South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia (Strategic Thought in Northeast Asia)

South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia

STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN NORTHEAST ASIA Gilbert Rozman, Series Editor Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States By Gilbert Rozman South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee Chinese Strategic Thought toward Asia By Gilbert Rozman (forthcoming)

South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia Edited by

Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee

SOUTH KOREAN STRATEGIC THOUGHT TOWARD ASIA

Copyright © Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, Shin-wha Lee, 2008. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published in 2008 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7555–3 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7555–8 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data South Korean strategic thought toward Asia / edited by Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee. p. cm.—(Strategic thought in Northeast Asia) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7555–8 1. Korea (South)—Foreign relations—East Asia. 2. East Asia— Foreign relations—Korea (South) 3. Korean reunification question (1945–) 4. Korea (South)—Foreign relations—Russia (Federation) 5. Russia (Federation)—Foreign relations—Korea (South) I. Rozman, Gilbert. II. Hyon, In-t’aek, 1954– III. Yi, Sin-hwa, 1965– JZ1747.A55S68 2008 355⬘.03305195—dc22

2007041540

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: May 2008 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

Contents

Acknowledgments 1

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Overview Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee

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Chronology 2

South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia in the 1980s Kyudok Hong

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3 Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Kim Young-sam Era In-Taek Hyun

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4 Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Kim Dae-jung Era Scott Snyder

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5 Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Roh Moo-hyun Era Seong-Ho Sheen

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Geography 6 South Korean Strategic Thought on Reunification Jong-Yun Bae and Gilbert Rozman

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7 South Korean Strategic Thought toward China Jae Ho Chung

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8 South Korean Strategic Thought toward Japan Gilbert Rozman

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South Korean Strategic Thought toward Russia Gilbert Rozman South Korean Strategic Thought toward Regionalism Shin-wha Lee

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List of Contributors

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Index

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Acknowledgments

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he editors are grateful to the Princeton Institute of International and Regional Studies (PIIRS) and the Ilmin Institute of International Relations of Korea University for supporting this project from its inception through publication. The initial meeting at Princeton also received support from the Korean Economic Institute (KEI) and the East Asian Studies Program of Princeton University. Many experts on Korea commented on the project during its various stages in 2005–07. Some attended the initial workshop where broad themes were raised and others joined later meetings where draft chapters were presented. We are grateful to all of them and, especially, to the contributors to this volume, whose comments on other chapters helped in the preparation of the overview. Special thanks go to Kim Dongjung for the onerous task of making the transliteration from Korean consistent as well as research assistance. Finally, we want to thank Anthony Wahl at Palgrave for his continuous support. Gilbert Rozman In-Taek Hyun Shin-wha Lee

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CHAPTER 1

Overview Gilbert Rozman, In-Taek Hyun, and Shin-wha Lee

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he simple days of choosing sides and depending exclusively on one patron are over for the states of Northeast Asia as for other states that were consequential in the polarized cold war era. The transition in this region began, albeit slowly, with China’s emergence as a third, if lesser pole, after its decisions in 1971–72 to abandon autarchy and in 1982 to seek equidistance between the superpowers. By the mid1980s Japan’s new insistence on becoming a regional leader with some autonomy from the United States gave more impetus to the transition. Greatly accelerating it were Moscow’s moves to end the cold war followed by a dramatic rise in Beijing’s clout in the 1990s. In addition, from 1993 North Korea became an object of regional attention and competition, demonstrating its independent ability to affect regional affairs. At the center of the region, tethered to the United States and newly attentive to its brethren in North Korea, South Korea squarely faces the challenge of a rapidly changing balance of great powers amidst lingering strategic dilemmas. This puts a premium on leadership that adroitly analyzes the forces of change and plans how best to serve the national interest. Strategic thinking in Seoul over a quarter century from the waning days of the cold war to the uncertain state of the North Korean nuclear crisis opens a window on Northeast Asia’s dynamic transformation. Of the countries of Northeast Asia, South Korea has made the most far-reaching shift in strategic thinking since the end of the cold war.

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Terms such as “nordpolitik,” “cooperative security,” “globalization,” “diplomatic diversification,” “new diplomacy,” “Sunshine Policy,” “Northeast Asian era,” “Northeast Asia central state,” and “regional balancer,” offer testimony to the search in progress for a new framework for relations with the other five states active in the region. Some of these refer to sustained policy initiatives, others to rhetorical thrusts that met fierce opposition. The “three R’s” of “reunification,” “regionalism,” and historical “revisionism” weighing heavily on many Northeast Asian states are most pronounced in discussions of how the South should deal with its neighbors. Yet, criticisms point to a fourth “R” “realism” that sets a standard to be reached for clear-minded calculations about relative threats and the policy choices that would best counter them. If there has been no shortage of boldness, our assessment of strategic thinking must consider prudence as well. Below we examine how well goals articulate with the means available, how adequately they respond to the shifting regional currents, and how consistent the ideas introduced for realizing them are. Both the global and the domestic system have changed dramatically since the 1980s. South Koreans seized the opportunity of China’s spectacular rise in power, responded to Russia’s sharp fluctuation as a force in this region and the world, nervously eyed Japan’s abruptly shifting fortunes and approach to reentering Asia, and were jolted by the ups and downs in perceptions of the North Korean threat. Changes also can be traced to sudden adjustments in U.S. strategy toward the region as its targets shifted from the end of the cold war to the shock leading to the war against terror. Domestically, democratization, the impact of South Korea’s economic miracle, and pride from new international standing seen vividly in the 1988 Seoul Olympics all provided background for electoral results bringing new types of leaders to the powerful post of president. Amid a deepening rift between progressives and conservatives over foreign policy, especially over handling North Korea and the United States, public opinion and the mass media acquired newfound importance in this shifting environment for strategic thinking. We divide the twenty-five years under five presidents into four periods. The Chun Doo-hwan era remained a period of cold war with limited options, and we group it with the Roh Tae-woo era in showing how the limitations of the cold war era were cast aside, as leaders anticipated its end and started to explore more f lexible foreign policies. This period must be judged, above all, for nordpolitik, combining a new approach to great power relations with a change in thinking on how to pursue reunification, to the point of introducing the notion of

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cooperative security. The second period is the time of Kim Young-sam, who, as another conservative, did not make major changes of direction although he gave globalization (segyehwa) precedence, gave voice to the notion of diplomatic diversification (oigyo dabyonhwa) as part of his “new diplomacy” (shin oigyo), and in the first nuclear crisis over North Korea was tested on how he handled the more complex post–cold war environment. Then came the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung, who linked peninsular and great power relations as he sought to make South Korea the driving force in the region. Finally, Roh Moo-hyun took office, maintaining engagement of the North but facing a more complicated great power environment with bolder moves to jump-start regional integration and challenge the United States and Japan, provocatively proclaiming the Northeast Asian era and his state as the Northeast Asian central state (Dongbukka jungshim gukka) and the Northeast Asian balancer (Dongbukka gyunhyong ja) before he conducted a summit in Pyongyang as his final legacy. Even as conservative Lee Myung-bak built an insurmountable lead in the race to succeed him, Roh rushed to commit South Korea to far-reaching measures for economic integration with North Korea and joint pursuit of a peace regime despite nervousness in other states about how well these moves would be coordinated with their priorities, including denuclearization. Each president colorfully announced far-reaching initiatives while struggling to weigh diverse, often conf licting, priorities as strategic challenges occurred often over the past quarter century. Priorities in Strategic Thinking There is no mystery to the strong aspirations for strategic autonomy, gaining maneuverability in international relations. Korean history is filled with stories of dependency: the buzzword for it is sadae, referring originally to the relationship with China over half a millennium in the Josun era that avoided outright subjugation but left no doubt about Korea’s subordinate status and need to serve, ritually at least, the superior state in a tributary relationship. This is followed by an image of completely losing sovereignty to Japan in 1910. South Korea then experienced the inescapable embrace of the United States following World War II that lingered long past the time of the Korean War as the threat of a repeat attack by North Korea was slow to abate and the cold war left insurmountable barriers. While the period we examine from the mid-1980s gave rise to fluctuating hopes that a new era of diplomatic f lexibility had dawned, the Northeast Asian regional environment with

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its abrupt shifts in the power balance and in prospects for stability has not made it easy to realize them. Normalization of relations with Russia and China diversified South Korea’s strategic options, but neither country fits into a regional order under the United States. Interest in a thaw or even reunification with the North has led to revamping the South’s strategic calculus, but tensions persist. The enduring reality in relations with other states is far less autonomy than is desired. Leaders still struggle with the large gap between their unquestioned preferences and the realistic choices now available. They may shuffle the priorities attached to other states active in the region, but only within tight limits. Compared to the other five players in Northeast Asian geopolitics, South Korea has the least flexibility. The United States operates from a distance with an unmatched array of assets, enjoying maximum f lexibility, while the South requires this alliance in the face of North Korea’s refusal to relax its military posture. China is the rising world power, better able than almost any major country to withstand U.S. pressure and treated with deference in almost all of Northeast and Southeast Asia except Japan. It has considerable f lexibility on the Korean peninsula; yet South Korea must rely on it to engage North Korea and increasingly for continued economic growth. Russia has the nuclear weapons and energy resources to chart its own course, and Moscow has refocused on ties with Pyongyang as one way to increase its inf luence. While Seoul is not particularly dependent on Russia, prudence dictates that it be careful not to give offense. Japan has the industrial clout and unqualified U.S. backing to seek its own path in East Asia. Although South Korean economic and strategic reliance on Japan is diminishing, relations are still asymmetrical. Finally, even North Korea arguably has more freedom of action since it is only weakly integrated into the world economy and keeps its own people isolated and impoverished. While Seoul is unlikely to drop its engagement strategy, Pyongyang has yet to become entwined in a web of interdependency with any state that would tie its hands. As a middle power buffeted by four assertive great powers and one autonomous, militarized state, South Korea is limited in the options at its disposal and by the damage it could cause to itself should it put at risk vital bilateral relationships. In this complex, evolving environment, South Korea’s foremost challenge is to prioritize relations among the other five states active in the region. The United States tops the list of partners, as it did during the cold war, but drawing increasing attention is North Korea, where the pull of brotherhood and the threat of destabilization coexist, followed by China, where ties have rapidly expanded with relatively little

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discussion of its possible future regional hegemony. Russia has lost considerable ground as a priority from the ominous presence of the Soviet Union during the cold war, while Japan’s role had appeared to be rising for a time but lately has been falling as an economic and security inf luence. Worthy strategic thinking must weigh the pros and cons of upgrading relations with each of these countries and try to achieve an equilibrium that maximizes national interests. With uncertainty about North Korea’s intentions and no appealing alternative, South Korea has clearly kept alliance ties with the United States as its first priority, even as it debates how much dependency has declined. It has made reconciliation with North Korea its second focus, unable to avoid turning its attention there whether from alarm or obligation. China’s importance keeps rising with economic ties leading the way. In turn, Japan has fallen to fourth among priorities, even if its economic and security salience is still substantial. That leaves Russia as a distant fifth, dropping from the Soviet Union’s cold war impact through the 1990s, but beginning by 2007 to revive as a serious factor. In a divided nation and one under the threat of renewed instability if not outright combat, South Korea naturally starts its strategic thinking with North Korea. In choosing among priorities, it faces coordination with other states to settle on a suitable combination between reassuring the regime in Pyongyang about the benefits from engagement and maintaining vigilance or even pressure so that it would understand the costs of confrontation. This has an economic component of using the superior economic prowess of the South as well as of the international community to entice the North without strengthening a regime that might take this as an opportunity for reinforcing its oppression at home and confrontation tactics to the outside. It also has a security component of forging a common front to resist the potential danger from the North, including the development of nuclear weapons, leaving no doubt about the South’s resolve to reduce the North’s threat capacity while offering reciprocal, confidence-building measures to guide the way forward. Finding suitable strategies for managing the North’s military danger and encouraging its international engagement have been a persistent headache for strategic thinkers in Seoul. Such strategies must have a major regional component, brought to the forefront through the Six-Party Talks organized in Beijing to deal with the nuclear crisis, especially by the shift on February 13, 2007 toward a multilateral approach offering inducements to the North, but keeping in reserve possible application of sanctions already approved by the United Nations Security Council and other joint measures.

