Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia (Strategic Thought in Northeast Asia)

Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia

Strategic Thought in Northeast Asia Gilbert Rozman, Series Editor

Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States By Gilbert Rozman Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia By Gilbert Rozman, In-taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia By Gilbert Rozman

Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by

Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson

JAPANESE STRATEGIC THOUGHT TOWARD ASIA

© Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson, 2007. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2007 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7553–9 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7553–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Japanese strategic thought toward Asia / Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, Joseph P. Ferguson, eds. p. cm.—(Strategic thought in Northeast Asia) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7553–1 1. Japan—Foreign relations—Asia. 2. Asia—Foreign relations—Japan. 3. Japan—Strategic aspects. 4. National security—Japan. I. Rozman, Gilbert. II. Togo Kazuhiko, 1945– III. Ferguson, Joseph P. JZ1745.A55J37 2007 327.5205—dc22

2006048205

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: January 2007 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

Acknowledgments 1

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Overview Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson

Part 1

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Chronology

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Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia in the 1980s Takashi Inoguchi

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Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward Asia in the First Half of the 1990s Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

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Japan’s Strategic Thinking in the Second Half of the 1990s Kazuhiko Togo

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Japanese Strategy under Koizumi T.J. Pempel

Part 2

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Geography

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Changing Japanese Strategic Thinking toward China Ryosei Kokubun

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Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan Ming Wan

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Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea Cheol Hee Park

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Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Russia Joseph P. Ferguson

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Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward Central Asia Akio Kawato

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Japanese Strategic Thinking on Regionalism Gilbert Rozman

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Contributors

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Index

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Acknowledgments

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his volume is the second in a series on Strategic Thought in Asia. With support from the Princeton Institute of International and Regional Studies (PIIRS), directed by Miguel Centeno, the overall project began in 2004 and is expected to continue until 2008. Without encouragement from PIIRS this project would not have been possible. Former Japanese diplomat, Kazuhiko Togo, after serving as Director General for European Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as Ambassador to the Netherlands, came to Princeton to work with Gilbert Rozman, Professor of Sociology, on both Russian and Japanese strategic thought toward Asia. Joseph P. Ferguson also arrived in the fall of 2004 as a postdoctoral fellow expert on both Japanese and Russian foreign relations. Together the three of us organized a conference in Princeton in May 2005, where each of the authors presented an initial version of his chapter and critiqued an early draft of the overview. We are grateful to the East Asian Studies Program at Princeton, directed at the time by Martin Collcutt, for providing additional support for the two visitors to Princeton and the conference. A number of specialists who attended the conference or joined the organizers at workshops in Princeton also played a role in shaping the contents of this volume, and we appreciate their contributions. Production of this volume was facilitated by Anthony Wahl at Palgrave. We are thankful to all at Palgrave who have contributed to this publication.

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CHAPTER 1

Overview Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph P. Ferguson

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apan being part of Northeast Asia had been directly influenced through the first thousand years of its recorded history by just two countries, China and Korea. For the past 150 years one of its greatest foreign policy dilemmas has been how to balance the West, coming from afar and representing modernity, and Asian neighbors, long behind in the pursuit of modernization and power but temptingly close at hand. Since the mid-1980s this dilemma has acquired new poignancy as the power differential between these two poles has rapidly changed. At stake are Japan’s position in the global balance of power and also its identity in an age of globalization accompanied by rising regionalism and reemergent nationalism. The challenge of strategic thinking toward Asia is to assess how ties to the United States and others in the West can best serve policies in nearby areas of Asia and how Japan’s own internal needs and national interests are best pursued as these areas become transformed. Our study examines how strategically have Japan’s leaders over the past two decades viewed Asia, especially Northeast Asia. We identify criteria for strategic thinking, assess how well they were met across four periods (the 1980s, the first half of the 1990s, the second half of the 1990s, and the Koizumi era through 2005), and separately focus on China, Japan, the Korean peninsula, Russia, and Central Asia as well as providing a broad look at perceptions of regionalism. It is essential to avoid the pitfalls of judging what is strategic through the frame of preferred relations with one or another country. For some, positive strategic thinking is linked to associating more closely with the

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United States; for others it comes from balancing the United States with partners in Asia. Our criteria are independent of this dichotomy. We ask to what extent was thinking targeted at making Japan more secure, prosperous, and respectable. Also, we consider to what degree was it directed toward reassuring the Japanese public rather than rousing them, solving recognized problems instead of postponing or exacerbating them, and putting in place a process of careful deliberation at home and consultation abroad. These criteria stress the pursuit of long-term aims, balancing the expansion of Japan’s influence with success in winning greater trust abroad and avoidance of excessive dependency with recognition of the need for increased interdependence. We note some recurrent priorities for Japan in Asia, the pursuit of which provides grounds for evaluating strategic thinking. First, there is the goal of balancing or limiting the country deemed to be ascendant or threatening to Japan’s aspirations for influence. In the 1980s the Soviet Union remained the foremost barrier; through the first half of the 1990s leaders seemed most concerned about gaining more equality with the United States in Asia; and afterward it is increasingly China that looms as the constraining power. Second, Japanese cling to the objective of legitimizing their country’s position in Asia, ending the abnormal legacy of a defeated and repudiated power. China, South Korea, and now North Korea are the targets for this strategic objective. Third, Japan has been positioning itself for diplomatic maneuvering over the Korean peninsula and Taiwan, matters of divided countries at the two main gateways to the Japanese islands. Finally, leaders sought a path to leadership in Asia, through various approaches such as plans for regionalism. Our comparisons of success in strategic thinking rely heavily on how well we consider these priority goals to have been conceptualized and addressed. Japan’s emergence from postwar humility and passivity in Asia occurred over a quarter century, marked by the dual book-ends of the five-year administrations of Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982–87) and Koizumi Junichiro (2001–06). Each of these leaders deepened the alliance with the United States, while projecting the image of a resurgent Japan inside Asia. Nakasone strove to end the lethargy of a weak Japan whose economic power was not matched by the lingering reticence of a defeated power’s postwar diplomacy. Koizumi aimed to halt Japan’s growing marginalization in Asia by defiantly repulsing further criticism of its historic behavior regarding issues that he considers domestic or personal. Though the two leaders took contrasting approaches to close East Asian neighbors, they wrestled with similar challenges in broadening Japan’s role in the region: how independent of the United States to be in

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asserting nationalism and preparing for breakthroughs in Asia; how compromising to be with China and South Korea in order to establish a strong foothold nearby in Asia; how hard to work to overcome the territorial dispute with Moscow and the lack of normalization with Pyongyang in order to pursue a new strategic balance; and how much attention to pay to Southeast Asia in order to forge an expansive hinterland with potential for regionalism. As his time in office drew to an end, Nakasone faced a radical transformation in U.S.–Soviet relations, both raising hope for new diplomatic opportunities and casting doubt on long-standing assumptions. A new premium was placed on strategic thinking following insistence early in Nakasone’s tenure that intensification of the cold war would raise Japan’s strategic profile. Similarly, Koizumi, triumphant after elections to the Lower House of the Diet in September 2005, faced a watershed in Asia. After drawing closer to the United States in partnership with George W. Bush, he stood at the threshold of a far-reaching struggle in Asia due to: a renewed U.S. push for a comprehensive approach that would stop North Korea’s capacity to pose a threat and limit China’s rise as a political power; a strengthened Sino-Russian strategic partnership with growing inclusion of Central Asia; a deepening North Korean nuclear crisis with reverberations in the troubled six-party talks where Japan found only the United States like-minded on security; the breakdown of trust in bilateral ties with China and South Korea; and the bifurcation of thinking on regionalism in the face of the back-to-back meetings of ASEAN ⫹ 3 and the East Asian Summit (EAS). While drawing ever closer to the United States, Koizumi struggled to articulate a diplomatic strategy to deal with dramatic changes in Japan’s Asian environment. In the 14-year interval between Nakasone and Koizumi we observe three distinct periods of groping with rapid changes without a firm strategic anchor. First, without major adjustment in the strategic outlook set by Nakasone, came strategic overconfidence under shortlived Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prime ministers hesitant to respond to the end of the cold war and abrupt reorganization in Asia. Second, Japan was beset by strategic weakness as the LDP could not exert power and no alternative strategic planning center could replace it in an environment of multiparty coalitions and weakly centralized authority. Third, after the LDP regained foreign policy control we observe strategic pragmatism. In contrast to the cautious assertiveness in Asia of Nakasone and the defiant assertiveness of Koizumi, these three periods produced an inconsistent record with some promising initiatives mixed with many lost

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opportunities. Koizumi left behind weakness and pragmatism in favor of bold rebalancing of the United States and Asia, letting opportunities for Japan in Asia pass. Though the focus below is strategic thought toward Northeast Asia, it would be a mistake to overlook three other orientations that operate in the background. First is the sense of national identity on which all strategic thinking is anchored. Having been shaken by the devastating defeat of 1945, this identity is still in flux in ways that bear heavily on thinking toward the nations of Northeast Asia. After all, some of these nations view Japan through a historical prism, and the Japanese cannot avoid reciprocating with their own search for the meaning of past conduct. Yet, we should avoid single-mindedly associating national identity with a complex centered on the history of the first half of the twentieth century. Appeals for becoming a “normal state” point no less to assuming the full responsibilities of the international community, including military cooperation to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and support of terrorism. Japan’s quest to become a permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council should be seen in this light too. Converting economic power into political status and expanded “soft” power are aspects of the drive for a new international identity. A second orientation that stands squarely in the background of views toward Asia is strategic thinking toward the United States. With power relations in Asia in great flux and Japan’s early postwar aspirations there unrealized, solidifying relations with the United States has become ever more important. Although this book does not directly assess this part of Japanese strategic thought, we do not hesitate to conclude that the level of consistency, coordination, and long-term calculus has been generally higher in thinking about the United States. We do not doubt that a careful evaluation of strategic thinking toward the United States would yield strikingly different results from our coverage of thinking toward Asia. Moreover, the two are not independent of each other. In putting priority on close ties with the United States for many years ahead, Japanese leaders have prepared a more solid foundation for “reentry into Asia.” Along with revitalizing national identity, this has potential to bolster confidence for addressing foreign policy complexities with reduced emotional nationalism and idealistic pacifism—the two extremes that bedeviled Japanese strategic thinking in the twentieth century. Third, we must acknowledge that the geographical range of our coverage of Asia largely omits areas that are now becoming more closely intertwined. Whereas through the 1990s few included India in calculations

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of the great power balance facing Japan, the situation is changing. Moreover, Australia and New Zealand have joined with India as newly invited members at the first EAS, adding to the core of 13 states in ASEAN ⫹ 3 that first convened in 1997. Above all, it is Southeast Asian states and ASEAN as a whole that remain important objects of Japanese strategic calculations. Below we consider Southeast Asia and ASEAN in some chapters, such as the one on regionalism, but we concentrate further north where the greatest challenges face Japan. As in the lack of separate focus on national identity and the United States, our restricted geographical emphasis in Asia limits our capacity to generalize about Japanese strategic thinking as a whole. Our justification is that Northeast Asia is the core of Japan’s strategic interests in Asia, and it poses enough challenges to deserve our primary and intense attention. Some may argue that success that might be identified through the above three orientations should be interpreted as counterbalancing whatever shortcomings we find in the geographical core of our coverage. We do not recognize this tradeoff as some kind of zero–sum game. Indeed, we see no alternative to strategic thinking centered on Northeast Asia. Distracting unresolved identity discussions toward revisionist rationalizations does not clarify critical historical identity questions that center on past ties in this region. Nor do certain US efforts to swing Japan behind goals that separate it from Northeast Asia leave Japan well positioned to strike a balance by looking in both directions. Finally, in Southeast Asia and beyond, Japan has been scrambling to counter China’s initiatives on a playing field that transfers their rivalry. The other orientations matter, but they do not make the case that relative success in strategic thinking outside of Northeast Asia means that Japan has prepared itself to face its greatest challenges. Comparing the strategic thinking toward Asia in Japan over four periods, we find more success in some periods than others. In the 1980s we note some success, especially in Nakasone’s time, with dwindling success in the overconfident period that followed. In the first half of the 1990s we see much less success as strategic weakness overtook forward-looking calculations. In contrast, the pragmatic period in the second half of the 1990s strikes us as the most successful; serious efforts were made to achieve a strategic understanding of Japan’s difficulties in Asia. Finally, we rank Koizumi’s defiantly assertive period even below the period of strategic weakness in addressing Japan’s strategic challenges in Asia. After a quarter century of low-key continuity in which strategic thinking was often set aside as an untimely source of discord at home and abroad, the Japanese political elite entered the 1980s in a mood to

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advance expediently toward normalcy. They understood the need to make progress on three fronts: (1) to transform ties with the United States, the country’s postwar occupier and protector, with the goal of gaining adequate balance in Asia; (2) to reestablish regional influence, especially in Northeast Asia as the country’s backyard from which it had been ignominiously ousted in 1945, with the goal of reconciliation; and (3) to restore pride at home in the Japanese nation, after an embarrassing silence marked by a virtual stalemate between leftist and rightist notions of national identity, with the goal of normal nationalism. The shared drive for strategic thinking required more than a rising consensus that opportunities for pursuing these three broad objectives were approaching. The challenge was to balance these goals, to set priorities, and to resolve inconsistencies in the means available for a combined strategic approach. In the 1970s Japan had concentrated on Southeast Asia with considerable success. It would continue to promote ties with many countries in this region. Yet, the key sites of reconciliation were concentrated in Northeast Asia. After relations with the Soviet Union had deteriorated in the second half of the 1970s, Japan set its sights on both using the Soviet threat to boost its regional standing and normalizing ties with that country as a step toward reshaping its regional role. In contrast, relations with China were moving forward after Beijing’s shift to reform and openness; reconciliation seemed within reach through massive Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other economic cooperation. The logic of dual U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea dictated that an upturn in relations with Seoul should occur, securing the most logical beachhead on the Asian continent. As Japan’s economic power rose, the potential was growing to take advantage of Soviet stagnation, Chinese reform, and South Korea’s widening industrial dependency. Strategic thinking offered a means to fit together the pieces of this complex region into an overall program of reasserting Japan’s leadership in a region poised for transformation. The 1980s The 1980s marked the height of Japan’s economic power. Japan had successfully overcome the two oil shocks in the 1970s and become a member of the G-7, and through the 1980s its economy kept growing, leading to the “bubble” in the latter part of the decade. Japan’s economic ascendancy in this period coincided with the emergence of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union; his unprecedented “new thinking” led to the end of the cold war. The dissolution of the Soviet Union inevitably highlighted

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Japan’s incontestable economic weight among the Western powers. Japan’s aspiration that its growing position in the international economic, and hence, political world should be recognized, and that it should play a more responsible and proactive role became an underlining motive of this decade. In reality, Japan’s policy choices were limited by the external restraints of the cold war and the unresolved post–World War II (WWII) syndrome, and its policy objectives did not produce as much success as it anticipated. But the overall strategic thinking toward greater proactiveness and autonomy was clearly seen. Nakasone became the symbolic leader of this direction. Some foreign leaders fueled rising expectations too. Ronald Reagan gave Japan a green light to assert itself more politically and militarily against the Soviet threat, relaxing concern that it should do more to address public opinion in South Korea. Following the lead of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and then Hu Yaobang led many in Japan to believe that China was preoccupied first with the Soviet threat and then with economic modernization, ready to set aside historical enmity and downplay nationalism. Finally, Leonid Brezhnev aggressively put in place new weapons that targeted Japan, sponsored invasions in Vietnam and Afghanistan, and unleashed a stream of invectives against so-called Japanese militarism. These leaders helped define strategic options for Nakasone, who became prime minister with strong inclinations to advance all three of Japan’s broad normalizing goals. The shared Soviet threat led Washington to beckon Tokyo, giving hope that more alliance equality could accompany more regional leadership. The United States stayed the focal point of Japan’s strategic thinking. Since Japan’s economic development and the growing U.S.–Japan trade deficit (over $50 billion in the middle of the 1980s) were central themes, the political and economic task “to overcome the economic and trade frictions” became the immediate strategic agenda. First, the United States pressured and then Japan reacted, but Japan’s willingness to cooperate in the devaluation of the dollar (hence, revaluation of the yen) at Plaza (1985) and Louvre (1987) did succeed in reducing its trade surplus. Nakasone’s own initiatives to change Japan so that it becomes better attuned to the international community, embodied in the Maekawa Report (1986), cannot be considered as just reactive and passive. Outside pressure was there, but equally there was a willingness on the Japanese side to utilize this pressure for enhancing Japan’s strategic position in the international community. Kokusaika (internationalization) was a key word to describe Japan’s policy; toward the end of the 1980s this motto developed into a symbol of Japan’s willingness to implement

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drastic changes: daisanno kaikoku (the third opening). The enormous bureaucratic energy directed toward the Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) (1989–90) also represented Japan’s willingness to change the internal texture of the society to make it more harmonious with the outside world. Asia was secondary, but as the decade proceeded it rose in prominence. In the politico-security area, drastic changes took place. The confusion during the Suzuki cabinet (1981) that he could not acknowledge the military implications of the “alliance” reflected a lack of leadership by a weak prime minister, but it was also a structural problem of passive pacifism. Nakasone took an assertive position, and the key notion he floated at the Williamsburg Summit (1983) that “Western security is indivisible” and that the SS-20s east of the Urals have to be dismantled together with those west of the Urals (zero-option in INF or Intermediate Nuclear Forces negotiations to be incorporated into the INF Treaty of 1987) was probably the first initiative that Japan took in international defense-security matters of that magnitude. Admittedly, proactiveness in economic and politico-security areas did not bring clear recognition; Japan “bashers” insisted that change was excessively difficult or slow in Japan. Even Nakasone could not send mine sweepers to the Persian Gulf because of the pacifists’ internal power (1987–88). The FSX controversy (1989) threatened the advent of security conflicts in addition to the trade conflicts. Growing economic strength and the disappearance of the Soviet Union as the rival power resulted in several years when Japan almost acquired the image of a major threat in the United States. The end of the cold war resulted in such views as “The Japan that Can Say ‘No’ ” by Ishihara and Morita (1989), but psychological tensions did not last long. Strategic thinking as manifested by Nakasone paved the way to a proactive orientation from the mid-1990s. A parallel rise in confidence toward Asia supported a more autonomous and energetic foreign policy. Aspiring strategic thinkers and officials had the most freedom of action in dealing with Northeast Asia. Washington remained the driving force in bilateral relations that would be difficult to challenge; Tokyo’s hope for equality rested largely on maneuvering in triangular contexts involving other Asian states. At home, voters, public opinion, and entrenched bureaucratic turf left only narrow parameters for nationalism. To overcome these narrow parameters required breakthroughs in foreign relations rather than some new political ploy by the Right or the Left within the scope of domestic politics. All could notice that the Asian continent was astir, opening new room for Japan to become more

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actively engaged and, perhaps, to accomplish all three of its paramount strategic goals: adequate balance with the United States in Asia, regional influence and reconciliation, and pride marked by normal nationalism. Nakasone cultivated personal ties with four leaders who could help realize Japan’s goals in Asia. Overcoming a downturn in relations with South Korea at the start of the decade and recognizing that the United States would appreciate a Japanese initiative, he went to Seoul in January 1983 bearing economic assistance of $4 billion and setting in motion preparations for a return visit of Chun Doo-hwan in 1984. Just the occurrence of summits between these two wary nations gave the appearance of a strategic advance. The second leader critical to Nakasone’s aspiration was Hu Yaobang, whose country in 1982 was facing a shift in the strategic triangle, as U.S. relations tottered under the Taiwan issue and Soviet relations began to move ahead after Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech. Though China had begun to show some nervousness about Nakasone’s assertion that Japan was becoming an unsinkable aircraft carrier in its military alignment and intimations that it was intent on becoming a political great power, Hu’s visit to Tokyo in November 1983 brought new emphasis on achieving mutual trust and suggested a new maturity to relations. Nakasone’s most trumpeted success came in the “Ron–Yasu” relationship, which at least gave the semblance of greater equality. The Williamsburg Summit with the notion of the “indivisibility of security among the West” and the removal of Soviet SS-20 was also a symbolic achievement of the Ron–Yasu personal relationship. At mid-decade Japan had a “presidential” leader boosting ties with critical partners and riding an economic boom backed by the confidence of his nation, but not with strategic thinking sufficient for long-term challenges. Only when Nakasone returned from the funeral of Konstantin Chernenko in 1985 optimistic about doing business with the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev did he seem ready to forge another tie and make the jump to a strategic role that could reorient Northeast Asia. From 1985 to 1988 weaknesses in Japan’s pursuit of separate goals in Northeast Asia became clearly exposed. Nakasone’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine set back relations with China and South Korea. Hu Yaobang was ousted as party secretary in China, being blamed even for being pro-Japan. As South Korean democratization burst forth, popular resentment of Japan and past autocrats’ dealings with it complicated relations. After a promising start in 1986 in exchanges of officials with Moscow, whose diplomacy was transformed by Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” one security problem after another set the clock back as Japanese nervously watched Reagan embrace arms control with Gorbachev. With

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Takeshita Noboru as prime minister from the end of 1987, Japan still had pretences about converting its economic weight into new political power, but the personal relations and leadership were weaker while new strategizing was not keeping pace with rapid regional change. Japan’s relations with the Soviet Union after Gorbachev came to power in 1985 were characterized by notable ups and downs. They began with a speedy improvement in the first half of 1986 with Shevardnadze and Abe’s reciprocal visits but then faced a sharp downturn for nearly two years. Resumption of the negotiations in the second half of 1988 was followed by a second downturn in the first half of 1989. Then slow but steady negotiations led to Gorbachev’s belated visit to Japan in April 1991. Why these ups and downs, and more importantly, why did it take six years until Gorbachev made his first visit to Japan? Soviet displeasure against Japan joining the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) (autumn 1986), the Toshiba submarine technology leak (spring 1987), and mutual expulsion of diplomats and trade representatives (1987) all exacerbated relations. So too did a disconnect between the two sides in 1989 in the process of the negotiations. Whatever the direct reasons for the downturn in relations, on the Japanese side, albeit slow and fragile, there was growing recognition that a clear opportunity for drastic improvement had emerged: Resolution of the thorny territorial problem and a fundamental improvement in relations would consolidate Japan’s strategic position. These limited and unsuccessful attempts were lessons for Japan’s policymakers on how to develop relations in the 1990s. Japan–Korea relations proceeded in the same direction with the same limitations as Japan–China ties. Suzuki and Chun Doo-hwan assumed power from 1980, and relations between the two countries entered into difficulty around the issue of Japan’s ODA to Korea. Knowing the strategic importance of resolving this issue, Nakasone acted swiftly after becoming prime minister. Chun visited Japan in 1984 and relations between the two countries seem to have stabilized. But in addition to the issues related to a 1982 textbook and Nakasone’s 1985 visit to Yasukuni, a 1986 article in a monthly magazine by Fujio Seiko, minister of culture and education, deepened the rift. Nakasone’s decision to dismiss Fujio from his cabinet post saved the relations from further rupture, but the issue of historic recognition stayed alive. As China continued the fundamental changes begun under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Japan saw an opportunity and the necessity of encouraging “reform and opening” because modernization would enable China to become a harmonious partner in the region. Japan took a consistent policy of “engagement,” starting from Ohira’s visit to China in

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1979 and the beginning of the first ODA package. These packages punctuated the 1980s: the second package with Nakasone’s visit in 1984, and the third during Takeshita’s visit in 1988. Engagement of China was further exemplified in the reaction after the Tiananmen Square repression, when Japan, while denouncing human rights infringements, advocated a policy of “not isolating China.” China showed appreciation, which paved the way to the imperial visit in 1992. Japan failed to understand another side of Deng’s “reform and opening.” Economic liberalization and political pressures made it necessary for China to face uncertain identity issues. An enhanced nationalism and a newly targeted Japan as a national enemy began spreading in China, in the party ideology and education. Zhou Enlai’s definition, “Japanese militarism is a common enemy of the Chinese and Japanese people,” which emphasized the friendship of the two nations, faded from sight. Ironically and tragically, at a time when new sensitivity over the issue of historic recognition emerged in China, a completely opposite reaction emerged in Japan. The majority of Japanese by this time came to realize that their pre-WWII policy toward China had been marked by something impermissible, but more than 30 years of sincere endeavor to become a peaceful nation, a substantial amount of ODA going to China, and rapid development of economic relations and people-to-people exchanges gave them an impression that the road to reconciliation was near. At the same time, those who felt that the post–WWII settlement had somehow infringed on Japan’s prewar honor and righteousness decided that the time had come to speak their views more openly. But the textbook controversy, the visit to Yasukuni, and statements by politicians justifying Japan’s prewar activities could not result in constructive mutual understanding. Rather they demonstrated the extreme sensitivity of these issues in Asia, Japan’s ultimate willingness to switch course in the face of those Asian views, and some disarray among Japanese politicians unable to convey their views to the outside world. Although each incident was temporarily overcome, the issue of historic recognition stayed on the agendas of Chinese internal politics and Japan–China bilateral relations. The political Right and Left overwhelmed the nascent centrist thinking in official circles, the media, and academia. The Right did not welcome a debate about reconciliation through fuller and deeper apologies to China and South Korea; some branded as traitors the few who dared to propose a compromise or staggered approach on the four islands in dispute with the Soviet Union as a means to normalization of relations. With the Left clinging to pacifism and ignoring the importance of working in tandem with the United States to take responsibility for a world

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still filled with uncertainty, many who might have moved to the center hesitated to confront the firm positions to the Right. As U.S.–Soviet ties and Sino-Soviet ties no longer permitted Japan to pursue its goals as Nakasone had assumed and South Korean change demanded a new approach, there were only glimmers of a strategic debate linked to such objectives as reentering Asia and forging regionalism. Even under cold war restraint, the 1980s had opened an opportunity for Japan to develop strategic relations with its Asian partners, notably China and Korea, but internal constraints, notably from the unresolved post-WWII issues, and inability to perceive how these relations could be renewed in neighboring countries, prevented Japan from grasping it. Various explanations can be suggested for a dearth of strategic thinking in the midst of rapid transformation of the regional and global strategic environment. First is the lack of institutionalization in government, academia, and the media of security expertise. The fields of international relations, area studies, and security studies had been slow to evolve. Economics had dominated Japan’s approach to the world, and the voices of those in the Foreign Ministry and the universities in favor of more vigorous steps to understand elite opinion in Asian countries and to achieve reconciliation were trumped by LDP politicians once political relations gained priority. Second is continued preoccupation with the United States, exacerbated by rising trade friction in the 1980s and by contradictory calls to stand up to U.S. pressure by carving more independent space for Japan and to ride the U.S. coattails in solidifying ties in Asia. The contradictory goals of the early Reagan years of containing the Soviets and supporting Taiwan and the concentration on Europe in the later years without much attention to Russia in Asia did not prepare Japan for engaging Gorbachev and reconciling with Chinese or even South Korean leaders. The message was similar to that in 2001–05: China matters little compared to Japan and even in Europe only Great Britain is so well trusted and so vital; the United States counts on Japan’s increased military role; and Japan can count on loyal ties to the United States putting it on top of Asia. This may have aroused excessive expectations. Third, the rise of nationalism in China to replace discredited Maoist communism and in South Korea along with democratization raised historical consciousness in ways that Japan could not easily diffuse with fuller apologies. Relations were becoming subject to mass consciousness and no longer were amenable for a few leaders, however well intentioned, to resolve. Most Japanese did not recognize the need for a far-reaching strategic reevaluation because of reassuring messages suggesting breakthroughs

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around the corner. The bubble economy instilled confidence in Japan’s growing economic clout, which, most assumed, would bring dividends before long. Nakasone repaired relations with China, promising no more Yasukuni visits, and the decade ended with Japan gaining favor by insisting that China should not be isolated despite sanctions after the Tiananmen state brutality. After hopes for an early Gorbachev visit in January 1987 faded, the countdown for his arrival had at the end of 1989 resuscitated expectations of a dramatic breakthrough. Security from the U.S. alliance gave Japanese the luxury of unrealistic hopes that forces on the Left were quick to embrace and many on the Right did not refute since the outcome could have been more talk of compromise. Economic overconfidence combined with foreign policy optimism left strategic thinking in the shadows. The dearth of strategic thinking must be considered a reason why successive windows of opportunity were lost in Japanese relations with neighbors in Northeast Asia. Over six consecutive years bold breakthrough chances were missed. In 1984 South Korea was reeling from the shooting down of KAL flight 007 over the Russian Far East and the bombing of its leadership in Burma, whereas Japanese ties were improving and a strongman in power could have led his nation further on the path of reconciliation. This was a time for bold action over the history issue, not satisfaction over incremental summits. In 1985, Hu Yaobang’s friendly leadership under Deng Xiaoping’s direction before nationalism had intensified, offered another chance following rejection of the antispiritual pollution campaign and a sharp acceleration of reform now centered on urban areas and drawing on Japanese ODA. As a model and vital partner, Japan could have pressed to resolve distrust still deeply rooted in the Chinese population instead of Nakasone going to the Yasukuni shrine. It was the Soviet Union’s turn in 1986 to beckon with new thinking on global relations under a vigorous new leader able to initiate a sharp shift in direction. During the first half of the year relations thawed fast, but Japan’s approach should have been bolder and its handling of potential setbacks over SDI and technology leakage more reassuring. Another opportunity presented itself in 1987 as South Korea democratized before nordpolitik turned its attention to China and the Soviet Union. By embracing this new face of Korea with appreciation for public opinion, Japan could have put relations on a new footing. In 1988 China again was on track toward more openness and more need for economic support in the face of inflation. In addition to offering a new ODA package, Japan could have turned China’s cultural fever into a joint search for historical trust putting the years of aggression into a context of

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centuries of shared tradition. Finally, the first half of 1989 was a fitting time for a far-reaching initiative toward Gorbachev, whose needs were mounting. The hiatus in relations after Moscow decided that Tokyo pressed it too hard contrasted to the stunning successes in Moscow’s other great power bilateral relations. Year after year an opportunity arose to pursue a fundamental change in Japan’s ties with Asia, but the year 1990 began with Japan still looking for a breakthrough. It is not beyond imagination to envision a pattern of snowballing success in diplomacy, as one breakthrough led to another. After all, Japan mostly enjoyed an image of efficient management, social harmony, and benign diplomacy reliant on economic ties. If it had parlayed “Ron–Yasu” ties in 1983 into a sharp improvement in ties with the South Korean leadership in 1984, then a notable upturn in ties with the Chinese leadership in 1985, and finally a clear understanding with the Soviet leadership in 1986, Japan could have positioned itself for further boosts in bilateral relations broadening to the public. In a second round of advances, it could have grasped Korean democratization, Chinese cultural fever, and Soviet glasnost with further initiatives. Flush with money and a global image of a rising but nonthreatening power, Japan faced a region where it needed to do a lot of convincing and had unprecedented opportunities to succeed. The decade of the 1980s saw progress mostly in relations with the United States, accepting Japan as a partner in Asia and finding growing satisfaction from Japan’s “forward defense strategy” of protecting sea lanes and coping with newly deployed Soviet aircraft, next with China relying on Japan for economic change and seeing it as a model, and to some degree with South Korea and the Soviet Union as long-sought negotiating partners now ready to conduct more normal diplomacy. These were significant advances and met expectations for step-by-step improvement in Japan’s Asian environment. Yet, the gains fell far short of aspirations and the needs of the time. They suggest that leaders and elite opinion paradoxically both set their sights too low, focusing on narrow progress, and expected too much, assuming that deep-seated historical issues could be resolved on the basis of economic diplomacy and little compromise. Only strategic thinking would have prepared leaders and the public for tough choices at home and rapid responses abroad. Dramatic events at the end of the decade could not but give new impetus to the quest for breakthroughs in relations. In June 1989, Sino-U.S. relations abruptly deteriorated; instead of nervousness about the United States drawing too close to China, Japanese saw a gap that might be bridged. In autumn the cold war was ending, leaving Japanese

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worried that they were isolated from new currents and very sensitive to talk in the United States that their country was becoming the foremost strategic competitor. South Korea’s nordpolitik and North Korea’s new isolation created unprecedented postwar flux around the Korean peninsula. The search for a strategic response to this torrent of change would lead Japanese discussions in new directions as the 1990s began. The First Half of the 1990s With the end of the cold war the decisive turn in post-WWII international relations gave opportunities for all major nations to adopt new strategic thinking. For Japan, on the one hand, the cold war iron umbrella was lifted, exposing it to the reality of the world. This compelled its leaders, after initial hesitation, to take a more realistic and proactive security policy. On the other hand, for geopolitical leverage Japan’s response turned out to be slow and unimaginative in grasping the fundamental changes occurring in the region. With a lot of potential at the start of the 1990s, toward the middle of the 1990s the political landscape changed dramatically. As the 1990s began with the international environment fundamentally changed, many in Japan anticipated dramatic advances. Hopes rose after China was isolated, leaving a wedge in U.S. relations for Japan to fill, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union when Yeltsin became dependent on the G-7. Talks with North Korea were frequent in 1991–92 with some hope for a breakthrough. Election of a new South Korean president late in 1992 led to signs of a new spirit of cooperation. Even Central Asia, a region left for grabs, came into play in 1992. Instead of a sustained strategy for utilizing this environment, we observe a pattern of excessive expectations and insufficient boldness in anticipating other nations’ needs. A competitive atmosphere with the United States cast doubt on old ways of thinking, but optimism about Japan’s autonomous rise in Asia was not an answer. If specialists in the government strove to understand the ways their counterparts were thinking and made progress toward realistic programs, this could not substitute for decisive and forward-looking leadership from the top and a candid debate in the media over possible tradeoffs. The first half of the 1990s was the most important period in the transformation of Japan’s strategic environment and outlook, both at home and abroad, after the restoration of sovereignty in the early 1950s. Because the party in power (the LDP) lost its exclusive grip and the longtime major rival power (the Japan Socialist Party) collapsed along with its worldview, barriers to new thinking should have fallen. Japan’s place

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in the world was tested by the most troubled relations with the United States, which aroused new doubts in public opinion, as well as the collapse of the Soviet Union, the enemy that bound together Japan and the United States throughout the cold war. Moreover, Japan’s place in Asia became for the first time in the postwar era a matter of intense concern, mixing new opportunity in the face of flux in all directions with rising alarm as events did not unfold as expected. This was a time for maximal strategic anticipation and adjustment, but the results were disappointing due to a mixture of excessive pessimism toward the United States and excessive optimism over “reentry into Asia.” Tensions over trade cast a shadow that left Japan less securely anchored in its alliance and less prone to a steady hand in dealings in Asia. With the United States more concerned about Yeltsin’s success with the Russian public than Japan’s territorial satisfaction and hesitant to endorse Japan’s handling of the history issue with its neighbors, Japan was on its own. Missing was a broad framework for interpreting how to “reenter Asia” without compromising with one or another of the region’s states. The year 1992 brought a cascade of opportunities with only short intervals to make bold decisions that defied the logic of the 1980s. The response to new Russian flexibility on the disputed islands proved inadequate to meet the needs of a reform leadership that only months later would face mounting nationalist pressure. China’s full-scale market opening led to increased Chinese interest in Japanese investment and an invitation to the Japanese emperor to visit. After hesitating to send him, the sincere message that he was able to deliver not only did not boost relations it did not succeed in calming the continuous resentment against Japanese historic atrocities. Still expecting that economic leverage would work, the Japanese were slow to grasp the message that the hopes of 1992 were not likely to reappear. China’s necessity of maintaining its national ideology for unity found no reason to abandon a rigorous attitude to prewar Japanese atrocities, and its growing geopolitical assertiveness increasingly collided with Japan’s enhanced sense of realism. China’s nationwide campaign on the Nanjing massacre in 1995 and its nuclear testing from May, at a time when Prime Minister Murayama expressed with political courage his statement of “deep remorse and heartfelt apology,” symbolized this change. On the Korean peninsula, President Roh Tae-woo’s swift nordpolitik in establishing ties with the Soviet Union (September 1990) and China (August 1992) must have shocked Kim Il-sung, who sought equivalent relations with Japan and the United States. After a flurry of negotiations, talks fell into a long stalemate from early 1992. But Japan’s effort during

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negotiations with North Korea to alleviate South Korean anxiety and the shared threat from the North due to its nuclear crisis brought Japan and South Korea somewhat closer. Japan’s effort in resolving the comfort women issue under the three cabinets (Miyazawa, Hosokawa, and Murayama, 1992–95) paved the way to development of relations in the second half of the decade, but it was far from resolving the deep-rooted mistrust felt by Koreans against Japan. Kim Young-sam’s election as the first civilian leader in 1993 does not seem to have been much exploited by the Japanese leadership. In 1991–92 during a fleeting period of euphoria in Russia, a narrow window of opportunity to resolve the territorial issue between the two countries emerged. After a brief interlude following Gorbachev’s visit in April 1991 through the abortive coup in August, in dealings with Yeltsin as head of the Russian government serious efforts began to resolve the territorial issue. Russia moved fast toward the spring of 1992, but Japan’s intransigence prevented it from grasping this opportunity. Yeltsin cancelled his visit in September 1992, and the window of opportunity was closed. The regional situation deteriorated from 1993. Writings in all four of the region’s countries became more nationalistic toward Japan. The Chinese grew confident, whereas the Russians vented their frustrations, South Korean democracy rediscovered Japan as the national nemesis, and North Korea accompanied its nuclear brinkmanship with more heated rhetoric against Japan. Meanwhile, the crash of the bubble economy and the political turmoil of divided government damped Japanese hopes. It took effort to stabilize ties with all parties. Yet, unrealistic interpretations were attached to the new arrangements. If the Tokyo Declaration patched up ties with Yeltsin and gave some hint of potential for talks on the disputed islands, it did not justify the insistence of some that a major advance had occurred that indicated Yeltsin would seriously consider transferring all four islands. At the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war the steps taken by non-LDP leaders to reassure China and Korea on history were undermined by the Diet and prefectural assemblies that tried to offer certain justifications for Japan’s past activities. The KEDO agreement gave the Japanese some taste for cooperating with the United States and South Korea to address troubling behavior by North Korea through compromise, but many dwelt on Japan’s weakness in the crisis and absence of a place in four-party talks rather than planning for coordination to face new assertiveness by the North. Japanese nationalism had no answers for the upsurge of nationalism around Japan’s borders except blaming others. Critical appraisals of diplomacy

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came largely from the Right complaining of weakness, as the Left was fading quickly. Asian-centered reasoning remained mostly in the mold of seeking friendship rather than solving problems. The regional environment in the mid-1990s did not offer many opportunities for strategic breakthroughs; expectations had to be lowered. Jiang Zemin was boosting nationalism that strengthened his hold on power but was damaging for relations with Japan. Seeking reelection, Boris Yeltsin catered to nationalists and gave new preference to partnership with China, while doing little to stem rampant demagoguery and corruption in the Russian Far East. Kim Jong-il replaced his father with cautious steps to solidify his position and little openness despite severe famine in the North. Before the Asian financial crisis, South Koreans may have been too confident to make it easy for Japanese leaders to ease tensions. The voices of prime ministers, especially Murayama, attuned to Asian sensitivities may have obscured the deteriorating climate for Japan. After an interlude in 1989–93 of focusing on China’s need for Japan because of its isolation from the United States and its loss of the socialist camp, the Japanese started to recognize that they were unlikely to become a bridge between China and the United States or a sponsor of China’s entry into regionalism. Beginning in 1994–96 the strategic challenge became clear of an assertive China, gaining economic clout and actively pursuing early Taiwan reunification, regional predominance, and global multipolarity. Japan had four main options. First, it could draw closer to the United States strategically and put pressure on China. This Japan did, but it was largely seen as a temporary expedient, not as a return to dependency such as had been accepted as a necessary tradeoff when Japan was weak in the 1950s–70s. The reality was not much acknowledged, limiting strategic explanations of its impact. Second, Japan could build up its own nationalism and independent foreign policy as a strategy to hold its own against China. This has been done to some degree, but there is little discussion of how far this should go. Third, Japan could forge close ties in Asia, outflanking China. Though there were some indications of reactive politics in order to match China’s initiatives, policies toward Russia, South Korea, and Southeast Asia lacked a sustained strategic rationale. Finally, Japan could try to find an accommodation with China, making an appeal to public opinion there and working to achieve mutual restraint. Steps in this direction were quite paltry. Expedient ties to the United States and recourse to nationalism without discussing its long-term prospects took precedence over a regional approach or a search for joint efforts with China. This is not a strong strategic orientation.

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A period that had begun with Japan’s highest expectations and a flurry of initiatives, if not bold moves, ended with stunning disappointments. In 1995 the Japanese public had no confidence in relations with any country in Northeast Asia; opinion toward China in particular was declining. Adding to the pessimism was the impression that Japanese politics lacked the capacity to redirect foreign relations as well as a troubled economy. By now, many assumed that first Tokyo would have to transform thinking and coordination toward Asia and only then could it expect to do more than staunch the downturn in relations. The economic integration of Northeast Asia was accelerating amid growing need for new forms of cooperation. There was ample reason to expect new opportunities ahead and to prepare for them. Overoptimism in the late 1980s had not led to far-reaching strategic adjustments, and deepening pessimism in the mid-1990s did not do so either. The depth of the setbacks was not well acknowledged. As primary attention went to reinvigorating ties with the United States, Clinton did not give consistent priority to the partnership and Japanese leaders did not sufficiently recognize that the United States too faced a troubling environment in Northeast Asia and might have been drawn closer with a joint search for a coordinated approach. Instead of strategically focusing on either Japan’s return to the West in dealing with its region or a realistic approach to reentering Asia, incremental steps were chosen. Japanese faced a difficult balancing act due to an insufficiency of realism holding back U.S. ties and an excess of idealism mixed with nationalism complicating relations in Asia. The two were not isolated from each other. Both closer and more troubled U.S. ties led to renewed search in Asia for international success. Closer ties brought reminders of dependence. Worsening ties led to fears of abandonment. Either way, Asia symbolized normal, multisided relations as well as the unrealized promise of Japan’s leadership. The end of the cold war led many to expect idealism to flourish, drawing Japan closer to Asia. The political Left embraced the idealism most fully, downplaying any realist challenges in the region. Even the political Right with warnings of some difficulties shared some of the idealist logic: assuming that “friendship” with China and others would be driven by economic ties and development assistance. There was a shortage of calculations of the cost of policies that tied Japan’s diplomatic hands. Gradually, the idealism faded: the Left suffered a steep decline, and the Right became more assertive toward neighbors deemed unreasonable or too nationalistic. Meanwhile, realism in ways supportive of the United States was becoming critical before Japan’s leaders and the Diet were prepared to

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embrace it fully. Having begun the period hopeful of moving beyond the U.S. orbit in Asia, Japanese ended it with reaffirmation of U.S. ties and cautious steps toward advances into Asia; however, there was no acknowledgment of the depth of setbacks in the region. The Second Half of the 1990s The late 1990s was a period when Japan had to face a new reality in international politics, particularly the impact of a rising China. When tension rose between China and the United States in the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, Japan felt an acute security danger, reshaping thinking about the nature of the post–cold war era. When the United States “passed” Japan in making overtures to China in 1998, Japan was exposed to the reality of “abandonment.” Meeting these challenges, Japan reshaped its foreign policy toward greater realism, which proved to be successful in strengthening defense-security policy and reaffirming its security ties with the United States. But Japan also tried to reshape its relations with China as well as its overall position in East Asia. Japanese strategic thinking became more “realist,” attuned to the potential for strategic instability in Northeast Asia. Realist thinking would denote the necessity of enhancing security ties with the United States, while reshaping Asian policy in order to manage relations with rising China and give a new place to South Korea, Russia, and regional institutions that could enlarge Japan’s foreign policy leverage. No efforts in Asia succeeded in producing a breakthrough on a sustainable basis, but none proved a failure either in this period. The three prime ministers who led Japan in this period—Hashimoto, Obuchi, and Mori—sought internally to overcome the economic malaise and introduce a fundamental restructuring of the social and economic system in Japan in the face of institutional obstacles and divisions within the LDP, and externally where they had more scope for action to play a greater leadership role. Hashimoto’s major achievement was the reaffirmation of security relations with the United States in 1996 and adoption of a new defense guideline in 1997. The reaffirmation had already been prepared by his predecessor seeking to overcome “Japan’s defeat” in the first Gulf War and facing North Korean adventurism, but Hashimoto’s own international experience may have convinced him that the country’s fundamental security interests lie with the United States, whose closer ties would consolidate Japan’s strategic position for involvement in East Asia. Obuchi and Mori maintained this policy without any oscillations. The Japanese government also became actively involved in the

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TMD (Theater Missile Defense) initiative, taking the first steps to help the United States develop and build a regional missile defense system. Hashimoto’s approach to China was basically realist, and he painfully endeavored to narrow the differences between the two countries. Having experienced the Taiwan Strait crisis and further rattling of relations: such as in his own Yasukuni visit and Chinese nuclear testing in 1996, Hashimoto’s reaction was not alarmist as seen in his withdrawal from further Yasukuni visits in 1997 and the resumption of suspended ODA grants in 1998. Whether his thinking was largely based on realist instincts (exacerbation of relations with China would not help in strengthening Japan’s strategic position in East Asia) or was more due to liberal-idealist desires (a legacy of the Tanaka faction to keep friendly ties with Beijing), his policy succeeded in moderating tensions. Obuchi maintained Hashimoto’s basic policy, as he crystallized his own sense of balance. He left a legacy in Japan’s Asia policy, ranging from South Korea to China, and regional cooperation. In relation to China, when Jiang Zemin resorted to aggressive preaching about Japan’s past sins during his November 1998 visit, Obuchi’s self-assertive and non-compromising approach received wide support from Japanese public opinion. Given the rise of Chinese power, one-sided bowing was not supported by either realists who called for adequate balance in bilateral relations or liberal-idealists who sought further reconciliation. At the same time, Obuchi’s approach was not alarmist either, and in his visit to China in July 1999 against the backdrop of deteriorating U.S.–China relations after the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, he expressed support for China’s participation in WTO, advancing concrete projects for cooperation as agreed in Jiang’s visit to Japan while calling for improved U.S.–China relations. At the time of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, Hashimoto showed leadership in assisting South Korea, but it was Obuchi who marked history in Japan–South Korea relations. Ironically, the North Korean Taepodong missile test in September 1998 was a “shock” beyond any other in Asia in recent times, giving the nation more determination and intensifying preparations for warming relations with South Korea. The South had a new president, Kim Dae-jung, and he was favorably disposed toward strengthening the relationship with Japan. No doubt, Obuchi’s success in receiving Kim in October was greatly due to the impact of Kim’s own preparations for a bold range of policies, leading to the sunshine policy, but Obuchi was also helped by the missile launching, which brought Japan–South Korea–U.S. security relations closer, as was proven in the Perry process and the establishment of

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Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in April 1999. Obuchi’s readiness for “a deep remorse and heartfelt apology” and Kim’s resolve to “overcome history with a forward-oriented relationship” were well received in Japan, breaking the ice in relations. Around this time it was announced that Japan and South Korea would cohost the 2002 World Cup soccer matches, and this added to the good feeling. By Obuchi’s death in 2000, Japan–South Korean relations were on a sounder and more equal footing than they had been since Japan’s annexation in 1910. The Sunshine Policy in 2000 presented Japan with some challenges. It changed South Korean internal politics and relations with the United States, and it created an uncertain dynamic for regional ties as North Korea reemerged as an active force. Japan had reason to become a major force in shaping the process, but it was slow to figure out how to respond. The search for a voice through talks with North Korea would not yield results until well after Koizumi’s selection as prime minister. Notwithstanding China’s widely acclaimed policy to maintain the value of the yuan in the face of the Asian financial crisis in 1997–98, efforts by Japan resulted in a total of $80 billion in assistance together with some imaginative schemes for cooperation (the Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) that failed and the Chiang Mai Initiative, which was successfully launched cannot be viewed as insignificant). These assertive moves for regional leadership, as the decision to work closely with ASEAN, led to the formation of the ASEAN ⫹ 3. Obuchi played a leading role in convening a Japan–China–South Korea tripartite meeting on the fringe of the ASEAN ⫹ 3 meeting in Manila. His proactive policy in enhancing cooperation in Asia was further manifested by organizing a conference for “intellectual dialogue for the future of Asia” highlighting “human security” cooperation and choosing Okinawa as the location of the 2000 G-8 Summit as he sought to have China represented. Hashimoto distinguished himself in manifesting strategic thinking toward Russia. He saw an opportunity for expanding Japan’s leadership role in East Asia through improved relations with Russia, reacting to Yeltsin’s second term as president and Russia’s interest in looking east after NATO’s eastward expansion. Hashimoto moved resolutely in strengthening his personal ties with Yeltsin and took a series of bold initiatives. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ intelligence and support were at its best, and Hashimoto did not hesitate in using them. Japan’s heightened initiatives did not bear fruit, however, as Yeltsin backed away because of ailing health and rising difficulty from the Russian financial crisis, and Hashimoto had to resign after the unsuccessful 1998 Diet election.

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Although in general, Japan’s foreign policy during Mori’s period may best be remembered as a year that bridges Obuchi to Koizumi, the notable exception was his Russian policy. Mori happened to be located at the threshold year for realizing Yeltsin’s promise “to make his best efforts to conclude a peace treaty” with Putin providing considerably stronger governance inside Russia. In this important year of transition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a supportive line-up for Mori’s Russian policy. Political support and advice also came from Suzuki Muneo, who was then rising fast on the LDP power-ladder and had gained influence over relations with Russia. In addition to the fact that Mori was one of the four musketeers of Abe Shintaro, who had been strongly inclined to improve relations with the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, he also had personal ties from his father’s long-standing friendship with the Soviet Union. Meetings between him and Putin took place five times in a year, and at Irkutsk in March 2001 they brought relations to their peak in the postwar period. The Koizumi Era Japanese strategic thinking took an abrupt turn in the spring of 2001. There was no clear precipitating factor. Domestic politics offer the most convincing explanation. The struggle for partisan support in the ranks of the LDP opened the door to a more populist leader whose defiant embrace of nationalism was symbolized by the promise to pay annual visits to the Yasukuni shrine regardless of the outcry in Asia. A turn toward unilateralism in Asia did not appear very abrasive because of three additional factors: (1) the new Bush administration left no doubt about its enthusiasm for upgrading the alliance, which privileged Japan above all other countries in Asia; (2) initiatives led by ASEAN reaching for partners in Northeast Asia and South Korea with its sunshine policy premised on joint efforts across Northeast Asia suggested a gradual process of region-building in which Japan’s role would be necessary; and (3) China’s rise and its assertive behavior had already created uneasiness and discomfort among many Japanese who had been fundamentally China friendly until the mid-1990s. With a focus on reform inside Japan coupled with revitalizing national identity, Koizumi acted precipitously with little debate within or beyond his administration on what might be the new course toward Asia. There is little sign that he and other leaders anticipated a deterioration of relations with the four states geographically closest to Japan by 2005. Actions taken essentially in isolation from each other reflected a general redirection of policy but not a new strategic calculus. Indeed,

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some had been set in motion years earlier and just happened to come on the eve of or just after Koizumi’s assumption of power. A textbook commission after years of labor approved eight options for new middle school history books, but China and Korea, which still recalled the yoke of Japanese aggression and colonialism, expressed their indignation. Faced with the fallout from this perceived provocation, Koizumi in contrast to past prime ministers stood firm. Also sensitive was the struggle within Japan’s bureaucracy over whether to grant a visa to former Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui, which was settled just days before Koizumi took office with the decision to defy China. Gradually, restraining forces, especially the China school in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which at crucial junctures had kept bilateral relations with Beijing from spiraling downward, were forced into retreat and eventual marginalization. Most assertively, Koizumi and Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko brushed aside those who had been striving to boost relations with Russia through methods of gradualism for addressing the territorial dispute. Reasoning that good Russian ties are not urgent and that the national symbol of the four disputed islands might be appropriated against any leadership that relaxed Japan’s long-standing demands, Koizumi hardly took into consideration the process that had led to the Irkutsk Summit of March 2001; a year later the clash between Tanaka Makiko and LDP politician Suzuki Muneo and unprecedented turmoil in the Foreign Ministry resulted in general repudiation of the process. All of these steps in quick succession were not couched in some overall framework; there was nothing but an overarching claim to acting firmly in the national interest by no longer abiding those in the bureaucracy who supposedly were following established patterns of accommodating other countries as if Japan were still a “weak” defeated nation. In the first months of the Koizumi era regional relations were sacrificed for nationalist support at home. Recent problems in ties with China and South Korea were strained rather than addressed. Ties with Russia deteriorated. The new Bush administration’s toughening posture toward China and North Korea and beckoning approach to Japan gave Koizumi some leeway; yet his quick foreign policy moves without coordination in the Foreign Ministry at a time of growing chaos under Tanaka Makiko’s divisive leadership did not suggest strategic calculations. After 9/11 Koizumi was quick to voice support for the U.S. war against terror on his own decision, not just following others. Although there was concern that Japan would lose some of its special importance for the United States given the new military priorities and breadth of the coalition, Koizumi stayed his course and took the opportunity in the fall of 2001

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to patch up relations with China, Russia, and South Korea to some degree. No genuine change of course followed; the basic problems of Koizumi’s handling of Asian relations only faded into the background. Meanwhile, most eyes centered on decisive steps that raised Japan’s profile as taking proactive and assertive defense and security policy, making Japan a responsible partner of the United States. For a time in late 2002 and early 2003 Koizumi showed signs of greater diplomatic initiative. After pursuing Kim Jong-il since early in 2002 in the face of Bush’s condemnation of North Korea as part of the “axis of evil,” September was filled with debate about the prospects and consequences of the Pyongyang Summit. Dwelling on the abduction of some Japanese citizens, the Japanese public, after the Pyongyang Summit of September 2002 and again after brief hopes accompanying the second visit of Koizumi to Pyongyang in May 2004, was fixated on the injustice done to Japanese citizens and the Japanese nation. This sentiment inclined them to support the Bush administration’s often uncompromising stance along with its pledge to retain multilateralism through six-party talks that gave Japan a seat at the table. The other three parties, apart from North Korea and foreign policy elites in the United States, debated compromise approaches, accusing Bush of seeking regime change and of failing to make an offer that would shift the onus of inflexibility to the North. In contrast, the Japanese were most hopeful that sanctions could be invoked against the North and least attentive to prospects for a multistage process that might strengthen China’s hand as mediator and move the Northeast Asian region toward long-term multilateralism. Reliance on the United States may have been called into question by both visits to Pyongyang, but in lieu of a direct deal with the source of the threat Japan was not weighing another option. Having won Chinese gratitude for lending legitimacy to the new Boao forum in the spring of 2002 for informal discussions among leaders from many spheres of life, Koizumi met again with a Chinese leader at APEC in October, where there was an upbeat mood although he was asked by Jiang Zemin not to continue visiting the Yasukuni shrine. With Hu Jintao succeeding Jiang and much talk of “new thinking” toward Japan in early 2003, Koizumi had a chance for a fresh start with China, but he remained insistent on Yasukuni. Likewise, when Roh Moo-hyun was elected president of South Korea in December 2002 amid suspicions that he knew little about Japan and could be leading a younger generation into political office without the deep ties and Japanese language skills of older politicians, Roh quickly signaled that he wanted close ties with Japan, and Koizumi could benefit

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from Japanese opinion that relations were now securely on an ascending trajectory. He had inherited a favorable trend in relations, and they were perceived on the Japanese side to be reasonably good, because of economic development leading to talks for an FTA in 2005, cultural successes due to the 2002 joint hosting of the World Cup soccer, fascination over Korean TV programs such as “Winter Sonata,” and increased security cooperation in the face of uncertainty over North Korea. In September 2002 the Pyongyang Summit had raised hopes that Japan’s promise of financial assistance would convince the North to give it a special place in plans for overcoming famine and isolation, but by November the pendulum had swung toward outrage against the North over unsettled questions linked to abductions as well as anxiety over nuclear weapons programs without international constraints. In each case, Japanese did not feel isolated but part of a region-wide process. Through 2003 and into 2004 the aftermath of these developments continued to suggest that Japan was positioned to reassert itself in Asia, especially as a close partner of the Bush administration in its determined diplomacy. Yet, Koizumi should have been aware that the situation in South Korea was moving in a new direction: greater sympathy toward North Korea, rising economic interests linked to China, and increasing antipathy toward the United States, which might have affected the decision to withdraw 12,500 U.S. troops. All these moves were not conducive to enhancing Japan’s strategic position on the Korean peninsula. Japan failed to identity with South Korean strategies for dealing with the North and was insensitive on history issues. Even before relations suffered in 2005, opportunities were not seized. In anticipation of a summit in Moscow in January 2003, Koizumi also showed strong interest in a rerouted oil pipeline across eastern Russia to the Nakhodka area that would supply Japan but would require large investments. Since discussions between Russia and China had already settled on a pipeline route to Daqing in Heilongjiang province, Koizumi’s appeal was widely seen as a strategic move. Also, a December 2003 conference in Tokyo with the leaders of ASEAN was seen as a calculated, if belated, step to match China’s initiatives in Southeast Asia. As the United States was preoccupied with Iraq, Japan appeared to be asserting itself in Northeast Asia, even taking a more positive approach to talks with North Korea than the United States. Appearances in 2003–04 were deceptive. The flurry of activity yielded little. Koizumi could throw Japan’s weight in the spring of 2003 behind U.S. preparations for sanctions against North Korea and then have Japan recognized as one of the participants in the six-party talks,

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but its role was little more than a backup to the United States with no room for a voice of its own. Koizumi could stand firm as Hu Jintao countenanced advocates of “new thinking” toward Japan, suggesting that China needed to win its neighbor’s confidence, but soon the Chinese were disappointed by another Yasukuni visit and no counteroffer to “new thinking.” Instead, anti-Japanese emotions of young Chinese at the Asian soccer games in the summer of 2004 left their footprint on public opinion in the two countries. Likewise, Koizumi could also take advantage of Roh’s pursuit of good relations after anti-Americanism in his election left him in a precarious position. The South Koreans had no choice but to join the United States and Japan in trilateral coordination from May 2003, but they objected to the Japanese stress, along with that of the United States, on using pressure against the North and the insensitive handling of the Roh visit to Tokyo in June 2003. When Russians became upbeat that Japan would proceed with the pipeline, leading figures in Japan warned that Koizumi must not send a message of progress in bilateral relations without resolving the territorial dispute, and there was no sign of strong resistance to this message threatening to set back relations. In the spring of 2004, Koizumi took another initiative toward North Korea, but it served narrowed domestic objectives and quickly faded from memory. By 2004 there was little sign left of any liveliness in diplomacy toward Asia. In fact, Koizumi made no strategic adjustment in Asia, and there was no national debate making clear why he should. The outcome of the course selected in 2001 finally was exposed in late 2004 and 2005. As the impasse over North Korea intensified, Japan’s further signs of nationalism became an outlet for the frustrations of the region. Koizumi’s inspection of the disputed islands by ship and signs that Japan was not eager to proceed with the pipeline may have caused Putin to postpone a visit to Japan expected early in 2005 until year end and both sides to fear a sharp downturn in relations. In March, Roh led Koreans to view Japan’s moves as provoking confrontation as the history issue along with the unresolved status of Dokdo/Takeshima Island took centerstage. The prospect of Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council drew the ire of Chinese, who in the tens of millions signed an Internet petition against it and then took to the streets in April with some destruction of property. New textbooks in April 2005 inflamed already heated passions. China’s human rights and some economic or social problems caught attention in America, Europe, and other part of Asia; Japan could not gain sympathy anywhere with only its strong U.S. ties as reinforcement.

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We find evidence for multiple explanations for the malaise in Japan’s Asian strategy. First, we must assign responsibility to Koizumi himself, who abandoned the caution of prior prime ministers in managing Asian affairs attuned to regional sensitivities under the professional advice of bureaucrats well positioned to alert the leadership to fallout from policy choices. Koizumi’s repeated expression of remorse for Japan’s past conduct, his unambiguous statement of apology in Bandung in April 2005 confirming forcefully Murayama’s statement a decade earlier, and his often pronounced readiness to improve relations with Asia might have been genuine, but his insistence on visiting Yasukuni evoked indignation and mistrust in China and Korea, while it gave satisfaction to some nationalist feelings inside Japan. Second, we should, thus, acknowledge that Koizumi was not acting out of step with many in the LDP and the media. He was part of a generation of politicians concerned with asserting national pride by overcoming Japan’s historical legacy in Asia, which increasingly meant standing up to Asian use of the “history card.” Third, it is necessary to recognize that the popular mood was supportive of a heightened degree of autonomous decision-making and national self-assertion. This applies to Koizumi’s approach to domestic reform, defense-security policy, and U.S. and Asia policy, but, above all, to nationalism. Many still lived in the shadow of the defeat of 1945, which had left a spiritual void filled only to some degree by the embrace of democracy and peace but never reconciled with the ambivalent manner in which Japanese history was taught. In place of the guilt earlier felt toward Asia and the optimism that time would heal historical wounds there was no guiding framework for reconceptualizing Japan’s historic place in Asia. No consensus exists, but in the tilt toward greater nationalism, it might well be tempting for a leader to gain temporary advantage from nationalist responses. A second set of explanations directs our attention to the international environment facing Japan. Strategic thinking toward Asia cannot be divorced from strategy toward the United States. Underneath this Asia–U.S. dichotomy, Japanese leaders had long faced the challenge of becoming a responsible and autonomous power in regional and global security. Although some interpreted this goal as meaning more active support of the UN and peacekeeping forces, the predominant understanding was that Japan’s responsible action may best lead to more support of U.S. global leadership with troops and a willingness to commit itself to multilateral security in dealing with threats to peace. On four occasions Japan was tested by the United States, and each time Koizumi determined that responsible action for Japan means offering strong support to the United

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States. Newly in office, Koizumi faced a recently configured Bush foreign policy team determined to boost the alliance with Japan and to put Japan well above China and others at the center of American policy across most of Asia. After 9/11 Japan successfully met U.S. expectations and found general understanding in Asia for its active logistical support of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. It seemed as if facing in both directions was within reach. Yet, when in late 2002 and the first half of 2003 Japan threw its weight behind the Bush administration in the war in Iraq, the North Korean nuclear crisis tradeoffs could not be avoided. Ties to most of Europe and internationalism through the UN suffered by the tilt to the Bush administration, and ties to South Korea became frayed by the inclination to sanctions with almost no distance from the Bush approach except for a harder line associated with the abduction issue. Finally, in its sympathy with Bush’s reelection and its lack of anxiety over the impact of continued visits to Yasukuni, Koizumi, hence Japan, was seen as choosing the United States at the expense of Asia. The strategies of other Asian leaders often did not make it easy for Japan to find a balance in Asia along with improving U.S. ties. In early 2005, Hu Jintao gave precedence to preventing Taiwan independence and to a national security law that promised war if this should occur. Moreover, China showed signs of wanting to forge the new East Asian community regionalism based on ASEAN ⫹ 3 under its sole leadership. Fear of Chinese hegemonism doubtlessly led Japan toward greater inclusiveness in EAS, incorporating Australia, New Zealand, and India, whose eventual membership in December 2005 finally provided a degree of reassurance to Japan. Roh Moo-hyun indulged in extreme rhetoric in suddenly reversing two years of conciliatory words toward Japan with March 2005 harangues. His disturbingly soft line toward the North and shift toward China complicated Japan’s task. Also, North Korea made nuclear weapons its priority while failing to meet Japanese concerns over abductees, including the remains of ten abductees declared to be dead. Finally, Putin’s slowness in dealing with obstacles to investment and in reassuring the United States and others of his cooperation on security problems such as Iran left a breakthrough with Russia in doubt as a step toward global responsibility. Putin’s public posturing at the end of 2004 that the transfer of the two smaller islands is Russia’s final offer paralyzed Japanese negotiators, whose intention was to seek the reversion of the two larger islands as well. The case for solidifying ties with the United States was stronger than the case for taking an independent posture in Asia, but Japanese leaders allowed it to reinforce reasoning that distanced it from others in the region. Mutual antipathy was heightened

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after provocations and failed efforts to take initiatives that might have limited the damage. The year 2005 saw Japan’s position in Northeast Asia plummet to its lowest point in several decades. Koizumi had opportunities to forestall or at least limit the troubles, but no initiative was seen. When Roh Moohyun and he met in December 2004, he had to see Roh’s anguish over a renewed hard-line U.S. stance in the six-party talks and over Japan’s tight support of U.S. strategy without reassuring Asian countries on matters of regionalism and history. Instead of working to reinforce ties with South Korea and searching for a way to win its backing for Japan’s plans for United Nations Security Council reform, Koizumi stayed in the background as Shimane prefecture rekindled a territorial dispute with South Korea. Relations deteriorated in March, ending the possibility that Roh and Koizumi could cooperate during their remaining time in office. This was a sharp reversal after more than six years of high hopes in Japan for South Korean partnership. The long awaited visit by Putin finally took place at the end of the year, but the Japanese negotiating position on the territorial issue was in disarray due to a total inability to find common ground for a mutually acceptable solution, hence even a communiqué could not be adopted. There was no strategic agenda except for further vague discussions about cooperation for energy security. The drift of Russia to China continued, and Koizumi and the Foreign Ministry never found a way to overcome the blow to bilateral relations that was inflicted when Japan’s position in territorial negotiations was hardened in the early 2000s. In March as Chinese leaders were discussing how to resuscitate ties with Japan and limit damage from an Internet petition drive against Japan becoming a permanent member of the Security Council and again in May when Wu Yi came calling to quell the anger over Chinese demonstrations in April, Koizumi did not show any sensitivity to take initiatives to bring the relationship to a positive spiral. Even after he won a resounding mandate through calling an election in September to the Upper House and Chinese leaders were searching for a way to give a fresh start to relations, Koizumi responded by visiting the Yasukuni shrine in October, leaving little hope that business as usual, let alone bilateral summits, could resume. Time after time, Koizumi vowed that he was remorseful of the pain that Japan inflicted in prewar years and made it clear that he was prepared to improve relations with Asian countries, including China and Korea, and that he took a rising China not as challenge but as opportunity. But his visit to Yasukuni, which he defines as a domestic and

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personal matter, in reality has created havoc with China and Korea, and Koizumi’s defiant refusal to show understanding toward positions taken by Japan’s closest neighbors while refuting their approach as “playing the history card” has not gained understanding and sympathy in the region or worldwide. Instead of responding to setbacks in bilateral relations with clear signals of his interest in finding a way forward, Koizumi seemed to take satisfaction from cultivating an image of defiance against Japan’s neighbors, each of which was blamed. Public opinion in Japan was divided, but increasingly it found the leaders of other countries at fault. Cabinet choices gave voice to those with more negative views on Asian neighbors. Koizumi may well be leaving a legacy of mutual distrust in Northeast Asia, not a strategic foundation for reviving Japan’s pursuit of partners in the area, not to mention the achievement of its long-term goal of reentering Asia to enhance its strategic calculus. At the end of 2005 there was little prospect for an upturn in Japan’s ties with any state in Northeast Asia before the end of Koizumi’s term in office in September 2006. In December at the ASEAN ⫹ 3 and EAS meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Hu Jintao and Roh Moo-hyun refused to meet with Koizumi. In November, Putin’s visit had raised economic goals but done nothing to bridge the territorial divide; the split between North Korea and the United States had widened, jeopardizing the sixparty talks even as separate bilateral meetings between Japan and North Korea did not look promising. Those in Japan who called for a different approach to Asia based on strategic thinking encountered a more assertive leadership, including Foreign Minister Aso Taro, who insisted that Japan was succeeding in Asia as the thought leader, the stabilizer for the region, and the country respecting other nations as peers and equals. Aso’s December 7, 2005 speech, discussed later in chapter 11, presented Japan as leader among optimists in Asia. Aso’s “visionary” thinking, however forward looking some of the arguments he displayed, still fails to understand the prevailing mood in the region and gives an impression of unilateralism in place of strategic thinking. Japan’s comfort in leading the EAS with its greater inclusiveness (with Australia, New Zealand, and India) and value-oriented approach (democracy, human rights, and shared ideals of middle-class prosperity) may not become a real sign of its leadership, unless it succeeds in resolving the most serious underlying problem: to find common ground with leading regional countries, notably with China. In dealing with many issues, symbols preoccupy the Japanese people more than the diverse substance that makes relations strategic. “Yasukuni” symbolizes troubles with China and South Korea, the

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“Northern Territories” with Russia, “abductions” with North Korea, and, of late, fear of “community” with Asian regionalism. Such themes dominate news coverage and distract public vision from far-reaching strategic choices. Even if the strengthened U.S.–Japan alliance and the newly growing Japanese economy provide some foundation for new initiatives in Asia, a new leader and renewed pragmatism of the sort demonstrated in the 1980s and the second half of the 1990s appear essential to develop a more strategic outlook to Asia. Ending his term with a visit to Yasukuni on August 15, the most sensitive date marking the war’s end, Koizumi left his successor Abe Shinzo with troubled ties in Asia despite behind-the-scenes efforts to chart a new course. Abe’s first month in office offered opportunities to visit Beijing and Seoul. His policy of ambiguity of “no confirmation, no denial” of a Yasukuni visit, sudden confirmation of Murayama’s apology, and new conceptualization of advancing Sino-Japanese relations with “politics and economics as two wheels” marked a fresh start. Furthermore, North Korea’s test of a nuclear weapon gave Abe a unique opportunity for regional cooperation. A unanimous United Nations resolution condemning the test called for sanctions; implementation depended above all on China and South Korea. Thus, the U.S. became focused on winning their cooperation. As comprehensive as Japan’s own sanction measures were, it now became part of a regional security dynamic that balanced threatening moves to prevent another nuclear test with further assurances to bring the North back to the six-party talks. Given this momentum for regional cooperation, there was new urgency to find common ground with leaders in the region. The North Korean threat could bring the region together, and China and South Korea were intent on steering first the United States and then Japan toward a strategic compromise.

