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Aristotle. M. Fuhrmann', Teubner edition (Leipzig 1966). H. Bonitz, I"d." Aristot.lieus (BeIlin 1870). W. M. A. Grimaldi, '.J., Aristotle, RHETORIC I: A Comm.ntary (New York 1980). E. M. Cope, The RHETORIC ofAristotle, rev. and cd. J. E. Sandys, 3 vols. (Cambridge 1877); except where otherwise designated, the citation is to Volume II. E. M. Cope. An Introduction to Aristotle's RHETORIC (Cambridge 1867). The editors of the five recent critical texts of the Rhetoric: A. Roemer. TeubneI, 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1898/1923); M. Dufour, Los Belles Lettres, 2nd ed. (I'ari. I¢o); A. Tovar, Instituto de Estudios Polltieos (Madrid 1953); W. D. Ross, Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis (Oxford 1959) = OCT; R. lWsd, De Gmytcr (BeIJln 1976). A Gree1TOo" :rulOo" by way of introduction to chapters 2-17 of which they form the subject. It is worth noting that both unfortunately receive relatively passing attention in the commentaries and critica1literature. This reflects, it would appear, an established attitude that both were non-logical in character, constituting what has been called "indirect proof," and so were clearly extrinsic to the proper purpose of discourse for Aristode (e.g., 54" 15-31) which was asswned to be exclusively logical proof by way of enthymeme. With 2.17 the analysis begun at 1.4 of the entecbnic pisteis (lOro" "d80, >TOo,) by way of the particular topics is concluded. Before moving on to the common topics, AriStode in chapters 18-22 reviews and enlarges upon a number of key concepts mentioned in 1.1-3, e.g., the koina (possibk-impossible, etc.), the two common ways of demonstrating (eothymeme.example) the enthyrneme as syllogism. In 2.23 he presents the common topics for inference by enthymeme followed by a chapter (24) on common topics for apparent (fallacious) enthymemes, and one (25) on ways to refute inference by eothymeme. The concluding chapter (26) mentions some further observations on the nature of the ent:l:tymeme. For support of the work on this volume I am grateful to my own University for a Faculty Fellowship, to the Classics Departments of Princeton and Stanford for Visiting Fellowships, and to the National Endowment for the Humanities for a Senior Fellowship and a Summer Stipend. I would like to thank the Princeton University Library and its staff where a substantial part of the work on both volumes was done and also the Fordham University Library and its staff for their many courtesies. In the course of the work on both
x
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
vollllD.CS some people have taken the time to discuss a problem or a matter of inteIp1'etation with me; the following come readily to mind: Professors GeoIgc Glanzman, s.]. (t), Harold Chemiss (t), Elmer Henderson, s.]. (t), Thomas Bermingham, s.]., Thomas Conley, Joseph Dolan, s.]., Gerald McCool, s.]., Antoni Raubitschek. Finally my thanks go to the editor who worked with much care on both volumes of the commentary, Mary Beatrice Schulte, and to the Director of the Fordham University Press, H. George
Flctdtcr. ForJIram University
WILUAM
M. A.
GRIMALDI,
s.].
CHAPTERr
I· Introduction: 77b 16 - 20
a transitional synopsis of Book A
II . Development: 77b 21 - 78a 28 1.
77b 21 -78a 6
general introduction to chaps. 2-17; since rhetoric is concerned with judgment on the part of the auditors, not only must there be a logical explanation (Adyo,) of the subject matter (given in Al, but the speaker must appear to 6. disposed toward the auditors and thus wortby of belief, and the auditon in tum must be disposed toward the speaker (thus the need for iJSo, awl ,..,so,) qualities re~uired in the speaker for his iJSo, to be acceptable to the audience and thus worthy of belief role of the "d8.J in affecting the judgment of the auditors
III· Conclusion: 78a 28 - 30
Clearly this refers to the contents of thefirst book 77b r6 : J 'Ex ...LYfdV in which A. has placed before us the special topics (srd7j, see SBa 17, a 26-35, a 27-28, S9b 25-32), or the material element of discourse for the three kinds of rhetoric. So obvious is the reference that it has been the occasion for lengthy discussion on the unity and coherence of our traditional text on the grounds that A., having presented a part of the first ,.la~" '.~.X"o, (Myo,: rational explanation) in Book A, should now continue it with the second part as found in B 18-26, and then take up his presentation of the other two ",In." lvr8X"01, our ",dBo" >l80, of B 2-17; see Studi.., pp. 28-49 and also COMMBNTAIlY I 34M6, and the notes to A I, 2. However, at A 2, 58a 29-33 A. stated that he would first cliscuss the special topics, and he proceeded to do this in the first book for the ",I~" , ..... which he calls Myo" or what reason can tell US about the subject. Chapter IS, granting
X"0,
AlUSTOTIJ!, 'nHETOllIC' II
2
77b 16
."".Z...
the stated differences between "[an,, and IJ.TBZ'.' (55b 35-39), also belongs to this analysis. See COMMBNTAll.Y I 354. 7sa 22 : 2, a 23. There still remain the other two ,,[aTS., l.TS;!;••• which must be analyzed by the methodology of the special topics. The varied ways in which these two ,,[a.,..., can be of help must be placed before us so that we may funnulate intelligent opinions and statements fur use in deductive (enthymernatic) and inductive (paradeigmatic) argument. A. proceeds, therefore, to study both and ~O.,. It is only when he has completed this study that he toms at B IS, 91 b sf[ to a general summary of the major concepts of his theory first enunciated in A 1-3; see Studies, pp. 33-34. Only at the conclusion of this review does A. sum up in a sentence what he has achieved in Books I and 2. (96b 28-34) and continue with a transitional sentence (96b 34 - 97a 6) to the second fonn of topical analysis, that of the general topics. This analysis occupies the final section of B. Dionysius of Halicamassus, De compo I.]-4. speaks of two parts of rhetoric, the "eaypaT",d, and the A. has been and will continue to be occupied with the first part until the end of Book 2. It is this which Dionysius says demands mature understanding, extended investigation, and large experience, an observation certainly in accord with A.'s detailed study of the theoretical side of the discipline. This study, as far as we know, is unique in the history of the discipline. The use of the preposition i" once again indicates the fact that these special topics (eld,,) for each of the three "taTS', ''''''Z'.' provide us with the substantive material for argument in each of the three kinds of rhetoric. See COMMENTARY I 354-56, A 2., S7a 32, 58a 26-30; 6, 63b 4; 7, 6sb I9; S, 66a 18; 9, 68a 33; S9b 25-32.; Raphael, 162-1e,a which are the necessary ones. They are then used in rhetorical argument by induction or deduction; see COMMBNTARY I 3SS-56. For this reason I would interpret the "at as altereative (Denniston, p. 292): "what kind of opinions or statements." See, e.g., Top. I05a 34 - b I, 104" 12-15; see also Cope, p. I. When A. finishes the topical analysis of ,,&.80, and ~Oo" he repeats our statement here at 77b 16-20 but now extends it to include ~Oo, and most probably "dOo, (c£ 9xb 8-23) at 9Ib 24-29. The d&~a, and neOTaae" are formed on the basis of the analysis via the particular topics (ex Tl.",., a 16). In the first book it was the particular topics for Myo, in each of the three kinds of discourse. The opinions and propositional statements so derived articulare the subject matter in the three geeera ("eel TOVT"'.) and are the source material (... TOVTOJ» of the argumentation, as A. says at a 19-20 (",eel yae . .. My",». See, for example,
78a 28-29. i.e., the three kinds of rhetoric. b 19 : 1 "lcrT€'~ i.e., most probably in its meaning which denotes the two instruments of demonstration: enthymerne and paradeigma; see 550 4-7, Studks, p. 59. z ..uG..' l ....lv Cope, p. I, is not happy with the grammar of the sentence, but see A 9, 68a 33-36. J "epl .......u....... "..Ii" ....u....... i.e., the MEa, Hal neOTaae" which in this phrase are both the subject matter and the source material of theenthymemes. See 5"" 15 : 1, 55a 4-7, 55a 8, S6a 36 - 56b 4, 4 lveu ..i1p....... COMMBNTARY I 352-56, Studks, pp. 55-68.
AIUSTOTLlI, 'RRBTORIC' II
4
20 ':'~ ••. AOY"'" On My.,. c£ 96b 3: "to speak, as it were, about each kind of discourse by itself"; C£ S9a 28. The passage, read by the edd.,
b
Spenge!, Cope, is questioned by Spenge!, p. 2lBo, thus &r in the text, he clearly refers to this limited sense only at A 2, 560 2/f., and 56a 8-I3 suggests this may have hem occasioned by a problem at the time (c£ S4& I5 : z). Further reflection on this last passage (560 4-I3) makes it clear that the speaker's >lBo, is not something which can be totally divorced from a knowledge of the >lBo, of the audience. This app.... in the crucial words dE,o,,'l1To. and l:!...",ia.. Both these qualities of the speaker's >l80, must be established by the language employed (a 8-10). This would mean that they are nec.... sarily determined in large part by the speaker's understanding of the >l80, of the audience. for that which would make one in one's discourse dE.O""a~0"ln'6t"'1" toyoungpeoplc(B I2) is not that which would produce the same effect among the mature (B I4). This view is supported at A 8, 66a 8-I6 where we meet the >lBo, TO;; Aiyo.~o, again. But essential to what he has to say of it is the met that the speaker must know the 7IB'I of the varied kinds of government, in which concept government is viewed as a moral person (66& I2, 66a 10-12). It is obvious from this that evm when the term >lBo, is used of the speaker more than his own >l8., is at issue. Relative and important to it is the .peaker'. understanding of the >l8., of those addressed.· further, the discussion of 718'1 at AID, 69a I8-3 I underlines this extension in A. of >lB., as the ",lant bT6X".t. Here he speaks of 7I87J in general and their role in men's actions. Aware, as we should be, of the importance of action on the part of the audito.. to the rhetorical art, one can dismiss only with difficulty the speaker's need for such knowledge of >l80, TOW c!Heoa~a;. in presenting his own >lB.,. In fact, to interpret chaps. I2-I7 with Cope (p. 158, and [ntrod., p. no) to mean that the speaker must adapt his >l80, to that of the auditor's is to acknowledge that an understanding of the auditor', >l8., is critical to the speaker's >l8., and, consequendy, that the 7}B., TW'V dxe'oaTwv is also ,,[an, 1'JI1:6%,,0,. Finally, returning to A 2, S6a 22-23, A. explicidy remarks that if we are to use the ",tI1TBI, m6X"0' correcdy (S6o 2O/f.) we must, inter alia, make a study of the types of human character, a study found in the discipline of ethics, as Cope, I 33 acknowledges. In short. it is not at all clear from the use of >lB., up to this point in our text that A. is using it in Cope's restricted sense; sec, e.g., S60 2. In actual fact, coming back to our present text, one may well ask how a speaker can Td. "eml' (01 • .0. Twa) XQTQU"""dC.w (77b 24) without a knowl-
"',aT" .'T6%,","
",iaT",
COMMBNTARY
7
edge of the auditor's ,y80~. Or, again, how he can make the auditors well disposed or dispose them at all (77b 28 - 78a 6) without such knowledge. Such an effort sounds unpleasandy like that of Gorgias in his reply to Socrates' questions at Gorg. 458e - 46oe. For a further discussion of ,y80~, C£ 88b 30--31.
b 25 : 1 &'Clcpip..
what make the difference are the character of the speaker and the way it is perceived by the auditors (b 26-28: TO TO ... a~T.': subject to d,acpses£), as well as the attitude and disposition of the auditors (b 28-29: lciv . .• TVYX""a>q,., protasi. to d.acpl.e••). This last is explained at b 30 - 78a 6 in terms of an emotional disposition ("d80~) but does not absolutely preclude, as explained, the role of the general character and set disposition (,y80~) of the auditors; c£ 77b 27-28, aab 30--31. 2 ,.(o"~. The adverb means: "in • certain way." As we see the verb at A 10, 68b 4, it would appear to decote a more established state or attitude (see also A 6, 62a 26, b 3) which would be more typical of what A. understands by ,y80~ (see 69a 18 : 3) than the transient and more ephemeral "atlo~. Part of the problem in this introductoty section of chapter I is that ,y8o~ and "a80~ are not at all totally separate within the human person, insofar a• .,yOo~ represects the dominant disposition in a man with respect to the appetitive part of his soul, one of whose elements is the "dO'l (6.:2b 13 : 2), and being a donlinant disposition it in/j.uences and typifies his usual way of responding emotionally.
.X'"
ARISTOTLE, 'RHBI'ORIC' II
b 28
xu,
b 28-29
Dtensive.
O!""' ... 'tUyyci;"",,,,v
possibly taken more precisely as a future more vivid COldition; for tense of 6.arpie.', S. 2326b.
b 2!f-3 I
-.:0 ... 61x",. read by the edd. (save Kassel), Spengel, Cope. Kassel, with TIurot ("Observations critiques [IJ," 302-303), brackets it as a possible additim of A.'s and would puoctuate with a colon after the secluded passage to main.in the thought connecrion between 77b 25-29 .nd 3If[; see Der Text, I\'. 13 If[ It is possible. I do not see it as necessary since the restatenJ.ell t he.: does introduce a specifIcation of the inunediately preceding statement whici is then developed (b 3I - 78a 6) with respect to the auditor.
b 3' lib.",. C£ A.'s comments on contemporary tecbnographers in A I, 54'1 11-21, 54b 19 - 55a I, 55a I!f-20; 2, 56. 16-17. b 31-32 06 yip ... lxoucr,v Cpo .4 2, 56a 15-19. The parallelism in statement betw.en our passage and that at 560 15-19 suggests that A. is speaking here ""'ut the nd01J, the more transient feelings and emotions of the auditors taiba than their more permanent and established dispositions, their i!lI7j. FrilOdship, anger, and mildness or patience are discussed in B 4, 2, 3 respeuively. 78a I : I ..0 ""pci;,..." i.e., "absolutely different"; different, as Cope, Cicero, De orat. 2.42.178, p. 4, suggests, in kind, e.g., 78a 2: otl~ presents a rather vivid description of the element of uoreason which can be introduced in" !he auditor by an irresponsible appeal to the emotions. z > ..O'
rae
78a 9
COMMENTARY
9
n
2 The present general condition reinforces this characteristic response of the optimistic man, i.e., "any time the prospective matter is attractive, then. etc,"
.,,£,,&..,
as: I x,d sc. TO <po, • •• sJ.o~ a 13); but questionably
'P@o"'l""
a II-I4 ;j yup .•. YLY''':'''''''''"v i.e., the determinations made in A 9, the analysis of the particular topics of epideictic rhetoric which concentrated on virtue and the honorable. Four of the edd., Spenge! read I" rde; a r8-I9 a yup •.. ". From among the three ("dO,! dvvcip..", l~..,) A. identifies moral goodness or badness (demj, "a"ta) with the l~s", habits. The relation of the "dOf] and the clvvcip..., as parts of this deenl (or "a"la) would appear to be this: the dO,! and d""d,.. .., are in SC! morally neutral capacities (Hosb 31-32 we are neither praised nor blamed for our "dO,!) with which man is naturally endowed. To the extent that they are subject to control by a man', dominant habits (6:&b 13 : 2), the "dO,! form a part of his moral nature. For. U" can shape a d~.....", and so in turn a ,,000,. A habit is an acquired, stable disposition which (nosb 2S-26) controls the dwa,.." to the extent that the 6wa,.." reacts in a certain way (w 11 "aHcii,). Thus we speak realistically of an irascible, or envious, or friendly person. The emotions as we meet them in the EN are described primarily as psychic phenomena (Tci'. Tjj 'I"'xii y,.o,...va, nosb 19-20). In the De anima we find that the emotions (403a 16-2-7) are also corporeal, inseparable from the body. Since the opening chapters of the De an. make it clear that A. is aware of the dual activity of body and soul, particularly in the emotions (403' Sf[), there is no reason to think that this
IS
COMMBNTAIIY
understanding is absent from the Rhetoric; cf. 898 I~2.0. Indeed, from EN 1I2sb 26 - rr26b 10 and the language used there, or from rr28b 14-IS where A. speaks of the emotions, it appears clear that the idea of bodily activity is present. On this point, see the interesting but not necessarily conclusive article of Duprat, and for the Ethics, see Hardie, pp. 68-93. While recognizing that the extenSive treatment of the nd67J in the Rheloric has a specific objective in mind, and is not a forrnaI study of the nature of the emotions, there is no reason to think that we should approach A.'S statements with trepidation. I do not agree with those who believe that we should not expect precision of statement in the Rheloric; cf. 60b 14: z,lS9b 31. Indeed, it is pleasant to read in a recentstudy of emotion (Lyons, p. 34) that A.'s "picture of the emotions ... is by and large the correct one," an observation which echoes that of Bacon (Cope, p. 8): de iis quanlum Ian. paucis fieri pOluil, acute el bene disseruil; see Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle'sRhetoric on Emotions," 4Off.; and 69b 33 : 1 on A.'s statement on pleasure. On the other hand, in what fonows I shaD work from the perspective A. adopts in the Rhetoric with respect to the emotions, adding, where necessary and possible, furtl,er statements from his other works. In conclusion, then, we can say of the emotions that it is ordinarily accepted that there are two kinds of aff"ective phenomena: the feelings and the emotions. AU emotions are feelings, but aD feelings are not emotions. Fedings are dementary aJfective states (pleasure, pain) which fairly wen defy further analysis beyond saying that they be viscetal (pain in the stomach) or mental (pleasure in an idea) and do not appear to require antecedent mental activity. Emotions are more complex alfective states of stronger intensity occasioned by a stimulus which cawes a psychic state accompanied by physiological changes in the body (the effect of seeing a crazed man approaching with a loaded shotgun). In order for the stimulus (object or situation) to arouse an emotion, it must be seen by the person as beneficial or harmful; thus some kind of knowledge is prerequisite for an emotion. An emotion calls for cognition - appetency - organic disturbance: the stimulus is seen as good or bad for the person, and this perception is fonowed by the impulse to acquire or avoid, together with a bodily reaction.
em
",p.p"",,,
"aD these modifications because of which a 20-21 Ii,' ... Ii .. men undergoing a change [,...Tapdllo....., is intransitive] diJfer in respect to the judgments they malte." This is to say that an emotion introduces an alteration within the person which alfects the critical &culty of the judgment, as Parmeno says in the Eunuchus of Terence, 22S£: "di bani, quid hoc morbist? adean homines immutarier ex. amore ut non cognoscas eundum esse (" See A.'s comment, A S6a IS-16. There is no reason at all to think (Cope, p. 7) that A. is speaking particularly of deliberative or judicial rhetoric because of the use of "eia..~; see 77b ZI : 1.
16
ARISTOTLE, 'RHB'IORIC' II
78a 23
a 21-22 O[~ ••• oJjSoviJ See also EN IIosb 23, EE 1220b 13-14; the presence of pi:asure and pain is a specification for A. of the kind of change in the penon with which he identifies ndOo,. The pain and pleasure are not simulcmeous; the "al is altemative (Dennistan, p. 292). As Vater, P.76, says of the phrase: "significat A*"1 11 ljdo.1i." The statements at 78b 1-2 and 82. 13 with mpect to der>i are in no way at odds with the above, as an analysis of each passage will reveal. On tn .... a., see.4. 7, 63 b 28-29, 62a 29 : Z, 63b 28 : z; in our case here pleasure or pain follows sinrultaneously on the "dOo,. a 22 or_ cinil I!6''''1'''.a, 0'; ne0O"7".'Tm,.
78a 31
COMMBNTAllY
:>r
Certainly the definition of the Riletoric is a good working definition with a genus (lfe.E •• I'eTa .t~"'1.). a differentia (T'w"e1a.). and a cause (dl.yme1a). Fortenbaugh. "Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions." So-SI. considers the definition inadequate (eE De an. 403 b 7-9) because of the absence of a reference to the matter of the emotion. i.e.. what happens in the body. Aubenqne, 313-17. argues for its validity as it stands. On anger. see also FiIlion-l2hilIe; on anger as found in the philosophers after A.. see Ringe/taube. pp. 3:>-90.
l......., &1\ C£ 60b 14: 2 on definitions in the Rhetoric. See also Fottenbaugh. "Aristotle's Riletoric on Emotions." 4S-48. 4:>n6. z 6py/j ap~l~ At A 10. 6ga 4- oeY>1 and br.O"I'l.. were called 4101'.' dei~..>= those movements in the appetitive soul not under the direction of reason; see 69" I : z. AtA roo 69b II-I2. we were told that oeYlf. together with 0"1'0. (but see 6gb II). was the motive (for the seven motives see 6ga :>-'7) for acts of revenge (Ta nl'me7)T! IUTtv. a 32-33 ",,1"" (2.. 3. 13. 19); xe>j (3, 7. 10 where it is explained by d",,"I). If one examines the instances given by A. in this chapter of those with whom one becomes angry. it becomes clear
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
78b
I
that the one who causes anger is not necesoarily an "inferior." but rather someone who should not by all that is right (or with Cope's explanation of "eoa>i"": by all that is naturally proper) show disdain to the other. For this reason I do not see Cope's objection. p. u. that according to A. one cannot become angry with one'••uperiors. Certainly 70b 14-15 leave that possibility open. and a1.o offer reason to believe that A. could agree with Seneca. De ira 1.3.2: "Deinde nemo tam humilis est. qui poenam vel sumrui hominis sperare non possit.... " If we insist that A. considered inferiority an essential element in ol'y"eia. we are faced with a further problem at 78b 31-34 where Achilles is angered at the slight from Agamemnon. who was certainly not an inferior. We are given the necessary consequents of this a 34 : 1 ilva.YXlI definition: the object of the anger (TOW ... a.Be"''''!'. a 34-35). the cause for the anger ("al (fT•••• lI,..ll.,.. a 35-36). an accompanying condition ("al "dan ... n,,"e>iaaoBa~ a 36-37). 2 -n;;" " ..8' j!"........v i.e.• individuals; see 59b 2. The individual. here a Cleon. is opposed to the general cl.... e.g.• a.Be"''''!' (and see s. II29). In this respect .. A. points out later. 82a 5-!_; e.g., Cooper: "is not esteemed either for good or evil." In the context it is more correctly taken in the second way: "that which is worth nothing receives no esteem either for good or for evil. "
b 30-31
m.d
b 32 -1)....1"11"." ... cr(j""O~ 1.356; see 9.367-369. A l'iea~ was a mark of honor, as we saw at A 5, 61a 35. Achilles came down in history as a man ofmany qualities, but in particular a honor.tus, as Horace, ATs poetic. 12.0-22, notes. b 33 ~ ... p.E""~ ••• 6py.~6"",,o~ namely, the dishonor shown by Agamemnon's actions as they are cited from Homer. Ricceur's observation (Freedom and Nature, p. 278) is to the point: "I do Il?,t cure myself of anger without curing mysdf of excessive self-esteem.... Z npoU1\K.'V S. olov...-a. a general statement: "people think ...n; on neoTa, : in (dl'a.a> a conjecture of Bekker's accepted by four edd., Spengd, Cope; see 79a 19. Kassd secludes the whole passage a IS-I8 (do•.•• oAoy"e06'Ta~); see Der Text, p. 132. Schneider, p. 56, would agree with him. I find the articulation of the whole reasonable, and the form it takes is found elsewhere (e.g., 73b 18-24), e.g., (a) statement (a 10-15), (b) general illustration introduced by 60. (a 15-18), (c) followed by a particular illustration (a 18-23: ala•... "d.6ou~~
...),
a 16 : 1 6""'~ b,,8up.oUvd~ "" "in a word everyone desiring"; cpo A 12, 73a 17 ("I 8A"~ ne.~ 79b 18 and note. T' is read by the edd. except Ross; Spengd reads it, Cope does not. 2 p.iJ " ....op8oGv"'.~ Whether it is taken transitivdy or intransitivdy, we must understand IlnrIJul'la with this verb. Par example, transitivdy: "and not bringing it [1,,060I'lo.] to a successful issue." a 17 : 1 cipy[)"o, ... " ..t As we see from EN IIa8a 4--9, II2sb 29 11260 21, and A 9, 67a 37 (deytAov Hal TO. pav,....) and A la, 69a 9, the dey tAo, is easily angered. Thus I would interpret the "at as linking the two as in apposition: "are irascible, that is, easily angered"; see Bonitz, Index 3S?b 131[, S. 2869a. 2 [p.tv] Roemer (but see his appar. erit., s. 21, for his reasons), Dufour, Tovar, Ross read the word. Kassd, Spengd, Cope do not. It has good text evidence, but I would prefer not to read it. Certainly, as pda"na has been used in the first book, its presence by itsdf would be quite justifiable here, namdy, to single out some one thing. See, e.g., A 9 66b 8 (typical of the usage between 54" and 66b), 68a II, 32; II, 70" 4. 7Ib 18; 12, 72a II. If the particle is read, I would not take it as tying our clause to 79" 21-22 (d 6A . .. n,) as Roemer suggests. In the first place, the paralld passages of Roemer indicate a much closer conjunction of pd.}.,cna pA..1 1'>1 in the text than we have here. Secondly, if we read the clause at 79a 21-22, we find that &I'0t." 6. Hat at 79a 20 introduces either redundancy or confusion. Finally, reading the clause brings to the fore an idea (i.e., daoycoeta) which is subordinate to the thought devdopment here; C£ 79" 18. At ItlO5t I would take the particle as pi-. solitarium (S. 2896) in which the contrast is understood: e.g., those who are in any way in pain ate easily roused to anger, particularly so if one makes little of their present condition; [but even without that] the sick man, for example, is easily roused to anger, etc.
a.
ARISTOTLE, 'llBBTORlC' II
3S
79'l 22
otov x«p.,,,.,,, ,...1. Cpo A 10, 6sb 16-1S This is commonly interpreted (Cope, the translators) to mean: (Oer/AO' 6,"1) T01, (aolTOV OA'l''''eOVCTL) "ed, nlv vOct... If this is so, then the interpretation of 79'l 20-:U, &,.0/"" . . • ruo., - e.g., Cope, p. 22: "and so for all the rest") - must mean: men are angry in all other instances in which they are slighted. There are some difficulties with such an interpretation. (a) It assumes that the particularizing phrase (,.aA.I1Ta ••• OA'l''''eoiivTa" a 17-1S) is the substantive idea in this section, 79a 9-2.7, which it is not. 11,e main idea is stated at 79a to-II (aolTol ,.A• ... AtmO",.••o,), and has to do with conditions in which men experience A1lm1 and thus anger; c£ "d/Jov" 79a 23 (misfortune, disaster). (b) The interpretation must find its support in a clause whicl, is duhious, 79a 21-2.2 , and which .ppears to be a gloss made to explain such an interpretation. More correctly, TO" "eo' (for parallel usage see 6sb 1 : 1: Ta ned, dl'!O.tav TOW ned, M~a.) is to be interpreted, I believe. as a dative of cause in each instance, i.e., ofo. "ap'JIllJv lIB'll (SOTt. o(rylloc) Tot, ne~' "TA.: "as, for example, the sick man is angered because of m.tters related to his sickness, the poor man because of matters rel.ted to his poverty, the military man because of matters related to war, the lover because of matters related to love, and similarly in other misfortunes." The whole passage then, 79' 15-21 (610 ...•LUol,), relates directly and reasonably to 79' 22.-23 ("eo",dO"O/'!TRI ..• "d80v,): "for each individual has been predisposed to his personal anger by the misfortune present to him at the moment." Kassel, Der Text, pp. 132£, interprets the passage clliferently but is aware, it would seem, of the difficulties in the common interpretation. a IS :
I
2
..oie; "'PD~
a 20-21 bp.ou..~ tiE "",[ "and sirnilarly also in other misfortunes" (c£ "d/J.I1~ • 23); the phrase has been used in various ways but with the same basic meaning found .t 68a IS : 2; c£ SSb 30, 5Sb 3S, 59' 25, 6,. 7, 6Sa IS, 6sb 23, 69a 15-16, 7
. See 81a 6Jf. a 23-24 d "oAu "lIpci &6~lIv what one expected.
i.e., what is sub.tantially contrary to
a 2S-26 "'PII' ... ~A'X[II'. Cpo A 7, 6sa 20-21; 9, 68a 12.-13. 7. a 34 nit; ... XClTtUppOVOUaL se. oeylCov-r:a, (79a 29)i another class of people with whom men grow angry. On "aTa'l'eoPBiv, see 7sb IS-I6, 78& I4-1S : I. Air." is to speak ill of, to revile. The understood object (TaVTa) of the verbs is the antecedent of the following relative clause, nse1 0011•.••
"a,,';;,
a 3S : 1 crn""6ci~auc,,v as osed at A II, 7ra 3; see also Soa 2S-27. It indicates, as does the following 'l'IloTl,..ov,.. ..ol (eager for honor), the serious concern of the individuals for the objects mentioned as things of major importance to them. 2 t ..l .o""'l'I~ 'l'Ilon,...iu6al int = to take glory in, pride oneself for. 3 ickv ... .O""'l'I..v The condition is present general, e.g., ea. TI, '"',,,,,;;, Ail'T/, ""Ta9'e6"l1); el" "with reference to, with respect to, in regard to"; LS, .1" N; eE also 7')a 36; 81, ... Idea•. a 36 160'1' In A. the word commonly means form, shape, figure. It is not unusual to interpret it as beauty; see, e.g., Plato, Protag. 3Ise. Thus Dufout, Tovar translate Out passage; in the English translations it becomes "their appearance." a37: 1 inl....." 4, 64b 16-17. 2
of ,..71
il....
....
"in the case of"; eE LS, b,t, A.i.2; cpo A 9, 6Sa IS-I9;
refen to the qualities just mentioned ana is the subject
1lnciex...· 3
..o)J.ij> p.iiAlov·
sc. OertCOVTal of a 29-30.
the reading of the codd., three edd., Spenge!, Cope. a 3S : 1 "U"D~ Ross and Kasse! read atlToi,; on the interchange of the personal and reflexive pronouns, cf. 60a I : 1. 2 i\ 6Aw~ ... SOX.LV i.e., if they suspect that the qualities are not in their possession: "either in general, or in any effective way, or do not appear (to others) to be present." 79h I : 1
D<pop6.. or.""....,
whenever men "are of the very firm
conviction. n 2 un.pix.'v is the reading of the edd. with Roemer whose conjecture makes sense. Spenge!, Cope have the reading of all the codd., 1lnciex'''' which has created difficulty; see, e.g., Cope, p. 26.
& 2 "DL~ 1 can develop the iE.~ deyWiT7J~. In the Topics passage cited above (I2sb 24-26), A. admits the possibility that a MJfJa,..~ accompanies the ll;.~ which is "ea6T7J~ such that if a .person experiences the ernotion of anger he is in control of it. See 80h 30 : 1. c£ Chantraine. A recent discussion of the word can be found in Nikolaidis; see also de Romilly, pp. 37""43. Gauthier &: JoliE, II 301, translate "ea&T7J~ as "Ia placidite," admitting that "Ia douceur" is "une praotes, mais c'est la praotes biblique, . . . une vertu essentiellement religiouse, tout afait dilferente de Ia placidit" aristotCIicienne." But cf. de Romilly, pp. 19sns, 97-196, who presents the concept as she understands its development in the fourth century. 2 ""'~ .XOV'i which is an emotion. The word itself is rare, and I find no evidence for its use in A., Plato, or other writers of the fourth century. It appears to be an Aristotelian construct to 'ignify the modification itself. the movement within the self experienced by those who undergo a change away from anger. 2 _' .•. "'l'Xd....). Pity means that the other person has suffered serious and unmerited harm, and so harm greater than any T'!'"'eta desired. As a consequence one will well fed "I11io, toward such a person.
b 14 il 01 opy.!;6P.6V0' is the reading of three edd., Spengd, Cope. Ross reads 11 8; Kassd reads without 01 from a good tradition. b 16
XIII icky • • . 1I:ci"l(E'V
se. neaol .!law.
b 17 eN y'yve:"L"'IL ••• Six.."", "anger does not arise with regard to justice." This phrase is secluded by four of the edd. Ross reads it (secluding '"Ii, as do Spengd and Cope; Cope and Tovar read o~ Those who seclude the phrase follow Vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften," 1I2). I cannot be as certain as Vahlen that b 17-18 are twO coequal reasons and that our phrase is that of an interpolator. The conclusion to b 16 is an undexstood "'eliot ela ... We must first know why they are so disposed. We are told this in the sentence before us: anger and justice cannot coexist since (as we are assumed to know) justice is the only virtue that is considered to be "another's good" insofar as it "does what is advantageous for the other" (EN 1130a 3-S). We are then (b 17-18) given the reason why men in this instance are "'elio&: the presence of justice makes it impossible for them to consider themsdves treated improperly (see .,sa 32-33).
rae.
See 63a 9 : b 18 ~ .d "'e0afj"o. aspect.
1.
The point of the de6nition is to emphasize the
b 18-20 S.D ••. SoiI),o. This is an observation which is really directed by the intent of the analysis of the ",dB'I in this book, an intent which can be lost .long the way. A.'s objective in the extensive analysis of the particular topics of Myo" "dBo" ijBo, inA and B is to make these constitutive elements of the TiM understandable so that they can be used correctly;
62
ARlSTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
80b 23
on this particular emotion, c£ 80b 30--3]. Their correct use is quite simply to enable the person to whom the spoken or wrirten word is addressed to make a judgment (see COMMENTARY I 349-50). In the present passage A. calls our artention to such a practical application of a special topic - namdy, that at 80b 16-18 - for eJfecting "I!aOT11'. The idea bdrind "chastising befordrand in word" is to make the other aware of the claims of justice against him with the expectation that when the claims are recognized any anger will be removed or lessened (I\"TTO. dy""""Tova..). On ".laa., c£ 80a 16-18. The ordinary interpretation of this stateb 2Q--21 x.d ic10v • • • 11!aova.., ala~a.pb.., contain what is in fact the antecedent idea to which oJ refers, and express this !JeBE', of the angry man insofar as cUY>la.~a.. i, the T,p"ela, the pain aspect, and alaB"a.p •••• , is the ",a",p.'1/ dement.
b 28 "O''1...q~ sc. .:tty... b 29 : I ..c8vcW"o~ an objective genitive modifying oeYii" 2 """PiJv, .. p.EVE.. I""", II. 24-504; they are the final words of Apollo in hi, appeal to the gods to permit burial of Hector', body. The key word in the citation as an example of the topic is " ..~, "dumb," i.e., without senses. After the above quotation Roemer, Dufour assume a lacuna in the text; Tovar, Ross, Kassd, Spengd, Cope do not, and I agree. Roemer's reason for the lacuna is that there is no consideration of d,d Ti• .,. "I!ailP.PTa, (8oa 7). In the first place this is not, strictly speaking, correct; see Boa 30-31, 80b 6-7. Further, see the comments at 7!lb 36 and at 80a 6: 2.
b 30 : I x ......"p"OV.'v i.e., to soften, appease; Isocrates, Panegyricus 13, expresles the idea intended here: "aTanea6....a, T'~' d"e.aTll,. A moment'l reflection on the use of this verb form and its cognates in this chapter ("eail••a8a~ 80a S, 7, 3I; "ea6Pa", 80a 8) should make it clear that A. is talking about "eaoT'7" not as a virtue here, but as an emotion; see, for example, Boa 6 : I with Cope's reservations (pp. 35, 42). The actionreaction projected by the verb is tranlitory and passing - see, e.g., Euripides' oeY!j. "eailPovaa (Nauck & Snell, frag. 822) - and as A. use. it, further
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
80b 31
supposes an action between agent and patient. Both these ideas ate in direct contradiction to everything A. says about a virtue in the EN and BE. Certainly it is quite incorrect once again (see 66a 36 : 2, 60b 14 : z) to say, as Cope does, that the view of nea/5T"1~ as an emotion "is adopted in the Rhetoric merdy for convenience, philosophical accuracy not being required" (p. 42); see, however, his subsequent comment (p. 42) on the de6nition of ""l/a. It would seem that the most telling observation against Cope's criticism on the matter is A.'s statement in the EN, a work to which Cope (e.g., I 159-00) usually refers on occasions such as this: namely, 1094b II-I3, 19-25. z b:... """,dov These are the .r6"1, special topics, and the methodology is exacdy the same as that in A; see COMMBNTAIlY 1354-55, 58a 17 : 1, 7tia 32 : 1, and cpo A 2, 58. 31-32, B I, 77b 16-20,78. 16-19, 27-30.
b 31 ll.nw~!Ltv namdy, the auditors; cf. 77b 24 (Tdv Hem)V HaTa-"HBvaC...). Set in contrast to b 31, cnJTO~~ ,•.tv, are those with whom they are angry, or~ d'.... We s.w naea"H.vaC, .. at 60b II, on which see the note. Ross reads aVToV,. o~ Ii' 6pyl~ov...... sc. (lH.tvov~) oC, 6' oerICo....a' (naea will be exemplified in the very first topic 8ra 8-II.
a 7:
1 Z
(3ouAi) .....,S See Bob 36 : 1. '"I!,€lov See 57b I : Z; and ..1:'11'....... 391.
a 8-9. ....lois &-11 ..• ex8pol sc. "al (",D.OI ./,,1. TOVTOI,) or,: "And (they are friends to those) to whom in fact the same things are good and bad and (who) are the friends and enemies of the same people (as they)." The logic of what is being explained. e.g.• Tl.a, \l'IAOV", (a 34). calls for but does not absolutely demand the rdative pronoun (who). The lines describe a single class toward whom men experience the emotion of friendliness. i.e.• those who have the same id... as they of what is good and bad and so like and dislike the same people as they. This seOInS to follow from the reason given at a 9-"0: TaVTa ..• dvdy"'!. Spengd (p. :0:01) is not happy with the norninztive case since he believes that all the accusatives (presumably betWeen 81a 14 and 8Ib 34) depend upon the construction at 8ra 4 (dvdy",! ",i).o. Bl.a.) but he =pts our text on a parallel with A 9. 66b 25-:06 eventually followal by 67a 16Jf. (his reference to A 5 is uncleor). But there are some problems with Spengel's position: first of all. the accusatives from 8la "4 on ("al Toll,) make more sense in e>ch instance as the objects of a ",lAov"" understood from a IZ (and cf. ",lAoVa.. at 8lb :02.. :06. 28) than they do as part of the 8la 4 construction; secondly. the cases at 8ra 34-35 ("al o! b"M.. ~101). 8Ib 23 ("al 01,). b 24 ("al TO.,) must also be explained by Spengd. Cope's problem (p. 44) with dlj (he would read IId'l) seems to be answered by 61 b 37 (q; d>j) and see Bucken. De Aristotelis diandi ,alio... p. 43.
a 9 x,d 01 ... q>IAo, ... ex8pol read by four edd.• Cope; Kassel alone secludes it. but as Aristotelian. Spengd reads the rdative o! for the articles. "for of necessity they [TOVTO.,] wish the same things." a 10 : 1 """·.ens TOOT..,. indirect object with d.d)''''!. refers to those just described, i.e.. those who fed friendly toward and those who are the objeclll of their friendliness_ For. as they are presented, they must enjoy the unity of mind and wish proper to friends (d"'Ddo~ta "Bel "I!DQ'I!A"B"". Plato. Definitions 4I3a).
8Ia IS
COMMBNTAIIY
i.e., wan po.lD,..."o~ "al cY,u
ll'aTa: "with regard to money"; on this use of see Bonitz, Index, :O:02.5Sf[ Cope, p. 46. speaks here of "the utilitatian view of virtue, ... already prominendy brought forward in 1.9." First of all ""Ala as a virtue is not the issue, but ""Ala as a "dBo,. Secondly, on this "utilitatian view" of virtue, see 66b 4. and EN II56a I#. where the utilitatian view of IIS6a lo-U is put aside.
.1"
8ra 24
COMMENTARY
71
1 ToU~ D..EU9€ptou~ See A 9, 66b 16-17, and 66b 7 : 1. From 66b I6-r7 it becomes clear that they feel friendly toward "the generous" because they are evmwrrr:ueo£ el, Xe7}IICTQ (a 20); see EN Il20a 21-23. 2 ToU~ olv6p€lou~ See A 9,66b II-I3 and 661> 12: 1, from which the same inference a. that of the preceding note must be drawn with respect to the avb(!£io, who are £v";0£77,£,'''0£ el, uW"CTJ(liap. 3 T.""",,,, xcd ToU~ 6.x .. lou~· Apart from the colon (Roemer, Dufour, Tovar use a period), this is the way the text is read by four edd., Spengel, Cope. I accept it but punctuate with a colon after ~,,,alov, as do Ross, Spengel. It is preferable to the period since we have in 8ra 20-24 one topic naming three lrinds of people who are d,e objects of 'P"Ua. Kassel collocates di1ferendy and not unattractively by using a period after T"PW"" and thus beginning a new topic with "al TO~' ~I"alov, ... pcUI"Ta - in which case al"alov, would be the object of 'PIlov" .. undmtood (a 12). On amalov, see A 9, 66b 9-II.
a 21 :
a 22 : 1 TO'oU-rOU~ From what A. says in what follows and from his statement in A 9, 66b 9- II, this would refer to Toll, ~I"alov,. With v"olappa,ov,," undmtand el.ao: "they assume such to he those who ..."; cf. 7!lb 28 : 1. 2 ToU~ ••• ~';;VTCl~ As we saw at A 9, 66b 9-10 (66b 10), justice is the virtue whereby men possess what is their own and as the law commands. The just man, then, is one who respects the rights of another, or as we read in EN II30a 3-5: 'Justice alone of the virtUes is thought to be the . good of the other since it looks to d,e other" (see also II34b 5-6). In these termS the just man is correcdy assumed to be one who does not use others (d'P' 'TieOJ' CW'Ta,) but to belong, on the contrary, to the class of 8Ia 18-20 ("iia ... .. 'Pao.).
