as well as guaranteeing regional participation and representation in the Spanish state. As a result, Spain’s democracy has been consolidated by addressing the regional problem. This is not to say that Basque and Catalan national identities are less strong than they were in the 1970s. On the contrary, these identities have flourished with newfound political freedoms and regional autonomy. What has changed, however, is that Spanish national identity is now based for the first time on a successful political transition. Being Spanish today can mean being loyal to a democratic regime and unified state, where regional identities can coexist peacefully with a sense of Spanish national identity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Spain’s current political system, with its highly decentralized system of autonomies, is considered a unique form that both conserves the unitary character of the state and allows for varying forms of self-government. Despite the stability and widespread acceptance of the system, however, there is one area that remains unresolved: the Basque problem. The Basque separatist group, Basque Homeland and Freedom (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA]), has murdered over 800 people since

Catalan Nationalism The wealthy northeastern region of Catalonia became part of Spain with the marriage of Ferdinand and Isabella in 1469 and the subsequent Union of the Crowns of the Catholic kings in 1479. During the Middle Ages, Catalonia was influential in the Mediterranean, primarily through trade and commerce. Until the second half of the 17th century, it enjoyed high levels of autonomy within the Spanish state, but this came to an abrupt end when successive Bourbon kings attempted to create a more unified and centralized Spanish state. An important nationalist movement emerged in the 18th century, at first characterized by the protection of Catalan culture and language. This movement became more politicized during the 19th century when the Catalan bourgeoisie became more involved in a political movement demanding greater autonomy from Spain. During the Franco regime (1939–1975), Catalan language, culture, and demands for autonomy were not recognized by the regime, which had an important effect on the emergence of a strong nationalist movement. Today, Catalonia enjoys high levels of autonomy, but the nationalist movement, which does not advocate separating from the Spanish state, remains strong.


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1968 in its campaign for independence from Spain. Since breaking away from the larger Basque Nationalist Party in 1959, ETA has fought for an independent state. The evolution of Spanish national identity has thus been hindered by the lack of a strong sense of Spanish identity or loyalty to the Spanish state in the Basque country. Whereas Catalan nationalists have been able to find a happy medium given wide-ranging self-governing powers and a special place within Spain’s unique constitutional framework, Basque nationalism has evolved in a different way. Basque identity has historically evolved in a more “exclusive” fashion, with the separation of Basques and non-Basques, primarily due to the difficulty of the language. Furthermore, in the early years of Spain’s transition to democracy, political polarization and violence in the Basque country were direct responses to the repressive nature of the Franco regime, violence that spiraled out of control into a self-reinforcing and uncontrollable cycle. Thus, with the exception of a brief cease-fire in 1998–1999, the violent campaign has continued virtually uninterrupted in the Basque country throughout both the Franco regime and the more recent democratic transition. Besides the unresolved Basque issue, Spanish national identity can be described as multifaceted. On the one hand, given its historical legacy, Spanish national identity is characterized by a conservative discourse that sees Spain as being different from the rest of Europe, a unitarian, centralized vision of Spain that only grudgingly accepts regional differences. The other, so-called “liberal” discourse equates Spain with Europe and sees the major components of national identity as being modernity and Europeanism. For Spain’s other competing identities, this picture is even more complex. For Catalans and Basques, Spain is often seen as a problematic political structure. Nevertheless, whereas Catalans see themselves as “solving” the Spanish problem, more radical Basque nationalism sees Spain and the Basque country as two fundamentally different historical and sociological entities that should be separate. Although “being Spanish” was for many years equated with the Franco regime, the stability of Spain’s political system, its rapid economic development, and its full membership in the European Union demonstrate how Spanish national identity has dramatically changed. Selected Bibliography Alvarez-Junco, J., and A. Shubert, eds. 2000. A History of Spain since 1808. London: Macmillan. Balfour, S. 1997. The End of the Spanish Empire 1989–1923. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Carr, R., ed. 2000. A History of Spain. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Conversi, D. 1997. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain. London: Hurst & Company. Díez Medrano, J. 1995. Divided Nations: Class, Politics, and Nationalism in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Guibernau, M. 2004. Catalan Nationalism: Francoism, Transition and Democracy. New York: Routledge. Heywood, P. 1995. The Government and Politics of Spain. London: MacMillan. Keating, M. 2001. Nations against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan.


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McDonough, P., S. H. Barnes, and A. Lopez Pina. 1998. The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. McRoberts, K. 2001. Catalonia: Nation Building without a State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mar-Molinero, C., and A. Smith, eds. 1996. Nationalism and the Nation in the Iberian Peninsula. Oxford: Berg. Preston, P. 1986. The Triumph of Democracy in Spain. London: Methuen. Shafir, G. 1995. Immigrants and Nationalists: Ethnic Conflict and Accommodation in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Latvia and Estonia. Albany: State University of New York Press. Smith, A. 1996. Historical Dictionary of Spain. London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. Solis, F. L. 2003. Negotiating Spain and Catalonia: Competing Narratives of National Identity. Portland, OR: Intellect.


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Algeria Catherine Lloyd, with Ghania Azzout, Samira Hanifi , and Ouassila Loudjani Chronology 1525–1830 Ottoman rule. 1830 French military expedition lands at Sidi Ferruch, west of Algiers. 1832 Emir Abdelkader begins a resistance to the French, which continues throughout the century under different leaders. 1848 Algeria becomes a department of France. 1926 North African Star (ENA) formed by Messali Hadj. 1936 A Muslim congress of ulama in Algiers proposes integration. 1943 Ferhat Abbas publishes Manifesto of the Algerian People. 1945 (May 8) The French massacre Algerian nationalist demonstrators at Setif, Kherrata, Guelma, and Saida. 1952 First oil exploration permits in the Saharan region. 1954 (November 1) Outbreak of the Algerian revolution and war of independence. 1955 French emergency law and censorship is enacted. 1956 Establishment of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and the announcement of the Soummam Declaration, the platform of the National Liberation Front (FLN). 1960 (December 11) FLN organizes the first mass demonstration of Algerians to reaffirm the principle of self-determination. 1962 A cease-fire is arranged. (March) Tripoli Congress and signing of the Evian Accord. On July 5, Algerian independence is proclaimed. 1963 Ahmed Ben Bella is elected the first president. Creation of Sonatrach, a state-controlled enterprise to develop oil and gas. 1964 First congress of the FLN: the Charter of Algiers sets out its program. 1965 Ben Bella is overthrown by Houari Boumedienne, who promises to end corruption. 1971 Algeria nationalizes oil and gas. 1978 Death of Boumedienne, who is replaced by Chadli Bendjedid. 1980 Berber Spring protests establish Berber Cultural Movement (MCB). 1984 Family code enacts shari’a law for women. 1988 (October) Riots in Algiers spread across the country following the collapse of world oil prices, inflation, and unemployment. 1989 The new constitution is ratified; opposition parties are allowed to contest elections. Formation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). 1990–1991 First Gulf War: FIS leads mass demonstrations and wins 55 percent of the vote in municipal and regional elections; later it seems poised to gain an absolute majority in the second round. 1992 The army dissolves the National People’s Assembly, and a High State Council chaired by Mohammed Boudiaf takes power. A state of emergency is declared, the FIS is outlawed, and all its local and regional authorities are dissolved. (June 29) Boudiaf is assassinated by a member of his bodyguard linked to Islamist groups. As violent attacks on the security forces increase, the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) emerges as the dominant militia.


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1999 (April) Abdelaziz Bouteflika is elected president unopposed. (September) Concorde Civil (policies to restore peace and security) is approved by a referendum. Members of the AIS (the FIS armed wing) are amnestied. The violence since 1992 is thought to have cost more than 150,000 lives.

Situating the Nation Algeria (whose capital city is Algiers) is the largest of the three states of the Maghreb, stretching from the Saharan heart of Africa to the Mediterranean Sea. In 1962, the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria was formed after an exceptionally violent war against more than a hundred years of French colonial rule. Anticolonial struggle is one of the persistent themes of the country’s national identity. Nationalist discourses refer to the “colonial night,” which was transformed into a more hopeful future through struggle. The constitution provides that the state religion is Islam, and the official language is Arabic, although Tamazight is now recognized as a national language and French is widely used. The country’s geographical position is reflected in its membership in international organizations. Algeria played a leading role in the nonaligned movement, became a member of OPEC in 1969 and the Organization for African Unity (known as the African Union since 2002) since its formation in 1963, is an associate member of the European Union (since 2002), and participates in programs such as MEDA. During a brief period of democratic opening in the late 1980s, an Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was poised to win legislative elections. In early 1992, the military stepped in and cancelled the elections. In the following conflict between Islamist militias and the security forces, which lasted almost a decade, assassinations, disappearances, and massacres took place, costing some 200,000 lives. Since 1999, Algeria has experienced a period of growing stability and prosperity, even though some lethal armed militia attacks persist. Algeria’s economy has been largely determined by the exploitation of hydrocarbons, an attempt at rapid industrial development, and substantial emigration of semi- and unskilled workers, especially to France. Immediately after independence, there was a mass exodus of European settlers (known as pieds noirs), which left a substantial gap in the professional and managerial elite that higher education worked hard to fill, with the help of solidarity workers. Many harkis, that is, Muslims who had supported the French during the war of independence, also left the country at this time. The discovery of substantial oil and gas deposits in the Sahara complicated the decolonization process and provided the basis for industrial development. Hydrocarbons were nationalized in 1971 and remain the single most important component of Algeria’s economy. After independence, many of the old colonial landowners expected to be able to return, so they left their affairs with local managers. In the early 1960s, to alleviate chronic rural poverty, there was an experiment in workers self-management N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and then, under President Boumedienne, land collectivization. The rural population remains at 41.7 percent. Algeria’s income per capita is U.S.$1,630 (2001), and in recent years unemployment has been falling spectacularly—from 30 percent in 2000 to 15 percent in 2006. Algeria is on the northern rim of the Mediterranean Sea, sharing borders with Morocco, Western Sahara, and Mauritania to the west, Mali and Niger to the south, and Libya and Tunisia to the east. It is the second biggest country on the continent of Africa, comprising an area of 2,380,000 square kilometers, although four-fifths of Algeria’s surface area is the Sahara. Its population has tripled since independence and stood at 32 million in July 2006. Life expectancy is 70.03 years for men and 72.8 for women, while infant mortality (2000) is 54.2 per 1,000 for boys and 47.8 per 1,000 for girls and the fertility rate is 2.54 (2000). Young people aged 15 to 24 form 23 percent of the population. Although they share much cultural and historical heritage, relations with neighboring Morocco have been affected by the latter’s claims to portions of Western Algeria (Sand War, 1963) and Algerian support for the Polisario Front, a Sahrawi movement seeking independence for the Western Sahara (which has been occupied by Morocco since 1975). Approximately 165,000 Sahrawi refugees N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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are based in four Polisario-managed refugee camps near the Algerian city of Tindouf. These tensions have made it difficult to consolidate the Maghreb Arab Union, established in 1989. Algeria’s proximity to Europe, and its colonial ties to France, enabled a culture of migration to develop in Algeria. Algerian emigration has helped to meet national and individual aspirations by providing foreign exchange, returning support for the family back home, and alleviating unemployment. In 1962 on the eve of independence, there were 410,000 Algerians living in France, and migration continued in a regulated form during the 1960s as Algerians were recruited into the automobile industry. After the early 1970s, families began to reunify, and by 1999 there were some 700,000 Algerians living in France, together with some 1 million French citizens of Maghrebi origin and another estimated 300,000 North African Jews. Public hostility toward Algerians has frequently caused tension between the two countries, notably in 1973 when racism in France prompted the Algerian government to suspend immigration. Algerian migrants, often from rural backgrounds in Kabylie and employed in unskilled jobs in heavy industry, provided an important support for the nationalist revolution. Many of them supported Messali Hadj’s North African Star (ENA), later the Algerian National Movement (MNA), until 1956 when the newly ascendant National Liberation Front (FLN) became the dominant party. During the war of independence, the FLN raised funds through a system of donations and fines for failing to respect its proscriptions on tobacco, alcohol, or patronage of French cafés, nonrespect of Ramadan, or marriages or circumcisions that had not been officially sanctioned. After independence, remittances were an important source of foreign exchange for the new republic, and immigration helped keep levels of unemployment (and hence discontent) down. The diaspora did not identify with either side during the conflict of the 1990s but rather offered informal support to a range of political movements. Most of the major Algerian parties have offices in France, and the Algerian government provides for 680,000 registered voters in France; consulates in most countries with Algerian populations open polling booths during legislative and presidential elections. Algeria has had a particularly turbulent history. It was colonized during the second millennium BC by the Phoenicians and Romans, invaded in the seventh century AD by Arab armies carrying the message of Islam, and part of the Islamic empire that extended to Spain and Portugal by 711. Algerians still look back with nostalgia to the enlightenment of Islamic Andalusia. To counter the influence of the Catholic kingdoms in Europe in the 15th century, the region became a vassal state of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the early 1500s. Under Turkish rule, the Arabs and Berbers of Algeria were excluded from government, Turkish became the official language, and the country was controlled by a Turkish dey, who divided the country under the rule of Caids or tribal leaders. During three centuries of Ottoman rule, the region’s economy was integrated into the permeable, mobile society of the Mediterranean. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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French colonial rule after 1830 brought fundamental changes in government. During decades of resistance and economic hardship, the Algerian Muslim population stagnated at around 3 million, and the French military and settlers expanded across the coastal cities and into the hinterlands of Saharan Algeria. Algeria was a French colony between 1830 and 1848, then fully assimilated as three departments of France from 1848 until independence in 1962. Colonial settlement deprived the original population of their lands and denied them any rights. The European population grew from 833,000 in 1926 to 984,000 in 1954 (forming 13 percent of the population by the 1950s compared with 6–8 percent in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco). By the mid-1950s, 79 percent of this population had been born in Algeria. The uprising of November 1, 1954, emerged from a much older political tendency, with its roots in the migrant working class. Algerian nationalism can be traced back to the integrationist Young Algerians, composed of the liberal, educated Algerian elite who demanded equal rights with the non-Muslim French. In the 1930s, the movement of the ulama (religious teachers) focused on cultural and religious demands, whereas the radical, eventually nationalist current in Algeria emerged from rural laborers and working-class emigrants to industrial France. The short-lived Etoile Nord-Africaine (ENA), founded in 1926 and reincarnated as the MNA, began a process of reclaiming Algerian identity and self-determination. The war of independence (1954–1962) was violent and protracted. After independence, there was no process of reconciliation, or even recognition of the brutality that had taken place on both sides. In the 1950s, only a few accounts of the torture used against Algerian nationalists by the French escaped censorship. Recent memoirs have documented the atrocities committed against Algerian nationalists, including rape and torture of women. Only in 1999 did the French government officially recognize the war, which it had previously described as “operations” or “events.” In the following year, the newspapers Le Monde and L’Humanite published the “Appel des Douze,” signed by distinguished historians, human rights activists, and opponents of the war in the 1950s, calling for both sides to accept that atrocities had taken place during the war and for the French authorities to recognize their use of torture.

Instituting the Nation Different groups in Algeria commemorate or relate to different key actors, but they all relate to the theme of historic resistance. Women’s groups often refer to el Kahina, the Berber queen in the 680s, or to Lalla Fatma N’Soumer, who led resistance to the French during the 1830s. The emir Abdelkader, who mobilized against and fought the French between 1832 and 1847, is remembered in popular culture. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Emir Abdelkader (1808 –1883) Abdelkader was a member of a noble family, claiming descent from the Prophet Mohammed. He was well traveled and educated, and when the French invaded Algeria in 1830, he was at the forefront of resistance in Western Algeria. Between 1832 and 1842, he waged guerilla warfare against the French, with some notable successes. Stories about Abdelkader emphasize his learning and chivalry in contrast to the brutal tactics of the French. On one occasion, he is thought to have released French prisoners because there was not enough food. Faced with defeat, he surrendered in 1847, but the French broke their promise to allow him to go to Alexandria, imprisoning him at Amboise until 1852. Upon promising not to intervene in Algerian affairs, he was deported to Turkey and later moved to Damascus. There he intervened to protect Christians during disturbances and focused on literary and theological work. After independence, Abdelkader’s remains were returned to Algeria.

Others recall the early, sometimes integrationist, nationalist leaders such as Messali Hadj and Ferhat Abbas, or the individuals who pushed them aside by initiating the insurrection of November 1994 and who were involved in active service with the FLN during the 1950s, such as Ahmed Ben Bella, Houari Boumedienne, Chadli Bendjedid, Mohammed Boudiaf, Liamine Zeroual, and the current president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Collective actors are also notable, during the war of the 1950s, the mujahideen and the moudjahidates (women resistance fighters), notably Djamila Bouhired, Djamila Boumaza, Djamila Boupacha, and Hassiba Ben Bouali. The status of moudjahid entitles the bearer to a lifetime’s pension. The Algerian state is slowly changing from a highly centralized and authoritarian one to a more accountable form of government. The president is elected on national suffrage, eligible for two five-year terms, and it has a bicameral legislature —the National People’s Assembly and the upper house, the Council of the Nation. The lower house is composed of 389 members (24 of whom are women), comprising members of 9 political parties and 30 independents. The upper house has 144 members, two-thirds of whom are elected by a college composed of members of communal and departmental people’s assemblies, and the remaining third appointed by the president of the republic. The independence of the Algerian judiciary is guaranteed by article 138 of the Constitution. The Constitution (amended in 1979, 1988, 1989, and 1996) provides for a multiparty state. All parties must be approved by the Ministry of the Interior, and a law of 1997 provides that political association must not be “based on differences in religion, language, race, gender or region.” The FLN and its armed wing, the ALN, were key actors in the struggle for independence. During this period, the command was divided between the internals, in charge of the wilayat or military regions, and the externals, initially based in Cairo and aiming to gain foreign support and to raise funds. At independence N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Oujda Group One of the external bases of the ALN (Armée de Libération Nationale) during the struggle for independence in the 1950s was Oujda, a Moroccan town on the frontier with Algeria. There, a group formed around the chief of staff of the ALN, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, that imposed a military-backed government in preference to the FLN’s government-in-exile. Since then, the Oujda men have played a dominant role in Algerian politics. After he overthrew Ben Bella in 1965, Boumedienne served as president until his death in 1978, after which his associates continued to exert a powerful influence behind the scenes. Bouteflika, who has been president since 1999, was part of the Oujda group. The group’s key contribution was to confirm the role of the military in Algerian politics. It also helped to produce a unitary Arabo-Islamic narrative of the struggle for national liberation, which erased earlier nationalist groups and marginalized the Kabyles, often referred to as the Berbers.

there was a struggle for power between politician Benyoucef Benkhedda and other representatives of the provisional government (GPRA) who had negotiated the Evian agreements between the French and leaders of the FLN such as Ben Bella and Boumedienne. For two months during the summer of 1962, it seemed that Algeria might descend into civil war. The group led by Ben Bella and Boumedienne triumphed and focused on the building of national unity. The risk of this focus was a tendency to erase the complex historic origins of Algerian nationalism in favor of a monolithic construction privileging the role of the FLN. The philosophical and cultural foundations of the Algerian revolution and of the new republic lay in a socialist, even populist ideology and the politics of anticolonialism in which politics and identity were intertwined. The preamble to the Constitution refers to “the long resistance to attacks on Algerian culture, values and the fundamental components of its culture: Islam, Arabness and Tamazight identity.” It emphasizes the unity of the Algerian people behind the FLN to “shed its blood in order to assume their collective destiny in liberty, the re-found national cultural identity and to give itself authentically popular institutions.” Especially after the decline of Nasser’s Egypt, Algeria became “the longrange artillery platform of revolutionary third-worldism” (Stora 2003, 22), known through the writings of Franz Fanon for many in the Anglophone world. Many Algerian nationalist intellectuals were/are much less well known and have been infrequently translated—for example, Mouloud Mammeri, Kateb Yacine’s Nejma, Mouloud Feraoun, or Tahar Djaout. Assia Djebar is widely known for her work on women in Algerian history and her critique of contemporary Algeria. For the first 25 years, this resistance to external aggression and unity of purpose behind the FLN was only challenged intermittently. After 1988, however, serious divisions and conflicts began to appear, which resulted in the 10-year civil conflict. These divisions were implicit in postcolonial Algeria, whose national identity was based on uncompromising and mutually exclusive concepts of Arabo-Muslim, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Berber, and Islamist identity. Hugh Roberts points to the complex mix that held the nation together during the Boumedienne period: “the original outlook of the leaders of the historic FLN, . . . the Arabo-Muslim conception of Algeria’s cultural identity, . . . [combined] with an ambitious development strategy, an egalitarian social policy and a populist discourse, . . . [tempered] with a pragmatic attitude to both the French cultural legacy and le fait berbère” (Roberts 2002, 148).

Defining the Nation At independence the new constitution defined Algeria as Arab and Muslim. But Berbers experienced this ethno-cultural definition of the nation, as holders of a common language and religion, as “effacing [them] and all the other various influences which have historically interacted” (Stora 2003, 22). Berbers (Amazigh), the descendants of the original indigenous inhabitants of North Africa, are traceable to the 5th century BC. While cities and the coast were Arabized during the 7th century AD, most of the countryside remained Berber until Arab invasions began to penetrate the countryside in the late 11th century. By the end of the 18th century, the Berbers were confined to inaccessible areas, such as the high mountains, distant oases, and desert plateaus, where the vast majority of Berbers live today. These areas are Kabylia (Djurdia Mountains) southeast of Algiers, the Aures Mountains southeast of Constantine, and Ouarseni Massif southwest of Algiers. After independence, the FLN government determined to Arabize the country as a means of making a break with the past; hence, Arabic was the only official language of Algeria. Berber political parties focused on the resulting linguistic disadvantage, and the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) split from the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) in 1963. The FFS called for official status for Tamazight, for a secular, pluralist polity, and for greater autonomy for Berber-dominated regions and more Berber input into central policy decisions. In 1989, a second Berber political party, the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), was formed, focusing on Berber cultural rights as well as broader democratization issues. Th e two parties formed the Berber Cultural Movement (MCB) for joint action. In 1999, the RCD joined the coalition government, the first time since independence that a Berber-dominated party was part of a ruling coalition. The challenge to the Algerian government by the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other Islamic parties during the 1980s and 1990s constituted a new challenge for the Berbers, especially in the call for Islamization and Arabization. The appeal of the Islamists was perceived as a threat to Berber aspirations, and in recent years fundamentalist militias (notably the Groupe Salafist pour la Predication et le Combat or GSPC) have retreated into Kabylie, where they have been responsible for periodic attacks. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Narrating the Nation The myths that created the Algerian image of a unique nation was one of resistance, of a generation of men—the (female) moudjahidates were rarely mentioned —who had been martyred for the nation or gifted in their intransigence and capacity for survival. Places of memory were dedicated to national heroes who had resisted different waves of colonialism, notably the emir Abdelkader, who fought the French for 15 years. The Place Abdelkader in central Algiers is dominated by a heroic sculpture of the emir mounted on a horse, and other places, such as the mosque and university Abdelkader in Constantine, many schools, and streets, are named after him. There are references to Abdelkader in popular culture, as in Cheb Khaled’s song “Abdel Kader.” Heroes of the war of independence are commemorated throughout Algeria’s cities and towns; on a walk through the center of Algiers one encounters, for instance, the streets Didouche Mourad, Larbi ben M’Hidi, Ben Boulaid, and Boudjemaa Souidani. To commemorate the 20th anniversary of independence in 1982, a huge monument was built to the million martyrs on the hill at the Riadh el Feth, dominating Algiers. The statue depicts three gigantic, stylized palm leaves at the foot of which are three statues of moudjahidine. The square on the seafront by the old mosque Djamaa el Djedid was renamed the Place des Martyrs. The idea of Algeria as a revolutionary and anticolonial state formed in the fulcrum of resistance was reinforced by representations of the war of independence, notably through Pontecorvo’s classic film The Battle of Algiers.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The struggle against the French mobilized part of the population of Algeria, but it did not fully unite them. On the eve of independence, some 900,000 people left the country for different reasons, the European colonialist pied noirs as well as the harkis. Even the FLN was divided on the future shape of the Algerian state. To impose some unity on this complex society, mobilization took place through the mechanism of a one-party state, and radio and television fell under central authority. The constitution allowed for one religion and one language, at least in theory. The FLN government established mass organizations, notably trade union, women’s, and youth organizations, to channel social movements. Since the conflict with Islamic fundamentalists during the 1990s, the Algerian government has introduced new controls over religious activities. While the Islamists may have been defeated militarily, they continue to attempt to influence everyday life, in a context characterized more by market values than those of anticolonial socialism. The Ministry of Religious Affairs provides financial supN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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port to mosques, paying the salary of imams, although mosque construction is funded through private contributions. In February 2005 the ministry created an Educational Commission charged with developing a Koranic syllabus, supervising the hiring of teachers for the madrassas, and controlling the qualifications and practice of all imams. The government appoints imams, provides general guidance, and approves sermons before they are delivered publicly during Friday prayers. The government also monitors activities, has prohibited the use of mosques as public meeting places outside regular prayer hours, and convokes imams to the Ministry of Religious Affairs in disciplinary cases. In September 2005, eight imams in Annaba were sanctioned by the Ministry of Religious Affairs because they had refused to pray for two diplomats who were kidnapped and later killed in Baghdad. Amendments to the penal code in 2001 established strict punishments for anyone other than a government-designated imam who preaches in a mosque or for any person, including government-designated imams, who acts “against the noble nature of the mosque” or acts in a manner “likely to offend public cohesion.” The government requires established religious groups to obtain official recognition prior to conducting any religious activities and has authorized the Protestant, Catholic, and Seventh-day Adventist churches to operate in the country. Algeria has several daily newspapers, which produce a circulation of 1.4 million copies a week. Six newspapers are owned by the state, and 26 are privately owned or controlled by political parties. A further 20 bimonthly or monthly periodicals have a total circulation of 300,000 copies per month. Until the 1990s, the National Television Company (ENTV) broadcast a limited schedule, and because its programs tended to reflect government views, it became known as la chaîne unique. The Chadli government introduced satellite television in 1989 as part of a policy of liberalization. Satellite television was launched at the Riadh el Feth commercial center, the shop window of the government’s policy of liberalization. The satellite dish, which could be imported free of tax to Algeria, was thus not an elite privilege as in other Arab countries. Those who could not afford to formally subscribe found experts who linked households to a central dish through communal subscriptions and inventive electronics. European television channels and more recently the Arab satellite stations like Al Jazeera and Al Arabia competed with ENTV. Connection to satellite television meant that viewing hours were dramatically extended, enabling those confined to the home (especially women) to watch a wide range of programs. Initially, Islamic fundamentalist groups condemned the paradiaboliques as responsible for exposing the population to temptation. Satellite dishes and the Internet have enabled Algerians to extend their view of local events by giving them access to global media. In May 1998 the Algerian government moved toward the liberalization of its media policy with a draft organic law on information, which was intended to lead to further private investment in audiovisual businesses and to changes in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Satellite dishes adorn overcrowded city apartment blocks in Algiers, Algeria, in 2004. (Jack Dabaghian/Reuters/Corbis)


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regulation and ownership of Algerian television. However, accusations of corruption have halted the development of the media interests of the privately owned Khalifa corporation. Conclusion The Algerian national idea was legitimized in the early years through anticolonial rhetoric, supported by revenues from oil and gas that allowed the government to subsidize food, health, and education. This resource enabled the population to achieve a reasonable standard of living, despite serious pressure on housing in particular. Muslim religious identity and the Arabic language, which had been the basis for denial of citizenship under French rule, became key components of the new national identity. By the 1980s, this apparent unity was challenged by the Berber population, but also by groups, especially women, who pressed for their rights in the face of new restrictions. The conflict of the 1990s and support for the FIS revealed the depth of popular discontent, but the turn to religious fundamentalism, though it highlighted profound divisions within society, was relatively short-lived and never achieved sustained popular support. Since 1999 Algeria has been slowly moving toward a more open, pluralistic society, with some of the characteristics of a liberal market economy and an increasingly self-confident civil society. Selected Bibliography Aissaoui, A. 2001. The Political Economy of Oil and Gas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Alleg, H. 2006.The Question. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. (Orig. pub. 1958.) Djebar, A. 1989. Fantasia: An Algerian Cavalcade. London: Quartet. Fanon, F. 1965. “Algeria Unveiled”: Studies in a Dying Colonialism. New York: Monthly Review Press. (Orig. pub. 1959.) Feraoun, M. 1953. La Terre et le sang. Paris: Le Seuil. Feraoun, M. 1957. Les Chemins qui montent. Paris: Le Seuil. Le Sueur, J. 2001. Uncivil War: Intellectuals and Identity Politics during the Decolonization of Algeria. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Mammeri, M. 1956. La colline oubliee. Paris: Plon. Meynier, G. 2002. L’Histoire intérieure du FLN. Paris: Fayard. Roberts, H. 2002. The Battlefield Algeria 1988–2002: Studies in a Broken Polity. London: Verso. Stora, B. 1991. Histoire de l’Algerie Coloniale 1830–1954. Paris: La Decouverte. Stora, B. 2003. “Algeria/Morocco: The Passions of the Past—Representations of the Nation That Unite and Divide.” In Nation, Society and Culture in North Africa, edited by J. McDougall, 14–34. London: Frank Cass. Yacine, K. 1956. Nedjma: Roman. Paris: Seuil.


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Iran David N. Yaghoubian Chronology 1796–1925 Reign of Qajar shahs. 1890–1892 Tobacco Revolt: a nationwide boycott of tobacco products forces cancellation of the British tobacco concession. 1905–1911 Constitutional Revolution forces Qajar shah to accept creation of a constitution and parliament. 1907 Anglo-Russian Agreement: Great Britain and Russia formally recognize their spheres of economic and military influence in Iran. 1925–1941 Reign of Reza Shah Pahlavi brings a 15-year period of intensive infrastructural, legal, social, and economic reforms. 1941–1945 Allied occupation of Iran: Reza Shah is forced to abdicate to his 19-year-old son Muhammad Reza due to close German ties. Press and political freedoms return. 1951–1953 Oil nationalization movement: Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) holdings in Iran are nationalized by the government of democratically elected prime minister Muhammad Mossadegh. 1953 CIA Operation Ajax: The CIA and British MI-6 initiate a coup d’état to overthrow Mossadegh and return autocratic power to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. 1953–1979 Dictatorship of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi: Iran becomes a client state of the United States and its primary anti-Soviet ally in the region. 1963 Ayatollah Khomeini exiled after an anti-regime speech and subsequent protests in which hundreds of religious students are killed by the Iranian military. 1969 Nixon Doctrine and Twin Pillars Policy: Iran and Saudi Arabia become the primary pillars of U.S. defense strategy in the Persian Gulf. 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution: nationwide protests involving nearly all sectors of Iranian society succeed in overthrowing the Pahlavi regime. 1980–1988 Iran-Iraq War: Iraqi invasion initiates brutal World War I–style trench warfare and stalemate. Iran suffers roughly 1 million casualties. 1988 Downing of Iran Air 655: USS Vincennes accidentally shoots down an Iranian civilian airliner killing 290 civilians while attacking Iranian naval vessels in Iranian territorial waters. 1993 Dual containment policy: U.S. effort to isolate Iran and Iraq via sanctions largely fails due to lack of international cooperation. 2002 Axis of evil: U.S. president George W. Bush declares that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea constitute an “Axis of Evil” that threatens the United States and its allies.

Situating the Nation Iran’s contemporary borders surround what was the heartland of the ancient Achaemenid Persian empire, which was established in 559 BC and, within 50 years, would become one of the largest empires in world history, stretching N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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from Egypt and Greece east to what is now Afghanistan. While the term “Iran” (Land of the Aryans) has been used alternatively with “Persia” or “Pars” to refer to the region since political consolidation by the Indo-Iranian Achaemenid Dynasty, it would not be until the 1930s that the name Iran would officially supplant Persia. The political and military achievements of the Achaemenid shahs (kings), such as Cyrus the Great (reigned 559–530 BC) and Darius the Great (reigned 521–485 BC), and the culture and civilization generated by their conquests and governance constitute one primary root of contemporary Iranian nationalism and one of two core national myths (see sidebar on Shahname). The ruins of the Achaemenid administrative city of Susa and of the ceremonial capital Persepolis mark the physical center of the Iranian homeland, and while they are nationally and internationally recognized as traditional Persian archaeological treasures, the two sites are particularly dear to Iranians of royalist and secular nationalist orientations, as well as to Zoroastrians. The country’s contemporary external borders—which at times have encompassed much if not all of what is now the nation of Iraq—were approximated in the early modern era by the Safavid Dynasty (1501–1722), which established “Twelver” Shiism as the state religion and forcibly converted the majority of the population. It is a direct result of Safavid rule that slightly less than 90 percent of Iranians are adherents to this branch of the Islamic faith today, while around 8 percent are Sunni Muslims and the remainder are Zoroastrians, Bahai’s, Armenian and Assyrian Christians, and Jews. The prior conquest of the Persian Sassanian empire (226–651) by Arab Muslim armies in the 7th century, and the subsequent conversion of large portions of the population to Sunni Islam, had by the 10th century begun to supplant or meld Zoroastrian and Persian monarchal

Shahname The Shahname (Book of Kings) written by the Persian poet Ferdowsi in the late 10th century is the Iranian national epic, melding history and myth as it tells of the glorious and heroic deeds of ancient Aryans and Persian kings up to the 7th century when Iran was conquered by Arab-Muslim armies. Penned in beautiful Persian (Farsi) prose almost devoid of Arabic terminology at a time when Arabic and Turkish regimes were competing for control of Iran, the Shahname is revered as a historical, literary, as well as linguistic masterpiece—and is one of a handful of works responsible for the persistence of Persian culture and language. Eternally popular with Iranians and Persian-speakers worldwide, the Shahname is read aloud in teahouses and parks throughout Iran, and its recitation is for some both a passion and occupation. Rumored to have been slated for destruction shortly after the Iranian Revolution due to its significance to pre-Islamic monarchal traditions and Iranian royalists, Ferdowsi’s tomb in Tus was not only spared but has since undergone extensive renovations. The tomb’s survival and continued importance as a somber site of national pilgrimage underscore the centrality of Ferdowsi and the Shahname to Iranian nationalism, and perhaps the pragmatism of the Iranian government.


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traditions, culture, and myths with those of the Islamic faith. However, Iran’s conversion to Shiism in the 16th century under Safavid shahs of Turkic origins, who derived legitimacy from claims to Islamic lineage and who concurrently sought to adopt the mantle of Persian monarchial heritage, perpetuated the dynastic traditions and culture embodied in the Shahname, while simultaneously instilling a reverence for the religious inspiration and heroic example left by the Shiite imams and reinforcing Islamic cosmology. Thus, the Safavids renewed Persian dynastic and cultural heritage and propagated Shia Islam as an equally powerful and appealing facet of Iranian national identity. Shah Abbas the Great (reigned 1587–1629), who ruled at the zenith of Safavid power, selected Isfahan as his imperial capital and economic hub. As well as fortifying the city with parks, bridges, and libraries, Shah Abbas commissioned a vast square surrounded by ornate mosques, a palace, and a bazaar complex that has remained one of Iran’s most treasured historical sites and tourist destinations. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Until 1979 the site was known as Maydan-e Shah (King’s Square or Royal Square). After the Iranian Revolution, the name was officially changed to Maydan-e Imam (Imam’s Square) to reflect the post-monarchal, Shia-oriented character of the new regime. Nevertheless, Isfahani bazaar merchants and local craftsmen openly persist in referring to the square as Maydan-e Shah, despite contemporary governmental decree—and perhaps in direct opposition to it. The complex tensions and competition as well as points of convergence between the two primary strands of contemporary Iranian nationalism represented by the square—Persian and Shiite—became firmly intertwined by the close of the Safavid era. As a result of this Safavid legacy, in the modern era any Iranian government to be deemed legitimate by the people must carefully calibrate its emphasis on both.

Instituting the Nation Despite important contributions by a handful of intellectuals and secular nationalist political leaders such as Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh (see sidebar on Operation Ajax), the actors most responsible for defining modern Iranian nationalism have been Iranian shahs and prominent Shiite clerics of the 19th and 20th centuries. The Safavid shahs, whose empire fell in the wake of an Afghan invasion in 1722, were the last Iranian leaders who attempted to garner legitimacy by making broad claims to continuity in both Persian dynastic and Shia Islamic religious lineages, and who sought to wield the political and religious authority that was the implicit birthright of this dual heredity.

Operation Ajax In 1951 the Iranian Majles (parliament) led by the democratically elected and widely popular prime minister Muhammad Mossadegh nationalized the holdings of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) due to dissatisfaction with the unequal division of profits from Iran’s oil concession to the British. A global boycott of Iranian oil was subsequently imposed by the British navy that shattered the Iranian economy over the next two years. While the Truman administration remained essentially neutral, in 1953 the incoming Eisenhower administration—prodded by effective British lobbying in a climate of increasing fear of communism—became increasingly concerned about a potential communist takeover of Iran due to worsening economic conditions and political instability. Thus, a joint CIA/MI-6 covert operation code-named “TP-Ajax” was initiated to overthrow Mossadegh and return autocratic power to Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. On August 19, 1953, the coup d’état was successful, bringing the oil nationalization movement to a close and marking the beginning of what would be a strong client relationship between Iran and the United States. As 25 years of anti-Soviet alliance and stability in Iranian oil production for the United States also brought the equivalent duration of despotic rule to the Iranian people, the seeds of anti-Americanism and of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 were sown.


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Between 1796 and 1979, political and religious authority was separated, as successive shahs of the Qajar and Pahlavi dynasties inherited the rights and traditions of the political lineage and utilized the institution of monarchy to pursue their political and economic agendas. Religious affairs during this period—which until the 1920s included important legal and educational duties—remained largely the province of the Shiite ulema (“the learned” clergy), operating through the clerical establishment and a vast network of mosque communities throughout the country. Qajar rule (ca. 1796–1925) had an unintended impact on Iranian nationalism and on the role of the ulema in political affairs. Because the Qajar government was too weak to dissolve strong corporate groups within Iranian society such as the ulema, the guilds, bazaaris, and nomadic and semi-sedentary tribes—as had been largely accomplished during the 19th century by Ottoman and Egyptian governments—these groups gained power during the 19th century in Iran. The Qajars were also too weak to oppose the Russians and the British, who established spheres of economic influence in the north and south of the country (respectively) by the mid-19th century and were granted vast concessions to Iranian resources and capitulatory economic agreements. Incensed by Qajar ineptitude and what was perceived to be the selling out of the country’s sovereignty and resources, Iran’s Shiite ulema—who had both the necessary organizational capacity and the perceived moral and ethical legitimacy—led the country’s strong corporate groups in open opposition to the regime’s policies, eventually joining with secular intellectuals at the helm of the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911. Thus, several things were inadvertently achieved by and for Iranian nationalism under Qajar rule, including the realization of the citizenry’s power when unified for a common cause, the solidification of the role of the ulema as defenders of the Iranian people and the interests of the nation, and the generation of antiimperialist sentiment that served as a vehicle for national unity. The Pahlavi era (1925–1979) largely reinforced this trend. While authoritarian rule and the rapid modernization, industrialization, and secularization that it enabled eliminated many of the institutions and structures that gave power to Iran’s corporate groups, political repression focused largely on the secular political opposition, and thus the ulema bided their time. Reza Shah Pahlavi (reigned 1925–1941) was responsible for perpetuating Persian monarchal traditions through his establishment of a new dynastic lineage and for the “purification” of modern Farsi (Persian) by purging Arabic and Turkish terminology. His intent to locate the roots of ancient Iranian nationalism and identity, combined with his strong anti-British, anti-Soviet sentiment, led him to establish close ties with Nazi Germany, which was, according to German philologist Friedrich Schlegel and advocates of the Aryan invasion hypothesis, a fellow Indo-European nation of common ancestry. It was in this context in 1935 that Reza Shah decreed that the nation be referred to officially as Iran instead of Persia. While successful in many areas of domestic reform, Reza Shah’s increasing political, economic, and ideoN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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logical ties to Germany would be his undoing, as he was forced to abdicate the throne to his son Muhammad Reza and was sent into exile following the Soviet invasion of August 1941. The ulema survived relatively unscathed, though now chafing under combined British, Soviet, and American occupation. Muhammad Reza Shah (reigned 1941–1979) was seated on the throne by the invading Allies and served as a figurehead throughout the four-year occupation, under which secular political parties ranging from the communist Tudeh to the liberal nationalist National Front emerged and rallied for control against each other and the monarchy, as well as against British interference and the AngloIranian Oil Company (AIOC). Between 1945 and 1953, the popularly elected Majles (the parliament) maintained its newly acquired strength, and open debate flourished in what had finally become a free and vibrant press. It was in this context that the Swiss-educated reformer and veteran Iranian politico Dr. Muhammad Mossadegh rose to prominence as a leading Majles member and head of the National Front. Emboldened by overwhelming demonstrations of support on the streets and in the Majles, Mossadegh led the movement to nationalize the AIOC and was ultimately elected prime minister in 1951. The 1953 coup ended this brief period of Iranian democracy and the oil nationalization movement, ousted Mossadegh, and reseated Muhammad Reza on the throne as dictator. It was followed up by a concerted effort to liquidate the secular opposition, which by the following decade left the ulema as the best-organized indigenous opposition. The 25 years of Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule are considered a golden age by Iranian nationalists of the royalist orientation, who laud the country’s infrastructural and economic advancements, rapid Westernization, and close ties with the United States and Israel during this period. The same period is viewed dimly by Iranians of liberal nationalist and Islamist orientations, who recall the dramatically unequal distribution of wealth and the poverty of the rural and urban lower classes, political repression and rampant corruption, the shah’s megalomania, and a range of domestic and foreign policy issues that offended the religious and cultural sensibilities of many traditional Iranians. Outside of the elite royalist camp, the vast majority of Iranians clearly agreed by 1979 that the dictatorial abuses of the shah and the client relationship with the United States had to end. Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, in which the ulema played a leading organizational role as they had in 1905–1911, the secular opposition was once again crushed as Ayatollah Khomeini—wielding political and religious authority —seized power and instituted a form of Islamic government that was radical and unprecedented within Shia Islamic tradition, thus ending the rule of the kings and sending most monarchists into exile. Although expressions of positive royalist sentiments are not tolerated in the Islamic Republic, which pragmatically purveys an amalgam of Islamic and Persian cultural nationalism narrated via selective use of history, they are nevertheless palpable when visiting sites such as Persepolis, Susa, and Tus (see sidebar on Shahname) and run strong in the large exile community. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The actors in the contemporary Islamic Republic most influential in attempting to define and perpetuate the revolutionary Shia Islamic form of Iranian nationalism are the ulema, religious students, conservatives, Iran-Iraq War veterans and their families, and to an extent the urban lower classes. They organize via the mosque community, the military and volunteer forces (basij), and charitable foundations and endowments (bonyads). Funding comes largely from state coffers, which are replenished by the predominantly petroleum-based rentier economy. Yet, like the Qajars and Pahlavis, the government’s impact on Iranian nationalism is also indirect, as disenchantment with the regime perpetuates the hope of political alternatives. Reformists in Iran—many seeking full representative democracy —attempt to garner legitimacy by claiming their vision as true Iranian nationalism. These groups organize and agitate in the Iranian Majles, through reformist and opposition newspapers, and upon thousands of Internet Web sites and “blogs,” but as yet are no match for the resources and juridical power of the state.

Defining the Nation The Iranian national idea is based on a combined ethno-linguistic (Persian) and religious (Shiite) amalgam that is not congruous with the global distribution of Persian speakers or Shia Muslims. Its modern borders demarcate early Qajar-era territories, which were established through defensive warfare and subsequent treaties with Ottomans, Russians, and the British in the 18th and 19th centuries, rather than being constrained or enabled by the character or limitations of the natural landscape. Iran’s highly variegated physical terrain, which includes vast deserts, mountain ranges, and jungle and offers no major navigable rivers to enable communication and transportation, has in fact been a primary hindrance to national unity, especially before the development of a modern transportation infrastructure in the early to mid-20th century. In the contemporary era, Iran has demonstrated no propensity toward irredentism, while it fiercely guards the borders it has struggled to maintain since the mid-19th century. The historical record clearly illustrates this: Iran has neither initiated war with, nor attacked outside its historic borders since 1747, whereas since then its territory has been invaded and occupied repeatedly, three times in the 20th century alone. Most devastating was the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), which caused over 1 million Iranian casualties and devastated the country’s infrastructure and economy. In the face of repeated attack and occupation by Russian/ Soviet, British, American, and Iraqi forces during the 20th century—sometimes acting in concert, sometimes independently—Iranian governments have been concerned with maintaining sovereignty over the country’s dwindling territories. Part of this effort includes staving off the separatist impulses of large ethnolinguistic minorities in border regions, such as the Kurds and Azeri Turks in the Iranian northwest and the Baluchis in the country’s southeast. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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One of the strategies Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (reigned 1941–1979) used to maintain stability and sufficient allegiance of ethnic and religious minorities, and that has been adopted by the government of the Islamic Republic (1979–present), is via official statements and policies that assert the “inclusive” nature of Iranian nationalism and the important place of minorities in the country’s history and national fabric. In this pragmatic formulation—which differs dramatically from the “exclusive” formulation of Turkish nationalism in the 20th century—the country’s minorities (only 60 percent are native Farsi speakers) are given a layered, hyphenated national identity (i.e., Armenian-Iranian, AssyrianIranian, Kurdish-Iranian) whereby their religious and linguistic distinctiveness is recognized, along with their contributions and sacrifices to the nation. Allowing the perpetuation of their unique religious and educational institutions and cultural traditions, the Iranian government enables Iranian nationalism to appeal to a broad spectrum of Iranian citizens, beyond the Persian-Muslim majority. Beginning in the late 1940s under Muhammad Reza Shah, these policies were expressed as representing continuity in the Persian monarchal tradition of inclusion and toleration of religious and ethnic minorities, which dates back to Cyrus the Great and Achaemenid rule. After 1979, the Islamic Republic recast the wellspring of these policies as the assertion of true Islamic traditions of toleration of “recognized” religious minorities (Iranian Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians) and general rejection of ethnic distinctions. The one unfortunate exception to this inclusive policy has been the Bahais of Iran, who, as an “unrecognized” religious minority perceived by the ulema to be an anticlerical foreign innovation, suffered violence and destruction of their religious and educational institutions after the 1979 revolution, and since the 1990s have endured ongoing discrimination.

Narrating the Nation Because contemporary Iranian nationalism is defined by Persian monarchal and Shia Islamic traditions, the figures and events that have played the greatest role in the nation’s history are subjectively determined and ranked based on one’s orientation toward monarchism, liberal nationalism, or Islamism. Indeed, the national memory is rent, whereby one Iranian’s primary heroes of the modern era are another’s villains. Nevertheless, there remain common founders, cultural figures, and historical events that all Iranians recognize and honor. Exalted political founders that all Iranians recognize are Achaeamenid shahs Cyrus and Darius, and Safavid shahs Isma’il and Abbas. One would be hard-pressed to find an Iranian anywhere in the world who did not revere the 11th-century doctor and philosopher Abu Ali Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the 13th- and 14th-century poets Hafez, Saadi, and Rumi, and/or any veteran of the Iran-Iraq War. The poet Ferdowsi (see sidebar on Shahname) is also considered a national icon by a vast N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Iranian high school students visit the tomb of Ferdowsi, author of the Iranian national epic Shahname. (David Yaghoubian)

majority of Iranians. With that said, perhaps Ferdowsi’s biggest modern promoters, Reza Shah and Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, remain two of the most controversial figures in Iranian history, rivaled only by their respective contemporary critics, the ayatollahs Modarres and Khomeini. Royalists laud and adore the Pahlavi shahs, while Islamists solemnly revere “Imam” Khomeini and his teacher Modarres. Inversely, the Pahlavis are anathema to revolutionary/religious nationalists, and Khomeini ranks as the primary nemesis of royalists and most liberal nationalists. Iranians with a strong liberal nationalist orientation generally loathe all three, while revering former prime minister Muhammad Mossadegh, progressive martyrs of the revolutions of 1905–1911 and 1979, and prisoners of conscience imprisoned and tortured by both regimes. The pomp and grandeur of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s lavish 1967 coronation ceremonies and the 1971 celebration at Persepolis of 2,500 years of Persian monarchy (skirting the more than eight centuries of Arab-Islamic rule) epitomize the monarchal symbolism, nationalist iconography, and strategic historicizing of the Pahlavi era. Both fetes, the latter costing in excess of $100 million, sought to make explicit links between the Pahlavi regime and the Achaemenids and to demonstrate continuity in the traditions, values, power, and benevolence inherN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ent to the (forged) lineage through replication of ancient Persian icons—most commonly Achaemenid reliefs and artifacts—on everything from commemorative postage stamps and posters to engraved plates and sewing kits. Beyond the Persian dynastic imagery that characterized the Persepolis festivities and parades, the shah made the connection as explicit as physically possible by opening the ceremonies standing at the door of the tomb of Cyrus the Great in Pasargadae and proclaiming, “Sleep easily, Cyrus, for we are awake” (Mottahedeh 2000). The event stands as the height of the shah’s power and glory for royalists and the height of hubris and conspicuous consumption for critics of the regime. In spite of the antimonarchal stance of the current government, continued implications for national unity, the global appeal and “brand recognition” of ancient Persian imagery, and direct economic implications for tourism pragmatically dictate that the same images of Persepolis that typified the rule of the Pahlavis are again omnipresent throughout the country and have become primary tools of the 21st-century Iranian tourism industry. Even the most casual observers of the Shia Islamic faith in Iran revere the Prophet Muhammad and the twelve Shiite imams, while more observant Iranian Shiites consider the imams to be among the founding fathers of the nation and the guides of Iranian culture, revolution, and government. The stark and profound example of self-sacrifice to achieve justice and proper governance that was set by the second imam, Husayn, at the Battle of Karbala in southern Iraq in 680— ritually reenacted in the intense public passion play and group catharsis known as ta’ziya—instilled brave defiance among Iranian political dissidents during the Pahlavi era and emboldened street protestors to face down machine guns and tanks in the 1979 revolution. The memory of Husayn’s martyrdom was also critical to the nation’s defense during the Iran-Iraq War, inspiring millions of Iranians to rush to the front lines and participate in exceedingly heroic and certainly suicidal trench warfare and mass infantry attacks. As Shiism is one of the few Islamic traditions that allows physical depictions of revered religious figures, posters and stickers of Imam Ali sitting cross-legged with his esteemed sword Zulfiqar (which, not coincidentally, is the name of Iran’s indigenously produced main battle tank) and of Imam Husayn riding his white steed into battle adorn teahouses and grace the dashboards of taxicabs throughout the nation. Posters and stickers depicting the trinity of Ayatollah Khomeini, Imam Ali, and current supreme leader Khamenai, or that juxtapose the Battle of Karbala with Iran-Iraq War scenes, are intended to render this metaphorical lineage, its implicit legitimacy, and its strong nationalist implications abundantly clear. Often perceived outside Iran as morbid and/or government-decreed propaganda, vivid murals depicting the events of Karbala and/or of Iran-Iraq War shohadat (martyrs) in life and in death abound in urban centers and are ways the population recognizes and honors these tremendous struggles and sacrifices. That former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s final words on the gallows included a parting curse for “the Persians” is a reflection of the deep-seated N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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historical rivalry between Iraqi-Arab-Sunni and Iranian-Persian-Shiite nationalisms, which reached a new and brutal apex during the Iran-Iraq War. To rally the Iraqi nation behind the invasion, Saddam attempted to cast the struggle as a modern-day version of the seventh-century Arab-Muslim invasion of the Persian empire, thus referring to the offensive as “al-Qadisiyya” after the battle of 637 that toppled the Sassanian Dynasty and opened Iran to Arab-Muslim conquest. He did not predict how such propaganda would be used to motivate Iranians to their own nation’s defense, nor how the Islamic Republic could utilize the same strategy, albeit with a powerful twist—sequentially numbering a series of Iranian military offensives Karbala I, II, and III to link the contemporary struggle to the most powerful and turnpoint event in Shiite history and thus imbue it with the requisite thirst for justice and self-sacrifice. The public recitation of the Shahname and reenactment of the Battle of Karbala sustain the knowledge of primary Iranian heroes and values and perpetuate the centrality of these two defining narratives to Iranian nationalism. Disproportionately favored by royalists and Islamists respectively, who alternatively emphasize Persian culture and tradition versus the defense of Islamic values and the Shia community, together the two narratives can be interpreted to encapsulate most if not all of the values that nationalists the world over idealistically laud: egalitarianism, justice, bravery, self-sacrifice, faith, and persistence. Whether attributable more to Persian or to Shiite culture and traditions, or to a product of the unique, situational amalgam of both, hospitality and kindness to guests— especially foreigners who heed local traditions and laws—is an unofficial national duty that is demanded by Iranian culture and has remained one of the most memorable characteristics distinguishing the people and culture of Iran to travelers throughout the ages.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Rooted in both Persian monarchal and Islamic traditions, the intervention of foreign powers in Iranian affairs and the repeated violation of Iran’s territorial sovereignty in the 19th and 20th centuries added a strong antiforeign, anticolonial component to modern Iranian nationalism. The CIA-initiated coup of 1953 (see sidebar on Operation Ajax) and the subsequent support of the United States for the shah’s dictatorial regime—as well as its material, logistical, and naval support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War—inflamed sentiments already well established as a result of past Russian and British interventions, and as such U.S. foreign policy remains the focal point of nationalist fears and animosity. This issue is complex, because an aggressive U.S. stance toward the regime of the Islamic Republic is potentially the last hope for the hundreds of thousands of royalists in exile, all of whom certainly consider themselves Iranian nationalists. Yet within Iran, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Iranian Nuclear Program Whether or not Iran has a clandestine nuclear weapons program has yet to be determined. What is certain is that, while they ardently and at times violently disagree on politics and the national trajectory, Iranian nationalists of all types—whether Islamist/Khomeinist, royalist, or liberal nationalist in orientation—almost unanimously agree that Iran should have the same rights as any other Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory to pursue a civilian nuclear energy program. After forging an agreement on nuclear cooperation in the late 1950s with its then-ally the United States, Iran acquired its first nuclear test reactor from the United States in 1967 and signed the NPT in 1968. Encouraged to develop nuclear energy to wean the economy off exhaustible petroleum revenues and thereby ensure long-term stability, Iran initiated contracts with American, French, and German companies for the establishment of 22 reactors with a planned total output of 23,000 megawatts of electricity by 1994. Mothballed as a result of the 1979 revolution and Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Iran revived its nuclear energy program in the 1990s, seeking Chinese and Russian assistance to restart projects begun under the Pahlavi regime. International concerns and U.S. threats regarding the program, generally centering on a potential secret nuclear weapons adjunct, are perceived as unacceptable double standards by Iranians, who rally around the flag at the mere hint that Iran should not be able to exercise its full rights under the NPT.

ongoing calls for “regime change” under successive American presidential administrations since the revolution, the unilateral imposition of economic sanctions by the Clinton administration in the 1990s, and more recently the overt threats of a potential U.S. military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities (see sidebar on Iranian Nuclear Program) and/or of covert agitation within Iran’s ethnic minority communities by the Bush administration have perpetuated these sentiments into the 21st century. Facilitated by popular memory of such recent and painful national offenses, the contemporary Iranian government seeks to gain maximum advantage from the specter of foreign intervention, wielding it as a strategy of national mobilization and unity as well as an eternal scapegoat, while Iranian politicians deftly manipulate antiforeign, nationalist sentiment in their electoral campaigns. This strategy proved especially effective for conservative candidate Mahmmoud Ahmadinejad, who was elected president in 2005, and proved inversely devastating to the agenda and legitimacy of his reformist predecessor, President Mohammad Khatami (1997–2004), and parliamentary supporters of the reform movement. The government of the Islamic Republic seeks to inculcate Iranian nationalism and maintain the allegiances of Iran’s minority groups by stressing Perso-Islamic glory and the inclusiveness of Iranian national identity. Since the reign of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1941–1979), the ruling elite has stressed the unifying nature of Iranian nationalism and allowed for hyphenated national identities by recognizing the distinctiveness of most minority groups and allowing them to N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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perpetuate their linguistic and cultural heritage when it does not interfere with state development, national cohesion, or security. The Iranian constitution provides representation in the 290-seat Majles (the parliament) for recognized religious minorities, thus providing guaranteed seats for Armenians (2), Assyrians (1), Jews (1), and Zoroastrians (1) based on population. Bahais are not recognized as religious minorities and have suffered discrimination and persecution throughout modern Iranian history, and especially since the 1979 revolution. Ethnic minorities such as Azeri Turks, Kurds, Baluchis, and Kuhuzestani Arabs receive national representation in parliament via geographic districting, thus unlike the religious minorities, they do not receive a fixed number of seats. Governmental strategies to sustain Iranian nationalism include mass public education in Farsi with standardized curriculum and the construction and maintenance of museums and national monuments to ancient Persian, Shiite, and modern Iranian heroes. Regime-friendly historical narratives and propaganda are disseminated in every conceivable format—from paper flyers to streaming Internet videos—and deftly crafted for domestic and foreign audiences. In addition to festivals and holidays central to Shia Islam, the Islamic revolution, and/or the Iran-Iraq War, the government also pragmatically respects important preIslamic Persian traditions such as Nowruz (New Year celebrations). Where the festivities and/or political interests of Iranian minorities pose insignificant risk to, or are deemed to overlap with, policies and security of the state, they are tolerated if not encouraged. A case in point would be the annual April 24 mass commemoration of the Armenian genocide in the streets of Tehran by the city’s large Armenian-Iranian community, which for the government serves the dual purpose of poking “popular” criticism at their U.S.-allied secular rivals in Ankara and demonstrating the regime’s toleration for the broader history and concerns of Iranian religious minorities. The dialogic, collaborative relationship illustrated by this example runs throughout the Iranian body politic and allows for multiple interpretations of what it is to be an Iranian, thereby promoting relatively broad allegiance to the state. History suggests that tensions, if not open hostility, will always remain among competing traditions within Iranian nationalism, as will the challenges associated with sustaining Iranian national identity among the country’s diverse population. It also demonstrates that the fiber woven of Persian, Islamic, and anti-imperial strands is extremely durable and like almost all nationalisms becomes even stronger when the nation is perceived to be under attack. Selected Bibliography Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Abrahamian, Ervand. 1993. Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic. Berkeley: University of California Press.


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Afary, Janet. 1996. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and the Origins of Feminism. New York: Columbia University Press. Arjomand, Said Amir. 1988. The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran. New York: Oxford University Press. Cottam, Richard W. 1979. Nationalism in Iran: Updated through 1978. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Gasiorowski, Mark J., and Malcolm Byrne, eds. 2004. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press. Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. 2000. Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Keddie, Nikki R. 2005. Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran. Oxford: Oneworld. Marashi, Afshin. 2007. Nationalizing Iran: Culture, Power, and the State, 1870–1941. Seattle: University of Washington Press. Mottahedeh, Roy. 2000. Mantle of the Prophet. Oxford: Oneworld. Vaziri, Mostafa. 1993. Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity. New York: Paragon House.


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Israel Arnon Golan Chronology 1945 1946 1947 1948

1949 1956 1965 1966 1967 1969–1970 1973 1977 1979 1982 1985 1987–1993 1993 1994 2000 2005

End of World War II in Europe. Full horrific dimensions of the Holocaust are revealed. President Truman issues a statement indicating U.S. support for the creation of a “viable Jewish state” in Palestine. UN General Assembly recommends the partition of Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states. First Arab-Israeli War. The end of the British Mandate and declaration of Israeli independence. David Ben-Gurion nominated Israel’s first prime minister. Military forces of Arab states invade Palestine. Israel signs armistice agreements with neighboring Arab states. Sinai campaign. Israel retreats from the Sinai peninsula in February 1957 under American and Soviet pressure. First attack by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) on Israel on January 1. Abolition of the military government over Israeli Arabs. Six Day War. Israel gains control of Arab territories. War of attrition with Egypt. Yom Kippur War. Right-wing Likud Party rises to power, ending three decades of Labor dominance. Menachem Begin becomes prime minister. Signing of peace treaty with Egypt. Peace of Galilee War (Lebanon War). Israel retreats to self-proclaimed security zone in southern Lebanon. First Arab uprising (Intifada) in the occupied territories. Signing of a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles based on an agreement worked out in Oslo. Signing of peace treaty with Jordan. Outbreak of second Palestinian uprising (Intifada). Israeli retreat from the Gaza Strip.

Situating the Nation The Jewish national movement known as Zionism developed in the second half of the 19th century. It was a form of diaspora nationalism, initiated by members of an ethnic group most of whose members did not reside in the destined homeland. The national territory, Palestine, seen by Jews as the biblical Land of Israel, at that time was a part of the Ottoman Empire and was populated mainly by Arabs. Zionism also adhered to concepts of Western modernism, especially to N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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modernist economic and societal models developed by European liberal and socialist thinkers. The first wave of Zionist immigration to Palestine was in the 1880s and 1890s, the second from the start of the 20th century to the start of World War I. Numbers were small as most Jews preferred to immigrate to the New World. Substantial Jewish immigration to Palestine took place with the establishment of the British Mandatory government in Palestine following World War I and the closure of the gates to the United States in the early 1920s. The rise of anti-Semitism in central and eastern Europe in the 1920s, and especially the rise of Nazism in Germany, resulted in the migration of tens of thousands of Jews from these areas to Palestine. The extermination of 6 million European Jews in the Holocaust resulted in growing international recognition of the right of the Jews to form a state of their own. This right was formally acknowledged by the United Nations in November 1947. Independence was formally declared on May 14, 1948, during Israel’s war of independence, fought against the local Palestinian Arab community, later augmented by the armies of neighboring Arab states that resented Zionism and the establishment of Israel. In 1947 Palestine had a population of 625,000 Jews and 1.25 million Arabs. The Jews resided mainly in the coastal plain and the northern inland valleys of Palestine, where they had been able to purchase land from Arabs. The main urban concentration was in the city of Tel Aviv, located in the center of the coastal plain, which had rapidly developed since the early 1920s in proximity to the mixedpopulation port town of Jaffa. Jerusalem was the second city with a sizable Jewish

Theodor (Binyamin Ze’ev) Herzl (1860–1904) Theodor Herzl, the visionary of Zionism, was born in Budapest in 1860. In 1884 he was awarded a doctorate of law from the University of Vienna. He became a writer, playwright, and journalist, the Paris correspondent of an influential liberal Vienna newspaper. The 1894 Dreyfus affair, the unjust accusation of treason of a Jewish officer in the French army, caused a fundamental transformation of his views. Herzl witnessed mobs shouting “Death to the Jews” in France, and he resolved that there was only one solution to anti-Semitism: the mass immigration of Jews to Palestine, the historic homeland of the Land of Israel, and the formation of an independent Jewish state. Herzl’s ideas were met with some enthusiasm by eastern European Jews, encouraging him to convene the First Zionist Congress in Basle, Switzerland, on August 1897, in which Zionism was established as a political movement. The difficult state of Russian Jewry, witnessed firsthand by Herzl during a visit in 1903 to Russia, had a profound effect on him. Subsequently, he proposed British Uganda as a temporary refuge for Jews in Russia in immediate danger. While Herzl made it clear that this program would not affect the ultimate aim of forming a Jewish entity in the Land of Israel, the proposal nearly led to a split in the Zionist movement. The Uganda program was finally rejected by the Zionist movement in 1905. Herzl died in Vienna in 1904. In 1949 his remains were brought to Israel and reinterred on Mount Herzl in Jerusalem.


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urban concentration, and the main port city of Haifa was the third. The latter two cities were both of mixed population, with the Jews being the majority. About 80 percent of the Jewish population of Palestine lived in the above three cities and nearby towns, forming the main core areas of the Jewish community. Although only a minority of the Jewish community lived in rural areas, the importance of those areas in Zionist ideology and the formation of territorial integrity was decisive. Zionist ideology regarded agriculture as a fundamental element of national revival, creating the bond between immigrants from the Diaspora and their old/new homeland. It also demarcated the territorial extent of the Zionist presence in Palestine. The dwellers of the rural settlements, most of which were collective (kibbutz) or cooperative (moshav) villages, were regarded as the harbingers of the national Zionist venture. The dominance since the early 1930s of Socialist-Zionist parties in the Jewish community in Palestine was crucial to the formation of the image of the Jewish agricultural settler as the prototype of a new Jew, contrasting and contradicting the image of the Diaspora Jew. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Instituting the Nation Zionism became a political movement following the convening of the First Zionist Congress in 1897, initiated by a Jewish journalist from Vienna, Theodor Herzl. The establishment of the World Zionist Organization (WZO) and institutions intended to collect funds and purchase land for Jewish settlement marked the institutionalization of the Jewish national idea. Following the death of Herzl in 1904, Chaim Weizmann became a leading figure in the Zionist movement. Weizmann’s political activities during World War I resulted in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, committing the British empire to the constitution of a national home in Palestine for the Jews, a commitment repeated in the 1920 League of Nations mandate charter. During the first decade of British Mandatory rule, the WZO, headed by Weizmann, became the main organization representing the Jewish community in Palestine. The Jewish Agency, established in 1929 according to the mandate charter and also including non-Zionists, replaced the WZO in this role, although Weizmann headed both. With the rise of Socialist Zionism to power in the early 1930s, David Ben-Gurion, the leader of MAPAI (Hebrew acronym for the Land of Israel Workers’ Party) and chairman of the Histadrut, the main Jewish trade union, became the chairman of the executive of the Jewish Agency. A group of right-wing Zionists headed by Ze’ev (Vladimir) Jabotinsky seceded from the WZO and formed the New World Zionist Organization, a rightwing activist alternative to the formal organization of the majority. Zionist organizations and political parties formed a framework for the establishment and amalgamation of the national home. The Jewish community was

Chaim Azriel Weizmann (1874–1952) Chaim Weizmann was born in 1874 in Motol, near Pinsk, then in the bounds of the Russian empire. He studied in Germany and Switzerland and taught chemistry at Manchester University in England from 1904 to 1914. While there he discovered a method of producing synthetic acetone and butyl alcohol that, during World War I, became essential for creating explosives needed for the British war effort. He became a Zionist spokesperson in England and was a major influence in the creation of the Balfour Declaration in 1917 in which Britain expressed its commitment to the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. He headed the Jewish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 and worked there to have the League of Nations assign administration of Palestine to Britain. He was the leader of the World Zionist Organization from 1920 to 1930 and from 1935 to 1946. In 1949 he was elected the first president of the state of Israel. He also played an essential role in the establishment of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Weizmann Institute in Rehovot, Israel’s leading scientific research organ. Chaim Weizmann died on November 9, 1952, after a long and painful illness. His grave is situated in the garden of his home in Rehovot.


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autonomous in almost all spheres of life: inner politics, education, health, religious matters, and more. Other institutions that did not belong formally to the Zionist movement as established by the mandate government, namely the National Committee (Va ’ ad Le’umi)—a sort of parliament—and municipalities, were also dominated by Zionist parties.

Defining the Nation Zionists considered all Jews living in different countries of the five continents as part of the Jewish nation. Jewish tradition fashioned the fundamental framework for the preservation of an ethno-cultural identity, preserving a unique Jewish world outlook based on Jewish religious law, defining and separating Diaspora communities from non-Jews, the “Gentiles.” The uniqueness of the Jewish people also stemmed from a common troubled history of persecutions, deportations, and massacres of Jews in different historical periods and areas. To redeem Jews from the cycle of strife, the Zionists sought their concentration in the ancient homeland to form a modern independent nation-state, based on concepts of social justice and universal civil rights for the Jewish and non-Jewish populations alike. Jewish culture and history were essential common denominators. Ancient Jewish symbols were manipulated for the purpose of forming a modern national identity. The menorah, the sacred temple lamp, and the Star of David, the mythological emblem of the biblical kingdom, became respectively the symbol and the ensign of the Zionist movement and later the state of Israel. The definition of the national territory was based on biblical sources relating to the array of the Israelite/Jewish presence in the Land of Israel. Moreover, Jews spoke different languages and were wholly shaped by their local Diaspora cultures, which worked against their integration. Therefore, an essential trait of Zionism was the adoption of Hebrew, mostly used in the Diaspora for ritual purposes, as its formal language. Through a thriving educational system, Hebrew was installed as the language spoken among most Jewish immigrants in Palestine, forming a fundamental instrument for nation-building. Most newspapers, theaters, and other cultural institutions used Hebrew, and Tel Aviv, almost wholly inhabited by Jews, was considered “The First Hebrew City.” Various Jewish groups opposed Zionism. Many assimilating Western Jewish communities regarded Jewish nationalism a threat because it could foster in nonJewish compatriots suspicions of Jewish dual loyalty. Ultra-orthodox Jews regarded Zionism as sacrilege, blaspheming the religious tenet of miraculous redemption and return to the old homeland. Another problem Zionism faced was territorial definition. In the Bible, taken as the source text, ancient descriptions of the boundaries of the Land of Israel were rather vague. Palestine’s political borders were drawn only with the estabN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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lishment of the British Mandatory government. The British soon decided to separate the area east of the Jordan River from Palestine. The area left for the establishment of a Jewish national homeland was rather small, about 27,000 square kilometers, and it contained an Arab majority. In view of such territorial obscurity, and in the absence of direct support from the British Mandatory regime, in practice the extent of the national territory was mostly determined by the process of rural settlement as it advanced over the coastal plane and through the northern inland valleys, where the Zionists could purchase empty land from Arabs. The major obstacle to the formation of a Jewish national home was the emergence of the rival Palestinian Arab national movement. Efforts to resolve this conflict, which occasionally escalated into violent riots, resulted in the formulation of several partition plans, initially by the British (1937) and later by the United Nations (1947). Failure of such efforts resulted in the termination of British Mandatory rule and the outbreak of the 1948 war. The Jewish victory resulted in the establishment of the state of Israel, whose boundaries were defined by the 1949 armistice lines between the Israeli and Arab armies, which came to be known as the Green Line or the 1949 boundaries. The Six Day War in 1967 resulted in the expansion of territory under Israeli control. Since the return of the Sinai peninsula to Egypt after the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights, captured from Syria, and of East Jerusalem, as well as control of Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, have been highly debated. Israel seems to be the only nation-state in the world whose territorial extent has not yet been settled.

Narrating the Nation The Israeli-Zionist national memory includes events and figures from three periods: glorious biblical times, which ended in a series of catastrophes that resulted in the end of Jewish dominance in the Land of Israel; the formation of Diaspora communities, a history regarded as successive cycles of flourishing, persecution, and destruction, culminating in the emancipation of European Jews followed by the Holocaust; and national revival, the Zionist project, or the return to the old/ new homeland. Biblical figures and their deeds form the first layer of national memory. Such figures include the patriarch Abraham, the father of the nation; Moses, who led the Exodus from Egypt; Joshua, who conquered the Promised Land; King David, founder of the Israelite kingdom; and Judah the Maccabee (Judas Maccabaeus), who liberated the nation from the Greek-Syrian yoke. These times of splendor ended in catastrophes, above all the destruction of the first and second temples, which symbolizes decay, exile, and despair. The second layer consists of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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golden ages that periodically illumine the dark centuries of exile. These eras include the golden age of Spanish Jewry at the time of Muslim dominance of the Iberian peninsula, the rise and flourishing of the Jewish community in Poland in the 15th and 16th centuries, and the 19th-century emancipation and enlightenment of Jewish communities of western and central Europe. But all these golden periods ended in the persecution, massacre, and deportation of Jews, proving the fragile existence of a nation dislocated from its territory and dispersed among nations. The third layer is the modern history of Zionism, from the formation of the Zionist concept to the recent history of the state of Israel, and the process of secular redemption. Ancient and modern Jewish history are both located in and connected to places that form core areas of the national territory. Most prominent in this context is the ancient capital, the holy city of Jerusalem. Other places are biblical cities such as Hebron and Bethlehem, battlefields like Mount Gilboa, Judas Maccabaeus’s hometown of Modi’in, and the last strongholds resisting the Roman occupation of the Land of Israel, Masada and Betar. Modern sites in this context are Degania in the Jordan valley, considered the first kibbutz; the Valley of Jezreel (Esdraelon), the initial concentration of collective and cooperative rural settlements, known simply as “The Valley” in the Zionist historical narrative; Tel Aviv, the first Hebrew city; the sites of battles in the wars of 1948 and later; and more.

Jerusalem’s Church of the Holy Sepulchre, first established in AD 330. The church grounds include the spot where Jesus of Nazareth was crucified, as well at the cave used as his tomb. (Corel)


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A formative myth of the Jewish nation is its status as the chosen people, the Almighty’s elect to spread his word among the nations, “a light to the Gentiles.” In secular Zionist terms, presented by Herzl in his utopian book Altneuland (OldNew Land), this choiceness was interpreted as a mission to form an ideal modern state according to the most enlightened principles of Western liberal democracy. Moreover, Zionists considered themselves heralds of modernism and enlightenment to the backward population of Palestine, in particular, and to the Levant in general. The latter concept did not originate in Jewish tradition alone but also in the idea of the beneficial role of European colonialism in redeeming non-European peoples. A national Zionist revival is evident also in the realm of arts, reflecting and presenting the old/new nation. The most flourishing trait of the renewed national culture seems to be folk music. Thousands of songs have been written since the beginning of the Zionist venture describing and praising the homeland and its landscapes. The plastic arts have also developed, beginning with the Jerusalembased Bezalel school of art, which specialized in the romantic presentation of biblical landscapes. Later, urban and rural landscapes became prevalent motifs in the work of most local artists. Landscape paintings and large photographs became powerful tools for the representation of the Zionist venture.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Zionist movement sought the total mobilization of the Jewish people for the national venture, namely the formation of a Jewish nation-state in the biblical Land of Israel. Nevertheless, within the Diaspora communities, joining Zionism’s ranks was a voluntary act, for the movement lacked formal political power and could not force membership on potential adherents. For those who did immigrate to Palestine, Zionism intended to form a melting pot in the historical homeland, in which Jews from different parts of the world with a variety of social and political values and speaking different languages would undergo a process of political, economic, social, and cultural transformation and amalgamation. In the absence of formal political power, the Hebrew language became Zionism’s main device for assimilating immigrants. The use of other languages in the emerging homeland project was regarded intolerable. The education system, newspapers, theaters, offices of different national and sectarian Zionist organizations, and municipalities all used Hebrew. Streets signs and outdoor advertisements had to be in Hebrew. It became almost impossible for an individual to manage everyday life without at least basic mastery of the language. Integration of immigrants took place through other cultural means, too, first and foremost exposure to biblical and recent landscapes and the history of the land. This initially took place through excursions guided by specialists in history N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and culture, organized by different Zionist institutions, and by schools and youth movements. It was aimed at forming an intimate bond between the Jew and his or her ancient and freshly stirring homeland. This practice, known as yediat ha’Aretz (“knowing the land”), along with popular songs praising the merits of the homeland, formed a crucial role in the mobilization of the nation. To increase its ability to integrate and shape the nation, and to achieve territorial integrity and suzerainty, the Zionist movement sought the formation of a political entity, an independent Jewish state in the Land of Israel. This aim was not proclaimed openly until 1942 due to the need to ease relations with the British authorities and the rival national movement that also considered Palestine its homeland, namely, the Palestinian Arabs. In 1939, the 450,000 Jews living in Palestine accounted for only some 3 percent of the total number of Jews worldwide, meaning that before World War II Zionism did not appeal to the majority of Jews. The Holocaust was a turning point in the legitimization of Zionism, causing many Diaspora Jews, especially those living in the United States, to become keen supporters of Zionism. The Holocaust proved the need to form a nation-state serving as a safe asylum for Jews; the Zionist concept likewise won international support, crucial for the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. The rise of modern anti-Semitism and consequent Jewish disillusionment with 19th-century European enlightenment and emancipation were the main catalysts for the formation of modern Jewish nationalism. The nationalist alternative, rather than assimilation or preservation of old lifestyles and isolation from the modern world, was in step with the rise of nationalism in other European ethnic groups.

David Ben-Gurion (Green) Ben-Gurion was born in Plonsk (a city then in Russia) in 1886. At the age of 17, he joined the Socialist-Zionist party of Poalei Zion (Zionist workers) and immigrated to Palestine in 1906. He was forced to leave the country during World War I due to Ottoman persecution of Zionists, finally settling in New York where he was instrumental in preparing young Jews to immigrate to Palestine immediately after the war. Following the Balfour Declaration, he joined a Jewish Battalion formed within the British Army and returned to Palestine by the end of the war. In 1921 he became general secretary of the Histadrut, and in 1930 he united the main Jewish Socialist parties in Palestine to form MAPAI, which shortly afterward became dominant among the Jewish community in Palestine. Subsequently, in 1935 he became chairman of the executive committee of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. Ben-Gurion led the Jewish community in Palestine through the troubled years of the Arab revolt, World War II, and the Holocaust, as well as through the postwar struggle against the British empire and the 1948 war. In Tel Aviv, on May 14, 1948, he proclaimed independence for the state of Israel. He served as Israel’s prime minister for 13 years, 1948–1953 and 1955–1963. Ben-Gurion died on his kibbutz, Sde Boker in the Negev, a few weeks following the end of the Yom Kippur War, on December 1, 1973.


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Major strategies used by Zionism were primarily in the cultural realm: first the use of the Bible as the wellspring of legitimacy; second the revival of Hebrew and its reconstitution as the exclusive national language. The third strategy was the augmentation of the Jewish calendar through inclusion of Israel’s Independence Day and memorial days for the Holocaust and fallen soldiers. Fourth was yediat ha’aretz, creating an array of meaning-filled places, biblical and modern, that symbolized the long-lasting bond between the Jew and his or her homeland. In the political realm, the Zionist movement was formed as a voluntary democratic system, affording representation in Zionist institutions of left- and rightwing Zionists, religious Zionists, and even non-Zionists; such was the case in the Jewish Agency, too, the main organ of the Zionist movement since the 1930s. Regarding external politics, Zionism wished to secure a national home through collaboration with European powers, especially the British empire. This goal was frustrated, so in the late 1930s and 1940s, guerilla warfare and civil disobedience were applied, together with political maneuvering, to bring about the termination of British Mandatory rule. The Zionist endeavor developed in conditions of a constantly intensifying conflict with the Palestinian Arabs, later joined by neighboring Arab states, over control of territory disputed between Jews and Arabs. This developed into a succession of violent clashes during the British Mandate period: the Arab riots of 1920, 1921, and 1929, and the 1936–1939 Palestinian Arab revolt. To meet the Arab challenge, the Zionist movement formed an underground militia, precursor to the postindependence Israeli army. The termination of British rule sparked the escalation of the armed conflict into the 1948 war, from which Israel emerged intact as an independent state and more than half the Palestinian population became refugees. The state of Israel was by and large based on political, administrative, and cultural institutions and concepts engendered by the Zionist movement. Its juridical system largely followed the colonial British Mandatory system, although it gradually became adjusted to the needs of an independent nation-state. Due to the development of an etatist ideology in the 1950s, a variety of functions performed by Zionist institutions were transferred to Israeli government ministries and agencies. Most important in this context was the crucial role played by the state in the absorption into Israeli economic, cultural, political, and social systems of about 900,000 Jewish immigrants in the 1950s, and myriads more in subsequent decades. The development of a pernicious conflict with the Arab world resulted in a series of wars between Israel and neighboring Arab states, in 1956, 1967, 1973, and 1982. The peace agreements with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994) and the Oslo accords in 1993 formed a basis, albeit rickety and problematic, for rapprochement with the Palestinian Arabs. The long conflict has played a crucial role in the formation and development of Israeli society, in the political, cultural, economic, and social realms. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The absorption of hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants resulted in the rise of economic and cultural conflicts between the mostly European pre1948 population group and the post-1948 immigrants, many originating in Middle Eastern and North African countries. Nevertheless, the external conflict with the Arab world has exerted a moderating effect on intra-Jewish social and cultural conflicts, although the control since 1967 of territories densely populated by Palestinian Arabs has resulted in gathering discord between right- and left-wing parties in the Israeli polity. It has also raised tensions with the Arab Israeli minority, which officially enjoys equal civil rights; in practice, however, their absorption into Israeli society has suffered innumerable setbacks due to their identification with a hostile Arab world. Israeli foreign policy and Israel’s place in the world is largely affected by the conflict with the Arabs. Due to the dominance of European culture among the pre-1948 Zionists, Israel aspired to be included among Western countries. Consequently, and due to Arab affiliation with the Third World and former communist regimes, Israel became identified with “Western imperialist reactionary regimes.” Since the 1980s, the changing world political system and the peace agreements Israel signed with Arab states have produced many changes, although Israel’s place in the international arena is still mostly affected by the state of its changing relations with the Arab world in general, and with the Palestinians in particular. Despite the need to maintain a large army, Israel has developed a modern Western-style economy. Despite the salience of the military in Israeli society, protracted poor relations with the Arab minority, and intra-Jewish tensions in an immigrant society, the democratic political structure has largely been preserved. Demarcation of the boundaries of the national territory and the control of large Palestinian Arab populations continue to be the foremost problems of the state of Israel, affecting its relations with its own Arab minority, the Palestinians as a whole, the Arab world, and the international system. Selected Bibliography Avineri, Shlomo. 1981. The Making of Modern Zionism: The Intellectual Origins of the Jewish State. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Cohen, Michael J. 1987. The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dershowitz, Alan. 2003. The Case for Israel. New York: John Wiley. Dowty, Alan, 1998. The Jewish State: A Century Later. Berkeley: University of California Press. Gilbert, Martin. 1978. Exile and Return: The Struggle for a Jewish Homeland. Philadelphia: Lippincott. Goldberg, David J. 1997. To the Promised Land: A History of Zionist Thought from Its Origins to the Modern State of Israel. London: Penguin. Halpern, Ben, and Jehuda Reinharz. 2000. Zionism and the Creation of a New Society. New York: Brandeis University. Kimmerling, Baruch. 1983. Zionism and Territory: The Socioterritorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press.


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Laqueur, Walter. 2003. A History of Zionism. New York: Schocken Books. Morris, Benny. 1999. Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict 1881–1999. New York: Knopf. Nethanyahu, Benjamin. 2000. A Place among the Nations: Israel and the World. New York: Bantam Books. Sachar, Howard M. 1998. A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time. New York: Knopf.


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Palestine Chris Bierwirth Chronology ca. 1840–1880 Precursors of Zionism appear in the writings of Rabbi Tzvi Hirsh Kalisher, Moses Hess, Leon Pinsker, and others; foundation of Hovevei Tzion (“Lovers of Zion”). 1882 Pogroms in the Russian empire lead to the beginnings of Jewish immigration to Palestine; over the next six decades, more than 400,000 Jews will immigrate, peaking in the 1930s. 1904 First clashes between Zionist immigrants and Palestinian Arab farmers. 1911 Filastin, an Arab nationalist newspaper, begins publication in Jaffa. 1917 The British government issues the Balfour Declaration. 1919 First Palestinian National Congress was held in Jerusalem. 1920–1921 Jewish-Arab riots in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv–Jaffa result in over 150 deaths. 1928–1929 Conflict over the Western Wall, resulting in riots in Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Hebron; 133 Jews and 116 Arabs are killed. 1932–1935 Four Palestinian political parties are founded, each representing a traditional faction. 1936–1939 The Great Arab Revolt; formation of the Arab Higher Committee in an attempt to coordinate Palestinian Arab actions; British White Paper revokes Balfour Declaration. 1945 Arab League charter includes an annex asserting the Arab character of Palestine. 1947 The British government turns the Palestinian problem over to the newly established United Nations. 1948 First Arab-Israeli War (Israel’s “War of Independence”; Palestine’s “Catastrophe”). 1957 Yasir Arafat and others found the Movement for the National Liberation of Palestine (Fatah). 1964 The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is established. 1967 The Six Day War (Israel versus Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) ends with Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights. 1970–1971 War between the Jordanian army and Palestinian forces leads to PLO expulsion from Jordan. 1973 The “October War” (or “Yom Kippur War”), Israel versus Egypt and Syria. 1974 The Arab League declares that the PLO is “the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.” 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; the “Palestinian Question” is glossed over. 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, aimed at destroying the PLO; the Sabra and Shatila massacres. 1987 Beginning of the first Intifada; Hamas is founded. 1993 Negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian representatives in Oslo, Norway, produce an outline agreement; signing of the Declaration of Principles in Washington DC. 1994 Palestinian National Authority (PNA) is established pursuant to the Oslo Accords. 1995 Oslo 2 agreement; partial Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank. 1999 Oslo 2 deadline for permanent status talks passes without talks having begun. 2000 Palestinian-Israeli negotiations at Camp David, mediated by the United States, fail to produce an agreement; Ariel Sharon’s visit to al-Haram al-Sharif provokes the “Al-Aqsa Intifada.”


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MIDDLE EAST: PALESTINE

2002 2004 2005 2006 2007

Israel begins construction of the “security barrier” separating most of the West Bank. International Court of Justice rules against the “security barrier”; Yasir Arafat dies. Mahmoud Abbas elected PNA president; Israeli forces withdraw from the Gaza Strip. Hamas wins a large majority in Palestinian elections; Kadima wins the Israeli elections. Fighting between Fatah and Hamas forces escalates; the Mecca Agreement between Fatah and Hamas establishes a Palestinian national unity government.

