American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882 - 1950 and After: Perception of Polarity and US Commitment to a Periphery

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American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia

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Seung-young Kim

American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882–1950 and After Perception of Polarity and US Commitment to a Periphery Seung-young Kim

Seung-young Kim

american diplomacy and strategy toward korea and northeast asia, 1882–1950 and after Copyright © Seung-young Kim, 2009. All rights reserved. First published in 2009 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN-13: 978-1-4039-7545-4 ISBN-10: 1-4039-7545-0 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kim, Seung-young. American diplomacy and strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 18821950 and after : perception of polarity and us commitment to a periphery / Seung-young Kim. p. cm. ISBN 978-1-4039-7545-4 (alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—Korea. 2. Korea—Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. E183.8.K6K5566 2009 327.730519—dc22 2008042332 A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. Design by Scribe Inc. First edition: May 2009 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Seung-young Kim

To my wife, Kyungmee Choi

Seung-young Kim


Seung-young Kim

Contents

List of Tables

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Abbreviations

xiii

Introduction

1

1

3

Sources of US Commitment toward Korea

Part I: US Diplomacy toward Korea in the Era of the Russo-Japanese War 2 3 4

The Rise of Korean Expectation and Decline of US Commitment to Korea, 1882–1901

13

Great Power Rivalry and US Assessment at the Outbreak of the War

27

US Diplomacy and the Japanese Imposition of Protectorate on Korea

43

Conclusion Part I

67

Part II: US Diplomacy toward Korea during World War II 5 6 7

Vision of Cooperation among the Allies and the Four-power Trusteeship Plan for Korea

73

Emergence of the Bipolar Perception and a Missed Opportunity for Diplomacy

83

Consolidation of the Bipolar Perception and US Suggestion of the Thirty-eighth Parallel

105

Conclusion Part II

127

Part III: US Policy toward Korea from 1945 to June 1950 8

Uncertain Strategic Situation and Rise of Competing Recommendations toward Korea Seung-young Kim

135

viii

9

CONTENTS

The Reemergence of a Multipolar Vision and the Decision for Withdrawal from Korea

10 The Erosion of Multipolar Perception and the Road to Intervention Conclusion Part III

155 175 203

Conclusion: US Commitment toward South Korea since 1950

209

Notes

219

Index

275

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Tables

Table 1. Hypotheses on Perception of Polarity and US Commitment to Korea

6

Table 2. Hypotheses on the Role of Ideas and Beliefs

7

Table 3. Summary of Evidence

210


Seung-young Kim

Acknowledgments

While writing this book, I have received invaluable guidance and support from many people. I would like to express my sincere thanks to professors Robert Pfaltzgraff Jr., Alan Henrikson (The Fletcher School), Ernest May, and Akira Iriye (Harvard University), who guided me to write the early version of this book as my doctoral thesis at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Particularly, professors May and Iriye went beyond their usual responsibilities and supported me to learn from their scholarship in international history. I also appreciate professors Stephen Van Evera, Alaistair Iain Johnston, Robert Ross, Kurt Dassel, and Frank Ninkovich, who gave me invaluable critique and suggestions during the early stage of this book. My particular thanks also goes to professor Stephen Peter Rosen, who welcomed me to the research seminars at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University as an associate. I also appreciate professor Okonogi Masao of Keio University for hosting me as a visiting researcher at the faculty of law in his university from 2001 to 2002. My Japanese friends at the Fletcher School and Koji Hirata helped me in ascertaining my translation of Japanese diplomatic documents, and Berthold Frommann helped me in translating German documents on the diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War. I also extend my particular thanks to my friends, Miki Kase, David Nickles, Geoffrey Smith, Anthony Wanis-St. John, Mitchell Lench, Keita Yonezawa, Chang Yang-sul, and the South Korean correspondents in Washington, D.C. for offering me places to stay when I visited Washington, D.C., New York, Boston, London, and Tokyo while tracing the archives. In South Korea, professor Park Tae-gyun gave me valuable tips on research material and professor Gerald Geunwook Lee encouraged me with his spirited discussions on theoretical issues. Professor Park Myungrim warmly welcomed me to use his collections of the historical material on the origins of the Korean War in the summer of 2008. The Unification Research Institute in JoongAng Ilbo allowed me to consult with its collection on US–Korean relations, and Dr. Cho Jin-koo and professor Chung Sung-il also helped me in securing research materials in Korean. My thanks also go to my friend, Dr. William Mott, and many other friends at the Fletcher

xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

School and the broader intellectual community at Cambridge, Massachusetts. I also appreciate the archivists and staff members in various archives and libraries in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Great Britain for extending excellent assistance and guidance for my research. I have benefited from several scholarships and research grants, without which this book could not have been completed. I appreciate Mr. Shin Dong-ho and Ahn Byung-hoon of The Chosun Ilbo, who supported me to receive the Seoul Press Foundation fellowship funded by Daewoo Group from 1996 to 1999. I also benefited from the fellowship of the Japan-Korea Culture Foundation for my research at Keio University from 2001 until 2002 and received a small research grant from International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School in 1999. During the later stage of my research, I benefited from the support of the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland, which allowed me to conduct two rounds of additional research in the United States and South Korea during the summers of 2006 and 2008. I also appreciate all my colleagues at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Aberdeen for allowing me the time, resources, and intellectual stimuli to complete this book at the final stage. It was also a great pleasure to work with Anthony Wahl and Farideh Kooki-Kamali of Palgrave Macmillan in preparing this book. I thank them for awaiting the completion of my manuscript with ample patience. Rosemi Mederos and Daniel Constantino at Scribe copyedited my manuscript with great efficiency and professionalism. I also express my sincere thanks to Mrs. Sharon Ahmeti for proofreading the draft of my manuscript with typical Scottish kindness and precision. Throughout the years in Boston, Tokyo, and Aberdeen, my family has been an unfailing source of encouragement. I deeply appreciate my parents and parents-in-law for their support and encouragement throughout my doctoral study, which followed a decade of a work as a diplomatic journalist in Seoul and New York. I appreciate Justin and Valerie for their various encouragement with drawings and smiles and for excusing my frequent absences from home during the weekends. My wife, Kyungmee, has consistently supported me while this project developed, crossing two oceans, accompanying various changes in our lives. I thank her for her patience and unwavering support and thus dedicate this book to her.

Abbreviations

AMG CIA CWIHP DDF DSB ECA FDR JCS KARD FRUS ISNK HUSAFIK HSTL KEDO KDP KMT KPG KPR NGB NGNB NSC PRC OSS PPS PRO ROK SWNCC UNTCOK

American Military Government Central Intelligence Agency Cold War International History Project Documents Diplomatiques Français Department of State Bulletin Economic Cooperation Administration Franklin Delano Roosevelt Joint Chiefs of Staff Korean–American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States Foreign Relations of the United States Intelligence Summary North Korea History of the United State Armed Forces in Korea Harry S. Truman Library Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Korean Democratic Party Kuomintang Korean Provisional Government Korean Peoples’ Republic Nihon Gaiko Bunsho Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo Narabini Shuyo Bunsho National Security Council People’s Republic of China Office of Strategic Service Policy Planning Staff Public Record Office Republic of Korea State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea


Seung-young Kim

Introduction

T

he Korean Peninsula has been one of the most visible areas in discussions about US military commitment to various parts of the world. Amid the rise of the friction in the US-South Korean alliance, perspectives about the origin of US commitment to Korea have often set the terms for discussion about the current role of the United States in Korea. This book attempts to assess the origin and nature of US policy toward Korea by examining three periods in the early half of US-Korean relations— the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman—until the decision to intervene in the Korean War in 1950. The popular debate on US foreign policy in South Korea can be summarized largely by two perspectives. One perspective regards US foreign policy as usually promoting and protecting democracy, whereas the other perspective regards it as a tool in promoting its economic interests. The latter has been the main source of anti-Americanism in South Korea, whereas the former has often nurtured a complacent attitude, regarding US assistance and protection as a given and taken for granted. Though these characterizations may sound simplistic, they have been, in fact, very popular as bases for discussion of US foreign policy in many countries around the world. This book does not deny the role of these two dynamics as the drivers behind US foreign policy. But it explains US policy toward Korea largely as an effort to promote its strategic interests, which are defined by its central decision makers in their pursuit to maintain a favorable balance of power in broader East Asia and the world. Often there were delays in the policymaking process in Washington when addressing the changes in strategic situations, but the author believes that the US policy toward Korea can be understood best in this broader strategic term. The chosen case histories of this book have been extensively studied by distinguished historians to whose work I am much indebted in preparing this book. But there have been few efforts to examine these important periods with an effort to identify some recurring patterns in the history of US commitment toward Korea. To do this, this book moderately introduces the method developed in the theoretical study of international relations,

2

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY & STRATEGY TOWARD KOREA & NORTHEAST ASIA

while trying to reconstruct the chosen histories of US diplomacy toward Korea.1 Following the tradition of diplomatic history, it examines how the central decision makers in the US government assessed the strategic situation and formulated their diplomatic and military strategies and implemented them. Particularly, the changing perceptions of central decision makers and the dynamic of decision making in the Washington bureaucracy will be scrutinized by tracing the historical records with extensive quotations. Korea’s diplomatic initiatives and the political situations in Korea and northeast Asia will also be examined; but the main focus of the book remains the examination of US policies toward Korea and its comparison with those toward China and Japan. While doing this, this book will offer some explanations of these controversial issues in historical research: the causes and process of US abandonment of Korea during the RussoJapanese War; the causes of US suggestion of the thirty-eighth parallel at the end of World War II; and the reasons why Washington chose to withdraw its troops from Korea in 1947 and then chose to save South Korea at the outbreak of the Korean War. After presenting a narrative historical account, this book makes an additional effort to summarize a recurring pattern in US policy at the conclusion of each part. This theoretically informed approach may not be welcomed by traditional historians for simplifying the realities, but this can help enhance our understanding of one of the main sources of US commitment to Korea until 1950. It will also provide some clues to explain the more recent US commitment to Korea along with implication in considering the current and future trends in US-South Korean relations. It is also hoped that the later chapters of this book can provide a basis for the broader debate on US military occupation of other countries in the current world. In this book, Korean, Chinese, and Japanese names are rendered according to local custom, that is, family names before given names, except for Syngman Rhee and other names that have traditionally appeared in English with the family names last. The Romanization of Korean followed in general the Revised Korean Romanization, issued by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of South Korea in 2001. The Romanization of Japanese followed a simplified Hapburn system without diacritical marks.

1

Sources of US Commitment toward Korea

U

S policy toward Korea from 1882 until 1950 can be understood as a US commitment toward a periphery. Although South Korea achieved impressive economic development during the later half of the cold war, until the outbreak of the Korean War it remained as a weak country in the periphery. When considering the US commitment toward the periphery, there are several established explanations of US foreign policy that deserve a brief review. The Realist Argument and Hypotheses Realist theorists in international relations have highlighted the importance of the constraints and opportunities posed by the international system on a country’s (i.e., state’s) foreign policy. Their main concerns in studying the foreign policy of states have rested on examining how central decision makers have addressed changes in the international environment by mobilizing domestic resources and concluding alliances with other states. While doing this, three strands of realism have advanced relevant discussions that are useful for the study of the great powers’ commitment toward the periphery.1 The classical realists, who often presented normative advice for statecraft, underscored the importance of wisdom and prudence in diplomacy and statecraft. As Walter Lippmann admonished, they also emphasized the importance of reconciling the goals (i.e., ends) of foreign policy with the available means in a rational manner rather than the pursuit of ideals, which could generate an overextension of commitment.2 Also, they have advised statesmen to discern between vital interests and peripheral interests and to utilize the subtle skill of diplomacy to find an alternative solution to war.3

4


The neorealists have kept the central tenets of classical realism but have put far greater emphasis on the constraints imposed by the international system while trying to present more rigorous social scientific theory of international politics. While doing this, they pay little attention to the study of specific foreign policies regarding such research as a reductionist approach.4 Yet the neorealist theory, which focuses on the constraints imposed by an international system, provides highly useful insights, which should serve as a starting point for the study of foreign policy. According to neorealists, in a bipolar world, super powers’ commitment toward the periphery increases and alliance relations also remain stable, because states have few options when choosing their alliance partners.5 This is a major difference from a mulipolar world, where the states have various options in choosing their alliance partners and the great powers’ commitment toward the non-vital periphery tends to be decreased.6 Though it is important to consider these fundamental differences accompanied by the changes of polarity in the international system, it is still impossible to exclude the roles of central decision makers when studying specific foreign policies of states. This is because it is, after all, the statesmen and stateswomen who assess the strategic environment and choose the most appropriate strategy under the influence of their perceptions and beliefs. Thus, a group of scholars, referred to as neoclassical realists, have recently made efforts to reinstate the role of statesmen in their studies of foreign policies. Particularly, they have factored in the perceptions and beliefs of the central decision makers when examining the effects of international systemic constraints imposed on states.7 The author’s view and approach in examining US policy toward Korea is couched upon this neoclassical realism in the study of foreign policy. To advance my main argument, I believe that it is when the perception of bipolar confrontation becomes dominant in Washington that the US commitment to Korea becomes strengthened. In contrast, when the multipolar perception becomes dominant in Washington, the US commitment to Korea is weakened.8 This is because US decision makers have formulated its policies toward Korea in the broad context of their efforts to maintain a favorable balance of power, considering the changes in East Asia and the world, as well as its own military capability.9 When discussing the process of change in US commitment, there are two other highly useful theoretical findings that refined the realist argument. First, Stephen Walt’s alliance theory provides insights that can help our understanding about the process of changes in intensity of US commitment to Korea. Walt has posited shared threat perception as the most important factor that decides alliance solidarity between states.10 His findings seem to be the most useful when synthesized as an intervening process Seung-young Kim

SOURCES OF US COMMITMENT TOWARD KOREA

5

to explain the changes of US commitment to the periphery. Thus, I assume that under the condition of bipolarity there will be few discrepancies in threat perception between the United States and Korea toward Korea’s (or South Korea’s) local adversary. In contrast, under a multipolar situation a discrepancy in threat perception would emerge between the United States and Korea. This is because under a bipolar condition the United States perceives threats on (South) Korea as an integral part of threat from the international system,11 whereas in a multipolar condition, the United States does not perceive local threat on Korea as a threat from the broader international system. Second, Robert Jervis posited the evocation of the domino image as a main cause of increase in US commitment toward the periphery. Jervis and his associates found that the image of falling dominos infused US leaders with zero-sum views toward the Soviet Union during the cold war,12 thus strengthening US commitment toward the periphery. This finding is largely compatible with the neorealist argument about the increase of great power commitment toward the periphery under bipolarity. Therefore, I include the evocation of the domino image in my hypotheses and will examine its role in strengthening US commitment to Korea under bipolarity and multipolarity. Drawing on these discussions by realist thinkers, I deduce a set of hypotheses in Table 1 to explore the changes of US commitment toward Korea.13 When considering the perceptions of US leaders and their decisionmaking, I address another theoretical issue, which is the causal weight between particular policy ideas (i.e., beliefs) and the material strategic environment existing out there. Constructivist theorists have argued that idea always plays the central role regardless of the material situation,14 whereas neorealists have denied the independent role of ideas. Over this issue, I take the middle ground, like the scholars who underscored the instrumental role of ideas like roadmaps that increase an actor’s clarity about goals or ends-means relationships.15 I assume that a priori policy ideas (i.e., beliefs) retained by policy makers play an instrumental and additional role when the strategic environment is ambiguous.16 They influence the process of assessing the external situation and choosing the right strategy, as Alexander George articulated.17 But when the pressure from the international environment becomes overwhelming, then I assume that the decision makers adjust their policy to adapt to the changes in the policy environment. In this way, I maintain a realist perspective in generating my hypotheses, though I recognize the instrumental role of ideas. While examining the role of ideas, I distinguish the committed thinkers on strategic issues (i.e., strategic intellectual and ideologues) from uncommitted thinkers on strategic issues. Strategic intellectuals or ideologues have Seung-young Kim

Table 1. Hypotheses on Perception of Polarity and US Commitment to Korea When a Bipolarity Perception Becomes Dominant 1. Domino image and grand strategy: The image of the falling dominoes becomes persuasive in Washington. US decision makers consider that even the periphery is important and pursue a strategy of preponderance. 2. Threat perception and alliance commitment: Few discrepancies exist in threat perceptions between the United States and Korea (South Korea) toward Korea’s local adversary, thus the US commitment to Korea remains firm and the alliance remains robust. 3. Ends-and-means (cost-benefit) analysis and the commitment: The United States becomes willing to take on the costs of defending Korea and the ends-and-means analysis does not block the US commitment to Korean security. 4. Pattern of diplomacy: The United States does not make much effort to reach out for a multilateral solution or negotiated settlement for the Korean question, against the wishes of Korea (or South Korea). When a Multipolarity Perception Becomes Dominant 1. Domino image and grand strategy: The image of the falling dominoes loses its appeal, and the United States becomes ready to recognize the sphere of influence of major regional powers. 2. Threat perception and alliance commitment: US leaders do not share the threat perception with Korean leaders toward Korea’s (or South Korea’s) local enemy. The gap in threat perception generates alliance tension between Washington and Seoul. 3. Ends-and-means (cost-benefit) analysis and the commitment: The United States becomes more sensitive to the costs of protecting Korea, and this ends-and-means analysis becomes an important factor in the US debate on its commitment to Korea. 4. Pattern of diplomacy: The United States tries to find alternative or additional partners, which may facilitate a negotiated settlement for the Korea problem. It also looks for nonmilitary measures, such as more active multilateral diplomacy, often against the wishes of Korea (or South Korea).

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7

clear a priori ideas about strategic affairs and tend to pursue the implementation of such coherent ideas consistently. In contrast, uncommitted thinkers do not have a priori ideas on strategic issues, though they may have morality driven ideas or just a very pragmatic approach.18 I hypothesize that in the case of committed thinkers, their ideas become instrumental in assessing the external strategic environment and choosing the policies, whereas uncommitted thinkers tend to follow the development of the strategic situation and adjust their policies in a reactive manner. Competing Explanations My hypotheses are deduced from the established central tenet of realist theories of international relations. But to evaluate the persuasiveness of my explanation, it should be examined in light of other established competing explanations. Thus, though my main goal remains writing a narrative history drawing on realist hypotheses as a guide for interpretation,19 I will pay some supplementary attention to the other dynamics posited by relevant theories and historiographies on US foreign policy. Promoting Democracy. Promoting democracy has long been regarded as a major motive of American foreign policy. Diplomatic historians have often explained this unique sense of mission as a major dynamic in American foreign policy. In their view, Americans have tried to change the world according to the image of the United States, which they believe is superior in political institutions and way of life to tyrannies, autocracies, or uncivilized states. Some scholars have criticized this missionary impulse as a convenient ideology to justify America’s imperial expansion under

Table 2. Hypotheses on the Role of Ideas and Beliefs • In the case of committed thinkers on strategic issues (e.g., strategic intellectuals or idealogues), their a priori strategic beliefs play an additional role (i.e., “add more”) in defining the existing strategic situation and formulating strategy, whereas uncommitted thinkers adapt to the changes of the external strategic situation in a reactive manner. • Beliefs and ideas matter in assessing the strategic situation and formulating strategy, but within the context of the given material strategic situation.

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the banner of “manifest destiny.”20 But, overall, history shows that such a mission-oriented approach has been present and utilized as an American method of foreign policy to deal with the problems of the world. Woodrow Wilson’s effort to “make the world safe for democracy” epitomized this approach and has been followed by many other presidents in different ways.21 However, it has not been settled whether the United States has tried to spread democracy for a purely altruistic purpose or whether it has promoted democracy even when its security interest was at stake. In my case histories, I will assess how much America’s effort to promote democracy mattered in its policy toward Korea by comparing its causal weight with that of security concerns. Promoting economic interest. The US defense policy has also been explained as serving to promote its economic interests abroad. This explanation is largely in line with leftist theories, and several diplomatic historians have utilized such theories when explaining American foreign policy.22 Earlier, Hobson and Lenin put forward theories of imperialism, maintaining that capitalist states pursue imperial expansion because domestic underconsumption and the lure of markets abroad push and pull them toward territorial expansion.23 In world systems theory, capitalist core states are portrayed as always trying to keep economic openness in the periphery states in order to exploit them by drawing on their technological and financial advantages. In its analysis, the “world’s dominant economic powers use its military power to protect the international system against external antagonists, internal rebellions, and internecine differences.”24 Corporatist theorists and historians assume a symbiotic collaboration between two senior partners and two junior partners: “the state and oligarchy capital” and “organized labor and the farm bloc.” According to the distillation of Thomas McCormick, they pursue aggrandizement of mutual economic interests through collaboration. 25 Recent corporatist historiography focuses as much on a more benign aspect of collaboration that promotes the liberal international order based on economic interdependence and a web of institutions.26 But, overall, the corporatists would predict that the United States pursues expansion into the periphery while serving the interests of collaboration participants. In short, these theories predict that if there exist economic interests or the prospect of economic interests, then the United States will extend its military commitment or pursue a territorial occupation of the states in the periphery. Scrutinizing the whole process of economic motives in US defense policy is beyond the scope of this book, because such a study should examine the broader societal pressure from interest groups as well as the decision making process in the Executive Branch. Thus, I will confine my Seung-young Kim


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goal to examining whether discussions about economic interests played a significant role in the US government’s decisions toward Korea. Pragmatic approach to address the local threat. America’s defense commitment to Korea has often been explained as an effort to address the local threat posed by North Korea. Indeed, the level of immediate local threat is an important factor in deciding the alliance commitment of a great power, but whether it draws greater concern than the need to maintain balance among great power relations deserves scrutiny. Explaining America’s commitment in terms of addressing the local threat is in line with pragmatic explanations of American foreign policy. Cecil Crabb maintained that American foreign policy has consistently followed a pragmatic approach of problem solving, which best reflects the American way of life rather than a grand design or ruthless power politics.27 Stanley Hoffman also pointed out that the United States has often sought technical and short term solutions for deep-rooted political problems.28 In fact, during the cold war the changes in the immediate local threat from North Korea have often been announced as the rationale for US troop reductions in South Korea. Thus, in my case histories, I will look at whether the intensity of local threat was more important than the changes caused by the major power relations in deciding the intensity of America’s defense commitment to Korea. The following chapters examine three crucial periods in US-Korean relations until 1950, utilizing the realist hypotheses as guides to explore history. I offer a brief account of the period from 1882 until 1901 in Chapter 2 but do not include any detailed review of the period when Korea was under Japanese colonial rule from 1910 until 1941. This is to maintain the focus of comparison29 and to spare greater room for the examination of the crucial turning points of US decisions toward Korea.

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Seung-young Kim

Part I

US Diplomacy toward Korea in the Era of the Russo-Japanese War

T

he United States established diplomatic relations with Korea in 1882, when Korea chose to open its doors to Western powers.1 King Kojong, who assumed power after two decades of the seclusion policy of his father (Regent Taewonkun), hoped to strengthen his country by accepting Western-style modernization. But the hermit Confucian kingdom was already at the mercy of imperial rivalry, which eventually resulted in two major wars between great powers ocurring before Korea became a Japanese protectorate in 1905. The fundamental cause of this rivalry lay in the geopolitical location of Korea at the intersection of great powers. But the Korean court’s failure to achieve genuine reform and self-strengthening also contributed to such rivalry. Often, the Korean court made strenuous and desperate efforts to counterbalance foreign intrusion by inviting other powers, but such efforts further escalated imperial rivalry in Korea. US relations with Korea also evolved intertwined with this rivalry and Korean appeals to guard its independence.

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2

The Rise of Korean Expectation and Decline of US Commitment to Korea, 1882–1901

T

he United States reached out to Korea mainly to open trade and to rescue shipwrecked crews. But other imperial powers approached Korea with far greater political and military intentions. China was trying to strengthen its traditional suzerainty over Korea to secure the peninsula as a buffer area against foreign intrusion. Japan eyed Korea, regarding it within its “cordon of interest,” which was indispensable to Japan’s “independence and self-defense.”2 Russia also made incessant efforts to secure political influence and ice-free ports in the peninsula, especially after its southward move was frustrated by Britain in the Middle East and Afghanistan. But such machination by Russia ignited nervous concerns by Japan and Britain, thus eventually contributing to the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, which helped Japan win the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Despite its disinterested stance, the United States became involved in such diplomatic rivalry over Korea. Initially, it tried to help Korea maintain independence as long as it could remain militarily uninvolved. But with the passing of time, it adopted strict neutrality and impartiality, which often was tantamount to recognition of the dominant powers’ policy in Korea. Often, American diplomats in Seoul tried to help Korean independence out of sympathy and based on their own judgment. But their efforts were repeatedly restrained by Washington, which took great care not to be entangled in the rivalry in the Far East. This trend continued until Theodore Roosevelt became president in 1901.

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The Opening of US-Korean Relations and the Rise of Korean Expectations US-Korean relations during the imperial era could be characterized as an asymmetry of expectation. While Koreans regarded the United States as the most trustworthy country from which to get assistance, the United States tried to disengage itself from any kind of political involvement that might lead to military intervention. When approaching Korea, the United States received the assistance of China. China was going through a rapid decline because of Western intrusions and domestic instabilities. But it still tried to strengthen its traditional influence over Korea and believed that a US-Korean treaty could counterbalance Japanese influence in Korea. The United States had independently prepared to open relations with Korea, and the US negotiator, Commodore Schufeldt, initially brought a letter of introduction by the Japanese Foreign Minister.3 But Korea refused to contact him. After learning this, Chinese statesman, Li Hung-chang, offered to introduce Schufeldt to the Korean court and, in fact, led the negotiation process by inviting him and Korean representatives to Tienjin. Li’s motive was to utilize the United States to counterbalance Japan, which was strengthening its influence after forcefully opening diplomatic relations with Korea in 1876. At the same time, Li tried to confirm Chinese suzerainty over Korea by inserting a dependency clause in the US-Korean treaty. It was an effort to strengthen China’s suzerainty by couching the relation within a modern international legal framework.4 Schufeldt, however, adamantly opposed inserting such a dependency clause. He pointed out that the Japan-Korea treaty of 1876 already clarified Korean independence, and that such a dependency clause would cause a rejection of the treaty in the United States.5 Eventually, after five months of tedious negotiation, a diplomatic compromise was reached. Schufeldt wrote a separate letter to Li, and the Korean king also wrote a separate letter to the US President indirectly acknowledging Korea’s dependency upon China. But the treaty itself was concluded on May 22, 1882, without the dependency clause. As Washington did not send any specific instructions, Shufeldt’s effort to support Korean independence was largely initiated by his own judgment.6 The Korean court, however, perceived Schufeldt’s efforts as reflecting Washington’s policy to support Korean independence. The inclusion of the good office clause also heightened the Korean courts’ expectation of American assistance. The clause, modeled after a very similar clause in the US-China treaty of 1858,7 stated that Seung-young Kim

THE RISE OF KOREAN EXPECTATION AND DECLINE OF US COMMITMENT

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If other Powers deal injustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings.8

The United States believed the clause did not imply any special obligation or commitment to maintain Korean independence. About six months after the conclusion of the treaty, the US Minister in Beijing reported frankly, “we have very little to lose whether Corea becomes a province of China or is annexed to Japan or remains independent,” while evaluating the opening of relations as a step forward in advancing US commercial interest and extending advanced American civilization.9 However, the Koreans developed expectations of America as a guarantor of Korea’s independence due to the context in which the clause was included. When a similar clause was inserted in the US-China treaty in 1858, China was in the middle of imperial rivalry, and it was the Chinese commissioner who inserted this clause in the treaty with the United States. Li Hung-chang was fully aware of this background and inserted the clause in the US-Korean treaty as a check against Japanese and Russian encroachment into Korea.10 The Chinese translation of the clause, pilsusangjo, which literally means “must extend help each other,” further encouraged Korean expectations of American assistance.11 King Kojong and his adherents interpreted the American “guarantee” as not only a legal but also a moral commitment.12 Thus, they regarded the United States as the guarantor to maintain Korean independence and repeatedly invoked the goodoffice clause whenever their country faced a threat from other imperial powers.13 After the treaty was signed in 1882 the United States took several actions that further encouraged Korean expectations. When a military revolt arose in 1882 by disgruntled Korean military trainees and caused a confrontation between China and Japan, the United States deployed its gunboat, Monocasey, to Korean waters with a view to facilitate its good offices role, though it preferred to keep strict impartiality.14 A stronger show of sincerity to support Korea was demonstrated when British Minister Harry Parkes in Tokyo tried to block the exchange of the ratification of the USKorean treaty. Regarding the treaty as too liberal and setting a bad precedent, Parkes attempted to block the exchange of the ratification when American Minister Lucius Foote visited Japan on his way to Korea. But Secretary of State Frelinghuysen instructed Foote to continue forward, thus he sailed into Korea and proceeded with the exchange of ratification.15 Minister Foote’s capacity was also perceived as a sign of sincerity toward Korea. Washington appointed Foote, who was former Minister to Colombia, as Minister Plenipotentiary to Korea. This was in sharp contrast to Seung-young Kim

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Britain, which made its Minister to Beijing also responsible for Korea, thus indirectly recognizing China’s suzerainty over Korea. When Minister Foote had his first audience with Kojong, he further enhanced the king’s expectations. Following the exchange of the ratification of the treaty, Foote stated, “in this progressive age, there is a moral power more potent than standing armies, and the weakness of a nation is sometimes its strength.”16 After hearing all this encouragement, the Korean king expressed genuine happiness. He remarked, “I rejoice that the friendship of the two countries is now firmly cemented, and I am certain that the friendly relations will always continue.” 17 Retreat of US Interest until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 Despite the goodwill shown at the beginning of diplomatic relations, Washington soon began to show signs of disinterest toward Korea. When Kojong asked the United States to send a military advisor in 1882, Washington delayed sending four advisors for almost five years mainly due to the lukewarm response in the State Department and Congress, which preferred to remain aloof from the imperial intrigues over Korea.18 More explicitly Washington decided to reduce the existing post in Seoul to the rank of Minister Resident and Consul General in July 1884.19 Faced with such a sudden demotion, Minister Foote resigned in a show of dissent;20 but the State Department did not send his replacement until June 1886 and just designated Lieutenant Foulk, navy officer in the Seoul legation, as temporary Minister to Korea in January 1885.21 In December 1884, there was a coup d’etat in Seoul by radical pro-Japan reformists. Their reform efforts lasted only three days, and were suppressed by the conservatives who relied on the forces of China. As a result, China came to further strengthen its influence in the Korean court and strove to limit Korea’s independent diplomatic activities. But the State Department chose to confine its concern to protecting American citizens and commerce rather than ensuring Korean independence.22 Witnessing such dwindling US interest toward Korea, the Korean court intended to counterbalance Chinese and Japanese influence by inviting a Russian military advisor and leasing Port Lazarev (Wonsan) to Russia. While these secret discussions continued amid spreading rumors, in April 1885, Britain illegally occupied Keomundo, an island with a well-sheltered harbor off the southern coast of Korea. At that time, Britain had been competing fiercely with Russia in the Middle East and Afghanistan and was concerned about the concentration of the Russian fleet in the Far East. Britain intended to block Vladivostok with this preemptive occupation of Seung-young Kim


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Keomundo, which was renamed Port Hamilton by Britain after the occupation.23 Britain eventually withdrew from the island in February 1887; but the occupation made Russia realize the difficulty in protecting its Far East interest with naval power alone, and thus expedited its construction of the Trans-Siberian railway.24 For Korea, the occupation was not only a clear breach of territorial integrity but also a serious threat to its safety with the potential of conflict between two great powers over Korea. Faced with impending danger, the Korean government appealed for American mediation in 1885, according to the good office clause of the US-Korea treaty.25 However, the Secretary of State, Thomas F. Bayard, made it clear that the treaty did not empower such an intervention, and the United States did not have any intention to interfere on behalf of Korea.26 The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 further demonstrated the limits of US assistance to Korea. The war came primarily because Japan wanted to secure Korea within its sphere of influence by expelling the dominant influence of China. But the broader origin of the war had to do with the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad, which began in May 1891. Japan was already regarding Russia as its primary enemy, as was articulated in the foreign policy memorandum of General Yamagata Aritomo in March 1890.27 Thus, consolidating its position in Korea before the completion of the Trans-Siberian railroad was deemed to be the most important, because the railroad would allow an enormous increase in Russia’s power projection capability. Such strategic necessity was further justified by Japanese public perception of the Korean situation. Since witnessing the failure of the pro-Japan reformist coup in 1884 and the brutal assassinations of the coup leaders, the Japanese public began to view the war as necessary to “save” Korea from the decadent grip of Korean conservatives and China. In tandem with the expectation of economic expansion, such thoughts provided a very popular rationale among the Japanese public behind the jingoistic support for the war.28 Japan found the opportunity to intervene when the Korean government asked China to send troops to quell the Tonghak revolt, which arose in 1894 with a similar origin and on a similar scale to the Taiping rebellion in China. The Korean government did not invite Japan to send any troops; but Japan sent much larger forces than China under the pretext of the Treaty of Tientsin of 1885 that stipulated mutual notification between China and Japan when sending troops to Korea. In fact, when Japan landed large forces in Korea, the revolting peasant army volunteered a truce with the Seoul government not to invite foreign intervention, and Seoul remained calm and peaceful. However, Japanese forces initiated a war by attacking the Chinese fleet in the Yellow Sea and quickly occupied the Korean court in Seoul.29 The war was waged on the peninsula and in southern Manchuria and ended in Seung-young Kim

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phenomenal triumph for Japan. As the spoils of war, Japan received Taiwan and the Liaotung peninsula, as well as an indemnity of about two hundred million Tail (three hundred million Yen) from China, thus establishing both its influence in Korea and its new role as an imperial power in Asia. During the war, Korea and Britain reached out to the United States with a view to seeking its assistance in mediation. But the United States stopped short of making an effort for mediation, though it showed sincerity in keeping the good office clause during the early stages of the war. When the Korean court appealed repeatedly to the United States to prevent the outbreak of war, Secretary of State Gresham instructed the US legation in Seoul to exert its best efforts for the preservation of peaceful conditions “in view of the friendly interest of the United States in the welfare of Korea and its people” and urged the Japanese Minister in Washington to respect the sovereign rights of Korea.30 But he did not go further than to exert moral and diplomatic influence on the Japanese government.31 In fact, on July 7, 1894, just several hours after sending a telegram urging Japan to seek a peaceful settlement, Gresham told the Japanese minister in Washington that the United States had no intention of intervening with force in behalf of Korea.32 After an initial Japanese victory, Britain also inquired whether the United States would join Britain, Russia, Germany, and France in an intervention on behalf of Korean independence. But US president Grover Cleveland recoiled from the British suggestion.33 In fact, the US stance during the war was as good as pro-Japan neutrality, though Washington announced strict neutrality throughout the war. In the early stages of the war, Japan could launch an attack on Chinese forces after being assured that the United States would not join a joint intervention by Western powers. Later, during the Shimonoseki negotiation to settle the terms of peace, Japan was again encouraged by the benevolent neutrality of the United States. The stance taken by the United States during the negotiation was most friendly to Japan, in contrast to the lukewarm attitude taken by the European powers.34 Thus, in Japan, the United States was regarded as the most reliable power throughout the war.35 Such a policy of the United States reflected its tradition of nonintervention in Asian affairs and its efforts to strengthen a friendly Asian power, that is, Japan. In the view of American leaders, a strong Japan would counterbalance the European intrusion in East Asia and could promote a favorable balance of power for the United States in the region.36 Meanwhile, US economic interest was negligible in Korea. Thus, the United States remained unwilling to commit to a military intervention in Korea and recognized the course of development that would eventually help Japanese dominance in Korea. Seung-young Kim


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Escalation of Russo-Japanese Rivalry and America’s Ambiguous Attitude Though Japan achieved a phenomenal victory over China, its ambitious acquisition of the Liaotung Peninsula caused the triple intervention of Russia, France, and Germany that forced Japan to retrocede the peninsula in 1895. Russia initiated the intervention, regarding any Japanese foothold in southern Manchuria as threatening Beijing and the Russian Far East. To force the retrocession, Russia mobilized its land forces in the Russian Far East in April 1895 and sent its powerful Mediterranean squadron to join its Far Eastern squadron.37 With little ability to resist a coalition of three European powers, Japan accepted their demands, only receiving an additional indemnity of thirty million taels for surrendering its foothold in China. What made Japan more enraged was Russia’s lease of the same peninsula three years after the retrocession. In 1898, Russia obtained a twentyfive-year lease on the peninsula and fortified Port Arthur on the southern tip of the peninsula. This move was influenced by the German lease of Kiaochow Bay in the Shantung Peninsula in 1897 but was in line with Russia’s decades-long efforts to secure an ice-free port in the Far East. Such a humiliating experience made Japan prepare for the forthcoming debacle with Russia by doubling its army and carrying out an ambitious seven-year naval build-up program, utilizing the indemnity from China.38 In Korea as well, Japan tried to expedite pro-Japan reform and the imposition of a protectorate, but the forceful measures of Japan made the Korean court lean further toward the Russian side. To prevent such a tilt toward Russia, the Japanese Minister in Seoul employed brutal measures. In October 1895, he engineered the hideous assassination of the Korean Queen, who was leading the policy of “inviting Russia and expelling Japan.” But the murder turned out to be counterproductive for Japan, at least in the short term. King Kojong, who felt threatened and under virtual captivity by pro-Japanese forces around the palace, sought temporary domicile in the Russian legation in February 1896. While Kojong stayed in the Russian legation for a year and a half, pro-Russian Ministers were appointed in the Korean government and Russia sent a financial advisor and military advisors to train Korean soldiers so that they could protect the king after his return to the palace.39 During such upheaval, Horace Allen, the American secretary in its Seoul legation, took a leading role in revealing Japanese misdeeds and protecting the King. Allen was temporarily in charge of the legation while Minister Sill was on leave in Japan and was instructed repeatedly by Washington to refrain from involvement in the political turmoil in Korea. But he collected evidence of Japanese involvement in the assassination of the queen, based Seung-young Kim

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on the testimony of the American military advisor General William Dye, and telegraphed an extensive and concrete report to Washington.40 After finding that Kojong was feeling extremely vulnerable, he also deployed fifteen US marines in Seoul in a joint action with the Russian legation, under the pretext of protecting their legations. Moreover, he arranged to provide safe food for Kojong with the help of American missionaries and the wives of western diplomats in Seoul and helped facilitate Kojong’s move to the Russian legation.41 But the State Department repeatedly instructed the Seoul legation to confine its activities to the protection of American citizens and interests. It cautioned the legation to stay away from the internal affairs of Korea and any joint efforts with European representatives against Japan.42 Such a cautious stance was partly due to contradicting reports from the US legation in Tokyo, which claimed that Allen’s report was exaggerated compared to the Japanese explanation. But this stance of abstaining from intervention abroad was the established policy in Washington during the era.43 Two years later, Allen was appointed the US Minister in the Seoul Legation, replacing Minister Sill in September 1897, and on that occasion Kojong confided in him, “we feel that America is to us as our Elder Brother.”44 However, Secretary of State Sherman reminded Allen that the US government had no protective alliance with Korea and urged him to maintain strict neutrality in Korean affairs.45 By the time Kojong returned to the palace from the Russian legation in February 1897, a strategic equilibrium between Russia and Japan had emerged in Korea. While Russian attention was diverted to Manchuria after its acquisition of the Liaotung peninsula in December 1897, an amicable convention was signed by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Nishi, and the Russian Minister to Tokyo, Rosen, in April 1898. Russia recognized Japan’s dominant influence in commercial and industrial activities in Korea and agreed on mutual consultations when sending military and financial advisors to Korea. 46 After securing an ice-free port in Port Arthur along with railroad access to the port, Russia gave first priority to the control of Manchuria. Consequently, Korea gained only secondary importance as a buffer to protect Manchuria in Russian considerations.47 Although the Nishi-Rosen Convention provided a foundation for equilibrium, tense competition continued between Japan and Russia over Korea. The competition to secure strategic locations and facilities in Korea epitomized such rivalry. In fact, it was the Korean government that encouraged foreigners to acquire the right to construct port facilities and railroads after the Sino-Japanese War with a view to inducing the formation of a balance of power among the foreign powers in Korea. The most lucrative economic concessions were given to the United States because the Korean Seung-young Kim


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court hoped to increase US stakes in Korea in order to keep its political commitment to Korea. But, in securing the strategic locations and facilities, Russia and Japan demonstrated the fiercest competition. Particularly, the two countries waged a furious struggle to purchase more land in the Korean port cities, such as Masampo, Mokpo, and Kojedo Island in 1899 and spring 1900.48 This competition dissipated due to the rise of the Boxer Rebellion from early 1900, but it generated a brief war scare in Japan, demonstrating the fragile nature of the Russo-Japanese understanding over Korea.49 The Image of Korean Domestic Politics and its Influence on Diplomacy The signing of the Nishi-Rosen Convention allowed a kind of stability for Korea to pursue domestic reform. But Korea’s domestic political situation still stagnated. Reform efforts of enlightened intellectuals were blocked by the monarch and the conservatives, and the court-led reform, launched in 1897, also remained superficial. In the observation of American diplomats, Korea lost several years of opportunity for reform before the RussoJapanese War.50 The most conspicuous development during that period was the emergence of the Independence Club movement, led by enlightened young intellectuals and former bureaucrats. The club was inaugurated on July 2, 1896, when the king was still in asylum in the Russian legation. It sought to encourage reform through such activities as publications, lectures, memorials, and demonstrations. The club urged Korean leaders to pursue independent and neutral foreign policy and to develop modern national defense capabilities including a navy. It also promoted the people’s rights movement in line with Western liberalism and sought to introduce constitutional monarchy by inaugurating a Senate. Its bilingual newspaper, The Independent, was the first vernacular newspaper in Korea and efficiently served as a vehicle to spread the messages of reform and patriotic nationalism. In reply, Kojong moved from the Russian legation to the Kyongun Place (today’s Toksu Palace) in February 1897, and also, for a brief time, selected leaders of the Independence Club to become cabinet ministers. Kojong, however, suppressed the movement when he felt a challenge to his own security. When the club voted to give a seat in the Senate to Pak Yong-hyo, who led a radical reform movement in 1884 and was in asylum in Japan, the conservatives spread rumors that the club was pursuing dangerous republicanism and that its leaders were merely a group of pro-Japan traitors.51 Kojong became captive to such rumors spread through posters and ordered the disbandment of the club in December 26, 1898. The leaders of Seung-young Kim

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the club were imprisoned and the arch conservatives recovered their positions in the government, aborting the opportunity to pursue institutional reform and self-strengthening.52 Allen, the US Minister to Seoul, sympathized with the club movement, but avoided becoming involved with it. He had great enthusiasm for its work and diligently reported its activities to Washington. The club was, in fact, virtually led by pro-American reformers, who had studied or worked in the United States. Though their contacts were mostly limited to the US diplomats in Seoul, they could use their pro-American stance as a political asset because Kojong consistently took pro-American views.53 In late 1897, Allen reported: “The club is composed of best elements among the Korean officials and will undoubtedly continue to do a great deal for the country if unmolested.” In his observation, “the members seem[ed] all to have taken America as their model.”54 Allen assiduously reported the developments surrounding the movement to Washington. But he took caution not to be involved with the international rivalry by taking any specific stance about the club movement. When Kojong asked Allen’s opinion about the bloody struggle between the club members and the armed peddlers mobilized by the conservatives, he declined to give advice.55 He also refused to participate in a joint action when the British representative suggested to him to protest against the Korean government for using force to disperse mass meetings. Allen did not wish to take the side of Britain and Japan by taking such a joint action, which would place him against Russia and France in Korea.56 But after witnessing the decline of the movement following its peak in November 1898, Allen later recalled, “this attempt at self-government has shown that the Koreans are very far from ready for it as yet.”57 In parallel with the movement of the Independence Club, the Korean government initiated its own reform efforts in October 1897. This effort has been referred to as the Kwangmoo Reforms by some Korean scholars, but the success of the reforms has been debated. After returning from his flight to the Russian legation, Kojong promoted himself to emperor and proclaimed the inauguration of the independent Great Han (Korean) Empire in response to the urge of public opinion. It was an effort to restore the prestige of the monarch and to solidify the independence of Korea. The inauguration of the Empire was also accompanied by several visible measures of modernization, including tentative efforts to reform the land and tax systems and to create new central economic institutions with foreign assistance.58 Despite such changes in the ambience, however, the political situation went backward. Since the suppression of the Independence Club, changes were led by the archconservatives and reversed the earlier reform of 1894, Seung-young Kim


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which had limited the autocratic power of the king through the inauguration of the cabinet and measures to control official revenue under the Finance Ministry.59 But the new court-led reform allowed the emperor to override the decisions of cabinet and to recentralize the budgetary authority to the royal household, thus making the Korean Emperor an absolute monarch with unlimited authority.60 This change resulted in the loss of a checks-and-balance system, and the enhanced discretionary powers of the emperor invited favoritism and made palace intrigue endemic. Also, while the financial powers of the monarch were enormously increased, the government experienced a desperate financial situation.61 About this time, Britain also regarded the Korean government as incurably corrupt and doubted the country’s capability to retain its independence.62 Kojong’s personality also played a part in weakening Korea. Enthroned in 1864, he lived through the most tumultuous era of the Yi dynasty, characterized by imperial encroachment and domestic factional rivalries. He was warm-hearted and inquisitive about Western-style modernization but projected an image of a vacillating and indecisive monarch.63 Allen observed in 1898 that “since the unfortunate death of his Queen who was one of the strongest personages in Asiatic politics he seems to be without any settled policy.”64 Such a low opinion was also often shared by a leading reformer of Korea during the Kojong era.65 In 1902, Allen reported, “he [Kojong] has become so absorbed with vanity and conceit that he will only attend to matters that minister to his personal pleasure and pride” and concluded that “there is really no government here in fact.”66 These negative evaluations have been countered in recent studies by Korean scholars, who emphasize Kojong’s strenuous efforts to ward off Japanese influence in the reform process and to keep Korean independence, often aligning secretly with the righteous army movement.67 But these efforts were exerted most actively after the fortune of the kingdom was sealed at the final stage of the Russo-Japanese War. In the eyes of Western observers before the war, Kojong was portrayed as an indecisive and weak monarch, not as a shrewd and Machiavellian despot. Kojong’s strategy was to induce the great powers to reach a balance of power over Korea so that no great power could attempt to swallow it.68 However, he mistakenly believed that the rivalry of the great powers would allow Korean independence, even if its own defense capability remained at a negligible level.69 Korea’s modern military force was trained under Western and Japanese military advisors but remained less than one brigade. Before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, Kojong examined the conscription to strengthen the Korean military forces. But even this belated plan could not be implemented because of lack of financial resources and his concerns about the danger of conscripted forces to the monarchy.70 Seung-young Kim

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Another weakness of Korea had to do with the extremely frequent replacement of cabinet ministers. During the tumultuous year of 1898, he appointed eight prime ministers and ten foreign ministers.71 Later, George Kennan, a journalist and close friend of Theodore Roosevelt, wrote in Outlook in 1905, “What are you going to do with a government which . . . avoids action and evades responsibility by allowing its Ministers to resign at the rate of one or two a week?”72 Allen also reported that: “he [Kojong] is moreover most easily influenced by his favorites and he seems to have facility of choosing about the worst counselors, one after another, that are to be found.” Based upon such observation, Allen reported several times that “there is no government in Korea, properly so called.”73 Thus, before the outbreak of the war, both Japan and Russia maintained that Koreans were politically and militarily incapable of any decisive action on their own behalf.74 Allen reported his frank and pessimistic assessment of the Korean situation to the State Department and his friends in 1902. In his observation, centralization, ineffectiveness, corruption, and oppression, including heavy taxation, were bleeding the country.75 Allen wrote, “there seem to be millions for celebration and other things that please the vanity of the ruler, but not one cent for supporting proper enterprises or for paying off obligations.”76 He also pointed out the sale of offices as evidence of corruption and reported that the main sources of such corruption traced back to the Emperor himself. For these reasons, Allen predicted in his report that “the present chaotic state will sooner or later end in interference from the outside, which will probably give to Korea the guiding hand she greatly needs.”77 US Refusal to Support Korean Neutrality With the outbreak of the Boxer rebellion, Russia occupied Manchuria with its forces under the pretext of protecting its railroad interests. This occupation set in motion a more serious competition between Japan and Russia over Korea. With the prospect of tracing Boxers into Korean territory, Russia requested the right of hot-pursuit and approached Japan to negotiate spheres of influence in Korea in July 1900. This Russian offer spurred discussion on several approaches to settle the Korean question. Senior Japanese statesmen, including Ito Hirobumi, supported the Russian offer on the spheres of influence as a way to reach a compromise with Russia, but the Japanese Foreign Ministry put forward a secret alliance with Korea in order to consolidate Japanese control of the whole of Korea.78 On the other hand, Kojong pursued a policy of neutrality for his country and asked the Seung-young Kim


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assistance of the United States for such a diplomatic effort. But the United States made it clear that it did not want to be involved in such a move. For the Korean government, the discussion of spheres of influence between Japan and Russia meant a partition of its territory. Faced with such a dangerous development, two policies were considered in Seoul as countermeasures: allying with Japan or pursuing permanent neutrality. Eventually, after taking measures to allay the factional rivalry over foreign policy, Kojong chose to pursue neutrality, which matched his long-standing policy of achieving a balance of power among the foreign powers in Korea.79 This approach was also recommended by the pro-American faction in the Korean government, which had promoted major administrative and educational reforms relying on US loans.80 However, Japan and Russia did not show much support for the Korean effort to achieve neutrality because they were suspicious that a neutral Korea would eventually fall under the influence of the other power.81 In this setting, the Korean government asked the United States to lead a diplomatic effort to secure its neutrality. But the US diplomats made it clear that their country had no intention of leading such a diplomatic effort to secure Korean independence through international guarantee. In October 1900, the Korean government developed a false optimism after receiving an optimistic report from the Korean Minister in Tokyo, Jo Byung-sik. But when the Korean government expressed its confidence about such a prospect, Allen endeavored to subdue the expectations of Kojong. In fact, when Allen visited the United States in 1899, president William McKinley and secretary of state John Hay had already rejected Kojong’s hopes of receiving US assistance for Korean neutrality. Thus, in his report to Hay, Allen reaffirmed that the US diplomats in Seoul had always tried to discourage such requests from the Korean court.82 The issue of Korean neutrality received renewed attention from January 1901, when the Russian Finance Minister, Sergei Witte, began promoting the neutralization of Korea. Witte believed that Russia should reduce Russo-Japanese tension over Korea to facilitate its “pacific penetration” into Manchuria through banks and railways.83 In Japan, Prime Minister Ito and Count Inouye showed favorable responses to this offer, but the Foreign Ministry remained adamantly opposed. The Foreign Minister, Kato Takaaki, and Minister to China, Komura Jutaro, maintained that Russian withdrawal from Manchuria should be the precondition of all negotiations. Such opposition by the Japanese government was further consolidated in September 1901 with the rise of Komura Jutaro as Foreign Minister, who had advocated alliances with Britain and Korea to confront Russia.84 With the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in January 1902, Japan Seung-young Kim

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became ready to confront Russia more assertively over Korea and southern Manchuria. Against this backdrop, Russia proposed a more specific formula for Korean neutralization, designating the United States as a guarantor of Korean neutralization along with Japan and Russia. This offer was made by three Russian representatives in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington simultaneously in August 1902. By 1902, American economic interest in Korea was second to Japan, and there existed an influential pro-American political faction in Korea. Russia was also well aware of the need to attract American support to consolidate its rights in Manchuria.85 But the United States made it clear that it would not join such efforts to guarantee Korean neutrality. When contacted by the Russian Minister in Tokyo about the neutralization scheme, US Minister Buck did not encourage the Russian Minister, thus the case was transferred to Washington.86 During the fall, the Russian representative in Seoul, Minister Pavlov, was visiting Washington, and the anxious Japanese Minister Takahira inquired with Hay about whether Pavlov had raised this issue. Hay soothed the Japanese Minister’s concerns in mid-October by telling him that the United States would not abandon its traditional policy by involving itself in the neutralization of Korea.87 When Takahira inquired about the issue again in November, Hay assured him that even if the Russians raised the question, the American government would not take it seriously and explained that the Russians had not brought up the question at all.88 Faced with the unenthusiastic response of the United States, the Russian ministers could not pursue the issue any further and gave up their plan to invite US support for Korea’s neutralization.89 In this way, several approaches were explored to find common ground on the Korean question but none bore fruit. Thus, Japan and Russia were poised to move into a more confrontational stage at the beginning of 1903, when Russia took an aggressive “new course” in Manchuria and northern Korea. Meanwhile, the United States consistently maintained a noncommittal stance over any diplomatic initiative that could entice it to a complex development over the Korean question.

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Great Power Rivalry and US Assessment at the Outbreak of the War

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heodore Roosevelt became president following the assassination of William McKinley in September 1901. When Roosevelt came to the White House, the Far Eastern situation was a microcosm of global rivalry. All the European great powers were jockeying in the game of balance of power in the Far East, and their policies toward the region were often an extension of their relationship in Europe and other parts of the world. The United States and Japan were also major players in this game of nations. Roosevelt and his close advisors had a keen grasp of such a multipolar situation and were well aware of the limit in US capabilities for an interventionist approach in the region. Their policy toward Korea also was closely related to their broader consideration about the strategic situation in East Asia and the limit of US military capability. Global and Regional Situation The global rivalry of the time was largely a German and Russian challenge to British dominance. Between the two challenging states, Germany posed a more recent and acute threat toward Britain. The Welt Politik of Kaiser Wilhelm II led Britain to worry about the German threat in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and the Far East. The German naval build up since 1897 under Admiral Tirpitz drove home the vulnerability of the Royal Navy in the North Sea, and the construction of the Baghdad Railway threatened British security in the Gulf region, which was vital for the trade and protection of India. Meanwhile, Russia continued to challenge British interests in India, with its efforts to advance into Afghanistan. In the Far East as well, Russian machinations made Britain uneasy about future developments in

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the region. While all these challenges were arising, the British Army demonstrated a dismal performance during the Boer War, further revealing its lack of preparedness against the German Army in Europe. To address such problems of overextension, Britain chose to abandon its “splendid isolation.” It looked for strategic partners that could share its defense burdens in such regions as the Far East, the Western Hemisphere, and the Persian Gulf. In the Far East, Britain concluded the alliance with Japan in January 1902 so that the combined fleet of Britain and Japan could remain superior to the Russian and French fleet. Britain also pursued a conciliatory policy toward the United States, as was demonstrated in Manila Bay during the Spanish-American War in April 1898.1 Eventually, Britain reached an entente with Russia as well, in August 1907; but until that time, it supported Japan’s efforts to contain the Russian encroachment into Manchuria.2 Faced with the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in 1902, France and Russia also announced that their alliance in Europe extended to the Far East. France, however, remained reluctant to become embroiled in the conflict in the Far East when the German threat was rising in Europe and collaboration with Britain became more important than ever. Against this backdrop, the confrontation between Japan and Russia further escalated in Manchuria and Korea. During the Boxer uprising in 1899, Russia deployed its troops in Manchuria to protect its railways but did not withdraw them after the uprising was pacified. Instead, it machinated to consolidate its grip on Manchuria through a series of bilateral agreements with China. Against these moves by Russia, Japan strove to loosen the Russian grip on Manchuria with the support of the United States and Britain.3 By that time, the United States also shared a common interest with Japan in keeping Open Door in Manchuria. Thus, with the support of Britain and the United States, Japan sought to induce the withdrawal of Russian troops and to keep Manchurian ports and cities open to all powers’ economic activities. In this way, by the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904, Japan, Britain, and the United States had formed a virtual alliance to address the Russian threat to Manchuria.4 Japan had already planned to pursue imperial expansion into Manchuria by linking the strategic railroad from Pusan to Uiju with the Manchurian railroads,5 and since the inauguration of the Katsura cabinet in June 1901, Japan established the control of the whole of Korea as an uncompromisable basis of its foreign policy6 Moreover, by June 1903, the Japanese government was determined to risk war if such goals could not be achieved through negotiation with Russia.7 But the situation looked exactly the opposite in Russia, though it did not consider a war with Japan as an imminent possibility. Japan’s active moves to keep the Open Door in Manchuria Seung-young Kim

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contributed to strengthening the voices of such hardliners as Bezobrazov, while isolating moderate voices represented by Witte in the Russian court. In this way, by spring 1903, the hardliners came to consolidate their ground in both the Japanese and Russian governments.8 The prewar negotiations over Russian withdrawal and the neutral zones epitomized the nature of the Russo-Japanese competition over Korea. Russia carried out the first withdrawal from Manchuria on October 1902 as promised in its agreement with China in April 1902. This was possible because Japan, Britain, and the United States made simultaneous protests against the Russian occupation of Manchuria, and Moscow was alarmed by the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. But with the rise of adventurous hardliners in the court, Russia did not carry out the second phase of its withdrawal in April 1903. Instead, it occupied Yongampo, a spot on the Korean bank of the Yalu River, and the entire region along the mouth of the river, in May 1903. The pretext was timber development, based on a concession that a Russian merchant had secured from the Korean government in 1898. But Russia sent forty former Russian soldiers along with Chinese bandits and Korean laborers into Yongampo and quickly fortified the area. Japan viewed this as a serious attempt to consolidate Russia’s military foothold in northern Korea.9 Japan tried to utilize the Yongampo crisis as an opportunity to settle the broader issues of spheres of influence. Thus, from August to December of 1903, a series of diplomatic notes were exchanged to designate the spheres of influence over Korea and Manchuria. But the demands of both sides ran in parallel. Russia insisted on establishing a neutral zone north of the thirty-ninth parallel on the Korean peninsula, while not giving any guarantee about the withdrawal of its troops remaining in Manchuria.10 Japan, however, insisted on establishing a demilitarized zone of fifty kilometers along the Korean-Manchurian border.11 The Japanese approach was to acquire exclusive control of the whole of Korea, while keeping an Open Door in Manchuria.12 Russian replies were frequently delayed due to the tsar’s holiday keeping and the illness of the empress. But such delays were perceived in Japan as a show of condescension toward the negotiation and as a tactic to secure more time to prepare for war. While such delays continued, the prowar voices became consolidated among Japanese army officers, senior statesmen, and the public opinion. In their view, if Japan should go to war, it had to go immediately because a further delay would only allow Russia to strengthen its military forces in the Far East.13

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The US Stance and its Military Power in the Far East While the Russo-Japanese confrontation emerged, the United States became clearly supportive of Japan as it confronted Russia to keep the principle of the Open Door in Manchuria. Russian occupation of Manchuria following the Boxer rebellion posed a grave challenge to the Open Door principle, which had been initiated by the Secretary of State, John Hay, with the support of other great powers in 1899. However, the United States was not ready or willing to use force to keep the Open Door, thus it found a natural ally in Japan, which was willing to use military power to keep Manchuria open.14 By this time, despite its reservations about military intervention in Asia, the United States was involved in the game of great powers in the Far East. Since its acquisition of the Philippines, Guam, and its annexation of Hawaii in 1898, US policy was not merely based on the pursuit of commercial interest any longer. Moreover, with the help of many innovations in its Navy and Army by the turn of the century, 15 the US military had acquired a capability to support its diplomacy toward the Far East. The United States, however, remained only one of the great powers in the Far East and did not have enough capability to impose its own plans unilaterally. In 1900, the Navy sought to acquire a naval base in southern China to protect the Philippines and to support US policies in China, but the State Department failed to obtain such base because of resistance from other powers.16 Congress also had repeatedly avoided making an appropriation to fortify its great base at Subic Bay. Furthermore, in its plan of 1901, the Navy General Board recommended concentrating their battleships in the Atlantic and dispatching several battleships to the Far East only under special situations.17 Although the Navy sent three battleships to the Far East during the Russo-Japanese War, it did not go beyond utilizing the fleet to support wartime diplomacy. Both Naval planners and President Roosevelt were well aware of the limit of US military power in the Far East.18 Yet, in a system of competing powers, US military power, though limited, was useful in supporting its diplomacy. Because no single state or group of states enjoyed political and military hegemony, securing the support of the United States was important for other powers; thus the United States could play a significant role in the diplomatic arena. The US Navy regarded Germany as a potential primary enemy because of its hostile actions during the Spanish-American War and the rivalry in Samoa. But it was not without misgivings about Japanese intentions. In 1900 and 1901, some Navy officers reported concerns about the possibility of Japanese aggression into the Philippines and Eastern Pacific islands, particularly if Japan and Russia could reach a compromise over Manchuria.19 Seung-young Kim


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But, by 1903, Roosevelt and the Navy most frequently hypothesized a conflict with a coalition of enemies composed of Russia, Germany, and France while regarding the Anglo-Japanese alliance as a friendly alliance. Such an assessment was based on the analysis of Russian ambition in Manchuria; German ambitions in Samoa, the Yangtse, and the Philippines; and the French alliance with Russia since the 1890s. Moreover the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance in early 1902 made an entente between Japan and Russia unlikely. This assumption did not match exactly with the complicated developments in Europe, where Britain, France, and Russia were moving closer to each other to address the German threat, but was utilized as the basis of naval planning toward the Far East until the Russo-Japanese War.20 US Economic and Missionary Interests in Korea Before the outbreak of the war, the United States had a substantial economic interest in Korea, with the prospect of continued growth. Its interests were greater than those of any other Western power but smaller than those of Japan. It was also mostly capitalists, engineers, and promoters rather than manufacturers who had interests in Korea. Though some American goods were sold in Korea, they were sold largely through Japanese agencies. The greatest American interest in Korea was the Unsan gold mine, conceded in July 1895. It was the most profitable gold mine in East Asia and was secured by Allen’s assiduous efforts as legation secretary. Kojong also hoped to attract American commitment to Korea by conceding the lucrative mine to the United States.21 Other financial undertakings started by Americans included street railways, the water main system, and electric lights in Seoul. American businessmen enjoyed very favorable terms for the contracts, and the Korean Emperor was directly involved as partner, owner, or shareholder in such concessions. The competition between American and Japanese capitalists from 1899 to 1904 was very keen, but the general feeling between the two groups remained friendly.22 However, these interests were of no comparison to the US economic interest in Japan and in Manchuria. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, American trade with Japan was twenty times as large as its trade with Korea, amounting to the value of 3.5 million dollars.23 More importantly, the United States, nurtured by the myth of the China market, had far greater expectation about its trade with north China, particularly with Manchuria.24 Roosevelt wrote, “all we ask is that our great and growing trade shall not be interrupted and that Russia shall keep its solemn promises. . . . We have always recognized the exceptional position of Russia in relation to Manchuria.”25 But Russia continued to close Manchuria with its military occupation, thus Roosevelt Seung-young Kim

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came to support Japan’s efforts to keep Manchuria open, while recognizing Japanese freedom of action in Korea. Indeed, the American Asiatic Association, composed mainly of Far Eastern traders, strongly supported Japan throughout the war, though it raised concerns about Japanese discrimination against American trade in Manchuria from September 1906.26 Washington continued to instruct the American diplomats in Seoul to secure American economic interests. And indeed, most important concessions were secured by the assiduous efforts of Horace Allen, who utilized Kojong’s personal confidence in him to obtain economic concessions.27 Kojong also willingly granted more lucrative contracts to American businessmen than to those from other countries.28 But such pursuit of economic interests did not induce the United States to develop a military, diplomatic commitment toward Korea. Later, after the end of the Russo-Japanese war, American business in Korea had to face stringent regulations imposed by Japanese authorities.29 But Washington did not take any measures to stop Japan’s closing of Korea, though it made efforts to protect its patent rights and to keep favorable tariffs for American goods.30 In the arena of evangelism, about 120 American missionaries, half the number of Americans in Korea, were carrying out extraordinarily successful missionary activities. Most of these missionaries were involved in medical service and education, playing a pivotal role in modernizing the country. Proselytizing also recorded unprecedented success compared with the same US efforts in China and Japan.31 As Korean adversity increased, so did Korean enthusiasm for the evangelistic movement. In this way, the philanthropic interests promoted by the missionary organization were on the course of great increase on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War.32 The Strategic Beliefs of Roosevelt and His Advisors Roosevelt has often been referred to as his own Secretary of State. During the Russo-Japanese War, his views dominated US policy toward Japan and Korea, though his policy toward China largely followed the path set out by Hay and McKinley.33 With a cosmopolitan upper-class background, he had associated with foreign diplomats and leaders, particularly from Britain, since his younger days. He had also served as the assistant secretary of the Navy until the beginning of the Spanish-American war in April 1898. Thus, by the time he became president in September 14, 1901, he had a sophisticated knowledge of the global situation and could utilize his personal friendships to listen to and influence other great powers. Roosevelt was the first American President who harnessed the fullgrown power of the United States to exercise diplomatic influence. He was Seung-young Kim


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a natural leader with astonishing intellectual and physical vigor and displayed an almost instinctive feel for the major currents of his era. Often he used boyish and surprisingly frank language to communicate his ideas and to create support for his policies in domestic and international arenas.34 He saw the world as inextricably interdependent by the turn of the century and urged Americans to assume, in an honorable manner, the responsibility bestowed upon them. He urged Americans to participate in world decisions for which they shared responsibility and whose consequences they could not escape.35 Such a view was motivated by both real politik calculations and a belief in the need to spread Western civilization. But in general he was much more realistic than his contemporaries. In Roosevelt’s view, nations acted not to promote universal good but to promote their own selfish interest. World peace also came about from balanced powers and equilibrium of force that restrained the selfish aims of nation-states, not from human kindness or moral restraint.36 He was also clearly aware of the need to reconcile ends and means in the practice of diplomacy. He said, “I never take a step in foreign policy unless I am assured that I shall be able eventually to carry out my will by force.”37 While discussing American policy toward Manchuria, he agreed with Hay that the United States could not fight a war to keep Manchuria open and wrote, “I hate being in the position of seeming to bluster without backing it up.”38 He was also well aware of the lack of American public and Congressional support for intervention in remote regions of the world.39 Thus, to restore the balance of power in the Far East and north Africa, he utilized mediation diplomacy, which could be carried out by stretching executive power to its limit without consultation with Congress.40 Another of his pillars of thought was his emphasis on self-help in international relations. In his letter to Spring Rice, his friend and a British diplomat, he wrote, “each nation . . . must rely for its own safety only upon its own forethought and industrial efficiency and fighting edge. Unless it has this fighting edge and this forethought it will go down.” He further elaborated, “no nation can depend upon the mere friendship of any other, even though that friendship is genuine, unless it has itself such strength as to make its own friendship of value in return.”41 By 1901, Roosevelt’s view of Far Eastern affairs was firmly based upon his concern to maintain the balance of power among the great powers. During the Spanish-American War, when he was assistant secretary of the Navy, he demonstrated a bellicose imperialism by pushing the Navy to capture the Philippines. But, by 1901 he had a mature understanding of balance of power politics, sophisticated by his constant association with the two most prominent strategic thinkers of the time, Brooks Adams and Alfred Thayer Mahan.42 He envisioned that the United States had to Seung-young Kim

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assume the role played by Britain as the external manager of the balance in the Far East when declining Britain could not play such a role any longer.43 Roosevelt was also a believer of social Darwinism and thus underscored the civilizing mission of great powers toward backward states. In the Far East, such a sense of civilizing missions neatly matched with his concern about maintaining a balance of power. In his view, backward states such as the Philippines and Korea could be taken care of by belonging to the sphere of influence of civilized great powers.44 Roosevelt admired Japan for its efficiency, success in modernization, and the fighting qualities of its people, thus he regarded Japan as an exemplary fusion between Western and Asian civilization. Yet, in strategic calculation, Roosevelt remained concerned about the possibility of a Japanese move against American interest. As assistant secretary of the Navy from 1897 until 1898, he expressed concern about the Japanese threat to Hawaii and the Philippines, and such concern remained in his mind throughout the Russo-Japanese war. However, in 1903, when the Russian menace in Manchuria reached its peak, the president came to believe that the United States had to help Japan’s efforts to keep the Open Door in Manchuria.45 His views on Russia were not necessarily negative until 1898.46 But with the outbreak of violence in Kishinev against the Jews in April 1903, Roosevelt publicly criticized Tsar Nicholas II and the Russian autocracy. Above all else, Russia’s continued occupation of Manchuria made him regard it as a country with a deplorable mendacity.47 On top of his concerns about the Manchurian market, Roosevelt had a broader geopolitical concern about Russian expansion into China, as noted by Brooks Adams and Mahan. These geopoliticians constantly advised their contemporaries to keep China open to the influence of Anglo-Saxon powers and cautioned against the danger of Russian encroachment upon China’s territorial integrity.48 Such thoughts of Roosevelt’s were largely shared by his foreign policy team. During Roosevelt’s presidency, the foreign policy bureaucracy in Washington was quite amateurish, yet he was well supported by a small group of highly able senior officials. William Rockhill was the expert on Asian affairs in the administration. The scholar diplomat, with extensive experience in China, was the main architect of Hay’s Open Door diplomacy in 1899 and remained as the most important advisor to Roosevelt and Hay in Far Eastern affairs.49 Rockhill also had a brief experience in Seoul as Charge d’Affaires during the winter of 1886. But during that winter he was alarmed by the naked clash of imperialism over Korea and developed a very low opinion of the country. Later he wrote: “Korea is the place . . . there you will see diplomacy in the raw; diplomacy without gloves, perfume or phrases.” On top of such experience, he believed in the civilizing role of Japan over Korea, thus he did Seung-young Kim


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not recommend any policy to support Korean independence.50 As for the method of checking Russian ambition in Manchuria, he wished that Britain, Japan, and China should play the main role, while the United States would only provide occasional verbal support to their joint effort.51 Secretary of state John Hay had extensive experience as a diplomat in Europe and, thus, was well aware of the rivalry among the European powers in the Far East. As a former ambassador to Britain and an Anglophile, he believed in Anglo-American cooperation as the pillar to secure American interests in China. He also shared a low opinion of Russia, writing that “dealing with a government with whom mendacity is a science is an extremely difficult and delicate matter.”52 Yet he was well aware of the public indifference to Far Eastern affairs, and repeatedly cautioned Roosevelt that pursuing any concerted intervention with England and Japan was out of the question.53 Instead, in line with his Open Door initiative, he simply continued his diplomatic efforts to maintain China’s neutrality and territorial integrity during the war54 but rejected two earlier overtures from Great Britain in 1903 to pursue cooperation against Russian expansion with Japan.55 As for Korea, he held the view that American interest in Korea was commercial rather than political.56 With a proven talent as a poet and journalist, he was a gentleman diplomat, and such a soft temperament of Hay’s did not match Roosevelt’s often impetuous diplomacy in Rough Rider style.57 But they did not have any fundamental difference in their views toward the Far East. Roosevelt’s policy toward China followed the track prepared by Hay,58 and most of the crucial decisions about Korea and Japan were made by the president because Hay became seriously ill in the spring 1905 and died on July 1. Elihu Root, the former secretary of war and a leader of the New York Bar Association, became secretary of state succeeding Hay. While serving as secretary of war, he administered dealings with Cuba and the Pacific islands and curbed the fiery Roosevelt by counseling restraint.59 He believed that the main objective of diplomacy was “to keep the country out of trouble . . . in the right way”60 and did not want to put particular grandiose schemes in foreign policy. By the time he became secretary of state, the policies to settle the Russo-Japanese war was already established by Hay and Roosevelt. Thus he generally followed the course set out by the president,61 while taking caution to couch Roosevelt’s policy toward Korea in an appropriate legal context. William Howard Taft, secretary of war and governor general of the Philippines, played an important role at the final stages of the war by reaching an agreement with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura on Korea and the Philippines. He was also a close friend of Roosevelt and, as will be elaborated later, his agreement with Katsura was fully consistent with the dominant views in the Roosevelt administration. Seung-young Kim

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Horace Allen represented the United States in Seoul until spring 1905. He started working in Seoul as a highly successful medical missionary for the Presbyterians in 1884 but later became a US diplomat and remained at the center of diplomatic rivalry in Seoul. After a brief period as secretary in the Korean legation in Washington from September 1887 to November 1888, he became a secretary in the US legation in Seoul and later became the minister in the fall of 1897. His heroic efforts to protect Kojong and other Koreans during several crises in Seoul consolidated the Korean emperor’s trust in him; such support of the emperor became the source of his influence in Seoul. He did not have a grandiose strategic vision but performed his duties in Seoul courageously and pragmatically. Though he had a low opinion about the Korean ruling class, he had a favorable view about the common people in Korea, regarding them as a “patient and hard working race.”62 Allen’s enthusiasm was repeatedly constrained by instructions from Washington, which ordered him to maintain strict neutrality. But he often went beyond the instructions and continued his efforts to counterbalance the dominant foreign power in Korea by supporting the weaker foreign power in Korea. When Japanese influence became dominant after the SinoJapanese War, he supported Russia. When Russian influence became dominant during Kojong’s flight to the Russian legation, he supported Japan along with other Western diplomats in Seoul. But before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, he adopted a clear stance against Japan.63 Since the inauguration of the Roosevelt administration, he was sending extensive reports about his efforts to secure American business interests in Korea.64 In his view, if war broke out, Japan had a good chance of winning the war, and following its triumph, Japan would limit economic opportunities for the United States in Korea and Manchuria.65 For such reasons, he thought that the president’s policy was misguided by the advice of Rockhill; thus he tried to persuade the president through a direct interview with him in Washington. Allen indeed had a frank discussion with Roosevelt by visiting the White House in late September 1903, but his views were completely countered by the president, who preferred to support Japan along with Britain. Rockhill joined the meeting, but he also supported the president, stating that American trade interest would not be challenged even if the United States maintained its current policy.66 After the meeting, Allen was censured by Rockhill for being too blunt with the president, but he later gave an interview to The Daily Telegraph of Colorado Springs with the same points he made during the meeting with the president. This interview was picked up by the Associated Press and eventually received a favorable review by The Washington Post, which urged the White House and State Department to “consult Seung-young Kim