Ii""
1 01 Toil .pyci~Ecr9... sc. 01 COl .... , ';"0 ... : "those who live by their own labor." eeraCeaOal refers particularly to agricultural work (e.g., see Thucyd. 2.72.3) which seems to be its primary meaning here. However, we saw it at A 9, 67a 31 where it refers to manual labor. 2 ~cni'fWV •.• yECdpylCl~ TOVTWV is a partitive genitive; the phrase refers to those who live by their own labor. Farming and agriculture (e.g., husbandry in general) are also given high praise in the Oeamomica 1343a 25 - 1343b 6, a work, if not by A. (? Theophrastus), is considered to be (in its first two books) by very early Peripatetics with a base in A.'s Politics and Xenophon's O.tonomit"s. Xenophon, of COUIse, holds farming in high esteem in the State; Barker, p. 263112, speaks of the "agrarian trend in Aristotle's thought" seen in Pol. I.9-II. Cp., however, Freese, p. 194a.
a 23 :
Tcdv oiAAb>v 01 "~TOUPYO( clAAOJ. (for its meaning, see S. 1273) is • partitive genitive with pcJ..!'aTa: "and beyond all the rest (of those
a 24
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
8ra 32
who live by their own labor)." We saw aUTOVerol at 73a 8 : 2; they are, as defined by Hesychius: oE d,' eavTcii. ~eraCop.••o, and so they are not the workers of 67a 31. a 25 : I "'DU~ G':'CPPDV~ .•. ci6",o! The reason for feelings of rprJ.la toward this class is dependent upon what is said about the just in a 22, and cf. 8Ia 22 : 2. On ao>rpeoaVVT/, see 66b 13. 2 ciftpciyl'ov,,~ i.e., those who mind their own business; the reason here is the same as in the preceding note, preswnably on the ground that these, too, exercise self-restraint regarding others. There is an interesting conjunction of the aUTOVerol and the d3tedrp.o••~ who constitute the demos in Socrates' discussion of the democratic State in Rep. 565a. a 26 : I "Cll ot~ ,e. "al (T06rOV~ rprJ.oiialV; cf. 8Ia 8--9) ol~. However, note that in the relative clause A. clranges from the generic plural which he has been using (at, e.g., 8Ia 14, 15, etc.) to the first person plural. a 'P"Lv"",,,,,,. i.e., "are manifestly (clearly) willing"; cf. 78a 31 : 3. a'7 ciYCl8ol"..",' cip.~ i.e., morally good; as he says in EN 10960 23-29, the good has many meanings; moral goodness, clem) >10,,,>1, is set out for us at n05b IS - no6a 12. a .8 :
1
See A 5, 6ra 25-27, together with 6zb 20 : a;
£660"'1'0'
and cf. A 12, 72b 21. i.e., "or among those who 2 8C1.UI'''~o""ivo.~ ... 9"u ....cil;ou.rLV are admired by us, or among those who admire us"; the verb has the meaning found' at 79b 25 where it is also used to denote the subject's admiration for another, or the admiration of another with respect to the subject. The TO'~ in TO'~ 8avp.dCovalV is a conjecture of Victorius' read by the edd. for the ol~ of the codd., and I would accept it. If ol~ is read, a different meaning emerges and it was indicated by the ancient commentator Anonymus: "and those who are hdd in honor in all things, or in the best things, or in those things which they admire, or in which othm admire them."
".d
a 30 CJUVll",yuy.iv CJUVll.'IJ .....pEiiG... The infinitives define the meaning of >id.'~' In EN Il57b 19-24 A. says that there is nothing more clraracteristic of mends than being together, that even those supremely happy desire to spend the day with each other. Cope, pp. 47-48, has a long note on the verb forms. a 31 c!t ......p"'ClVOp.&vc..v the verb is seen at 74b 7.
"of them when they are at fault"; the idea in
a 32 'PLAOv.XD. the reading of Dufour, Ross, Kassel rather than rprJ.6••• (read by Roemer, Tovar, Spengd, Cope); on the form, see LS, rp'A6v",o~: 2, and 63b I, 6sb 21, ?Db 3].
,,0.
Sra 34
COMMENTARY
73
a ]>-33 1tclV'xpci'n)V is the reading of the edd., except Kassel. Spengd. Cope reads the dative, on which see his note. p. s6; Kassd reads without 11 and gives the ordinary accusative form E"'''I!UT'1/ (our form is a common variant in Plato, Xenophon); from the codd., as I understand them, there may be a point in omitting the 11. We have the same conjunction of these two men at A 2, s6b 3I and CalIias is most Iikdy the Athenian nobleIlWl (ca. 4S0-370 B.C.) whom we meet in Plato's Protagoras and Xenophon's
Symposium. a 7 CNxCKpciv'n)V Together with the thief he exemplifies the statement at a 6 ("",'1/); on syncophants, see Bonner & Smith. 1139-'74; Harrison, 116o-62. 219-20.
a 8 : 1 dvlllTOII But, as the seboliasc says. death or something dse may well cure it. and Plutarch, On Envy and Hate 538c. says that men give up enmity or hate when convinced that they have not been unjustly treated, on taking the position that those hated as evil are good, or when they are benefited by those they hate. Pericles (Thueyd. 2.64.S) also argued that hatred does noC last long.
82a
COMMENTARY
II
:2 BpEaLt; lithe aiming at, desire for," as we see it at EN I I 14b 6. Cope, p. 56112, has a brief comment on dIe word in which he also mentions its legal meaning (appeal); for this meaning see Bonner & Smith, 1160, 104, 166; Harrison, II I90ff. The ).""'11 ().""1I' I'P""') would be the TlpOJe1a (mentioned at 78a 3I; see ,sa 3 I : 3) inflicted on the person who causes the anger, as is said at 82. IS. Anger and hatred here, in contrast to 82a 12-13 (Hal T~ ••• p,ati,. oil.), are being analyzed in terms of their specifying differences. 3 x"xoU i... , positive harm, or, as Plutarch (On Envy and Hal< S38e) expresses it: the deliberate intent of the one who hates is to do harm ("aHa;, no'iiaa,). & 'P,).[a was defined at 80b 36 we could, although A. never does so, define ",'lao, as: TO {JovA,sa(Jal rwl. a oina, Ha"ci.
a 8-9 ,derO.erO .. , ... 6py,~.".vos "for dIe angry man wishes the object ofhis anger to be. aware ofhis revenge"; see, e.g., T'p"'Q!a, 'Pawoph"" at 78a 3I, with which cpo 80b 20-29 and the notes thereto. a 9 '«j\ 5·
i.e.,
"00
the other" - namely, the hater.
a 9-I2 I .... , ... xCllxl ..S I would be inclined to agree with Vater (pp. 87-88) that this passage is parenthetical and intended to make a distinction between Ta ).tm1lea. the effects proper to anger, and Ta "a"Il, the effects proper 00 hatred. The desire of the angry person is to inflict retaliation experienced as pain upon the one who has slighted, to strike back and cause pain for the pain caused. The specifying diffete1ltia of anger is Tlp"'e!a which carries with it )."""1/. The specifying differentia of hatred is "ax!.. (e.g., piao, is an oeBE" "a,,/a,). A "a,,/a can be a Ha,,/a for another without causing pain. Hatred desires evil for the one hated, but this evil does not have to be recognized by the one hated and so be a source of pain to him in order for the emotion of hate to ""Press itsel£ The one hating is llot concerned whether or not the evil desired is experienced as evil by the one hated, but simply that evil be done to the person. Furthermore, A.'s argamont is not undermined if we say that the angry persoll can actually place an act of T'pOJe/a, which is in fact an injustice and so an evil, because the primary intent of the angry person as angry is to retaliate by giving pain; it is not his intent to do evil qua
tale. a 10 AU"'IP« .•• nciv..... Pain, like pleasure, by its very notion, is something which is sensed (De an. 413 b 23: ihr:ov ptv rae aia811a", "al ).""'1 TB Hal 7j60v>1); as a "sensation" it convey> meaning to the mind only as something that can be experienced (ala8'f/TIf, 10). a II ci6L>i (82a 2) is absent would be to miss the point made at 82a 2 : 1; see also Sob 34We begin a concluding section here which can readily be misinterpreted if we lose sight of what A. is doing in this analysis. And so I would refer to my com:ments at 7sa 22 : 2 (see also 7Sb 11 : 2) and call to mind that the purpose of this topical analysis of the emotions is to enable one to make an intelligent use of them in forwarding the objective of the TiX""I: namely, to get at truth as far as it is possible (see 55a 22 : I, 55a 29-38), the truth which is so easily obscured by the wrong emotional reactions, as A. says at A I, 54b 8-II. z tx 'l:'oU......v i.e., the preceding special topics; see COMMBNTAlty I 354-55.
xcii h'C'cxC; ci.1tO&ELKWVCl.L •. • &LCIAUIL'V anods"cMa, is a synonym for d..l1- 8.b 4 (b) 82b 4-22 (e) 8.b 22-'7 (d) bb.8 - 8l' 12
people who cawe fear: objective aspeer brief summary on the really fcadUl, be they penona or things the disposition, attitude, of fearful people: subjective aspect
II . Discussion of confidence: 83a 13 - 83 b 10 I. 83a I3-I9
transIlton to, with division and definition of, confidence
2. 83a 19 - 83 b IO
development of confidence thlng. aod persons whichin general occuion
(a) 8l' I9-'S (b) 8la.s - Slb
10
confidence: objective aspect the .mpesition, attitudco~ ocmlidcnt people: subjective aspect
III . Conclusion: 83b IO-II
82a 20 : J 1'1-36, A. emphasizes the idea that it is action which is deliberately willed; cpo EN TI36a I: a. d' ~" neoar.eell8(,), {JAav>n, dd", ••. Ibb 1 : 1 4PE-ri! {,~p.I;Ol'Ev"IJ As we saw at 78b 14 - IS : 3, Pol. 13I2b 29-32, J{Je" is a powerful stimulant of anger, and the reason is explained in part atA 13, 74a II-IS. Obviously if anger is present, the will to .etaliate is present (cf. 82a 34), and A. states this in the next clause (dijAo • ••. vii', b 1-2), where we have the obsetvation that deliberate intent (to punish) is always present when one is subjected to lJ{Je'" Added to this deliberate intent we now have the capability to act: atl.aTa. vii.. A 9, 67a 19-22 is the basic principle of natural ethics on which this statement rests. 2 &ijAov... Wv Ross alone includes this in parenthes.., omitting any punctuation before the parenthesis and placing a comma after it (see 82a 33 : 2). The parenthesis is acceptable; the comma is not. His punctuation of 82a 33 - 82b 4 is not as helpful as that of the edd., Spongel, Cope.
a.
The genitive;" subjective. The rpo{Jee&' b 2-3 ! "all the more could they harm them." el Ha! ••• , sc. 61l.a...ro (J).th.....; the "at is adverbial and intensive.
rae
b 16-17 x ..l cril~ ........:...6 As commonly noted, this topic does not differ significandy from the preceding b r 5-r6. In one respect there is no difference since in both instances those who are an object of fear to those' more powerful than we are are fearful to us. A distinction which possibly could be made between the two is that the first class is objectively fearful as A. takes care to point out, i.e., they have the power to do serious harm; the second dass is subjectively fearful, i.e., they are actually feared and so they are !po(J'eo~ but whether the fear is right or wrong either on the part of the "eBiTTOV, (oil, !po(Jov.Tal 01 "esITTov,) or their own part is not stated. For " similar repetition cpo A 7, 63b 35-]7, and c£ 63b 36-37b 18 : 1 .r..nplIx6...~ tial in 82b I5-r6. 2 lft,.. ,Si!,EVO'
C£ A IS, 76a 6. This dass realizes what is potenThe middle voice gives the verb its particular
meaning here (tS, B.IILz): "to attack."
b 19
~ ..v~lISMC~
so. la07Ta, !po(J'eot; see, for example, Demosthe-
nos in 01. 3-"5-28. b 19-20 x ..l """" ... ,,:CIPPlIa, ..a .. ,xo( tives are partitive; see S. 1306, 1312.
so. tpa(Joeol .Ial.
The geni-
b 20 6~u9u!,o, C£ 68b 20 : 2; cpo 79" 17: sVnaeOep1lTOI. Euripides, Med•• 319-320, illustrates A.'s point here, rtmj .'1l6v!,0, 1a.v On the meaning of the verb here ("anxiously contend"). cpo 6"]0. IS. The comment of Seneca. Epp. Moral. 5.7. while in a different context, is to the point: "Desines timere. si sperate de-
sieris." a 6
a'lfJ.£iov 5t
a7:1 3
See ..:£1/p.'o.... 393.
POUAEII"'ucoU~
POUA.ueru.
See S!lb 32 : I; i.e.• "men inclined to ddiberate." See 57& 2 : 1.
a 8 : 1 beA"{"""'" See EN II390 I3ff.: "no one ddiberates about that which cannot be other than it is." z "IIPllcncEllci~E'V See 60b II and 80b 31. a 9 : 1 ...11 ..• lI1koU~ articular infinitive subject of 11 liiAno. ("is better. preferable"). z 3....... "..e.iv IIT< = "namely that ... " (5. 2577); on oEo, with the infinitive ('Just the sort able to suffer") c£ LS. olo,. III a 9-10 "lit yckp ••• &1I8ov Ross alone includes this within parentheses without any punctuation before and a comma afte!. a 10 "'oU~ o""lou~ 5.uc""«' The infinitive is governed by de, understood from 83a 8. Our reading ("men like them") is that of cod. F and opparendy the reading which the scholiast and the author of the Vetus Translatio had before them. It is also the reading of Cope and Kasse!. Spenge! and the other edd. read with cod. A: TOU, TO'OVTOV, d..HvVva,. In the light of the Poetics '453a s. d e•• 'Polio,] ,.eel TO.lIpO .... the reading ofF appears preferable; see 82b 26-27. 83a 32. In the Poetics. Else. pp. 373. 461. understands 8po,0, as: a fellow-man. one like us. an ordinary and representative
d. r,.
human being. a II "lit 6,,11 ...0.0. < .. ~> a 18 'P0ll'pc;;." l\ with Richards; it does not appear necessary.
if
100
ARISTOTLE, 'RHJ!l'ORIC' II
a 19 8Clppcz).iCl
i.e., "that which inspires confidence."
a 1~2O 7tOpp... IlvTCl x ..l U eClppcz).ialyyd~ is the reading of most of the codd., of two edd., Spengd, Cope. Spengel was slightly disturbed t1lat the matter to be explained was in the explanation. Thus Dufour adopl5 a reading from the margin of cod. C: e.g., fur "al Ta 8aeeaAla he reads ij Ta uarnie.a lyyV~. Ross retains the "at but reads Ta uw.-.je.a; see also Richards, p. ro8. Kassd reads 8aeeaUa a. .uspect. I see no reason = the proximnot to read with the codd.; "dee'" = the remoteness of; ity: "that which inspires confidence is the remoteness of what i. dreadful and the proximity of what gives courage."
s""v.
a 20 l7t""op8':'cr..~ ... j3o>'l8€LCI' See 82b a2-a5, Ibb 22-a7, 83a 15. The apodosis to the protases of the general condition (av ibu., a 20; ibuw, a 22; lx"'uw, ibu., a 23) is an understood 8aeeeAlo. slul, as it i. also in the following sentence, a 24-25: ij .
a 2I -IJS,x'lp.ivo, Cpo 82b 10-12. These are the people who have not done them harm. They together with those who are not their rivals (a 22), or are rivals without power, or who have power but are friends (a 23), as well as tho.e who have treated them well, and those to whom they llave shown kindness (a 24), and those whose interesl5 are the same as their own (a 24-5) - all represent the presumably missing TlP,,~ 8aeeoiiu. (see Ibb 28 : 1; 83a I6 : 1). Cpo 82b I3-14.
a a3 :
1
2
p.iJ lxwcr,,, Suvap.'" Cpo 8ab 15-19, and 8ab 8-ro. ",0.0' They fed confident with such fur the reasons given at
80b lSi£. 24-25 M€(OU~ ••• xp£(TTOU~ i.e., those whose interesl5 agree with theirs are more numerous or more powerful or both than those who can block or interfere with their good.
a
On TO O"1J/MPieop see 62a I7-aI and A 6. II.......... eNTol Dufuur alone assumes a lacuna here after i1p'POJ for the same reason as that given at 838 16 : 1. 3 cril.....~ lxOVT€~ "those are confident who are so disposed," i.e., as he will set forth in 83a 26 - 83 b 10. a 25 :
1
au .......P€,
2
a 26 XClTOp8wxiv ..,
See 68a 14.
a 27 7t£7tov8iva, if their arritude is (Or_Ta,) "that they Iiave not experienced many reverses."
101
COMMENTARY
a 28 : 1 x ..1 &'''''ECp£uy6...~ Aeneas. Am. 1.198-207. attempts to rekindle the confidence in his men (rf1lOcate .flimos) with a quick survey of the serious dangers from which they had escaped. 2 .m..eEi~ "free from fear"; literally: "free from emotion." However. A. is speaking about the disposition of men who are a;>nfident, and to be confident is to be without fear. since confidence is the opposite of fear (83a 16). While on this point. it is worth noting that A. is talking about being without fear. which is a quality he attributes to those who are 8aeeaUo, (83' 26). But 8deuo~. while it may be an aspect of dJo~e.la (c£ 8sb 30). is not dJobeBla (EN 1I07" 33 - II07b 4. EE 1220b 39). and consequently the texts concerned with dJode.ta introduced by the commentators in support or criticism of A.·s statement at 83a 28-32 (d'%-194, 196-199. As Nicias says (197b): ol"a, ..d lbpo(Jo. "al ..d d.de.... 0'; ..avTo.lun•.
a 29" T-31 ot ...... XIII 01
"both - and."
and so see 8]a
10.
a 33 XIII.r.... sc. "al ...otSTO" m.. The difference between this group and the one immediately preceding is that the preceding group are actually our inferiors while this group are considered to be such. The grounds for sueh bdief are given in the following sentence. a 33-34: ol'o.Tal di ["e.l..... ...ou~ sl.a, To,)......1dip ..•
·.,,01....
a 34 ij 116........ . . • 61'0"",,, am~ liv '1:" "pO~ 8.o!l~ . . . Aoylwv readings. practically, for this phrase as there are edd. What I have accepted is the reading of cod. F (using Kassel's apparatus), of Spenge!, Cope. Kassel (but see below). Roemer, Dufour read with cod. A: d. "eo' TO'\, eBOV,. Tovar reads Ii. "eo' geov,. Ross reads with corrected cod. A: 4. Td "eck Tov,9..,v,. Kassel secludes b 5~ ("al ... ).oyl.,.) as an Aristotelian addition and conjectures < "al 8Ta. dd"'WVTa.> immediately before it. With our reading the interpretation would be: "And on the whole men are confident [sc. 9aeealio, slal., b 26] if their relations with the gods are good, their relations in general but particularly those dependent on signs and oracles"; on cflla see S. I2.73. This arguntent for inspiring confidence is rather prominent in Demosthenes' Olynthiacs and First Philippic - see 01. :0.2.2and Phil. 1.42, and Jaeger, Demosthe..es. pp. 130/£ and passim; Xenophon, CyropaeJeia 3.3.34; and Thucyd. 7.77-1-4: Nicias' attempt to give conJidence to his men at Syracuse. b 6 '"l"dwv KIll AOY[wV See Xenophon, CyropaeJeia I.6.2.; on "'1",l",. see "E'IJ""'o,," 383-84. 395-98; on ;'oyl.,., Euripides. Chiltlren of Hetacles 405·
COMMENTARY
103
b 7 8uppcU.o\ov ycip Some of the difficulties experienced here might be removed if rde is taken. not as causal (as it frequently is here), which of course makes no sense, but a, adverbial and explanatory (S. 2.808; see 66a 2.S : 1), e.g., "anger, for example. inspires confidence." So I would interpret: "Anger, in filct, inspires confidence, and to be wronged without doing wrong causes anger; moreover the gods are assumed to hdp those who are wronged." The devdopment would seem to be that b 7-8 is a part of the topic introduced at b j-3-:>5); each division is formally developed in this chapter; cpo 79b 36. b 13 If""",, Sir ,d"ltUv-rJ On the definition see 78a 3I : 1; see also 843 :>4. An understanding of alaxVV7I and c!..aU7xv.....1a in A. must come primarily from the chapter before us. Before taking up alaxVV71 we should form some idea of its rdation, if any, to al6rb, in A.'. ethical writings, particularly since there is generally no discernible diJference between his use of aldrb, - al..xVV71 in the ethical works and in the detailed .bternent on al..xVv'l and its meaning which we meet here in the Rhe1oric. Although there appears to be no sharp and clear distinction between aldrb, and al"xtl.'I in the ethical works, Gauthier & JoIif say that EN n:>8b 10-35 "nous livre sur I' aid8s I.e dernier mot de Ia pensCc technique d' Aristore: I'aid8s y est avant tout pOut lui la honte et Ie repentir d'une £aute d' ortS et deja commise" (II.I 3:>1). If this is so, it is not precisdy the view of al..xVV71 met in the Rheto,ic where in a larger and more adequate manner al..xV." is described as: the distress experienced in regard to present, past, future evils which appear to bring dishonor. Let us glance at .devant passages iD the EN, EE, MM, but before doing so let us see what A. says about alhrb, as an "emotion"
106
AllISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC 7 II
since al Cpo 823 21.
"a,,';;.
b 14-15 "'EP< ••• xaKiilv Ta TWv = "that class of evils which seem ..."; <pa"opB.a agrees with the idea represented by this noun phrase. On da.,ela., see the definition of ala." at ENII28b II-I3 (<po{lo, TO, daoEta,), or the definition of alaxv.'1 in Plato's "Definitions 416a, Diogencs Laertius, Uves of the Philosophers: Zeno 7.Il2 (<po{lo, dao.ta,); on the idea in the word, see 62b 20 : • on a6Ea; and cpo A 10, 68b 23. b 15 xaKii\v ... !,-EAAcIv"""" &. was mentioned at 83b 13, this is a larger definitinn of shame than repentance for a wrong action just committed which Gauthier & Jolif see as the definition of ala." in the EN. Shame is an emotion which extends to the past through the present into the future, and while it concerns actions primarily (hut not exclusively, e.g., 84a 9-13), at least, as it is analyzed in this section, these actions do not have to have occurred (e.g., pelMVTW'); nor, if they occur, do they have to be noticed by others in order that shame be experienced. I say this because the principle upon which A'.s analysis of shame is built in this chapter seems to be the sense of moral rightness proper to the good man. For example, to take the first division in the chapter (83b 17 - 843 23), the things which cause shame:
108
41USTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
the reason given for each is that they are either a v:iolation of a v:irtue or the exercise of a v:iee. In fact, he introduces the section by saying that the ~axd of which he is speaking are 8aa dnd ~axia, ill!'Ya ini. (83b 19-20); see also 84"- 7-9. Even when action is not involved - e.g., at 84"- 9-13 - it is still the sense of not possessing what is proper to the good man that causes shame. This is rather interesting to me. For in this sense the a~oEia spoken about (83 b 14) in connection with this emotion of shame caD readily refer to the MEa a person has ofhimself; his v:iew of his own honor, his self-respect. His violation of this causes him to experience shame. On the other hand, a. we see at 84a 24-26, the Mea in question is mainly the opinion, the view, of others which causes a person to experience sbame. From the fint perspective one caD seen the survival of the traditional meaning of aiM., in alaxV"'1. One caD also understand, perhaps, Alexander of Aphrodisw' problem (mentioned by Cope, p. 72) with calling shame a ",clOo, (Qllaestiones naturales et moral.. fed. SpengelJ, pp. 270-73). His specific concern is with as seen in EN n08a 31-32 and II28b 10-35, and his argument is that, if aiM>, is a rp&{Jo, MoE/a" this is something all good persons of any age experience. Therefore aiM>, would appear to be an d,uOTe.OT71' "ed, Ta alalecl in such a person, and thus not so much a "dOo, as a liE., ~al 6.cl· O.a". This is in many ways quite reasonable, but it reduces itself to the prob' lem seen earlier with respect to neaOT71'; see 80a 6 : 1.
aM"',
1 oiv.....xuv..I.. Cpo A la, 68b 23 and note, Theophrastus, Characters: Shamelessness 9 is essentially correct in its generic definition, e.g., ~aTatpeOv.ja.' Me1f" but far more limited are its specific differences which
b 16 :
reduce shamelessn... to a fOrm of alaxeoxied..a; see #30. In fact many types among the varied characters share in what A. would qualify in this chapter as ..sharnelesm...... z 6).'Y"'pl.. See 7Sa 32; from the ways (78b 14-IS) in which .;hY"'eia expresses itself, its affinity to sbamelesmes. is rather close; c£ Demosthenes, On the Palst Legotion 206; cpo A 10, 68b 23. 3 4....eE'.. a total lack of feeling with regard to the shameful; c£ 83a 28 : z. Where d).'Y"'eta would designate an intellectual attitude (78b IO) toward the shameful, d"clO.,a designates the complete insensitivity to it which would follow upon such an aItitude. b I7 6p".8oia.. b 19 il>v 'Pp......II;EL
b 19-20 _I~ Ipy.. On xa,,/a see 68b I4 : 1. leya is being used as it is at 66b 27-34, and I would interpret d",d "ax/a, leya in a way similar to the interpretation given to a,..aOo6 leya at 66b 28, i.e., "all those acts which proceed from vice"; c£ 66b 28 : z, 66b 29.
1 '"' ,broc....pij...., ",..pu""",..8>\,.'I" The particular topics in this section through 84b 16 arc introduced by the articular infinitive. On the verb see 63b 32; as Cope (p. 73) remarks, it is frequendy used of "the meaner vices of cheating and de&auding," as well as defaulting, refusing payment of a debt. To refuse to return money or propCIty entrusted to one's care, which Cicero, speaking of a similar situation, calls injustice ("qui propter avaritiam clam depositum non reddidit, quod est iniustitiae," Tusc. 3.8.17) was. considered among the G<eeks a challenge to the gods to destroy both the individual and his community; see, e.g., Herod. 6.86, Lysias, Against Diogeiton 13. Apart from the betrayal of trust it was thnught to be an outrage to friendship. Sec Isoerates, Against Eulhynus, a speech which is a ~l>lTTO. s{inoeo, is well exemplified in Terence, phormio 41-46. b 28-31 >c.d 6uvell;.aell' ..• ~'.>.,D,,~
See 68b 18 :
1
(where 83b 5 should be: 83b 35).
sc. s.J "aUXe..; i.e., "and frequendy do so."
a 4 : 1 ov •• 6(~.LV sc. (TO) av."'i~... (TOUTO) 8 ... • t'.xp"""'X("~ 66b 19: 1. 3 ....." ••v6'~ .~ rerov r'in short, one's equals"), gives the validating criterion for each class: namely, full parity with those in each group whose pO'Session of the honors he is without is the thing which causes him shame. Without such equality, and consequently the opportunity for the person to be as the other is, there would be no ground for him to experience shame at honors possessed by anyone in
II3
COMMBNTAlty
any of the groups mentioned. He might experience envy or other emotions. ~.,), l~ ru.v means persons of equal station in life; c£ Plato, Laws 777d, 919d. a 12 i\6"'1 See also 84"- 15; "for in this situation [i.e., being equal with others] it is a cause of shame not to share.... " On the word see 69& 27, S4b 7, 79& 9· a 13 : 1 en:l ...oGcru....", the neuter of the demonstrative used substantivally: "to the same extent as they do." 2 x,d... Of'O""~ coordinate with :n;aultolae.". a 14 : 1 7tsv..... 6£ .....G..... l'iiAAOV sc. Ian alaxed. The ~av~a refers minimally to the deficiencies mentioned at a 6-13. 3 ..u...... ... !'iiAAav sc. 'Pal....at: "for in this case they now appear to be more the effect of his moral badness." "whenever (if ever) he himself is a 15-16 ;tv ..u...b~ .•. !'dAciv'v brackets it, but olfers no reason.
,a.,
read by four odd., Spengd, Cope. Kassel
"and these are acts of prostituting one's body a 18 .... d~ iI""PE-njGE'~ or submitting to degrading actions." On the construction see S. IIS3. "among which is to be physically outraged." a 19 ilJv ••• iI(jpll;£a8 ..,. eli., partitive genitive; v{JeIC.a8at: to be physically outraged. A period is the punctuation accepted by four of the edd., Spengd, Cope. Kassel omits the period and makes this together with what precedes (apart from his seclusion at a 18-19) one statement down to a 20, cf.co.Ta, where he punctuates with a colon as do the edd., Spengd, Cope.
These lines are interpreted in a I~I : 1 " ..l....... (jl..v ihcav..... different ways by the translators, and the Roberts translation reflects the
II4
ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II
84a 20
general tenor of these interpretations: "And acts of yielding to the lust of others are shameful whether willing or unwilling (yielding to force being an instance of unwillingness)." It seems more correct to interpret the lines as follows (the reasons are given in the subsequent notes): "And on the one hand acts of licentiousness both voluntary and involuntary are shameful; however, the acts done under compulsion are involuntary." 2 XIII "Ill "." ott; ... xlllbov"... "Ill 6' EI~ ... lixov".. · This is the punctuation of Ross, Spengel, and I find it the most reasonable. Roemer, Dufour, Tovar punctuate: ... "at WcOVT4' (rQ /J' sl, ptav d"ona) '; Kassd includes the whole in parentheses ("al Ta ",S' • •. (iia. Il"ona) .; Cope omits the clause rei d' Bi, . . • &"0'111'0. J "Ill "EV .l~ m..o>'llcrl..v This should be interpreted as was Ta d~ V"1J~.nj(J"~ (84& 18), or as 84a 34f: Ta .. o'P8a).por~ [acts done in the sight
a 20 :
of all], Ta .. 'Pa••~q,. For example, I find it difficult to understand how Cope, p. 78, finds no problem in interpreting a 18, Ta e!~ 1ln1J~'Tlj(J"~, as "acts of service or subservience," but insists, p. 78, on interpreting our phrase here as: UTa ai, d"OAQalav sc. tp6eO'llTQ, uv'JITsivovra; quae spedatlt ad incontinentiam." which he then translates: "And of these, all that have a tendency or reference to (all that subserve) licentiousness are disgraceful." If 'P~~o'Ta, (JIIVTEi.ona are to be understood here on an analogy with (?) 84a 1.,£ (8ua e!~ QT,,,,ICrP cpi~,,) or 83b 14, then they should also be understood.t 84a 20, Ta 6' el~ (ila. axOVTa. But Cope, p. 78, does not so understand them, and translates the phrase: "the involuntary being such as are done under compulsion." This is the same as his interpretation of Ta el~ V"1J~ETljU.'~. Furtb=ore, if we understand tpB{!Ol1TO, auvTslvovra and translate in terms of acts, we have: "acts that 'have a tendency to or reference to' compulsion." While this can be defended as having some meaning, still such acts cannot be called unqualifiedly Il"ona if all that A. says about such action in EN u09b 30 uub 3 i.! correct. I would interpret our phrase (c£ Bl~, LS, IV) to mean: "things which have to do with lust, licentiousness," which comes to mean "acts oflicentiousness" since in the context these things have to be actionsif ."ona - Il"o.m carry any meaning. On dxoAaula see A 9, 66b 13-15 and EN Iu8b 15 - IIl9b 18. 2 Exmll XIII cbcOV''oyo, See 81b 7 from which the impression is drawn that "oHoMyo. are keenly aware of the faults of others and speak viciously about "al them. an impression borne out by the reason given here: .r,,'e ("""oA."o;;.,..) T.,), "TA. However. the subject of """.Aoy.6c1l is 1id"'"'!,..t.•• and "a"oAOyo,. the two specifications of Ual'l'BAT"•• t.
yae
.r,
b 9 : 1 Kill ot~ sc. "al (T.6T.0, olav......o.) (ian). 2· &'II"P'~~ i. •.• those whose way of life. whose business. is with the faults of their fellow-men. From the example given - e.g.• XAeoocr-rol, (7\111 2~31. 80a 29). "w,..rpdo"••ol,. and the classification of these people as "o".Uy... i~OyyeAT.".1 - 6.0Te'P>! implies more than idle amusement or innocent pastime.
For the general idea in the word. see 741> 7 and I14b :1.-3. b II-I2 "Ill tv o~ ... &'''''.'''''11' "And they experience shame io the pr.sence .of those among whom they have never failed sioce (among such) they are io the position of those admired." 60.,..01;&,..""•• as p....ive and subject of d.rb....TO. must refer to those who experience the shame. not those before whom they experience it. Knowing that their past successes ....ure them of a good M~o among such people (843 27: My •• lX.' TW. 600,..01;&oT-3I) aod Cope (p. 83) remark, there is no firm reason, apart from the absence of any confirmatory evidence, which permits us to say that this is not the tragic poet or that the scholiast has invented the story. Other conjectures have been made but they are equally unsatisfying. On the positive side in some favor of the scholiast is the fact that we know Euripides was deeply regarded in Syracuse and that many Athenian captives owed their lives to him following the Sicilian disaster (plutarch, Lives of the Philosophers: Nidas 29), and that A. from his many citations of Euripides (he racks third after Homer, Isocrates) apparently knew his work intimatdy. See commClit at
84a 25-26.
b 18 : t .... P'I9,....... certainly the shameful actions indirectly mentioned in this division (842 24- - 84-b 17) by way of illustrating "'e~' d.a" but .lso those mentioned in the first division (83b 17 - 842 23). 3 0"1)p.E111 Sec l'E'1}PBiov/' 391. b 19 itppo&LC..ci;l;ov..~ ... Moil al"xVv0VTa& must be understood with d'l'eoa&,,&a'ovre,: "those who engage in acts of sexual intercourse are ashamed of the acts and also of the sign. of such actions." The underlined phrase must be understood since A. is talking about actions even though he makes the construction personal both here and in 84-b 20: ".&oiivre" Ul'DVTB'. The context from 84-b 17 wil1110t tolerate any other meaoing. A. has already indicated what he has in mind by this topic at 842 16-20. b 20 "'o.oil.....~ •.. ).eyov...~ See preceding note. For the general idea, see Sophocles, philoct.ru 86-87, Oed. Tyr. 14-09; Isocrates, To Demonicus IS. b 21 ....... ~ elP"IJp.£vCl\l~ Cpo 84-b 18, Tel. tPI8bTa; the persons mentioned are those ("eo, dv~) of this division, 84-' 24- - b 26. b 22 cN"O~ i.e., the people before whom men experience shame, i.e., the -leTJPivov, (b 21). Now their servants and fiiends are put i.n this class.
COMMENTARY
b 22-26 1IAc.>~ ••• voP.ov 84a 24 - 84b 22.
I21
a general summation of the whole division
b 2.3-24 oil8' WV ...lou
... cU.'18WE'v so. 060' (TOVTOV,) &iv: eli. is a possessive genitive with M~'1' which is governed by the verb. This is the positive expression' of what was previowly stated negativdy at 84" 28-29 (Hal eli. pT, "aTa'Pe.'" Tij, Mf'l'). The validity of the statement rests on 84" 25-27: shame is occasioned not by the Mfa but by the quality of the person holding the 66~a. On "OTO'PeO"'v, see 78b 'S-I6, 78b 14 - IS : 1.
b 23 56;1)~ ",oil cU.1)8WE'V "whose views (judgments) on speaking the truth they deeply despise." On aA'IO.v... see 84" 33, A. II, 7" ro, 14. The more wual interpretation found is: "whose opinions we quite look down on as untrustworthy" (Roberts); "for the validity of whose opinion we have a great contempt" (Cooper); "for whose opinion in respect of perceiving the truth ..... (Cope). Cpo A II, 7" 13-17. I would interpret O'leio b 24 "",,5i.. x",l 81)p('" here as there; see pa IS. In fact this present passage would confirm that interpretation, for it is somewhat diflicult to comprehend how A., given his definition of shame., could possibly speak of being ashamed in the presence of animals. b 25 oiln ",ar6d an accwative of respect: "nor are they ashamed with respect to the same things before those well known to them. ..."
. . . 50xoiiv..", . . . ",ck "po~ ... vop.ov The TO "eo' phrases are also acowatives of respect: "with respect to those things righdy evaluated ... with respect to those conventionally evaluated." Cope on this passage, p. 84, refers to 8Ib 19-21 for the meaning of the. expression. However, this does not seem to be correct, and the reasons are set down at 8Ib 19. Spengel, p. 23', interprets our passage as a statement of what men are wont to do and cites EN r 128b 23-25 as a contrasting statement of what men should do. But there really is no connection between the two. In our p .... sage we are talking, not abollt the actions men perform, but about their emotional response to the actions they perform which are judged by others as wrong. Actions which are TO "ed, ,U"O••av d."criivro are those which are rightly viewed as wrong, i.e., in accord with what they really are. Those which are TO "ed, vo,..ov are those viewed as wrong in accord with established law, wage, or convention; see e.g., SE 173a 29-30. As was seen at 8Ib 19, sf, these last are not necessarily the cause of shame to one if they are done in the presence of close friends. In the discwsion on law and equity in A 13, and in particular 74" 25 - 74b 22, there is a difference between legal and real wrongness in an action.
b 26 ",ck .. po~
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
122.
b 27: 1 .r,&e "(disposed) as follows"; c£ 82a 20 : 3. We begin here the last division of the chapter. "W~ IXo .....~ of 83 b 13; it is analyzed (84b 27 - 85a I) first from a genexaI perspective. z np"'TOY po... This is :mswered at b 2.9 (-liera. 6') - if it is answered at all; cpo 87" 6. The usual correlation can be seen at A I. 54" 34-
b
I.
1 d ,:,...cipXO'EV •.• ixoy.".~ oil...., '''''.~ OIiT"'~ is read by Roemer. Dufour. Ross. "If certain people are related to there in the manner described." 3 oiou~ ... ,doxwOYT.., "people such as tho.!e we said are the kind in who.!e presence they feel shame." .'Pa,.... i.e.. at 84" 26/[ (d.ay,,'1
b 28 :
TOVTOV," • •• ).
ij."." ...
b 29-3 I IWT"; Kassel alone of the edd. enclo.!es this in parentheses without :my break with what precedes; the other edd.. Spenge!. Cope begin a new sentence with "iera. and omit parentheses. punctuating with a comma after /J'Te~. Kassel gives his reason for the change in DeT Text. p. 134. I do not see his reason. At 84b 29-36: >Jera•... alerO"ljer.erOa. (b 36-38: 6••... C7lA"'Tai is simply a further addition occasioned by the statement) A. specifies what he means by 84b 27-29 (neWTO' ... alerx.s.o.Ta.). and he does so by naming again the group mentioned earlier at 84a 27-32. In 84b 29-31 (>Jera•.•. /J'TB~) he mentions the four major groups in who.!e presence men experience shame. At 84b 32-36 ("al OIiTO' ••• alcrO>1er.erOa.) he determines the OIiTO' o( b 2.9 more specifically: "these especially [see S. 1246) whether they are onlookers ["al oIiTo. ~ (11. eli.,.",) de 7j~ (as does Richards. p. 109). However. leola> as a collective singular denotes a class (c£ S. 2502b): "or those from whom they have some need which they will not.... " Kassel conjectures J~ for the
b 32-35 (C, ....Ep ••. lJnicp("""'....,) Only Ross and Kassel enclose this within parentheses. as does Freese. Doing so is reasonable. for the remark is parenthetical. and a better use of the punctuation than that of Cope who encloses b 33-35 (~'lov . .. 'P'1'Pler"'>Ta.).
85a I
COMMENTARY
123
b 32 : 1 Ku&I,,~ A. is our primary source (see, e.g., PW) fur this Athenian orator who argued, probably in 365 B. c., against the establishment of cleruchies in Samos, an action which, while legitimate since Sames was not a member, was clearly contrary to the intent and spirit of the Second Athenian League (on this last see OCD; CAH, VI; D. Siculus, Ip8.3-4, gives a brief report of the formation of the League under the year 377/376 B.C.). • Eci"ou In the year 365 Timotheus after a se.ige of ten months captured the island, and the Athenians moved cleruchs into it; see CAH, VI I05f£, 209/f. See OCD, PW, for thi, process begun at the end 3 x>.1JpouXI..~ of the sixth century B. c. whereby Athens settled her own citizens (who retained their citi2enship) in conquered territory. Its unpopularity in the fourth century B.C. is reflected in the constitution of the Second Athenian League, and in Isoerates, Panegyricus I05-Iog.
b 33 :
1 E&1JI'-1JYOP'I"'" See A 3, 58b 8-10, and the whole chapter for comments on deliberative rhetoric. • .n.ol..u.....op.lvou~· as a sign of their shame; see, e.g., Plato, PhaeJrus 2.43 b, PhaeJo II7C, Acscbines, Against TimorchlU, 26. a 12-13 ....I .......u-...",.. possible example of aiM".
See 83b 13 where the words are cited as a
a 13 ij flo" sc. ij ly"aA,;,.na6. Pit . .. The alternative ii, here introducing a second question, is the equivalent of the Latin The second question usually (as here) anticipates and rejects the answer that would be given to the first. See Plato, Apology 2.6b (11 MjA.. "'i ...) and Adam's note on it (PI.tonu Apologia Suer.tis), or Crit. S3C (11 oJanee ...). Cope, p. 87, offers another explanation.
.n.
the conclusion to the chapter.•" a I4-IS ",.pl flo£'" ••• o(,"'OP"aofloEY To;,. hani.,>, i.e., the opposite of the particular topics on shame presented in the chapter. Apart from this nothing is offered on the emotion opposed to shame; however, c£ Boa 19. ,~oefjaop.., cpo A 8, 66a 20.
CHAPTER 7
(Sec 85' IS)
I . Introduction: 8s, IS-2.S I.
2.
introduction to, and triple division of,
8S' IS-I?
kindliness definition
8S' '7-19
expIanztion of definition when kindliness is gIOZt what 4••pb", in the cIe6nition
3. 8sa 1!)-2S (oj 8sa '!)-"
(6J 85' 21-25
IT • Development: 8S' 2.S-2.9
melD'
those who can be said to have kindliness. This is presented not so much by showing how men are disposed .s by considcrlng what kind of act they perfOrm in terms of the definition:
.movey'a as.pIN,!, of kindlincss: a restatement of the triple division as now clear, and then - most unusual- how one ;. to develop kindliness in others
III . Conclusion: 8S' 2.9-33
IV . Unkindlincss: 8S' 34 ~ 8Sb
10
development of unkindliness by Way of showing how to remove xde" in others. Again thiJ ;. done in the bare terms of the definition, that is, by showing that the person, or the act, ;. not commensurate with the definition
·.tenv ••. _1 .....; ... ix"""o; the usual division (cf. 78a 2.3-2S). The reading;' th.t of four edd. Tovar along with Spengd, Cope reads with the codd. iJ
lisa IS-I6
,.Iii,.
