Kennedy, De Gaulle and Western Europe

Kennedy, De Gaulle, and Western Europe Erin R. Mahan Cold War History Series General Editor: Saki Dockrill, Senior Lec...

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Kennedy, De Gaulle, and Western Europe Erin R. Mahan

Cold War History Series General Editor: Saki Dockrill, Senior Lecturer in War Studies, King’s College, London The new Cold War History Series aims to make available to scholars and students the results of advanced research on the origins and the development of the Cold War and its impact on nations, alliances and regions at various levels of statecraft, and in areas such as diplomacy, security, economy, military and society. Volumes in the series range from detailed and original specialised studies, proceedings of conferences, to broader and more comprehensive accounts. Each work deals with individual themes and periods of the Cold War and each author or editor approaches the Cold War with a variety of narrative, analysis, explanation, interpretation and reassessments of recent scholarship. These studies are designed to encourage investigaton and debate on important themes and events in the Cold War, as seen from both East and West in an effort to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon and place it in its context in world history. Titles include: Günter Bischof AUSTRIA IN THE FIRST COLD WAR, 1945–55 The Leverage of the Weak Christoph Bluth THE TWO GERMANIES AND MILITARY SECURITY IN EUROPE Dale Carter and Robin Clifton (editors) WAR AND COLD WAR IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1942–62 Saki Dockrill BRITAIN’S RETREAT FROM EAST OF SUEZ The Choice between Europe and the World, 1945–1968 Martin H. Folly CHURCHILL, WHITEHALL AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1940–45 John Gearson and Kori Schake (editors) THE BERLIN WALL CRISIS Perspectives on Cold War Alliances Ian Jackson THE ECONOMIC COLD WAR America, Britain and East–West Trade, 1948–63 Saul Kelly COLD WAR IN THE DESERT Britain, the United States and the Italian Colonies, 1945–52 Dianne Kirby (editors) RELIGION AND THE COLD WAR

Wilfred Loth OVERCOMING THE COLD WAR A History of Détente, 1950–1991 Erin Mahan KENNEDY, DE GAULLE, AND WESTERN EUROPE Donette Murray KENNEDY, MACMILLAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS Andrew Roadnight UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS INDONESIA IN THE TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER YEARS Kevin Ruane THE RISE AND FALL OF THE EUROPEAN DEFENCE COMMUNITY Anglo-American Relations in and the Crisis of European Defence, 1950–55 Helene Sjursen THE UNITED STATES, WESTERN EUROPE AND THE POLISH CRISIS International Relations in the Second Cold War Antonio Varsori and Elena Calandri (editors) THE FAILURE OF PEACE IN EUROPE, 1943–48

Cold War History Series Standing Order ISBN 0–333–79482–6 (outside North America only) You can receive future titles in this series as they are published by placing a standing order. Please contact your bookseller or, in case of difficulty, write to us at the address below with your name and address, the title of the series and one of the ISBNs quoted above. Customer Services Department, Macmillan Distribution Ltd, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS, England

Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe Erin R. Mahan Office of the Historian Department of State Washington, D.C.

© Erin R. Mahan 2002 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2002 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 0–333–98457–9 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Mahan, Erin R., 1969Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe/by Erin R. Mahan. p. cm. -- (Cold War history series) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–98457–9 1. United States--Foreign relations--France. 2. France-Foreign relations--United States. 3. United States--Foreign relations-1961–1963. 4. Kennedy, John F. (John Fitzgerald), 1917–1963. 5. De Gaulle, Charles de, 1890–1970. 6. United States--Foreign relations--Europe. 7. Europe--Foreign relations--United States. 8. France--Foreign relations--Europe. 9. Europe--Foreign relations--France. 10. Cold War--Diplomatic history. I. Title. II. Cold War history series (Palgrave Macmillan (Firm)) E183.8.F8 M34 2002 327.73044’09’046--dc21 2002075804 10 11

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Contents Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction

1

1

Personalities and Policies

12

2

Opening Moves

31

3

The Berlin Crisis: Contrasting Franco-American Strategies

49

4

The Challenge of French Nuclear Policy

67

5

Trade and the Atlantic Alliance: Protectionism versus Openness?

85

6

Strain on the Dollar: Franco-American Monetary Disputes

107

7

The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Making of the Double Non

128

Debating Détente

143

8

Conclusion

163

Notes

169

Bibliography

214

Index

227

v

Acknowledgments Many people and institutions helped make this book possible. I thank above all others, two close friends and colleagues, Ted Keefer and Ian Jackson. Ian encouraged me to turn my dissertation into this book; he read drafts, offered insightful suggestions about the structure of this work, and provided the moral support to help me through my self-doubts. Ted patiently read and reread drafts, offered invaluable criticism and advice, and was a source of support and wisdom. I could not have finished this book without them. Numerous scholars guided me through the various stages of this project. First and foremost, I thank my former dissertation adviser, Melvyn Leffler, whose pursuit of scholarly excellence has been an inspiration. A man of deep compassion and high standards, I was privileged to be his student and feel honored to be writing in the same field as he. I am also grateful to Nelson Lichtenstein, Stephen Schuker, and Allen Lynch, who served as readers when this project first began. Their vision and political insight have made me a better historian. I want to express gratitude to several additional scholars who helped me along the way. I owe a great deal to Kenneth Thompson, a brilliant and generous scholar who followed this project closely and offered constant encouragement and friendship. I thank Frank Gavin for his friendship, collaboration on projects, and our many conversations about Kennedy’s policies on Western Europe. Paul Pitman was kind enough to point out French archival sources. I thank my two readers for Palgrave Macmillan, Jeffrey Vanke and Philip Bell, who offered excellent criticism and advice. Tom Zeiler shared his knowledge of Kennedy’s foreign economic policies and kindly read parts of this book. My colleagues at the Miller Center of Public Affairs, Timothy Naftali and Philip Zelikow, offered endless encouragement and helped me refine my ideas about the Berlin and Cuba crises. I am indebted to the archivists of all the many depositories that I consulted. Particularly helpful were Megan Desnoyers, William Johnson, and Allan Goodrich at the Kennedy Library; the staff at vii

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Acknowledgments

the Quai d’Orsay and the archives at the French Ministry of Finance, the Public Record Office, and the Adenauer House. I also thank my friends and colleagues at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. There are many friends who kept me motivated. I thank Jeffrey Flannery, whose wit and wisdom I cherish. And to my dear friend and mentor, John Walters, I will always be indebted for his unwavering support. I would also like to thank Chris Hellings for his kind words. Finally, I express my love and gratitude to my family. My parents, who are college professors, instilled in me a dedication to writing and scholarship. I also thank my sister and best friend, Bryna, and my brother, Trevor, who touched me in many ways. * The views expressed in this book are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State.

Introduction

Background: trade, money, and alliance discord before 1961 In 1961, President John F. Kennedy proclaimed in his inaugural address, “Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country.” Kennedy’s address was a declaration that the United States would “bear any burden” to protect liberty from communist challenges around the globe. During his brief presidency, Kennedy, who had campaigned on a platform of personal sacrifice, extended his clarion call for burden-sharing beyond the nation’s borders to ask not what the United States could do for Western Europe, but what Western Europe could do for the United States in its common fight against international communism.1 When Kennedy assumed office, the political and economic reconstruction of Western Europe was largely complete. Due in large measure to the Marshall Plan of the late 1940s and the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) in 1957, Western Europe was no longer a continent of war-ravaged nations.2 In 1960, the EEC nations exceeded the United States in their share of gross world product, and the level of US exports and that of the combined Common Market nations were relatively equal. The dollar gap of the late 1940s, which meant that West Europeans spent more dollars for imports than they earned by exporting to the United States, was replaced by a dollar and gold drain for the United States.3 1

2

Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe

By 1958, the emergence of a deficit of $3.5 billion in the US balance of payments reflected the shifting economic balance between the United States and Western Europe. Under the Bretton Woods Agreement of 1944, an international financial system was set up which established the dollar as the chief international reserve asset, which coupled a guarantee of the dollar’s value with a promise that other nations could cash in surplus dollars for $35 an ounce at the US Treasury. The system lacked a mechanism for correcting payments deficits caused by shifting real currency values resulting from national monetary policies and savings rates. Despite the increasing outflow of dollars and gold from the United States, most American officials believed that the Bretton Woods system continued to provide the engine driving Western economic growth and was responsible for the rapid expansion of world trade from 1945 to 1960. They were also keen to draw on the benefits accruing from seignorage to the United States, which resulted from this dollar-based monetary regime. There were several reasons for the emergence of an increasingly severe balance of payments deficit in the late 1950s. The price of American goods had risen, which depressed exports and encouraged imports. Capital outflows in the form of US investment in foreign countries had increased. Military expenditures abroad also continued to increase. The West Europeans had moved toward current account convertibility. In October 1960, a severe run on gold dramatized those trends. International confidence in the dollar declined and raised the prospect of its devaluation. During the presidential campaign, to restore confidence and reverse those trends, Kennedy promised to maintain the official price of gold.4 In the late 1950s and early 1960s, US geostrategy toward Western Europe was influenced by domestic economic constraints structured primarily around declining American industrial productivity, especially within the steel industry, and highlighted by a dollar and capital flow. Although US financial officials and many politicians overreacted to the balance of payments deficit, which was quite manageable during this period, their often obsessive concern was prescient. The United States faced waning economic power as the decade progressed. Kennedy, for example, viewed the deficit in highly politicized terms both at home and abroad. In foreign affairs, he viewed the payments deficit as a sword of Damocles which the

Introduction

3

Europeans held over the Americans. By converting large amounts of surplus dollars into gold, France and other West European nations might force concessions in NATO strategy. Domestically, to satisfy the liberal-labor coalition that supported the Democratic Party, Kennedy had to worry about boosting productivity in order to justify, in macroeconomic terms, the domestic expansion program he wanted in terms of increased wages and social programs. The president and his advisers looked to tariff liberalization to increase US exports, a solution that alone could not address the competitiveness issue. Kennedy was not the only Western leader to speak in terms of burdens and exhortations of sacrifices. General Charles de Gaulle, who became president of France in 1958, was beset by a different set of economic problems. He felt saddled with le fardeau algérien (the Algerian burden) and le fardeau agricole (the agricultural burden). The economic issues that flowed from those problems brought France into conflict with the United States. De Gaulle returned to power to extract France from the Algerian war, which had been draining French coffers since 1954. One of the bloodiest wars of the postwar decolonizations, the effects of the Algerian war on the French national pscyhe have been described as analogous to the Vietnam syndrome in the United States. The effects of the war on the French political economy were more quantifiable. De Gaulle’s insistence on a common agricultural policy for the Common Market, for example, stemmed from domestic economic problems exacerbated by the necessity to decolonize. As the Algerian war drew to a close, de Gaulle expected an influx of French Algerians, who would establish large commercial farms and require export markets for their commodities. Farmers were an important Gaullist constituency and could not be ignored, especially as riots created political turbulence. For de Gaulle to implement continued subsidies would have created a hemorrhaging French balance of payments deficit. As he explained during a cabinet meeting, “If agriculture is not resolved, we will have another Algeria on our own soil.”5 In other words, French national economic interests were grounded in structural macroeconomics and also in the political economy of France. Despite the costly Algerian war, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the United States began experiencing balance of

4


payment difficulties, France was enjoying an economic miracle of financial stability, industrial progress, and an annual growth rate of 41/2 percent. The Fourth Republic had already laid the groundwork for the upward surge in the economy when de Gaulle came to power, but prosperity had often been marred by monetary crises.6 In December 1958, de Gaulle appointed a group of economic experts under Jacques Rueff, magistrate for the European Coal and Steel Community and a former minister of finance, who drew up the plans that put the French economic house in order. The successful reforms, however, came at a political cost. Implemented by two successive finance ministers, Antoine Pinay and Wilfrid Baumgartner, the program was based on a formula of austerity and strict financial and monetary orthodoxy. Measures included higher taxes, a devaluation of the franc by 171/2 percent, strict budgetary policy, removal of the automatic tying of wages to a cost of living index, and reduced government subsidies. Selective liberalization of trade allowed more foreign goods into the country. The currency was replaced with a new franc, worth 100 of the old variety. And in the years that followed, the French government restricted the growth of credit in order to slow inflation. This practice of encadrement du crédit, however, discouraged investment because it limited industry’s access to capital. The Finance Ministry also imposed a coefficient de trésorerie which required banks to hold 30 percent or more of their assets in treasury bonds or medium-term re-discountable credits.7 Franco-American economic differences during the late 1950s and early 1960s cannot be separated from the quadrilateral saga that also includes Western Germany and Britain. During the post war era, the German question dominated the agenda of the Atlantic alliance. Containing German power, however, carried different assumptions for each ally at varying times. The alliance polarized over ensuring that West German monetary and trade policies conformed to different allied national preferences. American and British leaders were preoccupied with burgeoning balance of payments deficits, trade expansion, and economic growth. They alternately competed and cooperated to secure military offset payment arrangements with West Germany and prevent an autarkic Common Market with high external tariffs. France, plagued by inflation and saddled with a troublesome agricultural sector, sought

Introduction

5

its own commercial and financial advantages toward the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) economic status was more secure than that of the other Western allies. Its leaders demanded political power within Europe and NATO commensurate to its strengthening economic capabilities. West Germany’s “economic miracle” was reaching top speed, as its gross national product (GNP) soared above 5 percent a year. Its monetary reserves of gold and foreign exchange made the FRG the major creditor for Europe and the envy of deficit nations such as Britain and the United States. Germany also had a trade surplus. Although poultry and wheat interests pressed Adenauer’s governing Christian Democratic Union Party (CDU) for agricultural subsidies, the chancellor and de Gaulle operated with an understanding of West German dominance in industrial goods for French preeminence in agricultural products within the EEC. Britain’s entrance into the Common Market could prove decisive in Franco-German economic machinations. Would Britain attempt to mediate, stand aside, or take sides in the bilateral dealings?8 Of all Western concerns about waning capabilities, Britain’s economic woes were the most real. Board of Trade and Treasury officials regarded increased productivity as essential for revitalizing Britain’s economy. The nation’s trading position had changed dramatically during the 1950s. Not only had Britain’s GNP fallen to six times less than that of the US and three times less than that of the Soviet Union, but the nation was being eclipsed by the economies of France, Japan, and West Germany – all three of which had experienced greater percentage growth rates during the 1950s.9 The pound suffered violent oscillations as speculation on the London gold market wrecked havoc on currency exchange rates. Britain’s balance of payments plunged further into the red. Farmers in southwest England pressed the government for subsidies, while the Commonwealth countries clamored for preferential trade arrangements. Harold Macmillan’s cabinet sought to protect those agricultural interests when negotiating with the Common Market.10

6


Background: strategic questions and alliance discord before 1961 Since the end of World War II, US policy on Western Europe pursued the double containment of the Soviet Union and Germany. The US viewed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), set up in 1949, as the best deterrent to the Soviets and the most effective means of integrating West Germany, which joined in 1954, to the West. Geography dictated that NATO’s defense of Europe come from widely dispersed forces, with the dominant power, the United States, separated by the Atlantic Ocean. Despite the stationing of US ground forces in Europe and the contribution of the West European members, nuclear weapons always constituted the primary deterrence for NATO because the alliance’s level of conventional forces in terms of manpower and equipment were far less than the huge armies of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations. The type of nuclear weapons (tactical, short-range to long-range) and the timing of their use (at what point upon aggression from the East) were the subject of debate from NATO’s inception. The conventional wisdom holds that prior to 1961, NATO doctrine called for immediate, massive, and deep strikes into Soviet territory in the event of aggression from the East. Yet in recent years, scholars increasingly have recognized that there was no clear shift from Eisenhower’s reliance on massive retaliation to Kennedy’s embracing of flexible response, which allowed for gradual escalation from conventional defense to responses up the rungs of nuclear strikes. Both strategic doctrines were ambiguous and depended on which side of Atlantic they were invoked. The debate over shifts in NATO doctrine became more acrimonious by 1961.11 Beginning in November 1958, NATO faced an acute crisis from the East, when the Soviets used the threat of signing a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to force the Western powers out of West Berlin. Initally, Nikita Khrushchev set a six-month ultimatum to reach an agreement with the West, and then let it pass in 1959 when the Eisenhower administration refused to give up the US position in Hitler’s former capital. Soviet threats to Berlin were not a new phenemenon. The Berlin blockade of 1948, however, was before the perils of the superpower nuclear arms race.

Introduction

7

In the late 1950s, West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer expressed dissatisfaction with the non-nuclear status of Germany. He felt that the FRG deserved some type of nuclear access given its strategic importance to the alliance and its economic power. The chancellor also believed that West Germany needed some type of nuclear status because of the Soviet threat to end Western rights in Berlin. The Atlantic alliance began polarizing over preserving Western access and rights to Berlin and over responding French and West German demands for Mitbestimmung, or a share in nuclear decisionmaking. By the late 1950s, the major West European allies were reluctant to centralize NATO’s nuclear control and command. One American proposal to meet the nuclear sharing demands that was floated during the last year of the Eisenhower administration was a NATO seaborne MRBM force of Polaris submarines with mixed manning and multilateral ownership. The idea was commonly referred to as a multilateral nuclear force (MLF).12 De Gaulle echoed Adenauer’s calls for greater NATO consultation, but sought to exclude West Germany from control of nuclear weapons. In September 1958, he issued a memorandum calling for a tripartite directory comprised of France, Britain, and the United States to handle not only NATO but global issues. Eisenhower and Macmillan rejected the idea.13 France hoped to join the nuclear club, which in the 1950s included Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. French development of nuclear weapons had begun many years before de Gaulle came to power. In December 1954, Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France of the Fourth Republic authorized a program to develop an atomic bomb. Another impetus followed the Suez débâcle of October 1956. With US opposition and collapsing British commitment, this disatrous joint British–French invasion of Egypt made French officials reluctant to rely on its erstwhile Anglo-Saxon allies and determined to develop an independent nuclear force. When de Gaulle came to power in 1958, he authorized France’s first nuclear test, which took place in the Sahara Desert of Algeria on 13 February 1960. The plutonium bomb that was detonated was the most powerful first test conducted by a nuclear power. Between March and December 1960, France proceeded with a series of atomic tests in the Sahara. Exploding an atomic device and

8


acquiring an operational nuclear military capacity, however, are two separate steps, and by early 1961 France was struggling to achieve the latter.14 Throughout most of the 1950s and into the early 1960s, France also remained mired in the Algerian war that had brought de Gaulle to power. The North African conflict cast a shadow over his foreign policy as French military power was concentrated predominantly in North Africa. There were 475,000 French forces in Algeria versus 333,000 in France and a mere 58,000 in Germany.15 This background of economic and strategic issues facing the Western alliance set the stage for dissension between the Kennedy administration and de Gaulle’s regime.

The historiography of Franco-American differences in the early 1960s Most studies of Franco-American relations during the early 1960s focus on the personalities of Kennedy and de Gaulle and present oversimplified depictions of French resistance to US hegemony by alternately chastising de Gaulle for nationalistic intransigence and Kennedy for imposing US policies on Western Europe. Scholarly works of this type fall into three distinct groupings. The first category focuses on a conflicting “grand designs” thesis about Great Britain’s bid for the Common Market and a NATO multilateral nuclear force. These accounts assume that Kennedy and de Gaulle had coherent “grand designs” for Europe, and that their visions were incompatible. These accounts end either with their wistful speculations about unfulfilled promise or harsh judgment of Kennedy’s crisis-ridden “thousand days” as a harbinger of future failures. Although de Gaulle has not fallen victim to the dubious distinction of a “what if” president in these studies, he is typically caricatured as a pontiff with inflexible and entrenched nationalist policies. Another problem with this category of works is its failure to examine the ambiguities in the Kennedy administration’s West European economic or defense policies.16 A second group of works examines balance of payments disputes within the Western alliance. Many of these works draw few distinctions between French foreign economic policies of the early and mid-1960s. Only one study, to the best of this author’s knowledge,

Introduction

9

effectively shows the relationship between US security and economic policies. Almost all works of this category, however, neglect to explicate the relationship between trade and finance.17 A third body of literature dwells on Franco-American differences during East–West crises in Berlin and Cuba. Many of these studies mistakenly perpetuate the myth that in times of Cold War crisis de Gaulle was a staunch, cooperative ally. Works touching on FrancoAmerican differences during the Berlin crisis are more numerous, but typically examine it on the continuum of postwar Berlin crises and East–West European settlements; depict it as a brief interruption to conflicting grand designs without examining the adverse effects of the crisis on overall US policy toward Europe; or analyze allied handling of Berlin as a case study of Kennedy’s crisis diplomacy. A few French historians assert the general importance of the Berlin crisis on different aspects of de Gaulle’s European design, but do not provide comprehensive description or analysis.18 Historians have long recognized that questions of co-opting German power were driving forces behind NATO strategies and the political and economic configuration of the European Economic Community in the postwar era. During the early 1960s, without the specific problem of Berlin, the German question would have been attenuated but not eliminated within the Atlantic alliance. The question of US hegemony as opposed to European autonomy occupies a large part of trying to understand postwar Franco-American relations. Scholars have grappled with related issues of control and autonomy within the Atlantic alliance. Some have adopted a framework of “empire by integration” or “empire by invitation” to characterize US relations with Western Europe since the onset of the Cold War. Others have postulated variant models of US hegemony and West European challenges.19

The argument of this book The general aim of this book is to examine the intricate economic and geostrategic differences that shaped Kennedy’s and de Gaulle’s responses to the multiple questions confronting the Atlantic alliance. During the early 1960s, Franco-American relations were riddled with controversies. Should Great Britain enter the Common Market? How should the Western powers deal with balance of

10


payments problems? What was the most effective NATO strategy for countering the Soviet threat to Berlin before and after the building of the Wall? What mechanism would satisfy West European insistence on independent nuclear capabilities? The following pages will argue that alliance issues during the early 1960s cannot be studied in isolation. Three primary problems – Berlin, European integration, and international finance – were linked in the minds of the Western leaders. The relationships among the issues accentuated Franco-American differences and foreclosed cooperation. Most previous analyses of Kennedy’s and de Gaulle’s disagreement over West European policies have relied almost solely on US documents, and have left out a key dynamic.20 After all, many diplomatic historians have long recognized that understanding the superpower crises and other international developments during the Cold War requires examining the policies of their allies. This work uses a wide range of French and US archival research, as well as some British and German documentation. The following pages examine how monetary issues became entangled with NATO strategy, Britain’s EEC candidacy became enmeshed with nuclear sharing, and the ongoing Berlin crisis served as a backdrop to all of those policies. In short, this book argues that Franco-American differences during this period resulted from related questions of international economics, defense strategy, and power politics. Building on the assumption that the disagreements between Washington and Paris reflected clashes of national interest, this study examines critical moments in the Franco-American relationship of the early 1960s in light of how both governments perceived their own interests and those of each other. This analysis also explains how the structure and dynamics of the bilateral relationship were embedded in complex multilateral relationships. Difficulties between Kennedy and de Gaulle are best understood as a series of mutually reinforcing strategic and economic problems, driven by divergent domestic agendas, and shaped by differing conceptions about the double containment of Germany and the Soviet Union. The larger significance of the Franco-American conflicts in Europe during this period lies less in what it reveals about rival visions of global preeminence and more in what it illuminates

Introduction

11

about the underlying structural economic and strategic bases of power that the two governments dealt with on domestic, regional, and international levels. The early 1960s are best seen as a pivot as the West struggled with questions about multinationalizing their economies and the need to reform the international economy. This study also reflects the belief that Franco-American difficulties cannot be separated from the intricate bilateral and multilateral relationships among the major West European nations. The significance of the Franco-American differences in Europe during this period lies in what it illuminates about the shifting balance of power within the Western alliance as a whole. The sour state of Franco-American relations during Kennedy’s tenure served merely as a microcosm of the problems within Western Alliance itself, as de Gaulle, more than any other West European leader, articulated increasing resentment and fears about US policy toward the continent. Kennedy’s and de Gaulle’s contrasting strategies point to a transitional moment in the Cold War and in the balance of power within the Western alliance. Their clash produced lasting effects on NATO policies, the international economy, and the development of détente during the 1960s.21

Chapter outline Chapter 1 provides brief descriptions of Kennedy, de Gaulle, and their chief advisers. It also sketches the general contours of their West European policies. Chapter 2 examines the series of bilateral talks among the Western allies during the first half of 1961 and the portents those discussions held for conflict between France and the United States. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the divisive strategic issues of Berlin and NATO nuclear sharing. Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the economic issues that separated France and the United States. Chapter 7 looks at the Cuban missile crisis as a catalyst for de Gaulle’s double non of Britain’s entry into the Common Market and of French participation in a MLF. The final chapter discusses the differing conceptions about a détente with the Soviet Union during 1963.

1 Personalities and Policies

André Malraux, who served as President Charles de Gaulle’s minister of culture, once commented, “If, one day, I were to speak about General de Gaulle, I should begin by saying that he is a man whom psychology will never manage to figure out.”1 The compulsion to “figure out de Gaulle” was a mistake typically made by President Kennedy and many members of his administration, who fell into the habit of believing that to understand Gaullist policies one only had to unravel the idiosyncrasies of his philosophy and psychological make-up. They viewed Gaullism primarily as an irrational cult of national vanity based on the charisma of the French general. In one colorful assessment, the president’s special assistant, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., relayed a characterization provided by Pierre Mendès-France, a former French prime minister, that there was “a strain of madness in de Gaulle. He once said to me ‘I have two brothers. One is crazy, and we had him put away. The other is normal. I am in between.’”2 Charles Bohlen, US ambassador to France, captured the prevailing assessment of de Gaulle when he privately caricatured him as a “comic monstrosity not to be taken too seriously as the animal is méchant [mean] but it does not matter because it is impotent.”3 The administration’s tendency to dismiss the French president’s statecraft as a “diplomacy of sound and fury”4 indicated an unwillingness to view him as anything more than an annoying impediment to US aims, as well as a failure to understand Gaullism as a system of thought and concrete objectives. 12


13

De Gaulle was certainly a man of multiple, even baffling, complexities. His rhetoric often distracted his opponents from shrewd political and diplomatic maneuverings. He also possessed a combination of vision and intransigence that served him well over the years. At the same time, his vision could turn to delusion and his suspicious attitude toward other powers continually astonished and angered many members of the Kennedy administration. US officials found it easier to focus on personalities and overlook economic and strategic differences between the two nations.5 Initially, Kennedy and de Gaulle mistakenly assumed that their charisma and rhetoric would disarm the other and overcome the strategic and economic differences separating their nations, which will be the focus of the following chapters. The two leaders were separated by age, background, and temperament – characteristics that made compatibility unlikely.

Kennedy’s and de Gaulle’s background In 1961, when Kennedy became president at age 43, he was 22 years younger than de Gaulle. In 1917, the year Kennedy was born into a family of affluence, Captain de Gaulle sat imprisoned in Germany. De Gaulle’s father, who had fought in the Franco-Prussian war, fostered distrust toward Germany in his son. During World War I, de Gaulle’s period of captivity nurtured his distrust of Germans. As a prisoner-of-war, however, he also acquired a measure of guarded respect for Germans, especially their quest for power and their strong sense of discipline. He learned their language and spent his days reading and teaching history to his fellow prisoners. Not surprisingly, the importance de Gaulle later placed on ensuring France’s security against its Rhineland neighbor followed from lifeexperiences shaped by his military background and early exposure to the German threat. Beyond his personal distrust, de Gaulle was acutely aware that France had fought three bitter wars against Germany in his lifetime.6 Kennedy, conversely, grew up learning that money was power. His father made his fortune during the roaring twenties through stock market speculation. He established million-dollar trust funds for his nine children so that they could have the freedom “to look him and others in the eye and tell them to ‘go to hell.’”7 John

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Kennedy’s inherited wealth financed a hedonistic youth, but also enabled him to make politics a life-time career. From his father, he grew up hearing that a nation was only as strong as its economy. As president, his visceral response to the US gold drain, and almost obsessive desire to alleviate it, flowed from his father’s early influence. George Ball, Kennedy’s under-secretary of state, recalled his dread “whenever the President returned from Hyannis Port [where he visited his father]; we braced ourselves for a sermon on gold and the hellfire awaiting us if we did not promptly correct the balance of payments deficit.”8 Kennedy and de Gaulle both served their countries during World War II, but the similarities end there. As a general, de Gaulle led the Free French. His stormy relationships with Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, who excluded him from major decisions, generated a smoldering animosity toward les Anglo-Saxons which persisted for the rest of his life. World War II also reinforced his determination to curb the power of postwar Germany.9 During the war, Kennedy served in the Pacific theater as a naval lieutenant. Unlike de Gaulle, his war valor was publicized beyond its merit. Kennedy lost his elder brother and a brother-in-law to the Nazi war machine – losses that colored perceptions of Germans and accentuated his desire, as president, to prevent that nation’s revanchism. His early personal exposure to Germans was limited to a short stay in the Third Reich during a pre-war tour of Europe and a similar tour in the summer of 1945. His best friend, who accompanied him during the first trip, recalled their general impression: “The Germans were extremely arrogant – the whole race was arrogant – the whole feeling of Germany was one of arrogance.”10 Kennedy’s diary from summer after the end of World War II revealed no changed impressions.11 Temperamentally, the two leaders were vastly different, which contributed to divergent world-views. De Gaulle was a devout Catholic, Kennedy only nominally so. De Gaulle attributed his strong sense of duty to his parents’ religious influence. His father taught at a Catholic collège and instilled within him a belief that certain values, particularly pertaining to religion and patriotism, were absolute and unquestionable.12 His upbringing strongly influenced his outlook. His ingrained sense of duty compelled him to regard his life as fulfilling an historical mission for France. Malraux


15

observed that “intimacy with [de Gaulle] did not mean talking about himself, a tabooed subject, but about France.”13 By viewing himself as the embodiment of France, de Gaulle exhibited a conceited determination to secure a place in the annals of history. The French general’s world-view colored his perceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union. He considered both nations “barbarous superpowers.”14 He was disdainful of Americans as a materialistic people lacking soul. He remained convinced that they cultivated no loftier ambition than economic dominance. Paradoxically, however, he regarded US industrial spirit and power with a contemptuous respect, realizing that France needed to become an economic powerhouse.15 The French statesman held an equally poor view of the Soviet Union. He once declared, “I don’t like ‘isms.’” Ideologies were inherently suspect and transitory because he did not believe that a civilization which denounced religious faith could survive. His moral aversion to atheistic communism made him distrust Soviet intentions. Usually referring to the USSR as “Russia,” as a way to antagonize Soviet leaders, de Gaulle believed the superpower disguised its traditional drive for expansion in ideological garb. One French scholar explains this duality: “With his right eye de Gaulle saw Russia, but with his left he saw the international Communist movement.”16 Kennedy’s world-view, in contrast, was influenced by a family environment where his father’s secularism held greater sway over the sons than his mother’s piety. Joseph Kennedy believed his son would acquire a greater appreciation for the free enterprise system through an understanding of other ideologies. At his father’s urging, John Kennedy studied a year at the London School of Economics under the prominent political scientist Harold Laski, whose views were considered Marxist by most members of his own Labour Party. Kennedy learned little, however, preferring the London social scene to academic studies and spending much of the year fighting bouts of recurring illnesses.17 Kennedy’s limited exposure to socialist thought and his failure to study or work out a political philosophy caused him later to accept the prevailing postwar anti-communist orthodoxy as an article of faith. As a member of Congress during the late 1940s, he supported the Truman administration’s early containment policies because he

16


feared that Moscow might extend its political-economic system beyond its borders. He voted for the funding of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee and temporized on Joseph McCarthy’s anti-communist crusade because his brother Robert had worked for the Wisconsin senator and his sister Eunice dated him.18 In 1961, at age 65, de Gaulle had assumed an avuncular shape but retained the energy to work incessantly. He had an inflated sense of his capabilities and frequently spoke of himself in the third person and interchangeably with France. He believed foreign policy was his domaine réservé and dismissed French officials at whim. During the early years of his presidency, de Gaulle gradually concentrated power at the presidential Palais d’Élysée, where he relied heavily on a coterie of loyal advisers, who jealously guarded his domaine réservé of foreign affairs.19 In contrast to de Gaulle, at age 43, Kennedy was the youngest elected US president, but chronically poor health plagued him throughout his life. He had the last rites of the Catholic Church administered five times before the age of 40. He struggled against Addison’s disease, an auto-immune disorder affecting adrenal gland functions. One side-effect was fatigue. He also grappled with frequent, debilitating back pain. He received cortisone injections in his spine to alleviate the discomfort and often took amphetamines to offset the fatigue.20 Despite these afflictions, Kennedy projected an image of vitality for himself and his administration. He sent members of his staff on 50-mile hikes to prove their physical fitness. On the policy level, he often spoke of invigorating organizations such as NATO, the United Nations, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development.21

Contours of Kennedy’s West European policies Kennedy considered himself a pragmatic idealist, and his attitude toward Western Europe reflected that outlook. He preferred day-today results even though he invoked grandiose ideas in speeches. His practical bent fueled his resentment that the United States alone paid what all the West European nations combined contributed to the NATO budget. He also questioned how the US alone could mount a costly counteroffensive to Sino-Soviet aid to the lesser developed countries. Under a banner of “interdependence,” he


17

appealed to a unified Western Alliance to help shoulder “free world” responsibilities. Kennedy labeled the concept “burdensharing,” and his administration often invoked the phrase “Atlantic partnership” and “grand design” to describe US and West European policies acting in tandem.22 Skeptical about the motivations behind Khrushchev’s brand of “peaceful co-existence,” Kennedy believed that the strength of the West would be derived as much from the promotion of productivity and abundance as from military defense.23 During the late 1950s, politicians and government officials accepted the mistaken but widespread view that the Soviet economy had a higher growth rate than the United States and was becoming a model for the lesser developed countries (LDCs). As a senator, Kennedy expressed concern that the “economic gap” and the “missile gap” were “equally clear and present dangers to US security.” He argued that economic and social chaos in Third World countries would generate political instability, which would foster communism. Kennedy expected the NATO allies to help bridge the “economic gap” between the industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere and the Third World.24 He worried that a chronic US balance of payments deficit would hinder the United States’s ability to appropriate the sums for military expenditures deemed necessary to wage the Cold War and feared that balance of payments problems would constrain his desire to increase aid to lesser developed nations.25 Kennedy’s general views on Western Europe were shaped not only by Cold War objectives but also by concern about the possibility of waning US economic strength. During the presidential campaign, he had promised to “get the country moving again.” Mounting public frustration over recessions during Eisenhower’s tenure made his slogan resonate with the electorate. Kennedy entered office realizing critics of “free-spending” Keynesian policies would use the US balance of payments deficit as a rationale to stymie a program of domestic economic expansion on the basis that it would worsen the recession.26 Kennedy realized that his administration’s economic orientation toward Western Europe would be critical to achieving domestic expansion and meeting US strategic objectives. He entered office seeking policies that would prevent the EEC from becoming a closed trading bloc and erecting a high external tariff. He planned

18


to expand trade, stem the balance of payments deficit, and foster economic growth throughout the “free world.”27 The Soviet military threat, however, most concerned the new president when formulating his general foreign policy objectives. During the presidential campaign of 1960, he had repeatedly chastised the Eisenhower administration for allowing a “missile gap.” In fact, there was no gap. The United States possessed 200 ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), 100 SLBMs (submarine launched ballistic missiles), and 1,700 strategic bombers to the Soviets 50, 0, and 200, respectively. The US nuclear deterrent was far superior in number to the Soviets.’ His predilection to finish in first place affected his policy outlook.28 During various campaign stops, he had proclaimed, “our defense policy can be summed up in one word: first. I do not mean first but. I do not mean first when. I mean first period.”29 Kennedy worried less that the Soviet Union’s supposedly superior number of nuclear weapons would increase the likelihood of nuclear confrontation and more that their arsenal would strengthen their hand in other ways. He warned that Soviet missile power would “be the shield from behind which they will slowly, but surely, advance – through Sputnik diplomacy, limited brush-fire wars, indirect non-overt aggression, intimidation and subversion, internal revolution, increased prestige or influence, and the vicious blackmail of our allies.”30 He charged that Moscow’s allegedly superior striking ability provided coverage for supporting insidious national revolutionary wars in the Third World. Khrushchev’s speech before the conference of world communist parties in late November 1960 heightened Kennedy’s distress. In berating the “imperialist” West, the Soviet premier made it emphatically clear that the Soviet Union, as “the vanguard of the world Communist movement,” would assist national liberation movements. Without explicitly endorsing military subversion or force, Khrushchev recognized the possibility “of nonpeaceful transition to socialism.”31 Kennedy considered the Soviet premier’s speech deceptively dangerous. He believed that under the guise of “peaceful coexistence,” the Soviet Union would incite “national-liberation revolutions” by providing economic and military aid to the LDCs. Kennedy felt that the United States was beleaguered by crises in the


19

Congo, Laos, Vietnam, and the Formosa Straits. He planned to shift NATO defense strategy from massive retaliation in favor of a military build-up based on the concept of gradual responses, commonly called flexible response. Although a NATO strategy based on gradual responses had its beginnings in the Eisenhower administration, in Kennedy’s mind, Third World revolutionary national movements and the Soviet threat to Berlin necessitated a more signficant departure from pure nuclear deterrence. Kennedy’s desire to raise the nuclear threshold by enhancing NATO’s conventional military capabilities promised to be controversial among the West European allies, as the following chapters will show.32 Kennedy’s views on the overall East–West conflict shaped his attitude toward the Western alliance. In the early 1960s, the double containment of the Soviet Union and Germany was an evolving concept as the United States faced an increasingly assertive Western Europe. For the new president, the most frightening aspect of West European divergence from US strategic guidelines were stirrings of nuclear ambitions. De Gaulle’s determination to provide his nation with full nuclear capability showed no signs of abating. Because France was preoccupied by the Algerian war, Kennedy did not want nuclear arms handled by the disenchanted French army.33 Kennedy’s fears of miscalculations were intertwined with concern about nuclear proliferation. He agonized over the precedent a force de frappe would set for West Germany and China. Realizing the United States could exercise no direct control over China’s development of the bomb, he concentrated on West Germany. Chancellor Adenauer embodied the policy of linking West Germany to Western Europe and NATO. Kennedy was concerned, however, that both the chancellor and former defense minister, Franz-Josef Strauss, were clamoring for greater nuclear participation.34 Although Kennedy repeatedly called for “rebuilding” and “reconstructing” the NATO alliance to meet changing circumstances, he articulated only the broad contours of a policy. On the issue of nuclear cooperation within the Atlantic alliance, he was particularly vague and ambivalent. His campaign speeches identified the need for greater allied consultation, but offered no concrete proposals. Throughout the campaign, his few allusions to the looming threat over Berlin were general expressions about the need

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for US resolve against Soviet attempts to expel Western troops from the city.35 Especially given Khrushchev’s threat over Berlin, Kennedy considered it imperative that the Federal Republic remain firmly tied to Western Europe. His pre-election actions, however, did not bode well for smooth relations with the octogenarian Adenauer, who had a propensity for bearing grudges. During the late 1950s, Kennedy had met with Willy Brandt, mayor of West Berlin and leader of the Social Democrats. Brandt was an opposition candidate for chancellor. In an article written for Foreign Affairs, Kennedy added insult to injury by implicitly endorsing the “new generation” of European leaders represented by Brandt.36 Kennedy’s knowledge of West German affairs and the Berlin question, in particular, was minimal. Journalist Theodore White, who chronicled the presidential campaign, noted how the candidate “talked about Berlin, very slowly, as if picking his own way through his thoughts.”37

Kennnedy’s advisers Kennedy’s choice for secretary of state, Dean Rusk, reflected the president’s desire to direct his own foreign policy. The 51-year-old Southerner was laconic and self-effacing. He lacked the “vigor” valued by the New Frontier, but possessed the intellectual credentials equally prized within the administration. He was a former Rhodes scholar and professor of government. His Protestant background was very different from Kennedy’s, and the two men never established a close rapport. Nevertheless, Rusk was loyal to Kennedy, without being a “yes” man. A dedicated public servant, he served in the army during World War II before joining the Department of State in 1946. He rose quickly through the ranks to become a key adviser to President Truman and then secretary of state, Dean Acheson.38 McGeorge Bundy, who left his post as dean of the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences, joined Kennedy’s team as special assistant on national security affairs. Bundy centralized decision-making in the White House, although he was never intimately involved with economic issues. Bundy’s intelligence was formidable, his selfconfidence often leading to sarcasm toward those he viewed as


21

incompetent. Fluent in French, Bundy was viewed by Department of State officials as a Gaullist sympathizer.39 Kennedy’s appointment of Robert McNamara, president of Ford Motor Company, as secretary of defense reflected the president’s predilection to submerge political ideology within technical and economic concerns. McNamara possessed no strong partisan convictions. Instead, with slicked-back hair, horn-rimmed spectacles, and a penchant for “number-crunching,” he came across as a technocrat par excellence.40 Even those who knew him well, such as Henry Ford, Jr., described him as “a real cold drink of water.”41 McNamara’s appointment promised the methodical application of cost-effective technologies to reshape the US deterrent into a more flexible, versatile, and efficient force which could buttress US diplomacy. Kennedy was not an economist, but he had faith in maintaining a strong dollar and a balanced budget. He made up for his lack of knowledge by surrounding himself with experts who steered him through intricate economic issues and helped him satisfy various political coalitions. He named 45-year-old Walter Heller, an astute but lesser known University of Minnesota economics professor, chairman of the Council Economic Advisors (CEA). To offset a largely Keynesian-based CEA and appease a hostile business community, Kennedy appointed a Republican as secretary of the treasury. C. Douglas Dillon was a distinguished, Harvard-educated, former member of the New York Stock Exchange and international banker. As Eisenhower’s ambassador to France, Dillon had friendships with many French officials. As a francophile, with a home near Versailles, Dillon entertained like a European aristocrat, much to the appreciation of his European colleagues.42 Those officials drawn from academia working under Heller and Dillon strongly influenced administration policy and formed a “brain trust” akin to that of former President Roosevelt. The trust included Kermit Gordon of Williams College and James Tobin of Yale, who joined Heller as fellow Keynesians on the CEA. Former Rhodes scholar, Robert Roosa, served as under-secretary of treasury for monetary affairs. MIT economist Walt W. Rostow became deputy special assistant to the president for national security affairs. Harvard economist Carl Kaysen joined the National Security staff, while his more prominent colleague, John Kenneth Galbraith,

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continually gave Kennedy gratuitous economic advice even after his “exile” to India as ambassador in April 1961.43 Outside that circle of scholars-turned-policy-makers was politician Henry Fowler, under-secretary of treasury, who had fought the Virginian political machine led by Dixiecrat Harry Byrd. Kennedy appointed William McChesney Martin chairman of the Federal Reserve Board because of his New Deal experience in economic policy-making as adviser to Roosevelt during the Great Depression.44 George Ball, under-secretary of state for economic affairs, had been a successful lawyer during the 1930s and 1940s, but immersed in European affairs and called Jean Monnet, the chief visionary and activist for European unity, his friend. Highly articulate, but often pompously self-assured, Ball was increasingly called upon by his boss, Rusk, to guide US policy toward Western Europe.45 The Bureau of Euorpean Affairs at the Department of State was the bastion of European integration advocates. Although Kennedy rarely dealt directly with those officials, with the exception of William Tyler, assistant secretary of state for European affairs, one of the few Kennedy administration officials, who had a good rapport with de Gaulle. Tyler frequently served as Kennedy’s translator during phone calls with de Gaulle.46 When appointing World War II General James Gavin as ambassador to France, Kennedy explained that “with your background in the Army, your being a maverick, an independent thinker, and an innovator, your career parallels de Gaulle’s.”47 Gavin shared as close an affinity with de Gaulle as the French general was willing to permit. Gavin was sympathetic to the general’s domestic difficulties and nationalist aspirations.

Contours of de Gaulle’s West European policies De Gaulle’s strategic objectives, like Kennedy’s, were influenced by a commitment to the double containment of German and Soviet military and economic power. Yet his conception of containing those powers differed drastically from the United States’ and included a complementary notion of ending the superpowers’ double hegemony.48 For de Gaulle, alliances and enemies were impermanent phenom-


23

ena based on expediency and national self-interest. An aloof man with few close personal friends, de Gaulle approached foreign affairs with a detached awareness of how other nations affected France’s domestic well-being and international standing. Despite the criticism that he was an atavistic nationalist trapped in a seventeenth-century mentality, the French general recognized the changed global power configurations wrought by the atomic age. He strove to achieve French independence “free of constraints imposed by powerful allies, powerful enemies and international organizations including the United Nations, the Atlantic Alliance and the European Communities.”49 His fluid conception of friend and foe allowed him to place nations simultaneously in both categories. Additional personal proclivities affected his policy formulations. Shrewd, calculating rationality enabled him to take the long view toward nations. Yet his non-rationality, if not at times irrationality, provoked an egotistical rashness in immediate decisions. This admixture of tendencies rendered it difficult for other powers to rank his enemies and allies and to anticipate shifts from one to the other.50 In the early 1960s, however, de Gaulle’s views of the Soviet Union were less fluid. Franco-Soviet relations had deteriorated sharply. A series of Soviet actions caused the general to regard the USSR as an implacable adversary: support to Nasser during the Suez crisis of 1956; covert supply of arms to the provisional Algerian government; the violent suppression of the Hungarian uprising of 1956; and the ultimatum over Berlin first issued in 1958. He fumed against the Soviet’s fraudulent use of ideology to justify its territorial aggrandizement.51 Although Franco-Soviet relations were adversarial during the early years of de Gaulle’s presidency, he hoped to see the Iron Curtain lowered in the distant future. On 30 May 1960, he declared his intention of establishing “a European entente from the ‘Atlantic to the Urals’ – an expression that disturbed US officials because it invoked the specter of an independent third force that might make a separate deal with the Soviet Union.52 Fitting with his style, however, de Gaulle’s statement held multiple meanings. His provocative banner came near the end of an address delivered after the Soviet downing of an American U-2 intelligence plane. Because the incident provoked the collapse of the four-power Paris summit,

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de Gaulle’s speech was largely devoted to expressing French solidarity with the Western alliance. Yet he also wanted to look beyond the immediate crisis by offering a lofty vision of “détente, entente, coopération.”53 In other words, after East–West relations relaxed, he looked toward establishing an alliance and cooperation with Eastern Europe and perhaps even with the Soviet Union itself. On another level, de Gaulle’s symbolic statement was intended to express France’s determination to chart an independent course for Europe. After his speech, de Gaulle confided his intentions for a French-led Europe to the French member of the high authority of the EEC. Speaking contemptuously of the Six, Gaulle declared that “there are only two countries, France and Germany, which are competent to lead; the others must be forced to follow.”54 De Gaulle had no formula for dismantling the Soviet regime. He envisioned the Soviet Union’s eventual implosion from internal economic difficulties. Until that day, his fear of Soviet territorial and economic domination permeated all his other foreign policy considerations. His ever-present wariness of German power, for example, was subsumed within his fear of the Soviet Union. No less than the United States, de Gaulle also sought the containment of an ascendant Germany. He worried that West Germany’s growing economic strength would rapidly translate into political influence that would enable it to play the Eastern and Western blocs against each other.55 He also feared a possible resurgence of militarism, especially in demands for access to nuclear weapons. While US policymakers referred to a European third force that might mediate between the US and the Soviet Union, the French government privately described Germany as a fourth force.56 Fearing an independent, revanchist Germany, de Gaulle couched his opposition to a neutral Germany in Cold War terms. He insisted that a neutralized Germany would eventually succumb to pressures from the East.57 At the same time, he was privately opposed to German reunification at any time in the near future. During Khrushchev’s visit to Paris in the spring 1960, when the subject of resolving the German question arose, he asked the Soviet leader, “What’s the hurry? Why do you want to sign this peace treaty right now? The time isn’t ripe yet.”58 Although de Gaulle unequivocally favored the containment of German power, his method of tying Germany to the West was


25

based on an entente between the two nations. He scoffed at containing Germany through a supranational European framework. He supported a counter-proposal for a confederated European structure offered by a study commission of representatives from the six EEC nations and headed by Frenchman Christian Fouchet. Through a European confederation, which allowed a nation-centered approach to foreign and security policies, de Gaulle intended to mute the siren voices of German neutralism and militarism. He boasted to intimates: “I am bringing [the West] Adenauer. I am making Europe, while others merely talk about it.”59 To cement the Franco-German rapprochement, he actively courted Adenauer by establishing initial contact on 14 September 1958, at his residence in Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises. Despite genuine personal warmth between the two heads of state, de Gaulle’s steps toward rapprochement with France’s traditional mortal enemy overlay deep mistrust, even disdain. To Monnet’s suggestion once that there should be a Franco-German union, de Gaulle snorted that “if the Germans are determined to become Frenchmen, I do not see why not.”60 For de Gaulle, Franco-German reconciliation served several interrelated purposes. It would allow France to draw upon West German industrial power. It would provide political leverage to use with the United States in policies involving Western Europe. It would represent a means of asserting independence from both superpowers.61 De Gaulle strove to make France the dominant power in Europe. He envisioned a European triad in which France would first dominate a “partnership” with West Germany. Their combined power would then ensure French supremacy in a European hierarchy once cooperation extended to Britain. In early 1961, French prime minister Michel Debré wrote that “nothing prevented thinking that the Franco-German political cooperation could not extend one day to England. It must be these three great European powers that resolve to organize outside the United States.”62 In relations with Britain and the Federal Republic, de Gaulle played a double jeu (a double game), by cultivating the nation that could facilitate the development of France’s atomic arsenal and expedite its economic ascendancy. He waited for the propitious time to play the British and German cards, conceivably both. That strategy entailed setting

26


out to exploit both nations’ economic and strategic needs in a manner that would strengthen France’s position. To facilitate his scheme, it helped that his personal relationship with Prime Minister Macmillan went back to their wartime association in North Africa. Although the general’s smoldering animosity toward Great Britain has become legendary and although his strained wartime relationship with Winston Churchill engendered an enduring distrust of Anglo-Saxons, de Gaulle knew how to adjust his attitudes to changing circumstances. By 1961, his attitude toward Britain had shifted from hostility to ambivalence. He considered Britain a great nation, while simultaneously respecting and resenting it. As his advisers speculated on how Kennedy’s youth and Irish heritage would affect US–British relations, De Gaulle hoped that the so-called “special relationship” between the AngloSaxon nations was in eclipse.63 By early 1961, de Gaulle had formulated an inchoate but comprehensive plan for Europe. As long as the Algerian conflict remained unresolved, de Gaulle believed he lacked the political mandate to pursue freely his aims in Europe and the world.64 Fortunately for de Gaulle, the North African shadow was lifting. Only a few days before Kennedy assumed office, the French president invoked the term “Algerian Republic,” and the French electorate approved by referendum peace negotiations. De Gaulle, therefore, planned to broaden his foreign policy.65 Gaullists conceived of foreign policy in terms of réalités and “trucs,” the latter term pejorative for amorphous “things.” The EEC was considered a partial reality and a partial thing. As a political entity it was incapable of speaking in world affairs and therefore ultimately a dangerous “truc.” Although he recognized that the other nations of Western Europe had global interests in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, he argued that the diversity of interests would prevent a unified “European” voice. In other ways, the EEC was a partial reality. British proposals between 1956 and 1960 to turn the EEC into an all-European free trade area made Gaullists realize the potential value the Common Market held for de Gaulle’s ambitions of keeping a close rein on France’s continental partners and preventing a European organization inimical to French interests.66 For Gaullists, NATO was also a partial réalité and partial truc. It was a temporary annoyance, necessary only while de Gaulle maneuvered


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to implement his grand dessein of placing France at the helm of an independent Europe. He scorned the other continental nations that accepted a permanent US military protectorate. For de Gaulle, NATO was simply a means for the United States to maintain dominance. He continued to call for a “tripartite directory” among Great Britain, the United States, and France to handle NATO as well as global issues. Yet he never sufficiently clarified whether tripartism would eliminate his dissatisfaction with NATO.67 Attempts by the United States to accommodate and circumvent French nationalist aspirations were difficult because de Gaulle frequently conflated his aims and tactics. At times, he posited demands for tripartism as a means of reorganizing NATO in order to achieve French participation in nuclear targeting and strategy. On other occasions, tripartism was an end in itself because it conferred great power status.68 Similarly, French possession of a nuclear arsenal constituted both a role and a capability. De Gaulle strove to ensure France’s security and influence in world affairs primarily through the development of an independent nuclear capability. Yet like his insistence on tripartism, de Gaulle often framed his pursuit of a force de frappe in symbolic terms as the keystone to his foreign policy. His detractors believed that he simply believed the syllogism: “great nations have nuclear weapons. France is a great nation. Therefore, France must have nuclear weapons.”69 He resented US–Soviet proposals for arms control, which he perceived as a means to maintain their nuclear hegemony. He believed that the nuclear test ban talks that had been underway intermittently since 1956 were designed to thwart France’s nascent nuclear weapons program.70 In other respects, de Gaulle valued a nuclear arsenal as a means to an end. It would provide political and diplomatic leverage as a force de persuasion. At the same time, he considered a nuclear arsenal strategically indispensable as a force de dissuasion. He believed that command of a nuclear arsenal would permit France to defend itself without the humiliation of stationing US troops on French soil. In short, it would allow strategic independence between the superpowers.71 Its value for his European policy also conflated means and ends. A force de frappe would ensure French supremacy on the continent. In solidifying the Franco-German rapprochement, it would mark France as the dominant partner while supposedly satisfying West German nuclear ambitions by offering it protection.72

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De Gaulle realized that military power required economic strength. He sought a monetary force de frappe in the form of increased gold reserves. His trusted economic adviser, Jacques Rueff, urged conversion of France’s dollar reserves into gold as an indication of displeasure with US abuses of the reserve currency system, which accelerated French inflation. Under the Bretton Woods Agreement, foreign central banks were permitted to convert inflows of dollars into gold. The practice of “hoarding” gold aggravated the US payments deficit by draining reserves from its economy.73 Rueff had little patience with US complaints about bearing the burden of Cold War security commitments. Before the Rueff plan in December 1958, many French politicians blamed the weakness of the French franc on the draining wars in Algeria and Indochina. Even though le fardeau algérien continued, the French franc became one of the world’s strongest currencies after the Bank of France stopped increasing its domestic money supply. Rueff argued that US foreign economic and military aid programs were a small proportion of GNP, hardly an intolerable burden. A practitioner of strict fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, he believed that a sharp increase in discount rate would eliminate the US deficit overnight, as the French government did in 1958.74 De Gaulle also realized that France needed to diminish its dependence on agriculture and develop its industries, for social as well as economic reasons. He insisted that the EEC must include a common agricultural policy (CAP), which would establish prices for trading key commodities throughout the Community and prevent cheaper imports from entering the Common Market and regulate prices among the EEC members. Until a common agricultural policy was adopted, de Gaulle understood that France needed to export its agricultural surplus to other European nations, particularly to West Germany. He sought bilateral accords that would ensure preference for French agricultural products and was reluctant to agree to multilateral trade liberlization agreements under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), which the United States favored.75

De Gaulle’s advisers Like Kennedy, de Gaulle had little proficiency in economics and relied on his subordinates to devise policy. But the French presi-


29

dent’s economic advisers were less a team and more rival factions. Jacques Rueff, chief architect of the French economic miracle during the late 1950s, was de Gaulle’s trusted unofficial adviser who shaped his overall philosophy about the virtues of the gold standard. Foreign minister Maurice Couve de Murville, who was also an inspector of finance, typically sided with Rueff in criticizing US and British monetary policies. De Gaulle appreciated Olivier Wormser, director general of economic affairs at the Quai d’Orsay, for his technical finesse and grasp of linkages between trade and finance. De Gaulle also relied on his prime minister, Michel Debré for economic advice. Debré was a Gaullist loyalist who shared de Gaulle’s vision of modernizing the nation’s industry to make it internationally competitive, but believed a transition period was required for “agricultural modernization.” The Ministry of Finance under Wilfrid Baumgartner was the bastion of “Atlanticism” during the early 1960s. Although de Gaulle often found the 67-year-old minister’s reserve and penchant for understatement distastefully British, he nevertheless recognized his unrivaled expertise in public finance. The aging Baumgartner lacked Debré’s indefatigable energy and was, for all intent and purposes, chiefly a finance technician responsible for achieving monetary stability.76 Baumgartner retired in December 1961 and was succeeded by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing who, in superficial respects, resembled many in Kennedy entourage. At 36 years old, he was the youngest finance minister in French history. Energetic and dashing in appearance, he was a Polytechnique graduate, and had studied for an inspectorate of finance. A technocrat by training, he began his career at the Bank of France under his father’s friend, Baumgartner. Giscard was also a politician, and, in 1953, he served in the cabinet of finance minister Edgar Fauré, a position that required him to carry out the minister’s political will over departmental reservations. It was that admixture of politician and technocrat that shaped his position on international finance.77 As mentioned above, de Gaulle regarded foreign policy as his domaine réservé. His minister of foreign affairs, Couve de Murville, shared his singular devotion to France and gave him unfaltering loyalty. Couve had been an inspectorate of finance during the late 1920s. Under the Fourth Republic, he served as ambassador to Bonn

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before becoming de Gaulle’s right-hand man when he formed his government in 1958. One French journalist described him as “the effective and discreet reflection of General de Gaulle’s foreign policy, the flawless performer.”78 Terse in speech and aloof in manner, Couve possessed those qualities de Gaulle sought for his inner circle. Few, if any, member of the French government was as privy to his confidences.79 Another loyalist was Pierre Messmer, who became minister for the armed forces in February 1960, after replacing Pierre Guillaumat who was rumored to have fallen from de Gaulle’s favor. Although trusting Messmer, de Gaulle recalls in his memoirs, “I kept Algerian affairs directly under my wing.”80 Whereas parliament was the chief institution under the Third and Fourth Republics, the presidency held more power under the Fifth Republic. To ensure centralization of presidential power, de Gaulle essentially established a type of miniature government within the Elysée. About 50 technical advisers and senior civil servants under Geoffrey de Courcel, secretary general of the presidency, and René Brouillet, director of the president’s private office, answered primarily to de Gaulle. Many of this coterie, including Olivier Guichard and Pierre Lefranc, had served with de Gaulle since the war. Others were trusted civil servants who handled specific areas, such as André de Lattre, who worked on economic issues, and Jean Boegner, who was responsible for diplomatic affairs.81 De Gaulle kept a tight rein on his ambassadors to maintain an image, in his words, of “a strong, homogeneous and self-confident regime.” These ambassadors included Hervé Alphand in Washington, Jean Chauvel succeeded by Geoffroy de Courcel in London, François Seydoux de Clausonne in Bonn, and Maurice Dejean in Moscow.82 Although there were many other official and informal advisers to both Kennedy and de Gaulle, the characters mentioned above appear most often in the following pages.

