Aristotle, Rhetoric I. A Commentary

ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC I A COMMENTARY

William M. A. Grimaldi, S.].

+t ~ ++ ++

§

NEW YORK

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS 1980

by FORDHAM UNIVI!RSITY PRESS All rights remlltd.

@ Copyright 1980

LC 79-SJ37Z ISBN 0-82.32-1048-0

PrjJl~J

de

CULTURA PRESS

Wetteren. Belgium

CONTENTS SIGLA •

vi

vii

PREFACE

Chapter 54a Chapter 55b Chapter 58a Chapter 59a Chapter 60b Chapter 62a Chapter 63b Chapter

I I - 55b 24 2. . 25 - 58a 35 3 36 - 59a 29 4 • 30 - 60b 3 5 . 4 - 62a 14 6 • IS - 63b 4 7 . 5 - 6Sb

8

35 79

89 103 121 143

:LI

•

181

6sb 22 - 660 2.2

Chapter 66a Cbapter 68b Chapter 6gb Chapter 723 Chapter 73b Chapter 74b

9 . 2.3 - 68a 37 10 • 1 - 69b 32 33 - 72.a 3 12 • 4 - 73a 38 13 . 1 - 74b 2.3 14 . 24 - 7Sa 2.1 22. -

2.25

2.43

II .

C~pter IS •

7sa

191

77b

2.69 285 307 317

12.

ApPENDIX: The Role of the ",taT"" in Aristotle's Methodology

349

BIBLIOGRAPHY

357

SIGLA

A. Anaximenes Bonitz, bulex Cope Cope, IlIlrod.

edd.

LS OCD

S. Spenge!

SlfJilies

540 1

54B

2

TexIS

Aristode. M. Fuhrmann's Teubner edition (leipzig 1966). H. Bonitz, Index Amloklicus (Betlin 1870). E. M. Cope, The RHETORIC ofAristoll" rev. and ed. J. E. Sandys, 3 vok (Cambridge 1877); except where odIerwise designated, dIe citation is to Vollllll
II -

2.

I -

I

55a 3

II

rhetoric is like dialectic since it is concerned with subject matter within the competence of men and submits to systematic analysis

55" 3

deficiencies in previous studies of rhet-

54"

oric:

(.) 542 II -542 31

nothing on nlant', the heart of any rhetorical TBVl1; sole concern is with matters extrinsic co rhetoric: e.g., with ways to influence dicasts

(b) 542 jl - 55-

this procedure encouraged by our legal system, with the result that rhetorical

study confines irself to judicial rhetoric

II . Development: 55a 3 - 55b I.

2.

55" 3 - 553 55a

19-

18

55b 7

21

what " rhetorical TiXP'1 should be:

its primary concern is with the nLaTttt;

and with truth it is usefUl to men

3. 55b 8 - 55b 21

III . Conclusion and transition: 55b

the function of rhetoric 22 -

55b 24

548 I ci,,-r!G"po'Po~ The meaning here is explained immediately at 5
54. 8

COMMBNTAllY

>.,. This is unspecified. If we interpret from the immediate conte.'Ct, we can e..'Cplain it by 5~ 15-21: these technographers write about an indiscriminate toying with the emotions of dre auditors, emotions which have nothing to' do with the point under discussi9n (e.g., 54a 26-28, 54b 13-15). It is a ploy unfurtunately too common at all periods of history, particularly in political, legal, and editorial speaking and writing. It is not that the line between legitimare and illegitimate appeal to the emotions is too fine for distinction, but drat the substitution of emotion for reason has the pragmatic value of enabling dre speaker or writer to gain his point with either a weak fabric of reasoning, or, indeed, no reasoning at all. Plato, Rep. 493, makes the point in a strongly negative way. The word neaaOij"a. (e..'CternaI, subsidiary additions; cf. Demosthenes, Olynthiacs 2.14, 3.32) exacdy carches the idea of what A. is criticiZing. We shall see (e.g., 55a 4) drat emotion is a legitimate object of good rhetorical theory and is, in fact, one of the "taTS', which he caIls ••• s7:.a. at 54a 13. 2 01 li. "But they say nothing ..." Most translators interpret this passage and convey the very distinct impression drat somehow the "{a~s,, of 543 13 are enthymemes. In the light of what follows in the chapter, this naturally leads people to conclude that A. is saying effectively in this first thapter drat the only true art of rhetoric is concerned purely and simply wid! the rational demonstration of the problenl under discussion. Yet the structure of the sentence contrasts the I'e. oJ. at of 54" II ("Contemporary technographers, to be sure, have produced a small part of the art, for dre ",ian., alone submit to art") with the at M of 5~ 14 ("On the other hand, they say nothing about the enthymeme, which is the body fur "ia~,,''). There are simply two statements: the technographers present a relatively small part of the art; they say nothing about enthymemes. 3 lveul''lJI'ci....." See 55a 4-7, 550 8, 560 36 - 56b 4·

.v.

a 15 : 1 ...."'" ..ij~ "'{"..."'~ The usual interpretation of this, such as we find in Cope and the English translations, is: the body, or the substance, of proof; e.g., "'the body' being the actual, logical, direct and substOlltial proof of the case" (Cope, p. 5). This, of course, means that the proof proper to rhetorical discourse is, for A., only logical and drat it is identified with endlymeme. All other proof, Sllch as the appeal to emotion (",,100,) or character ("100'), becomes indirect and really only accessory ("eoaOii"al),

5""' 15

COMMBNTAllY

9

an accommodatio;' to the limitations of the auditor (see, for example, Cope's remarks throughout his commentary on chap. I, esp. pp. 28-29n3). There is no reason, however, for such a metaphorical use of the word; A. uses it too frequendy in a literal and physical sense as "hody" (see Bonitz, Index, s. v.): that which enfolds, iucorporates. To argue as Cope suggests here, and agaiu later (p. 29), would mean that the critically substantive ",t(m~ of rhetoric is the enthymeme which is the logical, demonstrative proof of the subject matter. This abrupt dismissal of the other two ",l(f"'~ soon to be named (56a 1-4) is not warranted by the text here, or even later, as is done by Spcngd (p. 17); see 5"b 18: z. Furthermore, it simply disregards the explicit statement made shordy later at 54b 21-22 where there can be lime question that A. is speaking of the three entechnic proofS (7}60~, ",d60~, reasoll; on last, see end of 500 I : 3) and that the enthymeme pertains to each (see ~b 21). If anythiug, (f{ijf'Q means: the structure, the frame, which incorporates ",l(fn~, the "corpus probationum"; and if ",l(f"~ is ethical, and emotional, as well as logical, then the enthymeme is the structure which embodies them. A. at the moment does not explaiu how dris is done but the implication is clear: the enthymcme is a rhetorical argument which is organic in character and contains reason, "d60~, and 7}60~. z 'fii'>v l~", TOU "'P~YI''''''o~ This phrase is repeated a number of times in this chapter (5,,", 22; 54b '7-20, which is an explanation of the phrase; 54b 27; 55a 2, 19). [t is correcdy interpreted to mean: those matters extrinsic to the subject of discourse or to the point at issue in the discourse. Most, if not all, interpretations assume that the reference is to the use of if6o~ and ",d60~ (e.g., Spengd, pp. 17£), which are often called "indirect proo£" The reason for this assumption is, presumably, the .:"planatory clause which follows, together with the rest of chap. I. In this interpretation, then, A. would be saying that there is really only one way to prove or demonstrate in rhetorical discourse: namdy, by the use of logical proo£ For example, Cope's comment on this passage reads in part: "Aristode here assurnes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistendy adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject" (p. 6). Pearson in a critical comment on some speeches of Demosthenes justifies his own observation by a similarly restricted interpretation of A. (Demosthenes, p. 63). Such an interpretation create. immediate difficulties: first of all, in this chapter there is the statement at 55a 24-26 (sec 55a 25); secondly, at the beginning of chap. 2, A. acknowledges that if60~ and "d60~ are coequal with reason as the ways of demonstrating in rhetoric; thirdly, he then proceeds through the first two books to devdop his treatise around all three proofs: logical, ethical, emotional. He is quite aware, in other words, that one is always speaking to a person, who is a complexus of rcason, feelings, emotion., and set attitudes; and he says at B I, 77b 21-24: "But since rhetoric is directed to judgment •..

10

ARISTOTLE, cRHETORIC' I

5
it is necessary for the speaker not only to look to the discourse that it be probative and convincing, but also to develop a certain character in himself and in the one deciding." I would say that in his study of Demosthenes Jaeger speaks in a way completely acceptable to A. when he writes: "The new rhetoric gives rise to a psychag6gic consciousness such as the ancient poets themselves had nevet known. . . . This logic of proof is but the servant of a new conscious art of psychologically influencing the listener, and controls all the stops of human emotion with masterly virtuosity" (Demoslhenes, p. 29). In this first chapter there are a number of points which have been overlooked by those who stress the primacy of rational proo£ (a) In the chapter we have an obvious attack upon the misuse of the emotions in rhetorical discourse: namely, the playing upon the emotions in a way which is totally unrelated to the subject under discussion, with the sole intent of conditioning the auditor (e.g., at 540 18, 24). This is bad rhetoric and unacceptable, and we can see what A. has in mind not only from his comments in this chapter but also from Socrates' remarks in Apol. 34b-e, or from the Wasps (975-978) of Aristophanes. (b) A. in this chapter is speaking primarily of judicial rhetoric, a point which is rarely, if ever, noticed (see, for example, his references to dicasts, to the Areopagus, to legal cases in dl'rp'(fP'1TO;;VTO~ at 540 27, and his explicit statements at 54b 26-29, 55a 19-20). In connection with this perspective of A.'s in this chapter, it is interesting to note that Gorgias (Corg. 454b) gives as his fifth and fmal ansWer on the nature of rhetoric that it is the art of persuasion which is found "in law-courts and in other crowds." In legal rhetoric it is not at all difficult to manipulate emotional response with little or no reference- to the subject under discussion, as A. says at 54b ll-33 (see ~o Lycurgus, Againsl Leoerates II-I3, and Isocr., Antidosis 321). On the use of such extraneous emotional appeal, see Radermacher, p. 216. Spengel, pp. II-Il, gives some examples from the Greek orators of lEw TO;; neaYl'aTO,. Cope's reason, such as it is, for speaking of "direct and indirect proofS" is given in his notes (pp. 5-6, 28-29)- together with references m. his [ntrod., p. ISO. a 16: 1 "'p..y".....uOVT..' As Bonitz, Me/4physica, says at 987a 30, "in Aristotle ntet T"O~ "eaYl'aTtVOvTa. is used of one who proceeds in an orderly way and by reason in examining and coming to know something." Thus from the ordinary meaning of "to busy oneself, to engage in business" the word passes into a more technical sense, "to e..umine in a systematic way." In this sense there is a nicely ironic comment on the work of these textbook writers. 2 8'''~OA>i We think, of course, of Socrates' comment in Apol. 28a. ~'aPa.'J.£L" is "to set at variance, set against, discredit"; it reflects the use of reason to stir up the emotions. In itself d.apo).~ is not an emotion;

COMMENTARY

II

it produces an emotion. Demosthenes, On the Crown 3-4. reveals the .ttractiveness of such material to Greek audiences, material which he characterizes at 9 as irrelevancies: .. i~ Uwe •• lOyo,~. Radermacher, p. 216, speaking of the propensity of early Greek rhetoric for emotional material extraneous to the point at issue, remarks: "As a consequence anything prought forward which was foreign to the case in hand is especially called ~,apoA'Ij." Siiss, pp. 245ff., discusses the idea.

...

6L1, ..a-njv These are emotional appeals which are a 17 n.o~ totally extraneous to the issue (0. nsel TOJ "'eal'l'aro~), similar to what Socrates describes in the Apol. 38d-e or to Aeschines' comment in his work Against Ctesiphotl 205-206. As we saw in 5.... 15 : 2 and will see in what foliows in the Rhetoric, there are appeals to >}80~ and "a80~ which are quite de£nite1y ",sel TO;; "eal'l'aTO~. It is quite incorrect to say without any qualification that "Appeals to the feelings .re lEw TO;; "edl'l'aTO~ ... intended to bias and pervert ... judgment" (Cope, p. 7).

The dl here introduces a very slight antitha 21-22 ot!LEv ..• ot 6. esis and carries the idea of TS ••• "ai: i.e., "theoretically men believe that the l.ws should so declare, and further in practice they exclude discussion of such material." On the Areopagus see: MacDowell, the OCD, a 23 Ev 'Apdcp ",ciycp and Hignett. We know from Lysias, Against Simon 46, that A. is apparently describing accepted procedure in this court. Yet a glance at the speeches of Lysias before the Areopagus does not lead one to think that the roleo of "aeo~ and >}80~ were neglected, in spite ofQuintilian'o remark "quia Athenis aifectus movere etiarn per pr.econem prohibebatur orator" (rnst. orat. 6.1.7), which Spengel suggests may refer to the Areopagus. A. is speaking of the ordinary juror who would be a 24 : 1 6LXlla·"'jv found in an Athenian court. Socrates makes the point vividly and concisely in Apol. 35a--"""""'TEP"~ bilities, sense of duty, of the citizen, the one whose concern is directed to d,e larger interests of the city-state and the common good of all the citizens. Thucydides catches this concept, which underlies "o)..ci~"'f.Lev)

parentheses read by edd.

"general1y speaking"; on linlw, see 56a 7. a 7 : 1 cl>~ ElnEiv d.u.... ~ On the absolute in£nitive. the use of which is common in A.• see S. 20U. Kassel brackets 55a ']-8. "a. [an . .. "'aTS"'., read by the other odd,. Spengel. and Cope; he gives no reason. a xupu:..." ..ov Cpo 56a 13. together with the note. A syllogism is a form of inference COD.SlStmg a 8 cru),),oYLaf.LO~ .",~ of two propositions called premisses and a conclusion. There are many types of this inferential process and A. studies them in detail in his Prior Analytics. A sinIple form of the structure would be: all men are mortal; John is a man; John is mortal. Although A.'s authorship of the syllogism (inference by deduction) is disputed. there can be no question that he alone (as far as the evidence is in hand) developed it as an instrument of logic, together with induction, as the methodology whereby we move toward a more detailed knowledge of the world of reality. Here in the Rhetoric A. introduces this method of demonstration into the field of rhetoric, In fact, he will build all

22

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

the basic elements which for him constitute the art of rhetoric into this technique of deductive and inductive inferential reasoning. In itself this is another indication that for A. rhetoric is basically a reasoned and rational endeavor. Thus his distress, as we have seen, at all efforts which dismiss or neglect the role of reason. Throughout the Rhetoric A. identifies enthymeme as a sylle>gismo He stresses the identification when, in explaining enthymcrne at s6b 16/f., he employs the formula for his definition of syllogism as found in An. Pr. 24b 18-26 and Top. 1000 2Sff., r6sa r£ Certainly we are not to think of "syllogism" here as meaning strict scientific demonstration (the demonstration of the absolutely true) any more than we are to think of dn.d"EI~ at ssa 5-6 in such a way. A. clearly indicates that for him "syllogism" has a much wider extension and is a form for a variety of deductive reasonings (c£ API. Pro 2sb 26-3 I). Top. 162a IS/f. illustrates this well in its enumeration of types of syllogism: 'P,loaorpTffJa (the scie11tific syllogism), hr.''l.8IeTffJa (dialectical sylIe>gism), aorp'''fJa (eristic syllogism). To this enumeration we can now add ill86fJTffJa (rhetorical syllogism; c£ also s6b 4-5). See 56b 5 : 1. In a recentsrudy of rhetoric, The Prospect of Rhetoric, there is an intriguing comment on this matter: "In centuries past when dialectic and rhetoric were closely allied, speakers felt their reasoning ought to meet the tests of strict deductive and inductive inference. The feeling persists in modem text books on rhetoric. It now appears to be mistaken and outmoded" (.Bitzer & .Black, p. IS). While the author does not verify the st.tement, wh.t he does go on to say (name!y, that the logic of discourse involves more than mere reason) is precisely what A. himself is saying in the Rhetoric. "9 '\"'I'O~ S. lG'rt~ A. begins the conclusion of this first chapter by giving reasons why the art of rhetoric is important to man. Along the way he insists on the close relation between rhetoric and dialectic and therefore repeats the opening statement of the treatise. This repetition indicates that for A. rhetoric is an exercise of the intellect, and gives the reason for his strong criticism of those who reduce the art to emotional chicanery. This eminendy practical justification for the art is the one formal effort of A.' s in this regard which we possess. It is repeated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his Ep. ad Amm. 1729-730 and referred to by later rhetoricians (for evidence, see Spengel, pp. 2.3f£). A's apology for rhetoric is a fourfold answer to the criticism of Plato. We should compare the defense with that of Gorgias in Plato's dialogue of the same name (456-457), and that of !socrates in Antid. 249-2.50, 297-305. Both contain statements similar to A.'s

55a 23

COMMBNTARY

25

at 55b :df. on the misuse of the art (see also Isoer., Nicoc/es 1-9). Plato's art of rhetoric should also be consulted since A. would in no way take issue with the position staced there. See also Cic., De oral. I.46.202, D. inv. I.3-4.

PhtreJr. 272b - 278a on the true

a 2 I : 1 xpoJja,p.o~ an adjective of two or three endings, each of which appears in A.' s writings. 2 Su' 'l"e •.. lv..v...u.w To this first reason are added others at 55a 29 and 55a 38, as well as a general defense of rhetoric at 55b 2.

a 22: 1 ..aA'I)8ij x ..l 'l"& Six.. ,.. The first reason for the usefulness of rhetoric clearly connects the art of discourse with truth (see also 54b IO, 55a I7-18, 3I-38). If truth and justice, which in themselves are superior realities, fail to realize themselves in the decisions of men, the failure is that of rhetoric. This is particularly so since, as we shall see in chap. 3, rhetoric has as its goal just such decisions on the part of the auditor. Although Roberts leans strongly toward this relation between rhetoric and truth in our work, he is obviously not fully certain, as his strange, unsubstantiated statement shows: "In the body of the work fallacious arguments are, without comment, supplied to the reader as freely as legitimate ones" (UNotes," 351). The purpose of rhetoric for A. is to guard against the very thing which Euripides speaks about: "Time and again a man, even though he speaks what is just, caught by a lade of eloquence gains less than the glib-tongued man" (Alexalldros, frg. 56, ed. Nauck). In our passage A. makes a dose connection between truth and its correct articulation in language qnite similar to the statement of the Tix.~ TOO' i.&YOJ' in Phtredr. 260d 3-9. Indeed, Diiring's position (pp. 132-34) that the background against which our work was written is Plato's Phtredrus would further underline this stress on truth in the Rhetoric. Isocrates' comment in Antid. 255 is another way of expressing this relation: "The most substantial index of sound thinking is the proper use oflanguage." 2 x"'l"& TO 7I:p0crijxov .0 "eoa1j"o, is that whiclr is proper, fitting, seemly; and it is such primarily because it is that which belongs to, or concerns, something or someone. See Gorg. 507a. is the reading ofchecodd. and is accepted by three of the a 23 S,' ldJ"';;v edd. of the critical texts, by Spengel, and by Cope in his text and commentary. There are two exceptions to be found in the two most recent critical editions: i.e., Ross following Bywater reads d.' aVTOO.; Kassel follows Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Ep. ad Amm. 1729), who excerpted this passage of the Rhetoric. But, instead of the 6.'aVTO. of the codd. ofDionysius, Kassel reads &' aVTo., as does Roberts (Dionysius, p. 63). Both Ross (6,' aVT';;.) and Kassel (6,' ailT&') rellect in their readings a common interchange in the codices of A. between the rellexive and the definite pronouns. However, we must remem-

26

ARISTOTLE, tRHBTORIC' I

55a 23

ber that breathings and accents, like punctuation, are operative dements of interpret2tion, and reflect what someone thought A. meant. In this particular instance it would seem that the reading of d,e codd., d,' represents more corr«dy wh.t A. meant to say, and we should attempt to undentand it. Furthermme. Kassd's explanation (Der Text. p. 12I) for his reading is not coovincing and is answered in what follows. Our problem, then, is to determine whether aUr.,. or aVr.,. better represents whst A. possibly said. To avoid confusion in what follows, no breathing will be placed over avr.,•. There are two major difliculties in 55a 21-24: (a) What is the subject of 'ljrraaOa,? and (b) To what does avr.,. refer? Inanelfort to resolve the prol>lems, which are quite important for what A. is saying about rhetoric, let us put this initial question:Wh.t does the sentence at 55a 21-24 assert? In reply we find dut: (a) first, it makes a single statement: rhetoric is useful because truth and justice are naturally stronger than their opposites, i.e., untruth and injustice; and (b) secondly, it states the necessary consequence of this: if judgments are not made as they should be, something is necessarily defeated; (e) it passes a value judgment on the consequence. Looking at 55a 21-24, and without prejudicing a final decision, one must insist that from A.' s statement the usefulness of rhetoric is somehow tied to the superiority of truth and justice. Whatever may follow from this rel.tion, the fact is iliat the relation associates the usefulness of rhetoric with the natural superiority of truth and justice. This brings us to the first question about the subject of nrrau/la.. There is a threefold possibility. (a) Some say that the subject is "the speaken"; Bywater (arId so -presumably Ross), for e.'tample, introduces the reflexive av.,..,. to refer "back to the implied subject of nTIaa8a" i.e., the speakers or pfeaden." But we should reasonably expect a word like all.,..,. to refer to something within the sentence or, at least, within its logical vicinity. However, the only referent in A.'s ee.'}80" TO ""fOo" TO "ea),pa. The ,,{""'., which Dionysius calls TO "ea),pa modem commentators on A. call "the argument," "the rational proo£" If they mean by this simply the material in the subject matter which submits to reason and off'crs a logical explanation of the subject, then they reflect what A. is saying in 56. 1-2.0, and what Dionysius is trying to specify by his elassification TO "eaypa. If, on the other hand, these commentators mean that this third ,,{m., is the enthymcme (e.g., see Cope, pp. 5-6, and cf. 54& IS : 1; Spengel, p. 46, and c£ 560 13), then there is difficulty. For there is no clear textual statement in the Rhetoric in which A. identifies this third "{tiT., as enthymeme. From what he says here (56. 1-2.0) about these .,,{UTe., two things are cle.r: each "{tlTI, assists one in demonstrating one's point, and each "{UT., must be expressed in language. It seems safe to s.y that neither Cicero nor Quintilian fully comprehended A.'s division of the three entechnic ,,{""'.., (see Cope, pp. 28-29, for the relevant citations). Cf. Appendix. See B 12-17. As Socrate, says in Gorg. 5I3C: "Everyone rea 2. liBel joices when words are spoken in accord with his own character and dislikes those which are foreign to him." a3:

1

2

iv TcjI . . . . ."'; See B I-II. iv cdn:cj1 .•• 6."aNv,.. This is the third

"'UT.,. The meaning of lO)'o, here and at 56a 19 wh::re the third again appears must be determined. From the structure of the whole section, one might be justified in arguing that M)'o, here means the same as it does at 56a I: discourse, language. It can, in fact, be taken this way and would mean, because of the specifying a.d TO. a••".,!.a., discourse or language which expresses the logical coherence of the subject. Spengel, who considers this third to be enthymeme, still interprets mJTrjl Trjl AO),'I' as "the speech": "h.e. sola oratione, nulla alia re externa assumpta" (p. 46). Cope, p. 32, while favoring

,,1m.,

"'UTI,

ARISTOTLE, 'RHliTOIlIC' I

56a 3

"reasonings or arguments" (which is a bow in the direction of enthymeme as the third "t: "For which objective ./one contemporary treatise writers, we maintain, attempt to develop a systematic treatment."

a 17:

1

i.e., B I-II. This is one of a number ofindic.tors a 19: 1 "'cdv""Oidv that A. is setting before us an organized and wrified treatise; 56a 18-19, e.g., is taken up at B I-II, 56b 26 .tB 2C>-26, r '7. 2 5,a 5. ",aii >.ayou The genitive is a conjecture of Spengel's more fully justified by Vahlen ("Kritik d. Rhetorik," 560). It is read by all the edd. except Kassel (see below). Uyo, here is obviously the Myo~ of 56. 4, on which see 56a 3:'. It isnotthe.:t&yo~wemeetat56aIand56a9(sees6a I : .). VahIen's e.....:planation of the conjecture bears out the interpretation offered at S6a 3 :.. As he notes quite well, this section on the "IOTe., begins with an identification of the three and continues with a description of each, e.g., 6r.a /-,£11 06" TOJ lI(Jo1J~ •. • 6-ra'J/; 6r.& de Tei;" a:lteOdTa.W~ o-rQ'J}; ",0. 68 TO;; .:t&yov ... 8Ta.. And so we interpret Myo, here: ''by means of the logical statement of the subject." Whether one should read TO. Myo. with cod. A or TO;; Myov is not certain since dIll with either case can indicate means and A. d~es not hesitate to change cases with prepositions (witness "eel at ssb 28-30). Kassel reads dod d. TW. My ... and interprets in his apparatus: '" argumentis', 'ratiocinatione'." I om not sure of what he means by this, but the rest of his note clearly indicates that he sees a difference between the Myo~ here and that at 56a I, a.difference already indicated at 56. I : 2. a ~o 'I''''V6,..EVOV sc. d.:t7J01,; here the "apparently true" is that which to all intents and purposes is the highly probable truth in a given situation. It does not mean "the f.illacious branch of Rhetoric, 'the apparent, unreal, sham' arguments" (Cope, p. 32). For Cope's meaning of 'Pa••&,. ••o., see 5sb 15 and SSh 15 : 3. See also s6a 36 - S6b 4. Le., the three "[CIT.., '.TeX'o,. Spongel, p. 46, wrongly a 21 "'ctU"'''~ calls these l.OIl,.7JI'''' >JOo" ,,&00,; see 56a I : 3 and S6a 3 : 2.

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' I

44 a 22 :

TOU liuv .. ",o!vGU On the genitive, see S. Il'>'oY'''f'oO~

b 3 ""'pci6£.yf'o'" .""'Y"'Y>l

See S6a 36 - S6b 4See 57b 26-36 and S6b 5 :

b 3-4 v This is also read by Dionysius. From the context. here. a likdy reference is An. Pr. 6sb 9-14 and the whole of chaps. 23 and 24. as wdlasAn. Post. SIa 39 - 8Ib 42; see also 71a I-II. b II : I ckVClYXCl,av ..• Ellio~ Roemer's comment on Imes II-19: "a most difficult passage and one much badgered by scholars." z aNT"''' i,.Cldp'I' TeNT"'V aolTw, '''aTie'l'. which does not appear in Dionysius. e.'Cempli£es in part Roemer's comment. I would interpret the referents in aVTw•• TO';TW. thusly: a"TW. (s6b II). i.e.• deduction (1 here is A.'s theory of what we know and how we know it. The mind cannot know the individual completely because of the element ofmatter, which to A. is unknowable. The very thing which accounts for individuality - i.e., matter - is the very thing which introduces "unlimit" ("""eoo, 56b 33) and makes the individual unknowable (0,)" btL"TT/T.o). Art considers universals, classes, organizing principles (56b 31-32) which the mind can know. As an art, rhetoric with respect to the suasive will seek out in any ,ubject those concepts and ideas which are probable to a class or group; for this is its field as an art: TO.TO lVTBZOOO (56b 32). Rhetoric can train one to discern such material, but it cannot determine specifically that which is suasive or probable

rae

COMMENTARY

53

to this individual because it is the this-ness which ties the individual into matter and therefore into the unknowable. b 30 :

1

,,0

"..e' /l"CI....O"

• oro..

~ tCl"p'X-lj

See 511b

sc. TtZ"'1

2.

o~

a".",i.

b 3I ..tj> "O'&. "Some such person"; i.e., a general type represented by a person, such as Callias or Socrates. b 32-33

(-.ou..o ...•71:,....7)..6,,)

.x. . . ."

Parentheses read by edd.

"'&01;." "the individually probable," which from b 33 ..0 "Cl9' what follows means: probable to some one individual.

b 34 "0'0'''&. Ross alone of the edd. reads TOLoiad,; it is a strengthened furm of To,6"a8; "to people such as they are." This passage hasregularlybeenin~ b 35-57'l I XCII y4p •••• lw9CS....." terpreted in the way we meet it in the Oxford Aristode: "Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate" (Roberts, Rhetorica, p. [9]). Vater (p. 27) considers the passage not to be A.'s, arguing that the sentence has to do with the subject matter used by syllogisms and belongs, if anywhere, not here, but after S7a Iff. His view can righdy be questioned and a case easily made for the logic of the statement precisely where it appears in the codd. still there is a difficulty with the usual interpretation given to i" TW. 7Id'l {Jov;',6,,,Oal ,1",06T"", but it is not the problem which Spengel, p. 58, cites: namely, that A. should more precisely and correcdy say "eel TW' 7Id'l {Jov;'etle"Oa, elw8dTW' (and "eel TW. Myov deop ••",.). Spen~ gel's reason for this suggestion is open to question simply because there is no point in pressing A. to this kind of precision; the statement can quite readily be understood and accepted as it stands. The difficulty is whether or not {Jov;'B,JBaOa, can be translated as a passive, as everyone does. In fact, though the usage is certainly not common, it is not absolutely impossible. Apparendy because of this problem Kassel in his eclition has adopted a con~ jecture of Maier's and reads dBOp.,O'~ and e/wOd"w, commenting upon them in Der Text, pp. 123£ He considers these dative participles as masculine and as referring to persons, citing in support deop••w. at Top. lOsa 3-4, and mentioning BE I2I4b 28 - I2Isa 3. Presumably he would translate the passage (he forgoes doing so himself) in the following way (1 use the Oxford l Roberts 1translation once again): "Dialectic does not construct its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of crazy people, but out of the ideas occurring to those who need a reasoned discussion; and rhetoric, too, draws upon the ideas occurring to those accustomed to engage in d~

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

54

liberation." Granting the difficulty with pov)..,Jea8a" I am not at all sure that the inteq>retation of M.ier-Kassd is correct. Surdy it is clear that a few lines on, .t 5?a 9, we have d80l'i.ro. used again; yet it is used to refer, not to persons, as Kassd seems to argue it must, but to statements. I am inclined to think that such is its use in the present passage and that the common interpretation of the reading of the codd. is correct. i.e., be TOVTO,. Ii twX'" Dialectic does not b 36 : 1 .~.rw l.."XEV use as the subject matter of its argurnentatioll any and every chance idea or notion. Dialectic is an art devoted to a reasoned (avJ.J.oytCBTa., 56b 35) discussion of rational, not irrational, statements, of ideas which require ""planation (56b 37; see also Top. I04a 4-8, 105' 3-'7). 2 a'r'l:'CI i.e., Twa ; it is not an enclitic. 57"- 1-2 ~ouA.u.a8clL ... ~ouAEU6I'E8.. In the next seven lines A. mentions a few important ideas about rhetoric: (a) its general subject matter (namely, questions open to deliberatiou) and its specific function. Since men deliberate only about all things which· are problematical or open (or .pparently open) to other possibilities andinterprelOtions (5?a 5-'7), A. extends rhetoric to the whole area ofhuman inquiry. The excellence of rhetoric (its aeBnj) is achieved when it assists such deliberation; this is what rhetoric is meant to do (its leyo.) just as the ear is meant to hear; see 55b Io-II and 5.... II : 2. (b) the object of the art: rhetoric is directed to others, who constitute an integral part of the art; see 58. 36ff.

a

I

TO

epyov

See 5....

II : Z.