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its official representatives in that part of the world rather than mischievous and alarming gossip that comes by way of London.”67 The publication of these critical views angered Roosevelt and the State Department. The dismissal of Allen was discussed in Washington, but the State Department sent a telegram of censure to Allen instead of discharging him from his Ministership.68 Later, during the course of the war, Roosevelt replaced him with Minister Morgan, who was deemed to be the right person to implement the president’s plan to support Japanese dominance in Korea. The Aborted Effort to Secure a US Naval Base on the Korean Coast While the Russo-Japanese confrontation was escalating in 1902, there arose an important occasion to test the American commitment to Korea. In the fall of 1902, Admiral Rogers in the Far Eastern Fleet recommended securing a naval base on the southern coast of Korea with the endorsement of Horace Allen, but Washington declined to accept the offer. The reasons behind this decision epitomized the US Navy’s assessment of the Far Eastern situation before the Russo-Japanese War. The Navy started to look for a base in Korea because securing a base on the Chinese coast had become difficult. Initially, the Navy hoped to acquire a base in the vicinity of the Chunsan group of islands in China to protect the American commercial interests of North China. But the State Department pointed out that such a move could complicate US relations with European powers and could undermine its own commitment to the Open Door principle. At that moment, Rockhill heard from Allen about several magnificent harbors in Korea; thus he suggested securing a Korean harbor. Hay also concurred with Rockhill and forwarded Rockhill’s suggestion to the Navy, thus the Navy started a site survey of several Korean ports by sending admiral Frederick Rogers. Rogers recommended Sylbia Bay, close to Masampo on the southern coast of Korea as the most suitable port. Finding the admiral’s strong interest, Allen recommended occupying the port. He reported that, “once having occupied the port, a lease might be negotiated on amicable terms,” though the Koreans may refuse to lease the harbor because of Russian pressure.69 However, the strategists in the General Board in the Naval War College spurned the offer in June 1903 pointing out two problems. First, the location was regarded as too far removed from the probable naval operations in north China waters. Second, if Japan was an ally of the United States, the US Navy would have access to Japanese ports, and a Korean site would be of little additional value. Conversely, if Japan was an American enemy, any base in Korea would be indefensible and would become an immediate casualty to Seung-young Kim

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Japanese naval action.70 Following this decision, Hay also telegraphed Seoul to say that the General Board of the Navy did not recommend acquiring a port on the coast of Korea.71 During the Russo-Japanese War, the United States had three battleships in Asiatic waters in addition to a considerable number of cruisers and gunboats. But such force was not enough to be used for military intervention to support US diplomacy. When the General Board of the Navy considered a hypothetical war plan to attack the Russian port of Vladivostok in December 1901, success was predicated upon possession of a naval base halfway between the Philippines and the Russian outposts in Korea and Manchuria. But no such port was acquired due to aforementioned reasons and the unwillingness of Congress to appropriate funds for the new naval base. Moreover, the naval authority was averse to any serious commitment in the Far East, because it was concentrating its latest vessels in the Atlantic to build up a respectable battle fleet. In this way, the Navy was fully aware of the risk of taking an aggressive policy toward Manchuria or Korea by force. Although the Asiatic fleet was sent to the front of Port Arthur in early 1903 to support Hay’s protest of Russian policy in Manchuria, the naval strategists believed that such gestures had clear limits in military terms, given the limit of American naval power in the Far East.72 Such a stance of the Navy was later demonstrated in the Chemulpo harbor at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. When a Japanese squadron of seven large ships attacked two unprepared Russian vessels on February 9, 1904, the commander of US gunboat Vicksburg did not support the efforts by the European commanders to protest against Japan for its violation of neutrality of the Korean harbor. Noting that he was under explicit instruction from Washington to maintain neutrality, the American commander even refused to allow the wounded Russian crews to board after the brief battle between the Japanese squadron and the Russian ships.73 The US Response to Korean Neutrality at the Beginning of the War Since the Russian occupation of Yongampo in August 1903, Korea had made repeated efforts to secure wartime neutrality in case of conflict between Japan and Russia. During this period, Russia continued to encourage Korea to pursue neutrality, whereas Japan strove to achieve a treatybased foundation for sending troops into Korea. When a desperate Korea appealed to Japan in January 1904 to recognize its neutrality in case of a Russo-Japanese conflict, Foreign Minister Komura instructed the Japanese legation in Seoul to suspend the response for the time being. In Komura’s view, Japan was a directly involved party to the current problem and was in Seung-young Kim


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a very different position from Western powers, which were third parties.74 In contrast, the Russian minister, Pavlov, helped the Korean government to telegraph its declaration of neutrality by way of the French consul in Chefoo in north Shantung. Pavlov did this service because Korean telegraphic services, under Japan’s control, were interrupted from mid-January onward. After receiving this telegram in French, the eleven Korean diplomats around the world asked their host governments to declare their respect for Korean neutrality.75 In this way, France and Russia assisted Korea’s declaration of neutrality, and Britain, among others, agreed to this declaration. But the United States did not show support, to the disappointment of the Korean government, despite the Korean government’s expectation based upon the good office clause of the US-Korean treaty of 1882. Still, until three days before the Japanese attack on the Chemulpo (Inchon) harbor, Yi Yong-ik, the Minister of Defense and a leading pro-Russian figure, showed a high expectation of US assistance to preserve Korean neutrality. Yi answered that Korea was safe, because its independence was guaranteed by the United States and Europe, when Frederick A. McKenzie, a journalist from The Daily Mail, asked him about the urgent necessity of reform to save Korea from extinction. The British journalist further asked, “Why should they protect you, if you do not protect yourself?” But Yi insisted, “We have the promise of America. She will be our friend whatever happens.”76 The war started on February 9, 1904, by the Japanese attack on Russian warships in Chemulpo harbor and Port Arthur. Japanese troops wasted no time in moving into Seoul and brought the capital under their control within ten days. However, the United States did not meet Korean expectations in supporting Korean neutrality. Theodore Roosevelt declared strict neutrality on February 11,77 but his policy was tantamount to pro-Japan neutrality. Although John Hay received Korea’s hope of wartime neutrality on January 22,78 he merely acknowledged that due note had been taken of the declaration and instructed Allen to maintain absolutely strict neutrality.79 Such indifference was in sharp contrast with US efforts to support Chinese neutrality. In January, Hay secured private assurances from the Japanese and the Russian ambassadors to respect Chinese neutrality and territorial integrity.80 At that time, Germany and Britain were also expressing hopes of maintaining China’s territorial integrity in the case of war. When war began on February 10, Hay immediately informed Japan and Russia of the United States’ desire to respect the neutrality and administrative integrity of China and received a favorable response. He also urged “that the areas of hostility shall be localized and limited as much as possible, so that . . . the least possible loss to the commerce and peaceful Seung-young Kim

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intercourse of the world may be occasioned.” After receiving support from Japan and Russia for the neutrality of China on February 19, Hay sent a circular note to all powers informing them of the two belligerent powers’ support for China’s neutrality.81 Watching such efforts by the United States, the Russian ambassador to the United States, Arturo Cassini, complained about Washington’s neglect of Korea, which also declared neutrality, just as China did.82 But the US support for Chinese neutrality was in line with its established policy to maintain the Open Door, which it chose not to apply toward Korea. Thus, throughout the war, the United States maintained a careful watch and protested all violations of Chinese territory by any country83 but refrained from any similar diplomatic efforts on behalf of Korea. The US Assessment of the Far-Eastern Situation at the Beginning of the War Roosevelt and his staff ’s assessment at the beginning of the war remained in line with their prewar visions. On February 10, 1904, Roosevelt confided to his son, “I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.”84 He also believed that American and British support for Japan prevented a repetition of German and French intervention against Japan.85 On March 26, he confided to his Harvard friend, Kaneko Kentaro, who came to Washington to gain the support of the president, that his mind was in favor of Japan though publicly he had to declare strict neutrality to calm the Russian ambassador Cassini.86 Furthermore, he made it clear that he would allow Japan to secure the fruits of the victory, which included establishment of a protectorate over Korea.87 Yet, throughout the war, his realistic concerns to maintain balance of power outweighed his personal feelings in favor of Japan. In March 1904, just a month after the beginning of the war, he told German Ambassador Sternburg, “it is our interest that the war between Russia and Japan should drag on, so that both powers may exhaust themselves as much as possible and that their geographical area of friction should not be eliminated after the conclusion of the peace.”88 He also confided to French Ambassador Jules Jusserand in 1904 that “from [his] point of view, the best would be that the Russians and the Japanese should remain face to face balancing each other, both weakened.”89 With the continuation of the Japanese advance, Roosevelt became more concerned about the effect of Japan’s continued victory. As he later made it clear by December, Roosevelt became concerned that if Japan were not busy with continental affairs in Seung-young Kim


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Korea, China, and Manchuria, it could become a great maritime power and menace US, Dutch, or English possessions in the Pacific.90 Nevertheless, as far as Korea was concerned, Roosevelt regarded it as a legitimate prize for Japan throughout the war. In 1900, even before becoming President, Roosevelt confided in German Ambassador, saying “I should like to see Japan have Korea. She will be a check upon Russia, and she deserves it for what she has done. But I do earnestly hope there will be no slicing up of China. It will be bad for everybody in the end.”91 In March 1904, Baron Suematsu Kencho hinted at the necessity of Japan’s “preponderant influence in Korea” while visiting Washington, on his way to Britain to promote the western support for Japan. Roosevelt responded that Japan should have a position with Korea “just like we have with Cuba” in an assenting tone. 92 During a luncheon with Kaneko Kentaro and Ambassador Takahira at the White House on March 15, 1904, Roosevelt also told them that Korea should be entirely within Japan’s sphere of interest.93 As for the broader sphere of Japan, Roosevelt was sympathetic to the Japanese version of the Monroe Doctrine. He wrote to the British Ambassador Spring Rice that “Japan would simply take . . . a paramount interest in what surrounds the Yellow Sea, just as the United States has a paramount interest in what surrounds the Caribbean.”94 He also told German Ambassador Sternberg in August 1904 that Korea should be under a Japanese protectorate, which “should be tantamount to control.” After reading such a report, the German Emperor, Wilhelm II, also expressed complete agreement on the president’s view about the future of Korea. 95 Roosevelt’s assessment was shared by key decision makers in his foreign policy team. Within a fortnight of the outbreak of the war, his chief Asian advisor Rockhill wrote to Allen, “I cannot see any possibility of this Government using its influence ‘to bolster up the Empire of Korea in its independence.’” He further elaborated that Japanese annexation of Korea would be better for the Korean people and for peace in the Far East.96 Secretary of State Hay did not explicitly mention the desirability of Japanese annexation of Korea but later observed, “our interests there [in Korea] were rather commercial than political.”97 In this context, Hay instructed Allen to maintain strict neutrality in February 1904, when Japan was about to impose a protocol to open the road for the protectorate.98 Allen also did not insist on his earlier anti-Japanese view anymore after his stormy interview with Roosevelt. In fact, a month before the outbreak of the war, Allen came to support a Japanese protectorate over Korea. He wrote to Rockhill: We will make a great big mistake if we allow sentimental reasons to induce us to attempt to bolster up this “Empire” in its independence. These people

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can not govern themselves. They must have an overlord as they have had for all time. . . . Let Japan have Korea outright if she can get it . . . I am no pro-Japanese enthusiast as you know, neither am I opposed to any civilized race taking over the management of these kindly asiatics for the good of the people and the suppression of oppressive officials, the establishment of order and the development of commerce.99

This view is quite contrary to the earlier views of Allen, who had supported Korean independence during his long missionary and diplomatic career. But witnessing the decline of the Independence Club in 1898, he had been disillusioned by the inefficiency and corruption of the Korean court. His stormy interview with Roosevelt also must have made him realize that Washington had little enthusiasm for his support for Korea. Moreover, after the beginning of the war he also developed a keen personal wish to work as US Minister in Seoul until the legation would be withdrawn in the near future and tried to emphasize his new reputation as friendly diplomat to Japan in his reports to Washington. In December 1904, he observed that “already arrangements have been concluded for attending to Korea’s foreign relations at Tokio” and recognized that, “while Korea cannot stand alone, Japan is the rightful and natural overlord.”100 In this way, during the early period of the war, all key US decision makers shared a similar view about the Far-eastern situation and the prospect of Japanese control of Korea.

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US Diplomacy and the Japanese Imposition of Protectorate on Korea

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ith the continuation of Japanese victory over Russia, Japan kept consolidating its control over Korea. During this development, the Roosevelt administration chose not to provide any diplomatic assistance to the Korean government, though it made efforts to support China’s neutrality. Roosevelt tried to restore the balance of power in the Far East through his mediation diplomacy, but while doing this, he recognized Korea as within the Japanese sphere. Strengthening Japanese Control and the US Response Against the backdrop of its victories, Japan took a series of stringent measures to secure Korea as its protectorate. It concluded a de facto alliance with Korea in the fortnight after the onset of the war and virtually seized control over its foreign affairs and financial policies by August 1904. Faced with such an encroachment upon its sovereignty, the Korean court repeatedly appealed to the United States to gain support for Korean independence, but the United States continued to disregard these appeals. Ten days after landing in Incheon, the Japanese military occupied Seoul, preventing it from remaining a neutral city. By February 18, more than two divisions of Japanese forces moved into Seoul, following the dispatch of two battalions of an advance party on February 9. They surrounded the palace and seized vital strategic locations, including four entrance gates to Seoul.1 With such a dominant military presence, Japan could conclude a de facto military alliance with Korea. The protocol of February 23 allowed Japan to use strategic locations in Korea without limit and to take temporary measures when it deemed the Korean court or territory was endangered. The

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protocol also required the Korean government to accept Japan’s advice to improve its administration and not to conclude arrangements with third powers against the principle of the protocol.2 In this way, the protocol allowed Japan to limit Korean sovereignty and to interfere with its governance, opening the first concrete step toward a protectorate.3 The Korean government did not accept this protocol willingly. Its reservations about the protocol were already demonstrated during prewar negotiations in January. It had frustrated a similar, secret agreement by announcing neutrality two days before the scheduled ratification. Even after the outbreak of war, Kojong hoped to maintain neutrality and Korean officials still expected that Russia could eventually prevail. To make the reluctant Koreans sign the protocol, Japan used both bribes and threats. It deported the leading pro-Russian cabinet Minister, Lee Yong-ik, to Japan and expelled several senior guards of the emperor out of Seoul.4 Faced with such pressure, the Korean government appealed to the United States to extend diplomatic assistance to ward off Japanese pressure. The United States, however, again declined Korea’s appeals for assistance. Two days before signing the protocol, the emperor informed Allen that Japan proposed “an alliance whereby in return for the protection of Korea, Japan will have control over policy of the Government.” The Emperor was anxious to secure US assistance, but Allen “pacified him without making promises” and refused his wish to seek asylum.5 When the protocol was finally signed on February 23, Allen inquired Washington whether to cable the text of the agreement “for the protection of Korea.” But Hay replied, “not necessary,” and instructed Allen to “observe absolute neutrality.”6 The next day Allen telegraphed, “Last night articles of agreement has (have) been signed establishing the Japanese protectorate of Korea. It is very strong.”7 But the State Department did not send any instruction and simply received the text of the agreement from the Japanese Minister in Washington on February 26.8 Following the conclusion of the protocol, Japan tightened its control over Korea and mobilized Korean resources for war on May 18. Japan forced the Korean government to abolish all treaties and any concessions given to Russia.9 It also impressed Koreans for transportation coolies and army laborers,10 carved out economic interests, and designated a lot of Korean land off-limits under the pretext of military necessity.11 The Japanese Army took over large areas surrounding Seoul (Yongsan), displacing fifteen thousand families in the process. Similar confiscation also occurred in Pyongyang and Uiju city. In June, Japan pressed the Korean government to grant concessions on all Korean “waste land” to a Japanese corporation. This amounted to more than half of the entire territory and included all the undeveloped mineral resources. This scheme for a nationwide land Seung-young Kim

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grab could not be carried out because of the resistance of the Korean cabinet but stirred up determined opposition against Japan among Korean people. Apart from the expropriation of land, Japan also took over fishing rights in all coastal waters of Korea and placed the entire Korean telegraph and postal systems under its control.12 Allen sent detailed reports about these developments based upon his observations and the accounts of American missionaries near the frontline. In June 1904, Allen reported, “The Japanese authorities are greatly troubled by a very large disorderly element among the Japanese adventurers who have recently flocked into Korea.” He further noted, “Nearly every day the papers of Seoul give an account of some brutal murder of a Korean by these toughs who are abroad in the country.”13 On October 11, he cautioned, “Korean sentiment is not as friendly to Japan as one might suppose from hearing only the Japanese side,” while listing up various sources of Korean resentment and distrust toward the Japanese. He pointed to “the failure of the Japanese to listen to Korean complaints of injustice” and noted “if a Korean is found guilty of wrong doing he is promptly imprisoned or shot.” Based on the US missionaries’ reports, Allen also reported that Koreans in the North felt closer to the Russian Army as it treated them better than the Japanese Army when they lodged complaints. The Russian Army was also strict “in punishing their soldiers for any injustice committed against a native.” Allen further reported on the forced closure of a Korean newspaper, Jeguk Shinmun, by Japanese gendarmes, due to the content of an article.14 Korean grassroots, which became the direct victims of forced labor, dislocation, and execution, continued sabotage and resistance in the country side. 15 But reformist intellectuals in Seoul mistakenly believed that Korean independence was already established because of international rivalry and that an expedient reform through Japanese assistance would foster its independence after the war.16 A major newspaper in Seoul urged Japan to change its interference based only upon selfish motives17 but expressed a hope that a speedy reform could forestall further Japanese penetration of Korea until October 1905.18 Meantime, Kojong continued to appeal to the United States for help, based upon his misplaced belief in the good office clause of the US-Korean treaty of 1882. During his audience with Allen on April 13, 1904, the emperor confidently expected that America would do something to keep Korean independence based on the good office clause. He intended to send a high official as Minister to Washington to invoke the good offices of the United States. But, Allen discouraged it by explaining that such effort would “only be an embarassment [sic].”19 When the palace was burned on April 15, the emperor moved into a library building adjoining the American legation. He did his best to create the impression that he was under the protection Seung-young Kim

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of the US legation. Such a situation strengthened Allen’s influence in Seoul, but he made it clear that he could not allow Kojong’s asylum at the US legation. To show this, Allen reduced the US marine guard in the legation and informed the Japanese Minister that he had no intention of becoming a protector of the Korean palace.20 In the meantime, Japan further carried out a series of measures to strengthen its control of Korea. On March 10, the Korean Garrison Army was established, and from July, it started cracking down on sabotage along the railroads and suppressed anti-Japan newspapers and rallies by imposing military policing in Seoul.21 On May 31, the Japanese cabinet adopted a blueprint decision to establish Japan’s protectorate over Korea by limiting Korean sovereignty. The decision addressed six aspects of the administration to consolidate Japan’s grip on Korea: military, foreign policy, finance, transportation, telegraph, and economic development.22 Based upon this blueprint, Japan concluded an agreement with Korea on August 22, which allowed Japan to appoint advisors for the Foreign Ministry and Finance Ministry. Thus, Durham White Stevens, American counselor to the Japanese legation in Washington, was named as diplomatic advisor; and Megata Jutaro, a bureau chief in the Japanese Ministry of Finance and a graduate of Harvard University, was appointed as financial advisor.23 In this way, Japan began to control the foreign and financial policy of Korea through its advisors to the Korean government. The United States maintained an indifferent attitude, tantamount to the recognition of Japanese moves in Korea. Two days after the signing of the agreement in August, Allen reported that the advisors would have “full executive control of their respective departments,”24 and that the Japanese Minister had advised Korea to abandon its missions abroad on the grounds that they were spending needless expenses.25 The State Department, however, did not send any instruction. It was the Japanese minister in Washington, Takahira, who presented the full content of the agreement to acting Secretary of State Adee. In Takahira’s explanation, the goal of the new agreement was “to check, as far as possible, the future conclusion of unwise and improvident engagements, which in the past have been fruitful sources of trouble and complication.” Takahira noted that the agreement would not interfere with Korea’s existing treaties.26 Adee did not raise any questions and just replied that the State Department took note of Japan’s purpose in negotiating the agreement and the effect of the agreement.27 Soon, Allen also reported that the agreement would make “the Korean foreign office a mere adjunct . . . of Japanese foreign office.” Yet, the State Department did not send any particular instruction to Seoul or Tokyo.28

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Syngman Rhee’s Appeal to the United States Japan continued to strengthen its control of Korea with continued victories in the battlefield. Following major victories at Pyongyang and Uiju in March, the main forces of the Japanese Army crossed the Yalu River in May, thus the main battleground moved into Manchuria. After such a change, the Korean Garrison Army put most of its efforts into consolidating its military occupation of Korea, though it had to deal with several small engagements with Russian forces in Anju and Wonsan until August 1904.29 By this time, the Korean Foreign Ministry was under the virtual control of Japan with the presence of the pro-Japan advisor. Yet, the Korean government still employed every available channel to get assistance from the United States. In September 1904, the Korean Emperor sought help from Charles W. Needham, president of George Washington University and counselor to the Korean legation in Washington, to appeal to John Hay. At the order of the emperor, Cho Min-hui wrote a letter to Needham, which asked him to describe the dangerous condition of Korea to Roosevelt and Hay and to secure their assistance for the independence and integrity of the Imperial Household.30 Needham called upon Hay on December 21 and presented the message to Hay verbally. Hay expressed a deep interest in Korea but replied that nothing could be done by a friendly nation until negotiations to make peace commenced.31 Later in 1904, two of the most influential reformers in the court circle— Min Young Whan and Hahn Kyu Sul—sent Syngman Rhee to the United States to appeal directly to the US government. 32 Syngman Rhee, who later became the first president of South Korea, was born in 1875 into an impoverished Yangban family in Hwanghae province. He received an enlightened modern education in the Paichai missionary school in Seoul and studied English. He became a leading member of the Independence Club and led the proreform movement but was imprisoned in 1889 when Kojong chose to suppress the club for its attempt to inaugurate a republic. After five years and seven months’ imprisonment, Rhee had just been released, with the help of strenuous appeals by American missionaries to shorten his prison term.33 Rhee was chosen as emissary to escape the watchful eyes of the Japanese, but this experience of frustrated appeal was to serve as an important formative experience for his later diplomacy toward the United States. After arriving in Washington, D.C., on December 31, 1904, Rhee confided his plan to Kim Yun Jung, a counselor in the Korean legation, to secure cooperation from the legation. And with the help of Hugh Dinsmore, a Senator from Arkansas and former US Minister to Seoul from 1887 to 1890, Rhee was able to meet Hay in February 1905. Hay, who was a parishioner of the Church of Covenant, showed an enthusiasm for the Seung-young Kim

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vibrant American missionary activities in northern Korea that continued despite the dangers posed by the Russo-Japanese War. At the end of the thirty-minute interview, Rhee pleaded with Hay, “we Koreans ask you, Mr. Secretary, to do what you have done for China.” Hay seemed pleased at Rhee’s reference to his Open Door policy and responded in the presence of Senator Dinsmore, “I will do everything I can to fulfill our treaty obligations, either personally or representing the United States government, whenever the opportunity presents itself.” But to the dismay of Rhee, Hay fell seriously ill and died that summer.34 While Rhee was making such efforts, Japan cautiously implemented its plans to place Korea under its control. In December 1904, it sharply reduced the Korean legations abroad and cut the military budget under the pretext of financial necessity. Japanese financial adviser, Megata, seized the maritime customs of Korea, which was the most stable source of revenue for the Korean government. Megata dismissed McLeavy Brown, a British citizen who was the Superintendent of Korean maritime customs with respectable efficiency and cleanness since 1893. Furthermore, Japan announced a military order limiting the freedom of public gathering and organization on January 8, 1905. It also seized the police authority in January by appointing Japanese officer Maruyama Shigetoshi as police advisor to the Korean government. From that time on, Japan imposed the Godeung-gyeongchalje (Intrusive Police System), under which even cabinet ministers could be arraigned when engaged in active resistance against Japan. These measures allowed Japan to seize most of the administrative arms of Korea, thus Korea was placed under virtual emergency order, imposed by Japan, by the spring of 1905.35 Willard Straight, the US vice-consul in Seoul, observed that such developments were a war of aggression under the guise of waging a war to preserve Japan’s national existence.36 In the meanwhile, Japan asked Roosevelt for mediation following its victory in the battle of Tsushima. In June, with the consent of Russia, it was announced that a peace conference would be convened at Portsmouth. About this time, Syngman Rhee secured a letter of introduction from Taft, who wrote it after being warmly welcomed by Korean settlers in Hawaii on his way to the Philippines. Taft was moved by the enormous Korean gathering held in his honor and was also urged by a Methodist Mission superintendent, Dr. Wadman, to write a letter to Roosevelt introducing Rhee and Reverend Pyong-Ku Yoon. These two representatives were elected as the envoys to present a memorial for Korean independence to the president. After arriving in Washington, Rhee and Yoon further polished the memorial with the help of Phillip Jaisohn, the founder of The Independent newspaper in Seoul, then residing in Philadelphia as a medical doctor.37 Seung-young Kim


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The memorial started with the phrase, “We, the Koreans of the Hawaiian Islands, voicing the sentiments of twelve millions of our countrymen,” and continued to use “we the common people of Korea” as the subject. The memorial noted that the objective of the Korea-Japan alliance treaty of February 1904 was “to preserve the independence of Korea and Japan” from Russia’s aggression, and that the Koreans expected Japanese assistance to implement genuine reform in Korea. But the Japanese government only released several thousand rough and disorderly Japanese men in Korea, who treated Koreans in a most brutal manner. 38 Japan also forcefully obtained all the special privileges and concessions from the Korean government, thus making Koreans lose their confidence in Japan and become afraid of losing independence.39 Then the memorial underscored the presence of America’s industrial, commercial, and missionary enterprises in Korea, and asked for US assistance to keep Korean independence according to the good office clause in the US-Korean treaty. With the help of Taft’s letter of introduction, Rhee and Yoon could present this memorial to Roosevelt at his summer house in Oyster Bay in Long Island. Just after meeting the Russian representatives to the peace conference, Roosevelt spared thirty minutes to meet these Korean envoys on August 4, 1905. But after glancing through the brief memorial, Roosevelt told Rhee that the memorial should be submitted through the official diplomatic channel to be considered as a petition. If it was submitted through the Korean legation in Washington, then the president would send it to the Portsmouth peace conference along with the Chinese petition. Still he made it clear that he had no power but to invite Japan and Russia to come together to make peace.40 Moved by Roosevelt’s typical attitude of camaraderie, Rhee and Yoon were exulted and rushed to Washington, D.C. But to their surprise, Kim Yun-jung, then the Charge d’Affaires in the Korean Legation, told them that the memorial could not be submitted without official instruction from the Seoul government. By that time, sending out such instruction from Seoul was impossible because of the Japanese influence in the Foreign Ministry, and Kim must have been well aware of such a reality. In Rhee’s account, Kim was already in secret communication with the Japanese Minister in Washington, in return for Japanese support for his expected appointment to the legation post. Kim made such a choice despite the fact that Rhee had also recently recommended him for the position of Charge d’Affaires through Han Kyu-sul in the Seoul government. Rhee made every effort to persuade Kim with the help of Phillip Jaisohn in Philadelphia, but their efforts did not bear any fruit. Thus the petition could not be submitted through official channels to Roosevelt.41 Seung-young Kim

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Even if the memorial had been submitted through official channels, it was not certain whether Roosevelt would have changed his views and policy toward Korea. Though Taft wrote the letter of introduction for Rhee, during his following trip to Japan, he conferred with Japanese Prime Minister Katsura, and signed the secret agreement on July 29, which recognized the Japanese sphere of influence over Korea. By the time Rhee met Roosevelt, the president had already expressed his full support for the Taft-Katsura agreement on July 31. In fact, these activities of Syngman Rhee were closely monitored by Japan and made Katsura anxious to request a meeting with Taft while he visited Japan.42 Rhee’s appeal was also foreshadowed by the discouraging report of the new US Minister in Seoul who had just replaced Allen in June. About Rhee’s mission, Minister Morgan telegraphed that “their undertaking is regarded, in general, as unwise, since they command confidence neither at home nor abroad.” On such grounds, Morgan predicted that they might not be able to enter upon their missions.43 Edwin V. Morgan was, in fact, a close friend of Roosevelt and had been sent to Seoul as the new minister to implement the president’s design for Korea. On March 20, the president had frankly explained to the Japanese Minister in Washington that he chose Morgan because he would maintain a close relationship with the Japanese authority in Seoul.44 Not aware of this background, Kojong appealed to the United States several times to keep Allen in Seoul at least until the end of the war. Roosevelt and Adee repeatedly declined such suggestions by the emperor. Instead, they just explained that it was established policy to replace ministers abroad after several years and that the new appointment was about to be ratified in the Senate.45 The Taft-Katsura Agreement The Taft-Katsura agreement was the culmination of US policy toward Korea during the Roosevelt administration. Though the exact nature of the agreement has been debated, it was a clear expression of the existing policies of the Roosevelt administration by June 1905 when Taft visited Japan. At that time, Japan had recorded a phenomenal victory in the naval battle at Tsushima and was preparing to join the peace conference at Portsmouth. Japan was also negotiating with Britain to revise the Anglo-Japanese alliance in order to secure exclusive control of Korea. By this time, US decision makers reached a consensus to support Japan’s control of Korea but were developing concerns about Japan’s future designs toward the Philippines. Taft had been president of the Philippine commission since May 1900 and was appointed by Roosevelt as secretary of war in February 1905. Seung-young Kim


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Because of Hay’s illness, he was also the acting secretary of state and thus received the Japanese terms for peace and reported them to Roosevelt while the president was away from Washington during the spring of 1905.46 He was a consummate administrator with extensive experience as a lawyer but did not have historical perspective or a grandiose design in diplomacy. He had a close relationship with the president, and he generally followed Roosevelt’s initiatives on foreign policy. He was characterized as a good messenger in diplomatic activities rather than a creator of policy.47 Indeed, when he visited Japan, Taft was well acquainted with the established policy of the Roosevelt administration on the Far East. In March he confided a very favorable view about the Japanese governing class and wrote that Japan would “have her hands full” managing Korea and the Liaotung Peninsula, thus would not make an aggressive move toward the Philippines.48 Yet, after the phenomenal triumph of Japan in May, Taft heard from Roosevelt about his concerns for the defense of the Philippines and the importance of strengthening the naval base there.49 Taft’s visit to Japan was made immediately before the Portsmouth peace conference but was planned since May and directed by Roosevelt. On May 6, Roosevelt wrote to Hay that “Cassini is now having a fit about Taft stopping at Japan on his way to the Philippines”50 and later recalled that he directed Taft to discuss the outstanding terms of peace with Katsura.51 During his visit to Japan, Taft was accompanied by Alice Roosevelt and a congressional delegation, who were on their way to the Philippines. The delegation was greeted with an enormous welcome by the Japanese people and government, and Taft had the privilege of becoming the first foreign dignitary to have an audience with the Japanese emperor. Amid such a warm welcome, prime minister Katsura Taro, invited him on July 27 to discuss the Far-Eastern situation at the end of the war. The agreed memorandum shows that the Philippines question was the first item on the agenda. During the talk, Taft observed that “Japan’s only interest in the Philippines would be, in his opinion, to have these Islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United States, and not to have them placed either under the misrule of the natives, yet unfit for selfgovernment, or in the hands of some unfriendly European power.” Katsura agreed with Taft’s view in the strongest terms and stated that “Japan does not harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines.” Touching on the rumors of the yellow peril rising in the United States, Katsura strongly denied such a possibility. He stated, “all the insinuations of the yellow peril type are nothing more or less than malicious and clumsy slanders calculated to do mischief to Japan.” After the talk on the Philippines, Katsura raised the Korean question, with the usual logic employed by the Japanese government. Korea was, in Seung-young Kim

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his argument, the direct cause of Japan’s war with Russia, thus “it is a matter of absolute importance to Japan that a complete solution of the peninsula question should be made the logical consequence of the war.” Katsura further underscored, “if left to herself after the war Korea will certainly draw back to her habit of improvidently entering into any agreements or treaties with other powers, thus resuscitating the same international complications as existed before the war.” Upon these grounds, he stated that Japan had to take some definite step to preclude “the possibility of Korea falling back into her former condition and of placing us again under the necessity of entering upon another foreign war.” Taft fully admitted the justness of Katsura’s arguments and remarked that, in his personal opinion “the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea . . . was the logical result of the present war and would directly contribute to the permanent peace in the East.”52 The two statesmen also agreed to pursue cooperation between the United States, Japan, and Great Britain to maintain peace in the Far East. Specifically, Katsura stated that the best, and in fact the only, means to maintain a general peace in the Far East would be “to form good understanding between the three governments of Japan, the United States and Great Britain which have common interest in upholding the principle of eminence.” He further suggested that if the United States had difficulty entering a formal alliance because of its tradition, the three nations could make “some good understanding or an alliance in practice if not in name” with respect to affairs in the Far East. To such an offer, Taft replied that it was indeed impossible for the US president “to enter even to a confidential informal agreement, without the consent of the Senate.” But, simultaneously, he reassured Katsura that even without any agreement, Japan and Britain could count on “the appropriate action” of the United States whenever such an occasion occurred “as if the United States were under treaty obligation to take.”53 In this way, though Taft did not agree on a binding understanding, he gave a de facto commitment to pursue cooperation with Japan and Britain in the Far East. As a consummate lawyer, Taft was careful enough not to make a binding commitment, while keeping room to make reservations after consulting with Washington. It was recorded in the agreed memorandum that “he [Taft] had no mandate for the purpose from the President” and that he might be trespassing on another’s department in light of the fact that Root had been appointed secretary of state since he left Washington. Still, he made it clear in the memorandum that he was “temporarily discharging the duties of Secretary of State under the direction of the President” at the time of his discussions with Katsura. Seung-young Kim


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Such caution was justifiable because Taft did not have specific instructions from Washington about the drafting of the agreed memorandum. Taft’s telegram, reporting the agreed memorandum, also said that the discussion was proceeded by the “courteous desire” of the Japanese prime minister, who was “quite anxious for interview.”54 Still, his visit to Japan was directed by the president,55 and the points he raised were in line with the existing policy of the Roosevelt administration. Taft himself reported that “it was difficult to avoid statement” when the Japanese prime minister was anxious for an interview, and that he “so told truth as [he] believe[d] it.” The agreed memorandum became fully effective without reservation through the exchanges of telegrams of confirmation. After the agreement, Taft inquired about the correctness of the agreed memorandum to Root, writing, “if I have spoken too freely or inaccurately or unwittingly, I know you can and will correct it.” Because Root was on his way to vacation in Labrador, it was Roosevelt who sent the reply on July 31. The president telegraphed, “your conversation with Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura that I confirm every word you have said.”56 After receiving such confirmation from the president, Taft telegraphed, on August 7, to Katsura from Manila that “I am directed by the President to say to your Excellency that he confirms in every respect the statements made by me in our conversation.” After this confirmation, Katsura informed it to Komura, who was in Portsmouth to join the peace conference.57 The Taft-Katsura Agreement in the Context of Great Power Politics The complex wording and the spontaneous nature of the negotiation have caused heated debate among historians about the nature and effect of the Taft-Katsura agreement. While one group of scholars have regarded it as typical, secret diplomacy drawing spheres of influence,58 another authority on the issue, Raymond Esthus, has regarded it as “simply an honest exchange of views as described in the memorandum itself ” in light of the noncommittal wording and the situation in which the agreement was reached.59 But, the changing perception of Roosevelt about the broad strategic situation and the ensuing process of confirmation demonstrate that the Roosevelt administration attached much greater significance than “simply an honest exchange of views” to the agreement. Indeed, Roosevelt’s support of the Japanese protectorate in Korea was reaffirmed in his various remarks before the meeting between Taft and Katsura.60 On January 28, 1905, he wrote to Hay that “we can not possibly interfere for Koreans against Japan. They couldn’t strike one blow Seung-young Kim

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in their own defense.”61 On February 6, he wrote to Ambassador Meyer in St. Petersburg: “if peace should come now, Japan ought to have a protectorate over Korea (which has shown its utter inability to stand by itself) and ought to succeed to Russia’s rights in and around Port Arthur, while I should hope to see Manchuria restored to China.”62 By early 1905, overall, these views of the president became the guide for specific policies. 63 And in March, such a view of Roosevelt’s was informally conveyed to Katsura through his friends. During his interview with Richard Barry at the White House, Roosevelt confided: “Japan must hold Port Arthur and she must hold Korea. Those two points are already settled.” Barry communicated this message to George Kennan, an American journalist in Japan, with a note to pass the president’s remark onto “a few men of influence in Japan.”64 Thus, Kennan relayed the message to Katsura and sent a confirmation letter to the president.65 Because of this prior notification supporting the Japanese protectorate over Korea, some historians maintained that the Taft-Katsura talk was not a quid pro quo bargaining for spheres of influence in the Philippines and Korea. These scholars also point out that Japan did not pose a tangible threat to the Philippines until the talk and that the United States had announced its confidence in defending the Philippines from any states’ aggression.66 However, the changes in the strategic situation had already made US decision makers realize the importance of clarifying spheres of influence with Japan.67 From the beginning of 1905, Japan had continued with decisive victories in Port Arthur and Mukden. Particularly, its triumph in Port Arthur, on January 2, demonstrated that a fortified base was no match against a determined enemy with naval superiority and made American strategists more concerned about the vulnerability of the Philippines.68 As early as May 1904, the United States and Britain sensed the danger of Russian defeat and, perhaps, elimination as a Far-Eastern power, which could undermine the balance of power in the Far East.69 In March 1905, the British Ambassador in Washington reported that US naval officers were very worried about rising Japanese naval power.70 Such a concern was further sensitized after the phenomenal victory of Japan in the battle of Tsushima on May 27, 1905, in which the Russian Baltic fleet was annihilated while the Japanese fleet was left unscathed. Witnessing such changes, Roosevelt showed a heightened concern for the security of the Philippines. While congratulating his friend Kaneko, on May 31, on the naval triumph, Roosevelt wrote to Taft to direct the attention of senators and representatives in support of fortifying the Subic Bay during their forthcoming visit to the Philippines. He wrote, “if we are not prepared to build and maintain a good-sized navy, . . . and if we are not Seung-young Kim


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prepared to establish a strong suitable base for our navy in the Philippines, then we had far better give up the Philippine Islands entirely.”71 In his letter to Spring Rice, he underscored the importance of treating the Japanese “in a spirit of all possible courtesy,” and wrote, “if we fail to keep our navy at the highest point of efficiency and size then we will invite disaster.”72 Taft’s visit to Japan was made in this context, and he expressed the existing views in Washington when Katsura invited him for a talk. Indeed, American support on the Korean question was not new. But reaffirming Japanese nonaggression toward the Philippines while conceding nothing new was an exemplary technique for achieving a diplomatic goal. Moreover, the confirmation telegrams by Roosevelt, which endorsed “every respect” of the agreement, show a clear endorsement of the main points of the memorandum, recognition of the respective sphere of influence over the Philippines and Korea. Though not an open treaty, such an executive agreement could retain binding force as long as both governments were willing to abide by it.73 It was a convenient secret agreement between the executive branches of the two powers, which could avert controversy in domestic and international arenas during the process of open ratification. Roosevelt’s earlier communication with Britain also shows the broader context of great power diplomacy behind the Taft-Katsura agreement. In January 1905, before the battle of Mukden, Roosevelt suggested to Britain a joint action at the end of the war in connection with possible terms of peace. British prime minister Arthur Balfour also informed Spring Rice that the interests of Britain and of the United States in the Far East were identical, and that they harmonized with the professed aims of Japan. 74 And on the twenty-third of the same month, Roosevelt assured the British ambassador in Washington that the two countries must “stand together” to see the adoption of a reasonable peace settlement. In Roosevelt’s view, Japan should keep Port Arthur and Korea, Russia should retain north Manchuria, and the rest of Manchuria should revert to China. If neutrals tried to intervene against Japan, then Roosevelt promised, “I will oppose any attempt of the kind.”75 Balfour and Lansdowne accepted the terms of the peace outlined by Roosevelt. Lansdowne wrote that Britain would be “ready to join the United States” in opposing attempts at intervention by neutral Powers to coerce Japan to abandon either Korea or Port Arthur.76 Meantime, on January 25, the Japanese foreign minister, Komura, also sent a reply to Britain, which was along the same lines as the British and American terms of peace.77 In implementing these agreed terms, Roosevelt suggested an approach similar to the US diplomacy during the Taft-Katsura agreement. He suggested to Britain that “there should be no open evident agreement, so as to avoid exciting alarm and criticism.” He further added that “the two counSeung-young Kim

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ties must stand together” but that “they should show it by actions only” to avoid raising unnecessary difficulties.78 After the Japanese victory in the naval battle, these views of the United States were reaffirmed by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a close friend of Roosevelt’s, when the Senator met with Balfour and Lansdowne during his visit to Britain in June 1905.79 After the conclusion of the Taft-Katsura agreement, Roosevelt kept the spirit of his earlier remarks to Britain. On August 3, he confided to British ambassador Mortimer Durand that the United States was pursuing the same Far-Eastern policy as Japan and Britain, informing him of the discussion between Taft and Katsura, when the ambassador informed him of the substance of the second Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty before signing.80 This pattern of diplomatic coordination among the United States, Britain, and Japan was maintained until the end of 1905, when Japan established exclusive control of Korea by imposing the protectorate treaty on Korea. The Korean Question during the Portsmouth Conference The Portsmouth Peace Conference was held from August 10 until September 5, 1905. During the conference, the discussion over Korea still had to go through a fierce tug-of-war between Japan and Russia before the final agreement was reached. Komura requested Russia to acknowledge Japan’s exclusive control of Korea.81 The Russian representative, Witte, gave general approval to this demand by Komura but still insisted on adding a clause in support of Korean sovereignty. He insisted on adding a clause stating that the “taking of such measures by Japan must not impair the sovereign rights of the Emperor of Korea.”82 After negotiating for three and a half hours on August 12, both parties reached a diplomatic compromise. The issue of Korea’s sovereignty would not be mentioned in the treaty, but the conference minutes and the protocol would reflect Russian concern about Korean sovereignty.83 Thus, the protocol recorded: “it is understood that the measures which Japan may find it necessary to take in Korea in the future and which impair the sovereignty of that country will be taken in accord with the Korean government.”84 In legal terms, this clause in the protocol has the same effect as the same clause would have in the main text of the treaty.85 But the content of the clause was significantly moderated compared to Witte’s initial demand for Korean sovereignty. While Japan and Russia were negotiating the Korea clause on August 12, the second Anglo-Japanese alliance was signed. The new treaty was concluded after six months of negotiation mainly over the issues of Korea and India.86 It omitted all mention of supporting Korea’s sovereignty that had been Seung-young Kim


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included in the first treaty of 1902. In identical terms to the Portsmouth conference, the new treaty affirmed Japan’s paramount political, military, and economic interests in Korea and recognized Japan’s right to take measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea. In return, Japan agreed to relieve Britain’s concern for defending India.87 By the time the negotiations were under way, Britain was far more concerned about the German threat in Europe and a possible Russian move toward India once the RussoJapanese War ended. Thus it pushed Japan to commit itself to the defense of India. 88 Japan was reluctant to commit but had to accept this in return for securing British support for a free hand in Korea. Roosevelt’s most important contribution to the conference was his mediation to resolve the stalemate over the issue of indemnity and the cession of Sakhalin. Until the final stage of the negotiations, Komura insisted on both an indemnity and the cession of Sakhalin. Witte, however, adamantly refused to pay an indemnity, arguing that Russia was not a vanquished power yet.89 Confrontation over these issues led to the near break-up of negotiations before Roosevelt decided to intervene to save the negotiations. The president telegraphed to the tsar that the eastern Siberian province would be lost if the war continued. Simultaneously, he urged Japan to moderate its demand for indemnity, advising that continuing the war for the “money indemnity” would turn public opinion against Japan and eventually cost more money for Japan.90 Such a timely mediation by Roosevelt induced Japan to drop its demand for indemnity, and Russia also agreed to cede the southern half of Sakhalin Island.91 While striving to moderate Japanese demands during the final stages of the negotiations, Roosevelt made another suggestion to his friend Kaneko Gentaro about Japan’s further rights in Korea, which was interpreted by Kaneko as a suggestion for the annexation of Korea: “[Japan] does not need money. You talk about collecting indemnity. But you are taking Sakhalin, Manchurian railway, Port Arthur, and coal mine at Lushun. Then, sooner or later, it will be better for Japan to take Korea. I think Japan ought to take Korea. It will be good for the Koreans and Asia. Japan should not take Korea right away, but sooner or later it will be better [for Japan] to take it.”92 Exactly when Roosevelt made this remark is not clear. But it has been construed to have been made sometime during late August, when Roosevelt had a talk with Kaneko at Oyster Bay to persuade Japan to moderate its demand for indemnity. This view of Roosevelt went far beyond the Taft-Katsura agreement and was recorded under the title of “suggestion to the annexation of Korea,” by Kaneko. Roosevelt also used strong terms when the Treaty of Protection was forced upon the Korean cabinet by the Japanese, on November 17, 1905. He instructed the US Minister in Seoul to “pack and come home because the annexation of Korea by Japan will Seung-young Kim

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be good for Korea as well as Japan.” For these reasons, in Andrew Nahm’s interpretation, Roosevelt could have utilized Korea as a price to moderate Japan’s excessive demands to Russia during the Portsmouth peace conference.93 In fact, the permissive stance to allow Japanese annexation of Korea was in tune with the expressed view of the British Foreign Office. In late August, British ambassador to Japan, MacDonald, recommended, “we should not object even if the protectorate were to lead to annexation, and I have, in my conversation with Hayashi, taken this line.”94 Similar opinion had also emerged in the internal debate of the Foreign Office when Japan delivered an early version of the draft treaty for the second Anglo-Japanese alliance on May 26, 1905.95 US and British Support for Japan’s Decision for the Protectorate Once freedom of action in Korea was secured, Japan expedited its efforts to impose a protectorate over Korea, and such efforts by Japan faced little resistance from other great powers. The Korean Emperor and government sent repeated appeals to the United States, but the Roosevelt administration rejected such appeals from Korea with technical excuses. Immediately after the Portsmouth peace conference, Japan could reaffirm the support of the United States for its plan to impose a protectorate on Korea. Despite a high fever, Komura made a farewell visit to Roosevelt’s residence at Oyster Bay on September 9 and confirmed the president’s support for the Korean question. Komura told Roosevelt that Russia might resume conspiratorial measures similar to its activities during the prewar era. Therefore, he argued, Japan had no other choice but to take over Korea’s foreign relations. Then he inquired whether the president would support Japan if Japan unilaterally declared Korea as its protectorate in case Korea did not agree on the treaty. Roosevelt replied that he would have no objection even if the protectorate were imposed by a unilateral declaration of Japan. He assured that Japan could count on his support.96 On the previous day, Secretary of State Root had also recognized that such a measure should be taken to prevent an aggressive move by Russia. He further expected that American public opinion would not object to such measures taken by Japan.97 The British government also recognized the Japanese right to impose a protectorate over Korea. The foreign secretary, Lansdowne, expressed such a view while explaining the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese alliance to France in early September 1905. In his view, it had become evident that “Corea, owing to its close proximity to the Japanese Empire, its inability Seung-young Kim


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to stand alone, and the danger arising from its weakness must fall under the control and tutelage of Japan.” 98 Lansdowne showed satisfaction that Russia readily conceded this point in the Treaty of Portsmouth. The foreign secretary observed that his government “have every reason to believe that similar views are held by other Powers.”99 Later in September, after listening to the Japanese plans for Korea, Lansdowne reaffirmed that the “British government had no objection about the measure Japan was about to take on Korea according to the new Anglo-Japanese alliance.”100 With such clear support of the United States and Britain, the Japanese cabinet decided on October 27 to impose a protectorate on Korea in early November and confirmed the draft of the protectorate treaty. The cabinet decision stressed that it was the best time to establish a protectorate over Korea because of several factors: the support of Britain and the United States, the acquiescence of other powers about the inevitability of Korea becoming a Japanese protectorate following the Portsmouth treaty, and the conclusion of a new Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty.101 At the same time, the cabinet decided to dispatch Japanese military forces to Seoul before imposing a protectorate over Korea. It also directed General Hasegawa, the commander of Japanese forces in Seoul, to provide necessary support for Minister Hayashi to ensure a satisfactory result when imposing the protectorate. 102 By October, Japan had dispatched two powerful Army divisions, the thirteenth division from Japan and the fifteenth division from Manchuria, to replace the existing divisions in Korea. Because the war had ended already, such a swift reinforcement was perceived as aimed at suppressing Koreans while imposing the protectorate. Indeed, after the content of the Anglo-Japanese treaty was announced on September 27, increasing worries emerged among Koreans about the great powers’ consent to allow Japanese freedom of action in Korea.103 By this time, a number of lowerclass Japanese had moved into Korea and had committed brutality toward Koreans. Such developments had drawn the attention of the US diplomats in Tokyo. Thus Griscom, the US Minister in Tokyo, sent a telegram urging Washington “to throw our whole moral weight to prevent the Japanese from abusing Koreans.”104 Receiving this report, Roosevelt told Takahira to pay attention to the brutal treatment of Koreans and Taiwanese by lower-class Japanese. The president also cautioned Japan not to invite unnecessary antagonism among Koreans and Chinese. Roosevelt, however, simultaneously made clear his support for Japan’s supervision of Korea as a protectorate.105 In his telegram to Washington, Prime Minister Katsura promised to exert his best efforts to ban such mistreatment of Koreans by Japanese. He simultaneously informed Roosevelt that the Japanese government had decided Seung-young Kim

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to take over Korea’s external affairs within a few days.106 Roosevelt showed satisfaction about the Japanese reply and inquired whether Japan desired the withdrawal of the US minister from Seoul. Takahira suggested to him to wait until Ito Hirobumi finalized the issue of the protectorate during his visit to Seoul from November 9, but he simultaneously informed the president that British and Italian ministers had already left Seoul citing newspaper reports. Hearing this reply, Roosevelt promised that the US government would take measures that would satisfy Japan.107 Korea’s Futile Appeal to the United States and Japanese Imposition of the Protectorate By early November, there emerged an increasing awareness of the impending move by Japan in Korea. On November 3, Iljinhwoi, the leading proJapan society supported by the Japanese authority, adopted a declaration urging the transfer of Korea’s external relations to Japan. Against such a move, anti-Japanese societies, such as Daehanjaganghwoi and Gongjinhwoi, waged a strenuous protest against Iljinhwoi.108 Kojong had a keen grasp of the seriousness of the Portsmouth treaty for his country’s fate and employed various ways to appeal to the United States for assistance. Now that Russia was gone, the United States was the only power to rely on for his usual policy of balancing one foreign power against another. One important occasion for such purpose was Alice Roosevelt’s visit to Korea, made following her trip to the Philippines. During her visit, from September 19 to October 2, the Korean government made an utmost effort to secure the sympathy of the United States by extending the greatest welcome and courtesy to the president’s daughter. Willard Straight, deputy US consul general from August, wrote that the Korean court seemed to regard her visit as a “life preserver” to maintain the independence of Korea.109 Alice remained, however, away from any political activities. Instead, Senator Francis Newlands gave advice to the Korean officials to hire an international lawyer and raise a serious formal appeal based upon the good office clause in the US-Korean treaty. Kojong was not pleased with the senator’s advice and chose to make direct appeals to the US government.110 In mid-October, the emperor confided to Morgan that Japan was pressing him to arrange a protocol for the protectorate and expressed his desire to maintain the present right of direct relations with foreign powers.111 In the same month, Kojong also decided to send a direct appeal to President Roosevelt through an American missionary, Homer B. Hulbert. Hulbert was the editor of Korea Review and had Seung-young Kim


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been employed by the Korean government since 1886 for educational work in Seoul. In his letter to Roosevelt, Kojong pointed out that Japan was about to declare a protectorate over Korea, directly contradicting its promise to preserve Korean independence in the protocol of February 1904. Against Korean wishes for Japanese advice on genuine reform, Japan had gravely mishandled the financial policies of Korea and carried out nothing to advance the cause of education or justice.112 Kojong also underscored that the extinction of Korea’s nationality would remove the chance for Koreans to work gladly with Japan by intensifying old hatreds. He pleaded to Roosevelt “to render us what aid you can consistently in this our time of national danger.”113 But this letter could not be submitted to the US government on time because Hulbert arrived in Washington on November 17, the same day as the protectorate treaty was enforced on Korea. The treaty was concluded just one hour after his arrival at the railway station in Washington. While Hulbert was hurrying to meet US officials in Washington, Japan enforced the protectorate treaty.114 On November 16, Japanese artillery batteries and infantry detachments began a threatening show of force in front of the palace and in Jongro, the main street of Seoul. On the next day, when the treaty was enforced, the palace was filled with Japanese soldiers with bayoneted rifles.115 On the night before the enforcement of the treaty, Ito urged the emperor to make an immediate decision, but Kojong adamantly refused to transfer the right of external relations and did not convene a cabinet conference on the excuse of illness. On the next day, Ito and General Hasegawa forced the Korean ministers to convene a cabinet meeting and sign the protectorate treaty. The treaty would transfer the sovereign right of external relations to Japan and establish the presence of a Japanese resident general in Korea.116 The most resistant minister, Han Kyu-sul, was taken out to a side room and threatened with a sword by General Hasegawa, but Han still refused to sign the treaty. Meanwhile several other ministers thought that Han had been killed, thus capitulated to the threat and signed the treaty. In all, five ministers signed the treaty while three ministers refused to the end.117 After securing five signatures for the treaty, Ito announced that the treaty was concluded by majority vote, and the great seal of the emperor was also snatched by the Japanese and attached to the treaty.118 Although there are different interpretations about the theft of the seal and the validity of the treaty, it is clear that the treaty was signed under duress, which constitutes a cause to render the treaty invalid.119 The US government was well aware of these developments in Korea but left the situation to follow the course set by Japan. When Japanese moves to Seung-young Kim

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establish the protectorate became clear with the arrival of Ito on November 4, Morgan reported such developments to Washington120 but refused Kojong’s request to send his letter to Roosevelt.121 He also refused Kojong’s request for refuge in the American legation before the conclusion of the protectorate treaty.122 On the day the treaty was enforced, Kojong again sought the advice of Minister Morgan by sending his foreign minister, Pak Che Som, to the US legation. But Pak could not meet Morgan and met instead his secretary, Willard Straight, who informed him that Morgan could not advise him without consulting the State Department.123 On the day after the enforcement of the treaty, Morgan sent a congratulatory message to the Japanese minister for the conclusion of the treaty.124 And on November 20 he reported to Washington about the conclusion of the treaty and the heavy presence of Japanese military and police during its signing.125 On November 22, Komura informed Rockhill of his government’s wish to see the withdrawal of the US legation in Seoul.126 Komura was visiting Beijing for follow-up negotiations with China after the Portsmouth conference; and Rockhill was then the US minister in China. Following such reports, Root instructed Morgan on November 24 to withdraw the legation from Korea127 and informed American diplomats abroad of that decision on November 25.128 The United States was the first country to announce the decision to withdraw its legation from Korea.129 For taking such a “prompt and just step” in withdrawing the legation, the Japanese government expressed profound satisfaction to the US government.130 Indeed, following the US announcement, all the other powers began withdrawing their diplomatic representatives from Seoul, which looked, in the record of Straight, “like the stampede of rats from a sinking ship.”131 In the midst of these developments, Min Yong-hwan, a leading proAmerican reformer, committed suicide on November 30. The former prime minister and foreign minister was the main sponsor of Syngman Rhee’s visit to the United States. His suicide was in protest against the enforcement of the protectorate treaty, but Willard Straight believed that it was largely due to the withdrawal of the US legation from Korea.132 Indeed Min left a pathetic letter for his influential friends in America and the ministers of foreign powers in Seoul. The letter urged them to realize “the aim and actions of the Japanese.” Min wrote that, even after his death, he would be thankful if the United States could invoke the good offices clause of the US-Korean treaty to support Korean independence and to make known to the world “whatever injustice my people may suffer.”133 While this drama was unfolding, Hulbert arrived in Washington and could barely secure an interview with the secretary of state. But the interview was set on November 25, one day after the State Department instructed the Seung-young Kim


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withdrawal of the US legation from Seoul. Moreover, during the interview, Root told him that he could not discuss such an issue because Hulbert was only a messenger. Root frankly asked him in a very pointed way, “Mr. Hulbert, do you want us to get into trouble with Japan?”134 On the following day, Hulbert received a cablegram sent by Kojong, dispatched from Chefoo to escape transmission through Japanese lines. The emperor declared that the treaty of protectorate was null and void, because it had been secured at the point of the sword and he had never signed it or acquiesced in its signature.135 Hulbert brought the cablegram to the State Department, but Assistant Secretary Bacon only told him that it would be put on file.136 A few days later, Hulbert received a letter from Root. The letter informed him that Roosevelt had read the emperor’s letter but that the US government could not move on the matter because the emperor desired strict secrecy and had already made a new agreement with Japan since entrusting the letter to Hulbert.137 During this period of procrastination, Root briefly considered the possibility of invoking the good office clause in the US-Korean treaty. But he did not take any further action beyond cautioning the Japanese minister about the mistreatment of Koreans in a cordial tone. He still regarded that Kojong’s appeal did not come through an official procedure and listened to Takahira’s explanation about the recent conclusion of the protectorate treaty. Takahira also explained about the measures taken to address compensation for the lands taken for military purposes. After hearing this, Root replied that he had no doubt about Japan’s ability to pursue such goals in Korea in light of its management of its Taiwan colony.138 About two weeks after Hulbert’s mission, another special envoy of the Korean emperor, Min Yeung-Tchan, arrived in Washington with a telegraphic message from the emperor.139 He was the Korean minister to France and the younger brother of the late Min Yong-Hwan. By the time of his arrival, the Korean legation in Washington was in complete collaboration with Japan,140 and the Japanese minister in Washington was trying to discredit Min’s mission.141 Yet, Min obtained an interview with the secretary for about half an hour on December 11 and could relay the emperor’s message and informed Root about Japanese misdeeds in a pathetic tone. He specifically pointed out that the protectorate treaty was “procured from the Emperor of Korea by duress and should therefore be ignored” and relayed the emperor’s wish for the continuation of US recognition of the Korean entity.142 Such an appeal by Min was also reported by leading newspapers in Washington but could not change the secretary’s mind. Root gave only legalistic answers while not addressing the hopes expressed by Min. Root told Min that the United States had not broken diplomatic relations with Korea but Seung-young Kim

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would thereafter conduct its diplomatic business through the Japanese embassy.143 In the official reply sent on December 19, Root pointed to two reasons as grounds not to invoke the good office clause of the US-Korean treaty. First, after Min’s appeal, the Charge d’Affaires of the Korean legation bade him farewell and informed him of the instruction from the acting Foreign Minister Yi Wan Yong, the leading pro-Japan collaborator. Yi had already instructed the Korean legation to transfer its archives and property to the Japanese legation in Washington. Second, through its agreements of February 23 and August 22, 1904, Korea had already given to Japan “such extensive control over her affairs and put herself so completely under the protection of the Government of Japan,” so that applying the good office clause became completely impossible for the United States. 144 In this way, Kojong’s last ditch efforts to appeal to the United States to revoke the protectorate treaty could not bear any fruit in Washington. After the conclusion of the treaty, Japan tightened its control of the internal administration of Korea and took steps to annex Korea with the support of the great powers. It was only Russia that showed reservations about the annexation of 1910, but even Russia had few choices but to acquiesce to Japan’s move toward the annexation because of increasing tension in Europe and domestic political instability. 145 The Korean emperor continued his efforts to appeal to the great powers146 and sent his emissaries to the international peace conference held at the Hague in June 1907. But the Korean envoys were not allowed to participate in the peace conference on the grounds that they did not carry the credentials of the Japanese emperor. In fact, the controversy caused by the emissaries was used by Japan as an excuse to engineer the abdication of the Korean emperor the following month.147 Meanwhile, diplomatic tensions began to emerge between Japan and the United States because of Japan’s reluctance to keep an Open Door in Manchuria, but such changes did not influence established US policy toward Korea. The enforcement of the protectorate treaty ignited the Righteous Army movement in the Korean countryside. The forced abdication of the emperor and the subsequent disbanding of the Korean Army in 1907 further intensified the Righteous Army movement. But these guerrilla movements were no match for overwhelming Japanese military forces and police and was mostly pacified or moved into Manchuria after the annexation in 1910.148 The Taft administration, inaugurated in March 1909, did not take any particular action when Japan annexed Korea in August 1910. It just continued to support the US economic and missionary activities in Korea, while remaining distant from any political developments there. During the presidency of Woodrow Wilson, the Koreans waged an unprecedented Seung-young Kim


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nationwide movement for independence in March 1919. This movement was brutally suppressed by the Japanese military and police. But the Wilson administration did not take any action beyond cautioning American missionaries to maintain strict neutrality. This stance showed a contrast with the British government, which made efforts to persuade Japan to refrain from the inhumane suppression and to suspend its assimilation policy in Korea.149 In the diplomatic arena, the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Shanghai sent a representative to the Paris Peace Conference, and Syngman Rhee tried to participate in the Washington Conference on naval arms control at the end of 1921. But the United States did not pay any substantial attention to them, who were blocked from official participation due to the status of Korea as a Japanese colony.150 In this way, Korea remained largely outside the diplomatic concern of the United States until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

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Conclusion Part I

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he Roosevelt administration was most careful to maintain a favorable balance of power for the United States in the Far East. While doing this, it recognized Japanese control of Korea. The administration found a common interest with Japan and Britain in suspending Russia’s encroachment of Manchuria. Particularly, the administration regarded Japan as playing America’s game in keeping Manchuria open when the United States was not ready to use force for such a purpose. Thus, it exerted diplomatic efforts to prevent any European intervention against Japan and took a joint stance with Britain in providing diplomatic assistance for Japan. The administration also strove to maintain Chinese neutrality and later mediated a peace at a stage where Russia and Japan would remain face to face with each other. It was expected that such a confrontation would keep Japan away from expanding toward the ocean and conflicting with the United States. While pursuing such a course of policy, the Roosevelt administration did not listen to Korean appeals to secure its independence and neutrality. The lack of Korea’s capability was also one of the key factors that led to such an outcome. Kojong’s strategy of playing foreign powers against each other was virtually based upon a diplomacy-alone approach that neglected a careful assessment of the situation and self-strengthening. Such an approach could not maintain Korea’s independence when imperial rivalry was played out in the most naked fashion. Nationalistic movements such as enlightened reform campaigns and guerrilla uprisings arose in Korea, but those movements were suppressed by the Korean court or by Japan. The dynamics that drove US policy toward Korea can be analyzed further in the light of realist hypotheses set out in Chapter 1: Perception of polarity. During the Roosevelt era, the Far-Eastern situation was dominated by rivalry among the great powers in a multipolar situation. The central decision makers in Washington, D.C., also had a solid grasp of such a reality. The president especially had a strategic vision based on Realpolitik, and such beliefs of the president consistently influenced policy making in Washington, D.C.

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The domino image and grand strategy. The image of the falling domino was not evoked during the Roosevelt administration. Korea was faced with repeated threats of imperial encroachment by neighboring great powers and eventually lost its independence. But US decision makers did not worry about such developments as the beginning of falling dominoes, which could eventually threaten US security. Difference in threat perception. There existed clear differences between the United States and Korea in perceiving threat in northeast Asia. While Korean leaders were constantly worried about threats posed by Japan and other neighboring great powers, the American decision makers did not perceive those threats on Korea as a threat to America’s own security. Ends-and-means analysis. The ends-and-means (cost and benefit) analysis was conducted both explicitly and implicitly and constrained the US leaders from making any commitment to support Korean independence. The president and other decision makers were keenly aware of the limits of US military capability in the Far East, as were exemplified by Roosevelt’s remarks and by the internal discussion in the Navy when they chose not to acquire any coaling station on the Korean coast. As Root recollected later, the decision makers in Washington, D.C., also remained sensitive about the lack of support in Congress and in public opinion. Pattern of diplomacy. Both bilateral negotiations and multilateral mediation were employed to secure US interests. The Taft-Katsura talk, the Portsmouth Peace Conference, and the behind-the-scene discussions between the United States and Britain were such examples. Through these negotiations and mediation, the United States secured its interest without making a military intervention on behalf of Korea in the Far East. But during such diplomacy, Korean interests were not reflected at all, and the decisions of the negotiations meant a deprivation of independence from Korea. Role of ideas. During the Roosevelt era, there was little gap between the dominant strategic idea and the strategic reality in East Asia. Roosevelt’s belief in balance-of-power politics played the central role in guiding his administration’s policy toward Korea and the Far East. But this strategic idea also neatly matched with the reality in East Asia during the period. In terms of my earlier definition of the type of decision makers, Roosevelt and Rockhill were committed thinkers on the strategic issue, with a clear strategic vision from the outset, whereas other decision makers, such as Hay, Root, Taft, and Allen, were pragmatic in dealing with the diplomatic issues. In this way, overall, the realist hypotheses on the US commitment toward Korea were supported in this case history.

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Competing Explanations for US Foreign Policy Promoting democracy. This aspect of US foreign policy should be examined in broader terms of US efforts to spread American civilization and to enhance the humanitarian situation during the Roosevelt presidency. The US missionaries and diplomats in Seoul made significant contributions in these arenas, and Washington also kept supporting those efforts. The US leaders also cautioned Japan to reduce its inhumane practice in Korea, though it supported its enforcement of the protectorate. But these concerns did not lead the US government to develop a diplomatic and military commitment to support Korea’s independence. Rather, the administration believed that Japan could take on the role of ameliorating the conditions in Korea instead of the Korean court, which frustrated the reform movement. Economic interest. The United States consistently tried to promote its commercial interest with the warm support of Kojong. But Washington chose to compromise its economic interests when it had to decide whether to make a military commitment to defend such economic interests. The United States also had greater economic interests in Manchuria and Japan and tried to protect them by supporting Japan. Therefore, this case history cannot falsify the pursuit of economic interest as a main motive in US foreign policy. But as far as its commitment toward Korea was concerned, it showed that the pursuit of economic interests did not have much to do with the development of military commitment. Pragmatic approach to address local threat. Allen’s effort demonstrated a pragmatic approach to deal with the local threat posed by Korea’s adversary. His beliefs did not adhere to any grand idea, such as great power balancing. He listened to the Korean appeals for assistance to ward off the immediate threat to Korea and tried to extend assistance. Later, Hulbert, who worked as Kojong’s emissary, also reflected the same concern. These efforts to deal with the local threat, however, were repeatedly constrained by the decision makers in Washington, D.C., who had greater concerns about maintaining a broader balance of power with the limited US military capability in the Far East. Overall, the competing hypotheses on US foreign policy could explain some aspects of US policy toward Korea during the Roosevelt presidency but could not explain the main causes of US decisions toward Korea.

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Part II

US Diplomacy toward Korea during World War II

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uring the final stage of World War II, US policy toward Korea went through a sharp change. The Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) administration envisioned managing the Korean question as a trusteeship among the Allies with limited US military commitment. This was a method of dealing with the strategic linchpin in the periphery in a multipolar situation. Through several rounds of wartime conferences among the Allies, it was agreed that postwar Korea would be jointly managed through multilateral trusteeship. However, from April 1945, following the death of FDR, sharp changes arose in the US leaders’ perceptions of the strategic situation in the Far East. In the midst of rising concern about Soviet expansion in Europe, a far more confrontational view toward the Soviet Union became dominant in Washington, D.C. Moreover, Nationalist China, which was expected to assume a stabilizing role in the Far East, remained weak and at the mercy of Russian demands in Sino-Soviet negotiations. Trusteeship of Korea was also seen as a shortcut for the Sovietization of the whole peninsula. While these worries were arising, US leaders developed great expectations about the atomic bomb, which, in their view, could shorten the war against Japan and thus would limit Soviet encroachment in the Far East. All these developments made US leaders perceive the Far-Eastern situation as a stark bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In such a setting, the US leaders delayed diplomacy to discuss the method for multilateral trusteeship of Korea and chose instead to purse a zonal occupation of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel.