PART 1

Chronology

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CHAPTER 2

Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia in the 1980s Takashi Inoguchi

J

apanese strategic thought in the 1980s faced a major transition from being a free rider to becoming a systemic supporter. This transition is predicted by the Lake scheme of foreign policy roles determined by the size and labor productivity of an economy.1 It also can be anticipated as part of the historical evolution of Japanese foreign policy roles in tandem with the adjusted needs of the alliance with the United States Focusing on Asia, Japanese strategic thought might have missed an opportunity of articulating a more autonomous and multilateral foreign policy line embedded within the framework of the alliance with the United States due in part to the moderate success of the transition in foreign policy roles in three dimensions: (a) the successful “defensive internationalism” of the G-5 (G-8); (b) the sway of developmental authoritarianism in East and Southeast Asia in which the Japan-led flying geese pattern looked real; and (c) the appealing image of a “golden triangle” of Japan–the United States–China. To understand post–cold war Japanese foreign policy we should look back to the 1980s as a time of unprecedented opportunity that required far-reaching reassessment of how best to find an expanded diplomatic standing in Asia. David Lake has postulated that the size (GNP) and labor productivity of an economy (the ratio of GNP over national labor hours) determine a major power’s foreign policy role. If both represent the highest level in the world, it tends to play a hegemonic role. Most major powers, however, play an opportunistic role, and some play the

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role of spoiler or free rider. Lake’s purpose in postulating the politicoeconomic determination of foreign policy roles is to see how the United States had been changing its foreign policy roles in tandem with other changes for the half-century ending in 1939, especially in relation to those of Great Britain. I applied this postulate to Japan in the 1980s.2 Instead of measuring labor productivity, I used annual economic growth rate and overall industrial competitiveness in relation to those of the United States,3 while characterizing Japan’s foreign policy role in the 1980s as a supporter, neither a spoiler nor a challenger. As the 1980s was a period of intensifying trade and economic disputes between Japan and the United States, this characterization itself was contested. For instance, Stephen Krasner treated Japan as a selfish, opportunistic, and protectionist state, and thus a spoiler in the world free trade regime.4 By focusing on opportunities in Asia, we can clarify this difference of opinion and point to additional ways to evaluate Japan’s role. Having experienced new challenges in a short period of time during the first half of the 1970s, that is, the end of the Vietnam War, the Middle East War, and the oil crisis, Japan faced even more serious adjustments at the end of the cold war in 1989–91. The image of Japan as opportunist or autonomy seeker arose in the 1970s. The search for energy supplies and overtures to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Soviet Union by Prime Ministers Tanaka and Miki are oft-cited examples. In contrast, in the mid-1980s Prime Minister Nakasone’s clear opposition to the Intermediate Nuclear Forces of the Soviet Union and his security linkage with Western Europe are examples of a supporter’s role. The framework I developed for characterizing Japan’s foreign policy roles for the entire period 1945–2005 and beyond helps to locate strategic thought in the 1980s in a broad perspective.5 It constitutes an essential exercise because Japan’s foreign policy has revolved around its alliance with the United States. Only by elucidating this broader framework can Japanese strategic thought toward Asia be understood more deeply. Japan’s foreign policy roles since 1945 (table 2.1) have been heavily determined by its defeat in 1945 and its concomitant constraints, historical debt, and war renunciation.6 Henry Kissinger expounded a 15-year theory of Japanese decision-making,7 arguing for delayed responses as seen, for instance, to three tumultuous events: Commodore Matthew Perry’s visit to Japan in 1853; the complete defeat of Japan by the Allied Powers in 1945; and the collapse of the huge bubble economy in 1991. It took 15 years for the Japanese to put an end to seemingly endless debates and strife before they started de novo in 1868. It took 15 years

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Table 2.1 Japan’s foreign policy roles Role

Principal Author

1. Pro- and anti-alliance

Period

Features

1945–60

Constitution vs. Security Treaty

2. Free rider

(De Gaulle)

1960–75

Yoshida doctrine in action

3. Systemic supporter

Inoguchi

1975–90

Supporter vs. spoiler

4. Civilian power

Maull, Funabashi

1990–2005 conventional

Civilian power vs. power

5. Global ordinary power

Ozawa, Inoguchi

2005–20

Ordinary power vs. extraordinary power (Westphalian vs. Philadelphian)

for them to make up their minds as to whether they would get along with the Americans or not before they announced the income-doubling plan in 1960 whereby they indicated that they would stick with the United States, focusing on wealth accumulation. Now after about 15 years since the collapse of the bubble, the Japanese appear to have reached a consensus on economic transformation, including how to lay off employees and deal with bad loans. As the economy picks up at long last, Kissinger’s views may ring true even if some remain skeptical of his theory as to what factors lead the Japanese repeatedly to make such delayed, but long-lasting decisions. Chronological Overview The Battle between Pro-Alliance and Anti-Alliance, 1945–60 To appreciate the critical opportunities for change toward Asia in the 1980s, we should start with the first postwar period, 1945–60, the with-or-without-the-United States period. Though vastly different from Iraq after the Iraq War of 2003, Japan, 1945–60, was conducting a debate about whether it should continue to work closely with the United States or not, and, by implication, how seriously it should pursue an independent diplomacy to restore ties with Asia. The die was cast in 1960 when Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke passed the revision of the Japan–United States

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security treaty in the National Diet against vigorous resistance and submitted his resignation to the National Diet. The Yoshida line, announced almost a decade earlier, that happiness is keeping the security treaty with the United States as the Japanese focus their energy on wealth accumulation actually was solidified on the day of Kishi’s resignation. Prior to this the terms of the alliance had not been settled, and the line was vigorously contested at home. Many Japanese were not able to come to terms with the humiliation of delegating national security to a foreign country and with the uneasiness with which they had to allow the cohabitation of the security treaty and the Constitution. For a limited number of Japanese, revision of the security treaty brought about greater equality between Japan and the United States that made it easier to swallow the Yoshida doctrine, but for the many who protested against the revision, equitable relations meant nothing but greater entanglement in U.S. militarism. They were still not prepared to accept the Yoshida doctrine. Only gradually in the 1960s did many come to realize that there was little problem from entanglement. With the income-doubling plan of 1960–70 announced by Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato in 1960 the Yoshida line was enshrined. In the first period the two themes, historical debt and war renunciation, were most apparent, debilitating Japanese foreign policy. The United States was still very adamant about both themes. Japan was occupied by them for nearly the first half of the period. A war tribunal was held. Some were hanged. Many high-ranking leaders were politically purged. Okinawa was occupied by the United States, with the northern half around Amami Oshima returned in 1953 whereas the rest was returned only in 1972. After the war, the war dead were buried at the Yasukuni shrine, but war criminals were not. Anti-alliance forces were very strong in Japan throughout the period. Anti-Self Defense Forces (SDF) sentiment was no less strong. In order to placate public opinion, the government kept the SDF busy with disaster relief and economic reconstruction. Strategic thinking toward Asia was often paralyzed in this atmosphere of deciding how to deal with the United States. Even normalization with South Korea, another U.S. ally, took until 1965. In the wake of the San Francisco Peace Treaty diplomatic relations were realized with the Republic of China on Taiwan, leaving aside the People’s Republic of China. Only in the uncertain process of forging diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union in 1955–56 was there serious exploration of an autonomous approach, but that failed, resulting in no peace treaty and a lingering territorial dispute that made it harder for Japan to consider balancing its ties with the United States.

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Yoshida Line or Free Rider, 1960–75 In the next period Japan’s income level went up so steadily that Japan became the target of envy first and then of enmity. Internally as well, rapid economic, and social changes undermined the political basis of the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). President Charles de Gaulle’s nasty comment that Japan is a mere salesman of transistors was a caricature of Japan with the Yoshida line stripped of the visionary politician’s valor and pride. De Gaulle called Japan a free rider that had no sense of responsibility about how to run the world even when it had become the second largest economy. The free rider line prevailed more or less during the period 1960–75, and it had profound implications for Asian policies. In the second period two themes dominated Japan’s relationship to Asian events: the Vietnam War (1965–75) and diplomatic normalization with neighbors, notably Korea (1965) and China (1972). With Korea, normalization negotiations were bitterly opposed in both countries. The historical debt was paid in the form of a $300 million grant and a $200 million loan; Japan did not accept any claims for war reparations, insisting that there had been no war between it and Korea. With China, diplomatic normalization took place in the wake of the diplomatic normalization between the United States and China in 1971–72. China did not demand war reparations. Instead it wanted Japan to extend official development assistance to help China modernize. Complicating Japan’s foreign relations afterward was the fact that Prime Minister Miki Takeo’s (1974–76) second visit to the Yasukuni shrine took place on August 15, 1976, with the focus on the war dead during World War II. Nakasone did so on August 15, 1985, saying that Japan’s postwar period must be put to an end. Then China for the first time argued that a Japanese prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine must be avoided as high-ranking war criminals such as Tojo Hideki were also enshrined there (which took place in 1978). Nakasone stopped going to Yasukuni after his 1985 visit. Till the mid-1970s, Japan counted on its economic prowess to normalize relations with the countries of Asia, but it was limited in how far it pursued mutual understanding and all-around ties. On the one hand, a tight embrace with the United States restricted independent diplomacy even after the end of the Vietnam War saw the United States retreat to some degree in the region. On the other hand, assertive views of the limits of apology and compromise in interpreting historical events left Japanese diplomats with little room to yield to nationalist demands in neighboring states. Instead, Japan relied on a kind of checkbook

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diplomacy, taking advantage of its economic dominance in the region as other states began desperately seeking to revitalize their own economies. Systemic Supporter, 1975–90 Toward the end of the second period, the oil crisis erupted and the Middle Eastern war was waged. Japan wavered between pro-American and proOPEC positions, as both sides accused Japan of being a free rider. This prompted Japan to shift its position slowly but steadily from free rider to systemic supporter,8 an actor that gives a helping hand to maintenance of the U.S.-led international system. It is important to note that Japan’s support was mostly of an economic nature, as exemplified by Japan’s positions on free trade and energy security but that in the 1980s it took on a political and military nature as well, as exemplified by Japan’s support on the SS-20 issue concerning the placement of Soviet missiles and warheads. The period 1975–90 is aptly called the period of a systemic supporter role. It recalls Niccolo Machiavelli’s “armed support to friends, neutrality to enemies,” albeit without teeth. Despite all the difficulties associated with the constitutional ban on the use of force for the settlement of international disputes, rhetorical freedom was not in short supply. Nakasone went so far as to characterize Japan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”9 In the third period the historical debt issue was somewhat subdued in part because Korea was under military rule most of the time and in part because China was under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping who ordered that territorial issues be left to a later generation. Public opinion seeking more from Japan in compensation and recognition of past behavior was effectively contained. Even when Nakasone visited the Yasukuni shrine and China and Korea protested, his assurances of no further visits helped to keep the war renunciation issue from becoming serious. During this period China indicated that Japan’s alliance with the United States had better be retained rather than terminated, which would have been bound to bring a much more powerful SDF. Global Civilian Power, 1990–2005 The steady decrease of war occurrence among major powers,10 and the end of the cold war,11 set the stage for what some call global civilian powers to play a not-insignificant role.12 Having been a revisionist power and heavily militarist and expansionist power before 1945, and yet since 1945 exemplarily in deemphasizing military power, Japan and Germany were more than delighted to be recognized for this role.13 Both countries

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became active in peacekeeping, international rescue and relief, and economic reconstruction largely on the basis of the notion of human security. As the United Nations (UN) became most proactive in the 1990s, Japan assumed a larger role, especially in Asia, in exercising its civilian power. By the late 1990s, however, dark clouds started to prevail in many parts of the Third World. Global market integration deepened the predicament of poverty stricken and strife riddled countries; and the end of the U.S.–Soviet confrontation meant their reduced stake in the Third World. The world became concerned about failed states and bankrupt economies, well beyond what self-claimed global civilian powers, the UN or nongovernmental organizations were able to handle. Under such conditions the events of September 11 took place, as if calling for the United States to make its might felt and act decisively. That put an end to the fourth period of global civilian power, paving the way to an era of global power with “justice,” a single power that makes judgment about what is more just and what is a lesser evil. Japan preferred to side closely with the United States than to be sidelined as it was losing its earlier role. The Asian financial crisis and the second North Korean nuclear crisis were landmark events that revealed the limits of Japan’s civilian power. Having optimistically set new goals for shaping international relations in Asia in the first half of the 1990s, Japan’s government found that its influence was limited. Its new role in contributing peacekeeping forces was soon taken for granted. Even more, its ambitious guidelines for linking large-scale official development assistance (ODA) to restraint in such behavior as environmental pollution and rising military budgets had little effect. In 1997 Japan found that its own strategy for dealing with the Asian financial crisis through creation of an Asian Monetary Fund did not win support from the United States or China. Likewise, offers to North Korea to provide large-scale assistance failed, as in the Koizumi visit to Pyongyang of September 2002, to prevent threatening provocations through nuclear weapons development. In the fourth period ending in 2005 differences over history also rose to the forefront. The historical debt issue became more salient thanks to the disappearance of cold war–related issues and the subsequent rise of nationalism. The war renunciation issue also came up because of new threats facing Japan as well as the United States and other developed states. It also arose because of new means to respond to those threats, most importantly the Revolution in Military Affairs and the transformation of U.S. Armed Forces and their ramifications. The United States turned to Japan for a new strategic role in Asia, as it moved to reduce its troops abroad to a minimum and to augment them by repositioning its superior

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weapons and intelligence systems. By the end of the 1990s Japan was discussing cooperation on missile defense with the United States, despite China’s and Russia’s protests. In 2005 Japan and the United States agreed on a major restructuring of their alliance, constraining China and North Korea above all. As the third party to the U.S. alliance system in East Asia, South Korea for a time drew closer to Japan in strategic cooperation, but by 2005 it was torn by its growing ties to China and its accommodating approach to fellow Koreans north of the 38th parallel. Pursuit of civilian power was fading even before the sharp deterioration of political relations with China in 2005, whereas military ties to the United States were being upgraded. Global Ordinary Power, 2005–20 Japan has chosen the emerging role of a global power with justice.14 It implies that Japan is becoming an ordinary power in a number of senses. First, the use of force is becoming more accepted. The SDF as early as 1991 have been allowed to use force, more specifically rifles, if attacked or if it is detected that an enemy is about to attack in the context of UN peacekeeping operations. Without any reproach from public opinion, the Maritime Safety Agency used force in 2002 against an unidentified, presumably North Korean, vessel that fiercely resisted the Japanese coastguard’s attempts to investigate what it was carrying. And in 2003 the SDF have been allowed to use force, more specifically person-to-tank weapons, in the context of their peacekeeping operations in Iraq. The notion of “assertive defense”15 pursued by the United States since the 9/11 attack, which allows for preemptive war, is not to be accommodated, however. Furthermore, there is recognition in Japan that terrorism can only be reduced with concomitant efforts to eradicate extreme poverty, to terminate discrimination, and to enhance the involvement of a wider population in running a society. In the fifth period both the historical debt issue and the war renunciation issue come up as part of an increasingly visible Japanese selfassertive nationalism. They come up, however, on the basis of a solid record of antimilitarism that had not substantially waned over the preceding 60 years. Japan’s bid in 2005 for permanent membership in the UN Security Council combines the two elements. It reflects a new level of self-assertive nationalism as well as claims to a time-tested peace orientation. Two of the major platforms in Japan’s campaign for the UN are the slogan of “no taxation without representation” and a call for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons. By 2005 constitutional revision

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is envisaged by both the main governing party, the LDP, and the largest opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan. Through the above review of the evolution of Japanese strategic thinking, we observe that relations with the United States have remained in the forefront whereas Asian ties since the end of World War II have been secondary. The 1980s, however, were characterized by increasing efforts to find a new balance facing both directions. Looking to the Soviet Union for a breakthrough after the advent of Gorbachev’s “new thinking” was one focus. Another was envisioning a special friendship with China nurtured through ample development assistance and burgeoning economic ties. South Korea also became the target of new overtures. The strategic thinking behind these and other moves deserves attention against the background of Japan’s long-term strategic reorientation. Contexts and Actors Triggering Strategic Thought toward Asia in the 1980s Japanese strategic thought flourished in the 1980s for a number of reasons. First, some of the foundations of American hegemony started to erode.16 The Vietnam War of 1965–75 took a heavy toll. In 1973 the United States withdrew its troops there. Also, in 1972 the United States and China made a breakthrough in relations leading to full normalization in 1979 with their eyes set on the Soviet Union. The Soviet military buildup was most menacing to both. Japan followed the United States in switching from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. The dollar-gold convertibility was abandoned in 1971 and the Japanese yen was forced to be reevaluated from 1 dollar equals 360 Japanese yen to as high as 100 Japanese yen to the dollar during the 1980s in the course of a free floating exchange rate system. Unabashedly protectionist legislation passed in Congress, some of which hit Japan hard. OPEC’s restriction on oil exports in 1973 was another shock. Just the American perception of leadership decline would have been sufficient enough to lead Japanese leaders to grope for new options into the 1980s. Second, temporary setbacks to the American leadership position led actors in Western Europe and Pacific Asia to launch their own creative and vigorous initiatives. It was Giscard d’Estaing who took the initiative in creating the G-5 (later the G-7 and then G-8), which was assigned the mission of revitalizing the oil crisis–hit core economies of the world.17 Similarly, it was Okita Saburo and John Crawford who first envisioned a Pan-Pacific economic zone. The flying geese pattern of development in the Western Pacific, enveloping Japan and the four dragons (Korea, Taiwan,

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Singapore, and Hong Kong) and then members of ASEAN should be understood as a way of grouping the whole Pacific economy into an open but self-defined economic region.18 The rise of Japan’s economic power became a driving force in the 1980s propelling new approaches to regional leadership and political activism. The history issue gathered momentum in the mid-1980s; not only in China and Korea but also in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.19 With Japan’s rise in the world economy, Japan’s nationalistic voice became much stronger. With Nakasone’s accession to power, expectations rose since Nakasone was first elected to the Diet for his patriotism directed against the U.S. occupation. Nakasone’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine in 1985 caused uproar in China and Korea since war criminals were buried there along with all others killed in wars. Emperor Hirohito’s visits to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands elicited sensational reports and a sizable number of protesters. The history issue was perhaps inevitable as the Japanese construction of memory, history, and identity stresses the continuity between prewar and postwar periods in terms of its steadfast pursuit of modernization with the temporary derailment in the 1930s and 1940s. The standard versions of World War II as democracy fighting against fascism and anticolonialism winning over colonialism were all accepted by Japan when Japan signed the Peace Treaty with the Allied Powers and when it entered the UN.20 Yet, underneath the official acceptance lay the construction of modern Japanese history to the effect that the war was after all a war among imperialist powers with Japan being one of them, one of the vanquished, and therefore Japan was guilty along with many others, which was mitigated by the fact that it had been genuinely committed to the liberation of colonies from the Western powers. The Japanese quietly believed that Japan’s frontal attacks on the colonies in East and Southeast Asia critically devastated the military foundation of Western colonialism in Asia. These two components sometimes lurk in their minds along with the standard versions of World War II. To appreciate the dynamism of the 1980s, we need to focus on the main actors and strategic thinkers in Japan.21 First, there was Ohira Masayoshi, the prime minister who passed away during the election campaign in 1980. Sensing that he lived in an era of transition, he organized intellectuals and other leaders to come up with visions for such subjects as postindustrial economic management, pastoral cities, Pan-Pacific regionalism, governability in industrial democracies, and international security after hegemony. The notion of Pan-Pacific regionalism took concrete form as an agreement between him and Australian prime minister Malcolm Fraser in January 1980, which developed into

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the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1989. The core of this strategic thinking was that regionalism must be forged to further accelerate the region’s underutilized developmental momentum. Ohira chaired the G-5 Summit in Tokyo focusing on petroleum in June 1979 and decided on Japan’s nonparticipation in the Moscow Olympic Games after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Suzuki Zenko, prime minister after Ohira, was a socialist when he was first elected to the Diet in 1947. His first meeting with President Ronald Reagan went well as far as it went, but when asked about the word “alliance” that had been slipped into the joint communiqué, Suzuki replied, “Alliance does not have a military dimension.” To which Takashima Masuo, deputy administrative foreign minister, retorted, “That’s nonsense.”22 Takashima was a diplomat who at the time of the negotiations over the peace treaty between Japan and China in 1978 had been called by the Chinese a “fafei,” a legalistic bandit, meaning that Takashima was a self-righteous, rigidly legalistic diplomat. Minister for Foreign Affairs Ito Masayoshi resigned to take responsibility for the confusion within the Cabinet. This episode shows that even in a decade when Japan largely played the role of supporter for the U.S.-led international system it was a zigzag process. Nakasone Yasuhiro, prime minister after Suzuki, was a patriot who first campaigned in 1946 bicycling with the Japanese national flag in front of him and calling for retaining national pride and dignity in protest against the U.S. occupation. One of his close advisers, Sato Seizaburo of the University of Tokyo, told me that if Nakasone tried to do anything somewhat unorthodox in foreign policy, he was aware that he had to chant the value of the alliance with the United States one hundred times before he mentioned his object, say Korea or the Soviet Union. Nakasone turned from a proud patriot in the anti–United States camp of 1946 to a proud patriot in the mostly pro–United States camp of 1982, pursuing the pro-alliance policy to its limit. When he firstvisited Ronald Reagan in January 1983, he authorized technological cooperation in weapons. He was said to have told the Washington Post, “The Japanese archipelago should be like an unsinkable aircraft carrier facing the invasion of Soviet Backfire bombers.”23 In May 1983 at the Williamsburg G-7 Summit, he rescued Reagan, who faced the reluctance of other Western leaders to demand the eradication of Soviet intermediate nuclear forces targeted at Europe and the Far East. The State Department wanted to delink the Intermediate Nuclear Forces targeted at the Far East from those targeted at Europe, but Reagan rejected this. Instead the complete eradication of intermediate nuclear forces targeted at both areas was proposed. Nakasone supported Reagan on this matter

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against the State Department and all the rest at the Williamsburg Summit. The joint communiqué endorsed this action.24 On September 1, a Korean Airlines aircraft was shot down by the Soviet Air Force. When the Soviet government did not immediately admit its action, the Japanese government disclosed Soviet air communications at the UN Security Council on September 7, which attested to who had fired on the plane. This boosted the solidarity of the West. On September 22, 1985, the Plaza Accord was signed. Japan was not only a strong supporter of the accord but also its vigorous implementer. The purpose was to strengthen the competitiveness of the U.S. dollar in relation to other currencies by massively purchasing treasury bonds from abroad, especially from Tokyo and Bonn. The exchange rate for dollars subsequently rose visibly. One effect was to stimulate Japanese investment in Asia, leading to a sharp jump in manufacturing abroad and a more pronounced Japanese presence in the region. This increased focus on Asia was seen also in leadership actions. Nakasone was the first postwar Japanese prime minister who did not visit the United States first upon accession to power. He instead visited South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan in January 1983.25 Chun, whose legitimacy at home was in doubt, appreciated Nakasone’s decision, and the bilateral political relationship notably improved. Although Nakasone largely avoided the subject of the suppression of dissidents, his diplomacy with South Korea was widely regarded as a big success. Nakasone’s China diplomacy was also hailed as heralding a new era in Japan–China friendship. Hu Yaobang and he got along very well. Nakasone’s initiative of bringing 100,000 Chinese students to Japanese universities over the succeeding decade was made with high hope and widespread support in both countries. Although when the history issue flared up in China, it was not sufficiently understood in Japan for its extremely divisive impact; when Nakasone saw how his Yasukuni visit eroded the position of Hu and his reformist comrades and thus undermined the Japan–China friendship, he stopped going there. Nakasone also intensified diplomacy toward Southeast Asia on the basis of the steady development of the flying geese formation pattern of regional economic development and the track two institutionalization of regional meetings. All this was to culminate in the formation of APEC. Takeshita Noboru, prime minister after Nakasone, was a man of perseverance and mindfulness. The same man severed ties with Tanaka Kakuei, the don of the LDP, after serving him for some 30 years. He continuously tried to consolidate the U.S. alliance although the issues were tough.26 The rise of Japan invited criticism from abroad. The inflationary

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economy after the Plaza Accord heated up excessively and in tandem with inflation voices against the government from below increased. New thinking was gaining some ground, challenging the main approach of this era. A flirtation with the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) initiative made by Mohammad bin Mahathir at the end of the decade was extremely limited in duration and scope as it did not reflect overall Japanese strategic thinking in the 1980s, that is developing and enhancing Japan’s role as supporter of the U.S.-led global system. The configuration of forces among the United States, Japan, and China in the 1980s served the need for Japan to move slowly in the direction of a systemic supporter’s role.27 The triangle was best characterized as cordial and stable. With the Soviet Union sitting on the other side, the triangle was likened to an entente cordial. All were anti-Soviet. Japan was on its peaceful rise. China was on the road of reform and opening to the rest of the world. The United States challenged the Soviet Union with tough words and the Space Defense Initiative (SDI). Yet China’s shift in 1982 toward equidistance with the Soviet Union and the implications of Gorbachev’s new thinking for global and regional realignment were slow to be absorbed. Also, China’s tough words to Japan on the history issue and the tough negotiations by the United States over the Structural Impediments Talks were not sufficiently taken to heart by the Japanese government. The transition Japan is making to become a normal power in the 2000s has become more difficult because of the difficulties associated with history-related issues. Japan’s Asian Policy in the 1980s as Seen from the Vantage Point of 2006 In a clear contrast to Japan’s steady evolution as a supporting player to the U.S.-led system in the 1980s, Japan’s Asian policy did not evolve in a manner that would have paved the way to be followed beyond the 1980s. Three major factors were important. First, what is called the flying geese formation of regional trade and industrial development looked very real.28 Conceptualizing itself as the leading goose, Japan was somewhat oblivious to the foundation of increasing stability and prosperity of the region, the United States. Second, the transition to democracy in China and Korea was so bumpy in the 1980s that Japan was able to deal comfortably with their authoritarian regimes. Although Japan was a democracy, it was a kind of bureaucratic dominant regime, thus ironically finding authoritarian regimes in Korea and China easier to deal with than more democratic regimes under which nationalistic voices from below

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would have been more vociferous.29 Third, the global system that the United States led was in a quandary. Capital flows were insufficient from abroad, whether they came from direct investment or the purchase of treasury bonds, since the U.S. economy was beset by twin deficits— government and external balance deficits—for which the Plaza Accord had been concluded in 1985 to encourage the purchase of U.S. dollars in the form of treasury bonds by G-7 countries, most notably Germany and Japan. Also, the “second cold war” in the form of the military buildup and ideological offensive by the United States put the Soviet Union on the defensive but at the same time further accelerated the twin deficits. Sensing newly created leeway for leadership in the region, Japan did take an initiative to institutionalize the region. Japan took the lead in establishing APEC in 1989 along with Australia and the United States. It was a child of the flying geese formation pattern in the sense that Japan, good at manufacturing, and Australia, strong at mining and finance, each with greater leadership potential in the region, sandwiching between them much lower income countries into the 1980s, wanted to raise them up and integrate more closely with them by facilitating trade and market liberalization in the region. APEC was also a child of the U.S.-led global system in the sense that unlike the European Union it did not aim at institutionalizing itself very deeply or in a self-standing fashion. In other words, Japan’s Asian policy in the 1980s was a derivative of Japan’s newly found supporting role for the U.S.-led global system. The key aim was developmental. The key policy instrument was to prod trade and market liberalization in the region with policy incentives in the form of removing trade barriers, giving ODA, and encouraging direct investment. Thus, Japan’s Asian policy remained underdeveloped in the 1980s, as seen in the emergence or exacerbation in Asia one by one in the 1990s and 2000s of a series of policy agendas that could have been addressed in more favorable circumstances. They include history, identity, territory, energy, confidence building, and military buildup. Japan’s flying geese formation strategy dominated other aspects of Japan’s Asian policy in the 1980s. Japan was preoccupied with adapting to what it considered the post-hegemonic age when the United States had become somewhat enfeebled by the Vietnam War, the Middle East War, the oil crisis, and expanded political participation at home; Japan found its role in the flying geese formation writ large to Pacific Asia quite befitting its enlarged cognitive map of its place in the world in relation to its supporting player’s role to the U.S.-led global system. Its strategy had two origins. First, the idea lingered from the 1930s and 1940s experience demonstrating that growing influence of Japan in its vicinity came as

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regional integration took shape through the diffusion of industrial production step by step and Japan remaining as the leader in the spreading formation of economic development. The war suspended the process, but as it was revived in the 1950s and 1960s the idea of a flying geese pattern returned. Second, in the 1960s and 1970s a similar idea emerged in Australia as well, which found a need to develop the vast area of East and Southeast Asia and regarded as attractive cooperation by the other high per capita national income country in the area. Given the region’s high developmental momentum that had been already become obvious by the 1980s, it was quite reasonable for Australia and Japan to take the initiative in liberalizing trade and markets in the region by creating a regional forum. Since economic integration proceeded rapidly amidst confidence in the new broad-based regional groupings, Japan allowed wishful thinking to persuade it that its Asia policy was essentially taken care of by its regional economic liberalization and integration strategy. Japan’s Korea policy also was interpreted with excessive optimism. Based on the normalization approved in 1965 by Park Chung-hee and reaffirmed in 1983 by Chun Doo-hwan, Japan pledged to provide a vast sum of developmental assistance assuring the military dictatorship support for its developmental authoritarianism. After Park was assassinated in 1979 and power fell into the hands of Chun, who killed the assassin, Chun suppressed dissidents most vigorously and brutally, culminating in the massacre of students at Kwangju in 1980. This set the stage for Korean politics in the 1980s, whereby those who experienced the antigovernment struggles in the 1980s socialized themselves as antimilitary, antigovernment, anti-American, and anti-Japanese. A ticking time bomb was planted whereby Japan as well as the United States would have to face, especially after the advent of democracy, a generation with a radically different outlook. Japan sided with the military dictatorship throughout the 1980s, making it more difficult to handle Korea once the ghost of the pre-1945 days was revived by Prime Minister Koizumi’s annual visit to the Yasukuni shrine. In 1986 the people power coupled with the U.S. government’s distancing itself from President Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines forced Marcos to resign from his office and to flee to Honolulu. This triggered a tide of democratization in East and Southeast Asia as part of the Third Wave democratization, especially in Taiwan where Jiang Jingguo moved to allow other political parties to participate in elections, and in Korea where democratic protests forced Chun to accept other parties’ participation in direct presidential elections in 1987. Roh Tae-woo became the first democratically elected president in this new wave, and the Japanese

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should have been alerted by the rising voice of demonstrations for populist causes as well as by shifts in foreign policy aimed initially at the Soviet Union and China that they would face new challenges from Korean thinking. In China, Deng Xiaoping’s reform and open door policy led to the appointment of Secretary General Hu Yaobang and Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang in the early 1980s. Both were more democratically leaning than Deng. Eventually, Hu was deemed to be too lenient toward democratic reform in China and too soft on Japan, especially when Nakasone visited the Yasukuni shrine despite Hu’s warning that the visit would augur ill for the friendship between the two countries. Hu was dismissed from office in 1987, and when mourning for him brought democratic demonstrations in 1989, Secretary General Zhao Ziyang was torn between two forces—those sympathetic with the goals of the demonstrations, and those determined to suppress the protesters as long as they were anti-communist. Zhao’s dismissal and the repression on June 4, 1989, may have led some in Japan to expect that they would be spared a populist outcry that had marked protests in 1986 against Hu Yaobang as soft on Japan and even raised calls for reviving demands for war reparations. Yet, the fact that China did not turn democratic in contrast to South Korea would not spare Japan from becoming a target of nationalist sentiment in the 1990s. New circumstances after the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the June 4 suppression would also make China’s leaders prone to a more nationalist response toward Japan. Throughout these and other democratization tides, Japan showed its sympathy and its welcome as a democratic veteran in Asia. At the same time, the Japanese government was mildly disturbed by what it saw as a potential destabilizing force in the region in which the flying geese formation pattern might not proceed as smoothly. When Japan’s bubble economy began to burst, the conditions for holding the region together and keeping a lid on long-suppressed criticisms of the way normalization had been managed deteriorated. Japan’s China policy was based on the 1972 joint communiqué and the 1978 peace and friendship treaty, which achieved normalization through Japan expressing its remorse over past aggression and pledging to help China to modernize its country with ODA on a massive scale. China accepted Japan’s remorse without demanding war reparations and agreed to leave territorial issues to be tackled a generation later. With Deng Xiaoping taking the reins of Communist Party power, the reform and openness policy started off with his well-orchestrated visits to the United States and Japan and then with his military intervention to

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“punish Vietnam for invading and occupying Cambodia in 1979.” Deng’s pragmatism was supplemented in the 1980s by Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang’s eagerness to keep ties advancing smoothly. Thus, Japan was slow to foresee a nationalist turn that could target it. Indeed, in 1989 it became apprehensive about chaos engendered by protests undermining China’s stability. Though it agreed along with others in the G-7 to impose economic sanctions after China’s brutal suppression of the demonstrations and maintained them until 1991, it also took the lead in ending them. In the background was the image of Chinese prime minister Li Peng warning Japan not to kill more Chinese by the economic sanctions than those Chinese killed by Japanese in its war during the 1930s and 1940s. There was also the thought that if Japan befriended China through its economic policies and influence with the United States and others, it could leave a solid foundation for an extension of the improving state of relations in the 1970s and 1980s. The potential for a backlash was not well anticipated. Throughout the 1980s Japan was eager to help China to achieve its reform and openness and yet mildly apprehensive of China beset with turmoil. China was in a twin transition: one from autarchic socialism to open capitalism with Chinese characteristics; the other from authoritarian party dictatorship to more democratic party dictatorship. The Japanese penchant to separate politics from economics by downplaying China’s transition to more democracy might have blinded it from grasping the transition in the dynamics of patriotism. Once protesters’ patriotism was dangerously channeled into an antigovernment direction, as we saw in the slogans among the Tiananmen protesters, Li Peng and later Jiang Zemin would be tempted to channel protesters’ discontent into an anti-Japanese direction. Japan’s U.S. Policy and Asia Japanese strategic thought in the 1980s evolved around the idea of how to stem the seeming tide of U.S. hegemonic decline by giving a helping hand to them and, in the process, boosting Japan’s rise as an increasingly equal partner. The flying geese formation was an idea that justified a loose, open regionalism through which regional trade and market liberalization and integration would be guided. It was spatially a catch-all and temporally a step-by-step way of raising the region upward in terms of economic development. This would suit the U.S. scheme of enhancing the self-sustainability of each region within the broad framework of a U.S.-led global system. It would also give Japan a chance to more fully

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share leadership in Asia, assuming a division of labor where security remained centered in the United States but economics and, to some degree, culture too became a more equal partnership. The United States was seriously apprehensive of the sustainability of the American-led global system especially since 1971 when the golddollar convertibility was abandoned, changing the basic canon of the Brettons–Woods system of the international monetary system installed in the wake of the Allied victory in 1945. Without sustaining U.S. credibility and reputation in running the global system a replacement monetary system would be difficult to maintain. The United States sought new allies in forestalling the Soviet Union’s quest for global power. Normalization of ties with China enhanced its position. It welcomed the French initiative to enlist the major allied industrial democracies as the G-5 to consult and coordinate with regard to energy, missile threats, exchange rates, inflation, unemployment, government deficits, and other matters affecting the global system. This can be “defensive internationalism” in light of such possible symptoms of hegemonic decline as the military setback in Vietnam, the occasionally doubted credibility of the dollar as the key global currency, the challenge of the Soviet Union’s thrust into Western Europe through intermediate range nuclear missiles, the inability to co-opt or suppress self-assertion in the Third World, and so on. In Asia, the Soviet push into Afghanistan and support for Vietnam’s move into Cambodia as well as lingering concern over North Korea were security matters for which Japan’s role was limited, but the looming question of new high-tech weapons and militarization of space raised Japan’s profile. Even more vital was Japan’s role as a financial partner, located in the region with greatest economic dynamism. Reagan’s solution to the gold-dollar inconvertibility was to conclude the Plaza Accord in 1985 , which, contrary to plans, weakened the dollar vis-à-vis the yen and the Deutsche mark. Japan’s purchase of U.S. treasury bonds did not mean that the dollar was stronger, but resulted from the trade surplus with the United States, lower interest rates in Japan, and government guidance. This enabled the dollar to remain the world’s principal currency, while relying on other major powers to act as stakeholders in the U.S.-led global system. The impact of the Plaza Accord was enormous. Within a year after the Accord, the amount of trade in goods and services was exceeded by the amount of trade in currency by a factor of 50 : 100. Until 1985 the former had always exceeded the latter. The Plaza system had apparently resolved the twin deficits dilemma of the United States. In the latter half of the 1980s Germany ad Japan were acknowledged as global actors in a new way. As the European

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integrative processes deepened, the role of the German mark within Europe notably grew, presaging the advent of the euro as a common European currency. Japan’s role was also significant. It kept purchasing treasury bonds on a massive scale, as it provided the vital financial leadership to keep the Asian economic boom alive. Yet, the Japanese economy of the 1980s was built on a bubble, and it lacked the regional institutionalization that would ensure sustained integration in Asia of the sort possible in Europe. As Japan entered a long recession from 1991, China was poised in the aftermath of economic sanctions to accelerate its steep ascent. Not only Japanese but also Chinese became massive purchasers of treasury bonds in the mid-1990s. Given the shifting balance between the Japanese and Chinese economies, it was not surprising to see the U.S. government start thinking about China as an important global partner too. In this context Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick prodded China to act as a responsible stakeholder in December 2005 as the World Trade Organization was meeting in Hong Kong. Japan had proven itself, especially through the 1980s, as a partner of the United States in managing the global system. Its role in Asia was still evolving, but it was committing itself to work closely with the United States in favor of stability and continued integration into the world economy. Missing, however, was a clear strategy for facing the rapid transformation of Asia. Neither in its own response to Gorbachev’s unexpected shifts in Moscow’s policies nor in its handling of sharp changes in China and South Korea domestic and foreign policy by the end of the 1980s do we detect much preparation for new challenges. Moreover, Japan and the United States were working together for global objectives rather than for regional strategizing. This was a period of no serious missteps but many missed opportunities for a strategic outlook in Asia and timely anticipation of problems to come.

Notes 1. David Lake, Power, Protection and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercia Strategy, 1887–1939 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988). 2. Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Images and Options: Not a Challenger, but a Supporter,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 12, No.1 (1986), pp. 95–119. 3. Angus Maddison, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2004). 4. Stephen Krasner, “Asymmetries in Japanese–American Trade: The Case for Specific Reciprocity,” Policy Papers in International Affairs, No.32.

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5. Takashi Inoguchi, “Nichibei kankei kara mita Nihon gaiko rosen,” Kan, 2004. 6. Takashi Inoguchi, Kokusai seimino mikata (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 2005); Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Anti-Militarism: National Security in Germany and in Japan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Jennifer Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck? Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Summer 2004), pp. 92–121; Peter Katzenstein, Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996); J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004). 7. Henry A. Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001). 8. Inoguchi, “Japan’s Images and Options,” pp. 95–119. 9. Maki Taro, Nakasone seiken. 1806 Days, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Gyosei kenkyujo, 1988). 10. John E. Mueller, The Remnants of War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 11. Francis Fukuyama, End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992). 12. Hanns Maull, “Germany and Japan: A New Civilian Power?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No.5 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 91–106. 13. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Die Gezähmten Deutschen: von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verglas-Anstalt, 1985). 14. Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Ambition for Normal Statehood,” in Jorge Dominguez and Byung-Kook Kim, eds., Compliance and Conflict (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 135–64. 15. Stanley Renshon, In His Father’s Shadow: The Transformations of George W. Bush (New York: Palgrave, 2004). 16. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981). 17. Robert D. Putnam and Nicholas Bayne, Hanging Together: The Seven-Power Summits (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984). 18. Oba Mie, Ajia Taiheiyo chiiki eno dotei (Kyoto: Minerva shobo, 2004). 19. Kosuge Nobuko, Sengo wakai: Nihon wa kako kara kaihosarnainoka (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2005). 20. Takashi Inoguchi, “How to Assess World War II in World History: One Japanese Perspective” (Unpublished paper, 2005). 21. Watanabe Akio, Sengo Nihon no saisho tachi (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 2001); Iokibe Makoto, Sengo Nihon gaikoshi (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1999). 22. Watanabe, Sengo Nihon no saisho tachi. 23. Maki, Nakasone seiken. 1806 Days. 24. Watanabe, Sengo Nihon no saisho tachi.

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25. Kimiya Masafumi, Kankoku: Minshuka to keizai hatten no danamizumu (Tokyo: Chikuma shobo, 2001). 26. Funabashi Yoichi, Nichibei masatsu (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1987). 27. Ezra Vogel, Ming Yuan, and Akihiko Tanaka, eds., The Golden Age of the U.S.–China–Japan Triangle, 1972–1989 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000); Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 28. Takashi Inoguchi, “Shaping and Sharing Pacific Dynamism,” Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 505 (September 1989), pp. 46–55. 29. Zhukou Xiao (Takashi Inoguchi), “Cong Ribende jiaodu toushi Zhongguo de minzuzhuyi,” Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi, No.11 (2005), pp. 49–50.

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CHAPTER 3

Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward Asia in the First Half of the 1990s Tsuyoshi Hasegawa

T

he first half of the 1990s was a crucial period for Japan’s strategic thinking. It started with the Persian Gulf crisis and the Gulf War in 1990–91, which tested Japan’s commitment to international peace and stability under the emerging new international environment; however, the most crucial event was the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was during this period that the world made a drastic transition from the cold war into the post–cold war period, and began the process of searching for a new international order. Although the shape of the international order that was being formed in the first half of the 1990s was still murky and fluid, three basic trends were discernible. The first was the intention to create a unipolar order dominated by the only remaining superpower. Exploiting its unequaled military power, the United States would unilaterally forge a framework for a unipolar international order, Pax Americana. The second possibility was to return to a balance of power and Realpolitik. Having lost the stable ballast of the cold war structure, states would depart from the rigid alliances that it had dictated in search of alignments to maximize their national interests to prevent other powers from gaining dominance. The third was an attempt to create a multilateral international system that would resolve conflict through international consultation in support of peace, stability, and cooperation. All three possibilities existed in a nascent stage, with none yet emerging as the decisive trend. This fluid situation could have been a golden opportunity for Japan to shed cold war strategic thinking and fashion a foreign policy that would

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accurately assess the new reality of international relations and raise Japan’s role. With its still enormous economic power, Japan could have played a large part in forging a new international order. Unfortunately, Japan’s policies in the first half of the 1990s are a story of missed opportunity, failing to take advantage of a fork toward a future direction that would be unavailable later. This failure would have a lasting negative impact that was destined to haunt Japan. It also contributed to the inability of East Asia as a region to create a multilateral cooperative regional order. This does not mean that Japan did not react to the changing international environment. It was the first major country to restore normal relations with China after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) had been ostracized by the international community. It began negotiations with North Korea for normalization of diplomatic relations, while it enhanced cooperation with South Korea through mutual visits by the heads of state. Yet, these constructive moves were made without overreaching strategic thinking that asked the fundamental questions: what international order should Japan strive to establish—acceptance of Pax Americana, a balance of power system, or a multilateral cooperative system—and what role should Japan play in creating such an order? This period also saw a gradual shift in Japan’s strategic thinking to something new—amorphous, confusing, conflicting, and unsettling. Japan was caught between conflicting expectations—the demand from the United States that Japan should be more actively involved in global peacekeeping missions and the apprehension of China and South Korea over Japan’s assertion of a political and military great power status. Japan’s financial power remained ineffective as leverage for creating an international system beneficial to its interests. As cold war paradigms were gradually disappearing, right-wing nationalism was beginning to impede the search for new regionalism. Impact of the Gulf War on Japan’s Strategic Thinking As Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990 and U.S.-led multinational forces pushed him back in January 1991, Japan reacted slowly. Although Japan’s financial contribution at later $13 eventually was large, its refusal to commit human resources to international peace provoked rebuke, especially when Japan’s economic well-being depended on the secure flow of Middle East oil.1 Long accustomed to the comfortable cold war framework, supported by a U.S. security guarantee, Japan

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was slow to recognize the requirements of the new international environment. Japan’s Left had long enjoyed the luxury of standing for “Pacifism in One Country” (ikkoku heiwashugi), arguing for Japan’s sacred obligation, dictated by its Peace Constitution, not to resort to military action or even to join in keeping international peace. Afraid to provoke a divisive domestic debate, policymakers had opted not to confront the fundamental issue of Japan’s strategy, bowing to the restrictions of the Constitution, the three non-nuclear principles, and limitations in the military budget. When it became necessary to change this policy, the government explained such changes as being caused by pressure from outside (gaiatsu), not a new strategic rationale. This resulted in the absence of strategic thinking shared by a wide spectrum of public opinion. When the Persian Gulf crisis began, a powerful adviser to the cabinet, Seshima Ryuzo, commented that there were three options for Japan: money, sweat, or blood.2 Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu ruled out the option of dispatching the Self Defense Force (SDF) in any capacity. Use of Japan’s ships for logistical support was impossible because of objections by the powerful shipping workers trade union. The only way that Japan could show its cooperation with the world community threatened by Iraq’s brazen invasion was with “money.” Japan’s inaction in the Gulf War provoked an outcry from Japan’s realist critics. In his scathing attack on Japan’s reaction to the Gulf War, Sato Seizaburo pointed out five fundamental flaws that stemmed from the inertia in strategic thinking: (1) postwar antimilitarism; (2) worship of a peaceful solution to conflict (plus refusal to accept military means as a viable option) and escape into anti-Americanism; (3) avoidance of responsibility by self-denigration; (4) hiding behind the Constitution and anti-SDF arguments; and (5) immaturity of public opinion and lack of leadership.3 Kitaoka Shinichi criticized Japan’s choice of providing only financial assistance without sacrificing humans as the most inept policy that would endanger America’s trust in Japan as an ally.4 Tanaka Naoki decried the absence of strategic thinking during the Gulf War, which led to marginalization of Japan as a global power.5 After the war, the Diet belatedly enacted the PKO law, enabling the SDF to join in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). This was a crisis management measure—a continuation of the old pattern of patching things up while maintaining the old framework rather than questioning the framework itself. The government had to cajole the opposition Komeito, while assuaging the concerns expressed by China and South Korea. Opposition from its neighbors to its pursuit

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of great power status would revive history as a major issue, which, in turn, would rouse Japan’s own nationalism. The linkage between the Gulf War and Japan’s historical past provides an interesting glimpse of Japan’s strategic thinking, or lack thereof. Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait should have been likened to Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, which ushered in the war with China. The great powers’ tacit acceptance of Japan’s invasion and the League of Nations’ weak response encouraged Japanese militarists to embark on a path of foreign adventures. Yet, parallels were not drawn. The left-wing portrayed the U.S.-led intervention in Kuwait as Western intrusion into Arab nations; and the right-wing, though supporting Japan’s military role, refused to accept any connection. The Gulf War took Japan by surprise. The decision-making process proved dysfunctional. Parliamentary opposition paralyzed foreign policy. A lack of leadership from the Prime Minister’s Office left decision-making with the bureaucracies, but rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the Finance Ministry hampered the formation of a unified policy. Most detrimental was the paucity of strategic thinking. The End of the Cold War and the Challenge of Russia The collapse of the Soviet Union took away the ballast that anchored international relations. The superpower rivalry disappeared. The United States actively supported Russia’s transition to democracy and a market economy, as the two powers cooperated to remove nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Soon, however, the new Russian state was plunged into continuous political and economic crisis, diminishing its influence in the international arena, despite its possession of a formidable nuclear arsenal. The end of the cold war also meant that conflicts that were previously kept within limits by the framework of the East–West global contest lost their moorings. Ideology and allegiance to alliances were no longer the powerful driving forces. Instead, nationalism was on the rise. This meant that hostility between Japan and its neighbors—China and two Koreas—that had been kept within limits, had the potential to develop out of control. The Sino-Soviet conflict that had lasted more than a quarter of a century had already ended when Gorbachev visited Beijing in 1989. This put an end to the U.S. strategy to confront the Soviet threat with the triangle of the United States, Japan, and China. The collapse of the Soviet Union also meant that the “China question” became a crucial factor in

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East Asia. With its dynamic economic growth, increased military power, and revisionist foreign policy, China emerged as a force for tipping the regional power balance. How to approach it, containment or integration, became crucial for Japan as well as the United States. Also, the Korean Peninsula reemerged as a point of conflicting strategies. South Korea’s more varied foreign policy options raised the stakes for Japanese diplomacy, and the North’s greater desperation made multilateral cooperation more imperative for all who faced it. Sharp adjustments were needed in strategies to deal with this changing environment. The most urgent challenge for Japan was how to respond to changes emanating from Moscow. The sea change in international relations did not suddenly take place with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991; it had been occurring gradually in the Gorbachev period. Japan was slow to recognize this. Claiming that the cold war in Asia was not over, and making concessions on the Northern Territories the precondition for Japan’s normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, Japan missed its chance to respond. While Japan stood alone in its intransigence, the United States concluded a series of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, the Berlin Wall fell, leading to unification of Germany, one East European satellite country after another deserted Moscow’s camp, and the Soviet Union and South Korea opened diplomatic relations. While all these cataclysmic changes were taking place around them, the Japanese withheld large-scale economic assistance to the Soviet Union in the name of the principle of inseparability of politics and economy. Without taking into account that Gorbachev’s position had weakened by the time of his visit to Japan in April 1991, Tokyo insisted on his acceptance of Japan’s territorial demands beyond the 1956 Joint Declaration. The Gorbachev–Kaifu Summit did not produce historic rapprochement, neither did it bring major improvement to bilateral relations. Indeed, refusal to extend large-scale economic assistant to Gorbachev did not help to avert his fall from power later in the year.6 In the midst of the failed August coup against Gorbachev, a leading Sovietologist in Japan commented that a government under the coup leaders might serve Japan’s interests better since, isolated from the international community, it would be more likely to agree to return the Northern Territories in exchange for Japan’s recognition. Such a myopic view indicated the depth of the “Northern Territories syndrome.”7 After the coup failed, however, the Kaifu government took a new approach under Nakayama’s Five Principles, in which support for Soviet reforms, endorsement of economic assistance, and the effort to integrate the

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Soviet Union into the Asia-Pacific community were all placed above the resolution of the territorial dispute. For the first time in the postwar period, repairing relations with the Soviet Union was given priority. Nakayama also announced Japan’s first substantial assistance to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation of $2.5 billion. These positive developments suffered a setback when the Miyazawa government took over and Watanabe Michio became foreign minister. In December 1991 the Soviet Union dissolved, as the Russian Federation and 14 independent states were formed. This had a profound impact on the geopolitical landscape of Western Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and China, where borders were drastically altered. But in the Far East the border between Japan and Russia remained the same. In the minds of many Japanese, the Soviet Union was merely replaced by Russia, and there were no fundamental changes in the problems that existed between the two countries. Instead of new strategic thinking, the Japanese government was eager to exploit the situation to achieve its long-cherished goal of regaining the Northern Territories. Initially, the newly formed Russian government proclaimed its intention to depart sharply from Soviet foreign policy. Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev listed democracy, human rights, and rejection of imperial expansion as foreign policy goals and asserted that Russia shares the same values as the West. Boris Yeltsin visited Germany, Italy, Britain, the United States, Canada, and France from November 1991 to February 1992, declaring a new partnership with the West. This approach continued at the Munich G-7 Summit in July, to which Yeltsin was invited. Yeltsin intended to culminate his Western-oriented foreign policy with a visit to Tokyo in September. Deputy foreign minister Georgy Kunadze enunciated the principle of “law and justice,” on which to resolve the thorny territorial dispute. Yeltsin’s close identification of new Russian national interests with those of the West, however, provoked a profound sense of resentment not merely from conservative patriotic elements, but also from many who had previously supported democratic reform. The loss of republics that had been acquired over centuries deeply wounded Russian pride. Kunadze’s policy of settling the territorial dispute by conceding to at least some of Japan’s territorial demands rubbed salt into this humiliation. The Kuril question soon became a lightening rod of the frustration over the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Oblivious to the sea change resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as to the profound domestic backlash in Russia provoked by the Kuril question, the Miyazawa government continued to adhere to the policy of inseparability of politics and economy, making the

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resolution of the Northern Territories question the precondition of large-scale economic assistance. Watanabe rejected Kozyrev’s proposal made in March 1992 to accept the Joint Declaration of 1956 and postpone resolution of the two bigger islands, Kunashiri and Etorofu, for further negotiations. He further made it clear in April that Russia’s recognition of Japan’s sovereignty over all four islands was the precondition for the anticipated economic assistance. At the Munich Summit, Tokyo lobbied hard and succeeded in convincing other powers to include in the G-7 political statement a call for the resolution of the territorial dispute as a precondition of full normalization of relations with Russia. Faced with Japan’s intransigence as well as the mounting opposition to any concessions on territory, Yeltsin canceled his visit to Japan in September. Russo-Japanese relations suffered a huge setback. Only after this failure did the Japanese government gingerly begin to change its policy toward Russia. Under strong pressure from the United States, it finally altered its policy of inseparability of politics and economy, and adopted a new policy to extend economic aid to Russia. This new approach was made under pressure from other nations, not as a result of fundamental change in Japan’s strategic thinking. The sudden adoption of a flexible response to Russia finally resulted in Yeltsin’s visit to Tokyo in October 1993, only one week after government troops stormed the Russian White House to quell the insurgents against the president. By this time, the Miyazawa government was gone, and a nonLDP (Liberal Democratic Party) prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro hosted Yeltsin. The Tokyo Declaration was issued, in which both sides pledged to strive for resolution of the dispute over four islands. Mindful of his domestic opposition, however, Yeltsin declined to acknowledge the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, and thus refused to commit himself to the return of the two smaller islands, Shikotan and the Habomai group. Perhaps, Yeltsin planned to make this concession at the next summit in Moscow after he won a majority in the Duma election. Instead, in December 1993 he suffered a serious setback in the election. Foreign Minister Hata Tsutomu visited Moscow in March 1994, but Yeltsin refused even to see him. Fishing negotiations designed to allow Japanese fishermen access to Russian waters in exchange for fees began in 1994, but the talks, which remained the only thin thread for potential improvement in RussoJapanese relations, soon stalled because of the issue of sovereignty over the islands. When a devastating earthquake of 8.1 magnitude struck the Kurils in October 1994, Tokyo hastened to extend humanitarian aid, but refused to extend aid for the much damaged infrastructure. It became an

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uphill fight for Tokyo even to get Moscow to acknowledge the validity of the Tokyo Declaration. When Kozyrev visited Japan in March 1995 he clashed with Foreign Minister Kono Yohei over Russia’s war in Chechnya. Kozyrev refused to implement the promise in the Tokyo Declaration to move the territorial question forward toward ultimate solution, and rejected Kono’s proposal for demilitarization of the Kurils. In turn, Kono refused to commit himself to Kozyrev’s request that Japan support Russia’s membership in APEC. Russo-Japanese relations again found themselves in a stalemate.8 Japan’s approach to the Soviet Union and later Russia exposed the same affliction that was revealed during the Gulf War: an inability to refashion strategic thinking to correspond to the new international environment. Few asked the fundamental questions: Where should Japan place Russo-Japanese relations in its overall foreign policy? Could Tokyo afford to let its relations with Moscow slide in the changing global environment? How should it integrate the Northern Territories dispute into its overall policy? Instead of asking these questions, it placed the territorial dispute in the forefront of relations, thereby making rapprochement impossible. Without repairing its relations with Moscow, Tokyo could not possibly forge a new international order based on multilateralism or gain leverage in a balance of power game. The existence of the economically and ecologically devastated Russian Far East could pose a threat to regional stability. Even if Tokyo were to accept Pax Americana, it should have reconsidered relations with Moscow once there was a U.S.–Soviet rapprochement. Whatever Japan’s new strategy might be—support of Pax Americana, a balance of power option, or multilateralism—failure to achieve rapprochement with Russia was clearly detrimental to Japan’s own national interests. Japan always seemed to be one step behind in approaching Russia. It abandoned the policy of inseparability of politics and economics only after the shock of Yeltsin’s cancellation of his trip to Tokyo, and when Yeltsin’s political credit was being severely weakened. Behind this lack of timing lurked Japan’s hubris: it arrogantly assumed that its capital and technology would be essential for Russia’s transformation into capitalism. Japan supposedly had nothing else but the Northern Territories to gain from Russia, whereas Russia needed Japan’s economic assistance for its survival. Miyazawa faced three challenges in 1992: passing the PKO bill in the Diet, sending the emperor to China, and settling the Northern Territories dispute with Russia. He had to overcome opposition from the Left, especially from the Komeito to pass the PKO bill, and he faced

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opposition from the Right over the emperor’s trip to China. He was in no position to compromise on the Northern Territories, and standing firm gained support from both sides. Strategic thinking was sacrificed for domestic politics. A New Era in East Asia and the Challenge of China In contrast to its reconciliation with the Soviet Union, the United States became alienated from China from the end of the 1980s. It no longer needed China to counter the Soviet threat. With an emphasis on human rights, it spearheaded the policy of isolating China after June 4, 1989. By the middle of the 1990s, the United States even came to recognize a looming threat from China as a regional great power with dynamic economic development and potential military power. Japan’s reaction to China was markedly different. After June 4 it still considered China to be a linchpin for regional stability. Not known as terribly sensitive to human rights issues, prompted by the desire to put the painful past behind, ready to fill the gap left by U.S. hesitation in the vast Chinese market, and eager to play a regional great power role in East Asia in the absence of Russia and the United States, Japan embarked upon a conscious policy to bring China back to the international community.9 In turn, China’s approach to Japan was motivated by a desire to break out of its isolation. By decoupling Japan from the United States, China would escape the danger of the U.S.–Japan condominium, and, perhaps, even create a regional bloc against the United States.10 In 1991–92, the interests of both countries converged. Japan’s active policy to restore relations began with Foreign Minister Nakayama’s visit to Beijing in April 1991. China’s foreign minister Qian Qichen visited Japan in June, and requested the emperor’s visit to China. When Prime Minister Kaifu visited Beijing in August, Li Peng too called for the visit. Yet, this was resisted by the right wing. Conservative Sankei shimbun and its monthly journal, Seiron, launched a campaign against it. Some on the Left also opposed the trip as the political use of the emperor. When Jiang Zemin visited Tokyo in April 1992 and requested Prime Minister Miyazawa’s formal acceptance of the emperor’s visit, Miyazawa replied that this issue remained under consideration. Similar to Nakasone’s desire to end the postwar occupation legacy, Miyazawa focused on elevating Sino-Japanese relations as a means to forge a new environment. He wanted to accomplish this by sending the emperor to China, thereby putting an end, once and for all, to the nagging history issue that had

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plagued Sino-Japanese relations in the past. Miyazawa and the Foreign Ministry sought to achieve this breakthrough while Deng Xiaoping was still active and influential. Furthermore, the emperor’s visit would extract concessions from China about Japan’s effort to adopt the PKO bill. China became the centerpiece in Japan’s new strategy. Marginalized during the Gulf War and downgrading Russia’s role in its strategic calculations, Japan placed its hopes on China for boosting its regional and global status. East Asia was emerging in the forefront of the global economy. While the United States was experiencing a recession, Japan would assert unquestionable leadership in forging Asian economic integration by bringing China into the emerging regional system. Japanese public opinion and most of the newspapers, including the conservative Yomiuri shimbun, supported the emperor’s trip, and negotiations with China resulted in its muted response to the PKO bill and the assurance that it would not raise embarrassing questions about history during the visit. In October 1992 the emperor of Japan for the first time in history set foot in China, and expressed his “deep sorrow for Japan’s having caused great pains to the Chinese people.” Japan’s approach to China was based on questionable assumptions. Contrary to expectations that China would be grateful for Japan’s massive developmental assistance and investment, China accepted Japan’s economic assistance with marked lack of appreciation; even treating it as a form of reparations for the wartime damage that Japan had caused. The Chinese resented Japan’s tacit assumption that China was bound to remain backward for the foreseeable future, incapable of challenging Japan’s economic power, and that Japan should serve as a model for Chinese economic modernization. In fact, despite China’s muted response to Japan’s PKO law, China’s leaders would not accept Japan’s political great power status, let alone Japan’s leadership in the regional order. The most important mistake, however, lay in Japan’s erroneous expectation that with the emperor’s trip to China and his words of “deep sorrow” Japan would be able to put the history issue behind it once and for all. The resentment to Japan’s transgressions had deep roots, permeating deep into Chinese popular consciousness. When the Marxist–Maoist ideology could no longer unite the nation, it was inevitable that nationalism would serve as the driving force to unite Chinese behind a great power status. Leaders would manipulate the force of nationalism by turning it on and off for political convenience, but nationalism could not be controlled at will, contrary to the assumptions in Japan.11 As nationalism in both countries was on the ascendancy, managing bilateral relations was

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destined to become difficult. Buoyed by the emperor’s visit, Japan neglected to consider how to cope with the rise of nationalism both in China and at home. Even as trade boomed, 12 close economic interactions did not lead to closer political relations. While Japan held on to rosy expectations of integrating China into a Japan-led regional system, China began to play its ruthless Realpolitik. After failing to achieve rapprochement with Japan, Yeltsin was openly courting China and South Korea against Japan. He visited Beijing in December 1992. After much indecision, the Clinton administration, too, realized the need to mend fences with China. As soon as China succeeded in regaining status in the international arena, Japan ceased to be the only means for China to overcome diplomatic isolation. A different tone was already set in 1993 when Prime Minister Hosokawa and Foreign Minister Hata began pressing Beijing for greater military transparency, reflecting Japan’s growing concern with China’s arms acquisitions from Russia and its increased military power. History issues arose again. In May 1994 Justice Minister Nagano Shigeto stated that the Nanjing Massacre was a “trumped up story,” and in August 1995 Education Minister Shimamura Yoshinobu said that Japan’s culpability for the war was “a matter of personal interpretation.” Although Nagano was forced to resign and Shimamura was reprimanded, the Chinese would not overlook these statements. In contrast to the handling of history during the emperor’s visit, Li Peng loudly denounced Japan’s weak official apology on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war.13 The history issue returned to haunt bilateral relations. The territorial dispute between China and Japan also became a potentially explosive issue during the first half of the 1990s. In 1991, rightwing LDP politicians planned to hoist the Japanese flag on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, but the prime minister and Foreign Ministry were able to pressure them to stop. Then in 1992, China passed a territorial waters law and threatened to use force to protect China’s sovereignty over these same islands, as Chinese oil exploration began nearby. This provoked a nationalist reaction from Japan.14 By 1995 neither the Japanese government nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was strong enough to restrain nationalist forces in Japan over the territorial issue. Within Japan in the post–cold war context, the territorial disputes with China and South Korea were becoming joined to the Northern Territories dispute as nationalist causes. The greatest shock to bilateral relations came in May 15, 1995, when China conducted an underground nuclear test in Lop Nur. Coming on the heels of Prime Minister Murayama’s plea to Li Peng for a moratorium

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on testing, this was perceived by the Japanese as an open challenge, provoking fierce debate as to whether Japan should continue ODA aid to China. The Right and the Left converged into a force that advocated cutting it off. Under this intense pressure, the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were forced to suspend $75 million in grant assistance. The Chinese conducted further tests in August and September 1995, aware that they would soon sign the test ban treaty and could no longer test to reach the level of the United States and Russia, and they protested Japan’s decision to suspend aid, strongly indicating that it was a form of reparations. If the beginning of the 1990s began with optimism for the future of Sino-Japanese relations, the situation had deteriorated sharply by 1995. Japan’s strategy to use China as a major vehicle for its rise was totally derailed. On the contrary, it was China that ruthlessly exploited Japan’s miscalculations to enhance its military status and political leverage. At the halfway point of the 1990s, there emerged in Japan something that did not exist in 1990: Japan’s growing concern with China’s power, both economic and military. China was no longer Japan’s student to tutor, but a rival for leadership in the region. Containment of China became for the first time a strategic concern for Japan. Rapid Rise in Korea’s Significance for Japanese Foreign Policy The end of the cold war provided another opportunity for Japan to assert leadership for regional stability: an attempt at normalization with North Korea. As in the case of China, Japan and North Korea’s interests coincided at the beginning of the 1990s. Marginalized in decision-making during the Gulf War, Japan saw normalization with North Korea, together with its approach to China, as boosting its great power status. North Korea, in turn, faced an unprecedented crisis. The collapse of the Soviet Union and East European communism, the Soviet Union/Russia’s rapprochement with South Korea, and China’s recognition of South Korea left North Korea isolated. Along with the pursuit of nuclear weapons, Kim Il-sung attempted to normalize relations with Japan. If Japan had a strategic rationale to pursue normalization with North Korea, it was not clearly stated. Its approach began as the personal initiative of one powerful LDP politician, Kanemaru Shin, who, accompanied by Japan Socialist Party (JSP) vice chairman Tanabe Makoto visited Pyongyang in September 1990, and signed a three-party declaration (LDP, JSP, and the North Korean Workers Party) urging their respective

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governments to begin normalization talks and calling for Japan to apologize for the occupation and to pay reparations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs took over the normalization talks, which were held eight times between January 1991 and November 1992, partly to prevent Kanemaru from conducting personal diplomacy detrimental to Japan’s interests. It sought to ensure that normalization with North Korea would not jeopardize the interests of South Korea and the United States, presenting four principles as guidelines: no damage to South Korea; no reparations to North Korea; North Korean acceptance of IAEA inspections; and no effect on the ongoing negotiations between North and South Korea. North Korea did not accept these conditions, especially no reparations and the IAEA inspections. Kim Il-sung relied on Kanemaru’s stance on the reparations issue and considered the nuclear issue a matter to be settled with the United States. After the Japanese raised the Kim Hyon-hui issue (a captured North Korean agent on a terrorist mission) and kidnappings of Japanese citizens, the negotiations were suspended in November 1992.15 Drastic changes in Japan’s political landscape also impeded the normalization process. Kanemaru fell from power due to a political scandal, and the JSP suffered a huge election setback. As the protectors of North Korea’s interests lost their clout, a sharp outcry to change Japan’s approach could be heard from the Right. North Korea’s military threat was increasing. In March 1993, North Korea withdrew from the NonProliferation Treaty, signaling its intention to develop nuclear weapons. In May, it launched a Nodong-1 missile with the capability of striking Japan. In December the United States leaked information that the North had already developed one or more nuclear weapons. These developments shocked many into the realization that Japan was suddenly vulnerable to nuclear attack from North Korea. The Clinton administration was prepared to impose sanctions and a military blockade, and requested Japan’s full cooperation. But just as in the Gulf War, Japan’s reaction, even though directly threatened by the North, was torpid, provoking dissatisfaction in the United States. Japan was saved, however, by Jimmy Carter’s intervention to avoid nuclear confrontation. Eventually Japan agreed, though reluctantly, to join the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization, KEDO.16 While Japan gingerly began its approach to North Korea, it simultaneously sought to strengthen relations with South Korea, allaying fear that ties with the South would diminish. When Roh Tae-woo visited Tokyo in March 1990, the emperor expressed “painful regret” for Japan’s colonization of Korea, as did Prime Minister Kaifu. Roh said that the

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apology question was over. When Prime Minister Hosokawa visited Seoul in November 1993, he too made a clear apology for Japan’s colonial rule over Korea, and President Kim Young-sam in response emphasized the necessity of developing a “future-oriented partnership.”17 Nevertheless, Japanese and South Koreans saw each other as the most disliked people.18 Positive developments tended to be eclipsed by negative events. In November 1992, for instance, Miyazawa visited Seoul in the hope of improving ties in tandem with his China policy. Yet, South Korean sentiment against Japan was suddenly aroused over the issue of comfort women who had been forced to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese military during the war. Instead of launching his Asian initiative, Miyazawa found himself apologizing for Japan’s exploitation of comfort women, and no invitation to the emperor to visit South Korea ensued in the wake of his visit to China.19 Korean distrust of Japan became more politicized after the democratization of South Korean politics. A long list of contentious issues included: treatment of Japan’s colonial rule, reparations, assistance to the Koreans left in Sakhalin, assistance to those injured in the American atomic bombings, Japan’s government-approved textbooks, comfort women, treatment of the Koreans within Japan, and Japan’s military role in its peacekeeping operations. The more emotionally the Koreans brought up their resentment to the Japanese, the more it provoked Japan’s nationalism. The Asian Women’s Fund was established in 1995 and comfort women began receiving atonement with an official letter of apology signed by the prime minister; however, any positive developments in the first half of the 1990s rested on a fragile foundation. In addition, there emerged a balance of power game in the post–cold war period. After canceling his trip to Tokyo in 1992, Yeltsin ostentatiously visited South Korea, delivering the black box recording of the KAL airplane downed by Soviet pilots in 1983, which he had pointedly refused to give to the Japanese. Seoul was more than willing to play Moscow against Tokyo. In another incident of joining a neighbor to put Japan in a bad light, Kim Young-sam at a 1995 joint news conference with Jiang Zemin denounced Japan’s distortions of history. Although Japan made some attempts to improve relations with each of the Koreas in the first half of the 1990s, the results were meager. Policies toward the peninsula were not part of a comprehensive strategy to meet a changing environment in East Asia. The failure to cultivate new relations with South Korea, and perhaps North Korea as well, stemmed from the lack of an overall strategic approach.

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Reconsideration of the U.S.–Japanese Security Alliance and East Asia For Japan, the Persian Gulf crisis and Desert Storm were a wake-up call regarding the over-reliance on the U.S.–Japanese security alliance. Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet foreign minister Edvard Shevardnadze issued a joint statement on August 1990 denouncing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait; Baker was seen as being contemptuous of Japan during the crisis.20 The rigid cold war framework was unraveling as the United States and the Soviet Union were collaborating to resolve a regional conflict, and Japan was left on the sidelines. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a potential enemy, the U.S.–Japanese alliance had to change its character. The question about what was the potential danger against which the security alliance was directed became murky. If it were against North Korea, it would provoke resentment by China or even Russia. If it were against China, not only would it prevent China from being integrated into a system of regional cooperation, but also it would divide Japan. If the alliance had meaning only as a “cork in the bottle” to prevent Japan from becoming a military great power that would threaten its neighboring countries, this would provoke resentment among Japanese nationalists. And if the alliance were to serve as an open-ended instrument of the American global mission for whatever military contingencies would occur, utilizing American bases in Japan as U.S. forward bases, supported by Japanese financial backing, what role was Japan to play in that mission? Were their respective global interests identical? To what extent would Japan continue these arrangements? Those were the issues left for Japan to confront.21 Neither the United States nor Japan was quick in reexamining the nature of the alliance in the changing circumstances of the post–cold war era. The United States became more interested in pursuing economic interests, concentrating on economic friction with Japan. Matters changed only after Prime Minister Hosokawa appointed a blue ribbon advisory panel headed by Higuchi Hirotaro to reexamine the future of Japanese defense policy and revise the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) adopted in 1976. The Higuchi Report, submitted in August 1994, advocated a “coherent and comprehensive security policy,” moving from a “cold war defense strategy” to a “multilateral security strategy.” This outlined Japan’s changing strategic thinking after the cold war, clearly indicating that Japan’s future security policy should aim at the formation of a multilateral regional security system. The report emphasized

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more active participation in peacekeeping operations under the UN, more vigorous efforts in arms control and in the conduct of regional security dialogues.22 Though the new orientation was not incompatible with the U.S.–Japanese security alliance, it placed that alliance within the larger framework of a multilateral security system. It could have signaled a new push to develop security ties with Asian countries. At the same time the Pentagon was reexamining the U.S.–Japanese security alliance, which culminated in the Nye initiative for bilateral security dialogue with Japan. The United States was interested in encouraging Japan to have more active security collaboration that would go beyond financial contributions, preventing Japan from pursuing an autonomous defense policy, as feared from the Higuchi Report, and integrating Japan in any defense activities that might be directed against the rise of China.23 In the course of bilateral negotiations between the Pentagon and Japan’s Defense Agency, the importance of the U.S.–Japanese security alliance was upgraded to a higher priority than in the Higuchi Report. As a result, the major thrust of the Higuchi Report that emphasized multilateral regional security cooperation was diluted. The same process led to expanding the geographic scope of national defense, not merely to Japan proper, but also to the “areas surrounding Japan.” In the words of Mochizuki, “The new program outline was a breakthrough that permitted not only bilateral studies about how to respond to regional contingencies, but also eventual coordination of military operations.”24 The new defense arrangement was supposed to be approved in advance of the APEC meeting in Osaka in November 1995; but uproar over an American serviceman raping an Okinawa schoolgirl led both governments to scramble to resolve that issue. The redefinition of the alliance and the resolution of the Okinawa base issue were to be postponed; yet the direction of Japanese security thinking was shifting back to the United States after some uncertainty with implications for relations with other Asian states.25 The security deliberations that occurred in 1994–95 indicate some unsettling problems. There was a marked contrast in the general approach to the future of Japan’s security policy between the Higuchi Report and the Defense Agency’s new NDPO. Whereas the Higuchi Report emphasized the goal of creating a multinational regional security framework, the Defense Agency wanted to expand the realm of Japan’s military actions under the framework of the U.S.–Japanese security alliance. The latter course would be favored by Japan’s nationalists who considered it more promising for Japan to become an independent military great power and escape existing constitutional limits.