;, 2 : 1 ~auAEUOI'E8C1 We are told .bout deliberation somewhat more fully at EN II40a 3I - II40b 4. It is important to understand the way in which A. views deliber.tion since his understanding of it is closdy related to the concept of the three entechnic ntaTB'~ which he analY2ed at 56. 1-33. From the discussion of it in EN IIIIb 4 - IIl3a 14 we learn that deliberation is directed to what is contingent (changeable), as well as to the things which man can do (practical action; see our text at 5?a 24-26), and th.t it involves both the intellectual and appetitive faculties of man. Deliberation is not complete without intellect and appetition. For as the mind is deciding, the appetitive dement in man is desiring the thing decided upon, which is called the neoa/l1BTO.. Deliberation aims at "eoaIeBa.~, the act of choosing. neoa{e.q.~, in tum, is not possible without the exercise of reason and appetition. The act of deliberation is complex, and this complexity is caught by the explanation of neoate.a.~ as POVJ.BVTI~ 6eB~'~ (deliberative desire, EN III3a II), or even more explicitly by A.'s phrases "desireful reason," "reasonable desire" (EN II39b 4-5). Deliberation implicates both reason and appeti-

COMMENTARY

55

tion in man. If, then. the e~y .. of rhetoric finds its fulfillment, as A. says in our text here, in matters which call for deliberation, it is clear that rhetoric in its argumentation must look at any problem from both its rational and its appetitive aspects. This is another way of saying that it must seek its sources of conviction in 1100" ""00,, rational analogue, or in what he has already called the entechnic "to'T6t~; see ssa 4, S6a 3 : 2. As an activity rhetoric belongs primarily to what A. calls the practical intellect. Rhetoric is an activity of what he calls the '0;;' loy'O'T'''&,: the intellect working together with the appetitive element in nWl. See Studies, pp. 18-28. C£ Appendix. 2 x .. l ."exv ..~ i.e., rhetoric itself is the Tix,,! for this kind of endeavor. If another art, or arts, fulf,]led this l~'Yo" there would be no place for rhetoric. The negative "'~ is probably that of cautious assertion (S. 2869); a possible reason for the caution i. given at 58a 6-7; see SBa 6-7. a 3-4 S,Il ..OA>.&'>v . . . Aoyl1;£lJaa, ..opp...8w The whole phrase effectively comes to the same thing: people who are unable to engage in a long and subdy reasoned argument; see B 22, 95b 23-27. In 57" 3-2.1 we are given a more complete view of the typical auditor than that provided at 55a 24-26. a 4: 0'1JV-,

1 CNVopav We meet the word again at 59b 3 I; on the force of see 57'L 8 : 1. 2 ..opp",aw See 7Ia I2 : 1.

a 4-'7 ~OUA£\IOP.£aa ... yllp ....tov This is explained in more specific terms at 59" 30 - 59b I; see also EN II4O" 31-33. a 5 tvstX...a .., . . . l](uv "Able to be in both ways," i.e., "capable of admitting alternatives"; see S6b 21 : 1, and 54a 8. a7:1

oG_~ l'I"oA"p.~ciy.,v

"ifhe so conceives the issue." ou&w yllp ....tov "for there is nothing further in it"; i.e., such deliberation is useless. See LS ,,"sIOJ>, II, 'for examples. Our reading is accel'ted by the odd. The variant readings are explained well by Cope, p. 41. Z

a 7-17 tvS.X£....., . . . "ulloY'''!'~ The argument here is relatively simple but not immediarely obvious. A. first speaks about inference in general (57" 7-13), and then draws conclwiol" from this general statement with respect to the inferential processes of rhet.oric: namely, enthymeme and example (57" 13-17: cllO'T' .• """Ao'Y'O''''o~), He says of inference in general that one can first of all infer from material which itself is the result of prior inference, but that this kind of close reasoning is not suitable to the ordinary auditor. Secondly, he continues, one can infer from material which is not self-evident and so needs proof in order to be at least probable, but such material labors under the difficulty of not being commonly understood and therefore of

ARISTOTLB. 'RHETORIC' I

not being suasive. And so he concludes that inference in rhetoric - namely, enthymeme and example - must use subject matter which is probable (and so potentially suasive), and solidly probable to the .uditors: i~ 6,..OAOYO",..••.", (and therefore in no need of prior proof). uuU0Y{~E,,8(ll, auvciye,v U1IV- in composition with verbs is used (a) objectively: to put things together to make a whole; or (b) subjectively: to do something together with someone else (see Guthrie, Sophist!, p. 136n3). With verbs expressing mental action, as here, the use is objective, and the verbs denote bringing things together in the mind for comparison in order to make a judgment, draw a conclusion, enlarge one's understanding; see also Cope, p. 41. Z be GUAAu..OY'''JUvwv ..pO't"Epav It is dear from 57'i 10-12 that A. is talking about setting forth a chain of interdependent demonstrations, i.e., syllogisms from whose ultimate conclusions (b' ""AAe).oy,U,..•••,.) one establishes the premisses for the final demonstration. The problem with this procedure is the auditor (57a 12); he is assumed to be unsophistiCated, unable to follow such cIo;e reasoning (see also 57a 3-4). This remark re-emphasizes the important role which A. gives to the auditor in his theory: rhetoric is concerned primarily with discourse (spoken or written) which is directed to another.

a 8: 1

a 8-9 ...clt fIoEv ......clt 5'

C£ 56. 29: 1

a 9 olau>.Aoy,,,......v i.e., "from statements not reasoned out." From the to."t we can see the problem with this kind of material: as it stands it is un-

proved, and so"is not probable to the auditor (57a .uasive (57a 12). a 10: 1 ...ou......v T';;.

10);

it cannot therefure be

i.e., the ""lAsAoy,u",.,,,, of 57" 8 and the duvAAoy,u-

of 57a 9.

flo'"

2 "'0 i.e., the process of an interrelated series of inferences whereby one reaches the premisses to be used in the final argument. I I xp ....~S This word surely is the same as dxeoaf>i~ as the use of which a few lines back (57' 3--4) and a £ew lines on (57" 19) would prove. I mention this because the word is, I believe, pushed too far by those who comment on the text; see, for example, s8b 2. A., as has just been said (57" 8 : z), assigus to the auditor a prominent role in the rhetorical endeavor, which is spelled out in chap. 3. His basic character always remains that of an d"eo .... ni~ (see 5Sa 37 : 1), although he may be denominated diJferendy in specific instances.

a

a 12 : 1 ....AOU~ (a) at S6a 7.

i.e., unsophisticated, simple; it is similar to meauing

57a 16 2

COMMENTARY ..elt

66

57

responds to Td !''''' (57a 10) and picks up d"ulloY,"Tw>

(57a 9). a 13 c...... civ..y,...ioll ".T.l. On the relation of this to what precedes, see 5,.. 7-17. The purpose of the lines which follow is to introduce the type of subject matter which the two kinds of rhetorical inference use, matter which A. will discuss between 57a 22 and 57b 25. In general, this subject matter is contingent, concerns things which can be other than they are, is generally agreed upon, and is quite probable: e.g., an angry man usually, but not always and absolutely, acts in his anger.

'1.....

a 15-16 "'..pciS ••y ........ i118u ... Since A. is speaking about the two kinds of inference used in rhetoric, we should note the following. In our present passage down to s7b 25, even though he mentions example at the outset (57" I4fE), A. speaks with the rhetorical syllogism uppermost in his mind. This is rather typical ofhis whole treatise. "ae&6.,y!'a is clearly coordinate with enthymcme as the method of rhetorical inference, but enthymeme enjoys a dominant role. At the same time there is no indication in the text here, which is ptimarily a quest for the source material for argument by enthymeme, that this same material is not also to be used for argument by "a~dd ..".. !,a. Spengel, p. 59, asks: "Why not cb, ",I Td "ol6 a 15 .:.~ ..elt ",oUci which A. uses later?" Presumably (but it is not clear) Spengel is referring to 57a 27f£ Granted: both phrases can mean the same thing - i.e., "for the ·most part." still the point of the phrase here is not to signify the contingency of the material which is expressed by au"" lixew here and in 57" 27 by cb, inl Td "OAV. Here A. is stating that the material with which rhetorical inference operates uis,jo, the most part, contingent" (on this use of :1(0;(11" see Bouit>:, Index 6I8a 46 - 618b 13). Thus we should translate "so that it is necessary for both the enthymeme and the example to be concerned with' matters, for the most part, contingent." Therefore the possibility of using scientific material (6 "aTa T~> ""anl!'1J> Adyo" 55a 26) is not excluded; see 57" 22ff. and 57" 22 : 1. a 16 Et; o},(yc.>v This is the loclls classicus for the common interpretation of the enthymeme as a truncated syllogism, i.e., with one of the premisses ("~OT&I1.") or the conclusion (aul''''~al1;''a) missing. This interpretation goes back to the distinguished Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias of the third century A.D. A. himselflends strength to this interpretation by his use of 6 "~WTO, aulloy,a!'", (57" 17) - which means: the syllogism in its elementary, typical, unchanged form (see Cope, p. 42) - and by his explanation and example at 57a 17-21. However," careful reading of the text here and at B 22, 95b 24-26, the only other passage in which he discusses form, does not

ARISTOTLE, cRHETORIC' I

58

57a 20

permit one to say that the enthymeme by definition is an abbreviated syllogism (see Studi", pp. 87-91; see also the comment at the end of 57b 10-21). On the other hand everything which A. says about the character of rhetorical argumentation encourages the acceptance of his statement at r 18, 19a 18-19: "Enthymemes should be condensed as much as possible." A. wants to enable the auditor to acquire a quick, solid, and comprehensive grasp of the argument. See preceding note. a 17: 1 0 "@"'TO~ INUoy.",,"o~ 2 ielV yap It should be remarked that lines 57a 17 to 57b 6 (O'1JUo"."p&~) have disappeared from cod. A, and appear only in corrected A in the margin. i.e., one of the "eOTaa.ol; or the avpnieaapa. read by Spenge!, Cope, and all the edd. except Kassel, who, here and at 57a 21, reads o';6i., giving his reason in Der Text, p. 124, together with sorne paralle! exomples. I ftnd his reason not suasive at least for 57a 18, possible for 57' 21; his parallel examples are more suasive.

a 18 : 1 TOUT"'" 2

ou8E

a 19 : 1 orOV ST. oro. is the adverb. The edd. punctuate 57a 19-21 variously, reflecting their interpretations. Most place a comma after axeoanil;, but I think that the period, used by Cope and Kasse!, is better since 57a 19-21 illustrate 57a 17-19 (ldv •.. dxeoanM. Thus iJn ... d",;;va ••vtmay be taken as an indirect statement depending upon an understood taken from 57a 20 - "for example, to state that Dorieus was victorious in a contest in which the prize was a crown" - or as a QTO clause loosely attached to the ~ statement (S. 2586) - "with regard to the fact that

'''I'''' ,In,''

Dorieus ... "; we have a similar8n clause at Dem.., Crown,

2II.

a",p.eU~

son of Diagoras of Rhodes (on whom see Pindar, 01. VII). Diagoras himself, his father, and his two sons won Olympic victories. Thucydides (3.8) mentions a second victory for Dorieus at Olympia (c. 428 B.C.), and Harpocration in his Lexicon of the Ten Attic Orators (ed. Dindorf) tells us that Dorieus was a pancratiast. 3 aTe1eie'o, is a sign which guarantees the certainty of the signate, .s A.' s explanation of d.a)'.. aio. at 57b 5-6 indic.tes: "by necessary signs I mean those from which the strictly demonstrative syllogism comes." I add the words "strictly demonstrative" becawe that is the meaning of" avJ..to)',a!,d~" here: e.g., An. Post. 73a 24: "strict demonstration is the syllogism from necessary premisses." T6HJJ7Je'O" makes the syllogism built upon it a strictly demonstrative syllogism with respect to the signate. In fact, when Socrates uses ""!,ojew, at Euthyphro 9" 2, it would appear from the context which leads up to it that he wants such a demonstrative proof from Euthyphro. The TB,,!'oje'O., then, introduces into rhetoric the character of reasoning found in the Annlrlies, just as the ei.. a and le'o, with the middle term of the first figure syllogism, the usual figure for the strictly scientific syllogism. It is necessary to add, however. that in calling attention to the rdationship between " ..'!'>le'o, and d.a)'"aio. by which ..s,,!'>le'o, becomes the "eo .. aal~ anod .." ..."oi d.a),,,aia we do not thereby identify ".,,!'>ie'o, with the strict apodeictic protasis which leads to complete knowledge. TB;,!'>ie'o" as A. explains it in the Rhetoric, will give certain knowledge of the existenre of the signate. He does not say that it

o..

66

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' [

57b 10

gives, or will give, the reason for the fact of the existence, which is necessary for full ~",un'lI'''I. TS"I'r,lll0V win tell you that the signate exists, but not why it exists. i.e., this U"II'Biov has no further specifying b 5 XCI..-" ,",V &""'P0pclV diiference. To distinguish it from the u"ll',iov which is a TB"I'r,Il'0V A. calls it simply U"Il'e,ov d.wvvl'0v, probably because of his observation at r 13, 14b 15-18.

b6: 1 2

aullOyL"P.O~

oro

TOLOU'S'OV

For its meaning see S7b 4. i.e., an elv""""iov; see S7b 4.

b 8 : 1 'PEP£LV "Adduced, brought forward." :z .:.~ &£&£Lyp.4vov ••. ,,£n:£pexap.4vov These words presumably explain 7:e"I'r,lll0V: "a something, as it were, demonstrated and drawn to a full conclusion. " Yet the only thing which they explain about it is its character as elv"""",ov: namely, that it necessarily and absolutely points to its signate. b 9 ..-lKP.exp XCIi n:4pex~ A.' s explanation suggests that the n"I'r,lll0V could also be called "'.Il"~ (from """,seaul'l..ov). What he has in mind here at 57b 7-9 is explained by what is said about U"II'8ioV-TS"1'7}Ill0V in S7b 4 and in S7b 10-21 under (a). As for his further explanation that both words mean the same thing "in the ancient tongue," Gaisford has a somewhat startling comment. He says that the language of the fourth century did not diffi:r from Homer's but that the Homeric poems were not too well known in the fourth century. In confn-mation of this he points to Oem., Against Aristocrates 630, in whi.ch the orator explains a word (""olva) fairly common in Homer's fliaJ; see Spengel or Cope for the full citation. b ;0-21 I!O..-LV SO ... n:vEUGTLiiv A. uses his three syllogistic figures to illustrate the two kinds of U"II"'ov. Apparendy he finds in an U"Il's,a the quality possessed by the middle term of a syllogism. A middle term is something which points to another thing which it either includes within itself, or within which it is included. "Man" as a middle term points to all the individuals of the species which it includes within itself, and to a larger class within which it is included: namely, animal. The middle term in each of the three figures is a sign pointing to the signate in the conclusion. Thus A. can say, at An. Pr. 1Qa 10-13, that "an enthymeme is a syllogism from probabilities or signs; and a sign may be understood in three ways corresponding to the position of the middle term in the figures"; or again, at 70a 24-25, that "thus if a single premiss is stated, there is only a sign; but if the second is added, there is a syllogism." The middle term of the syllogism serves as a foundation to exemplify the nature of U"II'Biov. A. uses as his examples U"II'"a commonly employed by men. Furthermore, and this is important, he uses them in an argument in the way in which men

57b 10-21

COMMENTARY

presumably use them to establish a proposition. Thw he is able to show clearly the difference between Te"p>je'.' and '"11'0'.' d.,;,."p... For he is able to demonstrate that only the -""p>je'" is wed correcdy and infers a valid conclwion. The '"11'0'0' d.,;,.vpo. is wed by men in argument in such a way that if it is put into the syllogistic structure it employs the form incorrectly and can reach only an invalid conclusion. As he says at 57b 14, B 24, oIb 9-II, 25, and 03a 2-5, these '"Ipoia are dU1l,uoy,a-ru. Thw it is that in A.'s examples the (f~psi•• as used in the second figure syllogism violates a basic law of the syllogism by appearing as an undistributed middle term, while the '"Ips'o. used in the third figure concludes to a statement not warranted by the premisses. At most, therefore, in the second and third figures the sign will infer only a probable (and refutable) signote. But in the fmt figure the sign is wed correcdy and infers a certain and irrefutable knowledge of the existence of the signote. In exemplifying the text examples I will change A.'s order to that of the three figures.

(a) First figure: T8"p>je'.v: 57b 14-17: A. accepts the middle term "fever" (as does Plato, AidbiaJu II I40a-b) as necessarily included within "sick" - "all with fever are sick"; the term., in tum, includes "this man." It is a valid middle term for this inferential form. and the conclusion is certain and absolute. If A.'s text between S7b 10 and 57b 17 says anything in the Greek, then the rdation of this '"11'0'0' to its signote is that of a particular to a universal such as we have in (c) bdow. But in analyzing the logic of this '"Ips'o. I can find nothing in it which makes it, as a (f~pB'O', different from the '"IPS'o. in (b) which is related to its signate as a universal to a particular. (b) Second figure: '"11"'0' dv';'."po., which is rdated to its signote as a universal to a particular: 57b 17-21: The middle term "rapid breathing" is assumed to be included within "fever." But it may, or may not, be included, for, to paraphrase A.'s words at An. Pro 70a 35-37: "a syllogism cannot be formed when the terms are so cdated; for althottgh those with fever breathe rapidly and this man breathes rapidly, it is not necessary that he have a rever." Thus the conclusion can be refuted (57b 19). (c) Third figure: '"IPS'o, d.,;,."poo, which is rdated to its signote as a particular to a universal: 57b rr-I4: The middle term "Socrates" includes both "wise" and 'Jwt" (and truly so, S7b 14), but one can conclude from this kind of

68

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' 1

rdation not that "the wise are just," but only that "some wise person i. ju.t." The structure of the third figure will conclude only to a particular statement. The conclusion can be refuted (57b 13), as can that in the .econd figure. In conclusion, we should note that A.'. discussion of sign enthymemes, as well as his analy.i. of refutation, B 25, 02a 29 - 02b 13, clearly indicate that he assumes that the enthymeme, a. far as form is concerned, is in no way notably different from the syllogism, i.e., composed of two premisses and a conclusion; see S7ll 16. b II TI> " ..e' Ii"......ov •.. " ..e6Aou 1-3; see S7b Io-aI under (e).

b 13 AUTO"

A. begins the explanation of 57b

For the reason, see 57b 10-21 under

(e).

o"

b 14: 1 &.uuAA.;y,..... For the reason, see 57b 10-21 under (e). Ross alone of the edd. reads: .!e1Jl'wov (dO'lJAM".C1TOV ,,&e), with a comma after the parenthesis. It is more reasonable to punctuate it as follows: .le1Jl'evo• • aO'lJAM",C1TO' ,,&e. -i.e., a colon (or period), no parentheses, and a period after ,,&e. Z T;' 6£ introduces the second illustration of 57b 1-3. introduces a statement dependent upon "'11'810. b 15 : 1 3T' "o..aL (elva.). The statement is explained in 57b 10-21 under (a). 2 liT' yoiA .. EX£' The {fn is causal. It was a commonly accepted view that the relation between the two (having milk - recent childbearing) was a necessary one (d.a""aio., 57b 16); see, e.g., Plato, Menexenus 237e, and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Antiquitates RomanaB II.34.6.

b 17: 1 &A"Tov 2

TO 6£

b IS 3T' ""p£.....£,

b 19 :

1

"",..".;"

2 AUTO"

For the reason, see 57b 10-21 under (0). introduces the third illustration of 57b 1-3. See S7b 10-31 under (b). neuter; sing. and pI., frequendy used adverbially. For the reason, see 57b 10-31 under (b).

'ii"

b 21 7tIIEu ..... Cope, pp. 45£, has an extended note on this word a. an example of a class of verbs in -aw, ·<eoaTa~, though the words are grammatically acceptable as a personal object of Aa.M.ova... They are even more out of place when one compares 59b 8-16 with 59a 8-9. At 59b 8-r6 A. states in more detail what he is saying here. It is this same passage (59b 8-16) which makes it quite clear that there can be no reason for secluding pallo•. This leaves us with the question of whether or not A...8d.ova.. has an object, or whether there is a lacuna in the text. As the object of Aa.8d.ovaw, I take riJ. ~la'Poed. understood from s8a 2. Such an accusative with Aa.8d"s .. may appear unique, but it has a paralld at 660 2-3 and in Poet. r4ssa 25: Aa.8d.o. Ta V"s ....Tla. Thus I would read 58a 8 d.d "al Aa.81i.oval. TO [TO~~ d"eoaTd,], " ..I ,..aAAo. anT0l's.Ol! and translate s8a 8-9: "Therefore these individuals fail to notice this diH'erence, and the more they fasten upon the subject matter in its proper sense ["aTa TeO"'O.), the more they shift from the arts of rhetoric and dialectic." As Bonitz, Index, 77zb 45, says, it often means a 9 : 1 ......Ilt "pcl",ov apte, III decet. Our phrase is followed in some codd. by what is obviously a gloss: d•••Toot;. But it catches the meaning of our phrase: "in the proper, appropriate way," i.e., "using the method proper to the specific discipline." See Plato, Rep. 58Ib 7 ("aTa TeO"OV), comparing with it s8ra 6 and the use of de8cii~ in a parallel statement. 2 ..",..clII-""o, x ....1lt "pu",ov is e.' before "aTa TeOnO.; I do not see the point of this. 3 IL£Ta.(aa;(vOUGLV

Uto pass from one

place to another"; thus the

kind of action being criticized is that by which those who profess to be rhetoricians or dialecticians abandon the very arts which they profess, i.e., rhetoric and dialectic: a~Tcii. at s8a 9. a 10 : 1

TO AEYUII-""OV

Sux at s8a 10-35. 2

nAElOVtdV

"this statement." i.e., in more detail, which he proceeds to give

s8a 18

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

74

a II ",.pt wv ToU~ TO"'OU~ AtYOILEV Dialectical and rhetorical syllogisms for A. are "those syllogisms we have in mind when we speak: of the topics." These are the topics he calls ".w.t (s8a 12); they may be used as a source for inference in any discipline (s8a 12-17), but they will not provide knowledge about the disciplines (s8a ZI-22). They are obviously general sources from anyone of which one can construct a form of syllogistic inference which will be a valid form for specifically different disciplines (s8a 13-14: a.a'l'eeO.TW••rae,). For a fuller discussion of the I.A...... "",Inx"''' i.e., aAl,," ("eoTdj ...

a 25 d:pX..i~ These would be the r~I'" or the 01" ••". dex"t, the principles which constitute the nature of the particular ''''i"«~ •.• x«>.';y Athens for forgetting her own advantage in order to help others. 2 " Ii' E,,80!1'1!1" "UllOYL"!10~

See S6b 5 : I.

a II-I3 .".llit ......p"X8~"."e..L A. in this apparently obvious statement (for he has said [5f.l 5--7J that we do not deliberate about the impossible) is actually introducing his brief analysis of the clements which he considers absolutely necessary to all three kinds of rhetorical discourse. Such discourse by the very fact that it is Usnally discour$e about the probable implicates these elements. The elements are: possible-impossible (59' II-I5), past fact-future fact (59a [6), great-small (59a [9-26). To understand more fully what he is attempting to say here we should read B [9, 92a 8 - 93a 21, a companion passage (see Studie." pp. 36-38). A. gives these elements a name, after a fashion, at B 18, 9Ib 29-92a I (see als:> 92a 4-7) by calling them the "oIVd (see 7sa 8 : 3). Tills has occasioned confusion among interpreters who constantly identify thcse "oIVd with the "01.01 '0"01 (see, for example, the Cope passage cited in S9a 8). But nowhere in the Rhetoric docs A. use the word '."01 of these "o...t From what he docs say about them here and in B I9 we discover the following: (a) they are mentioned in connection with the .~).~ of the three kinds of rhetoric and are said to be common to thcse T~).~; (b) they are necessary to achieve the ..,,~; (c) in both places where these "o,.d appear in the text they occur in passages where A. is talking abont the large structural blocks of his theory: namely, enthymeme, naeddSly.aa. particular topics, general topics. One can assume that these "ol.d also belong among those key concepts. This assumption becomes more assured when we reflect on what A. has said thus far in the text. Rhetoric, as he tells us, involves open questions about which men deliberate. But men enter upon the discussion ofsuch an open question only when they consider it to be something possible, past, present, future, which is of some importance to them. In other words the "OIV& are necessary preconditions to the whole process of deliberation leading to one of the three TiA.~. This necessity arises from the manner in which A. has analyzed the art of rhetoric. The "oIVd represent categories into which the subject must fall before a speaker (or writer) can responsibly engage in any of the three kinds of rhetorical discourse (see 59a 14-16). The "OW" are like the 0el'a.a in the Topics (1.13-18); without them there

S6

.ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

presumably can be no rhetorical discourse just as there can be no topical investigation without the l1eyava. C£ Appendix.

oro"

010" T£ C£ LS, III.2. "'pcxxO>jCJ£CJOex. The future passive catches the contrast of past and future which A. has in mind, as we see from what follows. It is read by the edd., with the exception of Ross, who reads ",meaxBa •.

a

II : 1 2

a 13 oUX This is read by the edd. save Ross, who brackets it. Spengel reads it but is not happy with it. Even though the negative idea is already on hand in o~M (59'1 u) it should be read unless there is a solidly strong reason for secluding it.

".u,,••

a 15 bn& ••x....xij> as at 5Sb 17; Spongel, p. So, suggests b"6•• a verb which A. does use in the companion passage, B IS, 9Ib 27.

'P,

a 17: 1 l",ex.voiiv,,£S A. probably uses the six formalities (see 58b S-29) instead of the three genera to emphasize the fact that in every kind of rhetoric these three "o ••d come into play: namely. possibk-impossible, past-future (the ~a .le7Jpi.a of 59a 19), and great-small (p.iya IJ ,,"'eo', 59a 19). It appears that it is for the same reason that he uses the six proximate Til7J of the three genera, 59a 20-21. The order here of the z l", ...vo;;v,,£S •.. cl",ol\oyou!'-""o. three genera is: epideictic, deliberative, judicial. At 59a 20-21 when he presents the proximate Til7J of each genre the order is: deliberative, epideictic, judicial. It is this second order which he follows in the first book, i.e. deliberative (chaps. v i.e., the three genera; c£ S9a 6. a 28 [51,!, i.e., separate! y, one by one. The order which he gives is the one he follows, e.g., deliberative, chaps. 4-8; epideictic, chap. 9; judicial, chaps. 10-14. With chap. 4 A. begins and continues through chap. '4 an anal}'>is of the source material for the three kinds of rhetoric (on the relation of chap. IS to this development, soe tsa 22 : z, tsa 23). It is a study of the particular topics which will give material for the "e.T"a..~ to be wed in each genw. At the end of the analysis he describes the whole process as an "account of the 66Ea. [i.e., el"oTa and a7Jl"iaj "al "eoT"a..~ for" each kind of rhetoric (B I, 77b 16-20).

CHAPTER 4

I . Introduction: 59a 30 - 59b 18 general introduction to deliberative rhetoric by way of resume on: I.

59a 30 - 59b

2.

59b

2 -

I

59b 18

nature of ddiberation (chaps. 2 and 3, especially 56b 37 - 570 7) rhetoric as dVval''' (chaps. I and 2, especially 55h 8 - 580 34, 58a I - 58. 30)

II . Devdopment: 59b 19 - 600 37 subject matter of deliberative rhetoric: 59b 59b 3· 59b 4. 600 I.

2.

19 - 59b 23 23 - 59b J2 ll-60a 5 6 - 60a II

5. 60a u - 60a 17 6. 600 18 - 60.. 37

introduction ways and means

war and peace national defense imports and exports legislation

III . Conclusion and transition: 600 38 - 60b 3

S!)a 30 : J ,.pWTOV fLEv The statement which begins here and ends at 59b 18 is introductory; c£ outline of chapter. z ciy ..Oclt l\ XIIX4 interchanged with TO I11JI''PleO'/l Kal TO pJ.aP~ eDv. as we saw at 59a 20.

a 31 06 ,..pl

8.

£,.""""

sc. I11JI'Povl..l... See 57' 4--'7 and S7& 1-2.

a 32 Sa .. The 6i is .dversative and introduces the subjects .bout which men do not deliberate (59' 33-34). As A. says elsewhere: "No one deliberates about mose things which cannot be other than they .rc" (EN II39' 13-14). Isocr.tes remarks: "Intelligent men ought not to deliberate about wh.t they know, for it is a waste of time" (Peace 8). See Cic., De orat. 2.82.336: "All deliberation ends when we realize that the subject is impossible or inevitable, and the man who taught this truth [i.e., A.j not seen by others showed the deepest insight."

8.

a.

a 33 ".pl The here is rcsumptive, i.e., "with respect to these matters, theil, (I say) ..•"; see also 59' 38: TOlaVTa 6'.

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

90

59b 3

Not everything which is contingent is a 34-36 06&~ &" ... K.d "'>\ the subject of deliberative discourse. One. for e.'Cample. does not give advice (Td rftJ,..pov)..ti.... 59a 37) on matters such as these: potential natural endowments (,,,,;,,... 59a 35) - whether Jane is. or will be. plain or beautiful - or chance events (dnd TVX'I" 59a 35) - whether John will. or will not. fmel the treasure. We do not because this is not material for deliberation (povJ..';scr8a •• 59a 38) as A. will e."Plain at S9a 38 - 59b I; see also EE uIsa 12-15. The meaning of <pol".. and dnd T';X'l' i. explained in greater detail at 68b 33/£

a 36 :

1

ol>6c!v

2

."po lpyou

a 37 ciAA& 6;p..o~ 8uwp .. .

the adverb; ""TI is understood. See 54b 27; it occurs again at 59b 16.

Le•• dUd dijJ.O. (."TI) {In (TO "v,..povJ.." ... ,j"TI) n'el

a 38 - 5·9b I ..OLIN. . . . . . . ."pii~.. L A. presents the character of the subject matter about which there is deliberation; see 57a 24-26. 573 2 : 1 speaks of Aristotelian deliberation. As A .•ays in the passages cited there. we deliberate about the things man can do. or as .tated here at 59a 38. about things within our natural competence ("all those things so constituted by their nature is more fully exthat they fall within our competence"). d.dy."Oa••1, plained by eli. ij d~m The .ymbouleutic speeches of Demosthenes (e.g.• the O/1mhiacs) illustrate the point which A. is making. In this area we must have recourse to Demosthenes since his deliberative oratory constitutes the only specimens we possess from the Attic orators. with the exception of a speech of Andocides' (ca. 440 - ca. 390 B.C.) and one possibly from Hegesipp'" (II. 340 B.C.).

...•"TW.

",..ii,

a 39 ",EXPL ycip gives the reason for 59a 38-39: ill our deliberation the final test i. whether or not we can bring the matter 0/£ 59b 2 K..O' lK"IJ'i"acr8a.) all the topic. of deliberative di... course (nBel ... xe'lpaTtC...). one classifies them (a&aJ.dp", 81, 81d'l). i.e.• gives a scientific division of them. 2 XP'lI'-ll..(~.L~ Frequently used of public assemblies. and meaning "to deliberate" (see LS, I.z). it may also be used of law courts; see Dem .• AgaitlSt Timocrates 55 (717).

· COMMENTARY

91

b 4 &,.placlL " ....... ..-iJv \O.,,,,, I.e., define these topics according to their real nature: namely, scientifically; see Top. 105b 3D-3I.

&,," . .

0 fl>\ .... ".~.A. A. gives two reasons, both of which are contained b 5 in articular infinitives: (a) "'1fTB T;j;; e"lTOe"';j;; •.. (59b 6), and (b) no).,lq; TB nABi., ... (59b 7). The text accepted by our odd. reads 1'1f~B ..• TB; this use of the particles indicates that the reasons are coequal and corresponsive. Some codd. and editors (Spengel and Cope, for example) read ",1fTO . .• where the idea of contrast and difference is in the second member. Here ",oAlq; TB is a better reading than nollq; on the basis of the codd. and the sense itsel£ Cope, pp. 59£, has a full note on TO •.. Te, TB ••• M (see also Denniston, pp. 503, 513), and he reads no).,lq; M, saying that it "represents the sudden occurrence to the writer's mind ... that there is an important difference between the two things that are assigoed as reasons.•.."

a.

a.

I.e., such knowledge belongs to a b 6 ~flrppov.a..-£p..~ ... ciA"lJO'\lij~ discipline which is more informed about (."''Peo''~'eat;) and can more faithfully represent (d1"l8";j;;) the subject: namely, nolm'fi bna~,..n (58b 17). b 7 7tl..Iw &.&OaO .., We are not in a position to determine here what was going on in rhetorical theory. If we possessed A.'sSynagoge Technon, we might be enlightened. But we can form some idea of what plato thought was happening from a passage such as Gorg. 447-466. Indeed, !socrates with his view of education grounded in rhetoric (~ Ttli> My.,. na,6sla) could well have encouraged lesser minds to place within the study of rhetoric these many disciplines which do not belong to it, T.v. oIHE/.,. OE"e"l",aTtJJ. (59b 8); see Isocrates in Jaeger, Paideia III, or Beck. b 8 "p.s".pov i.e., 56. 25-3 I. At 56a 26 A. used a,al'''''''';j;;; here he speaks of d.alv ...~;; (59b 10). It is more likely that 560 26 refers to the Topics (see 55- 9 and 56822 : .), but at 56a 36 the word clearly refers to the Analyties (see 568 36); at 56b 10 we find d.alVT'''.v •. A. apparently uses the words interchangeably at times; see 55- 9. Rhetoric does share in the Analytics to the extent that the Analyties gives us our knowledge of syllogism and is concerned with the d.ay"aia found at 57a 22. b 10 -rij~ •.. ".A,.. ,,,ij~ see EN I094b II, I099b 25-32, II02a 5-10, II80b 28-31; ethics and politics constitute ~ "'Bel Ta ri.8edi" ..a 'P'Ao(J0'P1a, II8Ib IS. b

II

...

a. fl'" ........ &0

adverbial: "pardy ... pardy"; see 568 29 : l '

b 12 aorp,a..-,".i~ AOYO'~ Certainly rhetoric is not like sophistic because it engages in deception. Rhetoric, like dialectic, studies apparent argumentation and apparent probabilities in order to discover where they are false, not in order to use them. This, presumably, is also the intent of Spengel's

92

ARISTOTLB, IRHETORIC' I

explanation of the words (p. 83): "Quod non modo Td ,.,8avoy sed emm Td <pa ..o!'B'Po, ,,"8a.o. considerat." See ssb 15 : J, s6a 20, 56& 36 - s6b 4. At 55b 18-20 (see 5Sb 17-:n) A. explicitly distinguishes true and false rhetoric by comparing them to dialectic and sophistic respectivdy. b 13 : 1 xa8cb".p clv sc. "aTao".vdCOI; c£ S. 2464. The lI.y indicates a potential optative; at 5gb 12 the ci. is to be taken with ""eaTal, a subjWlctive representing future time. See 54& II : " 55b 25 : 2, s6a 33 : z. Cope's note z WVdP..LS here (p. 61) is strange. As ~v.a!,,,~ rhetoric and dialectic are common to all disciplines and arts, a point on which A. continually insists. It is easy to see why he does so if we take, for example, deliberative rhetoric, which he discusses in this section. One of its subjects is legislation. In order to present an analysis of this subject for use by others, a writer on rhetorical theory could easily enter into the kind of detail on law which is the domain of legal philosophy, and only of legal philosophy, certainly not of rhetoric, or dialectic, or logic. J b:u""lj p...s A. explains the meaning of tim word in what follows at 5gb 15-16. Earlier (58a 23-26) we have the same statement. Both statements point to still earlier ones: ssb 8-5), 25-34. The idea behind these statements is excellently summarized here by the words at 59b 16 which describe rhetoric as an '''"rn7J1''1 Mycu., not "eay!'aTcu.; see 59b 16 and note. b 14 xa...... crxEUd~.LV is "to furnish a thing fully with, to construct," and so here: "to establish rhetoric and dialectic." For the word see ssb 38, and 76b 3 with Cope's note, pp. 281£, where we are told that in dialectic the word is a technical term denoting the process of constructing positive argumentation. At 5gb 15 b ...."evclC,•• is "to make afresh, reconstruct." The point A. wishes to make ill using these verbs is that by establishing rhetoric and dialectic as the carriers of specific .,,'......fi!'a. (see 59b 2-8) one is thereby recolIStnJding them into these new ."...Tij!'a., and thus destroying what they essentially are: narndy, ''''''''fi",a• .ldycu., 59b 16. A. wants to say here that b 14-15 ..q. p......a~..tv.LV ... i71;u..njp... s in tire very ad of recoIlS/meting rhetoric and dialectic into other disciplines and not simply into the disciplines of language one is changing from rhetoric and dialectic to those other disciplines. For this reason I believe that ",6'afJa!•••• '"" ..".vdCcu. el~ must be taken closely together as a compendious expression, for it is the only structure which will give sense. First of all ",.Tapa!• .,•• l~, or ent. is a common usage in A. But bUC1~evdCw" slt; is acceptable to Bonitzr Index (b.......vclC...) and to LS for our passage, although Cope, p. 61, has reservations about the usage. If we accept ",'Tapa!.... el~, but not '", ..".vaCow .k, then we are faced with the fact that at the end of the sentence ,Uld

COMMENTARY

93

,..~

My,,)?, i.e., ,...Tapal,... • I~ l1"trr",..a~ My",. makes no sense in the context. For if the person constructs dialectic and rhetoric correctly, he is not chang;lIg over to them at all, and Cope, p. 62, accepts this. Therefore I would interpret: "he will unwittingly destroy their real nature by changing over to A"""Tfi,..al of particular subjects in the effort to reconstruct (rhetoric and dialectic) into 1"'''Tii,..ul of particular subjects and not simply into rnl"'ii,..a. of language."

b IS ~"OK""'.""'V

See S5a 36 :

2.