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5

Vision of Cooperation among the Allies and the Four-power Trusteeship Plan for Korea

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hroughout World War II, US policy toward Korea was based on a trusteeship plan among the Allies. Instead of extending an early recognition to the Korean nationalists, Washington planned a trusteeship because it remained doubtful about the Koreans’ ability for self-governance. It also believed that the four-power trusteeship could mitigate the great power rivalry over postwar Korea. This approach was maintained by the Roosevelt administration until it reached the secret Far-Eastern agreement with the Russians at Yalta in February 1945. The Emergence of a Trusteeship Plan for Korea The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor awakened the United States’ attention to the Korean question after decades of indifference. Washington began to consider supporting Korean guerillas to fight against the Japanese, while developing a trusteeship plan to deal with the postwar situation in Korea. Both ideas appeared from early 1942, but the two ideas were directed at different courses of policy toward Korea. Supporting the Korean guerrillas could lead to an early recognition of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Chungking, but the trusteeship plan excluded such an early recognition of the KPG. The KPG was organized by Korean nationalists abroad in April 1919, following the nationwide independence movement on March 1, 1919. It had several hundred followers in the Nationalist Chinese capital, with the support of the Chinese Nationalists and was preparing an armed struggle against Japan. It was Syngman Rhee who represented the KPG in Washington,

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though he had remained virtually independent from KPG headquarters in Chungking. Rhee received his doctoral degree in international politics at Princeton University in 1910 and briefly worked as a missionary in Korea during the early 1910s. But in the face of Japanese suppression of the independence movement, he found asylum in the United States in 1912 and settled down in Hawaii, where he could gain support from the Korean American community. He led a vigorous diplomatic effort from 1919 until 1924, utilizing the Korean Commission he inaugurated in Washington, D.C., but had gone through various difficulties during the 1930s with the decline of his business and competition over leadership in the Korean American community. Then from 1939, he resumed his petition diplomacy in Washington by reinvigorating the Korean Commission in Washington.1 Rhee had believed that the KPG’s efforts for armed struggle would be futile in the face of mighty Japanese military forces. Instead, he had focused on a public campaign to change US policy toward Korea with the financial support of the Korean American community. KPG leaders in Chungking, however, believed in the importance of armed struggle against Japan and did not wholeheartedly respect Rhee’s self-centered claim to remain as the leader of the independence movement while remaining in the safety of Washington. The relationship between the KPG and Rhee became particularly strained, since Rhee tried to submit a petition to the Paris Peace Conference to place Korea under the mandate of the League of Nations without consulting other KPG leaders.2 But with the looming clash between Japan and the United States, on June 4, 1941, the KPG reinstated Rhee’s role as its diplomatic representative in the United States, which it had denied since March 1925.3 The KPG’s leading role was, in fact, disputed by other leftist groups in Manchuria, and in Washington as well Han Kil-soo, who represented younger radical Koreans, challenged Rhee’s leadership. Still, overall, the KPG was regarded by several other groups as the legitimate representative organization for the Korean independence movement.4 Following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the aging Rhee and Han Kil-soo competitively suggested arming Korean guerillas. Had Washington decided to support the KPG and the Korean nationalist guerrillas, the course of history might have been different; but Washington did not choose this course of policy. In April 1942, the Chinese foreign minister, T.V. Soong also suggested raising a fifty-thousand-strong Korean irregular army in northern China and using ethnic Koreans for sabotage and intelligence work against Japan. Rhee and the Chinese authorities later maintained that such support would help counter the influence of the Soviet Union, which in their assessment had two divisions of an ethnic Korean army in Siberia.5 The psychological warfare committee in the Joint Chiefs Seung-young Kim

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of Staff and several officials in the State Department showed support for such proposals and later recommended cultivating a group of pro-American nationalists to help the United States in managing the postwar situation.6 But the US commanders in China, such as Stilwell and Wedmeyer, remained unenthusiastic due to their concerns about budgetary constraint and efficiency. The State Department also consistently objected to the plan. They remained disappointed with the vigor and solidarity of Korean nationalists and were concerned that such an approach could jeopardize wartime cooperation with the Soviet Union.7 The trusteeship remained the central pillar of the US plan for Korea throughout the war. In policy memorandum for Korea, drafted in 1942, William R. Langdon, a consular officer with experience in China and Korea, noted many difficulties standing in the way of Korean independence. In his assessment, Koreans were intelligent, quick, willing to learn, and patriotic, but after thirty seven years of Japanese rule, they had no experience in self-governing and had not demonstrated a will for self-defense. Thus, he recommended providing guidance, protection, and aid for the Koreans for at least a generation.8 This view in the State Department matched the paternalistic view of the president, who believed that the former colonies, such as Korea and French Indochina, needed guidance and protection until they learned self-governance.9 During the early half of the war, the Roosevelt administration did not develop the trusteeship idea into a concrete policy for Korea, but the developments around the Korean question seemed to justify the approach of international trusteeship. The State Department assessed that the Korean independence movement was marred with internal rivalries and had little association with the population in Korea.10 It also remained concerned about China’s designs on Korea. Chinese authorities, at that time, urged the United States to recognize the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in Chungking. It also registered concerns about the designs of the Soviet Union, which, in China’s assessment, had trained two divisions of Korean troops in its Siberian Army.11 The State Department, however, was as much concerned about the Chinese intent to establish a pro-Chinese government in Korea through its influence upon the KPG. The department also worried that granting recognition to a particular group of Korean nationalists could jeopardize cooperation among the allies. Such recognition could also sensitize Britain over the issue of allowing independence for India and alarm the Soviet Union over the eventual settlement of the Far-Eastern situation.12 The State Department believed that multinational trusteeship would be most useful in mitigating the rivalry among the great powers over Korea. As for other colonial areas, such as Southeast Asia, the economic motive was Seung-young Kim

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no less important than paternalism and security concerns when Washington was considering trusteeship. The Roosevelt administration expected to open new markets through decolonization13 and to prevent the emergence of radical nationalism in the former colonial areas that might adopt economic isolationism.14 Korea, however, was neither an attractive market nor an area with abundant natural resources.15 It was, rather, the geopolitical location of the peninsula that drew the attention of the State Department. The officials in the State Department were aware of the historical rivalry between China, Japan, and the Soviet Union over Korea and believed that a joint trusteeship among the Allies would prevent the rise of regional conflict over Korea.16 Later, the State Department developed realpolitik expectations for the joint trusteeship as well. It expected that, with friendly support from Britain and China, the United States could counterbalance the influence of the Soviet Union in managing the Korean trusteeship. In 1943, the principle of trusteeship for Korea was agreed through two wartime conferences among the Allies. When Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kei-shek met at Cairo in November 1943, Chiang insisted on issuing an immediate statement promising Korean independence. Prior to the Cairo conference, the Chinese officials feared that the Soviet Union would exploit unrest in Korea after the war, thus they had urged the Roosevelt administration to convene a tripartite conference with Britain to find a definite policy recognizing the KPG.17 But the United States and Britain had already agreed to trusteeship for Korea in March 1943, when British foreign minister, Anthony Eden, visited the White House.18 Thus, as a compromise, the three leaders announced in the joint communiqué that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent” after Japanese defeat.19 The phrase, “in due course,” was Churchill’s revision of Roosevelt’s wording, “at the proper moment,” and both leaders must have understood it as meaning trusteeship for Korea in light of the earlier consultation between Eden and Roosevelt. Roosevelt’s idea for Korea was further clarified when he met with Stalin at Teheran in late November, immediately after the Cairo conference. The president told Stalin that “the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government” and that “they should be placed under a 40-year tutelage.” Stalin specifically agreed to the president’s idea,20 showing the first consent of the Soviet Union to the trusteeship of Korea. Realities in the Far East and Roosevelt’s Optimism During the remaining period of the war, important changes emerged in the perception of US policy makers in the State Department. The State DepartSeung-young Kim


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ment became increasingly concerned about Russian ambitions and further disappointed with the Chinese performance in the war. However, President Roosevelt kept his optimism about cooperation with Russia after the end of the war. In case of difficulties with Russia, he expected to counterbalance Russian influence by buttressing the friendly Chiang Kei-shek regime. The Yalta agreement of February 1945 embodied such visions of Roosevelt. Since the Korean question was closely related to the rise and fall of the Yalta system, the broader context of the Yalta agreement deserves attention. By the end of 1943, the weakness of nationalist China was clearly demonstrated during its fights against the Communists and the Japanese. American officials worried that the Chiang regime might not be a competent member of the Four Policemen to maintain the postwar order, as envisioned by Roosevelt. In fact, throughout the 1930s, the Chiang regime was notorious for its dictatorial methods and lack of fighting prowess. But after Japan joined the tri-partite pact with fascist Germany and Italy in 1940, Roosevelt endowed the Chiang regime with the status of symbolic ally and great power.21 This policy reflected the immediate need to use Chinese forces and bases in the war effort against Japan. But the Roosevelt administration also intended to prepare China to grow as a stabilizing force in East Asia and to assume the role of great power in the United Nations.22 During the Cairo Conference, for instance, Roosevelt dramatically buttressed Chiang by adopting a statement with Churchill, announcing China’s recovery of all the territories lost to Japan.23 It was an effort to enhance the prestige of the Chiang regime before convening the Big Three conference at Teheran among Churchill, FDR, and Stalin. Even after the Cairo conference, however, the Chiang regime remained preoccupied with securing domestic supremacy and did not wage a vigorous fight against the Japanese. The US observers in China became increasingly skeptical about Chiang’s ability to suppress the Communists. During late fall of 1944, the US officials in Chungking reported that the Communists were already strong enough to be assured of “postwar control of at least North China”24 and that the Communists would become “the dominant force in China within a comparatively few years.”25 As a solution to this impasse, they began promoting a more real politik method of facilitating the emergence of coalition government in China. By facilitating the inauguration of coalition government in which the Communists could find “a satisfactory place,” they expected to keep a distance between Chinese communist and the Russians while inaugurating a strong, friendly China.26 Amid such reports from China, Roosevelt and the senior officials in the State Department remained reluctant to take any action that could undermine Chiang’s position. They preferred to continue to support Chiang as the leader to represent a unified China.27 The president was aware of Seung-young Kim

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Chiang’s lackluster performance,28 but he was also provided with optimistic reports from his personal envoy, Patrick Hurley, who strove to reconcile Chiang and the Chinese communists to inaugurate a united China during the autumn and winter of 1944.29 In the meanwhile, regarding Korea, the officials in the State Department had maintained a realistic assessment of the geopolitical sensitivity of Korea, which had caused the Russo-Japanese and Sino-Japanese War. From the early months of 1943, it was the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East that began coordinating postwar occupation policy.30 In March 1944, the committee suggested a principle for managing the Korean question. It strongly recommended that the military government be inter-allied in character and that Korea not be divided into zones of occupation.31 This suggestion was set forth when the US military inquired about the nature of its administrative civil affairs responsibility in the military government following the liberation of Korea.32 Once the military operation was over, the committee underscored, Korea should be managed as a single administrative zone “if this military government is to facilitate the preparation of Korea for its future independence.” Even if Korea was to be liberated from Japan through zonal military operations by the allies, the subsequent “civil affairs administration should be changed as soon as practicable into a centralized administration, composed of representatives from those same countries which have participated in the military operations in and around Korea.” The memorandum particularly wrote of concerns about the presence of ethnic Korean troops within the Soviet Far Eastern Army estimating them to number up to thirty-five thousand people.33 Meanwhile, it estimated that the units supported by KPG remained “directly under the control of the Chinese” with less than one thousand troops. It also suggested that the United States should take the leading role within the combined civil affairs administration of the military government.34 Two months later, the same committee underscored the danger that “an independent but weak Korea would again become subject to international pressure and intrigue and threaten political stability and peace in the Pacific” and recommended temporary trusteeship as the solution. Interestingly, it regarded the joint trusteeship among the Allies as a useful method to avert the case where the burden of trusteeship would fall on the United States alone. It also noted, “in any case there should be no mandate for the United States alone.”35 Overall, although there were debates about how much role the United States had to play in managing the Korean trusteeship, in the spring of 1944, the State Department envisioned that a joint military government and trusteeship could mitigate the potential rivalry over Korea while reducing an onerous burden upon the United States. Seung-young Kim


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By the time of the Yalta conference in February 1945, concerns about Soviet designs increased in the State Department. But such worries were not consolidated among the senior decision makers in Washington. A fundamental doctrine of Rooseveltian diplomacy was based on a belief in the American-Soviet unity of purpose and performance. Most of the Russian specialists never believed that unity with the Soviet Union could go beyond limited cooperation during the war against a common enemy. They were particularly concerned that the uncertain situation in China could become the source of a Russo-American rift in the future. But the cautions raised by these disbelievers had been little heeded, and the War Department tended to see US-Soviet relations in the short-term context of finishing the war against Japan. By early 1945, after repeatedly assuring the American public regarding a new world order and the Kremlin’s cooperative attitudes, Washington was reluctant to acknowledge that the unity among the Allies was ephemeral. This tendency remained in high circles in Washington, despite revelations of cold-blooded Russian efforts to establish a pro-Soviet regime in Poland.36 When Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin met at Yalta in February 1945, the president was aware of his staffs’ concerns about Soviet designs.37 Yet, he reached a broad agreement on the Far-Eastern questions with Stalin, based upon his vision for the postwar order. Roosevelt was basically a realist in managing power relations but maintained a great optimism for cooperation among the Allies.38 In drawing the line of spheres, he based his diplomacy upon the realities of military occupation. He tended not to discuss political issues about an area where the United States did not have military control. When agreements for a postwar order were based upon an acceptable compromise, he believed, a great-power concert could be achieved and maintained after the end of the war.39 He also enthusiastically supported a liberal internationalist approach for inaugurating the United Nations. But even for this purpose, he envisioned cooperation among the Allies, which he analogized as “the Four Policemen,” as the essential guarantor of the postwar world order. The president had a unique style of diplomacy that served him well to pursue such cooperation among the Allies. In devising and implementing such visions, he practiced a typically personal diplomacy based upon his personal relations with Allied leaders. In charting the courses of diplomacy he consulted a small number of informal advisors, reached his own personal judgments, and minimized the influence of the State Department.40 To keep diplomatic options open and flexible, he deliberately avoided preparing a coherent master plan for the postwar world.41 Both achievements and shortfalls of the Yalta agreement reflected such beliefs and the diplomatic style of the President. Seung-young Kim

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Far-Eastern Agreement and Korean Trusteeship at Yalta The Yalta discussion on the Far East was condensed in the secret accord, signed on February 11, 1945. Roosevelt accepted Russia’s territorial request in return for its guarantee to join the war against Japan, within two or three months after the defeat of Germany. Russia was guaranteed rights over the railroads in southern Manchuria, the lease of Port Arthur and Port Dairen, the Kurile islands, southern Sakhalin, and preservation of the status quo in Outer Mongolia.42 Already, at the Teheran conference held in late 1943, Russia expressed its wish to recover its rights lost by its defeat in the Russo-Japanese war, and Roosevelt expressed a sympathetic view of that request in the context of allowing Russia access to an ice-free port in the Far East.43 At Yalta, Stalin pressed Roosevelt hard to secure these concessions. Unless his conditions were met, he stressed, “it would be difficult for the Soviet peoples to understand why Russia was going to war with Japan.”44 Roosevelt accepted Stalin’s demand, while noting that these stipulations would be conditional upon Chiang Kei-shek’s concurrence. But the US military chiefs believed that such areas would easily be covered by Russian forces once it joined the war against Japan. 45 In return, the United States expected to secure an exclusive influence in the Pacific and Japanese home islands, which were to be crushed and placed under American control.46 After joining the war against Japan, the Russian military forces were expected to lock the Japanese forces in Manchuria and prevent their diversion for the defense of the home islands. Had the Russians not joined the war against Japan, the United States would have expected to suffer tremendous casualties against the ferocious Japanese foe. While Roosevelt and Stalin reached a political settlement on the spheres of influence, the US and Soviet military chiefs worked on the details of the joint war effort against Japan.47 During these negotiations, Britain remained primarily concerned about the settlements in Europe and retention of their predominant influence in South and Southeast Asia.48 Thus, the negotiation over Northeast Asia was conducted mostly between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Korean question was also dealt with in the context of cooperation among the Allies, though the meeting did not address the specific aspects of occupation and the trusteeship. The question was not included in the official agreement, but in a private talk, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed to run a trusteeship in Korea. During a meeting with Stalin on February 8 in the Livadia palace, Roosevelt said that he had in mind for Korea “a trusteeship composed of a Soviet, an American and a Chinese representative,” mentioning that Korea would need trusteeship for twenty to thirty years. Stalin replied “the shorter the period the better” and inquired whether any Seung-young Kim


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foreign troops would be stationed in Korea. The president replied in the negative, and Stalin expressed approval. The president also inquired into Stalin’s view about British participation in the trusteeship of Korea and expressed that he personally did not feel it necessary. Stalin replied that the British should be invited into the trusteeship in Korea, mentioning that Churchill might “kill us” in such case.49 In this way the United States and Soviet Union agreed to administer a four-power trusteeship to manage the postwar situation in Korea. While discussing the broad issues, however, Roosevelt did not mention the specific issues of the military occupation and the trusteeship of Korea. The oral agreement on the Korean question did not go beyond a general understanding. This might have to do with the president’s preoccupation with other weighty issues, such as the German and Polish questions or the United Nations. But in the account of James Byrnes, the ailing president did not read the briefing books prepared by the State Department because of illness during the sea-borne trip to Yalta.50 And during the discussion of the Far-Eastern issues, the president’s main concern was securing the Russian promise to join the war against Japan. The physically tired president was anxious to avoid further argument on details of the Far-Eastern issues.51 The recommendation of the briefing book underscored the principle of maintaining Korea as a single administrative unit in line with the State Department’s earlier recommendation of March 1944. The briefing book clearly recommended that Korea should be under a central military administration of allies, not divided into zones of occupation. It recommended, “such military government [of the Allies] should be organized on the principle of centralized administration with all of Korea administered as a single unit and not as separate zones.”52 It also recommended that in the army of occupation and military government “the representation of other states should not be so large as to prejudice the effectiveness of American participation in that occupation.” The allies had to avoid the possibility of an extended period of occupation and an unnecessary postponement of Korean independence. While noting that “the studies on problems of post-war Korea have not yet progressed far enough,” the briefing book recommended to reach an agreement at an early date among the principal interested powers on the question of interim international supervisory authority for Korea.53 But Roosevelt’s talk with Stalin on Korea did not reflect these recommendations. Stalin also gave only reactive comments to the Korean issue. This way of discussion may have facilitated reaching a broad agreement with Stalin, but such ambiguity played a role in future complications over the peninsula.54 In the broader context, the agreements at Yalta were based upon three essential assumptions of FDR.55 First, the president expected that the warSeung-young Kim

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time cooperation with the Soviet Union would continue after reconciling the minor differences. Second, by strengthening Chiang Kei-shek’s China, he believed, the United States could balance the overriding influence of the Soviet Union in East Asia after the defeat of Japan. Indeed, the strength of the Chinese communists was not fully appreciated until Yalta, thus even Stalin agreed to a commitment to conclude an alliance treaty with the Chiang regime during the conference.56 Third, the buffer area of Korea and such sensitive points as Port Arthur and Hong Kong would be managed through an international trusteeship or through international cooperation as international ports. In fact, by the time of the Yalta conference, tension had clearly arisen between FDR’s vision and the realities in the Far East. Yet, Roosevelt reached a broad agreement based upon his optimistic vision and the military realities in the Far East. These assumptions that undergirded the Yalta system, however, could not hold among US leaders after Roosevelt passed away after the conference. As Henry Stimson, senior statesman and Secretary of War, observed two months later, the meeting at Yalta tied the Truman administration in a diplomatic mess because “it dealt a good deal in altruism and idealism instead of stark realities on which Russia is strong.”57 American diplomacy over the Korean question was also to go through changes in such a context.

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Emergence of the Bipolar Perception and a Missed Opportunity for Diplomacy

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fter the Yalta conference, US leaders’ perception of the Far-Eastern situation went through a sharp change. Witnessing what had happened in Poland and the other Soviet occupation areas in Eastern Europe, they feared that the Soviet sphere would expand in the Far East in the same manner as in Europe. The new president, Harry Truman, accepted the alarmist cautions from his senior advisors, and the heightened threat perception evoked in their minds the image of falling dominos in the Far East, where China and Korea would rapidly fall into the Soviet sphere. Amid such worries, the president and his senior advisors developed an expectation that, by using the monopoly of the atomic weapon as a bargaining counter, they could prevent such a gruesome development. While senior decision makers were imbued with both fear of Soviet expansion and expectations for the development of the atomic bomb, the State and Defense Departments went through difficulty in policy coordination in their postwar planning toward the Far East. Against this backdrop, a precious opportunity to reach a diplomatic compromise over Korea was missed during the Hopkins mission to Moscow in June of 1945. The Truman Presidency and Fear of Soviet Expansion in Europe As soon as the Yalta conference was over, FDR began expressing worries about the course of action taken by Stalin.1 But the ailing president passed away on April 12, 1945, leaving myriad diplomatic challenges to vice president Harry S. Truman. In contrast to his aristocratic predecessor, Truman was a self-educated former senator from Missouri. He had preferred an active US role in world affairs as a senator during the 1930s, but he had

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only limited experience in foreign affairs. During the ninety days of his vice presidency he had never been made party to FDR’s personal diplomacy. Thus, in foreign affairs he had to rely on the advice of senior advisors who had deep concerns about Soviet designs on its occupied areas. The new president was, on the other hand, more pragmatic and efficient in making decisions than FDR, who constantly adjusted tactics to accommodate diplomatic compromise and often delayed and neglected specific decisions. When his efforts at friendly persuasion did not work, Truman also used a “get-tough” approach in foreign policy as he did during his senate investigation activities. Such a style of Truman’s decision-making, matched with the increasing worries of his advisors about the Soviet Union, toughened Washington’s stance toward the Soviet Union during the final days of World War II.2 US policy toward Korea, which had not been clearly charted during the FDR era, was directly influenced by these changes in Washington. When Truman was sworn in as president, the developments in Eastern Europe made the US decision makers worry that Stalin was breaching the Yalta agreement.3 During the two months after the Yalta agreement, Stalin made persistent efforts to consolidate Soviet influence in such occupied territories as Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland. Political forces hostile to the Soviet Union were arrested or purged, and pro-Soviet regimes were quickly established in the areas under Soviet occupation. Particularly, the arrests of sixteen Polish opposition leaders during March were perceived as a violation of the Yalta agreement. By that time, the American news media were already busy with critical reports about the brutal measures taken in the Soviet occupation areas. Churchill also began to take a very critical stance against the Soviet Union. The Poland issue was central in shaping the US leaders’ perceptions of Soviet behavior and left an enduring repercussion on US policy toward Korea by evoking analogy in their minds. Thus, the Yalta negotiation on Poland deserves some attention to explain US policy toward Korea. At Yalta, FDR did not firmly oppose the Soviet position over Poland. Stalin insisted that the pro-Soviet Lublin regime, already active in Warsaw, should have predominance in the provisional government. He underscored that Poland had been used repeatedly as an invasion corridor into Russia, and the Soviet stance was buttressed by the Red Army’s physical occupation of Poland.4 Against this effort of Stalin’s, Churchill and Eden strove to ensure a greater role for pro-Western London Poles in the provisional government. Britain had declared war against Germany in 1939 because of the German invasion of Poland; and the two British leaders were under pressure from Parliament and the Polish exile community in London. Churchill was also deeply concerned about the geopolitical implication of Soviet dominance of Eastern Europe.5 They objected to a mere expansion of the Lublin regime Seung-young Kim

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and insisted on inaugurating an entirely “new” provisional government and guaranteeing free elections with specific monitoring measures in Poland.6 However, FDR did not extend vigorous support for Britain on the Poland issue at Yalta. He needed Soviet support in the war against Japan and had to get Soviet agreement on voting procedures and the number of seats in the United Nations. Stalin skillfully used a Soviet compromise for the UN seats, granting only two or three memberships to its separate republics, when the discussion on Poland faced stalemate.7 Against such a linkage of issues, the US delegation chose not to insist on its strong initial draft on Poland. The initial US draft stipulated that the provisional government should be “fully representative” and that the Allies’ ambassadors should observe and report on the Polish election.8 But in the course of negotiations, the United States accepted a compromise largely based on the Soviet draft that merely assured the broadening of the existing Lublin government “on a broader democratic basis.” The final agreement on Poland included a stipulation that the provisional government would hold “free and unfettered elections” on the basis of a “secret ballot.”9 But this was not specific enough to bind Soviet policies on Poland. After the conference, FDR confided to Churchill that such a compromise placed “somewhat more emphasis on the Lublin Poles than on the two groups from which the new government is to be drawn.”10 Truman was not familiar with this concession and the broader context of the Yalta agreement. Further, the rapid expansion of the Soviet sphere and the brutal Sovietization of its occupation areas made the new president perceive the Soviet expansion in the most alarmist fashion.11 William Averell Harriman, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, played an important role in alerting Truman about the danger of Soviet expansionism. The ambassador was the son of railroad magnate E. H. Harriman and had experiences as senior manager in the Union Pacific Line and in international banking during the 1920s.12 During the FDR presidency, he was concerned about the president’s open-ended approach to Stalin, and from early April he began cautioning about the phenomenal growth of Soviet power, which was enriched by US lend-lease assistance.13 When Truman became president, Harriman seized the moment. Immediately after the death of FDR, Harriman flew to Washington and cautioned Truman that a new “barbarian invasion of Europe” was under way. On April 20, he reported that Soviet control over any country did not merely mean influence on its foreign relations but also on the extension of the Soviet system with secret police and extinction of freedom of speech. In light of such developments, Harriman recommended the new president reconsider overall US policy to arrive at a more workable basis with the Russians. Even if the United States took a new course, Harriman advised, Seung-young Kim

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the Russians would not be able to react violently, because they still needed assistance from the United States to rebuild their war-shattered economy.14 On the next day, Harriman expounded his concerns in talks at the Pentagon and the State Department. He cautioned that Stalin’s insistence upon a belt of weak neighboring states might not be limited to Eastern Europe. Once the Soviet Union had control of bordering areas, it would probably attempt to penetrate the next layer of adjacent countries. He saw no virtue in waiting and urged Washington to take quid pro quo countermeasures immediately when the Russians breached agreements. Meanwhile, he recommended consolidating cooperation with Britain and France, as they had also been concerned about Soviet expansion.15 The British government also urged the Truman administration to take a firm stance toward the Soviets over the Poland issue. On April 22 and April 23, Anthony Eden and Molotov were visiting Washington on their way to San Francisco for the inaugural conference of the United Nations. On this occasion, Anthony Eden and US Secretary of State Stettinius had two rounds of meeting with Molotov but failed to secure any guarantee over the Polish question from the stubborn Soviet Foreign Minister, who maintained that the Yalta agreement supported the inauguration of friendly Polish government to the Soviet Union.16 After these disappointing meetings, Eden seized the momentum and repeatedly suggested Stettinius take a firm stance against the Soviets over the Poland issue.17 Later on the same day through further discussion, Eden and Stettinius agreed that the president should “explain to him [Molotov] in blunt terms the effect of his attitude on future co-operation between the Great Powers.”18 Truman bought the recommendations of Harriman and Stettinius, though some advisors cautioned him not to make a sudden break with the Russians. The contending views among the advisors were epitomized in a special meeting held at the White House on April 23.19 In fact, the meeting was held to prepare for Truman’s meeting with Molotov. Secretary of War Stimson showed sympathy toward Russia’s desire to erect a protective ring around its border countries and cautioned Truman to avoid an open confrontation with the Russians. General Marshall, who hoped for Russian participation in the war against Japan, also supported Stimson.20 In contrast, Stettinius reported that the negotiation with Molotov reached a complete deadlock due to Russia receding from its agreement on Poland at Yalta. Secretary of the Navy Forrestal also noted that Soviet policy in Poland was not an isolated incident but one of a pattern of unilateral action. As examples, Forrestal pointed to Russian positions toward Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, and Greece, and recommended facing the issue “now than later on.”21 On the other hand, Admiral Leahy, who had joined Yalta as the chief of staff to the president, mentioned that when leaving Seung-young Kim


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Yalta he believed that the Russians would never allow a free government to operate in Poland. He further noted that “the Yalta agreement was susceptible of two interpretations.”22 But Harriman maintained that the real issue was whether the United States was to be a party to the Soviet program for dominating Poland. Truman sided with Harriman and Forrestal. The president, in fact, started the meeting by announcing that the practice of a one-way street in US-Russian relations could not continue any more. When Truman met Molotov in the later afternoon, he sharply criticized the Russian Foreign Minister for failing to implement the Yalta decision on Poland.23 He told Molotov that US economic assistance could not get the required support in Congress if Soviet policy on Poland undermined public support for such aid. His message to Stalin, handed to Molotov, was also direct. It urged Stalin to invite genuinely representative democratic Polish leaders to Moscow for consultation and cautioned that failure to implement the Crimean decision on Poland would seriously undermine future collaboration among the Allies.24 Faced with such a direct warning from Truman, Molotov underscored Moscow’s security concerns over Poland and made clear that Russia would not follow the US interpretation of the Yalta agreement on Poland. He stated, “there had been no case where one or two of the three [Big Three] had attempted to impose their will on another.” He further mentioned that he could not agree that “an abrogation of those decisions by others could be considered a violation by the Soviet government.” Truman believed that Molotov was avoiding the main issue and continued to press him to implement the Yalta decisions loyally. Molotov protested “I have never been talked to like that in my life.” Then Truman shot back, “carry out your agreements and you won’t get talked to like that.”25 Harriman later recalled, “I was a little taken aback, frankly, when the President attacked Molotov so vigorously.” He recollected, “I did regret that Truman went at it so hard because his behavior gave Molotov an excuse to tell Stalin that the Roosevelt policy was being abandoned.”26 As expected, Stalin sent a direct rebuttal without any diplomatic nicety on April 24. He vehemently charged Truman for violating the Yalta agreement and demanding him to renounce the security interests of the Soviet Union.27 On the same day, Truman received Churchill’s message that extended his entire agreement with his message to Stalin. On the same day, Truman received another message from the US embassy in Moscow that corroborated his views about the Russians. It was a report from George Kennan, the US Charge d’Affaires in Moscow. His message was to caution against the report of US ambassador to China, Patrick Hurley, who sent too optimistic a report following his interview with Stalin. Seung-young Kim

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Kennan’s message underscored that “Soviet policy will remain a policy aimed at the achievement of maximum powers with minimum responsibility.” Regarding Soviet policy toward China, Kennan cautioned against false optimism about Stalin’s verbal commitment to support Chinese unification under Chiang Kei-shek. He underscored that “words have different meanings to the Russians,” and noted “Stalin knows that these conditions are feasible only on terms acceptable to the Chinese communists.” In his view, “Stalin is also prepared to accept the idea of a free and democratic China since a free China means to him a China in which there is minimum of foreign influence other than Russian.” Kennan recommended that Washington keep “clinical objectivity” in studying the real character and implication of Russian Far-Eastern aims. He cautioned, “it would be tragic if our anxiety for Russian support in the Far East were to lead us into an undue reliance on Russian aid.”28 Truman later copied this telegram in his memoirs and wrote, “I realized only too well the implication in this message.”29 The Soviet Specter in the Far East In early May, the Truman administration was most concerned that the Soviet Union would repeat in the Far East what it had done in Eastern Europe. After learning about the content of the Yalta agreement on the Far East, the administration was stunned by the sweeping and open ended nature of the agreement. Harriman and Joseph Grew, acting Secretary of State and former ambassador to Japan, raised the issue of whether or not to implement the Yalta agreement on the Far East. On May 12, Harriman raised the question about the necessity of inviting Russian participation in the war against Japan, and in the occupation of Japan. He particularly recalled that during the Yalta conference Stalin raised a question about the need for the trusteeship in Korea “if the Koreans could produce a satisfactory government.” Harriman predicted that such a government satisfactory for the Soviet Union “would unquestionably be a Bolshevik or Soviet government.”30 During the war, Syngman Rhee, in fact, warned that the Korean division trained by the Soviet government would eventually invade Korea and set up a Soviet republic there.31 And throughout the spring of 1945, Syngman Rhee urged the State Department to allow the Korean Provisional Government (KPG)’s participation in the inaugural conference of the United Nations at San Francisco. However, the State Department remained skeptical about domestic support for the KPG in Korea, and did not extend recognition to the KPG.32 Thus, the State Department’s policy toward Korea remained upon the basis of the multilateral trusteeship, despite the growing worries about Soviet expansion in the Far East. Seung-young Kim


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As grounds for reexamination of the Yalta agreement, Harriman noted such new developments as the cessation of hostilities in Europe and the Russian breach of its part of the contract. In a meeting with Navy admirals on May 11, Harriman cautioned that once the Russians entered the war against Japan, there could be no illusion about a “free China.”33 Forrestal, secretary of the Navy, was very attentive to the arguments of Harriman, because of other evidence that supported Harriman’s argument. Naval Intelligence reported on May 14 that the Russians had established an elaborate system of espionage in South America with its headquarters in Mexico City. On May 20, the US naval attaché in Moscow also sent a lengthy, detailed telegram, reporting all the difficulties, irritations, deceptions, and delays involved in any attempt to negotiate with the Russians. By this time, the US Navy also assessed that Russia’s early participation in the war was not essential in light of the deadly effect of attrition by submarine and carrier strikes on Japanese war potential.34 This was a different stance from that of the Army, which still regarded Soviet participation in the war as essential to reduce American casualties. Joseph Grew, arch-anticommunist and political conservative, also registered similar anxiety about the Soviet entry to the war against Japan. After the discussion with Harriman, on May 12, Grew sent a memorandum to the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy, inquiring about the necessity of Soviet entry to the war against Japan and the possibility of revising the Yalta Far-Eastern agreement in different and specific ways. He raised the question of the US response when the Soviets demanded participation in the military occupation in Japan. As the opinion of the Department of State, Grew recommended receiving Soviet commitments to support Chiang Kei-shek in bringing about Chinese unification and to return Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty in adherence to the Cairo declaration. He also suggested acquiring unequivocal Soviet support for a four-power trusteeship for Korea after its liberation and its eventual independence according to the Cairo declaration.35 About the nature of this discussion, Grew reported to the Secretary of State, Stettinius, in San Francisco: “the whole question was being discussed about whether we were going to support what had been done at Yalta.”36 Grew had deep concerns that Russia’s entry to the war would bring the spread of communism to the Far East like falling dominos. On May 19, after passing a sleepless night, mulling over the difficult international problems, the acting secretary of state drafted a memorandum at five o’clock in the morning for his private use. Here he clearly defined the Soviet Union as “one certain future enemy” and wrote that the United Nations would be incapable of preserving peace and security because of the veto right Seung-young Kim

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of great powers. After noting Russia’s expansion into Eastern Europe, he worried that: Russia’s power will steadily increase and she will in the not distant future be in a favorable position to expand her control, step by step, through Europe. The Near East and the Far East will in due course be brought into the same pattern. Once Russia is in the war against Japan, then Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea will gradually slip into Russia’s orbit, to be followed in due course by China and eventually Japan. . . . A future war with Soviet Russia is as certain as anything in this world can be certain. It may come within a very few years.37

Based upon this assessment, he wrote that the United States had to keep the “fighting strength” and “do everything in our power to strengthen our relations with the free world.” He further wrote that placing any confidence in Russia’s sincerity would be a most fatal mistake and recommended that the United States insist upon the control of strategic air and naval bases. Grew read this memorandum only to Harriman and Bohlen and kept it in his private box at home.38 But the views expressed by this memorandum were largely shared by the advisors for the president. In May, Grew met Stimson and Forrestal, the secretaries of War and the Navy, every Tuesday morning and compared notes and opinions. As acting secretary of state, he also conferred with Truman almost every morning and sometimes several times a day. He recalled “no fundamental difference between the President and myself on any issue.”39 Expectation of the Atomic Bomb and Delaying the Big Three Conference By mid-May, Truman received repeated requests from Churchill and his advisors to hold an early Big Three summit but chose to delay the summit until July. 40 The prime minster wished to address the Polish deadlock and to prevent the rapid expansion of the Soviet sphere in eastern Europe while US forces were being diverted to the Far-Eastern theater.41 On May 12, to highlight his geopolitical concerns, Churchill warned Washington that “An iron curtain is drawn upon their [Soviet] front.”42 To such a request from Churchill, Truman replied that because of his budget message to Congress it was impossible for him to join the summit before July 1 and suggested an approach to induce Stalin to propose the summit meeting through diplomatic efforts by US and British ambassadors.43 On May 13, however, Churchill urged the president again to hold the summit in June, and wrote, “I hope your fiscal year will not delay it.”44 Seung-young Kim


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On May 15, Grew and Harriman also exhorted the president to hold the Big Three conference as soon as possible in early June to clarify problematic points of the Yalta agreements. Harriman said that he was not sure whether Stalin was getting accurate reports from Molotov. Both diplomats underscored that the longer the meeting was delayed the worse the situation would get. But Truman showed reservation and mentioned the existence of a number of pressing domestic questions including the preparation of a budget message before the end of the fiscal year. During this meeting with the president, Harriman specifically noted that the questions of Korean trusteeship and Chinese unity had been only orally discussed at Yalta and thus needed to be clarified urgently. But the president concluded the meeting by remarking that he would await word from Churchill about Stalin’s reply before deciding definitely in regard to the meeting.45 In fact, on May 14 Truman informed Britain that his budget message to Congress made it impossible to join the summit before July 1.46 By that time, however, Truman was aware of the secret development of an atomic bomb about which Grew and Harriman had no knowledge until the Potsdam conference held in July. The War Department shared the concerns raised by Grew but remained unenthusiastic about holding an early summit and attempting to revise the Yalta Far-Eastern agreement. Its lack of enthusiasm was influenced by two factors. The first reflected a keen appreciation of the military reality in the Far East in which the Soviet Union had enough capability to secure its interest in the region once it joined the war against Japan. The second, which was considered only at the highest level of the department, was the intent to delay the negotiation until July, when the secret program for the atomic bomb (S-1) would be completed. In terms of military reality, the War Department believed that the United States still needed Russia’s entry in the war against Japan. To save American lives, the Soviet forces had to join the war and pin down the Japanese forces to prevent their diversion to the defense of the Japanese main islands. Moreover, the Yalta concessions in the Far East were those which would fall within the Soviet military sphere once it joined the war. Earlier in February 1945, MacArthur articulated these points. In his prediction, Russia would seize all of Manchuria, Korea, and possibly part of North China once it joined the war against Japan. Nonetheless, he noted that Russian seizure of those territories was inevitable and underscored that “we must not invade Japan proper unless the Russian Army is previously committed to action in Manchuria.” He registered skepticism about the Navy’s plan to force Japan into submission through blockade and bombardment and recommended that Washington insist on Russian participation in the war at the earliest possible date after the defeat of Germany.47 During May and June of 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, led by general Marshall, shared the same view.48 Seung-young Kim

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In his reply to Grew’s inquiry, Stimson articulated several points as grounds for his department’s skepticism about holding an early Big Three summit to revise the Yalta agreement including the Far-Eastern accords. First, he observed that “Russian entry into the war against Japan will be decided by the Russians on their own military and political basis with little regard to any political action taken by the United States.” Second, the Yalta concessions on Far-Eastern matters were “generally matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of US military action short of war.” The War Department believed that “Russia was militarily capable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto, Manchuria, Korea and Northern China before it would be possible for the US military forces to occupy these areas.” Upon these assessments, the War Department concluded that not much good would come of a rediscussion at that time, though it did not oppose such a rediscussion. To the question of Soviet participation in the military occupation of Japan, the department replied that the question was rather a political one but noted that, in light of experience in Germany, “the discussion of this subject prior to Russian entry into the Japanese war does not appear necessary at this time.”49 This message of Stimson’s shows the widespread consensus in the War Department reflecting the military reality in the Far East by the spring of 1945. But his skepticism about the timing of such discussions seems to have reflected Stimson’s wish to delay the summit until the United States could secure a new leverage with the success of S-1 in July. The officials in the State Department, even Grew and Harriman, were not aware of the presence of such a secret program until the success of S-1 in July. The official memorandums indeed do not show any explicit evidence of consideration of the nuclear weapon. But Stimson’s meticulous diary shows specific evidence that such considerations played an important role in delaying the Big Three summit. Though he was keen to use S-1 as the bargaining leverage, he wished to reach a Rooseveltian compromise with the Soviets about postwar order, based on the recognition of spheres of influence. As a distinguished lawyer and former secretary of state, he was well aware that “there are always two sides to a question” and a fair hearing was important in every controversy.50 The senior statesman had also been accustomed to international mis-manners exemplified by Japan and Nazi Germany, and believed that alarmist Harriman was influenced by the personal mistreatment he went through in Moscow.51 Moreover, he believed that geography would allow the continuation of US-Russian cooperation. Given the US “geographical situation with respect of Russia” as well as its position in the world, Stimson believed, the United States did not need to fight with the Soviets “as long as she did not threaten any of our vital interests.” Seung-young Kim


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Stimson also believed that Washington did not need to bind itself to British wishes to form an Anglo-American alignment against the Soviets. During his discussion with McCloy on May 19, he confided: The British were more closely involved in Europe; the Russians were more suspicious of them than they were of us and any steps we took now in immediate reversal of our agreement with the Russians would be construed by them as a definite alignment of the Anglo-Americans against the Russians and make it all the more difficult for us to work out an effective relationship with them. Our position and strength justified and made advisable an independent attitude toward Russia in our own right.52

Still, as a pragmatic statesman with extensive experience in the legal profession, he was keen to suggest a diplomatic strategy to address the impending Soviet expansion. His recommendation was to utilize the atomic weapon as a quid pro quo in the settlement of the Polish, Romanian, Yugoslavian, and Manchurian problems. In return for taking the Russians into partnership for the international control of nuclear weapons, Stimson thought that the United States could receive Soviet agreement on such contested issues.53 But, to use this leverage, the United States had to wait until the atomic weapon became ready. Thus, he wanted the president to postpone the summit negotiations until the success of the new weapon was assured through a successful test in mid-July. Stimson kept thinking about using the nuclear weapon in negotiations with the Soviets almost every day during May. According to his diary, he shared this idea with his assistant secretary, John McCloy, and the Army chief of staff, George Marshall. Marshall seems to have had limited expectations about the utility of nuclear weapons as he continued to support Soviet entry into the war against Japan.54 But McCloy, who was an extremely able deputy to Stimson, reflected the Secretary’s views in his later memorandums to the State Department. In his diary on May 13, Stimson copied Grew’s memorandum that raised the need to renegotiate with the Soviet Union prior to implementing the Far-Eastern clauses of the Yalta agreement, including the issue of the Korean trusteeship.55 About this memorandum, Stimson wrote, “these are very vital questions” and “the questions cut very deep and in my opinion are powerfully connected with our success with S-1.”56 By making use of the economic leverage and nuclear weapon as bargaining counters, Stimson believed, the United States could regain the initiative in the negotiations with Russia over the Far-Eastern questions. On May 14, he told McCloy that “this was a place where we really held all the cards” and called it “a royal straight flush.” He also noted, “we mustn’t be a fool about the way we play it.” Upon this reasoning, Stimson Seung-young Kim

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concluded, “the method to deal with Russia was to keep our mouth shut and let our actions speak for words.”57 His diary entry on May 15 shows that the secretary was not completely sure about the success of S-1, but still wanted to postpone the summit further so that the United States could be sure about its nuclear leverage in the summit.58 On that day, he had “a pretty red hot session” with Grew and Forrestal over the questions of the Yalta Conference and US relations with Russia. In his view, Truman apparently agreed to hold the summit with Churchill and Stalin from July 1. He wrote that by that time Russia’s relations to Manchuria and Port Arthur and various other parts of North China would become burning issues, and observed: “Over any such tangled wave of problems the S-1 secret would be dominant and yet we will not know until after that time probably, until after that meeting, whether this is a weapon in our hands or not. We think it will be shortly afterwards, but it seems a terrible thing to gamble with such big stakes in diplomacy without having your master card in your hand.”59 Based upon such reasoning, Stimson recommended that Truman delay the summit. Stimson’s diary entry on May 16 suggests that he and Truman had discussed delaying the summit. On that day, he specifically counseled Truman that “we shall probably hold more cards in our hands later than now.”60 Truman had heard about the utility of nuclear advantage in dealing with the Russians in April. Stimson reported to Truman about the effect of the nuclear bomb on April 25, when the new president was much concerned about the ways to deal with the Russians after receiving Stalin’s protest following his first meeting with Molotov. After discussing the possible revolutionary effect of nuclear weapons on warfare and civilization, Stimson reported to Truman that “the atomic bomb would be certain to have a decisive influence on our relations with other countries” and probably shorten the war. Before this report of Stimson, James F. Byrnes, the secretary of state designate and the president’s representative on the interim Committee on Atomic Energy, reported a stronger expectation. He confided to the president: “the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our own terms at the end of the war.”61 Truman wrote that, in late April, no one was sure about the success of the secret project; but he remembered that Stimson appeared confident of the outcome, and told him that “in all probability success would be attained within the next few months.”62 This discussion about the role of nuclear weapons as leverage in dealing with the Russians continued throughout May. Against such a context, Truman postponed the summit until mid-July, declining the request of Churchill, Grew, and Harriman to hold an early summit. On June 6, Truman told Stimson that “he had postponed that [Big Three] until the 15th of July on purpose to give us more time.” The president agreed with Stimson on the Seung-young Kim


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value of nuclear leverage in settling such issues as the Polish, Romanian, Yugoslavian, and Manchurian problems.63 While choosing to defer the summit until mid-July, Truman chose to give diplomacy a chance. He became indeed concerned about the striking deterioration in US-Soviet relations, which was dramatically demonstrated during the UN inauguration conference at San Francisco. When the prewar ambassador to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, expressed his concerns about such a sharp deterioration and the need to understand the Soviet fear of encirclement by capitalist countries, Truman shared such concerns and expressed his wish to ameliorate US-Russian relations.64 In this context, Truman decided to send Harry Hopkins, an intimate associate of FDR and sympathizer of Russia, to bridge the gap between the United States and Soviet Union. To keep a diplomatic balance, the president also sent Davies as his envoy to London to consult with Churchill about the next round of the Big Three.65 A Missed Opportunity during the Hopkins Mission The Hopkins mission indeed provided an opportunity to have a frank discussion about Korean trusteeship and the Far-Eastern questions with Stalin.66 The State Department, which was not aware of the S-1 program, viewed the Hopkins mission as an important opportunity to reach a specific agreement on Korea and northeast Asia with the Russians. It prepared detailed guides for Hopkins for a concrete negotiation with Stalin on both political and military affairs. This guidance was sent to ambassador Harriman, who joined Hopkin’s mission to Moscow, and also to both the Department of War and the Department of Navy for their opinions on May 21. The guide memorandum included the most detailed plans to manage the Korean trusteeship, such as the four Allies’ joint military occupation, joint administration of Korea, and eventual independence for Korea. However, the War Department showed strong reservations about discussing such detailed aspects of military affairs with the Soviet Union. Thus the State Department sent a new instruction to Hopkins discouraging him from a detailed discussion of military affairs, including the method to deal with the Korean question. In this context, despite the six rounds of talks with Stalin, Hopkins did not have any detailed discussion with Stalin over any specific aspect of the Korean trusteeship. The State Department’s memorandum to Hopkins deserves scrutiny as a US plan for the postcolonial Korea and China. It recommended reaching “a firm and definite understanding” with the Soviet Union on various problems affecting China and Korea.67 Its recommendations for the China Seung-young Kim

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question aimed at inaugurating a unified China, which would be “one of the principal powers of the Pacific and a bulwark of peace and security in the Far East.” Hopkins was to secure Soviet support to persuade the Chinese Communists to achieve political and military unification. In the State Department’s plan, the Kuomintang (KMT) also should extend legal recognition to the Chinese communists, and the unified democratic China would be inaugurated through a Peoples Assembly, where all political parties in China would join. Touching on the military campaign, the State Department recommended that the US commander should lead the forthcoming military campaign, with the assistance of Soviet, British, and Chinese staff officers. It also envisioned that the KMT and the Communists would have fair representations on the supreme war council. Hopkins was also directed to receive detailed promises from Stalin to use only the unified Chinese Army in military operations in Manchuria, North China, and Korea. The State Department also wanted Hopkins to secure Soviet assurances to respect Chinese territorial integrity, including Manchuria, Sinkiang, and Tibet, and to maintain an economic Open Door in China.68 This plan of the State Department was much in line with Grew’s hope to revise the Far-Eastern accords of the Yalta agreement and reflected the department’s continuous efforts to achieve reconciliation between the Chinese nationalists and the communists through the Hurley mission.69 But the plan included a lot of wishful expectation, in contrast to the dire reality in China. The State Department presented the most detailed proposal, with regard to the Korean question. This plan was in line with earlier suggestions by the department before the Yalta conference but included detailed plans about how to run the trusteeship and how to ensure Korea’s security and independence after the trusteeship. This plan attempted to specify how the “due course,” ambiguously agreed at Cairo, would unfold in a manner to prevent power rivalry over Korea and to ensure Korean independence after five years of trusteeship. In the suggested plan, Korea would go through five years of trusteeship by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Great Britain. In administering Korea during this trusteeship, the four powers would have equal representation in all military, administrative, and judicial bureaus. They would also use as many local Koreans as possible in various governmental functions so as to train them and to transfer increasing responsibility and authority to them later. In military affairs, as soon as the trusteeship administration was established, the four powers would withdraw all of their armed forces from Korea, leaving only a token force of no more than five thousand men from each power. After five years of trusteeship, Korea would acquire a complete independence with political freedom and independent Seung-young Kim


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government. On that occasion, the four powers would publicly reaffirm the independence of Korea. If disputes over the Korean boundary should occur, such disputes would be settled by an impartial commission designated by the United Nations. If necessary and desirable, the UN Security Council would consider establishing military or naval bases on Korean territory, and such bases would be established without impairing Korean sovereignty by receiving agreement of the Korean government. The suggestion also noted that countries interested in trading with Korea should observe the principle of the Open Door to ensure equality in commercial and economic opportunity.70 This plan for Korean trusteeship and eventual independence, if agreed in detail with Stalin, might have changed the course of history in Korea and northeast Asia. Whereas the plans for China included a lot of wishful assumptions, the plans for Korea largely matched the realities of the Korean situation except its gross neglect of Koreans peoples’ yearnings for an immediate independence. It suggested a method of mitigating power rivalries over Korea, and its specific directive to train local Koreans must have been aimed at excluding the influence of the Soviet Koreans in postcolonial Korea. In light of the fact that Britain and China were friendly to the United States, the State Department’s plan already included a balancing scheme against Soviet influence in Korea. This detailed plan for Korean trusteeship, however, was not discussed when Hopkins and Harriman met Stalin. The Departments of War and Navy opposed discussing such detailed aspects of military issues over China and Korea with the Russians, noting the difficult experience in military consultations with Russia in Europe. On May 23, in his reply to Grew, Forrestal commented, “the military aspects require very careful study by the US military authorities” and strongly recommended that meantime “Harriman should be told not to go into the military aspects of this question with the Russians until he receives further advice.”71 John J. McCloy, assistant secretary of war, sent a more detailed reasoning for such reservations of the US military establishment to Grew. On May 27, he wrote two points in particular about this matter that troubled him. First, McCloy raised the question of the advisability of approaching the Russians with this set of instructions in view of their experiences with the Russians until that time and particularly when Chinese reaction to the scheme was still lacking. Second, such specific military issues, in his judgment, required consultation between the Department of War and Navy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff before making any military commitments. While there was little institutionalized coordination of wartime diplomacy, the secretaries of War, Navy, and State Department had jointly coordinated important issues in their Committee of Three since 1944. Thus, Seung-young Kim

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given the reservations expressed by the Navy and War Department, it was natural for the State Department to put on hold the discussion of its plans for Korean trusteeship in Moscow. Moreover, civil affairs in the occupation zones had been coordinated by the War Department since 1943. Stimson, who had earlier served as secretary of state, could wield influence over such broader issues, and the State Department was in reality unequipped to carry out major administrative chores apart from advance planning for political affairs. McCloy was in fact Stimson’s principal agent “for all problems of civil affairs and all questions that affected State Department.”72 Specifically touching the China issue, McCloy underscored that many of the points raised required Chinese and possibly British agreement and recommended that the discussions with Stalin should initially be exploratory and general on military aspects. The War Department agreed to placing the American chief of staff as the initial commander when incorporating all Chinese forces into one Chinese army. But about inaugurating a combined staff with the Russians, the War Department was pessimistic in light of earlier experiences with the Soviets. Thus it offered instead to establish just “a very adequate Russian liaison mission with the commander of all the Chinese forces.” As for Korea, the War Department agreed to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea as soon as the trusteeship was established, but suggested leaving a token force of ten thousand men instead of five thousand men from each of the four powers during the military occupation by the Allies.73 Although this amendment for the Korea issue was brief, the recommendation wrote that the Korea issue was also to be considered in light of the caution that discouraged discussions on military affairs with Russia.74 The reasons raised by the War Department were realistic concerns based on the difficulties they had experienced while working with the Soviets. But by this time Stimson and McCloy had also held constant talks over the role of S-1 on such thorny issues as Manchuria and Korea. Given such a context, McCloy’s objection against specific negotiations with the Soviets could have been influenced by their hopes to delay the detailed discussions about Northeast Asia until the success of S-1 as well.75 In Moscow, it was during the third conversation at the Kremlin on May 28 that Hopkins and Harriman discussed the Far-Eastern issues with Stalin. Stalin made clear his wishes that the Yalta agreement on the Far East be executed and indicated that Soviet armies would be in position on the Manchurian border by August 8, 1945. While supporting the imposition of unconditional surrender on Japan, he expressed the Soviet wish to secure a zone of occupation in Japan. Underscoring the necessity “to have serious talks in regard to the Far Eastern problems,” he particularly noted, Allies had to have serious discussions “in regard to Japan, including such questions as the zone of operations for the armies and zones of occupation in Japan.”76 Seung-young Kim


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Stalin also advanced his views about China in detail but paid only brief attention to the Korean question. As for China, Stalin gave most encouraging assurances and partly satisfied the wishes in Grew’s instruction to Harriman on May 21. Stalin clearly suggested his support for the inauguration of a stable and unified China. He mentioned that, though he knew little of any Chinese leader, he felt that “Chiang Kei-shek was the best of the lot and would be the one to undertake the unification of China.” The Chinese Communist leaders, in his view, were not as good as Chiang and would not be able to bring about the unification of China. Furthermore he noted that “the United States must play the largest part in helping China to get on [its] feet,” since the Soviet Union would be occupied with its own internal reconstruction and Great Britain would be occupied elsewhere. At this point Harriman probed what he would do if ambassador Hurley’s unification efforts had failed by the time Soviet forces entered Manchuria. Stalin made clear that the Soviet Union did not propose to alter the sovereignty of the Chinese over Manchuria or any other part of China. He even mentioned that, as agreed in Yalta, the Outer Mongolia republic “would remain in the same status it was now, namely not a part of the USSR and open to all.” He further assured that “Chiang could send his representatives to set up the Kuomintang regime in any areas wherever the Red Army were.” 77 The US leaders soon became skeptical about Stalin’s assurances in July, when T.V. Soong started the Sino-Soviet negotiations in Moscow. In the meanwhile, Stalin’s assurance about the China question became a great source of relief in Washington. In contrast, the discussion about Korea remained only very brief and rudimentary. Hopkins started the talks on Korea by saying that “at Yalta there had been some informal discussions of that subject” and added that, “after careful study the United States Government had come to the conclusion that it would be desirable to have a trusteeship for Korea made up of the Soviet Union, the United States, China and Great Britain.” Regarding the period of the trusteeship, he noted that “it might be twenty five years; it might be less, but it would certainly be five or ten.” About this remark of Hopkins, Stalin said that he fully agreed with the desirability of a fourpower trusteeship for Korea.78 This was all. In Harriman’s recollection, “the future of Korea received short shrift from Stalin,” though he showed intense interest in the future of China.79 The remaining discussion on May 28 was devoted to the discussion of the Allies’ occupation in Germany. The Korean question was never again discussed during the remaining period of Hopkin’s visit to Moscow until June 8. In this way, the discussion on Korea did not touch on any of the detailed points prepared by the State Department. Stalin’s lack of interest might have reflected his preoccupation with Seung-young Kim

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other issues or intentional neglect of the Korean issue. Still, Hopkins also did not pursue the issue further. Indeed, Hopkins had time to pursue the Korean issue further, if he had been instructed to do so. From the fifth meeting with Stalin on May 31 until their last meeting on June 6, Hopkins “took it easy in Moscow waiting for further orders from Truman.”80 As for the importance of the Korean question, he was well briefed during this stay in Moscow and must have been aware of the issue since his participation in the Cairo Conference of 1943, where he dictated Roosevelt’s discussion of the Korean trusteeship.81 In addition to Harriman’s knowledge about the Korean question and the earlier instructions sent by Grew, John P. Davies, then the second secretary in the Moscow embassy, told Hopkins that the “Kremlin wanted either to dominate or have the voluntary allegiance” of northern Asia, including Korea. This unilateral policy sprang from the need to protect the Soviet Far East from attack along the Korean corridor and to acquire naval bases and ports for an expanded merchant marine in the area. He also predicted that the Soviets would be drawn into Korea by the political vacuum left by Japanese defeat and would be most likely to pursue its goals in Korea through a gradual, diplomatically correct political-military action, making use of Soviet trained Korean nationalist troops.82 But on June 2, in a new instruction, Grew discouraged Harriman and Hopkins from proceeding with the detailed negotiations on the China and Korea issues. Grew’s instruction relayed the War Department’s reservation about discussing such military issues. He instructed that “it would be best that initially the discussions with the Soviets should be exploratory and general.”83 Grew wrote that in the view of the War Department, “many of the points raised in the memorandum require both Chinese and British agreement before they can be adopted,” thus making such a military commitment needed more careful consideration before putting forward so specific a plan. After receiving this instruction, Harriman noted his earlier report about Stalin’s remark on the Far East and replied that “we have no intention, unless instructed otherwise, to go further at this time or to discuss any other subjects in the Dept’s memorandum referred to.”84 After this, Hopkins focused again on the Poland issue during his talks with Stalin but had to be content with a token concession from Stalin allowing the participation of four non-Lublin Polish representatives, supported by the Western powers, in the Polish Government of National Unity.85 In his last meeting with Stalin on June 6, Hopkins did not raise the Korean question, even while inquiring of Stalin whether he felt all aspects had been covered in their talks regarding the Far East.86 In this way, despite ample opportunities, Hopkins did not discuss the Korea issue with Stalin beyond the rudimentary and general level during his mission to Moscow. Seung-young Kim


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Frustration of the KPG’s Efforts to get Recognition While this diplomatic inertia continued in spring 1945 over the Korean question, the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) repeatedly pleaded the State Department to grant diplomatic recognition, and to arm overseas Koreans for their fight against the Japanese. But the State Department maintained its policy of nonrecognition toward the KPG while keeping its expectation that a unified friendly China would emerge through US mediation efforts. In fact, by this time, the Korean independence movement based in Chungking had achieved greater unity, overcoming the discordance between different groups.87 But the State Department, which had contacts with Korean leaders in the United States,88 continued its negative assessment of the Korean independence movement. Earlier, on February 5, when a senior secretary to Chiang Kei-Shek, Shao Yu-lin, visited Washington, officials in the State Department reaffirmed their negative views regarding the leaders of the Korean independent movement. Shao and Joseph Ballantine, the director of the Office of FarEastern Affairs, agreed that the Korean leaders still could not reach greater unity to overcome the friction and jealousy among the leaders of different groups. Shao particularly noted that after meeting the leaders of the Korean Independence Movement in the United States he had discovered “even more jealousy and lack of cooperation” between them than between their counterparts in China. Thus, he had advised them to establish some form of relationship with the Korean Independence Movement in China and inaugurate responsible organization if they were to attain any kind of recognition. In this meeting with Shao, the United States and China agreed to continue withholding their recognition of the KPG for “for the present,” while agreeing on the need to arm Koreans so that they could fight against Japan.89 Without knowledge of such a meeting, Syngman Rhee, then the Chairman of the Korean Commission in the United States, suggested to the State Department a diplomatic scheme to achieve recognition of the KPG. If the State Department expressed its “tacit understanding” in support of the recognition of the KPG, Rhee wrote, then China would “formally recognize the de jure status of the Republic of Korea,” in light of its recent willingness to take the lead in recognizing the KPG.90 Rhee also drew attention to the danger that Soviet Russia could advance the “Korean Liberation Committee” in Vladivostok, unless the United States extended an immediate recognition of the KPG. The State Department, however, chose to continue withholding recognition of the KPG, drawing on the discussion with Shao. It simply instructed its embassy in China to gather information about the “Korean Liberation Committee” that Rhee had drawn attention to.91 Seung-young Kim

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On March 1, Tso So-wang, the foreign minister in the KPG, visited the US embassy in Chunking. Though his wish to visit Washington was declined in the previous year, Tso again expressed his wish to visit Washington and requested the United States allow Korean representatives to participate in the UN organizational conference in San Francisco. Tso also suggested training the Korean Army on a Pacific island and later along the north China coast under US supervision, and utilizing Korean agents for intelligence purposes.92 The State Department, however, remained skeptical about the usefulness of Tso’s visit to Washington and clarified that Korean participation in the San Francisco conference would not be allowed. As for Korean participation in the war against Japan, the State Department instructed that they should contact the US military commander of the local theater, acknowledging that the approach was under consideration by the US military authorities.93 Though they were not allowed to join the UN organizational conference, Korean dissident leaders in the United States gathered at San Francisco during the conference. On this occasion, Rhee and other Korean dissident leaders in the United States reached a tenuous agreement to launch the United Korean Committee, while postponing the question of leadership to future discussion. Based on this agreement, Rhee requested Alger Hiss be granted observer status representing Korea, but this request was refused. At this point, the Chinese foreign minister, T.V. Soong, invited the Korean leaders for dinner on May 22, with a view to draw them together to support a program of coalition for Korea. But, Rhee rejected such an offer on June 11, arguing that T.V. Soong and State Department officials were trying to launch a Korean coalition including communists.94 By this time, Rhee had developed a great suspicion that the Allies had secretly conceded Korea under the Soviet sphere at the Yalta conference. Since 1942, Rhee had striven to persuade the State Department to recognize the KPG to counter Soviet expansion into Korea, and recently appealed to secure the KPG’s participation in the San Francisco conference. 95 But his appeals had been repeatedly rejected. Interestingly, it was Alger Hiss who had been Rhee’s contact for his efforts to persuade the department. Though not aware of the later controversy over Hiss’s sympathy to Russia, Rhee suspected that the repeated rejection by the State Department was due to Soviet influence on US policy. And in early May, in the account of his close assistant Robert Oliver, a former Russian communist party member visited Rhee and convinced him that a secret agreement was made at Yalta to turn Korea over to Russian control. Rhee had vivid memories of Russia’s earlier ambition over Korea before the Russo-Japanese War and was keenly aware of Russian efforts to control its area of occupation in East Europe. Now, with the information from Seung-young Kim


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his Russian source, Rhee held press conferences at San Francisco and sent letters to President Truman and the senators and congressman requesting disclosure of the secret agreement.96 While doing this, Rhee openly criticized the United States, Russia, and China for reaching such a secret deal. His vehement and repeated charges drew substantial attention from American newspapers and made the White House and the State Department announce official denials. But this effort of Rhee further undermined his image among the State Department officials and alienated other Korean leaders Kilsoo Han and Young-jeung Kim, who believed securing the Allies’ support was crucial for the future of Korea.97 In his letter to Truman, Rhee reminded, “it is not the first time Korea was made a victim of secret diplomacy,” referring to the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905 and urged Truman to instruct the State Department to allow a rightful seat for Korea at the UN conference in San Francisco.98 But the State Department declined such a request of Rhee’s. In the reply, the Department repeated its existing assessment, arguing that “The ‘Korean Provisional Government’ has never had administrative authority over any part of Korea nor can it be considered representative of the Korean people of today.”99 In this way, while pursuing its trusteeship plan for Korea, the State Department did not listen to the suggestions from Korean nationalists during the early half of 1945.

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Consolidation of the Bipolar Perception and US Suggestion of the Thirty-eighth Parallel

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ollowing the Hopkins mission to Moscow, Washington was busy preparing for the Potsdam conference. The State Department again recommended detailed negotiation with the Soviet Union about the future of Korea, so that postwar Korea could be managed through a joint trusteeship among the Allies. At Potsdam, Harriman and Stimson also exhorted the president and the secretary of state to have detailed negotiations over Korean trusteeship. But this recommendation for diplomacy was not taken by Truman and Byrnes. While perceiving the threat of Soviet expansion and the helplessness of nationalist China, they heard the news about the successful test of the atomic bomb. Subsequently, they chose to count on an early surrender of Japan after the use of atomic bombs and, in such a context, delayed the diplomatic negotiation with the Russians over the Korean question. And when Japanese surrender became imminent after the Potsdam conference, Washington suggested the thirty-eighth parallel as a demarcation line between the US and Soviet armies to receive the Japanese surrender in Korea and Manchuria. US Involvement in the Sino-Soviet Negotiation While Hopkins was visiting Moscow, Stalin offered to hold discussions with the Chinese nationalists (KMT) over the Yalta secret accords on the Far-Eastern issues. This was, indeed, in accordance with the agreement between Stalin and FDR during the Yalta conference in February. Thus, the United States arranged for the Chinese Foreign Minister, T.V. Soong, to fly to Moscow.

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When the Sino-Soviet talks began from June 30, however, Stalin’s demands were beyond what Harriman and the officials in Washington had expected. Capitalizing on the favorable wording of the secret agreement, Stalin demanded that China extend a formal recognition to the Socialist Mongolian People’s Republic, a measure tantamount to relinquishing Chinese sovereignty over the area.1 This was different from what he had said during the Hopkins mission, when he remarked that “the Soviet system was not in existence in Mongolia.”2 Stalin’s demands for Port Arthur and Port Dairen were also perceived as attempts to secure virtually unilateral control of the entire Kwantung peninsula. Harriman, who had maintained a narrow interpretation of the Yalta Far-Eastern agreements, played a role in portraying the Soviet demands as expansionist. On July 10, Harriman reported to Truman and Byrnes and worried that “under such circumstances the Port of Dairen would be dominated by Russians and would not be a genuine free port.”3 Stalin indeed demanded the right to deploy Soviet troops as guards to protect the Manchurian railroads.4 The only reassuring position of Stalin was his assurance of Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria, in line with his earlier remark during the Hopkins mission. Stalin believed that these measures, along with its occupation of the Kurile Islands, were necessary to secure a warm port and to impose containment on Japan to prevent a future challenge to Russian security.5 But the US officials perceived such demands as Soviet attempts to expand into the Far East. Harriman particularly worried that such stepped-up Soviet demands would lead to the closure of Manchuria if accepted. But the Yalta agreement itself, which was basically a set of political concessions to invite Soviet entry into the war against Japan,6 had a number of clauses that could justify the Soviet claims. At Yalta, American hopes were reflected in the provisions stipulating the internationalization of Port Dairen and the joint-operation of Manchurian railroads by establishing a joint Soviet-Chinese Company. But the agreement included several clear provisions in favor of later Soviet claims. The clause on the preservation of the status quo of Outer Mongolia included a parenthesis that specified the status quo as “(The Mongolian People’s Republic).”7 And the concessions in Manchuria and the Kwantung peninsula started with a sweeping sentence that stated “the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored.” The agreement also stated the safeguarding of “the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union” in Port Dairen, in the Chinese-Eastern and in the South-Manchurian Railroads and stipulated the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR.8 Moreover, at the insist of Stalin, the secret agreement included a clause stating that “the heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.” Including such a sweeping Seung-young Kim

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concession was a source of much concern to Harriman at Yalta, but FDR was most concerned about gaining Soviet entry into the war against Japan and so allowed the inclusion of such an expansive term.9 In light of FDR’s sweeping concessions, Stalin’s claims were not completely out of context, but such a stepped-up interpretation was exactly what Grew and Truman’s advisors had worried about throughout the spring of 1945. Now that the very negotiations had begun between China and Russia in Moscow, resisting Stalin’s demands fell on the shoulders of T.V. Soong and Harriman. Soong strove to reject the Soviet demands that would breach the sovereignty of China, particularly with regard to Outer Mongolia. He also made his best effort to involve the United States in the negotiation and as a guarantor of the commission running Dairen as an international port. Harriman consulted with Soong in Moscow after each round of the Sino-Soviet negotiations. Indeed, Harriman, who had also been chairman of the Union Pacific Railroad, took the initiative to prod Soong to discuss the Manchurian railroads and ports with Stalin.10 Meanwhile, he sought to moderate China’s resistance on Outer Mongolia, where China had not exercised de facto sovereignty since 1911. The indigenous Mongolians had been traditionally antipathetic to the Chinese and had been willing adherents to Soviet ideologies and influence.11 The greatest concern of the US government lay in the possibility of breaching the principle of the Open Door in Manchuria and China. Harriman observed that Stalin’s demands could place the whole Kwantung Peninsula under Soviet control. 12 Particularly, he maintained a narrow interpretation of the term “pre-eminent interest” of the Soviet Union at Port Arthur. His view was that when Roosevelt agreed on the term, the president meant nothing more than free transit rights of Russian goods and people. In contrast, Soong was quite content with a sense of achievement to have Stalin recognize the sovereignty of the nationalist government over Manchuria. He was far less concerned than the Americans had been about such details as whether Chinese or Russian troops would guard the railroads or who would be the port master of Dairen. Thus, Harriman saw Soong almost every day and urged him “to be more firm.”13 The United States initially preferred not to be involved directly in the bilateral Soviet-Chinese talks.14 But recognizing the possibility of a breach of the Open Door principle, Washington took a more interventionist stance to preserve the principle. On July 6, secretary of state James Byrnes instructed Harriman to inform both the Soviet government and T.V. Soong about the clear position of the US government: as a party to the Yalta agreement, the United States would expect to be consulted before any arrangement was concluded between the two governments. Harriman was further instructed to secure an assurance that the principle of the Open Seung-young Kim

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Door would be respected in Dairen and any other areas that might be subject to special arrangements between the Soviet Union and China.15 While analyzing the Far-Eastern agreement, the State Department stressed that “the United States has, of course, an important practical interest in trade and commerce in Manchuria which should be safeguarded.”16 Stalin, however, did not moderate his demands. Until the eve of the Potsdam conference, Stalin insisted on a majority role in the management of the Sino-Soviet company to run the Manchurian railroads and insisted on securing virtual military control of the Kwangtung Peninsula. He insisted that the military zone under Soviet control should include Dairen as well as Port Arthur and that there should be a Soviet naval base within Dairen. Soong offered Port Arthur and the area south of Dairen as a military zone but maintained that Dairen should be a free port under Chinese management with certain docks and storage yards leased commercially to the Soviets.17 Stalin responded that such a suggestion of Soong’s was unsatisfactory. When the negotiations were adjourned for the Potsdam conference, Soong left for Chungking, wishing that Truman could reach an agreement with Stalin over such differences when they meet at Potsdam.18 Harriman brought this mood of concern to Potsdam when he flew to Berlin to join the conference. In the recollection of Stimson, Harriman “was much worked up over his fears of the Russian plans for Manchuria and wanted help,” when he arrived at Potsdam.19 Perception of Bipolar Confrontation with the Soviet Union in East Asia By the beginning of July, the US leaders clearly perceived a bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union in East Asia. China would not become an independent stabilizing force in the Far East, and Britain mostly remained detached from the postwar issues in the region.20 It was only the United States that could confront the ever-increasing threat of Soviet expansion. Meanwhile, the US leaders remained pessimistic about the prospect of Korean trusteeship. The State Department’s estimate of June 22, made at the request of the secretary of war, demonstrated such concerns. This comprehensive assessment of the Far-Eastern situation represented, according to Joseph Grew, “the considered views of the Department of State as a whole.”21 As a broad basis of American policy toward the region, the estimate underscored the spread of democracy and self-government in the newly independent countries. Aside from the traditional American belief in the right of all peoples to independence, the estimate noted, such developments were probably necessary to maintain continuing peace and security Seung-young Kim


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in the Far East and the Pacific.22 However, the United States was to pursue these goals gradually to maintain unity among Allies for the success of the United Nations.23 The estimate also mentioned the importance of maintaining equal commercial opportunity and access to raw materials. It envisioned the postwar era as an era of constantly expanding production and consumption and of rising standards of living.24 While articulating such visions, the State Department registered deep worry about Soviet expansion in the Far East after its participation in the war against Japan. The department expected that the Soviet military would occupy Manchuria and possibly Korea and parts of north China. The Soviet ideology, the estimate predicted, would be “a rising force throughout the entire Far East.” It concluded that the “Soviet Union offers the most perplexing problem” in US policy toward the Far East.25 The assessments about the postwar situation of specific countries elaborated such concerns. The estimate did not regard Japan as playing a role in the postwar order in the region. The Japanese military and economy would be crushed by the end of the war, and the Allied military government would take over Japan’s international relations. It would purge the military nationalism and encourage the emergence of a liberal government in Japan.26 The estimate remained pessimistic about China’s future. It predicted that China would remain “politically and militarily disunited” and worried that “a long, devastating and perhaps indecisive struggle is likely to develop.”27 It also noted that the Russian press had recently afforded the Chinese Communists moral encouragement. When the Soviet Union entered the war against Japan, it would cooperate with the Chinese Communists in establishing “friendly” governments in Manchuria, north China, and possibly Korea under the influence, if not complete control, of the Soviet Union. Such a unilateral course, the State Department worried, “would be in line with present Russian procedure in Europe, and would violate one of the most strongly held traditional policies of the United States: the maintenance of the territorial and administrative integrity of China.”28 Based upon such assessment, the department concluded: “A China rent with internal strife obviously cannot take its place as one of the major stabilizing powers of the world.”29 The State Department remained deeply concerned about the future of Korea. It stated that the US plan was to assist the Korean people for “the early establishment of a strong, democratic, independent nation,” according to the Cairo declaration.30 But about the prospect of trusteeship before its independence, the estimate registered a deep concern: “The Soviet government will, no doubt, establish military government in the portion of Korea under its control and may subsequently wish to establish a Korean regime Seung-young Kim

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friendly to the Soviet Union composed at least partially of Korean leaders groomed in the Soviet Union.” Particularly, the estimate noted that “20,000 to 30,000 Russian citizens of Korean ancestry are reportedly in the Soviet Army” and predicted that “the economic and political situation in Korea would be conducive to the adoption of communist ideology.” Although the average Korean is not favorably disposed toward Soviet Russia, the estimate noted that “the policy and activities of a Russian-sponsored socialist regime in Korea might easily receive popular support.” As the US policy toward Korea, the estimate elaborated a policy in line with its existing plan for joint trusteeship among the Allies. It stated: “The US government seeks to obtain prior agreement and joint action through consultation” among the four powers concerning the political future of Korea. By this time, however, the State Department also assumed that the initial occupation could be zonal in character, with responsibility for military operations and civil administration partitioned among several allied powers. Still, the department expressed its wish to maintain Korea as a single political entity. “As soon as practicable,” the department wrote, “military government will probably be replaced by an international interim authority composed of representation from the same four powers.”31 On July 10, a week before the Potsdam conference, another articulate warning arrived from the US embassy in Moscow about Soviet moves in the Far East. The memorandum, drafted by John P. Davies, second secretary of the embassy in Moscow predicted that the Soviet Union would pursue in East Asia a unilateral policy because of its security concerns. In his assessment, the Kremlin might worry that China could emerge as the greatest single threat to the Soviet Union on the Eurasian continent, if it developed along certain lines. The Kremlin could also view Korea as a natural corridor for an attack on the Soviet Far East and perceive the Kuriles and the Japanese archipelago as a potential menace to the Soviet Far East. Moreover, the internal struggle in China, the political vacuum in Korea, and chaos in Japan during the final stage of the war would invite Soviet actions toward the region. Davies predicted that the Soviet Union would seek to dominate or win the voluntary allegiance of North China, Manchuria, Korea, Karafuto (southern Sakhalin), and the Kurile Islands. He expected that the Soviet Union would also seek a voice in the peace terms toward Japan and an opportunity to exploit politically the postwar situation in Japan.32 To achieve these goals, the Kremlin would pursue tactics of opportunistic and pragmatic politico-military actions, relying heavily on Chinese Communists and Korean troops in the Soviet Union. In such efforts, the Soviets would strive not to provoke charges of Soviet interference in China’s internal affairs and Korea. Instead, David warned, it would keep the United States in anesthesia in its postwar happy mood.33 Seung-young Kim


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Korea as the Polish Problem Transplanted to the Far East The Potsdam conference was convened from July 17 until August 2, 1945. This summit provided the last opportunity for the Allies to reach a detailed agreement on the Korean question before the end of the war. The State Department again prepared clear guidance for the negotiations on the Korean question. The president and the new secretary of state, James Byrnes, however, did not follow the recommendations. They had received continuous reports about Soviet expansion and at the beginning of the conference heard about the success of S-1. In this context, they chose to delay the diplomatic negotiations, expecting that the atomic weapon would make Japan surrender early and minimize Soviet encroachments in the Far East. The briefing book for the Potsdam conference was prepared by Elsey, the president’s naval aide, and was based upon recommendation from the State Department. With regard to Korea, like earlier recommendations, the briefing book advised a detailed consultation with the Soviet Union to prevent its domination of the Korean trusteeship.34 It specified that postwar Korea would be governed through three stages: “an Allied Military Government, an interim international supervisory administration and a free and independent Korea.” For this process all four powers had to join the international trusteeship and interim administration until Koreans were able to govern themselves.35 It underscored the importance of joint action with the Soviet Union and China, which were contiguous to Korea and had a traditional interest in Korean affairs. “If Korea were to be designated as a trust area under the trusteeship of a single power,” the briefing book cautioned, “the selection of any power as trustee would be extremely difficult and might cause serious international consequences.”36 While the State Department kept promoting joint trusteeship as the scheme to prevent Soviet domination of Korea, there emerged increasing pessimism in Washington about the prospect of this trusteeship. From the Yalta conference, Stalin had suggested placing no foreign troops in Korea after liberation.37 By early July, the US leaders began worrying that this suggestion of the Soviets was aiming at eventual Sovietization of Korea. The Soviet stance during the Sino-Soviet negotiation galvanized such suspicions in Washington. During his talk with T.V. Soong, Stalin confirmed his agreement to establish a four-power trusteeship and stated that “there should be no foreign troops or foreign police in Korea.” Molotov interjected and mentioned that the four-power trusteeship was “an unusual arrangement with no parallel,” thus “it would be necessary to come to a detailed understanding.” When reporting this suggestion of the Russians, Harriman expressed a worry about the possible Soviet domination of the Seung-young Kim

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four-power trusteeship of Korea. He reported to Washington that Soong worried that Stalin would obtain domination of Korean affairs even with a four-power trusteeship, by leaving two Korean divisions trained in Siberia and by bringing Soviet trained political personnel into Korea.38 As a method to deal with this danger, Harriman suggested that Washington prepare for “a detailed discussion of the character of the proposed four-power trusteeship for Korea.”39 At the beginning of the Potsdam conference, Stimson also cautioned Truman about Soviet designs in suggesting the exclusion of foreign forces from the trusteeship. He supported trusteeship for Korea but drew attention to the presence of one or two Korean divisions trained by the Russians. Stimson worried: “If an international trusteeship is not set up in Korea, and perhaps even if it is, these Korean divisions will probably gain control, and influence the setting up of a Soviet dominated local government, rather than an independent one.” Upon such reasoning he concluded: “This is the Polish question transplanted to the Far East” and suggested to press for the trusteeship but station at least a token force of American soldiers or marines in Korea during the trusteeship.40 This explicit Poland analogy to Korea arose on June 23 in the intelligence report to the White House from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The Soviet mariners in San Francisco were reported as saying that Korea would be “independent” but “it is going to be just like Poland.” According to the interpreter, who helped the Soviet officers and crews while their ships were under repair in the San Francisco Bay area, they boasted “we have 100,000 Koreans in Central Asia ready to go back.” On the previous day, the OSS bureau in London had also reported that Moscow’s recent actions over Poland were in fact “reversal of promises which the Soviets gave Mr. Hopkins in Moscow.”41 In sum, Stimson, Harriman, and the officials in the State Department showed concerns that even the joint trusteeship could lead to Soviet domination of Korea. To prevent such a danger, they recommended specific negotiations with the Soviet Union during the Potsdam conference. Harriman and Stimson saw greater danger in not discussing the details with the Russians. Thus even after hearing the news about the successful test of the atomic bomb, they recommended the president and Byrnes hold a detailed discussion with the Russians over Korea and Northeast Asia. Truman and Byrnes, however, did not follow this recommendation to hold specific negotiations. Instead, they employed a delaying tactic during the Potsdam conference; thus the diplomacy on the Korean question was virtually frozen during the conference.