2 Opening Moves

In May 1961, Kennedy and de Gaulle met for the only time in Paris. Kennedy strained to present an image of strength and decisiveness. Despite having severely injured his back during a tree-planting ceremony in Canada the previous month, Kennedy refused to use crutches. The pain was debilitating. During every free moment he sought relief by soaking in the solid gold tub that was provided for him at the Palais d’Elysée. He held meetings with his closest advisors in the bathroom. Gavin recalled one occasion: “President Kennedy asked me to get down more closely so he could talk to me. I got down on all fours. He was whispering and beckoning for me to come closer. He only had about six inches of water in the tub, so I lowered my head practically down to his chest, an incongruous position for a president and an ambassador to be in. The only question the President asked me was ‘how are things going?’ I replied, ‘things couldn’t be going better.’ He seemed very pleased as he whispered, ‘Thanks.’” – US Ambassador John Gavin1

Initial perceptions and priorities In January 1961, when Kennedy assumed office, de Gaulle and his entourage initially viewed him with a mixture of consternation and disdain. The French Foreign Ministry examined Kennedy’s campaign speeches and unimpressive congressional record in order to determine his foreign policy priorities. French officials questioned how engaged the new US administration would be in West 31

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European affairs. They primarily saw a naive idealist who, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on the United Nations and on African Affairs, had consistently expressed sympathy for the peoples of the Third World and repeatedly voted for technical assistance appropriations bills. They especially resented Kennedy’s senatorial speech in 1957, in which he had condemned France’s policy toward Algeria. De Gaulle’s advisers initially worried that the new administration would meddle in or displace French influence in Africa and other underdeveloped regions. In one profile, Foreign Minister Couve de Murville wrote: “Kennedy has taken part with vigor in a politics destined to welcome the friendship of the neutral countries and more generally the underdeveloped nations.”2 Even before Kennedy took office, he did promise to replace the supposedly stale policies of President Eisenhower in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Kennedy regarded those regions as fertile ground for communist encroachment because of their precarious economic and social stability. The less developed countries might align with the superpower bloc that assisted them politically and economically. The Peace Corps, the Alliance for Progress, increased public commitment to the United Nations, a pledge to ask Congress for greater foreign aid – all suggested the Third World as the new administration’s chief priority.3 Kennedy did not intend to disengage from Europe, but he planned to make up for what he considered a decade of neglect of the Third World under Eisenhower. He regarded the West and the Third World as interlocking pieces in a global strategy of accruing predominant economic strength over the communist bloc. The West would draw increasingly on the raw materials of the less developed countries.4 Raised to win at all costs and culturally conditioned to view the Cold War in containment terms, he consistently spoke of the Soviet threat as a series of world-wide “areas of trial” in an all-encompassing struggle. Kennedy was alarmed at the possibility that the Soviet Union and China would provide more economic aid than the West to the Third World. He feared that China’s “Great Leap Forward” program of economic development offered an alluring model to less developed nations. Soviet promises of developmental assistance would also subvert Third World leaders. Kennedy decided that the West

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must eradicate class conflict in countries with wide disparities of wealth by turning questions of political ideology into technical concerns and economic imperatives.5 Kennedy believed the West as a whole could overcome the Soviet bloc in an “economic growth race.” He was influenced by economist Walt W. Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth, published in 1960. Rostow, who became Kennedy’s deputy special assistant for national security affairs, emphasized the economic competition between the superpowers.6 Rostow’s ideas struck a chord with the president and his chief advisers, who were concerned about the harm done to US productivity by the balance of payments deficit and concluded that “the United States must obtain a commitment of the industrialized nations of Western Europe for growth policies.”7 An overriding consideration of the Kennedy administration’s early formulations of West European polices was the problem of international balance of payments and the related fear concerning the Soviet appeal to lesser developed regions. As the chief international reserve currency, a weak US dollar would depress the level of international trade, which in turn would translate into a drop in Third World commodity prices. If the economies of the underdeveloped countries suffered and social chaos ensued, the Kennedy administration believed that the Soviet bloc would reap the benefits.8 Rostow later summed up “what underlay the gold issue, which was that the American competitive position was no longer one which was automatically going to churn out these big surpluses which [the US] could use for military purposes or foreign aid.”9

Western burden-sharing and foreign aid As the Kennedy administration’s “best and brightest” analyzed the intricate web of payment difficulties, aid to lesser developed countries, and maintaining a multilateral system of open trade, it concluded that the Western allies must share the burden of helping the under-developed regions. US notions of burden-sharing, however, were more of a broad conception than a specific formula. On 22 March 1961, in an address before Congress requesting increased foreign aid expenditures, Kennedy described burdensharing in loose terms, as “a program and level of commitments

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designed to encourage and complement an increased effort by other nations.”10 The president was encountering strong resistance within Congress to his various foreign aid proposals. To make requests for appropriations more palatable to a Congress dominated by Republicans and conservative Southern democrats, the administration couched its requests in terms of “multilateral” and “burden-sharing” efforts with the Western allies.11 Rusk believed that by convincing the West European nations to target 1 percent of their GNP for assistance to the lesser developed countries the administration could garner congressional appropriations. In late February 1961, he asked Ball to visit the major West European capitals to discuss burden-sharing formulations.12 Ball’s talk of US burden-sharing frustrated the French government for several reasons. His mission made the French government anxious to protect its former colonies from US interference and penetration.13 Multilateral burden-sharing programs also suggested financing US objectives in lesser developed countries without adequate French input into policy formulations. The French government believed there was no simple formula and moved discussion beyond “burden-sharing” into “fair sharing.” Determining the proportion of aid that countries should receive would be as difficult as setting the amount individual Western nations countries should contribute.14 In early 1961, the Kennedy administration’s efforts to implement other burden-sharing strategies within the Western alliance received an additional setback when the West German government joined France in resisting US pressure to provide more aid to lesser developed countries. West German minister of finance Ludwig Erhard preferred trade over aid. He urged private enterprise initiatives and argued that any governmental foreign aid should be worked out in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the successor of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, established under the Marshall Plan. A special committee called Working Party 3 was established within the OECD to study international monetary problems.15 Walter Heller, chairman of Kennedy’s Council of Economic Advisors, attended a session of the OECD in late January 1961. The administration hoped to achieve official membership in the organization and transform it into the economic arm of NATO. The

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United States envisioned using the OECD to promote the highest possible growth of member economies, aid the less developed nations, and expand US exports. Kennedy’s advisers also hoped to used the OECD as a forum to criticize certain European economic policies, particularly the failure to develop adequate capital markets. If the administration could reduce Western Europe’s dependence on capital from abroad, then it could ease the dollar outflow and boost domestic investment and economic growth.16

Western burden-sharing and military costs President Kennedy’s immediate concern over the US balance of payments deficit extended to concern about “free world” defense. Because military outlays in the Federal Republic of Germany accounted for a quarter of the US payments deficit, the administration initiated a series of talks with the West German government during late January and February 1961. When US Department of Treasury officials met with Foreign Minister Heinrich Brentano and Erhard, they all agreed the Federal Republic of Germany had an obligation to shoulder more of its own defense, particularly for West Berlin. Even so, although Brentano and Erhard were leading spokesmen of the CDU’s “Atlanticist” faction which favored close ties with the United States, it took several weeks of haggling to elicit a promise from West Germany of $900 million prepayment on military orders placed in the United States. Worse yet, Adenauer stipulated that West Germany would not extend payments beyond 1961, nor commit himself to financing military aid to other NATO allies.17 De Gaulle was irritated that the United States, rather than France, would receive the bulk of West German military outlay expenditures. As Dillon had anticipated, de Gaulle regarded Kennedy’s fixation on the payments deficit as a rationalization to perpetuate West Germany as a US satellite. He also resented US efforts to establish similar “offset” arrangements in which France would promise to purchase American military equipment to compensate for US expenditures in NATO.18 The British took an equally dim view of the Kennedy administration’s early pursuit of alliance remedies to a US balance of payments deficit. British prime minister Harold Macmillan informed de

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Gaulle during bilateral talks in late January 1961 that the British pound was in greater danger of devaluation than the dollar. The British government hoped to avert a currency crisis of its own and wanted to apply independent pressure on the West Germans “before the Americans staked too many claims” for offsetting military expenditures in the Federal Republic.19 Macmillan declared that if the Federal Republic did not help offset the British deficit with military outlays, the “British people would refuse to go on spending sixty million pounds a year across the exchanges to keep its troops in Germany.”20 In late February 1961, Macmillan visited Adenauer and asked him to offset British military expenditures in West Germany similar to the arrangements worked out with the United States. The aging chancellor lamented on more than one occasion, “Balance of payments, it is always balance of payments!”21 He considered such international monetary problems incidental and, worse, a distraction to a possible Soviet move on Berlin. Adenauer expected Kennedy and Macmillan to share his priorities and take steps to include Bonn as an equal in the military staff and strategic planning of NATO.22 A chasm was developing between Britain and Germany over different perceptions of the Soviet threat. Macmillan emphasized the “more subtle means of economic penetration and propaganda,” warning him that “the steady growth of Soviet economic power presents a challenge to the West which we can not afford to neglect.” In contrast, Adenauer agonized over Berlin and worried that Britain would sell out Germany for an illusory détente. He nevertheless agreed to help with British deficit.23

Steps toward a Franco-West German entente De Gaulle hoped to wean Adenauer from NATO and US tutelage. The French president and his ministers remained silent while the Kennedy administration and Macmillan’s government haggled with Adenauer over balance of payments issues, but they monitored how the issue caused acrimony between the West Germans and the Anglo-Saxon powers. De Gaulle delighted in an opportunity to capitalize on Adenauer’s annoyance with Kennedy, who had omitted the issue of Berlin’s security in his first address to Congress on 6 February 1961, and instead had spoken solely about Western

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economic growth and the balance of payments. On 10 February 1961, before the summit of the European Economic Community heads of government in Paris, de Gaulle met privately with the chancellor. His task was formidable because Franco-German relations had soured since their last meeting at Rambouillet in July 1960, when he had left Adenauer uncertain whether a force de frappe would be part of a European nuclear arsenal within NATO. In 1960, de Gaulle had also left him with doubts over whether France might disengage from the EEC.24 As he prepared for his trip to Paris in February 1961, Adenauer privately seethed, “I am full up to the throat with distrust of de Gaulle!”25 The shrewd chancellor, who had maneuvered deftly for fifteen years among the various Western powers to gain advantages for the Federal Republic, never envisaged substituting the US nuclear guarantee for a bilateral alliance with France. Alhtough he shared de Gaulle’s vision of solidifying the Franco-German rapprochement, what he called the “right angle of a united Europe,” he was not blind to de Gaulle’s designs to subordinate West Germany. At the same time, he wanted Bonn treated as an equal in the military staff work of the major NATO powers. Adenauer was willing to play the United States against France to achieve that objective.26 During their private discussions and in the meetings of the EEC heads of government, the two statesmen reestablished their affinity of interests. Adenauer emphasized that NATO was “the keystone, the foundation for the freedom and security of the West” – words taken incidentally from a telegram he had received from Dean Rusk three days earlier. De Gaulle responded that “NATO needed reform.” Concerning Macmillan’s likely bid for entry into the Common Market, de Gaulle argued that the growing political cohesiveness among the Six would be disrupted. Adenauer agreed that historically Britain had always stood aloof from continental affairs and might be seeking economic advantages without accompanying political fidelity to the European Economic Community.27 Adenauer was ambivalent about Britain’s joining the EEC. He gave general assurances to the British and Americans about supporting the United Kingdom if it applied for membership of the Common Market. At other times, he spoke disdainfully of the “state of rigor mortis” in the European Economic Community because of

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Britain’s political disinterest in continental Europe. “No, Macmillan will never join in any serious move toward European unity,” he emphatically pointed out, adding that he and de Gaulle “were convinced that some day Britain would join Europe but not while the Macmillan government was in power.”28

The Acheson Report Adenauer’s growing anxiety over the future of NATO made the Kennedy administration recognize the need to set out a comprehensive policy toward Western Europe. Rarely entrusting policy formulations to one person or department, Kennedy formed an interdepartmental taskforce. He grasped de Gaulle and Adenauer’s skepticism about his leadership and that of a new generation of advisers, so he called on former secretary of state, Dean Acheson, to chair an advisory committee on NATO. As a seasoned veteran of “standing tough” against the Soviets, Acheson’s involvement offered hope of boosting Kennedy’s credibility.29 In March 1961, after an exhausting month of bureaucratic haggling, Acheson sent the National Security Council a 72-page policy directive entitled “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future,” which consisted of political and economic sections followed by detailed defense proposals. It enumerated many of the broad policy positions of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Acheson urged continued adherence to the principle of double containment. The United States, he urged, should support an integrated European Community to offset Soviet power and militate against the possibility of Franco-German solidarity reverting to the “essentially national and loosely coordinated efforts of the past.”30 Acheson’s report advocated continued support of the Common Market. Yet it did not recommend active encouragement of Britain’s entry. The report instead emphasized increasing US exports through multilateral tariff reductions. The only significant departure from the West European policies of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations was an answer to Kennedy’s desire for multilateral burden-sharing and a promotion of economic growth. The report called for increased Western coordination through the OECD on trade policies and the establishment of equitable shares of Western

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foreign aid contributions to lesser developed countries. On fiscal and monetary issues, the report urged US and West European coordination on domestic economic policies to achieve greater collective economic growth.31 On strategic questions, Acheson’s report addressed Kennedy’s fears of nuclear proliferation. Anxious to limit the size of the global nuclear club, but acknowledging de Gaulle’s determination to continue a nuclear program, the taskforce pointed out that the United States could hope to affect only the scale on which de Gaulle pursued a force de frappe. The taskforce recommended nuclear integration through a NATO seaborne MRBM force of Polaris submarines with mixed-manning and multilateral ownership – commonly referred to as a MLF. Drawing on a policy paper produced by Robert Bowie during Eisenhower’s last year in office, Acheson’s report reasoned that if the United States and Great Britain committed nuclear weapons to a MLF, they would “help reduce the prestige incentive to the French, and potentially also to the Germans, to acquire great-power status through the creation of nuclear strike forces independent of NATO.” The report neglected critical issues concerning the control and release of nuclear weapons, issues that were highly sensitive among the allies.32 Acheson’s taskforce viewed the possibility of a renewed Soviet threat to cut off Western access to Berlin as a more imminent threat to the NATO alliance than issues of nuclear proliferation. Arguing that political and economic preparations were inadequate, it urged that NATO prepare for some type of military response. The chief difficulty lay in determining when a military response was necessary. The report declared that substantial interference with the traffic to Berlin, civilian or military, should be the determinant. Three NATO responses were possible: air strikes, ground forces, or threat of a nuclear response. The report called for substantially increasing the number of conventional weapons within Western Europe but avoided delicate questions about allocating the costs of that increase.33 The Acheson Report suggestions concerning NATO did not originate with the Kennedy administration. In May 1956, the NATO Council adopted Military Committee directive, MC 14/2, which addressed not only general nuclear war but also limited aggression

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in Europe. General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Commander, Allied Forces, Europe and a chief adviser to Acheson’s committee in early 1961, spearheaded a shift away from massive retaliation to graduated responses, commonly called flexible response. His interpretation of MC 14/2 advocated using limited force when necessary and conventional weapons alone where possible.34 The Acheson Report argued that the threat of full-scale retaliation alone would not dissuade the Soviet Union from launching any form of attack on NATO territory. It urged a mixed conventional and nuclear strategy, which would represent a more effective deterrent by forcing, if necessary, the Soviet Union to cease aggression before it escalated to nuclear conflagration.35 On 20 April, Acheson’s report was officially adopted in modified form and circulated as NSAM 40. Many of Kennedy’s inner circle, especially McGeorge Bundy, intended to phase out gradually any notion of a “special relationship” with the British. They favored reducing all West European nations to the same level through approving Britain’s joining the EEC and by creating a mechanism that encouraged Britain to withdraw from an independent nuclear deterrent business. They hoped a MLF would serve as a sufficient allure.36

Springtime of bilateral talks Despite his propensity for seeking multiple suggestions, Kennedy preferred to draw his own policy conclusions. During the first half of 1961, the basis of US–European policies was largely confined to ideas floated during high-level bilateral talks. Kennedy believed that if he met personally with the major European leaders, he would satisfy de Gaulle and other allied demands for greater consultation. Separate visits with Macmillan and Adenauer were planned for early April in Washington. Kennedy scheduled a state visit to Paris for May with the hope that the fanfare of a state visit would satisfy part of de Gaulle’s demands for consultation before the new American president met alone with Khrushchev in Vienna in early June 1961. From Kennedy’s standpoint, the timing of Macmillan’s visit in early April 1961 could not have been worse. An impending invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs and continuing crises in Laos and the Congo monopolized the president’s energies. Moreoever, he had

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been diverted throughout the winter by balance of payments questions and calls for alliance burden-sharing.37 Since the previous July, Macmillan had maneuvered to ease Britain’s entry into the EEC. He viewed inclusion as a means of maintaining his nation’s global power by bolstering its economic growth. The prime minister’s career had long demonstrated, particularly during the Suez crisis, an unfortunate mixture of egotism and impracticality. This time, Macmillan wished to avoid the possibility of US opposition to a momentous British move by ascertaining Washington’s position.38 On 4 April 1961, the normally subdued prime minister became animated when he told administration officials of his intention to join the Common Market. “We are going to do it,” he exclaimed to Ball during their first discussion. Macmillan was less effusive with Kennedy, whose position was unclear, but he hoped to sway him with his enthusiasm.39 Their meetings, however, were strained on both a personal and policy level. Kennedy sensed the prime minister’s intention to play elder statesman. The president implied that he wished to phase out the increasingly anachronistic “special relationship” and deal with Britain on equal terms with the other West European powers. Yet the president, like many officials within his administration, had contradictory impulses toward Britain. The US government wanted to enlist British help in managing the international economy, but also wanted to keep their Anglo-Saxon brethren at arm’s length in order to avoid alienating France and West Germany.40 Kennedy reacted to the prime minister’s talk about joining the EEC with skeptical encouragement. The president “opposed any step toward loose association with the Common Market which gives the British commercial advantages without any economic or political involvement on the Continent.” He made clear that the United States would accept short-term discrimination against US agricultural products only as the necessary price for greater political cohesion in Western Europe. The administration feared that France and West Germany would turn the EEC into an “inward-looking organization” that ignored the larger interests of the Western alliance. Britain’s entry could possibility offset that tendency.41 By the end of Macmillan’s visit, the president was offering qualified support. Yet both administration officials and Macmillan’s inner

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circle agreed that the US should maintain a low profile because de Gaulle’s attitude might be affected adversely if he believed that the United States was urging Macmillan to join the Common Market.42 The seemingly endless succession of bilateral talks between Kennedy or his personal emissaries and allied leaders continued to substitute for a conceptual framework for US–West European policies since the Acheson Report was not approved until 20 April 1961. On 10 April, Kennedy sent Acheson to Germany to confer with Adenauer prior to the chancellor’s visit to Washington. Adenauer greatly respected the former US secretary of state.43 Irked by Kennedy’s youthful impudence, Adenauer was distressed over the president’s seemingly ambivalent commitment to Berlin. Most recently, Kennedy’s ambassador-at-large, Averell Harriman, created a stir in Bonn when he announced that the president did “not feel committed to any discussions undertaken by the previous Administration and that all discussion on Berlin [would] have to begin from the start.”44 Acheson described Adenauer as “worried to death – just completely worried” over Berlin and deteriorating relations with the United States. The concern that the Kennedy administration was seeking a NATO strategy that placed a higher premium on conventional weapons in Central Europe than nuclear deterrence left Adenauer afraid that West Germany would become the chief theater of war. “What the Americans do not see,” Adenauer privately declared, “is that for Germany there is no difference between an atomic arsenal and conventional war on our own soil. To be roasted at a thousand degrees or burned at ninety, the result is exactly the same.”45 To the former US secretary of state, Adenauer argued that specifying in advance when the West would use nuclear weapons, or “raising the threshold” for nuclear war, as it was called, would only allow the Soviets time to nibble at NATO territory during the pause between conventional and atomic weapons. The Soviets could thereby present the West with a fait accompli.46 Acheson did not tell the chancellor that he had recently submitted to Kennedy his NATO report advocating graduated military responses. Instead, he expressed his eagerness to listen to Adenauer’s views. Although they continued to differ over whether advance definition would clarify NATO seriousness to the Soviets, Acheson sought to convince him that Kennedy was committed to

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Berlin’s security.47 Adenauer remained distressed when he came to Washington on 12 April 1961 and talked with US officials. Although he and Kennedy strained to find common ground, their agendas diverged. Adenauer came, hoping to instruct the young, inexperienced president about how to avoid making concessions over Berlin during his meeting in Vienna with the bellicose Khrushchev in early June 1961.48 In contrast, Kennedy intended to use his talks with Adenauer to educate the chancellor about the US balance of payments deficit and the need to reduce US expenditures in the Federal Republic in order to avoid having to consider American troop withdrawals.49 Talks between Adenauer and the Kennedy administration focused on NATO and East–West relations. The chancellor brought up few specifics and acknowledged that his concerns “dealt rather with the general trend of things.” When Kennedy asked how he might assure the Western European nations of his commitment to the continent’s security, Adenauer explained in Gaullist terms that “the question of consultation was a decisive and determining one for NATO.”50 Although there had been tentative steps toward a FrancoGerman entente, Adenauer was fully aware that de Gaulle’s concept of Western consultation revolved around tripartitism, which excluded West Germany. Adenauer aimed to keep France committed to the Atlantic alliance while simultaneously advancing West German interests in Washington by asking for Bonn’s participation in nuclear strategy and planning.51 When discussions turned to Britain’s inclusion in the EEC, Kennedy told Adenauer, as he had Macmillan, that the United States would accept the economic disadvantages accompanying a “more closely integrated Western Europe” for the political benefits which could accrue from a more politically united Europe. The chancellor assured the president that the six EEC nations were “ready for the UK today, and not tomorrow.”52 After a two-day visit, Adenauer left Washington generally dissatisfied. He had expected a grand strategy for an Atlantic Community which would embrace the United States and an enlarged, united Western Europe. Instead, he found Kennedy more concerned about the international economy and Third World issues. The president had raised the question of the US payments deficit during sessions

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that Adenauer wanted devoted strictly to Berlin. Further, the chancellor saw the president’s emphasis on increased West German military procurement in the US as a thinly veiled threat to diminish its commitment to Berlin. And despite Kennedy’s pledge to bridge the “gap between the military planning and the commitments and policy decisions by governments,” Adenauer remained distressed that West Germany would be excluded from Berlin contingency planning. Code-named “Live Oak,” the planning group was initally comprised of the three Western occupying powers of Berlin.53 The third in a series of bilateral talks between Kennedy and the major West Euroepan leaders took place with de Gaulle from 31 May to 2 June 1961. Kennedy believed that by visiting Paris before the Vienna Summit with Khrushchev two days later, he would satisfy de Gaulle’s demands for meaningful allied consultation. The misplaced focus on tripartite consultation of both Kennedy and de Gaulle, however, reflected their equally poor management of allied relations. Kennedy practiced a policy of courtesy. De Gaulle resented being excluded from global decisions, especially concerning European security. While Kennedy was guilty of superficial deference, de Gaulle allowed his ego to interfere with substantive policy. By demanding consultation, de Gaulle focused on the symptom of Franco-American differences, which only reinforced US perceptions that France sought the trappings of a great power. In fact, de Gaulle did not want a two-power or four-power summit. What he actually sought was coordinated allied policy in which French objections would prevent U.S. unilateralism.54 He worried that the Vienna summit would be a repetition of the Paris summit débâcle of 1960, which followed Soviet capture of an American U-2 spy plane. He feared that the bombastic Soviet leader would use the psychological advantage stemming from Kennedy’s folly at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba to rattle the young president on Berlin.55 The usually confident Kennedy was anxious about his meeting with de Gaulle and asked for advice from every quarter. The president was aware of the poor impression created by US humiliation at the Bay of Pigs in the previous month. He also worried that a recent assassination attempt on de Gaulle’s life and speculation in the French press about CIA involvement might cast a shadow over the Franco-American summit. Jean Monnet, a chief architect of the

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European integration movement, warned Kennedy of words and phrases to avoid. References to the United Nations, NATO, or Atlantic community, he cautioned, would irritate the general’s nationalist sensibilities. Stressing Europe, unity, and grandeur would impress him.56 Kennedy also thought he could profit from Macmillan’s experience with the French general. Macmillan explained that “conversations with de Gaulle are quite difficult to conduct. He has a remarkable command of language but does not like being rebuffed directly so sometimes puts his thoughts in a rather elliptical way.” Macmillan urged the president to emphasize the importance of French adherence to a unified political, economic, and military Western alliance, but added he was “conscious of the delicacy of trying to get him to the point without seeming to make a bargain.”57 From the moment Kennedy arrived in Paris on 30 May 1961, Kennedy operated from the mistaken assumption that de Gaulle could be disarmed by deference and charm. On a personal level the visit was largely successful for Kennedy, whose quip that he was the man who accompanied Jacqueline to Paris has become legendary. De Gaulle, usually disdainful of Americans’ supposed lack of culture and sophistication, was impressed with the president’s Francophile wife, who chatted with him fluently in his own language about French art, history, and education. The Parisian public was enthralled with the handsome American couple. Even de Gaulle characterized the welcome as “enthusiastic in the extreme.”58 On a policy level, the bilateral talks portended future conflict. De Gaulle sought to speak primarily about NATO with Kennedy. The French president’s priorities revolved around the defense of Europe; a possibility of a conventional arms build-up; the control and deployment of nuclear weapons; the Berlin question; and tripartite consultation.59 The French government had refined its concept of tripartism, which now required an institutional basis for the Atlantic alliance. For global strategies, de Gaulle’s government wished to establish common lines of action among Britian, France, and the US before any NATO power acted militarily. France also sought to divide the world into zones of influence. Most importantly, the French government demanded an equal voice in the planning and use of nuclear weapons. Tripartism within NATO was

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aimed at diminishing the influence of the supreme commander in Europe, which de Gaulle regarded as a US puppet. Finally, the French government sought a permanent standing group outside the supreme commander’s control that would direct NATO strategy, especially for Central Europe.60 During substantive policy discussions, the French president played mentor to a deferential Kennedy. De Gaulle approached the policy discussions determined to press his will upon the young US president. The talks touched on Third World crisis areas such as Congo and Laos, but focused predominantly on Berlin and European defense. In general, de Gaulle presented NATO reorganization, tripartite machinery, and a force de frappe as the primary threads in the French tapestry. He perceived Kennedy’s rebuttals as an attempt to tear snags in his grand dessein. Specifically, de Gaulle did not want to separate the Berlin problem from the overall German question. He asserted that Khrushchev must be made to believe that there could be no possibility of a limited war. In other words, any fighting around Berlin would be equated with an attack on West Germany and would therefore provoke general war. Kennedy agreed that any Soviet military advance against Berlin would constitute war, but questioned the point at which nuclear retaliation should ensue. In essence, he believed that limited conventional military skirmishes or tactical nuclear battles might prevent nuclear conflagration by allowing a “pause” for the Soviets to retreat. Kennedy had no intention of giving up Berlin, but, for him, preserving Western rights within the city primarily meant ensuring continued access to the city. Yet the French view challenged the basic reasoning and framework of the Kennedy administration’s emerging concept of graduated responses. For de Gaulle, the Berlin problem illustrated a fundamental lack of US commitment to the continent. De Gaulle questioned whether the United States would, for example, be willing to “trade New York for Paris” in a nuclear war. The credibility of the US nuclear deterrent was not simply an issue for the United States to consider in shaping its nuclear strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union but also a psychological variable in assuaging West European fears.61 De Gaulle may have exaggerated his doubts about the US commitment to Western Europe to justify France’s nuclear program and his demands for tripartism. He insisted that the implications of “raising

Opening Moves

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the threshold” for the use of atomic weapons called into question Kennedy’s assurances about protecting Western Europe. Couve recalls that, after the Parisian meeting between the two presidents, “atomic affairs occupied a large place in relations and discussions with the United States during Kennedy’s presidency, a place larger than in any period, either before or after.”62 During their talks, de Gaulle also criticized Kennedy for equating the Atlantic alliance with the organization of NATO. De Gaulle proclaimed that the institution no longer satisfied France. Although he promised not to destroy NATO during an international crisis, he warned that it could not continue indefinitely under its present structure.63 Kennedy declared that from the US perspective NATO as an alliance and an organization were one and the same. To separate the institution from the concept would benefit Moscow. The Soviets might advance on Berlin based on the assumption that the Western alliance was poorly organized or split. Moreover, a fullscale French withdrawal from NATO and a refusal to allow US forces on French soil would clearly jeopardize NATO strategy in Europe. Kenendy explained that the defense of Europe and the defense of the United States were one and the same. The strategy that he envisioned did not mean “decreasing US commitments but merely increasing effective control.”64 Kennedy struggled with the French belief that centralized control was simply a mechanism to increase US dominance in Europe.65 As the discussions in Paris came to a close, Kennedy hoped to accommodate de Gaulle’s various strategic demands by dangling the possibility of future acceptance of tripartism, an offer which ultimately rang hollow. He extended to de Gaulle the assurance that he “would consult France regarding the use anywhere in the world of nuclear weapons, unless an attack were so imminent that [their] survival was threatened.” In order to give de Gaulle more concrete assurance, he proposed that the United States, Britain, and France develop a formal mechanism for consultations that involved not only the three heads of states but also military representatives outside of NATO’s Standing Group. He promised that Rusk would “firm up the tripartite consultation machinery.”66 De Gaulle came away from his talks with Kennedy skeptical that the United States would officially institutionalize tripartism. He

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believed that the United States would pay only lip-service. Consultation would continue to mean “informing,” usually after the fact. De Gaulle remained convinced that “in reality, the American attitude will only change once we have atomic weapons.”67 In the wake of the Paris summit, Bundy informed Kennedy that the agreement he had reached with de Gaulle acknowledged the need for “a machinery of consultation to be worked out by the three foreign ministers [of France, Britain, and the United States].” The president’s national security adviser inserted a critical caveat, however, which confirmed de Gaulle’s suspicions: “the military aspect was also agreed to be important, though we avoided any commitment to discuss strategic planning in any detail – as de Gaulle well knows.”68

Conclusion During the first half of 1961, US-West European relations were characterized by a welter of ideas and a flurry of bilateral meetings but no overarching framework. The Kennedy administration’s immediate concern was addressing the dollar and gold drain, which the US deemed critical to addressing the burdens of the Atlantic alliance. Yet balance of payments issues polarized the alliance. The intensity of Kennedy’s fixation on the gold drain disturbed de Gaulle and the Western allies, skewed their initial perceptions of the administration’s priorities, and wrought subtle changes in the alliance’s balance of power. During the first half of 1961, the new US president anticipated Soviet initiatives over Berlin and crises in the Third World, especially in Laos and the Congo. The ongoing planning for the invasion of Cuba also preyed on his mind. Those problems diverted him from defining a comprehensive policy toward Western Europe but established general parameters for the administration’s West European policies and overall Cold War strategies. Kennedy’s initial priorities were of secondary, often tertiary, importance to de Gaulle, who focused on restructuring NATO through tripartite consultation. Strategic planning lay at the heart of the emerging differences between the United States and France. De Gaulle strove to restructure NATO, increase French influence in European affairs, and develop an independent nuclear capability.

3 The Berlin Crisis: Contrasting Franco-American Strategies

“When we have this problem of maintaining our position in Berlin, where you may be using sort of gradually escalating force to maintain yourself in Berlin, you can’t suddenly begin to drop nuclear weapons the first time you have a difficulty . . . and it’s a very valid reason for our emphasizing the necessity of their building up conventional forces . . . You can’t go up the autobahn waving an atom bomb. And say, the first time a bridge is blown out in front of you, you can’t begin a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union over getting to Berlin.” President Kennedy to President Eisenhower, 10 September 19621 On 13 August 1961, in the early hours of the morning, East German engineer battalions, under Soviet supervision, erected barriers which eventually became the Berlin Wall. Kennedy, who had probably anticipated some Soviet move to seal the Eastern border, felt a mixture of shock and relief. Many administration officials expected any Soviet initiatives to come after the signing of a peace treaty with East Germany, not before.2 Kennedy was eager to cement the status quo in Central Europe and insisted privately to his aides, “Why would Khrushchev put up a wall if he really intended to seize West Berlin? This is his way out of his predicament. It’s not a very nice solution, but a wall is a hell of a lot better than war.”3 He believed that as an unnatural barrier, it would fall when the time was propitious. The Kennedy administration had no strategy to destroy the raw and ugly barrier in Berlin. The president vaguely hoped that over time world opinion might force the Soviets to tear down the barrier.4 49

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For his part, de Gaulle did not advocate destroying the Wall. He publicly supported Washington but considered Kennedy’s crisis management reckless diplomacy that threatened German stability and might escalate into war. He scorned Kennedy’s symbolic dispatch of 1,200 troops down the autobahn under the command of Brigadier General Lucius D. Clay, hero of the Berlin Blockade of 1947–48. De Gaulle believed it was an unnecessary provocation, even though Kennedy sent the troops to test whether Khrushchev would cut off Western access to Berlin. “The Americans think differently,” he exclaimed bitterly, “because their interests are not those of Europe.”5 For the Kennedy administration, the Berlin crisis catapulted the German question and NATO strategy ahead of other European concerns, even temporarily ahead of the president’s preoccupation with the balance of payments deficit. Burden-sharing requests shifted from aid for Third World countries to increased demands for conventional military capabilities in Europe. The Berlin problem delayed a coordinated, comprehensive policy on Western Europe, ensuring that the promotion of further economic and military integration would be left to a small group of second rank officials at the Department of State. For de Gaulle, the Berlin crisis had a double-edged effect on his strategic defense objectives. US handling of the crisis intensified his disenchantment with NATO. His perception of US unilateralism and mismanagement confirmed his plans for additional withdrawals of French air and naval forces from NATO’s integrated command and reinforced his determination to equip France with nuclear weapons. Yet as long as the specter of a Soviet takeover haunted West Berlin, de Gaulle felt constrained from drastically altering France’s participation in NATO. He worried as much about a US retreat into isolationism as he did about its march to dominance.

Background of the 1961 Berlin crisis De Gaulle’s fears about the Vienna summit between the superpowers scheduled for early June 1961 proved to be well founded. Khrushchev came to Austria confident that he was confronting a “weak president.” The Soviet leader refused to accept Kennedy’s


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implicit suggestion that the superpowers maintain a Cold War status quo, which meant eliminating the Third World as an arena for the competition between the two blocs. He also dashed Kennedy’s hopes that the two nations could agree on a test ban treaty or work toward disarmament.6 The Soviet premier focused on Berlin and the German question. More animated than at any other point in their two-day discussions, he lambasted the president for perpetuating the division of Germany and jeopardizing European security. He handed Kennedy an aide-mémoire which renewed his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany. Unlike his similar ultimatum of 1958, he now added a deadline – the end of 1961. A separate treaty would transfer control of access to Berlin to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The signing of a peace treaty with the GDR would not by itself mean war. But the United States feared that once the Soviets renounced their wartime occupation rights, the East Germans would demand the withdrawal of the Western powers from Berlin. The Kremlin would denounce the hard-won understandings that permitted the West to reach West Berlin, an enclave 110 miles inside of East Germany, by air, rail, or road. It was East German interference with allied access to Berlin, backed by Soviet power, which could possibly spark a war. Showing none of his peasant charm, Khrushchev demanded that all foreign troops leave Berlin and that the city be given neutral status. Although he told Kennedy that the Four Powers would guarantee that status, he wanted no Western troops there as visible reminders of the guarantee.7 Although Kennedy was visibly shaken by the Soviet leader’s belligerence, he refused to capitulate. Yet what he did not tell Khrushchev was that he was willing to defend Berlin with nuclear weapons. As the summit drew to a close, Kennedy icily told Khrushchev that it was “going to be a long, cold winter.” But the Berlin crisis ensured that the summer and autumn would be long and hot. Martin Hillenbrand, director of Kennedy’s Berlin taskforce, recalled the effect of Khrushchev’s ultimatum on the president: “It was quite clear, I think, to all of us upon returning from Vienna that the president was now personally involved in the Berlin crisis in a way which made it the single most important item on his plate.”8

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Contrasting approaches: policies of the Kennedy administration and the de Gaulle government toward Berlin The Kennedy administration viewed Berlin as a test of Western credibility. Berlin was the hot spot of the Cold War, the one place where all the major powers had vested interests. The Kremlin’s pressure on the Western alliance hoped for two mutually reinforcing advantages: to generate dissension among the Western powers by demanding a different status for Berlin and to capitalize on that disunity to oust the Western powers from Berlin. For Washington, preserving NATO cohesion was critical, making the attitude of de Gaulle’s government an especially worrisome problem. Rusk warned of “the crucial role that France plays in the dialogue with the Soviet Union on Berlin.” He feared that de Gaulle might pursue an independent line that could encourage the Kremlin to take a divide and conquer approach toward abrogating Western rights in Berlin.9 In anticipation of trouble in Berlin, the Kennedy administration proceeded to formulate strategies and contingencies for handling a possible Soviet takeover of West Berlin. Kennedy streamlined the bureaucratic decision-making process and grafted a Berlin taskforce onto the National Security Council. The president also appointed a Department of State “Europeanist,” Martin Hillenbrand, an energetic man in his early forties, as chair of the taskforce responsible for coordinating opinions and information from the White House, Department of State, and the Pentagon. Kennedy also relied heavily upon an interdepartmental coordinating group headed by Acheson, who had managed the Berlin blockade of the late 1940s.10 Although the Kennedy administration’s contingency planning proceeded on two levels, Acheson’s steering group dominated the policy-making process during the early summer of 1961. The former secretary of state dictated to that group in a manner that ensured later alienation from the president and other advisers. Acheson’s group assessed Khrushchev’s motives, calculated the strategic importance of Berlin, and prescribed possible responses. They acknowledged that the Sino-Soviet split and GDR’s steady exodus of refugees flooding into West Berlin were generating pressures on Khrushchev. The group did not believe the Soviet leader was bluffing. By engaging in brinkmanship with the West, the Soviet leader could display toughness in order to appease his critics.11


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On 28 June 1961, in a report to the president, Acheson advocated a hard line based on pre-emptive military measures: calling up the reserves; increasing conventional forces in Europe; conducting troop exercises; resuming nuclear testing and U-2 flights; increasing the defense budget; and declaring a state of national emergency. Acheson’s report concluded that the United States must make it unequivocally clear that it would defend the status quo in Berlin with nuclear weapons.12 Acheson’s report sparked heated debate within the administration. Hoping for coherent advice that would allow him to modulate the US response, Kennedy heard only a cacophony of voices from the “best and brightest.” Walt Rostow, hardly a dove, criticized the Acheson line for its failure to state a political objective which justified “incinerating the world” over access to Berlin. Influential Bundy agreed that “nuclear weapons should not be pursued.” Bundy advocated buying time by building up conventional ground forces in Europe. Although debate on how to respond continued for many weeks, Acheson’s strident first report, which placed primary emphasis on a nuclear deterrent, increasingly lost ground.13

France’s approach The lack of consensus within the Kennedy administration mirrored discord among the Western allies, particularly between France and the United States. De Gaulle scorned Kennedy’s alarmist approach illustrated by the flurry of activity within his administration after the Vienna summit. De Gaulle’s government initially ignored Khrushchev’s ultimatum over Berlin.14 Although de Gaulle shared Kennedy’s commitment to Western unity, he wanted solidarity to occur on French terms. Having personally weathered the 1958 Berlin crisis, de Gaulle felt more qualified to assess the Kremlin’s intentions than newcomer Kennedy. De Gaulle believed that Khrushchev was bluffing and advocated a hardline stance. No advocate of a reunited Germany, de Gaulle supported unyieldingly the status quo in Berlin. He told Hervé Alphand, ambassador to Washington, that if Moscow interfered with Western rights in Berlin, NATO must, of course, respond militarily, although he did not specify what form of military response.15

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De Gaulle believed that his tough stance would preclude the West’s ever having to fight over Berlin. Since 1958, he had perceived himself as the West’s Jeremiah, constantly warning that negotiations would lead to concessions, perhaps allowing Berlin to become a neutral “free city” as the Soviets proposed. De Gaulle was also captive to history. Remembering the events leading up to World War II, he insisted that such a neutralist solution for Berlin would symbolize another “Munich” and open up a slippery and dangerous path leading to a neutral Germany, which would eventually succumb to pressures from the East. Negotiations – an indication in de Gaulle’s mind of Western weakness – would encourage the Kremlin to deny Western access into the city without expecting more than idle protest from NATO.16 In reality, de Gaulle’s bombastic stance on the Berlin ultimatum belied France’s limited defense capabilities. De Gaulle had long mastered the use of rhetoric to compensate for French weakness. Bogged down in Algeria, French forces could not easily be deployed in Central Europe. By insisting that Khrushchev was bluffing, de Gaulle did not need to admit that France’s military inferiority left him no alternative. And with France’s small nuclear deterrent, its strategic value lay in de Gaulle’s professed willingness to use it. He integrated the doctrine of dissuasion du faible au fort (deterrence of the strong by the weak) into his larger military and diplomatic strategy, which was based more on resolve than on capabilities.17 Once Khrushchev had backed down, as de Gaulle expected he would, the French president could appear the wise statesman. If he were wrong and the Soviets were not bluffing, de Gaulle knew the West could not match the Soviets conventional military power, especially a ground force engagement in Central Europe.18 France’s refusal to entertain the possibility of negotiations created difficulties within the NATO alliance. After tabling drafts of a possible tripartite response to the Soviet aide-mémoire on signing a separate peace treaty with East Germany, the French government made it clear that it intended to send an independent reply to Moscow.19 On 5 July 1961, after “consulting” London and Washington, Couve met the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromkyo, in Moscow. The French foreign minister chastised the Soviets for manufacturing a crisis, arguing that no Western action had occurred in Berlin to warrant a change in the status quo. Couve


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argued that West Germany had taken no unilateral action to provoke the Soviet Union. Bonn, in fact, had repudiated military force as a means to realize reunification and was not manufacturing nuclear weapons.20 Hoping to prevent France from pursuing an independent dialogue with the Soviets, the Kennedy administration acknowledged de Gaulle’s concept of tripartism, and attempted to give the concept of tripartism some de facto acknowledgment. In late June 1961, Kennedy suggested that the three Western leaders meet in the autumn if the crisis in Berlin became more serious. He also promised de Gaulle that “in the event of any emergency such as increased tension or the threat of war, the United States will take every possible step to consult with France and other allies unless an attack were so imminent that our survival is threatened.”21 Such verbal assurances were not what de Gaulle wanted to hear. His real concern was not consultation per se, but lack of French control over NATO’s nuclear forces. Although pledging allegiance to NATO, French generals chafed under the NATO chain of command established for an outbreak of hostilities in Berlin. They resented taking orders – in English – from the United States. In April 1959, the West had agreed that the occupying commanders in Berlin would be under the orders of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), US General Lauris Norstad. Because the NATO Secretary General received orders from Washington, the French complained that any action taken in Berlin would be “more American than tripartite.” They fumed over their exclusion from nuclear targeting and control of weapons.22

The Franco-American debate over NATO’s strategic posture For the Kennedy administration, the immediate threat to Berlin required defining NATO’s nuclear posture and preparing NATO for armed combat short of full-scale nuclear attack. In the event that the Soviets tried to block Western access to Berlin, the US government needed sufficient conventional ground forces and arms with air and sea lift to counter a Soviet conventional arms threat.23 In theory, the American rationale for increasing conventional capabilities – tanks, artillery, troops – was two-fold. The Kennedy

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administration believed that a conventional weapons build-up would demonstrate US willingness to bear the costs of escalating the arms race if the Soviets tried to force them out of Berlin. The administration also reasoned that such a build-up would convince the European allies that the United States was committed to sacrificing its own men to fight in Europe.24 Kennedy’s military advisers, however, expressed concern about the credibility of graduated responses. General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the JCS, advised the president to clarify when the United States would use nuclear weapons if the Soviets moved on Berlin. Kennedy acknowledged the ambiguity surrounding the issue but maintained that “the critical point was to be able to use nuclear weapons at a crucial moment before the Soviets used them.” General Curtis Lemay told the president that only the NATO air bases in Spain allowed the United States to take off without previous consultation. Kennedy worried about the feasibility of consulting France and Britain about the decision to deploy nuclear weapons before the Soviets unleashed theirs.25 The ambiguity in this early debate over graduated responses reflected what one historian has pointed to as the gap between the political and strategic value of a so-called “flexible response.”26 Despite the ambiguity surrounding the Kennedy administration’s theorizing about graduated responses, it asked the NATO allies to complement anticipated US conventional force increases with comparable efforts. During mid-July 1961, Kennedy informed de Gaulle, Macmillan, and Adenauer that he intended to request a supplementary military budget from Congress to increase US forces in Central Europe. Acheson’s report on Berlin pointed out that the number of NATO divisions in Central Europe was well below the levels agreed by the Western powers in 1958 under MC 70 and its revised directive, MC 26/4. Soviet divisions outnumbered NATO by 22 to 16. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s ability to mobilize additional manpower so far exceeded Western capabilities that NATO would be unable to engage in combat for more than three or four weeks. Acheson’s report concluded that such unequal conventional capabilities would not deter Soviet action in Berlin.27 McNamara assured the president, however, that if the NATO members followed the guidelines prescribed in 1958, then the alliance “would be prepared to launch non-nuclear warfare on a scale which would