'",,,,,,,..a,

b I6 : 1 AOY"'" i.e. (from s9b IS), .l~ My",.; see 59b I3 : J. As has becu said a number of times (see 54& II : 1 s. fine, and SSb 8 : 2; see also 74b I2), it seems more than clear that rhetoric for A. is the art oflanguage as used in discourse with another. One can only add by way of further confirmation the observation of Sextus Empiricus (fl. A.D. I7S-200), who held no brief for rhetoric, as he held none for many other things. In his work Aga;'''t the Rhetors he remarks at 6: "Xenocrates, a disciple of Plato's, said that 'rhetoric is the science, that is, the art, of good speech' [rn,,,,,,,..'1' Tali .J Aiy.... .. T~O rnltrr",..'1v la,..Pd,oVTo~ ... dOTl Tii~ Tixv'l~l." He continues in 8: "Aristotle in the first of his books on the art of rhetoric describes rhetoric more simply as 'the art of speech' [c!:n:lo.lu"eov ... TtXV'1' Myw,]." 2 a"",~ liE oall A. intends to speak of those subjects usefully determined (ned leyov ... dIBl•••) as far as the study of deliberative rhetoric is concerned, but the larger examination (.lnol.&.., ""..,..) of them belongs to political science. {J"a serves as the object of aIBA.iv and the subject of ~"oA.&. ... b I9 ciyopeUoUO'LV Used here possibly in its first meaning of "to speak in the assembly"; but at S4&22 and at 74a 20 it means "to proclaim.'" i.e., the most common and important b 20 ....ok "'olyu,.... 11 ••• "tv..... subjects are five, and they are discussed between S9b 23 and 60a 37 (see analysis of chapter) "briefly but with a sagacity which is astonishing" (Roberts, Greek Rhetor;c, p. 27). In Xen. Menwrnbilia 3.6.4-I3 there is a list of subjects about which the prospective statesman, in Socrates' mind, must be informed. They correspond with A.'s list, save that Socrates omits legislation, i.e., A.'s ,0,..08."la (60a I8-37). For example, we find in Xenophon: neo"odOl,S (our s9b 23-32); "dAe,..o\", 8 (our s9b 33 - 60a S); " 'I'1'Aa"oj 'ii~ x';'ea~, 10 (our 60a 6-n); TdQ1'Ve6,a-a;:TO~J 12-13 (somewhat similar to our60a12I7). In the work of Anaximenes (on whom, see Studies, pp. 7S-77) I423a 20-29, we are given a list of seven subjects, of which only four correspond more directly with A.' s list. This is typical of what takes place in later rhetoricians on this matter: they do not follow A.'s list too closely; see Spenge1, p. 84, for some examples.

94

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

h 23 ..op,",v There is a work traditionally ascribed to Xenopbon (ca. 430 - ca. 354 B.C.) on Athenian finances ("oel "tie"") which carries into detail some of the ideas mentioned here. The problem of revenue is a recurring theme in Demosthenes: e.g .• 01. I.29-20; Philippics I.]2-33; On the Symlllories 24-30. See also Anaximenes 1425b 2I-]5.

h 24 GUI-'fjOUAEUE'V

On the present instead of the future. see S. 1959'; some codd. read avl'{Jov). ••".... as does Cope.

h 25-32 'L'{"E~ XIII ",6..",•... Wl-'/3OUA>\V Tbese are the particular topics, the o! Kassel; Spengel. Cope do not read it. However, Cope's comment (p. 72) on the word is quite interesting in the light of 59b 25-32: ''Understand Tel, "eoTC1us. 13 - 62a 1~

deB'" will

be discussed more properly in chap. 9

i.e., both as individuals and in society; see 60b 4: 1 151, ... xo,v'ii aIso 610 8. We have the same idea at EN ID94b 7-8: TauTo. iaTi' bl "al "0';". z CJXo",;~ practically the same as Ttl.., in this metaphorical use: "the end, the object," that on which one fixes one's gaze; see Plato, Gorg. 507d.

104

AllISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

b 5 at; ClTox"'l;o"'.... a' vov,; C£ 55a 17, 62a 15. b 6: 1 b xc&Il'p.o,,11l In EN 1095a I2-30 A. indicates that ordinary people and philosophers differ in their understanding of what constitutes .~da.,..o.[a. In what follows there to 1102a 4, he examines the concept philosophically, returning to the problem at II 53 b 9-21 and again at 11760 30 II79b 23; see Gauthier & Jolif; L' Ethique Nicoln"que II. What we are given in the Rhetoric is the explanation of .~da.,..o.[a as it is commonly understood by the people together with an incorporation of some of the philosophical ideas which appear in EN. • ""..... &i) Spenge! suggested (followed by Brandis and Cope) that the form lrn;w d>i, used a number of times in this and the following book in giving a defmition, indicates the popular (see 69b 31-32) rather than the scientific character of the definition and that when the definition is precise and Inore scientific, Ian ,,~ is more common (SpecimetJ commentariOTum, p. 16). The evidence for such usage, however, is really not adequate. The definition of rhetoric at 55b 25 is quite precise, and indeed one can agree with Roberts that it possesses "scientific exactitude" ("Notes," 358). It is interesting that Spengel does not repeat this interpretation in his commentary. For Cope's

a

106

60b 20

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 1

view on definitions in the Rheto,ic, see his Introtl., pp. 12-14. Cope's critique is generolly unfavorable to A. and can be misleading insofar as none of the definitions which Cope mentions is substantially incompetent. 00. this matter of definition in the Rheto,ic, see 69b 31 and 69b 33 : 1. :1 Ei>71:pal;la See Pol. 7.1, especially I323b 21-32 where the argument is that "the happiness of a State, like that of an individual, cannot exist apart from the moral and intellectual virtues, and action in accordance with them." Compare 1325b 12-16 with this passage. At I325a 321[ we come upon the genuine Aristotelian doctrine that happiness is an activity. We also frnd this traditional identification of B~"'ea~la with ~6a,po7{a in Plato, Charm. 172a; see Tuckey, pp. 73-'76. 4 a?...tipxE'.. See EN 1097b 7-21, II770 27 - II77b 4. In both these passages (chap. 5 of Book I; chap. 7 of Book IO) A. attempts to refine the concept of eMa'po.la. In the course of his discussion in book 10 (chaps. 7-1O) we meet the first two definitions of eMa'po.!a mentioned in our Rhetoric passage: namely, e~",a~la and a~Tae"Bla. Our fourth definition (.,)8'1/.la) does not appear at all, and our third (Plo~ i16,aTo~) only indirecdy, and Dot reolly in our meaning here (c£ chap. 8 of Book IO). In the analysis of e~da.po.la which follows in the Rhetoric, 60b 19 - 62a I2., A. explicidy mentions only two of the rour definitions - aurae" ••a (60b 23) and Plo~ pera. aa'l'alel~ (60b 28) - and then only in passing. Instead, he uses the ideas implicit in the four definitions in his analysis. 1 ..... (Ioti......" Superficially this wonld seem to mean "slaves," and some so interpret it: "an abundance of possessions and slaves." But the word is not ordinarily used absolutely in this sense until the third century B. c. A more likdy expression for such an interpretation is found at 61a r4. aOOpa is Dot used in this way in the Rhetoric and the one passage which is quite close to this one, 83b 1-2, does not submit to this interpretation. It seems better to take both plurals as plurals used to refer to asingleidea (S. IOOO); "a thriving state of property and body." 2 6uvti(loEfd; M.ap,~ here has the meaning whicll we find at 6ra 2 and 62b 25, i.e., power, ability; on the general notion of 66.ap,~, see 5.fa II : 1.

b r6:

b 17 'yc"E.av... t"...,v Omitting the bracketed lines 60b 23-24, 11 "al ... a"''I'eOau.''I., as the edd. do, we have twenty-two ple'1/: of e~da'po.la:

b 20-29

60b 30

COMMBNTAlIY

I07

,a.

(0) the first I6, from .tlri•• to dQBTIj. (60b 23), are what A. calls ,,4 ,,' i. atlTq; draB& at 60b 24 and they include the draB& of (i) the soul, and (ii) the body (60b 26); (b) to these I6 he adds 6 more at 60b 26-29 from stlyi•• ,a to

"'X7J"

These comprise T4 I"Td~ draO& (60b 25).

This tripartite division of draBd into (i) Ta ".el !p1IX~., (ii) Ta "Bel uwpa, and (iii) "a bm$~ is also used in EN I098b I2-I5 and in Pol. I323a 24-27. It is aIso found in Plato, Laws 697b, 717C, Philebus 48d-e, Aldb. I 130a; and in Anaximenes 1422a 7-II. Cicero reports that this division was common to the Peripatetics and Academics (Tusc. 5.30.85, De fin. 3.13.43, Partit. orat. 22.74). It should be noticed that of the "externaldya8d" two (stlri •••a, ".poj) are also mentioned under the "internal dyaO&." Three "external dra8d" are quite siruilar to the "internal draOd": 'Pilo, to nolv'P.lia, xe"UT0'P.lIa; xe.}paTa to "lo;;To~; to .tlruXia; only one stands alone: dv.dp.,~. In what follows in the chapter A. speaks on .11 the pie" but he combines five of the extemal dra8d with their similars from among the internal. The order of presentation does not follow the order of 60b 2()-29, yet A. does keep the "excellences of the body" together and in the same oroer, e.g., 61b 3-26. Since all the pie" are mentioned in the chapter, they will be ",,:plained, when necessary, as they occur.

"'X7J

b 21

O[OV...

ciyto>v,..... 'x.qv

Ross, alone of the edd., encloses this in

parentheses. b 23-24 III x"l ........ rppoaOv'lv] Roemer, Spenge!, and Cope do not print these lines in the text; the other edd. bracket them, and rightly so, it would seem, in the light of A.'s comment at 62a I 3-14. b 23

",:,.."pxt....." ..

o,

Ross alone of the edd. conjectures a ".~ after

this word; possible, not necessary.

&Wei"."

These are not specified. From the context, it is clear b 27 that as an external dra06., they would have to be the powers which an individual possesses within the civil or social structure of the State. & such they are not powers or capacities radicated in a man's nature. They are dv.dps., by analogy, capacities or powers conferred on a person which are in no way dependent on his 'Pou", e.g., the powers enjoyed by an appointed or elected civil oflicial. b 28-29 011,"" y/tp av . . . (alo, d'l This is the reading of four edd., Spengd, and Cope; Ross, without giving any reason, reads differently. This is divided into good birth as it pertains to the b 30 : 1 e6yevE'" State (60 ... - ,,61.., 60b 3()-33) and to the individual (ldlq;, 60b 33-37). We

108

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

60b 38

find a number of the qualities of e{}yi.stu mentioned here in Plato, Menex. 2>37 and in Isoer., Paneg. 2>3-2>5. " ...0 c:t6dX9ovClS See Herod. 1.171-17'- on the Carians, Caunians; on Athens, see Thucyd. 1.2>.5-6; Dem., Embassy 261; Isoer., Panathen. U4; and Eur., 1011 29£, 589£, 735--738. This is the first constituent of a State's e{}yi...a. The other two are renown,d rulers and distinguished descendants of these rulers. Athens certainly (and the other Creek no}, .., as well) would make such claims. b 31

ijy."OVIIS ••. ",p':' ..OUS

C£ S. II59.

b 32 : 1 Y.YOVEVIIL is the verb for both >1YE!'o.a, and "o},},o~,. The infmitive is probably articular with the TO of 60b 30 understood; see Dem. 01. 1.10, or Goodwin, Syntax, p. 806. Or Olle may take it as a simple infinitive, as was done with ei6s1·at at 60a 3 I : 1. "",,[ i.e., "resting on," "distinguished for things which are held in esteem"; see also 60b 35 and 6:zb 2>2 : 2. b 33 : 1 Uil~ In Pol. U94" 20-2>'-, 130lb 3-4 A. defmes the ''''yi...a of individuals as flowing from established wealth and excellence (our 60b 35). The definition of the Rhetoric is far more detailed. In Helen 44, Isocrates cal1s l-vyiveta an "eternal patrinlony.u " Ii",' Iiv5pcdv In Evagoras 13-19, 71--72>, Isocrates e:'(emplifies for Evagoras (ca. 435-374/3 B.C.), prince of Salamis in Cyprus, most of the points which A. makes in 60b 34-37. b 34 YV'lClLo..'1S Ii,,' 1i"'P0Lv i.e., citizenship from both parents (Ii, a!''Poi. acnoi.).-· The rules for citizenship were determined by the constitution of the city-state and could vary. For a discussion of the Creek idea of citizenship, see Ehrenberg, Greek State, pp. 28-102>. b 35-36 .. oUS .... ·• "LfI.!""EVWV This is the reading accepted by four of the edd., Spenge!, and Cope.· Ross alone reads after n!'wpi.OJ. from the Fragmentum Monace.se and accepts Bywater's conjecture of '" before TOV, Te. In this way he sets up an articular infinitive to paralle! 60b 30-3 J.

,l.a,

The text, however, is secure.

i.e., t't.P£: "any other." b 38 : 1 ":;..."V[CI 50 ,,"l 7.>'o..p,ii'>aCl' mediately as the right to give or to sell (what one possesses); on the use of the infinitive with I",' aVT<ji ii, see S. 1984-1985. Kassel claims that WlCOrrected cod. A reads an articular infinitive and so he read, T& cinallaTu,wO'a •• z ij ",>i In the codd. these words appear after aEx"a .r.a. (so Ross, Kassel, and Cope). The other edd. transpose them to follow cinallaTu.waa,. There is no reason why we carmot read with the codd. a 23-24 3>.c.>S &E ••• ...>.oil..oS

See 6la 12-24-

a 24 >i tv"py£'Cl • . . XCll >i xpija,s This statement explains what immediately precedes, /lJ.w, ... "8"f~a8a. (61a 23): namely, that wealth actually resides in use, not in possession. In saying that wealth is ~ l.iuy..a TW. To.avTCu. A. means that wealth is the actualization (l.iuyeta) of the potentialities (fW' fo.aVf«>. used as at 6[a 5), i.e., the elements of wealth (money, land, etc.) which he set forth at 6xa uf( These elements (PiU'1'

61a 32

COMMENTARY

II3

61a 12) represent wealth as 66.a,..~: they are elements necessary for wealth to come into existence. Potentially they are wealth, but they are not wealth in actuality. When they are actualized by being used, then, and only then, are they wealth. Thus lj ••lel'•• a "allj lCeiia.~ should be interpreted: "the actualization, or use ["at corrective, S. 2870), of such elements." 1 dJ&o~11l This is the Mea of 60b 22. • <mou&lliov i.e., respected: "of being held in universal respect." A number of the senses of the word are at work here, e.g., (0) "good or excellent in its kind," as opposed to <pavAo. (bad, inellicient); (b) "morally good," as opposed to "o'~e&~, e.g., "a good man [anovdaiod is good from possessing virtue" (Cat. rob 7). Like that of S""B",7j~ (reasonable, equitable, good), the specific meaning of cmov6aio, must frequendy come from the context. See 67b 21 and 67b 2I : ••

a 25 :

a 26 ....0'0;;-.:611 .... ' The meaning here is partially determined by anD".. daiD', to which it rel.i:rs. Thus, it will be something which elicits respect. We can gather an idea of what such a thing might be from what follows at 61. 28 - 61b 2. There he speaks of ....,.7j which is a sign that one possesses a favorable reputation as one who does the good; C£, for example, 6ra 3¢: a 27 t\YIl801 ... 'PpOII'fI.O'

a 28 :

See 63a 17 and note.

,fI.>1

See 60b 22. • '"Ifl.tiioll See 57b I : 2. 3 £(,£py..... ,,,ij; .u&o~I..; "of a good reputation for doing good"; c£ 66a 38. Socrates in Apol. 36c explains his effort at eVeel'Baia. 1

....

,.e.

a 29 : 1 1;'"..Iw; fl.EII here is answered by the adversative oV ,..;,. dAAIi, where ,.7j> stresses that the fact stated in its clause coexists with the preceding statement which is opposed to it. See Denniston, pp. 334-35, 29; see also Plato, Gorg. 449b. Note the tense of e~Be1'8~"&"'B>, and therefore the contrast with the answering clause. 2 KClt p.ciAIO''Ta. "and above all"; take with d£xalQ)'. 3 ou fl."" oi1.l.ci "not but that"; see Denniston, pp. 28-30, with which compare LS, dAAa, II.5. a 30 " ..loa.. sc. I'o, five events: running. jumping, discus. javdin throwing. wrestling. It was one of the contests at Olympia and at the other festivals. Simonides mentions the five events in an epigram; see Hiller & Crusius. no. 133. On Greek athletics, see Harris. b II: 1 ",po~ ... ",...,uKexcr." We saw this usage at 55a 16; the perfect is intransitive and passive in meaning: "to be formed or disposed by nature," and therefore "to have a natural capacity for." Since the natural capacity is for the two qualities which constitute ,,"llo, (6Ib 9). the pentathletes are called "dll.aTo. (6rb 10). a 4x,,"ci~ov"O"o~ sc. from 6rb 7-8: "dllo, [~I1T!] Td xe~a.,..o. 6x.,. TO aoo,..«- A. frequently engages in this kind of brachylogy (as we have seen)

n6

6Ib 24

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

in which words or phrases must be supplied dnd yoo.,o;; from a previous statement. "to have the reputation [LS, 11.51 of being pleasant b 12 .r...,,, &o".i... as well as fear-inspiIing." b 13

YEP""""O~

See 6xb II :

2.

b 14 eli... i.e., 1",1,,,,, ii Td rijea~ A",plirat: "which disfigure old age." 25-27: "Freedom from pain in old age is preferable to freedom See Top. from pain in youth for it is more important in old age."

II.,..

generic: either person or thing. Although A.' s thought in b r 5 g.....pov this section (6rb 3-26) is dominated by the idea of athletics (see in particular 6Ib 23-26), still to give as the general norm of strength one's ability to lift, push, pull another person is not particularly reasonable. We have no reason to make A. say it, especially since he describes the ,,1'1JC1'~ of another person or thing in partially similar terms in the Physics 243a II-IS (OCT edition). b 17 ",aaLv .......Lalv

The datives are instrumental; see S. 1516.

b IS ....0 ':''''.pq.LV is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd. Ross, however, reads ro ""tieze .. with Bywater, and pe,Co,' (presumably pelCo.a) for peleo•• at 6rb 20. With the reading of the codd. the interpretation is: "Excellence in size is the pre-emmence which belongs to one superior to the many with respect to height, compactness, and breadth, to such an extent that bodily movements are not retarded because of the superiority." b"2I

ciYWVLGTtXiJ

i.e., "competitive excellence in a body."

b 22 " ..I ......Xou~ read with the codd. by Dufour, Tovar, Ross, and Cope. Spenge! bracketed it and is followed by Roemer and Kassel. Sponge! believes that the next clause stating that swifmess belongs to strength and the fact that A. did not include swiftness among the deeral of the body indicate that the words were not written by A. Possibly so; but I would read the words, and not accept Cope's strictures on careless writing in the Hal rtie clause. The "al rtie can introduce an explanation justifiably added by A. in the effort to clarify the mention of rax~~. b 23

p""....iv

Cope's note here on a difference between

tim..", and

el"Tru is not correct; see, for example, Jebb on Aja" 239.

b 24: 1 'Ked 'ROpPW Cope, p. 92, translates ~''''B''JI noeew as Uta take long strides." More likely the whole phrase should be interpreted: "move quickly and over a distallce." Most Greek running was at 200 yards and above; see Harris, pp. 64ff.

6rb 29

Il7

COMMENTARY

6po",'x6~, .. : 1. 2

b 2j oi"''o~ See 6Ib ro, 6Ib II : 1. Since boxing was not one of the events, Cope (p. 89) finds it very difficult to understand how A. can include it. Since A. does not mention javelin throwing or the discus, it would is simply a generalizing use and indicates the overall exappear th.t cellence found in the pent.thlete. "a happy old age; happiness in old age"; see Isoer., b 27 : 1 eUY'IP(CI Evag. 7r on the idea. 2 ~pIl6,,-rIj~ i.e., "growing old gradually" (the idea is aptly expressed by the expression: "to grow old gracefully''). A. discusses the causes of a long and short life in animals and plants in a separate treatise called "On the Longness and Shortness of Life " (464b r9 - 467b 9) which forms part of his work Parva naturalia.

"Ii",

.ijY'lP"'~ the adjective; all the cdd. save Tovar read .iI"'1ew~. ",6y,~ a rare word in Attic prose (save for Plato). The more common form, "o).,~, is used by Demosthenes and generally by A. In our

b 28 :

1

2

"0",,

is interpreted: "if olle grows old scarcely at all." This of course passage .picks IIp Peadvn), ,,~eW,.; therefore: "if one grows old slowly indeed, yet with

pain." 3 ~"""V

The subject is .oY'1~{a.

b 29 xlll -rox'l~ is the reading of the codd. and four edd., Spenge!, and Cope. Ross co.yecrures nlX'1\" b 29-31 "'lJ civOIfO~ ... &""",£LVE'ev civ As far as the reading at 6rb 3r is concerned: (a) all the edd., Spenge!, and Cope read Muret's palmary emendation a~BV nlX'1, for UV BOTVX*; (b) Cope, Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar bracket O"T'; Spenge! (p. 98), Ross, and Kassel read in its place Roth's conjecture oO~. If one writes out th, Greek for 6rb 29-3 I without accent, punctuation, and word division, one can see how dv BOTVX~' came about and why a negative idea (OilT') was then demanded. As far as the punctuation of the passage at 61 b 30 is concerned: Cope, Dufour and Tovar place a comma after a..... a8*; Spenge!, Ross, and Kasse! place it after aAV"o,. But a change ill punctuation here alters the mC'.I1ling of the passage. A. here is explaining the statement which immediately precedes: name!y, that happiness in old age comes from the excellences of the body and from good fortune. Ifwe (a) read iJ..sv ruX'1, and bracket OilT' -there being no need for a negative

liS

ARISTOTLE,

r RHETORIC'

[

61b 37

idea (itis already contained in the conjunction ",Jd' at61b 30) - and (b) place a comma after dna81j" our lines explain the previous statement in this way: (I) a..0. Spengel and Cope use parentheses in this sentence. But if parentheses are used they must be used with discrimination. The structure of the sentence is clear: there is (a) a causal clause, composed of l".1 all ... avfJ/Pseov (62) 17IS) and TO 6. (fVfJ/pBeOV dya86v (62a 20); and (b) its conclusion, A'InTi,. •.. d,,}.we; (62a 2C>-2I); with (c) the intervening clause, PoVJ.stlovTa, •.• ned~s.e; (62. IS-2.0), providing a reason for the causal clause. As Ross punctuates wing parentheses - (POvJ.etlovTa • ... aya86.) - this logical sequence is destroyed. I have since noted that Van Straaten &: De Vries (p. 147) find difficulty with what Ross includes in parentheses. Kassel concludes the parenthesis correctly at "ed~..,: (PovAstlwra • ... "ed~.. c;). a 17

"ii>

CIU!'(j.OU).WOV", • • . CIU!''P-25, S8b S-29.

... IS : 1 ax01l, which is not strong evidence; see 60b 14 : 2. A. expresses a view on definitions at 69b 3I-32, on which see 69b 31.

a ZI -.6:zb 9 ila'<W &iJ ..• ,dp£'«i ......'v A. sets down in 62a 21-34 a series of basic defInitions of the good as he intends to discuss it. He follows this (still by way of general introduction) with 6za 34 - 6zb 9 wherein he draws from the definitions a series of conclusions upon which he builds the analysis which follows in chaps.6-'7. The conclusions. are: (a) the acquisition of good, or deliverance from evil, is good both absolntely and relatively; (b) virtues are good; (c) pleasure is good. Commentators stress the practical character of the definitions and the examples derived from them. In doing so they imply (or state) that the defInitions really are expedient methods to achieve an end proposed - namely, success in deliberative rhetoric - and not analyses of ...o dya8o.. This is incorrect. In their substance the definitions and the instances drawn from them are correct. The fact that the specific particular topics developed from the definitions may not, as stated, be absolutely and universally valid simply points to the practica1 character of the analyses. A. would admit this, as he does at 62b 291£ His objective, however, is not a philosophical analysis of the good bnt the presentation of basically valid focal points from which to examine whether one's subject can be considered uu,..",4eo, - dya80.. In this respect Finley's observation (p. 35n52) on the working principles in the Rhetoric is quite to the point.

n III.".,.

a 22 : 1 Ii iiv ... ,dp£..-6v See BE 1248b 18-19; Plato, philebus zod,22b. 2 "",l aU See Plato, Gorg. 49ge, which is somewhat echoed by Philebus 54c-i At 62a 37-38 we read that "The acquisition of a greater good in place of a lesser. and of a lesser evil in place of a greater. is a good." Our present sentence explains why: "for that by which 'the greater' exceeds 'the lesser' constitutes the measure of [..ounp ,,(,sT,,"1 the acquisition of the one [the greater good) and the loss of the other [the greater evil)." In short. the measure whereby good is increased. or evil diminished. is itself a good. I am reading at 62b I TOU..ep with cod. A. Spengd. Dufour. Tovar. and Ross. Roemer and Kassd read TOUT01l with Vahlen following Muret. I see no critical diiference between ..oU...ep "loBT"". "in this measuTe consists the acquisition of the one. the loss of the other." and ..OU...1I "loBTal. "the acquisition of the one and the loss of the other belotlgs to this measure of difference." Vablen discusses the passage in "Kritik arise. Schriften" (p. I04). giving Murot's translation: "nam quo minus a maiore superatur. eius fit. boni quidem sumptio. mali autem depulsio." Roberts offers translations for the three possible readings ...OtlTep. TOtlT01l. ..O;;TO in R/letorica. p. [2S). b 2-3 "a, ...m~ 2I - 62b 9.

...

.rva,

b 3-S "a........ 1>'I....ov within p=theses.

the second conclusion as oudined in 62& Ross alone of the edd. places these words

b 3 .u .... &"i".,v...a, See 62& 26 : 2; the possession of the virtues llI2kes one all that one should be. Although the moral (>18"",,") virtues seem more prominent. it is clear from what follows shordy in the chapter that A. is not excluding the physical excellences. b 4 "0''1'"'''''''' "p.." ...." ..! "and further [..a-""l) the virtues ..•• There is a diiference between "ol"lulc; and "eMlc;. for. as A. says (Pol. I2S4a S). al"cpl.esl Bra... "0"" is "to llI2ke something"; its end is the production of something (e.g., poems are !1I:O"7fJQTa). neane", is "to act," and its end is the action itsel£ Both these ideas are at work here: e.g.• in "ol"lTl""i. the virtues as productive of other goods; in ore"".... the virtues as specifying

""i.

COMMENTARY

127

one's action, making one the doer of good things. This distinction appears to be present in the use of the words at 60b II-I3, 6Ib 37, 62a 27. b 5 X... pl~ p1Jdov

e.g., chap. 9.

b 6 -1jSo~-Ij~ the third conclusion as outlined in ~ 21 - 62b 9. On pleasure, see 69b 33 : " and Books 7 and 10 of EN where we are told that pleasure is a good, but not the supreme good. b 6-7 ,.ci~.... y"p ... j6ia. "IIIA....~ Cope suggests with some justification that in 62b 8-9 we have a division of HaA .. into physical beauty (that which is >jdBa, 62b 9) and moral beauty (that which is "a6' la" ...d ale ....d). Perhaps excellence, or goodness, might be a more appropriate term than beauty. Certainly the moral aspect of HaA.~ is apparent in the definition which we are given ofit at 66a 33-34. especially when read in the light of A.'s discussion of "aA.v in EN II69a 6-35. Physical goodness or excellence is more obviously the source to the senses of what is pleasant and delightful. But that which is honorable and noble (TO "aA&v as virtue, the touchstone of what becomes a man in the Socratic dialogues of Plato) is more clearly that which is desirable in and for itself as the goal of one's actions: e.g., "It is fur the honorable that the brave man endures and acts as courage directs" (EN IIISb 23-24; see also III3b 6-r3). b 8 : 1 .... I'tv 2

..Ow S~

b 9 "..0' l .." ..ci b 10 : 1 "..0' ill 7:

See S!}a 21. "individually"; on the absolute infinitive, see

ssa

1.

2 £1lS..,I'OV(.. See 60b 6 : 3 and 60b 14 : 1. We are told here at 62b II-I2 that s(,da'/Jovla has three qualities. These are the same qualities assigned to it at EN I097b 20-21 where, after a long discussion on what is the highest good, A. concludes that it apparendy is .~6a'/Jo.la for it seems to be: (a) T.fA"ov, our xa6' aUTO a!~'T.v (on which see r097a 3I - I097b 6); (b) a6Taext~, our aVTae"S'i (c) TWV neax:TW1' 1'£10" our IVBxa a,lroti (on which see I097b 16-20).

b II : 1

..ij....p".~

See 62a 27 : 1.

z ..u..oG This is the reading of the codd., four edd., Spenge!, and Cope. Ross reads a~Tii' (Spengel thought it should be read). However, a~To;; is quite acceptable since the neuter pronoun can refer to masculine or feminine substantives, as e.g., in Plato, Meno 73C; see Gildersleeve, Synta,,:, II 501.

u8

AD.ISTOTLB, ':aBBTORIC' I

b 12-28 6,x..'o~ ... xo'vii la·..." At 60b 19-29 (see 60b 20-29) A. gave us twenty-two parts of wda.",o.ia divided into three categories. Keeping in mind what was said of that division in 60b 20-29 we can see now that he follows the division in a limited way, e.g., draBa (a) of the soul: 62b 12-14; (b) of the body: 62b 14-18 ; (c) external: 62b 18-22. But after tbis, at 62b 22-28, A. reverts to what could be more properly considered internal goods (of the soul and body), concluding with TO di"a.o. (62b 28) which picks up the initial dyaO&., 6."a.ocnho1J (62b 12). None of the draBd of the soul mentioned in 62b 12-14 is mentioned at°60b 2(>-29. The two draM of the body noted here (1Iyi..a. "dUo,) are mentioned at 60b 20-29. of the external draBa only our rpilo, (62b I9) and T'",.j (62b 20) could be included among the clearly stated external draM of 60b 20-29. Plato's MenD 87e-88e carries an interesting parallel with many of the draBd mentioned in our 62b 12-28. b 12: 1 ttOllci is read by the codd. and edd., save Kassel; I am not sure that Kayser's conjecture (TilUa) is correct, though it is attractive. 2 6,x..,ooNv'l .•. l'.ycO..o1tpm.,.. A. repeats these moral virlUes and adds to them at 66b 1-3. All are given more detailed attention there, and in Books 3, 4. and 5 of the Nicomachean Ethics; for the references, see 66b 2. 3 dv8pd.. See 6Ia 3 : 2. 4 ""''PPOoNv'l See 66b 13, 660 2: 2. S I'EycO.."""'X I.. See 66b 17. b 13 : 1 l'eycO..o1tpol1t.,,, See 66b 18 : 2. 2 .. t ... gli:E~ In that part of the soul whichA.calls TO de,,.T"'''. -;- i.e., the appetitive part - there are three elements: ",d8'1, dvo';'",•• ,. lOBI,. The lEel, are stable dispositions which direcdy affect the dvvd",e., and indirecdy the dO'l, which are transitory motions proceeding from the dvvd",•• ,. These stable dispositions, or habits, are acquired by the person usually as the result of repeated acts. They are imposed upon those 6vv';'",.., which are able to be disposed one way or another since they are not already determined by nature. Thus a habit, shapes a faculty, d~va",.,. in a certain, stable way; when it disposes this power in a way proper to man it is called a virtue, UeBT07. The moral virtues (which are the ones mentioned at 62b 12-13) perfect the appetitive powers of the soul and under the guidance of rpeO'71au; (an intellectual virtue) effect an actual tending toward genuine human good. The moral virtues, as virtues, are "elective habits." 1,£1.(; neOa'eSTr.Kat. They assimilate the person to the standard of human goodness, a standard which is detemrined by nothing else save the objective good proper to man as man. Although it is not the ground for this analysis, the fact is that a careful reading of EN n03a 14 - II03 b 25 will find echoes of many of these comments.

iE."