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Atomic Confidence and Diplomacy Delayed During the Potsdam conference, there were two meetings when the Korean question could have been discussed. These opportunities emerged on July 17 and 22, but both were missed. The Soviet demand for its share in the former Italian colonies in the Mediterranean made the US leaders suspect Soviet designs on trusteeships. More importantly, after hearing of the successful test of the atomic bomb, Truman and Byrnes chose to postpone the negotiations over the Korean question to the postwar conference among allied foreign ministers. The first chance to discuss the Korean trusteeship arose during the meeting held on July 17 between Truman and Stalin along with their foreign ministers. After a brief talk over the agendas of the conference, the two parties discussed the issues of trusteeship and Sino-Soviet negotiations for more than an hour. The Soviets first registered their interest in securing their share in the trusteeship of Italian colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. They also suggested severing diplomatic relations with the Franco regime of Spain to allow the Spanish people to select a government of their choice. Regarding the former Italian colonies, Stalin remarked that he thought, “although this might appear stupid, that the Soviets were entitled to be considered for trusteeship of the former Italian colonies which had not been assigned.”42 Truman and Byrnes did not rejoin this remark, though it invited bitter opposition by Churchill. But they must have been alarmed by the revelation of Soviet intent to seek its share in the trusteeships. After this discussion, Stalin explained the status of the Sino-Soviet negotiations, which had just been suspended due to his participation at the Potsdam conference. Stalin first made it clear that the Soviet Union would be ready to join the war against Japan by mid-August. Then he strove to assure the US leaders that the Soviet demands on China were reasonable but the Chinese did not understand the big picture. He also said the railroads and Port Dairen would be managed jointly by Chinese and Russians through the joint railroad board and city council, the composition of which still had to be agreed. After Stalin’s remark, Truman observed that “it would follow, therefore, the Open Door policy.” Byrnes also stated that “if at any point they were in excess of Yalta agreement, this would create difficulties.” Stalin replied that the discussion in the Sino-Soviet negotiations were far less stringent than the Yalta agreement, which would have restored the vast right of Tsarist Russia in the ports and railroads in Manchuria and the Liaotung peninsula.43 But Byrnes remained much disturbed about “what kind of bargain he might coerce China into making,” because Stalin merely repeated that the arrangement over Dairen would be under Soviet control. Seung-young Kim

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Byrnes also felt that “he [Stalin] was not anxious to see an end to the fighting [against Japan] until Soviet entry into the war could help secure the concessions he expected of China.”44 Amid these discussions about the Far East, neither Truman nor Byrnes raised the issue of the Korean trusteeship. Indeed, it was not an ideal context for Truman and Byrnes to raise the Korean question. But Truman and Byrnes also did not follow the advices of Stimson, Harriman, and State Department officials who recommended detailed discussions about the Korean question. How can this silence of Truman and Byrnes on Korean trusteeship be explained? Both Truman and Byrnes were well informed of the concerns about Soviet expansion into the Far East and the possibility of Soviet domination of a multilateral trusteeship over Korea.45 Such concerns must have been corroborated by Stalin’s demands on the former Italian colonies. Stimson later recalled that the Russians at Potsdam did not act in a manner to increase the confidence of the Americans or the British in their future intentions. He recorded that “Stalin expressed a vigorous and disturbing interest in securing bases in the Mediterranean and other areas wholly outside the sphere of normal Russian national interest.” 46 On top of this concern about Soviet intentions for the trusteeship, an important new factor was added. Truman and Byrnes heard the news about the success of the test of the atomic bomb (S-1) from Alamogordo in the evening before their first meeting with the Russians. In Stimson’s account, “the news from Alamogordo, arriving at Potsdam on July 16, made it clear to Americans that further diplomatic efforts to bring the Russians into the Pacific war were largely pointless.”47 Byrnes indeed became pessimistic on July 16 about the usefulness of further negotiation, which was recommended by Stimson and Harriman. Regarding the Sino-soviet negotiations over Manchuria, he believed that Stalin would be satisfied only “through radical concessions” from the Chinese. He also believed that Stalin would join the war against Japan on August 15 regardless of whether or not such concessions were made by the Chinese.48 Amid such concerns, more detailed reports about the success of S-1 arrived at Potsdam on July 18 and July 21. In such a context, by July 20, Byrnes decided to delay the negotiations on Korea and Manchuria.49 The success of S-1 indeed sharply emboldened the confidence of US leaders in dealing with their Russian counterparts. When they first heard the news from Stimson, Truman, and Byrnes were “greatly interested, although the information was still in very general terms.”50 After hearing the more detailed second report about the test on July 18, Truman was “highly delighted” and “was evidently very greatly reinforced.”51 On July 21, a detailed report arrived describing the devastating effect of the explosion.52 Reading this, the president was “tremendously pepped up by it” Seung-young Kim


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and spoke to Stimson of it again and again. Truman confided to Stimson that “it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence.”53 Stimson recalled later: “The bomb as a merely probable weapon had seemed a weak reed on which to rely, but the bomb as colossal reality was very different.” At that time, American leaders were deeply concerned by Soviet demands for the control of Central Europe and the former Italian colonies and about the postwar situation in the Far East. The news of the success of S-1, arriving amid such worries, was received with great and unconcealed satisfaction. Stimson vividly remembered: “At first blush it appeared to give democratic diplomacy a badly needed ‘equalizer.’”54 Although their confidence had been reinforced by the success of the bomb, there still existed differences in their views about negotiations with the Soviet Union. Stimson, who knew that the US advantage in nuclear weapons was temporary,55 continued to recommend a detailed agreement with the Russians on the future of Manchuria and Korea. This was consistent with his earlier recommendation to share the atomic secret with the Russians in return for its cooperation over Poland and Manchuria.56 Regarding the surrender terms for Japan, he recommended moderating the terms by assuring Japan of a guarantee to keep its emperor system rather than pursuing an unconditional surrender.57 But Truman and Byrnes did not share this view of Stimson’s. Instead of following his recommendation, they employed delaying tactics, expecting that the bomb would allow an early end to the war with Japan and minimize Soviet encroachment into the Far East. After the first talks with Stalin on July 17, Truman boasted to Stimson that he had clinched the Open Door in Manchuria,58 though Byrnes was not as confident as the president was about the Soviet commitment.59 After receiving a more detailed second report about the success of the test, on July 18, Truman repeated that he was confident of sustaining the Open Door policy. On that occasion, Stimson emphasized to the president “the importance of going over the matter detail by detail so as to be sure that there would be no misunderstanding.”60 The advice of the senior statesman was as much based upon his concerns about US commercial interests in Manchuria as strategic concerns. In his memorandum to Truman and Byrnes on July 16, he noted “America’s clear and growing” commercial interest in Manchuria and China and urged them not to make further concessions that could encroach upon America’s Open Door in Manchuria and China.61 The elder statesman impressed on Byrnes the importance of the Open Door policy on July 17 explaining to Byrnes the development of the Open Door doctrine during the interwar era.62 Other State Department officials also reminded the new Secretary of State of the importance of the Open Door principle. They reminded him Seung-young Kim

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that the maintenance of the principle was one of the main reasons why the United States had become embroiled in the Japanese war. Donald Russell, special assistant to Byrnes, particularly stressed that “we should avoid any developments in China such as have occurred in Poland.”63 In addressing these issues, Stimson and State Department officials continued to recommend a detailed negotiation with the Russians.64 Truman and Byrnes, however, chose to pursue a different approach. Though they shared the same concerns about Soviet expansion into the Far East, they chose a delaying tactic and a policy of no negotiation over Korea and Manchuria. During the Potsdam conference, it was Byrnes who led the negotiation with the full support of Truman. Though Stimson was invited to the conference by Truman, the assigned role for him was senior advisor to the president, thus he could not join the negotiations.65 Because of his leading role during the Potsdam conference, Byrnes’ worldview and experience deserve attention when analyzing Potsdam diplomacy. James Byrnes and His Negotiation at Potsdam Byrnes became the Secretary of State on July 3 but had been designated for the post just after Truman became president in April 1945. Truman chose him as secretary of state because he thought highly of Byrnes’s negotiating skills, honed in the Senate, and his participation at the Yalta conference. 66 The president also had a sense of obligation to Byrnes, who was his competitor during the Democratic vice-presidential nomination in 1944. After the end of the war, their relationship soured because of their different views on dealing with the Russians. But, during the Potsdam conference, Truman and Byrnes shared the same approach concerning the Russians.67 The two statesmen were like partners in addressing Soviet expansion and their relationship was characterized as horizontal rather than hierarchical.68 Byrnes was born to an Irish family in South Carolina in 1879. His father passed away just before his birth, thus he grew up with his single mother who supported the family with sewing. Though he did not go through university education, he made himself a prominent lawyer through apprenticeship and later became a US senator and Supreme Court Justice. He was responsible for war-mobilization during World War II and was regarded as “assistant President on the home front” in the Roosevelt administration. As congressman, Byrnes had supported Woodrow Wilson for the Paris Peace Treaty and the League of Nations. But overall, he became popular with his natural charm and tactical skills to compose differences in the Congress, not as a visionary or intellectual. In the observation of British diplomats, Byrnes was “without doubt a very experienced and shrewd Seung-young Kim


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negotiator,” but he was also peculiarly sensitive to the changes in domestic public opinion and mood.69 Though he had participated in the Yalta conference, his mission at Yalta had been to persuade the US Senate and domestic audience to accept the agreement; thus he did not join the intricate negotiations on Poland and the Far East.70 Byrnes had served from early May as Truman’s special representative to the secret advisory committee on atomic energy. Due to his worries about Russia’s ever increasing demands, he was clearly unwilling to place the atomic bomb under international control with the Russians, which had been suggested by Stimson.71 He had also shared his concerns with Truman about the possible rise of criticism in Congress if the administration could not demonstrate the value of the atomic bomb after spending two billion dollars for its development.72 He also had a critical view about State Department officials, and such a view was also shared by Truman. They prided themselves as professional politicians.73 They believed that they were in a better position to address the best interest of the United States than merely rich men like Harriman or career specialists in the State Department, whom they regarded as reactionary elitists and dubbed “smart boys.”74 Before his trip to Potsdam, Byrnes had absorbed the briefing book material and thus was well aware of the State Department’s recommendation for detailed agreement for the Korean trusteeship. But his outlook and rapidly unfolding developments led him to pursue a different approach from the department’s recommendation. By July 18, Byrnes and Truman had secured enough information to adopt a new diplomatic tactic. In addition to the detailed report about the devastating effect of the bomb, they heard from their British and Soviet counterparts about Japan’s effort to negotiate to end the war. They had also heard from Stalin that he would not be ready to join the war against Japan until mid-August.75 Combining these reports, by July 20, Byrnes had come to believe that, with the use of the atomic bomb, the United States could end the war before Russia could join the war or at least limit Soviet encroachment into the Far East. He expected that if T.V. Soong stood firm in the Sino-Soviet negotiations after the end of the Potsdam conference, the Russians would not join quickly the war against Japan. 76 Truman also shared this reasoning with Byrnes.77 Thus, on July 20, differently from the advice of Stimson and the State Department, Byrnes explicitly chose to delay the negotiations on the Far-Eastern issues. His assistant, Walter Brown, wrote in his diary: “JFB determined to out maneuver Stalin on China.”78 Like many other complex issues, Byrnes suggested discussing Korea and Manchuria in the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was to be launched after the end of the conference.79 This approach was indeed different from Seung-young Kim

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the recommendation of Stimson and the State Department but was in line with the views of Truman, who believed that they should “win a peace” and “expect our [US] interests to come first” at Potsdam.80 About such a unilateralist approach of Byrnes, Stimson recorded his dissatisfaction in his diary,81 but Truman let his able and cunning Secretary of State deal with the Soviets. The Korean issue was explicitly raised by Molotov and Stalin on July 22 while the three powers were discussing the subject of trusteeships. It was the sixth plenary meeting, and the trusteeship discussion occurred following the acrimonious discussion between Churchill and Stalin about Poland. The discussion began with Truman’s introduction of the trusteeships issue. Then Stalin introduced Molotov as their expert on the issue. Molotov raised the need to discuss trusteeship for specific territories, such as Italy’s colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean, and said that he thought that they should also exchange views on the question of Korea. Stalin also mentioned, “we could exchange views on Korea.”82 But the discussion was consumed again by a prolonged and acrimonious exchange of words between Churchill, Stalin, and Molotov over the future of Italy’s colonies. Russia wanted its share in Italy’s colonies around the Mediterranean. But Churchill was adamant in blocking the Soviet demand, stressing the cost of heavy losses the British army had endured in conquering them. The Soviets also wanted a share in the redistribution of territories that had been under the mandate of the now defunct League of Nations. Throughout this discussion, the United States took a very passive stance. Truman simply suggested referring the trusteeship issue to the Council of Foreign Ministers and the United Nations and did not raise the Korea issue. Byrnes, who had already chosen to delay the negotiation, did not raise the Korean question either. The discussion was mostly consumed by the verbal battle over Italy’s colonies and closed without any discussion about the Korean question.83 After this talk, the issue of Korean trusteeship was not raised until the end of the conference. Truman and Byrnes did not pursue any detailed negotiation with the Soviet leaders over Korea and Northeast Asia. Meanwhile, with a clear prospect of the early surrender of Japan, the US military planners began preparations for the occupation of the southern half of the Korean peninsula during the final phase of the Potsdam Conference. Decisions toward Zonal Occupation and the Thirty-eighth Parallel Until mid-July, American commanders in the Pacific had not included Korea when the JCS instructed them to list up the key occupation targets. Seung-young Kim


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Indeed, when the JCS invited the suggestions of General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in June, it added a notion that it was to be ready for the yet “improbable” situation of the immediate surrender of Japan.84 But on July 21, the JCS specifically instructed MacArthur and Nimitz to include Korea in the occupation area of the US military forces. At that time, the JCS was maintaining close consultation with civilian leaders at Potsdam,85 and this instruction was based upon its new assessment that Japan might surrender before August 15, the expected date of the Russian entry to the war against Japan.86 It was also just before the date when the US leaders failed to discuss the Korean question despite Russian suggestion at Potsdam. Amid this transition, on July 24 the US military leaders at Potsdam continued their discussions with their Russian counterparts based on the existing war plan, which assumed the war against Japan to be continued until September or October.87 The Soviet General, Antonov, inquired whether the United States could join [a] coordinated amphibious attack against Japanese forces in Korea. Then General Marshall, Army Joint Chief of Staff, responded that the United States did not contemplate such a plan. He noted that such an operation should be considered only after securing Kyushu due to the danger of Japanese suicide attacks.88 Internally however, on July 25, the JCS again instructed MacArthur and Nimitz to include Korean ports in their plans for occupation in the event of the sudden collapse of the Japanese government. This specific instruction was issued promptly after President Truman advised his staffs that the atomic bomb could be used against Japan following its proven success in the test. The US military planners could also confirm the Soviet plan to invade Korea as well by this time. Thus on July 27, MacArthur suggested Seoul as the first priority of US occupation along with Tokyo and included two other Korean ports, Pusan and Kunsan, as the second and third priority ports for US occupation.89 In parallel with this decision, by July 24, the JCS developed a broader plan to designate air and naval zones of operation between the US and Soviet forces over Korea, Manchuria, and the Sea of Japan. This plan was presented to the Soviet counterpart, and the Soviet counterpart and Stalin agreed on this line suggested by the Americans in early August.90 Amid these developments, Syngman Rhee appealed again to the State Department to grant immediate recognition to the KPG. He argued that it was the only way to prevent a civil war in Korea after Japanese surrender and underscored that the KPG had all the conditions for recognition, including the overwhelming support of the Korean people in and out of Korea.91 By that time, the KPG had secured diplomatic recognition from DeGaulle’s the Free French and tacit recognition from Nationalist China92 Seung-young Kim

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and had been supporting OSS preparations to insert Korean intelligence agents into Korea through its Eagle Project and Napko Plan.93 In his appeal to the State Department, Rhee maintained that the arguments about division of Korean independence movements had been propagated by the earlier pro-Japanese and procommunist elements in the United States. He particularly noted the influence of communist sympathizers in the State Department, who wished to support the creation of a “Lublin committee in Korea.” The exiting line of policy, in his assessment, would only allow a repetition of what had happened in Europe in Asia. He warned that “if . . . the State Department is determined to leave the question undecided until the Korean Communists are in a position to form a government in opposition to the Korean Provisional Government, the inevitable result would be a bloodshed between the Korean Nationalist majority and the Communist minority in Korea.”94 However, this appeal and caution by Rhee were again ignored by the State Department, though its own recommendation for negotiations was not pursued by Truman and Byrnes at Potsdam either. Once the diplomatic momentum to find a negotiated settlement dissipated at Potsdam, the rapid flow of developments hastened Washington to suggest the zonal occupation of Korea. The need for a clear demarcation line became all the more galvanized with the resumption of the SinoRussian negotiation and the Soviet entry to the war against Japan from August 8. After the Potsdam conference, Harriman immediately returned to Moscow and joined the Sino-Soviet negotiations, which resumed from August 2. Then he dropped the guise of impartial observer of the negotiations. He strove to ensure that the Sino-Soviet negotiations could guarantee the maintenance of the Open Door principle, particularly on the use of ports and railroads in Manchuria.95 The Soviet demands on China were still based on its own interpretation of Russia’s preeminent position agreed at Yalta. Such demands of Russia, Harriman worried, would not allow maintenance of the Open Door principle in Manchuria.96 In the meantime, the first US bomber, Enola Gay, dropped the atomic bomb in Hiroshima on August 6. Then the Soviet Union decided not to wait until the end of the Sino-Soviet negotiations and joined the war against Japan on August 8.97 With the Soviet forces pouring into Manchuria, it became all the more urgent for the Chinese Nationalists to reach an agreement that would limit Soviet activities in Manchuria. During this hectic negotiation, the Soviets added another demand that surprised Harriman. Stalin demanded Japanese industrial equipment in Manchuria as “war trophies,” and this demand reminded Harriman and the US leaders of what the Soviets had done in their occupation area in Seung-young Kim


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Germany. Such facilities in Manchuria, in the view of the State Department, were most important for the postwar recovery of the area, and those equipments had to be available to all the countries that had suffered from Japanese aggression.98 From Moscow, Edwin Pauley, ambassador to the Allied Commission on Reparations, urged Truman to deploy US forces to “occupy quickly as much of industrial areas of Korea and Manchuria as we can, starting at the southerly tip and progressing northward.” According to Truman’s account, Pauley assumed that “all of this will be done at no risk of American lives after organized hostilities have ceased.” He further recommended that the US occupation continue until satisfactory agreements have been reached between the nations concerned over reparations and territorial rights.99 Harriman also recommended Washington land US troops at least on the Kwantung Peninsula and in Korea to accept Japanese surrender. Noting Stalin’s increasing demands on T.V. Soong, Harriman telegraphed: “I cannot see that we are under any obligation to the Soviets to respect any zone of Soviet military operation.” While recommending the landing in Korea and Port Dairen, Harriman noted the discussion of such a proposal among the US military planners during the Potsdam conference.100 With Japan’s sudden announcement of its willingness to surrender on August 10,101 choosing a demarcation line became an urgent administrative necessity. To ensure an orderly surrender of millions of Japanese forces, Washington had to suggest a clear demarcation line between the US and Soviet armies. Moreover, unless the United States suggested an acceptable line to the Soviets, the whole of northeast Asia could be placed under the control of the Soviet army, which had enough capability to dominate the region down to the southern tip of the Korean peninsula. By the time Japan probed the surrender terms on August 10, Byrnes had instructed the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to prepare a plan for US-Soviet occupation in Korea. He suggested that the US forces receive the surrender as far north as practicable. The task of choosing a specific demarcation line became the task of JCS military planners on the night of August 10. In the hectic process of drafting General Order No. 1, Colonels C.H. Bonesteel and Dean Rusk chose the thirty-eighth parallel as the dividing line between the US and Soviet zones.102 Although they chose the line in a matter of hours, as the planners in the politico-military committee in the JCS, they had been well informed of the recent political discussions in the top level of US government through the policy coordination in the SWNCC.103 By choosing the thirty-eighth parallel, these military planners believed, the US occupation zone could include Seoul, the capital, and a prisoner of war camp nearby Seoul within the American zone. They also wished Seung-young Kim

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to be ready “in case the USS.R proved recalcitrant in political dealings.”104 By choosing the thirty-eighth parallel the United States could allocate a sufficient portion of Korea to China and Britain in case some sort of quadripartite administration eventuated.105 During the discussion, dividing the occupation zone corresponding to “county boundaries” was also considered, but the idea was dropped. Brigadier General Lincoln worried that “this arrangement, technically 100 % military, might be taken by the USSR as implying US views as to a territorial arrangement.” As the Chief of Strategy and Policy Group of the Operation Division (OPD) in the US Army General Staff,106 Lincoln was the main coordinator of General Order No. 1. In his account, overall the military planners made efforts to pick a line that the Soviets would willingly accept. Reflecting these concerns, the thirty-eighth parallel was adopted and written in the draft of General Order No. 1. 107 Lincoln later gave a vivid account of the context of the decision to choose the thirty-eighth parallel. He recalled that his planners considered the intelligence reports that the Soviet forces were probably pushing very fast in their offensive in Korea as well as in Manchuria. The US forces could not take much of these areas unless the Soviets accepted the US suggestion for a demarcation line.108 The Soviet forces could reach the southern tip of Korea before US troops could be brought into the picture. At that time, the nearest US combat troops were six hundred miles to the south of the Ryukyu Islands. Consequently, if Korea was to be spared from total communist domination, the United States had to secure from the Kremlin “within matters of hours” an agreement on the northern most possible surrender line above Seoul.109 Lincoln also remembered the general lack of any detailed “political guidance” or “multilateral agreement” regarding Korea’s future. During the discussion, the staff members also considered the difficulties when the Russians took Berlin and Vienna. In such a situation, Lincoln recalled, “we should try to ride horses” and “pick a line the USSR would accept.”110 The policy coordination during these last days of the war was far more informal and rapid, often relying on telephone consultation.111 Still, the draft prepared by the military planners was approved through the established procedure of policy coordination through SWNCC and the Committee of Three among the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy before it reached the President. In the predawn hours of August 11, the Navy representative in the Joint Staff Planners (JSP), Admiral Mathias B. Gardner, preferred to shift the surrender line to the thirty-ninth parallel. The new line, which was favored by Secretary of Navy Forrestal, would include Port Dairen in the American zone. But General Lincoln objected to this. If Dairen was included in Seung-young Kim


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the US zone, there was a danger of jeopardizing the acceptance of whole provisions of General Order No. 1 by the Soviet Union. Assistant Secretary of State Dunn, who was chairing the SWNCC meeting in another room, also mentioned that Byrnes believed that Korea was more important than Dairen when Lincoln consulted with him.112 Lincoln also wanted to draw a line the Soviets would accept and honor, thus he opposed raising the line to the thirty-ninth parallel. Meanwhile the Far-Eastern experts in the State Department did not raise any further points during the review at the SWNCC.113 While the SWNCC was reviewing the draft of General Order No 1 on August 12, the Russians dramatically pointed up the urgency of the situation by launching their invasion of Korea. Through amphibious landings on the northeast coast near Yuki and Rajin, the Russian forces began pouring into Korea.114 But it was not until August 15 that General Order No 1, including the demarcation line at the thirty-eighth parallel, was finally sent to the Soviet Union following Truman’s approval. A short period of suspense occurred in Washington as to whether the Soviets would accept the suggested line. While waiting for the Russian reply, General Lincoln suggested to Admiral Gardner that “if the Red Army had occupied Seoul the alternate Korean city for US occupation should be the southeast port of Pusan.” But Stalin accepted this suggested line in an unusual promptitude on August 16, while reminding Truman that the Liaotung Peninsula was within the Soviet military zone. Stalin also expressed his wish to place the Soviet occupation forces at the northern half of Hokkaido as he did during the Hopkins mission to Moscow in late May. But Truman skillfully parried his proposal.115 By the end of the war, the Soviet Union and the Chinese Nationalists had also reached the final agreement on the treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Union softened its position, and thus the final agreement of August 14 included some elements guaranteeing the Open Door principle in Dairen and the Manchurian railroads. It was agreed that Dairen would be placed under Chinese administration except in time of war, when Russian military forces would take control of the port. The Soviet Union would not place any Russian guards along the Manchurian railroads, and the railroad would be managed jointly by the Chinese and Russians. The Soviets also agreed to withdraw their forces within three months after the Japanese surrender. To the satisfaction of the KMT negotiators, Stalin agreed to extend support only to the Chinese Nationalists and would allow the visit of KMT officials to the Soviet occupation zone in Manchuria.116 The Soviet claim of “war trophies” was not addressed in the treaty but was left for discussion among the Allies at the end of the war. Seung-young Kim

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Though it was agreed under enormous pressure generated by the Soviet advancement in Manchuria,117 this agreement was accepted with some satisfaction by the KMT.118 But the State Department retained lingering worries. Particularly, the department pointed out that the Soviets came to lease half of the Dairen facilities under a Russian port master, quite differently from the Yalta commitment for an international free port.119 It also registered concern about allowing an extensive military zone around Port Arthur and remained guarded about Stalin’s reluctance to issue a written statement that would reaffirm his earlier oral guarantee for the Open Door during the Potsdam conference. The Russian forces invaded Korea along the northeast coast near Rajin from August 12. The fighting against the Japanese resistance in northeastern Korea continued sporadically until August 26. With the beginning of surrender of Japanese forces from August 19,120 it could quickly occupy down to the Kaesong-Chuchon areas above Seoul. In contrast, the US forces, which had not been prepared for the occupation in Korea, could enter Korea only in early September.121 When the US troops reached south Korea on September 8, most of the Russians had complied with General Order No1 by withdrawing to positions above the thirty-eighth parallel. With the arrival of its forces in Korea, the United States came to face the dire realities of zonal occupation in South Korea. It had to deal with the agonizing realities of postwar domestic politics in the South122 and had to go through difficult negotiations for the Korean trusteeship with the Soviet Union, which by that time was determined to consolidate a Soviet style regime in North Korea. Truman later recalled that the thirty-eighth parallel was “proposed as practical solution when the sudden collapse of Japanese war machine created a vacuum in Korea,” and there was no thought of a permanent Korean division. 123 Byrnes also expected that zonal occupation would end with the inauguration of a provisional democratic government and fourpower trusteeship.124 The State Department later announced that the line of demarcation was “intended to be temporary and only to fix responsibility” between the United States and the Soviet Union for receiving Japanese surrender.125 These statements matched with the hectic realities before the Japanese surrender, and the United States indeed made an effort to end zonal occupation after the end of the war. However, the aforementioned process of decisions shows that the drawing of the thirty-eighth parallel was the culmination of political considerations the US government faced with developments in the Far East and Europe since the end of the Yalta conference. The US leaders tried to hedge against the situation when the Soviets become recalcitrant in the negotiations about the future of Korea and thus wanted to secure at least the Seung-young Kim


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southern half of Korea under its control. General Lincoln’s account and the internal history of the US Army also support the role of such political considerations.126 The internal history specifically noted: Although suggested by the military planners, the Army officers involved were members of a skilled group responsible at the working level for the official marriage of the political and military policy of the State and War Departments. Moreover, their suggested Pacific surrender zones had to clear three executive departments, State, War, and Navy, the President of the United States, and the chiefs of some of the Allied Powers. Despite contrary opinions of various writers on the subject, the military aspects of surrender were not the sole features considered by the Army planners in August 1945.127

The greatest motive behind the suggestion of the thirty-eighth parallel was to prevent the Soviet occupation of the entire peninsula. They did not wish to repeat what had happened in Eastern Europe in Korea, either through Soviet military occupation or through a gradual Sovietization under jointtrusteeship. While reaching such a decision, they expected that the line could become more than a temporary demarcation line to receive the surrender of Japanese forces.

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Conclusion Part II

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he division of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel was not what was intended during the Roosevelt administration. Since 1942, the State Department envisioned a trusteeship for Korea with a clear vision for a unified and independent Korea, following a temporary military occupation by the Allies after its liberation. Before the Yalta Conference, the State Department specifically recommended managing Korea under a single centralized administrative authority, not dividing it into separate zones. The State Department also consistently recommended detailed negotiations over the Korean question with the Russians before the Hopkins mission and the Potsdam conference. However, with the emergence of the perception of bipolar confrontation following the death of Roosevelt, the senior decision makers in Washington chose to pursue unilateral diplomacy and eventually suggested zonal occupation along the thirty-eighth parallel. When making this suggestion in August, they assumed a potential division of Korea in case the Russians proved to be recalcitrant in future negotiations over Korea. The causes and process of the change in US commitment toward Korea can be further analyzed in the light of the hypotheses I set out in Chapter 1 of this book. Changes in the perception of polarity. Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 marked a sharp change in the perception of polarity among the US decision-makers. Before his death, cooperation among the Allies continued despite frictions, thus the multipolar perception could remain dominant in Washington. Since his death, however, the perception of bipolar confrontation quickly gained dominance in Washington. Truman was a typically uncommitted thinker on strategic issues who did not have much a priori vision on strategic issues and thus was more susceptible to the alarmist cautions offered by his senior advisors. From April to late June, the remarks, policy memoranda, and diaries of Truman, Grew, Stimson, and Forrestal demonstrated that an alarmist perception of Soviet expansion gained dominance in Washington. Those leaders believed that the Russians would take the same expansionist moves in East Asia as it had in Europe, and they became very worried about the helpless situation of Nationalist China. Meanwhile, they developed a great expectation about

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atomic weapons, which would provide Washington with new capability and leverage in dealing with the Soviet threat. From July until the end of the war, the perception of bipolarity was further consolidated. After brief relief following the Hopkins mission, the US leaders could reaffirm that China would not play a stabilizing role in postwar East Asia while observing the Sino-Soviet negotiations. Moreover, during the Potsdam conference, the successful test of the atomic bomb further strengthened the US leaders’ confidence in American capability to confront the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Great Britain, much exhausted by the war, was not expected to exert influence in the Far East. This shift in perception of polarity, from multipolar to bipolar, accompanied an increase in US commitment toward Korea through the following developments. Domino image and grand strategy. The domino image did not gain persuasive power in Washington while the multipolar perception remained dominant. The Roosevelt administration did not assume that Korea and Manchuria would fall under Soviet control like falling dominos. In such a context, US decision-makers maintained their expectation to manage postwar Korea though multilateral cooperation through a joint-trusteeship. The image of the falling domino gained strength following the death of FDR in April 1945. After learning about the sweeping Yalta concessions on the Far East and witnessing Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, Harriman, Grew, and Forrestal worried that Manchuria and Korea would fall under Soviet control like falling dominos. Amid such worries, the top US decision makers found a great confidence based on their expectation of the development of a nuclear weapon. With the consolidation of the bipolar perception in July, the image of falling dominoes gained further strength, as was shown by the evocation of a Polish analogy to Korea and Manchuria. In such a context, Truman and Byrnes chose to pursue a unilateralist solution. Thus, despite the Russian suggestion for negotiation, they delayed the negotiation and later suggested the zonal occupation along the thirtyeighth parallel after the Potsdam conference. In sum, when the bipolarity perception became dominant, the image of the falling domino played important role in intensifying US military commitment to Korea, though its initial evocation was caused by the sharp rise of the threat perception among the US leaders. Ends-and-means analysis. Until near the end of the war, the JCS and the US commanders in the Pacific remained constrained by the limit of US military capability, thus did not include Korea as a target of occupation. From the FDR era, the State Department had recommended that the United States should play a leading role in the occupation and trusteeship scheme. Yet, the department also remained cautious in trying to manage Seung-young Kim

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the Korean question through diplomatic compromise among the four Allies, and inviting the United Nations’s role for future dispute settlement. In contrast, with the consolidation of the perception of bipolarity after the Potsdam conference, Byrnes and Harriman recommended the dispatch of US forces to Korea. At this point, they were not bound by the endsand-means analysis in deciding for the US military commitment to Korea. Also, imbued with the perception of bipolar confrontation, they suggested the zonal occupation, despite the fact that the commanders in the Pacific remained cautious about such a military occupation of Korea. Difference in threat perception. The KPG leaders consistently warned Washington that Korea would be placed under Soviet control eventually. While the multipolar perception was dominant during the FDR administration, Washington did not perceive the same level of threat as did the leaders of the KPG. With the consolidation of the bipolar perception, however, the US leaders became very receptive to the warning given by the Korean nationalists. Though they maintained a policy of nonrecognition toward the KPG, the US decision-makers developed serious worries about the Soviet designs on Korea through the trusteeship. While discussing the thirty-eighth parallel in August, Byrnes even remarked that Korea was more important than Port Dairen, which had been regarded as the linchpin to maintaining the Open Door in China. Pattern of diplomacy. While the multipolar perception remained dominant, the United States intended to manage the Korean question through multilateral cooperation among the Allies over the Korean trusteeship. While pursuing this policy, the US decision makers did not listen to the request of Korean nationalists, who appealed repeatedly for an immediate recognition of the KPG. With the rise of the bipolar perception, however, the US leaders did not favor a diplomatic compromise over Korea. Hopkins was instructed not to pursue a detailed negotiation with Russia, while Truman delayed the Big Three summit. Byrnes also did not pursue diplomatic agreement with the Russians over Korea at Potsdam. Instead, they pursued a unilateral course by suggesting the zonal occupation, which accompanied US military commitment to Korea. Although they still did not recognize the KPG, the chosen policy was partly in tune with Syngman Rhee’s recommendation in blocking the Soviet influence at least in the southern half of Korea. Role of ideas. The major turns of diplomacy demonstrated the instrumental role of the strategic ideas of statesmen in assessing the external situation and choosing the final policies. This was especially true while the strategic situation remained ambiguous. During the second half of World War II, granting a great power status to China was problematic in light Seung-young Kim

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of its division and weakness. Yet, with his firm belief in the cooperation among the Allies, Roosevelt included China as one of the Four Policemen to manage the postwar East Asia in the wartime conferences where Korean question was discussed. Following the death of FDR, Stimson recommended utilizing the US monopoly of nuclear weapons as bargaining counter but advanced a more sympathetic view to recognize Russia’s wish to secure its spheres of influence. He also recommended reaching detailed diplomatic agreements with the Russians over Korea and Manchuria. In contrast, Byrnes, who retained a more confrontational view, chose to delay diplomatic negotiations. Amid consolidation of the perception of bipolar confrontation, Truman supported Byrnes’ view to win the negotiation. This development demonstrates that the role of ideas was instrumental but mattered within the given context of the material environment. Competing Explanations for US Foreign Policy Economic interest. The US leaders’ concerns about the maintenance of Open Door in China and Manchuria reflected their concerns about securing US economic interests. But their discussion of US economic interest in Korea was less explicit and not crucial in changing US military commitment to Korea. Their concerns about Open Door in Manchuria were indeed most clearly demonstrated by the remarks of Stimson, Harriman, and the officials in the State Department during the Potsdam conference. They could have assumed an existence of similar future economic interest in Korea, and the State Department’s memorandum prepared for the Hopkins mission noted its wish to maintain the Open Door in Korea. But their concerns about economic interest were not the main driver that caused the change of US military commitment toward Korea during the spring and summer of 1945. Promoting democracy. Developing Korea into an independent and democratic country was one of the main goals of the United States in its plan for postwar northeast Asia. The policy memoranda of the State Department repeatedly made this point clear. Before the Yalta Conference, the State Department had also recommended that Korea be administered as a single zone during the military occupation and the trusteeship. Later, in June, the department again made clear its vision to make Korea an independent democracy according to the Cairo Declaration. Though it expected an initial zonal occupation by the Allies, it still expressed its wish to maintain Korea as a single political entity. Byrnes and Truman’s decision to secure the southern half of Korea within the US occupation zone also reflected the Seung-young Kim

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US motive to support democracy at least in southern half of Korea though the method was unilateral. Pragmatic approach to address the local threat. During the FDR presidency, the United States did not care much about the local threat posed upon Korea. The Korean nationalists and Chinese nationalists pointed to the danger of Soviet control of Korea. But Washington was not receptive to this caution. Instead, it kept pursuing a policy based on a broader design for great-power cooperation over the Korean trusteeship. However, with consolidation of the bipolar perception from April 1945, the Truman administration considered the Soviet threat to Korea far more seriously. But this change emerged mainly in conjunction with the changes in the broader international situation and the corresponding changes in the US leaders’ perception toward bipolar confrontation. In this way, my hypotheses derived from the realist theories are mostly corroborated by the case histories examined in Part II. Among the other competing explanations, the US effort to promote democracy proved most relevant, but it was shown that Washington tried to achieve this goal while taking into account the limit of its military capability and broader changes in the strategic situation.

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Part III

US Policy toward Korea from 1945 to June 1950 From Disengagement to Intervention

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ith the end of the war in the Pacific, the United States sent its occupation forces into southern Korea to prevent Soviet domination of the peninsula. But two years later, faced with the mounting difficulties of its occupation, Washington chose to withdraw all its forces from South Korea. Despite this withdrawal, however, when North Korea started the Korean War in June 1950, the Truman administration chose to intervene to save South Korea. These were very sharp changes of commitment, which were largely caused by the changing perceptions of US decision makers about the strategic situation in East Asia and the world. The US decision makers perceived the East Asian situation in multipolar terms when they decided to withdraw its costly occupation forces from South Korea in autumn 1947. While the multipolar conception of containment remained dominant, the United States implemented its troop withdrawal from Korea until mid1949. However, from September 1949, such a multipolar perception rapidly eroded following the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the Soviet success in developing the atomic bomb. The emergence of a bipolar perception from late 1949 paved the way for the Truman administration’s intervention in the Korean War in June 1950.

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Uncertain Strategic Situation and Rise of Competing Recommendations toward Korea

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he United States strove to implement the trusteeship plan and unify the two zones of occupation, while dealing with the difficulties arising from its unprepared occupation of southern Korea. But by early 1947, due to its limited resources and the complex political development in Korea, it had to make a clear choice regarding its costly military occupation of South Korea. The Political Situation in South Korea and Early US Occupation Policy The US occupation policy in South Korea went through tremendous difficulties after its troops began the unprepared occupation duty from September 1945.1 Lieutenant General John Hodge, who had been a typical combat commander, had to cope with complex political realities in South Korea, largely relying on the former Japanese colonial administrative institutions, including its notorious police organization. Amid bewildering political development in postcolonial Korea, he tried to implement the directives from Washington to prepare for the joint-trusteeship with the Russians. But the political realities in Korea proved insurmountable for the implementation of the plan developed by the State Department. After liberation, the Korean people treated the Japanese with restraint and maintained order until the arrival of the US forces on September 8. Until August 20, the Japanese authorities in Seoul believed in the rumor that the Soviet forces would occupy Seoul,2 and thus requested the moderate leftist, Lyuh Woon-Hyung, to maintain order during the transitional period. Lyuh

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indeed successfully led the nationwide Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI), which had been rapidly inaugurated based on the leftist organizations throughout Korea. Under the leadership of this leftist patriot, who had just been released from prison, the CPKI maintained order during the period of transition and transformed itself into the Korean People’s Republic (KPR) on September 6, 1945. But upon its arrival in Korea, the US military authority did not recognize any political role of this leftist organization, which included communists. Instead, it began military administration of Korea with only one State Department officer as political advisor, who was a specialist on Japanese affairs without any experience in Korea.3 The Korean people, who had developed a great expectation for immediate independence, were disappointed with the start of the US military government and angered by the discussion of trusteeship by foreign powers. Following the liberation from Japan, the conservative right wing also began exerting several strands of efforts to launch nationalist political parties.4 And by early September 1945, with the spread of news of the arrival of US forces, they expedited organized efforts to promote their vision and political interests against the leftists.5 On September 16, these conservatives, including well-educated intellectuals, community elders, and rich landlords, launched the KDP (Korean Democratic Party), which remained the most powerful and friendly conservative party to the US occupation authority.6 The former collaborators, who felt threatened by the rise of the left, also strove to secure their interests and safety by aligning with the KDP and the returning KPG leaders. They also tried to reach out to the American Military Government (AMG) by cultivating contacts with Korean translators, who developed influence in the daily management of the AMG. Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku arrived in Korea in November in individual capacities due to the US policy of not recognizing the KPG. After their arrival, Rhee and the KPG leaders from Chungking emphasized the importance of achieving national unity, while rejecting the offers from the KPR and communists for coalition.7 But soon Rhee came to enjoy the solid support of the KDP during the American occupation, while Kim Ku kept promoting the great cause of national unification based on the legitimacy of the KPG. By the time the KPG leaders returned to Korea, a clear confrontation between the left and right emerged in southern Korea, which often generated bloody clashes. The AMG kept sending reports depicting the unruly characteristics of Koreans, pointing to their factional rivalry and intolerance of opposition.8 Yet the unprepared US occupation policies further aggravated the political confrontation in Korea. The AMG’s policy also conflicted with the interest of peasants and leftist organizations in southern Seung-young Kim

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Korea and particularly contributed to aggravating political and economic chaos in countryside.9 As a tactic to resist the AMG, the South Korean communist leader, Pak Hun-yong, actively instigated the peasants and laborers to launch strikes and riots, which culminated in the nation-wide labor strike, peasant revolt, and uprising in Daegu city in autumn 1946.10 The North Korean authority also sent financial support and sent its communist party members to South Korean industry to encourage the strikes, maintaining close consultation with the Soviet authority in Pyongyang.11 The AMG assessed that the economic situation in southern Korea had ameliorated by early 1947,12 but overall the early US occupation contrasted with that of the Soviet policy in the north. The Soviets did not inaugurate a military government in northern Korea. Instead, it launched a Peoples’ Committee and indirectly consolidated the pro-Soviet regime, utilizing about two hundred Soviet Koreans extensively.13 Through this savvy method of occupation, it could place itself as liberator of Korea.14 The Soviet authority explored utilizing the prominent nationalist leader Cho Man-sik, but faced with his resistance to trusteeship in early 1946,15 it chose to support Kim Il-sung. Kim had gained reputation as an anti-Japanese guerrilla leader but had remained as a captain in the Soviet 88 brigade based near Khabarovsk during the final years of World War II. He was just thirty-three years old when he returned to Pyongyang but had been preferred by Beria, Stalin, and the local Soviet commanders over the other potential leaders, such as the Soviet Koreans or Pak Hun-yong, who had led the communist movement in Korea during Japanese colonial rule.16 Regarding the developments in northern Korea, the AMG developed great worries from the early days of its occupation. On September 15, 1945, the AMG reported to Washington the worrisome developments in northern Korea, such as widespread violation of human rights, rape, pillage, and looting in all areas under Soviet occupation.17 Such a wanton way of early occupation was later ameliorated when the Soviet authority focused more on the rehabilitation of North Korea.18 But this early development in northern Korea contributed to a hardening of the US threat perception of the Soviet Union. Merrell Benninghoff, a political advisor to the AMG, also reported on the political activities of the Soviet agents and various communist-inspired parades in Seoul. On October 1, Benninghoff reported that Hodge was very pessimistic about the possibility of achieving collaboration between the American and Soviet zones of occupation “at the military level,” though he kept trying to reach out to the Soviet Commander in Pyongyang.19 By early November 1945, the AMG assessed that the Soviets were forming a Korean army north of the thirty-eighth parallel with Japanese weapons.20 Seung-young Kim

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Amid such a rise of threat perception, there emerged suggestions to raise the KPG leaders to the core of pro-US political forces. As early as September 13, Hodge suggested “returning the Chungking Government in exile to Korea as a provisional government under Allied sponsorship to act as figureheads during occupation.”21 On September 25, Chiang Keishek’s government also advised Washington to recognize the KPG and use its leaders, in light of Soviet efforts to sponsor communistic government in North Korea.22 In November 1945, two prominent American officials articulated the need to strengthen the pro-American political regime by utilizing nationalist KPG leaders. After having several long conversations with Hodge in Seoul, John McCloy countered the State Department’s program for a trusteeship plan. In his view, the trusteeship plan was an approach “to avoid in large part the really pressing realities facing us in Korea.” While criticizing the plan promoted by John Carter Vincent, the director of Far Eastern Affairs, McCloy recommended allowing Hodge to use KPG leaders, such as Kim Ku and Rhee, at his discretion, underscoring that the Soviets were utilizing “two divisions of Koreans thoroughly indoctrinated in the Communist creed.”23 A week later, William Langdon, a political advisor to Lieutenant General Hodge, submitted a very specific recommendation in favor of strengthening the pro-American regime.24 Langdon was, in fact, the original drafter of the early document for Korean trusteeship while he was in China during wartime. But after observing the Korean situation for a month, he surprisingly concluded that the trusteeship plan was “unrealistic and immoral” and recommended dropping the plan. He recommended instead a very concrete plan to inaugurate a Governing Commission led by the returning leader of the KPG, Kim Ku. This commission would later be integrated with the US military government and eventually evolve into an interim government of Korea and “hold selection of the head of state.” While suggesting this plan, Langdon further elaborated, “our caution over becoming associated with the so-called Provisional Government in Chungking seems unwarranted now as Kim Ku’s group has no rival for first government of liberated Korea, being regarded as quasi-legitimate by all elements and parties.”25 Langdon also suggested carrying out the withdrawal of US and Soviet troops from Korea by the time the head of the Korean state was elected. But his suggestion clearly included a plan to inaugurate a separate regime in southern Korea. He noted that Russia should be informed in advance and invited to send Korean representatives from the Russian zone, who would be nominated by a council led by Kim Ku, to the Governing Commission. But if Russian participation was not forthcoming, he recommended, the “plan should be carried out for Korea south of 38th parallel.”26 While writSeung-young Kim


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ing this recommendation, he also recommended the creation of South Korean armed forces, including a naval branch as suggested by the AMG on November 13.27 Still, he expected an eventual unification due to the strength of Korean nationalism.28 The Pursuit of a Trusteeship Plan and Politics in South Korea The State Department, however, rejected Langdon’s recommendation for the Governing Commission on November 29, on the grounds that it might complicate the negotiations with the Russians.29 This directive from the department was largely in line with its earlier trusteeship plan developed during the final phase of World War II. Noting that the decision for trusteeship had been reached in consultation with the Soviet government, Secretary of State Byrnes wrote, “the adoption of this principle may still be necessary to secure the elimination of the barrier of the 38[th] parallel and zonal developments which are now taking place.” Byrnes further noted that joint trusteeship would serve best to train Koreans for full independence and “to assure the emergence of a united, independent Korea.” In conclusion, Byrnes directed the occupation authority not to extend any particular support to the KPG and objected to the inauguration of a separate regime in southern Korea. He drew particular attention to the SWNCC’s initial directive for Korean occupation, which stipulated the AMG neither extend official recognition nor utilize the KPG.30 This directive, approved in October, clearly stipulated a selective encouragement of political parties and organizations, while requiring the AMG to abolish those “whose activities are inconsistent with such requirements and objectives” of the US occupation. This definitive instruction from the secretary of state largely set the foundation and the boundary of US occupation policy toward Korea until mid-194631 when it was updated by new directive, which instructed the AMG to build a pro-US moderate coalition in South Korea.32 Finally, on December 27, the three foreign ministers of the Allies, except China, agreed in Moscow to launch the four-power trusteeship for Korea for “a period of up to five years.” For the preparatory consultations, they agreed to launch the Joint Commission between the US and Soviet occupation authorities in Korea, which would assist the formation of the provisional Korean government to be set up before the start of the trusteeship.33 The moderates in South Korea remained somewhat sympathetic about this scheme pointing to the agreement to inaugurate the provisional government by the Korean people.34 But this trusteeship agreement ignited an outburst Seung-young Kim

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of nationalist resentment in southern Korea, as it was perceived merely as a scheme to prolong the foreign powers’ domination of Korea. The debate over whether or not to accept trusteeship became the central issue in the politics of South Korea until mid-1947. The right-wing nationalists did indeed ignite a nationwide antitrusteeship campaign, thus far broadening its support basis. But their efforts placed themselves on a conflicting course with the US occupation authority, which tried to inaugurate the trusteeship by buttressing the moderates in the south. Hodge and Rhee developed a clash of personality as well,35 though the US political advisor tried to keep Rhee within the loop, given his popularity and his skillful moderation even while supporting the antitrusteeship campaign.36 Kim Ku, who led the most vehement antitrusteeship campaign, just like his struggle against the Japanese in China, was largely alienated from the US occupation authority.37 To discuss preparations for the trusteeship, the US-Soviet Joint Commission was convened on March 20 1946, but it was adjourned indefinitely on May 8, due to disagreement over the right to participate in the political consultation to discuss the provisional government. The Soviets insisted on the exclusion of all parties and organizations that opposed the terms of the Moscow agreement, but the US representatives could not accept such an approach, which would lead to the domination of the provisional government by the leftists who supported the agreement. Still the Soviets could claim that they were trying to uphold the principle of Moscow agreement, and thus the United States had to come up with a solution. As a solution for this stalemate, from June 1946, under instruction from Washington, the US authority in Seoul exerted efforts to support the nascent efforts to launch a “middle of the road” coalition in South Korea that was more willing to follow the terms of the Moscow agreement on the trusteeship and provisional government. While doing this, the AMG was to exclude the old émigré Koreans, who proved to be an obstruction to the implementation of the Moscow agreement.38 The instruction from Washington underscored “an amicable agreement with the Soviet Union over Korea is to be desired not only as a means of achieving our objectives there but also as a factor facilitating a Far Eastern and general understanding with the Soviet Union.”39 In this context, during his visit to Pyongyang, Langdon told his Russian counterpart that “the United States had no intention of trying to establish a provisional government under the control of Syngman Rhee and Kim Koo.”40 Although Washington considered the broader context of US-Soviet relations, the political realities in South Korea did not allow the formation of a political coalition around moderates. During the negotiations for coalition building, the representatives of the Left and the Right could Seung-young Kim


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not find compromise mainly due to the clashes of vision, class interest, and difference over the scope of removal of pro-Japanese collaborators.41 Moreover, despite its effort to broaden the participation of Koreans in its senior posts, the AMG’s daily governing of South Korea was heavily reliant on the extreme right element of society, such as the police, bureaucrats, and youth organizations.42 This contradictory reality was the dilemma throughout the US occupation in Korea and worked as an obstacle for the Korean moderates, who preferred the removal of pro-Japanese collaborators from the AMG. The stalemate in the US-Soviet Joint Commission continued until May 21, 1947, when the commission convened the second round of negotiations. During this interim-period, political movements in South Korea were largely streamlined following several prominent political leaders until mid-1947.43 On the extreme right there was the Korean Democratic Party (KDP), supporting Rhee. The KDP was supported by the most conservative elements in South Korea, including educated intellectuals, businessmen, and community elders, as well as former collaborators of Japan and rich landlords.44 On the other hand, Kim Ku’s group and his Korean Independence Party (KIP), consisting of KPG leaders from Chungking, represented less wealthy people on the Right but claimed rightful legitimacy for succeeding the KPG. These right-wing groups consistently opposed the trusteeship plan, but it was Kim Ku’s supporters who waged the most vehement antitrusteeship movement. On the moderate side, there were Kim Kyu-sik’s supporters, representing the moderate right, and the supporters of Lyuh Woon-hyung, who led the People’s Party and later inaugurated the Laboring People’s Party in April 1947. These groups supported the US-Soviet agreement on trusteeship as an acceptable interim-period before Korea acquired full independence as a unified nation. Kim Kyu-sik was an elderly scholar statesman and a selfless patriot, who had served as the chairman of the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly inaugurated by the AMG in December 1946.45 After studying in Roanoke College in south central Virginia, he joined the independence movement in China as a member of the KPG. He was sent to the Paris Peace Conference as the representative of the KPG and was elected foreign minister of the KPG in the mid-1930s. He had also maintained a close relationship with both Rhee and Kim Ku, and thus was regarded as the ideal person to lead a moderate coalition by the AMG. Despite his popularity among the intellectuals, however, he did not have broad popularity among the grassroots and was not keen on developing a political party that would help him to fight through the chaotic political situation.46 Lyuh was also supported by the US authority, but he was irresolute and his party was infiltrated and challenged by the Korean Communist Party Seung-young Kim

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led by Pak Hun-yong.47 While maintaining contacts with the authority in the North, Lyuh himself received financial support from Kim Il-sung, who wished to constrain the influence of Pak, who had a solid support base in the communist organization in southern Korea.48 Pak’s communist party had a well-organized network in southern Korea that had survived brutal Japanese colonial control. It launched numerous strikes and riots, 49 faced with suppression by the US authority and the extreme right, which also used terror tactics. Pak had to move to Pyongyang in October 1946 to escape the arrest order by the AMG, but he continued directing communist activities in the south through the liaison office located at Haeju, just north of the thirty-eighth parallel.50 Among these groups, the moderates were weaker than the extreme right and extreme left in their political tactics and organizations. In terms of organization, the leftists initially enjoyed a superior position with widespread labor organization in local areas. But with the spread of the antitrusteeship campaign, the right wing gained broader popularity in South Korea. In terms of armed forces at their disposal, the right had the solid support of police and youth groups, whereas the left had armed units of various types augmented by trained assassins and saboteurs from North Korea.51 Overall, in terms of political astuteness, diplomatic skill, and ability to read the broad international situation, Rhee was the most prominent. Using his long experience and contacts in New York and Washington, D.C., Rhee could also appeal to the anticommunist mood in the United States, despite his enduring personal antipathy with General Hodge.52 Rhee warned that the coalition with the leftists would only lead to communization of the entire Korean peninsula, and he led a vehement antitrusteeship campaign. He also began a series of political and diplomatic campaigns to gain support for his plan for the Korean question since the suspension of the US-Soviet Joint Commission. Experiencing the AMG’s efforts to marginalize him from the coalition building, Rhee began harshly criticizing Hodge and the occupation authority for not implementing the policy of Washington.53 Simultaneously, he tried to secure support from General MacArthur in Tokyo and appeal to broader US public opinion by utilizing small but vigorous group of supporters in New York and Washington.54 Particularly, on June 3, 1946, amid his campaign to boost his popular support base, Rhee suggested launching a separate provisional government in South Korea in light of the stalemate in the Joint Commission.55 This suggestion generated controversy among the other right-wing leaders and the US occupation authority as well. Kim Ku and other former KPG leaders strove to inaugurate an independent government based on the legitimacy of the KPG in early 1947 and later pursued national unification Seung-young Kim


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through negotiations with the authority in North Korea.56 Moderate leader, Kim Kyu-sik, also pursued building a coalition between the left and right, encompassing all political parties in South and North Korea.57 Later Rhee’s suggestion was to gain ground amid the change of political situation, but until mid-1947, Washington was faced with a dilemma because its efforts to build a moderate coalition did not progress while the antitrusteeship campaign remained popular in South Korea. In fact, the Soviet authority in North Korea also tried to block the emergence of a moderate coalition in the south. It did not wish to see an early inauguration of central government in Korea when the communist party was banned in the south.58 Amid such difficulties, by early 1947, there emerged a tremendous pressure that urged Washington to make a clear choice regarding its commitment toward Korea. Merely continuing the existing situation in Korea was not sustainable any longer when it was faced with sprawling military and economic commitment in other areas of the world. The United States had to choose between dramatically buttressing its assistance to or carrying out the withdrawal of its forty-five thousand troops from South Korea. The Strategic Situation in East Asia in 1947 While the US occupation was faced with an impasse, the broader strategic situation in East Asia in 1947 was perceived as a multi-polar situation in Washington. The Soviet troops were withdrawn from China along with the US forces, and the Chiang Kei-shek regime still showed prospects of controlling a substantial part of mainland China, though it might lose northern China to the Communists. Meanwhile, recommendations arose in the State Department to change the US occupation policy in Japan in order to buttress Japan to become a friendly power to the United States. The Truman administration also felt a clear limit on its resources to deal with problems in East Asia. It had to focus its limited resources to deal with the escalation of the cold war in Europe, which was deemed a main area of ideological contest. The situation in China in 1947 appeared at least less pessimistic than what Truman and Byrnes had perceived during the Potsdam conference. Following the Japanese surrender, the United States dispatched almost sixty thousand Marines into northern China and deployed them along vital railroads, ports, and airfields. The US Navy and Air Force ferried hundreds of thousands of Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers from south to north China during the early fall of 1945. These actions were explained as measures to help disarm and repatriate the surrendered Japanese forces, but their real aim was to assist the KMT to seize more territory in northern China and Seung-young Kim

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Manchuria in its competition with the Communists. Following the Japanese surrender, Washington sent the Chiang regime several billion dollars of military lend-lease aid, which was greater than the assistance provided during the Pacific War.59 The KMT could seize urban centers but was no match for the Communists in the rural areas, where the Communists secured the support of the peasants. Through 1946, the United States strove to mediate between the KMT and the Communists. The Marshall mission succeeded in arranging the mutual withdrawal of the US and the Soviet forces from north and northeast China but could not reap further results. The Nationalists insisted on the disarmament of the Communists as a precondition to any serious discussions for coalition government, and the Communists remained suspicious about American impartiality. The United States had maintained about one thousand military advisors in China in 194660 and did not want to undermine the Chiang regime for the sake of mediation. In this way, efforts for mediating between the KMT and the Communists ended as a failure in early 1947.61 During 1947, however, Washington retained its hope that Nationalist China could remain a friendly power to the United States in mainland China. Concerning assistance to China, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and State Department had different views. The JCS recommended continuing military assistance to the Chiang regime by keeping military advisors in China and sending military equipment. The JCS and the US officers in China believed that the Communists were “tools of Soviet policy” and recommended that “the military security of the United States will be threatened if there is any further spread of Soviet influence and power in the Far East.”62 They also believed in 1947 that with the relatively small figure of ten thousand officers, the United States could help Chiang to prevail over the Communists.63 To prevent the collapse of Chiang’s military forces, they maintained that US officers had to direct central military planning and implement their plans through liaison units with the Nationalist field commands.64 In contrast, China experts in the State Department worried about the inefficiency and corruption of the Chiang regime and remained pessimistic about the future of the regime. The China experts also believed that, even under Soviet control, China would not pose a serious threat to US security because of its industrial backwardness and possible rise of nationalist friction between the Chinese and the Russians. They discouraged providing any direct military assistance or strategic planning that could lead to US intervention in the Chinese civil war.65 The State Department, however, did not oppose military aid to the Chiang regime until early 1948. Though lamenting the state of the regime, Seung-young Kim


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Secretary of State Marshall concluded in his meeting with the secretary of defense in November 1947 that everyone agreed that “we wish to prevent Soviet domination of China.” It was also agreed that the United States had no choice but to keep it in power by providing aid to China.66 At that time, the Office of European Affairs also believed that the China hands in the department lacked sufficient appreciation of Soviet ambitions, and they could probably have expressed their support for strengthening the Chiang regime.67 In this way, throughout 1947, there remained the expectation that the Chiang regime could remain a friendly power to the United States, though it might lose control over north China and Manchuria to the Communists.68 Even the skeptical China experts in the State Department tried to preserve these relatively self-sufficient areas outside the zone of civil war by focusing US aid to the areas south of the Yangtze River and contiguous to Southeast Asia.69 The debate over whether or not to send military assistance to China continued throughout 1947. In the meanwhile, there remained an expectation that China could still play a role as a friendly third power for the United States in East Asia and could help counterbalance Soviet expansion in East Asia. Even after the Communists consolidated their strategic initiative in mid-1948, the United States chose to continue existing aid programs to the KMT, though it chose to deny any massive assistance that could entice the United States to civil war.70 As will be examined later, the US occupation policy in Japan went through change in 1947 toward revitalizing the Japanese economy and enhancing political stability. This new course sought to prevent the rise of leftists and resurrect Japan as a friendly power center to the United States so that it could resist infiltration by the communists.71 Developments in Europe The US policy toward East Asia in 1947 should be considered in light of the US position in Europe as well. During 1946 and 1947, it was the urgency of the European situation that drew the primary attention of Washington. Following the bitter winter of 1946, Washington worried that communism could spread quickly into the war-beaten European countries. Indeed in early 1947, because of its own economic crisis, Britain ended its military and economic aid to Greece and Turkey, which had been its traditional sphere of influence in the Mediterranean. Washington worried that this retrenchment of Britain would invite a leftist triumph in the internal political struggles in Greece and Turkey, the fall of which could open Soviet access to Europe, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. Seung-young Kim

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To address this problem, on March 12, 1947, the president declared in his congressional address that the United States would “support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.” This was the Truman Doctrine, which stated quite a universalistic commitment to all freedom fighters against communists. But, the immediate goal of this address was to persuade the US Congress to support an aid bill of 400 million dollars for Greece and Turkey, which was accepted by Congress on March 22.72 It was the subsequent Marshall Plan that reflected the dominant method of containment pursued in Washington under George Kennan’s initiative. By restoring the political stability of war-beaten Europe, the Truman administration expected to reduce the scope for communist penetration in European countries. For this purpose, Secretary of State Marshall announced the beginning of the European Recovery Program at the commencement ceremony at Harvard University on June 5.73 To implement the Marshall Plan, the Truman administration estimated a need to spend $17 billion over the next four years. More than a third of the fund had to be spent during the coming eighteen months.74 This assistance was to allow economic recovery of the European countries and prevent their falling prey to the spread of communism. By November 1947, the early success of the Marshall Plan was in sight. But the State Department still predicted that the Soviets would probably take over Czechoslovakia, which indeed occurred six months later. The department also worried that the Soviets would order communist parties in Italy and France into civil war, though it did not regard a war with the Soviet Union was in sight.75 The Limits of US Military Capability In 1947, the trend in US military capability had taken a different direction from the requirements of foreign policy. Despite the rising confrontation in Europe, US defense capability continued a sharp decline during 1947. In the United States, the yearning for a return to normalcy remained prevalent in every walk of life. The pressure from public opinion and Congress led the Truman administration to continue rapid demobilization. Though Secretary of State Marshall preferred universal military training, the Truman administration did not consider the revival of the draft as a realistic option when the presidential election was to be held in 1948. In the two years from 1945 to 1947, the strength of US armed forces declined from a wartime peak of 12 million men to a low point of 1.4 million men. The military budget also continued to decline during the fiscal years 1947 and 1948.76 In fall 1946, the Budget Bureau slashed $2.5 billion from the Seung-young Kim


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$8.4 billion War Department budget for the fiscal year of 1947. Moreover, during February 1947, the Congress under a Republican majority discussed cutting the president’s military budget by $1 billion. The costs related to the occupation duties of the Army were to receive the greatest cut, despite the continuing occupation of Japan, Germany, and Korea. By this time, Secretary of War Patterson, confessed that such a cut “would render the continuance of occupations impossible.”77 The United States maintained its monopoly in atomic weapons until mid-1949. But they were not actively considered a useful means of containment during this early period of the cold war. Due to limited budgets and attention from the national leaders, the nuclear engineers had only a small capacity to produce fissile materials and bomb assemblies. In 1947, much to his surprise, Truman was briefed that there were components for only seven complete nuclear weapons in the stockpile. With subsequent technological innovation achieved in 1948, the United States acquired the capability to assemble 169 atomic bombs in 1949. But this number was still less than half of the requirement of the US emergency war plan. It was expected in 1949 that the United States would have to wait until 1951 to fulfill its production goals of nuclear weapons. Yet, by that time, the Soviet Union was also expected to develop its own nuclear weapons, and indeed the Soviets succeeded in their atomic experiments far earlier, in late August of 1949.78 More important than the stockpiles of bombs was that the nature of the task during this period could not be addressed by atomic weapons. The atomic bomb was of little help in preserving the integrity of Iran, suppressing guerrillas in Greece and Turkey, or maintaining the military occupation of South Korea. All these tasks had to be addressed by ground troops, but their strength and readiness remained far below the requirement.79 In his later recollection, Marshall gave a realistic account about the discrepancy between US military capability and the requirements on the diplomatic front. During the spring of 1947, the new secretary of state was repeatedly urged by Truman to give the Russians hell through his radio messages over the developments in the Far East and Europe. But as a former soldier, he knew only too well that the United States did not have a military capability to support such broadcasted threats. When the president wanted to coerce Russians during the Berlin crisis in 1948, Marshall responded that he thought one American division in Europe was not an adequate instrument to threaten the Russians80 when they had as many as four to six million troops in Eastern Europe. Though the Soviet Union did not intend to start a new war, it had enough capability to overrun Western Europe at that time. Seung-young Kim

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The State Department’s Recommendation for Assistance and Protection Against such limits of US military capability, from 1947 to 1950, two trends of ideas competed in the Truman administration over its policy toward Korea. The officials in the regional bureaus of the State Department regarded Korea as the test case of postcolonial development and insisted on continuing the US military commitment. They cautioned that the communization of South Korea would ignite a domino effect on a regional and global scale. In contrast, the US military establishment and the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department insisted on an early withdrawal of US troops from Korea. These realists underscored that Korea was not a high priority area when the United States had to focus its limited resources and manpower. The State Department was overall less sensitive to the limits of resources and intended to continue its wartime plan for Korean trusteeship. It intended to help Korea to emerge as a democratic and unified country by providing assistance and protection. To realize such a vision, gaining the hearts and minds of Korean people was most important, and thus they suggested the Korean version of the Marshall Plan. This idea was first suggested by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and was further elaborated by a special interdepartmental committee on Korea in February 1947. By mid-1947, the State Department had to accept the inauguration of a separate state in South Korea and had to concede to the demands of the War Department to withdraw the US forces from Korea, due to the limit of resources and political realities in Korea. But the suggestions made in early 1947 remained as the foundation for the State Department’s approach to the Korean question even after the decision for troop withdrawal. The US-Soviet Joint Commission on Korea had been stalemated since May 1946, but they kept the channel of communication open till May 1947, when they convened the second round of negotiations for the trusteeship plan. While expecting the resumption of the commission, Washington intended to educate Koreans to believe that the United States would guarantee a genuine independence for a unified Korea after a brief period under joint-trusteeship with a Korean provisional government. Meanwhile, the AMG in Seoul also continued its efforts to encourage the formation of a real middle-of-the-road political coalition under the moderates like Kim Kyu-sik and Lyuh Woon-hyong while reducing the power of the extreme rightist bloc, led by Rhee, in the future provisional government.81 Washington and the AMG believed that it was essential to inaugurate a moderate coalition, which would embrace the majority of political factions in South Korea and attract the North Korean authority in launching Seung-young Kim


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a nationwide provisional government, which would function under the joint-trusteeship. Rhee and his supporters, however, requested Washington to allow immediate independence for southern Korea until the two halves of Korea could be reunited. In February, Rhee supported the US military presence in southern Korea “until the joint withdrawal of the US and Soviet armies could be realized,”82 but urged Washington to abandon its efforts “to bring about coalition and cooperation between nationalists and communists.”83 The State Department did not agree with Rhee’s argument. The department believed that the immediate independence of South Korea would only lead to economic chaos and the domination of all Korea by the communists.84 In early 1947, the State Department prepared a new aggressive and positive aid program after learning the difficulties faced by Hodge in Seoul. On January 22, 1947, Hodge reported that “unless positive action is taken . . . within the next two months, the US may lose the opportunity of accomplishing its mission in Korea and lose the confidence of the Korean people with consequent increased danger of outbreaks of violence.”85 General MacArthur made more specific suggestions, addressing a broader context. He recommended submitting the entire Korean problem to the United Nations and suggested convening a meeting between the four governments of the United States, Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. He also suggested holding a separate highest level meeting between US and Soviet representatives to resolve all current problems in Korea.86 The State Department disagreed with MacArthur in the method of dealing with the Korea problem. It believed that, in light of the recent experiences with the Russians, making further efforts to negotiate with them would not bear fruit. In late February, the department discouraged referring the Korean question to the United Nations, cautioning that such a move would in effect be “an admission of US failure in Korea” and would seriously damage the prestige of the United States. In their view, referring the question to the United Nations had to be reserved for the time when “all other attempts to solve the Korean problem should fail.”87 The State Department’s proposal was to strengthen South Korea with an ambitious aid program. This program was, in fact, in line with an earlier directive, given by Truman in July 1946.88 Such an approach, the department believed, would soften the Korean people’s resistance to the trusteeship and the intransigence of the Soviet Union. On January 27, the director of the Office of Far Eastern affairs, John Carter Vincent, suggested to Marshall increasing the new extended aid program for South Korea. The United States had to increase its aid to Korea by increasing the War Department’s budget and by passing special legislation that could establish a “Grant in Aid” for Korea of $50 million.89 While advancing this idea, Seung-young Kim

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the State Department made it clear that the objective of US policy was to inaugurate “a united, democratic and independent Korea” as soon as possible. It also specified the need to launch a sound economy and an adequate educational system in Korea, which were essential bases of an independent, democratic state.90 This idea of the State Department was further elaborated in the memorandum of the special interdepartmental committee on Korea on February 25.91 The special committee was led by a State Department official and Major General A.V. Arnold, who until recently had been the US representative in the US-Soviet Joint Commission for Korea. Their memorandum suggested launching a new aid program to make Korea a showcase of successful postcolonial development. It presented a strong statement in line with the Wilsonian approach in confronting poverty and the spread of communism in Korea. This vision was also echoed in John Hilldering’s speech at the Economic Club of Detroit. The Under Secretary of State emphasized that the United States had to improve the conditions in Korea far better than when the country was under Japanese colonial bondage.92 Until this time, the State Department did not see immediate independence for South Korea as a solution to the Korea problem. Granting immediate independence, the memorandum noted, would not solve the economic problem of South Korea and would accompany “starvation and economic chaos in south Korea.” The economic problem of Korea, in its analysis, could be solved only through unification and a program of outside aid. It also noted that if South Korea became independent immediately, it would be dominated by pro-Soviet organizations, regardless of whether the United States withdrew its forces or not.93 Such a development, the memorandum continued, “would represent a direct breach of our commitments, both to our allies and to the Koreans, to establish a united and truly independent Korea.”94 To solve the problem in Korea, it recommended initiating “an aggressive positive long-term program” amounting to $600 million over three years in the political, cultural and economic arenas.95 Without such a program and Congressional legislation, the memorandum cautioned, “the Korean situation will so deteriorate as to seriously impair the US world position.”96 A month after the submission of this interdepartmental memorandum, the State Department sent a more detailed aid program for Korea to the War Department. On March 28, Dean Acheson, the acting secretary of state, suggested a gradual replacement of the current US military government in Korea by a civil administration with a civil commissioner who would report to the State Department. He further suggested establishing a Korean provisional government with substantial autonomy in domestic affairs and the dispatch of a high-level business and industrial group to Korea. Seung-young Kim


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Acheson also adjusted the amount of aid and estimated that $540 million aid would be necessary in the next three years for Korea, with $215 million aid for fiscal year 1948. With such aid, he expected, Korea would become “a viable, self-supporting” economy after three years. Then he recommended that these policies could be carried out jointly with the Soviet Union or independently in South Korea, depending on the Soviet stance in the negotiations. Amid the stalemate in the US-Soviet joint commission, Acheson’s suggestion showed the emerging readiness to accept the inauguration of a separate regime in South Korea, as will be discussed later.97 This ambitious assistance program for Korea, however, could not gain support in Congress. During deliberation in April and early July 1947, the Republican Congress worried that such astronomical assistance for Korea could bankrupt the US economy, though it agreed on the urgency of assistance to European countries, such as Greece and Turkey. Thus the State Department had to abandon pursuing such an ambitious three-year assistance bill for Korea. It instead had to choose to pursue a more incremental approach of securing the budget as part of the general appropriation for economic reconstruction at a later date98 While discussing economic assistance, the State Department did not mention the future of US military presence in Korea explicitly. But they wished that the US forces would remain in Korea at least until the southern part of Korea could become viable with the expanded US aid program. For instance, during the autumn of 1946, John Carter Vincent warned the AMG not to give an impression to the Russians about US willingness to withdraw its troops when the Soviet troops withdrew from North Korea.99 Secretary of State Marshall also disagreed with Secretary of War Patterson when he advanced his withdrawal plan at the SWNCC meeting in May 1947.100 Aside from George Kennan, the officials in the State Department did not agree with the rapid withdrawal plan of the Army and the War Department.101 The War Department’s Demand for Immediate Withdrawal While this program of proactive assistance was recommended by the State Department, the War Department was consolidating its plan to withdraw US troops from Korea. It maintained that Korea would not be defensible in case of general war with the Soviet Union and did not deserve the costly military protection. Although some generals expressed concerns about the negative effect of US withdrawal and the communization of Korea, the civilian chiefs of the War Department insisted on early withdrawal. Seung-young Kim

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In January 1947, Major General Lauris Norstad, the Army’s director of Plans and Operations, supported maintaining the US position in Korea. US withdrawal from Korea, in his view, would have a negative impact on Japan and China and would bring negative political repercussions on US positions elsewhere in the world. The withdrawal of US influence from Korea “would bring the USS.R measurably closer to a capability of outflanking Japan both on the south and on the north, and of dominating Manchuria and the China coast as far south as Shanghai.” He maintained that, at least until agreement could be reached with the Russians, US forces should stay in Korea.102 The director of Army Intelligence, Major General S. J. Chamberlain, concurred on this view with Norstad. He noted that “the Communists Korean administration has been put in complete charge in north Korea, directly under Soviet guidance” and pointed out, “there is ample evidence that the greatest effort has been put forth, originating in north Korea, to confuse and mislead the Korean people, sabotage the economic situation, and discredit AMG by fomenting strikes and violence.” He underscored that if the US forces were withdrawn in return for a token withdrawal of the Soviet forces to Vladivostok or Liaotung Peninsula, then the Soviets could acquire all Korea. This would, Chamberlain worried, “materially aid in the expansion of the protective perimeter which is being built up all around the USSR.” He worried that “withdrawal of stabilizing US forces from Korea and China would merely transfer the pressure to Japan and ultimately Okinawa, completing the elimination of the United States as a balancing power in the eastern half of the Eurasian land mass.” Based upon this reasoning, he recommended “maintain[ing] our forces in Korea until the Korean provisional government has been set up and then only as a concerted withdrawal with Russian forces.” 103 The civilian chiefs in the War Department, however, disagreed with these generals and recommended a speedy withdrawal from Korea. Secretary of War Patterson had been under direct budgetary pressure and had long been disappointed by the lack of initiative in the Army to withdraw from Korea. He was an eminent lawyer trained at Harvard Law school and had served as Under Secretary of War during World War II. But he also had the personal experience of meeting with discontented American occupation troops in January 1946 when he visited Korea. During that visit, the impression he received about Korea was “a strange land, with strangelooking people.”104 In a meeting with Byrnes and Forrestal, he expressed the difficulties of ruling Korea, characterizing Koreans as “backward and unruly,” citing the negative report of Hodge.105 Patterson was not concerned about the domino effect either. Rather, he believed that if Korea fell to the communists while US forces stayed there, such a development would Seung-young Kim