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indicate [their] determination and which would provide some additional time for negotiation before resorting to nuclear warfare.”28 Although France assured Washington that it would meet its MC 26/4 goals and also allow nuclear stockpiles on French soil, the Kennedy administration believed that France and the major West European powers were delaying agreement on a coordinated military strategy. Robert Kennedy later recalled that “the French were the ones who gave us the most difficulties. The British were not much better. But the French!”29 In the area of conventional military measures, the French government took relatively minimal conventional military measures to prepare for an immediate East–West conflict over Berlin. The French military determined that it was impossible to deploy six French divisions, as envisioned in NATO’s MC 70 and MC 26/4. All the French managed was the shift of two divisions from Algeria to the metropole for quick transfer to West Germany in the event of military incidents in Berlin.30 De Gaulle resented US calls for a conventional weapons build-up. In a private memorandum circulated among his advisers, he fumed that a war over Berlin would rapidly turn French territory into a bloody battlefield. “America can lose the battle of Europe,” he noted with bitterness, “without disappearing.”31 French generals and civilian officials at the Ministry of Defense shared their president’s sentiments. They believed conventional weapons lacked both political and strategic credibility as a deterrent. They reasoned that the Kremlin knew the United States would never escalate a conventional war to a nuclear one unless the Soviets struck first. At the same time, however, they refused to recognize that, for the Kennedy administration, the use of force over Berlin could escalate to the choice between unleashing nuclear weapons or capitulating.32 De Gaulle wanted to make that choice for France and Europe, but realized that his infant nuclear program had no military or deterrent value for the present threat looming over Berlin. In 1961, French nuclear tests continued in the Sahara, but France lacked an operational military capacity to strike the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons. His government accelerated the development of a force de frappe. Defense minister Pierre Messmer approved the construction of two provisional silos along the Franco-German border for future nuclear warheads.33 And on 20 July 1961, in an

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address to the Assemblée Nationale, Couve stressed the importance of increasing defense appropriations for an independent French nuclear arsenal in light of the Soviet threat to Berlin.34 France was the most troublesome ally to Washington, but there were other aggravations. The Kennedy administration also worried about the possibility of a British withdrawal of Royal Air Force (RAF) fighter squadrons from West Germany, a policy being considered to offset the British balance of payments deficit. Norstad urged London to reconsider its course of action by stressing that “the significant imbalance in NATO forces in the Central Region which would result from the withdrawal would seriously impair [his] ability to fulfill the mission assigned for the integrated air defense of Allied Command Europe.”35 And beset with its own balance of payments difficulties, the Kennedy administration saw no reason why Britain should retrench and saddle the United States with the financial burden. Macmillan agreed to delay a decision on RAF withdrawals until April 1962, but only after the Kennedy administration promised to keep the door open for negotiations with the Soviet Union over Berlin.36 The lack of Bonn’s commitment to Berlin also frustrated NATO’s strategic planning. On 14 July 1961, Rusk and McNamara met with West German minister of defense, Franz-Josef Strauss, to determine whether the Federal Republic would give unequivocal support if the Berlin crisis deteriorated to the point where US forces came into conflict with those of the GDR and Soviet Union. Strauss replied that he was not in a position to answer the question with an unqualified “yes.”37 Kennedy, who was usually careful in public to conceal his frustration with the French posture, let slip his impatience during his press conference of 19 July. In response to a question about coordinating a common posture with the NATO allies, the president quipped that “Napoleon once said that he won all his successes because he fought without allies.”38

Allies in conflict: Franco-American discord over Berlin The Western leaders were unable to agree on a common approach to the Berlin crisis. Kennedy was convinced that further delay on a formal reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire of June 1961 would only strengthen Khrushchev’s hand. On 25 July, rather than wait for the


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meeting of Western foreign ministers scheduled for early August 1961, he responded to the Soviet ultimatum during a televised address to the American people. Speaking in a solemn tone, he stressed the importance of Berlin as the acid test of US credibility – “the great testing place of Western courage and will, a focal point where our solemn commitments . . . and Soviet ambition now meet in basic confrontation.”39 Kennedy’s speech was a call for an accelerated arms race. Although willing to negotiate, his emphasis on military preparedness was unmistakable. He requested an additional $3.25 billion for the defense budget, activated several National Guard units, and improved conventional weapons capabilities. The United States increased its forces in Western Europe from 228,000 to 273,000 men. The administration also deployed 11 airforce fighter squadrons.40 Kennedy’s uncompromising tone during his televised address failed to mollify de Gaulle and gave Macmillan cause for concern that the two superpowers were moving toward the brink of nuclear confrontation. The cautious British position on Berlin widened the gulf between Macmillan and de Gaulle and Adenauer. Macmillan viewed the crisis within his overarching aim of a détente between East and West. No less than de Gaulle, Macmillan envisioned himself as the leader of a mediating third force between the superpowers. On 28 July 1961, Macmillan’s cabinet concluded that Britain “should dissuade the US from assuming an inflexible negotiating position or taking any military action which might be provocative.” More significantly, Macmillan’s cabinet decided that “there might be positive advantages in according de facto recognition to the GDR, especially if it led to an increase in its contacts with the West which might serve to undermine the Communist hold on the country.”41 The British prime minister’s eagerness to negotiate heightened Adenauer’s fears that Britain would sell out West Germany in order to achieve a détente with the Soviet Union. Suspicious of British fickleness toward West Germany and worried by British consideration of withdrawing RAF fighter squadrons from West Germany, the chancellor thought that Britain would disengage militarily from Europe and neutralize Germany or divide it permanently as the price for détente.42

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De Gaulle used the chancellor’s disenchantment with Macmillan to strengthen his own hand in Europe. He reinforced Adenauer’s suspicion that Macmillan was always eager to compromise and sell out Western rights in Berlin and argued that the prime minister’s softness demonstrated that the British were not European-minded. In contrast, de Gaulle’s unyielding stance on Khrushchev’s ultimatum was not all bluff and bluster. His European strategy of cementing the Franco-West German rapprochement required no compromise with the Soviets. Ensuring that Adenauer stayed in power, the key in de Gaulle’s mind to collaboration between Paris and Bonn, was also the best way to prevent Germany from turning eastward. De Gaulle worried that any appearance of Western weakness, demonstrated by a willingness to negotiate, could only harm Adenauer’s domestic political situation. The Bundestag elections were scheduled for September, and a prospective separate peace treaty with the GDR, which might consolidate the division of Germany, promised to be a key issue. If Western discussions with the Soviets legitimized the GDR, Adenauer would face political death given that most West Germans were unwilling to pursue Ostpolitik. Adenauer, backed by de Gaulle, had no desire to chart that course.43

The response: the American and French reactions to the building of the Wall East–West negotiations over Berlin did not occur that summer. On 13 August 1961, the construction of the Berlin Wall became the Soviet solution to stopping the continuous exodus of refugees – over 155,000 in 1961 alone – fleeing the GDR through Berlin.44 De Gaulle worried about the effects of the Wall on West Germany. He was concerned, with justification, that the Wall would intensify West German desires for reunification at a time when France had not yet solidified an entente with its Rhineland neighbor. As de Gaulle feared, the building of the Wall resulted in a crushing political defeat for Adenauer, reflected in the September 1961 elections. In the eyes of the West German populace, the building of the Wall consolidated the division of their country and foreclosed the possibility of reunification.45 Adenauer’s party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), lost a


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substantial number of seats in the Bundestag and was forced to form a coalition with the Free Democrats. Adenauer remained chancellor, but had to give assurances that he would resign after two years. The coalition government also insisted that Gerhard Schroeder replace Heinrich Brentano as foreign minister. Both developments thwarted de Gaulle’s European strategy. Schroeder was wary of the emerging Paris–Bonn axis. Ludwig Erhard was named vice-chancellor and was expected to succeed Adenauer, a development neither de Gaulle nor Adenauer viewed positively because of their doubts about him. The French president disliked him chiefly because he sought to strengthen US ties with Western Europe.46 Adenauer did not blame de Gaulle for his political setback because of de Gaulle’s stalwart and unyielding stance throughout the Berlin ordeal. Instead, the chancellor privately directed his anger at the US and Britain. Reports from Bonn indicated that Adenauer castigated them for “timidity which permitted the erection of the Berlin Wall.”47 De Gaulle fueled the cautious Adenauer’s fears about Kennedy’s commitment to protect Berlin. Their mutual fears brought the two European leaders together and distanced them further from Washington. De Gaulle curried favor with Adenauer by arguing for a strategy of nuclear deterrence. Where France strengthened its own ground and air defenses, the Foreign Ministry, however, objected strenuously to US calls for modifying NATO strategy in a way that would collectively increase conventional forces. The French were convinced that the Europeans would suffer disproportionately. They also believed that any pause in military pressure, suggested by conventional forays, would indicate a lack of Western resolve.48 De Gaulle also tenaciously held to his anti-negotiation position for which he received the chancellor’s lasting gratitude. Both leaders dismissed a path to a second Munich.49 In contrast, Kennedy and Macmillan viewed negotiations as the best hope for stabilizing Central Europe. Within the corridors of the White House, Kennedy and his inner circle contemplated those areas of negotiation. Issues involving not only the superpowers but also Western allies fell under three general headings: a new status for Berlin; overall European security; and a nuclear non-dissemination agreement. Any one of those could lead to détente or invite serious complications.50 In considering measures to stabilize Central Europe, Kennedy’s

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advisers rightly anticipated strong opposition from Bonn and Paris. Bundy lamented that de Gaulle and Adenauer “would see a portent of ‘disengagement’ in negotiations about purely regional arrangements, unless those negotiations were tied in to continuing negotiations about German unity.” The Chancellor objected to actions that shut the door to reunification for domestic political reasons. He also counted on de Gaulle to support him in opposing de facto recognition of the GDR; accepting the Oder–Neisse line; negotiating a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw powers; agreeing to forbid the deployment of ballistic missiles in West Germany; and limiting military forces in Europe.51 Of course, neither the Western powers nor the Soviet Union believed the immediate reunification of Germany was possible. Unlike West Germany and France, the Kennedy administration understood that East–West negotiations could not proceed on the basis of reunification and therefore sought measures to stabilize Central Europe. As Kennedy informed Rusk, “It just does not make sense for us to propose negotiation for an early reunification of Germany or Berlin on the basis of free elections. The emptiness in this sense is generally recognized. Instead we should keep those ideas forward as those which we prefer, but without any pretense that we believe them acceptable to the Soviet Union at present.”52 When Rusk asked de Gaulle’s advisers why he adamantly opposed discussions with the Soviets, Messmer informed him that France would not agree to any “arrangement over Berlin which would weaken the German position. The destinies of these two countries are too closely intertwined.”53 De Gaulle’s and Adenauer’s refusal to negotiate led Rusk and Gromyko to broach the subject bilaterally in New York in late September and early October 1962 during the opening sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Before these discussions, however, Rusk assured the ambassadors of both France and West Germany that the United States would not negotiate issues of European security without consulting them.54 Nevertheless, while Rusk and Gromyko were meeting in New York, French and West German officials expressed grave concern that the Soviets would use the talks with Rusk to consolidate their position in Central Europe. More specifically, they worried that the US would grant de facto recognition to East Germany, tie a settlement over Berlin to the disarmament of Germany, or agree to the


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non-dissemination of nuclear weapons in Europe.55 De Gaulle and Adenauer’s refusal to negotiate ensured that they did not have a voice in those matters, but it also circumscribed what the superpowers could do.

The Berlin crisis enters a new phase If Moscow and Washington had hoped that the building of the Wall would stabilize Central Europe in order to allow negotiations, both sides miscalculated badly. The Berlin crisis entered a new phase in which the possibility of nuclear confrontation still loomed. Robert Kennedy recalled that he “couldn’t stress sufficiently the concern the President had, and the concern all of us had, about the possibility of war.”56 Throughout early autumn 1961, repeated air corridor incidents and contention over processing allied convoys on the autobahn intensified East–West tensions. The most serious episode occurred almost a year before the Cuban missile crisis when the two superpowers engaged in a tank standoff at Checkpoint Charlie.57 The French government fumed over what it regarded as unnecessary provocation. French officials resented US unilateralism and asserted that if the British and they had been included, the potentially explosive situation could have been averted. The tank confrontation reaffirmed the Gaullist belief that institutionalized tripartite planning was needed in order prevent Soviet harassment techniques.58 After the resolution of the tank confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie, the possibility of war over Berlin flared periodically. In November 1961, Kennedy administration’s proposal for an international access authority to govern entry to Berlin was rejected by the Soviets. Then, in July 1962, during discussions with US ambassadorat-large Llewellyn Thompson, Khrushchev renewed his threat to sign a peace treaty with East Germany, which would force US, French, and British troops out of West Berlin, but he did not set a time limit. In the meantime, the Soviets stepped up a campaign of harassing both civilian and military aircraft in the air corridors established between West Germany and West Berlin.59 Western officials in Berlin and Bonn agreed that the Soviet threat to access constituted a new form of intimidation in the conflict over

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Berlin. An ambassadorial group from the US, Britain, France, and West Germany continued to meet regularly to deal with the Berlin issue. The Kennedy administration, however, remained deeply dissatisfied with allied contingency planning, especially the French government’s unwillingness to work out detailed contingency responses, whether to a Soviet interference with Western aircraft or ground access. The various NATO military plans, known as BERCON (to deal with Berlin itself) and MARCON (to deal with marine countermeasures), would take days to implement, which left the allies with no effective way to deal firmly with aggression from the East without resorting to nuclear weapons, a response that could unleash general thermonuclear war.60 Kennedy was most familiar with National Security Action Memorandum 109, code-named “Poodle Blanket,” which he approved in October 1961 and which established the levels of NATO military responses to Soviet or East German interference with Western access to Berlin. The first phase called for non-nuclear air action followed by ground operations into East German territory. If the Soviets persisted, the United States envisioned three phases of nuclear responses: selective attacks on particular targets to demonstrate the will to use nuclear weapons; limited tactical use; and general nuclear war. The plan also envisaged a 60–day negotiation and mobilization period before the allies could act, a pause that allowed an intensive period of diplomatic activity to avoid military action.61 Such contingency phases and the whole concept of a graduated NATO response in Berlin left most French officials cold. The French government argued that postulating the contingencies requiring escalation to nuclear weapons involved unpredictable variables that could only be determined once a situation arose. As a general of vast experience, de Gaulle believed he knew all too well the folly of believing one could control the escalation of force.62

Conclusion Berlin continued to be a dangerous place during the early 1960s. The tactical differences that arose between France and the United States over how best to shape a credible deterrent to the Soviets had a divisive impact on relations between the two allies and far-reach-


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ing implications for the Western alliance as a whole. First, it heightened Adenauer’s fear of being abandoned by the US, which facilitated de Gaulle’s strategy of tying West Germany firmly to France.63 This growing entente thwarted formulation of a NATO strategic doctrine based on graduated responses ranging from conventional to tactical nuclear and strategic levels. As Kennedy exclaimed in exasperation to French Ambassador Alphand: “This great Franco-German [entente]. We are always subject to very sharp criticism by the Germans for not doing one thing or another . . . but we are doing everything we committed to under NATO and in addition carrying SAC [Strategic Air Command], and in addition the navy, and in addition Southeast Asia . . . Now France isn’t even fulfilling its NATO commitment.”64 Under NATO policy directives MC 70 and MC 26/4, France was committed to contributing four divisions but produced only two and one-third divisions. The Kennedy administration also remained frustrated that the West Germans would not pressure de Gaulle to meet its French commitment under the 1962 NATO policy proposals. Even worse, West German Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss informed McNamara that his country could not meet the requirements for an armed force of 750,000 West Germans needed to fulfill a commitment of 12 divisions under MC 26/4 and might need to reduce the size of its divisions.65 As Kennedy’s frustration over the effects of Berlin on the FrancoGerman entente and on NATO strategy mounted, he enlisted former President Dwight Eisenhower to visit Paris and Bonn in mid-1962. Upon Eisenhower’s return, he met alone with Kennedy in the Oval Office. “De Gaulle didn’t talk to me substantively at all,” Eisenhower lamented. “He just proved very nice, very hospitable, and all that, very kind, but we didn’t talk about it. And he wouldn’t, you know.”66 The Berlin crisis created an insurmountable obstacle to moving declarations of a shift in NATO strategy to flexible response to implementation of such a doctrine. Kennedy concluded to Eisenhower: “The fact is that [de Gaulle and Adenauer] would be perfectly right about talking about our immediate use of nuclear weapons, it seems to me, if we didn’t have the Berlin problem, because then obviously any Soviet intrusion across the line would be a deliberate one and would be a signal for war.”67 Due in part to French and West German opposition, the so-called

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flexible response remained in the theoretical realm rather than actual adopted NATO strategy.68 Finally, the Berlin crisis had decisive effects on French military policy. De Gaulle began formulating plans, unknown to Washington, that would culminate in the withdrawal of French forces from NATO in 1966. As long as a direct threat loomed over Berlin, the French government would allow US forces to remain and use French territory for logistical purposes. Beyond that point, de Gaulle insisted that French territory would not be at US disposal unless the Atlantic alliance were revised along several lines. For example, he wanted all US forces and logistical support units within France to be under the authority and control of his government. As it stood in the early 1960s, NATO’s supreme commanders were a US general and admiral. In the future, de Gaulle envisioned that strategic agreements currently falling under NATO purview would have to be worked out between Washington and Paris. In effect, he planned to reject the NATO framework and revert to bilateral arrangements. He also left open for further consideration whether he would allow the storage of atomic weapons in France for use by US squadrons in the event of a flare-up in Central Europe.69 Perceived American unilateralism concerning Berlin also strengthened de Gaulle’s determination to develop an independent nuclear capability, discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. He declared unequivocally that under no circumstances would France put its nuclear weapons at the disposal of NATO. Although the French president recognized that Washington, London, and Paris needed to coordinate nuclear strategy, he continued to insist on a tripartite body independent of NATO to coordinate Western strategy.70

4 The Challenge of French Nuclear Policy

“[Neither] the United States nor United Kingdom can deflect de Gaulle from his determination to make France co-equal by acquisition and capacity to build and deliver nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if we allow him to continue to go it alone then the Germans will become almost impossible to control, and indeed, the French might decide to give the Germans nuclear knowhow.” British defense minister Harold Watkinson to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan1

France’s nuclear weapons program There is limited open documentation on France’s nuclear program under de Gaulle. What is available suggests that de Gaulle sought bilateral cooperation with the United States or Great Britain, or tripartite cooperation among the three, rather than strictly independent development. Yet de Gaulle would not sacrifice independent control for technological information. He found coordination with NATO acceptable but insisted that a force de frappe remain in French hands for the defense of France.2 Most non-French scholars argue that de Gaulle chose a “minimum deterrent” because he sought only the symbol of great power status. Beatrice Heuser correctly notes, however, that “the development of official nuclear strategy in France was in fact preceded by the development of French nuclear technology. Official nuclear strategy was therefore constructed around existing weapons systems, instead of weapons systems being acquired to fulfill the needs of strategy.”3 67

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Nuclear sufficiency was dictated by financial and technological considerations, not by a desire for symbolic trappings of grandeur. The make-up of France’s nuclear arsenal was based on weapons already under development since the Fourth Republic. Defense officials chose the supersonic Mirage IV, a nuclear bomber with a strategic range to most Soviet cities, because its development could be partially facilitated by Anglo-French military staff collaboration on supersonic VTOL aircraft. One drawback of the Mirage IV, however, was its need for inflight refueling to make a round trip to the Soviet Union. The French Council of Defense decided that approximately 50 Mirage IV bombers would constitute the first generation of French nuclear weapons. By 1962, France had constructed four prototypes. By 1963, defense officials planned for these first nuclear bombers to be operational. As for the atomic bombs carried, during the early 1960s, France produced high-yield pure fission designs, primarily the AN-11 and AN-22 warheads. The AN-11 was first tested in May 1962 and began to be stockpiled in 1963. The AN-22 warhead, intended to replace the AN-11, had a higher kiloton yield and could also be dropped from Mirage IV aircraft.4 The French Council of Defense proposed a strategic triad. While nuclear delivery aircraft represented the first generation of the force de frappe, second-generation weapons would include nuclearpropelled submarines with uranium–tritium warheads. The production of 20–30 ground-based ballistic missiles would bridge the gap between the air and sea-based delivery systems. In September 1959, France created the Society for Research and Development of Ballistic Engines (SEREB) to produce ballistic missiles. The third aspect of the strategic triad was the construction of an infrastructure for nuclear research, tests, and the manufacture of warheads, vectors, and delivery systems. The Council of Defense realized the construction of a gaseous diffusion plant to separate radioactive isotopes for the production of enriched uranium was critical for the development of a nuclear arsenal. When French officials spoke of nuclear aid, help in building a gaseous-diffusion plant was a top priority.5 The costs of de Gaulle’s prized nuclear weapons program were considerable. Table 4.1 shows the portion of France’s defense and overall national budgets devoted to the force de frappe. Although the


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Algerian war was drawing to a close, the French defense budget increased; it did not go down. Funds shifted dramatically in military credits from conventional forces to the nuclear weapons program. Even so, at just under 7 percent of the national budget, the French defense program was less than that of the two superpowers, which ranged between 8 and 10 percent. The French and UK defense budgets were roughly equal.6 Table 4.1

The French budget for force de frappe

Général Charles State budget in de Gaulle billion francs

Defense budget in billion francs

Credits for military equipment

Cost of force de frappe in billion francs

1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969

16,886 17,415 17,841 19,483 19,715 20,859 22,025 23,769 25,485 26,090

5,895 5,739 5,601 7,831 9,100 10,378 11,268 12,207 12,982 13,069

0,538 0,909 1,245 2,432 3,701 5,040 5,575 6,277 6,267 5,367

59,788 66,139 73,331 81,428 87,399 93,338 104,047 121,238 133,733 147,150

Adapted from Institut Charles de Gaulle, L’Aventure de la bombe: De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1985), 118.

To defray developmental costs, the French government hoped for, but did not predicate its program on, bilateral cooperation with either the United States or Great Britain. French officials used suggestions of Franco-German collaboration as un double jeu (a double game). It represented a stick to beat the US and UK into offering nuclear aid. It was also a carrot that kept the West Germans receptive to an entente.7 Given the costs, the French government could not craft a nuclear strategy that matched capabilities with national ambition. De Gaulle sought an end to superpower global dominance, but realized France could never equal the Soviet or US arsenal. Even surpassing Great Britain proved unlikely in the near future. France therefore employed the strategy of dissuasion du faible au fort, deterrence of the strong by the weak. That strategy ultimately made the size of a nation’s nuclear arsenal irrelevant. French defense officials used the analogy of the threads that bound Gulliver to

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describe the relationship of a force de frappe to the superpowers’ weapons.8 Most importantly, a French nuclear arsenal, even if small, could force the United States, through a trigger concept, into abandoning graduated responses. In November 1963, de Gaulle described his reasoning in a meeting with his advisers: “If France is attached, it is certain that the Americans will intervene. But when and how? Their interest might not coincide with ours. The Alliance does not oblige them to be at our side right away, with all their weight and all their weapons. That is why our atomic force is necessary. It is a triggering and entangling force [une force de déclenchement et d’entrainement]. It is the starter.”9 De Gaulle integrated the doctrine of dissuasion du faible au fort into his larger military and diplomatic strategy, which was based more on resolve than on capabilities. One objection to US demands for increased conventional weapons was the realization that French nuclear strategy was based on precepts of credibility similar to the doctrine of massive retaliation. Although the future French nuclear arsenal would lack size to give it credibility, de Gaulle needed to establish his willingness to unleash nuclear weapons. The French president believed that shifting from a NATO policy in which deterrence was based upon consistent resolve to a strategy of graduated responses where limited engagement was possible might emasculate the nascent force de frappe whose effectiveness came from willingness to use immediate force.10

US attitudes toward nuclear sharing As in so many matters, many US officials, especially in the Department of State, failed to see past de Gaulle’s unyielding personality and discern the relationship among the various components of French defense strategies. On the question of Berlin, not realizing that de Gaulle’s strategy was predicated more on resolve than military capabilities, they criticized de Gaulle for hiding under the US nuclear umbrella by taking a stance that depended upon American force to maintain. On the build-up of NATO conventional forces in Europe, not realizing that de Gaulle wanted to devote more of the French defense budget to a nuclear weapons program, the Department of State assumed that the end of the


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Algerian war would allow returning French ground divisions to move into West Germany.11 Confronted with the challenge of the French nuclear program, the Kennedy administration never officially deviated from opposing nuclear proliferation. Within a global context, the administration based its opposition on what was commonly called the “nth country problem,” the idea that each nation’s development of nuclear capability encouraged other fledgling programs, including those of China, Israel, and Egypt. Within the context of the Western alliance, the administration worried that France’s insistence on a force de frappe would fuel West German nuclear desires. If the US provided France with nuclear assistance, West Germany might demand equal treatment. Haunting memories of the Nazi war machine, reinforced by the publication of William Shirer’s The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich in 1961, had not receded from the minds of most US officials or the public. In the immediate context of the ongoing Berlin crisis, independent German nuclear capability would provoke the Soviet Union. Conversely, if the US refused de Gaulle nuclear aid, France might turn to West Germany for financial and technological collaboration, which would provide the Federal Republic with information to develop an independent or joint capability. In other words, allied nuclear-sharing raised a cluster of frightening scenarios.12

De Gaulle’s threat of Franco-German collaboration What American officials misunderstood was de Gaulle’s opposition to helping West Germany achieve nuclear capability. In fact, he worried incessantly about Germany’s joining the nuclear club and had no plans to assist the country. Pierre Chatenet, the president of the EURATOM commission, recalls that de Gaulle “had a fear of Germany that would never entirely diminish.”13 De Gaulle, however, used threats of Franco-German nuclear collaboration to play on British and American fears in hope of extracting nuclear aid. His singular objective was an independent French nuclear striking force. That independence lay in national control, not how a force de frappe was obtained. De Gaulle preferred to create an atmosphere where les Anglo-Saxons feared his nuclear aims in order to extract their offer of assistance. His nationalistic

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pride kept him from asking for US assistance, and too often he heard US officials resort to the excuse that the McMahon Atomic Energy Act of 1958 prohibited American nuclear sharing with the allies, even though he believed that the legislation had been extrapolated into technical areas such as missile technology.14 French diplomats reinforced fears of Franco-German nuclear collaboration. On one occasion, François de Rose, a diplomat at the Quai d’Orsay who dealt with atomic issues, informed US ambassador to France James Gavin that de Gaulle was “not quite ready to give nuclear information to Germans now but he will be later.” De Rose explained that West Germany’s willingness to pay half the cost of a gaseous diffusion plant needed to isolate radioactive isotopes might result in an exchange for French nuclear information. De Rose added an ominous note about the Franco-German rapprochement: “If the two countries continue to work closely together it is inevitable that they will share nuclear information.” On another occasion, Rusk received similar hints of future Franco-German collaboration when West German Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss told NATO Secretary General Dirk Stikker that “there had been discussion of possible French-German cooperation” during his recent meeting with Messmer.15 De Gaulle held another trump card. Convinced of an AngloAmerican conspiracy against him, he assumed that his two erstwhile allies kept each other informed about France’s nuclear plans. By telling Macmillan that he “could not bind himself never to give nuclear weapons to the Germans,” he knew Kennedy would receive the message.16 Macmillan shared Kennedy’s fear of Franco-German nuclear collaboration but was less inclined to see nuclear sharing with France as encouragement to West Germany. British minister of defense Harold Watkinson believed, for example, that exploring some type of bilateral nuclear arrangement would deter de Gaulle from turning to the West Germans.17 Beginning in November 1961, an Anglo-French Steering Committee for collaboration on Defense Research and Development reviewed the whole field of bilateral armaments cooperation ranging from prototypes of new tanks to technical interest in air-to-air missiles and low altitude surface-toair missiles. Throughout 1961 and 1962, the extent of Anglo-French defense cooperation remained unclear, but the possibility of explor-


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ing various avenues of nuclear collaboration were opened, such as information exchanges on warhead and guidance systems.18

Debate over NATO nuclear sharing In Washington, officials from the Department of State officials who spoke in terms of a grand design for Western Europe were dubbed the “theologians” by the pragmatic-oriented Kennedy officials. The proponents of this vaunted rhetoric included Ball, Rostow, Robert Bowie, director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University who consulted part time for the Kennedy administration, Henry Owen, and others of the European Desk at the Department of State. They operated with Rusk’s blessing and sought to wed the United States to the Monnet vision of an integrated Europe. Possessing a crusading mindset, they thought in terms of all or nothing. The theologians urged the president to reduce all the West European nations to the same level by encouraging them to abandon national nuclear deterrents and by supporting Britain’s entry into the Common Market.19 In early 1962, the theologians tried harnessing public support through the publication of a short book entitled The Grand Design, by Joseph Kraft, who had been an editor for both the New York Times and the Washington Post. Kraft acknowledged that “it could not have been written without the kind cooperation of officials in the Kennedy administration.”20 The grand design envisioned an Atlantic community with military and economic cooperation between the United States and an integrated Western Europe. The theologians thought long term. Yet they were accustomed, like most vigor-prizing New Frontiersmen, to want immediate solutions and alliance nuclear sharing issues defied an easy answer. Nuclear sharing was an intractable problem where inaction was preferable to action. But the theologians sought multilateral solutions to circumvent, if not avoid, the difficult choices posed by the allies. Accepting alliance unity as an article of faith, they did not want to refuse all forms of nuclear sharing, so they offered participation in a sea-based MRBM force of Polaris submarines. During the first two years of the Kennedy administration, the variety of names given to a multilateral nuclear force within NATO indicated the indecision within the alliance over control and release procedures:

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NATO MRBM Force, NATO Nuclear Force (NNF), Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), Multinational Force, Inter-allied Nuclear Force (INF), Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF).21 The grand design crusaders revealed disagreements over tactics. They split between advocates according priority to economic integration and those supporting military integration as the first step. Rusk and Ball, spurred on by Monnet, viewed tariff negotiations and Britain’s entry into the Common Market as chief priorities. They rightly questioned the feasibility of a MLF.22 Walt Rostow, on the other hand, argued that a politically and economically unified Western Europe would result only if the member states retained a privileged nuclear status. Rostow realized that claims to first-rank political status within Western Europe rested on national nuclear forces. Inequality in that field only bred nationalist resentment which impeded economic integration, primarily Britain’s entry into the EEC. Rostow encouraged Kennedy to endorse the MLF as a leveling policy that would make all the European nations equal in the nuclear field.23 In essence, they all shared the same objective – a unified Western Europe – but equivocated on the steps to achieve that goal. Although Kennedy respected individuals within the Department of State, he remained skeptical, and was often critical of the Department’s entrenched bureaucracy. His attitude was shared by several members of his White House staff, as well as high-level officials within the Treasury and Pentagon. They included Bundy, Kaysen, McNamara, Dillon, Roswell Gilpatric, under-secretary of defense, and Paul Nitze, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs. Unlike the theologians, these critics were not wedded to the Monnet vision. Yet they offered no substitute. Instead, they stressed the pragmatic side of an Atlantic community, which meant a willingness to consider European policies – whether about nuclear sharing, balance of payments arrangements, tariff negotiations, or an expanded Common Market – on an individual, ad hoc basis. Although recognizing relationships among policies, they believed that the complexity of NATO issues precluded blanket application of the Monnet formula.24 The pragmatists’ biggest mistake was not rejecting the rhetoric of an Atlantic Community grand design, which the French found so distasteful. They became trapped into convincing its allies that the


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administration was not pushing for a grand design. Couve de Murville recalled the French frustration over those “two contradictory trends” of the administration’s pragmatic ideology, which pushed a distasteful concept of an Atlantic community while simultaneously contriving ad hoc policies to smooth alliance problems.’25 Nuclear sharing proved divisive, not only among the allies but also within the Kennedy administration. The president, Bundy, and a handful of Pentagon advisers realized that no US policy would reverse de Gaulle’s decision to develop an independent nuclear force. In February 1962, the president opened the debate on the question. He asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff “for a new appraisal of our atomic policy in regard to France,” informing them that they “ought to be thinking about it with a view to changing our present policy, if it would be advisable.”26 Ambassador Gavin played an important role in persuading Kennedy to reconsider nuclear aid to France. He proposed offering France nuclear aid equivalent to what the United States was giving the United Kingdom. As early as November 1961, he suggested selling the French missile technology and enriched uranium to offset the costs of a gaseous diffusion plant. Rusk quickly squelched his heresy: “We have made clear to all governments that we will engage in no activity and undertake no action which would be likely to assist any new nation to acquire or develop an independent nuclear capability.”27 Bundy described Gavin as a “square peg in a round hole.”28 For a man like Kennedy, however, who admired courage, Gavin’s maverick stance captured his attention. In early March 1962, Gavin flew to Washington and appealed directly to Kennedy. Aware of the president’s preoccupation with the US balance of payments deficit, Gavin explained that French obstructionism was an expensive annoyance that might change if the US reversed its stance on nuclear sharing. He cited several areas. There were ample unused atomic stockpile sites in France that could save the United States and NATO millions of dollars on building comparable facilities in Germany. France might cease being uncooperative in seismographic test detection needed for a nuclear test ban treaty and military communications systems. Gavin also warned that France was likely to block any US initiatives in trade relations or the negotiations for Britain’s entrance into the EEC unless the adminis-

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tration reversed its nuclear sharing policy. He proposed selling the French US missile technology. He explained that “we are asking France to help us in redressing our balance of payments by making more military purchases in the United Sates, but we will not sell the very items France wants because they are associated with modern weapons systems.”29 Gavin’s suggestions appealed to President Kennedy’s monetary concerns. While Gavin was visiting the White House in March 1962, a French delegation led by General Gaston Lavaud came to Washington for discussions with McNamara about offsetting US military expenditures involving France. They left empty-handed in terms of the items they coveted: missile technology, enriched uranium, or compressors for a gaseous-diffusion plant under construction in southern France. Kennedy asked Bundy to find out information on those items and on the series of Gavin telegrams that lay buried in the Department of State.30 At this point, Gavin ceased to be a lone voice in the wilderness. Gilpatric and Nitze, who had privately voiced similar views, began to circulate their opinions. They urged a quid pro quo, which Kennedy authorized Nitze to explore with General Lavaud: in return for de Gaulle’s pledge to remain committed to NATO, US would allow access to nuclear information up to the level of fission weapons. The Kennedy administration expected de Gaulle’s participation in an MLF; an increase in conventional ground forces committed to NATO; US stockpiling of nuclear weapons in France; and placement of a force de frappe under NATO command, though subject to withdrawal for national purposes. In return, the United States would help France achieve nuclear parity with Great Britain.31 Disturbed by the nuclear-sharing heretics, the theologians practiced damage control. Ball informed McNamara that nuclear aid to France contradicted approved Basic NSC policy of April 1961 set forth in NSAM 40.32 Ball instructed Gavin that “the President believed that it would be best for the present to avoid being drawn into further discussion of nuclear questions with French officials which could only further exacerbate our bilateral relations generally.33 West German nuclear aspirations were the real concern. The theologians’ opposition to providing France nuclear aid were


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subsumed within their fears about the implications for the alliance. They worried that aid to France would create resentment in West Germany over exclusion from a tripartite nuclear club of the British, French, and Americans.34 As Jerome Weisner, special assistant to the president for science and technology, summed it up, “the more you help the French, the more incentive you give other people to get to that stage, too, you see. So I think you have to be very careful on the bomb.”35

An MLF and nuclear aid to France Questions within the Kennedy administration about the feasibility of an MLF fed the debate over nuclear aid to France. On 15 March 1962, Kennedy met with his chief advisers to discuss NATO nuclear matters and expressed doubts about a MLF. His questions were numerous: was it wise to continue with an MLF since de Gaulle was obviously determined to have independent nuclear capability? Would continued US refusal to give any nuclear assistance to France compel de Gaulle to collaborate with the West Germans? Were the other West European nations interested in a MLF? Was the US pouring money down the drain for a proposition with dubious political value? If the US retained veto power over the nuclear trigger of a MLF, why would the Europeans be interested? Would a MLF compete financially with European ability to increase their conventional capabilities?36 Kennedy’s chief advisers echoed his doubts. Bundy recalled how he “became a principal on-the-spot enemy of the MLF within the government.”37 Given the multiple questions of feasibility surrounding the project, it represented an impractical ideal. Within the Pentagon, McNamara conceded some political need since an MLF might satisfy German nuclear ambitions. The navy was naturally enthusiastic about an MLF since it meant another mission for them, but insisted on strict US control. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover however feared compromising US nuclear reactor technology by allowing the possibility of secrets passing to the Soviets by sharing the Polaris submarine. The French government resisted an MLF. De Gaulle declared that he would not oppose, but did not support the project. Privately, he referred to the multilateral force as a “nuclear farce.”38 Yet the

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carrot of American nuclear aid kept most French ministers at the Quai d’Orsay and the Ministry of Defense from refusing participation in a MLF.39 Aware of the bureaucratic schisms within the Kennedy administration over nuclear sharing, they expected Kennedy to reach a decision after the North Atlantic Council meeting in May 1962.40 In the meantime, Nitze and Lavaud continued discussions about a quid pro quo of nuclear aid for French cooperation with US policies for Western Europe begun in Washington when the French general visited in March 1962. The details remain classified, but what is important was the outcome. While Nitze was in Paris, Kennedy responded to a question about giving nuclear aid to France asked at a press conference on 18 April 1962, by saying, “Well, I think that the policy of the United States, of course, continues to be that of being very reluctant to see the proliferation of nuclear weapons . . . I said that I thought it would be regrettable if nuclear weapons proliferated, or spread. So that our policy continues on that basis, and will continue unless we feel that security requirements suggest a change.” Kennedy’s response sealed de Gaulle’s rejection of the Nitze–Lavaud nuclear-sharing arrangement because he was annoyed by the mixed signals coming from the Kennedy administration.41 Given US indecision and mixed signals, French prime minister Michel Debré called US policy “stupid.”42 Revealing internal contradictions, Kennedy issued a national security action memorandum forbidding members of the executive branch from discussing the issue with French officials, despite his authorization of the Nitze mission.43 Gavin fed de Gaulle’s hope by offering the possibility of ballistic missile aid. The ambassador’s recommendations, however, were rejected by Rusk.44 Frustrated by Gavin’s insubordination, Rusk and Ball isolated him at his post in an effort to force his resignation. They succeeded. Already financially strapped by the expenses of Paris, a weary Gavin resigned in July 1962. Although he remained in Paris until September, he was a lame duck.45


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The Athens Decree In early May 1962, any hope de Gaulle’s government held for US nuclear assistance was temporarily demolished at the NATO ministerial conference in Athens. Ball described it as “one of the most successful in the history of the Alliance.” From the perspective of the Department of State, the conference suceeded because it reflected the ascendancy of the theologian viewpoint.46 Ball was thrilled because McNamara now voiced the “wisdom” of the Department’s position and spoke against small, nationally independent nuclear deterrents. With little White House review, the theologians essentially wrote the Athens speech.47 On 16 June 1962, McNamara chose a commencement address at the University of Michigan to publicize his NATO ministerial speech. Addressing the issue of nuclear aid to France, he declared that “the creation of additional national nuclear force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all of its attendant dangers. Limited nuclear capabilities operating independently are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.”48 In preparing for Athens and Ann Arbor, the Kennedy administration was a house divided over NATO strategy. The pragmatists at the Pentagon and on the NSC staff wanted to “present our views in NATO generally in a low tone, avoiding the suggestion that we are trying to impose a strategy ‘made in the USA,’”49 but Bundy warned Kennedy that the administration might want to tone down the passage in the commencement address about national nuclear forces because of “messy dialogue with the French.”50 The theologians in the Department of State, however, achieved the upper hand and persuaded McNamara to voice their position. First at Athens, and then at Ann Arbor, the secretary of defense, in the words of Ball, carried “forward the process of educating the Alliance in basic facts of nuclear warfare and rationale of US views on strategy.”51 MC 100/1, the so-called “Athens guidelines,” articulated concepts that had been circulating and worrying the major West European allies for a year and a half. It reinforced NATO policy directive MC 14/2 of May 1957, which called for differentiated responses in the event of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. It went one step further and articulated a “second-strike counterforce

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capability,” which meant creating a NATO force that could withstand a Soviet first strike in order to target remaining Soviet forces.52 McNamara also repeated a request for greater West European contribution to a conventional weapons build-up. To appease the allies, the so-called Athens guidelines took a step toward meeting French and West German demands for consultation by agreeing to do so before using nuclear weapons, but with the caveat of “time and circumstances permitting.”53 The Western allies interpreted the proposed Athens guidelines as an invitation for Soviet military encroachment because it implicitly acknowledged the possibility of a limited conventional engagement with Soviet forces in Europe. They also objected to the US pronouncement of greater centralized control in the decision to use nuclear weapons.54 Outraged by the Kennedy administration’s presumption to speak for the entire alliance, de Gaulle used his weekly press conference of 15 May 1962 to reiterate France’s determination to develop a nuclear deterrent. Countering the US line at Athens, he stressed that “a French atomic deterrent force is coming into existence and is going to grow continuously.”55 For the French president, the Athens decree, reinforced at Ann Arbor, highlighted the American tendency to dictate NATO strategy.56 France was not alone in its outrage. Macmillan privately described McNamara as “foolish” for needlessly infuriating de Gaulle and confided to his diary: “All the Allies are angry with the American proposal that we should buy [their] rockets. . . . This is not a European rocket. It’s a racket of the American industry.”57 Macmillan resented the American brand of “burden-sharing.” The British objected to a NATO-controlled MRBM force, in which the Europeans purchased US missiles that remained under US control. British defense officials found an MRBM force military unjustified and economically extravagant.58 The stormy relationship between Lauris Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe (SACEUR) and the Kennedy administration added to allied disgust with US NATO policies during the summer of 1962. In July 1962, after a private discussion with Kennedy at the White House, Norstad announced his resignation, effective in December 1962. Rumors circulated in the European


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capitals that Kennedy sacked Norstad because he had been asserting too much autonomy in pushing for both a European land-based and sea-based MRBM nuclear force against Washington’s instructions. Norstad had in fact argued that questions of control and access belonged with SACEUR, not Washington. Many Kennedy administration officials, especially in the Department of State, countered that European nations would demand a special national role in the peacetime deployment and control of missiles in their countries. Bundy, Rusk, and others, however, did not want too many fingers on the nuclear trigger.59 The Western allies were angered by the nuclear access and control issues and worried about the implications of Norstad’s resignation. Eisenhower made a six-week tour of the major West European capitals in mid-July, largely at Kennedy’s request and received a barrage of allied discontent. De Gaulle and Adenauer especially believed that Norstad’s successor, General Lyman Lemnitzer, and General Maxwell Taylor, who replaced Lemnitzer as chairman of the JCS, planned to denuclearize Europe by focusing increasingly on conventional weapons. Taylor’s 1959 boook, The Uncertain Trumpet, criticized Eisenhower’s “overemphasis” on nuclear massive retaliation.60

Anglo-French dialogue about nuclear sharing Disenchantment with US proposals for NATO contributed to the reopening of Anglo-French collaborative nuclear efforts. De Gaulle and Macmillan both hoped to dupe the other. The prime minister thought he could secure de Gaulle’s consent to Britain’s EEC candidacy by enticing de Gaulle with the possibility of British nuclear aid.61 De Gaulle was torn. To secure French dominance in continental affairs, de Gaulle needed an operational force de frappe and Britain could help. Yet he also realized that France needed the economic leverage that would come with dominating the Common Market, which Britain’s entrance could upset.62 When the two leaders met at Château de Champs in June 1962, Macmillan held his trump card too closely by leaving it to de Gaulle to raise the issue of collaborative nuclear policies. De Gaulle’s nationalist pride prevented him from making more than an oblique suggestion that “it might be useful if further talks between the two

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governments could take place about the future possibilities of cooperation in the political and defense fields.”63 Two days after Macmillan returned to England in June 1962, top secret, high-level talks between the French and British ministers of defense produced more specific proposals. Harold Watkinson and his French counterpart, Pierre Messmer, discussed the possibility of a joint missile-firing nuclear submarine. The British, who were skeptical of the strategic usefulness and concerned about the costs of a Polaris submarine-based MLF, were receptive to the French suggestion. A month later, Watkinson received Macmillan’s approval to pursue Messmer’s proposal on the navy staff level.64 The Anglo-French Defense Steering Group established in 1961 also continued exploratory discussions along three lines: cooperation in the manufacture and production of nuclear material; joint targeting for their deterrent forces; and cooperation in the building of delivery systems. Collaboration remained exploratory, matching the protracted negotiations in Brussels for Britain’s bid to join the EEC.65

The never-ending debate over nuclear sharing Before and after the discussions between Macmillan and de Gaulle at Château de Champs, rumors circulated in both the European and the American press about a deal of British nuclear aid for French consent to UK entry into the Common Market. Not surprisingly given the debate within the Kennedy administration over nuclear sharing, Washington’s reaction was mixed. Rusk’s opposition persisted, and he urged British officials not to accept any deals from de Gaulle. Kennedy’s ambivalence continued. Ormsby-Gore explained to Macmillan shortly before his departure for Château de Champs that “President Kennedy does not take up an attitude of doctrinaire opposition to such an idea but he does feel that it would only be worth considering if it would buy something really spectacular like full French cooperation in NATO and elsewhere plus British entry into the EEC.”66 In the meantime, Kennedy hoped Macmillan would not strike such a deal. Inconsistency and indecision characterized the Kennedy administration’s policy throughout 1961 and 1962. Despite public pronouncements against nuclear sharing, in the summer of 1962,


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the US government sold France twelve KC-135 jet tanker planes needed to refuel the French Mirage IV nuclear bombers so that they could reach Soviet targets. And as late as September 1962, the Kennedy administration sought congressional authorization for the sale to the French government of the Skipjack nuclear submarine, which was the Nautilus rather than the Polaris missile-firing type. By selling missile technology and other information up to the level of fission weapons, he hoped to offset US military outlays and discourage Franco-German nuclear collaboration. In early September 1962, Gilpatric left for Paris on mission similar to Nitze’s in March 1962, discussed above. From 7 to 9 September, he met with Messmer and used their talks to explore US–French cooperation in research and development, procurement and production, and logistic support. Once again, however, the exploratory talks fell short of providing France nuclear aid.67

Conclusion Perpetually in conflict over whether to give France nuclear aid, Kennedy never closed the door on its possibility during his presidency. The theologians, however, capitalized on the president’s vacillation and, at key junctures, told the French that it would never happen. Counterfactual scenarios provide some insight into the ambiguous US nuclear sharing policy. Should the United States have encouraged Macmillan to strike a deal with de Gaulle for British entry into the EEC? Should the Kennedy administration have made its own bargain for de Gaulle’s cooperation in NATO and foreclosed the possibility of Franco-German nuclear collaboration that they so feared? Exploring and deciding are two separate steps. In effect, the Kennedy administration followed the British path by exploring the issue and authorizing high-level officials, such as Gilpatric and Nitze, to bargain with the French. Both Anglo-Saxon governments hesitated, although at different times, which added to de Gaulle’s frustration.68 Why did the Kennedy administration oppose aid to France? The Kennedy administration’s NATO policies were guided by an often inconsistent pragmatic ideology. The pragmatic side of Kennedy plotted contingencies about whether US nuclear assistance to France would alter de Gaulle’s European policies. Temporarily, it

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would have improved relations. After all, Kennedy’s advisers generally accepted that de Gaulle would never abandon a force de frappe. Would he, however, have become more cooperative in NATO strategy or allowed Britain in the Common Market? As with all counterfactuals, there is no incontrovertible evidence and de Gaulle was an imponderable to most of Kennedy’s advisers, whose antiGaullist mentality gave them no reason to presuppose that his cooperation could be bought.69 De Gaulle saw nuclear aid as his right, denied him by the United States and Great Britain. The fact that he never directly asked the Anglo-Saxons for aid and his threats of collaborating with the Germans as an alternative suggest that French nuclear strategy would not have changed. A force de frappe would be independent. De Gaulle’s objection to conventional forces and a negotiated Berlin settlement would have persisted because they were integrated with French nuclear strategy.70 If pragmatism compelled Kennedy and his advisers to consider nuclear assistance to France, Cold War ideological precepts about the double containment of Germany and the Soviet Union ultimately shaped their refusal. Despite debate over nuclear sharing with France, the Kennedy administration was unified in opposing West German nuclear capability. Giving nuclear aid to France might have removed de Gaulle’s threats of collaborating with the West Germans and been a more realistic option than a MLF. Creation of a tripartite nuclear club that excluded West Germany, however, risked alienating Adenauer at a time when Soviet threats to Berlin made his allegiance to the Atlantic alliance the overriding concern. The ongoing Berlin crisis cast a shadow over NATO nuclear sharing policies, and like so many areas of the Kennedy administration’s West European policies, narrowed US choices for dealing with France’s nuclear weapons program.71

5 Trade and the Atlantic Alliance: Protectionism versus Openness?

“Shall we be caught between a hostile (or at least less and less friendly) America and a boastful ‘Empire of Charlemagne’ – now under French but later bound to come under German control? Is the real reason for ‘joining’ the Common Market (if we are acceptable) and for abandoning (a) the Seven (b) British agriculture (c) the Commonwealth? It’s a grim choice.” Harold Macmillan, diary entry, 9 July 19601 During the summer and autumn of 1961, Kennedy and de Gaulle dealt almost daily with the crisis over Berlin, but the turmoil in Central Europe was not the only image in a rapidly evolving West European kaleidoscope. On 31 July 1961, two weeks before the building of the Berlin Wall, Macmillan announced that Britain would seek membership of the European Economic Community. Although most accounts of the Kennedy administration’s attitude toward West European unity interpret US policies in terms of the double containment of Germany and the Soviet Union, relatively few studies examine in any detail the critical linkage between Britain’s Common Market bid and the Berlin crisis. Similarly, despite the importance of solidifying the Franco-German rapprochement to de Gaulle’s European policies, few non-French historians have noted the effects of the Berlin crisis on de Gaulle’s attitude toward the EEC.2 During the second half of 1961 and throughout 1962, the economic disagreements among the United States and the major West European nations unfolded against the backdrop of the crisis 85

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in Central Europe. The Berlin crisis influenced the major Western leaders’ position toward Britain’s Common Market bid in conflicting ways. For example, angered by what he regarded as Macmillan’s timidity and Kennedy’s sloppy diplomacy during the building of the Wall, de Gaulle was determined to minimize Britain’s opportunities for politically influencing West Germany.3 At a time when de Gaulle was exerting pressure on Adenauer to oppose negotiations with the Soviets over Berlin, Macmillan hoped Britain’s entrance into the EEC could offset French influence on West Germany. Macmillan was not seeking to neutralize West Germany through negotiations with the Soviets as Adenauer feared, but the prime minister insisted that diplomacy was the only possible way to resolve the Berlin question peacefully.4 Adenauer held a Bismarckian view of alliances as constructive entities and had long supported a unified Western Europe. Yet he was greatly disturbed by Macmillan’s apparent willingness to “sell out” West Germany for peace with the Soviet Union in Central Europe. He was also increasingly perturbed by Kennedy’s calls to revise nuclear strategy for NATO by increased reliance on conventional military capabilities. The chancellor was willing to entertain de Gaulle’s conception of a “Little Europe,” one that excluded Britain, if de Gaulle would maintain a hard-line stance on negotiating with the Soviets over Berlin.5 The Kennedy administration deemed a unified Atlantic alliance, which Britain’s accession to the EEC would signal, as necessary to avoid war with the Soviet Union in Central Europe. Many Department of State officials, however, held oversimplified assumptions about the virtues and importance of Western unity amidst the Berlin crisis. The Department of State Policy Planning Staff (PPS) and the European desk argued that the United States should show that it was not merely reacting to a series of Soviet-inspired crises, especially over Berlin, but had a vision for the “free world.” They particularly wanted to convince Adenauer that the Kennedy administration shared his conception of what the Bureau of European Affairs described as a “grand design” – a unified Western Europe tightly bound economically and militarily to the United States to form an increasingly cohesive Atlantic Community. They believed that the West German chancellor would then “have more confidence in [the US] Berlin strategy, since he would appreciate that it


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was being formulated in the same broad framework as his own.”6 Given his personal preoccupation with the Berlin crisis, Kennedy left long-term foreign economic planning to the Department of State. The Policy Planning Staff and European Bureau revised a cooperative framework, called the Atlantic Community, which rested on the imperative of the West’s surpassing the communist bloc in economic efficiency. They decided the United States should concentrate on exposing the deceptive aspects of communism by comparing them to the “practicality of [Western] policies and programs.”7 What emerged to guide the Kennedy administration’s policies toward Western Europe was a “pragmatic” ideology – a rhetorical banner of community, supported by the president’s faith in the efficacy of economic growth and propelled by a commitment to an open system of multilateral world trade and the democratic-capitalist system.8 Many of Kennedy’s advisers prided themselves on their practical approach to foreign affairs. Their use of the term “pragmatic” was a cant to distance themselves from the liberal branch of the Democratic Party, especially Adlai Stevenson’s supporters whom they derided as naive idealists. Historians have subsequently accepted its self-characterization at face value and consequently there are relatively few studies of its world-view or ideological perspective. Almost all memoirs, biographies, and general works contain a heavy dose of generalized “pragmatic” and “orthodox Cold War outlook” characterizations.9 Many of Kennedy’s advisers did, in fact, have a vision for Western Europe and for the world. As apostles of a technocracy, which was a school of thought dating to the Progressive era and placing a premium on management by experts, they fashioned a “pragmatic” ideology driven by functionality but with a rhetorical mystique meant to appease Adenauer and to enlist Western Europe in a cooperative framework.10 They viewed prosperity, social progress, and national security as interrelated. They worried that growing economic discontent would breed social and political disorder, which might destroy democratic institutions and undermine open markets. Kennedy evoked tenets of modernization theory cherished by his economic advisers in a collection of speeches, To Turn the Tide, compiled for publication in

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1962.11 Surpassing the Soviet bloc in the economic growth race partially motivated the Kennedy administration’s drive for increasing US exports and expanding international trade. In persuading Congress to support trade expansion and an enlarged EEC, Christian Herter, former secretary of state under President Eisenhower and future special trade representative for Kennedy, argued that “the West plus Japan and Australia . . . possess preponderant economic power in the world community. . . . It is our firm conviction that the way in which this preponderant power is used will be a major factor in determining the issues and the outcome of the cold war.”12 Throughout most of the early 1960s, much to the chagrin of the Department of State, integrating the parts of US foreign economic strategy toward Western Europe into a purposeful whole never progressed beyond a theoretical level. Instead, the administration approached Britain’s negotiations with the EEC (and related balance-of-payments issues discussed in detail in the following chapter) through ad hoc incrementalism because most US officials realized that de Gaulle would obstruct initiatives that changed the structural bases of international trade or monetary policy. They hoped that a tactical, step-by-step approach would prove successful against de Gaulle’s resistance, because it might make it more difficult for Gaullists to place obstacles to individual parts. Under the guise of multilateral cooperation, the Kennedy administration looked to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and a new round of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations to proceed with policies otherwise considered unpalatable by the French.13

Domestic economic constraints on US trade policy In the midst of the Berlin crisis, as the French and American governments grappled with the challenge posed by Britain’s EEC bid, they formulated strategies that hinged on domestic economic and political factors. Shaken by the Soviet building of the Wall and the prospect of calling up the Army reserves and sending additional divisions and supplies to Europe, the Kennedy administration’s perception of national strength became distorted. The president, for example, was distressed by forecasts that Soviet economic growth


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could reach 8 percent a year. Shortly before the Wall went up, Walter Heller, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, assured the president that the Kremlin’s projections were economically flawed and that the United States need only to sustain economic growth at 41/2 percent.14 Heller cautioned that “although work is going forward on many fronts to develop policies – towards the IMF, the Common Market as it may be enlarged, gold, foreign aid, overseas military expenditures – it is important to coordinate efforts on these fronts to assure that the various policies will be mutually reinforcing and consistent with domestic policies for economic recovery and growth.”15 Far from feeling confident about American power, Kennedy felt economically vulnerable. Heller’s “magical” growth figure of 41/2 percent was based less on surpassing the Soviet Union and more on what economists believed was the rate necessary to sustain domestic expansion and reduce unemployment. American economic supremacy had slipped in the past decade and a half. The steel industry, which Kennedy’s economic advisers thought fundamental to the economy, had “productivity problems,” which meant old plants were unable to compete with many West European industries which were becoming more productive in specialty steels and switching from steel to aluminum use. For parts of the business sector, decreasing industrial productivity meant that opening US steel industries to foreign competition caused declining profits, while for American workers and consumers it meant lower wages and rising prices.16 Kennedy, who had promised “to get the country moving again,” faced a lingering recession with few economic tools to combat it. Congress refused to accept a Keynesian fiscal stimulus package, which disappointed the labor and liberal factions of the Democratic Party. Nor did he make fiscal conservatives, including the president’s own secretary of the treasury, Douglas Dillon, confident that he would not abandon a balanced budget in the face of the financial burden of waging the Cold War, which threatened chronic balance of payments deficits. Although inflation remained low, the business community, whose support Kennedy needed, worried about renewed inflation. Heller’s target of 41/2 percent sustainable growth was based on proposed wage–price guidelines between US industry and unionized labor, the so-called Treaty of Detroit.