There are two things to be said of thiJ chapter on xde'" the emotion ofkindlincss, good feeling toward another. In the Drst place, in organization it is, despite the brevity, the most loosdy constructed of all the chapterS which have been met thus far in the second book. It;' also different
a IS XoiplV
u8
AlUSTOTLE, 'RHETOR[C' II
85' 17
from the preceding chapters and those which follow in the nature of its analysis. It makes a token effort by way of simple statement to follow the triple division, but does not do so. The analysis is concerned more with what constitutes xde." and thereby what constitutes ar.ae",...la in the second half of the chapter, than in determining in any detail the disposition of those who experience xde." or the people toward whom, or the conditions under which, it is experienced. It defines xde., in terms of the actions of the person experiencing the emotion; this is unique among all the definitions of the emotions. Then, unlike the other chapters, it analyzes these actions in terms of those who would be the recipients of the emotion. Even in this last analysis, which might seem to be a development of the division "ed, -.:l.a, (those toward whom men fed kindliness), A. occupies himsdf only with recipients who exemplify certain specific kinds of need which illustrate the de6nition. He does not assume the definition and present US with general classes which exemplify the kind of people toward whom the emotion is felt. The best way to grasp what is meant by this criticism is to take an emotion closely related to xde." namely, ",.lla, and compare the division ned, d.a, (8la 8 - 8Ib 34) with what is said in our chapter in 8sa 21-2\1; this, in fact, is the entire statement on xde" in all its divisions. The second point to be made is that xde., as we find it analyzed in the chapter does not include the feeling of gratitude, as not only Cope, pp. 87, 89, suggests, but Cooper, Freese, and before them Schrader, p. 299, and presumably Vater, pp. 93-94 (reading, a. Cope does, .t a 17-18 xde" unove,,'" for xde .. lX"')' In. itself xde" means: (a) kindliness, benevolence. (b) gr.titude, (e) a favor cOnferred. But the intent of the dc6nition (a 17-19) of xde" as an emotion and its explanation in the chapter is an analysis of the emotion as kindliness, benevolence: helping someone in need and doing so without any expectation of a retum. Cope'. effort, p. 89, to defend (b) gratitude, does not really stand up. Gratitude as a feding, or emotion, is pleasure at and thankfulness for aJavor received. No matter how else the feeling or emotion is described, gratitude is a response to kindliness shown to one. But A. excludes this in the definition of xae'" e.g., 85a IS-n, and repeats it at 8sb 4; nor does he say anything itt the chapter which negates his definition. Further, 8Ib 35-37 makes it clear that xde', is kindliness shown to another. On pp. 94-95 of his commentary Cope speaks more correctly of xde" when he says that it is "confined to doing a service to a friend in need." a 17 l ....... ail XclPL~ On the definition, c£ ,sa 31 : 1. As was said in 78a 22, xde., (the feeling of kindness toward another) is, as a ..d90" exclusive to the Rhetoric. The "d90, met in the EN (where it is only mentioned, nosb 22), is xaed, and it would seem tomeanjoy, as it apparently does in the De an. 403a 18 where again it is simply mentioned. In the, Top. Iub
Ss. 19
129
COMMBNTARY
21-26 it again appears to mean joy, as also in the Rhetoric to Alexander, i.e., Anaximenes 14221 17. When x- II: response (l,..8v,...t) occurs in the case of one who is l,lBTal "de n1o'0C' d AV,",OVI-'670" on which see 79a II.
.:1"".6,....."
a ZS "'EVI,!, Cpo 79a IS-19 where those who are poor are characterized as among those who are bnB",..oWro,. "C1fI't1Ta,.....' = "those who help." exile as at 72b 6. Plutarch (Parallel Lives) in his Thea 26 : 1 cpuylliS mistoeles Z4-2S speaks of the assistance given to Themistocles in exile by his friends; see also Thucyd. 1.137.3. z I'LKPci 67nJP.-nj....,crLV The verb here tolerates the meaning found in vnovl!l'ta (a 18); further, the presence of vn01Jl!ytap at a 29 suggests that this is the operative ide, in a 2S-29 (d,•... ,...tC.,), and so I would translate: "even if their helpfulness is insignificant." In, way this lends confinnation to the interpretation at 8sa 20 : 1.
a 26-1-7 &Lci"';' l'iYE8oS .•• KIlLPav to nplq., as Ha'l!6" does to qN')'ai'".
,..froB., T;j, 6mjl1• ." refers back
a 27 K€)CIlPLal'ivoL sc. • Iaa 21 : 3 these are two closely related ideas. and so: "painfully destructive." h 14 &v ..~lou TUyxcivE1V c£ Poetics 1453a 4-6. The importance of this phrase in the deftnition becomes clear as the chapter develops. The adjective also enters into the: definition of indignation; c£ 86b 9-x6.
_,.LV
While Cope's ohservation (pp. 94-95) is h 14-Ij 3 xiv ... correct ("the conception of general benevolence and love and duty to our fellow creature is of modern and Christian origins and finds no place in Aristotle's Ethicol System. . . . the limitation of pity to those sufferings to which we ourselves or our friends are exposed ascribes a selfishness to the emotion which seems not necessarily to belong to' it"; see also Schadewalt. 13If[, and Gomme. on Thucyd. 3.40.3). I am not certain that s~hness can be drawn from the text here. It seems more reasonable to see at work here an idea found in the Poetks whicll became popular in the fourth century; see. e.g .• Snell. pp. 246-52. and Dover. pp. 201-203. We read ill the Poetics 1452b 38 - 1453' I that the plot snitable to tragedy should be one which responds to man', sense of kindly sentiment for his fellow-man. sense of pity. and fear: 9"la.0eamo•• fl ....... rpo{J.erl.. This philantbropia ("ordinary sympathy." as Else, p. 364, calls it; c£ Stanford, pp. 26-27) is the compassion for oth"" aroused in man because of his sense of common humanity and fellowship with men. I tltink that there is a fine expression of what I mean in Cyrus' rellection. in Herod. I.86.6, or again in the words of Theseus to Oedipus, in Sophocles, Oedipus at C%nnus 566-568: "For I koow full well that I am a man and that my portion of tomorrow is no larger than yours." In general, just as tltis idea of common fellowship is at work in goa 20 where A. speaks of pity as experienced by the young. so, also, I believe it to be present here when A. says that we pity that Wldeserved suffering in others which we think that we ourselves or our friends could suffer. Unless we are able to see such suffering as sometlting which we, too, can suffer by reason of our cornman humanity shared with others. it is diflicult to comprehend how we can understand or appreciate suffering in another and so be able to "","tend pity to one in the throes of it. There must be this element of selfregard in pity (as there is in fear) in order that the emotion may be what it is primarily (as opposed to fear): other-regarding. On I",U.Oewno. in the Poetics, cf. Else, pp. 368-'7I; Lucas, p. 142; or Poblenz, 53/[ Pohlenz' description of philanthropy, p. 59, is somewhat to my point: "It is simply the feeling of intimate unity with our fellow man. It is more comprehensive than eleos since tltis has to do with our fellow man as suffering; and yet it is indeed a
138
ARISTOTLE, 'RBBToruc' 11
natural instinct out of which comes the fellow-feeling with our fellow man."
""'1"
il".Aov i.e., "overly timid"; on the use of ,UI;AAOV with the comparative see 64b 1-2, or Kiihner, Blass, & Gerth, I1.1.349b 6c, Cope, pp. 96-97, meaning (2). The person who is excessivdy fearful is deficient in confidence and is called a coward; c£ EN IlIsa 34 - IlI6a 3, 68b 18 : l. 2 e}My .....o. In the context, a. Bonitz, ltu/ex, notes, it is the one who is .v Aoy,C6,.."0,, one good at calculating, and, so, prudent, circumspect. This reason certainly applies to the "'."'aw.v,....', of whom it is characteristic that they are good in making judgments (EN I094b 23 - 109sa 2), questionably to da6 ....i', dBlA6ueo,. Cpo dAOyurra at b 30, 32.
b 28-29 a.6'ro\j ... "'''Oft "for these are one's own and are able ..."; see, e.g., 8sb IS, 18: ~OW aVTo;; T"a, which explains, I believe, A.'s use of the singular (av..oii) here; i.e., yo..., etc. fall into the category TOW aVTO;; Tl.a. The singular is questioned by Spengd, p. 234 (aV~oii); on the matter in general, see II4a 2S-26, 8Cia 1.7 : 2. b 29 dp1JfL.....
sc.
'P'l,.6,...a """d 'l'6a~,..a II
A""'1ea, 8sb
13-14-
b 2Sf-30 ."... 1Iv..~ "those who are not experiencing fedings of courage"; see Bl,.;, LS, C.rv.3. These fedings are immediately specified as anger (see B 2) and confidence (B s, 83' 13 - 83b 10). Aspects of courage as an absence of fear can be found in both: direcdy in confidence as the opposite of fear; in anger, in the desire for retaliation. See also 83b 7: 6aeeaAiov yae tj6ey7j· b 30 (liMy..............ii....) The parentheses are read by the edd. and ,Cope, but not by Spengd. The neuter represeats an understood Ta na87j, i.e., Ta;;Ta (Ta nd67j), referring back to anger and confidence. lliY'aTa = not heeding, thoughdess ot; apparendy in the sense of o~ Aoy,C6,...0,; C£ 8Sb 27 : 2. Spengd, p. 234, questions the use of dAOy'aTa TOG lao,.bov for these nd67j. I find the doubt a reasonable one for confidence; see, for example, 83a 17-19. On anger, however, we have the statement at A 10, 6ga 4- I believe the point that A. is making is that reason plays a more active role in pity as defmed (e.g., the one who pities "must be such a one as to think that he him.!elf would suffer some evil," 8sb IiS-I7) than it does in anger or confidence, where the reaction of the sense perceptions is more dominant; he says of anger (EN II49b I) that "it follows reason to some extent." b 31 6(3p,....."ij &,CI8taE' C£ 8sb ,u; on d,a8l1as, C£ 7Da 2 : 1. This attitude, which is described at 8sb 21-24, obviously excludes all thought of experiencing any serious harm. b 31-32 (x..l .....,) The parentheses followed by a comma or no punctuation are read by the edd. and Cope, but not by Sponge!. ,
800 2
COMMBNTARY
141
b 32 •.. "da.aOed T.). Q>.).' 01 p..T"~U ToU","", See asb 34. This is the reading of all the codd. at this place. It is also the reading of Dufour, Tovar, Ross, Sponge!, Cope, who punctuate with a comma, colon, or period after TO~TOW. The phrase dll' 01 pna." T.VTOW read here makes sense in itscl£ Moreover, taken as an integral part of the whole sentence8sb 29-34: "ai .1 ... ndO•• , it permits the sentence to read intelIigendy. On the other hand, put at the end of the next classification 8sb 32-34: pf}T' cnJ ••• 01>0.1'1' ndO•• , where Roemer and Kassel locate it, it makes for far more sense, I believe, although I can give no reason, nor does anyone else, for the dislocation (if indeed there is one) in the codd. The contrast in this single sentence, 8Sb 29-34, is between two emotions, inrmoderate courage (e.g., anger, selfconJidence, hybris which is excessive and irrational self-confidence) and excessive fear. It is possible to see midpoint between them: the experiencing of reasonable courage and fear which permits the person to see the possibility of suJfering misfortune and so being capable of pity. This, in fact, is said for fear at 800 27-29. On the other hand, if we read our phrase where it is found in the codd., it refers only to immoderate courage, specifically its examples: anger self-confidence, hybris. b 33-34 oU Y"'p ... " ..0.. Kassel alone includes this within paren-
a
theses without any punctuation before it. On the idea in the sentence, cpo 800 22-24: Tel ;e~a.pov.
rae ...
b 33 : 1 clX"E1fA.''lYp.£vO' strongly enforces the 'PoPODP"" u'P0dea, i.e., they are driven out of their senses by the fear; see Euripides, Medea 8. orO ••• " .. "becawe of their:. preoccupation with their own emotion"; see LS, slpl, C.N.6. Cope, pp. 97-98, analyzes the expression in terms of neo,. b 34 otxcI", " ..0••• ti)J;' 01 p.ET,,~u '\"eN","", I would read eLll' ... TOOT"'" here with Roemer, Kassel; for the reasons see Bsh 32. TQ,n"JV would then refer to the two major emotions mentioned: courage and fear.
,. 5....
e..
b 3S : 1 'tcdv cln•• b«.w On the word, see 7& I3 : 2; recognizing that there are good men, one acknowledges thzt there are men unworthy of their suJfering and so one can experience pity. The genitive is partitive. 2 p.'15lv.. Otop.EVO~ sc. .lva. b."""i; see Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.1I.2S on Timon of Athens: "ut odium ... in hominum universum genus, quod accepimus de Timone, qui p.advOem"., appellatur." Ixll oIl....,~ C£ LS, l;em B. 2: "and generally speaking indeed (men feel pity) whenever one is so disposed that ..."
8Cia 1
a 2 : 1 ...olcoin.. i.e., "axel ¢aeT",el 'ill~"'1ed (8sb 13). dvap...,aOij.a. T••a;;Ta is the side of the coin set forth in Bsh 14-IS, see Sophocles, DC
s60-S68.
ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II
86a 6
z il cN...p il ....." is the reading of three edd., Spengd, Cope. Tovar reads aVT~... dplI..... "well, then, the disposition of those who pity has been set forth." z cl 8' We begin here the second division: nola iA....d (8sb I2). a S.J? CI....... q6v........ We have here a division of those things which men pity, and from what A. says it is based on the definition: namely, "a"d cpa ..&,..va cp9ae..."a I} Av""!ed, 8sb I3-14- Despite the disagreement about the statement here - e.g., Spengd, p. 235 - it seems to be fairly straightforward: (I) 8aa ..... •• iA ....d is nothing but a statement of the definition of the kind of evil that arouses pity; (2) "al Gaa ava'eBTIHd i. one specification of the evil; (3) "al 817"" ... l;COvT"" is a second specification. Thus we have two kinds of evil: (a) evils which are ruinous; (b) those which are substantial and due to chance. "For all destructive evils which are painful and distressing arowe pity, both those that are ruinous, and those, provided they are substantial, for which chance is the cause." In what follows A. goes on to exemplify the destructive at 86a 7-9 and those caused by chance at 86a 9-12. From Victorius' comment on dva'e"""d compared with cp6ae""'Xrl, he would agree in part with the interpretation offered here - e.g., ",9"11"'"d ... "tantum ilia [mala] esse, quae interitum alferrent"; dva<eBT ...d . .• "cuncta mala, quaecunque ilia sint, quae perdendi vim habent, et dva'e ...."d sunt, misericordiam excitare" - as would Vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften," II6) essentially.
as
AUn1JpOw x.zl6&uv1Jpo.v Victorius and Schrader (pp. 3II-12) refer the first to mental, the second to bodily, pain. But Cope, pp. 99£, shows that each word can denote both. Certainly in the definition of fear (ltlm] ...., I} Taeax~ l" cpa.Taala" 82:1 21), Atlm] cannot be confined to the body alone. Nor do I agree with Cope, p. 100, that the evils mentioned here are "evils affecting the body alone" (Cope refers to Bipontine #8; he may mean #9). There are no grounds, however, for excluding """'7ew. "al &a""'1ew. from ##9, 10, II (86a 7-16). Moreover, the evils mentioned therein can be
both physical and mental; cpo BSh 13 : 3. Kassd alone secludes; in this he would agree with a 6 q>8C1p""'" Vahlen ("Kritik arist. Schriften," II6).
86a 13
143
COMMBNTARY
-rox1J
C£ A 5, 61b 39 - 62a 12, 69a 32. 68w1)pc\!,tv ",d S We begin here the fino! division: those who are pitied. The use of ~. here is a prohlem. A more detailed explanation is given at 86a 24-2S. HoweveI, ifwe read as all the edd. do at 86024,\"'fLOV 65b 8; 9, 66b 4-7, I think that A. ha, in mind the way in which the dreadful can just as readily evoke fear as pity, and can be so used. For ......lip Radt, "Rberorik," on good grounds suggests "the opponent." is the reading of all the codd. All the a 24-25 k. a..oG"." ... lIv",o~ edd., however, read Vahlen's conjecture: 16.~ Xfl7/lno. would indicate; on xe71aT&~ cf. 80a 30 : 1. See below Sllb 14 : 3.
b 13 : 1 &EL
would seem to imply a .ense of moral obligation, which i. the force Cope finds in the word (cf. 78a 33) and which is strengthened by 86b 14-16: 000"" l'~ •.• ",.Baa.. !u Barrett, p. r65, notes, began to replace Xq~ in denoting need, necessity (although in the fifth century xe~ to some extent was still reserved for moral obligation) until it became dominant and was used to denote various kinds of need. These needs could be, as we find the word used in the New Testament, physical, moral, legal, etc.; cf. Robinson or Bauer, or Gooddl. 3 4yCl~""~ "p.wrOUG' X"xcd~ On nqdTTS" "a"';;,, oJ cf. LS, "edTT.", II; doa';tQJ~ modifies the expression as it does in the next line: "those who undeservedly fare badly ... fare well."
a.,
b 14 : 1 GUVOVOU~
As Cicero says (Tuse. Disp. 4.8.18) in the continuation of the citation at 8sb 13 : 2: "nemo eninr parracidae aut proditoris supplicio misericordia comrnovetur." The accusative with the passive verb, A""7J8.i7J, is noted by Cope, p. III; see S. 1S9S. 0
b 29 :
J
•
'se&,.
b 34 - 87'l 1 6 yeip ... cp8av.p6~ Here. and in what follows to 87" 3 (.•. Xale ...). we have A.'s correction of his statements in EN. MM (the statement in EE is left open by the use of .ww.v/,ov): sec 86b 9 : 3. In stating here that the malicions man and the envious man arc the sarne A. recognizes that the two emotions arc mordy different aspects of the same state of mind. As he goes on to say (87" 1-3). if on. is pained by the presence of something in another (envy). he will necessarily be pleased by its loss (malice). ''The envions man." say. plato (Phileb. 48b). "will b. dearly found rejoicing at the misfortones of his neighbors." b 34 m.x...pt......~ Th. passages concerned with malice have been mentioned in 86b 9 : 3; 'l'6&.0, is taken up in the next chapter. y.yvo~ ....1 ~mtpxOV"-13 . .. • Ial,), and is groWlded in the fact that ,i,..sa., is the opposite of 11,0, (86b 9-12). On that ground the argument is: if we are indignant with a person for deliberately [virtue is the result of deliberate choice] being good, then we should pity him for being deliberately evil. a 12 0..0' "pity"; on the plural see S. 1004. a
II-I2
(o~di
a 13 :
l ..o6-n.>v i.e., justice, courage, virtue. sc. ",...rrlJa.~ z 4>.lil J .u.o6'«!' ... liwil..., .....o,o6-ro~ C£ A S, 61a 12-24 on wealth; 6Gb 27 on d'VtldpBt as meaning either "power" or flposition·'; 1'ot06is specified by what follows at a 14-16. C£ 87a r5.
TO.'
a 14 .:,~ cbu.....~ £I..dy
C£ 74& 34 : z. ixOVT~ 4ycz8il
is the reading of the codd., the edd. (except Dufour), Spengel, Cope; Dufour reads a conjecture of Roemer's ("Zur Krltik," 504): 0~6' .1 .d 'l'VCIB< 0%0"" ciy08c1. In the phrase Tel rp.au..O' apxOVTE~
a 23 : I Z
recendy acquired riches they have wed the money (d.a ~~. ,.loW..) to acquire political office in the State. It illustrates 87a 21£
a 25 01 pkI .•. 01 6'
"the latter" (those in long possession of the good) ... "the former"; c£ 62a 36-37-
a 26-27 ..0 yellp ••• ixE'"
See the comment at 87a 16 : z on this explanation of the rea.on given at a 25: "Por that which appears to have been always as it is now seems to be the reality, with the result that recent possessors do not seem to possess what is their own." One should compare with this statement that atA 7, 6Sb 14-16 ("al il ... do"•••). On cU'18c!, as "the real," seeA 4, 59b 4; 7, 64b 9; 13. 74b I; Bxb 19-20. WithcllcnBunderstand do"o6a •• the indicative stating the actual result. Cope. p. II5. has a note on the difference between cpal••aBa. and do"••••
a 28: I
..oii 'NJtmo~
"any chance person"; c£ LS. A.2.b.
z ei"uMylca... ..o elIpl'o....ov i.e.. there must be some rdation between the good and the possessor so that a proportion is preserved. and drw an appropriateness and fitness in the possession of the particular good; on depO~TO' see 6]a 2B. Ross alone reads n ae/JOTIo. with Richards. p. 109.
a 29 liPI'o....E'
Cpo the we at A 15. 76b 140 17.
160
ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II
a 30 : 1 &"''P.pOVT~ "distinguished," as used at A S, 61a 13, 'S; on the idea cf. r II, I2b z'7-z8, or Alcibiades speaking of the marriage ofhis father, Isccratcs, The Team of Horses 3I. 2 .u.ouCJIo.~ The reading of four edd., Spenge!. Kassel, Cope read nhtn-oiiuw; cf. 87" 19. a 31-32 WyWECJLV iiv oW •.. VEIUCJ"IITOV "it follows that [ow] it is a cause of indignation if a man, through he be morally good, obtains a good not appropriate to him." With a few minor differences the edd. agree on the reading and punctuation, e.g., Ross, Kassd, Spengd punctuate with • oJ. begins the apodosis to colon after BVy••iuw. This is acceptable since 87" z7ff., Hal br.1 (and .ince) ... ; cpo Vahlen, ''Kritik arist. Schriften," II9. I do not understand Cope's period after eiJySViUIV, but see his note, p. 116; Kassd, Cope read leW oJ..
a.
a 32 K,d To" ij......... a conjecture of Ross's read also by Kassel. An articu1ar infinitive
•.• d.p",cufJ"'ITB" as the subject of an understood BUTI """v TafjTa would be anything which brings honor with it and is the anteeedent of di.: "and above all if they are ambitious for
aN.......
ARISTOTLlI, 'RBBTORIC' II
those honors which others, who are unworthy of them, have received"; or, "of which others happen to be unworthy," as Cope, Freese, Radt, "Rhelorik," interpret.
I>
II
",11 a:Aco>~
I> 12 cr.v
governed by the verb, as its antecedent, would be governed by
a'.o;;.n,.
TOVT.,., if present,
1 """'""V apparendy governed by the ,.pBt17JTCxot on an analogy with the verb which can take a dative of the person (TO"TO.,) and genitive of the thing. The word refers to those goods undeservedly possessed in their view by others. 2 ci.v8pcmo8':'8E~ Such persons (whose opposites are the AJ.B.J6ie'0,) are characterized at EN 109Sb 19-2.0 as choosing a life suitable to cawe. In 87b 13-1S we are given a general cl... of those who do HoI experience indignation as a contrast to the general group (87b II-I3) who experience the emotion; see 87b 4. sf
I> 13 :
1....u....... I would say that this refers to the contents of the whole chapter, immediately to 87b 3-1S. mediately to 873 6 - 87b IS together with 86b 9 - 87a S. The sentence ('I'avseo, ... M) canilot be understood without knowing the definition of indignation, at whom and for what reasons men become indignant, and how the indignant feel. It cannot be understood because it actually sets forth persons and feelings opposite to the emotion, indignation. 2 ",,101, Although ",oio" is used here, not Tlaw (i.e., persons). :md ",oio, has been used quite consistendy for the things which cause an emotion (e.g., 78. 2S is the first instance). I do not see how it can be so interpreted here, e.g., "the cases of misfortune, disaster ... ' (Cooper; Jebb & Sandys similarly). The participles modifying the word are verbs which apply more readily to persons, not things. I would interpret, as do others, "at what kind of men they are at whose misfortunes, troubles, or failures one should rejoice, or not experience pain." If men rejoice or remain neutral in such instances, the misfortunes are deserved; c£ 871> 17 : 1. On the possibility of ",oiol, referring to things which cause the emotion, c£ 87a IS where such (e.g., '~l'iv,"a. "dllo,) are mentioned in a section which has to do (c£ chapter oucline II.2) with the people at whom men become indigoant.
I> IS :
~ cU.U"",~ qEIV Cpo 86b 26-28. In EE I:>33 b 20-21 the feeling of pleasure at the misfortune of another is said to be without a name.
I> 16 X,dpELV I> 17 :
1 obc yci.p ••• ci.V"L"IXEI/LEVU See 861> 9 : " 2, 88a 28 : 2. The reason is now given that £rom what has been said in the chapter the opposites are clear. In fact he has just set down some opposites to in.tion in bd
COMMENTAlIY
".[.,~ ... ~.~ The consequ=, as he goes on to say (dlUT' ...), i. that "if our discourse develops in the judges (auditors) a corresponding attitude of mind (i.e., to feel joy or nothing at all [b 16] at the failures of the undeserving) and further demonstrates that those who think it is their right to be pitied happen to be unworthy, in fact worthy not to receive pity, and so, too, the grounds on which they expect to receive pity, it will be impossible to pity." This concluding paragraph is somewhat strange in its argument. After presenting the threefold analysis of indignation, A. in this concluding statement reverts to the argument of the opening statement of the chapter: namely, that indignatinn is the contrary of pity but that there is a kinship between them. As he says at 86b 12-14:, orin MM II92b 22-23: the man who feels pain at undeserved good fortune (indignation) is the sarne man who feels pain at undeserved misfortune (pity). The argument here (seemingly somewhat unnecessarily involved) is that if we put forward persons, causes, reasons opposite to those which arouse indignation (pain at undeserved good fortune), we will in fact make it impo.sible for others to experience both indignation and also pity. For the opposite of pain at undeserved good fortune (indignation) would be joy at deserved bad fortune. But to arouse such a response in others is to remove any grounds for their feeling pity (pain at undeserved bad fortune). 2 c,G..' governs d~~.aT6. (eUT') lA••i" "with the result that pity is impossible if our discourse develops in the hearers a corresponding attitude of mind and further deroonsttates ..."
b 18 : J "oU~ ... " ..p..GlCoucicrn Cpo 77b Z4, 80b 3I, 83a 8, 8sa 3I; on the verb, see 6Gb II. 2 lCp,..ci~ C£ 77b 21 : J. 3 Myo~ Le. discourse; see 55a 26; 5gb 16 : I; A 13, 74b 12; 77b 23 : 2.
CHAPTER 10
I· Introduction: 87b ZI-34
with division and de6nition of envy
II . Development: 87b 34 - 88a :>5 I.
87b 34-35
3. 88a S-zS
the attitude of those who experience envy: the subjective aspect of the emotion the things which cause the emotion: the objective aspect of the emotion the persoDS who are envied: the objective aspect
III . Conclusion: 88a ZS-30
87b 21-:0:0 &.JAW.. Ixov".~ The usual division for the study of the emotions £irst mentioned at 78a Z3-2S; here it serves as the apodosis to the statement at h n-:>4The definition of envy is stated. It is b n-34 6 'Pe6vo~ ••• ixeLVDU~ essentially the same as that given at 86b 18-:0:0. The,.,q r.a ... phrase simply reiterates, hut with a different emphasis, what is said at 86h 20-:0:0: namely, that the major cause of envy is ohjective, not subjective; .ee 861> :00-:0:0. Men are moved by envy hecause of what happens to another; the self enters in as a secondarY, not a primary, cause. It is an emotion, as we are told at EN IlO?> 8-27, which is bad in se (see also 88a 36), and there is no way in which it CUI he made, in itself, into something good. This is an idea found again at EE 1Z34> 30 where we are told that it contrihutes to injustice. As we find envy in the ethical writings (c£ 861> 9 : z for the full passages), it is defined as the pain experienced at all good fortune; see, e.g., EN Il08h 4, EE I:O:OIa 38-40 (adding the qualification "even at those who deserve their good fortune"), MM Il9>h :05-:>6. However, EE IZ33 h 19-:>0 defines it as pain at deserved good fortune. This idea is repeated in the defiDition found in the Topics (which in its terminology is quite similar to that of our Rktom de6nition) at l09h 36-]7, IIoa 1-4: pain experienced at the manifest good fortune of good people. The de6nition given here in the Rktoric hovers hetween these two ideas. It is pain at good fortune, hut not at .11 good fortune, or again deserved good fortune, hut simply: at .11 good fortune of those who are one's e'l""l.r; c£ 86b 19-:00. As"equals" is explained
lo"'.ov,
166
ARISTOTLlI, 'RHBTORIC' II
at 87b 25-27 there is no necessary reason to confine them to "good men" (as the Topics passage does, and EE I233b 1\r20), or to "friends," as we find envy defined by Socrates in Xenophon, Mem. 3.9.8, and in the Definitions 416, which bear Plato's name. However, "equals" is more specific than the generic term given in the definition of Diogenes Laertius, Zeno 7.IIl: pain at another's goods, or of Cicero, Tusc. Disp. 4.7.16: "invidentiam esse mcunt aegritudinem susceptam propter alterius res secundas, quae nihil noceant invidenti." The discussion of 'P80•• , in Plato, phileb. 47b - 50e is not relevant; e.g., is it envy or malice which is at issue? And the comments of Anaximenes I#DO 34-39 on how to stir up envy in others are based partly on an understanding of it in direct opposition to A.'s statement at 86b 19 (dAA' .,; "06 d.aElov), e.g., 06, MO'PaJ..JU1' d.aEt." eil nmeaxo..a,•.. . Plutarch also has a small treatise On Envy and Hate; c£ II2a I : 1.
b 22 ...el w-n:pllyl~ ••• £law)· n '1'6011060""; c£ 87b 26-27. 2 saw ... In:IO"'O....... read by the edd. (save Kassel), Spengd, Cope. Kassd double brackets as an addition (or possibly such) of A.'s. The saying is identified by Nauck as Aeschylus' (frg. 305, Nauck & Snell).
a 8 "Cll ...pc\~
p.aGv.....
alI~ cpll..... sc. tp6o..vaw TOtlTO'~. It is important in this topic (a 7-17) which is concerned with rivals that we understand that the main subject is: those whom nlen envy. On tp,10·...,.••.-6a. "e&~ c£ 7lIb 14 : 2.
a 9 dp'lp.lvou~
presumably those mentioned in a 6-7 (e.g., see following two notes), as well as those referred to at a j-<S (ol~ •.. • le1/Ta.).
a 9-10 ",pc\~ 6~ ..• oN&d~ sc. tpUOT',. ........ Cpo 86a 29-31. Obviously TOtl~ ,."e'o....O-' ho~ w.a~ . .. "'o,.bov~ ... 1'B6••ciiTa~ refers 10 a 6: TO'~ . . . ."ytl~ ... xedvq>. Four of the edd., Spengd, Cope agree on t;he reading
88a I4
COMMBNTARY
of a 9--10. Kassel, however (0£ Der Text, p. 134, for his reasons), secludes and II n8.BwTflI;.
:ned~ ToV~ before laopbov~,
a 10 "oU~ .'P' ......TIj"CI~ refers to a 7: TO'~ ••. lyl'~~ ... TO"fjl. Cope, p. 127, illustrates the use of the phrase from Pindar to denote the outermost limits of the known world. I I-I~ wI' irw ... 6'REpQIELV, sc. oil'" (ned~ TOVTO!', fP,AOTI.uoiWra,) WP ••. : "nor are they rivals of those to whom in their own eyes, or the eyes of others, they consider themselves to be far inferior or far superior." After .moe';xo.. all save Tovar, Kassd read a comma, making the WotWTOJ~ clause a part of what precedes; o£ following note.
a
a 12-13 ':' ..cahw~ XCII ..po~ "oU~ ...pl ..a. ..O•..u-.CI The reading is that of cod. A, three of the edd., Spengd. Ross, Kassd, Cope, the Anonymus Commentator read with cod. F: wua6Tw~ "al "oel TDVTDV~ "al "eel Ta TDI.w...a. Usually the passage is interpreted as though there were a complete break before this clause, e.g., "So, too, we compete with those who follow the same ends as ourselves" (Roberts translation). However, the edd. (save Tovar, Kassd), Spengd, Cope punctuate with a comma before the clause. Of equal importance with the punctuation i. the verb to be understood with the clause. If one follow> the common punctuation, then the verb which introduces the whole clause should be understood, e.g., a II: D~a' (II"MJTIpD6PTa. "ed, To6TOV~) WP "DAV• ••• For this reason Spengd, p. 243, would transpose the clause to a 9: :ned~ TDU, 8Ie'lpbov, Q)"a6T.., "al ... TD,a6Ta. Certainly with the common punctuation I do not see the possibility of dismissing 006' (9'MOT'po6vTa.). Therefore I would have to interpret our statement to mean: "nor are they rivals of those to whom in their own eyes or the eyes of others they consider themsdves to be far inferior or far superior; so, too, they are not rivals of others in like instances." This offers the following sequence of statements in 88a 8-17: men are envious of their rivals, and their rivals are (I) the aforementioned (11-9), (2) not those far removed in time or place or to whom they are clearly superior or inferior or those of similar status (9--13); but they are rivals to those who are their competitors in general, or in love, or who seek what they seek - of such they are necessarily envious (13-17). The statement is eyclic: men are envious of their rivals. .. they are particularly envious of certain kinds of rivals. On the other hand, if we punctuate with a complete break (Le., a period) before our clause, then it would be corrdated with 88a 11-9: "al "ed~ o6~ 9"ADnpD6'Ta, ..• Sle'lpBIIOV, ... r.6aaV't'Q), ("&1oT,,,,oo,.Ta&) ned, TOO, neel Ta TO&a6Ta: "Men are envious of their rivals, for they are rivals of those already mentioned. . .. In the same way they are rivals of those engaged in similar pursuits." a 14 4"..ClY""' ..... Ii~ rivals, competitors in general (as at 8..b 13, 83a 22), e.g., in law, in politics, in sports, etc.
AIUSTOTLB, 'RHBl'ORlC' II
a 17 xIXl XEP"!L£US •.•
88a 24
c£ 8Ib 16: 2.
a IS xul Wv ... XCX'Top9oUv'nIN SC. tpB01IOVd& 't'oV'ro&" as at 88a 8; "those whose past acquisitions or present successes." On H,"OeBoVvT\cr.",..... This is the reading accepted by the edd and Spengel, and I consider it co=t. Cope reads: ." rde oil" l"oOTe, with which Vater (PI! ."0.....'), pp. 99-100, would agree. If we look at the whole passage from 88a as, we can see the development: "It is al.o clear at what things and with what persons men who are envious fmd delight and what their attitude of mind is. For just as men with this attitude of mind [envyl experience pain, so with this attitude they will rejoice at opposite in.tances; consequendy, if men, on the one hand, are made to feel envious [oth-.., ,,,."1, whereas those who deem themselves worthy of pity or of receiving some good are .uch as those mentioned [i.e., in the class of those enviedl, it is clear that the.e latter will not obtain pity from those with the power to grant it." The statement in the entry, despite the discussion it has aroused - e.g., Cope, pp. ~3O-3 I - is simply a repetition of the clarification made in the Rhetoric between '1'8.00' and l"""a'l!",a,,la in the preceding chapter. See, for example, 86b 9 : z where it was said in part that the confusion between the CWO appear. to have been corrected in the Rhetoric when A. points out that envy-malice are not two extremes of excess and defect whose mean i. indignation. Rather, as h~ says at 86b 34 - 87> 3, they are simply diiferent aspects of the same attitude of mind or general disposition. In saying that the envious man and the malicious man are the same, A. recognizes that envy-malice are only diiferent movements experienced by one and the same general attitude of mind They are not opposites as indignation and pity are, as he states at 86b 9-14 and argues at 87a II-I3 (oil rde . .. Blalo). Just as there is no contradiction in a man who experiences indignation and so pain at undeserved misfortune finding joy and so pleasure in deserved misfortune (or deserved good fortune), 86b 26-3 I, '0 there is none in a man, who experiences envy and so pain at another's possession and enjoyment of good, experiencing joy and so pleasure at the other's loss of those goods. See also I17b 17 : 1.
.''0"".'
a 26 c:.s ZxOIl'<ES This, together with oii~.., (a 27) and oiJ~.. , '''''' (a 28), refers back to ncii, ."0.....' (a 26) and 01 TOlo;no. (a 2S) and signifies those who experience envy.
AllISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
a 27 lv.."..lo,~ joyed by another.
88a 29
i.e., instances of the loss or destruction of the goods en-
a 28 : 1 "CIfIllcncWllriii'l",,, C£ 8sa 3I : 2. 2 "'••irill' See 86b 9 : I, z; 87b I7 : 1. Once again the emotion pity appears in an atgUDIent on what happens if a person is made to experience the opposite of the emotion under discussiop. It would be interesting to know whether this emphasis on pity is owed indirectly to the pervasive inHuence of forensic rhetoric.
a 29 41;106,,0"'"
Ross alone reads dE'.iin.~ with Bonitz (StuJien, p. 94).
CHAPTER II
I . Transition: 88a 3I-3S
definition of emulation
II . Development: 88a 3S - 88b 28 I.
88. 35-38
2.
88. 38 - 88b
definition explained by contrast with envy the attitude, disposition of those who experience the emotion: the subjective aspect
10
3. 88b II-I4
the things which cause the emotion: the objective aspect
4. 88b 14-22
the persons towmI whom the emotion is direCted: the objective aspect contempt: the emotion opposite to
5. 88b 22-28
emulation to the section on the emotions
III . General conclusion: 88b 29-30
88a 31-32 .....~ ... &ijAov
the usual tripartite division.
a 32 :, I:ij).o~ Apart from what is said here on this emotion, there is nothing of any substance on CilAo, in A. It is merely mentioned in the ethical works as one of the emotions; sec, e.g., EN IIoSb 23 and MM II86a 13. At EE I229a 38 in a discussion of fear it is identified in a passing way with the experience of A~"'1 (as we find it in our definition). There is nothing at all in Anaximcncs on the emotion. When we turn elsewhere, we find that emulation is generally linked with envy (as we find it at 8Ih 21-22, 88a 3S-38, and BID, II) but that it has also 2Cquired a pejorative meaning, e.g., Diogcnes Laertius, Zeno 7.II1: ",B.... all A~",," in' illOTelo" draB ••" CijA•• all AUmjv inl TCP 4.lltp "ae.'va, di. mlTo, in,Bu,.••,; Stobaeus, Ethica 2.178:
Disp. 4.8.17: "Invidentiam esse dicunt [ei. 87b 22-24] .... Aemulatio aUtem dupliciter ilia quidem elicitur, ut et in laude et in vitia nomen hoc sit; Dam et imitatio wtutis aemulatio elicitur ... et est aemulatio aegritudo, si eo, quod cupierit, alius potiatur. ip.e careat." In A. emulation i•• good emotion and an emotion which belong. to good men (88a 3S-36); its object is the good
88a 38
ARISTOTIB, 'RHBTORIC' II
174
seen in others who are one's p=s and seen as possible of attainment for the one who desires it. It is an emotion which is self-directed but with an element of altruism in it (88b II-14), and it is intimately connected with nfA~ which is itself a sign that one has a reputation for doing good (c£ A 5, 61a 28 - 61b 2). Further, it is the prize of virtue, that which is given to goodmen (EN II23b 35). • AU"') ... ,~ The presence of pain indicates in this instance the clear awareness of the absence of something seen as a good together with the desire to achieve it; c£ 79& II. This is also true in the case of anger, fear, envy. C£ 7& 31 : 3· J rp",~o"''''l1 not simply dyaOd, but those which are a 33 ."...(..."'" x ..l ."&<X0....,,...,. held in honor, as he says at 88b II: C'1.lwTa TIl ''''''fAa dya66 (and he indicates some such in b II-14). Furthermore they must be dya06 which are seen as possible of attainment by the individuaL Since the phrase ""de;C0fA""". a~Tq; .lape•• is in the definition of emulation and is therefore essential to the meaning of emulation, I have reservations about any suggestions at 88b 2;
c£ 88b 2.
"BfI'
a 34 : 1 ".pl "'oU~ ... " 4;lOi .... ", ...volfL"'" cl&6vcx.... This is the reading and punctuation of Tovar, Spengd, Cope. Roemer, under the influence of Victorius, Muret, indicates a lacuna after lxova.. • . .. This lacuna is replaced in Dufour, Ros.s by the conjectured words suggested by Victorius, Muret: 1.~.xo".A• .,. a~To" lap.,.. This replacement is considered necessary by Vater (p. 100) and schrader (p. 342) because of the "de clause, and Cope, p. 133, incorporates it into his interpretation. Kassel doublebrackets ~~.k ... cI~"'aTa with no punctuation before, and a colon after, the secluded passage. As was said at 88a 33, the possibility of obtllining the good things is part of the definition of emulation. Therefore, it should not be necessary to repeat it when speaking of emulous persons. According to the definition, men can be emulous only of good things which they can secure for themsdves. It may well be, as Spongel, p. 244. says, that "if the [conjectured] words are added, the whole passage has better coherence," but I am not certain that its coherence as it stands is not quite adequate, i.e., "it follows of necessity that those inclined to emulation are persons who deem themsdves worthy of the good things which they do not possess, for no one deems himself worthy of good things manifestly impossible for him." The "de clause, as an explanation of the statement immediatdy preceding (cI.a,,"'1 dlj ... T~' dE.oiivra" i.e., the tksi,e fo, certain good things, a desire denoted by dxo. 6Cib 17. 3 xcd.r.; sc. "al (TOIO;;TO.) or, ... b 4-5 h-I'-'" At A 9. 67b 27-35 there is a definition of praise and its difference from encomium. c£ 67b 27-33. 67b 28 : 2. b 22 : 1 "0'"1)........ II ).oyoypcicp_ Ros. alone of the edd. reads" ,j"d 10yoyea",ow. The words Aoyoyea",o,. loyono.a, (most likely Ionian constructions as !~oe,oyecl'l'"') acquired a different meaning in the fourth century at Athens. "Logographer" has a mixed history. however (c£ Bux in PW). which permits us to say that Cope'. three interpretation. (pp. 136-37) are true. but not as formally secure as he assumes. e.g,. (a) early prose writers. mythographers. geographers. historians; (b) those who wrote ,peeches at a price for others to deliver. particularly in the law courts; (e) writers of eulogies. panegyric. epideictic literature. For example. none of the early historians is formally called a logographer. and when the word was used in t!>e fourth
88b
22
COMMBNTAllY
179
century for speech writer it was a tenn of opprobrium. The range ofmeaning found in the word in its later use, however, appears to rdlect its earlier meaning. Bux, for example, argues that like AO"""O'.~ it was originally used in a serious way to denote prose writers including historians, mythographers, geographers. There is a difference in the three groups, and this is reflected in the change the word underwent when it was employed to denote serious prose like history (e.g., Thucydides I.2I.I) as well as prose not seriously concerned with the truth, "unreliable writers of stories," as Gomme, I 138-39, puts it. It is this last meaning (see, e.g., Plutarch, De Iside et Onride 3s8f, De deftctu o,,,,,,lornm 4171O-f) which appears to be reflected in the use of the word for speech writers, and for the writers of epideictic literature, i.e., those concerned more with giving pleasure than with presenting the truth. At the same time the word retains its denotation for ..nous prose, as Plato Phaedrus 2s8b-c would imply. There is little question that when it was used of speech writers (a practice called d"'oyea'l'ia by !socrates, Antid. 2) it was a derogatory term; see, e.g., Plato, Phaedrus 2S7C, Aeschines, Ag. Timarchus 94 (applying it to Demosthenes), or Aristotle, Rktoric r 7, 08a 34 (so Bux; Cope would disagree). The insulting character of the word resided in the fact that such writers were not concerned with the truth, were unreliable. It is this quality of unreliability which one senses in the use of the word to designate writers of eulogistic literature. This appears to be its meaning in our passage: namely, those concerned more with pleasing the auditor or reader than with the strict truth. Cicero, De orat. 2.84.341 describes the genre well: "Ipsi enim Graeci magis legendi et delectationis aut hominis a1icuius ornandi quam utilitatis huius forensis causa laudationes scriptitaverunt; quorum sunt libri, quibus Themistocles, Aristides, Agesilaus, Epaminondas, Philippus, Alexander a1iique laudantur." When Aoyoyeaq,O, or AO,..,,.,., is used with "'0' 1"''1" as it is in our passage, it may carry thismeaning. Compare, e.g., Thucydides 1.:U; Dionysius ofHalicarnassus, On the Composition ojWo,ds 93; Plato, Rep. 392a; Isocrates, To Philip 109, with which compare his Evago,as 40, To Philip I#3 "",,,,,,,,,,,,,u.,,, i.e., those who are opposite to 01 C'I1OJTol (b 15-22). b 22-24 lv.."..!ov"•.. x ....."'PPDVEiv Contempt, disdain, is considering persons and things as worthy of nothing at all (78b 15-16); emulation, in essence, is considering persons and things as worthy of very much. In contempt there is the pleasure which comes with self-satisfaction; in emulation there is the pain attendant upon the dissatisfaction owing to the sense of want. Herein lies their basic opposition. More fully, as we have seen at 88a 32-35, emulation is defined as feeling that the highly honored good things possessed by an equal but also available to the one experiencing the emotion are personally desirable.