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cause negative repercussions upon US policy toward Japan and China, by undermining US credibility. In early 1947, he pushed for increased US involvement in China but concluded that the United States must expedite the withdrawal from Korea.106 Patterson’s views were reinforced by the recommendation of the assistant secretary of war, Howard C. Peterson. Peterson had already expressed his reservations on February 28, while reviewing the Wilsonian memorandum drafted by the special interdepartmental committee on Korea. 107 Now he further argued that US withdrawal would become inevitable eventually, and that Washington should withdraw immediately, provided that the move did not entail “too great a loss of prestige.” He frankly assessed that following American departure, Russian domination of the peninsula was virtually inevitable, due to several factors: US withdrawal from China, the political immaturity of the Korean people, and their economic situation. Noting the likelihood of a Russian suggestion for joint withdrawal, Peterson concluded that the Truman administration should not “hold on tenaciously to what is essentially a weak position,” which it “will be forced to abandon at some later date.”108 Based upon these views, both Patterson and Peterson were against strengthening the American position in South Korea. Rather, they wished the State Department to prepare some face-saving arrangement so that the US forces could be withdrawn from Korea soon. Patterson further articulated his view when he countered the State Department’s suggestion for a bold new aid package. In his reply to the State Department’s suggestions, Patterson expounded his pessimism about the Korean situation on April 4 and emphasized that the United States should make every effort to disengage from Korea as soon as possible. He drew particular attention to the difficulties of satisfying the Korean desire for independence and the explosive domestic situation in Korea. He noted, “On the basis of equivalent strengths of occupation forces, Korea is the most difficult occupation area to maintain.” As long as the United States continued to occupy Korea, in his view, there remained the danger that the development of the internal situation in Korea could precipitate US withdrawal “under conditions gravely detrimental to our position in the Far East and in the world.” Patterson argued that the United States had to set early withdrawal as a paramount objective and should forcefully pursue a course of action that would allow for troop withdrawal. If the United States did not withdraw from Korea, he worried, then it may have “some impact on the Japanese people and on US security interests in the Far East.” Noting the difficulty in getting congressional support for aid to Greece and Turkey, Patterson doubted the willingness of US congressional support for aid to Korea for Seung-young Kim

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the next three years. He also suggested referring the problem to the United Nations or establishing an independent government of South Korea in case the United States could not reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on the Korean question.109

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The Reemergence of a Multipolar Vision and the Decision for Withdrawal from Korea

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he competition between the two recommendations toward Korea came to be settled in the broad context of streamlining US strategy of containment around the world. When compared with other areas of the world, Korea’s relative strategic value was ranked very low. Moreover, during 1947, the broader US military strategy toward the Far East became based on an off-shore balancing, linking the chain of islands in the western Pacific as a defense perimeter. George Kennan also provided greater elaboration of such an approach drawing on his multipolar strategic conception and recommended the withdrawal of US forces from Korea. In this context, Korea was categorized to remain outside the US defense perimeter. Although the State Department’s concerns were reflected in the policy debates, its argument could not prevail over the argument of the military establishment, which insisted on expedient troop withdrawal from Korea. Korea and China in the Grand Strategy of the JCS The War Department’s argument for withdrawal from Korea was further bolstered by the broader grand strategy that emerged during the early half of 1947. During the spring of 1947, Washington became busy in setting priorities among different countries that needed US assistance. Though the Truman Doctrine pledged to assist all freedom fighters around the world, this speech was more rhetorical appeal to obtain Congressional support for urgent assistance to Greece and Turkey. In reality, the United States did not have enough military and economic resources to provide such aid for

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all the freedom fighters around the world. The US economy went through the strain of inflation during the last half of 1946, and Washington worried that foreign aid would further fuel inflation during early 1947.1 In light of the limits on economic and military resources, the new approach distinguished countries as vital areas and nonvital areas for US security, so that US aid could be allocated according to priority. This reasoning, based upon a cost-and-benefit analysis, was promoted by the two branches in the Truman administration: the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) under the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) of the State Department, led by George F. Kennan. Both branches were in charge of long range policy planning, and, in fact, their views were mutually reinforcing on the issue of prioritizing assistance to different areas of the world. With full time staffs, the JSSC comprised three flag or general officers, who performed long-range planning and advised the JCS on current strategic matters.2 The PPS, inaugurated in May 1947 by Marshall, also recommended long-range policy in the State Department. Differently from the regional bureaus, it was free from specific considerations of geographical areas. Kennan, in fact, had shared similar visions with the US military planners about the main direction of US foreign policy while working as a resident faculty member at the National War College from September 1946 to May 1947.3 This thinking was embodied in an elaborate JCS memorandum prepared by the JSSC on April 29, 1947. The report provided a sophisticated calculation of the strategic values of different countries around the world. In this analysis, Korea did not fare well in comparison with other countries. In terms of urgency of current need for such assistance, Korea was ranked quite high, fourth among the sixteen countries. But in terms of strategic value for the United States, Korea was ranked as low, second to last in the JCS report. In combination, the JCS ranked Korea at the fourth to last among sixteen countries considered for US military assistance.4 The analysis of this report shows how the JSSC came to attach such a low value to Korea. The document first foresaw that the future war would be a war of ideology and measured the strategic value of different countries around the globe. The main criteria were the geographical location and the potential military-industrial capability of those countries. If a country with strong potential military capability fell into the hands of the enemy, its loss would cause far greater damage to US national security than would the loss of a country without such capability. In such terms, Korea did not fare well in comparison with other countries. The report emphasized that the entire area of Western Europe deserved the greatest assistance because of its strategic location and its potential military capabilities. It ranked Great Britain and France as the most important Seung-young Kim

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countries, because if these countries fell under Soviet control, the enemy would have secured the shortest distance from which to attack the United States and would make the Western Hemisphere completely vulnerable. Germany was also important because of its potential military capability and the importance of its industrial recovery for the French economy. Assisting these European countries was also important in terms of securing “the shortest and most direct avenue of attack” against the Soviets in war. Italy and Spain were listed as important countries in connection with securing the safety of free passage in the Mediterranean sea lanes, which were the shortest routes to the oil and processing facilities of the Middle East. The planners further noted Italy and Greece as important countries because they were border nations in the current diplomatic ideological war between the Western democracies and the Soviets.5 In East Asia and the Pacific region, the report listed Japan as the most important country to US national security but denied the importance of Korea and China. It acknowledged that Korea was where the United States had fought an ideological struggle for two years, and that its loss would be detrimental to US prestige and security interests throughout the world. The report argued, however, that “this suspicion could quite possibly be dissipated” and that US prestige in west Europe could be rather enhanced if the United States publicly announced “abandonment of further aid to Korea” in order to concentrate US resources in west Europe, which were of “primary and vital importance” to US national security. Within its limited resources, the United States could not afford to resist its ideological opponents on all fronts. In case of armed warfare, the report assessed, “Korea could offer little or no assistance in the maintenance of our national security.” In this vein, the report concluded, “current assistance should be given Korea only if the means exist after sufficient assistance has been given the countries of primary importance” for the United States.6 About China, the long range report of JSSC included a different vision from the dominant view in Washington in 1947. It ranked China very low among the list of countries that deserved any US assistance. China’s greatest military asset was manpower, but, the report wrote, it did not have the industry to equip this manpower for warfare. It also lacked the ability to produce sufficient food to maintain this manpower in fighting condition. The report predicted that the Communists could possibly conquer all China, if the United States withheld aid to China. But about the result of such a fall of China to communism, the report remained relatively sanguine. Though it noted the possible negative repercussions of the loss of China, the report regarded such a development as isolating communism “among the undeveloped countries in the Far East.” Such an occurrence would allow the United States to concentrate the US forces for a crushing offensive against Seung-young Kim

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its primary ideological opponents in more important areas of the world. It also predicted that the United States could “keep it [communism] isolated there by the imposition of an economic quarantine.”7 Japan was the most important arena of ideological struggle within the US defense commitments in the Pacific arena. The report regarded Japan as a potentially powerful country that the United States could not keep forever militarily impotent. Japan was also a country that could contain large communist forces in the Far East while the United States and its allies in the West launched a major offensive in Europe. For these reasons, the report concluded, Japan deserved primary consideration for current US assistance to restore its economy and military potential.8 The JCS supported this recommendation of the JSSC for US withdrawal from Korea. But the JCS approach toward China was different from this recommendation of the JSSC. While sending this report to the SWNCC, the JCS noted, “this study (J.C.S. 1769/1) does not represent the final views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since certain changes and additions are now being considered.”9 Indeed, differently from this report, the JCS continued to worry that the fall of China would be detrimental to the security of the United States. The JCS assessed that the Soviets supported the Chinese Communists in occupying Manchuria and northern China and worried that the fall of the Chiang regime would lead to establishing “Soviet hegemony over Asia.”10 Such a development would also mean another communist veto in the UN Security Council.11 From the military point of view, the JCS noted, the Truman doctrine “must be applied with consistency in all areas of the world threatened by Soviet expansion” if the policy is to be effective. Otherwise, if temporarily halted by US action in Greece and Turkey, “the Soviets may decide to accelerate expansion in the Far East, in order to gain control of those areas which outflank us in the Near and Middle East.”12 In expecting the Chiang regime’s continued viability, the JCS remained more optimistic than the assessment of the JSSC (JCS 1769/1) and the State Department. It maintained that “the latent resources and manpower of China are such that even small amounts of United States assistance to the National Government will materially strengthen its morale and at the same time weaken the morale of the Chinese communists.”13 Upon this reasoning the JCS continued to recommend military assistance to the Chiang regime until March 1948.14 In contrast to the JSC’s view, a US war plan prepared in June 1947, MOONRISE, remained in line with JCS 1769/1, prepared in late April. It assessed that the Soviet Union was not posing an imminent threat in East Asia but noted that US military capability was inferior to that of the Soviet Union. MOONRISE predicted that in case of war, the Soviet forces could Seung-young Kim


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overrun Korea by twenty days and take most of Manchuria and north China in forty to fifty days. In an additional 150 days, the Russians would be able to occupy the mainland as far south as the Yellow River, though the war plan did not presume that southern China would fall in the early stages of the war. The drafters of MOONRISE concluded that only the chain of off-shore islands could be defended with the limited US capability. This line included the Japanese islands except Hokkaido, the Ryukyus, and possibly Formosa. While elaborating this strategy, however, the military planners were not very pessimistic. They regarded the control of continental East Asia as a net liability for both the Soviet Union and the United States in the global strategic calculus. 15 It also assessed that in the event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union during the next three years “Soviet strategic objectives in the Far East would be in lower priority than in Europe and the Middle East.”16 It recognized that “the long-range Soviet objective will be to obtain a predominant influence in China, Korea, and Japan.” Yet MOONRISE assessed the Soviet threat not as an imminent one in East Asia. It noted, “it is very unlikely that for the next few years the USS.R. will actively oppose the United States in the Far East to a point where an open conflict is a serious possibility.” In its analysis, the Soviets would “oppose the spread of American influence primarily by indirect and political methods.”17 George Kennan’s Strategic Vision Shortly after the JCS articulated the importance of prioritizing in foreign assistance, George Kennan promoted a very similar method of containment.18 In fact, Kennan made very close contact with military planners during 1946 and 1947. After writing the famous Long Telegram from the Moscow embassy on February 22, 1946, he became an established strategic thinker in Washington. He joined the National War College as deputy for foreign affairs in September 1946, by invitation of James Forrestal, the secretary of the navy and first secretary of defense in the spring of1947. At War College, he worked closely with senior military officers until May 1947, when he returned to the State Department as the Director of Policy Planning Staff (PPS) at Marshall’s request. Kennan recollected that most of his basic views on US foreign policy were formulated during this period at War College.19 He taught mature, thoughtful military officers from lieutenant colonel to brigadier general and he enjoyed being at War College. He recalled that “they were a joy to teach” and “One learned from them as one taught.” Through the frequent discussion and enjoyable association, common Seung-young Kim

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understanding arose between Kennan and the US military planners. In early 1947 they found themselves in agreement with much that he had to say.20 Kennan broke the illusion of US-Soviet collaboration by dispatching the Long Telegram from Moscow in February 1946.21 However, in the method of containment, he did not support a tight military containment all around the Soviet periphery, as implied by the Truman Doctrine. After returning from Moscow, he deplored the rise of the hysterical sort of anticommunism in Washington and emphasized the need for “greater coolness, greater sophistication, greater maturity and self-confidence in our approach to this whole problem of Russia and communism.”22 After becoming the Director of PPS in May 1947, he was quite consistent in opposing the moralistic approach, which he later criticized as a major problem in US foreign policy.23 Much like the JCS memorandum (J.C.S. 1769/1), he stressed the necessity for prioritizing by differentiating areas of vital interest from those of peripheral interest for US security.24 This limit had, in fact, already been imposed by political and budgetary reality in Washington. But, for Kennan, his knowledge and admiration for European diplomatic history provided the point of reference, in conceiving the world situation and suggesting the strategy for the United States.25 Though he was not a naïve moralist, he consistently emphasized sophisticated and flexible diplomacy over hasty resort to military means. He believed that subtle diplomacy, not force, should be the tool of great statecraft.26 Kennan’s strategy for containment was firmly based upon a multipolar worldview. By 1948, he pointed out five power centers in the world: the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, Russia, and Japan.27 These were the countries and areas that had the industrial and military potential to become great powers. He believed that if the power centers around the Soviet Union could achieve economic and psychological recovery with American assistance, then these countries would not become vulnerable to the indigenous communist movements, which were the main source of threat. For this reason, he believed, along with Pentagon officials, that economic aid should have priority over military assistance and played an important role in launching the Marshall Plan. As long as these power centers could remain free from communism and friendly to the United States, he believed, the containment of the Soviet Union could be achieved, even without encircling the whole Soviet periphery with military forces. He basically assessed that the Soviet Union was not ready for another war28 and cautioned against draining US resources with an all-out militarized containment around the Soviet peripheries.29 Such an assessment of low Soviet threat was shared by the War Department in July 1947.30 Kennan’s policy recommendation flowed from his assessment of the world situation and the limits on America’s own resources. He recommended Seung-young Kim


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US assistance to such power centers as Western Europe and Japan. He also recommended providing assistance to some strategic areas adjacent to these centers like Greece and Turkey. In contrast, Kennan recommended the withdrawal of the US commitment to Korea and other peripheries. In such a vision, the United States did not need a vast scale of rearmament. Like many military leaders during 1947, Kennan preferred maintaining “small, compact, alert forces, capable of delivering at short notice effective blows on limited theaters of operation far from our own shores.”31 As long as the United States could rapidly mobilize in a clear threat of major war, it would be sufficient, and the United States would not need a large standing military force. In the atomic age, he believed, the United States had to prepare for a limited war, much like those during the eighteenth century in Europe rather than the total wars of the nineteenth century or the two recent world wars. Total war, in his view, was meaningless in the atomic age, and the United States could not occupy vast Russia, as demonstrated in the German invasion of the country. He also believed that atomic weapons should be considered only for retaliatory purposes and emphasized the importance of moderation in the use of force, cautioning against the American tendency of pursuing a total victory.32 Kennan’s Recommendation toward East Asia For East Asia, Kennan suggested support for Japan and the Philippines but recommended the withdrawal of the US commitment from China and Korea. While advancing this concept of a defense perimeter, he demonstrated quite different views from the internationalist vision expressed by the regional experts in the State Department. His vision did not include any altruistic role of the United States for postcolonial development. In his view, US resources were limited, and most Asian states remained in utter backwardness beyond rescue. Thus the United States had to restrain its altruistic attitude toward Asia, which would only drain its limited resources.33 His policy memorandum, written in February 1948, epitomized such a view: We should dispense with the aspiration to “be liked” or to be regarded as the repository of a high-minded international altruism. We should stop putting ourselves in the position of being our brothers’ keeper and refrain from offering moral and ideological advice. We should cease to talk about vague and—for the Far East—unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of the living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better.34

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Upon this assessment, he recommended focusing only on assisting vital areas for US security interest, which were Japan and the Philippines. Kennan played a crucial role in changing the course of US occupation policy toward Japan during the fall of 1947. Kennan had high regards for Japan’s industrial potential and further believed that Japan’s geopolitical location in East Asia was similar to that of Western Europe in its US strategy toward the Soviet Union. As it was essential for the United States in maintaining the balance of power in East Asia, Japan had to be the main cornerstone of US policy.35 Until the spring of 1947, however, the US occupation policy emphasized punitive measures, aiming at dismantling Japanese industrial and war potential, thus aggravating the Japanese economic situation. On March 19, 1947, General Douglas MacArthur declared that the United States should withdraw its troops from Japan and negotiate a peace treaty with Japan as soon as possible.36 MacArthur was conscious of his candidacy for the presidential election of 1948 and believed that the main task of occupation had been accomplished by demilitarizing Japan and laying the groundwork for its democracy. Amid a flurry of deliberations following MacArthur’s sudden press announcement, the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs prepared a draft peace treaty. This draft recommended continuation of drastic disarmament and democratization, under long-term Allied control and supervision. At this juncture, Kennan and John P. Davies in the PPS intervened. They worried that such a treaty would allow Soviet meddling into the direction of Japanese affairs.37 In their view, the central US objective should be “a stable Japan, integrated into the Pacific economy, friendly to the US and, in case of need, a ready and dependable Ally of the US” Thus, they recommended that peace with Japan be delayed until Japan recovered economic and political stability and that the US occupation policy be redirected toward rehabilitating Japan to become a prosperous and friendly country to the United States. Otherwise, Japan would only be penetrated by communists after US withdrawal. After the eventual conclusion of the peace treaty, Kennan suggested, Japan would not have the means of self-defense. But the United States could provide military protection for an unarmed Japan by keeping its forces in its proximity or in Okinawa.38 Kennan’s recommendations gained broad support in Washington. Thus, from late August 1947, Kennan and his staffs in the PPS took over the initiative in shaping the occupation policy of Japan from the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs and SCAP.39 Later, while advancing a broad strategy for the Far East in February 1948, Kennan reiterated that US policy toward Japan should “permit the economic potential of that country [Japan] to become again an important force in the Far East, responsive to the interests of peace and stability in the Pacific area.”40 These recommendations to Seung-young Kim


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reinstate Japan as a stable and friendly power became the basis of a new course in US occupation policy during 1948 and 1949, which allowed the political resurrection of the prewar business leaders while suppressing the leftist activists who had thrived during the earlier period of the occupation.41 In contrast, Kennan and his staffs in the PPS recommended withdrawal of the US commitment from China and Korea. He regarded the eastern part of the Eurasian continent from Afghanistan to Korea as a nonvital area for the United States. This area did not have industrial potential and would not allow Soviet control because of nationalism, even if it did fall into the hands of communists.42 Under the influence of John P. Davies, a China expert who had worked with Kennan in Moscow, Kennan had reported from Moscow on January 10, 1946, that Yenan could have been enjoying “a surprising degree of independence of Moscow.” The Soviets supported Chungking during the Sino-Japanese conflict, and the Chinese communists had developed their own brand of Marxism and indigenous nationalistic tradition.43 With regard to the Chiang regime, Kennan suggested, “to liquidate as rapidly as possible our unsound commitments in China and to recover, vis-à-vis that country, a position of detachment and freedom of action.”44 Based upon such views, he suggested policies to induce a Titoization of the Chinese Communists. During late 1947 and early 1948, he played a distinctive role in dissuading Washington from providing assistance to Chiang Kai-shek.45 Later when Mao established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949, he recommended immediate diplomatic recognition of the PRC, cautioning that the nonrecognition policy of Acheson would only lead to the strengthening of Beijing-Moscow solidarity.46 His recommendation on Korea was also firmly couched upon this broader strategic vision toward Asia. While underscoring the importance of US assistance to Japan, the PPS meeting led by Kennan on September 22 assessed, “As matters are now developing, there is a real likelihood that Korea will eventually become a Soviet satellite, unless the US takes military, political and economic measures far beyond the limits of practicability.” Based upon this, the PPS recommended, “Korea may therefore be eliminated or at best put at the bottom of the list [of assistance for Far-Eastern countries], excepting for interim assistance in the immediate future.”47 And as the director of the PPS, Kennan was to play an important role in the fall of 1947 in persuading the Truman administration to withdraw the US forces from Korea. During late 1947 and early 1948, the views presented by Kennan and the PPS gained greater influence in US policy toward East Asia. This was possible because Kennan had broader influence in Washington through Seung-young Kim

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his close relations with Secretary of State Marshall, the new Secretary of Defense, Forrestal, and the military planners in the JCS. Marshall had made Kennan the first director of the PPS and Forrestal had appointed him as the deputy in the National War College in 1946 and remained the promoter of Kennan’s idea. Most importantly, Kennan’s approach, emphasizing the prioritizing and focusing on areas of vital interest to US security, provided a solution for the perceived problem of US policy: an overextension of commitment in an era of limited military and economic resources. The US policy toward Korea also changed within this broad context, and Kennan was to play an important role in bringing about such a change. Deadlock in US Policy and Support for a South Korean State While the broad framework of containment strategy was emerging, by the summer of 1947, the US trusteeship plan for Korea reached a complete deadlock. The US government was faced with insurmountable obstacles over the issue. First, the antitrusteeship movement led by the right-wing nationalists drew wide popularity among Korean people. No matter how benevolent the objective, the trusteeship scheme was difficult to sell to the Korean people, who had endured thirty-six years of colonial rule and developed excited expectations for an immediate independence. Second, the supporters of the trusteeship were mostly leftists, who expected that the scheme would eventually allow the unification of Korea under leftist terms. By the summer of 1947, through numerous negotiations with the Soviet Union in the resumed Joint Commission, the United States found that the Russian intent was to communize all Korea under trusteeship. Much like its method of inaugurating a satellite regime in Europe, the Soviets maintained that the provisional Korean Peoples’ Assembly should invite only leftist organizations that supported the trusteeship plan. They insisted on excluding all the rightist and moderate organizations from the assembly, which would function as a consultation body and inaugurate the government.48 Third, the US effort to nurture the middle-of-the-road coalition also remained stalemated. The cause of this stalemate reveals the essential aspect of politics in South Korea in 1947. Until mid-1947, the rivalry continued among political groups of different backgrounds and ideological orientation in South Korea.49 Amid such rivalry, the United States did not support the extreme right, while maintaining its wish to build a moderate coalition to be ready for the resumption of the Joint Commission that had been adjourned since May 1946. Meanwhile, Rhee continued his efforts to discredit General Hodge and the occupation authority, claiming that Hodge Seung-young Kim


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was not really representing the views of Washington. He also tried to persuade Washington that the US military occupation in Korea was a complete failure and maintained that allowing immediate independence for southern Korea was the best policy for Koreans and the United States.50 In the face of Rhee’s campaign against trusteeship, the AMG tried to block his initiatives. In his statement released on January 4, 1947, General Hodge noted that Syngman Rhee, out of personal ambition, caused confusion in the minds of some Koreans by carrying out a campaign for “immediate independence under an un-defined South Korean aegis.”51 His political advisor, Jacobs, also reported him to be “a vain man, [who] loves flattery, and would sell his soul to be the Chief of State of a United Korea or even over South Korea.”52 Such a negative assessment of Rhee was shared by the British Consul General in Seoul, Kermode, who characterized Rhee as a “megalomaniac” yearning to become the first president of South Korea and to “retain dictatorial leadership.”53 While distancing itself from Rhee, the AMG remained more sympathetic to moderate Kim Kyu-sik and Lyuh Woon-hyong, with whom it had tried to build a coalition among the moderates supporting the US plan for trusteeship.54 The political situation in South Korea, however, was dominated by antitrusteeship demonstrations led by right-wing nationalists. Meanwhile the confrontation between the right and left also became fiercer, generating worries about more terror attacks and assassinations.55 Amid such development, the moderates did not demonstrate as many Machiavellian tactics as Rhee. To make matters worse, the moderate leftist leader, Lyuh was assassinated on July 19, 1947. Both extreme right and left were suspected as the assassins of Lyuh, but his death irrevocably damaged the efforts for coalition building by the AMG.56 In fact, while the prospect of the trusteeship plan was becoming darker from spring 1947, a new view in dealing with the Korean question gained ground in Washington. This view was linked to the inauguration of a separate pro-American government in South Korea rather than uniting the two zones following the decisions of the US-Soviet joint commission. During the earlier period of occupation, this idea was suggested sporadically by various officials including Langdon and McCloy in late 1945. In early November 1946, the assistant secretary of state for Occupied Areas, John R. Hilldring, also suggested that he would not stick to the inauguration of a central administrative authority as a precondition to US troop withdrawal when responding to John Carter Vincent, who had been supporting a unified administrative authority for the whole of Korea.57 But until the spring of 1947, these recommendations were not adopted as the official policy. With the dark prospect of US-Soviet negotiation and persistence of the antitrusteeship campaign, however, the support for inauguration of a Seung-young Kim

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separate regime increasingly gained ground in Washington, D.C. In his speech at the Economic Club of Detroit on March 10, 1947, Hilldring signaled Washington’s intention to fortify the US position by taking “independent action” in southern Korea.58 Later in the month, while discussing such an approach with Rhee, who was visiting Washington, D.C. to counter the trusteeship program, Hilldring did not object to Rhee’s suggestion for inaugurating a separate South Korean regime. Rhee had been visiting the United States since December 1946 to wage his personal campaign to promote support for the inauguration of a separate regime in South Korea with UN support. After his meeting with Hilldring on March 22, Rhee unilaterally announced his discussion as an agreement, but the State Department just ignored his statement rather than actively denying it.59 Later Rhee’s close aid in Washington, D.C., Ben Lim, recollected that Hilldring had made a great contribution for the inauguration of the South Korean state in 1948, suggesting an existence of common understanding between Rhee and Hilldering.60 The concrete internal preparations to inaugurate a separate regime in South Korea started from April 1947, based on the expectation that the Russians would not resume the second US-Russian joint commission.61 Then, after experiencing the impasse in the joint commission after its resumption by the summer of 1947, the inauguration of a separate regime in South Korea emerged as the only viable option for the United States. Under this prospect, Hilldring specifically recommended on August 6 that the United States had to inform a plan tantamount to the inauguration of a separate government in South Korea to the four wartime Allies, and the United Nations. His memorandum did not specifically mention the inauguration of a separate government in South Korea. But by noting the need for an observance of “recognized democratic procedures” and “UN observation of elections,” his memorandum excluded the northern part of Korea, where such democratic procedures and UN monitoring could not be carried out. He also clearly noted that the question should not be treated as a trusteeship question any longer and recorded on the margin that the secretary of state “approved this in my presence.” This plan was also concurred by various offices in the State Department and War and Navy Departments.62 Though a plan to inaugurate a separate regime was consolidated, Washington was not sure about the viability of the separate regime in South Korea in the summer of 1947. The US occupation authority assessed that the left would gain the upper hand in South Korea if the United States withdrew its forces from Korea.63 Moreover, in the case of Joseph Jacobs, he worried that even a unified coalition government for the whole of Korea could be eventually turned into a communist-led government as in Eastern Seung-young Kim


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Europe. While making this assessment in the summer of 1947, the political advisor to the AMG particularly drew attention to an earlier G 2 intelligence summary of May 1946, which noted ample evidence about large scale military training in North Korea and the evidence of infiltration by these trainees into “the police force and constabulary of South Korea.”64 In fact, the US army intelligence reached a worrisome conclusion that North Korea would easily expand communist control into southern Korea by utilizing its superior military and police organization. It predicted such a development regardless of success or failure of the US-Soviet Joint Commission and trusteeship.65 By 1947, the Russians had blocked traffic and communication with southern Korea and were taking steps to establish a Soviet system in the north by supporting its communist leader Kim Il-sung. Under Soviet support, Kim Il-sung began consolidating his leadership in North Korea, along with the development of a personality cult.66 While US policy went through adjustments amid chaotic development in the south, the pro-Soviet regime was consolidating in the north. Amid such a development, in the summer of 1947 even the US occupation authority in Seoul grudgingly acknowledged the need to support the right-wing leaders. In late July, following the assassination of Lyuh, the AMG’s political advisor Jacobs reported to Byrnes that “it is unfortunate that events are forcing us into a position where we may be compelled for reasons of expediency (opposite to Soviets) to support extreme rightist leaders such as Rhee and Kim Ku.” In his view, Rhee and Kim continued “to hold to concepts and practices, which, while suited to their positions as messiahs when the Japanese occupied their homeland, are not suited to the situation today.” Thus, he wrote, “I have a feeling that in dealing with the rightist group we shall eventually be compelled to arrange somehow that they select other leaders.” This hope of the AMG to select other leaders than Rhee could not be realized in the election of May 1948, but this report aptly summarized the AMG’s views and the situation it was faced with during the summer of 1947.67 Korea Policy in Transition amid Worries The decision to withdraw the US troops from Korea was reached in early October 1947. But until this time, the debates continued over the wisdom of such a withdrawal. Until this decision of October, worries about the negative repercussions of US withdrawal from Korea were raised continuously. The different views expressed by the War Department and State Department ran in parallel, and thus, often, the memorandum of interdepartmental Seung-young Kim

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discussions included both perspectives. Overall, the debate in Washington was evolving toward the withdrawal of US troops, while taking some supplementary measures to buttress the new regime to be launched in South Korea. Meanwhile, the State Department’s plan to inaugurate a separate regime in South Korea came to be regarded as a scheme to allow a graceful exit from Korea, though initially, it was not considered as a substitute to US troop withdrawal. After all, the State Department stance was not totally against any withdrawal plan.68 Its position was rather against an immediate withdrawal, which would certainly lead to a communist domination of the whole of Korea. Such resistance of the State Department was demonstrated when Secretary of War Patterson insisted on withdrawal during the SWNCC meeting of May 7, 1947. Patterson stressed the expense to the United States and the insignificance of the strategic and economic value of Korea. He reiterated that the United States “should get out of Korea at the earliest possible time.” But Secretary of State Marshall did not agree with these views, which were put forth by Patterson.69 Aside from Kennan, the secretary of state and other officials in the State Department did not agree with the withdrawal plan of the Army and the War Department. In light of the extensive Soviet support for North Korea, they believed, US withdrawal would certainly lead to the communist dominance of the whole of Korea.70 In early August, however, the interdepartmental committee on Korea agreed on the principle of the withdrawal of US troops while inaugurating a separate regime in South Korea through the debate in the United Nations. In its report on August 4 to the SWNCC, the committee reported: “The US cannot at this time withdraw from Korea under circumstances which would inevitably lead to Communist domination of the entire country.” Such a development would seriously damage US prestige throughout the world and would discourage the small nations relying upon the United States in their efforts to resist communist threat. However, the report simultaneously suggested “to liquidate or reduce the US commitment of men and money in Korea as soon as possible without abandoning Korea to Soviet domination.” To achieve both goals, the report recommended a thorough preparation to bring the Korean question to the United Nations General Assembly in the fall and suggested making South Korea an independent country. While recommending this course of action, the committee recommended continuing to pursue the grant-aid program for Korea in the next session of Congress.71 By the beginning of September the debate in Washington was clearly suggesting withdrawal from Korea by referring the Korean question to the United Nations. While watching such a development, the bureau dealing Seung-young Kim


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with Eastern European affairs raised strong reservations about this trend. On September 9, 1947, Francis B. Stevens, Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs, expressed deep worries about the existence of a “fairly unanimous agreement to abandon the Koreans to their fate.” In his memorandum to Kennan and John M. Allison (assistant chief in the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs), Stevens noted that such a course of action might “be a rather short-sighted policy from the standpoint of our longrange interests.” The Soviets would expect to control Korea after military withdrawal “through the various infiltration devices which they have used with such success in the Balkans.” If the United States allowed Korea to fall within the Soviet orbit, he worried, the world would feel that the United States had “lost another round in our match with the Soviet Union.” Recalling the earlier US pledge to establish Korea as an independent nation, he wrote, “Korea consequently is a symbol to the watching world both of the East-West struggle” and “of American sincerity in sponsoring the nationalistic aims of Asiatic peoples.” He concluded by cautioning that the United States had to pay serious consideration to these factors before making “a hasty decision” to withdraw entirely from Korea.72 To assess the complex developments in both China and Korea, the Truman administration sent the Wedmeyer mission to both countries from July 16 to September 18. After these visits, the Wedmeyer mission recommended troop withdrawal from Korea, while taking some measures to prevent the Soviet domination of all Korea. Its recommendations included an inauguration of the US-officered Korean scout forces and continuing US military aid for South Korea.73 The Wedmeyer report was, indeed, a typical example of committee reports, which combined different views with contradictory recommendations of both the War Department and the State Department. In strategic terms, the report noted that “the United States has little military interest in maintaining troops or bases in Korea,” except for denying the Soviets the use of warm-water ports.74 Thus, it recommended the withdrawal of US forces from Korea based upon agreements with the Soviet Union. Its analysis part, however, included ample concerns about the negative repercussions of US withdrawal as well. It noted that North Korean forces, trained under Soviet auspices, could achieve the Soviet goal of dominating the whole peninsula under communism without the actual presence of Soviet forces.75 Such a development, it worried, “would result in a serious political and psychological threat to China, including Manchuria, and Japan.” 76 The fall of Korea would also allow the Soviet Union to gain prestige in Asia and would create opportunities for further Soviet expansion into the nations in close proximity to the Soviet Union.77 Although the final recommendation of the report did not follow these concerns, these discussions show Seung-young Kim

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the existence of worries about the domino effect following US withdrawal from Korea. The Decision for Withdrawal from Korea Despite such concerns, in late September, there arose a crucial momentum that pushed the US leaders to decide on troop withdrawal from Korea. By this time, several courses of development had built pressures that urged an expedient decision. The US-Soviet negotiations had been facing a deadlock since July. To settle the existing stalemate in the US-Soviet joint commission, the United States suggested a four-power conference to settle the Korean situation on August 26.78 But the Soviets refused the suggestion79 and instead proposed a joint withdrawal of US and Soviet forces from Korea during early 1948.80 This proposal provided the opportunity and excuse for Washington to withdraw US troops, if it chose to.81 Under such conditions, the US effort to build the middle-of-the-road moderates as the central force in support of the US plan proved to be a failure. The domestic political situation in South Korea was also perceived in Washington to have reached an explosive stage, with the spread of antitrusteeship demonstrations and terror tactics by both rightist and leftist groups.82 The prospect of a bold economic assistance program for Korea, suggested by the State Department, was not realized either. And, there arose worries that even with ample US assistance, the Korean economy could not become self-sufficient.83 On September 19, a memorandum from Jacobs, the political advisor to the US commander in Seoul, added to the sense of urgency in the deliberations in Washington. 84 He made a decisively pessimistic assessment about the Korean situation, and urged Washington to make an immediate decision about the US military presence in Korea. Pointing out the resentment of Korean people toward the US occupation, he wrote: At least 30 per cent of the people of South Korea are leftists, following Comintern Communist leaders who would support the Soviets behind United States lines. In addition the rightists and middle-of-the-roaders are divided into at least 4 groups with numerous minor factions, fighting and quarrelling among themselves with all (except few intelligent leaders who have spent most of their lives abroad) desiring that we turn the country over to them, simple-mindedly believing or hoping that the United States will continue to pour in aid and assistance without control and somehow magically protect them from the Russians with few American troops. A better milieu for communist propaganda could not be devised.85

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He expected further that the withdrawal of US forces would certainly be followed by “a state of anarchy and blood letting.” Yet, he noted, “in any event we cannot give democracy, as we know it, to any people or cram it down their throats.”86 The economic assistance for Korea, in his estimate, would also reach at least half a billion dollars over a five-year period, excluding the cost of troop maintenance. Jacobs was also a senior official in the State Department, but he expressed concerns much in line with those of Kennan and the JCS. He noted that the program suggested by the State Department was fraught with dangerous and costly possibilities, which could drain the US budget. To control the situation, “the United States would probably be compelled to increase its armed forces in Korea and to station along the 38th parallel more or less permanently at least 1 division of well-trained American troops, not recruits.”87 Based upon these assessments, Jacobs recommended that Washington decide whether South Korea was a vital interest or not. If Korea was not judged as a vital interest area, in his view, the United States had to “get out of Korea as quickly and as gracefully as possible,” while taking other “safeguarding measures which could be undertaken in Japan or elsewhere nearby.” Arguing that “two years have been lost,” Jacobs concluded that Washington had to reach decisions immediately and to “move swiftly to implement them.”88 Jacobs’ pessimistic report provided the opportunity for Kennan to express the PPS’s support for the US withdrawal from Korea. On September 24, 1947, in his memorandum to the Office of Far-Eastern Affairs, Kennan noted that the SWNCC had not fully taken into account the military aspect of the Korean question. The PPS was not sure whether the SWNCC program of aid represented “a logical elaboration” of the concerns raised by Jacobs about Korea’s value to US security. Kennan underscored that the PPS did not get “the impression that Korea is regarded as militarily essential to us” from the discussion with the members of the armed services. If this was correct, Kennan recommended, “our policy should be to cut our losses and get out of there as gracefully but promptly as possible.”89 Based upon such an analysis, Kennan continuously recommended during the fall of 1947 that the United States had to withdraw its forces from Korea as promptly as possible.90 On September 29, the JCS also provided specific grounds for US withdrawal from Korea. These reasons were articulated in response to an urgent inquiry of the SWNCC, 91 which intended to ascertain the assessment of JCS before taking a new step in Korea. In the event of war, the JCS wrote, the US forces in Korea would be a military liability, and could not be maintained there without substantial reinforcement prior to the initiation of hostilities. In any offensive operation, the United States most probably Seung-young Kim

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would by-pass the Korean peninsula. The JCS acknowledged that if Korea should fall into the hands of an enemy, the enemy could interfere with US communications and operations in Eastern China, Manchuria, the Yellow Sea, and the Sea of Japan. But such interference could be neutralized by US air power, which would be more feasible and less costly than large-scale ground operations. They also noted that the occupation of Korea cost very large expenditures for preventing disease and disorder, with little contribution to the security of the United States. The conclusion of the JCS was that the United States could use its forty-five thousand troops for other more important purposes elsewhere, given the severe shortage of military manpower.92 On the same day, the copies of this JCS memorandum were circulated to senior officials in the State Department, and Secretary of State Marshall discussed the matter with Kennan and Undersecretary Lovett. Following this discussion, on October 1, Kennan wrote his understanding of the conclusions of the discussion: “That we will not turn down the Soviet proposal for evacuation of armed forces but will pass it on to the UN together with our recommendations as to what should be done to prepare the Koreans for national independence before troops are withdrawn.”93 The idea was to utilize the Soviet offer as a face-saving measure to implement US withdrawal from Korea. By bringing the Korean question to the United Nations, Washington could secure a graceful exit from Korea. This reflected the incremental changes that had been made but marked a clear turning point in the Truman administration’s policy toward Korea. During the earlier discussions about bringing the Korean question to the United Nations, the negative repercussions of US withdrawal from Korea had been noted simultaneously.94 But by this time, carrying out a prompt and graceful withdrawal had gained a greater emphasis in the policy deliberation. The deliberation within the State Department on October 1 evidenced such a change. The discussion was held in Marshall’s office. The secretary of state and all high officials involved with the Korean question joined the discussion. Lovett, Kennan, Walton Butterworth (director of Far-Eastern Affairs), Dean Rusk, and John Allison (chief in the Office of Northeast Asia) participated in the meeting. They assessed “ultimately the US position in Korea was untenable even with expenditure of considerable US money and effort.” Accordingly they decided that the US government should employ all proper means to settle the Korean problem in a manner that “would enable the US to withdraw from Korea as soon as possible with the minimum of bad effect.” The participants also agreed that the latest Soviet proposal offered an opportunity for the United States to withdraw gracefully from Korea. Upon this basis, the meeting recommended referring

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the Korean question to the General Assembly of the United Nations in such a manner that the Soviets could also agree with the United States on the Korean problem.95 In this way, the State Department came to agree on the US military establishment’s demand to withdraw from Korea, and joined the preparations to carry out the withdrawal.96 Truman was well aware of these discussions in the State Department and the JCS and supported the decision for troop withdrawal from Korea. The president had followed the main developments in Korea and the issues at stake.97 In 1946, he had paid keen attention to the report of Edwin W. Pauley, who was his personal representative in reparation matters and had visited North Korea from May 29 to June 3. Pauley reported in graphic detail about the systematic communization of North Korea and characterized Korea as “an ideological battleground upon which our entire success in Asia may depend.”98 In his reply, Truman expressed complete agreement with Pauley’s characterization of the situation in Korea and wrote, “our commitment for the establishment of an independent Korea requires that we stay in Korea long enough to see the job through and that we have adequate personnel and sufficient funds to do a good job.”99 He further wrote to the secretaries of war and the Navy, “I am convinced that we may be required to stay in Korea a considerable length of time” and assured his support to the War Department in securing additional funds for the aid program in Korea.100 On the other hand, Truman also received the negative report about Korea from Lieutenant General John Hodge. In late 1945, the US commander in Korea recommended that “both the US and Russians withdraw forces from Korea simultaneously and leave Korea to its own devices and an inevitable internal upheaval for its self-purification.” Hodge also reported in person to Truman at the White House on February 24, 1947, and recommended that Russia and the United States find a joint solution to the Korean problem.101 Receiving all these reports, Truman was well aware of both arguments about the Korean question. By September 1947, however, the president clearly supported the withdrawal policy from Korea. During the spring of 1947, while focusing on economic assistance to Europe, large-scale aid to Korea had become second-order business in Washington.102 By spring, Truman became keenly conscious about the need to limit spreading commitments of the United States. He recalled, “our armed forces had been drastically reduced from their wartime peaks, and there was strong congressional pressure to reduce military spending even further.” Thus, he had instructed the JCS and State Department to weigh up the US commitments and “consider where we might safely withdraw.”103 Then, on September 25, he received the JCS recommendation for troop withdrawal from Korea, which incorporated the

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views of General Eisenhower and Admirals Leahy and Nimitz, who were members of the JCS at that time. Reading this recommendation from the JCS, Truman chose to follow the recommendation of the Wedemeyer mission. Withdrawing US forces while bolstering the South Korean defense force was deemed the best available policy compromise within the limits of US forces.104

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The Erosion of Multipolar Perception and the Road to Intervention

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he decision reached during the autumn of 1947 remained the foundation of US military policy toward Korea until the Korean War. Following the decision, the United States withdrew all its troops from Korea except five hundred military advisors by June 1949 and did not provide substantial military aid until the Korean War. From the final stage of the US troop withdrawal, however, major changes arose in the strategic environment. In China, the Communists launched an offensive, crossing the Yangtze River on April 20, 1949, and won the civil war in the late summer of 1949. In late August, the Soviet Union also succeeded in its atomic weapons test, and in October Mao Tse-tung announced the PRC’s decision to lean to the Soviet side, darkening the prospect of a Sino-Soviet split. The US-Soviet confrontation over Europe showed signs of stabilization after the end of the first Berlin crisis in May 1949, but the series of crises in Europe since 1947 spread a perception in Washington that diplomacy alone had a limit in dealing with the Soviet Union.1 These changes in the strategic environment, culminating in the fall of 1949, resulted in the strengthening of the bipolar perception in Washington. The globalists, who opposed US troop withdrawal from Korea, found grounds to strengthen their argument in the escalating bipolar confrontation. Though their recommendations were not adopted until the outbreak of the Korean War due to domestic and budgetary considerations, they paved the way for US intervention at the outbreak of the Korean War.

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Withdrawal of US Forces Despite the State Department’s Resistance (NSC 8, NSC8/2) The South Korean government was inaugurated through a UN monitored election in 1948. Following the UN resolution, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) began its activities to prepare a nationwide election in the whole of Korea, but North Korea did not allow the UN monitoring team to enter its zone. There arose also vehement resistance by the extreme left in South Korea, which waged strikes and a major revolt in Cheju Island in the spring of 1948.2 But the general election was conducted in South Korea under the strong AMG’s vigilance and support for the right-wing candidates. Based on this election in southern Korea alone, the South Korean National Assembly was elected in May 1948, and Rhee became president with an easy majority through indirect election by this assembly.3 Other prominent nationalist leaders, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, who disagreed with the inauguration of the separate regime, promoted negotiations with the North Korean authority and boycotted the election.4 Despite their visit to Pyongyang, however, their efforts to realize national unification turned out to be futile because Kim Il-sung advanced a scheme that would allow unification only under North Korean terms. After its inauguration, the South Korean state under Rhee showed signs of stabilization, but this new regime was faced with chronic economic instability and large scale guerrilla insurrections. The State Department tried to buttress South Korea by providing economic and military assistances, though it could not reverse the decision for troop withdrawal. Meanwhile, the Pentagon kept insisting on the swift withdrawal of the US military commitment from Korea. Indeed, in Washington, the period from 1948 and 1949 witnessed a tug of war between the State Department and the Pentagon over the issue of US commitment toward Korea.5 The discussion in the National Security Council (NSC) crystallized how this bureaucratic confrontation between the State and Defense Department evolved in Washington. The NSC was inaugurated in September 1947, following the adoption of the National Security Act. It was a cabinetlevel committee to advise the president on foreign and defense policies, but it had a very small staff and there was no national security advisor comparable to Henry Kissinger or Brezinski during the Truman era.6 The goal of this new organization was to coordinate better foreign and military policies, but the process still remained disjointed during the Truman administration.7 The president also wished to confine the role of the NSC as an advisory one and sat in on only limited number of the meetings. Still, the NSC remained extremely active “both as discussion forum and as Seung-young Kim

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a medium of drawing up formal statements of national policy on a wide range of subjects.”8 In this context, the NSC documents included divergent views and recommendations promoted by different departments.9 On April 2, 1948, the NSC reaffirmed in its policy document (NSC 8) that the troop withdrawal from Korea should be completed by the end of 1948. NSC 8, however, included the concerns about the domino effect in case Korea fell under communist influence. It wrote that “the extension of Soviet control over all of Korea would enhance the political and strategic position of the Soviet Union with respect to both China and Japan, and adversely affect the position of the US in those areas and throughout the Far East.” It further cautioned about “a fundamental re-alignment of forces in favor of the Soviet Union throughout the Far East” unless the United States strengthened South Korea to defend itself “against any but an overt act of aggression.”10 Yet, even this phrase supporting military aid excluded the kind of assistance that would allow South Korea to defend itself against “an overt action of aggression.” The conclusion of NSC 8 remained the same as the decision made by Washington in October 1947. It noted the importance of expeditious strengthening of the South Korean constabulary forces and of obtaining congressional approval to strengthen the South Korean economy. But it recommended that the United States make a best effort to withdraw all US forces from Korea by December 31, 1948, with minimum adverse effects.11 Specifically, its conclusion recommended, “The US should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation that any action taken by any faction in Korea or by any other power in Korea could be considered a casus belli for the US”12 In short, NSC 8 reaffirmed the policy of pursuing a graceful exit from Korea by the end of 1948. US aid to Korea was also confined to serve this limited goal in line with positions taken by the US military establishment and Kennan. The document was approved by Truman on April 8 and sent to Lieutenant General Hodge as an instruction for the US occupation authority in Korea.13 The US troop reduction started from September 15, 1948, but completion was delayed in November because the UN special representative in Korea recommended postponement of the final withdrawal “for several months.” The UN special representative wanted to enhance the stability of the Rhee government by delaying the departure of the US troops. Following the South Korean government’s inauguration on August 15, its armed forces were also launched, based on the existing constabulary forces in existence since January 1946. But the stability of the government was challenged by the guerrilla activities in the mountains on the eastern coast, which were actively supported by North Korea.14 This appeal was accepted by Washington, thus, approximately 7,500 US troops remained Seung-young Kim

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until March 1949 in Korea, pending a definitive decision with respect to final troop withdrawal.15 By the end of 1948, the Chinese Nationalists’ position in the civil war had sharply deteriorated. It was believed in Washington that the nationalists would not be able to retrieve their declining fate. Against such development, on December 17, the regional bureau in the State Department requested reconsideration of the US withdrawal policy from Korea. The division chief of Northeast Asian Affairs, Bishop, wrote, “with the abandonment or the loss of all of Korea to the communist power system the United States would have lost its last friends on the continent in northeast Asia.”16 He noted that if South Korea fell into the hands of Communists, “the islands of Japan would be surrounded on three sides by an unbroken arc of communist territories.” While drawing attention to the broader repercussion of the withdrawal on the Asia-Pacific,17 he recommended paying serious attention to “whether communist expansion in northeast Asia has already reached the point at which the security interests of the United States require positive efforts to prevent further expansion.” Upon this basis he recommended reconsideration of the US withdrawal policy from Korea, stipulated in NSC 8.18 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union completed its withdrawal from Korea on December 25, except for one thousand military advisors. But following Bishop’s memorandum, the director of the Office of Far-Eastern Affairs, Butterworth, raised a need for “an early and thoroughgoing re-appraisal” of US policy in Korea by the NSC. For this purpose, the State Department and the Army jointly requested MacArthur’s view about the possible repercussion on Japan of the US withdrawal from Korea.19 But MacArthur replied that the fall of Korea would not adversely affect the US position in Japan.20 MacArthur further noted that “the United States did not have the capability to train and equip Korean troops to the point where the Koreans would be able to cope with a full-scale invasion accompanied by internal disturbances fomented by the Communists.” He recommended, “If a serious threat developed, the United States would have to give up active military support of the ROK [Republic of Korea] forces.”21 And the General recommended completing the withdrawal of US forces from Korea by May 10, 1949, one year after the inauguration of the South Korean national assembly. He noted that a further delay in withdrawal would increase the risk of being pressured to withdraw rather than doing it as a voluntary act. The Department of the Army underscored this worry of MacArthur when forwarding his recommendation to the Department of State in late January.22 The NSC resumed its review on Korea policy in this context in March 1949. But already, Bishop’s initiative had been countered by MacArthur Seung-young Kim


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and the Army. Thus, the NSC reaffirmed that US troop withdrawal should be completed by June 30, 1949. Its recommendation to the president (NSC8/2) included concerns about the negative repercussions of the fall of South Korea upon broader northeast Asia, but the conclusion was not different from that of NSC 8. The only concession that the State Department secured was in delaying the withdrawal by fifty days later than MacArthur’s suggestion. The NSC8/2 included more specific economic and military assistance for South Korea, but the goal of this assistance was to be confined to strengthening South Korea to resist internal disorder, not an invasion by an external enemy.23 The document recognized that North Korea could overthrow South Korea through military aggression or insurrection despite this compensatory assistance to South Korea. As the view of the US military establishment, it noted that “the mere further temporary postponement of withdrawal would not serve to diminish this risk” and worried that “US occupation forces remaining in Korea might be either destroyed or obliged to abandon Korea in the event of a major hostile attack, with serious damage to US prestige in either case.”24 These analyses and recommendations were largely reaffirmed by the Department of the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staffs on the eve of complete withdrawal from Korea in late June. 25 This Army memorandum of late June 1949, however, included a somewhat positive assessment about the local military balance between South and North Korea. It also left a door open for potential US intervention under UN police action in case of North Korean attack. It assessed that South Korean security forces were “sufficiently organized, trained, and equipped” to defend against North Korean forces unless they were supported by the Soviet Union or China.26 Moreover, it observed that in case the UN Security Council did not block a resolution to organize UN forces, for instance, if Soviets exercised abstention instead of veto, then the United States could consider such an intervention. It also discussed that such a response “might provide a recognized lever, the employment of which could have a salutary effect on future violations of law and order or disregard for U.N. resolutions,” though it added a caution that such a course of action would be “unsound militarily.”27 The JCS also expressed a very cautious endorsement of such a course of response by noting that “it would be practicable only if and when it has become possible to organize United Nations armed forces for the Security Council under the terms of Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.”28

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State Department’s Effort to Link US Commitment with the Credibility of the UN Indeed, one noteworthy trend from the spring of 1948 was the State Department’s effort to place South Korean security in the context of maintaining collective security within the UN system. Washington brought the Korean question to the United Nations with a view to securing a graceful withdrawal of US forces. But while conducting UN diplomacy on the Korean question, the State Department developed a rationale to support the US commitment to South Korea in the context of US commitment to the United Nations. The very fact that South Korea was the first government inaugurated under the auspices of the United Nations further buttressed this argument. Niles W. Bond, assistant chief of the Northeast Asian Division, later recalled that when the South Korean government was established, it was perceived in the State Department “in a sense our creation.” “Once that was set up,” Bond recalled, “we began . . . to feel that we had a commitment to them, and it became more a matter of political interest.” He also noted that “Koreans, of course, were very good at playing on this feeling, on this moral responsibility of ours.”29 In April 1948, this position of the State Department was reflected in NSC 8, though the conclusion of the document recommended troop withdrawal from Korea. NSC 8 noted that “the overthrow by Soviet-dominated forces of a regime established in south Korea under the aegis of the UN would . . . constitute a severe blow to the prestige and influence of the UN.” It then argued, “in this respect the interests of the US are parallel to, if not identical with, those of the UN” and recommended a continuation of US assistance to Korea.30 NSC 8/2, adopted in March 1949, included greater articulation of this point. It drew attention to the General Assembly resolution of the United Nations, adopted on December 12, 1948, which recognized the establishment of a lawful government in southern Korea under UN auspices. This resolution, in fact, had been co-sponsored by the United States, Australia, and China and was adopted over the opposition of the Soviet bloc. On the basis of this resolution, the United States extended full recognition to the Government of the Republic of Korea.31 Taking note of this background, NSC 8/2 recommended that, when announcing the withdrawal of US forces from Korea, the United States should make it unmistakably clear that the US troop withdrawal in no way constituted “a lessening of US support of the Government of the Republic of Korea.” It recommended that the Truman administration announce that the US withdrawal “constitutes rather another step toward the regularization by the US of its relations with that Government and a fulfillment on the part of the US of the relevant provision of the GA Resolution of December Seung-young Kim


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12, 1948.”32 In fact, later in mid-December 1949, Secretary of State Acheson showed a keen attention to examining the possibility of intervention under UN resolution in case of major attack by North Korea.33 This trend developed while the Department of Defense was implementing the steps to ensure a graceful exit from Korea. Despite the appeals from Acheson and the South Korean special envoy, 34 the US troop withdrawal was completed by the end of June 1949. But concerns about the credibility of the United Nations were to play an instrumental role in the US decision toward intervention following the North Korean attack in June 1950. The Erosion of Multi-polar Perception: NSC-48 Series and Kennan’s Resignation The US troop withdrawal was completed by the end of June 1949, except for five hundred US military advisors in Korea. From early fall 1949, however, the strategic situation in East Asia deteriorated dramatically. Nationalist China was expelled to Formosa, and the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in late August, several years earlier than US intelligence had estimated.35 Moreover, Mao declared that the PRC would lean toward the Soviet Union on October 1 and on February 14, 1950, signed an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union. These changes heightened the US decision makers’ concerns about the future of South Korea, though they could not reintroduce US troops, which had already been withdrawn. In fact, compared with the pessimistic assessment of fall 1947, the US diplomats in Seoul made more positive assessment about the stability of the Rhee regime in South Korea. During the early half of 1949, the South Korean Army had successfully suppressed major guerrilla uprisings on Cheju Island and in the Chiri mountain area, which had been supported by North Korean communists in the analysis of the US embassy in Seoul.36 In late July 1949, the CIA still reported a predominant trend toward complete communization of the whole of Korea. It pointed out the problems of inefficiency and shortsighted authoritarianism of the Rhee regime, which would induce “a public reaction favoring Communism.”37 But during December the US Ambassador in Seoul, John Joseph Muccio, reported on “the gradual improvement” in government administrations and the economic situation, especially in agricultural and industrial production with the implementation of US assistance programs.38 Truman administration’s worries about the broad deterioration of the US position in East Asia were reflected in the debates in Washington while drafting the NSC 48 series, which were adopted in late December 1949. The comprehensive review to prepare NSC 48 began in June 1949, when Seung-young Kim

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the fortunes of Nationalist China had completely declined on the Chinese mainland. It was started at the request of Defense Secretary Johnson to the NSC39 but reflected the already existing worries in Washington caused by the decline of the KMT.40 The first draft of NSC 48 clearly embodied worries about the emergence of the Soviet Union as a Pacific power and registered deep concerns about the further spread of communism in East Asia.41 After underscoring the disappearance of the European countries and Japan as power centers in East Asia, it characterized the strategic situation in East Asia as a stark bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet-led communist bloc. It noted concretely, “the United States is the only nation which offers any check or balance to the greatly enhanced power position of the USS.R. in Asia.” This first draft of NSC 48 blamed the continuous withdrawal of US commitment as a cause of weakening its influence in the Far East and recommended acquisitions of permanent military bases in the Far East.42 Though this early draft prepared during summer 1949 did not include fully developed recommendations, overall it showed a clear difference from the Kennanesque method of detached containment. The earlier drafts of NSC 48 also embodied a bipolar vision quite similar to NSC 68 adopted in the spring of 1950, except for its silence about the methods to mobilize US resources to address the communist threat. While the earlier drafts went through reviews by the relevant departments in Washington, both support and reservations were expressed. On October 19, the State Department’s Walton Butterworth, director for FarEastern Affairs, expressed strong dissenting opinion about the third draft of NSC 48. Still registering an expectation for a Titoization of Communist China, he chided the third draft for assuming an existence of automatic unity between the Soviet Union and Communist China and the dominolike expansion of communism in East Asia. He also registered concerns about the drafter’s discussion about the desirability of making Taiwan available for US use and noted that the military occupation of Taiwan was not the intention of the JCS.43 In fact, since the fall of 1948, the reputation of the Chinese communists had sharply deteriorated in Washington due to its mistreatment of US diplomats detained in Mukden (Shenyang). But until the end of 1949, there still remained grounds to allow expectations about an emergence of a Sino-Soviet rift due to the lingering tension over Russian control of Manchuria.44 The JCS also opposed providing military protection for Formosa, while underscoring the importance of strengthening the United States’ position with respect to the Philippines, the Ryukus, and Japan. But it expressed wholehearted agreement about the need to take up firm actions to stem the Seung-young Kim


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further spread of communism in East Asia. It stated, “the time has come for the determination, development, and implementation of definite United States steps in Asia.”45 Regarding the economic aspect of containment, a draft paper of September 21 underscored the need to expand trade among the free countries in Asia and other noncommunist countries, along with a general economic recovery of the Asian region. Such a development, the draft noted, “would provide one of the requisite of political stability and go far toward making communism unattractive, and alignment with the west more probable.” While noting this point, the draft underscored the importance of Southeast Asia for the economic recovery of Western Europe and to Japan.46 This draft did not mention the Korean economy, but ECA officials made similar remarks regarding the importance of Korea as “one of the natural complementary trading areas” for Japan in their congressional testimonies on June 28,1949.47 This trend showed subtle changes from an earlier AMG economic policy toward Korea, which aimed at severing Korea’s colonial economic dependency on Japan.48 Overall, the greatest change embodied in the final versions of the NSC 48 series was a new strategic outlook, including the assertive recommendation to use South Korea for containing communist expansion. The final drafts of NSC 48 were adopted as NSC 48/1 and 48/2 in late December. NSC 48/1 was adopted on December 23, and the president approved “the conclusion of NSC 48/1 in modified form (as NSC48/2) on December 29, 1949.”49 Like the earlier NSC recommendations of the Truman administration, these documents also combined different perspectives, but they included far more assertive policy goals toward Korea and East Asia. The NSC 48/1 and 48/2 still included a recommendation to encourage a rift between Communist China and the Soviet Union,50 but they also recommended providing military assistance to Nationalists in Formosa. 51 With regard to Japan, NSC 48/1 recommended a US guarantee of Japanese security along with efforts to promote its democracy and economic stability before and after the peace settlement.52 Most importantly, the NSC 48 series explicitly stressed the need to rollback communism in Asia. This was a major difference from the earlier NSC 8 series. Much like Truman and Byrnes’s thoughts at Potsdam, NSC48/1 assessed that “[for] now and foreseeable future it is the USSR which threatens to dominate Asia through the complementary instruments of communist conspiracy and diplomatic pressure supported by military strength.” Then it stated, “therefore, our immediate objective must be to contain and where feasible to reduce the power and influence of USSR in Asia to such a degree that the Soviet Union is not capable of threatening the security of the United States from that area and that the Soviet Union would encounter Seung-young Kim

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serious obstacles should it attempt to threaten the peace, national independence or stability of the Asiatic nations.”53 The conclusion of the series, NSC 48/2, added greater elaboration of rollback strategy. It recommended an “eventual elimination of the preponderant power and influence of the USSR in Asia,” so that the Soviet Union would not threaten “the security of the United States or its friends.”54 To pursue this objective, NSC 48/2 recommended the inauguration of collective self-defense among Asian states to resist the further spread of communism and the provision of “political, economic, and military assistance and advice” to Asian states.55 It further recommended that any such security arrangement should be in conformity with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter relating to individual and collective self-defense.56 NSC 48/1 reaffirmed the chain of off-shore islands, linking Japan, the Ryukyus, and the Philippines as the defense perimeter. Yet this discussion also noted, “The chain represents our first line of defense and in addition, our first line of offense from which we may seek to reduce the area of Communist control, using whatever means we can develop, without, however, using sizable United States armed forces.”57 The NSC 48 series did not mention anything about re-introducing US forces into Korea. But while noting the need to continue economic and military assistance for Korea, NSC 48/1 presented new goals of assistance. The principal objective of US assistance to South Korea, the document wrote, was “to strengthen that Government to the point where it can (1) successfully contain the threat of expanding Communist influence and control arising out of the existence in north Korea of an aggressive Sovietdominated regime, and (2) serve as a nucleus for the eventual peaceful unification of the entire country on a democratic basis.”58 Until the spring of 1949 when NSC 8/2 was adopted, the US government recognized the danger of possible Soviet control of the whole peninsula following US troop withdrawal. Yet Washington did not show any intention to assist South Korea in developing a defense capability against a direct attack from North Korea, supported by the Soviet Union. Now in NSC 48/1, however, Washington not only announced the defense of South Korea as a policy goal of US assistance to Korea but also clarified that South Korea should be “a nucleus for the eventual peaceful unification of the entire country.” However, despite all these assertive recommendations, NSC 48/2, which received the president’s approval a week later, omitted this new specific recommendation toward Korea. NSC 48/2 again stipulated that US assistance for South Korea should be based on NSC 8/2 by adding a footnote in the text,59 though it recommended various available assistances for Korea.60 In fact, the records of earlier debates drafting the NSC 48 series also show that the tug of war over the goal of US policy toward South Korea continued Seung-young Kim


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in Washington until the final stage of policy review for the NSC 48 series. About a month before the adoption of NSC 48/1, a draft version prepared by the Department of Defense Consultant underscored that US policy toward Korea still had to be based on NSC 8/2 of March 22, 1949, though it recommended providing assistance to South Korea, such as “ECA, MDAP, USIE and related programs for Korea.” This draft unequivocally articulated that the United States had to be ready to cope with the communization of the whole of Korea as was articulated by NSC 8/2. It stated, It must be recognized that there is the ever present possibility, despite the compensatory measures mentioned above, of a serious and rapid breakdown in the Korean situation from the point of view of the interests of the US–the possibility, in short of a Communist takeover of the entire peninsula. To the extent that it may be practicable, the US policy in Korea should take this possibility into account by preparing to minimize the impact of such a development on the position of the US in the Far East.61

In light of this documentary evidence, it can be construed that the noteworthy gap between NSC 48/1 and 48/2 was the result of the continued battle over Korean policy within the Washington bureaucracy. Indeed during the spring of 1950, large scale assistance to South Korea was rejected by Congress and the US military establishment. The State Department kept arguing the importance of South Korea as a symbol of US commitment to the free world in order to secure Congressional approval for the Korea aid program.62 But the Pentagon kept rejecting major military assistance for South Korea, pointing to the limits stipulated by the NSC 8 series. Yet the aggressive vision revealed in the statements of NSC 48/1 show the changing perception of US decision makers toward Korea and East Asia, which facilitated the decision for intervention at the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. While this method of assertive containment was discussed during the fall of 1949, Kennan expressed his hope to resign from the post of director of PPS.63 The direct cause of his resignation involved his dissatisfaction with Acheson’s approach in dealing with European integration, but Kennan had been unhappy with the fact that his advice was not fully reflected in the policy of secretary of state Dean Acheson. Acheson had worked as a lawyer in Washington, D.C., but by 1949 he had already worked five years as assistant secretary then as under secretary of state. Though a believer in the activist role of the United States in world affairs, he was more pragmatic in addressing the new strategic situation than in Kennan. By the fall of 1949, the secretary of state had quite a different view from Kennan on the importance of military means in addressing the Soviet threat.64 In the Seung-young Kim

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meanwhile, finding that his recommendations were regarded only as one of many recommendations, Kennan resigned voluntarily at the end of 1949 and remained as a counselor to the State Department. Acheson appointed Paul Nitze, the deputy director of the PPS, as Kennan’s successor.65 The former Wall Street investment banker had worked as vice chairman of the Strategic Bombing Survey team from 1944 to 1946. Nitze had felt that Kennan’s fascination with European diplomatic history had influenced his moderate approaches to containment. In contrast, Nitze prided himself on having a more pragmatic approach to strategic issues than Kennan had. In fact, Nitze preferred a far more assertive role for the United States in managing the global situation than had Kennan,66 who always emphasized the limit of American resources and emphasized the need to differentiate vital areas from nonvital areas for US assistance. The Acheson Speech: Defense Perimeter Reaffirmed Despite the assertive approach evinced in the process of preparation for the NSC 48 series, the winter and spring of 1950 was still a transitional period. The tough and assertive statements of the NSC 48 series were not yet fully embodied into government-wide policy in Washington, D.C. Military policy toward Korea still remained within the context of the NSC 8 series, which denied sufficient aid for South Korea to resist a direct invasion from the North. The broader policy toward the Far East also retained the hope of the development of a Sino-Soviet split, which was noted in the NSC 48 series as well. Apparently, Washington still made it clear that it would remain distant from the Chinese civil war and would not provide military protection for Taiwan in the probable case of a communist attack on the island.67 The US emergency war plan, approved on December 8, 1949, was also still based upon the off-shore balancing strategy. The war plan, OFFTACKLE, approved by the president, stipulated the US forces to remain on the defensive in the Far East and to hold Japan, the Ryukus, the Philippines, and Taiwan, but required no attempt to be made to maintain a foothold on the mainland.68 In this context, US defense policy toward Korea did not go through changes reflecting the assertive visions articulated in the NSC 48 series. For instance, the authority in defense assistance objected to Muccio’s request for assistance to develop a Korean air force pointing out the boundaries set by NSC 8/2.69 The existing defense policies, which had been long established with the support of the president and reflecting budgetary constraint, could not be changed expediently. Seung-young Kim


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Acheson’s famous speech on January 12, 1950, reflected this transitional situation in Washington. In his speech at the National Press Club, Acheson stated that the US defense perimeter would run along the Aleutians to Japan, Ryukyu, and the Philippine Islands. For the military security of other areas in the Pacific and Asia, he remarked, “it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack.” Should such an attack occur, he further elaborated, “the initial reliance must be on the people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter of the United Nations.”70 This speech has been much criticized since for excluding South Korea from the US defense perimeter, but Acheson was, in essence, reaffirming the existing policy of the off-shore defense perimeter, established by the US military staffs and Kennan from the spring of 1947.71 His suggestion about the UN-led intervention was also in line with his earlier considerations. But this remark fell short of a substantial demonstration of the US commitment to the defense of South Korea. At that time the State Department was not sure about the effectiveness of the United Nations as a bulwark against armed aggression. On the day after his speech, Acheson himself expressed skepticism on such a role for UN action in a Senate hearing. He mentioned that the United States would take part if the United Nations took action following the UN charter in case of a North Korean attack. He added, however, that UN action on the Korean contingency was not likely because the Soviets could veto such an action. During this hearing he reaffirmed that the United States would not extend military support to South Korea if North Korea attacked with Soviet or Chinese support.72 Acheson’s position during January 1950 was to strengthen South Korea through US assistance rather than trying to change the established US military strategy in the Far East. Indeed, during his speech on January 12, Acheson urged the US Congress to pass the aid bill for South Korea, underscoring that its government had been inaugurated under UN blessing. In his view, scrapping all assistance to Korea in the Congressional deliberation would be “the most utter defeatism and utter madness in our interests in Asia.”73 Constraints on the New Strategy During the early spring of 1950, Acheson kept making strenuous efforts to secure the Korea aid bill in Congress. The goal was buttressing the South Korean economy and defense assistance according to the vision of NSC 48 series, while not making any new US military commitment. Despite Seung-young Kim

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his appeals for aid, neither fully fledged economic nor military assistance were realized until the outbreak of the Korean War. This was due to tight budgetary constraints imposed by the president and Congress on defense spending. After being elected in his own right in 1948, Truman had pressed for a Fair Deal, which involved spending for housing, schools, and national health insurance. The president did not want limited resources to be diverted for military expenditure. Indeed, in late March 1949, Truman had replaced the secretary of defense, James Forrestal, who had supported more defense spending, appointing in his place an ambitious Missouri politician, Louis Johnson. Johnson believed that, with a tough reputation for cutting the defense budget, he could improve his chances to be nominated as the Democratic presidential candidate in 1952.74 After being appointed, Johnson imposed tough constraints on the service chiefs to tighten budgetary control on military expenditure.75 The Republican Congress also maintained a negative response to Acheson’s effort to secure any substantial aid program for South Korea. On top of its concern about the sprawling defense budget, the pro-Chiang Congressmen had been angered by the Truman administration’s reluctance to support the Nationalist regime in Taiwan. The State Department also could not provide a persuasive rationale to buttress Rhee’s regime in Korea in the Congressional hearings. Constrained by the limits set by interdepartmental agreements, Acheson could not justify South Korea’s strategic value and US willingness to defend it militarily in case of attack from North Korea. Kennan also did not articulate Korea’s value against his own earlier internal discussion. In this context, the Republican Congress sharply reduced US assistance to Korea in March 1950, despite Acheson’s efforts to secure the assistance bill. 76 Syngman Rhee’s policy did not help in securing further support from the United States either. In mid-1949, after realizing the irreversible nature of US withdrawal, he began focusing on securing greater US assistance to buttress South Korean forces, while suggesting the formation of a collective security organization in the Asia Pacific. He even suggested adoption of a new declaration, publicly reaffirming “the amity clause of the KoreanAmerican Treaty of 1882” to educate the American people about the nature of US commitment toward Korea.77 However, the old nationalist also promoted a counterproductive approach during 1949. He openly promoted a plan for unification by invading North Korea. Rhee assertively raised this option of invading North Korea when the US Secretary of the Army, Royal, visited Seoul on February 8, 1949. Royal had to restrain him by clarifying that no invasion would be allowed as long as US combat forces remained in Korea.78 The staunch anticommunist president, however, kept criticizing US efforts to restrain it from taking any Seung-young Kim


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military action beyond the thirty-eighth parallel.79 From February until June 1949, the armed skirmishes along the thirty-eighth parallel, often provoked by the South, reached its peak and drew keen attention from Stalin as well.80 Following the communist victory in the Chinese civil war, Rhee expressed his wish to remove the North Korean regime and to stabilize the border with China.81 In fact, however, Rhee himself was well aware of the general lack of military readiness of his forces to launch a full scale invasion into the north. The US forces left only defensive weapons when withdrawing from Korea, and the South Korean forces lacked arms and ammunition even for an adequate defense against a full scale attack by the North.82 A senior US diplomat in Seoul interpreted Rhee’s argument for absorbing the North as an expression of his ardent nationalist feeling after inaugurating a separate regime.83 Such an approach was also much in line with Rhee’s longstanding belief and method, which attempted to harness American power to find a fundamental solution for the Korean question.84 However, along with the revelation of his repressive authoritarian rule in South Korea,85 Rhee’s announcements to invade the north generated greater reluctance in Washington toward an aid program for South Korea. It remained greatly concerned that major military assistance to South Korea could lead Rhee to invade North Korea, given the ongoing skirmishes along the thirtyeighth parallel, which were often caused by South Korean attack.86 Within this context, the US military establishment repeatedly rejected the recommendation from the State Department to buttress South Korean defense capability. In addition to its reluctance against developing any military commitment toward Korea, the budgets for all the services were under most tight control by Secretary of Defense Johnson.87 During the spring of 1950, Ambassador Muccio expressed his worries about North Korea’s military capabilities and requested greater military aid for South Korea. In April, under Rhee’s prodding, there were massive public rallies in South Korea, where Koreans chanted, “Give Us Arms” for two weeks.88 But the Department of Defense rejected such a request except for the provision of a limited number of liaison aircraft, pointing to the limit imposed by NSC 8.89 Drafting NSC 68: The Embodiment of a Bipolar Vision While such procrastination continued, a new strategic review, which embodied the increasing concerns of Washington’s policy circle, was prepared under the initiative of the State Department. Paul Nitze led this interdepartmental review under the active encouragement of Acheson from January 31, 1950.90 Their goal was to highlight the seriousness of the Seung-young Kim

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communist threat and to secure a dramatic increase in the defense budget so that the United States could address the impending danger without budgetary constraint. By April, this interdepartmental review was boiled down in NSC 68, which recommended a rapid build-up of US military capability as well as its assistance for the free world. While NSC 68 was being prepared, the CIA assessed further signs of growing Soviet influence in East Asia. Following the conclusion of the SinoSoviet pact in February, the CIA expected the Soviets to further strengthen Chinese military capability while increasing their influence over China. The CIA also worriedly observed that the Soviet recognition of Ho Chimin’s north Vietnam would increase the Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. It also predicted the hardening of the Soviet stance on the German question, pointing out that the Soviets were unlikely to withdraw their troops while continuing their harassing actions in Berlin.91 In addition to all this, during the early spring of 1950, a major intelligence review was conducted regarding the new threat posed by the Soviet nuclear capabilities. This assessment was conducted as a concerted effort among the CIA and other intelligence branches of US military services and State Department. The CIA estimated that the Soviet Union would possess about one hundred atomic bombs by 1953 with a similar destructive power to that dropped at Nagasaki. During this debate, it was pointed out that the United States had to strengthen its military and strategic posture as the Soviet Union would also pose a greater threat to the neighboring states beyond its current control.92 Overall, the assessment and debates were far more alarming than the previous CIA assessments of the Soviet threat in mid-1948 and early 1949, which had regarded a Soviet resort to deliberate military action as unlikely.93 In the forward of the new estimate, the CIA wrote, “the examination of these problems also brought to light many operational and policy questions of far-reaching importance . . . which are in large part beyond the cognizance of the intelligence agencies.”94 The recommendations of NSC 68 were, in fact, efforts to address all these concerns, though it was not implemented until the outbreak of the Korean War. The content and the process of drafting clearly showed the shifting perception in Washington during the spring of 1950. NSC 68 assessed the world situation as a stark bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. It concluded that there had emerged only two great powers, America and Russia, following “the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and French Empires.” In such a setting, the Soviet Union was assessed as “animated by a new fanatic faith antithetical to our own, seeks to impose its authority over the rest of the world.”95 To address this threat, the document recommended, the United States had to impose a militarized containment all around the Soviet perimeter. For Seung-young Kim