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Also critical to prioritizing goals in East Asia is figuring out how to make effective use of the alliance framework into which the South is enmeshed (the U.S. alliance and the trilateral U.S.-led system including Japan), at a time of rising calls for a multilateral regional framework. To some this appears as a sharp dichotomy between traditional bilateralism and emergent regionalism, but the Six-Party Talks have raised the possibility of a more nuanced duality: a lasting multilateral framework is arising, even as a reinvigorated U.S.-Japan military alliance is beckoning to an ambivalent South Korea. Calls for regionalism in Northeast Asia as well as East Asia have security implications. If the focus were placed on an East Asian Community (EAC) without the United States, ties with China would no doubt intensify. If, however, emphasis turned to a network of bilateral alliances radiating from the United States and draped in assertive rhetoric about universal values, then the South would cast its lot with a maritime coalition termed by Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro the “arc of freedom and prosperity.” In 2007 both options remained alive as the Six-Party Talks drew Washington and Beijing closer not only in search of denuclearization in North Korea but also in developing working groups that could lead to a third path toward regional cooperation. Each president has had to find a way to construct multilateralism on the foundation of the alliance with the United States, considering the U.S. role and response in choosing among alternative approaches to regionalism as well as to North Korea. South Korea’s strategic priorities were clear in the cold war, but subsequently they became hotly disputed. For close to four decades, the Korean War and possible recurrence amidst the environment of the cold war established a little-contested consensus that the foremost priority is to ensure military support against North Korea and its likely backers. Given its continued potential threat and lingering competition with it for advantage in any reunification process, some still weigh this priority above all others, valuing the alliance factor. Second in priority (an offshoot of the first to gain defensive strength and meet the challenge of competition) is to maintain rapid economic growth. Even now, as the South’s economy is heading toward per capita GNP of $20,000, there remains a widespread sense of precariousness about the breadth of the export economy and the prospect of becoming sandwiched between competitive manufacturing in Japan at the high-tech end and in China’s rising mid-level technologies, underlining the strategic significance of the economic factor. A third priority is confidence-building measures, in principle aimed at reunification but treated by many as serving other more urgent goals such as stability on the peninsula and a peace

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dividend for the economy. Indeed, a fourth priority of normalizing Korea after distortions in the twentieth century broadly refers not only to reunification but also to achieving a national identity and social fabric correcting effects of the unnatural state of division and unprincipled acts of dictatorial governments. This includes preparing to lead regional efforts to deal with North Korea whenever conditions permit. There is also a fifth priority to move beyond a sense of subordination and thus overcome distortions associated with a national identity focused on victimization. Across the political spectrum priorities are viewed differently. South Koreans are deeply divided between conservatives, who long ruled, and progressives, who have held power since 1998. Their split extends to foreign relations, as each side was quick to denounce the other’s moves, especially in handling North Korea. Thus, when placed in the context of international debates over security in the region, the differences in thinking within the South are pronounced, but not necessarily along lines that outside observers might expect. Whereas many conservatives elsewhere stress that the rise of China is a threat and all should take part in its containment, South Koreans overwhelmingly agree on engaging China, albeit not on how to balance ties with it and the United States. Similarly, the evaluations of Japan share much in common, blaming it and warning against its revisionist tendencies, although there are notable differences on the appropriate strategic response. As Russia reasserts its claim to inf luence in the region, we also see less variation in South Korean perceptions than in views found in Washington and Tokyo. In the case of United States and North Korea, however, the extremes are more prominent. Variations in evaluations of the United States for most are less pronounced than many may expect, but a diametrical contrast exists between the two ends of the political spectrum. The main issue for the vast majority is not whether to end the alliance, but under what circumstances would it be advisable to increase the South’s flexibility. Finally, in the context of the Sunshine Policy or its follow-up and the Six-Party Talks, if South Koreans clash over how much reciprocity is required in overtures to the North, they largely agree on prioritizing incentives through dialogue rather than pressure. The desired direction of security in Northeast Asia is mostly shared: toward multilateralism, a balance of power, a continued U.S. alliance and regional presence, and room for maneuver with decreasing dependence on any one state. The various priorities have had different significance over time and across the political spectrum. Progressives fault conservatives for overrating the alliance factor and misreading the economic factor, while

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the latter fault so-called appeasement policies for naively pursuing one-sided, unconditional engagement with the North without essential confidence-building measures and at the same time exaggerating the meaning of normalizing Korea and prospects for self-reliant defense ( jaju gukbang). In the early years of the Kim Young-sam era, “new diplomacy” combined all of these themes with stress on internationalization to complement alliance and regional cooperation to accompany diversified foreign relations and a future orientation to better ties with the North. A decade later, Roh Moo-hyun had shifted the weight in pursuit of closer ties to the North, “normalization” of South Korea by revisiting its postwar development, and balancing powers as part of Northeast Asian regionalization. The stakes were rising as North Korea tested a nuclear weapon and many in South Korea doubted Roh’s bold moves as a threat to national security as the North’s belligerent rhetoric continued and the United States, even while exploring compromise in the Six-Party Talks, sought more restraint in Seoul. Korean foreign policy elites cannot escape a sense of frustration over what has happened since the Sunshine Policy was launched. After appearing to be at the center of diplomacy, especially in managing interKorean relations as it orchestrated four-power support for its efforts, the South found the strategic climate tightening after 2001. Especially the nuclear crisis from 2002 narrowed its options. The most important test of strategic thinking has been the challenge of dealing with what have become the two main “adversaries”—ally and brother nation. After the start of the Six-Party Talks, prospects for multilateral coordination have been in f lux with the possibility that the February 13 Joint Agreement will require vigilant strategic responses, involving not only Pyongyang and Washington but also the other three participants. Having lost some of the centrality visible in the Sunshine Policy, Seoul must look in many directions to adjust to its region. It now does so in the context of invigorated Six-Party Talks and associated working groups as well as emboldened North Korean diplomacy. The North Korean nuclear test in October 2006, the shift in the U.S. posture that led to the Joint Agreement, and the completion of the first phase of that agreement in the summer emboldened progressives under Roh Moo-hyun as his summit with Kim Jong-il signified a daring push for Seoul to regain the initiative. Yet, they also alarmed many conservatives under the leadership of Lee Myong-bak chosen on August 19 as the candidate of the Grand National Party (GNP), who warned that Seoul would really be handing the initiative to Pyongyang while undermining the Six-Party Talks if Roh persisted. When Lee was elected on

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December 19 with domestic economic issues foremost on voters’ minds, he gave priority to rebuilding ties with the United States and Japan, even as he pledged to keep engaging North Korea, subject to more stress on reciprocity and on progress in denuclearization. Turning Points in Strategic Thinking Twice in the past half century circumstances congealed for South Korean leaders to launch far-reaching initiatives in policies toward Asia, and in 2007 we observe the sort of f lux that may signal that a third opportunity is about to emerge. Undoubtedly, the end of the cold war stands as a critical turning point for South Korea’s opportunities and strategic responses, but we would date the turning point back to 1988 and trace its roots to the early 1980s. The period 1998–2000 indisputably stands as a second turning point, again made possible by developments earlier in the decade as well as a fortuitous combination of circumstances at that time. Given the extraordinary f lux in foreign policy in 2005–07 with a possibility that in 2008 major adjustments will follow under a new president, we would be remiss in not taking particular note of this period as a potential third turning point that could also leave a lasting mark. As we review the chronology of strategic thinking over a quarter of a century, we focus attention on these transitional moments. In the cold war era, South Korean strategic thinking was dominated by two themes: vigilance and dependency. The threat of attack or subversion by North Korea demanded vigilance, while the necessity to station large numbers of American forces and support U.S. strategic objectives led to dependency. Increasingly, from the end of the cold war we observe two more strategic themes, initiative and coordination, even as the other two remained. Shifts in the foreign policy of Moscow and Beijing gave Seoul an opportunity to show its initiative even as the challenge was growing to maintain coordination with the Washington and then with Tokyo as well. Without undermining its earlier principles, Seoul could explore ways to escape the past confines that had narrowed its prospects. Looking back to the early years of the Chun Doo-hwan era, we see a president with low popularity and legitimacy eager to make his mark in foreign affairs given a great boost by support from the leaders of the United States and then Japan, as well as by the economic successes of his country. Newfound confidence came just as Seoul was named host of the 1988 Summer Olympics. Networking opportunities to socialist

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states raised hopes for economic and political normalization. Democratization through the presidential election in December 1987 boosted the legitimacy of Roh Tae-woo as the leader who could pursue such opportunities even as the unorthodox manner of his selection by Chun left him urgently in need of foreign policy successes. Meanwhile, the United States and Soviet Union were achieving one breakthrough after another in their relations, and China was opening its economy rapidly with increasing interest in investment and trade with a neighbor whose development complemented its own. A convergence of domestic and international factors created near ideal conditions for new strategic thinking symbolized by the nordpolitik policy. The new direction established in 1988 became the driving force for normalization in 1991 with the Soviet Union, and 1992 with China as well as economic integration with China that kept accelerating. Instead of relying solely on U.S. military support and U.S. and Japanese cooperation as the bulwark of economic growth, South Korea diversified its options. It greatly increased its scope for diplomatic f lexibility and drastically reoriented its economy with substantial strategic implications. After long cold-war confinement on the margins of continental Asia, Seoul burst into the continental spotlight with an abrupt turn in its strategic options. Olympics diplomacy raised China’s profile, setting a new direction that would lead Seoul to look beyond the United States toward a second significant inf luence, which by the end of Roh Tae-woo’s term was considerable. From 1994 to 1999, Korean strategic thought wavered. Multiple options appeared. While North Korea looked threatening as it pursued nuclear weapons in 1993–94 and launched a new missile in 1998, South Koreans became much less concerned about it as a threat when its pitiable famine conditions in 1995–96 were revealed after its alliance support had been greatly undermined by Moscow and Beijing’s shifts in policy and withdrawal of massive subsidies. In addition, while the U.S. alliance remained the backbone of national security, the deals cut by the Clinton administration with North Korea in 1994 and 1999 gave the green signal to the South to intensify newly rising engagement efforts. The situation was changing in relations with other powers too. While the 1998 breakthrough with Japan achieved through Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Tokyo provided the most dramatic news after normalization at the beginning of the decade with former adversaries, the widening gap in strategic thinking about regional issues including North Korea as well as the emotional fallout due to provocations over history from Japan left the foundation for strategic consensus weaker

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than what seemed to be the case with China. The Sunshine Policy gathered steam against the background of this shifting strategic calculus. Another turning point was reached amidst new international circumstances enveloping the Korean peninsula. With the Kim Dae-jung presidency, there was new intensity to Seoul’s initiatives and its multisided coordination. A two-year exhilarating ride put it at the center of regional diplomacy, but also left it on a treacherously winding path that could not be navigated by itself. When Vladimir Putin, George W. Bush, and Koizumi Junichiro successively took office as leaders set on transforming the foreign policies of their countries and Kim Jong-il revealed that North Korea was not nearly as transformed as some in Seoul had expected, the path forward appeared blocked. Leaders keen on engagement were tested for their patience and ability to work with other states while facing the danger of overreaching and leaving their country exposed with little inf luence. If Kim Dae-jung’s one-sided approach to Kim Jong-il, such as the secret payment of about $500 million in return for holding a summit, left an unbalanced legacy, Roh Moo-hyun’s troubled ties with the United States and Japan and often unconditional moves to the North were more damaging. In 1998–2000 Kim Dae-jung steered his country toward a new outlook on each of the three R’s. Engaging the North on the apparent path to reunification, promoting a vision for regionalism, and promising not to play the historical “card” in the hope that historical revisionism would disappear were hallmarks of Kim’s leadership. Above all, his Sunshine Policy substituted the goal of vigorous engagement for the purpose of peaceful coexistence in place of the earlier objective of unification through containment, then absorption of the North, and other interim ideas. It became the aim of South Korean leaders to pursue normalization of ties with the North and to urge the United States and Japan to do the same, while also pressing private enterprises to develop ties with the North through separation of economics from politics. This dramatic shift resulted in the historic North-South summit of June 15, 2000, and it set the tone for the approach toward North Korea under Roh Moo-hyun too, although new tensions over nuclear weapons and intensive negotiations among many states tested him differently. We treat 1998 as a strategic divide, whose significance was made possible by the earlier strategic breakthrough in 1991–92 through normalization of relations with Moscow and Beijing, but we also recognize in 2005–07 a decisive strategic test, with high stakes beyond any faced in these earlier milestones. The end of the cold war, the emergence of North Korea as a