180
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
88b 29
b 23 xed " .. ~'I)Aoilv "'" x""llfI>povEiv is the reading of the codd. and four edd., Spengd. It is parallded at 80a 5-6. Ross, Cope read: Tq;
err
lot;" TO HaTj8., (78a 7-20) and (78a 20-28). The comment on ;>j8." however, is directed to that of the speaker and enumerates three traits which make one credible (as a speaker) to others: sound judgment, moral integrity, good will. Oddly enough, these are the qualities which appear in the analyses of the typical responses associated with a character type in 12-17. To exemplify from the fir.t charaCler (12), that of the young: we learn that sound judgment i. limited (89a 17-26, b 5-1), moral integrity mixed (89a 3-16, 35-37), good will.trong in certain areas (89a 37- b 2, b 8-n). Theargwnent which underlies chaps. 12-17 is that by observing these traits and their presence or absence in his auditon the speaker ensures the effectiveness of his own ;>j8., as entechnic proo£ The argument is stated blundy at 90a 2S-28 and earlier at A 8, 66a 8-14 (hrsl ... siva,). Should the speaker overlook the.e qllalities in his audience or dismiss them as insignificant or irrelevant, he effectively weakens or negates the power of his own ;>jB., as entechnic proo£ As Demosthenes remarks: "while other artistic or technical attainments are fairly autonomous, the speaker's art is ruined should the auditors prove recalcitrant" (On the Embassy 340). In such a relationship the auditors' ;>j8., is obviously seen as an entechnic pistis for it must be understood and addressed by the speaker to ensure the credibility of his own >J0o, with the auditors. Thus Spengel has no hesitation in speaking of chaps. 1:>-17 (the "indolem auditorwn") as the last of the three artistic proofs of 56a 1-4 (Specimen c.mmenlari.rum, pp. 3435). Finally, we must recognize the fact that A. has made the auditor the
",,8., ",,8.,
186
ARISTOTI.E, 'RHBTORIC'
[J
88b 30
telos of rhetorical di!course (A 3, 58b 1-2; 9, 67b 7-II) and judgment ("el,"~) on the part of the auditor essential to the whole process (77b 21 : 1). In itself this is an argument for the auditors' ~90~ as part of the enteehnic pistis ~90~. In such a perception of rhetoric, to be effective, the speaker must always recognize and utilize the fact that he is speaking to a certain kind of audience with a particular set of established attitudes, interests, intellectual convictions, emotional responses, desires, needs (i.e., a certain kind of ~90~), all of which flow into the judgments and decisions made by them. & we learn at A 10, 69a 7-3', it is this ~90~ which affects a person's decisions and judgments. So it is that the actual purpose of chaps. 12-17 with its study of the major character types is to show the speaker how his il90~ must attend and adjust to the il90~ of varied types of auditor if he is to address them successfully. The chapters di!elose th.t in A.'s mind the speaker', ~90~ cannot function autonomously as entechnic pistis nor con the auditors' ~90~ be viewed as neutral or passive as a source of proo£ The more realistic assessment of the speaker-auditor relation is that the auditor's ~90~ influences not only the speaker's il90~ but also the emotional resonance he lends his argument (,,&90') and its intellectual temper (Mro~). On this tnatter I would have to conclude that if any di!tinction on ~90~ as entechnic proof were to be made, I would say that A. thinks of ij90' primarily as that of the speaker (e.g.,.4 9, 66a 26-27), and secondarily but equally as that of the auditors (e.g., 90a 2S-28; A 8, 660 9-14). In the Rhetoric A. does not explain the meaning of il9o" but it is safe to say that it carries for the most part the ordinary meaning found in the ethical worle., i.e., moral character. We can come to some understanding of its "'lJ1eanmg in the Rhetoric from what A. calls its root idea, 890~ (c£ A 10, 69b 6-7, 70" 6 : 1; EN TI03a 17-18; EE 1220a 39 - b r). This is the name given to an action repeatedly placed by a person, an action done over and over. Thus at 700 6 Ta l/hi refer to specifically diffi:rent actions repeatedly performed by an individual. This manner of acting, as we are also told there (70a 6-9), is like but not the same as that which flows from our nature; in fact, .90, is said to be like a second nature (EN nS2a 31>-32). Thus i!90~ is the ground for what A. colis €E'~, which, in turn, plays an important role in determining A.'s notion of il90,. A lE~, it seems, is a disposition already present in a person (see below) which can receive the effect of the repeated action and thus become further disposed for the doing of that action (EN IIo3b 7-25, c£ b 21; 1II40 9-10). A. speaks of this very notion of .E'~ at .4 I, S4a 7 in the introductory lines of our treatise: "because of the habitude ['''''''j9.,av] derived from a stable di!position [dno lE.w,]." According to A. (EN nosb 19-28, EE 1220b 7-20) there are three things found in that part of the soul called TO Oee"",,", the appetitive part: .&,.." (capacities), ,,&9'1 (transitory motion proceeding from the capac-
88b 30
187
COMMENTARY
ities). From the passages cited it would appear that the dvvdp." possess no specific determination from nature (EE 122.0b Hi) but may be influenced one way or another. That influence come. from the which shape the capacities to function in a certain way (EN IIoSb :>3-28, EE 12Wb 16-20). If a Mwap', is shaped pardy uuder the direction of reason by IE" as an dective habit, i.e., iE', "eoal{!BTt"'7, into an habitual way of acting in the area of moral activity, the tesult is a firm direction of the person toward or away from the good proper to man which iJ called virtue or vice. A. also calls it l}6o, which is a tendency toward (or away from) the standard of goodness proper to man (BE 1:>2Ib 3:>-34; Poetics 1448a 2.-4). Such an understanding of l}6o, as "moral character" is common in the Rhetoric. It is seen quite dearly atA 8, 66a 14-16; A 10, 69a 15-19, 28-:>9; 89> 35-37; 90a 16, 17-18; 95b 14-IS; r 13, 140 21-:>2; 16, 17a 17, IS, 19-20, 22, :>3-24; 17, ISa 16-17; 18b 23. It is also the meaning found inA 9. In B 12-17 and its presentation ofl}6o" there is constant reference to the virtues (and so good moral character) as they are found in EN nD7a 2S - IIosb 10; EE 122.0b 3S - I:>2Ia 12. A. speaks, for example, of courage, temperance, liberality, greatness of spirit, love of honor, etc., and their presence or ahsence in the varied character types. In analyzing the character types A. actually presents patterned ways of acting common to a type and indicative of good or bad moral character. Thus if we were to make specific the primary meaning of l}Oo, as A. uses it in the Rhetoric we arrive at this: l}6o, is a firm disposition within the person formed pardy under the direction of reason (BE 1220b 5-7), a finn disposition with respect to the appetitive part of the soul represented by the emotions which reflects the quality of the person's dominant habits in the sphere of moral activity. As Burnet, p. 66, remarks, it was the formation of this kind of l}Oo, that was the object of the first education in the Republic and Laws of Plato; cpo EN II04b 11-13. But ~6o, does not always denote this finn disposition deliberatdy formed in part under the guidance of reason. For example, at EN II44b 1-30 we read (4-6) that men are of the belief that each of the kinds of ~6o, (and he has in mind moral character) are somehow naturally present: men are just, temperate, and brave, and possess other kinds of character from the moment of birth (cp. n03a 24-26 and cf. Schiitrumpf, pp. 4/[). In other words, there are kinds of l}6o, with which people are variously endowed by nature; e.g., EN III70 3-6: "The courage arising from the spirited temper seems to be most natural and, when it adds choice and motive, to be courage." This natural endowment disposes the individual to a degree for the ddiberate formation of the kind ofl}6o, which iJ formally identified with moral character, whether it be good or bad. ~6o, as a natural endowment would appear to be a dominant meaning at 11790 33 - nSoa 24. In the expression l}Oo, .~".,.i, "a! OJ, ciA7jOw, ."uo"alov (II79b S-9) >lOo, signifies a natural predisposi-
Ie..,
188
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 11
88b 30
tion for moral goodness, something that is .1",••• Pi~ de'Pi~ (II79b 30) and that can be made ready for virtue (OJ soil is made ready for the seed) by education in virtue Wlder proper laws. In itsdf, however, this fl9.~ does not signify moral eharacter. In the same way the states of feding discussed at EE I233b 16 - I234a 33 are closely roated to moral character but they are not fl90~ as moral eharacter since they too are d.w "e.a'eiC1'''~ (12340 25). The same may be said, it would seem, of the statement at EE I220b 7-10 in which A. speaks of kinds of character denominated by natural capacities for =tain kinds of emotiom, e.g., the irascible, the lustful. It is in this sense, however, that Kroll and Verdcnius enlarge the meaning of fl9.~. Kroll (p. 69) argues that fl9.~ can denote a "passing mood" which seems to mean an emotion typical ofone age group and not another. Verdenius (p. 243) includes within the meaning "emotional states." Such stable emotional responses or attitudes may be "praiseworthy or censurable states with respect to eharacter" (I233b 16-17), but they do not constitute moral cltaracter. As moral character fl90, signifies a stable and established attitude in the area of moral activity which is the result of some kind of reasoned action by the individual. We know that the emotions (nd9'l) are integral to fl90c;. We also know that diJferent age groups (ljl",/a.) respond almost Wlanimously to a spectrum of emotions peculiar to the age (and so the idea of the "ages of man"; cf. Horace, AP I56-I7S). In the same way we know that individuals because of the circumstances of life (TVXa.) can devdop =tain kinds of emotional respOIlSe. In the sen.e that such responses are somewhat stable and set they may be (and are) spoken of as fl90c;. When A. is using the word in its strict sense in the Rhetoric and when in ,the wider .ense would have to be determined from the context. But in either meaning it includes an aspect of the personality of tho.e addressed as of utmost importance to the speaker. If he overlooks or dismisses it, as has been said, he effcctivdy undoes his whole intention to communicate. In its strict sense a. moral character Aristotelian fl90~ does not appear to have been understood in the Latin tradition. As a matter of fact, it is a word for which according to Quintilian the Romans had no equivalent (6.2.S): "There are two kinds of emotions as we know from ancient tradition: one kind the Greeks called "d90" a word which we, interpreting it properly ond correctly, call adfectus; the other kind they call fl90" a term for which, as I helicve, Latin has no equivalent. MoTtS is the term used, and so that part of philosophy known .. >18'' 7/ is called moral philosophy." This is clear from Quintilian and Ci=o. Quintilian's failure in Wlderstanding may wdl be owing to O=o's failure (Roth, S58-59). In any event, an explicit reference by Quintilian (5.10.17) to B r:Jr-I7 cannot be reconciled with our text OJ we have it. In the Latin tradition 'lj"9.~ is interpreted as For example, at 6.2.2-20 Quintilian takes up the concept. Through 8-IS his comments are promising (~g., at s£
"dB.,.
88b 31
COMMENTARY
it is morts; at 131£ it denotes goodness in the speaker reflecting the morts dic...tis; at 18 it requires that the speaker be a vir bonfls). But in the last analysis ~Oo, is a calm, gentle, perduring emotion, and "dOo, is a more violent, momentary emotion. Quintilian attributes the distinction to the more careful writers on the subject (6.2.9). Thus ~Oo, is a "dOo, (c£ Martin, 97). Cicero's comments on this matter arc contained substantially in Or.t. 37.128. Everything dse met here and there in De or.t. :z.27.U5-2.S3.2Ia1f. could be seen as a rather loose deveIopment of this. First of all it should be said that Cicero recogniud the importance of the auditor, and therefore of hi. ~Oo" to the speaker. See, e.g., De inv. 1.16.22 (.b iuJicum person.); De or.t. 2.79.321 (ex eis opud quos . .•) and compare 2.44-186-187. However, despite encounging statements-e.g., Drat. 37-128 (cp. De or.t. 2.53.213, 2.43.182-184) where he explairu >10.,,0. in a way which would qualify it for the ~Oo, of speaker or auditor ("ad naturas et ad mores et ad omncm vitae consuetudincm accomodatum") - he does not appear to understand ~O", (a word he uses once; see De foto I) as we find it in the Rhetoric. At most where he is presumed to be speaking of Aristotdian ~Oo, as a form of "t,m, (c£ Drat. 37-128; De orat. 2.27.115,28.1211£,29.1281£, 43.18a1f., 79.322), if he is not actually speaking of what we know as "aOo, ("dOo, and iJOo, in Roman rhetoric are called ajf.ctus; c£ Martin, 158--60), Cicero is speaking only of the ~Oo, TO;; liro..o, and how it may exert an effect on the audience. But his statements are directed to arousing an emotional respome in the audience. In A. this would be done by the use of "dOo, (A 2, 56a 14-19, 78a 20-28). For A. any response of the auditors to the speakers' ~Oo, is fonnally a response to the ertckntial quality of the speaker (56a 5-8, 77b 25-28). It is a response that is more intellectual than emotional, or as Roth, 856, says: "the speaker's ~Oo, is the prominent quality in his personality and his style which respond. to the understanding of his hearers." For another view on Cicero and ~Oo" c£ Fantham. In conclusion we can say that in these chapters A. is speaking of the allditor's ijOo, and understands the word essentially in the same sense as ~Oo, when used of the speaker. Further, the auditors' 1jOo, is studied because it is apparently understood to be as much a "I....., hlTB""o, as is the speaker'. ~Oo,.
b 31 :, "aial .....~.~ sc. .lao: "Let us discus. next the characters of men, the kind ofmeo they arc (Le., their character] in rdation to their emotions...." On the meaning in "oio. c£ 77b 26-29. There is no formal hierarchy among the "t......, (66a 27: ,) and so the discussion of iJOo, (which has been called 6."...iea "t.....,) in the third and final place is not in any way unusual. In fact, methodologically the discussion is simplified by locating it in the final place since there is no need to explain the many referents to the "dO,! which constitute a critical part of the nature of ~60,.
"'TO""O.
190
88b 35
ARJSTOTlB, 'RIIEl'ORIC' II
governs each of the following four nouns, and .0 ifOo, can be considered under each aspect. The explanation offered in the text for each of the four words lend. confirmation to this interpretation as does the scholiast in a general way for ,,&0'1, U .." and 9Ib 5 for 7jA..o/a" TVXa,. A. does not discuss the first two forma1ly for the reasons given at 88b 33-37 in Roemer, 33-36 in Ross, Kas.e1: "Bel dip ... "ea"'''Ho~ The Vetus Translano and some of the older commentators, e.g., Vater, p. rolfE, understand "aTd only with the last two nouns, e.g., "we will treat next the ij67J, ,,&0'1, U .., with respect to various age groups, and the gifts of fortune." Cope, p. 140, agrees with the first interpretation but later (ibid.) in replying to Vater to accept the interpretation of the Vetus Translatio. However, A. appears to be saying that 110" can be considered from four general viewpoints: dominant emotions (we have an example of sueb at 79" 10-25), habits (specifically moral habits, dqBT~ Hal "ax/a" 88b 34), qualities determined by age, and those determined by fortune. Since the first two have been studied, he concentrates on the last two showing how different periods in man's life as well as differing fortunes bring about certain artitudes, dispositions, traits of personality (emotional, moral, intellectual) which can determine if00,. The point is made for >lA/x,a, in a passing comment in Euripides, Hipp. 986-987. At A 10, 69> 21-3 I we are told that youth, old age. wealth, good fortune can affect if0o, and that this will be discussed later. 2
" ...."
=
On "dO", see 78a 20 : 2, ,sa 22, 86b 12-13, and 84ib II. Anger was discussed in B 2. In&O"pla, as was. mentioned at ,sa 22, is not one of the emotions in the Rhetoric but is found in the EN, among the emotions.
b 32-33 Atyw .....o""G....
!E
b 33 dp~_I'EV ",po...pav i.e., B 2-I!. Ross following Spenge), p. 248, secludes the adverb; Spenge)'. reasons are not strong.
b 34·:
J lll.'~ ... " ..,,!..~ Oearly A. has the moral virtues in mind and is speaking of ojO,H'Ij dq.T1j; cf. 88b 30-3 I. On l~.", cf. 6zb 13 : 2, Ii9a 8: 2. Kassel alone of the edd. read. Hal with cod. F.
a.
b 34-35 Elp,)",,' "'po...,av e.g., inA 9 the virtues and the vices. However, in A S there was a discussion of ,roda,pa.1a and the goods which are a necessary part of it: goods of the sou!, of the body, extrinsic goods, rob 20-29. In A 6 after defining the nature of good he partially repeats and adds to these goods, 62b Iolf. and see 62b 12-28'- Since the goods of the soul are virtues, we can include A S, 6 also in nedneav. b 3S-36 ",oi..... "'p.." ..",o! In A S, 6, 9 A. mentions moral goods which individual men eboose ("oia "eoa'eomal ;"aa-ro,) and .ou8YjTlXol
a 5 "<jj ..cpl . . . Victorius conjectured ~ for Tai~, rii~ of the codd. and in this he is followed by Ross, Kassd, Spcngd; the other edd. read Tai~ with cod. A, as does Cope, but he presents the problem, p. 14.1. The singular seems more likdy in the light of TavT17' (a 6). J b:p"T£i~ "they are powerless in the face of it"; cf. 68b 14 : z. z o6"....cil3o>.o, ... ~lxopo, C£ Horace, AP 160 ("ct mutatur in ho..."), 163 ("cereus in vitium fI.ecti"). Cope, p. 142, on dtp{"oeo~ ("fickle, quickly sated") gives the evidence for this word which is found with some frequency in Plutarch. VlCtorius suggests Horace, AP 165 ("amata Tdinquere pernix") as an apt illustration of the meaning.
a6:
a 8-9 6Iiei.., . ..
1M."..,
Ross alone encloses this within parentheses with no punctuation before the parenthesis and a comma following. The ordinary punctuation followed by the edd. is preferable: "avona,· 0.6ia' ... ".ioa~ Ross makes 89a 4 ("al TWO) down to a 10 (derfil one sentence, not three, as found in the other edd., Spengd, Cope. The fact is, however, that we have here three different topics relative to the ~O.~ of the young.
a 8 l3ou).>\cr£,~ •.• IN "cyci)... , As we have seen povl1}(II, thus far e.g. 6tb 32 : 4, 69a 2.-3, 78b 18, 8ra 7, and see Bob 36 : J - it means rational wish, desire. If it denotes that here, and there is no reason that it does not, it must mean rational desire, wish, which, while impulsive and quick (d.eia,; c£ also a 7: o-q>ddea ""0.,,,,0.0-'), is not substantial and lasting (ou ",aydlo,). Comparing them to the hunger and thirst of the sick (cf. 70" 21 : z) A. indicates their transient character. a 9 eu",xol _I 61i6eu .... , au O"",&~ as a synonym for del"i (e.g., dtn'fi at a 10), see 69a 4 : z, 69b II, A II, 70h II, 78b 5: on anger, see chap. 2; on oi"" at a 18, 89b I; o~ •.. "., at 89ll30, 31-32.
za....
a 21 ~cr, ...ci 1.a 36-37). Le.. the fierce, hot-tempered (BvprMB") disposition diminishes a sense of fear for it is impossible to fear if one is angry; e.g.• a 28. and o£ Boa 33. This absence of fear is complemented by the positive quality of confidence. the opposite of fear. as was seen at 83a 13f[ where we are told further. at 83a 17-19 (as we are here at 890. 29: "to hope for some good inspires confidence"). that confidence is a certain kind of hoping. The combination of spirited and sanguine temperament makes for the greater degree of courage in the young (rlvae"OTSeO'). Courage. defined arA 9. 66b II-13. is said to be (A S. 6ra 3-4) a virtue of the young and. together with pryaAotpvX1a (0£ 890. 31-33). is called at A 6. 62b 12-14 • virtue of the soul. It should be clear that in pointing to characteristics of this sort in this age group A. has moral virtue in mind (;;60,) in the ·strict sense; o£ 88b 30-31 .
"sensitive to shame" (0£ 8sa 9 : 1) which expresses • 29 ..lax......'!Aol the idea more sharply than "modes!," "shy." etc. Owing to their limited experience the young are immature in the matter of what is honorable, the Tilo, of all morally good things (660 33 : 1). "Educated only in the established rules and customs of their society [n.,.aMswra, Wed TOV v&pouj they have as yet not entertained the idea of other standards of the honorable [.. aAr! keea Wrolap/lr:lvovalV)." I understand vop., here as explained at 73b 5 : 3 (I) and (3) (i) i.e.• positive and customary law. Consequently. keen as they are to do the honorable (89' 34-35) they are more sensitive to what others think. i.e.. the MEa of others in their regard. This attitude exposes them more readily to the fear of clishonor which is shame (83 b 14-15. EN Iu8b II-I3). Their situation is described well at 84a 25 - 84b I (o~asl~ ... a,.'1'onea). a 31 : 1 "EYC&).6IJmxo. This is another indication of their concern for the honorable; o£ 66b 17. Z olin yrlp is the reading of the codd.• four odd .• Spengd. Cope. Ross conjectures 011.
196
A1USTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II
89' 35
a 32 ..on. d,""Y",d",,, "the force of circumstances." Cope, p. 147, refers to Anax. 1422a 2D-21 which explains d'ay"",a as "those things which do not lie in our power to do but are such as they are as a result of divine or human constraint."' a 33 !'-EymA."'UXI.. The definition here is different from that at A 9, 66b 17. However, as can be seen from the discussion of the idea at EN Il23a 34 - Il2sa 16, both explanations of the word are contained in the concept. At II23b 1-12 we find our present definition: "A person is thought to be high-minded who being in fact worthy deems himself worthy of great things." At II24b 7-18 we read that he is the person who does good and repays good with greater good, i.e., 66b 17.
".A""
a 34 ..ail...... ":'EA7t.&.~ This meaning of does not emerge explicitly from 8ga 19-29 but a comparison of a 19-29 with a 31-34 indicates what A. has in mind: namely, their attitude of hope combined with their inexperience of life fosters a self-confidence and ,elf-assurance which in turn inspires the self-esteem of the high-minded person. a 34-35 x .., !'-iiAA." ... ""!'-'Popclv...,,, Cpo Horace, AP 164: "utilium tardus provisor." The distioction between ,d "aM. and ,d rlVI'rpiqa. at work here i, that the honorable is an ultimate good chosen (when chosen) for its own sake, whereas the advantageous is a relative good chosen with reference to a more ultimate good. Action whose object is the honorable is not self-regarding, whereas self is the object of action directed to the advantageous. A. says as much at 89b 38 - 90a 1 and earlier at A 8, 6sb 25: "All ,men are won over by the advantageous," because, ordinarily, as he remarks at A IS, tsb 19, "no one chooses the absolute good but the good relative to
himsel£"
a 35-37 ..oj> yclcp ... "mAail "For they live more by the rule of moral character than by that of calculation." With the exception of Cope (lOo.), all read 710 .. (an instrumental dative of manner, S. 1516). This appear. to be correct both from 90a 16-18, the compauion passage, and from the explanation of 1j0 •• by deoni (i.e., moral virtue) at 89a 36-37 (" 66 deonj ,au "aAav), which is what "lOa, signifies in the ",trict" sen.e as seen at 88b 3D-31. In A 9, 66a 33 - 67a 32 A. discus.e. the honorable, identifying it as good and connecting it with virtue (c£ 660 33 : " 660 34-35). a. he says at EN lI20a 23-24: "virtuous actions are honorable and done fur the .ake of honor." The honorable is that which exists for its· own sake and is the goal of all good action. In describing the activity of the young as he does here, A. is attributing to them either formal (deliberately acquired) or natural moral virtue (de'ni). The advantageous is also a good (A 6, 62. 20) and is studied as .uch inA 6. Its difference from the honorable was indicated in the.preceding
89a 36
COMMENT AllY
197
note. At 66b 36 - 67a I we have, I believe, the distinction A. wishes to make in our present passage on the actions of the young: e.g., "all the objects of human choice which a person does not for his own sake are honorable, as also are things which arc absolutely good such as the things one does for onc's country while neglecting one's personal interests, and those things which are naturally good, and those which are not goods for the person himself, for all such are not done for the sake of the seI£" In other words the unselfish choice of good is rd HaM., and (as he remarks at BB I~4ga IQ-II) for the truly good man the advantageous and the honorable coincide. Cope, p. 147, has a strange note in which he asserts a 36 Aoy..r"o~ that ''The intellect and its calculations are here distincdy excluded from any participation in virtue which is assigned soldy to the moral character." SchfitrumpC. p. 7113, in a reference to Cope, explains the passage by the 6."&""1' concept of EN II44a 23f[ In view of the fact that cleverness itself is a form of reason, I do not see how it responds to Cope. The first problem with Cope's observation is that virtue and moral character, as we have seen them, are a stable attitude formed pardy under the guidance of reason (88b 3Q-3I). There can be no moral character, good or bad, without some role for the intellect in the form of practical reason since moral character implicates "eoate.a." which is desire conjoined with reason. The second problem with his comment is that from the companion passage at goa 16-18 we would have to say that the old for the most part do not act with virtue and moral character. Yet all of chap. 14 on the old in detailing their deficiencies specifies deficiencies in moral virtue. Moral character and virtue are not possible without the exercise of the intellect and its calculations. Furthermore it is not possible to have good practical reason without good moral character since virtue is both that which is in accord with right reason and that which aims a person at the right objective and so enables practical reason to take the right means; C£ EN II78a 16-~I, II44a 6 - II4Sa II, MM II98a IQ-~I. In his analysis of moral virtue, A. does not exclude the possibility of incomplete or deficient virtue and therefore an incorrect use of reason in deliberating. From his statements on practical rcason, we find that it can be exercised wrongly. In the first place, as II~a 7-Iof[ implic:s, to grasp one', good is not always as simple as it might seem. Secondly, we learn at II~b I~ that the calculation can be quite correct and successful, but can in the case of a person not fully good result in what is an evil and not a good. Thus in our present passage, together with its companion, goa 16-18, the object of the criticism and the contrast in the way of acting would seem to be the exercise of the practical reason upon what is practically expedient for the individual in given situations; his personal good at a given moment which as a good rdative to himsdf i, not necessarily his rcal good as a person (e.g., to do an injustice
ARISTOTLE, 'RHBTORIC' II
to another person rather than incur monetary loss). On the idea in practical wisdom see Hardie, pp. 212-39; Gauthier & Joli£; II 463~ (history of concept) and noteS to II39a 17 - b 3, II4Qa 24 - b 30, II41b 8 - II4sa II; and Sorabji. a 37 <po).';'1"AO. On the meaning in 'I'M&-, see 63b I : z. The friendship of the young is directed to pleasUIe, EN lIS6a 31 - IIS6b 1; that of the old is generally a friendship of utility, EN IIS6a 24-30. i)A.Xu"" i.e., the aged, those in the prime of life. ..cji cru!;ijv i.e., "in companionship"; the case of the artK:ular infinitive is detem:rined by ;ca4!8w. 89b 1 :
1
l
b 2 : 1 Xp(VE.V sc. d,a Td; an articular infinitive in a construction similar to 6.a Td Xa4!6W. In EN IIS6a 7-19 three kinds of friendship are mentioned, that of utility, of pleasUIe, of the good. The friendship of the young i. that of pleasUIe, the love of people for the pleasUIe they give. Cpo EN IIssb 17 - IIS7b S. 2
Glen«
sc. "~l,,e'71.
b 3 11_..... ck""'P""civou.n "They commit all their mistakes with excess and vehemence." The phrase A"I [in the direction of] Td I'dlAov "al a'l'o6eoneov is another instance of the article used with the adverb to fo= a noun (S. lIS3). On al'de"tTJl'a see 74b S, 74b 7. While potentially harmful, al'aen,l'aTa as such do not have their SOUlce in moral perversity; see, e.g., A 13, 74b 2-10. b 4 Xv..;,VE.OV Cbilon (fl. S60-SS6 B.C.), a Spartan prominendy influential in his country (as indicated in later references to him), served Sparta as an ephor and may have contributed significandy to that type of government found in Sparta; cf. PW, OCD. In Diogenes Laertius, Lives oJthe PI,iIo:lOphe,.: Chi/on 1.3.68--73 we learn that the bUIden of his teaching was self-restraint but find no mention of OUI proverb. In his Life oj Thaies 1.1.40-41, however, Diogenes remarks that the sayings of the Seven Sages of Greece receive varied attributions, with Chilon singled out as the author of the saying: nothing in excess (41). On the expression cpo Euripides, Hippo/rlus 26S, and Terence, Andria 61: "ut nequid nimis"; cf. 9sa 33-34b 6 &llGXUp(!;OV...... "confidendy allinn." This is a distinct step beyond thinking that they know all. It is this complete self-assuxance (cf. 8ga 34) which leads to their excess in all that they do, e.g., 89b 6-7. sc. "ednB" from 89b 4- Although 1''76i. &yav b 7 : 1 oroii ••• cir"Y can be considered a noun expression (cf. LS, 6, >1, TO, B.LS), the main thought in b 2--7 is the manner of acting. At 89b 4 (nd.Ta rde) unrestrained action
COMMBNTARY
199
is given as the reason for their excess in wrong action. At A 89b S-6 ("a! ... ~""%"eICovTa,) another characteristic trait of the young is introduced and it is now offered (To6ro rde) as the reason for their unrestrained action. • &&,x-IJp."'f" ••• €I; GI3P'v . C£ 74b 8, 73b 36: 1. aaooj"aTa are acts which proceed· from moral badness and are done with knowledge and so are considered voluntary. But they can be either the result of deliberation and moral choice (and so deliberately wrong actions) or the result of emotion (and so partially outside the control of deliberation). In our passage A. docs not say which they are, and so both meanings arc possible. As to the meaning of 01, IJllelV . . . "altOVerlav ("with wanton insolence in mind not small-minded malice"), the companion passage at 90a 18-'9 (sec also 9I~ ,8-,g) is of assistance in deriving this understanding of the words; c£ bdow. However, Po/. 129Sb 9-II says that the causes of d~'''''"a..a are twofold, vile" and "axoverla, and identifies the former (cp.73a '3 : 1) with great wrong acts, the latter with minor. This passage is in tum reinforced by B ,6, 9" ,8-1g which, together with our present passage (89b 7-8), points back to 78b 28-29 (~.d 01 viOl "al 01 "Aov,,"o" ...). There we learn that hyhristic action is typical of the yOWlg and the wealthy as the means taken to asscrt their superiority. In this sense the wrong action of the yOWlg is fully in accord with the general mode of behavior attributed to them ill 8gb 3-7: one of excess. Thus I am not sure that A. is diminishing the wrongdoing of the young as we find 8gb 7-ll interpreted in the translations: e.g., "If they do wrong to others, it is because they mean to insult them, not to do ·them actual harm" (Roberts). Sec gIa 18 : 2 a10ug with A.'s example at a Ig. The contrast between the wrongdoing of the young here and that of the old (goa 18-19), who are shown in general as mean and ignominious in their wrong action, not strong and violent, tends to confirm the interpretation oifcred, as do Cope's remarks, pp. 14;1, 16g. b 8-n D.E1J'fucol ..• "':''f..u; This becomes clear from chap. 8 where piry is defined and explained. Here, however, A. stresses the aspect of the manifest Wlmerited misfortWle of anodler which evokes pity and does not mention its other aspect: namdy, misfortune which the person who pities sees also as something possible for himsd£ As a matter of fact, from what A. has said of the young in general. they could well qualify for those who do not experience pity; see, e.g., 8sb 21-23 (oil... 01 . •. "'16m- """".). However, there are two statements which explain A.'s use of tAs'l"'''o/ of the yOWlg. The first, 8sb 34 - 800 1 ("clv ol.",ra•. .. """06) is directly connected with the reason given here for the young's being disposed to pity, 8gb 8-g (dod T• • • • w.o}.a"lIav ...). The second, 90a 20 (which attributes youth's capability for pity to their ia.., (890 8), .';.~a",l ",TO' (89a 25), r7tpOa@&r'eo> apQ@TavoVr7t (89b 3). Cpo on the old, Horace, AP 19-174.
b IS .... 7dEi......... i\S'I
"for the most part possess characters." On
1j8'1 cf. 88b 30-31.
b 16 1v i.e., 89b 27: "ed, ... (Jlo•.
b 29-30 060'''' ..• 'CD "..-.jO'IIO'ell' .....0 cl7topoO.dv
These are all subjects (ACId understood) to which 8. n, xaleno., 64d.o. are predicates: "for money is one of these necessities, and at the same time they know from experience that acquiring it is difIicult and losing it easy." Plutarch, MoraUa 786b, notes that Simonides when charged with being avaricious (c£ Aristophanes, Pax 698-699) remarked that since old age had robbed him of all other pleasures, he was growing old with the only pleasure left, that of making money.
b 3O-]I lioiAol ... 7tPCKpoP1]...... 1 Cpo 89a 26-27 and Horace, AP 171-172 ("res omnis ... inen"). "eo<po(J1JT""" = "inclined to be anticipative in their fears."
v..
v.....
b 3I lv.. I"lS yoip a.&x•• On the meaning in the verb, c£ 77b 27-28. The statement here is explained in what follows: "aT61pVY",ivo •• .. xaT4tpvEI, ian.. In 892 19-20 there is a physiological explanation for the sanguine temperament. Here, as in the definition of fear at 820 21-22,' the physiological aspect of the emotion receives attention. Fear is identified with a coldness in the physical system, 89b 33: <po(Jo, "aTd'PvEI, tCIT" as it also is at De part. animo 650b 27-28 (6"de <po(Jo, "aTmpVX") and at Prob. 954b 13 (6 <po(Jo, "IITa'P.X")' At De part. animo 692a 23 he atttibutes the coldness to a want of blood and a lack of heat. In the present instance the coldness is identified with the condition of old age itsdf ("oTetpO""'ivo •• .. eliCITS ••• Td ,,;;ea,), with the consequence that the old are d••lol, ne0tpO(J'f/n"ol. Schrader cites Vergil, Aeneid 1.69 ("extemplo Acneae solvuntur frigore membra"), with ServiWi' comment: "Frigare, i.e., timore, et est reciproca transIatio nam et timor pro frigore et frigus pro timore ponitnr." C£ 790 22; read by Spengd, Cope, Kassd. and all b 32 7tpo...lio7ta(1]". the codd. save corrected A. which reads the "eoOldonsnol'1". accepted by the other edd. As LS note (s.v.), the form with the double reduplication is "probably corrupt." On the metaphor in the word, see S4a 8. Here it is ~ physical
205
COMMENTAlIY
condition of old age with its accompanying coldness which prepares the way for timidity. In De part. anim. 650b "7-30, it is the condition of the cooled blood, and in Frob. 954b 10-13, the condition of the chilled bile which prepares the way ("eoQ)~O"O;'1Ta.; "eow6onrnol1J"') for fear. b 33 xczTci<jm~I~ a good tradition.
ien."
Ross, Kassel, Cope read
"aTa.,v,I,
T"
from
b 34 : 1 "">.O~"'O' A5 Cicero says in De senectute 7.24: "No one is so old that he does not think that he can live another year," or Sophocles, "No one cherishes life like an old man" (frg. 63, ed. Nauck & Snell). 2 Td daB...,,) echoes that of 89a 8 (&••'m ... ou p.,.,uao).
a"II
a 12 : 1 XIII III i".GuIL!II' ""I b,,6upiao of cod. A is read by three edds., Spengd. Ross, Kassd, Cope read with cod. F ""I "I b"6upi,,o. Two lines bdow (o,IT' b"6up~TO,,ol olire "I1a"Tt"oi) all the edd. read with cod. F; cod. A transposes the two words. On b,,8uplao, see 89a 3 : 1. 2 lxAEl.o!"IIG'V ''have failed"; and so the consequence at a 13: oifr' b"6up~T",,,i: "they are not inclined toward desiring."
a 13 "plIX"'LXol ... xlp6o~ "nor do they act from motives of desire but rather from those of gain." On "II""To"oi C£ 61b 37 : 2, Ii2b 4a 14 _'Ppov,xol At A 9, 66b 13-15 we have the definition of ''''''Peomlv77; C£ 66b 13. Since the dderly are rdativdy free of desire, they "appear to be able to control themsdves." On the force of the termination, see S!lb 32: I. a IS 4vdx..o,
"have slackened"; for the metaphor c£ 60a 24.
a 16 .,.;;; xip6.. In what follows at a IIS-I8 A. continues this theme of the sdf-interest and odf-seeking of the old which he has mentioned a number of times: 89b 27-30 (T';;. "eo, TO. plo•.. .), 89b 36 - 900 I ("al 'PtJ."1>TO .... ), 900 14 ("aT,hd "Iedo,). a IIS-I8
x .. l fLUUov ..•
tOT'V
C£
a 18-19 XIII -..l6un\IL.......... llfip.v
89a 34-35,
a 35-37. a 36.
C£ 89b 7 : 2.
.1,
a 19 : 1 oUx GfiP'v Ross, Cope alone read: ou" ilPe .. from a good tradition. However that tradition also reads ddo"ia. not the ""Houeria. which Ross and Cope accept from cod. A. 2 o.CYjT'XO! C£ 89b 8-n.
208
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' 11
90a 27
3 'r@'r-c. This appears to be the more correct interpretation although Cope, p. 157 (wiili Freese), interprets: "since language, ... as well as persons similar to themselves, are acceptable to everyone." This interpretation may be occasioned by a 28 ("ai mhol "al 01 ).61''' both ilie speakers iliemselves and the discourse). However, if 7}80' as a form of proof is in question (which it is), its effect is achieved 6,,1 Myov; cf. 560 I, a 4~ (dtd pi•. .• Air••Ta), 66a 10 (dl'~61"06, sc. My.v), 66a 25-28 (uvppofJUtrral . .. deeTfJ.). a 27-28 7";'~ . . . AOYO' "how the speakers in the discourse they employ will reflect such characters both in themselves and in their words."
CHAPTER 14
general statement: cbaracrer of those in the prime of life lies midway between that of the young and that of the old
I . Introduction: 90a 29-30
II . Devdopment: 90a 30 - 90b
I2
I. 900 30 - 90b 6
not excessively confident or overly fearful not ex=sively trustful or d;strustful
(.) 900 30-3'
(b) 90a 3'-33 (e) goa 34 - 90b (d) 90b
I
1-'
(,) 90b >-3
(I) '90b 3-6 2.
of the introductory statement specific instances:
90b 6-g
not living only for honor or the advantageous
frugal similarly with respect to anger and desire temperate with courage and vice vena not extravagant or
general principle: those in the prime of life possess the valuable qualities of the young and the old the age period of those in the prime of life
III . General conclusion: 90b 13 -14
to chaps. 12-14
gOB 29 : 1 4"p.ci~ov..~ C£ 90b 9-12. 2 ..0 ij90~ accusative of respect, S. 1601. This is an instance (c£. 88b 30-31) of.the use of YJO.~ as the generic term which includes the domioaot aod typical traits of 0 specific type, e.g., the young, the old, etc. We find it at 89b 13, 90026, 90b 17, 9Ib 7. a 30 ix..dp........ 6KIEfI(30).>jV "removing the excess of each of the other two," i.e., both excess aod deficiency as we see at 90b iI-9 (i/aa ... dlkin.va ..). Since A. begins to exemplify the statement of 90a 29-30 in what immediatdy follows, 0 clearer punctUation break in English might be of hdp, e.g., ". .. of the other two - they will be neither excessivdy confident, etc." Cope, p. 158, on dq>a<e.;;vTO~ refers to the idea contained in it of subtracting us. adding (neoanOba.); at A 4, s9b 27-30 we have both verbs so used; more specifically to the text here, EN II06b 9-12. In the next seven
210
ARISTOTLE, cRHBTORIC' II
lines there is a series of active participles each specifying a'l""eo'ihrrs, •.•
""se/loA>lv. a 31 8I1ppoGv...~ (8plI..u..YJ~ ••• ) Ordinarily there is no distinction made between Bd{1ao, and Beaao,; e.g.• at Pol. us8a Io-II we read that "the function of courage [d.6eeta,] is not to make money. but to produce daring [Bdeao,]." and at 1312a 19 that "courage possessing power is daring [Beaao,]." Bd{1ao, as "daring." "confidence" was discussed at 83a 16 - 83b 10. However. at 83a 2 Beaa", C'audacious." "over-bold',) appears to carry the meaning given here. i.e., Beaa6TrJ, = atpddea Baeew., as we also find it at EN II07b 2-3: 6 d' b Tq; Baees,v ,j"se/ldU.,. 6eaatl,. On the other hand. at A 9. 6-]b 2 (c£ 67b I : J). 8eaatlv Iiluld mean confidence. daring and not necessarily rashness. audaciousness. although this second meaning is possible. See. for example, the shifts in its meaning at oob 19-20. "they are well disposed." At I19b 14 : z the a 32 ...w;;~ ... 1x0V"ni~ points of correspondence among the three age groups are noted. a 33 I sc. ,"l8.,. Historically, however, the known facts (b 28-30) point to variance in families of good hirth: some continue, some falter. The passage is a rdlection of the nurture-nature discussion of the fifth and fourth centuries. Euripides mentions the problem in connection dying of Polyxena, He lil ... lI1h'oG
is the reading of four edd., Spengd. Kassel, Cope read with a good tradition d vUe ... ; copulative di (S. 2836) can have the force of vae: "for wealth, as it were, is taken as a kind of criterion of the worth of all other things." On ",."" c£ LS, TI,.Io>, II.2; on ~ta, c£ 6sa 8 : 1; a~Toii (i.e., wealth) is a genitive of price; tion.
Kassd. Cope read draM with this from a good tradi-
b 5 ".pl 1'6'1 • • • Elp,,"'" This is a general summation for chaps. Iz.17. However that which immediately follows b 6Jr (Tli rae . .. cloIvvdTOV) refen only to chaps. IS-17. In his discussion of the age groups A. gave us the special topics proper to the /j6o, of the YOWlg. the old. the mature. In presenGing these three groups. by way of contrast between each group. he actually gave the opposites (..Ii lvaVTta) of each group.. In this respect he follows the method he used to specify the opposites of many of the "d6'1. With -WX'1 in its varied aspects. however. he follows his procedure with alaxUv'l (Ssa 14-IS). CfjAo, (SSb 24-27). simply stating that by anaiy:>.ing the opposites of each (e.g.• poverty. lack of power. etc.) in terms of the topics presented in chaps. IS-17 the typical traits of these opposites will be discovered (the opposite of '~rlv..a is nO! mentioned).