129

COMMENTARY

b 14 : 1 "yiE'" 3

"ci7.Ao~

3

...& ...

C£ 61 b 3-6. C£ 61b 7-14. e.g., 60b 2C>-22

0',.;:;.....

(.vye••• a•

... dy",••"",,~.).

,,,.1l

b 15 : 1 'l'l:0''1... is the reading of the codd. and the edd., save Ross. We should read with the codd.; compare Ross's reading here with 62b I I : 2. z '1'1:0''1...,,,..1 'l'l:oAA&Iv i.e., dya8". as indicated for Ilyleta at 62b 15-18 and for "aAA.~ at 61b 7-14. b 16 &,0 ",d cip"I'''ov See B 21, 94b 13: d.6el 6' -dy.al.... c'1e'''T&' BaT". This same idea appears in EN 1099a 27 where A. identifies it as a Deli." epigram; see also BE 12140 1-5. We also find it in Theognis' (fl. 544-541 B.C.) degies (II. 255£, ed. Young). A. gives us two reasons why health is considered to be the best of all good things: 62b 17-18. n>.oG...o~

See 6ra 12-24 and notes. This defInition of wealth is at variance with the idea expressed earlier (see 6Ia 12-24, 6xa 24) that wealth, though it requires possession, resides in the use of what one possesses, not simply in the possession of it. Cope's note, p. 104, explains how A. can call ",A.GT.~ the demj "T~"'Q)~ but not how he can give this defInition in the light of 61a 24 where it is really the deBT>! X~".Q)' (which would be a tempting reading here with ".''1T'''.' ".AA ...).

b 18 :

1

z dPE..-li ••• " ...1\cr.... ~

b 19 :

1 cpi>.o~ " ..I cpLAt.. See 61b 35-38 and 6Ib 37 : 1. Z " ..0' lI,hllv .. lpE...6~ The friend as defined in 61b 36-37 is

obviously someone "desirable for his own sake"; since this is so, he is an dya8&., in the light of the dcfmition given at 62a 22. b 20:

See 6u 28 - 61b 2. See 61a 25-27. As we see in 61a 28lf., TlI'~ refers to external honors of every kind bestowed upon a person, whereas 6&E.. (6ra 25-27) is the esteem and repute in which one is hdd by others. 1

""1-'1\

z &61;11

b 21 : 1 ""...oi~ is the reading of the codd., four edd., Spengd, and Cope. Ross alone reads atiTa'~, following a suggested conjecture of Spengd's; however, see 62b II : z. z c:.~ t'l'l:l ..... 'l'l:oM For the meaning, see 5'79- 34 : 3. b 22 :

1

"'0 "'I'I:"PJ(E'V

The subject of d".A• .,8 ••; it means "the actual

possession, the actual presence. n Z Up' oI~ The antecedent of or, is an understood a.ha, the subject of the articular infInitive tlndex..... '"l with the dative in this usage gives the reas.n for the honor paid; see Eucken, Sprachgebrallch, p. 52.

T.

13 0

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

3 or~ For Tll't} these would be such things as those mentioned at 6ra 34fL For M~a they would be personal qualities which win the esteem ofmeo. 4 ... The subject is most probably "men"; less preferable would be Tll't}, ~6Ea. In the latter case the verb should be translated: "are

,"""'v.....,

prized." 5 &UvClflo'~ ,<eN l.ty£'v aptly expressed in Phoenix' words to Acbilles, niad 9.443. Homer's words, in Jaeger's mind (Paid,ia, I 8; and see all of chap. I), bear witness to a "new ideal of human perfection." Cic., De orat. 3-16.59, speaks of such men as Themistocles and Pericles "qui ••. propter ancipitem, quae non potest esse seiuncta, faciendi dicendique sapientiam. florerent." b 22-28 &UvClflo'~... i ....'v Up to this point there has been an order in the presentation of these goods, e.g., (a) goods of the soul (62b 12-14), (b) goods of the body (62b 14-18), (e) external goods (62b 18-22). Here we shift back to what are more properly internal goods (some of which are d".dI'B'" 62b 25). The rdation between this group of internal goods and the goods of the soul and body at 62b 12-18 is revealed by the mention of TO (62b 26), which echoes 62b 16, and the inclusion of TO M"a,o. (62b 28), which repeats ~.,.a,o"O", at 62b 12 to which it is closely related (as we can see from 67a 20). See 62b 12-28. The root idea of the word "well-grown" gives a clue b 24 : 1 eU'f>\ItCl to its use as denoting natural goodness in general (see EN 1II4b 8-I2) or good qualities, whether of the body, mind, or person (in the last case it would be the moral qualities of the person). From the context here and the use of the ward at 63a 35, and B 15, 90b 28, as well as at Top. 163b 13-15, and u8a 22-23, it seems to refer more direcrly to the mind and to mean quiclcness, cleverness, of intellect. See Cope, p. !O5, for further references. 2 fIoV>\fIolJ This correction of Victorius' for the codd. I"nl'a, is read by the edd., but not by Spongel or Cope. Since the enumeration in which it occurs lists individual faculties in the singular, and since A. is obviously talking about the faculty of memory, the correction is quite reasona?Ie.. CoP." reads the pl~ with the codd. and gives a competent explanation, I.e., acts ofmemory. 3 eUfIoci8£,.. See Plato, el,arm. 159d-e. z cl:YX'VO'CI "shrewdness, sagacity, quick wit," the ability to apprehend a problem at once; see Plato, Charm. lOOa where it is called

en.

",OTT}'

T', Tn' "",Vi,·

b 25

&\lVciflo£'~

See 60b 16 :

2.

b 26 i1t'aorijflo"' .•• ..ExVCl' "all the sciences and the arts"; on the difference between them, see Met. 98Ia 2 - 982b Io,ENU39b 14 - II4Ib 23.

6ab 30

COMMENTAllY

131

b 27 x,dl' Cl.h·D CllpEd" I.e., even if no other good attends upon "living," and even if it is not productive of other goods (see the general division at 6aa 27-28), still it is a good because it is desirable in itself (see 6aa 22).

If justice is ""1''Pieo, in any way, then it is a b 28 : 1 GUI''PEPOV yap good, for A. has told us that the ""1''Pieo, is good (6aa ao). 2 This is generally interpreted as "for it is of advantage to, promotes, the common interest"; "o,wii would then stand for the more common T.p "ow ..01.401 •.• ; (g) 63a 10, TO bratV6To.; (h) 63a II, "al 8 0/ AxBeol ... ; (i) 63a 17, "al 8 TW•••• ; (j) 63a 19, "ai 8),"" Tci neOa'eBT& (on this last, see 63a 19). Spengd calls these criteria "topics," as indeed they are, and they are like all the topia which we have seen thus far: particular topia. Some (such as the first, for example) arc simply stated to be draM; others arc shown by an example or by an argument to be dra8&. Each of these criteria falls into the class of particular topics described in 59b 25-32. Spengd calls attention to the fact (and gives ample evidence in proof) that "later rhetoricians, who for the most part ignored Aristotle, followed him in this area." i.e., "from what follows"; see S. 1245. b 30: 1 lx 'L'",,,&o 2 auUoy,,,f'O{ The meaning here is probably "reasonings," "inference." If one insists (as Cope, p. 107, does) that the meaning is "syllogisms," then it would have to be rhetorical syllogisms, i.e., "enthymemes." b 30-3 I ••• 4yClOcl" In B 23, 97a 8£F., this is cited as the first of the general topics. It is presented there as an inferential form on which to structure arguments; here it is simply a form of classification: anything which has evil as its contrary is a good thing. Thus the comment on criteria at 62b 30- 63b 3. In Top. 1ub 27 - II40 25 A. discusses the various kinds of contraries; in Cat. I3b 36 - I4a 25 he analyaes the idea of "contrary" and shows that the term must be used with care. For example, he is willing to agree that the contrary of good must be evil. But as he goes on to show, the con-

132

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

trary of an evil can be either: (a) a good, or (b) an evil: e.g., the contrary of defil:iency which is an evil is both (a) right measure, which is a good. and (b) excess. which is an evil. Yet A. does admit that generally speaking the contrary of evil is good. which is what he asserts here. sc. rour' dra8&.. A. uses a genitive with the b 3I 0~ ...1> lv"'v... [..... substantive adjective here instead of the dative which he has just used. The dra86. which he is discussing is clearly rdative and particular to the indiv,idual. or individuals. concerned. It is not as general or as universal.s the preceding dra86.. By his example A. appears to generalize it. However a moment's reflection on it will show that as .n .11'..8&. it is rdative. Demosthenes at the opening of the First Olynthiac 4--0 uses this topic but in a more complex way. He argues that Philip's greatest good as ruler is his absolute power but that in the given situation (the effort to win over the OIynthians) the desire of the Olynthians is fOr independence and full freedom such as Athens has to offer; thus the opposite ofPhilip's good is Athens' good. b 33 civlipd", See Mob 12: J. b 34-35 a 01 qOpot ... "''''[V....'''L For examples of this particular topic in the orators, we have Andocides (ca. 440 - ca. 390 B.C.). Against Alcibiatks 5--0 (a speech which is considered to be not from the hand of Andocides but from a Iatet period); Oem.. Embassy 299, 01. 1.24, Crown 176. 198. On the Chersonese 17-21; Cic.• Pro MUTeIl. 39.83. See Spengd for other instances . • ,,8eot in Ross's text is wrongly accented. b 36 ~

XEY ••

~ np!",,,o~

i.e.. fliaJ 1.255.

b,37 lllTL Ii' eN,. dd Tltis is one of the reasons why these dra8& are disputable. It also indicates why argwnents from contraries must be used with care (see Mob 3D-31). 63a I ...ci ,.",xci auvdy.. The point of this illustration of 62b 34-35 is that what may be hdpful and therefOre good (""fJ'P.e .... 62b 37) to our enemy may itself - and not its opposite - be good for us. as we find when caught up in a threat common (ra~rd (Jla{J'e6.) to our enemy and oursdves. See Pol. 1304b 23 - 1305a 7 where A. gives a nwnber of e.'CaIIlples of enemies being brought together by a common fear. On the force of awd".... see S'JIl 8 : 1. a 2: 1 x,d 06 is the reading of the codd. and should be retained. The edd.• except Ross and Kassci, follow Spengel and write "aI6. This simplifies the statement. but Spengd's reasoning is not convincing; Roemer. however. accepts it together with the additional evidence of a scholion. 2 06 ,,>1 EIITLV 6"'.p(30A>1 Here we have the doctrine of the mean. It is this mean which constitutes for A. that excdlence which in the

COMMBNTARY

133

Nicolflll£he.II Ethics he calls desT?!. The idea of P'UOT7}".....-£py......,.. "easy to do"; he explains the word in wbat follows: they are ~".aTa clJ~ et#D,a; and so see 63a 21-24. A. defines the word at 63a 31-33: they are actions which men in general accomplisb successfully. is read by four edd., Spengd, Cope. Ross alone z: .:.~ p~&,.. reads ;eal e4d.a; it is possible as far as the interpretation is concerned. a 33 : 1 .......:.p8c.oal1V Tbe aorist simply indicates a fact of experience (see S. 1930). 2 Ii Tbe antecedent to this clause is an understood TaiiTa "eoa.eoiina. "eanew, as we might assume from 63a 30 and 63a 35. However, a here and in 63a 34 is an accusative of respect. This statement is similar to that made at 63a 20-21. It should, perhaps, be noted that Spengel finds Isocrates' To Philip a fruitful source of illustration for many of the points which A. makes in tbis section. For example widl respect to 63a 25 (ea. clJ~ fJ06),00Ta.): Philip 95-104; 63' 27-28 (>eal Ta ... l'iiUoo): ph. 140-143; 63a 28 (Ta aeI'OTTooTa): ph. 68--']1; 63a 29 ("aTa ri.o~): Ph. 105-127; 63a 29 ("aTa . .. ~6.al'w): Ph. '37; 63a 33-34 ("al Ii ... AxOeor~): ph. 130; 63a 34 (>caI8aa ...): Ph. II3; 63a 3S ("al "eo~ ... ll'''..eo.): Ph. 97-98; 63' 363,. ("a I Ii ... 1'iiJ.).0.): ph. 130-136.

"at 8aQ (e"et)'o&

a 34

.... lISa ..

SC.

a 35

E6'PuEi~

See 6zb 24:

a 36:

nQc:i-r:ToVUI) 06r; 8a1J~dCovat ...

1.

1 pqov "more easily" than in matters in which they are not so clever or practiced. Z ........,pOwa£'v This reading of good codd. is accepted by Spengel, Cope, Ross, and Kassel. Roenler, Dufour, and Tovar read "aToeOwaa. with cod. A. J "l)&d~ See 63a 27 : J. I understand <paulo, here to rr.ean "tbe common and ordinary person." Consequently, if the actions are beyond the interest and competence of such • person, they are somewbat beyond tl,e ordinary and therefore are praiseworthy. If we interpret <paii).0dsee 63aI I : 1) as "worthless" (i.e., of no moral value), as the translators do, it is difficult to understand the rae clause, even with Victorius' explanation presented by the commentators. Victorius cites a fragment of Euripides which says:

141

COMMENTARY

"Do not mention wealth; I stand in no awe of a god whom even the basest of men can easily make his own" (Aeo1m, fig. 20, ed. Nauck & Snell). As A. tells US at EN II IIh 17, buOvpia is a 37 /: "men lay plots to this end that they may execute them." a 24 ",I. aTCClv,wnpov SC. 1"'Co. al'a66v. At 64a '4 (see 648 12-'4) we appear to bave left I"'C o. al'a66., the dominant idea in this chapter, for an analysis of 1"'Co •. From the content of 64a 24-30 I's'l;o. as a predicate makes little sense, and so it would appear clear that we are retuming to I's'l;ov al'u66.. For another change, see 648 3I. On the idea contained in' the topic here see Isoer., Amid. 80-83. a 25 :

1

iJJv

2

fI-.i~ov

concessive. SC. al'a66•. 3 X.v.E...... dpClV is the re.ding of the better codd., four edd., Spenge!, and Cope. Ross .lolle reads xalrncoTOea. On the idea in this

topic, see Top. II7b 28-30. a 26-28

&AAov ... \l6wp Ross encloses this within parentheses for which there is no need. In fact, if we pl.ce them here, why not .t 64" 29-30: (aAAo • ... (JovA6 ...s6a)?

a 26:

1 ",I. ci<eopw~ 6eiiv aieSTtbneO' TO;; darpeat.sa8ao, 1f'P0~ darpetjasw,· Td rp.AolTaoeov .l.ao TO;; rp.AOxe>i!-,aTOv !-,IiA.\ov "moo., clIaTe ,,"l rp.AsTaoela rpo'.oXe1J!-'aTla,. Spengd, Cope, and four edd. accept the reading of the codd.; Ross introduces clranges. As for the differences in punCtuatioll, whiclr are several in number, I call attention only to Ross's parenthesis at 64a 38 - 64b I, ,,"l oarpe>iaew" whiclr is harmless, and Kassel's double-bracketed 64a 37 - 64b 2, 010• .•• rpoJ.oXe1J!-,aTl"" whiclr he identifies as "philosophi additamentum," and whiclr I do not accept. Granting the problems whiclr can be found here, I would say drat the passage is basically sound, and would interpret it in the following way: "And those things whose superiority is more desirable or more honorable are greater, as, for example, sharp sight is more desirable than a keen smdl since in fact sight is more desirable than smdl; and to be fond of comrades is far more honorable than to be fond of money so drat, indeed, the love

,,"l yae

,,"l

rae ...

r60

ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' I

of comrades is more honorable than the love of money. And conversely, the better things are, the better their superiority; the more honorable things are, the more honorable their superiority." a 37 : 1 cr.V"IJ ••• xcz).:l.iwv SC. (p.te., a.n&)· oloo TO dxe.{Jw, ... : "those things whose superiority ..• are themselves greater, as, for example ... " This topic is found at Top. usb 4-'7. z CdpE......dp.. exemplified at 64a 37 - 64b r. 1 xu>.Alwv exemplified at 64b 1-2.

a 3S :

1

6cripaTa at Top. nSb 4-'7. If sight and smell.re in the positive degree, why should love of comrades and love of money be placed in the comparative degree? Therefore it is necessary for pa).).o. to go with "c£.U.o •. Suclt a use of peiUo. with a conlparative is not impossible, as Waitz shows (on Top. u6b 24). In this interpretation we have: "to be fond of comrades is far more honorable than to be fond of money, so that, indeed, the love of comrades is more hOllorable than the love of money." b 2 cpU.E" : 2. b IZ 01 CPpoVLfIooL those who possess practical wisdom., 'PeOV7J"'" Plato, in a passage not unrelated to the basic notion (Rep. SI8c-e), described it as "the eye of the soul." A. defines it at 66b 20-:>2 as "an iotellectual virtue by which men are able to deliberate with respect to their own happiness about the goods and evils mentioned above." See 638 17; see also EN II4Da :>4 II40b 30 (and the commentary on it of Grant, II 158-62), where 'P1!6v7J"" is primarily that virtue which regulates the life of the iodividual with respect to his good. In these passages, as in our own, the 'Pea.,po, - either the generality of such men ("d.TS') or, if we ascend the ladder of ability, the best (~£ "eli...."TO') of them - is the one who looks to the good. On the intent of this topic, see Top. II6a 14-:>2. b 13 : 1 &y.. OI>v ij p.ci~av is the reading of the codd., the edd. (exeept Ross and Kassel), and Cope. Ross reads clyaBd. P"'C0. with the scholiast; Spenge! and Kasse! seclude 11. Although the passage has been variously argued, the codd. seem quite correct. A., as we saw, strayed from his ioitial proposition of seekiog the "greater good" to an analysis of simply "the greater." He is retumiog to the idea of the good (which remaios the domioant idea in the rest of the chapter), as his introduction of the judgment of the 'Pea.,po, makes clear. Good is certainly present to his mind, as is also shown by the phrase "aTB nil. ,!lAw. (64b IS), which are "thiogs other than the good," and by his comments at 64b I6f[ Therefore it seems quite reasonable to read with the codd.: dyaBd. IIp"'Co. (draBa.): "the good (simply) or the greater good." a 41W1">S See S6a 7, meaning (b).

COMMENTARY

n

b 14 : 1 All the codd. read 8/. However, the use of ii at 64b 20-21 and at Top. u6a 16 suggests ii as more likely, and it is accepted here by the edd. ii is the dative singular feminine of the relative pronoun, used as an adverb of maimer, "insofar as": i.e., "either absolutely or insofar as they make their judgment in accord with practical wisdom." 2 "cd "cz"ck ""'" /iAAwv "also in respect of other matters (besides goods)." A. frequently uses MTa with tl,e genitive to indicate to whata predicate is attributed. in! wirll the genitive or dative (see A:n;' aya8wv, 64b 17) or ".et with the genitive or accusative serves rlle same purpose; see Eucken, Sprachgebrauch, p.40. b 15-16 "cz1 yckp ••. d"o, This sentence presumably. explains the statement just made, and does so by saying that "for in fact somerlling is wh:!t it is, is of such a size, ofsuch a quality, in the way in which reason and practical wisdom would assert it to be." Accordingly, tlle judgment of the most infonned minds is a very valid criterion. As an e:cal "o.d. refers to the first rllree of A.'s ten categories of being: namely, substance, quantity, and quality (see Cat., chap. 4). These categories represent the most general predicates which can be assigned essentially to anyone subject and tell us what the subject is in itse!£ But in iliis interpretation of the phrase there is a problem with the use of rlle word Tt to express >j o~uia. A.'s ordinary way of expressing substance is, not by ri, but by Td T{ IUT •• Therefore Sponge! has reservations about the text here.

b 17:

1 l,,' ckycz9"", dp-q"czp.cv In rlle light of rlle el':n;o. (64b 16) inlmediately preceding, and the explanatory cl\elUTal yde >c. d. inlmediate!y following, iliis apparently casual comment must be interpreted as "I bave made just such an assertion in the case of good rllings"; i.e., in my statements on the good I have fullowed the norm of the mind best informed about the nature of the good. 2 &p,,,,,cz, yckp ciycz96v e.g., at 63 b 12..

is rlle reading of the codd., the edd. (e.."'Ccept Ross and Tovar), Sponge!, and Cope. Brandis (p. 41) would be willing to strike TCi "eaYl'aTa; but the Greek commentator reads a plural&naVTa for :n;eaYl'aTa - and at 64b we read :n;a.Ta There is no need to change the codd.; out expression recalls iliat at 63b 14-15.

b 17-18 )'c.!36v"cz "ck "pciy",cz....

Z4

d,.,,,...

b 18 : 1 2"""",,ov in partitive apposition wirll the pluta! subject: "which all beings, if rlley acquired practical wisdom, would choose, each and every one of them." 2 5jjAov 0;)" • • . ).Eyc, the conclusion to 64b I I- 18.

64b 23

AIUSTOTLB, 'RHETORIC· I

b 19 :

1 fLEil;ov sc. draB ••. 2 fLiV.Aov .•• AEyE' ,..cillo> is probably to be translated, as uq>6dea, i.e•• "very firmly asserts to be so." The point which A. is making is that if the judgment of one endowed with 'I'e6.~u,~ is normative for" good,"

it is also nonnative for "greater good." b 19-:"22 XClt 'to 'toi~ .•. ci&'XEiv The fundamental point which A. is trying to make here - namely. the better man as the criterion of the greater good·- is exemplified well by Top. II6b 12--16. which reads in part: "what belongs to that which is better is more desirable; for example. that which belongs to god (is better) than that which belongs to man and that which belongs to the soul (is better) than that which belongs to the body." b 20 :

1 2

II II

ck"'Ab>~

"either as a general rule"; on cinMii~, see S6a 7. sc. ""'Co. draB6•• "or insofar as they are better

n I3EA't{ou~

(are a greater good)." 3 otov ".T.l. The example illustrates p.;....lov~. just as the exaIlJ.ple at 64b 21-22 exemplifies p.l"';.,>. In each instance A. takes the general rule (a:nAcii~) for granted on the principle which he has already set forth at 63 b 7-9. and exemplifies what he means by "man insofar as he is better." In the present example d.de.La is an excellence of the soul; as such it belongs to the better part of man. and therefore to "man insofar as he is better." Strength is an excellence of the body which A. would place at a lower level of reality. For a good discussion of a.de.la, see Plato. Laches I99d - 20IC; see also EN III5a 6 - III7b 20. 4 civ&pdCl See 6zb 12 : 3.

n

n

1 x,d a no,'t' ..... I3EA'tiwv sc. "'''Co> d"aB&•. With this topic we move from the nature of better men as the criterion (64b 19-:"20) to their activities. specifically their choices. as the criterion. and their choices viewed once again as coming either from their general nature (ci:n:Acii~) as better men or from some specific aspect W PeA,t.,.) of that better nature. 2 olov TO ci.&ucEia8cxL SC. oiov (ei 1", 610&1:0) 1'd ac""si'a6a& . .. The reason for the statement is given in the following dause, where A. assumes that all will acknowledge that the d,,,a,,jTBeO' exemplifies 0 peAT!.,. ii peATL.,.. The whole question of whether it was a mark of a man's CUP'O' XIIL' 01 .U;OT.' sc. Td 6. (w~ a. B~ at ,..;.. e'o' "al 01 olMT8~ (<pail.. ian). 3 >CUP'O' We saw the word at S4b 12. It means one having power, authority; here: "those eminendy qualified."

"at one tim.e ... at another." " S : 1 I'.i~ov sc. dya8&•. z ciT'I'I.. to be without, deprived of, what confers T,,.>7, which (as we saw at 61a 28 - 6rb 2) consists primarily of external honors of every kind. And so dTl,.ia would be, in this instance, a mark of aTlie1)a.~ (see 64" 3r) in the individual, a lack of some honor which men possess and which is acknowledged by others.

"S-6 b'L"' Ii•... 6>'lyo,' a colon after allyo •.

sc. ,.eTIi'ICova" ,.8'CO' dra8&.; punctuate with

"6 : 1 ""'IILV";'UPOV ycip At 64a 2S (,.BiCo. yme) we fmd the reason which validates this explanatory statement. At 6sa 19 A. takes it as selfevident that the ona.uf>Toeo, is ,.BiCo•. .. z E:7tClLVE~""'EPCl As we saw at 6]a IO the ~naW6Tdll is virtue, or is in some way related to it. Consequently it is dra8&•• Thus the lnalV6Twnea are certainly ,.eIC", draM of the moral order, and therefore are called here "aAU.,; see 64" 34: 1.

"7:

1

kudos.

T'I'.lI

u......

See 6ra 28 - 6r b 2: honors, awards, all forms of external

2 .:.".. sc. aUTd ,.BICOJ draM. was at 63b 37; see, too, 63h 36-37.

waatlT"~ is used here as it

1 c.iJG'1CEP ci:~(CI "'C'LCi "is, as it were, a kind of estimate of value"; i.e., the award given reilects the judgment of the giver on the deeds, acluevements, etc., of the person honored. all dla:n:ee as "quasi," see Borutz, rudex 872b 48££ 2 x ..l cJ)v ..I ~YJI'('" I'd1;ouo; sc. aUTd ,.8ICw. Here we shift back to the idea of "greater." C1),.la. are "penalties" or "fines," as is evident from the contrast with ",.al. !;rll,ta, do not mean "losses." Anything ro-

a8:

6sa

II

COMMENTARY

ceiving a heavier penalty is ordinarily something more serious and substantial

in

nature.

a 8-9 x"l ..& ••• I"U;", "those things greater than •.." In this translation, which is used to make more explicit what A. is saying, the article has its original demonstr:ltive force. a 9 : 1 -rWv ofLOAoyoUP.tvwv i.e., TmJ! Op.O).O),OOI'£l1{JJl1 (el'JIar.) J'Bi'dlQw: "acknowledged to be great." The infinitive with this and the following verb may be understood, as indicated in the notes, but it may also be omitted. A.'s elliptical way of writing includes omissions tolerated in correct Greek as well as others which are more in the character of a shorthand. When either is supplied in the commentary, it is for the sake of clarity. z ij .W~ is the reading of good codd. and is accepted by Roemer, Tovar, Spenge!, and Cope. ,,"l Td a';Tq; II MAW, is also found in cod. A •. 1. and is read by DufoUI. Ross and Kassel read ,,"l ~d ati~q; ~OU MAW~. From a glance at the structure of the preceding and subsequent sentences, one can see why the reading Ii MAW~ or TO;; MAW~ is preferred, fur one finds there a comparison of what is the greater good in any given two instances. Bonitz (Studion, p. 88) also prefers 11 (or TOO) MAW~. (a) If we read with Ross and Kassel, we have: "the good relative to a person is greater than absolute good." This is acceptable, even though it is a source of trouble to Spenge! (pp. 128-29) and Cope (pp. 146-47), for the very solid reason that the general good is greater than a relative good. Both cite to their point Top. u6b8-Io. But Cope does note that there is a difference between what is theoretically good and what is practically good. This is important. For, theoretically, the greater good is perfect health; but if a person labors under debilitating disease which precludes such, then partial recovery (health) is the greater good. Furthermore, we must not lose sight of the fact that these topics are meant to help one to present a subject as advantageous (O'IJp'l'ieov--al'a06v, S9a 30ff., 62.3 ISff.) to an auditor trying to come to a decision on a practical problem. Such a person is no diJIerent from all men of whom A. says (A IS, 7Sb 19): "no one chooses the absolute good

174

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTOlUC' I

but the good relative to himself"; see also 65b 35. Moreover, in this particular situation, which is concerned with TO (11Jp, A. himself says that TO (fVP in itself is a relative good, not an absolute good (B 13, 89b 37 - 90a I). (b) If we follow the more accepted reading of the codd., we translate: . "the good relative to a person simply and solely is a greater good (than what is not so relative to him)." This is most acceptable. The fact that the structural balancing of the surrounding sentences is changed might raise a question in our mind. But such a change is certainly not unique, from what we have seen in this chapter alone. In either reading, the point of this topic is illustrated by the topic which immediately follows. The text here presents a not uncommon problem in this first book, and we might use it as an example of the kind of puzzle which one faces in any attempt to interpret. The text contains a number of difficulties which could be occasioned by either mistaken punctuation or poor copying. Here are a few of the possibilities which are quite legitimate:

(I) Start the sentence at leal dvo" and punctuate differently: e.g., "al dvoi" TO

l"YVTBfl071 1'06

TslotJ,' xal TO cW1'q; xal dn.tru,. ~vo'> TO Ey"V-

(2) Do the same but write the words as follows: "al

Teeo, TO;; Tilov, . "al TO aVTW "al dnAw,. xal ~voi. TO

{"",s-

a"1'O Hal tin..tru,. (i) aVTIji and aVTIji are easily, interchangeable, as we know. (ti) a~T'; could have been misunderstood and written aVTIji. (iii) both sentellces as written in (2) have the same meaning. (iv) the sentellces as written in (2) can stand by themselves, in which case the statement is tile same as Top. II6b 8-ro: namely, that which is good absolutely and simply is a greater good. 2 ,,"l '\'0 &uv1l'\'Ov sc. pB'CO> a"aB';.; cf. Top. u6b 26. As we have seen (57" 5-7), men do not deliberate about the impossible. If something is seen as beyond their attainment, it is not seen as a good for them. Alexander in his commentary on Top. n6b 26 cites the extreme example as an illustration: e.g., long life vs. immortality (CG II.2). TeeO" 1'06 T£..lOV," . ual TO

1'"

a 36 : 1 '\'0 I'Ev yap cruoriil sc. TO "d~ ({(ff') aVTIji (d"aB&.): TO piv = "the former," namely, the possible. The me:ming of Tiji aVTIji (or aVTIji as some read) will certainly be determined by what precedes at 65a 3S (TO aVTIji) and from such comparable usage as 63b 17-18 (see 63h 17: ,) and

90a I, where we see that it is equivalent to T..l. For a discussion of the word in. this meaning see Cope, p. 147, and Bonitz, Studkn, pp. 88£

6sa 37

COMMENTARy

17S

2 Ttl..,. TEAEL Toii ~'ou Here again we have a statement variously interpreted. Since the entire sentence (to Tq; TU•• , 6sa 37) is involved, let us look at each part. (I) 6sa 36: Ta l. Til •• TO' Piou would seem to mean the same as the phrase in a companion passage from the Topics (n6b 23-26), Ta "eo~ TO TOU Plou Telo~: nam.ely, anything directly related to the accepted TUO~ of life. As directly related to the T'lo~, such things more· properly constitute a part ·of the Tilo~ (see Bucken, Sprachgebrauch, pp. 22-28). The preposition .. does not appear to be temporal as many interpret it-Jebb&Sandys, for example: "Also, goods at the end oflife are greater goods; for those things are more ends which are close to the ends." (2) 6sa 37: Ta "eo~ Tq> Til." these would be anything itulirectly related to the Tilo~, near it, by its side, but not immediately flowing into it. neo~ with the dative here is different from "eo~ with the accusative, which A. uses in the sentenCes which follow. (3) 6sa 36-37: and so we translate: "those things which are direcdy related to the end of life are greater goods; for ends are more important (greater) th2n things indirectly related to the end." Finally, an ex:ample of the topic: ethical knowledge is direcdy related to .d~a.p•• la, the T'lo~ of life; typewriting only indirecdy. The fonner is more clearly Te.l.."O~, or, as A. says, Til'l pall••, or, in the Latin phrase, "sapit natuIam

rae

finis."

a 37 - lish 8 xed Ttl. •.. ~y""{VELV 06 This is one of those passages which make sense upon reading and become confusing upon analysis. Yer it will yield .ense upon analysis if we assume that A. is talking here, as at 6sa 3S-37, about relative, not absolute, greater good. A. an expression of the practical choices of the greater good which men actually make in relation to themselves and of their reasons for doing so, the statements are valid. But they are not valid as statements of absolute greater goods. For, surely, conferring benefits is equal, if not superior, to receiving benefits (e.g., 7Ia 3S 71 b 4), and being just is a greater good than seeming to be just, in the same way as, clearly, actual health is a greater good than apparent health. Asecond point to keep in mind is that A.'s argument at first glance appears to be this: the greater relative good lies in that which is grounded in reality, and not in the. appearances of reality. And in fact this has to be the base for any intelligent understanding of these two topics, as the second topic (6sb S-8) - where the greater good (actual health) is the one grounded in reality makes quite clear. This is the base for the second topic, and is expressed in

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

the phrase .l.a, ,,,,illo. ~ do".i.. It is present in the first topic, 65' 376sh 5, hut it is somewhat obscured (a) hy the phrase "eo, MEa. (which seems hest translated "related to appearance"), (b) hy what seems to be an unnecessary enlargement of the example at 6sh 2-5 (which could he set down more directly, e.g.: 6,0 ~al ,0 tJ ",da-X.w ME., .. a. a!et..aVO.lj8E'"'' ycltp fLillov i.e., the wishes are directed to what is, and therefore to what is the greater good, on the principle of 65 b I. 2 'P""I Those who would say that "appearing to be just is more desirable than actUally being just" are not merely men in general but also men who were considered to be reputable thinIcen, like the Sophists, Callides in the Corgias (481-522), for example, or Thrasymachus in the Republic (336354). Thrasymachus' position is quite clear: justice is sinrply what it would seem to any practical and realistic individual: namely, the interests of the stronger. Socrates countered with the argument that the answer to the problem entails the nature ofman and must be determined by what that nature is in itsel£ We find the Thrasymachean view frequendy in Thucydides' account of the last quarter of the fifth century; see, for example, 3.82.-83. b 7:

5.