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Why Did Japan Fail to Develop New Strategic Thinking? In the middle of the 1990s, Japan was left with no reliable friends. China was poised to compete with Japan for great power status in East Asia, prepared to utilize ruthless Realpolitik and Japan’s historical past as its instruments of diplomacy to prevent Japan’s ascendancy. North Korea rattled nuclear weapons backed by missiles threatening Japan’s security. South Korea preferred to keep its distance from Japan. Spurned by Japan, Russia was consciously cultivating ties with the United States, South Korea, and China to isolate Japan. Finally, even the United States showed a distinct inclination to downgrade Japan’s influence, treating Japan as a not completely trustworthy ally. By 1995 Japan had lost confidence in its foreign policy options and reverted to the approach of the 1980s. With the formidable economic leverage that it could utilize to enhance its national interests, this outcome was not inevitable. Economic power not only did not enhance Japan’s international stature, it may even have damaged it. Economic frictions were a constant irritant in U.S. relations. Despite massive economic assistance and investment in China, the latter was becoming a fierce competitor, unwilling to accord to Japan a political great power status. Likewise, increasing economic interaction with South Korea did little to assuage the Korean people’s resentment and even hostility toward the Japanese. Putting excessive stress on resolution of the territorial dispute soured Japan’s relations with Russia. And North Korea opted to choose the path to develop nuclear weapons rather than to try to lure Japan’s capital. Japan’s “checkbook diplomacy” was not achieving the expected results, but it continued to be overrated. Below I discuss several other causes for failing to grasp the new strategic realities. Domestic Politics Change in the international environment coincided with the transitional period in the Japanese political system. The Recruit scandal took its tolls on the LDP’s succession process, derailing Abe Shintaro’s chance to become the prime minister after Takeshita. After a short tenure of premiership by Uno Sosuke, Kaifu Toshiki became prime minister in 1989. Kaifu was succeeded by Miyazawa Kiichi, whose government became bogged down with the PKO issue. Hit by another scandal, Miyazawa resigned. Then the 1955 political system that maintained the LDP’s monopoly ended. The first non-LDP government led by Hosokawa Morihiro, and composed of six small parties, was formed. But this

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government was shortlived, again struck by political scandal. This led to Hata Tsutomu’s government that lasted for only two months. After Hata’s fall, a new coalition government composed of the Socialist Party, the LDP, and the small Japan Harbinger Party (Sakigake) was established with socialist Murayama Tomiichi as prime minister. Only in 1996 was the LDP government and more stable leadership restored. The quick turnover of political power was not conducive to the formulation of a new strategic approach. In fact, absorbed by the immediate political tasks at hand, these politicians had no time to devote their attention to foreign policy, let alone develop a creative new strategy. In addition, the more the political power changed hands, arguably the less qualified the holders of power became. Miyazawa, a disciple of the Yoshida school, reputed to be endowed with formidable intellectual capacity, turned out to be a disappointingly unimaginative leader. He was assisted as foreign minister by another powerful politician, Watanabe Michio, who was known for his skills in domestic politics, but who did not display the strategic thinking necessary in the critical year of 1992. James Baker lamented the absence of serious intellectual dialogue with Japanese politicians, noting that whenever he sat at the negotiating table with one of them, they had to forgo preliminary exchanges of ideas and proceed straight to horse-trading.26 Thus, the management of foreign policy during this transitional period was entrusted to the professionals in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was a divided institution with little coordination between departments and desks and no mandate to look boldly at the future and present politicians with a far-reaching strategic vision. Poverty of Strategic Thought The cause for Japan’s failure to formulate new strategic thought went deeper. Lack of, or even absence of, strategic thinking was the hallmark of Japanese intellectual tradition throughout the postwar period. Japan’s security was safely assured by the U.S.–Japanese alliance and the American nuclear umbrella during the cold war. Precisely because their voice had no possibility of being realized, the Left had the luxury of indulging in the daydream of glorifying the Constitution, pacifism, nonacceptance of the U.S.–Japanese security treaty, and nonacceptance of the SDF. The conservatives in power also enjoyed the comfort of American protection, abdicating their responsibility to develop Japan’s own independent strategy. For instance, everyone knew that the United States transited nuclear weapons within Japan, but they pretended that

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nuclear weapons did not exist, since the Japanese government did not ask the United States, and the latter did not admit their existence. Nor was there any tradition to discuss Japan’s strategic choice in a public debate involving both camps. In fact, the Left and the Right almost never talked to each other. If this was so among the politicians, it was also true for intellectuals and journalists. Even worse, it is unlikely that Japan’s ossified educational system produced young scholars and public figures prepared to create a new strategy. Filling the gap in Japan’s emerging intellectual development was a resurgence of right-wing nationalism. As the presence of the left-wing intellectuals faded—they had long dominated the intellectual scene in such outlets as the monthly journal Sekai and the daily newspaper Asahi shimbun—nationalist advocates began effective campaigns against “selfdenigrating historical interpretations,” glossing over Japan’s militarist past, aggression, colonialism, and atrocities during the Pacific War. Some began to look for examples to glorify parts of Japan’s military past, while attacking the government’s weak-kneed Asian policy kowtowing to China and South Korea. Little attention was given to the prospect that the nationalist strategy would lead Japan into a collision course with China, North and South Korea, and Russia. Although these nationalists identify their security policy closely with that of the United States to the extent that U.S. policy was to encourage Japan’s more active military role, their deep-seated aspiration was to free Japan from U.S. dominance. The marriage of convenience between Japanese nationalists and the United States might hold for some time, but it appears destined to break. During the first half of the 1990s, the left-wing proved to be incapable of coping with the changing circumstances, providing no coherent and effective strategic vision other than adhering to the old cliché of pacifism. The only promising strategic vision was provided by Japan’s realists such as Sato Seizaburo, Tanaka Akihiko, Kitaoka Shinichi, and Inoguchi Takashi, who advocated Japan’s continuing cooperation with the United States, but emphasized Japan’s special role in East Asia in creating an integral, interdependent regional economic and security order. In order for Japan to contain emerging nationalism, the role of these intellectuals will become more important in coming years. Refusal to Atone for Past Historical Transgressions Japan cannot expect to be accepted by its neighbors as a constructive member of the new security system in East Asia until it honestly atones for its past historical transgressions against its neighbors. The Japanese

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government actually took some decisive steps toward this end in the first half of the 1990s: in March 1990 when Roh Tae-woo visited Japan; in 1992 when the emperor traveled to China; in August 1993, when Hosokawa became the first Japanese prime minister to refer to the Pacific War as a war of aggression perpetrated by Japan and expressed his regret for its victims to Japan’s Asian neighbors; in October 1993 when Hosokawa visited Seoul and apologized for Japan’s colonial rule; and finally on August 15, 1995, at the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, when Murayama admitted that Japan, “through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations.” He further declared: “In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.”27 Murayama’s 1995 statement was the clearest statement of the Japanese government’s atoning for its past. Thus, two non-LDP prime ministers took a decisive step toward accounting for Japan’s past. But these statements themselves were not enough. The problem was how to implement this sense of “remorse and apology” as a national policy in the face of strong, contradictory messages delivered by cabinet members and other politicians. As soon as Hosokawa’s statement on Japan’s war of aggression was made, the hawkish deputy minister of education, Abe, rejected the notion of “aggressive war.” The director of the environmental agency, Sakurai, also stated that Japan did not fight the war as “a war of aggression.” When this statement provoked international protest, especially from South Korea, Sakurai was forced to resign. These were not isolated incidents. Many nationalist Japanese disapprove of the statements made by Hosokawa and Murayama, and criticized the government that approved the emperor’s China trip, obliging him to make the statement about his feelings of “sorrow.” Even in the period of maximum apologies of the first half of the 1990s, Japan’s Asian neighbors were left with the impression that there was little sincerity behind them and that they would not have any binding effect on those who were likely to rise to power in the coming years. Above all, they doubted that there was any effort to convey to a younger generation the reasons why atonement is needed. The statements of “regret” and “apology” were contradicted by repeated visits by government officials to the Yasukuni shrine, and the Ministry of Education’s approval of the textbooks that minimized, ignored, or even appeared to justify Japan’s war of aggression and its colonial rule in Korea. Although Chinese and Koreans may use the

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textbook issue and the government officials’ visits to the Yasukuni shrine for political purposes, their protests that Japan’s atonement was not sincere can be justified. The issue of history is integrally connected with the territorial disputes. During the cold war, the Japanese government could separate its territorial disputes with South Korea over Takeshima/Dokdo Island and with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, from the Northern Territories/Kuril dispute with the Soviet Union. In the post–cold war period, these territorial disputes appear to be merging into one. Insisting on Japan’s exclusive sovereignty over these contested territories would inevitably lead Japan into a collision course with China, South Korea, and Russia, rousing their nationalism. What is required is strategic thinking that places the territorial disputes in the larger context of Japan’s overall strategy and comes up with imaginative solutions that would turn each dispute from a zero–sum game into a positive–sum game. The first half of the 1990s was the turning point from the cold war to a new world environment. Japan failed to react proactively to this fundamental change. New strategic thinking that was required to adjust to the new environment did not emerge. New approaches were attempted in an ad hoc fashion without coordination and without comprehensive strategic thinking at their foundation. Japan drifted, without asking fundamental questions about the future direction of foreign policy. Should Japan follow the path of Pax Americana, and accept the unipolar world? Should Japan play a balance of power game? Or would Japan’s interests best be served by moving in the direction of establishing a multilateral mechanism? These questions remained unanswered. Notes 1. For Japan’s reaction to the Gulf War, see Teshima Ryuzo, 1991 nen Nihon no haiboku (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1993). 2. Teshima, 1991 nen Nihon no haiboku, p. 22. 3. Sato Seizaburo, “Sengo ishiki no dasei to tatsu toki,” Chuo koron, November 1990. 4. Kitaoka Shin’ichi, “Kyocho no daika,” Chuo koron, November 1990. 5. Tanaka Naoki, “Nihon gaiko no kijuku wa nanika,” Chuo koron, April 1991. 6. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “The Gorbachev–Kaifu Summit: Domestic and Foreign Policy Linkages,” in Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Jonathan Haslam, and Andrew C. Kuchins, eds., Russia and Japan: An Unresolved Dilemma between Distant Neighbors (Berkeley: International and Area Studies, 1993), pp. 49–82; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, vol. 2, Neither War Nor Peace. 1985–1998 (Berkeley: UC Berkeley IAS Publications, 1998), pp. 368–407.

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7. Kimura Hiroshi, “Shintaisei de ‘Hopporyodo’ wa zenshin suru,” Asahi journal, August 30, 1991, p. 21; also see Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, vol. 2, pp. 417–20. 8. For Russo-Japanese relations from 1991 to 1995, see Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, vol. 2, pp. 420–97; Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Why Did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement in 1991–1996?” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949–1999 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 175–205. 9. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s Images of China in the 1990s: Are They Ready for China’s’ Smile Dipomacy’ or Bush’s ‘Strong Diplomacy?’ ” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2001), p. 102. 10. Gilbert Rozman, “China’s Changing Images of Japan, 1989–2001: The Struggle to Balance Partnership and Rivalry,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 2 (Winter 2002), p. 304. 11. Rozman, “Japan’s Images of China in the 1990s,” pp. 99–102, 104–05, 116. 12. Richard Drifte, Japan’s Security Relations with China since 1989: From Balancing to Bandwagoning? (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), p. 135. 13. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 95–96. 14. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 85–86. 15. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 117–19; Shigemura Chikei, “Soredemo tebanasenai Kitachosen kaado,” Chuo koron, June 1992, pp. 149–54. 16. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 119–22. 17. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan and Korea: Should the US Be Worried about Their New Spat in 2001?” The Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002), p. 5. 18. Rozman, “Japan and Korea,” p. 2. 19. Wakamiya Yoshifumi, “Kensho: Tenno hochu,” Chuo koron, September 1993, pp. 126–40. 20. Teshima, 1991 nen Nihon no haiboku. 21. Mike M. Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” in Mike M. Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.–Japan Security Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 5–6. 22. Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” pp. 8–9. 23. Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” pp. 11–12. 24. Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” pp. 13–14. 25. Mochizuki, “A New Bargain for a Stronger Alliance,” pp. 14–15. 26. “Reisen go Nihon to Amerika: Gaiko gishi,” Asahi shimbun, November 14, 1991. 27. Quoted in Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 170.

CHAPTER 4

Japan’s Strategic Thinking in the Second Half of the 1990s Kazuhiko Togo

T

he end of the cold war opened a new strategic environment for Japan. But Japan was ill prepared for this change, and its inability to act responsibly in the Gulf War of 1991 inflicted a deep blow against its relations with the United States. In East Asia, at the time the Soviet Union was losing its influence, China was rising, guided by Deng Xiaoping’s concept of “peace and development” from the early 1980s. 1 Based on its “engagement” policy, Japan revealed an unusually autonomous policy of “not isolating China” after the Tiananmen incident in 1989. But the “artificial honeymoon” 2 brought about by the imperial visit in 1992 did not last long and Japan had to face China’s nuclear weapons tests (1995–96) and the revival of history issues in 1995. 3 Japan’s North Korean overture in 1990–92 proved to be abortive, and relations with South Korea did not improve much either, despite efforts to recognize and apologize for the comfort women, and 1995 became a difficult year symbolized by the destruction of the prewar Japanese governor’s office. In relation to Russia, Japan missed an opportunity opened during the short period of euphoria in 1992 after the demise of the Soviet Union. Thus, heightened expectation in the wake of the cold war in 1991–92 was followed by general disappointment in the middle of the 1990s for all the missed opportunities.

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Strategic Environment in the Second Half of the 1990s The strategic environment affecting Japan in the second half of the 1990s can be described from the following three perspectives: geopolitics, geo-economics, and history. In geopolitics, the first and probably the most important factor was the rise of China in the Asia-Pacific region. After the difficulty China faced after the Tiananmen crackdown, Deng Xiaoping emphasized economic construction, as underlined in his “lectures in the southern inspection tour” at the beginning of 1992. In order to harmonize China’s external policy with this objective, he put forward a four-dimensional concept of the world: “one region (regional countries), one line (industrialized countries), one side (developing countries), and one point (the United States).” Each dimension had a specific mission within the overall objective of achieving economic construction. U.S. policy was specifically expressed with a “20-word directive,” asserting a cautious, nonprovocative but principled approach, which was made public only at the end of 1995.4 How to manage the relationship with the United States, the sole superpower, was a difficult and much debated issue, the answer of which was left unclear in China. Japan was an important “regional” and “industrialized” country, but as a close ally of the United States, its position within the East Asian power balance could easily be seen as interfering with China’s interests. In 1996, China’s success in economic construction and modernization since the beginning of the policy of “reform and opening” and “peace and development” could not be doubted, but maintenance of an international environment conducive to economic development was not considered an easy task. For Japan, the United States was not only the sole superpower, but a close ally. China was an important neighbor with long historic ties and developing economic relations, but with which political relations were complex. Facing a China rising in all spheres was totally a new experience for Japan. Considered by many to have a special negative feeling toward Japan, Jiang Zemin was not an easy interlocutor. How U.S.–China relations would develop was unclear. In such a situation, Japan’s strategic thinking was left with little imagination: first, to strengthen trustworthy alliance relations with the United States; second, to maintain and consolidate as friendly relations as possible with China; and third, to avoid two possible nightmares, “U.S.–China hostility” and “U.S.–China passing of Japan,” by way of helping to improve those relations in case of hostility, and impressing both with Japan’s presence in case of “passing.”

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On the Korean Peninsula, Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy and changes occurring in the external relations of North Korea created another strategic challenge for Japan. Russia became an important factor; one that had the potential to create a new power balance in Japan’s favor in East Asia as well. In geo-economics, the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, which affected Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea, and Malaysia, became the major factor to gauge Japan’s proximity with Asia. Japan itself was mired in its own financial crisis in overcoming nonperforming loans and introducing structural reforms. Efforts could not be spared to launch a new round of the WTO,5 but as the largest economy in Asia, Japan was expected to show effective leadership to overcome the crisis. Japan’s credibility was at stake. And through this process emerged another challenge to create a regional cooperative economic structure in which Japan might play a leading role as well. In history, Japan struggled to seek further reconciliation and establish its identity in Asia. China increasingly did not hide its concern about Japan’s past and that contemporary Japan was not cognizant enough about past atrocities. Such concerns were not stilled in South Korea either. Several important exchanges of top leaders were made in this period with mixed results. Furthermore, two fundamental issues for Japan to overcome linked to World War II history—the conclusion of a peace treaty with Russia and the normalization of relations with North Korea—were under continuous attention. In particular, normalization of relations with Russia became a weighty agenda at the turn of the century. Inasmuch as these issues were important from the point of view of regaining identity for Japan, identity was also a crucial issue for Asian neighbors. As Muthiah Alagappa argues, the three major security issues in Asia—Taiwan, Korea, and Kashmir—are “identity cum sovereignty conflicts.”6 In these circumstances, Japan’s struggle for identity became a complex issue. Thus, from the point of view of international relations theory, an analysis of this period could be made based on three approaches: realism, focusing on geopolitics, power relations, hegemony and balance of power; liberalism, accentuating the formation of an international structure to govern relations among states, including regional economic cooperation; and constructivism, emphasizing the importance of a search for identity in a state’s behavior.7 Three prime ministers led Japan in this period: Hashimoto (1996.1–98.7), Obuchi (1998.7–2000.4), and Mori (2000.4–01.4). Internally, their primary task was to overcome the economic crisis stemming from the nonperforming loans and introduce a fundamental

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restructuring of the social and economic system. They tried without real success; however, it was not clear whether they had real scope for leadership in the face of institutional and party obstacles. But in external policy, each period under the respective prime minister had its distinct characteristics. Hashimoto: Strategic Thinking in Relation to the United States, China, and Russia Born in 1937, son of a parliamentarian, Hashimoto Ryutaro was elected as a member of the Diet in 1963 at the age of 26. He served as minister of welfare, transportation, finance, and international trade and industry and became prime minister at the age of 59. First a member of the Sato faction and then becoming an influential member of the Tanaka– Takeshita faction, he was known to be a “lone wolf ” and a seisakutsu (well versed on policy), strong in his policy articulation without resorting to human networking in LDP politics. Hashimoto played a major role as minister of finance during the Gulf War in preparing $13 billion in assistance. While in the opposition, he seriously studied the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94 as the LDP chairman of the Policy Affairs Research Council. In June 1994, under the extraordinary coalition of LDP and JSP, Hashimoto became the minister for international trade and industry under Prime Minister Murayama. In this capacity, he served as chief negotiator on automobile disputes with the Clinton administration and faced the Okinawa outcry over the rape of a primary schoolgirl in early September 1995. In late September 1995 Hashimoto became the president of the LDP also assuming the post of deputy prime minister. This position paved the way to becoming prime minister in January 1996 upon Murayama’s resignation. Analyzing Hashimoto’s policy initiatives, one cannot but fail to notice that in the economic sphere his decisions created fundamental problems in managing the Japanese economy in the 1990s. First, as the minister of finance the introduction in 1990 of the restriction of asset trading to overcome the bubble economy successfully exploded the bubble, but created impossible nonperforming loans that brought down the Japanese economy for more than a decade. Second, his decision as prime minister to increase the consumption tax to five percent stifled the barely recovering Japanese economy, taking it back to its deflationary cycle. In each case he had to resign from this post, minister of finance or prime minister. One should observe though that Hashimoto’s bad decisions were also based on the recommendations of the Ministry of

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Finance (MOF)’s officials, thus not only the prime minister but also the whole bureaucracy was responsible for these policy failures. Hashimoto’s foreign policy experience must have given him an understanding of the precarious ground on which international relations were poised after the end of the cold war and the necessity for Japan to strengthen its strategic position in the region. As in internal policy, all his external policy decisions were the results of combined efforts of the prime minister and supporting bureaucracies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), MOF, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), and the Japan Defense Agency (JDA). Relations with China and the United States Hashimoto became the first prime minister who dealt with the dual challenge that Japan had to face in the post–cold war period: to maintain and to develop sound political and security relations with the United States and to face squarely the enormity of issues connected with a rising China. The U.S. decision to send two carriers to the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 after China’s missile tests on the eve of Lee Teng-hui’s election seemed to justify Deng’s cautious “20-word” directive. For Japan and Hashimoto, this crisis was the first real exposure to the reality of East Asian security danger. The 1993–94 nuclear crisis was somehow left for the security experts to mull over, but the Taiwan crisis in 1996 became an open concern for the prime minister and the nation. The central issue that Japan had to face was “what should Japan do if hostility breaks out between the U.S. and China?” Omori Yoshio, director of the Cabinet Intelligence Office, 1993–97, recalled that “the Taiwan crisis was the greatest security danger which Japan faced during my tenure. Japan was going to be involved in the great power geopolitics between the United States and China in 21st century Asia, and Japan had to take a position on this issue.”8 According to journalist Funabashi Yoichi, “the first nightmare for Japan, the hostility between China and the United States, emerged.”9 For Hashimoto the answer was clear. Drawing on his own foreign policy experience, he knew well that Japan’s security was deeply dependent on the United States. “If ultimately Japan was asked to choose, there was no doubt for Hashimoto to opt for the alliance with the United States.”10 But at the same time, China was not a country that Japan could discard. Thus, what Hashimoto did was to consolidate security ties with the United States, to do his best to improve relations with China, and in facing the “U.S.–China hostility” nightmare, to be careful so that Japan would not further aggravate the hostility.

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Hashimoto explained his thinking to President Clinton in his April summit: he emphasized the necessity to consolidate Japan–U.S. security ties and added that “If Japan and the United States jointly approach China, China would not accept it. Japan and the United States should coordinate our policies, but should endeavor [to implement] respective policies [separately].”11 For Hashimoto, the first task of consolidating the alliance proceeded smoothly. As a matter of fact, the format for consolidation of Japan–U.S. security relations had already been prepared by the spring of 1996 by the two administrations. After the discovery in the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94 that Japan was almost incapable of effectively assisting U.S. operations against North Korea, the two administrations had worked out an important document to reaffirm their security relations, which failed to be adopted at the Osaka APEC Summit in 1995 because of Clinton’s absence there. The Taiwan Straits crisis made the tone of that document even stronger,12 and in April 1996, when Clinton visited Japan, “The Japan–U.S. Joint Declaration on Security-Alliance for the 21st Century” was adopted. China launched a wave of criticism against the consolidation of Japan–U.S. security ties. Its academics raised serious concerns that the security alliance was a mechanism of containment, which could seriously damage China’s strategic position in the world.13 Voices of those concerned with the “egg shell” role of the U.S. troop presence in Japan to foster Japan’s military power grew louder than of those who stressed the “bottle cap” of keeping the Japanese military genie in the bottle.14 China argued that the “Japan–U.S. security treaty changed into a tool to contain China. Japan and the U.S. were afraid of the future military power of China and were implementing an adversarial policy against China. The U.S. should withdraw its forward deployment system from the Asia-Pacific region.” It sought to drive a clear wedge between Japan and the United States: the danger of Japanese militarism was amply emphasized in talks with the Americans. Minister of Defense Chi Haotian in his visit to Washington in December 1996 did not hide his view of Japan as “a country that cannot be trusted.” Meanwhile, Japan was told by the Chinese that just being obedient to the Americans lacks a proactive quality necessary for a leadership role in Asia. 15 In addition to the security rift, Hashimoto faced a rocky agenda with China in 1996 regarding power and identity. Japan’s bewilderment about China’s nuclear weapons tests in May, August, and September 1995, which resulted in a partial suspension of ODA, still affected the psychology of the relationship. The Senkaku Island issue emerged when

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several patriotic Japanese youth, in an anti-Chinese mood, went ashore and constructed a lighthouse and a war memorial in July–August 1996.16 Tensions escalated after Hashimoto’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine on July 29, 1996, his birthday. For Hashimoto, the year 1997 tested his strategic sense in East Asia: how to remedy relations with China, while consolidating relations with the United States. First, on the security rift, the Japanese government went out of its way to explain to China that it was not its intention to gang up with the United States to threaten China. The fourth round of the Japan–China security dialogue held in March 1997 became an unusually long and detailed session to explain the essence of Japan–U.S. security relations to China.17 The new defense guidelines, adopted in September 1997, formalized a new notion of the “surrounding situation” for the defense cooperation between Japan and the United States, and the new notion was understood as being “situational” and “not geographical.” The two administrations have kept this position since then, and the political decision to be silent about the implications that the guideline might have vis-à-vis Taiwan helped to take some heat away from China’s reaction.18 This position was thoroughly explained by Hashimoto to Jiang Zemin in his September visit to Beijing and MOFA ascertained that “Japan succeeded in getting a fair amount of understanding from the Chinese side.”19 Second, the thorny issue of nuclear weapons tests was resolved when China declared a moratorium after its last test in July 1996 and signed the CTBT in September. Japan lifted its ODA sanctions in March 1997. Third, concerning the Senkaku Islands, Hashimoto reached an agreement with China in September 1997 to create a 200-mile-wide “joint management zone” to allow fishing by both nations.20 Fourth, in the summer of 1997, Hashimoto had to decide whether to continue visiting Yasukuni or not. In October 1994, Hashimoto made a revealing statement about his thinking on history before a committee of the Diet Lower House: I still continue to think about when Japan’s policy began to change to, what is generally called, aggression against the Chinese continent. It might have been some point during WWI. In relation to Korea, our seniors chose an action which cannot but be called colonialism. But when I restrict my thinking to WWII, where Japan fought a war against the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, there remains some doubt whether we can call it aggression. At least, I have no intention to state that Japan waged a war of aggression against the Soviet Union, which began the attack on Manchuria.21

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Speaking cautiously, as is typical in parliamentary debate, Hashimoto, in essence, acknowledged that Japan needs a humble approach to Asia, where it has committed aggression and ruled as a colonial state. With this recognition, Hashimoto decided not to repeat his Yasukuni visit. Thus, Hashimoto on the whole successfully navigated through 1997 to rebuild relations with China, while continuing to strengthen U.S. relations, particularly through the defense guidelines. While Hashimoto was busy improving ties with China, U.S.–China relations were also overcoming the 1996 crisis. From the latter half of 1996, and particularly when his second term began in 1997, Clinton took the initiative in improving U.S.–China relations. This culminated first in Jiang Zemin’s October 1997 visit to Washington and the establishment of a “cooperative strategic partnership,”22 after Jiang stopped over in Honolulu and placed a wreath at the Pearl Harbor Memorial, “reminding all of the WWII alliance between China and the United States against Japan.” Clinton reciprocated this visit with a “nine-day grand tour” bypassing Japan and Korea in June–July 1998, an omission that was then bitterly criticized in Congress as a “strategic miscalculation.”23 Furthermore, in Shanghai, Clinton announced the famous “three no’s” on Taiwan that the United States does not support “independence for Taiwan, two Chinas or one Taiwan one China, and Taiwan’s membership in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”24 Improvement of U.S.–China relations accompanied by “Japan passing” was the second “nightmare” that Japan could face in this strategic triangle.25 Bad memories linger from Nixon’s announcement of his visit to China in 1971 without sufficient prior notification, the so-called Nixon-shokku. Ironically, Hashimoto had to face the first nightmare of “U.S.–China hostility” at the outset of his activities and the second one of “U.S.–China passing of Japan” at the end of his career as prime minister. Hashimoto later narrates his feeling: It was not pleasant to observe impassionately the visit to China while being bypassed by President Clinton. But I would have said: “please.” I made up my mind that we are not in a position to insist that President Clinton come to Japan. But mixed feelings remained. The U.S. might have two faces: the Straits crisis and Clinton’s China visit. What would be Japan’s position?26

Hashimoto’s unanswered question was probably all the more bitter, because Japan had just undergone a complicated and strange adjustment in the implementation of the defense guidelines, fully taking into account China’s sensitivity. After the adoption of the guidelines in

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September 1997, Hashimoto, upon advice by MOFA, made the decision in the spring of 1998 that the cooperation in accordance with the new guidelines will be confined within the scope of cooperation based on the 1960 U.S.–Japan security treaty. This limitation was clearly prescribed in the Surrounding Situation Law, which was formulated in April 1998. It was a strange order of determination that this point, whether the scope of cooperation is wider than the narrowly defined Japan–U.S. security cooperation or not, was left somewhat ambiguous in the guidelines and that Japan’s internal law to support implementation unambiguously specified it. But whatever the reason for this anomaly, when Hashimoto and MOFA sharpened the interpretation of the guidelines to be cooperation strictly under the 1960 security treaty, a logical dilemma occurred: the cooperation under the 1960 security treaty cannot be conducted outside the area that may affect the security of the “Far East,” whereas the geographical interpretation of the term “Far East” in accordance with Article VI of the 1960 treaty was abundantly defined in the parliamentary debate in 1960 to include Taiwan. Once one enters into a definition related to the 1960 treaty, it would become rather difficult to stick to the definition that the cooperation may be exclusively “situational” and not “geographical.” Thus, pushed by the force of logic, a MOFA official touched upon such a “geographical” interpretation at the Diet in May 1998. Hashimoto not only insisted on sticking to the “situational” interpretation, but eventually removed that official from his post. Thus, Hashimoto did his best not to provoke China. Japan’s sense of balance that it is unwise to provoke China on such an issue was the legal explanation for the new guidelines that prevailed in this period. The Asian Financial Crisis In addition to his geopolitical thinking and based on his long-time experience as minister in the MOF and MITI, Hashimoto had confidence in understanding the logic of international economics, finance, and trade. When a financial crisis of unprecedented magnitude befell Asia starting with Thailand in July 1997, Hashimoto’s government was ready to take a leadership role to overcome it. Japan’s initiative to establish an AMF was launched in August 1997. What was Japan’s motivation? It was a combination of three factors: First, the crisis occurred in Asia, to which Japan belongs, and where Japan is the greatest economic power. In Asia, Japan has tried to create longstanding relations based on economics, trade, and investment, if not political relations. Should Japan be unable to take an effective role to overcome

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the crisis, how can it claim an honorable leadership role in the region? Second, practical and tactical considerations such as the low profile of U.S. activities, some dissatisfaction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) scope of assistance, and ASEAN’s support for Japan’s leadership role made policymakers think that a new AMF would genuinely contribute to better resolve the crisis. Third, personality factors played a role. Sakakibara Eisuke, vice minister for international affairs in MOF, powerfully led the negotiations. Given Hashimoto’s confidence on such crucial matters of international finance, it is more than natural to assume that Sakakibara’s initiative was fully supported by Hashimoto’s thinking.27 By the end of September, the initiative had essentially failed. It was partly due to the generality of the proposal; apart from proposing a fund of $100 billion of which Japan was prepared to finance half, such important issues as conditionality and relations with the IMF were left vague. But primarily it was due to a lack of coordination with the United States. A lineup of the United States, the IMF, Europe, and, strikingly, China emerged to oppose this scheme, which was formally rejected in November.28 Not only from the point of view of Japan’s leadership in international finance and geo-economics in Asia, but also in terms of geopolitics and identity in Asia, it was a costly defeat. Japan again faced the second “nightmare” of being opposed both by the United States and China. ASEAN’s expectations could not be met. In the fall when the crisis spread to Indonesia (in October) and South Korea (in November), Hashimoto’s government had no choice but to coordinate with the United States and IMF. Its international assistance package harmonized with that of the IMF: $10 billion to South Korea, $5 billion to Indonesia, and $4 billion to Thailand. Primarily under the Hashimoto cabinet, Japan’s assistance totaled $44 billion, including funds for private investment, trade financing, help to the socially vulnerable, and support for economic structural reforms.29 In his ASEAN trip in January 1997, Hashimoto proposed a regular summit between Japan and ASEAN, which triggered ASEAN’s invitation of Japan, China, and South Korea.30 Amidst the financial crisis, it invited the three to the December 1997 Kuala Lumpur Summit, commemorating 30 years. Hashimoto therefore became the first prime minister to attend the ASEAN ⫹ 3 summit meeting. Relations with Korea, India, and Myanmar In relations with South Korea, Hashimoto’s major task became the implementation of Japanese assistance for the Korean financial crisis.

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Although Kim Dae-jung was elected to the presidency in December 1997 and inaugurated in February 1998, Hashimoto did not face the full impact of his sunshine policy. With North Korea, though, Hashimoto’s era was characterized by relatively warm relations: efforts to resume negotiations for normalization, the home return of former spouses, and continuous implementation of humanitarian assistance. It coincided with the general warming up of North Korea’s relations with the outside, such as KEDO and four-party talks, but at the same time, “as the backdrop of these developments, there were positive directions from Hashimoto.”31 When India tested a nuclear weapon in May 1998, Japan immediately froze all grant aid and subsequently new loans. “Hashimoto was genuinely concerned about the danger of proliferation and the fate of the NPT.”32 Purnendra Jain points out that Japan’s action was “swift and severe,” “out of proportion,” and “unnecessary,” and there was a lack of geopolitical calculation that India might act as a useful balancer to a rising China.33 Indeed, although there was long-term security concern about the risk of proliferation in East Asia, nothing indicates that Hashimoto had any strategic calculation to include India in the geopolitics of East Asia against a rising China. In relation to Myanmar, however, Hashimoto was very aware that isolating Myanmar just because of human rights issues would lead it to drift toward China, and this would not be conducive to the strategic interests of Japan and the United States. Despite American criticism, he gave the green light to an emergency repairs project for airport safety.34 Relations with Russia Hashimoto’s geopolitical thinking toward Asia was on the whole sound and balanced, but, apart from the abortive AMF initiative, it was reactive and lacked dynamic initiative. The exception was “Russia, other than the United States, and in that context Okinawa, where Hashimoto really worked with personal enthusiasm and leadership.” 35 Most conspicuously, Hashimoto’s leadership toward Russia was not only based on his aspiration to achieve a breakthrough in a bilateral context but also on his geopolitical calculation that improved Japan–Russia relations would strengthen Japan’s position in East Asia against a rising China. Hashimoto’s own words tell this: We must make Russia an Asian player. We have to make Russia a friend for Japan. We do not want in the 21st century China and India to struggle for hegemony in Asia. In order to achieve this objective, we need to have Russia included in the region.36

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When Hashimoto was preoccupied with the Taiwan Strait crisis and the consolidation of the U.S. alliance in the first half of 1996, Yeltsin was preoccupied with his election campaign to bring him a second term. But Hashimoto and Yeltsin had their first encounter in April 1996 at the nuclear summit in Moscow, and it was a success. Hashimoto made a specific comment that he would not press on the difficult territorial issue and would wait for Yeltsin’s victory in the elections. Yeltsin responded with appreciation. In the area of security exchanges, two important initiatives were taken by the Japanese side in this period: to send the head of the Defense Agency in April, for the first time in history, and to dispatch a Maritime Self Defense escort vessel Kurama to Vladivostok in July, after an interval of 71 years. But Hashimoto had to wait another year for his next encounter with Yeltsin; Yeltsin came back to lead Russian internal and external policy in March 1997 after his reelection and health problems. Hashimoto recalls: “The turning point was President Clinton’s phone call just before his departure to Helsinki. He asked me whether I have any objection to including Russia in the G-8, because the U.S. needs some triggering factor to let Russia accept NATO’s eastward expansion. I told him that I have no disagreement, provided that Russia would not join discussions on their own economy or Chernobyl, but simultaneously, I asked President Clinton to tell Yeltsin that Hashimoto was genuinely inclined to conduct in-depth talks [on a peace treaty]. Clinton reassured me that he would convey that message. I asked the same of Chancellor Kohl.”37 The bilateral meeting in Denver proceeded successfully; Hashimoto proposed to expand Japanese investment in Russia and to hold an informal “no necktie” meeting in the Russian Far East. “We got along well in Denver, but I felt that some concerns remained on the Russian side. I thought that highlighting Japan’s policy as ‘Eurasian foreign policy’ may resolve Russian concerns and I sent a new message through my July speech at the Keizai doyukai.”38 Hashimoto emphasized in the speech that after the conclusion of “Eurasian policy from the Atlantic Ocean” by the formation of an expanded NATO, Japan was ready to embark on “Eurasian policy from the Pacific Ocean,” adding that the weakest link that needs to be strengthened among the four countries (Japan, Russia, China, and the United States) is Japan– Russia; further, he called for enhancement of the bilateral relationship based on the principles of trust, mutual interest, and a long-term perspective to be applied to the territorial problem. The speech also reflected Hashimoto’s geopolitical instinct to improve relations with countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The Russian side was deeply

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impressed by the dynamic worldview and the nondogmatic approach to the territorial issue. A “no-necktie” meeting was planned for November 1997 in Krasnoyarsk. “President Yeltsin moved faster than I anticipated. He confirmed the target year of 2000 and proposed to work together.” Hashimoto, on his part, prepared a detailed program for economic cooperation, named the “Hashimoto–Yeltsin Plan,” emphasizing cooperation for an open economy, a market economy, and energy.39 After Krasnoyarsk, a MOFA team led by Tamba Minoru, deputy foreign minister for political affairs and an expert on Russia with a strong personality and definite views on Russia, began tackling Japan–Russia relations in a most energetic manner. The purpose was to drastically improve Japan–Russia relations in all spheres and make this overall improvement connected to conclusion of a peace treaty by 2000. Hashimoto and Tamba first showed leadership by inviting Russia to the APEC summit in Vancouver, which was held immediately after the Krasnoyarsk meeting. “Japan introduced Russia to APEC. There was some feeling of a mismatch in APEC. But it had merit for Japan to remind others that Russia has an Asian face. APEC is an ideal place where Japan, China, the U.S., and Russia can meet in a natural manner.” Thus, Russia became a member of APEC at the Kuala Lumpur summit in 1998.40 As concrete proof of economic cooperation, Foreign Minister Obuchi announced a financial assistance package of $1.5 billion to be jointly implemented with the World Bank in February 1998. This was the first, and it turned out, the last “un-tied” financial package that Japan declared toward Russia.41 Another step that helped to strengthen mutual trust was the successful signing of an agreement on fishing around the four islands in February 1998. The compromise formula that allowed Japan the right to fish within the territorial waters around the islands without infringing the legal position of the two sides was the product of three-year negotiations between the two administrations. A shared spirit of mutual trust that characterized the Krasnoyarsk meeting became the basis of that agreement. Finally, Hashimoto launched the first concessionary proposal on the territorial issue in April 1998 at the second round of “no-necktie” meetings in Kawana. The content of the proposal was not formally disclosed but numerous reports emerged since then indicating that it was a combination of drawing a border line between Urup and Etorofu (assigning sovereignty over the four islands to Japan) and leaving the current status of the islands for some time to come (with all administrative rights to

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Russia).42 The proposal seemed to have impressed Yeltsin, but no clear conclusion emerged in Kawana. “At the Birmingham summit in May, I did not expect much progress. We also had to deal urgently with the nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan. After that, several factors contributed to the derailing of the negotiations. My resignation in July was one of the reasons.” Whatever Hashimoto’s own evaluation may be, the financial crisis in Russia, Hashimoto’s resignation due to the LDP’s defeat in the July elections, and Yeltsin’s declining health, all contributed to the closure of a shortlived Japan–Russia “honeymoon.” A new page in the relationship had to be opened under Prime Minister Obuchi with Yeltsin ailing. Obuchi: In Search of Reunification with Asia Obuchi, as Hashimoto, was born in 1937, as a son of a parliamentarian, and was first elected to the Diet in 1963. He was known as hitogarano Obuchi (a man of personal warmth) and built his career through party work, in contrast to Hashimoto, establishing a solid personal network among LDP and opposition parliamentarians. He became the chief cabinet secretary in the Takeshita cabinet from 1987 to 1989 when Japan moved from Showa to Heisei. Having gone through major party and factional work during the political reforms of the 1990s, he became the minister for foreign affairs in the second Hashimoto cabinet in July 1997 and succeeded Hashimoto as prime minister in July 1998 at the age of 61. Because of his humble and nonflamboyant character, Obuchi was nicknamed first “cold pizza” or bokyahin (poor in vocabulary), but this low-key image was soon replaced by an impression that he was a man who had long prepared for the post of prime minister. Relations with China and the United States Probably it was in his Asia policy, from China to South Korea to regional cooperation, that Obuchi left his name in history. As Hashimoto, Obuchi faced a rising China, and his response was similar in reducing geopolitical tension and introducing a broad range of cooperation with a future orientation. On history, he made efforts to close the gap with China, but also sought a more self-assertive position to express Japanese views. Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in November 1998 became the first crucial occasion for Obuchi to deal with China. History, Taiwan, and Japan–U.S. defense guidelines were the three difficult issues. Obuchi’s

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position on history was not confrontational but self-assertive, in contrast to his predecessors in the first half of the 1990s and to Clinton’s stand on Taiwan. On history, Obuchi took a clear position that Japan was not going to include the word “apology (owabi)” in the written joint declaration. China, which did not ask in particular to include this point in the early preparatory stage, began to strongly request its inclusion after the Obuchi-Kim Dae-jung Declaration issued a month earlier. But Obuchi’s position was firm, and so was the position of MOFA in Tokyo. The consensus was that the postwar process of reconciliation with China, including the 1972 joint statement and the imperial visit in 1992, should have brought the relationship to a point where it does not require another written owabi. Inclusion of owabi without an expression of reconciliation was considered unacceptable.43 A great majority of the LDP leadership supported this position. Ultimately, Tokyo agreed to include for the first time in a Japan–China official document the word “aggression” and Obuchi expressed verbally “heartfelt apology” at the summit meeting on November 26, but that was as far as Japan went.44 Obuchi’s position was reciprocated by Jiang Zemin’s full deployment of the history card. But the preaching tone of his statements at the summit, the imperial dinner, Waseda University, and the press conference did not invite sympathy even among those who deemed friendship with China to be of utmost importance. Obuchi’s approach was justified and appreciated by most Japanese media and opinion leaders.45 On Taiwan too, Obuchi’s position was cautious. The “three no’s” expressed by Clinton in his visit to China were neither confirmed in writing nor stated verbally. The Joint Declaration declared that Japan “continues to maintain its stand” from the 1972 Joint Communiqué, “reiterated Japan’s understanding that there is one China,” and asserted that “Japan will continue to maintain its exchanges of a private and regional nature with Taiwan.”46 In the summit, Obuchi went to the extent of expressing that “the position of not supporting Taiwan’s independence will not be changed henceforward,” while emphasizing that he “hopes that the issue will be resolved peacefully through dialogue of the parties concerned.”47 At the same time, on the Japan–U.S. defense guidelines, Obuchi confirmed the position that “the surrounding situation is not a geographical concept,” and also that “Japan–U.S. security cooperation is not targeted against any specific country.”48 During the parliamentary scrutiny of the internal law to back up the Japan–U.S. defense guidelines in the spring of 1999, Obuchi firmly maintained this position.49 But Obuchi and MOFA officials also put a lot of effort into making Jiang’s visit an occasion for future-oriented cooperation. The new

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declaration was entitled “Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development.” By accepting Deng’s key notion of “peace and development,” Japan meant to encourage China toward positive engagement not only in economic matters but also in peace and security.50 Thus, the accompanying press statement comprised 33 projects for cooperation, including the construction of a high-speed railway between Beijing and Shanghai, the preservation of cultural heritage in the Silk Road area, human rights, nonproliferation, and exchanges on security and police activities. While Obuchi was struggling to establish his policy on China, an important change of tone was occurring in the U.S.–China relationship. In the second half of 1998 after the cooperative strategic partnership appeared to be established by Clinton’s visit to China, a series of difficulties occurred: congressional attacks against the “three no’s” (summer 1998), a crackdown on the China Democracy Party and on human rights issues (late 1998), a nuclear technology spy scandal (March 1999), and finally U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade (May 1999).51 Tense debates on “peace and development” accelerated in China, and those who warned of a “U.S.–China cold war” got the upper hand.52 Japanese concern was shifting from the broad spectrum of the second nightmare “U.S.–China passing of Japan” to the first “U.S.–China hostility.” But Obuchi was unusually proactive in bridging the gap between the United States and China in an area where Japan found itself with greater room to maneuver—economics—namely, on the question of China’s participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO). By early 1999, Clinton was favoring China’s entry. China was no less enthusiastic and sent Zhu Rongji in April to gain U.S. approval. But the U.S. Congress was not prepared, and after the Belgrade bombing in May, China’s internal hard-liners began to voice caution, as did the U.S. Congress, which sent a letter to Clinton asking him not to accept China’s accession to the WTO.53 In talks with Clinton at the Kern Summit in June, Obuchi asserted that “friendly China–U.S. relations are important for the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region; I sincerely hope for the improvement; China’s early participation in the WTO is important.”54 Toward China, Obuchi took concrete action in his July 8–10 visit to Beijing by giving consent to China’s membership. It was the first agreement reached with China among the G-7, and Obuchi advised Zhu Rongji to improve U.S. relations.55 Iokibe Makoto argues that Obuchi’s encouragement of China’s membership to the WTO in 1999 was the third symbolic gesture of Japanese policy of engagement toward China,

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after Ohira’s launching of ODA in 1979 and Uno-Kaifu’s nonisolation policy after June 4, 1989.56 On history, Obuchi acknowledged in his July visit that common recognition was confirmed during Jiang Zemin’s visit the year before, and interestingly, the Chinese side withheld any further demands from Japan.57 The negative impact of the absence of a written apology and the playing of the history card in November 1998 was kept to a minimum by China against the backdrop of the emerging rift between China and the United States. With Japan’s encouragement, the United States agreed in November on China’s entry into WTO. Geopolitics, identity, and economics were coming together in a favorable circle in Obuchi’s China policy. Relations with Korea Kim Dae-jung, elected as president in December 1997, declared immediately a new policy to radically improve North–South relations as well as cooperation with the United States, China, Japan, and Russia for peace and stability on the peninsula.58 This thinking later was defined as the “sunshine policy,” and Obuchi was fully exposed to it. Kim visited Japan in October 1998, and encouraged by his policy of reconciliation, Obuchi and MOFA agreed to write “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” in the Joint Declaration, in return for Kim’s statement calling upon both countries “to overcome their unfortunate history and to build a futureoriented relationship.”59 Obuchi overcame hard-liners in the LDP by reiterating almost word-for-word in the Declaration Murayama’s statement of August 1995. Kim followed by taking the first step toward the liberalization of Japanese cultural imports into Korea. A new fishery agreement for cooperation under the 200-mile fishery zone system was also concluded in October with a mutually acceptable approach to waters around the disputed island Takeshima/Dokdo.60 Japan’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) reached a historic high in 1999. It should be noted, however, that although the Joint Declaration was a landmark achievement in Japan’s search for reconciliation, Obuchi and MOFA missed an important point: In the perpetrator–victim relationship between Japan and Korea, after crossing the Rubicon, Japan should have taken the lead in dealing with history, and sought greater understanding on what really happened in the past to make the reconciliation take an irreversible character. Despite Obuchi’s wish to reenter Asia, this did not really happen. In contrast to relations with the South, Obuchi’s relations with the North were strained. The Taepodong missile shooting in August 1998 deeply shocked Japanese politicians. Japan suspended its aid to North

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Korea and KEDO financial support. Through tense consultations with the United States, Japan eventually agreed to resume its support of KEDO, but in March 1999, an unidentified vessel, known to be from North Korea, intruded into Japanese territorial waters and was chased away by the Maritime Safety Agency’s gunfire. Ironically, North Korea’s increased threats resulted in strengthening security coordination among Japan, South Korea, and the United States and involved Japan more directly in security around the Korean peninsula. First, Japan and South Korea began closer defense and security coordination. The 1998 Obuchi–Kim Dae-jung Joint Declaration “welcomed the security dialogue as well as the defense exchanges.” Naval exercises and training for search-and-rescue exercises began in August 1999. Second, the United States took the initiative to improve Japan–U.S.–Korean coordination, and former defense secretary William Perry was appointed as the senior coordinator for Korea in November 1998. After tense coordination among the three countries, the TCOG was established in April 1999 and began to play an important role for coordination on North Korean security policy. Third, Japan decided to participate in research on TMD (Theater Missile Defense) with the United States in October 1998 and also develop an indigenous Japanese surveillance satellite system in November 1998. Thus, although relations with the North did not improve largely due to North Korean erratic behavior, Obuchi’s relations with the South improved from the point of view of security, history, and economic relations, creating a second positive circle in his Asian policy. East Asian Regional Initiatives Obuchi’s emphasis on Asia was not limited to China and Korea. In October 1998, the so-called Miyazawa Initiative of $30 billion was announced in dealing with the Asian financial crisis. This decision brought Japan’s total contribution to the financial crisis to $80 billion.61 It was based on the political leadership of Obuchi and Miyazawa, former prime minister in 1991–93, and the MOF bureaucracy’s continued interest in exerting leadership in the crisis. This was proof of Japan’s proactiveness after Clinton’s “Japan passing” in June, when he also applauded China’s constructive approach to the Asian financial crisis and criticized Japan’s lack of economic reform in that context.62 The MOF continued to seek a more effective structure of crisis management, and in May 2000, the Chiang Mai initiative of currency swapping was approved. In October 1998, Obuchi took another decision more delicate in nature. At the APEC Kuala Lumpur meeting, Japan faced U.S. pressure for the liberalization of fish, fish products, and forestry products. But

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internally, Obuchi was under pressure from a powerful agricultural lobby, which categorically rejected concessions outside the framework of the WTO. He did not find compelling reasons to introduce a compulsory liberalization process in APEC. His gradual approach was supported by his Asian colleagues from Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, whom Japan helped in their financial crisis and even from China.63 But as a result of Japan’s determination not to let APEC become another forum for trade liberalization and many Asian leaders siding with this “Asian consensus approach,” U.S. interest in APEC waned. It was as if Mahatyr’s position a year earlier in Vancouver to “dilute APEC’s importance and strengthen the prospects for an Asians-only grouping in the future” came true,64 although there is no evidence that “weakening APEC” was Obuchi’s intention. In striking contrast, in November 1999, Obuchi played a leading role in convening a Japan–China–South Korea tripartite breakfast meeting on the fringe of the ASEAN ⫹ 3 meeting in Manila. Obuchi tried to hold such a gathering in Hanoi in 1998, but China was reluctant to attend. This time China accepted: improved bilateral relations in 1999 might have softened Zhu Rongji’s position. On the eve of the breakfast, Obuchi said to the accompanying Japanese press corps: “I feel much obliged to ASEAN which gave us this occasion, but I simply cannot miss this opportunity.”65 The first meeting concentrated on trade and economic matters, avoiding any political matters such as North Korea. But whatever the central theme of the talks, for Obuchi, the tripartite breakfast was a significant step toward establishing closer relations with the two closest Asian neighbors. It was seen as a golden path for reentering Asia through regionalism and even regaining national identity. Obuchi sustained a proactive policy in enhancing cooperation in Asia. In September 1998 during his trip to the United States, he proposed holding six-party talks instead of four-party talks on Korea’s future.66 In December 1998, he called for a conference for an “intellectual dialogue for the creation of Asia’s future” highlighting “human security” as a possible area for cooperation.67 The choice of Okinawa, a security hub and symbol of Japan’s history in World War II (WWII), as the location of the 2000 G-8 Summit was a decision made by Obuchi himself, a rare case of top–down leadership.68 Relations with Russia Obuchi was as enthusiastic as his predecessor Hashimoto or his successor Mori in improving relations with Russia. When he assumed the post of prime minister, Obuchi confirmed the continuity of Japan’s policy

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toward Russia and expressed his willingness to activate the relationship based on the agreements thus far reached under his predecessor.69But it was evident that the Hashimoto–Yeltsin personal friendship, which was crucial in 1997–98, could not be sustained. The Russian financial crisis was gradually overcome in September, but Yeltsin’s health stayed at its nadir. Russia’s counter proposal, made during Obuchi’s trip to Moscow in November 1998, was received with disappointment in Japan. The proposal to conclude two treaties, the first treaty legally obliging Russia to conclude a second treaty to demarcate the border and to create a joint “special legal regime” on the four islands,70 was not supported by MOFA nor by opinion leaders: the dual treaties were perceived as procedural and avoiding any decision on sovereignty; and the “special legal regime” was considered legally too complicated and creating too many practical difficulties; Yeltsin’s positive reaction in Kawana in April and Russia’s cautious approach in November left an impression of unexplainable discrepancy. Returning from Moscow on November 14, Obuchi stated, “I did everything I could. A final conclusion has to be decided later, but I will continue to do my best.”71 In the course of 1999, however, Obuchi had no internal basis to do his best based on the Moscow proposal, and Russia did not show any interest in the Kawana proposal. The only Obuchi–Yeltsin meeting in 1999 occurred during the Munich G-8 Summit in June and lasted only ten minutes, with warm words of encouragement for the development of relations but without any tangible direction.72 Obuchi’s renewed enthusiasm after Putin’s nomination as actingpresident was reciprocated by an encouraging response, and his special envoy, Suzuki Muneo, met Putin in Moscow on April 4, 2000. Obuchi’s stroke, however, just two days before that meeting, left it to his successor to pursue this relationship. Mori: Short-Term Prime Minister with a Passion toward Russia Mori, also born in 1937, was the son of a village chief of Negoro in Ishikawa prefecture and joined the Diet in 1969 after spending three years as a correspondent of Sankei shimbun. He became an influential member of the Fukuda-Abe faction, and assumed key LDP posts, including twice secretary general and minister for culture and education, MITI, and construction. Although his career was impressive as a leading parliamentarian, he had never been considered a serious candidate for the post of prime minister, and it was due to Obuchi’s unexpected brain

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coma that he took that post in April 2000 at the age of 63. During his one-year tenure to be succeeded by Koizumi in April 2001, Mori’s ratings were low and he was constantly exposed to press criticism for a lack of legitimacy in the process of his selection as prime minister.

Relations with Asia Under Mori, relations with China and Korea were marked by relative calm, but several points require analysis. U.S.–China relations in 2000 oscillated between tension and relaxation. Lee Teng-hui’s statement of “state to state relations” in July 1999 created considerable tension between China and Taiwan, and it was reflected in U.S.–China relations. The February 2000 Chinese White Paper met with severe criticism, particularly by the U.S. Congress and media. Chen Shui-bian’s victory in the March elections kept cross-Strait relations, and hence U.S.–China relations, on tender hooks. At the same time, economic relations moved onto a more solid foundation. As Robert Suettinger observes, “establishing a constructive relationship with China became one of President Clinton’s legacy issues.”73 The agreement reached in November 1999 on China’s accession to WTO led Congress to approve permanent normal trade relations (PNTR). At a time when U.S.–China relations were in flux, the Chinese government essentially kept its “soft” approach toward Japan, continuing from 1999. A key statement was made in May 2000 by Jiang Zemin, emphasizing the importance of friendly relations with Japan to a Japanese culture-tourism delegation of 5,000 persons headed by the minister of transportation. The statement was published in major Chinese media as “important discourse.”74 It was confirmed at the JiangMori meeting at the United Nations Millennium Summit in September.75 In October, Zhu Rongji made a visit, which emphasized friendly relations and economic cooperation, deemphasizing history. Mori and Japanese public opinion greeted China’s approach with passive enthusiasm and guarded optimism. In fact, tensions rose over Taiwan. In the winter of 2001, Lee Tenghui, already retired from the government, sought entry into Japan for a medical checkup. In April, just before his retirement, Mori finally decided to grant it on the condition that the visit be confined to medical treatment and not include any political activities. Nevertheless, China reacted with indignation, canceling Li Peng’s scheduled visit. China’s decision to “bash” Japan for this humanitarian decision roused little

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sympathy in Japan, and Mori’s last decision as prime minister was ironically supported by the majority of Japanese public opinion. The year 2000 was a great year of opportunity on the Korean Peninsula with the North–South summit held in June. It was a reflection of Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy combined with Kim Jong-il’s calculated approach to regime preservation and normalization of relations with the outside world. Japan was slow in responding to this huge change in the political dynamics of the region. Particularly with the South, Japan was happy to enjoy the fruits of the 1998 Joint Declaration. In relation to the North, Mori’s government made efforts to warm up the relationship. Three rounds of negotiations for normalization of relations took place in April, August, and October, and Japan continued humanitarian assistance. But no concrete results emerged; progress had to await the next phase of negotiations under Koizumi. One incident tells us the way public opinion was becoming extremely sensitive on the issue of abductions. At the ASEM (Asia-Europe) meeting in Seoul in October, Mori had a meeting with Prime Minister Blair and explained his efforts to resolve the abduction issue, and as an example of a past effort made by a LDP delegation to North Korea, described a “flexible idea” to arrange a reunion with abductees to be presented as missing persons, somewhere in a third country. When the content of Mori’s statement to Blair was disclosed to the media, it led to public outrage. Mori was criticized for disclosing sensitive ideas for negotiations (although it was just an idea already conveyed to the North several years earlier and made public then) and deviating from the “principled position” to pursue the abductors.76 Mori’s visit to India and Pakistan in August 2000 became an important turning point in bringing relations back to normalcy after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests and Japan’s economic sanctions in 1998. In particular, given the rising geopolitical importance of India, it is worthwhile to note that Japan and India established a “global partnership in the 21st century” and agreed on enhanced cooperation in the area of Information Technology.77 Relations with Russia It was, above all, in his Russian policy that Mori left his mark on Japan’s foreign policy. He happened to be in office in the threshold year for realizing Yeltsin’s promise “to make the utmost efforts to conclude a peace treaty by 2000.” Yet, he had to negotiate with Putin, a new leader whose international stature was unknown, but considerably younger and with much greater support in Russia than Yeltsin had had. Mori did not

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have the special geopolitical flare that characterized Hashimoto, but he had sufficient understanding that enlarging the scope of Japan–Russia relations and taking a flexible and realistic approach on the territorial issue would serve Japan’s interest. MOFA’s views were streamlined by Kato Ryozo, deputy foreign minister for political affairs who succeeded Tamba. Kato was strongly supported by Russian experts from the European Affairs Department. Political support and advice also came from Suzuki Muneo, who was then rising fast on the LDP power-ladder and had gained influence over Japan’s policy toward Russia. Mori himself, (in addition to the fact that he was one of the four musketeers of Abe Shintaro, who had shown strong leadership to improve relations with the Soviet Union under Gorbachev) had personal ties from his father’s long-standing friendship with the Soviet Union. Mori’s father opened a sister-city relationship for several decades between his village Negoro and Shelekhov, close to Irkutsk, and in his will stipulated that part of his ashes were to be buried in the graveyard in Shelekhov, hoping that his son would regularly visit the Soviet Union to establish someday a solid friendship with this country. Mori had already honored his father’s will several times. Mori and Putin met five times in one year, starting in April 2000 with Mori’s visit to St. Petersburg. After this visit of familiarization with the broad political and economic issues facing the two countries, the second meeting took place in July in Okinawa, where Mori, as the host country’s representative, warmly greeted the debut of a newly elected Russian leader in the G-8 forum. But the real negotiations began in September with Putin’s official visit to Tokyo, when Putin acknowledged verbally the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration. This was a contentious position that neither Gorbachev nor Yeltsin (although he indirectly approved it in 1993) dared to take. Mori and his team recognized that with this statement, peace treaty negotiations entered a new stage. Though expressing due respect for the position taken by Russia’s new leader, Japanese negotiators insisted that not only must the fate of the two smaller islands be resolved, as prescribed in the 1956 Joint Declaration, but also that the fate of two larger islands be addressed. The Japanese side showed preparedness to talk about the fate of the larger islands “without preconditions.” Intense talks continued at the fringe of the APEC meeting in Brunei in November, and were concluded by the Irkutsk meeting in March 2001. Mori proposed parallel negotiations on the two smaller islands, prescribed in the 1956 Joint Declaration, and the two larger islands, the sovereignty of which was undetermined. Putin did not accept Mori’s proposal, but he did not negate it, and negotiators

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of the two ministries became convinced that the approaches by the two sides were converging more than ever. At the same time, from the summer of 2000, severe criticism against Mori and his team were raised by opinion leaders, the mass media, and even from within the Foreign Ministry that they were not following the traditional approach to resolve this issue by “four islands in a bunch.” One reason for this criticism was the various clashes of personalities among policymakers and opinion leaders related to Russia; nationalistic feeling that did not allow room for any deviation from the established “principled approach” was also roused.78 Conclusion To what extent could Japan have demonstrated its strategic thinking in the second half of the 1990s? In this period, geopolitics fundamentally changed in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States, the sole superpower in the post–cold war era, and rising China were contending for power in the region. Japan’s strategic agenda was to avoid the two nightmares of “U.S.–China hostility” and “U.S.–China passing of Japan.” The general guideline was to maximize solid alliance relations with the United States while minimizing tension with China. By and large, three prime ministers followed this line: Hashimoto, very conscious about the importance of the alliance but eager to avoid the two nightmares; and Obuchi with his long-term objective of stabilizing Japan’s position in Asia. Changes occurring on the Korean peninsula under Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il were also substantial. Despite many limitations, North–South rapprochement proceeded on an unprecedented scale. Japan succeeded in strengthening its relations with South Korea and the democratic triangle of the United States– Japan–South Korea, but relations with the North stagnated despite efforts for a breakthrough. Strengthened relations with Russia seemed to be giving Japan geopolitical advantage in East Asia, and the two countries drew closer in their bilateral relationship than at any other point in post-WWII history. In geo-economics, Japan did try to take a leadership role in the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. Japan’s endeavor to create an AMF did not materialize, but Japan poured in economic assistance of $80 billion and the Chiang Mai swap accord was realized in 2000 under Japan’s initiative. Amidst the financial crisis, Japan, China, and Korea were invited to the ASEAN summit, resulting in the establishment of ASEAN ⫹ 3 from 1997, and the start of annual meetings of the three

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under there own auspices from 1999. Japan participated eagerly in this process and played the role of initiator of the meeting of the three. All these moves helped to advance Japan’s agenda to strengthen its ties with Asia. The third issue with which Japan struggled through this period was related to history and identity. No small efforts were made from the Japanese side to overcome the past, but with mixed results. President Kim Dae-jung’s visit in October 1998 was generally welcomed as a historic breakthrough because of the mutual willingness for reconciliation. President Jiang Zemin’s visit a month later did not achieve the same result, but many Japanese thought that it was China’s unwillingness to accept reconciliation that prevented the same outcome as with South Korea. In this context, showing leadership for enhancing regional cooperation was welcomed in Japan as a step for regaining its Asian identity. A series of improvements in Japan–Russia relations brought some expectations that the long-waited resolution of the territorial problem, a wound in Japan’s national consciousness, might be near. The overall record for this period was rather positive from all perspectives, whether geopolitics, regional economics, or overcoming history. The U.S. alliance certainly became stronger. Japan’s proactive and more responsible policy succeeded in overcoming the loss of confidence in the early 1990s. Chinese relations were clearly not easy, but they were under control and Japan even took some initiatives to improve U.S.–China relations. South Korean relations seemed markedly improved. Russian relations were at their peak. East Asian regionalism seemed to have found its place for the first time in post-WWII history. In reality, none of these achievements rested on a sufficiently solid basis to have secured Japan’s strategic position in East Asia. Responsible and proactive security policies and efforts to bring U.S. relations closer needed constant renewed attention; yet, in the first half of the following decade, only U.S. relations were destined to develop along that direction. But in Japan’s policies in Asia, all successes achieved during the second half of the 1990s were replaced by self-assertive policies that failed to take into account sufficiently positions of others and resulted in mismanagement of relations. Retrospectively, such policy symptoms that we saw under Prime Minister Mori as the lack of visible outcome to meet China’s “smile diplomacy” while taking the decision to issue a visa to Lee Tenghui (that humanitarian decision was genuinely supported by a large number of Japanese); rising emotions about North Korean abductions instead of strong interest in capitalizing on the “sunshine policy”; and calls for a “principled approach” on the territorial problem with Russia rather than

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earnest preparations for a new stage of negotiations based on Putin’s interest in improving relations, all prepared the ground for public opinion formation and policy decisions in the first half of the 2000s. Notes 1. “Peace and development” was Deng Xiaoping’s key concept contrasting to Mao’s “war and revolution.” See Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 44. In more precise terms, Deng’s thinking could be summarized as “continue to oppose hegemony and strive to preserve world peace; reunite Taiwan; and step up economic construction and the drive for China’s four modernizations—industry, agriculture, defense, and science and technology–.” See: Jiangwei Wang, “Adjusting to a ‘Strong–Strong Relationship’: China’s Calculus of Japan’s Asian Policy,” in Takashi Inoguchi, ed., Japan’s Asian Policy, Revival and Response (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 104–05. 2. Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 78. 3. In 1995, after a Nanjing Massacre campaign was resumed in all primary schools even “pro-China” MOFA officials were in a desperate mood. See Yoichi Funabashi, “How to End the Issue of War Responsibility,” Chuo koron, February 2003, p. 59. People’s Daily on September 9, 1995, criticized the “noisy clamour in Japan against China under the guise of protest against nuclear testing” when “Japan ought to be making a deep self-examination of the criminal act of aggression it committed and learn some serious lessons from history.” Kamiya Matake describes Japanese reaction to this article, saying that “China’s way of bringing up the history issue in this way is unwarranted and unfair.” in “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia,” in Takashi Inoguchi and Jain Purnendra, eds., Japanese Foreign Policy Today (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 236. 4. The division into four groupings was as follows: one region (yiquan), one line (yilieh), one side (yipian), one point (yidian). The 20-letter directive was to “observe calmly, strengthen the basis, react with caution, hide the spirit, and achieve the results.” See Aoyama Rusa, “Reisengo Chugoku no taibei inshiki to Beichu kankei,” in Kokubun Ryosei, ed., Chugoku seiji to Higashi Ajia (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), pp. 241–52. 5. The ministerial meeting in Seattle in December 1999 collapsed, and the Doha round was finally launched in November 2001. 6. Muthiah Alagappa, ed., “Introduction: Predictability and Stability Despite Challenges,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Order, Instrumental and Normative Features (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 4. 7. For eclectic analyses of realism, liberalism, and constructivism, see: J.J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford: Stanford University, 2004);

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8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

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16.

17.

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19. 20. 21.

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Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia ( Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); and John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, eds., International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). Funabashi Yoichi, Domei hyoryu (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1997), p. 439. Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, pp. 438, 478. Interview with an informed MOFA source, August 3, 2005. Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, p. 474. Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, p. 463, referring to a statement by Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State. Aoyama, Reisengo Chugoku no taibei inshiki to Beichu kankei, pp. 252–53. Thomas Christensen, “China, the U.S.–Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” in Michael Brown, Owen Cote, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., The Rise of China (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), p. 148. The danger of Japanese militarism was repeatedly stated by the Chinese side during Samuel Burger’s visit to China in August 1997 and in March 1996 the Chinese foreign minister expressed his bewilderment at Japan’s concern about missile tests in March 1996 that “other than the US, it is only Japan which is making a fuss about it.” See Funabashi, Domei hyoryu, pp. 457–61 and 482. Michael Green says that despite China’s protest, the Japanese government did not back away to prohibit the right-wing youth from implementing their legal rights, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 84–86. Japan–China security talks were held on February 25, 1999; January 13, 1995; January 15, 1996; and March 15, 1997. See Funabashi, Domei horyu, p. 467. Michael Green, “Defense or Security? The US–Japan defence guidelines and China,” in David M. Lampton, ed., Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Win–Win or Zero–Sum Game? (Tokyo: Nihon kokusai koryu senta, 2001), pp. 81–83. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/98/1st/bk98_1.html#1-2-2⬎. Green, “Defense or Security?” p. 87. October 24, 1994, statement at the Special Committee on Tax Reform of the Lower House, Iwami Takao, Jitsuroku Hashimoto Ryutaro (Tokyo: Asahi sonorama, 1995), p. 286. Robert Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of US–China Relations 1989–2000 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003), pp. 264–327; M. David Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams, Managing US–China Relations 1989–2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 46–56. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, pp. 322, 344–45. Lampton and Suettinger concur that the three no’s newly included “no to international organizations for which statehood is a requirement,” in comparison to the Kissinger–Zhou talks in 1971 (Lampton, Same Bed: Different Dreams,

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35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

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p. 302) or Clinton’s letter to Jiang in July 1995 (Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, p. 348). Funabashi, Domei horyu, p. 478. Funabashi Yoichi, “Shusho Hashimoto gaiko o kataru,” Asahi shimbun, July 30, 1998. Interview with an informed MOFA source, August 3, 2005. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 239–50. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html⬎. Nakanishi Hiroshi, “Reisen shuryogo no Nihon no henyo,” in Soeya Yoshihide and Masaaki Tadokoro, eds., Nihon no Higashiajia koso (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), p. 289. Interview with an informed MOFA source, August 3, 2005. Interview with an informed MOFA source, August 3, 2005. Purnendra Jain, “Japan and South Asia: Between Cooperation and Confrontation,” in Inoguchi and Jain, Japanese Foreign Policy Today, pp. 267–69. Interview with an informed MOFA source, August 3, 2005. On Japan’s dilemma over Myanmar and the limited decisions taken in this period to continue projects that meet basic human needs, See Yutaka Kawashima, Japanese Foreign Policy at the Crossroads, Challenges and Options for the TwentyFirst Century (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003), p. 122. Interview with an informed MOFA source, August 3, 2005. Funabashi Yoichi, Asahi shimbun, July 30, 1998. Asahi shimbun, September 3, 2000; all Hashimoto’s quotes below are from this interview. For the full text of the speech, see: ⬍http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/ 0731douyukai.html⬎. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/kiroku/s_hashi/arc_97/russia97/ hyoka.html⬎. The plan outlines six pillars for cooperation: (1) investment cooperation; (2) Russia’s participation in a multilateral international economy; (3) enhancing assistance to Russia’s reform; (4) cooperation in a managers’ training program; (5) energy dialogue and cooperation; and (6) cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Tamba has left a detailed account of how Hashimoto and he prepared the groundwork with Clinton to accept Russia as a member of APEC. See Tamba Minoru, Nichiro gaiko hiwa (Tokyo: Chuo koron, 2004), pp. 20–23. Sato Kazuo and Komaki Yoshiaki, Nichiro shuno kosho (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2003), pp. 133–36. The Japanese government disclosed only in September 2000 that the proposal contained (1) a border demarcation between Urup and Etorofu and (2) maximum concessions to be made by the Japanese side. In January 2005, Yachi Shotaro, vice minister for foreign affairs, at a press conference stated that the content of maximum concessions is to “acknowledge for some time to come Russian administrative rights.” See Asahi shimbun, January 5, 2005.

