CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN DUNS SCOTUS
STUDIEN UND TEXTE ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE DES MITTELALTERS BECRONDET VON
JOSEF KOCH W£ITERGEFOHRT VON
PAUL WILPERT und ALBERT ZIMMERMANN
HERAUSGEGEBEN VON
JAN A. AERTSEN IN ZUSAMMENARBEIT MIT
TZOTCHO BOlADjIEV, KENT EMERY, JR., ANDREAS SPEER und WOUTER GORIS
(MANAGING EDITOR)
BAND LXXVII
GIORGIO PINI
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN DUNS SCOTUS
CATEGORIES AND LOGI C IN DUNSSCOTUS An Interpretation ifAristotle's Categories in the Late Thirteenth Century
BY
GIORGIO PINI
BRILL LEIDEN· BOSTON· KaLN 2002
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnalune Categories and logic in Duns Scotus : an interpretation of Aristotle's Categories in the late thirteenth century I by Giorgio Pini. - Leiden ; Boston ; Koln :Brill, 2002 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters ; Bd. 77) [SBN 9(H)4-12329-6
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CONTENTS
Preface
vii
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Introduction. Chapter One: Categories and Logic in the Thirteenth Cen....................... tury.
19
Chapter Two: Intentions and Modes of Understanding in Thomas Aquinas.
45
Chapter Three: Second Intentions in Henry of Simon of Faversham, and Radulphus Brito.
68
Ghent,
99
Chapter Four: Second Intentions in Duns Scotus . . Chapter Five: Scotus on the Logical Consideration of Categories.
138
Chapter Six: Scotus's Reading of Aristotle's 'Categories'
171
Bibliography Primary sources. ..... ................ Secondary sources Index of Names........... . Index of Subjects ......................
.
203 208 219 .
223
P REFACE
Several studies have been devoted to Duns Scotus's theological and metaphysical output. His contributions to logic and philosophical logic, however, have not received much attention. Scotus's com mentaries on Porphyry's Isagoge and Aristotle's Categories, De Interpre tatione, and Sophistical Rqutations have often been considered youthful works, and consequently have been neglected. When con sidered against their background, however, Scotus's logical com mentaries disclose a fresh and brilliant reading of Aristotle and bear witness to the lively debates of the end of the thirteenth century. In this work, I do not intend to provide a general assessment of Duns Scotus's contribution to logic. Rather, I focus on a specific question, namely why Aristotle's Categories were considered a logical work and, consequently, how logic was thought to deal with categories. With this question in mind, I approach Scotus and his contempo raries' writings and logical doctrines. Since Scotus is particularly careful when dividing the respective fields of logic and metaphysics, I hope that this study will also shed light on how thirteenth-century authors conceived metaphysics as the science of what there is in the world as opposed to the way it is understood. During the elaboration of this work, I have contracted a debt of gratitude to many people and institutions. Among the latter, I am happy to mention the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, where in 1997 I defended my doctoral dissertation on some of the themes with which I deal in the present study . I am also fond of remem bering my time at University College London (1996-97) and the De Wulf-Masion Centrum at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (1997-99). The Italian CNR funded my stay in Leuven during the summer 1997 (Short Mobility Program). The Onderzoeksraad ( Research Council) of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven granted me a junior fellowship in the year 1998-99. The Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto (where I stayed in 2000-01, thanks to a fellowship funded by the Mellon Foundation) provided an excellent place where I could carry out the final revision of this work. Among the people who helped me, I am particuarly grateful to
viii
PREFACE
Francesco Del Punta, who saw the beginning of this research and always provided his precious advice on most various matters. Marylin McCord Adams, Stefano Di Bella, Gianfranco Fioravanti, Massimo Mugnai, and Dominik Perler read an Italian version of some of the ideas that resulted into the present study. Michael J. Loux and Claude Panaccio read a first version of this work.
All of
them suggested many corrections and improvements. If I was not able to follow their advice on every matter, this was only due to my incapacity. Concetta Luna read a first version of the Introduction. Roberto Lambertini and Andrea Tabarroni generously shared their knowledge of medieval logic with me and provided much needed encouragement. Alessandro D. Conti, Silvia Donati, Stephen D. Dumont, and Cecilia Trifogli provided me with materials, ideas, and friendship. Conversations with them gready clarified my con fused views and saved me from many faux pas. Carlos Steel, Jos Decorte, and all the people at the De Wulf-Mansion Centrum made my stay in Leuven most profitable and enjoyable. Andreas Speer has been generous with advice and friendship, as always. Any errors contained in this book, of course, are entirely my re sponsibility. I finally wish to thank all the friends who made me feel at home whether in Pisa, London, Leuven, or Toronto. T his book is dedi cated to them.