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Nitze, as for Acheson, the Soviet capability for aggression was more significant than present Soviet intentions, which were impossible to know for sure. 96 This document not only embodied a clear zero-sum worldview but also recommended a rollback strategy going beyond containment.97 While preparing this document, Acheson and Nitze aimed to use external pressure to “reduce the power and influence of the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union and other areas under its control.”98 NSC 68 also recommended a drastic increase in the US military budget and military aid to all countries in the “free world.” The budget needed to buttress the conventional as well as nuclear forces was estimated at about forty billion dollars a year, far beyond the budgetary ceiling of fifteen billion dollars a year, declared by Truman during his 1948 campaign.99 But, NSC 68 assumed that such a rapid increase of the military budget could be achieved without a long-term budget deficit by operating the US economy at full efficiency.100 This way of removing the budgetary constraint from strategic considerations was an important change from earlier discussions in Washington.101 The earlier recommendations of Kennan and the JCS always reflected a concern for the limits of US resources, and thus recommended confining US assistance only toward the areas of vital strategic interest. NSC 68, in contrast, assumed that the United States could face up to the Sovietled threat by mobilizing its own economy and underscored that the United States had to extend assistance to all countries in the free world. The recommendation of NSC 68 reflected Acheson’s concerns about the deteriorating strategic environment from the fall of 1949.102 During the drafting process, Acheson was fully informed about this new review from the beginning and favored the study. NSC 68 also embodied Nitze’s own pragmatic approach in comparing US and Soviet forces, as well as his activist belief on America’s role in world affairs. Nitze, who had a background in Wall Street, did not have the scholarly character of Kennan but was more clearly attuned to Acheson’s way of thinking. He liked clear, numerical comparisons of military capabilities between the United States and the Soviet bloc.103 He opened debates among the staff members on strategic issues and reflected their views in policy recommendations. This was a different way of drafting policy memoranda from that of Kennan, who usually confined the role of his staffs to merely commenting on the drafts he prepared.104 Nitze also had the instinct and skill that helped him get his ideas through the Washington bureaucracy, and the sharply deteriorating security environment added to the persuasive power of his recommendations.105 Although NSC 68 was prepared by the Defense-State joint working group, Nitze could minimize the influence of Secretary of Defense Johnson, who remained most sensitive to increases in the defense budget. While drafting Seung-young Kim

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the document, Nitze could secure support from all the participants in the State Department, all the civilian service secretaries, and service chiefs of staff in the Pentagon. When Acheson briefed Johnson at the final stage of drafting on March 23, Johnson was very upset and walked out of the room. But after learning that Nitze already had gained support from a majority of officials in the Pentagon, Johnson did not try to block the adoption of NSC 68.106 Kennan and Bohlen remained skeptical about Nitze’s assessment of Soviet intention. Kennan expressed his concerns to Acheson in February about the militarization of containment,107 which would lead to “a state of semi-mobilization.” Bohlen also wrote to Nitze that oversimplification of the problem and Soviet design would inevitably lead to the conclusion that war is inevitable.108 But Acheson kept Kennan out of the way by sending him on a long fact-finding trip to South America 109 and chose Nitze’s view over Bohlen’s caution.110 The recommendations of NSC 68, however, were not implemented immediately. Truman did not reject it but instructed to keep it under special security, to prevent any publicity. Already under attack by the right, he could not resist the united bureaucracy, warning enslavement, but still wanted to keep substantial resources for his Fair Deal. In fact, in May, Truman and Johnson raised questions about the financial projection of NSC 68 and kept rejecting the immediate execution of NSC 68. 111 Although the president accepted the conclusion of the NSC 68 in April, he did not approve the new budgetary requirement. Nitze recollected that the president had two different ideas until as late as June, when he gave a media interview, reasserting his intentions “to try to hold the defense budget down to twelve and a half billion dollars.”112 On a working level as well, other related departments kept raising questions about the assumption and budgetary requirement of the document.113 In this way, NSC 68 could not be implemented until the outbreak of the Korean War. Military assistance to South Korea was also influenced by this reality in Washington. During the preparation process, Nitze and his staff discussed Korea as one of the “soft spots” on the periphery of the Soviet Union, vulnerable to “aggressive political action,”114 although they remained more concerned about Yugoslavia and Berlin.115 Not long after completion of NSC 68, Alexander Sacks, an economist at Lehman Brothers with Soviet expertise, predicted a North Korean attack sometime late in the summer of 1950. He assessed that the Soviets might consider their successful atomic tests and the communization of China as favorable changes in the correlation of forces, opening the way for cautious action through a satellite. Nitze felt that Sacks’s prediction was a logical analysis and one that deserved closer study, but he did not take any particular initiative toward Korea.116 Seung-young Kim


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Shortly after this meeting, Nitze was visited by US ambassador to Seoul, Muccio. The ambassador had made every effort to appeal to Washington to buttress the South Korean defense capability and had maintained an excellent relationship with Rhee.117 In his view, Rhee was a shrewd and able manipulator, though he was detested by many politicians. During his visit to Washington, Muccio underscored that South Korea was definitely “a symbol of US interest in Asia,” and urged small additional support to keep this twenty-one-month-old Korean government on its feet. In his report at an interdepartmental meeting, the ambassador underscored, “2,000,000 Koreans had moved south, whereas none had moved north.”118 The main purpose of Muccio’s visit was to persuade the military assistance people in the Pentagon to give South Korea fighter aircraft, ammunition, and patrol boats to catch North Korean infiltrators.119 Nitze managed to put together a program to give the South Koreans some additional fast patrol boats but could not go further. The existing policy of the JCS did not allow any provision of aid that might create a South Korean navy or airforce. The JCS response was, “without additional forces or a reduction of obligations elsewhere, we should make no commitment to defend either Korea or Taiwan.”120 In fact, the Department of Defense had already denied such a request from Muccio in early April and clarified that the US military assistance in fiscal year 1950 was proposed “to maintain internal security and protect the Republic of Korea from border incidents” according to NSC 8/2.121 Nitze and his staff recollected that they knew that until NSC 68 was approved and implemented, the United States would continue to address South Korea’s problems in piecemeal fashion.122 The Situation before the Onset of War Throughout the spring of 1950, Acheson made strenuous efforts to persuade Congress and the general public to support a more assertive foreign policy. Much in tune with NSC 68, Acheson urged the US government to launch “Total Diplomacy,” just like during wartime, so that all branches of government could work closely together to defend the free world from Soviet imperialism. He cautioned, “whatever the Soviet detects weakness or disunity . . . it exploits them to the full,” and urged that “the only way to deal with the Soviet Union . . . is to create situations of strength.”123 He underscored the importance of strengthening collective security by utilizing regional pacts and proposed, “we must champion an international order based on the United Nations and on the abiding principles of freedom and justice.”124 However, in Washington, Korea remained as only one of the many areas of potential Soviet challenge, and Washington overall Seung-young Kim

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remained reluctant to provide major military aid to Korea. In the meanwhile, North Korea quietly made preparations to invade the South with the support of the Soviet Union and the PRC. The documents available in the Russian and Chinese archives show that Kim Il-sung played an active role in persuading Stalin and Mao to support his plan for unification through war from the spring of 1949. On March 7, 1949, Kim Il-sung asked Stalin to approve his invasion of the south, pointing to the relative strength of North Korean forces and the strong guerrilla support in the South. But Stalin dissuaded him, pointing out that North Korean forces had not yet established a solid superiority over those of the south. Stalin also warned Kim that the US forces would intervene in case of hostilities, drawing Kim’s attention to the US forces still remaining in the south. 125 In September 1949, in their meeting with the Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang, Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong, North Korean foreign minister, claimed again that a North Korean attack would be followed by a number of significant uprisings by partisans in South Korea. But the Soviet Politburo dissuaded North Korea from a hasty attack on the South, pointing out its weak military preparation and the possibility of American intervention.126 But Stalin approved Kim’s plan when Kim visited Moscow from March 30 until April 25, 1950. In his meeting with Kim, Stalin agreed to Kim’s suggestion for the invasion, mentioning the favorable changes in the international situation since Mao’s victory in the Chinese civil war. Stalin mentioned that the PRC could put its attention and energy into supporting North Korea, while observing that the United States would hesitate to challenge communism in Asia now that the Sino-Soviet alliance was concluded. Based on intelligence reports from the United States, Stalin also assessed that a noninterventionist approach was becoming the dominant trend in the United States, after the Soviet success in the atomic bomb and the strengthening of its position in Europe. While making these assessments, Stalin still made his support of the war conditional on Mao’s guarantee of support. He urged Kim to secure clear support from Mao127 and soon induced Mao to have a concrete consultation with Kim about the war.128 In the meeting with Stalin, Kim confidently reported that Mao had already guaranteed Chinese support. Then Stalin urged Kim to make perfect preparations for a surprise attack, assuring him of Soviet military assistance. In his subsequent visit to Beijing in mid-May, Kim ascertained the support from Mao, who also guaranteed him that the PRC would intervene if the United States intervened.129 While these discussions continued, Stalin sent Soviet weapons and members of his general staff to draft the operation plan, and Mao also sent the ethnic Korean soldiers in the People’s Liberation Army(PLA) to North Korea.130 Seung-young Kim


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From the summer of 1949 until May 1950, thirty-seven thousand ethnic Korean troops from the PLA were dispatched to North Korea to buttress its war capabilities.131 US intelligence had been aware of such reinforcement from China but did not regard it very seriously. In January, the CIA had assessed that the southward movement of the expanding North Korean Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel “probably constitutes a defensive measure to offset the growing strength of the offensively minded South Korean Army.”132 In mid-April, the British military advisor in Tokyo also sent a special intelligence report, drawing attention to the recent evacuation of North Korean civilians residing within three miles of the thirty-eighth parallel. Quoting American intelligence, A. K. Ferguson cautiously assessed that this large-scale evacuation of mid-March could obviously be a preparation for offensive operations by North Koreans, though he also listed other possibilities, such as labor conscription and counter-intelligence actions against South Korea.133 Before the outbreak of war in June 1950, the situation in the Korean peninsula appeared more stable than the previous year. By April 1950, the North Korean guerrilla activities in the mountainous region of the eastern coast were mostly suppressed by the South Korean forces.134 In the fall of 1949, both South and North Korea restrained military provocations along the thirty-eighth parallel following the demands of the United States and the Soviet Union. Thus, border skirmishes remained on a minor scale compared to those of 1949, though North Korean media exaggerated them for propaganda purposes from May.135 Amid such an uneasy quietness, US Senator Tom Connally revealed the weak US commitment toward South Korea in an interview with a weekly magazine. When asked about the possibility of abandoning South Korea by the U.S News and World Report, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee answered, “I am afraid it is going to be seriously considered because I’m afraid it’s going to happen, whether we want it to or not.” He also remarked, “it has been testified before us [senators] that Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines make the chain of defense which is absolutely necessary.” But he mentioned that Korea was not “very greatly important” or “absolutely essential” for US defense strategy and worried that the communists in the North and its neighboring ally Russia could just overrun Korea.136 The Senator’s remark invited rebuttal and criticism from the State Department and Rhee. In an internal memorandum, the assistant secretary of state for Far-Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, characterized the remark as “an attitude of defeatism which the Department does not share and which it has consistently endeavored to counteract.” He clarified the State Department’s Seung-young Kim

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position by quoting Acheson’s testimony in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 7. During his testimony, Acheson had underscored, “American policy should be based on determination to succeed rather than on fear of the possibility of failure,” while expressing his worries about the skepticism in Congress about the survival of South Korea. Acheson on that occasion had reported that the “condition of stability and public order have continued to improve and the threat of Communist overthrow appears at least temporarily to have been contained.” 137 Rhee also made deeply bitter denouncements of the remark during his talk with the American Charge in Seoul. He sarcastically said, “it was very easy for a man several thousand miles away from Korea airily to dismiss Korea and its 30 million people as of no strategic or other importance to the United States.” Rhee further regarded Senator Connally’s remarks “as an open invitation to the Communists to come down and take over South Korea.” US Charge Drumright thus had to try to assuage Rhee’s concerns by pointing out that the ECA was spending more than 100 million dollars in Korea and that the United States was keeping a large number of military advisors in Korea.138 But, in fact, the military readiness in South Korea was overall more in line with the senator’s remark. The Military Advisory Group in Korea (KMAG) had reported in early May a dismal assessment about the logistical situation of South Korean forces, along with its worries about the ongoing inflation in South Korea. According to the report, 10 to 15 percent of the weapons and 30 to 35 percent of the vehicles of the ROK forces were unserviceable due to deficient military aid and the expansion of South Korean forces (100,000) beyond its earlier plan of fifty thousand troops. It further noted, “it is tentatively planned by Dept. of Army that the spare parts approved for issue to Korea under 1950 MDAP will not arrive until some time in FY52.”139 On May 11, Rhee’s government also made an alarming press announcement about the dramatic strengthening of North Korean forces with the arrival of the ethnic Korean troops from the Chinese army. But the US embassy reported that it was an exaggerated estimate by Rhee’s government to enlist greater military aid from the United States.140 Six days before the outbreak of the war, the CIA assessed superior military capability of North Korea, though it was not yet aware of North Korean preparation for a full-scale invasion with Soviet support. It estimated that “although the northern and southern forces are nearly equal in terms of combat effectives, training, and leadership, the northern Koreans possess a superiority in armor, heavy artillery, and aircraft.” Thus, it noted, North Korea had “a capability for attaining limited objectives in short-term military operations against southern Korea, including the capture of Seoul,” though it required increased Soviet logistical support for long-term military Seung-young Kim


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operations. It also noted the southward deployment of North Korean tanks and heavy artillery close to the thirty-eighth parallel in recent months but expected it would take some time for the integration of Korean troops that had been sent from China.141 It also expected that North Korea would continue its ongoing “program of propaganda, infiltration, sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla operations against southern Korea.”142 The Outbreak of War and the Decision to Intervene North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, armed with Soviet tanks and a Soviet war plan. During the first week of the invasion, North Korean forces smashed South Korean defenses on a devastating scale and forced the Rhee government to desert Seoul within three days. It took this scale of shock to make Washington change its established policy and intervene to save South Korea. Though it became convinced of Soviet support for this attack,143 the Truman administration made its decision in an incremental way from June 25 to June 30. Initially it decided to use air and naval forces to contain the North Korean advance, but after discovering the disintegration of the South Korean defense, the administration chose to deploy US ground troops on June 30. This was a reversal of the established military policy toward Korea, based on the NSC 8 series, which was abandoning South Korea in case of a Soviet supported attack. Several factors influenced Washington in changing its policy. The nature of the attack, a direct aggression into an UN-recognized state, shocked US leaders. Matched by the sequence of strategic events since fall 1949, the attack ignited the memory of appeasement of the 1930s among the US leaders. Truman and other senior decision makers vividly remembered that the unchecked aggression of the fascist states led to a world war during the 1930s. This lesson of history worked as a powerful analogy in their decision at the outbreak of the war.144 They also perceived the attack as a challenge to the credibility of the United Nations, which was the embodiment of collective security at that time.145 Indeed, on June 25, the UN Security Council quickly adopted a resolution condemning the North Korean attack and requested all member countries to extend support to repel North Korean forces back to the thirty-eighth parallel.146 The adoption of the resolution was facilitated because the Soviet representative was absent in protest against the KMT’s representation of China, and this support of the United Nations provided important political and diplomatic rationale for US intervention in the war. The Truman administration was also faced with Republican criticism about its policy toward East Asia; and from the Seung-young Kim

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spring of 1950, anticommunist McCarthyism was particularly targeting the State Department.147 However, it should be noted that there had already existed very assertive voices in support of strong US commitment to Korea in the Truman administration. Assertive globalist views had been gaining strength since mid-1949, and the rise of bipolar perceptions among US leaders was crystallized in the drafting of the NSC 48 series and NSC 68. The surprise attack by North Korea sharply buttressed such assertive views, the implementation of which had been delayed because of budgetary and domestic political constraints. The decision-making process following the North Korean attack shows that the perception of bipolar confrontation, and the evocation of an image of falling dominos, played crucial roles leading to decisive US intervention in the Korean War. During the meetings at Blair House on June 25 and 26, State Department officials dominated the discussion.148 Acheson brought to Truman the telegram from Tokyo sent by ambassador John Foster Dulles and John M. Allison, who were visiting Japan to negotiate the peace treaty with Japan. They maintained that “to sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war” and recommended US military intervention.149 Dulles had earlier believed that Acheson’s January speech on the defense perimeter had to be corrected.150 While visiting the South Korea just before the outbreak of the war, he had been impressed by Rhee’s fiery patriotism,151 and pledged at the National Assembly unspecified American support under UN charter in case of trouble, though he had no authorization from Washington to make such a statement.152 The Blair House conferees worried about a Chinese communist attack on Formosa and its expansion into Southeast Asia, along with the possibility of large-scale communist insurgency in the Philippines and a new menace to Japanese security. Though they did not assess the Soviet Union as ready to wage a global war, they worried that the North Korean invasion might be accompanied by Soviet moves at other critical points of the world, or by communist expansion in the Far East.153 Truman also came to believe that US armed forces in the Far East were stronger than Soviet forces, after receiving reports on the relative capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union.154 In fact, on his flight back to Washington from Missouri on June 25, Truman was already convinced that a firm response was necessary, due to his memory of the 1930s.155 But this rational for intervention was further consolidated with continuous concern about the domino effect. On June 26, Truman told his naval assistant that he was worried about Soviet moves toward Iran, pointing to Iran on the large globe in his office. Then, he said, Seung-young Kim


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“Korea . . . is the Greece of the Far East. . . . If we are tough enough now, they won’t take next steps.” He further mentioned, “if we just stand by, they’ll move into Iran and they’ll take over the whole Middle East.”156 Truman also told his advisors that the development in Korea seemed to him a repetition of what had happened in Berlin on a larger scale. Since the Reds were probing for weaknesses in US armor, he believed, the United States “had to meet their thrust without getting embroiled in a world-wide war.”157 On the same day, Truman met South Korean ambassador, Chang Myun, and suggested US military support. As a show of warm encouragement, Truman specifically mentioned the French support during the American War of Independence and US intervention in Europe during World War I.158 The image of the falling domino was further consolidated in the broader policy discussions in Washington. Already on June 25, the initial intelligence estimate prepared by the State Department had worried about the ripple effect of strengthening communists in Southeast Asia, the Baltic, the Black Sea, Iran, and Japan. Without a strong US response, it said, Chinese communists would also adopt “more bold and militant tactics in their attempts to promote Communism in other parts of Asia.” 159 On June 26, during the Blair House meeting with the president, Dean Rusk pointed out that Formosa would be the next likely spot for a Communist move. Secretary of Defense Johnson also guessed that Iran would be next move by the communists.160 Truman pointed out the danger of further challenges by the Soviet Union, while explaining the need to take firm action to the Congressional leaders on June 26. He told them, “if we let Korea down, the Soviets will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another.” Then, he proclaimed, “if we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe.”161 Truman also urged special attention to be paid by US intelligence to Bulgaria and Iran and the whole of the Yugoslav frontier while leading the NSC meeting on June 28.162 The initial decision to use US air and naval forces was reached without serious concerns. Following Acheson’s recommendation, Truman and the Blair House conferees agreed on June 25 to use US air and naval forces to contain the North Korean advance. They also decided to deploy the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait.163 At the request of Acheson, Kennan counseled that this attack was a local affair, not indicative of a Soviet desire to precipitate a third world war. But he also supported the military intervention to prevent a ripple effect on other parts of the world such as Formosa, Tibet, Berlin, and Iran.164 Before this decision to use US naval and air forces was known, Republican senators had also criticized the Truman administration for indecisiveness on June 26, recalling appeasement of the 1930s.165 Seung-young Kim

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The decision to send ground troops was faced with reservations from the Department of Defense. At the Blair House discussion on June 25, Acheson asked what further assistance the United States should render in pursuance of the resolution adopted by the UN Security Council. But General Bradley questioned the advisability of putting in large ground troops, and Secretary of Defense Johnson also opposed committing ground troops in Korea.166 But in the evening meeting of June 26, Truman stated, “we must do everything we can for the Korean situation—“for the United Nations,” even while mentioning his reluctance to go to war.167 During the discussion, Acheson strongly suggested his support for intervention with ground troops in case the air and naval supports could not hold a line of defense. He underscored, “it would be very important for the United States to see that the support of South Korea did not fall from a political point of view, from an international point of view.”168 In such a setting, the military leaders, who had been far more cautious, did not oppose it. Instead, they recommended waiting and watching the situation for a few days while considering the question of necessary mobilization of national guards.169 By June 29, North Korean T-34 tanks breached the Han River defense line south of Seoul, and the casualty rate of South Korean forces had reached a catastrophic level, estimated at 50 percent.170 Most importantly, General MacArthur recommended the dispatch of two US combat divisions on June 30, after making a personal reconnaissance by flying to the front line. In his view, the introduction of US ground combat forces was the only assurance of saving South Korea and “for the holding the present line and the ability to regain the lost ground.”171 Ambassador Muccio in Korea also urged Washington to give full support to McArthur’s recommendation, without further delay. He underscored, “all-out effort is necessary if the situation is to be saved.”172 Receiving these reports, the president convened another full conference with his advisors on June 30 and decided to support MacArthur’s recommendation. Underestimating the strength of the North Korean army, Truman and his advisors believed that the two US combat divisions would be able to turn the tide of the war.173 While deciding to send US ground forces, Truman expressed his wish not to fight directly with the Russian forces, but he continued expressing concerns about possible Russian moves in the Balkans, Iran, and Germany.174 Meanwhile, by June 29, Truman received an overwhelmingly favorable domestic and foreign response to his initial decisions on Korea.175 Of the more than 1,200 letters and telegrams that Truman received, nine out of ten were in support of his decision. Great Britain and Australia pledged naval support and many European countries expressed a favorable reaction to the decision to support South Korea and repel the North Korean

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attack.176 This support further facilitated the Truman administration’s decision to intervene to save South Korea. As Kissinger observed later, despite the earlier announcements of weak commitment to Korea, the United States could not abandon South Korea after most of mainland Asia fell under communism.177

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his part showed how different policy recommendations (i.e., ideas) toward Korea were selected by the Truman administration, depending on the broad changes in the strategic situation from 1947 to 1950. After coping with its unprepared occupation duty until the end of 1946, Washington had to come up with a solution about its costly commitment there by early 1947. The State Department insisted on providing ambitious economic assistance as well as military protection to South Korea. It intended to block the spread of communism and to make South Korea a showcase of success in postcolonial development. In contrast, the War Department and George Kennan insisted that the United States had to make a graceful exit from Korea, pointing out its low strategic value and the limits of US resources. The competition between these two policy ideas was settled in the context of priority-setting in a multipolar strategic situation. The regional experts in the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) assumed that at least southern China would remain a friendly third power and continued to recommend assistance for the Chiang regime. As a grand strategy of containment, George Kennan and the military planners recommended to focus the limited US assistance on building pro-US power centers, such as Japan and west Europe. They remained pessimistic about the future of the Chiang regime but expected the emergence of Sino-Soviet split in the long term. They also assessed the Soviet threat as not an imminent one in the region. In this way, in Washington, the dominant perceptions toward East Asia remained in the multipolar conception, in which either China or Japan would play the role of third power to counterbalance the threat of communist expansion in East Asia. Under the dominance of such a multipolar perception, Korea was regarded as a nonvital area. The War Department’s argument for withdrawal from Korea, in fact, reflected the reality of the material limits of US resources; thus the State Department had to concede to the demand for troop withdrawal in October 1947. Under the approval by the president, the troop withdrawal was started from mid-1948 and was completed at the end of June 1949.

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However, from mid-1949, when the KMT’s fortune began its drastic decline, the arguments based on a bipolar perception began to gain strength. The State Department kept advancing an argument in support of Korea registering concerns about domino effect. This trend became dramatically heightened with the Soviet success in its test of the atomic bomb in late August 1949. The NSC 48 series adopted in December 1949 not only emphasized assertive containment but also included discussions for rollback policies in the Korean peninsula and East Asia, though the assertive policy on the Korean peninsula was excluded in the final recommendation to the president (NSC48/2). While the implementation of such an assertive vision was being delayed due to domestic budgetary concerns, in the spring of 1950, the NSC 68 finally suggested a method to remove the budgetary constraint to implement a highly assertive containment, while further articulating the Soviet threat in tune with the new CIA assessment. Indeed the spring of 1950 was the period when the assertive recommendations based on bipolar vision were not implemented due to domestic political and budgetary constraints imposed by the president and Congress. The US military establishment also remained reluctant to reverse its established policy of disengagement from Korea. It required the shock of the North Korean surprise attack for the Truman administration to address the changes in the strategic situation. With the outbreak of war, the assertive globalist arguments, based on a bipolar perception, quickly gained dominance in policy debate and resulted in the full scale US intervention to the Korean War with its ground forces. The process of change in the US commitment toward South Korea can be further examined in the light of my realist hypotheses. The domino image and grand strategy. While Washington perceived the strategic situation in East Asia in multipolar terms during 1947, the argument based upon the image of falling dominoes was not adopted as the final policy. Officials in the State Department evoked the image of falling dominos when discussing the importance of US assistance for South Korea. But the JCS and Kennan did not agree with such arguments on the domino effect. Instead, they argued that if Korea fell under communism while US troops remained there, it would cause greater damage to US credibility. From fall 1949, however, with the strengthening of the bipolar perception, the argument based on domino image gained persuasive power as was demonstrated during the discussions to adopt the NSC 48 series and NSC 68. The image of falling domino played crucial role in the Truman administration’s decision to intervene in the Korean War as was demonstrated during the Blaire House discussion following the North Korean attack. Difference in threat perception. From 1947 until mid-1949, a difference in threat perception existed between Washington and Seoul. When WashSeung-young Kim

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ington chose to withdraw its forces from South Korea, it was well aware that South Korea would fall into the hands of the communists following the withdrawal. Rhee’s government wanted to delay US withdrawal and later tried to receive greater assistance to address the threat from the North, but Washington chose to pursue a graceful exit from South Korea while minimizing any binding military commitment. This difference in threat perception between Seoul and Washington became gradually reduced from the fall of 1949 when the bipolar perception began to gain strength in Washington. With the outbreak of the Korean War, this discrepancy in threat perception between Washington and Seoul disappeared. Ends-and-means analysis. The decision of fall 1947 was a shining example of withdrawing US military commitment based upon ends-and-means (cost-and-benefit) analysis. The War Department and the JCS remained most sensitive to the cost of the US commitment toward South Korea, and the president agreed with them amid constraints in the US defense budget. This ends-and-means analysis in US policy toward Korea began losing its appeal when the perception of bipolarity began to gain ground from fall 1949, as was demonstrated by NSC 68 and the discussions at Blair House after the outbreak of the war. Patterns of diplomacy. The United States chose to refer the Korean question to the United Nations in fall 1947 with a view to secure a graceful exit from Korea. This was a clear example of using multilateral diplomacy to make up for the reduction of the US defense commitment under the dominance of a multipolar perception. Following the inauguration of the South Korean state with UN support, the State Department recommended protecting South Korea to preserve the credibility of the United Nations, but this argument could not reverse the US troop withdrawal from Korea by June 1949. However, when a bipolar perception became dominant, US decision makers used the UN resolution as the grounds to justify its intervention to save South Korea in June 1950. Role of (strategic) ideas. While the material situation remained uncertain, Kennan’s idea was instrumental in defining the global and regional strategic situation, and in formulating the corresponding US strategy for the troop withdrawal from Korea in 1947. From autumn 1949, Nitze’s globalist idea became instrumental in a similar way, though his idea was selected because it matched better with the drastic changes in the external strategic situation. Both Kennan and Nitze were committed thinkers, who had a-priori ideas about strategic issues. Their ideas played instrumental and additional roles in defining existing strategic situation and formulating policies. But it was also shown that the strategic ideas that did not match with the material realities were selected out. This was shown by the decline of Kennanesque Seung-young Kim

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containment from fall 1949 and the decline of John Carter Vincent’s Wilsonian recommendation for assistance toward Korea during 1947. Competing Explanations for US Foreign Policy Economic interest. The State Department’s suggestion included an ambitious assistance program for South Korea in the spring of 1947, including plans to encourage business leaders to visit the country. But this suggestion was not implemented fully, and due to its low strategic value, Washington chose to withdraw its protection from South Korea while being aware of the danger of its falling prey to communism. Since 1949, the ECA officials began supporting South Korea’s value as a natural trading partner for Japan, the recovery of which was regarded as important for US security and its economy. Despite this argument, Truman and the US Congress kept US military assistance to South Korea constrained until the outbreak of the Korean War, making it exposed to North Korean attack. Several senior US decision makers, who took a globalist and interventionist position including Nitze, had extensive experience in Wall Street. These globalist interventionists could have been interested in Korea’s potential for the US economy. But the policy debates in Washington did not leave enough evidence in support of the economic motive as the main force behind the US strategic decisions toward Korea. This economic consideration was not as explicit as in the US discussions about the value of Southeast Asia, which drew clear attention as the source of natural resources and market for Japan and the United States. Promoting democracy. The State Department intended to develop Korea into a unified democratic state until 1947. After the inauguration of Rhee’s government in 1948, the State Department continued its effort to buttress it, despite the realists’ caution to abandon the Rhee regime. During the Blaire House discussion following the North Korean attack, the US motive to protect the fledgling democracy played an instrumental role in justifying the military intervention. However, this effort to spread democracy could not prevent the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea from 1948 to 1949. Also, the main reason to save South Korea in June 1950 was to block the domino effect in a bipolar competition with the Soviet-led communist bloc. Overall, the US effort to spread democracy continued, but this effort was conducted cautiously, in light of broader strategic considerations and limit of US military capability.

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Pragmatic approach to address the local threat. When the Truman administration decided to withdraw US forces from Korea in fall 1947, it acknowledged that South Korea could fall into communist hands after the US withdrawal. Still, it chose to carry out the troop withdrawal, rather than addressing the local threat. After the inauguration of the South Korean state, the State Department and UN representatives raised concerns about the fall of the Rhee regime under the communist threat. But this pragmatic appeal only resulted in a temporary delay in the withdrawal by several months, not the reversal of the withdrawal policy. Throughout the spring of 1950, ambassador Muccio repeatedly urged Washington to buttress South Korean military forces to address the local threat from the North. But his recommendations were not fully accepted because of the limit imposed by the earlier interdepartmental decisions for troop withdrawal, embodied in the NSC 8 series, which reflected the US grand strategy set forth in 1947. In this case history, my realist hypotheses were mostly corroborated. The other competing explanations on US foreign policy, particularly US efforts to promote democracy, were relevant. But they could not explain the main dynamic of US policy toward Korea from 1947 to June 1950.

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Conclusion

US Commitment toward South Korea since 1950

T

his book examined three important periods in US-Korean relations focusing on the dynamic of policy making underscored by realist thinkers in international relations. While doing this, each case history also presented a detailed narrative account about how and why US diplomacy and strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia changed over time. The answers to salient historical questions were already offered in each Part, thus, in this final conclusion, I discuss the relevance of my hypotheses in explaining the more recent US commitment toward Korea and its implications about US-Korean alliance in the twenty-first century. Overall, my realist hypotheses were supported well in the case histories. The summary of each Part’s conclusion can be condensed in Table 3. Depending on changes in the dominant perception of polarity, the intensity of US commitment toward Korea changed, accompanying the four related developments as summarized in the following table. The dynamics posited by competing established explanations (US efforts to promote democracy, economic interest, and its pragmatic efforts to address the local threat posed on Korea or South Korea) also influenced the course of US policies toward Korea; but they did not play the central role in changing the intensity of US commitment toward Korea. Among these, the US motive to promote democracy fared best and played the most consistent role. Particularly, during the presidencies of Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, this motive was revealed consistently in policy discussions among the State Department officials and other senior decision makers. Though the final policies eventually chosen were based upon the realistic calculation of US strategic interests, this motive to promote democracy has played a role quite consistently since 1941.

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Difference in Threat Perception between the United States & South Korea

Dominant Perception of Polarity

Domino Image

Ends-andMeans (Cost-andBenefit) Analysis

T. R.

Multi-

No

Active

Yes

Taft-Katsura Agreement; Portsmouth Mediation

Weak

F. D. R. (Dec. 1941–Apr. 1945)

Multi-

Weak

Active

Yes

Multilateral Trusteeship

Moderate

Truman I (Apr.– Aug. 1945)

Bi-

Strong

Suppressed

No

Unilateral decision to secure South Korea (38th Parallel)

Strong

Truman II (1947– Aug. 1949)

Multi-

Weak

Active

Yes

Referral of Korean Question to UN

Weak

Truman III (Sep. 1949–June 1950)

Bi-

Strong

Suppressed

Small

Used UN to justify US intervention to save South Korea

Strong

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Pattern of Diplomacy

US Commitment to South Korea

Copyright material from www.palgraveconnect.com - licensed to University of MN Twin Cities - PalgraveConnect 2011-04-19

Table 3. Summary of Evidence

US COMMITMENT TOWARD SOUTH KOREA SINCE 1950

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US policies toward Korea since the End of the Korean War Since 1953, the United States and South Korea have maintained a formal military alliance. South Korea also has achieved rapid economic development from the late 1960s, thus strengthening its own military and economic capability. Moreover, since 1987, it has become a fully fledged democracy, adding another important factor that help buttress the solidarity of the alliance as underscored by the constructivist theorists.1 The United States has also remained conscious of its heavy sunk cost in protecting South Korea, which eventually helped turn the country into a most successful case of economic development and democracy. To consider the more recent US commitment toward Korea, we should take into account these various significant changes. Still, if we extrapolate the realist dynamic focusing on power and threat and the related changes of perception of US decision-makers, my realist hypotheses remain useful in explaining the more recent trends in the US commitment toward Korea. Since the end of the Korean War, US commitment toward Korea remained mostly solid when the perception of bipolar confrontation remained dominant in Washington. During the 1950s, the Pentagon considered reducing the US commitment toward Korea, but Washington overall did not adopt this policy due to its perception of threat from China, which was presumed to remain within the same communist camp as the Soviet Union.2 During the 1960s, the US leaders continued to perceive a bipolar confrontation as was demonstrated by its escalation of the Vietnam War under the influence of the domino theory. During this period of the 1960s, South Korea’s Park Chung-hee government could further consolidate US commitment to protect South Korea by dispatching two combat divisions to the Vietnam War. However, with the emergence of a multipolar dynamic and the related perceptions of US leaders during the 1970s, noteworthy changes occurred in the US commitment to South Korea.3 Witnessing the growing evidence of the Sino-Soviet split, Nixon and Kissinger defined the global situation as a tri-polarity, including China’s political role, and tried to find a solution to the overextension of US military commitment by rearranging its relations with China and Russia into a détente mode. They also defined the world’s economic situation in penta-polar terms including the roles of Japan and the European Community. Under this multipolar strategic vision, articulated by Kissinger, the Nixon administration assessed that the ameliorated great power relations would allow it to withdraw troops from South Vietnam and South Korea, as China and Russia would restrain its allies from adventurous moves.4 Also, under the sensitive calculations of Seung-young Kim

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ends-and-means in extending alliance protection, Washington requested a greater defense contribution from its allies in East Asia. In this context, the Nixon administration unilaterally implemented the reduction of one combat division out of Korea in 1971, while encouraging Japan’s greater contribution to the East Asian security. The Ford administration, inaugurated from 1974, suspended further implementation of troop withdrawal. While trying to stabilize the situation after the fall of South Vietnam, the administration reassured South Korea by maintaining forty-two thousand US forces in Korea. This effort had also to do with the need to dissuade Seoul from pursuing its nuclear weapons program, which was started by the Park government in early 1972 under its own assessment about the eventual complete withdrawal of US forces from Korea. The Ford administration could suspend Park’s nuclear program by 1976 by threatening the withdrawal of alliance protection and denial of South Korean access to the US market, though Park wished to retain the potential until his death in 1979.5 Differently from the Ford administration, the Carter administration tried to carry out a complete withdrawal of US ground forces from South Korea. The administration maintained that it was continuing the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine for US troop reduction in East Asia. Though the administration’s withdrawal policy had also to do with Carter’s disenchantment with Park’s repressive rule, it was pursued under a benign assessment of the broader regional security situation during the early years following its inauguration. Moreover, as the Nixon administration considered, the administration explored a dialogue with North Korea to find a diplomatic solution to the Korean question through negotiation.6 However, as the confrontation with the Soviet-led communist bloc aggravated since 1978 on both global and regional levels,7 the Carter administration suspended the withdrawal plan by February 1979. Witnessing the decline of the détente dynamic and rise of bipolar confrontation, Carter accepted the dissenting view that resisted troop withdrawal based upon a new assessment about the strength of North Korean tank forces.8 Moreover, despite its pledges to enhance human rights conditions, due to security concerns, the Carter administration did not restrain Chun Doo-whan, when he suppressed the prodemocracy movement and committed the Kwangju Massacre in May 1980 while seizing power after the assassination of president Park in October 1979.9 During the early 1980s, amid the rise of US-Soviet confrontation, called the New Cold War, the Reagan administration further strengthened its commitment to protect South Korea and buttressed its defense capabilities by providing high-tech weapons. The administration in fact had also introduced a highly assertive strategic vision about containment, which Seung-young Kim


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further buttressed its alliance commitment to South Korea. The Reagan administration also played a significant and instrumental role by consistently urging the Chun regime to refrain from its moves to suppress the prodemocracy movement in South Korea, particularly when the situation reached an explosive point in the spring of 1987. The administration had assessed that Chun’s dictatorial rule was undermining US security interests by nurturing anti-American sentiment in South Korea.10 But such diplomacy for democracy was also facilitated by the benign security environment near the end of the cold war. Overall, this trend shows that the US alliance commitment toward South Korea changed mostly depending on its central decision-makers’ assessment of the changes in great power relations as my earlier case histories showed. Washington also has made efforts to promote democracy cautiously when the favorable security situation allowed it to pursue such a goal. The Trend since the End of the Cold War and Implications When discussing the US commitment to Korea in the post–cold war era, we should take into account the role of various changes, such as the advanced economic interdependence between the two countries and South Korea’s increased capabilities. Korea’s geopolitical location, however, will not change, and in terms of relative capabilities, South Korea and even a unified Korea would remain as a medium power, which is relatively smaller than China, Japan, or Russia. Thus, when discussing the management of power relations, my hypotheses can provide several points of reference in considering the direction of US policy toward Korea and Northeast Asia. With the end of the cold war, the United States has established unipolarity at global level with its superior military capability. It has also pursued a fundamental transformation in its alliance management since 2001 to better address new challenges posed by terrorism while continuing to manage the traditional great power relations.11 While pursuing such goals, it has also been looking for various regional partners when addressing regional security issues.12 This is because US power gets defused when it reaches specific regions, particularly when its efforts and energy is diverted to address other burning issues in different parts of the world. During the 1990s, US policy toward East Asia showed some aspects of multipolar balancing, though it maintained the US forces in Korea to address the North Korean nuclear issue. The United States consistently encouraged Japan to assume an enlarged role in regional security by redefining the US-Japan security alliance in 1998. It has recently further consolidated the US-Japanese alliance, defining Japan not only as the “most important ally” Seung-young Kim

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in East Asia but also as a global partner.13 The United States meanwhile has often been ready to go through diplomatic friction with South Korea, as was demonstrated during its negotiations to secure the Geneva Framework Agreement of 1994,14 which froze North Korean nuclear activities temporarily by promising the provision of two light-water nuclear reactors for civilian power generation. In 2003, Washington chose to reduce US troops in South Korea by 12,500 and recently decided to return Wartime Operational Control to South Korea until 2012. While choosing to disband Combined Forces Command (CFC) with South Korean forces, it is also in the course of repositioning the forward deployed US bases north of Seoul southward.15 This trend demonstrates weakening of the US commitment to Korea, though Washington has claimed that the revolutionary changes in military technology allow such a reduction without weakening the deterrence capability. These developments suggest that US policy toward Korea has been showing a greater tendency to utilize multipolar balancing, though it has tried to keep the role of the United States as a pivot in managing the East Asian strategic situation, much like Kissinger’s approach during the 1970s. It has also pursued greater flexibility in using the US forces in Korea for its war in Iraq and Afghanistan and has consistently requested Seoul to make a greater contribution to help US war efforts in these countries, though South Korea deployed a 3,000-strong force to the Kurdish city of Irbil from 2004. This trend clearly reflects sensitive cost-and-benefit analysis in Washington in providing alliance protection for South Korea. As long as the assertive globalists’ vision remains strong in Washington, the policy based upon a multipolar vision may be delayed temporarily. But with the passing of time, Washington’s options in Korea and East Asia will be further constrained by the material limits on deployable US military capability and resources for the defense of South Korea.16 The most important change, compared with bipolarity during the cold war, is that the dominant threat posed by the Soviet-led communist bloc no longer exists in East Asia, while American military capabilities are defused to address other imminent concerns around the world. Rising China may be perceived as posing a consistent threat to the United States, and such an assessment may provide a rationale for US-Korean alliance. Yet the Chinese threat is not comparable to that of the Soviet-led communist bloc at the height of bipolar confrontation during the cold war. US concerns about nonproliferation and Pyongyang’s future missile capability to attack the United States can sustain US commitment toward South Korea. But this task can be managed without deploying a large number of ground forces with the help of high-tech power projection capabilities. Thus, the United Seung-young Kim


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States will try to preserve the US-Korean alliance, but with a significantly reduced level of military commitment than during the cold war era. My hypotheses shed specific light on possible developments in the USKorean alliance when regional multipolarity and the related perception get consolidated in Washington. In such a setting, first, the United States will not worry about the development of falling dominoes, even if South Korea’s security is challenged by North Korea or a unified Korea is challenged by a local adversary. Second, the United States will become more and more sensitive to the cost of providing protection for South Korea and will calculate whether such an effort would be worthwhile in an era of limited resources. Third, the United States will not perceive the same degree of threat as South Korea or a unified Korea toward its local adversary, and this development will work as a source of tension in the US-Korean alliance. Fourth, the United States can neglect South Korean interests while pursuing diplomatic compromise through bilateral or multilateral negotiations over various issues in Northeast Asia. These predictions are based on my consideration about the realist variables of power, threat, and perceptions related to them. If Korea wishes to preserve the US-Korean alliance as the foundation of its security policy,17 it should take some active measures to mitigate the dire dynamic posited by my hypotheses. Korean policy makers may also draw on the advices offered by the constructivist or institutionalist theories of alliance, which emphasize the shared identity of democracy and alliance institutions as factors strengthening alliance solidarity. It can continue to develop a truly liberal democracy while nurturing an internationalist outlook of its society. It can also enhance the efficiency of the cooperative mechanism of the US-Korean alliance,18 though the US decision to disband CFC has already darkened the prospect, demonstrating the limit of such countermeasures. My hypotheses do not suggest much solution for enhancing the US commitment to Korea under the dominance of the multipolar perception in Washington. They do suggest, however, that South Korea can partially mitigate the cost-benefit calculation in Washington by contributing to burden-sharing and by enhancing its contribution to US efforts to address regional and global security problems. Dispatching Korean peacekeeping forces to the countries where the United States has interests and enhancing Korea’s contribution to the regional security issues in East Asia can be those solutions.19 These efforts can contribute to stabilizing the US-Korean alliance in mutually beneficial terms. South Korea, however, should be ready for a new era of weaker US commitment in which the United States would help Korea with air and naval power but would become increasingly reluctant to use large numbers of ground troops to protect Korea. Thus, it should consider and prepare its Seung-young Kim

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own strategy as a medium power, located in the crossroads of great power influences. Particularly, if it does not wish to be entangled in an unwanted conflict due to the US-Korean alliance, as it did during the recent Roh Moo-hyun administration, it will have to build its military doctrine and capability before advancing a hasty diplomatic statement that is not sustainable due to the limit of its capability.20 Some implication for the United States can be derived from the case histories examined in this book. The kind of lessons one teases out from these tumultuous histories can be subject to the normative stances taken by observers. But, with the benefit of hindsight, I indicate some tentative points that can be considered by the United States when addressing current international issues. The history of US policy toward Korea since 1941 (Part II and III) showed the importance of careful planning and policy coordination in managing postcolonial issues. Had different departments in Washington maintained better coordination from the early stages of the war in the Pacific, they could have found a more sustainable solution to the Korean question without dividing the country and fighting the war in Korea later. The rise of perception of a bipolar confrontation with the Soviet Union, indeed, suppressed a diplomatic solution for the Korean question in the spring of 1945. But the lost opportunity during the Hopkins Mission showed that the miscoordination between the State and War Departments also contributed to losing the opportunity to reach a diplomatic compromise with the Soviet Union over the Korean question. Also, developments before and during the Potsdam Conference demonstrated the need to pay greater attention to the role of diplomacy in reaching compromise with other great powers over sensitive buffer zones around the world. On the other hand, if Washington had wanted to secure its sphere in Korea, it could have given more serious consideration to supporting Syngman Rhee and the KPG from the Pearl Harbor attack onward. Its unprepared and haphazard occupation policy, though it was conceived by ample goodwill to turn Korea into unified and democratic country, also showed a lesson best not repeated. Today, South Korea, for all of its problems, has reached a level of prosperity and political development that is unprecedented in its history. Yet the Korean situation in the 1940s can provide a point of reference for the United States. The Korean situation after liberation was chaotic and was laden with political violence and terror. When considering new challenges in the current world, the US experience in Korea offers more relevant points of reference than the US occupation of Japan and West Germany after World War II. Both Japan and Germany had earlier experience of democracy during the 1920s and had alternative groups of leaders useful for building the new regime. All these conditions in combination made the Allies’ Seung-young Kim


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occupation and the ensuing regime changes efficient and successful. However, the realities in the peripheries would be closer to the Korean example during the 1940s than the success stories of US occupation in Japan and Germany. To ascertain success eventually, it would require a long-term, patient, and tenacious approach on the side of the United States. The developments from 1945 until the outbreak of the Korean War also showed that simply withdrawing from an important strategic periphery may not provide a solution for Washington in the long term. Kennan and the Pentangon led such a withdrawal in 1947 because of the need to limit overextension of commitment. The Korean example shows that this abandonment of the postcolonial issue, particularly after making an intervention, could lead the United States into an even more costly intervention eventually. The Korean example also shows that when pursuing a settlement through an international organization like the United Nations, Washington should be engaged with the whole process with a commitment to contribute to solving the problem. Using such organizations as a measure to secure a graceful exit, as Kennan recommended, was eventually not successful in the case of Korea. Unless the United States intends to return to virtual isolationism, which does not seem feasible in this era, the United States should care and manage the postwar regime building process in cooperation with other states and the United Nations to find a sustainable solution to the problem. With regard to the Korean peninsula, which remains as strategic linchpin in the region, the United States will have to remain actively engaged with the multilateral diplomatic process like KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) and Six-Party Talks over North Korean nuclear issue and northeast Asian security.21 To secure leverage and the US interest in all these multilateral discussions, the US commitment toward Korea would still remain essential, though the scale and type of commitment may go through adjustments. The strategy of Theodore Roosevelt or Kennan can be useful as points of reference but cannot be a viable guide for today’s US foreign policy. If the US military commitment will not be like that shown during the height of the cold war, then the United States needs to employ creative diplomacy while maintaining optimum level of its forces to broaden US options and to maintain its role as a stabilizing force in this sensitive area. The United States also will have to be mindful about the sensitive geopolitical reality of Korea and Northeast Asia, which often require moderation and compromise with other powers to find a stable and longer-term solution for the Korean question.

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Notes

Introduction 1. For encouragements of cooperation between historians and theorists for the study of international relations, see Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge: MIT, 2001); and Geoffrey Roberts, “History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in IR,” Review of International Studies 32, 4 (October 2006), 703–14.

Chapter 1 1. I summarize my theoretical discussion due to the limit of space and my decision to focus more on international history. For a detailed appreciation of theoretical literature, see chapter 1, 2 of my dissertation, “Americans’ Perception of Polarity and the US Commitment toward Korea, 1882–1950,” unpublished doctoral dissertation, the Fletcher School, Tufts University (November 2003). 2. Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), 7, 9. 3. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985), 584–91. 4. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill: 1979), 18–20; Colin Elman, “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy?,” Security Studies 6, 1 (Autumn 1996), 7–53. 5. Waltz, Theory, 171–72; Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, 4 (July 1984), 485; Glenn Snyder, “Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs 44, 1 (Spring 1990), 117. 6. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapter 8; John Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,” in The Cold War and After, ed. Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994), 150–53; Snyder, “The Security Dilemma,” 485; Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39, 1 (Spring 1997), 160–61, 163. 7. Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 35; Randall Schweller, “The Progressiveness of Neoclassical Realism,” in Progress in International Relations Theory, ed. Colin Elman and Mariam Elman (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 2003), 311–47.

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NOTES

8. Regarding the definition of polarity, if there is a third power that can help counterbalance the main adversary of the United States, then I assume the situation is multipolar. I thank Stephen Van Evera for advising me with this simple but useful way of defining the term, which has generated much controversy. 9. The intensity of US commitment to Korea also needs to be examined as its efforts to expand its influence in the periphery. Regarding this issue, defensive realists pointed out the presence of a threat as the most important cause that invites expansionist policy. In contrast, the offensive realists, as well as Zakaria’s “state-centered realism” have argued that growing states would expand and that an anarchic international system provides incentives for states to expand if they can. However, I synthesize both views by utilizing the concept of “perception of polarity.” In this concept, I include US decision makers’ perceived levels of threat, their assessment of US power, and their assessment about the existence of third powers that can help the United States to counterbalance other hostile powers. For related discussions, see Lynn Jones and Miller eds., Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1995), xi–xii; Jeffrey N. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited,” International Security 25, 3 (Winter 2000–2001), 128–61; Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, 42. 10. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 263–66. 11. For interdependence of threat under bipolarity, see Thomas C. Shilling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 55; and Robert L. Rothstein, Alliance and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 62. 12. See Douglas J. MacDonald, “The Truman Administration and Global Responsibilities: Birth of Falling Domino Principle,” in Dominos and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 127–32. 13. As to the process in which a certain policy idea gains dominance in Washington, see Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy,” International Studies Review 3, 2 (Summer 2001), 47–81. 14. Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, 19 (Summer 1995), 73–74. 15. Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework,” in Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change, ed. Goldstein and Keohane (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 3–4. 16. See Max Weber, “Social Psychology of the World Religions,” in From Max Weber, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 280.

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17. For the role of operation code belief in assessing situation (i.e., diagnostic propensity) and choosing the “right” strategy (i.e., choice propensity), see Alexander George, Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: the Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder: Westview, 1980), 36. 18. I drew on the findings of Shimko and Larson for this hypothesis. See Keith Shimko, Images and Arms Control: Perceptions of the Soviet Union in the Reagan Administration (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991), 40, 249; and Debra Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 45, 49–50. 19. For examples of this way of historical research, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 91–92. 20. For such critique, see Thomas R. Hietala, Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985). 21. See Tony Smith, America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 22. For a representative work, see William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 2nd ed., rev. and enl. (New York: Dell Publishing Co., Delta Book, 1972). 23. Lenin, “Imperialism as a Special Stage of Capitalism,” in Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline with New Data, ed. E. Varga and L. Mendelsohn (New York: International Publishers, 1940), 192–211; J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938). 24. Thomas J. McCormick, “World Systems,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations, ed. Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 89–94. For world systems theory, see, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1974). 25. Thomas J. McCormick, “Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History,” Reviews in American History 10, 4 (December 1982), 318–30. 26. Michael J. Hogan, “Corporatism,” in Explaining the History, 233. 27. For the implication of pragmatism in foreign policy, see Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American Diplomacy and the Pragmatic Tradition (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1989), 83–86. 28. For Stanley Hoffmann’s mastery cultural analysis of US foreign policy, see Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 148–75. 29. For this method of comparison, see Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67–72.

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Chapter 2 1. For US-Korean relations before 1882 and Shufeldt’s role in opening US-Korean diplomatic relations, see Jongsuk Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry: Korean-American Relations to 1910 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1990), 17–59. 2. Roger F. Hackett, Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838–1922 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 138–39. 3. For a broader discussion, see Yur-bok Lee, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Korea, 1866–1887 (New York: Humanities, 1970), 36–51. 4. See Fred Harvey Harrington, God, Mannon and the Japanese: Dr. Horace N. Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884–1905 (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1944), 233–34. 5. Lee, Diplomatic Relations, 39. 6. Ibid, 40–41. 7. Tyler Dennett, “American ‘Good Offices’ in Asia,” The American Journal of International Law 16 (1922): 1. 8. Kuhanmal Joyakhwichan [Treaties of Corea]: 26(Gukhoedoseokwan, 1965), 294–95. 9. Young to Frelinghuysen, December 26, 1882, Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: 1883, 172–73. This series of document will hereafter be referred to as FRUS. 10. Li Hung Chang, Memoirs of the Viceroy Li Hung Chang (London: Constable, 1913), 262; Tyler Dennett, “American ‘Good Offices’ in Asia,” 1–3. 11. Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 56. 12. Henry Chung, The Oriental Policy of the United States (New York: Flemming H. Revell Co., 1919), 31; Yur-bok Lee, “Korean-American Diplomatic Relations, 1882–1905,” in One Hundred Years of Korean-American Relations, 1882–1982, ed. Yur-Bok Lee and Wayne Patterson (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1986), 21. 13. Allen to Hay, April 14, 1904, Korean-American Relations: Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, ed. Scott S. Burnett, III, 1896–1905 (University of Hawaii Press, 1989), 127. This book will hereafter be referred to as KARD. 14. Tyler Dennett, “American ‘Good Offices’ in Asia”; Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 4–6. 15. George McCune and John Harrison, eds, KARD, I, 1883–1886 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 70–73; Lee, Diplomatic Relations, 56–57. 16. “Foote Address,” Enclosures in Foote to Frelinghuysen, May 25, 1883, FRUS: 1883, 243. 17. “Reply of the King to Mr. Foote,” ibid, 244. See also Dinsmore, letter to Secretary of State, April 13, 1887, KARD, II, 1887–1895, ed. Spencer J. Palmer (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 121–22. 18. Bayard to Foulk, August 19, 1885, Instructions, Korea, M. 77, R. 109; KARD, I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951), 160.

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19. Frelinghuysen to Foote, July 14, 1884, KARD, I, 36. 20. Foote to Frelinghuysen, September 17, 1884, KARD, I, 40. 21. Tyler Dennett, “Early American Policy in Korea, 1883-7,” Political Science Quarterly, XXXVIII, 1 (March, 1923), 93, 97. 22. See, Bayard to Denby, February 9, 1888, FRUS, 1888–89, pt 1, 255–56. 23. George Alexander Lensen, Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899 (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1982), 54–55; Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907 (London: The Athlone, 1966), 17. 24. Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881–1904: with Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War (New York: Octagon Books, 1977), 32–33. 25. Foulk to Bayard, June 29, 1885, KARD, I, 79–80. 26. Bayard to Foulk, August 18, 1885, KARD, I, 78; Lester Burrell. Shippee, “Thomas Francis Bayard,” in The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, ed. Samuel F. Bemis (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1927–29), 8, 85. 27. “Yamagata Aritomo Ikensho” [Written Opinion of Yamagata Aritomo], published in Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Nihon Gaikoshi Kenkyu: Meiji Jidai (Tokyo: Yuhigaku, 1957), 192–95. 28. Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: from War to Peace, 1894–1972 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975), 47, 71. 29. Park Jong Keun, Nisshin-senso to Chosen [Sino-Japanese War and Chosun] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1982), 9–44. 30. Edwin F. Uhl to Sill, June 23, 1894, Instructions, Korea, M. 77. R. 109; Sill to Gresham, June 25, 1894, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 11. 31. Gresham to Edwin Dun, July 7, 1894, Instructions, Japan, M. 77, R. 107, NA; Files under Japanese Legation, July 7, 1894. Notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, M. 163. R. 5. NA; Gresham to Sill, July 9, 1894, KARD, II, 337. 32. Files under Japanese Legation, July 7, 1894, Notes from the Japanese Legation in the United States to the Department of State, M. 163, R. 5. 33. Yur Bok Lee, “Korean-American Relations,” 22; George Alexander Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, I, 159. 34. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NGB: 28, II, 257–58, 278; Park YoungJae, “Cheongilganghwawa mikuk” [Sino-Japanese Peace and the United States], Yeoksa Hakbo (Seoul: Yeoksa Hakhoe), 59 (September 1973), 62–63. 35. Jongsuk Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 98. 36. Tylor Dennett, “American ‘Good Offices’ in Asia,” 18–20. 37. Lensen, Balance of Intrigue, 323; Andrew Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 60–67. 38. Molozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 100–104; Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894–1972, 28–29, 74–75; Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 36. 39. Allen to Sherman, October 2, 5, 1897, KARD, III, 29–32. 40. Allen to Secretary of State, October 10, 1895, KARD, II, 357–62.

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41. Allen to Olney, October 8, 11, 12, 13, 1895, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 12; Allen to Dun, October 9, 11, 13, 1895, Despatches from US Ministers to Korea, 1882–1905, ed. Institute of Asian Culture Studies, 7 (Chuncheon: Hallym University, 2000), 261–63. See also, Bonnie Oh, “Myeongseong Hwanghu Sihaesakeongwa Migukui dae-Joseonjeongchaek,” [The Assassination of Queen Min and US policy toward Chosun], Myeongseonghwanghu Sihaesageon-gwa Agwanpacheongi-ui Gukjegwangye [The Assassination of Queen Min and the International Relations during Kojong’s Asylum to Russian Legation], ed. Choi Mun-hyeong (Seoul: Donglimsa, 1998), 98. 42. Olney to Sill, November 20, 1895, Olney to Sill, December 2, 1895, Instructions, Korea, M. 77, R. 109; Olney to Sill, FRUS, November 11, 1895; Olney to Sill, November 21, 1895, KARD, II, 268–69. 43. Rockhill to Allen, November 23, 1895, KARD, II, 273–74. 44. Allen to Sherman, September 13, 1897, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 13. 45. Sherman to Allen, November 19, 1897, Instructions, Korea, M. 77, R. 109. 46. Kajima Morinosuke, Diplomacy of Japan, 1894–1922, I, Sino-Japanese War and Triple Intervention (Tokyo: Kajima Institute of International Peace, 1976– 1980), 432–47. 47. B. A. Romanov, Russia in Manchuria, 1892–1906, trans. Susan Wilbur Jones (New York: Octagon Books, 1974), 131, 136–38; Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 109–10. 48. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaiko-shi, I, 93–97; NGB: 31, I, 165–68; British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914 (London: Him Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1927), II, 32–33; Peter Duus, The Abacus and The Sword, 124–25; Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 119–23. 49. Allen to Hay, March 19, 1900, KARD, III, 86–87; Juhanilbongongsagwan Girok [Record of Japanese Legation in Korea]: 16 (Guksapyeonchan Wiwonhoe, 1996), 1–32. 50. Herbert D. Croly, Williard Straight (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 181; Yunchiho Ilgi [Diary of Yun, Chi-ho], 6, November 17, 1905, 194. 51. Duus, Abacus and Sword, 130. 52. Vipan Chandra, Imperialism, Resistance, and Reform in Late NineteenthCentury Korea (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1988), 173–210; Shin Yong-ha, Dokriphyeophwoe-wa Gaehwawundong [The Independence Club and the Enlightenment Movement] (Seoul: Sejongdaewang Ginyumsauphwoi, 2000). 53. See Han Chul-ho, Chinmi Gaehwapa Yeongu [A Study of Pro-American Reformist Group] (Seoul: Gukhak-jaryowon, 1998); Fred Harvey Harrington, God, Mammon, and Japanese (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1944), 154. 54. Allen to Sherman, November 13, 1897, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 13. 55. Allen to Hay, Despatches, November 28, 1898, KARD, III, 56–57. 56. Allen to Hay, November 14, 1898, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 15. 57. Allen to Hay, May 31, 1902, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 18.

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58. Gang Man-gil, Gocheosseun Hangukgeundaesa [New Modern Korean History] (Seoul: Changjakgwa Bipyeongsa, 1994), 197–99; Duus, Abacus and Sword, 127. 59. The Kabo reform of 1894 was carried out by the enlightened reformers and Japanese pressure during the Sino-Japanese War. See Gang, Gocheosseun, 192–97; Chandra, Imperialism, 75–82; Duus, Abacus and Sword, 129. 60. Duus, Abacus and Sword, 129–32; Gang, Hanguk Geundaesa, 200; Shin Yong-ha, “Gwangmu Gaehyeokeui Munjejeom” [The Problems of Gwangmu Reform], Changjakgwa Bipyeong 13, 3 (Fall 1978), 143–83. 61. Duus, Abacus and Sword, 129, 131; Carter J. Eckert, et al, Korea: Old and New, A History (Seoul: Ilchokak, 1990), 236. 62. Allen to Sherman, October 5, 1897, KARD, III, 31–32; Ian H. Nish, The AngloJapanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907 (London: Athlone, 1966), 71. 63. George N. Curson, Problems of the Far East: Japan, Korea, China (London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1894), 156; Isabella B. Bishop, Korea and Her Neighbors (New York: Revell, 1898; repr. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1970), 255, 257; Yun Chi-ho, September 22, 1897, Yun Chi-ho Ilgi [Yun Chi-ho Diary] (Seoul: Kuksa Pyonchan Wiwonhoe, 1973–89), V, 96. 64. Allen to Hay, December 23, 1898, KARD, III, 58. 65. Yun Chi-ho, Ilgi (November 5, 1898), V, 178, 193–94. 66. Allen to Hay, Despatch, November 21, 1902, M. 134, R. 19, NA. See also Allen to Hay, Despatches, Korea, May 31, 1902, M. 134, R. 18. 67. See Lee Tae-jin, ed, Ilbon-ui Daehanjeguk Gangjeom [Japanese Seizure of Korea] (Seoul: Kkachi, 1995); Oh Young-seop, Kojong Hwangjewa Hanmaluibyeong [Kojong and Righteous Army] (Seoul: Seonin, 2007). 68. For similar recommendation by The Independence Club, see The Independent, editorial, August, 22, 1896. 69. Allen to Hay, Despatches, Korea, May 31, 1902, M. 134, R. 18. 70. Hyun Gwang-ho, Daehan Jegukui Daeoe-jeongchaek [External Policies of Great Han Empire], 251–81. 71. See also Duus, Abacus and Sword, 129; James B. Palais, Politics and Policy in Traditional Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 55–56. Palais observed that such high turnover could have been caused by the King’s need to provide prestige and status to the upper class yangban at the expense of administrative efficiency. 72. Outlook, 1905, quoted from Marius B. Jansen, Japan and China: From War to Peace (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975), 125. 73. Allen to Hay, Despatches, Korea, November 21, 1902, M. 134, R. 19; Allen to Hay, Despatches, Korea, May 31, 1902, M. 134, R. 18, Allen to Hay, Despatches, Korea, September, 30, 1904, M. 134, R. 21, NA. 74. John Albert White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), 51, 84.

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75. Allen to Hay, May 31, 1902, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 18. Allen to Durham W. H. Stevens, September 2, 1902; Allen to Buck, September 13, 1902, Horace Allen Papers, Microfilm (New York Public Library), R. 4. 76. Allen to Morse, December 3, 1902, Allen Papers. Allen estimated the cost for the celebration at six million Yen. 77. Allen to Hay, May 31, 1902, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 18. In sum, he judged in mid-1902 that the Korean situation was worse than he had ever known except the years just previous to the Tonghak uprising of 1894. See Allen to Hunt, June 21, 1902, Allen Papers. 78. Moriyama Shigenori, Kindai Nikkan Kankei-shi Kenkyu [A Study of Modern Japan-Korean Relations] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1987), 117–21. 79. Earlier, Kojong considered a scheme to neutralize Korea in 1891 with an international guarantee like Switzerland. But China, which was the dominant power in Korea, paid no attention to the idea. Allen (Charge d’Affair) to Blaine, June 3, 1891, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 8; Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 89. 80. Moriyama, Kindai, 121–25. For the reform effort of the pro-American faction, see, Han Chul-ho, Chinmigaehwapa Yeongu [A Study of pro-American Reformist Party] (Seoul: Gookhakjaryowon, 1998). 81. Moriyama, Kindai, 125–27. 82. Allen to Hay, October 2, 9, 11, 29, 1900, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 16. 83. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 164, 168. 84. Ibid, 171; Moriyama, Kindai, 127–31; Nish, The Origin of the Russo-Japanese War, 98–99. 85. Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, 198–203; Moriyama, Kindai, 138–40. 86. Buck to Hay, August 15, 1902, Despatches, Japan, M. 133, R. 76. 87. Takahira to Komura, October 17, 1902, NGB: 35, 405. 88. Takahira to Komura, November 24, 1902, NGB: 35, 416. 89. Takahira to Komura, November 20, 1902, NGB: 35, 414–17; Moriyama, Kindai, 138–40.

Chapter 3 1. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (New Jersey: Ashfield, 1986), 208–17; Ian H. Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires 1894–1907 (London: Athlone, 1966), 212–18. 2. John Albert White, Transition to Global Rivalry: Alliance Diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895–1907 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 30–32. 3. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaiko Bunsho (NGB): 34, 203–8, 445; Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon Gaiko Nenpyo Narabini Shuyo Bunsho (NGNB) I, 201–3. 4. Langer, “The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War,” Explorations in Crisis, ed. Carl E. Schorske (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 34, 37, 40, 45. Britain was more willing to recognize the established interest of Russia

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in Manchuria but cooperated with Japan and kept the spirit of the AngloJapanese alliance. 5. Kato Takaaki Hakuden Hensan Iinkai, Kato Takaaki (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1970), I, 411–13, 417–20, 431–46. See also Ohata Tokushiro, Nihon Gaiko Seisaku no Shiteki Tenkai [Historical Development of Japanese Foreign Policies] (Tokyo: Seibundo, 1983), 190. 6. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaiko-shi [History of Komura Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1966), I, 277–80; For English translation, see Ian Nish, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance: the Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 383–85. 7. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaiko-shi, 322–24. 8. William Langer, “The Origin of the Russo-Japanese War,” 28–33. 9. NGB: 36, I, 453–54; Allen, to Hay, May 26, 1903, KARD, 103–4; Sergius Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte (London: William Heinemann, 1921), trans. Abraham Yarmolinsky, 116–20; Ian Nish, The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War (Harlow, Essex: Addison Wesley Longman, 1985), 146–50, 168–70. 10. NGB: 36, I, 22–23, 36. 11. Ibid., 25, 27–28. 12. NGNB, I, 212–13. 13. Nish, The Origins, 189–90, 199, 203, 211; Ohata Tokushirou, Nihongaiko, 205–6. 14. Michael Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door: Manchuria in ChineseAmerican Relations, 1895–1911 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 77–79. 15. Seward W. Livermore, “American Navy as a Factor in World Politics, 1903– 1913,” The American Historical Review LXIII, 4 (July 1958): 864–69. 16. William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), 124–36; Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy 1898–1914 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 179–98. 17. John A. S. Grenville and George Berkeley Young, Politics, Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy, 1873–1917 (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1966), 305. 18. Braisted, The United States Navy, 152; Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, 249–50, 181–83. 19. William Reynolds Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1897–1909 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1958), 115, 120, 128; Outten Jones Clinard, Japan’s Influence on American Naval Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), 34–42. 20. Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, 225–27. See also, Lester Burrell Shippee, “Germany and the Spanish-American War,” The American Historical Review, XXX, 4 (July, 1925): 754–77. 21. Fred Harvey Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese: Dr. Horace Allen and Korean-American Relations, 1884–1905 (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1944), 130, 153, 164.

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22. Tyler Denette, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1925), 104–5. 23. Ibid, 308. For details of US economic interests in Korea, see Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 1–4. 24. Michael Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), 53; Walter Lafeber, The Clash: US-Japanese Relations Throughout History (New York: Norton, 1997), 66. 25. Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, June 22, 1903, Letters of Roosevelt, III, 497–98. 26. Journal of the American Asiatic Association, April, 1904, 78; January, 1905, 355; September, 1905, 225; September, 1906, 228. 27. Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, 164. 28. Allen to Hay, June 6, 1900, KARD, III, 216–17. 29. Allen to Hay, March 27, 1904, KARD, III, 125–26. 30. Charge Jay to Secretary of State, FRUS, October 6, 1908, 518–20. 31. Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 5–6. 32. Denette, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, 104. By the end of 1909 there were 829 US missionary schools in Korea. This was possible because the first Resident General, Ito, kept a policy of noninterference toward the educational activities of the American missionaries. Ku Dae-yeol, Hanguk Gukjegwangyesa, 106–10; Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 169. 33. Denette, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1933), 349. 34. Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906– 1909 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 8–9. 35. Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), 253. 36. John Morton Blum, The Republican Roosevelt (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 125–27; Robert E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), 66–70, 88–91. 37. Quoted in Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 35. 38. Roosevelt to Hay, May 22, 1903, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, III, 478; April 28, 1903, Hay Papers, R. 2. 39. Roosevelt to Mahan, March 18, 1901, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, III, 23; Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, 179–80. 40. Eugene P. Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1969), 1. 41. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, December 27, 1904, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1087. 42. See Brooks Adams, America’s Economic Supremacy (New York: Macmillan, 1900); Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Problem of Asia and its Effect upon International Policies (London: Sampson Low, Marston: 1900). 43. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, 253–60; Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth, 6.

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44. Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy, 48; Denette, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1925), 1–3. 45. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, 265–69. For Roosevelt’s early worry about Japanese threat on Hawaii and the Philippines, see Trani, The Treaty of Portsmouth, 9; Charles E. Neu, Troubled Encounter: the United States and Japan (Huntington, NY: R. E. Krieger, 1975), 35. In May 1897, Roosevelt asked the Naval War College to plan for a conflict that involved the defense of Hawaii against Japan and the liberation of Cuba from Spanish rule. 46. Roosevelt to Charles A. Moore, February, 14, 1898, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, I, 772. 47. Roosevelt to Hay, May 22, 1903, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, III, 478, Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan, March 9, 1905, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1134. 48. For Roosevelt’s worry about Russian possession of northern China, see Roosevelt to Spring Rice, August 5, 1896, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, I, 555; Roosevelt to Charles A. Moor, February 14, 1898, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, I, 772; Roosevelt to Spring Rice, June 13, 1904, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 832. 49. Paul A. Varg, Open Door Diplomat: The Life of W. W. Rockhill (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), 29–36, 51; Tyler Dennette, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company: 1933), 289. 50. Varg, Open Door Diplomat, 11–12. Rockhill’s remark is quoted by Barg, Ibid, 12. 51. Michael Hunt, Frontier Defense and the Open Door (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1973), 60–61. 52. Hay to Roosevelt, May 12, 1903, John Hay Papers, Library of Congress, R. 2. 53. Hay to Roosevelt, April 25, April 28, 1903, ibid. 54. Durand to Landsdowne, January 27, 1905, FO 5/2579, PRO. 55. G. W. Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy, 1900–1907 (London: T Nelson, 1963), 124–25, 131. 56. Hay to Allen, November 17, 1904, John Hay Papers, Library of Congress, Microfilm R. 2; Allen papers, Microfilm R. 1. 57. Tyler Dennett, John Hay: From Poetry to Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1933), 289, 348–49; Kenton J. Clymer, John Hay: The Gentleman as Diplomat (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975), 190. 58. John A.S. Grenville and George B. Young, Politics and Strategy, and American Diplomacy: Studies in Foreign Policy 1873–1917 (New Haven and London, 1966), 311; Clymer, John Hay, 153. 59. Phillip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (Dodd, Mead & Company, 1938), I, 451–53. 60. Root to St. Loe Strachey, September 9, 1905, quoted by Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 4. 61. Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 3–4. 62. Allen to Hay, June 2, 1902, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 18, NA; Horace N. Allen to Horace E. and Maurice Allen, December 20, 1903, Horace Allen Papers, New York Public Library.

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63. Kim Won-mo, “Alen-ui Hanguk Dokrip Bojeonundong,” [Allen’s Effort to Keep Korean Independence], in Allen-ui Ilgi [Allen Diary], ed. Kim Won-mo (Seoul: Dangook University Press, 1991), 336–84; Jongsuk Chae, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 120–22; Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, 308. 64. See, Despatches by Allen, KARD, III, 217–42. 65. Allen Diary, Preface to Part IV (June 1–November 20, 1903), Allen-ui Ilgi, 571–72. 66. Allen Diary, September 30, 1903, Allen-ui Ilgi, 654–56; Horace Allen, Things Korean: A Collection of Sketches and Anecdotes Missionary and Diplomatic (New York: Fleming Revell, 1908), 251–52; Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, 313–16. 67. The Washington Post, October 21, 1903. Allen praised Russia’s role in bringing order to Manchuria and making possible a rapid growth of trade, seventy five percent of which came from the United States. Allen later reported that the interview was published based on the account he gave to a close friend in the West, though he kept evading newspapers. Allen to Hay, December 24, 1904, Hay Papers, R. 21. 68. Harrington, God, Mammon, and the Japanese, 317–18. 69. Allen to Hay, 21 November 1902, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 19. For detailed discussions about securing a harbor on the Korean coast, see Richard D. Challener, Admirals, and Generals, 190–93; Seward W. Livermore, “American NavalBase Policy in the Far East 1850–1914,” The Pacific Historical Review, XIII, 2 (June, 1944), 125–30. 70. GB (General Board), Proceedings, June 12, 1903, Proceedings and Hearings of the General Board of the US Navy 1900–1950, Library of Congress, M. 1493, R. 1. 71. Hay to Paddock, June 23, 1903, Instructions, Korea, M. 77, R. 109. 72. Seward W. Livermore, “American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East 1850– 1914,” 127–30. 73. Thomas F. Millard, The New Far East (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906), 65–70; Commander Marshall to the Secretary of Navy, FRUS: 1904, 780–85. 74. Hyun Bo Woon to Komura, January 24, 1904, NGB: 37, I, 316; Komura to Hayashi, January 25, 1904, ibid, 316–17; Komura to Hayashi, January 28, 1904, ibid, 316–17. For the most thorough and recent study on US-Japanese-Korean diplomacy during the Roosevelt era, see Nagata Akifumi, Seodoa Ruzuberuto to Kankoku [Theodore Roosevelt and Korea] (Tokyo: Miraisha, 1992). 75. Fontenay (Chefoo) to Delcasse, February 2, 1904, DDF (Documents Diplomatiques Français): 4 (1904), 314–16; NGB: 37, I, 310; White, The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War, 124. 76. Quoted from F.A. McKenzie, Korea’s Fight for Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1920), 77–78. 77. “Proclamation by the President,” February 11, 1904, FRUS: 1904, 32–35. 78. Hay to Allen, March 4, 1904, Instructions, Korea, M. 77, R. 109; Allen to Hay, January 30, 1904, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 20.