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Although unrealistic in light of long-term American productivity trends, it was a political expedient for the Kennedy administration to demonstrate its commitment to strengthening the economy. The administration calculated how trade and monetary policy would intersect with domestic employment and tax objectives.17 Anxiety, lest a strengthened Common Market raise barriers against US goods, initially made President Kennedy and his advisers ambivalent toward Britain’s proposed entry. They worried that his support of an enlarged EEC might provoke considerable domestic criticism. A National Security Action Memorandum, the collective decision of the National Security Council bureaucracy taken in the president’s name, stressed that a “great deal of responsibility would be laid upon our doorstep” if the Common Market became a closed, autarchic trading bloc.18 American farmers griped about the Common Agricultural Policy to secretary of agriculture Orville Freeman and to farm bloc legislators. In addition, US multinational corporations in Western Europe were concerned how EEC tariff walls might affect them. The business community, though far from a monolithic pressure group, held diverse tariff preferences. Hoping to allay businessmen’s doubts that he could protect the US economy from negative foreign repercussions, Kennedy’s economic advisers paid close attention to developments within the Common Market. Within Congress, powerful legislators, such as Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, looked warily at the EEC.19

Domestic economic constraints on French trade policy Like the United States, France worried about the limitations of its national economic capabilities in a destabilized Europe. The agricultural sector was a longstanding problem for France’s economy. French farmers were inefficient and highly subsidized, but they were the rock of Gaullist political support. Following a series of agricultural riots during the late summer of 1961, the French government were worried about farmer malaise. After the failure of the artichoke market in Brittany, farmers protested against governmental cuts in commodity subsidies by riding tractors through the streets and offloading thousands of bushels of potatoes to disrupt the traffic. Protests spread to other parts of France, as peasants in


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central and southwestern France demonstrated in solidarity with the Breton farmers by sabotaging telephone lines and occupying buildings.20 In all regions of France, inflation caused bitter consumer complaints. De Gaulle reminded Pierre Pflimlin, a leading French spokesman for European unity, that “it was absurd to think that the struggle against economic depression and inflation or agricultural policy was not political in nature.”21 Focused on the economically draining Algerian war and the ongoing Berlin crisis, de Gaulle could ill afford to alienate the rural electorate with economic hardship. French farmers lobbied for the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which was already under consideration by the six member nations as part of a twelve-year implementation schedule for the Treaty of Rome that established the Common Market in 1957. Historian Philip Bell succinctly explains the CAP: Its details were complicated but its essence was simple. There was to be a common market for agricultural produce, applied to producers and traders though not to consumers. Producers were to receive a single price for a given commodity – wheat, for example – whether grown in the prairies of the Beauce in France or on a small farm in Germany. These common prices were to be fixed annually, and converted into national currencies by using the so-called ‘green’ exchange rate. . . . Prices in the shops in the six countries were not identical. . . . Another element in the CAP was ‘Community preference,’ making it cheaper for the consumer within the EEC to buy Community produce rather than imports – for example, French wheat rather than Canadian or American. There was to be solidarité financière, by which agricultural prices were to be maintained at a high level by payments for surplus production and subsidies for exports.22 During this period, de Gaulle’s government devised strategies to align its position on Britain’s EEC candidacy with its domestic agenda. The French government was in the midst of finalizing its Fourth Plan for economic and social development to cover the period 1962–65. Started at the end of World War II, the plan initially carried the stigma of government control and socialization. The plan’s first successful high commissioner, Jean Monnet, had

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partly allayed those prejudices. Over time, the business community and virtually all circles of public opinion embraced the practice of managing the economy through state planning, or dirigisme. A cooperative effort among representatives of industry, the government, and trade unions – the plan provided guidelines for economic development in different sectors of the economy. Working through 22 commissions, the troika of representatives set targets of production, regulated the rate of growth to prevent inflation, and tried to balance various areas of the economy. A Planning Commissariat, working with the president’s Council of Economic Ministers, overlooked the implementation of the plan.23 During October 1961, in speeches before the National Assembly, French prime minister Michel Debré and minister of the economy and finance Wilfrid Baumgartner announced the ambitious goals set by the Fourth Plan. Baumgartner sought additional industrial modernization, but privately cautioned the French president against protectionism, particularly in agriculture, because price supports aggravated inflation. One drawback to the CAP was that it caused high food prices within the Common Market, estimated to be between 50 and 100 per cent higher than world prices.24 Debré and Baumgartner promoted a Fourth Plan predicated on significant economic growth. Debré and Baumgartner called for greater domestic investment and targeted a 22 percent increase in industrial production. Baumgartner promised that inflation, which continued to menace the expanding French economy, would not be the by-product of high levels of economic growth. In order to smooth the transition to a more industrialized economy, Debré contradicted Baumgartner by recommending precautionary measures to protect the agricultural sector.25 Britain’s bid for Common Market membership stood to upset a delicate equilibrium in the French economy. Agricultural policy was a chief problem because the French government was determined to rely on mechanisms such as the CAP to guarantee price levels for France’s agricultural commodities. French economic officials warned that Britain sought to delay the full implementation of the CAP for over a decade if it entered the EEC. The British government also sought 27 exceptions to the Common Market’s external tariff on certain commodities such as aluminum and tin deemed essential to the Commonwealth countries. French officials suspected that the


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British were unwilling to accept high agricultural subsides and would use Trojan Horse tactics to continue their cheap Commonwealth food policy.26 French economic officials also felt threatened by the possibility that British agricultural policy could thwart French attempts to build an economic base for subordinating West Germany. Britain’s membership in the Common Market would allow West Germany to import cheaper agricultural goods from the UK rather than from France. Even as negotiations for the CAP proceeded, Debré and de Gaulle’s Council of Economic Ministers sought bilateral trade accords with West Germany. During the autumn of 1961, the two nations worked out an arrangement, effective in December 1961, that set preferential prices for French wheat. West Germany, the primary industrial exporter in the EEC, was the chief importer of wheat within the Common Market. For France, the inverse situation held true. The Franco-German accord essentially amounted to a temporary swapping arrangement in which Paris accepted West German dominance in industrial exports within the Common Market while Bonn recognized French preeminence in agricultural exports.27

Contrasting approaches on trade issues No less than Kennedy’s, de Gaulle’s trade policy hinged on domestic factors. Although de Gaulle placed economic policy outside his personal domaine réservé, he instructed his economic advisers to prevent interference from the UK, as France maneuvered to increase Franco-West German economic ties.28 The general delegated primary EEC negotiating responsibility to Olivier Wormser, director general of economic affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who was aided by Bernard Clappier, director of foreign economic affairs at the Ministry of Finance. De Gaulle retained full confidence in his able civil servants, whom he left to oversee many of the technical issues, especially agricultural ones. The French president had additional faith in his financial technicians working with the EEC commissions. Baumgartner’s deputies at the Ministry of Finance demanded that the Six, as the member nations were called, focus on problems that Britain’s balance of payment difficulties posed for the EEC, including liberalizing capital movements

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that might allow the United Kingdom to export its balance of payments deficit.29 The technical economic points of controversy between France and Britain fell into three related categories: tariffs, domestic agriculture, and British Commonwealth temperate and tropical foodstuffs. Negotiators haggled over the upper and lower limits of tariffs, the special position of commodities from the Commonwealth associates, and arrangements for intervention should a particular commodity market face disruptions. They also deliberated over the length of a transitional period for the British economy and the extent and timing of changes in UK agricultural price levels. By 1963, agreements were reached on over 2,500 commodities.30 While technical questions were left to the EEC commissions, diplomatic jousting between the French and British continued outside the EEC commissions. In Paris, Debré assured Dixon, who combined his ambassadorial duties in Paris with being part of the British negotiating team, that the bid for entry into the EEC could be successful so long as France found outlets for its agricultural surplus.31 Like his French counterpart, Macmillan preferred to concentrate on high politics and leave intricate economic issues to his specialists. On 26 November 1961, de Gaulle visited the prime minister at his Birch Grove estate. During their discussions, the Berlin question emerged as de Gaulle’s litmus test of Britain’s political readiness “to join Europe.” The prime minister explained that Britain’s firmness on enforcing allied access rights to Berlin reflected its commitment to Europe. He argued that his nation’s ever-rising defense expenditures in West Germany justified its inclusion in the EEC. De Gaulle listened intently, offering few variations from his common themes about refusing to negotiate with the Soviets. When broaching the issue of Britain’s Commonwealth connections, the general also expounded on familiar arguments about the likelihood that foodstuffs from those countries would lower the prices French products received in the Common Market.32 The Birch Grove discussions were inconclusive in revealing de Gaulle’s attitude toward Britain’s chances to enter the Common Market. In an effort to divine the French president’s intentions, Macmillan’s government relied on contacts with French supporters of West European integration – precisely those men whom de


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Gaulle kept at arm’s length. Macmillan listened rather unwisely to Monnet’s assessment of the EEC negotiations. Monnet assured him that the “French would not hold things up,” and that “things would work themselves out naturally.”33 Given de Gaulle’s blatant disgust at the idea of a federated Europe, the British should have realized that Monnet’s blandishment was an inaccurate assessment of de Gaulle’s views. De Gaulle was dismissive of this architect of European unity and confided to one intimate, “Who is Monnet? He is nothing at all.”34 Records at the Quai d’Orsay and the Ministry of Finance reflect this view of Monnet as persona non grata among Gaullist officials. Monnet is never mentioned as a “player” in making France’s European policies and instead is monitored in terms of his coziness with US and British officials.35 Kennedy was limited in what his administration could do to support Britain’s Common Market candidacy. In many respects, the Brussels negotiations between Britain and the Six were a European affair. The United States could determine neither the pace nor the outcome. On one occasion, Ball told the British that the Kennedy administration had been “taking a hands-off approach” to quieten French accusations of American interference.36 Despite American attempts to stay behind the scenes, the French government often berated British officials for calling the ministers of the Six together to hear British “impressions of the US attitude toward British candidature.”37 If there were points of difficulty, there was also hope in Washington and London that West Germany would apply pressure on de Gaulle to admit the UK into the Common Market. AngloAmerican representatives often enlisted the aid of “Atlanticist” vice-chancellor Erhard, whom they hoped could influence Adenauer. Although the chancellor was one of the earliest supporters of European integration, he questioned how Britain’s entry would change the economic structure and political character of the EEC. While the protracted discussions in Brussels dragged on, he adopted an ambiguous attitude. The chancellor preferred neither to alienate de Gaulle nor anger the Americans. On one occasion, he told French officials that it was dangerous for him to make general statements about the British bid because of the “delicate problems” involving technical economic questions. In fact, he did not want to be put in the position of choosing between Paris and Washington.38

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With British officials, Adenauer claimed that he had spoken only once, in early 1961, to de Gaulle about the UK’s entry and that both elder statesmen “felt that there were many difficulties to be overcome.”39 Many Kennedy officials worried about the implications of an emerging Paris–Bonn axis on the Common Market. The Department of State theologians were convinced that “de Gaulle’s power to inhibit progress towards our objectives depends on his ability to seduce Chancellor Adenauer into support of his policy line.”40 At Kennedy’s urging, Eisenhower made a six-week tour of the major West European capitals in mid-July 1962. On 10 September, the two US presidents met at the White House to discuss Eisenhower’s conversations with Adenauer. The chancellor “doesn’t want [the British] in,” Kennedy told his predecessor. “He thinks because it will weaken the British empire?” “No, I think he would like them in,” Eisenhower remarked, “but he doesn’t think France wants them in. [Adenauer] said France has finally gotten into a position they’ve been wanting to get some kind of a lever on all of Western Europe – where they’re really big, big shots.”41 The Kennedy administration’s approach to the question of an expanded EEC and trade with Western Europe evolved during the second half of 1961. Based on Macmillan’s assurances during his Washington visit in April 1961, the Kennedy administration assumed Britain’s entry would orient the Common Market in a liberal direction. Uncertain of that promise, however, on 23 August 1961, the president instructed Ball to suggest US actions to offset adverse effects of the UK’s admission.42 Ball, who promoted himself both within the administration and in Europe as the mastermind of US foreign economic policy, dutifully responded. The under-secretary of state was a self-avowed disciple of Monnet and a staunch supporter of the European integration movement for over 35 years. His Eurocentric conception of US foreign policy colored his views, and he subordinated economic disadvantages for the US to the political cohesion he hoped Britain’s entrance would give to the alliance. He vaguely acknowledged that “some additional discrimination” would result from Britain’s adherence, but he concentrated on “net” effects as a way to argue that the basic impact of Britain’s entry would simply be “trade diversion and creation.” As a precautionary measure, he


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recommended that the administration pursue liberal trade policies and seek reciprocal tariff reductions from the EEC nations.43 Playing to Kennedy’s faith in the efficacy of economic growth, Ball also assured him that an enlarged Common Market would generate a higher growth rate, which would offset discrimination by stimulating a demand for US exports in Western Europe.44 Ball did not ignore US economic interests. He carefully explained to Lord Privy Seal Edward Heath, Britain’s chief negotiator during the 16-month EEC negotiations, that US backing of Britain’s candidacy for the Common Market was qualified. He described the American public and US Congress as “increasingly restless in face of prospective discrimination and feared the consequences on U.S. interests of [an] expanding and possibly autarchic economy.” In typical New Frontier parlance, he stressed that the “maintenance and vigor” of the EEC’s political cohesion and its adoption of lower tariff barriers would serve as the litmus test for US acceptance of likely discrimination posed by an enlarged Common Market.45 Given French criticisms about US interference in European affairs, the Kennedy administration decided not to interfere directly with British negotiations for EEC membership. During the early stages of negotiations between Britain and the Six, which were conducted in Brussels, US officials refrained from broaching the subject of Britain’s candidacy with top French officials and focused their attention instead on Macmillan’s government.46 With Rusk’s blessing, Ball shaped the contours of US policy toward West European integration. Ball later acknowledged his tendency to proclaim unilateral administration decisions: “Kennedy had given me no mandate to state American policy with such assurance . . . Thus, in describing the American position, I was not sure whether I was making American policy or interpreting it.”47 In a headstrong fashion reminiscent of Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, Ball exasperated top British officials with a barrage of communications and visits to London that autumn. In his memoirs, the prime minister recalled his frustration with the US under-secretary: “There was always Mr. George Ball of the State Department who seemed determined to thwart our policy in Europe and the Common Market negotiations.“48 Macmillan resented Ball’s accusations that British attempts to arrange association of the Commonwealth countries to the EEC was a way for an

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enlarged Common Market to masquerade as a European Free Trade Area, which Britain had helped form as a counterpoint to the EEC in the late 1950s. Macmillan and his ministers preferred the conviviality of David Bruce, the US ambassador to Britain. A patrician of good humor and grace, Bruce had served as ambassador to France during the early 1950s. Like Ball, he had come under the spell of Jean Monnet’s vision of a federated Europe. During the 1950s, he had been irritated by Britain’s initial opposition to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and its later rejection of the EEC. Now, during the fall of 1961, as ambassador to Britain, he traveled on many weekends to Paris, where he met Monnet. Bruce’s relaxed, aristocratic manner appealed to Macmillan’s Conservative government. In contrast to Ball’s brusque lawyer-like approach, Bruce conveyed US views over fine wine and witty conversation.49 Bruce paid numerous calls on Heath and other top-level officials to discuss the status of the British negotiations for membership in the EEC. Bruce, who preferred concentrating on the political importance of Britain’s membership, “found the whole affair about as complicated as anything could be.”50 Macmillan also hoped to capitalize on the friendship between Kennedy and British ambassador to Washington, David OrmsbyGore, to sway the president toward British thinking about the EEC. Ormsby-Gore had been a friend of the president’s deceased sister, who had married the Duke of Devonshire during World War II. Rusk resented the personal connection between the president and the British ambassador. A stickler for protocol, Rusk inwardly cringed at Ormsby-Gore’s informal access and to his addressing the president as “Jack.” No secretary of state wanted a foreign ambassador to have that kind of open and easy access.51 While Macmillan’s government used its contacts with Kennedy as an alternative to dealing with Ball’s willful arrogance over the EEC, the under secretary of state narrowed his field of competitors within the Kennedy administration. Ball’s contemporaries remember his determination to “elbow his way” into the president’s favor. Timing proved propitious for Ball’s directing the administration’s trade policy toward Western Europe because the president was personally preoccupied with Berlin and other foreign policy issues. In mid-August 1961, the president appointed


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him chair of an inter-departmental committee on foreign economic policy.52 Ball used his position as chairman of the interdepartmental committee on foreign economic policy to shut off administration debate over the US position toward an enlarged Common Market. During the second session of the interdepartmental committee, he announced that, given the likely controversy that would ensue over the next few months, it was “quite important that they get a common policy line and speak with one voice.” He intended that voice to be his, commanding all departmental participants to pass statements and proposals through his office.53 The Kennedy administration promoted trade expansion as the solution not only for handling Britain’s possible entry into the EEC but also for US economic woes. Trade expansion was seen as a way to stimulate US productivity and offset unemployment and inflation, which in the late 1950s had reached a postwar high. The Kennedy administration, especially insofar as Ball spoke for it, also regarded trade expansion as the wedge with which it could begin to solve the incipient balance-of-payments problem.54 At a critical meeting in the autumn of 1961, Ball decided almost unilaterally the extent to which the United States should seek trade legislation greatly extending the nation’s bargaining authority in GATT. The existing Trade Agreements Act would expire in June 1962, and the under-secretary wanted to seek congressional authorization for 50 percent linear, or across-the-board, cuts rather than a continuance of item-by-item reductions, which were restricted by Congress to 20 percent. He also wanted to eliminate the practice of peril points, or the level of imports that allowed a nation to escape from a tariff agreement. As he departed and climbed into his limousine, someone challenged that his proposition was not currently US policy. Declaring “it is now,” he shut his door without waiting for a response and drove away.55 Securing a major change in the US tariff negotiating authority was not as simple as Ball’s pronouncement. Ball’s proposal about what trade powers to seek from Congress lacked universal support within the administration. His forcefulness reflected the Department of State’s insistence not only on increasing executive authority for foreign trade but also in wresting control from the Department of Commerce. Until Ball monopolized power over the

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administration’s foreign economic policy, Howard Peterson, the president’s special assistant for trade, carried an important voice on trade issues. Peterson thought Ball’s proposal overly ambitious because Congress would never grant broad negotiating powers to the executive branch. He agreed that the administration needed greater powers, but wished to retain some features of the existing system, including peril points.56 Ball, in contrast, pushed the more expansive idea of 50 percent across-the-board cuts. Unlike Peterson, he urged the president to delay trade expansion legislation until after 1962 elections. He thought the 1963 congressional session would be the more propitious time to introduce it because the administration would have had time to launch an effective lobbying campaign. By postponing trade legislation, the administration was also less likely to be regarded by France as tying trade policy to Britain’s EEC candidacy bid.57 Kennedy ultimately chose Ball’s more ambitious proposal, but accepted Peterson’s timing by seeking legislation immediately. Feigning US disinterest in the outcome of the EEC negotiations seemed ridiculous to the president. The administration forged ahead with plans to seek broader negotiating powers from Congress.58 In late November 1961, Kennedy made several significant personnel changes that increased Ball’s influence on US foreign economic policy. Motivated by frustration with the inefficiency of the Department of State, Kennedy’s decisions affected the administration’s West European policy formulation. The primary target was former New Dealer and then under-secretary of state Chester Bowles, whose alleged expertise lay in Afro-Asian and Latin American regions. Both Rusk and Kennedy frowned upon Bowles’s propensity for grandiose conceptualizing and his inability to act decisively. Ball became Bowles’s replacement, while the deflated New Deal liberal became an adviser to the president for African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs. Although inclined to think in terms of “grand designs,” Ball’s legal mentality shaped his policy planning so that it would fit into the functional model of the administration’s pragmatic ideology.59 With new-found power, Ball’s involvement in trade affairs toward Western Europe increased. Although US officials tried not to interfere directly with Britain’s Common Market bid, Ball’s brash


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assertiveness on related topics provoked French ire. Kennedy would have been wise to rely primarily on his ambassador, General Gavin, one of the few US officials whom de Gaulle regarded favorably and permitted to see him on short notice. Rusk and Ball, however, distrusted Gavin. They felt that he had become too pro-Gaullist.60 During the autumn of 1961, Ball’s trips to Western Europe included stops in Paris. During discussions with Wormser and Clappier, he avoided raising the subject of Britain’s Common Market bid, but nevertheless quickly found himself enmeshed in quarrels over related tariff issues, especially agricultural policy. The French civil servants declared categorically that a CAP must be accepted by the Six before Britain’s entrance. The question of timing was critical from their standpoint because Anglo-German collusion in agricultural price-fixing would otherwise result. Wormser lashed out at Ball and argued that West Germany looked to the United States for encouragement in reneging on its commitment to support a CAP.61 The United States posed certain problems for the agricultural polices of the Common Market. As a net exporter of agricultural products, France hoped to sell its surplus to West Germany. Portending the future “chicken war” in tariff negotiations, Debré pointed out on one occasion to US ambassador to France James Gavin that the Federal Republic bought poultry primarily from the US to please Arkansas Senator William Fulbright, who insisted on protecting the agricultural interests of his home state. US poultry exports to West Germany rose from £3.5 million in 1956 to £122 million by 1962. Angered by US hypocrisy about open trade, Debré warned that the French government would not idly sit by and accept additional competition from Britain with its preferential ties to the Commonwealth.62 On many points concerning the Common Market and trade policy, the US and French governments worked at cross-purposes. The French government did not share the American objective of accommodating the interests of Latin American commodity producers or many of the other less-developed regions. France, instead, wished to perpetuate preferential arrangements between the EEC and former French African colonies. The United States also received no assurances that France was receptive to large reciprocal tariff reductions in general. The French government especially

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sought to maintain the position of chief agricultural supplier to the Common Market.63 On some points, however, US and French interests toward the Brussels arrangements ran in parallel. Both countries opposed the discriminatory arrangements that accommodated the British Commonwealth or European neutrals in the EFTA. Throughout 1962, Ball incurred British disapproval by objecting to a permanent preferential system for Commonwealth products. Not only would the establishment of such a system be inimical to US economic interests, but it would also harm Latin American producers.64 The Kennedy administration realized that Britain’s candidacy for the EEC would be hindered unless the Dillon Round of GATT negotiations, which had begun in 1960, came to a conclusion. After a four-month delay, the Dillon Round resumed in Geneva on 13 November 1961 and created additional difficulties for the administration’s plans to introduce trade legislation to the Congress. Before departing for Geneva, Ball pleaded with Baumgartner to help him resolve the outstanding problems. Kennedy’s chances of receiving congressional authorization for a trade liberalization bill would be poor if the Dillon Round failed to produce tariff cuts. In addition, as long as the Dillon Round stalled on deciding tariff cuts, especially for agricultural commodities, the EEC deliberations for the CAP would remain unresolved.65 On 9 December, the fifth phase of the Dillon Round came to a close without reaching an agreement. The EEC members argued that the unresolved issue of a CAP permitted them to wait on establishing tariffs on agricultural commodities. The Common Market members offered 20 percent reductions on a variety of industrial goods. Although Dillon encouraged Kennedy to accept agreements on industrial products, the president had to be careful about appearing to barter US agricultural interests for industrial ones. Offering a partial way out of the dilemma, Baumgartner suggested that the GATT members set up a study group to examine the commodity problem and ways to accommodate agricultural products from outside the Common Market. The US negotiators were also unable to reciprocate on the offer of 20 percent on industrial goods because of the cumbersome peril point provisions that prevented across-the-board cuts. Dillon informed the president that


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the United States could not accept the package because of the lack of agreement on agricultural goods.66 Advocates of liberal trade within the Kennedy administration worried that unless the United States had the authority to offer reciprocal reductions, the EEC might erect a high external tariff on manufactured as well as agricultural goods. The administration received some encouragement when Baumgartner and other West European officials charged with trade and economic matters declared that future multilateral tariff reduction negotiations would be successful if all participants used linear rather than product-byproduct cuts.67 The trade policies of de Gaulle and Kennedy received conflicting boosts in January 1962. The Six agreed to provisions for the CAP. That same month, Kennedy placed the Trade Expansion Bill before Congress, though it would be another nine months of arduous congressional machinations before it passed. Kennedy asked for the general authority to cut tariffs by up to 50 percent in reciprocal negotiations. He also asked for more specific authority to reduce or eliminate tariffs on products where the US and the Common Market accounted for 80 percent of world trade.68 The Trade Expansion Bill reflected the Kennedy administration’s pragmatic ideology. From a pragmatic, functional perspective, it promised a means of creating an equal playing field with an expanded Common Market. From an ideological perspective, the administration’s trade legislation reflected a commitment to a multilateral world system of open trade and the promise of Western cooperation, or Atlantic community.69 In the meantime, as the EEC negotiations in Brussels dragged on, Macmillan became increasingly convinced that de Gaulle was uninterested in economics and only with the political impact of Britain’s admission to the Common Market. High-ranking British officials concluded that “de Gaulle does not want to appear to be responsible for the breakdown of negotiations. His hope is that we ourselves will give up trying and that the breakdown will appear as the consequence of our own decision.”70 The British had good reason to focus on de Gaulle’s position visà-vis Britain’s entry into the EEC. While leaders are often used as shorthand references for a nation’s policies, in France’s case de Gaulle’s voice was usually definitive. During the first half of 1962,

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his domestic troubles were easing as he consolidated his domestic mandate. He planned to centralize powers of state almost exclusively in the presidency. His loyal political appointees, such as Olivier Guichard, confirm that de Gaulle had “reduced all things to one: a search for new means to prolong and reinforce his power.”71 De Gaulle spoke to Alphand about his intention of eventually to eliminate all parties by using the national referendum to give the presidency greater powers over the parliament. On 8 January 1962, a national plebiscite gave him a resounding 90.7 percent vote of confidence.72 The ending of the Algerian war, which had torn the Fourth Republic apart, helped him tremendously. On 18 March 1962, the Evian peace declarations became official. Two weeks later, a national referendum gave de Gaulle another clear majority approval. Now De Gaulle moved to strengthen his hold over parliament. In mid-April, he replaced Debré with Georges Pompidou, director of the president’s cabinet at the Élysée. Debré had been indispensable in winding down the Algerian war but lost favor with de Gaulle by asserting that the office of prime minister should exert a necessary check on the presidential powers.73 In July 1962, France signed peace accords with Algeria ending the eight-year war which had been a cancer in the French body politic. In order to consolidate his domestic mandate in a war-weary public, de Gaulle found anti-American rhetoric and policies a convenient unifying theme. The loss of empire made the French receptive to his calls to resist US hegemony.74 The fate of Britain’s Common Market entry would not be publicly decided until January 1963. As the following chapters show, the drama of Britain’s EEC candidacy became increasingly entangled with monetary disputes, nuclear sharing, and NATO strategy.

Conclusion Because the terms “protectionism” and “open trade” have become highly politicized in a way similar to “isolationism” and “internationalism,” it has become easy for post-World War II scholars to cast de Gaulle as a villain for pursuing the Common Agriculutural Policy and Britain’s exclusion from the Common Market, and Kennedy as an enlightened crusader for pushing trade expansion. Officials in


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the Kennedy administration grew up during the Great Depression. In power a generation later, they feared a reversion to the restrictive economic arrangements of the 1930s, which included autarky, barter, and trade restrictions. French society, in contrast, was largely agricultural before World War II and experienced the world-wide Depression differently from more industrialized countries.75 The different domestic constraints under which Kennedy and de Gaulle operated highlight the historian’s need to depoliticize the terms “protectionism” and “open trade” in order to understand what those policies actually meant. In the early 1960s, de Gaulle was radically changing France, both transforming its economy and withdrawing from its empire. Many French officials described the integration of the agricultural sector into the general economy as “a true phenomenon of decolonization.” French Algerian refugees were buying up commercial farms and replacing traditional peasant farmers. For de Gaulle, le fardeau agricole was equivalent to the Algerian problem, even though he was less involved in its solution. Protectionism paced France’s economic transformation, permitting structural reforms and technological innovation to take root. Were the French economy flooded with cheap foodstuffs from Britain and the Commonwealth, social turbulence would ensue. With a long tradition of rural protest, French society was experiencing riots throughout the early 1960s. The simultaneous French retreat from empire placed de Gaulle literally under fire. Between his return to power and Kennedy’s murder in 1963, de Gaulle survived numerous assassination attempts.76 For the Kennedy administration, “open trade” was cast as a type of moral Cold War crusade against communism. As a key component of its pragmatic ideology, a global system of multilateral open trade promoted economic growth and kept the US competitive against the communist bloc. Although the early 1960s were a time of relative prosperity, Kennedy felt burdened by a national industrial capacity that seemed to be lagging behind Japan and many West European nations. Industrial and agricultural development involve different processes. The United States might have done well to pace its mechanization of agriculture fifteen years earlier when it experienced questions comparable to France’s over how to integrate the agriculatural sector into the overall national economy. The mass migration of Southern sharecroppers to industrial cities such

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as Detroit and Chicago created pockets of unemployment that plagued Washington officials during the 1960s, when the civil rights revolution made African-Americans a force no longer to be ignored.77 Yet from the Kennedy administration’s perspective, the Trade Expansion Act and hope of Britain’s entrance into the Common Market left the United States poised to promote its quest for a multilateral world system of open trade. Kennedy’s deputies, charged with formulating strategies for expanding the multilateral commercial and financial bases of the international economy, realized the formidable obstacles that lay ahead at the sixth round of GATT, named the Kennedy Round, which began the rule-making stage in 1963. The domestic battle for passage of the trade expansion legislation only presaged the difficulties the United States confronted with France in the GATT negotiations, as de Gaulle worked to extend French power – first, to dominate West Germany, and then to secure its standing not only in Europe but globally. If the Trade Expansion Act and an enlarged EEC promised means of facilitating Western economic progress for the Kennedy administration, they also represented a wedge that divided the Atlantic alliance.78

6 Strain on the Dollar: FrancoAmerican Monetary Disputes

I know everyone thinks I worry about this too much, but [the US balance of payments deficit was like] a club that de Gaulle and all the others hang over my head. In a crisis they could cash in all their dollars, and then where are we? Kennedy to Theodore Sorenson1 Trade policy was only one of the contentious issues in Western economic negotiations during the early 1960s. Related financial problems surrounding the inherently unstable Bretton Woods gold–dollar system which allowed the US dollar as a key reserve currency to be used to settle international financial transactions constantly irritated Franco-American relations. The Western alliance’s reliance on dollar deficits to provide international financial liquidity undermined the convertibility of the US dollar into gold and forced the allies constantly to readjust and renegotiate the Bretton Woods system. By the early 1960s, it was increasingly unclear how large a balance of payments deficit the United States could sustain without provoking large-scale conversion of dollars into gold by foreign central banks, a conversion that could deflate the international economy. Confronted with a flawed international monetary system, France and the United States struggled to pursue their narrower national economic interests without precipitating global monetary calamity reminiscent of the meltdown of the Great Depression. Debate over the merits, flaws, and workings of the international monetary system under Bretton Woods is best left to the economists and is beyond the scope of this work. This chapter examines the monetary disputes between France and the United States during the early 1960s, which were exacerbated by trade expansion issues and the Berlin crisis. 107

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Sources of Gaullist resentment of Bretton Woods De Gaulle resented the privileged position held by the US dollar in the Bretton Wood system and the national prestige of the dollar’s acceptance as a reserve currency. It galled him that the dollar but not the French franc could be used in lieu of gold for settling international transactions. There was an economic price to France of US monetary seigniorage: Americans could buy French companies and resources with overvalued dollars. The United States could run a payments deficit and cover it by printing and exporting dollars which the French central bank had to accept as part of its reserves. When the French government complained, Washington responded by calling for expanded international liquidity through International Monetary Fund resources to cover countries in deficit.2 In many respects, however, the French government’s view of multinational, especially American, investment in its economy was “schizophrenic.”3 De Gaulle and his economic advisers first and foremost wanted national investment in the French economy. On the one hand, Ministry of Finance officials sought an influx of foreign capital because it usually brought foreign technological advances. They realized that if US investment were not allowed, it would probably be diverted to Britain or other West European nations, leaving France at an exporting disadvantage vis-à-vis its Common Market competitors.4 French economic officials wanted the EEC to adopt a common policy toward multinational investment and urged the United States to change its tax code to eliminate deferrals on taxation of overseas facilities.5 US international monetary policy under Bretton Woods was also a convenient target for Gaullist complaints about the relationship between Britain’s application for the EEC and “Anglo-Saxon” balance of payments. Olivier Wormser, director general of economic affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, argued that Kennedy’s and Macmillan’s desire to stabilize the pound and the dollar was connected to Britain’s bid to join the Common Market. Given the US gold outflow, the Kennedy administration, however, was in no position to support the pound and therefore encouraged Britain’s entry into the Common Market as an alternative.6 During discussions with British Board of Trade members in the summer of


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1961, French financial officials shared their suspicions. According to their reasoning, Macmillan’s government calculated that joining the Common Market would boost domestic productivity by attracting overseas capital, which in turn would prevent recurring sterling crises.7 French officials leveled charges of Anglo-American economic collusion. French Prime Minister Michel Debré and other Gaullists, for example, were concerned that US investment in France might disrupt provisions under the Fourth Economic Plan for boosting domestic investment and production if Britain entered into the Common Market. Debré explained to US Ambassador Gavin that since the British request for membership of the Common Market, US private investors had shown an increased preference for dealing with British businesses, which “lured them through linguistic and sentimental ties.”8

The Berlin crisis and balance of payments While France’s reluctance to strengthen Britain’s economic position in Western Europe shaped its reaction to US proposals for expanding international liquidity, the Berlin crisis heightened Kennedy’s urgency to ease US dollar and gold outflows. Although there was not necessarily a causal relationship between the Berlin crisis and the severity of the US balance of payments deficit, the turmoil in Central Europe certainly exacerbated the Kennedy administration’s fears of a linkage between monetary problems and security concerns. The crisis set off new speculation in the London gold market and increased Kennedy’s resolve to protect the dollar from similar speculative runs. He worried that each confrontation with the Soviet Union sent shock waves through the domestic and international economies. As Kennedy worried about the cost of maintaining six divisions in Western Europe, he demanded that Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon assess the severity of the US deficit and recommend safeguard measures.9 Dillon warned that serious negotiations with the Western allies in meetings of the IMF and Bank for International Settlements (BIS) were needed to offset the possibilities of either a capital flight or sudden conversion of dollar holdings into gold by foreign central banks. The secretary of the treasury urged a long-term strategy focus-

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ing chiefly on increasing US exports. In the short term, working through the IMF or BIS would permit the Kennedy administration to postpone asking Congress for legislation that eliminated tax havens and deferrals on US corporate overseas income – a measure which would increase his unpopularity within the business community.10

Contrasting approaches to international monetary disputes Although by 1965 de Gaulle’s claims that Bretton Woods allowed for l’hégémonie américain and used every opportunity to put pressure on the dollar, the views of the mid-decade were not the basis for French policy in the early 1960s. In fact, before 1962, France was one of the few European countries that did not convert the bulk of its dollar reserves into gold. In 1961, the US sold no gold to France but $970 million of gold to other countries.11 The Ministry of Finance under Wilfrid Baumgarter and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing after 1961 were essentially “Atlanticist” and believed in cooperating with the United States. Baumgartner held that quaint sense of gratitude toward the US for its help to France under the Marshall Plan. He also had developed a close profession friendship with Dillon during the latter’s ambassadorship to France under Eisenhower.12 The French Ministry of Finance preferred to deal with international monetary problems within the framework of the Organization of European Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD was the successor institution of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, formed in April 1948 to coordinate, in part, Marshall Plan aid. The United States joined the OECD in March 1961, and the expanded body was established to facilitate cooperation on trade, foreign aid, and monetary issues. In exchange for French cooperation, the United States would have to accept certain limits on its policies – a kind of “surveillance multilatérale.”13 Using Working Group 3 within the OECD, rather than the IMF, would provide France a platform to criticize an overly expansionist US domestic budget, which many French Ministry of Finance officials identified as the primary cause of the US payments deficit. The OECD was deemed more appropriate for handling monetary disputes on a political level.14 The French government refused to capitulate to the Kennedy


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administration’s and Macmillan’s demands for expanding international liquidity. The Triffin and Bernstein plans were the primary proposals under consideration. Although ultimately rejected by the major West European powers, the proposals were noteworthy because they reflected an important divide both within and between the individual Western governments: those who endeavored to establish a precedent for multilateral financial solutions and those who preferred a cartel approach involving gentlemen’s agreements among central bankers. Neither plan addressed the fundamental problems of the Bretton woods adjustment mechanism, however; they focused primarily on the symptom, which was the dollar and gold drain from the United States.15 The proposals being set forth by Yale University professor and part-time consultant to the Council of Economic Advisors, Robert Triffin, required members of the IMF to deposit a substantial proportion of their exchange reserves with the Fund. Because the IMF automatically guaranteed deposits against any change in exchange rates, the plan would supposedly eliminate fears of devaluation and the temptation by either private US creditors or European central banks to convert dollars into gold.16 The continental Europeans and British strongly objected, but for different reasons. Baumgartner argued that if the Fund were allowed to increase liquidity automatically, international inflation would result. The British objected because the Triffin plan would rob them of their role as an international banker by ending the use of the pound as a reserve currency. Sterling and the dollar were the two key currencies upon which the international gold exchange was based.17 The proposals of British economist Edward M. Bernstein, who had been associated with the IMF since its establishment, required that any country with large balance of payments surpluses had an obligation to lend funds rather than piling up gold reserves. Under his plan, the IMF would permit nations to borrow funds under standby arrangements from nations that were increasing their international reserves. The British disliked the Bernstein plan because it involved bilateral rather than multilateral arrangements. The French found the Bernstein plan less objectionable than the Triffin scheme. Gaullist officials disapproved because undisciplined nations would continue to react to the general shortage of interna-

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tional monetary reserves by resorting to exchange and trade restrictions long before internal spending was cut.18 Monetary disputes within the Atlantic alliance were discussed primarily in the OECD, which the United States joined in February 1961. In mid-April 1961, at the first ministerial meeting of an expanded OECD, the Kennedy administration failed to elicit French cooperation to expand international liquidity through the IMF. French officials declared that their view simply and clearly. The best way to address the balance of payments difficulties, Couve argued, was for each Western nation to put its economic house in order. On a multilateral level, he conceded that the Western nations might coordinate their economies and domestic monetary policies so that the wide discrepancy between nations with payment deficits and those with surpluses did not arise in the international monetary arena.19 Although the French government resented the inflationary effects of the overvalued dollar, Baumgartner agreed that it was in the interest of the Western alliance as a whole for the Bretton Woods system to function smoothly. After Ball assured him that the United States did not sanction transferring its payments deficit to other nations as standard practice, Baumgartner agreed that France would participate in IMF and OECD discussions geared toward finding lasting and equitable solutions.20 After the April OECD meeting, Couve took Heller aside and intimated the reasons for French objections to the administration’s proposals for expanding international liquidity. French officials believed any special borrowing arrangements in the IMF would be dangerously inflationary. In addition, they refused to bail out the British pound because Macmillan’s government had consistently failed to make structural adjustments in its own economy and this was contributing to Britain’s payments deficit. Couve also reminded Heller that even though de Gaulle did not directly involve himself in economic matters, he nonetheless considered the IMF an “alien and objectionable organization.” Couve stressed that Kennedy needed to understand that it was “not at all clear that there are any terms on which the French would be willing to contribute francs to international monetary stabilization efforts, except perhaps through a restricted OECD undertaking outside of the IMF.”21 Despite French recalcitrance, Dillon hoped to prevail over his


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“dear friend” Baumgartner. Baumgartner, however, contended with the influence of Jacques Rueff, who encouraged de Gaulle to take measures that would end the dollar as an international reserve currency. Rueff implored him to circumvent parliament and invoke the emergency powers given to the president under the French constitution so that he could pursue polices that might force the devaluation of the dollar. A practitioner of strict fiscal and monetary orthodoxy, Rueff considered the gold exchange standard a “prodigious collective error that allowed the United States to avoid the consequences of its economic profligacy.”22 His views resonated with de Gaulle, who longed to abolish the privileges of the dollar and sterling as reserve currencies within the Bretton Woods system. He recognized the long-term political advantages of weakening the dollar and sterling, but left the details to Baumgartner. Baumgartner did not share Rueff’s desire to end the dollar as a reserve currency, but agreed that Paris should not assume a passive role within the IMF by agreeing to the Kennedy administration’s demands for international liquidity expansion.23 Baumgartner managed to mute Rueff’s stridency because de Gaulle was reluctant to use his domaine réservé for areas outside defense or foreign affairs policies.24 Baumgartner remained unconvinced of the need for a formal mechanism within the IMF to deal with what he regarded as shortterm international payments problems. Baumgartner insisted that ad hoc arrangements whereby deficit nations could arrange their own credits with surplus nations would adequately meet any foreseeable short-term international monetary crisis.25 Department of State officials also preferred the OECD as a forum to discuss contentious economic issues. Rusk and Ball viewed it as a platform for spreading the growth ideology within an Atlantic Community framework – a rhetorical banner of community, supported by the president’s faith in the efficacy of economic growth and propelled by a commitment to an open system of multilateral world trade and the democratic-capitalist system. On 3 November, Ball proposed “a ringing declaration of growth” for the next OECD ministerial meeting, which meant using that pragmatic ideology to unify the Atlantic alliance. His motivation was threefold: “to convey a sense of purpose, unity, strength, and momentum in the West; demonstrate that in economic strength

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the West is superior to the Soviet bloc; and set the stage for US projections and policies for growth.” Ball, after consulting with the CEA, projected a goal of 50 percent over nine years and a 41/2 percent annual growth as the target rates.26 Fascination with and faith in the virtues of economic growth permeated many of the Western capitals. France’s Fourth Economic Plan was largely predicated on achieving high growth rates. Similarly, Macmillan had emphasized the need for increased Western economic strength throughout the spring and summer of 1961. In one exchange with US ambassador-at-large and later ambassador to France Charles E. Bohlen, he “mentioned the possibility, under the cover of the OECD, of having a high-level meeting to consider the entire problem [of preventing] increasing trade barriers, adopting unilateral financial solutions, which would have the same result as in [19]29.”27 In mid-November 1961, at the first OECD Council of Ministers meetings, the representatives of the West European nations unanimously endorsed a banner of increased economic growth throughout the Atlantic alliance. The relaxed ambiance of the Château de la Muette, where previous strategy meetings among lower-ranking economic officials had taken place, was replaced on this occasion with the more officious surroundings of a Parisian ministry. Despite general acceptance of Ball’s projected 50 percent growth rate, disagreements arose over where to direct the fruits of increased Western economic growth. Ball, who was accompanied by Henry Fowler, under-secretary of the treasury, aimed to use the newly formed Development Assistance Committee within the OECD to coordinate a panoply of foreign aid policies, ranging from grants and loans to all forms of technical assistance. The West European metropoles, which meant primarily France and Great Britain, agreed in principle, but refused to relinquish control over their former territories to a multilateral working group.28 During the autumn of 1961 and early winter of 1962, the FrancoAmerican monetary disagreements were restricted to the OECD and IMF conferences. Despite divergent frameworks and frequent squabbles, there was also room for cooperation. IMF discussions stalemated in Vienna during September 1961. Subsequent consultations among the US and European central banks, however, resulted in ad hoc measures that propped up the Bretton Wood system rather than


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reformed it. One measure, the “gold pool,” as it was called, was the brainchild of US under-secretary of Treasury Robert Roosa, who hoped it would offset the likelihood of speculation on the London gold market. Each country would provide a set amount of gold to a pool of the participating nations to cover fluctuations in the price of the dollar.29 Currency swap arrangements were worked out in 1962; these were standby credit lines which allowed participants to draw on other participants’ currencies in order to defend their own exchange rates.30 Triffin later critically characterized the central bank syndicate gold pooling arrangement and swap arrangements as the first “fire extinguisher” measures to fight the recurring monetary crises that persisted through the decade. As gentlemen’s agreements, they fell short of an institutionalized multilateral approach favored by the Department of State within the United States and at the Foreign Office in Great Britain. Neither did Roosa’s gold pool permit automatic drawing rights because Baumgartner insisted that the individual governments give approval before their currencies were withdrawn from the pool. The French finance minister, as well as most of the bureaucrats and central bankers involved, vividly remembered the financial chaos of the interwar period. They were hesitant to alter the Bretton Woods system, which they believed had solved the pre-war international financial problems. In the post-World War II era, the strength of the dollar had become the symbol of financial stability and of the monetary system established at Bretton Woods. The idea of removing it as the reserve currency for the Western world was anathema.31

Kennedy’s fascination with French dirigisme During 1962, while de Gaulle’s domestic mandate expanded, Kennedy felt mounting economic pressures at home. On 10 April 1962, US Steel, followed by four other major steel producers, raised prices 31/2 percent, the equivalent of six dollars a ton. Kennedy felt double-crossed by Roger Blough, president of US Steel Corporation, whom he believed reneged on the wage–price guidelines negotiated four days earlier between the steel industry and labor unions. Dubbed the “Battle of Blough Run,” US Steel rescinded its price increase only after pressure from the Department of Labor and the Department of Justice.32

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Mistrust lingered between Kennedy and the business community, and the latter’s confidence in the Kennedy administration declined. Within a month, the stock market dropped to its lowest point since the Great Depression. Kennedy’s advisers turned to classic fiscal pump-priming remedies – an investment tax credit for business and a personal and corporate income tax cut. Kennedy’s economic advisers split over the best type of tax reduction and reform. His more orthodox advisers in the Department of Treasury pushed for an investment tax credit and a change in IRS depreciation guidelines for industrial plants and equipment because those measures would restore business support to the administration. Heller, Paul Samuelson, and other members of the Council of Economic Advisers pushed for a general tax cut despite worries that “the Republicans would kick us in the balls on that one,” because it conveyed fiscal irresponsibility.33 In pushing for forms of business subsidies, secretary of the Treasury Dillon saw domestic and foreign policies as mutually reinforcing. Always with an eye to lowering the US payments deficit, Dillon knew investment credits had been successful in modernizing European industry. He hoped that a stimulus to capital spending would have an analogous domestic effect and make US factories more competitive against the newly modernized European ones.34 Although Kennedy’s CEA supported an investment credit, they preferred expanding the domestic economy through a tax cut that would add purchasing power. In early June 1962, the president chose a Yale commencement address to test the waters for a tax cut that was not revenue neutral. Kennedy attacked what he considered the prevailing myths about macroeconomics: big government and deficits were bad; fiscal policy was irrelevant. He emphasized his belief that the executive branch could control the domestic economy and find fiscal policies that would sustain economic growth, lower inflation, and steady employment. His address reflected the administration’s pragmatic ideology and faith in technocratic management. Chairman Walter Heller later explained that “Kennedy was a pragmatist. His Yale speech revealed his feeling that we were getting to the point where most of the questions of economics were technical.”35 In the president’s self-confident view, who better to manage the economy than his clinical, no-nonsense young advisers.