INTRODUCTION
Since the time of Aristotle, categories have been the subject of much debate. This is, in part, because they are central to two con nected but distinct philosophical areas: the study of what there is in the world and the reflection on how we think about it. It is agreed that categories are classificatory notions, but there are some recurring questions. First, what sorts of objects are classified by means of categories? Second, how many categories are there? Third, can we give a derivation of categories so that we can be sure that the list is complete? For a long time, the debate on the nature of categories took the form of a discussion of the correct interpretation of Aristotle's work known as 'Categories'. In this study, I will focus on the logical inter pretation of Aristotle's treatise offered by certain philosophers at the end of the thirteenth century. By that time, commentators on Aris totle had developed the view that logic was the science concerned with the way we understand the world, rather than the study of the way the world is - which was seen as the object of metaphysics. So conceived, logic was regarded as a second-order knowledge, the study of the properties our intellect attributes to things insofar as they are understood. These authors also maintained that logic deals with specific, second-order objects, the so-called second intentions. The logical study of categories was part of the consideration of the way in which we understand things in the extra-mental world. The main focus of my inquiry will be John Duns Scotus (1265/66-1308), who provides a very coherent reading of Aris totle's Categories, a brilliant exercise in what we now call the philos ophy of logic. Since his insights can be fully appreciated only if compared to the positions of his predecessors and contemporaries, I have devoted much attention to other authors, in the hope of re trieving Scotus from the isolation to which some historians have rel egated him. Scotus and his contemporaries faced many problems that are similar to those of contemporary philosophers interested in metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of logic, but there are also important differences between the two. As a consequence, I have tried to maintain and explain the language and approach to
2
INTRODUCTION
problems typical of Scotus and of his contemporaries in order to understand their project as they were likely to understand it them selves. I have also made a special effort to avoid general tags such as 'nominalism' and 'realism', which may be helpful in other contexts but here may mislead. For example, Scotus is usually classified as a realist, but his logical doctrine of categories turns out to have re markably weak ontological presuppositions. In general, we must be cautious in our approach in order to distinguish between the re spective realms of metaphysics and the philosophy of logic: what applies in one field may not hold in the other. This work can perhaps be better seen as an attempt to recon struct a phase in the history of Aristotelianism: the interpretation of Aristotle's Categories as a treatise of the philosophy of logic con cerned with concepts called 'second intentions'. By the time this in terpretation was developed, the debate on the Categories had already had a long history. Consequently, I will now cursorily review the most famous interpretations of the Categories from the time of Aris totle to the mid-thirteenth century.
I.
Aristotle
Aristotle presents his so-called list of categories in several places in his writings. Yet only twice does he list ten items: in chapter four of the Categories' and in chapter nine of the first book of the TopicSl. Another important passage where Aristotle introduces the cate gories is in chapter seven of the fifth book of the Metaphysics, where he lists only eight items.3 There are many obscurities in these pas sages, and interpreters have not ceased discussing them. Specifically, it is not clear whether Aristotle is introducing one and the same di vision in all three passages. Recently, it has even been doubted that Aristotle intends to provide a classification. Even when Aristotle is thought to be introducing a classification, however, it is clear neither what he is classifying nor how he obtains the list of the so-called cat egories.' I Cat. 4,Ib25-2a4. , Top. 1,9,I03b20-39. ' Met. V, 7,IOI7a22-27. 4 M. Frede, "Categories in Aristotle," in Studits in Aristotle, ed. D. J. O'Meara (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1981),1-24, reprinted
INTRODUCTION
3
Surprisingly, in Cat. 4 the term 'category' does not even appear. There Aristotle presents his list as the list of meanings of what is said without combination. Scholars usually interpret "things said without combination" as nouns and verbs, i.e. the simple terms keeping their signification even when they are not part of a sen tence.5 In Top. I, 9 Aristotle speaks of the ten items known as cate gories as of "the genera of the categories," namely, according to the most likely interpretation, the genera of the predications. Thus, in the Topics Aristotle sees categories as the ways in which predicates are attributed to subjects in sentences. First, the predicate says what the subject is; second, the predicate says by which quality the sub ject is modified, and so on.6 In Met. V, 7 Aristotle again links the ways in which something is said to be by itself with the "figures of the categories," i.e. the genera of predications. There he says that all the things that the genera of predications signifY are said to be by themselves.7 Let us focus on Cat. 4, which may be seen as the place where the categories are first introduced. It is well known that Aristotle's Cate gories presents several problems, and some doubts have even been raised as to its authenticity." Even though these doubts are usually in Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 987). 29-48; D. Mor rison, "The Taxonomical Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories: A Criticism," in A. Preus andj. P. Anton, eds., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 5, Aristotle's Ontology (Albany, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1 992), 1 9-46; D. Morrison, "Le statut cat."