Situating the Nation Despite the claims of the most ardent Palestinian nationalists, it seems quite clear that Palestinian national identity and Palestinian nationalism began to emerge in the early 20th century as a direct result of and response to Zionism. Conversely, despite the claims of the most ardent Zionists, it seems clear that, even if there were no clearly identifiable “Palestinian people” at the beginning of the 20th century, a Palestinian people does now exist, and this national identity has crystallized in the course of their struggle for independence and recognition. Zionism could not have provoked Palestinian nationalism had there not been substantial antecedents. Indeed, Palestinian nationalism emerged as part of a nascent Arab national consciousness that had been growing among Arab-speaking peoples of the Levant for several decades toward the end of the 19th century. The constraint, of course, was that no jurisdictional territory of “Palestine” existed at the time. Thus, although Arab protests against Jewish immigration, which began at the turn of the 20th century, clearly marked an awareness of separate identity, the development of a “Palestinian” nationalism could not begin until the creation of the territory as a British Mandate following World War I. Internal social divisions constituted another constraint on the development of Palestinian nationalism. The Arab-speaking populations in the region that would eventually form Palestine were divided into numerous sectarian groups, including a small Jewish community. In addition, the Arab population was divided along urban-rural and class lines. In cities like Acre, Haifa, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, an educated upper class, the a‘yan, formed a land-owning gentry. In the countryside, the population was mainly made up of peasant tenant farmers, the fellahin, who worked land owned by absentee a‘yan landlords, and groups of herders who followed the ancient ways of the bedouin in peripheral regions like the Negev. After World War I, the British maneuvered to set up a mandate in Palestine— assembled from parts of three different Ottoman districts—to fulfill the Balfour Declaration’s pledge for the “establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.” The creation of the mandate territory began the process by which local Arab populations would develop a distinctly Palestinian national identity. Moreover, as the Jewish population in Palestine grew under the British Mandate, feelings of Palestinian nationalism intensified in reaction against the influx of foreign interlopers. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The struggle for the future of Palestine would rely largely on leadership. In contrast to innovative, cohesive leadership institutions in the growing Jewish community, the a‘yan who should have provided the natural leaders of the Palestinian cause relied on traditional religious and municipal institutions and remained divided by long-standing rivalries among powerful families like the Husaynis and Nashshashibis. As a result, for the first 10 or 15 years of the Mandate period, there was little effective leadership for the Palestinian Arabs, and the Palestinian people often took matters into their own hands. Popular opposition that had been sporadically expressed in the decades before World War I intensified with the resumption of Zionist immigration in the 1920s; deadly clashes occurred in 1920–1921 and 1928–1929, and a major Arab rebellion convulsed the territory from 1936–1939. Despite the lack of effective leadership, the Arab population of Palestine had begun what can only be called a national struggle, and it seems clear that, by the late 1930s, a distinctive Palestinian identity had begun to coalesce. In the wake of the Arab rebellion, the British reappraised their situation, and in a 1939 White Paper repudiated the Balfour N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Declaration and announced stringent limits on further Jewish immigration. The creation of an independent, Arab-controlled Palestinian state seemed within reach—but World War II proved its undoing. Some important Palestinian politicians, notably Hajj Amin al-Husayni, backed the Germans, hoping that their victory would lead to a quick British—and Jewish —expulsion from the Middle East. In the wake of the Allied victory, this collaboration undercut the Palestinian cause. In addition, the war also created enormous sympathy for the Zionist project once the horrors of the Holocaust became known; nothing could have more strongly vindicated the claim that a national state was absolutely necessary to protect the Jewish people. The pivotal event in the development of Palestinian nationalism would be the postwar establishment of the state of Israel. In early 1947, the British government turned the problem of Palestine’s future over to the United Nations. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly endorsed a partition plan, creating separate Arab and Jewish states. By this time, the British had already announced their plans for total withdrawal in May 1948. As Zionist and Palestinian forces fought for control of the country in the winter and spring of 1947–1948, five Arab nations—Egypt, Transjordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—prepared to invade, ostensibly in support of Palestinian independence. However, this Arab “coalition” was debilitated by political rivalries and, frankly, a lack of commitment to the Palestinian cause, as each nation sought to use the situation for its own advantage. Not surprisingly, the coalition forces performed poorly in the 1948 war. By the end of the year, both the Arab armies and Palestinian militias had been beaten back by the better-trained and betterequipped Israeli forces. By July 1949, all five Arab nations had signed armistice agreements with Israel, ending the war—known to the Israelis as the “War for Independence” and to the Palestinians simply as al-Nakba, “the Catastrophe.” The consequences of this catastrophe would be enormous. As many as 800,000 Palestinians fled their homes and lands, seeking refuge in Jordan, Egypt, and Lebanon, where they were treated like unwanted stepchildren, deprived of political and economic rights, and lived in miserable conditions. Moreover, in December 1948, the Israeli government decreed that Palestinian Arabs who had fled their homes during the fighting would lose their property rights, applying the rule even to those who had simply moved to another area under Israeli control. As a result, all 800,000 refugee Palestinians, and approximately 90 percent of the 150,000 Arabs still living in Israel, lost their homes and land.

Instituting the Nation Several individuals and groups have played key roles in establishing Palestinian national institutions, though this process is still ongoing and its outcome still unclear. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Dayr Yasin In the last stages of the civil war, just before the final British withdrawal from Palestine, the Jewish community in Jerusalem was cut off and under siege. The Palestinian strategy during the winter and spring of 1947–1948 had been to attack traffic on the roads leading to Jewish communities, effectively isolating them from one another. In early April 1948, the Israelis launched a major offensive to reopen the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. On April 9, a strike force led by IZL and Lehi (two radical Zionist commando groups) seized control of the Arab village of Dayr Yasin on the western outskirts of Jerusalem. Until that time, the residents of Dayr Yasin had remained neutral in the civil war and had offered little or no support to the Palestinian commandos of the Arab Liberation Army. Nonetheless, with the IZL-Lehi takeover, more than 100 residents of Dayr Yasin were killed and the remaining villagers either fled or were forcibly transferred to Arab-held East Jerusalem. IZL and Lehi suffered no more than five dead. Soon after the massacre, published accounts in both the Israeli and Arab press claimed a death count of 250 or more, and all sides had motives for exaggerating the scale of the atrocity. The official Israeli armed forces sought to discredit the irregulars of IZL and Lehi; the Arabs, to paint the Israelis as wanton aggressors; and IZL and Lehi, to provoke terror in the Arab population. And, in fact, the willingness of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs to flee their homes was certainly one of the main consequences of the Dayr Yasin massacre. Dayr Yasin remains one of the most emblematic events of al-Nakba.

In 1920, the British administration in Palestine removed Musa Kazim al-Husayni, the mayor of Jerusalem, from office, replacing him with Raghib al-Nashshashibi, and two prominent a‘yan families that had long been rivals then became bitter enemies. The Husaynis became the chief opponents of British rule in Palestine and, therefore, the presumptive leaders of a budding national movement. In December 1920, Musa Kazim, along with other Arab nationalists, organized the first of a series of Palestinian national congresses, which provided the beginnings of an institutional framework for the nationalist cause. Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who had been appointed mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, emerged as the most prominent Palestinian leader after Musa Kazim’s death in 1934. In 1936, Hajj Amin attempted to create a sense of Palestinian unity with the establishment of the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), which represented all major factions within the Palestinian Arab community. Within a year, though, most of the AHC leadership had been arrested and Hajj Amin forced to flee. He eventually landed in Berlin, where he lived from 1941 to 1945, actively supporting Germany’s war effort against those he saw as common enemies: the British and the Jews. Though this crippled Hajj Amin’s leadership position, he had identified the objectives of the national struggle and is still regarded as one of Palestine’s first national heroes. If Hajj Amin al-Husayni helped to identify the political objectives of Palestinian nationality, that is, the defeat of British and Zionist “colonialism,” Yasir Arafat N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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can be credited with transforming the movement into an armed struggle. In 1958, Arafat and several friends formed a militant group called Fatah (meaning “conquest” in Arabic and a reverse acronym for Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini, “Palestinian National Liberation Movement”), aimed at coordinating fidayin commando attacks against Israel. In 1964, the Arab League agreed to sponsor the formation of a party to represent the Palestinian people, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), though the PLO at first rejected belligerent actions like those advocated by Fatah. However, in 1967 the front-line Arab states and Palestinians suffered another bitter defeat at Israeli hands, and in the war’s aftermath, Fatah, which was clearly the best-organized Palestinian commando group, launched a series of raids into Israeli-held territory, establishing Arafat’s reputation as a national hero. In 1968 the PLO issued a new charter declaring that “armed struggle was the only means to liberate Palestine” and granted Fatah and other commando groups seats on the Palestine National Council. This led to Yasir Arafat’s election to head the PLO in 1969. His leadership signaled the end of the PLO’s status as a puppet of the Arab states, as he seemed determined to make it into an effective and independent nationalist organization. This determination, though, led Arafat and the PLO into a series of confrontations with Arab states that eventually forced his exile to Tunis. Arafat reached the apogee of his career with the signing of the Olso Accords in 1993 and his assumption of the presidency of the Palestinian Authority. Yet many hardliners condemned him as a traitor and collaborator, claiming that Arafat had conceded too much: the accords made no mention of a Palestinian state; territories promised to the Palestinians were isolated and included a relatively small fraction of the land, leading some to liken them to “Bantustans”; nor did the accords give any indication of ending Israeli settlement in the occupied territories. In the late 1990s, the Oslo process ground to a halt, and Arafat’s style of governing, more dictatorial than democratic and more corrupt than capable, opened him up to additional criticism from both within and outside the national movement. Moreover, Arafat became increasingly marginalized as Islamist groups like Hamas, which appeared to be beyond his control, aggressively assumed the initiative in the struggle to achieve Palestinian statehood. Nonetheless, his death in November 2004 brought a huge outpouring of grief that showed that many Palestinians still regarded him as a national hero. Hamas was an outgrowth of the Muslim Brotherhood, which had been active in the Gaza Strip since the 1950s, providing extensive welfare services to poor Palestinians and preaching a message of gradual social transformation. In the 1980s, with an organization already in place and with the PLO increasingly discredited, Islamists moved quickly to seize the initiative. In 1987 Shaykh Ahmad Yassin established the new militant organization (Hamas is an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, “Islamic National Movement,” and also means N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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President Bill Clinton (center) watches as Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin (left) and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat (right) shake hands at the ceremony for the signing of the historic Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (also known as the Oslo Accords) on September 13, 1993. (William J. Clinton Presidential Library)

“zeal” or “enthusiasm” in Arabic). With the goal of establishing an Islamic theocratic state in all of Palestine, including territory belonging to Israel, Hamas’s creation, in some ways, marked a return to the objectives of Hajj Amin and the AHC: the defeat and total expulsion of the Jews. Not surprisingly, this new organization had broad appeal, expressing as it did strong moral integrity and promising resolute action against the Israeli occupation. Before long, Hamas was outdoing all secular groups in violent action against Israeli targets, both military and civilian. Yassin’s assassination by Israeli forces in 2004 did not deter the self-sacrificing zeal of his followers; indeed, it made him a national martyr. As the 2006 Palestinian elections demonstrated, Hamas remains an important force in the institution of Palestinian national identity.

Defining the Nation Clearly, the definition of the Palestinian nation remains an ongoing task. Before World War I, the residents of what would become Palestine looked upon themN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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selves variously as Syrians, Arabs, Bedouin, and so forth. In the days of the Mandate, as the struggle against Zionism progressed, a distinct national identity began to emerge, though to some extent as a negative definition; that is, to be “Palestinian” meant to be a non-Jewish resident of the Mandate territory and included people of all classes and sectarian affiliations. Nonetheless, the uprising of the late 1930s signaled the emergence of a distinctly Palestinian national movement. After 1948, the deprivation of the Palestinian people, the loss of their lands and homes, and radical social revolutionary ideologies adopted by groups like Fatah, the PLO, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) added ideas of persecution and victimization. By the 1960s, Palestinians could be self-identified as those Arab peoples engaged in the struggle to liberate themselves and their lands from Israeli subjugation. Feelings of deprivation and alienation were enhanced as Palestinians living in neighboring Arab countries found themselves treated as outsiders. This sense of dispossession became a primary marker of Palestinian identity. For the first half century or more of its development, Palestinian nationalism remained explicitly secular, and even Islamic religious leaders like Hajj Amin alHusayni worked hard to include Christian Palestinians in the movement. Likewise, the political doctrines of Fatah, the PLO, and other organizations active in the movement since the 1950s had been drawn from secular social revolutionary sources, ranging from Fanon to Mao. But in the 1970s and 1980s, as the secular nationalist movement personified by Arafat and the PLO suffered repeated setbacks and seemed increasingly inept and corrupt, political Islam began to offer a strong contrast. With the growing strength of Islamist groups since the 1980s, inclusive definitions of previous generations appear to be weakening. Although Islamists like Hamas proclaim a pluralist vision of sovereign Palestine, it seems increasingly apparent that being Palestinian—or at least being a militant Palestinian—means being Muslim. What this bodes for Christian or nonobservant Palestinians and for the nation’s future remains unclear. Unless Islamist and secularist parties can reach some kind of accommodation, it seems likely that national identity will remain in dispute and the establishment of Palestinian statehood will remain in doubt.

Narrating the Nation While dramatic victories can be extremely important in creating a national epic, so can dramatic defeats. The most significant event in Palestinian history was al-Nakba, the catastrophic loss of the 1948 war. The Palestinian Arabs had begun this decisive battle confident in victory; after all, even after decades of Jewish immigration, they still formed a large majority in the territory, and even in the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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UN-designated Jewish state, Arabs constituted nearly half the population. Moreover, they had been assured military assistance by surrounding Arab states, whose combined armies would surely overwhelm the small Jewish defense force. There did not seem to be any possibility that Palestine could fail, and yet it did. This disaster embodies the essential characteristics of the Palestinian national saga: a valiant struggle against dispossession and betrayal. National mythologies assert that Palestine failed in 1948 because the British favored the Zionist cause and did everything possible to obstruct Palestinian Arab efforts to achieve statehood. In the ensuing war for control of Palestine, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians lost their homes, their lands, their livelihoods, and their self-respect. It is true that the British did little to help develop Arab-governing institutions under the Mandate and that the Mandate charter specified the establishment of such institutions only as they related to the creation of a Jewish homeland. In addition, it is said that al-Nakba occurred because Palestinians were deceived, misused, and betrayed by their fellow Arabs. Again, it is equally true that the military support promised by the Arab states fell far short of Palestinian expectations. None of the Arab countries committed a sizable percentage of their armed forces to this war, and their attacks quickly bogged down due to lack of coordination and lack of preparation. In fact, the Arab states were deeply divided by mutual mistrust, jealousy, and fear, and none really had any interest in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The twin themes of dispossession and duplicity remain powerful after more than half a century. The role played by the British in depriving the Palestinians of their land and hopes has been assumed by Israel, which continues to throw up obstacles to Palestinian statehood. Sometimes these barriers are figurative, like the foot-dragging negotiations following the 1993 Oslo Accords; sometimes they are literal, like the “security barrier” under construction since 2002. Additionally, as in 1948, other Arab countries have continued to let the Palestinian cause down, and it seems clear that Arab states’ support for Palestinian organizations has mainly been motivated by the desire to manipulate the Palestinian cause to achieve their own, sometimes conflicting political objectives. And finally, after generations of ineptitude and corruption, the Palestinian people feel that even their own leaders betrayed them, as well.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Since the catastrophe, the Palestinian national cause has undergone significant development. The two decades from 1967 to 1987 were years of defeat and retreat for the Palestinian nation. Swift Israeli advances into the Gaza Strip and West Bank during the 1967 war brought the last remaining Palestinian territories under occupation and created another 100,000 refugees. In addition, the PLO was N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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twice forced to relocate its headquarters during this period, from Jordan to Lebanon in 1971, then from Lebanon to Tunisia in 1982; the last relocation represented a dramatic setback since it removed the organization hundreds of miles from its homeland. The beginning of a popular uprising in December 1987 marked a significant turning point. Like the 1936–1939 revolt, the Intifada (“shaking off ”), as it soon came to be called, represented a spontaneous popular expression of Palestinian frustration. Once again, lacking effective leadership, the people pushed the movement ahead. Over the course of the next five years, hundreds of Palestinians would die, and thousands more would be arrested, but the revolt also gained enormous sympathy for the Palestinian cause as the Intifada made it clear that the Palestinian people were not prepared to accept an open-ended occupation of their territories. The PLO’s announcement of willingness to recognize Israel’s sovereignty, and the Knesset’s authorization of official contacts with the PLO, led to the Oslo Accords of 1993. Once again, the cause of Palestinian nationalism seemed on the brink of success; yet once again this would prove a false hope. Violence by radicals on both sides undermined the peace, and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 removed the Israeli leader most likely to achieve a lasting resolution. Since the mid-1990s, the PLO has continued to founder, disabled by ineffectual leadership and Israeli intransigence. The ongoing failure of Palestine’s secular leadership to achieve national independence has increased the appeal of militant Islamist groups, and the future of the national movement remains quite uncertain. Clearly, the Palestinian movement is splitting between secular and Islamist interests, and each focuses on differing approaches to mobilize support. Since the 1980s, the PLO has sought ways to mitigate Israeli control over Palestinian populations, thus achieving some sense of relief from oppression, while at the same time maintaining a measured level of militant pressure on the Israelis through organizations like the Al-‘Aqsa Martyrs to retain credibility among the general population. In addition, Arafat and others attempted to build bridges to other Arab leaders, hoping to win genuine support for the cause. Islamists, though, have rejected these incremental strategies and limited goals. Instead they have returned to the original far-reaching objective of the first Palestinian nationalists, promising nothing short of the emancipation of all of Palestine, including territory now constituting the “Zionist entity” (i.e., Israel) and perhaps beyond. Thus, they assure the Palestinian people not only of their liberation from Israeli subjugation but also that duplicitous Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan may one day be punished. Secularists and Islamists both seek full Palestinian sovereignty, but the means of constructing the Palestinian state, as well as its final form, remain in dispute. While the original objective of the national movement was to retain control of all of Palestine, the reverses of the last six decades forced secularist groups like the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Death of Arafat More than any other man, Yasir Arafat was responsible for the making of the Palestinian nation. Unlike Hajj Amin al-Husayni, Arafat had not relied on tradition to establish his leadership but was a self-made man who had launched his political career as a hero in the armed struggle against Israel. While still a young student in Cairo, he had cofounded the Fatah commando organization; within a decade he had become the best-known Palestinian freedom fighter and the acknowledged leader of the armed struggle to achieve nationhood. However, though his status as fidayin leader won him the leadership of the Palestinian cause, it crippled his ability to negotiate effectively with Israeli governments, which viewed him as nothing more than a terrorist. To the end of his days, the Israelis would deal with him only under duress and put every effort into keeping him isolated. Many therefore came to see him as an obstacle to peace and to the establishment of a Palestinian state and hoped that after his death in November 2004 these objectives might be achieved. That they have not is perhaps an indication of how irrelevant Arafat had, in fact, become.

PLO to retreat from this winner-take-all position and agree to accept a smaller share of the land in return for achieving independence. The Islamists, though, are clearly less willing to accept compromise on this issue. Nor are they as willing to fudge the question of the “right of return” for dispossessed Palestinians. The sweeping victory for Hamas in the elections of January 2006 may indicate that the majority of Palestinians strongly favor the Islamists’ unconditional position. Just as likely, though, it represents frustration with a dozen years of ineffective and corrupt government by Fatah. As has happened so many times in the past, the people felt let down by their leadership and sought dramatic action, this time through the ballot box. Following the election, relations between Fatah and Hamas continued to deteriorate, and their conflicting visions of the nation’s future led them to the brink of full-blown civil war by early 2007. In February 2007, King Abdullah of Jordan, rightly concerned about the implications of Palestinian civil war for his own country, partnered with the Saudi government to broker a power-sharing deal between Fatah and Hamas, known as the Mecca Agreement. Nonetheless, it took five weeks of further negotiations between the two parties to agree on the formation of a cabinet, as each sought the upper hand. Moreover, the United States and Israel have refused to recognize this “national unity” government, which undoubtedly means that both will continue to interfere in internal Palestinian politics and pressure Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas to end the partnership with Hamas. Likewise, the Iranian government has been providing Hamas with arms, money, and training and has no desire to see a rapprochement between the Palestinians and Israel. Predictably, mutual mistrust arising from an unbridgeable ideological gap, coupled with susceptibility to outside influence, quickly led to another break between Fatah and Hamas. By mid-2007, gun battles between militia forces deployed N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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by the two parties had again broken out, resulting in the partition of Palestinian territories between Hamas (in Gaza) and Fatah (in the West Bank). It seems increasingly likely that this dispute may not be resolved until one side has crushed the other. Even that outcome holds little promise for furthering the national cause, hence, yet again, a failure of leadership will have frustrated the aspirations of the Palestinian people. Selected Bibliography Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf), with Eric Rouleau. 1981. My Home, My Land: A Narrative of the Palestinian Struggle. New York: New York Times Books. Aburish, Said K. 1998. Arafat: From Defender to Dictator. London: Bloomsbury Press. Finkelstein, Norman G. 2003. Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict. 2nd ed. London: Verso. Gelvin, James L. 2005. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: One Hundred Years of War. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hart, Alan. 1994. Arafat: A Political Biography. Rev. ed. London: Sidgewick & Jackson. Hroub, Khaled. 2000. Hamas: Political Thought and Practice. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. Khalidi, Rashid. 1997. Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness. New York: Columbia University Press. Khalidi, Rashid. 2006. The Iron Cage: The Story of the Struggle for Palestinian Statehood. Boston: Beacon Press. Milton-Edwards, Beverley. 1999. Islamic Politics in Palestine. London: I. B. Taurus & Co. Mishal, Shaul, and Avraham Sela. 2000. The Palestinian Hamas: Vision, Violence and Coexistence. New York: Columbia University Press. Pappe, Ilan. 2006. A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples. 2nd ed. New York: Cambridge University Press. Rogan, Eugene L., and Avi Shlaim, eds. 2001. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Said, Edward W. 1992. The Question of Palestine. New York: Vintage Books. Said, Edward W. 2001a. The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After. New York: Vintage Books. Said, Edward W. 2001b. Out of Place: A Memoir. New York: Vintage Books. Smith, Charles D. 2001. Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s. Tessler, Mark. 1994. A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Whitelam, Keith W. 1996. The Invention of Ancient Israel: The Silencing of Palestinian History. London: Routledge.


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South Africa Christopher Paulin and Kathleen Woodhouse Chronology 1877 Great Britain annexes the independent South African Republic, known as the Transvaal. 1880 The organization Afrikaner Bond is formed to maintain Boer political rights and cultural heritage. 1880–1881 To regain their independence, Afrikaners from the South African Republic declare a republic. 1881 Great Britain agrees to the retrocession of the Transvaal in 1881 through the Pretoria Convention but maintains control over its foreign affairs. 1884 Great Britain grants complete autonomy to the Transvaal through the London Convention. 1899–1902 War erupts between the British empire and the two independent Afrikaner republics, ending in their defeat and the creation of a federated South Africa. 1912 South Africa is granted dominion status. 1913–1914 J. B. M. Hertzog establishes the National Party (NP) to give voice to rising Afrikaner nationalism. 1918 Broederbund secret society is founded to promote Afrikaner nationalism. 1924 The NP in coalition with the Labour Party wins an electoral victory raising, Hertzog to prime minister. 1933 NP merges with the pro-British South African Party to create the United Party. 1933–1934 Daniel F. Malan establishes the Purified National Party, later the National Party. 1948 The National Party gains control over the South African government and will remain in power until 1994. 1952 First official legislation for what will become known as apartheid. 1989 Election of Prime Minister de Klerk; reforms begin. 1990 Nelson Mandela is granted freedom by the prime minister. 1994 The end of apartheid; democratic elections are held.

Situating the Nation Afrikaner nationalism teetered over the years between the need for freedom from European influence and dominance and the quest for a common identity. The majority of Afrikaners live in present-day South Africa, with others scattered further north or on entirely different continents. The country of South Africa contains a fascinating mix of communities, all with their own history and sense of self. The “rainbow nation,” as it is often called, has attempted to include all of the races and ethnic groups living within its borders. Black Africans make up the majority, with about 79 percent, whites total 9.6 percent, colored peoples make up 8.9 percent, and Indian/Asian groups, 2.5 percent. During the years of Afrikaner N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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rule, particularly apartheid, the country was divided along racial lines. Its vast territory of plateaus and farming land was parceled out to different communities. Today, South Africa borders Namibia (formerly part of South Africa), Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique. It also provides the majority of Swaziland’s border and completely envelopes Lesotho. It is difficult to judge the number of Afrikaners living in present-day South Africa because the census does not cover ethnicity. Looking at race and language, it appears that over 2 million of the country’s inhabitants belong to this group. Afrikaners are the descendants of Europeans, particularly the Dutch, who migrated from the northwest. The establishment of the Dutch East India Company at the Cape of Good Hope attracted many seeking a change in life or fleeing religious persecution. The first colony established itself in 1652, mostly comprised of Dutch farmers and traders. The term Afrikaner emerged in 1707 as these Europeans began to view themselves as Africans belonging to this new land. Due to the amazing landscape and resources of the South Africa region, the Afrikaners were largely farmers, or Boers. These farmers settled originally in the cape region but began to migrate due to conflicts with local tribes and the need for farmable land. Two wars followed during which the Afrikaners fought for their rights to freedom and control of South Africa. Today, the community resides in various parts of the country, with a large number in the urban areas.

Instituting the Nation The origins of Afrikaner nationalism emerged with the British annexation of the South African Republic in 1877. Previous struggles and changes such as the series of resettlements called the Great Trek (1830s) and the establishment of two independent Boer Republics, Transvaal (1852) and the Orange Free State (1854), suggest a divide in the Afrikaner mindset. The Dutch Reformed church leaders frowned upon the exodus of thousands of Afrikaners from the British-controlled Cape Colony, fearing the moral degradation of Boers living among Africans outside the church community. The church played a pivotal role in reinforcing the notion that the Afrikaners were a chosen people, with the right to their land. However, this did little to slow the changes in this region. The two provinces also tended to act in opposition with the designs of Cape Colony Afrikaners, particularly in regards to land. Friction resulted from the constant drain of resources from the Cape Colony due to wars between independent African polities and the Afrikaner republics. However, differences began to fade after the British sent Theophilus Shepstone to annex the republics on April 12, 1877. The South African Republic at that time was engaged in a disastrous war against the Pedi people residing in the northern parts of South Africa. The annexation officially was to prevent the slaughter of the Transvaal European population. In reality, however, the need for cheap African labor and the lure of diamond mining had inspired the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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British involvement in the region. Shepstone alleged his good intentions of helping the Transvaal Boers with the protection of the British army, however consent from the republic’s president or the Volksraad was never given. Britain’s refusal to retrocede the Transvaal through peaceful means stemmed from the fact that annexation had created a more favorable labor situation for the diamond mines at Kimberley. This refusal, however, led to a forceful resolve by the Boers to regain their freedom. On December 13, 1880, Paul Kruger, along with Piet Joubert and Marthinus Pretorius, declared a republic. Transvaal Boers ambushed the small British force, thus triggering the First Anglo-British War. After several defeats, Britain granted Transvaal autonomy for local politics but maintained control of foreign affairs, including relations with other African nations. Afrikaner nationalism received a boost, though, as a result of the Second or Great Anglo-Boer War from 1899 to 1902. President Paul Kruger of Transvaal ordered a preemptive strike against the British as the desire for an independent state increased. The Orange Free State and Boers from the Cape Colony took up arms as well. A key ideology clearly emerged during this time: the idea of Afrikaners as a persecuted people.


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The British fight the Boers at the Battle of Belmont on November 23, 1899, during the Boer War. The second of two conflicts centering on the Transvaal Republic and the Orange Free State, the war of 1899–1902 was the result of British determination to dominate areas of South Africa that had been settled by the Boers and were growing in economic strength. (Library of Congress)

After the South African provinces gained some autonomy from the British, several political parties emerged. The establishment of the National Party of South Africa in 1914 became the first nationalist party. It included a young Daniel François Malan, a preacher in the Dutch Reformed church. The National Party (NP), known for its disapproval of entering World War I, played an important role in furthering the use and development of Afrikaans as the people’s language. The NP appealed to poor whites by founding two companies, the South African National Trust Company and the South African National Life Assurance Company. The two focused on aiding Afrikaners in economic distress. They catered exclusively to this clientele, using only Afrikaner capital and investing exclusively in Afrikaner businesses. In turn these companies played a key role in gaining the NP its popularity through grassroots measures. Among other things, they provided relief to families whose husbands fought against participating in World War I. Furthermore, banking in South Africa lay entirely in British hands until this point, offering few loans to Afrikaners. The NP realized the importance of supporting this community as well as driving a wedge between poor whites and poor blacks who may have united due to their economic circumstances. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Afrikaner Broederbond (Brotherhood), comprised of mainly Dutch Reformed church ministers, government bureaucrats, teachers, and other professionals, was initially formed in secret. The Brotherhood became a powerful force behind the scenes, manipulating many political affairs because of its impressive membership. Post–World War I depression led to growth of both the Brotherhood and the NP, especially after the mineworkers’ strike of 1922. The government’s breaking of the strike resulted in the deaths of 80 workers, bringing Afrikaner nationalists closer together. A coalition of the NP and the new Labour Party influenced the following elections. Prime Minister James Barry Munnik Hertzog showed support of poorer Afrikaner whites by setting ratios for whiteblack employment in the mining industry, giving management to whites only. During the 1930s, the merging of the NP with the South African Party created the United Party, which controlled the government until 1948. Many Afrikaners viewed this alliance as antinationalist, spurring D. F. Malan to found a new opposition party, the Purified National Party. The Brotherhood and the National Party played a significant role in maintaining Afrikaner control throughout the decades of apartheid. Upon the election of Nelson Mandela, the new NP continued to be a powerful party. Other groups, such as the Afrikaner Bond and the extreme-right Afrikaner Resistance Movement, appealed to a wide range of whites, depending on their political convictions. The Dutch Reformed church stretched its power not only across political boundaries but also into other institutions such as education. Not only did classrooms emphasize the allegiance and belief in a free Afrikaner nation but they highlighted important aspects of self-identity. Afrikaners desired a deep religious content to be added to the syllabus. Christianity was a part of their pedagogy, largely because they could interpret texts to support their beliefs in Afrikaner purity. The allocation of South Africa to the Afrikaners was explained via the educa-

The Afrikaner Resistance Movement Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) was founded as a political and paramilitary group. Seen as a white supremacy group, members grew from seven to several thousand in the 1970s and 1980s. Founded in the 1970s by Eugène Terre’Blanche in a small town outside of Johannesburg, this group initially focused its attention on the dwindling power of the white government. The AWB based its convictions on traditional Boer values, striving to establish a free Boer state and all that was lost after the Anglo-Boer War. The group objected particularly to the ANC, which they believed welded too much influence in local politics (though the party was banned at this time). The NP government never took the party particularly seriously, though officials did squelch AWB riots in the mid-1980s. The group gained international infamy in 1994 when they were defeated in Bophuthatswana (a Northwest homeland). After shooting at residents and wreaking havoc on the area, the Bophuthatswana military was able to subdue Terre’Blanche’s group. Since the imprisonment and then release of Terre’Blanche in 2004, the AWB activities have greatly subsided.


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tional system as part of the divine plan or Providence. For instance, the theory of evolution was not taught because it clearly removed divine reasons for South Africa’s existence and the Afrikaner as God’s chosen people. Faculty was highly encouraged to belong to the Purified National Party and the Broederbund.

Defining the Nation The ideology of an Afrikaner people distinct from both the English and their own Dutch ancestors emerged in two movements: one cultural, the other political. The cultural movement stemmed from an attempt to create a formal, written Afrikaans language, generally referred to as Taal. Because Afrikaners descended from several European countries, differences between groups existed. Two brothers, Reverend Stephanus Jacobus (founder of Afrikaner Bond) and Daniel du Toit, emerged as pioneers in developing the Afrikaans language. They provided a translation of the Bible into Afrikaans along with a newspaper and also started the Society of Afrikaner Rights to protect the emerging language. Targeting language as a means of developing identity proved challenging at first. Not all Boers were eager to abandon their traditional Dutch tongue. Some, including the influential Cape Colony Afrikaner Jan Hofmeyr, saw this language as an affront to both God and Afrikaners, calling it a “kitchen language.” The tension associated with using Afrikaans was echoed through communities as the simplified language that allowed masters to easily talk to their African servants. However, using the language as a foundation would pave the way to believing God created separate nations and languages, and ignoring this was akin to blasphemy. D. F. Malan, who propagated an extreme nationalism, focused his attention on language as well. Ideas taken from Dutch Reformed church minister Abraham Kuyper pressed the notion that nation and language are divine creations. Preserving the purity of the nation was essentially obeying God’s command. This idea, along with the church’s ideology and the rise of Nazi Germany, further formed the Purified National Party’s extreme beliefs. Afrikaans slowly blossomed and became an official language in the 1920s. In June 1976, the government designated Afrikaans as the language for teaching in schools. This announcement reaped considerable backlash from blacks living in the area outside of Johannesburg, the last straw for many and helping to solidify the Black Consciousness Movement. Violence continued, followed by considerable backlash from officials. Today, the language is recognized as only one of 11 official languages. With changes in the mentality of whites, many “Coloured” South Africans now speak Afrikaans as well. This result has caused interesting changes within the community. Self-identity as a persecuted people also contributed to Afrikaner nationalism. The Great Anglo-Boer War offered one of the first obvious examples of persecution. Two other poignant examples included the burning of Boer farms and the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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internment of Afrikaner women and children, which became focal points over the generations. The high number of deaths of women and children in the concentration camps due to disease provided sympathetic martyrs for nationalists. Over the period that followed, relations between the Afrikaners and the British ameliorated as the colonialists began to achieve a status of equality with Europeans. The beginning of World War I demonstrated this newfound ease, as many believed it their duty to fight alongside the British. Not all Afrikaners agreed, however, causing the eruption of new rebellions among nationalists. Even under the apartheid government, Afrikaners fell back on their important history of persecution and rights to land. This attitude justified not only their strong sense of community but their actions as well.

Narrating the Nation Many events and individuals contribute to the Afrikaner nation’s memory. Initial struggles to gain a foothold in the region and build a common identity continue to be significant to the people. Aside from the rich tradition of poetry and music, specific days in history help symbolize the Afrikaner mentality. During the initial settling of the Great Trek, a war began due to complications between the Trek leaders Piet Retief and Gerrit Maritz and the Zulu tribe. Though previously an understanding existed between the two groups, the death of the Afrikaner leaders, followed by the murder of hundreds of Afrikaner women and children, brought the need for retaliation. A group of 470 attacked 10,000 Zulus at the Battle of Blood River. Their determination and firearms won them victory with only three injuries, whereas the Zulus lost 3,000 men. This victory became less of a simple win and more of a defining moment in Afrikaner history. The people had vowed to God that, if they succeeded, December 16 would be honored as the Day of the Vow. In postapartheid Africa, the day is celebrated as the Day of Reconciliation. Over the decades, many Afrikaners dressed in traditional Boer clothing and reenacted many day-to-day farming rituals as a means of honoring this special day. The symbols associated with strong convictions and emotional ties to the land illustrate the importance of Boer history even to younger Afrikaners. Many key figures have played important roles in symbolizing and leading the effort toward a cohesive Afrikaner nation. Paul Kruger, known as the Boer resistance leader, led many efforts to help gain independence from British rule in the 1800s in the Transvaal. A former vice president of the South African Republic, he became the voice of retrocession after the former president, Thomas Burghers, accepted a pension from the British government. Kruger traveled to London in 1877 to urge the Colonial Office to grant Transvaal Afrikaners their independence. His plea fell on deaf ears. Upon his return to southern Africa, Kruger drummed up support for independence among the Transvaal Boers and held a series of meetN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ings in which differences among them were set aside in support of the movement. This national spirit seemed to spill over to Cape Colony Afrikaners, especially those within its parliament. Desire for independence swelled to dangerous levels after the British removed the immediate African threats, the Pedi and the Zulu. Kruger remains an important figure in Afrikaner history. Cecil John Rhodes also gained notoriety in the Afrikaner community. British born, he favored British influence but also decried the so-called “Imperial Factor” as meddlesome. A businessman and a politician, he was both pro- and anti-Boer during his career. He became prime minister of the Cape Colony but lost the position as a result of the Jameson Raid, which further united the Afrikaners against British interests. This event inevitably paved the way to the Second Boer War. In more recent times, Prime Minister de Klerk is seen as one of the most influential Afrikaners of the 20th century. His leadership toward abolishing apartheid gained him mixed reviews in his community. However, the younger generations have responded in a positive manner.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation While the majority of events that helped define Afrikaners took place during the formation of the community and fights against the British, the 20th century was dominated by the need to maintain Afrikaner dominance through apartheid. Apartheid classified people through a racial system and created a political framework to ensure economic and political dominance for the white category. The main categories were white, black, colored, and Indian. Jan Christiaan Smuts, as leader of the NP, ran under the platform of apartheid, which continued until the 1990s. By the end of the 19th century, whites owned the vast majority of land through the government or by surveyed titles. After their involvement in both world wars, Afrikaners were ready to explore their position in South Africa. Prime Minister Malan, elected in 1948, appealed to newly successful whites. During the earlier part of the century, Afrikaners began to move to urban areas as jobs pulled them away from the traditional Boer farms. Malan’s government promised reforms catered especially to the white ruling class. The idea of apartheid was established to create a definite divide between whites and other races. For example, the Population Registration Act provided a method for each race to remain separate, such as outlawing interracial marriage. Each town was required to decide who would own or occupy property through the Group Areas Act. Whites benefited greatly under these laws, especially when land reforms made the most lucrative employment available to them. The apartheid government also set up “homelands” to help separate the races geographically, making states for each group. This segregation hindered others, particularly blacks, from economic opportunity and voting. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd Verwoerd served as South Africa’s leader from 1958 until his assassination in 1966. Born in the Netherlands, he lived in several areas including Rhodesia and the Orange Free State. A great deal of mystery surrounds his studies and interests. Many accused Verwoerd of being influenced by German philosophers, particularly during the rise of Nazism. Though this has never been proven, he did take particular interest in the ideas of Social Darwinism. After a yearlong stint in Germany, he returned to South Africa and became politically active. Many refer to him as the principal “architect” of apartheid during his role as minister of native affairs. His distaste for the British Crown was apparent during his premiership, when South Africa finally left the Commonwealth. In 1960 he was shot by David Pratt but recovered from the injuries. In 1966, he was stabbed to death in the House of Ministries by Dimitri Tsafendas, who claimed that the worm in his stomach made him kill the politician. Verwoerd’s influences and ideology may have been controversial at the time, but he remains one of the most important Afrikaner figures of the 20th century.

Though Prime Minister Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd recommended creating industrial jobs on homeland boundaries, the government refused to fund the project. These homeland areas survived until the 1980s when corruption and uprisings finally destroyed the system. During this time, the African National Congress (ANC) was viewed by Afrikaners as their main threat. This pro-African party gained substantial support during the first portion of the 20th century. The initial movement relied on nonviolent confrontation but, nonetheless, raised concern within the white government. In the 1960s the Afrikaners pushed for pro-white reforms within the political system. These actions spurred violent protests from the African population. In response to these events, the government banned the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Prime Minister Verwoerd encouraged his government to leave the British Commonwealth, inciting more activity from the ANC. Nelson Mandela, along with his fellow instigators, were captured and given life sentences. After a harsh economic depression in the early 1980s, the Afrikaners were now represented by Pieter Willem Botha, who fought to keep white dominance intact. Among other things, he desired an ethnically separated house of parliament for each race category. Ultimately, due to the homeland system and other obstacles, this plan allowed for no African representation. Lack of representation incited new violence among nonwhite groups. The government’s inability to control the violence and changes within the government incited a small increase in popularity of the Afrikaner extreme right (AWB). Though this group looked to overthrow the Botha government, the 1989 election brought NP leader Frederik Willem de Klerk to power. Prime Minister de Klerk ushered in a new type of Afrikaner who was raised under the apartheid government. Surprisingly, his govN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ernment saw the mounting violence of other groups as a major threat to South Africa’s very survival and moved to abolish apartheid. Prime Minister de Klerk released Nelson Mandela in 1990, a signal to both national and international communities that the Afrikaner government was ready to change. Internationally, the Afrikaner government had been viewed unfavorably, an outlook aggravated by its refusal to support sanctions against the white government in Rhodesia. The de Klerk government continued to make strides toward sculpting a new South Africa. The prime minister attended celebrations for the newly independent Nambia, formerly South West Africa. He and Nelson Mandela worked closely together and were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993. The major opposition at this time was from the AWB. Fearing that these changes would move Afrikaners further from their traditional Boer past, the AWB continually appealed to the NP. However, these appeals had little effect. April 1994 marked the end of the lengthy white rule. The first democratic election held was both chaotic and inspiring. The black population was finally given a voice, and the ANC was named victorious with Nelson Mandela as their leader. Today, the Afrikaners are adjusting to the new South Africa much like all the other racial groups. Though many roadblocks still exist, the country has made strides in reallocating land, helping individuals in need of economic support, and attempting to foster understanding among groups. As the country deals with heavy burdens, such as the AIDS epidemic, the sense of Afrikaner nationalism is constantly changing. While the community no longer enjoys the economic and political benefits of the past, many Afrikaners have maintained their positions in society. Though it is difficult to say what direction Afrikaner nationalism will take, its strong roots will help keep the community together. Selected Bibliography Du Toit, Andre, and Hermann Giliomee. 1983. Afrikaner Political Thought: Analysis & Documents. Berkeley: University of California Press. Giliomee, Hermann. 2003. The Afrikaners: Biography of a People. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Keegan, Timothy. 1996. Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Marks, Shula, and Richard Rathbone, eds. 1982. Industrialization and Social Change in South Africa: African Class Formation, Culture, and Consciousness, 1870–1930. New York: Longman. Marks, Shula, and Stanley Trapido, eds. 1987. The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth-Century South Africa. New York: Longman. Moodie, T. Dunbar. 1975. The Rise of Afrikanerdom: Power, Apartheid, and the African Civil Religion. Berkeley: University of California Press. O’Meara, Dan. 1983. Volkskapitalisme: Class, Capital, and Ideology in the Development of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1934–1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paulin, Christopher M. 2001. White Men’s Dreams, Black Men’s Blood: African Labor and British Expansionism in Southern Africa, 1877–1895. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc.


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Schreuder, D. M. 1969. Gladstone and Kruger: Liberal Government and Colonial “Home Rule,” 1880–1885. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Shillington, Kevin. 1987. History of Southern Africa. Harlow, UK: Longman. Templin, J. Alton. 1984. Ideology on a Frontier: The Theological Foundation of Afrikaner Nationalism, 1652–1910. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Thompson, Leonard. 1985. The Political Mythology of Apartheid. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.


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Congo and Zaïre Kevin C. Dunn Chronology 1878–1887 Henry Morton Stanley is hired by Belgium’s King Leopold II to establish trading posts and acquire land throughout the Congo River basin. 1884–1885 At the Berlin Conference, Leopold II obtains personal sovereignty over the Congo, which soon becomes known as the Congo Free State. 1908 Facing growing international criticism, Leopold II agrees to sell the colony to the Belgian government. 1959 Anticolonial riots erupt at Leopoldville and several other cities. 1960 The Congo becomes independent on June 30, with Patrice Lumumba as prime minister. Mutinies within the armed forces break out on July 5. Katanga secedes, and the United Nations intervenes. Patrice Lumumba is captured and eventually murdered. 1961–1965 Continued political instability and civil war. 1965 Failed elections are held in March. The military seizes power on November 24 and installs Joseph Mobutu as head of state. 1966 The Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) is formed. City names are Africanized beginning in May. 1970 Elections are held with Mobutu as sole candidate. The MPR is declared the sole political party and supreme institution of the country. The country is renamed Zaïre the following year. 1990 Under internal and external pressure, Mobutu announces the end of the one-party state. 1996 Rebels, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, launch an offensive in the eastern part of the country, rapidly gaining strength and quickly moving westward. 1997 Kinshasa falls to the rebels on May 17. Mobutu flees, and Laurent-Désiré Kabila proclaims himself president and changes the country’s name back to the Congo. Mobutu dies in exile.

Situating the Nation Like most African states, the Congo was a colonial invention. Subsequently, the seeds of Congolese nationalism were generated largely from within and in opposition to the colonial experience. While the development and manifestations of Congolese nationalism are admittedly complex and often contradictory, this chapter will focus on three specific phases in the development of Congolese/Zaïrian nationalism from 1945 to the 1980s: the colonial experience, the short tenure of Patrice Lumumba, the Congo’s first prime minister, and the lengthy reign of Mobutu Sese Seko, during which the country was renamed Zaïre. Each phase contributed distinct elements within the development of a national identity for the Congo. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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European conquest and colonization of the Congo was overseen by Belgian King Leopold II and executed via his colonial agents, most notably Henry Morton Stanley, a young American newspaper reporter turned explorer. Under the guise of various international associations, Leopold II directed Stanley to establish treaties with local African leaders that would cede their land to the Belgian Crown (not the Belgian state), thus establishing the groundwork for a colonial state. Leopold II was able to achieve international recognition for his personal rule over the Congo River basin at the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference. International outcry, led by the Congo Reform Association, later arose as mounting evidence emerged concerning the severity of Leopold II’s colonial rule and his monopolization of trade and resources. In 1908, Leopold II gave in to the growing international pressure and sold the colony to the Belgian state, which assumed control over the colonial government. In the wake of Belgium’s inheritance of the Congo from Leopold II, the colonial state instituted a colonial practice termed “Paternalism,” with an overt emphasis on the white man as “father” and African as “child.” While arguing that some progress had been made in civilizing the Congolese people, the Belgian colonial project maintained that, by and large, they remained precariously close to their savage roots and were still evolving. This claim justified the Belgian colonial N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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project’s strict control over most aspects of Congolese daily life. The policy was articulated in Governor-General Pierre Ryckman’s 1948 treatise Dominer Pour Servir (Dominate to Serve). This paternal metaphor continued to inform Belgian colonial policy until the granting of independence in 1960. A significant development during Belgian colonial rule was the emergence of an indigenous elite social class called évolués—Congolese who had relatively advanced education and/or civil service jobs. For the colonial government, the évolués were regarded as symbols of their “civilizing” mission. Évolués were defined by the colonial government as those blacks in the midst of the transition from “traditional” tribal customs to Western “developed” culture. The colonial state engaged in the act of measuring and documenting the level of “civilization” individual Congolese had reached, going as far as introducing the Carte du Mérite Civique, which was awarded to Africans who could prove that they were “living in a state of civilization.” An African had to go through an application process to show that he or she was free of “uncivilized” practices, such as polygamy, witchcraft, and theft. It was within the évolués milieu that Congolese nationalism was incubated. By midcentury, the évolués were pressing for a greater voice in the colony’s future and articulating a nascent Congolese national identity. The nationwide publication La Voix du Congolais became a forum for indigenous ideas and art, helping construct, in Benedict Anderson’s terminology, an “imagined community” among Congolese elites. Yet, most of the political and social changes that were granted were largely reserved for the évolués and not the masses, which further incited general anticolonial sentiment. But there were few accepted outlets for anticolonial or nationalist expressions. Because the colonial state only permitted “cultural” or “mutual self-help” indigenous associations, most of the political movements that emerged during the colonial era, such as the Alliance des Bakongo (ABAKO), were firmly rooted in ethnic or regional identities. Anticolonial activities were thus generally expressed within ethnic and/or regional, not national, frameworks. The Belgian colonial government experienced an unexpected surprise in January 1959 as powerful anticolonial riots broke out in Leopoldville, the capital of

Évolués Évolués was the term used to describe Congolese who were assimilated into European lifestyles. The product of the Belgian colonial policy of “Paternalism,” this elite social class enjoyed relatively advanced education and/or civil service jobs. Regarded as symbols of the colonial “civilizing” mission, the évolués were awarded the Carte du Mérite Civique, signifying that they were “living in a state of civilization.” By the mid-1950s, the évolués actively pressed for a greater voice in the colony’s future. Most évolués were from urban areas and moved into positions of leadership after independence.


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the Belgian Congo. Most Belgians assumed that the nationalist movements sweeping across Africa would somehow bypass their colony. The colonial government had long maintained that the Congolese had neither political consciousness nor engagement. In the wake of the 1959 riots, the Belgian government moved quickly to decolonize. On June 30, 1960, the Belgian Congo became the independent Republic of the Congo. The political structures put in place were similar to the Belgian parliamentary system, and in national elections, Patrice Lumumba was elected prime minister. In a gesture of national unity, Lumumba created a unity government with his chief rival, ABAKO’s Joseph Kasavubu, as president. However, on July 5, 1960, several units in the Congolese army mutinied, demanding promotions, pay raises, and the removal of white officers. As rioting and unrest spread, Belgian troops stationed in the Congo intervened and actively engaged the Congolese army and civilians, further increasing the volatility of the situation. Illustrating the absence of strong national cohesion, the southern province of Katanga announced its secession. In response, Lumumba and Kasavubu asked for military assistance from the United Nations. The United Nations responded by sending a multinational force to the Congo to “restore law and order.” But the internal political situation quickly worsened, with President Kasavubu, Prime Minister Lumumba, and Gen. Joseph Mobutu each claiming national leadership. Despite being under UN protection/house-arrest, Lumumba managed to escape from Leopoldville but was soon captured. Lumumba was then flown to Katanga, where he was handed over to the secessionist forces, beaten, tortured, and eventually murdered. After several years of political instability and civil war, Joseph Mobutu seized power in 1965. After consolidating his control of the country, Mobutu launched several campaigns to define, narrate, and instill a national identity for the country, which he renamed “Zaïre.” Mobutu’s project of nationalism was largely an attempt by a segment of Congolese to define and inscribe their own identity within an international context that had heretofore portrayed the Congo in almost exclusively negative terms (e.g., the “Heart of Darkness”). In an attempt to foster a

Patrice Lumumba (1925–1961) The Congo’s first prime minister, Lumumba was born on July 2, 1925, in the Kasai province. He rose to political prominence in Stanleyville after helping found the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), which he attempted to make into a nationally based political party. He participated in the 1960 Brussels Round Table Conference, which established the terms of Congolese independence. After the MNC scored significant victories in the May 1960 election, Lumumba became prime minister and defense minister of the new Congolese government. After the army’s uprising and Mobutu’s coup, Lumumba was captured and eventually flown to the secessionist region of Katanga, where he was murdered under mysterious circumstances.


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His arms roped behind him, ousted Congolese premier Patrice Lumumba is captured by troops loyal to Col. Joseph Mobutu in 1960. Lumumba was killed in early 1961, exacerbating the violence that began shortly after independence and continued for years under Mobutu’s dictatorship. (Bettmann/Corbis)

sense of national identity, Mobutu began a renaming campaign in 1966 and introduced the philosophy of authenticité and the political/economic program of “Zaïrianisation.” In later years, the regime also introduced a cult of personality known as Mobutisme, which was less concerned with articulating a national identity than with justifying Mobutu’s regime.

Instituting the Nation Congolese nationalism has been a complex project, shaped by myriad forces and events. For the sake of brevity, this chapter focuses on three of the most important forces shaping the evolution and articulation of discourses of Congolese nationalism from 1945–1990: the tensions within the colonial project between the colonial narrative and the emergence of an educated Congolese social class known as the évolués, the nationalist identity narrated by Patrice Lumumba, and the creation of a Zaïrian national identity by Mobutu Sese Seko. While the colonial era évolués helped introduce a nascent sense of nationalism, Patrice Lumumba embarked on the project of articulating a coherent national identity. Unfortunately, his administration was extremely short-lived. The project of defining and instilling a Congolese/Zaïrian national identity was carried out largely under Mobutu’s reign. Despite the eventual emergence of a cult of personality, Mobutu’s attempts to create a sense of national cohesion among the disparate population largely succeeded, as evidenced by the levels of nationalism displayed in the Congo following the multiple foreign invasions and “civil wars” that began in 1996. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Defining the Nation The Congo is an entirely colonial invention. Though the entity borrows its name from the Kongo Kingdom, the Congo was made up of diverse and disparate ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious groups. At the time of its creation, there was no commonality among the peoples that would become “Congolese.” During his 1879–1884 expedition for Leopold II, Henry Morton Stanley was responsible for establishing the physical space of the “Congo” by traveling on foot throughout the region, physically demarcating the geographical limits of Leopold II’s possession. In effect, Stanley colonized by traversing; assimilating that space into the larger colonial structures, and scripting the colonial subjects’ identity and history to necessitate their conquest. Under Belgian colonial rule, the Congo was administered by the colonial state, in cooperation with the church and Belgian corporations, and was treated as a collection of regional spaces rather than as a unified and homogenous whole. Within the colonial ideology of paternalism, the Congolese were regarded as largely uncivilized children requiring the strong guiding hand of Belgian rule. As Congolese elites emerged to articulate alternative visions of the Congo and Congolese, regional, ethnic, and cultural divisions were pronounced. The first coherent articulation of a national identity—as opposed to a regional and ethnic one —was produced by Patrice Lumumba, who emerged as one of the most popular articulators of a Congolese nationalist/pro-independence position in the 1950s. Lumumba helped form the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC), becoming its leader and serving a prison sentence in 1959 for reputedly fomenting anticolonial riots in Stanleyville. He was begrudgingly released by colonial authorities in January 1960 to attend the Roundtable Conference on decolonization in Brussels. Prior to independence, the MNC was victorious in the May 1960 elections. Lumumba’s popularity was largely based on the fact that he articulated a coherent

Mobutu Sese Seko (1930 –1997) Born Joseph-Désiré Mobutu on October 14, 1930, Mobutu spent his early adult years in the Congolese army as a journalist. In 1958, he joined Patrice Lumumba’s Mouvement National Congolais (MNC) and was appointed state secretary when Lumumba became prime minister at independence. Mobutu led a coup on September 14, 1960, establishing a College of Commissioners that ran the country until February 1961. Mobutu led a second coup on November 25, 1965, eventually gaining extensive political powers through a one-party state centered around the Mouvement Populaire de Révolution (MPR). By the 1980s, Mobutu had constructed a political aristocracy that became infamous for extracting state resources for personal enrichment. It is generally estimated that Mobutu and his close friends pillaged between $4 billion and $10 billion of the country’s wealth. Mobutu was eventually overthrown in 1997 by forces led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. Mobutu died in exile later that year from prostate cancer.


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and nationally based challenge to the Belgian colonial project. He offered an interpretation of the previous 80 years that focused on colonial exploitation, violent repression, and economic plundering. For most of the 1950s, however, Lumumba had accepted most of the colonial myths, even praising Belgium’s supposed civilizing mission in his 1956 book Congo, My Country (published posthumously). Lumumba’s position changed, however, after his visit to Ghana in December 1958 for the All-African People’s Conference. This meeting of African nationalist parties was organized by Ghana’s President Kwame Nkrumah to support the anticolonial struggle and to strengthen the ideas of pan-African unity. It proved a valuable meeting place for African national leaders to share ideas and develop anticolonial strategies. This trip proved formative for Lumumba, who afterward drew heavily from the pro-nationalist, anticolonial rhetoric espoused there. Returning to Leopoldville, he proclaimed that independence from Belgium should be considered a “right” not a “gift” and began demanding immediate decolonization. In articulating a narrative of Congolese identity, Lumumba was the sole Congolese politician stressing a “national” identity rather than one based on region or ethnicity. Subscribing to the dominant Western view that territorial space was the sole spatial form in which to secure a political community, Lumumba accepted the colonially constructed space of the Congo as entailing a single, unified political entity. For him, Congolese sovereignty resided within the population that dwelt within that space. While other politicians privileged smaller, fragmented spaces bound by ethnicity, language, or regional memories, Lumumba tied Congolese identity to the larger colonially demarcated space of the Congo state. Employing the rhetoric of Afro-nationalism, Lumumba sought to create a unified identity for the people inhabiting that territory. The specifics of Lumumba’s national identity narrative will be explored in the following section. In the wake of Lumumba’s murder, the Congo suffered several years of political instability and civil war. It was not until after Joseph Mobutu seized power in 1965 that a semblance of stability and order was established across the country. After consolidating his power, Mobutu engaged in furthering Lumumba’s nationalist project. Whereas Lumumba was only able to introduce a vision of Congolese national identity, Mobutu’s regime was able to instill a sense of national solidarity over the next several decades. Mobutu’s success in doing so stems from several projects: his renaming campaign, the introduction of the philosophy of authenticité, which was based on an invention of national identity, and the program of “Zaïrianisation,” which began in 1973. The specific elements of these projects will be discussed in the following sections.

Narrating the Nation As previously stated, Patrice Lumumba was instrumental in articulating a national identity discourse that enabled Congolese to see themselves as part of an N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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“imagined community.” Lumumba articulated what it meant to be “Congolese” by grounding Congolese identity in the collective social memories of suffering at the hands of Belgian colonizers. This conception was clearly articulated in his Independence Day speech, which followed the Belgian king’s recitation of a glorified Belgian colonial history. Lumumba offered an alternative history of the colonial project and of Congolese identity. In the opening passages, for example, he stated: Our lot was eighty years of colonial rule; our wounds are still too fresh and painful to be driven from our memory. We have known tiring labor exacted in exchange for salary which did not allow us to satisfy our hunger, to clothe and lodge ourselves decently or to raise our children like loved beings. We have known ironies, insults, blows which we had to endure morning, noon, and night because we were “Negroes.” (quoted in Merriam 1961, 353)

Lumumba’s narrative exposed the repression, exploitation, and violence that the Belgian colonial narrative sought to erase. Lumumba’s speech politicized the tensions and resistance between whites and blacks that were romanticized or dismissed within the Belgian colonial historical narrative. Moreover, Lumumba created a counterimage of the Congolese population. The Congolese, in Lumumba’s narrative, were not the immature children or irrational savages portrayed within the Belgian paternalism project; rather, they were presented as part of a “we”—as victimized men and women who had survived Belgian brutality and exploitation with dignity, humanity, strength, and unity. Paternalism was replaced with “brotherhood.” Yet Lumumba’s narrative on the Congo’s identity contained a fundamental tension because, to articulate a national identity among the diverse elements of the population, essential markers for this identity had to be created and articulated. Lumumba chose not to use preexisting ethnic, linguistic, or regional markers to delineate this identity, largely because similarities of these kinds did not exist. Rather, he offered a narrative of the colonial project based on shared memories of exploitation and brutalization. By articulating a shared history of colonial suffering, Lumumba tried to unite a disparate population. Moreover, Lumumba accepted not only the colonially created embodiment of the Congo but also the Western-scripted concepts and practices that constituted the Congo. Thus, Lumumba sought to Africanize the colonial state institutions by replacing white state officials with Congolese and reaping the benefits that such a transition would entail (in terms of both power and wealth). Lumumba, like most other postcolonial leaders, viewed the state as the primary vehicle for forging national cohesion. His attempts to do so were unfortunately cut short by his brutal murder. The project of forging a unifying sense of nationalism among the Congo’s ethnic, cultural, and linguistically diverse population would be deferred until after Joseph Mobutu seized power in 1965. In May 1966, the Mobutu government began N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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the policy of renaming many of the country’s major cities, replacing their colonial names with “African” ones. Leopoldville became Kinshasa, Elisabethville became Lubumbashi, Stanleyville became Kisangani, and so forth. A few years later, streets in Leopoldville with colonial names were given African ones, and statues of colonial icons such as Leopold II and Stanley were removed. On October 27, 1971, Mobutu announced that the Congo—both the country and the river—would henceforth be known as “Zaïre.” The flag was replaced by the ruling party’s flag, and a new national anthem was written. Continuing this trend, Mobutu proclaimed that all citizens of Zaïre were required to change their names by adopting more “African” ones. Those who refused to do so ran the risk of losing their citizenship. In January 1972, Joseph-Désiré Mobutu changed his own name to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga. These name changes were justified on the grounds of overcoming the colonial legacy, making the country more authentically African, and removing the negative baggage associated with the “Congo.” These acts of renaming were transformative in that they sought to create new knowledge formations grounded in a nationalist ideology. The renaming of Zaïre by its political elites represented the self-invention of the populace they sought to govern. Mobutu’s construction of a national identity for Zaïre was most clearly realized in his authenticité campaign. According to this campaign, the first step of building national unity required the decolonization of the mind. It was held that authenticité sought to move away from borrowed or imposed ideas toward an increased awareness and privileging of indigenous cultural beliefs and values. This campaign was seen by its supporters as a pivotal act of decolonization because it was aimed at restoring among the Zaïrian people a sense of pride in their own traditional culture, which had been taken away by colonialism. The underlying domestic goal of these projects was to increase cultural pride in the hope of furthering national unity. The dilemma for Mobutu’s regime was that there was no preexisting “nation” to unify. Prior to colonization, the “Congo” had been made up of diverse and fragmented societies and sociopolitical systems. There were no “national” traditions, beliefs, and values to “authenticate.” The history of modern nationalism indicates that many nations must be invented. Such was the case in Zaïre. While European nations had centuries to construct a national identity, Zaïrians had to make do with a few years, and thus the artificiality and forced nature of authenticité were more obvious than similar projects had been in Europe and elsewhere. Mobutu’s regime engaged in selecting, plotting, and interpreting the events and characteristics that narrated a Zaïrian identity. The discourses on authenticité were thus engaged in a larger project of inventing a national identity, which required the production of a narrative of common precolonial historical memories, myths, and traditions. Yet, by focusing on a return to traditional cultures, the Zaïrian elites ran the risk of increasingly fragmenting a precariously unstable multicultural country since the cultural identities at play in the region N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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bore little relationship to the territorially delineated state of “Zaïre.” To counter this trend, the regime engaged in trumpeting and, in many cases, inventing commonalties. Mobutu and his propagandists spent a great deal of time defining the philosophies, beliefs, and values of “traditional Zaïre.” Much of this entailed synthesizing different cultural traditions and beliefs into a single invented “Zaïrian” discourse. Mobutu’s production of national identity also relied on the scripting of the country’s colonial and postcolonial eras. Through the authenticité campaign, Mobutu continued Lumumba’s project of narrating a national community by selecting, plotting, and interpreting the shared colonial experiences of abuse at the hands of the Belgians. At the same time, Mobutu and his agents narrated the history of the failed first republic as one of communal Congolese suffering under the “Imperialists” and corrupt, incompetent rulers. Despite repeated rhetorical moves to “put those years behind us,” great attention was paid to the “mistakes” of the pre-Mobutu era to solidify shared historical experiences. One of the most interesting acts involved the heroicizing of Patrice Lumumba, the assassinated first prime minister. Despite the fact that Mobutu led the coup against Lumumba and was implicated in his murder, Mobutu appropriated his image in the name of Zaïrian nationalism.

Building and Mobilizing the Nation The goal of Mobutu’s nationalism campaign was to create a feeling of national pride and cohesion among the heretofore diverse and divided population. Thus, the target audience was the average citizen, regardless of social class or ethnicity. Much of the nationalism project relied on narrating common memories and (invented) precolonial cultural commonalities. However, creating a Congolese/ Zaïrian nationalism also involved performative aspects. For example, the Mobutu regime held extravagant displays of dancing, performances, parades, and other “authentic” displays of national character across the country. These performances of Zaïrian identity were called animation and were regarded as expressions of a shared “national spirit.” Animation involved public dancing and singing songs of praise to Zaïre, Mobutu, and his regime, usually by numerous women dressed in “national” garb. Mobutu himself also became an important site for the performance of an imagined national identity, gradually transforming himself into a personification of the body politic. He dressed in the accoutrements of authenticité, drawing from different cultures around the country. Often he would wear an abacos (an acronym for à bas le costume, which means “down with suits”), the two-piece male garment that was designed as part of the authenticité campaign to replace the European suit and tie. It eventually became mandatory business attire. As both the author and symbolic representation of what it meant to be and N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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dress like a Zaïrian, Mobutu attempted to become the physical embodiment of Zaïrian national identity. In its invention of common traditions within the narrative of Zaïrian identity, the Mobutu regime emphasized the image and political beliefs of “chieftaincy,” redefined according to their own needs and agendas. In fact, the regime sought to interpret Zaïrian tradition as undemocratic and authoritarian, much as earlier colonial agents had done. This aspect of the imagined national identity allowed the regime to suppress other political parties and engage in repressive practices. For example, the regime warned that, because individual liberties may lead to anarchy, the authority of the government could not be questioned. Mobutu often claimed that the traditional rule by chiefs meant that Africans could not understand European or American-style democracy. Mobutu’s domestic control was intimately tied to his narrative of national identity. Exploiting the image of the traditional chief helped Mobutu establish himself as a contemporary dictator. Moreover, the rhetorical imagining of the Zaïrian community as a family with Mobutu as the father figure harkened back to the colonial discourse of paternalism and produced the political dynamic of coercive authoritarianism and violent repression. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that Mobutu’s invention of a Zaïrian national identity was merely a self-serving attempt to mask his authoritarian rule. In the 1990s, as the country was ravaged by two foreign invasions and subsequent “civil wars,” it was clear that some sense of nationalism existed in the renamed Congo. All suggestions that the country be officially balkanized into separate regional entities were strongly resisted by most citizens in the name of Congolese unity. Thus, a clear sense of Congolese nationalism seems to resonate among the citizens of the country. That said, however, it should be noted that the definition of Congolese nationalism remains strongly contested. There is no clear agreement on what it means to be Congolese—or even who is Congolese. During the closing years of Mobutu’s reign, the embittered ruler would frequently heighten ethnic and regional divisions to maintain power. This practice was also employed by his successors, Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila. Indeed, the question of Congolese citizenship and national identity has been a particularly contentious, fractious, and violent political issue for many years and will likely remain so for the foreseeable future. Selected Bibliography Anstey, Roger. 1966. King Leopold’s Legacy: The Congo under Belgian Rule 1908–1960. London: Oxford University Press. Callaghy, Thomas M. 1984. The State-Society Struggle: Zaïre in Comparative Perspective. New York: Columbia University Press. De Witte, Ludo. 2001. The Assassination of Lumumba. New York: Verso. Dunn, Kevin C. 2003. Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity. New York: Palgrave.


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Hochschild, Adam. 1998. King Leopold’s Ghost. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. MacGaffey, Wyatt. 1997. “Kongo Identity, 1483–1993.” In Nations, Identities, Cultures, edited by V. Y. Mudimbe, 45–58. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Merriam, Alan. 1961. Congo: Background of Conflict. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Nzongola-Ntalaja, Georges. 2002. The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: A People’s History. London and New York: Zed Books. Schatzberg, Michael G. 1988. The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaïre. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Willame, Jean-Claude. 1972. Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Young, Crawford. 1965. Politics in the Congo: Decolonization and Independence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Young, Crawford, and Thomas Turner. 1985. The Rise and Decline of the Zaïrian State. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.


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Eritrea Fouad Makki Chronology 1869 Opening of the Suez Canal. An Italian shipping company acquires a coaling station at Assab on the southern Red Sea coast. 1882 Assab is transferred from the shipping company to the Italian state, which gradually extends control over the region. 1890 Eritrea declared an Italian colony. 1894 Peasant revolt against Italian expropriation of village land. 1896 Ethiopian forces defeat the Italian army at the Battle of Adwa. 1900–1908 Three treaties are signed delineating the boundaries between Italian Eritrea and the adjacent states. 1935–1936 Italy invades Ethiopia and establishes the Italian East African empire. 1940 Italy enters World War II and launches an offensive against British-occupied Sudan, Somaliland, and Kenya. 1941 The British counteroffensive leads to the collapse of the Italian empire, and Eritrea comes under British administration. Formation of the patriotic Association for Love of Country. 1942 Publication of first vernacular newspapers in Tigriña and Arabic. 1946 Formation of pro-independence Muslim League. 1947 Formation of pro-Ethiopian Unionist Party. 1950 Establishment of the Independence Bloc. A UN General Assembly resolution establishes a federation of Eritrea and Ethiopia. 1952 Transfer of power to the new federal government. 1958 Worker and student demonstrations against the subversion of Eritrea’s autonomy. 1959 Formation of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM). 1960 Formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). 1961 The ELF commences armed operations. 1962 Ethiopia abrogates the federal arrangement and annexes Eritrea. 1970 Formation of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). 1974 The Ethiopian Revolution topples the monarchy, and a government dominated by leftleaning military officers proclaims the formation of a republic. 1991 Eritrea is liberated by the EPLF. A coalition of Ethiopian ethno-nationalists controls Addis Ababa. 1993 Eritrea becomes a sovereign state after a UN-monitored referendum. 1994 The EPLF holds its third organizational congress, adopts a new charter, and changes its name to the Popular Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ). 1997 The draft constitution is ratified by the Eritrean Assembly. A national currency, the Nakfa, is introduced. 1998 A border war breaks out between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 2000 A peace treaty is signed ending the war, and an international tribunal is mandated to determine the boundary between the two states. 2001 Leading critics of the Eritrean president as well as many others are arrested, and the independent press is shut down.


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In the context of the unresolved dispute over the border, the constitution remains suspended, political critics remain incarcerated, and the independent press remains shut down. Over 100,000 Eritreans are still in the Sudan as refugees, while a large percentage of the nation’s youth remain mobilized in work brigades under military discipline.

Situating the Nation Some 60 years ago, at a time when political independence was far from being the obvious and inevitable option it would later become, Eritrea was one of the first colonies in Africa to grapple with the issue of decolonization. In the years immediately following World War II, there were just as many Eritreans who favored independence as chose union with Ethiopia. Few would have imagined at the time that Eritreans would eventually be engaged in one of the most bitter and prolonged wars of national liberation in the African continent in the name of a common identity. The origins of Eritrea as a distinct political entity date back to the end of the 19th century, when virtually the entire continent of Africa was partitioned among a handful of European powers. Throughout the precolonial era, the territory was never under the control of a single political entity, even though large portions of


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it formed part of the Aksumite empire between the first and eighth centuries. Following the collapse of that empire, the political geography of the region was fragmented so that, by the mid-16th century, the constituent peoples had been incorporated as tributaries of either the Ottoman Empire, the Abyssinian Kingdom, or the Funj Sultanate, whereas village communities in the frontier areas between them remained relatively autonomous. For much of the past two millennia, the peoples of Eritrea were part of a wider northeast African and Red Sea world, connected by culture and commerce if not always by political affiliation. European overseas expansion gradually destroyed the wider matrix that had underlain those connections, fundamentally altering the social and economic dynamics in the region. At the time of the Italian occupation in the late 19th century, there were nine ethno-linguistic and two main religious communities coinciding roughly with a highland-lowland geographic divide. The lowland Muslims were all Sunni, while the highland Christians were predominantly Orthodox Christian, although Catholicism and Protestantism had made some inroads through missionary activities. In the course of the 20th century, politics and culture became linked to territorial identity, and by the time of independence in 1991, the interrelations of the territory’s peoples had taken on new meaning.

Instituting the Nation The boundaries of today’s Eritrea are the product of the extension of Italian imperial power between 1869 and 1890. Beginning with a coaling station on the Red Sea coast of Assab, the Italians gradually expanded their colonial empire to include all of today’s Eritrea. They had planned to turn Eritrea into a settler colony, but faced with a peasant rebellion in 1894 and defeat by Ethiopian forces at the Battle of Adwa in March 1896, they were forced to abandon their settler schemes. The colonial project was subsequently reconfigured to make Eritrea part of an Italian commercial empire, which provided the impetus for the construction of a relatively extensive rail and road network connecting various settlements, markets, and military garrisons. This infrastructure laid the foundations for the development of a light industrial sector that by the 1930s had turned Eritrea into the most industrialized zone in northeast Africa. Besides employment in the construction and industrial sectors, tens of thousands of Eritrean youth were conscripted into the colonial army, serving in Italian-occupied Somalia, Libya, and Ethiopia. The colonial state ruled via the Italian language but made little effort to provide modern education for Eritreans. In 1941, when the population of the colony was estimated at 1 million, there were no more than a thousand Eritrean students enrolled in modern schools. The schooling that did exist was limited to the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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fourth grade, and different schools were designated for particular religious or social groups. The colonial bureaucracy’s need for trained translators and clerks nonetheless produced a small but influential stratum of bilingual intellectuals who were to play a critical role in the subsequent politics of the territory. The Italian empire collapsed in 1941 in the context of World War II, and Eritrea came under British rule. The priority for the newly arrived British was to stabilize the situation in Eritrea in order to mobilize the territory’s human and economic resources to advance their own war effort. Toward this end, the Italian colonial apparatus, including much of its personnel, were left intact. It was only with the end of World War II that the situation changed and the political and educational restrictions that had been imposed on Eritreans were gradually relaxed. The Paris Peace treaties at the conclusion of World War II mandated the victorious Allied powers—the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, and France—to determine the future of the former Italian colonies. Unable to reach a consensus, they transferred their mandate to the newly formed United Nations. The United Nations set up a Commission of Inquiry to canvas the views of the population regarding the territory’s political future, and it was during this period that the first Eritrean political organizations came into being. Like the Italians, the British viewed Eritrea as composed of two sharply defined religious communities. Arabic and Tigriña had consequently become recognized as the respective print languages of “Muslims” and “Christians,” each possessing vernacular newspapers and administrative representation. Two main political blocs eventually crystallized—the Muslim League, campaigning for independence, and the Unionist Party, advocating amalgamation into Ethiopia—and the stage was set for a bitter conflict over the future of Eritrea. Other smaller political formations—the National Party, the Progressive Liberal Party, the Pro-Italia Party, the War Veterans Association—that also emerged at this time were eventually drawn by the gravitational pull of the Muslim League or the Unionist Party.

Defining the Nation Although a self-conscious “Eritrean” nationalism appeared at this time, it was from its inception hindered by religious and linguistic divides, and remained for some time the notion of small groups in the urban areas. It gained an initial following in the Muslim towns where reaction to the prospect of being absorbed into the Ethiopian empire galvanized the population, and acquired a mass form when the rural plebeian Tegra revolted against their aristocratic overlords. At the top of Tegra society was a patrician nobility of various origins that had come to dominate the region in the 16th century. Their authority was secured by recognition from regional kingdoms and empires and, in the 20th century, from the colonial state. Below them were the masses of agro-pastoralists who had to pay tribute N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Ibrahim Sultan (1916 –1988) Born into a plebian Tegra family from northern Eritrea, Ibrahim Sultan grew up in the town of Keren, where he studied Arabic and Italian and then worked as a clerk in the colonial bureaucracy. Following the emergence of a legally sanctioned political sphere in the 1940s, he was instrumental in linking the social emancipation movement of the Tegra with the political struggle for Eritrea’s independence. He was the founding leader of the Muslim League, the main pro-independence organization of the 1940s, and secretary general of the Independence Bloc. Elected to the Eritrean Assembly in 1952, he remained a staunch opponent of Ethiopian rule. He went into exile in Egypt in 1958, where he lived out the rest of his life.

to the nobility in exchange for physical “protection.” In the context of the collapse of Italian authority in 1941, the Tegra revolted against the hated tributary system and refused to pay tribute or render services to their overlords. The British initially suppressed the revolt, but by 1947, they had come to recognize that the system had to be reformed if social order was to be maintained. They turned to the Tegra leaders in the towns for assistance, and the result was a complete dismantlement of the tributary structure. It was the political charge released by this impressively self-mobilized social movement that generated the possibility of an Eritrean nationalism rooted in popular social strata. The Muslim League impressed upon the plebeian Tegra that only national sovereignty could secure their social emancipation and prevent a restoration of patrician privileges, which would be almost inevitable in the event of Unionist victory and the imposition of Ethiopian rule. In so doing, they were able to draw the Tegra into the organizational and symbolic structures of Eritrean nationalism, which in turn became the key vehicle through which the mobilized Tegra entered the stage of national politics. Meanwhile, in the Christian highlands, the forces of nationalism took longer to develop. There, the Orthodox church had served as the bulwark of the call for union with Ethiopia, a call that appeared not to have offended the political sensibilities of any except a small sector of the bilingual functionaries. It was along this inherited vocabulary of religious differences that the rival imaginings of Eritrea’s future became articulated, and in this context of internal political rivalry and imperial manipulation, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution in 1950 establishing a federal arrangement between Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Narrating the Nation From the start, the federation proved unworkable. Ethiopia was an empire ruled by an absolutist monarchy that was hostile to any semblance of democracy. Eritrea’s N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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UN-drafted constitution, with its provisions of democratic guarantees, was anathema to the monarchy, and over the next decade, the monarchy systematically dismantled the democratic freedoms Eritreans had enjoyed. Political parties, independent associations, and labor unions were suppressed. Th e once vibrant Eritrean press was muzzled, and Eritrea’s two administrative languages, Arabic and Tigriña, were struck down and substituted by Amharic—the official language of Ethiopia. In 1959, following the suppression of political protests and a general strike in the towns of Asmara and Massawa, the Eritrean flag was lowered. This was followed three years later by the formal abrogation of the federation and the annexation of Eritrea into the Ethiopian empire. In response, nationalist politicians initially put most of their energies into international appeals for redress against the disabling of Eritrea’s autonomy. By the late 1950s, confronted with an intransigent autocratic order that resisted all calls for reform, the main impetus of nationalist activity shifted to armed opposition. Repression acted as a decisive accelerator of this shift and drove nationalist politics underground. The efforts of the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) at a broader political mobilization were soon outflanked by the emergence of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), which emphasized the exclusive efficacy of armed struggle and commenced armed operations in September 1961. In the subsequent decade, the nationalist movement went through a series of internal crises,

A young female soldier of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front in 1975. (Patrick Chauvel/ Sygma/Corbis)


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Eritrean Women The women of Eritrea played a prominent role in the war of independence. Thousands of young women joined the liberation movements in the 1970s, serving in various capacities, including combat units where they constituted close to 30 percent of the fighting force. The mass entry of women into the nationalist organizations helped transform prevailing gender norms. In the postindependence period, these veterans of the war of liberation have continued to organize and mobilize to ensure that the gains they have made are not eroded and to advance the rights of women in Eritrean society at large.

culminating with the breakaway formation of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) in 1970. It was in this altered context that Eritrean nationalism underwent a cultural and political mutation. The breakdown of the old urban-based politics became serviceable for a larger reconstitution of nationalist politics. Divisions, partly of a generational outlook, opened up as old status demarcations came under attack and new forms of radical nationalism appeared. A new generation of nationalists inspired by revolutionary anticolonial movements elsewhere came to dominate the nationalist movement. Venerating progress, science, and rationalism, they saw national liberation as the path to modernity, knowledge, and freedom. For them, the nation was to be understood as the structural form of modernity, and they were averse to forms of subnational cultural or regional affiliations and allegiances. In this sense, radical nationalism was articulated not only in opposition to imperial rule but against other forms of cultural attachments as well. By the mid-1960s, the fortunes of nationalism in Eritrea were changing as nationalism ceased to be the prerogative of only one sector of Eritrean society and entered the general currency of political affirmation. Significantly, a new generation of Christians had begun affirming their own nationalist credentials, clothing themselves in the modern legitimacy of the nation. This represented an unprecedented extension, both socially and spatially, of nationalist politics, which now embraced all Eritreans regardless of their faith or ethnicity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation This reconstitution of the constituency for nationalism was ironically as much a source of contestation as of unity. The mass entry into the nationalist movement of Tigriña-speaking Christian youth brought to the fore the dialectic of political unity and cultural diversity that was a key dynamic of Eritrean nationalism from the beginning. If religion provided an inherited vocabulary of difference in the 1940s, that divide by the 1970s had become secularized in the form of language. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Unlike so many other colonies in Africa, the colonial language was not diffused enough to serve as the language through which Eritrea could be imagined. Arabic and Tigriña had become the means through which national consciousness was to develop. While Tigriña was the language of the ethnic group by the same name, Arabic had come to serve as the lingua franca of the various Muslim ethnolinguistic communities. No single language had emerged to serve the public role of national unifier. The central political challenge for the nationalist movement consequently was how to forge the bonds of solidarity in a population otherwise fragmented along cultural and regional lines. A more deeply rooted sense of Eritrean-ness had to be fostered in the crucible of a three decades–long war of national liberation. Within the constricted conditions of a rural-based armed movement, nationalists had to devise various forms of cultural and political projects to nurture the sense of commonality. From music and popular theater to the cultivation of civic values and secular marriages, nationalists worked hard to fashion local cultural differences into a society-wide political project. There were, however, clear limits to this nationalist political culture. In the absence of a legally sanctioned, society-wide public sphere, various notions of representation substituted for the popular will. The hierarchical structures of an armed movement fostered a compliant culture in which the ideal of a selfempowering citizenry was constrained by the cult of efficiency and rationality. The sheer brutality of the war, and the massive social dislocation it occasioned, was understood as necessitating a movement that had to be exceptionally disciplined while being intimately attuned to the sympathies of the people. Nationalism therefore became impregnated by the model of war, and at two bitter moments in the history of Eritrean nationalism, the early years of the 1970s and the 1980s, the rival nationalist movements, the ELF and the EPLF, crossed swords with each other. The period between 1961 and 1991 was therefore both a creative and a limiting one. While the process of forging a common Eritrean nation was well advanced, it was clearly not without tensions. But, in the end, neither religious and ethnic differences nor the repression by the imperial state were strong enough to contain the emergence of a widely diffused and popular sense of Eritrean-ness. By May 1991, a propitious context for the realization of the long-sought dream of independence had emerged as a result of three major developments. The first was the changed international context, characterized by the end of the Cold War and the fact that Eritrea was no longer a strategic theater of superpower conflict. The second was the collapse of the coercive apparatus of the Ethiopian state in the face of mounting resistance not only in Eritrea but within Ethiopia as well. And finally, by the 1980s, the EPLF had secured its dominance over the national movement in Eritrea, militarily marginalizing or politically subsuming rival organizations. Relatively freed from external dictates or internal contestations, and in conditions of popular legitimacy derived from its role in the struggle for liberaN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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tion, the EPLF was provided an auspicious opportunity to fashion the emerging state institutions. The formal declaration of independence came on May 24, 1993, following the holding of a referendum. Based on a relatively broad and inclusive conception of the nation, the referendum confirmed what was in actuality never in doubt: with 98.5 percent of the 1,173,706 eligible voters participating, 99.8 percent voted in favor of independence. With this fitting climax to a decades-long struggle for national liberation, the state of Eritrea became part of the interstate system, accepting its covenants and protocols and joining its central institutions: the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity, and a host of other multilateral institutions. The attainment of national sovereignty once again shifted the field of political contestation back to the arena of an embryonic national public sphere. The transition to statehood and the prevalent sense of peace worked to mobilize popular expectations behind a vision of reconstruction that incorporated strong ideals of democratic citizenship and social justice. The sacrifices needed for victory in the face of years of embattled hardship made a powerful case for equitable social and cultural policies in the peacetime to come. But once the initial euphoria of liberation had settled, political power seemed less susceptible to the popular expectations that the wartime ethos of common sacrifice had generated, and there was a slow assertion of a restrictive normalization. In the society at large, there was a general retreat to the mundane concerns of the everyday as people started reassembling the dispersed fragments of their interrupted lives: education, careers, marriage, children, and homes. The onset of the tragic war with Ethiopia (1998–2000) further threatened to reduce the promise of national liberation and unmasked the underlying authoritarianism latent in the nationalism articulated by the EPLF. The period after the conclusion of the war already marks an important watershed, and a new political landscape is now taking shape in which the regime finds itself confronted with a popular longing for democratic rights and representative government. Selected Bibliography Connell, Dan. 1993. Against All Odds. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Habte Selassie, Bereket. 2003. The Making of the Eritrean Constitution. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Iyob, Ruth. 1995. The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism 1941–1993. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Killion, Tom. 1998. Historical Dictionary of Eritrea. Lanham, MD: The Scarecrow Press. Markakis, John. 1987. National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mehreteab, Ammanuel. 2004. Wake Up, Hannah! Reintegration and Reconstruction Challenges for Post-War Eritrea. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. Negash, Tekeste. 1987. Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882–1941: Policies, Praxis, and Impact. Stockholm, Sweden: Uppsala University Press.


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Pool, David. 2001. From Guerrillas to Government: The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. Athens: Ohio University Press. Tesfai, Alemseged. 2002. Two Weeks in the Trenches: Reminiscences of Childhood and War in Eritrea. Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press. Trevaskis, G. K. N. 1960. Eritrea: A Colony in Transition 1941–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wilson, Amrit. 1991. Women and the Eritrean Revolution: The Challenge Road. Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press. Yohannes, Okbaghzi. 1991. Eritrea: A Pawn in World Politics. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.


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Nigeria Bonny Ibhawoh Chronology 1900 Britain establishes colonial rule over the Niger Coast Protectorate, previously under chartered company rule. 1914 Britain consolidates its hold over Nigeria with the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Protectorates. This brings the predominantly Muslim North and the Christian and animist South under a single colonial administration. 1924 The first indigenous political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) is formed. 1960 Nigeria gains independence from Britain with Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa leading a coalition government. 1966 Ethnic and political conflicts lead to a military coup in which the elected civilian government is overthrown. 1967 Eastern states dominated by the Igbo ethnic group secede from Nigeria as the Republic of Biafra, sparking a bloody civil war. 1970 Biafran leaders surrender; the former Biafran regions are reintegrated into the country. 1976 The nationalist military ruler Gen. Murtala Mohammed is assassinated in coup attempt. He is replaced by Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, who introduces an American-style presidential constitution. 1979 The new constitution is introduced with the “federal character principle,” an affirmative action principle aimed at ensuring equitable distribution of national resources. Elections bring a new civilian government to power. 1984 The military regime of Gen. Muhammadu Buhari launches the “War Against Indiscipline,” an ambitious national campaign to mobilize the country that stresses the work ethic and emphasizes patriotism. 1993 Military ruler general Ibrahim Babangida annuls the results of presidential election following an extended and controversial democratic transition program. 1999 Transition from military dictatorship to democratic rule. Former military ruler, Olusegun Obasanjo is elected president. 2003 President Olusegun Obasanjo is reelected president for a second term.

Situating the Nation The foundations of contemporary Nigerian nationalism can be traced to 19thcentury European imperialism in Africa. Until it gained independence in 1960, Nigeria was a British colony and nationalist activities during this period focused mainly on challenging colonial domination and ending British rule. With the attainment of independence, Nigerian nationalism began to focus more on fostering national integration and a sense of national identity among Nigerians. The main trust of postcolonial nationalism was establishing a cohesive nation out of N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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about 200 constituent ethnic groups in the country. The largest of these ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. The origin of the Nigerian state dates back to 1900 when the British government took over the administration of the Niger Coast Protectorate that was previously under chartered company rule and formed the protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. In 1914, the British government amalgamated both protectorates to formally establish the colonial state of Nigeria. Colonial efforts at creating a Nigerian nation were fraught with many challenges. The most significant of these were the cultural and religious differences between the predominantly Muslim North and the Christian and animist South. For most of the colonial period, the British administration maintained a policy of divide and rule that sought to keep the prevalent Western Christian influences of the South from the Muslim North where appeals to Islamic legitimacy upheld the rule of the emirs. The policy of indirect rule was aimed at preserving the indigenous cultures of each area. Yet, the bringing together of various ethnic and religious groups under a common colonial administrative unit fostered a spirit of oneness and some sense of unity. This sense of unity was strengthened by the desire for self-rule and freedom from foreign control, which gave rise to an organized nationalist movement soon after the imposition of colonial rule. At the forefront of this early anticolonial nationalist movement was an emergent class of Western-educated Nigerians, many N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of whom were products of Christian missionary schools in the South. Like colonial rule elsewhere in Africa, British colonial rule carried with it racial intolerance and discrimination that limited the opportunities of Nigerians, particularly the intelligentsia in political and economic life. Colonial policies that excluded Africans from important political positions in the state affected all Nigerians, irrespective of their ethnic origins, and helped them to see themselves not as separate ethnic entities but a marginalized group collectively in opposition to British colonialism. This became the basis of the early nationalist movement.