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43. In fact, the November 26, 1998, Joint Declaration included the following: “The Chinese side hopes that the Japanese side will learn lessons from history.” 44. All these points are based on my interview with an informed Japanese MOFA source on June 26, 2005. Asahi shimbun of November 29, 1998, carries a detailed article on how the negotiations on history were conducted, and it practically confirms all the points mentioned by the informed source. 45. Some argued that “it would have been wiser for Japan to make a written apology and agree in principle that China would not further take up the history issue,” Amako Hajime, Sankei shimbun, November 28, 1998. But it remains unclear whether China was prepared to accept Kim Dae-jung’s “future oriented formula,” should Japan have agreed to a written apology. At any rate, given the language of the declaration to include “learning lessons from history” and Jiang Zemin’s repeated statements that the issue was not resolved, this question was overridden by events. 46. From the “Japan–China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development,” November 26, 1998. 47. Yomiuri shimbun, November 27, 1998. 48. Asahi shimbun, November 27, 1998. 49. Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko defended the law backed by MOFA and JDA officials. Hitogarano Obuchi kept a relatively low profile in that debate. 50. Kojima Tomoyuki, “Sogo hokan no Nitchu kankei,” in Kokubun Ryosei, ed., Chugoku seiji to Higashi Ajia (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), p. 206. 51. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, pp. 347–77. 52. Aoyama, Reisengo Chugoku no taibei inshiki to Beichu kankei, p. 253. 53. The Chinese representative at the WTO negotiations with the United States declared on May 27 that “China is not in a hurry; until satisfactory explanation is given by the U.S. on the Belgrade bombardment, the negotiations would not be resumed.” See Asahi shimbun, May 28, 1999. 54. Mainichi shimbun, June 19, 1999. 55. Yomiuri shimbun, July 19, 1999. 56. Iokibe Makoto, “Hanchu genrishugiha yugai mueki dearu,” Chuo koron, May 2004, p. 87. 57. Sankei shimbun, July 10, 1999. 58. Asahi shimbun, December 19, 1997. 59. From the “Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New JapanRepublic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-First Century,” October 8, 1998. An informed Japanese MOFA source (June 26, 2005) said that there was a consensus between Obuchi and MOFA officials that unlike the case of China where the history of reconciliation had engendered results, there was good reason to express an apology in writing in the case of Japan–Korea, where no such achievement had been made yet. 60. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 132–33. 61. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/asia/crisis0010.html⬎.

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62. Soeya Yoshihide, “Higashi Ajia anzen hosho shisutemu no naka no Nihon,” in Soeya Yoshoihide and Tadokoro Masaaki, eds., Nihon no Higashi Ajia koso (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), p. 197. 63. John Ravenhill, APEC and the Construction of Pacific Rim Regionalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 184. 64. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 212. 65. Asahi shimbun, November 29, 1999. 66. Nakanishi, Reisen shuryogo no Nihon no henyo, p. 290. 67. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/culture/koryu/bunka_4.html⬎. 68. Obuchi Keizo no 615 nichi (Tokyo: Koshinsha, 2000), p. 326. 69. Based on the Obuchi–Yeltsin telephone conversation of July 31, 1998. See Kyodo tsushin, July 31, 1998. 70. Alexander Panov, Kaminari nochi hare (Tokyo: NHK, 2004), pp. 107–09. 71. Obuchi Keizo no 615 nichi, p. 64. 72. Sato and Komaki, Nichiro shuno kosho, pp. 261–71. 73. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen, pp. 392, 400. 74. Mainichi shimbun, May 22, 2000; Sankei shimbun, June 13, 2000. 75. Jiang stated that “the rise of Asia was only possible with friendship and cooperation between Japan and China, and the two countries must take a long and broad view of bilateral relations.” See Akio Takahara, “Japan’s Political Response to the Rise of China,” in Ryosei Kokubun and Wang Jisi, eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asia Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), p. 166. 76. Asahi shimbun, October 21, 2000. 77. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/kiroku/s_mori/arc_00/asia4_ 00/gh.html⬎. 78. The Mori–Putin negotiations could be followed through newspaper and other media reports, but this synthesis is based on my personal involvement as director general of european affairs, August 1999–April 2001.

CHAPTER 5

Japanese Strategy under Koizumi T.J. Pempel

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trategic thinking within the Koizumi administration, not surprisingly, reflected far more elements of continuity with past policies than stark adventures into unexplored territory. In particular, Japan continued to base much of its strategic thinking on a “comprehensive” notion of national security—a conceptualization transcending any exclusive focus on overt military security of national borders and domestic security from terrorism. Instead, it has been expansive enough to weave in concerns about economic security, security from illicit migration and drugs, energy and food security, protection from the worst forms of environmental pollution, and the like. This broader orientation can be traced to the early 1980s, and remains largely in place. Furthermore, Japan continues to abjure unilateralism in preference to bilateral arrangements. Generally, Japan seeks to forge its policies in accord with multilateral organizations such as the United Nations, the WTO, or the IMF. In recent years, Japan has also worked within regional bodies. It eschews unilateral actions or aggressive efforts to forge new regional or global arrangements. As a consequence, its strategic thinking is typically concentrated on its individual relationships with other nation states, while continually seeking to prove itself an upright member of the international community. Japan’s bilateral security arrangement with the United States remains the keystone in Japan’s arch of foreign policies; relations with the Asian region are important supplements. Nevertheless, distinctly new ideas and surprisingly new directions were introduced, particularly with regard to military and external security,

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many of which appear unlikely to be reversed, taking Japanese strategic policies into new directions. In some instances these changes grow out of shifts in domestic politics; in others they reflect adaptations to altered regional and global conditions. Understanding these deep structural changes is prerequisite to examining the specific strategic actions and policies under Koizumi per se. Changing Structural Conditions Facing Japan under Koizumi The Koizumi administration’s strategic thinking and behavior were deeply affected by the intersection of conditions at three different analytic levels—national, global, and regional. Changes in Japanese Domestic Political Structures Domestically, Japan has been going through a fundamental regime shift. By “regime shift” I mean the establishment of a new equilibrium among political institutions, public policies, and the socioeconomic roots of power.1 Japan’s so-called 1955 system rested on an equilibrium among institutions, policies, and socioeconomic blocs that has now been upended. The deep predictabilities of that earlier system have been replaced by considerable political fluidity as the country moves toward establishing a new system based on new relationships that are likely to shape and structure Japanese politics for several decades. The end of the old regime and the transition to a new one began with the bursting of Japan’s asset bubble in 1990–91 and the subsequent 1993 splintering of the LDP. In their wake came powerful political and economic breaks with the past plus fundamental, albeit slow moving, structural readjustments in who holds power and how that power is exercised.2 Most fundamental in influencing Japan’s strategic thinking and behavior have been the following three items. First, Japan’s electoral and party systems are now fundamentally different from those that prevailed from 1955 until 1993. The electoral Left, once an undeniable and frequently strident voice constraining conservative governments on a wide number of security fronts, has all but vanished. The demise of the Left followed the decision of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) to enter government in the eclectic seven-party coalition of 1993–94 and then later in its “strange bedfellows” alliance with the LDP. Socialist leader Murayama Tomiichi took over the prime minister’s office and proceeded to renounce virtually all

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of the party’s prior security planks, among other things endorsing the constitutionality of the SDF and the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty, effectively undercutting the party’s raison d’etre. The electoral response included a massive renunciation by long-standing supporters, an internal party split, and the socialists’ overall marginalization. Since the mid-1990s, party and electoral politics in Japan have moved security debate and public opinion substantially to the Center–Right. The new electoral system, meanwhile, has lessened the need for parliamentary candidates to appeal to established interest group constituencies or to rely heavily on factional endorsements to gain their party’s nomination. The current system puts a premium on media-savvy populist candidates who can attract individual voters. Not a few successful parliamentarians have taken advantage of the diminished Left, winning office through appeals around a new mixture of populism and nationalism. A second important domestic change concerns economics. For most of the postwar era, Japan’s approach to foreign policy rested predominantly on its ever-expanding economic muscle. Political and business leaders from a host of countries in developing Asia looked to Japan as the logical model for emulation in pursuing their own economic strategies.3 Meanwhile, Japanese foreign assistance, trade, production networks, and bank loans became increasingly pivotal in advancing the economic fortunes of much of Asia. The combination long reinforced Japan’s position as the undisputed leader of Asia’s region-wide development, a model known widely in Japan as the “flying geese model.” Japan’s once unchallenged regional economic leadership was eroded by the country’s economic slowdown plus the simultaneous successes of other Asian countries including South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and eventually and most significantly, China. Japan’s relative inability to stymie the pandemic Asian economic crisis of 1997–98 further undercut its own national confidence, as well as that of many of its neighbors, in Japan’s ability to rely on its economic powers to shape regional events. Although Japan remained by far the most economically sophisticated and industrially advanced country in Asia, its position at the unchallenged center of regional economic developments was no longer automatic.4 Still a third element in Japan’s regime shift has been the change in policymaking powers within Japan’s ruling coalition. Under the 1955 regime, policymaking had been characterized by a high degree of functional separation—what the Japanese call tatewari gyosei, what von Wolferen labeled the truncated pyramid, and what others have labeled iron triangles.5 Most characteristic of this system was the development

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and implementation of specific policies through close coordination among individual bureaucratic agencies, the interest groups they allegedly were responsible for regulating, and LDP politicians with a demonstrated interest and expertise in the policy areas involved. The predominant arenas where policy was formulated were the agencies themselves and the relevant functional committees of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Council. Highly marginalized by these silo-like decisions were the interests or influence of other ministries, interest groups, or opposition politicians. Equally diluted was any strong initiating or coordinating role for top policymakers such as the cabinet or the prime minister. This has changed radically. Particularly under Koizumi, bureaucratic and LDP party powers were reduced whereas both the Cabinet and the Prime Minister’s Office gained enhanced powers to generate policies, many of which involve trampling on hitherto sacrosanct bureaucratic or LDP turf. In January 2001, Japan’s 20 odd ministries were recombined into 14, with an important redistribution of functions and powers in many of the most important. Previously tight links between agency and constituent interest groups were weakened, and the long-standing system of vertical administration was altered. Previous powers of bureaucratic officials were checked. The number of political appointees in each ministry, which had previously been limited to only the top two posts, was more than tripled for most agencies, providing additional layers of political control over earlier agency autonomy. Perhaps most importantly, a new and well-staffed Cabinet Office, plus a bolstered Cabinet Secretariat, gained substantial muscularity in initiating and coordinating policies. At the end of 1999 the Prime Minister’s Office had a staff of only 582 and the Cabinet Secretariat had 184. By the end of 2001, the new Cabinet Office had nearly 2,200 staff and the Secretariat had more than tripled to 487.6 Under 1999 legislation, the prime minister was also given explicit authority to engage in policy planning and to initiate legislation. A new Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) gained considerable leeway to generate a mixture of policies aimed at addressing the country’s extensive economic and financial problems. Collectively, these measures altered the previous balance of power between elected officials and senior bureaucrats. Agency autonomy declined whereas the power of elected politicians, and particularly politicians in the executive branch, rose. Relatedly, the power of individual LDP leaders, including the once formidable faction leaders, was reduced as the prime minister and the Cabinet gained in policymaking oversight

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and strength at the expense of party institutions and individuals. All of these bolstered Prime Minister Koizumi’s predisposition toward taking a “presidential” and personal leadership role in key decisions as well as to his efforts to undermine long-standing practices and power holders in the LDP. Nowhere was this more visible than in Koizumi’s masterful purge of his intra-party opponents in the September 11, 2005 election. Without question, Koizumi lacked a strong background in diplomacy. Moreover, his political attention was concentrated principally on Japan’s long-standing and truculent financial and economic problems. Nevertheless, he also demonstrated a strong personal predilection for shaping national security policy, often taking the lead in overseas diplomatic missions such as those to the DPRK (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea), to the United States, or to ASEAN. He has explicitly and regularly campaigned to enhance Japan’s political, diplomatic, and military influence to a level commensurate with its economic heft. The previously powerful role played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was also eclipsed, in part as a result of the general trends noted above, but accelerated by a series of scandals that made it clear that Japan’s “best and brightest” diplomats were less than exceptional when it came to resisting the temptations of mind-numbing greed and arrant stupidity. The tenure as foreign minister of the popular but frequently erratic Tanaka Makiko, and the sticky fingered ODA policies of former foreign vice minister Suzuki Muneo did little to bridge the widening gap between bureaucrats and politicians and nothing at all to enhance the strategic and policymaking influence of the Ministry. Finally, and of particular importance in shaping strategic policy, the LDP saw the rise within the party of a vastly more nationalistic or revisionist leadership cadre. The combination of North Korea’s nuclear program, China’s steady rise, and anti-Japanese rioting in China enabled Japan’s conservative nationalists to advance their own strategic and military goals while aligning the country more closely than ever with U.S. goals across Asia. Anxious to make Japan “a normal nation,” conservative politicians and opinion leaders such as Abe Shinzo, Nakajima Mineo, Nakamura Katsunori, Hiramatsu Shiego, Okazaki Hisahiko, Hasegawa Keitaro, and Kase Hideaki moved into more prominent policymaking roles within the party.7 A bipartisan group of young Turks pushed as well for a rekindled national pride and a more activist pursuit of their vision of Japan’s national interest. Koizumi himself was a foremost champion of this shift to revisionism and heightened nationalism, embodied most notably in his various visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Undoubtedly, much of Koizumi’s ideological orientation had deep and long-standing roots;

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but not coincidentally, his overt nationalism served the tactical purpose of appealing, through the flourishes of flags and trumpets, to long-standing party supporters such as agricultural interests, local financial institutions, the postmasters, and others that approved portions of his economic program. Meanwhile, erstwhile “pragmatists” and adherents of the long-standing Yoshida line—with its predominantly economic focus and limited foreign policy role—were eclipsed, men such as Kato Koichi, Miyazawa Kiichi, and Kono Yohei. So was the Heisei Kenkyukai, the factional organization of Hashimoto Ryuichiro, a group with numerous individuals having close ties with China.8 As Richard Samuels has phrased it: “The consolidation of party power behind revisionist leadership has . . . worked to marginalize pragmatists and unify the LDP around revisionist goals to [a] heretofore unprecedented degree.”9 The ideological shift and the rise of nationalism were evidenced as well by the fact that Japan reopened parliamentary discussions about constitutional revision, with a particular focus on Article 9, the role of the emperor, and the importance of spiritual education. New domestic political conditions have released Japan from some of the long-standing taboos surrounding such issues.10 The Research Commission on the Constitution was established by the Diet in the House of Representatives and submitted a progress report in November 2002. A series of proposed revisions followed in June 2003, which, among other things, called explicitly for change in Article 9 and the creation of explicit provisions for the maintenance of armed forces. In December 2004, the LDP put forward its explicit proposals for change. These were formalized in celebration of its fiftieth anniversary on November 22, 2005.11 Unlike earlier efforts at constitutional revision, this series of moves had support both among the opposition parties and the general public. A Yomiuri poll of Diet members in 2002 showed that 71 percent favored revising the Constitution up 11 points from 1997 with 55 percent favoring revision of Article 9. This last figure was up 14 points from the prior poll.12 As late as 1986, only 23 percent of the general public had supported revision; since 1998 this figure has consistently exceeded 50 percent.13 A Yomiuri poll released in April 2005 showed that support was up to 61 percent of respondents, the second-highest figure since the opinion poll was first taken in 1981 and the second consecutive year that support for constitutional revision exceeded 60 percent, with 65 percent reported in 2004. In addition to opening up discussions on constitutional revision, Japan’s Ministry of Education gave voice to the enhanced nationalism. In 2005 it approved the middle school textbooks that reduced overt

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discussion of Japan’s actions in World War II (WWII) on such matters as comfort women, the Nanjing Massacre, and Unit 731. Moreover, maps in the new books were redrawn to make explicit Japanese claims on hitherto disputed islands, notably Dokdo-Takeshima and the Senkakus. In and of themselves, such domestic changes, important though they were, did not lead directly to some new and clear-cut national strategic framework. But they set in motion undeniable moves away from longstanding presuppositions critical to the continuation of the Yoshida line, for example bureaucratic autonomy, economic primacy, and checks on unabashed nationalism. Equally less in evidence were the occasional oneman adventures in foreign policy by politicians such as those of Kanemaru Shin to press normalization with the DPRK in 1990 or Ozawa Ichiro to cut an aid-for-islands deal with Russia in March 1991. Changes in the Global Balance of Forces The end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and China’s tentative embrace of quasi-capitalist economics, along with the increased importance of so-called rogue regimes, failed states, and nonstate terrorist networks changed the broad configuration of regional politics in East Asia, as well as many of the premises underlying Japanese strategic thinking. Gone were the certainties about friends and enemies so deeply entrenched during the long era of bipolarity. So too was the near statemonopoly on the instruments of violence and the formulation of national policies. By the time of Koizumi’s accession to office the threat of nuclear warfare between superpowers had virtually disappeared, as had any serious threat of invasion of Japan, only to be replaced by the increased number of relatively small, often failed, states, some with a limited nuclear capacity giving them a newfound capacity to play an enhanced role in global and regional politics. In particular, North Korea took on a much more forbidding character for Japanese policymakers with its 1998 launch of a Taepodong missile over Japan, its April 23, 2003 declaration that it was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and its unprecedented decision to end its adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Nonstate groups, from terrorist networks to NGOs, demonstrated enhanced ability to shape regional events, further complicating Japanese strategic thinking. By the time Koizumi acquired the prime ministership, the United States, Japan’s most significant ally and its major military guarantor, had become the world’s only remaining superpower. As of the early years of the twenty-first century the United States was spending about five times

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more on its military than its next closest competitor and its total military budget was greater than that of the next twenty countries combined. Its military capabilities in a host of military systems vastly exceeded those of most other countries.14 This uncontestable military prowess was put to new uses under George W. Bush in a series of unilateral strategic and foreign policy actions designed to reshape the global status quo. These moves were in direct contrast to the prior 50 years of a predominantly multilateral and status quo–oriented U.S. foreign policy.15 The Bush administration also articulated a “for us, or against us” dichotomy that obliterated the nuances by which states had long shaped their foreign policies. In keeping with its new unilateral and preventative military actions, U.S. military and strategic thinking also underwent comprehensive overhaul with the move from a “threat-based” to “capabilities-based” military. The new U.S. doctrines were laid out in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001, the Bush speech at West Point June 2002, and the National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002. The new doctrine called for the United States to take on three major goals—“[to] defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants . . . [to] preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers . . . [and to] extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”16 New were Bush’s elevation of the terrorist threat to the level of that posed by tyrants, the explicit notion of preemptive warfare to achieve his goals, and the aim of actively removing the causes of terrorism and tyranny though military action. The QDR argued that new, post–cold war challenges would require massive changes in the existing U.S. basing system. Forces would need to be closer to what the United States identified as the “arc of instability” stretching from Northern Africa to Southeast Asia. America’s new focus would be on mobility to conduct expeditionary operations in distant theaters against adversaries armed with WMD, rather than on the fixed bases designed to ward off, or respond to, conventional attacks from wellidentified adversaries. The United States plans to close many bases in Western Europe and Northeast Asia pulling back some 60,000–70,000 troops along with 100,000 civilian employees and family members. But it also plans to require additional bases and stations in the Middle East and Central Asia. 17 Certain “bedrock” allies such as Japan and probably Australia would be home to central U.S. basing hubs. These hubs would be supplemented by a large number of “lily pads” holding prepositioned equipment to which rapidly deployable forces can deploy and/or “leap

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to and from” in response to contingencies in a wide variety of geographical locations. Thus, the United States requested that Japan allow for the transfer of U.S. military command functions for the U.S. Army I Corps (now based in Fort Lewis, Washington) to Camp Zama in Kanagawa Prefecture. Such a transfer would underscore and enhance Japan’s role in broader U.S. global military strategy as well as deepening ties between the U.S. military and the Ground SDF. Since the sphere of action of the Army I Corps reaches to the Middle East, however, the relocation of headquarters from Fort Lewis to Camp Zama would also expand considerably the geographic scope of the current U.S.–Japan Security Treaty beyond its current focus on “the Far East.” This in turn opens up the possibility that Japan will shift from its long-standing support of “collective defense” to the more activist doctrine of “collective security.” The former stresses the defense of Japanese territory through the alliance with the United States, but is seen as purely “defensive defense.” In contrast “collective security” is a broader conception, holding that Japanese security requires the country to consider engaging in collective actions to enhance its overall security in ways that require a broader geographical sweep. Included would be peacekeeping actions under UN auspices, or activities that expanded Japan’s defense perimeter well beyond the Japanese homeland. Meanwhile of equal salience to East Asia, the new doctrine calls for a substantial reduction and repositioning of U.S. forces in the Republic of Korea (ROK). This would remove the U.S. tripwire at the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) allowing U.S. forces in the ROK to conduct more than just one task, that is, its traditional defense of the ROK from DPRK attack. Changing Regional Dynamics The Asian region became far more integrated and regionally cohesive during the past two decades or so. This integration involved a mixture of formal, top–down, governmentally driven regional institutions along with more important but less formal, bottom-up linkages driven primarily by the economic activities of corporations and financial institutions.18 Pan-regional ties were far more numerous and vastly more significant in the economic sphere than in security. Moreover, Southeast Asia has shown more signs of cooperation and integration than Northeast Asia. In the north, nationalist competition, unresolved territorial disputes, and ghosts from the historical past continue to work at cross purposes

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with efforts to reduce the predilections for unchallenged sovereignty through deeper regional cooperation and connection. Over and above any normal nationalist competition in the region, two particular problem areas loom large and have risen in relative importance—the Cross-Strait problem of Taiwan and the DPRK’s decision to remove itself from the NPT and to assert that it has become, and deserves to be treated as, a nuclear power. Cross-Strait relations took a negative turn with the Chinese shelling across Taiwan prior to the 1996 elections and the subsequent U.S. positioning of forces from the Seventh Fleet in defensive positions in the Straits. The election of the nominally pro-independence DPP’s presidential candidate, Chen Shui-bian, in 2000 and his close and contested reelection in March 2004 worsened ties across the Strait. Equally problematic were threats of military action by the PRC in the event that Taiwan went too far in testing precisely where the “red line” lay between “one China” and Taiwanese statehood. Early in 2005 China passed an anti-secession law that called for the forceful repatriation of Taiwan in the event of unspecified Taiwanese moves deemed provocatively pro-independence by the PRC. The ongoing challenges stemming from North Korea’s actions were even more destabilizing to Northeast Asian security and challenged Japan directly. A mixture of bilateral Japanese–DPRK negotiations plus Japanese participation in the six-party talks was the result. Japan has played an ambivalent role in Northeast Asia’s ongoing tension between regionalization and nationalism. For a long time the country was an ardent supporter of closer Asian ties, particularly when these involved economic links, “open regionalism,” and no overt threat to Japan’s close ties with the United States. Thus, Japan opposed the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) advocated by Malaysia’s prime minister Mahathir but was a strong proponent of APEC and is a regular participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), for example, while at the same time using ODA and private sector investment to bolster economic links between Japan and the region. It unsuccessfully proposed an AMF to deal with the liquidity problems in the Asian economic crisis and has supported the ASEAN ⫹ 3 process. Support for enhanced Asian regionalism was easier for Japan when its economic prowess afforded it unchallenged leadership ideologically, technologically, and financially. Things became more problematic with the bursting of Japan’s asset bubble, a decade of domestic economic torpor, and the country’s demonstrable inability to head off the sweeping devastation of the Asian economic crisis. The economic achievements of South Korea, Taiwan, much of Southeast Asia, and eventually

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the hyper-growth of China also reduced the relative influence of Japan’s regional economic muscle. As Japan’s enthusiasm for the Asian region was overwhelmed by events in Iraq and North Korea, and as China gained an enhanced appreciation for the benefits of regional leadership, Japanese leadership of the region has been challenged by China. The latter has increasingly used regional forums to advance its influence throughout the neighborhood, in many cases in ways that proposed a challenge to Japan. Perhaps its most notable came in 2001. At the ASEAN ⫹ 3 meeting in Brunei that year, China dramatically proposed an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to be come into effect within ten years. Challenged to do the same, and to demonstrate a continued Japanese capability to “lead” within East Asia, the best that Japan could muster was the promise to consider freer trade with its Southeast Asian neighbors. In the years since, China has become an active player in formal and informal (e.g., Track II) regional bodies whereas Japan more often remained passive. In the recent race to create a series of bilateral FTAs, China again has moved at far greater speed within the region than Japan, as has been most recently seen by active negotiations between Australia and China toward an FTA compared to Japanese unresponsiveness to Australian efforts to initiate similar talks. China’s position in the Asian region was further enhanced, and complicated Japan’s security position, because of its close cooperation with the Bush administration’s “war on terror.” Although the Bush administration came into office in 2001 with strategic presumptions that China would be its next major “strategic competitor,” that predisposition was muted by China’s nominal opposition to Muslim fundamentalism (particularly as manifested in its Western province of Xinjiang) as well as its active (if less than fully pro-U.S.) role in the six-party talks aimed at resolving the issue of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program. Overall, therefore, Japanese strategic thinking under Koizumi was compelled to deal with an Asian region that in the early years of the twenty-first century showed less openness and easy receptivity to Japanese leadership, as well as a region in which China continued to press for, and to acquire, greater relative importance. Meanwhile, however, once somewhat peripheral trouble spots such as the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait took on greater significance in Japanese policy and planning. In summary, during Koizumi’s premiership Japanese domestic politics was going through a major transformation characterized by enhanced nationalism and prime ministerial power whereas bureaucratic autonomy,

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the power of the Left, and functional specificity were in decline. The United States has moved into a position of unchallenged military supremacy and the Bush administration pursued unilateralism and preventative wars while also beginning to reconfigure its long-time basing strategies. Within Asia, intra-regional rivalry between Japan and China rose as did the significance of once marginal areas of potential dispute, particularly Taiwan and the DPRK. Japanese strategic thinking and actions under Koizumi reflected, responded to, and sought to exploit these deep changes. Japanese Strategic Thinking and Behavior under Koizumi The most important aspects of Japanese strategic thinking and behavior during the Koizumi administration were played out at two different levels. Certain general trends characterized Japanese strategic activities more or less across the board. These largely supplemented Japan’s long-standing focus on economic diplomacy by expanded uses of the Japanese military. The second shift involved a tilt from Japan’s developing ties to the Asian region and embracing the United States more closely than at any time in the recent past. Embrace of a More Active Military Role in Support of the United States The single most striking feature of the Koizumi administration’s approach to the country’s foreign policies and its national strategic activities was the rather clear-cut break from Japan’s earlier “passive pacifism,” “pacifism in one country,” or “culture of antimilitarism.” 19 In its place has come what, was an expanded geographical scope for Japan’s security and a stepped-up role for its military. These changes were most explicit with the Koizumi administration’s active support for U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq, but they resonated far more broadly. The base line from which these changes began was the overt U.S. disdain for what Japan saw as its generous $13 billion contribution in support of U.S. actions in the 1991 invasion of Iraq. Among Japan’s foreign policy and strategic elite, the take-away message was that “boots on the ground” rather than “checkbook diplomacy” were vital to maintaining close ties with the United States. The redefinition of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty in 1996–97, Japan’s willingness to commit to a broader geographical scope for the treaty that included the Far East generally

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(and Taiwan at least implicitly), and Japan’s decision to allow its SDF troops to participate in UN peacekeeping operations all represented tangible markers along this shifting strategic path. Overcoming prior political and popular taboos inhibiting such moves was also congruent with the rising nationalism among many politicians and their desire for Japan to strengthen its defense and security posture and to enhance its global and regional weight. Japan was also aware of its easy marginalization at the time of the 1994 DPRK nuclear problems. The United States settled the issue with North Korea on a strategic level, but then passed on the bill for the key portion of the solution (KEDO) to nonparticipants, South Korea and Japan. When the Bush administration came to power it clearly envisioned a much more active and cooperative role for Japan. This had been articulated in the election-year report, “US and Japan: Toward a Mature Partnership,” generated in October 2000 by Richard Armitage (subsequently deputy secretary of state) and a half dozen Japan specialists most of whom joined the administration.20 For many in Japan, especially within the military and within the ruling LDP, American demands for such an enhanced security role were hardly unwelcome; rather they provided an excuse to bolster ties to the United States and to pursue more activist military policies long on the shelf. Particularly under Prime Minister Koizumi’s administration, Japan embraced the strategy of overt bandwagoning with the superpower, giving few signs that it ever considered alternatives such as balancing with other nation-states against the rise in U.S. power or embracing exclusively Asian regional institutions. The result was the rapid and wholehearted embrace of closer U.S.–Japan security ties. For most Japanese prime ministers before Koizumi, Kishi’s political evisceration over the renegotiation of the security treaty in 1960 had stood as a warning to any politician becoming too overtly supportive of U.S. foreign policies.21 Koizumi moved to become in Asia what Tony Blair was in Europe—an unabashed adherent of U.S. foreign policies. Unlike Japan’s collective foot dragging in 1991, Koizumi moved quickly to coordinate Japanese actions with those of the United States following the attacks of September 11. Just two weeks after the event, Koizumi visited the United States to express his active support for the war against terrorism. Following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, on October 29 of 2001, the Japanese Diet enacted the “Special AntiTerrorism Measures Law” and “Amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law.” These provided the legal justification that allowed Japan to send

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three convoy vessels to the Indian Ocean on November 26, 2001, in support of the United States in Afghanistan and represented the first dispatch of Japanese military forces out of the “areas surrounding Japan” since 1945. Japanese tankers serviced not only U.S. and British vessels but also those of a variety of European navies as well as ships from Australia and New Zealand, moving Japan closer to “collective security” than ever before. Koizumi also proved to be one of the industrial world’s few strong supporters of U.S. actions in Iraq. Japan went so far as to provide SDF ground troops in support of the American-organized “coalition of the willing,” despite vociferous domestic opposition to the war and to Koizumi’s actions and the absence of any UN legitimization of those actions, a step long taken as mandatory for Japanese commitment of its military forces to overseas operations. Sending troops to Iraq rested on various legal changes. In June 2003, Japan passed three laws—the Bill Concerning Measures to Ensure National Independence and Security in a Situation of Armed Attack; the Bill to Amend the Security Council Establishment Law; and the Bill to Amend the Self-Defense Forces Law and the Law Concerning Allowances, and the like of Defense Agency Personnel. Overwhelming majorities in both houses of parliament supported these bills, in striking contrast to prior, highly contentious debates over even the minutest SDF activities. The new laws gave Japan a legal foundation for expanding the prime minister’s authority and for building a rapid response system in cases of emergency (in contrast, for example, to the disastrous lack of such capabilities at the time of the 1994 Kobe earthquake). Japan also pledged a $1.5 billion grant to Iraq for aid and $3.5 billion in loans at the Madrid donors’ conference in October 2003. In July 2003 another law was passed—the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. This law, followed up with a December 19 general order from Minister Ishiba to the SDF, led to Japan sending troops for reconstruction activities including medical services to local inhabitants, long-term repair and construction of infrastructure, school rehabilitation, and the like. These laws explicitly removed many long-standing constraints on the SDF thereby authorizing them to take part in a range of new activities. By mid-2003, Japan had pledged to send some 500 troops in support of the United States. They arrived in Sarawah Iraq in January of 2004, and even though they were restricted from combat actions—indeed they required military protection, first by the Dutch and then by the Australians—their mission was one that would have been unthinkable a decade or two

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earlier. Authorization for these forces to continue was extended in December 2004 and December 2005, even as many other countries in the dwindling “coalition of the willing” were pulling troops out. As Robert Uriu argued, “. . . Koizumi seems intent on using this unique opportunity to fulfill his long-term desire to move Japan toward a more active foreign policy role.” That role hewed closely to U.S. preferences.22 Furthermore, in October 2005, Japan agreed that the U.S. Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier based in Yokosuka would be replaced by the nuclear-powered USS George H.W. Bush in 2009. This would be Japan’s first time hosting a nuclear aircraft carrier.23 Koizumi’s support for the United States had economic as well as strategic rewards. It was not clear whether or not the U.S. decision to cut out France and Germany from development of oil fields in Iraq would explicitly benefit Japan; allocations of drilling rights remain quite confidential. But without a doubt Japan’s strategic support for the United States made it much easier to go forward in developing the Azadegan oil field in Iran for an estimated $2.8 billion, a deal likely to have been opposed by the United States had Koizumi not been so close on Iraq.24 Beyond expanding Japan’s support of the United States in the Middle East, Japan under Koizumi began to devote more explicit attention to the country’s own strategic situation. Six governments in East Asia have deployed or possess ballistic missiles—China, ROK, Russia, Taiwan, Vietnam, and North Korea. Of these China, North Korea, and Russia have missiles capable of reaching Japan. Most immediately worrisome for strategic thinkers in Japan, the DPRK’s Nodong has a range of about 1,300 km. enabling it to reach most parts of Japan; its Taepodong travels even further. Japanese thinkers and policymakers became more overtly sensitive to this situation and were less quick to assume that the U.S. nuclear shield would “solve” any consequent security problem for Japan. As a consequence, Japan began to consider a more active military role in and around the home islands as well as in the Middle East. This was clear in Japan’s new NDPO of December 2004.25 That document laid out the country’s mid-term defense buildup plan for the fiscal 2005–09 period. Among the most important elements, the document broke precedent by identifying China and North Korea as potential security concerns. It also explicitly stressed the country’s need to deal with both ballistic missile and guerrilla attacks as well as traditional invasion threats involving Japanese airspace and territorial waters. Japan’s security interests were overtly expanded from defense of the home islands to include international security, international peacekeeping, and counterterrorism as key targets of Japan’s overall national defense strategy.

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To meet the newly characterized threats, Japan, it was argued, needed a new “multifunctional military capability with a centralized SDF command and a rapid reaction force.” The overall thrust of the new NDPO was to strengthen air and naval capabilities, including the capability for force projection. It also wove into Japanese strategic thinking explicit cooperation with the United States on missile defense, arms exports, export by Japan of technologies developed in that project, as well as enhanced interoperability of weapons systems. Japan explicitly considered the purchase and deployment of a U.S.-made missile system as early as 2006 along with missiles that would be launched by Aegis-equipped destroyers and a groundbased Patriot missile system as backup. Japan ordered PAC-2 Patriot interceptor missiles and announced plans for the subsequent purchase of PAC-3 Patriots to be delivered in FY 2006. The expanded SDF role was also reflected in an August 2003 request for a tenfold increase in spending on missile defense to $1.2 billion and an expected outlay of $1 billion for missile defense from 2004 through 2007. Japan was also one of eleven charter members of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in May 2003. The PSI drew Japanese support, including a September 2003 exercise with the United States in the Coral Sea designed to practice interception of ships suspected of smuggling. (Interestingly, however, Japan insisted that the exercise not be built around a hypothetical DPRK smuggler so as not to antagonize North Korea.) In October 2004, Japan for the first time hosted a PSI interdiction exercise in Tokyo Bay involving nine naval and coastguard ships from four countries. Japan also engaged in increased naval exercises during an August 2003 joint exercise with the Russian and South Korean navies. In September 2003, Japan and China agreed to accelerate their own bilateral defense exchanges including reciprocal naval ship visits. Important as all of these changes have been in Japan’s overall strategic posturing, the country by no means abandoned other legs of its “comprehensive security policy.” Nor did its moves toward closer links with the United States mean abandoning Japanese efforts to enhance cooperation across Asia. Most particularly, Japan remained active in a number of new or recent regional institutions particularly the ASEAN ⫹ 3 process and the currency swap arrangements set out in the Chiang Mai Initiative of May 2000. Japan also supported moves toward the development of an Asian bond initiative. And though it has moved far more slowly than many other Asian countries, including China and the ROK, Japan has been active in pursuit of various bilateral FTAs.26 Furthermore, in the quasi-competitive race to be the nice neighbor to the North, China and

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ASEAN countries reached agreement on the “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea” so as to avoid military conflicts. And in 2003, China acceded to ASEAN’s 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). But Japan quickly followed suit acceding to the Treaty on July 2, 2004.27 Japan was a participant in the East Asian Summit of December 2005 that included the ASEAN ⫹ 3 countries, India, Australia, and New Zealand, but not the United States. Yet there was no doubt that strengthening ties with the United States remained a vastly higher priority for Japan than improving ties to the rest of Northeast Asia. Overall, Japan’s strategic thinking under Koizumi took on an explicitly more important role for traditional security concerns, including an enhanced role for Japan’s military and moved Japan into a much closer and more explicit overlapping with U.S. strategic planning. Asia and the tentative embrace of Asian regionalism were by no means abandoned, but they began to take on a secondary importance behind the heightened focus on remaining quite close to the United States. Bilateral ties were revitalized and expanded at the diplomatic level and personally close ties were fostered between Bush and Koizumi, most overtly manifested in Koizumi’s visit to Bush’s Crawford “ranch” on May 22–23, 2003. There, and in subsequent Diet speeches he set out to “globalize” the bilateral ties, also referring explicitly to them as an “alliance,” a term previously taboo.28 To critics, once-pacifist and passive Japan suddenly appeared willing to play an enhanced and active role in support of U.S. military policies, serving even as America’s “deputy sheriff ” in various parts of East Asia,29 most notably vis-à-vis North Korea. East Asian Manifestations of Japan’s New Strategic Thinking The general features of Japanese strategic thinking and behavior outlined above were manifested in several important cases involving Japan’s links in East Asia. Of greatest importance were relations with the PRC and with the DPRK. Historical memories continued to cast a long shadow over relations between Japan and China. These played out on a host of ad hoc issues from Koizumi’s regular visits to the Yasukuni shrine, the revision of Japanese history textbooks, anti-Japanese protests at soccer matches in China, ongoing competitive claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Chinese intrusions into the Japanese consulate in Shenyang in pursuit of North Korean asylum seekers, and the like. Just as historical legacies lay beneath the surface of many problems, so too was the psychological perception that China seemed to be “rising” whereas Japan was at best “stagnant.”

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Japan’s bilateral ties to China had long been kept close through economic assistance. Japan has provided about $35 billion in economic assistance since the normalization of relations between the two countries. Furthermore, bilateral trade and investment ties between the two moved forward at a rapid pace, and China now outstrips the United States as Japan’s major trade partner. At the same time, concerns within Japan have expanded about the potential strategic and diplomatic implications of an economically stronger China, particularly as its rapid economic growth allows it to expand its military budget geometrically. Thus, Japan announced in October 2001 that it would reduce and redirect its ODA to China in recognition of the country’s rising economic success and diminished need. The result was an overall reduction combined with a shift from multi-year pledges of ODA to China in favor of a single-year pledge system and a shift in focus away from infrastructure and construction to environmental protection, increased living standards, education, institution building, and technology transfer. This naturally irritated bilateral ties. As was noted above, China, following the Asian economic crisis and following its accession to the WTO, began to demonstrate a renewed interest in Asian regional diplomacy. Mentioned above were China’s efforts to generate an FTA with ASEAN. Within Northeast Asia, China also normalized relations with the ROK and expanded trade and economic relations so that by 2001 China was the ROK’s number one target of investment. In 2002, China–Hong Kong became South Korea’s largest export market.30 Seoul also began cooperating with the PRC on military matters. In some instances, their closer ties tilted them against Japan. For example, both China and Korea issued declarations indicating their opposition to Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Korea’s President Roh actually came out explicitly in favor of a seat for Germany, making even more striking his unwillingness support Japan’s claims). Then in April 2005, President Roh announced that his country would seek to be a “balancer” in the Asian region, a role that implied a new proximity to China at the expense of Korea’s prior ties to the United States and Japan. All of these actions created frustrating diplomatic problems for Japan, which had traditionally taken for granted its own leadership role in Asia, but particularly among ASEAN and with the ROK. And as a demonstration of hostility to Koizumi’s continued visits to Yasukuni, both President Roh and Chinese prime minister Wen Jia-bao cancelled a normal three-way meeting with Koizumi and shunned bilateral meetings with him during the following East Asia Summit.

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China also began exploring the waters near Japan and periodically broaching areas that Japan claimed were within its national economic zone. In one such instance, on November 10, 2004, the Japanese Navy discovered a Chinese nuclear submarine in Japanese Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) near Okinawa. Although the Chinese apologized and called the sub’s intrusion a “mistake,” Defense Agency Director Ono gave it wide publicity, further inflaming Japanese public opinion against China. From that point on, relations between Beijing and Tokyo went steadily downhill, culminating in the Japanese–American announcement on February 19, 2005 that Taiwan was of special military concern to both of them, which China in turn denounced as an “abomination.” Tensions soured as a result of China’s expanding its blue water navy and its increased activities in search of enhanced energy resources both in the Middle East and in West Africa. These worsened further in the spring of 2005 when both China and Japan announced plans to explore for natural gas in waters contested by the two countries. Bilateral tensions were also exacerbated by the situation in Taiwan. Japan’s official position on the Taiwan issue has long involved mutedly ambiguous support of the long-standing “one China” policy, but increasingly Japan has aligned itself with the United States in suggesting that it would provide overt support to U.S. actions designed to fend off any enhanced Chinese military pressures against Taiwan. Such overt support contrasted with the actions of such close U.S. allies as Singapore and Australia, who indicated they were not willing to help Taiwan in any cross-Straits conflict with China. Without a doubt, Taiwan has great strategic importance to Japan. On average, there is one Japanese vessel passing the Bashi Channel located at the southern tip of Taiwan heading for Japan every 15 minutes. This makes the Strait of Taiwan immediately important to Japan’s national security. But beyond sea lanes, Taiwan is an economically successful democracy with long historical ties to Japan and increasingly anxious to demonstrate its autonomy from the PRC. Perhaps even more importantly, as a potential thorn in the side of an increasingly worrisome China, Taiwan has appeal to many Japanese policymakers. Furthermore, Taiwan has been an increasingly important fulcrum in Japan’s developing stronger ties to the United States. This was made clear in the 1996 rearticulation of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. Coming as it did on the heels of the Chinese missile tests across the Taiwan Straits in March 1996, and explicitly stating that Japan’s security was linked to that of the “Asia-Pacific” (implicitly at least including Taiwan), the Chinese saw the actions as explicitly aimed at them, rather than at a

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reinforcement of the status quo (as it was interpreted by both the United States and Japan).31 Soon after Koizumi came into office, former Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui was granted a visa to visit Japan for medical treatment. A second visa for touring was given in 2004. On April 4, 2005, members of Lee’s Taiwan Solidarity Union made a very public visit to Yasukuni in memory of Taiwanese who had served in the Japanese military during WWII. Then on February 19, 2005, Japan and the United States signed a new military agreement in which, for the first time, Japan joined the administration in identifying security in the Taiwan Strait as a “common strategic objective.” As Chalmers Johnson noted, “Nothing could have been more alarming to China’s leaders than the revelation that Japan had decisively ended six decades of official pacifism by claiming a right to intervene in the Taiwan Strait.”32 It was clear by the middle of 2006 that relations between Japan and China had plummeted to one of their worst levels since relations had been normalized some 30 years earlier. Competing nationalisms boiled to the surface and were most manifest in Chinese popular demonstrations against Japan, first at soccer matches and then on the streets. These demonstrations came with the clear support of the Chinese government, but it was also clear that Japan was not particularly anxious to take steps to reduce tensions, as some 85 legislators made a collective (if long planned) visit to Yasukuni in April 2004, and Koizumi made a highly publicized visit on August 15, 2006—a symbolically important date— further enflaming bilateral and regional relations. As a tangible manifestation of these declining bilateral ties, Chinese vice minister Wu Yi in May 2005 abruptly cancelled a scheduled visit with Koizumi, presumably because of his continued Yasukuni shrine visits. Japanese relations with North Korea were perhaps the single most problematic set of bilateral ties faced by the country. By 2005, North Korea occupied a position within Japanese strategic thinking as the most probable and immediate military threat to the country. Relations had ebbed and flowed over the postwar period, but like relations with China, those with the DPRK were continually affected by the legacy of Japan’s colonial history, overlaid with the equally important vestiges of the cold war and the often problematic actions of pro–North Korean residents within Japan. Nevertheless, Japan and the DPRK began normalization talks at the end of January 1991, and five rounds took place between then and 1992. A long break of seven years followed, but Japan’s participation in KEDO and the apparent resolution of the 1994 nuclear threats kept relations on

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a generally positive note. Then in August 1998, North Korea fired a long range Taepodong right over Northern Japan—“a brazen act that shook the Japanese out of their remaining complacency about North Korea the way Sputnik shook the United States in 1957.”33 In addition to the threat posed by its missiles, the DPRK remains the only country in Northeast Asia that has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. And North Korea has been a continuous irritant to Japan domestically. Pro–North Korean residents in Japan contribute as much as ¥4 billion to the DPRK every year, much of the money moving on ships between Niigata and Pyongyang. DPRK transfers of illegal drugs, most especially metaamphetamines, to Japan pose an additional problem within the country (and unlike the situation with drugs from China, lacking normal diplomatic relations with the DPRK, Japan has found it impossible to engage in bilateral efforts to curtail illegal exports).34 Also contributing to poor relations were the Japanese Coast Guard’s sinking of a North Korean spy ship on December 22–23, 2001; the failure of five North Koreans to obtain asylum within the Japanese consulate in Shenyang, China, in May 2002; Japan’s decision to salvage the wreck of the spy ship from China’s EEZ in June and July of 2002, and eventually to put it on public display in downtown Tokyo, well-marked as it was with signs indicating the threats the ship (and the DPRK) posed to Japan. In the face of such longstanding irritants, Koizumi sought to improve bilateral relations. A year of quiet negotiations led to an apparent breakthrough visit by Koizumi to Pyongyang on September 17, 2002. Though allegedly briefed by U.S. officials before the visit on what the United States allegedly claimed was North Korea’s moves toward a nuclear weapons program, Koizumi attempted to normalize relations between Japan and the DPRK. Koizumi extracted an explicit confession from Kim Jong-il that his country had abducted various Japanese citizens over the preceding decades as had long been claimed by Japanese officials. While the acknowledgment itself could have served as a positive step toward improved relations, Kim also announced that a substantial number of the abductees had died (often under mysterious and hard-tobelieve circumstances). Japan had been putting forward 11 cases involving 16 Japanese citizens. Only 5 allegedly remained alive; the DPRK claimed that of the remainder 8 had died and 3 had never entered the country. The 5 who were alive were permitted to return with Koizumi to Japan on the promise that they would subsequently return to North Korea after a short visit to see relatives. The public outcry in Japan against the North, however, combined with mass media sympathy for the abductees made their return to the North politically impossible.

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Normalization of bilateral Japan–DPRK relations was even more implausible. Then in October 2002 during a visit by assistant secretary of state for the Far East, James Kelly, the DPRK acknowledged having a highly enriched uranium program. This declaration and the subsequently tough policies of the United States toward the DPRK, combined with the abductees issue and the North’s growing missile arsenal presented Japan with a dilemma: improved ties with the DPRK or adherence to U.S. policies? The question of how to move toward denuclearization of the Korean peninsula has been the overarching issue for the countries of Northeast Asia since the Kelly visit. Following unsuccessful demands by North Korea for bilateral talks with the United States, the six-party talks were begun in Beijing in August 2003, but they met little success. A second round in February 2004 led to agreement by all parties on several principles, most notably the desire to denuclearize the Korean peninsula issue through peaceful dialogue. Koizumi made a second visit to Pyongyang in May 2004 in an attempt to advance the talks, but the third session of the six-party talks in June was a stalemate. But Koizumi, in part because of his close ties to the Bush administration, was able, during his second visit, to stress the need for a U.S. initiative. This apparently convinced the United States to table a concrete proposal at the next meeting of the sixparty talks. Still, U.S. negotiators (hemmed in by a deep internal division between neoconservatives and pragmatists in the Bush administration) were restricted to simply reading the official position paper, refusing to elaborate or negotiate. Not surprisingly, the DPRK refused to agree to future talks. Throughout the process, Japan, with U.S. support, continued not only to press for denuclearization but also for a resolution of the kidnapping issue. The United States, alone among the remaining five parties, supported Japan in pressing the abductees issue. On February 10, 2005, the DPRK issued a statement saying that it already owns nuclear weapons and that the six-party talks would be postponed indefinitely. On March 31, the DPRK Foreign Ministry proposed that the six-party talks be switched to a disarmament conference, in light of its claim that the country is itself a nuclear power. Only after the Bush administration began to soften its hostile tone about the DPRK being an “outpost of tyranny,” about the need for “regime change,” and to hint at a willingness to put some serious proposals on the table did the talks resume. And it was not until September 2005 that they finally reached some measure of agreement. This was essentially on a statement of principles with few tangible timetables

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concerning concrete steps to be taken by the DPRK and other parties. But following a U.S. decision to freeze North Korean assets in a Macao bank, the DPRK broke off talks completely. Meanwhile, the DPRK moved to a much more potentially ominous posture with missile tests in July 2006 and a nuclear test in October. Throughout the process, Japan largely supported the U.S. while also seeking to advance its own security against potential DPRK conventional or nuclear threats. Among these have been measures to restrict North Korean shipping from entering Japan and talks of an economic blockade by Japan of the DPRK. Certainly, public opinion in Japan remains skeptical of immediate normalization while the issue of nuclear and missile development makes it highly unlikely that the Japanese parliament would approve any economic assistance to the DPRK, an obvious requirement of any normalization agreement. In summary therefore, as Japan moved to strengthen its bilateral ties to the United States and to increase its own military posture, relations between Japan and the Asian region though close economically became progressively more tense in the military and diplomatic arenas between Japan and China, the ROK, and the DPRK. Conclusion Japan under Koizumi substantially challenged past guideposts of the country’s security thinking and began to advance new policies. Most importantly, Koizumi responded to changes in domestic, regional, and global conditions by advancing Japan’s close ties to the United States, creating an enhanced military role for the SDF and the Coast Guard, and expanding the country’s efforts to take on a vague but increasingly tolerated role as a “normal” country. As Japan moved more closely into security collaboration with the United States it expanded its own definition of “security” in ways that strengthened its bilateral ties across the Pacific while at the same time creating conditions that as at least a residual factor have worsened Japan’s ties with other counties in Asia, most notably China and the DPRK. Notes 1. T.J. Pempel, Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998). 2. Steven Vogel, Japan Remodeled: How Government and Industry Are Reforming Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).

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3. Meredith Woo-Cumings, The Developmental State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999). 4. Andrew MacIntyre and Barry Naughton, “The Decline of a Japan-Led Model of the East Asian Economy,” in T.J. Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 77–100. 5. Karel van Wolferen, The Enigma of Japanese Power (New York: KNOPF, 1989). 6. ⬍http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tokino-ugoki/9909/pdf9_18.pdf⬎. 7. Chien-min Chao and Szu-shen Ho, “Hegemonic Stability or China Threats? A Debate over Japan’s Foreign Policy in the Post–Cold War Era,” (Taipei: unpublished paper, 2004), p. 8. 8. Hiroshi Nakanishi, “East Asian Security Conditions and Japanese Policy Responses” (Kyoto: Unpublished paper, 2005). 9. Richard J. Samuels, “Constitutional Revision in Japan: The Future of Article 9” (Washington, DC: Talk given at the Brookings Institution, December 15, 2004) ⬍http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/events/20041215.htm⬎. 10. Yoshihide Soeya, “Japanese Security Policy in Transition: The Rise of International and Human Security,” Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), p. 103. 11. Nikkei Weekly, November 28, 2005 at ⬍http://www.nni.nikkei.co.jp/ AC/TNW/Search/Nni20051128EE1LDP01.htm⬎. 12. Samuels, “Constitutional Revision in Japan.” 13. Changsu Kim, “Security Relations among Major Powers in Northeast Asia: Views from Seoul,” in Security Cooperation in East Asia (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2004), pp. 170–71. 14. Michael O’Hanlon, “The ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ and Security in Asia,” in G. John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., Reinventing the Alliance: US–Japan Security Partnership in an Era of Change (New York: Palgrave, 2003), p. 172. 15. Ivo Daadler and James M. Lindsey, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2003), p. 13; G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001). 16. John Lewis Gaddes, Surprise, Security, and the American Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p.83. 17. Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 213. 18. T.J. Pempel, Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005). 19. Thomas Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Washington, DC: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1998). 20. Institute for National Strategic Studies, The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership, Special Report (Washington DC: INSS, 2000).

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21. Robyn Lim, The Geopolitics of East Asia: The Search for Equilibrium (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 138. 22. Robert Uriu, “Japan in 2003,” Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January/ February 2004), p. 178. 23. Nikkei Weekly, October 31, 2005, p. 4. 24. Mike Mochizuki, “Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004–2005: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), p. 116. 25. This full report can be found at ⬍http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index.html⬎. For analysis, see David Fouse, “Japan’s FY 2005 National Defense Program Outline,” Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (March 2005); “Highlights of New Midterm Defense Buildup Plan,” December 10, 2005, and “Editorial: Defense Plan Marks 1st Step toward Structural Reform” both at ⬍www.nni.nikkei.co.jp⬎. 26. Urata Shujiro and Japan Center for Economic Research, eds., Nihon no FTA senryaku (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbunsha, 2002); T.J. Pempel and Shujiro Urata, “Japan: A New Move toward Bilateral Free Trade Agreements,” in Vinod Aggarwal, ed., Bilateral Trade Arrangements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications (London: Routledge, 2005). 27. ⬍http://www.aseansec.org/16234.htm⬎. 28. Recent discussion of Japan’s approach to Asia can be found in Yoichiro Sato and Satu Limaye, eds., Japan in a Dynamic Asia: Coping with the New Security Challenges (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006). On globalzing the alliance, see Richards J. Samuels, Securing Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, forthcoming), ch.8. 29. Simon Tisdall, “Japan Emerges as America’s Deputy Sheriff in the Pacific,” The Guardian, April 19, 2005. Accessed at Japan Focus, April 21, 2005 ⬍http://japanfocus.org/260.html⬎. 30. “China becomes South Korea’s Number One Investment Target,” China Daily, February 2, 2002. 31. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 90–91. 32. Chalmers Johnson, NAPSNET, March 23, 2005. This paper was also published by the Japan Policy Research Institute. A version with citations and references included can be found at ⬍http://www.jpri.org/publications/ workingpapers/wp105.html⬎. 33. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, p. 22. 34. Keiichi Tsunekawa, “Why So Many Maps There? Japan and Regional Cooperation,” in Pempel, ed., Remapping East Asia, pp. 115–24.

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PART 2

Geography

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CHAPTER 6

Changing Japanese Strategic Thinking toward China Ryosei Kokubun

O

n October 17, 2005, Japanese prime minister Koizumi Junichiro embarked on his fifth visit to the Yasukuni shrine. However, it was one made in a style somewhat different from before. The prime minister turned up outside the shrine in his official car, wearing a casual suit not a traditional Japanese garment nor a mourning dress, walked up to the shrine, picked some money out of his pocket that he put in the offertory box, and without even entering the shrine walked back to his car and was on his way again. The prime minister no doubt did this with the intention of showing himself visiting the shrine just like any ordinary citizen. It was presumably the ultimate display of his concern over the response from China, South Korea, and other Asian countries, yet it bore no fruit whatsoever. On the contrary, China only voiced even stronger criticism. To be precise, the Chinese government’s reaction was relatively subdued at first, but turned sterner along with the relentless attacks that abounded in tabloid papers and on the Internet. Since then, China has maintained that abandonment of the Yasukuni visit is a condition for resuming summit meetings between Japan and China. Looking back, however, China still showed a rather open attitude toward Japan until the anti-Japanese demonstrations in April 2005. On the last day of the National People’s Congress (NPC) held in March 2005, Chinese prime minister Wen Jiabao stated that Sino-Japanese relations are the nation’s most important bilateral relations and pointed out prerequisites for improving them: (1) top-level talks; (2) strategic study

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on China–Japan friendly relations; and (3) proper handling of historical issues.1 In his speech, he referred to the historical issues last, not specifying any concrete solution for the Yasukuni problem, a critical issue between the two countries, and suggested possible “strategic relations” for the first time in the history of China–Japan relations. It is assumed that China’s policy toward Japan was discussed during the NPC with President Hu Jintao and that some conclusions were drawn. Clearly, China had the intention to improve its relationship with Japan; however, contrary to the government’s intentions, the Chinese people developed their own view, taking steps opposite to the direction set by the government. What does this tell us about Chinese strategic thinking and the inputs that shape it? More important for this volume, what do the responses in Japan tell us about the strategic thinking inside the Japanese government and the inputs that are shaping it? Sixty years have passed since the end of World War II (WWII) and the Japan–China relationship is faced with unprecedented difficulties following anti-Japan demonstrations throughout China in April 2005. Historical processes have accumulated to reach this point; however, the direct causes that triggered the anti-Japan demonstrations are Japan’s bid to become a permanent United Nations (UN) Security Council member and new history textbook issues. In March 2005 when Security Council reform became an international issue, Secretary General Kofi Annan’s comment that Japan should be a permanent UN Security Council member seemed to have offended many Chinese, and a massive signature-collecting campaign against this proposal started, spreading through websites such as SINA.com, SOHU.com, and WNGYI ⫽ 163.com. More than ten million signatures were said to have been collected.2 In addition, news about the possibility of approval for a history textbook for middle schools, developed by the same group that caused controversy in 2001, gave rise to a call on the Internet for boycotting Japanese products.3 During the weekend of April 2, 2005, the first anti-Japan demonstrations broke out in Chengdu, Zhongqing and Shenzhen. Several thousand protesters participated, according to reports. Some called for a boycott of Japanese products and some angry protesters attacked a Japanese department store. Just about the same time, an anti-Japan mood was mounting in South Korea due to the dispute over Takeshima/Dokdo and the Japanese textbook. South Korea objected to Annan’s proposal that the UN Security Council reform be completed by September 2005. As if he were keeping step, Wang Guangya, China’s ambassador to the UN, expressed opposition to Annan’s proposal on April 6 to contain the influence of states favoring the reform such as Japan.4 Later, even the United States objected to the proposal.

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On April 9, larger-scale anti-Japan demonstrations were held in Beijing and other cities in China. “Boycott Japanese products,” “Oppose Japan becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council,” and “Object to Japanese history textbooks” were the main slogans. Some 10,000 people took to the streets just in Beijing, and it is believed that a substantial number of people demonstrated throughout China. The final destination of protesters in Beijing was the Japanese Embassy. Although Chinese law enforcement officers were guarding the embassy, protesters turned into a mob, threw stones, destroyed official vehicles, and tore down signs and billboards of Japanese corporations. Japan strongly protested and asked for an official apology by China and compensation for damages. However, the Chinese government maintained its position that Japan should be blamed in the first place. On April 16, even more massive demonstrations with approximately 20,000 participants took place in Shanghai as well as smaller-scale demonstrations in Tianjin and other cities. Preceding these demonstrations, Chinese authorities tightened their control in Beijing by reminding the public that unauthorized demonstrations were against the law and nothing happened there. Although the government is said to have tightened its control in Shanghai, large-scale demonstrations broke out. The Japanese government sent Foreign Minister Machimura to China, officially protested, and asked for an apology and compensation. The only agreement reached was to review the bilateral relationship and to hold a meeting between Koizumi and Hu Jintao during the fiftieth anniversary of the Asia-Africa Summit in Jakarta, Indonesia, that started on April 22. The Chinese government initially refused to apologize; however, as it may have sensed that the international spotlight had shifted from the Japanese history textbooks to China’s unruly demonstrations, it quickly tried to reverse the situation. On April 20 a special meeting was held to explain China’s policy toward Japan, summoning 3,500 leading members of the Propaganda Department, the Ministry of Education, and the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army as well as related governmental agencies. Li Zhaoxing, minister of foreign affairs, reaffirmed the importance of China–Japan relations and appealed for calm and sensible measures,5 a sign that the authorities had started to recognize the seriousness of the disturbances. In Bandung, Koizumi began his speech by stating, “In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved

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in its mind, Japan has resolutely maintained—consistently since the end of World War II—of never turning into a military power but into an economic power, as well as the principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to the use of force.”6 This part basically repeats the content of the speech Prime Minister Murayama made in 1995 on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war. Koizumi’s speech was made in consideration of anti-Japan demonstrations that had continued for three consecutive weeks in China, territorial issues, and history textbook issues. Koizumi and Hu met in Bandung to discuss ways to mend relations. Until then, Japan was asking for apologies and compensation for damages caused to its embassy and consulates as well as to Japanese corporations and restaurants, and China was insisting that Japan was at fault in the first place for the demonstrations. At the meeting, both avoided disputes and agreed on further communication and promoting exchanges. Koizumi asked for proper handling of anti-Japan demonstrations, emphasizing positive future Japan–China relations, and Hu expressed five points to be observed in future relations between the two nations: (1) to observe the three basic documents including the China–Japan Joint Communiqué; (2) not to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people in Japanese handling of history; (3) to keep the “One China” principle on the Taiwan issue and not to support Taiwan’s independence; (4) to solve problems through dialogue; and (5) to expand exchanges and cooperation.7 April 23 was the third week after the first anti-Japan demonstrations. China mobilized law enforcement personnel throughout the country to suppress demonstrations completely. The authorities enforced their control of the Internet. Ironically, such steps proved that China could suppress any demonstration in advance. At the Asian Soccer Cup held in the summer of 2004, similar anti-Japan behavior was observed; however, the incidents unfolded differently in April. They were definitely organized systematically under a clear anti-Japan banner. The main slogans were opposing Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, objecting to Japanese history textbooks, and, eventually, calling for a boycott of Japanese products. The atmosphere deteriorated so far that Japanese exchange students and businessmen in China were hiding their identities and taking care to be aware of their surroundings. In 1999, similar demonstrations took place and some demonstrators threw stones at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing after NATO forces had bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, causing a loss of several lives. Chinese refused to believe that it occurred by mistake during the Kosovo dispute. This happened just before the tenth anniversary of the

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Tiananmen crackdown and Beijing was tense. It seems that the authorities made use of the incident to relieve the tension, mobilizing the demonstrators. Students were transported back to campus by chartered buses after the demonstrations and several weeks later they gave up and resumed their study of English.8 Although the United States and China disagreed over compensation, the matter was settled by the former compensating the victims first, followed by China compensating for damages at the U.S. Embassy. Despite continuous problems that the United States and China have in their relationship, their ties are based on a general strategic perspective and not on emotions. In contrast, no hotline exists between the top leaders in Japan and China. In April 2005, it is assumed, specific anti-Japan groups called on students, notified the authorities in advance, and gained authorization for the demonstration with certain restrictions. The government may not have been behind the demonstration; however, the fact remains that it did not aggressively restrain violent acts. It has been said that protesters were loaded on buses arranged by the authorities after the demonstrations,9 apparently to avoid being criticized for being faint-hearted toward Japan. Concerned about protesters turning into a mob if they were left alone, the authorities took an evasive attitude. Many in Japan describe the context as one of fear inside China that a spillover into anti-regime activities would follow. China’s growth seems brilliant; however, protest actions are breaking out all over the country and the situation is gloomy to the extent that half of all new college graduates are unemployed. The government controlled Japan-related news in the official media to restrain a chain reaction. The demonstration that took place in Shanghai has many incomprehensible aspects. The activist groups were supposed to be under tight control due to the incidents that had occurred in Beijing during the previous week. Websites were supposed to be frozen. Although the municipal authority said that there would be no demonstrations, large-scale demonstrations took place. The demonstrators actually tried to restrain protesters from turning into a mob by sending detailed cautions on the Internet ahead of time. “Do not carry Japanese products. No stones or metal items to be taken. Take tomatoes and eggs. Take photos of Prime Minister Koizumi, Japanese flags and lighters. Wear sneakers.”10 However, the protesters turned into a mob after all, throwing stones and other objects at the Japanese Consulate General building. Based on these factors, there has been speculation in Japan of a power struggle within the party. Shanghai is known to be the political base for the Jiang Zemin faction, which may have used different organizations to mobilize

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demonstrators to shake up the Hu Jintao administration. Although Jiang is officially retired, many close associates are at the center of power in the party and are seen as resisting consolidation of Hu Jintao’s power. Jiang’s group escalated the demonstrations. Afterward, Hu Jintao appeared relatively quiet in dealing with China’s policy toward Japan. Instead, Zeng Qinghong, Huang Ju, and others seem to be mentioned more often in this context. Although many things remain unclear about the demonstrations, they revealed the complexity of Japan–China relations. The image with respect to each other has worsened. The incidents gave the Japanese an image of “Violent China,” and the Chinese grew even more convinced of the image of Japan of “not reflecting on its past conduct.” At a given point in time, various persons who served as liaisons existed in both countries, who could act quickly to calm frictions and solve problems. Now such people have disappeared. Although most Japanese recognize the urgency of improving relations with China, the country’s biggest trade partner, it has become more difficult to step forward as the image toward China has worsened. That leaves no other channel but the official diplomatic route. Since the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972, relations had developed under the slogan “Friendship,” which now appears empty. China seems to be alarmed by Japan’s diplomatic relations toward China shifting from “friendship” to “hard line.” Setting aside whether it should be called “hard-line” or not, there is no doubt that Japan has been acting more on its own initiative toward China. Does this phenomenon mean that Japan’s strategy toward China has changed? If so, what is behind it? Below I analyze how Japanese strategic understanding of relations has been transformed. Japan that Can Say “NO” to China It is not that Japan has never said “no” to China. At such times as the normalization of diplomatic relations, the negotiations over the Japan–China Aviation Agreement and the Japan–China Peace and Friendship Treaty, and the flare-ups over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, Japan essentially kept to its determined position. However, when it comes to history issues, Japan has often compromised, for instance over the 1982 history textbook problem when it promised to be sensitive to the reactions of neighboring countries, and in 1985 when Prime Minister Nakasone stopped visiting the Yasukuni shrine to avoid stirring up controversy in neighboring countries. In other cases, whenever cabinet members made comments justifying Japan’s invasion of China and

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Chinese leaders responded with irritation, they were forced to resign or be replaced. Sankei shimbun, Bungei shunju, and other conservative media repeatedly criticized this as Japan’s “kowtow diplomacy”; however, it was not the mainstream opinion of Japanese media. What changed things was an overall transformation in attitudes toward China, influenced by such developments as: the outcry over China’s conduct at Tiananmen on June 4, 1989; a different strategic outlook after the end of the cold war, the new way of thinking about China after its remarkable economic growth from the 1990s; and the shock over Jiang Zemin’s repeated comments on Japan’s war responsibility during his visit to Japan in 1998 in the midst of China’s rapid emergence as a rival power. In place of a presumption of “friendship” to at least gloss over differences, the general attitude of Japanese shifted to resistance against the habit of compromise with China in favor of taking a firm stand not only toward historical problems, but also to various matters such as national security and Taiwan. This becomes clearer when we examine the situation over the past several years. The most controversial issue has been Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Nakasone stopped official visits to the shrine after 1985, Miyazawa Kiichi is said to have visited the shrine secretly once while prime minister, and Hashimoto Ryutaro visited the shrine while in office in 1996 without making any announcement; however, when it became public knowledge, he stopped. One of Koizumi’s campaign pledges was to visit the Yasukuni shrine on August 15. Although he did not visit it on the day he promised until 2006, he went every year. An advisory panel of well-informed independent personages was established in 2002 to study the possibility of building a national memorial; however, its opinions have not been made public. Furthermore, there has been talk of removing the 14 Class A war criminals entombed at the shrine who were held responsible for the war by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal. Objections persist, and the shrine itself considers it impossible. Whenever China or South Korea objected to his visits, Koizumi repeated his refutation that “I visit there so that we do not start a war again,” or “Other countries should not interfere with my own beliefs.”11 A similar tendency can be seen concerning the textbook issue. When it first arose in 1982, the Japanese government resolved the difficult situation by issuing a statement that it would take the concerns of neighboring countries into consideration in the future. Textbooks used in middle schools and high schools in Japan must be authorized by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (hereafter the Ministry of Education). There are no government-designated

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textbooks in Japan. Private publishers ask experts to write the textbooks, which are then submitted for the Ministry to review, then recommend revisions and, after several rounds of these, to give its authorization. The problem occurred in 2001 and 2005. In the 2001 incident, China firmly protested that a history textbook for middle schools edited by the “Group to Create New History Textbooks” was approved even though 137 items should have been corrected. In the 2005 incident, the textbook written by the same authors and published by the Fusosha Publishing Company, a company under Sankei shimbun, had many corrections to make and it was eventually authorized despite containing many more assertions disturbing to China. China compared these books to others previously published, stressing the subjectivity on topics such as Japan’s invasion of China in the modern era. The Japanese government refuted China’s criticism by stating both that corrections had been made and that the textbooks do not necessarily represent the government’s position.12 The Japanese people cannot forget the incident at the Consulate General of Japan in Shenyang in 2002. On May 8, China’s armed security police entered the compound and detained five North Korean asylum seekers. Since the entire incident was videotaped by the media and became public, Japan’s public sentiment toward China became leery. Even though the Japanese government insisted on an apology, China did not respond although the five were allowed to go to South Korea via the Phillipines.13 The incident greatly damaged the Japanese people’s image of China. Regarding the oceanographic surveys in the East China Sea, there have been constant disputes. Japan’s attitude toward China is becoming increasingly firm. Until 2000, China’s oceanographic research vessels conducted surveys off Japan, to which Japan protested. In order to improve the situation, it was agreed that they would notify each other prior to surveys. Two months prior notice is now required. Oceanographic surveys without notice have decreased; however, in the undetermined territorial waters in the East China Sea, China hired a company to start building a mining facility of natural gas on the Chinese side of the middle line between Japan and China in international waters. In June 2004, Nakagawa Shoichi, minister of economy, trade and industry at an ASEAN ⫹ 3 meeting of energy ministers, emphasized the danger that resources on the Japanese side could be drained by the Chinese.14 The issue is under discussion through diplomatic channels, where Japan has repeatedly asked for all related data to no avail. As a result, Japan carried out its own survey on its side of the demarcation

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line, and in 2005 it granted partial mining rights to development companies to allow them to conduct test drilling in the region. This issue has a direct impact on national interests in both countries. China’s energy sector is closely related to its military, and Japanese are concerned that accidental conflicts may occur. Both countries realize that joint development is the only solution; however, they have not agreed on a way to proceed. As security incidents become more frequent, Japan is showing new firmness. In November 2004, a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine entered Japanese territorial waters, to which Japan protested strongly. The maneuver seemed to be part of a drill in preparation for possible war with Taiwan and China explained that the trespassing “was due to technical reasons.” To clear the air in advance of a meeting between Koizumi and Hu Jintao at the APEC Summit in Santiago, Chile, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing expressed “regret.”15 It is the Taiwan issue that concerns China most. Former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui visited Japan twice on a tourist visa, once in April 2001 and again from late December 2004 to early January 2005, first for a cardiology examination and second for sightseeing. His speeches and behavior were restrained; however, China was offended by the fact that Japan approved his entry. Japanese public opinion and media supported each visit, and the Japanese government ignored China’s accusations, saying that Lee visited Japan as a private person. The Japan/U.S. diplomatic and defense agencies, the so-called two plus two (2⫹2), in February 2005 reached agreement on common strategic objectives in the region to encourage “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Straits through dialogue” and China to improve transparency in its military affairs. The two sides sought to “develop a cooperative relationship with China, urging the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally.”16 When Beijing took offense that Tokyo and Washington referred to Taiwan for the first time at this security meeting. Tokyo ignored its objection by insisting that the reference was nothing new. One month later, China adopted the “Anti-Secession Law” at the NPC, which suggested that China would use “non-peaceful means” if Taiwan took obvious actions for its independence. The so-called 2 ⫹ 2 meeting might have influenced China’s actions. When the EU tried to lift the ban on arms exports to China that had been imposed in 1989, Japan and the United States protested. Shortly afterward in April 2005 when anti-Japan demonstrations raged across China, the EU countries had little choice but to postpone lifting the

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ban. China depends heavily on Russia for the supply of arms. In August 2005, the two conducted joint military drills. Observing such developments, Japanese have hardened their attitude toward China. The 2005 National Defense Program Guidelines adopted by the Japanese Cabinet in December 2004, stated, “China, which has a major impact on regional security, continues to modernize its nuclear forces and seaborne missiles. We will have to remain attentive to its future actions.”17 The White Paper on Defense published in August 2005 stated that the Taiwan issue could be the “security issue that may threaten the peace and safety of the region” and “China with great political and economic influence as a major nation is the country that should be watched for its militaristic moves.”18 Japan’s growing assertiveness led Chinese to argue that “As Japan’s economy is on the decline and China is gaining power, Japanese society is becoming increasingly conservative in its mental state and is trying to be politically influential by borrowing U.S. power. Although Japan is taking a firm stand toward China regarding visits to the Yasukuni shrine and the textbook issues, the essence of the issue is political and Japan is trying to become directly involved in the Taiwan issue by containing China militarily. The final objective of Japan is to be internationally prominent with U.S. help and eventually to sail out to the ‘independent sea.’ ”19 It is not clear whether Japan’s firm stance toward China is a strategic policy of Japan based on the consensus of the Koizumi government. At least, the government has never stated it clearly or even hinted at it. It is more realistic to consider that this policy is not based on strategic consensus, but rather reflects public opinion and politics in dealing with each situation after years of smoldering over Japan’s “passive” policy toward China. However, based on general political thinking in China, it is only natural that the Chinese view the series of movements as part of a “conspiracy theory” that the Japanese government is proceeding with consolidated intent. A different conclusion might be reached by concentrating first on changes in the popular image of China inside Japan as one cause of the shifting Japanese government stance.