J fL'XPG" On the neuter, see S. I048. Z .,,0 ':'y,..I"E'" This clearly manifests the confusion typical of this relativism. Unable to escape the facts of physical reality, it admits the validity of the principle for the physical world: "it is better to be than to

AIUSTOTLB, IRHETORIC' [

6sb 14

seem" (6sb I). But in the arca of ethical reality, where the facts can be interpreted, it shifts readily from objective to subjective criteria. Socrates w:ith his e.'Campie of the dagger (Gorg. 469O-e) pinpoints the weakness in such subjective criteria.

b S : 1 TO ••. XPlIcr,I'...... pov

SC.

,...";0.

a1'a6&,·.

See Top. nSb

2 TO ,.p0t; ...6 "e.~ goes w:ith each of the following specifications of "olid, but A. feds no need to repeat it - a fact which should be kept in mind when we find that a preposition is not repeated in other instances; c£ S. 1667. b 10 !'-iT'....... so. d1'a6d. On "AO;;T.~. see 6Ia 12-24 and notes. On ~1'{.,a see 6Ib 3-0 and notes. The text in each place demonstrates that these two goods possess lbra.Ta Ta.Ta, 6sb II. II : 1 xlli ... o !,-EO' i)6ovijt; is the reading of most of the codd. and four of the edd.; Ross, Spengd, and Cope omit the article. The article can be read but it should be intetpreted as a repetition of the article referring to the same entity qualified by two separate thing. (c£ Gildersleeve, SYlltax, II 603). From the explanation at 6sb U-I3 it i. clear that one single thing i. meant which writes in itsdf both "freedom from pain" and "pleasure": "that which has more freedom from pain together w:ith pleasure." Reading w:ithout the article make. thi. more obviou.. In Top. n']a 23-34 thi. topic appears as two distinct topic•. 2 I'EO'i)6ovijt; $C. d1'a6&••

b

,...,C••

c!Av:Ir."'e.' "al Td ,...0' "6T"TOV decisive of all hdps." J npo~ ..11 8,;"".. 8", nd8ELV If SSb IO is correct, we must translate: "with respect to the power of speoking persuasivdy," Le., giving expression to the ,j"dexovTa ",8avd (ssb Io-n). b 23 : J GUl'f3ou).eUE'V ..ci~ is the reading of the codd., the edd. (except Ross and Kassd), Spenge1, and Cope. With this reading, the infinitives (lap.,. and a,.l.,v) are predicate to an understood I1 (see 57b 30-36) and a king's guard is that the former is used against the citizens and is often composed of non-citizens; see, e.g., Pol. 1285a 24-2.9, 13IOb 40 - '3Ila 8.

.&,..,.a ...;

a 7: 1 "rei RPOC;: TO TEla.; EJcciCJ"t'lC;: se. nOA'Teia,,; "national characteristics ... related to, belonging to, the end of each kind of government." Some translators give this as "conduce to," upromote," the end. But A. is not saying this. There could be any number of EO.", (ostracism, for example, in fifth-century Athens), and C11J,.rpieovm (pericles' restriction of citizenship ca. 45 I B. c.) which might "promote the end" of democracy, and yet not be proper to this fonn of government. In these three words (which pick up 65b 22-25) A. is talking about "national characteristics, established institutions, advantageous factors" whiclr belong to the ..O",'Tela insofar as

.&,.,,.a

66a 12

COMMBNTARY

they reflect it and designate the way in which it expresses itsel£ These are the things which the deliberative speaker mwt know and distinguish. It has been said that the architecture of the city-state"grew out of the needs, ways of life, traditions and ideas of its citizens, and followed these at every point, without pursuing the artificial and extravagant" (Wycherley, p. vii); the same sentiment may be applied to its "oA,ula and emphasizes the importance of a speaker's knowing these "national characteristics, established institutions, advantageous factors." z 118'1 is the reading of the codd., the edd. (except Ross), Spengel, and Cope. Ross reads "I~, a conjecture of Bywater's. I interpret .0'1 as "national characteristics." As to its differences, if any, from 118'1 at 66a 12, see 66a I2.; on the general meaning of lOo~, see '7Qa 6 : 1; for the meaning of o1Oo~, see 69> 18 : J. J See CiSh 24; Le., "the established institutions" of the State as they reflect the common effort to achieve the common good.

vo"."..

a8:

1 eL1CEP "if, as is the fact, U and therefore ICsince." 2 l ...." ..'P.pOV'l"£. "with reference to the TiAO~, men (within the

State) make their choices."

!.......

> 9: 1 .. "tunt; here is most probably wed in meaning (el as source material; see ss> 4- If we take ",1,rrB TO ijB.xoil sc. Myo,,; see S6a 3 : z. See Isoer., AntiJ. 276-280, on the importance of o180t; as ;.tun~. a 10-12 ("oj> ... cli"'PbJ) The material enclosed by the parentheses (read by all the edd.) explains what A. means by 6,' >j8."oii and is only indirecdy relevant to the main statement at 66a 8-12: .".1 ... y'.ovTa • . " M.o. Ii•.... The point of the whole statement at 660 8-12 is that jwt as o18o~ is important in speaking to individual persons, so, too, is it important in addressing oneself to the interests of a collective person - a "oA.T.la, for example. The speaker mwt know the o1Oo~ r;j~ "ol'Tela~ so that the content, tone, and quality of his discourse reflect an intimate acquaintance with the habitual interests and objectives of the particular type of "oJ.,ula; for such discourse, responding as it does to the dAO~ of the "oA'Tela, carnes with it a strong persuasive power. a 12 "ok lIB'I "."V .. 0>'."••0;" As we saw at 6Sh 24 Demosthenes wes lOo~, o180~, T;j~ "oJ.'TBla~ interchangeably. In the light of the context at 660 8-16 and its apparent reference to 56a 5-7 and 11-13 and anticipation of

188

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' J

66. 17

660 25-26, it would seem clear that >}8o~ is the word which A. intends to use here. If this is so, then he is employing the word in an extended sense and applying it to a moral person, the State, in contradistinction to its normal use of a person. For, as A. says, >}80~ properly belongs to a person and is the result of moral choice. It represents the person fIrmly disposed one way or another and indicates the dominant direction which he gives himself as a result, in part, of deliberate choice. As will be said .t 760 25 : z (see also 698 18 : 3), >}80~ is the sum of • person's physical and psychic nature together with his dominant habits. Insofar as the State is a community of persons joined together to achieve a common good, we can speak of it as possessing >}80~, by an extended use of the term. >}80~ then becomes an expression for the dominant tendencies of the State determined by the choices it makes as a moral person. Because of the point which he is attempting to a 13 n:,e"V':'''''''''DV make in the Corgias, Socrates would clearly dismiss this approach, arguing that it proves his contention that rhetoric is Hattery bent on giving the people pleasure, trying to amuse them, saying what they like to hear and not saying what is best for them to hear whether it is welcome or nnwekome (see Corg. S02C - S03 b). Fortunately for the truth of the situation plato reallied in the Pha,ams what A. in fact is saying here. a 14: 1 'rf&Uom

z """"

i.e., 'E'a ~81J t'wv noA'TelQ)'V.

Clu..wV

This is explained by the following sentence. As the >}8o~ of the individual is determined by his deliberate choices made with respect to a determined ·,ilo~, so the nation's >}8o~ is determined by the collective choices which the people make in order to obtain the goal of their "'oA'TEla. As we see at EN 1I60a 9-15, A. recognizes that any community forms itself in the pursuit of a good common to all the members. >}8o~ is revealed in choice for A. since "by choosing a IS: 1 ","VEl'" what is good or bad we are men of a certain character," EN III2a 1-2; see also B 21, 9sb '3-14, and Poetics I4sob 8-10. On "eoaieea,~, see EN II lIb 4 - IIIsa 3, and 57B 2 : 1. z ciV"'P.pE"'''' i.e., neoaieeat, is relative to the TiAo, since choice is not of the end but of the me:ms to the end; see, e.g., EN lIIIb 27, lII3h 3-4.

These lines form a conclusion to chaps. • '7-22 iIw!,Ev... "'''''''''''v 4-8, the section on deliberative rhetoric. Chaps. 4-S gave the general subject areas of this branch (66a 17-18: WY ••• lao",i• .,. ~ O.TOJ.); chaps. 6-7 spoke of """,,,,eeo, (660 18: "eel ,0;; """,,,,ieO'TO,); chap. 8 spoke of the kinds of nojhn:ia (66a 19: 1&Bf2l Td~ noln:elaG-). a I7-(S oao!'EVwv ~ av.....v

See ssb I4-I5, 62. 15-16.

66a 22

COMMENTARY

a 18 : 1

EX .. (vwv These were formally and specifically given in chaps. 6-7. But all the material of chaps. 4. 5. and 8 must also be included since it concerns the subject matter of deliberative rhetoric. the TiAO, of which is the I1vp'Pieoo (58b 20-22). 2 "I.....,. As at 66a 9. this is probably "tl1n, in meaning (c). i.e .• the source material from which we develop our propositions; see 59a 6-7. and 26-27. as well as 600 38 - 60b 3. It is the evidentiary material of a probative character which we must seek out and which lends itself most readily to the demonstration of what is crvp'Pieoo.

I .. , 6£ "'pt ..c;,v is the reading of cod. A and is accepted by the edd. (except Ross). Spengel. and Cope. There is no reason not to read it. Ross reads with cod. F ST' TWO. in which case the genitive is govemed by the verb (i.e.• "further still. the means [dod Tlv ...J and the method by which ["w,J we shall be amply supplied with the characters and the established institutions with respect to forms of government .•. ").

a 19

a.

a 20 EJ0o, can include more than moral excellence (0£ 76& 1.5 : .), as A. explains .t B I2., 88b 30 - 89' z; and (b) since the source material for the honorable (or dishonorable) must of necessity be derived from the choices a person makes in the domain of action, it directly reflects a man' s de.~~ and >J0o, - see, e.g., EN n62a 22-23: "the essential element of '~ (62b 4). In the definition here he is stressing this active aspect (see 66b 4), but he is fully aware of the "habit" aspect, as his mention of the same virtues which he has already identified as l~.., (62b 13) indicates. des~ can be called a aol.ap.', insofar as it is a capacity in the soul resulting from the repeated acts which made it a I~", or habitual disposition. Grant, I 241, who would agree in general with Cope and Spengel, makes my point well when he says: "the l/:" is a fIxed tendency to a certain class of actions, and, if external circumstances do not forbid, will certainly produce these." In other words the meaning of atlva,." here is not as obviously contradictory as it has been assumed to be. Those who insist that it is must be ready to explain how TiM, which in A. is so demonstrably a can be called l~., at EN II40' 2-23 and In.a''-~''T/ at II39b 31: 7} p.~ /Iea Ant-

.. a,dx, ..

ao.,.,.."

dol.a,.."

a~fJT/

AUT/.

U.,

dnoaB."n~.

a 37 : 1 nop ...... 'xJj "able to supply, obtain." There is nothing in the word which denotes "for onesel£" It may be for the self or for another. Ifanything, the emphasis is "for others" as 66b 3 and the anal}'llis of the fieSTal (66b 3-22) make manifest. Compare 62a 27-28: "o'T/T",d. - cpvla"T&"&'. Z cpul.......1l<Jj See 60b 16, 60b 17.

a 38:

1 "':'opyej "all. "'01£1''1' ;cal .. Blen-n. which also appears in a scholion and in the Vetlls Trans/alio. and is read by Roemer. Dufour. Tovar. and Ross. Though the addition makes sense, I cannot decide fIrmly on one against the other.

b 6:

a.

66b

II

COMMENTARY

197

b 7: 1 ~ ~EU9EpLC;"''1i is preswnably the reading of the codd. as far as the edd. are concerned. Ross alone omits the article. On "libera1ity," or, more probably, "generosity," see 6ra 17 : z, 6Ia 7. For aJulIer description of the concept, see ENIII9b 19- IIZ2a 16. Very little has been said in this commentary about A:s style in this work or about the way in which he uses Greek. With respect to the latter, his writing, which most probably reflects the devdopment and legitimate changes through which Greek was passing in the last half of the fourth century, has been notably neglected by grammarians in general. As an example of what I have in mind, consult 66b 24 : 3 and 6?a 22 : 2; see also Cope, p. 202. A:s style in the Rhetoric as we find it in this first book is often subtle and precise. Here, for example, in the chiastic sentence structure of 66b 5-9 (.o,)~ 6,,,aiov~ . •. "I"~' ya2 . .• ~).ev9.2,,$f7/~ ... "2ot...a.), he uses the structure to emphasize ("men," the key idea) and to enclose (the idea of virtue). The sentence presents us with: the individuals and then their specific virtue, the specific virtue and then the individuals. At 7Ib 2. : 2 I take the opportunity to illustrate the careful articulation of a sentence which superficially could seem banal. Judgments on style can be subjective, and it would be correct to say that a more typical view of A:s style is that of Spengd in his comment at 68a 2 to the elfect that A. was not concerned with "sermonis degantia." 2 . "pot£V'l"Il' "give away, give &edy, spend generously, be openhanded." b 8 XP'I""'''''''v One of the external goods, as we saw at 60b 27; with the . idea, one should compare :do6TO~, 60b 20, 6Ia r2-I4, and 618 12-24b 9 ...elI ,.{,..-wv

See 54b J3.

b 10 Kill Wi .; v0I'o0S sc. ".l.';e, (0. 66b 12). Cope's comment (p. r6I) that the presence of this phrase invests justice and courage "with a political and objective character" distinguishing them from the. other virtues mentioned here which "are rather subjective and individual" is questionable. It might apply to courage- though, even with respect to courage, the fact is that in the Nicomachean Ethier the first of the five subdivisions of courage at Iu6a 16 - rrI6b 3 is political courage "because of its close resemblance to true courage." On the other hand, 6."a.oatl.'1 does look primarily to rdarions within the State, to the conduct which i. proper to those living in society, as we al.o see in Plato's Republic. Furthermore .1; see Lobe! & Page, Sappho '37. Alcaens wrote: "Som,thing I would say but shame holds me back." Sappho answered: "If you had a longing for the noble and the good, and if your tongue were not churning some evil for utterance, shame would not shroud your eyes, but you would speak of what is right."

20S

COMMENTARY

J eXYWVUA»al "to be distressed or an..-,Qous about"; sec Plato, Protag. 333e. Anything wbich is the objeCt of such anxiety is bonorable since,

a IS :

as A. goes on to say, this is a normal human experience with respect to all things leading to renown. We see this concern in Phaedra in Euripides' Hippolylll' (c£ in particular II. 403-404). The reading accepted by the edd., save Kassel, a ",.pl YO:P "'''''' who reads with cod. A: "eel TOl. rde.

a 16 qJuacl a 17:

instrumental dative; "naturally.

G1'C'ou&cllo·d:Plll'V see 6xa 2S : •• J

It

Here the word means "morally superior";

a 1\ This is the comparative particle. The two genitives are subjective: e.g., oloo al de_Tal Hal Td ilera a.oed, "alAtov, " rvoa",.,. a r 8 li",oAIN ..... ,xlI! the virtues which "are capable of giving enjoyment to others"; on dn.lav,,,,, see 6Ib 9. After " atlTo" one must understand _lui "alAlov,. From the following clause (67a 19) did ... , it is manifest that the enjoyment is primarily of all order higher than the merely physical. a 19-20 XIII "'0 ... fl-iJ xll",oV,).,i.""...e,,, sc. "aAO. fUTI. We saw this idea at 63a 20£; see also 63a 20 : 3. However, A. now gives us his reason (67a 20-22) for this kind of statement. As a principle with its ground in narural ethics, it is quite reasonable. If we go a step further and interpret justice in a stricdy legal sense, it is even more M>\

See 61a 28 - 61b 2. • """" X .......v This usc of the partitive genitive with an understood or expressed Tl or e.; TI for a predicate in apposition or agreement with the subject is a fairly common construction in A. (see 70& 16 : ,). Cope, p. 202, cites a number of instances togetber with examples from Aeschines, Demosthenes, Isocrates, and Plato, remarking that he does not find the usage in any writer earlier tban plato.

a 23 : , il"llp"ll In whatever sense we take .1"71 (e.g., victory, mastery, success), this adjective makes a perceptively ironic comment. • o".POX>\v See B 12, 89a 13-14: victory is 3 kind of preeruinence. In what follows between 67a 23 and 673 32 I will accept the punctuation of the edd., wbo for the most part agree. Tbe exceptions are Kassel, who at 67a 2S reads and brackets "al 1/ TIl''' d"olov6 ••, alld Tovar and Kassel at 67a 28 who read a period after rdla "alii, not. comma. a 24 : , fl-V'Ifl-ov£uTa is tbe reading of one cod. for 1"71l'ooWl'aTa, i.e., "memorials," such as we saw.t 6r. 34-36. Our reading "tlUD.gs wbich

206

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

are remembered are honorable" is probably correct in the light of eiJl"~"'O"v­ TdT6/!a (67a 26) and the preceding statements which it qualifies. ",~",o'BvTa is the reading of the edd., Spengel, and Cope. • ,1" ....... ax.. stood predicate is "a,la. Possessions do not in themselves fall into the class of the honorable, and productive possessions ("TfJ",aTa "ae"'l'a) are, ifanything, not honorable, but useful; See 61a 12-19 with notes. Possessions which yield no profit are "honorable" because they are lA8v08e"bnea. In the light of 6Ia I1-I9 (see 6xa I7 : .) such possessions are proper to the "free man"; on this see 6"73 29 : •• z ...ok " ..p' lxdlJ" 7 ).YJ"do~ . .. ro ".Ld~ The principle at work in this section can be misunderstood, and misused. Misunderstanding is easy because, for the first time, A. appears to be playing loose with the truth. His comment at 67b 3-4 would strengthen this view (see 671> I : 3). One could argue that A. encourages deliberate fa1sehood, and is creating the kind of self-destroying climate which Thucydides vividly describes as a consequence of the collapse ofvalues brought on by the Peloponnesian War (3.82). Yet there is a way in which to understand A.'s statements which is not only reasonable, but proper - until strong evidence to the contrary can be brought forward and which removes the kind of blatant sophistry just described. Virtue, for A., is a mean between two extremes. A declination from the mean may be neither virtue nor vice, but legitimately viewed as either the virtue or the vice. To use A.'s e.'Cample at 67a 34: it can readily be possible that one who appears to be discreet and prudent (a virtue) is actually calculating and indifferent (a vice). But it is also possible that he is discreet and prudent. Isocrates makes the point rather clear. Telling Nicocles to be a man of dignity he says: "This is the most diffu:ult of admonitions; for you will find that by and large those who affect dignity [To.k u.""""o","'ov~1 are cold ['I'v:ceoo~l" (N""c/es 34; see also 46, and 67' 3S). These aflinities of meaning which reflect ambignities in the order of reality are simply something which must be recognized as possible aids in praising or blaming. Quintilian, in a passage (Inst. orat. 3.7.2S) referring to this section, considers A.'s position a valid one because of the close relationship which can exist between a virtue and its vice (see also Cic., Partit. orat. 23.81). Qnintilian calls the procedure "derivatio verborum": substituting one word for another to soften the expression. This is one use. But the technique can also be misused, as QuUltilian illustrates in the sanle passage with Cornelius Celsus; see also Livy's example of such misuse, 22.12. II-l2. Alexander (CG II.2.IS6-s8), in commenting on the topic of "substituting a more &miliar and clearer term for one which is less so" (Top. I IIa 8), not only shows by his examples how powerful such a change, legitimately made, can be. but also demonstrates the misuse of it by Callicles in the Corgias, who substitutes To.k ~A,8Iov~ for ToV~ aW'Peo,,,,, For further justification of the explanation oJfered here, see my observation at 671> 12 : 1• • 33 ..... aU~'YYU; "qualities closely allied to the actual qualities"; see 6,. 36: "aea"oAov8o';vTro•.

• 34 ...o~ .u).Cl~'ij .. £"I~ou)'~ This exemplifies the method when used "po~ 'l'oy.,; the method "'eo~ l"aIVo. receives two examples at 6,. 3S.

COMMENTARY

209

See 66b 2. See also EN II08a 4-{i, Iusb 26 - II26b 9. A a 35 "piiav careful reading of the second passage demonstrates how close d.d.lY~TO' is to neiiov. A. says: Clit is not easy to determine .in what manner, with what person, on what occasion and for how long a time one ought to be angry, and at what point right .ction ends and wrong action begins. We do not blame a man for straying a little either toward the more or toward the less. Sometimes we praise those who are deficient in anger and call them gentle, and sometimes we praise the angry as manly .•." (I126a 32 - II26b 2). a 35-36 "Ill all""'ov ... (3EA... ' .....OV The verb for this coordinate clause is .l~'m!o. of 66. 32: "and one must choose each quality from among those qualities intimately related to it - and always in the most favorable sense,'- On the force of naeaxoAovOovvraw. see 623 29 : 2. a 36 KIl..... '1&,,":l:0' should have been written. As far as the text is concerned, our word is secure. 2 ".p.v6v "majestic, lordly"; one worthy of respect. Insofar as Uel"OT7I' is a mean between a,)Odd"., and de~u"•• a (EE I233b 34-38, 122" 8), we can see the possibility in situations which are unclear (see 67'l36 and 67b I : 3) either of • legitimate, or of. partially legitimate substitution. Cope, p. I75, has an extensive note on this type of euphemism, which is called hypocorism. 3 ...OU~ tv .....,~ "".p(30A",S Here we are on dangerous ground (67'l 32 - 67b 7), and the misrepresentation of the truth is apparently accepted. Both Oe".ro~, (67b 2) and aU(J)Tia (67b 3) are vices - i.e., e. Tai, ';"'ePo.lai, (EN II07b 2-3, II07b 8-10). Their presentation as virtues is accepted here for two reasons (67b 3-4): (a) they will seem such to most men - which is not a valid reason at all; and (b) one can proceed to develop an argument for the honorable which is superficially correct, and therefore

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

210

convincing, but is, in fact,}imdanrentally folse - which is the force of naeaAo"""""•• (67b 4). On the other hand, there is an explanation which makes A.' s statement here acceptable, and less sophistic in actual fact than superficially it appears to be. A. acknowledges, as his use of "aeaAoy.a-r."•• indicates, that theoretically and absohudy speaking what is proposed here is not correct. At the same time he must admit in terms of his own analysis of the virtues (such as we saw at 67& 36: namely, EN noSb 35 - II09a 19), that in the practical order it is not always easy and simple to establish an extreme of virtue as a vice although it is in fact a vice. rn other words, what is to be qualified, theoretically speaking, as a vice, is not in the harsh light of practical experience and action so readily identifiable. As he says: "for e.'CalIlple, since boldness seems to be more like and closer to courage, and cowardice more unlike courage, we more readily establish cowardice as the opposite of courage" (EN 1I09a 9-10). This is to say that theoretically boldness is as much a vice as cowardice; but faced with it in the order of action it is not as easy to draw the same finn conclusion. Thus it is that, following A.'s general line of argument in 67a 32 - 67b 7, • person in praising someone might quite reasonably and honesdy assess as a.deeia in. given action that which is quite possibly and more correcdy 8eautlT'1'. b 4 "'llpllAoY"'"r'xOv be ..ij~ Ilt..tll~ is the reading of the codd. and the edd., except Ross, who secludes .". It should be read: "a form of fallacious reasorring proceeding from cause." An example of this kind of reasoning would be to take two different causes, or motives, for two different actions and interchange them, thereby attributing the cause (or motive) of one action to the other. It can be exemplified from 67b 4-5: facing unnecess~danger(el " "pocrijxov

,,,I

212

ARISTOTLE, IRHETORIC'

r

to read pi. with "eoaij"o•. The force of ."'{ with the accusative is that of direction toward which: "but incline to what is better and more honorable." z ~"o, and its difference from ~y"w""o" its similarity to the giving of advice and so to deliberative rhetoric, whichhas just preceded, and, finally, the role of amplification in praise seems quite natural to me. For this reason I would accept the passage with the four edd., and reject Kassel's seclusion of the entire passage as Aristotelian but misplaced.

214

ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' I

b 27-33: .....,... 5' l ..'lL.... ~ . . . ..o'oil.......

The line of the argument is: to bestow o~ is to make the virtue of a person manifest; since virtUe is revealed in action, it is necessary to show that the actions are virtuous; ly"';',,,o. is directed to individual acts (and so is related to lna,.o~); (in both lna ..o~ and loy"';',,,o. actions are critical) all else,like education, merely serves as confinnatory evidence; loy,,';',..,o. is directed to men who have acted; but the fact is that actions signify habit (therefore good actions would signify the presence of virtUe) and so we would give "'a ..o~ to one who did not act, provided we consider him to be one who, ifhe acted, would do good things, i.e., had the habit of good action. A., then, is saying that is directed to good actions, "'a ..o~ to good char:tcter. On virtue and virtuous actions, see EN nosa I7 - nosb 18.

'"a ..

"'''';',..'0.

b 27 i ....,.... ~ Myo~

From here to 67b 35 praise in itsd£ and its dif,. ferenee from ,..a"ae,,,,..6~, and .~6a,,..0 ,,,..6~ is considered. Praise and blame are the moral approval and disapproval by which 'we distinguish virtue from vice; c£ EN n06a 1-2, and Cope, [nlTod., pp. 212-18.

.y",;,,.. ....

..

1 w~ ..o'..il.... , l",d..,,.,!.a, has as its object "'ed7"a, is the object of liyo'Ta" which in tum is subject of peTan6wa, and UTee"'.... Ta;;"" is also the object of the two in£nitives, e.g., "when we present these matters (the actions, the character of the person) as advice, we must alter them in expression and tum them about." a

2 : 1

a 3 otov D'TL

.c. 010. (Aiy.,.) 8n.

a4

sc. y,y.opi.o,,; or /indexovu" as at 68a 6.

i"l

.,.o,~

a 5 : 1 ~"o8""x1Jy The statement at 68a 3-4 (ot! dsi ... d,' aUTO.) actually appea" as a u,,06>7''~' a piece of advice, in Isoer., Panathen. 32 in his comments on the truly educated man; c£ liSa 5-6. z su" ...,..., Used here with the accusative as cognate, it is best taken as "equivalent to, equal to" (sec LS II). This meaning satisfies many of the instances cited by Cope (p. 182) in his note. As he remarks, the idea of power, furce, which is in the primary meaning of the word, is developed into the secondary meanings. These secondary meanings would be such as we find them in LS (of which "equal to" is an instance). At times, however. we can find in the verb the idea "to bring about, bave the force of"; see, e.g., Eur., Medea 128 (a difficult passage), Herod., 3.89.2, and Thucyd., 6.40.2. In the present passage both meanings seem possible: "when thus expressed it is equivalent to (or, it has the power of) advice." a strengthened form of the demonstrative adverb (bdi, it J cbS! points to what immediately fullows.

..6.,.."

a 5-6 !,-o1y..... Cope, Ross. and Kassel prillt this ill quotatioll marks, possibly because it is an almost "''axov .k 6v is the reading of the codd. accepted by the edd. save Ross, who conjectures TOOTOV. Kassel secludes the whole phrase as an Aristotelian addition.

a 17:

1

mania1J

is a good word here for iy,,,b/llov as a made thing,

and is reminiscent of Isocrates' phrase for rhetoric as a "O''ITOH.V "'eii.ypa (Sophists 12) as something made by the art oflanguage. 2 "Cll 'App.cl5,ov Spengel and Cope read Hal d,' 'Aep&d,ov; Roemer, Hal ; Ross, "al . Dufour and Tovar read as I would read. A repeated ok is likely, but since all the names are used as examples, an omitted el~ is not impossible; see 6Sb 8 : 2. Following the codd. without the insertion ofY>!.

IV . Conclusion and Summary: 69b IS - 69b 32 with emphasis on the nature of voluntary action the goal of which is the real or apparent good or pleasant, in view of this, since the good has already been analyzed (chap. 6), there will now be an analysis of the pleasant (i.e., chap. II)

226

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

68b 1 : 1 XIl't"l)yoP'Il~ XIII .mOAOY'Il~ See 500 36 - 59a 10 passim. In this third and final section of the fitst book A. introduces us to an analysis of judicial rhetoric in chaps. 10-14. In chaps. 10-12. he considers the motives and character of wrongdoers and, briefly, of those WIonged. In chap. 13 he gives us a classification ofjust and unjust .cts. In chap. 14 he takes up the question of the greater wrong. . z .,. 1V xIII 1tov....~ is the reading of all the codd., four of the edd., Spengd, and Cope. Ross reads 6lc1&TB~, following Richards, who gives no significant· reason for his conjecture. In the light of what A. says at A 13, 73b 33-36 and at EN IIIIb 6--10 and 1112. 14-15, l,,&v'lllYJao!'''''''''' i.•.• B I-It. A knowledge of the emotions and feelings (such as ang.r or vindictiveness mentioned abov.) also enables us to recognize bad emotions, or good emotions gone wrong; see A.'s conunent at 69' 9-JI.

b 26-27 ""L"1Iv .•• ..Iv..~

This is substantially a repetition of 68b 3":..5. His effort in what follows in this chapter will be to .xplain Tivo, (see the chapter outline), but in doing so he is at the same time indirectly explaining "oo~ 'XO'TS~. But only indirectly; h. do.s not formally take up 3Z'cO, 8XOllU, or Hal dva~ until chap. 12. .

l.,,,a

b 28 ,,(""'" - "0'" picked up at 68b 30 and 68b 32 in ,,&..a "ai "ota: not only the particnlar things which motivate men, but also ",hat kind of things theyar•. The reason is given at 68b 29/£: MiAo. yae .•.

b 29 : 1 lYX.LpoiiaLV a&L".LV "put their hand to doing wrong." .,:,~ governs .."."Tio. ('''Ti). 68b 30. 1 Wv The antecedent is n6aa Hal nola 1:001:(.(1)', 2 oni> 8€ ""OAOYOU!'Evct> Sc. .".=io.. From A.'s use of "aT'1yoesr. and dno.loyer.8ae (sec 58b 8-12) it is clear that we are looking for material proper to judicial rhetoric. A practical and detailed example of the procedure is Cicero's analysis of Clodius and his activity in comparison with Milo and his actions in the Pro Milone.

b 31 :

68b 3S

231

COMMBNTARY

b 32 - 6ga 2 "civ~ 5iJ . .. 5.' cU.oyov Obviously. if we are to d.,. tennine causes for human action (Tlv., 'v.xa, 68b 27), we must know the nature of human action. This A. analyzes here in what is the most detailed effOrt in his work to classify the facets of human action. We find the idea in Plato, and elsewhere in A. but not in such detail; see, for example, Plato's La.vs 888e-889c and A:s All. Post. 94b 34 - 95a 9, Phys. I98a 5--6, Met. I032a 12-13 and I070a 6-8, EN I099b 20-23, III2a 32-33, and II40a 14-16.

I I I I chance

(aj involuntary All human action is

compulsion

necessity

nature

habit

(b) voluntary

rational

appetite (6e. brief analysis of each of the seven Illotives, beginning with the involuntary and concluding with the voluntary. Cope, Introd., pp. 218-33, studies each motive in detaiL In the Physics (195b 31198> I3), A. explains the meaning of TUm at greater length but in substance just as he defines it here; he tdIs us that with TVX'1 we cannot assign a cause to the event (U'"' and "aT' atlT~' l':, Metaph}'sica; or Wait'>:, on An. PO!t. 83b 38, for a discussion of the meaning of necessity in A.). A. reduces these four meanings to the one which we saw at S7" 22 - s7b 2 r, 3lld to a degree seen here: namely, that which cannot be other than it is. The other three meanings, as he says at Met. 10lsa 3S-36, come from this meaning. I accept the comma after pta as read by Spengd, Roemer, Dufour, and Ross (Cope, Tovar, and dva""ai.v the at ,ba""a, of Kassel use a period). Kassd alone reads for cod. F.