Instituting the Nation The first group of anticolonial Nigerian nationalists emerged in the South. These nationalists opposed the British policy of indirect rule, which entrenched what was considered to be an anachronistic traditional ruling class in power while shutting out the Westernized elite. The nationalist organizations they led aimed to mobilize not only a particular class or group but also the entire nation against what they saw as oppressive British rule. The ideological inspiration for many of these early nationalists came from different sources, including prominent American and Europe-based pan-Africanists, such as Marcus Garvey, W. E. B. Du Bois, and George Padmore. Inspiration also came from Nigerian students abroad who joined those from other colonies to form such nationalist and pan-African groups as the West African Students Union, founded in London in 1925. One of the first nationalist organizations in the country was the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). Although there were several nationalist-oriented political movements before it, its formation in 1923 marked the emergence of organized political parties in Nigeria. A central figure in its formation was Herbert Macaulay, a former civil servant and newspaper publisher who became a dominant figure in post–World War I Nigerian politics. By the 1930s, Macaulay had gained a reputation as the leading symbol of the anticolonial nationalist movement. His central demand was greater representation and participation of Nigerians in the colonial government. He was also strongly opposed to colonial racial discrimination and segregation. The chief sources of Macaulay’s strength and mobilizing power were his newspaper, the Lagos Daily News; his party, the NNDP; the highly organized labor unions in the South; and his unique ability to fire the imagination of semiliterate and illiterate masses of the country. His fiery public speeches and newspaper commentaries appealed to both educated elites and chiefly authorities. Under his leadership, the NNDP emerged as the most powerful group and a major political force in Nigeria in the 1930s. However, like most first-generation West African nationalists, Macaulay was conservative in his approach. Although he was deeply critical of British imperial policies, he also at times demonstrated great loyalty to the British Crown and devotion to the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Herbert Macaulay Herbert Macaulay was a pioneer of the Nigerian nationalist movement. Trained as a civil engineer in England, he established the first Nigerian political party, the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which successfully contested and won seats in the colonial Legislative Council. He was a leading campaigner for the welfare of Nigerians and gained a reputation for his principled opposition to the excesses of the colonial government. He is often described as the “father of Nigerian nationalism.”

British cause. He did not quarrel with the goal of British policy in Nigeria but with specific actions and policies of the colonial administration. This seeming paradox in Macaulay’s political beliefs was seen by some of his contemporaries as a limitation of his political vision for Nigeria. Many believed that his loyalty to Britain compromised his nationalist activities. Such concerns paved the way for a new phase of nationalism in the 1940s with the emergence of a new breed of men (and a few women) who were more radical in their opposition to colonialism. These men, many of whom had been trained in England and the United States, and had therefore been more intensely and directly exposed to the Atlantic race discourse, came back to their country to right what they regarded as historic wrongs by the Europeans against African peoples. This new phase in the nationalist movement in Nigeria was inaugurated with the formation of the Lagos Youth Movement (later, Nigerian Youth Movement, or NYM) in 1934, which embraced most of the young intellectuals of the period—H. O. Davis, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Olufemi Vaughan, Kofo Abayomi, and Obafemi Awolowo. The NYM proclaimed as its political goal the “immediate and complete independence of Nigeria from British colonial rule.” Yet, it also agitated for dominion status within the British Commonwealth of Nations so that Nigeria would have the same status as Canada and Australia. Although the NYM represented a departure from the conservative nationalism of the past, it did not have the mobilizing power of Macaulay’s NNDP. A split in the ranks of the organization in 1941 led to the formation of two political organizations that subsequently dominated the nationalist movement—the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) led by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe and the Action Group (AG) led by Obafemi Awolowo.

Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe was born in 1904 and educated in Nigeria and the United States. In 1937, he founded a newspaper, the West African Pilot, and later cofounded the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, a major political party that dominated Nigerian politics in the 1940s and 1950s. He was elected premier of the Eastern Region in 1952 and served as governor general and later president of Nigeria between 1960 and 1966.


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The outbreak of World War II strengthened the nationalist movement. Leaders of the nationalist movement sought to link local nationalist aspirations with global issues associated with the war. Allied propaganda that the war against Germany was being fought to preserve democracy and to ensure that people in every part of the world live in freedom and peace, provided a basis for Nigerians to demand that these same ideals be extended to them. British wartime assurances to improve the welfare of colonized people, which were made as a way of securing their support for British war efforts, were also used by Nigerian elites to press their demand for political reforms. They charged that colonial rule prevented the unshackling of progressive forces in the country and demanded immediate self-government. This more radical phase of Nigerian nationalism was also marked by numerous protests of postwar political and economic conditions. Prominent among these were the agitations of Nigerian ex-soldiers and trade union leaders who led popular protests against the economic hardships that Nigerians faced after the war. During the war, Nigerian soldiers fought alongside other British forces in Palestine, Morocco, and Burma. Wartime experiences provided a new frame of reference for many of these soldiers, who interacted across ethnic boundaries in ways that were unusual in Nigeria. This experience engendered a unique sense of unity and nationalism among the soldiers. Besides, many of these soldiers who returned home after the war had learned skills and trades in the army that they found difficult to apply after the war. Demobilized and unemployed, they felt that the colonial government had not given them a fair deal in spite of their contributions to the war efforts. These soldiers, returning from theaters of war, brought back with them dreams of national self-expression and became very active in the nationalist movement. At the same time, the increase in the spread of education swelled the ranks of the middle class, leading to the emergence in the late 1940s of a vibrant nationalist newspaper press and organized labor union movement. The most active of the unions was the Railway Workers Union under the leadership of Michael Imoudu who organized a successful national workers strike in 1945. Many of these workers and trade union leaders were exposed to nationalist propaganda and became increasingly involved in nationalist politics. Under these domestic and international circumstances that challenged the legitimacy of colonial rule, Britain began to reappraise Nigeria’s political future, paving the way for the country’s independence.

Defining the Nation In the period leading up to independence in 1960, the nationalist movement began to assume a more ethnic and regional character. The new political parties that emerged placed greater emphasis on regional and ethnic concerns rather than on national interests. For instance, the AG evolved from Egbe Omo Oduduwa N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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(Society of the Descendants of Oduduwa), a Yoruba cultural movement in 1948. The latter had as one of its main objectives, “the inculcation of the idea of a single nationalism throughout Yoruba land.” The founders of the party openly declared it to be a regional party aimed at organizing within its fold all nationalities in the Western Yoruba-dominated region of Nigeria. Similarly, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was a purely Northern political party, dominated by the Muslim Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. The membership of the party was limited to people from the Northern region and its declared objective was to seek regional autonomy within Nigeria. The third major party was the Igbo-dominated NCNC (later the National Council of Nigerian Citizens). Although these regionalist parties jointly negotiated with the British government over constitutional changes leading up to independence, cooperation among them was the result of expediency rather than an emerging sense of national unity. For the most part, political groups articulated their political aspirations on the basis of regional, rather than national, interests. Once it became evident that political independence was within reach, the tenuous sense of national unity and consensus that had sustained the anticolonial movement gave way to rigidly parochial ethnic and regional interests. In championing their various regional causes, some political leaders even questioned the viability and desirability of a Nigerian nation. Ahmadu Bello, the leader of the NPC, characterized the British amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914 as a mistake, while Obafemi Awolowo, leader of the AG, famously stated: Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no “Nigerians” in the same sense as there are “English,” “Welsh,” or “French.” The word “Nigerian” is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not. (Awolowo 1947, 48)

With growing regional sentiments among the dominant ethnic groups, leaders of minority ethnic groups began to demand either for separate states of their own or for constitutional safeguards to prevent their domination by majority ethnic groups in an independent Nigeria. The concerns were based on the fact that the major regional parties were effectively controlled by leaders of the numerically dominant ethnic/cultural groups—the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and the Igbo.

Obafemi Awolowo Obafemi Awolowo was a foremost Nigerian nationalist and political leader. Trained as a lawyer, he became involved in politics in the 1940s and organized the Action Group in 1951. He was elected premier of Western Nigeria in 1954 and later became the opposition leader in the national parliament. During the civil war he served as the federal commissioner for Finance and deputy chairman of the Federal Executive Council. In 1979, he ran unsuccessfully for president. He died in 1987.


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Minority groups were concerned that independence from British colonial rule would only be replaced by permanent Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, or Igbo domination. To address these concerns, the British colonial government established a commission in 1957 to ascertain the facts about the fears of minority ethnic groups in Nigeria and to propose means of allaying those fears. In its report, the commission identified two main grounds for the fears of suppression and political marginalization among minority ethnic groups in the country. First was the use of physical force by the major political parties to intimidate smaller political groups. In the view of the commission, this trend was a grave threat to national integration and inter-ethnic harmony. A second reason for the fears of the minority groups was the tendency of regional governments, secure in their majority, to disregard the wishes of the minorities. But in spite of these observations, the commission rejected the idea of creating more states because it thought that would “create more problems as great as it sought to cure.” It suggested instead that a “Bill of Rights” modeled after the European Convention on Human Rights be included in the independence constitution as a way of promoting national integration and guaranteeing minority rights. Following this recommendation, the constitution introduced at independence contained elaborate provisions guaranteeing to every Nigerian certain basic human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Narrating the Nation Although Nigeria became independent in 1960, it retained formal links with the British Crown until 1963 when the country became a Republic. With independence, Nigeria also adopted a federal form of government. This was thought to be the best form of government for a country with such diverse regional and ethnic groups. Federalism, which guaranteed some level of regional autonomy, was also seen as a way of protecting the rights and interests of minority groups within the country. The country also adopted the Westminster style of government as a way of ensuring that political power was not concentrated in the hands of any single ethnic or regional group. Thus, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, from the Muslim-dominated Hausa-Fulani group, became the prime minister; Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo from the East, became governor general (later president); and Obafemi Awolowo, a Yoruba from the West, became leader of the opposition party in parliament. Under these circumstances, postcolonial Nigerian nationalism tended to focus on promoting a shared sense of national belonging. Old colonial histories that stressed ethnic divisions and cultural disparities were rejected for new national histories that stressed national unity. Nationalist historians challenged the idea that the Nigerian state was an artificial colonial creation and stressed, instead, the long history of precolonial economic and cultural contacts between the diverse ethnic groups in the country. The underlying message was that there were cultural and historical bases for national unity. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Nigerian coat of arms. (Vector-Images.com)

The aspiration toward national integration was also evident in some of the national symbols that were adopted at independence. The national anthem, composed by a British expatriate, acknowledged ethnic differences but stressed national unity: “Nigeria, we hail thee/ Our own dear native land/ Though tribe and tongue may differ/ In brotherhood we stand.” Similarly, the new national motto and coat of arms evoked unity by incorporating symbols that connected the land and people of Nigeria. The coat of arms consisted of wavy bands of silver on a black shield representing the Niger and Benue rivers, two major rivers that run across the country. It also included the Cactus spectabilis, a wild flower common throughout the country. The adopted national motto was “Unity and Faith, Peace and Progress.”

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Beneath these national symbols, however, were serious challenges to the idea of the Nigerian nation. Ethnic and regional differences were accentuated in the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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struggle for economic power and limited state resources. In the absence of a truly national political platform, politicians drew on ethnic and regional loyalties in staking their claim to national office. Even supposedly national institutions such as the military and the police were not spared the divisive ethnic politics of this period. In 1966, the military overthrew the elected government of Tafawa Balewa in a coup led by Igbo officers in the Nigerian Army. The coup led to the assassinations of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa and the Northern Premier Ahmadu Bello, leading many to conclude that it was ethnically motivated. The new military ruler, Maj. Gen. Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, sought to stem the tide of ethnicity and regionalism in Nigerian politics by abrogating the federal system and introducing a unitary system of government. His hope was that by centralizing political power, the regional governments would cease to be bases of ethnic agitations. This reform was short-lived as Aguiyi Ironsi was himself overthrown in a bloody countercoup by military officers, mostly of Northern extraction. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gowon was named as the new head of state amidst the violence and killings of Igbos in the northern part of the country. These killings were apparently to avenge the assassination of Northern political office holders during the earlier Igbo-led coup. The killing of Igbos led to the mass departure of over a million Igbos from the North back to their homelands in the Eastern Region. It also led to calls in the Eastern Region for secession from Nigeria, as several Igbo leaders proclaimed that they had lost faith in the Nigerian nation. In May 1967, Lt. Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military governor of the Eastern Region, proclaimed the establishment of the independent Republic of Biafra. This led to a devastating civil war from 1967 to 1970. The Biafra War was the most serious threat to the Nigerian nation since its creation. Leaders of other ethnic groups made it clear that they too would seek secession if the Biafran secessionist movement was successful. This scenario was, however, averted with the surrender of Briafran forces in 1970. One of the main challenges that faced the country after the civil war was restoring confidence in the nation, which had been shaken by the conflict. The military rulers realized that there was an urgent need to repair the damage of war and to foster a renewed sense of national belonging, particularly among the Igbos

Biafra War The Nigerian Civil War (also known as the Biafra War) broke out in 1967 following political and ethnic crisis in the country. The Eastern states dominated by the Igbo ethnic group under the leadership of Lt. Col. C. O. Ojukwu declared the Eastern Region the sovereign and independent Republic of Biafra. The federal government declared a state emergency, and the ensuing fighting raged until 1970 when Ojukwu fled the country and Biafran forces surrendered. One million Nigerians died in the war.


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who had lost the war. To this end, the government of Gen. Yakubu Gowon declared the official principle of “No victor, No vanquished,” indicating that there would be no retribution against leaders of the secessionist movement. No military medals of valor were awarded to the victorious federal troops since, as General Gowon argued, the war had been a conflict between brothers. Instead, the government promised to adopt the policy of the three R’s: rehabilitation, reconciliation, and reconstruction. Efforts were made to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during the war and reintegrate Igbos into national institutions, such as the civil service, the police force, and the army. Although these postwar reconstruction initiatives had their limitations, they represented an attempt at promoting national integration. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Nigeria continued to be ruled by a succession of military rulers. The most prominent of these was Brig. (later Gen.) Murtala Ramat Mohammed, a Muslim Northerner, who came to power in 1975. Mohammed assumed power with an agenda to reform key institutions of the state and foster a new sense of national belonging among Nigerians. This included a purge that affected the civil service, judiciary, armed forces, and public corporations. He strengthened the power of the central government and imposed the authority of the federal government in areas formerly reserved for the states. His successor, Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, continued with these reformist policies and oversaw the transition from military rule to elected civilian rule in the country. One of the tasks of nation-building that the Mohammed-Obasanjo regime grappled with was formulating new political institutions, processes, and orientations that would address the problem of ethnic and regional politics that had plagued the nation since independence. One solution was to divide the country into more states to reduce the concentration of ethnic groups in particular states. It was thought that this would “help to erase memories of past political ties and emotional attachments.” Thus, in 1976, 6 new states were created, bringing the number of states in the country from 13 to 19. Also, as part of reforming political structures to foster national integration, the country adopted the American-style presidential system of government and a new constitution in 1979. Under the constitution, parties applying for registration had to have national objectives and executive boards whose members represented at least two-thirds of the states. This was clearly aimed at avoiding the divisive ethnic and regional politics of the past. Another provision of the 1979 constitution aimed at eliminating past loopholes was the “federal character principle.” This was an affirmative action principle requiring that appointments to top government positions be made to reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the country. This principle also applied to the composition of the armed forces and the distribution of national resources. Apart from the federal character principle, other initiatives taken by the Mohammed-Obasanjo regime that were aimed at promoting national integration included the adoption of a new national anthem composed by a Nigerian to replace the old nation anthem handed down from the colonial period. Unlike the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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old anthem, the new anthem made no reference to ethnic differences but, rather, emphasized faith in the fatherland and the labors of past heroes: “Arise, O compatriots/ Nigeria’s call obey/ To serve our fatherland/ With love and strength and faith/ The labor of our heroes past/ Shall never be in vain.” The government also launched a public-awareness campaign that promoted patriotism and pride in Nigerian culture. Public officers were encouraged to dress in local attire rather than Western cloths, particularly when representing the country abroad. It became common to see Nigerian public officials dressed in flowing traditional gowns known as Agbada. The assassination of Gen. Murtala Mohammed in an unsuccessful coup d’état in 1976 provided a rare moment of national unity in the country with the outpouring of national loss. Although Gen. Mohammed was a Muslim Northerner, his political and social reforms won him popular admiration and support throughout the country. His decisive leadership seemed to promise a bright future and many saw him as a national hero. Several national monuments were subsequently built or named in his honor, and his image adorns the national currency. In the 1980s, Nigeria was ruled by a combination of military and elected civilian regimes, all of which adopted policies aimed at promoting national unity and a sense of patriotism in the country. The elected civilian government of Shehu Shagari, which succeeded the military government in 1979, strove to ensure that each region of the country was represented in public appointments in accordance with the federal character principle in the constitution. Similarly in 1984, the military regime headed by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari launched an ambitious national campaign to mobilize the country. The military-style initiative, which it called the “War Against Indiscipline,” stressed the work ethic, emphasized patriotism, decried corruption, and promoted environmental sanitation. In government-sponsored media campaigns throughout the country, Nigerians were encouraged to take pride in their country and eschew the ethnic animosities of the past. Daily recitals of the national anthem were made compulsory in schools, and public institutions were mandated to fly the national flag to demonstrate their patriotism. Although this campaign for reform and national mobilization created an unprecedented awareness of the importance of national symbols like the flag and anthem, it met

Gen. Murtala Ramat Mohammed (1938 –1976) Gen. Murtala Mohammed, an army general and later head of state, was born in 1938. He received his military training in Nigeria and England and was a commanding officer during the Nigerian Civil War. Following a military coup in 1975, he was named head of state. His dynamic administration gave this country a new sense of direction, duty, and patriotism. He pursued a radical program of reforming major national institutions and outlined a democratic transition program. He was assassinated on February 13, 1976, in an abortive coup.


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few of its aims. An economic recession coupled with the authoritarian character of the regime undermined the efforts at promoting patriotism and national integration. Sporadic conflicts between Christians and Muslims in the northern part of the country also seemed to undermine the message of national unity. Like several other African countries, Nigeria was caught in the wave of democratization that swept across the world in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Its military rulers came under sustained international and domestic pressure to restore democratic constitutional rule in the country. Between 1989 and 1993, the military ruler general Ibrahim Babangida oversaw an extended and controversial transition program aimed at terminating military rule and restoring the country to full democracy. The Babangida regime stressed the need for a democratic system of government that was suited to the geopolitical and multiethnic realities of Nigeria. It was repeatedly argued that Nigerian democracy had to be “home grown” and need not be modeled after Western democracies. Although the country’s previous experimentation with the Westminster style of government had indeed been unsuccessful, the argument for a “home grown” democracy was often an excuse for excessive government intervention in the democratic transition process. For example, participation in the democratic process was limited to two national political parties established by the government. The justification for this was that by limiting political participation to two national political parties, the nation would avoid a repeat of the divisive ethnic and regional politics that marred previous attempts at democratic rule. This democratic transition program ended in a fiasco in 1993 when General Babangida abruptly annulled a presidential election that was widely believed to have been won by Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba businessman from the southern part of the county. The country was thrown into political and social turmoil, particularly in the South where the annulment of the election was seen as an attempt by a military regime dominated by Northerners to prevent a shift in political power to the South. This political situation intensified ethnic and regional tensions across the country for much of the 1990s as the military struggled to maintain its hold on power amidst growing opposition. However, following the death of the military ruler general Sani Abacha in 1998, the military leadership inaugurated a new, more transparent democratic transition program that sought to open up the political space by encouraging mass participation. The two national political parties established by the previous government were abolished and multiparty politics was reintroduced. Old arguments about the need for a uniquely Nigerian “home grown” democracy were abandoned with the adoption of a federal constitution and a system of government modeled after the American presidential system. The transition program culminated in the election of a former military ruler, Olusegun Obasanjo, as president in 1999. It also led to the establishment of a fragile but inclusive democratic political system that ushered Nigeria into the 21st century. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Like most colonial creations, African nations are unique in the fact that the people who make up the nation often had little or no say in the creation of these nations. Modern nation-states in Africa were more or less accidents of colonial rule. With the end of colonial rule, the central challenge that many of these states face is one of forging cohesive nations out of the fragmented colonial states bequeathed at independence. Nigeria epitomizes this challenge. The greatest challenge to the idea of the Nigerian nation remains the sheer diversity of its constituent ethnic and religious groups as well as the arbitrary colonial circumstances that led to its creation. The task of building a cohesive nation and forging a sense of national identity among its people is one that the country has grappled with since its independence and will likely continue to grapple with in the years ahead. Selected Bibliography Arikpo, O. 1967. The Development of Modern Nigeria. Harmondsworth: Penguin. Awolowo, O. 1947. Path to Nigerian Freedom. London: Faber and Faber. Azikiwe, N. 1943. Political Blueprint of Nigeria. Lagos: African Book Company. Burns, A. 1972. History of Nigeria. London: George Allen and Uwin. Coleman, J. S. 1958. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Crowder, M. 1962. The Story of Nigeria. London: Faber and Faber. Dudley, B. J. 1982. An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Politics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ikime, O., ed. 1980. Groundwork of Nigerian History. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books for Historical Society of Nigeria. Nwabueze, B. O. 1982. A Constitutional History of Nigeria. New York: Longman. Oseghae, E. 1988. Crippled Giant: Nigeria since Independence. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Tamuno, T. N. 1972. The Evolution of the Nigerian State: The Southern Phase, 1898–1914. London: Longman. Tamuno, T. N., and J. A. Atanda, eds. 1989. Nigeria since Independence: The First 25 Years. Ibadan: Heinemann Educational Books.


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China Orion Lewis and Jessica Teets Chronology 1842–1860 China signs the “unequal treaties” with Western powers after losing the Opium Wars. 1912 (January 1) End of the Qing Dynasty and beginning of the Republican Era under Sun Yat-Sen. 1919 (May 4) Movement in the wake of Versailles Treaty where Chinese territory is not returned. 1921 (July) Formation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 1925 (March) Dr. Sun Yat-Sen dies. 1927 (March) Nationalist Party, Guomindang (GMD), rule under Chiang K’ai-shek. 1931 The Japanese invade China (Manchuria) during World War II. 1945 (August) The Japanese are defeated and withdraw from China. 1945–1949 Civil war between GMD and CCP. 1949 (October) Establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) headed by the CCP. 1958–1960 Great Leap Forward. 1966–1976 Cultural Revolution. 1972 (February 21) Nixon visits China to normalize U.S.-China relations. 1976 (September 9) Mao Zedong dies and Hua Guofeng takes control of the CCP. 1978 Deng Xiaoping takes control of the CCP. 1979 Deng begins economic reforms.

Situating the Nation Although China’s ancient history as the Middle Kingdom—the center of commerce, power, and culture in Asia—was seen as a time of strength, the 100 years before the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 was known as the “century of humiliation” (bainian guochi). This period began with China’s defeat at the hands of Western forces during the Opium Wars of the mid-19th century, which initiated the partial colonization of areas of China via a series of “unequal treaties.” Further humiliation occurred when the Chinese territory taken by the Germans during World War I was given to the Japanese in the Treaty of Versailles, spawning the anti-imperialist May Fourth Movement of 1919. Out of the anti-imperialist fervor of this time emerged a nascent communist movement, which would spend the next few decades contesting the ruling Nationalist Party, Guomindang (GMD). Yet it was not until fighting against Japan’s military invasion during World War II that the communists gained the nationalist credentials and peasant support that helped them to emerge victorious in the country’s civil war. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The early years of the PRC clearly brought dramatic political change to China, yet from a nationalist perspective, one can look at the Communist Party’s policies as a continuation of previous attempts to deal with the great national question that had plagued China since its first clash with the Western nations in the 19th century. That is, how should China regain a place as a great independent nation in a Western-dominated international system that centered on the nationstate as the primary unit of political organization? Indeed, the dilemma of transforming a traditional society, based on universal cultural principles and local kinship ties, into a modern country with cohesive national unity was one that Chinese elites perpetually grappled with during the 20th century. While the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attempted to provide a new answer to this old question by relying on the communist ideology of class struggle, its legitimacy rested to a great extent on popular ideas of anti-imperialism and national self-strengthening. American hostility to communist China during the Cold War, a political rivalry with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, and American involvement in conflicts in Korea and Vietnam, all provided a continuous pretext for appeals to the strong anti-imperialist sentiments throughout the country. Thus, it was the seemingly constant threat of foreign imperialism that continued to serve as the paramount justification for many of the policies that sought to unify the country under a common ideology of communism and a common goal of national modernization. This nationalistic impulse to become a strong modern nation was a common theme underlying the efforts of the CCP to achieve a number of nation-building goals, including rewriting ethnic boundaries in a

Century of Humiliation The period from approximately the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries, when China was partially colonized by Western powers, is known as the “century of humiliation.”

Mao Zedong The leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the civil war. The chairman of the party, he wielded tremendous power and influence until his death in 1976.

Mao the Nationalist: How the Communists Were More Nationalist than the Nationalist Party Although the Nationalist Party named Guomindang (GMD) conceived of themselves as the party to unify the varied peoples of China, the majority of Chinese perceived the GMD to be a corrupt party more interested in personal enrichment than protecting China’s territorial integrity from the Japanese incursions in 1931. The CCP, on the other hand, earned a nationalist reputation by fighting the Japanese troops more effectively during World War II. Mao continued to stress an anti-imperialism brand of nationalism that sought to unify and modernize the disparate ethnicities within China. This anti-imperialism nationalism was a strong source of legitimacy for the CCP throughout this period.


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broad multicultural land, cultivating a common socialist belief system, and modernizing the economy.

Instituting the Nation Shortly after coming to power, the CCP instituted a political view of the nation that sought to define China as a unitary multiethnic nation. This was clearly viewed as the best means to create a strong country and maintain an aggressive stand against imperialism. When examining nationalism during the early years of the PRC, the dominance of the government in creating and instituting nationalist policy is evident: it was the decisions of the CCP that promoted new ways of thinking about the nation and the means by which to implement those ideas. However, the CCP itself was organized along hierarchical lines, and as the supreme leader, Mao Zedong clearly had tremendous influence over the project of national construction. His writings on the composition of the people, national modernization, and the ongoing fight against imperialism were instrumental in spreading the official message of the new China. Even after he was removed from his official positions of power following the disastrous “Great Leap Forward,” Mao continued to exert tremendous influence among the people, as was witnessed by his ability to incite anti-traditionalist nationalism during the Cultural Revolution. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Thus, a clear focus on the decisions of the CCP and Mao himself are the best means to understanding the development of the Chinese nation during this time period. The institutions of the PRC were characterized by the partial adoption of the Soviet model of political and economic development. In this type of political system, the CCP was the dominant political institution that was designed to embody the “revolutionary classes” of the people and to guide the “correct thinking” of the population. Once in power, the CCP embarked on an ambitious agenda of changing traditional social and ethnic relations, ostensibly to unite the people under the common communist purpose. To do this, the CCP maintained tight control over the media, instituted organizations at every level to promote socialist teachings, set up a variety of institutions to incorporate ethnic minorities in the government, and built infrastructure that helped to physically link together a large and diverse country. Beginning in 1950, the CCP began the process of instilling a communist ideology of class struggle, which was a difficult social transformation as the Chinese people had traditionally identified primarily with their birthplaces as opposed to universal economic classes. Thus, the CCP embarked on a broad effort of mass education and propaganda designed to develop ideas of class consciousness and promote the CCP’s agenda of a unified people. First, borrowing in part from the Soviet model, the CCP organized study groups at all levels of society in order to promote communist indoctrination and class consciousness. Most work places had groups organized to study the writings of Mao Zedong and almost every organization had a Communist Party representative to ensure correct thinking among the masses. This education campaign in the workplace was bolstered by the government’s control over two other institutions—the public education system and the media. By maintaining tight control over school curricula, the CCP was able to ensure that generations of youth were indoctrinated regarding the superiority of the communist system and the importance of political loyalty. This teaching was reinforced by the state-run media that served to disseminate CCP propaganda. In sum, the CCP designed a complex set of institutions that pervaded every aspect of the citizen’s life and ensured that the CCP’s messages of patriotism and anti-imperialism were heard by all. In addition to general principles of class struggle and communist unity, the CCP was also faced with the challenge of governing a large and diverse multiethnic country. In this regard, the government sought to co-opt traditional leaders in order to ensure the allegiances of these groups to the new government. Consequently, ethnic leaders, such as the Dalai Lama, came to play a pivotal role in promoting either national integration or separatism. Additionally, the CCP established a variety of institutions to incorporate minority groups into the broader project of national unity, which included an ethnic identification campaign, partially autonomous regional governments, and a “united front” of traditional ethnic leaders within the CCP itself. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Chinese propoganda poster: the glory of Mao’s ideologies brightens up the new China. (Library of Congress)

Defining the Nation During its early years in power, the CCP set out to redefine the nature of social relationships as well as the identities of ethnic minorities within the country— all for the purpose of building a cohesive nation united under the banner of communism. As indicated, the ideology of communism presented a view of class struggle, whereby the oppressed classes were to revolutionize social relations, changing society from a backward “feudal” one to a modern progressive one. The primary definition of “the people” in the new China was based on the communist notion of the revolutionary classes. Mao defined the citizens, or the “people,” based on communist ideas of the four revolutionary classes: the workers, the small-business owners, the peasants, and the national business class. Yet Mao also argued that the composition of the people would change as the country progressed beyond the early stages of national development, and eventually the nation was to comprise the peasant and worker classes. However, as many researchers have pointed out, ultimately the simple class categories were insufficient to explain whether someone was to be included in the nation. Eventually, the emphasis on class would devolve into struggles over political loyalty to the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Class Struggle as the Basis of the Nation Drawing on Marxist philosophy, the CCP emphasized “class” as the primary political category. Class represented an individual’s economic background, but also came to indicate an individual’s political position. The “revolutionary” classes were glorified as the people that would lead China down the road to communism. They were to struggle against the “feudal” classes, comprised of landowners, capitalist, and imperialists. Usually this struggle entailed teaching “correct thinking” to these classes so that they would support national policy. According to Karl Marx, the process of class struggle was to ultimately give way to a unified people that no longer required class distinctions. This utopian goal thus provided a theoretical justification for the CCP’s emphasis on national unity among the people.

state and to Mao in particular. During the great upheavals that characterized this time period, it was only loyalty to Mao that guaranteed inclusion as a valid citizen of the nation and prevented political and social ostracism. It is important to note that the term “nationalism” (minzu zhuyi) was not used by the government because of the danger that it would alienate the minority ethnicities. Instead, the concept of patriotism (aiguo) was constantly evoked by the ruling party to justify policies, most often in the context of external threats. Thus the nation and citizenship were defined primarily by political—not ethnic— criteria. Political allegiance and territorial integrity were the primary rules used for determining the composition of the people and therefore the nation. While the nation was defined by political criteria, the leadership also tried to promote ideas of a single Chinese civilization that would unify the various ethnicities within the country. The concept of “Chinese nationalism” (zhonghua minzu) became crucial to thinking about the Chinese nation. To this end, the CCP directed the academic establishment to construct a myth about the cradle of Chinese civilization, and archeological evidence of multiple origins of the “Chinese” nation was suppressed. The theory surrounding the concept of zhonghua minzu presented a picture of the Chinese nation, originating in the Yellow River basin, that had mixed with various ethnicities over time, yet retained its essential cultural character. This theory promoted the notion of a unified yet diverse nation that was able to adapt and evolve over the centuries despite interaction with many different ethnic groups. This concept formed the theoretical basis of a modern Chinese nationalism under the CCP. While Mao himself rarely used the term, his writings did indicate that zhonghua minzu signified all of China’s “multinational people.” In essence, this term helped to resolve the dilemma that had faced Chinese leaders since its initial contact with the modern nation-state system: how to build a unified nation-state on the same terms as the European powers. The concept of the Chinese nation thus implied a unified nation based on vague cultural principles, yet it also left space to acknowledge the various ethnicities N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Centrality of the Han Ethnicity While the term zhonghua minzu referred to a general concept of Chinese nationalism, one that was modern and multiethnic, in fact, one ethnic group, the Han, was promoted as the leading ethnicity. The term “Han” originated in the late 19th century as a relatively modern national construction. It simply refers to the children of the Han Dynasty, which symbolized China’s classical greatness. Within the narrative of a multiethnic zhonghua minzu, the Han were always the most advanced and civilized. This helped justify an assimilationist policy during the early years of the PRC that sought to integrate minorities into the Han.

(minzu) within China. In this way, China claimed to be a unified multiethnic country, which helped align the Chinese with the nation-state ideal advocated by the West.

Narrating the Nation As indicated, communist ideology, and Mao Zedong’s writings in particular, provided a new answer to the continuing narrative surrounding the “century of humiliation.” This rhetoric of the Chinese fall from great nation status continuously provided legitimacy for the modernization efforts of the PRC. Communism provided an answer to this problem, because it was a very similar story of oppression by the capitalist class, which was easily associated with the United States and the other capitalist nations that had infringed on China’s national sovereignty during the 19th century. Communism thus lent itself well to an international narrative of a struggle for independence in the Third World. After consolidating its control over China, the CCP downplayed the class divisions within the country and opted for an international perspective on communism, which divided the world into “capitalist” nations and the oppressed “working” nations. This fostered the nationalist narrative of a struggle for independence, which was intertwined with the broader international communist movement in the rest of the colonized world. This perspective carried on throughout the Maoist years. Indeed, Mao and the CCP often blamed international “imperialists” for China’s backward economic development and used international threats to solidify national unity. Yet under Mao, this international narrative also became linked to domestic actors that opposed CCP policy, and domestic class struggle became as important as the international one. The implication was that only by putting one’s full energies behind the socialist program of the new China would the nation become strong and modern. This was the impetus behind Mao’s emphasis on “voluntarism”—the idea that the collective willingness of the people could create revolutionary change and improve the country’s economic conditions. In effect, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Chinese Nationalism and Communist Internationalism Communist ideology advocated class struggle on an international scale. Mao adhered to the rhetoric of international communist solidarity, but it was tinged with clear nationalist overtones. In the initial years of the PRC, Mao advanced an international communism, which placed China at the center of the Third World’s struggle against capitalism. He perceived China as a leading communist country in the fight against international capitalism, which was responsible for China’s weakness. Yet the nationalist overtones of this message also implied that China’s domestic modernization took precedence over international solidarity. This tendency created friction between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China, and ultimately led to a split between the two communist countries. The ethnically driven, anti-imperial nationalism that propelled the CCP into power in China, ultimately separated China from the international influence of other communist states, particularly the Soviet Union.

Voluntarism This was an explicitly Maoist idea, which argued that collective willpower could overcome backward economic conditions. It contradicted Marxist philosophy that held material factors to be the most important drivers of social change. Mao used this idea to mobilize people during the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution.”

Mao blended long-standing feelings of national humiliation with the ideas of a national collective will, which served to mobilize people behind the goal of a classless, modern, and strong country. In addition to creating a socialist narrative of national strength, the national unification project also involved the revision of China’s ethnic history, or as Mao stated, “the past should be used to support the present.” Thus, the academic establishment became instrumental in rewriting Chinese history to tell a story of a single Chinese civilization, which formed a “core” people and had evolved by interacting with and assimilating various ethnic groups over thousands of years of development. In this account, the Han are always at the center of the multiethnic China. This myth of an essential multiethnic Chinese culture came to be embodied by the concept of the zhonghua minzu. This story thus gave the government a political tool by which they could play down the differences among China’s various ethnicities and, conversely, appeal to a vague notion of the common “Chineseness” that supposedly pervaded all citizens.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The CCP actively mobilized the countryside during World War II to fight the Japanese and continued to use the peasant army it created to defeat the GMD after the end of World War II. While the peasants were the primary group that the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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communists mobilized, the CCP also undertook mass education campaigns to mobilize the urban population and non-Han population. Although the national identity still largely depended on ethnicity and anti-imperialism, the CCP under Mao added a new component—a political identity. Now peasants and CCP members were identified as being the most patriotic. Mao’s version of nationalism consisted of ridding China of the things that made her weak and thus susceptible to foreign aggression, mainly tradition and a nonindustrial economy. Two main impetuses existed that drove the construction of a national identity: the threat of disunity from inside China and the threat of foreign aggression from outside. Given the large population spread out over a great distance, as well as the lingering pockets of resistance facing the CCP after its civil war with the GMD, the CCP undertook a nation-building project designed to create an ethnic, political, and anti-imperial national identity. This identity was intended to allow the CCP to mobilize the Chinese to modernize the economy and withstand any further foreign aggression. To accomplish these aims, Mao undertook a modernization program called the Great Leap Forward in 1958, which lasted until 1960. By emphasizing voluntarist ideas of collective willpower, Mao mobilized the peasants behind efforts to industrialize the economy in only a few years’ time. Although this was an elitedefined national modernization project, the citizens supported the idea of making China a strong state that would cast off the century of humiliation and retake her rightful place in relation to other states. However, the Great Leap Forward failed to modernize China’s economy and in fact resulted in an estimated 20–30 million dead due to famines. After 1960, under a more rational economic plan, China’s economy began to slowly recover from the Great Leap Forward. Further emphasizing the political dimension of nationalism begun in 1949, Mao once again mobilized people behind a project of socialist upheaval and nationalist awakening in 1966. The Cultural Revolution called for students to overthrow the four olds: old ideas, old customs, old traditions, and old habits. Students were encouraged to demonstrate their commitment to Mao specifically and the nation more generally by eradicating the things that made China vulnerable to foreign aggression during the “century of humiliation,” namely tradition. The enormous social upheavals that resulted from the student uprising created what is known as the “lost generation”—indicating the loss of economic progress made before 1966 and the education of the student population between 1966 and 1976. The goal of this revolution was first to create strong political loyalties to Mao, but also to completely re-create traditional social relationships in China, which supposedly prevented the country from realizing its national potential. The Red Guard policed every household and conducted what were called struggle sessions, which entailed questioning and public humiliation as a means to gain power. These struggle sessions were enacted on teachers and government bureaucrats—all in the hope of re-creating China in the image of a modern socialist nation. This conception of nationalism relied heavily on voluntarism and anti-imperialism, as N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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well as on a strain of anti-traditional thought that had been present in elite debates since the late 19th century. Once again, membership in a modern socialist China depended on one’s political commitment to Mao as well as strong support of modernizing China through voluntarism and adherence to socialist economic theory as interpreted through Mao Zedong thought. Throughout Mao’s leadership, and beyond, a sense of national unity was cultivated by the CCP through a strong education campaign in the schools and factories, as well as an active propaganda department that controlled all media outlets. While the media was to serve as the mouthpiece of the party, the study groups in factories, schools, and villages were designed to create citizens who held unified views on the origin and purpose of the Chinese nation, as well as to construct identification with the party and the nation. In addition to the “voluntary” mobilization of Mao’s modernization policies, the CCP also focused on an ethnic component in their nation-building project. Although minority groups were eligible for certain benefits from the government, they were not encouraged to consider self-determination. Instead, Mao envisioned China as a state of many nationalities slowly being incorporated into the Han ethnicity. As mentioned, archeologists and historians were encouraged to rewrite China’s history so that the earliest Chinese civilization was the Han ethnicity that supposedly expanded across the country from the Yellow River (Huanghe) and incorporated all other ethnicities into the “Chinese” civilization. All groups within Chinese territory were incorporated into this notion of Chinese civilization. In addition to creating a new history, the CCP encouraged assimilation through the adoption of Mandarin as the official language, mandatory education, and migration of Han Chinese to “minority” areas. Moreover, the PRC constitution legally obligated all citizens to “protect the unity of the state and solidarity among all nationalities.” As important as the mythical notion of a Chinese civilization was for helping to unify the nation, it was clearly not enough on its own to ensure the loyalty of the ethnic minorities. Therefore, the second front in the multiethnic national project was the creation of a number of institutions to incorporate all regions into the political structure. First, starting in 1950, the government created an ethnic identification program (minzu shibie) to classify the various minorities within the country. Mao sent teams of approximately 200 ethnographers throughout the minority populations in China to classify them using a Soviet categorization system that divided groups based on four criteria: common language, common territory, common economic base, and common psychological character. This project resulted in 55 official minority groups and the formation of 8 autonomous regions. The program also had strong political motivations to weaken the power of the larger groups. For example, the Muslim peoples in the west were divided into 10 different ethnic groups, while other groups, such as the Zhuang, were literally invented by the government. The goal was to divide potentially divisive groups and promote an ideal of a multiethnic, yet unitary, state. Secondly, the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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PRC allowed for a certain degree of regional autonomy in such areas as Inner Mongolia and the western Xinjiang province. This policy allowed for somewhat autonomous governance and provided these regions with certain economic privileges. Third, the CCP sought to maintain traditional leaders in certain positions of power as symbols of ethnic autonomy. By co-opting ethnic elites, the CCP once again sought to legitimize its rule in these areas and ensure their continuing inclusion in the territory of the new China. Finally, the importance of the construction of infrastructure, which connected the far hinterlands to the center of China, cannot be underestimated. All of these institutions were designed to help legitimize CCP rule in these areas and further promote the idea of a multiethnic, yet unified, country. After Mao’s death in 1976, Hua Guofeng and then Deng Xiaoping took control of the CCP. Deng also emphasized a national identity that was a conglomeration of ethnic, anti-imperialism, and political components; however, his focus was much more on the anti-imperial and political components. Similarly to Mao, Deng desired to strengthen and modernize both China and the CCP. However, unlike Mao, his foreign policy was more conciliatory toward the Western powers, except for Japan who was still associated mostly with her imperialistic practices during World War II. Under Deng, less emphasis was placed on a unified myth of the past, and more was placed on the anti-imperial component, such as the reunification of Hong Kong and Macau that China lost during the unequal treaties period. Deng also advocated the use of nationalism to advance economic modernization. In fact, strong feelings of nationalism helped the transition from a socialist to a market-driven economy beginning in 1979. The continued emphasis on economic modernization to build a strong nation justified using whatever methods necessary to achieve this modernization: socialist or capitalist. As Deng famously stated, “it doesn’t matter if the cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice.” Selected Bibliography Callahan, W. 2004. “National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism.” Alternatives 29:199–218. Fitzgerald, J. 1995. “The Nationless State: The Search for a Nation in Modern Chinese Nationalism.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 33:75–104. Friedman, E. 1993. “A Failed Chinese Modernity.” Daedalus 122 (Spring): 1–17. Gries, P. H. 2004. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press. Johnson, C. 1962. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Moskalev, A. 2003. “Doctrine of the Chinese Nation.” Far Eastern Affairs 31, no. 1: 64–82. Unger, J., ed. 1996. Chinese Nationalism. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Zhao, S. 2004. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.


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India Laura Dudley Jenkins Chronology 1947 1948 1950 1955 1956 1964 1965 1971

1974 1975 1977 1984 1989 1999 2004

Independence from Great Britain and the Partition of India and Pakistan. Mohandas (The Mahatma or “Great Soul”) Gandhi is assassinated. India’s constitution goes into effect. Bandung Conference of Asian and African leaders, including Prime Minister Nehru, start a nonaligned movement. States Reorganization Act results in linguistic states in India. India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, dies. Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, becomes prime minister. Simla Agreement formalizes the Line of Control in Kashmir, designating areas controlled by India and Pakistan. With the help of India, East Pakistan breaks from Pakistan to become the independent country of Bangladesh. India detonates first nuclear bomb. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declares Emergency, suspending many democratic rights. The Emergency ends. Indira Gandhi loses the election and falls from power for three years. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi is assassinated. Her son Rajiv Gandhi becomes prime minister. Rajiv Gandhi is assassinated. Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party government is in power. Congress Party–dominated coalition government is in power.

Situating the Nation India gained independence from Great Britain in 1947, but Independence Day is also recalled as a day of tragedy due to Partition. British India was divided into two countries, Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan, and the ensuing mass exodus of Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan and of Muslims from India led to violence and deaths. Millions of people moved and hundreds of thousands of people, some estimate 1 million, were killed in the aftermath of Partition. East Pakistan (ethnically and linguistically distinct from West Pakistan and separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory) later broke from the rest of Pakistan to become the independent country of Bangladesh. In addition to Pakistan and Bangladesh, India’s geographic neighbors include (from east to west) Burma, China, Bhutan, Nepal, and Afghanistan, as well as Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean to its south. India is one of the most geographically varied countries on Earth, including some of the wettest and driest climates, ranging from the Himalayan Mountains of the north to the tropical beaches of the south. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Partition of India and Pakistan at independence was an outcome of a debate over the model of nationalism that India should embody after independence. Could religious minorities be guaranteed their rights in a Hindu majority country? Ultimately, British administrators, in the waning days of their empire, rather hurriedly drew the lines that would divide India from East and West Pakistan, and many Muslims (who still are India’s largest religious minority) opted to leave. Shared colonial history and family ties between Indians and Pakistanis have not prevented repeated military conflicts over territory, particularly in Kashmir, making the India-Pakistan relationship one of the most intense and volatile in the world. Indian politicians have long constructed Pakistan as a nemesis and frequently attribute violence even within India to Pakistani involvement. Partition did not solve the national question of how to encompass a multireligious population in the new Indian nation. India encompasses Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Parsis, Jains, Buddhists, and other religious minorities in addition to Hindus, and many of the most contentious national issues, ranging from the status of Muslim-majority Kashmir to the role of religious laws in the Indian legal system, stem from India’s religious diversity and continue to this day. The status of Kashmir remains so contested in part because it is a symbol of the competing ideas of nationhood in India and Pakistan. Kashmir was a Muslimmajority state with a Hindu king at the time of Partition. The first Indo-Pakistani military conflict began over this region in 1947, and conflicts continued, most notably in 1965 and 1999. As a Muslim-majority area, according to the logic underlying the formation of Pakistan, it should have become part of Pakistan. Yet as a state that was both Hindu and Muslim, Kashmir exemplified one major ideology of Indian nationalism, epitomized by Mohandas Gandhi’s nationalist movement, the ideal of unity in diversity.

Satyagraha: Gandhian Nonviolent Resistance Anticolonial nationalist Mohandas Gandhi is widely known for his use of nonviolence resistance to achieve independence from British rule. Known as satyagraha (literally, truth force), Gandhi’s approach should not be confused with “passive” resistance. He and his many followers strategically chose active and forceful campaigns that challenged the British economically, politically, and morally. Examples include boycotting British goods, marching in defiance of new taxes, starting national educational institutions, and being arrested in large numbers. The spinning wheel became a nationalist symbol, and as nationalists, both men and women made homespun cloth (khadi ) rather than buy imported British textiles. Gandhi’s technique challenged and rebuked the British by highlighting the contradictions between their own moral and political arguments regarding colonialism and their actions. The image of Gandhi in simple homespun cloth walking into meetings with British authorities was reproduced in media around the world and remains one of the most striking nationalist images of the modern era. Gandhian satyagraha has inspired many subsequent leaders, including United States civil rights leader Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.


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Recent historical work cautions us that the situation should not be reduced to a competition between religious versus secular visions and reminds us of the marginalization of the inhabitants of Kashmir themselves. A symbol of national ideas that are at odds, Kashmir remains divided by a “Line of Control.”

Instituting the Nation In part because Independence Day brings to mind the tragedies of Partition, the commemoration of independent India’s constitution in 1950 has become a national celebration known as Republic Day. India’s constitution is one of the longest in the world and includes a rather idealistic section on the goals the country hopes to achieve, providing a window through which to see national aspirations. These “directive principles” include such ideals as equal justice, living wages, free and compulsory education, protection of the environment, and promotion of international peace and security. The principle architect of India’s constitution, which, in amended form, is still in use today, was Dr. B. R. Ambedkar. Independent India’s first law minister, Dr. Ambedkar was born an “untouchable,” in other words, a member of the lowest status group in the Indian caste system. Although people viewed as untouchables face extreme social stratification as well as discrimination in education and employment, Dr. Ambedkar had the extraordinary opportunity to study for advanced degrees in Britain and the United States, thanks to a progressive patron and his own academic achievements. He returned to India to work tirelessly for the rights of India’s lowest castes. The constitutional recognition of the need for special policies for certain disadvantaged groups reflects Dr. Ambedkar’s and many early Indian lawmakers’ recognition that the Indian nation was severely stratified. Official lists or “schedules” of disadvantaged communities include the “Scheduled Castes” (the constitutional name for those formerly known as untouchables), “Scheduled Tribes” (certain culturally distinct, socioeconomically disadvantaged, and, in many cases, spatially isolated communities), and the “Other Backward Classes” or OBCs (another constitutional category that encompasses other economically and socially disadvantaged castes or communities, such as lower castes that are not considered untouchables or other similarly disadvantaged non-Hindu communities). Recognizing these groups has resulted in far-reaching affirmative action for disadvantaged citizens in government employment and higher education policies that continue today. Supporters of these policies view them as an essential means to achieve national integration and social justice. Critics decry the policies as nationally divisive due to their organization on the basis of groups. These affirmative action policies, known as reservations, are most controversial when targeting the complex and large OBC category. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Although both Dr. Ambedkar and Mohandas Gandhi fought for the rights of untouchables, their divergent approaches relate to their different ideas about the nationalist movement, extending back to debates about constitutional reforms in the last decades of British rule. Gandhi emphasized reform of Hinduism from within to achieve lower caste rights and worried that distinct legal rights for lower castes or large-scale conversions from Hinduism as a route to social mobility would splinter Indians, who needed to remain united to achieve independence. He even fasted to protest against some of Dr. Ambedkar’s proposals for lower castes. In contrast, Dr. Ambedkar insisted that group rights were necessary, and he eventually left Hinduism to convert to Buddhism along with about a half million of his followers in 1956. Notably, he picked a “national” religion with roots in India. Another defining moment that instituted the Indian nation-state was the States Reorganization Act of 1956, which defined federalism on a linguistic basis. Although various changes have been made to the federal structure, including the addition of three new states as recently as 2000, language remains a key feature of India’s federalism. In a nation where shared language was an impediment to national unity rather than a basis for national identity, this reorganization recognized ethno-linguistic units within the national structure. The demand for linguistic states was particularly strong in south India, due to the dominance of the single largest linguistic group, Hindi/Urdu speakers, in the north. The linguistic diversity in India encompasses not just dialects, but languages and even different language families. South Indian languages are in a different language family altogether from north Indian languages, so speakers of Tamil and other south Indian languages were at the forefront of linguistic nationalist demands. Prime Minister Nehru was initially reluctant to create a linguistically based federal system, because such units could become the basis for secessionist challenges to national unity. Indeed Indians to this day maintain strong linguistic, state, and regional identities in addition to their Indian national identities. Such subnational ethno-linguistic identities are maintained through bi- and trilingual schooling as well as distinct literatures, holidays, and other art forms. Hindi written in the Devanagri script is the official language of India, but both Hindi and English (preferred by many southern elites) must by law be used for many official purposes. State legislatures may adopt their own language(s) to be used for official purposes within their states, and states and localities are supposed to provide children with education in their “mother tongue” at least through the primary stage. Indians routinely have a working knowledge of multiple languages, allowing them to converse with people and enjoy films from neighboring states. Although the division into 14 linguistic states in 1956 has since doubled into twice that many states, linguistic federalism has not proven as divisive to the nation as Nehru feared. Federalism has not solved all the tensions of regionalism, as border disputes, tensions over the distribution of resources, such as water, and even secessionist N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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movements have continued. Yet the recognition of diverse identities in the form of castes, tribes, and ethno-linguistic groups in India’s constitution and in the federal structure has arguably helped rather than hindered its efforts to sustain national unity.

Defining the Nation Because Indian identity is fragmented by cross-cutting identities, political leaders have often looked outward in order to define Indian nationalism. One postcolonial legacy was the first prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s tendency toward economic nationalism. Nehru was a protégé of nationalist leader Mohandas Gandhi, who advocated boycotting British goods as part of his strategy to achieve independence. Nehru’s economic policies differed from Gandhi’s rural, villagebased vision of development in that Nehru embraced all that was modern and industrial; however, like his mentor, Nehru recognized the intertwined nature of political and economic independence. Nehru’s economic policies were guided by his desire to achieve economic independence along with India’s new political independence and resulted in a relatively closed economy until recent years. He also oversaw a number of spectacular development projects that became symbols of national progress and modernity in the postcolonial era, including massive dams and, most strikingly, the new city of Chandigarh, largely designed by Le Corbusier, the high modernist urban planner and architect. Another key form of externally oriented nationalism was India’s involvement in the nonaligned movement in the context of the Cold War. This involvement was epitomized by Prime Minister Nehru’s participation in the Bandung Conference of 29 African and Asian leaders in 1955. Attempting to avoid new forms of imperialism in the wake of anticolonial struggles and successes, these leaders not only were concerned about economic issues but also security issues. Many, including Nehru, tried, at times with difficulty, to maintain a “nonaligned” posture in the Cold War by refusing to definitively side with the United States or the Soviet Union. By remaining nonaligned, Third World leaders could rally nationalist sentiments by snubbing the great powers of the day and occasionally use their lack of commitment to a certain side to strategic advantage. Economic nationalism and nonalignment helped to define the nation as independent and sovereign in the international sphere; yet the nation needed internal definition as well. A kind of democratic dynasty in Indian politics helped to provide this definition, as the Indian nation became intertwined in the minds of its own citizens and the world with a single, remarkable political family. Not only did Jawaharlal Nehru (son of an anticolonial nationalist leader) lead India as prime minister from independence to his death in 1964, but also his daughter, and then her son and his family have been central figures in Indian politics. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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How have Indian democracy and national identity persisted despite the endemic poverty, widespread illiteracy, and multifaceted diversity of its population? The Nehru family and their political party provide one answer to this puzzle. The transformation of the Indian National Congress from an anticolonial nationalist movement into the major political party of modern India provided continuity and leadership for the new nation. The charisma and appeal of one nationalist family, for many citizens of independent India, transcended cultural, economic, and educational differences. Indira Gandhi became prime minister after her father’s death in 1964 and recalibrated Indian nationalism through her rhetoric and her policies. Chosen by her Congress Party’s elite, who viewed her as the electable yet malleable daughter of a revered national figure, she proved to be less malleable than anticipated after her election. She is remembered for her populist nationalism, epitomized by her appeals to India’s poor, and her militant nationalism, particularly in the 1965 conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir and the 1971 conflict with Pakistan that resulted in the independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan). She also exacerbated religious nationalism, particularly in the Indian state of Punjab, where

The Nehru Dynasty and Congress Party Motilal Nehru was a wealthy and influential member of the Indian National Congress, the leading nationalist movement for independence from the British. He served as president of this organization, a role that his son, Jawaharlal, later took over. Jawaharlal Nehru, with the support of Mohandas Gandhi, built on his leading role in the nationalist movement to eventually serve as independent India’s first leader. He oversaw not only the transition from colonial rule to independence but also the transformation of the Indian National Congress into the Congress Party, which became the dominant political party for decades to come. After his death, his daughter, Indira Gandhi (no relation to Mohandas Gandhi), became the next prime minister. Indira Gandhi groomed her son Sanjay for politics, giving him extensive powers during the Emergency, when his heavy-handed approach to population control made him quite notorious. Sanjay’s accidental death prior to the assassination of Indira meant that her other son, Rajiv, became heir apparent and the next prime minister to be elected. After Rajiv’s assassination by a Tamil extremist who was angered by his use of Indian troops in Sri Lanka in 1987, Rajiv’s wife Sonia Gandhi gradually took on more political roles and now heads the Congress Party. Hindu nationalists criticize her role in Indian politics by making an issue of her Italian and Catholic heritage. Sonia wears a sari, speaks Hindi, and seems to have tapped in to the national psyche. Evoking the traditional veneration of renunciation in India, she led her Congress Party to victory in 2004 and then refused to take power herself, instead handing over the prime ministership to Manmohan Singh. Rajiv and Sonia’s children, Rahul and Priyanka, are the most recent members of this illustrious family to make their marks on Indian politics. Rahul is a member of Parliament, and Priyanka has been very active in her mother’s and brother’s campaigns.


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she sent troops to attack secessionists while they were within the holiest site of Sikhism, the Golden Temple in Amritsar. Ultimately, she was assassinated by her own bodyguard, a Sikh, after which many Sikhs were targeted and killed, particularly in the capital city of Delhi. A defining moment for Indian nationalism was Indira Gandhi’s crackdown on democracy during the Emergency and the response of India’s citizens. Facing increasing political opposition and instability, Indira Gandhi declared a national emergency in 1975. She arrested many people who opposed her and suspended many democratic rights by postponing elections, limiting civil liberties, and restricting the independence of the press and the courts. When she ended the Emergency and called for new elections in 1977, she and her party were decisively defeated. This suggests that democracy had become a key component of India’s national identity. India’s citizens were willing to defeat even a member of the Nehru family to protect democracy in India.

Narrating the Nation Diversity on the basis of religion, gender, and caste has resulted in varied narratives of the Indian nation. Competing narratives have emerged with the rise of Hindu nationalism, controversies over women and personal laws, and the increasing presence of low-caste political parties. Hindu nationalism extends back to colonial days. Although known for his ecumenical approach within the nationalist movement, Mohandas Gandhi defended some aspects of the caste system and eschewed conversions from Hinduism. Extremist Hindu nationalists, however, felt he was pandering to Muslims and other minorities. Mohandas Gandhi was killed by such an extremist shortly after Indian independence, an act that gave Hindu nationalism a bad name for some time. Yet Hindu nationalist organizations continued and made a resurgence in the 1980s and 1990s with the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which eventually ruled the national government, in coalition, from 1999 to 2004. In addition to this political party, Hindu nationalists also have interlinked networks of social, cultural, and political organizations, including wings for youth, women, and Indians living abroad. The ideology of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, is that India (in some versions, a greater India extending beyond its current borders) should be reimagined as a Hindu nation, and that historical attempts to be inclusive of other religions are appeasement, which should cease. Persons within the Hindu nationalist movement vary from moderate to extreme. Achieving power at the center necessitated a more moderate face and approach, personified by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee; yet attacks on Muslims and Muslim sites, with the encouragement of other Hindu nationalist leaders and organizations, have continued, as in the state of Gujarat in 2002. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Hindu epics such as the Mahabharat and Ramayan have played a role in Hindu nationalism by presenting ideal leaders and heroes as well as familial and societal relationships. Beginning in the 1980s, these religious epics were shown in the form of serials on the government television network, Doordarshan. When they were initially shown, often the streets emptied due to the number of viewers. Interestingly, the nationally shown television programs may have homogenized the varied regional versions of these epics into one version that dominated the national imagination. Women frequently become national or community symbols, and women in India are no exception. One example of this dynamic is the ongoing controversy over “personal law”—certain civil laws that vary by religious community. One court case became a national controversy, when Shah Bano, a divorced, Muslim woman, demanded alimony from her husband. The Supreme Court, Parliament, and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi became embroiled in a national debate over the role of Muslim family law and the meaning of secularism in India. Although Hindus and Christians also have personal law codes, which are also inequitable to women, Muslim personal law, and particularly Muslim women, remain the emotive center of attention in debates over personal law. A uniform civil code still has not emerged, in part due to minority groups’ concerns about the clout of Hindu nationalists in the design of such a code. The issue of these distinct civil codes is part of an ongoing debate over how to implement the key concept of “unity in diversity” in Indian nationalism. Lower caste political parties are on the rise in India, and they offer distinct narratives of Indian nationalism. Challenging both the Congress Party that has claimed to speak for them and the Hindu nationalist BJP, lower caste parties, including the Bahujan (majority) Samaj Party (BSP) and the Samaj Party (SP), have increasingly challenged the status quo, particularly at the state and local levels. Political parties dominated by lower castes (which have been most successful in the north) promote the idea that low castes, including both Dalits and OBCs (a category discussed above), actually form a majority in India. Their majoritarian nationalism counters the Hindutva narrative, which they see as an upper-caste dominated version of majoritarian nationalism. Many politically active members of the very lowest castes now prefer to be called Dalits (the crushed or oppressed). Their narratives of nationalism have taken a variety of forms. Some in the 1970s modeled their counternationalism on the Black Panthers in the United States and called themselves the Dalit Panthers. Like the Black Panthers, theirs was a militant nationalism, but it also took a literary turn, with an outpouring of Dalit literature, particularly the western state of Maharashtra (and written primarily in Marathi). Some low-caste groups (particularly in the south) promote a counternarrative of nationalism by arguing that low castes were the original inhabitants of India, who were oppressed by invaders from the north who moved south and invented the caste system to control the sons of the soil. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Dalits, or “Untouchables,” rally in India on January 11, 2004. The aim of the march, begun on December 6, 2003, is to increase awareness of the plight of this strata of society, considered “impure” according to the rigid caste system still in place throughout India today. (Antoine Serra/In Visu/Corbis)

Individuals from the lowest castes, including women, have been able to enter local politics in larger numbers due to a constitutional amendment in 1993 that reserved varied percentages of seats in local legislative bodies for candidates who are members of the Scheduled Castes and one-third of seats for women. This practical measure, although not always perfectly implemented, is a far-reaching effort to achieve national integration of some of India’s most disadvantaged citizens.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Joining the nuclear “club” with its first nuclear test in 1974 seemed to clash with the national legacy of Gandhian nonviolence, although India remains in favor of nuclear disarmament if done on a global scale. Periodic nuclear tests have mobilized various reactions within India, ranging from national pride in technological prowess to criticism of national priorities. Although the outside world tends to focus on the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry, Indians point out that another neighbor, China, is also a security threat. India and China went to war in 1962 over territory and still disagree on border issues.


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Building the nation in economic terms is a policy area that has undergone dramatic changes in recent decades. Breaking from his grandfather’s legacy of closed economic nationalism, Rajiv Gandhi’s government embraced a new era of economic liberalization, a trend that has continued. Certain aspects of Westernization that have accompanied this liberalization have sparked some cultural nationalist backlash, as in protests related to Kentucky Fried Chicken or Saint Valentine’s Day. Concerns about obesity related to the former and promiscuity related to the latter seemed to spark as much concern as their promotion of a nonvegetarian diet or a Christian saint. Uneasiness about such imports is rather varied and diffuse, and concerns related to Westernization have not sparked widespread backlash, perhaps because the upper classes in India have become so globalized themselves. Many work in multinational companies within India, and many have gone abroad to work. The government of India is paying more and more attention to the Indian diaspora, dubbing them Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) and creating various incentives to encourage their continued identification as Indians. Various policies encourage NRIs to establish residences in India and to invest in India. In addition to government outreach efforts, organizations such as the Hindu nationalist Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) also encourage their own versions of diasporic nationalism through culture camps for NRI children and various international fundraising efforts for political, cultural, and social causes. The Indian diaspora is economically diverse. In addition to computer engineers in Silicon Valley, several at the forefront of the information technology revolution, the diaspora includes many lower-class NRIs working overseas as laborers and domestic help. In some cases, particularly in the Middle East, these laborers are working under dangerous conditions. The modern Indian diaspora builds on earlier waves of emigration under colonial rule and has resulted in the spread of India’s rich national heritage to all of the regions of the world (South Asian Diaspora Project Database). Modern Indian citizens balance a variety of ethnic, linguistic, religious, and caste identities and various competing ideologies of nationalism. Over the years, nationalist leaders have attempted to integrate this nation through nonviolence and inclusion (Mohandas Gandhi), distinct rights for the oppressed (B. R. Ambedkar), reverence for a leading political family (the Nehru dynasty), or appeals to the Hindu majority (the Bharatiya Janata Party). In addition to the challenges of internal diversity, relations with the outside world have shaped Indian nationalism. From the heady days of freedom from colonial rule, through the struggles to achieve economic development and political nonalignment, Indian nationalists have defined India as a politically and economically independent nation. In this era of globalization, the increasing role of India and the Indian diaspora in the global economy means that the ever-changing ideas of Indian nationalism are undergoing another incarnation.


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Selected Bibliography Brass, P. 1994. The Politics of India since Independence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brown, J. 2003. Nehru. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hardgrave, R. L., and S. A. Kochanek. 2000. India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt College Publishers. Jaffrelot, C. 2003. India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of Lower Castes in North India. New York: Columbia University Press. Jenkins, L. D. 2000. “Shah Bano: Muslim Women’s Rights.” (Retrieved December 21, 2007), http://homepages.uc.edu/thro/shahbano/allshahbano.htm. Jenkins, L. D. 2003. Identity and Identification in India: Defining the Disadvantaged. New York: Routledge Curzon. Mistry, R. 2001. A Fine Balance. New York: Vintage. Nehru, J. 1989. The Discovery of India. New York: Oxford University Press. Pandey, G. 2001. Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rai, M. 2004. Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, Rights and the History of Kashmir. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Robinson, R. 2005. Tremors of Violence: Muslim Survivors of Ethnic Strife in Western India. New Delhi, India: Sage. Scott, J. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. South Asian Diaspora Project Database. 2007. South/Southeast Asian Library, University of California, Berkeley. (Retrieved December 20, 2007), http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/South AsianDiaspora/.


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Malaysia and Singapore Albert Lau Chronology 1941 Japanese forces invade and occupy “British Malaya.” British forces reoccupy both Malaya and Singapore in 1945. 1946 The Malayan Union is inaugurated. Singapore becomes a separate British colony. Malays protest by forming the United Malays National Organization. 1948 The Federation of Malaya replaces the Malayan Union. The Malayan Communist Party launches its armed insurrection and a state of emergency is declared. 1957 Britain grants Malaya independence after the Alliance Party wins a resounding mandate in the federal elections two years before. Tunku Abdul Rahman becomes the first prime minister of Malaya. 1959 Britain grants Singapore self-government after the People’s Action Party wins the Singapore general elections. Lee Kuan Yew becomes first prime minister of Singapore. 1963 Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah join Malaya to form the Federation of Malaysia, through which the former British dependencies attain their independence from British rule. 1965 Singapore leaves Malaysia, after their deep-seated political disagreements could not be reconciled. 1969 The ruling Alliance Party wins the general elections but without securing a two-thirds majority. After the outbreak of race riots, a national state of emergency is declared. The Tunku resigns as prime minister the following year. 1971 Parliament is restored and the New Economic Policy is approved. 1981 Datuk Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohammad becomes Malaysia’s longest serving prime minister. Under his 22 years at the helm, Malaysia saw rapid modernization and prosperity. 1990 Goh Chok Tong becomes Singapore’s second prime minister after Lee Kuan Yew steps aside to become senior minister. 2003 Datuk Seri Ahmad Badawi succeeds Dr. Mahathir as premier. 2004 Lee Hsien Loong succeeds Goh Chok Tong as prime minister of Singapore.

Situating the Nation Modern Malaysia, comprising Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak, is a multiethnic and multicultural nation—a mix of communities of Malays, Chinese, Indians, and other indigenous peoples, and their distinctive cultures. As a political community, however, the Malaysian nation reflects the political primacy of the Malays— a result of the historical dominance of its ethnic Malay base. The Malays were the first indigenous group to be organized politically in the Malay Peninsula through their founding of the earliest Malay “states.” From the 19th century, however, the establishment of formal and informal British control in the Malay Peninsula, Sarawak, and North Borneo (now Sabah) brought both stability and economic N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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opportunities, and invariably encouraged the influx of immigrants from within and without the region. “British Malaya” became a popular destination for many of these immigrants. A smaller number made their way to Sarawak and North Borneo. Malay migrants from the neighboring islands, sharing similar linguistic, religious, and cultural affinities, were easily assimilated into Malay society. But the arrival of non-Malay, and particularly Chinese and Indian, migrants in increasingly large numbers led to the creation and growth of ethnically and culturally differentiated communities in Malaya, and similarly in Sarawak and North Borneo. In the latter two states, ethnic and cultural heterogeneity also characterized their indigenous peoples to an even greater extent than those of the Peninsula. Sarawak included, for instance, the largely non-Muslim communities of Ibans, Bidayuhs, Kayans, Kenyahs, and the Kelabits and Muslim groups like the Kedayans, Bisayas, and Melanaus. In North Borneo, the largest indigenous communities— the Kadazans and Muruts—are largely non-Muslim while groups like the Bajaus, Bruneis, Sulus, Illanuns, and Kedayans share ethnic and cultural affinity with the Malays of the Peninsula. It was this background of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity that dictated the course of political evolution and set in motion the process of nation-building in Malaysia and the nature of the underpinning nationalism that sustains it.

Instituting the Nation Malaysia’s heterogeneity, to be sure, presented a fundamental challenge to any notion of territorial nationalism and nation-building. Divided by sectional loyalties, and owing allegiance primarily to the rulers of their states, the Malays in “British Malaya” were unable to transcend state loyalties to embrace a common nationhood. They were even less prepared to embrace a pan-Malayan territorial nationalism that included non-Malay participation. Threatened by the influx of “immigrant” Chinese and Indians who, by 1941, had outnumbered them, the Malays also felt at once the pressure to check the spread of non-Malay influence. It did not help that, by and large, Chinese and Indian political orientation was still very much influenced, and fueled, by developments in their respective motherlands. Inter-ethnic competition, state parochialism, and the stimuli of an externally oriented activism had doomed any prospect of a united pan-Malayan nationalist movement emerging from among Malaya’s heterogeneous communities to challenge the logic of British trusteeship. In Sarawak and North Borneo, where political development lagged even further behind Malaya’s, there was little nationalist awakening among the indigenous communities. If the national project had been put on hold by default, it was World War II that finally set it in motion. In Malaya, the shock of defeat at the hands of Japanese N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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forces had left an indelible imprint on indigenous minds that the British were, alas, vulnerable rulers, and set the stage for a simmering anticolonial nationalism among the more radical nationalist elements in its aftermath. But the nascent territorial nationalism was still unable to transcend the ethnic divides that had since deepened as a result of Japan’s uneven handling of the various communities during the war. The Chinese, in particular, were singled out for harsh treatment by their new invaders because of their prewar record of anti-Japanese activities, and the increased state of ethnic competition and insecurity wrought by wartime conditions. Heightened ethno-nationalism was played out after the Japanese surrender, as Chinese and Malays clashed in parts of Malaya. The communal vendetta and bloodletting that ensued sorely tested inter-ethnic peace and threatened Malaya’s increasingly fragile social stability. Inter-ethnic tensions further increased after the British introduced in April 1946 their controversial Malayan Union scheme that sought to “invent” a unitary, British-governed, multiracial Malayan nation-state out of the prewar disparate Malay states and British settlements (excluding Singapore). Through its new common citizenship provisions, the scheme also sought to benefit many non-Malays, and Chinese in particular, by empowering them politically for the first time. But the Malay backlash that it immediately provoked led to the closing of Malay ranks behind a newly formed Malay political party—the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)—that successfully campaigned for the replacement of the Malayan Union by the new Federation of Malaya in February 1948. Partly in response to Malay mobilization and partly in defense of their own community interests, Chinese and Indian nationalists started to muster their communities as well. Yet their belated efforts failed to derail the Anglo-Malay settlement that tightened up the new federal citizenship provisions to permit only qualified non-Malay residents to share citizenship with the Malays, and the restoration of a pro-Malay agenda in the creation of the new Malayan nation-state. The outbreak of the “Emergency,” a communist-led armed insurgency for national liberation, four months into the life of the new federation, further undermined the prospects of creating a Malayan nation-state. As the majority of the communist insurgents were Chinese, Sino-Malay friction intensified. However, the rising economic and political costs of fighting the insurgency soon precipitated a stocktaking of British colonial trusteeship in Malaya and strengthened the conviction of hastening constitutional progressivism as a weapon in the ideological and political contest against totalitarian communism. With decolonization at last thinkable, Malaya’s moderate political forces worked out a formula of interracial cooperation that was to take the form of an alliance of three communal parties—comprising UMNO, as the principal partner, and two major nonMalay political parties, the Malayan Chinese Association and the Malayan Indian Congress, representing the Chinese and Indian communities, respectively. This formula was to meet London’s prerequisite of social stability before effecting a transfer of power. The Alliance Party, as the coalition came to be known, won a N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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resounding mandate—winning 51 out of the 52 contested seats—in the national elections in 1955, paving the way for the formation of the new, independent state of the Federation of Malaya with its seat of government in Kuala Lumpur two years later. Impressed by the level of support accorded to the Alliance Party and the determination of its moderate and pro-British leaders for independence, London accepted their demand to end its empire in Malaya, even though its requirement of a noncommunal, multiracial, Malayan consciousness had not yet been fully met.

Defining the Nation When Britain transferred power in 1957, it was to an essentially communally oriented, “pro-Malay” territorial state, based, as it was, on an extension of the framework of the 1948 constitution. As before, UMNO had prevailed on the other non-Malay parties and dictated Malay terms. The so-called historic bargain or social contract worked out among the three Alliance Party partners in 1957 basically upheld the earlier British recognition of Malay sovereignty and endorsed what had been tacitly assumed in the 1948 agreement—that the Malays were the original “sons of the soil” and therefore accorded a “special position” that would be safeguarded by special privileges, such as quotas for jobs in the civil service, permits to engage in business or trade, and scholarships. In addition, Malay was made the national language, Islam recognized as the official religion, and the Malay rulers became constitutional monarchs. The non-Malay parties in the Alliance received federal citizenship rights for those in their communities born on or after (but not before) Independence Day in Malaya. Also, the non-Malay who qualified due to terms of residency gained the freedom to worship and the right to use and study their mother tongues. But though the non-Malay parties conceded to Malay political primacy, and UMNO accepted that non-Malays could be admitted to the “nation” through the provision of federal citizenship, there was no conclusive agreement by both the Malay and non-Malay leadership about what the “imagined” nation-state ought to be. Debates surrounded the question of whether it should be an exclusive “Malay” nation-state, or bangsa Melayu, as the Malay nationalists would have it, or a more inclusive multiracial and egalitarian “Malayan” nation-state, as desired by the non-Malays. For Malay nationalists, the use of the term “Malayan” was objectionable not only because it had previously been used as a shorthand reference for non-Malay residents in Malaya but also because of its association with the outlawed Malayan Communist Party and the unpopular Malayan Union. With Malays forming just under half of the population of 6.2 million in 1957, Malay national leaders were justifiably wary of alienating non-Malay support by pushing too hard for a Melayu bangsa and, in the process, threatening the viability of the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Malay as the National Language With so many languages spoken in the country, Malaysia has designated Bahasa Melayu or the Malay language as its specific national language, and its constitutional status may not be questioned. Malay replaced English as the language of administration upon Malaya’s independence in 1957, although the status of English as an official language remained until 1967 to allow for the smooth transition of administration and education into the national language. After the formation of Malaysia in 1963, the status of Malay as the national language was upheld, even though English was given a further 10-year lease as an official language in the two new territories, Sabah and Sarawak, that had joined Malaysia. As the national language, Malay is the language of government and administration, although it is not the medium of instruction in all schools, and English has continued to play an unofficial role as the de facto language of the professions and business.

nascent state. The question of a “common nationality” was therefore left vague and largely undefined, though it had been assumed that its form would include a nucleus of Malay nationalism encased within an inclusive “Malayan nationalism” that was forged through the interracial alliance. The “historic bargain” managed, for a time, the friction of Malay dominance against the backdrop of contesting nationalisms. In 1963, Malaya was transformed into an enlarged federation, Malaysia, which included the states of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah (formerly North Borneo). However, the “historic bargain” that had been the cornerstone of the old Malaya started to crack under the stresses of accommodating the new members, not all of whom shared a common understanding of the nature of the new “Malaysian nationalism” that should be forged to undergird the new Malaysian entity. The inclusion of the former British dependencies into the enlarged grouping had been part of a long simmering British project for postwar regional consolidation conceived during World War II. But momentum for the proposed confederation was lost in the immediate aftermath of war, overtaken as it was by a series of events, including the postwar separation of Singapore from Malaya (1946), the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960), and the ending of the British empire in Malaya (1957). While British officials kept the idea alive, progress was slow as the difficulties of integrating the different territories at different stages of political, social, and economic development deterred them from forcing the pace. This was until May 1961, when during a meeting in Singapore, Malaya’s premier, Tunku Abdul Rahman, in an unexpected initiative, publicly broached the subject of bringing the territories closer together. He was concerned about how political instability and a communist revival in Singapore might affect Malaya’s own internal security. No doubt the prospect of inheriting the Borneo territories, including oil-rich Brunei, from the British as the price of the “package deal” for taking in Singapore must have been an added attraction. Not only would the Tunku have N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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gained an enlarged federation that would enhance the size and status of Malaya, but he would also simultaneously be able to ensure his Malay base by using the indigenous peoples of the Borneo territories as a counterweight to the Singapore Chinese, tipping the racial balance against the Chinese and providing a safeguard sufficient to justify the risk of accepting Singapore’s incorporation. By envisioning the new Malaysia as an extension of the old Malaya, Kuala Lumpur had inadvertently transformed the unfinished debate on the nature of the Malayan nation-state into a Malaysian one. Fears of Malayan, and in particular Malay, “colonialism” replacing British imperialism, dogged the inter-state negotiations on the terms of membership in the run-up to the formation of the new federal state. In Sarawak and North Borneo, the threat of an encroaching Malay ethnonationalism invariably stimulated the awakening of Iban and Kadazandusun nationalism, respectively. Nervous of being rushed headlong into some uncharted venture, the outcome of which they were uncertain, and fearful of Malay-Muslim political, administrative, and cultural domination, opinion in the Borneo territories

From left to right, the Duke of Gloucester, the Yang Di-Pertuan Agong (Paramount Ruler), an aide-de-camp, and Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first prime minister of Malaya, attend the Malayan Proclamation of Independence ceremony in Kuala Lumpur on August 31, 1957. (Central Press/Getty Images)


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hardened against absorption. They wished inclusion on their own terms, not on the basis of Malaya’s “historic bargain.” A commission of enquiry sent to Sarawak and North Borneo between February and April 1962 to determine the level of support for Malaysia in the Borneo territories found only one-third of the inhabitants supportive of the new federation, another third against, and the remaining third desiring safeguards. Wary of the inherent dangers of an encroaching Malay ethno-nationalism, Singapore’s ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) leaders, led by Lee Kuan Yew, also struck hard bargains in negotiations to protect the island’s interests, even if they deliberately played down in public the Malay threat in their consuming desire to achieve a merger with Malaya and at risk of communist subversion. A referendum conducted in Singapore in September 1962 resulted in over 70 percent of the people declaring their support for the PAP’s platform for merger. Contradictory objectives, in the end, were reconciled, and grudging compromises were brokered only after much hard bargaining and maneuvering behind the scenes by the key players. Twenty-eight months after the Tunku first broached the subject, an uneasy agreement on the nature of the new federation was finally achieved, and Malaysia was birthed on September 16, 1963.

Narrating the Nation The new federal state almost immediately found itself embroiled in controversy that threatened to undermine the very basis of its territorial and political integrity. Suspicious of Malaysia’s creation as a “neocolonial” plot, and also probably harboring territorial ambitions over Malaysia’s Borneo states, neighboring Indonesia had, since January 1963, embarked on a campaign of Konfrontasi (confrontation) against the former that subsequently developed into small-scale skirmishes across the border. This required the deployment of Commonwealth military forces to defend the nascent state until the official ending of hostilities in 1966. The more serious threat to Malaysia’s integrity, however, came from within—the mutual suspicion and intense political rivalry between the PAP-led Singapore state government and the Malay-led Alliance federal government invariably brought into sharp relief the unresolved debate over the fundamental character of the Malaysian nation-state and the nature of the nationalism that sustained it. Was Malaysia to be a “Malay” Malaysia, where Malays held supreme political power over a communally weighted political system and enjoyed special privileges, or a “Malaysian” Malaysia, where all communities were treated equally regardless of their race? The lack of consensus on the nature of the relationship between Malay culture and the Malaysian identity remained problematic: If Malay culture were to serve as the basis for Malaysian culture, how would this affect the position of other cultural groups? N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Lee Kuan Yew Lee Kuan Yew was Singapore’s first prime minister from 1959 to 1990. Born in 1923, and educated in both Singapore and the United Kingdom, where he graduated with top honors in law at Cambridge University in 1949, Lee’s political awakening apparently occurred during the war years. Subsequently, as a student in Britain, he joined other Singapore and Malayan students in the Malayan Forum, a discussion group, in London to press for an independent Malaya, inclusive of Singapore. Later, his involvement in left-wing causes in Singapore and his growing interest in politics led him to found the People’s Action Party that spearheaded the anticolonial struggle and attained independence for Singapore through a merger with Malaysia in 1963. After the merger collapsed in 1965, Lee was in tears at his press conference during his “moment of anguish.” But Singapore has since been transformed from a struggling new state into one of the most stable and economically successful nation-states in Asia, for which Lee has often been regarded as its principal architect.

Kuala Lumpur, as it turned out, never seriously departed from the former conception of Malaysia as an extension of the old Malaya. To Singapore’s leaders, riding on a Singapore-oriented territorial nationalism that had emerged since the island’s separation from the Malayan Union in 1946 and had developed in earnest from the mid-1950s, a “Malay” Malaysia was a political anomaly as Malays no longer formed the majority community upon the inclusion of the peoples of Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak. Singapore’s alternate conception of a “Malaysian” Malaysia, on the other hand, was perceived by Kuala Lumpur as nothing short of a direct challenge to the Malay ethno-nationalism of the Malayled Alliance government and one that needed to be contained. After the ensuing tensions precipitated two politically charged race riots in Singapore in July and September 1964, leaving 36 dead (which was blamed on incitement by UMNO activists), collision seemed inevitable as both sides mobilized for renewed political battle. In May 1965, joined by two parties from Malaya and another two from Sarawak, the PAP formed the Malaysian Solidarity Convention, a united front of opposition parties, to campaign for a “Malaysian Malaysia,” which it declared “is the antithesis of a Malay Malaysia, a Chinese Malaysia, a Dayak Malaysia, an Indian Malaysia or Kadazan Malaysia and so on. The special and legitimate interests of different communities must be secured and promoted within the framework of the collective rights, interests and responsibilities of all races” (Cheah, 2002). The looming political crisis was averted only with Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in August 1965, some 23 months after it joined the federation, to become an independent sovereign state, a decision made by key leaders from both territories. Singapore’s separation from the federation checked a potentially serious threat to the molding of the “Malay” nation-state (Bangsa Melayu), but it caused much foreboding among the non-Malays who felt even more acutely the threat N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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of political domination by the Malays. Latent ethnic tensions were kept very much alive as pressure mounted from Malay nationalist circles to implement fully the basic agreement reached in 1957 to make Malay not only the national language but also the sole official language by 1967, 10 years from Merdeka Day (Independence Day). Singapore’s departure was also nearly followed by Sabah and Sarawak, which resented the Tunku’s failure to consult their leaders before taking precipitous action to “expel” Singapore. Fears that the rights of their respective states would be similarly brushed aside by Kuala Lumpur further fueled their antipathy toward Kuala Lumpur. They were also sensitive to issues like the imposition of Malay (a minority language in these states) as the official language, and the status of Islam in the two largely non-Muslim states. Federal leaders, however, moved quickly to nip the secessionist tendencies in the bud by removing the incumbent chief ministers of the two states. Such underlying tensions were brought to the surface during the watershed Malaysian general election of May 10, 1969. The results shocked the Alliance party. For the first time, the ruling Alliance party lost its two-thirds majority in parliament, winning only 66 of the 104 parliamentary seats in west Malaysia, and polling only 48 percent of the total votes. A victory procession by opposition supporters in Kuala Lumpur during the next two days provoked a Malay backlash on May 13 that led to tragic race riots over two days that left at least 178 people dead and threatened to split the nation asunder. Parliament was suspended, a state of emergency was declared, and a National Operations Council, headed by the deputy prime minister, Tun Abdul Razak, took over the reins of power from the Tunku, who subsequently resigned in September 1970 in favor of his deputy. It was not until 1971 that parliament reopened.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The Tunku’s greatest legacy perhaps lay not so much in his role in securing independence for the nation, for which the appellation Bapa Kermerdekaan (“Father of Independence”) had been applied to him, but in the crafting of a mechanism for managing race relations built upon the “historic bargain” that made both independence in 1957 and subsequent nation-building possible. By casting himself in the role of an inclusivist Malaysian nationalist, and not an exclusivist, the Tunku accommodated demands within the context of power sharing among the respective communities without the need for him to publicly acknowledge the fact of Malay political primacy. By 1969, however, the questioning of old assumptions and the unleashing of new political forces and alignments since the creation of Malaysia in 1963 brought new stresses and strains that led to the unraveling of the “bargain,” with the May 13 incident as its tragic manifestation.