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Kennedy’s Yale address failed to generate the enthusiasm he had hoped for. He had little success in breaking the shackles of conservative Wall Street bankers and businessmen. In other words, it was acceptable to adjust interest rates but not generate budget deficits. The US Congress passed an investment tax credit at the rate of 7 percent in October 1962, but the administration’s proposal for a general tax cut quickly became bogged down in congressional committees.36 In the wake of the Big Steel crisis and an economic slump at home, Kennedy marveled at the performance of the French economy and considered transposing aspects of French dirigisme, state economic planning, to the United States. “It’s fascinating,” he remarked to his journalist confidant Ben Bradlee, “here’s a country getting a five and a half percent annual increase in its GNP, while we struggle to get two and a half. They have almost no unemployment, while we have too much.”37 Kennedy yearned for the control and autonomy the French government had over the domestic economy. He instructed his Council of Economic Advisers to study the French economy. Expressing the technocratic ethos that guided his West European policies, he told one French official that “nearly all internal [domestic] problems were now matters of administration rather than politics in the liberal-versus-conservative sense.”38 Naively thinking that matters involving economic proficiency could be depoliticized, Kennedy viewed the French economy as a model of technocratic management. In late May 1962, he sent CEA advisers Walter Heller and James Tobin to Paris for a study of French economic planning processes. They concluded that the French and many other West European economies grew faster than in the United States for multiple reasons: persistent high levels of demand; a high level of government investment; greater reinvestment of business earnings; a larger body of skilled labor; higher levels of capital formation; technology; productivity; and smaller defense expenditures.39 To generate interest in dirigisme within the United States, Kennedy arranged for French officials to speak to labor and business groups. In mid-May 1962, the financial counselor of the French embassy addressed AFL-CIO directors on his country’s economic plan as a successful model of growth promotion.40 The resistance of the majority of US businessmen, who frowned upon dirigisme as

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socialism, meant that Kennedy’s hopes for French-style policies were never realized.41 Kennedy’s interest in dirigisme was also a way to convince Gaullist officials that he was serious about making the US economy sound so that they would be less worried about a devaluation of the dollar and less inclined to convert dollars reserves into gold, a practice that exacerbated the US payments deficit. Bundy reminded Heller before his departure for Paris that “in the current state of FrancoAmerican relations, any friendly contact is a good thing.”42 Kennedy’s interest in French economic planning was also motivated by Cold War aims. The focus on economic competition with the Soviets, expressed repeatedly during 1961, re-emerged as a theme in public announcements. On 8 May 1962, in a speech at the United Auto Workers convention, he pointed out that “when Mr. Khrushchev talks about coexistence it is because he believes that the economy of the Soviet Union has enough vitality that over a period of time he can pass this country. And when he does, as he has said, the hinge of history will move.”43

Summer of threats and accommodation: the gold standstill proposal Kennedy was ever mindful of the relationship between economic and security considerations. In early 1962, Kennedy told his NSC Council that the global problems facing the United States “have a high degree of interrelation, in that political and military factors tie closely together.” More specifically, he told his advisers that the shape of the Common Market and the imminent domestic fight on trade policy directly affected US military interests. “If we cannot keep up our export surplus,” he declared, “we shall not have the dollar exchange with which to meet our overseas military commitments.”44 Although Kennedy supported Britain’s entrance into the EEC, he was simultaneously irked that the West European powers were concentrating predominantly on continental developments such as the Common Market. He wanted them engaged in sharing the burden of developmental problems in Africa and Latin America. Overseas commitments exacerbated the US balance of payments deficit. Kennedy underscored the linkage he made between


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economic and security policies by telling his NSC that “the over-all importance of the balance-of-payments position to our military security can be understood still more clearly by noting the British experience. The British pull-back of forces from numerous bases throughout the world in the years since World War II has been very largely a response to balance-of-payments difficulties.”45 Britain’s financial instability served as a negative example for Kennedy. He sought to avoid a situation in which the United States had to choose between putting its economic house in order or meeting Cold War security commitments. Balance of payment problems continued to vex him and served as a backdrop to all defense questions. Kennedy’s closest advisers recall the president’s twin fears as nuclear conflagration and American loss of gold. Carl Kaysen remembers that Kennedy “had this more primitive and less rationally analyzed feeling that gold was an important symbol of power and therefore a gold loss was a serious matter.”46 Kennedy feared that France in particular would use gold as political leverage. How that scenario would unfold was never entirely clear, but Kennedy worried that France, either alone or with West Germany, would convert its surplus dollars into gold in order to force the administration into altering its NATO policies.47 Kennedy’s fear of what one historian has called alliance “gold battles,” in which divergent strategic aims were waged on a financial front, compelled him to devise a tactical counter-threat. Because a large portion of the US gold and dollar drain came from the foreign exchange costs of the US’s NATO commitments, Kennedy and several high-level advisers including Kaysen, Nitze, Gilpatric, and at varying times McNamara, considered threatening troop withdrawals from Europe as a way of conveying to the allies US frustration at carrying the major burden of Western defense.48 Debate over troop withdrawals from Western Europe pre-dated the Kennedy administration. President Eisenhower hoped to reduce the level of US conventional forces in Europe, but the flare-up of the Berlin crisis in 1958 prevented any retrenchment. Although Kennedy and several top advisers, including Dillon and McNamara, examined the benefits of troop reductions on the US balance of payments deficit, the continued crisis in Berlin created the opposite effect. US conventional forces deployed to Europe increased, exacerbating the US deficit. As long as the Soviet threat to Berlin

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remained, the Kennedy administration was careful not to mention the possibility of troop withdrawals with West German and French officials. For example, Kaysen encouraged Kennedy to call McNamara to suggest “your concern, which you know he shares, about the political impact of any premature troop movements; your thought that it might be useful for the Army planning process to examine the implications of a series of alternative options with respect to the times when our European forces can be returned to their normal manning levels.”49 By late spring 1962, Kennedy was finding it increasingly difficult to contain his irritation with the NATO allies. Rumors, unsubstantiated and untrue, that France and West Germany were planning to convert their surplus dollars into gold angered the president, who believed the action was a deliberate anti-American plot. The gold ratio of French reserves was 70 percent, which meant that its surplus reserves totaled $3.5 billion. In the first quarter of 1962, France converted $45 million of gold, and in the second quarter, that increased to $97.5 million. In conversations with French officials, Kennedy made little attempt to disguise his irritation as he threatened troop withdrawals. In mid-May 1962, when Kennedy met with French minister of state for cultural affairs André Malraux, the larger implications of US payment difficulties was very much on the president’s mind. He was angry about the “unfair” economic and military burden shouldered by the United States. Unable to see de Gaulle’s European policies as anything more than empty gestures of grandeur, he exclaimed: “If it is desired that we should cease to carry the load in Europe, nothing could be better from our point of view – it has now cost us about $1.3 billion to maintain our forces in Europe and the savings on these forces would just about meet our balance of payments deficit.”50 Kennedy never intended to carry out his threat of troop withdrawals, but he did have his top advisers examine the possibility. In late May, when rumors of French plans to cash their dollar holdings frightened the Kennedy administration, deputy under-secretary of state for political affairs U. Alexis Johnson responded to McNamara’s injunction to “identify force adjustments designed to alleviate US balance-of-payments.”51 Like the issue of nuclear sharing, threatening troop withdrawals split the Kennedy administration. The Department of State opposed


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even the study of the issue. Ball and Rusk feared that it would frighten Adenauer, who already questioned the administration’s security commitment to Germany. The outcome of troop withdrawals as a counter-threat to potential European actions against the dollar was parallel to the debate over providing US nuclear aid to France. The Department of State ultimately prevailed. On 22 June 1962, a Basic National Security Policy directive stated that “US ground forces will be retained in Europe at present strength for the foreseeable future.”52 A month later, the Pentagon announced the return of 7,500 of the 40,000 troops, but that reduction came from US forces sent to Europe in 1961. In other words, the Berlin crisis, not Kennedy’s anxiety about the US gold and dollar drain, dictated US troop levels in Europe.53 Even so, during the summer of 1962, Kennedy’s anger increased over French and German unwillingness to carry their burden of European defense. The president’s secret tape-recording system installed in the Oval Office and Cabinet Room only a few weeks earlier captured his exasperation, as his anger bubbled over in elliptical remarks: We will make some proposals about their increasing their acceptance of the burden of defense. And then about increasing manpower, we’ll suggest that if they don’t want to do any of these things, then we’re going to take some of ours out. We’re not going to be up for six divisions while the Germans don’t do what they should do in their own country, and the French do nothing, and I think at that time, we don’t want to do it now because we want to use that argument perhaps for our monetary problem, but I think we would pull out. We would indicate either that we’re going to thin out . . . We can’t be the ones, while no one else is doing . . .54 For the Kennedy administration, national security priorities ultimately trumped economic concerns when it came to threatening troop withdrawals. Negotiations for military offset arrangements with the NATO allies provided the most appropriate forum to demand that Western Europe share the burden of the continent’s defense. Kennedy’s top advisers found it reasonable to extract European promises to purchase American military hardware with

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surplus dollars resulting from US military expenditures on the continent. In the end, however, they decided against coercion because they feared alienating their West European allies.55 By mid-1962, mistrust infected the Atlantic alliance. The major powers ascribed the darkest motives to each other. The United States imagined a Franco-German bloc purposely draining the US gold supply by converting their surplus dollars. De Gaulle and Adenauer believed the United States would devalue the dollar and make those surplus dollars worth much less – a scenario that proved to be the case later in the decade. The French sensed that the British were impatient with American defense and economic policies, but were unwilling to take sides on divisive financial issues because of their preoccupation with the Common Market negotiations.56 Given the climate of mistrust, US officials initially suspected a veiled threat when French Finance Minister Giscard d’Estaing reminded them that only cooperation “on a grand scale” could help the Americans with their dollar drain.57 Although Heller and Tobin had established a good rapport with Giscard during their Paris trip to study French economic planning, the finance minister was not well known by US officials. He had succeeded Baumgartner as minister of finance in late January 1962. Baumgartner, incidentally, had been encouraged to resign by de Gaulle because he had proved to be an “Atlanticist” by cooperating with the United States in international finance.58 Although in personality and accomplishment close to the Kennedy administration model, Giscard’s attitude toward US investment in the French economy worried Ball, who recalled several troubling conversations with him. On several occasions, Giscard complained that American investment in France was leading to the loss of French control over key segments of the economy. He implied that “measures might be taken by the French government to establish safeguards against such a possibility.”59 Ball suspected Giscard was threatening French moves against the dollar. In mid-July 1962, the French finance minister planned to visit Washington, and Ball warned Kennedy that the administration should be prepared for possible large-scale French conversions of dollars into gold. Supported by Kaysen and the Council of Economic Advisors, the under-secretary of state proposed a multilateral gold standstill arrangement. For two years, the West


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European nations would agree to hold primarily dollars rather than gold, while the United States would provide an agreed amount of gold to them. During the two-year grace period, Western Europe and the IMF would finance the American payments deficit. The United States would supposedly balance its accounts and agree to negotiate a new set of international monetary arrangements to supplant Bretton Woods.60 Ball’s guiding rationale was the widely shared belief within the administration that the US was carrying the “heavy share of the Free World burden.” He sought a multilateral political arrangement among the Western powers that would force the allies to accept the US contention that its deficit was the result of European and global security commitments. He and the Council of Economic Advisors preferred restructuring international financial arrangements rather than deflate the domestic economy, implement trade and capital restrictions, or reduce its overseas commitments.61 To Ball’s surprise, Giscard was in a cooperative mood when he visited Washington in late July 1962. He first met Kennedy alone and tried to explain that the president should be irked at the British, not the French, because the British held no dollar reserves. Kennedy believed that a political agreement among the leaders of Western Europe was desperately needed. He complained that the central bankers of the individual countries were too preoccupied with their nation’s interests with little regard to the alliance as a whole.62 The administration was surprised when the French finance minister agreed with most of what the Americans said about the problem. Giscard tried to explain that the president should be upset at the British, who before 1962, converted more dollars into gold than France. As long as other European countries continued to convert their reserve dollars, France would feel compelled to follow suit. Giscard declared that the key was to avoid unilateral action by either side. He thought that it was important for creditor countries to establish a common payments policy. Such an agreement might suspend gold takings and establish fixed reserve ratios. France was willing to hold its dollars for a time, as long as other nations agreed. He believed Britain might cooperate to facilitate its entry into the Common Market.63 By initially suspecting the worse about possible French actions before Giscard’s visit, Ball displayed the Department of State’s

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typical ignorance about de Gaulle’s policies. Especially on economic issues, French motives were diverse and complex. Politically, de Gaulle delighted in the possibility of forcing the devaluation of the dollar and causing the United States to accept its fiscal irresponsibility of an overvalued dollar.64 Giscard, however, did not share de Gaulle’s smoldering animosity. The finance minister also recognized that it was not in France’s economic interest to force a devaluation of the dollar because the value of France’s foreign exchange reserves would also drop considerably. De Gaulle was torn between his two camps of advisers. He valued the unofficial advice of Jacques Rueff and foreign minister Couve de Murville. He also trusted his finance minister Giscard. French ambassador Hervé Alphand recalls that de Gaulle hesitated in making a decision because he was preoccupied with France’s nuclear development. Rueff’s strong ally Couve was also preoccupied with strategic issues. While Giscard was in Washington, Couve was in Geneva for talks with the Soviets on Laos and Berlin. Rueff was one of the greatest influences on de Gaulle’s economic philosophy, but without an official capacity to implement policy, Giscard gained the upper hand and decided to cooperate with the United States.65 Giscard was hopeful that he could convince de Gaulle to accept a gold standstill arrangement because it could potentially meet de Gaulle’s long-term objective of curbing the hegemony of the dollar. The indications that he received from Ball suggested that after a two-year grace period, the Group of 10 industrial nations, who comprised the major participants of Bretton Woods, could modify or construct a new international financial structure. Giscard did not intend to end the use of the dollar as a reserve currency. He hoped, however, to give the franc a place in an enlarged monetary scheme that used additional currencies as reserves. He wished to establish a unité de réserve composite (CRU), which would be tied to gold. The creation of a CRU would address French concerns of curbing global inflation while meeting demands for expanded international liquidity.66 Another key French motive in cooperating with the Americans for a gold standstill arrangement was its potential as an anti-British move. This impression was not lost on Kennedy’s economic advisers, who questioned French motives. Dillon informed Kennedy that the British had been upset because they thought the president had


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put Giscard up to telling them the West was going off the gold standard. Roosa also explained that “the British are trying to figure out what it is that we are trying to put over.”67 Historian François Loriaux provides some insight into French motives by pointing out that “during this period, France’s foreign monetary relations were strained with Great Britain . . . because the British used the dollars that began to reenter their economy after stabilization to restock their reserves with gold bought from the United States rather than repay their debt to the IMF.”68 The Kennedy administration was uncertain what type of international monetary proposal that it wanted. The president cared most about forcing the Europeans to share the “feeling of a community acceptance of risk.”69 A new set of monetary arrangements, however, never came to pass, not because France obstructed initiatives but because Kennedy’s economic advisers were deeply divided over solutions to the payments deficit. A series of top-level meetings, which Kennedy secretly recorded, captured the debates. Dillon and Roosa argued that the problems surrounding the dollar should continue to be worked out bilaterally between central bankers. They argued that the measures secured in the first eighteen months of the administration, including military offset arrangements, the gold pool, and swap agreements were sufficient to meet any future financial crisis. Many US officials, chiefly Dillon and Roosa, vividly remembered the financial chaos of the Great Depression and saw Bretton Woods as the answer. Tinkering with firmly established international financial norms was the economic analog to the Munich syndrome. Although the Bretton Woods structure may have been faulty, Kennedy’s orthodox advisers preferred to stay with the devil they knew rather than one they did not know. And without a formal offer from France, the Kennedy administration was reluctant to act. Even so, the debate for a gold standstill arrangement showed that the United States was not entirely wedded to the Bretton Woods system. A better system could be created that reflected the new economic strength of the West Europeans. This system would give the Europeans an “expanded role in the international monetary system.”70

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Conclusion The Kennedy administration’s approach toward handling the balance of payments problems within the Atlantic alliance was muddled by inconsistency. Washington’s hopes of resolving international monetary disputes faced a better chance of success with the French government when it played down the rhetoric of an Atlantic Community and adopted an incremental, piecemeal approach with amenable Ministry of Finance officials. Yet even the one proposal for a gold standstill arrangement, which would have moved beyond the ad hoc measures of gold pools and swap arrangements was dropped by the Kennedy administration despite French hints of cooperation. Moreover, during the period when Giscard and Ministry of Finance officials were maneuvering quietly for a type of gold standstill that would have addressed the fundamental flaws, and not just the symptoms, of the faulty Bretton Woods regime, the Kennedy administration maladroitly pushed ahead with rhetoric for an Atlantic Community that annoyed de Gaulle. On 4 July 1962, in an address in Independence Hall, Kennedy endorsed a visionary policy of an Atlantic partnership. He hoped to veil US policy toward the Old World with a mystique of purposefulness and thereby minimize the defensive, incremental nature of many of the administration’s policies. Kennedy’s conception of partnership meant burden-sharing within the Western alliance. His speech contained numerous references to “burdensome tasks,” the need to “look outward” to poorer nations, the hope for transatlantic cooperation so that “the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men.” Since it is a speech that has been much maligned for offering hollow promises of equal partnership, it deserves to be quoted at some length: We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas.71


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Gaullists had little patience with US complaints about bearing the burden of Cold War global security commitments and even less patience for British financial difficulties. After all, they argued, US foreign economic and military aid programs were a small proportion of the American gross national product (GNP) – hardly an intolerable burden. De Gaulle believed that the solution to the economic problems of Atlantic alliance simply required reconciling geopolitical ambitions and domestic economic constraints. After all, Gaullists reasoned, during the early years of his presidency, they faced le fardeau de décolonisation, the burden of decolonization, and oversaw imperial retreat while preserving economic arrangements with former territories and colonies. Despite that difficulty, under the economic plans of the Fifth Republic, the French franc became one of the world’s strongest currencies.72 After 1962, France became less cooperative in international monetary matters. Without assurances that other West European nations would restrict “hoarding” of gold, the French government began increasing its conversion of dollars. For each of the first two quarters of 1963, the sale of US gold to France was $101.1 million. Although monetary disputes between France and the United States during the early 1960s looked like shadow boxing, their disagreements portended serious conflicts that culminated with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in August 1971.73

7 The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Making of the Double Non

On 22 October 1962, President Kennedy informed de Gaulle about the Soviet attempt to put missiles in Cuba through his special emissary, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who flew to Paris. When Acheson entered the presidential office at the Palais d’Elysée to present the photographic evidence, de Gaulle greeted him politely but tersely by saying, “I understand that you have come not to consult me but to inform me.” The general masked his indignation with a magnanimous wave of his arm. “Your president’s word is enough,” he assured Acheson, as he dismissed the accompanying CIA technical expert’s attempt to show him the intelligence. He offered France’s support.1 Although the details of the Cuban missile crisis have been told countless times, relations between the United States and France figure minimally in most accounts. Most scholars view Charles de Gaulle’s reaction as a derivative of a classic balance of power axiom about alliances that during times of crisis between the US and the Soviet Union, France was a firm ally, while in times of decreased superpower tension, France sought independence from American dominance. Other historians regard de Gaulle’s irritation over lack of tripartite consultation as standard reflex. The problem with both conclusions is that scholars mistakenly dismiss de Gaulle’s foreign policy demands as “sound and fury” about being informed rather than consulted. By dwelling on France’s exclusion from the process of Western nuclear decision-making, scholars have perpetuated the myth of tripartism and neglected de Gaulle’s substantive concerns.2 128


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While US interaction with France is not central to the unfolding of the thirteen-day missile drama, cursory depictions of de Gaulle and the other Western allies as anxious bystanders and then resentful obstructionists overlook important elements of the crisis and its aftermath. The United States never viewed the Cuban missile ordeal as a conflict between themselves or exclusively restricted to a showdown in the Caribbean. For the United States, the Cuban missile crisis was more accurately viewed as a twin Cuban–Berlin crisis. Many in the West believed Khrushchev’s motives for installing nuclear missiles in Cuba were set against the backdrop of the perennial Berlin question. As Marc Trachtenberg describes it, a “mutual hostage situation” had developed between Cuba and Berlin.3 Recently published transcriptions of Kennedy’s presidential recordings from this period reveal the extent to which a linkage between the Cuban missile crisis and a renewed crisis over Berlin was certainly the expectation created in Washington. Whether the Soviets intended a linkage is unclear. An authoritative account of Khrushchev’s motives and actions prior to and during the Cuban missile crisis, which draws on documents from the former Soviet Union, refutes any direct connection between Khrushchev’s attempt to place missiles in Cuba and his attempt to cut off Western access to Berlin, but Soviet materials related to Berlin are limited. Nevertheless, the constant consideration of how events in the Caribbean could affect Berlin, as well as the converse, figured prominently in Washington’s evaluation of its response options.4 Influenced by US reports and actions, the French government and other major West European allies were forced to view the tense days of October 1962 as a parallel crisis when in fact they were not. If the building of the Berlin Wall had worried de Gaulle about Kennedy’s reckless crisis management and highlighted FrancoAmerican strategic differences, the Cuban missile crisis reinforced those differences. The 13 days of October 1962 catalyzed a series of French calculations that culminated in de Gaulle’s double non of participation in the MLF and Britain’s EEC candidacy as well as his signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship in January 1963.

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Washington’s perception of a Cuba–Berlin linkage Before the US’s discovery of missile installation sites in Cuba, Kennedy advisers anticipated a Soviet initiative against Berlin. In the two and a half months preceding the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy was immersed in the details of the protracted Berlin crisis. One reason why he installed a secret taping system in the White House over the weekend of 28 July 1962 was to monitor his meetings and telephone conversations about Berlin. As he told Rusk on his first day of recording, “Looks to me like all that stuff, that Sunday intelligence thing about what [the Soviets] are doing to the Wall, doing to the autobahn and the shipment of fighters and all the rest, sounds to me like they’re ready to do something.”5 Taping selectively throughout the summer of 1962, Kennedy’s fear of war over Berlin was a dominant theme. In particular, Kennedy’s White House tapes captured his and his chief advisers’ preoccupation with the immediate problems of access rights and contingency planning concerning Berlin. Before the Cuban missile crisis, many Kennedy administration officials believed that Berlin was the most likely area where nuclear war might arise through miscalculation, over a minor incident that would trigger a general nuclear war. During one meeting in early August 1962, Rusk characterized the problem: “The damnedest details come into this business.”6 Whether it was deciding about submitting to lowering tailgates on military trucks for inspection or deciding which national authorities would stamp visas, Rusk declared: “the whole situation there [in Berlin] is so irrational. We’ve got them in an elaborate system of symbols. And one of the difficulties is what message the Soviets will get if we, over a little thing . . . They might make the wrong conclusions. . . .”7 All the allies realized the potential for a small spark in Berlin to ignite a larger fire. They had created an ambassadorial group from the United States, France, Great Britain, and later West Germany to provide contingency plans to deal with incidents that could escalate into war. In one of the most publicized incidents, in mid-August 1962, East German border guards shot an eighteenyear-old Berliner, Peter Fletcher, as he tried to escape over the Wall. He was left to die while West Berliners watched helplessly. The incident triggered riots and demonstrations as West Berliners stoned


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Soviet personnel on their way to the Soviet War Memorial near the Brandenburg Gate in the British sector.8 Despite allied differences over the value of contingency planning, a month before the discovery of missiles in Cuba, the allied ambassadorial group approved a “Preferred Sequence of Military Actions in the Berlin Conflict.” The group agreed that the West could never guarantee its preferred sequence of military actions, but ultimately decided it would help during a crisis at least to have advance planning. Rusk persuaded the allies that NATO acceptance of a preferred sequence would show the Soviets that a threatening move in Berlin would meet with unified Western resistance.9 During a renewed crisis in Berlin, Kennedy sought more from the French government than participation in contingency planning. On 9 October 1962, the president asked that additional French ground divisions be moved to West Germany to meet commitments under NATO policy directive 26/4. Foreign Minister Couve de Murville countered that Khrushchev would be better deterred by unequivocal assurances of US nuclear retaliation. Couve also argued that the French could not easily move divisions from the south where they were needed for possible duty in Algeria.10 During September and October 1962, Washington led the French to expect twin crises over Cuba and Berlin. Rusk informed French Ambassador Hervé Alphand that rumors were circulating in Washington about Soviet shipment of arms to Cuba. Although Rusk declared that “an organic line” tying Cuba and Berlin did not exist, it was possible that Khrushchev intended to capitalize on Western isolation in Berlin and provoke a parallel crisis by encouraging Castro to attack the US base at Guantanamo.11 On another occasion, Rusk informed Couve there was a 50 percent chance that Khrushchev would come to New York in November 1962 for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. At that point, the Soviet premier might raise the Berlin problem and Cuba. What further to expect from that linkage, Rusk did not know.12 On the morning of 16 October 1962, Kennedy learned that medium-range Soviet missile sites had been detected in Cuba. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy interrupted the president as he lay in bed reading the daily newspapers and showed him overhead photographs taken by a U-2 intelligence plane. Kennedy quickly convened a group of advisors, later called the Executive

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Committee of the National Security Council, or Ex Comm for short, to decide the US course of action.13 Kennedy was outraged at Khrushchev’s duplicity. The day before, Khrushchev had assured him that the Soviet Union would make no political move against Berlin until after the US domestic elections of November 1962. US ambassador-at-large Llewellyn Thompson also warned the President that Khrushchev intended to sign the much threatened separate peace treaty with the GDR, but not until November 1962.14 Before convening the first Ex Comm meeting, Kennedy speculated about Khrushchev’s motives to the new ambassador to France, Charles Bohlen, who delayed his departure for Paris to meet with the president. The former Kremlinologist and newly appointed ambassador to France reinforced Kennedy’s belief that the timing and surreptitious nature of the Soviet deployment was a gamble intended to install missiles 90 miles from the US shore as leverage to force the Western allies out of Berlin.15 The Ex Comm members spent little time deliberating about Khrushchev’s motives. For Robert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, and others in the room who had knowledge of “Operation Mongoose,” the administration’s covert operation to eliminate Castro’s regime by any means necessary, the Soviet move could have been viewed as defensive. Ex Comm ultimately saw no need to explain Khrushchev’s motives, however, because the deployment of missiles in Cuba exceeded what was necessary to deter an attack on Cuba.16 Kennedy quickly discarded diplomatic pressure as a means of handling the crisis. In his mind, the clandestine nature of the Soviet activity suggested that Khrushchev would likely negotiate until the missiles were operational. Moreover, a host of uncertainties about the missile sites mitigated against applying diplomatic pressure and necessitated temporary secrecy: were any of the missiles already operational? When would they become operational? What type of missiles were involved?17 Kennedy insisted that knowledge of the missiles be kept to a minimum within the US government and abroad until his advisers decided on a course of action. Members of Ex Comm entered the White House surreptitiously through a basement tunnel adjacent to the Treasury Department building. The president instructed Martin


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Hillenbrand, chair of the Berlin Task Force, to use the main entrance of the White House so that the press corps would believe the commotion and late-night light-burning was over Berlin rather than Cuba.18 From the outset, Kennedy worried about the status of Berlin. As Berlin became subsumed in the Cuban crisis, Kennedy established a subgroup of the Ex Comm to handle the German problem. Chaired by Paul Nitze, it also included Thompson, Hillenbrand, and Major General David Gray of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Hillenbrand recalls the stressful atmosphere of their meetings: “Our fears proved groundless, but we did not know that they would until it was all over. So our subgroup on Berlin worked feverishly in the White House while receiving current information about the development of the [Cuban] crisis.”19 US convoys were scheduled to travel the German autobahn during the week. Soviet and East German harassment of allied convoys had occurred intermittently since the building of the Wall. With a showdown brewing in the Caribbean, the Berlin subcommittee, authorized by the president, decided not to cancel the convoys “since it might have conveyed an impression of irresolution to the Soviets.” Despite a weak Soviet attempt to have the US soldiers dismount for counting, the convoy proceeded without conflict.20 On 17 October, Kennedy kept his pre-scheduled meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder. Cuba was on the president’s mind, but he revealed nothing to Schroeder, who wanted to discuss Western access rights in Berlin. Although their half-hour talk was cordial, differences emerged. Kennedy questioned whether visa stamping was worth risking war with the Soviets. Schroeder, however, wanted strict adherence to Western rights on seemingly minor issues because the West Germans saw them as symbols of commitment and credibility. In Schroeder’s opinion, the West must take a hard-line position on seemingly inconsequential details.21 As Ex Comm continued secret deliberations, Kennedy maintained his White House appointments. On 18 October, Gromyko met with the president and Rusk. The Soviet foreign minister made no mention of the missiles in Cuba or those en route. Neither Kennedy nor Rusk intimated knowledge of Soviet initiatives. Gromyko mentioned Cuba only to stress the defensive nature of Soviet

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policies and chiefly focused on Berlin, which reinforced Kennedy’s assumption that the Kremlin hoped to use the successful installation of missiles in Cuba as a crucial bargaining chip in a new round of negotiations over Berlin.22 Gromyko detected an atypical coolness in Kennedy’s demeanor, but failed to link it to US knowledge of the Soviet actions toward Cuba. Kennedy kept quiet as Gromyko claimed that the Kremlin had no intention of doing anything about Berlin until after the November US congressional elections.23 Kennedy’s suspicions, reinforced by Bohlen and shared by many Ex Comm members, about a linkage between the Soviet deployment of missiles to Cuba and the ongoing Berlin affair influenced their deliberations over a US response. Doing nothing was quickly dismissed as an option even though McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff confirmed that the United States would retain nuclear superiority despite Soviet missiles in Cuba. George Ball reminded them that Khrushchev had spoken about coming to the United Nations during November and might present the Cuban missiles then as a fait accompli or as a “trading ploy” – Soviet disarmament of Cuba in return for Western withdrawal from Berlin.24 The continuing tension in Berlin led Kennedy’s advisers to posit their options as the possibility of facing war now or war later in November 1962.25 A similar rationale prompted the majority of Ex Comm members to discount diplomatic pressure because it might allow Khrushchev the opportunity to negotiate for an exchange of removing missiles in Cuba for withdrawal of Western troops from Berlin. For the first two days, President Kennedy leaned toward an air strike or an invasion of Cuba, but eventually chose a “quarantine,” a more delicate term for a “blockade,” which was a formal act of war.26

France and the Cuban missile crisis Having decided on a response, Kennedy worried about allied reactions to a quarantine. Kennedy reopened the possibility of US nuclear sharing policy with France two days before informing de Gaulle about the shipment of Soviet missiles to Cuba. He asked Rusk to “reconsider the present policy of refusing to give nuclear weapons assistance to France [because] in light of present circumstances a refusal to help the French is not worthwhile.”27 Because the president anticipated withdrawing NATO Jupiter missiles from


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Turkey as a type of quid pro quo for Soviet removal of missiles in Cuba, he believed an offer of nuclear aid to France would preempt de Gaulle’s objection and remove “the impression that they are prepared to take nuclear weapons of all kinds out of Europe.”28 In what had become established practice during the past two years, the Department of State quickly shelved nuclear-sharing proposals. Rusk responded to Kennedy’s “heresy” by declaring that “the French are already supporting us on Berlin and Cuba; whether they continue to do so will depend more on what we do, and how intimately we consult with them, than on provision of nuclear aid. . . . We would not earn his respect by changing our policy toward him when we were in trouble.”29 Despite de Gaulle’s often-quoted response that Acheson came to “inform” and not “consult” with him about an American course of action, lack of consultation was not the primary irritant for the French president or the other allied leaders. Primarily, de Gaulle doubted the effectiveness of a “quarantine” as a device to force Soviet removal of missiles. He told the former secretary of state that Khrushchev might counter with a blockade of Western access to Berlin. The general also worried that Khrushchev might negotiate a quid pro quo with Kennedy: removal of Soviet missiles for ending the Western presence in Berlin. De Gaulle, whose confidence in Kennedy’s commitment to Berlin had crumbled when the Wall went up, reminded Acheson that, because Berlin was under fourpower occupation, the United States could reach no understanding with the Soviets without allied approval.30 While de Gaulle expressed doubts over Kennedy’s choice of a quarantine, the Kennedy administration faced a severe crisis of confidence with the West German leadership. Adenauer was shocked when the US ambassador told him about missile sites in Cuba. He later confided to de Gaulle that it was ludicrous the United States had not realized what the Soviets had been concocting in the Caribbean, especially since Republicans in the US Congress had been saying so for weeks.31 Although both de Gaulle and Adenauer feared repercussions in Berlin, they rejected its linkage to the Cuban missile crisis. On 23 October 1962, at a foreign ministers meeting of the Six EEC nations, Couve and Schroeder chided the others for accepting the US notion that the two affairs were connected. They argued, “the two

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questions are, in fact, very different.”32 The Cuban missile crisis was between the two superpowers, as the lack of prior consultation indicated. Geographically and politically, the Cuban affair showed that Moscow was directing its actions at the United States. Yet the consequences of the superpower brinkmanship could affect not only Berlin but the entire world. In that sense, the two crises became related.33 Worried about US unilateralism and afraid that the Cuban “blockade” could escalate, the French government changed its attitude on Berlin contingency planning. Within the Washington ambassadorial group, Alphand urged his counterparts to issue stern warnings to Moscow that they were prepared and beginning to implement counter-measures against a possible Soviet blockade of Berlin. The French ambassador rejected Llwellyn Thompson’s contention that the Soviets had the initiative and the West must wait and see. The French government worried that neutralist sentiment was rising in Washington, which could result in a trade of Cuban missiles for a Western evacuation of Berlin, even though the Kennedy administration had no intention of abandoning Berlin or permitting a blockade of the city.34

Drawing lessons from the crisis: contrasting FrancoAmerican views On 25 October US ships stopped Soviet convoys en route to Cuba. A tense showdown ensued over the next six days. Ultimately, the “quarantine” and a secret agreement to dismantle the NATO Jupiter missiles in Turkey compelled the Soviets to back down. Kennedy rejected celebratory toasts because the Berlin linkage muddied when one crisis began and ended. As Martin Hillenbrand points out, “the Berlin crisis was obviously more protracted, and perhaps in essence more fundamental, but not in chronological compactness or in the intensity of official attention.”35 In other words, the United States did not consider the Berlin-Cuban crisis over, with either the Soviets or with the West European allies. In the wake of the crisis, Washington contemplated the effects on its West European allies. Ball and chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, Walter Heller, asked Jean Monnet about the probable effects of the crisis on French policies. Monnet confessed


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uncertainty regarding de Gaulle’s response, but foresaw that “the initial impact of the Cuba crisis [would] be to strengthen the unity of the West.”36 Monnet’s prediction fed the common misperception about Gaullist policies: whenever the Soviets posed a specific challenge to Western interests, France displayed NATO solidarity, but when the Soviet Union posed only a generalized threat to the Western powers, he reasserted French independence from perceived American tutelage. The Kennedy administration’s Berlin-NATO Subcommittee held a more realistic view about the effects of Cuba on West European policies. Nitze warned, “European suspicion that a sudden, secret, Berlin deal underlay the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba is a possible side effect of US initiatives.”37 Although President Kennedy had no intention of ending Western occupation of Berlin, he was anxious to reach a modus vivendi over Berlin. In mid-December 1962, Kennedy and Khrushchev exchanged messages through their private correspondence and agreed that they had “come to the final stage of the Cuban affair.” Both leaders understood, however, that the Berlin question was unresolved. Kennedy added that “still it is quite true, as you say, that the main issue which seems to separate us on Berlin is that of the presence of allied troops in West Berlin.”38 Kennedy hoped either to continue the status quo over the city or convince the Soviets to accept an international access authority, which would permit the presence of Western troops. Whereas the superpowers viewed the Cuban missile crisis as reason to relax tensions over Berlin, de Gaulle and Adenauer drew different conclusions. They expected the Cuban missile crisis to have shown Kennedy the folly of trusting Khrushchev. The two West European leaders were disappointed that Kennedy seemed to be taking the Soviet threat to Europe less seriously. The Cuban missile crisis thus set into motion forces that prompted de Gaulle’s famous January 1963 double non decisions, in which he vetoed Britain’s entry into the EEC and rejected the US offer of Polaris submarine-launched nuclear missiles for the NATO multilateral nuclear force.39 The Cuban missile crisis heightened de Gaulle’s awareness that decisions leading to nuclear annihilation excluded France and the other major NATO powers. De Gaulle urged Macmillan to press Kennedy for a tripartite global decision-making directorate,

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pointing out to Kennedy that France’s faithfulness to the Atlantic Alliance during the Cuban ordeal meant that France deserved to be consulted as a first-rank power.40 De Gaulle’s simultaneous machinations for the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship, however, call into question his desire for tripartism. De Gaulle pursued bilateral means as a way to assert French dominance of European affairs. Admittedly, Adenauer strongly encouraged de Gaulle’s overtures across the Rhine, which blurs whether the general or the chancellor was the driving force behind the subsequent treaty. Essentially, the mutuality of FrancoGerman interests vividly illustrates how polarized the Atlantic alliance had become.41 On 8 November 1962, almost two months after receiving de Gaulle’s request to establish official bilateral cooperation in all areas, Adenauer expressed a desire to reach “a narrow entente” with France. Four days later, Bonn agreed to explore a possible organization and program of cooperation. The French government had established a commission interministériel pour la coopération francoallemande in late September. West Germany now followed suit. The two governments envisioned cooperation in the areas of defense, economics, cultural affairs, and youth exchanges. Adenauer promised de Gaulle that he would discuss bilateral cooperation, especially in defense matters, more seriously after his visit to Washington in November 1962. In the meantime, the chancellor reminded him that the NATO strategic concept remained “indispensable” to Europe. As sympathetic as Adenauer was to the Gaullist approach of a Europe européenne, he was not rash enough to break with the United States.42 In Washington, Adenauer sought reassurance that the resolution of the missile crisis would not cause Kennedy’s vigilance over Berlin to diminish. Although Kennedy gave general assurances, the two leaders continued to disagree over whether a graduated or massive retaliatory response was a more effective NATO deterrent. Adenauer returned to Bonn chagrined that the president had failed to draw the parallel between the Berlin and Cuban crises that he saw. In other words, Adenauer believed that the threat of nuclear conflagration had caused Khrushchev to back down in the Caribbean, and he could not understand why Kennedy failed to see Berlin as analogous and instead insisted on increasing conventional capabilities in Europe.43


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For his part, Kennedy was exasperated with West German unwillingness to talk directly with the Russians and reach agreement over Berlin. British ambassador David Ormsby-Gore recalled that the president “was acutely conscious of really the absurd situation we had all got ourselves into over Berlin.”44 Kennedy, who was growing weary of a crisis mentality, desperately wanted to stabilize Central Europe without sacrificing Western credibility or rights. Adenauer and de Gaulle shared uneasiness about the status of Berlin and the continued US insistence on a conventional weapons buildup. “What the Americans do not see,” Adenauer confided to the French, “is that for Germany there is no difference between an atomic and conventional war on our own soil. To be roasted at a thousand degrees or burned at ninety, the result is exactly the same.”45 Adenauer knew that the concept of massive retaliation underpinned France’s nuclear deterrent. Even a small force de frappe would show Khrushchev that any advancement into Western zones would be met with a nuclear response. The Kennedy administration continued to press its West European allies for greater conventional weapons force levels on the continent. The president was irritated by “the excessive contribution which the United States is making to the maintenance of NATO” and in general terms instructed McNamara to rectify the unfair burden.46 Rusk tried to temper Kennedy’s injunction by explaining to McNamara that even though the president wanted “to have the Europeans pull their own weight,” the administration should be careful not to create the perception of a US withdrawal by replacing American units in Europe with allied divisions.47 The December 1962 NATO ministerial meeting, like that in Athens, Greece, in May 1962, left de Gaulle and Adenauer critical of US “high-handedness” over alliance strategy. The British, too, balked at increasing conventional forces, not out of disagreement over strategic doctrine so much as an unwillingness to drain London’s coffers for ground forces and tactical nuclear weapons.48 In the end, disenchantment with American conceptions of NATO strategy was the decisive factor in Adenauer’s seeking a bilateral accord with France. On 22 January 1963, the chancellor and de Gaulle met in Paris for a tête-à-tête that concluded with an initialing of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. Although the treaty covered cooperation in economic and cultural affairs, their talks

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were dominated by de Gaulle’s contempt and Adenauer’s irritation at the Kennedy administration’s European defense policies. Adenauer declared that “for the past eighteen or nineteen years, the Americans have wished to prove their superiority and intelligence to the world, and especially their elders in Europe.” De Gaulle agreed that Kennedy, in particular, had floundered in world leadership. “His brother Robert [Kennedy] is the more serious and consistent of the two,” the general added. The real bête-noire for both elder statesmen was Robert McNamara, whom they considered arrogant and politically naive. They thought McNamara was mistaken to implement a NATO strategy based on graduated responses in Europe where the Soviets had 22 ground divisions and would not so easily back down.49 When Adenauer raised the delicate question of Franco-German nuclear collaboration, de Gaulle was politely evasive. The chancellor denied wanting atomic weapons at that moment, but he asked the French president’s views on future nuclear research and development. De Gaulle answered that “if disarmament fails between Russia and America, the day will come when Germany will want atomic weapons; other nations will, also.”50 The French president assured Adenauer that the force de frappe would be for the defense of Germany and Europe. French nuclear weapons, not increased allied conventional divisions, de Gaulle asserted, would deter the Soviet Union. De Gaulle’s double jeu of trying to establish Anglo-French nuclear collaboration while solidifying a Paris–Bonn entente further illustrates the duplicity behind French demands for tripartism. The general preached tripartism but practiced bilateralism. During the Cuban missile crisis, French defense minister Pierre Messmer and British defense minister Peter Thorneycroft discussed bilateral armaments collaboration and continued to flirt with the quid pro quo of British entrance into the EEC for nuclear aid for French weapons systems.51 The British government set two preconditions to any deal: admission to the Common Market before collaboration and US acquiescence to Anglo-French nuclear cooperation.52 In early December 1962, when the French government learned that the United States planned to pull the plug on the Skybolt missile project, it became increasingly hopeful that Britain would become more eager for bilateral nuclear collaboration with France.


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Offered to Britain in March 1960 by the Eisenhower administration, Skybolt was a long-range missile with a highly complex guidance system designed for firing from British V-bomber aircraft rather than from land or sea. The British viewed it as important because it would keep the Royal Air Force’s increasingly obsolescent Vbombers viable for another decade.53 When de Gaulle and Macmillan met at Rambouillet in midDecember 1962, the French president expected the prime minister to make some move toward him about cooperating on nuclear defense issues and, as one French official later explained, “was very disappointed that Macmillan had not responded.”54 Macmillan, however, had decided against Anglo-French nuclear collaboration. Six months before he had appointed a committee headed by his trusted personal secretary Philip de Zulueta to study the issue. Before going to France, the committee informed him that it was “unable to see any fruitful possibilities of Anglo-French cooperation” because France was overly determined to keep its nuclear deterrent independent of the alliance. Also, there were too many risks of compromising the NATO system of intelligence were Britain and France to set up a joint targeting program.55 At Nassau in late December 1962, Macmillan, having spurned French overtures for bilateral nuclear collaboration, readily accepted the Kennedy administration’s offer of Polaris missiles as a counter-offer to Skybolt.56 Kennedy also intended to offer France a similar arrangement, but was undermined by George Ball, an opposition unknown to the president. In early January 1963, Ball met with Couve and offered Polaris under a multilateral, not multinational, arrangement – a distinction that rendered the offer unacceptable to the French government because the Polaris-based MLF would be under mixed-manned NATO control rather than in national control.57 The Anglo-American deal not only removed the possibility of the French and British developing an independent European striking force but also gave impetus to the detested US proposal for a MLF, regarded as a device to perpetuate US military dominance and stifle an independent force de frappe.58 When Ball met with West German officials in Bonn to elicit a commitment to a MLF, he received a tepid response. Adenauer used the meeting as an opportunity to denounce US defense strategy, especially the call for increased conventional weapons. The

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chancellor, incidentally, brought a record of his conversation with Ball to Paris for his talks with de Gaulle in mid-January 1963, which culminated in the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. Ball rivaled McNamara as the US official most disliked by de Gaulle and Adenauer.59 De Gaulle was not loved by most US officials. On 14 January 1963, during the French president’s weekly press conference, he added to his reputation for imperviousness and non-cooperation by announcing a double non. He not only vetoed Great Britain’s entrance into the Common Market but also denounced the US proposal for a MLF within NATO. A week later, he signed the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship.

Conclusion De Gaulle’s vetoes and his crafting of an entente with West Germany showed that he was momentarily the master of the European agenda. The timing of the treaty tied West Germany more firmly to France and directed West Europe’s two major powers on a course independent of the United States.60 De Gaulle envisioned the bilateral accord as a way to prevent US global meddling. In economic matters, he intended for Franco-German cooperation to dominate EEC policy and replace Atlantic Community burdensharing formulae toward the lesser developed countries with bilateral aid. In defense areas, de Gaulle expected the FrancoGerman treaty to throw a wrench in US plans for a MLF and coordinate resistance to a NATO conventional weapons build-up.61 The Berlin–Cuban missile crisis set the stage for de Gaulle’s double non and the signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. The Cuban ordeal reinforced Franco-American differences that had emerged when the Berlin Wall was erected. For both the French and American governments, Berlin was the prism through which the Cuban crisis was seen and the crucible in which their divergent European strategies were forged.

8 Debating Détente

“Talking with de Gaulle was like crawling up a mountainside on your knees, opening a little portal at the top, and waiting for the oracle to speak.” US Secretary of State Dean Rusk1 Rusk’s recollection captures the standard interpretation of the American reaction to de Gaulle’s double non and signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. The French president, the arguments runs, shocked Kennedy with an unexpected veto, which ended the Anglo-Saxon “grand design” for an economically and militarily integrated Western Europe.2 This standard account of de Gaulle’s actions and Kennedy’s reaction, however, is too simple and is not supported by documentary evidence. The French president’s veto of Britain’s EEC candidacy and his rejection of the US offer of Polaris missiles was not the abrupt shock that Kennedy advisers later maintained. At least two days before the double non, the Kennedy administration received reports that “de Gaulle, at a press conference on Monday, will reject the Nassau offer.”3 Moreover, de Gaulle’s double non, by itself, did not disturb the president. Kennedy’s national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, reminded him that “the British entry into the Common Market, while important and desirable, has never been the first object of our policy in Europe, nor even a matter in which we could expect to have decisive influence.” Bundy pointed out that “the specific defense of Berlin and the general defense of NATO” had been, and remained, the primary US objective.4 The conventional view of de Gaulle’s double non as the climax of 143

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a “grand design” drama misrepresents US priorities toward Europe. Although Kennedy’s advisers agreed that the Soviet threat to Berlin had subsided, they worried about the effects of de Gaulle’s decisions on NATO and wider Cold War European settlement. Historically, the United States regarded European integration as a vehicle for the double containment of Germany and the Soviet Union. The FrancoGerman Treaty of Friendship potentially disrupted that strategy. US policymakers questioned whether Adenauer intended to follow de Gaulle’s lead in altering the integrated command structure of NATO. They also worried about possible policies that a FrancoGerman bloc might pursue toward the Soviet Union. Although Adenauer never planned or spoke of substituting a Franco-German entente for US protection under NATO, the Kennedy administration misread the treaty as a Faustian bargain. Many of Kennedy’s advisers spent the president’s last year in office grappling with the tension between securing West German allegiance to the American conception of NATO strategy and pursuing a settlement with the Soviet Union that stabilized Central Europe. Those goals were not inherently incompatible. Yet during 1963, Kennedy increasingly articulated either/or dichotomies by declaring, for example, that “unless we make clear our opposition to the Franco-German treaty, we would not be able to make clear to the Germans that they faced a choice between working with the French or working with us.”5 As the goals of double containment became enmeshed in the multilateral relationships of the Atlantic alliance, US strategies for containing Germany and the Soviet Union no longer worked in tandem. Despite de Gaulle’s rhetoric of a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, the French president opposed a continental and global détente during Kennedy’s presidency. At a cabinet meeting in February 1963, de Gaulle exclaimed in exasperation that Americans accused him of seeking a separate European settlement when “ce sont les Américains qui sont neutralistes!”6 The de Gaulle of the early 1960s was quite different from the one of 1966, remembered as the first Western head of state to visit Moscow during the Cold War. The contrast deserves note because it demonstrates divergent Franco-American views about the Cold War strategy of double containment of the Soviet Union and Germany. For de Gaulle during the early 1960s, curbing and co-opting West German power

Debating Détente

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was a prerequisite to containing the Soviet Union, and only possible by meeting Bonn’s demands vis-à-vis Moscow. Because Adenauer opposed any form of Ostpolitik, whether normalizing Soviet–German trade, recognizing East Germany and the postWorld War II borders, or accepting the status quo in Central Europe, a European settlement was out of the question from de Gaulle’s perspective. After all, the General’s strategy for French dominance in Europe was predicated on a “partnership,” albeit unequal, with West Germany in a subordinate role. De Gaulle’s leverage with Adenauer depended on opposition to any form of Ostpolitik, and as Adenauer lamented on more than one occasion, “We are the victims of American détente policy.”7 Whereas de Gaulle viewed containing Germany and the Soviet Union as separate but reinforcing goals, Kennedy fused the strategies into a genuinely double policy. In other words, for the Kennedy administration, it was less a matter of first tying the Federal Republic of Germany to the West and then containing the Soviet Union. Instead, the Kennedy administration’s twin strategy of containment required fine calibration so that the United States could avoid having to assign priority to one or the other. Kennedy failed to provide that deft management. Because the German question was the principal Cold War issue in Europe, the US president regarded West Germany less as an actor and more as the object upon which to act. Kennedy and many of his key advisers regarded a lowering of tensions with the Soviet Union as a way to settle the problem of Berlin and “normalize” the German question. As a consequence of Franco-American differences during 1963, however, the limits of a détente in Europe, like US policies toward the continent in general, reflected the role played by Gaullist officials, who aptly described themselves using the analogy of the Lilliputians who thwarted the fictitious giant, Gulliver.8

Divergent views over the future of Europe The contrasting perspectives of Washington and Paris on defining and debating the merits of détente with the Soviet Union affected the future of the Cold War in Europe. Ironically considering de Gaulle’s opposition later in the decade, Kennedy’s search for a European settlement in 1963 was partially motivated by fear that

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the French president would pursue a separate détente with the Soviets. Kennedy revealed his early conception of what détente meant when he asked his National Security Council to “look now at the contingency of de Gaulle trying to run [the US] out of Europe by means of a deal with the Russians.“9 Kennedy’s advisers were vague about precisely how that scenario would unfold. They suspected a French-inspired European settlement that reunified Germany as a way to force US troops from the continent. They also worried that de Gaulle contemplated establishing a European defense system that excluded the United States. In the wake of de Gaulle’s January decisions, the Kennedy administration received disturbing, though unfounded, reports that the French government was pursuing a separate European East–West settlement. Wellplaced Gaullist deputies, including former prime minister Michel Debré, told various European officials that de Gaulle had conducted secret talks with Soviet envoys and “would shortly spring a major surprise on his Western Allies.”10 Within the Department of Defense, suspicion about de Gaulle’s alleged plans generated US proposals for preempting the French president from negotiating a separate European settlement with the Soviets.11 Kennedy’s anxiety over a French-led European détente settlement with the Soviet Union reflected a misreading of de Gaulle’s motives behind the Franco-German treaty. De Gaulle and Adenauer solidified a rapprochement out of frustration with NATO strategy and a belief that the US commitment to Europe was waning. Before the treaty, de Gaulle worried that the Soviets and Americans would reach an agreement over the fate of Germany without consulting France.12 Although de Gaulle and Adenauer misperceived the strength of the US commitment to European security when they signed a treaty, their accord generated the very possibility in Washington that they feared. When asking the NSC to examine the implications of the treaty, Kennedy fumed that “if it appears that the Europeans are getting ready to throw us out of Europe, we want to be in a position to march out.” He therefore wanted “the narrower interests” of the United States considered.13 Kennedy’s threat of withdrawing US troops from Western Europe was familiar tactic. Like previous instances when the president sought a counter-threat to anticipated French moves against

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American policies, Kennedy was merely expressing frustration at a Franco-German axis rather than seriously suggesting an about-face in US policy toward Western Europe.14 Nevertheless, he received a welter of suggestions from his anointed “best and brightest” that echoed his generalized fears. Advisers within the Pentagon called into question the level of commitment that should be maintained in Western Europe, often in tandem with concern over the severity of the balance of payments deficit.15 Contrary to American fears, there was no separate French pursuit of a European settlement with the Soviets. After signing the accord with West Germany, de Gaulle enjoyed incurring the Kremlin’s wrath for being “seduced by German propaganda.”16 He was also pleased when the Soviets mocked his pursuit of a Europe européenne and voiced concern that the treaty did not serve “la cause de la détente.”17 Recently open records at the diplomatic archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs show that consistently throughout 1963, French officials rejected that term and made references to une fausse détente and une détente fausse, a distinction that was more than semantic. By une fausse détente, French officials meant that the timing was unpropitious for easing international tensions, especially in light of the ongoing Berlin crisis. De Gaulle frowned upon the West’s even talking about a Cold War thaw. Like French resistance to Berlin negotiations during the previous two years, skepticism about Soviet intentions made France reject a “false path to détente.” In late February 1963, Charles Bohlen, who had replaced General James Gavin as US ambassador to France, asked Couve de Murville if de Gaulle would object to arms control talks between the United States and Soviet Union. Couve argued that the Kremlin sought those talks to reopen the Berlin question. For a genuine easing of tensions the French government placed a higher premium on Soviet actions than on dialogue, and Soviet moves since Khrushchev’s first ultimatum over Berlin in 1958 made France highly suspicious of engaging or negotiating with Moscow. Sharing Adenauer’s trepidation that “Kennedy seemed eager for a détente,” the French government worried that “the Americans might be inclined to make concessions over Berlin.”18 By une détente fausse, French officials meant a fraudulent term evoked by the superpowers to maintain global dominance. The

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French government often viewed Cold War confrontations as the outcome of both “U.S.–Soviet global rivalry and superpower complicity.” As a result, competition between the superpowers pulled their respective allies and neutral nations into dangerous conflicts, as the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated. Gaullists also felt that superpower rivalry did not preclude a degree of complicity. They believed, for example, that the United States and Soviet Union sought a condominium of power in order to deprive other nations of atomic weapons. A test ban treaty, under the guise of relaxing tensions, maintained US–Soviet nuclear superiority and global hegemony. French officials concluded that the superpowers’ emerging détente politique would contain France’s development of an independent nuclear weapons capability.19

Détente and the multilateral nuclear force (MLF) While de Gaulle viewed the Franco-German treaty of 1963 as a way to assert independence from the global dominance and une détente fausse of the superpowers, the accord left the Kennedy administration in a dilemma between reconciling a nuclear test ban disagreement and a NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF). The treaty between France and West Germany renewed the Kennedy administration’s fears about nuclear collaboration between those two allies and the possibility of a Franco-German nuclear force working at cross-purposes with the NATO command structure. In conversations with his British confidant, Ambassador OrmsbyGore, Kennedy expressed “acute anxiety” that West Germany would supply technical support and assistance in building delivery systems in return for French production of nuclear warheads as a way to build a European nuclear force outside NATO.20 After the Nassau agreement between Britain and the United States over Polaris missiles, the Soviets protested the creation of the MLF as a contradiction of Anglo-American calls for nuclear non-proliferation. Khrushchev argued that a NATO nuclear-sharing scheme would “lead not to creating conditions facilitating general and complete disarmament . . . but to further intensification of [the] arms race.”21 The Kremlin stepped up its opposition to the MLF, arguing that West Germany would divert part of the sea-based Polaris force for use against the USSR, even though the NATO

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submarine force would be ostensibly under multilateral manning and control with an American veto over its use. Dobrynin warned that creating the MLF might dash hope for a nuclear test ban agreement.22 The tension between nuclear non-proliferation and thwarting West German access to atomic weapons reflected a clash of priorities within the US double containment strategy for the Soviet Union and Germany. The cluster of Department of State theologians, including Ball and Rusk who pushed the MLF, believed that containing West German nuclear ambitions should take precedence, since progress toward a test ban agreement was unlikely in the near future. After all, they argued, negotiations for a test ban treaty had been going on intermittently and unsuccessfully in Geneva since 1957. The most recent round of talks had collapsed in July 1962 over underground test verification, which the Soviet Union opposed in its territories.23 The theologians saw greater urgency in ensuring West German fidelity to the MLF than pursuing a test ban with the Soviet Union. They insisted that the administration’s tepid support of the NATO submarine project be replaced with salesmanship. The signing of the Franco-German treaty increased the theologians’ urgency to satisfy West German nuclear ambitions. In March and early April 1963, Kennedy sent a special representative, Livingston Merchant, to the NATO capitals, except Paris, in what ultimately proved a futile attempt to sell the supposed merits of a MLF to the West European allies.24 Given de Gaulle’s double non, the United States did not expect French participation in the NATO project. In April 1963, in the first high-level Franco-American contact since the general’s fateful press conference, Couve questioned Rusk about the administration’s faulty logic behind the MLF since NATO’s current operations and chain of command would remain unchanged. How then, Couve asked, would allied requests for nuclear sharing be met? Rusk argued that a MLF was primarily for the political purpose of providing West Germany with access to nuclear weapons without giving them independent authority to use those forces. Rusk insisted that by providing the Federal Republic of Germany inclusion in targeting, programming, and command arrangements for the MLF, Bonn would be less inclined to seek independent nuclear capability.25

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At best, US officials hoped France would not turn the other allies against the MLF. Although the United States feared France would poison allied attitudes, de Gaulle was simply more vocal than other allies in his repudiation of the project. Moreover, de Gaulle’s views on the MLF were conflicting. At times, he stated that France certainly would not join the project, but he did not care if the other allies participated. At other times, he intimated that he did not want the West Germans to join.26 Macmillan shared France’s doubts about how the MLF would satisfy West Germany’s “incipient appetite for the nuclear.” The prime minister believed the French understood Adenauer’s motivations better than the Americans. The West Germans might temporarily accept an illusion of nuclear sharing offered by the MLF while they pursued other avenues to real control of nuclear weapons. He believed Kennedy’s advisers were foolish to dismiss French views of the project.27 The “seaworthiness” and viability of a MLF hinged on British participation. Macmillan’s cabinet doubted the feasibility of the mixed-manned component. One British official wryly noted that “the macabre surface vessels, with their lethal cargoes, their crews chattering away in languages incomprehensible to one another, and the ships’ stores stocked with everything from stout to ouzo, made perfect targets for bureaucratic sniping.”28 The British found the MLF a luxury they could not afford and one with dubious political and military value to either West Germany or NATO. During late spring 1963, the British cabinet decided that “it would be to our advantage to defer for as long as possible a decision on the question whether we should contribute to a force of this nature.”29 Like the British, the West Germans oscillated between skepticism and resistance to the MLF. Bonn questioned how Germany could afford an increase in conventional forces and participation in the MLF. The West German government preferred a NATO-controlled land-based MRBM force, which the United States rejected in the summer of 1962. After the December 1962 Nassau agreement, Adenauer often called the MLF “the unfortunate Christmas gift.” West German officials realized it created tension with France, even though de Gaulle often sneered that “it is your affair.” Although West German officials expressed doubts about the MLF, the

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Kennedy administration believed that Bonn would join rather than have no access to nuclear weapons at all.30 Although the Department of State continued to sell the supposed merits of the MLF abroad, President Kennedy waffled in his commitment to the project. Ormsby-Gore recalled Kennedy’s awareness of allied uncertainty and declared that “it wasn’t indecisiveness; it was that he wished to be absolutely clear in his mind in which direction we ought to go before he threw his full weight behind it.”31 With the Joint Chiefs of Staff questioning its strategic value and, with none of the allies unequivocally committed, the president never resolved his own position.32 By the summer 1963, Kennedy’s indecision about the MLF deepened as he grappled with assigning relative priority to relaxing tensions with Moscow through a test ban treaty and thwarting West German independent access to atomic weapons. The questionable merits of the NATO sea-borne project convinced him that it was an inadequate mechanism for containing German nuclear ambitions. Kennedy shifted alliance tactics and decided that pressing Bonn to water down the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship during its ratification by the Bundestag was a more convincing litmus test of West German commitment to NATO than the MLF. Kennedy ventured to the Federal Republic in late June 1963, as part of a European tour that excluded France. He always preferred, in Wilsonian fashion, to speak over the European heads of state to the masses and hoping to put a spoke in the Franco-German wheel, and the highlight of his trip was his “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech, which received such an enthusiastic, almost hysterical, reception that Kennedy later remarked privately that if he had called upon the crowd “to cross into East Germany and pull down that wall, they all would have gone.”33 The president hoped his visit would symbolize his commitment to Berlin. Yet even a few weeks before Kennedy’s trip, on 16 May 1963, the West Germans attached a preamble to the Franco-German treaty that required the Federal Republic to maintain close relations with the United States and to adhere to integrated forces within NATO. In defense matters, the Kennedy administration was convinced the treaty ultimately represented merely “un exercice de symboles.”34 Even so, the United States underestimated the working relationship between France and Germany. Adenauer was as skillful as de

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Gaulle in elevating his nation’s power by capitalizing on friction within the Atlantic alliance. In an interview with the American journalist Cyrus Sulzberger, the chancellor observed that “acting with France, Germany can exert greater influence in international affairs; without France, we cannot.”35 The chancellor realized that de Gaulle cared little for West German interests except in terms of French ambitions to lead Europe. Adenauer took advantage of de Gaulle’s distrust of German intentions toward the Soviet Union by procuring his support in opposing East–West negotiations for a nuclear free zone in Central Europe and related European security issues. During the summer and fall of 1963, the two elder European statesmen used each other to thwart American initiatives toward détente and a European settlement.