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target for diplomacy, and the deepening of the second nuclear crisis, each posed realist challenges. Old thinking would not suffice nor would falling back on one or more of the three R’s for one group or another’s emotional gratification as real dangers and shifts in power demanded urgent responses. In the maneuvering associated with the third watershed event— represented by the February 13, 2007, deal at the Six-Party Talks—Roh Moo-hyun, who had risked relations with Japan and the United States by his independent moves and outspoken comments, had to choose between synchronized moves to keep the pressure on the North or unilateral overtures to establish his legacy in the final year of his presidency. Having coordinated with China to keep the process going forward and also discussed with Russia triangular economic integration with the North should security improve, Roh was impatient to advance ties with the North. Throughout his tenure, responses to the nuclear crisis stood as the centerpiece in strategic thinking about Asia. With this new stage in the crisis of a more dangerous, nuclear-armed North Korea and a more promising multilateral framework, Roh faced his ultimate test, but not one fundamentally different from what he had faced since 2003. As the United States doubted his resolve and Japan did not hide its intention just to wait for the election of his successor, Roh desperately focused on Pyongyang in the hope of winning its cooperation for a last-minute summit that might propel the Six-Party Talks forward and salvage his legacy through the election of a progressive as his successor. His renewed partisanship further alienated part of the South Korean public and media, failing the test of rallying the country behind a strategic, realist approach to its foreign policy. Yet, he rested his hopes on the summit, first scheduled for August 28–30, and then, following heavy f looding in North Korea, postponed to October 2–4, 2007. While progressives mainly approved this as the accomplishment of a visionary, conservatives suspected that it was a naive move of desperation that would have to be handled with caution if North Korea continued to fail to reform, to denuclearize, and to permit even gradual improvements in its human rights. Roh never found a countervailing force to check South Korean reliance on the United States. His allies in the Uri Party, having swept the April 2004 National Assembly elections with a big majority, contemplated China replacing U.S. inf luence in the region, but the Goguryo historical claims by Chinese academics that were revealed that summer dimmed the image of that country as aloof from the controversies swirling about South Korea’s search for historical vindication and resurgent

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national identity. The United States and Japan stuck closely together, as Roh alienated his country within the triangle, and in the Six-Party Talks, Sino-U.S. consensus from late 2006 left South Korea on the periphery. Only by maneuvering for leverage with Pyongyang did Roh hope to raise his country’s voice, and he rested his prospects on a lastditch summit with Kim Jong-il. Many in South Korea expected little impact on nuclear disarmament from the summit, charging that it had more to do with the December elections and North Korea’s desire to keep a progressive in office and prevent a conservative from replacing him, but they also accepted the need for further engagement as long as the concessions were not one-sided. The Transition from Chun Doo-hwan to Roh Tae-Woo Three fundamental transformations occurred from the early 1980s to the early 1990s in South Korea’s position in Northeast Asia. First, foreign policy shifted from a military dictatorship’s narrowly purposeful pursuit of regime support and rapid growth in exports to a democratic nation’s exploration of national identity with varied regional options. Second, the regional economic environment rapidly switched from a supplicant’s plea for assistance from more established economies focusing on Japan, to a confident host of the Summer Olympics projecting its own economic vitality into newly accessible surrounding areas struggling to establish their own market systems and opening to the outside world. Finally, the regional security environment lost its cold war frostiness, creating an inviting playing field for South Korean diplomacy without removing the inherent tensions of an armed standoff in a divided country, one side of which had the demeanor of a failed, abandoned state desperate for regime survival. Chun consolidated power under the weight of a “moral debt” for his brutal betrayal of popular aspirations and of an economic downturn that could undercut his rule. He needed the United States for legitimacy and Japan for economic recovery. For a time, South Korea was deepening its dependency in a polarized environment. Yet, stabilizing his control, Chun capitalized on the dominant inf luence of these two states in Southeast Asia to make a breakout tour of the region, focusing on energy security and resource acquisition and proclaiming “SouthSouth cooperation.” The South clearly pulled far ahead of the North in their strategic and economic competition. Preparations for the Asian Games in 1986 and the first truly global Olympics since 1976 after two successive boycotts opened the door to business-like contacts with

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China and the Soviet Union. In short, a firm foundation was built for bold diplomacy aimed at regional reordering. The United States was more tolerant of separate initiatives as confidence in Mikhail Gorbachev grew, Japan was more eager for support as it contemplated regional leadership initiatives, and China as well as the Soviet Union had more need of a new economic partner. Chun could capitalize on his country’s new opportunities. Eagerness for new economic opportunities drove Korean business groups and a supportive state to look to the continent. As the “Han river economic miracle” continued to integrate Korea’s economy with those of its two principal partners, the United States and Japan, at the high end of the economic scale, a country just entering the ranks of the advanced capitalist nations found great advantage in integrating with China above all at the low end of the scale. Great optimism about prospects followed by a stunning rise in trade as early as the second half of the 1980s kept raising the profile of China. Chun viewed China mainly for its economic prospects, but Roh Tae-woo broadened the vision to include normalization of relations and a new regional, political environment for facing North Korea, adding to the sense that 1988 was South Korea’s strategic turning point. After decades of unchecked rulers cultivating anticommunist nationalism, the success of the democratic movement left uncertain how skeptical young people and pragmatic diplomats eager to explore ties with communist-led states would now adjust. Resentment among young people over the U.S. failure to condemn Chun Doo-hwan for the Gwangju massacre and to provide support for the democracy movement contributed to the search for other partners. Yet, under Roh Tae-woo, there was no sharp break with past foreign policy. Even Chun would have welcomed nordpolitik and the necessary shift toward coexistence with the North, while conservative elites stayed close to the United States and reminded Japan of the distrust it could engender by moving independently toward a deal with North Korea. The new continental strategy kept the old maritime ties as a given, coordinating closely with Washington even as the pace of change accelerated. Yet, Roh did not need the United States as much as his predecessors had; he listened to China’s advice in offering to coexist with North Korea and took a fresh look around. Roh’s July 7, 1988 roadmap for regional transformation symbolized the turning point in strategic thinking. It envisioned three stages: first, overall opening to socialist countries; second, normalization with China and the Soviet Union; and third, a summit with North Korea. Economic

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power would become the means to political breakthroughs. The United States’ reconciliation with the Soviet Union and China’s all-out advance into the global economy made this turnabout possible. In the 1989 Sino-Soviet normalization, China’s growing need for regional partners due to its isolation after June 4, and the collapse of the socialist bloc all served Roh’s objectives. Public debate on foreign policy was minimal. He did not have to worry about moral revulsion over China’s brutality or abandonment of Taiwan as a partner. He could conduct secret diplomacy through the Korean CIA to Moscow and through corporate leaders with close personal ties to Beijing. Although no summit with Kim Il-sung ensued, he was able to achieve simultaneous entry into the United Nations of the two Koreas, and direct talks that in 1991 produced the Basic Agreement. A new psyche arose of Seoul at the center, bringing a diverse region together while democratizing and entering the club of developed, market economies. Roh was an unpopular president targeted by progressives and conservatives alike and never able to escape the shadow of being Chun’s heir, winning due to Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung splitting most of the vote, and becoming enmeshed in scandal as part of a legacy of corruption. He lacked charisma and appeared weak. His inability to rally the public behind new strategic goals left the two extremes of the political spectrum little inclined to seek reconciliation in the following years. Yet, the fact that he may not be appreciated does not diminish his strategic accomplishments. Perhaps, the times made the man, as he seized opportunities to transform South Korea’s place in Northeast Asia. The Kim Young-sam Period The euphoria of dual normalization, bringing abandonment of North Korea by its principal military partner and economic integration with the world’s fastest growing manufacturing juggernaut, left unclear what strategic goals should follow. Kim Young-sam took office with the intention to consolidate what already had been accomplished, but that did not exclude bold plans combining globalization, diplomatic diversification, and some overtures to North Korea. His approach was well suited to the harmonious image of entering the post–cold war and post– Soviet Union era. Yet, he did not have the luxury of regional stability. North Korea provoked the first nuclear crisis in 1993, and Kim’s strategic thinking had to concentrate on how to respond while working with others.

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Kim’s ties to the Clinton administration advanced unevenly. It took the nuclear crisis to remove the danger of a U.S. troop pullout from the peninsula. Intense pressure for trade and financial liberalization subsided only slowly, but the Asian financial crisis left Kim scrambling to meet IMF requirements that were much more resented. As U.S. talks proceeded with North Korea over the crisis, Kim made demands that added to the tensions. Resentment at being stuck with most of the bill for the Agreed Framework further rankled South Korean leaders. U.S. agreement to accept China as one of four parties in new talks involving the Koreas was approved with reluctance after the North Korean demand for bilateral talks with the United States met joint rejection by Seoul and Washington The makeshift character of U.S. regional policies only compounded a lack of consistency in Kim Young-sam’s approaches to the various countries involved. Responses to North Korea helped to sort out Seoul’s options for diversification of diplomatic ties. Russia seemed irrelevant and resentful at its exclusion from crisis talks and construction of nuclear reactors promised to the North. Its failure to start repaying South Korean loans followed by the suspension of further loans left a bad aftertaste only aggravated by Seoul’s loss of interest. The crisis suggested that Russia had no further role to play, having lost its influence over the North and lost its way economically and even in foreign policy. Japan did not seem to be a player in the crisis either, as hopes for a new era in relations, fueled by non-Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) leaders more forthcoming with apologies, met similar frustrations to hopes that had been placed on Russia to inf luence the North. Kim Young-sam’s testy responses to perceived affronts related to historical issues and lack of coordination of humanitarian rice assistance to North Korea even went so far as a desire to teach Japan a lesson, seen in the united front with Jiang Zemin at a news conference in Seoul where both blamed Japan for its attitude toward history. Happening just as U.S.-Japan ties were strengthening and tensions were mounting between China and both of these states, this hardly served a strategic purpose. Kim’s sudden aboutface in the fall of 1997 in turning in desperation to Japan to extend large amounts of credit and allow the South to avoid the clutches of the IMF ended in failure when it might have dramatically upgraded relations. Diversification of foreign relations increasingly focused on China, where economic ties were booming. Kim articulated appealing and promising concepts, but he found it hard to put them into practice. Seoul was buffeted by forces beyond its control and for which it was little prepared. It tried to enlist China’s