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It was the Tunku’s deputy, Razak, who set new terms for intercommunal relations. These were based on a more open and vigorous assertion of Malay political primacy through a program of affirmative action—the New Economic Policy (NEP)—to restructure Malaysian society in favor of the Malays, so as to enable them to achieve economic parity and balance with the non-Malay communities within the framework of an expanding economy. This gave way to what came to be known as the “bumiputera” policy (“sons of the soil,” a reference to the ethnic Malays and other indigenous ethnic groups). Taken out of public debate were also certain “sensitive” provisions of the constitution—like the special position of the Malays and the citizenship rights of non-Malays, the status of Islam as the official religion, the status of Malay language as the sole official national language, and the status and powers of the rulers. A new national ideology (the Rukunegara) was crafted based on five principles—belief in God, loyalty to King and country, upholding the constitution, the rule of law and good behavior, and morality—and taught in the study of civics in schools. A national culture, based largely on Malay and Islamic culture, but including suitable elements of other cultures, was also formulated. To broaden the political consensus, Razak, over a period of three years, expanded the Alliance into the Barisan Nasional (National Front) with the inclusion of a host of largely non-Malay and former opposition parties from Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak. However, this excluded the Democratic Action Party, which had refused to join the coalition, and the Parti Islam se-Malaysia, which had joined the coalition in 1973 but subsequently left it in 1977. For his contributions to Malaysia’s nation-building, Razak, who died suddenly in 1976 while undergoing treatment for leukemia in London, was accorded the title Bapa Pembangunan (“Father of Development”). Razak was succeeded by Hussein Onn (1976–1981) and then Dr. Mahathir bin Mohammad (1981–2003). During their tenures, policies were put in place to manage the process of nation-building in Malaysia. A number of challenges confronted Razak’s immediate successor: a revived communist terror campaign, the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, localized incidents of religious violence, revival of intra-ethnic and interparty conflicts in Sarawak and Sabah, and growing disunity within Malay ranks, which saw Parti Islam se-Malaysia leaving the UMNOled Barisan Nasional in 1977. Still, by building on his commitment to the rule of law, Hussein Onn succeeded in stabilizing the broad political and social architecture of the new nation by maintaining political stability and racial harmony during this tenure, helped in no small part by a growing economy, and earning him the title Bapa Perpaduan (“Father of Solidarity”). But it was to Mahathir Mohammad to whom the appellation Bapa Pemodenan (“Father of Modernization”) was accorded for his leadership in engineering Malaysia’s rapid modernization and resulting prosperity. During his 22 years as prime minister, Mahathir raised Malaysia’s nation-building project to a different level by making economic success a determinant of national identity and developing the


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nation’s psychological capacity to modernize by infusing in Malaysians —and especially in a Malay community where years of colonial rule had bred values that discouraged initiative—a new sense of pride and a “can-do” mindset (“Malaysia Boleh”) by embarking on a series of “mega” projects, including building the world’s tallest twin towers (the Petronas Twin Towers, which were also the world’s tallest buildings between 1997 and 2003); developing the Proton Saga national car project; building the North-South Highway on the west coast of Malaysia, which reduced transport times by half; creating of the Multimedia Super Corridor, modeled on Silicon Valley and designed to take Malaysia into the information technology age; and building Malaysia’s new administrative capital, Putrajaya, which incorporated elements of Islamic-Mogul architecture. Mahathir also sought to project an international identity for Malaysia that showcased its commitment to justice and equity for all nations, especially its solidarity with the Third World, Islamic identity, and the Malaysian model of a democratic, rapidly modernizing, and economically successful moderate Muslim nation, whose multiethnic and multirelgious communities lived together in harmony. The realization of Mahathir’s conception of a progressive Bangsa Malaysia, or Malaysian nation, depended to a large extent on the relative strength of the overlapping pull of Malay nationalism at its nucleus and the Malaysian nationalism that undergirded it. The stronger the pull of Malay nationalism, the greater was the demand for a Bangsa Melayu (“Malay” nation), and the more challenging it was to realize the vision of a more inclusive Bangsa Malaysia. In Singapore, separation from Malaysia had opened the way for the PAP government to embark on its nation-building project to create its own version of a “Singaporean Singapore”—a natural extension of its former campaign for a “Malaysian Malaysia”—based on the nonassimilationist principles of multiracialism, multilingualism, multiculturalism, and multireligiosity. These principles were subsumed under the social formula of what came to be known as the C+M+I+O model of managing the polity’s social heterogeneity: Singapore society is considered to be the sum of its conceptually “separate” but “equal” (in status) component parts, namely, Chinese (C), Malays (M), Indians (I), and Others (O) (with the majority in this category being Eurasians). In this model, social and economic mobility would be determined by the corollary principle of meritocracy, not ethnicity. While Malay remains the national language for historical and geopolitical reasons and is used in the national anthem, four official languages are recognized— Chinese (Mandarin), Malay, Tamil, and English, with the latter promoted not only as the common “link” language for the various communities and the language of administration, but also the language of science and technology that would support Singapore’s economic development. For the politically significant and majority Chinese community, a regular series of “Speak Mandarin” campaigns have been launched since 1979 to discourage the proliferation of dialects and to promote the speaking of Mandarin as the community’s unifying lingua franca. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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In short, the “Singaporean Singapore” that its founding leaders envisaged is a dominant English-educated Singapore society reinforced by Singaporeans speaking their respective “mother tongues” and retaining their Asian “cultural ballast.” This is perpetuated through the “bilingual” education policy where English is used as the main language of instruction and students also learn their respective “mother tongues.” Daily nation-building rituals like the ceremony of raising the flag, singing the national anthem, and reciting the national pledge take place in every school. The national pledge, for instance, exhorts its citizens to “pledge ourselves as one united people, regardless of race, language, or religion, to build a democratic society based on justice and equality so as to achieve happiness, prosperity, and progress for our nation.” Since 1997, a national education program, drawing lessons from recent history to “develop national cohesion, the instinct for survival, and confidence in our future,” was also introduced into the educational curriculum. To give citizens a stake in the country and a common experience, the national housing policy ensured that every eligible citizen of all income levels would have the opportunity of owning their own apartment. An overwhelming 80 percent of Singaporeans are living in apartments developed by the Housing and Developing Board. Compulsory national service for all male citizens in the nation’s defense forces afforded another means of building a common nationalism and national integration. The annual National Day parade, drawing on the use of ritual, mass participation, pomp, spectacle, and ceremony, provided another visual and aural “bonding” event for the nation. Both Malaysia and Singapore have chosen different nation-building approaches and solutions that have worked for their respective countries. The adoption of divergent strategies is as much a product of historical circumstances as it is reflective of the extent of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity that dictated the process of political change in both countries. In the making of the Malaysian nation-state, the dominant culture of its largest ethnic group, the Malays, continues to exert a strategic influence on Malaysian identity creation. But as the Malays make up slightly more than half the population, neither Malay ethnicity nor culture could realistically be the raison d’être for nation-building without alienating the other half. Malaysian nationalism provides the obvious alternative ideological nation-building construct but much would depend on its content —whether it could, in practice, be differentiated from Malay nationalism. Singapore, like Malaysia, had sought to create a separate national identity out of the multiple ethnic identities that it inherited from its historical legacy. But while acknowledging the prominence of multiple ethnic identities, Singapore sought to depoliticize ethnicity in its approach to nation-building. It went on to create instead a national identity that is based, not on the dominant culture of its ethnic majority, but on common integrative economic criteria and ideologyneutral values designed to ensure the long-term viability and survival of the young island state. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Selected Bibliography Cheah, Boon Kheng. 2002. Malaysia: The Making of a Nation. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Cheah, Boon Kheng, ed. 2004. The Challenge of Ethnicity: Building a Nation in Malaysia. Singapore: Cavendish Academic. Daniels, T. P. 2005. Building Cultural Nationalism in Malaysia: Identity, Representation and Citizenship. New York: Routledge. Hill, M., and Lian Kwen Fee. 1995. The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore. London: Routledge. Kong, L., and B. S. A Yeoh. 1997. “The Construction of National Identity through the Production of Ritual and Spectacle: An Analysis of National Day Parades in Singapore.” Political Geography 16, no. 3: 213–239. Lau, A. 2003. “ ‘Nationalism’ in the Decolonisation of Singapore.” In The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization, edited by M. Frey, R. Preussen, and Tan Tai Yong. New York: M. E. Sharpe. Lau, A. 2005. “Nation-Building and the Singapore Story: Some Issues in the Study of Contemporary Singapore History.” In Nation-Building: Five Southeast Asian Histories, edited by Wang Gungwu. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Ongkili, J. P. 1985. Nation-Building in Malaysia 1946–1974. Singapore: Oxford University Press. Shamsul, A. B. 1996. “The Construction and Transformation of a Social Identity: Malayness and Bumiputeraness Re-examined.” Journal of Asian and African Studies 52:15–33. Siddique, S. 1989. “Singapore Identity.” In Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, edited by Kernial Singh Sandhu and P. Wheatley. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Wang Gungwu. 1981. “Malayan Nationalism.” Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese. Singapore: Asian Studies Association of Australia. Wilmott, W. E. 1989. “The Emergence of Nationalism.” In Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore, edited by Kernial Singh Sandhu and P. Wheatley. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Yeoh, B. S. A., and L. Kong, ed. 1995. Portraits of Places: History, Community and Identity in Singapore. Singapore: Times Edition. Zawawi, I., ed. 1998. Cultural Contestions: Mediating Identities in a Changing Malaysian Society. London: ASEAN Academic Press.


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Pakistan Hooman Peimani Chronology 1947 India gains independence, after about two centuries of British colonialism, and is partitioned into a state for Muslims (Pakistan) and another for Hindus (India). Pakistan and India fight over Jamo and Kashmir, ending in Pakistan’s defeat. The agreed ceasefire line in 1949, adjusted in 1972, leaves the region’s major part under India. India defeats Pakistan in another war in that region in 1965. 1971 Pakistan and India fight a war over East Pakistan as it declares independence. Pakistan’s defeat marks that region’s independence as Bangladesh. 1978 Army chief of staff, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, proclaims martial law and becomes president. He tries to Islamize Pakistan and gives a free hand to religious groups and extremists/fundamentalists. He dies in 1988 in a plane crash. 1979 The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan to keep the pro-Moscow Afghan regime in power begins a civil war that lasts until 2001 when the Taliban regime collapses, although those troops leave Afghanistan in 1989. 1980–2001 Pakistan is heavily involved in Afghanistan, supporting mainly armed Afghan Pashtun groups, including the Taliban, until 2001 when its joins the U.S.-led coalition. 1988–1999 Pakistan’s People Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto and Muslim League leader Nawaz Sharif form a few governments that will be dismissed on corruption charges. 1998 Pakistan conducts five nuclear tests after India’s nuclear tests. 1999 Gen. Pervez Musharraf stages a coup and overthrows Nawaz Sharif’s government. He is still in power as president and military commander in chief. 2005 Pakistan and India hold talks to improve their relations, resulting in an ease of tensions in their relations, and sign an agreement regarding measures to avoid a nuclear war, while expressing a desire for a peaceful settlement of conflicts over Jamo and Kashmir. 2007 In advance of scheduled elections in early 2008, Benazir Bhutto returns to Pakistan but is assassinated while campaigning.

Situating the Nation Pakistan was part of India until 1947, when it gained independence, creating the two states of India and Pakistan. About two centuries of British colonialism in India had an impact on Pakistan. It retarded Pakistan’s development, because India as a whole was primarily meant to provide for the British empire’s certain needs. Therefore, the British directed India’s economic development to suit their needs, requiring a limited degree of economic development. Unsurprisingly, in 1947, Pakistan, like India, was mainly underdeveloped, lacking viable agrarian and industrial sectors and an adequate infrastructure. Comparatively, Pakistan was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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less developed than India, where most of the industries and financial and educational institutions of the colonized country were located. Additionally, like India, Pakistan suffered from poverty, unemployment, a low literacy rate, and poor health care services. Despite all its negative aspects, colonization helped create an intellectual and scientific strata, a degree of industrialization, an infrastructure, an administrative system, and a military. Since independence, those institutions have helped Pakistanis achieve significant industrialization, more efficient agriculture, and a remarkable scientific community. With an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) of only $368 billion in 2005, Pakistan had suffered from decades of economic problems after its initial rapid growth in the 1950s and 1960s. Contributing factors include bureaucratic barriers, rampant corruption, inadequate domestic revenues, and investments and limited foreign investments. Other major factors were instability and political uncertainty caused by intra-elite disputes, various military coups, ethnic and religious conflicts, and a five-decade-long conflict with India. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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However, the Pakistani economy has improved since 2001 because of limited economic reforms bolstered by generous foreign assistance and renewed access to global markets. In particular, Pakistan’s positioning itself as the main U.S. ally in the region in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, has significantly contributed to its economic recovery. Washington has since rewarded Islamabad by writing off some of its foreign debts (debt relief), renegotiating others on better terms, and providing it with over $3 billion worth of grants and loans on favorable conditions. Moreover, Pakistan has received a significant share of reconstruction projects in its neighboring Afghanistan and supplies some of the consumer products to meet the growing needs of that country and the U.S.-led coalition forces stationed there. To this, one should add a large ($1.3 billion) International Monetary Fund Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility loan, which has helped Pakistan implement an antipoverty project. As a result, in 2004, Pakistan exported $15.07 billion worth of goods, reflecting a significant increase in the value of its exports compared with 1999, when it was $8.4 billion. This amount of export helped Islamabad have a positive balance of payment compared with 1999, as the value of its imports in 2004 ($14.01 billion) was less than that of its exports, unlike 1999 when it imported more ($9.8 billion). Briefly, economic improvement is evident in an impressive increase in GDP, from 3.1 percent in 1999 to 6.1 percent in 2004. Pakistan’s economic improvement is not yet a steady trend. While economic reforms are partly responsible for such development, their main stimulus has been Islamabad’s alliance with the United States, rather than addressing the internal situations preventing a sustainable economic growth. Therefore, Pakistan has a long way to go to deal with its economic problems as reflected, for example, in its growing foreign debt, which amounted to $35.5 billion in 2004—equal to about 10 percent of its GDP ($368 billion), a significant increase from 1999 ($32 billion), whereas its public debt was equal to 61.7 percent of the GDP in 2005. Late in the 19th century, the idea of independence emerged among the welloff, educated Indian elite, who became India’s leaders both for the Hindus and the Muslims. The movement toward creating Pakistan started as a demand for the recognition of the Muslim minority’s interests in a Hindu-dominated country as it was heading toward independence. In 1929, as the leaders of independence movements were discussing the nature of an independent Indian state, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, a Muslim leader, put forward 15 points that would satisfy his constituents’ interests, including the creation of “safeguards” to prevent a Hinducontrolled Indian legislature. The rejection of Jinnah’s proposals by the Hindu leaders paved the way for the development of the idea of a separate state for the Indian Muslims upon independence. A year later, in his address to a session of the Muslim League, a party advocating the Muslims’ interests, Sir Muhammad Iqbal Lahori (1876–1938), a prominent poet and philosopher, demanded the establishment of a confederated India to include a Muslim state consisting of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan, and NorthWest Frontier Province (NWFP). In his subsequent speeches and writings, Iqbal N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876 –1948) Known as Quaid-e-Azam (Great Leader), Muhammad Ali Jinnah was born into a prosperous business family in Karachi on December 25, 1876. Jinnah received his early education at the Sindh Madrasa (meaning “school” in Urdu) and later at the Mission School, Karachi. He went to England for further studies in 1892, where he studied law and was called to the bar in 1897. Jinnah started his political career in 1906 when he attended the Calcutta session of the All India National Congress in the capacity of private secretary to the president of the Congress. He therefore became active in the pro-independence movement in India, seeking an end to the British colonial rule. In 1910, he was elected to the Imperial Legislative Council, India’s parliament under British rule with a limited legislative power. In 1919, Jinnah resigned from the Congress and turned his focus to Muslim interests as he joined the All India Muslim League. Early in his political career, Jinnah was chiefly concerned with achieving independence for a unified India. Increasingly, he worried that in an independent India with a Hindu majority, British oppression would be replaced by Hindu oppression and the subjugation of India’s Muslim minority. Gradually over three decades, he became the architect of an independent state for the Indian Muslims, requiring the partition of India along religious lines to preserve Muslim political and economic interests upon independence of India, a dream first voiced by India’s Muslim poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal Lahori. In the 1930s, Jinnah was a major Indian Muslim political figure and became the leader of the Muslim League late in that decade. He led the pro-independence Muslim movement in the 1940s. The idea of partitioning India into two states, one for Muslims and another for Hindus, was formally accepted by the British government on June 3, 1947. This led to the independence of India and the creation of Pakistan and India on August 14, 1947. Jinnah became Pakistan’s first governor general and president of its legislative assembly. Despite his efforts for an independent state for Indian Muslims, he envisaged Pakistan as a secular state where people of different faiths could live in peace, a dream that disappeared when he died on September 11, 1948.

reiterated the claims of Muslims to be considered a nation “based on unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests.” In 1933, this view was developed into a clear plan for creating a separate state for Muslims in a pamphlet by a group of Indian students at Cambridge (United Kingdom) entitled Now or Never. Rejecting India as a single nation, it demanded India’s partition to make its northwest region the state of “Pakistan.” Accordingly, “Pakistan . . . is . . . composed of letters taken from the names of our homelands: that is, Punjab, Afghania [North-West Frontier Province], Kashmir, Iran, Sindh, Tukharistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan. It means the land of the Paks, the spiritually pure and clean.” In his efforts to unite the divided Muslim movement, in 1934, Jinnah emphasized the Two Nations Theory envisaging the creation of two states, one for Hindus and another for Muslims, upon India’s independence. He further developed his theory at the Muslin League’s annual session on March 23, 1940, when he demanded, in a resolution (Lahore Resolution), independent separate states N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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for the population of the predominately Muslim northwestern and eastern India. He declared unacceptable for Muslims any independence plan without this provision as he demanded India’s partition into separate states for Muslims and Hindus. The roots of Pakistan can be traced back to the rise of the Indian independence movement. In its embryonic form, it reflected itself in the formation in 1885 of the Indian National Congress (Congress Party). As an umbrella organization, it represented a variety of ideas and individuals, Hindus and Muslims, advocating changes to the British rule as a prelude to independence. After World War I, Congress advanced the idea of a speedy end to British rule, while opposing any sectarian division of India. However, fear of Hindu domination in independent India provided grounds for the Two Nations Theory. Founded in 1906, the All India Muslim League (now Muslim League) demanded a separate state for India’s Muslims in 1940. Prior to independence, the rise and expansion of violent communal conflicts that pitted Muslims and Hindus against each other strengthened the desire for a separate state for Muslims and helped expand its social basis among average Muslims. The expanding demand for independence among the Indians in the 1940s was reflected in mass nonviolent political activities, which made the continuation of British rule impossible. It thus left no choice for the British but to accept India’s independence on August 14, 1947. Prior to independence, and given the strong demand, the British split India into two states: a predominantly Muslim (Pakistan) state and a predominantly Hindu (India) state.

Instituting the Nation Forming the single largest ethnic group, the Punjabis have dominated Pakistan with a noticeable predominance in the upper echelons of the military and civil service and also in the economy. They have run Pakistan for most part of its history, a source of resentment for other major ethnic groups: the Pakhtuns (Pashtuns), the Balochis, and the Sindhis. The Sindhis have been the main challengers as reflected in the efforts of two Sindhi prime ministers: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1970s) and his daughter Benazir Bhutto (1980s and 1990s), who tried to end the Punjabi domination. Both of them were ousted from power before ending their terms. Another major ethnic group with political clout is the Muhajirs (immigrants), the Indian Muslims (and their offspring) who migrated from India to Pakistan at the time of independence. They form a strong minority group in Sindh, especially in its capital, Karachi. Generally speaking, they have been well represented in government institutions, partly thanks to their better education, which enables them to fill many positions left vacant because of the migration of Hindus and N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Sikhs to India in 1947. Conflict between the Sindhis, who view the Muhajirs as a major challenge to their power and culture, and the Muhajirs was the major source of instability in Sindh during the 1980s and the 1990s. Since independence, the military has been the major power broker and kingmaker in Pakistan. Its influence lies in its role as the country’s defender, facing a hostile and strong neighbor, India, and in the weakness of the civil society and the political parties. At the time of crises, that weakness created a power vacuum to be exploited by the only organized force ready to take charge, the military. In practice, the military has ruled over Pakistan for most of its history (about 30 years), through coups removing civilian governments on the grounds of incompetence and the need to preserve national security. The Pakistani military rulers include Gen. Mohammad Ayub Khan, Gen. Yahya Khan, Gen. Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, and the current president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who came to power through a coup in 1999. The military is also a powerful institution within civilian governments and is capable of influencing events. For example, in July 1993, it forced President Ishaq Khan and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to resign. The direct rule of the military and its intervention in political affairs during civilian periods have contributed to the expansion of corruption in the military and in the bureaucracy. Pakistan’s constitution institutionalizes the power of tribal leaders only to weaken the central government’s authority. Accordingly, the tribal region of Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province has a practical autonomous status, a condition for its joining Pakistan in 1947. The central government’s limited power in that region enables the local tribal leaders to run it as they wish. Hence, it is a haven for illegal activities, including arms production and trafficking, drug trafficking, and the operation of Pakistani extremist religious groups, including those operating in other countries, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Certain factors have contributed to the rise and expansion of extremist Islamic groups all over Pakistan. Apart from the existence of a situation that is ripe for their expansion, one caused by rampant poverty, a high illiteracy rate, and the absence of democracy, two factors have been prominent. One is the efforts of certain military leaders, first and foremost, Gen. Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who sought the support of the clergy and the fundamentalist extremist groups to expand their social basis. During his rule (1973–1988), Zia ul-Haq sought to Islamize Pakistan through his plan to make the Sharia the law of the country and implement social restrictions that would result in the strength of the clergy, while courting fundamentalist groups, such as Jamat-i Islami. Although he was not fully successful in achieving his objectives, his reign helped the expansion of fundamentalist groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Current president General Musharraf, while limiting the power of some fundamentalists with direct terrorist ties, has also sought to appease other fanatics to consolidate his power. The second factor is the heavy involvement of Pakistan in the Afghan Civil War (1979–2003). To stop Soviet expansion in the region, Western countries and their N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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regional allies, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, helped the expansion of Afghan and non-Afghan fundamentalist groups fighting in Afghanistan. Moreover, the Pakistani government tried to use the religious card to expand its influence in Afghanistan by supporting certain Afghan Mujahideen groups, such as that of Gulbadin Hekmatiar, and eventually through its contribution to the Taliban’s formation.

Defining the Nation During the years leading to independence, such major figures as Iqbal Lahori justified their objective of a Muslim nation (Pakistan) based on the “unity of language, race, history, religion, and identity of economic interests” of the Indian Muslims. However, in practice, language is not a unifying factor because there are more than 20 spoken languages in Pakistan. Nearly half of all Pakistanis (48 percent) speak Punjabi. The next most commonly spoken language is Sindhi (12 percent), followed by the Punjabi variant Siraiki (10 percent), Pakhtu or Pashto (8 percent), Balochi (3 percent), Hindko (2 percent), and Brahui (1 percent). Although Urdu is the official national language, it is spoken as a mother tongue by only 8 percent of the population, of whom the majority are the Muhajirs. India’s Muslims considered Urdu the main literary language during British colonialism. Upon independence, the Muslim League promoted Urdu as the national language to help develop a national identity for the Pakistanis. Hence, what gave birth to the idea of a state for Muslims was not their having a common language, but a fear backed by the reality of living in a predominately Hindu country (India) as a minority with expected religious and economic discrimination. Therefore, a common religion that made Muslims of various ethnic and linguistic backgrounds closer to each other than to the Hindus served as the main factor. Although Islam was the basis for unifying Muslims to establish a separate state, it was not expected to serve as the model of government. Known as Quaid-e Azam (Great Leader), Muhammad Ali Jinnah made clear his commitment to secularism in Pakistan in his 1947 inaugural address. However, viewing Pakistan as a secular state where all Pakistanis should enjoy equal rights despite their religion has been challenged since independence. Shia Muslims, Ahmadis (an Islamic sect), and Christians have been ill-treated by extremist Sunnis and/or the Pakistani authorities, while efforts have been made to Islamize the entire country and its laws. As a state for India’s Muslims, Pakistan was meant to be formed by those parts of India where the Muslims were in majority. Prior to independence, the Muslim leaders considered two states for Indian Muslims because, even though they lived throughout India, Muslims mainly were concentrated in its far western and eastern parts. However, at the time of independence, this plan was dropped in favor of a single state to include the current Pakistan, consisting of Balochistan, Punjab, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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British lord Louis Mountbatten (in uniform) officially hands off power to Mohammed Ali Jinnah (to left of Mountbatten), leader of the new nation of Pakistan, on August 14, 1947. (Library of Congress)

NWFP, and Sindh, and India’s Bengal, which was to become East Pakistan and Bangladesh when it gained independence in 1971.

Narrating the Nation At least three major events have strengthened the Pakistanis’ resentment toward the Indians. These have been major contributing factors to five decades of hostility and mistrust between Pakistan and India. One is the communal violence pitting Hindus and Muslims against each other, especially in the last three decades of independence (1920s–1940s). The last major communal violence took place upon independence, as the Hindus and Sikhs were leaving Pakistan for India while the Muslims residing in India’s Hindu-dominated territories were heading toward Pakistan. The violence left at least 250,000 killed and made 12–24 million people refugees on both sides. Being a predominately Muslim region to which Pakistan has a claim, the status of Jammu and Kashmir, which did not become part of Pakistan at the time of N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Wars with India Pakistan and India have been each other’s main national security threat since their independence in 1947. They have fought three major wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971. They were on the verge of another war in 1999, and they have experienced hundreds of smallscale skirmishes along their long borders over the last 50 years. Pakistan lost all three wars, which is a major source of humiliation for the Pakistanis. The first war (1947–1948) was fought over Kashmir, a predominately Muslim region that remained in India when India was portioned into two states. The war failed to secure Pakistan’s sovereignty over the region as it left the majority of it under India. After engaging in many skirmishes, the two neighbors again went to war over the region in 1965. This war ended with another humiliating defeat for Pakistan, whereas it showed India’s military superiority, which had been reinforced by a flow of Soviet state-of-the-art arms. Weapons supplied by Pakistan’s main ally and military supplier, China, were simply no match for those supplied by the Soviet Union to India. Washington DC’s reluctance to help Islamabad, and its efforts to convince Islamabad to accept a cease-fire, made the Pakistanis annoyed with the United States, who now seemed to favor India and who were anti-China like India, unlike the Pakistanis. The third war started in 1971, when Indian forces intervened in favor of the East Pakistanis (Bengalis), whose bid to declare independence from Pakistan was met by force. Pakistan’s military weakness led not only to its defeat, but to the loss of its eastern part, which became Bangladesh. In 1999, Pakistan and India fought a 73-day limited military conflict along the cease-fire line in Kargil, putting the two neighbors on the verge of war, but which was avoided by international mediation.

independence, is another factor. It has been an agonizing issue for the Pakistanis and the single major factor responsible for hostility between Pakistan and India since independence. The two nations went to war over it in 1947 and in 1965— both conflicts ended without resolving the situation in Pakistan’s favor—and they were close to beginning another war in 1999 (Kargil War). India still controls the majority of this region. Finally, the third war between Pakistan and India in 1971 resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan, when its eastern part became independent as Bangladesh through India’s military intervention. Pakistan’s May 1988 nuclear tests, which were conducted after India’s tests, boosted the Pakistanis’ morale that had been weakened by the memory of three consecutive defeats in their wars with India. These tests have since been a major source of pride for them.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Two issues have been used to create a sense of nationhood among the Pakistanis. One is language. Hence, efforts have been made to make Urdu, which is not the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Pakistan’s Nuclear Tests Following five Indian nuclear tests in May 1998, Pakistan conducted five nuclear tests of its own, which heralded its joining the club of nuclear states. The two neighbors’ efforts to become nuclear states were not secret as they had been involved in nuclear weapon activities for about three decades. India tested a nuclear device in 1974, which revealed India’s ability to produce nuclear weapons. Under Dr. Abdul Qadir Khan, Pakistan started its nuclear project in the 1970s. Pakistan probably acquired the capability to produce nuclear weapons around 1990. Because of President George H. W. Bush’s inability to certify Pakistan’s lack of nuclear weapons, the majority of most American aid and military and nonmilitary trade ceased. Pakistan received assistance from China, including a blueprint for a basic atomic bomb, as well as research and technology assistance. Its nonmilitary nuclear activities backed by Western countries, including the United States, enabled it to acquire technology, know-how, and equipment of dual implications of use in its military program as well. While all nuclear states condemned the Indian and Pakistani tests, their actions were not technically in violation of any international agreement, as they never joined the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. Nevertheless, Pakistan and India were faced with a degree of military, scientific, and economic sanctions imposed and implemented mainly by the Western countries, which had a limited impact on their societies. However, these sanctions basically ended, especially the American ones, when Pakistan joined the U.S.-led anti-Taliban/Al Qaeda war in Afghanistan, which marked the United States’ practical recognition of Pakistan as a nuclear state.

mother tongue of more than 90 percent of the Pakistanis, the national language. It has become the official state language, although English is the de facto one. The second is religion. Islam, the religion of about 97 percent of the Pakistanis, has been promoted in the postindependence era as a unifying factor. Efforts to Islamize the country have provoked hostility among religious minorities, especially the Shias, accounting for about 20 percent of the Pakistanis. The process has strengthened the power of extremist fanatic Sunnis who view their Shia compatriots as infidels. The Punjabis account for about 48 percent of the Pakistanis and form the single largest ethnic group. Their dominance since independence over all the major professional fields has mainly marginalized other ethnic groups who lack a proportional representation in those fields. This notwithstanding, the Pakistani constitution declares all Pakistanis equal regardless of their ethnicity. Unsurprisingly, this situation has fostered a strong sense of resentment among other ethnic groups toward the Punjabis. Added to political and economic factors, the political tension made a contribution to the disintegration of Pakistan in December 1971. At that time, the East Pakistanis declared East Pakistan the independent state of Bangladesh, after about a year of political strife and a bloody war that ended in their favor. Being ethnically Bengali, they resented the high-handed policy of the Pakistani elite N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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residing in West Pakistan who also sought to impose their official language (Urdu) while, according to the Bengalis, treating them as second-class citizens. The Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, who form a large immigrant group, have been integrated into Pakistani society. However, they have become a target of Sindhi nationalism, which portrays them as a challenge to Sindhi power and culture in their own province. Violence between the two social groups reached a very high level in the 1980s and the 1990s. Selected Bibliography Ahmad, S. Si. 2004. History of Pakistan and Role of the Army. London: Royal Book Company. Burke, S. M., and S. A.-D. Quraishi. 2004. The British Raj in India. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, S. P. 2004. The Idea of Pakistan. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. Harrison, S. S., P. H. Kreisberg, and D. Kux, eds. 1998. India and Pakistan: The First Fifty Years. Woodrow Wilson Center Series. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hussain, J. A. 1997. History of the Peoples of Pakistan: Towards Independence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Jaffrelot, C. 2002. A History of Pakistan and Its Origins. London: Anthem Press. Jalal, A. 1994. The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khan, R. 1997. Pakistan—A Dream Gone Sour. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Peimani, H. 2000. Nuclear Proliferation in the Indian Sub-Continent: The Self-Exhausting “Superpowers” and Emerging Alliances. Westport, CT: Praeger. Peimani, H. 2003. Falling Terrorism and Rising Conflicts: The Afghan “Contribution” to Polarization and Confrontation in West and South Asia. Westport, CT: Praeger. Qureshi, J. H. 1992. A Short History of Pakistan. Karachi: University of Karachi Press. Qureshi, S., ed. 2003. Jinnah: The Founder of Pakistan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Schofield, V. 2003. Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Sinkler, A. 2002. Pakistan. Farmington Hills, MI: Greenhaven Press. Verkaaik, O. 2003. Migrants and Militants: Fun and Violence in Pakistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Weaver, M. A. 2003. Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Ziring, L. 1997. Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.


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Philippines Christine Doran Chronology 1565 1896–1902 1898 1899 1935 1942–1944 1946 1946–1948 1948–1953 1953–1957 1957–1961 1961–1965 1965 1969 1972 1981 1983 1986 1986–1992 1992–1998 1998–2001 2001

Arrival of the first Spanish settlement party. (August–April) Philippine Revolution. (June 12) Independence from Spain. Annexation of the Philippines by the United States. Beginning of the Commonwealth period. Japanese occupation. (July 4) Independence from the United States. Presidency of Manuel Roxas. Presidency of Elpidio Quirino. Presidency of Ramon Magsaysay. Presidency of Carlos Garcia. Presidency of Diosdado Macapagal. Ferdinand Marcos is elected president. Marcos is reelected. (September) Marcos declares martial law. Martial law officially ends, but the controls continue. Benigno Aquino is assassinated. Marcos is ousted from power. Presidency of Corazon Aquino. Presidency of Fidel Ramos. Presidency of Joseph Estrada. Presidency of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.

Situating the Nation The Philippines is an archipelago in the region of Southeast Asia, located between the Philippine Sea and the South China Sea. On the face of it, the most outstanding feature of the nation is its geographical fragmentation. It is composed of more than 7,100 islands, of which about 900 are inhabited. On the larger islands, the geography is further divided between central highland areas and coastal riverine plains. The difficulty of communications, both between and within islands, has until very recent times been a significant constraint influencing the historical development of the nation, and even today remains an obstacle to national integration. The archipelago can be divided into three major regional zones. In the northern zone, Luzon is the main island, and since the era of Spanish colonization, it has been the dominant island politically and culturally. Many of the major develN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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opments of the national movement have been initiated in Luzon. Manila, the capital, is situated on the island of Luzon. The central group of islands is known as the Visayas and includes the important islands of Samar, Panay, Negros, Cebu, and Leyte. In the south, the main island is Mindanao, with the Sulu Archipelago extending out into the Sulu Sea toward the northeastern tip of Borneo. The distinguishing feature of the southern zone is the widespread adherence of the people to Islam, which differentiates it from the remainder of this predominantly Christian nation. Islam began to make a significant impact on the southern Philippines from the 14th century, transmitted by traders and missionaries along the trade routes skirting the coast of Borneo. Prior to the impact of European colonization, the Philippines was not a unified nation or state, and the people had no concept of the Philippines as such. In that sense, the nation of the Philippines is a colonial creation. It is the area that was ruled as a political unit by the Spanish colonizers. Indeed, the very name, Philippines, derives from that of King Philip II of Spain and was given to the islands by an early Spanish explorer, Villalobos. In precolonial times, the most extensive and sophisticated forms of political organization were developed in the Muslim south, notably the Magindanau Confederacy centered on the island of Mindanao and the Sulu Sultanate, which covered the Sulu Archipelago. In other parts of the archipelago, social and political organization did not usually extend beyond the level of the local community, known as the barangay. The Spanish began the process of colonizing the Philippines in the 1560s and remained in control of the islands until 1898. They established their administrative headquarters at Manila, which is still the capital city. Probably the most important long-term consequence of Spanish colonization was the adoption of the Christian religion by the majority of the population, creating the first and, until recently with the independence of East Timor, only Christian nation in Southeast Asia. More than 90 percent of the population is Christian. The Filipino people resisted the European interlopers during the three centuries of Spanish rule, but it was only during the Philippine Revolution, which broke out in 1896, that they finally began to achieve military victories. It is noteworthy that this war of the Filipinos against Spain was the first successful nationalist revolution staged by a colonized Asian nation against a Western imperial power. By 1898 independence was in sight, but the Filipino revolutionaries had formed an alliance with the United States and their nationalist aspirations were betrayed by their American allies. The United States saw advantages in annexing the Philippines as a colony for reasons of commercial gain, geopolitical strategy, and international prestige. After intense resistance from the revolutionaries and great loss of life, the Philippines was subdued by American forces by 1902. The Philippines remained an American colony until 1946, apart from a period of Japanese occupation from 1942 to 1944. The confusing nature of the Filipino experience of Western colonization has been summed up as 300 years in a Spanish convent followed by 50 years in Hollywood. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Philippines achieved independence as a modern nation state on July 4, 1946. After independence, the new nation retained close ties with the United States, economically, politically, and culturally. The Republic of the Philippines is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the United Nations (UN) organizations.

Instituting the Nation The process of creating a new nation really began with the American decision to inaugurate, in 1935, a 10-year Commonwealth period that would lead to full independence. The Americans’ reasons for this decision can be traced to the desire N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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to eliminate trade competition from Philippine products in the context of the Great Depression, strategic worries about the proximity of the Philippines to an increasingly militaristic Japan, and the continuing influence of an anti-imperial strand in American political culture. Within the Philippines, the dominant political party, the Nacionalista Party, under the leadership of Manuel Quezon from 1916 until his death in 1943, constantly pushed for independence, while at the same time, the real links between the Filipino elite and American interests were continually being strengthened. Under American rule, the Filipino elite was gradually given more political say and gained administrative experience. The Commonwealth period was interrupted by World War II and Japanese occupation of the country. After the war, the American debate on whether to retain the Philippines was revived, but the outcome was a decision to go ahead with independence in 1946. In the emerging political context of the Cold War, American leaders saw advantages in presenting the Philippines as a showcase for democracy in Asia. After independence on July 4, 1946, the date itself an echo of American history, ties with the United States remained strong. The economic relationship continued, the Bell Trade Relations Act (1946) providing for free trade between the two countries until 1954, and after that, a sliding scale of increasing tariffs to be applied up to 1974. In return for what they considered these economic concessions, the Americans insisted upon “parity” rights, which gave Americans rights to dispose, exploit, develop, and utilize all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands in the Philippines, as well as the right to operate public utilities. The American government offered aid for postwar reconstruction, but this was made dependent on the Filipinos’ acceptance of the trade relations act containing the “parity” clauses. “Parity” was to become a highly contentious issue, producing much bitterness among Filipinos concerned about the unfettered rights of Americans to continue to exploit the resources of their country after it was formally independent. American military bases in the Philippines were another sore point for many Filipinos. After World War II, the destruction of Japanese military power and the communist victory in China made an American military presence in the Philippines seem important to the United States. Under the Military Bases Agreement signed in 1947, the United States was to retain 23 military base sites in the Philippines, of which 5 were developed extensively, most notably Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base. These bases, both their existence on Philippine soil and the social problems that sprang up around them, provided a continuing source of friction in Philippine-American relations, up to 1992 when the United States withdrew from the bases. With these laws and agreements at its foundation, the first 20 years of the postcolonial period, during the tenure of the first five presidents, saw close relations maintained with the former colonizing power, perhaps reaching a high point during the presidency of Ramon Magsaysay from 1953 to 1957. The American connection continued with the election of a new president, Ferdinand Marcos, in N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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1965. Marcos was reelected in 1969, although allegations of electoral rigging were widespread. In both elections, a significant element in Marcos’s campaigning hinged on the popularity of his wife, Imelda, a former beauty queen and singer with an ostentatious persona. In 1972, Marcos’s presidential term was due to expire and elections should have been called. Under the constitution of the Philippines, Marcos could not run for a third term. He was also aware that his successor would probably be his political opponent, Benigno Aquino. Rather than face the result of elections, Marcos declared martial law in September 1972. He obtained a change in the constitution to allow him to stay in power and rule by decree. In reality, the political system of the Philippines became a dictatorship. Martial law continued officially until 1981, but even after that, strict controls were still imposed. In 1983, Benigno Aquino was assassinated under suspicious circumstances. This sparked off a growing groundswell of popular protest against the dictator, culminating in the “People Power” Revolution that overthrew Marcos in 1986 and inaugurated a return to democratic government under the presidency of Benigno’s widow, Corazon (Cory) Aquino. Cory Aquino retained the presidency, despite several unsuccessful coup attempts, until 1992.

Ramon Magsaysay (1907–1957) Ramon Magsaysay was a guerrilla leader during the Japanese occupation who was later appointed as a provincial military governor by Gen. Douglas MacArthur. After the war, he developed a plan for subduing the Hukbalahap guerrillas. Elected as president in 1953, he cooperated closely with the United States, leading some critics to identify him as an American puppet. He was killed in an airplane crash in 1957.

Benigno Aquino (1932–1983) Benigno Aquino trained as a lawyer, then entered politics and soon became mayor of his town, governor of the province, and then a senator. Benigno was Ferdinand Marcos’s strongest political opponent. When martial law was declared, Benigno was imprisoned for nearly eight years. After spending three years in the United States for medical reasons, he returned to Manila despite warnings that his life could be in danger; he was gunned down at the airport. His assassination gave momentum to the popular movement against the Marcos dictatorship.

Corazon Aquino (1933– ) Corazon (Cory) Aquino came from a wealthy, landowning family in Luzon. After studying in the United States, she married Benigno Aquino in 1954. Following the assassination of her husband in 1983, Cory declared her candidacy for the presidency. After the election, both sides claimed victory. When Marcos refused to step down, Cory Aquino organized mass demonstrations. Marcos was forced into exile and Aquino became the first female president of the Philippines. However, many of the reforms and improvements she had promised failed to materialize, and her tenure as president was marked by economic problems, human rights abuses, and six failed coup attempts. She did not stand for reelection in 1992.


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Defining the Nation The Philippine experience of defining the nation in the postcolonial era has thrown up a number of distinctive issues, giving rise to varying interpretations of the national idea. In developing a concept of nationalism, the Philippines has had the advantage of a large degree of ethno-cultural commonality within the population, with the Malays being the numerically preponderant, and culturally and politically dominant, ethnic group. Nevertheless, one prominent issue has been the problem of the integration of the Muslim south within the predominantly Christian nation, an issue with a long history. During the Spanish colonization, the Spaniards waged many military campaigns against Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, whose inhabitants they identified as the Moros, reflecting the earlier Spanish historical experience of domination by the Muslim Moors from northern Africa. The Spaniards achieved no lasting triumph against the Moros until the final 20 years or so of their rule, the turning point in the conflict coming with the advent of new military technology, notably in the form of steam gunboats. Nevertheless, the south was never completely subdued, and guerrilla resistance never ceased. Th e south went on to become a constant problem for the American administrators in the first half of the 20th century. After independence, the Muslim south continued to pose problems of integration for all national governments. In the postcolonial period, the south has generated separatist movements, seeking independence from the Philippine nation. These movements have been more or less active, and more or less violent in their methods, in various periods. The Moro National Liberation Front was the umbrella organization for the separatist movement during much of the period under review. From the 1980s, the movement has comprised a variety of organizations, including the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Abu Sayaff, which has gained international notoriety by its strategy of kidnapping tourists. The problems of exerting effective control over the south and integrating the region within the nation have been compounded by corruption within the local administration, both civil and military, involvement of various parties and organizations in drug trafficking and extortion, and lack of resources on the part of the national government. Through enhanced links with the United States as part of the Bush administration’s War on Terror, the national government has sought to overcome its lack of military resources to bring southern separatism under central control. While the Muslim south has proved to be the greatest challenge to developing a clear and inclusive definition of the nation, it should be noted that there have been other significant issues of integration in the northern and central zones as well. One notable issue has been the bases for inclusion of the mountain peoples within the nation. These peoples, known as Igorots, live in the mountainous areas of Luzon and are of non-Malay ethnicity. This complex issue has links with factors of geographical fragmentation, ethnic diversity, language differences, religious N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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differences, inter-ethnic prejudice and intolerance, and differential access to economic opportunities.

Narrating the Nation During the postcolonial period, undoubtedly the most significant event within the national memory and national imaginary was the Philippine Revolution of 1896–1902. Even though this revolution did not succeed in achieving de facto national independence because of the intervention of the United States, Filipinos regarded it as the foundational narrative of their nation. The revolutionary era has remained central to the national psyche. The peaceful hand over of power from the American colonizers to the Filipino elite in 1946 has appeared far less glamorous or emotionally stirring. During the postcolonial period, the Philippine Revolution was frequently taken up as a theme by Filipino artists working in a variety of media. During the 1970s and 1980s, for instance, a number of novels appeared set in the revolutionary era. This was a time of rising social stress building up to the “People Power” Revolution in 1986 and the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship. It is not surprising that in the fictional works of the period comparisons and parallels were frequently drawn between the final years of Spanish rule and the Marcos regime, and between the revolution of 1896–1902 and the potential for another outbreak of popular revolutionary protest.

Ferdinand Marcos (1917–1989) Ferdinand Marcos trained as a lawyer and was elected to the presidency in 1965. As president, he maintained close ties with the United States, especially President Ronald Reagan. Marcos launched major military campaigns against communist insurgents and Moro rebels. After declaring martial law in 1972, by the following year he had assumed dictatorial powers with a new constitution. His regime was marked by corruption, extravagance, and human rights abuses. Opposition to Marcos united behind Corazon Aquino and Marcos was forced to flee to Hawaii, where he died in exile.

Imelda Marcos (1929– ) Imelda Marcos was a beauty queen and singer who married Ferdinand Marcos in 1954. She was actively involved in Marcos’s electoral campaigning for the presidency. When her husband became president in 1965, Imelda took a prominent part in political life. Imelda Marcos became notorious for her extravagant spending on clothes, especially her shoes. Forced to flee to Hawaii in 1986, Imelda returned to the Philippines after her husband’s death. In 1995, she was elected to the House of Representatives.


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For example, in a short work of extraordinary literary power, The Birthing of Hannibal Valdez (1984), Alfredo Navarro Salanga traces how revolution can result merely in the oppressed of today becoming the oppressors of tomorrow. Written during the Marcos regime, the novella would have prompted readers to reflect that the achievement of national independence had not reduced inequalities of power and access to resources among Filipinos. Although Salanga had been held briefly as a political prisoner during the early days of martial law in 1972, his novella was completed with financial assistance from the Cultural Center of the Philippines under the sponsorship of Imelda Marcos. As in much of the literary output of the period, the political implications of his work were never overt, but would have been clear to readers at the time. In Alfred A. Yuson’s Great Philippine Jungle Energy Café (1988), the adventures of a 19th-century millenarian rebel are interwoven with the experiences of the modern Filipino writer doing research on him. The chronology swings between the last years of Spanish rule, 1886–1898, and the era of Marcos’s domination of Philippine politics, 1968–1984, suggesting parallels between the two periods. Like Salanga’s, this work received financial support from the Cultural Center of the Philippines. This exuberant and original novel, which mixes history and fiction in an irreverent blend, concludes in the Great Philippine Jungle Energy Café, where a motley assortment of Filipino national heroes, heroines, and other historical figures, both worthy and notorious, together with representatives of other nationalities who have had an input into the Filipino national psyche, gather to drink coffee, tell stories, and have a lovely party. Another significant Filipino novel set during the revolutionary period was Linda Ty-Casper’s The Three-Cornered Sun (1979). The title an allusion to the national flag, Ty-Casper develops her story around the contrasting temperaments of the men of the Viardo family, who are taken to represent the various components of the Filipino nation, displaying a range of different attitudes and responses to the revolutionary experience. Historians have also contributed significantly to narrating the Filipino nation in the postcolonial era. Again, much of their work has focused on analyzing the revolutionary period at the turn of the 20th century, often with subtle implications for the politics of the postcolonial period. For instance, the role played by various social classes in the Philippine Revolution has been hotly debated by historians. Some have emphasized the leadership role of the educated class, the ilustrados (for example, John Schumacher), some have asserted the importance of the revolt of the masses (for example, Teodoro Agoncillo), while others have placed the emphasis on the involvement of peasants in the revolutionary outbreak (for example, Reynaldo Ileto). Renato Constantino raised questions about the appropriateness of Jose Rizal, a moderate intellectual from a relatively wealthy background, as the national hero. Constantino argued that the American colonizers had created Rizal as a suitable heroic figure in their own interests. Teodoro Agoncillo promoted the rival claims of Andres Bonifacio, the leader of the revolutionary organization that sparked off the revolution, as a national hero of plebeian origins N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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in place of the more conservative Rizal. This question resurfaced as a heated controversy in the late 1990s when an American historian, Glenn May, questioned the evidentiary basis for the claims made in favor of Bonifacio as revolutionary hero. In postcolonial Philippines, competing narratives of the nation have been strongly contested in the field of historiography.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation During both the American colonization and the postcolonial period, Filipino political thought and behavior have been influenced by the persistent idea that their national revolution was as yet unfinished. The Philippine Revolution of 1896–1902 was seen as unfinished because of American intervention followed by a second colonization. The achievement of independence in 1946 was regarded as unfinished because of binding American economic and military ties. As the Marcos dictatorship gathered oppressive momentum in the 1970s, the idea that the creation of a democratic and independent nation-state had not yet been fully achieved gained popular currency. The belief that further revolutionary activity on the part of the people was required to realize that goal became a basis for popular political mobilization in the “People Power” Revolution of 1986. In February 1986, hundreds of thousands of Filipinos of all social classes came out onto the streets to protest against the Marcos dictatorship and demand regime change. This popular upsurge is often called the “EDSA Revolution” from the name of the broad road through Manila where the protestors gathered: the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, usually referred to simply as EDSA. As noted above, literary fiction and historiography played important roles in the creation of an ethos of continuing revolution. The propaganda movement against Marcos, often seen by Filipinos as a reenactment of that leading up to the 1896 revolutionary outbreak, was driven by intellectuals and students and promoted by such means as the dissemination of alternative histories and biographies; gaining control over school and university texts and courses; publication of magazine and journal articles; presentation of conferences, speeches, and debates; mass distribution of pamphlets and leaflets; and creation of mass organizations, especially among youth and students. The resurgence of nationalism leading up to the EDSA Revolution was propelled to a large extent by an organized youth movement. It should also be emphasized that Filipino women played a prominent role in EDSA. Indeed, women were Cory Aquino’s initial power base. Another significant factor promoting the mobilization of the populace in 1986 was support for the popular protest from the Catholic Church. In Manila the Catholic archbishop, Cardinal Jaime Sin, called residents out onto the streets to join the demonstrations, thus reinserting the church into the national movement. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Celebrating the overthrow of President Ferdinand Marcos, February 1986. (Reuters/Corbis)

Despite a relatively high degree of ethnic uniformity, the Philippines, since independence, faced significant problems of integration. The issues of the Muslim south and the highland Igorots have been outlined above. Since independence, the new nation has had to face the problems of geographical fragmentation, with the consequent obstacles to communications and transportation. One result of fragmentation, differences in language within the archipelago, has also caused significant issues, with more than 90 different languages and dialects being spoken. Pilipino, based on Tagalog, one of the local languages of Luzon, and English were adopted as the national languages. When independence was gained in 1946, the national economy was at an extremely low ebb because of the run down of infrastructure during the Japanese occupation followed by intensive bombing during the Allied liberation. Since independence, the economy has continued to develop only slowly. More than 40 percent of the population live below the poverty line. Many Filipinos are forced to work overseas and remit part of their income home. The country’s main natural resources include timber, petroleum, and minerals, such as cobalt, nickel, copper, silver, and gold. Forty-five percent of total production remains agricultural. The population is approximately 97 million. The rate of population increase is relatively high, unemployment is high at over 10 percent, and there is a markedly unequal distribution of income. Other problems encountered in building prosperity have been the prevalence of administrative corruption and nepotism, and the political obstacles that have limited all attempts to redistribute land. The N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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main trading partners are the United States and Japan. The Philippines was less severely impacted by the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 than its neighbors in Southeast Asia, partly because of remittances from overseas workers. The vicissitudes of the relationship with the United States, the Philippines’ former colonizer and by the late 20th century the dominant global power, have deeply influenced the development of the new nation. Attempts to ameliorate economic dependence have been only partly successful. Some gains have been made, such as the removal of American military bases. During the whole postcolonial period, especially during the Magsaysay era and, most saliently, the Marcos period, the United States has exerted continuing influence on the politics of the Philippines. Despite all the obstacles, nevertheless, the historical trajectory of the nation from 1945 to 1990 demonstrated the commitment of the Filipino people to progressive ideals of democracy and independence. Selected Bibliography Constantino, R. 1975. The Philippines: A Past Revisited. Quezon City, Philippines: R. Constantino. Doran, C. 2001. “Behind the Lines: Women in the History and Literature of the Philippine Revolution.” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies 7, no. 3: 7–30. Fast, J. 1973. “Imperialism and Bourgeois Dictatorship in the Philippines.” New Left Review no. 78 (March–April): 69–96. Fry, H. T. 1973. A History of the Mountain Province. Quezon City, Philippines: New Day. Gowing, P. G. 1988. Understanding Islam and Muslims in the Philippines. Quezon City, Philippines: New Day. Guerrero, A. 1971. Philippine Society and Revolution. Hong Kong: Ta Kung Pao. Ileto, R. C. 1986. Critical Questions on Nationalism: A Historian’s View. Manila, Philippines: De La Salle University Press. Ileto, R. C. 1998. Filipinos and Their Revolution: Event, Discourse, and Historiography. Quezon City, Philippines: Ateneo de Manila University Press. Krinks, P., ed. 1987. The Philippines Under Aquino. Canberra: Australian Development Studies Network. Mijares, P. 1976. The Conjugal Dictatorship of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. San Francisco, CA: Union Square. San Juan Jr., E. 2000. After Postcolonialism: Remapping Philippines–United States Confrontations. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Santiago, L. Q. 1995. “Rebirthing Babaye: The Women’s Movement in the Philippines.” In The Challenge of Local Feminisms: Women’s Movements in Global Perspective, edited by A. Basu, 110–128. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.


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Taiwan Stéphane Corcuff Chronology 50,000–15,000 BC Changbin culture, earliest human trace found to date on Taiwan. 1430 Chinese sailors set foot temporarily on the island (Taiwan) after a shipwreck. 1557 Portuguese sailing to Japan see the island, and name it “Ilha Formosa.” 1593, 1620, 1874 Repeated official Japanese expeditions to the island. 1624–1681 Dutch colonization. Chinese economic migrants flood in and start settling. 1661 Ming loyalist and pirate Zheng Chenggong expels the Dutch and seizes Taiwan. 1683 Shi Lang obtains the last Zheng king’s allegiance to the Manchu throne. 1684 Though hesitant, Manchu emperor Kangxi decides to integrate Taiwan into his empire. 1684–1895 The Chinese colonize the plains; there are frequent ethnic feuds and rebellions. 1885 Taiwan elevated to the status of province of the Manchu (Qing) empire. 1895 Sino-Japanese War. Taiwan ceded to Japan. Taiwanese establish a brief republic. 1895–1945 Japanese colonial rule. Rapid economic development and social progress. 1945 Military occupation by the Republic of China (ROC) troops as decided by Gen. MacArthur. 1945 Taiwan is elevated to the status of province of the Republic of China. 1947 An island-wide rebellion is crushed by the Chinese army; suppression of the elite. 1949 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is founded. Fall of the ROC government, which takes refuge in Taiwan. 1951 San Francisco Treaty. Japan declares the end of its sovereignty over Taiwan. 1952 ROC-Japan Peace Treaty. 1971 The UN General Assembly unseats the ROC as the representative of China. 1975 Chiang K’ai-shek dies; Chiang Ching-kuo becomes president; dies in 1988. 1988 Vice-President Lee Teng-hui, a reformist native Taiwanese, is sworn in. 1990–2000 Lee Teng-hui leads the democratization and nativization of the regime. 1995 President Lee Teng-hui quasi-officially visits the United States of America. 1996 China tries to oppose Lee’s reelection. Missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait. 2000–2008 Moderate pro-independence policy led by minority president Chen Shui-bian.

Situating the Nation Where is the nation, and what is or should be the identity of the state? These have probably been the two underlying questions of most contemporary political debates in Taiwan since the early 1990s. The answers are embedded in the contested status of the island, in its history, and in the political psychology of its ethnic groups. The island of Taiwan, or Ilha Formosa (the “Beautiful Island,” in Portuguese), is presently ruled by the Republic of China (ROC)—founded in 1912 in Nanjing, and now reduced to the island. This rule is contested, although in different N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ways—both by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), founded in Beijing in 1949, and by Taiwan’s radical pro-independence movements—on three fundamental issues: history, international status, and belonging. At the end of World War II, the ROC, then the master of mainland China, received from General MacArthur the mandate to accept Japan’s instrument of surrender on Taiwan and to militarily occupy the island before a peace treaty could formalize the termination of Japan’s sovereignty. Formosa had been a possession of the Japanese for 50 years, since the end of the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, when the Manchus, who had ruled Taiwan for the previous 200 years, ceded the island by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. In December 1943, at Cairo, U.S. president Roosevelt, Chinese president Chiang K’ai-shek, and British premier Churchill had discussed the idea that “territories stolen from China” by Japan should be retroceded, once Japan was defeated. The question of Taiwan was discussed during the closed-door talks, but the United Kingdom initially opposed its mention in the announcement to the press that followed the meeting, which resulted in the so-called Cairo Declaration, often misperceived as a written, legal document. However, the declaration by the press N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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attachés did include a mention of Taiwan and the neighboring Pescadores Islands. Consequently, two years later in 1945, Chiang K’ai-shek considered the military occupation of Taiwan as a genuine and legitimate retrocession of Formosa to China, immediately turning the island into a province of the Republic. Yet the clarification of Taiwan’s status and the recognition in international law of the ROC’s legitimate control over the island was still pending. It became all the more urgent when, in 1949, the Communists’ PRC was founded, forcing the Nationalists to retreat to the island province. The 1952 peace treaty between Japan and the ROC, now de facto reduced to Taiwan, cancelled all treaties previously signed between China and Japan. With the implicit denunciation of the 1895 treaty, the formal retrocession was finally enacted, and it was made in favor of the one Chinese state signing the treaty, the ROC, which had survived on the island, officially preparing to recover the mainland from “Communist bandits” who, on their side, were preparing for the “liberation” of the island. Meanwhile, immediately after the relocation to Taiwan of the central Nationalist government in 1949, the new PRC regime declared that the ROC was now defunct. Formosa was to be incorporated into the PRC territory, since the PRC was viewed as the ultimate beneficiary of the so-called 1945 Retrocession of an island now declared to be “part of China since ancient ages.” Caught in the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan became a political stake, a prize to keep or to get. During the following decades, this would prevent Formosan identity from expressing itself free from the interferences of the political competition between Nationalists and Communists and its geopolitical consequences.

Pre-communist leader of China and then long-time ruler of Taiwan, Chiang K’ai-shek and his Nationalist Party supporters were forced to flee the mainland for Taiwan in 1949 by Mao Zedong and his communist forces. Chiang ruled Taiwan until his death in 1975. (Library of Congress)


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Instituting the Nation The two Chinese governments tried to monopolize the discourse over Taiwan’s history, status, and belonging with a noticeable dislike for the island’s aboriginal tribes (between 2 and 3 percent of the present-day population), some of which (the plain aborigines) had already been assimilated, and the others (the mountain aborigines) were still regarded as half savage. None of them had ever been considered as valuable historiographical “material”: in the Sino-centrist worldview, the history of Taiwan had merely started the day the Chinese started to colonize it, even though the first trace of human history in Taiwan was 10 times older than the Chinese civilization itself. For the Nationalists, stressing that Taiwan was indisputably part of China and had been so since a vague “ancient times” was crucial to show that they were not a government-in-exile, and to legitimize their “re-Sinicization” of the island, after 50 years of Japanese rule. For the Communists, the same discourse on history and Chineseness served a new claim over an island that Mao Zedong, back in the 1930s, could hardly situate on a map, and for which the Chinese Communist Party had expressed the desire that it would one day become an independent country, freed of its Japanese masters. A myth was born, that of Taiwan’s undisputable Chineseness, and of the island being a part of China “since ancient ages.” A simple knowledge of Taiwan’s history could easily dispel such a myth. In May 1684, Taiwan was loosely integrated into the Chinese empire after months during which Emperor Kangxi had considered selling the island—which had just been cleared of its anti-Manchu rebels, the Zhengs (1661–1683)—to its original colonial masters, the Dutch, who had created Taiwan’s first government, under colonialism, and ruled part of the plains between 1624 and 1661. “Taiwan,” Emperor Kangxi had written before changing his mind, “is an insignificant piece of land. Obtaining it doesn’t bring any advantage, not obtaining it will not do any harm.” Taiwan had been finally integrated and colonized, but never benefited from any developmental policy until the last decade of Chinese rule on Taiwan. The 212 years of Manchu rule had been a history of corruption, mismanagement, ethnic feuds, and rebellions against the rulers. And before the end of World War II, after decades of Japanese rule on the island, no one in China really cared about Taiwan, which was far away beyond the sea. The discourse on Taiwan’s “Chineseness” was created for legitimization purposes during the pivotal years of 1945–1949. In asserting Taiwan’s Chineseness, the question of what it means to be Chinese was eluded. Discussing it could expose one to dangerous consequences. No alternative discourse would be tolerated about Taiwan’s history, status, and identity. After World War II, “instituting the nation” in a Taiwan ruled by the Chinese Nationalists was a matter of reconstructing a Chinese nationality for Taiwan and of eradicating any idea of a Taiwanese nation. To the Nationalists, Taiwanese nationalism could lead to the independence of Taiwan, which would mean the extinction of the ROC. It was a matter of survival. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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As dissidence was fiercely suppressed at home, the Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) started to organize abroad, mainly in Japan, the United States, and some European states. Official discourses about Taiwan’s status and identity were contested by intellectuals opining that Taiwan was now ruled by a new colonial (and dictatorial) government; that the legality of the ROC’s rule over Taiwan was disputable (to say nothing of the PRC’s claim to rule the island); and that Taiwanese identity had long since evolved into a culture distinct from China’s.

Defining the Nation Different policies were used to implement the official discourse on Taiwan’s Chineseness: the promotion of a language new to the Taiwanese, Mandarin; the extensive use of school textbooks; the control of the media; the promotion of Chinese culture; and the severe limitation on the use of Taiwanese languages (Minnan, Hakka, and Aboriginal languages) and expression of local cultures. Such policies could not but strongly impact Formosans’ identification processes and their discourse regarding the island’s history, its status, and its identity or belonging. As a result, when democratization was launched in the 1990s by the first native president, Dr. Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000), most people needed time to distance themselves from the teachings of the political socialization that had shaped their minds for four decades. Because it was liberalizing Taiwanese society, democratization in the 1990s paved the way for the identity debate, which instantly resurfaced. A passionate introspection movement blossomed, and people dared again to ask the question of where the nation was and who they were. But defining this new nation was no easy task: if President Lee managed to reduce drastically the political and military influence of the mainlander-dominated establishment of the Nationalist

Dr. Lee Teng-hui Dr. Lee Teng-hui was a Taiwanese statesman, born in 1923. He was educated in colonial Taiwan, in Japan, and in the United States. Chosen in 1984 by Chiang Ching-kuo to be his vice-president, Lee succeeded him in 1988, was elected president of the ROC in 1990, and was reelected in 1996 during a missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait. With rare political intelligence, he managed to peacefully democratize and Taiwanize a mainlander-dominated, prounification ROC inherited from the Chinese civil war. Under constant pressure from China, confronted with an unceasing political opposition from the Nationalist Party’s powerful conservative faction, often misunderstood by media, Teng-hui totally redesigned Taiwan’s polity and shaped the form of moderate, inclusive nationalism that has become mainstream; he can be viewed as one of the most prominent figures in Taiwanese history.


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At the 2004 Festival of Taiwanese Cultures in Taipei, where the public is invited to express itself, one attendant illustrated how the political conundrum and Chinese military pressure polarize love and hate (“Taiwan (heart) / China (skull and crossbones) out!”). (Stéphane Corcuff)

regime, the promoters of the Chinese nation managed to retain, throughout the process, influential political positions, a legislative majority, and a pervasive influence over the printed and electronic media. A conflict quickly developed over differing versions of Taiwan’s history, status, and belonging, without showing signs of appeasement. Under Lee’s presidency, the questions to be discussed were numerous. School textbooks had to be changed, adopting a more Taiwanese-centered point of view to foster individuals’ identification to Taiwan. It consisted, for instance, in showing that the island was inserted into the center of world trade in Asia well before China took possession of it. The issue of what it means to be “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” was reopened by Taiwanese intellectuals: it was in fact at the heart of the debate. Could people be ethnically or culturally Chinese, while being at the same time politically or civically Taiwanese? The debate naturally extended to the future of Taiwan, with the claim that the status quo or a “future unification,” even with a democratized China, should not be the only two possible options, excluding self-determination and the creation of a Taiwanese Republic. The questions of ethnicity and the nation were inevitably raised. Is it possible to assert the existence of a Taiwanese nation? If so, to when could it be dated back, and if not, is it legitimate to build one and how? Central to the question of the viability of any nation-building was the issue of how to associate Taiwan’s mainlanders with the process of creating a state or a nation, or both, as it was clear that nothing could be peacefully achieved without their consent. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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By the end of the 1990s, Taiwan had already become a laboratory of identities, where not only a new Taiwanese identity was discussed and started to be elaborated, but also where a new way to be Chinese was envisioned—by separating “race” and governance, or ethnicity and civic identification. The intellectual maturity of the debate only contrasted with its rapid politicization. Each move by some to further Taiwanize the state and society was inevitably criticized by the others as a policy of “de-Sinicization.” The promoters of the Chinese nation, disoriented and afraid, were forgetting that Taiwanization was simply a response to decades of acculturation under a regime that had promoted a form of idealized Chinese culture, largely foreign to the island’s local culture—and to most of the refugee population itself, which was coming from every little local corner of China. The spatial dimension of the nation was not easy to define either. Both Lee Teng-hui and his successor, Chen Shui-bian (2000–2008), of the former opposition Democratic Progressive Party, were presidents of the ROC. In spite of their declared inclination toward a Taiwanese nation, they remained constrained by Taiwan’s “constitutional deadlock”: no such move as redrawing the “national boundaries,” which so far had remained officially those of the ROC, and which constitutionally encompassed the mainland, could be made. Changing this would mean making the reduction of the ROC to Taiwan official. For the pro-unification camps in Taiwan and China this would be the equivalent of so-called Taiwan independence. However, much has been done within these political limits. Unofficial military, administrative, security, and economic boundaries, both maritime and aerial, have been discreetly drawn in the Taiwan Strait, with the Chinese part being sometimes unofficially advised of it. The government of the Province of Taiwan, with jurisdiction over 60 percent of the total population administered by the ROC, was “suspended.” The question of the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu remain a complex issue, with some pro-independence diehards convinced that the nation doesn’t encompass those islands “inserted” into China’s coast and that they are too costly to defend. All other offshore islands, the Penghus, in the Taiwan Strait, and the islets in the Pacific Ocean, were more commonly viewed as belonging naturally to this emerging nation. Taiwan, as an island, seemed to have a “natural boundary.” This became obvious when 400 years of ambiguities and misunderstandings between the two sides of the strait started to be reexamined by historians, demonstrating that this geographical separation had incarnated itself into the evident, political boundary of an “Island Nation.”

Narrating the Nation If any nation needs the mythology, or the narrated reality, of a foundation, the “February 28 Incident” was the perfect historical milestone for Taiwan. This 1947 N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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massacre indeed provoked a dramatic shift in Taiwan’s political situation, acting instantly as a brutal psychological divorce between the native Taiwanese and the Chinese regime, which had come to be seen by Taiwanese as yet another colonial master, who was worse than the Japanese one without compare. But this time, it was no ethnically foreign regime. It was China, the country that had most influenced Taiwan’s culture and ethnicity from 1624 (when permanent Chinese immigration began under the Dutch) to 1895 (when China gave Taiwan away to Japan); and a “motherland” that the Taiwanese had been, in 1945, happy to join again after 50 years of estrangement. The “February 28 Incident” was in every sense a founding massacre, the birth certificate of Taiwan’s independence movement, which soon developed abroad into an initial form of anti-Chinese, anti-“Chiang K’ai-shek’s clique,” promoting the “Independence of Taiwan”—not from the PRC of course, which did not rule Formosa, but from the ROC on Taiwan. The “February 28 Incident” was the most sensitive taboo for 50 years. Any important move on the national identity question (whether simply a reconciliation between mainlanders and Taiwanese, or the start of a nation-building movement) needed to end this taboo. In 1995, President Lee, in his capacity as Taiwanese president of the ROC, presented to the Formosans, in the name of the State, the first official apologies and had February 28 turned into a new day of commemoration. It was the first on the calendar of the ROC that remembered an event not experienced by the mainland Chinese before the 1949 separation, the first one that the Taiwanese experienced alone. Commemorations of the “February 28 Incident” within civil society, which had been held regularly since the start of democratization, obtained recognition, enshrined in a memorial in Taipei. The “2.28 Peace Memorial” became the first memorial of the Taiwanese nation. However, narrating the nation in Taiwan quickly ran up against the impossibility of the nation, as no consensus existed on these issues. Most often, mainlanders interpreted these moves as directed against them. In addition, any unilateral dec-

The “228 Event” This 1947 event could be seen as the founding massacre of a Taiwanese nation. De facto reunified with China in 1945, Taiwan was about 20 years ahead of China in terms of socioeconomic development, and yet the Taiwanese were happy to return to the motherland. However, months of economic depredation by a new, notoriously incompetent Chinese government on the island, determined to exclude local Taiwanese from the administration, dispelled their illusions. A rebellion quickly started in Taipei after a policeman beat a woman for selling cigarettes on the black market; the rebellion spread instantly to other cities throughout Taiwan. While the governor was buying time, pretending to “listen to the grievances” of the Taiwanese elite, troops were secretly sent as reinforcements from the mainland, and finally crushed the rebellion with terrible bloodshed (an estimated 10,000–20,000 victims). The “228” sealed the psychological divorce between the native Taiwanese and China.


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laration of a Taiwanese Republic was unfeasible politically, insofar as President Chen Shui-bian never got a legislative majority sufficient to pass radical changes to the Constitution. Lastly, the geopolitical constraint remained: China claimed it would attack Taiwan if such changes were made. As a result, one nation has not replaced the other; instead, two nations started, in the 1990s, to intertwine: the ROC, fading away, and the Taiwanese, being promoted within the framework of the official title of the regime and its constitutional boundaries. Such is the constitutional deadlock constraining Taiwanese nationalism: the difficulty of changing the constitutional name of the country from the Republic of China to the (Republic of) Taiwan, because of political and geopolitical factors—a determined opposition from the mainlanders, the Chinese military threat, and, as a result, a hesitant Taiwanese society, and no legislative majority supporting the nationbuilding movement.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Collective memory in Taiwan has been deeply divided since the arrival of the last wave of Chinese immigrants between 1945 and 1955. The division in the collective memory finds its origin in the role of political psychology in the building of ethnicity. The Nationalists crossed the Taiwan Strait in 1949 with a refugee population of approximately 1 million civilians and military, fleeing the Communists in a traumatic condition. Most of these mainlanders long denied the Taiwanese any specific identity, encouraged by the official policy of “re-Sinicization” of Taiwan. Both the government and the mainlanders suspected those “fellow Chinese” of having been brainwashed by the Japanese. The native population, for its part, soon began to see them as invaders supporting a dictatorial regime—with its imminent defeat on the continent, the Republic had indeed declared a state of emergency and severely curbed civic freedoms. All those resentments were already strong when the Nationalists moved to Taiwan two years after the February 28, 1947, massacre. Prejudices in the perception only grew deeper as it became a taboo to discuss ethnicity, collective memory, identity, and the “February 28 Incident.” As they permeated the mindsets of both populations, they initiated two sets of world views: Important events that would happen in Taiwan in the following decades, experienced by both populations at the same time, would be interpreted sometimes very differently. It would be later known as “a Chinese consciousness” as opposed to a “Taiwanese consciousness,” mind-sets where identification with China or Taiwan prevailed without, in most cases, making the other totally disappear. If not everyone has an opinion about the complex issues of the existence of a Taiwanese nation and the Chineseness of Formosa, the most opinionated people in Taiwan vehemently contest each other’s positions. On one side are the N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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promoters of a Taiwanese nation who are convinced that Taiwan is culturally distinct from China; on the other side are those who deny the possibility that a Taiwanese nation could ever exist because the Taiwanese are of Chinese ancestry and are deeply attached to an ROC rescued from history. Countless positions between these two poles constituted the richness of Taiwan’s debate on nation and nationalism. Mobilizing the nation, in such a context, has proved a particularly difficult challenge. The division of collective memory and the opposition between Chinese and Taiwanese “consciousnesses” have led to radically opposed interpretations of what has been going on since the 1990s. What the nation builders who reached supreme power, presidents Lee and Chen, tried to do during the 20 years that followed the death of the last mainlander president in 1988 was to invent a modern, moderate, and inclusive Taiwanese nationalism. This meant abandoning as much as possible the old political myths and symbols of the regime, within the limits of Taiwan’s constitutional deadlock; removing all limitations on the identity debate (a policy consubstantial to the democratization process); indigenizing national curricula; and promoting local culture. At the same time, it was proposed (by President Lee) that the mainlanders join the Taiwanese in forming a “new Taiwanese people,” and decided (by President Chen) that Mandarin Chinese, being the only language understandable by every community on the island, would remain the only national language and prevail over other choices (like changing to the local Minnan language) promoted by more radical pro-independence movements (Chen Shui-bian). Such ideas, however, never got support from the mainstream mainlander population. The mainlanders had indeed been, until the democratization and the nativization of the regime, in the situation of being a minority (about 13 percent of the population), coming from abroad and being strongly overrepresented in the ROC state—in other words, in a quasi-colonial situation. The rank-and-file soldiers and powerless mainlanders were certainly not often living in enviable socioeconomic conditions, and this exiled population had found relief in a colonial state that was monopolizing all powers, reimposing Chinese culture on Taiwan, and cracking down on pro-Taiwan independence movements. Inevitably, they were unprepared when a Taiwanese rose to the presidency and reversed such policies. The “Taiwanese ascendancy” meant the end of their illusions and the beginning of a deep identity crisis for them, which strongly contributed to the intensity of the new century’s debates over nationalism and identity. Their identification with China, the past political socialization they had received, the military threat of the PRC, and the mobilization against the two presidents led by the former ruling party turned parliamentary opposition, made it difficult for these mainlanders to find legitimate the idea of a Taiwanese nation and the Taiwanization policies led by the native Taiwanese. They did not trust the new rulers when they said they were genuinely inviting them to join in. Not only did the mainlanders not consider this form of nationalism to be inclusive, but more N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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importantly, most did not accept as legitimate any “Taiwanese nation.” Between those whose Chinese consciousness prevails and Taiwan’s nation-builders, there is a basic absence of communicability on the questions of Taiwan’s history, status, belonging, and future: their perceptions are based on two incompatible sets of worldviews. To build the nation, the two presidents—Lee and Chen, and especially the latter, who had inherited an already democratized regime and could focus more openly on its nativization—had also to target the Taiwanese themselves and not only the mainlanders. For the native Taiwanese are reluctant to change Taiwan’s status quo as a result of the island’s constitutional deadlock and its political and geopolitical consequences. Although a vast majority of the Taiwanese now identified themselves as “Taiwanese” only (as opposed to “Chinese” only or “Taiwanese and Chinese”), and while they considered Taiwan as being their country, if not their nation, the military pressure exerted by China as well as the political feuds provoked within Taiwan by any major change on such issues, prompted most of the Taiwanese to shy away from these sensitive issues. President Chen, for both of his two terms, had been a minority president, unable to get a parliamentary majority to implement the most important reforms, especially sensitive ones. He often tried to circumvent this institutional predicament by appealing directly to the people. This was a logical response to the absence of a legislative majority as well as to the absence of a consensus within the native Taiwanese population on the question of changing the nation’s name—or at least, of giving a new constitution to Taiwan, even under the ROC name. Taiwan being a democracy, with a high frequency of elections, such a strategy was naturally revived in several major political campaigns, quickly but wrongly leading to denunciations at home and abroad of nationalist demagogy, whereas it was precisely the opposite: a moderate, inclusive nationalism unable to develop under strong constraints. However, not every sensitive issue regarding the nation is divisive in Taiwan. If the cohabitation between a legal nation, the ROC, and a real nation, Taiwan, creates much political infighting, all the players have stayed within the bounds of legality and the democratic process. Parties, in democracies, need platforms, and elections suppose boundary drawing, which, in Taiwan, constantly politicizes the opposition between a Chinese consciousness and a Taiwanese consciousness. Nevertheless, there is a consensus a minima, between the moderates in both camps, who together form the vast majority of the electorate and the politicians: the island of Taiwan has a sovereign state, called the ROC, whatever the PRC and the world may think about it, and whether this denomination should be kept or not; and Taiwan is politically, if not culturally, distinct from present-day China. Secession is thus not envisioned, for a simple reason: Taiwan is not ruled by China. And the central point under discussion in Taiwan, coming before the existence or not of a Taiwanese nation, is the identity of the state—is the ROC a Chinese state being Taiwanized, or does Taiwan already have a Taiwanese state without the right to proclaim its nation yet? In this sense, not only are there not N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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one, but several nationalisms in Taiwan (moderate and radical forms of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms), but nationalism, contrary to what a tumultuous debate agitating the island on the question of the nation may indicate, is perhaps not the central issue, if we consider Taiwan’s constitutional deadlock. Taiwan’s moderate nationalism is in fact the face, and the fate, of the (presently) impossible Taiwanese nationalism. Selected Bibliography Brown, M. 2004. Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power and Migration on Changing Identities. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ching, L. T. S. 2001. Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley: University of California Press. Corcuff, S., ed. 2002. Memories of the Future. National Identity Transition and the Search for a New Taiwan. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Hsiau, A-c. 2001. Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism. New York: Routledge. Lai, T-h., R. H. Myers, and W. Wei. 1991. A Tragic Beginning. The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Lee, T-h. 1999. The Road to Democracy: Taiwan’s Pursuit of Identity. Tokyo: PHP Institute. Makeham, J., and A-c. Hsiau. 2005. Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary Taiwan. Bentuhua, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Mendell, D. 1970. The Politics of Formosan Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Peng, M-m. 1972. A Taste of Freedom. Memoirs of an Independence Leader. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Rigger, S. 1999. Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy. New York: Routledge. Rubinstein, M. A., ed. 1999. Taiwan, A New History. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. Tsai, S-s. H., 2005. Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan’s Quest for Identity. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.


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Vietnam Christopher A. Airriess Chronology 111 BC–AD 939 The northern Red River valley functions as a Chinese vassal state and adopts selective Chinese cultural and political institutions. 1300s–1700s Various dynasties engage in periodic wars with China; Hanoi is established as the capital of an independent polity of Dai Viet; southern expansion includes much of present-day Vietnam. 1600s Territorial division by Trinh lords in the north and Nguyen lords in the south; Catholic missions are established. 1860s–1890s French colonial control includes Cambodia and Laos in a larger Indo-Chinese Union. 1945 Japan surrenders; Ho Chi Minh creates the National Liberation Committee of Vietnam and forms a provisional government. 1954 The French are defeated at Dien Bien Phu by the Viet Minh; French colonial rule ends; the Geneva Conference partitions Vietnam into north and south, and independent governments are established, led by Ho Chi Minh and Ngo Dinh Diem, respectively. 1966 The United States increases troop strength to 500,000 in South Vietnam. 1973 The United States signs the Paris Peace Accords with North Vietnam and begins to withdraw troops. 1975 North Vietnamese troops enter Saigon and Vietnam is unified one year later. 1978–1979 Vietnam invades Cambodia, overthrows Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge. China briefly invades across the northern Vietnam border. 1986 Market liberalization, or doi moi, is implemented. 1989 Vietnamese troops withdraw from Cambodia. 1995 The United States restores diplomatic ties; Vietnam joins Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Situating the Nation While the present Vietnamese government describes the country’s history as one of continuity and unity, in reality, its experience has been full of conjunctures that have both exacerbated and promoted a national identity. Direct control by China for over 1,000 years was followed by northern and southern rivalries, only to be replaced by French colonial rule that heightened existing regional differences. The postcolonial period witnessed the division of north and south into two independent states in a Cold War proxy conflict, followed by a unified socialist Vietnam during the past 30 years. Vietnam’s socialist-based nationalism is being challenged as the country’s economy becomes more market oriented and globalized. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Unlike most other modern Southeast Asian countries, Chinese cultural, social, and political influences have been deep and pervasive in Vietnam. This link was first established more than 2,000 years ago when the Vietnamese people, who once occupied the most southern Chinese province of Guangdong, were pushed southward into the Red (Hong) River lowlands of northern Vietnam. In their expansion to the far south, Chinese military garrisons occupied the Red River lowlands by 111 BC and eventually came to control central Vietnam as well. Despite numerous rebellions against Chinese occupation, successive Chinese dynasties ruled this vassal state until AD 939. During this 1,000-year period, all manner of Chinese cultural and political institutions were adopted, such as Mahayana Buddhism, Chinese classical education, and most importantly, the Confucian scholarbased system of bureaucratic governance. China’s cultural impact was greatest among the Confucian bureaucratic urban elite, whereas village culture remained tied to folk cultural traditions. After throwing off their Chinese overlords in AD 939, the Ly Dynasty (1010–1225) was established, whose land encompassed Dai Viet and centered on what today is Hanoi. Despite periodic incursions by the Chinese, the Ly Dynasty was the first of many dynasties comprising the “Golden Age” of Vietnam. The Ly was replaced by the Tran Dynasty (1225–1400), centered in Thanh Hoa just south of the Red River Delta, and marked the first concerted efforts at southern expansion by gradually conquering the Indianized Champa empire. The standard historical portrayal of this expansion southward is of a northern-orchestrated process of rolling back the frontier, when in fact, territorial growth was managed by a power base in central Vietnam that was oftentimes at odds with northern rule. An excellent example of multiple political power bases engendering regional rather than national identities was the Trinh-Nguyen Wars of the 1600s. While allied to expel the rogue Mac from the Red River lowlands and claiming to be loyal to the figurehead king, the armies and navies of the respective Trinh (northern) and Nguyen (southern) lords engaged in open warfare. By the mid-1700s, the far southern Mekong Delta region (or Nam Bo, traditionally) controlled by the Khmer was finally conquered by the Nguyen. By the late 1700s, Vietnam was briefly united by the Tay Son in the south, who succeeded in conquering both the lands of the Nguyen and Trinh. Final unification, however, only came under Nguyen Phuc Anh Gia Long, who, as a member of the Nguyen noble family, established his base of power in Saigon but soon thereafter founded the royal capital at Hue in central Vietnam, which was his original homeland. As a symbol of growing Vietnamese nationalism and sense of unity, Nguyen Phuc Anh replaced the Chinese imposed name of An Nam with Vietnam (although this was short lived) and adopted the name Gia Long (the traditional name for Saigon is Gia Dinh and for Hanoi is Thang Long) to symbolically unify Vietnamese territory. The Nguyen Dynasty lasted until 1945. After the 1858 landing of French forces in Danang, the Nguyen royal court in Hue ceded southern Vietnam (Cochin China) to the French as a colony in 1862, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and by 1885, the north (Tonkin) and central region (Annam) became protectorates. By 1893, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were administratively formed as French Indochina. As a formal colony, Cochin China in the south experienced greater and more direct Western influences when compared with the protectorates of the central and northern regions. Nevertheless, knowing that some Annamese elite possessed a vision of a greater Annam and Confucian-centered civilizing mission, the French used Annamese as civil servants and merchants throughout Indochina in what might be referred to as a form of domestic colonialism. After the defeat of the Japanese during World War II, the French returned in an attempt to reclaim its Asian colonial empire, but they met resistance in the north by the nationalist Viet Minh, founded in 1941 by Ho Chi Minh to resist the Japanese occupation. Despite Ho proclaiming an independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945, with the abdicated Bao Dai, the last Nguyen emperor, as an advisor, he signed the ambiguous Franco-Vietnamese Agreement of 1946, which stated that Vietnam was to become a free state within the larger French Union with the continued presence of French troops. Other nationalist groups were sharply critical of the agreement. Because of the agreement’s ambiguity and because of continued skirmishes between Viet Minh and French military forces in the north, the First Indochina War (1946–1954) broke out and ended with a French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. France’s colonial rule ended with the signing of the 1954 Geneva Conference that partitioned Vietnam into north and south at the 17th parallel. In the south, the Roman Catholic Ngo Dinh Diem came to power after abolishing the monarchy of Emperor Bao Dai, who was exiled to Paris. Elections for national assemblies were held in both the north and the south, but in the south these elections were hijacked by Diem and the U.S. government for fear of a Communist victory. In a classic Cold War “proxy” conflict, the Soviet Union backed North Vietnam and the United States formally allied themselves with the South Vietnamese government; this marked the beginning of the Second Indochina War. Due to increased resistance to Diem’s dictatorial rule by the Buddhist Hoa Hao and the syncretic Cao Dai religious sect, plus the territorial gains of the southern-based

Ngo Dinh Diem (1901–1963) Ngo Dinh Diem was the first president of South Vietnam (1955–1963). His early adult life was spent as a colonial French provincial governor, and in 1955, he won a fraudulent election against Emperor Bao Dai for the presidency of South Vietnam. Backed by the U.S. government, he was a conservative Catholic and staunch anticommunist nationalist who became unpopular among the Buddhist majority and others because of his authoritarian manner and pro-Catholic policies. Increased popular protests because of the mass jailing of dissidents, many of whom were Buddhist monks, led to his overthrow and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)–backed assassination by South Vietnamese army generals.


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Vietnam War (1956–1973) The Vietnam War was also known by the Vietnamese Communists as the American War. The U.S. government began sending military advisors to South Vietnam in 1956, and by 1969, some 500,000 U.S. military personnel were stationed in the south. Gradual control by the Communist Viet Minh in the south led to the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1973, which marked the beginning of the withdrawal of the U.S. military. The final withdrawal of the United States came in April 1975, with a frantic evacuation from Saigon.

North Vietnamese Viet Cong guerilla army, the U.S. government gave its blessings to South Vietnamese generals to overthrow and assassinate Diem in 1963. To bolster the new Nguyen Van Thieu–led government, the United States began bombing North Vietnam and, by 1966, sent almost 500,000 troops to South Vietnam. With the increased disillusionment in the United States toward the continued success of the Viet Cong, the U.S. government signed the Paris Peace Accords with the North Vietnamese government in 1973. American military withdrawal, demoralized South Vietnamese troops, and a well-organized North Vietnamese army eventually led to the liberation of Saigon by North Vietnamese military forces in 1975 and the establishment of the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam in 1976.

Saigon falls to the North Vietnamese, 1975. (Françoise de Mulder/Corbis)


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The government then set about establishing a socialist state through nationalizing industry and collectivizing agriculture. Vietnam invaded and occupied eastern Cambodia during 1978–1989, and in response, Chinese troops briefly crossed the Vietnamese border in 1979 in what is known as the Third Indochina War. After a decade of poor economic performance, the national economy became more market oriented, predicated on a philosophy of doi moi, or “renovation,” that has led to a more globalized economy based primarily on foreign investment. In response, economic growth rates were some of the highest in the world. Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995 to improve regional trade prospects, and a bilateral trade agreement was signed with the United States in 2001. While most regions benefited from foreign investment, it was the south that attracted the lion’s share of investment. Although poverty rates declined, unemployment remained high, especially in rural areas. Nevertheless, Vietnam remains, along with China, Cuba, and North Korea, one of the handful of states ideologically wedded to communism. Still controlled by the old guard, the authoritarian political system continues to censor the media and punishes outspoken religious leaders. This situation will only change with a newer and younger group of leaders.

Instituting the Nation Perhaps the first period in which there emerged a sense of national identity was during the Ly Dynasty (1010–1225), the first time in which Vietnam was relatively free of Chinese political domination. While the sense of national identity anchored in being anti-Chinese was strong among the elite, rural-based society no doubt was less politically engaged in their isolated villages. Resistance against China anchored a sense of national identity, but it must be recognized that Chinese institutions, such as Confucianism and political dynasties, were borrowed from its northern neighbor.

Ho Chi Minh (1890–1969) Ho Chi Minh was the father of the socialist revolution, statesmen, and the founder of the Viet Minh. He spent much of his young adult life in France, the Soviet Union, and China where he was introduced to nationalist and communist ideology. As Vietnam’s most celebrated national hero, he was commonly viewed not as a stern father but as a kinder “Uncle Ho.” His body is embalmed and on display at a Hanoi mausoleum modeled after Lenin’s tomb in Moscow. Like Mao in China, statues and framed pictures continue to be found throughout public and private spaces in Vietnam, which attests to his cultlike status.


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As in many colonial possessions, the first true and inclusive modern Vietnamese national identity emerged during the late colonial period with the formation of the Viet Minh in 1941. As is true in many colonial possessions with native communist movements, the Viet Minh’s origins were ideologically communist, but were decidedly nationalistic in nature. Indeed, its name is an abbreviation of the “League for the Independence of Vietnam” and possessed members with no communist leanings; two of Ho Chi Minh’s most famous political quotes are “I only follow one party: the Vietnamese party” and “It was patriotism, not communism, that inspired me.” The Viet Minh, however, did encounter strong opposition to a socialist-based independence movement from noncommunist nationalists. The Viet Minh’s 1954 victory at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu only solidified this growing nationalist movement. This Soviet-inspired and rural-based Communist Party of Vietnam became a successful anchor for promoting national pride and identity and was in part more successful when compared to China because Vietnamese socialist ideology was less strident on such issues as class warfare, the purging of intellectuals, and the persecution of landlords. This in part explains why the Communist Party of Vietnam was able to facilitate market-oriented reforms based on “market socialism” in the mid-1980s, with less opposition when compared with China.