The Beginning of a Psychological Cold War with China? Public opinion surveys have been carried out by the Secretariat of the Japanese Cabinet since 1978.20 According to a survey carried out in October 2004 (covering 3,000 people randomly selected), 37.6 percent

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of Japanese felt “friendly” toward China and 58.2 percent did not. Those who thought that the Japan/China relationship was going well were 28.1 percent, and over 61 percent did not agree. The survey was taken soon after the Asian Soccer Cup was marred by anti-Japan behavior of Chinese spectators. The mood never improved as news followed of the alleged gas siphoning in the East China Sea, the incursion of a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine into Japan’s territorial waters, and finally the anti-Japan demonstrations in 2005. The same survey showed 56.7 percent of Japanese felt “friendly” toward South Korea and 39.2 percent did not; and 55.5 percent described the relationship with South Korea as “good” versus 34.9 percent as “not good.” Despite the disputes in 2005 over territory and a textbook and growing distrust of the South Korean government under Roh Mov-hyun, the South Korean boom in Japan continued. A worsening image of China is also apparent in polls. According to the December 2004 results of the poll conducted by Yomiuri shimbun and the Gallop Company, only 16 percent of Japanese felt the relationship with China was “good” and 59 percent felt it was “not good,” whereas in the United States 31.9 percent felt the relationship was “good” and 16 percent not good.21 Similarly, only 16.5 percent of Japanese indicated that they can trust China, in contrast to 40.7 percent in the United States. Those who do not trust China number 71.2 percent in Japan and 56.9 percent in the United States.22 The center of the dispute has been the annual visit by Koizumi to the Yasukuni shrine. Even among readers of Asahi shimbun, which maintains its position of opposing the visit, a survey in November 2004 found that 38 percent supported it and 39 percent opposed it; and when it came to the demand of China to stop the visits, 30 percent thought it reasonable, whereas 57 percent did not agree.23 Perceptions of China are changing, as can be seen in the annual surveys conducted since 1978 by the Secretariat of the Japanese Cabinet. In 1981 the image of China among the Japanese reached its peak: 78.6 percent felt “friendly” and only 14.7 percent did not. The results were slightly higher than the 77.2 percent of Japanese who felt “friendly” toward the United States and 14.7 percent who did not.24 By 1978 China’s modernization policy had taken a firm hold and the Japan–China Peace and Friendship Treaty and the Japan–China Long Term Trade Agreement were signed. Ahead of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the United States and China on January 1, 1979, the Japan–China relationship had been expanding. At the end of 1978, many contracts in the steel and chemical industries were signed

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and there was a kind of “China Fever” with the prospect of market development. In addition, an extremely popular NHK TV documentary program called “Silk Road” gave a considerable boost to the romantic feelings of Japanese toward the continent. The image toward China did not change very much until June 1989, when “friendly feelings” declined to 51.6 percent and “not friendly” ones increased to 43.1 percent as nostalgia started to be crushed by images of the reality of China. To shake China free from isolation from the world and to avoid becoming another Soviet Union after its break-up, Deng Xiaoping set a goal of establishing a market economy, and foreign investment rushed into the Chinese market lifting the growth rate beyond 10 percent a year. Yet, the image of China among the Japanese people did not improve. In 1995, “feeling friendly” and “not feeling friendly” toward China were both 48.4 percent and in 1996, the rates of “feeling friendly” dropped to 45 percent and “not feeling friendly” 51.3 percent, reversed for the first time. One reason behind this negative image may have been the perception of China continuing to gain power and international status from rapid economic growth. Another is that Japan was suffering from psychological damage after the collapse of the bubble economy. Also, we cannot forget that the “China Menace Theory” was spreading due to China’s military exercises and the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis in 1996. At any rate, the nostalgic feelings toward China among the Japanese faded before the reality of the present-day situation. As interdependence between Japan and China deepened, images toward each other worsened. In the 1980s, the total trade volume was less than $10 billion; however, in 2004, including Hong Kong, it exceeded $200 billion, which is more than the total trade volume with the United States. Direct investments reached $8 billion worth of contracts in 2003, as the actual figure approximated $5 billion. Why was deepened interdependence accompanied by expanded friction and a kind of psychological cold war? One explanation is a “power shift theory.” Japan enjoyed economic prosperity in the 1980s; however, it became psychologically weak and introverted after the collapse of the bubble economy in the 1990s. In contrast, China’s rapid rise led to mixed feelings, warning that China does not know proper manners and how to behave as a great nation in the world community, which gives Japanese the impression of China being overbearing. In a long-term version of the power shift theory, we see a picture of Chinese having a sense of superiority for their great civilization until the nineteenth century followed by an inferiority complex from their failure in modernization, and Japan having a cultural inferiority complex until the nineteenth century and

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then a sense of superiority by succeeding in modernization. At the start of the twenty-first century, Japan and China are on equal terms for the first time in history and are struggling with a complex sense of rivalry.25 Increased interdependence has a high possibility of creating frictions, as noted in many textbooks on international relations. The more interdependence deepens, the more conflicts of interest occur; however, these frictions cannot easily destroy fundamental relationships, according to the textbooks. The worsening image of Japanese people toward China was due at various times to: China’s military maneuvers, as during the Taiwan Strait crisis; economic strains from wrongdoings; nondemocratic images; and violent crimes committed by Chinese in Japan (in 2003, there were 16,708 cases committed by 8,996 criminals, of which 41 percent of the cases and 45 percent of the criminals were foreigners, mostly Chinese). The above factors cumulatively gave rise to a negative image of China; however, the current situation of mutually deteriorating images can also be traced to a structural element. The End of the 1972 System—the International Context Normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China was based on three major elements known as the “1972 System” for the year when their impact was registered.26 These were the cold war, a common awareness of China, and the Taiwan issue. After signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan faced two Chinas, the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC) and was forced to select one. Although Yoshida Shigeru sought relations with the PRC, under U.S. pressure and the reality of the cold war, Japan acknowledged Taiwan’s ROC in 1952. Having forged a U.S. alliance marked by the US–Japan Security Treaty, Japan had no other choice. As the Soviet Union and China were allies, the PRC considered the United States an “imperialist power” and Japan its “follower.” In order to improve relations with the PRC, U.S. approval and recognition of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty by the PRC were the indispensable conditions. What made it possible was the U.S.–China détente after 1971, a process to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Although Japan was shocked at the sudden change, the rapprochement between the United States and China made it possible for Japan to seek an autonomous foreign policy. Freed from the restrictions, Japan under Tanaka Kakuei normalized diplomatic relations with China without delay, and it concluded various agreements concerning trade, aviation, fishery, shipping, and so on.

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Where to position the Soviet Union was complicated; however, Japan and China managed to agree on the Japan–China Peace and Friendship Treaty by 1978 as it pursued China aggressively. When Deng Xiaoping visited Japan to exchange ratification documents for the Peace and Friendship Treaty, he was surprised at the high level of modernization and upon his return to China, he set the growth of Japan as the model for modernization and was positive toward receiving funds from Japan.27 Immediately after his visit, Japan decided to provide loans in yen and grants ODA, a sign of its acknowledgment of that country. In studies on the decision to provide ODA to China by the Ohira administration, three views can be found: (1) postwar consideration of China relinquishing its demand for war reparations from Japan; (2) potential economic benefits from the promising Chinese market; and (3) expression of autonomous diplomatic relations toward the United States or, conversely, keeping step with the U.S. strategy toward Asia, both related to U.S. policies. Recently Suh Seungwon, on the contrary, has pointed out that the decision was due mainly to strong concern for preventing China’s retrogression after it had just emerged from the Cultural Revolution and had launched its modernization policy. In other words, Japan’s biggest concern was how to pull China back into the international community. Suh calls it Japan’s “Economic Diplomacy,” a sign of seeking power in international politics.28 Under the 1972 System, there was agreement on two aspects of the Taiwan issue. One was that official diplomatic relations should not be established with both the PRC and the ROC simultaneously, and Japan should choose one, that is, the “One China” principle. The other was that Japan should “fully understand and respect” Beijing’s position that “Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China.” As Japan had diversified interests in Taiwan that had developed since 1952, especially economic ties, it was able to get China’s tacit consent for maintaining the relationship through the private sector even after breaking off diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Not many Japanese demanded maintenance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan or were even sympathetic toward Taiwan, except a pro-Taiwan group and some staunch anti-communists. After all, Taiwan was under the dictatorial control of the Kuomintang. The international context that supported the 1972 System has changed drastically. The cold war ended in 1989, the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991, and the mutual hypothetical enemy that supported the virtual alliance of Japan, the United States, and China disappeared. When both Japan and the United States were concerned

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about the direction China would take after June 1989, Japan took the lead in appealing not to isolate China and resuming ODA assistance. At this point, Japan may have been still exercising its economic diplomacy under the 1972 System.29 Only after 1992 when China reached a remarkable annual growth rate while Japan was engulfed in the Heisei Great Recession after the collapse of the “bubble economy” did the economic logic change. As for security, only from 1995–96 with the Taiwan Straits missile tests and the “China Menace Theory” as well as agreement on “redefining the US–Japan Security Treaty” was another element of the 1972 System seriously reconsidered. Meanwhile, Japan began to question whether China should be considered as a “developing country” under the framework of the 1972 System since it had achieved remarkable economic growth. The stance toward ODA for China—once considered the symbol of Japan/China friendship—had changed. Whereas Japan’s economic situation had worsened, China’s economy had grown rapidly. When China increased military spending and space development expenditures and offered more financial assistance to developing countries, Japan started to question why it should continue providing ODA to China. Moreover, one of the criticisms was that ODA was not acknowledged by the Chinese people. Reflecting public sentiment, the Koizumi administration started to decrease ODA for China each year. On November 28, 2004, Koizumi hinted at China’s “graduation” from ODA, which became official in 2005 with the announcement that ODA for China would end as of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.30 How to perceive a more powerful China and to position China in Japan’s diplomacy are points of discussion that have just started, but providing ODA and retaining the 1972 System is no longer considered strategic for Japan. The “One China” principle in dealing with the Taiwan issue has not formally changed, but perceptions inside Japan of how to deal with Taiwan have. Since 1986 democratic measures have transformed Taiwan into a multiparty political system. Under Lee Teng-hui mainlander control broke down, democratization accelerated, and transformation of the ROC into Taiwan advanced abruptly. Chen Shui-bian of the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidential election in 2000, ending the control of the Kuomintang. Reelected in 2004, Chen tolerated economic unification with China; however, politically he took steps toward independence and made severe confrontation with the PRC inevitable. Although both Japan and the United States made it clear that they would not support Taiwan’s independence that could lead to war, they also took great interest in the future of Taiwan. Thus, the 1972

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System concerning Taiwan was not fundamentally changed; however, due to enormous internal changes in Taiwan, any solution without the consent of its residents had become more difficult. The End of the 1972 System—the Domestic Context Examining the domestic context of the 1972 System provides background for grasping changes in Japanese strategic thinking. First, the 1972 System was backed by a specific generation with its own worldview, that is, the sentiments of the war generation not to repeat the miserable history of war. For them, “Japan–China Friendship” had significant meaning; no matter what problems existed, they sought to go back to the original stand of “Japan–China Friendship.” Dealing with Chinese leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Liao Zhengzhi, who were responsible for diplomatic relations with Japan, Tanaka Kakuei and Ohira Masayoshi, who played the major role in the normalization of diplomatic relations, as well as business leaders, such as Inayama Yoshihiro and Okazaki Kaheita, all had a certain sense of atonement toward the war particular to their generation. They seemed to have had a mission to pursue friendship with China. Regarding historical views of war and aggression, some still try to justify Japan’s actions to this day; however, under the 1972 System, their opinions could not be heard much because of the war generation and its strong influence. The Joint Communiqué issued at the time of normalization of diplomatic relations stated, “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war, and deeply reproaches itself.”31 Chinese materials concerning Japan–China relations do not refer in detail to historical issues. They seem to indicate that China had in mind strategic thoughts in the context of its international relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. On the other hand, even though historical issues are not expressed directly, it is rather evident that Japan always had war and aggression in mind. Simply put, China viewed Japan-related policies in the context of its international strategy, whereas Japan had a tendency to view the relationship with China as one between two nations.32 The 1972 System was backed by the political structure of Japan led by the LDP. At the time of diplomatic normalization, Tanaka, who headed the largest faction of the LDP, had great influence over Japanese politics. Tanaka regarded the relationship with China as highly important and used it to the maximum. After Tanaka’s downfall because of the Lockheed

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scandal, his faction was eventually taken over by that of Takeshita Noboru. Yet, before Takeshita became prime minister in 1987, Prime Minister Nakasone developed personal ties of mutual trust with Hu Yaobang. Hu’s fall damaged this connection. Nakasone explained in his memoirs that Hu was forced into a tight corner due to Nakasone’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine in 1985, and Nakasone agreed to stop such visits, responding to a personal request by Hu.33 Relations seemed to remain stagnant, despite Japan’s continued adherence to the System. Around this time, more troublesome issues arose, including a lawsuit over property rights regarding a dormitory in Kyoto for Chinese exchange students, Japan’s defense spending exceeding one percent of its GDP, and a trade imbalance favoring Japan. Yet, after succeeding Nakasone, Takeshita visited China in August 1988 in commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Peace and Friendship Treaty and agreed on a huge loan of 810 billion yen to China, reaffirming the status quo in relations. The elements that supported the 1972 System changed greatly. New generations, changed historical awareness, and domestic politics altered Japanese thinking. Sixty years have passed since the end of the war, and the only generation that recalls the war is the elderly. No longer does this generation have social influence. In politics, Nakasone is still somewhat active; however, he has, for the most part, retired. Sentiments of “Japan–China Friendship” have faded along with both atonement and romanticism, replaced by unsentimental criticism of the “real” China after the turning point in 1989 and then the emperor’s visit to China in 1992 that ended any complex toward historical issues. Anticipation of the emperor’s trip caused a great deal of controversy over whether he should visit China or not; however, his successful visit gave many a feeling of relief that Japan could finally put to rest the wartime animosity. The emperor who is not allowed to make any political remarks expressed his own thoughts delicately at the welcome reception banquet. His remark was, “In the long history and relations of two nations, there was a time when my country caused a great deal of suffering to the people of China. It is my grave sorrow.”34 With this remark Emperor Akihito brought to an end an entire epoch. In China, on the other hand, history issues linked to Japan surfaced around the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war in 1995. Chinese authorities claimed that it was just a patriotic movement, not an antiJapan campaign; however, as long as winning the war against Japan is the basis for the legitimacy of the ruling party’s control, patriotism and antiJapan sentiments are naturally inseparable. As China’s growth has accelerated since 1992 under a market economy and people have been

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increasingly weaned away from the Communist Party and from the socialist ideology, leaders have seen a need to put a brake on the situation. Around the same time, the Taiwan issue, the other element that backs the legitimacy of the Chinese Community Party’s rule, became prominent and China was worried that Japan might get involved as new guidelines for the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty were established. A gap in understanding between Japan and China became obvious during Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998, with friction over history issues. On the surface, his visit seemed to be successful when a joint communiqué was issued under the new slogan of “Friendly Cooperative Partnership.” Yet, for the Japanese, Jiang’s visit failed due to his incessant criticisms, including remarks about Japan’s militarism during the imperial banquet.35 He tried to have Japan include an apology for what it did in the past in the joint communiqué; however, Japan explained that historical problems were mentioned clearly in the 1972 Joint Communiqué and refused. We can see the end of the 1972 System even in Japan’s domestic political context. Traditionally, the LDP was the political pipeline with China; however, the Miyazawa administration resigned in August 1993 and the Hosokawa coalition government was born, ending what was labeled Japan’s 1955 Political System. Since 1994, the LDP has not been able to sustain single-party control. Currently it maintains political power by forming an alliance with the Komei Party. Prime Ministers Hashimoto and Obuchi used to be part of the Tanaka faction; however, there were some signs of Japan’s relationship with China declining even when they were in power, especially due to Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan. When Koizumi became prime minister, the LDP’s factionalism, due partially to strict regulations on political ethics, lost some of its force. After the birth of the Koizumi government in 2001, the prime minister continued his visits to the Yasukuni shrine, and frictions with China increased. The Hashimoto group insisted on improving relations with China; however, Hashimoto was no longer influential, especially after a political contribution scandal that came to light and the resignation of Nonaka Hiromu, a central figure in the faction. Weakening of human networks in Japanese politics has reverberated in Japan–China relations. Conclusion Japan–China relations are growing more complicated as seen in the antiJapan demonstrations that occurred across China in the spring of 2005. This is the consequence of accumulated gaps in communication between the two nations and expanded friction since the 1990s. The slogan

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“Japan–China Friendship” has lost its effect. Japan’s attitude toward Japan–China relations changed from keeping a low profile to being assertive and autonomous. Matters worsened after June 1989 despite closer and deeper interdependence between Japan and China. A psychological factor arose from the contrast between China’s economic growth and growing power on the international scene and Japan’s economic recession after the collapse of the bubble economy. At any rate, those Japanese who used to have nostalgic and romantic feelings as well as admiration toward China were brought back to the reality of China gaining power with uncertain goals in the future. The end of the 1972 System in both its international and domestic contexts has left Japan pondering how to approach China anew. The end of the cold war, the rise of China’s power, and the democratization of Taiwan all undermined the existing system after 1972. The “One China” principle has not changed to date, even if the nature of the Taiwan issue and the international environment surrounding it have changed a great deal and the way Japanese see Taiwan has also changed drastically. Members of the war generation that supported Japan–China relations, backed by feelings of atonement and a sense of mission, have retired. The postwar generation focuses on the reality in China and is tired of the history issue and China’s endless criticism. The Japanese thought the history problem ended with the visit of the emperor in 1992 and were irritated when China kept raising it, as in Jiang’s visit of 1998. Dominance by the LDP and the Tanaka faction ended with LDP single-party control in 1993. The Hashimoto faction, heir to Tanaka’s normalization strategy, weakened, especially after Koizumi took office in 2001, causing a breakdown in the network of people who worked on Japan–China relations. It took much time and effort to build up Japan/China relations. After normalization in 1972, the Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1978, and the emperor’s visit to China in 1992, the momentum has turned from building stronger relations to trying to keep relations from deteriorating. For many years when problems arose, important people in different fields worked to settle disputes. Japan dealt with history problems relatively promptly, and China acted maturely in order to contain them. In other words, both Japan and China tried to keep them under wraps and made efforts to maintain friendly relations by respecting each other. It may have been the Asian-style of operating through a tacit understanding. Now, such wisdom is not always available. In Japan, there are many who call the Japanese diplomacy of recent years the “kowtow diplomacy” giving in to “Chinese Thought.” In reference to the Chinese policy toward Japan,

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people have a tendency to consider that China has constantly used the “history card” to promote “anti-Japan education” at the grassroots level. In China, on the other hand, people consider that Japan is neglecting history education and is assuming an “Anti-China” policy intentionally, calling it the “leaning right” tendency or “containing China” jointly with the United States. China is quite alarmed. Thus, the history problem became a political issue and, as a result, Japan/China mutual mistrust has been growing. There may be random prescriptions or specific remedies such as top-level exchanges; however, considering historical circumstances, the problem lies in more essential and structural factors and treatment with long-term awareness and attitude is needed. After the turbulent anti-Japan demonstrations of 2005, scholars and the press discussed the matter very actively, aware that the main theme in Japan–China relations become the issue of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni shrine. Unprecedented, heated debates are taking place among political circles, journalists, and the academic world in Japan concerning the Yasukuni shrine itself and many public opinion surveys have been taken. All show arguments both for and against the visit to the shrine; however, as to the question whether the visits should be stopped thus meeting the demands of China and Korea, the answer was predominantly negative reflecting a poverty of thinking in political circles, journalists, and the academic world on the subject, as a worsening Japan/China relationship has been evident for some time. In any case, we should consider it positive that Japanese society is actually discussing the issue. Such debates should be carried out thoroughly and focus on finding a balanced approach, keeping strategic objectives clearly in mind. Considering the mutually dependent and even unavoidably close relationship, it is inconceivable to have a decisive, prolonged confrontation between Japan and China. However, we humans do not always act logically. At times, one accidental incident touches off nationalistic attitudes in both countries, and critical situations may occur especially if there is a lack of communication between the two governments or other unfortunate circumstances develop. It is dangerous to subconsciously think optimistically that such a confrontation could never occur or to act out of force of habit. Efforts must be made to establish mutual exchanges of different expertise and networks in order to develop a system for firmer interdependence and to raise levels of trust that would put a floor on any downward spiral. That requires strategic thinking. On the Japanese side, this means paying renewed attention to reciprocal ways to improve the atmosphere in bilateral relations and to why they would serve the national interest.

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Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28. 29. 30.

Renmin ribao, March 15, 2005. Sankei shimbun, March 30, 2005. Asahi shimbun, April 1, 2005. Asahi shimbun, April 7, evening edition, 2005. Li Zhaoxing’s report, Renmin ribao, April 20, 2005. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/meet0504/speech.html⬎. See major newspapers on April 24, 2005. Interviewed students who participated in a demonstration. Photo of a bus waiting for demonstrators was taken by a Japanese residing in Beijing and was put on the Internet. Obtained some internal Internet texts distributed before demonstrations. Special issue on the Yasukuni problem, Yomiuri shimbun, June 9, 2005. Also see, ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/koizumi/observe0204.html⬎ (Koizumi’s statement). Asahi shimbun, April 4, 2001 and April 6 and 7, 2005. Asahi shimbun, May 23 (evening edition) and 24, 2002. Asahi shimbun and Nihon keizai shimbun, June 10, 2004. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/kaidan/g_machimura/apec_g8_04/ j_ china_gh.html⬎ (Foreign Ministers meeting summary). ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502. html⬎ (Joint Statement document). ⬍http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/e01_02.htm⬎. ⬍http://jda-clearing.jda.go.jp/hakusho_data/2005/w2005_00.html⬎. Liaowang, August 19, 2005. Naikakufu daijinkanbo seifu kohoshitsu, Gaiko ni kansuru seron chosa, 2004: ⬍http://ww8.cao.go.jp/survey/index-gai.html⬎. Yomiuri shimbun, December 16, 2004. Yomiuri shimbun, December 16, 2004. Asahi shimbun, November 30, 2004. Gaiko ni kansuru seron chosa. See Keio University’s symposium records on Japan–China relations in Ronza, May 2005, pp.172–81, for related discussions. Kokubun Ryosei, “Reisengo no Nitchu kankei: ‘Nanajuninen taisei’ no tenkan,” Kokusai mondai, January 2001, pp. 42–56; and Kokubun Ryosei, “Beyond Normalization: Thirty Years of Sino-Japanese Diplomacy,” Gaiko Forum English Edition, winter 2003. Asahi shimbun, October 26, 1978. Suh Seungwon, Nihon no keizai gaiko to Chugoku (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2004), chapters 1 and 2. Suh, Nihon no keizai gaiko to Chugoku, chapter 4. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0411/press.html⬎ (Koizumi’s press conference speech). Also see Yomiuri shimbun, March 3 and 18, 2005.

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31. ⬍http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html⬎. 32. Ishii Akira, Zhu Jianrong, Soeya Yoshihide, and Lin Xiaoguang, eds., Kiroku to kosho: Nitchu kokko seijoka to Nitchu heiwa yuko joyaku teiketsu kosho (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2003). 33. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Jiseiroku (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 2004), pp. 135–39. 34. ⬍http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/⬎. 35. Kokubun Ryosei, “Shiren no jidai no Nitchu kankei: Kotakumin honichi kijitsu,” Hogaku kenkyu, January 2000.

CHAPTER 7

Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan Ming Wan

J

apan’s strategic thinking toward Taiwan should tell us much about Tokyo’s overall strategic thinking. Strategic thinking is often narrowly defined as thinking about a country’s national security. More broadly, it may be seen as a calculated approach to advance a country’s core national objectives. Security thinking toward Taiwan has become important to Japan since the mid-1990s. It is viewed in the context of relations with the PRC and the world. The United States, Japan’s security ally, has taken on the responsibility of defending Taiwan against unprovoked attacks from the PRC. Taiwan is strategically located on Japan’s shipping lanes to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Taiwan has become a high-stakes issue. To know a country’s strategic thinking, it is crucial to see how it views high-stakes issues. The chapter also examines Japan’s general attitude toward Taiwan as well as the PRC. On the one hand, public sentiment in Japan often exerts a major impact on policy. Thus, anyone who studies Japanese foreign policy has to pay close attention to Japanese public opinion. On the other hand, one should not confuse sentiment with strategic calculations. Similar to other countries, much of Japanese writing about the Taiwan issue is a reflection of public sentiment rather than strategic thinking, as the term strategy normally means. Thus, to identify what is public sentiment is to sharpen our understanding of what is strategic in Japanese thinking. Japanese views on Taiwan have been diverse and evolving. Broadly speaking, the Japanese have become more sympathetic to Taiwan since

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the outcry over the PRC’s handling of the 1989 Tiananmen demonstrators, and they have become worried about the security implications of the Taiwan issue since the Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait in the mid-1990s. Some Japanese have become verbally supportive of Taiwan’s separation from China in the past few years, viewing Taiwan as more strategically important for Japan than for the United States. Japanese sympathy for Taiwan and concern over the PRC’s rise have translated into upgraded official exchange with the government in Taiwan and stronger public support for Taiwan’s security. In a highly publicized joint statement issued on February 19, 2005, the Japanese foreign minister and defense agency director general along with the U.S. secretaries of state and defense minister declared that Japan and the United States have a common security objective to “encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue.” At the same time, the Japanese government remains committed rhetorically to the One China Principle in the 1972 Joint Statement.1 Japan remains convinced that U.S.–China relations rather than Japan–China relations are central to the Taiwan question. Japanese know that Japan will side with the United States if conflict occurs in the Taiwan Strait but would rather not face that stark scenario and that Japan is in no position to fight for Taiwan at this point without the United States taking the lead. Japan is being defensive rather than offensive at this point, but the possibility exists of Japan taking a stronger stance depending on what China does and how international politics evolve. Taiwan is not the only worst-case scenario for a possible Japan–China conflict: territorial disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu and the East China Sea and competition over energy, being other scenarios. The Taiwan issue complicates Japan’s relations with China. Conversely, the state of the relationship with Beijing affects Tokyo’s strategic thinking toward Taiwan; a bad relationship with China would make the “loss of Taiwan” a far more significant security concern for Japan than would be the case if relations were friendly. The chapter includes six sections. The first section provides a brief historical overview of Japan’s relations with Taiwan through the 1980s. History provides a reference point to determine where current Japanese thinking toward Taiwan comes from and it is also a present issue in Japan’s relations with China. The next three sections examine Japan’s public sentiment and strategic thinking toward Taiwan in three periods: from 1989 to the mid-1990s, from the mid-1990s to 2001, and from 2001 to the present. The fifth section offers a focused discussion of the

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current triangular dynamic among Japan, Taiwan, and the PRC. The last section concludes the chapter. Historical Overview Meiji Japan launched its first overseas military expedition to Taiwan in 1874. Annexation of Taiwan from China in 1895 was the beginning of a Japanese colonial empire. In the early days after Meiji, Korea was viewed as Japan’s lifeline, a dagger pointed at its heart, and was thus far more important strategically than Taiwan. Japan fought a war with China in 1894–95 over Korea, not Taiwan. Nevertheless, once Taiwan became Japan’s colony, it acquired strategic importance as a Japanese territory and as a support base for Japan’s rivalry with the West. Also, Taiwan would later become an important strategic launching platform for Japan’s invasion of southern China and Southeast Asia in the 1930s–40s. Today many Taiwanese endorse the view that Japan’s colonial rule in Taiwan improved human and institutional resources and facilitated economic progress, self-serving though it might have been. They see China unfavorably by contrast.2 Japanese opinion of China has worsened continuously since 1989. Thus, we see a triangular dynamic in terms of public sentiment among Japan, Taiwan, and the PRC. A favorable view of Japan among Taiwanese and an unfavorable view of Japan among Chinese contribute to reciprocal positive sentiment toward Taiwan among the Japanese, which only serves to increase China’s suspicion of Japanese intention toward Taiwan and Chinese distrust of Taiwanese “traitors” to the motherland. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru was initially interested in making diplomatic gestures to the PRC. The ideal situation for Japan would have been to have official relations with both China and Taiwan to secure resources, markets, and diplomatic status wherever available. However, under U.S. pressure Japan established a diplomatic relationship with the Nationalist government in Taiwan in April 1952. Throughout the 1960s, Japanese public sentiment toward the PRC was generally favorable, but that alone was not enough to overcome Japan’s paramount strategic interest in maintaining a security alliance with the United States. Taiwan was not central to Japan’s strategic thinking during the cold war. Taiwan should have been important for Japan’s security. Americans certainly saw a clear connection between defense of Japan and defense of its other allies in Asia including Taiwan. But like other security issues,

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Japan could avoid acknowledging Taiwan’s strategic importance because it was shielded by the Japan–U.S. security alliance. Through the 1960s, Japan made accommodating gestures to the United States over the Taiwan issue, but it had no strategic planning for Taiwan per se. Taiwan was important in Japanese domestic politics. In 1965, 160 LDP Diet members formed the “Asian Problems Study Group,” which supported relations with Taiwan and opposed China’s membership in the United Nations (UN). Some of the anticommunist Japanese politicians such as Kishi Nobukuke and Sato Eisaku wanted to maintain a good relationship with Taiwan. There was also a smaller, 100-member group “Asian-African Problems Study Group” within the LDP that supported expanding ties with China. Furthermore, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and other progressive groups and parties supported better relations with China. The Japanese business community was interested in the China market, but they also had significant economic ties with Taiwan. That division in Japanese domestic politics explains why Japan sought to establish diplomatic ties with Beijing while maintaining a substantive relationship with Taiwan in its negotiations with China in 1972. In September 1972, Japan and China established diplomatic relations and issued a joint communiqué. Article Two of the Communiqué states that Japan “recognizes the Government of the People’s Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.” Article Three says: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Postsdam Proclamation.” Taiwan was a main negotiation issue during Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to Beijing, which centered on Premier Zhou Enlai’s “Three Principles” for diplomatic normalization, namely that the PRC is the sole legitimate Chinese government, that Taiwan is a province of China, and that Japan must abrogate its illegal peace treaty with Taiwan. Japan made a cleaner break with Taiwan than the United States. It took six more years for the United States to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, and even then the Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act to authorize arms sales to Taiwan. At the same time, Japan succeeded in maintaining unofficial ties with Taiwan and ensuring its economic interests in Taiwan, and the Japanese model would later be adopted by the United States to handle the Taiwan issue. Negotiations for the Sino-Japanese Civil Aviation Agreement, signed April 1974, were complicated by the Taiwan issue. China wanted Japan

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to sever its state-to-state arrangement with the Nationalist government in Taiwan. Japan met Beijing’s demand by creating a “separate airline” for Taiwan flights and letting the Taiwan airline land in a different airport (Haneda) from the PRC airline (Narita). In essence, Japan maintained substantive relations with Taiwan while allowing Beijing to save face. For the rest of the 1970s, China was content with Japan’s position on Taiwan, which explains why Taiwan was a nonissue in the difficult negotiations for the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, signed in 1978. In fact, as Chinese understood it, the Japan–U.S. Security Treaty now no longer covered Taiwan, given the changing nature of Sino-Japanese relations and the common security interest namely the Soviet Union.3 In the 1980s, Beijing voiced concerns over Japan’s policy toward Taiwan. In particular, the Chinese government turned a lawsuit on a student dorm in Kyoto into a major diplomatic dispute. The Kyoto district court ruled in February 1986 that it belonged to the Taiwan government. The Chinese government protested that the property should be transferred from the Nationalist government to the PRC government and characterized the civil suit as a political issue involving the legal rights of the PRC and the nature of Sino-Japanese relations. So the real issue was Beijing’s concern that the Japanese government was offering the Nationalist government de facto recognition in the court decision. In the scheme of things however, Taiwan was largely a nonissue between Beijing and Tokyo, sharply different from Sino-U.S. relations. Chinese analysts admit now that Japan was largely faithful to the terms of the 1972 Joint Communiqué through the early 1990s. In a way, Beijing did not appreciate how good it had it before the end of the cold war. The fact that China belatedly appreciates Japan’s past efforts in this regard reflects concern that Japan may adjust its strategic thinking toward Taiwan, which is indeed the case now.

Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan in the Early 1990s Japan had limited strategic space in policymaking toward Taiwan after World War II. First, Japan’s imperialist strategic thinking was discredited by its total defeat. Second, the Japan–U.S. security alliance since 1952 provided a strong constraint on Japan’s ability to maneuver on the Taiwan issue independently, which suited Japan just fine. Third, the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement added yet another constraint on

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Japan. Logically, limitations on strategic action should limit strategic thinking in the core of a country’s policy community. It would be a waste of time to think about issues beyond one’s control. Factually, there was not much strategic discussion about Taiwan in Japan through the 1980s. The world changed after 1989. The removal of the Soviet threat as a common strategic interest, combined with the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, led to heightened tensions in U.S.–China relations in the early 1990s. At the same time, the democratization and Taiwanization process in Taiwan that had begun before the end of the cold war accelerated. Japan was in an improved strategic position in the early 1990s. It was a rising economic superpower vis-à-vis both the United States, perceived to be in decline, and China, isolated due to Tiananmen. The mounting U.S. pressure on Japan in trade negotiations eroded the Japan–U.S. security arrangement, leading to greater Japanese interest in the UN and in East Asia. China’s isolation from industrial countries potentially also allowed Japan to play a brokerage role, which would enhance Tokyo’s diplomatic prestige. Thus, there was much discussion about Japan’s role in the world. One school of thought urged Japan to “reenter” Asia. Some wanted Japanese foreign policy to be centered on the UN. A few commentators wanted to say “no” to the United States. Yet another viewpoint emphasized the importance of maintaining a strong U.S. alliance. But a common denominator in the debate was a strong yearning for greater Japanese influence in Asia and in the world, which would have significant implications for Japan’s view of China and Taiwan. In the context of becoming a great power again, Japan reached out to China out of self-interest.4 The Japanese government now sought to situate the Japan–China relationship in the global context, which essentially meant the end of a special relationship perceived by many Japanese to be disadvantageous to Japan; further, some Japanese wanted to utilize its closer relations with China to advance Japan’s influence in the world.5 Moreover, since Japan was helping China after Tiananmen, its bargaining position vis-à-vis China improved. Both developments meant that Japan had the desire and confidence to end the special relationship with China. It follows then that taboo issues such as history and Taiwan became less salient for Japanese. There was always a reservoir of goodwill for Taiwan in Japan, but Japanese public affinity for Taiwan has grown across the political spectrum since 1989. There are no tracking surveys on Japanese public opinion toward Taiwan; as a result, we do not have a precise picture of trends in public opinion. But a broad consensus among Taiwan and China watchers in Japan and Japan watchers in China exists regarding such a trend.

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There are different explanations for this. First, Taiwan’s democratization that had begun in the late 1980s accelerated in the early 1990s and inevitably led to Taiwanization of the ruling elite given the fact that Taiwanese are the absolute majority in the island.6 Critics of China often start by contrasting the repressive communist regime in China and the vibrant democracy in Taiwan. Many Japanese hold it as an article of faith that the difference in political regimes explains why the view of Japan is worsening in China whereas the Taiwanese are friendly toward Japanese; the anti-Japanese propaganda by a communist government in order to divert public attention from domestic problems is the root cause of recent Japan–China tensions. In fact, Taiwan’s democracy explains why the Japanese appeared calm in a dispute with Taiwan over fishing rights near Senkaku/Diaoyu in June 2005, unlike their more emotional reaction to Chinese demonstrations a few weeks earlier.7 Second, an improved image of Taiwan virtually mirrors the worsening image of China in Japan. The events of June1989 on Tiananmen Square changed the public perception of the PRC and Taiwan. Observing Chinese government repression of dissent with regular army units in the nation’s capital, Japan’s public sentiment toward China began a steady decline while becoming more accepting of some Taiwanese’s desire for independence. There is a triangular dynamic among Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese public opinion; worsening Chinese perception of Japan and warming Taiwanese views of Japan help to improve Japan’s opinion of Taiwan and worsen its view of China. Third, the favorable view of Taiwan held by the Japanese stems in a major way from the warm reception given to Japanese officials, scholars, and opinion leaders by the Taiwanese government.8 President Lee Tenghui, in particular, was willing to talk to Japanese visitors on all levels and was sensitive to Japanese concerns. Japanese visitors would leave meetings content and appreciative of Taiwanese concerns. Lee continues to engage Japanese visitors. He is often compared to Zhou Enlai in his ability to relate to the Japanese. Like Zhou, Lee spends much time cultivating relations with the Japanese and knows what buttons to push. This reversal of roles partly reflects the fact that China was isolated diplomatically before and Taiwan is now. Chinese officials now simply have more foreign visitors to meet. Nonetheless, it is no secret that Taiwanese politicians tend to have a favorable view of Japan whereas Chinese leaders generally distrust Japan. Fourth, Japan’s colonial rule in Taiwan serves as a basis for sympathy. This is not a case in which the Japanese are interested in reclaiming the island; rather, it is part of general Japanese nostalgia about their past

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experience.9 More significant, Japan’s 50-year colonial rule in Taiwan contributes to a general sense that Taiwan is different from China, thus making a good case that it should shape its own destiny. According to Japanese perceptions, prior to Japan’s colonization Taiwan was an uncivilized place the Dutch helped to cultivate, frequented by Chinese and non-Chinese pirates, connected in an East Asian regional trade network, ruled passively and briefly by Qing emperors all of which makes Beijing’s claim over Taiwan problematic.10 This Japanese view coincides with Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) own view of Taiwanese history as distinct from that of China.11 Japanese analysts understood that Taiwan’s democratization meant the end of the Chinese civil war, which had been the foundation of the One-China principle underlying the 1972 System that favored Beijing. Put simply, once a large segment of Taiwanese society no longer wanted to be part of China, the logic for recognizing one China began to disintegrate.12 Taiwan’s new political reality posed a challenge to Japan’s policy. Japan had to balance between Taiwan and the PRC. Japan wanted to upgrade ties with Taiwan while remaining sensitive about Beijing’s reaction. But it was not unreasonable to believe that Japan now had some policy space because China now needed Japan more and Beijing itself had shown flexibility toward Taiwan for peaceful unification. Japan’s search for greater maneuver room on Taiwan fit nicely with Taiwan’s effort to expand its international space. Taiwan eagerly reached out to Japan.13 Tokyo accommodated Taiwan by allowing Vice Premier Hsu Li-The to attend the Asian Games opening ceremony in Hiroshima in September 1994 even though China had protested strongly. At the same time, Japan remained cautious and tended to retreat somewhat when Beijing protested. After all, Japan was also trying to maintain a good relationship with China, knowing well that Taiwan mattered to China. Japan’s security concerns about China emerged with the end of the cold war. In the early 1990s China began to increase military spending and asserted its territorial claims. Some Japanese, particularly defense specialists, voiced concerns about China’s potential military threat to Japan. Tomohide Murai, a professor at Japan’s National Defense Academy, wrote an article about China as a potential threat in the May 1990 Shokun magazine. His colleague Kawashima Kozo saw China expanding into a maritime power and argued that China would view Japan as its principal enemy.14 Hiramatsu Shigeo, formerly of the National Defense Agency, published a book on the emerging Chinese navy in 1991.15 Japan’s worry increased after the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress adopted the Law on the

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Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas (Territorial Waters Law) on February 25, 1992. The new law said that the PRC’s territorial islands include Senkaku/Diaoyu, Taiwan, the Penghu Islands and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. The Japan government protested.16 Taiwan was principally a political challenge for Japanese thinkers at this stage, however. The Japanese security thinking discussed in the previous paragraph was largely a minority view on the margin of Japanese policy thinking. Japan had a stronger interest in contributing to international peace after the experience of the first Persian Gulf War, but there was little interest in taking on bilateral security challenges. The 1992 Chinese territorial waters law did not cause immediate tension with China. After all, 1992 was a good year in Japan–China relations, with Chinese party chief Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in April and the Japanese emperor’s visit to China in October. Some contemporaries actually considered 1992 the best period in Japan–China relations. If the Chinese Territorial Waters Law had been enacted in a time of tensions between China and Japan as it is now, it would have surely caused far more serious tensions between the two nations. Japan’s security concerns about China would increase, as is shown in the following two sections. In that context, Taiwan would shift from a diplomatic and political issue to a security one. China’s growing military strength contributed to a renewed U.S. interest in strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance. The March 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis helped to illustrate the strategic importance of the alliance. Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan in the Late 1990s Japanese began to be seriously concerned about the security dimension of their relations with China during the 1995–96 Chinese military exercises aimed at Taiwan.17 Japanese now realized that their country could be dragged into a U.S.–China military conflict. Japanese had previously ceased to consider security to be an important issue in relations with China and in the cross-Strait relationship because the last crisis took place in 1958 when the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) shelled two islands controlled by the Nationalist government in Taiwan and because Japanese thought China had changed with economic reform and opening. A dominant view in the Japanese policy community is that the Taiwan Strait crisis was a wakeup call for Japan. Japanese attitudes toward Taiwan became more favorable and views of China worsened still after the mid-1990s. Beijing’s military intimidation

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tactic made the Japanese more sympathetic to Taiwan and more negative about China. Also, due to fatigue over the history issue, more Japanese began to feel, based on exchange with Taiwanese, that many Taiwanese express affinity for Japan, in turn making them feel close to the Taiwanese.18 The Japanese media, both reflecting and shaping Japanese public opinion, also became more critical of China. Critics of China became more energetic after the mid-1990s. They wrote a large volume of books, journal articles, and editorials advocating a tougher policy toward China and an improved official relationship with Taiwan. The leading thinkers along this line include Hiramatsu Shigeo, Hasegawa Keitaro, Ishihara Shintaro, Kase Hideaki, Nakajima Mineo, Nakamura Katsunori, Nakanishi Terumasa, and Okazaki Hisahiko.19 The thrust of their arguments is that China is trying to revive the Chinese world order in Asia and Japan must resist it. In that context, Taiwan shares a common destiny with Japan. Taiwan is a democracy, and the most pro-Japan country in Asia. Thus Taiwan’s survival is essential for Japan’s defense of sea lanes. On the other end of the political spectrum, some Japanese still advocated good relations with China and urged Japan to be sensitive to Beijing’s concern over history and Taiwan, but their influence began to decline. The mainstream view in Japanese policymaking sought a compromise position. On the one hand, Japan strengthened the alliance with the United States beginning in 1995, with direct security implications for the Taiwan issue. Japan also paid greater attention to its defense doctrine and capabilities. On the other hand, Japan tried not to attract attention to its role in Taiwan in this period and tried to be vague about whether its expanded security arrangement with the United States would cover Taiwan. Japanese officials emphasized the legal obligation of the 1972 Joint Statement. They also recognized that Taiwan was a sensitive issue that needed to be dealt with carefully. Though the Japanese might confront China over the history issue, they knew the importance of Taiwan for China. Tokyo’s strategy worked to some extent as China protested over the strengthened Japan–U.S. alliance but continued to cooperate on other issues. It made sense strategically for Japan to tread lightly in the Taiwan issue. The United States, the world’s sole superpower with a security treaty with Japan, was committed to Taiwan’s defense by law if China used force against the island. Beijing was asserting its claim to take Taiwan by force if necessary. China’s military exercises in 1995–96 increased the danger of a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Moreover, China was a rising economic and military power. In this

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situation, Japan had little incentive to take rash actions, particularly when the two principals themselves had yet to come to the point of an explicit military confrontation. Instead, Japan continued to use its tried and true approach of coping in foreign relations. This coping strategy became difficult to maintain due to developments in Taiwan. Taiwan became a direct democracy and was moving further away from China politically and psychologically. Thus, Taiwan would force the issue. Moreover, Japan–China relations had also changed. Japan’s relations with Beijing continued to deteriorate, which would put the Taiwan issue in a different light. The second half of the 1990s was dominated by frequent disputes and repairs. The 1998 visit to Japan by Jiang Zemin furthered this negative trend of worsening Japanese opinion of China. Jiang was viewed as unreasonably pressuring the Japanese over the history issue to keep Japan down and to advance China’s own great power ambitions. Taiwan was one of the underlying sources of growing tension between Beijing and Tokyo. In fact, one of Jiang’s principal objectives for his 1998 trip to Japan was to have the Japanese government accept the principle of “Three Nos,” namely no to Taiwan’s independence; no to one China, one Taiwan or two Chinas; and no to Taiwan’s membership in the UN or other international organizations that include only sovereign nations. Even though President Bill Clinton had just verbally accepted the principle during his visit to China, the Japanese government soundly rejected the Chinese demand. Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Taiwan since 2001 Japan’s strategic thinking toward Taiwan since 2001 maintains a clear continuity with its previous thinking. What has changed is that security thinking regarding Taiwan has been fleshed out and has become more salient in Japanese discourse in the context of a worsening top-level political relationship with China; Taiwan is now a security concern for Japan, not just as a derivative of the U.S.–Japan alliance; and Japan has become more explicit in its policy position on Taiwan and is taking precautionary measures in case of a Taiwan contingency. Japan’s policy toward Taiwan began to shift in 2001 with former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Japan in April. Lee had tried to attend the Asia Open Forum in Matsumoto in October 2000 but failed due to Beijing’s protest. Support in Japan for Lee’s visit in 2001 grew. Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro asked the Foreign Ministry to grant Lee a visa. Concerned about Japan–China relations, the Foreign

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Ministry decided against it initially. However, on April 20, the Japanese government allowed Lee to come to Japan for medical treatment.20 Lee visited Japan on April 22–26, a major breakthrough for Taiwan and a major setback for China. Significant for future handling of China, the Japanese felt that Japan survived this test of political will with China with little damage. In fact, some critics of China simply called China a “paper tiger” since it did not carry out retaliations as moderates in Japan had feared.21 Koizumi Junichiro, who assumed office the day Lee left Japan, did not make the decision on Lee’s visit. What has been significant about Sino-Japanese relations since Koizumi became prime minister is political coolness on the top level. Koizumi’s annual visits to Yasukuni have meant a suspension of mutual visits by government leaders since 2002. Taiwan emerged as a top political issue between the two nations in that context. Japan began to talk about the security of Taiwan in an open fashion around 2004, which reflected worsening Japan–China political relations and, in turn, further strained the relationship. Japan’s public sentiment toward Taiwan continues to improve and has come to exert an unusually large impact on Japanese foreign policy toward China. As an often-cited example of Japan’s broad sympathy for Taiwan, even Asahi shimbun, the most pro-China newspaper in Japan, supported granting former president Lee Teng-hui a visa to visit Japan as a private citizen.22 In a more recent case, virtually all Japanese newspapers criticized China’s anti-secession law enacted in March 2005 as destabilizing. Japanese public opinion also has a major effect on politicians who have become ever more important in decision-making in Japan at the expense of elite bureaucrats since the mid-1990s. In Japan’s relations with China, there is a larger tendency of the public and politicians to feed off each other in a way that is unfavorable to China. The Japanese public has urged the government to be firmer over a number of issues, particularly over territorial disputes. Such sentiment has made a number of policy changes possible. For example, while the Ground SDF considered plans to strengthen the defense of Okinawa and other southwestern islands in the mid-1990s in light of China’s 1992 territorial waters law, they did not carry out the plans due to concern over negative public reaction from Okinawans. But by the end of 2004 Japanese defense officials were planning to replace F-4 fighters with more powerful F-15s in Okinawa and to upgrade the GSDF troops to a brigade, anticipating little public negative reaction or protests from the ruling parties.23 For the past two years some Japanese have come to support Taiwan’s separate path from China, converging with pro-independence Taiwanese

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activists.24 For example, 47 junior Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) parliamentarians reportedly expressed support at a meeting held in November 2004 for the right of Taiwanese to revise the constitution and to correct the name of the state based on public will.25 Support for Taiwan has also grown within the ruling LDP, particularly among younger politicians many of whom have built strong personal ties with Taiwanese leaders.26 Beijing considers revision of the constitution and correction of state names as moves toward independence. There is even greater support in Japan for Taiwan’s effort to seek greater international space. The idea of geopolitics has come back in Japan. When reading Japanese publications and news stories or talking with Japanese officials and analysts, one reads or hears frequently the analysis that if China takes Taiwan, the Taiwan Strait would become China’s internal waters and can thus control Japan’s shipping lane. And if the United States and China ever fought over Taiwan, Japan would be dragged into the conflict. Japan’s defense community now more openly expresses security concerns about China. Retired SDF officers, who are presumably freer to talk about issues than active-duty officers, express alarm over China’s apparent maritime expansion and increasing military spending. They typically use geopolitics, Chinese history as the Middle Kingdom, and Chinese Communist Party rule to explain China’s behavior.27 Gomi Matsuyoshi, a retired vice admiral of the Maritime SDF, sees China as positioning itself to seize natural resources in Japan’s economic zones down the line and urges Japan to acquire the independent defense capacity in case of military clashes with China based on the argument that Japan needs the maritime resources in the disputed areas for survival and prosperity in the twenty-first century and that the United States might not come to Japan’s assistance over disputes in the East China Sea. 28 Furusawa Tadahiko, another retired vice admiral, sees China as shifting from a continental country to a maritime one and as seeking to recreate a Chinese world order in which neighboring countries are obedient to the Chinese.29 In this context, he sees Taiwan as central to China’s objective to establish a Chinese empire and to seek maritime resources. He argues that it is far better to see Taiwan maintaining the status quo than becoming part of China since the island is strategically located along Japan’s sea lanes. China’s seizure of Taiwan would mean that the South China Sea and the East China Sea would become Chinese waters, which would restrict traditional maritime states in the region. Besides, Taiwan is a fellow maritime democracy that would serve as a check on China’s maritime expansion. He also recommends that Japan formulate its own defense strategy to deal with security threats while improving its alliance with the United States.30

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Japanese government officials and politicians seem to share security concerns over the Taiwan question. Not surprisingly, more serious discussion takes place under the surface, which one can only infer by examining media-reported government studies and documents. For example, Tokyo shimbun, a paper considered to be close to the defense policy community, reported on November 8, 2004, that in a report completed in September in preparation for the new National Defense Program Outline, to be issued by the end of November, Japanese Defense Agency officials had established three scenarios in which China might decide to attack Japan.31 The first scenario is that China might attack American bases in Japan if American troops use bases in Japan to assist Taiwan in a serious military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait. The second scenario is that China might seize Diaoyu/Senkaku, triggering a military conflict with Japan. The third is that China might resort to force over the territorial dispute in the East China Sea. The new national defense strategy issued on December 10, named North Korea and China as Japan’s potential security concerns, the first time China was named as such by the Japanese government. A Chinese nuclear submarine trespassing in Japanese territorial waters on November 10, 2004, only enhanced Japan’s security worries. The action of the Chinese navy is interpreted as seeking domination over Taiwan and testing Japan’s capacity to respond to a military conflict. Sankei shimbun reported on November 14 that a top secret simulationbased analysis had recently been submitted to the Prime Minister’s Office by the Japanese Defense Agency.32 The report predicts China’s comprehensive military domination over Taiwan by 2009. A series of Japanese actions, including U.S. alliance enhancement, adjustment of Japan’s defense priorities, and greater defense capabilities reveal the fear of a belligerent China as an important motivating factor in Japanese strategic thinking. The 2004 Defense White Paper issued on July 6, 2004, emphasized that Japan’s SDF should play a role commensurate to Japan’s international standing. The paper also expressed concern over China’s military modernization and Chinese research ship activities in waters close to Japan. There are also reports of shared intelligence regarding Chinese submarines among the American, Japanese, and Taiwanese military forces.33 Japan’s new National Defense Program Outline approved by the cabinet in December 2004 mentioned China’s name, calling attention to China’s military modernization and maritime activities. Japanese officials emphasize that their February 2005 joint statement with the United States to express a common security interest in the Taiwan Strait does not amount to a dramatic shift in its Taiwan

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policy. In fact, they argue that Japan’s position on a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue has been consistent since 1972. However, Japan was clearly much more explicit and bolder in expressing its position on Taiwan, which has been perceived by China as a major hostile move. The 2005 East Asia Strategic Review, issued by the National Institute for Defense Studies of the Japan Defense Agency in March 2005, expressed concern over the PLA’s intense training for attacking Taiwan and preventing American intervention as well as Chinese ship activities in the disputed waters in the East China Sea.34 Also in March, Moriya Takemasa, the deputy director general of the Defense Agency, raised the issue of the anti-secession law during his security discussion with Xiong Guangkai, a deputy PLA chief of staff.35 On April 29 Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka said that the Japan–U.S. alliance covers Taiwan when answering questions at a speech in New York City.36 While there is shared concern about China’s rise and some hedging moves, there does not seem to be a consensus on how Japan should deal with the situation. Japanese scholars and officials generally do not believe that Japan is that strategic about the Taiwan question. The gap between positive public opinion on Taiwan and a cautious policy not to rock the boat is often used as an indication of such a lack of strategic vision. Japan’s cautious policy toward Taiwan at this point reflects two major strategic calculations. First, the Japanese recognize U.S.–China relations as central to the Taiwan question. In a way, the U.S.–Japan alliance is now really about Taiwan (not to diminish the strategic importance of the Korean peninsula). It makes strategic sense for Japan to let Americans deal with this very difficult question. There has been a basic dynamic of entrapment and abandonment in Japan’s U.S. alliance. Specifically over Taiwan, there is mainly fear of entrapment since Japanese recognize that the United States is not going to hand Taiwan to China even if U.S.–China relations improve. Second, the Japanese understand that overt support for Taiwan would aggravate the situation, creating a self-fulfilling effect. Tokyo should play it cool diplomatically while taking precautionary moves in alliance formation and defense capabilities. In fact, the Japanese often see the Taiwan issue as one involving Chinese and Taiwanese nationalisms, which means that the issue will take a long time to resolve.37 As of now, Japan is still largely reactive rather than taking things into its own hands, based on the strategic calculations behind Japan’s largely faithful adherence to the one China principle in its relations with Beijing. Despite their strong interest in the outcome of the Taiwan game,

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the Japanese believe they have limited ability to influence how the game plays out. Awareness of Japan’s own limitations has constrained their strategic thinking; some policy elites do not want to think about things that they have no control over. Nevertheless, there are people in Japan who are thinking about this issue, and if the situation in the Taiwan Strait and China–Japan relations change, Japan’s thinking and action regarding Taiwan may change quickly. What is important overall about Japan’s strategic thinking is a revealed strong preference to compete with China. Unlike other East Asian countries, Japan is competing and will compete for regional leadership with China. This is a reflection of an identity as a proud country that has always been largely outside the Chinese world order politically, as the first non-Western nation to modernize, as a first-rate economic power, and now as a country that should take its rightful place in the international community and step out of the shadow of other major powers. Taiwan, China, and Japan Taiwan has been trying to entrap Japan, an approach that makes obvious strategic sense to secure an ideal trilateral alliance including the United States. Taiwan benefits from worsening Sino-Japanese relations. China’s military pressure will create more room for Japan–Taiwan cooperation.38 The Taiwan government has periodically expressed support for Japan, supporting its candidacy for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. At a forum of Taiwanese and Japanese thinktanks held in Taipei in October 2004, Taiwan’s premier Yu Shyi-kun stated that “the security of the Taiwan Strait is closely linked with the security of Japan.” Taiwan’s National Security Council Secretary General Chiou I-jen supported Japan’s revision of the Peace Constitution to participate in peacekeeping missions abroad.39 Chen Shui-bian told visiting Japanese that Taiwan had alerted Japan about China’s submarine entering Japanese waters.40 He has also urged Japan to say “no” to Beijing and act as a normal state.41 Taiwan is particularly interested in lobbying for the Japanese Diet to pass a law similar to America’s “Taiwan Relations Act.” The Taiwan government has been successful in cultivating relations with influential Japanese, but sympathy has its limits. Japan’s policy toward Taiwan is realpolitik to the core. Neither Lee nor other leaders can change Japan’s fundamental policy, which is constrained by the alliance with the United States. Japan wants to create more room for its diplomacy, but it operates within constraints that it remains happy to respect.

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Taiwan stands little chance of entrapping Japan. Since Japan is in a strengthened U.S. alliance that covers Taiwan, the basic dynamic between security and autonomy in an alliance is extended to its relations with Taiwan. Taiwan now wants to have greater security and autonomy to walk its own path, which has enhanced the danger of insecurity for the United States, and for Japan by extension. That position has logically caused some distancing from the United States. Japan is behaving similarly to the United States, another indication of clearheaded strategic calculations. Japan would enhance official relations with Taiwan in an ideal world. A major foreign policy document produced by a task force on foreign policy for Koizumi stated matter-of-factly that changes in Japan–Taiwan relations were “natural” given China’s economic reform and opening and Taiwan’s democratization and participation in the APEC forum and WTO.42 Japan has done more for Taiwan. Former prime minister Mori visited Taiwan in December 2003. Japan cast its vote for the failed resolution to invite Taiwan to the World Health Organization as an observer in May 2004. Tokyo mayor Ishihara Shintaro visited Taiwan in October 2004. Lee Teng-hui came to Japan as a tourist in late December 2004. Japan was also critical of China’s anti-secession law in March 2005. At the same time, China views Japan’s warming ties with Taiwan as anything but natural. Beijing has reacted quickly and strongly over Tokyo’s periodic attempts to upgrade official ties with Taiwan. Japan generally retreats in reaction to China’s objection. After all, China is a rising political and economic power, and Japan has interest in avoiding unnecessary tensions. Japan also has a huge economic stake in China. Its trade with China and Hong Kong combined surpassed its trade with the United States in 2004. Japan’s trade with China was almost three times its trade with Taiwan in 2004.43 Thus, the cost of Taiwan’s entrapping depends on how far the Taiwanese government pushes for independence and on how hard the PRC is prepared to fight to prevent such a movement. Chen Shui-bian’s narrow victory for a second term in March 2004 increased the danger of cross-Strait conflict when Chen continued to take measures toward independence while giving inadequate attention to U.S. concerns. The danger was partially eased when Chen’s DPP failed to win a majority position in the December 10, 2004, parliamentary election, a surprising setback due to high expectations before the election and a sign of Taiwanese voters’ wariness of causing conflict with the Mainland.44 Beijing clearly saw a welcome setback for the Pan-Green forces in Taiwan, reflected in the statements by the spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council and Chinese media analysis. The election lowered the danger of immediate

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military conflict. The PRC has shown greater flexibility in early 2005 as revealed by its invitation for Lien Chan, the chairman of the Kuomintang, to visit in late April. With his party winning an overwhelming victory in municipal elections on December 3, 2005, a more confident Chinese government under Hu Jintao now feels vindicated by its strategy of demonstrating resolve to prevent Taiwan’s independence while not reacting every time to Chen’s particular moves. But Beijing will continue to watch closely Taiwan’s relations with major powers such as Japan. Chinese and Japanese were deadlocked politically over Koizumi’s annual visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The Yasukuni dispute has become a test of wills. Even those in Japan who did not approve of Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni do not want to send a signal that China can dictate what a Japanese leader can do in what is considered a domestic issue. On the other side, China also does not want to show weakness. Even Japanknowledgeable moderates do not want to make concessions for fear that such a weak move would only encourage Japanese assertiveness elsewhere while triggering a major public backlash in China. This situation reflects a combination of both confidence and insecurity on both sides. It also reveals the basic nature of an emerging strategic rivalry between the two nations. The anti-Japan mass demonstrations in Beijing and several other major cities in China in April 2005 marked the lowest point in Japan–China relations since 1972. With Koizumi’s Yasukuni visit on October 17, Japan’s relationship with China deteriorated further. Chinese leaders no longer wanted to meet with Koizumi for bilateral talks even at multilateral summits as they did for the previous three years. From a political perspective, a worsening relationship with China means that Japan will need more allies. Since South Korea and Southeast Asian nations have largely indicated neutrality in Japan–China disputes, Japan shares common interests with Taiwan. From a strategic perspective, a hostile relationship with China would enhance Taiwan’s strategic value. As a senior Japanese diplomat summarized it succinctly, “Taiwan is a strategic asset between the East China Sea and the South China Sea . . . Japan of course does not want to see Taiwan seized by a hostile power.”45 The explicit expression about Taiwan in the joint statement with the United States in February 2005 should be seen as a warning to Beijing that Japan has a stake in the Taiwan issue. Whether Japan will stand more firmly for Taiwan’s defense depends on China’s relations with Taiwan and with Japan. But in a vicious cycle, Japan’s Taiwan policy shift would contribute to a worse relationship with China. Conversely, Taiwan may also act as a check on China, making it less willing to confront Japan in order to prevent driving Japan and Taiwan together.46

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Conclusion Japan’s strategic thinking toward Taiwan has been a product of a complex interaction of transformations in Japan, Taiwan, the PRC, and the world as well, including the perceived security environment and national objectives. Diverse opinions about the Taiwan issue exist in Japan. In a market of ideas, the salience of a particular view is contingent upon domestic developments and international politics. The Japanese public has become increasingly sympathetic to a democratic, pro-Japan Taiwan since 1989. By contrast, the Japanese view of a nondemocratic, rising China has declined sharply. While the marginal improvement in views of Taiwan is now leveling, Taiwan benefits from a continuous decline of China’s image due to a series of Japan–China disputes in recent years. Public sentiment alone has been insufficient to push Tokyo to change its Taiwan policy dramatically, but it matters. It exerts pressure on the government to take a firmer stand over disputes with China, which creates more room for Taiwan’s diplomacy. It explains partly why the Japanese government has slowly but surely upgraded its official exchange with the government in Taiwan. Ultimately, Japan’s assessment of the international environment after the cold war and its desire to become a normal, great power explain why Japan is interested in situating its relations with China in the global context and seeking greater room to engage with the government in Taiwan. Though public opinion is not the same as hard-nosed strategic calculations, growing public sympathy for Taiwan and resentment toward China open up public space for discussion on more sensitive security issues. Security discussion is no longer an impolite topic. Japan’s security thinking about Taiwan has become increasingly based on geopolitics. For some defense thinkers, Taiwan’s survival in separation from China is central to Japan’s future security and prosperity. Thus, Japan shares common security interest in Taiwan as the United States. Security concerns about China as a military threat have moved from the margin of the policy community in the early 1990s to close to the center at present. Japan’s growing security concerns and worsening public view of China have allowed right-wing critics of China to have greater influence in policy debates. At the same time, guided by mainstream views, Japan is still being defensive in security thinking at this stage. Much of Japanese strategic calculation is contingent upon China’s future actions and development. Japan’s thinking toward Taiwan shows that the Japanese remain cautious in high-stakes issues. They tend to be reactive to the changing environment

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and take half measures. However, this pattern of behavior should not be interpreted as Japan’s inability to think strategically or to act assertively. Rather, it reflects the fact that the Taiwan issue is extremely complex. Moreover, one can equally question how strategic and smart the three principals, China, Taiwan, and the United States, have been. In such a fluid situation, it is unproductive or even counterproductive for Japan to spell out clearly what its strategic objectives and approaches should be. The Japanese care about the security ramifications of the Taiwan issue. It makes a major difference for Japan’s security whether Taiwan is taken over by a China hostile or friendly to Japan. If current Japan–China relations continue to deteriorate, one should expect Japan to become more proactive and offensive over the Taiwan question. Simply put, Japan has its own strategic reasons to be involved in the Taiwan issue independent of its U.S. alliance obligations. Territorial disputes with China and its strategic interest in Taiwan’s future will increasingly determine its terms for the alliance with the United States. Notes 1. In an important speech on Japan’s Asian strategy delivered on December 7, 2005, Foreign Minister Aso Taro stated, “Japan will keep the position that was stipulated in the Japan-China Joint Communiqué, in the understanding that there is but one China.” 2. One finds many titles in Japanese bookstores. For samples, see Ko Bunyu, Taiwan wa Nihonjin ga tsukutta (Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 2001); Kin Birei and Shu Eimei, Nihon yo Taiwan yo (Tokyo: Fusosha, 2001). See also Kobayashi Yoshinori, Taiwanron (Tokyo: Shogakukan, 2000). For a critique of this view, see East Asian Network of Cultural Studies, Kobayashi Yoshinori Taiwanron o koete (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2001). 3. Liu Jiangyong, Panghuang zhong de Riben (Tianjin: Tianjin renmin chubanshe, 2000), p. 271. 4. For a detailed study of Japan’s relations with China after 1989, see Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic and Transformation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006). 5. Nakai Yoshifumi, “Nitchu kankei,” in Takagi Seiichiro, ed., Datsu reisenki no Chugoku gaiko to Ajia Taiheiyo (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2000), pp. 105–33; Kokubun Ryosei, “Reisen shuketsugo no Nitchu kankei 72 taisei no tenkan,” Kokusai mondai, January 2001, pp. 42–56. 6. Much has been written in Japan about Taiwan’s democratization and Taiwanization. For a representative book, see Wakabayashi Masahiro, Taiwan bunretsu kokka to minshuka (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 1992). 7. The Japanese coastguard chased out some Taiwanese fishing boats from the disputed area in early June 2005. Dozens of Taiwanese fishing boats

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8. 9. 10.

11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

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18. 19.

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subsequently massed in the area in protest, creating a standoff with Japanese ships. On June 21, two Taiwanese warships were dispatched, having senior officials and legislators aboard. The ships did not enter what Japan claims to be its exclusive economic zone. As a senior Japan Defense Agency official put it five days later, Taiwan’s action “was a political show” common in a democracy and there was simply no reason to be concerned about it. (Conversation with the official, June 27, 2005.) Still, a senior Japanese diplomat expressed surprise at the Taiwanese action and criticized it as dangerous. The Japanese government privately complained to the Taiwanese government. (Conversation, July 15, 2005.) Japan and Taiwan held negotiations over fishing on July 29, but did not reach any consensus. Arguably sending a signal that Taiwan worries about China rather than Japan, President Chen visited the Dongsha islands, in dispute with the PRC in the South China Sea, on the same day. In interviews in Tokyo in October 2004, Japanese officials and scholars familiar with China and Taiwan all emphasized this factor. One sees a good number of books published in Japan in this regard. Izumi Taro, Nichibeitai sangoku no jidai Beichu reisen no Ajia shudan ampo taisei (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1998); Nakamura Katsunori, Yo Gogi, and Akino Kazuo, Nichibei domei to Taiwan (Tokyo: Waseda shuppan, 2003). In fact, some Western historians agree as well. See, for example, Tonio Andrade, “Pirates, Pelts, and Promises: The Sino-Dutch Colony of Seventeenth-Century Taiwan and the Aboriginal Village of Favorolang,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 64, No. 2 (May 2005), pp. 295–321. Wakabayashi Masahiro, “ ‘Taiwan mondai’ no atarashii naijitsu,” in Takagi, Datsu reisenki no Chugoku gaiko to Ajia Taiheiyo, pp. 297–317. Kojima Tomoyuki, Chugoku no yukue (Tokyo: Jiji tsushinsha, 1997), pp. 138–44. Kawashima Kozo, Gekido suru To Shohei go no Chugoku: Nihon wa kakubuso Chugoku no “shuyoteki” ni naru (Tokyo: Daiichi kikaku shuppan, 1990). Hiramatsu Shigeo, Yomigaeru Chugoku kaigun (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1991). Hiramatsu expressed concern about China’s new territorial waters law and its maritime strategy in his 1993 book Chugoku no kaiyo senryaku (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 1993). For Japan and the Taiwan Strait crisis, see Funabashi Yoichi, Alliance Adrift (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 351–445; Ijiri Hidenori, ed., Chutai kiki no kozo: Taiwan kaikyo kuraishishisu no imisurumono (Tokyo: Keiso shobo, 1997). Amako Satoshi, Toshindai no Chugoku (Tokyo: Keisoshobo, 2003), pp. 212–13. For sample works of these prolific writers, see Nakamura Katsunori, Unmei kyodotai to shite no Nichibei soshite Taiwan: nijuisseiki no kokka senryaku (Tokyo: Tendensha, 1998); Hasegawa Keitaro and Nakajima Mineo, Iatsu no Chugoku Nihon no hikutsu (Tokyo: Bijinesusha, 2001); Izumi, Nichibeitai sangoku no jidai; Nakajima Mineo and Komori Yoshihisa, Chugoku bohatsu (Tokyo: Bijinesusha, 2004).

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20. For Japanese domestic politics over the visa issue, see Okada Takashi, Chugoku to Taiwan: tairitsu to kyozon no ryogan kankei (Tokyo: Kodansha gendai shinsho, 2003), pp. 221–25; Hasegawa and Nakajima, Iatsu no Chugoku Nihon no hikutsu, pp. 14–47. 21. Critics of China frequently make this point in their writings. A senior Japanese journalist who had been posted in China used the expression “paper tiger” in an interview I conducted in Tokyo in June 2001. The Chinese government postponed a planned visit by Li Peng, and Japanese officials and analysts with whom I talked expressed the feeling that they did not consider the cancellation a serious retaliation. 22. Several Japanese journalists I interviewed in Tokyo in June 2001 all emphasized this trend, whatever their attitudes toward China. 23. “China Syndrome: Tensions Rise,” Asahi shimbun, December 29, 2004. 24. Interview with a leading Taiwan specialist in Japan, Tokyo, October 26, 2004. 25. Taiwanese media coverage reported in China, November 25, 2004 ⬍http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-11-25/14275031117.shtml⬎. 26. Taiwanese media coverage reported in China, November 25, 2004 ⬍http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2004-11-25/14275031117.shtml⬎. 27. See also Ishizuka Isao (retired General ASDF), “21 seiki wagakuni no anzen hosho kankyo,” Defense Research Center (DRC) (Japan), DRC Annual Report 2000; Yoshida Akiji (retired MG GSDF), “Anzen hosho senryaku o kangaeru kihon yoken, DRC Annual Report 2001; and “Senryakuchiseigakuteki ni mita wagakuni no boei tokucho,” DRC Annual Report 2004, October 15, 2004. 28. See, for example, Gomi Matsuyoshi, “Chugoku no kaiyo shishutsu,” DRC Annual Report 2004, October 15, 2004. 29. Furusawa Tadahiko, “The Chinese and the Sea,” DRC Annual Report 2001. 30. Furusawa Tadahiko, “Nihon no kokueiki to Taiwan,” DRC Annual Report 2004, October 15, 2004. 31. Tokyo shimbun, November 8, 2004; The Japan Times, November 9, 2004. 32. Sankei shimbun, November 14, 2004; Asahi shimbun, December 29, 2004. 33. Xinhua News Agency, November 26, 2004. 34. Yomiuri shimbun, March 28, 2005. 35. Guoji xianqu daobao, April 1, 2005. 36. Asahi shimbun, April 30, 2005. 37. A senior Japanese diplomat who has been handling the Japan–US alliance differentiates the Taiwan issue from the North Korean crisis. He sees the Taiwan issue as political in nature, which can turn military, because it is about nationalism. By contrast, he sees the Korean situation largely as military. Thus, the Taiwan dispute would last a long time with the United States as the main player. Interview, Washington, DC, March 22, 2005. 38. Chien-min Chao and Szu-shen Ho, “Riben waijiao zhong youguan Zhongguo huo Meiguo youxian zhi zhenglun,” Wenti yu yanjiu, Vol. 43, No.1 (January–February 2004), pp. 83–104.