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help in influencing North Korea during the first nuclear crisis, but China refused to become involved, unwilling to pressure the North even if the United States contemplated an attack on its nuclear facilities. After the Agreed Framework was reached as the North sank deeply into famine without sign of yielding on reform, Seoul again was stymied on how to move forward. Yet, now that Beijing in the four-party talks had appeared to join Washington and Seoul in a line-up of three versus one to prod Pyongyang to open its doors, Kim had more reason to expand cooperation. In the mid-1990s, it also became clear that new divides would delay the pursuit of regionalism in Northeast Asia; the United States and China were struggling anew over Taiwan’s quest for independence, and Sino-Japanese relations had begun a sharp descent over nationalism. Cautious diplomacy from Seoul could not ameliorate these tensions, but at least it was not doing any harm, as others made earnest efforts to reverse the tide. The establishment of ASEAN 1 3 bringing Seoul together with Tokyo and Beijing in a new forum kept alive hopes for multisided diplomacy to supplement the U.S. alliance. The Kim Dae-jung Period Just when South Korea seemed to be at its nadir with few diplomatic options and a financial crisis that left it at the mercy of the international community, Kim Dae-jung took the reins of power and went on the offense. He made use of an unusual alignment of reconciling forces. The United States and North Korea were seeking common ground: the Perry mission in 1999 succeeded in reaching an agreement on a freeze in missile tests as part of a new effort to stabilize and even normalize relations. Chinese and Japanese leaders were trying before the setback from Jiang Zemin’s visit to Japan in 1998 and even more afterward to put relations back on a forward-looking track, finding the new venue of ASEAN 1 3 to serve their purposes but having some need for a third party to serve as intermediary. Seizing these opportunities, Kim Daejung set a policy course supported by a fundamentally different strategic calculus. He realized considerable success for more than two years, but his own overeagerness and a suddenly altered external environment for which his approach was unsuited led to a regional impasse. Kim Dae-jung entered office relying on the United States and Japan in order to meet the demands of the IMF to resolve the financial crisis. Yet, as recovery became evident, his passion for the Sunshine Policy led him to turn to China, which more than the United States accepted

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earnest engagement between the two Koreas, seen in the June 15, 2000, summit’s use of the expression “self-reliant, peaceful unification.” In contrast to previous presidents who stuck closely to their sole ally, he made China as well as the United States one of Seoul’s overarching policy priorities. From late 1999, this move led Beijing to broker the arrangements for an historic summit, and a follow-up attempt in 2001 to bypass the new Bush administration’s reluctance aimed to keep ties with Pyongyang moving forward. Beijing proved hesitant to become so involved, insisting that it lacked leverage on Pyongyang. If Kim hinted at further upgrading strategic ties with Beijing, even suggesting in Hong Kong starting a security forum with it amid rumors that new military relations would become institutionalized beyond naval port calls and mutual visits of defense ministers, he pulled back in the face of obvious concern in Washington. The reality of regional security is that South Korea cannot bypass its alliance partner. Kim Dae-jung fell short of success at political reconciliation inside South Korea, although he came from a different background than his predecessors, regionally and as a representative of progressive forces. In fact, through his secret generosity to Kim Jong-il in order to realize the summit and the exuberant enthusiasm toward the North that he showed little interest in controlling, he energized the progressive camp without calming the concerns of the conservatives, especially its foreign policy elite. In a position of great autonomous power, he did not take care to steer the process he had unleashed, as his own popularity slipped and his lame-duck status started early. Recognizing that rallying all of the powers active in the region was the best basis for pursuing reconciliation with the North, Kim did a better job of this than any president of South Korea had done. But beginning in 2001, he found it difficult to manage Bush’s suspicions of his Sunshine Policy, Koizumi’s neglect of historical reassurances, and Putin’s vigorous wooing of Kim Jong-il through three summits in three years. No longer able to coordinate regional actors, he also had little hope of reinvigorating inter-Korean engagement. Having devoted so much energy to winning the trust of Kim Jong-il and failing at that, he was unsuccessful in clarifying a balanced approach to reunification with restraint. The secret funding to North Korea in 2000 may have been kept from the Clinton administration and not deterred its own follow-up engagement of the North, but when it came into the open along with the one-sided impact of the Gumgang mountain tourism dollars f lowing to the North, there was a breach of trust in the alliance despite its continued

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importance as the anchor in facing the North’s inclination to brinkmanship. In turn, although in 2002 Koizumi was making his own overtures, a fundamental divide was widening between Seoul and Tokyo in dealing with Kim Jong-il. Kim Dae-jung’s reliance on Beijing was growing. His encouragement of Putin’s North Korean gambit and regional policies also did not preserve a favorable great power balance. However difficult the final years of his presidency were for steering a stable course, he left a legacy of frustration raising hopes that Seoul could steer the region while managing Pyongyang without clarity about the direction that should be carefully followed in coordinating the various powers. The Roh Moo-hyun Period Roh came to office more eager to boost his generation of eager backers than to achieve political reconciliation with conservatives. His was a partisan administration that grew more so after a failed impeachment attempt against him led to the stunning electoral success of his favored Uri party in the April 2004 National Assembly elections. Above all, in his pursuit of North Korea without at times insisting on reciprocity, he split public reactions and the political establishment, undermining prospects for consensus. Yet, he faced an external environment that made it hard to navigate between Bush’s unilateralism and Kim Jong-il’s determination to play his “nuclear card” to its fullest extent. Roh’s overreaction to Japan in 2005 was a blow to the proven strategy of building closer ties with all of the regional powers as the starting point in dealing with the North. Unable to reestablish trust with Koizumi or his successors Abe Shinzo and Fukuda Yasuo, Roh thereafter lacked a full-fledged regional strategy. His moves toward the North generally occurred in isolation from those of other states, reducing their effectiveness. In the summer of 2005 and the first months of 2007, there was a greater level of coordination with better results as the United States changed directions and explored a compromise approach, but Roh’s impatience soon showed again as he tried to seize the initiative with Kim Jong-il. The boldest strategic concept raised by Roh was his call, most often attributed to a speech on February 24, 2005, for South Korea to become a “balancer” in Northeast Asia. There was much debate on his motives and the degree that this was a realistic move in the circumstances facing the country. Those who found merit in the term suggested that it is rooted in discussions among Roh’s advisors from the second half

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of 2004 in search of a future vision and in ref lections on more than a hundred years of Korean history marked by frictions among great powers striving for hegemony in which the peninsula served as a pawn in their efforts. In contrast, critics charged that it was based on an inf lated view of South Korea’s national power as if it could assume an intermediary role between the United States and China as they have trouble finding common ground for a new order in Northeast Asia. In fact, hasty mention of the term without clarification followed by desperate e-mail requests to get scholars and officials to explain the concept suggests that Roh was unprepared and even unprofessional in provoking other states with no sign of strategic advantage. Having been seen as contributing to a downturn in relations with Japan as well as the United States, the term was little used after the first half of 2005; yet, an aftertaste endured. With poor coordination over the Six-Party Talks and a boycott of Koizumi over his historical transgressions, the image stuck of Roh as impatient to make Seoul an autonomous force. In its daring, his rhetoric could be regarded as the biggest strategic gambit, exceeding nordpolitik and the Sunshine Policy in reaching beyond alliance ties and making shaky assumptions about Pyongyang’s willingness to change. Not to be out of step with other states, Roh suspended rice and fertilizer assistance to the North after its provocative actions in the second half of 2006 led to United Nations Security Council votes in favor of sanctions. When the February 2007 deal was reached, Roh rushed to reinvigorate inter-Korean talks while facing the challenge of resuming humanitarian aid and economic assistance in a manner that would keep pressure on the North to denuclearize while also enticing it toward reunification. The timing would test relations with the United States and Japan, both wary of hasty rewards that could take the pressure off the North, and China and Russia, both eager to offer ample incentives to the North to keep it engaged in talks and compromise moves. In advance of the presidential elections in December 2007, Roh was impatient to lock in an inter-Korean reconciliation process, angling for a summit to revive the momentum established with the summit of 2000. Yet, unilateral moves could be disruptive of the multilateral coordination needed for the Six-Party Talks to advance, of alliance ties with the United States, and of relations with Japan at the other end of the spectrum in its doubts about the new deal and its reluctance to resume assistance to the North. After plans for the summit were made public in early August, there was much discussion of what Roh intended to offer and the strategic wisdom of this initiative so close to the date of the

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presidential election and in the shadow of critical watersheds in Phase 2 of the implementation of the Joint Agreement. A persistent problem was balancing the alliance with the United States and reunification moves toward the North. Having aroused anti-Americanism in his election in 2002 and caused dismay by his trial balloons before taking office, Roh found it difficult to stay in synch with Bush in the context of the Six-Party Talks: in late 2004 and the first months of 2005, as Bush failed to turn toward a more moderate approach, Roh proved unreliable; from the fall of 2005 through the spring of 2006, he was insufficiently insistent on tough conditionality for engagement of Kim Jong-il, arousing distrust; and after the February 13 Joint Agreement, he showed impatience without necessarily recognizing his country’s limits in leading Northeast Asia or striving to build consensus. After the February 2007 Joint Agreement, the foremost challenge was to walk a tightrope between five versus one to keep the Six-Party Talks focused on denuclearization, essential for the United States, Japan, and even China, and six building a cooperative future together, required to show North Korea the benefits of normalization in its foreign relations and of economic and energy assistance. When Kim Jong-il delayed shutting down his nuclear reactor in the spring of 2007, Roh withheld shipments of rice. This met his obligations as part of five versus one. Yet, when Kim agreed to test runs on the two rail lines crossing the DMZ, Roh sent substantial materials to reinvigorate light industry in the North, raising doubts among those insistent on maintaining the pressure on Kim. Roh’s toughest challenges were still to come as more deadlines loomed for the North to fulfill its obligations and rewards for holding an inter-Korean summit might not speed denuclearization, as Roh suggested, but instead might take the pressure off a state bent on staying nuclear. Lee Myung-bak and the GNP appealed to Roh, if he was determined to go ahead with the summit, to concentrate on humanitarian issues and supportive steps toward denuclearization through the Six-Party Talks, and not to try to commit his successor to massive economic assistance without sufficient conditionality or to lower the South’s guard with claims of peace at hand before confidencebuilding measures are undertaken. In February 2007, five working groups of the Six-Party Talks began to function, and after completion of the first phase of the Joint Agreement, these groups gained more momentum in August. Roh’s approach was put to a stern test, again putting a premium on farsighted strategic thinking. One working group focused on denuclearization and another on economic assistance and energy for the North,

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not easily kept in synch. A third group faced with forging a lasting multilateral security framework for the region would have to await progress in the two normalization groups of the United States and Japan, respectively, meeting with North Korea. As the driving force in the assistance group and also active in ministerial-level meetings and planning a summit with the North, the South would need to time its moves carefully to realize strategic advantage. Its actions have serious consequences for relations with the United States and Japan and for managing the North at a critical moment for the entire region. The sharp split between progressives and conservatives, exacerbated in a time of campaigning for president, did not bode well for reaching consensus and following a measured strategic approach. But after his election victory Lee Myung-bak made clear that he would lead his country by supporting further engagement with the North dependent on its willingness to denuclearize and based on increased coordination with the United States. The United States as a Factor in South Korean Strategic Thinking toward Asia If no ally of the United States has, over a long time span, been more limited in its foreign policy options than South Korea, it may be that no ally has had so little rapport with the United States in recent years. European allies had each other as well as multiple options through their own ties to the Soviet Union and powers around the world, as seen in independent diplomacy toward China before the Sino-U.S. breakthrough in 1972. Japan grew strong enough economically and could cite both constitutional limitations and formidable leftist opposition to restrain U.S. pressure. South Korea’s dependency went deeper: the nature of the North Korean threat, the presence of large numbers of U.S. forces deployed along a tense border, the dearth of options in dealing with China and the Soviet Union until the 1990s, and the legacy of suspicion toward Japan despite its existence as the only real option in the region. More recently, North Korea’s decision to play for high stakes with its “nuclear card” has again limited the South’s prospects for operating independently of the United States. Even as Seoul struggles to gain more leverage, the need for a secure alliance continues to place severe limits on its choices. Oddly, relations between the leaders of South Korea and the United States usually remained troubled in comparison to other ties with allies. Presidents of South Korea were not successful in projecting a personal