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
37
prisingly, his solution i s strongly influenced by Boethius. Categories are studied in Aristotle's
Categories
as the ten most universal terms
signifying the ten kinds of extramental things. Considered as signi fying something, categorial terms act as predicates or subjects in sentences. So far, Sutton's solution does not seem to be different from Kil wardby's and Albert's solutions, but Sutton adds a reference to second intentions absent in his predecessors. He states that in the
Categories, and in logic in
general, categories are studied not only in
sofar as they act as subjects and predicates in sentences but also in sofar as they receive the attribution of second intentions. These second intentions pertain to categories insofar as they are consid ered as ordered to syllogism: Therefore, the book of the Categories, since it is a part of logic, is about the ten first words signifying the first kinds of things, as Boethius says, insofar as they are significative, and insofar as they can act as predicates and subjects, and insofar as other second intentions pertain to them as they are ordered to syllogism.'"
Sutton here seems to put two different conceptions of the study of the categories next to each other. He first introduces the old view according to which logic studies the categories as significative terms acting as subjects and predicates in sentences. Then he adds a ref erence to the new view of logic as a science of second intentions, for he says that categories are also studied insofar as other second in tentions pertain to them. Admittedly, it is not easy to see how Sutton can reconcile these two views. He seems to reduce the two views to unity by an appeal to what is traditionally regarded as the subject matter of logic, i.e. syllogism'" He maintains that logic studies cat egories as they are constituents of a sentence, and sentences are +6 Thomas Sutton In Cal. (ed. Conti. J 9 1): "Liber igitur Praedicammtorum, cum sit pars logicae, est de decem primis vocibus decem prima genera rerum significantibus - ut dicit Boethius - ut significantes sunt, et ut sunt praedicabiles et subicibiles, et prout aliae intentiones secundae eis conveniunt in ordine ad syllogismum. It See also In Cat. (ed. Conti, 193): "Conveniunt autem [scil., praedicamenta] in hoc quod sig nificantur per dictionem incomplexam, quae est terminus in syllogismo. Et sub hac ratione determinatur hie de praedicamentis, prout scilicet quodlibet eorum signifi catur per dictionem quae polest esse pars sylJogismi." 47 That the syllogism is the proper subject of logic is a classical doctrine, wide spread in Paris since the middle of the thirteenth century. See Marmo, "Suspia."o. A Key Word," 1 56-58.
38
CHAPTER ONE
premises or conclusions of syllogisms. Accordingly, logic considers categories as parts of syllogisms. The properties that categories pos sess when they are regarded as constituents of a syllogism are second intentions. Sutton, however, is unwilling to reduce Aristotle's
Categories
to a
treatise exclusively dealing with second intentions. He admits that
Categories concerns
much of the content of the
extramental things,
not terms signifying extramental things or second intentions per taining to categories. For instance, Aristotle states in the
Categories
that substance has the property of not being in a subject. Not being in a subject, according to Sutton, is a property pertaining to sub stance as an extramental thing, not as a subject-term in a sentence and as a constituent of a syllogism. Similarly, quantity has the prop erty of being either continuous or discrete, and this property per tains to quantity as an extramental thing.'a Why, then, does Aristotle study these properties in the
Categories, which is a logical treatise and
should accordingly be concerned solely with second intentions? In order to answer this question, Sutton remarks that there is a difference between the
Categories and the other logical treatises by Categories Aristotle considers the cate
Aristotle. It is true that in the
gories as they are terms signifying something, but it is also true that categories, considered as terms, are first imposition terms, which signify extramental things. It is not surprising, therefore, that much of what is said in the
Categories concerns
extramental things and not
the terms by which they are signified. This interest in things singles out the
Categories from among the
other logical treatises, which deal
either with syllogism or with the parts of syllogism as signified by second imposition terms. For instance, in the
De Interpretatione Aris
totle studies second imposition terms like 'sentence', 'assertion', 'negation'. In the Prior Anarytics he studies the second imposition term 'syllogism', considered in relation to its different figures. Ac cordingly, only the
Categories
deals with first imposition terms and
with the things they signify, whereas the other logical treatises deal with second imposition terms and with what they signify, which are not extramental things but first imposition terms.49 48 Thomas Sutton, In Cat. (ed. Conti, 1 88). 49 Ibid. (ed. Conti, 1 9 1): ')\d tertium dicendum quod quia deteminat hie de praedicamentis prout significantur per voces primae impositionis, quae immediate significant res et supponunt pro rebus, ideo multa dicta Aristotelis verificantur in hoc libro pro rebus ipsis et non <pro> vocibus, quia voces primae impositionis non sup-