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39. “Taiwan, Japan Ties Need More Realism,” Taiwan News.com, October 5, 2004. 40. “Chen Claims Taipei Told Japan about Chinese Submarine,” Taipei Times, November 20, 2004, p. 3. However, as a senior Japanese diplomat pointed out, Japan had not heard from the Taiwan government about the submarine beforehand. (Conversation with the official, July 15, 2005.) This was confirmed by others who were familiar with the case. 41. China News Agency, March 3, 2005. He said so in the context of complaining about his inability to make a transfer stop in Japan. 42. Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, 21 seiki Nihon gaiko no kihon senryaku—aratana jidai, aratana bijon, aratana gaiko, November 28, 2002. 43. For the trade data see ⬍http://www.customs.go.jp/JCWSV08/servlet/ JCWSV08⬎. 44. The DPP interpreted the setback as resulting from executing a vote reallocation plan to channel votes from popular incumbents to new candidates, but Chen had used the independence theme heavily in his election campaign. 45. Interview, Washington, DC, March 22, 2005. 46. As a sign that the Chinese government is worried about this connection, in the aftermath of the anti-Japan demonstrations leading media outlets emphasized the importance of the Taiwan issue as well as economic cooperation in Sino-Japanese relations. On May 1, 2005, Xinhua News Agency issued a commentary urging Japan to keep its commitment to China over the Taiwan issue.

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CHAPTER 8

Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Korea Cheol Hee Park

D

espite geographical proximity that requires only two hours for flights from Tokyo to Seoul, Koreans often argue that Japan is a geographically near but emotionally distant country. Recent developments in Korea–Japan relations show that even as relations have improved through “kanryu” (Korea fever) in Japan,1 bilateral ties can be shattered at any time by any move that is deemed provocative. When Shimane prefecture declared Takeshima day on March 17, 2005, relations were frozen abruptly.2 Though overall ties may be characterized as alignment despite antagonism as Victor Cha notes, antagonism despite alignment can arise.3 How to deal with Korea, which for decades has served as a virtual ally strategically yet retains historical animosity against Japan, has been a critical concern for Japanese strategic thinking. Japanese strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula fits into a larger geostrategic context. First, there exists a long-standing search for strategic balance between the United States and Asia. At times, Japan relied one-sidedly on the United States, but, more often, it oscillated between the United States and Asia. These strategic moves affected Japanese strategic thinking toward Korea in a profound way. Second, Japanese strategic thinking cannot be properly grasped without considering conflict and cooperation between South and North Korea on the peninsula. In the cold war era, Japan’s strategy focused mostly on

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making friendly ties with South Korea while antagonizing North Korea in order to build a bulwark against communist expansion, but afterward Japan had to design a strategy for the entire peninsula, including North Korea as a potential partner. In the post–cold war period, North Korea has been a major factor in Japan’s strategy toward South Korea. Third, the domestic political context in Japan must be considered in order to figure out Japanese strategy toward Korea. The shared historical legacy in modern times often became the cause of politically contentious issues. Japan’s political context, especially the relative weight of conservatives and liberals, contributed much to shaping a distinct style of strategic thinking toward Korea. The postwar era can be divided into five periods in Japanese strategic thinking toward Korea, the first of which is not separately covered and the second is only briefly covered below. First, from the immediate postwar period to diplomatic normalization in 1965, Japanese strategy toward Korea was virtually absent. Mutual antagonism and suspicion prevailed. Diplomatic relations were slow to be normalized as Japan kept its distance from a country determined for it to acknowledge the historical injustice of its conduct during the first half of the century. Second, from normalization through the 1970s, Japanese strategy toward Korea was mostly about cultivating the market by boosting the economy for the purpose of building a bulwark against any potential communist threat from the Soviet bloc. Economic pragmatism was the backbone of the strategy. Third, in the 1980s, Japan added the element of security subsidies to South Korea against the background of the newly unfolding cold war situation.4 Building a strong market in close alliance with the United States worked in the interest of Japan. Fourth, after the end of the cold war, especially after the Gulf War, Japan showed signs of oscillation between the United States and Asia. In addition to South Korea, Japan showed intermittent interest in improving relations with North Korea. In this sense, Japan’s Korean peninsula policy became more serious only in the 1990s. In 1997 the Asian economic crisis awakened Asian identity among the Japanese, which led to extensive efforts to expand its sphere of influence in East Asia. Korea emerged as a key strategic partner. At the same time, by strengthening the US–Japan alliance, Japan tried to keep a balance between Asia and the United States. Fifth, after September 11, 2001, and the North Korean nuclear crisis from October 2002, Japan began singlemindedly strengthening its alliance with the United States while closing its eyes to Asia. Korea remains a zone of ambiguity or ambivalence since 2001.

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From Uneasy Neighbor to Virtual Ally, 1965–79 Japan in the immediate postwar period was preoccupied with remaking itself under democratic rule led by the United States. Japan embraced defeat, accepting American-style democracy and the punitive order of demilitarization.5 During the American occupation, Japan had no luxury of developing its own strategy toward Korea, or Asia in general, except coping with the United States. Within Japan the voices of the “repentant intellectual community” dominated the discourse.6 Mutual antagonism between Japan and Korea, as the latter under Rhee Seungman took a strong stand, blocked any potential rapprochement. As the Japanese economy rebounded from the mid-1950s, Japan began actively exploring opportunities to expand its markets other than the United States, especially in Asia.7 In the early 1960s, the United States also tried to reduce its burden from propping up anticommunist regimes in Asia.8 At this time President Park Chung-hee, after assuming power in a military coup, desperately sought funding to promote economic growth. Pushed by the United States and pulled by South Korea, Japan normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1965. Together with Japan’s strategic entry to Southeast Asia, Korea provided Japan with a chance to invest its money and expand its market. Pragmatism based on economic gains constituted the core of Japanese strategic thinking in those times. In a desire to strengthen a bulwark against the communist threat, Japan helped Korea to achieve heavy and chemical industrialization.9 South Korea became the best student of Japanese style state-guided development in the 1970s.10 Korea outgrew the status of underdeveloped country to reach successfully the status of newly developing country.11 In this period Japan kept its distance from North Korea. Officially, there was no contact between Japan and North Korea. However, in reality, Japan could rely on two extraordinary channels to communicate with the North. One was the Korean residential community (chosensoren) in Japan that was sympathetic to North Korea. Though Japan knew that significant amounts of money were channeled to North Korea through this community, it closed its eyes in a desire not to antagonize the North. The other channel was the JSP, the main opposition party to the LDP. The JSP, due to its critical stance against the brutally authoritarian Park Chung-hee regime and because of ideological sympathy, got along with the North Korean Labor Party.12 Hence, after diplomatic

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normalization with South Korea, Japan maintained a dual-track strategy toward the Korean peninsula: It formally was a partner for South Korea, while informally it kept ties with North Korea to stabilize the region through the Korean community in Japan as well as the JSP.

Korea as a Member of a Triangular Alliance in the Asia-Pacific, 1980s Increasingly in the 1970s, Japan discovered the geostrategic significance of Southeast Asia and Korea; however, its approach to these areas was confined to economic activities such as developmental assistance and technological transfer. At the end of the 1970s, Japan acquired confidence as an economic power after successfully overcoming two oil shocks. The national goal of catching up to the West was deemed already attained. With increased confidence in its economy, Japan began searching for a possibility to extend its regional strategy. The concept of a panPacific strategy arose in the Ohira cabinet.13 Also the concept of comprehensive national security (sogo anzen hosho) was newly developed as a way to encompass not only military but also nonmilitary means of securing the nation.14 In the new approach, the geographical extension of the strategy reached Australia and New Zealand, extending much beyond Southeast Asia. Together with Australia, Japan took strong initiatives to establish APEC in 1989 after forming PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council). At the center of Japanese strategic thinking was the United States, which maintained a dominant presence in the Asia-Pacific. In this sense, Japan was a faithful U.S. supporter in the region.15 Prime Minister Nakasone had a keen sense of the need for embracing South Korea to build a community of nations in the Asia-Pacific. The new cold war situation, which was sparked by the Soviet intrusion into Afghanistan, helped Japan approach South Korea from a strategic angle. Nakasone was a unique Japanese politician in that countering the Soviet threat was squarely in the mindset of his strategic thinking. In order to effectively deal with the communist threat, Nakasone built strong personal relations with President Chun Doo-hwan, as well as President Ronald Reagan.16 Nakasone also did not hesitate to give security subsidies to South Korea. In this sense, Japan, for the first time in postwar history, added the politico-military dimension to its Asian strategy. This kind of move was possible because the main opposition party, the JSP, lost its drive to grasp power. From the 1980s, it was satisfied with the

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role of defending the peace constitution rather than presenting itself as an alternative party of power. The Japanese strategy toward Korea in the 1980s was deeply integrated into the scheme of building a triangular alliance among the United States, Japan, and Korea. North Korea was an enemy to deter. When South Korea became the victim of bombings—by North Korean agents in Burma and Soviet missiles against a KAL flight that had strayed into the Russian Far East air space—Japan showed its clear support for South Korea while at the same time working closely with the United States. Oscillation between the United States and Asia, 1990–97 The end of the cold war made it possible for Japan to explore new-style strategic thinking that was unavailable during the cold war period. First, Japan began approaching North Korea as a potential partner for diplomatic normalization. Seoul’s diplomatic drive called “nordpolitik,” which focused on normalization of relations with Moscow and Beijing and using them to draw Pyongyang into talks, awakened Tokyo to the need to deal with Pyongyang in a different way. As the Roh Tae-woo regime grew more energetic in its diplomacy, Tokyo approached Pyongyang, offering to alleviate its sense of isolation. The domestic political situation was a factor. In 1989, the LDP for the first time lost its majority in the Upper House and was seeking ways to gain cooperation from the JSP. As the JSP was close to North Korea, Kanemaru Shin, a powerful LDP leader, organized a group of politicians to visit Pyongyang together with Tanabe of the JSP. This visit opened a new horizon on strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula, widening the scope beyond relations with South Korea. Japan began negotiating with North Korea, putting diplomatic normalization on the agenda; however, with revelation of the North’s nuclear program in 1992 and controversy over a Japanese woman who had been revealed as a language teacher for a North Korean terrorist, talks came to an end. Adding to the complexity, the South Korean government was reluctant to give consent to the idea of Japan normalizing relations with North Korea before interKorean relations had matured. Second, Japan came to have doubts about its unilateral reliance on the United States. The period when the cold war ended coincided with the peak of Japanese economic expansion. With its “miraculous” economic growth, Japan came to be perceived as a threat to the United States.17 Confidence in the Japanese style of management and continued upward

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movement in the world economy led to the increasing confidence in designing a strategy autonomous from the United States, in a Japan “that could say ‘no.’ ”18 Unexpectedly, Japan was entrapped in the Gulf War, reluctantly paying a huge financial contribution, which amounted to $13 billion, without feeling that this was appreciated.19 The policy at the end of George H.W. Bush’s presidency to reduce the American presence in Asia further aroused Japanese concern about where U.S. relations were headed. Two types of responses emerged. One was the move to make Japan a normal country that Ozawa Ichiro spearheaded.20The other was growing skepticism over U.S. relations and an effort to turn to Asia. A senior diplomat wrote in a monthly journal that it was time for Japan to come back to Asia.21 Reflecting this mood, Japan responded to the Korean outcry to apologize over newly discovered comfort women issues. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono made a sincere apology to the comfort women in 1992, and Prime Minister Miyazawa also confirmed this stance. The JSP, which had made defense of the peace constitution its primary identity, began giving extraordinary attention to history issues after its stance against the overseas dispatch of the SDF became wildly unpopular. The LDP also turned defensive after it lost power in 1993. After regaining a share of power in 1994, it gave the premiership to Murayama, head of the JSP. Deepening Japan’s Asia-oriented diplomacy, Murayama showed his sincere apology to Asian countries that were victimized before the end of the war. The JSP-led Japanese government also took strong initiatives to establish the Fund for Asia Women and to have the Diet pass a resolution in 1995 to apologize for the war, which failed. When Murayama stepped down and Hashimoto became prime minister in 1996, the LDP reversed its course. Instead of returning to Asia, Hashimoto tried hard to reaffirm the U.S.-Japan security alliance. The result was change not only in the domestic political environment, but also in regional political dynamics. As North Korea was isolated from neighboring countries after South Korea normalized relations with Russia and China, North Korea had begun to develop nuclear weapons as a last resort to secure regime survival. The first North Korean nuclear crisis, which started in 1992, continued until 1994 with dangerous twists and turns. Ultimately, the United States and North Korea concluded the Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994, where the United States and other countries promised to provide North Korea with light water reactors in return for giving up its nuclear program. In the course of the crisis, the United States had seriously thought of the possibility of

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making a surgical strike.22 That taught a lesson to the United States and Japan that closer cooperation was necessary to cope with regional contingencies.23 After the first North Korean nuclear crisis, the United States felt a need to strengthen its alliance with Japan to deal with possible contingent situations surrounding Japan.24 The United States reconfirmed its security commitment in Asia, as seen in the Nye Initiative.25 The Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996 confirmed the importance of strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance intact, resulting in the redefinition of the security treaty as a regional alliance in 1996. In early 1996 the LDP remained in a coalition with the Left—the SDPJ was the new name for the JSP—and it again tried to normalize relations with North Korea with LDP politician Kato Koichi taking a lead in proposing humanitarian food assistance to North Korea. Along with other LDP doves, Kato sought almost equal balance between Asian diplomacy and steps to improve U.S. ties. In contrast, hawks in the LDP gave almost unilateral weight to strengthening the bilateral alliance with the United States. Also the latter moved assertively to denounce the JSPled repentance to Asian countries. They played an instrumental role in mobilizing groups of intellectuals to promote a revisionist perspective on Japanese history. Hawks also brought the abductees issue to the political forefront, which served as a stumbling block to better the relationship with North Korea. Japanese strategic thinking toward Korea in the mid-1990s is characterized by oscillation between historical compromise with Asia and strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance. Also it is from this period that North Korea came into sight in Japanese strategic thinking toward Korea. Even though Japan made a move to ameliorate ties with North Korea, the South Korean government showed its reluctance. Until that time, North Korea was still perceived as an enemy of South Korea. From the Asian Economic Crisis to the Pyongyang Declaration, 1997–2002 Korea as a Key Strategic Partner in East Asia The unexpected advent of the Asian economic crisis awakened a new regional consciousness on the part of Japan. The ensuing financial crises in Asia, starting from Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea, produced an Asian identity in opposition to Westerners, especially the United States. Signs of East Asian regionalism emerged.26 Japan made assertive moves to help Asian countries as well as to integrate Asian markets. When the

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idea for an AMF was suggested by Japan in 1997, it faced negative appraisal from the United States. In 1998, the Miyazawa Initiative generously supported countries hit by the crisis. As Japan had discovered Southeast Asia as a region in the 1970s and the Asia-Pacific in the 1980s, it discovered East Asia anew after the Asian economic crisis. At this time, Japan’s ambassador to Korea, Ogura, proposed an FTA between Korea and Japan. It is clear that Japan had tight economic integration with Korea in mind in addition to the general upgrading of cooperation among East Asian countries after the economic crisis. The ASEAN ⫹ 3 framework emerged when ASEAN invited leaders from Korea, Japan, and China to join its annual summit in December 1997. Then the three Northeast Asian leaders began to hold annual breakfast meetings from 1999 on the occasion of ASEAN ⫹ 3 meetings. The three leaders agreed to launch a study group for facilitating a trilateral FTA among Korea, Japan, and China. But at the same time, Japan and China entered into a competitive bidding to ASEAN countries to conclude an FTA with them. Knowing that concluding a trilateral FTA among the three Northeast Asian countries would be very difficult, Japan became much more enthusiastic about FTA negotiations with South Korea. The Asian economic crisis brought about another unintended consequence. South Korea, which had not avoided pursuing the collapse of the North Korean regime, came to the conclusion that the sudden collapse of the Kim Jung-il regime would impose an enormous financial burden on it. At the same time, President Kim Dae-jung sincerely wanted to dismantle the cold war structure on the Korean peninsula. Engaging North Korea and pursuing long-term gradual change of the North Korean regime was in the interest of Korea. In order to achieve this goal, South Korea had not only to engage North Korea but also to persuade neighboring countries to join this move. This strategic consideration facilitated a bold initiative to ameliorate relations with both Japan and China.27 The Obuchi–Kim Dae-jung codeclaration in 1998 was an outcome of coinciding strategic interests after the Asian economic crisis. Japan sought a chance to strengthen strategic partnerships with Asian countries. South Korea needed Japanese cooperation not only to overcome economic hardship as soon as possible but also to push for the sunshine policy toward North Korea.28 Both Obuchi and Kim favored turning Korea–Japan relations into a future-oriented partnership. As a gesture to confirm strengthening ties, both governments opened their cultural doors to each other. Accelerating the mood for Korea–Japan cooperation was the plan to cohost the 2002 World Cup. Though there was a history

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textbook controversy in the year 2001, overall relations between Korea and Japan were favorable, which was confirmed by the increasing positive images of Korea among the Japanese people. Cultural openings softened the image of each other and the number of tourists increased around the year 2002. Though in 1965 only about 10,000 persons a year had crossed the border, by 2003, the number of Koreans and Japanese visiting each other had risen to 10,000 people a day. Korea–Japan relations seemed to be making smooth progress with no concerns over historical animosity. Unlike the amelioration of relations with South Korea, Japan’s relations with North Korea fluctuated wildly from 1998. Voices of criticism against North Korea grew louder, as the abductee issue became a focal point of political attention around 1998. This was actually a counter-political move against a stream of thought among liberal LDP members that Japan should improve relations with North Korea. Conservative hawks in the LDP tried to put a brake on efforts to improve relations with North Korea. A missile launch by North Korea drastically aggravated the situation. On August 31, 1998, North Korea launched a Taepodong missile over Japanese territory, which was a tremendous shock to the Japanese who had not experienced an actual security threat from a neighboring state since the end of the war. All of a sudden, Japanese public opinion supported the idea that Japan should be prepared against a potential threat from North Korea. At a cabinet meeting in December 1998, a decision was made to introduce intelligence satellites by the year 2003 as well as to participate in research and development for TMD with the United States. Preparations to deal with a North Korean threat became a major topic of discussion in the security community in Japan from 1998, a realist turn in response to a perceived threat. To prepare for contingencies, Japan continued to strengthen the U.S.–Japan alliance. In 1997, the Cabinet passed new guidelines for U.S.–Japan defense cooperation. In 1999, a law to cope with regional contingencies was enacted. In 2000, a law that enables Japan’s maritime security guard to check and investigate suspicious ships in the sea areas around Japan was passed. A realist turn to equip Japan with modern military technology was not the only option under consideration. A few Japanese strategists began designing a scheme for normalizing relations with North Korea as the ultimate solution for the security threat. This move was in line with South Korea’s initiative to dismantle the cold war structure on the Korean peninsula with a view to replacing mutual confrontation with peaceful coexistence. On June 15, 2000, Kim Dae-jung visited Pyongyang for

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a summit with North Korean leader Kim Jung-il, which was a historic event for the divided Korean people. Inter-Korean relations have shown signs of advancing in many areas. Mt. Kumgang was opened for South Korean tourists, roads crossing the DMZ were built, military tension reduction measures were introduced, and humanitarian aid was increased. It looked as if Japan would lag behind unless it took an initiative to join the South Korean efforts to improve ties with North Korea. Japan wanted to gain some influence over North Korean issues. Japan experienced nightmares of diplomacy in the 1990s with regard to the North Korea question. First, when the first North Korean nuclear crisis broke out between 1992 and 1994, Japan did not play a significant role. All deals were made between the United States and North Korea, which produced the Agreed Framework, which obliged Japan to pay for constructing light-water reactors through KEDO. Second, when four-party talks were in progress, Japan was not a participant and felt excluded. Third, when the summit meeting between the two Koreas was realized, Japan was not informed fully in advance. As a result, Japan felt a need to develop its own leverage with North Korea to get involved in the Korean peninsula issue. Unlike in the past, the South Korean government led by Kim Daejung urged Japan to normalize relations with North Korea. Tanaka Hitoshi at the Japanese Foreign Ministry played a key role in designing a bold initiative to try to normalize relations. After several rounds of secret negotiations, they reached an agreement that Koizumi would visit Pyongyang. On September 17, 2002, he did so and signed the Pyongyang Declaration with Kim Jung-il. At that moment, Japan was ready to embrace Pyongyang as a legitimate member of the East Asian community; however news that eight abductees had died and only five had survived shocked Japanese public opinion, turning it very negative to North Korea. Also, the disclosure of the secret North Korean nuclear program by James Kelly in October 2002 drastically aggravated the situation. The above record makes clear that from the late 1990s for about four years, Japan showed a dual response to North Korea. On the one hand, after the missile launch by North Korea, Japan perceived it as an immediate and tangible military threat and introduced measures to strengthen military preparedness against it. This may be called realist readiness. On the other hand, Japan also tried to engage North Korea as a way to overcome mistrust and reduce the danger. An effort to normalize relations with North Korea may be termed an idealist engagement approach. This

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combination reveals an unusually fertile time in Japanese strategic thinking. The same applies to Japanese thinking on South Korea. Between 1998 and 2002, it may be said that Japan placed importance on improving relations with South Korea in a comprehensive manner, regarding it as a strategic partner for building an East Asian community. It is noteworthy that the entire Korean peninsula was within the range of Japanese strategic thinking at least by the summer of 2002. Though Japan upgraded its efforts for realist preparedness against a North Korean threat, it also designed a strategy to upgrade relations with North Korea. Strategic partnership between Japan and Korea reached a point that Japan took an autonomous initiative to normalize relations with North Korea.29 It is also characteristic of this period that Japan tried hard to keep a balance between its alliance relationship with the United States and its forthcoming stance toward Asian neighbors, especially South Korea. Korea as an Ambivalent Partner, after 2002 The year 2002 proved to be another turning point in Japan’s strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula. After Koizumi returned from his summit meeting with Kim Jung-il unable to manage the abductee issue, North Korea was depicted as a true rogue state that killed innocent Japanese civilians after kidnapping them unlawfully. The Japanese media continued to feature North Korea as an unreliable terrorist state ruled by a dictator. The image of North Korea as a rogue state was strengthened by North Korea’s assertive responses to U.S. accusations about a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program and the tense showdown of the nuclear crisis. After the unprecedented terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001, the U.S. security strategy focused on fighting against terrorism and stopping the proliferation of WMD.30 In January 2002, President Bush singled out three countries as an axis of evil: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. In this connection, North Korea drew worldwide attention, not just regional concern, as a failing rogue state. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi also shared the same security concern and identified Japan as a core member of the coalition of the willing. Already at the beginning of the Bush administration, the United States had designed a new policy toward Asia and Japan, which was revealed in the so-called Armitage report in 2000.31 Japan was regarded as the key alliance partner in the trans-Pacific area as the United Kingdom played a cornerstone role for the transatlantic alliance.

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Knowing the American strategy to empower Japan in the Asia-Pacific region, the Koizumi administration tried its best to establish tighter cooperative ties with the United States. When the Iraq war broke out in March 2003, the Koizumi cabinet immediately declared its support for the war and promised to dispatch the SDF to Iraq. When the Defense Department initiated its military transformation project, Japan followed the policy line set by the United States, in recognition that the transformation would ultimately strengthen the politico-military role of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. Compared with the Koizumi cabinet, the newly born Roh Moo-hyun regime in Korea looked in 2003 as if it were a hesitant coalition partner to the United States. With the political background of growing anti-American sentiment triggered by the death of two students caused by American soldiers in 2002, the Roh government raised its voice against U.S. moves on several fronts. Roh took a more conciliatory stance toward North Korea whereas the United States and Japan were inclined to take a hard-line policy. Also with regard to the relocation of American bases as a part of the military transformation, the South Korean regime did not faithfully accept the American request. These moves, in the eyes of Japanese strategists, were seen as estrangement from the traditional ally. Because of an increasing perception gap between South Korea and Japan, especially with regard to North Korea, Japanese cast suspicious eyes on the South Korean government. Though Japan kept promoting increased exchanges at the mass level, at the elite level “ambivalence” may be the term that best characterizes the reality of South Korea–Japan strategic relations. From the fall of 2002, Japan devoted much political energy to North Korea bashing. Since that time the Japanese people have been addicted to finding fault with North Korea–related things. This extraordinary situation did not change even after Koizumi made a second visit to North Korea in May 2004 and brought home surviving family members of the abductees. Moreover, because of the advancement of its nuclear development program, North Korea remained the immediate threat to Japan. From the beginning of the Koizumi administration, Japan turned a deaf ear to Chinese requests to stop Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits, which were regarded as an act of glorifying the past war. Despite repeated Chinese and Korean requests, Koizumi never gave up his Yasukuni visits.32 Throughout his tenure, Koizumi did not show serious interest in improving relations with China. Compared to the troubled relationship with China, Japan under the Koizumi cabinet seemed as if it could manage relations with South Korea well despite Koizumi’s Yasukuni shrine visits. At a summit meeting in Jeju island in July 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun even spoke publicly that he would not raise the history issue

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again during his tenure; however, at the beginning of 2005 the situation changed. In February 2005 the Shimane prefectural assembly decided to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of annexing Dokdo/Takeshima. Japan’s ambassador in Seoul remarked in a public setting on February 23, 2005, that the island is historically and legally Japanese territory, provoking an emotional reaction on the Korean side. But the Japanese Foreign Ministry took the position that it could not meddle into local government affairs. This sounded like an irresponsible excuse to Koreans. The announcement of the results of the regular middle school textbook review on April 5, 2005, only aggravated the situation, because on the front page of one of the textbooks were photos of the disputed island. Books approved in the review also contained phrases that hurt Korean pride. In addition, Koizumi turned a deaf ear to the Korean request that he stop going to the Yasukuni shrine. Japan’s situation in Asia has deteriorated. Japanese–Chinese relations are troubled by the Yasukuni shrine and textbook issues. Japanese– North Korean relations are worse than ever before. Japanese–South Korean relations are, in essence, frozen after several years of the best mood in modern times. At the end of Koizumi’s time in office, it is no exaggeration to conclude that Japan lacks any concrete strategy to deal with Asian countries, including South Korea. Conclusion Before Japan normalized relations with South Korea, Korea remained an uneasy neighbor to Japan. Because of resentment and historical animosity pervasive among Koreans, Japan failed to establish even diplomatic relations, let alone design a strategy toward Korea. The development of the cold war situation enabled Japan and Korea to share a minimal accord. Both nations, under the security umbrella provided by the United States, had to confront the communist threat. Though historical animosity remained, both Japan and Korea were urged by the United States to draw closer as security allies in East Asia. When relations were normalized in 1965 Korea badly needed funds for economic growth and Japan wanted market expansion. Constructing an integrated economic system stood at the core of Japan’s strategy. Under the cold war context, Japanese strategic thinking was designed solely toward South Korea, a U.S. ally and a state that shared an interest in containing North Korea. Korea and Japan became virtual allies through triangular ties with the United States. Though the JSP and Korean residents in Japan continued contacting North Korea, there was no plan for a strategic initiative toward that country.

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The end of the cold war bewildered Japan. Signs of oscillation between the United States and Asia became visible. After the Gulf War, a group of strategists initiated a drive to make Japan a normal country with a view to strengthening U.S. ties, whereas other strategic thinkers called for a “return to Asia.” In the early 1990s, Japan looked as if it were tilting toward Asia. Prime ministers from Miyazawa to Murayama showed sympathy to Asian neighbors’ concern about the past, which signaled that Japan would strategically approach Asian countries after resolving the history issues. But after Hashimoto became prime minister, Japan made a conservative shift to stand firm against Asian requests while trying to reaffirm and strengthen the U.S.–Japan alliance. With some exceptions noted earlier in this book, the Hashimoto period should be considered as “back to the US” after a short break, but under the Obuchi cabinet there were new endeavors to strike a balance between the United States and Asia, especially focusing on South Korea. The Obuchi cabinet continued to pursue empowering the U.S.–Japan alliance, but at the same time it made a bold initiative to make Korea–Japan relations cooperative. The Mori cabinet basically inherited the Obuchi line, but added a more conservative tone on history issues. Conservative backlash was gathering steam in the Mori period. Hence the 1990s can be characterized as a period when Japanese strategic thinking oscillated between giving primacy to the United States and making historical compromises with Asian neighbors. Japan maintained its distance from China, especially after 1998 when Jiang Zemin provoked Japan with history questions. At the end of the 1990s, how to make strategic partnership with South Korea in the changing geopolitical context was at the heart of Japanese strategic thinking even if Japanese strategic thinkers did not doubt the primacy of U.S.–Japan relations. After September 11, 2001, terrorism and proliferation of WMD constituted a new major security threat. After assuming power, Koizumi strongly committed himself to the cause of making the U.S.–Japan alliance a global partnership. He drew close to Bush, whose primary cause was to fight terrorism. After Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang did not bring fruitful results, Koizumi put most of his energy into constructing the global partnership. Roh Moo-hyun looked like a hesitant U.S. ally. Also his approach to North Korea was perceived as being too conciliatory. Accordingly, from the Japanese strategic viewpoint, Korea was thought of as an ambivalent partner. In contrast to South Korea’s closer ties to China, Koizumi had little intention to improve relations with Beijing. Japan’s strategy after 2002 is characterized by standing by the

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United States as a strong ally while remaining relatively aloof from Asia. Under the Koizumi cabinet it has no clear and visible Asian strategy. Despite the current troubled relations, Japan’s relations with South Korea have a possibility of getting better soon. The territorial dispute between Korea and Japan can be submerged, even if no complete solution is found. Both parties have come to understand that changing the status quo of the island is neither easy nor feasible in the near future. The textbook issue selection process is over, and both parties understand that the selection rate for the history textbook published by Fusosha, which stood at the center of the debate, was only 0.4 percent.33 While the Yasukuni shrine visit remains an unresolved matter, if we look back to the period between 2001 and 2004, Korea–Japan relations remained under control despite Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits. Also North Korea promised to give up its nuclear program at the fourth round of the six-party talks in September 2005, which may open the possibility for Japan–North Korean rapprochement. One can cautiously say that South Korea–Japan relations have a fair chance of entering into a phase of stabilization after a year of political turmoil. Regardless of whether some stabilization occurs in relations with South Korea or some positive spillover occurs through progress in the six-party talks, there is little evidence that Japan is designing any grand strategy to deal with Northeast Asian countries, including Korea. It appears to be coping, but in a situation that leaves it falling well behind the rapid pace of change.34 There is no sign of coherent strategic debates to face the question of history or to weigh various approaches for regaining a strong foothold in Asia. On some occasions Koizumi publicly made a deep apology with regard to the history issues.35 Yet, he also repeatedly reaffirmed his priority for relying on U.S. ties abroad and strong nationalism at home. His legacy is unlikely to make it easy for a successor to resume the promising steps seen primarily in the period 1998–2002 for advancing strategic thinking toward the Korean peninsula.

Notes 1. Since 2003, when Japanese TV stations first featured a Korean drama “Winter Sonata,” a Korean actor, Bae Yongjoon, known as “Yong-sama,” has gained great popularity among Japanese housewives. 2. Fishermen in Shimane prefecture had been dissatisfied with Korean fishermen’s encroachment into their fishing grounds. Instead of appealing to the Korean or Japanese government, which keep a low profile on such matters, the Shimane Prefectural Assembly took a provocative action on February 22

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5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10.

11. 12. 13.

14. 15.

16. 17.

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of declaring a day of for celebrating the hundredth anniversary of annexing what Japanese call Takeshima. Since the island called Dokdo is under the virtual control of the Korean government, this ignited strong reactions in Korea. Victor Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US–Korea–Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). After President Chun Doo-hwan assumed power, he stressed a special relationship with Japan. He claimed that South Korea was facing the threat of a massive North Korean army; the South Korean military buildup was contributing to regional security; a country like Japan could not be secured if South Korea fell to communism; and hence Japan should play a larger role by providing aid to South Korea. The U.S. administration under Reagan was positive to the proposal and several rounds of negotiations were held between Korea and Japan. In 1983 when Nakasone visited Korea, he agreed to provide a four-billion-dollar security loan. This was a new development in Korea–Japan relations in acknowledging security ties between the two. See Chong-Sik Lee, Japan and Korea: The Political Dimension (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1985), pp. 105–39. John Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: The New Press, 1999). Sakamoto Takao, Chishikijin (Tokyo: Yomiuri shimbunsha, 1996). Takashi Inoguchi, Nihon no Ajia seisaku (Tokyo: NTT Publications, 2003). Robert Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977). Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: Norton, 1997). Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Woo Jung-en, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University, 1991). Stephen Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990). Shin Jung Hwa, Nihon no Kita-chosen seisaku 1945–1992 (Tokyo, Ph.D. Dissertation, Keio University, 1999). Nagatomi Yuichiro, “Kantaiheiyo rentai koso,” in Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, ed., Ohira Masayoshi seijiteki isan (Tokyo: Ohira Masayoshi Memorial Foundation, 1994). Sogo anzen hosho kenkyu grupu, ed., Sogo anzen hosho kenkyu grupu hokokusho (Tokyo: Sogo anzen hosho kenkyu grupu, July 2, 1980). Takashi Inoguchi, “Japan’s Images and Options: Not a Challenger but a Supporter,” The Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 95–120. Nakasone Yasuhiro, Tenchi yujo (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 1996). Richard Samuels, “The Myth of the Independent Intellectual,” in Myron Weiner and Richard Samuels, eds., The Political Culture of Foreign Area Studies (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1992); Robert Uriu, “The Impact of

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18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31.

32. 33.

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Policy Ideas: Revisionism and the Clinton Administration’s Trade Policy,” in Gerald Curtis, ed., New Perspectives on US–Japan Relatons (Tokyo: JCIE, 2000). Ishihara Shintaro, Japan that Can Say No (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). Kunimasa Takeshige, Wangan senso toiu tenkanten (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1999). Ichiro Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1994). Ogura Kazuo, “Asia no fuken no tameni,” Chuo koron, July 1993, pp. 60–73. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Akiyama Masahiro, Nichibei no senryaku taiwa ga hajimatta (Tokyo: Aki shobo, 2002). Funabashi Yoichi, Domei hyoryu (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1997). Joseph Nye, “Coping with Japan,” Foreign Policy 89 (Winter 1992/1993), pp. 96–115. T.J. Pempel, “Regional Ups, Regional Downs,” in T.J. Pempel, ed., The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1999). Park Cheol Hee, “The Development of Korea’s Regional Strategy in Northeast Asia,” in Hoon Jaung and Yuichi Morii, eds., Cooperation Experiences in Europe and Asia (Tokyo: Shinzansha, 2004). Kim Dae-jung’s sunshine policy should be understood as an extension and revision of Nordpolitik. Under Roh Tae-woo, South Korea aggressively approached Russia and China, former enemies, to normalize diplomatic relations and succeeded in isolating North Korea. The sunshine policy was an effort to gain support from Japan and the United States for pursuing gradual regime transformation of North Korea. It is reported that Japan gave very short notice to the United States about Koizumi’s scheduled visit to Pyongyang in September 2002. This was regarded as an aberration from the usual practice of consulting in advance before Japan takes important steps. Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang was looked upon as an autonomous action because it was designed independently from the United States and kept secret until the very last moment. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s North Korea Initiative and US–Japan Relations,” Orbis, Vol. 43, No. 7 (Summer 2003), pp. 527–39. Morimoto Satoshi, “Reisengo ni okeru Beikoku no kyoi ninshiki to anzen hosho senryaku henka,” Kokusai mondai, October 2002, pp. 18–32. The official title of the Armitage report is the INSS Special Report, The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership (Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, October 2000). Takahashi Tetsuya, Yasukuni mondai (Tokyo: Chikuma Books, 2005). Compared with the selection rate of 0.039 in 2001, the number rose 10 times, but still it is below 1%.

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34. Gerald Curtis, “Introduction,” in Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). 35. In April 2005 at a Bandung conference Koizumi made a speech where he showed deep regret regarding the past war. Also, on August 15, 2005, Koizumi made an apology almost equivalent to the Murayama speech in 1994.

CHAPTER 9

Japanese Strategic Thinking toward Russia Joseph P. Ferguson

I

f the twentieth century exhibited a cyclical pattern in which Japanese–Russian relations alternated between long periods of distrust and enmity, punctuated by fleeting periods of rapprochement marked by a common strategic outlook, then the 20-year period between 1986 and 2005 could be said to be a microcosm of the previous 80 years. This period saw moments of intense mistrust and mutual acrimony between Moscow and Tokyo, but it also witnessed moments of warm relations, in which some saw the promise of normalized relations. As in the earlier periods of the twentieth century, Japanese leaders, policymakers, and analysts saw in Russia the embodiment of a potential strategic partner, but also a nation that was far from Japan psychologically (although it is geographically the closest neighbor). The unresolved issues of World War II (WWII) that have clouded Japan’s relations with its other neighbors in Northeast Asia have been the bane of Japanese–Russian relations since the end of the cold war. The Northern Territories not only represent lost territory for Tokyo, but in the minds of most Japanese also a sense of having been victimized in a dastardly fashion by the Soviet Union. Although Russia is viewed much more benignly than the Soviet Union, the obstacle that this issue poses has been much more difficult to overcome than anyone may have guessed 60 years ago. This chapter examines the evolution of Japanese strategic thinking toward Russia, covering four periods as well as the major Japanese

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players in the formulation of policy toward Russia. Additionally, it examines international structural factors that influenced the Japanese outlook toward Northeast Asia, and hence toward Russia. These were not only about balance of power, but also a wholesale changing of systems and ideologies, which had a tremendous influence on how the actors of the region formulated strategy. Gorbachev’s Ascension and the End of the Cold War, 1986–91 Mikhail Gorbachev became secretary general of the Communist Party of the USSR at a time when Japanese–Soviet relations were at perhaps their worst since August 1945. The late 1970s and early 1980s were a time of intense East–West confrontation, as U.S. and Soviet troops faced one another in a number of potential hot spots—including in the Soviet Far East and the North Pacific—while American and Soviet proxies did battle in Southeast and Southwest Asia. Japanese and U.S. strategic planners were extremely concerned about the build-up of Soviet forces in the Far East, particularly air and naval assets. Soviet air and naval incursions in Japanese territorial airspace and waters were increasingly frequent. Indeed, in 1976 a Soviet pilot flying a MiG fighter actually defected by landing his plane in Hokkaido. In the late 1970s Soviet force levels on the disputed islands were increased, and Soviet SS-20 missiles were redeployed to the Far East from Soviet territory in Europe.1 It was during this time that the American–Chinese–Japanese triangle emerged in direct response to Soviet machinations across Asia. The mistrust that pervaded the Japanese–Soviet relationship was reflected in the lack of high-level visits during this period. Following the visit to Tokyo of Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko in 1976 and to Moscow of Japanese foreign minister Sonoda Sunao in 1978, there were no official high-level visits to either capital until 1986, when Gromyko’s successor Eduard Shevardnadze visited Tokyo. One of the first non-Soviet bloc statesmen to visit with Gorbachev upon the death of Konstantin Chernenko in 1985 was Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. Although his impressions were favorable, the Japanese leadership (particularly after Nakasone stepped down in 1987) was the slowest among the G-7 nations to accept at face value the ideas the Soviet leader was espousing.2 For Tokyo and for the Japanese people, no matter how intriguing Gorbachev may have been, the benchmark for his sincerity was the status of the four disputed islands. Despite the

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distrust, bilateral trade reached a high of $6 billion in 1989, but by 1992 it had fallen again to $3.4 billion.3 Shevardnadze’s visit to Tokyo in January 1986 was relatively successful as he indicated a willingness to discuss the territorial issue amid hints of the viability of the 1956 Japanese–Soviet Joint Declaration.4 A follow-up visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Abe Shintaro in May 1986 was rather pro forma, just succeeding in resuming graveyard visits on the four islands by former islanders. The July 1986 speech by Gorbachev in Vladivostok signaled new Soviet intentions in East Asia, but it was aimed more toward the Chinese and leaders in Japan remained skeptical.5 The U.S.-proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, or “Star Wars” as it was known popularly), which the leadership in Japan backed, contributed to the continued chill in bilateral relations. The Toshiba incident of April 1987—in which the Japanese trading company was found to have violated export regulations and to have sold sensitive submarine technology to the Soviets—also held back relations. It worsened Japan’s image in the United States at a time when trade frictions were threatening to undermine bilateral security relations. A tentatively scheduled visit by Gorbachev to Japan in 1987 was cancelled. By 1988 leaders and analysts in Japan began to rethink their views of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union.6 They recognized that he was prepared to back up words with actions (such as withdrawing from Afghanistan and permitting more freedom in Eastern Europe). Japanese leaders no doubt also saw U.S. efforts to bolster relations with Gorbachev and did not want to be left out, particularly given U.S.–Japanese trade frictions. In July 1988 former prime minister Nakasone visited Moscow and met with Gorbachev. Shevardnadze made a second visit to Tokyo in December, which was followed in May 1989 by the Moscow visit of Foreign Minister Uno Sosuke, who touted a new policy of “balanced expansion” (kakudai kinko) in relations with Moscow. This entailed improvement in all areas without reducing the paramount importance of the territorial dispute.7 In 1989 Shevardnadze announced that Gorbachev would visit Japan, but only in 1991. For the next year domestic issues (including successive scandals that brought down two prime ministers) halted all attempts at creative diplomacy in Japan. Certain leaders in the ruling LDP were eager to cement a rapprochement with the Soviets and several efforts were made to secure an agreement. The most high-profile effort was led by Ozawa Ichiro, who on a visit to Moscow in March 1991 reportedly offered the Soviets $26–28 billion in economic aid for the return of the disputed islands.8 The visit only managed to whip up nationalist opposition in both

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countries. The motivations behind the politician’s desire to cement an agreement with the Soviets were probably more vainglorious than strategic. Gorbachev’s Japan visit finally came about in April 1991. In meetings with Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki he officially recognized the four islands as the objects of the territorial dispute, which could be seen as a coup for the Japanese side, but all in all the visit (Gorbachev’s last state visit before the August 1991 coup attempt against him) led to few results. Japanese leaders were still first and foremost concerned about the territorial dispute and notions of strategic compatibility with the Soviet Union were almost nonexistent. The Early Yeltsin Years The reaction in Tokyo to Yeltsin’s rise to power in the fall of 1991 was much like the reaction during the Gorbachev years. Tokyo took a waitand-see attitude, and again the benchmark for the new Russian leadership’s sincerity was based on how quickly it was prepared to return the Northern Territories to Japan. Although leaders in Tokyo were hesitant in their denunciation of the coup plotters in August 1991, and Japan was criticized by other G-7 nations in not moving fast enough with Russia, it responded to the coup and the threat of chaos in Russia by announcing an aid package totaling $2.5 billion.9 Ruslan Khasbulatov, the new chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation, visited Tokyo in early September 1991 along with the new deputy foreign minister, Georgy Kunadze. In Tokyo, Khasbulatov passed along a letter to Kaifu from Yeltsin, which promised to approach the territorial dispute with the guiding principal of “law and justice,” leading to a relationship in which there were no “victors or vanquished.” Foreign Minister Nakayama Taro visited Moscow in October 1991, and for a few fleeting months there was hope that the two sides could reach a settlement of the territorial dispute, but this window quickly closed as domestic events and opposition in Russia prevented the new government from taking serious action. During the crucial summer of 1992 (for the new Russian government) Japan again faced pressure from the West to provide more aid to Russia. This pressure was acute and public during the G-7 summit meeting in Munich in July, but the government insisted that any additional aid be contingent on a statement issued by the G-7 leaders supporting Japan’s territorial claims. This was done, but like the hesitant Japanese denunciation of the coup the previous year, this event put further strain on relations with the new government in Moscow while it also demonstrated the

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lack of a strategic vision in Tokyo. Though leaders in the West were wondering how a new, democratic Russia could be propped up in a dire situation, leaders in Japan pressed the new Russia to yield. A visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Watanabe Michio in August 1992 was meant to be a last-minute preparatory meeting to sort out the details of Yeltsin’s upcoming Japan trip. Instead, it provided further negative publicity for both sides, as each responded with acrimony to the other’s views on the territorial dispute.10 Four days before Yeltsin was due to arrive in Tokyo in September, he called to postpone his visit. Although he promised to visit in the first half of 1993, this last-minute cancellation was the height of diplomatic effrontery, especially since the Japanese had arranged an audience with the emperor. At the April 1993 summit of G-7 foreign and finance ministers in Tokyo (the site of the upcoming G-7 heads of state summit in July), the Japanese government announced a bilateral aid package for Russia as part of a larger G-7 package. It would extend $1.5 billion in credit, much of it tied once again to export credits and trade insurance. This was a conciliatory gesture given Yeltsin’s behavior the previous fall. Yeltsin thereupon announced he would visit Japan in May, but again cancelled and rescheduled for October. Yeltsin did visit Tokyo to attend the G-7 summit as an observer and met there cordially with Prime Minister Miyazawa. As the fall 1993 summit approached, Japan was caught in domestic crossfire, and hence unable to ponder a strategic partnership with Russia. For the first time in 38 years the LDP was excluded from power, and a new coalition government was formed with the head of the New Japan Party, Hosokawa Morihiro, as prime minister. The strategic rationale for the two leaders resolving the issues dividing them was not strong enough. Both sides were still enjoying amicable relations with China, and the idea of a “China threat” lacked the effect that it might have had at the end of the decade.11 Hosokawa and Yeltsin ended the summit by signing the Tokyo Declaration in which the two sides promised to abide by all legal and historical precedents (i.e., treaties and agreements) in pursuit of a peace treaty and resolution of the territorial dispute, and that all agreements would be based on the principles of “law and justice.” Furthermore, the names of the four disputed island groups were specified, and Yeltsin orally affirmed that past agreements included the 1956 Joint Declaration.12 Following the Hosokawa–Yeltsin summit, it was revealed that the Russian government had been dumping nuclear waste into the Sea of Japan for several years. This only added to Russia’s “out-of-control” image in Japan, which originated largely with Yeltsin’s last-second cancellation of his trip in 1992.

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Strategic factors were still not strong enough to force a change in thinking among the Japanese leadership. Despite China’s rise and the strategic ambiguity of the United States, Japan was not concerned yet about its position in East Asia. Officials from both the Bush and Clinton administrations urged Japan and Russia to put their differences behind them for political, economic, and strategic reasons, but these entreaties fell on deaf ears.13 In fact by 1992 there were already early indications of a split in thinking toward Russia within the Japanese Foreign Ministry. Some officials favored moving forward quickly in order to shore up Japan’s strategic position in East Asia; others favored the status quo, demanding territory before any political or strategic rapprochement. The former group represented the deguchi-ron, or the “exit-point” strategy that insists on better relations first, which will eventually lead to the return of the islands. The latter group represented the iriguchi-ron, or the “entry-point” strategy insisting on the return of the islands as the key to improved relations.14 This split would become more public in 2001–02. Meanwhile, the political situation in Japan was such that little room existed for creative diplomacy. The reformist Prime Minister Hosokawa was forced to resign in the spring of 1994 in the wake of yet another corruption scandal. His weak successor Hata Tsutomu was forced to resign after several months, and a patchwork coalition uniting the LDP with the JSP came to power. In 1994 the waters around the disputed islands saw a dramatic increase in the number of incidents at sea. Japanese fishing boats and their crews were often stopped by Russian coastal patrol boats in disputed waters and sometimes arrested and taken into Russian custody while their boats (and catches) were impounded. Sometimes the boats were fired upon, resulting in casualties. Known as the “fishing wars,” these incidents significantly increased the level of public hostility toward Russia.15 Japan’s New Eurasia Diplomacy A confluence of events abroad and at home forced a change in the thinking of the leadership in Japan beginning in 1996. The difficulty of follow-up to Yeltsin’s visit of 1993, the “fishing wars” of 1994–95, and the Russian decision to refuse Japanese aid after the two earthquakes on Shikotan and Sakhalin in 1994 and 199516 were felt through 1995. By 1996 a new line of thinking toward Russia was emerging. It was to be seen as a potential partner, both in an economic and a strategic sense. This line of thinking had existed, to be sure, at many levels of the government for years. However, now those that favored a more open

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approach to Moscow were supported from the very top. Hashimoto Ryutaro became prime minister in early 1996. As minister of MITI from mid-1994 to January 1996, Hashimoto had been a strong proponent of expanding Japanese trade and investment relations with Russia. As president of the LDP from 1995, Hashimoto had made it known that he also favored stepped-up political relations with Russia, cultivating a strong personal relationship with Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets.17 In March 1996 Hashimoto dispatched Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko to Moscow to meet with new Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov. Ikeda handed Primakov a letter for Yeltsin from Hashimoto, which expressed Japan’s support for Russia’s ongoing democratization and economic reforms. Primakov announced that Russia would continue the demilitarization of the disputed islands. Hashimoto met with Yeltsin for the first time in Moscow in April 1996 at an international summit on nuclear safety, convened on the tenth anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. He did not bring up the territorial issue during the meeting, and this undoubtedly was received favorably. After Yeltsin’s victory in the presidential election that summer Hashimoto phoned him with congratulations. Yeltsin invited Hashimoto to Russia at the earliest opportunity. For the first time in the history of bilateral relations the leaders of Japan and Russia were forming a good bond. This was perhaps the extra something needed to jumpstart the relationship. Also, in April 1996 Minister of State for the Japan Defense Agency Usui Hideo visited Moscow, the first such visit by a JDA chief. He and his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev signed a military cooperation protocol calling for advance notice of military exercises and providing for exchanges of information, training missions, and naval port visits.18 In November 1996 Primakov visited Japan and suggested that the two nations jointly develop the disputed islands. His Japanese counterpart Ikeda agreed to study the proposal, provided that the new idea would not detract from the basic legal positions of the two sides. It was a much more positive attitude for the Japanese leadership in comparison to years past. Along with France and Germany, it pledged to help Russia with the reprocessing of nuclear materials. The relationship was now more than about just territory. In the Foreign Ministry the chief of the Russia division, Shinoda Kenji, had advocated a “multi-layered approach” ( jusoteki apurochi), and the Japanese government was beginning to act along these lines. Formerly all aspects of the bilateral relationship had been tied to the territorial dispute.19 Although some gaffes by both sides in early 1997 momentarily stalled the positive momentum, by the spring of 1997 the pleasant atmospherics

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returned. Russian Defense Minister Igor Rodionov visited Tokyo in May (the first visit by a Russian defense minister in over a century), and called for more bilateral and trilateral cooperation, among Japan, Russia, and the United States. Rodionov also voiced support for the U.S.–Japan security relationship. But the major events of the first half of 1997 occurred at the G-7 summit meeting in June in Denver, and a July speech Hashimoto gave to the Japanese Association of Corporate Executives (Keizai doyukai). At the Denver summit, Yeltsin and Hashimoto in their bilateral meeting discussed plans for promoting Japanese investment in the Russian Far East, particularly in the energy sector. Yeltsin also pledged to support Japan’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.20 In his July speech, Hashimoto outlined a strategy for Japan’s new “Eurasia Diplomacy.” He promised that Japan would steer a “new course” in developing relations with Russia to be based on three principles: trust, mutual respect for each other’s interests, and building relations proceeding from a long-term perspective.21 These two events paved the way for the Krasnoyarsk informal summit meeting in Siberia in November 1997. There the two leaders greeted one another in Krasnoyarsk like old friends. As they sailed up the Yenisei River on a fishing expedition, the two promised to increase political and defense cooperation. Hashimoto announced that Japan would officially support Russia’s APEC membership, and he unveiled a six-point economic plan (known as the Hashimoto–Yeltsin Plan).22 To everyone’s surprise, Yeltsin went a step further and declared that Russia and Japan would do their utmost to sign a peace treaty by the year 2000. Although most experts in Japan doubted that this goal could be attained, it showed the excitement that the relationship was beginning to engender on both sides. Japan’s interest in Russia was more than just about goodwill diplomacy and economics. A big rationale for a rapprochement was the fluid international environment in Northeast Asia. Most remarkable in this regard was the disappearance almost overnight of the Soviet Union, which had posed the greatest security threat to Japan for the previous five decades. Russia was now a benign player in Northeast Asia that posed little direct threat. At the same time, because of the collapse of the Soviet Union, many in Japan considered that the United States was exhibiting some strategic ambiguity in East Asia, complete with the downsizing of troop levels across the region and the closing of longexisting air and naval bases in the Philippines. Japanese leaders were growing nervous about the U.S. commitment to the region, seeing its leaders as acting unilaterally and often not in Japan’s interests.23 Neither of these events would have caused undue alarm had not there been another factor weighing in: the rise of China.

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China’s rise as an economic, military, and political giant in the region had been clear to many in Asia for years, but it was in the1990s that the trajectory raced markedly upward. Not only was the Chinese economy accelerating beyond ten percent annual GDP growth, it was now beginning to modernize its military, and acquire the types of weapons systems that were oriented toward a maritime strategy rather than the earlier focus on a land-war with the Soviet Union. Disconcerting to the Japanese was the 1995–96 series of missile crises in the Taiwan Strait, when war between the United States and China suddenly seemed possible. Japan pondered the decision it would be forced to take in the event of such a conflict, supporting its ally at the cost of damaging irreparably its relations with its large neighbor, whose power in the twenty-first century would be immense. One of the reasons the JDA took a sudden interest in improving relations with their Russian counterparts was in fact the concern about China’s dramatic emergence. There was concern not only about China’s military and economic performance, but how it was achieving this. Economic growth was helped along by Japanese largesse, military modernization was being fostered by large acquisitions of hardware from Russia. Part of the reason the JDA wanted to promote cooperation with Russia was not only as a potential balancer, but also to come to a better understanding of Russian defense systems. In August 1996 it was announced that pilots from Japan’s Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) would be invited to train in Russia. Articles published later in the Asahi shimbun revealed that two veteran Japanese pilots from the ASDF had been training at the Gromov air base just south of Moscow, learning to fly the Su-27, one of Russia’s most advanced fighter jets and, as pointedly noted, being sold to China. The ASDF was in fact interested in learning more about these planes, not just because potential enemies might be flying them, but also to carry out research for Japan’s own indigenous fighter program.24 This revelation was surprising because not only was Russia allowing Japanese pilots unfettered access to platforms of the latest technology and to Russian bases, but also because the Japanese ASDF (and the JDA) was studying equipment that would be used by the People’s Liberation Air Force in China. China was only part (albeit, a major part) of the reason for Japan’s concern about the strategic situation in East Asia. The Korean peninsula posed a danger to the Japanese archipelago, and this was highlighted by the first Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94, and North Korea’s ballistic missile program. It test fired its first Nodong-1 missile into the Sea of Japan, halfway between the Korean peninsula and the Japanese coast in 1993, and in the summer of 1998 tested a Taepodong missile in a

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trajectory over the Japanese archipelago. North Korean boats made repeated incursions into Japanese waters during the 1990s, prompting an armed Japanese response (the first since WWII). During the first half of 1998 two major events transpired that helped along the Japanese–Russian rapprochement. The first was an agreement signed in the first weeks of 1998 that allowed Japanese fishing boats to catch a quota of fish and shellfish in the waters off the disputed islands, in exchange for cash and fishing equipment to be paid by the Hokkaido Fisheries Association. This was seen as a coup by many Japanese who felt that this could considerably strengthen the basis for resolving sovereignty over the disputed islands.25 The second event was the follow-up to the Krasnoyarsk summit in Kawana in April 1998. During the Kawana summit both Yeltsin and Hashimoto repeated their pledge to do their utmost to sign a peace treaty by the year 2000. Hashimoto also floated a proposal for the disputed islands, which reportedly called for Russia to recognize Japan’s sovereignty in return for putting off any handover until future years. The two leaders also discussed concrete economic plans, agreeing to maintain the engagement of their defense establishments. Yeltsin invited Hashimoto to visit Moscow in the fall, and he proposed a Tokyo visit sometime in 1999. He promised that before the next meeting he would study Hashimoto’s proposal. Although the two shared an amicable visit, already the positive momentum of the second half of 1997 was clearly wearing off.26 Momentum was lost when in July 1998 Hashimoto resigned after an electoral defeat by the LDP (on the very day that the Russian prime minister, Sergei Kirienko, was visiting Tokyo). Hashimoto’s successor Obuchi Keizo had served as foreign minister under Hashimoto and was well-versed in Russia issues. He shared Hashimoto’s vision about the importance of furthering the rapprochement with Russia, but his connection with Yeltsin was not as strong as his predecessor. This was reflected in his visit to Moscow in November 1998. Obuchi hardly met with Yeltsin who was sick and incapacitated, and instead met with the new prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov. The Russian answer to Hashimoto’s proposal was tepid (Russia asked first for a peace and friendship treaty and then resolution of the islands). The so-called November 1998 Moscow Declaration repeated the same platitudes about joint economic development, discussions on border demarcations, and the like, but it was an empty document from the point of view of the sovereignty of the islands, and Obuchi’s visit was a source of great frustration for the Japanese leadership.27

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The year 1999 was essentially a dead year in Japanese–Russian relations. The promised Yeltsin visit never came off. Trade was still stagnant at only $4.2 billion, and investment was meager (cumulative private investment through 1999 was close to $340 million, or 1.3 percent of all foreign investment in Russia).28 Additionally, it was clear to most seasoned observers in Japan that no peace treaty would be forthcoming by the end of 2000. On the bright side, defense contacts did continue to rise, and the Japanese government followed through on its far-sighted decision in the early 1990s to assist Russian nuclear clean-up efforts in the Far East by extending $200 million to help dismantle 50 aging nuclear submarines.29 Japanese decision-makers had begun to think pragmatically about Russia in light of the evolving strategic situation in Northeast Asia. There was a confluence of thinking with Russia, as both responded to the rise of China while also striving to maintain good relations with Beijing. Unfortunately for the Japanese, domestic events in Russia put a cap on how far Japan could move forward with its newfound friend. By the end of 1999 Yelstin had resigned, and the Japanese leadership was forced to deal with an entirely different figure in Vladimir Putin. The Irkutsk Interlude and the Suzuki Scandal, 2000–02 When Yeltsin resigned on December 31, 1999, Japan’s leaders—like the rest of the world—scrambled to understand what exactly Vladimir Putin represented. The immediate conclusion was that Putin was a strong leader, and the erroneous corollary was that this would be the kind of man with whom a deal could be cut. A number of top Russian officials were invited to Japan in the first months of Putin’s presidency, including Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Deputy Prime Minster Mikhail Kasyanov (soon to be named prime minister). An invitation was issued for Putin to visit Japan after the presidential elections in Russia in March 2000 (when Putin was officially elected to office), and again in July when the G-8 summit was to take place in Okinawa. Obuchi even offered to visit Russia, even though the last official visit took place in Moscow at the end of 1998 (and thus it was ostensibly the turn of the Russian leader to visit Japan). The Japanese leadership seemed very keen to find a spot for itself on Putin’s agenda. Despite Obuchi’s untimely coma in April 2000, the new prime minister Mori Yoshiro was undaunted and pushed for a meeting with Putin, which finally came about in St. Petersburg at the end of April.

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The two leaders established rapport, probably because Mori touched upon the territorial issue as a factor within the broad strategic perspective of the necessity of improving the overall relationship, rather than from the more traditional, narrow perspective. During the summer of 2000 Putin and Mori met two more times in Japan, first at the G-8 Summit on Okinawa in late July. Shortly after that Nonaka Hiromu, the secretary general of the LDP, shocked the Japanese public and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by stating that the territorial dispute should not stand in the way of a peace treaty between Japan and Russia.30 Soon Nonaka seemed to be embroiled in an intergovernmental spat involving both the LDP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Several LDP leaders (including former deputy chief cabinet minister Suzuki Muneo, who was chosen in April 2000 as Obuchi’s and, consequently, as Mori’s special envoy to Russia) and a few members of MOFA, unhappy with the direction of Japan’s Russia policy, had been looking for a more “gradual” approach to resolve the territorial question. The old guard of the Foreign Ministry’s Russia school was quick to quash this experiment, with the support of influential opinion leaders. All major Japanese dailies quickly joined in the criticism of Nonaka’s statement.31 This event reflected the existing split in thinking toward Russia not only within the LDP, but also within MOFA. Nonaka’s statement, however, was not given prior approval by anyone in MOFA, and many MOFA officials were shocked by it and asked for clarification. Nonaka’s response was that he just wanted to shake up the “traditional, stereotyped” approach to Russia.32 The second meeting in the summer of 2000 was the summit held in Tokyo in early September, where Mori and Putin signed 15 documents encompassing trade, investment, security, the environment, and military cooperation, and they reaffirmed the Tokyo (1993) and Krasnoyarsk (1997) Declarations. Putin declared that relations were “at their highest level since the end of World War II,”33 affirming the validity of the 1956 Joint Declaration, which ceded to Japan the two southernmost and smallest of the disputed islands in exchange for a peace treaty, but insisted that the meaning of the 1956 Joint Declaration be carefully studied by experts on both sides. In spite of the pleasant atmospherics no further initiative emerged, as some on the Japanese side had hoped. Mori and Putin met one more time at the APEC summit in Brunei on November 15, as Mori expressed his desire to meet with Putin in Siberia late in the year or early in 2001. The Siberia meeting did take place on March 25, 2001, in the city of Irkutsk along the shores of Lake Baikal. Mori apparently broached the idea of a “two-track” policy that envisioned two sets of talks: one

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focusing on the 1956 agreement (and the handover of Shikotan and the Habomai group), and the other on the sovereignty of the two additional islands (Kunashir/i and Etorofu/Iturup). This was a substantial shift in Japanese policy. To this point MOFA and the LDP had always insisted on the return of all four islands at the same time. Attempts to separate the islands, even in the process of the negotiations, had been consistently refuted since 1956. This shift in policy brought the Japanese closer to the Russian perspective and could be seen as a dramatic compromise.34 Behind the idea was reportedly former chief cabinet secretary Suzuki Muneo, who had allies within MOFA, and most importantly was close to Prime Minister Mori, through his wide power network inside the LDP including Secretary General Nonaka.35 Soon thereafter the discord between the “gradualists” and the “traditionalists” spilled into the public arena and caused a shake-up in personnel at the Foreign Ministry. The reaction in the press to the Irkutsk summit expressed serious concern at Japan’s “retreat.”36 Despite these circumstances, the Japanese proposal did reflect pragmatic thinking (especially in MOFA) in line with the strategic angst that was present in Japan. The Russian side was apparently quite receptive to the Japanese proposal, but the uproar in Japan was such that all avenues of discussion were soon to be shut off. Mori was forced to step down at the end of April 2001 (for different reasons). His successor Koizumi Junichiro, at first announced that he could be flexible on the territorial issue, suggesting tacit support of the results of the Irkutsk meeting, but Foreign Minister Tanaka Makiko immediately let it be known that she was opposed to the “two-track” policy outlined by Mori. Soon Koizumi also called publicly for the return of all four islands simultaneously. There was much public criticism of the “two-track” policy in the press.37 Tanaka also said in a Diet address that she felt that there had been no true achievement in Japanese–Russian relations since the 1973 Moscow Summit, attended by her father, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. With one statement she had brushed over the accomplishments of Japanese politicians and diplomats in 1991, 1993, 1997, and 1998. Suzuki publicly blasted Tanaka’s comments, saying that they invited a return to the days of the cold war.38 These were the opening salvos of the “war” between these two strong-willed politicians, which set back relations with Russia. Koizumi seemed to back track from his hard-line position when he met with Putin at the October 2001 APEC summit in Shanghai and acknowledged that the “two-track” negotiating strategy could be effective.39 This change reflected the still unsettled situation in the Japanese Foreign Ministry as well as the influence that Suzuki still exerted over Japan’s

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Russia policy. But by the end of 2001 the situation, which had seemed somewhat promising as recently as the spring, was as muddled as ever. Though the political situation in Russia had become somewhat settled and the Russian economy was actually showing signs of life, the “Makiko vs. Muneo” war was a sign that the political situation in Japan was no longer conducive to creative diplomacy. Although defense contacts continued to proliferate during the 2000–01 period, Russian military officials began expressing serious concern about Japan’s stepped up role in the framework of the U.S.–Japan security relationship. Of particular concern was Japan’s role in the development of a missile defense system and Putin reportedly relayed this concern to Mori in April 2000.40 But this was asking Japan to put aside a program that was designed to allay Japan’s fears of perhaps what was now the greatest threat to the security of the Japanese homeland: North Korean missiles. Additional irritants included a spy scandal in the fall of 2000, and violation of Japanese airspace by Russian warplanes on several occasions in the spring of 2001. Former Prime Minister Mori visited Moscow in a private capacity in January 2002, suggesting that the “two-track” policy was not entirely dead. In a meeting with Putin, Mori reportedly spoke of the need to return Shikotan and the Habomai group, but on the status of Etorofu/ Iturup and Kunashir/i Mori spoke merely of the recognition of sovereignty.41 Suzuki accompanied Mori on his trip, leading the Russian press to argue that his influence on Russia policy was still strong.42 Japanese observers continued to insist on the danger of the “two-track” approach, saying that all Russia wanted was to “eat and run” (kuinige suru—take two islands and leave the table).43 Suzuki received some help from the top when Koizumi relieved Tanaka of her post in late January 2002, a decision unrelated to Russia policy. Tanaka’s constant warring with Diet members, such as Suzuki, and her diplomatic blunders forced his hand. Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov arrived in Tokyo on an official visit only hours after Kawaguchi Noriko was asked to replace Tanaka. The two discussed the territorial dispute and the peace treaty, but there was little substance to the rushed meetings. As one press report said, “the cast of characters continues to change but the results remain largely the same.” 44 Suzuki’s “victory” over Tanaka was fleeting. From MOFA began leakage of documents, which caused media fury about his excessive influence on foreign policy, in particular on Russian policy. Reports flourished about receiving bribes on several occasions, including from construction companies that had been contracted to build facilities on

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the disputed islands, as well as in Africa. Suzuki was finally arrested on June 19, 2002, on suspicion of receiving illegal contributions in return for political favors. His arrest, in effect, put a damper on any diplomatic efforts toward Russia, no matter how strategically sound they may have been. Meanwhile the Japanese government announced that it was halting all aid projects in the Northern Territories. Post-9/11 Japanese Foreign Policy and Russia Japan’s strong stance in support of its U.S. ally in the global war on terrorism had no direct bearing on its relationship with Russia, other than the fact that the leadership of both nations understood clearly that support for the United States should be a cornerstone of each nation’s national strategy. The reasons for their support of the United States were quite different. Russia’s was more nuanced, with an understanding not only of the threats of terrorism, but also the role that the United States could play in Central Asia, as well as a tacit agreement with the United States over Chechnya. Japan, on the other hand, made a decision that was in no way as difficult as the one made by Putin. Being a U.S. ally and faced with uncertainty in Asia, it calculated that the best course would be unwavering support. Although many top-level diplomatic channels to Russia were shut down after 2002, Japanese–Russian relations maintained a semblance of normalcy, which actually grows with each year. Japanese–Russian trade has surpassed the all-time high levels attained in the late 1980s (reaching $8.8 billion in 2004), and Japanese interest in the Russian market and Russian energy sources, in particular, has grown tremendously in the last few years. Energy is perhaps the key strategic motivating factor driving Japan’s Russia policy since 2002. By early 2003 it began making serious overtures for a stake in the development and transportation of oil and gas resources from Eastern Siberia. Of particular interest is the proposed oil pipeline the Russians are planning to build, originally from the Siberian oil depot Angarsk and later from Taishet, northwest of Lake Baikal. China’s interest in this project has been well documented. As oil prices climbed in the world markets from 2003 (partially because of the war in Iraq, but also because of growing Chinese consumption), Japan’s interest in the pipeline project grew. Previously Japanese investment had been limited to the Sakhalin shelf, where there was a multinational presence, including a strong commitment by U.S. oil majors.45

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The Sino-Japanese competition over the pipeline involves the planning of the terminus of the project. Originally in October 2002 Russia and China agreed for the pipeline to be constructed from Angarsk to the Chinese city of Daqing in the northeast. The initial estimates for the cost of the project ran to about $2.5 billion. China was unable, however, to secure a firm pledge from Putin during his state visit to Beijing in early December 2002.46 Japan jumped squarely into the picture with Koizumi’s visit to Moscow and the Russian Far East in January 2003, when he urged Putin to build a pipeline instead to the Pacific port of Nakhodka, from whence oil could be shipped directly to Japan. It was prepared to offer up to $8 billion initially for the so-called Pacific route, which would include $1 billion in investment in the infrastructure of the beleaguered Russian Far East.47 The Chinese reacted testily to the Japanese overture at the eleventh hour, to which the Russian government responded by announcing that a branch line could easily be built to China.48 Over the next several months the announcements coming from Moscow varied about what was to be done, normally according to who gave the commentary. But it was clear that Putin himself was reluctant to put all of his eggs in one basket, so to speak, by building a pipeline directly into China where all the energy would be consumed. The Pacific route offered access to all of the markets of the Asia-Pacific region, including China and Japan.49 Through the summer of 2003, Japanese government and business delegations visited Russia as part of an intense lobbying campaign to see the Pacific route realized. This included a trip by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi to Vladivostok in late June. Japanese leaders were now perhaps less concerned about a Chinese military threat than about China gobbling up energy supplies and forcing oil prices through the roof. China, after all, presents Japan with more of an economic threat, than it does a military threat, especially as long as U.S. military forces remain in the region. The lobbying campaign for the pipeline was more than just between the Chinese and Japanese governments. There was also a large Russian domestic component at this point, involving the Russian oil company Yukos, and the state-owned pipeline firm Transneft. The CEO of Yukos Mikhail Khodorkovsky had political ambitions that ran counter to Putin. He also favored the China pipeline, arguing that it made the most sense economically. Transneft wanted to build a pipeline to the Pacific. When Khodorkovsky was arrested and imprisoned indefinitely in October 2003, the China route lost a big ally.50 The following spring a tentative decision was made by the Japanese and Russian governments to go ahead with the Pacific route, pending feasibility studies.51

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Meanwhile there was a pulse in political relations between Moscow and Tokyo, as well. Partially this was due to the reemergence of a nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula in 2002–03. Japan and Russia had been excluded from the political negotiations around the 1993–94 crisis much to their mutual chagrin. This time, both sides made sure they would be included in any political settlement surrounding the peninsula. Moscow and Tokyo supported one another’s participation in sixparty talks, and they were indeed both invited to the table when talks commenced in August 2003. Leaders in both countries still shared a concern about China’s emerging power, and amicable relations gave both countries more latitude in dealing with Beijing. Nevertheless, peace treaty negotiations went nowhere during this period. Koizumi stuck ever more tightly to his call for the return of all four islands in one batch ( yonto ikkatsu). Even as Putin made it clear that Russia would be amenable to a 1956-based agreement, the Japanese government and the Japanese public would not budge. No major leader in Japan was prepared to expend the political capital necessary to compromise. Creative diplomacy and strategic thinking were stifled. This prompted Putin to cancel a trip to Japan, which had been tentatively scheduled for some time in the fall of 2004.52 On the heels of his successful visit to China in October 2004, Putin and his new foreign minister Sergei Lavrov again offered the Japanese two islands and a peace treaty along the lines of the 1956 Joint Declaration. In Beijing Putin had reached an agreement with Chinese leader Hu Jintao, which had effectively put an end to the Sino-Russian border dispute that had divided the two nations for decades. In doing so Putin had agreed to the partial transfer of the last three disputed islands in the Amur and Ussuri Rivers (against local opposition). 53 In a press conference on November 16, Putin offered the Japanese a compromise. Putin demonstrated that he was able to push through an agreement with the Chinese, and that he was prepared now to deal with Tokyo. It was unclear whether this was Russia’s final position or the beginning of a bargaining process. It made little difference, as the official Japanese response was an immediate call for the return of all four islands. 54 At their meeting less than a week later in Santiago, Chile, at the APEC summit, Koizumi and Putin were unable to come to any sort of agreement; they were also unable to finalize the dates of the Putin visit to Japan in 2005. 55 The Japanese press was uniformly against any compromise, and only one outlet suggested a strategic partnership with Russia—on the condition that Moscow return all four islands first. 56

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The year 2004 ended on a positive note for Japanese–Russian relations when the Russian government announced that it had given the final approval for the go-ahead for the construction of the Angarsk (now Taishet)–Nakhodka (now Perevoznaia) pipeline. The state-owned company Transneft was given the task.57 The goal was for the pipeline to pump 80 million tons of crude oil annually, but the cost estimates continued to balloon, reaching $11–14 billion.58 Upon the announcement, however, the Japanese government was oddly quiet. Not much was made of the decision in the national press. This was probably in part due to the territorial impasse, but also to the need to temper enthusiasm about a costly project that was still far from being commenced. It was also later reported that the project was to be divided into two stages, the first of which would lead to the Chinese border and transmission of oil through a possible connecting pipeline to Daqing and the second was still not scheduled. This created the possibility that the Chinese would benefit most and even that if oil supplies were not expanded the extension would not even be built. In a January foreign ministerial meeting between Lavrov and Machimura Nobutake, Lavrov bluntly told his Japanese counterpart that two islands were the final offer. Again, the date for the Putin visit was left undecided.59 Meanwhile, the Upper House of the Japanese Diet passed a nonbinding resolution in March calling for Russia to return the Northern Territories lost in the war. The resolution was somewhat vaguely worded to appeal to all parties in order to get a unanimous vote, but this had been the practice in the past and for the Japanese it was nothing out of the ordinary. But the Russian press interpreted it as calling for all of the Kuril Islands, giving it extensive coverage.60 Putin announced that he would not be visiting Japan in the spring. There was even a growing concern in both capitals about the viability of the pipeline project.61 The Russian ambassador, Aleksandr Losyukov, gave an interview in which he stated that Japanese–Russian relations were in their worst state.62 Although Koizumi went to Moscow to join the May celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the victory over fascism, Japan’s political relations with Russia seemed to be drifting toward the chill and indifference during the cold war. Putin’s long-anticipated visit to Tokyo, the first in five years, finally came about on November 20–21, 2005, when he met Koizumi. The two-day trip failed to produce any common approach on the territorial issue; hence no communiqué could be adopted. It was a situation that reminded some observers of the cold war chill in bilateral relations. Yet, the trip did have significance in several ways. Putin was escorted to

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Tokyo by a large delegation of business executives (over 100 people), primarily drawn from the energy industry. The East Siberian oil pipeline was still a pending issue—no final decision had been made—and this was obviously a major point of discussion among business and government executives from both sides. This marked by far the largest Russian business presence at a bilateral summit. Normally, if outside the context of summit meetings, it has been the Japanese side that brings large business delegations to Russia. As two-way trade reached $10 billion in 2005, ten documents on economic cooperation held out hope that it would rise substantially. Where Japan once seemed to possess the carrots in the relationship, Russia now seems to have the upper hand economically, due to energy. Tokyo could once threaten to withhold economic assistance and investment if Moscow skirted the territorial issue. At one time, particularly in the early 1990s and again after the 1998 economic crisis in Russia, the later was desperate for Japanese investment, particularly in the Russian Far East. But Russia is now cash rich thanks to the all-time high price for oil and gas. Additionally, Russia now has other suitors for investment and economic cooperation, having found half a dozen nations besides Japan to invest in energy projects in the Russian Far East and Siberia, particularly on Sakhalin. This marks a fundamental shift in the bilateral relationship that was markedly apparent during Putin’s visit. Japanese businesses are moving more rapidly into Russia, no matter how the government in Tokyo feels about the situation. One of Japan’s flagship corporations, Toyota Motors, is building an assembly plant near St. Petersburg. Large trading houses, including Mitsubishi and Mitsui, are deeply involved in energy projects from the Caspian to the Pacific. Some strategists in Japan among politicians, opinion leaders, and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1990s saw the development of relations with Russia as an important factor to strengthen Japan’s diplomatic leverage in the changing international power balance in Northeast Asia, notably facing the rising China. But they also clearly recognized that Japan’s leverage in resolving the territorial issue, be it economic or otherwise, was diminishing. Some kind of “gradualism” and compromise approach on the territorial problem was inevitable, if, as an overwhelming majority of Japanese people requested, the resolution of the territorial problem needed to be achieved to meet Japan’s desire to recover its honor and identity. The Japanese government withdrawal of this policy line by 2002 led to a complete impasse in the territorial negotiations; however, recognition of the importance of improved relations with Russia has not disappeared.