Détente and the test ban treaty Whereas de Gaulle seemed temporarily hooked on the single horn of West Germany, Kennedy was cognizant of both horns of the double containment dilemma. Shortly before leaving for the European tour that included a stop in Berlin, President Kennedy delivered a commencement address at American University. With stirring rhetoric, he called on the United States and Soviet Union to reexamine their attitudes toward the Cold War. Kennedy did not evoke the term détente but spoke primarily about avoiding nuclear conflagration. He expressed hope for arms control and called for a resumption of test ban negotiations. He also insisted that “increased understanding will require increased contact and communication.”36 Kennedy’s tentative search for a détente generally meant easing East-West security anxieties. The Cuban missile crisis and fear of a concurrent Berlin confrontation compelled him to lessen the dangers of nuclear destruction. From his standpoint, the Berlin problem – of paramount concern to Adenauer and de Gaulle – was only one barometer of Cold War tensions for Washington. Kennedy was willing to engage in dialogue with the Soviet Union on issues separate from Berlin and other global flashpoints. As negotiations for a test ban gained momentum with the Soviets, President Kennedy’s already waning interest in the MLF further declined. In essence, he accorded higher priority to easing tensions

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with the Soviets than thwarting German access to nuclear weapons through the dubious NATO project. The Kremlin reiterated that the MLF was incompatible with the goal of nuclear non-proliferation. Soviet officials rejected US assurances that Washington would retain a veto over the MLF. They argued, quite rightly, that “no nation really wished for an MLF except the Germans who welcomed it as a first step toward enlarging and ultimately acquiring their own control over nuclear weapons.”37 The Department of State theologians who pushed an Atlantic Community worried that the MLF would be sacrificed for a nuclear test ban. They used the same logic as earlier in the year when the US faced the quandary of reconciling the two policies. Rostow argued that the United States “would be wrong to trade the MLF for a test ban treaty. Quite aside from the fact that we would, in my view, be trading something real for something, taken by itself, without content, we have explicitly promised our European friends not to do that in our non-diffusion discussions.”38 The Department of State, however, misrepresented allied sentiment. De Gaulle, of course, cared nothing about the MLF. Macmillan felt relieved that US interest in the project was diminishing. Moreover, he had always been a more consistent proponent of a test ban agreement than Kennedy, and the prime minister hoped the president would sacrifice the MLF if necessary to secure a treaty banning nuclear tests.39 Although Adenauer continued to go along with the MLF scheme, he did so only because there was no alternative for gaining access to nuclear weapons. The chancellor was less concerned about a possible rejection of the MLF than he was about the wider political implications of a test ban treaty. He was disturbed by Khrushchev’s linkage of treaty talks to a proposed NATO–Warsaw non-aggression pact. Bonn disapproved of a pact because it would internationally acknowledge East Germany, legitimize a divided Germany, and possibly “de-nuclearize” Central Europe.40 Adenauer developed a tacit understanding with de Gaulle. The chancellor would oppose a test ban treaty, which de Gaulle viewed as an impediment to a force de frappe, in exchange for the general’s resistance to a non-aggression pact. France’s nascent nuclear weapons program was dependent on atmospheric testing. The West German and French governments were suspicious of Soviet insis-

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tence on a pact because it resurrected the German question, which had been relatively quiet all year. The two European allies suspected a Soviet change in tactics to force the removal of Western troops from Berlin. They also feared that a test ban and East–West pact would lead to a Soviet–American condominium over Europe.41 The proposed non-aggression pact polarized the Atlantic alliance. At the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council in late May 1963, the subject dominated the agenda. The United States was willing to accept an accord as an insignificant gesture that “would do no harm and would show some people in Moscow that East–West agreement on something was possible.” In terms of concrete objectives, US secretary of state Dean Rusk believed a pact would make a renewed Berlin crisis less likely. The British embraced a non-aggression pact enthusiastically. Lord Douglas Home, British secretary of state for foreign affairs, remarked that he “did not see how one could bring about a détente with the Soviets – if the Russians want one – without giving serious consideration to something like an NAP.” The French and West Germans vehemently objected to the Anglo-Saxon arguments. They declared that a pact would remove Berlin from four-power control and place it under UN auspices. Moreover, legitimizing the East German regime would preclude future reunification. West German foreign minister Gerhard Schroeder concluded that “it would be better to continue the relative tension that exists today rather than pay the price for a détente which would be no real détente because no problem would have been solved.”42 On one level, French and West German officials were astute about Soviet motives. The Soviets had presented a draft non-aggression agreement on several occasions during 1962.43 After the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev pressed more seriously for a pact. The brinkmanship in the Caribbean did not so much end the Berlin crisis as it ended the Soviet “shock treatment” tactics. Since Khrushchev’s first ultimatum in 1958, he had often referred to Berlin “as a foot corn, on which he could apply pressure whenever the need arose.”44 By 1963, a proposed non-aggression pact replaced the threat of a separate peace treaty with East Germany as a tactic to legitimize the Kremlin’s hold on the GDR. Khrushchev explained to Kennedy that “these proposals only fix the situation which has developed as a result of World War II.”45

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Many American scholars have adopted the French and West German explanation that an intricate web of linkages bound the Berlin problem, Germany’s non-nuclear status and a test ban treaty. They point to Khrushchev’s proposal for a concurrent test ban and non-aggression pact negotiations as evidence. The goal of Soviet détente initiatives for a European settlement, the arguments runs, was US acceptance of a non-nuclear status of West Germany.46 The question of causality between superpower détente initiatives, such as a test ban treaty, and the search for a European settlement in 1963, however, is difficult to establish. Because Soviet materials remain largely closed on Germany and the Berlin crisis of the early 1960s, scholars are missing a critical piece of the puzzle. And because dictatorships are inherently secretive, motives always appear more “complex” than they actually are. Khrushchev was erratic, and his method of conducting foreign affairs was less a clever linkage of policies than an attempt to achieve as many disparate objectives as possible at a time. In July 1963, Khrushchev listed a panoply of détente proposals: a non-aggression pact, decreased arms budgets, troop reductions in the two parts of Germany, and a solution to the problems of Berlin and Germany that would make possible complete disarmament. He sought to stabilize East–West relations, especially in Central Europe.47 The Soviet premier wished to conclude a non-aggression pact and a test ban agreement before talks with the Chinese, scheduled for late July. To secure both measures would demonstrate for Chairman Mao Zedong the viability of “peaceful co-existence.”48 Khrushchev was not alone in worrying about Chinese foreign policy objectives. By mid-1963, the Kennedy administration turned increased attention to the specter of communist China and the likelihood of its developing nuclear capability, either independently or through Sino-Soviet collaboration. US officials also worried about China’s expansion into Southeast Asia. Several of the president’s advisers argued, however, that the problem of China and the SinoSoviet dispute could converge favorably into a test ban treaty. Kaysen, and former ambassador to the Soviet Union and administration troubleshooter, Averell Harriman, explained that the Kremlin disliked the Chinese threat to the Soviet Union’s international communist leadership and also feared China’s developing a nuclear bomb. They believed that a test ban treaty could bolster the

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Soviet policy of thwarting the Chinese nuclear program by withholding technical assistance for testing.49 US officials understood that a test ban treaty’s effect on world opinion was insufficient to impede China’s nuclear development. In mid-July 1963, during eight-day test ban negotiations in Moscow, the concern over of China’s nuclear capability was the modus operandus of Kennedy’s special envoy, Averell Harriman. Precisely what lay behind Kennedy’s instructions and Harriman’s oblique references to Soviet or US action as a “means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development” is inconclusive, but it was possible that the Kennedy administration contemplated, even proposed, a joint Soviet–American preemptive air strike against China’s nuclear facilities.50 Distrust over inspections for underground nuclear testing posed the most serious obstacle for Harriman and British negotiator, Lord Hailsham, minister of science. For over a year, representatives of the three major nuclear powers had haggled interminably over a verification system under the highly technical terminology of “internationally supervised nationally-manned control sites.” Lord Hailsham was authorized to accept a risk of some cheating by the signatories in order to achieve a comprehensive agreement. Harriman understood, however, that American public opinion was less favorable than British toward a treaty. The Kennedy administration expected stiff congressional opposition to any test ban, and did not want to jeopardize ratification of a treaty by the US Senate. Rather than argue incessantly over the need for inspections for underground tests, the Soviet, British, and American delegates settled for a limited test ban treaty that covered nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater.51 Without the accession of other nations, any type of test ban was an inadequate diplomatic tool for curbing nuclear proliferation. By the time the US Senate ratified the limited test ban treaty in October 1963, 107 countries had embraced it. Communist China and France, however, withheld their signatures. Gaullist advisers rejected the Kennedy administration’s rationale for a treaty. To Couve and other high-ranking French officials, the worsening SinoSoviet dispute suggested that the Kremlin was losing influence on its Chinese comrades. Kennedy argued to Couve that the Soviets could coerce China to end its nuclear program if America obtained

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de Gaulle’s signature to sign a treaty. Couve knew, however, that accession to a treaty which forbade nuclear testing necessary for a force de frappe was ludicrous to de Gaulle.52 In an effort to secure French accession to the test ban treaty, Kennedy reopened the question of nuclear sharing. Bundy and Pentagon advisers encouraged the president to recognize France under the Atomic Energy Act, which meant that new legislation would no longer be required in order to grant that nation nuclear assistance. The French and British governments would, therefore, share the same nuclear status vis-à-vis the United States. Kennedy, however, specified three conditions for US aid: insistence that France sign the test ban treaty and discontinue atmospheric testing; stronger commitment to NATO; and participation in “a cooperative effort” such as the MLF to satisfy the nuclear desires of West Germany and other non-nuclear NATO countries.53 The contradictions inherent in offering nuclear aid to France as a way to secure de Gaulle’s signature on the limited test ban treaty revealed confused US objectives regarding nuclear non-proliferation. The theologians rightly pointed out that if containing the nuclear aspirations of communist nations was the primary US goal, giving France atomic assistance would provide the Soviets justification for a similar bilateral agreement with Communist China. And if providing nuclear assistance extracted de Gaulle’s commitment to the MLF, the president could expect Khrushchev to oppose nuclear sharing as a contradiction to non-proliferation, especially when the Franco-Germany Treaty of Friendship made the Kremlin suspicious of de Gaulle’s and Adenauer’s motives. Finally, how would Adenauer react to a tripartite Western nuclear club that kept West Germany in an inferior position?54 The president failed to resolve the inconsistencies and clash of priorities that manifested during the early 1960s in the traditional American strategy of double containment. He clung to the simplistic view that a blanket policy, in this case a test ban treaty, could satisfy multiple objectives. In reality, the traditional US strategy of double containment needed refinement. The debate within the Kennedy administration over the merits of giving France nuclear assistance proved unnecessary because de Gaulle rejected aid offered with strings attached. He resented Kennedy’s toying with him by dangling the carrot of nuclear assis-

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tance whenever he sought French assent to American policies. Most importantly, Kennedy’s conditional offer was incompatible with French nuclear strategy, which was predicated on an independent force de frappe. On 2 August 1963, in a terse response to Kennedy, de Gaulle declared that France would continue nuclear testing until a hydrogen bomb was developed.55 Adenauer objected to a test ban because if East Germany signed, it would legitimize the communist regime. In the early 1960s, no Western nation recognized East Germany, but its signature on an international treaty would give it de facto recognition. In the end, he reluctantly signed the treaty because without a West German national nuclear program, he had no justification for withholding his country’s signature. Moreover, the chancellor had secured American promises to separate a test ban agreement from a nonaggression pact during the Moscow negotiations for a test ban that began on 15 July 1963.56 During the ten days in Moscow, Harriman succeeded in deferring discussions for an East–West non-aggression pact to a later date. He and other Kennedy advisers were themselves ambivalent about such an agreement. On the one hand, they viewed it as a concession to the Soviets; on the other hand, it could serve as a possible diplomatic tool to stabilize Central Europe by ending danger of a renewed Berlin confrontation. After initialing a test ban treaty, Harriman gave the president confusing advice: “I’m not saying we ought to sign a nonaggression pact. I’m saying we ought to take this thing seriously and carry on discussions in good faith and see whether we can allow a decision.” Harriman, who understood Soviet motives and objectives perhaps better than anyone within the administration, worried that without some form of a non-aggression agreement, the Sino-Soviet dispute might force Khrushchev to revert to a pre-test ban, bellicose attitude. Kennedy’s advisers also regarded a non-aggression pact as both a means of containing the Soviet Union and transforming the East European bloc. Harriman explained that “instead of keeping Eastern Europe in turmoil, the more stability there is the more chance there is of it becoming free.” He thought the Soviets were “loosening the bonds” of its satellites, at least economically and socially, and Harriman viewed stability in Europe as the key to the ultimate political and military “liberation” of the communist states. In that respect, détente represented a potential policy of transformation.57

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Yet a non-aggression pact threatened Western unity. Kennedy never sought détente to displace European integration as a form of double containment. The combination of French and West German opposition to a pact forced Kennedy to alter the direction of US policies toward stabilizing Europe. The president was outraged by the French position. He felt that if de Gaulle joined the British and Americans, the three allies might then coerce the West Germans into accepting a pact. An East–West agreement not to engage in hostilities could preserve Western rights to Berlin while lowering the risk of war – objectives proclaimed by de Gaulle. Kennedy was convinced that the only reason the French president sided with Adenauer was to gain the upper hand in the Franco-American rivalry for West German allegiance. The president was further infuriated that Adenauer could be seduced into viewing de Gaulle “as the protector of Germany.” Kennedy privately exclaimed, “this is a farce we’re putting up with!” After all, French foreign minister Pierre Messmer had told US officials on numerous occasions that a force de frappe was for the defense of France, not Germany. Kennedy was convinced that de Gaulle told the West Germans whatever they wanted to hear.58 Adenauer, backed by de Gaulle, was relieved that, without their consent for a non-aggression pact, Kennedy was forced to drop the issue with the Soviets. French and West Germans officials, who continued to meet under the auspices of the Treaty of Friendship, agreed that Kennedy’s dismissal of a non-aggression pact signaled a more “realistic attitude” toward the Soviet Union.59 Couve and Schroeder were concerned, however, by Kennedy’s proposal to sell $250 million of wheat to the Soviets, whose own crop had failed. Adenauer publicly criticized the proposed wheat sales. Although Kennedy proceeded with the commercial transaction, Couve and Alphand officials conveyed the general impression of “any détente as pernicious” during a meeting with Ball and Bohlen on 8 October 1963.60

Conclusion The question of détente in Europe within the broader context of relaxing Cold War tensions illustrates the importance of middle powers in determining East–West relations during the early 1960s.

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Kennedy faced continual pressures from France and West Germany that shaped his responses to the Soviet Union, drove a wedge in détente initiatives, and ultimately precluded a European settlement. Throughout 1963, détente remained a nebulous phenomenon infused with superpower mistrust and complicated by allied resistance. East–West dialogue did not alleviate mutual suspicions. The test ban treaty, which was partial, not comprehensive, reflected that mutual mistrust. An expanded Vietnam war loomed, and East–West proxy wars in the Third World – Laos, Yemen, the Congo – obstructed already dubious progress toward a détente in Europe. Talk of a non-aggression pact gradually faded. European relations stabilized but no resolution to either the Berlin problem or the more general question of a divided Germany was on the horizon. Although Khrushchev dropped his threat of a separate peace treaty with the GDR, confrontations in Berlin continued. During the late fall of 1963, the Western occupying powers faced a problem with the Soviets and East Germans over access for military convoys. One of Kennedy’s advisers remarked that the “Berlin flare-up illustrates the way in which spats between us continue to rise” and disproved the belief that the Kennedy administration was “speeding down road toward détente.”61 Adenauer stepped down a month before Kennedy was assassinated. Former minister of finance Ludwig Erhard’s accession to the chancellorship placed US–West German relations on a better footing, while simultaneously eliminating de Gaulle’s ability to cast West German policies as a choice between France and the United States. Not until the early 1970s would the former mayor of West Berlin Willy Brandt become chancellor and pursue Ostpolitik, which normalized Soviet–German trade, recognized the East German regime and post-World War II borders, and generally stabilized Central Europe. During the last months of 1963, Adenauer remained the leader of the ruling party, the Christian Democratic Union, and West German foreign policy adhered to the firm nonrecognition policy of East Germany that had prevailed during his long tenure.62 On 21 November 1963, the day before Kennedy’s assassination, in his first meeting with new West German chancellor, Erhard, de Gaulle denounced the possibility of a détente with Soviets, principally over concern about Berlin and future German reunification. In

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his view, the US “strategy of peace,” as the French president derisively called détente, jeopardized both issues.63 De Gaulle, of course, was in no hurry to see Germany reunified. Only a few months before, when British officials asked him whether his initiatives toward West Germany suggested that he favored reunification, he scoffed, “the Germans will always be Germans” – meaning they could never be trusted.64 Yet reassuring the West German leaders of French commitment to West Germany’s protection was critical to his larger strategy of institutionalizing a rapprochement, which would provide him levers of influence through bilateral consultation and coordination of policies. The French president’s efforts to sign a treaty with West Germany and his resistance to Ostpolitik reflected his fears of a post-Adenauer government.65 During the early 1960s, the limits of détente underscored French and American distinctions between appropriate means and ends for Western policies toward the Soviet Union. Invoked cautiously by Kennedy and disapprovingly by de Gaulle, détente reflected divergent containment aims and differing tactics. For the French president, détente was an objective, not a tactic. The ongoing Berlin crisis, which ebbed and flowed, compelled him to see initiatives, such as a non-aggression pact, as merely a change in Soviet tactics to force the West from Berlin, or as a fraudulent means to an unacceptable end. Once the Soviets stopped trying to end Western rights in Berlin and in other regions, de Gaulle was willing to accept a détente with the Soviets. Relaxed international tensions, in his view, could then create an atmosphere conducive to resolving East–West conflicts.66 The general’s position, however, revealed a measure of inconsistency, which inhered in the French security dilemma over Europe. How did de Gaulle expect a French-led European third force to mediate between the superpowers when he did not want any negotiations with the Kremlin? How did he expect to bring about détente before solving the German question? De Gaulle never resolved these questions during the early 1960s. In essence, the French government accepted a de facto détente over Central Europe, but rejected the global nuclear status quo. Determined to develop an independent nuclear capability, de Gaulle was unwilling to accept purportedly peaceful measures such as the test ban treaty, which preserved the US–Soviet nuclear condominium. Preferring to

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perpetuate a divided Germany, de Gaulle was unwilling to negotiate with the Soviets. The Kremlin’s threat to Berlin provided him justification for siding with Adenauer and rejecting Ostpolitik. Kennedy’s conception of détente was equally confusing. Viewing relaxed Cold War tensions as a form of double containment of the Soviet Union and Germany, the president postulated a strategy that could not be sustained given the shift in the alliance toward a stronger Franco-German voice. British confidant, Ambassador Ormsby-Gore described President Kennedy’s general philosophy toward détente: “It would be easier to find areas of agreement when you first of all improved the atmosphere. It was very hard to reach agreements when the atmosphere of distrust was so intense.”67 Distrust, however, permeated both the Atlantic alliance and East–West relations. Kennedy believed that if the West probed the Soviets for arrangements over Berlin and the security of Central Europe, then the allies could create an atmosphere for resolving Cold War disputes. Yet it was those very contentious issues, Berlin and the overall German question, which polarized the Western alliance and generated perpetual East–West enmity. In sum, Franco-American disagreements over the timing and nature of a détente in Europe accentuated the allies’ competing strategies for ensuring Western dominance. In questions of détente, like most alliance issues, Kennedy and de Gaulle worked at crosspurposes.

Conclusion President Kennedy visited Paris only once, but his tours through the West European capitals in May 1961 and June 1963 drew cheering crowds and full publicity. Despite his brief presidency, he spent more time in Western Europe than his two successors – Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon – combined, and was able to create a popular image of solidarity with the “Old World” which masked severe differences in alliance policies. Kennedy’s ability to invoke a lofty vision of an “Atlantic Community” and “Atlantic Partnership” between the United States and Western Europe and the apparent paucity of his accomplishments in Europe has caused many scholars to denounce his administration for a supposed gap between rhetoric and action. While there is always a disjunction between political intentions and policy actions, this book argues that judging Franco-American relations in the early 1960s in terms of an over simplified characterization of promise versus reality is inadequate. Although Kennedy’s youthful arrogance and de Gaulle’s established hubris came to stereotype Franco-American relations, both presidents were mindful of the structural economic and strategic constraints defining their policies for Western Europe. They clung to the promise of dominance inherent in their contrasting strategies for Western Europe but more often spoke of the burdens of the alliance. While the United States strove to mold the Western alliance to its vision of global preeminence, France pursued dominance within Europe as a prelude to expanded international aspirations. Yet these competing geostrategies were constrained by East–West crises and shaped by divergent domestic demands of their national economies. Although many of the broader contours of the Franco-American narrative are well known, this study demonstrates the relationship of economic issues to security concerns in the formulation of US and French policies toward Western Europe. Between 1961 and 1963, the governments of Kennedy and de Gaulle grappled with a host of economic considerations: industrial and agricultural trade, Britain’s proposed entry into the Common Market, balance of 163

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payments disparities, and the Bretton Woods system. At the same time, numerous security problems weighed heavily on the allied leaders: the Berlin crisis, management of nuclear weapons and NATO strategy, the Cuban missile crisis, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and tentative steps toward détente with the Soviet Union. The most obvious fact that emerges from this study is that changing structural bases of economic and strategic power in the early 1960s affected the overall balance of power within the Western alliance. Different circumstances involved new bargains and accommodations, forcing the United States to pay closer attention to West European interests. At the same time, Washington often reacted to French and other allied initiatives rather than leading the West European allies. United States’ difficulties with France and the other major West European allies were hardly a new phenomenon. Since the immediate postwar era, there had been perpetual bargaining among the Western allies to determine NATO policies and economic arrangements. During the early 1960s, however, the United States confronted several new trends, first evident in the last two years of the Eisenhower, but increasingly noticeable during Kennedy’s presidency. First, the United States had to cope with the loss of relative economic leverage over the Western allies. The gold and dollar drain most vividly symbolized that loss but declining American industrial productivity relative to many West European production marked a more severe long-term problem. Second, the Berlin and Cuba crises made the perils of the nuclear era a frightening reality. The exigencies of the nuclear age trapped Kennedy in a crisis mentality and encouraged France and West Germany to aspire to atomic capability. Third, American uncertainty about the implications of the strengthening Franco-German rapprochement, fed Kennedy’s ambivalence about many policies toward Western Europe, especially in defense matters. His administration searched to reconcile the tension between German security anxieties, exacerbated by the Berlin and Cuba crises, and de Gaulle’s resistance to overt US influence in Western Europe. Rather than confronting a simple choice between the two allies, the Kennedy administration worried that alienating either France or West Germany would cause one vexed power to conspire with the other against the United States.

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Kennedy and de Gaulle so linked economic and security policies until they became difficult to separate. The French president flirted with swapping nuclear assistance with Britain for consent to the latter’s entrance into the Common Market. Kennedy contemplated providing nuclear aid to France in return for de Gaulle’s vote to allow Britain into the EEC and his compliance with the present NATO command structure. De Gaulle fed Adenauer’s suspicions that Macmillan’s desire for détente with the Soviets was reason to keep Britain out of the Common Market. Kennedy continued to see the burgeoning US payments deficit as an unfair burden for carrying the bulk of Western Europe’s defense. And despite economic disadvantages posed by Britain’s entrance, Kennedy supported West European integration primarily for the geopolitical reason of the creating an EEC that served as a bulwark of Western unity against Soviet penetration. At times, the Western leaders established false linkages among policies that should have been treated independently. Kennedy’s personal attention was devoted more to security issues concerning Western Europe. As a result, his interest in economic problems related to the continent was greatest when they impacted on security issues. Kennedy, for instance, worried incessantly that the US payments deficit was leverage that France and West Germany could use to force changes in US defense policies in Europe. In fact, Kennedy’s advisers would have been wise to discern where de Gaulle was exploiting US vulnerabilities and where French economic complaints were legitimate. Instead, quarrels over balance of payments arrangements evolved into opposing views about responsibilities for bearing Cold War security commitments in Europe and globally. Similarly, both Kennedy and de Gaulle would have been prudent to separate the issue of nuclear sharing from Britain’s entrance into the Common Market. Instead, Kennedy provoked de Gaulle by using a carrot-and-stick approach with the offer of nuclear aid, and de Gaulle politicized already contentious economic issues. In short, the tendency to establish linkages between economic and security policies transformed many FrancoAmerican disputes over individual issues into more severe multilateral disagreements.

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Implications of US–French policy The larger historical significance of the clash between Kennedy’s and de Gaulle’s European visions and policies are multiple. Western expedients to prop up the tottering international financial edifice of Bretton Woods were merely part of a series of “fire extinguisher” methods pursued intermittently from 1958 to the closing of the gold window in 1971. This book corroborates the thesis that Western policymakers were reluctant to reform the Bretton Woods system because they were captives of history. An economic analog of the Munich syndrome was at work. After World War II, Western policymakers operated from the assumption that they should not negotiate with and thereby appease dictators. In postwar monetary relations, a similar distorted “lesson of history” about the causes of the Great Depression led many Western leaders and central bankers to see currency exchange instability and competitive devaluations as a chief cause of monetary chaos. Franco-American trade disputes during the early 1960s, especially those revolving around Britain’s desire to join the Common Market, highlight a transition in the relationship between the United States and the movement for European unity. The Kennedy years were pivotal from the American perspective because they showed a shift in attitudes toward more wariness about a unified Europe’s effects on the US economy. From a French standpoint, European integration did not supplant or circumvent, as Jean Monnet’s federalists envisioned, the preferences of individual European nation states. In other words, West European unity was viewed as a vehicle for national objectives. Most significantly, now that the Cold War is over, interpretative questions are shifting from why the Cold War ended to why the Cold War lasted as long as it did. The meanings of détente are critical to that question. This analysis offers not a march of Western triumphalism, but a sober inquiry into the protracted nature of the Cold War. Alliance politics affected the timing of détente. Seen in this light, the concept had different starting points for individual countries, which indicates that the middle powers and periphery just as much as the center powers drove détente. The early 1960s are increasingly regarded as the end of one era and the beginning of a new one in terms of East–West relations in Europe. This analysis

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cautions against rash proclamations. The Kennedy years as pivot must be seen in two ways. As a culmination of structural changes in the bases of power within the allied nations, it was an end of an era. As a culmination of changed outcomes – whether a European détente, altered NATO strategies and command structure, or an enlarged Common Market – the Kennedy years are best characterized as a transitional moment in the Atlantic alliance. Finally, to understand Kennedy’s and de Gaulle’s leadership qualities, one must realize that Kennedy’s policies toward Western Europe lacked clarity. On one level, that murkiness reflected the difficulty of reconciling contradictory policies, especially in the security realm. Yet the ambiguity in US policies toward Western Europe also revealed the president’s indecisiveness, tendency to improvise and his inability to reconcile opposing camps of advisers. Kennedy’s effusive promises of a well-coordinated “Atlantic Community” could not disguise his administration’s ad hoc approach toward West European affairs. Kennedy’s policies toward Western Europe were driven by fears, many of which were exaggerated, some of which were prescient. The balance-of-payments problem of the early 1960s was quite manageable, but the urgency Kennedy subscribed to it brought the United States into conflict with France. Kennedy erroneously calculated a Gaullist plot to bring down the Bretton Woods regime. Yet the looming war in Southeast Asia, which later strained the US ability to curb dollar drain, and de Gaulle’s consolidation of domestic power by the mid-1960s, which allowed him to exploit the overvalued dollar as the decade wore on, legitimize Kennedy’s fears. Europe was the chief focus of de Gaulle’s foreign policy and therefore an area where his leadership could shine. De Gaulle’s European policies were not driven by irrational impulses or megalomania, whether revenge against the Anglo-Saxons or a global quest for grandeur with all of its symbolic trappings, but based on French economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic interests. De Gaulle was a shrewd practitioner of realpolitik. The French president never succumbed to sentimentalism in his use of power. During this period, he was determined to secure French oversight of West German policies and became increasingly mindful that his personal rapport with Adenauer was insufficient as a focus for long-term strategy. Having cultivated a generally amicable personal relationship

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with the West German chancellor to facilitate political advances, he then increased efforts to secure bilateral cooperation in defense and economic matters. By concealing his motives and tactics from the United States and, to some extent, from West Germany, he derived power within the alliance. His crafted confusion left the Kennedy administration in a quandary: the United States wanted to continue its traditional support of improved relations between France and West Germany as a necessary ingredient for successful West European integration but feared a Franco-German axis that dominated the continent. To understand the real nature of the relationship between the United States and France during the period 1961–63, one must understand the inability of the Kennedy administration to forge a coherent policy based on the president’s blurred ideas about security, European integration, tendency toward economic simplicity, and his overriding Cold War fears. De Gaulle, on the other hand, did not suffer from these inconsistencies. With less power, but more skill, de Gaulle battled Kennedy to a standstill.

Notes Introduction 1. Inaugural Address, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, John F. Kennedy, 1961 (Washington, 1962), 1–3. 2. For excellent accounts of US promotion of West European unity after World War II, see Michael Hogan, The Marshall Plan (New York, 1988); John Gillingham, Coal, Steel, and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955 (New York, 1991); Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Unity of Europe (New York, 1993); and Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (New York, 1988), 40–98. 3. For comparative figures on gross world product, see Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York, 1989), 486. 4. “Kennedy Pledges He Will Maintain Value of Dollar,” New York Times, 31 October 1960, A1. For comprehensive studies of the payments deficit, see Robert Triffin, The Evolution of the International Monetary System: Historical Reappraisal and Future Perspectives (Princeton, 1964); Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (New York, 1996), 150–219. Francis J. Gavin, Gold, Dollars and Power: Money, Security and the Politics of the U.S. Balance of Payments, 1958–1971 (Chapel Hill, NC, forthcoming). 5. Quoted in Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, 1998), 180. 6. William Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 12–71. See also Richard Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1981). 7. Serge Berstein, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958–1969, trans. Peter Morris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 101–24; Loriaux, France after Hegemony: International Change and Financial Reform, (Ithaca, NY), 168–74. 8. Wolfram F. Hanrieder and Graeme P. Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France, and Britain (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1980), 30–49. See also Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Europe: entre la nation et Maastricht (Paris, 1995), 169–90. 9. For background on Britain’s postwar economic troubles, see Paul Kennedy, Realities behind Diplomacy (London, 1981), 120–85. 10. For a good overview of British motivations and objectives in the two and a half years preceding its bid for EEC membership, see Jacqueline Tratt, The Macmillan Government and Europe (New York, 1996). 169

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11. See especially John Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, 1995); Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace (Princeton, NJ, 1999); and Francis Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s,” International History Review (4 December 2001), 847–75. 12. See generally Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG (London, 1997), 40–7. 13. Geoffrey Warner, “De Gaulle and the Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’ 1958–1966: Perceptions and Realities,” in Maurice Vaïsse et al., La France et l’OTAN, 1949–1996 (Paris, 1996), 250. 14. Wilfrid Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy (Princeton, NJ, 1971), 3–119. 15. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France, 27; For how the Algerian war impinged on de Gaulle’s power, see Pierre Messmer, Après tant de batailles: mémoires (Paris, 1992), 252; and Pierre Lefranc, . . . Avec qui vous savez: vingt-cinq ans avec de Gaulle (Paris, 1979), 212. 16. For representative works reflecting the “grand design” thesis, see Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York, 1993), 139–350. See, also, Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II (New York, 1992). 17. For representative works on balance of payments disagreements, see Harold James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods (New York, 1996), 150–219. See also Diane Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York, 1997), 94–108. For an excellent work on the relative importance of security to financial issues in US policies toward Western Europe, see, forthcoming, Francis Gavin, Gold, Dollars and Power: Money, Security and the Politics of the U.S. Balance-of-Payments, 1958–1971 (Chapel Hill, NC, forthcoming). 18. For works that discuss Berlin during a longer time period, see, for example, Ann Tusa, The Last Division: A History of Berlin (Reading, MA, 1997), 225–353. See also Tractenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963. For works on Berlin as an interruption to grand designs, Frank Costigliola and Thomas Alan Schwartz provide a good starting point, but the unavailability of French and allied sources produces an incomplete analysis. See Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars and Berlin,” in Thomas Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963 (New York, 1989), 24–56; and Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: the United States and Western Europe in the 1960s,” in Diane Kunz, ed., The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade (New York, 1994), 115–33. For crisis diplomacy accounts, see Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1961–1963 (New York, 1991). For French works, see, Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et les allemands (Paris, 1990), 200–1; Cyril Buffet, “La politique nucléaire de la France et la seconde crise de Berlin (1958–1962),” Relations internationales (Autumn 1989), 350–8; and Frédéric Bozo, Deux Stratégies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les États-Unis et l’alliance atlantique,

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1958–1969 (Paris, 1996), 77–82. The best account is in Maurice Vaïsse, La Grandeur: Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1998). 19. Charles S. Maier, “Alliance and Autonomy: European Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in the Truman Years,” in Michael J. Lacey, ed., The Truman Presidency (New York, 1989). Costigliola’s works have given currency to increasingly accepted charges about Kennedy’s policies toward Western Europe. His works include France and the United States: The Cold Alliance since World War II (Boston, 1994); “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin,” in Thomas Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963 (New York, 1989), 24–56; “Kennedy, de Gaulle, and the Challenge of Consultation,” in Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, eds., De Gaulle and the United States (Providence, Rhodes Island, 1994), 169–94. For a significant exception, see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York, 1997), 26–53 and 189–220. Gaddis discusses the relationship of ideology and economics but adroitly avoids discussion of hegemony. 20. For significant exceptions, all by French historians, see Frédéric Bozo, Deux stratégies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les États-Unis et l’alliance atlantique, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1996). See also Maurice Vaïsse, La Grandeur: politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1998). 21. My analysis builds on the insights of Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (New York, 1998), 58–98; idem, ed., No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe, Past, Present, and Future (London, 1998).

1


1. André Malraux, quoted in memorandum, Robert G. Neumann to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 5 February 1963, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., papers, White House files, box WH-4, folder: Common Market, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts. 2. Arthur Schlesinger to Kennedy, memorandum, 8 May 1961, John F. Kennedy National Security Files, Countries series, box 70, folder: France, 5/1/61–5/10/61, JFKL. 3. Pierson Dixon to the Earl of Home, Dispatch 148, 7 October 1963, General Records of the Foreign Office, FO 371/172070, Public Records Office, Kew. 4. Historian Stanely Hoffman applied this colorful description to de Gaulle’s statecraft. See, Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim, eds., The Diplomats (Princeton, 1994), 233. 5. James M. Gavin, Beyond the Stars (Gavin’s proposed book about his tenure as ambassador to France), 144, Gavin papers, Personal and State Department Files on France, box 18, folder: (n). 6. De Gaulle’s biographers emphasize those formative experiences in

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7. 8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

16.

17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23.


shaping his attitude toward Germany. See, for example, Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel, 1890–1944 (New York, 1990), 29–72. See also Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Allemagne: le rêve inachevé (Paris, 1990), 27–45. Richard J. Whalen, The Founding Father: The Story of Joseph P. Kennedy (New York, 1964), 171. Kennedy’s closest advisers often felt baffled by his fixation on the balance of payments deficit and believed that it stemmed from Joseph Kennedy’s influence. See, for example, Theodore Sorenson’s comments, Members of Kennedy’s presidential staff Oral History, JFKL, 16. See, George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York, 1992), 205. Few Gaullist biographies omit the impact of World War II on the general’s attitude toward Great Britain and the United States. See, for example, Jean-Paul Olivier, De Gaulle et la Bretagne (Paris, 1987), 31–85; and Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle (New York, 1982), 99–159. Nigel Hamilton, JFK: Reckless Youth (New York, 1992), 192. Hugh Sidey, ed., Prelude to Leadership: The European Diary of John F. Kennedy, Summer 1945 (Washington, D.C., 1995), 43–74. Philippe de Gaulle, De Gaulle (Paris, 1989), 9–11. André Malraux, Fallen Oaks: Conversations with De Gaulle, trans. Irene Clephane (London, 1971), 8. Pierson Dixon (British ambassador to France), “Visions and Illusions of General de Gaulle” 26 November 1961, PREM 11/3338. Christopher S. Thompson, “Prologue to Conflict: De Gaulle and the United States, From First Impressions Through 1940,” in Robert O. Paxton and Nicholas Wahl, eds., De Gaulle and the United States: A Centennial Reappraisal (Oxford, 1994), 14–16. Georges Henri-Soutou, “General de Gaulle and the Soviet Union, 1943–5: Ideology or European Equilibrium,” in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons, The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53 (New York, 1996), 310–33. Hamilton, Reckless Youth, 141–3. Herbert Parmet, Jack: The Struggles of John F. Kennedy (New York, 1980), 24–8, 182; and Parmet, JFK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy (New York, 1983), 45. See Mark Hayne, “The Quai d’Orsay and the Formation of French Policy in Historical Context,” in Robert Aldrich and John Connell, eds., France in World Politics (London, 1989), 197–208. Kenneth R. Crispell and Carlos F. Gomez, Hidden Illness in the White House (Durham, 1988), 160–202. Richard Reeves, John F. Kennedy: A Presidential Profile (New York, 1991), 171–2; Thomas Reeves, A Question of Character (New York, 1991), 295. George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York, 1982), 167. Kennedy shared this prevalent belief among postwar policymakers. See, Charles Maier, “Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II,” International Organization 31 (Autumn 1977), 607–33.

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24. John Kennedy, “The Economic Gap,” speech before Senate, 19 February 1959, The Strategy of Peace, 45. 25. “Kennedy Pledges He Will Uphold Dollar,” The New York Times, 31 October 1960, 1, 22. See, generally, Report of Task Force on Foreign Economic Policy, 31 December 1960, George Ball papers, box 155, folder: Task forces, Seely G. Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey. 26. Alan Wolfe, America’s Impasse (New York, 1981), 32–4. 27. See, generally, William S. Borden, “Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy,” in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963 (New York, 1989), 57–85. See, also, Thomas W. Zeiler, American Trade and Power in the 1960s (New York, 1992). 28. See, Lawrence Budash, Scientists and the Development of Nuclear Weapons (New Jersey, 1995), 96. 29. Quoted in Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 16. 30. Kennedy, Strategy of Peace, 37–8. 31. For a translation of Khrushchev’s speech, see “Statement of Conference of World Communism,” November 1960, The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 12 (28 December 1960), 3–9; ibid., Part II, 12 (4 January 1961), 3–8. 32. For John Kennedy’s reaction, see Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Sulman, eds., Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words (New York, 1988), 310. For the evolution of flexible response, see Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Response. 33. For an excellent summary of an evolving US nuclear policy in Europe, see Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London, 1997). For specific fears of the incoming Kennedy administration concerning Western Europe, see National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 1–61), 17 January 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 8: 8. 34. Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy (Princeton, 1991). Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, 1999), 146–283. 35. Kennedy, “The Reconstruction of NATO,” speech delivered in Palm Beach, 15 December 1959, in The Strategy of Peace, 99; James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1997), 65–6. 36. John Kennedy, “A Democrat Looks at Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 36 (October 1957), 49. 37. Theodore White, Making of a President: 1960 (New York, 1962), 145. 38. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years (New York, 1988), 263–4. 39. For an excellent biography, see Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge Bundy and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms (New York, 1998). 40. Deborah Shapley, Promise and Power: The Life and Times of Robert

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41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51.

52.

53.


McNamara (Boston, 1993); the faith in a technocracy was inspired by John Kenneth Galbraith’s seminal work, The New Industrial State (Boston, 1958). Galbraith joined the administration as Kennedy’s political and economic adviser and later as ambassador to India. Comment of Henry Ford in Paul B. Fay, Jr., The Pleasure of His Company (New York, 1966), 206. Irving Bernstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier (New York, 1991), 127–8. The best summary of Kennedy’s “team” remains Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York, 1965), 133–55. Part-time consultants to the administration included additional professors. Harvard professor Henry Kissinger advised Kennedy on German affairs. Yale professor Robert Triffin sought unsuccessfully to influence the president’s views on international liquidity. Sorenson, Kennedy, 252–3. James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1997), 40–2. William Tyler oral history, JFKL. Bradley Biggs, Gavin (Hamden, CT, 1980), 117. See, generally, Maurice Vaïsse, La Grandeur: politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1998). Anton W. DePorte, “De Gaulle Between the Superpowers,” The Tocqueville Review 13 (1992), 5. Georges-Henri Soutou provides a thoughtful analysis of de Gaulle’s fluid and shifting relations with the Soviet Union, Germany, and the United States from the early 1940s to the mid-1950s. See, Soutou, “General de Gaulle and the Soviet Union, 1943–5: Ideology or European Equilibrium,” in F. Gori and S. Pons, eds., The Soviet Union in the Cold War, 1943–53, 310–31. See, also, Robert Aron, An Explanation of De Gaulle, trans. Marianne Sinclair (New York, 1966), 137. Djermen Gvichiani, “Les relations franco-soviétiques pendant la présidence du général de Gaulle,” in Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 5: “La sécurité et l’indépendance de la France” (Paris, 1992), 381–92. See also André Eshet, “Aspects stratégiques de la politique étrangère gaullienne,” in Elie Barnavi et Saul Friedlander, La politique étrangère du général de Gaulle (Paris, 1985), 77–8. Kennedy administration officials often expressed fears of a French-led “third force.” The orientation of the dreaded “third force” varied, ranging from fears of neutrality to fears that it would work at crosspurposes to the United States. See, for example, Memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Alphand, 28 May 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 709. Memorandum of conversation between Couve de Murville and Kennedy, 26 May 1963, Pactes 1961–1970, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 409, dossier: entretiens bipartites/Couve-Kennedy, 25 mai 1963. For a text of de Gaulle’s speech, see “L’Allocution radiotélévisée du général de Gaulle,” 2 June 1960, Le Monde, 3.

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54. Pierre-Olivier Lapie, “Avec de Gaulle en juillet 1960,” Revue des deux mondes (July 1981), 29. 55. Former defense minister Franz-Josef Strauss captured the prevailing West German sentiment well when he wrote that the West could not “in the long run have a Germany which [was] an economic giant and a political dwarf.” See Franz-Josef Strauss, The Grand Design: A European Solution to German Reunification, trans. Edward Fitzgerald (New York, 1965), 80. 56. See, for example, Couve de Murville to French embassies in Washington, London, and Moscow, telegram, 19 January 1961, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier: 346 (échange de messages et notes). 57. De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 260. 58. Vladislav Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958–1962),” Working Paper 6, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, May 1993, 12. 59. Telegram, U.S. Embassy in Paris to Department of State, 2 July 1962, RG 59, Central Files, 1960–63, box 1736, folder: 751.00/7–262, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. 60. François Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence (New York, 1994), 328. 61. The centrality of Germany to de Gaulle’s European policies is broadly explored in Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’allemagne: le rêve inachevé (Paris, 1990) and Jacques Binoche, De Gaulle et les Allemands (Paris, 1990). 62. Michel Debré, “Copie d’annotations manuscrites a/s d’une note du 27 February 1961 du Premier Ministre, sur la politique européenne,” papers of Maurice Couve de Murville, tome II, CM7, Fondation des sciences de politique. 63. See, generally, P.M.H. Bell, France and Britain, 1940–1994: The Long Separation (London, 1997), 179–203. 64. Olivier Guichard, Mon général (Paris, 1980), 407. 65. Michel Debré, Entretiens avec le général de Gaulle, 1961–1969 (Paris, 1993), 22; Aron, An Explanation of De Gaulle, 160. 66. For a delineation of Gaullist attitudes toward the EEC, see, Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Europe, 103–90. See specifically Debré, “Copie d’annotations manuscrites a/s d’une note du 27 February 1961, du Premier Ministre, sur la politique européenne,” Couve de Murville papers, tome II, CM7. 67. Ibid. For de Gaulle’s evolving views on NATO, see, for example, Vaïsse, De gaulle: La grandeur, 111–61. 68. This analysis was influenced by Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London, 1997), 95–110. 69. Memorandum of Conversation between Paul Henri Spaak (Foreign Minister of Belgium) and Kennedy, 28 May 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 582.