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
39
Therefore, Sutton finds room for a logical consideration of cate gories only by separating it from the rest of logic, but he also distin guishes the logical and the metaphysical consideration of cate gories. In order to obtain this result, Sutton turns to general terms pertaining to categories. He explains that there are two types of general terms. First, there are first imposition terms common to all categorial terms, such as the term 'being'. We could label these terms as 'metaphysical transcendental terms' (even though Sutton does not call them 'transcendental'), for metaphysics studies cate gories insofar as they are signified by these terms. Second, there are second imposition terms common to all categorial terms, such as 'universal', 'sayable'
(dicibile),
'most general genus'
(generalissimum),
and the like. We could call these terms 'logical transcendentals', since logic studies categories insofar as they are signified by such second imposition terms: . . . Among the things that are common to the ten categories some are of first imposition and some are of second intention. First imposition common terms are 'being' and the other things that pertain to being. And in this way metaphysics, which is about being as being as about its subject, deals with categories. On the other hand, second intention common terms are 'universal', 'sayable', 'most common genus', 'genus', 'signified by a simple word', 'capable of being ordered in a syllogism', and similar notions. And with regard to these common no tions it is not metaphysics but logic that deals with the ten categories.50
Sutton is not able to eliminate a tension from his treatment of cate gories. On the one hand, he stresses that logic studies categories as subject- and predicate-terms in sentences constituting syllogisms. Accordingly, logic considers categories as first imposition terms, and the logical study of categories is separated from the rest of logic,
ponunt pro vocibus, sed pro rebus. In sequentibus vera libris determinat de syl1o gismo et suis partibus non prout significantur per voces primae impositionis, sed per nomina secundarum intentionurn, quae supponunt pro vocibus primae impositionis complexis." 50 Ibid. (ed. Conti, 1 94): " . . . decem praedicamentis quaedam sunt cammunia quae sunt primae impositionis, et quaedam quae sunt secundae intentionis. Communia primae impositionis sunt ens et ea quae sunt entis; et sic de decem praedicamentis determinat metaphysica, quae est de ente in quantum ens ut de subiecto. Communia vero secundae intentionis sunt universale, dicibile, genus generalissimum, genus, sig nificatum per vocem incomplexam, ordinabile in syUogismo et huiusmodi. Et quantum ad ista communia non tractat metaphysica de decem praedicamentis, sed logica."
40
CHAPTER ONE
which is concerned with second imposition terms. If this is the case, then, it is not clear how the study of categories carried out in the
Categories differs
from the metaphysical study of categories. On the
other hand, Sutton states that logic studies categories insofar as second imposition terms such as 'universal' or 'most universal genus' are attributed to them. In this way, the logical and meta physical considerations of categories are different from one another, for metaphysics considers categories insofar as first imposition terms such as 'being' are attributed to them. Sutton does not explain what relationship holds between these two different conceptions of the logical study of categories. We shall see that other authors writing at the end of the thirteenth century will find a more satisfying answer to how logic considers categories.
6.
Categories as thefoundations if second intentions
Between 1 280s and 1 300s, some authors elaborate what we can label as the standard view of the logical study of the categories. Peter of Auvergne, the so-called Anonymous of Madrid, William Arnaldi, and Radulphus Brito provide a very similar treatment of this topic. They all assent that logic considers categories to the ex tent that they are subject to second intentions. These authors maintain that categories are not themselves second intentions but can act as subjects of second intentions. Logic studies categories insofar as second intentions are founded on them. This solution to the issue of the logical study of category seems to owe much to Thomas Aquinas, who does not present a systematic view on the topic but puts forward all the elements of the solution that will become standard. (Thomas Sutton uses Thomas Aquinas's writings in his commentary on the
Categories;
however, he does not
adopt his view as far as the twofold consideration of categories is concerned.) In a passage of his commentary on the
Metaphysics, Thomas Metaphysics,
Aquinas faces a dilemma. In the seventh book of the
Aristotle gives a refutation of the doctrine according to which uni versals are substances. In the course of his refutation, Aristotle states that a substance is not said of anything.51 But, as Aquinas re" Mel. VII, 13, I038b15.