Ho Chi Minh founded the Indochina Communist Party in 1930 and was president of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from 1945 to 1969. (Library of Congress)


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Defining the Nation Like so many other Southeast Asian states, nationalism was often framed with reference to external threat. Despite the deep Sinicization of the Vietnamese ruling class, the “Golden Age” of Vietnamese dynasties, when Chinese control waned, marked the origins of Vietnam’s “national essence” because of the switch from being East Asian– to Southeast Asian–centered. This new orientation only increased with the conquering of Champa lands to the south. While upland ethnic groups were digested into this expanding lowland-based empire, the definition of being Vietnamese was promoted based on a shared common culture, historical heritage, and language. Nationalism, of course, was given greater motive force because Vietnam lost its independence for some 150 years during the period of French colonialism, the Japanese occupation during World War II, and the military engagement with the United States. Throughout much of Vietnam’s history, there also existed conflicting definitions of national identity, particularly between northern and southern regions. The early 1600s’ southern Nguyen government, for example, formed a cosmopolitan government that included Siamese, Khmers, Chams, and Malays. This far southern base is commonly viewed as the ascendancy of the south over the northern heartland; however, it is best viewed as one of many regions—no less authentic nor less Vietnamese than the north—that through time contributed to a larger national identity. While a national identity has always been assumed to be northern-centered, the southern Nguyen perceived themselves as being more freedom loving, moral, and self-confident, and less bound to tradition, when compared with the corrupt, Mandarinized institutional culture of the northern Trinh. Indeed, the villages of the north have traditionally been more communalist, whereas those in the south have been characterized as more individualistic. A unified national identity based on a Viet Minh–centered independence movement was also obviated because of differing natures of French colonial administration. Unlike the central and northern regions where a Confucian culture endured under protectorate status, direct rule in the south cultivated a Westernoriented Vietnamese elite, a Chinese capitalist class, and the vociferously anticommunist Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious sects, which were far more resistant to a Viet Minh nationalist ideology than the population in the north. Nevertheless, northern nationalists of various political persuasions were able to solidify a sense of Vietnamese nationalism during 1920–1950 through the appropriation of the name Vietnam. Although the French colonial government demanded that their possession be called Annam or Indochina by all subjects, the name Vietnam was increasingly being used by nationalists as a form of ethnocultural and patriotic vocabulary. By the end of World War II, no longer did nationalist refer to the colonial names of Tonkin, Annam, and Cochin China. Even the Indo-Chinese Communist Party changed it’s name to the Vietnamese Workers N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Party in 1951, despite the urging of the Comintern (an internationalist Communist organization) to keep Laos and Cambodia part of a larger revolutionary struggle.

Narrating the Nation Construction of narratives was primarily a project of the elite and often deployed ancient historical events or anticolonial sentiments to mold a distinctive Vietnamese cultural identity. In addition to the many literary elite who published newspapers and periodicals, nationalism narratives during the mid-1900s primarily originated from the Communist Party of Vietnam in the north, who attempted to build a national identity by conflating nationalism and communism based on premodern national heroes, cultural institutions, and external threats; assimilating premodern culture into a postrevolutionary context was a great concern. When the Indo-Chinese Communist Party’s Standing Committee met in 1943, for example, they discussed not only economic and political issues but also cultural ones. One example of deploying national heroes is that of the Trung sisters who valiantly organized armies to fight off the Chinese between AD 40 and 43, but ultimately failed. Vietnamese families often had statues of the Trung sisters at home, and an evolving communist ideology appropriated them as examples of the importance of participating in struggles against foreign invaders, in this case Americans, and also dovetailed with the suffrage goals of the revolution. Northern nationalist ideology also conflated traditional communal village life with revolutionary goals. This was in part accomplished because with their Confucian culture backgrounds, revolutionary leaders were predisposed to the twin self-reinforcing ideologies of Confucianism and communism that included the cultivation of individual morality, the importance of community over the individual, and the culture of political indoctrination. Revolutionaries attempted to add to and secularize traditional religious village festivals to create new village “meetings” that promoted increased rice production, military enlistment, and attention to the critical role of national heroes in the national consciousness. Linked to village life was its basic communal psychology, based on the family and ancestor worship; family ancestral altars were simply transformed into altars of national heroes that, in turn, symbolically meant that all Vietnamese were imagined as possessing a shared ancestry. Referring to Ho Chi Minh as “Uncle Ho,” for example, reoriented identities from the family to the state. For several reasons, the construction of alternative nationalistic narratives in the south was far more difficult when compared with the north. It was difficult for southern politicians to speak of national self-determination and independence from foreign rule when the stability of the government was dependent upon American military and financial aid. In addition, the political elite were primarily drawn from the ranks of military officers who were trained at French military N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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academies and, thus, were less troubled by the foreign presence and erosion of an imagined Vietnamese culture. Nevertheless, they did learn from the northern government how to deploy narratives of recognized national heroes to construct a southern form of nationalism. For example, the “new life villages” that were constructed to resettle southern villagers displaced by U.S. military action and targeted for pacification under the U.S.-inspired “winning the hearts and minds of the people” campaign, were frequently named after the pantheon of historical “undead” national heroes. While less common in the north, various religious sects in the south provided an alternative narrative of national identity. One was the Hoa Hao, an anticolonial, anticommunist, and anti-Diem Buddhist millenarian movement of the western Mekong Delta that, in the late 1960s, claimed 18 percent of the southern population as adherents. Under conditions of greater Westernization, social inequalities, and urbanism, sect doctrine called for a return of an imperial and Confucianized moral political order and idealized the true essence of Vietnamese folk culture as being village-based. With modern socialist Vietnam experiencing rapid social change, the government is attempting to draw upon its historical and cultural past as a source of stability and national identity to legitimize its authority in the context of globalization. This is difficult, however, because much of Vietnam’s history and culture is indirectly antithetical to the socialist revolution that claims to be the torchbearer of modernization and progress. As a result, the government selectively harnesses the “positives” of Vietnam’s past, such as festivals and handicrafts, for its own ends in fashioning national identity, while disposing of “outdated” customs. Confucianism, for example, is making a comeback despite its Chinese origins and being symbolic of elitism and class; the government views the institution of Confucianism as an avenue to combat the “social evils” of Western culture by stressing the importance of the traditional family. The royal capital of Hue is being promoted as an important tourist destination, despite it functioning as a symbol of French colonialism and the feudalistic Nguyen Dynasty. Indeed, no recent governmentsanctioned and official history of the country has been written because of the contradictory nature of historical events and periods and their relationship to national identity.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation The institutions that build a sense of national identity are many, but the most important were the central government and educational institutions. The National Assembly in the north first met in 1946 and served as an important mechanism for promoting national inclusiveness and integration. Assembly members were to represent all economic, political, social, religious, and ethnic groups, and even southerners, irrespective of party affiliation, were to assist in defining the national N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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ideology. While membership was reserved for such minorities as highland ethnic groups or ethnic Chinese, over time they became marginalized and thus not part of the nation-building process. The northern National Assembly granted autonomy to tribal peoples and promised to preserve their traditional culture, but they continued to view highlanders as uncivilized and backward. This produced an informal policy of assimilation, through populating the highland with lowland Vietnamese, and tribal resettlement in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Even more aggressive “Vietnamization” assimilation policies directed toward highland ethnic groups were common in the south under Diem’s rule during the 1950s and 1960s. After unification, the government abolished the autonomous zones in 1976 and introduced lowland Vietnamese socialism into the southern highlands. In a similar vein, while ethnic Chinese were reserved representation in the National Assembly, they were in reality not part of the dialogue defining national identity; postunification discrimination resulted in the mass emigration of ethnic Chinese, especially in the south, during the 1980s because of their incompatibility with Vietnam’s socialistic ideals. As in all countries, the educational system afforded opportunities for governments to promote a nationalist identity. Much like the utilization of villages to inculcate a national identity, the northern government in the early 1960s decentralized education based on the hypothesis that stimulating patriotism at the national scale requires cultivating loyalties at the local, agricultural collective level. Stimulating a patriotic education involved adults telling personal stories to schoolchildren of the abuse under the feudalistic landlord system and the economic stress during the colonial period. In addition, standard academic subjects possessed an applied nature with reference to improving agricultural and industrial production to meet socialist productivity goals. A localized education to promote a nationalistic identity was supported in the south during the 1960s as well, but was constrained for various reasons. Southern middle schools, for example, eschewed any post-1940s’ indigenous literature that spoke to anticolonial themes or a war-ravaged southern population. Private elite schools that were very common in southern urban areas favored a curriculum that was French-centered and thus not geared toward cultivating a postcolonial and nationalistic consciousness. Much the same was found at universities, where administrators and faculty were still tied to colonial intellectual models. Since the implementation of doi moi policies that have opened Vietnam’s economy to the liberalized forces of globalization, the role of education in building a national identity is somewhat ambiguous. Although the Education Law of Vietnam passed by the National Assembly in the late 1990s recognizes the practical needs and realities of a university education, such as private-sector funding and a knowledge-based training, there continues to exist a strong vein of MarxismLeninist and Ho Chi Minh thought in the curricula. The government remains strident in its goals of cultivating a national identity anchored by socialist theory to combat bourgeoisie capitalism that is associated with increased globalization. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Selected Bibliography Cheung-Carter, J. 2004. “The Moral Imperative and the Politics of Confucianism in French Indochina: Vietnamese Strategies of Resistance, Appropriation and Transformation.” Explorations in Southeast Asian Studies 5, no. 2. (Retrieved December 18, 2006), http://www. hawaii.edu/cseas/pubs/explore/cheung-gertler.html. Goscha, C. 1995. Vietnam or Indochina? Contesting Concepts of Space in Vietnamese Nationalism (1887–1954). Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Jamieson, N. 1995. Understanding Vietnam. Berkeley: University of California Press. Kerkvliet, B., A. Chan, and J. Unger. 1998. “Comparing the Chinese and Vietnamese Reforms: An Introduction.” The China Journal 40:1–7. Long, C. 2003. “Feudalism in the Service of the Revolution: Reclaiming Heritage in Hue.” Critical Asian Studies 35:535–558. McLeod, M. 1999. “Indigenous Peoples and the Vietnamese Revolution, 1930–1975.” Journal of World History 10:353–389. Ninh, K. 2002. A World Transformed: The Politics of Culture in Revolutionary Vietnam. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Pelley, P. 2002. Postcolonial Vietnam: New Histories of the National Past. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Taylor, K. 1998. “Surface Orientations in Vietnam: Beyond Histories of Nation and Region.” The Journal of Asian Studies 57:949–978. Taylor, P. 2001. Fragments of the Present: Searching for Modernity in Vietnam’s South. Honolulu: Allen and Unwin and University of Hawaii Press. Tonkin, D. 1997. “Vietnam: Market Reform and Ideology.” Asian Affairs 28:187–196. Woodside, A. 1971. “Ideology and Integration in Post-Colonial Nationalism.” Pacific Affairs 44:487–510.


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Cuba Antoni Kapcia Chronology 1868 1879 1892 1895 1898 1902 1933 1934 1940 1944 1947 1952 1953 1955 1956 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1965 1967 1972 1975 1976

Start of the 10-year Guerra Grande rebellion against Spain. Start of the Guerra Chiquita rebellion. Creation of José Martí’s Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC). Start of the War of Independence. U.S. military intervention and start of the U.S. military occupation. Independence. Nationalist revolution against the dictator Machado. Batista’s coup; start of a new U.S.-Cuban arrangement. Election of Batista; new Constitution. Election of Ramón Grau San Martín’s Auténtico Party. Creation of the Partido del Pueblo Cubano (Ortodoxos), under Eduardo Chibás. (March 10) Batista’s coup. (July 26) Fidel Castro leads an attack on the Moncada barracks (Santiago de Cuba); formation of the 26th of July Movement. The Castro brothers are in exile in Mexico, where they meet Che Guevara. Invasion of Oriente on the yacht Granma; start of the Sierra Maestra campaign. (January 1) Che Guevara takes Havana. Cuban-Soviet commercial agreement; first U.S. economic sanctions; creation of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). (April 17–19) Bay of Pigs invasion (Playa Girón); creation of the first single party (ORI). Cuban Missile Crisis; Cuba’s expulsion from the Organization of American States. Full U.S. economic embargo. Creation of Cuban Communist Party (CCP); start of “moral economy.” Death of Guevara. Cuba joins Comecon, the Socialist Bloc’s trading organization. First Congress of the Communist Party. Constitution of the revolution.

Situating the Nation Although nationalism was late to develop in Cuba, the question of national identity has been the central theme of Cuban political debate since the moment, in the early 19th century, when Cuba, almost alone in Spanish America, remained a Spanish colony, leading many Cubans to question their ability, right, and willingness to be independent. This was complicated by the race issue; until the shock of slave rebellion in Saint Domingue in 1791, some white Cubans (criollos) and a few black ex-slaves had advocated separatism or autonomy within the Spanish N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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empire, but after that, many white Cubans preferred a continuation of colonialism to protect their new slave-based sugar wealth and to protect themselves against a possible slave revolt. Thereafter, race influenced Cuban debates on identity; the perceived threat of a progressive “blackening” of the island through increased mass slave imports, the parallel threat of black rebellion, and the increased “Hispanization” of Cuba through greater Spanish immigration between the 1870s and the 1930s all conspired to postpone the evolution of a clear consensual sense of national identity. Besides, there was no consensus about the entity to which such an identity was opposed: Was it Spain, the black Caribbean, or (in the 20th century) the United States? Moreover, was Cuba a Latin entity, a Caribbean island, or an adjunct to the United States? These debates continued well into the 20th century, being complicated, after 1959, by the rapid evolution of a socialist society and a close affiliation with the Soviet-led Socialist Bloc. Because of this, when separatism emerged in the 1840s it came in the form of “annexationism,” whereby white sugar growers sought to preserve slavery by advocating for U.S. statehood rather than an independent nationhood. Ultimately, it was only in 1868, when this option was closed by the U.S. Civil War, when Spanish resistance to Cuban demands for fairer treatment created frustration, and when the cost of slave imports became prohibitive, that white planters, under Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, declared rebellion in the eastern province of Oriente. Th e war that resulted—the Guerra Grande (Great War)—was a long, divisive, bitter struggle, increasingly fought by thousands of black guerrillas (called mambises), who saw it as a struggle for social liberation; this, coupled with their fear of the popular black general Maceo, led the white leadership to surrender in 1878, which Maceo refused to accept, and in 1879–1880, he led another rebellion, the exclusively black-fought Guerra Chiquita (Little War). After 1878, Spanish retribution alienated many, especially the growing Florida colony of emigrant tobacco workers, who soon became the radical base for the new Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) under José Martí, who, in 1895, launched the final rebellion in Oriente. That rebellion (which saw both Martí and Maceo killed) was ended in 1898 by unilateral U.S. intervention (turning the Cuban War of Independence into the Spanish-American War), which began a 40-month occupation and a process of “Americanization.” Independence finally arrived in 1902—on the condition that the terms of the Platt Amendment were incorporated into the new Constitution and that a commercial treaty cementing Cuba’s role as a supplier of raw sugar to the United States and as a market for U.S. manufactures was ratified. Although the resulting prosperity guaranteed loyalty to the U.S. link, disillusionment soon set in as politics became unstable and corrupt, generating three U.S. interventions. The first of these (1906–1909) brought the formally nationalist liberals into office and finally stimulated a process of institutional nation-building (creating an army, various academies, museums, and ministries). Following the economic crisis in 1920–1921, nationalism became radicalized (especially among N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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José Martí (1853–1895) José Martí towers over modern Cuban history. Exiled from Cuba at 17, he spent most of his life abroad, achieving fame as a leading poet, a journalist, a diplomat for several Latin American countries, an essayist, and, above all, the leader who organized opposition to Spain among Cuban émigré communities. Increasingly radical in his views and worried about growing U.S. designs on Cuba, he founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party (PRC) and launched the final independence rebellion in 1895, dying in battle after a few weeks. Relatively neglected before 1910, “rescued” by student radical Mella in 1923, and institutionalized as the héroe nacional after 1934, he became seen as a stark contrast with Cuban political life, a symbol of purity, self-sacrifice, and committed patriotism, thus being adopted by the 1950s’ rebels as the “author of the Revolution.” After 1959, his works were republished in huge quantities, and the post-1977 Centro de Estudios Martianos launched a since undiminished wave of research into and veneration of Martí.

Havana students) and social unrest generated the new Communist Party, union militancy, an abortive Veterans’ rebellion, and the election of the nationalist Gerardo Machado, whose drift into authoritarianism further radicalized politics. The University Students Directorate, Directorio Estudiantil Universitario (DEU), generated armed and violent “action groups,” and labor insurrection and several uprisings by the Union Nacionalista occurred in 1931. These events all resulted in a rebellion in September 1933 by an uneasy alliance of the DEU and mutinous soldiers, producing the “100-days revolution,” led by law professor, Ramón Grau San Martín, but increasingly underpinned by the soldiers’ leader, Fulgencio Batista. However, the resulting instability and radicalism worried Washington and Batista, the latter finally seizing power in January 1934. Between 1933 and 1953, the key actors were therefore the “generation of 33”: Batista dominated during 1934–1944 (as elected president from 1940), returning to power in a coup in 1952, while Grau’s new Auténtico Party (the Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party) governed during 1944–1952. Even the third force, Chibás’s anticorruption Ortodoxos (the Cuban People’s Party) was a split from the Auténticos in 1947. During this period, Cuba’s relationship with the United States became less formally neocolonial (President Roosevelt abrogating the terms of the Platt Amendment in 1934), but effective U.S. domination of the sugar link continued to constrain full economic independence. However, the 1959 revolution led by Fidel Castro reacted to this continuing domination and produced a more radical definition of nation, increasingly influenced by socialism. Following the United States’ abolition of Cuba’s annual sugar quota, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics purchased Cuba’s unsold sugar, leading to a long-standing oil-sugar exchange, to Soviet funding of social reforms, and, after 1972, to a close economic relationship with the Socialist Bloc. This was accompanied, from 1960 (after U.S. economic sanctions), by a “siege mentalN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The Platt Amendment The Platt Amendment was the name given to the wording inserted, at the United States’ insistence and against fierce Cuban resistance, into the draft Cuban Constitution in 1901; ultimately, the nationalist Constitutional Convention was obliged to accept it as the price of even partial independence. The amendment’s terms effectively legalized U.S. neocolonial control of Cuba until their abrogation by President Roosevelt in 1934. They included three key issues: the right of the U.S. government to intervene militarily in Cuba to restore order, limitations on the Cuban government’s freedom to enter into foreign treaties and loans (apart from those with the United States), and U.S. ownership of Cuban territory as naval bases (of these, only one—Guantánamo Bay—survived, remaining U.S. territory after 1934 and even after 1959). The effects of the amendment were counterproductive, generating repeated U.S. intervention and a permanent instability caused by rebellions designed to provoke such interventions.

ity,” which intensified and distorted definitions of nation, especially during the 1960–1971 exodus of a largely white urban-based middle class (mostly to Florida), making the island blacker and more working class, changing residential patterns, and, with social reforms and desegregation, bringing greater equality and support for the revolution among rural and black Cubans.

Instituting the Nation The initial phase of official nation-building after 1910 disintegrated in the face of economic collapse after 1921, but the 1933 nationalist revolution presaged a conscious construction of a new, formally nationalist, interventionist state under the successive leaders of 1934–1952. However, just as after 1902, institutionalization of national politics increased the opportunities for patronage, generating a corruption of social and political life, which was especially evident in the post-1938 problem of political gangsterism, and which helped to undermine the new state. The fragility of that state was revealed in 1952 when Batista’s coup produced minimal opposition, state organizations either collaborating or being easily taken over; Batista’s subsequent dictatorship (until December 31, 1958) fatally weakened that state. Given the nationalist importance of historiography, key institutions during this period were the 1938 Office of the Historian of Havana (Oficina del Historiador de la Ciudad de la Habana) and the 1941 Congreso Nacional de Historia (National History Congress) and Sociedad Cubana de Estudios Históricos (Cuban Society of Historical Studies). The Sociedad de Folklore (Folklore Society) and Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos (Society for Afro-Cuban Studies) also emphasized AfroCuban culture and history for the first time, reflecting a shift in attitudes among N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Fidel Castro, the long-standing leader of Cuba. Castro has been in power since 1959, serving as Prime Minister from 1959 to 1976, before being elected as president, the position he still holds today. (Library of Congress)

the cultural elite, from its early European-oriented tendency toward derivative art to an appreciation of the black contribution to Cuban history and society. As Batista’s coup ended the sway of the 1933 generation, a new political generation arose, led especially by Fidel Castro, an ex-student, practicing lawyer, and founding Ortodoxo member. On July 26, 1953, he led an abortive armed assault on the Moncada barracks, Santiago de Cuba, after which he was arrested, tried, and imprisoned. From prison, and after his release and exile to Mexico, he constructed a new force, the 26th of July Movement (whose initial manifesto was N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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based on Castro’s 1953 defense speech, “History Will Absolve Me”) and led an initially unsuccessful invasion in December 1956. A 25-month guerrilla war followed in the eastern Sierra Maestra in which the Rebel Army eventually defeated Batista in late 1958. Throughout this time, the University of Havana, long a base for student radicalism, became known as the crucible of the anti-Batista movement. The revolution under Fidel Castro (as prime minister from February 1959 and then president from 1976) inevitably reconstructed the nation totally, creating new institutions, centralizing the economy (from 1963), organizing a conscious drive toward a national culture, and developing a constant process of popular mobilization through new “mass organizations.” After 1961, a single-party system was instituted, eventually creating in 1965 the Cuban Communist Party (CCP). However, since the new party remained somewhat dormant until 1975, the more important political institutions of the first 16 years of the revolution were the Rebel Army (which became the Revolutionary Armed Forces in 1959), the post1959 militias, and the post-1960 neighborhood Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR)—the mainstay of civil defense, political socialization and involvement, and key instruments in the new nation-building. The new revolutionary nation was therefore largely based on central political and economic control, mass mobilization and involvement, a vigorous drive to spread a new national culture to all Cubans—through such institutions as the new Cinema Institute (ICAIC), Casa de las Américas, and the Union of Writers and Artists (UNEAC), and through mass literacy and education campaigns—and a carefully fostered spirit of national defense against, and resistance to, the United States (a “siege mentality” and a “guerrilla ethos” that ensured unity and did not tolerate deviation or dissent).

The Cuban Revolution The rebellion of 1953–1958 was led by three people: Fidel Castro, his brother Raúl Castro, and, after 1956, the Argentine radical, Ernesto Che Guevara, who joined the Cuban rebels in Mexico, becoming Fidel Castro’s deputy. After the 1956–1958 guerrilla campaign and the defeat of Batista’s troops, the revolution remained ideologically unclear for some months; essentially a coalition of anti-Batista forces at the start, unity soon disintegrated in the face of growing U.S. opposition to its radicalism, the increasingly socialist orientation of its leaders and philosophy, growing popular demands for social reform, and the collapse of a “liberal” pole (the latter finally destroyed by the failure of the CIA-backed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, known as Playa Girón in Cuba). After 1961, Cuba increasingly gravitated toward the Soviet Union and a socialist economic, political, and social structure, although never losing the nationalist orientation and inspiration of the early days. This inherent nationalism resurfaced repeatedly thereafter: much of the 1960s’ radicalism was nationalist in character (rejecting Soviet models as much as “U.S. imperialism”) rather than socialist, and many aspects of the political system, foreign policy, and cultural development reflected this nationalism.


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Defining the Nation Being an island culture with no external threats, the geographical definition of a Cuban identity has never been in doubt, apart from two cases: the Guantánamo Bay naval base and the Isle of Pines, both claimed by the United States under the Platt Amendment. While the latter was returned, Guantánamo remains more contentious, its U.S. status confirmed in 1934; after 1961, it became “proof ” of U.S. imperialism and occupation of Cuba. Equally, there are few internal geographical obstacles or cultural divisions to affect nationalism, apart from a perceived historical dichotomy between Havana (seen as less “Cuban” and, firstly, more “Spanish” and, later, more “Americanized”) and Oriente (often seen as more essentially “Cuban,” given its historical associations with independence struggles, blackness, and revolution). Given this, debates over identity have tended to focus firstly on racial difference and, after 1959, on political and ideological orientation, with a constant current of historical identification with past struggles. In the latter respect, the historical ethos of “Free Cuba,” Cuba Libre (the mambí slogan of 1868–1878), was more an existential belief (sustaining opposition to colonialism) than a pragmatic goal; after 1902, it became a symbolic slogan, justifying either the new republic or continuing rebellion (as in 1933). As disillusionment with 1940–1952 politics grew, Castro eventually had recourse to that notion; using the coincidence of symbolic anniversaries in 1952–1953 (50 years of a questionable independence and 100 years since Martí’s birth), his new movement adopted the epithet “Generation of the Centenary” to identify explicitly with Martí. Before independence, arguments over cubanidad (“Cuban-ness”) were driven by race fears or, conversely, a growing black consciousness, whereas after independence, and especially after the repression of a 1912 black rebellion, there was a sustained campaign of denial and exclusion of black Cubans’ role in Cuban history and, even more, a denigration of the different Afro-Cuban religions (generally grouped together as santería—worship of the saints), which were now dismissed as witchcraft. By the 1920s, however, artistic interpreters had become aware of black Cuba, mostly focusing on an anthropological and folkloric “AfroCubanism” rather than “blackness.” Hence, by the 1950s, a Cuban cultural identity was presumed to include “Afro-Cuba.” After 1959, ethnic definitions tended to disappear because of a de facto “blackening” as thousands of whites left and through a conscious attempt to resist supposedly divisive classifications, rejecting prevalent notions of black consciousness. However, ethnographers and the national music and dance ensemble, the Conjunto Folkórico, sought to rescue Afro-Cuban cultural forms, including the rumba, as a source of national pride. One curious development of this was the gradual supremacy of santería over the largely white Catholic Church (the latter already weakened by mass emigration and expulsions): not only did a growing number of Cubans, white and black, adhere to these N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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religious forms, but santería itself fused increasingly with notions of cubanidad to become seen by many as the essential Cuban form of religious expression. Identity debates also had an external dimension. After independence, cubanidad continued to be defined by external referents: the emerging cultural elite looking to a European cultural tradition and the political and economic elites looking to the United States. By the 1950s, however, any suggestion of a “Spanish” or European identity for Cuba was limited to intellectual groupings; instead, the middle-class identification was with North American values and consumption. As Cuba became separated from the United States and then excluded from Latin America after 1961, Cuba retreated into a cultural “autarky,” the revolution seeking definitions in Cuba’s past and character. There was, however, a new awareness of Latin America born of pragmatism (to break isolation) and ideology (seeing Cuba as the “front line” against imperialism) but also responding to the Latin American cultural renaissance. Similarly, Cuba became aware of the Third World from the early 1960s, a consciousness that, from 1975, became a strategy to aid Africa, presented as the “return of the slaves,” and also brought a realization that Cuba shared a Caribbean identity. Both campaigns generated prestige for Cuba’s African roots. After 1960, as many of the white middle class left Cuba (largely for the United States), a new dichotomy emerged, seeing those who remained in Cuba as the “true” nación and condemning as “traitors” and gusanos (worms) those émigré Cubans who sided with the U.S.-led isolation and “siege” of Cuba. Beyond this, the most consistent dichotomy in interpretations of “Cuba” and Cuba’s historical failures (to gain independence and then to govern with stability and without corruption) has been between those blaming innate weaknesses and those blaming external forces. In the early republic, this focused on “decadence,” seeing Cubans as either the “problem” (and an attachment to North American values as the solution) or the “solution,” blame being accorded to successive imperialisms. After 1959, this dichotomy continued implicitly: the attraction toward Soviet models partly still saw the “solution” as lying outside, while the growing preference for a more indigenous solution followed the “nationalist” tradition.

Narrating the Nation Given the importance of historical awareness and revisionism in the creation of a consensual Cuban identity, a pantheon of dates, events, figures, and places has inevitably evolved that was interpreted as the expression or symbolism of that identity, and included several powerfully mobilizing historical myths. With “action” often being extolled over thought, one consistent theme has been the tendency to exalt events, rebellions (including failed ones), and any acts of selfsacrifice and “martyrdom.” N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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With “struggle” (lucha) being the most powerful historical theme in Cuban political life, Cuban nationalism has long extolled the Guerra Grande (framed by the declaration of rebellion in 1868, the Grito de Yara, and Maceo’s refusal in 1878 to accept the white leaders’ surrender to the Spanish, the so-called Protesta de Baraguá), the Guerra Chiquita, and the 1895–1898 War of Independence. Around these seminal events, there has also been a consistent veneration of annexationist rebellion led by Narciso López (which, despite its ambiguity regarding Cuban independence, created the Cuban flag) and, of course, Martí’s 1895 death. After 1933, the “heroism” of that year’s revolution “struggle” also became a symbolic reference point, signaling the birth of the “Second Republic” to replace the discredited neocolonial and “Plattist” system, and creating the basic principles of the 1940 Constitution. After 1959, new historical moments were added to the canon: Moncada (July 26, 1953), the Granma invasion (December 1956), the rebel victory (January 1, 1959), and April 17, 1961, the defeat of the U.S.-backed invasion at the Bay of Pigs. By 1968, the revolution was consciously presenting its own struggle as part of a 100-year-long struggle for national independence. A parallel demonology of events also grew up, including, especially, the imposition of the Platt Amendment (1901), the start of the pseudorepública (May 20, 1902), and Batista’s coup (March 10, 1952). Of these, “Platt” was the strongest theme, generating a whole mythology that, as opposition to the U.S. link grew after 1910, was used to explain Cuba’s ills. Given the prominence of event over person, there is an inevitable veneration of certain places associated with historically resonant events, almost all of them in Oriente, especially Céspedes’s farm at La Demajagua (the site of the Grito de Yara), Guáimaro (site of the 1869 rebel constitution), Baraguá (Maceo’s refusal), and Dos Ríos (where Martí was killed). After 1959, a new nationalist geography equally added the Moncada (Santiago) and the Sierra Maestra. Within the nationalist pantheon, José Martí has figured most prominently, his death, ideas, and image being seen from the start as symbolic of this struggle, of past betrayals, and of future hope. However, that pantheon also includes people like the 1868 leader Céspedes, the mambí leader Maceo, the 1895–1898 generals Calixto García and Máximo Gómez. Of the politicians and leaders of the 1902–1953 period, only two have been extolled: Antonio Guiteras (the leftist radical of Grau’s 1933 revolution, killed by Batista in 1935) and Eduardo Chibás (the Ortodoxo founder who committed suicide in 1951). After 1959, the pantheon became more radicalized, adding the figure of Julio Antonio Mella (founder of the Communist Party), and, after 1968, Che Guevara, who was exalted as the “heroic guerrilla,” as el Che, to whom all schoolchildren ritually aspire at each morning’s assembly. Consistent and clearly consensual myths have of course been fundamental to the construction and preservation of a collective historical memory and to mobilization of collective action. One of the most enduring of these has been that surrounding sugar, seen alternately as Cuba’s blessing or curse, the latter often being counterposed to the more indigenous and “Cuban” tobacco. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The mythification of struggle (lucha) has also been consistent, legitimizing two ruling “generations” (1895 and 1933) and creating a pantheon of betrayed heroes. Hence, the mambí became fundamental, even allowing the generals dominating post-1902 politics to call themselves the mambisado. This also implied the construction of subsidiary myths around Oriente, Martí, generations (each one rescuing “betrayed” ideals), and after 1959, a similar mythification of the Sierra-based guerrillas, epitomized by Che Guevara. Myths about identity have also identified the “natural” Cuba with the countryside and the peasant (whether the more political campesino or the simpler, and usually white, guajiro). Given the prominence of lucha and “action,” the personality trait most valued by Cuban nationalists over the years has logically tended to be a selfless heroic willingness to fight, regardless of the outcome; the national anthem enshrines this, incanting morir por la pátria es vivir (“to die for the country is to live”), and it is kept alive by the constant veneration of a genealogy of “martyrs” who died young in struggle, notably Martí, Maceo, Mella, Guiteras, and, after 1959, Camilo Cienfuegos (a leading 1950s rebel) and Che Guevara. However, from the early republic and reflecting national self-doubt, an alternative to this cult of “heroism” was the comic figure of Liborio, reproduced repeatedly in magazines and on posters: an obtuse but wily peasant with a cunning approach to life, an innate wisdom, and an ability to fool authority. This became related to the choteo, the exaltation of Cubans’ supposed tendency to take nothing seriously and joke in the face of adversity. Conversely, however, morality has always been associated with national identity, especially through Martí, immediately after his death given the epithet el Apóstol by émigré tobacco workers who saw him as the epitome of selflessness and purity and a direct contrast to the reality of the new Cuba. As corruption became an issue, the underlying nationalist binarism between corruption and purity grew, underpinning the symbolic importance of youth in 1923, 1933, and 1953. It was resurrected after 1959, enshrined especially in the figure of the “New Man” and the 1960s’ “moral economy,” and in the person of Che Guevara after 1967. With this powerful pantheon of symbols, a parallel argument developed in cultural circles about the most essentially “Cuban” cultural forms. According to this, a Cuban identity has long been identified with popular dance: in the late 19th century the danzón was seen as the national dance, giving way, successively, to the eastern son after 1910, then the urban rumba, despite the latter often being disparaged as a black, erotic, and crude dance form. After 1959, the rumba was rescued formally, with “rumba Saturdays” (sábados de la rumba) becoming a weekly event in Havana. Beyond music and song, the symbols of Cuban nationalism have tended to be baseball (especially after 1959), and those associated with the national emblem or flag (e.g., the royal palm and the lone star), but echoing pre-Columbian and African traditions, the indigenous ceiba tree also came to be seen as quintessentially Cuban. The Cuban shirt, the guayabera, also has nationalist significance, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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and the cigar has long symbolized national identity, given its working-class associations and the cigar-workers’ historical role.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Before 1959, national mobilization was never easy and usually suffered from partisanship and doubts about Cuba’s “true” identity and best route to genuine independence, whereas the post-1959 experience has seen mobilization become fundamental to the political process, with mass organizations and the media mobilizing thousands regularly for defense, labor, social transformation, or public support, always stressing such themes as duty, patriotism, collectivity, and defense. Each one of these mobilizations has its own militant discourse of “battles,” “campaigns,” “struggles,” “combat,” and so forth, and regular rallies (e.g., May Day or July 26) are periodic moments for renewing the collective and individual “belonging” to the national project. Given this, post-1959 political life has seen the steady fusion of the notions of pátria (or nación) and Revolución, in both official discourse and popular parlance. This is the result of decades of socialization through mass organizations, schooling, collective labor, and, especially, by painting U.S. opposition as a threat to the pátria; the continuation of that opposition has thus been critical to popular nationalism, reinforced by continuing Cuban resistance, and also by more mundane issues such as sporting success and by the post-1975 successes of “internationalism,” especially in Angola. Unlike after independence, when institutional and monumental nationbuilding was slow, the institutionalization of the post-1934 “Second Republic” began under Batista; this included his vainglorious and ambitious plans for a new Havana, including a civic center that, apart from a few buildings and the modernist Martí monument, remained incomplete in 1958. Inevitably, in 1959, a new wave of monumentalization emerged, stressing the revolution’s Cuban roots but also borrowing heroic styles from Eastern Europe. Over the whole period being described, the nationally celebrated days tended to be the obvious ones: before 1959, October 10 (Grito de Yara) and May 20 (independence) were consensually important, while after 1959, the latter was downgraded (since the 1902–1958 independence was now questionable) and replaced by January 1 (the “triumph of the revolution”), July 26 (now the real national day) and May 1, which, although increasingly celebrated as the international workers’ day as Socialist Bloc links grew, became a largely patriotic celebration. Days associated with Martí have also long been significant: on January 28 (Martí’s birth), the student torch-lit march commemorates the 1953 demonstration that spawned the rebel movement, and May 19 (Martí’s death) sees processions to a “shrine” (the Fragua) in Havana or at Dos Ríos. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The failure between 1902 and 1958 to construct a strong state and a legitimate sense of “nation” ultimately ensured political polarization and the success of the 1959 revolution. It also meant that, after 1959, with the departure of the elite and the middle class and with Cuba’s increasing isolation, a tabula rasa was created for the revolutionary regime, which now used nationalism to construct a defensive unity and a historical rationale. Hence, the creation of a single ruling party was presented as a logical and patriotic continuation of Martí’s 1892–1898 PRC and a necessary act of wartime national unity. Building a nation, of course, also meant building a distinct external identity. Between 1934 and 1960, Cuba’s foreign policy was inevitably closely aligned with U.S. policy: Cuba sided with the Allies in World War II and with the West during the Cold War, joining the Organization of American States (OAS) and suppressing the Communist Party (PSP). After 1960, Cuba shifted toward the Soviet Union. Expulsion from the OAS in 1962 ensured regional isolation (apart from Mexico), but with security from invasion guaranteed (under the secret protocol to the October 1962 U.S.-Soviet agreement) and with rapid disillusionment with Moscow, a more independent foreign policy was adopted after 1963, which meant advocating armed revolution in Latin America, defying both U.S. “imperialism” and Soviet policies of “peaceful coexistence,” and becoming the spearhead of what was seen as the regional antiimperialist revolution by financing, arming, and training “national liberation” guerrilla groups. This independence was still evident after 1975, when established links led the Cubans to defend the new Angolan government against a South African invasion, eventually defeating South African troops in 1988. This was part of a wider policy of seeking leverage through leadership of the Third World, leading to the “internationalism” of 1975–1989 (sending people and aid to over 40 countries) and Castro’s 1979 election as head of the nonaligned movement. In conclusion, after almost two decades of a more “Sovietized” system and ideological apparatus, the traumatic and devastating economic crisis after 1991 (as the Soviet Union and the old Socialist Bloc collapsed) led to a new siege mentality and a wide political debate about what aspects of “the revolution” should and could be saved, especially as unprecedented economic reform and an opening to tourism (which now replaced sugar as the main foreign exchange earner) threatened to undermine long-held principles of equality and solidarity. One result was a noticeable shift away from the patterns of 1971–1990 and toward the more nationalist version of revolution espoused during 1959–1969, which extolled the struggles of Cuban history (and especially Martí) rather than proletarian struggle and reached out to non-Communist elements inside Cuba (including the churches) and even outside (as the pro-dialogue émigrés were again courted and brought into the fold). Instead of “people” (pueblo), the talk was now more about the nación, the “Cuban family,” and the community, and defending national sovereignty and building commercial and diplomatic alliances against the U.S. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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embargo became the key issues for foreign policy, especially because the crisis had led the United States to tighten sanctions even more. As part of this new nationalism—enhanced increasingly by the fact of survival against all the odds— the figure of Che Guevara was adopted as another national (rather than socialist) “hero,” being almost “Cubanized” as an updated version of Martí, for the younger generation. By 2000, after being legitimized by the January 1998 visit of Pope John Paul II and mobilized by a six-month popular national campaign to return a small child, Elián González, from Florida to Cuba, the Cuban leaders embarked on a new “struggle,” the “Battle of Ideas,” designed to fortify Cuba (and especially Cuban youth) against what were seen as the corrosive effects of tourism and the dollar, but also to shift the burden of national “defense” and sovereignty to a new generation. In 2006, this became especially important as, for the first time, Fidel Castro temporarily relinquished ultimate authority to his brother, Raúl Castro (first vice president). By 2008, this arrangement became permanent as Fidel resigned, ending this remarkable chapter in Cuban history. Selected Bibliography Ferrer, A. 1999. Insurgent Cuba: Race, Nation and Revolution, 1868–1898. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Fuente, A. de la. 2000. Una Nación para Todos: Raza, Desigualdad y Política en Cuba, 1900–2000. Madrid: Editorial Colibrí. Gott, R. 2004. Cuba: A New History. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Helg, A. 1995. Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886–1912. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Kapcia, A. 2000. Cuba: Island of Dreams. Oxford: Berg. Kapcia, A. 2005. Havana: The Making of Cuban Culture. Oxford: Berg. Moore, C. 1988. Cuba, the Blacks and Africa. Berkeley: Centre for Afro-American Studies, University of California. Moore, R. 1997. Nationalising Blackness: Afrocubanismo and Artistic Revolution in Havana, 1920–1940. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Pérez, L. 1988. Cuba: Between Reform and Revolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pérez, L. 1999. On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture. New York: Ecco Press. Thomas, H. 1971. Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode.


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Québec James Kennedy Chronology 1534 1603 1759 1763 1774 1790 1837 1840 1867 1899 1914 1917 1939 1942 1944 1945 1960 1963 1967 1970

1976 1977 1980 1990 1992 1994 1995 2000 2003

Jacques Cartier’s first voyage to the Saint Lawrence, from which dates New France. Samuel de Champlain’s first voyage to the Saint Lawrence. Québec City falls to British forces. Treaty of Paris brings an end to the Seven Years’ War between Britain and France, and formerly transfers New France to British rule. The Québec Act recognizes the Catholic Church, the Civil Code, and seigneurialism. The Constitution Act divides Québec into Upper and Lower Canada. Patriote rebellion in Lower Canada (Québec). The Union Act unites Canada East (Québec) and Canada West (Ontario). The Canadian Confederation forms, initially comprises Québec, Ontario, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. Outbreak of the South African War. Outbreak of World War I. Conscription Crisis I: conscription was imposed in August; in March 1918, an anticonscription riot broke out in Québec City in which five civilians were killed by the military. Outbreak of World War II. Conscription Crisis II: the referendum on conscription is opposed by 72 percent in Québec (85 percent among francophones) and supported by 79 percent outside Québec. Conscription imposed. Union Nationale provincial government elected, remains in power until 1960. The Liberal provincial government is elected; led by Jean Lesage, it ushers in the period known as the “Quiet Revolution.” Nationalization of Hydro-Québec. Controversial visit by French president Charles de Gaulle, during which he declares “Vive le Québec libre!” (“Long live free Québec!”). Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnaps the British consul James Cross and the Québec minister Pierre Laporte. Laporte is murdered following the introduction of the War Measures Act by the federal government. The first Parti Québécois (PQ) provincial government is elected. Bill 101 passed, introduces a range of measures to stabilize French language use in Québec. The first referendum on sovereignty is defeated by 59.6 to 40.4 percent. Meech Lake Accord is agreed upon; later, it is not ratified by Manitoba and Newfoundland. Referendum on the Charlottetown Agreement is defeated by 55.4 to 42.4 percent in Québec (and by 54.4 to 44.6 percent in Canada). Bloc Québécois, led by Lucien Bouchard, becomes the official federal opposition. The second referendum on sovereignty is defeated by 50.1 to 49.9 percent. The Clarity Act is passed by the federal government, introducing a series of obstacles for a future Québec referendum. There is a “sponsorship scandal” in which federal government funds, intended to bolster the image of Canada in Québec, are misused by the federal Liberal Party in Québec.


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Situating the Nation Despite the establishment of the 16th-century French colony of “New France” on territory occupied by the Canadian province of Québec, “Québécois nationalism” only emerged in the 20th century, that is, a nationalism centered on Québec making political and cultural claims on behalf of “la nation québécoise.” However, 19th-century precursors can be identified in the form of Canadien or “French Canadian” nationalism. In 1837, Louis-Joseph Papineau led the Patriotes’ rebellion in Lower Canada and a further rebellion broke out in 1838. The rebellions were a response to the marginal position of the majority French Canadians within the political structure that dominated the legislature yet were excluded from the executive branch and power. The Durham Report on the causes of the rebellions placed the blame on the existence of “two nations warring within the bosom of a single state,” and recommended French Canadian assimilation. However, the resulting Union government established an informal consociational arrangement between Canada East (Québec) and Canada West (Ontario), in which power was effectively shared between French and English Canadians. French Canadian interests were thereby secured. With Confederation in 1867, Canada grew to include not only Québec and Ontario but also Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, implementing a new federal structure. Former dependencies of British North America joined the Confederation over subsequent decades. The Québec politician, George-Etienne Cartier, viewed the Confederation as an opportunity for the expansion of French Canadian interests through Canada’s westward expansion. However, Québec’s misgivings were already in evidence with the formation of Honoré Mercier’s Parti

New France New France was established in 1534, making a French claim to North America. Its subsequent settlement mirrored the social organization of European feudalism. While the fur trade initially led its early economy, following a period of settlement in which indigenous peoples were displaced, particularly the Huron in the Saint Lawrence Valley, seigneurialism dominated. The king of France owned the land; landlords or seigneurs controlled a piece of land, a seigneury, which was then subdivided and rented to censitaires. This was a relatively static society that did not permit the sort of social communication necessary for the emergence of a modern nation. In this regard a modern nation had yet to be established, and would only develop under British rule, for New France fell to Britain in 1760 during the Seven Years’ War between France and Britain. Following the conquest, French Catholics were initially excluded from political office. However, with growing unrest among its American colonies, Britain sought to secure the loyalty of its Catholic French minority. It did so through the Québec Act of 1774 in which the Catholic Church and the Civil Code were recognized, and the continuation of seigneurialism tolerated.


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National, a provincial political party that brought together Liberals and dissident Conservatives in opposition to the execution of Louis Riel, leader of the Métis rebellions of 1869–1870 and 1884–1885. Riel, who was part French Canadian, had sought to preserve the Métis and the native traditional nomadic way of life from the incursions of the Canadian drive westwards. Mercier’s party was elected in 1896, becoming the first administration to espouse a conservative French Catholic nationalism. In the early 20th century, Henri Bourassa, grandson of Papineau, and a group of like-minded Nationalistes railed against the British imperialism of that era (South African War, tariff reform, and naval rearmament) and its consequences for Canada, a dominion of the British empire. But just as importantly, they promoted a binational vision of Canada, seeking to revive the consociational arrangements of the Union era throughout the new federation. However, their vision failed to garner support outside Québec, where largely as a result of mass, nonfrancophone immigration, French Canadian influence had been significantly reduced. This was demonstrated by the virtual eradication of schooling in French outside Québec. Québec’s isolation, as the only French-speaking province, was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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accentuated by the imposition of conscription in 1917 during World War I, despite its opposition to compulsory drafting. The failure of pan-Canadian nationalism allowed a Québec-centered version to develop. Hitherto it had been relatively marginal, associated with those such as Jules-Paul Tardivel. However, it was the priest and historian, Abbé Lionel Groulx, who transformed nationalism in the interwar era. His groups, Action Française and later Action Nationale, promoted a Québec-centered nationalism that was both conservative and Catholic in character. These groups remained largely outside of politics. This conservative nationalism took a political form in Maurice Duplessis’s provincial political party, the Union Nationale, formed in 1935. It received a political boost in 1944 when during World War II the federal government imposed conscription on a reluctant province, this time contrary to Québec’s wishes in a 1942 Canada-wide referendum. The Union Nationale dominated Québec politics through the 1950s. Duplessis’s administration was notorious for its political corruption and its willingness to accede to the wishes of big business while rejecting participation in federal social programs on the pretext of defending “provincial autonomy.” This is a period frequently referred to as le grand noirceau (“the great darkness”). However, this descriptor underplays the degree to which there was also an undercurrent of change. These years were, in the federal Liberal politician Gerard Pelletier’s words, “years of impatience,” which ultimately led to the electoral triumph of the provincial Québec Liberal Party, led by Jean Lesage, in 1960—a period known as the “Quiet Revolution.” This was a period marked by “rising expectations” among the population as a whole, but especially among its political elite. The Parti Québécois (PQ) was formed in 1968 by René Lévesque, a merger of his Mouvement Souveraineté-Association (MSA) and the right-wing Ralliement national (RN); the left-wing Rassemblement pour l’indépendance nationale (RIN) dissolved and joined the new party. The PQ provided an umbrella for a range of social movements that emerged in this era: women’s, students’, gay, and ecology movements, as well as the radicalized trade

Quiet Revolution There is some controversy over the dating of the period known as the “Quiet Revolution,” though generally there is agreement that it began with the provincial Liberal governments of 1960–1966 headed by Jean Lesage. It was characterized, above all, by the intervention of the Québec provincial state, officially replacing the Catholic Church in education, health, and social welfare. This was the chief means by which the Lesage government sought to achieve ratrappage (“catch-up”) with the rest of Canada and the developed West. The growing role of the state was exemplified by the nationalization of HydroQuébec, navigated by the dynamic energy minister René Lévesque under the banner maîtres chez nous (literally, “masters in our own house”). This period exemplifies the development of “welfare state nationalism,” itself a nation-building strategy.


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René Lévesque, founder of the sovereignist Parti Québécois (PQ) and Québec’s prime minister (1976–1985). (Bettmann/Corbis)

union movement. However, nationalism in this era also had an ugly and violent side. The Marxist Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) was responsible for a series of bombings and, in October 1970, the kidnapping of the British consul in Montréal, James Cross, and the kidnap and murder of the Québec government minister, Pierre Laporte. This is bitter irony given that Laporte had been a forceful proponent of the reforms ushered in during the Quiet Revolution. The federal government briefly imposed martial law during the “October Crisis.” In 1976, the PQ assumed power for the first time. The PQ pursued a social democratic program that extended the Québec state’s welfare provision. Its nationalist agenda was focused on the introduction of language legislation (see “Mobilizing and Building the Nation” section) and a referendum in 1980, asking for a mandate to negotiate “sovereignty-association,” in which Québec would be politically independent but economically integrated with Canada. The referendum was resoundingly defeated—“à la prochain fois” (“until the next time”) declared Lévesque. Despite this defeat, the PQ was reelected in 1981 with an increased majority. In 1982, the federal Canadian government, under Pierre Trudeau, sought to repatriate the Canadian Constitution, until then an act of the Westminster Parliament. However, the new Constitution was unacceptable to the PQ government and was not ratified. Thereafter, the sovereigntist movement fell into a period of demobilization. However, the combination of a revived PQ under the leadership of Jacques Parizeau and the failure of the Meech Lake Accord reinvigorated the sovereignty movement. Specifically, the Québec Liberal government led by Robert Bourassa had made five demands under which it would agree to ratify the Constitution. The most celebrated was the insistence that Québec be recognized as a “distinct N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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society.” The failure of Manitoba and Newfoundland to ratify the accord led to its collapse. This fallout gave rise to the formation of a federal sovereigntist political party, the Bloc Québécois (BQ). The Bloc was formed in 1990 by a number of conservative and liberal members of parliament in response to the defeat of the Meech Lake Accord. The charismatic Lucien Bouchard, a former Conservative government minister, became its first leader. The party became the Official Opposition in the Canadian House of Commons following the 1993 federal election. In 1992, another accord was formulated, the Charlottetown Agreement, which sought not only to appease Québec but also a range of other constituencies, including the Canadian West and the first nations. This was defeated in a Canada-wide referendum. The election of the PQ in 1994 set the scene for a second referendum on sovereignty. This took place in 1995, and following the intervention of the popular Bouchard to lead the “Yes campaign,” was only narrowly defeated. While the PQ remained in power until 2003, there was little popular appetite for constitutional reform. The Clarity Act, passed by the federal government in 2000 in an attempt to place constitutional hurdles in the way of Québec sovereigntists, failed to ignite Québécois nationalism; however, the 2003 revelations surrounding federal Liberal Party corruption in Québec briefly did.

Instituting the Nation Historically, the Catholic Church and the Civil Code have been key institutional markers of Québec’s distinctiveness. Th e Catholic Church dominated Québec society, particularly following the defeat of the Patriotes in the 1840s to the 1930s; thereafter it fell into decline. This period of decline allowed for a genuinely secular civil society to emerge through the 1950s and 1960s. During the Quiet Revolution, the Québec state officially replaced the church as the provider of education and welfare and became the key Québécois institution. It subsequently amassed a range of powers, including immigration and pensions—powers unmatched by other Canadian provinces or other substates in the developed West. State-owned Hydro-Québec epitomized the power of the new Québec state. Symbolically, its Montréal headquarters also houses the Montréal office of the Québec premier. Québec’s significant public sector has a particularly vociferous trade union movement to represent it. Among them, the Confédération des Syndicaux Nationaux (CSN) has been among the most prominent supporters of sovereignty. In addition, the cooperative movement, the Mouvement Desjardins, and its credit union, the Caisses Populaires, have been hugely successful, enjoying unrivaled (in North America) penetration of Québec’s banking sector. The social carriers of nationalism in Québec reflected these distinctive institutions. In the early 19th century, it was urban middle-class professionals, such as the lawyer Papineau, who led the Patriotes. It was middle-class professionals, N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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with careers in politics and journalism, who were prominent among the Nationalistes. The sociologist Hubert Guindon suggested that it was the emergence of a “new middle class,” the creation of postwar state expansion, which accounted for both the Quiet Revolution and the rise of the PQ. While it was certainly the case that provincial public sector employees in Québec disproportionately supported the PQ and sovereignty, a “new middle class” was established too late to explain these developments. The PQ leadership remained reflective of the professional middle class. Québécois nationalism was only exclusively a cultural project in the interwar years. Thereafter, it has sought specific political objectives whether in the form of “autonomy” or “sovereignty-association.” However, the “cultural ideal” on which Québécois nationalism was based has been reinterpreted. Interwar nationalism, inspired by Lionel Groulx, was exclusive and ethnically based—only those with French ancestry properly belonged—however, a more open, civic nationalism, which still imposes requirements on membership, notably language, has largely superseded this earlier form of nationalism.

Defining the Nation Language and religion have been the chief markers around which French Canadian and later Québécois national identities have formed. Both were based on a consciousness that French Canadians and later the Québécois constituted a religious and linguistic minority not only of the Canadian population but also among the wider North American population. The changing appellations “Canadien,” “Canadien Français” and “Québécois” reflected the changing cultural and political space delimited by these conceptions of nation. In the early 19th century, French speakers in Lower Canada were defined as “Canadien.” Papineau’s party initially was called the Parti Canadien and sought to represent the interests of French speakers. However, with the expansion of political space following Confederation in 1867, the Nationalistes in the early 20th century sought to promote a French Canadian nation beyond Québec. This meant embracing existing French-speaking communities in Ontario and Manitoba in the west and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia in the east, and promoting French settlement in the soon-to-be established provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan. The failure of the Nationalistes’s binational project meant that nationalism was once again focused on Québec. Lionel Groulx was instrumental in promoting this Québec-centered nationalism, a course followed by subsequent nationalist movements on both the political right and left. It is only from the 1960s that “Québécois” has emerged as the most popular identity among francophones. Nationalists varied in their embrace of “industrial society.” This can be grasped by reviewing the key 20th-century nationalist figures. Henri Bourassa N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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was ambivalent: he wrestled with reconciling the benefits of industrialism with the moral Catholic order. Lionel Groulx was outright hostile. Groulx shared with his contemporary nationalists, Eamon de Valera in Ireland and Sabino Arena y Goiri in the Basque Country, a desire to maintain Catholic rural society against the onslaught of industrial society. While Duplessis’s rhetoric romanticized rurality and religion, he nevertheless oversaw the relatively rapid postwar industrialization of Québec. In contrast, Lévesque’s neonationalism wholeheartedly embraced modernity and was avowedly secular in its orientation. Moreover, PQ rhetoric emphasized its embrace of continental economic integration, arguing that Québec could be independent within the U.S.-Canada Trade Agreement of 1989, and later with the inclusion of Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). These treaties were more popular in Québec than elsewhere in Canada.

Narrating the Nation Québécois historians played an influential role in depicting New France as a “golden age” brought to a premature end by the trauma of “the Conquest.” This nationalist school of thought was popularized in the writings of Lionel Groulx at the Université de Montréal, and was continued by Maurice Séguin. Groulx and Action Française used history explicitly for nationalist purposes. For example, they promoted Dollard des Ormeaux as a hero of New France whose exploits should be celebrated (a public holiday still exists in Québec that bears his name). Yet as Trofimenkoff noted, “Dollard belonged less to history than to the Action Française. Dollard portrayed all the traits that the Action Française advocated for young French Canadians: he was religious, strong, brave, dominant, patriotic and self-sacrificing.” In 1948, Québec acquired its own flag: the Fleurdelisé. The flag is a white cross with an azure background with four fleurs-de-lis in each of the four quarters. The cross and fleurs-de-lis are taken from French heraldry, though are white rather than gold, symbolizing religious purity. The flag’s religious overtones reflect the imprint of Duplessis and Groulx who were instrumental in its development. This dominant conservative nationalism was challenged in the 1960s and 1970s by a period of cultural ferment, in music, theater, and film. Many of the francophone artists of this era not only identified themselves as Québécois but also championed the sovereigntist cause. Among its number were the playwright Michel Tremblay, the theater director Robert Lapage, and the filmmaker Denys Arcand. These works used distinctly urban Québécois idioms to comment critically not only on Québécois society, its traditionalism and religiosity, but also to make a more general comment on the modern human condition. Tremblay’s use of the working-class dialect, joual, is particularly notable. The singersongwriter or chansonnier Gilles Vigneault’s “Gens de pays” has become an N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The “Two Solitudes” (the flags of Canada and Québec) fly side by side in Montreal. (iStock Photo.com)


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unofficial national anthem. However, contemporary francophone artists such as Céline Dion and Cirque du Soleil, with an appeal beyond Québec, have remained outside of the constitutional debate. Anglophone and allophone artists have varied in their response: the singer Leonard Cohen has remained aloof from the debate, while the late novelist Mordecai Richler was a vociferous opponent of Québécois nationalism.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation Media plays an important role in reproducing a sense of nationhood in Québec, not necessarily in an overt “hot” way but rather in a “banal” everyday way. Both French-language print and television media have provided its francophone audience with a “national” lens through which to view the rest of Canada and the outside world. This applies as much to the broadcast media—notably the public funded Radio-Canada, the French counterpart to the English-speaking CBC—as it does to the print media, particularly the mass circulation tabloid Le Journal de Montréal and the broadsheet La Presse. Le Devoir remains the newspaper most identified with the nationalist cause; founded by Henri Bourassa in 1910, it was initially characterized by a conservative Catholic nationalism. In the 1960s, it adopted a campaigning journalism, and its editors have included the future Liberal premier Claude Ryan. As the medium of communication, the French language is crucial here. Since the abrupt decline of Catholicism, language has become the key national marker. Since the 1960s, a series of provincial laws have sought to both elevate the status of the French language in Québec and maintain its demographic position. The most famous remains the “Chartre de la langue française,” or “Bill 101,” passed by the PQ in 1977. Its main provisions concerned the restriction of English-language schooling so that immigrant children would be compelled to be educated in French, establishing French as the language of business, the professions, and government, and promoting a French public face for Québec by ensuring that public signs were preponderantly French. Bills 86 and 178 have since amended Bill 101. Language laws have been successful: they have both stabilized the demographic proportion of francophones in Québec and raised the status of the French language. However, they have been highly contentious, particularly among Québec’s minority anglophone and allophone populations concentrated in the Montréal municipal area. In 1989, the Equality Party, established in response to the provincial Liberal government’s failure to amend its language laws, had some success in that year’s provincial election, electing four members of Québec’s National Assembly in anglophone ridings, and achieving 4 percent of the overall vote. More generally, Québec has had a varying degree of success at the integration of its immigrant population. It has developed a policy of “interculturalism,” which N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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sought to promote the equality of ethnic groups within Québec. The independence movement, too, has had only partial success in attracting support from its ethnic minority populations: the greatest success has been among such francophone groups as Haitians and Vietnamese. Parizeau’s now infamous outburst immediately following the 1995 referendum defeat in which he blamed “money and the ethnic vote” did little to improve relations. However, since then there has been a concerted effort by sovereigntists to broaden their appeal. For example, the annual fête national organized by the nationalist Societé Saint-Jean-Baptiste has sought to include the range of cultural communities found in Québec. This was an attempt to broaden belonging beyond the pur laine (literally, “pure wool”), those who can trace their ancestry to the original settlers of New France. Québec’s relations with its indigenous peoples or first nations have been fraught. The most noted events concerned the expansion of a golf course on a Mohawk burial ground that led to the Oka Crisis in 1990, in which a Québec police officer died, and Cree opposition to Hydro-Québec’s James Bay development in northern Québec. In many ways, first-nation nationalism in Québec and Canada has sought to replicate Québécois nationalism’s own demand for sovereignty. This overview of the development of Québécois nationalism has highlighted its modernity. In large part, it is political events, instigated by the Canadian state, that explain its strength at particular moments, notably the imposition of conscription in 1917 and 1944 and the failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord in the late 1980s. Yet its character has changed, from one suspicious of modernity to one that embraces modernity, from one exclusive and ethnic to one inclusive and civic. National symbols have reflected this change; religious symbols in particular have been demoted.

Selected Bibliography Behiels, M. D. 1985. Prelude to Québec’s Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945–1960. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Coleman, W. D. 1984. The Independence Movement in Québec, 1945–1980. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Gagnon, A. G. 2004. Québec: State and Society. 3rd ed. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press. Greer, A. 1993. The Patriots and the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in Rural Lower Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Kennedy, J. 2004. “‘A Switzerland of the North?’ The Nationalistes and a Bi-National Canada.” Nations and Nationalism 10, no. 4: 499–518. Kymlicka, W. 1998. Finding Our Way. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Linteau, P.-A., R. Durocher, J. C. Robert, and F. Ricard. 1989. Histoire du Québec contemporain, tomes I et II. Montréal: Boréal. [English edition available.] McEwen, N. 2006. Nationalism and the State: Welfare and Identity in Scotland and Québec. Brussels: P. I. E.-Peter Lang. McRoberts, K. 1997. Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity. Toronto: Oxford University Press.


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Pinard, M. 2005. “Political Ambivalence Towards the Parti Québécois and Its Electoral Consequences, 1970–2003.” Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 30, no. 3: 281–314. Quinn, H. F. 1979. The Union Nationale: Québec Nationalism from Duplessis to Lévesque. Enlarged Edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Taylor, C. 1993. Reconciling the Solitudes. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press. Trofimenkoff, S. M. 1975. Action Française: French Canadian Nationalism in the Twenties. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.


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United States Melanie E. L. Bush and Roderick D. Bush Chronology 1945 The term “Cold War” is instituted to describe the tense relationship between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 1947 The Truman Doctrine initiates U.S. policy to support nations opposing communism. 1950 U.S. troops are sent to South Korea. The Korean War ends in 1953, leaving 3 million people dead. 1954 (May 17) The Supreme Court rules in Brown v. Board of Education that racial segregation in public schools is unconstitutional. 1955 United States begins sending financial aid to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. 1959 (January) Alaska and (August) Hawaii are admitted as the 49th and 50th states. 1962 The United States planned and funded the attempt to overthrow the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. 1963 Civil rights demonstrators (200,000) march in Washington DC in support of the Civil Rights Act. Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. delivers “I Have a Dream” speech. 1964 The Civil Rights Act requires integration of public accommodations and prohibits job discrimination; the National Voting Rights Act outlaws literacy requirements in voting. 1965 Immigration and Nationality (Hart-Cellar) Act of 1965 abolishes national-origin quotas. 1968 (August) Massive antiwar demonstrations occur at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Protesters were beaten and arrested. 1974 (August 8) After the House Judiciary Committee recommends impeachment based on the “Watergate Affair,” Richard Nixon becomes the first president to resign office. 1975 (April) The war in Vietnam ends claiming 6.56 million Southeast Asian and over 58,000 U.S. lives. 1981 (July 29) Tax cuts are approved, shifting funds away from social services; President Ronald Reagan fires air traffic controllers and decertifies the union for striking. 1982 Congress deregulates the banking industry and lifts controls on airfares. 1984 The World Court calls upon the United States to “cease and refrain” from the “unlawful use of force” against the government of Nicaragua. The term “collateral damage” is coined for civilian deaths. 1986 Iran-Contra Affair exposes that profit from Iranian arms sales were diverted to Nicaraguan contras. 1991 U.S., Western, and Arab forces eject Iraq from Kuwait by force. The Gulf War begins. (December 31) The Cold War ends as the Soviet Union dissolves. 1993 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) passes in Congress and eliminates trade barriers between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. 2000 (December) The Supreme Court rules (5 to 4) on the Florida recount that Republican candidate George W. Bush is the 43rd president with a majority of the electoral votes but not the popular vote. 2001 (September 11) Attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The United States retaliates by bombing Afghanistan and overthrowing the Taliban government.


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2003 The United States invades Iraq. 2005 (August 29) The levees break in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, leading to at least 1,836 deaths and massive dislocation of the population, the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history. 2006 Study reported in the Lancet estimates the number of Iraqi deaths due to the U.S. invasion is close to 654,965, though the meaning of this is contested by forces supporting the war. The death toll of U.S. soldiers reaches 3,106. The election marks a significant increase of Democrats and decrease of Republicans in both the Senate and the House of Representatives and shifts control to Democrats for the first time in a dozen years. 2007 Nancy Pelosi becomes the first woman Speaker of the United States House of Representatives. Key leaders of antigay legislation are revealed to have been involved in homosexual activities.

Situating the Nation From its establishment out of the settler colonies of British North America, the United States of America occupied a unique position among nations as a new start for Europeans, because opportunities were collectively much greater than they had been in their homelands. And while this new nation expanded possibilities for some, it did not do so for all. From the displacement and decimation of Native Americans, the enslavement of Africans, the conquest of Mexican territory and relegation of her people to a subordinate role in the economy and society, and the import of Chinese people as cheap and degraded labor to build the transcontinental railroad, the nation was born of and grew out of this embedded contrast. The United States has been a Euro-centered and white-dominated nation for most of its history, but with the rise of the nation to international preeminence in the 20th century, it began to cast off what had become the albatross of racism and create an image of U.S. society as a multiracial democracy. The modern civil rights movement emerged during the period of easy accumulation within the world economy after World War II, which enhanced the bargaining power of the working classes (throughout the core world-economy zones) whose social struggles ultimately allowed them to forge a new social compact within the pan-European world, the social democratic welfare state. The New Deal was an expression of this social compact and initiated social policies based on the idea of collective responsibility for the common good. The coincidence of this period of economic expansion with the rise of the United States to a hegemonic position in the world economy (the so-called American Century, coined by Time Magazine magnate Henry Luce) and the political competition between the United States and the Soviet Union created a political opening that was favorable to the elevation of the social position of blacks and similarly “disadvantaged” groups in U.S. society. Although the 1930s would be a period of incorporation of white ethnics into the mainstream of the U.S. body politic, African Americans continued to be N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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treated as second-class citizens. This was problematic as the nation entered into the global struggle against fascism, a struggle for democracy and against racism. This was also a period in which the United States emerged increasingly as the most powerful economic, military, political, and cultural power within the world system. As a contender for hegemonic status within the world system, the United States could no longer afford the isolationist and insular culture of the upstart new entity on the block. It had to think seriously about its appeal as a global leader and, thus, of how it looked to the rest of the world. In the context of a struggle against fascism abroad and racism at home, it was clear that the second-class status of the black population had to be remedied. This set the stage for massive changes in legislation and reforms leading to desegregation and the liberalization of immigration policies, and it culminated in the historic Brown v. Board of Education, an event that is generally taken as the official beginning of the modern civil rights era. Racial exclusion had been deeply interwoven into the fabric of U.S. law and society as the nation entered the 1940s. Scholars such as W. E. B. Du Bois, C. L. R. James, George Padmore, along with Oliver Cox, viewed fascism as a logical development of Western civilization, with slavery and imperialism rooted not only in capitalist political economy but racist ideologies that were already in place in the very origins of the modern world system.

The March on Washington DC on August 28, 1963, called for equal rights, integrated schools, decent housing, jobs, and an end to racial inequality. (Library of Congress)


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Henry Wallace (former vice president under Franklin D. Roosevelt and Progressive Party candidate for president in 1948) and the intellectuals associated with him at such periodicals as Common Ground, The Nation, and The New Republic claimed the 1900s to be the Century of the Common Man, or the People’s Century. Angelo Herndon and Ralph Ellison, the editors of The Negro Quarterly, a leading voice of the Black Popular Front, argued that if in fact the U.S. government stood for the common man that the administration would have to provide more convincing proof, particularly for minorities. They held that the strategic goal of U.S. blacks should be the struggle for human rights against domestic racism and imperialism, and in alliance with the “common man.” When this stance is considered alongside of the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, the social uprisings within most European countries, and anticolonial struggles around the globe, the parameters of the imperial project of the American Century had to be set both internationally and domestically. The Truman administration advocated a more limited version of civil rights and won an alliance with centrist liberals within the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which expelled the scholar W. E. B Du Bois from the organization, deeming that his positions were too extreme. Consequently, the civil rights movement that emerged in the next decade, seeking only assimilation and acceptance into U.S. society, was a component of the American Century.

Instituting the Nation By the post–World War II era, the United States was firmly established as a nation and as the dominant state within the world system whose economic and military power far outstripped that of any other state. However, the rise of the socialist states and decolonization of the globe posed formidable political challenges in the international realm. The impending question was where it would be positioned in the global hierarchy of nations. This open question was epitomized internationally by the Cold War struggle with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and domestically through what became known as the “McCarthy era” that sought to minimize dissent within the nation and define loyalty and patriotism as incompatible with communist allegiance. The Truman Doctrine provided support for political forces opposing communism and sought allies around the globe. U.S. participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) linked the United States and West European countries against the “threat” of the Communist Bloc. Despite this, the period of 1945–1972 was characterized by a whole range of social movements that sought profound transformation in the structure of U.S. society. In particular, the 1960s is sometimes known as a Second Reconstruction era, during which the civil rights movement, Black Panther Party, Young Lords, N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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American Indian movement, Feminist movement, Poor Peoples and Welfare Rights movements, Gay Liberation movement, and major labor union organizing demanded the inclusion of those populations previously marginalized within U.S. society. The stakes were high as people in the government and positions of power, such as Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) director J. Edgar Hoover, understood that the future direction of the society was being questioned by the broad masses of people. Ultimately, a program entitled “COINTELPRO” was established to undermine the power of these movements. Landmark legislation, such as Brown v. Board of Education, the Voting Rights Act, and the Civil Rights Act outlawed Jim Crow segregation. The federal government was called upon to take a stand about whether the United States was truly a nation where “all men are created equal.” Congress passed Title IX Legislation in 1972 outlawing discrimination against women. The Hart-Cellar Act opened the doors for increased immigration by removing national-origin quotas. The American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, along with many unions, gained strength by representing working people during this period. The war in Vietnam and in Cambodia became a significant issue related to the contestation about the meaning of U.S. nationalism. While the antiwar movement built slowly through this era, the GI movement ultimately played a critical role in ending that military invasion. At the beginning of the Vietnam War, to be patriotic was to support the bombing of Southeast Asia to protect the world from the domino effect of communism. By the mid-1970s, the definition expanded to include war resisters and protesters of all sorts. By the 1980s, the rightward shift took firm hold on U.S. politics. Labor movements were under attack, the tax base shifted away from the corporations and toward the general population, and regulations were adjusted to maximize profit. Ultimately, by the turn of the century, several million jobs were eliminated, particularly in manufacturing.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. is often identified as the greatest leader of the 20th century. He played a critical role within the civil rights movement, as a galvanizing thinker and speaker. Responsible for the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963 along with a coalition of activists, he is well known for his famous “I Have a Dream” speech as well as his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” in which he castigated liberals who want justice without struggle and call for patience and going slow in pushing for social change. In 1964, King became the youngest man to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize; he was assassinated on April 4, 1968, while in Memphis, Tennessee, in support of the black sanitation workers. He was known for his staunch opposition to the war in Vietnam and called for the people of the United States to unite with the “barefoot people of the world.” King believed that the United States was the most violent country in the world and sought to challenge the triple evils of militarism, racism, and economic inequality.


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Throughout this period, the United States was engaged in multiple military interventions, firmly rooting its imperial power around the globe. These interventions included involvement in the invasions or coups of Iran, Guatemala, Chile, Nicaragua, Grenada, the Gulf region (particularly Iraq) and Afghanistan, and others. These occurred most often without public consensus, however, and have been consistently used as a means to provide funds for corporate entities involved in war, thereby strengthening the military and soliciting unquestioning loyalty from the peoples of the United States in support of foreign policy. The nation was portrayed as benevolent saviors, the epitome of democracy and standing up for everyone’s freedom. That philosophical and cultural framing created and reinforced the cooperation of the broad masses of people and provided a raison d’être for the U.S. nation.

Defining the Nation The post–World War II period was one of economic expansion and upward mobility, in particular for people of European descent. The GI Bill provided educational opportunities for veterans returning from the war. Communities such as Levittown on Long Island, New York, were constructed to facilitate mass migration from urban areas, and the Federal Housing Act provided low-interest loans. These developments offered upward mobility almost exclusively to whites. In cities, large housing projects were constructed and highways erected, distancing black communities from resources and jobs. The 1960s was an era of struggle and contestation about how the United States would self-define as a nation, and who in fact was to be included in the “American Dream.” The Labor movement, Poor Peoples movement, and Welfare Rights Organization articulated demands along class lines; the civil rights movement and such organizations as the Black Panthers, Young Lords, Brown Berets, Crusade for Justice, and the Young Patriots addressed issues of white supremacy and represented the interests of marginalized and subordinated racial and ethnic communities. The Student movement, Antiwar and GI movement, Feminist movement, and others put pressures that led to legislation, programs, and policies and that called upon the “Great Society” to live up to its rhetoric of equality. Opportunity and access expanded as did income and wealth for large numbers of people. The balance of power swung toward support for a society that cared about the common good. In the late 1960s, a movement led by scholars of color, in particular, demanded that the educational system better represent the society and that it specifically provide education relevant to previously excluded populations. These were often insurgent movements that aligned with the democratic movements mentioned above and radicalized large sectors of the academy. The liberal establishment was N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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American Dream The idea of the American Dream emerged post–World War II expressing the notion that immigrants can arrive to the United States penniless and get rich through hard work. This central pillar of the social ideology of U.S. society insists that all Americans can achieve material success. For many, this was the case as rapid industrial growth and expanding global power initially provided jobs, the Federal Housing Act provided access to suburban homes, and the GI Bill opened the door to higher education. These rewards, however, were disparately distributed so that access to the “Dream” has been differentially achieved. This notion of infinite possibilities for those who work hard provides justification to work without questioning the structure of society, because the reason for inequality and for lack of success is deemed a weakness of the individual.

challenged as the reforms of the 1970s, generational shifts, and the much more repressive atmosphere of the 1980s led to the expression of needs in the form of a less-confrontational demand for multiculturalism, and then a more moderate demand for diversity. This included the movement for curricular reform and transformation within all levels of the educational system. However, this perspective has continuously been contested as the more traditional view asserted that multiculturalism represents “special interests.” Another key struggle in the defining of the nation during the second half of the 20th century was related to the massive waves of immigration that occurred after the legislative changes in 1965, and especially in the 1990s. This shifted national demography as large numbers of people from Latin America, the Caribbean, and Asia came to the United States. Because the economic situation became increasingly difficult for poor, working, and middle-class citizens, the presence of these immigrants emerged as an easy scapegoat for their troubles. Major controversies occurred about whether legislation needed to be more restrictive or supportive. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, political and ideological trends caused many tensions. The far right and religious right were initially mobilized in the 1960s as a response to the calls for radical transformation in U.S. society. They came to greatest power, however, toward the 2000 election, where they lobbied strongly for Republican candidates. While the United States and the core states of Western Europe had been called liberal democracies, by this period, the concepts of liberalism and democracy became detached from each other. This began in 1988 when George H. W. Bush branded a democratic presidential candidate as a card-carrying member of the American Civil Liberties Union and has continued in George W. Bush’s pursuit of a neoconservative inspired campaign to “spread democracy” to the “dark corners” of the Earth by preemptive warfare. The dominance of this political environment was also evident in government actions after Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, when not only were warnings of catasN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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American or United Statesian? Given that the Americas include over 20 countries in addition to the United States, “American” as equated with the peoples of the United States is deemed by some to be a narrow and arrogant expression. While some may assert that this is semantic, others feel that the use of “United Statesian” is more appropriate. This issue has been raised most primarily by peoples from Canada and Latin America who articulate that the use of “American” reinforces their marginalization and is actually an expression of power.

trophe not heeded, but the breaking of the levees and the destruction of so much of New Orleans that precipitated a massive migration from the city laid bare the vast inequalities of wealth, particularly evident in racial terms, within the U.S. nation and despite the rhetoric of the American Dream. Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the concept of being “American” has carried significant ambiguity as it sometimes is used to refer to those born in the United States, at other times to legalized citizens of the United States, and still at other times to all peoples who inhabit the over 20 countries in the Americas. The meaning of being American shifts between something tangible (naturalization and citizenship), something unambiguous (bestowed by birth), something ambiguous (a belief system), and something transitory (a combination of any of these). For people of European descent, there is a clearer sense of belonging than for communities with tenuous acceptance. The mystification of the term “American” and its equation with someone from the United States, specifically of European descent, symbolize underlying patterns of structured inequality and naturalize these two concepts as one and the same. For many people of African descent, their marginalization within U.S. society has resulted in a detachment from a sense of national belonging. Referring to one’s self as “American” and believing that “God blessed America” provides a sense of elevated status in relationship to the rest of the world, the primary basis for the nation’s collective identity. At the same time, distinctions are made between images of “true Americans” and people of status made questionable by the ambiguous borders and margins at which they are positioned. Thus native-born blacks, Latinos, and Asians hold a tentative status as Americans, depending on circumstance. Additional distinctions often are made between generations, linguistically, and within both immigrant and native-born populations.

Narrating the Nation U.S. national formation occurred with the explicit concept of exceptionalism and destiny. From inception, the constituting documents, policies, and practices N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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invoked the notion that the United States as a nation was unique in its calling to demonstrate and implement a new form of democracy. The frameworks of “manifest destiny” and “westward expansion,” along with the rhetoric of civilizing the non-European world and exemplifying “freedom,” provided cornerstones for the very meaning of being “American” and “America.” Like the American Dream and democracy, the American flag came to symbolize the status of the United States in the global order from its years after the First Reconstruction and through World War I. Many of the symbols and rituals of patriotism that are now assumed as having always existed, actually came into being within the last century. The “Pledge of Allegiance” was written in 1891; the “Star-Spangled Banner” was taken as the national anthem in 1931. These symbols embody points of contestation, contradiction, and ambivalence about American ideals and their everyday manifestations. The ideal of the American Dream depicted routinely in all forms of discourse is that immigrants can arrive penniless and in time will get rich. This idea is a central pillar of the ideology of U.S. society prior to World War II, but it was never applied to African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans. However, the period 1945–1970 saw the increased inclusion of some strata within these formerly excluded populations. After immigration laws changed in 1965, increasing numbers of people came to the United States, just when deindustrialization began to occur. The most prominent explanations for why these groups were not upwardly mobile drew increasingly from a culture-of-poverty framework. Central tenets of the Dream revolve around the achievement of success in the forms of high income, a prestigious job, a nuclear family, a suburban lifestyle, and an economic security. The idea that this is an achievable goal for all has been built into what it means to be an American. However, over the last several decades, the wealth and income gap has significantly grown. Average annual compensation of the top 100 chief executives skyrocketed to almost 300 times the pay of the average worker. While media in the United States intermittently covers the reality of poverty rampant throughout the world, the realities of the stratification within the nation are rarely shown. It was in this way that the dire poverty revealed in New Orleans, post Hurricane Katrina, was considered shocking. The “united we stand” slogan, and “we are all in this together against the enemy” rhetoric function to obviate internal tensions and differences and to further promote the notion that America is the “greatest country in the world,” with more equality, modernity, technology, efficiency, liberty, culture, and democracy than anywhere else on the globe. The rendering invisible of structural patterns allows some flexibility in the representations of what being American means. Hence, patriotism and nationalism, with implicitly racialized ideological underpinnings, need not always be articulated. They are called upon, at such moments as those after September 11, 2001, to impose the presumptions and draw the lines between who is and who is not a trustworthy, loyal, and “true” American. N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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Mobilizing and Building the Nation After World War II, the United States emerged from a center-left alliance with France, Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics against fascist forces in Germany, Italy, and Japan. But the struggle had actually begun in 1870 when the United States and Germany were locked in fierce rivalry for succession to Britain, who had begun its slide from the heights of Pax Britannica. Both countries expanded their industrial base between 1870 and 1914 until they each surpassed Britain in industrial might. Germany tried to transform the world economy into a world empire, the “Thousand-Year Reich.” But while the kind of military conquest at the root of such empire-building had the advantage of vigor and speed, it was also expensive and united the victims of such a strategy. Since the war did not take place on U.S. territory, the United States emerged from the war as the hegemonic power in the world system. Internally, the United States had constructed a welfare state that was a governing alliance dominated by economic elites, but included the professional-managerial class, intellectuals, and organized labor. The left-led popular front played an important role in this alliance. The choice facing the nation at this time was whether they would continue with the center-left alliance that the left-wing of the New Deal led by Henry Wallace called the “Century of the Common Man,” or embark on the more frankly imperial project that Henry Luce had dubbed the “American Century” under the leadership of Harry Truman. The New Deal coalition had incorporated European ethnic groups into the nation. The Jewish American, Italian American, and Irish American ethnic groups who had formerly been viewed as distinct and “not quite white” finally were fully accepted as a part of the white race. African Americans had been partially incorporated into the nation but remained marginal throughout the nation, and were legally denied citizenship rights in the South. Puerto Ricans, Mexican Americans (Chicanos), Chinese Americans, Filipino Americans, and Japanese Americans occupied positions similar to that of African Americans, although Mexican Americans at that time were actually deemed to be white. The status of these groups was a legacy of the long period when the United States had been considered a white nation. Native Americans were the most marginal group in the nation. The emergence of the New Deal within the United States had been a part of a social compact in all of the states, with large numbers of industrial workers concentrated in the leading sectors of the economy, known as the social democratic welfare state. In the United States, this was deemed a liberal system because the strength of anticommunism would not allow such an ideologically tinged movement to become a part of the social fabric of the nation. But such compromises emerged throughout these nations to obtain social peace in countries that were often on the verge of social revolution. Labor unrest had been a significant part of the landscape in all of these countries. In the United States, there had been widespread labor strikes involving 4.6 million workers in 1946. N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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The United States used the Marshall Plan to rebuild Western Europe in the camp of the United States and in opposition to a putative workers’ state in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Anticommunism was central to the achievement of national unity in a country in which the left had been a central part of the working-class movements of the interwar period. The elaboration of anticommunism as central to the mobilization of the nation after World War II was to break the center-left alliance of World War II and to justify the repression of the left internally so that the United States would now be in a position to oppose its new competitor, the Soviet Union—a socialist state that stood at the head of an international revolutionary workers movement. This was the context in which the social democratic compromise made so much sense. While the rise of U.S. hegemony had been central to the story of the United States nation in the 20th century and dramatically affected the structuring and mobilization of U.S. nationalism, U.S. nationalism was powerfully affected by the rise of the “dark world,” which had slowly but surely, over the course of the century, pushed back against domination by the pan-European world. The world workers movement now under the leadership of the Soviet Union had changed its slogan from “workers of the world unite” to “workers and oppressed people unite,” signifying a strategy of united workers fighting for social revolution and colonized nations fighting for liberation. The United States, however, was able to distinguish itself from the European nations that had been colonial powers in many parts of the world by claiming that it too had been a product of a national liberation movement from European colonialism. But for this claim to ring true, it was necessary for the United States to eliminate the structures of de jure racism from the nation. This then was the way in which civil rights became an element of the “American Century” like the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress. Thus, in the 1960s, the “white nation” ended, and President Johnson embarked on a plan to complete the Great American Revolution via his promulgation of a Great Society. The war in Vietnam and end of the great postwar economic expansion undermined Johnson’s program, while the social base of the Second Reconstruction had expanded to encompass not the issue of race, but of gender, sexuality, and social class. The democratic forces had pressed too far; the nation had reached the limits of democracy, which caused a dramatic turn away from the social democratic compromise. The struggle for racial justice that had been central to the spread of the democratic forces within the United States was said to have ended racism in the United States, and that henceforth the quest would be for a colorblind society. This universalism was then the basis for the construction of a neoliberal project designed to not only eliminate the social democratic welfare state but also the very processes by which such a system could be envisioned. While during several decades post-1945, U.S. nationalism was shaped by the New Deal framework—one which was essentially egalitarian, pro-labor, and so on. Ronald Reagan’s policies and practices in the 1980s mark a significant shift away N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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from that conceptualization of the U.S. nation and toward the neoconservative/ neoliberal orientation that had characterized the decades up to then. This period is also characterized by the significant increase in numbers of immigrants coming to the United States, partially as a result of the earlier legislative opening but also as a consequence of the economic and political destabilization of Central and Latin America and parts of Asia. People coming into the United States have been both documented and undocumented largely seeking employment and a means to economically support themselves and their families. The numbers parallel those at the beginning of the 20th century. This reality has led to significant controversy within the U.S. population about immigration policy and just how inclusive the nation should be. This issue calls into question the portrait of the United States as a “nation of immigrants,” and the historical, political, social, and economic relationship of the nation to the globe and in particular to peoples everywhere. This issue has raised debate about what constitutes the essence and the core of the U.S. nation. The story of the U.S. nation therefore is one of democratic ideals and tremendous possibility, conceived of, applied to, and actualized for some communities but not others. Additionally, certain eras expanded opportunities, while in others they were constricted. This complex history cannot be told without recognizing the moments of significant opening to the broad masses of people that occurred as a result of struggles for equality and representation, but also the ways in which the nation has been used as a means to create and then replicate structural hierarchies both within its boundaries and globally. Selected Bibliography Bush, M. E. L. 2004. Breaking the Code of Good Intentions: Everyday Forms of Whiteness. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Bush, R. D. 1999. We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class Struggle in the American Century. New York: New York University Press. Foner, E. 1998/1990. The Story of American Freedom. New York: W. W. Norton. Gerstle, G. 2001. American Crucible: Race and Nation in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Glenn, E. N. 2002. Unequal Freedom: How Race and Gender Shaped American Citizenship and Labor. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Gonzalez, J. 2000. Harvest of Empire: A History of Latinos in America. New York: Penguin. Hochschild, J. L. 1995. Facing Up to the American Dream: Race, Class and the Soul of the Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Marable, M. 1991. Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction in Black America, 1945–1990. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. Martinez, E. 2003. De Colores: Latina Views for a Multiracial Century. Boston: South End Press. O’Leary, C. E. 1999. To Die For: The Paradox of American Patriotism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.


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Steinberg, S. 2001. The Ethnic Myth: Race, Ethnicity and Class in America. Boston: Beacon Press. Wallerstein, I. 2003. Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World. New York: New Press. Winant, H. 2001. The World Is a Ghetto: Race and Democracy since World War II. New York: Basic Books. Zinn H. 1995. A People’s History of the United States 1492–Present. New York: Harper Perennial.