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70. Jean Klein, “Le désarmement,” Espoir 93 (septembre 1993), 38–41. For general accounts of France’s nuclear program, see Raymond Tourrain, De la défense de la France à la défense de l’Europe (Paris, 1987); Marcel Duval et Yves le Baut, L’arme nucléaire française: Pourquoi et comment? (Paris, 1992); Charles de Gaulle Institute, L’Aventure de la bombe: De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1985). 71. General George Buis oral history, Archives orales, Institut Charles de Gaulle, Paris, France. 72. François Seydoux, Mémoires d’outre-rhin (Paris, 1975), 224. 73. There have been few detailed studies of de Gaulle’s economic concerns and policies of the early 1960s. Most articles and books detail the French economic miracle of the late 1950s and the Bretton Woods system crisis of the late 1960s. Representative works that offer a good starting point include Alain Prate, Les Batailles économiques du Général de Gaulle (Paris, 1978); and Michael Loriaux, France after Hegemony: International Change and Financial Reform (Ithaca, 1991). 74. Rueff to Wilfrid Baumgartner, 26 June 1961, papers of Wilfred Baumgartner, box 3BA34, folder DR 7, FNSP, Paris. 75. See, generally, “Les problèmes du marché commun,” L’Année politique, économique, sociale et diplomatiques en France, 1961 (Paris, 1962), 193–6. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, NY, 1998), 159–237; and Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 5: L’Europe (Paris, 1992). 76. For comments on de Gaulle’s economic advisers, see Jean MaximeLévèque (economic adviser at Élysée) oral history, Charles de Gaulle Institute. Raymond Triboulet, “Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Wilfrid Baumgartner,” lué dans la séance du 10 février 1981, Institut de France, Académie des sciences morales et politiques, 5–21, Bibliothèque nationale, Paris, France. 77. J.R. Fears, France in the Giscard Presidency (London, 1981), 1–18. See, also, Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, entretien 5, 28. 78. Marc Ullmann (assistant managing editor of L’Express), “The Flawless Performer: French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville,” General James Gavin papers, box 26, folder: letter collecting information on Frenchmen, U.S. Army History Instititue, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 79. See, generally, Vaïsse, La Grandeur: politique étrangère du général de Gaulle, 1958–1969. 80. De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 85. 81. Serge Berstein, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958–1969, trans. Peter Morris (Cambridge, 1989), 58–60. 82. De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor, trans. Terence Kilmartin (New York, 1971), 206–7.

Notes

2

177

Opening Moves

1. Gavin’s unpublished autobiography, ch. 9, Gavin papers, box 2, folder: “Beyond the Stars,” 411. 2. Couve de Murville, “Sénateurs américains les plus influents,” September 1960, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier: 128. See, also, Couve, circular telegram (Washington, London, Moscow), 19 January 1961, ibid., dossier: 346 (échange de messages et notes). 3. Theodore Sorenson, ed., “Let the Word Go Forth”: The Speeches, Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy, 1947–1963 (New York, 1988), 330–68. 4. John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace, ed. Allan Nevins (New York, 1960), 57–8. 5. Ibid., 48–9, 141–4. 6. Walt Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth (Boston, 1960). For a more comprehensive analysis about industrial growth, see Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in Recent History (New York, 1972). 7. Ball, memorandum to Dean Rusk and Chester Bowles, 29 December 1960, Ball papers, box 155, folder: Task Forces. 8. Memorandum, George Ball to Rusk, 29 January 1961, George Ball papers, box 153, folder: [Duplicates telecon]. 9. Gerald S. and Deborah H. Strober, “Let Us Begin Anew”: An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency (New York, 1993), 245. 10. The importance Kennedy placed on foreign aid to the LDCs as critical component of his Cold War strategies was reflected in his compilation of statements and speeches published in 1962. See, Kennedy, “Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid,” 22 March 1961, in To Turn the Tide (New York, 1962), 147. Ball and Rostow talked generally about the administration’s interest in burden-sharing. See, telephone conversation between Ball and Rostow, 1 February 1961, Ball papers, box 153, folder: Duplicates telecon; ibid., 2 February 1961. 11. Testimony of Dean Rusk, 28 February 1961, US Senate, Foreign Relations, Executive Sessions, 13: 187. 12. Author’s telephone interview with Francis Bator (assistant to George Ball), 7 July 1997. Although 1 percent sounds low by today’s standards, it is roughly equivalent to asking foreign governments to provide $50 billion dollars annually. 13. François Seydoux to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, 17 March 1961, Amérique, États-Unis, dossier 381 (Allemagne) MAE; Jean Monnet to Couve, 12 March 1961, Papers of Maurice Couve de Murville, tome II, CM7, FNSP. 14. Baumgartner, memorandum, 17 March 1961, Papiers de Baumgartner, carton 3BA46, dossier DR 6, FNSP. 15. Heinrich von Brentano, Germany and Europe: Reflections on German Foreign Policy, trans. by Edward Fitzgerald (New York, 1962), 114, 118. Jacques Rueff, Balance of Payments: Proposals for the Resolution of the Most

178

16.

17.

18. 19. 20.

21. 22.

23. 24.

25.

26

27. 28. 29. 30.


Pressing World Economic Problem of Our Time, trans. Jean Clément (New York, 1967), 6–7. “Compte-rendu du premier réunion du Comité de Politique Économique de l’OCED,” 25–26 January, Fonds 9: Institutions Financières Internationales, Côte B 54754, Ministère de l’économie et finances, Paris, France. Memorandum, Douglas Dillon (Secretary of Treasury) to Fred Dutton (special assistant to the president), 3 February 1961, JFK NSF, box 289, folder: Dept. of Treasury, 1/61/–5/62. Charles de Gaulle to Geoffroy de Courcel (French ambassador to Great Britain), 16 January 1961, Archives de Baumgartner, dossier Dr 2, FNSP. Christopher Steel (British ambassador to Bonn) to Foreign Office, 20 February 1961, PREM 11/3286. Record of conversation between de Gaulle and Macmillan at Rambouillet, 28 January 1961, PREM 11/3322. A few weeks before his meeting at Rambouillet, the prime minister had privately inveighed against the Wirtshaftswunder: “German policy [was] short-sighted and selfish,” he confided to his journal. “The Germans secretly enjoy their power and the feeling that fifteen years after defeat they are threatening both the dollar and the pound.” See note, 3 January 1961, PREM 11/3325. On a more rational level, Macmillan’s government realized that it needed to reduce costs or at least prevent them from escalating, particularly defense expenditures, which had steadily increased during the 1950s from $2.3 billion to $4.4 billion by the end of the decade. See, Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London, 1988), 495. Christopher Steel, 15 February 1961, PREM 11/3286. “Informationsgespräch mit Wolfgang Bertholz,” in Konrad Adenauer, Rhöndorfer Ausgabe: Teegespräche, 1959–1961, ed. by Hans-Peter Mensing (Berlin, 1992), 465–71. Record of meeting between Macmillan and Adenauer, 22 February 1961, PREM 11/3286. François Seydoux to Ministry, 2 February 1961, Europe 1961–1965, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1571 (janvier 1961–mars 1962). Courson to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 February 1961, ibid. Gordon Craig, “Konrad Adenauer and his Diplomats,” in Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim, eds., The Diplomats, 1939–1979 (Princeton, 1989), 220. Horst Osterheld, “Adenauer and de Gaulle: portraits comparés,” Espoir: Revue de l’institut de Charles de Gaulle (March 1992), 7. Seydoux, Mémoires d’outre-rhin, 217. “Réunion des six chefs de gouvernement,” 10 February 1961, Papiers Couve de Murville, Tome II, CM9, dossier 3, FNSP. Telegram from the Mission at Geneva to the Department of State, 24 May 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 22. Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–1971 (New Haven, 1992), 117–18. “A Review of North Atlantic Problems for the Future,” March 1961, JFK

Notes

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37.

38.

39.

40.

41. 42.

43. 44.

45.

179

NSF, box 220, folder: Acheson report, 3/61, JFKL, 24 . Ibid., 65–7. Ibid., 45, 61. Ibid., 4–7. John S. Duffield, Power Rules: The Evolution of NATO’s Conventional Force Posture (Stanford, 1995), 123–130. Beatrice Heuser, “The Development of NATO’s nuclear strategy,” Contemporary European History 4 (Winter 1995), 37–66. For a more extensive analysis that particularly highlights European fears, see Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London, 1997), 1–18. “NATO and the Atlantic Nations,” NSAM 40, 20 April 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 286, 289, 288–90. George Ball, memorandum for Rusk and memorandum for Kennedy, 1 April 1961, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs, Records relating to UK membership in EEC, box 1, folder: UK position. Sabine Lee, “Staying in the Game? Coming into the Game? Macmillan and European integration,” in Aldous and Lee, eds., Harold Macmillan and Britain’s World Role, 142–5. George Hutchinson, The Last Edwardian at No. 10: An Impression of Harold Macmillan (London, 1980), 76; Harold Evans, Downing Street Diary: The Macmillan Years, 1957–1963 (London, 1981), 113. Memorandum of Conversation between Ball and Macmillan, 6 April 1961, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs, Records relating to UK membership in EEC, box 1, folder: UK Position. McGeorge Bundy oral history, JFKL. For an excellent analysis of the complexities and contradictories involved in Anglo-American relations during this era, see Alan P. Dobson, “The USA, Britain, and the Question of Hegemony,” in Geir Lundestad, ed., No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe, Past, Present and Future (New York, 1998), 134–63. “Prime Minister’s Talks in Washington,” 12 April 1961, PREM 11/3318. Edgar Beigel (International Relations Officer, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State) to Robert J. Schaetzel (special assistant to the under-secretary of state for economic affairs), 13 April 1961, CD711.51, box 1473, folder: 7–2260; David Bruce diary, 14 April 1961, Virginia Historical Society. Dean Acheson Oral History, JFKL, 15. Briefing paper for Dean Rusk’s press conference, 9 March 1961, RG 59, Records of Bureau of European Affairs, Office of German Affairs, Records Relating to Berlin, 1957–63, box 6, folder: Soviet memos of US replies. For Adenauer quote characterizing his consistent sentiment toward increased conventional weapons, see Roland Jacquin de Margerie to Ministry, telegram, 5 January 1963, Europe 1961–65, République

180


Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1565 (rélations avec les États-Unis 1963). 46. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance, 89. Brinkley, Dean Acheson, 128–9. 47. Telegram, Acheson to Department of State, 10 April 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 269. Adenauer missed the security of his “special relationship” with Eisenhower’s secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, who gave the CDU government full support. See Hans-Jürgen Grabbe, “Konrad Adenauer, John Foster Dulles, and West German–American Relations,” in Richard Immerman, ed., John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton, 1990). 48. Seydoux, Mémoires d’outre-rhin, 273–4. 49. Dillon to Kennedy, 7 April 1961, RG 56 Records of the Treasury, Classified Files of Henry Fowler, box 3C-F, folder: Germany. 50. Memorandum of Conversation, 12 April 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 274–5. 51. Only three days after Adenauer and de Gaulle’s first historic meeting at Rambouillet in September 1958, which the French president sent letters to London and Washington demanding tripartite consultation those two capitals and Paris. 52. Memorandum of Conversation, 12 April 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 274–5. 53. Memorandum of Conversation, “Adenauer Visit,” 13 April 1961, FRUS, 1961–1962, 14: 46–51; ibid., FRUS, 1961–1963, 9: 114–16; For West German ambassador Wilhelm Grewe’s voicing of Adenauer’s displeasure to Rusk, see Memorandum of Conversation, 15 April 1961, FRUS, 1961–1962, 14: 51–5. Only after the Berlin Wall was built was West Germany allowed as an “observer“ on Live Oak. For an excellent microfiche documentary collection on the contingency planning for the Berlin crisis, see William Burr, ed., The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962 (Alexandria, VA, 1991). 54. “Coopération à trois,” 20 May 1961, Pactes 1961–70, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 408, dossier: entrétiens de Gaulle/Kennedy, MAE. 55. The French ambassador to Moscow confirmed de Gaulle’s fears by describing Khrushchev’s return from Vienna as a triumph similar to his return after the collapse of the Paris summit. Maurice Dejean to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, 9 June 1961, Amérique, États-Unis, dossier 368 (URSS). Scholarly attention to French demand for tripartism is essentially superficial. See, for example, Frank Costigliola, “Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult,” Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1996), 105–23. 56. Schlesinger, memorandum for Kennedy, 8 May 1961, JFK NSF, Countries series, box 70, folder: France 5/1–5/10/61, JFKL. 57. Macmillan to Kennedy, 28 April 1961, JFK NSF, box 171, folder: UK, Macmillan correspondence, 4/8/61/-4/30/61, JFKL. 58. Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor, trans. by Terence Kilmartin (New York, 1971), 254–5.

Notes

181

59. John Gavin to Dean Rusk, telegram, 20 May 1961, RG 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Classified General Records, 1961, box 43, folder: France–US, 1961; Gavin’s unpublished autobiography, Gavin papers, box 2, folder: “Beyond the Stars,” ch. 9, 404. 60. “Note pour l’entretien du Général de Gaulle avec le Président Kennedy: Coopération à trois,” 20 May 1961, Pactes, 1961–70, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 408, dossier: entretiens de Gaulle/Kennedy. 61. Memorandum of Conversation between Kennedy and de Gaulle, 31 May 1961, 12:30 pm, RG 84, box 51, folder: President’s Visit. 62. Couve de Murville, “Indépendance ou ‘partnership’?” Espoir (June 1974), 24. 63. “Note pour l’entretien du Général de Gaulle avec le President Kennedy: Coopération à trois,” 20 May 1961, Pactes 1961–1970, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 408, dossier: Entretiens de Gaulle/Kennedy, 31 mai-2 juin 1961. Memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and de Gaulle, 1 June 1961, RG 84, box 51, folder: President’s visit. 64. Memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and de Gaulle, 1 June 1961, RG 84, box 51, folder: President’s visit. 65. For an analysis of how the centralization of control in NATO affected US relations with the allies, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, 1998), 302–22. 66. Memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and de Gaulle, 2 June 1961, RG 84, box 51, folder: President’s visit. 67. De Gaulle, note, 13 June 1961, Maurice Couve de Murville, tome II, CM7, FNSP. 68. Bundy to JFK, 28 July 1961, JFK NSF, Meetings and Memos series, box 330, folder: NSAM 64, JFKL.

3


1. Meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 September 1962, transcribed by author, in The Miller Center of Public Affairs, The Presidential Recordings of President John F. Kennedy, vol. 2 (New York, 2000). Kennedy did not install a secret recording system in the White House until mid-July 1962. 2. See, for example, memorandum, “A non-economic report from Germany,” Walter Heller, 2 August 1961, JFK POF, Part V, reel 8: 899. Author’s interview with Martin Hillenbrand, 19 September 1997. 3. Beschloss, The Crisis Years, 278. 4. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York, 1965), 289. 5. Alphand, L’Étonnement d’être, 364. 6. Khrushchev’s attitude going into and during the Vienna meeting, see Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 236. For

182

7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

12. 13.

14. 15. 16. 17.


transcripts of the two leaders” various discussions, see, memorandum of conversations between Kennedy and Khrushchev, 3–4 June 1961, Berlin crisis collection, box 30, National Security Archive, Washington, DC. Memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and Khrushchev, 4 June 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 14: 96–8; ibid., 8: 86–91. Thomas Finletter, “June 5 – report on Vienna meeting,” telegram, 5 June 1961, RG 59. Records of Department of State, JCS meetings, 1959–1963, Lot 70D328, box 2, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. Gerald S. and Deborah H. Strober, “Let Us Begin Anew”: An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency (New York, 1993), 359. NATO strategy and Berlin contingency planning meeting, 13 June 1961, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of German Affairs, Records relating to Berlin, 1957–63, box 6, folder: NSC discussion of Berlin, June–July 1961. Memorandum for the President, “Current Organization of the White House and NSC for Dealing with International Matters,” 22 June 1961, FRUS 1961–1963, 8: 108; Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953–1971 (New Haven, 1992), 135. Report by Dean Acheson, 28 June 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 14: 128–59. See, generally, John C. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis, 1961–1964 (Oslo, 1996), 3; for specific references to perceptions of Khrushchev’s motivations and Soviet intentions, see, memorandum of Conversation between Rusk and Dirk Stikker (Secretary-General, NATO), 14 June 1961, Berlin Crisis Collection, box 25, folder: Rusk memcons, National Security Archive; Record Meeting of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin Contingency Planning, 16 June 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 14: 120. Report by Dean Acheson, 28 June 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 14: 128–59. Walt W. Rostow, memorandum for JFK, 7 July 1961, JFK POF: Countries, box 117, folder: Germany Security, 7/61; McGeorge Bundy, “Proposed use of Substantial Non-nuclear Ground Force in Europe,” undated, JFK NSF: Countries, box 82, folder: Germany, General, 7/23/61–7/26/61, JFKL; Charles Bohlen, memorandum for the files, 17 July 1961, RG 59, Records of Bohlen, Lot 74D379, box 17, folder: Correspondence, 1960–1961. Hillenbrand to Kohler, memorandum, 28 June 1961, RG 59, Central Files, 762.00/6–2861, box 1743. Alphand to Couve de Murville, telegram, 22 June 1961, Amérique 1952–63, États-Unis, dossier 381 (Allemagne), MAE. Alphand, L’Étonnement d’être, 352. De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 260. Alphand to Couve, 22 June 1961, Amérique, États-Unis, dossier 381 (Allemagne), MAE. Inspection général de l’armée de terre, “Les formes de la guerre et de l’armée future,” no. 412, undated, Cabinet du ministre de la défense, politique de défense, carton 1R58, dossier 2, Ministère de la Défense, Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre [SHAT], Paris. De Gaulle, note, 5 January 1962, Papiers de Couve de Murville, tome II, CM 7, dossier 1962.

Notes

183

18. Many Gaullist contemporaries have noted his rhetorical ploy. See, for example, Horst Osterheld, “Adenauer et de Gaulle: portraits comparés,” Espoir: Revue d’institut Charles de Gaulle 79 (March 1992), 4–9. 19. Memorandum of conversation, meeting of four-power working group on Germany and Berlin, 7 July 1961, Berlin crisis collection, box 25, folder: Rusk memcons, NSA. 20. Laloy to Ministry, telegram, 5 July 1961, Pactes, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 408, dossier: Berlin, réponse au note soviétique du 2 juin 1961, MAE. Unable to agree on a common reply to the Soviet aide-mémoire, the French government issued its own response on 12 July, which reiterated almost verbatim Couve’s comments to Gromkyo on July 5. See, texte de la note française sur Berlin, 12 July 1961, Pactes, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 408, dossier: Berlin, réponse au note soviétique du 2 juin 1961, MAE. 21. Kennedy to de Gaulle, 30 June 1961, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier 346 (échange de messages et notes), MAE. 22. État-Major Général de la Défense nationale to Prime Minister Michel Debré, 7 July 1961, État-Major des Armées, OTAN: conseil de l’atlantique nord, 1961–1963, carton 12S75, dossier: Commandement unique à Berlin, 1960–1963, SHAT. 23. Martin Hillenbrand Oral history, 37, JFKL. Duffield, Power Rules, 154, 158. 24. Author’s telephone interview with Martin Hillenbrand, 19 September 1997. 25. Memorandum of Conference with Kennedy, 27 July 1961, RG 218, Records of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of General Maxwell Taylor, box 34, folder: Memos for President, 1961, National Archives II. 26. Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response: United States Strategy in Europe during the 1960s,” 858–9. 27. Kennedy to Adenauer, 20 July 1961, The Berlin Crisis, 1958–1961 (Washington, DC: The National Security Archive and Chadwyck-Healy, 1996), no. 2198; Kennedy to Macmillan, ibid., no. 2199; Kennedy to de Gaulle, ibid., no. 2200. Memorandum on Berlin, Inter-departmental coordinating group on Berlin, 21 July 1961, 9, Berlin Crisis Collection, box 30, NSA. 28. Memorandum of Conference with Kennedy, 27 July 1961, RG 218, Records of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Records of General Maxwell Taylor, box 34, folder: Memos for President, 1961. 29. Guthman and Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words, 281. 30. Grandes unités revenant d’Algérie en Metropole, Commission de la Défense à l’issue d’un voyage aux F.F.A., Juillet 1961, Cabinet du ministre de la Défense, Forces françaises en Allemagne, carton 1R179, dossier 12/B8, SHAT; Laloy à de Rose, fiche, compte rendu de réunion relative au memorandum U.S. sur Berlin, 26 July 1961, Pactes 1961–1970, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 408, dossier: Conférence des ministres des Affaires étrangères, 28 July and 4 August 1961, MAE.

184


31. De Gaulle, note au sujet de l’Europe, 17 July 1961, Lettres, notes et carnets, 107–8. 32. Inspection Général de l’Armée de terre, “Les formes de la guerre et de l’armée future,” no. 412, July 1961, Cabinet du ministre de la Défense, Politique de défense, carton 1R58, dossier 2, SHAT. 33. Pierre Messmer to le Général, Commandant en Chef des Forces Françaises en Allemagne, 13 July 1961, Cabinet de Ministère de la Défense, FFA, carton 1R179, dossier 12/B3, SHAT. 34. Couve de Murville, “Discours avant l’Assemblée Nationale,” 20 July 1961, Papiers de Couve de Murville, CM 1, FNSP. 35. Lauris Norstad to Chief of the British Defense Staff, 13 July 1961, ibid. 36. McGeorge Bundy, “Meeting of the Interdepartmental Steering Group, July 24, 1961”, 25 July 1961, JFK NSF: Countries, box 88, folder: Germany, Berlin Steering Group, 7/17/61–9/11/61, JFKL; memorandum, “Berlin: Military Aspects,” Minister of Defence, 27 July 1961, CAB 129/106 C.(61)118, PRO. 37. Memorandum of Conversation between Franz-Josef Strauss and top US officials in State, Defense, and JCS, 14 July 1961, Berlin Collection, box 25, folder: Rusk memcons, NSA. 38. “The President’s News Conference of July 19, 1961,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, 515. 39. “Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis,” 25 July 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, 533. 40. Ibid., 535–7. Khrushchev had faced pressure from his defense minister and military advisors to suspend those reductions and increase the Soviet defense budget because the Kremlin had feared the initial Acheson line would shape the Western response. See Thompson, Khrushchev, 235; James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore, Maryland, 1994), 141. Duffield, Power Rules, 160. 41. Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 28 July 1961, CAB 128/35 Part II [C.C. 45 (61)], Public Record Office [PRO], Kew, England. See, generally, John P. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Crisis, 1958–1962 (London, 1998), 165–98. 42. Macmillan to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 20 June 1961, DEFE 7/2265, PRO. A.W. Ramsbotham (Foreign Office) to A.W. France (Treasury), 7 July 1961, DEFE 7/2265, PRO; France to Ramsbotham, ibid. 43. Bernard Ledwidge, “La crise de Berlin 1958–1961: stratégie et tactique du général de Gaulle,” De Gaulle en son siècle, 4: 380. Alphand, L’Étonnement d’être, 352. 44. David Childs, The GDR: Moscow’s Ally, 2nd edition (London, 1988), 56, 64. 45. Frank Mayer, Adenauer and Kennedy: A Study in German-American Relations, 1961–1963 (New York, 1996), 44–5. 46. Couve de Murville Une politique étrangère, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1971); Heinrich von Brentano, Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler! (Hamburg, 1974), 341–43.

Notes

185

47. “West German Reactions to the Berlin Wall, August 1961,” Research Project No. 655, Prepared by Historical Studies Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, December 1963, Berlin crisis collection, box 30, NSA. 48. Couve to Alphand, “Instructions pour les révisions des plans d’urgence pour Berlin,” 14 August 1961, Europe 1961–1965, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1601 (plan d’urgence pour Berlin), MAE; Annexes de table des matières pour la crise berlinoise, ibid.; Message no. 14066, Délégation française, LIVE OAK à Ministère de la Défense, État-Major des Armées, OTAN: conseil de l’atlantique nord, 1961–1962, carton 12S75, dossier: documents du travail sur les accès aeriens à Berlin, Archives de l’armée de terre. 49. Memorandum of conversation between Froment Maurice (Counselor of Foreign Affairs) and Charles Bohlen, 29 August 1961, RG 59, Records of Bohlen, box 17, folder: correspondence 1960–61. 50. Bundy, memorandum for Kennedy, 25 August 1961, JFK NSF, Countries series, box 82, folder: Germany, General, 8/26/61–8/28/61, JFKL; Bundy to Kennedy, 28 August 1961, ibid. 51. Laloy to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Direction des affaires politiques) 7 October 1961, Pactes 1961–70, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 408, dossier: entretien bipartites, américano-soviétiques, MAE. 52. JFK to Rusk, 12 September 1961, JFK NSF, Countries series, box 82, folder: Germany, 9/9/61–9/12/61, JFKL. 53. Lyon (US Embassy, Paris) to Rusk, telegram, 27 October 1961, JFK NSF, Countries series, box 61, folder: France, General, 9/61–10–61, JFKL. 54. Memorandum of Conversation of Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting, 14 September 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 14 : 405–8. For summaries of the talks between Rusk and Gromyko, see telegram form the Department of State to the Embassy in France, 22 September 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 14 : 431–3 and ibid., 2 October 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 14: 456–60. 55. See, for example, Alphand to Ministry, telegram, 3 octobre 1961, Pactes 1961–1970, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 408, dossier: entretien bipartites, américano-soviétiques, MAE. Laloy to Ministry, telegram, 7 October 1961, ibid. 56. Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, eds., Robert Kennedy: In His Own Words (New York, 1988), 284. 57. Ann Tusa, The Last Division, 333–7. See, also, Raymond Garthoff, “The US-Soviet Tank Confrontation at Checkpoint Charlie,” in Stephen J. Cimbala, Mysteries of the Cold War (Brookfield, Vermont, 1999), 73–88. Schecter and Luchkov, Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes, 170. 58. Message, exemplaire No 9/10, 28 octobre 1961, centre de transmissions de la défense nationale, État-Major des Armées, OTAN: conseil de l’atlantique nord, 1961–1962, carton, 12S75, dossier: commandement unique à Berlin, 1960–1963, SHAT. 59. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin–Cuba Crisis, 44–6. See also, meeting on Berlin, transcribed by author, in Miller Center of Public

186

60.

61. 62.

63.

64.

65.

66. 67. 68.

69.


Affairs, The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy: The Great Crises, vol. 1, 203–26. Bundy, memorandum of meeting with Kennedy, 20 October 1961, JFK NSF, Meetings and Memoranda series, box 317, folder: meetings with President, 9/61–1/62, JFKL. NSAM 109, 23 October 1961, JFK NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, box 332, JFKL. See, for example, note from General F. Subsbielle (État-major général de la défense nationale et chef de la délégation française de “Live Oak,” 2 October 1961, État-major des armées, OTAN: conseil de l’atlantique nord, 1961–1962, carton 12S75, dossier: Instruction du conseil OTAN aux authorities militaires, 1961. See, generally, Christoph Bluth, “Reconciling the Irreconcilable: Alliance Politics and the Paradox of Extended Deterrence in the 1960s,” in Cold War History (January 2001), 77–84; and Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer: A German Politician and Statesman in a Period of War, Revolution and Reconstruction, transl. By Geoffrey Penny (Stuttgart, 1997), 605–6. Kennedy talked about his discussion with Alphand of 10 September 1962 in Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower, transcribed by author, in The Miller Center of Public Affairs, The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, 129. Strauss’s visit of 7–8 June 1962 was discussed in a meeting about the Soviet Union, 21 September 1962, transcribed by author, in The Miller Center of Public Affairs, The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, 216–17. Meeting with Dwight Eisenhower, 10 September 1962, transcribed by author, in ibid., 125. Ibid., 129. This analysis is shared by Francis Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response,” in The International History Review (4 December 2001), 859. Gavin points out that, “Senior U.S. officials did not necessarily believe in the strategic, as opposed to the political, logic behind their call for increased conventional capabilities, nor that the United States should enlarge its own conventional forces in Europe.” Charles de Gaulle, notes, 18 September 1961; 4 October 1961; 26 October 1961, Archives de Couve de Murville, tome II, CM7, FNSP. Général George Buis oral history, Institut Charles de Gaulle. The scholarly literature on de Gaulle’s management of the Berlin crisis and its effects on his overall European strategy is limited. For exceptions that were published before the opening of French documents on the crisis, see, Cyril Buffet, “La politique nucléaire de la France et la seconde crise de Berlin, 1958–1962,” Relations internationales 59 (Autumn 1989), 347–58; and Bernard Ledwidge, “La crise de Berlin 1958–1961: stratégie et tactique du général de Gaulle,” in Charles de Gaulle Institute, De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 4 (Paris, 1992), 366–80. For an example

Notes

187

published after French documentation opened but one that speaks in generalities, see, Frédéric Bozo, Deux Stratégies pour l’europe: de Gaulle, les États-Unis, et l’alliance atlantique, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1996). 70. De Gaulle, note de service, 14 August 1961, Papiers de Couve de Murville, tome II, CM7, FNSP. De Gaulle, “L’annotation manuscrite sur le télégramme-circulaire no. 218,” 30 November 1961, ibid. Most of the literature on the force de frappe neglects the decisive effects of the Berlin crisis. For the best studies of the French nuclear program, see, Raymond Tourrain, De la défense de la France à la défense de l’Europe (Paris, 1987); Marcel Duval et Yves le Baut, L’arme nucléaire française: Pourquoi et comment? (Paris, 1992); Institute Charles de Gaulle, L’aventure de la bombe: De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire, 1958–1969 (Paris: Plon, 1985).

4


1. Harold Watkinson (minister of defence) to Harold Macmillan, 12 April 1962, PREM 11/3712. 2. De Gaulle, note, 4 August 1961, papiers de Maurice Couve de Murville, tome II, CM7. See, generally, Raymond Tourrain, De la défense de la France à la défense de Europe (Paris, 1987), 68. 3. Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000 (London, 1997), 100. 4. Tourrain, De la défense de la France à la défense de l’Europe, 83. Général François Maurin, “La mise en place opérationnelle de la triad stratégique,” in Institut Charles de Gaulle, L’Aventure de la bombe: De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire (1958–1969), 224. 5. Maurin, ibid., 227. Marcel Duval et Yves le Baut, L’Arme nucléaire française: Pourquoi et comment? (Paris, 1992), 158. 6. Institut Charles de Gaulle, L’Aventure de la bombe: De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire (1958–1969), 119. 7. Chatenet oral history, Institut Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle to François Seydoux (Bonn), 9 February 1962, Papiers de Couve de Murville, tome II, CM 7, dossier 1962. 8. Tourrain, De la défense de la France à la défense de l’Europe, 80. For Gulliver analogy, see, for example, Peter Thorneycroft (British Defense Minister) to Harold Macmillan, “Visit to Paris 16th to 19th October,” 24 October 1962, PREM 11/3712. 9. Translated by and quoted in Jeffrey Vanke, “De Gaulle’s Atomic Defence Policy in 1963,” Cold War History (January 2001), 121. 10. See, for example, Général François Valentin, “La dissuasion et les armements classiques,” in Institut Charles de Gaulle, L’Aventure de la bombe: De Gaulle et la dissuasion nucléaire (1958–1969), 190–1. 11. Rusk, telegram to Department of State, 21 June 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 725. 12. Much has been written on the Kennedy administration’s opposition to nuclear proliferation. See, for example, John Newhouse, De Gaulle and

188

13.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18.

19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28.


the Anglo-Saxons (New York, 1970), 149–83. See, also, Bernard J. Fireston, Kennedy and the Test Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms Control, in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds., John F. Kennedy and Europe (Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1999), 66–94. For quote, see Pierre Chatenet (President of the EURATOM commission) oral history, Institut Charles de Gaulle. For statement of general French opposition to nuclear collaboration with West Germany, see note, “Coopération atomique franco-allemande,” Direction politique, Service des Pactes, 16 May 1961, Pactes 1951–70, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 409, dossier: Atome/général, MAE. See, for example, telegram, Dean Rusk to General James Gavin (US Ambassador to France), 29 November 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 678–9. See, also, memorandum of conversation between Charles Bohlen and Alphand, 6 September 1962, RG 59 Bohlen Records, Lot 74D379, box 19, folder: Secretary of State, memos from Bohlen. Gavin to Rusk, telegram, 27 December 1961, Central Files 1960–1963, 751.11/4–1166, box 1740. Rusk telegram, 8 February 1962, RG 84, Records of Foreign Service, France, Classified General Records, 1962–63, box 54, folder: January-June 1962, National Archives II. “Message to President from Prime Minister,” telegram from Foreign Office to Washington Embassy, 27 November 1961, CAB 129/107. Harold Watkinson to Macmillan, 12 April 1962, PREM 11/3712. See, for example, “Anglo-French Co-operation in Defense Research and Development,” Agreed report to Minister of Defence for period November 1961–May 1962, 18 May 1962, DEFE 7/2135. For a chronological record made by French officials of British references to nuclear collaboration, see “Note sur programme de défense britanique et coopération avec d’autre pays,” 10 December 1962, Pactes 1961–70, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 409, dossier: visite de Macmillan à Paris, MAE. David L. DiLeo, “George Ball and the Europeanists in the State Department, 1961–1963,” in Brinkley and Griffiths, eds., Kennedy and Europe, 263–80. Joseph Kraft, The Grand Design: From Common Market to Atlantic Partnership (New York, 1962), 9. Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG, 43. Ball, The Discipline of Power (Boston, 1986), 205–7; and ibid., The Past Has Another Pattern, 22, 265. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power (New York, 1973), 241. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, 219. Couve de Murville oral history, JFKL, 6. C.V. Clifton, Memorandum of Conference with the President, 7 March 1962, JFK NSF: Chester Clifton files, box 345, folder: Conference with President and JCS, 10/61–11/62. Rusk to Gavin, telegram, 29 November 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 678. Bundy to Kennedy, memorandum, 28 February 1962, JFK NSF, countries series, box 71, folder: France-General, 2/17/62–3/4/62.

Notes

189

29. Gavin followed up his meeting with Kennedy by elaborating and summarizing the issues they discussed. Gavin to Kennedy, 9 March 1962, JFK NSF, Countries series, box 116a, folder: France, General March 1962. 30. L.D. Battle (Executive Secretary) to Bundy, “Matters raised with the President by Ambassador Gavin,” 5 March 1962, ibid. 31. Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 211. For the specifics of the Department of Defense proposals, see memorandum, Foy Kohler to Russell Fessenden (assistant to Rusk), 7 March 1962, RG 59, CDF 1960–1963, 751.5611/3–261, box 1743. 32. Ball to McNamara, 10 March 1962, Central Files 1960–1963, 751.5611/3–261, box 1743. 33. Ball to Gavin, telegram, 15 March 1962, RG 84, France, Classified General Records, 1962–1963, box 54, folder: France–US, 1962. 34. Henry Owen, memorandum, “Nuclear Aid to France,” 7 March 1962, RG 59, Records of PPS, Lot 69D121, box 215, folder: France, 1962. 35. Meeting about the Soviet Union and France, 29 September 1962, transcribed by author, in Miller Center, Presidential Recordings of John Kennedy, vol. 2, p. 218. 36. Memorandum of meeting (JFK, Robert Bowie, Bundy, Kaysen, McNamara, and Gilpatric), 15 March 1962, JFK NSF: Regional Security, box 216, folder: MLF, General, Vol. 1, 1961–6/62. 37. McGeorge Bundy, “Presidents and Arms Control: John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson,” in Kenneth Thompson, ed., Presidents and Arms Control: Process, Procedures, and Problems, vol. 4 (Lanham, MD, 1997), 12. 38. George-Henri Soutou, L’Alliance incertaine: les rapports politicostratégiques franco-allemands, 1954–1996 (Paris, 1996), 224. 39. Note, Compte rendu d’un entretien entre Pierre de Leusse (Représentant permanent de la France au Conseil de l’O.T.A.N. et Thomas Finletter (Représentant permanent des Etats-Unis à l’O.T.A.N.), 2 April 1962, Documents diplomatiques francais, 1962, tome 1: 1 janvier–30 juin, 376–7. 40. Courcel (Ambassador to UK) to Couve, 3 April 1962, Europe, GrandeBretagne, dossier 1737, Défense nationale, MAE. 41. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 211. See, “The President’s New Conference of April 18, 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962, 333. 42. Gavin to Rusk, telegram, 9 March 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 685. 43. NSAM 148, 18 April 1962, JFK NSF, Meetings and Memoranda series, box 336, folder: NSAM 148. 44. Rusk to Gavin, cable, 18 May 1962, 02800, National Security Archive (NSA), Washington, DC. 45. Randolph Kidder (Counselor to Embassy, USIA), telegram, 5 August 1962, Gavin papers, box 20, folder: French reaction to resignation. Kidder reports that the French were sympathetic to Gavin’s resignation and had “without exception linked it to Franco-American disagreement

190


over nuclear matters, in general, the force de frappe in particular.” 46. George Ball, circular telegram from the Department of State to Certain Missions, 9 May 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 389–93. 47. L.J. Legere (Chief of Staff for General Maxwell Taylor) memorandum for Taylor, 18 April 1962, General Maxwell Taylor papers, box 35, folder: 6B NATO, National Defense University, Washington, DC. 48. “McNamara speaks out against National Nuclear Forces,” 17 June 1962, New York Times, 1. 49. Taylor to McNamara, “Comments on the corrected draft ‘Remarks by Secretary McNamara, NATO Ministerial Meeting, May 6, 1962,’” 25 April 1962, General Maxwell Taylor papers, box 35, folder: 6B NATO. 50. Bundy to Kennedy, memorandum, 7 June 1962, JFK NSF, Department and Agencies, box 274, folder: Dept. of Defense, 6/62. 51. George Ball, circular telegram from the Department of State to Certain Missions, 9 May 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 389–93. 52. Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley, 1980), 196. 53. Jane E. Stromseth, The Origin of Flexible Response: NATO’s Debate over Strategy in the 1960s (New York, 1988), 73. 54. Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG, 13, 47. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 316. 55. Sixth press conference held by General de Gaulle in Paris at the Elysée Palace, 15 May 1962, Major Addresses, Statements and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle: May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964 (New York, 1965), 180–1. 56. Frédéric Bozo, Deux Stratégies pour l’Europe: De Gaulle, les États-Unis et l’Alliance atlantique, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1996), 85. 57. Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961–1963, 335. 58. See, for example, Joint Defense Planning Staff, “NATO Strategy: Conventional Forces and MRBM’s,” 18 April 1962, DEFE 6/79 [JP 57(62)], PRO. 59. Robert McNamara to Kennedy, “Your interview with General Norstad,” 14 July 1962, Taylor papers, box 37, folder: 104b NATO. See, generally, Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 302–17. On 1 August 1962, at his press conference, President Kennedy was asked to comment on European press speculation that Norstad’s resignation indicated “a complete change in American strategy going as far as to a nuclear disengagement.” He responded that the speculation was “wholly unfounded, wholly untrue, and the slightest check by those who transmit them through Europe would demonstrate that they are unfounded.” See “The President’s New Conference of August 1, 1962,” in Public Papers of the Presidents: JFK, 1962, 597. 60. Meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 September 1962, transcribed by author, The Miller Center of Public Affairs, The Presidential Recordings of President John F. Kennedy, vol. 2 (New York, 2001).

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61. See, generally, Constantine Padgedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem, 1960–1963 (London, 2000). 62. Macmillan suggested to French Ambassador Chauvel that “the effect of putting the French and British nuclear power might be considered. . . and that this idea depended on the success of the British negotiations.” See Note, “Prime Minister’s Talks with Chauvel,” 3 May 1962, PREM 11/3792. 63. Conversation between de Gaulle and Macmillan, 3 June 1962, Pactes, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 409, dossier: entretiens bipartites, de Gaulle/Macmillan, janvier–juin 1962. See also, Record of conversation at the Château de Champs, 3 June 1962, 14, PREM 11/3775. 64. Extract from Record of Watkinson’s talks with Messmer, 7 June 1962, DEFE 7/2135. Record of Harold Watkinson’s Talks with Pierre Messmer in Paris, 7 June 1962, PREM 11/4224. Watkinson to Macmillan, 4 July 1962, PREM 11/3712. 65. Philip de Zueleta to Macmillan, “Anglo-French Relations in the Nuclear Field,” 24 June 1962, PREM 11/3712. André Puget (General of the air force) to Couve de Murville, 9 April 1962, Europe, Grande Bretagne, dossier 1737: défense nationale, MAE. 66. Bruce diary, 23 May 1962, Virginia Historical Society. For quote, see note of a conversation at Department of State luncheon, 28 April 1962, PREM 11/3712. 67. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, 223. 68. For a discussion and analysis of the pros and cons of providing France nuclear aid, see Minutes of Meeting (JFK, Rusk, McNamara, Bundy), 16 April 1962, JFK NSF, Meetings and Memoranda, box 317, folder: 2/62–5/62. 69. Soutou, L’alliance incertaine, 264–5. 70. Pierre Messmer, Après tant des batailles: mémoires (Paris, 1992), 316–20. 71. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 284. Most scholars fail to frame the nuclear sharing question with the context of the explosive Berlin problem. See, for example, Lawrence Kaplan, NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance (New York, 1994), 82–96, and Beatrice Heuser, NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949–2000. For a significant exception but with a divergent interpretation, see, Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 283–351.

5


1. Quoted in Philip Bell, France and Britain, 1940–1994: The Long Separation (London, 1997), 179. 2. Representative studies include Miriam Camps, Britain and the European Community (London, 1964); Ernst van der Beugel, From Marshall Aid to Atlantic Partnership (Amsterdam, 1966); Frank Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin,” in Thomas

192

3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.


Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963 (New York, 1989), 24–56; Thomas Alan Schwartz, “Victories and Defeats in the Long Twilight Struggle: the United States and Western Europe in the 1960s,” in Diane B. Kunz, ed., The Diplomacy of the Crucial Decade (New York, 1994), 115–48; Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (New York, 1998), 26–7, 58–82; Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945 (New York, 1980), 199–200; and Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Europe: entre la nation et Maastricht (Paris, 1995), 205. Some scholars mention Berlin as a backdrop to the EEC question, but offer no details. See, for example, Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, 521. The scholarship dealing with the relationship between Britain’s bid and the Berlin question is sparse. For two recent works that focus exclusively on the two issues as discrete phenomena, see John P. Gearson, Harold Macmillan and the Berlin Wall Crisis, 1958–62 (London, 1998); and Jacqueline Tratt, The Macmillan Government and Europe (New York, 1996). Adenauer’s veiled threats are conveyed most vividly in the memoir literature. See, for example, Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 207; François Seydoux, Mémoires d’outre-rhin (Paris, 1975), 211–12, 22. George McGhee to Rusk, memorandum, 26 October 61, RG 59, Lot 67D548, Policy Planning Staff, 1957–61, box 139, folder: Germany, Aug.-Dec. 1961. See, also, “Talking paper: discussion of general issues with Chancellor,” unsigned, 8 November 1961, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs, Records Relating to Berlin, 1957–63, box 3, folder: Chancellor Adenauer’s Visit, 20–22 November 1961. “Highlights of discussion at the Secretary’s Policy Planning meeting,” 3 November 1961, RG 59, Lot 67D548, box 132, folder: Secretary’s Policy Planning meetings. Kennedy’s faith in a politics of plenty as a way to prevent the rise of socialism or communism was prevalent among post-World War II policy-makers. See, generally, Charles Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II,” in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: The Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States (Madison, WI, 1978), 23–49. Some historians fixate on the world systems view of “hegemony.” See, Frank Costigliola, “The Pursuit of Atlantic Community,” in Thomas Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, 24–56; and Thomas J. McCormick, America’s Half Century (Baltimore, 1989), 125–47. There are two important exceptions. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security (New York, 1982), 198–236; and, Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth

Notes

10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

16.

193

Century (Princeton, 1994), 146–176. Although Gaddis stresses the concept of an autonomous “third force,” his primary focus is Kennedy’s formulation and implementation of flexible response. Smith discusses the liberal internationalism of the Kennedy administration but focuses almost exclusively on Latin America and neglects the technocratic proclivities of many Kennedy administration officials. For a general study of the rise of a technocratic culture in the first two decades of the post-World War II era, see William G. Carleton, Technology and Humanism: Some Exploratory Essays for Our Time (Nashville, 1970). Dean Rusk echoed the president’s conviction in The Winds of Freedom (Boston, 1963), 111: “We have learned that assistance is not likely to achieve its purposes if it is unconnected with social objectives, if it merely serves to enrich the rich and perpetuate the gap between rich and poor that breeds discontent and revolt.” Modernization theory applied in this context has been criticized by scholars as paternalistic and a guise for global “Americanization.” For its prevalence and influence within the Kennedy administration, see, generally, Walt W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth (Boston, 1960); and Rostow, The Diffusion of Power: An Essay in recent history (New York, 1972). For a critique, see Zdenek Suad, “Modernization or Americanization?: The Concept of Modernity and American Culture,” in Mustafa O. Attir, et al., eds., Direction of Change: Modernization Theory, Research, and Realities (Boulder, 1981), 249–64. Christian A. Herter and William Clayton, “A New Look at Foreign Economic Policy in Light of the Cold War and the Extension of the Common Market in Europe,” paper for Joint Economic Committee, 23 October 1961, 87th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1961), 1. Ball emphasized the same theme of winning the economic growth race with the Soviet Union: “We should stress that we see in the Common Market’s growth a partial answer to Khrushchev’s challenge of the competition issued to the free world in his speech at the XXIII Congress,” in which he declared that the Soviet Union “threatened capitalism by peaceful competition.” See, Ball to Kennedy, 23 October 1961, Ball papers, box 153, folder: Economic, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey. Remarks of Francis Bator (assistant to under-secretary of state for economic affairs George Ball), “Reflections on the Kennedy Round of GATT Trade Negotiations after Thirty Years,” 5 May 1997, US International Trade Commission, Washington, DC. Heller to Kennedy, 9 August 1961, JFK NSF, Department and Agencies, box 272, folder: Council of Economic Advisors. Memorandum, Council of Economic Advisors, 27 September 1961, Behrman papers, box 8, folder: Interdepartmental committee on foreign economic policy reports, 8/61–9/61, JFKL. See, generally, Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America: Race, Economic Policy, and the Decline of Liberalism (Chapel Hill, NC, 1998), 18–36.

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17. For background analyses of US economic conditions and concerns during this period, see generally, Irving Berstein, Promises Kept: John F. Kennedy’s New Frontier (New York, 1991), 118–217; William S. Borden, “Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy,” in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963 (New York, 1989), 57–89; and Judith Stein, Running Steel, Running America, 197–228. 18. National Security Action Memorandum No. 76, 21 August 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 32. 19. Thomas Zeiler, American Trade and Power in the 1960s (New York, 1992), 60–7. 20. “La France et l’unification ouest-européenne,” L’année politique: 1961, 179. 21. Pierre Pflimlin, Mémoires d’un Européen de la IV à la V République, 186. 22. Bell, France and Britain, 187. For a general summary of the French government’s position on a CAP, see Pierre Gerbet, “La politique agricole commune,” Espoir: La revue de l’institut Charles de Gaulle (March 1993), 2–11. See also, Alain Prate, Les Batailles économiques du général de Gaulle (Paris, 1978), 45–76. 23. Serge Bernstein, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958–1969 (London, 1993), 102–6. For a more detailed study of French economic planning but one that covers only the Fourth Republic, see Richard F. Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1981). 24. De Gaulle et ses premiers ministres, 1959–1969, colloque organisé par l’Institut Charles de Gaulle et l’Association française de science politique (Paris, 1990), 34–41; Raymond Triboulet, “Notice sur la vie et les travaux de Wilfrid Baumgartner,” 10 février 1981, Institut de France, Académie des sciences morales et politiques, 21, Bibliothèque nationale, Paris, France. On the effects of the CAP on food prices, see Bell, France and Britain, 187. 25. Annexe N. 1431 à 1439: “Exposé des motifs et projet de loi,” Documents de l’assemblée nationale, 3 octobre 1961, 491–517. The Fourth Plan was passed by the National Assembly on 17 November 1961. 26. For a general summary of the French government’s position on a CAP, see Pierre Gerbet, “La politique agricole commune,” Espoir: La revue de l’institute Charles de Gaulle (March 1993), 2–11. For British demands, see Bell, France and Britain, 186. 27. Debré au comité interministériel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne, 3 novembre 1961, Sécretariat général du comité interministeriel pour les questions de coopération économique européenne (SCGI), Politique agricole commune, article 771468/85–96, côte 52, Archives nationales, centre des archives contemporaines Fontainebleau, France. 28. Jean-Maxime Lévêque oral history, Archives orales, Institut Charles de Gaulle.

Notes

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29. Note, “Problèmes monétaires et financiers posés par l’adhésion éventuelle du Royaume-Uni au Marché commun,” Communauté Economique Européenne Commission, 30 octobre 1961, Papiers de Wilfrid Baumgartner, carton 3BA53, dossier Dr 5. 30. See, for example, Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 17 April 1962, CAB 128/36, Part I [C.C. 28(62)]; ibid., 31 July 1962, CAB 128/36, Part II [C.C. 51(62)]; Lord Privy Seal, memorandum, “Britain, the Commonwealth and the EEC,” 17 August 1962, CAB 129/119; and Note, Direction des affaires économiques et financières du ministère des affaires étrangères, 22 May 1962, Documents diplomatiques français, 1962, vol. 1 (Paris, 1998), 511–4. For an excellent scholarly analysis, see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, 159–237. On figures for 1963, see Bell, France and Britain, 188. 31. Dixon to the Earl of Home, 31 October 1961, FO 371/160446. 32. Macmillan, Pointing the Way, 410–28; and ibid., The End of the Day, 32–3. 33. See, for example, Dixon, “EEC Negotiation: Discussion with Jean Monnet,” 28 November 1961, FO 371/158184. See also, W.L. Gorell Barnes, “Record of a discussion with Monnet,” 13 December 1961, ibid. 34. Henri, Comte de Paris, Dialogue sur la France: Correspondence et entretiens, 1953–1970 (Paris, 1994), 164. 35. See, for example, François Seydoux to Ministry, telegram, 6 February 1961, Europe 1961–1965, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1571 (janvier 1961 à mars 1962), MAE; Alphand to Ministry, telegram, 25 May 62, Amérique, 1952–1963, États-Unis, dossier: 487 Relations commerciales; and “Monsieur Ball, Sous-Secrétaire d’Etat, devrait être censuré,” 2 or 3 February 1963, Amérique, 1952–1963, Etats-Unis, dossier 339 USA-France. 36. Memorandum of conversation between UK and US participants re/EEC negotiations, 4 April 1962, JFK NSF, United Kingdom, box 178, folder: General, 4/26/62–4/30/62, JFKL. 37. Dixon to Foreign Office, telegram, 19 January 1962, FO 371/164832. 38. François Seydoux (Bonn) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 June 1962, Europe 1961–1965, RFA, dossier 1571. See, generally, Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer. 39. Record of conversation between the Lord Privy Seal and Adenauer at Cadenabbia, 1 October 1962, PREM 11/4522. 40. Scope paper for Rusk’s European Trip, prepared in Department of State, 11 June 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 106. 41. Meeting with President Dwight D. Eisenhower, 10 September 1962, transcribed by author, forthcoming in The Miller Center of Public Affairs, The Presidential Recordings of President John F. Kennedy, vol. 2 (New York, 2000). 42. National Security Action Memorandum No. 76, 21 August 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 32. 43. Memorandum, Ball to Kennedy, 23 August 1961, Kermit Gordon papers, box 32, folder: Foreign Economic Policy (Ball), JFKL. See, generally,

196

44.

45. 46.

47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52.

53.

54.


George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York, 1982), 197–8; and James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1997), 120–2. Memorandum, Ball to Kennedy, 23 August 1961, Kermit Gordon papers, box 32, folder: Foreign Economic Policy (Ball), JFKL. See, generally, George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs (New York, 1982), 197–8; and James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1997), 120–2. W. Walton Butterworth (Mission to the EEC), telegram, 21 September 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 13: 40–2. The US attitude toward the EEC negotiations was aptly expressed by Department of State, European bureau officer, Richard Vine, to the first secretary of the US embassy in London when he wrote, “As you will have seen from a recent cable we are under strict instructions to follow our own prescription to ‘lay low’ on the UK-Common Market issue.” Richard Vine to Joseph A. Greenwald, 28 July 1961, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and Economic Affairs, Records Relating to UK Membership in the EEC, 1961–62, box 1, folder: UK Relations w/EEC, 1961. Quoted in James Bill, George Ball, 125. Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961–1963 (London, 1973), 111. For a summary of British differences with Ball’s arguments during the autumn of 1961, see, David Ormsby-Gore (British ambassador to U.S.) to Ball, memorandum, RG 59, Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Political and Economic Affairs, 1961–62, box 5, folder: UK-EEC negotiations. See, generally, George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York, 1988), 215–20. Nelson D. Lankford, The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of David K.E. Bruce, 1898–1977 (Boston, 1996), 310–312. Bruce Diary, 4 April 1962. Alistair Horne, Macmillan, 1957–1986 (London, 1989), 306–8. David L DiLeo, “George Ball and the Europeanists in the State Department, 1961–1963,” in Brinkley and Griffiths, eds., John F. Kennedy and Europe, 271. Summary minutes of Committee on Foreign Economic Policy, 4 October 1961, Jack Behrman papers, box 8, folder: Interdepartmental Committee on Foreign Economic Rpts., 10/61–12/61, JFKL. Summary minutes of meeting of the Interdepartmental Committee of Under Secretaries on Foreign Economic Policy, 4 October 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 9: 14; and George Ball to Luther Hodges (secretary of commerce), Jack Behrman papers, box 8, folder: Interdepartmental Committee on Foreign Economic Policy Correspondence, 1961–62, JFKL. For the administration’s focus on trade expansion as a cure-all for US domestic economic ills, see, generally, William S. Borden, “Defending Hegemony: American Foreign Economic Policy,” in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy,

Notes

55.