CHAPTER 18
I . Tramition: 9Ib 8-23 I.
9Ib 8-9
from B
1-17
(cf. 9xb
8-23)
rhetoric is concerned with ~ta,,; cf. 77b 2.1 -78a 6
2. 9Ib 10-20
how this is so in each kind of rhetoric
3. 91b 20-23
TW. "ol ...:.t... was discussed in A 8; thus we have shown [presumably he has B "}'-17 in mind] how to make discourse reBeet moral character
II . Transition: 9Ib Z4 - 92a 4 I.
91b Z4-29
2. 9Ib 29- 92a I
the ij61/
from A
I
to B 17
each kind of rhetoric has its own Ti.ao~, and the ways for arguing in each have been discussed, as well as how to make the discourse reBcet moral character we must now discuss the elements common to each kind: namely, possible-impossible, past tact - futuIe fact, amplificition-mciosis
3· 92a 1-4
III . Conclusion: 92.4-'7
to complete OUI task we must consider the proofs (enthymeme, example) as formal modes of reasoning common to each kind of rhetoric a brief statement on the ""..lOo" and >lOo~ even in the RiletD,ic entails in the last analysis the "d67J. The solution is not overly satisfying, but c£ 77b 27-28. Turning to the chapter as it is written, it is clear that the immediate problem in the text is the unexpected appearance of the statement on Hela,~. Yet, though abruptly introduced and lengthy in detail, the statement is not necessarily out of place in a chapter of transition such as this in which A. is moving from one major division of the work to another, i.e., fromA 4-B 17 toB I~ 26, and more immediately nom his discussion of "dOo~ and >lOo~ in B 2-17. With respect to this particular transition from "dOo~ - >l0o~ we must recall that when he introduced them in B I (c£ outline to B I) he wished to show their importance (77b 21-39) along with Adyo, (A 4-14) for "eta.~ which
,,0.,,&,
ARISTOTLE,
f
RHETORIC t II
is the telos (c£ A. 3, 5ab 1-8) of rhetorical discourse. So a restatement at the end of the study of "dBa, - iJBo, of the importance of "e[a., is not strange (c£ !lIb u). Theacldition of the reference toA 8 is odd but not unacceptable. For with the completion of iJBo, in chap. 17 this concept would be uppermost in his mind. Some ,ense might be obtained from b 8-23 by a schematic statement of the lines: "Since the use of persuasive speech has "ela" (for which "dBo,- iJBo, is essential) as its telos and this is so in all the kinds of thetoric even if there is a 'ingle auditor for he, too, is a "e'nj,; and since iJBo, as it applies to the 1IB'1 of constitutions has been discussed under deliberative rhetoric - so it is that the ways by which persuasive speech must be made to rcBeet iJBo, may now be considered established"; see !lIb 12("opl ..• Aclyou) All the edd. use the parentheses. "pIa,,, Cpo 77b 2I-29 and the notes thereto; c£ also A 3, 58b 4-8. The reason for the role of "e'a., is also seen at A 2, 57" 22--26; c£ S7I' 23·
b 9 :
1
2
sc. xeta.,. We might, ask as Spenge! does, why not also "ed, "oAAo.k, but comparing this passage with 58a 36 - 58b 8 we find A. speaking in the same manner. In fact 91b 8-20 in its content repeats that of 58a 3658b 20; c£ comment in 9Ib 8-23. 3 "po-rpmn i.e., ddiherative oratory; c£ S8b 8-29. The general condition indicates that in each instance (deliberative, forensic, epideictic) there is always (1111:' d', b 8) a question of xeu",.
b 10 : 1 I...", Ii' 2
~ II-13
"pa~ Iv..
(06liw .•. "P'""'~)
All the edd. use the parentheses.
b II "oIeov....,~ always in the sense stated at A 3, SSb 8-14; c£ SSb 10 : 1. I would think that there is a contrast between this word and .0~B& ...ov....,. The scholia,t says that .ov8...0;;,..... , are those who give counsd (~,.{Jo~A.,;o.....,) or advise, which seems to me reasonable, and I find our contrast paralld to that at A 8, 6sh 23 (".IB.w ... ~,.{JooA";.,.). b 12 "P'""'~ predicate to an understood ia.... C'for one person is no less a judge"). The distinction made later at 91b 16-19 is in the nature of a technical distinction rather than one of actual fact. The auditor in all the branches of rhetoric is called upon to make a judgment which is the point A. wishes to make here as earlier; c£ 77b 21 : 1 with the references (to which add S'711 II, S8b 4 : 1). Further A.'s view of the role of "eta" in rhetoric and of what is important for its actuation is set down at 77b 21-29. There we learn that both reason and appetition play a part in "eta" and that he will now begin the study of the latter, i.e., "dBo, and iJBo,. So it is that in emphasizing "et,,,, once again here (as wa' remarked at !lIb 8-:-23, and
gIb 16
COMMBNTAllY
see COMMENTARY I 350) A. is referring rather directly to the presentation of ,,&80, - ~80, of chaps. 2-17 just completed; see gIb 16-23. Ro.. alone conjectures a masculine plural. Schrab 13 oll"!""!3"1)TOilv"" der, p. 374. wants the word to refer to judicial rhetoric, and so we have (a) deliberative, (b) judicial, (c) epideictic rhetoric named. But I believe that it signifies nothing more than the one who opposes, argues against, in a trial (S4A 27 : 1) or in any instance; see, for example, A 7, 73b 6, glb 13. At gIb Ig (Td dP.'P'U{J~TO~P.BVQ: the points in dispute) the reference could be to both deliberative and furensic oratory (e.g., Freese, p. 2-nnc), but see gIb 27. b 14 6"68... ,,, "against a proposed subject"; Spengel, p. 264, reasonably suggests the tetralogies of Antiphon. To this might be added many of the discourses of Isocrates of an instructive or deliberative character, or Gorgias'
Helm, Pala....J... b 14-16 &I'ol... ~ ('rii> ... "o ••iT..,), .:.....w....~ is the punctuation afRo.. and Kassel alone of the edd. All punctuate with a comma after "o.eiTa. except Roemer, Spenge!. Cope. The above punctuation is preferable, containing as it does the three brief explanatory clauses, b II-I3, b 14-16, and "".~~" in one sentence. later b 17-18 (dl"".~
...
..)
i.e., the opposing arguments. or theses, "against which, b IS 'Ollt lv""..I.. as though an actual opponent. one speaks"; cf. LS, " ••i .., A.ILS. C£ gIb 14-16. is the punctuation b 16-18 ....&• .,....,xo~ (C, .....p ... auvt......xov)· of Kasse! (cf. 9Ib 14-16) which I accept. Roemer, Tovar, Spengel, Cope read dl"".~ 'nml~"... So, too, Dufour but with a comma after """i~" Ross includes b 17-20 in parentheses: .,,,d•• I~ who conjectures
See sBb 2 or Cope, p. 176. is the reading of the codd. and all the edd. save Kassd
8,...,,; cf. Der Text, p. 136.
z xp,orlJ~ tv All read in this way. Kassd, following a good tradition, reads "1!'T-q,6 i., transposing the article from b 19 6 Tci ~rrr.';,.."a. b 19 "a).'T'KDi~ ct.y&\cnv Since our passage apparently has A 2, 5sb 2-S in mind, the words refer to deliberative and forensic rhetoric as the explanatory clause (Td TS ycil! ..• /I.u),.v••Ta,) would also indicate. b 20 llouAoUovTcu' I would place a colon after this word as Tovar does. Ross, Dufour use a comma; Roemer, Spengd, Cope, a period. Kassd (cf. 9Ib S-23) ends his double-bracketed passage here. b 22 np.....pov i.e. A S. The usual punctuation is a comma after the word; a colon might be preferable; Kassd uses a period. On the meaning of 1}B., in the Riletor;c, including these iJB17 Teil. ".),cnIOJ., see 88b 30-3 I, 77b 24. I take this to be the conclusion to the b 22-23 c. ........ no,'1..mv protasis at b 8-22 and offered a possible explanation for it at 9Ib 8-23. If "B,,,.';, here and at b .S does include 1}B., (c£ same note), then 6,ci Tl• .,. refer to the study of the particular topics in B 2-17; if not, then simply to 12-17. See, however, ~b 27-29.
,re."
"ci8., -
C£ A 3, 5Sb 20 - 59a 5, sBb 8-29. 1}. = "is," b 24 lupOll'" TtAO~ quite possibly the philosophical imperfect, 63' 9 : 1. The echoes of A 3 in B 18 are fairly obvious. In 3 A. spoke of the role of "I!/'''' and three kinds of rhetoric with their Til7J as he does in IS. He mentioned next the need for "I!OTa ..s" for each kind of rhetoric and in 18 (9Ib 25-27) he cdls us that we 110W have them. Then he turned to the three ".,.d necessary to each kind of rhetoric as he does here (9Ib 29 - 92a 1). In 3 after mentioning these ".,.eI he said we must also have "1!.Ta...., for them, and these (cf. also 92a 4-7) he will present in chap. 19. Taking our statement in chap. 18 with its back references to the opening chapterS of the first book (cp. also 92a 1-4 with A 2, 56. 34 - 56b 27) and recalling his statement in chap. I of Book 2 it seems clear that A. is marking the end of one major division and the beginning of another. C£ 77b 18: I. From the methodology b 25 6c1;Il' xlll "poTcicr..~ of B 2-17, paralld as it is to A 4-14 (and also IS), together with the statement at the end of B I, i.e., 78a 28-30, there would appear to be little question that A. views his effort ill the second book as one which provides further 8&Ea, "al "I!OTeI.."" for "dB., and 1}Bo,; cf. 78a 28-29. In fact "elBo,
9Ib 30
COMMBNTARY
:>31
and oJ80~ os "Icrr..~ lvr:0X"0o are dod TO;; l&yov (A 2. 56a 1-19) which must be by way of expressed opinions or statements. b:>6 "'{CJ'U'~ On the meaning of this word in the Rhetoric, c£ Studi... pp. 55-07. and 55a 4- The word here may signify the modes of inference (enthymeme. example) or the source material suitable to effect conviction (the particular topics); Smdies. pp. 60. 64. b 2.7-29 k •... 5..:.p........ Depending upon how one interprets "8",ov~ (c£ 9Ib 8-23. 9Ib 22-2.3) the words TOUTO,. here will refer either to the material of chaps. I2-I7. or 2-17. Because of the nature ofb 24-29 as a brief oudine of what was done in the first two books (as well as as a transition to a new division of the work). it is difficult (but not impossible) to believe that A. would intend to make reference here only to a part of the second book (I2-I7) and not to all that preceded (2-I7). This fact might encounge an extended meaning for "8o"ov~. e.g.• 9Ib 8-23. On the other hand. since there is no mention of the "aBot Spenge!. p. 264. is inclined to delete lTO ••• "0"'" (b 27-28). while Vahlon ("Kritik arist. Schriftc:n." 126-28) would drop ..., ... d"be,crrao.
di..
b 29 xo.ve;;" The logic of this passage to 92a I suggests that this should be interpreted as it was in A J. 59a II-I3 (and c£ 7Sa 8 : J): the elements common to the dA'7 of rhetorical discourse which he will discuss in chap. 19. The nature of possible-impossible. past-future fact. greatsmall as ".wa is that they are necessary preconditions which must be on hand befure one engages in the different kinds of rhetoric. At 92a I-4 A. follows this up with the general program for the remaining topics of this book. They cover material which is common to rhetorical discoune - e.g.• chaps. 20-2.1: the common proofS. exarnple-enthymeme; chaps. 22-23: the stoicheia or general topics for argument by enthymeme; chap. 24: the nature of fallacious reasoning; chap. 25: the ways in which to refute reasoning>; chap. 26: a few general refiections on points mentioned in chaps. I!)-25. b J 0 ...0 ",.p{ is the reading of cod. A and four edd.. Spengel. Ross reads Teji with Bywater (with whom at b 32 he reads
"oel); in the light ofb 3I-32 (c£ 9Ib 3 : 1) this is a reasonable conjecture grammatically. Cope reads Ta from a good tradition. In our reading TO marks the articular infinitive: "in discoune the use also of the common principle of possibilityimpossibility is necessary for all speakers" ("also." i.e.• in addition to the kinds of argumentation already outlined in A 4 - B I7). As A. says. no one deliberates about that which is impossible. A 2. 57" 4--'7. At b 29 "oO'W' is commonly interpreted as "the common topics." Apart from the problems mentioned in 59" II-I3. it is difficult to see how past fact, future fact. can be called topics. Like possibility or gre.tness. they are aspects which the subject
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORICJ II
23 2
92.> 3
of discourse must have if you are to speak about it at all (possibility), or in forensic discourse (past fact), deliberative (future fact), or convincingly (greatness); c£ Studies, pp. 35-39.
e,..
b 3 [ : 1 x,d....u~ "." ... ",".pii.. Understand (doay"ai.. l-171C. Granted the science and the art, their objects either exist or can exist. se. dVV4TO'V (eUTt); a 205-26 6uvu'C'ov 'C'caU"C'lI KelL e.IvclI. xexl YfNEria.a. this is the reading of a good tradition adopted by Spengel, Cope, Ross, Kassel; the other edd. read with cod. A. I would accept the above reading, consistent as it is with the usage in rhe whole paragraph.
a 26 iI cl:pxi) When the principle and starting l1"int of anything (whether the starting point be a thing or person; cf. a 28: T..vTa ••. , where the power is contingent on certain conditions. If such capability to act conjoined with the deliberate intent to act can be shown, then, says A.., the action has been taken. Before considering (e.g., Cope, pp. 189-90) whether A. had an idea of "will" in s{JovASTo we should note two things: (a) that what is said about human action here and at 93a 1-4 re£lects the statement at A la, 68b 32 - 69b 32; and (b) that A. is apparently distinguishing here between the character of s{JovASTo and ' ..sBv,... (b 22), just as he did atA la, 68a 37 - 69a 7 where he says that {JovA"1Ja,~ is the rational wish for the good. c£ 69& 2-3 together with 6gB I : 3, Met. I072a 27-28; and then 64b 32 : 4 together with 68b 326gB 2. In our present palisage l{JovA8To would appear to signify a more deliberate and reasoned action; 1".Bv,. .. (b 22), amore habitual (C£ 69& 8 : 3) and unthinking act, as the example (b 23-24: 01 ,.••... I",Bv,.oiJaw) indicates. A look at some instances of {iovAsaBa, encourages one to interpret the word in the direction followed by Victorius ("cuncti enim, inquit, qui agendi facultatem habent, si volunt, quod volunt, efficiunt"), and Schrader, p. 381, even more emphatically ("voluit praevia deliberatione"); for Schrader l"smeans "concupivit ex affectu." For example, at 80b 35 - 8ra 1 (see Sob 36 : 1), {iovAsaBal in the context implies an act with reason behind it and one more firm than mere desiring (just as 69a 1-4 calls (Jov)."1Ja,~ a rational wish for the good, 69& 2-3). At 82a p - 82b 2 deliberate intent is the implication, and we find in the context that neoate.aBa, is used (on neoate.a,; ,ee 5.". 2 : 1, 63a 20 - 63b 4, 63a 20 : 1). At 84> 27-31, because of the ernotion analyzed (shame), there is more in the word than simple wishing, as there is also at 84b 14-15, 30, 37. {Jov;'.aBa" as a more deliberate act of
6V,..,
ARISTOTLE, I'RHETORIC' II
wishing, desiring the good or what is seen by the individual as good for himself, implies reasoned action (the AoY.U"ijJ "tfa 6v.a,..(J)~ of the parallel passage at 93a 3) in contradistinction to the spontaneous and natural desires, the ,!Aoyo. ae'Eo.~ of A 10, 6ga 4. fu reasoned action one would expect some calculation and therefore some choice in the action. b 19-20 "clv...~ .•. "pcl""OUcr,V
C£ PoL 13 ub 3.
b 20 lp."oSw" ymp "':'Siv fu noted at g2b 19, nothing wilhin the person is an obstacle to the act. This is by way of distinction from the next principle closely joined to it (iT') where there is no obstacle .xlernal to the person. Spengel, pp. 269-70, sees no difference in meaning between b 19-20 and b 21 (I... •. ",aU".,.) and would change the passage as cOIrllpt. Omitting his exclusions he would read b 21-22: In el TOO' IE", l".,A".. "al wwl{no,...A.
""a..
is the reading of a good tradition and accepted by Ross, Kassel, Cope. The other odd. read "al .1 d".aT&'.
b 21 K,d d .su".._
1 rl>py{~...o From the definition of anger (cf. B 2) it is clear that the possibility of an act of retaliation is essential to it. See A.'s comment at A II, 70b 13-14. 2 m.OUp.., After b 21-22 (In ... hroO."••) the verb "'''eax. of b 19 is understood. On the idea in lnoO."." see references above in g2b 19 and also A II, 70a 16-27 (with the notes thereto), II9a 3 : 1.
b 22 :
b 23 Wv bplyov.... , ... "o,OOcr", For the reason see 6ga ,should note that it is qualified here (w~ ... noAu').
I :..
One
b 23-24 01 p.tv .•. m,lh>p.OOcr,v
The opposition of these two classes has been met before: e.g., 7Iia .8 : 2, 83b 32-33, 88a 35-36. On In.o,,,i~ C£ 86b JI : 2, Boa 30 : 1,788 13 : " 6Ia "5 : 2. On the ide. in d"eau1a, 68b 14: 2.
b 25 : 1 Ip.""'. ylynoa.. " " ..t rn".iv is the punctuation of Tovar, Ross, Kassel; the reading ofRoerner, Tovar, Kassel. Ross bracketsy,,,••u6a,; Spengel, Cope, y'y.oaOa, "al, although the words are found in all the codd. Vahlen, Arisloleles De arte POttica, p. 183, reads as above and interprets "al .1 ."dA. "lyv."Oa. "al [sc. sl ii"s}.A.] no ••i• • • l>-91)
COMMBNTAllY
do. This interpretation is found in the Roberts translation, quite unclearly in Freese, and not at all in Jebb & Sandys, Cooper. 2 £lXD~ See S?a 34 : 2, 3, S7b 1 : 2; ..If/p.i.....
"Olij",,,
b 25-26 Elxo~ ... "for it is probable th.t a person on the very verge of doing something did it." lu seen above (9Zb 25 : I), A. explains The "al is intenonly the second part of the statement, sc. ellPMk
".,si..
sive. b 26-31 XCll .. yCyOl/€V •.. rnElpCl"€V "And if all those things which .re by nature antecedent to X or the means to X have happened (then X has happened); for example if it has lightened, then it has thundered and if one made the .ttempt to act, then he acted. And if all those things have happened whose nature it is to be consequent upon X or which are the cause of X, then the n.turaI antecedent X and the cause have happened; for example, if it thundered, then it lightened, and if he acted, then he made the attempt to act." This passage is a unit in which the statement ofb 26-28 is given conversely at b 28-31. The principle makes use of the idea of relation grounded in as well as antecedent-consenature seen at 92b 3-5 (c£ 9zb 3-5 on quent, 92. 20-23 (c£ 92b 17-19). Victorius interptets in.lea". in one of its possible meanings: make an attempt to seduce a woman.
".'1'"".')
"tfpux.
".".,
b 26 is the reading found here in all the codd., and at b 28 it is the reading of cod. A. The edd., Spenge!, Cope read it in both places. Ross and Kassel read "l'l'v". at b 26; Kassel (as would 1) te2ds it .also (with cod. F) at b 28. "s"v" .. is found in Plato and generally corrected to nl'!'v.... b 31 ... fL£v l~ .vci.YX'l~ This conclusion to the ways in which to establish the existence of past fu:t takes into account that in some instances the natural relation between the two events establishes the past fact with certainty; in other instances, particularly those involving human action, with strong probability. The phraseology here takes us hack to A 2, 57a 22 - 57b 10 and particularly so since much of the form ofargumentation used in 92b 15-3 I is based on sign and probability argument, as can be seen from the subsequent passage in A 2, i.e., 57b 10-25. On the question of necessary argumentation see S?a 22 : I, S?a 28, S7b 4, 57b 10-21. .iJno, lx.vTa qualifies both Ta pl. and Tel de: "some are so related...." This is the phrase used atA 2, 570 34 for b 31-32 ... 5' .:.~ ... ""AU probable argumentation from B!"oTa; c£ S?a 34 : 2, 3. However, it is also applicable to argumentation from -27 3!'-OlDY ... "'''Y'''Yii
C£ A 2, 57b 21'>-36, 57b 27 : 2, S6b 5 : 2·
a 27 dPX1\ As was said, 57b 27: 2, it is clear with respect to example that one cannot use example. without explicidy or implicidy making a real induction to apprehend the general class under which the example faIls. In this sense induction is the "beginning" as far as example is concerned. However, from A.'s remarks elsewhere - e.g., at An. Post. roob 3-5, 8ra 38 - 8Ib 9, EN II39b 25-31 - it is also the with respect to syllogism. The reason for this is that while the mind cannot know the individual but only the universal the only way d,e intdlect can reacll the universal is through the particular, as A. tries to show in An. Post. 99b 15 - roob 17, De an. 43Da ro"17. On this problem see Owens, 167-68, or Harnlyn, pp. 140-41.
"em
i.e., two species or kinds of the genus example. We have a 28 &IS,! seen this use of the word at, e.g., A 4, 60a 21, 78b 14, 8Ib 33, and will see it again at 94b 7, ¢b 24. However, see s8a 36 : 1 and 68a 26.
Iv!,-Eo... Al(aU"ol One kind is basically f.lctual and historical, the citation of past events; the other is fictive in which one either invents a comparable instance or utilizes suitable paraIlds already at hand (Cicero, De part. orat. 11.40 mentions each kind). In all three instances of example, the point to be noted is that the ground for each must be likeness, or similitude. b c""'llp!e, a. A. explains it (An. Pro 2.24), we have two sta=ts of the same order (A 2, 57b 29-30) with one more familiar and accepted as true. The more familiar is used to establish the less familiar, or, as he says, the major term (A) is shown to be applicable to the middle term (B) by means of a term similar to the minor term (C). Thus if we wish to show that C is A, we can do so through the example D which is like C since both have the attribute B. But we also know that D has the attribute A. Therefore D is A, D is B, and so B is A (thus the m'!ior term bdongs to the middle which is shown by way of D). Then: B is A; C (as we already know) is B; so C is A. Ifin the example at 93a 32 - 93b 4 we identify the terms, the use of example becomes clear: A (cross over to Greece), B (take Egypt), C (Artaxerxes III Ochus), D" 2 (Darius, Xerxes). Arguments from example (or indeed parable, faple), based
'a 28-3 I
·93' 30
COMMENTARY
25I
as they are on analogy, will yidd only probability; they can move only from particular to particular in the same class and one particular must be better known and accepted. i.e., the speaker (writer). a 30 : 1 aN.."" again a fO[IIl of argument by analogy grounded in • '''''p/301.>'1 similitude. It involves comparison as the word and the examples (93 b 5-9) indicate. The word means: a juxtaposition for comparison, or as Cicero denotes it col/ationem; c£ Quintilian, Inst. orat. 5. I I .2.3; Cicero, Defin. 4.27.75, De o,al. 2.66.265. Ordinarily the comparison is invented by the speaker (writer), and its effectiveness depends upon his acuteness of mind in seeing analogies suitable to his argument (cp. Quintilian, Inst. o,at. S-II.I-6). In itsdf the parable in its stricter form is an extended metaphor or simile in brief narrative form usually for the purpose of teaching. An example of it can be found in the objection ofCebes in Phaedo 87b 4-88b 8 to Socrates' argument for the imm.ortaIity of the soul. In testameotalliterature where the parable is a more readily identifiable form, it is mostly instructional, employed to offer a clear illustrative example: ''The kingdom of heaven may be compared to a man who sowed good seed in his field ..." (Mt. 13 :241f.). a 3-31 l,Oya •... AL{3uxa( In contrast to the parable, the fable is not invented by the speaker (writer) but ddiberatdy sdected from material at his disposal which A. points to here as Aesopic or Libyan. Of the latter we know rdativdy little. There is a passing mention of Libya (Aeschylus, frag. 139, ed. Nauck & Snell) as well as Egypt and Sybaris as sources of fable; c£ Plato, Phaec/rus 275b, Aristoph., Wasps I2.59. But Hermogenes, Progymnaslllala "Be! ,",-600v, says that the place names were given by those who discovered the fables; c£ Spengd, Rhet. G,aea II, p. 3. The fable found in Classical literature is apparently independent of the other main stream of fable which is Oriental (India). Fabl... (Uyo~, Jabu/a: a thing said), parables, proverbs, gnomic sayings possess in common the quality of wisdom literature. This explain. in part both their suasive power and their use by speakers (writers). They rellect the fund of common sense of the race. The fable of Classical literature is identified with the name of Aesop (c£ Quintilian, Inst. o,al. 5.II.I9-21). The identification which was made by the Greeks in the fifth century B.C. is confumed by the later formal collections of fables by Phaedrus (ca. 15 B.C. - A.D. 50) and Babrius (latter half of first century A.D.). The sole exception to this identification is the fables of Aphtbonius (latter half of fourth century A.D.). However, we do have instanc... of fable prior to its identification with Aesop. We know, for example, of Hesiod (? 750 B.C.), Wo,ks and Days 202-212, Archilochus (? 68-640, or ca. 720 B.C.). Furthermore no collection of fables from the hand of Aesop has come down to us, and indeed our knowledge of the man is meager despite the fact that in Greece
ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II
from the fifth century onward fable and Aesop became one, e.g., Aristoph.,
Wasps 1446-1448, Plato, Phaedo 61b. What these Greeks meant most likely by Aesopic fable is that defined by Theon (second century A.D.) ". fictitious story pictoring • truth" (c£ Spengd, Rhet. Graeei II, p. 72-), such as we find in Herodotus I.141, Aesch., Agam. 717-'736, or even Soph., Ajax II42-II58. Aesop himsdf was most probably a Thracian from Messembria who was a slave in Samos and a contemporary of Sappho's (ca. 612 - ? 550 B.C.); c£ Herodotus 2.134-135. The first collection of fables under his name was made by Demetrius of Phalerum (b. ca. 350 B. c.). This work is known to us only through a copy made in the tenth century A.D., although it i. very probably the source for the work of phaedrus and Babrius. Collection. of these Greek fables in prose such as that of Demetrius (or later the sO'oyou~ Sl p/j.<w We are told that fables were collected precisely for the practical purpose of their being used by writers and speakers and for no other. Their appearance as an independent fonn of literature intended to be read solely for their own sake only begins with the work of Phaedrus and Babrius; c£ 93a 30-31. 2 7j .... , This repeats wkt was said of fables at 93a 29-30. But there is an olmous diiference between the "making" of a fable and that of a comparison or parable. From the evidence of A: s words, it is cleal that fables exist as independent entities ready to be used elfectively by a discerning speaker (writer). On the other hand, the speaker must "make" the comparison; c£ 93a 30 : 2. In each instance the "making" is different. With fable it is a matter ordinarily of "finding" the relevant similitude, likeness, in the material already at one's disposal; in parable one "invents" the relevant comparison. This would be the point of his adding with respect to fable "if one is able to see the likeness, an ability which comes from skill in philosophy." a 5:
1
pqw
.read by the cadd., edd., Spengel,
Cope; Kassel secludes it.
;rho text of the codd. makes sense, and there seems no need for any change although Thuror, "Obserntions critiques [II] ," 4Z would rearrange the line for wkt he considers a more logical statement. z 'X cp"'ocro\"",,,V
a 10 : 1 el,,08o1~.,,,v C£ 7& 8 : J. • "(.....,~ C£ 55a 4 meaning (b), Studies, pp. 5!r6Q.
By way of illustrating !j4a 9-II Spengel, a II : J .:.~ ""p.... plo'~ pp. 275-'76, cites Problomata 916b 25f[ where we read: "Why are men more happy with examples and fables in speeches than with enthymemes? Is it because they rejoice both in learning and in learning quickly? People in fu:t do learn more quickly through examples and fables. For these are things which they know and which are particular. But enthymemes are demonstrations from universals which we know less than the particular. Furthermore we place more trust in that for which there are several witnesses, and examples and fables are like wimesses; again, proofs by means of witnesses are more easy to come by. Further, too, men perceive likeness with pleasure and examples and fables show forth likeness." Interestingly enough, this same principle of pri91Jac~ T"X"" plays a part in his urging the use of a condensed furm fur the enthymeme in the third book; o£ Studies, pp. 88-91. • tnt ...oi~ ~8u">\""",,, the reading of a good tradition. Ant also appears in corrected cod. A. but Kassd alone reads it and comments on it (Der Text, pp. 138£). Cope, p. 203, who does not read it implies it in M"p~parJe.. The translations interpret explaining the common reading: as Cope does and are essentially the same as the translation given in 94& srI! where the preposition is accepted.
TO',
ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II
94" 16
Tn "'CJf!a6.lypaTa is undera 12 : 1 "'pOTlO.!"""" .•• lO'XEV oln"ywyij stood with "'eo ..9Ip••a, as it is with b"lsyops.a (a 13). On lo.".. lnay"'l'ii see 93a 26-27. We have seen the nature of argument by example at 93a 28-3 I. Argument by induction goes from the less universal to the more universal. It do;" so (cf. An. Pr. 2.23) by establishing a relation between a major term (A, men) and a middle term (B, mortal) by means of a minor term (C, individuals): e.g., the individuals X, y, z are men; x, y, z are mortal; men are mortal. The diiference between induction and syllogism is that the C which is used to relate A to B is not a truly universal term but a collection of singulars. Z ToiS Si ~lIToP'xoiS i.e., "Rhetoric"; cpo 02a 3-9 where dialectic, eristic, rhetoric are compared, and 7sa 8 : 3. This is the interpretation commonly given to the word, and so nltj. b dliyo.~, 94" 13, is taken to
mean '·save rarely," "except in a few instances." If one reHects upon A:s concern for the audience and their ready apprehension of what is said which is round as early asA 2, S7" '-4, 7-21, and lateratB22, 9sb 22-9604, rIB, I9a I"l-I9, it is possible to see why induction is not 01> to rhetoric. The comment ofProblemDla notwithstanding (see 94a II : ,), any strong inductive argument (as can be seen in many of the early Socratic dialogues) requires an extensive presentation (nolAd Mys .., 94a IS) and labors therefOre under the same problem as syllogism, S7" 7-17. AD this works against the pri9'1'J1' Taxs.a of the auditors which A. favors. There is, however, another interpretation offered by Victorius, p. 37], which is valid, attractive, and in accord with what A. says of rhetorical merhodology. Victorius interprets e'1Toe",oi, as "those skill~d in speaking." nltj. b dlLyo" he would accept, but hesitandy, as above. However, he believes that it is more righdy interpreted as "save - in the presence of a small audience" ("nisi cum verba fiunt ad pauces").
TO.,
a
I]
IKLAq6"."..
C£ 94a u : , init.
a 14 6 ... ""P-rUS .•• K'OUVOS To understand what A. intends by this statement and that at 943 Is-r6 (PrieTv, ... xe>l'oyl..~ probably "the uses of maxims"; possibly "the theory of maxims," although in Plato, PhaeJr. 267c the word refers to what would apparently be a collection of maxims (if Ta Mou".ia My",. is the name of Polus' book) gathered from poet> such as Hesiod, Theognis. Apart from Anaximenes we have here, as far as can be known, the only effort up to this moment to define and specify It is more complete and (despite Spengel's preference for just two kinds of 1'• .,,...,, as we have in Anaximenes; c£ 94b 7) more specific than that found in Ana:ximenes. All future efforts made by later writers, in particular the rhetoricians in their Progymnasmata, are grounded in what A. says here. For Anaximenes the maxim is primarily an instrument for argument. In his mst mention of it (1v .....L'rlV The kind of subject and the times suitable for maxims, and the persons best fitted to use them, will become clear with the ddinition of maxim. The threefold division is renIiniscent of the analysis of the emotions at 78a 23-25; c£ 7Sa 23. The kind of subject is covered mainly between 94a 26 and 9.sa 2. Tbere we learn that in subject matter maxims are assertions about the moral character ofhuman living, assertions whose brief statements are either well-known and accepted or readily grasped when heard, or, on the other hand, are controversial or paradoxical and so in need of a short supplementary explanation. At 9.sa 1r-'7 A. gives us the persous, and at 9.1' 7-34 the occasions or times.
a 22 : 1 Aclyo,~ i.e., "in discourses"; c£ S9b 16 : 1. 2 lcs"" 5' 'Ii a' oj is the reading of cod. A and four edd. Kassel appropriates "'1 &om Spengd's conjecture ian" "'1 (c£ Spengd's note on .s.sb 25); Cope reads at with cod. F. On 001 plnoo oJ.... ("not, however" read by the edd. but not by Spengd, Cope, Freese, see .ssb 8 and Bonitz, In-
,dex 5460 2Off. :1 1l,,6cpllV"U;
C£ 6Sb 27 : 2.
a 23-24 x,d a(, ".pt """"""" olav is the reading of cod. A and three edd., Spengd, Cope. Ross, Dufour read 0;;.... "eel with cod. F, which is rejected by Kassd (Der Tex~ p. IU) .
....,.'v
This is A.'s ddinition of Y"wp7J. Without • 22-26 E""" •.. "p.. any significandy new contributions, it reappears together with dements of Anaximenes' explanation of maxim in the efforts of later rhetoricians to explain the concept: e.g., Hermogenes, Progymnasmata 4, Aphthoniw Frog. 4, Theon, Frog. .I (all in Spengd, Rhet. Grata II), and c£ 94b 7, sf. The definition of Anaximenes is not adequate. He explain. maxim as the setting forth of a personal view ("'1A.... darpaTo, 16(00). on gcneraI matters and leaves it at that. A. gives us a ddinition offering both genus and species: (a) a general statement on the objects of human actions, (h) specifically: objects to be chosen or avoided in these action.. Maxim, therefore, is for A. directed exclusivdy toward the human person and the quality of his actinn,. In this
o,
COMMENTARY
definition A. reHects the general nature of "'''1'71 as found in the antecedent literature. i.e.. a terse. pithy statement of a general truth on the moral character of human living. With two possible exceptions (94b 13. 95a 21; see below) all the examples in chap. 21 illustrate the definition; c£ Studies. pp. 141-44. The Audo, ad Heren,.ium 4-17-24 (ca. 86-82 B.C.) competendy describes A.'s idea: "A maxim is a statement drawo from life which sets forth in a few words what either occurs or should occur in human living." This idea is echoed for the most part in the comments on "'''1'71 found in Rhelo,es G,aed. among which the comment of Maximus Planudes (Rheta,.. G,aed. V 422) is a good example. Obviously. such ao explanation covers an area large enough to be transected by other popular modes of expression such as proverb (cp. A.'s remark at 95a 20). apothegm (c£ 9Ia II-I2. for example). chri.. epigram. In fact Quintilian. Ins/. o,at. 8.5.3. discussing senlenlia says: "The oldest forms which are most correcdy called senlentia are those which the Greeks named "'"'I'a< although the same name [St"le') from Euripides are maxims (e.g., ".tfnJ, 94b 5), but A. gives us the next verse (865) which gives the reason, and so, as he observes, it becomes an enthymcme. b 5 "pil~ ... ixo!,iv'l' and cpo 68b 2 : 2.
"along with the llext line." c£ LS,
'xw,
C.l.J.
b 7 ttT' 29-34. Roo. alone encloses this
i.e., dre maxim: oil 'P'1P' ..• "a,de.ecrlJa•.
b 32 £'JtELK'EL'V sc. aepone". In Tel l,meoaOev we have the reason (i.e., b 30-3 I: 'nB.d~ ... ,l.a.). Kassel reads a colon after ll"'eoa9sv, not the comma of the edd., Spengel, Cope.
At"....
b 33 : I &.Ii-lj"""' ... "poa'r'04v'rCl sc. c1epOTT.. The difference between this kind of statement and that at b 27-28 is that the latter either contradicts or seriously challenges commonly accepted opinion - e.g., children should not be educated - or the paradox of Socrates in the Gorgias 469C: it is better to suffer wrong than to do it. Here the maxin! (95a 1-2) and others like it would be accepted but are not in themselves immediately self-evident in a given situation, e.g., one should not be insolent. 2 a'rpoyyuAc:lTCl'rCl .... tersely as possible"; cf. Plato, Phaedr. 234e: UTeO"",)}.a TW' .VOpaT.,V (terseness of language). See the references in Roberts, Dion}'sius ofHalicarnasst.is: On Literary Composition, p. 323. C£ also Grube, p. 10"9. Some (Roberts, Cope, p. 2n) find its meaning (compact, rounded, terse) in Latin rotundus, i.e., rounded off so that nothing is missing or unnecessary (e.g., Cicero, D. fin. 4-3.7, Horace, AP 323). But this meaning is questioned by Douglas at Bruoo 68.272. In later literary terminology the .Greek word was used of d", periodic style. i.e., when maxims which are controversial, parab 34 : I 'rO'aUTO'~ doxical, or unclear in their statement are used, Spartan apothegms or enigmatic sayings are also appropriate. For,like the preceding, they, too, are not always obvious and call for a brief word of explanation. 2 li",otpO.Yfl""'Cl Plutarch has a collection of those in Book III of his MornUa called Apophthegmata Laconica, 208bJ[ In his life of Lycurgus 19-20, he gives us further examples. Ftom Socrates' remark this manner of speaking was typical of the Spartans: "Indeed if anyone is willing to associate with the most ordinary Spartan he will find that he appears by and large undistinguished in conversation, and then somewhere in the cour.. of the discussion like a skilled marksman he throws in a notable remark - terse and compressed such that the one speaking with him seems to be no more than a child" (Protag. 342e). b 35 - 9sa 1 olav... or".... Kassel alone reads U,,", (for U,.... of the edd.) and gives it as the reading of all the codd. On Stesichorus 1'3b 9 : J.
COMMENTARY
The loenans are most likely the inhabitants of loen in southern Italy (c£ 9Sa I-Z), not those of mainland Gre=, i.e., East Locris running along the Euboean straits and West loeris which lies along the Corinthian Gul£ Cpo r II, IZa ZI-Z3. The fragment can be 95a l-Z 06 ... ~&"":JL" found in Page, 104 (b). Demetrius On Style cites the saying in less full form at 99, 100, Z43 and says that the comment was made to the locrians by Dienysius. If correct, it could be Dionysius II, who spent the ten years of his exile at Loen in Italy (356-347 B.C.) ruling rather cruelly; c£ CAR, VI z85. Demetrius giving the ordinary explanation of the saying (for a more confused interpretation, see Gregory of Corinth, Rhetores Graea, VII 1155) says: "If Dionysius had spoken directly and said that he would level the territory of the Locrians, he would have appeared quite angry and undignified. But he used allegory as a veil as it were for his meaning. Hidden meaning in all instances is more frightening ... " (100). a 2.-3 Y""'p.aAy£i,. ... "'pEa(3u«p"'" 948 ZO-ZI. c£ Quintilian, ['lSI. Drat. 8.5.8.
These are the Tl",. of 94a ZI; c£
a 3 ,r,,. lp." ••po~ "matters in which one is experienced." The comment seems obvious from the very nature of maxim (94a Z2r-z6) whose subject is the moral character of human living. In this area experiential knowledge is critieal enough for A. to say that while the young can be good mathematicians and geometricians and attain theoretical expertise in such matters, they do not, as far as can be seen, attain practical wisdom "because practieal wisdom is concerned with particulars as well as uuiversals, and particulars become known through experience; but the young are without experience since length of time produces experience" (EN lI4Za u-I6). The same reason prevails for ..J7. On the overuse of maxims, e.g., YVOJI'OMO', e'J61OJ' dnotp. both the Auctor ad Herenn. 'P7.2S (use themrardy) andQointilian 8.S.7 (not many, not randomly used, not put in the mouth of anyone) oifer words of advice.
a 7-8 xu8Q).ou .•.•brE'v e.g., Catullus 70.4-S: "mulier cupido quod dicit amanti" in vento et rapida scrihere oportet aqua," or conversely 6+143: "nunc iam nulla viro iuranti femina credat, I nulla viri spcret sermones esse fideles." "in expressing bitter complaint and a 8-9 "ltE' •.. ely..,,) The edd., Cope (but not Spengd) use the parentheses. I would read with Ross, Kassd, Spenge!, Cope without the quotation marks employed by the other edd. for ,,>..0, ,,,,,,...d>, 1'''16& cIya•. I would also punctuate 9sb 9-10 without the quotation marks used by Roenrer, Tovar, Dufour. On the two sayings and their assumed origin with the Seven Wise Men see Plato, Protag. 342d - 343b, CharmiJes 1641' - 16Sb, and the references at 63a 2 : Z, 66b 13. a 23 ij8o~ On the meaning of the word 6ga IS : 3. Here A. is talking of the speaker's >TOo, about which he spoke directly at 7Sa 7-20; c£ 78a 9 : 1. However, on the meaning of >TOo, in general as used in the Rhetoric cf. 77b 24, 88b 30-31. a 24 ",,,,8~,x&I~ etp'lI'iv'J. "or the maxim is likely to appear to be one stated with strong feeling." This is the reading of cod. A, Ross, Kassd, and Cf. Richards, p. 178: "na81J"'''''', .le1Jpi>1J 1i "''''1'''1, i.e. ,..tlln 'l'a ..."OaL" The other edd., Spengd, Cope read Bekker's conjecture: ele1Jpiv1J !}. a 25-.6 .,;s...o~ ... iJ~lc.>". Victorius quite perceptivdy refen OifTO, to Iphicrates mentioned at A 7, 65a 28 : I; 9, Ci']b 18-19. But Cope, p. 217, disagrees, and suggests a reference to "Cleon, Thne. IV.27 seq." As noted (650 28) we are not certain that this Iphicrates is the famed strategos of the fourth century. However, everything in the Rhetoric points in that direction. fle is mentioned many times as someone presumably well known to the readers (e.g., at 6sa 28; 67b IS; 94a 23; 97b '7; 98a 5, 7, 17; 99a 34; osa 19; IIa II; IIb I; 160 10), as well known in fact as the fourth-<entury general Iphicrates, who appears frequently in Xenophon and Demosthenes. Certainly there is no other Iphicrates of the fourth. or earlier centuries who would qualify. The general, Iphicrates, had a reputation of being a speaker of some distinction (see 97b 27 : 3, gSa s), and there is the flavor of the spoken word whenever a citation from him is given in the above references. In fact there is evidence of a defense in 355 I 3S4 against Chares and an Aristop'hon (see
271
COMMBNTAlIY
98a 3-8). See PW, OCD, CAR, VI passim. Cope's reasons for rejecting Iphicrates as the referent are not convincing. The comment could easily have been made by Iphicrates himsdf or an opponent in Victorius' instanee, or that mentioned at 97b 27 : J, or that at 98a 17-22 (his defense against Chare. and Aristophon, on which see r la, lIb IIf., CAB, VI 2II). a 26-34 -n. U ~eo~ ... I'oU'£lV" Io this passage A. discusses the relation between the ~Oo~ of the speaker and this special use of "vrh!'7J in a paradoxical way (the "oea M~a. idea of 79" 24) which was introduced at 9Sa 21. However, at 9sb 13-18 he will discuss the relation between ~Oo~ and ".rh!'7J in general. On the ~OO~-'l"'rh!,1/ connection see 9Sb IS-16. In both places ~Oo~, as should be expected, is contingent upon moral choice, 9sa 28-29 and 9Sb 14-18. a 26-27 TG U ~eo~ ... aU 5.i sc. TO d. ~Oo~ (<pal.na,) {JiAT'" (sr T'~ <pa/TI) Un ou dei": "One's character appears superior if one should say that one must not ..." The previous phrases are understood since they are clearly implied by the statement; 'P7J!,llIn is not unusual in the fourth century.