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image before the American public. They did not gain the stature of some of Japan’s prime ministers as valued partners. Moreover, in spite of the greater attention given to problems in U.S.-Japanese relations related to the trade gap, the problems complicating U.S.-South Korean relations were more damaging to bilateral trust. Some past troubles could be traced to the fact that one was democratic, the other a dictatorship. Others ref lected different assessments of how best to meet the North Korean threat. The trade gap became an issue, albeit on a smaller scale than the U.S. gap with Japan. Additionally, contrasts in negotiating style left one side or the other upset; even when an agreement was reached the aftertaste could reduce trust and complicate the next phase of negotiations. Apart from a few years at wide intervals, the objective need for a strong overall alliance and close formal military ties presented a facade that hid what were troubled diplomatic dealings. Koreans were quick to perceive more victimization; Americans paying attention saw exaggerated nationalism. When relations seemed to be at their best, short-term factors operated, which could actually obscure deepening long-term divisions. One such situation existed in the early 1980s when Ronald Reagan and the U.S. ambassador embraced Chun Doo-hwan so fully that Korean opponents of his renewed military dictatorship, including the massacre of many students at Gwangju in 1980, doubted America’s support for the values of democracy and human rights. Ignoring the opposition leaders, including Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, the United States narrowly defined bilateral relations as opposition to the Soviet Union as well as North Korea without preparing for a political transition in the South. This United States’ failure to develop a regional strategy beyond anti-Soviet containment brought a temporary upswing in ties between leaders at the cost of long-term trust between peoples, arousing antiAmerican sentiment. The end of the cold war produced a second upswing in relations, as both ideology and engagement in Asia drew the two countries closer. Yet, even diligent diplomacy was insufficient in the face of more open anti-Americanism directed in part at Roh Tae-woo, who as a military man could not escape association with his predecessor. With China orchestrating a shift in the South’s approach to North Korea toward peaceful coexistence and joint entry into the United Nations in 1991 (prerequisites for normalization of ties with China), even U.S. support for nordpolitik aimed at reconciliation with communist countries and those that had just broken free would not suffice to keep strategies toward Asia heading in the same direction. Just as the democratization

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movement in 1986–87 exposed the shortsightedness of the Reagan approach, the North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993–94 demonstrated that the George H.W. Bush approach was inadequate. In this crisis during the first years of Bill Clinton’s presidency, Kim Young-sam’s insistent demands that the United States hand over position papers in advance of U.S.-North Korean talks and that he be given a veto over its policy strained diplomatic management by professionals on both sides. Along with American pressure to open its economy rapidly—later blamed by South Koreans as one cause of the 1997 financial crisis—, lack of clarity over security interests hobbled cooperation. The third example of apparent improvement in U.S.-South Korean relations came in 1998–2000 when Bill Clinton and Kim Dae-jung rallied around common objectives, especially the Sunshine Policy. With each facing hostile conservative opposition at home toward engaging North Korea, they reinforced each other’s decisions to move boldly ahead. If the North Korean Taepodong missile test in August 1998 aroused some division that took the Perry process about a year to overcome, and the June 2000 summit raised doubts in Washington about whether Kim was moving too fast, Clinton and the State Department’s top leadership lionized Kim Dae-jung and his achievements. This too proved short-lived, not only because George W. Bush’s suspicions of Kim abruptly changed the American approach but also due to one-sided concessions to the North that inadequately tested its intentions. This third “honeymoon” in bilateral relations was no more sustainable than the previous two. The nuclear crisis that erupted in 2002 may have been avoided by more continuity in American policy and sensitivity to multilateralism, but there is ample reason to conclude that the rush for reconciliation on the peninsula with U.S. blessing required some corrective. Even when Washington and Seoul drew closer around a common regional policy, the results proved unsatisfactory. The attention of the United States to South Korea’s long-term trends and interests was inadequate, and South Korean leadership failed to recognize the need to reassure the American political elite with its values and concerns rather than just to cater to the predilections of the current president. For Washington, Seoul was never a high priority as attention easily turned elsewhere, such as the Persian Gulf War in 1991 and the Iraq War in 2003. Even for Seoul, building lasting trust with its only ally did not achieve sufficient priority, especially in the Roh Moo-hyun era. In the background, behind the search for new South Korean strategic thinking toward Asia loomed a critical but often troubled and asymmetrical

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alliance with a superpower that was more concerned with the major powers in the region. Problems in strategizing about the alliance became more apparent as the South’s options grew more diverse and as ties to the North were changing. After the election of Lee Myung-bak, his advisors left no doubt about the increased priority for relations with the United States made easier by the latter’s conciliatory posture in the Six-Party Talks as long as the North proceeded with denuclearization. They called for a “trust-based alliance,” a “values-based alliance” based on joint support for democracy and a market economy, and a “peace-building alliance” targeting both the Korean peninsula and the world. A binational “wisemen’s group” began planning for an early summit after the inauguration and a leap forward in strategic coordination as well as a better atmosphere for ratification of the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) that was concluded in the spring of 2007. With Fukuda and Lee eager to repair ties between their countries, prospects for triangular cooperation were also improving. Forces of Change in Strategic Thinking The past quarter century has seen both conservative and progressive leaders in Seoul seek ways to gain leverage in regional relations. If the latter were more insistent on breaking free of dependency, even the former found it advantageous to add more options. Japan became an alternative source of funds, but it was too associated with historical misconduct and with U.S. foreign policy, to be taken seriously in the search for more diversity. In the fall of 1997, it missed a rare opportunity in the financial crisis to become a kind of savior in place of the IMF, and after 1998, it hastened its own slippage despite the breakthrough agreement with Kim Dae-jung by stubbornly putting historical issues in the foreground. North Korea too had a chance of dealing directly with the South in ways that could have bypassed the United States; however it kept insisting that the latter was its real target on political and security matters, relegating the former to a humanitarian role and limited economic and cultural ties incapable of giving it a leadership role. Only China emerged as a serious alternative to dependency on the United States, but this occurred gradually and is too limited to allow for balanced relations. China’s significance has been rising for two decades. It has become the number one economic partner of South Korea and is pulling further ahead of other partners. In the nuclear crisis, China has agreed to take

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a central role, sharing leadership in dealing with North Korea with the United States and encouraging South Koreans to value its similar approach as well as essential contribution. In the pursuit of regionalism, as in ASEAN 1 3 where the United States is absent, China gained an equal status with Japan as a partner and then proceeded to take regionalism more seriously and make South Korea more reliant on its initiatives and more in sympathy with its thinking. The continued rise of China promises to add further balance to Seoul’s calculations on great power connections for realizing regional goals; yet, as long as Pyongyang keeps relying on military pressure to make its weight felt, strategic thinking in Seoul is likely to be focused on Washington. In addition, by making Goguryo an historical flashpoint with ramifications for future reunification diplomacy, China has aroused distrust that is likely to linger. The outcome of the nuclear crisis could have far-reaching consequences for South Korean strategic rethinking. If the North were to remain a nuclear state and be accepted in the region, some in the South might be inclined to make some accommodation that could lessen reliance on the United States. Yet, should the Six-Party Talks break down and leave the North more isolated and disruptive as a pariah state, the adjustment could well be to draw closer to the United States. Finally, if a multilateral approach continues to gain momentum with the prospect of a mixture of carrots and sticks to keep the North in line as the Six-Party Talks kept going, then interest in regionalism, working closely with all of the others, might be enhanced. The nuclear issue has been a powerful force since 1993 affecting strategic thinking, and it is likely to remain so in the near future. We should not neglect soft power as a factor that could exert impact on strategic thinking too. The Korean wave phenomenon of popular culture drawing rave interest in the region bodes well for South Korea’s potential to become a magnet for its neighbors. Its political leaders might also take advantage of the fact that Japan’s narrow historical outlook and often excessive reaction to China’s rise as well as China’s authoritarian image and potential to arouse fears of hegemony put South Korea in the enviable spot of being the least suspect of the core states in Northeast Asia. Skillful diplomacy may allow it scope to capitalize on its superior image. Finally, it is necessary to recognize the importance of presidential elections in shaping strategic thought. Replacement of an uncompromising progressive such as Roh Moo-hyun with a strong conservative voice is clearly bound to produce major changes in a state deeply divided

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in worldview. The turning points in 1988 and 1998 can be traced in part to shifts in the type of political leadership governing the country, and another shift in 2008 can be expected, especially if the Six-Party Talks reach an impasse. Within limits imposed by the region’s geopolitical realities, Seoul has room to make critical choices for altering its strategic environment. Lessons for Strategic Thinking Strategic thinking poses a unique challenge for South Korea for the following reasons. First, it is the world’s only divided country where a single nationality with strong historical roots as a unified state has long faced a danger of devastating inter-Korean war. This confuses the meaning of nationalism and leads to rapid shifts in views of reunification. Second, South Korea has an unparalleled location at the crossroads of four great powers, each with an assertive position about its place in the region and deep sensitivities about any loss of inf luence on the peninsula. Its situation is ripe for strategic maneuvering by others and, as its own claims to power have risen, by itself too. Third, South Korea, in 1950–53 and again from 2002, found itself on the front line in a polarized world. In the first case, the rules for the cold war were being tested, and in the second, the rules for nuclear weapons possession and the prevention of proliferation were on the line in a new war against terrorism and threats with WMD. Fourth, because strategic thinking becomes intertwined with historical legacies and territorial claims, the fact that Northeast Asian states are burdened with consciousness of deep division over Japan’s conduct in the first half of the twentieth century and some further distrust over the legacy of communism in the second half makes South Korea’s task more difficult. Historical symbols such as the Yasukuni Shrine contribute to emotionalism at home and elsewhere in Asia that can obstruct forward-looking strategic calculations. We draw the following six lessons from the quarter century of strategizing in South Korea about Northeast Asia. First, political reconciliation at home is a cornerstone for a clear, consistent strategy. Regional, generational, and institutional divisions—all a residue of the cold war divides that were left to fester—have not been bridged, as each new president with the immense power vested in this office brusquely sets a distinct course while stumbling in forging a broad coalition. Overcoming the divides left through the cold war looms as one of the principal challenges, especially difficult in a nation still split by the DMZ, for improved strategic foresight.

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Second, successive experiences since nordpolitik demonstrate that reentering Asia in the fullest sense, including reconciliation with Japan, is a critical precondition for a well-conceived strategic approach to reunification. This means reconciling the special alliance ties to the United States with the geographical realities of a state sandwiched between three great powers of Asia. Given Japan’s incomplete reentry into Asia, China’s uncertain leadership aspirations in the region, and Russia’s unrealized longing for recognition as a full member of the club, South Korea cannot expect smooth or quick resolution of its own quest for clarity about how it fits into the evolving Northeast Asia regional complex. Third, however unchallenged reunification remains as a long-term goal, strategic thinking requires that it be approached with sober recognition of the hurdles ahead. It must be kept in context, putting security concerns first and striving in various ways for synchronization of the different lines of engagement toward the North in light of reciprocal actions and region-wide developments. Fourth, for the near future at least, the alliance with the United States stands as the foundation for relations with North Korea and a significant factor in shaping ties with others in Northeast Asia. This foundation should not be undermined, although the United States also must not be given a veto regardless of the circumstances. When U.S. policy fails to suit South Korean national interests, quiet means of registering dissatisfaction are preferable. If initiatives might damage U.S. ties, cautious restraint in how to proceed is sensible. The alliance must change, inevitably losing some of its significance, but it would be nothing short of strategic shortsightedness to undercut it when its role remains essential. Fifth, South Korea must keep its eyes on the East Asian core triangle, managing the Sino-Japanese rivalry as the pivotal third party but attentive to the limitations of a middle power caught between two assertive great powers. As the heir to the Sinocentric legacy and a country that stresses “respect” and censorship in coverage of critical foreign affairs themes, China’s sensitivity to criticism suggests prudence in dealing with it. As the successor to imperial Japan’s colonial rule and a country inclined toward “revisionist” talk about its past role in Asia, Japan’s insensitivity also demands prudence on matters of considerable emotional appeal to South Koreans. Shaping this triangle will not be easy, but it is becoming increasingly important. Finally, we recognize the enduring appeal of championing regionalism, building consensus toward multilateralism. This is likely to be a

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priority for any president of South Korea, given the presence of four assertive great powers and the complicated problems of achieving reconciliation, let alone, reunification on the peninsula. Strategic thinking will no doubt incorporate this objective, but doing so without succumbing to idealism over how to proceed means keeping the above five objectives clearly in mind. Given these daunting challenges, Lee Myung-bak is starting by advocating a “creative, pragmatic diplomacy-security policy.” In order to achieve the long-standing goal of “peace and stability” on the peninsula, his basic plan is “denuclearization, opening (liberalizing North Korea’s economy), and then upgrading its per capita income to $3,000 over ten years.” At the same time as global standards are applied to the North, the foremost priority will be to strengthen the “strategic alliance” with the United States, highlighting its usefulness for the national interest. Another objective is to develop a “greater Asian diplomacy,” leading to the expansion of an “Asian cooperative network” based on open regionalism. As a starting point, reconciliation is sought with Japan on the basis of renewed and deeper trilateral cooperation involving the United States. A new energy diplomacy is also planned, including an “energy frontier strategy” to secure future resources. This pragmatism toward Russia and Central Asia, however, may conf lict with an emphasis on “liberal-democratic” values. In recognition of culture as an “indelible component” of his foreign policy, Lee aspires to build a “soft, strong power,” especially combining culture and technology into a “creative industry.” Despite these ambitious goals, Lee’s foreign policies will be tested by how he positions his country among the four powers and his implementation of North Korean policy. Realistically, his success depends heavily on what strategic choice the North makes and on regional dynamics mostly beyond his control.