56.

57. 58.

59.

60.

61. 62.

63.

64. 65. 66.

197

1961–1963 (New York, 1989), 57–89; and Diane B. Kunz, Butter and Guns: America’s Cold War Economic Diplomacy (New York, 1997), 105–6. A more comprehensive study is provided by Thomas W. Zeiler, American Trade and Power in the 1960s (New York, 1992). Remarks of Michael Blumental (deputy under-secretary of state for economic affairs), Symposium, “Reflections on the Kennedy Round of GATT Trade Negotiations after Thirty Years,” 5 May 1997, US International Trade Commission, Washington, DC. Paper prepared by Howard Peterson, 17 October 1961, Peterson papers, box 2, folder: trade legislation, correspondence on proposals, JFKL; and Peterson to Kennedy, memorandum, 23 October 1961, ibid. Ball to Kennedy, memorandum, 23 October 1961, Ball papers, box 153, folder: Economic, Seely G. Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey. Zeiler, American Trade and Power in the 1950s, 66. See also, Zeiler, “Meeting the European Challenge: The Common Market and Trade Policy,” in Mark White, ed., Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (New York, 1998), 135–40. Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, 141–2. Most memoirs, biographies, and general studies of the Kennedy administration provide descriptive accounts but focus on the intra-bureaucratic problems without analyzing the policy implications, especially for Western Europe. See, for example, Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days (New York, 1965), 440–5; Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 171–2; and Bill, George Ball, 64. For Gavin’s recollection of the Department of State’s animosity toward de Gaulle and skepticism of his diplomatic skills, see Gavin’s unpublished autobiography, Beyond the Stars, Gavin papers, box 2, folder: chapter 10: “An Ambassador’s Life,” U.S. Army Historical Institute, Carlilse, Pennsylvania. See, for example, Alphand to Couve, 17 October 1961, Amérique, ÉtatsUnis, dossier 337, MAE. “Compte rendu de l’entretien entre Debré et Gavin,” 4 September 1961, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier: 346 (échange des messages et notes), MAE. For an explanation of the poultry disagreement, see Ynze Alkema, “European–American Trade Policies,” in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds., John F. Kennedy and Europe (Baton Rouge, 1999), 232. J.J. Reinstein to Charles Bohlen, “Balance Sheet of our Economic Relations with France,” 26 February 1962, RG 59 Bohlen records, Lot 74D379, box 21, folder: economic-miscellaneous. Ball to Kennedy, 24 April 1962, JFK NSF, Countries, box 175, folder: UK, 4/62. Ball to Baumgartner, 24 November 1961, Papiers de Baumgartner, carton 3BA53, dossier Dr 3, FNSP. For Dillon’s advice to Kennedy, see Dillon to Kennedy, 12 December 1961, JFK POF, Staff memoranda, box 62, folder: Bundy, 5/61–12/61. For

198

67.

68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75.

76.

77.

78.

6


a summary of the Dillon Round negotiations, see “The Reciprocal Trade Issue: Background and Analysis,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly, (5 January 1962), 14. For Baumgartner’s position, see “Décisions de la F.A.O. et recommendations du G.A.T.T.,” L’Année politique, 1961, 595. “Excerpts from statements made at the GATT Ministerial Meeting, 27–30, 1961,” unsigned, RG59, Bureau of European Affairs, box 4, folder: US-Internal Preparation. “Special Message to Congress on Foreign Trade,” 25 January 1962, ibid., 68–69. Circular telegram, Department of State to Certain Diplomatic Missions, 30 January 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 9: 512–16. Pierson Dixon to Foreign Office, telegram, 23 May 1962, PREM 11/3775. Oliver Guichard, Mon général, 389, 401. Hervé Alphand, L’Étonnement d’être, 476. “La situation politique au début de 1962,” L’année politique, 1962 (Paris, 1963), 1–2. “Du ministère Debré au ministère Pompidou,” L’année politique, 1962, 40–5. Jean Charlot, “L’opinion publique en France face à la politique européenne de Gaulle,” Espoir 90 (mars 1993), 36. For a general discussion of the effects of the Great Depression on postWorld War II economic thinking, see Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York, 1995). For a French study, see Richard Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1981); and William Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944–1954 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1988). Benard Bruneteau, “Mutation politique et mutation agricole: le gaullisme et la révolution silencieuse des paysans,” in De Gaulle en son siècle: moderniser la France, vol. 3 (Paris, 1996), 194–206. See, also, Serge Bernstein, The Republic of de Gaulle, 1958–1969, trans. Peter Morris (New York, 1989), 74–91. Stein, Running Steel, Running America, 26–36. See, generally, Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: the Great Black Migration and how it Changed America (New York, 1991). Geir Lundestad, “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997 (New York, 1998), 75; Zeiler, American Trade and Power in the 1960s, 159–89.


1. Cited in Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power. 2. Henri Bourguinat, “Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du système monétaire international: la contestation manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 3, 110–18.

Notes

199

3. A term used by Jonathan Lee, “Kennedy, Johnson, and the Dilemma of Multinational Corporations: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1960s,” Essays in Economic and Business History 14 (1996). 4. Robert Solomon, The International Monetary System, 1945–1981 (New York, 1982), 54. 5. Lee, “Kennedy, Johnson, and the Dilemma of Multinational Corporations: American Foreign Economic Policy in the 1960s,” Essays in Economic and Business History 14 (1996), 322. 6. Note, Olivier Wormser, 30 May 1961, Baumgartner papers, box 3BA48, folder DR 2, cited in Francis Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability? Giscard, Ball, and the Gold Standstill,” Journal of European Integration History, 6 (December 2000), 61–84. For a summary of this reasoning, see René Larre (le conseiller financier près l’ambassade de France aux États-Unis) to Baumgartner, 28 September 1961, Fonds Trésor: Vol. 15, Relations bilaterales avec les États-Unis, côte B10917, dossier: balance des paiements, MEFI. 7. For a summary of the Anglo-French dialogue, see C.W. Sanders (British Board of Trade), “Points for Meeting,” 26 June 1961, FO 371/158179. 8. Compte rendu de l’entretien entre Debré et Gavin, 4 septembre 1961, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier 346 (échange des messages et notes), MAE. 9. National Security Action Memorandum No. 81, 28 August 1961, FRUS, 1961–1963, 9: 122. 10. Dillon to Kennedy, 31 August 1961, ibid., 9: 122–5. Dillon reported that the gold loss for 1961 equaled a deficit of $274 million. 11. For figures on French conversion of gold, see “Tableau des transactions en or des États-Unis avec les pays étrangers,” given by Bourguinat, “Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du système monétaire international: la contestation manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar, in De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 3, 110–18. 12. Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, number 4, 23, Comité pour l’histoire économique et financière de la France. Dillon to Baumgartner, 4 May 1961, Archives de Baumgartner, box 3BA48, folder Dr 1, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?”. 13. André de Lattre, Servir aux finances (Paris, 1999), 150, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?”. 14. Maurice Perouse (Directeur du trésor) to Giscard d’Estaing, Compterendu de la 8ème réunion du groupe de travail no. 3 du Comité de politique économique de l’O.C.E.D, 16–17 April 1962 at Château de la Muette, fonds 9: institutions financières internationales, côte B54754, MEFI, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?”. 15. Robert V. Roosa, Monetary Reform for the World Economy (New York, 1965), 125–6. In brief, within the Kennedy administration Roosa and Dillon generally favored ad hoc gentlemen’s agreements, while the Department of State supported a multilateral approach that elicited promises from the major Western European leaders that balance of

200

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28.


payment disparities were a political problem. Within the French government, the Ministry of Finance’s views were similar to its US counterparts at Treasury. The intricacies of the Triffin plan are analyzed in Robert Triffin, The World Money Maze: National Currencies in International Payments (New Haven, Conn, 1966), 266–72. Baumgartner and US under-secretary of the Treasury Robert Roosa discussed the upcoming IMF talks and the various proposals during midAugust. Dillon reiterated those discussions in an appeal to Baumgartner for France’s cooperation. Dillon à Baumgartner, 22 August 1961, Papiers de Baumgartner, carton 3BA49, dossier dr 4, FNSP. Ibid. Throughout the late spring and summer of 1961, the Ministry of Finance formalized its position on IMF expansion proposals. See, for example, memorandum rédigé par de Lattre (cabinet du ministre des finances) sur la position françaises, undated, Papiers de Baumgartner, carton 3BA47, dossier DR 5; Secrétariat particulier du ministre des finances et des affaires économiques, “Contre un renforcement du fonds monétaire: Inquiétude du gouvernement français,” 27 mai 1961, ibid., carton 3BA49, dossier Dr 1. Maurice Perouse (Directeur du Trésor) to Baumgartner, “Compte-rendu de la 6ème réunion du Comité de politique économique de l’O.C.E.D., 18–19 avril au Château de la Muette,” Fonds 9: Institutions Financières Internationales, côte B54754, MEFI. Baumgartner, note, 20 February 1961, Papers of Baumgartner, carton 3BA46, dossier Dr 3. Alphand to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 20 February 1961, Amérique, États-Unis, dossier 387 (Grande Bretagne). Memorandum, Walter Heller to President Kennedy, 16 May 1961, Heller papers, Heller/JFK 1960–64 series, box 5, folder: memos to JFK, 5/61, JFKL. Jacques Rueff to Charles de Gaulle, 5 May 1961, Papers of Baumgartner, carton, 3BA34, dossier Dr 5. André de Lattre, memorandum, ibid., carton 3BA47, dossier Dr 5. Jean-Maxime Lévêque Oral History, Institut Charles de Gaulle, Paris, France. Summary of conversation between Baumgartner and Dillon, 18–19 mai 1961, Archives de Baumgartner, carton 3BA48, dossier Dr 1. James Tobin (Council of Economic Advisors) to Kennedy, 3 November 1961, Heller papers, Heller and JFK series, box 5, folder: memos, 11/61–12/61, JFKL. Memorandum, Bohlen to George Ball, 20 July 1962, RG 59, Lot 67D2, Records of Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn Thompson, box 5, folder: England. “Statement by George Ball,” and “Text of Communique,” 16–17 November 1961, US Department of State, Bulletin (18 December 1961), 1014–20. For French hesistation about relinquishing control over their former territories, see Maurice Perouse (le directeur du trésor) to

Notes

29. 30.

31. 32. 33.

34.

35.

36.

37. 38.

39.

40.

41. 42.

201

Baumgartner, “Compte-rendu du premier réunion du Conseil interministériel de l’OCED,” 18 November 1961, Fonds 9, côte B 54754, MEFI. Charles A. Coombs, The Arena of International Finance (New York, 1976), 61–2. Cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?“ For detailed analyses of the various ad hoc measures, see, generally, Gavin, Gold, Dollars, and Power, forthcoming. Triffin, The World Money Maze: National Currencies in International Payments, 249. David L. Stebenne, Arthur J. Goldberg: New Deal Liberal (New York, 1996), 295–300. See, generally, Jonathan Lee, “Kennedy, Johnson, and the Dilemma of Multinational Corporations: American Foreign Policy in the 1960s,” in Essays in Economic and Business History 14 (1996), 322–5. For debate within the administration, see, for example, Meeting on the Economy and the Budget, 30 July 1962, transcribed by Gavin and David Shreve in The Presidential Recordings of JFK, vol. 2, 54–79. C. Douglas Dillon, “The Kennedy Presidency: The Economic Dimension,” in The Kennedy Presidency: Seventeen Intimate Perspectives of John F. Kennedy, ed. Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham, MD, 1997), 131–2. Walter Heller, “John F. Kennedy and the Economy,” in Thompson, ed. The Kennedy Presidency, 153. For Kennedy’s attacks on economic myths, see Bernstein, Promises Kept, 148. Kennedy’s tax cut was passed in 1964. Bernstein, Promises Kept, 152–9. For a sound analysis of the politics of Keynesian and counter-Keynesian doctrine in the post-World War II era, see Alan Wolfe, America’s Impasse (New York, 1981), 49–108. Benjamin Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy (New York, 1975), 84. Notes on luncheon at Glen Ora (Kennedy, Alphand, Bohlen, Malraux, Bundy), 13 May 1962, RG 59, Bohlen Records, Lot 74D379, box 18, folder: memcons. Ben Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy, 92. Conversation between Giscard d’Estaing and James Tobin, 1 June 1962, Heller papers, reel 24: European budget study file. For Heller’s study of French economic planning, see, e.g., Heller, “Capital Budgeting Experience in Five European Countries,” May 1962, Walter Heller papers, reel 21: Budget (federal) file; and memorandum, Bundy to Heller, 14 May 1962, ibid., reel 24: European budget study file. Remarks by Larre at a meeting of the AFL-CIO Research Directors, Washington, D.C., 15 May 1962, Fonds trésor: Tome 15, Rélations bilaterales avec les États-Unis, Côte B 10917, dossier: balance des paiments, Archives économiques et financières, Ministère de l’économie et des finances, Paris, France. Business Week, 5 June, 1962, 32. Memorandum, Bundy to Heller, 14 May 1962, Heller papers, reel 24; file European budget study. For French perception of Kennedy’s motives, see Jacques Rueff to Philip Cortney, 31 May 1962, ibid. Ribicoff file.

202


43. Address in Atlantic City at the Convention of the United Auto Workers, 8 May 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents, 369. By autumn 1962, Kennedy was making a campaign issue out of the growth race with the Soviets. See “Remarks by telephone to a Democratic rally at St. Cloud, Minnesota,” 7 October 1962, ibid., 748. He made almost verbatim comments at a dinner of the Democratic Party of Cook County, Illinois on 19 October 1962: See “Remarks at a dinner of the Democratic party of Cook County,” 19 October 1962, ibid., 802. 44. Summary of President Kennedy’s remarks to the 496th meeting of the National Security Council, 18 January 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 8: 239. 45. Ibid. 46. Carl Kaysen oral history, 90–1. On one occasion, Kennedy declared that “there is no problem of foreign policy – not Berlin, Laos, or nuclear testing – which is more important than the balance of payments, because the solution of all of our foreign policy problems depends on our finding a solution to the balance of payments problem.” See memorandum of presidential meeting on foreign aid and the balance of payments, 22 June 1962, Kermit Gordon papers, box 24, folder: balance of payment matters, JFKL. 47. Douglas Dillon to Kennedy, 25 May 1962, NSF, Departments and Agencies, box 289, folder: Treasury, 1/61–5/62, JFKL. 48. For the term “gold battles,” see Francis Gavin, “The Gold Battles within the Cold War: American Monetary Policy and the Defense of Europe, 1960–1963,” Diplomatic History 26 (Winter 2002), 61–94. Where I disagree is over the seriousness that the Kennedy administration accorded to troop withdrawals from Europe. I see it as a tactical counterthreat rather than a serious policy proposal. 49. See, Carl Kaysen to Kennedy, 19 January 1962, JFK POF, Staff memos, box 64, folder: Kaysen. On Eisenhower’s intention to return U.S. troops from Europe, see, generally, Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 200–6; and Gavin, “The Myth of Flexible Response.” 50. Memorandum of Meeting (JFK, Alphand, Malraux, Lebel, Bundy), 11 May 1962, FRUS, 13: 695. For figures on French dollar conversion, see US Net Monetary Gold Transactions with Foreign Countries and International Institutions, 1 January 1962–30 June 1962, Fonds Trésor: Vol. 15, Relations bilatérales avec les États-Unis, côte B10915, folder: Budget, 1956–65. 51. U. Alexis Johnson (deputy under-secretary) to Paul Nitze, 23 May 1962, CDF 711.51, box 1473, folder: 5–162. 52. “Military and Related Aspects of Basic National Security Policy,” 6 June 1962, JFK NSF, Subjects series, box 330, folder: basic national security, 6/62. 53. U. Alexis Johnson to Roswell Gilpatric, 19 June 1962, CDF 711.51, box 1473, folder: 5–162. 54. Meeting about Berlin, 3 August 1962, tape 6, transcribed by author, in Miller Center of Public Affairs, The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, vol. 1, 203–26.

Notes

203

55. William Tyler (European Desk, Department of State) to Johnson, memorandum, 17 August 1962, CDF 751.5/8–162, box 1741. August 17 memo: “It was agreed at a Dillon–Gilpatric–Kohler lunch last June 7 that US troop withdrawals from Italy should not be used as a threat in those negotiations.” 56. US Embassy in London to Department of State, “De Gaulle and Dollar Diplomacy,” 13 June 1962, Ball papers, box 156, folder: balance-ofpayments dispute. Courcel to Ministry, telegram, 27 June 1962, Pactes, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 409, dossier: entretiens bipartites/RuskHome, juin-juillet 1962. Privately, Macmillan stressed his desire to see international liquidity expand in tandem with increasing world trade and his concerns lest France and Germany hoard gold. See Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 383. 57. Gavin to Rusk, 12 July 1962, JFK NSF: France, box 79, folder: general, 6/62–8/62. 58. J.R. Fears, France in the Giscard Presidency (London, 1981), 1–18. See also Entretien biographique de Claude Pierre-Brossolette, entretien 5, 28. 59. Jacques Reinstein (Minister-Counselor, US Embassy Paris), circular telegram, 29 June 1962, RG 84, France, box 64, folder: Investment of Capital. 60. Ball to Kennedy, “A Fresh Approach to the Gold Problem,” 24 July 1962, Ball papers, box 156, folder: balance-of-payments dispute, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?” 61. Ibid. 62. No record of Giscard’s meeting with Kennedy has been found. Kennedy mentions some of the points they discussed in a later meeting with Federal Reserve Chairman William Martin. See Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis, 16 August 1962, transcribed by Gavin, The Presidential Recordings of John F. Kennedy, vol. 1, 464–79. 63. Memorandum of Conversation, 20 July 1962, FRUS, 13: 731–5. Ibid. 21 July 1962, JFK NSF: France, box 79, folder: meetings 1962, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?” 64. François Bourricaud and Pascal Salin, Présence de Jacques Rueff (Paris, 1989), 11. 65. Alphand, L’étonnement d’être, 381. See, also, entretien Couve–Gromyko in Geneva, 21 July 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956–66, 16: 179–81, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?” 66. In September 1962, Giscard began talking about a CRU, a proposal which was debated intermittently until 1965. See, for example, Loriaux, France after Hegemony, 185–6. See, also, Samy Cohen and Marie-Claude Smoute, La Politique de Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (Paris, 1985), 146–8; and Bourguinat, “Le général de Gaulle et la réforme du système monétaire international: la contestation manquée de l’hégémonie du dollar,” in De Gaulle en son siècle, 116–117, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?”

204


67. Meeting about the international economy, 20 August 1962, transcribed by Gavin, in the Miller Center of Public Affairs, The Presidential Recording of John F. Kennedy, vol. 1, 489–525. 68. Loriaux, France after Hegemony, 185. 69. Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis, 16 August 1962, transcribed by Gavin, Presidential Recordings of Kennedy, vol. 1, 462–524, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?” 70. Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis, 10 August 1962, ibid.; and Meeting on the Gold and Dollar Crisis, 20 August 1962, ibid,, cited in Gavin and Mahan, “Hegemony or Vulnerability?” 71. Address at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 4 July 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 538. 72. See, for example, Jacques Rueff, “Deux pyramides du crédit sur le stock d’or des États-Unis,” Le Monde, 23 June 1961; Rueff, “Un danger pour l’occident: le gold-exchanges standard,” ibid., 27 June 1961; and Rueff, “Comment sortir du système?“ ibid., 29 June 1961. 73. United States Net Monetary Gold Transactions with Foreign Countries and International Institutions, 1 January 1963 – 30 June 1963, Fonds Trésor, vol. 19, relations monétaires-États-Unis, 1962–1978, côte Z9984, folder: Transactions d’or monétaire avec l’étranger.

7


1. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle (Paris, 1991), 375. 2. See, for example, Frank Costigliola, “Kennedy, the European Allies, and the Failure to Consult,” Political Science Quarterly (Summer 1996), 105–23; Josephine Brain, “Dealing with de Gaulle,” in Mark J. White, ed., Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (New York, 1998), 173–4; and Maurice Vaïsse, “Une hirondelle ne fait pas le printemps: la France et la crise de Cuba,” in Vaïsse, ed., L’Europe et la crise de Cuba (Paris, 1993), 89–105. 3. Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 399. 4. For an authoritative account of Soviet motives and actions during the Cuban missile crisis, see Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble. For a persuasive analysis, though based on circumstantial evidence about Soviet aims, see Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd edn. (New York, 1999), 99–109. 5. Meeting about Europe and General Diplomatic Matters, 30 July 1962, transcribed by George Eliades and Timothy Naftali, in The Miller Center of Public Affairs, The Presidential Recordings of Kennedy, vol. 1, 45. 6. Meeting about Berlin, 3 August 1962, transcribed by author, The Presidential Recordings of JFK, vol. 1, 212. 7. Meeting about Berlin, 29 August 1962, ibid., 633. 8. John C. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin–Cuba Crisis,

Notes

205

1961–1964, 59–63. 9. Report by the Military Sub-Group of the Washington Ambassadorial Group, 12 September 1962, FRUS, 1962–1963, 15: 315–0. 10. Conversation between Couve and Kennedy, telegram by Alphand, 9 October 1962, Secrétariat général series, entretiens et messages, 1956–66, reel 17: 74, Archives diplomatiques, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris. 11. Alphand to Couve, 7 September 1962, Documents diplomatiques français, 1962, vol. 2 (Paris, 1999), 186–7. 12. Memorandum of conversation between Couve et Rusk, 7 October 1962, Secrétariat général, entretiens et messages, 1956–1966, 17: 49–58, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 13. Kai Bird, The Color of Truth: McGeorge and William Bundy, Brothers in Arms (New York, 1999), 227. Ex Comm members included throughout the next two weeks were Bundy; the president’s brother and attorney general, Robert; White House aide and speechwriter, Theodore Sorenson; vice-president Lyndon Johnson; Treasury secretary C. Douglas Dillon; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Maxwell Taylor; defense secretary Robert McNamara; deputy defense secretaries Roswell Gilpatric and Paul Nitze; secretary of state Dean Rusk; undersecretary of state George Ball; assistant secretary of state for Latin America Edwin Martin; deputy under-secretary of state for political-military affairs U. Alexis Johnson; Ambassador-at-Large Llewellyn “Tommy” Thompson; newly appointed Ambassador to France, Charles (“Chip”) Bohlen; deputy CIA director Marshall Carter who filled in for Director John McCone while he was away dealing with an ailing family member; former secretary of state Dean Acheson; US Ambassador to the United Nations Adlai Stevenson; and Arthur Lundahl of the CIA’s National Photographic Interpretation Center. 14. Reported in telegram, Kohler (US ambassador to the Soviet Union) to the Department of State, 16 October 1962, FRUS, 1961–1962, 15: 361. 15. Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 223. 16. James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore, 1994), 150. 17. Meetings on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 16 October 1962, transcribed by Philip Zelikow, The Presidential Recordings of JFK, vol. 2, 397–468. Almost a year before to the date, when Soviet and US tanks faced off at Checkpoint Charlie, Kennedy had used back channel diplomacy through Soviet intelligence officer Georgi Bolshakov to encourage Khrushchev to seek a resolution. 18. Hillenbrand, Fragments of Time, 202. 19. Ibid., 203. 20. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin–Cuba Crisis, 1961–1964, 71. 21. Meeting with West German Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder, 17 October 1962, transcribed by Zelikow and author, Presidential Recordings of JFK, vol. 2.

206


22. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind, 150. 23. Memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and Gromyko, 18 October 1962, JFK NSF: Countries series, box 185, folder: USSR, Gromyko Talks, JFKL. 24. Off the Record Meeting on Cuba, 16 October 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 11: 72. 25. Kennedy’s detractors argue that his insistence on proving his toughness compelled him to recklessly court nuclear annihilation by forcing a showdown over Soviet missiles in Cuba. Understanding the linkage that the Kennedy administration saw between Cuba and Berlin casts the president’s actions as a tempered response. This conclusion was influenced by numerous discussions with P. Zelikow. 26. Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 230. 27. Minutes of the 506th meeting of the National Security Council, 20 October 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 11: 135–6. 28. Minutes of the 506th meeting of the NSC, 21 October 1962, ibid., 11: 148. For a study of the Jupiter missiles, see, Philip Nash, The Other Missiles of October (Chapel Hill, 1997), 117–49. The withdrawal of the Jupiters had been planned before the outbreak of the Cuban crisis and their removal was not a contentious issue with France or the major West European nations. 29. Rusk to Kennedy, 25 October 1962, RG 59 Records of Policy Planning Staff, Lot 69D121, box 236, folder: H. Owen chronological July–Dec. 1962. See, also, Rusk to Kennedy, 2 November 1962, RG 59 Records of PPS, box 215, folder: France, 1962. 30. Conversation between de Gaulle and Dean Acheson, 22 October 1962, Documents diplomatiques français, 2: 315–19. The British government was also informed and favored the option of a quarantine. 31. Hans Peter Schwarz, “Adenauer et la crise de Cuba,” in Vaïsse, ed., L’Europe et la crise de Cuba, 83. 32. Réunion des ministres des affaires étrangères des six pays la CEE, Brussels, 23 October 1962, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956–66, 17: 101, Diplomatic archives, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 33. Ibid., 101–5. 34. Alphand to Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, 23 octobre 1962, État-Major des Armées, OTAN: Conseil de l’atlantique nord, 1961–63, carton 12S75, dossier: concept stratégique, 1962–63. See, also, Laloy to Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, ibid. For US firmness on the Berlin question, see, for example, Abbott Smith (Acting Chairman of the Office of National Estimates of the CIA) to John McCone (Director of the CIA), memorandum, 23 October 1962, FRUS, 1962–1963, 15: 394–5. 35. Hillenbrand, Fragments of Our Time, 203. 36. Kermit Gordon (Council of Economic Advisors), memorandum for Ball and Heller, 26 October 1962, Heller papers, reel 13: Monnet file. 37. Paul Nitze, “Berlin in Light of Cuba,” attachment to memorandum for Kennedy, undated, FRUS, 1961–1963, 15: 414–15.

Notes

207

38. Kennedy to Khrushchev, 14 December 1962, JFK NSF: Countries, box 184, folder: USSR, Khrushchev correspondence 11/20/62–12/14/62, JFKL. 39. See, generally, Pierre M. Gallois, “Les conséquences de la crise de Cuba sur l’alliance,” in Vaïsse, ed., L’Europe et la crise de Cuba, 171–6. 40. De Gaulle to Macmillan, 6 November 1962, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier 149 (Présidence de la République), MAE; de Gaulle to Kennedy, 1 December 1962, ibid. 41. Scholars disagree over who was the architect of the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship. Comments of Pierre Maillard, Günter Diehl, Horst Osterheld, Sigismund von Braun, and Jacques Morizet, “La genèse du traité franco-allemand,” in De Gaulle en son siècle, ed. by the Charles de Gaulle Institute (Paris, 1992), 5: 416–20. For an excellent analysis, see Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, 596–627. 42. De Gaulle to Adenauer, 20 September 1962, Europe 1961–65, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1574 (préparation du traité/septembre 1962–janvier 1963), Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Roland de Margérie (French ambassador to West Germany) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, 10 November 1962, ibid.; Roland de Margérie to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, 12 November 1962, ibid. 43. De Gaulle to Adenauer, 19 November 1962, Korrespondenz des Herrn Bundeskanzler mit de Gaulle, Stiftung-Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Rhöndorf, Germany; and Adenauer to de Gaulle, 20 November 1962, ibid. 44. Ormsby-Gore oral history, 61–2, JFKL. 45. Margerie to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 5 January 1963, Europe 1961–65, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1565 (relations avec les EtatsUnis 1963), Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 46. John F. Kennedy dictabelt XXXa, 28 November 1963, transcribed by author, JFK POF, Presidential Recordings, Cassette J, Telephone Recordings Transcripts, JFKL. 47. Rusk to McNamara, 5 December 1962, RG 59, CDG 711.51, box 1473, folder: 11–262. 48. Roland de Margerie to Secrétariat général de la défense nationale, 20 December 1962, État-Major des Armées, OTAN: Conseil de l’atlantique nord, 1961–62, carton 12S75, dossier: concept stratégique, 1962–63, SHAT. The British objections to proposed US strategy for NATO had been set forth earlier in 1962 in a White Paper. See, Defense White Paper, 9 February 1962, CAB 129/108 [C.23(62)], Public Records Office. 49. Tête-à-tête entre de Gaulle et Adenauer, 21 January 1963, 9 am session, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956–1966, vol. 18: 46–62, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 50. Ibid., 18: 46–62. For quote, see p. 54. 51. Pierre Messmer, Après tant de batailles: mémoires (Paris, 1992), 293. 52. Peter Thorneycroft (British defense minister) to Harold Macmillan, “Visit to Paris 16th to 19th October,” 24 October 1962, PREM 11/3712. 53. De Courcel to Couve de Murville, 3 December 1962, Pactes, Politique de

208

54.

55. 56.

57. 58. 59.

60.

61.

8


l’OTAN, carton 409, dossier: visite de Macmillan à Paris; entretiens de Nassau. For a good analysis of the Nassau deal, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 359–67. Record of conversation between D.P. Reilly (Foreign Office) and Olivier Wormser (French Director General of Economic Affairs), 29 March 1963, FO 371/169122, PRO. Philip de Zulueta to Macmillan, “Rambouillet and Anglo-French Relations in the Nuclear Field,” 7 December 1962, PREM 11/3712. For revised interpretations of the Nassau agreement, which show that it was neither a surprise arrangement to deal with British political exigencies nor a continuation of US defense policy, see Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 360–70. See, also, Richard E. Neustadt, Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective (Ithaca, New York, 1999). Conversation among Couve and George Ball and Bohlen, 10 January 1963, SG, Entretiens et messages, 18: 11–16. Messmer, Mémoires, 293, 326. Note for Couve de Murville, “Principales étapes de l’évolution allemand sur le projet de force atomique multilatérale,” unsigned, 1 July 1963, Europe 1961–65, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1575 (entretiens franco-allemands des 4 et 5 juillet 1963 à Bonn, MAE. Record of conversation between Adenauer et Ball, 14 January 1963, SG, Entretiens et messages, 1956–66, 18: 18–23. Roland de Margérie to Couve, letter, 31 January 63, Europe 1961–1963, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1571 (janvier-février 1963), MAE; Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Europe, 220. This conclusion extends the focus of bilateral burden-sharing discussed in David G. Haglund, Alliance Within the Alliance?: Franco-German Military Cooperation and the European Pillar of Defense (Boulder, CO, 1991), 53.

Debating Détente

1. Dean Rusk, As I Saw It (New York, 1990), 240. 2. See, for example, Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance: EuropeanAmerican Relations since 1945 (New York, 1980), 206–8. And, Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe (New York, 1993), 315–29. 3. Memorandum for the record, “Meeting with President Kennedy of 12 January 1963,” 15 January 1963, JFK NSF, Series: Meeting with President, box 317, folder: 1/63–2/17/63, JFKL. 4. (Emphasis in the original), memorandum, Bundy to Kennedy, 30 January 1963, James M. Gavin papers, box 21, folder: letters to President about de Gaulle, US Army Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. 5. Although this analysis draws different conclusions about the effects of the Atlantic alliance politics on a European settlement in 1963, the framework of interpretive questions was influenced by Marc

Notes

6. 7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

209

Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Princeton, 1999), 379–98. For Kennedy quote, see, 375. For Adenauer’s commitment to NATO, see Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, 597. Alain Peyrefitte, C’était de Gaulle (Paris, 1994), vol. 1, 379. This analysis expands upon the phases and linkages between de Gaulle’s policies toward Germany and French attitudes on Ostpolitik and détente offered in Michael Stürmer, “De Gaulle, l’Allemagne et l’Ostpolitik,” in De Gaulle en son siècle, vol. 5 (Paris, 1992), 480–9. For Adenauer quote, see Schwarz, Adenauer, 687. Stanley Hoffman, Gulliver’s Troubles, or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1968), 171–2 and 451–2. Summary record of NSC Executive Council meeting no. 38 (Part III), 25 January 1963, JFK NSF, box 316, folder: Executive Committee Meeting 38, JFKL. Current Intelligence Weekly Review, 25 January 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 5: 614. Roger Hilsman to George Ball, memorandum on “Reported de Gaulle Plan for an East-West Settlement,” 26 January 1963, RG 59 Records of Llewellyn Thompson, Lot 67D2, box 5, folder: European policy. Walt W. Rostow to Ball, memorandum on “De Gaulle’s Alleged Intent,” 26 January 1963, ibid. Paul Nitze, draft memorandum to Llewellyn Thompson and Carl Kaysen, 1 February 1963, RG 59, Records of Llewellyn Thompson, Lot 67D2, box 5, folder: European policy. Two leading scholars of de Gaulle’s and Adenauer’s tenures briefly mention these causes. See, Vaïsse, La grandeur, 255–6; Schwarz, Adenauer, 598–601, 631. Summary record of NSC Executive Council meeting no. 38 (Part III), 25 January 1963, JFK NSF, box 316 folder: Executive Committee Meeting 38, JFKL. The administration alone did not determine policy, and congressional talk of a European retrenchment followed in the wake of de Gaulle’s double non and signing of the Franco-German treaty. See “Should U.S. Maintain Protection?” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Digest, 8 February, 1963, 165–7. Rusk to McNamara, 23 January 1963, CDF 711.51, box 1473, folder: 1–562, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland; and memorandum, Rostow to Kennedy, 4 February 1963, FRUS, 1961–1963, 9: 161–2. Discussion between de Gaulle and Serge Vinogradov (Soviet ambassador to France), 29 January 1963, Secrétariat général, Entretiens et messages, 1956–66, microfilm vol. 18: 115. Letters, Khrushchev to de Gaulle (passed through Serge Vinogradov), 29 January 1963 and 5 February 1963, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier 76. “Réponse du gouvernment français à la note du gouvernment soviétique du 5 février 1963,” 30 March 1963, Europe 1961–65, République Fédérale d’Allemagne, dossier 1574 (réactions étrangères au traité), MAE. Maurice Dejean (French ambassador to Moscow) to Ministry of Foreign

210

18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

23.

24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29.


Affairs, Europe 1961–65, URSS, dossier 1930 (relations politiques francosovietéiques). Couve de Murville to Hervé Alphand, 28 February 1963, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier 64: affaires atomiques. For mutual concerns between Paris and Bonn over US moves toward détente, see, for example, Roland de Margerie (French ambassador to Bonn) to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 26 February 1963, Europe 1961–1965, RFA, dossier 1571 (janvier–février 1963). There are few studies of de Gaulle’s views on détente for the early 1960s. For a general “rivalry/complicity” framework that covers his entire presidency, see Marie Mendras, “The French Connection: an Uncertain Factor in Soviet Relations with Western Europe,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 481 (September 1985), 29–40. David Ormsby-Gore Oral history, 57, JFKL. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 29 December 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 6: 241. Kohler (US Ambassador to Soviet Union) to Bruce, memorandum, 8 February 1963, W. Averell Harriman papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, box 560, folder: 3. It is beyond the scope of this analysis to provide a comprehensive history of the test ban treaty. For such studies, see, Arthur H. Dean, Test Ban and Disarmament: The Path of Negotiation (New York, 1966); Glenn T. Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban (Berkley, 1981); Bernard J. Firestone, “Kennedy and the Test Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms Control,” in Brinkley and Griffiths, eds., John F. Kennedy and Europe, 66–94. “Overall Thoughts on a MLF en route from Ankara to Naples,” Livingston Merchant, 29 April 1963, Livingston Merchant papers, box 10, folder: MLF (1 of 3), Mudd Library, Princeton, NJ. See, generally, Lawrence S. Kaplan, “A MLF Debate,” in Brinkley and Griffiths, eds., John F. Kennedy and Europe, 60–5. Conversation between Couve et Rusk, 7 April 1963, Pactes 1961–70, carton 409, dossier: entretiens bipartites/visite de Rusk à Paris. Vaïsse, La Grandeur, 372–81. Macmillan to foreign secretary, personal minute, 12 April 1963, PREM 11/4221. See, generally, Donette Murray, Kennedy, Macmillan and Nuclear Weapons (London, 1999). Quoted in James A. Bill, George Ball: Behind the Scenes in US Foreign Policy (New Haven, 1997), 115. Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 23 May 1963, CAB 128/37 [C.C 34(63)]. As British stalling continued, Ormsby-Gore declared that “if we are going to go on pouring cold water on their project it really will be necessary for us to put forward a carefully considered alternative, which in particular, will meet the German problem.” See, Ormsby-Gore to Harold Caccia, 11 July 1963, PREM 11/4579. For a summary of British objections, see Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Cabinet paper, “NATO Nuclear Force: Mixed-Manned Component,” 28 May 1963, CAB 129/113, [C. P.(63) 95].

Notes

211

30. For a chronology of West German attitudes, see note, “Principales étapes de l’évolution allemand sur le projet de force atomique multilatérale,” unsigned, 1 July 1963, Europe 1961–65, RFA, dossier 1575, entretiens franco-allemands. See, also, Cristoph Bluth, Britain, Germany, and Western Nuclear Strategy (Oxford, 1995), 87–95. 31. Ormsby-Gore oral history, JFKL, 89. 32. “JCS Views on MLF,” memorandum for General Maxwell Taylor, 1 June 1963, Maxwell Taylor papers, National Defense University, Washington, DC. See also, D.W. Wilson (US Navy, European branch) to Taylor, memorandum, undated, probably late March 1963, RG 218, Records of General Maxwell Taylor, box 37, folder: Nassau/Jupiter/Skybolt, MLF. 33. George C. McGhee, On the Frontline in the Cold War: An Ambassador Reports (Westport, 1997), 165. 34. Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War (New Haven, 1992), 191. Jacques Binoche, De Gaulle et les allemands, 144. 35. Adenauer Informationsgespräch mit Cyrus Sulzberger, 22 July 1963, Hans-Peter Mensing, ed., Adenauer: Teegespräche, 1961–1963 (Berlin, 1992), 403. 36. “Commencement address at American University in Washington,” 10 June 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents, 459–64. A direct telecommunication line was established between Washington and Moscow on 20 June 1963. 37. Memorandum of conversation between Georgi M. Kornienko (Chargé d’affaires, Soviet Embassy) and Jacob D. Beam (Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), 21 June 1963, Harriman papers, Library of Congress. Colette Barbier, “La force multilatérale,” Relations internationales (Spring 1990), 13–14. 38. Rostow to Harriman, memorandum, 2 July 1963, Harriman papers, box 560, folder: 3. 39. Harold Caccia, note on his conversation with David Bruce (US ambassador to Great Britain), 8 July 1963, PREM 11/4579. See, generally, Alistair Horne, Macmillan. 40. Memorandum of conversation between de Gaulle and Adenauer at Rambouillet, afternoon session, 21 September 1963, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier: 347. 41. See, for example, De Margerie to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram, 8 September 1963, Europe, RFA, dossier 1564 (politique extérieure). 42. Memorandum of conversation at Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Ottawa, Canada, 23 May 1963, FRUS, 1962–1963, 15: 513–18. 43. The Soviet Union first mentioned the possibility of a NATO–Warsaw non-aggression pact at Geneva in 1955. Like most East–West questions, however, it was discussed intermittently and unsuccessfully for years. 44. “Shock treatment” and foot corn metaphors are invoked by former Khrushchev speechwriter, Oleg Troianovskii in his memoirs, Through

212

45. 46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.


Time and Space, and discussed in Timothy Naftali, “Trachtenberg on Europe’s Cold War Chessboard,” Orbis (Spring 2000), 1–16. Khrushchev to Kennedy, 12 December 1962, FRUS, 1961–1963, 6: 230. In speaking about a “web of linkages“ over Berlin, the overall German question, and the test ban treaty, Marc Trachtenberg exaggerates the centrality of German nuclear capability to both the on-going Berlin crisis and a European settlement in 1963. See Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 388–402. For a convincing rebuttal, see Timothy Naftali, “Trachtenberg on Europe’s Cold War Chessboard,” Orbis (Spring 2000), 11. Naftali argues that Khrushchev’s “not playing the Berlin card in 1962–63 was perhaps less the product of a new European settlement than of the Kremlin’s reluctant acceptance of the international status quo.” In other words, although Khrushchev sought to stabilize Central Europe, his conception of a European settlement did not revolve solely around the issue of German nuclear capability. Foy Kohler (US ambassador to the Soviet Union), “Khrushchev Proposals – Private statements and speeches of July 19 and 26, 1963,” undated (probably late July 1963), Foy Kohler papers, box 78, folder: 20 (conversations with Khrushchev), Ward M. Canaday Center, University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio. This analysis was influenced by James G. Richter, Khrushchev’s Double Bind: International Pressures and Domestic Coalition Politics (Baltimore, 1994), 173. Wireless File No. 192, 11 July 1963, Background, Test Ban Treaty, Trips and Missions file, box 560, Harriman papers. Harriman, memorandum concerning the Soviet Union, Briefing Book, Test Ban Treaty, Trips and Missions File, box 561, ibid. See, generally, Gordon Chang, “JFK, China, and the Bomb,” Journal of American History (March 1988). For cable of Kennedy to Harriman, see Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 239. For a provocative examination of US–Soviet motives toward China, see Gordon Chang, “JFK, China, and the Bomb,” The Journal of American History, 1295. See, also, Chang, Friends and Enemies (Stanford, 1990), 241–7. See, generally, Seaborg, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Test Ban, 238–42. For British involvement and engineering for a test ban treaty, see Allistair Horne, Macmillan, 1957–1986, vol. 2 (London, 1989), 503–12 and 518–26. Conversation between Kennedy and Couve de Murville, 25 May 1963, Pactes, carton 409, dossier: entretiens Couve-Kennedy. For French monitoring of Chinese development of nuclear capability, see, for example, S. Mieux (French ambassador to Beijing) to Foreign Ministry, telegram, 22 August 1963, Pactes, Politique de l’OTAN, carton 409, dossier: atome/général. U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy, memorandum, 2 August 1963, RG 59 Records of Department of State, Central Policy Files, box 3722, folder: Defense Affairs-Armaments. See also “The President’s News

Notes

54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60.

61.

62.

63.

64. 65. 66. 67.

213

Conference,” 1 August 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1963, 613. Rostow to Rusk, memorandum, 1 August 1963, RG 59, Records of Thompson, Lot 67D2, box 6, folder: France. De Gaulle to Kennedy, 2 August 1963, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier: 347 (échange de messages et notes). John Van Oudenaren, Détente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953 (Durham, NC, 1991), 172. Off-the-Record Meeting (Kennedy, Harriman, Bundy, Kaysen), 31 July 1963, transcript by author, JFK POF, Presidential recordings, tape 102/A38, JFKL. Meeting about European defense, 30 July 1963, transcript by author JFK POF, Presidential Recordings, tape 102/A38, JFKL. Schroeder to Couve, 2 October 1963, Cabinet du ministre, Couve de Murville, dossier 347 (échange de messages et notes). Memorandum of conversation (Ball, Bohlen, Couve and Alphand), 8 October 1963, RG 59, Central Policy File, 1963, box 3912, folder: policies of France–West Germany. The scholarly literature is unclear and somewhat misleading on the establishment of a European settlement in 1963. See, for example, Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace, 352–402, which argues that there was one. For Berlin quote, see, Robert Komer to Bundy, memorandum, 16 October 1963, JFK NSF: Staff memos, box 322, folder: Komer, 6/63–11/63. On the question of continued East–West tensions in Berlin, see, generally, John C. Ausland, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Berlin–Cuba Crisis, 1961–1964 (Oslo, 1996), 79–90. For Kennedy’s personal preoccupation, see meeting about Berlin, JFK POF, Presidential Recordings, tape 118/A55/Cassette 1 of 2, transcript by author. See, for example, Horst Osterheld, Außenpolitik unter Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard, 1961–1963: Ein dokumentarischer Bericht aus dem Kanzleramt (Düsseldorf, 1992), 30. Memorandum of conversation between de Gaulle and Ludwig Erhard, afternoon session, 21 November 1963, Europe 1961–65, RFA, dossier 1575: entretiens entre de Gaulle et Erhard. Record of Lord Avon’s conversation with de Gaulle, 11 June 1963, FO 371/169124, PRO. See, Michael J. Sodaro, Moscow, Germany, and the West from Khrushchev to Gorbachev (Ithaca, 1990), 43. De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope, 259. Maurice Couve de Murville, Une politique étrangère, 1958–1969 (Paris, 1971), 179–81. Ormsby-Gore oral history, JFKL, 24–5.

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Index Acheson, Dean, 20, 38, 42, 52–3, 56, 128, 135 Adenauer, Konrad, 5, 7, 19, 36–8, 40, 42–3, 56, 59–63, 65, 81, 84, 86–8, 95–6, 135, 137–42, 144f Algeria, 3, 7, 8, 19, 26, 57, 91, 104–5 Alphand, Hervé, 30, 53, 65, 104, 131, 136 Ball, George, 22, 32, 73, 76, 78–9, 96–101, 113–15, 212, 121–5, 134, 136, 141–2, 149, 159 Baumgartner, Wilfrid, 4, 29, 92, 110, 112–15, 122 Berlin Crisis and 1958, 6, 51, 53, 119 and 1961, 9, 39, 48–66; 84f, 94, 108, 121, 129f, 143, 152, 160–2, 164 Bohlen, Charles, 114, 132, 147, 159 Brandt, Willy, 20, 160 Bretton Woods, 2, 107, 110–15, 123f, 166–7 Britain and balance of payments, 5, 35, 93, 110, 115, 118–25 and Berlin, 84, 130 Common Market, 10, 37, 41, 43, 75, 81, 84, 91f, 129, 165–6 nuclear weapons,7, 67, 76, 81, 140–1, 148f and West Germany, 25, 58–9, 69 Bundy, McGeorge, 20, 53, 74–7, 81, 118, 131, 143, 157 China, 32, 52, 71, 155–7 Clappier, Bernard, 93, 101 Common Agricultural Policy, 28, 90f, 101–6, 163

Common Market, see European Economic Community Congo, 40, 46, 48, 160 Council of Economic Advisers, 21, 34, 89–90, 116–17, 122, 136 Couve de Murville, Maurice, 29–30, 32, 54, 58, 75, 112–15, 124, 131, 135, 147, 149, 156 Cuban Missile Crisis, 9, 63, 128f, 148, 164 Debré, Michel, 25, 78, 92, 94, 101, 108 De Gaulle, Charles, and Adenauer, 36–8, 60, 62, 144f and Algeria, 2 background, 13–16 and Berlin, 46, 49–66, 85, 164 and Bretton Woods, 107f, 164 and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), 90f, 163 and Cuban missile crisis, 128f, 164 and double non, 128f, 149 and European Economic Community, 85f, 163 and economy, 29 and force de frappe, 27, 46–7, 66, 67f, 137–42, 156, 158 and Germany, 24, 25, 65 and NATO, 45, 66 and Soviet Union, 22–3 and test ban treaty, 152f, 164 and U.S. balance-of-payments deficit, 48, 108f, 163 Department of State, U.S., see United States, Department of State Détente, 11, 24, 59, 143f, 166 227

228

Index

Dillon, Douglas, 21, 74, 108, 112, 119, 124–5 Dirigisme, 92, 115–18 Eisenhower, Dwight, 21, 32, 49, 65, 96–7, 119, 141 Erhard, Ludwig, 35, 61, 95, 160 European Economic Community, 1, 4, 5, 17, 24–6, 28, 37–8, 73–4, 87f; 101–6, 108, 118, 135, 143 France and agriculture, 3, 4, 90 and economy, 28–9, 91, 104–6 and Ministry of Finance, 4, 93, 110, 115–18, 122f and nuclear capability (force de frappe), 7–8,19, 27, 46–7, 57, 67f, 137–42 and nuclear sharing, 75f and trade, 101f Gavin, General James, 22, 31, 72, 75–6, 78, 101, 108, 147 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 28, 88, 99f Gilpatric, Roswell, 74, 76, 119 Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, 29, 110, 122–5 Gromyko, Andrei, 54, 62, 133–4 Guichard, Olivier, 30, 104 Harriman, Averell, 42, 155–6, 158 Heller, Walter, 21, 34, 89, 116–18, 122, 136 Hillenbrand, Martin, 51–2, 132–3, 136 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 89, 108, 110–15, 125 Joint Chiefs of Staff, 56, 133–4, 151 Kaysen, Carl, 21, 74, 119, 122, 155

Kennedy, John F. and balance of payments, 3, 48, 107f, 118f and Berlin, 19, 36, 49–66, 87 and burden-sharing, 16, 32–6, 50, 80, 119f, 126–7 and Cuban missile crisis, 128f, 164 and détente, 142f and dirigisme, 115–18 and economic growth, 38, 87–90, 105 and European Economic Community, 85f, 165–7 and flexible response, 6, 65, 86 and French nuclear capability, 46, 76 and NATO, 19, 42, 45, 47, 61, 65, 77–81, 121, 148f and test ban treaty, 152f and trade policies, 100f Khrushchev, Nikita and Berlin, 6, 24, 49–52, 54, 58, 63 and Cuban missile crisis, 129, 132, 134, 137–9 and economic competition with U.S., 118 and lesser developed countries, 17 and test ban treaty, 153–9 and Vienna summit, 43–4, 50–1 Laos, 40, 46, 48, 124, 160 Lemnitzer, General Lyman, 56, 81 Macmillan, Harold, 26, 35, 36, 37, 40–1, 43, 45, 56, 59–61, 67, 72, 80–2, 96f, 108, 110, 137–41, 150, 165 Malraux, André, 12, 15, 120 Messmer, Pierre, 30, 57, 62, 82–3, 140, 159 McNamara, Robert, 21, 56, 74, 76–7, 79–81, 119–20, 134, 140 Monnet, Jean, 22, 25, 44, 73–4, 91, 95–6, 136–7, 166

Index

Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLF), 8, 39–40, 73, 76, 129, 137, 141–2 NATO and Acheson report, 38, 42 and alliance burden-sharing, 35, 57, 119f and Berlin crisis, 50, 54–6, 64 and Cuban missile crisis, 134, 136–42 and de Gaulle, 26, 47, 50 and establishment, 6 and graduated nuclear response (flexible response), 19, 42, 53, 56, 61, 70 and Kennedy, 19, 42, 45, 47, 61, 65, 77–81, 121, 148f and MC 14/2, 39, 79; and MC 26/4, 56–7, 65 and MC 70, 56–7, 65; and MC 100/1; and MLF, 8, 39–40, 73–4, 76, 82, 129, 137, 148–53# and nuclear sharing, 75f, 164–7 and non-aggression pact with Warsaw Pact, 62, 153–4 Nitze, Paul, 74, 76, 78, 83, 119, 133, 137 Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Lauris, 55, 58, 80 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 32–5, 88, 110, 112–15 Ormsby-Gore, David, 82, 98, 148, 151 Peterson, Howard, 99–100 Roosa, Robert, 21, 115, 125 Rostow, Walt, 21, 32, 53, 73–4

229

Rueff, Jacques, 4, 28–9, 113–15, 124 Rusk, Dean, 20, 47, 62, 73, 78, 81, 98, 101, 113, 121, 130, 133–4, 139, 143, 149, 154 Schroeder, Gerhard, 133, 135, 159 Soviet Union, 18, 22–3, 32, 46, 52, 56, 62, 108, 128, 133, 137, 144f Strauss, Franz-Josef, 58, 65, 72 Taylor, General Maxwell, 81, 132 Test Ban Treaty, 75, 148, 151f Thompson, Llewellyn, 63, 132–3 Tobin, James, 21, 122 Triffin, Robert, 111, 115 Tripartism, 27, 43, 46–8, 55, 66, 67, 128, 137 United Kingdom, see Britain United States and balance of payments, 2, 35, 99f, 107f, 118 and defense budget, 59 and Department of State, 70, 73–7, 79, 86–8, 96, 99, 115, 120–1, 123, 149 and nuclear weapons, 46 Watkinson, Harold, 67, 82 West Germany and burden-sharing, 35 and Cuban missile crisis, 129–30, 164 and economy, 5 and EEC, 41, 93f and NATO, 119–20, 144–5, 148f and nuclear weapons, 7; 19–20, 27, 69, 71–3, 75, 77, 83–4, 139f and reunification, 24, 62 Wormser, Olivier, 29, 93, 101, 108

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