C£ 8gb 24-2S. a 29 : 1 ",pocdpc.,." cruv5Yjl.oil" "to make the moral choice completely clear." On the relation of ~Oo~ to "eoa/esa" c£ A 8, 660 14-16, 66a IS : I, 2; A 9, 67b 21-26, 67b 21 : I, Z; A 13, 74" II-I3, 74& II : 2; see also EN IIub 4If., II39"]I1f. The relation between ~Oo~ and U~,~ was announced .early on atA 2, S60 4-10; latel at 8, 66a 10-12, 9, 66a 2S-28; or again at 90a 27-28. 2 ..hI..... C£ 94b !rIO (a"od.t~• ." ,...l.). If one's moral choice is not fully clear in the statement of the maxim, one must make it so by giving one's reason, just as one must do with unclear maxims. The examples at a 30-34 fully illustrate the point. Thurot, however, notes, "Observations critiques [11]," 42 that the thzee examples illustrate the two precepts in a reverse order, e.g., the first example exemplifies nt. ai-riav 1",U,,6w, while examples two and three illustrate rfl U~•• ... avVd1/AOJ••
"''''ty.,,,
a 30
El",c\vor..
reason
subject of
.".lo/.w: "for
example, one must add the
by saying."
a 3I ",,~cNAou... 8ciTEPOV On the first c£ A 9, 67a 34; the second has been seen a number of times as a form of crasis: "for the other is the act of a traitor." a 33
b 2 cpo!""x0'n)'ra "because of the uncultivated minds." In general the word signifies a view of life which is confined 10 its obvious and superficial meanings. I would say that Victorius has captured it in part: "the kind of person captivated by the empty semblance of wisdom"; he also refers to BE 12I5a 29-30 which is somewhat to the idea. The estimate of the auditors seen here is similar to that expressed at A 2, 57a 1I-12. Cope, p. 218, looks upon the word (correctly so it seems) as a unique imtance.
b 3-4 xa80Aou... ixou,,,Y
"if someone speaking in universal terms hits upon ideas which they entertain about a particular instance." This is to say that their grasp of the general truth is limited, partial, and prejudiced owmg to their 'I'0e ..."oT71'. On "a9&).0v-"ieo, cpo S4b 5, S4b 6; on b"TV;m cpo 54>9: 2.
b 4-5 /iILII .•• 8lJP~E'Y sc. Ii"a de "al (Mj).o.'cn:a,) ,,0;,.... The metaphor in fi.qeB6 ... is found at AI,. Pr. 46a II-P2. b 5-6
c::.cr"op .•• tcr'r'Y
b 6 ).OYOIL£vou 3 11..
).."0",,,.,.
i.e., 94a 22-23.
sc. (TOtirO) )..,,0,,8'0" 6; C£ S. 2072. Kassel alone reads
b 7 & ••• 'rUYl(ciyoucr, "upon which with respect to a particular instance they happen to entertain an established opinion."
..ux0'
b 8 XEXP'lp.£vo~ i.e., "happens to have." The individual who is distressed by such particular instances will generally respond sympathetically to a statement which universalizes (even wrongly) the misfortune. This is even truer of those with a Iimiled and undiscriminating outlook; c£ 9sb 2. , b 9 : 1 eI"ltOY'rO~ aT' is the reading of Ross, Kassel, Cope. The other edd., Spenge! read (with cod. A) without an; but c£ 7J 6n immediately following. The same three along with Spengel read the text without the quotation marks; c£ 9sa 22-23. • 06&lv •.• XCIIA....:.... pOy Cpo Hesiod, Works and Days 346 ("a bad neighbor is a disaster''); Isocrates, Plalai",s 17-19 on the n,ebans as neighbors; Demosthenes, Ag. Callicles I ("there is nothing worse than having a bad and greedy neighbor"); also, Plato,Laws 843c, Thucyd. 3.1I3.6 (Cope). Kassel reads "etTOVBla!;; everyone else, "etTovla,. b 10 : 1 o6&lv •.. 'r"'YO"lto,la~ 418.
Cpo Menander 166 in Edmonds: or
b I I ""'~ . . . "ltoia .•. oIi..... ~ "at what kinds of preconceptions they happen to have and how ilis that they came upon them"; c£ 95b 7. Schrader suggests Cicero, De orat.2.44-186 as an illustration of the comment. Ross,
95b 19
273
COMMBNTARY
Kassel read noo" for "w~ and do not read "w~. which is omitted on a good tradition. oil..."'~ (read as o/lT'" by Tovar. Sponge!, Cope) refers to the manner of stating a maxim about such established views as he himself has just offered: "and then to speak in general terms on these opinions in the manner described." b 12 "..u,,'1Y'" xpija,Y is Bekker's reading adopted by all the odd., Spenge!, Cope. The statement refers back: to 9sb I and forward to what follows to xe;j"'" b u. b U-13
". Sij •.. " ..I
both - and; see Denniston, pp. 26~1.
b 13 ij8,,,oU~ This is a natural consequence of the definition of maxim at 94" 25-26 (aAAa ••• ned.........); c£ 94& 22-26. b 14-15 ~90~ ... "po.. lpe.. ,; See the references at 9sa 29 : I; cpo 17. ISa 17-1S; 16. 17a 16-33; Poetics 14sob S-II; Studies. p. 143.
r
b 15-16 ..I S~ ... """ n:po ..,p"";;'" "All maxims do this owing to the fact that the one who states a maxim makes a general declaration about his moral preferences." All the edd., Spenge! read neoa.'ei..e",. of cod. A. Cope, Kassel. and Freese read neoa.'I!e...w. from a good tradition. This is obviously the correct word here since this statement is nothing more than • summary of the definition of maxim given at the beginning of this chapter (b 22-26). See Kassel. Det' T....I. p. 139. for a further observation. At Poetics 14Soa 5-7. a.d•••a. b 5-u there is an indication of a close relation among ~Oo~ in A.'s mind. as exegesis ofthese passages tends to show; see. e.g.• Else pp. 23 S45; 263-73. Lucas. pp. 100, 108.
'Y''',.1/ -
b 18 XP'l""o>j9'1
C£ 86b 12-13. which r would take to be its meaning
here.
Ii....
b 111-20 ".pl p.~ ....... basically a summary of the divisions followed in the chapter - c£ 94& 2cr.21 - with two exceptions: the persons best suited to use maxims are dropped out and rep1tced by the advantages of maxim.
C£72a2:Z.
CHAPTER ••
I . Introduction: 9Sb
II . Devdopmcnt: 9Sb I.
ro discwsion of enthymemes as forms of argument
20-22
22 -
96b 21
enthyuwne as syllogism
9sb •• - 960 3
(0) 9sh 22-24 (6) 9sh 24-31 (e) 9sh 31 - 960 3
entbymcmc argues &om definite and acc:epted opinions and infen ttom premisses both necessary and probable
subject matter of these opinions and premisses material be specific to subject under dDamion this acmpli6cd for dclibcrative rheto-
•• 96• 4 - 960 34
to...
(0) 96a 4-'1
(6) 96a
entbymeme is • syllogism its dilICrona: &om dialectical syllogism
7-12
ric
this exemplificd for cpidcictic: rhetoric thi. only stated for juclidal rhetoric
(e) 960 12-22 (t!) 96a ....24 (e) 96. 24-34
3. 960
summation: on any .ubject the relevant
6cts are ncc:cssary sources of this rdCVllllt subject matter
34 - g6b 21
(0) 96a 34 - 911b ]
(6) 96h 4-II
(e) 96h II-19 (t!) 96h :1.0-21
demonstration of one"s subject comes only &om .he relevant &cIS so there must be a selection of pro~ sitions which .peak directly to the subject at hand (0) and (6) .bove arc exemplificd the mctbcd by which this selection is made is that of the particular topics (c£ 96b .8-34)
III . Transition and General Introduction: g6b I.
96b
21-2]
31 -
974 4
the Fecol sources of cnthymemes (i.e., chaps. '3-24)
to
96b .31, i.e.• Ta di: aTO,xsia ,",1.: there are two necessary prelim-
inaries to be noted
ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II
(0) 96b 23-28
(6) 96b 28-34
95b 22
there are two kinds of en'hymeme the method of ,he particular topia for cnthymemes have been disalsscd.
(e.g.• A4- B (7) we will now study me memod of general topics for enthymemes IV· Conclusion: 97a 4-6
when the above is done. the method for the refutation of enthymemes will be discussed (i.e.• chap. 25)
In this chapter we have the final section of those transition.l chapterS (I8-22) which move us from the study of the particular topics (Bi' ("al,u~ ... My.v" ..). On 5-26 TO ciuTI> ToijTO Spa... a~.d ToJTO is that which he has been insisting on from 96a 6f(: obtain the /lndeX""Ta. I find the construction awkward. I take the phrase as an articular infinitive: ''Doing this very thing differs in no way whether the subject be the Athenians or the Spartans, a man or a god." It also seems possible to take aeiiv as an imperative or with an understood as,: "It is immaterial whether the subject be the Athenians ..• one must do the very same thing." a 26 ""f'o~OU).";""TIl This together with the following accusatives (a 26-27) include all three kinds of rhetoric. In avpfJovAeilo>Ta (for the accusative subjects of ).""'."'" [a 28], S. 21520) we have the word denoting the kind of rhetoric. For epideictic and judicial he does not usc the words signifying the kind of rhetoric but those denoting the fonnaliry under which each operates; cf. schema, S8b 8-29. This usage continues through a 29-32, and the fonnality of deliberative rhetoric (neOTe"'''''''"'~ - dno ...e."o.....~) is omitted; c£ 91b 34. In a 29-32 (r.' ... fJAafJse6v) we learn that only by seeking the /lndexo ••a can we 1lI2ke intelligent statements about the proximate .....).'1/ of each kind of rhetoric, i.e., "ald." alaxed. ""'A. A moment's rellection on this should reveal why A. gave such an extended analysis (A 4 B 17) to the methodology of the particnlar topics. a 28 6".p cNToij Til 6"lipX"'TIl i.e., all the rdevant material on him (Ross alone puncruates in a way which would give a different meaning). This point is made a number of times, e.g., a 6 (Tli ... Vndexo ....a); a I5-16 (i" ... Vndex ...); a I7-18 (...1 . •. Vndex...); a 22 (Vndex.1 ~TO"); a 23 (il< ... tlnaex ......,.); a 29 (il< TOVT.,.); a 29-30 (81 ••. VndeX"); a 33 (I" ... Ilnaex ........ ... dya8q;); b 2 ('"'' . tlnaex6vT"'). At 96b 4-2I A. draws the conclusion from this: namely, the need to have on hand propositions directly rdevant to the subject if one is to present the subject effectivdy. See comment at end of preceding note.
a 29-30 d T. ,...>.0" ... 6"oipXE' sc. av...q;. Similarly vndex.. av...q; is understood at a 31-]2 with 8f ..., at"alo•. .. fJAafJ8e ••• a 32 6f'oO""~ •.. Kill "in the same way as the instances given"; cpo 79& 21)-21 where the phrase could be interpreted as here, i.e., the adverb and dative. a 33
II
f'o-IJ liYll801v
C£
96a 9 :
J.
I would read the words with Ross,
Kassel, Spengd, Cope. Understood with the clause sI ... pTj araB•• is VndeX", just as ).1)="" (a 28) is understood with what follows: II, ... araBq;. a 34 " ...... mE.S"; The consequence is at 96b 4f£: e.g., "Conscquendy since all indeed clearly demonstrate in this manner whether they reason stricdy or loosdy (for they do not t~e their premisses from any and every
ARISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' 11
thing but from the fact'! relevant to the subject), and since it is clear that it is otherwise impossible to present anything by. way of discourse [or: it is clear from reason that it is otherwise impossible to explain anythlngJ, it is manifestly necessary ... "; C£ 96b 3. a 35 ,i7,oS.uaoUv'<EI;
C£ S6a 3 :
2,
"b 23 :
2,
82a I7-I8.
a lS - 96b 2 Uv .•. aul.l.oyl1;"",'.Gyou C£ 960 34. This word has been understood in two ways here: (4) "speech," "discourse," by Cope and others: (b) "reason." by Vater (Animadversion .... pp. I24-25) and others. If by (b) is meant "logical exposi-
tion," c'rational explanation." "argument." ureasoned. discourse," or something similar. I can see the possibility for either interpretation and would accept either although I have given preference to (4) at 96a 34. From a study of 66 instances of the word (exclusive of the present passage) in the first two books. and in all the cases of the singular and plural (which I do not intend to list) the following emerges. Since in particular instances one can argue interpretations of a word, the meanings I offer are those interpretations of the word found in most instances in the commentaries or the translations. In 40 instances [m all word cases and in the singular and plural) it means "discourse" (e.g.• 55a 26, 58b 7. 80a 2). In 9 cases it clearly denotes "argument" (e.g.• 55' 33, "b 2, OIa 27); in 4 instances either "argument" or "discourse" (e.g.• 55a 28. 9Ib 9); and in 3 either "rational explanation" or "discourse" (e.g.• S604, 66a9, IO). In 2 instances in the genitive singular it means "reason" (e.g.• 70a I9.2S). In the remaining examples it signifies: (i) "words." four times (e.g" 80» I9. SSb
COMMBNTAlIY 3); (ii) "account," twice (e.g., OIa 23); (iii) either "word" or "reason," once (74b 19); (iv) "esteem," once (S4a 27). The two meanings olfered above for our passage can be seen at s6a I : z, S6a 3 : 2, s6a 19 : 2. Either of those meanings - "discourse," "reasoned discourse" - is strengthened, I believe, by what follows in b S-I9, particularly the comment at 96b 5r-II (8aq> ••• "0"&) where the use of d."",vva. in the clause points to what he means at 96b 3 by d.el TO;; UYOV .•• d.....v.a•. ...o".xoi~ Cpo s8a 2.9 (see s6b 13, ssa 9). The first book of the Topics, chaps. 4-IS, give the general method for seeking propositions on a subject. It does so by suggesting ways in which to look at any thing to discover its essential and non-essential aspects; it reviews the varied meanings of terms, kinds of possible propositions and ways they should be sdected, sum-
], 4
ming up the process in part at IOsb 12-1S (on which see 96b 6). ], 4-II "p......"" ..• xo.vci This is a specification of what was explained in a more gcneral manner at 96a 6; see note. b 5 : 1 ~.o).'Y,,"tvCl "sdeaed statements, premisses"; cpo 96b 30-31; o£ A 2, sSa '7-23 (rd.a ... sldw.), 58a 26-35. Mention of the sdection of one's material from what is olfered in the analysis of particular topics is common in A 4-IS (0£ COMMENTAlIY I 354 [s.£]- 355) and also in B I-17 (0£ 77b I6 : 1, 80b 30 : 2, 88], 29 : 1). 2 w8exo""""",,, i.e., possible points of discussion relevant to the subject; on the word 57" 27 : ]. b 6 b ..XCl.po...ci....", i.e., matters most suitable to the subject; on the word o£ 65a 20 : 1. At Top. IOsb I2f[ he says: "We should also sdect from written handbooks and compose for oursdves outlines on each kind of subject, setting them down in separate lists, for example, on good, on life, and on every kind of good beginning with the nature of good itsel£" ], 6 ~_YIIIGU C£ 54], 3 : 1. These are the unexpected aspects of a subject which suddenly arise, e.g., new problems, questions, uncertainties. As he will say (b 7fI:) they are to be handled with the same care for rdevant information as the subjects for which one is ptepared.
b.,..s '"oraAII"..,....Cl ..• A6yo~ "one must search out [''ITS''] premisses by looking not at indefinite gencralities but at the facts rdevant to the subject of discussion." On dOelUTa cpo 740 34: 1. b S-9 ".p.yp4<pov..-Cl ..... pciY,,"Cl...o~ "and by specifying as many of these facts as possible, especially those intimately related to the subject." On ly"vTaTa cpo 6sa 34 : z; o£ Cope, p. 23I, on ".e.yea'!'....
], 9-II 6"'1' p.tv ... xo.vci These two comparative clauses explain in tum first "l.iUTa, and then lyYVTaTa TO;; nedy",a..o~ ofb 9.
286
AllISTOTLB, 'RHETORIC' II
b 10 Ix'l)..... ' is the reading of both cod. F and corrected A ("more of the rdevant facts are in hand") and of Cope, Kassel, and Freese. The edd. read 1%1/ from uncorrected A.
b Ie-II 0I'OV
I would begin (c£ chapter outline) theJinal section of the chapter here. The statement here is picked up at 96b 34lE (IT. d~ ...) afrer an interruption (b 22-34) which serves a double purpose: it is an introduction to what follows in chaps. 23-26 (e.g., b 22-28) and a recapitulation (e.g., b 28-34) of what bas been done from A 4 to B 17. It i. a logical interruption since the analysis is about to turn to an entirely new matter: namely, a study nf the general ways of iDference and reasoning which apply to all three kinds of rhetoric and their subject matters. The meaning of aTo'XBia is given in the next sentence.
b 21-22. " ..o'Xdov ... oNTO C£ 01' 17-18, and 58a 35. It seems clear that in b 20-22. A. repeats the statement made at 58a 29-33. Since the particular topics are Jinished, the common topics alone remain (c£ 58a 10-26). The meaning of "common topic" is fiUrly well explained at 58a 12-17 (omo • . . . d.a"ses.), a ;U-22. ("",,s'.a ... ',..",eo.a); see Studies, pp. 129-35. The explanation of v El6ii>v C£ Studies. pp. 39-42, where the reasons arc presented for interpreting this phrase to mean "each of the kinds of rhetoric." i.e.. referring to deliberative, j~dicial. and epideictic. On A.'s use of .r~., C£ SBa 36: 1. Cope's interpretation. p. in which .rd1J means "specific topics" and TOn•• means "general heads or classes" I find difficult to understand in the light of A.'s treatment of topics in the text. Both the particular (.r~1J) and the general (".wol) topics can be and are called TO".' by A.• e.g., 96b 34 where we find TO".' for "particular topics." However. I know of no comparable instance in which he would speak of TOn•• TOO' Bldw. as Cope has him doing here. And I would say that Cope confuses one more with his interpretation (pp. 235-36) of b 34£ (e.... ••. lap"",,),
"33.
b 29-30 Xp'l.,(.......... civ"y",,""" C£ Studies. p. 411145. As A. says at A 3. 58a 37if.. when the constituent elements of discourse are taken into account. there are necessarily (d.d",,'1. b 2; ., d.6.r"'1" b 6) three kind, of discourse. The usefulness of rhetoric. and so the usefulness of the three ways in which it can be exercised. are mentioned at 55a zIfE. SSb 9.
96b 34
COMMBNTARY
b 30 tIl.ol.oy",£VIIl ... ",poTli,,£,~ 96b 30-34 should be compared with 9Ib Zo4-zB. At 7Ba 2B-30 A. declares unmistakably what he has done and will do. These "eo~dl1o" would be prim.arily the larger proposals on general subjects from which one would develop more specific propositions mevant to the particular subject of the discourse. We find them exemplified from the first chapter of the process (A 4) on to the end at B 17. For example, at A 4 A. mentions as relevant subject matter for premisses in argument: ways and means, war and peace, national defense, imports and exports, legislation. These larger proposals are frequendy added to and supplemented with specific propositions; these are well exemplified in the next chapter, A 5, e.g. "A friend is one who is able and inclined to do for the other whatever he thinks to be the other's good." On neo~dl1'" C£ 5Sa IB, 66. 23, 66a 31 : 4. b 31 "'Il<nov C£ 96b 29. It is because he has discussed the question of particular topics in each of the three genres that A. can say: "consequendy the particular topics from which enthymemes must be drawn on the good or bad, etc ••• have already been selected and are on hand for our use" (b 31-33). On the Use of ciya90ii 11 Ha"o;; for I1VfMP1eo, ••• PlaP8eO' C£ 5!11l 2.0. Cpo the observation at 96a 26. b 33-34 xlll ",.pl .....6"'0' A. completes the summary by mention of the study of the particular topics for >J90, in B I:Ir-17 and "d90, in B 2.-II. The use of "a9111"a.TaW for "dB_ is not unusual for A.; c£ Bonitz, Index, p. 554a 56/[ Cope, p. 234 and note, has some doubts; however, Lucas on Poetics 1449b 27 agrees with Bonitz. On Uo.w read by all the edd., Spengel, Cope (a good tradition has BE dl. which is quite reasonable), the explanation of Cope, p. Z35, is aeeeptable. See 88b 31 : Z, 88b 34 : 1. b 34 cl>"cN..... ~ I.e., for >JBo" "dBo, an analysis by particular topics was done in tho same way as it was done for lOYD, in the three genres. This is a confirmation on A.'s part of what has been said in both volumes of this commentary on A.'s methodology up to B 17, e.g., inter alia 77b 16 : 1. b 34 - 97ll 1 H, ... l.ul3"'",£v This statement is interpreted in varied ways by the commentators and trans1ators. In general all agree that A. is changing his perspective and is now about to approach the subject from a general viewpoint. However, some leave this "subject" undefined. Some call it "commonplaces for enthymemes"; some, "universal topics for enthymemes." Some also give no indication of any difference between "a90lov and "oel cind.~.,. in their interpretation. Certainly there is a sequence in this passage (the concluding section of the chapter), and it begins at 96b 21. The dominant idea in the passage is that of the topics of enthymemes, and specifically what he calls ~a l1~o,,,.ia TWv l.9vl"7Jd~.,. or ~&"o. lv9vl"f/l"d~_ (96b 21-2:0). The sequence ofideas is given in the chapter oudine at III (96b :01-
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
9?a 5
9?a 4). From there it is clear that A. intends to speak of topics here in a dilferent way. This would imply that the object of Up.,,...,, is TO".V, understood. What, then, is the denotation of "Be! ""d......,.? It must refer to what is mentioned in the previous sentences (b 23-34: irnw . .. T"".') or in the sentence immediately preceding (b 28-34: "X.607 ... TO".'). I would consider the reference to be to b 28-34 and so the reference in ""d7TW7 to be to the three kinds of rhetoric. Indeed, the function of the topical method (particular or general) is to facilitate rhetorical discourse. Therefore I would translate our clause: "But now let us consider topics in another way, that is, universally, as they are applicable to all three kinds of rhetoric." I note that Victorius makes a comment on the passage which I have not seen mentioned anywhere: ""a6cU.ov, i.e. comtnuniter atquc in universultl: cuncta scilicet simul genera complectentes: n.el ""d7TW7 ... pollicetur enim se communes omnium locos, et qui sine discrimine tribus dicendi generibus accommodentur, nunc traditurum"; see Spengel at 98a 3-4.
9'78 2 1tIlPIlCl'llU"VO""",,,o, Cope, p. 236, considers this word an odd choice for the discussion of chaps. 23-24 since it sipes a kind of marginal comment on the material. However, it also means to "counterseal. "put one's seal, stamp, upon." Thus we could say: "pointing out definitively." If
a 2-4 ..ou~ ..• wlloy".""",
TO~' sc. Tonov" and clearly the comnJon topics that may be used for all subject matter (e.g., A 2, 58. 10-17, 31-32). They are probative (""06 ......."'.,;,) and therefure useful for the d..........ci ill8v,..,,..aTa (96b 24), or refutative (1l.,."TO".6,) and useful for the i.u""T,,,d enthymemes (96b 25). Mosdy the probative are presented in chap 23. The 'topics of apparent enthymemes are given in chap 24.
a 4 066£ crulloy,CI""", "since they .re not even syllogisms"; Cope's interpretation, p. 236, is strange. C£ Studies, pp. 941£, on apparent enthymemes. a 5-6 _pI"';;" •.. rpEP€'V
discussed in chap 25.
CHAPTER
~3
The only reasonable ourline to which this wpter submits is to locate each of the 28 topics by the note in which each first appears in the following pages. I - rna7 II - rna ~o III - rna ~3 IV - !'7b I~ V - !'7b 27 VI-'}8a3 VII - 98a IS VIII - '}8a.8 IX - 98a30 X - 98&33 XI - '}8bw XII - 99&6 XIII - 99& 10 XIV - 99& 18
XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX
-
XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII
-
xx -
99>:09 99& 33 99b S 99b '4-'S 99b I!r'O 99b 3'-3' ooa6-7 ooa IS ooa 23-27 00& 30-3 I ooa37-bI oob 4-S oob!rIO oob 17
!'7& 7 : I ..O"O~....... SEl,... l""'" We come now to the general or formal topics in contradistinction to the particular or material topics of A 4 - B 17. The subject has been prepared for since chzp. 2 of the first book, s8a 1-30; c£ Studies, pp. IIS-Jj. is correctly understood to refer to enthymemes which is the way it is used in the treatise (e.g., 96b 23-28, I8b 24). Kassel, p. 212, refers it to Ton••. The Greek text of this chzpter is, of all the chzpters in the first two books, the one most subjected to variant readings by the editors. In fact Roemer's comment appears to reflect their attitude: "there are many things which occasion uneasiness in this most diflicuit discussion of the ".lV.l TO""" (p. 148). The change from the particular to the general topics can be viewed in a way as a change from a static to a dynamic phase of topical analysis. It is a move from a collection of particulars produced by topical analysis (c£ Studks, pp. 126-27) to forms of inference which can employ the particular facts to demonstrate reasonably the validity or invalidity of the subject (c£ Studies, pp. II6-20). If, as many think, the topics found in A.'s T.pics are logical principles, or laws, upon which arguments can be built, then from the evidence on hand I would be constrained to say that the "..39.162-40.173 •
"'CIV.."""
.a 8 6vllv..I'I'... 6v""..lov Here two sets are in play, and they are illustrated at b 10 (olov ... (J).a{J.~&,): e.g., moderation-dissipation which are signified by ivanlrp, and good-bad by iva,•••,. Thus if one of the sets ("bad'1 belongs to (,0 l,anlo, ~",d~X") dissipation, then its opposite C'good") belongs to the opposite (.cp iva.drp ~~"••) of dissipation, namdy, moderation. In the example at a 10 "moderation" is the Tcpl,anlrp. a 9 li.VCltpo\ivo;a.... XClTClcnceuciJ;ov"E'CI SC. dBi ava&(?oiivTa tnlonai.." "TA. On xaTaaxsvdC... (prove), S9b 14; e.g., in refuting, if one finds that "bad" does not bdong to dissipation, then one denies that moderation is good.
a II
MccrcrlJV'"Kiii
C£ 73b 18 : 1.
a II-12 d ........VOpO.:.crllcrOCIt Quintilian 5.10.73 uses the same example. Cope, p. 238, cites Quintilian 5.IO.2Q-94 as a discussion of these common topics. Some of the topics therein are obviously common topics; others, less clearly so. Cicero, De part. orat. 2.7 does mention a number of ordinarily accepted common topics which are in accord with his explanation of the term at De in.. 2.14.47 and which he illustrates at De orat. 2.39.16240.173. Spengd (pp. 289-90) is not overly confident that Cicero's understand-
AllISTOTLl!, 'RHETORIC' II
ing of the topics comes from A. He sees a Stoic influence; see also p. 29:> on the second topic at 9']a 20. I'm not at all as certain of the difference in understanding and would take a stronger stand in favor of Cicero than I took in Studies, p. II6nI8. Lloyd, Polarity, pp. 15-171, considers the idea of opposition in Greek thought. Cpo Cicero, De inv. 1.30.46. The author of &: Snell, Adespoto 80, with olpal .s a conjecture for .lval. The infinitive is • problem, but dlis is an excerpt and so possibly part of a larger whole which influenced the construction; cpo cob 17 : 2. Radermacher, C.48, notes that some of the common topics were in use prior to A., as is clear from A.'. cieation at times of the authors of his examples. Arguments from contraries he sees as common in the fifth/fourth cennlrie., and he cites Aristophanes, Frogs 1443-1450, Andocides, On the Mysteries 24. To these can be added Dem., On the Emb....y 214, Thucyd. 6.92, both of which are forms of argument from contraries. Spenge!, pp. 29 29. second paragraph. and 97'l 29 - 97b I I bdow. The .econd i. that aleoTa. = that which is good (here: an act which is beneficial); on the rdation between draB&. and a/eSTOP cf. A 6. a 23 0. ... ~~a C£ Radermacher. C.5I. The te., b IO : J xu..ue •..• 4 ...o8czvEiv "(The accused man) bid that a judgment be made whether the man killed was righdy put to death." On ai"a.o~, ~', S. I982. 2
""oneo. < 4.> Mn at
I'fA. b 17 CI8 k-, el ..• ijnov At b 18 we return to the ordinaty lineation found with slight variation in Roemer, Tovar, Kassel. Introduced here and exemplified in b 1'J-27 is the • pari argument. b I'J-2O xcii "O~ . , . YOvov Cf. Nauck & Snell, AJespota 81. The author is unknown although some suggest that it is Antiphon (on whom see "b IS, Bsa 9 : 2). At 99b 25 we have a reference to the Meleager of Antiphon (c£ Naua & Snell, p. 792), and some (c£ Cope. p. 248, Nauck & Snell, p. 8SS) consider our citation and that at 97" 13ff. (.1 ..• xcletv) to collie &om the same play. In fact we know that an Oeneus was the father of Meleager and that Meleager killed Plexippus ("b IS), the brother of Althaea, who was the wife ofOeneus. So it is that the .choliast Stcphanus thinks "that our lines are those spoken by Oeneus to Althaea as she grieves for her father (Thestius) in his loss. Ocneus asks her •If your father i, to be pitied for his son, am I not to be much pitied for the los. of my son, Meleager?'" Stcphanus follows one account; A.'s citation follows another (e.g., "ai8a,) in which the two sons of Thestiu. are killed. Diodarns Siculus 4-34.1-6 tells the story. xed BT' •.. 'Al.';",,6po~ a pari arguments in defense of Paris and his abdllCtion of Helen and his killing of Achilles; cpo Top. II4b 25-36. 0n the grounds that among equals if one is guilty (or not guilty), all are, the innocence of Paris is argued &om the like instance of Theseus (lsoer., Helen 18-20) who carried off Helen as a youog girl (plutarch, Theseus 31), and also
b 21-23
Ariadne from Crete, and &om that of the Dioscuri, Castor and Pollux (brothers of Helen), who caxricd off Aethra, and also their cousins, daughters of Leucippus, Phoebe and HiIaera. Similarly, &om the instance of Hector, the killing of Achilles by Paris is defended, These examples may come &om an encomiam called the AlexanJros; cpo 98a 22, OIb 21, 36 and c£ Polycratcs in Baiter & Sauppe, II 223, Erg. 13. b "3-24 xed d . . . 'I'Ll-aoorpo, by Spenge!.
b 25
e..y .....oiiYT..'
Cpo !soer. Amidosis 2O'J-2I4 mentioned
"condemned to death"; Cope alone reads 7jTTOi....a.:
"are defeated." b ::16-"7 "d ... 'BU."""""," All . except Spengel, Tovar print the quotation marks. Most of the translations interpret 60 rJ> which appeared in an early edition of the Rhetoric. I would accept this conjecture, which would explain some of my problems mentioned in the previous note. & I understand the conjecture A. indicates that there are varied kinds of retort, the kind found in the Teuc." the kind used by Iphicrates (with rJ> referring to TeO"O~). As was remarked, however, one can take the first meaning of d.atpiee., read without the conjecture, and have an acceptable, if restricted, understanding of retort. It is commonly thought that the Teuc., is the play of Sophocles, and Cope, p. 252, recoDSt:ruCts the possible retort in that play; see Pearson, II 215-16.
a 5 'I'I"xpci'"l~...' A.p ....0'Pc;;II.... On the first, 97b 27 : 3. This is a second speech of Iphicrates. It apparendy concerns a charge of betrayal. It, too, is mentioned by Dionysius as not being written by Lysias (c£ 97b 27 : 3). In fact, A. assumes here as at 97b 27 that the speech is that of Iphicrates as does Aristides, Or. 49.656-657 (Dindor£, Aristides, II 518-19), wbo makes reference to both the Hamwdius and Aristophon speeches; c£ also the comment ofQuintilian, P2.9-IO. The present speech was Dlost likely given when Chares (76& 10 : 2) supported by Aristophon wrongly attacked lphicrates for treachery as a fleet commander in the Social War, 357-355 B.C.; c£ CAR, VI 2II and Diodorus Siculus 16.21 who gives the story of the baede and the accusation. On Aristophon see PW. Bom before the Peloponnesian War (431-404) and.living well into the fourth century, he became a leading states,man in Athens in mid-fourth century after the fall of Callistratus in 361.
a 6 "et...."
Tovar, Kassel of the edd. use quotation marks, as does Cope.
a 7-8 "crQ ••• 'I:>.S3; De arat. 2.39.165) speaks of division as partitia and di.i.io. Quintilian, Insl. orat. 7.1.1, gives a reasonable explanation of each and remarks at 5.10.63 that it is Cicero's distinction: partitio i. the separation of a .ingle whole into its parts; divisio is the separation of a genus into its species. The reference sometimes made to An. Pr. 46a 3I - 46b 37 with its discussion of 9ivision is in fact a reference to A.'s criticism of trying to prove that something is necessarily what it is by using Plato's method of diairesis.
CiA 2, 56b 14-15 on the general similarity between a 33 : 1 ~"..ywyjjs argument by induction and argument by example. On the difference between the two see S6b 5 : 2, S7b 27 : 2, 931> 27, !/4lL U : 1, z. Our topic certainly speaks of induction [I.e., reasoning from particulars ro a universal, Top. Iosa 13) as the opening lines (9Sb 1-5) indic.te. They argue to the statement: women everywhere best determine the truth about their children. This topic, however, has been interpreted to include example (i.e., reasoning from part to part, like to like, 57b :>7-30), e.g., Rhetore. Graed, V 405. Thus Riccobonus cites 9sb 6-10 as concluding not to a universal but to a particular; e.g., do not entrust your safety to those who have failed to protect the safety of others. Cope, however (p. :>61), sees agmeralprindplein this. Ci=o (De in•. I.3I.5157, Top. 10.4:» seemingly makes no distinction between example and induction, calling both induction. Quintilian (PO.73, j.II.Iff.), speaking of the argument from similarities (i.e., from analogy), also makes no distinction, placing in the same category that "which the Greeks call epagoge, Cicero
COMMENTAllY
induction." Induction is regressive thinking working from the particular, which is far better known since it can be apprehended by the s"",es, through like particulars (from which in fact you can argue to a like particular, and SO argument by example) to the principle (or the universal) which underlies all the particulars. In his note on this passage (b I-S) I find Cope (p. 259) somewhat confusing. His first statement that a general truth is derived from a series of analogous cases is correct. His further explanation (''The meaning is ...") is unclear for there is no induction here to a geoerol truth from a single instance, i.e., that of the Peparethian woman. such an argument grounded in one such example would in fact carry small probability. z UE1tClp'l8[CI~ Peparethus is the largest of a group of small islands off the northeast tip ofEuboea; in the fifth century it was a member of Athens' Ddian Confederacy and in the fourth century (3408) was again an ally of Ath"",; Livy 3I.28.6 mentions its destruction in 200 B.C. Some - e.g., Eustathius citing our text in his comment on ad. I.:>IS - think the word refers to the place (a woman of Peparethus). Victorius suggests a piece of writing called the Peparethia; Cope proposes a trial, lawsuit (~IH7J). The context (a 33 - b S) strongly suggests I"woman" (peparethian woman), e.g., b 4: "Dodonis," or "the Dodonian woman," and b 3: "the mother." 98& 2-J M""",[, ... 1':/j'"lP Cpo Herodotus 6.68~. Mantias is most Iikdy the father mentioned in Demosthenes, Ag. Boeotus I; see also II. He is the father of Mantitheus duly recognized and registered as a citi2en of Athens. He also fathered (by another woman, Plangon) two SODS called Boeotus and Pamphilus; ultimatdy he was forced to acknowledge and register these as his own. This account is given in Or. XXXIX in which the son registered by Mantias as Mantitheus is a losing (c£ Or. XL) plaintiff against his halfbrother, Boeotus, who had registered himsdf apparently as a Mantitheus. Since it parallds in meaning TO;;TO at b 2 I take it together b 3 "'oU-ro with as the object of Wride.E••, functioning as a zeugma: "showed this in proclaiming her son to be the child of Ismenias."
,,16.
Ismenias and stilbon are probably the Thebans who were well known in Theban political life (IsmeDias was possibly boeotarch in J68; and both men represented Thebes at the Amphictyonic Council); see Xen., Hell. p.2S£[; CAR, VI 46, 64££; Buckler, pp. I35-37 and DU. 2S, 33. Ismenias was proclaimed the father. Dodona (the mother's birthplace?) is the site of a very ancient shrine of Zeus in the mountains of central Epirus.
& 3-4 'Icrp.'I"iou
On Theodectes c£ 97& 2-3. Prom the b 6 : 1 No....... -roil a.o&bc-rou statement here and at 99b I-4 it would seem that this "Law" was probably a speech of Theodectes and was possibly a statement concerning mercenaries employed by Athens, their serviceS, and the rdations between Athenian
310
AIUSTOTLB, 'ltHBTOIUC' II
citi7ens and mercenaries; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 247, frg. I. See 98a 33 : 1 for Riccobonl1s' interpretation of the argument here. Mercenaries, a common phenomenon in the fourth century B. c., when employed as a force integrated with citizen levies were valuable and responsible. As a mbstitute for citi2en troops they were a questionable factor, as might be expected ,ince apart !rom pay and possible booty their ties to the COllDtry which hired them were inexistent; Demosthenes, Phil. I 20-27 illustrates these points as does CAR, VI 57; and cpo Cope, pp. 2']6-77b 6-10 EI ........'"Ipl..v Ross alone encloses this in quotation marks as though it were a direct citation. He does the same with b II-I9 (Ode ••• ...
"oil.,). b H VrN~· i. the reading of the codd., Speugd, Cope, Tovar, Kassel; these edd. pllDctuate (as Thurnt, "Observations critiques [II]," 47) with a colon. Roemer reads the conjecture mggested by the scholiast as do Dufour, Ross; they PllDctu.te with a comma.
b 8-9 .ruxoUv ••• " .. I
"surely ifit is the same in all instances, then ... "
b 10 ·A:1.x,6ci(l."~ C£ 73b 18: I, PW; Radermacher, B.XXIl.I4, cites b 10-17 as that of Alcidamas. Baiter & Sal1ppe, II ISS, &g. 5, attributes it to a work of his which Stobaeus, Anth.logy (ed. Gaisford), III 459 (T.I20.3) call. Movu ••o•• a work whose title and contents are much argued. It is thought to be a collection, or golden trcasuty, of statements on varied topics; c£ Radermacher, B.XXII.I3, Cpo 000 I8/[ for a further comment on Alcidamas. I I : 1 ao<poU~ The meaning is specified by the people mentioned: poets [Including a woman, Sappho), philosophers, some of the seven sages of Greece - in general, persons especially distinguished for talent and learning. 2 Olip'o,... The places mentioned down to the end of this topic are all well known: Paras and Chios are islands in the Aegean, as is Lesbos on which Myruene is the major city. The Italiots are the Greeks of southern Italy and Sicily, and specifically the city of Croton on the southeast coast of Italy. Lampsacus is at the northern mouth of the Hellespont; and Sparta (Lacedaernonians), Athens, Thebes are well known.
I>
b 12 •ApXv.oxov Born at Paws he probably lived ca. 75D-700 B.C. From his fragments it is clear that he was a prolific poet and also one known to antiquity for his bitter tougue, e.g., {Jildu'P"f/f-'OV (cp. Horace, AP 79), a quality he more or less acknowledges in !rg. 66 (Diehl & Beutler Ill). He is somewh.t notorious for the shield he tossed aside in battle to rl1D and fight another day, frg. 5B (cp. Horace, Odes 2.7.10) and for his ongoing conBict over Neobule with her father, Lyeambes; LTo PW, OCD.
98b 17
COMMENTARY
31I
b 13 : 1 1t.M'"!v Seven cities claimed Homer as their own, and the most favored is Chios, although A. here has Alcidamas denying that Chios is his home; see, however, Thucydides 3.104.5 where Homer remarks of himself: "blind the poet and he dwells in Chio., the rocky island." z Ellmpw C£ 67a 8. b 14 Xo...wll b 15 YEpciv......"
C£ 89b 4a partitive genitive: "one of their senators."
Kassel (Der Text, pp. 139£) alone of b 16 Du9I1YOPCLV ••• •AVCL!;CLYOPClV the edd. secludes Hal 'LTd.roTa. IIv6ayoeCD' following an observation of Thorot's ("Observations critiques [11]," 47). Kassd bases his reasons for seclusion on the structure of the sentence at b II-17 (II.Je ••• ... Hal m). The argument is reasonable and fOT me in the light of my regard fOT the articulation of A.' s sentences - see, for example 7tb 2 : Z - suasive. Pythagoras was born (ca. 570 B. c.) on the Aegean island of Samo., which he left ca. 531 for the Greek colony of Croton in South Italy. His life and wOTk are identified mosdy with Croton, from which he and his followers were banished most probably toward the end of the sixth century B. c. He went to Metapontum where he died. A remarkably original thinker who was both a theologian (e.g., his doctrine on the immortality of the soul) and "a founder of mathematical science and philosophical cosmology"; c£ OeD, PW, and Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, I 173-81. Anaxagoras (ca. 500 - ca. 428 B.C.), bom in Clazomenae, a city on the coast of Ionia, arrived ca. 480 in Athens, probably as a conscript of the invading Persian army. Here he taught philosophy and science and was both the teacher and close friend of Pericles. This friendship was partially the cause of his trial and exile (probably ca. 4]:'; there is the possibility of an earlier exile in the 4505) which brought him to Lampsacus. Socrates records (PhDedo 97b - 98e) his high hopes of and then disappointment with the Anangorean system. The edd., Spengd, Cope assume a lacuna befOTe BT.; b 17 : 1 ... aT' Ross reads, as does Victorius, "al in place of Bn from a good tradition; Kassd secludes b 17-20. In accepting the text the first thing to note is that we have here a new induction with three instances to prove something which is not stated at all and which was quite Iikdy: "wise men are the best political rulers." Secondly, I would also note that from the statement at b II (Bn ... n,..ro ....) the Bn at b 17 could well have been preceded and followed by a lacuna, e.g., "(and as X said) that (wise men are the best ruler.)." This statement was then proven by the three instances of Athens, etc. On the passage here see Vahlen, "Kritik d. Rheto.ik,n 557.