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79. Hay to Allen, March 2, 1904, Instructions, Korea, M. 77, R. 109. 80. Howard Beale, Theodore Roosevelt, 273. 81. FRUS: 1904, 2; Hay to Griscom, February 10, 1904, FRUS: 1904, 418; Hay to McCormick, February 10, 1904, ibid, 722–23. 82. Von Alvensleben (German ambassador to Russia) to the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 12, 1904, Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette, 1871–1914 (Deutsche Auswartigen Amt, Berlin, 1927), 19, Band, pt. 1, 106. 83. “Neutrality of China,” February 20, 1904, FRUS: 1904, 2–3; Hay to US ambassadors to European powers, January 13, 1905, included in Durand to Lansdowne, January 27, 1905, FO 5/2579, PRO. 84. Roosevelt to Theodore Roosevelt Junior, February 10, 1904, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 723–24. 85. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, December 27, 1904, Letters of Roosevelt, 1087. 86. Tani Hisao, Kimitsu Nichiro Sen-shi (Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1966), 600–601. 87. Sternberg to the Foreign Minister, May 9, 1904, Die Grosse Politik, 19. Band, pt. 1, 113–14, 38, 101. 88. Sternburg to the Foreign Ministry, telegram, March 21, 1904, Die Grosse Politik, 19. Band, pt. 1, 112–13. 89. Jean Jules Jusserand, What Me Befell: the Reminiscences of J.J. Jusserand (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1933), 300–301. 90. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, December 27, 1904, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1087–88; Roosevelt to Spring Rice, June 13, 1904, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 829–30. 91. Roosevelt to von Sternberg, August 28, 1900, Letters of Roosevelt, II, 1394. 92. Hayashi to Komura, March 15, 1904, Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Telegram Series, R. 41, Microfilm, 5039, Library of Congress. 93. Takahira to Komura, March 15, 1904, ibid. 94. Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, June 13, 1904, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 830. 95. Von Bülow to the Kaiser, August 31, 1904, Die Grosse Politik, Band. 19, pt. 2, 535–37. Kaiser noted on the margin of the telegram that “Korea will be definitely annexed by Japan” and wrote, “It is without question that Japan deserves it.” And earlier, on May 9, 1904, Roosevelt told the German ambassador, “Korea can belong to Japan. The United States will not oppose this.” Sternburg to von Bülow, May 9, 1904, Die Grosse Politik, Band. 19, pt. 1, 114. 96. Rockhill to Allen, February 20, 1904, Rockhill Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Quoted from Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 97. 97. Hay to Allen, November 17, 1904, John Hay Papers (Library of Congress, Washington), microfilm, Reel 2 and Allen Papers, microfilm, R. 1. 98. Hay to Allen, March 2, 1904, Instructions, Korea, Microcopies, NA, M. 77, R. 109. See also Nagata, Seodoa, 145–46. 99. Allen to Rockhill, January 4, 1904, Rockhill Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge Massachusetts, b*46-M-386 (78); Allen Papers, microfilm, R. 4.

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100. Allen to Hay, March 27, 1904, Despatches: Korea, M. 134, R. 20; Allen to Hay, December 24, 1904, John Hay Papers, R. 21, Library of Congress.

Chapter 4 1. Sanmohonbu, Meiji-sanjushichihachinen Nichirosenshi [History of RussoJapanese War] (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1912), I, 178; Im Jong-gook, Ilbongun-ui Joseon Chimryaksa [History of Japanese Military Invasion into Korea] (Seoul: Ilwol Sugak, 1988), I, 111. 2. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NGNB, I, 223–24; FRUS: 1904, 437. 3. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Komura Gaiko-shi [Diplomatic History of Komura] (Tokyo: 1953), II, 256. 4. Unno Fukuju, Kankoku Heigo [Annexation of Korea] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1995), 124, 125, 130. NGB: 37, I, 297–98. 5. Allen, to Hay, February 21, 1904, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 20. 6. Allen, to Hay, February 23, 1904, Despatches; Hay, to Allen, February 23, 1904, Instructions, Korea, M. 77, R. 109. 7. Allen, to Hay, February 24, 1904, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 20. 8. “Protectorate of Japan over Korea [Telegram received by Japanese Minister from His Government],” February 26, 1904, FRUS: 1904, 437. The Japanese minister left a copy with the Secretary of State on February 26. Allen also sent the text on February 27. Allen, to Hay, February 27, 1904, FRUS: 1904, 454. 9. Komura Gaiko-shi, II, 256; Allen to Hay, May 19, 1904, Despatches, M. 134, R. 21. 10. Moffett (Presbyterian missionary at Penyang) to Allen, August 15, 1904, enclosed in Allen, to Hay, August 27, 1904, KARD, III, 132–34. 11. Oliver, Syungman Rhee: the Man behind the Myth (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1960), 72; Allen to Hay, December 17, 1904, KARD, III, 138. 12. Allen, to Hay, June 28, 1904, KARD, III, 129; Duus, Abacus and Sword, 368–72. 13. Allen to Hay, June 28, 1904, KARD, III, 129. 14. Allen to Hay, October 11, 1904, KARD, III, 135–36. 15. Jung Chang-ryeol, “Noiljeonjaenge Daehan Hangukin-ui Daeeung” [The Reaction of Koreans to the Russo-Japanese War], Noiljeonjaeng-jeonhu Ilbonui Dae-Hangukchimryak, ed. Yeoksahakhoe (Seoul: Iljogak, 1986), 230–40. Robert Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 72–73. 16. Hangukshinmun Yeonguso, ed., Daehanmail Shinbo, I, September 17, November 2, 1904 (Seoul: Gyeongin Munhwawsa, 1976). 17. Daehanmail Shinbo, I, September 14, 1904 (Seoul: Gyeongin Munhwawsa, 1976). 18. Daehanmail Shinbo, II, October 6, 1905. 19. Allen to Hay, April 14 1904, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 20. This telegram still shows that Allen left room for Kojong to develop expectation for the US invocation of the “Good Office” clause.

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20. Allen to Hay, April 16, 1904, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 20; Allen to Hay, April 22 1904, ibid. 21. Japan, Rikugun, Chosen Chusatsugun Rekishi, ed. Kim Chong-myong (Tokyo: Gannando Shoten, 1967), 33–36, 177–79, 213–14; Jung Chang-ryul, “Noil Jeonnjaenge,” 212; Unno, Kankoku Heigo, 135–37. 22. Komura Gaiko-shi, II, 257. The text may be found in NGNB:I, 224–28; Duus, Abacus and Sword, 182–86. 23. NGB: 37, I, 360–69; Takahira, to Adee, August 30 1904, FRUS, 1904, 438–39; Griscom to Hay, September 1, 1904, FRUS, 1904, 439; Komura Gaiko-shi, II, 258. Eventually three advisors on police, court, military affairs were also appointed by Japan. 24. Allen to Hay, August 24, 1904, M. 134, R. 21. 25. Ibid., August 30, 1904, M. 134, R. 21. 26. Takahira to Hay, August 30, 1904, FRUS: 1904, 438–39. 27. Adee to Takahira, September 2, 1904, ibid., 440. 28. Griscom to Hay, September 1, 1904, ibid., 439; Allen to Hay, September 10, 1904, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 21. 29. Unno, Kankoku Heigo, 134. 30. Allen to Hay, September 30, 1904, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 21. 31. Needham to Min Hui Cho, December 22, 1904, NGB: 38, I, 655–56. 32. Min Young Hwan committed suicide in 1905 in protest against Japanese imposition of protectorate over Korea. 33. Chong-sik Lee, Iseungman-ui Kuhanmal Gaehyeok-undong [Rhee’s efforts for Reform Movement] (Seoul: Paichai University Press, 2005), 39–44. 34. Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 82–83. 35. Kim Ki-suk, “Gwangmuje-ui Jugwonsuho Oegyo, 1905–1907,” [Kojong’s Diplomacy to Guard Sovereignty, 1905–1907], Ilbonui Daehanjeguk Gangjeom [Japan’s Seizure of Korea], ed. Lee Tae-jin (Seoul: Kkachi, 1995), 222–23. 36. Diary of Straight, on June 22, 1905, quoted in Herbert Croly, Williard Straight (New York: MacMillan, 1924), 169–71. 37. Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 85. 38. For the full text, see “Petition From the Koreans of Hawaii to President Roosevelt,” in Frederick A. McKenzie, The Tragedy of Korea (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1969, Reprint), 311–12. 39. For a similar account reported by Japanese diplomat in Seoul, see NGB: 37, I, 596. 40. “Will Ask Roosevelt to Protect Koreans,” The New York Times, August 4, 1905; “Koreans See the President,” The New York Times, August 5, 1905; Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 85–87. 41. Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 85–88. 42. NGB: 38, I, 600, 656–58; Nagata, Seodoa, 153, 157. 43. Morgan to Root, July 20, 1905, Theodore Roosevelt Papers, Library of Congress. R. 57. 44. Takahira to Komura, March 23, 1905, NGB: Nichiro Senso, V, 225; Rockhill to Stevens, March 21, 1905, Rockhill Papers, b *46M-386, 370–71.

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45. “Memorandum of Interview” between Adee and The-Moo Sin, March 21, 1905, Notes from Korean Legation, M. 166, R1; Telegram, the Emperor of Korea to the President Roosevelt, March 25, 1905, ibid.; Roosevelt to Kojong, Guhanguk Oegyo Moonseo: 12, 753–54. 46. Taft to Roosevelt, April 5, 1905, quoted in Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), 297. 47. Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906– 1909 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 15–16; Ralph E. Minger, William Howard Taft and United States Foreign Policy: The Apprenticeship Years 1900–1908 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975), 162. 48. Taft to Martin Egan, March 25, 1905, quoted in Henry F. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), 296–97. 49. Roosevelt to Taft, May 31, 1905, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1198. 50. Quoted in Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography, 383. 51. Roosevelt to Spring Rice, November 1, 1905, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, V, 61. 52. Taft to Root, July 29, 1905, Roosevelt Papers, Microfilm, R. 57; William H. Taft Papers, R. 52 (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1969), Series: Presidential Papers Microfilm. 53. Ibid. 54. Taft to Root, July 29, 1905, Taft Papers, R. 52; Roosevelt Papers, R. 57. 55. Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft, 297–98; Theodore Roosevelt: A Biography, 384. 56. Roosevelt to Taft, July 31, 1905, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, p. 1293; Pringle, Taft, I, 297–99. 57. Katsura to Komura, August 8, 1905, NGB: 38, I, 450. 58. See, Griswold, Far Eastern Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938), 125–26. 59. Raymond A. Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement–Reality or Myth?” Journal of Modern History XXXI (March 1959): 50. For counter arguments, see Jongsuk Chae, “Taft-Katsura Memorandum Reconsidered,” The Pacific Historical Review XXXVI (1968): 321–26; Nagata, Seodoa, 119–34. 60. For his earlier view in 1900, see Roosevelt to von Sternberg, August 28, 1900, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, II, 1394. 61. Roosevelt to John Hay, January 28, 1905, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1112. 62. Roosevelt to George Von Lengerke Meyer, February 6, 1905. Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1115–16. 63. Ernest R. May, “The Far Eastern Policy of the United States in the Period of the Russo-Japanese War: A Russian View,” The American Historical Review LXII, 2 (January, 1957): 347. 64. Barry to Kennan, February 21, 1905, George Kennan Papers, Library of Congress (Washington), Container 3. quoted by Esthus, “Reality or Myth?,” 50; Nagata, Seodoa, 141. The author checked the same box at the Library of Congress in August 2006 and June 30, 2007, but the original letter was missing. 65. Kennan to Roosevelt, March 30, 1905, Roosevelt Papers, R. 53.

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66. Esthus, “The Taft-Katsura Agreement–Reality or Myth?,” 50; Nahm, “US Policy and the Japanese Annexation of Korea,” US-Korean Relations 1882–1982, ed, Tae-hwan Kwak, 39. 67. For this view, see Outten Jones Clinard, Japan’s Influence on American Naval Power (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947), University of California publication in history, 36, 43–44; Griswald, The Far Eastern Policy, 125–26; Nagata, Seodoa, 120–25. 68. Clinard, Japan’s Influence on American Naval Power, 47. 69. Speck von Sternburg to Chancellor von Bülow, May 9, 1904, Die Grosse Politik, Band. 19, pt. 1, 114. 70. Durand to Lansdowne, March 10, 1905, FO 5/2579, PRO. 71. Roosevelt to Kaneko, May 31, 1905; Roosevelt to Taft, May 31, 1905, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1198. For Roosevelt’s similar discussion with the French Ambassador, see J. J. Jusserand, What Me Befell, 301. 72. Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, June 16, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, 1905, 1233–34. For Roosevelt’s earlier concerns about Japanese design on the Philippines, see, Roosevelt to John Albert Tiffin Hull, March 16, 1905, ibid., 1140–41. As early as March 21, 1904, Roosevelt also expressed his hope that the confrontation between Japan and Russia would remove the Japanese threat toward the Philippines. See Sternburg to Foreign Ministry, March 21, 1904, Die Grosse Politik, 19 Band, pt. 1, 112–13. 73. For a discussion of the legal aspect of the agreement, see Jongsuk Chay, “TaftKatsura Memorandum Reconsidered,” The Pacific Historical Review XXXVI (1968): 323–24. 74. Cecil Spring Rice, The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice: A Record, ed. by Stephen Gwynn (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929), I, 449. 75. Durand to Lansdowne, January 23 and 26, 1905, Lansdowne MSS. xxxii. Quoted in George Monger, The End of Isolation: British Foreign Policy 1900– 1907 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1963), 181. 76. Lansdowne to Durand, January 25, 1905. FO 800.144, Microfilm, PRO. 77. MacDonald to Lansdowne, January 25, 1905, FO 800.134. 78. Durand to Lansdowne, January 30, 1905, quoted in Monger, End of Isolation, 182. See also, Durand to Landsdowne, August 4, 1905, FO 800.144. 79. Lodge to Roosevelt, June 29, 1905, Roosevelt Papers, Microfilm, R. 308. 80. Durand to Lansdowne, August 3 and 4, 1905, FO 800.134. 81. NGB: Nichiro Senso, V, 401–2. 82. J. J. Korostovetz, Pre-War Diplomacy: The Russo-Japanese Problem, Treaty Signed at Portsmouth, USA., 1905, Diary of J.J. Korostovetz (London: British Periodicals, 1920), 6; Esthus, Double Eagle and Rising Sun: the Russians and Japanese at Portsmouth in 1905 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), 85. 83. NGB, Nichiro Senso, V, 409–13; J. J. Korostovetz, Pre-War Diplomacy, 67–68; Esthus, Double Eagle and Rising Sun, 92; White, Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War, 269.

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84. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Protocols of the Peace Conference between Japan and Russia (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1906), 10. 85. This is the opinion of Professor Alfred Rubin at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Interview, February 23, 2001. 86. Nish, Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 333. 87. NGB: 38: I, 59–63. 88. For the defense problems Britain faced in Europe following the conclusion of entente cordiale with France in 1904, see note by Joseph Chaumie on the cabinet meeting of June 6, 1905, DDF (Paris: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères), 2nd Ser., VI, annex I, 602–3. 89. Korostovetz, Pre-War Diplomacy, 62–63. 90. Roosevelt to Meyer, August 21, 1905, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, V, 4–5; Roosevelt to Kaneko, August 22 and 23, 1905, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, IV, 1308–10, 1312–13. 91. Sergius Witte, The Memoir of Count Witte, 135, 159; Roman Romanovich Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 1922), I, 263–64; Katsura to Komura, August 28, 1905, NGB: Nichiro Senso, V, 300–301. For best analyses, see, Esthus, Double Eagle and Rising Sun, 109–83. 92. Kaneko Kentaro, Nichirokowa-ni-kanshi Beikokuni-okeru Yono Katsudo-nitsuite [Concerning my activities in the United States during the JapaneseRussian peace negotiations] (January 1939), Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Research Division 1. First Section, Kenseishi Hensankai Shushu-bunsho 118, Kenseishiryou-shitsu, Japan National Diet Library, 62. 93. Andrew C. Nahm, “US Policy and the Japanese Annexation of Korea,” 46–47. 94. MacDonald to Lansdowne, August 27, 1906, FO 800.134. 95. See, “Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1905,” Lansdowne Papers, British Library. 96. Komura Gaiko-shi, II, 154–55, 260. 97. Ibid, 260; Uchida to Komura, October 20, 1905, NGB: 38, I, 568. 98. A phrase, “as well as from chronic misgovernment,” was included in the earlier draft of September 3 but was deleted in the final draft of the telegram. See British Documents on the Origins of the War, IV, 174n3. 99. Ibid., 174–75. 100. Komura Gaiko-shi, II, 260–61. 101. For other powers’ reaction, see, John Espy Merill, American Official Reactions to the Domestic Policies of Japan in Korea, 1905–1910 (Ph.D. Diss. Stanford University, 1954), 70–72. 102. NGNB, I, 250–51. See also, NGB: 38, I, 519–20. 103. Unno, Kankoku Heigo, 148–50; Japan, Rikugun, Chosen Chusatsugun Rekishi, ed. Kim Chong-myong (Tokyo: Gannando Shoten), 277–78. 104. Griscom to Roosevelt, October 12, 1905, Roosevelt Papers, microfilm, R. l 60. See also, Morgan to Root, October 19, 1905, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 22. 105. Takahira to Komura, November 1, 1905, NGB: 38, I, 528–29. 106. Katsura to Takahira, November 6, 1905, ibid., 529. 107. November 11, 1905, Takahira to Katsura, ibid., 530. See also, “Korea and Japan,” The Korea Review, May 1905, 5, 162–70.

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108. Cha munseop, “Maegukui Apjapi Iljinhwoe,” Hanguk Hyeondaesa, 3–Minjokui Jeohang (Seoul: Shingu Munhwasa, 1969), 66–70. 109. Straight to Frederick Palmer, October 3, 1905, Straight Papers (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Library), Microfilm, R. 1. Morgan to Pak, Je Soon, October 14, 1905, Guhanguk Oegyomunseo [Diplomatic Document of Old Korea], 12, 791–92. 110. Straight to Schoellkopf, November 14, 1905, Straight Papers, Microfilm, R. 1. 111. Morgan to Root, October 14, 1905, Despatches, Korea, October 19, 1905, M. 134, R. 22. By sending a French instructor to China, the emperor also tried to inform France and Germany that the agreements concluded since the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war were not valid. Hagiwara to Komura, October 20, 1905, NGB: 38, I, 661–62. 112. Willard Straight also wrote in his diary during the summer of 1905, “instead of wishing to give Korea and the Korean people the benefits of a good government, they [Japanese] prefer to allow the present state of affairs to go from bad to worse so that they may be at some future date the more justified in assuming complete control.” Croly, Willard Straight, 172. 113. Korean Emperor to President Roosevelt, quoted in McKenzie, Korea’s Fight for Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1920), 102–3. 114. Japanese cabinet decision on October 27, 1905, NGNB, I, 250–51. 115. Croly, Willard Straight, 178, Hayashi Gonsuke, Waga Shichijunen-o Kataru [Memoirs of 70 Years] (Tokyo: Daiichi Shobo, 1935), 223–25, Tokyo Nichinichi Shimbun, November 25, 1905. 116. Guksa Pyunchan Wiwonhoe, Juhan Ilbongongsagwan Girok: 26, 118–25; Unno Fukuju, Kankoku Heigoushi-no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2000), 200–21. 117. This is the account by Hulbert. His account was based on his interview with Han Kyu-sul. Hulbert, “American Policy in the Case of Korea and Belgium,” The New York Times, March 5, 1916. See also, Hayashi to Katsura, November 18, 1905, Juhan Ilbongongsagwan Girok: 26, 125–26.For a more detailed account, see, Unno Fukuju, Gaiko Shiryo: Kankoku Heigo [Annexation of Korea: Diplomatic Documents] (Tokyo: Fuji Suppan, 2004), I, 282–83. 118. Hulbert, Homer B. Hulbert, “American Policy in the Cases of Korea and Belgium”; Yoon Byung-suk, “Eulsa 5 joyak Shingochal,” Ilbon-ui Daehanjeguk Gangjeom (Seoul: Kkachi, 1995), ed. Lee Tae-jin, 58–59. For the related report, see, NGB: 38, I, 550–51. 119. For the representative article that regarded the treaty invalid, see Francis Rey, “La Situation Internationale de la Corée,” Revue Générale de Droit Internationale Public, XIII (1906), 40–58. For the related debate, see Kim Gi-seok, “Gwangmuje-ui Jugwonsuho Oegyo,” Ilboneui Daehanjeguk gangjeom, 226–27. See also, Unno Fukuju, Kankoku Heigo, 162–64. 120. Morgan to Root, November 10, 1905, Despatches, Korea, Microcopies, M. 134, R. 22. 121. Straight to Schoelkopf, November 14, 1905, Straight Papers, microfilm, R. 1; Herbert Croly, Willard Straight (New York: MacMillan, 1924), 177. 122. Croly, Willard Straight, 176.

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123. Ibid., 180–81; Yunchiho Ilgi, 6, November 17, 1905, 194. 124. NGB: 38, I, Hayashi to Katsura, 538. British minister Jordan also sent a congratulatory message to Hayashi on November 18. 125. Morgan to Root, November 20, 1905, Despatches, Korea, M. 134, R. 22. 126. Rockhill to Root, November 22, 1905, Despatches, China, M. 92, R. 129. 127. Root to Morgan, November 24, 1905, Instructions, Korea, M. 77. R. 109; Root to Morgan, November 24, 1905, FRUS: 1905, 631. See, also, Root to Takahira, November 24, 1905, FRUS: 1905, 613–14; Root to Kim Yun Chung, November 24, 1905, FRUS: 1905, 632; Root to Griscom, November 24, 1905, FRUS: 1905, 614. See also, Croly, Willard Straight, 183. 128. Root to Diplomatic Officers of the United States, November 25, 1905, FRUS: 1905, 626. 129. Croly, Willard Straight, 192. For the official notification to withdraw the US legation from Korea, see, Morgan to Pak, November 28, 1905, Guhanguk Oegyomunseo: 12, 799–800; Morgan to Root, November, 28, 1905, FRUS: 1905, 632. 130. Katsura to Wilson, November 28, 1905, NGB: 38, I, 571–72; Komura to Rockhill, November, 26, 1905, Rockhill Papers, b*46M-386 (1427). 131. Croly, Willard Straight, 188. Western diplomatic representatives left Seoul, turning their business over to consular officials. See also, Jongsuk Chay, Diplomacy of Asymmetry, 158. 132. Straight to Schoellkopf, November 30, 1905, Straight Papers, microfilm, R. 1. 133. “Min Young Whan,” in The Korea Review, January 1906, 6, 7. 134. Homer B. Hulbert, “American Policy in the Cases of Korea and Belgium,” New York Times, March 5, 1916. Dennette, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, 303–5. 135. Hulbert, Ibid; McKenzie, Korea’s Fight for Freedom (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1920), 100–101. 136. File, December 11, 1905, Notes from Korean Legation, Microcopies, M. 166, R. 1. 137. Hulbert, “American Policy in the Cases of Korea and Belgium”; McKenzie, Korea’s Fight, 100; Roosevelt to Root, November 25, 1905, Morrison, Letters of Roosevelt, V, 96. 138. Takahira to Katsura, November 22, 1905, NGB: 38, I, 667–68. 139. Min to Root, December 7, 1905; Adee Memorandum, December 7, 1905, Notes from the Korean Legation, M. 166, R. 1. 140. Nagata, Seodoa, 158. 141. Takahira to Katsura, December 8, 1905, NGB: 38, I, 668–69. 142. Root to Min Yeung-Tchan, December 19, 1905, FRUS: 1905, 629. 143. “Told A Pathetic Story,” The Evening Star, December 11; “Prince Min Turned Down,” The Washington Post, December 12; “Emperor Will Not Sign the Agreement with Japan,” The Evening Star, December 13, 1905. Enclosed in Hioki to Katsura, December 13, 1905, NGB: 38, I, 669–72. 144. Root to Min Yeung-Tchan, December 19, 1905, FRUS: 1905, 629–30; “Memorandum,” December 19, 1905, Notes from the Korean Legation, M. 166, R. 1.

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For Kim Yun Chung’s message, notifying Yi Wan Yong’s instruction, see Yun Chung Kim to Root, December 16, 1905, Notes from Korean Legation, M. 166, R. 1. Root later recalled that it was impossible to intervene for the sake of Korea given the clear prospect of reluctance in the Congress and public opinion for such an intervention. He noted, “there was nothing we could do except fight Japan.” Root to Jessup, September 5, 1930, quoted in Jessup, Elihu Root, II, 62. 145. Moriyama Shigenori, Kindai Nikkan Kankei-shi Kenkyu, 227–49. 146. In June 1906, Kojong sent his personal letters to the eight major powers including the United States to clarify that the protectorate treaty was invalid. Kojong designated Hulbert as special envoy and entrusted him with this mission, but the letters could not be received by the powers because Kojong was forced to abdicate by the Japanese authority. For Kojong’s letters with the imperial seal, see Yong Jeung Kim Papers, Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Columbia University, Box 1, 4. 147. Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 78; Unno Fukuju, Gankokuheigo, 172–76, 180–82. 148. Chong-sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), 79–85; Duus, Abacus and Sword, 220–34; Unno, Kankoku Heigo, 185–96. 149. Ku, Hangook, 215–82; Ku, Korea under Colonialism (Seoul: Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch, 1985), 133–68. 150. Nagata Akifumi, Nihonno Chosentochito Kokusaikankei [Japanese Control of Korea and International Relations] (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005), chapters 6, 13.

Chapter 5 1. Jung Byeong-jun, Unam Yiseungman Yeongu [A Study of Rhee] (Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyeongsa, 2005), 91–94, 199–216. 2. Nagata Akifumi, Nihonno Chosentochito Kokusaikankei (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2005), 153–56, 381. 3. Hyeondae Hangukhak-yeonguso, ed., Unam Munseo [Rhee Papers] (Seoul: Gukhakjaryowon, 1998), VI, 441–44; Ko Jeong-hyu, Yiseungmangwa Hangukdokripwundong [Rhee and Korean Independence Movement] (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2004), 428. 4. See Paul C. McGrath, “United States Army in the Korean Conflict,” Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, Unpublished Manuscript, US Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 28; The US Army, 8th, History of the United States Armed Forces in Korea (HUSAFIK), ed. Dolbegae (Seoul, 1988), II, pt 2, 47–48; Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), 129–233. 5. Roosevelt to Welles, April 8, 1942, enclosing Soong’s memorandum, Department of State, FRUS: 1942, I, 866–69; Rhee to Hull, February 16, 1943, DS Records, 895.01/214, Box 5929, RG 59, NA. See also, Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man behind the Myth (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1954), 188.

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6. Berle to Grew, July 21, 1944, DS Records, 895.01/7-2144, Box 5930, RG 59, NA; Grew to Berle, July 31, 1944, DS Records, 895.01/ 7-2144, Box 5930, RG 59, NA; “Minutes of Meeting,” March 23, 1942, Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, William J. Donovan Papers, Microfilm, Roll 67, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. 7. Hull to Gauss, May 1, 1942, FRUS: 1942, I, 874, Gauss to Hull, December 6, 1943, FRUS: 1943, III, 1096, Gauss to Hull, May 19, 1944, FRUS: 1944, V, 1293. 8. Langdon memorandum, February, 1942, DS Records, 895.01/79, Box 5928, RG 59, NA. 9. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 1595–96. 10. Hull to Gauss, May 1, 1942, FRUS: 1942, I, 873–75. For a report highlighting Chinese skepticism about KPG, see, Gauss to Hull, “Disunity Among Korean Independence Groups,” May 16, 1942, Records of US Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea, 1940–1944, Decimal File 895. RG59LM79, Microfilm, R. 1, NA. For the difficulties the US government encountered while training “American Koreans,” see Captain Carl O. Hoffmann to Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, O.S.S., “Korean Situation,” June 15, 1943, R. 67. William J. Donovan Papers. 11. FRUS: 1942 I, 868–69; Memorandum by Mr. O. Edmund Clubb of the Division of Chinese Affairs, May 19, 1944, FRUS: 1944, VI (Washington, 1967), 785–93. 12. Gauss to Hull, April 10, 1942, FRUS: 1942, I, 869–70. 13. F.D.R. to Cordell Hull, October 17, 1944, Elliott Roosevelt ed., F.D.R. His Personal Letters (New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1950), II, 1546–47. Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Slaon and Pearce, 1945), 24–25. The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, compiled by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: Random House, 1945), 139, 296, 373. 14. P. Minutes 20, Meeting of August 1, 1942, Notter File Box 55, RG 59, NA, 17. 15. Ibid., 9; Foreign Policy Studies Branch (Division of Historical Policy Research, Office of Public Affairs) Department of State, United States Policy Regarding Korea 1834–1941 (May 1947), 37–39. 16. P. Minutes 51. Meeting of April 10, 1943, Notter File Box 55, RG. 59, NA, 9–11; Foreign Policy Studies Branch, United States Policy Regarding Korea, 37–39. 17. Atcheson to Hull, August 20, 1943, FRUS: 1943, III, 1095. 18. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), II, 1596; Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 438; Welles memorandum, March 29, 1943, FRUS:1943, China, 845–46. 19. FRUS, Cairo and Teheran, 1943, 399–404; 448–49. 20. FRUS, Cairo and Teheran, 1943, 869. 21. Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 133.

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22. Cordell Hull, Memoirs, II, 1583. See, “Questions Relating to the Far East,” December 4, 1943, Harry L. Hopkins Papers (Sherwood Collection), Box 331, FDR Library. 23. FRUS: Cairo and Tehran, 1943, 448–49. 24. John Paton Davies Jr., November 7, 1944, Department of State, United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (Washington, DC, 1949), 566–67. Hereafter noted as The China White Paper. 25. John S. Service, October 9, 1944, ibid., 573. 26. David Memorandum, “American Chinese Relations During the Next Six Months” November 15, 1944, FRUS: 1944, VI, 695–97. 27. See Vincent to Hurley, April 2, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 323–25; Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia, 77–81, 104–5; Cohen, America’s Response to China, 127–30, 133–34, 141–42. 28. FDR to Chiang, September 16, 1944, Map Room Paper, Box 10, FDR Library. 29. Hurley to FDR, November 16, 1944, Map Room Paper, Box 11, FDR Library; Russel Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: NY Cornell University Press, 1973), 184. 30. See the personal account by Hugh Borton, “Preparation for the Occupation of Japan,” The Journal of Asian Studies 25, 2 (February 1966): 203–4. 31. “Memo Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East: Korea: Occupation and Military Government: Composition of Forces,” March 29, 1944, FRUS: 1944, V, 1225–26. 32. On February 18, 1944, the senior US military planners had inquired to the State Department of the nature of interim governmental machinery and the administrative civil affairs responsibility of the US military in Korea. FRUS: 1944, V, 1194. 33. Ibid., 1226–27. In lieu of Britain, the memo assumed that Canada could participate in the military government representing the British dominion. 34. The memorandum noted, “It is assumed that the representation of other states will not be so large as to prejudice the effectiveness of American participation in CAA.” FRUS: 1944, V, 1227–28. 35. “Memorandum Prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East,” May 4, 1944, FRUS: 1944, V, 1240–41. 36. John Paton Davies Jr., Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters With China and One Another (New York: Norton, 1972), 390. 37. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 503; John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), 167. 38. For the sources of FDR’s optimistic character, see Doris K. Goodwin, “Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1933–1945,” Character Above All, ed. Robert A. Wilson (New York, N.Y.: Touchstone, 1995), 13–23. 39. Roosevelt to Churchill, R-624. September 28, 1944, Warren F. Kimball, ed., Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

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University Press 1984), III, 339. See also, Gaddis, Russia, Soviet Union, and the United States (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), 167–68. 40. For Roosevelt’s diplomatic style, see William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 4–5; Henry Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1949), 317, 321–23. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932–1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 519. 41. J.A.S. Grenville, A History of the World in the Twentieth Century, II (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997), 372. 42. See “Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan,” February 11, 1945, FRUS: 1945, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 984. 43. FRUS: 1945, Conference at Cairo and Teheran, 1943, 567, 869; Harriman to FDR, December 15, 1944, FRUS: 1945, Malta and Yalta, 378–79. 44. Averell Harriman and Elie Avel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941– 1946 (New York: Random house, 1975), 398. 45. FRUS:1945, Malta and Yalta, 984. See also, FRUS: 1945, Malta and Yalta, 768–69; 894–97. 46. FRUS: 1945, VI, 560–61. 47. FRUS: 1945, Malta and Yalta, 593–94, 698–99, 757–67, 834–41; Harrimann, Special Envoy, 396–400. 48. War Cabinet Confidential, annex, February 19, 1945, CAB 65/51; April 3, 1945, CAB 65/52, PRO. 49. FRUS: 1945, Malta and Yalta, 770. 50. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1947), 23. 51. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 867. 52. “Briefing Book Paper: Inter-Allied Consultation Regarding Korea,” FRUS: Malta and Yalta, 359. 53. Ibid., 358, 359, 361. 54. For similar problems in FDR’s dealing with Poland, see, Frazer J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origin of the Cold War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986), 69. For FDR’s lack of preparation for the possibility of fall of cooperation among the Allies, see Frederick W. Marks III, Wind Over Sand: The Diplomacy of Franklin Roosevelt (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 171, 173. 55. Iriye, The Cold War in Asia, 94–97. 56. FRUS, Malta and Yalta, 984. 57. Stimson Diary (New Haven: Yale University, 1973), Microfilm, R. 9, April 23, 1945.

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Chapter 6 1. For FDR’s concerns, see Roosevelt to Churchill, March 29, 1945, FRUS: 1945, V, 189–90; Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941–1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), 441. 2. Gaddis, The United States and the Origin of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 198–206. 3. Harriman to Stettinius, April 6, 1945, FRUS: 1945, V, 821–24; “Bohlen memorandum,” FRUS: 1945, V, 252–55. 4. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 405–7; Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929–1969 (New York: Norton, 1973), 188. 5. For later articulation of this point by Churchill, see Churchill to Truman, May 12, 1945, Char 20/218, Churchill Papers, Churchill Archive. 6. FRUS, Malta and Yalta, 786–88, 842–43, 846–54, 870–71; Edward R. Stettinius Jr., Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference (1949; repr. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1970), 246–47. 7. Clemens, Yalta, 189–90. 8. FRUS, Malta and Yalta, 787–88; 803–7. 9. Harriman, Special Envoy, 413; FRUS, Malta and Yalta, 980. 10. Warren F. Kimball, Roosevelt and Churchill: The Complete Correspondence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), III, 593. 11. For FDR’s own concerns before his death about Soviet occupation in Eastern Europe, See ibid., 593–97. 12. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wisemen: Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon, Schuster, 1986), 20. 13. Harriman to Stettinius, April 6, 1945, FRUS: 1945, V, 821–24; Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Wolff Book, 1951), 39–41. 14. Bohlen memorandum of Truman-Harriman conversation, April 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, V, 231–34. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 447–49; Truman, Year of Decisions, 70–71. 15. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 449–50. 16. Eden to Churchill (Telegram 2804), April 23, 1945, FO 371/47588, PRO. 17. Eden to Churchill, April 23, 1945 (telegram no. 2805), FO 371/47588, PRO; Cadogan to his wife, April 23, 1945, Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, ed. David Dilks (London: Cassell, 1971), 732. 18. Eden to Churchill, April 23, 1945 (telegram no. 2818), FO 371/47588; Same telegram, Char20/216, Churchill Papers. 19. Forrestal Diary, April 23, 1945, The Forrestal Diaries, 48–51; Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 451–53; Bohlen Memorandum of Truman meeting with advisors, April 23, 1945, FRUS: 1945, V, 252–55; Leahy, I Was There, 413. 20. Stimson Diary, April 3, 23, 1945. See also Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 605–11. 21. Recollecting Forrestal’s remark, Harriman noted that, differently from the Army, the US Navy and Airforce concluded that Russian help would not

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be needed in forcing the Japanese to surrender. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 452. 22. Truman, Year of Decisions, 78; Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 452. 23. Truman, Year of Decisions, 77, 79–82. FRUS: 1945, V, 256–58. 24. Truman, Year of Decisions, 81. 25. Ibid., 81–82; Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 453–54. For Stalin’s rebuttal, see Truman, Year of Decisions, 85–86. 26. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 453–54. 27. Stalin Message, included in Truman, Year of Decisions, 85–86. 28. Ibid., 84–85. 29. Ibid., 85. 30. Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, 56. 31. Gauss to Hull, December 6, 1943, FRUS: 1943, III, 1905. 32. See FRUS: 1945, VI, 1018–31; Joseph C. Grew, “Review of Policy Regarding Korea,” Department of State Bulletin, 12 (June 10, 1945), 1058–59. 33. Harriman noted that “two or three hundred millions in that country would march when the Kremlin ordered.” 34. Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries, 55–58. 35. Joseph C. Grew and Walter Johnson, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904–1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), II, 1456–57; Grew to Forrestal, FRUS: 1945, VII, 869–70. 36. “Memorandum of telephone conversation” between Grew and Stettinius, May 12, 1945, Joseph Grew Papers, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA., MS Am 1687.3, v. 7 (11). 37. Grew and Johnson, Turbulent Era, II, 1446. 38. Grew and Johnson, Turbulent Era, II, 1445–46. 39. Ibid., 1449–50; Stimson Diary, May 15, 1945. 40. FRUS: 1945, Potsdam, I, 3–20. For Churchill’s suggestion to hold an early Big 3 summit, see Churchill to Eden, May 4, 1945, Char 20/217; Churchill to Truman, May 11, 1945, Char, 20/218, Winston Churchill Papers, Churchill Archives. 41. Churchill to Truman, May 11, 1945, Char 20/218, Churchill Papers. 42. Churchill to Truman, May 12, 1945, Char 20/218, Churchill Papers. 43. Truman to Churchill, May 12, 1945, Char 20/218; Eden to Churchill, May 14, 1945, Char 20/219, Churchill Papers. Regarding such a scheme, Eden observed, “I am myself far from clear as to how this can be done.” 44. Churchill to Truman, May 13, 1945, Char 20/219. 45. Memorandum by Joseph Grew, May 15, 1945, FRUS: 1945, Conference of Berlin, I, 12–15; Grew and Johnson, Turbulent Era, 1462–64. 46. Eden to Churchill, May 14, 1945, Churchill Papers, Char 20/219. 47. Freeman memorandum to Marshall, February 13, 1945, “The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945,” (Department of Defense, September, 1955), 51–52. 48. Herbert Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 13–14.

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49. Stimson to Grew, May 21, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 876–78. Grew and Johnson, Turbulent Era, II, 1458–59. See also, “The Entry of the Soviet Union Into the War Against Japan,” 68–71. 50. Stimson, “Introduction,” Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, 15. See also, FRUS: 1945, V, 253. 51. Stimson Diary, April 23, 1945. 52. McCloy Diary, May 19, 1945, Record of the Army Staff (Office of the Chief of Military History), 2–307 AB-C, John McCloy’s Diary 1944–1945, RG 319, NA; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1949), 356. 53. Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945. For Stimson’s preference for diplomatic compromise with the Russians over confrontation, see Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 387–88. 54. Stimson wrote that Marshall was “one of the very few men that know about S-1.” Stimson Diary, May 1, 1945. 55. Stimson Diary, May 13, 1945, Yale University Library. For original message, see FRUS: 1945, VII, 869–70. 56. Stimson Diary, May 13, 1945. 57. Ibid., May 14, 1945. 58. Ibid., May 15, 1945. 59. Ibid. 60. Personal Memorandum, Stimson to Truman, enclosed in Stimson Diary, May 16, 1945. See also, Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 191. 61. Truman, Year of Decisions, 87. See also, Stimson Diary, April 25, 1945. 62. Truman, Year of Decisions, 87. 63. Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945. See also, Joseph E. Davis Diary, May 21, 1945. Davis MSS, Box 17, Library of Congress. Truman told Davies, “The test was set for June, but had been postponed until July.” In his open explanation, Truman used the excuse of pressing domestic concerns including budget work. See FRUS: 1945, Potsdam, I, 4, 10, 13. Anthony Eden reported on May 14, “In general, I was struck by the President’s air of quiet confidence in himself.” Truman said at one point of his talk with Eden, “I am here to make decisions, and whether they [Russians] prove right or wrong I am going to take them.” Eden to Churchill, May 14, 1945, Char 20/219, Churchill Papers. 64. Davies memorandum of conversation with Truman, May 13, 1945, Davies MSS, Box 16. See also Davies to Truman, May 12, 1945, Char 20/219, Churchill Papers. 65. See Truman, Year of Decisions, 257–61; Bohlen, Witness to History, 215. 66. For Truman’s hope to straighten the US-Russian relations through Hopkins mission, see Wilson Miscamble, From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 135–48. 67. Grew to Forrestal, May 21, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 879. 68. Ibid., 879–82.

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69. For China policy debate in the US government, see Russell D. Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), 188–209. 70. FRUS: 1945, VII, 882–83. 71. Ibid., 883–84. 72. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1949), 320–23. 73. McCloy to Grew, FRUS: 1945, VII, 884–87. 74. Ibid., 886. 75. For work highlighting this point, see Mark Paul, “Diplomacy Delayed,” Child of Conflict, ed. Bruce Cummings (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), 67–93. 76. FRUS: 1945, Potsdam, I, 43–45. See also, John Paten Davies Jr., Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another (New York: Norton, 1972), 398. 77. FRUS: 1945, Potsdam, I, 41–46; Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 472–73. 78. FRUS, Potsdam, I, 47. 79. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 471. 80. Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (Harper & Brothers, 1948), 910. 81. FRUS: 1943, Cairo and Teheran, 399–403. 82. John P. Davies Jr., Dragon by the Tail, 397, 405–7. See also, Davies Memorandum, July 10, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 928–32. 83. Grew to Harriman, June 2, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 892. 84. Harriman to Stettinius, June 4, 1945, ibid., 893. 85. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 468–70. For the achievements of Hopkins mission, see ibid., 470–75. 86. Bohlen Memorandum, June 6, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, I, 60. 87. Mu Tao and Sun Zhike, Piorin 27 nyun: Daehan Minguk Imsijungbu (Seoul: Kungook University Press, 1992), translation of Dahanminguo Linshizhengfu Zai Zhongguo (Shanghei: Shanghei Renmin Chubanshe), 160–62. 88. Robert T. Oliver, close assistant to Rhee since 1942, wrote that in September 1942 Young-jeung Kim bitterly contested Rhee’s claim to the leadership of Korean independence movement in the United States, and later Kilsoo Han also challenged Rhee’s leadership. Oliver wrote that Kilsoo Han’s “air of bravado and confidence won him friends in the lower echelon of the Department of State.” Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942–1960 (Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978), 5, 15. 89. Ballantine Memorandum, February 5, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1018–20. 90. Rhee’s letter to the Department of State, February 5, 1945, quoted in FRUS: 1945, VI, 1022. 91. James C. Dunn to Hurley, February 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1022–23; Kennan to Secretary of State, April 17, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1026–27. 92. Atcheson (the US Charge in China) to the Secretary of State, March 1, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1024; FRUS: 1944, V, 1293.

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93. Grew to Hurley, March 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1024–25. Rhee had cooperated with the O.S.S. to train Koreans to join the NAPKO plan to inject agents before the US invasion of Korea, but this plan was aborted because of Japan’s early surrender. 94. Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 198–99. Oliver wrote that many Korean leaders in the United States by that time believed that the only “practical” solution for Korea would be a communist coalition government. They represented themselves as “realists” and denounced Rhee as being “stubbornly unrealistic,” and they won the support of Dr. George McCune, head of the Korean desk in the department. 95. Rhee to Secretary of State, April 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1027. 96. Oliver, ibid., 192–207. 97. Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 199–200; Jung Byung Joon, Unam Yeongu, 263–65. 98. Rhee to Truman, May 15, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1028–29. 99. Frank P. Lockhart (Acting Director of Office of Far Eastern Affairs) to Rhee, June 5, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI 1029–30. The British and French governments shared almost the same view about the issue of recognizing the KPG. See Atcheson telegram and Winant telegram, April 9, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1025–26.

Chapter 7 1. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 8, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 920–21. T.V. Soong resisted Stalin’s claim, noting that the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924 did recognize China’s sovereignty in Outer Mongolia. Hurley to Byrnes, July 6, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 918. 2. Department of State, China White Paper, August 1949 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1967), I, 115. 3. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 11, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 927; ibid., July 13, 1945, 933–34. 4. Shokaisheki Hiroku [Memoir of Chiang Kei-shek] I (Tokyo: Sankei Shinbun, 1975), 68–69. FRUS: 1945, VII, 926–28. 5. See report by John P. Davis, FRUS: 1945, VII, 930–32; “Notes taken at Sinosoviet Conferences,” Victor Hoo Papers, Box 6, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Library, Stanford University, 44, 61; Geoffrey Roberts, Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 283–84, 287. 6. The China White Paper, I, 115. 7. For counterargument by Harriman, see Harriman, Special Envoy, 483. 8. See The China White Paper, I, 114 (note). 9. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 482–83. For the text of Yalta agreement on the Far East, see, FRUS: 1945, Conference at Malta and Yalta, 984. 10. Harriman to Byrnes, “Memorandum for the Secretary,” July 28, 1945, FRUS: 1945, Potsdam, II, 1244. 11. See “US Interpretation of the Yalta Agreement,” FRUS: 1945, VII, 937.

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12. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 11, July 13, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 927, 933–34. 13. Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 483. For earlier position of the Chinese Nationalists, expressed by T. V. Soong, see, “Memorandum by Mr. Dewitt C. Poole,” May 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 871–72. Later Vincent, the chief of the division of Chinese affairs, confided in his draft policy memorandum that “the Chinese are in no position to bargain” and noted, “our interpretation of the Yalta commitments is for them controlling.” See Vincent to Dunn, July 23, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1242. 14. Byrnes to Harriman, July 4, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 914. 15. Byrnes to Harriman, July 6, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII, 916–17. 16. Grew to Byrnes, “US Interpretation of Yalta Agreement” [Annex], July 13, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 941. 17. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 12, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 932–33; China White Paper, I, 114. 18. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 13, 1945, ibid., 933–34. 19. Stimson Diary, July 15, 1945. 20. During the Potsdam conference, American officials believed Great Britain to be a “junior” partner of the United States, and British leaders also recognized such a reality in their internal discussions. See John Balfour (British Charge in Washington) to Bevin, September 8, 1945 (AN 2851/763/45), FO 371/44635, PRO; Minute from Churchill to Cadogan, June 17, 1945, Churchill Papers, Char 20/209 (Reel 253, Series 2: Part 4), Churchill Archives Center, Churchill College, Cambridge University; Cadogan Diary, August, 2, 15, 1945, David Dilks, ed, The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945 (London: Cassell, 1971), 778, 782. 21. Grew to Stimson, June 28, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 556. See also, “An Estimate of Conditions in Asia and the Pacific at the Close of the War in the Far East and Objective and Policies of the United States,” June 22, 1945, ibid., 556–80. 22. Ibid., 557, 577. 23. Ibid., 558. 24. Ibid., 577. 25. Ibid., 577–78. 26. Ibid., 560–61. 27. Ibid., 563–64. 28. Ibid., 565–66; 578–79. 29. Ibid., 566, 579. 30. Ibid., 561–63. It noted that the Soviet Union was not a signatory in the declaration. 31. FRUS: 1945, VI, 562. 32. “Davies Memorandum,” July 10, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 928–29. 33. Ibid., 930–32. 34. “Briefing Book Paper,” undated, FRUS: 1945, Potsdam, I, 310–11. 35. Ibid., 314. 36. Ibid., 311–12.

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37. During the Yalta conference, FDR expected Korean trusteeship to last for twenty to thirty years. Then Stalin said that the shorter the trusteeship period the better and expressed approval when the president said foreign troops would not be stationed in Korea. FRUS: 1945, Potsdam, I, 309–10. 38. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 3, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 914. 39. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, July 9 [8], 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 924. 40. Stimson to Truman, “Memorandum for the President,” July 16, 1945, FRUS: 1945, Potsdam, II, 631. This memo was submitted to Byrnes for transmittal to Truman. Note 1, ibid. 41. Edward Buxton to Rose Conway, “Memorandum to the President,” June 23, 1945, M-1642, R. 25, RG 226, Records of the OSS Washington Director’s Office, 1941–1945, NA. 42. This was the later recollection of Bolen, based on his longhand note. FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1583–84. 43. FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1586–87. 44. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York; Harper, 1958), 290–91. 45. Harriman recalled that Truman had been astonishingly well prepared. See Special Envoy, 485. 46. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 637. 47. Ibid., 637. 48. Leahy Diary, July 17, 1945, William D. Leahy Papers, Library of Congress. 49. Walter Brown Note (Brown, Walter, Excerpts from the “Book”), July 20, 1945, Box 2-1, State Department Material, James Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library. 50. Stimson Diary, July 16, 1945. 51. Stimson Diary, July 18, 1945. For the early reports about S-1, see FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1360–61. 52. For the detailed special report, received by special courier, see Grove (The Commanding General, Manhattan District project) to Stimson, Washington, July 18, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1361–68. 53. Stimson Diary, July 21, 1945. 54. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), 637–38. See also, William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Wittlesey House, 1950), 430–31. 55. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 638; Stimson Diary, April 25, 1945. 56. Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945; Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 387–88. 57. Forrestal Diary, June 12, 19, 1945. Millis, ed., Forrestal Diary (New York: Viking, 1951), 68–70. Stimson Diary, July 24, 1945. For elaboration of this point, see Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy, 97–98, 111, 116–18, 146–47, 156–57. 58. Stimson Diary, July 17, 1945. Byrnes recalled that after hearing this confidence of Truman he was “encouraged but not quite that confident.” See Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 291. 59. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 291. 60. Stimson Diary, July 18, 1945. See also, Stimson Diary, June 6, 1945.

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61. Stimson to Truman, July 16, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1223–24. 62. He wrote in his diary that “Byrnes evidently accepted that advice.” Stimson Diary, July 17, 1945. About this time, Chiang Kei-shek also informed them that China went to the limit in meeting the Soviet demand to fulfill the Yalta formula (and even beyond in the case of Outer Mongolia). Chiang asked them for their support so that Stalin would not insist on the impossible. See Hurley to Byrnes and Truman, July 19, 20, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1224–27. 63. Russell to Byrnes, July 20, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1227; Vincent to Dunn, ibid., 1229. 64. Vincent to Dunn (Assistant Secretary of State), July 19, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1228–30; Harriman to Byrnes, [Babelsberg] July 28, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 1243–44. 65. Robert L. Messer, The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 77. 66. Robert L Messer, The End of an Alliance, 11–92; David Robertson, Sly and Able: A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes (New York: Norton, 1994), 15–33. 67. Messer, The End of an Alliance, 97. 68. Ibid., 94–95. 69. Halifax to Eden, July 3, 1945 (AN 2136/245/45), FO 371/44620, PRO. 70. Messer, The End of an Alliance, 48, 52. See also Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 239. 71. Richard Hewlett and Oscar Anderson Jr., The New World: A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, I (University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University, 1962), 357. 72. Walter Brown Note, August 6, 1945; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper, 1947), 257; Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 247–48. 73. Truman Diary, July 7, 1945, Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman, ed. Robert Ferrell (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 49. 74. Truman Diary, July 7, 1945. See also, Halifax to Eden, July 3, 1945. FO 371/44620, PRO. 75. Walter Brown Note, July 20, 1945; July 24, 1945. On July 16, Stalin stated that a prerequisite of Soviet entry to the war against Japan was the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and cooperation, envisioned in the Yalta agreement. See FRUS, Potsdam, II, 43–46, 1582–87. 76. Walter Brown Note, July 20, 1945; July 24, 1945; Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 291; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, 208; Walter Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 78. So much was delegated to the three foreign ministers that Stalin at one point quipped, “we shall have nothing to do.” FRUS, Potsdam, II, 63. 77. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 291; Truman wrote in his diary of 18 July 1945: “[I b]elieve [the] Japs will fold up before Russia comes in. I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland.” Diary entry, July 18, 1945, Truman Diary, ed. Ferrell, Off the Record, 54.

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78. Walter Brown Note, July 20, 1945. 79. FRUS, Potsdam II, 609. 80. July 7, 1945, Truman Diary, ed. Ferell, Off the Record, 48–49. Truman wrote in his diary on July 25 that “it seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.” Truman Diary, July 25, 1945, ed. Ferrell, Off the Record, 56. 81. Stimson Diary, July 19, 1945. 82. “Thompson Minutes,” FRUS, Potsdam, II, 252–53; “Cohen Notes,” FRUS, Potsdam, II, 264. 83. “Thomson Minutes,” FRUS, Potsdam, II, 252–56; “Cohen Notes,” FRUS, Potsdam, II, 260–266; Leahy, I Was There, 408; Truman, Year of Decision, 373–75; Byrnes, All in One Lifetime, 294–95. 84. Lt. Paul C. McGrath, “United States Army in the Korean Conflict,” unpublished manuscript, Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of Army, US Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 22–23. The US Army and Navy codenamed these areas of occupation as Blacklist and Campus, respectively. 85. For decision-making structure in the JCS on politico-military affairs, see McGrath, “US Army in the Korean Conflict,” 9–10, 33. 86. JCS to MacArthur and Nimitz, July 21, 1945, Terminal Despatches out, July 12–26, Box 19, Double Zero 1941–1946 (Office Files of the C.N.O. Double Zero Files), 370/47/11/3, RG 38 NA This message of JCS noted that the administration and occupation of Korea would most likely be on a quadripartite basis. 87. “Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes,” July 24, 1945, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 347. 88. Ibid., 351. 89. McGrath, “US Army in the Korean Conflict,” 26–27. 90. Ibid., 25–26. This internal history of the US Army noted that these zones did not have any logical connection with the later decision to divide Korea at the thirty-eighth parallel. For detailed discussion of zones, see, FRUS, Potsdam, II, 410–12, 1327–28. 91. Rhee to Truman, July 21, 1945, and Rhee to Lockhart (Acting Chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), July 25, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1031–36. 92. McGrath, “US Army in the Korean Conflict,” 27; US Army, the 8th, HUSAFIK, II, pt. 2, 48. 93. Chief, SI. to Director, O.S.S., “Colonel Eifler’s Memo on Penetration of Korea,” March 26, 1945; CHAFX, KUNNING to O.S.S., April 29, 1945; CHAFX, KUNNING to O.S.S.; May 7, 1945, Colonel Carl F. Eifler to Major General William Donovan, June 6, 1945, “Plan of Organization–Project NAPKO,” R. 130, William Donovan Papers, Microfilm, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Due to the early end of the war, these plans were not implemented. 94. Rhee to Truman, July 21, 1945, and Rhee to Lockhart (Acting Chief of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), July 25, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1031–36.

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95. “Memorandum of Conversation, by Kennan,” Moscow, August 8, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 960–65; Harriman to Byrnes, August 10, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 966–67. Harriman’s efforts were particularly focused on the effort to secure Port Dairen away from the Soviet military zone. See Harriman to Byrnes, August, 13, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 970–71. 96. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, August 8, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 965. See also, “Notes taken at Sino-Soviet Conferences, Moscow 1945,” Victor Hoo Papers, Box 6, Folder 9, Hoover Institution Library, Stanford University, 43–44, 48–56. 97. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 177–91. 98. Harriman to Byrnes, August 8, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 958–59. See also, Byrnes to Harriman, August 9, 1945, ibid., 965–66. 99. Truman, Memoirs, I, 433. 100. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, August 10, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 967; Truman, Memoir, I, 434. 101. See Hasegawa, Racing the Enemies, 217. 102. This is the account of Dean Rusk, made on July 12, 1950. See FRUS, 1945, VI, 1039; James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, US Army, 1972), 8–9; Truman, Year of Decisions, 444–45. 103. McGrath, “US Army in the Korean Conflict,” 33. 104. Lincoln to Charles Donnelly, JCS Historical Section, July 18, 1949, RG 319, Records of the Army Staff (Records of the Office of the Chief of Military History), 2–3.7, CG5, Washington Command post, Box 372, NA, 3. 105. McGrath, “US Army in the Korean Conflict,” 44–45. 106. Ibid., 46. 107. Lincoln to Donnelly, 3. 108. Ibid., 2. 109. McGrath, “The US Army in the Korean Conflict,” 43–44. 110. Lincoln to Donnelly, 3. 111. Ibid., 3; Attached memo to Ibid, “Memorandum of Comments on History of OPD,” 20, 23. 112. McGrath, “The U.S Army in the Korean Conflict,” 46–47; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 10. 113. Lincoln to Charles Donnelly, July 18, 1949, 3. 114. McGrath, “The U.S Army in the Korean Conflict,” 48. 115. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USS.R., Stalin’s Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman, 1941–45 (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1958), 261–69; McGrath, “The U.S Army in the Korean Conflict,” 50–53; Harriman and Abel, Special Envoy, 499–500; Forrestal Diary, August 10, 1945, Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (London: Cassell, 1952), 95. 116. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, August 14, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VII, 971–73. For the text of the treaty, see The China White Paper, II, 585–96.

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117. For the negotiation on August 13, see “Notes taken at Sino-Soviet conferences,” Victor Hoo Papers, Box 6, Folder 9, 70–74. 118. FRUS: 1945, VII, 972–73. 119. Harriman to Truman and Byrnes, August 14, 1945, FRUS, 1945, VII, 973–74; Ballentine to Byrnes, FRUS: 1945, VII, August 15, 1945, 975–76. 120. N.G. Lebedev, “Suhaenghaeyahal Uimureul Jagakhamyeo” [Conscious of the Duties], Soviet Academy of Science, Leningradrobuteo Pyongyangkkaji [From Leningrad to Pyongyang: Memoirs of the Soviet Generals in Liberating Korea] (Seoul: Hamseong, 1989), 76–89; S. E. Zaharov, “Taepyeongyang Hamdae,” [The Pacific Fleet], ibid., 101–29. 121. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, 10, 16. 122. Vincent to Acheson, Oct. 1, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1066–67; Beninghoff to Byrnes, Oct. 1, 1945, ibid., 1065–66. See also, James Matray, Reluctant Crusade, 50–51. 123. Truman, Memoir, Years of Trial and Hope, 317 124. Byrnes, “Report by Secretary of State on the Meeting of Foreign Ministers,” Department of State Bulletin (DSB), December 30, 1945, 1035. 125. John H. Hildring, Assistant Secretary of State, “Korea-House Divided” [Address delivered before the Economic Club of Detroit], March 10, 1947, DSB, March 23, 1947, 545. 126. McGrath, “The U.S Army in the Korean Conflict,” 33–34; Lincoln to Charles Donnelly, JCS Historical Division, July 18, 1949, 2. 127. McGrath, “The U.S Army in the Korean Conflict,” 33.

Chapter 8 1. See Hodge to MacArthur, December 16, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1144–48. 2. Morita Yoshio, Chousen Shusenno Kiroku [The Record of the End of the War in Korea] (Tokyo: Gannando, 1964), 70; Guksapyeonchan Wiwonhwoe, Shtykov Diary (Gwacheon, 2003), 180. 3. George M. McCune, “Occupation Politics in Korea,” Far Eastern Survey XV, 3. (February 13, 1946), 33–34. McCune had been in charge of Korean affairs in the Department of State before writing this article. 4. Baek Nam-hun, “Hangukminjudang Changdang Bihwa” [The Hidden Story behind KDP’s Inauguration], Jinsang (April 1960), published in Hangukminjudang Yeongu, I, ed. Sim Ji-yeon (Seoul: Pulbit, 1982), 143–49. 5. Song Nam-hun, Haebang Samnyeonsa [History of Three Years after Liberation], I (Seoul: Kkachi, 1985), 65–66, 121–23. 6. The 8th US Army, History of the US Armed Forces in Korea (HUSAFIK), II, pt. 2, ed. Dolbegae (Seoul: 1988), 48–49, Song Nam-hun, Haebang, 127–29: G-2 Weekly Summary, no. 11 (27 November, 1945), 4. 7. Kim Ku, “Imshi Jeongbu Dangmyeon Jeongchaek” [KPG Policies], September 3, 1945, Guksa Pyeonchan Wiwonhwoe, Jaryo Daehanminguksa: I (1968), 46–47; Incl. #2 to G-2 Weekly Summary, 9 (November 7, 1945), No. 2; “Announcement of Kim Ku,” Jaryo: I, 463; Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee

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and American Involvement in Korea, 1942–1960: A Personal Narrative (Seoul: Panmun Book, 1978), 29. 8. FRUS: 1945, VI, 1131. FRUS: 1946, VIII, 754; Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 29. 9. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, I: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), chapters 9 and 10. 10. G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 58 (October 25, 1946); G-2 Periodic Report, No. 373 (November 5, 1946); JoongAng Ilbo-sa, Birok: Joseon-minjujuui Inmingonghwaguk [Secret Record: D.P.R.K.] (Seoul: Joongang Ilbosa, 1992), 263. 11. G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 56 (October 11, 1946), 6, 10. This report wrote, “it is fairly well established that as many as 10,000 members of the Communist Party of North Korea infiltrated into South Korean industry during the past several months in order to organize, agitate, and lead the South Korean labor strikes.” For Soviet support and consultation for the strike and guerilla struggle in the south, see Shytikov Diary, September 28; October 21, 1946, 20, 27. 12. Tokyo to FO, 14 February 1947, F2867, FO371/63831, PRO. This telegram reported signs of strain in North Korean economy due to heavy central control. 13. Joongang Ilbosa, Birok, 177–78. 14. I.M. Chischakov, “Je 25-gunui Jeontu-haengro,” [The 25th Army’s Road of Combat], in The Soviet Academy of Science, Leningradrobuteo Pyongyangkkaji [From Leningrad to Pyongyang: Memoirs of the Soviet Generals in liberating Korea] (Seoul: Hamseong, 1989), 56–60; I.M. Lebedev, “Suhaenghal Uimureul Jagakhamyeo,” ibid., 91. 15. Ibid., 56–57, 195–97. 16. Ibid., 65–66, 177–78, 265, 292–97. 17. Benninghoff to Byrnes, September 15, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1050–51. Substantially the same report was sent from Hodge to MacArthur on September 13, 1945. 18. Langdon to Byrnes, August 23, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 728; George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950), 214–16. 19. Benninghoff to Byrnes, October 1, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1065–66. 20. Hodge to MacArthur, November 2, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1106; Harriman to Byrnes, November 12, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1121–22; Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 18. 21. Benninghoff to Byrnes, September 15, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1053. 22. Robertson to Byrnes, September 25, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1057. 23. McCloy to Acheson, November 13, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1122–24. 24. Langdon to Byrnes, November 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1130–33. See also, Atcheson (in Tokyo, after meeting Rhee).to Byrnes, October 15, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1091–92. 25. Langdon to Byrnes, November 20, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1130–32. 26. Ibid., 1132. For political mood in support Kim Ku in Seoul, see New York Times, November 26, 1945, noted in FRUS: 1945, VI, 1138.

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27. Ibid., 1133. On December 5, 1945, the AMG inaugurated the Military English School to train sixty officers, who would assist US forces and lead the South Korean constabulary forces. This school trained 110 officers until May 1946, when a more proper military academy was inaugurated in southern Korea. JoongAng Ilbo, August 11, 2008. 28. FRUS: 1945, VI, 1132. 29. Byrnes to Langdon, November 29, 1945, Ibid, 1137–38. 30. SWNCC 176/8, approved on October 13, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1073, 1081. The earlier version of this document was drafted and circulated on September 1 as SWNCC 176/3 and kept being updated. 31. For Langdon’s later support for the trusteeship, after experiencing vehement resistance against trusteeship by KPG leaders, see Langdon to Byrnes, May 8, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 670; Landon to Byrnes, May 24, 1946, ibid., 685–89. 32. Hilldring Memorandum, June 6, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 692–96. 33. See Moscow Communique in Harriman to Byrnes, December 27, 1945, FRUS: 1945, VI, 1150–51. 34. Seo Jung-seok, Nambuk Hyupsang: Kim Kyu-sik-ui Gil, Kim Ku-ui Gil [SouthNorth Negotiations: Roads taken by Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Ku] (Seoul: Hanwul, 2000), 24–29. 35. For Hodge’s bitter feelings about Rhee’s activities, which he described as “the perfidy of the old s.o.b.,” see Hodge to Goodfellow, January 28, 1947, Goodfellow Paper, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archive, Stanford University. 36. FRUS: 1946, VIII, 689. 37. See, HUSAFIK, II, pt. 2, 88–90. 38. Appendix B to Hilldring Memorandum, June 6, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 695, 698–99. For Lyuh’s initiative for coalition, see Dokrip Sinbo, May 26, 1946. 39. FRUS, 1946, VIII, 697. 40. Langdon to Byrnes, October 9, 1946, FRUS, 1946, VIII, 744. 41. See, Dokrip Sinbo, October 13, 1946; Sincheonji I, 8 (August 1946): 17, 30–31; Simjiyon, Hanguk Jeongdang Jeongchisa [History of Korean Party Politics] (Seoul: Baeksan, 2004), 40–42. 42. HUSAFIK, II, chapter 4, 43; Jung Yong wook, Haebang Jeonhu Miguk-ui Daehan Jeongchaek [US Policy toward Korea before and after Liberation] (Seoul: SNU, 2003), 478. For US efforts to encourage the inauguration of a moderate coalition, see Cummings, The Origins, I, 255–59. 43. For broader aspects of US occupation of Korea, see Bonnie Oh, ed., Korea under the American Military Government, 1945–1948 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002). 44. HUSAFIK, II, chapter 2, 48–49. 45. AMG had high regards about Kim Kiu-sik and Lyuh Woon-hyung in 1946. General Arnold wrote, “Kim Koo has lost out completely. Syngman Rhee, while powerful, is completely self-seeking.” FRUS: 1946, VIII, 743. See also, Yi Chong-sik, Kim Kyu-sik-ui Saengae [Life of Kim Kyu-sik] (Seoul: Shinku Munhwasa, 1974). 46. Chong-sik Lee, Kim Kyusik, 174.

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47. “G-2 Weekly Summary,” No. 63 (November 29, 1946); Seoul (Kermode) to FO, July 21, 1947, F9942/54/81, FO 371/63836, PRO. 48. Lee Cheol-seung and Pak kap-dong, Daehanminguk Ireokke Seweotda [R.O.K. was founded in this way] (Seoul: Gemyeong-sa, 1998), 267–68, 339–42. When Lyuh inaugurated his Laboring People’s Party in April 1947, a British diplomat reported, “his [Lyuh’s] declaration brings disappointment to the moderate Right and Center” and “leaves his attitude to Communism sufficiently vague to permit him at any moment to jump in the direction that discretion may require.” Seoul (Kermode) to FO, May 6, 1947 (F8110/54/81), FO 371/ 63845, PRO. 49. See Chong-sik Lee and Robert Scalapino, Communism in Korea, pt. I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 233–312. 50. Joongang Ilbosa, Birok (Seoul: 1992), 254–56; Kim Nam-sik, Namrodang Yeongu (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1984), 358–61. 51. HUSAFIK, II, chapter 2, 142; “G-2 Weekly Summary,” No. 61 (14 November 1946); Seoul to FO, April 17, 1947 (F8176/54/81), FO 371/63835, PRO. 52. Ambassador Muccio interview, February 10 and 18, 1971, HSTL Oral History, 22. 53. For the mutual animosity between Rhee and Hodge, see Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 22, 24, 32, 47. 54. Rhee to Goodfellow, November 9, 1946, Goodfellow Paper, Box 1; Lim Byeong-jik, Imjeong-eseo Indokkaji [Diplomatic Memoir] (Seoul: Yeowonsa,1964), 280, 299–301. For Rhee’s ambition and popularity in South Korea, see Diary entry, Robert Oliver, July 18, 1946, quoted in Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 38. Citing a US colonel in the AMG, Oliver claimed that the communists did not receive more than 21 percent of the vote in the local elections. For Rhee’s critique of AMG’s soft approach to communists, see Rhee to Goodfellow, October 16, 1946, Goodfellow Paper, Box 1. 55. The Chosun Ilbo, June 5, 1946. 56. Seoul Shinmun, February 27, 1947; US Armed Forces in Korea, G-2 Weekly Summary, Institute of Asian Culture Studies, Hallym University ed. (1990), 76 (February 27, 1947), 77 (March 6, 1947), 78 (March 13, 1947). 57. G-2 Weekly Summary, 62 (November 21, 1946). 58. Shtykov Diary, September 26, 1946, 17. 59. Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 111–16. 60. May, The Truman Administration and China, 1945–1949 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975), 8, 14. 61. Schaller, The United States and China, 111–16. 62. JCS to the SWNCC, June 9, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 838–44. See also Ernest May, The Truman Administration, 17. 63. US Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 82nd Cong., 1st session, 1951, 465. This was based on Marshall’s recollection.

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64. Gen. Lucas (Chief of the Army Advisory Group in China) to Stuart (Ambassador in China), June 28, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 861–62; General Wedemeyer to Ringwalt (the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs), October 13, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 893. 65. Vincent to Marshall, June 20, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 849. 66. “Minutes of a meeting,” November 3, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 911. See also, “Wedemeyer Memorandum,” October 13, 1947, ibid., 893; Marshall to Ambassador Stuart, November 28, 1947, ibid., 923. In November 1945, the flamboyant US ambassador to China, Hurley, resigned, openly criticizing the China hands in the State Department as supporting the Communists in China. See Russell D. Buhite, Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1973), 253–81. 67. Carter to Marshall, August 14, 1945, FRUS: 1946, X, 27–28; May, The Truman Administration, 18–19. 68. Stuart to Marshall, March 26, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 85–86; “Memorandum by General Wedemeyer,” September 7, 1947, ibid., 769–70. See also, May, Truman Administration and China, 21–22, 28. 69. Sprouse to Wedemeyer, August 23, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 749–51. 70. NSC 22, July 26, 1948, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 118–22, 131–35; NSC 22/1, ibid., 131–35. For the limit set by the US Senate in March 1948, see Washington to FO, March 27, 1948, F4635/190/10, FO 371/69585, PRO. 71. See PPS/10, October 14, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 540–42; Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 98–140. 72. See Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 59. 73. FRUS: 1947, III, 224–26, 228, 230–32, 237–39. 74. May, The Truman Administration, 28. 75. “Resume of World Situation: Report by the Policy Planning Staff,” November 6, 1947, FRUS: 1947, I, 770–71, 773. 76. James Schnabel, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 1, 1945–1947 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1979), 204–47; Laurence Radway, Liberal Democracy in World Affairs: Foreign Policy and National Defense (Atlanta: Scott, Foresman, and Co., 1969), 31; Henry Nash, American Foreign Policy: Response to a Sense of Threat (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey, 1973), 19–20. 77. Patterson to Alexander P. de Seversky, 8 February 1947, Box 27, Robert P. Patterson Papers, Library of Congress. 78. David Alan Rosenberg, “US nuclear stockpile, 1945 to 1950,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 38, 5 (May 1982): 25–28; Nash, American Foreign Policy, 19–20; Alan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1994), 499. 79. Kenneth W. Condit (Historical Division, JCS), The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, II, 1947–1949 (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, Inc, 1979), 191–212; Samuel Huntington, Common Defense: Strategic Problems in National Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 33–47.

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80. Quoted from Huntington, Common Defense, 40; Millett, For The Common Defense, 499. See, CIA, ORE 46–49 (April 21, 1949), published in CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991, ed. Gerald Haines and Robert Leggett (Washington, D.C.: CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 29–32. 81. “Development of a Political Program,” February 4, 1947, enclosed in Langdon to Marshall, February 20, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 607–8. 82. “A Solution of the Korean Problem by Syngman Rhee,” in Vincent to Hilldering, January, 27, 1947, ibid., 604–5. Later, in September 1947, Rhee opposed the US troop withdrawal while urging the Soviet troop withdrawal from the north. See DongA Ilbo, October 1, 1947. 83. Rhee to Truman, March 13, 1947, ibid., 620. This letter was sent following the announcement of the Truman doctrine. Rhee argued, “Korea is located in a strategic situation similar to that of Greece” and wrote, “the Korean patriots are greatly encouraged in their fight for freedom by your inspiring message.” 84. FRUS: 1947, VI, 612. 85. Hodge telegram via Tokyo, January 28, 1947, quoted in Vincent (Director of the office of Far Eastern Affairs) to Marshall, January 27, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 601. 86. MacArthur telegram, January 22, 1947, quoted in ibid, 601. 87. “Memorandum by the Special Inter-Departmental Committee on Korea,” February 25, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 613. 88. Truman to Pauley, July 16, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 713–14. 89. Vincent to Marshall, January 27, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 602. 90. Vincent to Marshall, January 27, 1947; Vincent to Hilldring, January 27, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 601, 603; Langdon to Marshall, January 4, 1947, ibid., 596–98. Meanwhile, Vincent recommended against military intervention in China, believing that eventually the Sino-Soviet split would emerge. 91. FRUS: 1947, VI, 608–18. 92. Hilldering, “Korea-House Divided,” Department of State Bulletin, 16 (March 23, 1947), 544–47. 93. See also, G-2, “The Evolution of the Armed Forces of North Korean Peoples Committee,” enclosed in G-2, US Army Forces in Korea, ISNK (Intelligence Summary Northern Korea), ed. Hallim Taehakkyo Asia Munhwa Yeonguso (Chuncheon, 1989), no. 39, June 30, 1947, 17. 94. FRUS: 1947, VI, 612. 95. Ibid, 613–14. 96. Ibid, 609; Hilldering and Vincent to Marshall, February 28, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 618–19. For similar recommendation for South Korean economy, see, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 694–95. 97. Acheson to Patterson, March 28, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 621–23. Secretary of State Marshall was in Moscow to participate in the Moscow conference. 98. See Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945–1950 (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 1981), 91–98. 99. Vincent to Hilldring, November 4, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 764.