T.

""'v yeltp . • • This line, attributed to Evenus of Paros, is quoted again by A. in BE I223a 30-]3, and at Met. 10Isa 29-30, together with a similar line from Sophocles. Evenus was apparently an degiac poet and a sophist living iD. the time of Socrates, as we would gather from Apol. 20a-c and ph..J. 6od. His death is thought to have followed shortly upon that of Socrates in 399. He is mentioned in the Phaedrus (267") as one of the rhetorical technographers involved apparently with study of the parts of speech (see S4b 18 : 1). The line quoted in our text appears among his elegies (Hiller & Crusius, no. 8) and among the degies of Theognis (ibid., line 472, where zefj,..' is read in place of our nea.",..'). a II

a 12 AU"'lP~

sc. clvdl''''1 .lval from 7fJa 3.

a 13 i8,o8",a,v The subject of this verb is not TaiiTa as one might believe from some interpretations (although it is possible grammatically; see S. 9S9), but "men." Strictly speaking, men are the only ones who can form habits: "unless men have become accustomed to them."

a 14 :

1

"OLEi

ij&Q

See 69b r6-r8.

Telt 5' ivu"'l"lu It is interesting to see that A. has given each of the nouns in 7fJa I I a pair of opposites in 70a 14-16: e.g., b5 (elal. a•... if.",,) apparendy in an effort to tie the entire statement between 70a 19 and 7Oa:>7 closely together. Ross's punctuation and parentheses can be accepted.

0.,,"

1 """,op ,xl . •• IIn:mpxou.,..., This phrase explains cp~a••• Natural desires are "like those present in us through the medium of the body."

a 21 :

2 olov " ... XCll "OLV" A. here exemplifies what he means by at ... ,jnciqxovaao: "as, for example, thirst for nourishment or hunger for nourishment." Spengel is not happy with the text at 7fJa 21-25 (010' .•. 0.,,"); nor is Kassel (see 7Qa 18 : z), who also brackets M."a "al ",'va. However, the text is well attested and makes sense as we have it. Spengel's major problem was with di."a "al "".a, which he said are not InillvfJia., but are caused by them. But A. uses the same expression when speaking of desires at B 12, 89a 3-9 ; in De an. 4I4b II-I3 he calls them 1".6vfJia., as does Plato in Rep. 437b-e.·

a. . 22 xal XIX'- ExIXG-rOV ... E:7u8ufJ.LUt; i.e., "corresponding to each kind of nourishment there is a form of desire"; as there are specific nutritive needs, so there are corresponding desires. a 23 xed til sc. b,,01J~la,. A. mentions desires with respect to taste, sex, touch in general, smell (fragrance), hearing, and sight. a 24 [€u",liu.~l Vablen following Muret deletes this word found in all the codd. because he cannot explain it as a genitive. It could be an accusative (see Plato, Tim ....s 560) and explanatory of oerfJ>1" which in fact is frequendy used for foul rather than pleasant smells. Our word, however, looks like a gloss. Though one would like more certainty before secluding it, the fact is that all the edd., Sponge!, and Cope bracket it.

/l.,...

a 25 : 1 is the reading of the codd. accepted by the edd., except Ross, who reads 8era, (c£ 70a 19). Spengel and earlier editors would agree with him. Reading with the codd. we can take the relative pronoun as a cognate accusative: "all the desirings which they have."

70a 28

COMMENTARY

251

2 .K .. aU "€LC,8ijvClL explained by the following sentence. The verb clearly, in the conte.'Ct, indicates the exercise of reason and thus the translators' phrase: "from being convinced," "from conviction." See Studies, pp. 3-5. The role of reason ill persuasion is stated well at De all. 428a 22-23: uFurtb.ermore, every opinion implies conviction, conviction implies that we have been persuaded, and persuasion implies reason." Hicks's comment (p. 464) is also to the point: "There cannot be belief Ii.e., nilTjMa. As can be seen in both cases the present ("ae&.Ta) has a role (see 70b 9-10) which bears out the comment from EN cited in 700 J2. Together with our lines here on the place of memory and anticipation in ."periencing pleasure, one should read Plato, Phileb. 34-36.

,.V7j-

"to 1'E'l'ci. ~oU~O i.e., "the sequel." As we have seen, a common use of the article with a prepositional phrase forming a substantive. S. 1153C.

b3

b 4 ,i),).' .•• "Ovc.Jv Eur., Andromeda, frg. IJl, ed. Nauck; see Cicero's "suavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria" (De jill. 2:]2.105).

Od. 15.400-401 (see the entire passage, n. 398b 5-6 ",.Til ...•6pyn 402). Line 401 is not exact and may be a "lapsus memoriae" on A.'s part; it is further confused by the fact that we should (as Spengel notes) have the indicative with "''laa,. ••or; on. If we read with Kassel """"B'O~ aaTL~, we have, in his words, a "forma inaudita" in o~. Both passages cited by A. are commonplaces, as the citation from Cicero above Sllggests, and illustrate Vergil's "Forsan ct haec olim rneminisse iuvabit" (Aen. 1.203). See also Sen.,

,..r,,.••

COMMBNtARy

Hercules [Furms] 656-57, and the fragment of Soph., Tympanista., no. 574, ed. Campbell

b7:

J 3

'roUTOV &' ut"rlOV se. ean. sc. EI1',",; the subject of this clause is the followIDg

a... ~&U

phrase. See 62a 36; "at is intensive. 3 Ked ..o "" ExE." K""6v 4 ..ci &' tv 0..,,[&. i.e., things hoped for. This passage carries on the devdoprnent of 70a 32-34 (OlI1'r' ... l'iUo.Ta) which was begun with TcZl''''1I'0VS1ITd at70b I. We are to understand with it ~6ia lan. from 70b I. b 8 : 1 3.." "'''po".." Take circumstantial participle as temporal (see S. 2069) and translate: "all things which whenever they are present." a cognate accusative (for the use of the adjective, see a "Eyen.. S. 1573): "to confer great delight or advantage." The phrase should probably be taken closdy b 9 : 1 K"l &vEl> "U""l~ with what precedes as a qualification of (~'PelB" at 70b 8. On 11•." l*,,!, cpo 63a 23-24. and 64b 23-26, 65b II-I3 on its assumed rdationsbip with the pleasant. a "' ..p6v.... See 70b 8 : I.

1 KCll o..",U;o"..,,~ B~'Peat'B' with this clause:

b 10 :

"al responsive: "also"; we are to understand

"also delight ..."

a w~ ... na>.u See 7Ila 4 : I. 3 &.0 This sentence down to 70b 15, >1TTO. (after which there should be a period; I note that the edd. so punctuate, e.'1 would refer to judicial rhetoric, some of the bad aspects of which A. attacked in chap. I. In our present chapter (together with chaps. 10, 12-14) by this detailed analysis of the subject matter ofjudicial rhetoric A. places before us many of the comple:x intellectual challenges of legitimate judicial rhetoric. On ee.tIT.,,>1, see 718 1 : z. 2 -1)&.,.. is the way this word is read by the codd. and the edd. e:xcept Ross, who reads old/a. On the question of orthography, see the comment at 61a 3 : z. 3 .le'''P.£VOL~ "..1 &uv"fL£vO'~ These are closely related, i.e., the repeated activity develops the ability. It is both which make the action second nature and therefore pleasurable; sec 70a 3-9. a 7: 1

a8:

... p.>\

See 61a 28 - 61b 2. Sec 6ra 25-27. 3 ...;;,. -I)&i!J'nI>V See 6zb ZcrZ2; on the constrUCtion, sec 678 22 : 2. I

z .6&01;1..

S... "oLoii ..o~ oto~ sc. 8n To,oiiTd~ ('tln) old~ «tIT.) n7, and one would have difliculty in demonstrating that what a writer makes in any way permits" comparable relationship of sameness with its source. On the idea of ",6.B'1"'~ Tax.1a, see Studies, pp. 88-89. b 10: J cd "'.p."',........ For defInition and "-'!:planation, see Poet. 14S2a 22-29, and F. L. Lucas, pp. IIC>-I3. Z "'''pm ...xpclv i.e., "being saved by the skin of one's teeth"; see "a~6., LS, lIT.s.b. Cope's note (p. 219) on this use of the preposition together with examples is good. We also have an explanation of the phrase from A. himself at Phys. 197" '7-30.

b

I2 : J

..;,

see 70a 3-4-

x ...... cpu.nv

iJ&U

i.e., uthat which is natural is pleasant";

7Ib 19

Z '«Inl . .. bntrBTal is always cited as part of the lines of Euripides; see. e.g., Problemata (attributed to A.) 917a 13-I4; Plato. Gorg.484e. We also find the third line (iu part) in Akib. II I46a; Plutarch. Mo,alia SI4a. 630b. (b) mstr .. is read by Ross without any explanation for changing the .... traTa, of the codd.• which is rcad by all the other edd .• Spengel. and Cope. See 7Gb 3S : z. See 6"7ll 22 : z for construction. 3 civ.a,~ On the idea. see 60a 240 Kassel alone of the edd. follows Spongel in sccludiug ~al " riAW~ TW. >iMw •.

h-34:

1

"Ii " .. ,Sui

z ..;;", "IiS""'v

b 3S livayxl) x ..1

"at as at 7xh S.

72a z : 1 lv ...ol~ ... "O''1 .. 'xij~ as also at r 18. I9b 6-7. We do not have this passage from the Poetics. It is thought to have been a part of his treatment of comedy promised at I449b 21-22. We have a definition of the laughable at 1449" 32-37. 2 elpJja8", & Cope, p. 224, remarla. this is the first instance in the Rhetoric of this form. which is rather common to A. and which denotes that the action or process "has been completely gone through aud finished. and that that is sullicient. and no more need be said or done about it"; see. e.g .• Plato. Phileb. S7C; Xcn.• Mem. ,(,2.I9. Cope cites instances of other verbs usiug this third person imperative passive with this sense of a fully completed action.

CHAPTER

I . Introduction: 72a 4 - 72a 5

12

the kind of people who do wrong and the kind of people who are wronged

II . Development: 72a 5 -73a 37 I·72a

5-72b 22

(0) 'Po 9-721 II

(h) 'Pa

II -

721

(,) 721

>I -

7" II

21

(d) 7>0 3J -7.b ..

(0) 7.b '3 - 730 27 (h) 73a 27 -73" 37

the wrongdoers are those who, considering the act possible, believe they may (i) go undiscovered, (ii) pay no penalty, (iii) pay little penalty, or receive other compensation: possibility will be seen later (ii) pay no penalty (i) go uncllicovercd (iii) pay little penalty, or receive other compensation

the wronged, and the kinds of wrong action: the wronged tbe kinds of wrong aesion

III . Conclusion: 73a 37 - 73a 38

wv...

'P8 4: 1 iv.XCI This goes back to the statement at the end of chap. 10, 69b 20-32, which in tum picked up the opening statement and the first subject to be discussed in chaps. 10-14: namely, 68b 3-4• " ... ~ 8£ I!xov, ~v C.,plav .l,a•• But the second member is introduced by the stronger adversative particle, &.l.l' (S. 2781.); see 7.... 2.

a 9 ij

cr....

i.e.,

i/ (T•.sT.'~) eli••

lv ~o;~ .G ......pov i.e., B 19, 920 8 - 92b t4z xo.vu See S!)a II-I3, and Studies, pp. 32-39. Ross, Kassd, and Cope encl~ 72. to-II, ".wei ... AOy",v, in parentheses.

a

10: 1

72a 19

COMMBNTAlIY

a II "':'..Dl A. begins here a catalogue of those wrongdoers who think that they will pay no penalty; it ends at 72a 21.

.",dv

a 12 : 1 6UVUI'-EVD' namely, the kind of facility so apdy described in the opening pages of Plato's Apology (170 - ISa). As !socrates says in Against EuthYllus s: "I think that you all realize the fact that those who are clever speaker>, since they have no money, are especially the ones who instigate. these malicious prosecutions, whereas the prosecuted are Wlable to speak but are able to pay money." z at 'JCpClK~1)CO' limen of action." As we see at 73a 5--6, it is the poor speaker and the i"eso/ute person who are wronged. . a 13 : 1 l!1'-1<E'PD' 11 On the usage, ,ec S. 2346d and N. 2; or LS, £I, B.VII.a. i.e., friends, etc., who are in the categories jnst 3 "O"';:;"oT.p'" The two reasons are: (a) personal advantage outWeighs any personal shame (72b 2--3); and (b) the sense of doing what is good outweighs the physical punishment (72b 3~).

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIc' I

b ']-8 4p.cpo"£F"'~ lxov,,€~ . . . lIeEa,~ i.e., "men have either attitude of mind Idl''I'oTBe'''~ lxo.T.,], yet the men are, not Inl». o"X] the same, but opposite, in character." As was pointed out at pb 6, one group acts with a sense of doing the good, the other without any regard for it. Indeed, such individuals as A. deb 9 ttollcix,~ elttO"E""X'IXa«~ scrib.. them (010' d.al'ax.uO ..£, 72b 10) sound like born losers in their dforts to do wrong. b 9-II dal yelp ... el~ap.ciXEa8a, Ross alone includ.. this in parentheses. iv ..a;:~ "o".u..a,~ i.e., in comnnttmg wrongs. O[OL This conjecture of Victorius' for the 010. of the codd. receives support from Moerbek:e's translatioo, "qui victi penitus volunt vincere," and is patently correct. For the only thing wbich would explain this kind of wrongdoer is that he belongs to that kind of person (010') who is convinced that ifat first you do not succeed ..• 3 el~CI..ciXEa8cll the infinitive with 010.; see, e.g., Dem., Aristogeiton A, 2: 010' TO~~ "o"'leo~, 'I'u", " ..I ar{>C.w. Vergil expresses the idea in our verb when, in speaking of the Trojans, he says: "quos nulla fatigant I proelia nee victi possont absistere ferro" (Aen. II.306-307).

b 10:

1

2

b 12:

1 2

,,1> x£p&O~ a.xpCI"E;:~

sc. n ..goxe7il'a. See 68b 14 : 2.

b 13 : 1 elxpClalCl C£ 68b 14 : 2. This is moral weakness; A. discusses it, and moral strength (AY"ea ..,..), at EN II4Sa IS - IIS2a 36. 2 ",.pl tt~"CI oa...~ 6p"yov"a, i.e., moral weakness is something "concerned with all the objects of man's appetitive drives." What is said here (72b II-16) about moral weakness and moral strength is in accord with the statements of the Nko,.eu:he•• Ethics. b 14 : 1 "o6vCl~"iov See pb 3. 2 i\~ Because of the contrast with lianea ,,01 xeo.,WTeea, this carries the meaning "inunediately and for the moment"; see Soph., o. c. 6I4-6IS. b IS : 1 x ..l .:.cpo.,I'OV Ross alone conjectures " ..I ciJcpil.l'o•. It really is no more necessary than oE would be with 'I'eo"l'w-rseo, in the next line. 2 xpovLciJ«p.. C£ 64b 23-26, 30. 3 lyxpCl".;:~ These are the morally strong men who are analyzed in conjunction with morally weak men at EN II4sa IS - IIS2a 36: the morally strong men abide by the results of their deliberations and decisions. On the idea in the word, see 63a '7, 66b

20-22.

COMMENTARY

b 17 :

1 .

Suk ""XJ)V

2

Soil'" "piill'"

277

See 6911 32. i.e., those for whom there exists the possibility "of being thought to act ..." 3 S,' ci~ciY"'l~ Since A. mentions tp1la .. explicitly, a.a),,,,), here means ~,a pia., as found at 69b 5-6, and not what is said at 68b 35. See the use of pta.a at 70a 13. 4 SuI< cpuc..~ See 69a 35 - 69b 5 and notes. The three causes we have jusr seen (i.e., rum', d.dy,,'7" and 'I'tla..) were included among the involuntary causes of chap. 10; see 68b 32 - 6911 2. 5 S,' i!8D~ See 69b fY7 and 69b 6: 3. This was considered a voluntary cause in chap. IO. However, if 'I'tla,~ can be considered an involuntary cause, it is clear from the way in which A. wishes to be understood in chap. II, 70a 6-8 (and see 70" 6: 1) that wrongdoers can easily take lOo~ as an excuse since it could fall (in the light of 70a 6-8) into the same

.00,

elass of cause as qWc,,~.

"I'-..

b 18 : I p"'.i~ ... ciS'XEi~ At 68b fY7 there was a definition of wrongdoing (see also 66b 9-n). At 73b 25 -74a 17 and at 74b 2-IO A. repeats it and approaches the idea of a distinction between deliberate, intentional wrongdoing (d~".. '.) and unintentional wrongdoing which arises from misunderstanding (al'aeniv). The latter is also the idea in al'aeTia as we see it in Poet. I453a 7ff. For a brief discussion of al'aeni. in A., see D. W. Lucas, Appendix IV. a ",oii ~,,'..xoii~ See 56& 6, 6Ib 38. We will meet the word in a more detailed explanation at 74a 26ff. Translate as "fair and humane consideration." ENU37b II-I3: ",,0 t",.,,,i~ involves justice, not in the legal sense of justice, but rather as a rectification of what is legally just." ,,0 .",..",i~ is "what the law~ver himself would say about the case if he were present" (II37b 22-23); see II37a 31 - II38a 3. b 20: I .:,~ ~"yxCdDU Understand l.d •• i~ after cL~ here, and also after the next cL~ (see following note). Thucyd. 3.45-4 illustrates the idea. 2 .:,~ ';".p~oAij~ This statement confirms the interpretation given at 6911 13. b 21 ""SoX'l'-oii~",.~ i.e., "those very well thought of"; see 6zb 20 : 2. b 22 : 1 0'; ScSliw".~ i.e., "as those who will not be suspect." Their position is similar to that of those who harm their friends; see 72a I7-20. 2 oi>SEv l'-iiAA~ See 58a I4: 2: "as none the more held in contempt," i.e., "as those held iu the same contempt QS before."'

b 23 : 1 oll...... ~ lXO~E~ This statement (ad".1 ... 20 : 3 and 67" 19-'0. 3

~C; liv't'ClS ... 't'oU't'ouC;

i.e., "as people who are , • ,"

'Pb 37

COMMENTARY

b 33 : 1 Mu...;w A£I..... "Mysian spoil," i.e., easy prey; see Oem., Crown 72. There are many accoWlts of this phrase, and Cope, pp. 23S£, in a long note has most of the references. One story has it that they were defenseless while their king Telephus (of sesquipedalian fame in Horace, Ars Po,L, 96, 104) sought to be cured by Achilles, who had wOWlded him and who alone could heal him. 3 x"l "oU~ . . . "o).Acix,~ sc. a,j""l6i'Ta~. Both instances of T06~ appear only in the Basel edition of Michael Isingrin.

b 34:

1 ci, a conjectuIe of Vahlen's. Spengel and Cope read as Ross does, but both in their notes Wlderstand the infinitive. Vahlen's conjecture is reasonable since it makes explicit what seems to be the intended contrast: -(a) out of fear of the jury they do not choose to ioitiate proceedings; (b) as people detested and despised, they are not able (if they go to law) to win over the jury. Presumably Ross, and more cert.linly Kassel with his PWlctuation, take the verb -with "eoa'e06'Ta. to be ",16.... (72b 37). b 37: 1

cl)"

01 1Io"'eNfI£'IO' x"l cp8OVeNIIoOVoi

.t,,,,,

is presumably the

reading of two good codd. (A, F). The reading foWId in the edd. (except Kassel) is from a corrected copy of A (14th c.): cb~ I'"UODI'S'O' "al '1'60'06,."0' ("as men who are detested and resented"). Cope and Kassel read with the uncorrected codd.; Spongel does the same but changes cli. to cb,. Whichever reading is chosen, this clause must be taken closely with 72b 3S-37 (oE •.• 6...). The cb, •.. '1'60.06,.6.0' reading does this with facility. The cli••.• eluw reading presents us witli a genitive which is somewhat cumbersome but which would be interpreted as "among whom are those who are detested and resented." Z _1 "po~ oG~ For the sake of-clarity we must understand here the main verb of 72b 24: "al (.18.".6u, T.6T.V~) "ed, o1J~ ••• ; see also at 73a 4·

".1-

:>80

ARISTOTLE. 'RmrrORIC' I

73a 7

Take· these genitives as objective 73a I : 1 l\ ..poy6vc.>v . . . cp!Ar.>v with neo<patl..: "concemiJJg their ancestors, or thcmsdves, or their friends." 2 l\ ..O''1Gci........v ... P.U.A'IGciv.."'" These two participles qualify the preceding nouns and have as their ohject the following words: "as men who hamu:d or intended to harm them or their ancestors ..•" a 2

mv

x~8ov't't&&

a 3 ..pocpciG....~

se. (TOtS,:ovr;) cO)' .•.

The pretext of past harm or potential harm is too

frequendyan excuse, as A. says, not for good or just action, but for villainy; see, e.g., a past harm: Pol. 13Ub 8-17. About the closest we can come to a citation of the proverb is from a later period, i.e., Menander (342/341293/:>89 B.C.), Frg. 193: I""I!rJ '1'. ne4<patl/~ TO;; ne!Ua. """Qj~.

"tiT'

a 4: 1 ".d "oU~ . . . C£ 7Zb 37 : 2. 2 ..oU~ p.~ .....OU~ 6£ "the latter - the former," as at 7Zb 26 : 2; see also 6:za 36-37. J tI,S.ov For one reason, see 72a 18-20; for the sentiment, see Theognis (I\. 544-541 B.C.), 1219-20 (ed. Young). Lysias,'Andocides 7, claims that Andocides has the particular gift of doing wrong always to his friends, never to his enemies.

i.e., one's enemies. Isocr., Euthynus 8, uses the a 5 : 1 ..OU~ 56 -IJIU topic as an argument; see 63a 20-21 where it is considered a good. 2 AcplAou~ Apparendy this was followed by a period in the codd., and it is so read by Dufour, Kassel, Spenge~ and Cope. Roemer, Tovar, and Ross join this topic to the next by leaving out any pllllC1:uation. In the light of the threefold explanation (73a 6-7), there may possibly be some justification for doing this. J p.iJ 6£,voU~ EI..£lV See 72a I2 : 1; d...O~ is the usual adjective to describe skill and cleverness in speaking. A facility in speaking on the part of the person wronged could be a positive hindrance to a wrongdoer, as we can gather quite clearly from the fears which Socrates attributes to his accusers (Apol. 17a ff.). To what such facility might descend is delightfully portrayed in Aristophanes' Clouds 8891£ in the exmange between the just and the unjust M'Yo~. a 6 npii~cz. Narndy, with the ability mentioned at 72a 13: ",••tAw. dyed• .,•• From Xenophon's account of Crito (Mem. 2.9) we gather sorne idea of how hazardous life at Athens could be in this regard ifone were a prominent or wealthy person. a 7 oiISlv ,,£pcztVOUG.v out any success.

i.e., they undertake the prosecution but with-

73 a 14

COMMENTAlIY

281

a 8: 1 b"'n!p..ucnv "to keep an r:ye on," agreeing with ol~. These would be people whose major interests presumably lie outside Athens (d'l'a. The other edd., Spengd, and Cope use • period. I would find a period more acceptable to the division of ideas in 73" 2!r]2. 2 l\ xp':'!'-"a,v l\ "pliaEO"V Re-dyeing or repainting (xeml'llO"W) stolen goods makes sense, just as it might also be possible for the ingenuity of a thief to devise ways of altering the goods "by combination" ("eaaBaw). "Combination" seems to be used purposefully to suggest the blending of nonliquid materials. But it is strange that A. uses " word here which he employs mostly in its normal sense signifying the mixing of liquids (e.g., Top. 122b 25-32); one wonders whether "eaaBO"w here could refer to the melting down of precious ores.

a 31 ticp"v(all'

i.e., to make disappear, and therefore "to hide."

a 33 : 1 oI~ &6uicpoPII "indistinguishable from which," i.e., "exactly like," whereas the 81'0,a would be "generally like, similar to"; see its use at 70a 7. i.e., ready at hand; see ssb 36. a 34:

,,"I

30'11 See 73a 28 : 2. IIlaxWov...II, •.. AEY£'v See Lysias, Deftnse Against Simon 3. 3 YUVII'''Wv an objective genitive.

1

2

Il~PE'~ [£l~l ul£~

See 73a 13 : 1. tI~, not found in the best cod., is secluded by Roemer, Tovar, and Spengd; not read by Kassel; accepted by Ross, Dufour, and Cope. sc. ;cal (Ta,lr:a cid,xova,,) Baa . .. : "and they commit 3 xt:ll Gau those wrongs in prosecuting which the victim would be considered a lover of litigation." On tpMod",.i., see B 23, 000 1!r20; Thucyd. 1.77.2; Dem.,

a 3S :

1

z

Against DionysoJonlS '4. i.e., "for which iudulg= is shown." the conclusion to this chapter.

CHAPTER 13

I ' Introduction: 73 b I - 73 b 24 I.

73b 1 -7lb l

justice and injustice arc defined with respect to two no~. laws and persons, :and in each instance in two ways:

(a) particular

{ written unwritten

2.

laws

7lb 4 - 7lb 18

(b) general, i.e., law of nature, this is discussed at 7lb 6-18, 74a 2.1-2 S (a) the individual

persons

f (b) d,e community

II ' Devdopment: 73b 25 - 74b 22 I.

73b 'S - 742 17

justice and injustice with respect to persons (this devdops I.l.a-b), definition of being wronged (ie., injustice): act must be voluntary. knowing'

(b) 73b 38 - 74" 17

since the actions are often admitted bUI their wrongness is clliputed. we must ddine wrong action by showing that it resides in the moral purpose which motivates the act

justice and injustice with respect to laws, specifically unwritten laws (this develops !.z.a-b),

's 's - 74b ..

(0) 743 18 - 743

unwritten general (na,ural) law

(b) 743

unwritten particular law which involves the matter of equity

III . Conclusion: 74b 22 - 74b 23

see 74b 23

286

ARISTOTLE, 'RBBTOlUC' 1

73b I liUC"":'"IITII "acts ofjustice"; see S98 25. Cope, p. 245, wrongly identifies those as "~ust acts."

b 2 C.PLCH.' This does not necessarily mean that A. has so de£ned justice and injustice. ":!,he petteet simply indicates an accepted and still operative norm for specifying them. At 66b 9-11 A. gave a brief definition of justice and injustice, and at 68b 6-24 he de£ned injustice, using as his norms written and unwritten law, the voluntary, and knowledge. All these are norms which he also uses in this chapter. b 3 v6"ou~ &.10 xlIl ",po~ oilS The fundamental criteria (and "eo~ with the accusative indicates that A. has criteria in mind) for determining justice and injustice are: laws and persons. Each of these is further specified (M., a,%.;;~) into particular and general:

(I) Law as a general criterion is what A. calls natural law (73b 6), and, as we see here (see also 68b 11-9), it is unwritten. Law as a parncular criterion can be either written or unwritten (73b 5-; see also 74" 25-26). (2) ''PClSons'' as a general criterion means any collective group of people. "PClSons" as a parlicular criterion is the individual person; it is the human person, as an individual, who is accepted as the nonn for establisbing man's rights and duties within society. At 73b 2.2-24 A. gives an example of what he meallS by both.

In reality A. gives us here two norms by which to determine just and unjust acts: law and person. It is important to remember this because later A. speaks of "kinds" ofjust and unjust acts (e.g., at 74a 181£), and he means acts whiCh violate these two norms oflawand person. Law itself will be divided into three categories: (a) natural (unwritten); (b) positive (written); and (c) positive (but unwritten). Persons are divided into two categories: (a) the State; (b) the individual (on this, see 73b 26). In a true sense there is really only one norm: the person, singular or collective; for law itselfin this area, whether it be nataral or positive, is ultimately derived with reference to the human person. b 4: 1 TOY ply i5,ov ..ov 5. xo,,,o.., See 68b 8 : 1 and 68b 8 : 2. At EN Il34b 18 - Il35a 15 A. speaks of nalural justice (which is our .opa. .0.) as opposed to legal justice (our ,01'.' rala.). Cope, Intrad., pp. 239-42, gives evidence from Greek V',,:iters for the idea of natural law; on this, see 68b 8: 2. z tlilOV jdv This is set off against ,,~ ..d. di (73b 6). We are told here that this particular law is established by each community, and is pardy written, partly unwritten. The unwritten form of particular law is taken up between 74" 26 and 74b 23.

".l-

COMMENTARY

b 5 : J bc.......o,~ ':'P'''"",,ov Le., established for the good ordering of their lives by each and every community. Such a community would be a " ....,.ia like that mentioned at 73b 8. '"daT.', is a dative of agency; for its force, see S. 1488-1489. 2 ~o6"",ov i.e., the 7&~OV ld,o'J'. 3 ciyptupov At 68b 8-9 unwritten law was identified with universal or natural law. Here we find that there is unwritten law which belongs to the class of particular or positive law. An adequate and precise meaning for this unwritten, particular law is given neither by A. nor by those who interpret the Rhetoric. In fact A. complicates the problem at 74a 18-20 by introducing a further distinction on two kinds of unwritten law without giving any clear indication whether he is speaking about unwritten particular law, unwritten universal law, or both. In an elfort to make clear the kind of law which A. is describing, we will look briefly at the three critical passages together: namely, 68b 7-9, 73b 4-6, and 74' 18-20. From these sources we discover that A. divides law in this way: (1) particular, written law (i.e., positive law); (2) universal, unwritten law (i.e., natural law); (i) customary law (3) particular, unwritten law which is either { or (ii) equity (or ."n.t...

" ..a). A. speaks about each of these in the following passages in chap. 13:

(I') 73b 18 -74' 17; (2') 73b 6-18; 74' 21-25; (3') {(j') 73b 5 (ii') 74a 25 - 74b_ 23.

Returning, then, to areatpo. at 73b 5, we can say that A. has in mind customary law, or the institutions, customs, and accepted ways of a particular society for which there is no positive legislation, but which the entire community accepts. It is necessary to note that "particular society" is the connotation demanded by the Greek '"dl1To" tbe,a,,'.o, neo, atlTo';, (73b 5). Thus A. is speaking here of the customs accepted as normative (though unwritten) in a particular society. COluequently I am forced to conclude that many of the references cited from ancient sources for such particular, unwritten law do not appear to be correct. For e,ample, those given by Cope, [nuod., p. 244, and Speugd, p. 178, apply better to unwritten natural law - our (2) above - than to customary law - our (3.i) above - to which IJ.reatpo. at 73 b 5 refers. Thus the following do not appear applicable as references: Dem., Crown 275, Aristocrates 61, 70 (85 is possibly applicable); Xeo., Mem. 4-4.19; Lysias, And.cides 10 (possibly applicable); Cic., Pro Mil.,",

288

AIUSTOTLB, cRHETORIC' I

4.10. On the other hand, Plato, Law! 793a-d does seem to be speaking of customary law. Phillipson, r S3ff., speaks of universal and particular law. b 6 : 1 x ........ laTa loww.ta see Newman, 1 41-44. On the word as it appears in the PolitiC!, see Susemilil & Hicks, who say (po 138) that it "denotes chiefly •.. I) the voluntary combination, association, or cooperation of free men with each other in objects in which they have common interest ... 2) the associated body, the members who compose the

union ..." 3

auv81jX1)

See 60a IS : " and Pol. 1280a 38 - 1280b 12, 12840

41; at I276b 7 we meet the phrase 1eowOJlIial' "al avv6saw.

b 9 : 1 'A"",yOvrj of the play of the same name presented by Sophocles (ca. 496-406 B.C.), possibly in the year 441; see "Sophocles" in the OCD. 2 'P..l" ....... , AEyOU.... "manifestly means when she says that .••" This is the use of <pat.eTa., which we saw at 63a 8. Our expression here is compendious for <pat.eTa. li"... lirovaa; cpo Eur., Hec. 736.