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Chronology

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CHAPTER 2

South Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia in the 1980s Kyudok Hong

T

he most common explanation for the foreign policy of a small or middle-ranked state during the cold war rests on the concept of power: powerful states secure the compliance of small states through the use of coercion as well as rewards.1 David Vital explains that since there is a disparity of military strength between the great and small powers, it is inevitable for the latter to sacrifice their autonomy in making foreign policy. Most realist scholars share Vital’s view that “conflict with a great power is ultimately a conflict over autonomy,” 2 but there is a tendency to underestimate the possibility of a small state being able to shape its own policy independent of external pressure. The basic assumption on the capabilities of small states was not changed by neorealists during the 1980s, who also treated systemic conditions as the fundamental determinant of their behavior and tended to neglect the impact of domestic sociopolitical structure upon the foreign policymaking process and the role of top leaders in making strategic choices. Analyzing key foreign policy decisions of South Korea during the 1980s and looking back to the context in the 1960s–70s provide us with pertinent cases for understanding how leaders of a small/middle state can inf luence the great powers and how they search for strategic alternatives when the great power’s interests no longer converge with theirs. This requires us to identify the main characteristics of South Korea’s foreign policymaking and also the strategic thinking of the leaders who

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responded to both domestic and international challenges. South Korea’s two leaders of the late cold war period, Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, operated in the shadow of Park Chung-hee’s longstanding rule; so we also look back to his legacy. Through comparisons, we take note not only of positive outcomes from their strategic choices but also strategic failures. This study addresses several thematic questions: 1) which was more important, economic growth, or changes in the international system, in shaping Korean strategic thought? 2) in what ways did South Korea enhance its capability and mitigate the asymmetry between larger powers, including through linkages between economics and politics? 3) what was the domestic context for unification proposals posed by Chun and Roh, and how did they inf luence strategic thought toward neighboring states? and 4) how did changes in the South Korea-U.S. alliance relationship affect the strategic thought of Korean leaders toward the region? Among the strategic choices made by leaders in Seoul, this study emphasizes nordpolitik, the comprehensive, successful strategy of Roh best approached through three dimensions; security, economics, and domestic politics. We ask: was it as successful as claimed? If not, why not? And, in this connection, how did it influence the leaders of North Korea in calculating their own strategic choices? Decision-Making Authority and Comparisons of Three Leaders South Korean foreign policy may appear straightforward because few people are involved in policy formulation; yet there are challenges in explaining what kinds of strategic considerations decision makers made and why. While pursuing the strategic goals of legitimacy, national security, and economic development,3 Korean elites based their legitimacy upon what was considered a Confucian code of “making their country wealthy and militarily strong” (buguk kangbyong) as set forth by Park Chung-hee and faithfully followed by his successors. The fact that he came to power through a military coup had direct implications for conducting foreign policy, as did the professional background as military officers of his two successors, who also were extremely sensitive in justifying their hold on power. They had to keep reminding people how dangerous the threat from the North was, and how keeping close ties with the United States under their leadership would bring benefits by improving economic conditions. Particularly Chun and Roh, as rookie politicians, needed to prove that they could achieve strategic goals

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through bold foreign policy initiatives and positive results in areas where Park had not succeeded. The foreign policy decision-making process was consistent with structures in which a strong leader makes every key decision in a monarchical manner. These were leaders “who have both the ability to commit or withhold the resources of the government in foreign affairs; and the power or authority to prevent other entities within government from overtly reversing their position without significant costs.”4 In the 1960s–70s, Park Chung-hee held the power to commit the resources of the nation that could not readily be reversed and to stif le opposition with an iron hand. He was “a predominant leader,” whose personal beliefs as well as desire to reach consensus were major factors that restricted diverse perspectives and open expression of disagreement.5 For the past thirty years, however, South Korea’s policy structure and process has been changing fundamentally. Public opinion became an important component of domestic power as democracy advanced. The opposition groups were rapidly strengthened during the Chun period and their power was hardly controllable by the time Roh became the president in 1987, facing violent demands for open democracy and a more f lexible unification policy. He desperately needed new approaches to preempt their progressive demands and quell their criticism. Despite the fact that the bureaucracy had developed greatly in manpower and professional capability, as a former military officer, he preferred to conduct foreign policy in a secretive manner through his royal advisors without relying on the regular channels. The most useful category for the South Korean policymaking process may be the “royal court” model, in which foreign policymaking is highly centralized in a monarchical mode, dominated by the head of government and his key advisors. 6 Under Park, only a handful of qualified professionals worked relentlessly to serve him and there existed no room for bargaining or compromise with the bureaucracy. No one dared to challenge a presidential decision. In contrast, Chun and Roh were totally dependent upon a professional advisory group who were in charge of foreign and national security affairs. Unlike Park, Chun could not overcome his tarnished image throughout his seven years in office after brutally suppressing the Gwangju uprising in the process of gaining his post. Being handpicked by Chun as his successor in the 1987 presidential election, Roh’s popularity was extremely low from the beginning. Chun and Roh exerted all of their power to assist their key advisors and officials to implement certain policies. Organizational constraints began to appear in making key decisions.

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The issue of strategic autonomy has always been sensitive for Koreans. The role of the United States and the pro-Korean American leaders was critical, particularly in the early Park period when he made decisions to normalize relations with Japan and send troops to Vietnam. However, after Nixon announced his Guam Doctrine in 1969, rising mistrust and inflexibility on the part of the Korean government made it much more difficult for the United States to support Korea as in the past. Jimmy Carter could have attempted to weaken the Park government (or to embrace Park), but instead he chose a course of open criticism and warnings that only irritated it. The United States could still make itself felt in the South Korean political process but not necessarily in ways that enabled it to achieve specific goals, and certainly not in a matter of regime legitimacy to which the South Korean authorities attached vital political importance.7 The confidence between Washington and Seoul was miraculously restored, however, when Ronald Reagan began to change U.S. policy. He invited Chun as the first foreign leader to visit him in the White House and gave him the legitimacy to win the presidential election in February 1981. Chun’s total confidence in Reagan enabled the United States to regain its political influence; yet his dilemma was that he could not remain passive within the U.S. sphere of inf luence when changes in international and national conditions required breaking out of this preoccupation. Chun and Roh were wary of repeating the strategic mistakes of Park in relying exclusively on the United States. Despite a revitalized partnership, radical elements within Korean society began to use anti-American sentiment as a tool to oppose Chun and his authoritarian manner of rule. The decision-maker’s policy choices and strategic thinking were shaped by personal characteristics. Henry Kissinger postulates that leadership types are formed by at least three factors: leaders’ experience during their rise to eminence, the structure in which they operate, and the values of their society.8 He distinguishes between three contemporary leadership types: the bureaucratic-pragmatic type, of which the American elite is the main example; the ideological type, seen in communist states such as the Soviet Union; and the charismatic-revolutionary type, often found in new nations. It is difficult, however, to categorize Park, Chun, and Roh into one of these types. Their foreign policies centered, above all, on the United States; Park was a hybrid “charismaticpragmatic,” Chun was closer to the charismatic type, and Roh may best be labeled as an “opportunistic-pragmatic” leader. Park Chung-hee successfully executed the first coup in Korea’s modern history on May 16, 1961. To obtain support from the United States,

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he expressed strong anticommunist sentiments and sought an image as a practical, pro-American leader. Park repeatedly delivered a message of readiness to fight against communist forces in Vietnam in order to assist the U.S. war efforts. Moreover, he distanced himself from President Syngman Rhee by showing his f lexibility in dealing with Japan. Although Park faced widespread anti-Japanese sentiments at home, he made a bold decision to normalize relations, knowing that his choice would be welcomed as a step toward forging an anticommunist alliance between Japan and Korea. Yet, he skillfully used anti-Japanese feelings in extracting economic concessions whenever he found it necessary to strengthen his bargaining position vis-à-vis Japan. Park was the type of leader who had strongly held views of the world and used incoming information to support his predispositions, choosing advisors who defined problems as he did and who were generally enthusiastic about his ideas. Policymaking under the Chun government was often conducted in a “corporativist” manner, according to Ahn Byung-Joon, meaning, “a type of organization where its members try to cooperate and unite for certain purposes; one of its characteristics is that such cooperation takes place within the organization itself because its hierarchy of command is very strict.” 9 The decision to request a $6 billion loan from Japan ref lects Chun’s leadership style. His advisors argued that Seoul is entitled to such aid by virtue of its contribution to Japan’s security. If they expected that such a request could cause strain between two neighbors, they had to implement the decision, since Chun strongly believed that showing his toughness would pay off. Roh was more sensitive to the opinions of others and to incoming information in the wake of the successful democratization movement. As chairman of the Olympic Committee and minister of sports, he knew how to compromise with those who cast votes. He also showed great interest in collecting sufficient information and intelligence from many different sources before making a decision. Individuals with experience and knowledge in foreign and economic affairs had good access to him. Roh was not regarded as a decisive leader and he often shifted direction as opportunities arose, but people believe that without his softness and ambiguity he would never have had a chance to be nominated as the official candidate to succeed Chun. All of his colleagues who had shown strong personalities and leadership qualities were ousted by Chun in the process of power competition. For Roh Chun was a lifetime companion since his youth at the military academy, about whom he always had mixed feelings, prompting a desire to overcome him by achieving a success in foreign policy, particularly in inter-Korean affairs.