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It could, therefore, be argued that the time in which Japan could realistically expect to recoup all four islands has passed, and that the territorial dispute can no longer hold up the development of the Russian Far East or sound security relations with Russia. If so, then this could mark an important change in Japanese policy from the search for a grand strategic breakthrough characteristic of the 1990s to moderate policy satisfaction to realize lukewarm but realistic relations between the two countries. Conclusion One of the primary strategic drivers behind the change in Japanese thinking toward Russia in the mid-1990s was clearly China. The perception of a “China threat” arose in the mid-1990s and kept growing, especially over the past two years. Similarly, a sense of threat from North Korea emerged by 1998 and intensified over the past several years. In fact, the strategic situation in Northeast Asia (including Taiwan) is at its tensest point since the cold war. Yet, another factor has reduced the urgency of turning to Russia in response. Japanese perceptions of the strategic ambiguity of the United States have changed. Over the course of the past decade Japan and the United States have significantly shored up their security relationship, and Japanese forces support the United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, and East Asia, including participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Contingency planning and joint maneuvers continue apace. In this regard, a strategic rapprochement with Russia is seen as something less vital than it may have been a decade ago. Additionally, energy and trade relations with Russia have generally experienced positive trends over the past few years, in spite of the chilly political relationship. If anything, the changing mood in Japan over the last 15 years after the end of the cold war now gives energy-economic and security relations with Russia much greater legitimacy without resolution of the territorial problem. A grand strategic vision of fundamental development of relations in three spheres—economics, security, and territorial—now often invites apathy (i.e., the intransigence of Putin, which makes all efforts on the territorial problem futile), frustration (it is not in Japan’s interest to hold economics and security hostage to the territorial problem), or even fear (i.e., the fate of those who tried to work creatively). All these factors contribute to tepid relations with Russia being satisfactory to political leaders, MOFA officials, and the public in general.

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This is not to say that one day in the not too distant future Japanese leaders will not rethink Japan’s relationship with Russia. China’s new role in Asia causes much greater anxiety in Tokyo (and in Moscow, as well). There may be a point when Tokyo decides it needs a strong strategic relationship with Russia. Certain exogenous shocks may force them to come to such a conclusion (such as a war over Taiwan or Korea, maritime incidents in the East China Sea, or a considerable spike in the price of oil). The concrete structure of this newly born Japan–Russia strategic relationship would also depend on how Moscow would look at the global and regional power balance (such as their evaluation of China, the nature of U.S. unilateralism and U.S. human rights policy, and Japan’s readiness to accept a gradual or compromise solution on the territorial issue). But in the meantime, Tokyo seems assured of its relationship with Washington, giving strategic leaders less reason to seek a partnership with Moscow.

Notes 1. Joachim Glaubitz, Between Tokyo and Moscow: The History of an Uneasy Relationship, 1972 to the 1990s (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), pp. 181–98. See also Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neighbors (Vol. I): Japanese–Russian Relations under Brezhnev and Andropov (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), p. 211. 2. Gilbert Rozman, Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, 1985–1991: A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 151. See also Kazuhiko Togo, Nichiro shinjidai e no joso: Dakai no kagi wo motomete (Tokyo: Saimaru, 1993), pp. 42, 182. 3. Statistics from the Japanese Ministry of Finance cited in Okada Kunio, “Nikkei kigyo shinshutsu no koki wa?” Gaiko forum, No. 149 (December 2000), pp. 56–61. 4. The 1956 Joint Declaration had stated that upon the signing of a peace treaty the Soviet Union would return the island of Shikotan and the island group of Habomai to Japan. See Nobuo Shimotomai, “Japan–Soviet Relations under Perestroika: Perceptions and Interactions between Two Capitals,” in Gilbert Rozman, ed., Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949–1999 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 112. 5. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations (Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies, University of California Press, 1998), pp. 246–49. See also Rozman, Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, p. 151; and Togo, Nichiro shinjidai e no joso, pp. 42, 182. 6. Both Rozman and Hasegawa date the change to thinking among Japanese to 1988. See Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute, pp. 285–89; Rozman,

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Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era, p. 112. Shimotomai dates the change to 1989, “Japan–Soviet Relations under Perestroika,” p. 113. Togo, Nichiro shinjidai e no joso, pp. 17–19, 24–25. Andrei Kozyrev, Preobrazhenie (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie otnosheniia, 1995), p. 295. Also see Edamura Sumio, Teikoku kaitai zengo (Tokyo: Toshishuppan, 1997), p. 143. Of the aid dispensed, $1.8 billion was in the form of trade insurance for Japanese companies doing business in Russia (most used for energy projects), $500 million for humanitarian assistance distributed through loans by the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), and $200 million in JBIC export credits (source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s Assistance for the Russian Federation, April 2000). Edamura, Teikoku kaitai zengo, pp. 268–69, 282. In 1992 Japanese private investment in Russia reached just over $40 million; the same year Japanese private sources invested over $1 billion in China, The Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1993. Edamura, Teikoku kaitai zengo, pp. 346–50; Hiroshi Kimura, Distant Neighbors (Vol. 2): Japanese-Russian Relations under Gorbachev and Yeltsin (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 166–71. Raymond Garthoff, The Great Transition: American–Soviet Relations and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 468. See also Andrei Markov, Rossiia i Iaponiia: V poiskakh soglasiia (Moscow: RAN, Institut Dal’nego Vostoka, 1996), pp. 78, 93. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Why Did Russia and Japan Fail to Achieve Rapprochement in 1991–1996?” in Rozman, Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, pp. 184–85, 200. See also Joseph Ferguson, Continuing Patterns in Japanese–Russian Relations, 1996–2002 (Ph.D. Dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 2004), p. 159. Stepan Pesh, “Zapretnyi paltus: Iaponskie brakonery stanut rybolevami posle uregolirovaniia spora o severnykh territoriiakh,” Novoe vremia, No. 35 (September 1994), pp. 24–25. Hasegawa, The Northern Territories Dispute (Vol. 2), pp. 491–93. Nishimura Yoichi, “Yurashia gaiko no butaiura,” Sekai (January 1998),p. 143. “Boeicho ga tsuini Roshia-sei sentoki o konyu ka,” Foresight (June 1996), p. 22. Also see RFE/RL?, April 29, 1996. Nishimura, “Yurashia gaiko no Butaiura,” p. 142. Nishimura, “Yurashia gaiko no butaiura,” pp. 138–47. Also see Hakamada Shigeki, “Aratana Nichiro kankei kochaku e no teigen,” Foresight (August 1997), pp. 6–9. “Address by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to the Japan Association of Corporate Executives” (Washington, DC: Translation issued by The Embassy of Japan, July 1997), pp. 5–6. “Kurasunoyarusuku ni okeru Nichiro shuno kaidan (gaiyo to hyoka)” (Washington, DC: The Embassy of Japan, November 1997). The Hashimoto–Yeltsin Plan called for: (1) an initiative for joint investment;

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30. 31. 32.

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(2) Russia’s integration into international economic organizations; (3) expanding assistance for Russian reforms; (4) Japanese training of young Russian business managers; (5) a strengthening of the energy dialogue; and (6) cooperation toward the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Michael Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 6, 23–24. Asahi shimbun, March 30, May 23, 1998. See Jamestown Monitor, January 6, 1998. I have also drawn on interviews with correspondents from the Hokkaido shimbun in 1997. Mori Shinjiro, “Nichiro shuno ‘Kawana kaidan’ no butaiura,” Sekai (June 1998), pp. 126–32. Asahi shimbun, Yomiuri shimbun, November 14, 1998. Sugano Tetsuo, “Russia’s Economy and Development of the Far East,” in Koji Watanabe, ed., Engaging Russian in the Asia Pacific (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 1999), p. 85. It should be noted, however, that large-scale investment in the energy infrastructure of Sakhalin was on the verge of accelerating. “Roshia gensen 50-ki kaitai e zaisei shien,” Yomiuri shimbun, April 21, 1999; “Roshia kakukaitai ni 2 oku doru shinki shien,” Yomiuri shimbun, June 16, 1999. Yomiuri shimbun, August 9, 2000. Sankei shimbun, July 28, 2000; Yomiuri shimbun, August 4, 2000. Also see Wada Haruki, “Sukyandaru to gaiko,” Sekai, May 2002, pp. 71–77. The Nonaka–Foreign Ministry exchange was communicated to the author in a conversation with a former high-ranking ministry official who wished to remain anonymous. Napsnet Daily Report, September 5, 2000, as quoted in Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, “Is Japan’s New Eurasian Diplomacy a Failure?” (Unpublished paper, 2000). The Japanese proposal was outlined several months prior to the summit in a series of controversial articles published in the Sankei shimbun, December 27–29, 2000. See Toshikawa Takao, “ ‘Muneo Paji’ de miushinatta gaiko-Gaimusho kaikaku,” Sekai, May 2002, pp. 78–87; Hakamada Shigeki, “Irukutsuku no genso,” Sekai shuho (May 2001), pp. 6–9. Yomiuri shimbun, April 8, 2001; Hakamada Shigeki, “Irukutsuku no genso,” Sekai shuho (May 2001), pp. 6–9; Sankei shimbun, March 26, 2001. Asahi shimbun, May 10–11, 2001. Izvestiia, May 19, 2001; Itar-Tass, May 21, 27, 2001; Yomiuri shimbun, June 21, 26, 28, 2001. Asahi shimbun, Yomiuri shimbun, October 22, 2001. “Moscow Blasts US, Japan for Regional ABM System Plans,” Moscow Interfax, February 24, 2000, as cited in FBIS-EAS-2000-0224. Also, Interfax, April 26, 2000, as cited in FBIS-SOV-2000-0426. Asahi shimbun, Nihon keizai shimbun, Yomiuri shimbun, January 19, 2002.

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42. Vremya novostei, January 28, 2002. 43. Hakamada Shigeki, “Roshia ni gokai o ataeru yo na Nihonteki ‘kikubari gaiko’ o aratameyo,” Nihon no ronten, 2001 (Tokyo: Bungei shunju, 2001), pp. 130–35. 44. Jamestown Monitor, February 5, 2002. 45. Japanese companies have a 30% share in the Sakhalin-1 project, totaling approximately $4 billion. In the Sakhalin-2 project, they invested 45% of the total amount of $12 billion. See the interview with Japan’s Ambassador Nomura Issei in Novoe vremia (January 2005). 46. The Wall Street Journal, December 2–3, 2002. 47. Financial Times, January 14, 2003. 48. “Moscow Testing China’s Patience on Oil Exports,” RFE/RL, February 26, 2003. 49. Putin gave this opinion at a news conference on June 20, 2003. Text of the news conference was supplied by the official Kremlin website ⬍www. kremlin.ru.⬎. 50. Asia Times, December 9, 2003. 51. BBC News, March 22, 2004. 52. Kyodo News Service, May 9, 2004. 53. BBC News, October 16, 27, 2004. 54. Nihon keizai shimbun, November 16, 2004. 55. Asahi shimbun, Nihon keizai shimbun, Yomiuri shimbun, November 16–17, 2004. 56. Yomiuri shimbun, November 24, 2004. 57. Nihon keizai shimbun, January 1, 2005. 58. Asia Times, January 4, 2005. 59. Sankei shimbun, February 2, 2005. 60. Kommersant, March 9, 2005; Nezavisimaia gazeta, March 10, 2005. 61. Eurasia Daily Monitor, Issue 2, Vols. 68 and 72, April 7, 13, 2005. Also, Financial Times, April 29, 2005. 62. Asahi shimbun, February 10, 2005.

CHAPTER 10

Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward Central Asia Akio Kawato

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he Eurasian continent in ancient times consisted of three major civilizations: China, the Orient (composite of Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Persia), and the Roman Empire. Today Oriental civilization, which has probably the oldest origin among the three and extends from Morocco to the Ferghana Valley and even to Xinjiang, is mostly ignored, being simply identified with Islam and backwardness. Its glory as the center of science and art went into oblivion, connections among nations were ignored, and, owing to its critical geographical location, the history of the Eurasian continent as seen from East Asia was thereby deformed into a collection of separate civilizations. The situation is even worse for Central Asia. Although it used to be one of the centers of Oriental culture, it is today considered to be a mere desert and backward former colony of the Soviet Union. In fact Central Asia possesses vast arable land between the Amu and Sir Rivers and people originating from this region often played vital roles in the politics and economies of surrounding countries, such as India and China. The Mughal dynasty in India was founded by an Uzbek prince, Babur. Afghanistan used to be an indivisible part of the advanced Oriental civilization. The role of Persians, Central Asian people, and nomad nations in Chinese history and its economy is not yet fully studied. Central Asia is a missing link in world history. Today Central Asia is regaining its independent position in the world. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of Chinese power, and the

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stationing of U.S. armed forces—all keep the balance of power in this region constantly changing. A serious “Great Game” has not yet started, but it is increasingly becoming important for major powers to have some stake in this region. For Japan, located in Asia and being a neighbor of Russia and China, it is vital to have a viable strategy vis-à-vis Central Asia. Japan’s Strategy—an Oxymoron? Strategy in Japan’s foreign policy may sound like an oxymoron, because in the eyes of many Japanese, deprived of the capacity to project her will abroad by forcible means since 1945, Japan is not a full-fledged state. Her dependence on the United States in security strengthens such an impression. A unitary government typical of a “nation state” was not intrinsic for Japan through most of her history. Separated from the continent by the sea, Japan before the Meiji Restoration almost always enjoyed the leisure of living under dual or even triple centers of power: Emperor and aristocrats at one time, emperor and samurai at other times, and even emperor, samurai, and merchants at certain moments. The absolute power of the emperor and an articulate self-identification of Japan as a nation state—all these were new for Japan from 1868, and she adopted them to cope with the colonialist powers. Thus, Japan in the Meiji period began to formulate a clear national strategy: to achieve industrialization as quickly as possible and build strong armed forces to defend herself and, subsequently, to acquire overseas colonies. Eventually, she extended her sway through much of China, but she did not gain control over western areas that would have inserted her into border relations in Central Asia or face the Soviet Union’s domination there. After World War II (WWII), Japan was deprived of military means to realize her interests overseas. However, this does not mean that postwar Japan did not possess any strategy. As long as a nation survives, she has her own interest and will, which can be realized by a “strategy”: a scenario to achieve one’s own goals. Japan’s foreign policy after WWII was not as passive as some pundits assume. When Japan’s intention does not go against U.S. interests, she can pursue her own policy safely. One should not overlook the fact that Japan possesses a set of peaceful but effective means to promote her strategy. In fact, Japanese diplomats abroad always enjoy substantial privileges emanating from the fact that Japan is the second-largest economic power in the world. Access to the policymakers is fairly easy, and third country diplomats are always attentive to what

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Japanese have to say. Economic power can be converted into political power, usually without much fanfare. Many countries appreciate Japan’s economic assistance program, because it is not merely donations of money, but a serious attempt to improve the economic and social infrastructure of developing nations. These countries do not hesitate in rendering support for Japan’s international initiatives. What is more, Japan has a high degree of “soft power”: the charm of her affluent and free society, and the appeal of her traditional as well as contemporary culture. Employing these means, Japan is capable of actively promoting her interests overseas, especially in Asia. In accordance with the “Fukuda Doctrine,” Japan helped the ASEAN countries’ economic development, at the same time urging them to unite in regionalism. Today ASEAN is both politically and economically a viable entity. Japan established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in 1973 even before unification, irritating the U.S. administration. After imposing sanctions in 1989 Japan was the first country to resume economic assistance to China, overriding criticism from the West that Japan neglected the human rights issue. When Cambodia held her first general election, Japan’s political role was vital. These are some examples of an active foreign policy, drawing on soft power linked to substantial economic assistance. It is true that Japan found it possible to realize her own strategy only within the confinement of the American grand strategy, but the end of the cold war and the surge of Chinese power have given the Japan–U.S. alliance a more relative character. Japan now finds a more urgent need for strategic thinking on how to ensure a balance of power around herself, which would serve her security and prosperity. Her policy in Central Asia should constitute one of the links in such a strategy. Japan, however, has been suffering from several constraints in realizing her own strategy. She could not establish an AMF because of joint objections by the United States and China, and she was unable to fully develop ties with Iran and Myanmar because of American objections. Each case was specific, but at the bottom lies America’s basic consideration: do not allow Japan to take the sole lead in Asia. Japan has her own home-made limitations, too. For example, the prime minister and even the foreign minister are usually obliged to stay in Tokyo while the Diet is in session. When they go abroad, they have to ask for its consent. So these leaders can only rarely visit those areas of the world that are not deemed vital for Japan’s interests, for example, Central Asia, making Japan’s foreign policy an “on-and-off diplomacy.” Visits to such regions may rouse brief attention and create a false impression of

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Japan’s quasi-initiatives, but over the ensuing years the momentum can hardly be maintained merely by the efforts of Japanese diplomats. The way of thinking of the majority of Japanese diplomats is such that changes and new trends in and outside of this country are not noticed and dealt with in a timely fashion. In their eyes, the order of importance of each region and country rarely changes. Each regional department of MOFA acts independently. Usually it takes the intervention of the vice minister to coordinate the activities of the interested departments for one or another big diplomatic operation. Those diplomats who work on relations with Russia, for example, tend to solve issues solely on a bilateral basis without fully recognizing the fact that Japan’s overall position vis-à-vis the United States and Asia greatly affects Russia’s attitude toward Japan. Japanese diplomacy suffers from one more snag, too: stereotyped reporting by the international media. Even when Japan’s initiatives are politically motivated, the international media often discerns only economic motives, thus reproducing the image that Japan is a mere vassal of the United States and does not possess her own strategy. These constraints all apply to strategic thinking toward Central Asia. Japan’s Diplomacy in Central Asia—the Start Japan has been very ignorant about Central Asia, although the latter’s cultural influence was conspicuous in ancient Japan. Under Soviet rule, Central Asia grew even more remote in the eyes of the Japanese, becoming mixed up with the image of Russia. As the Japanese did not possess a positive view on the USSR, Central Asia was even more neglected because it was considered to be a mere “backward” part of the USSR. When the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker made a quick tour of the newly independent states of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), promising support and announcing the opening of U.S. embassies. Japan opened her first embassies in Central Asia only in January 1993 (in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). Such a slow move reflects yet another drawback in Japanese diplomacy; the acute shortage of diplomats with a fair command of languages such as Russian. Also, opening a new embassy takes a long time; one can be opened only when an old embassy elsewhere is scrapped to restrain the overall number of embassies. What is more, the new Japanese ambassadors were left on their own because the officials in Tokyo did not have the capacity to pay enough attention to these new countries. The number of personnel and the budget were very limited,

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obliging the ambassadors themselves to draft cables to ask for more resources and attention. In the first half of the 1990s, Kyrgyzstan drew the largest attention of the Japanese government. It became the first Central Asian country which a Japanese foreign minister visited. President Akayev at that time was considered to be the most reform-oriented among CIS leaders. It was assumed that because the economy is small, Japan’s assistance would be more effective, turning Kyrgyzstan into a showcase of Japan’s ODA, and, thus, greatly enhancing Japan’s position among CIS countries and Russia. That was the tacit calculation of Japanese officials at the time. However, it became clear that the Kyrgyz government was not prepared for implementation of large assistance projects, and gradually priority was transferred to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two most populous Central Asian countries. If Kazakhstan is important due to her large oil reserves, Uzbekistan occupies a geopolitically vital place at the center of the Eurasian continent, possessing the largest political influence. Uzbekistan is regarded as the key country in Central Asia based on the reasoning that if the situation becomes unstable in this country, it will easily spread to neighboring states, affecting the balance of power in the eastern half of Eurasia. Turkmenistan from an early stage also had drawn the attention of Japanese business because of its huge natural gas reserves; however, relations were slow to materialize and only in 2005 did Japan open its official liaison office in Ashkhabad. Toward the end of the civil war in Tajikistan Japan showed interest in the postwar settlement and economic development in that country. It was a way to lift Japan’s international position: rendering altruistic help for another state’s well-being. But its presence never became permanent in Tajikistan before the opening of a liaison office in 2002. It is ironic that the less the attention a country draws, the easier it is to develop a coherent strategy vis-à-vis that part of the world. If a country has a strong bearing on one’s diplomacy, opinions may differ too much, making it hard to elaborate an articulate and consistent strategy. Central Asia for Japan is a case in point. A small number of high-ranking officials gradually formulated Japan’s policy vis-à-vis Central Asia. For Uzbekistan the role of MOFA officials is noteworthy. They visited Uzbekistan many times, not only because they were asked to come by the Japanese ambassador at the time and they had sympathy toward Uzbeks, but also because they clearly saw the geopolitical importance of Uzbekistan and its meaning in Japan’s foreign policy. For them Central Asia, located between China and Russia, is vital for maintenance of the balance of

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power and stability in eastern Eurasia, and if Japan established its footing there, she would get a card to play with China and Russia. For example Chino Tadao, vice minister for financial affairs at that time, established friendly relations with President Karimov and government officials, giving frank advice for economic reforms.1 In 1994 Karimov made his first visit to Japan and by 1997 Japan had given about $500 million in soft loans and grants to Uzbekistan, making the latter a showcase of Japan’s assistance in Central Asia. Japan had to be cautious, though, so as not to incur criticism from the West that Japan provides easy money, ignoring human rights issues and the need to impose further economic reforms. Japanese society is one of the most democratic in the world, and human rights are well guarded. However, Japan was never hasty in spreading the values of democracy and freedom to other countries. Out of her own historical experience she knows very well that without economic development real democracy is hard to achieve. Therefore, her main efforts were directed toward construction of economic infrastructure in developing nations. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan was always in Japan’s sight. Her oil resources attracted the attention of Japanese business and her large geographical size, located between Russia and China, drew the attention of Japan’s MOFA. Watanabe Michio, Japanese foreign minister, made a visit to this country already in 1992, and Kazakh President Nazarbayev visited Japan in April 1994, one month ahead of Karimov. However, rich in oil resources, Kazakhstan was not enthusiastic about receiving Japanese economic assistance, which for Japan is one of the limited means to promote bilateral relations. It was only toward 1998 that Kazakhstan accepted a substantial Japanese soft loan. For many Japanese Kazakh officials seemed “haughty,” leading to preference to the Uzbeks who always received the Japanese very cordially. The second wave of Japan’s involvement came with the announcement of “Silk Road Diplomacy.” By 1997 Togo Kazuhiko, then deputy director general of the Department of European and Oceanic Affairs, had realized the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia and proposed that Japan should not fall behind in filling the vacuum in this region. It was argued that Japan’s clout there would benefit her diplomacy vis-à-vis Russia, China, and the Middle East, even if there was little specificity about what benefits actually might be realized. Togo’s department formulated three principles, which were later named “Silk Road Diplomacy,”2 and gradually started promulgating them. Toward the end of June and the beginning of July of 1997 Obuchi Keizo, a member of the Lower House who became prime minister in 1998, led a large delegation

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(approximately 60 people consisting of politicians, government officials, businessmen, and academics) to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. His initiative, undertaken under the name of “Eurasian diplomacy,” must have been coordinated with MOFA and the Prime Minister’s Office. In July 1997 an indication came down from the Prime Minister’s Office to give MOFA’s comments on a major speech on “Eurasian diplomacy” drafted by that office.3 The Department of European and Oceanic Affairs in one night summarized the office’s ideas, including “Silk Road Diplomacy” and revised the draft. The speech was delivered by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro to Keizai Doyukai on July 24. The speech also launched a new approach to Russia. This is a good example of how quick and dynamic Japan’s foreign policy can be, when both the prime minister and the officials in charge happen to be innovative and imaginative, insofar as most major diplomatic policies are decided by the tandem of the Prime Minister’s Office and MOFA. “Silk Road Diplomacy” was highly lauded by countries in the Caucasus and Central Asia. They anticipated not only Japan’s ODA, but also her political involvement, which would dilute the effect of their overdependence on either Russia or the United States. However, this was doomed to become yet another example of the “on-and-off diplomacy” of Japan. In July 1998 Akino Yutaka, political adviser for the UN monitoring operation in Tajikistan and well-regarded academic who toiled for the repatriation of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan, was murdered by local fighters. Soon after that Hashimoto had to step down as prime minister because of a defeat for the LDP in the Upper House elections. Almost at the same time there was a regular rotation in the MOFA, and the officials who had initiated the policy toward Central Asia moved elsewhere. Implementation of “Silk Road Diplomacy” was left to their successors, who achieved slow progress. In May 1999 Minister for Foreign Affairs Komura Masahiko visited Uzbekistan. Liaison Offices were opened in Tajikistan in January 2002 and in Kyrgyzstan in January 2003. JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency) opened its offices in Tashkent in 1999 and Kyrgyzstan in 2000 respectively, starting active support for reforms in these countries. VIP visits remained rare, but Japan’s footing in Central Asia grew (the Caucasus lagged behind, partly because Japan did not have any embassy until 2000 when she opened one in Azerbaijan). Japan by then had become the No.1 donor of ODA for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. She hosted in Tokyo a Consultative Group Meeting of donors for Tajikistan in 2001, inviting President Rakhmonov.

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The 9/11 terrorist attack in New York and the ensuing battle in Afghanistan raised international attention for Central Asia. A large part of the humanitarian aid by the UN went to Afghanistan via Central Asia. This was largely financed by Japan and was supervised by Oshima Kenzo, then deputy director general of the UN. Simultaneously, the Japanese government conferred more than $20 million of urgent grants to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. They were used for importing capital goods, which were vital for the economic development and political stability of these countries. In Tajikistan, for example, combines, tractors, and other agricultural machinery were imported from Uzbekistan, Russia, and Ukraine. In July 2002 Sugiura Seiken, senior vice minister for foreign affairs, made a tour of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, heading an energy mission. This was done on the initiative of the MOFA, which attempted to draw the attention of Japanese business to this part of the world. However, economic considerations have been playing a marginal role in relations with Central Asia. The total volume of trade in 2003 was merely $446 million (about 0.5 percent of Japan’s foreign trade), and Japanese companies had not invested much money in this region because it is landlocked and business there is subject to many inconveniences, the remnant of the rigid socialist economy. The energy mission produced few concrete results. Toward Multilateralism: Central Asia Plus Japan In late July 2002 President Karimov paid his second visit to Japan. He had visited Washington D.C. in March and had signed a document on “Strategic Partnership” with the United States. Having decided to provide the Hanabad base for use by the American Air Force, he shifted the pivot of his foreign policy to the United States and Japan. Probably he calculated that in this way he would be able to thwart the Russian imperialistic intention to subjugate Central Asia again and that thanks to lucrative financial aid by Japan and the United States Uzbekistan would be able to accomplish a smooth transformation into a market economy. Karimov proposed to Japan to agree to a similar “Strategic Partnership” and a separate document on economic cooperation. In the first document Japan was urged to contribute to the security of Uzbekistan. As ambassador to Uzbekistan at the time, I had the impression that the initiative to conclude such a document came directly from Karimov, although most officials in his government were skeptical whether Japan could make a real contribution to Uzbek security. Karimov, for his part, was probably

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eager to draw political benefit from Japan’s economic assistance, which he had come to highly esteem by that time. Japan’s assistance in the construction of infrastructure in Uzbekistan (Japan’s yen loan was used for laying a vast network of optic fiber lines across the country, modernization of local airports, opening tens of vocational colleges, construction of a factory to repair old railway wagons, construction of a huge power plant, etc.) promoted the economy, thus enhancing political stability. It allowed Uzbekistan to secure her departure from colonialist subjugation. Karimov was aware that Japan does not possess any imperialist ambition vis-à-vis Central Asia, seeing it as a safe and reliable force for avoiding overdependence either on Russia or the United States. He pursued a political goal even in the economy, asking for Japan’s yen loan for construction of a new railway, which will reduce dependence on Russia and Turkmenistan and will open a new transportation route to the Persian Gulf via Afghanistan. In Japan, however, the implementation of these agreements was left to the mercy of diplomats and other government officials. The Central Asian desk of the MOFA again had to engage in an obstacle course to gain the attention of higher officials and obtain financial and other resources. When I replaced Nakayama Kyoko in 2002 as ambassador to Uzbekistan, I did not possess enough connections. She had come from the Ministry of Finance and enjoyed the support also of the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation. I could count only on MOFA for promotion of my ideas. In the renamed Ministry of Financial Affairs the situation was changing. A new generation of officials did not share the passionate view on Uzbekistan of their predecessors, such as Chino. Their priority was to follow the line of the IMF and the World Bank, which became increasingly dubious about Uzbek performance in human rights and economic reforms. The general atmosphere in MOFA too was not positive toward Central Asia, an unknown newcomer in world politics and a “mere part of the former Soviet Union.” The Central Asia desk tried to realize a visit either of the prime minister or the minister of foreign affairs to the region, but their attempts were always thwarted by other departments, which proposed “more urgent and more important” visits elsewhere. The yen loan for construction of the new railway in Uzbekistan was finally approved only in August of 2004. At the same time, a new idea was fermenting among interested Japanese diplomats. By the autumn of 2003 new people had taken charge of Central Asia in MOFA and welcomed new ideas. As ambassador, I suggested to Uzbek officials that regional integration such as ASEAN would serve the interests of all Central Asian countries in

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strengthening their political independence and economies. My colleagues in other Central Asian countries and in the Tokyo home office were also reaching a similar idea independently. This thinking found a unified, concrete form when the first Central Asian ambassadorial meeting was held in Tashkent in September 2003 with the participation of high-ranking officials from the home office. All participants expressed support when an idea was floated to establish a forum “Central Asia plus Japan” and to strengthen multilateralism and regional coordination, if not integration, in the region. When Uzbek foreign minister Sadyk Safaev paid his first official visit to Japan in December 2003, this idea was formally conveyed to him by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko. Simultaneously, Japan’s MOFA started coordination with other Central Asian states to launch a joint forum “Central Asia plus Japan.” The future form of Japan’s involvement in Central Asian affairs was much discussed among Japanese officials at that time. One possibility was to take part in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the consensus among Japanese officials was that if Japan joined this mechanism as the only non-socialist country, she might end up being used by other members, and without the involvement of Western countries SCO will not become an effective organization. Another possibility was to hold a joint meeting with the CACO (Central Asian Cooperation Organization). However, as CACO did not seem a reliable body and, meanwhile, Russia was accepted as a member in May 2004, the only choice for Japan was to launch a new forum “Central Asia plus Japan.” The model was ASEAN ⫹ 3 (Japan, China, and South Korea). This form ensures flexibility for Japan, because it does not close the door for others, while for the time being there was no necessity for cumbersome coordination with a large number of participants. The Department of European and Oceanic Affairs gradually began lobbying to have the Minister of Foreign Affairs Kawaguchi go to Central Asia in the summer of 2004, the typical season for Japan’s diplomacy. In August 2004 Kawaguchi made official visits to Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In Tashkent she delivered a major speech in front of the local dignitaries and foreign representatives, presenting three principles in dealing with Central Asian countries: respect for diversity, a cooperative rivalry, and openness to the participation of third parties. Kawaguchi articulately called for further democratization and economic reforms, cautioning the conservative forces in an unusually blunt tone from attempting to guard their vested interests under the guise of “tradition.” On August 28 she held a joint meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan, with the ministers of foreign affairs of all the Central

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Asian countries except Turkmenistan. (These ministers were in Astana for a regular meeting of the CACO; however, they met Kawaguchi independent of this framework.) The ensuing joint statement declared that Japan and the four Central Asian countries had agreed to launch the new forum, “Central Asia plus Japan.” Kawaguchi did not resort to the notorious “checkbook diplomacy” and did not announce any spectacular aid package. This was a rare example where Japan’s working-level officials elaborated a coherent strategy to create a new international framework. The general lack of interest in Central Asia brought an opportunity where MOFA officials could create an articulate new initiative without help from the Prime Minister’s Office. This was not subject to attentive discussion in the Diet or even close attention from the mass media. Thus, the initiative was coherent, but at the same time fragile. Fundamental Change after the Andijan Incident On May 13, 2005, a group of armed intruders assaulted a prison in Andijan to free the inmates. In ensuing events a large number of citizens were shot to death. The European Union (EU) and the United States, to different degrees, blamed the Uzbek authorities for shooting the unarmed citizens, whereas Russia and China openly defended the actions of the Uzbek government. Japan took a cautious approach and urged the Uzbek government to provide a more plausible explanation about the cause and the outcome of the incident. Japan did not publicly denounce the Uzbek authorities. On July 6 the SCO held its annual summit in Almaty, and all participants demanded in their joint declaration that the United States define more clearly how long its armed forces intend to use the bases in Central Asia, inasmuch as the situation in Afghanistan was heading toward stability and the mission of the American armed forces was being fulfilled. Later, on July 29 the Uzbek government sent a blunt diplomatic note to the American Embassy in Tashkent, urging it to withdraw all U.S. forces within six months. By November all U.S. troops and airplanes left the Uzbek territory, and soon after that Karimov flew to Moscow and signed a treaty on mutual security. Uzbek foreign policy has made a turnabout. For some years the world media had been talking about a new “Great Game” in Central Asia. However, it is noteworthy that no big power other than Russia has a vital interest in this region. As Russian influence remained limited after the fall of the Soviet Union, a power vacuum resulted. Without a serious caretaker Central Asia was becoming an orphan

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in world politics. The United States has not been able to formulate an unequivocal policy toward Central Asia, being unable to synthesize various considerations: the oil in Kazakhstan, the need to secure the use of military bases for operations in Afghanistan, and aspirations to spread democracy and a market economy. China has a burning desire for energy resources in Central Asia, but her political ambition for dominance is not yet fully visible. Moreover, China still lacks the capacity to project her influence to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which do not share common borders with China. Her culture and the mentality of the people are much different from the ones in Central Asia, which is still under the legacy of past Russian influence. The EU has a tendency to try to expand its cultural, economic, and (eventually) political spheres, and Central Asia is no exception. Central Asia is the only area in the world where both the ADB (Asian Development Bank) and the EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) are active. The EU countries have been rendering substantial economic assistance and advice; yet, they face severe commercial competition, and their hands tend to be tied by public opinion that denounces assistance to authoritarian regimes. India, Iran, and Turkey all have strong historical ties with Central Asia and have renewed their interest in this region; yet their capacity to project influence is still limited. Japan’s economic assistance plays a substantial role in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but her involvement in Central Asia still lacks general understanding and support in her own society. She does not possess serious weight in either politics or security affairs in this region. Therefore, a real “New Great Game” had not started yet in Central Asia, when the rapprochement between Uzbekistan and Russia substantially changed the political map in Central Asia. But before going into this strategic reorientation, we need to take a glance back at the background of the remarkable shift in Uzbek foreign policy. One has to note that even before the Andijan incident the United States and Russia had been gradually changing places in the eyes of the Uzbeks. If America in the past posed as liberator and generous financier for Central Asian countries, the authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet Union had come to fear the United States, which may attempt to topple their regime for the sake of democracy and reforms. Wary of the intentions of the Americans, Uzbekistan has been strengthening her tilt toward Russia. Upset that the United States did not pay them enough for their independent policy from Russia and the introduction of economic reforms, the authorities turned instead to Russia, which could provide some money from her huge new oil income, and, more importantly, would not attempt

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to topple the government. The Uzbek army for the first time after the fall of the Soviet Union engaged in a joint exercise with the Russian armed forces in 2005. Russia gladly took advantage of this situation and even touted herself as a bridgehead of political freedom and economic reforms. The Uzbek elite, eager to maintain their position from the days of the Soviet Union, welcomed the return of Russia, which they still consider as the center of civilization. Russia looks attractive to the common people in Central Asia as well. Expectations that someday an American would knock on their door to offer lucrative help never came true, and what is more the United States imposes, in their eyes, a foreign culture that is not compatible with theirs. If in the United States the people from Central Asia are generally not recognized, in Russia they are still somehow reckoned with and it is easier for the Uzbeks to do business in Russia. Knowledge of Russian and Russian mores contrasts with weak knowledge of the English language and American ways of thinking. The Andijan incident and the conclusion of a security pact between Uzbekistan and Russia have made this tendency decisive. If the United States wants to keep her influence in Central Asia, she will need a more cohesive and consistent policy than up to now. China’s political role in Central Asia is on the rise too. Shortly after the Andijan incident Karimov flew to Beijing for an official visit as scheduled, and China publicly announced her support for the Uzbek government in its handling of the Andijan incident. China later joined the joint declaration of the SCO and objected to the location of American armed forces in Central Asia. In this way, the world was made to understand that China is a natural player in Central Asia and that the United States is an outsider. China has become attractive as a donor of economic assistance, too. In the 2004 SCO summit, Hu Jintao announced that China is going to offer Central Asia soft loans amounting to $900 million. Representatives of Chinese oil and natural gas companies frequently visit Central Asia in quest of resources, promising to finance a wide range of projects. China’s status is on the rise in Central Asia, and it is interesting to see how long Russia can continue its collusion with China against the United States. A new “Great Game” may well start between China and Russia. Redefinition of Interests: Toward Establishment of a Central Asian Version of ARF After the fall of the Soviet empire, Central Asian countries were urged to reform themselves to introduce democracy and a market economy, both

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of which had been only gradually established in Western Europe and America, taking much time and bloodshed. Any attempt to achieve these two goals in a short time would incite total chaos, as was the case in Russia in the early 1990s. Therefore, Central Asian countries merely vacillated between major powers depending upon when and what they provide. In their eyes there was no country in the world on whose assistance they can totally rely in order to jump into an unknown world of freedom and democracy. Now, having seen that the United States does not possess a coherent strategy for the benefit of the current leaders in the region, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have made decisive their tilt toward Russia. Kyrgyztan may soon follow suit. The lacuna created by the break-up of the Soviet Union is now being filled by Russia, which raises the following questions. First, the Central Asian countries will have to discuss really well what their true interests are. Their dependence on Russia entails a danger of renewed subjugation in view of the unchanged attitude of the majority of the Russians toward Central Asia as their legitimate outpost. The absence of American influence might someday allow a wanton rivalry between Russia and China, which would harm security in this region. In any case, Central Asian states have to achieve democratization and a market economy for their own sake. Second, Japan, the United States, and the EU need to redefine their interests and goals in this region. They may well leave this region at the mercy of the rivalry among major regional powers, but then their influence in the eastern half of the Eurasian continent will be substantially reduced. China may possess some political weight in Kyrgyztan, but in other Central Asian countries her influence is largely limited to economics. Most Chinese experts today cannot speak Russian, the common language in the ex-Soviet sphere, and their mentality is different in spite of some racial resemblance. China will be accepted in Central Asia as long as and as much as it pays money to them. Russia, too, although she gladly accepted the overture of Karimov, will not be able to shoulder all the expenses that are needed to maintain stability and develop economies in Central Asia. All these facts indicate the necessity for serious international cooperation. In Europe the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) greatly contributed to securing the status quo and security in the region. In Southeast and East Asia, on a more tentative basis, the ARF has been addressing similar questions with the participation of Japan, China, the United States, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and other countries. Central Asia has the SCO, but its terms of reference are

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mainly economic and its main financier is China Russia might not be so happy about China’s growing stake in Central Asia. Therefore to embark upon more rapid construction of economic infrastructure and to ensure security, solving the dilemma of the Sino-Russian rivalry, Central Asia would need either to enlarge the SCO to include Japan, the United States, and the EU or to establish a new international framework like ARF with more than security considerations. Obviously such an initiative should originate from the Central Asian countries themselves. Until recently the Japanese government was considering initiating a broad program of infrastructure building, the effect of which would encompass the territory of several Central Asian countries. It would be started with small-scale technical assistance and with a view to incorporating Afghanistan into regional cooperation. Such an undertaking would accelerate the tendency to deeper integration among Central Asian states, an outcome to be welcomed in Japan. The Central Asian version of ARF, which so far remains the author’s personal idea, might incorporate such a Japanese initiative under its umbrella. The Central Asian countries should resume their efforts for genuine democratization and economic reform, and the industrialized countries should continue to help them, keeping in mind the following specifics in Central Asia. In ex-socialist states, namely countries where all (but limited) resources were monopolized by the state, there is no real basis for a democratic opposition. The medieval despotism augmented by Russian and Soviet autocracy engendered an atmosphere in which both the elite and the masses do not listen to a “democratic” leader. They tend to consider such a leader to be weak, an invitation to unhampered fighting to extract as much as possible. Some intellectuals aspire to freedom and democracy, but the common people do not support them, suspecting, often correctly, that the intellectuals are concerned only with their own liberty and well-being. In the opinion of the masses the national wealth should not be monopolized by private persons. Only public ownership of property would guarantee the people’s well-being, they believe. Under these circumstances, any opposition leaders, after toppling an authoritarian regime, may well end up establishing yet another authoritarian and corrupt government, dividing up property for their own advantage. Unlike some Americans who assume that these conditions do not stand in the way of vigorous efforts to impose democracy and a market economy, Japanese tend to be cautious in pressing for far-reaching reforms that do not take these conditions into account. The world should possess a more exact knowledge about Central Asian society. The Andijan incident, for example, might have been

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caused not by religious extremism (as the Uzbek authorities claim) or by the “widespread dissatisfaction of the people with the slow pace in economic reforms” (as some Western media claim). Islam in Central Asia is in general moderate, and fanaticism is rare. People are dissatisfied not with the “slow pace” of economic reforms, but with the early results of the reforms: a constant rise in communal payments and unemployment because of the breakup of collective farms. In this vein the background of the Andijan incident may have been not so much ideological as materialistic. This area is prone to illegal import of Chinese commodities and illegal export of Uzbek cotton and oil, and may be involved in narcotics traffic. The change of the Andijan local governor and the ensuing attempt to revamp the local economic interests may well have served as a trigger of the Andijan incident. All this suggests that the world community should be more careful in approaching the ex-socialist states. Many reforms, contrary to the general understanding in the West, are not welcomed by the local people who are accustomed to being taken care of by their government. Usually fewer than ten percent of the total population is eager to start their own ventures, utilizing newly acquired freedom (and in many cases their initiative tends to be stymied by envy and suspicion in the society and extortion by the officials). A hasty attempt to enforce reforms will exacerbate the economic hardship, bringing political chaos in which quasi “opposition” politicians engage in an endless battle for ownership of the properties. A serious discussion is needed to reexamine the development strategies of the ex-socialist countries. Central Asia as one of the centers of world history deserves independence, and its people deserve a better and more democratic way of life. Japan would be willing to help them to achieve these goals inasmuch as the presence of an integrated power in this region independent of outside control would serve the interests of Japan. Even if Japan may adjust her policy to the region now, her long-term objectives are likely to endure. Japan’s strategy is not limited to trade promotion. She endeavors to enhance her international position in general, sometimes even in remote areas. In Central Asia, where the rivalry among big powers may create a stalemate, Japan could aspire to serve as an impartial balancer in a multilateral mechanism for security and development of the region. Earlier its role in the development of ASEAN proved to be a remarkable showcase for its diplomacy, economic assistance, and direct investments. Cambodia’s moves toward democratization were facilitated by Japan’s involvement, too. In Central Asia, where the rivalry among

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big powers may turn into a stalemate, Japan may serve as an impartial balancer and initiator of a multilateral mechanism for security and development of the region. In June 2006 the second joint meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of “Central Asia plus Japan” was held in Tokyo. Turkmenistan did not send a delegate, but this time Afghanistan was represented. This proactive gesture by Japan drew the attention of some foreign media, the more so because it took place just one week before the SCO’s annual summit. Shortly afterward Koizumi asked MOFA to arrange an official trip to Central Asia. A farewell visit to the United States was approaching, and the feud over Yasukuni made a visit to Japan’s direct neighbors impossible. Central Asia, because of its “freshness” in the eyes of the Japanese public (there had been no visit by a Japanese prime minister to this region) and prevalent pro-Japanese attitudes, was a natural choice for him. The visit was brief (August 28–30 to Astana, Tashkent, and Samarkand), and Koizumi did not engage in “checkbook diplomacy.” He reiterated Japan’s interest in energy resources, including uranium, but did not go beyond giving his blessing to what private companies had been doing. The visit was the culmination of the policy symbolized by the forum “Central Asia and Japan,” which appealed to the Central Asian countries for more unity among themselves, open cooperation with all interested third parties, and further democratization and economic reform. Koizumi’s visit coincided with moves by the United States and EU. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher had visited Uzbekistan at the beginning of August. Soon refugees from Andijan were repatriated apparently without any repression. The EU also had sent a high-level delegation to Uzbekistan in late August. These moves are not closely orchestrated, but they reflect a change in the general atmosphere vis-à-vis Uzbekistan. Japan does not have any intention to challenge the influence of Russia and China in this region but wants to have her own voice heard there, too. Koizumi’s visit coincided with yet another positive move. On September 2 the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan held an informal summit in Astana and declared that they were going to accelerate intra-regional cooperation. This group had not met by itself at least since 2004 when the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) admitted Russia as a member. Following this meeting Karimov switched his visit to Kazakhstan into a bilateral state visit, overtly demonstrating his friendship with Nazarbayev. Thus, Koizumi left a legacy of rising hopes in relations with Central Asia.

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Notes 1. Author’s conversation with Chino Tadao in November 2003. 2. The three principles were: political dialogue to strengthen confidence and mutual understanding; economic cooperation and cooperation in the development of mineral resources for realizing prosperity; and cooperation for realization of peace through nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, democratization, and stabilization. 3. Author’s interview with Kazuhiko Togo in March 2005.

CHAPTER 11

Japanese Strategic Thinking on Regionalism Gilbert Rozman

A

s the cold war ended in 1989–90, the first rumblings of regionalism were felt in Japan, both with the establishment of APEC inclusive of the United States and with talk of the “Japan Sea economic rim” and of the EAEC (East Asian economic caucus) exclusive of the United States. In December 2005 the first meeting of the EAS (East Asian Summit) rekindled Japanese hopes for regionalism, now with careful attention to preventing China’s dominance. Over more than 15 years we can trace Japanese interest in regionalism,1 transcending bilateral relations while requiring some delicate balancing of relations involving first the United States and later China.2 Different assumptions could be found on the political Right and Left, initially among those who placed a high future value on U.S. relations and those who were impatient for “normal” foreign relations that limit the U.S. role, and eventually among those who sought to forestall China’s leadership in Asia and those who accepted the need for Japan to “reenter Asia.” This chapter focuses on the strategic calculations operating in the background as approaches to regionalism changed. Critical to Japanese reasoning about Asia are unsatisfied expectations about the establishment of an organization or community that would forge regionalism. Already in the late nineteenth century sentiments were rising that Western powers were bent on making the countries of Asia their dependencies and preventing them from joining each other for regional self-interest, and that theme has never fully disappeared.

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The idea that Japan had been motivated by legitimate pursuit of regional cooperation later assuaged memories of the half-century of expansionism. By late in the cold war as Japan’s economic clout raised its profile, talk had resumed of promoting regionalism, now in accord with global principles of the equality of states and economic interdependence.3 As European nations joined the EU and the United States led the formation of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), Japanese debates intensified over what strategy would be suitable for Asian regionalism, both an imperative for global competition and a pathway to realize leadership aspirations. Enthusiasm for closer relations with Asian countries had led to a succession of approaches in the cold war era. One essential objective was to normalize diplomatic relations and conclude peace treaties if a state of war had existed, which succeeded with all states except North Korea and the Soviet Union. Another vital step was to forge economic ties, ranging from trade to developmental assistance, to the degree that Japan became a vital partner. Third came reassurances that not only did Japan pose no security problem but also it was uniquely supportive of peace and disarmament and, thus, could be trusted. By the end of the 1970s a fourth goal had been added: to make Japan into a cultural power in Asia, winning friends through educational programs, exchanges, and the export of cultural products of widespread appeal. Even as these aims were realized it was well understood that more ambitious targets lay over the horizon, holding out the prospect of Japan gaining substantial soft power coupled with political clout in Asia. One challenge that became obvious in the early debates of 1988–93 was how to persuade the peoples of Asia that they should join Japan. Some would be reminded of the deceptive slogan of a “co-prosperity sphere” used to sugarcoat Japan’s historical aggression. Others were still burdened by the heavy legacy of socialist planned economies and closed societies, fearing opening unbridled access to an economic giant. Promises of large-scale development assistance and investment were tried, but they proved insufficient. Indeed, early signs of interest came mostly from vested interests seeking a short-term infusion of cash but lacking any commitment to sustained cooperation. Efforts to start gradually with cross-border exchanges and trade led to criminal networks gaining economic control such as between Hokkaido and the Russian Far East.4 The “Japan Sea rim economic sphere” drew champions from “backdoor Japan” away from the prosperous Pacific Coast, who paid more attention to winning Tokyo’s support for infrastructure spending than in rooting out abuse and promoting market forces across Japan’s

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borders.5 The strategy of economics before politics and building reliable networks by overlooking shortcomings proved inadequate. A second challenge that was never far from the minds of boosters of regionalism was concern about U.S. opposition. Having identified closely with the United States as part of the “West” and supported its leadership role toward China, South Korea, Russia, and other parts of Asia, Japan was not clear on how to break the news that it was launching an independent foreign policy as part of the “East.” It could not be ascertained that the parting, however sweetened by assurances of cooperation, would not cause economic loss, security uncertainty, and even identity doubts. In countenancing “Asian values,” Japan failed to provide reassurance for universal values. On neither side was there much debate about how to accomplish the transition to Japan between East and West. In 1990–91 when Malaysia’s Mahathir called for forming the EAEC, in 1997 when Japan responded to the Asian financial crisis with a plan for establishing an AMF, and in 2004–05 as states prepared for the first meeting of the EAS with uncertainty about its membership and objectives, the United States was known to raise objections to “closed regionalism.” In contrast, U.S. attempts to make APEC into a powerful force through annual summits of leaders and ambitious timetables for global economic integration left some states eager to exclude it from a new regional organization. Japan yielded to the United States in resisting the EAEC, dropping its call for the AMF, and joined the United States in seeking membership for Australia and New Zealand amidst shared doubts on the EAS. Yet, Japan’s role in forming the ASEAN ⫹ 3 and in agreeing to supplant it with the EAS showed that it continued to favor some sort of regionalism apart from the United States. It never found a strategy to advance regionalism significantly, in part, because of an inability to resolve the strategic dilemma of balancing the United States and Asia. The most serious challenge complicating Japan’s search for regionalism came from its relations with its neighbors. South Korea was the most logical partner, and Japan made closer economic ties, leading to an FTA, a priority. Yet, despite their long-standing economic ties and shared background as capitalist, democratic states, Japanese failed to win the trust of South Koreans and could only proceed as part of a triangle with China. If Seoul would have welcomed Japanese support in making the reintegration of the Korean peninsula a centerpiece of regionalism, Tokyo was set on first achieving its own normalization with North Korea. It was the rapid rise of China that left Japan increasingly hesitant about regionalism from the late 1990s. Fearing that China would gain a dominant place in a region centering on Northeast Asia and later extending the concern to

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one embracing Southeast Asia too, Japanese approved only stuttering steps forward. Despite the rapid integration of the Japanese and Chinese economies, trust was deteriorating. Desirous of some sort of regionalism, Japan had little success in creating a combination of countries that would guide China’s regional rise. Japan was still pursuing regionalism, but its approach became defensive in the face of Chinese gains in all directions whether with Russia and Central Asia, the Korean peninsula, Southeast Asia, or South Asia. Thinking about Regionalism in the 1980s Although trade tensions and long-standing unease about the asymmetrical relationship with the United States gave the Japanese reason to contemplate some sort of balancing force, through the period of Nakasone’s leadership there were only indirect, long-term images of how this could be accomplished. Focused more on Japan’s recovery of influence than his predecessors, Nakasone became associated with various steps that, together, might have built a foundation for regionalism. First, he championed the goal of cooperating closely with the United States even on security matters to achieve an equal partnership. A kind of division of labor loomed with the United States, which was predominant militarily, but Japan ascending through its growing capital accumulation and technological prowess. Likewise, the United States would retain broad, global leadership, while it increasingly acknowledged Japan’s rising status as the economic leader of East and Southeast Asia. Finally, as the global capitalist economy became more concentrated into three regions, Japan would assume its place as first in Asia at the same time as the United States remained tops in the Americas and the major powers of Europe drew closer together in their region. Biding its time as national and regional economic growth continued to favor Asia, Japan would eventually pass beyond the Yoshida doctrine into a new blueprint for displaying leadership in its region. Nakasone presided over significant efforts to boost ties with South Korea by expanding ODA and overcoming obstacles to summit meetings, with China by also increasing ODA and turning attention to deeper cultural exchanges, and with Southeast Asia as production sharing intensified with a stronger yen. He also made overtures to Mikhail Gorbachev, whose Vladivostok speech appealed for breaking down barriers in the region. Yet, when Nakasone left office in 1987 Japan was little prepared for the convulsive changes under way: in U.S.–Soviet relations, in the Chinese public’s expression of political views including those

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based on nationalism that targeted Japan, and in South Korean democratization that even more energized demonstrative expressions of nationalism. Nakasone’s leap forward in strategic thinking prepared the way for a world that was disappearing already by the time he relinquished his post to a string of shortlived prime ministers lacking the worldview or the mandate to refocus Japan on Asia. The most direct calls for regionalism in the late 1980s came from economic interests linked to MITI, left-leaning political circles, and local governments eager to draw public infrastructure funds. The economic forces eyed large projects, such as Sakhalin energy development, Northeast China farm specialization for exports, and Sea of Japan economic rim transportation linkages. These entailed long-term commitments that required political trust as well as a modern business environment. For the political Left, regionalism was the newest incarnation of the postwar dream of limiting dependence on the United States and finding new partners for Japan. Responding hesitantly to the end of dictatorship in South Korea, they held out hope, as in the past, for one or more of the socialist countries. In addition, prefectural governments on the Sea of Japan and Hokkaido cast the cause of regionalism as the long-awaited rebalancing within Japan after four decades of sharp differentiation with the Pacific Coast. The novelty of these appeals stirred some excitement in Japan and reverberated in continental Asia as Japanese funding led to conferences, exchanges, and new publications about regional integration. Government authorities and corporate headquarters in Tokyo were less enthused. Recognizing that business opportunities and political receptivity were not yet ripe, they may have acquiesced to this boosterism as testing the waters, but they were in no rush. Failure to normalize relations with Moscow and Pyongyang and the sanctions that had to be imposed following the harsh repression in Beijing left little serious challenge to this caution. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense let it be known that even as U.S.–Soviet security ties were rapidly improving and the Berlin Wall was falling, Japan should not proceed with security negotiations with the Soviet Union; the United States was not ready to agree to Gorbachev’s appeal for a multilateral security dialogue in Asia. Even as voices in favor of regionalism in Japan grew more noticeable, they had a limited mandate. Instead of Asian regionalism, in 1989 Japan stayed in the background as it worked with Australia to establish APEC crossing the Pacific Ocean and including the United States. This limited economic grouping reassured the United States, but it did not satisfy those focused on Japan finding its own niche in Asia or others in the region anxious to limit the

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American predominance. APEC was not seen as an answer to the quest for regionalism. When Bill Clinton in the fall of 1993 summoned leaders to Seattle for the first APEC summit and over the next years as his administration pressed for faster financial globalization through APEC, the search intensified for a separate Asian organization. Finally, the Asian financial crisis exposed some fault lines over globalization and gave Japan a new chance. Thinking about Regionalism in the First Half of the 1990s For a few years the balance appeared to tilt in favor of Japan’s relations with Northeast Asia. Resentment against “Japan-bashing” by the United States came amidst a mutual downturn in favorable images. Many were optimistic that Japan could become the pivot of a triangle with the United States and China, as the United States was fixated on sanctions from 1989 and then on raising human rights accusations to keep pressure on China. When Deng Xiaoping in January 1992 opened the throttle to market forces, Japanese firms were expected to gain the upper hand. With China in tow, acceptance in Asia would be assured. Taking improved South Korean ties for granted and ready for talks with North Korea to bear fruit, the Japanese more actively championed regionalism to be shaped by their economic dominance. Whereas a place for Russia could be opened if it met Japan’s conditions for normalization, it would be the loser if it let the opportunity slip. To the extent that a process of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia under ASEAN could complement efforts in Northeast Asia, Japanese were confident that they were well anchored in the region without serious challenge. The primary challenge was to persuade others to accept regionalism in the form of institutionalized economic cooperation. Strategic miscalculations occurred. It was a mistake to expect economic inducements to carry so much weight that the legacy of distrust could be overcome. Discussions of how to proceed with regionalism became formulaic, failing to assess candidly the real barriers.6 Assumptions rooted in normalization with South Korea in 1965 and other breakthroughs gave false hope that desperation for Japan’s support would drive others to the side of a country flush with capital and prepared to spend generously for political as well as economic objectives. No serious initiative was taken to overcome the lack of trust in Japanese leadership, as others agreed mainly to economic ties. Loss of confidence in the reliability of the special relationship with the United States failed to produce a pragmatic turn toward Asia. The

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low point in postwar Japanese–U.S. relations occurred early in the 1990s. This no doubt heightened Tokyo’s active interest in Asia, but it did not produce new strategies for drawing the region together. In 1992 Japan let slip an opportunity with Moscow, and in the fall of 1993 leading officials overestimated the significance of Yeltsin’s agreement to the Tokyo Declaration. In 1993 there was also too much optimism about Kim Young-sam’s commitment to closer ties, resulting in misjudgments about relations that culminated in the downturn of 1995–96. Likewise, excessive hopes for ties with China in the first part of the decade gave way to disappointment by 1995–96. The failure of North Korean talks in 1992 to be followed by the fallout from the nuclear crisis of 1993–94 only worsened the picture. This period witnessed the sharpest swings from confident promotion of regionalism to uncertainty about how to proceed amidst strategic confusion over why Japan’s position was fading. Japan was better attuned to rallying weak neighbors by dangling economic incentives than to winning the confidence of more optimistic partners. Not much attention was given to South Korea as a critical partner, given the growing assertiveness of that country still benefiting from high rates of economic growth and now advancing well to democracy and foreign policy diversification. As China’s sense of isolation and economic uncertainty gave way in 1993 to self-assurance of its rapid rise in comprehensive national power, Japan had no answers about how to win it over. The theme of Asian values, raised largely in Southeast Asia, was at a peak in 1993–96, challenging U.S. values and human rights advocacy as if it led to degeneration into unconstrained individualism and a litigious society with rampant deviance. If the Japanese hesitated to embrace the anti-Western implications of the theme, it was ambivalent after having been the leader in the 1980s in championing, to the discomfort of many Americans, an alternative model of a harmonious society. Disparities in values professed by the states of Northeast and Southeast Asia left little common ground, notably for Japan, which prized its bridging role with one foot in the West. It had to distance itself from civilizational notions of regionalism. In 1995 Prime Minister Murayama made the fullest apology by a Japanese leader for wartime and prewar excesses, but there was little impact on regional cooperation and trust. Although it may have opened the door to follow-up apologies such as with Kim Dae-jung in 1998, its effect was muted in the wider context of the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end. Failure to pass a Diet resolution that conveyed a similar spirit undercut the prime minister’s statement. Also reemergence of the Taiwan and Dokdo/Takeshima issues meant that sparks from the still smoldering

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embers of twentieth-century colonialism and aggression drew attention away from more than a millennium of shared Confucian civilization and the promise of shared globalization as intra-regional economic ties grew. Thinking about Regionalism in the Second Half of the 1990s On the one hand, from 1997 to 1998 regionalism advanced with the formation of ASEAN ⫹ 3 and the shared response to the Asian financial crisis. On the other, security problems grew serious, making it important to face forthrightly the strategic dimensions of power in Northeast Asia. Japan took care to strengthen its U.S. alliance, positioning itself for a more robust security presence. It comfortably worked with ASEAN to add a Northeast Asian component, assuming that it would not be marginalized by China. Support for regionalism became couched in wider contexts. Given the fact that in 1995 the leaders of China and South Korea had issued a joint statement critical of Japan’s handling of history, the broader setting was insurance against Japan’s isolation. The Asian financial crisis demonstrated continued Japanese optimism about wide-ranging economic regionalism exclusive of the United States. Its proposal for an AMF won praise in the region for challenging the monopoly of the IMF and at least implicitly rebuking the arrogance of U.S. financial management before and after the crisis began. Even if Japan retreated in the face of U.S. opposition, it proved its willingness to stand behind the region. As it proceeded with generous financial assistance, the positive impact was reinforced. This generosity along with the more desperate situation of South Korea led to a breakthrough not only in bilateral ties, but also in cooperation in support of regionalism. It was China that had to play catch up as Japan’s greater financial resources were brought to bear. In 1999 the three Northeast Asian states formalized their annual summit at the ASEAN ⫹ 3 meetings. Soon Japan led in joint measures to stabilize currencies in the event of new financial problems. On matters of regionalism, Japan did not lose the initiative during the late 1990s; it succeeded in drawing China and South Korea along. Security developments from 1997 to 2000, however, left Japanese feeling less assured. First, no matter how much reassurance came from new defense guidelines with the United States and steps toward cooperation on missile defense, the Clinton administration’s inclination to explore a strategic partnership with China set off alarm bells. Japan was in no mood for a balanced triangle with the United States at the center. Second, the North Korean missile launching over Honshu left a sense of vulnerability beyond any experienced in recent decades. Although the

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Perry process in early 1999 brought a freeze in testing, this was not sufficient for a sense of security. Third, Russian arms sales to China and the revived interest of Russia in the Korean peninsula brought another actor into the picture with reminders of decades of threat and the potential to fortify countries that posed a danger. Finally, South Korea’s shift to the sunshine policy put the entire Korean peninsula into play with uncertain ramifications for Japanese security. In the year 2000 Japan’s prospects with North Korea were doubtful, U.S. support for the sunshine policy was worrisome, and the diminished sense of threat in South Korea all aroused uncertainty. This was not a time for clarity about the path to regionalism. In response to a more complex environment, Japan’s leaders remained active in looking for opportunities. They continued to seek closer ties to South Korea on the foundation of the October 1998 Kim Dae-jung summit, initiating talks for forming a bilateral FTA. Efforts were made to engage North Korea in talks, assuming that the sunshine policy would lead it toward reform and greater need for Japan’s large-scale assistance. In 2000 the initiative toward Russia was in full swing. Even Chinese ties were expected to improve; from the fall of 1999 Chinese leaders spoke of “smile diplomacy” to assuage public opinion in Japan. However reserved many in Japan had become about conditions in their region, they still anticipated a balanced foreign policy with continued close U.S. ties and newly expanding ties in Asia in which regionalism would help to overcome lingering distrust. Triangular analysis provided a strategic backdrop to regionalism, as many began to recognize the triad of the United States–China–Japan.7 Some in Japan recognized that by forgoing a military build-up the country was accepting asymmetry or a junior status in the triangle.8 Others suggested that by siding more fully with the United States and taking a firmer stand toward China’s growing power, Japan was, however reluctantly, becoming a realist nation.9 Such arguments tended to underestimate the aspirations for a leadership role in Asia that require not only a strategic approach to keep pace with China but also some distancing from the United States and efforts to reshape its agenda in the region. Formation of the ASEAN ⫹ 3 organization along with the impact of the Asian financial crisis gave a boost to Japanese expectations for regionalism despite growing ambivalence about the prospects for leadership and emerging fears over China’s strengthening voice.10 Tokyo had less opportunity to lead and found itself playing catch-up, yet it also accepted growing momentum for regionalism and a favorable setting for its emergence. As late as Koizumi’s January 2002 visit to Southeast Asia

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with completion of an FTA with Singapore, there was a sense that Japan “was going regional.”11 Optimism about regionalism substituted for sober calculations about the tough choices needed to gain leverage. It was not difficult to identify the general contours of an open, flexible, economically centered regionalism,12 but just concentrating on its pursuit left in doubt what measures might resolve the serious political fissures and cultural cleavages in the region. Some who expected Japan to forge an independent foreign policy toward Asia forecast that bilateral relations with the United States would become less stable and security relations more contentious.13 In fact, in the Koizumi period stable security ties led in calming relations. Yet, there remained the question of how persisting Asianism on both the political Left and the political Right would find its expression.14 Strategic reasoning left little room for boldness toward Asian countries. Although South Korea’s foreign relations and economic development were being transformed by a leadership quite different from any Japan had faced earlier, most assumed that the South would become easier to manage due to the agreement on history, its financial weakness, and its need for Japan’s support in addressing reunification matters. Even as Putin clearly distanced himself from Yeltsin’s weak policies, powerful figures opposed a negotiating position that might lead to a compromise. China’s rapid rise led mainly to talk of punishing it by cutting back ODA or containing it through the U.S. alliance, not to rethinking how to accommodate it. To the extent that the goal was regionalism in Asia, Japan lacked a lively debate let alone a strategic consensus cognizant of realities. Thinking about Regionalism in the Koizumi Era From 2000 China has been in the forefront in the pursuit of regionalism. In November it proposed an FTA with ASEAN, taking the lead in an area where vested interests hold Japan back and thereafter never relinquishing it. This was a time when Chinese leaders also made it clear that only with friendship and cooperation between China and Japan would Asia rise and regionalism take shape. Although this echoed a message long repeated by Japan’s leaders, responses were often hesitant. Koizumi rejected China’s offer for a joint study group with South Korea of an FTA.15 A loss of confidence in using economic power, including ODA, for security objectives made Japan pause.16 Sharp reductions in ODA to China occurred just as the two sides were searching for a joint approach to regionalism. The lack of a strategic vision as Koizumi took steps that

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complicated bilateral relations with one Asian state after another left China with the high ground as the champion of multilateralism in the region. Resentment of the United States was an important reason for Japan not only to deepen its economic ties to its neighbors but also to seek a regional counterweight. Mike Mochizuki argues that the U.S. veto of the AMF “prompted Japan to quietly but methodically promote East Asian regionalism as a check on the so-called ‘Washington consensus’ and US ‘market fundamentalism.’ ”17 Despite closer ties with the Bush administration, there were many ill at ease by the unilateral U.S. policies toward North Korea, Iraq, and other targets that implicated Japan. The independent moves by Koizumi when he visited Pyongyang carried hopes for regional transformation, but the North’s showdown with the United States proved too serious for him to play a role.18 The search for a breakthrough in Asia continues; yet, those who see Japan as pragmatic in combining incipient multilateralism with bilateralism must account for Koizumi’s defiance toward potential regional partners.19 A paramount objective of Japanese foreign policy became securing one of a handful of coveted spots as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. This means, at a time of balancing regional interests, representing Asia along with China and another aspirant India. Winning regional backing would matter. South Korea had opposed a Malaysian proposal along somewhat similar lines in 1997, and Japan had to bide its time until the issue again rose high on the UN agenda.20 Yet, Japanese approaches to regionalism failed to keep in mind the need for winning broad support, especially from Seoul, and in March 2005 Roh Moo-hyun announced to popular support his country’s opposition. A month later boisterous Chinese demonstrators shouted similar defiance. At times Koizumi has shown support for regionalism. He attended the first Boao forum, organized by China as the equivalent to the Davos forum for Asian leaders. He kept pace with China’s leaders in supporting ASEAN ⫹ 3 as it launched various initiatives favored by the Southeast Asian states. There was no wavering in approval for the goal of economic integration. Yet, calculations of the pros and cons of regionalism were in constant flux. There was roughly an inverse relationship between China’s growing enthusiasm for regionalism, especially from 2001, and Japan’s declining confidence in it. Leadership posed a problem. In 2000 Kim Dae-jung was in the forefront, appealing to North Korea and trying to coordinate four powers in support of a process of peninsular reintegration that was no less a mechanism for addressing the security concerns of the region as well as for

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considering some steps toward economic integration. Left largely as a bystander, Japan nervously awaited the outcome. With progress slow in its talks with North Korea and uncertainty about how far Bill Clinton would extend his support, Japanese lost confidence that they were in the lead in shaping reconfiguration of the region. Yet, the North’s foot dragging and Clinton’s defeat eased Japanese concerns, at the same time as satisfaction with improving political, economic, and cultural ties with South Korea cushioned the blow. In 2002–05 China’s ascendancy on all of its borders grew more apparent. Flexing its market muscle, China leaped ahead in drawing neighbors into its economic orbit. In Russia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia, and, arguably, South Asia, China’s voice was rising. Most obviously to the Japanese public, Sino-Japanese economic ties were accelerating rapidly and leaving little leverage in Japanese hands. After assuming for many years that threatening to reduce ODA and acting to limit the flow of FDI would assure that Japan’s voice would be heard, abruptly plans to “graduate” China from ODA were accepted as a matter of course while the hemorrhaging of manufacturing to China was oblivious to troubles in bilateral political relations. Japanese grew alarmed that China was rapidly becoming the central country in the region, leaving Japan in a marginal position. One barrier on the path toward regionalism was the mounting effort to demonize China as a country with which Japan could not find common ground.21 Chinese actions contributed to this: from military pressure on Taiwan to demonstrations in April 2005 against Japan, including its ambition to become a permanent member of the Security Council in a forthcoming reform. Yet, the conciliatory tone of finding a path to cooperation through mutual understanding and concessions,22 was fading in the face of intensifying insistence that strategic thinking requires recognizing China as a threat and standing firm in contrast to the weak-kneed Foreign Ministry.23 Of course, there were invariably those who warned that in the new “Chinese century” with the United States supposedly drawing closer to China the only reasonable strategy for Japan was to accept this process.24 Some went even further to insist that only if Japan embraced ideas such as the EAEC or stuck to the theme of the AMF, the age of Northeast Asia would be within reach.25 They found support in a variety of sources critical of the hesitancy of foreign policy that proposed new diplomatic thinking with a strong Asian component that would keep Japan from falling hostage to U.S. unilateralism.26 Nonetheless, the voices of the mass media and the political establishment propelled Japanese public views in a more alarmist direction. Particularly the North Korean problems with abductions and

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nuclear weapons and the Chinese public hostility toward Japanese at soccer games in 2004 and in demonstrations in 2005 boosted the voices of opponents of regionalism under current circumstances. Among the most vocal was Nakajima Mineo, who called for suspending ODA immediately and abandoning the 30-year pursuit of “friendship.”27 Little could be expected even by those anxious to salvage the East Asian community until China made a new effort to calm emotions on its side as both sides set limits on official acts that might bring another downturn.28 Southeast Asia and Regionalism Recalling its own failed attempts to reorganize Asia by force and observing increasingly successful efforts to unite Europe with economic integration a driving force, Japanese long aspired to play a leading role in Asian regionalism. Prospects were grim in the communist-run hinterland of Asia through the 1980s, but the soft underbelly of Southeast Asia was tempting. Historical memories of Japanese atrocities or indignities were generally less intense there than in China and the Korean peninsula, and some Japanese convinced themselves that these would be erased by gratitude from acceptance of the image of Japan’s self-proclaimed role of liberator from Western colonialism as well as by economic assistance. The ignominious U.S. retreat in the 1970s after the Vietnam War left a political vacuum, while US interest in preventing a domino effect through communism’s spread kept alive a security blanket and a ready market for locally produced goods. ASEAN’s early success in forging maritime regionalism gave Japan an opening at its tenth anniversary in 1977 to show its generosity through the Fukuda doctrine, and a decade later the sharply increased value of the yen added an imperative to transfer production on a large scale to countries with cheap labor. Japan’s quest for regionalism is inseparable from its pursuit of a leadership role in Southeast Asia. Through the 1990s Tokyo perceived itself as still in the lead in working with the leading states of Southeast Asia and with ASEAN toward a higher level of cooperation that could turn into regionalism. Its ODA and investments supported development. Its soft power through growing cultural ties lavishly funded by Tokyo and at least indirect sponsorship of Asian values contrasted to the hard edge of U.S. human rights advocacy and the ambivalence over the onslaught of individualist mass culture. Japan could take comfort in Malaysia’s “look East” policy, Indonesia’s satisfaction with Japan’s attentive beneficence, and Singapore’s welcome for Japanese supportive steps at regional integration and balancing.