COMMBNTAlI.Y

b 10: 1 Iln.,P'lp.£voY is the reading of the codd. accepted by four of the edd., Spengel, and Cope. Ross alone read. ';"e'l!'1pivov; there is no reason not to read with the codd.: "in .aying that to bury Polyneices is right, though forbidden." z .:.~ CPUCJE' IJv cb, with the absolute participle: "on the ground that"; see S. 2086d. Antigone assumes that it is right by natural law, and implies that natural law should be the ground of positive law. On ,6'181, see 73b 7: z. b 12-13 0(, ycip .. , ..• cpciV"IJ Soph., Antigone 456-457. For the full import of A:s citation, read 450-460. At 73b 13 A. reads TOVTO for Sophocles' TaVTa. This is an instance of A:. adjusting a citation for his own use as an example of the natural law. In confirmation of this, I note that when he again cites 1. 456, together with I. 458, at 75b 1-2, he makes a similar change at the beginning of 458 which makes it quite clear that he wants an accusative form and not the genitive (TOUTWV) of Sophocles. In each instance A:s changed form fits his own context. b 14 'EfIon£lioxAij~ ca. 493-433 B.C.; see the OCD. Empedodes' cosmology bas been traditionally interpreted as explaining the world process as cyclic and circular, passing through a four-stage process from writy to writy under the direction of two major forces, Love and Strife. Recently it has been argued that a more correct understanding of his cosmology would be ". single linear development in which the impulse toward cosmogony is given by Strife, whereas Love acts as the creative power" (A. A. Long, p. 398). This citation as we read it is no. 135 b 16-17 1iAA....o p.£v .....(,yij~ of the fragments of the pre-Socratics edited by Diels & Kranz. b 17 ..(,yij~ read by Ross, Tovar, and Kassel. aJ codd. is read by Roemer, Dufour, Spengel, and Cope.

l'ii' of the .inferior

a rhetorician of the fuurth century; see the OCD, b 18 : 1 •AA,,,&ciflo"~ and Sblt/ies, pp. 72-75. This "speech," the Messeni.cus, is cited again at B 23, 97" U-12. Cope, p. 247, and Commentary: II 239-40, discuss this "speech," which the scholiast suggests was made on behalf of the Messeniansin their break with Sparta. Such·a break would probably refer to the years 370/369 B.C. when Epaminondas established an independent Messeuia. Radermacher, p. 147, on the other hand, cites our evidence as pointing to a "libellum qualis fillt lsOCIatiS Archidamus," rather than a speech. The Architlamus of Isocrates was possibly published in the year 366. In it Archidamus III, son of Agesilaus, the ruling king of Sparta, urges the position that the Spartans should never cede Messenia. After this name Spengel, Cope, and three of the z 'AAx'&ciflo"~ edd. (Ross and Kassel are the "-,,ceptions) assume a lacuna. If we are to con-

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

73b 23

jecture a lacuna, both Dufour and Tovar indicate it more precisdy, i.e., < ...>. That we are to assume a lacuna is not at all certain, however, in spite of the fact that one was assumed quite early by the ,choliast. Editors read a lacuna on the grounds that since A. cites Sophocles and Empedocles, he should cite Alcidamas as well. At 73b IS-ISa, Ross gives the citation ".Asv6ieo,,~ . .. "",otTJ"'.' wbich from the scholiast and which, from Ross's inclusion of it in his text, we are safe in concluding he accepts as the citation from Alcidamas. Though the incorporation of the words in the text is a questionable procedure, and although they are better omitted, it should be obvious that the quotation ("God has sent all men forth free; nature has made no man slave") is quite apposite to the point at issue. I make this observation because Spengd, p. 179, and Cope, p .. 247, comment rather strangdy. Spengd writes: "egregia sunt quae scholia graeca exhibent ad locum nostrum et supplendum et interpretandum"; and Cope observes: "It SeenIS to be totally inapplicable to the topic which it professes to illustrate, and ..• is at all events quite out of place here." 3 ,.pl>~ oG~ "and with respect to persons"; this picks up the second criterion for justice and injustice at 73b 3.

=

,.pl>~ oG~ ..• i1>p'cr",CI' yap This reading, restored from cod. A by Vablen and Roemer, is accepted by the other edd., who use the same punctuation.

b 18--19

b 19 : 1 &Lp'cr",CI' &LXCl i.e., "there is a twofold division"; cf. 73b 3 where we can also obtain the subject for this verb: namely, Ta d{"a.a "al ..a c!d",a. However, it seems better to take as the subject of this verb the su,bjecr of the followiug we.l1Tat: namdy, the clause at 73b 20, d dB• ... !,.q

ne aTTS '''.

2 , XD'VOv

b 21

See 60b 38 : 3.

"unjust acts," a cognate accusative with d6&xE;i", just as ..a a",a.rh!,aTa is with d."a.on;ea'Y.... The infinitives are subject infinitives of d.xCii, lUT•• ("is possible in two ways"). On ddool!,aTa, see 74b 4-10 and notes. 'rtl8lXlifLCI'fCl

b 22 "pl>~ IvCl XCII c:.pur"ivov This is the individual as the norm of just and unjust action. If the individual's rights are violated, he may resort to the courts. The private legal action of one person against another (or against a group of individuals, a socia~ political club, etc., for example; see 73 b 26: cUAov~) is called in Attic law a 6{"TJ (or M"'T} l8ta); see, for example 73a 13 : z which would be an action brought against 6 nl"",w. of 73b 23.

"eo,

b 23 : 1 "po~...o xo,vOv This is the community, or the collective person, as the norm. The public legal action brought by any qualified citizen

COM.MENT ARY

on behalf of the whole body politic is c:illed a Yeu'I'>i (dymv d~l'dcr...). Refu.ring military service ~rued one to a rea'l'>i acrTeaTBta.; see, e.g., Arist., Knights 440-444. Other public charges were: high treason, accepting bribes from the enemy, disenfranchisement, kidnapping, etc. 2 ,; fIoo'XEllwv This is presented here as a 6~, but the Athenian State was willing to .ccept it as a rea'l"1' since it considered such action an offense also against the common good of the State. This' identification, in certain areas, of the private with the public good is reflected in 'Cicero's comment (In Veff. 3.69.16r): "Quibus in rebus non solum filio, Verres, sed etiam rei publicae fecisti iniuriam. Susceperas enim liberos non solum tibi,

sed etiam. patriae ..." b 2S : 1 &nciv"'""' ... 8'tlP'lflotvwv "with this division, then, of all wrong actions." This phrase gives the tenor of A.'s remarks in this chapter: while ostensibly concerned with the classification of just and unjust acts, he places emphasis primarily upon unJust actions. 2 ICcd ' .",Iyp .. p.p... : .• jj ",.pl 3 The tide or name given to an offense to classify it and to place it in a certain category as a violation of a specific law, and as subject to a certain court of law and certain penalty, is called Td l"'Yeal'l'a. This classification of an action later became known as the l1Tao"l~ oel"~: the definition of the action. The "sellJ (74' 2) would be the action itsdf which must be defined. Obviously all dispute will center on this, as we can see &om 74a 2- is understood. Cope reads ~'1l'da.a; this form not only commands good testimony but also is not impossible: i.e., d'll'oa.a d'll'0ala> is read by the edd. and by Spengel; it is the more probable reading since it is clear rut land is intended.

""'e'a.

a 7: 1 ""I intensive. i.e., the actions of 74'1 H, but, as is seen from what • ..06""'" immediately follows, A. mentions only the first three of these six actions. 3 a''''pl"e", "definitions be established"; i.e., that the actions be given a clear status before the law. It was on the question of such definitions that technographers later developed the a is the reading of all the codd. The Id,V', is generally considered to be a gloss and secluded. As far as I can see, this is the better reading and it is .ccepted by Spongel and Kassel; Cope and Freese also accept it but omit Ixl6'l" entirely. The other edd. (Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Ross) accept the reading from Moerbeke vi. Dittermcyer (see Roemer, pp. xxxi £): ...1 pU.PTI < rovr"" acp' oJ llap_> Jeal af{'BTSe&api[J. • btl (3l.ci(3lJ "for the purpose of," "with a view to"; LS, i"t, B.III.2. J CKf'tt.pLC.p.ij> l ..u ..oG a unique and unusual noun form with which an objective genitive is used: "for the use and advantage of onesel£"

.".1 ... d&.J "Although there are two kinds of just and unjust actions (the written and the unwritten), while the kind for which law speaks [i.e., the written; see A's comment at 542 21-22] has been discussed, there remain two kinds of unwritten just and unjust actions to be discussed." There should be no punctuation after ,r6~ at 74' 18. a 18-2O

a 18 'ljv philosophical imperfect; 63a 9 : I. The most obvious reference is to 73b 4-6

COMMENTARY

:>99

a:>:>: 1 ,;"d&q K ..l £""'''0' Praise (and blame), as we know from chap. 9, is the tribute given to virtue; see 63a 10, 67b :>7. Z K ..l ,....,p.lIIt, See 65a 5 : z. Ross alone of the edd. prints a comma after d-rlptal. It is strange and should not be there. Less troublesome are his parentheses at 74" 23-25. They can stand, although the other edd. read the text without them. J .. ,p... 1 See 6ra 28 - 6rb 2, 65a 7: I,

a 23 8"'p.:.. l

See 6ra 37 - 61b

2.

a 23-25 oT"" ..o .....o,eN.... A.'s examples here are accepted precepts of the natural law, and represent actions which obtain the spontaneous moral approval of men. See also Anaximenes 142rb 36 - 1422a 2; Ear., Antiope, frg. 219, ed. Nauck. a 25 .... 8. This is the second member of the 74a 21 phrase, -rav-ra 6' lad. Tel pi•. We can translate: "and in part those which represent a defi-

ciency in the particular and written law." As A. will go on at once to explain, and explain quite well, this Wlwritten law represents an interpretation of written law; it is an interpretation which is, in general, in accord with the spirit and the mind of the legislator, even though it may be directly opposed to the written prescriptions of the actual law. As his explanation reveals, this Wlwritten law is an effort to preserve true justice as far as it is humanly possible. . See Cope, IntroJ., pp. 19C1-92, 242-44, and EN a 26 : 1 ..0 y ..p b""'XE~ "37a 31 - I138. 3, which is a passage rightly called "an important stage in the history of law" (Gauthier & Jolif, II 433). In the light of what follows at 74" 26-74b :>3, it is interesting to reread A.'s comments at 54" 26-54b 16. The usual translation ofbr.I.I"i~ is "equity," and I will use it in the commentary. L.w as enacted does not always embody the right and just when it is applied to specific cases in certain circumstances. In a legal sense that which is "according to the law" is the just and the right. But in a given instance the legally just may be Wljust and wrong. In such a given instance, "equity" denotes a judgment of what constitutes the just and the right, a judgment determined not by the law in question, but by a higher law, or principle, which frequently is what the generality of men would consider to be by nature the right and the just in tllis instance. Equity, then, is concerned with legal justice, and it is an attempt to s.feguard the truly right and just from the imperfections of positive law. Equity, as opposed to legality, looks to the sense of the law rarlIer than ·to the letter of the law. Equity seeks the same rlIing as r1Ie legislator desired by the law but could not fully achieve insofar as it is impossible to legislate for all circumstances and situations. Equity, in other words, does what the legislator would do were he on hand: it remakes

300

ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' I

7-!a 34

the law. It is a correction of the law, a law which, if applied in a given case, would result in injustice - or even totally irrational action. Equity is a correction of the law made by attempting to follow the mind and the will of the legislator when he wrote the law. Equity says that in a given case the given law does not apply, and that the legislator clearly did not intend it to apply. Equity is a restriction set upon a law because to apply the law in a given situation makes nonsense of the general intent of the law as enacted. 2 60K£L "seems, appears" to people, and does so for some higher reason, as explained in the preceding note. The verb here does not mean "appears to be but is not"; for A. says immediately (74a 27): "Equity ;5 the jwt," a justice which goes beyond jwtice as found in written law. a 27

TCupci

i.e., "beyond"; see 6gb 2.

a 28 "" """" - "" st

adverbial; see 73b 35 : 3. 7tO'~ "'C'Lvl

i.e., "whenever they are unable to give a precise definition, and yet it is necessary, on the one hand, to speak in a definitive way and possible, on the other, to speak only in a general way. Furthermore, whenever the problems are all those which are not easy to define with precision because of a lack of experience - for example, the statement about wounding with iron of a certain size or kind." a 30-33:

O'MV

tJ.iJ ...

a 30 K"SO>'Ol> d".iv, 1'0-1) Ti St C£ EN 1137b 14-16; see also LS, el",l, A. VI. Despite varied interpretations offered of 74a 3-31 (particularly in the translations), the tran5lation given in the preceding note represents what the Greek says. a j I: I K"l 3a" The ~al coordinates what follows with DTav "'~ 6uvanl'ra, ",oelaal.; therefore we must understand: (8Ta." 't'oaaUTa if) oaa ... 2 3.. " ... p~S,ov sc. laT.. Apart from the clearly defined .ction upon which he legislates the lawmaker obviously cannot (and should not attempt to) foresee and provide for the unlimited possibilities which can readily qualify any action. A. vividly describes the impossibility of such a procedure at 74a 33: ".lifetime would not suffice" for it. All such contingencies must be left to intelligent interpretation by those competent to ...-"ecute the intent of the lawmaker. But this procedure also has its drawbacks, as 54a 28 - 54b 16 reveals. For A. rightly constituted law was sovereign in the State. Vet there were instances where it could not be such because of its inability to be precise; see Pol. I282b r-6. 1 ciopla-ro'Y i.e., "if the action, then, is something which cannot be precisely defined." The English tran5lators interpret with Cope in this manner: "If, then, it is impossible to be defInite." But A. from what follows at 74" 35-J6 is speaking with an action in mind such as he has mentioned at

a 34 :

COMMBNTARY

301

74a 32, Td TeWua, u,dljelfl, and this should be made quite clear in translating: e.g., "if the action is beyond precise de6nition." In other words, in such instances the defect lies not in the law, or in the lawmaker, but in the nature of the action; see, e.g., EN Il37b '7-19. 2 &n').W~ E.b~Eiv i.e., "to speak: generally"; on MAw(;-, see s6a 7, meaning (c). The phrase carries the Same meaning as ~a6&'ov elnti., 74a 3O-3I: "to speak universally," "to make a universal statement." In speaking of equity at MM Ilg8b 24-33, A. restates much the same idea. a 35-36

WaTE ...

a 36: 1 .Voxo~

EG'''fCIl.

xlSl clSLXEi

the indicative to stress actual fact.

As a legal term, it means "subject, liable to" the law.

a mo., Four of the edd. read 'UTa' with cod. A; Ross, Spengel, and Cope read iO"Ti with the other codd. Either reading is possible, but 'UTa, expresses the sense more precisely. This is set in contrast to 74" 36 (~aTd 74h I : 1 XII'tel< BE 'tD aA'I8t~ /AB• ... './Ao,). It is precisely this fact which gives validity to, as well as demands, the exercise of equity. Without equity in such instances the execution of justice becomes an act of injustice. See Lysias, Against Theo",nestes 6-20, especially 7; compare also the criticism of Sextus Empiricus (II. A.D. '75-200) in his essay Against the Professors 36-38. 2 'tOu-ro This word refers to what A. has just said at 74a 28 74b I (uv/A(Jai... .•. dd,~.l): namely, in a given instance, to make the judgment between the demands of the written law and the actual truth of the case. b 2-3 .t &~ . • • Iiv8pw"o, With this transitional sentence A. moves on, from 74b 4 to the end of the chapter, to draw the conclusions which follow from his analysis of equity. Each of them opens up further the character, quality, and humaneness of this most necessary qualification of all positive law. See Barker, Appendix II, 362-72, for a consideration ofjustice, law, and equity as they appear in the Ethics and Rhetoric. For d. (74b 2) Spengel, with a reference to 54b 16, 83b '7, reasonably suggests dlj, and it is read by

Kassel. b 1 xlll "OLO' ... 1iv8p..."o, Spenge~ pp. 184-85, mentions two problems with respect to this clause: (a) the absence of a positive to balance the negative, as we find in the preceding clause; and (b) the omission in what follows of any discussion of "inequitable persons," such as that given in the EN passage, e.g., II3ib 34 - Ill8a 3. The first problem is simply a matter of personal judgment on the part of the commentator and carries no real weight. The second is surely incorrect. For by pointing out in detail what kind of person can make judgments of equity (see 74b 10 : 1) A. illustrates the inequitable man by way of the equitable person. See, for example, 74b 4 : 2.

ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' I

302

b 4: J bp' oI~ This is "'/ in the local (figurative) sease: "in cases such as these"; see LS, 1.,,1, B.I.I.i. and S. 1689.2.C. 2 ""YY"rl>I'"IIV lx.LV i.e., "to judge kindly." """y.o,I''1 expresses feeling with another, an effort to make a compassionate judgment of the other. I do not think that """y.o,I''1' here, or in the exPression at 74h la-II ("al Tel ••• "'.. ,,,.,), means anything more than this: compassionate tmderstanding prompted by a sense of a higher law or principle causes precisdy that recourse to the mind of the lawmaker which is the mark of equity .s we find it in the Nicoma,hean Ethics. In fact A. attaches inunediatdy to his statement at 74b la-II the requirement which he demands for equity in EN: look to the intent of the lawmaker. I make these observations because our phrase has been interpreted to mean: "to pardon, to excuse," a meaning which is found for in Thucyd. 3.40.2-3. But such an interpretation changes the nature of equity. For it grounds equity, not in the law, but outside the law. This gives an interpretation of equity different from that in the Nicomachean Ethics, which is the •.""planation which A. is following, as far as one can see, in the Rhetoric. For the evidence on this matter in EN, see Gauthier 11£ Jolif; II 431-33; see also 74b II. 3 beL.'Xij ...IIG..... perhaps best translated: "such cases bdong to equity."

.,,,,.I>ll''''''''· l!.....v Ii..-ux>ll''''''''' I'~ II.... n ..pciAoYCI The text here is read in different ways, and arguments can be adduced for the varied readings. The reading given above is that of Roemer, Dufour, and Tovar, and of Kassd as well except that he reads lUTI a' for lUT... Since the reading of the edd. has the advantage of reproducing a good text, it is preferable. The major variant is introduced by Ross and it repeats in part changes made by Spengd and Cope. However, the substantial sease of the passage is not seriously affected by the reading of the edd. or that of Ross. In the reading which the edd. accept, the interpretation of 74b 5--'7 would be: "(and equity consists in) not judging errors and wrong actions, or indeed misfortunes as worthy of the same penalty; misfortunes are all such as are beyond calculation and not the result of moral badness." In the reading of Ross and Cope - neither of whom presents a reason for it - we have a critical addition: dE,.;;p, l''1di Ta QI'I1enil'aTII Hal Ta ·,Ir~%~l'aTI1. Although the reading is acceptable, my problem with it is twofold. (a) It implies some special relationship between al'aenipIITa and ciWml'l1TI1 which is not justified

COMMENTARY

303

in what follows in the text. For in what follows, it seems clear that A. wishes simply to distinguish among three things: dd'~1i,uaTa, a,uaeT11,uaTa, dTtlvl,uaTa (and see also the passage from EN cited in 74b s). (b) I find Spengel's objection to the reading a reasonable one, and rather than take the space t() explain it I will cite it: "Haec [i.e., Ta a,uaeT~,uaTa "al] vulgo pmt ,u'fJdA posita om. A, recte; nam non modo haec sed etiam dd'''~,uaTa intelligenda

sunt, quod illis verbis omissis fit." b 6 : 1 cil;.ouv with the accusative and the genitive means: "to think something worthy of either reward or punishment" (see, e.g., LS, I). In our context the negative idea of punishment is the dominant meaning. • ci""X",,"''''''' As A. says in EN II3Sa 16 - II3!Sa 9 (mentioned in 73b 36 : I), there are three kinds of harm (pM.pa., II3sb IIf£) done in transactions between men. They are called dnlX'fJ,ua, a,utleT'fJ,ua, and rlM"'f},ua. "Mistakes," "misfortunes" (dTtlx>7,uara) axe the results of a person's action, results which axe in no way to be expected (i.e., they axe "aedAora, 74b 7; see 62a 7 : 1) and which do not have their source in any moral evil in the persn (,u~ "'". ,uoX6'fJela~, 74b 7). In such an instance, the agent is in no way responsible, even though he may be guilty before the law. He has committed, not an ddl"'f},ua, but an dnlX'fJ,ua, and so there is a place for equity. In the EN passage (at II3Sb 12), A. does use rl.,uaeT11,uaTa (best ttanslated as "errors") to introduce both dT1lx~,uaTa and 6.,uaeT11,uaTa (see Spengel, p. 18S), but he distinguishes between the two just as he does in our Rhetor;c passage. As far as we know, the attempt to distinguish degrees of responsibility in PUP'fJ by a study of the subjective dispmitins of the agent is first found in Plato, Laws 86Ie - 8640, although Gorgi.s in his Helen is surely awareof some distinctins among ddlx'fJ,ua, dnlX'fJ,ua, and pmsibly ti,uaeT'fJ,ua; see GDrg., Helen 6, 7, IS, .and 19 in Radermacher, pp. S4. s6~ and S7. See also Anaximenes 1427' 34 - I427b II. b 7 ci","pTij",,,..,, These axe what we would call "faults," implying, as the word does, some personal and moral responsibility. They are not simply intellectual errors. Unlike aTVx>7,uaTa, they have their source in the person as an agent, in some flaw in character which, though it is not morally wrong in any substantial way, can be the cause of harm to others. Despite the extensive discussion on 6./AaeTla in tragedy, whenever one makes the attempt to specify it in a chaxacter, one finds ultimately that it is some such character flaw - or action resulting from such a flaw. As such, it is something understandable (,uiJ naedAora, 74b 8), acceptable, and, in most circumstances of living, harmless to others. But it is potentially dangerous in the wrong situation, and in such a situation can actually be the cause of serious harm to others. Yet as a a,uaeT'fJ,ua it is in no way attributable to moral badness in the agent (,u~ "'". nOV'fJela;, 74b 8).

ARISTOTLE, 'RB:BTORIC' I

b 8 &S.X>1"'....... From what has been said in the previous two notes, it should be possible to recognize "wrong" or "criminal" deeds: they arc the usual consequents ip1/TE "ae&.l0l'a, 74b 9) of the kind of action from which they derive: namely, action whose source resides in moral badness in the agent (lind "O"'leta~, 74b 9). As we saw in 73b 36 : I, there are two kinds of dM"'Ipa. There is a possibility for equity in the second kind (TO dt d.o "aOo~; but see 74b r r), not in the ftrst. from the context it appears that A. has in mind the ftrst kind (Ta 116. "eOeA0lli.ov) here, the truly wrong act for which there is no possible role for equity. b 9-10 ..... yap ... 1CO"'IpICl~ This is the reason why an act is an ddiH'l/pa. It is an act inspired by an rn.Ovpta whose source is ''""'leta (which is synonymous with pox07leia at 74b 7 and which was deftned at 74" II-U). If the analysis at 68b 32. - 69a2 and 69a 1 : 2 correcdy represents A.'s thoughts on the causes of human action, we must conclude that In.Bvllia can also be guided by reason. When so guided, it must therefore rellect knowledge, a necessary ingredient for voluntary action (68b 9-10). Certainly, then, the .,,,OVlIla here at 74b 9-10 must be under some control of reoson. For there can be lW voluntary act otherwise, and the statement on M'''''lIaTa becomes nonsensical Since this '""Ovllia has its source in evil (lind ""'l/ei~), and since people whose acts arise in this source are both IIOxO'leoi and 11.6"'0' (68b 14-16), we can readily understand that their acts are dd'''''lIaTa. Kassel, Der Text, pp. 129£, considers our phrase to be a contradiction of A.'s logic and ethics and omits the clause in his edition of the text. b 10: 1 XClI ...o ....i~ . . . A. begins here a brief listing of the kinds of ju, which may be helpful but is not necessary. Z ""0 d,vExea8uL ci6lxovlL£vOV i.e., lito be patient when one is wronged." See 74b 12. "To be disposed to have an issue decided by b I9 >.ely,!, word rather than by deed." We can also interpret Ml''!' as "reason," and lel',!, as "physical force, violence." In either interpretation, the tenor of this topic (which is made more specific in the following topic) is the stress on negotiation rather than action. b 20 81I1L........ On the idea, see Lysias, Against Diogoito. 2; Isocr., Against Callimaelms I3. Cic., Pro Rosao eomoedo 4.10-13, presents us with a distinotion between "arbitrium" and ~Iiudicium." Arbitration, as A. tells us at 74b 20-22, is specifically designed to do all that equity demands. furthermore, it has more freedom of operation than is possible in a court of law, where, as he tells us at 74b 2I, the juror must look to the strict demand of the law. On this last, see also 540 29-31, 59b 12-15. On the idea of "arbitrator," see Constihltion oj Athens b 21 8LClL-nrni~ 54 and passim. From 53, for example, it appears that most private cases were tried first by an arbitrator. As a matter of fact, Pol. I268b 4-1I suggests the likelihood of such courts of arbitration. We fmd plutarch {Thertlistocles 5

306

ARJSTOT~ 'RRBTOlUC' I

[I 141) praiSing Themistacles for his success in this kind of work; see also Oem., Against DionysioJoTUS 18. b 22 mpilOn

C£ 68a 16 for the idea.

See 72a 2. All the edd. end our chapter at 74b 23. b 23 a .... p,..e... Because of the dose connection of chap. 14 with what precedes, Cope prints the text as a run-on into chap. "4, with no period after ToiiTOV, and with no chapter-break indicated. The new theme of chap. 14, although not as dearly introduced as the similar theme in chap. 7, is sufficiendy distinguished to Justify the introduction of a new chapter heading. Ross's manner of printing strikes one as an unsatisfying compromise.

CHAPTER "4

I· Introduction: 74b 24-74b 30 discussion ofgreater injustice (wrong) which is determined by the greater injustice revealed; this is the slIbj«tive norm and is developed in II.>. the greater injustice committed; this is the objective /lorm and is developed in II.I II . Development: 74b 30 - 7sa 20 I.

74b 30 - 75a

the objectipe norm:

II

(0) 74b 30 - 74b II

(6) 74b 34 - 75' • (c) 75" - 75' l (J) 75' l (e) 75' 4-75' 6

(j) 75' 6 - 75•. 7S' II - 75a :w

II

no punishment or cure commensurate

with the wrong harm done to self by wronged person b=ose of the wrong done to him uniqueness of wrong frequent repetition of the wrong

fact that wrong cawes new legislation the wrong

any excess in

the subjective lIorm: any action which reveals • greater subjective tendency

toward wrong

III . Conclusion: 7Sa

74b 24;

1

37paTa) piYI.....ri (ddl">7paTa) is Tel tlaXI .....a (d",al("paTa) .~ piYletTa (al"al("paTa): the most insignificant right actions are not the greatest acts ofjustice. For the e."l'lanation of this, see 74b 28 : 2. b 28 : 1 ...au..." This refers to 74b 25, Tel AUX"O'Ta (c!dIX>7paTa) ply,etTa (dal"ojpaTa), because A.'s purpose in this chapter is to explain the dM""Ipa p.lC.v, and because his explanation ('" TO;; E",,,,dex'" ... ) will explain only Ta .UXI.....a ply.etTa, and his reason (0 ycie Teta ... ) clearly refers to an dM""Ipa. Cope, p. 261, suggests (and he is followed in this by the tronslatiolls in English) that we interpret in this way: "'The reason of this' (Ta;;Ta is Td Tel .AdXI.....a piy ......a .lval) 'is, that (the greater crime) is virtually latent (in the less) ••. '" On the otlrer hand, it is possible to interpret more simply: lun'JI de l'atil'Q (ra lAdXI.OTa p.ey"n:a) ex -ro;i . .. : "and these most trifling wrong acts are (the greatest wrong acts) from the fact drat (the greatest) are contained in them potentially/' On this last, i.e., EX TOV •• " see the next note. 2 olx nu lw,.,ci;PX.LV 'i 'UTlV lau,~ (ddl"'7,.a "d. l'Qq Hal d6••aTOV: "that wrong act for which there is no cure is a greater wrong; for it is a wrong which is hard, indeed impossible, to deal with." This surely is confirmed by 74b 33; see 74h 33 : 2. Between 74b 30 and 74b 33 tbe fact that one cannot cope adequately with such an action constitutes it a greater wrong. 2 &IXI)v At 74b 20 this word means "trial or legal process." The phrase M"1JV Aa,.pav... more commonly means "to take or exact a penalty"; see LS, Aa,.p&vw, I.I.C. But because of the statements in 74b 33, it is diflicuIt to see how tbe phrase here can mean anything more than "to have recourse to • legal trial, a legal process." On the kinds of trials, see Whibley, pp. 481510; the article "Dike" in the OeD; or Adam, pp. 334-43.

,..'C6.

h 33 :

1 2

4vlaorov yoip i.e., for such an dM"'7,.a ,..'C07 is irreparable. "yc.p &IXI) xcd x6b.ns xcd I .... 'S is the reading of cod.

A, which Ross alone of the edd. accepts. Cope and the other edd. (although Roemer is not certain) read with tbe other codd.: " l'Qq dl"'7 ~al "ciAal7l~ rauo~. All the English translations follow Cope, and are not translations of our text here. If anything is to be read, surely tbe text of cod. A is correct, as Spenge!, p. 189, acknowledges. Moreover, "ciAauo~ is to be understood as it was used at 69b 12-14. The point of A.'s argument is tbat the wrong act is greater because there is no legal redress (61)ipaTl is wlderstood; compare tbe use of T'P>iU'" at 75" 1-2. the personal construction, S. 1982. z &IX.. ,OS h 36 : 1 EO<pox).jjs At r 18, 19a 2.6 a certain Sophoeles is mentioned who is dearly a member of the probouloi and probably identical witb the one mentioned by Xenophon (Hell. 2.3.2). Aside &om these two passages all other references to Sophocles in our treatise can easily refer to the dramatist. There are two questions: (a) Is the Sophocles here the same as tbe one at I9a 26? and (b) If he is, is he someone other than the poet? There is no dear answer to either question. If the Sophodes here is the same as the SophodC$

312

AllISTOTLE, cllHETORIC' I

75> 3

of 19a 26 and therefore one of the Ten Probouloi (413-4II B.C.), those who follow Wilamowitz (I 102n6) will say that he is the dramatist. others - Cope and Spengd (with their followers) - will say that he is some statesman and orator who was a member of the Probouloi. On this last, we do know of a Sophocles, son ofSostratidcs (Thueyd. 3.II5.5), who was quite active, known as a general in the fifth century, and banished in 424- Gomme (11431) thinks that this Sophocles may have been the member of the Probouloi mentioned by Xenophon in the Hellenic. passage cited. But this is questioned by others. A. for Euktemon, we know of one who was arclron in 408/407 (Xen., Hell.