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As for Kissinger’s other two factors shaping leadership types, South Korea’s particular domestic environment ensured an ideological context. The three presidents tried hard to portray themselves as pragmatists but their pragmatism was heavily blended with the ideology of anticommunism. In addition, social values in Korea were changing rapidly from the period of sending troops to Vietnam, when no serious student opposition materialized, to the early 1980s, when Chun failed to persuade the public of the rationale of sending his special forces to Lebanon at the request of the United States. After the Gwangju massacre, anti-Americanism was growing fast and Chun decided not to provoke public animosity against his government. Despite his charisma, Chun’s once forceful role in foreign policy slipped after experiencing the Rangoon bombing and the downing of K AL 007 over Soviet air space in 1983, as he grew more tentative. Paranoia related to excessive fear of abandonment by the United States may have affected strategic thinking too. After experiencing the withdrawal of some American forces from Korea, Park repeatedly mentioned changing South Korea’s foreign policy orientation from dependence on the United States to self-reliance or independence. His strong doubts about United States staying power in East Asia contributed to South Korea’s brief but serious effort to develop its own nuclear capability. Experiencing Kim Il-sung’s frequent attempts at intimidation also left a deep impact on leaders who had spent their professional career in the military before turning to politics. Although they proposed various ideas to Pyongyang for reducing tensions, they never trusted its sincerity and were frustrated by repeated failures. Despite the rhetoric of peaceful coexistence, they turned to a strategy of isolating the North by normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries. Chun and Roh aimed to win the cold war with Pyongyang by using South Korea’s rising economic power. Having barely survived the Rangoon bombing by North Korean agents, Chun resented the regime responsible for killing many of his cabinet members. Although he made various proposals to improve relations, he did not believe in the possibility of North Korea accepting his legitimacy. A “good neighbor policy” toward its communist patrons could, however, cause a diplomatic coup to regain public support and marginalize its inf luence. Changing Dynamics of the International System and Korea’s Economic Rise The most important change during the cold war era was the realignment among the major powers in East Asia resulting from the development of

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relations between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the one hand and the United States and Japan on the other. This gave South Korea an opportunity to seek strategic alternatives. Its first step was to propose Red Cross talks with North Korea on August 12, 1971 in order to reduce tensions and promote communications. Considering the people’s desire to unite their families separated after the Korean War, this could instantly gain popular support, and it was a well-calculated tactical response to the move by Pyongyang six days earlier to include all political parties and social organizations in discussions of peace and unification. Seoul’s step-by-step approach, starting from nonpolitical moves, was much safer than Pyongyang’s position focusing on politicomilitary issues first. After mutual visits of high officials, the two sides finally agreed on a Joint Statement of July 4, 1972, which consisted of three principles: 1) independence and exclusion of external powers; 2) nonuse of force; and 3) national unity transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems. This momentous historical event raised high expectations for unification. The North-South dialogue served Park’s political interests. He hinted that a fundamental restructuring of South Korea’s political system might be necessary in order to carry out the dialogue with Kim Il-sung. Actually, the first principle, “the exclusion of external powers,” was totally inconsistent with Seoul’s long-standing position, but its concession induced Pyongyang to sign the agreement as a platform for demanding an early withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. Park exploited the new development, using the need for strong leadership for managing instability as the main justification for the Yushin (Revitalized Reform) on October 17, 1972, in which he proclaimed martial law and prolonged his presidency indefinitely by using extraconstitutional measures. Park’s initiative toward North Korea was equally aimed at Washington, which had enthusiastically welcomed North-South talks in 1971 in the hope that they would reduce tension on the peninsula. Park argued that his government would be able to continue the talks with Pyongyang more easily and confidently if his modernization program was fully implemented in a speedy manner. Approximately two-thirds of the aid program awaited congressional approval when substantive talks between the two Koreas started in October 1972.10 The second course of action taken by Seoul was to seek official contacts with the PRC and the Soviet Union, hoping that these communist powers might succeed in persuading the North Korean government to accept a formula of cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the major powers. Seoul’s proposal on June 23, 1973 included the

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following: 1) not to oppose North Korea’s participation in international organizations; 2) not to object to the North’s admission into the UN together with the South; and 3) to open its door to all the nations of the world on the basis of the principles of reciprocity and equality. In fact, these points merely acknowledged a fait accompli since North Korea had already been admitted into the World Health Organization in May 1973 and had succeeded in establishing official relations with as many as twelve states including Sweden, Finland, and Norway. What was new, however, was the bold proposal for the simultaneous entry of both Koreas into the UN as full-f ledged members, ref lecting an assessment that reunification remained but a distant goal. However, Pyongyang instantly rejected this proposal on the ground that it made the division of Korea permanent. The open-door policy produced no tangible results but some communist countries including the Soviet Union showed interest in the idea of a two-Korea policy. Fully recognizing the rift between Beijing and Moscow, Seoul considered that Moscow would be interested in countering Beijing’s antiSoviet encirclement campaign in East Asia by stretching a conciliatory hand toward it. In fact, Moscow carefully began to allow nongovernmental contacts and indirect trade with South Korea. In many venues, Soviet delegations did not conceal their interest in a two-Korea policy, while the PRC, due to its close ties to Pyongyang, heavily criticized Seoul’s open-door policy. Seoul’s third course was to pursue strategic autonomy. As soon as Nixon announced a partial withdrawal of ground forces, Park attempted to develop Korea’s own nuclear capability and tried to increase its own defense capabilities by emphasizing self-reliance and military modernization. But his clandestine efforts to become a nuclear power state were frustrated, and personal diplomacy to influence pro-Korean U.S. congressmen and other officials strained the alliance further. The resultant lobbying scandal significantly undermined Seoul’s ability to conduct effective diplomacy. The anxiety felt by South Korean leaders during the Nixon and early Carter administrations gave rise to the realization that U.S.-South Korean relations should not depend heavily upon a particular U.S. administration. In order not to repeat Park’s strategic mistakes, his successors should prepare for the contingency that U.S. security assistance might not be available. Under Chun, a reevaluation of the perennial dependence on the United States was undertaken in light of rapidly changing international circumstances. An important change noticed increasingly in the 1980s was South Korea’s remarkable economic growth, which compelled its leaders to

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look far beyond the United States as well as Japan for exchange and cooperation. Seoul was able to expand its horizon to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Western Europe, South America, and Africa. It needed export markets, manpower outlets, investment sources, and resources for industrial use and consumption. It also sought opportunities for economic exchange with the Soviet Union and China, as it was reducing its heavy economic dependence on the United States. The exportled industrialization and economic modernization strategy came with the assumption that rapid economic dynamism would translate into increased prestige on the international arena. Rising economic power became an effective source of legitimizing the rule of Chun and Roh as well as Park. Chun successfully managed the economic difficulties after Park’s death, securing a stable supply of natural resources and crude oil, diversifying trade partners, and forging ties of economic and technical cooperation with many countries through his economic diplomacy. Later, Roh skillfully used economic resources to achieve foreign-policy objectives by increasing contacts with the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, and finally China. The rapid economic expansion has been the source of self-confidence and assertiveness among the South Korean people in general and officials in particular. Korea became an important emerging market and was treated as a crucial partner for its purchasing power and technological skills. By the early 1980s, the Soviet Union and the PRC realized that South Korea could be a contributing factor in transforming their own economies.11 Depicted as one of Asia’s rising “four small dragons,” Korea was able to take advantage of changes in the international system in which “low politics” were gaining more attention at the expense of “high politics.” The Roh government believed that security requirements would be reduced by these new associations with the socialist governments, removing the military threat from both the Soviet Union and the PRC. Transcending his military past, Roh became a true believer in “transnationalism,” preaching that economic exchanges would reduce long-held prejudices. Key Strategic Decisions under Park Chung-hee Park made two important early strategic choices: sending troops to Vietnam and normalizing relations with Japan. The policies achieved remarkable success and laid the foundation for his successor to reach out to the world by breaking out of the foreign policy preoccupation with the United States. Park spent four years persuading policymakers

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in the United States before he finally won approval from Lyndon Johnson for sending combat forces to Vietnam.12 He understood the possibilities for using this to support his economic development plans, military modernization, and new diplomatic movement.13 A divided state like Korea apparently has fewer options than do other small states in competing for patron powers, but U.S. dependence on its contribution in Vietnam strengthened its bargaining position. Many now agree that successful avoidance of a balance-of-payments crisis through export-oriented industrialization in the early 1970s was due to Park’s early decision on participation in Vietnam. Sending troops for eight and half years proved helpful in mobilizing a surplus for investment and avoiding an oversupply of labor that might slow the pace of development. It is hard to imagine such economic success without considering the impact of Park’s decision to join the war; however, once the United States changed its policy, Park had to change too. The initiative to normalize relations with Japan was no less critical in laying a foundation for Korean foreign policy in the 1980s. The United States was eager for early reconciliation between its two “client states.” Not only would cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo solidify its alliances against communist expansion in Northeast Asia, but it would also lessen the U.S. defense burden in the region. However, Park, who once served as a Japanese army officer, had difficulty reducing anti-Japanese sentiments that deeply penetrated the society after his predecessor Rhee Syngman deliberately drummed up emotions as part of a calculated policy to stabilize his insecure regime. One of his motives for normalization was to stabilize South Korea economically. The military government established an economic planning board and announced an outline of a Five-Year Economic Development Plan for 1962–66, but it did not have the resources to implement this plan. It was hard to convince the United States to offer more aid because Park had failed to fulfill commitments to return the government to civilian control. The normalization opened Korea to Japanese investment, and over the next seven years the Japanese loaned an additional $581.3 million, largely as commercial credit. It gave momentum to efforts to expand foreign relations beyond the United States and also reduced to some extent the heavy economic dependence on one country.14 Key Strategic Decisions under Chun Doo-hwan As president-elect, Reagan invited Chun Doo-hwan to Washington in February 1981, signifying a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy.

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It was a diplomatic coup for Chun since he was not only deeply involved in the Gwangju atrocities of May 1980, but had also ordered the arrest of prominent political figures including Kim Dae-jung on charges of sedition. In total, he dismissed or arrested about 8,000 civil servants, executives of state corporations, and journalists on charges of corruption and shut down 172 journals and newspapers.15 The image of military dictator was bolstered when he forced Choi Kyu-hah to resign the presidency in order to be elected without opposition by the National Conference for Unification on August 27, 1980. Chun’s efforts to win international support on the world stage to boost his image as a capable leader benefited from the renewed cold war after Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979. Reagan wanted to check Soviet expansionism and restore American leadership, seeing South Korea as central to building a loose grouping of friendly powers in East Asia.16 Reagan’s support gave Koreans more self-confidence and even a sense of autonomy. Reagan recognized the strategic value of the Korean peninsula and confirmed that the United States had no plans to withdraw ground troops, showing that he placed security and loyalty ahead of other considerations, including human rights. This gave Chun confidence to pursue foreign policy in other directions, beginning with Pyongyang. Chun delivered a simple, clear message that he would be ready to meet Kim Il-sung anytime, anywhere to discuss unification and humanitarian concerns. Chun soon launched a propaganda campaign toward nonhostile communist countries and nonaligned states, mobilizing the Korean business community to promote the country’s strategic interests overseas. South-South cooperation with resource-rich countries could not have been possible without their active contribution. They were ready to gamble in high-risk areas as the “second engine” for “Korea’s economic take off.”17 When North Korea failed to win endorsement at the foreign ministers’ conference of the nonaligned countries in New Delhi, it was a huge victory for Chun. Chun’s two-week tour of the ASEAN countries in the summer of 1981 also represented a diplomatic coup. His hosts in all five countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines—endorsed not only his proposal for mutual visits and dialogue between the heads of the two Koreas but also the longstanding position on simultaneous admission of the two Koreas to the United Nations. Affirming joint pursuit of common strategic interests, the summits paved the way for expansion of economic and technical cooperation. ASEAN had emerged as a vital source of natural resources, completely meeting the domestic requirements for tin, rubber, and palm