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Fiji Martha Kaplan Chronology 17th and 18th centuries Fiji Islands consist of multiple chief-led kingdoms/confederations and smaller polities. 1643 Dutch navigator Abel Tasman charts the islands. 1800s Coastal Fijian kingdoms /confederations vie with each other and with the Tongan Kingdom. European and American whaling ships and ships engaged in trade with China increasingly come to Fiji. 1835 Wesleyan Methodist missionaries from London Missionary Society arrive. 1854 Cakobau, an influential high chief and self-styled “king” of Fiji, converts to Christianity, followed by the majority of Fijians. 1860s White settlers buy land and experiment with growing cotton and sugar. 1874 Cession of Fiji to Great Britain by Cakobau and other high chiefs. 1875 Sir Arthur Gordon becomes governor of Fiji. He sets in place a paternalistic system of indirect rule in which traditional and colonially chosen ethnic Fijians serve as colonial officials at the village and province level. He also sets in place Native Land commissions that survey and eventually reserve 83 percent of Fiji’s land as communally and inalienably owned by ethnic Fijian kin groups. 1878 The first Indian indentured laborers arrive. Between 1878 and 1919, departing through depots in Calcutta and later Madras, over 60,000 indentured workers from India come to Fiji to work on sugar plantations. 1882 Colonial Sugar Refining Corporation is brought in to dominate sugar refining and lead the sugar industry, becoming a monopsony in 1926. 1920 Indenture is abolished. Indo-Fijians become small-scale independent sugar cane growers on land leased from ethnic Fijians or move to the cities to various forms of salaried and wage work. 1946 Deed of Cession debate. 1947 India becomes independent. 1970 Fiji becomes independent. Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara of the Alliance Party is prime minister from 1970 to 1987; National Federation Party is the opposition party. 1973 Colonial Sugar Refining Corporation leaves Fiji; the sugar industry is nationalized. 1987 (April 12) National Federation Party–Fiji Labour Party coalition wins the national election. Labour Party leader Dr. Timoci Bavadra becomes prime minister. (May 14) Lieutenant Colonel Rabuka leads coup. 1990 New Fiji Constitution. 1997 New Fiji Constitution. 1999 (May) Fiji Labour Party wins the election and forms a coalition government. The Labour Party leader Mahendra Chaudhry becomes prime minister. 2000 (May) George Speight leads a coup. Ethnic Fijian–led caretaker government installed. 2001 (May) Court of Appeal upholds the 1997 Constitution but does not reinstate Chaudhry government.


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Situating the Nation Independent in 1970, Fiji has had military coups in 1987 and 2000, in which ethnic Fijian nationalists ousted democratically elected multiethnic Labour Party coalition governments. Unlike most other Pacific nation-states whose decolonization history follows encounters between Pacific indigenes and colonizing Westerners, Fiji’s story is one of a three-way encounter, among Pacific island indigenes, white colonizers, and plantation laborers from India. Thus, any understanding of Fiji as a nation-state involves the histories, goals, and rights of both postcolonial indigenes and labor diasporic peoples. Today, Fiji citizens debate, with words and force, leadership of the nation-state and its very nature: Is Fiji to be a nation in which a core people—colonial chiefly rulers and one ethnic group—has special rights or a multiethnic democracy? Fiji is an independent nation-state. Formerly a colony of Great Britain, its colonial history shapes its independence history of constitutionally institutionalized separation of ethnic groups. In the 1996 census, with Fiji’s population at 775,077, people identifying themselves as ethnic Fijians were 50.7 percent of the population, Indo-Fijians were 43.7 percent, and people of East Asian, other Pacific islander, and European heritage, and those locally termed “part Europeans” comprised the remaining 6 percent. Fiji has been a member of the British Commonwealth from 1970, excepting a hiatus of 10 years following the 1987 coup. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the islands were composed of chiefly-led coastal kingdoms or confederacies and less hierarchical polities located in the interior and hill areas. From 1874 to 1970, the colonial British ruled Fiji through a paternalist system of indirect rule based on the indigenous Fijian chiefly system, and preserved ethnic Fijian land ownership. Consequently, ethnic Fijian kin groups inalienably now own 83 percent of the nation’s land. Ethnic Fijians are Christians, predominately Methodists. At independence in 1970, colonially groomed Fijian chiefs were the highest national leaders. Fiji’s first and succeeding constitutions were written to ensure various degrees of ethnic Fijian political paramountcy and landholding rights. Ethnic Fijians have predominated in civil service, maritime work and comprise almost 100 percent of Fiji’s military, but many still partially gain their livelihood from subsistence economic activities on communally owned, inalienable land. The ethnic Fijian military has been responsible for all of Fiji’s coups. In contrast, the Indo-Fijians came to colonial Fiji as indentured laborers, in the era of colonial capitalist plantations. During this time, Fiji was a classic sugar colony, with one colonial-installed monopsony (monopoly buyer), the Colonial Sugar Refining Corporation. Exploited in Fiji’s sugar plantation system, Indo-Fijians served as the economic backbone of the colony and nation. (Additionally, a small number of Indo-Fijians were free migrants to Fiji as merchants and importexport specialists.) They also resisted European domination. Joining with the nationalists in India and forming local labor unions, they sought political and ecoN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nomic parity with colonial whites and a path to self-determination. Indo-Fijians are predominantly Hindus, with some Muslims and Christians. At the end of indenture, rural Indo-Fijians became cane growers for the Colonial and—at independence—the National Sugar Corporation. Farming on leased land and entering diverse fields of professional and wage work, Indo-Fijians predominated in many areas of business and wage labor, while ethnic Fijians dominated in government. A consistent trend has been the decreasing number of Indo-Fijian cane farmers each year since independence, due in large part (at present) to the decline in the world sugar market and instability of leases on ethnic Fijian-owned agricultural land. Indo-Fijians never participated in organized violence directed against any ethnic group in Fiji. Many Indo-Fijians seek to emigrate from Fiji due to military coups and loss of political rights. A central problem for Fiji as a nation-state involves ensuring both the rights of the postcolonial Pacific indigenes and the rights of South Asia–descended laborers. In the 1870s, the colonial British created a political framework for ethnic Fijian representation, consisting of village, district, and provincial “chiefs” and a


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colony-wide council called the Great Council of Chiefs. Colonial policy paternalistically codified ethnic Fijian tradition as sacred, timeless, and shared by all Fijians. Explicitly made in 19th-century social evolutionary terms, colonial policy assumed that ethnic Fijians were on a lower rung of the human evolutionary ladder: less civilized, more communal, unfit for individualized property ownership or rights, and requiring colonial protection from the depredations of the market. Many ethnic Fijians have explicitly linked “Fijian tradition” with non-capitalist, kin-based forms of production and exchange, with Christian conversion, and with the colonial paternalist protection from the market. Though ethnic Fijians also had some significant anticolonial movements, overall, most did not actively reject Christianity and colonialism, nor did they seek independence from the British or from their own chiefs. Ethnic Fijians attended government- and church-sponsored schools, read government- and church-sponsored newspapers (in Fijian), and joined government- and church-sponsored associations. They did communal work and attended rituals sponsored by and in service to traditional chiefs, the colonial government, and the Methodist Church. The British regulated residence, keeping Fijians in villages and apart from Indo-Fijians who resided in cities or on leased cane-farming land. Arriving to work on sugar plantations beginning in 1878, Indo-Fijians had no colonially sanctioned representation, but formed Hindu and Muslim religious associations and community uplift organizations. They also sponsored schools, newspapers (in several Indian languages), and unions. After the indenture system ended, sugar cane farmers’ unions were important social and political organizations. Colonial social evolutionary ranking saw Indians as more civilized, but less deserving of special protection than the allegedly simple Fijians. Unfortunately, colonial Christian prejudices against Hindus and Muslims, and colonial resentment of Indo-Fijian assertions of equality, negatively influenced ethnic Fijians. These divisions inspired prejudice against Indo-Fijians as living “life in the way of money” (as though engagement in commerce or wage labor was not a situation inevitable for landless immigrants). Intermarriage between the two major population groups has been rare.

Instituting the Nation Fiji came into existence as a nation-state due to the imperatives of post–World War II world decolonization. The United Nations (UN) and the UN-era institutions that were sought by the United States, were key players in bringing Fiji into nationhood. Decolonization was part of the American plan for the post–World War II world, involving, on the one hand, a commitment to greater political selfdetermination for the world’s peoples and, on the other, a commitment to dismantling the unilateral system of trade and currency regulations that had powerfully undergirded the British empire. Independence was resisted by many ethnic Fijians who found colonial hierarchy compatible with chiefly-led Fijian society that N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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denied the capacity of common Fijians to engage in democracy. In parallel with the Gandhian quest in India, independence was sought by Indo-Fijians who held to the ideals of equality and respect for the world’s peoples’ self-determination. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress made the end of indenture throughout the empire a key issue as they struggled for India’s independence Since independence, Fiji has had three constitutions. Both the constitutional provisions themselves, and the manner in which each constitution was authorized, tell a clear story of the power relations in the new nation-state. Upon gaining independence, the constitution set in place by the departing British administration reproduced the unequal political relations formed in the colonial era in favor of ethnic Fijians, and it reinforced and further reified “race” as a category in Fijian social and political life. In 1970, Fiji’s national government (formally the Commonwealth Dominion of Fiji) followed the so-called Westminster model, with a governor general representing the queen and a bicameral legislature of appointed senators and elected members of the House of Representatives. Electorally, the majority party’s (or coalition’s) leader became the prime minister. Most of the seats in the House of Representatives were “communal” with three voters’ rolls: Fijians, Indians, and general electors. There were also seats on a so-called national roll on which all voters were listed. Thus, to vote as a Fiji citizen, one had to also define oneself as a member of a colonially constituted “race.” Further, while at the time there were more Indo-Fijian citizens than ethnic Fijian citizens, the two groups received equal numbers of representatives in the House of Representatives.

Fiji’s 1970 Constitution The 1970 Constitution was written under the auspices of the departing colonial British and promulgated by their authority. In independent Fiji’s bicameral representative system, the House of Representatives had 52 members: 22 members were Fijians, 12 elected by Fijians and 10 elected by all of the voters (on the national roll) in particular districts; 22 members were Indians, 12 elected by Indians and 10 by all of the voters in their districts; 8 were general electors, 3 elected by general electors and 5 by all the voters in the districts. (Note that at the time, the numbers were not proportionate.) In 1980 figures, Fijians, who were 44 percent of the population, elected 42 percent of the elected representatives. Indians, who were 50 percent of the population also elected 42 percent of the representatives, while general electors (people of European, East Asian, or other Pacific islander descent), who were 6 percent of the population, had 15 percent of the seats. The “overrepresentation” of general electors (as some would term it) worked largely to ethnic Fijian advantage, since general electors tended to form coalitions with the predominantly ethnic Fijian party. The second house, the Senate, had 22 appointed members, 8 named by the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, 7 named by the prime minister (head of the party in power), 6 named by the opposition party, and 1 member represented people from the small island of Rotuma, which had been colonized by the British and was incorporated into Fiji at decolonization.


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Defining the Nation The national boundaries of Fiji follow those of the colony, and the multiethnic citizenry is colonial in origin as well. Multiple visions of the nation have existed and been propagated. There is no single definition or shared goal for Fiji as a nationstate. Ethnic Fijian and Indo-Fijian goals have been highly different. Over the years, colonial British and postcolonial ethnic Fijian narratives stressed the founding relationship of cession (between Fijians and the British), in which, in 1854, Fiji’s leading chief, Cakobau, Vunivalu of Bau, converted to Christianity, followed by the vast majority of Fijians. Then in 1874, King Cakobau and a group of Fijian chiefs “gave” Fiji to Queen Victoria in an act of ritual-political homage. This narrative of colonial chiefly relationship was embodied by Ratu Sir Lala Sukuna, a Fijian chief and, from the 1920s–1950s an official in the colonial Native Lands and Native Affairs bureaucracies. Ratu Sukuna is famous for coining the expression that Fiji is a “three-legged stool,” dependant on Fijians, the colonial British, and Indo-Fijians. Sukuna’s actual political role was to enshrine the relationship of ethnic Fijians and the state as a special one, in which ethnic Fijians, especially chiefs, would hold special political rights. In the narrative of “cession” the Crown had a duty to return Fiji to ethnic Fijians at independence. Within this narrative, ethnic Fijians debated whether the nation was to be defined by Fijian chiefs, by all ethnic Fijians, or as a Christian nation under the Christian God. Indo-Fijian narratives of the nation and their place in it emphasized a pioneering spirit and the role of Hindu and Muslim faith in overcoming the adversity of the plantation experience. However, most Indo-Fijians and many other people in Fiji seek to lessen Fiji’s history of sharp legal divides between ethnicities. When defining the nation, they emphasize not Fiji’s divided past, but their hopes for a “common future”; see for example, the title of the 1997 Constitutional Commission report: “Toward a Common Future.” Indo-Fijians have pointed to important leaders like A. D. Patel, who, in the 1940s, conjoined narratives of the dignity of working people with a Gandhian anticolonial message. Indo-Fijians, as well as many ethnic Fijians, acted as strong supporters of the multiethnic Fiji Labour Party, founded in 1984.

Narrating the Nation These different national narratives were first concretized during the mid-20th century. World War II saw the end of the British imperial era and the beginning of the UN era of nation-states. In Fiji, the war brought into sharp focus the differing colonial pasts and visions of the future of ethnic Fijians and Indo-Fijians. Fijians envisioned a postwar world run along similar lines to the imperial politics of the N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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colonial era. Indo-Fijians, like the Indian nationalists, were more attuned to impending decolonization. Ethnic Fijians fought eagerly on behalf of the British during the war. The Indo-Fijians, in contrast, offered to serve in the army and auxiliary services on the condition of equal status and pay with white British citizens. Denied equal pay for equal work, they followed Gandhi in refusing to fight for an imperial system that classed them as inferior. Faced with the Indian challenge, British political rhetoric forged an ever-stronger alliance with ethnic Fijians, drawing upon ethnic Fijian fears of Indo-Fijian population growth and denigrating Indian and Indo-Fijian anticolonial resistance. At the so-called Deed of Cession debate in the Legislative Council in 1946, European members argued that the original deed of cession “giving” Fiji to Queen Victoria and her heirs in 1874 provided that the British would preserve and protect Fijian interests. These arguments were clearly directed at quelling Indo-Fijian initiatives for greater legislative representation. Fiji Indian legislative council member A. D. Patel pointed out the irony of colonial claims to protect indigenous Fijians against foreigners, and made powerful arguments against the colonial position. “As a matter of fact,” he argued, “if anything the coming of my people to this country gave the Fijians their honor, their prestige, nay indeed their very soul. Otherwise I have no hesitation in saying that the Fijians of this Colony would have met with the same fate that some other indigenous races in parts of Africa met with” (Legislative Council of Fiji 1946, 48). In the colonial era, it was assumed that different populations, “races” or “communities,” had different natures and roles to play in the colonial polity and would each be represented separately in the governing bodies of the colony. At this key moment in world history, with the impetus to world decolonization taking shape, Fiji’s colonial Europeans and Fijians wrote laws to protect the colonial ethnic Fijian “polity within the polity” to secure special ethnic Fijian paramountcy. Patel’s arguments on behalf of the Indian contribution to Fiji failed to reshape the colonial-Fijian chiefly position (see also Lal 1992). As Fiji moved slowly toward independence, a model of representation based on “communal” rather than “common” electoral rolls dominated Fiji’s politics, with fundamental implications for the future of the nation. Common roll electoral systems regard all citizens as equal—one person, one vote—within a particular electoral district. Communal roll systems, on the other hand, require people to register themselves as members of particular communities and to choose representatives. They are found primarily in former colonies that relied on “racial” categories for political and economic structuring. Thus, in every constitution in independent Fiji, citizens had to identify themselves as “Indians,” “Fijians,” or “general electors” as they carried out the task of electing representatives and shaping the nation. Given this discourse, Fiji’s independence was a contested matter. On the one hand, Indo-Fijians had long sought equality with the colonial British and equivalent forms of political representation. They argued for a democracy with a N ATION S A N D N ATION A LISM: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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common electoral roll. Fijians and colonial whites wished to preserve their own special rights, through separate voting rolls, constitutionally mandated proportions of representation, and, especially, nominated representation by the Great Council of Chiefs. Repeatedly in independent Fiji, ostensible pluralism in policy coexisted with colonial continuations of ethnic Fijian paramountcy. The ceremonies of independence in 1970 dramatized these ambivalences. On the one hand, for the first time in Fiji’s history, Indo-Fijians and other peoples had a major role in public ceremonies. The independence celebrations were intended to represent Fiji as a “threelegged stool.” Language policy gave equal status to English, Fijian, and Fiji Hindi. But in fact, the independence ceremonies themselves, presided over by Prince Charles, gave special weight to royalty in political life, underlining the ongoing position of Fijian chiefs, a kind of authority, leadership, and appeal to tradition not open to Indo-Fijians.

Mobilizing and Building the Nation In the decades that followed World War II, and in the new frameworks established in the UN, world insistence on decolonization propelled Indo-Fijians seeking independence, and ethnic Fijians resisting it, toward independence. Decolonization was part of the American plan for the post–World War II world, involving, on the one hand, a commitment to a world with greater political self-determination and, on the other, a commitment to dismantling the British empire’s barriers to U.S. trade and investment. Colonial officials, Indo-Fijians, and ethnic Fijians made different assessments of the global plans and institutions that were to break up empires and make decolonization a mandate. The ambivalences toward pluralism seen in the independence ceremonies of 1970 were to harden into polarized political parties. Then in the late 1980s, multiethnic political party democratic victories fell victim to ethnic Fijian coups. In 1970, Fiji had two major political parties that gave voice to the aspirations of Fiji’s peoples for the nation-state. Because of constitutional requirements, each party had mixed “racial” membership and fielded candidates of all three electoral categories (“Fijian,” “Indian,” and “general elector”). Each at times espoused more or less pluralistic ideals. However, they swiftly became parties representing different ethnic groups. The largely Indo-Fijian National Federation Party was founded by leaders of cane growers’ unions and other unions in 1964, with a history of contestation against colonial policies. The largely ethnic Fijian Alliance Party held power from 1970 to 1987. Initially, it aspired to be a multiracial party ideal (these aspirations diminished by the 1980s), under the leadership of a colonially groomed high Fijian chief, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. It was a new form of the colonial-ethnic Fijian partnership of the era of indirect rule. By the 1980s, the Alliance Party lost N AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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nearly all of its Indo-Fijian support, and since 1987, it has fragmented into a large number of ethnic Fijian parties, which frequently fuse to support ethnic Fijian nationalist projects. In 1984, a new Fiji Labour Party formed to combat the “racial” parties, with such key platforms as the designation of all Fiji citizens as “Fijians.” Labour won the 1987 election, forming a coalition government with the National Federation Party. Within a month, an ethnic Fijian army colonel, Sitiveni Rabuka, led a military coup, claiming to represent ethnic Fijian interests. After criticism of the coup from other British Commonwealth nations, he declared Fiji a republic, withdrawing from the Commonwealth. He first reinstated the Fijian chiefly leaders of the Alliance Party that had lost the election. Colonel Rabuka (later brigadier general) then became Fiji’s prime minister by elections held under the new constitution that he sponsored. This new constitution simultaneously simplified and reinforced principles already at work in Fiji’s constitution at independence in 1970. Not only were the “races” out of balance and demographic proportion, but major offices were reserved for Fijians. Taking upon itself the power to ratify this new constitution, the Great Council of Chiefs institutionalized its role as the central voice of ethnic Fijian authority. Indeed the Great Council institutionalized their claim to national political authority. They promulgated the 1990 Constitution, and it was subject to no popular referendum. However, following the establishment of this constitution, a period of debate among ethnic Fijians ensued, centered especially on arguments among politicians from three historically dominant ethnic Fijian kingdoms (Bau, Rewa, and Lau) and arguments for the creation and representation of a fourth ethnic Fijian confederacy, representing the ethnic Fijians from the west of Viti Levu Island. Urban ethnic Fijians also argued for representation. Competing new ethnic Fijian political parties were formed. Simultaneously, the debates and fragmentation of ethnic Fijian solidarity created opportunities for multiethnic, nonexclusively ethnic Fijian parties as

Fiji’s 1990 Constitution The 1990 Constitution, written under the auspices of coup leader Rabuka and authorized by the ethnic Fijian Great Council of Chiefs, simultaneously simplified and reinforced principles already at work in Fiji’s first constitution. Like the 1970 Constitution, the 1990 Constitution sought to ensure that ethnic Fijians would always dominate government, irrespective of demographics. It was simply more direct about it. The office of prime minister was to be filled by an ethnic Fijian. It created a single House of 70 representatives. Ethnic Fijians elected 37 of the members of the House and Indo-Fijians elected 27 members. The 1990 Constitution defined Fiji as a Christian nation, irrespective of the half of the citizens who were Hindu and Muslim. The new constitution also created a 34-seat Senate (24 ethnic Fijians, 9 others, 1 Rotuman). Not only were the “races” out of both balance and demographic proportion, but major offices were reserved for Fijians.


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partners. Even more importantly, concerns driven by a need to have a constitution that recognized international standards led to the formation of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission of 1996 and to another new constitution in 1997. The Fiji Constitution Review Commission held the first broad-based, nationwide discussion on Fiji’s future as a nation, calling for submissions from all interested groups and individuals within and outside of Fiji. The Commission’s three members were New Zealand jurist Sir Paul Reeves (a Maori), Fiji historian and Australian National University professor Brij V. Lal (an Indo-Fijian), and Fijian longtime parliamentarian Tomasi Vakatora (an ethnic Fijian). They considered an extensive number of submissions from constitutional experts to interested organizations to ordinary citizens. Submissions from within Fiji ranged across political and historical positions. Some proposed reenvisioning Fiji and all Fiji citizens in a Pacific Islander tradition. Others made proposals for affirmative action programs to engage ethnic Fijians in business, not by emphasizing traditional development programs for small businesses, but rather by treating Fijians as groups of stockholding investors. Others outlined the rights and needs of minority (and majority) populations and groups in the islands (e.g., submissions on part-Europeans, Rotumans, other Pacific islanders, and women in Fiji). Key submissions noted the pending crisis of agricultural land leases. The Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act had been negotiated during the move toward independence in the late 1960s. Thirty-year leases of Fijian-owned land were made available to Indo-Fijian farmers to ensure the continuity of the sugar industry, seen as crucial to the soon-to-be independent nation-state. Yet this meant that the vast majority of Indo-Fijian cane farmers’ leases expired in 1997. Ethnic Fijian interest in using the land or, more commonly, in raising rents, created a fearful situation for many Indo-Fijians and an unstable economic outlook. Others addressed the problem of poverty, especially among urban and periurban residents. Importantly, both the submissions from constitution experts and many of those from citizen groups brought new questions to Fiji’s political process by engaging global cases, models, and structures from beyond Fiji. First of all, models for national governance and citizens rights drew on formulations from UN organizations and from a range of international nongovernmental organizations. Constitution experts from all over the world provided comparative studies and citizen groups used a variety of international declarations and conventions to support their positions. Thus, those arguing for ethnic Fijian paramountcy cited the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples along with the Bible and Fijian tradition as their authorities. Supporters of common roll voting appealed to such documents as the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Secondly, the global financial situation loomed in the background of every report on Fiji’s economy. Dependence on sugar as a major crop seemed increasingly unwise, and the booming stock market of the 1990s encouraged visions of outside investment. This in turn encourN AT I O N S AND NAT IONALIS M: VOLUME 3 (1945–1989)

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aged new industries including tourism, spring water, gold, film studios, and other luxuries, and fueled landowners’ sense of the potential for high rents on lands. The Review Commission led to the drafting and adoption of a new constitution in 1997, again promulgated by the Great Council of Chiefs and supported by coup leader and then prime minister Rabuka. While it continued some of the 1990 Constitution’s many concessions to ethnic Fijian custom and chiefly power (the Great Council of Chiefs appoint the president and vice president, the largely ceremonial heads of state), it altered the “racial” composition of representation in important ways. Again, crucially for future issues of power and authority in Fiji, this constitution was ratified by the Great Council of Chiefs, rather than popular referendum. The Chiefs’ agreement seems to have been gained via the assurance of Prime Minister Rabuka that it contained clauses that would ensure ethnic Fijian paramountcy, notably in the reservation of the presidency for ethnic Fijians. In a crucial expression of the voice of Fiji’s citizenry, the first election under this new constitution in May 1999 did not lead to the electoral return of coup leader Rabuka. Nor did the National Federation Party win any seats, not even its leader Jai Ram Reddy who had become famous for his efforts to work together with coup leader Rabuka. Rather, to the surprise of many, the Labour Party, led by Mahendra Chaudhry, won an absolute majority and formed a new government in coalition with several ethnic Fijian parties. The voice of the people supported the multiethnic democracy envisioned in 1987 in the first Labour victory. But one year following the election, a complicated aggregation of agents led and solidified a coup against Chaudhry’s Labour coalition government. First, George Speight, a failed businessman, led a group of military personnel and took Prime Minister Chaudhry and coalition parliamentarians hostage. Speight claimed to act on behalf of indigenous Fijian rights. Outside analysts have noted that

Fiji’s 1997 Constitution The 1997 Constitution was drafted by a multiethnic commission. It was promulgated by the Great Council of Chiefs and supported by coup leader, brigadier general, and then prime minister Rabuka. While it continued, some of the 1990 Constitution’s many concessions to ethnic Fijian custom and chiefly power (the Great Council of Chiefs appoint the president and vice president, the largely ceremonial heads of state), it altered the “racial” composition of representation in important ways. The House of Representatives had 71 members, elected from five electoral rolls (23 by Fijians, 19 by Indians, 1 by Rotumans, 3 by others, and 25 by all voters on an “open roll”). Drawing on “consociational” constitutional theory, it required the prime minister to invite into his or her cabinet members from other parties that obtained 10 percent of the seats or more in the House of Representatives, in numbers corresponding to the total percentage of members in the House. Again, crucially for future issues of power and authority in Fiji, this constitution was ratified “from the top down,” by the coup leader and the Great Council of Chiefs, rather than popular referendum.


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Speight, past head of the Fiji Hardwood and Fiji Pine commissions in the Rabuka government, had seen his carefully laid plans to sell Fiji’s mahogany reserves (planted by colonial planners in the 1950s) to a U.S. buyer overturned by the newly elected Labour coalition government. Speight had incited and championed the ethnic Fijian landowners, on whose rented land the mahogany was growing, to back his plans for its sale. Their position was that the timber, or revenue from it, should not be regarded as a national asset (as colonial and national planners had intended) but rather that of the landowners on whose rented land it was grown, and that ethnic Fijian groups deserved a special share and benefit from its sale. On May 19, 2000, Speight got the jump on other potential coup leaders and led a group of armed soldiers into parliament and began the coup against Chaudhry’s Labour coalition government. Speight’s coup was overtaken and solidified by a second simultaneous coup, more from the top down, led by ethnic Fijian stalwarts, including high chiefs and the military. The president, Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, dismissed Prime Minister Chaudhry for failure to perform his duties (while Chaudhry was a prisoner of Speight!). Mara then resigned and handed power directly to the military, who installed ethnic Fijian bureaucrat Laisenia Qarase as interim prime minister, with the support of Fiji’s military forces under Comm. Frank Bainimarama. As head of

Supporters of coup leader George Speight wave the Fijian flag in the grounds of Fiji’s Parliament House on May 25, 2000. (Reuters/Corbis)


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the interim government, Qarase announced and implemented a range of programs to solidify ethnic Fijian paramountcy in the nation. In the wake of the takeover of the nation, in May and following months, there were many local takeovers of roads, power stations, tourist resorts, factories, and even police stations by ethnic Fijians asserting their rights as landowners and indigenes to define the nation as a whole. The interim government, headed by ethnic Fijian Laisenia Qarase, presented its role as returning Fiji to peace, order, and “normality.” Their interim budget and blueprint for Fiji sought to reconcile diverse ethnic Fijian claims and projects, their vision making ethnic Fijian interests the main national interests for Fiji and once again diminishing the rights and contributions of Indo-Fijians to the nation. Many Indo-Fijians saw no future in Fiji, emigrating up to the limits set by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States. For those who stayed in Fiji, the vision of the nation-state rested on a model of a more democratic multiethnic society. Taking recourse to Fiji’s courts, in 2000, an Indo-Fijian farmer filed suit arguing that his civil rights had been violated by the abrogation of the 1997 Constitution, leaving him dispossessed of his rented land, his livelihood, and in fear for his and his family’s lives. In March 2001, Fiji’s court of appeal upheld his suit. Prime Minister Chaudhry was not reinstated, but the 1997 Constitution was upheld. Elections were held in 2001 and again in 2006 under the electoral rules of the 1997 Constitution. Both elections returned ethnic Fijian Laisenia Qarase and his Soqosoqo Duavata ni Lewenivanua (SDL) Party, who continued to make ethnic Fijian interests central to the nation. Qarase’s government was deposed by military commander Bainimarama at the end of 2006; he then became prime minister and handed the presidency to Ratu Josefa Iliolo. In conclusion, the history of independent Fiji shows the persistent national dilemma of how to enable diversity while encouraging equality. From independence in 1970 to the 1997 Constitution and beyond, two points repeat themselves. First, to one degree or another, individuals have been required to register themselves as belonging to one or another “racial”/political group. The electoral system has persistently concretized and perpetuated a system of invidious categorizations of persons developed in the colonial era. In essence, it enshrined nationally and constitutionally the claim that Fiji’s people are to be separate, bounded races, with different natures, interests, and political and property rights. Second, however, in every election since 1987, the majority of voters have turned to multiethnic alternatives. Whether the votes for multiethnic parties and coalitions reflect increasingly individualized subjectivities, or result from certain social or economic common denominators well served by a Labour Party, is not clear or fixed. But multiplicity in Fiji need not, one hopes, always result in inequality. Selected Bibliography Clammer, J. 1973. “Colonialism and the Perception of Tradition in Fiji.” In Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter, edited by T. Asad, 199–222. London: Ithaca Press.


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Gillion, K. L. 1977. The Fiji Indians: Challenge to European Dominance, 1920–1946. Canberra: Australian National University Press. Kahn, J. 2000. “The Mahogany King’s Brief Reign.” New York Times, September 14, section C, p. 1, 8. Kaplan, M. 1995. Neither Cargo Nor Cult: Ritual Politics and the Colonial Imagination in Fiji. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Kelly, J. D. 1988 “Fiji Indians and Political Discourse in Fiji: From the Pacific Romance to the Coups.” Journal of Historical Sociology 1, no. 4: 399–422. Kelly, J. D., and M. Kaplan. 2001. Represented Communities: Fiji and World Decolonization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lal, B. V. 1992. Broken Waves: A History of Fiji in the Twentieth Century. Pacific Islands Monograph Series, no. 11. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Lal, B. V., and T. Vakatora, eds. 1997a. “Fiji Constitution Review Committee Research Papers.” Fiji in Transition, vol. 1. Suva: School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific. Lal, B. V., and T. Vakatora, eds. 1997b. “Fiji Constitution Review Committee Research Papers.” Fiji and the World, vol. 2. Suva: School of Social and Economic Development, University of the South Pacific. Legislative Council of Fiji. 1946. Extracts from Debates of the July Session, 1946. Suva, Fiji: Government Press. Rutz, H. 1995. “Occupying the Headwaters of Tradition: Rhetorical Strategies of NationMaking in Fiji.” In Nation-Making: Emergent Identities in Postcolonial Melanesia, edited by R. Foster, 71–93. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Sahlins, M. 1985. Islands of History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Trnka, S. 2003. “Ethnographies of the May 2000 Fiji Coup.” Special issue of Pacific Studies 25, no. 4 (special issue).


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Index

Note: Page numbers in bold indicate a main entry for that subject, and numbers in italic refer to the sidebar text on that page. Aasen, Ivar, 226 Abacha, Sani, 1188 Abayomi, Kofo, 1180 Abbas, Ferhat, 1099 Abbas, Gulam, 1763 Abbas, Mahmoud, 1142 Abbas II (Egypt), 261 Abbas the Great, Shah, 1108, 1113 Abd-ul-Ilah, 1745 Abdallah, King (Transjordan), 728, 729 Abdelkader, Emir, 1098, 1099, 1102 Abduh, Muhammad, 731 Abdülhamid II (Ottoman Empire), 764, 765 Abdullah, Farooq, 1767, 1768, 1770 Abdullah, King (Jordan), 1142 Abdullah, Sheikh Muhammad, 1761, 1761, 1763, 1764, 1765, 1766–1767 Abiola, Moshood, 1188 Aboriginal Tent Embassy, 1847, 1851 Aborigines, Australian, 932. See also Pan-Aboriginalism Abrams, Lynn, 53 Abyssinia, 736–737, 739 Aceh, 954, 1468, 1734 Achebe, Chinua, 913, 914, 917, 920, 921, 925 Acton, Lord, 687 Adams, Abigail, 50 Adenauer, Konrad, 947, 973–974, 1549 Adivar, Halide Edib, 770 Afghanistan, 1683–1695, 1684 (map) and education, 1388–1389 Germany and terrorists in, 1554 invasion of, 1497 and music, 1440 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Soviet Union, 954 and terrorism, 1488 and women, 904, 1457 Aflaq, Michel, 731, 732, 733, 981, 1740 Africa and colonialism, 890 education in, 39–40, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 431 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence/separatist movements in, 1461, 1464, 1468–1469

literature/language in, 919–920, 925–927 and music, 1440 and religion, 108 and socialism, 980–981 supranational organizations and, 962, 965 See also specific African nations African Americans, 493–494 Afrikaner nationalism, 1144–1153 Afzelius, Arvid August, 73 Agathangelos, 1706 Aghulon, Maurice, 49 Agoncillo, Teodoro, 1245 Aguirre, José Antonio, 1515–1516 Ahmad, Kamal Mazhar, 1741 Ahmad Shah, 1686, 1691 Ahmadinejad, Mahmmoud, 1117 Ahmed, Imam, 739, 743 Aho, Juhani, 605 Aidoo, Ama Ata, 927 Aizawa Seishisai, 810–811, 813–814, 814, 815 Akbar, 802 Akçura, Yusuf, 766, 770, 771, 773 Akhmatova, Anna, 1074 Akhmetov, Renat, 1625 Aksakov, K. S., 692 al-Afghani, Jamal al-Din, 261 al-Alayili, Shaykh Abdallah, 732, 733 al-Azmah, Yusuf, 728 al-Azmeh, Aziz, 725 al-Bakr, Ahmed Hasan, 756 al-Banna, Hassan, 984, 985 al-Bitar, Salah al-Din, 731, 981 al-Bustani, Butrus, 731 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin, 1135, 1136, 1138, 1139 al-Husayni, Musa Kazim, 1136 al-Husri, Sati, 730, 732–733, 751 al-Jawahiri, Mohammad Mahdi, 1740 al-Jazairi, Amir Abd al-Qadir, 727 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 753 al-Kawakibi, Abd al-Rahman, 727 al-Miqdadi, Darwish, 734 al-Nashshashibi, Raghib, 1136 Al Qaeda, 986–987, 1484, 1488, 1492 and Pakistan, 1232 al-Qaysi, Nuri Ali Hammudi, 1741 Al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, 1488–1489


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I-2 al-Said, Nuri, 753 al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Adb, 984 Alamán, Lucas, 352 Albéniz, Isaac, 1437 Alberdi, Juan Bautista, 275, 276 Albizu Campos, Pedro, 840, 840 (illus.), 841, 844, 845, 846 Alem, Leandro, 281 Alevi, 1650–1651, 1653, 1654–1655 Alexander I, Czar (Russia), 20–21, 209, 211, 1576 Alexander I (Bulgaria), 578 Alexander II, Czar (Russia), 210, 598 Alexander III, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Alford, Kenneth J., 1442 Alfred the Great, King (England), 165 Algeria, 1094–1105, 1096 (map) and colonialism, 48 diaspora population of, 1371 and France, 1050–1051 and independence, 1464, 1490 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1496 and women, 903 Ali, Monica, 927 Ali, Muhammad, 258–259, 263 Aliyev, Heidar, 1715, 1720 Aliyev, Ilham, 1715 Allende, Salvador, 331 Almirall, Valentí, 703, 710 Alsace, 475, 1501–1510, 1503 (map) Althusser, Louis, 486, 1052 Amami Island, 1754 Amanullah, King (Afghanistan), 1684, 1686, 1688, 1689 Amazon basin, 1827–1831, 1829 Ambedkar, B. R., 802, 1204–1205 Ambrose, Stephen, 905 American Revolution, 21 and Canada, 299 and education, 32 gender roles and, 45–46, 50 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 Americanization, and Puerto Rico, 841 Americas and language, 478 and music, 75–76, 1432 nationalism and gender in, 44 See also Central America; North America; South America Amharanization, 739, 741, 742 Amin, Hafizullah, 1687 Amir, Yigal, 1400, 1403 Amrane-Minne, Daniele Djamila, 903 Anatolian movement, 1646, 1646 Andersen, Hans Christian, 228 Anderson, Benedict, 25 and diaspora populations, 1368–1369, 1370

INDEX

and the “imagined political community,” 475, 481, 912, 1342 and Latin America, 826 and national symbols, 122, 900 on print technology, 129, 485, 1475 on the realistic novel, 923 on “young” and “youth,” 1859 Andic, Helmut, 545 Andrade, Mário de, 1662, 1662 Angell, Norman, 532 Anger, Carl, 228 Anglo-Boer Wars, 198, 204, 449, 490, 1146 and Canada, 305–306, 306 Anglo-Burmese wars, 776 Anglo-Chinese war, 27 Anglo-Nepal war, 1805 Angola, 968, 1657–1667, 1658 (map) and Cuba, 1285 and independence, 1464 Anjala Conspiracy, 223 Ankara, Turkey, 770–772 Anthem, national, 68, 116, 117, 1430, 1431, 1442–1444 and Basques, 1521 and Belgium, 145 and Brazil, 294 and Burma, 782 and Canada, 303 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and the EU, 1042 and France, 175, 1502 and Germany, 619 and Indonesia, 1732 and Japan, 1756, 1757 and Mexico, 354 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 1184, 1186–1187 and Poland, 211, 215 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 230, 230 and the United States, 1308 and Uruguay, 401 Anthias, Floya, 902 Anti-Catholicism, and England, 163, 166 Anti-free-trade movements, 1448 Anti-Semitism, 439, 447, 517, 520–521, 907 and Bulgaria, 582 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and France, 179 and Hungary, 639, 645 in Turkey, 1649 and Ukraine, 1078 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Zionism as reaction to, 1121, 1128 Antiabortion movement, 1446


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I-3

INDEX

Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism, 912–928, 957–970 and Algeria, 1095, 1100 and Angola, 1658, 1664 and Burma, 777, 779, 780–781, 782, 783 and China, 1191, 1193, 1196, 1198–1199, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157–1158, 1163 and Gandhi, 1203 and India, 131, 796, 800–801 and Iran, 1110, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 753, 1739, 1740 and Malaysia, 1216 and nationalism, 26–27, 47–48, 486–487, 1461–1465 and Nigeria, 1178–1179 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 840 and Vietnam, 1269 and women’s rights, 457 Anticommunism, 520, 1310, 1394 Anticosmopolitanism, 415 Antinuclear-power movements, 1449 Antiracist movements, 1457 Antislavery, 161, 163 Antwerp, Belgium, 200 Apartheid, 1151–1153 Appadurai, Arjun, 136, 1374–1375 Aquino, Benigno, 1242, 1242 Aquino, Corazon (Cory), 1242, 1242, 1244 Arab-Israeli War (1948), 729, 1125, 1129, 1135, 1136, 1139–1140 Arab-Israeli War (1967), 1137, 1394–1395 Arab-Israeli War (1973), 1039 Arab League, 726 (map) Arab nationalism, 724–734, 726 (map), 965, 981 and Iraq, 751–752, 753, 754, 754, 757–758, 1739 Arabs, in Turkey, 1650–1651 Arafat, Yasir, 1136–1137, 1141, 1142, 1488–1489 Aral Sea, 882 Arana, Sabino de, 704, 709, 710, 1515 Arason, Jón, 228 Araucanian Indians, 323, 324–326 Arcand, Denys, 1294 Arce, Mariano José, 317–318 Architecture, 30, 37, 407–408, 409, 413, 414–415 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Brussels, 144 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1024 and Malaysia, 1224 and Russia, 692–693 and Turkey, 770–771 Arena y Goiri, Sabino, 1294 Argentina, 268–281, 270 (map) and film, 1335 immigration and national identity in, 492 and music, 1439, 1443 national identity and education in, 39 Arif, Abd al-Rahman, 755 Arif, Abd al-Salam, 754–755 Aristocracy, 5–9

Aristotle, 529 Armageddon, 1394 Armenia, 1696–1711, 1698 (map) and Azerbaijan, 1719 and diaspora populations, 1376 and the Soviet Union, 946 Armenian Apostolic Church, 1699–1700, 1701 Armenians in Azerbaijan, 1718–1719. See also Gharabagh conflict ethnic cleansing/genocide of, 438, 523 and the Ottoman Empire, 764, 765 and Turkey, 1648–1649 Arminius (Hermann), 618 Armstrong, John, 1368 Arndt, Ernst Moritz, 187, 1504 Arne, Thomas, 1438 Arnim, Achim von, 73 Arnold, Matthew, 915 Árpád (chief), 643 Art, 16–17, 49, 405–409, 412–417 and Australia, 859–860 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1522 and Canada, 305, 1841 and Finland, 605 and France, 177 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569 historic paintings of Denmark, 154 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127 and the Maori, 1860 and Mongolia, 1794 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Poland, 212, 216, 682 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 402 and Wales, 1637 See also Culture; Landscape Artigas, José Gervasio, 397–398, 401, 402 Asbjørnsen, Peter C., 228 Ashoka, Emperor (India), 802, 1815–1816 Asia and education, 39–40, 428 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 442 independence movements in, 1461–1463, 1465–1468 and language, 478 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Asian countries Asquith, Herbert, 868 Assimilation, 29, 522, 931–932 and Australian Aborigines, 858 and China, 1196, 1199 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 and Ethiopia, 744–746


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I-4

INDEX

Assimilation (continued ) and Hungary, 644 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 866 and Poland, 685 and the Sami, 1612–1613 and Turkey, 768, 1647, 1652 and Ukrainians, 716 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Education Asylum and the EU, 1042 and Germany, 1556, 1557, 1558–1559 See also Immigrants/immigration; Refugees Atahualpa, 373 Atatürk. See Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk) Atlee, Clement, 1461 Atwood, Margaret, 1841 Auber, Daniel, 144 Audubon, John James, 389 Augustina of Aragon, 51 Aung San, 784, 785 (illus.) Aung San Suu Kyi, 784 Austin, John, 1372 Australia, 849–860, 851 (map) and Aborigines, 932, 1844–1853 communication in, 1473 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1375 and education, 1379, 1382 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigration, 883, 1420–1421 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 Macedonians in, 1415 and music, 1439 and new social movements, 1448 and New Zealand, 865 Austria, 539–554, 543 (map) education and, 33–34, 35, 36, 429 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 442 fascism in, 516 and German unification, 192 and Hungary, 638 and Poland, 210 politics and political philosophy in, 535, 1410 Austro-Hungarian empire. See Habsburg empire Autonomy, 899, 939–940 and Armenia, 1698 and Basques, 1516, 1517, 1522 and Catalonia, 1536, 1544–1547 and China, 1200 and the EU, 1041–1042 and Greenland, 1562–1563 and minorities, 1357–1358 and Nepal, 1805 and Pakistan, 1232 and Poland, 679 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 843, 845–847 and Spain, 707, 707–708, 708, 711, 1084–1085, 1088, 1090–1091

Avellaneda, Nicolas, 280 Awolowo, Obafemi, 1180, 1182, 1182, 1183 Ayala, Julio César Turbay, 833 Ayubi, Nazih, 734 Azaña, Manuel, 705 Azerbaijan, 469, 1713–1721, 1714 (map) and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1710 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1078–1079 and Turkey, 769 Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 1180, 1180, 1183 Aznar, José María, 1544 Aznavour, Charles, 1707 Aztecs, 345–346, 351–352 Ba Maw, 779–780, 785 Ba’ath Party, 731, 981 and Iraq, 753, 754, 756, 1740–1741, 1743, 1745, 1746 Babangida, Ibrahim, 1188 Babenberg monarchy, 539–541 Babenco, Hector, 1334–1335 Babeuf, François-Noël, 1489 Bache, Otto, 228 Bachyns’kyi, Yulian, 722 Bacon, Sir Francis, 61 Bagehot, Walter, 162–163 Bahais, 1113, 1118 Bainimarama, Frank, 1324, 1325 Bakongo, 1660–1664, 1664 Bakshi, Gulam Mohammad, 1766 Baku, 1716 Bakunin, M., 38 Balakirev, Mili, 75, 79, 80, 82, 1437 Baldorioty de Castro, Román, 839 Balearic Islands, 1546 Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, 1183, 1185 Bali, 1440 Balkan nations, 435, 436 Balkan Wars, 437 and Bulgaria, 572, 580 and Turkey, 1645 Baltic states, 555–568, 559 (map), 1573 (map) independence, 503 and new social movements, 1449 racism in the, 518 and the Soviet Union, 946, 955, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1581–1582 Bancroft, George, 389 Bandaranaike, Nathan, 1467 Bandera, Stepan, 718, 1624 Bandung Conference (1955), 958–962, 964–965, 1206 Bangladesh, 1201, 1234, 1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1466 Bano, Shah, 1209 Bao Dai, 1264 Barassi, Ron, 857 Barbosa, José Celso, 839, 841 Barceló, Antonio, 840 Barcelona, 1539–1540


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I-5

INDEX

Barker, Ernest, 531–532, 535 Baron, Beth, 264 Barons, Krišj¯anis, 564, 1577, 1577, 1578 Barrès, Maurice, 416 Barrios, Agustín (“Mangoré”), 365, 365 Barruel, Abbé, 45 Barry, Brian, 97 Barry, Sir Charles, 408 Barthes, Roland, 1052 Bartók, Béla, 1435 Basanáviˇcius, Father Jonas, 567 Basarab, 1592 Basedow, Johann, 34 B˘asescu, Traian, 1589 Basques, 1512–1524, 1514 (map) concessions to, 932 and cultural survival, 878 and the ETA, 1090, 1091–1092 and language, 477, 482 and the mixing of ethnic and civic nationalisms, 938–939 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1470, 1471 and Spain, 702–711, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1496 Batavian Republic, 197, 198 Batista, Fulgencio, 1276, 1277 Batman, John, 1845 Battle of Kosovo (1389), 100 Battle of Maysalun, 728 Battle of Yungay, 327–328 Battle y Ordóñez, José, 403 Bauer, Otto, 535, 1071 Bauman, Zygmunt, 1368 Baumer, Gertrude, 453 Bavaria, 621, 631 Beatrix, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Becker, Nikolas, 189–190 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 16, 117, 185, 186–187, 1431, 1432 Beg, Mirza, 1763 Begin, Menachem, 1488–1489 Bejarano, Jorge, 830 Belarusia, 1079 Belaúnde, Victor Andrés, 373, 375 Belgian Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Belgium, 137–146, 141 (map) colonialist policies of, 958, 968, 1464 and Congo/Zaïre, 437, 1156–1158, 1160 fascism in, 517 and language, 472 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1678 secession from the Netherlands, 197 Bello, Ahmadu, 1182, 1185 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 1099, 1100 Ben Bouali, Hassiba, 1099 Ben-Gurion, David, 953, 1123, 1128 Bendjedid, Chadli, 1099 Beneš, Edvard, 587, 588, 588, 596, 596 (illus.), 1017 and World War II, 595, 1019

Bengalil, 1466 Benkheddda, Benyoucef, 1100 Bennett, Louise, 913, 921 Bennett, Robert Russell, 1433 Bentham, Jeremy, 19, 855 Berbers, 1101 Berg, Christian, 153 Berkl¯aus, Edvards, 1578 Berlin, Isaiah, 97 Berlioz, Hector, 1431, 1435 Bernstein, Leonard, 1439 Berra, Francisco, 402 Betances, Ramón Emeterio, 839–840, 841 Bethlen, Count István, 638 Bhabha, Homi, 914, 927 Bhanubhakta Acharya, 1807 Bhimsen Thapa, 1806–1807 Bhindranwale, Jarnail Singh, 1466 Bhutto, Benazir, 1231, 1398 Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali, 1231, 1767 Biafra, 1469 Biblical texts, 473–474 Biculturalism, and the Maori, 1858–1859 Biehl, Janet, 882–883 Bierstadt, Albert, 65, 389 Billig, Michael, 121, 479 bin-Laden, Osama, 986–987, 1399, 1400 Bingham, George Caleb, 389 Biogenetics, 883 Bioregionalism, 879 Birendra, King (Nepal), 1808, 1809 Bismarck, Otto von, 24, 150, 192–193, 436, 611 and Alsace, 1505 monuments to, 410–411 and Poland, 678 Bjørnson, Bjørnstjerne, 78, 228, 230 Blake, Christopher, 1439 Blanc, Louis, 239 Blest Gana, Alberto, 329 Block, Alexander, 1602 Bluetooth, Harald, 226 Boer Wars. See Anglo-Boer Wars Boers. See Afrikaner nationalism Bohemia, 584, 1022 and Hussitism, 1023 and music, 1435–1436 Boland, Eavan, 926 Bolger, Dermot, 927 Bolivar, Simón, 16, 272, 370, 825, 831 Bolivia, 371–372, 1443 Bolognesi, Francisco, 377 Bolshevik Revolution, 436, 520, 593 Bolsheviks, and religion, 106 Bonald, Louis de, 178, 179 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 16, 26, 34, 175, 176–177, 474 as father figure, 51 and the French national anthem, 1443 and Haiti, 336 and Switzerland, 248


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I-6

INDEX

Boniface, Pope, 100 Bonifacio, Andres, 1245–1246 Bonifácio de Andrada e Silva, José, 287–289, 290, 292 Borden, Robert, 306 Borders, 460–461, 966, 967, 968 and Afghanistan, 1684–1685, 1689 in Africa, 1464, 1469 and Algeria, 1096 and Armenia, 1697–1699, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 562–563, 1582 and Basque Country, 1513, 1514 (map) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 289, 1831 and Bulgaria, 574 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 298 in Central America, 316 and the collapse of communism, 1413 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Denmark, 152 and Egypt, 262 and Ethiopia, 740, 742 and the European Union, 1042 and Fiji, 1318 and Finland, 598 and France, 175 and Germany, 187–188 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 639–640 and Indonesia, 1729–1730 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1738–1739 and Ireland, 655 and Israel, 1124–1125, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1771 and Japan, 1753 and language, 471, 474–475, 477 Mexican, 353 (map) and Mongolia, 1792 and Nepal, 1805 and the Netherlands, 199 and Paraguay, 359, 362 and Peru, 368, 371 and Poland, 212–213, 685 and Romania, 1591 and Russia, 1599 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669 and Scandinavia, 225 and Scotland, 236 and South Africa, 1145 Spain/France, 1513 and Taiwan, 1255 and Turkey, 768, 769, 1647 and Ukraine, 713–714, 719, 1620 and the United States, 390, 1390 and Uruguay, 395 and Wales, 1636 and the War of the Pacific, 376 (map)

after World War I, 514, 524 See also Expansionism Borglum, Gutzon, 65, 411 Borneo, 1218–1220 Borodin, Aleksandr, 78–79, 82, 417, 1437 Bosanquet, Bernard, 534–535 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 806 Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1358, 1409, 1525–1535, 1526 (map) Bosse, Abraham, 62 Botero, Fernando, 832 Botev, Hristo, 573, 576–577 Botha, Pieter Willem, 1152 Botswana, 1443 Bouchard, Lucien, 1292 Boudiaf, Mohammed, 1099 Boudicca, Queen (England), 165 Bouhired, Djamila, 1099 Boumaza, Djamila, 1099 Boumedienne, Houari, 890, 1099, 1100, 1100 Boundaries. See Borders Boupacha, Djamila, 1099 Bourassa, Henri, 306, 1289, 1293–1294, 1296 Bourassa, Robert, 1291 Bourbon reforms, 350, 371 Bourgeoisie, 12, 585, 626. See also Elites Bourguiba, Habib, 1464 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 1099, 1100 Boyer, Jean-Pierre, 333, 337, 340, 342 Bracken, Thomas, 868 Bradley, F. H., 531 Bradman, Sir Donald, 857 Brahms, Johannes, 117 Brandt, Willy, 976 Brathwaite, Kamau, 917, 921 Brazil, 282–297, 284 (map), 1824–1832, 1826 (map) and the Amazon, 876 and the arts, 1334–1335, 1439 and colonialism, 889 and Uruguay, 396–397 Brazilian Portuguese, 478 Brentano, Clemens, 73 Bretagne, 1490 Brezhnev, Leonid, 1026, 1076–1077 Brinker, Hans, 204 Bristow, George, 76 British North America Act, 300, 300 Britishness, 159, 162, 167 and Scotland, 233 Britten, Benjamin, 1434 Brock, Sir Isaac, 304 Brooklyn Bridge, 128, 134 Brunel, Isambard Kingdom, 164 Brussels, 144 Buddhism and Asian political identity, 972 and Burma, 779, 780 and Japan, 106 and Mongolia, 1791, 1792, 1796, 1798


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I-7

INDEX

and politics, 983, 988 and Tibet, 1815–1817, 1821, 1822 Buenos Aires, 395–396, 397 Buhari, Muhammadu, 1187 Bulgakov, M. A., 697 Bulgaria, 437, 570–582 Bull, John, 117 Burghers, Thomas, 1150 Buriats, 1784, 1785, 1788–1795, 1791 Burke, Edmund, 89, 162, 1489 Burlington, Lord, 62 Burma, 776–785, 1370 Burnley, I. H., 883 Burns, E. Bradford, 292 Burns, Robert, 73, 238 Burschenschaften, 187 Burundi. See Rwanda and Burundi Bush, George H. W., 1306, 1395 Bush, George W., 1306, 1347, 1395–1396, 1453 Bushnell, David, 834 Bustamante, Carlos María de, 350, 352 Byron, Lord, 631 Cabero, Alberto, 330 Cabinda, 1660 Cabral, Amílcar, 1661 Cáceres, Andrés A., 377 Cady Stanton, Elizabeth, 53, 57 Cakobau, King (Fiji), 1318 Calhoun, John C., 390 Caliphate, 760–761 Cambó, Francesc, 706, 710 Cambodia, 1463 Camden, William, 61 Camphausen, Wilhelm, 408 Canada, 298–307, 301 (map), 1289 (map), 1372, 1834–1842, 1836 (map) communication in, 1473 education and, 424, 428, 429, 1383–1384 and environmental nationalism, 880 and immigrants/immigration, 1415, 1418–1419, 1420 and indigenous groups, 1566 and music, 1441 and national symbols, 1344, 1346, 1347–1348 and natural resources, 884 and Nunavut, 1562 and Québec, 1288–1297 railroad in, 127 and sports, 993, 1000–1001 and technology, 1477–1478 Canal, Boisrond, 338 Cannadine, David, 1009 Capitalism and Korea, 1778–1779 and Social Democrats, 976 See also Economy; Globalization Captaincy General of Guatemala, 310, 314 Carbó, Eduardo Posada, 834 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 1829

Carducci, Giousè, 671 Carey, Henry, 117 Caribbean, 838 (map), 1274 (map) Carmichel, Franklin, 1841 Carnegie, Andrew, 239 Carpathian Ukraine, 716 Carr, E. H., 23, 536–537 Carr, Emily, 1841 Carrera, José Miguel, 326 Carrera, Rafael, 315, 318 Carretero, Luis, 711 Carter, Jimmy, 1395 Cartier, Georges-Etienne, 1288 Cartography. See Maps Castile, 1083, 1537 Castilla, Ramón, 372 Castillo, Florencio, 317 Castro, Arturo, 830 Castro, Fidel, 834, 942, 952, 1276, 1278–1279, 1278 (illus.), 1279, 1286 Castro, Raúl, 1279, 1286 Catalonia, 1413, 1415, 1536–1547, 1538 (map) and language, 477 and nationalism, 1082–1083, 1086, 1091 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and Spain, 702–711, 708, 1083–1084, 1085, 1087–1092 and terrorism, 1490 Catherine the Great, 19–20 Catholicism. See Eastern Orthodox Church; Roman Catholicism Caupolicán (chief), 326 Cavour, Camillo Benso di, 669, 673 Ceau¸sescu, Nicolae, 952, 1585, 1589, 1591, 1594 Cederström, Gustaf, 228 ˇ Celakovský, František Ladislav, 73 Celis, Carlos Uribe, 832 Celman, Miguel Juárez, 280 Celtic languages, 471, 472, 477 Celts, 236–237 Central America, 309–321, 312 (map), 838 (map), 1274 (map) Central American Common Market, 316 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 896, 1746, 1821 Ceremonies, 1347–1348 and Burma, 782 and France, 176 and Iran, 1114–1115 and nationalistic art, 411, 417 See also Holidays/festivals Cervantes, Ignacio, 76 Césaire, Aimé, 488, 917, 919 Céspedes, Carlos Manuel de, 1275, 1282 Chabrier, Emmanuel, 1437 Chaco War, 360, 363, 365 Chadwick, George, 76 Chamberlain, H. St., 41 Channing, Edward Tyrell, 389 Charents, Yeghishe, 1707 Charles III (Spain), 350


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I-8

INDEX

Charles V (Habsburg), 196 Charles XII (Sweden), 226 Charrúas Indians, 394 Chartists, 161, 164 Chatterji, Bankimchandra, 800 Chaudhry, Mahendra, 1323, 1324 Chaves, Julio César, 364 Chávez, Carlos, 76, 1439 Che Guevara, Ernesto, 942, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1286 Chechens, ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 441 Chechnya and Russia, 897, 1080, 1597, 1605–1607 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 Chen Duxiu, 789, 793 Chen Shui-bian, 1255, 1257, 1258, 1259 Chenrezig (God of Compassion), 1816, 1817 Chernobyl disaster, 954, 1078, 1457 Cherono, Stephen (Saif Saeed Shaheen), 1001 Chiang K’ai-shek, 791, 792, 794, 1250, 1251, 1251 (illus.) Chibás, Eduardo, 1282 Chile, 39, 323–331, 325 (map) and Peru, 377 China, 787–795, 788 (map), 1190–1200, 1192 (map) and Angola, 1664 anticolonialism in, 27 and the Cold War, 942–943 and colonialism, 890 and communism/Maoism, 952, 977, 978 and diaspora populations, 1372–1373 education and, 426, 1386–1387 and film, 1339 and India, 1210 and Indonesia, 1729 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762 and Japan, 809, 815, 1749, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 and Korea, 1780, 1781 and language, 472, 478, 481 and Mongolia, 1784, 1785, 1786–1788, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1794, 1795–1796 and music, 1440 and population transfers, 876 and religion, 108 separatism within, 1468 and the Soviet Union, 948, 979 and Taiwan, 1251, 1252–1253, 1256, 1256, 1257, 1259, 1462 and Tibet, 1813, 1814–1815, 1818–1821, 1823 and the United States, 1395 and Vietnam, 1263, 1266 Chinese in Japan, 1753 in Malaysia, 1215, 1216, 1385, 1463 in New Zealand, 867 See also Singapore Chipenda, Daniel, 1662, 1662 Cho Man Sik, 1773

Choibalsang, Marshal (Mongolia), 1789, 1792, 1797, 1798 Choinom, R., 1794 Chopin, Frédéric, 74, 81, 212, 214, 216, 686, 1434–1435 Chornovil, Vyacheslav, 1078, 1626 Chou Wen-chung, 1440 Choueiri, Youssef, 730 Christian III (Denmark), 226 Christian IV (Denmark), 226 Christian Coalition, 1395 Christian Democrat and Peoples Parties International, 973–975 Christianity and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1706 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and Fiji, 1318 and fundamentalism, 1392, 1393 and the Philippines, 1239 and South Africa, 1148–1149 See also specific Christian religions Christophe, Henry, 337, 340 Chrysanthemum Revolution, 638 Chubais, Anatoly, 1597 Church, Frederic Edwin, 65 Churchill, Winston, 950, 1011, 1012, 1033, 1034, 1461 Cienfuegos, Camilo, 1283 Cinema, 133, 417–418, 497, 1327–1340 and Algeria, 1102 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and France, 1053 and Mongolia, 1794 and Québec, 1294 related to World War II, 1434 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1675 and the Soviet Union, 1075–1076 and the United States, 951–952 See also Theater Cintrón, Rosendo Matienzo, 841, 845–846 Citizenship, 930, 934–936 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 1851 and the Baltic states, 568 and Brazil, 293 and Canada, 298, 1835 and Central America, 320 and Czech Republic, 1027 and Denmark, 154–155 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1366, 1371–1372, 1374, 1376 and the EU, 1041, 1042 and forms of nationalism, 488, 1354 and France, 171, 1050 and gender/sexuality, 444, 446, 909 and Germany, 188, 620, 1554, 1556, 1557, 1558, 1559 and globalization, 1409


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I-9

INDEX

and Haiti, 335, 338 and immigration, 1419–1420 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 669 and Japan, 1752, 1753 and Malaysia, 1216, 1217, 1223 and Mongolia, 1796, 1798 and Peru, 371, 372–373 and Poland, 207 and Puerto Rico, 836, 843 and Ukraine, 1624 and the United States, 1398, 1401 and Uruguay, 400–401 and Wales, 1639 ˇ Ciurlionis, Mikolajus Konstantinas, 565 Civil rights movement, U.S., 124, 944, 965, 1300–1303, 1304, 1305, 1310 Civil war and Angola, 968, 1658–1659, 1663, 1666 and China, 790 and collapse of communism, 895, 896 and Colombia, 829, 833, 834 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Iraq, 757 and newly independent states, 968 and Nigeria, 967, 1185, 1185 and Palestine, 1142–1143 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and Spain, 707, 711, 1088 and the United States, 382, 391 See also Conflict/violence Civilis, Gaius Julius, 203 Class, 1–12 and Afghanistan, 1692–1693 and Angola, 1661 and Argentina, 280 and Brazil, 285 and Bulgaria, 571 and Catalan nationalism, 1537–1538 and Central America, 311 and Chile, 323, 327, 328, 329, 330–331 and China, 1194–1195, 1195, 1196, 1197 education, nationalism, and, 423, 427, 431, 478–479, 481 and Egypt, 265 and ethnic conflict, 892–893, 895, 897–898 and Finland, 601 gender, nationalism, and, 55–56 and Germany, 611 and Great Britain, 163–164 and Greece, 625 and Haiti, 334, 339 and Hungary, 644–645 and India, 131, 1204–1205 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 755, 1739 and Italy, 669–670 and Mongolia, 1795 and Québec, 1292–1293 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222

and social movements, 1452, 1454, 1456 and Soviet ideology, 693–694 and Spain, 709 and the United States, 1305 and Uruguay, 397, 403 Clavigero, Francisco Xavier, 350, 351, 351 Clay, Henry, 388–389 Clientelism, Iraq and, 750, 750–751, 755, 755, 756 Clifford, James, 1368 Clinton, William, 1408 Cloots, Anacharsis, 86 Clos, Joan, 1541 Coates, Eric, 1433 Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 516 Cohen, Leonard, 1296 Cohen, Robin, 1672 Cohn, Roy, 908 Cold War, 525, 942–956, 975–979 and Angola, 1658 and Austria, 550 and Canada, 1840 and Eritrea, 1174 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 442 Europe and the end of the, 1043–1044 and Great Britain, 1012 and Indonesia, 1733, 1734 and Italy, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750 and Korea, 1772, 1773 and the Philippines, 1241 and separatist movements, 1465 and sexuality, 907–908 and sports, 994 and Tibet, 1821 and the United States, 1039, 1303, 1310 See also Nonaligned movement Cole, Thomas, 389 Collins, Bob, 1849 Colombel, Noel, 338 Colombia, 39, 824–834, 827 (map) Colonialism/imperialism, 25, 26, 489, 530, 958, 1301, 1303 and Algeria, 1098 and Angola, 1659 and Arab nationalism, 728–729, 734 and Australia, 855 and Basques, 1513 and Brazil, 283–285 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 299 and Chile, 323–324 and China, 1190 and Congo/Zaïre, 1156–1158, 1160 and diaspora populations, 1364 education and, 419, 420–421, 424–425, 428, 430, 431 and England/Great Britain, 161, 165–167, 490–491, 1005–1007 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737–740


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I-10

INDEX

Colonialism/imperialism (continued ) and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889, 893 and European nationalism, 513–514 and Fiji, 1314–1316 and France, 178, 1050–1051, 1056 and gender, 54–55, 447–448 and Germany, 621 and Greenland, 1566, 1568 and Haiti, 339 and indigenous cultures, 1337 and Indochina, 1264 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1730 and Iraq, 749 and Italy, 665, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 815, 821–822, 1749, 1751 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language/literature, 479–480, 912–913, 914–917 and the Maori, 1859 and the Netherlands, 197–198 and Nigeria, 1178 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1239 and Puerto Rico, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 and sports, 992 and Taiwan, 1253 and technology, 1478–1480 and terrorism, 1490 and Third World nationalisms, 1776 and the United States, 1310 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Expansionism Comenius, Jan Amos, 1028 Commonwealth Games, 996–997 Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 1079, 1715 Communication, 1473–1476 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 279 and Australia, 852 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and Basques, 1521 and Central America, 311, 315 and Colombia, 833 and globalization, 1414, 1416–1417 and ideologies, 972 and immigrants/diaspora populations, 1370, 1427 and India, 800 and Iraq, 1738 and Mexico, 354, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and New Zealand, 865 and Paraguay, 364 and Peru, 368

and the Philippines, 1238, 1247 and Polish nationalism, 216 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavian nationalism, 229 symbols in, 112, 122–123 technological advances in, 127–128, 129, 132, 135–136 and the United States, 388–389, 390 and Wales, 1639 See also Media Communism, 468–469, 944 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1689, 1690, 1693 and Angola, 1663 and anticolonial nationalism, 964 and Armenia, 1706, 1707 and Burma, 780 and China, 789–790, 791, 792, 793, 1190–1200, 1191, 1197 and the Cold War, 947–948, 976, 977–979 collapse of, 1413 and Cuba, 1276–1277, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020, 1022–1026 and France, 1053 and Indonesia, 1727, 1730, 1731, 1732, 1733 and Iraq, 753, 754, 755–756, 1745 and Korea, 1773 and Malaysia, 1216, 1223 and Romania, 1587–1588, 1589 and Singapore, 1218 versus socialism, 975–976 and Ukraine, 718 and the United States, 1303 and Vietnam, 1266, 1267, 1269 Companys, Lluís, 708 Compromise Agreement of 1867, 638 Conder, Charles, 859 Condorcet, Jean Marquis de, 53, 86, 370, 1351, 1362 Conflict/violence, 14–28, 436, 888–898, 929 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Algeria, 1095 and Basque nationalism, 1518, 1521 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527 and Brazil, 1831 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and competition among nation-states, 1032–1033 and education, 1388–1389 and Eritrea, 1172–1173, 1174–1175 and Finland, 606–607 and gender roles, 50–52, 449–450 in Germany, 1555, 1556–1557, 1559 and Gharabagh (Nagorno-Karabakh), 897, 1706, 1707–1709, 1711, 1715, 1718–1719 and ideological differences, 943–944, 977, 988–989 and India and Pakistan, 804–806, 950, 987, 1201, 1203, 1228, 1234–1235, 1235, 1236–1237, 1461–1462, 1762, 1769


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I-11

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and Indonesia, 1734 and instability in postindependent nations, 1469 and Iraq, 1742, 1746–1747 and Ireland/Northern Ireland, 649, 651–652, 662, 1058, 1059, 1060–1062, 1068 in Italy, 665 and the loss of optimism, 935–936 and Malaysia, 1216, 1220–1221, 1223 and minority issues, 939–940, 1412 and Mongolia, 1795–1796, 1796–1797 and natural resources/territory, 523–524, 883–886 in New Zealand, 1856–1857 and Nigeria, 1185 and the Ottoman Empire, 763–764 Palestinian/Israeli, 1129–1130, 1141 and the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 985–986, 1403 and rituals of belonging, 499, 503 role of diaspora populations in, 1365, 1415 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1673–1674, 1676–1677, 1679, 1680–1681 and separatism, 1460, 1465–1470, 1470–1471. See also Separatism/secession and South Africa, 1152–1153 and the Soviet Union, 1075, 1078–1079 and sports, 995 and Taiwan, 1256, 1256 and Tibet, 1823 in Turkey, 1649, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 722 and Vietnam, 1463 See also Civil war; Genocide; specific conflicts and wars; Terrorism Confucianism, 1270 Congo and Zaïre, 962–963, 1155–1165, 1156 (map), 1667, 1671–1672 and Angola, 1662 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and music, 1440 and separatist movements, 1469 Congress of Berlin, 578 Congress of Tucuman, 272, 273 Connolly, James, 652, 654 Connor, Walker, 931, 933 Conrad, Joseph, 489 Conscience, Hendrik, 145, 145 Constantinescu, Emil, 1589 Constantino, Renato, 1245 Consumerism and education, 1380 and image technology, 1339 and Korea, 1778–1779 and sports, 1001–1003 “Contract of the Century,” 1720–1721 Cook, James, 1855 Cook, Ramsay, 1842 Cooke, John Esten, 494

Cooper, James Fenimore, 389 Cooper, William, 1851 Copland, Aaron, 1439 Copps, Sheila, 1839 Copts, 265 Corbin, Margaret, 50 Cornejo, Mariano H., 374 Corradini, Enrico, 515 Corruption and Angola, 1665, 1666–1667 and Armenia, 1710 and the collapse of socialism, 895–896 and Congo/Zaïre, 1160 and Cuba, 1275, 1277, 1283 and Iran, 1111 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1767, 1768 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Palestinians, 1140, 1142 and the Philippines, 1243, 1244, 1247 and Québec, 1290, 1292 and Russia, 955 and the Soviet Union, 1076, 1079 and Spain, 704, 705, 1088 and Turkey, 1645, 1651 and Ukraine, 1628 Corsica, 1490 Cortés, Hernán, 346 Cosmopolitanism, 86–88, 97, 1350–1362 and Alsace, 1510 challenging cultural, 416 and Chile, 330 and globalization, 1409 and immigration, 1427–1428 versus national identities, 1342 and Russia, 82 Cossacks, 1620–1621 Costa, Emília Viotti da, 292 Costa Rica, 318, 321 Costa y Martínez, Joaquín, 705, 705 Coubertin, Pierre de, 991 Coulanges, Fustel de, 1502 Council of Europe, 1715 Counterterrorism, 1496–1498, 1757 Cowan, Charles, 235 Cox, Oliver, 1301 Coyer, Abbé, 32 Creole patriotism and Chile, 324, 326, 329 and Mexico, 349, 351, 351–352 and Peru, 369–370 Crete, 1440 Crime and Brazil, 1831 and Colombia, 834 and Iraq, 757 and Mongolia, 1797 and Pakistan, 1232 and the Philippines, 1243 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675


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I-12

INDEX

Crime (continued ) versus terrorism, 1485, 1486. See also Terrorism and women, 904–905 See also Corruption Crimea, 1078, 1625 Crispi, Francesco, 737 Croatia borders of, 1413 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440, 524 fascism in, 516, 518 and language, 481 and new social movements, 1449, 1453 Croats, in Bosnia, 1527–1535 Cromer, Lord, 261 Cross, James, 1291 Cuba, 1273–1286 and Angola, 1658, 1663, 1665 and film, 1335 and music, 1441 Cui, Cesar, 82, 1437 Cultural diversity, 877–879. See also Multiculturalism Cultural revivalism, 407 Culture, 88–90, 92–93, 405–418, 506 and Alsace, 1509 and Argentina, 276, 277–279 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 854–856 and the Baltic states, 558–560, 558–561, 1578 and Basques, 705 and Brazil, 291–295, 296, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 575–577 and Canada, 1837–1842, 1843 and Catalonia, 706, 1537, 1542, 1543–1544 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Danish folk high schools, 151 education and standardization of, 420. See also Education and Egypt, 260, 264 and Ethiopia, 741, 742 and Finland, 599, 600 and France, 1050, 1052–1053 geopolitics and national, 461 German versus Austrian, 542–543 and Germany, 184, 186–187, 617–620 globalization and world, 1407. See also Globalization and Greece, 628, 629 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1728 and Ireland, 657–659 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 671–673 and Korea, 1778 and Malaysia, 1223 and the Maori, 1858, 1860 and Mongolia, 1790, 1793–1794, 1797 music in establishing national, 72–73, 76–83

and nationalism, 31, 47, 53, 129–130, 485–487, 1355 and Nepal, 1801 and the Netherlands, 205 and Nigeria, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1852 and Paraguay, 358, 362, 365, 365 and Peru, 369–370, 373, 378 and Poland, 212, 214–216, 217 and Puerto Rico, 841–843, 846–847 and Scandinavia, 226–228 and Scotland, 237–239 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 692–696 and technology, 132–134, 1474–1475 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Uruguay, 400, 402 See also Art; Folk culture; Language; Literature; Music Currency and Austria, 552 devaluation of the U.S. dollar, 1039 the euro, 1039, 1043, 1044, 1549, 1551 and Finland, 598 and globalization, 1392 and Tibet, 1818 Cuthbert, Betty, 857 Cygnaeus, Fredrik, 601 Cyprus, 1648 Cyrus the Great, 1107, 1113 Czartoryski, Adam Jerzy, 211–212, 213 Czech Republic, 446, 584 and music, 82, 1435–1436, 1441 See also Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, 583–596, 1016–1028 breakup of, 1413 and communism, 977 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441, 442 and geopolitics, 465 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Da˛browski, Jan Henryk, 215 Dahl, C. J., 228 Dahl, Jens Christian, 67 Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso), 988, 1816, 1816, 1819–1820, 1821–1823 Dalin, Olof, 227 Damas, Léon, 488 Dame Te Atairangikaahu, 1857 Dance, 81, 114 and Angola, 1665 and Catalonia, 1543 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Peru, 378 and Wales, 1637


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I-13

INDEX

Danevirke, 152–153 Dangarembga, Tsitsi, 913, 926–927 Danilevski, Nikolai, 93, 94 D’Annunzio, Gabriele, 489, 670 Darcy, Les, 858 Darius the Great (Persia), 1107, 1113, 1697 Darwin, Charles, 40, 462, 532 Dashbalbar, O., 1794 Daud Khan, Mohammad, 1687, 1689, 1690 David, Jacques-Louis, 177 Davis, H. O., 1180 Davitt, Michael, 451 Dayananda, Swami, 798–800, 802 Dayton Peace Accords, 1527, 1530, 1533 D’Azeglio, Massimo, 665 de Gaulle, Charles, 949, 1038, 1051, 1051, 1052, 1053–1054 de Klerk, Frederik Willem, 1151, 1152–1153, 1489 de Maistre, Joseph, 178, 179 De-Stalinization, 1077 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 245 de Valera, Eamon, 655, 657, 660–661 Deakin, Alfred, 853, 859, 859 Deane, Seamus, 488, 925 Debray, Regis, 61–62 Declaration of Arbroath, 233 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 173 Decolonization and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Eritrea, 1168 and Fiji, 1316, 1320 and Great Britain, 1006–1007, 1012, 1012 and Malaysia, 1216–1217 and the United States, 1303 See also Colonialism/imperialism Decommissioning, 1063 Dehio, Georg, 415 Delacroix, Eugene, 49 Delgado, Matías, 318 Delors, Jacques, 1040 Demchugdongrub, Prince (Mongolia), 1789–1790 Demirchian, Karen, 1707 Democracy, 66, 1360–1361, 1362, 1399–1400, 1488 and Afghanistan, 1686, 1687, 1689–1690 and Angola, 1663 and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Argentina, 275, 276, 281 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 853, 854 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Brazil, 1831 and Canada, 1843 and Central America, 314–315, 318 and Chile, 328–329 and China, 789, 791, 794 and the Cold War, 944–945 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England/Great Britain, 163, 1008 and Eritrea, 1175 in Europe, 419

and Germany, 190, 613, 614, 620–621, 1556, 1559–1560 and India, 981, 1208, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Mongolia, 1784 and Nepal, 1809 and the Netherlands, 199, 206 and Nigeria, 1188 and the Philippines, 1248 and Poland, 214, 215 and Romania, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1594 and Russia, 1596 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1674, 1678–1679 and Spain, 1082, 1084, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 248, 249, 250 and Taiwan, 1253–2354, 1259 and Turkey, 1647 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 385, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1311 See also Voting franchise Democratic Republic of the Congo. See Congo and Zaïre Demonstration effect, 1477–1478 Deng Xiaoping, 1200 Denmark, 147–156, 220–222, 226–228 education and, 429 and the European Union, 1038 flag, 229 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1566, 1572 language and, 225, 472 national anthem/music of, 68–69, 230, 1443 Derrida, Jacque, 1052 Desai, Anita, 923 DeSica, Vittorio, 1334 Dessalines, Jean-Jacques, 336–337, 340, 342 Determinism social, 127–128 technological, 126–127 Deutsch, Karl, 1474–1475 Devolution, and Great Britain, 1013–1015 Devoto, Juan E. Pivel, 399 Dewey, John, 422, 425 Dialectical materialism. See Marxism Diamonds, 968 and Angola, 1659–1660 and South Africa, 1145–1146 Diaspora populations, 1364–1377 and Algeria, 1097 and Armenians, 1698, 1699, 1700–1701, 1703, 1704, 1704, 1707, 1708–1709, 1710, 1711 and discrimination, 1426–1427 and homeland politics, 1414–1415 and India, 1211 and the Internet, 1482–1483 Jews, 1125–1126 and Latvians, 1581 and Nepal, 1807


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I-14

INDEX

Diaspora populations (continued ) and new social movements, 1455 and Nigeria, 1179 and Russians, 698 and supporting terrorism, 1488 Díaz, Porfirio, 355 Diderot, Denis, 102, 171 Die Degenhardts, 133 Diefenbaker, John, 1838, 1839 Diego, José de, 839, 841, 846 Diego, Juan, 347, 349 Diem, Ngo Dinh, 1264, 1264–1265, 1271, 1463 Diffusion of innovations theory, 1477 Dion, Céline, 1296 Discrimination/prejudice and Afghanistan, 1690, 1692 and Alsace, 1505 and Australia, 858 and Czechoslovakia, 1022, 1027 and Ethiopia, 741 and Fiji, 1316 against immigrants, 1420, 1423–1427 and India, 802 and Indonesia, 1729 and Iran, 1113, 1118 and New Zealand, 867 and Nigeria, 1179 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Turkey, 1653, 1655 and the United States, 1304 See also Racism Dixon, Thomas, 1328 Djaout, Tahar, 1100 Djebar, Assia, 1100 Dmowski, Roman, 436, 682, 685 Dobson, Andrew, 877, 880 Dodge, Mary Mapes, 204 Dodson, Mick, 1848 Dodson, Pat, 1848 Dollard des Ormeaux, Adam, 303, 1294 Dollfuss, Engelbert, 516, 546 Domingue, Michel, 338 Dominican Republic, 339. See also Santo Domingo Donskoi, Dmitrii, 696 Dontsov, Dmytro, 718 Dorrego, Manuel, 273 Dorzhiev, Agwang, 1793 Dostoyevski, Fedor, 93, 105–106 Dostoyevski, Mihailo, 93 Dostum, Rashid, 1695 Douglas, Stephen A., 390 Douglas, Tommy C., 1839–1840 Drahomanov, Mykhailo, 718 Drake, Sir Francis, 164 Du Bois, W. E. B., 965, 1179, 1301, 1303 du Toit, Daniel, 1149 Dubˇcek, Alexander, 978, 1022, 1026, 1028 Duchy of Warsaw, 209

Dufour, Guillaume-Henri, 253 Dugin, Alexander, 1601 Duke, James, 1399 Duplessis, Maurice, 1290, 1294 Durand, Asher, 389 Dürer, Albrecht, 415 Dürich, Jaroslav, 588 Durkheim, Émile, 5, 99, 111–112, 120, 908–909, 1054 Duruy, Victor, 178 Dutch Antilles, 197 Dutch Reformed church, 1145, 1148, 1149 Duyvendak, Jan Willem, 1446 Dvoˇrák, Antonín, 75, 1436, 1438 Dyer, Reginald, 804 Eagleton, Terry, 922 East Germany, 1449. See also Germany East Slavic nationalism, 716 East Timor, 1381, 1468, 1729, 1731–1732, 1734 and Christianity, 1239 Easter rising of 1916 (Ireland), 651–652, 652 Eastern Europe and communism, 977 development of nationalism in, 26 ethnic conflict and, 888, 895–897 and new social movements, 1449, 1456 Eastern Orthodox Church, 946 and Eritrea, 1171 and Greek independence, 627 and national identity, 103 and politics, 983 and Russia, 105–106, 1080, 1602–1603, 1605 and Serbs, 1529 and Slavic peoples, 972 Ebbesen, Niels, 153–154 Ecologism versus environmentalism, 877, 880–881, 883 Economic liberalism, 19 and Argentina, 276 and Central America, 316 and India, 1211 and Peru, 368, 372 and Turkey, 1645 See also Liberalism Economy, 18–19, 433, 895–896, 1359, 1380, 1407, 1474, 1496, 1939 and Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1095–1096 and Alsace, 1502, 1510 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Arab nationalism, 729 and Argentina, 269–271, 279, 280 and Armenia, 1707, 1710 and Australia, 850–851 and Austria, 545, 553 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1719–1721 and Basques, 1513, 1522 and Brazil, 296, 1825, 1827, 1828–1832 and Burma, 777


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I-15

INDEX

and Canada, 302, 1477–1478, 1837, 1842 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 310–311, 315 and Chile, 324, 330 and China, 1198, 1372–1373, 1387 and Colombia, 826 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Denmark, 149 and Egypt, 257, 258, 259 and the European Union, 1044 and Fiji, 1322–1323 and France, 172, 175, 1047, 1054 and Germany, 191–192, 611 and Greenland, 1563, 1568 and Haiti, 333, 337, 342–343 and India, 1206, 1211 and Indonesia, 1723, 1733 and Iraq, 756, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 653, 660–661 and Israel, 1130 and Italy, 665, 669, 671 and Japan, 1749, 1750, 1753, 1755–1756, 1757 and Korea, 1778–1779, 1781 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 and Mongolia, 1784–1785, 1796 and Nepal, 1801, 1808, 1811 and the Netherlands, 205 and New Zealand, 863 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1059–1060 and Pakistan, 1227–1229 and Paraguay, 358–359 and Peru, 368, 377 and the Philippines, 1247–1248 and Poland, 217, 678, 679, 680 and Puerto Rico, 837, 847 and Romania, 1585 and Russia, 692, 1597, 1599, 1604 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670–1671 and the Sami, 1609–1610, 1613 and Scandinavia, 221 and Scotland, 233 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1077 and Spain, 706, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1644–1645, 1651, 1656 and the United States, 388–389, 1395 and Uruguay, 396 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Economic liberalism; Globalization Edelfelt, Albert, 605 Edgerton, Lynda, 903 Education, 9–10, 29–41, 81–82, 130, 419–433, 461, 464–465, 478–479, 482, 504–505, 1379–1390 and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Arab nationalism, 731

and Argentina, 276–277, 279 and Armenia, 1703 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 287, 289, 293, 296 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 303, 1477–1478, 1843 and Central America, 315 and China, 1193, 1198, 1199 and Colombia, 833 and Cuba, 1279 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 258, 259, 260, 262, 265 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 746 and Finland, 608 and France, 178, 409, 1049 and Greek independence, 627 and Greenland, 1566, 1571–1572 and Haiti, 342 and India, 796, 798 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 751–752, 755, 756, 1740, 1741, 1743, 1745 and Italy, 675, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and Japan, 811, 816, 1749, 1757 and Korea, 1776–1777 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1785, 1796, 1797, 1798 and Nepal, 1808 and the Netherlands, 197, 198, 199–200, 205 and New Zealand, 865–866 and Nigeria, 1181 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Paraguay, 362 and Poland, 217, 688 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and the Sami, 1613, 1615 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 and Scotland, 234 and Singapore, 1225 and Slovakia, 587 and South Africa, 1148–1149 and the Soviet Union, 696, 1073 and Spain, 708–709 and Switzerland, 250, 254 and Taiwan, 1254 and Tibet, 1822 and Turkey, 1646, 1652, 1656 and Ukraine, 714, 1621, 1625 and the United States, 1305–1306 and Uruguay, 400, 401, 403 and Vietnam, 1271 Eelam, 1467, 1491 Egypt, 256–266, 257 (map), 982 anticolonialism in, 26 and Arab nationalism, 725, 728, 729–730, 734


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I-16

INDEX

Egypt (continued ) and gender, 446, 450 and new social movements, 1452 and religious fundamentalism, 984–986, 1396 and terrorism, 1490 Eicher, Carolyn, 56 Eiffel, Gustave, 134 Eiffel Tower, 134 Einstein, Albert, 1350, 1362 Eisenstein, Sergei M., 697, 700, 1330 El Salvador, 318, 321 Elchibey, Abulfaz, 1715 Elgar, Edward, 1438 Elias, Norbert, 1369 Elites and Afghanistan, 1689 and Angola, 1665 and Belgium independence, 142–143 and Colombia, 826–827, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1157 of Ethiopia, 739–741 and Finland, 598, 600, 601 in Hungary, 637–638 and Iraq, 749, 750–751 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 1751 and new social movements, 1453 and Peru, 368, 371 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Russia, 690, 692–697 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672, 1676 and Spain, 707 and sports, 999 technology and the authority of, 1480 in Turkey, 1651, 1653 and Vietnam, 1269 and Wales, 1633 See also Intellectuals Elizabeth I, Queen (England), 164–165 Elizabeth II (Great Britain), 870 Ellison, Ralph, 1303 Emecheta, Buchi, 927 Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 59, 389 Emigration and Afghanistan, 1687 and Algeria, 1095, 1097, 1102 and Alsace, 1505, 1507 and Basques, 1513 and Cuba, 1277 and Czechoslovakia, 1019–1020 and diaspora populations, 1364, 1365–1366, 1371 and Fiji, 1325 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Ireland, 649, 660–661 and Korea, 1781 and Mongolia, 1798 and Poland, 212 and Puerto Rico, 847

and Turkey, 1648 and Vietnam, 1271 See also Diaspora populations; Immigrants/ immigration Eminescu, Mihai, 1592 Emmet, Robert, 649 Enculturation. See Assimilation Engels, Friedrich, 217 England, 158–167 constitution of, 162 and counterterrorism, 1496 economic liberalism and nationalism in, 18–19 education and, 423 and Greek independence, 631 and music, 1432 nationalism in, 5–6, 502 nationalistic art in, 408, 410 and Uruguay, 395 See also Great Britain English language, 480, 483 Enlightenment, the and the American Revolution, 21 erosion of religious power in the, 102 and France, 171 and liberalism, 1350–1351 and organicism, 462 and origins of nationalism, 9–10 and romantic nationalism, 406 Enloe, Cynthia, 901, 904 Ensor, Robert, 425 Environment and Brazil, 1825, 1827–1831, 1832 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and Haiti, 343 and Latvia, 1575–1576, 1581 and the Sami, 1615 and Tibet, 1814 See also Environmentalism/environmental movements; Natural resources Environmentalism/environmental movements, 875–886, 1446–1458 Eötvös, Jószef, 96 Epicurus, 476 Erben, Karel Jaromír, 73 Ercilla, Alonso de, 324–326, 329 Eriksson, Magnus, 226 Eritrea, 1167–1175, 1168 (map), 1469 diaspora population of, 1370 and Ethiopia, 742 Erk, Ludwig Christian, 73 Erkel, Ferenc, 79 Erskine, David Stuart, 239 Erslev, Kristian, 227 Escher, Hans Konrad, 254 Eskimo. See Inuit Estonia, 1078, 1374. See also Baltic states Ethics. See Morality Ethiopia, 736–746, 738 (map) and Eritrea, 1171–1172, 1174, 1175, 1469