I.2.I).

z """'Iyopbiv In the circumstances which A. gives, it is not possible to determine from the word whether Sophocles is acting privately or as a public advocate; see, e.g., Pol. 1322b II, Constitution of Athens 54.2. Either seems possible, although 75a 1-' (especially vPe,aeel" and see notes) suggests a public trial. 75'1 1 : J 6(3p"r8d~ See 73a 13 : I. • ..,,,>\a&lv Le., to "assess a penalty." Obviously, then, the 61"'1 was an d1'd.. np1JTO', one in which no penalty was set by law. If there is a penalty established by law, the legal process is called an dyd.. dTlP1JTO~. For an idea of the procedure in an dyd.. Tlp1JTO', see the antitimesis in Plato's Apology (35e I-38c r). There, after Socrates' defense, the prosecutor is allowed to speak again in favor of the penalty which he demands. The defendant replies to this by proposing a counter penalty, the d.n-rlP1/a,~. The usual technical language demands npiiaBa. for an accuser (or defendant) and npa. for the dicasts; see LS, nfJ&co, III. But since we find the active form at 7:5> I and 75a 2, the use is apparently deliberate on A.'s part. 3 D.ci"f"tovo~ sc. T.p~paTo~; the genitive is originally a genitive of price. The TtfJ1/pa sought would be BdvaTo,. a 2: 1 .orl"1)aEV See 75" 1 : z. See 68a ID-rr where these same three inz "Ovo~ ... o).lyc.>v stances are noted as topics for demonstrating the magnitude of an action. "3 : 1 Xlll ..I> "OUcixl~ Repeated action is indicative of an inner di.... position toward the act. See 68a 13-15 where we are told what ,"olldx., would ~rdinarily indicate. All the edd. follow Spengcl here in brackNiDg this because, z ~YII as Spengcl argued, "fJ.ieo> quaerit"r .•. positivo grad,,; ,,"llus est locus." All the codd. and Cope read Jdya, which may possibly be correct. We may grant that in this chapter, which, like chap. 7, formally treats of the topic of degree, one should not dismiss Spengcl's comment. But we saw in chap. 9 that A. moves back alld forth between the positive and comparative degrees; see,

CQMMBNTARY

313

e.g., 67a 23-28. Further, I find it interesting to note that when speaking of "frequency" as a way of intensifying pr';'e - i.e., making it greater (68a 13-14) - A. uses the same word: e.g., "al ,I "oAl"".~ Td a~Td "aT sc. ,01''1'. On the concept, see 73b 4-I8, and 73b 6 : lff.

a ,,8 : 1

a 29 : 1 XIIi TOL~ "".'X'''T.pO'~ The "at coordinates equity with natural law, and adds another and different dement (TO dm.,,,i~), something which is different from natural law and to which we must have recoune. The two are also separated at 7Sa 31-32. This is not apparent in the common inteTpretation given to the phrase: see, e.g., the Oxford translation, "we must appeal to the universal law, and insist on its greater equity and justice" (Roberts, Rhelorica, p. [641; emphasis added). a XIIi &'XIl'OT.pO'~ This "at is not really copulative. It is used often by A. to join two words in which the second explains the first: "we must use the more equitable interpretation. that is to say, the more just." The reading "al Toi~ m"''''O'Tieo,~ "al 6,,,a,oTi~o.~ is that accepted by four

3 20

ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' I

of the edd. and Spengel. lin equally good reading. "at TOr~ 17... ,,,e(1 di~ d,,,a ..Tie"~, is read by Kassel and Cope. 1 K,,13'n Something must be understood before this repeated use of "aI8... ,. which we find at 75a 31. 75b 3. 5. 7. etc. For the first time since he began his topical analysis of the subject matter (chaps. 4-14) in each of the three genera of rhetorical discourse A. uses this kind of expression. The most obvious candidate for the understood word. or phrase. is 'I'av'eov rae . .. from 75a 27. After a careful testing I was at first convinced that <pav.eov was tolerable but really not fully satisfying between 75a 29 and 75b 8. The other candidate was k" ...eo. at 75b 17. A check on the translations (in English; Dufour and Tovar) reveals that they compromise by using both <pa'.ed. and ',,,do •• and mosdy the latter between 75a 29 and 75b 8. While I believe that 'I'aveedv can be used in each instance down to 75b 8. and. in fact. I prefer it at 75a 29 (see 7sa 29 : 4). there is something to be said for the use of l."TAo. and it is this: A.'s method of analy';s in this chapter on atechnic proofs is to olfer in the case of each a series of particular topics which can be used if the ",trn:,~ does. or does not. favor the speaker. Down to 77b 10. wherever the iJ... , clause has no introductory verb. the verbal adjective ""Teov clearly seems to be understood by A. In addition to the evidence on hand. a further reason is to be found at 77> 29-30. There are a few instances where another verbal adjective is introduced: e.g.• at na 23 A. uses <paTio. with the infinitive construction; at 76b 20 G".",TBOV with a dilferent construction; and at 77b 6-7 GvvaxTtov introduces the an clause. The translation of the neuter verbal adjective is personal: "one (a person) must say. state"; on this. see S. 2 I 52. From the character of the statements in this first b60k. a translation in the third person is preferable; yet the English translations insist on the second person, e.g., "you must .. 0" 4 TO YVWfLlI Tij oiplGT'/l Ross alone of the edd. uses quotation marks. We translate: "It is clear that the phrase 'to decide in accord with my best judgment' means this ..." Understood with the phrase TO 'Y'WfJTI detrn:n. which appears at 75b 16-17 and 76a 19. is "el..... or d"'a~.... which often occur with it, as we can see atB 25. 02b 34-35. A.'s statement at 02b 31-33 is more fully explained by Oem.• Ag. Aristocrates 96--97. In a good passage on rule by law. Pol. 1287",8 - I287b l5. A. speaks of the way in which law teaches men to decide and judge "to the very best of their judgment" (\

i.e.• 4TIVa; compare this with S6b 36 : z. The negative is redundant; see S. "740.

b II : 1 a.l"Pi~OAO~

i.e.• 0 '01'0,. On ambiguity in the law. see Auctor ad Herelln. I.Il.3D, 2.Il.I6; Hermogen.es, IIeel E,aas" 62.-63. Cope,.Commentary. III 58-59, discusses ambiguity. This "very elliptical" sentence, as

Cope. p. "73, calls it, must be completed, and one of the ways which he suggests makes sense: e.g., ~a! Bl dl''I'ifJoA.o, (a V0l'0" xe1/l1Tlo. a~Tq;) . w"n I1Tee'l'etV (a~Td.) "al .•. For the translation, see the following note. 2 C. ....E .... pE lSII;«,SIIL . . . cl!PX"""" the subject of an tmderstood {llanTS!. OniBle... cf. 69b 18, 70.6 and 13. For the idea in it, see 69h 16 : 2. See Pol. 1269a 14-"4, which speaks to the point made here. 2 ",I>. "'..~ ~61'-"'~ ".rpili",.p"" Thucyd. 3.37.3-4, is very much to A.'s point. h 25

Ih"'pl"S",

See p.a 2 :

2.

h 26: 1 I'-cip'I:"Up~; d",~ 5,,,,,,,.1 On witnesses, cf. AnaJrimenes 143 I b 20 - 1432a 12. Spenge!, p. '95, asserts th.t subsequent rhetoricians did not follow this division of A.' s, citing as an example Cicero's division of testimony into divine and human (Part. orat. 2.6). On the general question of evidence, see Bonner, Evidence in Atheni." Courts, and Bonner & Smith, VoL II, chap. VI, "Witnesses." VanBeek makes a brief comparison between A. and Anaximenes on the meaning of witness. 2 .1 I'-~ "IIA .. ,.I explained by 75b 28 - 76a 7. The development of an idea by A. should be attended to here because it demonstrates once again the orderly progression of his thought. For example, 75b 26 -·76a 17 discussion of the lcinds of witnesses 75b 26 - 75b 28 geoeral division: ",cJenJe'~ da .. ~.nol (a) tsb 28 - 76a 7 naAalo{: RO''l-rd", ;etl1uE1, rpallB@ai d.U.mll YJ'Q)Qlpwp (1) 75b 29 - 7sb 3S ".,,,,do (2)?6a I -?6a 7 "'e/(1EI, rpaveea/ (b) 760 8 - 76- 16 "I!o.~aTO' . 76a ·,6:" 760 '7 conclusion on each kind of witness. 1 K ..l "'.U~ 2 I'-''''Ex'''''''''~ and 76a 12 : 2.

h 2r:

i.e., 01 neoatpaTO!, as 76a 8-16 indicates. K,~5u~.u See 76a 12-13 and 76a 12

",.u

explained at 75b 29-35. h 29 0.."", lillwv Y""'pll'-"'"

explained at 76a

'-'7.

h 29-30: •AS,!"",., 'Ol'-~P'P The reference is to the action of Solon (ca. 640 - ca. 560 B.C.) in effecting a decision (perhaps arotmd 600 B.C.) in favor of Athens on the island of Salamis in the long struggle between Athens and Megara for possession of the island. See Solon's elegy on Salamis in Diehl & Beucler, no. 2. As the story is told, Solon cited Iliad 2. 557-58 in support of Athens' claim. The citation comes from the Catalogue, which, in fact;· is considered by some to be an important historical document; see "The Trojon War"· in CAH, 112.342-50. It is interesting to follow the recorded account of these two verses as it appears between 50 D.C. and A.D. 230. According to Strobo (64/63 B.C. - A.D. 21; see the OCD) the second line, as we

COMMENTARY

possess it, was not accepted as genuine by the critics (The Geography 9.I.IO [C394]). Strabo gives the line as the Megarians read k This line can be found in any critical apparatus of Homer's text. Plutarch (Co. A.D. 46 - post I20) in his Life of Solon (10 [83]) tells us that Solon interpolated the second line, although the Athenians denied it. Quintilian (ca. A.D. 35/40 - post 1(0) cites this e.'CaDlple in his [lIstilU!io oratoria (5.II.4O), noting that the second line is not found in all the editions of Homer. Diogenes Laertius (II. A.D. 230; see the OCD) in his Life ofSolon (48) (ed. H. S. Long) repeat> the plutarch story. b 3 I ; 1 lv"'yxo~ We have no information on this incident between Tenedos and Sigeum. If we did, it could very probably help toward establishing • date for the Rhetoric. z UEP'c1VSp'I' This may be the well-known tyrant of Corinth (ca. 625-585 B.C.; see the OCD) who arbitrated the dispute between Athens and Mytilene over Sigeum; see CAH, N 98. 3 IO.EOrpb>v See the OCD, CAH, V 343--45, 358~s. His political career as leader of the democratic faction in Athens began after 4II with the restoration of democracy, and ended with his prosecution and death at the hands of the oligarchic faction in 404. On his death see Lysias, AgainSt Nicomachus Io-I3, and Against Agoratus u; and Xen., Hell. I.7.35. Cleophon may well have hindered Sparta's peace offer in 410, but that he could have done so again in 40S (as is frequently stated) is questioned. He isattacked by Aristophanes, Thelm. 80S, Frogs 679-682, Is04, IS32; Andoc., Mystcies I46; and Lysias, Ag. AgoralUs 7-11, with which compare Aeschines, Embassy 76. b 32: 1 Kp."."t, p. 130) will indicate why. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Spengel read ~al nee' TOLOV'ULllI nUJTOTaTOt, as does Cope, save for TOVTWV in place of TO'OUt'CtW. Ross omits Hal and reads "'el TOVT"'. ,nI1TdTSeO'; Kassel brackets "''''OTaTOi. The reading of the other edd. is more acceptable than Ross's since all the codd. read the "at, and since there is nothing in the various readings to suggests ,."CTTOTtI10L, Reading with the edd., we translate: "on the other hand, recent witnesses not connected with the case are highly trustworthy on such matters as just mentioned. But the most credible of all are the ancient wimesses ..." However, Kassel may be quite correct ill suspecting a dittography and bracketing the fmt 07naTd'TaTO'. a 17: 1 1'ClGTWIJ.cr."C'CC "warrant. pledge, confirmation"; the word is "sually found in the plural.. This appears to be its only occurrence in A. Just as A. looked at the material by which law could be examined and will follow the same procedure for the other atechnic proon, so he begins just such a consideration of witnesses here. Although the English translations make this clear in a way, the fact remains that their interpretation of the Greek of 76a 17-18 is rather free. Jebb & Sandys is typical: "The arguments in regard to testimony are these. If one has no witnesses olle may argue that ..." It is preferable to take ""/TWpaTa in explanatory apposition with paeTVea" and 'X0",I as a dative of agent with an understood 1."Tio. (see 7sb 19 : " 77"

12 : 1): "The pers~ who possesses no wimesses as cOl1firmation of the evidence

must say that ... 3

,,,,,p,,,,,p.ow

i.e., evidence, testimony.

a I8 be '"CWv .b,o"""" On the idea in the word, see S7" 34 : 2. In favor of such argumentation is Aeschilles, Ag. Timarchus 91, who argues that "truth is determined by the probabilities" (or as it is frequently translated: "by circumstantial evidence"). !soer., Ag. Euthynus 4, Against Callimachus r6, and Cic., Pro Caelio 9.2.2., also speak strongly in favor of this kind of argument. a 19 Y'''''fLlI ' 17-19, with the exception of a colon, in place of the period, at 77a 19: Td "tI. The punctuation used by four odd., Spenge!, and Cope in the critical passage 77> 18-19 is: ".q &,,&aa, 6' oil. OilTW, . . . '""oe~ia. Td "tI. Ross alone deviates from this, reading a colon after d' oil (Cope favors it but does not use it), a comma after hnoe"ia., and a period (like everyone else) after Td ,,07; he is also the ouIy one to use quotation marks .t 77> 19-20, "oil" ll111 ••• 8;'a8pfj." Except fur • period after Td I do not find the punctuation critical, but I agree that the passage is not notably clear. As part of the development (77a 15-21) of what to say if one does not take the oath, the present passage, 77> 17-21, continues with the arguments whiclt con be offered: "further, indeed, by taking the oath he will win the case; by not taking it he will not. And. so, not taking the· oath would be because of his moral principles not because of his fear of perjury. And the saying of Xenophanes is to the point: no equal challenge can come from a godless man to a god-fearing man: rather, such a challenge would be as if a strong man should challenge a weak man to strike or be struck."

1'' ,

a 17 2~., This is probably to be taken transitively with an understood ~. di"7J" and the whole to be interpreted in the sense of "he will obtain satisfaction," i.e., he will win the case; see LS, M"7J IV.3. a 18 :

&' oil sc.lO... 2 iiv dlJ The subject is at 77> 19, Td ",,; see 77'1 19 : 1. J eN &,' EmoplCiCIV false swearing, i.e., "perjury." Literally, the phrase means "not on account of perjury." Everyone gives it the extended meaning: "not from the fear of perjury." This is surely what A. wishes to say. For in this OilTW, statem:nt the person not taking the oath explains that his actions in 77a 15-18 would argue to his moral integrity and not to any concern about swearing falsely. 1

sc. Aa"p6..8W Be"o" or &"•••al De"o" Ca. 570 - 470 B.C.: see the OCD and Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, I 360-402. Among the Greeks Xenophanes was considered to be the founder of the Eleatic Scltool of philosophy (on whiclt see the

a 19 :

OGD).

1

', the general subject of the p.ss.ge 77"- 21-25 (£I dA ••• a'Hac...). aVT••, the subject of,.~ BU.,., refers to the person taking the o.th. a 2.S

sc. nea'Y",aTwv, or some similar

&v

word.

a 26 06 ...(!o\~

predicate (with .lva. understood) to the articular infinitive. On the idea, see Dem., Against Callippo. 27. a 27: 1 CI':'...6v i.e., the opponmt to whom one tenders the oath, so also the following TOUT,!, (or aVTqi ifitis read). 2 5.xacnci>v 5s'''&CI.....au...'!' yup 515 ...... "pl...y We are still discussing the arguments to be used if one tenders the o.th to another (77"25-29). Our reading is that of cod. A. The problem here is whether one is to read with cod. A or F, both of which represent good traditions. As far as the basic meanmg of the p ....ge is concerned, there is no radical difference between the two. For this re.son I read A with Roemer, Dufour, Tovar, and Spengel. The punctuation is also theirs. Kassel and Cope are essentially in .ccord, save that they read "I!m;;. (also favored by Spengel) for d,,,a-II; see 77& 8 : 3. From 77b 3-10 it is clear that a previous oath is on record which contradicts the present oath taken by either party. 3 6,.· ..6-raG is the reading accepted by four of the edd.• Spengel. and Cope. Ross reads V'P' aUTo;;·as found in cod. A. With either reading the meaning is the same. sc. A."Tiov. If one has previously taken b 4: 1 3.... o.:.x t,nopx[.. a conflicting oath (e.g .• 77a II). this is the kind of statement which would be made in order to counteract a charge of perjury in the case of a new oath. a lxo.:.cr.ov predicate to an understood [UTL For the meaning of Td cia",•••• see chaps. 10 and 13. For the relation between the voluntary anti wrongdoing. see 68b m ... n. 73b 28 : 1. 73b 28: 3. 73b 30. and 73b 36 : 1. b 5: 1 .... 3e (Uq: ••• oixwcr... On involuntary action, see68b 32-69a 2; on the role of pia in such action. see 68b 35-37. 6gb 5-6. and 69b 5 : 1. and 69b 5 :.. Some sense of the force of c!xd"'l1 can be gathered from the comment at 68b 22. The argument here is that one of the oaths (we do not know which one. i.e.• the earlier oath. or the present one) cannot be considered a free and deliberate human act. Four of the edd.• Spengel. and Cope read "al clndTII. apparendy the reading of all the codd. Kassel reads an in... teresting "ai Ta clnd"'l1 but offers no evidence for it. .2 w"rClu8cr. i.e., lIin this situation"; c£ comment at 6:ra 20. b 6 : 1 cruv.......lov with the not uncommon meaning in A.. for uu.d,.... of "to conclude"; see 57& 8 and S7& 8 : 1. As Cope, p. 290. remarks: "cruvd,.... like utJAAo,.IC.u8a~ avAAa"pd..... avAU,..... avvoea.•• av.,a.i.. av.,';" va' etc.• and similarly comprehend.,e. col/igere. all convey the notion of •gathering' facts together. for the purpose of comparison. and so drawing a conclusion of sow kind."

77b 9-10

COMMENTARY

34-7

2 xed intensive: '~indeed." J ...0 ol".opKELv This belongs in the 8n clause as the subject of Jun (whose accent is to stress that this is requisite for perjury; see S. I87b). This prolepsis (see S. :n8z) of the articular infinitive gives emphasis to the idea. 4 '2), still A. suggests (at 56b 23-.6 and B 20, 94' !H4) that the iv9,jp.'1p.a may arty more weight with the audi",rs. In the last two passages discussed above (55a 35ff. and 55b 3Sff.) the "'[aTsr, are unmistakably determined: i.e., at 55a 3Sff'. they are the 1VTB'X70&; at ssb 3sff., the clnode"'T,,,al. To recognize the different meanings in which A. is wing ,,[un,is to find coherence and precision present in the constituent elements of the methodology as he analyzes it. According to A. all rhetorical discourse concemsmatters about which we deliberate, and its o~jective is to make judgment possible on the part of another. Faced with that fact, the first thing which we must detetminc js whether in a given situation deliberation, and therefore judgment, are possible. Here the rhe",rical situation must be assessed in teons of the "oIVa (59' 11-,6; see Sludies, pp. 35-39): Is the subject of the deliberation s~met:hing which is ,Possible (6vvaTov - d~vva~ov) sometliing from the past, present, or future (rerovo, - iuop.evo,') which is of importance and coneem (pl.rs90'- p.'''eOT'1') '" the participants? !fit is nooe of these things, one does not ordinarily undertake the effort. If It is, then one proceeds to an aitalysis of the subiect in order", present it for deliberation. Since deliberation for A. involves both reason and appetition, it is not surprising that he proposes to analyze the subject matter under those aspects which respond to the operations of the d.... Iiberative process and therefore possess a peculiar probative force for those engaged in'the deliberation. These are the areas defined by the 'VTeXvo. "I~BI': logical ,,[tiT 16: an affirmative or negative statement of something about something. In itself, the word does not of necessity entail avUoy,al'0' - h061'TJl'a. Therefore I expect inductive-paradeipn.tic aod deductive-enthymematic inference to employ sucli propositions ("eoTaa"~I. Thus when A. also speaks of s,d'1 as "'eOTaaSl, (5S, 3I) I do notfuld it a prob em. primarily because die usual character of the sia,! is to be propositional statements about the subject matter which result from the examination of the sources (botll l""x'o, and aTB;CVo,). ". statements. most will be probabilities (el"oTa. aTJl'eia). some will be faerual statements ofvarious kinds given by the sources themselves (.i~TJ in its general sense). and some might well be ne=sary statements yielded by the sources ("'''I'>le,a).* Tbe fact that the

* For example. if an Athenian, sPe:Wng befure his peers in the Boule or EccIesia 00 the accion atMelos in 416 B.C., were to examine solely the 'agia" nlrTr" of the action, many state-mears would result from the analysis: the action was successful (simple fu:tual statement); such action will be likely to have evil consequences for us (elxd,); such action indicates irrcsponsihili'Yin the AthcuiaaState ("'J1'01o.); suchan assertion of might over right reveals the presence of injustice in the State (T""I'~~'O'). And by way of a brief addendum. not to the point of the present matter but relevant to A.'s method in the Rkr:lDtic as presented in this analysis: the content of these statements, the IIWlDt1' in which the propositions will he expressed, the language. and the images used in casting the statements will be determined by the topical examination of the 7}60!; and naBo!: of this particular speaker-auditon situation.

APPBNDlX

sId,.,. are mentioned as neoTdO'el.~ in connection with·l1l8o}lf]/.la and not with napdd.''Yl''a (s8a 18-19, B 22, 95b 30-34) r consider to be explained by the exegesis of s8a I just given. Futthetmore, froli>. statements such as cl,ose at 55a 31-]3 and 18a 28-29 we have no grounds to argue that neo'E'dat'~ is not to be extended to both "luTe't; dnod."tTI"al, but rather to be restricted to ••901""Il"a. : The last of the constitutive elemeats which r proposed for consideration are the "0£'10' tonal. (SSa 2, SBa Ir). From. what A. says ofthcm these TonOl are axiomatic principles which offer to the rhetorician varied ways of inferring by either • .90I""Il"a or napda"'Yl"a on any subject. Unlike the .rd"l, they are not confined to the patti", u1ar subject from which they come, but may be employed with any subject. The tw~ty-C!i~t "o"'o~ ·Tdno~ off'ered in B 23 bre.ak down more or less into three types of mferenbal patterns which can be summarIzed thus: en) antecedent-cODSequent, cause-effect; (b). more-less; (e) relatio'!. As logical structures, if they are used for enthymematic reasoning, they readily assume a fotm quite suited to syllogism: if X, then Y (see Sh,dies, pp. I29-31). The ready adaptability ofthese logical patterns to paradeigmatic inference certainly should not require illustration;' but if it does, then A.'s exaltlple ofDionysius and tyranny (s7b 30-36) is an inference based on antecedent-consequent. The xot'JIol '['ono, serve as varied sources for inference to be used by the ",taTe't; dnod.,,,Tt,,ai as they orgaui:ze the material provided by the "taTS'" I'JITevol, into argwnents which enable the auditors to make" reasonable judgments on the subject placed before d,em.

BmLIOGRAPHY

Lysias. Norman 1960. Suidae Lexicon I-V. Leipzig 1928-1938. "Reflections" 11.. Yorker Sept. 8, '975.

Adam, C. D. Adler, A. Adler,M.&

Gorman, W. Andrewes, A. Ast, F. Atkinson, B. F. C. Barker, E. Barrett, W. S. Beck, F. Bethe, E. Bitter, L., & Black, E. Blass, F. W.,

N".

The Greek Tyrants. London 1956. Lexicon: platoflicum. Leipzig 1835. The Greek Languagi'. London 1938. The POLITICS of Aristotk. Oxford 1968. Ellripides: Hippolyms. Oxford 1964. Greek Education. New York 1964. Pol/ueis Onomastieoll I-llf. Leipzig 1900-1937. The Prospect of Rhetoric. Englewood CIif& 1971. , A Greek Grammar oj the New Testament. Chicago 1962.

Dcbrunner, A., & F1lIlk, R.W. Boeckh, A. Boer, W. den Bonitz, H. Bonner, R.

J.

Bonner, R.

J.,

&

Smith, G. Bowra, C. M. Brandis, Chr. A. Buck, C. Bury, J. Bywater, !.

CAR Campbell, L. CG Chatelet, F. Cbrimes, K. M. T. Chroust, A.-H. Cooper, L.

Pi"Jari Dptra quae supers,mt II, [ & 2. Leipzig [82.1: Loconian Studies. Amsterdam '954. Anstotelis Metaphysi",. Bonn 1848. Aristorelische Studi.. I-IV. Vienna 1862-1866. Index Aristotelieus. Berlin 1870. Evidtnce in Athenian Courts. Chicago 1905. Lawy.,. and Litigants in Ancient Athens. Chicago 1927. The Admillistration of justice Jrom Homer to Aristotle I-II. New York 1968. Pindori, Carmina. Oxford 1947. "Ueber Aristoteles' Rbetorlk Wld die griechischen Auoleger derselben" Philologus 4 (1849) 1-47. The Greek Dialects'. Chicago 1968. The Ancient Greek Histori..... New York 1909. "Aristoteli. IIr' 11.. jOllmal of Philology, 17 (1888) 5374· ' "Aristotdia IV" The journal of Philology 28 (1903) 24153· "Aristotelia V" The journal ofPhilology J2 (1913) 107-22: The Cambridge Ancient History I-XII. Cambridge 19231939; I-II (rev.) 19']O-I975; III-VI (repr.) 1969. Sophocles II. Oxtord ISSt. " Commentario ill Aristotel.,n Graeca (ed. C. WaIz). Berlin I882-1909· La'Naissa"'t de l'histoire. Paris 1962.. Ancient Sparta. Manchester 1952. Aristotle I-II. Notre Dame"lnd. 1973. The RH.TORIC oj Aristorle. New York 1932.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

358

An IntroJuaioli to Aristotle's RHETORIC. London I867. The RHBTORIC ofkistotle with a Comme1ltary I-III (rev.

Cope, E. M. Denniston, Diehl, E.

B< cd. J. E. Sandys). Cambridge I877The Greele Particles. Oxford 1934. Prodi Diadochi in Platonis TImaeum cOPnnrmtdrid I-III.

J.

Leipzig I90J-1906. Diehl, E., &: Beuder, R. Diels, H., &: Kranz, Dindorf, W.

w.

Anthologia Iyrica Gra,,"". Leipzig r949. Die Fragmellte tier Vorsoleralileer'. Berlin I9SI. uxicon Harpoaationis in decem oratores Attico! I-II. Oxford 18SJ.

Stromateis (in Clementis Alex..ulrini Opera III). Oxford 1869. Dittenbergcr, W.

Sylloge inscriptio.um Gra"aru"'I-IV. Hildesheim 1960. Scholi. vetera in Pilldari Carmina I. Leipzig 1903. Arlstoteles. Heidelberg 1966. Aristote: Rbitorique I-IF'. Paris, 1960. From Solon to Socrates. London 1967. The Greele State. London 1969. Sophocles and Pericles. Oxford 19S4. Aristotle's POBTICS: The Argument. Cambridge, Mass.

Drac:bma.m, A. Daring, I. Dufour, M.

Ehrenberg,

v.

Else, G.

I967.

Eucken, R.

Festugiere, A. Finley, J. Freeman, K. Freese, 1- H.

De Aristotelis dicendi ratione. GlIttingen 1866. Ueber den Sprachgebrar/Ch des AristoteltS. Berlin r868. Aristote: Le Plaisir. Paris 1936. Thr.. Essays on Thuqdides. Cambridge, Mass. 1967. The Murder of Herotles. London 1946. Aristotle: The "Art" of Rhetoric. New York 19.6. Anaximenes: An rhetorica. Leipzig 1966. "Plato Comicus or Plato Philosophus? (Aristod., Ars rhetorica I IS, 1376a ?-II)" Bulletin of tIre Institute of Classical Studies (Univexsity of London) .6 (1979) 51-61. Anima4versioNtS variorum criticae et exegeticat in Aristotelis De rhetoric. libros tres. Oxford I820. Stobaei Edog.I1Im physica/1lm et ethicaruIII libri duo. Oxford

J.

Fuhrmamt, M. Gaiser, K. Gaisford, T.

Gauthier, A., &: Jolif,

J.

1850.

Gildersleeve, B.

C Ethique d Nicomaque I-II. Paris 1959. Pindar: 71.. Olympian .nd PyIMan Odes. New York

Glotz, G. Gomme, A.

Syntax of class;."l Greek I-II. New York 190G-I9II. The Greek City and Its Illstitutions. London 1965. A Historical Commentary on Thllqdi"s I-III. Oxford

r89S.

1956. Goodwin, W.

.

Demosthenes: Oil the Crown. Cambridge 1901. Sy"tax ofthe Moods and Tenses of the Greek Verb. Boston 1893·

Gow, A. S. P. Gnut, A.

Graye££; F.

Theoeritus 1-112. Cambridge 195'. The ETHICS of Aristotle I-II'. London 1874. "The Problem of the Genesis of Aristotle's Text" Phronesis I (1956) IOS-ZZ.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

359

Grimaldi, W. M. A., 5.1.

"Rhe.oric and the Philosophy of Arisrode" The Classi",1 Journal 53 (1958) 371-"75. Studies in the PhiloSDphy oj Aristotle's RHI!TORIc. Wi.....

Grube, G. Guthrie, W. K. C.

A' Gre.k Critic: Demetrius 011 Style. Toronto 1961. A History ~f Greek PloiloSDphy I-V. Cambridge 1971-

baden 1')72. 1978.

The Sophists. Cambridge 197'Plato's Examination of pleasure (The PHIU.US). New York r'945). Hamlyn, D. Aristo,}e's D. ANIMA. Oxford 1968. Hammond, N. A History of Gree«. Oxford 1959. Harris, H. A. Greek Aihletes and Athletics. London 1964. Harrison, A. R. W. 11.. Law of Athens I-II. Oxford 1968. Hellwig, A. UntnsucJmngen zur Theorie der RhetoTik bei P[Dton mid Aristoteks. GQttingen 1973. Hicks, R. D. Aristotle: DE ANIMA. Amsterdam 1965. Hignett, C. A History of the Athenia. Constitution. Oxford 1952. Hiller, E., Be Crusius, O. AnthologitJ lyrica. Leipzig' '907. Hinrikk., K. "Arls.oile's DiJFeren. Possibilities" Inqlliry 3 (1960) Hackforth, R.

Immisch, O. Jacoby, F. Jaeger, W. Jebb, R. Jebb, R. & Sandys, J. E.

Jones, J. w. J. Kaibd, G. Kassel, R. Kennedy, G.

KiDkd, G. Kock, T. Kroll, J. Lacey, K. Leutsch, E. L., & Scbneidewin, F. G. Lieberg, G.

Lobd, E., & Page, D. Long, A. A. Long, H. S. 15 Lucas, D. W.

18-28. "Der Epilog dot Nikomachischen Etbik" Rheinisches MilSeum 84 (1935) 54-61. Die Fragmente der griec/Jischen Historile" I-III. Berlin 1929. Demosthenes. New York 1963. Paideia I-III'. New York 1944-1960. 11.. A1t.JC of Sophocles. Cambridge 1907. The RHI!TORIC of Ari,tot/e. Cambridge 1909. The Law and Legal T1Jeory of the Greeks. Oxford 1956. Comicorum Gratcorun, fragmenta Lt. Berlin 1899. Der Text tier Aristote/i,chen RhetMile. Berlin 1971. Aristotelis Ar, rhetorica. Berlin 1976. The Art of Persruuion in Gree«. Prioceron 1963. EpicDrUm Gra"orum ftagmenlll. Leipzig 1877' Comicarum Atticarum fragmenlll I-III. Leipzig 1880-1888. All,..,... Bronze Allotment plates. Cambridge, Mass. 1972. The Family in Classical Greece. London 1968.

Corp'"

paraemi.graphorum Grateonrm I-II. G5ttingen

1839-1851.

Die I.elo,. v.n dtr Lust in den Blhiken des Ari,toteli,. Munich 1958. Poe",",m L"bi.rum fragmenta'. Oxford 1963. "Empedocles' C",mic Cycle in .he 'Sixties" in The Pr....SocratiCl:AC.Ilectio" oj Critical Essays (ed. A. P. D. Mourelaros). Garden City 1974. Diog.... Lami.. : Vitae phiu,sophorum. Oxford 1964. A Greek-English L.xic.,,' (edd. H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, and R. McKenzie). Oxford 1948. Aristotle: POEl"ICS. Oxford 1968,

360

BIBLIOGRAPHY

LUl:as,. F. L. MacDowell, D. M. Mcimigliano, Jr.. .

Tragedy. London 1957. Al/.t/.ian Homicide Ln•. Manchester 1963. ·.,.TheDe.elopment oJGreek Biography. Cambridge, Mass. 1971.

'~Hermogenes on

Nadeau", R.

Nauck, A. Nauck, A., II< Snell, B.

Stases" Speech Monographs 3I (191)4)

361-.124.' "Hermogenes on Stock Issues" Speech MOllographs 25 (1958) 59-2.

Paassen. C. van

Page, D. Pater, W. A. de Pearson, L. Pede, W. Phillipson, C. Plescia,

1.

Radermacher, L. Rauchenstein, R.

Rhetores Grate;

Richards, H. Ricoeur, P.

Roberts,

w.

Rhys

"Was There a Concept i1:rea'l'o, .&",o, in Classical Greece?" in Extgesis and Argllmellt (edd. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, II< R. M. Rotry). Assen 1973. The Classical Tradition of Geograp/.y. Groningen 1957. Poetat melici Grate;. Oxford 1962. us' TopiqllfS d'AriJtote et 14 Jialectique platonicienne. Fribourg 1965. 11.. Art of Demosthenes. Meisenheim am Glan 1976. Early 10llian Historia"s. Oxford 1939. Griichische Versi,JSt:IIl!ften I. Berlin 1955. The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece aud Rome I-H. London '9Il. The Oath and Perjury in Ancient Gre.". Tallahassee 1970. "Artium Scriptorcs" Sitzunglbtrichte der Wiener Akadtmie aer WiUtRsciJajten. Phil.-hist. Klasse U7, No. 3 (1951-1952) 1-247· "Zu Aristoteles Rhdorik" Rheinisches Musellm 18 (1863) 463-71. Rhetores Graeci I-IX (ed. C. Wah). Stuttgart-TiibingenLondon-Paris 183"""1836. Amtolelica. London 1915 . .Freud and· Philosophy (cr. D. Savage). New Haven 1970. Dionysius oj Halicarnasslls: The Three Literary Letters. Cambridge 1901. Greek Rhetoric tllld Lite;ary Criticism. New York 1928. "Notes on Aristode's Rlzetoric" The American Journal oj Philology 45 (1924) JSl~6I. "References to Plato in Aristode's Rllttoric" Classical PhilolDgy 19 (1934) 342.-46.

BIBLIOGRUHY

Roberts, W. Rhys Roemer, A.

Ros.;W. D.

Rhetori,. (in The Works ofAristotl. XI, ed. W. D.. Ross). Oxford I9"4. Aristolelis Ars rhetorica2. Leipzig 1923. . "Zur Kritik der Rhetorik des Aristotdcs" Rheinisches Museu .. 39 (I884) 49I-50I. Arislot.lis An rhetori,•. Oxford I959. Aristotle's METAPHYSICS. Oxford 19"4/1948. Aristotle's PRIOR AND POSTERIOR ANALYTICS. 1949· ..

Sinclair, T. A. Smyth, H. W,.

Sparkes, B. Spengd, L.

Stallbaum,

J.

G.

qxford

A History of Gruk Politi,.1 Thought .. London 1959. Greek Gra..mar, Cambridge, M .... I956. " "Konabos: An Athenian After-Dinner Gam':' Archaeology 13 (1960) 202r-207. . . Aristotelis Ars rhetorito. I-II. Leipzig 1867. "Die De.6nition und Eintheilung der Rhetorik: bei den A1ten" Rheinisches Musellm 18 (1863) 481-526. Specimen co",nrmta,iorum in Aristotelis libras De artt riletori,a. Munich I838. Eust.lb;; Commelltarii ad Homeri Odysseam I-III. Leipzig 18.8.

n .. A,uak,ning of the Gre.k Historical Spirit. New York:

Starr, C.

I968.

Stavdey, E. Stewart,

J.

A.

Siiss,W. SwemihI, F., & Hicks, R. D. Thompson, W. N. Thurot, C. Tod, M. Tovar, A. Trenddenberg, F.

Tuckey, T. G. Twining, T. Vablon, J.

Greek alld Ron,an Voting and Elections. Ithzca 1972. Notes on the NICOMACHEAN ETHICS of Aristotle I-II. Oxford 1892. Ethos. Leipzig '9'0. The POLITICS of Aristoti