41
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY
marks, this statement contradicts what Aristotle says about sub stances in the
Categories.
There Aristotle maintains that some sub
stances are said of something, even though they are not in any thing.52 Secondary substances, in fact, such as man and animal, are universals said of first substances such as this particular man. Now, according to what Aristotle states in the
Metaphysics, secondary sub
stances are not substances, for they are said of something. There fore, secondary substances are considered as substances in the
gories
but not in the
Metaphysics.
Cate
How can these two contrasting
views be reconciled? In order to solve this conflict, Thomas Aquinas says that in the
Categories Aristotle
speaks as a logician and considers substance
our intellect understands it. By contrast, in the
as
Metaphysics Aristotle
speaks as a metaphysician and considers substance as an extra mental being independent of our understanding: But it must be said that in the Categories the Philosopher speaks ac cording to a logical consideration. But the logician considers things in sofar as they are in the mind, and therefore he considers substance in sofar as it is subject to the intention of universality according to the consideration of the intellect . . . But the first philosopher deals with things insofar as they are beings . . . 53.
Logic deals with the category of substance not as a kind of being, but only insofar as it is present to the intellect as a universal con cept. That is to say that logic considers substance insofar as our in tellect attributes universality to substance. Consequently, logic re gards substantial universals as substances, for those universal notions are identical with substances as they are understood by the intellect.
" Cat. 2, la20-22; 5, 2al4-19. Thomas Aquinas In Met. VII, leet. XIII, n. 1 576: "Sed dicendum quod se cundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in Praedicamentis. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantiam prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsumit intentioni universalitatis . . . Sed philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia . . . " Thomas wrote his commentary on the Metaphysics ca. 1 270-72. See J.-P. Torrell, Initiation a saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son (luvre (Fribourg-Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1 993), 502. On Thomas's treatment of modus logicus, see R. A. Te Velde, "Metaphysics, Di alectics and the Modus Logicus according to Thomas Aquinas," Recherches de thiologie ancienn, et mediivale 63 (1 996): 15-35. On Thomas's distinction between the subject matter of logic and metaphysics, see In Met. IV, lect. 4, nn. 570, 574. $3
42
CHAPTER ONE
Two elements of Aquinas's analysis will appear again and again in the works of subsequent authors. First, Aquinas regards the dif ference between metaphysics and logic as the difference between the consideration of the extramental things taken by themselves and the consideration of the extramental things as understood. Second, the category of substance is studied in logic as it is subject to a second intention, namely the intention of universality. It is the intellect that attributes this intention to substance. Although Aquinas mentions only one category, i.e. substance, and only one intention, i.e. universality, what he says can be easily generalized: metaphysics studies categories as they are beings, whereas logic studies categories as they are subject to second intentions. Thus, logic considers categories even though categories are not second in tentions. The influence of Aquinas's approach becomes apparent if we turn to some of the authors writing at the end of the thirteenth cen tury. Both the so-called Anonymous of Madrid and Peter of Au vergne inquire in their commentaries on the Categories about which discipline studies categories. 54 Their arguments pose the problem with clarity. According to a first argument, which is almost identical in both authors, it is the metaphysician's task to study categories, be cause the metaphysician studies being as being, and categories are the different kinds of beings and the modes into which being as being is divided. On the other hand, it can also be argued that it is the logician's task to study categories because the logician studies second intentions added to first intentions. According to the Anony mous of Madrid's formulation of this argument, categories are terms signifYing second intentions added to first intentions. Ac cording to Peter of Auvergne's formulation, categories are the sub jects on which second intentions are founded. In both cases, the study of categories seems to pertain to logic. To this question the Anonymous of Madrid answers that cate gories can be considered in two different ways. First, categories are 54 Anonymous of Madrid Super Praed., q. 3 (ed. Andrews, 125); Peter of Auvergne Sup.,. Praed., q. 3 (ed. Andrews, I I). These two commentaries were probably written in Paris in the 1270s: see J. Pinborg, DU Entwicklung d.,. Sprachtluorie im Mittelalter, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters XlJI.2 (Munster: Aschendorlf, 1967), 86, n. 5 1 ; R. Andrews, '\