3I1.
ARISTOTLE, tRHBTORIC' II
• EO>.c.rJo~ C£ 7Sb 32 : z; as one of the earliest known specialists in the devdopment of Athens' constitution Solon made a major contribution to the wdfare of the state in his codification and publication of its laws. the legendary lawgiver of Sparta and the founder b 19 : 1 AUJ(..upyou of its constitution whose life Plutarch has given to us; C£ OCD, PW. He is well attested in ancient sources but his existence, whether we assign him to the traditional dates of the ninth or the seventh century B. c., i••tiII conteSted. 2 ciIL" ... ..o),~ "as soon as the leading men became philosophers the city then prospered." Victorius suggested, and in this he is followed by others, that the leaders were Epaminondas and Pdopidas. These men were the instruments and leaders of Thebes' moment of glory in 371-361 B.C. when she was the effective leader in Greece. The reference of Victorius is actually to Polybius 6.43 where, comparing the Roman Repnblic with the constitution. of some Greek stateS, P. remarks in part: "the fortunes of Thebes very obviously grew, reached their peak, and declined with the lives of Epaminondas and Pdopida.... The fact that A. may be referring to them is s1ighdy strengthened by his references in the topic which follows to others from the same fourth century B. C. On both men see OCD, PW. Theban history offers no other obvious candidate. apart from A:. mention (Pol. 1274" 31) of Philolaus of Corinth as the "lawgiver at Thebes." b 20 J(pID.... ~ This is the argument from authority, an argument for or against the point 1l1lder discussion based on the judgment of someone thought to be a secure soqrce for its truth or falseness. This topic is often called an extrinsic topic since it does not directly rdate to one's proposition; witnesses, laws, documents, exhibits are other examples of .uch. Intrinsic topics are those which are directly related (e.g., definition, parts, cause, etc.) since they are involved with an analysis of the terms and the cnherence of the propo.ition. An argument from authority is based on a witness (testis) who states/denies the truth of something (testimonium). What is stated may range from an acrual fact to a scientific or theoretical principle to a fact of religion, and the statement may be made on the witness' own knowledge (immediate) or on that derived from others (mediate). The witness' authority is determined by the fact that he knows and is truthful (scien, et verax). It is on this last point that our motive for giving consent rests. An argument from authority can be a source of certain knowledge. It should also be clear that this certitude can vary in accord with the capability and quality of the authority. Finally, a moment's reflection will reveal that there is no segment of human society from the most to the least learned which does not direct many of its actions on the acceptance of such authority. The topic can be found in Cic., D. inv. 1.30.48, Z.22.68; Auctor ad Herenn. 2.13.19, 2.30.48; QuinIili2n, 5.II.17-18, esp. 36-44; Apsines, Rhetores Gratci, IX 526; Minuclanus, Rhetor.. Graed, IX 6JI. In a
COMMENTARY
3I 3
more general form the topic is frequelldy wed by the orators when they call for wimesses, the reading of documents. For its we in argument ef. Demosthenes, On H.lonneSfIS 40. A.'s discussion of wi messes, A I5, 75b 26 -760 3:0, is generally to the point here. The judgment ("eta.,) is analyzed here b 20-25 ".pl ... &.&...."u>.o.~ fust in term, of what is judged: the "eta" employed as an argument may be about something that is the same as, or like to, or opposite to, the point we wish to establish. The analysis also considers those wha give the judgment: (x) all men always so judge (in the moral order this is practically the same as saying that the judgment is the sensus communis of man.lcind); understood here and with the nominatives to b 23 is the verb "eHQi"aa..; (2) most men; (3) all the learned; (4) most of the learned; (5) good men (ef. A 6, 63a 17-I9); (6) the judges themsdves, i.e., those about to give judgment on the point under discussion whose past judgments on the matter are favorable to it; (7) those whose judgment these judges accept; (8) those whose judgment cannot be overruled, e.g., those in authority; (9) those whose judgments it is unseemly to overrule, e.g., the gods, one's father, one's teachers. is the reading and punctuation of b 22--23 ij cmop ",,0 All the edd. read lv""da save Ross who conjectures the singular. All the codd. and most of the edd. read wanee TO. Bywater ("Aristotelia V'') suggested wa"ee iJ on a paralld with oxb I5 (010' 8 U,.e,),xoa I7-I8 ("al 8 ... eln••), and it is read by Ross, Kassd. I prefer the Bywater reading. Reading TO makes the whole phrase the object of the verb (ef. S. U53): '1ike the statement Autodes made to Mixidemides." b 26 : I M'~'&'1p.I&'1v ... Au""o""ij~ There is an Athenian, Meixidemides (as Kassd spells the name), who is known, at least by name, from a lost (and possibly not genuine) speech ofLysias dating ca. 393; see PW. Autokles is better known (ef. Cope, p. 265). Xenophon, Hellenica 6.3.2, 7--9 mentions him as one of the embassy to Sparta in 37X (before Leuctra) and gives us his words to those gathered at Sparta. In 368/367 in command of a squadron of 30 ships he was sent to the aid of Alexander of pherae (Diodoms Siculus 15.7I.3-4) and later in 362/36I took over from Ergophilus (see Bob II and Demosthenes, Ag. Aristocr.us I04). Autedes himsdf was later prosecuted as Demosthenes says (For Phormio 53); ef. PW. 2 et seduded by Ross alone. With the punctuation given by the ede!., Cope's suggestion (p. 264) is hdpful, i.e., understand 6...,", .lvat: " ... Autodes said that it is frightful that [sI: S. 22471 it was all right for the Dread Goddesses to stand trial before the Areopagus but not for Meixidemi-
314
AIUSTOTLB. IRHETORIC' II
98b
32.
des." The reference is to the Brinyes who willingly entrusted the just decision of their case against Orestes to the Court of the Areopagus in Athens, as the story is told by Aeschylus in his Oresteia presented in 458. Apparendy Meixidemides would not acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court in his own case even though the goddesses had judged its authoriry valid. b 28 E ..mp" C£ 98b 13 : 2; again the .rgoruent is from a judgment of the gods; o£ Lobel & Page, p. lOS, ttg. 20!. C£ Rhelores Gra«i. VII II53 where £Om this example Gregory of Corinth (on whom see the note to frg. 201 in Lobel & Page) exemplifies what he calls an epenthymesis. i.e., a confinning argument added to an enthymeme. ·Apl ....'1mO~ ... Ina.....".. On Aristippus c£ OCD. PW. Guthrie. Greek Philosophy. III 49D-99. He came £Om Cyrene to be a pupil of Socrates. Somewhat older than Plato. he taught as a Sophist with some success and is the likely founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy. From what we know ofhis own comments it is somewhat strange that he shollid rebuke Plato with speaking "rather professorially"; c£ Mannebach. frg. 104. Cope. p. 266. discusses the matter.
b 30
b 31-32 AUde •.. Ewxpa'"IY Cope, Tovar. Ross. Kassel punctuate with quotation marks around "cillO. ... ",,,,wv," "ovBb 't'olo6To,,"; Kassel reads o.d •• and with Ross the accusative in TJ for Socrates' name. If the quotation marks are read, a verb of "saying" is understood with the quotation. In this example the argument is on the authoriry of a teacher.
imJp......
b 32-33 •AY'lar"oA,•... Cope. Spengel. all the edd. except -Roemer read Agesipolis from a good tradition; the verb. also from a good tradition. is read by Cope. Kassel. There seems small doubt that this is Agesipolis of Sparta (son of King Pausanias) who later became king (ca. 394); c£ PW. Xenophon (Hel/enita 4.P) tells this story of his visit to both shrines before he invaded Argos ill 387 B.C. (0£ CAR. VI 52). As Xenophon notes. this was an effort to neutralize the Spartan rear prior to the planned campaign against Thebes and Athens in the Corinthian War (395/394-387/386). The rea.wn for the precautionary double visit according to Xenophon was the Argive habit of declaring a festival orod so a lime of In,a when threatened with an invasion from Sparta. Cope (p. 267) gives an account of the text problem as known at the time. Kassel (Der Text, pp. 141-42) presents us with a detailed corrected account of the history in which we discover that Agesipolis was a reading found in the tradition and that Hegesippus was probably the mistake of a Byzantine copyist. In his account Xenophon uses the form ""'TJeWTa. and Kassel offers evidence (p. 142nS8) in support of it as the term used to consult an oracle. In this example the argument is on the authoriry of a father.
99a 7
COMMBNTAllY
99a I c:.~ ...•bt.iv his father"; S. 2086.
3IS
"implying that it would be shameful to contradict
a 2 'IlJoxp«"t'l~ The passages referred to are Helen 18-22 for Helen; 41-48 for Alexander; Evagoras 51-52 for Evagoras. Cpo our lines with 63a 11-19·
a 3 Ov
Ross alone reads 6n.
a 5 KcIv_ a distinguished Athenian naval commander, ca. 444-392 B.C. He fought in the Peloponnesian War and was helpful in the rc:-establishment of Athens after her defeat; c£ PW, OCD, CAE, V-VI passim. On his flight to Evagoras in 404 see Xenophon, Hell. 2.1.29. Ross alone punctuates .. K67.,. ... illO.,."; I would not assume a citation though four of the words in a S-6 appear in Evogoras S2. a 6 ,.tp_ ... "to"'lCoi~ From the statement of thi. topic A. is speaking of "parts" in tenns of genus and species, and the kinds of inference made possible by this topic are seen at Top. lIla 33 - Iub I I (the likely reference in To,.,,,oi,; cpo T2.Ib 2.4 - I2.3a 19; I27a 20 - u8b 10). This topic is closely related to the triad at 98a 15-33, and the notes to those topics indicate some of the possible, varied lines of inference. In the example from Theodectes we see one line: if contempt for the divine (genus implied) can be predicated of Socrates, then the profanation of some house of the gods (or) failure to reverence the gods recognized by the State (species) can be said of him. Since the latter cannot be said ofhim neither can the former. For such an argoment to be valid you should know all the "parts," as Quintilian (5.10.67) notes. If one is omitted, the statement can be challenged and dismissed. For example (e.g., Cope, p. 268), the "parts" of ,,1"'1"" are four in the De anima and six in the Caregories. Quintilian, 5.10.63££, discusses "parts" as we find it here; Cicero does not, confining himself to the topic of definition (for the references see the end of 9Sa IS). a 7 "0(,. ..• ilS. Cpo Top. I27b 13-17. For A. the soul is the first actuality (ivnUx.,a) of the body, the form which actuates the body (matter); in the union a living being is constituted, whose formal cause is the soul. The problem of the soul and movement (Is it movement? If so, what kind? etc.) is reviewed in chap•. 2 and 3 of the first book of the De anima. Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, VI 277-330 olfers a survey of the psyche in A. a 7-8 tIC ••. eE06t.."tOu "Socrates" is apparently the title of an apologia by Theodectes (on whom see 97b 2-3, Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, IV 73). We have a number of ,uch defenses among which the Apology of plato and th~t ofXenophon are the most well-known.
31 6
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
99-0 13
a 8-9 ".t~ ... "o"U;.," Cope and the edd. punctuate with quotation marIa; cf. Baiter & Sauppe, II 247, frg. 3. Plato, Apol. 26b, Xenophon, Apol. II mention Meletus' ebarge against Socrates of disbelief in the gods of the city; c£ Memorabilia 1.1.2, 20; 98a 15-17; Cope, p. 255. See also r I9a 8-12 and Cope, III 212. a 10-13 au.o~ ..• ojIoIy.,,, This thirteenth topic on consequents is closely related to the fourteenth. Topic 13, in A.'s words, is valuable as a source of inference in all three kinds of rhetorical discourse (e.g., a 12--13, cpo S8b &-29). But he confines topic 14 to deliberative discourse (a 1&-19: 6Ta•.•. d~, and see d7lPJyoes" a 22, 24). Another dilference between the two is that 13 speaks of things whieb are simple and unqualified, anyone of whieb can usually be found to have opposed (good or bad) consequents, e.g., education, running, courage, justice, etc. In 14 we start with two opposed things, each of whieb has two consequents whieb are themselves opposed to caeb other: e.g.,
anteadenl: to speak justly
- consequents: loved by gods I hated by men
t
t
t
vs. anlecedent: to speak unjustly - consequents: loved by men I hated by gods.
Top. '1I3b IS, II4a 25, 1I73 5-15 describe the character of argllDlCnt from consequents well. At 62a 29 - 62b 9 A. uses the argument in establishing what things are "a good." Cicero in his treatment of the topic (Topics 12.5354) speaks of consequents (also antecedents, contradictories) where the relation of the consequent to its antecedent is a necessary one. This is not 50 in our present topic. Quintilian, 5-10.74-'77 speaks of two kinds: consequenlia t-13. a 2.1 ""XOv........ -MVIIV... I.. On TVXO.Ta cf. 66a 31 : I, 67b 6: "any two things." a 22-2.5 ."" ... tlv8p,"",o, Sponge!, Cope, Dufour, Kassd read without quotation marks. Ro.. uses them, Tovar uses them at a 22.-23 (la•. .. 6e.L) and, as noted (99& 18), Roemer's text is awry. On this example see Rlreto,es e,a.ci, VII IlS3, where it is cited as an example of." epenthymesis, i.e., the strengthening of an enthymerne by a corroborative argument (see 9IIb 28). There is a further illustration of what A. is saying in Euripides, The Phoenician Women 954-958, and in Auct. ad Here"". 2..24.38. a 2.6 'I"ij> ••• n..~ The "saying" is a proverb ("to buy the marsh along with the salt") whose provenance is unknown; cf. Leutsch & Schneidewin, I 409. Its meaning, I should say, is rather clear in itself (sometimes to have a
31 8
AllISTOTLB, 'RBETOIue t II
99a 30
good you must take the bad), and in the context, i.e., in the sitwttion as given, you are damned if you do and damned if you don't. In either sitwttion given at a 22r-25 (im. ... &.6e"".'), the good has an admixture of the bad. a 27 (nco,....... " Cope, pp. 273--"74, explains well the problem with this term as well as its possible meanings and the general lack of understanding
on the part of the commentators of its meaning here. The root idea in the word is: crooked, twisted, bent, curved. Its form here appears to be a unique instance in A. who explains it in the words which follow: a blaisosis occurs "when good and bad follow as comequents upon each of two opposites, each of the two consequents opposite respectively to each other." As I understand this, it means (cf. 99a 10-13): (I) two opposites: speak justly I unjustly (2) good/bad consequents of: speak justly: loved by gods I hated by men good/bad consequents of: speak 1lJljusdy: loved by men I hated by gods (3) each of the two consequents opposite respectively to each other: { loved by gods I hated by gods loved by men I hared by men. In fact in this sense the term seems to have the meaning found in LS: to retort a dilemma. Put in form, the dilemma would be: If I speak justly, I will be loved by the gods; if unjustly, I will be loved by men. So I will speak either justly or unjustly. Therefore I will be loved either by the gods or men. The retort: If you speak justly, you will be hated by men; if unjustly, you will be hared by the gods. So speak either justly or unjustly for in either case you will be hated eitheJ: by men or the gods. a 29 1iAM~ ••. XCll II...... i ....!v ~t1Tl. is read by Cope, Ross, Kassd, and bracketed by Spengd and the other edd.: "And to state that to give earth and water is to act the slave.... " On the idea of total submission in the act see Herodotus, 5.17.18; for other references see Cope, p. 278. b 13 dp~'l~ In late 338 B.C. (after Cbaeroneia) Philip formalizcd his re-c:stablished rdations with the Greek states by creating at Corinth the League of Greek States (CAR, VI 266ft:). All except Sparta participated. On Philip's death in 336 and the growing break-up of the League, Alexander moved quickly in late summer to re-establish the League under Macedonian control with himsdf replacing philip as general of the League. The commonly accepted date for this "common peace" is 336 B.C. If the remark: of the scholiast Anonyrnus, who refers to Philip, is accepted, then ca. 338/337 seems a probable date (c£ Cope, I.trod., pp. 36-49). Anonyrnus also notes, however, is Demosthenes'. This does not that the remark at b 12-13 (TO make 338/337 improbable, for it could be a remark: ofhis for which we have no evidence. There is, however, a speech attributed to Dernosthenes, O. the Treaty "itb Alexantler, which is dated ca. 335. This mentions explicitly "o•...j eleoi"'l (30, 17-18; and cpo la-II); and so the acceptance of the 336 date. The speech is an attack: on Alexander, and it is accepted as a work: not of Demosthenes but of Hypereides (389-332 B.C.) or of one of the party of Bernosthenes. The question of the actual date, I would say, remains a question.
pgr,,,......)
b 14 1m6...pov See 99b 5-6. In terms of the explanation there one could argue that the criticism of Isocrates' writings is equally unjust as a criticism of the man himsdf since in each case one is questioning the value of philosophy. Or the opposite can be argued: namdy, that such a criticism is not at all unjust because in no way does it implicate the value of philosophy. The example (b 16-19) illustrates b 14-15 : 1 cD.M>~ ••. civ""d.y well the way in which this topic can raise challenging questions and strikingly sharpen the issue when persons are questioning or are in doubt ahout a former decision they have taken. As instances of this topic Spengd mentions Deinarchus, Ag. Demosthenes 81-82, Thucydides 3.56.6-7 with 5702. a ... lx "gij 1'1) "...:.,,;, ciEl "(another topic is derived) from the fact that people do not always make the same choice." This is the reading of all the edd., Spengel. Cope, Freese read with a good tradition and the scholiast, Anonyrnus: en TO;; p~ TIZ1lTO ...o1l~ av...ov~ dB!.
COMMENTARY
323
b IS : 1 1\ the reading of the edd., Spengel, Cope. The meaning is "as"; cf. LS, B. Cope, p. 279, is not happy with this interpretation of the word, and Richards (p. III) rejects it for "al which Ross reads. 2 "'~"'1".. Victorius (p. 414) interprets this in the way in which we find it in Cicero and later rhetoricians. His comment is-that here A. calls the ent:hymemc not an inrperfect syllogism but an argument drawn from contraries (sententiam ex conlTariis conelusam), the way in which many rhetoricians C'magistri dicendi') usually understood the term. On this interpretation of the enthymeme see Cicero, Top. 13.55, 14.56. More reccndy, Conley, "Enthymeme in Perspective," 175ff., views this interpretation with some favor. Without dismissing the interpretations of later rhetoricians I fail to see how they, inJIucnced as they so obviously are by Anamenes (once thonght to be Anstode) and by each other, can help to specify the term in A., who clearly calls it the syllogism of rhetoric; c£ Studies, pp. 74-'75, 77-'78, 80-81, and cpo Cope, pp. 279-80, c£ cob 35-38.
b 16-17 "d ... "1lJ(..
,,.e....
Tovar, Ross, Kassel among the edd. along with Cope use the quotation marks. Quite possibly this is correct since it reads like an adaptation to the enthymeme form of a statement by Lysias in Against the S~bversion of the Ancestral Constitution of Alhens 11. Lysias' statement starts with the words "For it would be strange, men of Athens, if, when we. . .. These words arc understood in most interpretations of b 1617, e.g. (Roberts): "when we were exiles, we fought in order to return; now we have returned, it would be strange to choose exile in order not to have to fight." Dionysius of Halicarnassus in his critical essay Lynas at #33 preserves Lysias' speech for us (cf. 31). At 32 Dionysius gives us the occasion of this speech written as he says for a well-known statesman and probably not ddivcred. The year was 403 B,C., and dre occasion had to do with the return of the democrats to Athens from the Peiraeus. The return was arranged by the Spartan king, Pausanias, but only after an armed conllict with them (b 16: (~l'o,~s, i"a%o"s8a); cf. CAR, V 371-'75, esp. 373. On this matter Cope, pp. 280-8 I, is quite exercised at what he call, A.'s "haste and carelessness in writing." Unfortunately his reasons (p. 281) for the comment arc to me not convincing. There is no need for A. in exemplifying this topic to say anything more than he docs; sec following note. Planudes, Rheto,.s Gratci, V 406, cites b 16-17 as an illustration of topic 23 at oca 23-29 (Spengd, p. 323).
"t.
b 17-19 0... "'" ... "",,,tV AlI the edd., Spenge!, Cope agree on this reading given by all the codd. Spcngel (p. 324) has problems with A.' s Greek, which he explains at some length, as docs Cope (p. 280); Kassel in his apparatus gives some conjectured possibilities for the Greek. The Greek. of the codd. seems to be quite reasonable. In the first place A. at b 16-17 echoes (with the exception of the mention of the Lacedaemonians) the statement of
32 4
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
Lysias at 33.n; as for the omissiou of Lysia.' d....o. ycle Ii• • r'l, cf. 98b 26 (as Kas.el notes). Secondly, the explanation at b 17-19 corresponds exacdy with the example given, e.g., (I) b 16:.1 ep.vYOVT., . .• "aTi),Ow/J" is explained by aTi /Js, ... neO;;VTO (b 17-IS): "for at one time they chose their homeland (TO /Jiv ....) at the price of fighting"; (2) b 17: ""T••OO ....., ••• /J"x"'/J.Oa is explained by aT•.•• /J1I /Jiv ... (b 18-19): "but at another they chose not to fight at the price of leaving their homeland" (TO;; JJ1! /JI.••••). One possible discrepancy which i. of no significance in terms of what is meant would be that TO /Jiv ... •.. iieOVvTO (b 17-18) answers to "ad),Ow/JtnI (b 16). b 19-20 oi),AoS •.. yoy.,.ij"eClL literally: "another topic is to say that the reason why [TO oJ b ...a] something might be or might have come to be is the actual reason [TO.TO~ ' ••"a] for ... " We can simplify this without changing its meaning by translating: "Another topic is to say that the possible reason for a thing's existence or its having come into existence is the actual reason." All the edd. concur on the reading of the Greek text, as do Spengel and Freese. However, Cope reads at b 19: &••r7j, .1 /J1I yivo'To, TO.TO~ ••• , which is the reading of all the codd. and the scholiast Stephanus. Our reading 4• • r'lll ,/ivO'TO is hinted at by the scholiast Anonymus and can be seen in the comntent of Maximus Planudes atRhetores Gram, V 406 and in codex C. Cope, pp. 28I£, presents a more detailed discussion of both readings in which he leans toward our reading. The topic itself in my understanding is not to make an "inference from the possible to the real motive" as Cope following Brandis says (p. 281) but rather to infer a possible motive for an action and assert it as the real motive; sec, for example, b 28-30, r IS, 16b 9-IS. A. is not necessarily urging this course of argument. Rather he is calling attention (0 the possibility of this kind of argumentation.
On the use of 11." which Ross alone secludes, sec b 20 orov d &0['1) civ Goodwin, pp. 458, 506; Cope, II 331>-40. ~"'. eI = as i£ b 20-21 orov •.. l.uml"ll Victorius cites as an example Horace, Epp. 1.I8.31-36. In this· and the following examples at b 22-29 a possible motive for the action is asserted as the real motive: e.g., b :u: to cause pain; b 24: to make the misfortunes of men more obvious, etc. b 22-24 ..cIllo.~ ... m"PClV€....tpCls Cpo Caesar, The Galli, W or I. 14 (Victorius). At b 22 all the codd., Ross, Kas.el, Spongel, Cope read epeew, for epesv6iv (Schneidewin) read by the other edd. Our lines (also reading epe ••ai.) arc found in Nanck & Sncll, AJespo/4 82 (p. 8SS) but we do not know the author. b 25
MdEciypau ..eN·Av.."P""'''os
C£ 79b IS,
8sa 9 : 2, "b 19-20.
b 26-27 06x ... 'EUci&CI The fragment can be found in Nanck & Sncll, Antiphon 2, p. 792. The scholiast Anonymus say. by way of .explana-
COM.MBNTARY
tion that Antiphon wrote that eminent men of Aetolia came to King Oeoeus, father of Meleager, not to kill the Calydonian boar but to see Me!eager do it and so give public witness to his act. Ross reads .. ~ for
r....
b 28-29 AI..v..o~ ••• cbcoAOU8iiN On Theodectes cf. 97b 2-3, 98b 6 : 1. This play and this incident are mentioned again at ooa 28-29 and the incident alone at r IS, 16b 12-15. A citation of our lines as a fragment of Theodectes is found in Nauck & Shell, p. 801. For an explanation of the possible context of the citation cf. Cope, p. 283. b 30
w3tx ......,... mllijera,
C£ my comment at the end of 99b I!)-20.
b 31-32 cillo~ •.• oup.(!oul.eUOUC,. This 20th topic, whilemadespecific to deliberation and forensic rhetoric, needs but a moment's thought to make clear its usefulness and applicability to epideictic rhetoric as well, paa Spenge!, p. 325, and cf. 98a 3-4- A reading ofA 9 quickly makes this clear, and see 67b 36 - 68a 9. At 67b 36 A. remarks that "epideictic and deliberative rhetoric have a common nature." On this topic A 10, II, 12. on hwnan actions and A 6, 7 on the nature of the good and the greater good merit a casual review for an understanding of why men act. Cope, pp. 284-85, offers a running comment on the topic.
b 31 rcpoTP€7CCW"'C'U. •.. ci.7COTP€mN'rCl. Le., "inducements," udeterrents," to action, as cD" b87«J (b 32) denotes "reasons," llmotives," for acti.on/non-
action. b 32-34 '.Ao~ .•. axo".iv On IlA."..."tI~ C£ 97a 2--4- Here its refutative force consists in looking (aHo".") for inconsistencies or contradictions in the statement of one's opponents; cpo 96b 26-28. From the use of dp'!'.afl1JToVvTO~ (a 17) and the three examples, the topic seemingly refers to judicial rhetoric and is so thought o£ But it is clearly of use in any of the three kinds of rhetoric. Cicero at Top. 3.n speaks of a topic ex repugnantibus and exemplifies it at 4-21; A., however, conveys the concept more fully and clearly.
a 16-17 d ..., ... l.Oyco>v
scl. axon.E.: "to examine whether there is any inconsistency (contradiction) &om among all the dates, actions, statements." All the edd. save Kassd read this clause immecliatdy after axo".'" In all the codd., however, it appears after X"'~l~ ... ap'!',afl1JTOV>To,. Mord placed it whete it is now. Kassd reads it where it i. found in the codd., but brackets it as an addition of A. Ross alone reads T."... for "dvT'" with Thurot, "Observations critiques [II]," 48. Thurot agrees with Mord's transposition but suggests that Ta dvopoloyov,...a should go since it looks like an interpolation. Lysias, Ag. Alcibiades I II exemplifies a contracliction in actions. .. 17 X",pl~ fIo6v Along with "wei, d' at a 18, 20 = "separately in the case of the opponent ... and in the case of onc.df ... and in the case of both together." It is usually interpreted: "in thr.. separate ways. First ... Secondly ... Thirdly ...."
a IS uxcd fP'IG'l ... "E'plcixav'TCI" an obvious contradiction; no one who worked with the Thirty (c£ ooa 33), who were viciously anti-democratic, could have affection for the demos. The Thirty took over Athens in the summer of 404 B.C. and were removed in Fcbruary 403; cf. CAH, V, 365-72. As example. of the topic, c£ !socrates, Ag. Cal/imamus 47-48 (Spengd); Lysias, Ag. Eratosthenes 25-29. a 19-20 "XCII ",,,,01 •.. SIx.,.,." ,!"M6",ov, i.e., "litigious"; c£ 73a 3S : J for the verb. 6/X1J' d",d~.aOa, = "to go to law with someone"; po is understood with 6ea,,,aapi-lo•• Cpo Lysias, Ag. Theomnestus 12-3, Ag. Eratosthenes 39-40· a 21-22 "XCII cro.... ~ ••. .:."""," Cpo Demosthenes, On the Palse Embassy 229-231, On the Crown 3XI-PO.
ODa
30
COMMENTARY
a 23-27 .nA0S ... 5'''(3oA>1 Ross alone reads a colon not a period after 'Palv""a, at a 2S. The statement of this topic contains a series of problems: e.g., (I) Toi~ ... do"o ..., (a 23-24): why the dative? (2) II do"o""" what is its meaning? (3) how are we to inteTpret vnop.pA'1,.b7J~ . .• uCav? To answer each: (I) a dative of interest (S. 1474); Spengel, p. P7, takes it with ruo~; (2) it modifies d0geo\no,~ Hal nea",.a.... as does neod,ap.{J).1J,.i.o,~; for another interpretation t£ Cope, p. 289; (3) the common interpretation of the clause is "who palmed off her son on another woman" (0£ LS, s.". II); the usual meaning of the middle, however, is not this, but "to bring in another's child as one's own." In the following translation I retain the common interpretation (but see following note). "Another topic with reference to men or their actions misrepresented by prejudgment in actual fact or seemingly so [i.e., thought to be by others] is to state the reason for the false impression [naeadOEov], for there is some reason why the false opinion is formed ['Pal.na" appears to be so). For example, the woman who palmed off her son on another woman was thought to be the young man's mistress because of the ardent embrace she gave him." It is this topic which Planudes exemplifies with 99b 16-17 (0£ 99b 16-17). a 2S-26 6tt0(3EIiA'IfLiv'lS ... l&OxE' c£ S. 2073 on the subject of the genitive absolute and that of the main verb as the same. Without pressing further on the meaning in vnop.pA.,,.b7J~ it should be clear that a mere kiss or embrace would hardly cause anyone to form the idea expressed in ...,..ioa, ... ,..'ea"lrp. I am inclined to bdieve that Victorius' comment (for part of it o£ Cope, p. 289) is a move in the right direetton, although Cope, pp. 28990, finds difficulty with the interpretation. A problem I have with Victorius' explanation (which does catch the meaning in vno{JdAA...9a,) is that it not ouly makes the mother's aetton quite unusual but also throws doubt on the fact that anyone seeing such action could be accused of"misrepresenting the aetton by prejudgment," which is the topic. A. seems to me to want to say that the mother wantouly abandoned hersde in embracing the young man who was in fact her sou. i.e., that the youth i. her own child. a 28-29 olov ... 06 50XEL Cpo 99b 28-29. On d,aTO (why) see 55a 20 : 1: "Odyssus tells Ajax wby ...." a 30-31 .nA0S •.. o6x l ..... 'v The general idea of the argument from cau.e to effect is mentioned in passing among the intrinsic (0£ 98b 20) arguments by Cicero, De part. orat. 2.7, and exemplified at De Drat. 2.40.171. At Top. 14.s8~ Cicero discus.es the variou. kinds of causes and the nature of their effects; cpo Quintilian, S.IO.SO£[ Our topic can be found at Rhetores Graea, V 404; IX 606. The argument is from cause to effect, i.e., from exi.t-
ARISTOTLB,
330
C
RHETORIC'
l[
coalS
ence or non-existence of the cause (Il•... ~"&em ... P7J ~"aem) to the existeoce/non--400 B.C.) worked primarily in Athens. and A. places him (SE IS3b 26-33) with Tisias and Thrasymachus. identifying all three as esteemed men who advanced the study of rhetoric. From this comment. along with those of plato at Pluzed..... 2660, 2613--31. A.'s idea in the topic can be seen in Eteocles' taunt to Polyneices, Euripides, Phoenician Women 636-637, or !socrates, On the Team ojHo,stS 2S (a play on the .word Eupatrid, i.e., noble birth), or ru.etores Gr_ ci, V 406. Cope, p. 297, gives some examples from Greek tragedy. 2 olav ......ailvOfLlZ The fragment is from the Tyro of Sophocles and can be found in Pearson, II 6SS or Nauck & Snell. Sopko S97, or Radt, Sophocles, F 6SS. This last gives citations of our text by Eustathius in hi. commentary on the Odyssey and the Iliad, and cites the preceding line found also in the scholiast Anonymus, which explains the dative a''''Ie'l' read by all the edd. except Kassel. This line (alJT1/ dll in.. ct., ,",,1/) explains the dative ("d~e'l' as the object of ".xe1/,..iv1/. However, I would read the proper name L",d~e" with Spengel, Cope. Kassel. TIlls reading is also found in a good tradition and in the scholiast. As A. cites Sophocles here, usiog the proper name does make the meaning clearer. Kassd reads feoVoJaa for tpoeoiiaa.
,..ax,,...,
"'xerr
b IS c:.~ ... ".YE.V, XlZl c:.~ Only Roemer, Dufour read a lacuna before Hal Roemer conjectures that the tc:xt continued with the words
eli,.
A11ISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
334
oob 25
we find in the .cholia.t Stephanus, who explains the phrase .. , I. TOO, TW. 8sW. mat.o" thus: "as Zeus is given his name as the cause of our life" (Cm;M; this would be the lost clause. b 19
.:.~
K6vc.Jv . . , lxliJ...
C£ Did. &: Kranz 85 A 6. On Conon,
c£ 9!Ja 5 ; on Thrasybulus, ooa 33b 19-20 'HpoS'''Q~ 8pOl..u",OIXov "old ...•r' On Hcrodicu., 6xb 5: 1, he i. the author also of the following comments on Polus, Dracon. Thrasymachus of Chalcedon (JI. 430-400 B.C.), a Sophist who is important in the development of prose style, is well known from Plato's &publll: as an ardent defender of the theory that might makes right (c£ 338b-e); c£ also OCD, PW (1), Guthrie, Creek Philosophy, III 294-98, Radermacher, B.IX.I-I9. I would punctuate with the quotation marks as do Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. b 20-21 1Iii">1ov "old ...•r' I would punctuate as here with Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. Polus of Agrigentum is a younger contemporary of Socrates, and the author of a rhetorical tecbne. He is well known from Plato's Go'gias where at 463 e he i. called by Soaates "young and passionate." This dialogue at 461b 3 - 4C>1d 9 gives some sense of his "coltish" nature as h. breaks into a conversation between Socrates and Gorgias. C£ OCD, PW (3), Radermacher, B.XIV.I-n. ApcbcOV'l"OI ••• &pcbcOV"Q~ Cope and Kassd, reading with the more recent tradition, omit dv in this sentence; Ross secludes it; the other edd. and Spengd read it. Richards, p. III, co.yccturcs >fa"" for it, or po... sibly dittography from dv8ecb"ov. Dracon is one of the early lawgivers (~omothete, c£ S4b I) in Athens. His effort to counter social unrest arising in Athens was to enact this law code in 621 B. c. and thus make clear the rights and duties of all. These laws became rather notorious for the punishments attached to violations (c£ Pol. 1274b IS-I8) and won the reputation of being "written not in ink but in blood," as Plutarch (Solon 17) notes. On Dracon see OCD, PW (8), CAll, IV 28-36.
b 21-22
The citation is from the Trojan Women b 22-24 E6p ...(Sou .•. e~ 990. Eustathius in his commentary on the niaJ, p. 414.37 refers to this p.... sage of A. It can also be read in Spengel, pp. 330-31, and in Kassel, p. 137Spengel finds the reference to A.'. text unclear, as it is. b 25-26 XOI.pil/U'W ••. iml>vu",o~ C£ Nauclc &: Snell, p. 783; the fragment is attributed to the Dionysus of Chacrenwn (fl. ]50 B.C.), a play like the BtJtClute of Euripides. Chaeremon is a tragic playwright whose plays, A. teI!s us at I3b 12-14, were intended for reading (7 not acting); c£ OCD (I), PW (5). Pentheus, a king of Thebes in mythology, is well known from the BtJtCh"" of Euripides.
cob 33
COMMBNTAllY
3JS
b 27-30 ":'&OX."oL .•• p.iiillov In b 27-34. the end of the presentation of the common topics for demonstrative enthymemes, A. gives us a brief observation not SO much on demonstrative-re!Utative enthymem.es as on the essential character of enthymeme as he understand. it: an inference marked by such brevity and clarity of statement that the auditors readily apprehend it as it is delivered, and, ifnot, comprehend it as soon a. it is completely expressed. In our present passage (b 27-30) refutative enthymemes which conclude to the opposite of the opponent'. conclusion achieve this objective very effectively since they allow the auditor to compare opposite.; cf. r 17, 18b 2-5. The comparison of two opposites is seen rather well in the examples at 970 7-19. C£ Studies, pp. 8~I on the enthymeme as an abbreviated syllogism. sV~o"... lUi, cf. 9"b 20; h8~"'7J,..dT("" is a genitive of the whole; did TO .•• el."., articular infinitive with subject (TO oil."... 01.86,..71,..") and predicate (""""Y"Y>1v); the articular infinitive is still at work (e.g., ,..i• ... a~ in the following clause naf!' elll'll" ... ,..allo., "because .tatements set side by side are ..." (on nae' W7Jla, cf. Bonitz, Index, p. 340 13). Cpo r 9, loa 2.0-:>3. b 30-32 ...Ii",""" .•. dv... On 8oevpsiTa, cpo A 2, 56b 24- "AU such refutative and demonstrative syllogisms are particularly applauded which (the auditors) foresee from the beginning (as they are begun) not because they are superficial (.een at a glance)." TIP ... • l.a" articular infinitive, dative of cause; on .!n,,,oMi' 76b 14- On the idea cpo 94b 17-25, rIO, rob 21-27. b 32-33 (11..........po.....8czvo'""o.) "for at one and the same time men are delighted with themselves as they anticipate (the conclusion) with understanding." Auditors are pleased with the speaker's argument and also (d,..,,) with their ability to foresee its devdopment. C£ Studies, p. 88; r ro, rob 10-26, A 2, 570 r5-21. b 33-34 ....I a""", ... Y""'plt;••v "and all those enthymemes are applauded which they are late in apprehending only to the extent that they grasp then! as soon as they are stated." lIa.,. governed by 1laTEet\ovaIV.
CHAPTER 24
C£ the outline to chapter 23. I-alar 1a - oIa2-6 Ib - ala 12 II - ala 24-25 III - alb 3 IV - alb 9-10
v-
VI VII VIII IX
-
alb 15 alb 20 :2 alb 30-34 alb 35 028 3-9
oob 3S-3 8 t"d 6' ... auUoy"rl'-o~ "L~ As we begin this chapter on the apparent enthymeme, we should recall the statement at A I, ssa 29-38 that the student of rbctoric must be able to argue both sides of a subject simply because in this way one eomes to know the subject as it truly is and thus can then refute false statements about the subject; cf. ssa 2!r38. This study of the sources of false enthymematic reasoning is not at all in aid of the teclmiquc of deception as a positive factor in rbctorical discourse. On the contrary it is an effort to unmask false reasoning on the part of others. We read in SE (which in dialectics is eomparable to this study of the topics of apparent enthymemes): "It is the task: of one who has knowledge about a thing to speak the truth about what he knows, and to be able to expose the individual who makes false statements," 16sa 24-27 (0£ 174b I!r23). This S\lIllS up accurately the tenor of all A.' s writings: namely, the effort to apprehend and communicate, as far as possible, that which is. Viewing the discussion of apparent enthymeme as a study of the ways to misrepresent reality cannot be substantiated from the Rhetoric. and is totally at odds with the cJfort of all his work. C£ S6a 36 - S6b 4, Studies, pp. 94-99. One should also note the emphatic correlation here between syllogism and enthymeme; o£ 99b IS : 2, ala 7-8.
The usc of TO"D' here reveals once again the character of the b 38 "I:.mOL common topics; o£ 978 7 : 1. For it is obvious that in these nine topics we have nine principles from which inferences or arguments can be developed. These topoi are nine general propositions each of which can be used for &lse inference on any number of subjects. stoichcia (03a 17-19) into which many apparent enthymemes fall. Roemer. Dufour. Tovar number the nine as la, b, II, III. etc., a numbering found in the English translations, e.g., Roberts, Cooper. Jebb & Sandys. In a passage in SE (16Sb 23 - I68a 16) comparable
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
OIa 2
to chap. 24 thirteen topics are given. A distinction is also made (I65b 24) between fallacies which, while not stated in the Rhetoric, is valid for the topics there. We are told that there are two kinds of fallacies: (a) fallacies rooted in language, i.e., verbal, "oed -nj. lBE .. (c£ oIa I); (b) fallacies independent of language, lEO) Tii, UEBo)', i.e., grounded on principles which result in false inference. In the Rhetoric the following would fall among the verbal fallacies: la, b, ala 1-24 (ambiguity, amphiboly), on ala 12-24 cpo SE 165b 30 - 1600 23; II, ora 24 - alb 3 (composition and division), cpo SE 166a 23-38. Of the six verbal fallacies of SE all but the last two (wrong accent, form of expression used) are found in the Rhetoric. The following fallacies independent of language are found in the Rhetoric: V, oIb 15-20 (accident), cpo 166b 2a:-36; VI, oIb 20-30 (consequent), cpo I67b 1-20; VII, alb 30-34 (not cause as cause), cpo I67b 21-38; IX, alb 35 - 02a 27 (confosion of the ab_ lute and the qualified), cpo I66b 37 - 1670 20. Five of the SE fallacies have no formal counterpart among those of the Rhetoric, e.g., two verbal fallacies: wrong accent (I66b 1-9), form of expression (I66b 10-19), and three of the fallacies independent of language: ignorance of refutation (I67a 21-35), assumption of the point to be proved (1670 36-39), combining separate questions into one (I67b 38 - I68a 16). Of the Rhetoric fallacies only one, use of indignant language, alb 3-9, has no comparable paralld in SE, since the use of sign, alb 9-15, is included as a fallacy of consequent at SE 167b 8-u. On fallacy in Latin, c£ Cicero, Do inv. 1.47.87-95; Auct. ad H""",. 2.20.3146. Cope, pp. 300-302, and Hamblin, pp. 50-88, review the fallacies of the Rhetoric and SE. Chaps. 24-25 of the Rhetoric epitomize in a way the SE for rhetorical use, as·chap. 23 makes use of the Topics. oia I "lIpci •.. >.t;,v verbal fallacy, one occasioned by the use of language; cpo SE I65b 24. This is divided here into "oed ~d u1/ip.a XTA. (a 7)
and naea niSI op,ru,,'tJp.La'JI (a 12.).
a 2-6 c...",.p .•. £V8uP.>'IP.II.... ~. VlCtoriUS indicates wdl that the contrast in the sentence is between the procedure in dialectic (~,aA.,<TI"o.,) and that in rhetoric (lvOvp.>ip.aa,). The fallacious process in dialectic is to present a statement as the conclusion of a syllogistic inference although it is not such. In rhetoric the fallacy resides in making a compact and antithetical statement and p..sing it off as an enthymematic inference. In each case the form gives the appearance either of a syllogism or an enthymeme. In short A. has given us a single sentence as found now in the critical editions (Spengd, Cope, Freese give two sentences) contrasting this verbal fallacy as found in dialectic and in rhetoric. The reading of the codd., however, does not make this contrast clear. At a 4 ("al ~d ~oi, EvOvp.>ip.au,) the codd. start another sentence. The edd., following Vablen's suggestion ("Kritik arist. Schriften," 135-37), read < "al ••> ~o,~ or variants on the .. rde of a lau.: codex
.. "
OIa. 12
COMMENTARY
339
(e.g., Ross: h TO'~; Tovar: v "from other evidence." As dn.6.IX6'1 indicates, each main argument set forth is itself the conclusion of a demonstration. When such final statements are combined there is the appearance of some new conclusion resulting from the union. Homonymy and amphiboly are forms of the £allaey of a I2. 6f1o"'Vu",l_ equivocation, which is rampant in the EuthyJemus of Plato, as Sprague analyzes the dialogue. Homonymy is the use of the same word in diiferent senses, as seen in the example. Amphiboly, mentioned in the SE passage similar to our present passage, is a form of equivocation occasioned by the double meaning of a phrase or clause, e.g., this commentary belongs to A.