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As late as 1997–98 the Asian financial crisis offered Japan another chance to pride itself as the true benefactor of Southeast Asia, and it accepted ASEAN ⫹ 3 with expectations that its special ties with Southeast Asia would give it an edge. Already in the 1990s, however, as ASEAN’s advance toward regionalism intensified, the Japanese were noticing four barriers to their country’s aspirations for regional leadership. First, the United States frowned on exclusive regionalism and treated the Soviet retreat from the region and the spread of globalization as conditions for opening the area. Thus, when Mahathir appealed in 1990–91 to Japan to join in a new regional grouping—the EAEC—some in Japan felt thwarted by U.S. opposition, as was the case in 1997 when Japan proposed a separate AMF. Second, Japan itself was losing its image of teacher model for the countries of Southeast Asia, as it not only succumbed to economic stagnation but also its management model and claim to a uniquely homogeneous society lost their credibility along with Asian values in the financial crisis across the region. Third, China’s success in normalizing relations with Southeast Asian states around 1990 and in rallying the overseas Chinese community to invest in what was fast becoming the Chinese “economic miracle” gave Japan a formidable rival in the region. Finally, ASEAN achieved a consensus on broadening its membership and raising its profile, allowing much less room for the special influence of one outside power. All of these circumstances obliged Japan to rethink its options in partnering with an emergent but complicated regional organization. In the second half of the 1990s its strategy shifted from forging a kind of ASEAN ⫹ 1, which did not gain favor, to accepting ASEAN ⫹ 3 where it would compete with China in an ASEAN-led framework and would leave room for South Korea to play some kind of an intermediate role. This was a realistic accommodation that gave an important boost to the drive for regionalism, while changing its dynamics. The Koizumi era is marked by China seizing the initiative in regionalism centered in Southeast Asia and Japan hustling to catch up. On occasions Japan vigorously contested for a leading role, as in January 2002 in a Singapore speech when Koizumi called for deeper regionalism as well as expansion to include Australia and New Zealand. Generally, in 2003–04 Japan matched China step for step in drawing ASEAN closer. Yet, by 2005 the image had spread that Japan was nervous about new moves to boost ASEAN ⫹ 3. In the second half of the year it grasped the opportunity of the first EAS with its wider membership as preferable to ASEAN ⫹ 3. Even so, Southeast Asia remained Japan’s primary route to regionalism, and this goal endured in Japanese planning.

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Japanese Expectations for Regionalism In 1991 while Japanese were pressing their claim to regional leadership as well as a leadership role in the G-7, they discovered that U.S. pressure was intensifying—for more global support, seen in the Persian Gulf War—and to resist exclusive regionalism, feared from the Malaysian proposal for the EAEC. In 1997 the Asian financial crisis brought a renewal of U.S. pressure against the formation of the AMF and a distinct Asian approach to the financial crisis. In 2003 Koizumi faced the full weight of the Bush administration behind support for the Iraq War and preparing for pressure against North Korea in opposition to the softer approach preferred elsewhere in Asia. At critical points the United States prevailed, as Japan backed away from forging agreements with neighboring states. Although the circumstances were changing—the rising importance of security in Asia, the deteriorating state of Sino-Japanese relations, the expanding pace of regional economic integration—Japan continually sided with the United States without abandoning the dream of achieving regionalism. The first lesson learned based on the experience since the late 1980s of working to establish regionalism is that globalization must take precedence over regionalism. Given the high expectations for “reentering Asia” and achieving equality by balancing U.S. power, this lesson was not readily embraced by many circles in Japan. In the early 1990s quite a few Japanese blamed U.S. pressure against regionalism, reflecting narrow value preferences and human rights priorities, for holding Japan back from its chance for equality. In the second half of the decade the U.S. insistence on fiscal openness and international rather than regional management of the Asian financial crisis aroused similar distrust. The Bush administration’s initial Asian policy and its unilateral handling of security questions whether directly related to the war against terror or not also have riled many Japanese, casting globalization in a negative light for a different reason. Yet, the growing determination to rely on global more than regional cooperation is less about approval of U.S. policies than disapproval and nervousness about the regional environment. The United States offers strong reassurance of its commitment to Japan, even if this does not translate into Japanese leverage over it. Coordination, notably over the North Korean crisis, has reached unprecedented levels. Trade disputes with the United States have faded away, while some may be looming with China. Calls in Japan for “open regionalism” mean to bring the United States into the picture. The immediate challenge in 2005 was how to define the scope of the East Asian community to hold its inaugural summit at year end. Japan

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has called for inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the community and for observer status for the United States. These notions of openness clash with initial Malaysian and Chinese intentions to keep the United States at a distance and to exclude non-Asian nations. In contrast to China’s interest in forging a separate regional body with Russia and Central Asia based on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Japan was edging toward an expansive notion inclusive of India in which China’s leadership inclinations could be more readily countered. In contrast to 15 years earlier, Japanese thinking had shifted from the small Japan Sea rim easily put under Japan’s influence to the vast Asian continent (minus Southwest Asia) difficult for China to lead. Japan’s approach had become mostly reactive to counter what some see as Chinese “expansionism.” The idea was spreading that the entire area from Pakistan to Kamchatka was being reconfigured under Chinese initiative. By organizing the main holdouts and the weak links in this still incipient process, Tokyo might lock in place an arrangement that would give less opportunity to Beijing. Yet, the fact that some Japanese scrambling was occurring on the eve of the first EAS did not signify strategic planning. Clearly, Japan shares with the United States determination not to allow China to gain dominant standing in Asia. China’s rapid advance in all directions and its assertiveness, especially through tolerance and indirect support for the anti-Japanese student demonstrations of April 2005 left the Japanese more dependent on U.S. assurances. Only agreement on a path forward by national leaders and progress toward a regional security framework is likely to stabilize the situation. Given the growing tensions over North Korea’s determination to retain nuclear weapons with the United States inclined to intensify pressure on China to pressure the North Koreans, prospects are high for Japan to stay cautious on regionalism. After North Korea defied world opinion by launching multiple missiles in July and testing a nuclear weapon in October 2006, the stakes rose for regional coordination. Newly in office, Abe Shinzo travelled to Beijing and Seoul both to restore relations on the highest level and to seek common ground in responding to Pyongyang. Hu Jintao’s strong interest in revitalizing ties could be seen in the near absence of history and Taiwan on the bilateral agenda. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice soon toured the region in search of joint enforcement of UN approved sanctions against the North. Yet, China’s centrality in this dangerous standoff suggested that it was the deciding voice, determining

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how far the sanctions would go and pressing (with South Korea and Russia behind it) Japan as well as the U.S. for a regional strategy to renew the six-party talks. Even as its pariah status made North Korea a threat to Japan unparalleled since 1945 and Japan’s approach to sanctions severed almost all ties, working in conjunction with the U.S. and even South Korea more closely with China could lead in a different direction. After years of deteriorating Japanese ties with its neighbors, which insisted on more incentives for the North, Japan was preparing for more cooperation even if it was early to assess Abe’s strategic thinking. Many Japanese needed greater reassurance that China’s rapid assent across Asia would not just entrap their country in dependency on an untrustworthy partner that was intent on keeping Japan from “normalizing” its history, its political and military power, and its international relations. They suspected that regionalism was a device to split Japan and the United States. Already in his Singapore speech at the start of 2002 Koizumi declared his support for Australia and New Zealand to join in an inclusive region. Even when Chinese leaders appeared to signal their interest in improving relations, the Japanese were prone to ignore the message. Kokubun Ryosei observed that in March 2005 there were signs from China that were overlooked before a wave of Internet postings and the reaction to Japan’s new textbooks stirred popular emotions. He adds that only a shift to strategic relations based on diplomatic realism by Japan is likely to keep such sentiments under control.29 Chinese leaders would have to help in creating the right environment. The primary test for China had become its handling of the North Korean WMD crisis. Outbursts on the streets of Shanghai and in other Chinese cities were a wakeup call that the entire process of regionalism could be at risk. Talk of a May boycott of Japanese products caused the Japanese business community to raise an alarm that the long-term impact on economic ties, investment in China, and the development of East Asia could be substantial. Though the tone was not normally accusatory against Japan’s politicians, it did suggest that the anti-Japanese sentiments were becoming unfavorable to Japanese firms and were rousing joint interest in finding a solution.30 The demonstrations elicited diverse criticisms from politicians, even from some in the LDP, toward Japanese policies and the statements of Cabinet ministers. Although Abe Shinzo warned that it would be a mistake to stop visits to the Yasukuni shrine, as it became likely that he would be the next prime minister he began informal talks with Chinese representatives on an ambivalent approach. Kamisaki Takenori of the Komeito feared that there would be an influence on the economy and on

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Japan’s plan to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, while Hatoyama Yukio of the DPJ called for rapid restoration of relations of trust through a summit. Other politicians bemoaned the inflammatory rhetoric of METI head Nakagawa Shoichi on the gas fields in the East China Sea and of the Minister of Education and Science Nakayama on the textbook question. Some grounds for a backlash could be seen, calling for more forthcoming policies toward Asia. If Japanese strategic thought has been slow to articulate an alternative to China’s growing commitment to regionalism, U.S. moves to some degree provide a guide for what lie ahead. In addition to intensifying pressure on China to act against North Korea’s nuclear intentions, the United States has stepped up military relations with India and Indonesia. Along with Australia, these are likely targets for any Japanese attempt to build some partnerships that may put limits on Chinese regional influence. Indeed, an inclusive and open approach to regionalism with a high priority for security would serve Japan’s interests well as it cautiously proceeds with regionalism. Yet, it would be short-sighted to count on the United States to balance the interests of globalization and regionalism or even to overcome the unilateralism that has failed previously to rally other nations to its side or to counter China’s rapid rise. Japan would be well advised to begin its strategic reorientation toward Asia with a more activist role in shaping U.S. policy in the region. There is no more urgent place to begin than in the quest for a five-party consensus in managing North Korea. If Japan were to succeed in bridging differences between the United States and South Korea, this could jump start its reengagement in Asia. The principle that applied in the 1960s and should have been recognized in the 1980s and 1990s applies today: the Korea peninsula is the gateway to Asian regionalism for Japan. The sharp downturn in relations with South Korea in the first half of 2005 bodes poorly for regionalism, as does the danger that a deepening split between the United States and China will further damage Tokyo’s relations with Seoul. Japanese policy that leads the United States to toughen its posture toward China and South Korea would have very different consequences for the emergence of regionalism than policy that tries to bridge the differences. Consultations after the North’s nuclear test left the outcome unclear. Idealists in the long-standing tradition of postwar Japanese intellectuals voice approval for regionalism without calculating the pros and cons for security. Conservative nationalists dismiss any compromise on the symbols of Japanese national identity without concern for the impact on regional cooperation. The middle ground, characterized by those who

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insist on a strong U.S. alliance and a greater role for Japan in international security while striving for accommodation in Asia that accepts progress toward regionalism if China agrees to meet Japan’s fundamental requirements, is not well represented. The increasingly buoyant media on the Right play up the China threat, while the now struggling media on the Left hold up the banner of regionalism without often acknowledging many of the most serious barriers. An effective strategy for regionalism does not emerge from either extreme. The following are promising components of such a strategy.31 First, Japan should embrace globalization more fully, overcoming vested interests in order to pursue FTA more vigorously than China, reforming the economy to draw closer to the United States and the EU, finding more common ground on human rights with nations in the West, taking a more active role in international security, and insisting on regionalism open to globalization. At times China has outflanked Japan in Southeast Asia because it has more fully endorsed globalization of trade, and Japan would be well-advised to prevent further repetition. Second, Japan should play a more active role as a force for compromise on North Korea that would achieve the most important U.S. objectives while bringing the other four parties from the six-party talks together on a path that should be appealing to the North at the same time as it is conducive to regional security and joint support for gradual Korean integration. A breakthrough in this crisis holds the most promise of accelerating the pursuit of regionalism. Third, a compromise over the handling of history with China should be part of a broad agreement on how to manage disputed waters and the exploration for gas in the East China Sea. In the process, there should be a joint understanding that both countries can become regional leaders with intense consultations to resolve problems that arise. Fourth, Japan’s confidence in regionalism will rise to the extent that it coordinates closely with the United States and wins its support. This is more likely in an inclusive region open to Australia, New Zealand, and India. Fifth, recognition of the critical role of South Korea as Japan’s regional partner should lead to a new approach to historical questions and renewed efforts to win the trust of the Korean people. It should be understood that regionalism begins in the country with the closest historical ties. Along with these priorities in developing a strategy for regionalism, other elements worthy of consideration should not be ignored. Sixth, it is in Japan’s strategic interests to draw Russia into a region-wide association for reasons of security, energy, and inclusiveness. It should not be left to the advances of China while the territorial claims of Japan cause

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continued tensions. Seventh, Japan should take an active role in forging a regional identity with historic content that turns the clock back before Japan’s imperialist era and references to values that focus on future transparency and trust. The vision statement for ASEAN ⫹ 3 in 2001 is just a forerunner to the difficult job of defining what the East Asian community represents. Eighth, it is time for Japanese leaders to consider a comprehensive approach to territorial disputes, all lingering from 1945. In pursuit of regionalism as well as bilateral normalization, possibilities for compromise should be considered. None would involve displacement of any Japanese citizens. Economic costs could be minimized with awareness that they are not likely to be great. Let the symbolism be addressed with awareness that in each case a compromise outcome is required and that all will share in the future of regionalism that can serve as an alternative symbol. Ninth, agreement on large-scale undertakings that serve as engines of regionalism should include some that resonate well inside Japan, including energy projects. A future orientation becomes more tangible with some concrete manifestations of the benefits. Finally, a gradual timetable with cautious optimism is preferable to presenting regionalism as a panacea in an area where difficult problems will take a long time to resolve. Japan needs to test China’s cooperation, North Korea’s transformation, and Russia’s rule of law, while staying close to the United States in a balanced foreign policy. Other states in the very diverse area to be subsumed in the newly constructed East Asia will also need to test the waters gingerly. Even with a strategic approach to regionalism on the part of Japan and other major actors, the coming decade is likely to be a transitional period with continued doubts that a threshold has been crossed. Without a strategic approach by Japan, which has been missing to date, we should not expect the EAS to advance beyond a facade of regionalism. The East Asian Summit In 2004 the Japanese government was preparing for the inaugural meeting of the EAS with concern that this new body could solidify China’s rise, establishing it as the dominant voice in regionalism. Over the past few years China had seized the initiative in ASEAN ⫹ 3, not only advancing an economic agenda welcomed in the region but also gaining more political leverage. Japan often seemed to lag one step behind, as when in December 2003 it scurried to host the first ASEAN ⫹ 1 summit in Tokyo at which it signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that China had already accepted. In the summer of 2004 when foreign

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ministers met to define the nature of the EAS, the Japanese side cautiously proposed limited, functional objectives and made clear its opposition to a fully institutionalized regional grouping. After the Laos ASEAN ⫹ 3 summit in November the image remained of a reluctant Japan facing an energetic China, leaving ASEAN to manage the dual summits a year hence. For the first half of 2005 the situation appeared even less promising. While Tokyo concentrated on a fruitless mission to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as part of a larger reform package, Beijing was consolidating its position in various regions of the world as the rising challenger to the United States and hardening its stance toward its East Asian rival. Anti-Japanese demonstrations in April in China’s major cities not only protested Japan’s handling of sensitive historical issues, but also called into question its claims to political power, especially the plan for Security Council reform. In March, South Korean president Roh Moo-hyun assailed Japan’s political ambitions too, starting with denunciation of the provocative move by Shimane prefecture to declare an annual “Takeshima day” in asserting Japan’s claim to Dokdo Island and continuing with a vigorous offensive against Japan’s UN ambitions. Deteriorating relations with Japan’s two partners in the ⫹ 3 of ASEAN ⫹ 3 cast doubt on cooperation in a regional format. Japan’s isolation in Northeast Asia intensified over the year; yet the impact on its views of regionalism proved to be the opposite of what was expected. In May the abortive visit to Japan of the Chinese deputy prime minister, Wu Yi, and in June the disastrous visit of Koizumi to Seoul (to listen to a two-hour harangue from Roh in lieu of the shuttle diplomacy that was planned) continued the downward spiral in ties with Japan’s two most important regional partners. In November after Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine again and named a cabinet with prominent right-wing figures, Hu Jintao refused to meet with him at the APEC summit in Busan and Roh’s short meeting brought another stern lecture. Cooperation in pursuit of regionalism had collapsed in Northeast Asia. Koizumi turned instead to the EAS with fresh hope for a different sort of regionalism. The turning point in Japanese thinking on regionalism occurred in July when the ASEAN foreign ministers agreed to invite India, Australia, and New Zealand to join the EAS. Despite the long-standing insistence by Malaysia on excluding non-Asians from regionalism and an image of Thailand’s President Thaksin working closely with China, the balance had shifted toward a more inclusive definition of East Asia. Considering that Japan had been arguing for inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in a regional body since at least the mid-1990s, the result was welcome.

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Now it was China, which had not tried to challenge the decision making of ASEAN and damage gains already achieved toward regionalism, that became cautious about the EAS. It concentrated on strengthening the ASEAN ⫹ 3 summit without giving much of an agenda to the EAS. Japan’s renewed enthusiasm for regionalism can be explained by three factors. First, the redefined scope of East Asia suggested that it could balance China. Australia’s presence introduced a close U.S. ally certain to welcome close alignment between global and regional concerns. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s reassertion of a leadership role under its new president Sudhayono, Vietnam’s rising voice, and Singapore’s unusually active support for a new regional framework all gave Japan confidence that China would not gain a dominant role. Possibly, India would serve as a credible counterweight to China. Given the active cultivation of Southeast Asian and Indian leaders by Japan as well as by the United States and Australia, it was hard to avoid the conclusion that a strategic success was achieved by the geographical reconfiguration of regionalism. This ushered in regionalism with Southeast Asia still occupying centerstage but the weight of Northeast Asia held in abeyance. Second, the goal of forging an East Asian community acquired a new meaning in Japan that rekindled interest in regionalism. Often talk about regional values has revived memories of Asian values, long associated with resistance to Western values propounded by the United States above all. The Japanese had come to recognize that close coordination with the United States would not be served by giving credibility to this sensitive theme. Lately, China and South Korea had focused attention on treatment of history as the most salient cultural theme. Although provoked by Koizumi’s actions, they had, in effect, placed additional obstacles in the path of finding a consensus on the meaning of community. In 2005 the more assertive SCO had directly challenged the application of human rights concerns against member states, reinforcing the image of China as well as Russia intent on regionalism with no interference in each country’s internal politics. At the same time, the Bush administration was accelerating its messianic quest for democratizing other states, including China, and pressing human rights concerns. By joining the cause of universal values and insisting that it is the crux of a regional community, Japan deflected the talk about history, boosted coordination with the United States, and found a weapon to use against China as well as North Korea in the struggles within Asia. A third reason for Japan to embrace the EAS is to reenergize its Asian diplomacy. At APEC in November Koizumi appeared isolated as Hu Jintao, on the heels of a visit to North Korea, gained lively exposure

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through prominent meetings with host Roh and others concerned about the fate of the six-party talks. At ASEAN ⫹ 3 there was no escaping more headlines about Koizumi being shunned. In articulating a vision for the EAS, however, Japan was reaching for the spotlight. It championed an Asian community open to the world, especially cognizant of the U.S. role, and steeped in universal values with a strong security component. India and Indonesia would serve as two pillars entitled to economic priority and special political recognition. Regionalism centered in Southeast Asia and balancing Northeast Asia with other Indian Ocean states would become the venue for Japan’s new diplomatic initiatives. Having started its postwar reentry into Asia in Southeast Asia, Japan was again giving priority to this area as its gateway to Asia. Foreign Minister Aso Taro’s December 7 speech explained Japan’s vision of regionalism, beginning by proclaiming that the EAS offers a common dream for the future. Aso proceeded to stress his pleasure at the inclusion of three full members who share fundamental values of democracy and at the importance of the middle class around the region as the standard-bearers for the future. In this way he conveyed Japan’s role as the thought leader, both the forerunner for postwar optimism in the area and the leader in universal values. Aso also presents Japan as the stabilizer, both economically with its generous assistance and through the U.S. security alliance as well. Finally, Aso presents Japan as an equal partner respectful of other nations as peers. In this light he calls the countries of ASEAN the captain of the ship called regional cooperation and appeals to them for further contributions toward the overarching goal of the East Asian community. This upbeat speech failed to address the real problems in the area, only superficially conveying a strategic vision as tense summit meetings loomed, but it laid a foundation. Having abruptly changed course on the EAS, Tokyo seemed less interested in regionalism than in balancing Beijing. There were no signs that this was planned as a stepping stone to renewed engagement of Beijing and pursuit of a Northeast Asian community. Japan’s leaders cannot count on key ASEAN states or even Australia or India to share their intense suspicions of China’s leadership. If the goals of economic integration and community building were taken seriously, there would be no alternative to striving to repair relations in Northeast Asia. The strategic response is not to concede to Japan’s neighbors, but to look for common ground that would serve national interests. As his tightening embrace of the United States, Koizumi’s shift on the EAS highlighted Japan’s obsession with the rise of China. In comparison to George W. Bush’s legacy of strategic competition transforming into

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strategic accommodation with China, Koizumi appeared to be fixated on steps associated with countering China’s rise yet without a strategic framework for Asia. It remains to be seen if preference for the EAS over ASEAN ⫹ 3 will lead to a struggle that undermines any path forward to regionalism or somehow under Abe a strategic vision will emerge that reengages China to a degree as part of a broad and inclusive regionalism with security on the Korean peninsula an urgent priority. In December 2005 the debate in Japan over regionalism intensified. The decisions at the two Kuala Lumpur summits to put the emphasis on community building in ASEAN ⫹ 3 allowed only a secondary role for the EAS. This was seen as a win for China, leading some to argue that Japan must abandon its illusions since the very concept of “community” is dangerous.32 One critic had warned in Tokyo shimbun that community means guaranteeing free movement of labor as well as coordination of macroeconomic policy leading toward a common currency, all of which serve China’s regional strategy; yet, the newspaper disavowed this message, insisting that it was a distortion that puts Japan in danger of rejecting Asia.33 Some argue that Japan must not be isolated or that its role is essential to balance China in regional groupings. Former Foreign Ministry official Tanaka Hitoshi led in making the case for a desirable form of community, including accelerated flows for economic integration, capacity building for infrastructure and personnel, and human security. Japan could maintain strong U.S. ties and still work to spread common values in Asia, he insisted.34 After the summits, others argued in the same vein that it is not constructive to see regionalism just as a battle between China and Japan; instead of being defeatist, Japan can press forward with its agenda, which requires improving relations with China and South Korea.35 Koizumi has articulated three principles for regionalism: open regionalism, which suggests broad membership and less exclusivity of operations; a functional approach that imposes fewer obligations than an institutionalized body; and respect for the values of a liberal democracy.36 These can be seen as challenging China’s alleged intentions and keeping U.S. ties as strong as possible. They set the bar high for reaching the stage of a “community,” asserting Japan’s new vision for regionalism rivaling China’s interest in building communities with neighbors regardless of values. While Chinese analysts hope that the process for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis through six-party talks will create a stronger basis for regionalism in Northeast Asia,37 the underlying rivalry with China may well lead Japan to present its own vision for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Such a vision will only reflect mature

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strategic thinking if it both seeks to create trust with China for a broad and inclusive regionalism and to persuade the United States that Japan’s visionary participation in regionalism well serves U.S. global interests. Notes 1. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 2. Ming Wan, Japan between Asia and the West: Economic Power and Strategic Balance (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2001). 3. Gilbert Rozman, Japan’s Response to the Gorbachev Era: A Rising Superpower Views a Declining One (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). 4. Brad Williams, “The Criminalisation of Russian–Japanese Border Trade: Causes and Consequences,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No. 5 (2003), pp. 711–28. 5. Gilbert Rozman, “Backdoor Japan: The Search for a Way Out via Regionalism and Decentralization,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Vol. 25, No.1 (Winter 1999), pp. 3–31. 6. Gilbert Rozman, “Restarting Regionalism in Northeast Asia,” North Pacific Policy Papers 1 (Vancouver: Program on Canada-Asia Policy Studies, Institute of Asian Research, 2000), pp. 2–21. 7. Ming Zhang and Ronald N. Montaperto, A Triad of Another Kind: The United States, China, and Japan (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999). 8. Kamiya Matake, “Japanese Foreign Policy toward Northeast Asia,” in Takashi Inoguchi and Purnendra Jain, eds., Japanese Foreign Policy Today (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 238. 9. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 10. Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004), pp. 154–58, 240–41. 11. Takashi Inoguchi, “Introduction: Japan Goes Regional,” in Takashi Inoguchi, ed., Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response (New York: Palgrave, 2002), p. 30. 12. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective,” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi, eds., Network Power: Japan and Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 40–41. 13. Steven K. Vogel, “Final Thoughts: Whither U.S.–Japan Relations?” in Steven K. Vogel, ed., U.S.–Japan Relations in a Changing World (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2002), pp. 262–69. 14. T.J. Pempel, “Transpacific Torii: Japan and the Emerging Asian Regionalism,” in Katzenstein and Shiraishi, Network Power: Japan and Asia, p. 80. 15. Takahara Akio, “Japan’s Political Response to the Rise of China,” in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), p. 167.

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16. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan’s Security Agenda: Military, Economic & Environmental Dimensions (London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), p. 240. 17. Mike M. Mochizuki, “Japan: Between Alliance and Autonomy,” in Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, eds., Strategic Asia 2004–05: Confronting Terrorism in the Pursuit of Power (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), p. 117. 18. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan’s North Korean Initiative and U.S.–Japanese Relations,” Orbis, Vol. 47, No. 3 (Summer 2003), pp. 527–39. 19. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan and Asian-Pacific Security,” in J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson, eds., Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 108. 20. Kazuhiko Togo, Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2003: The Quest for a Proactive Policy (Leiden: Brill, 2005), pp. 380–81. 21. Sankei shimbun Chugoku shuzaiban, Yami no naka no Nitchu kankei (Tokyo: Sankei shimbunsha, 2002). 22. Kokubun Ryosei, ed., Nihon, Amerika, Chugoku: kyocho e no shinario (Tokyo: TBS Britanika, 1997). 23. Imazato Yoshikazu, Gaimusho “shippai” no honshitsu, (Tokyo: Kodansha, 2002). 24. Samejima Keiji, ed., Chugoku no seiki, Nihon no senryaku (Tokyo: Nihon keizai kenkyu senta, 2002). 25. Musakoji Kinhide, Tohoku Ajia jidai e no teigen (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 2003). 26. Motegi Toshimitsu, Nihon gaiko no kosoryoku (Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 2003). 27. Nakajima Mineo, “ODA o toriyame taiChugoku gaiko no arikata mo minaose,” Chuo koron, March 2005, pp. 128–35. 28. Ogura Kazuo, “ ‘Joshiki’ ni hisomeru itsutsu no ayamari,” Ronza, March 2005, pp. 46–51. 29. Asahi shimbun, April 9, 2005, p. 15. 30. Nikkei sangyo, April 12, 2005, p. 3. 31. Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, pp. 366–79. 32. Sankei shimbun, December 15, 2005, p. 2; Sankei shimbun, December 18, 2005, p. 12. 33. Tokyo shimbun, October 2, 2005, p. 3; Tokyo shimbun, October 19, 2005, p. 5. 34. Nihon keizai shimbun, November 24, 2005, p. 25. 35. Nihon keizai shimbun, December 15, 2005, p. 9. 36. Sankei shimbun, December 15, 2005, p. 2. 37. “ ‘Higashi Ajia kyodotai’ koso ni netsu o ireru Chugoku no shini,” Foresight, December 2005, p. 86.

Contributors

Joseph P. Ferguson is Vice President of the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research. He received his Ph.D. from the Johns Hopkins University, and was in residence at Princeton University as a postdoctoral fellow. He has published numerous articles and essays on the international relations of Eurasia and Northeast Asia. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa is Professor in the Department of History and CoDirector of the Center for Cold War Studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. He received his B.A. in international relations at Tokyo University and his Ph.D. in history at the University of Washington. His monographs include The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo Japanese Relations, 2 vols, (1998), and Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (2005). Takashi Inoguchi is Professor of Political Science at Chuo University and Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo. His latest publications include Japanese Politics (2005), Japan’s Asian Policy (ed., 2004), Reinventing the Alliance (co-ed., 2003), American Democracy Promotion (co-ed., 2000), and Japanese Foreign Policy Today (co-ed., 2000). He is Editor of the Japanese Journal of Political Science and President of the Asian Consortium for Political Research. Akio Kawato served in the Japanese Foreign Ministry from 1970, mainly working on Russia. After serving as Ambassador to Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, he retired in 2004. Now he is Chief Economist at the Research Institute of Capital Formation, Development Bank of Japan, and teaches at Waseda University. He is the author of many books on international relations and a novel on Russia. Ryosei Kokubun is Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies and Professor of Political Science at Keio University. He is currently President of the Japan Association for Asian Studies and also President of the Japan

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Association of International Relations. He co-edited The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order (2004). Cheol Hee Park is Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies at Seoul National University after teaching at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security under the Korean Foreign Ministry and Tokyo’s National Graduate School for Policy Studies. He has written many articles on Japanese politics, Korea-Japan relations, and international relations in East Asia. T.J. Pempel is Il Han New Professor and Director of the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. His recent books include Regime Shift: Comparative Dynamics of the Japanese Political Economy (1998), The Politics of the Asian Economic Crisis (1999), Beyond Bilateralism: U.S.-Japan Relations in the New Asia-Pacific (2004), and Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region (2005). Gilbert Rozman is the Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, where he has taught since 1970. His most recent monograph is Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (2004). He also co-edited Korea at the Center: The Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (2006). Kazuhiko Togo served in the Japanese Foreign Ministry from 1968 on Russia, the United States, Europe, international law, and economics. After serving as Ambassador to the Netherlands, he retired in 2002. He taught at universities in Moscow, Tokyo, and Leiden. In 2004–06 he was engaged in teaching and research in Princeton. His recent publications include Japan’s Foreign Policy 1945–2003: The Quest For a Proactive Policy (2005). Ming Wan is professor of Government and Politics and Associate Professor and Associate Chair for undergraduate studies in the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University. His most recent book is Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (2006).

Index Abe Shintaro, 10, 23, 73, 98, 101, 203 Abe Shinzo, 32, 113, 259 Abductions issue, 25–6, 29, 69, 100, 129–30, 187–94; as symbol, 32,103, 254 Academia, 11–2, 75, 156 Afghanistan, 225, 233, 241; Soviet war in, 7, 45, 52; U.S. war in, 29, 120–2, 220, 232, 235 Africa, 116, 127, 225 Agreed Framework of 1994, 188, 192 Agriculture, 97, 109, 114, 232, 240, 247 Akayev, Askar, 229 Akino Yutaka, 231 Andijan, 235–7, 239–41 Annan, Kofi, 138 Anti-Americanism, 26–7, 49, 59, 194 Anti-secession law, 166, 145, 170, 173, 176 Apology, 28, 39, 50, 66–7, 75–7, 153–4; and Koreas, 69–70, 189; by China, 138, 144, 152; of Murayama, 16, 28, 188, 249; of Obuchi, 22, 93, 95; of Koizumi, 28, 30, 139–40, 196 Armitage, Richard, 121, 193 Arms, control, 8–9, 61, 72; sales, 67, 124, 145–6, 209, 251 ASEAN, 6, 44, 88, 227, 240, 255–6; conference in Tokyo in 2003, 26, 262; leader in regionalism, 23, 265; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), 125, 262 ASEAN ⫹ 3, 234; formation of, 5, 88, 102–3, 190, 245, 250–1, 256; in 2005, 3, 29–31, 262–6; support for, 118, 124–5, 253; summits of, 31, 144, 119, 262, 264; vision statement, 262 Asia, balance with U.S., 1, 6–8, 29, 37, 43, 125, 150, 183–4, 189, 193, 196, 243–5, 251, 257; priorities in, 2, 47

Asia-Africa Summit, 139 Asia-Europe Summit (ASEM), 100 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Taiwan, 175; decline of, 97, 248; entrance into, 64, 91, 208; formation of, 45–8, 186, 243–7; summits, 25, 72, 84, 101, 145, 212, 213, 217, 263–6; support for, 118, 245 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 236 Asian financial crisis, 81, 87–8, 96, 184, 189–90, 250–1, 256–7; and China, 178; and Japan, 21–2, 41, 102, 111, 118, 245, 248; and South Korea, 18, 81, 88, 190 Asian Games, 166 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), 87–9, 245; failure of, 22, 41, 102, 118, 227, 250–7 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 118, 238–9 Asian values, 245, 249, 256, 264 Aso Taro, 31, 265 Atomic bomb victims, 70 August 15, 32, 39, 143 August 1991 coup, 17, 61, 204 Australia, 116, 122, 260–1; and APEC, 44, 48–9, 186, 247; and China, 119, 127; and the EAS, 5, 29, 31, 125, 256, 258–9, 263–5 Axis of evil, 25, 193 Azerbaijan, 231–2 Baker, James, 71, 74, 228 Balanced expansion (kakudai kinko), 203 Belarus, 60 Blair, Tony, 100, 121 Boao forum, 25, 253 Boucher, Richard, 241 Bretton-Woods system, 52 Brezhnev, Leonid, 6–7

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Bubble economy, 53; and thinking, 13, 118; collapse of, 17, 36, 50, 82, 110, 148, 151, 155 Bush, George H. W., 188, 206 Bush, George W., 116, 119, 257, 265; and Koizumi, 23–9, 125, 193, 196, 265; and North Korea, 25, 130, 184 Cabinet, 31, 45, 112, 142–3 Cambodia, 51–2, 227, 240 Canada, 62 Carter, Jimmy, 69 Caucasus, 62, 90, 230–1 Central Asia, 62, 225; and great power competition (Great Game), 15, 215, 226, 235–6, 240–1, 254; and SinoRussian ties, 3, 237–8; as a priority, 90, 230; Cooperation Operation (CACO), 234–5, 241; plus Japan, 233–5, 241 Chechen war, 64, 215 Checkbook diplomacy, 39–40, 59, 73, 120, 235, 241 Chen Shui-bian, 99, 117, 151, 174–5 Chernenko, Konstantin, 9, 202 Chi Haotian, 84 Chiang Mai Initiative, 22, 96, 102, 124, 250 China, and cultural barriers, 236; bridge to, 14–5, 18, 65–7, 164, 248; equidistant diplomacy, 47; fever, 146; military cooperation with, 124; normalization with or the 1972 System, 38–9, 43, 45, 50, 142, 149–54, 161–3, 166; social problems of, 27, 141; world order of, 168, 171, 174 Chino Tadao, 230, 233 Chosensoren, 185–6 Chun Doo-hwan, 9–10, 46, 49, 186 Clinton, Bill, 67, 69, 82–6, 90, 93–5, 99, 169, 206; and globalization, 248; and Japanese concerns, 250, 254 Cold war, and later idealism, 19, 79, 243; reasoning of, 61–2, 149, 183–4, 195, 202, 244; restraints of, 7, 14–15, 58, 143, 161, 247; second, 48 Collective security, 117, 122 Colonialism, 24, 44, 75–6, 85–6, 128, 161, 165–6, 244 Comfort women, 17, 70, 79, 188

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 228–9 Communist Party rule in China, 153–4, 165, 171 Community in East Asia, 29, 32, 193, 255–8, 262–6 Comprehensive National Security, 109, 124, 186 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 85, 124 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 238 Confucianism, 250 Constitution, 37–8, 74; limits on use of force, 40, 59, 72, 140, 187–8; revision of, 42–3, 114, 174 Corruption, 18, 203, 214–5, 239 Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP), 112 Countdown to 2000, 23, 91, 100, 208, 210, Crawford, John, 43 Crime, 149, 244 Cross-border trade, 244 Cultural, fever, 13–4; opening, 26, 95, 190–1, 254; exchanges, 11, 99, 194, 227, 244, 246 Cultural Revolution, 150 Daqing, 26, 216–8 Defense guidelines, 20, 72, 92–3, 127, 154, 250 DeGaulle, Charles, 37–9 D”Estaing, Giscard, 43 Democracy, 31; and Central Asia, 234–9; and China, 50–1, 149; and Japan, 28, 44, 47, 185, 230, 264–7; and Russia, 60, 62, 205–6; and South Korea, 9, 13–14, 17, 49–50, 70, 246, 249; and Taiwan, 49, 127, 151, 155, 164–8, 175; third wave of, 49 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), 43, 171, 260 Demonstrations in China in 2005, 113, 128, 137–42, 145–7, 154–6, 165, 253–5 Deng Xiaoping, 10–13, 40, 50–1, 66, 79–80, 148–50, 248; concept of world, 7, 83, 94 Developmental authoritarianism, 35, 49

Index Diet, 60, 131, 162, 227; elections, 3, 22, 30, 92, 111, 113, 187, 210, 231; history resolution, 17, 188, 249; laws, 38, 59, 121–2; territorial resolution, 218 Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, 27, 77, 95, 115, 138, 147, 249; and Shimane prefecture, 30, 183, 195, 263 Drug trafficking, 109, 129, 239 Duma elections, 63 East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 47, 118, 243–5, 254–7 East Asian Summit, 3, 5, 29–31, 125–6, 243–5, 256, 257–8, 263–6; vision for, 265 East China Sea, 144, 147, 160, 171–3, 176, 221, 259–61 Eastern Europe, 61, 68, 203 Economic integration of Northeast Asia, 19, 117, 246 Economic power, impact of, 39, 58, 73, 150, 227, 248, 252 Economic reform in Japan, 20, 23, 81–2, 113–4; and financial crisis, 81–2; and resumption of growth, 32, 37 Emperor, Akihito, 69, 154; and talk of visit to South Korea, 70; and visit to China, 16, 64–7, 76, 79, 93, 153–5, 167; Hirohito, 44; role of, 114 Energy, competition, 127, 144–5, 160, 215–9; cooperation, 208, 262; security, 30, 40, 45, 109 Environmental problems, 41, 109, 126 Eurasian diplomacy, 90, 208, 231 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 236 European Union (EU), 48, 52–3, 88, 145–6, 235–6, 239–41, 244, 261 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 127, 129, 171 Famine, 26 Fishing, 63, 96–7, 165, 208; agreements, 85, 91, 95, 149, 210; wars, 206 Flying geese pattern, 35, 43, 46–50, 111, 246 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 48–9, 232, 255; in China, 16, 66, 73, 148, 254; in

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Russia, 29, 208; in South Korea, 46–8, 95 Four islands in a batch, 102, 213, 217 Four-party talks, 17, 89, 97, 192 France, 43, 52, 62, 123, 207 Fraser, Malcolm, 44 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) talks, 124, 126, 252, 261; and China, 119, 252; and South Korea, 26, 190, 245, 251 Friendship diplomacy, 19, 43, 46, 142–3, 151–4, 255 FSX controversy, 8 Fujio Seiko, 10 Fukuda, Takeo, 98; doctrine, 227, 255 Funabashi Yoichi, 37, 83 Functional separation (tatewari gyosei), 111 G-8 (G-7, G-5), 15, 35, 51–2, 257; Denver summit, 90, 208; Munich summit, 62–3, 98, 204; Okinawa summit, 22, 97, 101, 211–2; Tokyo summit, 45, 205; Williamsburg summit, 8–9, 45–6 Gaiatsu (outside pressure), 59 Gas, 127, 144, 147, 229, 237, 259–61 Generational change, 25, 49, 152–5 Germany, 61–2, 123, 126, 207; parallel to Japan, 40, 48, 52–3 Globalization, 1, as a challenge, 250, 256–7, 263; and market fundamentalism, 253; and market liberalization, 48–9, 51 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 6, 10, 14; and Japan’s response, 23, 53, 202, 246; visit to China, 60; visit to Japan, 13, 17, 61, 203–4 Grachev, Pavel, 206 Great Britain, 12, 36, 44, 62, 85, 122, 193 Gromyko, Andrei, 202 Gulf War, 57–60, 64, 71, 167, 184, 196, 257; marginalization in, 20, 66, 68–9, 79, 82, 188 Hasegawa Keitaro, 113, 168 Hashimoto Ryuichiro, 114 Hashimoto Ryutaro, 20–1, 81–92, 143, 154, 188, 196, 231; and Russia, 22, 206, 210 Hashimoto-Yeltsin Plan, 91, 208 Hata Tsutomu, 63, 67, 74, 206

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Hatoyama Yuko, 259 Higuchi Report, 71–2 Hiramatsu Shigeo, 113, 168 History, card, 73, 93–5, 155, 250; debate, 11–12; education, 28, 76, 155; repulsing criticism of, 2, 21 Historical debt, 36–41 Hokkaido, 202, 210, 244, 247 Hong Kong, 44, 53, 76, 148, 175–6 Hosokawa Morihiro, 17, 63, 67, 70–6, 154, 205–6 Huang Ju, 142 Hu Jintao, 25, 27, 29, 138–42, 176, 237; meetings with leaders, 31, 145, 216, 258, 263–4 Hu Yaobang, 7, 9–13, 46, 50–1, 153 Human rights, 31, 89, 221, 255, 257, 261; and Central Asia, 230, 233, 235; and China, 11, 27, 46, 65, 94, 227, 248; and Russia, 62; and universal values, 245, 249, 264–5 Humanitarian assistance, 41, 63, 206, 215, 232; and North Korea, 89, 95, 100, 189, 192 Human security, 22, 41, 97, 266 Ideology, as a factor, 60, 66, 153–4, 202 Ikeda Hayato, 38 Ikeda Yukihiko, 206 India, and the EAS, 5, 29, 31, 125, 258, 263–5; and role in Central Asia, 225, 236; priority of, 100, 253, 260–1 Indian Ocean, 122, 265 Indonesia, 81, 88, 97, 189, 255, 260, 264–5 Intelligence, satellites, 96, 191; sharing, 172 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF), 8, 36, 45, 52 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 69 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 88, 109, 233, 250 Internationalization (kokusaika), 9 Internet, 27, 30, 137–40, 259 Iran, 29, 123, 193, 225–7, 236 Iraq, 193; War, 26, 37, 119; and Japanese troops, 29, 42, 120–2, 194, 220, 257 Irkutsk summit of 2001, 23–4, 101, 212–3 Ishihara Shintaro, 8, 168, 175 Islam, 119, 225; radicals, 168, 340

Ito Masayoshi, 45 Ivanov, Igor, 211, 214 Japan, as model, 14, 66, 111, 150, 185, 249, 256; militarism of, 7, 40, 60, 75, 84, 154 Japan Defense Agency (JDA), 72, 83, 90, 127, 172–3, 206, 209 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), 231 Japan Socialist Party (JSP), 68, 82, 162; collapse of, 15, 69, 74, 185–8, 195 Jiang Jingguo, 49 Jiang Zemin, 18, 51, 70, 80, 85–6, 99; visit in 1992, 65, 167; visit in 1998, 21, 92–5, 103, 143, 154–5, 169; and Hu Jintao, 25, 141–2 Joint Communique of 1972, 50, 93, 140, 152, 154, 162–8 Joint Declaration of 1956, 61–3, 101, 203–5, 212, 216 Kaifu Toshiki, 59, 61, 65, 69, 73, 95, 204 Kamisaki Takenori, 259 Kanemaru Shin, 68–9, 115, 187 Kanryu (Korea fever), 183 Karimov, Islam, 230, 232–3, 235–8, 241 Kase Hideaki, 113, 168 Kashmir, 81 Kasyanov, Mikhail, 211 Kato Koichi, 114, 189 Kato Ryozo, 101 Kawana summit, 91–2, 210 Kawaguchi Yoriko, 214, 216, 234–5 Kazakhstan, 60, 228–31, 234 Kelly, James, 130, 192 Khasbulatov, Ruslan, 204 Khodorkovsky, Mikhail, 216 Kim Dae-jung, 81, 89, 100, 102, 191–2, 253–4; visit to Japan, 21–2, 93–6, 103, 190, 249–51 Kim Il-sung, 16, 68–9 Kim Jong-il, 18, 25, 100, 102, 129, 190–3 Kim Young-sam, 15, 17, 70, 249 Kirienko, Sergei, 210 Kishi Nobusuke, 37–8, 121, 162 Kissinger, Henry, 36–7 Kitaoka Shinichi, 59, 75

Index Kohl, Helmut, 90 Koizumi Junichiro, leadership role of, 113–4, 121, 170; overview of, 2; strategic thinking of, 5, 24, 28, 125, 193, 196, 253 Komeito, 59, 64, 154, 259 Komura Masahiko, 231 Kono Yohei, 64, 114, 188 Korea, annexation and rule over, 22, 69–70 Korean Airlines (KAL) downing in 1983, 13, 46, 70, 187 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 17, 69, 89, 96, 121, 128, 188, 192 Korean summit of 2000, 100 Koreans, in Japan, 70, 129, 195; on Sakhalin, 70 Kowtow diplomacy, 75, 143, 155 Kozyrev, Andrei, 63–4 Krasnoyarsk summit of 1997, 91, 208–12 Kunadze, Georgy, 62, 204 Kuriyama Takakazu, 59 Kwangju repression, 49 Kyoto dorm dispute, 163 Kyrgyzstan, 229, 231, 234–6, 238–41 Lake, David, 35–6 Lavrov, Sergei, 217–8 Law and justice, 62, 204–5 League of Nations, 60 Lee Teng-hui, 83, 151, 165, 174–5; and visa to Japan, 24, 99–100, 103, 128, 145, 169–70 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and expertise, 12, 28, 112; and multi-party coalitions, 3, 17, 74, 82, 206; loss of power, 15, 63, 73, 110, 154–5, 188; divisions within, 20, 23, 113, 152, 171, 212 Li Peng, 51, 65–7, 99 Li Zhaoxing, 139, 145 Liao Zhengzhi, 152 Lien Chan, 176 Lockheed Scandal, 152–3 Losyukov, Aleksandr, 218 Machimura Nobutaka, 139, 173 Maekawa Report, 7

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Mahathir, Mohammad bin, 47, 97, 118, 245, 256 Malaysia, 81, 97, 111, 253, 255–8, 263 Mao Zedong and Maoism, 7, 12, 66, 152 Marcos, Ferdinand, 49 Maritime Safety Agency, 42, 96, 129, 131, 191 Market economies, Central Asia’s shift, 232, 235, 239; China’s shift in 1992, 16, 80, 115, 148, 248; Russia’s shift, 60, 91, 244 Meiji era, 161, 226 Middle class values, 31, 265 Middle East, 58, 60, 116–7, 123, 127, 159, 225, 230; War, 36, 40, 48 Migration, 109 Miki Takeo, 36, 39 Military affairs, revolution in, 41–2, 116, 194 Military bases, 116, 208; in Central Asia, 232–5, 237; in Japan, 71–2, 117, 172; in Korea, 26, 117 Military budgets, 41, 59, 124; of China, 67, 126, 151, 166, 171 Ministry consolidation, 112 Military exercises of Russia and China, 146 Ministry of Education (and Science), 114–5, 143–4 Ministry of Finance (MOF), 60, 82–3, 87–8, 233 Ministry of Industry and Trade (MITI, later METI), 82–3, 87, 98, 144, 206 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), 83, 87, 93, 96, 226–31; and Russia, 22–3, 30, 91, 98, 101, 219; China school, 24, 66–7, 85, 169–70, 254; divisions in, 24, 74, 102, 206, 212–4, 233; role of, 60, 69, 235, 113, 195; understanding of, 12 Missile defense, 21, 42, 96, 123–4, 191, 214 Miyazawa Kiichi, 17, 62–5, 70–4, 114, 143, 154, 188, 196; Miyazawa Initiative, 22, 88, 96, 102, 189–90 Mori Yoshiro, 20, 23, 81, 97–103, 169, 175, 196, 211–3 Multipolarity, 18 Murayama Tomiichi, 17–18, 67, 74–6, 82, 110–1, 196; apology of, 16, 28, 32, 96. 140, 188 Myanmar (Burma), 13, 89, 187, 227

276

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Index

Nagano Shigeto, 67 Nakagawa Shoichi, 144, 259 Nakajima Mineo, 113, 168, 255 Nakamura Katsunori, 113, 168 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 44–6, 202–3; and Chinese ties, 50, 142, 153; overview of, 2; strategic thinking of, 7–13, 36, 40, 186, 246–7 Nakayama Kyoko, 233 Nakayama Taro, 61–2, 65, 205 Nakhodka, 26, 216–8 Nanjing massacre, 16, 67, 115 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), 71–2, 123–4; guidelines of 2004–5, 146, 172 National identity, 1, 4, 226; and Asia, 81, 97, 103, 245; and cultural superiority, 148–9; left and right notions of, 6, 11–12, 17–18, 59, 74–5, 189, 247, 252, 258; of China, 10–11, 148–9; pride in, 28, 45, 174; revitalization of, 23, 44, 219 Nationalism, 60; rise in China, 12, 18, 50–1, 66–7, 246–7; rise in Japan, 18, 27–8, 42, 70, 75, 111, 114, 121; rise in Russia, 16, 18, 62 NATO, expansion, 22, 90 Naval incursions, by China, 127, 145, 147, 172, 174; by North Korea, 42, 96, 129; by Soviet Union, 202 Naval power, 122–4, 127, 166, 171–2, 202; and Seventh Fleet, 117 Naval visits, 90 Nazarbayev, Nursultan, 230, 241 Netherlands, 44, 85, 122, 165 New thinking, of Gorbachev, 6, 9, 13, 43, 47; of China toward Japan, 25, 27 New Zealand, 122, 186, 261; and EAS, 5, 29, 31, 125, 256–9, 263 Nixon, Richard, 86 Nodong missiles, 69, 123, 209 Nonaka Hiromu, 154, 212–3 Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), 41, 115 Nordpolitik, 13, 15–6, 50, 187 Normal country, transition to, 4–6, 42, 47, 177, 188, 196, 243 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 244 Northeast China (Manchuria), 85, 247

North Korea (DPRK), clashes with, 42, 96; concern over, 20, 41, 52, 191, 220; missiles, 73, 123, 129–30, 214, 258; nuclear program, 26, 29, 68, 73, 113, 118–9, 129–30, 188, 192–4, 255; normalization with, 68–9, 81, 89, 128, 184–92, 244; talks with, 15–16, 22, 25, 58, 79, 100, 249, 254 Northern Territories (Southern Kurils), as symbol, 32, 61–2, 77, 201; demilitarization of, 64, 207; inspection in 2004, 27; joint development, 207; multi-layered approach, 207 Nuclear crisis, of 1993–94, 17, 69, 82–4, 121, 187–9, 192, 249; of 2002–6, 3, 29, 41, 115, 119, 130–1, 184, 217, 257, 266 Nuclear tests, of China, 16, 21, 67–8, 79, 84–5; of India and Pakistan, 89, 92, 100; of North Korea, 32, 131, 258, 260 Nuclear, power plants, 273, clean-up, 207, 211; safety summit, 299, three principles, 59; waste dumping, 205; weapons abolition, 42; weapons removal, 60; weapons transit, 74–5 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), 89, 115 Nye initiative, 72, 189 Obuchi Keizo, 20–3, 81, 91–8, 154, 190, 210–1, 230, 196 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 41, 48–9, 113, 118; and Central Asian ties, 229–30, 232–3, 237–9; and China ties, 6, 10–13, 19, 43, 50, 66, 73, 95, 126, 150, 153, 252–5; and South Korean ties, 9–10, 39, 49, 246; gratitude for, 151, 227, 255–6; suspension and resumption, 21, 68, 84–5, 89, 151 Ogura Kazuo, 190 Ohira Masayoshi, 44–5, 95, 150–2, 186 Okazaki Hisahiko, 113, 168 Okinawa, 38, 89, 170 Oil, 40, 58, 229–30, 236–9; crises or shocks, 6, 36, 43, 48, 186; exploration, 67, 123; pipelines, 26–7, 215–9 Okinawa, 72, 82, 97

Index Okita Saburo, 43 Olympic Games, 45, 151 Omori Yoshino, 83 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 36, 40, 43 Oshima Kenzo, 232 Ozawa Ichiro, 37, 115, 188, 203 Pacifism, 4, 11, 59, 74–5, 128; and passivity, 2, 120, 146 Pakistan, 100, 258 Pan-Pacific regionalism, 43–4, 186 Park Chung-hee, 49, 185 Patriotic education, 11, 76, 114, 153, 165 Pax Americana, 28–9, 57–8, 64, 77 Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978, 45, 50, 142, 147, 150–5, 163 Peacekeeping operations (PKO), 28, 41–2, 58, 70–3, 117, 123; law on, 59, 64–6, 121 Pearl Harbor, 86 Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR), 99 Perry, Matthew, 36 Perry (William) process, 21, 96, 251 Philippines, 49, 144, 208 Pipes (liaisons), 142, 154–5 Plaza Accord, 7, 46–8, 52 Policy Affairs Research Council, 82, 112 Politics and Economics, as two wheels, 32; newly matched, 2, 40, 44; separated, 61–3, 67, 245 Primakov, Yevgeny, 207, 210 Prime Minister’s Office, 60, 112, 172, 231 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 124, 220 Public opinion, and nationalism, 8, 27, 31–2, 75, 114; and China, 19, 21, 142, 146–8, 161, 177; and North Korea, 25, 191; and South Korea, 147; and Taiwan, 99–100, 145, 159, 161, 164–70, 177; placating in Japan, 1, 38; toward Japan, 7, 13–4, 18, 40, 70, 138, 142, 161, 246–7 Putin, Vladimir, and Mori, 23, 98, 101, 211–4; and 2004 offer, 29, 217; visit in 2005, 27, 30–1, 218 Qian Qichen, 65 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 116

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Rakhmonov, Imomali, 231 Reagan, Ronald, 7–9, 12–14, 45, 52, 186 Realism, 16, 19–21, 191–3, 251, 256, 259 Realpolitik, 57, 67, 73, 174 Recruit scandal, 69, 73, 203 Reentry into Asia, 16, 19, 164, 188, 196, 243, 257; foundation for, 4, 31, 95 Refugees, 125, 129, 144 Regime shift, 110–3 Regionalism, and China’s role, 21, 29, 126, 252–3, 259–62; open, 44–5, 51, 118, 245, 256–8, 261; reasons for, 45, 189; thinking on, 3, 23, 58, 103, 126, 190, 243–8, 268 Rhee Seung-man, 185 Rice, Condoleezza, 259 Rodionov, Igor, 208 Roh Moo-hyun, 25–30, 194–6; in 2005, 31, 126, 147, 253, 263–4 Roh Tae-woo, 16, 49, 69, 76, 187 Russia, flexibility on islands in 1992, 16–7, 63, 79, 249; military cooperation with, 206 Russian Far East (RFE), 18, 64, 187, 202, 211, 219, 244; and East Siberia, 215–6, 219 Russian financial crisis, 22, 92, 98 Safaev, Sadyk, 234 Sakakibara, Eisuke, 88 Sakhalin, energy projects, 215, 219, 247; oblast, 206 Sanctions, on China, 15, 51, 53, 58, 65, 151, 227, 247–8; on India and Pakistan, 100; on North Korea, 25–6, 29, 32, 131, 258 San Francisco Peace Treaty, 38, 44, 149 Sato Eisaku, 82, 162 Sato Seizaburo, 45, 59, 75 Sea of Japan economic rim, 243–4, 247, 258 Sea lanes, 14, 127, 159, 168, 171–2 Security Treaty, 37, 111, 121, 149; scope of, 87, 93, 117, 120, 127–8, 151, 163 Self Defense Forces (SDF), opposition to, 38, 74, 111, 114, 188; power of, 40, 42, 209; use of, 59, 90, 117, 121–4, 170–2, 194 Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, 67, 77, 85, 115, 125, 160, 165–7, 172

278

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Index

September 11 attack on U.S., 24, 29, 41–2, 121, 184, 193, 196 Seshima Ryuzo, 59 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO, Shanghai Five), 234–5, 237–41, 264 Shenyang consulate incident, 125, 129, 144 Shevardnadze, Eduard, 10, 71, 202–3 Shimamura Yoshinobu, 67 Shinoda Kenji, 207 Silk Road Diplomacy, 230–1 Singapore, 44, 127, 252, 255–6, 258 264 Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, 161 Sino-Soviet ties, alliance, 149; split and reconciliation, 12, 60 Six-party talks, 25–6, 30, 97, 117, 119, 130, 197, 217, 266; in jeopardy, 3, 31; return of North Korea to, 32, 258–61 Smile diplomacy, 103, 251 Soccer games in China in 2004, 27, 125, 128, 140, 147, 255 Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ, see also JSP), 110, 189 Soft power, 4, 227, 244, 255 Sonoda Sunao, 202 Soskovets, Oleg, 206 South Asia, 254 South China Sea, 125, 167, 171, 176 South Korea, dependency of, 6; image of, 21; normalization with China and Russia, 50, 61, 68–9, 126, 188; normalization with Japan, 38–9, 184–5, 195, 248; split with Japan in 2005, 26–7, 29, 138, 260; thinking on North Korea, 29, 190, 194 Southeast Asia (SEA), and competition with China, 18, 26, 176, 190, 253–6, 261; and Japan’s historic role, 44, 161, 255; influence in, 246, 248, 255–6; priority of, 3, 6, 46, 116, 159, 185–6, 190, 245, 264; ties to Northeast Asia, 117, 246, 249–50, 265 Soviet Union, collapse of, 16, 50, 57, 60–2, 68, 115, 148–50, 164, 237; diplomatic relations with, 38; military buildup of, 45, 52, 202; threat of, 2, 7–8, 16, 43, 186, 208 Space programs, 151

Spying and bilateral relations, 10, 94, 214 SS-20 missiles, 8–9, 40, 202 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 10, 13, 47, 52, 203 Strategic partnership of China and Russia, 3, 18, 30 Strategic thinking, and political groups, 11–13, background orientations, 4, causes of, 28; Chinese on Japan, 138, 146; comprehensive notion of, 36, 109–10; criteria for, 1–2, 20, 58–60, 73–5, 156, 159; degree of, 19, 43, 53, 197, 205, 252; periodization of, 3–5, 43, 184–6, 226; transition in, 23, 35, 64–8, 187, 193, 227; wavering in, 175–8 Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), 8, 47 Student exchanges, 46, 140, 153 Sugiura Seiken, 232 Sunshine policy, 21–3, 81, 89, 95, 103, 190–2, 251–4 Suzuki Muneo, 23–4, 98, 101, 113, 212–5 Suzuki Zenko, 8, 10, 45 Taepodong missiles, 21, 95, 115, 123, 129, 191–2, 209–10, 250 Taiwan, and China’s national security or anti-secession law, 29, 117, 170, 173–5; and defense guidelines, 85–7, 168–71; and one China policy, 93, 127, 140, 150–1, 155, 160–2, 166; and two plus two talks, 127–8, 145, 160, 172–3, 176; lobby, 162, 171; significance of, 2, 143, 159–60 Taiwan Relations Act, 162, 174 Taiwan Strait Crisis, 20–1, 86, 117, 160; and Japan’s reaction, 21, 83–4, 127, 148–51, 90, 167–9, 189, 209 Tajikistan, 229, 231–2, 234, 236–8 Takashima Masuo, 45 Takeshita Noboru, 10–11, 46–7, 73, 82, 92, 153 Tamba Minoru, 91, 101 Tanabe Makoto, 68, 187 Tanaka Akihiko, 75 Tanaka Hitoshi, 192, 266 Tanaka Kakuei, 36, 46, 149, 152, 162, 213; faction of, 21, 82, 153–5

Index Tanaka Makiko, 24, 113, 213–4 Territorial disputes, 77, 117, 262; with China, 50, 67, 140; with Russia and impact on relations, 24–7, 30–1, 38, 61–4, 73, 201, 204, 207, 212, 262 Territorial waters law in China, 67, 166–7, 170 Terrorism, 115, 196; response to, 4, 24, 42, 116, 121, 123, 215, 257 Textbook issues, 24, 76–7, 115, 143–4, 195–7, 260; and China, 11, 27, 125, 138–42, 260; and South Korea, 70, 138, 147, 191 Thailand, 80, 87–8, 97, 111, 189, 263 Theater Missile Defense (TMD), see Missile defense Three No’s, 86, 93–4, 169 Tiananmen repression, and Japan’s response, 11, 13–4, 18, 65, 79, 95, 160; as turning point, 15, 50–1, 80, 143, 153, 155, 164; reverberations of, 141, 165 Togo Kazuhiko, 230 Tojo Hideki, 39 Tokyo Declaration, 17, 63–4, 205, 249 Tokyo Tribunal, 38 Toshiba incident, 10, 13, 203 Toyota, 219 Tourism, and Mt. Kumgang, 191–2 Trade disputes, 7, 12, 16, 46, 71–3, 82, 164, 203, 246, 257 Trade goals and data, 52, 148, 175, 203, 215, 219, 232 Transneft, 216–8 Triangle with China and South Korea, 29, 70, 176 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), 22, 27, 96 Turkey, 236 Turkmenistan, 229–33 Ukraine, 60, 232 Unit 731, 115 United Nations, and China or Taiwan, 162; reform with Japan’s Security Council entry, 4, 27, 30, 42, 126, 138–40, 208, 253–4, 263; resolutions of, 32, 258; role in, 41–2, 122, 231; support for, 28–9, 109, 164, 232

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279

United States, and normalization with China, 39, 43, 52, 147–9, 161–2; as strategic competitor, 15; deficits of, 48, 52; dependency on, 2, 18–9, 39, 75, 226–7, 247; division of labor with, 25, 51–2, 245; occupation by, 44–5, 185; passing by, 20, 80, 86, 96, 102; saying no to, 8, 16, 164, 187–8; treasury bonds, 46–8, 52–3, 246 Uno Sosuke, 73, 95, 203 U.S.-Japan alliance, consolidation in 1995–9, 20, 84, 120, 127, 149, 168, 188–9; development of, 38; meaning of, 7–8, 45, 71–2; restructuring in 2005, 42, 194; tests for, 28–9, 162–3; views of, 40, 214 U.S.-Japan-China triangle, 18, 80, 83–7, 99; golden era, 35, 47, 60, 202; changing nature of, 65, 102, 248, 251–2 U.S.-Japan-Russia triangle, 16, 38, 246–7 U.S.-Japan-South Korean triangle, 27–9, 96, 102, 185–7, 195–6, 260 Usui Hideo, 206 Uzbekistan, 228–41 Vietnam, 227, 264; invasion of Cambodia, 7, 51–2; War, 36, 39, 43, 48, 52, 255 Visits, to Southeast Asia, 251; to Central Asia, 227, 241; to China, 21, 32, 153, 94, 258; to India, 100; to North Korea in 2002 (Pyongyang Declaration), 25–6, 41, 129, 192–3, 196, 253; to North Korea in 2004, 25, 27, 130, 194; to Russia, 26, 216, 218; to South Korea, 9, 32, 46, 70, 194, 258, 263 Vladivostok, 90, 216; speech of 1986, 203, 246 Wang Guangya, 138 War renunciation, 36–41 War reparations, 39, 50, 66–70, 150 Watanabe Michio, 62–3, 74, 205, 230 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 4, 116, 129, 193, 196 Wen Jiabao, 126, 138 Winter Sonata, 26 World Bank, 91, 233

280

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Index

World Cup, 22, 26, 190 World Health Organization (WHO), 175 World Trade Organization (WTO), 21, 53, 81, 94–9, 109, 126, 175 World War II, fiftieth anniversary of end, 17, 67, 75–6, 79, 140, 188, 249; impact of defeat, 2, 4–6, 28, 36, 49, 163, 201, 226; invasion of China, 51, 85, 144, 161; Soviet role in, 85, 218 Wu Yi, 30, 128, 263 Xinjiang, 119, 225

85–6; Miki’s visit, 39; Nakasone’s visit, 10–11, 13, 39–40, 44, 46, 50, 142, 153; South Korean reactions, 49, 196; Taiwanese visits, 128 Yeltsin, Boris, 15, 18, 22, 90–2, 98, 204–11; cancellation of visit in 1992, 17, 62–4, 70; visits to Japan, 63; visits to China, 67 Yen revaluation, 7, 43, 46, 52–3, 246, 255 Yoshida Shigeru, 149, 161; doctrine or school, 37–9, 114–5, 246 Yugoslavia (Kosovo war), 21, 94, 140–1 Yukos, 216

Yasukuni shrine, 32, 76–7, 143; and Abe, 32, 259; and Koizumi, 23, 27–31, 113, 125–6, 147, 154–6, 176, 194–5, 263; burials in, 38, Chinese reactions, 39, 137–8, 170; Hashimoto’s visit, 21,

Zeng Qinghong, 142 Zhao Ziyang, 50–1 Zhou Enlai, 7, 11, 152, 162, 165 Zhu Rongji, 94, 97, 99 Zoellick, Robert, 53