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I-17

INDEX

Ethnic cleansing, 435–442, 522–523 and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1507 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530, 1531, 1532 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 596, 1020 and Germany, 617, 622 and Hungary, 645 and Jews in Iraq, 756 and Poland, 681 and Turkey, 1648–1649 in Ukraine, 722 See also Conflict/violence; Genocide Ethnic conflict. See Conflict/violence Ethnicity, 931, 1354 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688–1689, 1693, 1694–1695 and Angola, 1660, 1664 and Argentina, 276, 277 and Armenia, 1703, 1709 and Austria, 543–544 and Azerbaijan, 1716, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528–1530, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 1826–1827 and Bulgaria, 580 and Burma, 781 and Canada, 1836 and Catalonia, 1542–1543 and Central America, 311, 314 and China, 1193–1197, 1196, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1020–1021 and education, 35, 36, 39, 40, 1379 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 741, 742–743 and Fiji, 1314 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1412–1413, 1415, 1416 and Greece, 633 and Greenland, 1570–1571 and Hungary, 644 and immigrants, 1424 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 672, 673 and Japan, 1753 and Latvia, 1574–1575 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1213–1215, 1225 and Mongolia, 1790–1791, 1797–1798, 1798–1799 and music, 1431–1432 and nationalist movements, 10, 11, 27, 46, 1460, 1464, 1465, 1468, 1469–1470 and Nepal, 1808, 1809–1810 and the Netherlands, 199 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 868 and Nigeria, 967, 1178, 1185, 1186

and Northern Ireland, 1063 and the Ottoman Empire, 101–102 and Pakistan, 1231–1232, 1236 and Paraguay, 362 and the Philippines, 1243–1244 and Poland, 209, 212, 213, 214, 216 in political philosophy, 88–90, 95, 461, 464 and Québec, 1296–1297 and religion, 103–105, 107–109 and Romania, 1592–1594 and Russia, 1079–1080, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1669–1670 and Scotland, 236–237 and South Africa, 1144, 1145 and the Soviet Union, 1076 and Taiwan, 1254, 1257–1258 and Turkey, 1650 and Ukraine, 712–713, 1621 and the United States, 1309 See also Minorities; Religion Eto Shin’pei, 820 Eurasianism, 466 Europe borders after World War II, 581 (map), 591 (map), 616 (map), 668 (map), 684 (map), 1018 (map), 1550 (map), 1590 (map) borders from 1914 to 1938, 170 (map), 184 (map), 540 (map), 556 (map), 579 (map), 586 (map), 612 (map), 624 (map), 636 (map), 656 (map), 666 (map), 680 (map), 762 (map) borders in 1815, 139 (map), 148 (map), 182 (map), 208 (map), 246 (map), 610 (map), 664 (map) colonialism and, 420–421 and cultural identity in, 445 development of nationalism in, 26, 31 education and, 33–36, 38–39, 422, 427 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 437, 441–442 and gender/sexuality, 44, 908 and immigration, 1418, 1421, 1424, 1425 imperative and imaginary forms of nationalism in, 501–503 and landscape art, 64 and language, 472, 477 and music, 73–75, 1432 nationalism and class in, 4, 11 nationalism and conflict in, 16, 23–26 and new social movements, 1447 perversions of nationalism in, 512–525 revolutions of 1848 in, 24–25, 47, 52 supranational bodies in, 948–949, 974 systems of governance in, 419 and terrorism, 1494, 1495, 1497 and transnationalism, 1509–1510 women’s suffrage in, 453 and xenophobia, 1412 See also European institutions; specific European countries and organizations


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I-18

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European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), 1034–1035, 1037 European Convention on Human Rights, 908 European Court of Justice, 1035 European Economic Community (EEC), 1010, 1036, 1038, 1049, 1509–1510 European institutions, 1034–1036, 1039, 1040 and Great Britain, 1007, 1010 See also European Union (EU) European Parliament, 974, 1035, 1039 European Union (EU), 948–949, 1021 (map), 1030–1046, 1032 (map), 1532–1533, 1551 (map) and Algeria, 1095 and Alsace, 1510 and Armenia, 1704 and Basques, 1517, 1522 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1528 Committee of the Regions, 1043, 1541 and Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1028 education and, 432 flag, 1410 (illus.) and France, 1048 and Germany, 1549–1551, 1555 and globalization, 1407, 1409, 1410–1411 and indigenous groups, 1610 and Ireland, 1060 and Latvia, 1582 and minorities, 1412–1413 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Spain, 1092 and Turkey, 1645, 1648, 1650, 1656 and Ukraine, 1623 Europeanization, 1406 Evans, Gwynfor, 1633, 1635 Evans, Robert, 1434 Evatt, H. V., 858 Evolutionary theory. See Social Darwinism Exhibitions, 412–414. See also Holidays/festivals Exile and diaspora populations, 1365, 1369, 1370 Expansionism affect on Hungary of, 639 and Brazil, 283–284 and Canada, 300–302, 1837 and geopolitics, 459 and Germany, 617, 621 Herder on, 88 and Italy, 665–667 and manipulation of ethnic autonomy claims, 940 nationalism as justifying, 40 and Nazi Germany, 518 and perversions of nationalism, 523–524 Soviet, 945 and the United States, 22, 37, 39, 465, 1308 See also Colonialism/imperialism Expedition of the Thousand, 672, 674 Expressionism, 491

Fabianism, 471 Factionalism and the Maori, 1857 and nationalist movements, 940–941 See also Conflict/violence Factory, 129–130 Faehlmann, Friedrich Robert, 561 Fairhair, Harald, 226 Faisal I, King (Iraq), 727, 728, 728, 749–750, 750, 1742, 1743, 1745 Falkland Islands, 275, 1009 Falla, Manuel de, 1437 Fallersleben, Hoffmann von, 117 Falwell, Jerry, 1395 Fanon, Frantz, 963, 1100 Færoe Islands, 220–222, 225, 231 Fascism, 515–517, 525, 973, 1301 and gender, 454–456 and Hungary, 638, 639 and imperative nationalism, 502 and Italy, 419, 667, 670–671, 674–675, 675–676 and Japan, 817 and nationalistic art, 413–415, 417 and the Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 and race, 672 See also Nazism Fashoda Incident, 460 Fatah, 1137, 1142–1143 Faulkner, William, 495 Favre, Louis, 254 Federal Republic of Central America, 310, 313, 316 Federalism and Australia, 850, 852–853 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and Eritrea and Ethiopia, 1171–1172 and India, 1205–1206, 1766 and Indonesia, 1723 and Malaysia, 1216, 1218 and Nigeria, 1183, 1185 as solution to minority demands, 933 and Ukraine, 721–722 and the United States, 383 Feminists, 451–453, 454 versus nationalists, 902, 907 See also Women’s rights Fennoman movement, 598–599, 600, 601, 601 Feraoun, Mouloud, 1100 Ferdinand, Franz, 1490 Ferdinand, King (Romania), 1586 Ferdinand of Aragon, 709 Ferdowsi, 1107, 1113–1114 Ferguson, Adam, 234 Ferguson, William, 1851 Fernández, Emiliano R., 364 Ferreira Aldunate, Wilson, 400 Ferry, Jules, 178 Festival of Britain, 1011 Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 17, 34, 90–92, 186, 475, 533


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I-19

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Fidelis, Malgorzata, 53 Fiji, 1313–1325, 1315 (map), 1441 Film. See Cinema Film noir, 1333 Finland, 220–222, 597–608, 599 (map) education and, 429 and gender, 54, 450 and independence, 223, 231 language and, 225 and music, 1432, 1436, 1443 national identity and culture of, 226–228, 466 and national symbols, 230 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1614, 1616 Finno-Russian War, 607 Firley, Barker, 1841 (illus.) First Schleswigian War, 149, 152 Fischer, Joschka, 1555 Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 489 Fitzpatrick, Brian, 857 Flag(s), 112–113, 116–117 Australian, 855 Basque, 1521 Belgium, 145 Brazilian, 294 and Burma, 781 Canadian, 1835 Catalonian, 1538–1539 and Central America, 318–319 Chilean, 327 Colombian, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 Egyptian, 265 and the European Union, 1042, 1410 (illus.) French, 175 German, 619 and Greenland, 1569, 1570 Indonesian, 1732 Irish, 659 Japanese, 1756, 1756 (illus.), 1757 Maori, 873 and New Zealand, 866 Nigerian, 1187 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 Polish, 686 Puerto Rican, 842 (illus.), 844 and Québec, 1294 Romanian, 1592 Russian, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 229–230 Swiss, 253 and Tibet, 1818 Turkish, 1646, 1647, 1653 and the United States, 1308 Flemings, 144–145, 146, 200, 413 Folk culture, 406, 462, 530 and Alsace, 1510 and the Baltic states, 561, 563–564 and Cuba, 1280

and Finland, 599, 604 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 Haiti and folktales, 342 and Hungary, 643 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1797 and music, 73, 76, 77, 80–82, 417, 1434–1435, 1436, 1437, 1444 and Paraguay, 364 and Poland, 212, 216 and Russia, 693 and the Sami, 1612, 1614–1615 and Scandinavia, 226, 228, 229 and Switzerland, 251 and Turkish folklore, 774 and Ukraine, 721 and Wales, 1634 See also Culture; Indigenous groups Food insecurity and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Peru, 378 Ford, John, 1337 Foreign intervention and Angola, 968, 1658 and China, 793 during the Cold War, 943–944, 945, 947–948, 977 and Cuba, 1275, 1277 and globalization, 1408–1409 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117 and Turkey, 1652 and the United States, 1305 See also Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Foreign policy and Armenia, 1710–1711 and Brazil, 1831 and China, 1200 and Cuba, 1285–1286 and the European Union, 1040, 1042 and geopolitics, 458 and Germany, 1554, 1555 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1751, 1757–1758 and Latvia, 1576 and Mongolia, 1798 and New Zealand, 871 and post-World War II Europe, 974 and the Soviet Union, 979 and sports, 994–995 terrorism as, 1488 and Ukraine, 1622–1623 and the United States, 955–956 Forster, E. M., 490 Forster, Georg, 86 Fortuyn, Pim, 1453, 1486 Foster, Stephen, 389 Foucault, Michel, 1052 Four Freedoms, 972 Fourier, Charles, 423 Fowler, Robert, 1839


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France, 102, 169–179, 172 (map), 502, 1047–1057, 1048 (map) and Algeria, 1097, 1098 and Alsace, 1502–1504, 1505, 1507 and Arab nationalism, 727–728 aristocracy and nationalism in, 5–8 and Basques, 1513, 1513, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Belgium, 140–141 and Canada, 298 colonialism and, 424–425, 958, 1463–1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the Dreyfus affair, 520 education and, 31, 34, 35, 36, 38, 423 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1034, 1038 fascism in, 515 and film, 1336 and gender, 43, 48–49, 448 and geopolitics, 468 and Greek independence, 631 and Haiti, 333, 335–336, 340 and Indochina, 1263–1264 and Iraq, 1739 and language, 420, 480, 482 and the Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities/immigrants, 1412, 1418, 1419, 1420, 1424 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1437, 1441, 1443 and national identity, 461, 465 national symbols of, 134 nationalistic culture/art in, 407, 408, 409–410, 413, 415, 416 and new social movements, 1448, 1457 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and political philosophy, 14–17, 475 and the Rhine crisis of 1840, 189–190 and the Suez War, 266 and Syria, 728 and Uruguay, 395 See also French Revolution Francia, José Gaspar de, 361, 364 Franco, Francisco, 705–706, 707, 709, 973, 1088–1089, 1089 (illus.), 1471, 1515, 1519, 1536 Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), 409, 412, 465 Francophonie, 1056–1057 Franklin, Benjamin, 21 Franko, Ivan, 720 Franks, 1537 Fraser, Dawn, 857 Frederick I (Holy Roman Empire), 619 Frederick II (Denmark), 226 Frederick William IV (Prussia), 191 Frederik, Christian, 224 Freinet, Célestin, 425

French Canadians and the defeat at Québec, 299 and duality in Canada, 303, 306 identity and, 302 tensions over political control in, 299–300, 303 See also Québec French Revolution, 34, 174 and Alsace, 1502 and the aristocracy, 7 and Basques, 1513 gender and symbols in the, 45–46, 49, 50–51 and Germany, 185–186 impact on Haiti of the, 334–335 influence in Brazil of, 293 influence in Central America of the, 311 and origins of nationalism, 474 and popular sovereignty, 15–16 and terrorism, 1489 French West Africa, 424–425 Friedrich, Caspar David, 67, 463 Friel, Brian, 917, 925 Fröbel, F., 36 Frost, Robert, 392 Fry, William Henry, 76 Fuad, King (Egypt), 263 Fucik, Julius, 1441 Fugner, Jindrich, 594 Fukuyama, Francis, 988 Fukuzawa Yukichi, 9 Furnivall, J. S., 783 Furphy, Joseph, 857 Gagarin, Yuri, 951 Gaidar, Yegor, 1597 Gaitán, Jorge Eliécer, 833 Gaitskell, Deborah, 904 Galicia, 209, 210, 1088 and Ukrainians, 715, 716, 718 Gallen-Kallela, Akseli, 605 Gálvez, Mariano, 317 Gamsakhurdia, Zviad, 1079 Gance, Abel, 1328 Gandhi, Indira, 1207, 1207–1208, 1466, 1766, 1767 Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (Mahatma), 798, 801, 802–804, 803, 805 (illus.), 950, 963 and gender issues, 451 and India’s social structure, 1205, 1208 and nonviolent resistance, 976, 1203, 1822 Gandhi, Priyanka, 1207 Gandhi, Rahul, 1207 Gandhi, Rajiv, 1207, 1209, 1211, 1492, 1767, 1768 Gandhi, Sanjay, 1207 Gandhi, Sonia, 1207 García, Calixto, 1282 García Calderón, Francisco, 375 García Márquez, Gabriel, 832 Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 502, 672, 673, 674, 674 (illus.) monuments to, 410 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Garnier, Charles, 134


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I-21

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Garrigue, Charlotte, 585 Garvey, Marcus, 494, 1179, 1850 Gasperi, Alcide De, 973–974 Gaudí, Antoni, 706 Gay, Peter, 613 Gediminas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Geffrard, Fabre, 337, 339 Gégoire, Abbé, 34 Geijer, Erik Gustaf, 73, 228 Gellner, Ernest, 130, 461, 476, 479, 1475, 1835 Gender, 43–57, 444–457, 899–910 and colonialism, 926–927 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Uruguay, 401 Genocide, 435–442 and American indigenous groups, 893 and Armenians, 765, 1699, 1704, 1704, 1706, 1709, 1711, 1718 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Hungary, 645 and Kurds in Iraq, 756 and Nazi Germany, 517, 622 and perversions of nationalism, 522–523, 524, 525 and Rwanda and Burundi, 968, 1671, 1672, 1674, 1676, 1677, 1678, 1679, 1680 and Tibet, 1820 See also Conflict/violence; Ethnic cleansing; Holocaust Geoffrin, Madame de, 7 (illus.) Geopolitics, 458–469 George, Lloyd, 468, 593 George, Terry, 1674 George V (Great Britain), 132, 870 Georgia, 897, 1071, 1079, 1080, 1710 German Confederation of 1815, 149–150, 189, 191 German Customs Union, 191–192 German National Society, 192 Germanization, 617 Germans, in Czechoslovakia, 594–595, 595 Germany, 181–194, 525, 609–622, 1548–1560 and Alsace, 1504, 1505, 1507, 1508 anti-Semitism in, 520 and Austria, 544, 546–548 citizenship in, 1354 and colonial ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and democracy, 946–947 education and, 34, 35, 36, 38, 419, 421, 422–423, 426, 429–430 and the environment, 882–883 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and the European Union, 949 and expansionism, 524 and film, 1330–1331 and France, 1051 and gender, 448, 453 and geopolitics, 458, 459, 462–464, 466–467, 468 and immigration, 1419, 1424

and language, 472 and minorities, 1374 and the Moroccan crises, 514 and music, 1431, 1432 and national identity, 465 National Socialism/Nazism in, 133–134, 517–519 nationalism and political philosophy in, 9–10, 17–18, 90–93, 474–475, 491, 502, 533–534 nationalistic art of, 408–409, 410–411, 413–414, 415–417, 418 and new social movements, 1450, 1453 and Poland, 678 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 and rituals of belonging, 507–508 Soviet advancement into, 950 symbols in, 49, 114, 117 unification of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 512 and World War II, 1309 See also East Germany; West Germany Gershwin, George, 1439 Geser, 1791 Gettino, Octavio, 1335 Gezelle, Guido, 145 Ghana (Gold Coast), 962, 964, 980 and independence, 1464 and music, 1443 Gharabagh conflict, 897, 1078–1079 and Armenia, 1706, 1707, 1709, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1715, 1716, 1718–1719 Gheorghiu-Dej, Gheorghe, 1589, 1594 Gibbs, Pearl, 1851 Gilgamesh, 1738 Ginestera, Alberto, 1439 Gladstone, William E., 241–242, 651, 654 Glaize, Léon, 409 Glinka, Mikhail, 75, 78, 79, 694, 1437, 1602 Global institutions and globalization, 1412 for governance, 1359–1362, 1406, 1456 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 sports, 991 and transnationalism, 1407 and values, 1392 See also United Nations (UN) Globalization, 1405–1417 and Brazil, 1826, 1830, 1832 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1374, 1376 and education, 1380, 1389 and the environment, 877 and global governance, 1359 and image technology, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1427–1428 and India, 1211 and Japan, 1750 and the loss of optimism, 936 and minorities, 1547 versus nationalism, 1392


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I-22

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Globalization (continued ) and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and religious fundamentalism, 1397–1404 and sports, 999, 1000, 1001–1003 technology as facilitating, 135–136 and Vietnam, 1271 Glyndwr, ˆ Owain, 1637 Gobineau, Arthur, 40 Gocar, Josef, 594 “God Save the King,” 117 Godard, Jean-Luc, 1336 Goebbels, Joseph, 133, 1332 Goh Chok Tong, 1384 Gökalp, Mehmet Ziya, 766, 766, 770, 774 Gömbös, Gyula, 638 Gómez, Máximo, 1282 Gonçalves, Gomide, Antônio, 283 Gongaze, Georgiy, 1628 Gonne, Maud, 451 González, Juan Natalicio, 365 González Prada, Manuel, 373, 374 González Vigil, Francisco de Paula, 377 Good Friday Agreement, 1062, 1062, 1063 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 946, 979, 1039, 1079, 1581, 1582 and the Baltic states, 1078 Gordon, Andrew, 815 Gordon, Walter, 1842 Gorodetskii, S. M., 700 Görres, Joseph, 92 Gothicism, 223 Gottschalk, Louis Moreau, 76, 389, 1438 Gottwald, Klement, 1019, 1024 Gouges, Olympe de, 173–174 Gouldner, Alvin, 1473 Gounod, Charles, 117 Government(s) and Afghanistan, 1686, 1686–1687, 1692 and Algeria, 1099 and Angola, 1663 and Argentina, 272, 275 and Armenia, 1699 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1527–1528 and Brazil, 282–283, 284, 287, 289–290, 296 and Bulgaria, 578 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 302–303 and Catalonia, 1538–1539 and China, 795, 1192–1193 and Colombia, 828 and Czechoslovakia, 590 and England, 162, 163 and Ethiopia, 740, 741 European systems of, 419 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1317, 1317, 1321, 1323, 1323 and Finland, 598 and France, 169–171, 175, 176, 1048–1049, 1053–1054 German, Italian, Japanese postwar, 946–947

and Germany, 609, 611–613 and Great Britain, 1007–1008 and Greenland, 1562–1563, 1565, 1567 Haiti and instability in, 336–338 and India, 1204 instability of postindependence, 1469 and Iran, 986 and Iraq, 750, 1747 and Ireland, 648 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 675 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1766 and Japan, 812 and Nepal, 1809, 1811 and Nigeria, 1183, 1186 and Northern Ireland, 1059, 1063 and the Ottoman millet system, 761 and Palestinians, 1142 and Romania, 1588, 1588–1589 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Scotland, 234–235 and Spain, 702–703, 1084–1085, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 247–250, 249, 254–255 Tibetan exile, 1821, 1822 and the United States, 383–387, 391 and Uruguay, 398–399 and Vietnam, 1270–1271 and Wales, 1632 See also Democracy; Federalism Govineau, Arthur, 415 Gowon, Yakubu, 1185, 1186 Goya, Francisco de, 1437 Grabski, Stanisław, 685 Gracia, Gilberto Concepción de, 845 Gramsci, Antonio, 486 Granados, Enrique, 1437 Granatstein, Jack, 1842 Grant, George Parkin, 1838 Grant, James, 235 Grant, John, 235 Grau, Miguel, 377 Grau San Martín, Ramón, 1276 Great Britain, 236 (map), 1005–1015, 1006 (map), 1061 (map) and Arab nationalism, 727–728, 729 and Argentina, 269, 275, 279–280 and Australia, 850–851 and Brazil, 289 and Burma, 776–777, 781, 783, 783 and Canada, 299–300, 300, 307 and Central America, 318 and colonial divestment, 1461, 1464 and colonialism, 27, 490–491, 889, 958 communication and technology in, 128, 132, 1473 and Denmark, 150 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 36, 38–39, 426, 429, 432, 1381–1382 and Egypt, 259, 260–261, 262–263, 265


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and Eritrea, 1170 and Ethiopia, 740, 740 and European integration, 949, 1036, 1038, 1040 fascism in, 516 and Fiji, 1314, 1316, 1317, 1317, 1319 and film, 1337 and gender, 447–448, 450 and geopolitics, 468 and Haiti, 335, 340 and immigration, 1419, 1420 and India, 55, 131, 797, 798, 804–806, 1203 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 749–750, 752–753, 1739, 1742, 1745 and Ireland, 915 Irish in, 654 and Israel/Palestine, 1123, 1125, 1129, 1133, 1134–1135, 1140, 1402 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1762, 1763, 1764 and landscape art, 61, 62–64 and language, 472, 480, 482, 912 and Malaysia, 1213–1215, 1216, 1217, 1218 and the Maori, 1856 and the Middle East, 891 and minorities, 1412 and the Munich Conference, 595 and music, 1432, 1433, 1434, 1438, 1442, 1443 national anthem of, 117, 1431 and natural resources, 885 and Nepal, 1805 and New Zealand, 863, 868, 872 and Nigeria, 1178, 1181, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1058–1068 and the Ottoman Empire, 766, 767 and Pakistan, 1227, 1231 political philosophy in, 534–535 and Québec, 1288 and rituals of belonging, 507 and Scotland, 233–242 and South Africa, 1145–1146, 1150 and sports, 992, 996–998 symbols of, 114 and terrorism, 1488 and Tibet, 1818 and Uruguay, 396, 397 and Wales, 1631–1633, 1632 Great Depression and Burma, 777, 777 and Canada, 302 and Japan, 810, 821 Great Rebellion of 1780–1782 (Peru), 370–371 Greece, 623–633, 626 (map) and diaspora populations, 1374 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437–438 and the European Union, 1040 independence of, 46, 53, 464 and language, 477 and minorities, 1424 and Turkey, 1648

Greeks ethnic cleansing of, 438 Greek independence and diasporic, 627, 632 in Turkey, 1648 in the United States, 1427 Greenfeld, Liah, 938 Greenland, 220, 1561–1572 Greenpeace, 1361, 1362, 1448 Grégoire, Abbé, 173, 178 Gregory, Lady Augusta, 918, 922 Grenfell, Maria, 1439 Gretzky, Wayne “The Great One,” 1842 Grieg, Edvard, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 228, 417, 1436–1437 Griffith, David Wark, 1328 Grimm, Jacob and Wilhelm, 67, 406 Grímsson, Magnus, 228 Grofé, Ferde, 1439 Grotius, Hugo, 203 Groulx, Abbé Lionel, 1290, 1293, 1294 Gruffudd, Llywelyn ap, 1637 Grundtvig, N. F. S., 151, 151, 228, 429 Guantánamo Bay, 1280 Guaraní Indians, 358, 395 Guardiola, Santos, 315 Guatemala, 318, 319, 321 Guernica, 1515, 1519–1521 Guerrier, Philipe, 337 Guindon, Hubert, 1293 Guiteras, Antonio, 1282, 1283 Guizot, François, 177 Gulf War (1990–1991), 756, 952, 1408–1409, 1746–1747 and Germany, 1554 Gumilev, Nikolai, 94, 1601 Gustav I Vasa (Sweden), 226, 230 Gustav II Adolf, King (Sweden), 223, 224 (illus.), 226, 565 Gustav III (Sweden), 223 Gyanendra, King (Nepal), 1809 Haakon IV (Norway), 226 Habermas, Jürgen, 97, 1481, 1556 Habibullah II, 1686, 1688, 1691 Habsburg empire, 512, 541 and Austria, 539, 541, 543–544 and Belgium, 138–139 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Czechoslovaks, 584, 587–588 and the formation of Austria-Hungary, 512 and Germany, 189, 191 and Hungary, 407, 637 and language, 472 and Mexico, 350 nationalistic philosophers from the, 96 and the Netherlands, 196 and Poland, 679–681 and Switzerland, 252 Habyarimana, Juvenal, 1677


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I-24

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Hadj, Messali, 1097, 1099 Hadjiiski, Ivan, 577 Haegy, Xavier, 1508 Hagemann, Karen, 52 Haider, Jörg, 553 Haile Selassie, 740, 742, 743 Hailu, Kasa (Emperor Tewodros), 739, 743, 744 Haiti, 26, 174, 332–343, 334, 1414 Halbwachs, Maurice, 1343 Hallgrímsson, Jónas, 228 Halonen, Pekka, 605 Halperin Donghi, Tulio, 394 Hals, Frans, 203 Hamas, 972, 978, 986 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1142–1143 Hambach Festival, 190 Hamilton, Alexander, 22, 386, 387 Hamilton of Gilbertfield, 239 Hamitic hypothesis, 1678 Hammershaimb, Venceslaus, 225 Hansen, H. P., 156 Hanson, John, 386 Haq, Abdul, 1690 Harb, Talat, 729 Harlem Renaissance, 494 Harris, Lawren, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Harris, Leonard, 1008 Harry (Scottish minstrel), 239 Hasan, Zoya, 902 Hashshashin, 1489 Hatta, Mohammad, 1463 Haushofer, Karl, 460, 466, 467 (illus.), 491 Havel, Václav, 1026, 1027, 1028 Haydn, Franz Joseph, 117, 1432 Hayes, Joy Elizabeth, 132 Hazaras, 1693 Hazelius, Arthur, 229 Head, Bessie, 927 Health, and the environment, 882 Health care and Aboriginal Australians, 1847 and Canada, 1840 and New Zealand, 871, 871 and Pakistan, 1228 Heaney, Seamus, 925 Hebrew, 477 Hecht, Abraham, 1400, 1403 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17, 92–93, 187, 534 Hegemony Anglo-American, 1393 and Baltic nationalism, 558, 562 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1534 of Buenos Aires in Argentina, 275 and Chilean identity, 327 and Ethiopia, 738, 741 and Finnish nationalism, 605, 608 and gender issues, 445, 906 of German music, 80, 82

and Germany, 611 Germany and French, 186 and Great Britain, 397, 490 Japan and U.S., 1754, 1757 and literature, 486 and Mexican identity, 349, 352 nationalism in maintaining, 898, 1481 nationalist music as reaction against, 79 and Nepali nationalism, 1809 and Peru, 374 of political ideologies, 512 Prussian, 544 and Spain, 702, 711 technology as undermining, 136 and Turkey, 1646 and the United States, 837, 1300, 1301, 1309, 1310, 1742-1743 and World War I, 713 Heidegger, Martin, 533–534, 534 (illus.) Heidenstam, Verner von, 228 Heimat, 611, 883, 1344 Heimatbund, 1508 Heimatkunst, 417 Hein, Piet, 203 Heine, Heinrich, 501 Helfferich, Karl, 613 Hellenism, 623 Helvetic Republic, 248–249 Henderson, Paul, 1842 Henlein, Konrad, 595, 595 Henry, Paul, 659 Heraclitus, 533 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 17, 30–31, 73, 88–90, 89 (illus.), 185, 406, 529, 533 and the Baltic states, 561 and organicism, 462 Hernández, José, 278–279 Herndon, Angelo, 1303 Heroes/heroines, 446, 504, 1345 and Afghanistan, 1690 and Algeria, 1098–1099, 1099, 1102 and Armenia, 1706 and Australia, 857, 857 of the Baltic states, 564–565 and Bulgaria, 576, 577 and Burma, 782, 784 and Canada, 304–305 and Central America, 318 and Colombia, 831, 832 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164 and Cuba, 1282, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592 and England, 164–165 and film, 1331, 1332, 1333 and Finland, 604–605 and Great Britain, 1012 and India, 1209 and Indonesia, 1725, 1727 and Iran, 1113–1114, 1115, 1116 and Ireland, 658, 659


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and Korea, 1779–1781 and Latvia, 1578–1579 and Mongolia, 1786, 1789–1790, 1791, 1797, 1798 and New Zealand, 870 and Nigeria, 1187 and Palestinians, 1137 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 377 and the Philippines, 1245–1246 and Poland, 211, 214 and Québec, 1294 Russian, 1074 Scandinavian, 226–227 and Scotland, 232–233 and the Soviet Union, 694, 695, 696, 700, 951 and sports, 995 and Switzerland, 253–254 and Syria, 728 and Turkey, 1643, 1646–1647, 1653 and Uruguay, 402 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637 See also Leaders; Symbols Herrera, Bartolomé, 377 Herrera, Enrique Olaya, 830 Herries, William, 869 Hertzog, James Barry Munnik, 1148 Hervé, Gustave, 515 Herzl, Theodor, 1121, 1123, 1127 Hezbollah, 986 Hidalgo y Costilla, Miguel, 350 Higgins, H. B., 859 Hikmatyar, Gulbuddin, 1693 Hilden, Patricia, 56 Hilty, Carl, 252 Hindenburg, Paul von, 613 Hinduism and fundamentalism, 1393 and India, 107, 797, 803, 803, 987, 1204–1205, 1208–1210 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Nepal, 1806 Hindutva, 107, 108 Hirata Atsutane, 815 Hispanophilia versus hispanophobia in Mexico, 352–353 and Puerto Rico, 841 Historiography, 121, 406, 477, 880, 1343 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Algeria, 1098–1099 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 733–734 and Armenia, 1702, 1705–1708 and Australia, 855–858 and Austria, 551 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 564 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531 and Brazil, 292–295

and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 303–305, 1840 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 320 and China, 1195–1197, 1199–1200 and Colombia, 831–832 and colonialism, 917, 923–924 and Congo/Zaïre, 1162, 1163–1164 and Cuba, 1277–1278, 1281–1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1022–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Ethiopia, 742–744 and Fiji, 1318 and film, 1327–1328, 1336–1338 and Finland, 604 and France, 177–178, 1051–1052 and Germany, 188–189, 614, 617–619 and Great Britain, 1010–1011, 1011 and Greece, 629 and Greenland, 1568 and Haiti, 341 and India, 802–803, 1209 and Indonesia, 1727, 1728, 1730 and Iran, 1107, 1107, 1113–1116 and Iraq, 752–754, 757, 1741 and Ireland, 658–660 and Israel, 1125–1127 and Italy, 673–675 and Japan, 1750–1751 and Mexico, 354, 355–356 and Mongolia, 1788 and New Zealand, 864–865, 868–870 and Nigeria, 1183 and Northern Ireland, 1066 and Palestinians, 1139–1140 and Paraguay, 362–364 and the Philippines, 1244, 1245–1246 and Poland, 212, 214, 685–686 and Puerto Rico, 843–844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and Romania, 1592 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670, 1677–1678, 1679 and the Sami, 1618 and Scandinavia, 223, 223, 226–228, 228 and Scotland, 234, 237–239 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 700, 1076 and Spain, 708–709, 1086 and Switzerland, 247, 251, 252–254 and Taiwan, 1252, 1255–1256 and Turkey, 771, 773–774, 1646 and Ukraine, 721, 721 and Vietnam, 1269–1270 and Wales, 1637–1638 Hitler, Adolf, 413, 611, 613 and anti-Semitism, 517 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and Austria, 545, 546, 547


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Hitler, Adolf (continued ) and Czechoslovakia, 1019 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438, 439 and gender, 450, 454 and Hungary, 638 and music, 1431 ties with Mussolini, 516 Hiwet, Addis, 737 Hjärne, Harald, 228 Hlinka, Andrej, 585, 590 Ho Chi Minh, 952, 962, 963–964, 1264, 1266, 1267, 1267 (illus.) Hoad, Lew, 857 Hobbes, Thomas, 63 (illus.) Hobsbawm, Eric, 19, 23, 132, 473, 476, 478, 481 Hobson, William, 863 Hodge, John R., 1773 Hofmeyr, Jan, 1149 Hogg, James, 238 Holberg, Ludwig, 227 Holidays/festivals, 116, 504, 1346 and Australia, 855–856 and Azerbaijan, 1717 and the Baltic states, 567 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 295 and Bulgaria, 575–576 and Burma, 782 and Catalonia, 1543 and Central America, 319, 319 and Chile, 327, 328 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 594, 1025 and France, 1053 and Germany, 620 and India, 800, 1204 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 754 and Israel, 1129 and Japan, 1752 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 and the Maori, 1857 and Mexico, 347–349, 354 and the Netherlands, 204 and New Zealand, 869, 873 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1067–1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 211, 216–217, 685–686, 688 and Romania, 1586 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 and South Africa, 1150 and the Soviet Union, 695 and Spain, 709 and Switzerland, 244, 254 and Taiwan, 1256 and Turkey, 1651, 1652–1653, 1653

and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637, 1638 Holly, James Theodore, 340 Holocaust, 439–440, 517–518, 523, 524 and Austria, 546 and Czechoslovak Jews, 1020 and German guilt, 1555–1556, 1557–1558 guilt and the foundation of Israel, 1402 and immigration to Israel, 1121 and legitimacy of Zionism, 1128 as reconstituting ethnic borders, 617 remembrances of the, 1345 See also Genocide Holst, Gustav, 1432 Holstein, 147, 149, 150, 220, 222 Holy Roman Empire, 183, 186, 543, 619, 1816 Homosexuality, 907–908, 909–910 Honduras, 318, 321 Hoover, J. Edgar, 1304 Horowitz, Donald, 989 Horthy, Miklós, 638 Hosokawa, Toshio, 1440 Hotel Rwanda, 1674, 1675 Hou Hsaio-hsien, 1338 Hoxa, Enver, 952 Hozumi Yatsuka, 816 Hrushev’skyi, Mykhailo, 721, 721 Hsaya San, 777, 782 Hu Shi, 789, 793 Hua Guofeng, 1200 Hueber, Charles, 1509 Huggins, Jackie, 1849 Hugo, Victor, 177 Humanism, 41, 86, 87 Humbert, Ferdinand, 409 Humboldt, Alexander von, 34, 64, 65, 423, 462 Hume, David, 18, 234 Hume, John, 1062 Hunedoara, Iancu de, 1592 Hungary, 635–645, 640 (map) anti-Semitism in, 520, 521 and the Austro-Hungarian empire, 24 autonomy and, 407 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 441 and expansionism, 524 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and music, 1432, 1435 and nationalistic art, 412 and Slovakia, 587 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Huntington, Samuel, 929, 988, 1374 Hurston, Zora Neale, 494 Hurt, Jakob, 563–564, 567 Hus, Jan, 592, 1023 Husayn, Imam (Iran), 1115 Hussein, Saddam, 756–757, 758, 952, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Iran, 1115–1116 Hussein, Sharif, 727, 749, 750, 1739


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Hussitism, 1023 Hutton, C. M., 481 Hutus, 1669, 1675, 1677, 1678 Hyde, Douglas, 654–655, 657, 918 Hypernationalism, 1389–1390. See also Xenophobia Hyppolite, Florville, 338 Iancu, Avram, 1592 Ibn Sina, Abu Ali, 1113 Ibn Taymiyyah, 725 Ibsen, Henrik, 228 Iceland, 220–222, 226–228 and the environment/natural resources, 875–876, 885 independence and, 231 and national symbols, 230 reading and, 229 Icelandic Sagas, 227 (illus.) Idealism, 534–535 Identity, 27, 405, 528, 537, 930–932, 1351, 1418–1429 and Afghanistan, 1693–1695 and Algeria, 1100–1101, 1105 and Alsace, 1504 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 276–279 and Armenia, 1698, 1699–1700, 1701–1705, 1704, 1708 and Austria, 550, 551, 554 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1716–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 558, 561–562, 563, 563–565, 1576, 1577, 1577–1578, 1581 and Basques, 1519–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527, 1528–1530, 1531, 1533–1535 and Brazil, 283, 285–287, 288, 292–295, 294, 1826–1827 British versus English, 159–161, 162, 163, 167 and Bulgaria, 577 and Burma, 780–781 and Canada, 298, 302, 303–305, 1835–1843 and Catalonia, 1536–1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Central America, 313, 319–321 and Chile, 324–326, 327–329, 328 and China, 1198–1200 civic versus ethnic, 933–936 and Colombia, 832, 833, 834 and communications, 1474 and Congo/Zaïre, 1157, 1158–1159, 1160–1165 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1282–1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 1025 Dutch, 197, 198, 204 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 265 and the environment/landscape, 875–876, 879–880, 883, 884, 886 and Eritrea, 1174 and Ethiopia, 741–743, 744–746 European, 974, 1045–1046 and film, 1327, 1338–1340

and Finland, 598–605, 608 and France, 1056, 1057 and gender/sexuality, 43–45, 444–447, 909–910 and geopolitics, 458–459, 464–466 and Germany, 183–187, 190, 192–193, 611, 613–620, 621–622, 1549, 1552, 1555–1556, 1558 globalization and de-territorialization of, 1416 and Greece, 630, 633 and Greenland, 1565, 1567–1568, 1570 and Haiti, 341–342 and Hungary, 639–644, 645 after independence, 1465 and India, 797, 803 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726–1728, 1732, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Iraq, 757, 758–759, 1740, 1743 and Israel, 1124, 1127–1130 and Italy, 665, 670–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and Japan, 809–810, 813, 815, 820, 822, 1750–1751, 1755–1756, 1757–1578 and Korea, 1773, 1775–1776, 1778–1781 and landscape art, 59, 60–71 and language/literature, 482, 486, 492–495, 922–923 and Malaysia and Singapore, 1225 Maori, and intertribal unity, 1856, 1858, 1859–1860, 1863 and Mexico, 345, 347, 347–350, 351–356 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788–1789, 1792, 1793–1794, 1797, 1798 and music, 78–83 and national symbols, 113, 122–123, 1342–1348 in nationalist political philosophy, 97, 473–476 and Nepal, 1803, 1804, 1805–1806, 1807, 1811 and New Zealand, 863, 864–870 and Northern Ireland, 1065–1066 and overdetermination, 121 and Palestinians, 1133, 1134, 1138–1139 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1849 and Paraguay, 360, 362, 365–366 and Peru, 378 and Poland, 209, 213, 682, 686–688 and Puerto Rico, 839, 841–843 and Québec, 1293–1294 and religion versus ideology, 972–973 religious, 99, 103, 109, 983, 988–989. See also Religion and rituals of belonging, 499, 509. See also Rituals of belonging role of education in, 29–41 and Romania, 1589–1591 and Russia/Soviet Union, 690–701, 1599–1601 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672–1673, 1677, 1679 and the Sami, 1614, 1615, 1617 and Scandinavia, 222–225, 226–228 and Scotland, 233, 234


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Identity (continued ) and social class, 1, 3–4 and South Africa, 1149–1150 and Spain, 1083, 1085–1087, 1092 and sports, 995, 996, 997–998, 1002–1003 and Switzerland, 251, 251–252, 253 and Taiwan, 1253–1255, 1257–1260 and technology, 134–135, 1476, 1481 and Tibet, 1815, 1817–1818, 1821–1823 and Turkey, 761–763, 764–765, 766, 768–770, 1645–1647, 1650 and Ukraine, 718–721, 720, 1622–1623 and the United States, 389, 392, 1307, 1307–1308 and Uruguay, 400, 401–402, 403 and Vietnam, 1266–1269, 1271 and Wales, 1636, 1640 Ideology, 971–989 and China, 794–795, 1193, 1194–1197, 1195, 1197 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1280–1281 globalization, disillusionment, and, 936–941 and Iraq, 752 and Malaysia, 1223 and nationalist movements, 940–941 and Russia, 692–697 and the United States, 1307–1308 and Vietnam, 1269 See also Communism; Fascism; Nationalism; Philosophy, political Igbo, 1469 Iglesias, Santiago, 839 Ileto, Reynaldo, 1245 Iliescu, Ion, 1586, 1587, 1589 Iliolo, Ratu Josefa, 1325 Immigrants/immigration, 1418–1429 and Alsace, 1510 and Argentina, 276, 277, 279, 280, 492 and Australia, 850 and Basques, 1517 and Burma, 777, 783 and Canada, 304, 1837 and Catalonia, 1538, 1542–1543, 1544 and Colombia, 833 and cosmopolitanism, 1362 and Cuba, 1275 and Denmark, 155 education and, 420, 423–424 and the European Union, 1042 and France, 1055–1056, 1056 and gender, 448 and Germany, 1554, 1556 and globalization, 1409, 1411–1412, 1415 and Great Britain, 1007, 1009, 1013 and Greenland, 1566 and homeland politics, 1414–1415, 1416 and Indonesia, 1729 and Israel, 1121, 1129, 1130 and Japan, 1749, 1753, 1753 and language, 482, 483–484

and Latvia, 1575 and Malaysia, 1215 and Mongolia, 1797 and nativism, 883 and the Netherlands, 202, 206 and New Zealand, 864, 867, 868, 1856 and Pakistan, 1237 and Puerto Rico, 839 and Québec, 1296–1297 and Russia, 1604–1605 and Scandinavia, 231 and sports, 1000 and Turkey, 1650 and the United States, 1304, 1306, 1308, 1311 and Uruguay, 402 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnicity; Minorities; Refugees Imoudu, Michael, 1181 Imperialism. See Colonialism/imperialism Incas, 367–368, 370–371, 373 Income distribution and Australia, 853 and Brazil, 1831–1832 and Iran, 1111 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 955 and the United States, 1307, 1308 Independence and Afghanistan, 1684 in Africa, 890 and Algeria, 1098, 1099, 1100 and Angola, 1664–1665 and Arab nationalism, 728 and Argentina, 269–273 and Armenia, 1709–1710 and Austria, 542, 548–550, 552–553 and the Baltic states, 556–557, 562, 568, 1575, 1577–1578 and Belgium, 140, 142–143 and Brazil, 282, 287, 289, 295 and Bulgaria, 573–574, 578–580 and Burma, 777, 782–785 and Central America, 313, 319 and Chile, 326–327, 328 during the Cold War era, 949–950, 960, 969 and Colombia, 825 and Congo/Zaïre, 1161 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1277 and developing countries, 980 and Eritrea, 1173, 1173–1175 and Fiji, 1316–1317, 1320 and Finland, 223, 231, 605, 606 and Greece, 46, 53, 623, 625–631 and Greenland, 1571 and Haiti, 336 and Hungary, 638 and Iceland, 231 and India, 804–806, 889–890, 1201–1203 and Indonesia, 1722–1723, 1725, 1727, 1733–1734


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and Iraq, 750, 752–753 Latin America and, 46, 272 and Mexico, 349–350 and Mongolia, 1790, 1795 and New Zealand, 872 and Nigeria, 1181–1183 and Norway, 223–225, 231 and Pakistan, 1229–1231 and Paraguay, 359, 360–361 and Peru, 370, 371 and the Philippines, 1240–1241 and Poland, 681, 687–688 and popular nationalist movements, 503 to protect national culture, 1355 and Puerto Rico, 839–840, 841, 843, 844–847 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Santo Domingo, 332–333 and South Africa, 1150–1151 and Taiwan, 1256–1257 and technology, 1479 and Tibet, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 767–768 and Ukraine, 722, 1626, 1626–1627 and Uruguay, 397 See also Anticolonialism/anti-imperialism; Separatism/secession; Sovereignty India, 796–806, 799 (map), 943, 949–950, 1201–1211, 1202 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and colonialism, 48 and diaspora populations, 1372, 1373 education and, 424, 429 and gender, 446, 451, 902 government in, 981 and Great Britain, 889–890 and independence, 963, 1006, 1461–1462 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1771, 1765 and the Khalifat Movement, 1763 language/literature in, 920, 922, 923, 927 and music, 1440, 1441, 1443 and Nepal, 1802 and new social movements, 1452 and Pakistan, 967–968, 1229–1231, 1234–1235, 1235 politics in, 976–977, 987 railroad in, 131 and religion, 107 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 and terrorism, 1495 and the Tibetan government-in-exile, 1821, 1822 and water, 885 Indians, in Malaysia, 1215, 1216 Indigenismo, 352 Indigenous groups and Argentina, 277, 280 and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 283, 285, 293, 1826, 1828

and Canada, 303, 1837, 1840 and Central America, 310, 311, 317 and Chile, 324–326, 327 and Colombia, 829, 830 colonialism and, 889, 893, 912–913, 914–917 and education, 1383, 1385 and the environment/natural resources, 879, 883–884 and Fiji, 1314–1325 influence on music of, 1438–1439 Inuit, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 and language, 472, 482 and Malaysia, 1213–1215 and Mexico, 345–346, 351 and new social movements, 1448, 1451–1452 and Peru, 370–371, 372–375 and Québec, 1297 and Taiwan, 1252 and the United States, 1309 and Uruguay, 394–395 See also Maori; Pan-Aboriginalism; Sami Indo-Fijians, 1314–1325, 1318 Indo-Pakistan War, 1767 Indonesia, 1722–1735, 1724 (map) aircraft industry in, 1476 diversity and government in, 953–954 and independence, 1462–1463 and Malaysia, 1220 and the Netherlands, 197, 204 political tensions in, 938 radio hobbyists in, 128 separatist movements in, 1468 and technology, 1479–1480 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and transmigration, 876 Industrial Revolution, 161 Industrialization and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Basques, 1514–1515, 1517 and Catalonia, 1537 and Central America, 317 and class, 55–56 and Czechoslovakia, 1022 and England, 161 and Eritrea, 1169 and the European revolutions of 1848, 47 and Finland, 598 and geopolitics, 461 and Germany, 611 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 648, 661 and Italy, 665 and Japan, 424, 1748–1749 and Korea, 1778 and Mongolia, 1785 and nationalism, 1475, 1480 and Pakistan, 1228 and Poland, 209, 679, 681 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Québec, 1293–1294


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Industrialization (continued ) and Romania, 1585, 1587 and Russia, 699 and Scandinavia, 221 socialism and, 205 and the Soviet Union, 1075 and Spain, 703–704, 1084, 1086 and Switzerland, 245 and Ukraine, 714–715 and the United States, 1309 See also Economy Inequality and education, 1382, 1385–1386 and gender, 901–902, 903–904 and globalization, 936 and oil revenues in the Middle East, 1396 See also Income distribution; Rights Infrastructure and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 296, 1829 and China, 1193, 1200 education, 1381 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1169 and Indonesia, 1723 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 205 and Pakistan, 1227–1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and religious fundamentalism, 1400 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1680 and Spain, 706, 708 and technological advances, 127–128, 131–132 and Tibet, 1814 and the United States, 389–390 Ingrians (Ingers), 557 Ingush, 441 Injannashi, 1788, 1789 Innis, Harold Adams, 1474, 1475 ˙Inönü, ˙Ismet, 768 Inoue Nissho, 816–817 Intellectuals, 1707 and Algeria, 1100 and Arab nationalism, 725, 730–733, 734 and Armenia, 1706 and Bulgaria, 571–572, 573 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1842 and China, 789–790, 792, 793, 793 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 and France, 1052 and Germany, 183–185 independence and Greek, 626–627, 629–630 and Indonesia, 1725 and Iraq, 1741, 1745 and Latvia, 1575, 1577 and Mongolia, 1785–1786 and Nigeria, 1180 and Scandinavian nationalism, 221–222, 223

the Soviet Union and disciplining, 1074–1076 and Ukraine, 718 Young Ottomans/Turks, 763, 763, 764–765, 767, 771, 774 See also Elites International institutions. See Global institutions International Labour Organization (ILO), 1610 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 1229, 1829, 1829 International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), 1359–1361 Internationalism, 536 and Angola, 1663 and Germany, 1551, 1559–1560 and globalization, 1408–1410 issue-specific, 1361–1362 versus nationalism, 418, 1342 and sports, 991 See also Post-nationalism; Transnationalism Internet and Armenia, 1709 and diaspora populations, 1370 and national identity, 1476, 1481–1483 and transnationalism, 1339 Interpellation, 486, 489–490 Intervention. See Foreign intervention Intifada, 1141 Inuit, 879, 1562, 1564 (map), 1566–1568 Ioann, Metropolitan, 106 Iqbal Lahori, Muhammad, 1229–1230, 1230, 1233 Iran, 1106–1118, 1108 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714 and gender, 446 and Iraq, 758, 1743 and Islamic fundamentalism, 986 and new social movements, 1452 and Palestine, 1142 and religious fundamentalism, 1396–1397 and terrorism, 1488 and the United States, 952 See also Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 756, 757, 952, 1112, 1115, 1116, 1746 Iraq, 747–759, 748 (map), 1736–1747, 1738 (map) borders of, 966 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1389 and Iran, 1115–1116 U.S. invasion of, 954, 955, 1497 water, 884–885 See also Gulf War (1990–1991); Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) Ireland, 647–662 Celtic revival in, 407 and colonialism, 915 and diaspora populations, 1374, 1375–1376


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economy of, 1060, 1408 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 112–113 and gender/sexuality, 452, 908 and immigration, 1424 and independence, 166, 1006 language and literature in, 488, 913–914, 918, 919, 920, 922–925 and Northern Ireland, 1060–1062, 1062, 1068 and sports, 997–998, 999–1000 Irian Jaya, 1734 Irish National Land League, 653–654 Ironsi, Johnson Aguiyi, 1185 Irving, Washington, 389 Isabella of Castile, 709 Islam and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1690, 1694 and Arab nationalism, 731, 733 and Azerbaijan, 1716 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and the caliphate, 760–761 and India, 797 and Indonesia, 1728, 1734 and Iraq, 755, 1737, 1743–1745 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1763, 1768 and national identity, 103–105 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763, 764 and Pakistan, 1236 and the Philippines, 1239 and politics, 983–987 in Russia, 1605–1607 and Turkey, 768, 1653–1654 See also Islamic fundamentalists; Shiism/ Shiites; Sunnis Islamic fundamentalists, 984–987, 1392, 1393, 1396–1400 and Algeria, 1101, 1102–1103 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1769 and Pakistan, 1232–1233 and the Palestinians, 1137–1138, 1139, 1141–1143 and terrorism, 1492, 1495 in Turkey, 1649 Islamization, 1397–1400 Ismail, King (Egypt), 259, 260 Israel, 953, 1120–1130, 1122 (map) and counterterrorism, 1496 and diaspora populations, 1367 and education, 1387–1388 and environmental nationalism, 880 and minorities, 1374 and music, 1443 and Palestinians, 1133–1143 and religious fundamentalism, 1394, 1398, 1401–1402 and the Suez War, 266 symbols of, 114, 116 and water, 885 Isto, Edvard (Eetu), 603 (illus.) István, King (Hungary), 643

Itagaki Taisuke, 820 Italy, 663–677 and democracy, 946–947 and diaspora populations, 1372 education and, 426, 429, 432 and Eritrea, 1169–1170 and Ethiopia, 737, 740, 740 fascism in, 419, 514–516, 518–519 and film, 1333–1334 form of nationalism in, 502 and gender, 448–449 and language, 472 and the Libyan war, 514 and minorities, 1374, 1412, 1424 and music, 1437–1438, 1441 and nationalistic art, 410, 413, 414–415, 418 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and terrorism, 1491 unification (Risorgimento) of, 24, 47, 52, 407, 464, 468, 512 Ivan the Terrible, 700 Ives, Charles, 1439 Iwakura Mission, 818–820 Izetbegović, Alija, 1527 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev (Vladimir), 1123 Jacini, Stefano, 669 Jackson, A. Y., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jacobitism, 175, 233, 238, 238 Jacobsen, J. C., 154 Jacobus, Stephanus, 1149 Jahn, Friedrich Ludwig, 92, 186 Jakobson, Carl Robert, 562 Jamaica, 495 James, C. L. R., 992, 1301 James VI (Scotland)/James I (England), 61 Jamieson, John, 239 Jammu and Kashmir, 1462, 1759–1771, 1762 (map) conflict in, 1203–1204, 1234–1235, 1235, 1465–1466 Jang Bahadur, 1807 Jangghar, 1791 Jannsen, Johann Voldemar, 562 Japan, 808–822, 811 (map), 819 (map), 821 (map), 1748–1758, 1750 (map) and Burma, 777, 784–785 and China, 791, 792, 795, 1190 colonialism and, 1462 and democracy, 947 education and, 38, 40, 424, 426 and gender, 445, 450, 456 and India, 806 and Korea, 1773, 1775, 1780 and language, 472, 478 and the Meiji Restoration, 27 and Mongolia, 1792, 1795, 1796 and music, 1439–1440, 1441 nationalism and literature in, 491–492 origins of nationalism in, 9


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Japan (continued ) and politics, 988 and religion, 106–107 and sports, 1001 and Taiwan, 1250, 1251 and terrorism, 1491 Jargalsaikhan, D., 1794 Jarl, Birger, 226 Järnefelt, Eero, 605 Jefferson, Thomas, 22, 32, 65, 211, 370, 387, 388 Jesuits, 350–351 Jews and Austria, 546 in the Baltic states, 563 in Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1022 and the Diaspora, 1366, 1367 as discredited sexuality, 907 and Egypt, 265, 266 and establishment of Israel, 1402 ethnic cleansing and genocide in Russia, 438 and Germany, 188, 193, 430 and the Holocaust, 439–440, 523 and Hungary, 644, 645 in Iraq, 755–756 in Macedonia and Thrace during the Holocaust, 582 and the Netherlands, 199 and pogroms in Ukraine, 722 and Poland, 207, 209 in Romania, 1594 and Switzerland, 249 in Turkey, 1649 in the United States, 1398, 1400 See also Anti-Semitism; Israel; Judaism Jibzundamba Khutugtu, Eighth, 1788, 1792 Jinnah, Muhammad Ali, 804, 976, 1229, 1230, 1230–1231, 1233, 1461 Joergensen, A. D., 152, 154 Jogaila (Lithuanian prince), 564 John, King (England), 165 John Paul II, Pope, 948, 988 Johnson, Barry, 1399 Johnson, James, 73 Johnson, Lyndon, 944, 1310 Johnson, Samuel, 60 Johnston, Frank, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Jones, Aneurin, 1637 Jones, Inigo, 61 Joseph II (Austria-Hungary), 138, 140 Jospin, Lionel, 1510 Joubert, Piet, 1146 Joyce, James, 489, 658, 914, 923, 924 Juan Carlos I, King (Spain), 1087 Judaism and fundamentalism (Ultra-Orthodoxy), 1124, 1392, 1393, 1395, 1400–1403 and national identity, 103 See also Jews Juliana, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Júnior, Caio Prado, 292

Kabila, Joseph, 1165 Kabila, Laurent-Désiré, 1165 Kagame, Paul, 1674 Kalaallit. See Greenland Kalevala, The, 227, 228, 406, 599, 602, 604 Kallay, Benjamin von, 1529 Kalmyks, 1784, 1790–1791, 1792, 1794–1795 Kamenev, Lev, 520 Kamil, Husayn, 262 Kamil, Mustafa, 261 Kangxi, Emperor, 1252 Kant, Immanuel, 14, 17, 86, 87–88, 533, 1352 Kaplan, Robert, 929 Karaites (Karaim), 557 Karamzin, Nikolai, 94 Karavelov, Luben, 573 Karel IV, king of Bohemia, 592 Karelia, 599, 600, 608 Karlsbad Decrees, 187, 189 Karmal, Babrak, 1687 Karnaviˇcus, Jurgis, 560 Károlyi, Count Mihály, 638 Karzai, Ahmed Wali, 1694 (illus.) Karzai, Hamid, 1686, 1695 Kasavubu, Joseph, 1158 Kashmir. See Jammu and Kashmir Kasparov, Gary, 951 Katanga, 1158, 1469 Kaunitz, Chancellor (Austria), 33–34 Kayibanda, Gregoire, 1677 Kazakhs, 1798 Kazakhstan, 1079, 1798 Kazimierz (Casimir) III (Prussia), 214 Keane, John, 1446, 1456 Kedourie, Elie, 474, 533 Keller, Ferdinand, 413 Kellerman, François, 1504 Kelly, Edward “Ned,” 857, 857 Kemal, Mustafa (Atatürk), 451, 633, 767–770, 1643, 1646–1647, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1653 and Turkish identity, 766 Kemal, Namik, 763, 763, 766, 770, 774 Kemboi, Ezekiel, 1001 Kennan, George C., 945 Kennedy, John F., 944 Kent, William, 62 Kenya education and, 429 and literature, 919–920, 925–926 and music, 1440, 1441 Kenyatta, Jomo, 965 Kerber, Linda, 50 Kerkorian, Kirk, 1707 Key, Francis Scott, 117, 1443 Keyser, Rudolf, 228 Khachaturian, Aram, 1707 Khalifat Movement, 1763 Khan, Abatai, 1791 Khan, Abdul Qadir, 1236 Khan, Altan, 1817


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Khan, Chinggis (Genghis), 1786, 1786, 1791, 1798, 1816 Khan, Dayan, 1786 Khan, Ishaq, 1232 Khan, Mohammad Ayub, 1232 Khan, Sayyid Ahmad, 801 Khan, Yahya, 1232 Khan, Yaqub, 1690–1691 Khan Khattak, Khushal, 1690 Khatami, Mohammad, 1117 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla, 952, 986, 1111, 1114, 1396, 1397, 1399, 1400 Khomiakov, A. S., 692 Khorenatsi, Movses, 1702, 1708 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 948, 952, 979, 1076, 1077, 1603 Khutugtu, Jibzundamba, 1790 Khyvliovyi, Mykola, 718 Kidd, Benjamin, 532 Kierkegaard, Søren, 228 Kim Dae Jung, 1779 Kim Il Sung, 952, 1773, 1779–1781, 1780 Kim Jong Il, 1780 Kincaid, Jamaica, 924 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 123, 938, 1203, 1304 King, Michael, 869 King, Rodney, 1339 King, Sir Frederic Truby, 871 King, William Lyon Mackenzie, 306 Kireevskii, I. V., 692 Kiribati, 1443 Kissinger, Henry, 458 Kivi, Aleksis, 602 Kjellén, Rudolf, 460, 463, 491 Klaus, Václav, 1027, 1028 Kléber, Jean-Baptiste, 1504 Klingler, Werner, 133 Knudsen, Knud, 225–226 Kochanowski, Jan, 214 Kodály, Zoltán, 81, 1432, 1435 Kohl, Helmut, 1549 Kohn, Hans, 23, 392, 474 Koidula, Lydia, 564 Koirala, B. P., 1803, 1807 Koizumi, Prime Minister (Japan), 1755 Kolberg, Oskar, 216 Köler, Johann, 564 Kolettis, Ioannis, 632 Kollár, Jan, 592 Kołła˛taj, Hugo, 211 Kollontai, Alexandra, 453, 454 Konovalets, Yevhen, 718 Kopernik, Mikołaj (Nicholas Copernicus), 214 Korais, Adamantios, 626, 628, 628 Korchynsky, Dmytro, 1628 Korea, 1467, 1772–1781, 1774 (map) education and, 424 and independence, 1462 and Japan, 809, 810, 815, 818, 1749 and sports, 1001

Koreans, in Japan, 1753 Körner, Theodor, 73 Korppi-Tommola, Aura, 54 Ko´sciuszko, Tadeusz, 96, 211, 211, 214, 686 Kosovo, 1409, 1554, 1555 Kossuth, Lajos, 638, 643 Kossuth, Louis, 239 Kostecki, Platon, 716 Koyama Eizo, 822 Kozyrev, Andrei, 1597 Kracauer, Siegfried, 1330–1331 Kramáˇr, Karel, 590 Krasicki, Ignacy, 214 Krasiński, Zygmunt, 212, 214, 216 Kraszewski, Józef Ignacy, 216–217, 685 Kravchuk, Leonid, 1078, 1597, 1621, 1622, 1626 Kreutzwald, Friedrich Reinhard, 564, 567 Krieck, Wilhelm, 426 Kronvalds, Atis, 1577 Kruger, Paul, 1146, 1150–1151 Krupskaya, Nadezhda, 453, 454 Kuchma, Leonid, 1080, 1621, 1622, 1625, 1628 Kun, Béla, 520 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, 1079 Kunchov, Vasil, 580 Kurds and European partition, 891–893 and Iraq, 752–753, 755, 756, 1737, 1741–1742, 1745 and terrorism, 1491 and Turkey, 769, 885, 1646, 1650, 1653, 1655 Kushner, Barak, 822 Kutuzov, Dmitrii, 696 Kutuzov, Mikhail, 1074 Kuwait, 1743 Kuyper, Abraham, 200, 1149 Kymlicka, Will, 97, 931 Kyoto treaty, 877, 1447, 1456, 1457 Kyrlylenko, Vyacheslav, 1626 Labor/employment and Australia, 852 and Burma, 777, 781 and England, 164 and Fiji, 1314–1315 and Great Britain, 1012–1013 and Iraq, 1746 and the knowledge worker, 1380 and migration, 1422, 1424 and Nigeria, 1181 shortages and ethnic cleansing/genocide, 441 slavery, 889. See also Slavery and South Africa, 1145–1146 specialization of, 130 and the United States, 1304, 1309 Ladulås, Magnus, 226 Lagarde, Pierre, 409 Lagerbring, Sven, 227 Lahiri, Jhumpa, 927 Laicism, 769


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Lal, Brij V., 1322 Lalli (Finnish hero), 604–605 Lamanskii, Vladimir, 1601 Lamas, Andrés, 402 Lamming, George, 913, 917, 924 Land ownership and Australia, 1851–1852 and Fiji, 1314, 1322 and Haiti, 338, 342 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Ireland, 648, 653 and Japan, 811–812 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1861–1863, 1862 and Paraguay, 358 and Puerto Rico, 845 and South Africa, 1151 Land rights/claims and Afghanistan, 1692 and the Baltic states, 568 and Burma, 783 and the Inuit, 1567 and new social movements, 1450, 1451–1452 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846 and the Sami, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1617 Land sacralization, 100, 103 Landes, Joan, 49 Landsbergis, Vytautus, 1078 Landscape, 59–71 and Afghanistan, 1685 and Canada, 1841 and Denmark, 154 and England, 162 and Finland, 599, 604 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1127–1128, 1129 and music, 78–79 and national identity, 875–876, 1342, 1344–1345 and Russia, 698 and the Sami, 1614 and Scandinavia, 228 and Switzerland, 251, 252 as symbols, 114–115 and Turkey, 770 and Ukraine, 1621 and Wales, 1633 See also Environment Lange, Christian, 228 Language, 471–484, 912–928 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1692 and Afrikaner nationalism, 1147 and Algeria, 1095, 1101 and Alsace, 1502–1503, 1509, 1510 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 733 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703 and Austria, 542 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and the Baltic states, 557, 560, 561, 562, 563 and Basques, 704, 710–711, 1092, 1512, 1514 (map), 1516, 1522

and Belgium, 138, 141–142, 144–145, 146 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Brazil, 285, 289, 1825 and Bulgaria, 572–573 and Canada, 303, 307, 1840 and Catalans, 706, 1537, 1542, 1544, 1546 and China, 1199 and cultural survival, 878–879 and Czechoslovakia, 590, 1017, 1021 and Denmark, 154 dictionaries and standardizing, 477 education and, 420, 424–425, 427 and Egypt, 259 and Eritrea, 1170, 1172, 1173–1174 and Ethiopia, 741, 746 and Europe, 1031 and Fiji, 1320 and Finland, 598–599, 601, 601–602, 605–606 and France, 34, 178 and Germany, 185 and globalization, 1392 and Greece, 629–630 and Greenland, 1565, 1566, 1568, 1570–1571 and Haiti, 339 and Hungary, 641 and immigration, 1420, 1421 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723–1725, 1728 and Ireland, 657, 660 and Israel, 1124, 1127, 1129 and Italy, 665, 671 and Japan, 813 and Latvia, 1575, 1577, 1578, 1582 and Malaysia, 1217, 1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1860 and Mexico, 345, 346 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790, 1791–1792, 1796, 1798 and national boundaries, 461 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 16, 533, 1355–1356 and nationalistic music, 78, 80 and Nepal, 1807 and the Netherlands, 199 and New Zealand, 1383 and Pakistan, 1233, 1235–1236 and Paraguay, 358, 364, 365 and the Philippines, 1247 and Poland, 217, 679, 688 and political philosophy, 88–89, 91 and print technology, 1475 and Puerto Rico, 841, 845 and Québec, 1291, 1293, 1296 and Romania, 1588, 1589–1591 and the Sami, 1613–1614 and Scandinavia, 225–226 and Singapore, 1224–1225 and South Africa, 1149 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Spain, 707


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and Switzerland, 245 and Taiwan, 1258 and Tibet, 1815, 1818, 1820 and Turkey, 772–773, 1646, 1646, 1652, 1655 and Ukraine, 714, 719, 719, 720, 721, 1621, 1623–1624, 1625, 1627 and the United States, 389 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 and Wales, 1632, 1634–1636, 1635, 1638 Laos, 1463 Lapage, Robert, 1294 Laporte, Pierre, 1291 Laqueur, Walter, 1489, 1498 Larrazábal, Antonio, 317 Larsson, Carl, 228 Laski, Harold, 981 Lassale, F., 38 Lastarria, José Victorino, 329 Latin America development of nationalism in, 8, 9, 16, 26, 46 and film, 1335 and language, 472 and nationalistic music, 76 and new social movements, 1450–1452 See also specific Latin American countries Latvia, 1573–1582, 1573 (map) fascism in, 517 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Lavalleja, Juan Antonio, 399 Lavater, Johann Kaspar, 251 Lavin, Mary, 925 Lawson, Henry, 854 Laxman, Adam, 810 Le Carre, John, 951 Le Corbusier, 1206 Le Pen, Jean-Marie, 1054, 1056, 1447, 1453, 1510 Le Republicain (L’Union), 341, 342 Leaders and Africa, 890 and Angola, 1661–1663, 1662 anticolonial nationalist, 962–964 and Arab nationalism, 730–731, 732, 732–733 and Argentina, 277–278 and Armenia, 1699 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532 and Canada, 306, 1837 and Central America, 317–318, 320–321 and China, 790, 794, 1200 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158, 1160 and Denmark, 153 and Egypt, 258–259 and France, 1051, 1052 and Germany, 189, 190 and Haiti, 336–337, 338 and India, 1206–1207, 1207, 1765 and Indonesia, 1723, 1726, 1727 and Iraq, 758 Islamic attacks on Muslim, 1397–1398

and Islamic movements, 984–985 and Israel, 1121, 1123, 1123, 1128 and Japan, 818–820, 1751–1752, 1752 and Korea, 1775, 1780 and the Maori, 1856–1857, 1857, 1858 and Mongolia, 1789–1790 monuments to, 410–411 and national identity, 1345 as national symbols, 114, 116 and Nepal, 1803, 1806 and new social movements, 1453 and Nigeria, 1180, 1180–1181, 1182, 1187 and Pakistan, 1230 and Palestinians, 1134, 1136–1137, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846, 1848, 1848, 1851, 1853 and Paraguay, 364 and the Philippines, 1241–1242, 1242, 1244 and Poland, 210–212, 681–683, 682 and Puerto Rico, 839–840 qualities of, 982 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1597 and the Sami, 1616, 1616–1618 and separatist movements, 1464–1465 and Singapore, 1221 and South Africa, 1150–1151, 1152 and the Soviet Union, 1072, 1075 and Taiwan, 1253 and Uruguay, 398 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Heroes/heroines League of Arab States, 729 League of Nations failure of the, 1402 and Iraq, 750, 1739 and Israel, 1123 Mandates, 728, 1461 and New Zealand, 872 Lebanon, 728 Lechner, Frank, 1392 Leclerc, Charles, 336 Leclerc de Buffon, Georges-Louis, 351 Lee, Richard Henry, 385 Lee Kuan Yew, 1220, 1221 Lee Teng-hui, 1253, 1253–1254, 1255, 1256, 1258, 1259 Legal system/institutions and Central America, 314, 315, 319 and France, 174, 176 and the Netherlands, 202 and Scandinavia, 227 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 254 Legitimacy and Angola, 1666 and Chinese communists, 1196, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1370–1371 and ideologies and religions, 972–973 and Iran, 1109


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I-36

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Legitimacy (continued ) and modern nation-states, 930 and national sports, 998–999 and North versus South Korea, 1776, 1778–1779 and the Qing Dynasty in China, 788 Legitime, Francois, 338 Leino, Eino, 605 Lej Iyasu, 740, 740 Lelewel, Joachim, 212, 214, 692 Lemarchand, Rene, 1676 Lemieux, Mario “The Magnificent,” 1842 Lemkin, Raphael, 436 Lenin, Vladimir (Vladimir Il’ich Ulianov), 436, 697, 978, 981, 1072 and ethnicities, 1599 and film, 1330 on nationalism, 1071 León y Gama, Antonio de, 351, 351 Leopold I (Belgium), 142 Leopold II (Belgium), 1156 Lepeletier, L. M., 34 Lerroux, Alejandro, 710 Lesage, Jean, 1290, 1290 Lespinasse, Beauvais, 341 Lester, Richard, 1337 Lévesque, René, 1290, 1290, 1291, 1291 (illus.), 1294 Levitt, Kari, 1842 Levski, Vasil, 573, 576, 576 Levsky, Vasil, 96 Levy, Andrea, 928 Lewis, C. S., 971 Lewis, Geoffrey, 773 Lewis, Saunders, 1635 Liberalism, 14–15, 23–28, 535–536, 537 and Australia, 854 and Brazil, 1830 as detached from democracy, 1306 and European nationalism, 512–513 and Finland, 598 German, 17 and Indonesia, 1732 and Italy, 669 versus nationalism, 1350–1351. See also Nationalism, liberal and Paraguay, 364–365 and Puerto Rico, 841 and Spain, 704 See also Economic liberalism Liberties. See Rights Liborio, 1283 Libyan war, 514 Liebermann, Max, 416 Liebknecht, Karl, 520 Liechtenstein, 1443 Lieux de mémoire (realms of memory) movement, 121–122 Lijphart, Arend, 206 Lilburn, Douglas, 1439 Lincoln, Abraham, 382, 391

Lindeman, Ludvig Mathias, 73 Lindsay, A. D., 536 Linguistic internationalists, 471 Lippmann, Walter, 950 Lira, Luciano, 401 Lismer, Arthur, 1841, 1841 (illus.) Lisson, Carlos, 374 List, Friedrich, 18, 191, 192, 463 Liszt, Franz, 74, 81, 1432, 1435 Literacy rates, 495–497, 496 (map) and Pakistan, 1228 Literature, 465, 485–497, 912–928 and Argentina, 278–279 and Armenia, 1700, 1701, 1702, 1703 Austrian, 543 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Brazil, 285, 287 and Bulgaria, 576–577 and Canada, 1841 and Catalonia, 1543 and Chile, 329, 330 and Colombia, 832 and Finland, 602, 604, 605 and France, 177, 1052 and gender, 49 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and India, 800, 1209 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 1740 and Ireland, 657, 658–659 and Mongolia, 1789, 1794 and Nepal, 1807, 1808 and the Philippines, 1244–1245 and Poland, 682, 685 and Russia, 692 and the Sami, 1615 and Scandinavia, 228 and Scotland, 238–239 and the Soviet Union, 694, 698, 1075–1076, 1077, 1077 and Spain, 708 and Turkey, 763, 770 and Ukraine, 720 and the United States, 389, 951 See also Poetry Lithuania, 561 and gender/sexuality, 908 and the Soviet Union, 1078 See also Baltic states Livingston, David, 164 Livs, 557 Localism and globalization, 1411 nationalism as, 1415 and subsidiarity, 881 See also Regionalism Loggia, Enrico Galli della, 676 Lomonosov, M. V., 694 Lönnrot, Elias, 228, 406, 599, 602 López, Carlos Antonio, 362, 363, 364


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López, Narciso, 1282 Lopez, Vicente Fidel, 276 López Pumarejo, Alfonso, 830–831, 832 Louis-Philippe, 408 Louis XVI, King (France), 1489 Louis XVIII, King (France), 1443 Louisiana Purchase, 390 Lower, Arthur, 305 Loya jirga, 1686, 1687, 1690, 1691 Lu Xun, 793 Lubbe, Marinus van der, 119 Luce, Henry, 1309 Ludendorff, Erich, 613 Lumumba, Patrice, 962–963, 1158, 1158, 1159, 1159 (illus.), 1160–1162 heroicizing of, 1164 Luther, Martin, 188, 618, 983 Luxemburg, Rosa, 520 Lyngbye, Hans Christian, 225 Lypyns’kyi, Viacheslav, 718 MacArthur, Douglas, 1751 Macartney, C. A., 1368 Macaulay, Hebert, 1179–1180, 1180 Macaulay, Thomas Babbington, 165, 912 MacCunn, Hamish, 1438 MacDonald, J. E. H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Macdonald, John A., 1837 MacDowell, Edward, 76, 1438 Macedonia and Bulgaria, 580, 582 and diasporic communities, 1415 Germany and peacekeeping in, 1554 Maceo, 1275, 1282 Machado, Gerardo, 1276 Maˇciulis, Jonas, 565 Mackenzie, Alexander, 300, 1438 Mackinder, Halford, 460, 468 Maclennan, Hugh, 307 Macpherson, James, 462 Mada, Gajah, 1727 Madison, James, 386, 387, 388 Magna Carta, 165 Magnus, Olaus, 223 Magnus VI (Norway), 226 Magsaysay, Ramon, 1241, 1242 Magyarization, 644 Magyars, 587 Maharaja (of Jammu and Kashmir), 1764–1765 Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah, 1803, 1807–1808 Maimonides, 1402, 1403 Maistre, Joseph de, 92 Majoritarian nationalist movements, 940 Makarenko, Anton, 425, 429 Malan, Daniel François, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1151 Malawi, 1440 Malay(s), 1213–1215, 1217, 1219, 1225 as dominant culture in Malaysia, 1220–1222 and education, 1384–1385 and the Philippines, 1243

Malaysia, 1213–1225 and education, 1385–1386 and independence, 1463 and Indonesia, 1729, 1733 and natural resources, 884 Malcolm X, 965 Mâle, Emile, 415 Malthusianism, 518 Mamluks, 257–258, 259–260 Mammeri, Mouloud, 1100 Manchester, England, 161 Manchuria and independence, 1462 and Japan, 810, 818 Manchurian Incident (1931), 810, 821 Manchus, 1818 Mandela, Nelson, 995, 1148, 1152, 1153, 1488–1489 Mandukhai, Empress, 1786 Manifest destiny. See Expansionism Mann, Horace, 37 Mann, Thomas, 617 Mansell, Michael, 1848 Manzanilla, Matias, 374 Manzoni, Alessandro, 671 Mao Zedong, 948, 952, 977, 1191, 1816, 1819, 1821 economic and political programs, 1198–1199 ideology of, 978, 1194–1197, 1197 influence of, 1192–1193 Maoism, 978–979 and Angola, 1664 and Nepal, 1810–1811 Maori, 866, 1855–1863 and education, 1383 and music, 1439 and New Zealand, 873 population, 864 and the Treaty of Waitangi, 863 and the world wars, 869–870 Maps, 465 and Central America, 319–320 and Finland, 602–604 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 640 and Japan, 810 Mara, Ratu Sir Kamisese, 1320, 1324 Maragall i Mira, Pasqual, 1539, 1540, 1541 (illus.) Marcinkowski, Karol, 217 Marcos, Ferdinand, 1241–1242, 1244, 1246 Marcos, Imelda, 1242, 1244, 1245 Margalit, A., 97 Marginalization, 935–941 Maria Theresa (Austria-Hungary), 138 Mariam, Mengistu Haile, 1469 Maritz, Gerrit, 1150 Markievicz, Countess, 654 “Marseillaise,” 175 Marshall, George C., 948 Marsland, David, 114


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I-38

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Martí, José, 1275, 1276, 1282, 1283 Martin, Henri, 177 Martins, Wilfred, 975 Marure, Alejandro, 319 Marx, Karl, 1–3, 17–18, 217, 1195 and gender roles, 56 and religion, 1397 on socialism versus communism, 975 Marxism, 1–3, 12 and Angola, 1661, 1662 and Arab nationalism, 730–731 and culture, 485–486 and the environment, 881 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 471 See also Communism Mas, Artur, 1539 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 585, 585, 587–588, 589, 589 (illus.), 592, 593, 1017, 1028 Masculinity, 900–901. See also Gender Mashtots, Mesrop, 1701 Mason, Lowell, 389 Masood, Ahmad Shah, 1690, 1693 Massey, Vincent, 1838 Massey, William, 869 Masur, Gerhard, 834 Matejko, Jan, 682 Mathews, Robin, 1843 Matto de Turner, Clorinda, 374 Maude, Sir Stanley, 1742 Maupassant, Guy de, 134 Maura, Antonio, 707 Maurits of Orange (the Netherlands), 196 Maurras, Charles, 533 May, Glenn, 1246 May Fourth movement, 793, 793 Mayer, Gustav, 611 Maynard, Charles Frederick, 1848 Mazzini, Giuseppe, 24, 90, 94–95, 468, 502, 673, 673 and the William Wallace monument, 239 Mbundu, 1660, 1664, 1665 McCarthy, Joseph, 907–908, 944 McCubbin, Frederick, 859 McDougall, William, 530, 535 McKay, Claude, 494 McLuhan, Marshall, 129 McVeigh, Timothy, 1492 Meˇciar, Vladimir, 1026–1027 Media and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Alsace, 1509 and Armenia, 1709 and Azerbaijan, 1719 and the Baltic states, 567 and Brazil, 287 and Bulgaria, 573 and Burma, 783 and Canada, 1839 and Central America, 316, 320

and China, 1193, 1199 culture and forms of, 1474–1475 education and, 422, 433 and Egypt, 261, 262 and Eritrea, 1172 and Ethiopia, 746 and globalization, 1412 in Haiti, 341 and immigration, 1427 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iraq, 1738, 1745 and Korea, 1781 as maintaining psychological stability, 123 manipulation of, 1480–1481 and national identity, 30, 31, 38, 464–465, 486, 1473 and Nepal, 1808 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1853 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 217 and Québec, 1296 and Scandinavia, 222, 229 technological advances and, 129, 132–134, 135–136 in Turkey, 1649 and the United States, 390, 1308 See also Cinema; Literature; Newspapers; Print technology; Radio; Television Megali Idea, 632–633 Mehmed V (Ottoman Empire), 765 Mehmed VI (Ottoman Empire), 767 Meiji Restoration, 818, 1748, 1751 Meiren, Gada, 1789 Mekhitarians, 1700 Melgar, Mariano, 373 Mella, Julio Antonio, 1282, 1283 Melnyk, Andrei, 718, 1624 Melucci, Albert, 1446 Men and gendered role in conflict, 449 nationalist imagery and, 445–446 See also Gender; Masculinity Mendelssohn, Felix, 1431 Mendes, Chico, 1829 Mendes-France, Pierre, 1054 Menelik II (Ethiopia), 737, 737–740, 744 Mercantalism, 18–19 Merchants. See Bourgeoisie Mercier, Honoré, 305, 1288–1289 Merse, 1789 Mesopotamia, 748, 757–758 Messiaen, Olivier, 1434 Mestiço, 1660, 1661, 1664, 1665 Mestizaje, 349, 349, 356 Mexican-American War, 347, 352, 354, 390 Mexico, 344–356, 346 (map), 353 (map) and communications, 1475 and music, 1439 national identity and education in, 39 national radio of, 132–133


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and politics, 1414 and terrorism, 1491 Zapatista movement in, 1412, 1451–1452 Meyer, John, 1392, 1397 Meyerbeer, Giacomo, 117 Michael the Brave (Romania), 1585, 1592 Michelet, Jules, 102, 177, 177–178 Mickiewicz, Adam, 212, 213, 214, 216, 686, 692 Micombero, Michel, 1677 Middle East and education, 428, 1387–1388 and European colonization, 891 and music, 1440 and terrorism, 1494 See also specific Middle Eastern countries Mier, Servando Teresa de, 350, 351, 352 Migration and consolidating sovereignty, 876 globalization and international, 1414–1415 and sports, 1001–1002 See also Emigration; Immigrants/immigration Mikhalkov, Sergei, 1602 Mikhnovs’kyi, Mykola, 722 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 683 Military and Algeria, 1100 and Angola, 1667 and Armenia, 1710 and Brazil, 1827, 1828–1829, 1830–1831, 1832 and Burma, 781 and China, 790 and Ethiopia, 740 and Fiji, 1314, 1324 and gender/sexuality, 903, 910 and Germany, 620, 621 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726 interventions and terrorism, 1497 and Iraq, 751, 753, 1743, 1745 and Ireland, 661 and Israel, 1130 and Japan, 1748–1749, 1752 music, 1430, 1431 and New Zealand, 868–869 and Nigeria, 1185, 1188 and Pakistan, 1228, 1232 and Russia, 955 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1679, 1680 and Spain, 703, 705, 706 technology, 1473 and Turkey, 1646, 1647 Mill, Harriet Taylor, 57 Mill, John Stuart, 19, 57, 85, 95, 527 and cosmopolitanism, 1356 Miller, Ferdinand von, 416 Mindaugas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Minghetti, Marco, 669 Minin, Kuz’ma, 700, 1602 Minorities and Afghanistan, 1689–1690, 1692–1693, 1694 in the Baltic states, 557

and Basques, 1516–1517 and Bulgaria, 580–582 and Burma, 781 and China, 1193, 1199–1200 and citizenship, 1374 and Colombia, 833 and concerns about cultural survival, 878–879 cosmopolitanism versus nationalism and, 1356, 1357–1362 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and demands for rights, 932–933, 936–941. See also Rights and discrimination, 1420, 1425. See also Discrimination/prejudice education and, 419, 422, 427, 429–430, 431, 432 and the environment, 882 and Ethiopia, 741 and Germany, 617 globalization and mobilization of, 1412–1413, 1414 and Hungary, 639, 644 and India, 976, 1203 and Indonesia, 1728–1729 and Iran, 1112–1113, 1117–1118 and Iraq, 1741–1742 and Israel, 1130 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and Japan, 1753, 1756, 1758 and Latvia, 1575 and the legacies of colonialism, 894 and Malaysia, 1463 marginalization in modern states of, 931–932 and Mongolia, 1798 and nationalist ideologies, 513 and Nepal, 1804, 1809–1810 and new social movements, 1448, 1453, 1457, 1458 and New Zealand, 866–867 and Nigeria, 1182–1183 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and Poland, 683, 685, 687 and Romania, 1587, 1591, 1593–1594 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1672 and state terrorism, 1488 and Turkey, 1648–1651, 1654–1655 and Ukraine, 1625 and the United States, 1307, 1308 and Vietnam, 1271 and Wales, 1636 See also Ethnic Cleansing; Ethnicity; Genocide; Language Missionary activity, 480 Mistral, Frédéric, 477 Mitre, Bartolomé, 276, 279 Mitterrand, François, 458, 1051–1052, 1054 Mixed race descent and Brazil, 293 and Central America, 311 and Paraguay, 358


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I-40 Mobutu, Joseph (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbedu Waza Banga), 1158–1159, 1160, 1161, 1162–1165 Modarres, Hassan, 1114 Modernization and Afghanistan, 1686, 1688 and Armenia, 1707, 1708 and Australia, 853–854 and China, 792, 1191–1192, 1197, 1198–1199, 1200 and diaspora populations, 1372 and Ethiopia, 740–741 and film, 1337 and Greece, 625, 630 and Iraq, 1737–1738 and Italy, 669–670 and Japan, 1753 and Malaysia, 1223–1224 as necessitating the nation-state, 930–932 and the Ottoman Empire, 761–763 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Spain, 705, 705, 706 and Turkey, 771 Moe, Jørgen, 228 Mohammad, Mahathir bin, 1223–1224 Mohammed, Murtala Ramat, 1186, 1187, 1187 Mohaqeq, Mohammad, 1695 Moldavia/Moldova, 469, 1414 Molina, Felipe, 319 Molina, Pedro, 315, 316 Molotov, Viacheslav, 1077 Moluccans, 1491 Monarchy and France, 169–171 and Great Britain, 1007–1008, 1008 Mondlane, Eduardo, 1661 Mongolia, 1783–1799 and independence, 1818, 1819 Mongols, and Tibet, 1816–1817 Moniuszko, Stanisław, 74, 216, 686 Monnet, Jean, 1034 Montcalm, Louis de, 299 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, 62–64, 171, 529 Montevideo, 395–396, 397, 402 Montgomerie, Archibald William, 235 Montilla Aguilera, José, 1539, 1541 Montúfar, Manuel, 319 Monuments, 117–120 and Algeria, 1102 and Basques, 1521 and Brazil, 294–295 and Cuba, 1284 and Czechoslovakia, 592, 594, 1024–1025 and Egypt, 264 and Germany, 618, 619 and Indonesia, 1732, 1733, 1734 and Iran, 1118 and Ireland, 659 and Japan, 1754–1755