340
ARISTOTLE. 'RHBTORIC' II
Ola 2.0
a 13 ..,,0118 ...011 C£ 6xa 25 :.: "held in respect." Baiter &: Sauppe (II 221, frg. 8) gives this as a fragment of Polycrates; e.g., oxb 16. On PoIycrates see OXa 33-35. i.e., a festival accompanied by mystic rites of initiation. a 14 : 1 TEA""", a l'uCJT>\p'" Cf. OeD, "Mysteries"; Burkert, pp. 276-304. The equivocation lie. in the as.umption that pv(mle,a (major annual religious solemnities celebrated by the Greek.) is derived &om pJ~ (mouse) and not pviw (initiate into the mysteries). a 15 Ti>v ••• aGp""c!> i.e., Sirius, the scorcher, brightest star in the constellation Canis Maior and known as the dog-star, harbinger of the "deg days." Its appearance marked the beginning of the hottest part of the year. C£ S8b 24: • for the idea: take along a 16 : 1 GUI',,"pd.CtI'(3civo, with, take in as an assistant. a Db.. For Pan, Cybele c£ OCD. There is no mention there, however, of this relationship between the two. It is spoken of by Pindar, frg. 86 (Bowra) and again in frg. 85. Both fragment. are from the Parthenea which were songs sung (and danced) by young girls to honor Pan; c£ Pindar, Pythi... 3.77-79. From frg. 85 Pan appears to be an attendant upon Cybele, the Magna Mater, and his statue to be placed before shrines. On Pindar (? 522/518-438 B.C.) the lyric poet see OCD, PW. a 11)-20 i\ 8T' .....11',011 "or to state that to be without a dog is the highest disgrace, and so it is clear that to be a dog [TO ".n.a (817a,)] is something honorable." In.. itself the statement is a puzzle, or in Victorius' words "to a hjgh degree ob.cure" (obscurus aurem lot:u.r admodum •.V,xOv... 'Epl'ij~ among the gods is the most sociable for he is the only one of the gods called 'sharer Hermes.'" Hermes (0£ OCD), like Pan, is Arcadian in his origins and has many facets: messenger of the great gods (e.g., Virgil, Am. 4-211)-276), guide of souls (Homer. od. 24-1-14), and here the god of good luck. On the chance discovery of money or anything else (such a find was called i1 TO Ie-
ora 27
COMMBNTARY
341
palOV), if anyone on hand cried out" ,.owo, 'Eepii'" (or OUI "halves'') he made a claim to a share in the find, e.g., Theophra.!tIlS describes the covetous character (Characters 30.9) a. one who when "some money is found in the streets by his slaves is clever at demanding part of it by crying out 'halves.'" The phrase x. 'Eepii' (luck: is common) is proverbial, e.g., Menander, Epitrepolltes 284 (108) and ef. 28G-28s (cd. Sandbach). The equivocation rests on the different meanings of x.w6" as in the following example it rests on the different meaning of .I6y., as speech (a n, To,. My.v) and as esteem (a 23, cU.Id
Adr"'), a U-23 " ..I,,~... ~,., On the equivocation here see previous note. ..,...,da,6TaTov, ef. ala 13; Spengel, pp. 333£, cites Diodoms Siculus 1.1-2, Anaximenes I42Da 6 - I42Ia 2, and Isocrates, Pallegyricus 47-49 as indicative of the high esteem in which logos was held. a 23-24 "~YdIp .•. ).EYE"'" "for the expression Ady.v !l.E,.v is not wed with a single meaning." On clnAw, see 560 7. dEt.Aoy., meaning "notable, distinguished" is a word special to Diodoms Siculus. a 24-2S lDJ.o~ .•. &LlILPoGv".. Ross (along with Bonitz, Studiell, p. 87) reads TO 6'TJe'7pbov. This topic is found in SE as two topics, oob 38. Here it is a single fallacy which in fact is twofold: composition, division. Composition is to assert of the whole what is true of a part or parts, e.g., a 24: "another topic of fallacious argument is for the speaker to combine [a""..,66na Myew] that which is separate [TO 6'TJe'7P"""]"; e.g., the Supreme Court is a prejudiced body since its members have prejudices. Division i. to as.ert of a part or parts what is true of the whole, e.g., a 2S: "or to divide [6Ia~.;;vTa] that which is combined [TO avyxstp...v]," e.g., all the faculty members of Oxbridge are distinguished scholars for the Oxbridge faculty is noted for its distinguished scholarship. a 25-26 ,brEl ... ....u.CbCL~ "for since what is not the same is often thought to be the same." On Tml",6. (not TaVr6 as at a 26) S. 32.8n.; theword refers to the whole and its parts which frequendy appear to be the same and therefore capable of the same attributes. a 26-27 6..6"EpOV .•. _'Ei" c£ oob 35-38. The import of the comment (e.g., 6•• ".'.'7) is, I would say, that one is to use the fallacy not in presenting an argument but in refuting the statement of an opponent who may have deliberately or inadvertendy used the fallacy. a 2.7 ".,;:;".... My.~ Kassel alone conjectures Tmo . Euthydemus (ef. OGD, PW [13]), a Sophist from Chias, was a contemporary of Socrates and is known to us for the most part from Plato's dialogue Euthytkmus (ef. ola 12), a study of eristics and the use of fallacies; its character is
ARISTOTLE, 'R~TO'RIC' II
OIa 33
mirrored in A.' sSE. Whether the Euthydemus of Xenophon's Memorabili. is a different person is questioned; cpo PW, Euthydernus (13) with Kerferd, p·53· a 2.7-2.8 or.." ... 0[&611 This example is not in the EuthyJemus. Its OCCUIrence in a slightly different form at SE I77b 12.-13 would indicate that it is • sophism identified with Euthydemus. The kind of composition at issue is of the following sort: Patti is good; Patti is an artist; Patti is a good artist, (c£ D. into 2.ob 351f.). Thus we have here: What you know, you know in the Peiraeus where you now are; secondly, you know that there are triremes. And so the statement: you know that there are triremes in the Peiraeus. This p ....ge is explained by Victorius in terms of the SE passage 177b 12.-13 which, .. it stands, is the same kind of fallacious statement. Cope, pp. 3"730B, gives an exact citation of Victorius' wor.u and his difficulties with them .. an explanation of the Euthydeman logos. a 2.9 -rav.. .•",'......P.61IOV The accusative is the object of Uy ••• understood ("to say of the one who knows the lettets'I, which also governs the dependent /In clause; see use of My... at a 2.5. The scholi..t Anonymus intetprets bro, as "verse"- so too Cope - and not "word," citing by way of illustration the first few words of the Ili.d: I";j'" d••6. O.d. a 3~3 I xed mEl ... icnLV dt~ ToaouTo7 = twice as much: Iland since twice as much of a thing is hannful." ",a.a. is again a predicate infinitive (sc. allo, emf), governing the accusative I"716i Tel .. ("another topic is to say ~at not evc:n a "siDgI~ po~on") and infinitive 6l"a, ,sy,s,."d". IlTmro" (sc. san). iaTw, I.e., CODSbtute.
~ 32.-33 oikw ... ",..p(l),oy....."'6~ The first formulation is refutative since its conclusion - Two good things do not make one bad thing - is the contradiction apparently of what was originally stated: One portion of a thing is good, but its double is bad. This last statement is often correct but is open to this attack. Even the converse - One good thing does not make two bad things - though apparently demonstrative is not correct for it, too, is open to the fallacy of division. a 33-35 ",IU,,, ... Y"P On Polycrates see Radermaclrer, B.xXI.I-13 and particularly # 13, together with Baiter & Sauppe, II 2.2.1, ftg. 5. He is a rhetorician of the fourth century. His Aa:usation of Socrates, now lost, written somewhere about 394 B.C., may have been occasioned by Plato's Gorgias. It was criticized by !socrates, Busiris, 4-9 and answered by Xenophon, Mem. 1.2..1-1"11 is "the speaker" who is specified in what follows. Spengel, pp. 335Jf., exemplifies the fallacy from !socrates, Antidosis 88-92, Andocides, all the Mysteries 29-33, Lysias, Ag. the Subversion ~f the Ancestral Constitution 2-6. Another example would be Cicero,
Pro Milone 23.61. i.e., the accused, the defendant. b 7 : I opyl!;'1Tco, This reading of the codd. (except A: 6el17J', which for the sense I find more attractive) is accepted by the edd. save Ross, Kassel. • ."UUI'-'11'4 It fails to be an enthymeme because nothing is demonstrated or proven (oil dedo,,,,,,"o,,); any conclusion or inference by the hearer that something was or was not done is a groundless inference (",aea-
Ao"lCeT"'). b 9-ro IDo~... ToUTO This fallacy of sign, specifically semeia allonymo (non-necessary signs, S7b 1 : " 57b r0-21), is very much implicated with the fallacy of consequent (olb 20-30). In fact SE 167b 1-20 not only remarks that in rhetoric proofs frOlll signs are based on consequents (b 8-9) but exemplifies by using a sign argument (b 9-Il) which is the same example as that used in the Rhetoric to exemplify d,e fallacy of affirming the consequent (oIb 24), i.e., assuming that the consequent is convertible with the antecedent. On the other hand, there can be no question that non-lIecessary sign argument can be a form of valid inference which, however, is not logically conclusive; c£ Studies, pp. 96-99, 104-15. Since the argumentation concludes to the probable and not the certain, there is 110 inevitable demand that the assertion must be accepted. When used correcdy and with reasonable circumspection, sign inference can be highly suasive, as can be seen from the instance of seeking a bodyguard as a sign of conspiring for tyranny (A 2, 57b 20-36). But, by the very nature of the non-necessary (anonymon) sign, this can be challenged on the grounds that it involves the fallacy of the consequenL Thus it is that sign (i.e., semeion anonymon) can be used as a legitimate argument of persuasion, but the argument can be disproved as fallacious. b 10 Tcoi~ ",6).£0"' . • • "I"""copxov enclosed within quotation marks by Tovar, Ross, Kassel, Cope. Plato, Symposium 182C 4--'7 says substantially the
oIb 15
COMMENTARY
345
same thing. C£ Aeschines, Ag. Timarc"us I32-I35 (Spengel). On Harmodius, Aristogeiton, Hipparchus, 6Sa 17 : z, also 9Sa IS. "oAe". here denotes the Greek city-state in general. b II : 1 .pWvTES the reading of all the codd.; Kassel alone reads .e"'Te~. z 'API'-0&lou ~d. c£ 6Sa I7 : 2. Hipparchus, son of the Athenian tyrant Peisistraus, enjoyed a position of eminence in Athens when his brother Hippias assumed power in 527 B.C. on the death of their father. Hipparchus died in 5I4 B.C. b I2--I5 ij.[ T'S ••. 'l.uxpci"O)~ ... "'u~ C£ ola 33-35, OIa 13-14, Cope, p. 313; cpo Spenge!, p. 338 and Radermacher, B.XXI.IO both citing the scholiast Anonymous to the e.ffi:ct that the inhabitants of Troy honored the mice of the region for this action. A similar incident in another context is related in Herodotus, 2.141.5. b 17 jj et ....... ,"'..;,..........ov The articular infmitive (TO ... "A~81j.a.) is the subject of an understood "is" in the finite or infinitive construction. The non-invitation is the accidental reason for the anger, the substantial cause of which, as we see at a 19-20 (0 d' tb, . ..), was the disregard (d).'l''''eia) shown in the action; cf. A.'s comments on the concept, 78b 10 - 79a 8,,sa 32. The story is said to come from a play of Sophocles' called the Syndeipnoi (Companions at Table), whose subject is the Greeks gathered at Tenedos prior to the siege of Troy; cf. Pearson, II 198-209. In the past the incident has been confused with another Sophoclean play, Syl/ogos (The Gathering of the Greeks); cf. Pearson, 194-100, Nauck: & Snell, p. 161. Plutarch, Moralia 74" speaks of a Sophoclean play in which reference is made to Achilles and an invitation; cf. Pearson, II 205, Nauck & Snell, Radt, Sophocles, p. 425. b 20 :
I
&,« ...... "'~
Cope, Kassel read with a majority of the codd.:
hd TO;; p.o;" "on the occasion o£"
z ....0 "'rc6",EVov Fallacy VI is that of affirming the consequent. It is ordinarily understood of the hypothetical syllogism (If Bill is clever, he will see this deception; but he sees the deception; and so, Bill is clever). A., however, did not discuss the hypothetical syllogism. As A. underst\lod this
oIb 30
COMMBNTAllY
347
(inop ..o.; c£ 62a 29: z) is a predicate necessarily connected with the subject as umortal," "animal" are hropna of
fallacy in SE I67b 1-20, consequent
"man." However, the consequent is not convertible with its subject, and when it is so converted. we have the fallacy of consequent. In the example at a 21-24 the consequent is "disdain for society"; e.g., high-minded people have a disdain for society. When we affirm this of Paris, we conclude wrongly that it is convertible with ''high-minded'' and therefore that Paris is "highminded." This misapplies the rule that two things identical with the same thing are identical with each other. Thus. although A. did not speak of the hypothetical syllogism. his explanation of the fallacy of consequent is easily expressed in the antecedent-consequent statement of the hypothetical syllogism. C£ Poetics 14600 20-22; Rheto,es Gr._d. VII 322. On the encomium of Alexander b 21 ' A>.E1;.h6p'I'. hI fL£ycU"IruxD~ by Polycrates. see Baiter &: Sauppe, II 223. and 97b 21-22. With the comma after Alexander accepted by all. I would understand a predicate infinitive (lily ...). i.e., Ur.BT'; c£ OIa 29 or OIa 3G-31 ('I'''.a,). On p."aAO,,~ZO~ see 66b 17. Rheto,es G,aed, V 283 (Spengel) notes that Demosthenes commits the fallacy in the CroUl. speech 136. :'for seeing that the high-minded are such, so. b 23-24 3..1 yckp ... cIv then, should Paris be thought to be high-minded."
b 25
fLDIX6~' Wtoil..Dl
b 26 ~5oucrl ... 6PXoii,....1l
Cpo SE 167b 8-u.
TocoiiTOC sc.
i.e.. in begging for
pOC%ot.
alms.
b 27-29 hI yckp . . . iiv m&czlp.ovoiv The same struct\lre as aT' at b 25, 26; see Olb 21: "to state that since these qU2!ities belong to those who are thought to be prosperous and happy, so. then. those who possess these attributes should be considered prosperous and happy." As in the other examples the argument is: the very fortunate sing, dance, and travel, but so do the poverty",tricken and those sent into exile; therefore these latter are very fortunate. rsocrates. Hele. 8 uses a similar example of beggars and exiles. &111(1'011'£1 ... 111.,,1"""1 C£ below olb 35 - 020 3 on the diiference between an unqualified and a qualified statement. The ,.cii~ should
b 29-30
be obvious 6:om the last example given: exiles travel without choice as to the travel and the destination while the fortunate travel when and where they wish. On Ill"" .. see olb 35. b 3G-34 auo~ ... ,,6A'fLo~ This topic is cited almost verbatim by Dionysius of Halicarnassus in clrap. 12 of his First Letter to Ammaeus in his effort to show that the Rhetoric was composed after Demosthenes had reached hi. prime and had delivered most of hi. speeches, i.e.• post 330 B.C. A com-
ARISTOTLE, 'RHETORIC' II
orb 13
parison of the statement of our topic with the fallacy in SE 167b 21-36 reveals a striking difference between the two. The SE fallacy (see also An. Pr. 6sa 3Sff.), although A. says that it is fairly common, is one infrequently referred to in modem books (Hamblin, p. 78). The interpretation of the fallacy of cause which is co=on in the modern books is that given here in the Rhetoric, e.g., the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. The fallacy of non-cause as cause in the SE is a form of reductio ad impossible and was used to challenge (and presumably refute) an opponent's assertion. For example, if someone declares that the death penalty for murder is just, the sophist argues that the statement leads to nonsense because granting that the penalty of death for murder is just and that a just punishment is one that is an effICacious deterrent, then it would be equally just to inllict the death penalty for picking pockets (cf. Joyce, p. 281). The conclusion is made possible by the gratuitous insertion of a premiss (granting . . . that a just ... deterrent) which has nothing to do with the original statement. "Another fallacious topic is that dependent on b 30 a>.>.o~ "lIpa .. 6 (non-cause as cause)." naea here as elsewhere in this phrase is best interpreted as "depend upon," or "on aocount of" (a"'I, e.g., 02a 4; cf. Bonitz, Ind,,,, p. S62.12fE b 31 otav"'-;; ... YEY"""'IIL "for example, by reason of the fact that a thing occurred together with or after another...." "for men assume the fact of coming b 31-32 ..0 yap ... A.. ",~oi~QU"L~ after the other ("p fJtn:d. "06"0) to he the.ame as because of the other ("'~ d.d
-ro...ifro)." b 33 :
J Z
otav':'~ C£ fJ78. 2S-27 for the expression. 41J"'''&'IJ~''' 41J",oa61!~QU~ noA.«iao, aida., double accusa-
tive objects of l).ap. understood. Antony was similarly blamed by Cicero for the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Philippics 2.22.SS (Victorius). On both these Athenians see OCD, PW, CAR, VI (passim). Demades (fl. 3SD-3I9 B.C.) as an active politician was an effective intermediary with Macedoni. (both Philip and Alexander) during the 405 and 30S of the fourth century. It is possible that he was in the pay of Macedon although he was fined along with Demosthenes in the Harpalus affair of 324/3'.3 B.C., the incident which brought to an end the distinguished career of Demosthenes (384-322 B.C.), polirically active as a Scltesman in Athens from the year 3S4. The objective of Demosthenes was to maintain Athenian freedom in the face of the advancing power of Macedonia under Philip and, later, Alexander, the very policy Demodes attacks here. Whether this is the only (Cope, I"trod., pp. 4S£) mention of Demosthenes in the Rhetoric is questioned; c£ 97b 7 : Z, 07" S (of the latter Spengd, p. 37S, remarks that Victorius and others "'1"ithout
02a 3
COMMBNTARY
349
reason" consider this a mention of the fifth-century general, but Cope, III S2, takes it to be a reference to the general). presumably the words ofDemades; cf. Baiter & b 34 1/.£" 13 :
J,
78b 14-IS : J.
liS",,,,,,
> 3 11".ADyLC'I'6~ "an apparent syllogism results from something being stated both absolutely and not absolutely but with a qualification." With ""I1a TO ci:n;lw, ..TA. understand 1.,,01'''.'; ep. SE 166b 37l8. On the meaning of ci:n;lw, c£ S6a 7. The common interpretation of the clause follows essentially that of Cope, e.g., "from the substitution of, the interchange of, the confusion of the absolute with what is not absolute but particular." Certainly the idea but not the Greek.
1'1. solitarium, S. 2896. a 6 .....l ..1> 1'-1) av 1Sv This is the reading of all the codd. and the edd . •ave Ross, Kassd who seclude the final If.. The fallacy resides in a ddiberate confusion of two meanings of .l..." (a) that wbich signifies actual existence, which is the meaning of 'rm in this phrase, and so the second •• is superfluous; and (b) that which indicates that Ian is a mere copula joining a subject and predicate, which is its meaning in the following clause: Ian rae TO I'.q 8'l'iJ II•. a ~8 x ..lll.., ... a... liyvw....ov another example of the fallacy: on the fact that the unknown can be known (bnaT'7/To,) to be unknown (8T~ ll".....
oz. 13
COMMBNTARY
lSI
........) it is argued that the unknown can be known: "to argue that the unknown can be known for the unknown is known as unknown." a 8-9 oG.....~ ••• ..,1 d .. 6~. "So. too. in rh.toric an apparent enthymeme comes from that which is not absolutely probable, but only probable in some respect." This. on what groWlds I caunot say. is commonly turned "on the confusion of some particular probability with absolute probability." This clause responds to a 3: ';''''''/1 ... • /1' ..... & this eristic &IIacy of the exchange of the absolute and qualified statement gives rise to the apparent syllogism such as is found in dial.ctics. so. too. it appears in rh.toric as the apparent enthymeme based on • particular probability raised to an absolute probability. On sI,,&, c£ A Z, 57a 34 - 57b I. 57'1 34 : J.
"'0.'.
"'""Tia.) so here in rhetnric ("al mrz;jOa . .. sI"d,) it also CIeates deception. for it is deception when one leaps from a qualified statement to an absolute statement. The structure of the sentence at a 16 ("all..a;;" 8,. ... TI six.,) is elliptical. Literally the sentence reads: "so. too. here because the probability ["«ed TO .•.•17,.,] is not absolute but qualified." It is clear. however. that A. means to say: "so. too. here [in rhetoric] the fact that the probability is not absolute but a qualified probability creates the deception."
A1USTOTLE, 'RHBTOllIC' II
3S2.
o~a
2.2.
1 ' oJ.) A. stateS that both ca.es which he has presented in a 18-2.0 appear to be probable but in one instance we have a true probability, in the other we do not. In the instance of the weak man liable to the charge of p!>ysical
02a 26
COMMBNTARY
353
assault (a 18-19), it is quite probable that he did not attack (jwt as we can also say that it is probable that the strong man did attack). This is the true probael,,6,. In the second instance of the strong man (a 19bility of a 22-23: T6 20) we have the untrue probability. In this instance it is said that it is probable that the strong man made no assault becawe he was bound to be considered the likely candidate. This untrue probability is the qualified probability of a' 23: T6 a. o~X .mAw,. In the very same way one can say of the weak man that ids probable that he made the assault becawe he was not likely to be considered a candidate. In the fint case (a 18-19) we have unqualified probability as .1,,6, is explained at A 2, 573 34 - 57b I. In the second (a 19-20) case we have a qualified probability or what A. calls d .l..6, at a 8-9, 16, and the qualification is the statement at a 20: If« .1"6, ... ME ..v. To raise this second case to the statu. of a general 81..", is an instance of Agathon's generalization that "the improbable is probable." This makes for the sophistry """otpa1lTiav (a IS) which A. speaks of, the sophistry described in the concluding lines of the chapter (a 23-28). Such argumentation he claims (a 2627) is counterfeit, built on apparent and not genuine probability. This interpretation of a 22-23, as far as I can see, not only explains A.'s comment here, but, more important, the logical connection with what follows at a 23-:;08.
,av
a 23-24 ""II ........." ... ,,, C£ Cicero, Brutus 8.3D-3r. Such, says Socrates (plato, Apol. I8b), was one of the charges leveled against him, a charge picked up in the Clouds of Ari.tophanes where at 889-II04 we have a debate between "e81TTOJv and "..-TOJV .10)10', right and wrong logic, in which the "better" argument naturally finds the going difficult with a self-assured "inferinr" argument. a 25 ...0 Dp........yop"" • ..;uyyu-p.cz I.e. "the profession" of Protagoras (?490-?42O B.C.), a very well-known Sophist to whom Plato devoted a dialogue. This together with other dialogues of Plato is the major source for Protagora' thought which, perhaps, is best characterized for many by his dictum: ."man is the measure of all things, of the existence of those that are and the non-existence of those that are not" (plato, TheOBt. IS2a). c£ OCD, PW (I), Guthrie, Greek Philosophy, III 262-69. What appears to be called a "fraud" here is the teachiog a 26 ojI£ij&o~ of Protagoras grounded in the lrind of relativism which we assume to be identified with him: namely, the acceptability of arguing either side of a question as expediency demanded. Troth was rdative, not absolute, and apparently if certain lrinds of improbability seemed probabilities to the individual, he could legitimately we them in argument, thw engaging in what Dionysiw of Halicamassw called that "most maliciow of arguments that the improbable is at times probable" (Epistula ad Ammaeum I 8).
354
AllISTOTLE, tRHBTOB.IC' II
02> 27
a 27 : J !ll' €v Ross alone reads dU' with Gomperz. Of this Kassel remarks "possibly right"; he rejects cLUd but does refer to Denniston (p. 4), who cites this passage and remarks "Here the rendering 'except' seems to be absolutely necessary.•.• Outside Anstode I can find no parallel except S. OT 1332•••• " 2 P'ITap,xii As should be clear from A I, SSb 17-2.1, there i. no word for false rhetoric or the misuse of rhetoric as there is for false dialectic, which is called sophistry. We have only 2j e'1"oe"'oj, which here denotes bad rhetoric. C£ ssb 17-2.1.
CHAPTER 25
I . Introduction: 02a 30-37
refutation of enthymemes by counrasyllogism or objection (enstasis)
II . Dcvdopment: 02« 37 - 03a IS I. oaa 37 - ozb 13 (0) 02a37-0.b4
oza 28-29 "cal ",.pl ... • lp......, end of chap. 24-
the different kind. of objection &om the opponent·, eothymeme &om aD opposite &om. like fiom the judgmeoa penon.
of well-known
the different kinds of enthymetne and their refutation four kinds of eothymeme refutation of an eik:0I eothymeme refutation of semeia eothymomes refutation of • paradcigmatic eothythe tekmcrion eothymeme
Kassel alone places these lin.. at the
a 30 : 1 ).U ......~ This chapra on refutation is fairly sdf-explmatory in its analysis of the method. Afra the presentation of the varied ways in which one em argue by enthymeme validly (chap. :1.3) and sophistically (chap. 24), A. introduces the student to the methods of challenging the validity or exposing the falseness of such arguments. While in SOtne ways this chapra is compared with the concluding chapters of SE (chaps. 16-33), those chapters are primarily concerned with the refutation of fallacious reasoning. In the Rhetoric refutation is analyzed in terms of any kind of rhetorical inference. Apart from Top. S.IO there is no comparable discussion of ADa., in the Topia; and S.IO is dilIercnt from the Rhetoric. So, too, the discussion of lpf1Taa" in An. Pr. 2.26 dilfers from our dlscussion by analy:>.ing 1lll11:aa" in terms of syllogistic figures. I have briefly looked at SOtne of these problems in Studies, pp. 100-103. There is a running analysis of the whole chapra in Cope, Inlrod., pp. w,--,6. A. introduces the matter again at r 17, Isb 2-'3. On the
ARISTOTLB, 'RHBTORIC' II
02a 35
cluracter of refutation Ci=, De o,al. 2.53.215 repeats the twofuld classification we find here, i.e., counter-syllogism, and objection raised against one of the premisses in the opponent's >argument. other references to "refutation" in Greek or Latin authors should be examined with care since they probably are speaking about refutation as a part of the speech (exordium, narration, con£rmation, refutation, peroration). Tn our chapter A. is more concerned with an analysis of the technique of counter-argumentation. As he remarks. all inferences which reason to a false conclusion must be refuted (Audo.) by demolishing that which is the source of the fallacy (Top. 160b 23-24). At SE 1761> 29-36 and 179b 23-34 he specifies AVu" as the exposure offalse reasoning with respect to that which makes it false. And so it is that in this chapter his interest is in explaining the mechanics of handling the kind of false reasoning which is possible in rhetorical discourse. • ixcip.ovci~ laTL~ C£ 75" 22 : 3. " 31 : 1 e1p"p.~..... enthymemes.
i.e., both real (chap. 23) and apparent (chap. 24)
• olv"'Lau).).Oy"'ci:p.ov~ "either by stating a counter-syllogism"; together with iv"'''O.TCI \,or by bringing an objection") it is an accusative agreeing with the understood subject of A15.... A counter-syllogism would conclude to the opposite of the syllogism it refutes, and this is what A. calls at SE 170b I-II an l'.,,%o,: a refutative syllogism which concludes to the contradictory of what was affirmed.
"33 Clu...;;;~> ...ci""", i.e., the common topics of elIap. 23 (for valid enthymemes) and of elIap. 24 (for invalid).
l.aooa can be correctly desctibed as gen" a 33~34 01 p.~ .•. ~6ei~o>V erally accepted opinions of suelI • character that they are entertained by reputable people; C£ Top. locb 21-23. Dialectic and rhetoric use b60Ea in argumentation; cpo A I, 55a 1"7-18 and 2, 56b 33-35 (o~a• ... a.a'.'m"~). Ai: a 34-35 in the statement on opinions (aO"O;;.Ta) we have the reason for the possibility of counter-syllogismJenthymeme; c£ 02b 21-25 (TO a••1"0," ... rIJlaYHaioJl). " 35 lva...ci:a..~ •• IITi........
b 13 """'..
Spengd gives the word a larger extension than that met in A 2, B 20 and refers the meaning to s6a 3-4 ("laT." do a~T.p T.p Ao"q> TO;; ...v.a. II tpalv.a9a. ...v.a.). In this way he would include "aeda"'Ypa under lvIMp'lpa. I do not accept this interpretation of s6a 3-4, e.g., Stia 3 : 3. See also S6a 35 - S6b II or 93a 24-25 where A. calls the two the "OLVa! "lar•• ,. Further I do not view Spengd's comment ("Nunc et "aeda.''Ypa in numerum enthymernatum referre licet'') as correct or necessary. It is not necessary as will be seen; and it /lies in the face of the constant distinctionmade between the two in the whole work, e.g., S7"n - s8a2.
a.a
a••
a••
b 14 : 1 ..t......p.. I have discussed these four sources in St..dies, pp. 104IS, as well as the seeming contradiction with statements in A, to say nothing of B 20, occosioned by the introduction of naeda.''Ypa as a source of enthymeme. In the context of the chapter A. is saying that enthymemes come £rom these sources and that such enthymesnes are open to objection becawe of either their inferential form or the statement of their premisses. Even the irrefutable enthymeme fIom infallible sign, the T."p>le'''' can be challenged on what it alleges as a fact, e.g., 03a 12-13. z elxo~ ... "'11"".... On 01"&, C£ S?a34 : 2, J, Grimaldi, "EfJp .... 0.," 389-90, ]95--97. On "aeda."Ypa: s6b 5 : 3, S7b 27 : 2, S?a 15-16; 93a 28 - 94" 19 with 1l0tes. On TB"p>le'oP; S7b 4. and on dvay"aiov, another name for the necessary sign (e.g., 02b 19): S?an : 1. On G'}p••ov: 57b I : " S7b 10-21. See also Studks, pp. 104-15; "1:fJp: "enthymemes based upon that which is always and necessarily what it is." b 20-21 Ttl &. &'tI . . . '"11'£""" "Those enthymemes expressed by means of a universal or particular proposition whether true or not are sign enthymemes." Ross alone reads "a6&10v ["1 ...06. On the statement see 57& 10-21 and An. Pr. 700 3 -70b 37. In the interpretation given I understand 11 with id. 11• ... ,.>1; Cope (ad loc.) calls this "a rare ellipse of the subjunctive mood of elva" II
T.
b 21 - 03a 2 TO s. £txo~ ... El"o~ I'iill.ov As Spengd, p. 348, notes, ml TO "olv (02b Victorius (p. 443), Vater (p. 138) consider Td a~ 21-22) an insertion from a marginal note. Spengd disagrees, saying that zfter presenting the sources of enthymemes A. undertakes to show how each source can be refuted. Thus he returns here (02b 21 - 03a 2) to the first of the four, i.e., el"d" and at ala 2-I5 to fl7Jpsia, xa.eade&ypa. TBH"'''e'OV. While I would not remove the phrase, which also appears in the scholiast Anonymus, it is an awkward intrusion. I would resolve the logical articulation of
.l"d, ...
COMMBNTARY
o~b I3-~5 in which it appears in this way. There is a protasis at o~b I3-U (hr.t . .. ) which is followed by an apedosis at ~b ~:1.-~5 ('1"17Bedv • .•):
(13-21) Seeing that (hrB'1 enthymemes come from the four following sources. (21-2» and seeing that el"o~ means that which is generally true, (22-25) it is clear that enthymemes based on el"o~ (TOIaiiTa) can be refuted. This is then developed into an explanation of what a refutation of the probable means (o~b Z5-JI). the dif!iculty experienced by the auditors with such a
refutation (02b 31-35). and the way to counteract this diflieulty (02b 3503a 2). Cope. Introd.• pp. 271-'74. offers a loose paraphrase of 02b 21 - 03" 2. b
23
TOUZUTI1... lfCH't ,,"UCtY
i.e., enthymemes whose source is tlHor;;
but the fact is that all the sources except Te",..7je"" are sources of probable argumentation. Spengel cites as an example of the refutation of probable arguments AIltiphon. Tetml. III.y.z. b 24 .u1Jei)~ 6:d
"not always genuine"; Kassel alone secludes dBi.
b 24-~5 ~ ycip II... , ... 6:VOtY"Ot'OV "For the one who brings an objection offers a refutation not that the statement challenged is not a probable statement but that it is not a necessary statement." See following note. b 25 iv,.....ci"."o~ C£ 02a 35 on the word. The reason why the refutation is only an apparent and not a real refutation is that it must show that the statement which is being rejected is not a probable statement. which is all that it professes to be. To argue in refuting such a statement that it is not a necessary statement is no refutation, only an apparent refutation. Thus it is of no help in refuting the statement that all who seek a bodyguard are ainIing at tyranny to assert that this does not necessarily follow. The statement does not pretend to assert a necessary connection between subject and predicate but only a probable one. To refute it one must show that the asserted connection is not probable. C£ 60a 30 : 1. Spengel remarks (pp. 349-50) that b ~6 ""• .,..x....'V the orators db not agree. e.g.. Dernosthenes. On the Crown 6-7; Demades. On the Twelve Years 3 (the authenticity of the speech is questioned); lsocrates. Antidosis 17-19; Andocides. On the Mysteries 6; Lysias. On the Prop.rty of
Atistophanes 2-3. b ~7 : 1 1tOtpcz).oy,afLCN "False rea.oning "and the fallacy which causes the false reasoning ("aeaJ.oy'C&,.. ..o~. b 3~) on the part of the auditor is that explained in 02b ~5 and stated here in more detail at b 27-3 I; e.g.• you refute a probable statement or inference only by showing that it is not probable. 3 l1tEl ycip This introduces a number of statements whose consequence is at b 31 (d dA "e'T~~ ...). e.g.• "since the prosecutor proves ...• and since it is not the same thing to refute ... and since the probable statement
ARISTOTLE. 'RHETORIC' II
o2b 38
is always open to objection ... , the consequence is [6 dB "IJ'T~' ... b 3I] that the judge, if the .tatement is refuted in this way [i.e., as not necessary], reasoning falsely, as we said, thinks that the conclusion is not probable or that he must not decide the mattet." c£ ssa IO. b 28-3 I lenL 6E 06 ... Xld a.vaYXlliov· I would read this without any punctuation save a comma before it and a colon at the end as Spenge!, Cope, Kassel do. Tovar uses acceptable parentheses before and after with the colon. Ross reads the first part of the sentence as Spongel etc., but reads 30£ as: (0'; yae "" 11.,.' dBI slxo" del xal d.ayxaio.) followed by a comma; Roemer, Dufour punctuate b 28-3 I with dashes before and after and a colon at the end. At b 30 the edd. (save Ross who reads as cited above) read with Vablen: <w, inl Td "oAu>; Cope omits it.
n
c£ ozb 27 : 2. The reading is that of the edd., b 3I iiv o6-n.> ).u8ij Spcngel, accepting Bonitz' change of the codd. lAuD,!. Cope accepts lAu8,!, reading .1 oOTo), ll.JB>7 with Bekker. Cpo s~ 22 : I, COMMENTARY I 355. Ross alone enclose. b 33-35 in parentheses (0'; yae . .. "e'.ew).
b 33 ""Ilyxcd"",
b 34-35 yvW,''"n··· a.pllJ''74, Jebb & Sandys, p. '40H:>', and Spengel, p. JI5, will reveal. "Facts" is the common interpretation of "edy,.aalV. I would accept that, or uactions," "circumstances," "incidents." The problem. is with xedvcp. If we assume fiom the context (e.g., b 25-28) that A. has only judicial rhetoric in mind here, then an interpretation of the word such as that of Cope, Jebb & Sandy. is normal, i.e., "time" when the action 'took place. This is acceptable, and such a meaning could apply in fact to other kinds of discourse. However, I am inclined to interpret ;ceo''!' (literally, "by means of time") as the scholiast Anonymas did and, later, Victorius, i.e., "by the frequency (of the act)." Tbis would mean that an enstasis by xew'!' cites more instances which are qpposite
·COMMBNTARY
OJ' 5
to what is claimed by the opponent. I find this meaning (which Cope says is impossible for xeoo'P) more likely, but I cannot offer an instance of xeo,o, so used. Still those points must be considered which make such an interpretation seem "more likely." At oja I in explanation of what he means by the statement the codd. read: sl yde Tel ""Bovd,,,, oih:w, ... (on which see 03a x). This means: "For if things (happen) in a similar way [OilT.,,] with more frequency ["lB••We.,], this is more probable." Further, the scholiast interpreting this Oja I reading of d,e codd. specifically in terms of time (dncl TO;; xeoo.,,) and action (dnd TO;; "edypaT.') understands it to mean: "If a larger number of incidents [Td nA.l.oa Tlii. "eayp,lT.,.] are such as I say and the incidents are more frequent [xai nABovd."" -liTO' bd l'cihl n:o .U.wv • xedvru,,], etc." Further still, we know (see Oja 5..{i) that enthymemes drawn from examples are refuted in the same way as those drawn from probabilities. But as can be seen at oja 5-10 both the idea of frequency of incident and similar incidents are stressed in Td "lei", ;j "i.e ••We., at oJa 7-8. It is quite possible, I would say, dIat with the sense of this whole passage (o2.b 3S - Oja ra) in mind as well as the schaliast's gloss Vicrorius conjectured as the reading of Oja I: el yde Td ",l ••• ,;".,. TherefOre I would understand the words in this way: xeo,'P, the sanle thing repeated a number of times; "'edypaa.., other instances or acts similar to it. For example, if I show that a man has violated the speed limit a number of times (xeo0'P) and has committed other violations - e.g., neglected traflic signals, passed other vehicles on the wrong side, ignored stop signs ("edypaaIV) - my objection to his probable innocence of traveling 80 miles an hour i~ a 40 mile an hour zo~~ is de£ini~~,more pro~ble. .. 2 xup ...........'" an adverb: best of all, most effecavely. ot y/&p "4 11>, paXeT....
In the following interpretation I accept both the text and the punctuation
usually read by the edd.; if I diverge from either I indicate it in a parenthesis. The intent of the passage is to show two ways to refute enthymemes from example, e.g., (a) a 6-8, (6) a 8-ro. "The refutation of enthymemes based on example is the same as that for those based on probabilities; for if we have one negative instance, there is a refutation, since the argument is not a necessary argument, even though there are more [i.e., diverse?] examples or several in,tance, of the example on the opponent's side; on the other hand, if[lo.. ~s] tIlere are more examples or several instances of the example favoring the opponent, we must contend that his present example is unlike those examples or shows dissimilarities or at least has some difference." Kassel, Vcr Text, pp. 143-44, explains his changes at a 8-9. Bottin discusses a 5-9 at length (pp. 33-39); on p. 38 he offCrs a summary account of his interpretation.
Cpo ola 5:
2.
a II 1CII"i,..aTa) that he is speaking about the subject m2tter enthymcmes utilize, not about the &mns of inference (T."O.) enthymemes take. The two arc different, as he says at a 23-24: Olen' .z ... TO"O,. I would interpret: "Amplification/depreciation has as its object to show that the subject is significant or insignificant, just as one shows [se. dBI"""a.] that a subject is good or bad, just or unjust, or anything else of that character." C£ his brief comments on this point in the Poetics 56b I and 4. a 21-22 tlyu86v ... Ii&ucav
C£ references at the end of 03a 17 : 2.
a 23 ...pi a . . . i.e., the subject matter of rhetOrical discourse as it is presented in genere atA 3, 58b 6 - 59a 10 as well as 59a II-29. a 25 : 1 .... AUTUC" se. bBv,..>i,..aTa; on refutation and its kinds, e£ chap. 25 where the refutative syllogism (enthymeme in rhetoric) was merely mentioned (oza 31-35). However, in that mention the grounds for the comments here at 03a 25-31, particularly 03a 29-30, Olan ..• d",,,."eoo, arc given at 02' 32-33 (dijl..... "0 ••••). On the refutative enthymeme, e£ Studies, pp. IOD-roI. 2 d&6~ .., "Nor arc refutative enthymemes some one specific kind; for it is clear ... "; e£ 96b 23-28 (laT-91-308. "Observations critiques sur la Rhllorique d' Aristote [11]." Revue Archiologiqu, N.S. 5 (1861) 40-61. Arist6teles: Ritoria. Madrid 1953. Anstot./is De .,t. poetica'. Leipzig 1885. Beitriigo zu AristoUles' Foetik (ed. H. Schone). Berlin 1914· G.sammelto philologische Schriften I-II. Leip>ig-Berlin 19I1. 1923. 'Zur Kritik aristotelischer Schriften (poetik und Rheto-
Tovar, A.
Vablon,
Vater,
J.
J.
S.
Verdenius, W.
377
J.
Victorius Waitz, T. Wartelle, A. West, M. L. Wilamowitz, U.
rik)." Sitzungsberichk d., Wi..., AkaJomie rler Wimnschaftell. Phil.-hist. Clmse 38 (1861) 59-148. "Zur Kritik der Rhetorik des Aristoteles." Rheinisches Museum 9 (1854) 555-67. Animadversiones et le,tiones ad AristoteJis libras tres RIletoricornm (ed. F. A. Wolf). Leipzig 1794. "The Meaning of ij9., and 'lj9",., in Aristotle's Poetics." Mnemosyne 13 (1945) '41-57. Petri Vielorii Commentarii in tres libros Aristoklis De ute oktfldi. Florence 1548. Aristotelis Organon I-II. Leipzig 1844, 1846. Lexique de la "Rhltoriquo" .'Mstok. Pari. 198•. Iambi ot elegi G,.ed I-II. Oxford 1971, 1973. Heraklts 2 . Berlin 189'.