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100. Walter Millis, ed, Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 273. 101. Paul H. Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 101–2; Alexis Johnson, Oral History, HSTL, 35. 102. Norstad to Patterson, “Maintenance of US Forces in Korea,” January 4, 1947, 091 Korea, Box 87, RG 319. 103. Chamberlain to Norstad, “Comments on Informal Planning Meeting Regarding Korea,” February 11, 1947, Box 87, RG 319. 104. Patterson Diary, January 12, 1946, Robert P. Patterson Papers, Box 26, Library of Congress. 105. “Memorandum on Meeting of Secretary of State, War, and Navy,” May 22, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 682. 106. Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 78. Some military officials also thought that China was much more important than Korea, and did not want the limited funds diverted to Korea. See, Bruce Cummings, The Origins of the Korean War, II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 59–60. 107. Hildering and Vincent to Marshall, February 28, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 618–19. 108. Peterson to Patterson, March 1, 1947, 092, RG 319, quoted from Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, 80. 109. Patterson to Acheson, April 4, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 625–28. See also, Patterson to Peterson, May 19, 1947, Patterson Papers, Box 27, Library of Congress.

Chapter 9 1. Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 147. 2. James F. Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945–1947 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the JCS, 1996), 2. 3. George Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1983), 309. 4. “J.C.S.1769/1,” April 29, 1947, FRUS: 1947, I, 739–42. The document noted, “our powers of assistance are not without limitations,” 735. 5. The Middle East was regarded as the area of secondary strategic importance due to the existence of oil and potential of US-soviet ideological contest over the region. See JCS 1769/1, April 29, 1947, FRUS: 1947, I, 742. 6. Ibid., 744–45; Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea (Seoul: Panmun, 1978), 48–49. 7. Ibid., 745. 8. Ibid. 9. JCS to SWNCC, May 12, 1947, FRUS: 1947, I, 736. 10. JCS to SWNCC, June 9, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VII, 842. 11. Ibid., 841.

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12. 13. 14. 15.

Ibid., 844. Ibid., 843. See “Possible Courses of Action,” July 26, 1948, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 118–22. JWPC 476/1, June 16, 1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), section 5, Box 71, RG 218, NA, 11. 16. Ibid., 2. 17. Ibid., 8–9. 18. Melvin Leffler also noted this similarity between JCS 1769/1 and Kennan’s thinking. See Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 148. 19. Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950, 309. 20. Kennan, Memoirs, 305–7; Leffler, Preponderance of Power, 150. 21. “The Long Telegram,” February 22. 1946, FRUS: 1946, VI, 696–709. 22. Kennan, “Russian-American Relations,” University of Virginia Lecture, February 20, 1947, Kennan Papers, Box. 16–25, Mudd Library, Princeton University, 9, 21; Kennan, Memoirs, 301. 23. Kennan, American Diplomacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 95. 24. Kennan, “Problems of Far Eastern Policy,” January 14, 1948, Kennan Papers, Box 17-3; “Contemporary Problems of Foreign Policy,” September 17, 1948, Kennan Papers, Box 17-11. 25. Kennan, Memoirs, 310; Paul Nitze, Tension Between Opposites (New York: Charles, Scribner’s Sons, 1993), 123. 26. Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thoughts from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), 165, 183. 186–87, 190. 27. Kennan, National War College Lecture, “Contemporary problems of Foreign Policy,” September 17, 1948, Kennan Papers, Box 17; Kennan, Memoirs: 19251950, 359. 28. Kennan, Memoirs, 304. 29. For Kennan’s preference of nonmilitary measures of containment (psychological, economic, and political measures), see Kennan, “Measures Short of War,” Kennan War College Lecture, September 16, 1946, The George F. Kennan Lectures at the National War College, 1946–47, ed. Giles D. Harlow and George C. Maerz (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1991), 9–17. 30. The War Department assessed, “Soviet strength for total war is not sufficiently great.” It estimated that, despite its ability to rapidly mobilize and overrun the bulk of Eurasia, Soviet military capabilities outside Eurasia remained limited. This was because of “the lack of a sufficiently powerful economic system, of mass destruction weapons, of a long-range bomber force, and of a deep sea navy.” War Dept. Intelligence Division, “Estimate of the Possibility of War Between the United States and the USSR,” July 21, 1947, P&O, War Dept. Gen Staff, Sec II, Box 76, NA, 1–2. 31. Kennan, Memoir, 311. 32. Ibid., 308–11. The JCS report further underscored the importance of these power-center countries as military asset in case the United States had to start a counterattack. Apart from this military consideration, the reasoning of the

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report shares ample similarity with Kennan’s thoughts. See J.C.S. 1769/1, FRUS: 1947, I, 739. 33. Kennan to Marshall and Lovett (Under Secretary of State), February 24, 1948, FRUS: 1948, I, 524. 34. Ibid., 525. 35. Kennan, “Problems of Far Eastern Policy,” January 14, 1948, Kennan Papers, Box 17-3, 2. In December 1947, the JCS planners also raised Japan’s importance as a base to a level equal to that of Britain in Western Europe. See Roger Dingman, “Strategic Planning and the Policy Process: American Plans for War in East Asia, 1945–1950,” Naval War College Review 32, 6 (November– December, 1979), 12. 36. Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: the Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 142–43; Howard B. Schonberger, Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989), 71. 37. Davies to Kennan, August 11, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 485–86; Kennan to Lovett, August, 12, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 486–87. 38. PPS/10, October 14, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 540–42; “US Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan,” September 17, 1947, PPS Records, General Records of the Department of State, Box 32, NR 59, NA, 19. 39. See Records of meetings at PPS and related endorsements from August 26 until September 22, PPS Records, Box 32, RG 59, NA; FRUS: 1947, VI, 537–43. 40. PPS/23, February 24, 1948, FRUS: 1948, I, pt. 2, 525. Kennan also recommended preserving the Philippines as a bulwark of US security in Asia. 41. NSC13/3, FRUS: 1949, VII, pt. 2, 730–36; NSC49, ibid., 774–77, NSC49/1, ibid, 871–73; Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan, 122–40. 42. Kennan, “Russian-American Relations,” February 20, 1947, Kennan Papers, Box 16, 13; Kennan, “Problems of US Foreign Policy After Moscow,” May 6, 1947, Measures Short of War, 198–99; Kennan, “Contemporary Problems of Foreign policy,”September 17, 1948, Kennan Papers, Box 17-11, 11. 43. Kennan to Byrnes, Moscow, January 10, 1946, FRUS: 1946, IX, 119. 44. PPS/23, February 24, 1948, FRUS: 1948, I, pt. 2, 525. 45. PPS/39, September 7, 1948, FRUS: 1948, VIII, 154–55; For Kennan’s consultation with experts, see “Minutes of Meetings,” February 10, 1948 (Fairbank); February 11, 1948 (Rowe); March 2, 1948 (Johnson), PPS Records, Box 32, RG 59, NA. 46. See Kennan to Rusk, November 17, 1949, and the attached paper, “Mr. Ward, the Russians and Recognition,” PPS Records, Box 33. RG 59; Kennan memorandum to Acheson, August 21, 1950, Acheson Papers, Box 65, HSTL. 47. Record of PPS (65th meeting), September 22, 1947, PPS Records, Box 32, NA, 13. 48. Jacobs to Marshall, September 3, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 777–78; August 21, 1947, ibid., 760, 746; Seoul to FO, 28 June 1947, F8715/54/81, FO 371/63835, PRO. 49. FRUS: 1947, VI, 752–53.

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50. Wedemeyer (Director Plan & Operation) to Hodge, April 28, 1948, RG 319 (Army Staff), P & O, 091 Korea, Box 87, NA; Rhee to Hodge, November 4, 1946, Preston Goodfellow Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archive, Stanford University; FRUS: 1947, VI, 749–50. See also, FO to Seoul, February 28, 1947, F 2095/54/81, FO 371/63831. 51. FRUS: 1947, VI, 596–98; Hodge to Goodfellow, January 28, 1947, Goodfellow Paper, Box 1. 52. FRUS: 1947, VI, 746. 53. Seoul to FO, February 8, 1947, FO 371/63831, PRO. Britain was supporting a four-power trusteeship for Korea. 54. See Langdon to Byrnes, July 3, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 710–11; Langdon to Byrnes, August 24, 1946, ibid., 729–31; Hodge to Byrnes, October 18, 1946, ibid., 749. 55. FRUS: 1947, VI, 752–53. For Hodge’s later account, see Hodge to JCS, “Summary of current political situation in Korea,” January 3 1948, 2, 5, RG 319, P & O, 091 Korea, Box 87, NA. 56. For police conspiracy behind the assassination, see Sim Ji-yeon, Song Namheon Hwoegorok [Son Nam-heon Memoir] (Seoul: Hanwul, 2000), 83. For communist’s responsibility, see FRUS: 1947, VI, 709. 57. Hilldring to Vincent, November 8, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 764–65. 58. John H. Hilldring, “Korea-House Divided,” DSB 16 (March 23, 1947): 547. 59. Robert T. Oliver, Syngman Rhee, 63–64; New York Times, June 20, 1947. 60. Lim, Imjeong-eseo Indokkaji, 290, 358–59. For Acheson’s related remark on economic aid, see Acheson to Patterson, March 28, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 621–23. 61. This is James Matray’s view, based on Acheson to Vincent, April 8, 1947, Dept. of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/ 4-847, RG 59, NA. See James Matray, “Bunce and Jacobs: US Occupation Advisors in Korea, 1946–1947,” Korea under the American Military Government, 1945–1948, ed. Bonnie Oh (Westport: Praeger, 2002), 71. 62. Hilldring to Byrnes, August 6, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 742–43. For the start of concrete preparations to submit the Korean question to the UN, see Allison Memorandum, FRUS, 1947, VI, 734–36, 714. 63. “Report [to SWNCC] by the Ad Hoc Committee on Korea,” August 4, 1947, FRUS, 1947, VI, 738. 64. Jacobs to Byrnes, August 7, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 745–46. 65. US Army Forces in Korea, “The Evolution of the Armed Forces of the North Korean Peoples Committee, 1945–June 1947,” enclosed in US Army, G-2, ISNK, no. 39 (June 30, 1947), 17. 66. Charles Armstrong, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 39, 55–57, 222–29. 67. Jacobs to Byrnes, July 21, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 711. 68. Niles W. Bond recalled, “there was general tacit agreement between State and Defense that we should eventually disengage.” Bond Interview, Oral History, HSTL, 29.

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69. Walter Millis, ed, Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking, 1951), 273. Earlier in November 1946, John Vincent had opposed a Soviet offer for the joint-withdrawal of forces. FRUS: 1946, VIII, 764. 70. Paul H. Nitze, Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), 101–2; Interview, Alexis Johnson, Washington, D.C., June 19, 1975, Oral History, HSTL, 35. 71. “United States Policy in Korea,” Ad Hoc Committee on Korea to SWNCC, August 4, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 738–41; Allison Memo, ibid., 713–14. See also, Washington to FO, August 4, 1947, F10470/54/81/G, FO 371/ 63836. 72. Stevens to Kennan and Allison, September 9, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 784–85. On August 28, Walter Bedell Smith, the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, also made a similar warning to Stevens. See Smith to Marshall, August 28, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 775–76. 73. Wedemeyer, “Report to the President,” 27. Hodge recommended inauguration of South Korean military forces to counterbalance force in North Korea. See Dupuy to General Norstad, “Report on Visit to Korea,” October 2, 1947, TAB “C,” RG 319, P&O, 1946–48, 091 Korea, Box 89, NA. 74. A. C. Wedemeyer, “Report to the President, submitted by Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer,” September 1947, Korea, printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services US Senate (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1951), 25. For summarized version of Wedemeyer Report on Korea, see, FRUS: 1947, VI, 796–803. 75. Wedemeyer, “Report to the President,” 13. 76. Ibid., 26. 77. Ibid., 13. The report also wrote, “The United States has a strong strategic interest in insuring permanent military neutralization of Korea and its denial as a base to the Soviet Union,” 26. 78. Lovett to Molotov (via the US embassy in the Soviet Union), August 26, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 771–74; Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope, 323–24. 79. Molotov to Marshall, September 4, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 779–81. 80. Jacobs to Marshall, September 26, 1947, ibid., VI, 816–17. 81. Ibid., 798; 804. 82. Ibid, 734, 801–2, 808. At this stage, the State Department decided to relinquish its earlier plan to achieve Korean unification as a policy goal. 83. Ibid, 736, 786, 805. 84. Jacobs was angry with Syngman Rhee’s “malicious and false” critique of US occupation authority and his efforts to establish himself as the only leader of Korea. See Jacobs to Marshall, September 20, 1947, ibid., 809. 85. Jacobs to Marshall, September 19, 1947, ibid., 805. 86. Ibid., 806. 87. Ibid., 804. 88. Ibid., 805, 806–7. 89. Kennan to Butterworth (Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), September 24, 1947, ibid., 814. 90. In November 1947, Kennan recommended again that “since the territory [Korea] is not of decisive strategic importance to us, our main task is to extricate

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ourselves without too great a loss of prestige.” See PPS/13, November 6, 1947, FRUS: 1947, I, 776. 91. SWNCC to JCS, September 15, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 789. For Hodge and MacArthur’s agreement on the troop withdrawal, see Dupuy to General Norstad, “Report on Visit to Korea,” October 2, 1947, TAB “C,” RG 319, P&O, 1946–48, 091 Korea, Box 89, NA. 92. Forrestal to Marshall, September 26 [29], 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 817–18. 93. Ibid., 818n27. In January 1948, Kennan stated at the Pentagon that the US troop withdrawal from Korea did not need any delay. “Problems of Far Eastern Policy,” January 14, 1948, Kennan Papers, Box 17-3, 3; Han Pyo-wook, Yiseungman-gwa Hanmi Oegyo [Rhee and US-Korean Diplomacy] (Seoul: Joongang Ilbo-sa, 1996), 76. 94. For the State Department’s opposition to the UN referral of the Korean question in February, see FRUS: 1947, VI, 613. 95. Butterworth to Lovett, “Presentation of Korean Problem to the United Nations,” October 1, 1947, FRUS: 1947, VI, 820–21. British diplomats made the same observation but wrote, “it would be unfortunate if the United Nations were used as a whipping-boy for American policy.” See Seoul to FO, F2556/511/81, 16 February 1948, FO 371/69938. 96. “Korea Withdrawal Considerations,” Memorandum for Record, November 4, 1948, RG319, P & O, 091 Korea, Box 87, NA. 97. See Truman, Memoirs, II: Years of Trial and Hope, 316–27. 98. Ibid., 321. 99. Truman to Pauley, July 16, 1946, FRUS: 1946, VIII, 713–14. 100. Truman to Patterson, ibid., 721–22. 101. Truman, Memoirs, II, 318, 322–23. 102. “Letter from John Carter Vincent,” New York Times, January 30, 1957. 103. Truman, Memoirs, II, 325. 104. Ibid., 325–26.

Chapter 10 1. Lawrence S. Kaplan, NATO and the United States: Enduring Alliance (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 31–49. 2. Kim Nam-sik, Namrodang Yeongu [Study about Workers’ Party of South Korea] (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1984), 305–7. 3. Britain observed that the United States’ approach was certainly to favor the extreme right, “since they enjoyed the police patronage and the United Nations Commission is not adequately equipped to supervise elections.” See Seoul to FO, February 18, 1948, F2564/511/81, FO 371/69938, PRO. 4. Seoul Shinmun, February 10–13, 1948; Kyeonghyang Shinmun, Chosun Iblo, April 6, 1948; Song Nam-heon, Haebang Samnyeonsa, II (Seoul: Kkachi, 1985), 531–65. 5. Interview, Niles W. Bond, December 28, 1973, Oral History, HSTL, 32.

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6. Ernest R. May, “Introduction: NSC 68,” American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68, ed. Ernest R. May (Boston: St. Martin’s, 1993), 1. 7. Butterworth and Allison, October 19, 1949, “Comments on Third Draft of NSC Paper on Asia,” RG 273, Records of the NSC, Policy Papers 48–49, Box 6, NA, p. 5; Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 122–24, 238. 8. Stanley Falk, “The NSC under Truman and Eisenhower,” Fateful Decisions: Inside National Security Council, ed. Karl Inderfurth and Lock Johnston (New York: Oxford University Press), 35–37. 9. John Prados, Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1991), 34. 10. NSC8, “Report by the National Security Council on the Position of the United States With Respect to Korea,” April 2, 1948, FRUS: 1948, VI, 1167. 11. Ibid., 1168–69. 12. Ibid., 1169; emphasis in the original. 13. Ibid., 1164, see note 3. For Eisenhower’s support for the withdrawal as Army chief of staff, see Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 102. 14. Gukbanggunsa-yeonguso, Hanguk Jeonjaeng [The Korean War] (Seoul, 1995), 41–50, 34–35. 15. NSC to the president, NSC8/2 (US Position with Respect to Korea), March 22, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 971–72. 16. Bishop to Butterworth, December 17, 1948, 1339. 17. Ibid., 1338. 18. Ibid., 1340. 19. Butterworth to the acting secretary of state, January 10, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 942–43. 20. FRUS: 1949, VII, 977. 21. Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, a volume in the United States Army Historical Series, ed. Walter G. Hermes (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1962), 37. See also, note 2, FRUS: 1949, VII, 945. 22. Royall (Secretary of Army) to secretary of state, January 25, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 945–46. 23. NSC 8/2, March 22, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 969–78. 24. Ibid., 976–77. 25. Department of the Army to the Department of State, “Implication of a Possible Full Scale Invasion from North Korea,” June 27, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, pt. 2, 1046–57. 26. Ibid., 1052. 27. Ibid., 1054. 28. Ibid., 1057. 29. Bond Interview, Oral History, HSTL, 34–35. 30. NSC 8, April 2, 1948, FRUS: 1948, VI, 1167. 31. See FRUS: 1949, VII, 972. 32. Ibid., 976, 978. 33. Acheson to Muccio, December 14, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 1108.

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34. For Acheson’s request for the final postponement of the troop withdrawal on May 19, 1949, see ibid., 1016; Ross to Acheson, June 1, 1949, ibid., 1036–37. 35. On September 3, 1949, US reconnaissance planes detected the abnormally high count of radioactive particles off the coast of Alaska. See Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 82. 36. Muccio to Acheson, October 13, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 1086–87. 37. CIA, July 25, 1949, “Implications for US Security of Developments in Asia,” RG 273, Records of the NSC, Policy Papers 48–49, Box 6, NA. 38. Muccio to Acheson, December 1, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 1102–3. 39. Johnson Memorandum, June 10, 1960, Records of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS), Hangukjeonjaeng Jaryo-eopseo: 12, ed. Gukbang-gunsa Yeonguso (Seoul, 1997), 289. 40. See Acheson’s alarm in May at FRUS: 1949, VII, 736–37. Washington also started its plans to secure Southeast Asia from communism. See PPS51, March 29, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 1128–33. 41. “Background Documents on NSC 48(1),” August 31, 1949, RG 273, Records of the NSC, Policy Papers 48–49, Entry 1, Box 6, NA. 42. Ibid., 9. 43. Butterworth and Allison, October 19, 1949, “Comments on Third Draft,” RG 273, Records of the NSC, Policy Papers 48–49, Box 6, NA. See also Bishop to Lay, October 26, 1949, ibid. 44. Club to Acheson, December 3, 1949; McConaughy to Acheson, FRUS: 1949, VIII, 618; December 16, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VIII, 632–36; Washington to FO, October 17, 1949, F15556, FO371/75818, Microfilm, Reel 12, PRO; Washington to FO, F16417/1023/10, Ibid; Robert Beisner, Dean Acheson, 194–97. 45. JCS, “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,” December 29, 1949, Records of NSC, Policy Papers 48–49, Box 6, RG 273, NA. 46. NSC 48, Draft, September 21, 1949, Records of NSC, Policy Papers (48–49), 10–11. Overall, while drafting NSC 48, Washington underscored the importance of Southeast Asia for Japanese economic recovery and security. See Michael Schaller, “Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia,” The Journal of American History 69, 2 (September 1982): 392–414. For the emphasis on Southeast Asia for the US economy, see Department of Defense Consultant to NSC, November 25, 1949, 14, Records of PPS, ed. Gukbanggunsa Yeonguso, 319. 47. US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Economic Assistance to China and Korea, 1949–1950. Hearings Held in Executive Session Before Committee on Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 1st Cong., 1st and 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), 134, 146, 156. 48. “Economic Objectives of the Occupation,” 1947, undated and without author name, p. 9, RG319, P & O, 091 Korea, Box 89, NA. 49. Thomas Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 251.

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50. NSC 48/2, December 30, 1949, Containment: Documents, ed. Etzold and Gaddis, 273–74. 51. Ibid., 273–75; NSC48/1, ibid., 258. 52. NSC48/1, ibid., 255. 53. NSC 48/1, ibid., 253. 54. NSC 48/2, ibid., 269. I benefited from the discussion with professor Bruce Cumings regarding the importance of the NSC-48 series, though I present a different interpretation of the debates in Washington, D.C. 55. NSC 48/2, ibid., 271. 56. NSC 48/2, ibid., 270–71. 57. NSC 48/1, ibid., 264. The war plan MOONRISE of 1947 also presumed utilizing these off-shore islands as the basis for the offense. 58. NSC 48/1, ibid., 256. 59. See, NSC 48/2, ibid., 272, along with note 14. 60. NSC 48/2, ibid., 272. 61. “Department of Defense Consultant to NSC,” November 25, 1949, 19–20, Records of PPS, ed. Gukbang Gunsayeonguso, 323–24. The NSC staff by this time predicted, “The collapse of South Korea either through attack from the north or through internal weakness,” within a year to eighteen months, unless there was real change in a US policy or program for Asia. See “Prediction in Asia,” October 14, 1949, enclosure to Bishop to Rusk, “Predictions in Asia,” November 8, 1949, ibid., 341–43. 62. Acheson, “Continued Aid to Korea Requested,” DSB 22 (March 20, 1950). 63. See Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security 4, 2 (Winter 1979): 120. Kennan asked on September 29, 1949, to be relieved of his duties as director of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS). From October 1 until December 31, 1949, Kennan served as both counselor and director of PPS, and from January 1, 1950, Paul Nitze assumed the latter post. 64. Ernest R. May, NSC 68, 8; Beisner, Dean Acheson, 233–34. 65. James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World (New York: Somon & Schuster, 1998), 27–73; Miscamble, George F. Kennan, 288–91; Kennan, Memoirs, 1925–1950 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), 468. 66. See, “Record of the Meeting,” March 2, 1950, FRUS: 1950, I, 178–79. 67. “United States Policy toward Formosa,” DSB 22 (January 16, 1950): 79. 68. Kenneth W. Condit, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, II, 1947–1949, 520; JCPC 877/59, Etzold and Gaddis, Containment Documents, 324–34. For earlier articulation of this strategy by MacArthur to Kennan, see PPS28/2, March 5, 1948, FRUS: 1948, VI, 700–702. 69. See FRUS: 1950, VII, 46, 82–83. 70. Dean Acheson, “Crisis in Asia,” DSB 22 (January 23, 1950): 116. 71. For the defense perimeter in East Asia, see Gaddis, “Drawing Lines,” 72–103. 72. On this occasion, Acheson answered that South Korea could then take care of any trouble that was started solely by North Korea, but that it could not take care of any invasion, which was powerfully supported by the Chinese communists

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or by the Soviet Union. US Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Review of the World Situation, 1949–1950 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1979), 191. Acheson also made clear that the US policy does not protect Formosa. Review of the World Situation, 184. 73. Acheson, “Crisis in Asia,” 116–17. 74. Paul Nitze, “The Development of NSC 68,” International Security 4, 4 (spring 1980): 171; Ernest R. May ed., American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68 (Boston: St. Martin’s, 1993), 3, 10, 324. 75. Condit, History of the JCS, II, 210–12, 272–23, 277, 324. 76. For Kennan’s testimony in the Congress, see, US House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Selected Executive Session Hearing of the Committee, 1943–1950, VIII: United States Policy in the Far East, pt. 2: Korea Assistance Acts (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 48–49, 55, 57–59. For a broad discussion, see Charles M. Dobbs, Unwanted Symbol (Kent, OH: Kent University Press, 1981), 161–86; Washington to FO, January 20, 1950, FK 11345/2, FO 371/84147, PRO. 77. Rhee to Muccio, April 14, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 991. 78. Royal Memorandum, February 8, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 956–59. See Muccio’s qualification about this memo, see ibid., 958–59. Muccio interview, Oral History, HSTL, 11. 79. Rhee to Oliver, February 12, 1949, included in Oliver, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 220–23; Rhee to Cho Byong-ok, April 10, 1949, Facts Tell (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Pub. House, 1960), 11–14. 80. Memorandum of conversation, Stalin and Kim Il-sung, March 5, 1949, published in Kim In-geol, ed., Hanguk Hyndaesa Gangui (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1998), 120–21. 81. The Chosun Ilbo, October 16, 1949. 82. Ibid.; Rhee to Truman, August 20, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 1075–76; Han Pyowook, Yiseungmangwa Hanmi-oegyo (Seoul: Joongang Ilbosa, 1996), 73–74; Lim Byeong-jik, Imjeong-eseo Indokkaji, 328, 331; Tunkin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, September 14, 1949, Virtual Archive, Korean War, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP). 83. See Drumright to Acheson, March 15, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 966. 84. For Rhee’s wish to achieve national unification through a counterattack in case of a North Korean invasion, see Rhee to Truman, August 20, 1949, FRUS: 1949, VII, 1075–76. 85. While advocating the aid bill for Korea, Acheson warned the Rhee government to address the worrisome inflation and to hold the general election in April rather than postponing it until November. Washington to London, FK11345/5, April 14, 1950, FO 371/ 84147, PRO. In mid-1949, ECA officials had advocated the US aid to South Korea, underscoring that it was a democracy and had efficient ministers. See, US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Economic Assistance to China and Korea, 148–49.

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86. Muccio interview, Washington, D.C., February 10 & 18, 1971, Oral History, HSTL, 17–18; Han Pyo-wook, Yiseungman-gwa Hanmi-Oegyo [Rhee and USKorean Diplomacy] (Seoul: Joonang Ilbosa, 1996), 72–73. 87. Condit, History of JCS, II, 1947–49, 273–81. 88. Han, Yiseungman-gwa, 73–74. 89. See Acheson to Muccio, FRUS: 1950, VII, 46; Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 99. 90. For earlier preparation of Nitze’s staffs, see Hooker and Tufts to Nitze, “The NSC Study—‘US Objectives, Commitments, and Risks,’” January 18, 1950, Records of PPS, 1947–53 (General Records of the Department of State), Box 54, RG 59, NA; Beisner, Dean Acheson, 241. 91. CIA, Daily and Weekly Summaries, 1–17 March 1950, Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years, ed. Woodrow J. Kuhns (CIA, 1997), 350–64. 92. See CIA, ORE 91–49, “Estimate of the Effects of the Soviet Possession of the Atomic Bomb,” April 6, 1950, ibid., 369, 366–79. 93. See CIA, ORE 22–48 (August 27, 1948), ORE 46–49 (April 21, 1949), CIA’s Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947–1991, ed. Gerald Haines and Robert Leggett (Washington, D.C.: CIA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 25–32. 94. CIA, “Estimate of the Effects,” 366. 95. NSC 68, April 14, 1950, FRUS: 1950, I, 237. For Nitze’s assessment of Soviet threat, see, Nitze, “Recent Soviet Moves,” February 8, 1950, FRUS: 1950, I, 145–47. 96. Chace, Acheson, 274. 97. NSC 68, FRUS: 1950, I, 238, 240, 282–85. 98. Beisner, Dean Acheson, 242. 99. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat,” International Security 4, 2 (Fall 1979): 123, 130. 100. NSC 68, FRUS: 1950, I, 256–58; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 93. 101. Nitze, “The Development of NSC 68,” International Security 4, 4 (Spring 1980): 173. 102. Paul Nitze, “The Development of NSC 68,” 172. 103. Nitze to Winston Lord, January 24, 1978, Nitze Papers, Box 29, Library of Congress; FRUS: 1950, I, 177. 104. David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War (New York: Harper Collins, 1990), 60–61; Miscamble, George F. Kennan, 297; James Chace, Acheson, 272–73. 105. Nitze, “The Development of NSC 68,” 172; Ernest R May, “Introduction,” American Cold War Strategy, 11–12. 106. Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), 373–74; May, “Introduction,” 11–12; Chace, Acheson, 277–78. 107. Kennan to Acheson, February 17, 1950, FRUS: 1950, I, 160, 163, 164–67. George Kennan, “Is War With Russia Inevitable?,” DSB 22 (February 20, 1950): 267–71, 303.

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NOTES

108. Bohlen to Nitze, April 5, 1950, FRUS: 1950, I, 222; Bohlen to Nitze, April 5, 1950, Records of PPS, Box 54, RG 59, NA; Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History, 1929–1969 (New York: Norton, 1973), 290–91. 109. May, “Introduction,” 12–13. 110. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 98. 111. May, “Introduction,” 14–15; Beisner, Dean Acheson, 246. 112. Nitze, Oral History Interview, August 5, 6, 1975, HSTL 113. Memorandums by James Lay Jr., May 2, May 12, June 8; William F. Schaub, “Comments of the Bureau of the Budget,” May 8, 1950, Records of PPS, Box 54, RG 59, NA. 114. Nitze, “Recent Soviet Moves,” February 8, 1950, FRUS: 1950, I, 145II–47. 115. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision (New York: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1989), 101. 116. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 99; Nitze, “The Development of NSC 68,” 174; Nitze, Oral History Interview, HSTL. 117. Jessup Memorandum, January 14, 1950, FRUS: 1950, VII, 2. 118. Hackler Memorandum, April 27, 1950, FRUS: 1950, VII, 48–52. 119. Niles W. Bond Interview, Oral History, 37–38. For the comparison of airpower, see “North Korean People’s Air Force,” December 30, 1949, FK1016/1, FO 371/84076, PRO. South Korea had only about fifteen light aircraft, whereas North Korea was about to see the arrival of more than one hundred close support aircrafts. 120. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 100. 121. FRUS: 1950, VII, 46 122. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 99. Robert Tufts (PPS staff with Nitze), telephone Interview, January 18, 1998. 123. “Total Diplomacy to Strengthen US Leadership for Human Freedom,” DSB (March 20 1950). 124. “Tension between the United States and the Soviet Union,” DSB (March 27, 1950). 125. Memorandum of Discussion, March 7, 1949, The War in Korea 1950–1953, ed. Anatoli Vasilevich Torkunov, trans. Ku Jong-seo, Hangukjeongjaengui Jinsilgwa Susukkeki (Seoul: Bokwangmunhwa, 2003), 44–45. 126. Tunkin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, September 14, 1949; Korea; Politburo to Shtykov, September 24, 1949, Virtual Archive, Korea, CWIHP; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Korea, Hangukjeonjaeng-gwanryeon Soryeon Oyegyomunseo [Soviet Diplomatic Documents on the Korean War] (Seoul: Oemubu, July 20, 1994), II, 13–19. 127. Memorandum of Conversation between Stalin and Kim Il-sung, prepared by the international affairs bureau of Central Committee, CPSU, published in Kim In-geol, ed., Hanguk Hyndaesa Gangui (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1998), 123–24 128. Stalin to Mao, May 14, 1950, ibid., 125. 129. Memorandum of conversation between Mao, Kim, and Pak Hon-yong, May 13, 1950, May 15, 1950, ibid., 125; Soryeon Oegyomunseo, II, 24–27. 130. Gukbanggunsa Yeonguso, Hanguk Jeonjaeng, 71–74.

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NOTES

271

131. Jung Byeong-jun, Hanguk Jeonjaeng: 38-seon Chungdol-gwa Jeonjaeng-ui Hyeongseong (Seoul: Dolbegae, 2006), 467–71. 132. See CIA, Weekly summary excerpt, January 13, 1950, “Far East: Soviet Relations; Korea: Troop Buildup,” Assessing the Soviet Threat, ed. Woodrow Kuhns, 11, 347. 133. Tokyo to War Office, “Special Intelligence Report,” April 16, 1950.FK1016/11, FO371/84076, PRO. While listing the evacuations from various strategic areas in Kangwon and Hwanghae provinces, he noted, “vacated houses in the Yonchon-Chorwon area were commandeered by armed force personnel and members of guerrilla units.” The US Brigadier General, Crump Garvin, blamed this neglect of intelligence by “G-2 in Tokyo” during his private discussion with John Allison after the North Korean attack. See John M. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1973), 131. 134. Drumright to Acheson, April 25, 1950, FRUS: 1950, VII, 47–48. 135. Jung, Hangook Jeonjaeng, 444–65. 136. Excerpt from “US News & World Report” May 5, 1950, quoted in FRUS: 1950, VII, 65–66. 137. Rusk to Webb, May 2, 1950, FRUS: 1950, VII, 64–65. 138. “Rhee’s Remark,” May 9, 1950, FRUS: 1950, VII, 77. 139. Roberts to KMAG Advisors, “KA Logistical Situation,” May 5, 1950, enclosed in Muccio to Acheson, May 29, 1950, FRUS: 1950, VII, 92–93. 140. FRUS: 1950, VII, 83–85. 141. CIA, “Current Capabilities of the Northern Korean Regime,” June 19, 1950, FRUS: 1950,. VII, 110, 118–19. 142. Ibid., 110; CIA, ORE 18–50 (same intelligence assessment), Assessing the Soviet Threat, 390. For Dulles’ regret about the US intelligence failure, see Dulles Memorandum, June 29, 1950, FRUS: 1950, VII, 237–38. 143. See FRUS: 1950, VII, 149. 144. Presidential memoirs interview, August 21, 1953, Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post presidential Files, HSTL; Mr. Citizen interview, November 16, 1959, Truman: Post-presidential Files, HSTL; Webb to Snyder, April 25, 1975, Papers of James E. Webb, HSTL. For elaboration, see Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 52–86. 145. “Jessup Memorandum,” June 26, 1950, HSTL, 7; “Jessup Memorandum,” June 27, 1950, 81–82; Elsey Note, June 27, 1950, Elsey Papers, HSTL, 7; John Hickerson, Oral History Interview, June 5, 1973, HSTL. 146. FRUS: 1950, VII, 155–56. 147. The arrest of atomic spy, Klaus Fuchs, in February 1950 added the rise of hysterical anticommunism in the United States. See Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), 321, 355, 362. 148. Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision (New York: Free Press, 1968), 142. 149. Dulles and Allison to Acheson, June 25, 1950, George Elsey Papers, HSTL; Truman, Memoirs, II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1956), 336.

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272

NOTES

150. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 100; Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 130. 151. Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, 130. 152. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 100. 153. “Points Requiring Presidential Decision,” June 25, 1950, Elsey Papers; Truman, Memoirs, II, 337. 154. Truman, Memoirs, II, 335; Paige, Korean Decision, 134–35. In his memoirs, Truman recorded, “we were still holding the stronger hand, although how much stronger, it was hard to tell.” 155. Truman, Memoirs, II, 332–33; May and Neustadt, Thinking in Time, 35–36. 156. “President Truman’s Conversation with George M. Elsey,” June 26, 1950, Elsey Papers. 157. Truman, Memoirs, II, 337. In this context, he approved recommendations for the strengthening of US forces in the Philippines and for increased aid to the French in Indo-China. 158. Han Pyo-wook, Yiseungmangwa, 97–98. 159. “Intelligence Estimate,” June 25, 1950, FRUS: 1950, VII, 148–55. 160. Jessup Memorandum, June 26, 1950, Acheson Papers, HSTL, 5. 161. Elsey Memorandum, June 26, 1950, Elsey Papers, 4. 162. Jessup Memorandum, “NSC Meeting,” June 28, 1950, Acheson Papers, 4. 163. Jessup Memorandum, June 25, 1950, President’s Secretary’s Files, HSTL; “Teletype Conference,” June 25, 1950, Naval Aide Files, HSTL. 164. Kennan, “Possible Further Communist Initiatives in the Light of the Korean Situation,” June 26, 1950, Kennan Papers, Box, 24, Mudd Library, Princeton University; FRUS: 1950, VII, 258–59. 165. Paige, Korean Decision, 151–52. 166. Jessup Memorandum, June 25, 1950, President’s Secretary’s Files, 2–4. 167. “Jessup Memorandum,” Blair House Meeting, June 26, 1950, Acheson Papers, 7. 168. Acheson Interview, Talent Associates Interview, ca. 1961–62, Merle Miller Papers, HSTL. On June 29, Acheson again strongly recommended the dispatch of US ground troops. See Draft Summary of Meeting, June 29, 1950, Elsey Papers, 3. 169. Jessup Memorandum, June 26, 1950, HSTL, 7; Louise Johnson, Congressional Testimony, June 14, 1951, posted on the HSTL Web site on Korean War-Week of Decision: June 26, 1950. 170. Paige, Korean Decision, 237, 251; Gukbanggunsa Yeonguso, Najubayev-ui 6.25 Jeonjaeng Bogoseo [Najubayev Report on the Korean War] (Seoul: Gunsapyeonchan Yeonguso, 2001), 178–82. 171. MacArthur to JCS, June 30, 1950, Naval Aid Files, HSTL, 2. 172. Sebald to Acheson, June 30, 1950, Elsey Papers. 173. FRUS: 1950, VII, 255; Beverly Smith, “The White House Story: Why We Went to War in Korea,” Saturday Evening Post (November 10, 1951), 88. 174. Truman, Memoirs, II, 343.

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273

175. Briefing for key Senators and Congressmen by Truman and Acheson, June 27, 1950; Dewey to Truman, June 27, 1950, Draft Memorandum, June 30, 1950, Elsey Papers; Paige, Korean Decision, 212–14, 225, 243. The supporters of Truman’s decision included Dwight Eisenhower, then President of Columbia University, who had urged the withdrawal of US forces from Korea as Army chief of staff. The New York Times called the President’s decision to save the Republic of Korea “a momentous and courageous act.” See New York Times, June 28, 1950, 26. 176. “Jessup Memorandum,” June 28, 1950, Acheson Papers, 2; Memorandum of Conversation between Acheson and Australian ambassador, June 29, 1950, Acheson Papers; FRUS: 1950, VII, 203, 206–8, 215–16. 177. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 475.

Chapter 11 1. See Michael N. Barnett, “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” The Culture of National Security, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 400–447; Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, ed., Security Communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective Identity in a Democratic Community,” The Culture of National Security, 369–71. 2. Hirayama Tatsumi, “Jousenhanto-to Nichibei Anzenhosho Joyaku” [The Korean Peninsula and the US-Japan Security Treaty], Kokusaiseiji 115 (May 1997): 58–74. 3. For two best accounts of recent US-Korean relations, see Chae-jin Lee, A Troubled Peace: US Policy and the Two Koreas (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2002). 4. Robert Moore to East Asian IG, “EA/IG Review of the FY-73 Korean PARA,” April 26, 1972, Pol I, KORS-US 1973, RG 59, E1613, Box 2429, 1970-73, NA. 5. See Seung-young Kim, “Security, Nationalism, and Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles, South Korean Case, 1970–82” Diplomacy and Statecraft 12, no. 4 (December 2001), 53–80. 6. William H. Gleysteen Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999), 41–44. 7. China remained closer to the United States during the late 1970s, while the Soviet Union maintained close strategic cooperation with North Korea and Vietnam. See Robert S. Ross, ed., China, the United States, and the Soviet Union (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1993), 160–63. 8. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, 23–28. 9. John A. Wickham Jr., Korea on the Brink (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2000), 138, 142–43, 156; Secretary of State to the US Embassies in Seoul and Tokyo, May 13, 1980, Declassification Project on US-Korea-Japan Relations, National Security Archive. 10. Oberdorfer, Two Koreas, 161–78.

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11. The White House, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 2002), 25–31. 12. See Samuel Huntington and Gary Wills, “Is American Hegemony Working?” Foreign Affairs 78, 2 (March–April, 1999), 35–49. 13. See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Security Consultative Committee Document US-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future,” October 29, 2005; “The Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html; Richard L. Armitage, Press Conference, October 13, 2004, http://www.state .gov/s/d/rm/37049pf.htm. 14. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L, Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004), 311–12, 314–16. 15. “US, South Korea to Transfer Wartime Force Command in 2012,” 23 February 2007, http://seoul.usembassy.gov. These rapid changes also had to do with Washington’s sensitive reaction to the anti-Americanism in South Korea and Roh government’s worries about the Bush administration’s potential attempt to engineer regime change in North Korea or to use preemptive strike on North Korean nuclear facilities. 16. For the development reflecting the limit of US military capability in East Asia, see Thomas Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security 23, 4 (Spring 1999), 49–80. 17. The policy makers in Seoul believe that the United States is the most reliable partner when compared with other major powers around the Korean Peninsula. 18. See J. J. Suh, et al, Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 142–50. 19. See Victor Cha, “Focus on the Future, Not the North,” The Washington Quarterly 26, 1 (Winter, 2002–3), 91–107. 20. See Chung-in Moon, “Softpower-ui Yebangjeok Oegyoramyeon . . . ” [If it were a preventive diplomacy based on soft power . . . ], NEXT (Seoul: JoongAng Ilbosa, June 2005), 2–10. 21. KEDO was inaugurated in 1995 to provide two light water nuclear reactors to North Korea in return for its freezing of nuclear activities related to weapons program. Six-Party Talk includes the United States, China, Japan, Russia, and two Koreas.

Seung-young Kim

Index Acheson, Dean, 185 establishment of Korean provisional government, 150–51 Korean aid, 151, 187, 188 Korean military intervention, 199, 200 National Press Club speech, 187 NSC 68, 189, 191–92 role of U.N., 181, 187 Total Diplomacy, 193 troop withdrawal, 181 US News and World Report interview, 195–96 Adams, Brooks, 33, 34 Adee, Alvey, 46, 50 Allen, Horace, 19–20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 36–37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50, 68, 69 alliance theory, 4, 6 Allison, John M., 169, 172, 198 analogy, 84, 112, 128, 197, 198–99 American Asiatic Association, 32 American Military Government (AMG) assessment of Korea, 137, 138, 167 coalition building in Korea, 141, 142, 148–49, 165 economic policy toward Korea, 183 factional rivalry in Korea, 136 instructions to, 139, 140, 151 Korean general election, 176 Korean opposition to, 137, 139, 141, 152 recommendations of, 139, 141 Anglo-American alignment against Soviets, 93

Anglo-Japanese alliance, 13, 25, 28, 29, 31, 50 second Anglo-Japanese alliance, 56, 58, 59 Anglo-Russian entente, 28 anti-Japanese societies, 60 Antonov, General, 119 Arnold, Major General A. V., 150 assassination of Korean queen, 19 atomic bomb, 147, 161 Hiroshima, 119, 120 North Korea, 213, 214 South Korea, 212 Soviet, 133, 147, 175, 181, 190, 192, 204 U.S: bargaining counter, 71, 83, 93, 94, 95, 115, 128, 130 Bacon, Assistant Secretary, 63 balance of power East Asia, 152, 162, 203, 214 foreign powers in Korea, 20, 23, 25, 36, 60 global rivalry, 27 policies of Theodore Roosevelt, 33, 34, 40, 67, 68 US policy in Asia, 4, 18, 54 Balfour, Arthur, 55, 56 Benninghoff, Merrell, 137 Big Three conference, 76, 77, 90–91, 94, 118 bilateral negotiations, 215 bipolarity NSC 48, 182, 204 NSC 68, 182, 190, 204

Seung-young Kim

276

INDEX

bipolarity (continued) perception of bipolar confrontation, 4, 71, 108, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 175, 212, 214, 216 shift toward bipolar perception, 128, 131, 133, 198, 204, 212, 216 theory, 4, 5, 6, 205, 206, 210, 211, 214 US intervention in Korean War, 198 Bishop memorandum, 178 Blair House meetings, 198, 199, 200, 204, 205, 206 Boer War, 27 Bond, Niles W., 180 Boxer Rebellion, 21, 24, 28, 30 Britain, 16, 22, 23, 55, 57, 58–59, 65 Korean trusteeship, 81 Polish issue, 86 buffer zone, 13, 20, 82, 216 Butterworth, Walton, 172, 178, 182 Byrnes, James, 81, 94, 113–14, 116–17 atomic bomb, 114, 117 Korean trusteeship, 114, 139 Potsdam conference, 105, 111, 112 Sino-Soviet negotiations, 107 Yalta Conference, 117 Cairo conference, 76, 77 declaration, 89, 109 Carter administration, 212 Cassini, Arturo, 40, 51 central administrative authority, 81, 127, 165 central decision makers assessment of Far Eastern situation, 41, 42, 54, 67, 76–77, 83 perception, 2, 4 role of, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 67, 68, 79, 213 CFC. See Combined Forces Command Chamberlain, Major General S. J., 152 Chang Myun, 199 Chiang Kei-shek, 99, 138 Cairo conference, 76 regime, 77, 82, 143, 158, 163 US concerns, 144

US support, 144, 145, 163 China civil war, 77, 133, 144, 175, 186, 188 great power status, 77, 129, 211 Hopkins mission, 96, 98, 99 Korean trusteeship, 35, 76, 81, 96, 111, 139 military assistance to North Korea, 195 neutrality, US support for, 40, 43 Open Door, 96, 107–8, 115, 129, 130 Outer Mongolia, 106, 107, 113 sovereignty, 106, 107–8 support for North Korean attack, 194 suzerainty over Korea, 13, 14, 16, 17 territorial integrity, 34, 35, 39, 41, 96, 109 threat to US, 144, 158, 211, 214 unification, 78, 88, 89, 91, 96, 99, 101 US-China treaty, 14, 15 US State Department post war estimate, 109 See also communism; Manchuria; Sino-Japanese War; Sino-Soviet; Soviet expansion Cho Man-sik, 137 Chun Doo-hwan, 212, 213 Chungking government. See Korean Provisional Government Churchill Big Three conference, 90, 118 Cairo conference, 76, 77 Korean trusteeship, 81 Poland, 84, 87, 90 Soviet Union, 84, 85, 90, 113 CIA, 181, 190, 195, 204 classical realists, 3, 4 cold war, 147 in Europe, 143 New Cold War, 212 collective security, 180, 188, 193 collective self-defense, 184

Seung-young Kim

INDEX

Combined Forces Command (CFC), 214, 215 committed thinkers on strategic issues, 5, 7, 68, 205 Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI), 136 Committee of Three, 97, 122 communism in Asia, 89, 178, 182, 183, 199, 203 in China, 77, 82, 133, 143, 144, 145, 157, 158 communism in Korea, 109, 120, 149 communization of Korea: under trusteeship, 164 in Europe, 145, 146 in Japan, 161 North Korea, 138, 173 South Korea, 137, 142, 148, 170, 178., 184, 196 threat to Manchuria, 144, 145, 158 US fears of large scale insurgency, 198 Connally, Tom, 195, 196 constructivist theory, 5, 211, 215 containment, 133, 146, 155, 159, 160, 164, 182, 183, 185, 186, 191, 192, 203, 204, 206, 212 corporatist theorists/historians, 8 cost and benefit analysis. See ends and means analysis corruption, 24, 42 Council of Foreign Ministers, 117, 118 coup d’etat, pro-Japan, 16, 17 CPKI. See Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence Crabb, Cecil, 9 Daegu uprising, 136 Davies, John P., 100, 110, 161, 163 Davies, Joseph E., 95 defense perimeter, 155, 161, 184, 186, 187, 195, 198

277

demarcation line, Korea, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125 détente, 211, 212 Dinsmore, Hugh, 47, 48 diplomatic historians, 7, 8 domino effect, 5, 6, 68, 83, 89, 128, 148, 153, 169–70, 177, 178, 182, 198, 199, 204, 206, 210, 211, 215 Dulles, John Foster, 198 Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 183, 206 Eden, Anthony, 76, 84, 86 Eisenhower, General Dwight, 174 ends and means analysis, 6, 68, 128, 129, 156, 205, 210, 211, 214, 215 Esthus, Raymond, 53 Fair Deal, 188, 192 Foote, Lucius, 15–16 Ford administration, 212 Forrestal, James, 86, 89, 97, 122, 188 Four Policemen, 77, 79, 130 four power conference, 170 Franco-Russian alliance, 28, 31 Gardner, Admiral Mathias B., 122 General Order No. 1, 122, 123, 124 Geneva Framework Agreement, 214 geopolitics, 22, 34, 76, 78, 84, 90, 92, 162, 213, 217 George, Alexander, 5 Germany, 27–28, 30, 31, 39, 57 globalists, 175, 198, 204, 205, 206, 214 good office clause Japanese protectorate, 45, 49, 62, 63, 64 Korea’s declaration of neutrality, 39 Sino-Japanese War, 18 US-Korea treaty, 14–15, 17, 188 Governing Commission, 138, 139 grand strategy, 6, 68, 128, 155, 203, 204, 207 Great Han Empire, 22, 23

Seung-young Kim

278

INDEX

great power relations, 11, 23, 27, 30, 34, 35, 45, 67, 73, 75–76, 79, 96, 131, 211, 213 Greece. See US assistance Grew, Joseph, 88, 89–90, 91, 93, 96, 100 Griscom, US Minister, 59 Han Kil-soo, 74 Han Kyu Sul, 47, 49, 61, 103 Hay, John, 25, 26, 30, 32, 33, 35, 39, 40, 41, 47, 51, 68 Harriman, William Averell, 85, 92 Big Three conference, 91 Hopkins mission, 95, 100 Potsdam conference, 105, 108, 112 Sino-Soviet talks, 106, 107, 112, 120 Soviet expansion, 85–86, 87, 106 Yalta agreement, 88, 89, 91 Hasegawa, General, 59, 61 Hayashi, 58, 59 Hilldering, John, 150, 166 Hiss, Alger, 102 Hodge, Lieutenant General John, 135, 137–38, 149, 165, 173 Hoffman, Stanley, 9 Hopkins, Harry, 95 Hopkins mission, 83, 95–97, 98–100, 112, 216 Hulbert, Homer, 61, 63, 69 Hurley, Patrick, 78, 87 Iljinhwoi, 60 Imperial rivalry. See great power relations Independence Club movement, 21–22, 42, 47 India, 57, 75 institutionalist theory, 215 international system, 4, 8 interventionist, 27, 107, 206 Intrusive Police System, 48 isolationism, 217 Italian colonies, 113, 114, 118 Ito Hirobumi, 24, 25, 60, 61, 62

Jacobs, Joseph, 166, 167, 170–71 Jaisohn, Phillip, 48, 49 Japan, occupation of, 119 Japanese annexation of Korea, 41, 57–58, 64, 65 Japanese Army, 44, 45, 47, 59 Japanese interest in Korea, 13 Japanese mistreatment of Koreans, 59, 60, 63 Japanese Naval build up, 19 Japanese occupation of Korea, 17, 39, 43 Japanese protectorate, 43–46, 58–65 British support for, 58–59 US support for, 40, 41, 53–54 Japanese protectorate treaty, 56, 58, 62 invalidity of, 61, 63 Japanese protocol, 41, 43–44, 56, 60, 61 Japanese surrender, 115, 118, 119, 121, 123, 124, 143–44 Japanese suzerainty, 52 Japanese tension with Russia, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26 Japan-Korea treaty, 14, 49 Japan strengthens control in Korea, 46, 48, 60, 64 Japan-US Japanese threat in Philippines, 34, 55 moral and diplomatic influence, 18 peace treaty, 161 requests US mediation, 48 tensions over Manchuria, 64 US estimate on postwar Japan, 109 US-Japanese alliance, 214 US Japan security alliance, 214 US occupation policy, 143, 145, 161–63 US security guarantee, 183 US support of Japan, 18, 30, 50, 55 JCS. See Joint Chiefs of Staff Jervis, Robert, 5 Jo Byung-sik, 25

Seung-young Kim

INDEX

Johnson, Louis, 181, 188, 189, 191–92, 199, 200 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 118–19, 121, 144, 156, 158, 171–72, 173–74, 179, 193, 203, 204, 205 Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), 156, 158 Kaiser Wilhelm II, 27, 41 Kaneko Kentaro, 41, 54, 57 Kato Takaaki, 25 Katsura Taro, 28, 35, 59 See also Taft-Katsura agreement KEDO. See Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization Kennan, George, 54, 87, 88, 146, 151, 155, 156, 159–62, 163–64, 168, 171, 172, 185, 192, 199, 203, 204, 205, 217 Kiaochow Bay leased to Germany, 19 Kim Il-sung, 137, 142, 167, 176 Korean War, 194 Kim Ku, 136, 138, 140, 141, 142–43, 176 Kim Kyu-sik, 141, 143, 165, 167, 176 Kim Yun Jung, 47, 49 Kishinev, Russian violence in, 34 Kissinger, 176, 201, 211, 214 KMAG. See Military Advisory Group in Korea KMT. See Kuomintang Kojong, King, 11, 14, 23, 24, 36, 44 abdication, 64 balance of power strategy, 23, 25, 67 becomes Emperor, 22, 23 Korean reform, 21, 22, 23, 47 Portsmouth treaty, 60, 61, 63 Russia, asylum in, 19, 20, 21 US, appeals to, 16, 24, 45, 50, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64 US, assistance to, 20 US, concessions to, 31, 32, 69 US, expectations of, 15, 16, 20, 25, 31 US, protection of, 45–46

279

Komura Jutaro, 25, 38, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62 Korea annexed by Japan, 41, 57–58, 64, 65 Korea clause. See Portsmouth peace conference Korea, occupation of, 118–19, 121, 123, 124 See also South Korean occupation Korean Commission, 74 Korean Communist Party, 142 Korean Democratic Party (KDP), 136, 141 Korean economy, 22, 23, 183 Korean election, 176 Korean Garrison Army, 46, 47 Korean guerrillas, 73, 74 Korean independence, 139, 149, 141 , 150, 172 Koreans’ expectations, 136, 153, 164 Korean independence movement, 65, 75, 101, 120 in China, 101 Korean Independence Party (KIP), 141 Korean Liberation Committee, 101 Korean military, 23, 24 Korean neutrality, 38–40 Korean policy of neutrality, 24, 38, 39 memorial for Korean independence, 48–50 Russia promotes Korean neutrality, 25, 26, 39 US refusal to support Korean neutrality, 13, 14, 20, 25, 26, 39–40, 43, 47–48, 69 US support for independence, 13 Korean participation in WWII, 102 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 217 Korean Peoples’ Assembly, 164 Korean People’s Republic, 136

Seung-young Kim

280

INDEX

Korean Provisional Government (KPG), 65, 73, 74, 75, 88, 101, 103, 119–20, 136, 138, 139, 141, 148, 151–52, 216 diplomatic recognition, 119 threat perception, 129 Korean trusteeship anti-trusteeship campaign, 136, 139–40, 141, 142, 143, 164, 165, 170 Britain, 76, 81 China, 76, 81 ends and means analysis, 129 Korean support, 164, 165 launch of trusteeship, 139 multipolar perception, 129 negotiations after occupation, 124, 135, 136, 139, 148 Potsdam conference, 111, 113 pragmatic approach, 131 principle of trusteeship agreed, 76 promoting democracy, 130 recognition of KPG, 73, 103, 129 fears for Sovietization, 71, 109–10, 111–12, 114, 129, 164 Soviet Union, 76, 80, 81, 88, 89, 95, 99, 111, 137 US criticism of trusteeship plan, 138, 166 US delays diplomacy, 71, 91, 98, 105, 114, 117, 118 US end of trusteeship plan, 164, 165, 166 US motives for trusteeship, 75, 76, 78 US role in trusteeship, 78–79 US vision of multilateral trusteeship, 71, 73, 75, 88, 95–97, 98, 99, 110, 111, 127, 128, 148 Yalta secret agreement, 80, 81, 82, 88 clarification of Yalta agreement, 91, 93, 95 See also US-Soviet Joint Commission

Korean unification, 139, 141, 143, 148, 150, 164, 176, 184, 188, 194, 206 Korean War, 133, 175, 190, 197, 200 Chinese assistance, 194–95 Soviet assistance, 194, 197 support for US intervention, 200 threat perception, 205 U.N. response, 197 US reaction to preparations in north, 195, 196, 197 US intervention, 197, 199, 200, 204, 205, 210 KPG. See Korean Provisional Government Kuomintang (KMT), 96, 99, 105, 120, 123, 144, 178 decline, 182, 204 expulsion to Formosa, 181 US support for, 143–44, 182 Kurile islands, 80, 106 Kwangju massacre, 212 Kwangmoo Reforms, 22 Land expropriation, 44 Langdon, William R., 75, 138, 140 Lansdowne, Foreign Secretary, 55, 56, 58, 59 League of Nations, 74 Leahy, Admiral, 86, 174 Liaotung Peninsula, 18, 19, 20, 51, 123 Li Hung-chang, 14, 15 Lincoln, Brigadier General, 122, 123, 125 Lippman, Walter, 3 Li Yong-ik, 44 Local threat, 9, 69, 131, 206, 215 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 56 Long Telegram, 159, 160 Lyuh Woon-Hyung, 135–36, 141, 142, 165 MacArthur, General Douglas, 91, 149, 161, 178–79, 200 MacDonald, British Ambassador to Japan, 58

Seung-young Kim

INDEX

Mahan, Alfred Thayer, 33, 34 Manchuria Big Three conference, 94 Cairo declaration, 89 Chinese civil war, 145 Chinese sovereignty, 106 communist threat, 144, 145, 158 domino effect, 128 Japanese occupation of, 19, 28, 47 Open Door policy, 28, 29, 30, 34, 64, 106, 107, 115, 120, 130 railroad interests, 24, 28, 107, 113, 120, 123 Russian occupation, 20, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 54, 67, 99, 120, 122, 123, 124, 182 Russo-Japanese War, 38 Sino-Japanese War, 17 Sino-Soviet negotiations, 114, 120 Soviet threat, 108, 109, 110, 114, 158–59, 169 spheres of influence, 29 Triple Intervention, 19 US economic interest in, 31, 32, 34, 36, 69, 108, 115 US occupation, 121, 144 US- Soviet negotiation, 115, 116, 117, 130 Yalta agreement, 80 zonal occupation, 119 Mao, Tse-tung, 163 Korean War, 194 Marshall, General, 86, 91, 93, 119 Marshall mission, 144 Marshall Plan, 146, 148, 160 Marshall, Secretary of State, 145, 147, 151, 168, 172 Maruyama Shigetoshi, 48 McCarthyism, 198 McCloy, John, 93, 97, 98, 138 McCormick, Thomas, 8 McKinley, William, 25, 27, 32 mediation diplomacy, 33, 68 Megato Jutaro, 46, 48 Military Advisory Group in Korea, 196

281

Min Yong-Hwan, 47, 62, 63 Min Yeung-Tchan, 63, 64 Molotov, Foreign Minister, 86, 87, 91, 111, 118 Monroe Doctrine, 41 MOONRISE, 158 Morgan, 37, 50, 60, 62 Moscow agreement, 140 Muccio, John Joseph, 181, 186, 189, 193, 200, 207 Mukden, 54, 55 multilateralism, 129, 205, 209, 215, 217 See also Korean trusteeship multipolarity, 4, 6, 27, 67, 71, 127, 128, 129, 133, 143, 155, 160, 203, 204, 205, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215 Nahm, Andrew, 58 National Security Council (NSC), 176–77, 178–79 NSC 8 series, 177, 178, 179, 180, 184, 186, 189, 193, 197, 207 NSC 48 series, 181–85, 186, 198, 204 NSC 68, 190, 191, 192, 193, 198, 204, 205 Needham, Charles W., 47 neoclassical realism, 4 neorealism, 4, 5 Newlands, Senator Francis, 60 Nimitz, Admiral, 119, 174 Nishi-Rosen convention, 20, 21 Nitze, Paul, 185, 189, 191–92, 193, 205, 206 Nixon, 211 Nixon Doctrine, 212 North Korean assistance to South Korean communists, 136, 143 North Korean communists, 138 North Korean invasion of South Korea, 194 North Korean military capability, 196, 212 North Korea, Soviet support for, 167

Seung-young Kim

282

INDEX

North Korean threat to South Korea, 152, 177, 179, 181, 184, 187, 195 North Korea, threats from South Korean, 188, 189 North Korea, US threat perception of, 137 Norstad, Major General Lauris, 152 NSC. See National Security Council Nuclear weapon. See atomic bomb Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 112, 120 off-shore balancing strategy, 155, 186 Oliver, Robert, 102 Open Door policy, 34, 35, 37, 40, 48, 115–16, 124, 129, 130 in China, 96, 107 in Korea, 97 in Manchuria, 28, 29, 30, 34, 64, 106, 107, 115, 120, 130 in Port Dairen, 108, 113, 123 Outer Mongolia, 80, 99, 106, 107 Pak Che Som, 62 Pak Hun-yong, 136, 137, 142, 194 Pak Yong-hyo, 21 Paris Peace Conference, 65, 74 Park Chung-hee, 211, 212 pattern of diplomacy, 6, 68, 129, 205, 210 Patterson, Secretary of War Robert, 147, 151, 152–53, 168 Pauley, Edwin, 121, 173 Pavlov, Russian Minister, 26, 39 Pearl Harbor, 65, 73, 74, 216 penta-polarity, 211 Peoples’ Committee, 137 People’s Party, 141 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 163, 175 perception. See bipolarity, central decision makers, multipolarity, threat perception Peterson, Howard C., 153 Philippines, 182

Japanese threat, 30, 34, 50 spheres of influence, 34, 55 Taft-Katsura agreement, 35, 51, 52, 54, 55 US occupation, 30, 33, 54, 55 polarity. See under bipolarity; multipolarity; penta-polarity; tripolarity; uni-polarity Policy Planning Staff (PPS), 156, 160, 163, 171, 185 Polish question, 79, 83, 84, 85, 86, 112 analogy, 128 arrest of opposition leaders, 84 Hopkins mission, 100 Yalta, 84–85, 87 Port Arthur, 19, 54, 55, 57, 80, 82, 94, 106, 107, 108, 124 Port Dairen, 80, 106, 108, 113, 121, 129 demarcation line, 122 Sino-Soviet agreement, 123 US concerns, 124 Yalta, 124 Portsmouth Peace Conference, 48, 50, 56–58, 62, 68, 210 annexation of Korea, 57 Korea clause, 56–57 Korean independence memorial, 49 Sakhalin, 57 Potsdam conference, 111 Korean trusteeship, 105, 112, 113, 119, 120, 127, 129 Open Door policy, 124, 130 status of Sino-Soviet negotiations, 113 Soviet interest in Italian colonies, 113, 114 success of atomic bomb, 114, 128 US briefing book, 111, 117 US diplomacy, 116–18 PPS. See Policy Planning Staff pragmatic approach, 7, 9, 68, 69, 84, 93, 110, 131, 185, 186, 191, 207, 209 PRC. See People’s Republic of China

Seung-young Kim

INDEX

priority setting, 203 Pro-American Korean political faction, 22, 25, 26, 47, 75 promoting democracy, 7–8, 69, 130, 206, 207, 209 Reagan administration, 212, 213 realist theories, 3–4, 7, 9, 67–68, 148, 211, 215 Realpolitik, 33, 67, 76, 77 regional security, 213, 215 Republic of Korea, 180 stability, 181 US support, 193 Rhee, Syngman, 74, 193 Acheson’s US News and World Report interview, response to, 195–96 anti-trusteeship campaign, 140, 142, 165 appeals to US, 47, 88, 102, 188 authoritarian rule, 189 coalition, 102 independence memorial, 48, 49, 50 Korean Commission, 74 Korean Democratic Party (KDP), 136 Korean Provisional Government (KPG), 73, 74, 88, 101, 119–20 League of Nations, 74 North Korea, threats against, 188, 189 president, 176 separate South Korean state, 142, 149, 164–65, 166 United Korean Committee, 102 United Nations, 88, 102 US support, 167, 206, 216 Washington conference on naval arms control, 65 Yalta, suspicions, 102–3 Rice, Spring, 33, 41, 55 Righteous Army, 23, 64 Rockhill, William, 34, 36, 37, 41, 62, 68 Roh, Moo-hyun, 215 role of ideas, 5, 68, 129–30, 203, 205

283

rollback strategy, 183, 184, 191 Roosevelt, Alice, 52, 60 Roosevelt, Franklin, D., 79–80, 82, 210 Cairo conference, 76 Far East policies, 71 Korean trusteeship, 80–81, 127 Polish issue, 84, 85 post-war order, 79 strategic beliefs, 79 Yalta agreement, 77, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85 Roosevelt, Theodore, 27, 32, 34, 210 Far East policies, 13, 27, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 43, 56, 67, 217 Japanese occupation of Korea, 41, 42, 53–54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63 Korean independence memorial, 49 Philippines, security of, 54, 55 Portsmouth Peace Conference, 48, 57, 58 Russo-Japanese War, 39, 40 strategic beliefs, 32–34, 67, 68 Taft-Katsura agreement, 50, 51, 53, 55 Root, Elihu, 35, 52, 53, 68 Japanese protectorate, 58, 62, 63, 64 Royal, US Secretary of the Army, 188 Rusk, Dean, 172, 195, 199 Russia Britain, challenge to, 27, 28 Japanese annexation of Korea, response to, 64 Japan, confrontation with, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 38 Japan, tension with, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26 King Kojong, 19, 20, 21 Korea, interest in, 13, 19, 24, 25 Korean neutrality, 25, 26 Liaotung peninsula, 19 Port Arthur, 20 Trans-Siberian railway, 17 See also Manchuria; triple intervention

Seung-young Kim

284

INDEX

Russo-Japanese War Japanese victory, 40, 51 outbreak, 28, 39 Russian recovery of rights, 80 US response, 30, 38, 40, 41 Sacks, Alexander, 192 Sakhalin, 57, 80 Schufeldt, Commodore, 14 secret diplomacy, 53, 55 Shimonoseki negotiation, 18 Siberian Army, 75 Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), 17, 18, 19, 36 Sino-Soviet alliance treaty, 181 Sino-Soviet negotiations, 105–8, 111–12, 113, 114, 120 Sino-Soviet pact, 190 Sino-Soviet split, 182, 183, 186, 203, 211 Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance, 123 Six-Party Talks, 217 social Darwinism, 34 Soong, T. V., 74, 99, 102 Sino-Soviet negotiations, 105, 106, 107, 108, 111–12 South Korea armed forces, 177 Communist Party, 137, 142 communization, 148, 170, 178, 184, 196 creation of separate state, 138–39, 142, 148, 151, 154, 165–66, 168, 176, 180, 205, 207 defense, 189 economy, 137, 170, 176, 196, 211 elections, 176 independence. See Korean independence moderate coalition, 140–43, 148–49, 164, 165, 170 military capability, 189, 196, 211, 213, 215

North Korean infiltration, 177, 181, 195, 197 North Korea, threat against, 188, 189 North Korea, threat from, 184, 205, 207 political organization, 140–43 Soviet control, threat of, 129, 131, 169, 177, 184 US commitment through the U.N., 180, 198 US defense commitment, 9, 184, 186, 187, 188 US economic interdependence, 213 US military alliance, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215 Vietnam War, 211 See also communization, Republic of Korea; US aid to Korea, US troop withdrawal South Korean National Assembly, 176 Soviet expansion, 71, 83, 84, 85–86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 93, 105, 106, 108, 117 in Far East, 122, 158, 159, 169, 177, 182, 190 Rhee’s fears for Korea, 102 US fears, 109, 110, 111, 114, 127, 152, 190, 200 Soviet military capability, 198 Soviet participation in war, 79, 80, 84, 85, 89, 91, 92, 113, 114, 117, 119 atomic bomb, 114 enters war, 120 Soviet support for North Korean attack, 194 Soviet troop withdrawal, 151, 170, 172 Spanish-American War, 28, 30, 32, 33 spheres of influence, 6, 34, 53, 92, 130, 216 in Korea, 17, 24–25, 29, 41, 43, 50, 54, 55 in Manchuria, 29 in the Philippines, 34, 54, 55 Yalta agreement, 80 Stalin, 80

Seung-young Kim

INDEX

Big Three conference, 90, 118 Hopkins mission, 95, 98, 99 Korean trusteeship, 76, 80–81, 99 Korean War, 194 North Korea, 137 Poland, 84, 87 Sino-Soviet negotiations, 105–6, 108, 111–12, 113 meeting with Truman, 113 Yalta agreement, 84, 98, 111 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC), 121, 122, 123, 139, 151 Sternburg, Ambassador, 40, 41 Stettinius, Secretary of State, 86, 89 Stevens, Francis B., 169 Stimson, Henry, 82, 86, 91, 92–94, 98 atomic bomb, 114 Open Door, 115 Potsdam conference, 105, 112, 115 Straight, Willard, 48, 60, 62 strategic calculation, 34, 159, 169, 206 strategic situation, 53, 54, 71, 129, 133, 143, 175, 181, 182, 186, 191, 203, 204, 205, 214 strategic thinkers, 5, 7, 33, 129, 159, 205 strategic value, 155, 156–58, 160, 168, 186, 188, 191, 195, 203, 206 strategic vision, 36, 67, 68, 163, 212 Suematsu Kencho, 41 SWNCC. See State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Taft-Katsura agreement, 50–56, 57, 68, 209 Taft, William Howard, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 65, 68 Taiwan Nationalist China expelled to, 181 US military occupation, 182 US military protection, 182, 183, 186, 188 Takahira Kogoro, 26, 41, 46, 59, 60, 63 terrorism, 213

285

Thirty-eighth parallel, 71, 105, 121–22, 123, 124, 125, 127, 129, 139, 210 armed skirmishes, 189, 195 threat perception, 4–5, 6, 68, 129, 205, 211, 215 Tonghak Revolt, 17 Total Diplomacy, 193 treaty of Tientsin (1885), 17 tri-partite pact, 77 Triple Intervention, 19 tri-polarity, 211 Truman Doctrine, 146, 155, 158, 160 Truman, Harry, 83, 84, 127, 143, 188, 210 Big Three conference, 90, 91, 94 Korea, 103, 114, 148 Korean War, 133 NSC 68, 192 Potsdam conference, 105, 111, 112 Relations with USS.R., 86, 87 thirty-eighth parallel, 124 troop withdrawal, 173 Yalta, 82, 85 trusteeship. See Korean trusteeship Tsar Nicholas II, 34 Tso So-wang, 102 Tsushima, battle of, 48, 50, 54 Turkey. See US assistance uncommitted thinkers on strategic issues, 5, 7, 127 unilateralism, 58, 86, 100, 109, 110, 118, 127, 128, 129, 210, 212 uni-polarity, 213 United Korean Committee, 102 United Nations collective security, 180 credibility, 181, 197, 205 General Assembly resolution, 180–81, 200, 205 intervention, U.N. led, 187, 205 Korean question, 97, 118, 149, 154, 168, 172–73, 180, 205 Korean War, 197 KPG participation, 88

Seung-young Kim

286

INDEX

United Nations (continued) military intervention in Korea, 179 organizational conference, 102 seats, 85, 103 Security Council, 158, 179 Soviet veto, 89, 158, 187 United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), 176, 177 Unsan gold mine, 31 US aid to Korea Grant in Aid, 149–50, 151, 153–54, 168 limited/opposed, 154, 157, 173, 177, 188, 189, 193, 194, 203 military aid, 169, 175 NSC8, 186 NSC 48, 184–85 South Korea, 176, 179 support for, 187, 203 US assistance to Asia, 184 to China, 144–45, 157, 158 to Europe, 173 to Greece, 146, 151, 154, 155 to KMT, 144, 183 to Turkey, 146, 151, 154, 155 to USS.R., 86, 87 US-China Treaty (1858), 14, 15 US commitment to periphery, 3, 6, 71, 160–61, 216 US credibility, 153, 204, 205 US defense budget, 147, 150, 188, 190, 191, 192, 204, 205 US defense strategy, 195 US economic interest, 8, 109, 115, 130, 206 in China, 37, 39 in Europe, 146 in Japan, 31, 69 in Korea, 15, 16, 18, 20, 26, 31, 32, 35, 36, 41, 49, 65, 69 in Manchuria, 108 US emergency war plan, 186

US evangelism/missionaries, 32, 45, 48, 49, 65, 69 US-Japan. See Japan-US US Korea treaty, 14–15, 39, 45, 49, 62, 63, 64, 188 US legation, withdrawal of, 42, 62, 64 US military aid, 145, 191 budget, 147, 191 capability, 27, 30, 68, 69, 128, 131, 146, 148, 158–59, 190, 198, 207, 213, 216 commitment, 69, 71 control, 79 Navy, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38, 55, 68, 89 permanent military bases, in Far East, 182 strategy in Far East, 187 support for South Korea, 187 US military advisers, Korea requests, 16 US prestige, 149, 153, 157, 168, 169, 179 US resource limitations, 135, 143, 148, 155–56, 157, 160, 161, 173, 174, 186, 188, 191, 203, 206, 211, 214, 215, 216 US-Soviet confrontation in Europe, 175 US-Soviet Joint Commission, 139, 140, 141, 142, 148, 151, 164, 165, 166, 170 US State Departmentestimate, 108–10 US troop withdrawal China, 143, 144, 163 Japan, 161 Vietnam, 211, 212 Vincent, John Carter, 138, 149, 151, 206 Walt, Stephen, 4 Wartime Operational Control, 214 Washington Conference on naval arms control (1921), 65

Seung-young Kim

INDEX

Wedmeyer, 75 Wedmeyer mission, 169, 174 Weltpolitik, 27 Wilsonian memorandum, 153, 206 Wilson, Woodrow, 8, 65 Witte, Sergei, 25, 29, 56, 57 world systems theory, 8 Yalta agreement, 73, 77, 80, 82, 88, 89, 106–7, 113 ambiguity of discussions, 81, 87, 107 conference, 73, 79, 111 Hopkins mission, 98 Polish issue, 84–85, 86, 87 revision of, 89, 91, 92, 93, 96

287

Rhee’s suspicions, 102–3 Sino-Soviet negotiations, 120 violations, 84, 87 Yamagata Aritomo, 17 Yi Wan Yong, 64 Yi Yong-ik, 39 Yongampo, Russian occupation of, 29, 38 Yoon, Rev. Pyong-ku, 48, 49 zonal occupation in Japan, 98 in Korea, 71, 78, 81, 110, 120, 122, 127, 135, 139 in Manchuria, 119 in South Korea, 124

Seung-young Kim

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