INDEX

and Latvia, 1580 and Mongolia, 1798 and national identity, 1342, 1345–1347 and nationalism, 408, 409, 410–412, 414–415, 417 and Nigeria, 1187 and rituals of belonging, 502, 504 and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1603 Scottish, 239 and Turkey, 774 Mora, José María Luis, 352 Mora, Juan Rafael, 315, 318 Moral Majority, 1395, 1446 Morality and cosmopolitanism versus nationalism, 1351–1353, 1356–1357 and Cuba, 1283 and gender and sexuality issues, 447, 899, 908–909 and national character, 531 U.S. idealistic, 944 See also Values Moravia, 584 Morazán, Francisco, 318 Moreno, Manuel, 398 Moro, Aldo, 676 Moroccan crises, 514 Morocco, 1096–1097, 1464 Moros, 1243 Moscow Declaration, 548 Moscow metro, 134 Mosley, Oswald, 516 Mossadegh, Muhammad, 1109, 1109, 1111, 1114 Mosse, George, 905 Motoori Norinaga, 815 Mott, Lucretia, 53, 57 Motz, Friedrich, 191 Mount Ararat, 1702 Mount Rushmore, 134 Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 1765 Mourer, Jean-Pierre, 1509 Mozambique, 968, 1464 Mubarak, Hosni, 985 Muhammad V, 1464 Mujahideen, 1687, 1688, 1693 Mukhtar, Mahmud, 264 Mulgan, Alan, 868 Müller, Adam, 92, 463 Multiculturalism and Australia, 858, 860 and Brazil, 1826 and Canada, 1838, 1840, 1843 and education, 1379, 1382–1384, 1386 and Fiji, 1325 as a form of nationalism, 934, 935 and globalization, 1411–1412 and Great Britain, 1011–1013 and immigration, 1367


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and India, 1765 and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, 1784 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1763 and the Netherlands, 206 and Poland, 685 and Romania, 1589 and Singapore, 1224 as solution to minority demands, 933, 939 and the Soviet Union, 694 and the United States, 1306 Multilateralism, 877, 881 Multinationality, 1358 Munch, P. A., 228 Munich Conference, 595 Muñoz Marín, Luis, 840, 841, 845, 846 Muñoz Rivera, Luis, 839, 841 Museums, 31 and the Baltic states, 560 and France, 1053 in Germany, 1558 and Indonesia, 1732 and Iran, 1118 and Latvia, 1578 and nationalistic art, 412–414 and Scandinavia, 229 Musharraf, Pervez, 1232 Music, 72–83, 1430–1445 and Angola, 1665 Baltic folk songs, 561, 567 and Basques, 1522 and Brazil, 1826 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and Czechoslovakia, 592–593 and Finland, 600, 605 folk songs and nationalistic, 417 and France, 1053 and Germany, 619 and Greenland, 1569–1570 in Indonesia, 1479 and Israel, 1127, 1128 and Italy, 671 and Latvia, 1577, 1577, 1578 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and national identity, 31, 132–133, 407 and Paraguay, 364, 365 and Poland, 214, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844 and Québec, 1294–1296 and the Sami, 1614 and Scotland, 238 songs in Denmark, 154 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 389 and Wales, 1637 See also Anthem, national Musical instruments, 1440–1441, 1442 Muslim Brotherhood, 984–986, 1396

Muslim League, 801, 804, 806, 976, 1761 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171 and Pakistan, 1230, 1231 Muslims and Egypt, 265 and India, 801, 803, 804, 806, 1203, 1209 and the Netherlands, 202 See also Islam Musset, Alfred de, 177 Mussolini, Benito, 448–449, 514–516, 518, 667, 670, 676 and Roman history, 674 Mussolini, Vittorio, 1334 Mussorgsky, Modest, 75, 75 (illus.), 78, 82, 1437 Nadim, Abdullah, 261 Nadir Shah, Mohammed, 1686, 1688 Nagorno-Karabakh. See Gharabagh conflict Naguib, Muhammad, 266 (illus.) Nagy, Imre, 978 Naipaul, V. S., 924 Nairn, Tom, 933 Naji, Dr., 1740 Najibullah, Mohammad, 1687 Napier, Theodore, 242 Napoleon, Louis, 197 Napoleon III, 407, 1443 Napoleonic Civil Code, 174, 176 Napoleonic wars, 463 and Central America, 317 and Germany, 186, 618–619 music and resistance in the, 73 as stirring nationalism, 14, 16, 26, 46 Nariño, Antonio, 831 Naruszewicz, Adam, 214 Narutowicz, Gabriel, 687 Nassef, Malak Hifni, 450 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 265–266, 266 (illus.), 730, 890, 964, 1396 and the Bandung Conference, 962 and pan-Arabism, 965, 982 Nation-building, 929–941 National Association for the Vindication of Scottish Rights (NAVSR), 235, 235, 241 National character, 527–537. See also Culture; Identity National Socialism, 419, 422, 513, 514, 517–519. See also Nazism Nationalism defining, 4–5, 85, 1351 ethnic-genealogical versus civic-territorial, 1353–1354 forms of, 5–12, 934–935 and geopolitics, 458–469 as an ideological political project, 875 imperative and imaginary forms of, 501–503 and language, 473, 482–484. See also Language as a legitimating ideology, 436 liberal, 488–490, 1355–1359, 1362


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Nationalism (continued ) and masculinity, 900–901 origins of, 473–474 particularistic, 90–94 versus patriotism, 45 perversions of, 512–525 religious, 100–101. See also Religion technological, 1478 transnational, 1407, 1414–1415 universalistic culture-based, 88–90 See also Identity; Philosophy, political; Politics Nativism, 883 Natsir, Mohammed, 965 Natsugdorji, D., 1794 Natural resources and Azerbaijan, 1714 and Brazil, 283, 1827–1828, 1832 and Canada, 1842 and conflict, 883–886 and India, 1205 and Indonesia, 1723 and nationalism, 877 and the Philippines, 1247 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1671 and Scandinavia, 221 and Wales, 1632 Nau, Emile, 341 Naumovych, Ivan, 716 Navarra, 1516, 1517, 1523 Nazism and Austria, 545, 546, 550, 552 and Czechoslovakia, 592 education and, 426 and the environment, 882 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 438–440, 523, 622 and expansionism, 621 and film, 1331 and gender, 454–456 on German national character, 533 and Iran, 1110–1111 and language, 481 and music, 1431 nationalism of, 1353 propaganda of, 133–134 and rituals of belonging, 505, 507–508 and sexuality, 907 Ndadaye, Melchior, 1673, 1679 Negritude movement, 488, 918–919 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 981, 1207, 1461, 1761, 1764, 1765, 1766 and the Bandung Conference, 961, 962, 1206 and the Dalai Lama, 1820 economic policies of, 1206 and Indian federalism, 1205 and the nonaligned movement, 982 Nehru, Motilal, 1207 Nejedlý, Zdenˇek, 1023–1024 Nekrasov, N. A., 694

Nelson, Lord Horatio, 164 Neo-fascism, 525, 974 Neo-Nazis and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557, 1558 and the Soviet Union, 1078 Neo-Stalinism, 1077–1078 Neoliberalism, in education, 1381–1382 Neorealism, 1333–1335, 1336, 1337 Nepal, 1800–1811, 1802 (map) Netherlands, the, 195–206, 201 (map), 202 (illus.) and Belgium, 141–142 and Brazil, 283–284 and colonialism, 1479 education and, 34, 429 fascism in, 516 and immigration, 1420 and Indonesia, 1463, 1723, 1733, 1734 and Japan, 809, 810 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 and music, 1443 national anthem, 117 and Taiwan, 1252 and technology, 1480 and terrorism, 1486–1487, 1491 See also Afrikaner nationalism Neto, Agostinho, 1661–1662, 1662 Nevskii, Aleksandr, 696, 700 New France, 1288 New Guinea, 852 New Zealand, 862–873, 864 (map) and education, 1382, 1383 and the Maori, 1855–1863 and music, 1439, 1441 and sports, 993 Newspapers and Algeria, 1103 and Arab nationalism, 752 and Australia, 854 and Colombia, 833 and Greenland, 1565, 1570 and Iraq, 1740, 1745 and Irish resistance, 918 and Japan, 816, 817 in Latvia, 1576 and nationalism, 1473, 1475–1476 and Nigeria, 1179, 1181 and Québec, 1296 and the Sami, 1613 and Wales, 1639 Ngata, Sir Apirana, 1858, 1859 Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, 1818 Ng˜ ug˜ı wa Thiong’o, 913, 915, 919–920, 925–926 Niagara Falls, 134 Nibelungenlied, 406 Nicaragua and national identity, 321 symbols of, 319 and William Walker, 318


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Niceforo, Alfredo, 672 Nicholas I, Czar (Russia), 210, 690–692 Nicholas II, Czar (Russia), 605, 693 Nicholls, David, 341 Nichols, Terry, 1492 Niemcewicz, Julian Ursyn, 214 Nietzsche, F., 10 Nieuwenhuis, Domela, 205 Nigeria, 1177–1189, 1178 (map) Biafran secessionist movement in, 967 education and, 424 and literature, 920 Nightingale, Florence, 164 Nitze, Paul, 950 Nixon, Richard, 1039, 1395 Nkrumah, Kwame, 962, 964, 965, 980, 1161 Noble, Paul, 734 Nolan, Sidney, 857 Nolte, Ernst, 515 Nonaligned movement, 961, 969, 982 and Algeria, 1095 and Cuba, 1285 and India, 1206 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 944, 1359–1361, 1412 and Brazil, 1830 and Fiji, 1322 and new social movements, 1453 Nora, Pierre, 121–122, 1343 Nordau, Max, 416 Nordraak, Rikard, 230 North America and immigration, 1421, 1425 and terrorism, 1494 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 1294, 1407, 1412, 1451 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 943, 974, 1532–1533 and Azerbaijan, 1715 and Germany, 1549, 1555 and international interventions, 1409 and Romania, 1585, 1588 and Russia, 1604 and Turkey, 774 and Ukraine, 1623 and the United States, 1303 North Borneo (Sabah), 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 North Korea, 977, 1757. See also Korea Northern Ireland, 1014–1015, 1058–1068 conflict in, 1470–1471 and counterterrorism, 1496 symbols in, 113 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1492 Norway, 220–222 and the European Union, 1038 flag of, 229–230 and gender, 450 independence and, 223–225, 231 and language, 225–226, 472, 477

and music, 1432, 1436–1437 national anthem, 230, 230 national identity and culture of, 226–228 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612, 1617 Notari, Elvira, 1327 Nourrit, Adolphe, 144 Novalis, 92 Nuclear weapons/energy and India, 1210, 1236 and Iran, 1117, 1117 and Pakistan, 1235, 1236 Nunavut, 1562 Núñez, Rafael, 828 Nussbaum, Martha, 97 Nyerere, Julius, 890, 962, 964, 980–981 Obasanjo, Olusegun, 1186, 1188 O’Brien, Mary-Elizabeth, 133 Öcalan, Abdullah, 1655 Oceania, and language, 478 O’Connell, Daniel, 658, 920 O’Connor, T. P., 654 O’Donoghue, Lowitja, 1848 O’Dowd, Bernard, 853 Oehlenschläger, Adam, 67–69, 70, 228 O’Faolain, Sean, 925 Oge, Vincent, 335 Ogiński, Michał, 215–216 O’Gorman, Edmundo, 354 O’Higgins, Bernardo, 272, 326 Ohmae, Kenichi, 929 Oil/gas and Algeria, 1095 and Angola, 1659–1660, 1666 and Armenia, 1711 and Azerbaijan, 1713, 1714, 1715, 1719–1721 and Canada, 1837 and Egypt, 729 and Iran, 1109, 1111 and Iraq, 755, 756, 1742, 1746 and the Middle East, 1396, 1397 Oirat Mongols, 1797–1798 Ojukwu, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu, 1185, 1185 Okinawa, 1757 Olav II (Norway), 226 O’Leary, Juan, 365 Olympic Games, 991, 994 O’Neill, Onora, 97 Onn, Hussein, 1223 Oommen, T. K., 1393 Opera, 79–80 Opera Nazionale Balilla (ONB), 676, 676 Oral traditions, and the Sami, 1615. See also Folk culture Orange Free State, 1145 Organicism, 462–464 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1033, 1380, 1706 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 1095, 1742


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Oribe, Manuel, 275, 399 Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, 667 Ortega y Gasset, José, 704, 705, 707, 707 Orwell, George, 995 O’Shea, Katherine, 651 Oslo Accords, 1137, 1141 Ossian, 237 Otero, Mariano, 354 Otto of Wittelsbach, Prince, 631 Ottoman Empire, 760–767 and Algeria, 1097 and Arab nationalism, 725, 727, 734 and Armenia, 1704, 1704 and Armenian genocide, 522–523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529 and Bulgaria, 571, 573, 577 collapse of the, 891 and Egypt, 258–259 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 436, 437–438 and Greece, 623–625 and India, 801 and Iraq, 748–749, 1737, 1739, 1742 and language, 472, 482 religion and the, 101–102 and Turkey, 1643, 1645 Ottomanism, 761–763, 764, 766, 768 Overdetermination, 120–121 Ovimbundu, 1660, 1661, 1662, 1664 Paderewski, Ignacy Jan, 682, 682, 683, 683 (illus.) Padmore, George, 1179, 1301 Page, Thomas Nelson, 494–495 Pahlavi, Muhammad Reza, 952, 986, 1109, 1111, 1114, 1396–1397 coronation ceremony of, 1114–1115 and minorities, 1113 Pahlavi, Reza, 986, 1110–1111, 1114 Paine, Thomas, 162, 370 Paisii, Father, 571 Paisley, Ian, 1065 Pakistan, 976–977, 1227–1237, 1228 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1689 creation of, 1201–1203, 1461–1462 and India, 950 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1762, 1764–1767, 1768–1769, 1771 and religion, 107 and religious fundamentalism, 1396 separatist movements in, 1465–1466 and terrorism, 1488 and water, 885 Palach, Jan, 1026, 1028 Palacký, František, 96, 587, 594 Palais de Justice, Belgium, 143 (illus.), 144 Palestine, 1132–1143, 1134 (map) and Arab nationalism, 729 as British Mandate, 728 and education, 1387

and Israel, 1120–1121 and new social movements, 1452 and terrorism, 1484, 1490, 1491, 1492 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 1137, 1140–1142 Palestinians and European partition, 891–893 and Israel, 1125, 1129–1130 Pamuk, Orhan, 1649 Pan-Aboriginalism, 1844–1853 Pan-Africanism, 965, 1161, 1179 Pan-Arabism, 965, 981, 982 and Iraq, 1740–1741, 1743 Pan-ethnic identities, 939 Pan-Germanism, and Austria, 544, 545 Pan-Islamism, 965 and Egypt, 261 and Turkey, 1645 Pan-Mongolian nationalism, 1790, 1792–1793 Pan-nationalist movements, 964–965, 980 Pan-Slavism, 93–94 and Russia, 20 and the Soviet Union, 946 Pan-Turkism, 764–765 Panama, and Colombia, 828, 829, 830 Pancasila, 953, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1728, 1731, 1732 Panchayat system, 1803, 1807–1808 Panchen Lama, 1821 Pandita, Zaya, 1791 Pankhurst, Christabel, 453 Pankhurst, Emmeline, 453 Papineau, Louis-Joseph, 300, 306, 1288, 1292 Paraguay, 358–366, 359 (map) and Argentina, 275 Paraguayan War, 296, 359–360, 360, 362, 363 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 472, 1790 and Czechoslovakia, 593–594 and Hungary, 640 Parizeau, Jacques, 1201, 1297 Park Chung Hee, 1778, 1780 Parkes, Henry, 852 Parlacen, 316 Parnell, Charles Stewart, 649, 649 (illus.), 651, 651, 653–654 Parry, Hubert, 1438 Parry, Joseph, 1438 Parsons, T., 1399 Pashtuns, 1688–1689, 1689, 1691, 1692, 1693 Pasternak, Boris, 1074 Pastoral ideal, 251 Pat, Joe, 1853 Patel, A. D., 1318, 1319 Paterson, “Banjo,” 854 Pátria, and Brazil, 285–287, 288, 295 Patriarca, Silvana, 52 Patriotism and Austria, 553 and China, 1195 and France, 172 Iraq and local, 752


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and Mongolia, 1794 and national symbols, 1347 versus nationalism, 45 and Nigeria, 1186–1187 and political philosophy, 86, 91 and the Soviets, 945 and sports, 997 and the United States, 1308 Päts, Konstantin, 560, 565, 568 Patten, Jack, 1851 Paulin, Tom, 925 Pauw, Corneille de, 351 Paz, Octavio, 345–346 Peace movements, 1447–1448 Peace of Westphalia (1648), 183 Péan, Pierre, 1052 Pearse, Padraic, 449 Pearse, Patrick, 652, 918, 919, 922 Pearson, Karl, 532 Pearson, Lester B., 1838, 1839, 1840 Pearson, Noel, 1848 Peck, Raoul, 1674 Peckinpah, Sam, 1337 Pedro I, Emperor (Brazil), 289, 290, 294, 296 Pedro II, Emperor (Brazil), 290–291, 291 (illus.), 293, 296 Pelletier, Gerard, 1290 Penderecki, Krzysztof, 1434 Peres, Shimon, 1400, 1488–1489 Performance, and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 Perkins, Charles, 1846, 1848, 1851 Perlee, Kh., 1794 Perón, Juan Domingo, 278, 281, 942 Perón, María Eva Duarte de (Evita), 278 Perry, Matthew, 809 Persia, 1106–1107, 1700. See also Iran Peru, 367–379, 369 (map) and Colombia, 830 independence and, 272 and terrorism, 1491 Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 371–372 Pestalozzi, J. H., 34, 36 Pétain, Marshall, 1052 Peter the Great, 8, 20, 105, 696, 700 Peterloo Massacre, 163 Peters, Janis, 1575 Petion, Alexandre Sabes, 337, 340 Pham Van Dong, 963 Philip II (Netherlands), 196 Philippines, 1238–1248, 1240 (map) and gender, 450 and independence, 1462 separatist movements in, 1468 and terrorism, 1495 Philips, Caryl, 927 Phillips, Jock, 869 Philosophy, political, 85–97 and defining national identity, 474–476 and fascism, 514–517 and France, 171–172

and geopolitics, 460–464, 466–467 and Lenin, 1072 and national character, 527–537 and post-World War II France, 1052 postcolonial nationalist, 957–970 and Scotland, 234 See also Cosmopolitanism; Ideology Phuc Anh Gia Long, 1263 Picasso, Pablo, 1519 Pierrot, Jean Louis, 337 Pikul, Valentin, 1077 Piłsudski, Józef, 681, 682, 682, 683, 685, 687 Pinochet, Augusto, 331 Pinochet Le-Brun, Tancredo, 330 Pius IX, Pope, 665 Place names and Afghanistan, 1692 and Basque Country, 1513 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Congo/Zaïre, 1163 and Turkey, 1652 Plato, 529 Platt Amendment, 1277, 1282 Poetry Chilean, 324–326 and Finland, 599 and forming national identities, 31, 32 and Greenland, 1570 and Japan, 491–492 and landscape, 67–69 and language, 78 and Latvia, 1577 and Mongolia, 1794, 1797 and Nepal, 1808 and Paraguay, 363 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 213, 214, 686 and Uruguay, 401 Pogge, Thomas, 97 Pogroms. See Genocide Poland, 207–218, 210 (map), 678–688, 679 (map) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and gender, 53 hostility toward German-speaking minority in, 522 Kingdom of, 209–210 and Lithuania, 558, 561, 562–563, 563 nationalism and literature in, 492–493 partition and, 21–22, 207, 209 and the Soviet Union, 948, 950 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716 uprisings against Russia in, 46 Poland-Lithuania, 207, 209, 212–213 Poles in the Baltic states, 563 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440 and Germany, 617, 1557 Political participation and Finland, 601 and France, 174


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Political participation (continued ) and gender, 46, 49–50, 53 and Germany, 620–621 and Japan, 812, 813 and Nigeria, 1188 and Northern Ireland, 1059 See also Voting franchise Political power and Afghanistan, 1685, 1686, 1686–1688 and Angola, 1666 and Armenia, 1710 and the Baltic states, 560 and Chile, 324 and China, 792 collapse of socialism and struggles for, 895–896 and Fiji, 1317 and Finland, 606 and Indonesia, 1723, 1730 and Iraq, 756–757, 1739, 1741, 1745. See also Clientelism, Iraq and and Malaysia, 1220–1223 and nationalist movements, 940 and newly independent states, 966, 967–968, 969 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1677 and Spain, 707 and the United States, 385 and Uruguay, 399 Political system. See Government(s) Politics and Afghanistan, 1686–1687, 1689–1690 and Algeria, 1097, 1098, 1100, 1101 and Alsace, 1507–1509, 1508, 1509, 1510 and Angola, 1660, 1661, 1665–1666 and Arab nationalism, 728–731 and Argentina, 271, 275, 280–281 and Armenia, 1703, 1704, 1706, 1708, 1709, 1711 and Austria, 544–546, 548–553 and the Baltic states, 560 and Basques, 1515, 1516, 1517–1519, 1521–1523 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1535 and Brazil, 1827 and Burma, 777–780, 783–785 and Catalonia, 1539, 1539–1541 and Central America, 316–317 and China, 791–792, 793, 794 and Colombia, 827–828, 832, 833 and communications technology, 1480 and Cuba, 1275–1276, 1277, 1285–1286 and Czechoslovakia, 1017–1019 Danish, 150–151 and Egypt, 260, 261, 265 and England, 161, 162–163 and the environment, 876–877, 882–883 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171, 1171, 1172–1175 and Fiji, 1319, 1320–1322 and Finland, 605–606 and France, 178–179, 1054

geopolitics and legitimizing, 465 and Germany, 190–191, 611, 613, 620–621, 1552–1557, 1555, 1557, 1558 and Great Britain, 1011 and Greece, 628–629 and Haiti, 337–338 and Hungary, 638, 639, 641–644, 643 and hypernationalism, 1389 and the ideology of nationalism, 875 and immigration, 1427 and India, 798–802, 987, 1206–1207, 1207, 1208, 1209–1210, 1461–1462, 1763 and Indonesia, 1725, 1726, 1730 and international migration, 1414–1415 and Iran, 1109–1112, 1117 and Iraq, 754, 755, 1745–1746 and Ireland, 649–657 and Israel, 1129 and Italy, 667–671, 676–677 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764–1765, 1768–1771 and Japan, 988, 1751, 1752, 1757 and Korea, 1780 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 and Malaysia, 1216–1218, 1222, 1223 and the Maori, 1857, 1858–1860, 1862 and Mexico, 355 and Mongolia, 1789 and Nepal, 1810–1811 and the Netherlands, 205–206 and new social movements, 1446, 1453, 1455–1456, 1458 and Nigeria, 1179–1183, 1185 and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1062–1063, 1064–1065, 1066, 1068 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1846–1847, 1848–1849, 1850–1853 and Peru, 372–373 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 213–214, 681–685, 687 post-World War II, 973–976 and Puerto Rico, 837, 839–840, 844–847 and Québec, 1288–1289, 1290–1292 and religion, 982–989, 1064, 1112, 1394, 1395–1396 and Romania, 1586–1587, 1587, 1589 and Russia, 1597, 1597–1599, 1604, 1605 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678–1679 and the Sami, 1612, 1613, 1615, 1616 and Scandinavian nationalism, 228–231 and Scotland, 241–242, 1014 and South Africa, 1147–1149, 1148, 1152–1153 Soviet, 979 and Spain, 702–703, 709–711, 1086 and Switzerland, 250 and Turkey, 1645, 1654 and Ukraine, 718, 1621, 1622–1629, 1623, 1624, 1626, 1629 and the United States, 387–388, 389, 391, 1304, 1306


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and Uruguay, 398–399 and Wales, 1014, 1633, 1633–1635, 1639–1640 See also Government(s); Ideology; Leaders; Political power Pomare, Maui, 869 Ponce de Leon, Ernesto, 1375 Poniatowski, Józef, 211, 686 Poniatowski, Stanisław August, 210, 215 Popławski, Jan Ludwik, 681, 683 Popper, Karl, 534 Population and Algeria, 1096, 1098 and Argentina, 269, 277, 280 and Armenia, 1699 and Australia, 851–852, 1382 and Brazil, 1825, 1831 and Burma, 777 and Canada, 1836 and Central America, 311 and Colombia, 829 and Czechoslovakia, 1017 and Fiji, 1314 and France, 1054–1055 and Germany, 190 and Gharabagh, 1706 and Haiti, 333, 336 and Indonesia, 1723 and Israel, 1121 and Latvia, 1574 and Mexico, 346 and the Middle East, 885 and Native Americans, 893 and New Granada, 826 and New Zealand, 864, 865, 868 and Nigeria, 967 and Paraguay, 360 and the Philippines, 1247 and Puerto Rico, 837 and Russia, 1604 and the Sami, 1609 and Turkey, 1645 and Uruguay, 402 U.S., 1836 See also Ethnicity; Immigrants/immigration; Migration Population transfers. See Migration Populism, 281, 643 Porter, Jane, 239 Portugal and Angola, 1666 and Brazil, 282, 283–285, 287–289, 293 and colonialism, 889, 1464 and diaspora populations, 1372 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 and geopolitics, 465 and immigration, 1424 and language, 472 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397

Post-nationalism and Germany, 1555 and globalization, 1406, 1408–1410, 1411 See also Multilateralism; Transnationalism Poster, Mark, 1476 Potatau Te Wherowhero, 1856 Potocki, Ignacy, 211 Poujade, Pierre, 1054 Poverty and Brazil, 1831 and Fiji, 1322 and Pakistan, 1228 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 and the United States, 1308 See also Income distribution Powell, Adam Clayton, 962 Powell, Enoch, 1013 Power. See Political power Pozharsky, Dmitry, 700, 1602 Prague, 584–585 Prague Spring, 1025, 1026 Prat de la Riba, Enric, 706 Prejudice. See Discrimination/prejudice Premchad, 923 Press. See Media Pretorius, Marthinus, 1146 Primo de Rivera, José Antonio, 516, 705, 706, 709 Primo de Rivera, Miguel, 516 Primrose, Archibald Philip, 242 Print technology, 127, 129 and Armenia, 1701 and diaspora populations, 1370 and India, 796 and Japan, 1749 and language, 479, 485 and national identity, 1474, 1475 See also Newspapers Prithvi Narayan Shah, 1803, 1803–1804, 1804, 1806 Pro-natalist policies, 878 Propaganda and Angola, 1665-1666 the arts and, 83, 176 and Australia, 1852-1853 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306 and China, 952, 1193, 1199 and Czechoslovakia, 595, 1020, 1025 and Ethiopia, 743, 744 and ethnic cleansing, 441 and Germany, 186 and Greenland, 1571 and Indonesia, 1727, 1734 and Iran, 1115, 1116, 1118 and Iraq, 758 and Italy, 667, 674 and Korea, 1781 and the Jacobins, 31 and Japan, 817, 818


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Propaganda (continued ) and Nazis, 133, 455 (illus.), 456, 614, 621, 1332 and Nigeria, 1181 and the Philippines, 1246 and Puerto Rico, 846 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1677 and the Soviet Union, 508, 694, 696, 696 (illus.), 697, 699-701, 1074, 1708 and Switzerland, 255 and terrorism, 1490 and Yugoslavia, 896 Protectionism, 25, 316 and Amazonia, 1827–1828, 1831 and Argentina, 271 and Canada, 1837, 1839, 1842 and film, 1331–1332 and natural resources, 886 and new social movements, 1448 and Peru, 368 Protestantism and Czechoslovakia, 1023–1024 Dutch, 199, 200, 200–202 and fundamentalism, 1393, 1398 and Germany, 188–189 and politics, 982–983 Proust, Marcel, 489 Provençal, 471, 477 Prussia, 611, 617 and Denmark, 150 and education, 34 and German unification, 186, 191, 192 national anthem of, 117 and Poland, 210 resistance to Napoleon and women, 52 Puerto Rico, 836–847 colonialism and, 425 literacy rates in, 495 and terrorism, 1491 Pueyrredón, Juan Martín de, 273 Pujol, Jordi, 1539, 1539, 1541, 1542 Pumpurs, Andr¯ejs, 564 Punjabi Muslims, 1231, 1236, 1764–1765 Purcell, Henry, 117 Pushkin, Aleksandr, 78, 213, 694, 1437 Putin, Vladimir, 1080, 1597, 1601, 1602, 1604, 1605 Qanuni, Yunus, 1695 Qarase, Laisenia, 1324–1325 Qasim, Abd al-Karim, 754, 754, 1742, 1746 Québec, 478, 1287–1297 and protecting culture, 1355–1356 and separatism, 306, 307, 1470, 1471, 1836–1837, 1843 and terrorism, 1490–1491 Québec City, 299 Quezon, Manuel, 1241 Quinet, Edgar, 177 Rabin, Yitzhak, 1141, 1400–1401, 1488–1489 Rabuka, Sitiveni, 1321, 1321, 1323, 1323

Race and Afghanistan, 1688–1689 and Alsace, 1504 and Arab nationalism, 732 and Argentina, 277 and Australia, 850, 851 and the Bandung Conference, 961 and Basques, 710 and Brazil, 290, 293, 297, 1826 and Central America, 314 and Colombia, 826 and colonialism, 958 and Cuba, 1273–1275, 1280, 1281 and Darwinism, 480 and Fiji, 1317, 1319, 1321, 1323, 1325 and France, 179 and gender, 47–48, 54–55, 447–448 and Haiti, 333–336, 337–339, 341 and India, 131 and Italy, 672 and Malaysia, 1222 and Mexico, 349 and Mongolia, 1792 and nationalist ideologies, 415–417, 513, 517 and new social movements, 1450 and New Zealand, 866–867, 869 and Peru, 373–375 and Puerto Rico, 837–839, 843–844 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1678 and South Africa, 1151–1153 and the United States, 391–392, 894, 1300–1303, 1307 and Völkisch nationalism, 614, 614, 622 See also Ethnicity; Minorities Racism and Afghanistan, 1692 and Alsace, 1510 and anticolonialism, 958 and Colombia, 829 education and, 429–430 and Egypt, 263 and film, 1328 and France, 1056, 1097 and gender, 447, 452–453 and Germany, 1556–1557, 1557 and Great Britain, 1013 and Hungary, 645 and immigration, 1424–1426 and imperative nationalism, 502, 510 and India, 798 and nationalism, 533–534 and Nazism, 426, 517–518 and new social movements, 1448 and Nigeria, 1179 and perversions of nationalism, 518–521 and Puerto Rico, 837 and the United States, 1310, 1339–1340 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Ethnic cleansing; Genocide


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Radio and Canada, 1839 and Colombia, 833 education and, 422 and Egypt, 264 and Indonesia, 1727 in Indonesia, 1479 in nationalism, 132–133, 1474, 1475 and promoting nationalistic art, 418 and Puerto Rico, 846 Rahman, Abdul, 1218–1219, 1222 Rahman, Abdur, 1684, 1685, 1686, 1691, 1692 Rahman, Mujibur, 1466 Railroads and Argentina, 279–280 and Canada, 302, 1837 and Central America, 315 and Ethiopia, 740 and Germany, 192 in India, 131, 796 and Mexico, 355 and New Zealand, 865 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Rainis, J¯anis, 560, 564 Rakovski, Georgi, 573 Raleigh, Sir Walter, 164 Rangihau, John, 1860 Rao, Raja, 914, 921, 922 Rapp, Jean, 1504 Ras Tafari Mekonnen, 740 Rasputin, Valentin, 1077 Ratzel, Friedrich, 460, 461, 463, 488–489 Ravel, Maurice, 1437 Rawls, J., 97 Raynal, Guillaume-Thomas, 351 Razak, Tun Abdul, 1222, 1223 Reagan, Ronald, 945, 946, 1039, 1244, 1310–1311, 1395, 1453 Rebet, Lev, 1624 Reddy, Jai Ram, 1323 Redmond, John, 651 Reeves, Sir Paul, 1322 Reformation, 618, 1502 Refugees and Europe, 1044 and the Gharbagh conflict, 1716, 1719 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1768 and Korea, 1781 and Pakistan-Indian violence, 1234 Palestinian, 1135, 1140 Sahrawi in Algeria, 1096–1097 and Taiwan, 1257 and Tibet, 1813, 1821–1822 See also Asylum; Immigrants/immigration Regionalism, 407 and Angola, 1665 and Argentina, 271 and Australia, 852 and Austrian provincialism, 551–552

and Basques, 1518–1519 and Canada, 306–307, 1837, 1843 and Central America, 311–313 and Chile, 324 and Colombia, 828–829, 834 education and, 432 and the European Union, 1043, 1044 and Finland, 608 and France, 1056 and Germany, 611 and globalization, 1413, 1415 and India, 1205 and Italy, 665, 672–673 and language movements, 482 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1808, 1811 and Nigeria, 1181–1183, 1185 and Romania, 1591 and Scandinavia, 225 and Spain, 1083, 1087, 1090–1091 and Switzerland, 245 and Turkey, 1649–1650 and Ukraine, 1623 and Vietnam, 1263 See also Separatism/secession Reich, Robert, 1407–1408 Reichsland, 1505 Rej, Mikołaj, 214 Religion, 971–989 and Afghanistan, 1685, 1688, 1692, 1693–1694 and Algeria, 1095, 1102–1103 and Arab nationalism, 725, 731–732, 733 and Armenia, 1700, 1701 and Azerbaijan, 1718 and the Baltic states, 558, 564 and Basques, 710 and Belgium, 140, 142 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1525–1526, 1528–1530 and Brazil, 289, 1825–1826 and Bulgaria, 573, 580 and Burma, 781 and Colombia, 828 and Cuba, 1280–1281 and Czechoslovakia, 1020 and discrimination against immigrants, 1423–1424 education and, 424, 428 and Egypt, 265 and Eritrea, 1169 and Ethiopia, 736, 741, 742, 746 and Europe, 1031–1032 and Fiji, 1314, 1315 and France, 176 and gender, 902 and Germany, 188–189, 618 and Greece, 627 and Haiti, 339–340 and India, 797, 800, 801, 1203, 1461–1462 and Indonesia, 1723, 1728


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Religion (continued ) and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112 and Iraq, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1746 and Ireland, 648, 657–658, 1470–1471 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1768 and Japan, 813–814 and Malaysia, 1217, 1223 and Mexico, 346, 347, 347–350, 356 and Mongolia, 1785, 1786, 1788, 1790, 1792 and national character, 529 and nationalism, 99–109, 519–520 and Nepal, 1806 and the Netherlands, 196, 197, 199–202, 200, 202 (illus.), 205, 206 and Nigeria, 967 and Northern Ireland, 1064 and Pakistan, 1233, 1236, 1461–1462 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1243 and Poland, 216, 686 and Québec, 1293 ritualism and nationalism as substitutes for, 500–501 and Russia, 1603, 1605 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 245, 250 and terrorism, 1487, 1494–1495, 1498 and Tibet, 1816–1817 and Turkey, 769–770, 1653–1654 and Ukraine, 720 and Uruguay, 403 and Vietnam, 1270 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 See also specific religions Religious fundamentalism, 1392–1404 and the United States, 1306 Rembrandt, 203 Renan, Ernest, 95–96, 415, 475–476, 477, 501, 528–529, 1504 Renner, Karl, 542, 542 Repression and Afghanistan, 1685, 1694 and Australia, 1845–1846 and Congo/Zaïre, 1165 and counterterrorism, 1496–1498 and Eritrea, 1172 and ethnic conflict, 888, 889 and Indonesia, 1723 and Iran, 1110, 1111 and Iraq, 1741, 1743, 1746 and Korea, 1773, 1775 and Latvia, 1576, 1578, 1581 and the legacies of colonialism, 893–894 and Mongolia, 1784, 1794 and the Ottoman Empire, 764 and Puerto Rico, 846 and religious fundamentalism, 1397 and Russia, 690–692 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675, 1680 and the Sami, 1615

and the Soviet Union, 1074–1075, 1075 and Spain, 708, 709, 1089, 1092 and Tibet, 1820 and Turkey, 769 and Ukraine, 722 and the United States, 1310 and women, 904 Republic of the United Provinces, 196 Republicanism, French, 409 Resettlement, forced. See Ethnic cleansing Resnick, Philip, 1842 Retief, Piet, 1150 Reventós, Joan, 1539 Revueltas, Silvestre, 76 Reyntjens, Filip, 1675 Rezanov, Nikolai, 810 Rhee Syngman, 1780 Rhodes, Cecil John, 1151 Ricasoli, Bettino, 669 Richard, Maurice “Rocket,” 1842 Richard the Lionheart, King (England), 165 Riche, Jean Baptiste, 337 Richler, Mordecai, 1296 Riefenstahl, Leni, 1332 Riegl, Alois, 415 Riel, Louis, 301, 305, 1289 Rights, 14, 129, 444 Argentina and political, 272 and Armenia, 1703, 1708 and Australia, 852, 855 Brazil and political, 290 Central America and political, 316 Colombia and human, 834 demands for, 499–500 and diaspora populations, 1371 England and political, 161, 164 and the European Union, 1041 and Fiji, 1315–1316, 1325 and forms of nationalism, 1352–1354 France and, 34, 173–174, 176, 179 free speech and the United States, 387–388 Greenland and civil, 1570 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 812 and the Maori, 1858 minority verus majority, 932–933 and Nepal, 1809 the Netherlands and political, 199 and New Zealand, 873 and Nigeria, 1183 Rwanda and Burundi and human, 1675, 1679, 1680–1681 and the Sami, 1612 Switzerland and political, 249, 252–253 and Turkey, 1648, 1650 Ukraine and human, 1626 See also Discrimination/prejudice; Liberalism; Minorities Riguad, Andre, 335 Rimsky-Korsakov, Nikolai, 82, 417, 1437


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Rinchen, B., 1794 Rinchino, Elbek-Dorzhi, 1793 Risorgimento, 663–665, 669, 672, 673 culture and identity and the, 671, 673–674 Rituals of belonging, 499–511. See also Ceremonies; Symbols Riva Aguero y Osma, José de la, 373, 374–375 Riva Palacio, Vicente, 355 Rivadavia, Bernardino, 272, 273 Rivera, Fructuoso, 399 Rivera Maestre, Miguel, 320 Riviere-Herard, Charles, 337 Rizal, Jose, 1245 Robert I, the Bruce, 233 Roberto, Holden, 1662, 1662 Roberts, Hugh, 1101 Roberts, Tom, 859 Robertson, Roland, 1393, 1399 Robertson, William, 234, 351 Robespierre, 175, 1489 Robinson, Mary, 1375–1376 Robles, Mariano, 317 Roca, Julio A., 280 Rodgers, Richard, 1433 Rodrigo, Joaquín, 1437 Rodrigues, José Honório, 292 Roma. See Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies) Roman, Petre, 1587 Roman Catholicism and Alsace, 1507–1508, 1508 and Belgium, 140 and Brazil, 1825–1826 and Central America, 317 and Colombia, 827, 828, 829, 832, 833 and Czechoslovakia, 1020, 1023–1024 and France, 179 and Germany, 189, 192, 193, 618 and Haiti, 339–340 and Ireland, 654, 661 and Mexico, 346, 347–350 and the Netherlands, 199, 200, 200–202, 202 (illus.), 204, 205 and Peru, 371, 375–376 and the Philippines, 1246 and Poland, 686 and politics, 982–983, 987–988 and Québec, 1292 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1670 and Spain, 703, 705, 707 and Uruguay, 399 Romania, 1584–1594, 1586 (map) anti-Semitism in, 521 fascism in, 516 and minorities, 1414 and Ukraine, 713, 715 Romantic nationalism, 31, 406, 463, 474–475, 476 German, 10, 92 Romanticism, 527, 882, 1352–1353 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 950, 1276, 1277 Roosevelt, Theodore, 448

Rosas, Juan Manuel de, 273–275, 274 (illus.), 276, 277–278 Rosenau, James, 1368 Rosenberg, Alfred, 416, 417 Rosewall, Ken, 857 Rossé, Joseph, 1509 Rossellini, Roberto, 1333–1334 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 15, 22, 30–31, 86–87, 171, 501 and the collective will, 1054 and organicism, 462 and sovereignty of the people, 530 and Switzerland, 251 and the Terror, 174 Rozent¯als, J¯anis, 565 Rubin, Marcus, 227 Rubinstein, Anton, 82 Rubriks, Alfr¯eds, 1582 Rudbeck, Olof, 223 Runeberg, Johan Ludvig, 228, 601, 605 Rusesabagina, Paul, 1674 Rushdie, Salman, 913, 920, 921, 927 Russell, Bertrand, 1676 Russia, 689–701, 691 (map), 1596–1607, 1598 (map) and Afghanistan, 1684 and Armenia, 1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714–1715 and the Baltic states, 562, 567–568 and the Bolshevik Revolution, 436 and Bulgaria, 575 and Denmark, 150 education and, 423 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438 and Eurasianism, 466 and Finland, 598, 605 and Greek independence, 631 and Hungary, 638 and indigenous groups, 1566 intelligentsia and nationalism in, 8 and Iran, 1110 and Japan, 815 and language, 472 and Latvia, 1576, 1582 and Mongolia, 1784, 1788, 1790–1791, 1791–1792, 1796 and music, 82, 1432, 1433, 1437, 1441 national symbols, 134–135 and new social movements, 1449 and Orthodoxy, 105–106, 983 and the Ottoman Empire, 766 and Poland, 209–210, 679 and political philosophy, 93–94 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1594 and Russian nationalism, 1079–1080 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 and Scandinavia, 220 Slavophilism versus Westernizers in, 19–21 and terrorism, 1489, 1495


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Russia (continued ) and Tibet, 1818 and Ukraine, 714, 1621 See also Soviet Union Russian nationalism, 1074, 1076–1078 Russians in Latvia, 1575, 1582 in Ukraine, 1627–1628 Russification, 946, 955 and Finland, 605 versus Germanization in the Baltic states, 561–562 and Latvia, 1576, 1578 Russo-Japanese war (1904–1905), 810, 816, 820 Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), 574, 763, 764 Rustaveli, Shota, 694 Rustow, Dankwart, 929 Ruthene-Americans, 589 Ruyter, Michiel de, 203 Rwagasore, Prince (Burundi), 1670 Rwanda and Burundi, 1668–1681, 1670 (map) genocide in, 968–969 Ryan, Claude, 1296 Ryckman, Pierre, 1157 Ryklin, Mikhail, 135 Ryukyu Island, 1754 Saakashvili, Mikheil, 1080 Saba, Isak, 1614 Sadat, Anwar, 266 (illus.), 985, 1398 Sadiq, G. M., 1763 Šafàrík, Pavol Jozef, 592 Safavid Dynasty, 1107–1109 Saget, Nissage, 338 Sahak, Catholicos, 1701 Said, Edward, 915, 924 Saigo Takamori, 820 Saint-Domingue. See Haiti Saint Paul’s Cathedral, 410 Sakharov, Andre, 951 Salanga, Alfredo Navarro, 1245 Salazar, Antonio, 516 Sale, Kirkpatrick, 879 Salisbury, Lord, 460 Salnave, Sylvain, 338 Salomon, Louis Lysius Felicite, 338 Salvarrieta, Policarpa, 831 Samarin, Iu. F., 692 Sami, 225, 231, 1608–1618, 1610 (map) Samper, José María, 829 Sampson, Deborah, 50 San Martín, José de, 271, 272, 277 and Peru, 370, 371 San Stefano Peace Treaty, 575 Sánchez, Miguel, 347, 349 Santa Anna, Antonio López de, 354 Santa Cruz, Andrés de, 372 Santander, Francisco de Paula, 826, 827, 831, 831 (illus.) Santo Domingo, 332–333

Santos, José Eduardo dos, 1662 São Tomé e Príncipe, 1667 Sarawak, 1215, 1218, 1219–1220, 1222 Sardà, Joan, 706 Sarmatian ideology, 213–214 Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino, 276, 277, 278, 279 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 1052 Saryan, Martiros, 1707 Saudi Arabia, 984, 1492 Saussure, F. de, 482 Savage, Michael Joseph, 871 Savimbi, Jonas, 1659, 1662, 1662–1663 Savoy, 175 Sayad, Abdelmalek, 1370, 1419 Sayeed, Mufti, 1769, 1770–1771 Scandinavia, 219–231, 221 (map) languages of, 471–472 Schaepman, Herman, 205 Schefferus, Johannes, 1615 Schelling, Friedrich, 67 Schieder, Theodor, 501–502 Schiller, Friedrich, 188, 251 Schlegel, August Wilhelm, 7, 415 Schlegel, Karl Wilhelm Friedrich, 67, 92, 415, 1110 Schleswig, 147, 149, 152, 155–156 Schmid, Alex, 1484 Schoenberg, Arnold, 1434 Schoenfeld, Eugen, 1393 Schöning, Gerhard, 227 Schumacher, John, 1245 Schuman, Robert, 190, 1034, 1509 Scotland, 166, 232–242, 1413, 1415 and communication, 1639 and devolution, 1014 and music, 1442 Scott, James, 903 Scott, Robert, 1434 Scott, Sir Walter, 238 Scottish Home Rule Association (SHRA), 241–242, 242 Sculpture. See Monuments Sculthorpe, Peter, 1439 Second Schleswigian War, 150, 152, 153 Secularism and Arab nationalism, 731–732 and Azerbaijan, 1713 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1526–1527 and France, 175, 409 and globalization, 1401–1402 and India, 1765 and Iraq, 1740, 1746 and Italy, 676 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1761, 1769 legitimacy and, 973 and Mongolia, 1796 and the Netherlands, 206 and Pakistan, 1233 and Palestinians, 1139, 1141–1142 and Québec, 1292, 1294 and religious fundamentalism, 1403


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role of symbols in, 115 and Turkey, 769, 1647, 1651–1652, 1653–1654 and Uruguay, 403 Seddon, Richard John, 868, 870 Sedition Act (U.S.), 387–388 Segregation and Northern Ireland, 1060, 1064 and South Africa, 1151–1152 Séguin, Maurice, 1294 Seipel, Ignaz, 551 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 1662 Self-determination and Austria, 544–545 and the Baltic states, 558 ethnic conflict and denial of, 888 and ethnicity, 464 and Fiji, 1317 and forms of nationalism, 1354–1355 and Israel, 1402 and Mongolia, 1790 and the Napoleonic wars, 474 and nationalistic philosophy, 476, 524 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1845 in political philosophy, 536–537, 965–966, 969 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 as a precondition of rights, 972 See also Independence; Sovereignty Self-government. See Autonomy Selim III (Egypt), 258 Sella, Quintino, 669 Senegal, 963 Senghor, Léopold, 488, 919, 963, 980–981 Separatism/secession, 1460–1472 and Angola, 1660 and Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and Burma, 780–781 and Catalonia, 1540–1541 during the Cold War, 949 and the collapse of communism, 1413–1414 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and cultural distinctiveness, 461 and gender and sexuality issues, 899 and Georgia, 897 and global governance, 459 increases in, 929 and India, 800, 804, 806 in Iran, 1112 and Ireland, 649–657 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1764, 1766, 1769 and Latvia, 1581–1582 linguistic, 477 and Malaysia, 1222 and minorities, 933, 1359 and Mongolia, 1784, 1798 and New Zealand, 866 and newly independent states, 966–967 and Nigeria, 1185 in the Philippines, 1243 and Puerto Rico, 844

in Russia, 1600 and Swedish speakers in Finland, 606 and Taiwan, 1259 and terrorism, 1487, 1490–1492, 1494–1495, 1494 (table) in Turkey, 1655 and Ukraine, 716, 1625 See also Civil war; Independence Sepoy Mutiny, 27, 55 September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, 119, 955, 1399, 1410, 1457, 1488, 1492, 1493 (illus.), 1496 casualties, 1495 Serbia, 437, 481, 1413 Serbs in Bosnia, 1527–1535 ethnic cleansing and genocide of, 440, 524 Sergeev-Tsenskii, S., 697 Seton-Watson, Hugh, 1368 Setus, 557 Sevak, Paruir, 1707 Sexuality, 446, 899–910 Sha, Mirwaiz Yusuf, 1764 Sha’arawi, Huda, 450 Shagari, Shehu, 1187 Shah, G. M., 1768 Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman, 732, 733 Shakespeare, William, 474, 915–917 Sharif, Nawaz, 1232 Shatterbelts, 942 Shays, Daniel, 386 Shcherbytsky, Volodymyr, 1626 Sheng Bright, 1440 Shepstone, Theophilus, 1145–1146 Sheptyts’kyi, Andrei, 718 Sheridan, Jim, 927 Sheridan, Richard, 915 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 1080 Shevchenko Society, 718, 719 Shiism/Shiites differences from Sunnis, 983–984, 986 and Iran, 1107–1108, 1109–1112, 1115–1116 and Iraq, 748, 752–753, 755, 755, 757, 1745, 1747 and Pakistan, 1236 Shinto, 106–107, 108 Shostakovich, Dmitri, 1074, 1432, 1433 Shums’kyi, Oleksander, 718 Shushkevich, Stanislav, 1597 Sibelius, Jean, 79, 228, 417, 600, 605, 1436 Sidgwick, Henry, 527, 531 Sidqi, Bakr, 752 Siebenpfeiffer, Philipp Jakob, 190 Siemiradzki, Henryk, 682 Sienkiewicz, Henryk, 493, 682, 683, 685 Sierra, Justo, 355 Sieyès, Abbé, 172 Sigüenza y Góngora, Carlos de, 350 Sikhs, 1466 Sikorski, Władysław, 683 Silesia, 584


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Sillars, Jim, 997 Silva, Lula da, 1829, 1830, 1831 Simeon I the Great, 574 Simms, William Gilmore, 389 Simon, Claude, 1052 Simpson, L. P., 494 Sin, Cardinal Jaime, 1246 Sinai peninsula, 262 Sinclair, Keith, 870, 872 Sindici, Orestes, 828 Singapore, 1218–1219, 1220–1221, 1221, 1224–1225 and education, 1384–1385, 1386 and Indonesia, 1733 Singh, Gulab, 1763 Singh, Hari, 1465, 1764 Singh, Manmohan, 1207 Singh, V. P., 1769 Sinhalese, 1466–1467 Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), 810, 820, 1774 Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), 795, 810, 817, 822 Sinti/Roma peoples (Gypsies), 440, 517, 521, 523, 1022, 1027 Skalagrímsson, Egil, 226 Skoropad’kyi, Pavlo, 716 Skötkonung, Olof, 226 Skrypnyk, Mykola, 718 Slanský, Rudolf, 1020 Slave rebellions, Haitian, 335–336, 340 Slavery, 1301 and Brazil, 283, 289, 292, 293 and colonialism, 889, 890, 893 and Cuba, 1275 and the development of nationalism, 47 and Egypt, 258, 259–260, 262 and France, 174 and Haiti, 333, 334–336 and Mexico, 345 paternalistic justifications of, 54 and Peru, 371 and the United States, 383, 385, 388, 390–391 and Uruguay, 401 Slavophilism, 20, 213, 692 and religion, 105, 108 Slesvig, 220, 222, 225 Slovakia, 584, 1017, 1021–1022, 1026–1028 and separatism, 590, 594 See also Czechoslovakia Slovenia, 1450 Słowacki, Juliusz, 212, 214 Smart, Mary Ann, 671 Smetana, Bedˇrich, 74, 74 (illus.), 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 417, 593, 594, 1435–1436 Smetona, Antanas, 560, 565, 568 Smiles, Samuel, 531 Smith, Adam, 19, 234, 855 Smith, Anthony D., 113–114, 400, 473, 929, 931, 1368–1369

Smith, Dennis Mack, 674 Smith, Zadie, 927–928 Smuts, Jan Christiaan, 1151 Smyrna, 633 Snellman, Johan Vilhelm, 601 Social Darwinism, 437, 439, 518, 532–533 and gender, 447, 452–453 and language, 480–481 and Völkisch nationalism, 614 Social Democrats, 149, 975–976 Social mobility and ethnic minorities, 931 and nationalism, 5–6, 11 and technology, 1475 and the United States, 1305 See also Class Social movements and Finland, 600–601 new, 1446–1458 and the United States, 1303–1304, 1305 Social policy education reform as, 421–422, 428–429 and gender, 448–449 and women’s rights, 446–447 Social structure and Eritrea, 1170–1171 and France, 1050 and India, 1204–1205 and Rwanda and Burundi, 1675–1676, 1680 See also Class Socialism and Alsace, 1508 and Arab nationalism, 732, 733 and Canada, 1839 and China, 789 versus communism, 975–976 and developing countries, 980, 981 disillusionment and discredit of, 936 and Egypt, 266 and France, 179, 1054 and gender, 453, 456 and Great Britain, 1011 and Iraq, 754 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761 and the Netherlands, 205 and Poland, 212 and Vietnam, 1266 See also Communism; Marxism Socialization and Finland, 600, 607–608 and perversions of nationalism, 522 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 See also Assimilation Sokol, 594 Solanas, Fernando, 1335 Solano, Armando, 830 Solano López, Francisco, 362, 363, 363 (illus.), 364 Solzhenitsyn, Aleksander, 951, 1077, 1601 Somalia, 949


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Somaliland, 459 Sonam Gyatso, 1817 Songtsen Gampo, King (Tibet), 1815, 1816, 1821 Sonnenstern, Maximilian von, 320 Sontsen Gyatso, 1816 Sorel, Georges, 514 Soulouque, Faustin-Elie, 337 Sousa, John Philip, 1441 South Africa, 1144–1153, 1146 (map) and Angola, 1664, 1665 and apartheid, 890 and education, 1386 and language, 478 and music, 1440, 1441 and the Netherlands, 198 and sports, 995 and terrorism, 1491 South America and language, 478 national identity and education in, 35, 37, 39 See also specific South American countries South Korea and Japan, 1751, 1754, 1755, 1758 See also Korea South Tyrol, 1490 South-West Africa, 437 Southeast Asia, 778 (map), 1214 (map), 1262 (map), 1724 (map) Southern Mindanao, 1468 Sovereignty and Australia, 855 and Brazil, 1830–1831 and the environment, 886 and the Gharabagh conflict, 1718, 1719 versus globalization, 1406, 1408 and Greenland, 1571 and Japan, 814–815 and the Maori, 1856 nationalism and popular, 5, 15 and Nepal, 1805 and post-World War II nationalism, 957 and Québec, 1291–1292 See also Independence; Self-determination Soviet Union, 699 (map), 714 (map), 1070–1080, 1072 (map) and Afghanistan, 1687 and Angola, 1663 and Armenia, 1705, 1706, 1707, 1708, 1709–1710 and Azerbaijan, 1714, 1716–1717, 1718–1719 and the Baltic states, 563 breakup of the, 888, 895–897, 972, 1413, 1596 and China, 1197 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Cuba, 1276 and Czechoslovakia, 1026 education and, 419, 426, 430 and the environment, 881–882 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 440–441

and film, 1330, 1332 and gender, 449, 450, 454 and geopolitics, 459 and Japan, 822, 1754 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780 and language, 482 and Latvia, 1575, 1576, 1578, 1581–1582 and Mongolia, 1785, 1789, 1794–1795, 1795–1796 and national identity, 693–701, 880 nationalistic art of the, 411 nationalities policy, 468–469, 946, 1599 and new social movements, 1449 and Poland, 681 and rituals of belonging, 508 and Romania, 1588, 1591 and Siberia, 876 and sports, 993 and Ukraine, 713, 715–716, 719, 722 See also Russia Soyinka, Wole, 925 Spain, 702–711, 703 (map), 1082–1092, 1085 (map), 1540 (map) and Argentina, 269 and authoritarianism, 973 and Basques, 1514, 1517, 1518–1519, 1522–1523 and Catalonia, 1536–1537, 1544–1547 and Central America, 311–313, 314, 317–318 and Chile, 323–327 and Colombia, 825 and colonialism, 889 education and, 36, 432 and the European Union, 1040 fascism in, 516 interventions in Haiti by, 335 and Mexico, 345–346, 350, 353 and minorities, 1412 and music, 1437 and the Philippines, 1239, 1243 resistance to Napoleon, 51–52 and Santo Domingo, 332–333. 339 separatist movements in, 1471 and sports, 997, 999 symbols in, 49 and terrorism, 1491, 1495 and Uruguay, 395, 396–397 Spanish-American War, 1086 Speight, George, 1323–1324 Spencer, Herbert, 532–533 Spengler, Oswald, 70 Spenser, Edmund, 915 Spinoza, Baruch, 203 Spivak, Gayatri, 926 Sports, 991–1003 and Australia, 852, 857 and Canada, 1841, 1842 and Colombia, 832 and Cuba, 1283 and England, 165


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Sports (continued ) and Ireland, 657 and Mongolia, 1797 and New Zealand, 870 and Peru, 378 and rituals of belonging, 504–505 soccer and Brazil, 295 and Turkey, 1651 and Wales, 1637 and war, 901 Sri Lanka, 1466–1467 and terrorism, 1484, 1491, 1492 St. Erik (Sweden), 226 St. Gregory, 1700 St. Laurent, Louis, 1838 Stalin, Joseph (Iosif Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), 945, 1075, 1603, 1603 (illus.) and China, 978 and the Cold War, 977–978 cult of personality, 952 and ethnic cleansing and genocide, 440 and gender, 449 and nationalism, 1071, 1076 nationalities policy of, 469 and Russianness, 693, 694, 697, 700–701 and Yugoslavia, 948 Stambolov, Stefan, 578 Stanford, Charles Villiers, 1438 Stanley, Henry Morton, 1156, 1160 “Star-Spangled Banner,” 117, 118 (illus.) Starˇcević, Ante, 96 Statue of Liberty, 119 Steele, James, 1843 Štefánik, Milan Rastislav, 587, 588, 1017 Stefano, Alfredo Di, 1002 Steffens, Henrik, 66–68, 69–70 Stein, Freiherr von, 34 Stephen the Great (Moldavia), 1592 Sternberger, Dolf, 1556 Stetsko, Slava, 1624 Stoilov, Konstantin, 578 Strasbourg, France, 1510 Stratification. See Class Streeton, Arthur, 859 Strindberg, August, 228 Stuart, Charles Edward (“Bonnie Prince Charlie”), 237–238, 238 Stubbs, Paul, 1450 Štúr, L’udovit, 96, 592 Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, 589 Subsidiarity, 881, 1042, 1045 Sudan, 263, 1468–1469 Sudeten-Germans, 595 Sudetenland, 595, 1017–1019, 1025 Suez Canal, 259, 265–266 Suez Canal crisis, 1012 Suffrage, women’s, 446 and Australia, 853 and Germany, 620 and nationalist movements, 450

and New Zealand, 870–871 and transnational movements, 452–453 and Turkey, 770 See also Voting franchise; Women’s rights Suharto, President (Indonesia), 954, 1723, 1725, 1726, 1728, 1730–1731, 1733 Suhm, P. F., 227 Sukarno, Ahmad, 953–954, 964, 1463, 1725, 1726, 1726, 1727, 1730, 1732, 1733, 1734 and the Bandung Conference, 960–961, 962 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 1734 Sükhebaatur, General (Mongolia), 1789, 1797, 1798 Sukuna, Ratu Sir Lala, 1318 Sullivan, A. M., 658–659 Sultan, Ibrahim, 1171 Sun Yat-sen, 789, 789 (illus.), 790, 791, 794 Sunnis differences from Shiites, 983–984 and Iran, 1107 and Iraq, 748, 751, 754, 755, 755, 757 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1761, 1764 Suriname, 197 Suvorov, Aleksandr, 696, 1074 Švec, Otakar, 1024 Svecoman movement, 599 Sweden, 220–222 communication in, 1473 and Finland, 598 and language, 472 national anthem and holidays, 230 national identity and, 223, 226–228 and Norway, 224–225 and the Sami, 1609, 1610–1612 Swildens, J. H., 198 Swiss army, 253 Swiss Confederation, 245, 247–248 Switzerland, 244–255, 248 (map) education and, 429 flag of, 114 and landscape art, 60 and language, 472 national identity and education in, 35 and prejudice against Sinti-Roma peoples, 521 Symbols, 111–124, 1342–1348 and Afghanistan, 1690–1691 and Armenia, 1702 and Australia, 856, 860 and the Baltic states, 565 and Basques, 1519–1521 and Belgium, 144, 145 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532 and Brazil, 285, 286 (illus.), 294–295 and Burma, 781–782 and Canada, 305 and Catalonia, 1543–1544 and Central America, 318–319, 320–321 and Chile, 327–328, 328 and Colombia, 825, 831 and Congo/Zaïre, 1164–1165 and Cuba, 1283–1284


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and England, 163 and Ethiopia, 744 and the European Union, 1042 and Finland, 600, 602, 604 and France, 175 gender and familial, 43–45, 46, 48–50, 54, 445–446, 449, 904–905, 907 and Germany, 618, 619 and Greenland, 1568–1569, 1570 and Hungary, 641–644 and Indonesia, 1732–1733 and Iran, 1114–1115 and Iraq, 757 and Ireland, 659 and Israel, 1124 and Japan, 1752, 1757 and Latvia, 1579–1580, 1580 in literature, 917, 926, 927 and Mongolia, 1786, 1793–1794, 1797 and national identity, 30, 31, 37, 38, 40, 465 and national self-invention, 900 and Nepal, 1803 and the Netherlands, 204, 204 and Nigeria, 1184 and Northern Ireland, 1066–1067 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847, 1850 and Peru, 373 and Poland, 215, 686 and Puerto Rico, 844, 846 and Québec, 1297 religious, 99, 102, 115–116 and rituals, 500. See also Rituals of belonging and Romania, 1592 and Russia, 1602 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and Scandinavia, 229–230 and Singapore, 1225 and South Africa, 1150 and Spain, 709 and Taiwan, 1258 technologies as national, 128, 134–135 and Tibet, 1818 transnational, 115 and Turkey, 766, 770, 774, 1646–1647 and Ukraine, 721 and the United States, 1308 and Wales, 878, 1633, 1637–1638 Syncretism and Mexico, 347–350, 349 and Paraguay, 358 Synge, John Millington, 918, 920–921, 922 Syngman, Rhee, 1773 Syria and Battle of Maysalun, 728 and Egypt, 982 as French Mandate, 728 water, 884–885 Syrian Arab Kingdom, 727–728 Szálasi, Ferenc, 516, 638 Széchenyi, Count István, 637, 643

Tacitus, 64, 617 Tagore, Rabindranath, 918 Taine, Hippolyte, 415 Taiping Rebellion, 101, 108 Taiwan, 1249–1260, 1250 (map) and film, 1337–1338 and independence, 1462, 1468 and Japan, 810, 818, 1749 Tajiks, 1692–1693, 1694–1695 Takemitsu, T¯oru, 1439–1440 Taliban, 986–987 and Afghanistan, 1687, 1688, 1691, 1692, 1693–1694 and Pakistan, 1232, 1233 Tamils, 1385, 1466–1467, 1492 Tamir, Yael, 97 Tammsaare, Anton Hansen, 565 Tan Dun, 1440 Tanzania, 962 Tarai, 1801–1802, 1804, 1808, 1811 Taraki, Mohammad, 1687 Tardivel, Jules-Paul, 1290 Tarnowski, Count Stanislaw, 493 Tartars, 1621 Tatars, 441, 469 Tawfiq, King (Egypt), 260, 261 Taylor, Charles Wood, 328, 989 Taylor, T. Griffith, 851–852 Tchaikovsky, Piotr, 82, 1432, 1437 Technology, 126–136, 1473–1483 Cold war and weapon, 944 and diaspora populations, 1367–1368, 1370, 1376 as enabling ethnic cleansing and genocide, 437 and the Holocaust, 524 and ideologies, 972 image, 1338–1340 and immigration, 1428 and Iraq, 1738 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mexico, 355 and Nepal, 1807 and new social movements, 1455 and promoting nationalistic art, 417–418 See also Internet Tegnér, Esias, 228 Telegraphy, 127–128 and Central America, 315 and Germany, 192 and Mexico, 355 and the United States, 390 and Uruguay, 402 Television and Algeria, 1103–1105 and Angola, 1666 and Canada, 1838 and Catalonia, 1546 education and, 422, 433 versus film, 1336, 1339


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Television (continued ) and India, 1209 and language in Italy, 671 and Québec, 1296 and Wales, 1635, 1639 Tenzin Gyatso. See Dalai Lama, 14th (Tenzin Gyatso) Terre’Blanche, Eugène, 1148 Territory and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1531–1532, 1532 and Israel, 1125 See also Borders; Expansionism Terror, French (1793–1974), 174–175 Terrorism, 1484–1498 and Armenia, 1707 and the Basques, 1090, 1091–1092 and hypernationalism, 1389, 1410–1411 and India, 801 and Indonesia, 1728, 1729 and Italy, 676 and Japan, 821 and Pakistan, 1232 and religious fundamentalism, 986–987, 1400 and Russia, 955, 1607 and the 1970s, 1939 and Turkey, 1651, 1655 in the United States, 955 and Wales, 1637 See also Conflict/violence Terrorism Knowledge Base (TKB), 1493 Thailand, separatism in, 938, 1468 Thakin Soe, 780 Than Tun, 780 Thatcher, Margaret, 1013, 1040, 1453 The Birth of a Nation, 1328, 1329 (illus.) Theater and the Baltic states, 559–560 and France, 176–177 and Ireland, 918 and Québec, 1294 See also Cinema Theweleit, Klaus, 904 Thibaw, King (Burma), 782 Thiers, Adolphe, 177 Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648), 115, 183, 188, 592 Thomas, Harold, 1850 Thomas, W. I., 1403 Thompson, Tom, 1841 Thomson, James, 32, 1438 Thorarensen, Bjarni, 228 Thorbecke, Johan, 198, 201 Thrace, 580, 582 Thubden Gyatso, 1818, 1820 Thyra, Queen (Denmark), 153 Tibet, 988, 1468, 1813–1823, 1815 (map) Tidemand, Adolph, 228 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 800 Tiso, Jozef, 1019 Tito, Josip Broz, 948, 978, 982, 1530 Tokugawa Nariaki, 814, 815

Tokugawa Narinobu, 814 Tokutomi Soho, 813 Tolstoi, A. N., 697 Tone, John, 51 Topelius, Zacharias, 228, 604, 605 Toronto, Canada, 1837 Totalitarianism education and, 429–430 and Europe, 419 and gender, 454–456 and imperative forms of nationalism, 501, 502, 510 Touraine, Alain, 1446, 1456 Tourism, 1028 and Cuba, 1285 and Iran, 1115 and Tibet, 1823 Tours, Georges Moreau de, 409 Toussaint-Louverture, 332, 335–336, 335 (illus.), 340, 341, 342 Toynbee, Arnold, 1368 Trade Argentina and, 269–271, 280 and Brazil, 285, 287 expositions and Scandinavia, 229 and Peru, 368 Transjordan, 728 Transnationalism and diaspora populations, 1369 and globalization, 1407 and identity among immigrants, 1427–1429 and ideologies, 972 and image technology, 1339 and literature, 927–928 versus national identities, 1348 and new social movements, 1447, 1455 and sports, 1001–1003 and women’s rights, 451–453 See also Cosmopolitanism Transportation and Argentina, 279–280 and Colombia, 833 and immigration, 1427 and Iran, 1112 and Malaysia, 1224 and Nepal, 1807 and Peru, 368 and the Philippines, 1247 and Russia, 692 technological advances in, 127, 131, 136 and the United States, 388–389, 389–390 See also Railroads Transvaal, 1145–1146 Transylvania, 472 Trautmann, Catherine, 1510 Trdat III, King (Armenia), 1700 Treaty of Amsterdam, 1549 Treaty of Kiel, 220, 223 Treaty of Lausanne, 437–438, 768, 1647, 1648 Treaty of Maastricht, 1549


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Treaty of Nice, 1549 Treaty of Rome, 669 Treaty of St. Germain, 542 Treaty of Trianon, 638–639, 645 Treaty of Utrecht, 299 Treaty of Versailles, 459, 468, 476, 513–514 and Bulgaria, 580 and Czechoslovakia, 595 and Germany, 613, 617, 621 Treaty of Waitangi, 863, 873 Tremaglia, Mirko, 1372 Tremblay, Michel, 1294 Trimble, David, 1062 Troels-Lund, F., 227 Trofimenkoff, S. M., 1294 Tromp, Maarten, 203 Troost, Paul Ludwig, 413 Trotsky, Leon, 520 Trubetskoy, Prince, 94 Trubetzkoy, N. S., 94 Trudeau, Pierre, 1291, 1835, 1836, 1837–1838, 1838, 1840 Truman, Henry, 950, 1309 Tsai Ming-liang, 1338 Tschudi, Aegidius, 252 Tsedenbal, Yumjaagiin, 1798 Tshombe, Moise, 1469 Tsongkhapa, 1817 Tubin, Eduard, 560 Tucholsky, Kurt, 111 Tucker, George, 494 Tuheitia, 1857 Tunisia, 1464 Tupac Amaru II, 370, 371 Turanism, 641, 773–774, 1645 Turgenev, I. S., 694 Turia, Tariana, 1862 Turina, Joaquín, 1437 Turkey, 760–775, 767 (map), 1642–1656, 1644 (map) and Armenia, 1704, 1710–1711 and Azerbaijan, 1714 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 438, 442 and the European Union, 1411 and gender, 446 and new social movements, 1452 water, 884–885 Turkish-Greek war (1919–1922), 522 Tutsi, 1669, 1670, 1672, 1673, 1675, 1677, 1678 Tuvan Republic, 1792 Twa, 1669, 1672, 1678 Twelve Years Truce, 200, 201 (map) Ty-Casper, Linda, 1245 Tymoshenko, Yulia, 1629, 1629 Tyrs, Miroslav, 594 U Chit Hlaing, 779 U Nu, 783 U Ottama, 779 U Saw, 780, 782

Uhde, Fritz von, 416 Ukraine, 712–722, 715 (map), 1619–1629, 1620 (map) borders of, 1413 and new social movements, 1449 and the Orange Revolution, 1080 and the Soviet Union, 1071, 1073, 1074, 1078, 1079 Ulanfu, 1790, 1794 Ulmanis, K¯arlis, 560, 565, 568, 1576, 1578 Unifications, national, 464 Union of Utrecht, 196 United Kingdom. See Great Britain United Monarchy of Denmark, 147 United Nations (UN) and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1532–1533 and Canada, 307 and Congo/Zaïre, 1158 and Eritrea, 1170, 1171 and Fiji, 1322 and Germany, 1554 High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), 1535 and indigenous groups, 1610, 1617 and interventions, 1469 and Iraq, 756, 1743 and Israel, 1121, 1125, 1135 and Jammu and Kashmir, 1765, 1767 and Korea, 1780, 1781 membership, 957 and Mongolia, 1795 and new social movements, 1456 and the nonaligned movement, 961–962, 969 and peacekeeping, 1412 and the self-determination doctrine, 972 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, 510 United Provinces of the Río de la Plata, 273 United States, 381–392, 384 (map), 1299–1311, 1302 (map) and Afghanistan, 1690 and African Americans, 493–494 and Angola, 1666 and Argentina, 275 and Armenia, 1710 and Australia, 850 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1533 and Canada, 305, 307, 1835–1836, 1842 and China, 1191 and the civil rights movement, 938 and the Cold War, 942–956, 977–979 and Colombia, 829, 830 and colonialism/expansionism, 22, 1462 and counterterrorism, 1497–1498 and Cuba, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1280 Czechoslovaks in the, 588–589 and decolonization policy, 1320 and diaspora populations, 1372 economic policy and globalization, 1407–1408, 1409 education and, 32–33, 35–39, 420, 422–426, 429, 433, 1381–1382


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United States (continued ) ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 437 and European integration, 1033 and film, 1328–1330, 1332–1333, 1337, 1339–1340 and France, 1050 and gender and sexuality, 447, 448, 450, 452, 901, 902, 907–908 and Greenland, 1563 and Haiti, 340 and immigration, 1412, 1418–1419, 1420–1421, 1424, 1428 and indigenous groups, 1566, 1845 and Iran, 1109, 1116–1117, 1117 and Iraq, 1742–1743, 1746–1747 Irish in the, 654–655 and Israel, 1398, 1401 and Japan, 810, 822, 1749–1754, 1756–1757 and Korea, 1772–1773, 1780, 1781 and the Kyoto treaty, 877 and landscape art, 64–66, 70 and language, 472, 482 and the League of Nations, 1402 and Mexico, 353–354 and minorities, 894, 935 and Mongolia, 1796 and music, 76, 117, 118 (illus.), 1433, 1438–1439, 1441–1442, 1443 and national identity, 465, 930, 931 nationalistic art of the, 411 and new social movements, 1446, 1448 and New Zealand, 872 and Northern Ireland, 1061, 1068 and Pakistan, 1229, 1235, 1236 and Palestine, 1142 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1850 and Peru, 372 and the Philippines, 1239, 1240–1242, 1243, 1248 and Puerto Rico, 836–837, 837, 845, 847 and religious fundamentalism, 1394–1396, 1400 and rituals of belonging, 509 and Russia, 1604, 1607 and Southern identity, 494–495 and sports, 994, 1000–1001 symbols of the, 114, 119, 124, 128, 134, 1346, 1347 terrorism and xenophobia in the, 1410, 1488, 1490, 1492 and Vietnam, 954, 1264–1265, 1265 and Yugoslavia, 896 See also American Revolution Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 972 Unterhalter, Elaine, 904 Urabi, Ahmed, 263–264 Urabi Revolt, 260, 263–264 Urbanization and Argentina, 278 and Basques, 1515

and Central America, 311 and Denmark, 149 and France, 1055 and Iraq, 753, 755, 755, 1737 and Korea, 1778 and language, 479 and the Maori, 1860–1861 and Scandinavia, 221 and Turkey, 772 and Ukraine, 714–715 Urquiza, Justo José de, 275, 279 Urrutia-Thompson Treaty, 829, 830 Uruguay, 393–403, 395 (map) and Argentina, 275 Argentine-Brazilian war over, 273 and Brazil, 289 and Garibaldi, 672 Utilitarianism, 531 Uvarov, S. S., 692 Uvin, Peter, 1680 Uygur, 1468 Uzbekistan, 1079 Uzbeks, 1693 Vaculík, Ludvík, 1026 Vagris, Janis, 1581 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 987, 1208 Vakatora, Tomasi, 1322 Valdemar IV (Denmark), 226 Valdemar the Great (Denmark), 153 Valdem¯ars, Krišj¯anis, 561, 562 Valdivia, Pedro de, 323, 326 Valencia, 1546 Valera, Eamon de, 1294 Valle, José Cecilio del, 315, 316 Valle-Riestra, José María, 76 Vallejo, José Joaquín, 329 Valois, Georges, 515 Values and Afghanistan, 1693 and Brazil, 1830 and Burma, 779 and Canada, 1839 and Cuba, 1283 in education, 1381 exporting U.S., 944, 955–956 and Great Britain, 1008 and India, 797 and Iran, 1116 and Japan, 1754 and Latvia, 1576, 1580 and Malaysia, 1224 and Mongolia, 1793 and national character, 528–529, 530–531, 537 and nationalism, 901 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1847–1848 and Poland, 686 post-materialist, 1454 and Puerto Rico, 844 and religion versus ideology, 971


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and religious fundamentalism, 1397, 1399 and rituals of belonging, 504–506 See also Morality; Religion Van der Noot, Henri, 140 van Gogh, Theo, 1486–1487 Van Thieu, Nguyen, 1265 Vanessa-Mae, 1440 Varikas, Eléni, 53 Varley, Fred H., 1841, 1841 (illus.) Varnhagen, Francisco, 292 Vasnetsov, V. M., 694 Vaughan, Olufemi, 1180 Vazov, Ivan, 576–577 Velestinlis, Rigas, 626, 631, 631 Velvet Revolution, 1026, 1028 Verchères, Madeleine de, 303 Verdi, Giuseppe, 75, 77, 79, 80, 671, 1437–1438 Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 197, 203 Vermeer, Johannes, 203 Vertov, Dziga, 1330 Verwoerd, Hendrik Frensch, 1152, 1152 Vian, Boris, 1052 Victoria, Queen (England), 164, 237 Vieira, Luandino, 1665 Vienna Congress of 1815, 46, 197 of 1819, 35 Vietnam, 963–964, 1261–1271 and France, 1050 and gender, 446 and independence, 1463 Vietnam War, 944, 952, 954, 1265, 1265, 1310 and the United States, 1304 Vigneault, Gilles, 1294 Vigny, Alfred de, 177 Vike-Freiberga, Vaira, 1579 Vikings, 228 Vilde, Eduard, 565 Villa-Lobos, Heitor, 76, 1439 Villarán, Manuel Vicente, 374 Vilnius, Lithuania, 563, 563 Vinnen, Carl, 416 Violence. See Conflict/violence Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène, 415 Virgin of Guadalupe, 347, 348 (illus.), 349–350, 356 in Peru, 376 Visconti, Luchino, 1334 Vivekananda, Swami, 802 Vizcardo y Guzmán, Juan Pablo, 370 Vlad the Impaler (aka Dracula), 1592 Vodou (Voodoo), 340 Vogel, Sir Julius, 865 Volhynia, 716 Völkisch nationalism, 613, 614, 614, 622 Voltaire, 14–15, 370 Voluntarism, 1196, 1197, 1198–1199 von Flüe, Niklaus, 253 von Metternich, Klemens, 671

von Ranke, Leopold, 41, 101, 227 Vonk, Jean Francoise, 140 Voting franchise and Argentina, 275 and Australia, 853 and diaspora populations, 1365, 1366, 1371–1372 and England, 161, 164 and Finland, 605 and Germany, 611 and Haiti, 336 and Italy, 669, 670 and the Netherlands, 199 and Scotland, 234 and Switzerland, 250 and Uruguay, 401 See also Democracy; Suffrage, women’s Vramshapuh, King (Armenia), 1701 Vytautas (Lithuanian prince), 564 Wade, P., 1450 Wagner, Richard, 74, 77, 79, 406, 463, 1431 Wagner, Robert, 1508 Wais, Mir, 1690 Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, 863 Walcott, Derek, 914, 921 Waldheim, Kurt, 550 Walensa, Lech, 948 Wales, 166, 1631–1640, 1634 (map) and devolution, 1014 nationalism and environmentalism in, 878, 881 Walker, William, 313, 318 Wallace, Henry, 1303, 1309 Wallace, William, 232–233, 238–239, 240 (illus.) Wallot, Paul, 408 Walser, Martin, 1558 Walton, William, 1433, 1438 Walzer, M., 97 Wang Xilin, 1440 War of 1812, 388 War of the Pacific, 327, 330, 376 (map), 377, 377–378 Ward, Russel, 854 Warren, Robert Penn, 495 Warsaw Pact, 945 Wartburg Festival, 187 Washington, George, 387 Water, 884–885 Watkins, Melvin, 1842 Weber, Carl Maria von, 73, 74, 117, 1431 Weber, Eugen, 9, 102, 179 Weber, Max, 3–4, 40, 982, 1399, 1402 Webster, Noah, 32–33, 389 Weimar Republic, 613, 613, 620–621 and film, 1330–1331 See also Germany Weissman, Stephen, 1676 Weitz, Margaret, 905 Weizmann, Chaim, 1123, 1123


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Welfare state and Canada, 302–303, 306, 1290 and New Zealand, 870–871 and the United States, 944, 1300, 1309 See also Socialism Welhaven, Johan, 228 Wellington, Duke of, 164 Werner, Abraham, 67 Werner, Anton von, 409 West Germany, 976, 1448, 1490. See also Germany West Papua, 1468 Western, the ( film), 1332–1333, 1337 Western Sahara, 1468 Westernization and India, 1211 and Iran, 1111 and Japan, 1753 and Russia, 692 Wetterlé, Emile, 1508, 1508 Whitehead, Gillian, 1439 Whitlam, Gough, 1845 Wielopolski, Aleksander, 212 Wilhelm I (Germany), 619 Wilhelm II (Germany), 416, 621 Wilhelmina, Queen (the Netherlands), 204 Willems, Jans Frans, 145 William I of Orange (the Netherlands), 141, 142, 196, 197, 203 William II (the Netherlands), 199 William III (the Netherlands), 201 Williams, Edward (Iolo Morgannwg), 1638 Williams, Kyffin, 1637 Williams, Ralph Vaughan, 1434 Wilson, A. T., 1742 Wilson, Woodrow, 464, 1328 Fourteen Points Speech, 436, 972 and Iraq, 749 principle of self-determination, 1790 Winter War, 607 Wirth, Johann Georg August, 190 Wislicenus, Hermann, 408 Wolfe, James, 299, 303, 304, 1840 Wölfflin, Heinrich, 416 Wollstonecraft, Mary, 53 Women and Afghanistan, 1457, 1690, 1694 and Algeria, 1105 and Czechoslovakia, 1025 and Egypt, 264, 265 Eritrean, 1173 and fascism, 454–456 and France, 1047, 1050 and Germany, 620 and India, 1209, 1210 and Ireland, 661 and Northern Ireland, 1064, 1065 and the Philippines, 1246 and postcolonial gender roles, 926–927 and social policies, 448–449 as symbols, 445–446, 926, 1345

and Turkey, 769, 770, 1653, 1654 and the United States, 901, 1304 and Wales, 1636 and war, 449–450 See also Gender; Women’s rights Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 453 Women’s movements, 1449, 1450, 1452–1453 Women’s rights, 53–54, 57, 446, 450–451 and France, 173–174, 176 and Germany, 620 and Greece, 53 revolution and, 46, 50–52 social policy and, 446–447 and socialism, 56–57 and Switzerland, 249 transnationalism and, 451–453 See also Suffrage, women’s Wood, Henry, 1438 World Bank, 1610 World divided. See Cold War World War I and Arab nationalism, 727–728 and the Armenian genocide, 523 and assassination of Habsburg heir, 1490 and Australia, 855–856 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1529–1530 and Bulgaria, 580 and Canada, 306, 1835 colonialism and the causes of, 514 and the Czechoslovaks, 588–589, 593 education and, 426 and Ethiopia, 740 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 438 and fascism, 515 gender roles and, 449 and Germany, 613, 621–622 and Greece, 633 and Hungary, 638 and India, 804 and Iraq, 1739, 1742 and Ireland, 651, 660 and Italy, 667, 670 and New Zealand, 868–869 and the Ottoman Empire, 765 and Poland, 682, 682–683 results of, 419, 436, 527 and South Africa, 1150 and statuary, 412 and Turkey, 1643, 1649 and Ukraine, 713 World War II and Alsace, 1507, 1508 and Australia, 857 and Austria, 547–548 and Bosnia/Herzegovina, 1530 and Bulgaria, 582 and Burma, 781, 784–785 and Canada, 302, 1835 and China, 1197


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Yassin, Ahmad, 1137, 1138 Yeats, William Butler, 487–488, 487 (illus.), 489, 654–655, 657, 659, 914, 918 Cathleen ni Houlihan, 922 Yeltsin, Boris, 946, 1079, 1080, 1597, 1597, 1605 Yohannes, Emperor (Tigray), 739 Yrigoyen, Hipólito, 281 Yrjö-Koskinen, Yrjö Sakari, 601 Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 1725 Yugoslavia civil wars of, 525, 896, 1044, 1413–1414 common language versus religious difference in, 529 ethnic cleansing and genocide in, 435, 441, 442 and international interventions, 1408–1409 and the Soviet Union, 948, 978 Yushchenko, Viktor, 1080, 1622–1623, 1623, 1626, 1628 Yuson, Alfred A., 1245 Yuval-Davis, Nira, 902

and Czechoslovakia, 594–596 and Eritrea, 1170 ethnic cleansing and genocide during, 435, 437–441. See also Holocaust and expansionism after World War I, 524 and Fiji, 1318–1319 and France, 1051–1052, 1052 and gender roles, 450 and Germany, 617 and Hungary, 645 and India, 804–806 and Indonesia, 1733 and Iraq, 753 and Ireland, 661 and Italy, 667, 674–675 and Japan, 817–818, 822, 1749, 1751 and Malaysia, 1215–1216 music related to, 1433–1434 and nationalism, 509–510, 1490 and New Zealand, 869–870, 872 and Nigeria, 1181 and Palestinians, 1135 and pan-Aboriginalism, 1851 and Poland, 681, 683, 688 role of religion in, 106–107 and Russia, 1603 and the Sami, 1614, 1616 and sexualized imagery, 905–907 and the Soviet Union, 1073, 1074, 1075 and Taiwan, 1250–1251 and terrorism, 1496 and Ukraine, 713, 722 Woronicz, J., 692 Worringer, Wilhelm, 415 Wright, Erik Olin, 2 Writing/alphabets, 481, 577, 1529 and Armenia, 1701–1702, 1703, 1706 and Azerbaijan, 1717–1718 and Mongolia, 1784, 1786, 1788, 1793, 1798 and Romania, 1591 and the Soviet Union, 1073 and Tibet, 1815 and Turkey, 773, 1652 Wybicki, Józef, 215 Wysłouch, Bolesław, 681, 685 Xenophobia, 1411–1412, 1415. See also Hypernationalism Xenophon, 1697 Xu¯ant˘ong, Emperor, 1818 Yacine, Kateb, 1100 Yamin, Muhammad, 1727, 1727–1728 Yanaev, Gennadii, 1582 Yang, Edward, 1338 Yanukovych, Viktor, 1621, 1622, 1623, 1624, 1625

Zaghlul, Saad, 262–263, 263 Zaghlul, Safiyya, 263 Zahir Shah, Mohammed, 1687, 1689 Zaïre. See Congo and Zaïre Zanabazar, 1791 Zavala, Lorenzo de, 353–354 Zealots, 1489 Zeroual, Liamine, 1099 Zetkin, Clara, 453 Zhamtsarano, Tsyben, 1793 Zhdanov, Andrei, 1075–1076 Zhirinovskii, Vladimir, 1078, 1079–1080 Zhou Enlai, 962, 1816, 1821 Zia ul-Haq, Muhammad, 1232 Zimbabwe, 1441 Zimmers, Oliver, 244 Zinnermann, J. G., 41 Zinovief, Grigory, 520 Zionism, 103, 104 (illus.), 1120–1121, 1121, 1123–1125, 1126 and agricultural settlements, 1122 and Arab nationalism, 730 and the arts, 1127 and forming national identity, 1127–1130 and language, 477 and Palestinians, 1133 Žižka, Jan, 1023 Zografos, Panagiotis, 632 (illus.) Zola, Emile, 134 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 1074 Zta-Halein, Kathinka, 52 Zulus, 27, 1150 Zurayq, Qustantin, 732, 732 Zyuganov, Gennady, 1079–1080, 1597


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About the Editors

Guntram H. Herb, Ph.D., is associate professor of geography at Middlebury College, Middlebury, Vermont. In addition to peer-reviewed articles and book chapters, his published works on nationalism include Under the Map of Germany: Nationalism and Propaganda, 1918–1945 and the collection of essays co-edited with David H. Kaplan, Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory, and Scale. David H. Kaplan, Ph.D., is professor of geography at Kent State University in Ohio. He is an editor of the journal National Identities. His six books include Boundaries and Place (with Jouni Häkli) and Nested Identities (with Guntram Herb). He has also published over 30 peer-reviewed articles and chapters, many of them in the field of nationalism.


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Nations and Nationalism: A Global Historical Overview, Volume 1: 1770 to 1880

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Nationalism in a Global Era: The Persistence of Nations (Nationalism and Ethnicity Routledge Studies in Nationalism and Ethnicity)

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Biotech Industry: A Global, Economic, and Financing Overview

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Historical Materialism, Volume 19, Number 3, 2011

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