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oil. In addition, the ASEAN countries, which accounted for 76 percent of total timber imports, 49 percent of copper ore, 45 percent of titanium, and 35.2 percent of raw sugar, pledged that the supply of these resources and crude oil would not be interrupted. In return, South Korea pledged to provide technical know-how and trained manpower in such sectors as construction, development of energy resources, manufacturing, and processing. Chun and ASEAN leaders agreed to promote joint ventures, particularly in resource-based industries, and to increase cooperation in fishing and marine transportation. Considering the chronic trade deficit with ASEAN—$348 million in 1980—, these were beneficial moves.18 Pyongyang also dispatched its own delegation headed by Vice Premier Kye Ung-tae to the region after Chun’s successful visit, but it failed. This demonstrated the strategic importance of economic capacity in conducting foreign policy. Chun’s “South-South Cooperation” initiative gave him a political victory at home, showing too that his regime was capable of functioning smoothly without social or political disturbances during his prolonged absence. South Korea’s growing ability to win support in the Third World was demonstrated in September 1981, when the International Olympic Committee chose Seoul rather than Nagoya, Japan as the site of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games. U.S. backing was a significant factor in winning votes from many countries, but Pyongyang did its best to prevent the Games from coming to Seoul. After a Korean commercial airliner carrying 109 passengers was blown out of the sky in 1987 in a terrorist bombing, even officials at Olympic headquarters in Lausanne began to doubt the wisdom of their choice. North Korea also masterminded a boycott of the Games, and when this failed demanded to cohost. The International Olympic Committee eventually offered it a share in hosting five sports. Pyongyang insisted on a minimum of eight and never replied to the IOC’s final offer.19 With Seoul also chosen to host the Asian Games of 1986, Chun was able to use these decisions to expand Seoul’s inf luence abroad and solidify his grip on power at home. In January 1982 South Korea launched a diplomatic offensive focused on reunification policy. In his New Year’s policy statement to the National Assembly on January 22, Chun unveiled a comprehensive proposal for forming a Consultative Conference for National Reunification (CCNR) consisting of representatives of North and South Korea with the aim of drafting a constitution for a unified Korea, the conclusion of a provisional agreement on basic relations between the two Korean

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states, and the establishment of resident liaison missions in each other’s capitals. Chun also reiterated his 1981 proposals for a summit meeting. Chun responded strategically to the North’s diplomatic offensive aimed at exploiting Seoul’s vulnerability in the aftermath of Park’s assassination. After Pyongyang proposed the Democratic Confederated Republic of Koryo (DCRK) as the “most realistic and shortest way to realize Korea’s reunification based on the three principles of independence, peaceful reunification, and great national unity,” Chun countered with a call for a CCNR, saying that the North and South should aim at promoting mutual confidence and trust before normalizing relations. North Korea dismissed Chun’s proposal on January 26, 1981 on the grounds that a peaceful solution would not occur while U.S. ground forces remain on the peninsula and Chun was not a legitimate leader by failing Korea’s democracy. 20 However, Seoul continued to unveil a twenty-point practical action plan for promoting inter-Korean cooperation on February 1, 1981. Interestingly, some of the proposals such as the opening of a Seoul-Pyongyang highway, the joint development of Mt. Gumgang, exchange of mail between separated families, the dispatch of a single team to international sports competitions, and removal of military facilities in the DMZ, eventually were adopted. While Chun was under no illusion that the new proposals would be accepted, he earned high marks from abroad as he also gained confidence in an area where Park had not succeeded in leaving much of a legacy. Having no political experience or skills at first, Chun rapidly acquired them and moved with surprising speed to develop his political base with such achievements. 21 Nordpolitik under Roh Tae-woo After his election, Roh Tae-woo made it clear that he would pursue the goals of international prestige and unification more vigorously, recognizing the global trend in which the dramatic economic dynamism of the 1980s led to pragmatism and abandonment of the ideological blinders of the previous era. Roh presented his foreign policy agenda in a series of statements and policy initiatives during the first year of his presidency in 1988. Although he was elected by popular vote, he still had a hard time distancing himself from his predecessor who was criticized not only by opposition leaders but also by the general public now given its voice. Handpicked by Chun, Roh needed to prove himself capable of leading the country in the new democratic era. As his predecessors, Roh chose foreign policy as the arena for proving his ability,

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pledging to double his efforts to outperform his predecessors in order to silence those harsh critics at home. In the process, he departed from Chun’s strong anticommunist stand in foreign policy. Roh’s f lexibility contributed to arrangements whereby North Korea joined the United Nations together with South Korea in 1991 and the two signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North, the first historical document laying down the basic framework for inter-Korean relations in 1991. 22 A favorable external environment also provided him with an opportunity to achieve remarkable success in establishing political ties with the Soviet Union and the PRC. Mikhail Gorbachev’s new overtures toward the Asia-Pacific from 1986 and the Chinese leaders’ new operational image under Deng Xiaoping opened the door to his success. As Roh assumed the presidency, Gorbachev’s “new thinking” was in full swing. He had achieved path-breaking consensus with Ronald Reagan and was well on the way to ending the cold war in Europe in 1989. In 1988–89 his attention toward Northeast Asia intensified, leading to normalization with China but no breakthrough with Japan. At last, glasnost was making possible open discussion of Korean affairs, bringing into the open reform views sympathetic to South Korea and questioning of the huge costs and negative consequences of relying on North Korea. By putting priority on political ties with Moscow, Roh could take advantage of this reform thinking and on the impasse that resulted when the momentum with China was stalled after June 4, 1989 when it was necessary to keep a distance from a state subject to international sanctions. With Moscow hesitant about Beijing, and Tokyo rather uncompromising to Moscow, Roh made his country the regional diplomatic partner with which Gorbachev could get quick results. As perestroika imperiled the Soviet economic system and the revenues vital to its leader’s prospects, Roh offered vital financial support in return for diplomatic ties. For a few years, the success of nordpolitik as a South Korean strategic achievement led many to contrast it to Japan’s strategic failure with Moscow and Beijing’s inability to advance beyond normalization as Moscow tilted to the West. Given its weak position with Washington and Moscow, Beijing turned to Seoul as the most important partner in its new strategy of improving regional relations. Once having normalized ties with Moscow and shown moderation to Pyongyang in ways that curried favor with China’s leaders, Roh could complete political normalization with Beijing. When Deng Xiaoping at the beginning of 1992 decided to open

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China’s borders to investment and trade with a desire to encourage growth in North and Northeast China as well as the Southeast already in the throes of transformation, South Korea was ideally situated. Exceptional economic complementarity became a lever for another major achievement of Roh’s nordpolitik. The Security Dimension It was a huge challenge for Roh, as host of the 1988 Olympic Games, to conduct a successful world sports event without interruption from North Korea. He did not want to see a boycott by the communist countries for political reasons as had occurred in 1984 at the Los Angeles Games. At least three things were needed. First, U.S. support of Seoul’s efforts to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula had to be maintained, enhancing cooperation to prevent a potential terrorist attack. Second, the Soviet Union and the PRC needed to be encouraged not to boycott and to do their best to encourage North Korea to take part or, at least, not to spoil the event. Roh expected that if he managed the Games smoothly South Korea might proceed to establish official relations with the Soviet Union and China. Third, Seoul must not give Pyongyang an excuse; therefore, it made clear that it had no intention of isolating Pyongyang. In his inaugural address and on other occasions, he stressed that the North is no longer a target of competition, but a partner in building a community together for a better future. 23 He used the concept of cooperative security in order to persuade Pyongyang and other target countries and called for establishing a multilateral security forum of six-parties and adoption of a nonaggression principle in his speech on July 7, 1988 and in his UN speech on October 1, 1988. Such ideas appeared to be too progressive or naïve to most Korean conservatives at the time. Lacking details, his suggestion for security cooperation did not attract serious responses from neighboring powers. The Economic Dimension Economic considerations were important in Roh’s nordpolitik strategy. In 1980, the South’s economy suffered a setback for the first time since the early 1960s, and strategists began to show concern about heavy reliance on two major trading partners, the United States and Japan. In search of diversification of trading partners, Seoul worked hard to penetrate markets in Europe and the Middle East. Yet, interest was growing in the China market for various reasons. By the time Roh became

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president, there was worry that increasing wages already were surpassing productivity gains. Renewed labor disputes could cause large wage hikes, hurting the competitive position of Korean manufacturers and putting a brake on the country’s export-dependent economic growth as it triggered joblessness in the affected factories. 24 Less expensive and fairly productive Chinese labor could allow Korean manufacturers to restructure their production operations. At the time, the business community had keen interest in opening ties with China and other communist countries, where they could shift the production of such basic commodities as textiles. The Soviet Union and China also were interested in expanding economic ties. Mikhail Gorbachev gave a speech on the importance of the Asia-Pacific in Vladivostok in 1986, and intensified his appeal for improving relations in the region, including South Korea, in Krasnoyarsk in 1988. When Roh finally met Gorbachev in San Francisco in June 1990, the Soviet Union requested a loan of $5 billion as a condition for forging diplomatic relations. 25 Seoul compromised with an offer of $3 billion, using its economic clout for the strategic goal of establishing formal relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries. Economic ties with China expanded more quickly. Already in 1988 South Korea had become China’s fourth largest trading partner. In 1991 China signaled a change of policy by shifting its position to support simultaneous entry into the United Nations, opting for Seoul’s two-Korea policy over Pyongyang’s long-standing insistence on a oneKorea policy. China calculated that this change of policy would not only assure Seoul’s economic support, but also provide diplomatic leverage in dealing with North Korea, Taiwan, Japan, and the United States. During Roh’s tenure 631 cases of direct investment in China totaled over $600 million as trade skyrocketed to $4.2 billion during the first half of 1993. 26 Roh also correctly calculated that China would need Korea in order to counter the dominance of Japan, but it was the South’s proven ability to meet China’s economic needs that led to formal political ties. The Domestic Political Dimension Democratization imposed new requirements on the political process including unification policy. Public apprehension at the prospect of a nuclear-armed North Korea also pushed Roh to step up efforts to seek rapprochement. Raising the idea of nordpolitik as a candidate, Roh had pledged that during his five-year tenure, he could establish official

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relations with China. He promised to open the “Era of the West Coast” in which residents of areas generally left behind in development could benefit from economic cooperation. Nordpolitik continued to draw attention as it became a center of debate at the next local elections held in April 1988. Roh’s rosy prognosis and the optimism found in many commentaries at the time served, however, to strengthen the power of many long outside of the political mainstream. They called themselves friends of the minjung (masses) and tested the government’s stance on freedom of speech and freedom of travel to North Korea. 27 They criticized the government’s inconsistent unification policy on the grounds that prohibiting individual contacts and arresting them on charges of sedition are contradictory to the spirit of the proposal made by Roh on July 7, 1988. Rev. Mun Ik-hwan, famous dissident leader, and former lawmaker So Kyung-won went to Pyongyang to meet with Kim Il-sung on March 1989 in protest against Roh. Student activist Yim Su-kyung, who represented Hanchongryon (Federation of Korean University Student Organizations), also visited Pyongyang through a third country in order to participate in the Pyongyang Festival. She instantly became a national hero in North Korea, inspiring anti-Roh demonstrations on university campuses throughout the South. As North Korea exploited their visits, conservatives in the South became increasingly alarmed by threatening transgressions of radicals. Roh had to respond to the conservative reaction by postponing the revision of the National Security Law and canceling scheduled inter-Korean athletic meetings. As these episodes indicate, Roh adopted his policy without consensus, and he did not follow up with institutional changes and legal adjustments. Successful hosting of the Olympic Games, establishing diplomatic relations with communist bloc members, joint entry into the United Nations, and signing the Basic Agreement with Pyongyang were indeed great propaganda victories for Roh, but his popularity did not improve as expected. On the contrary, his policies were challenged more seriously by both the radical left and the conservative right. With the Declaration of July 7, 1988, President Roh pledged not to oppose participation of North Korea in the international arena. This decree served as a variation on West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s ostpolitik and as a successor to Park’s June 23, 1973 Declaration. However, Park did not show any respect to Pyongyang since his statement referred to North Korea as a puppet regime and he hastened to add that, “the taking of these measures does not signify our recognition of North Korea as a state.” 28 Roh’s announcement of nordpolitik contained six major points. The first three concerned inter-Korea relations: promoting exchanges,

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attempting to reunite families, and opening trade contacts. The remaining three were external in nature: approving external ties between its allies and North Korea, abandoning North-South diplomatic competition, and supporting cross-recognition. This entailed increased U.S. and Japanese contacts with North Korea along with increased contacts by South Korea with China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern European countries. Roh was concerned with convincing Pyongyang that he was different from his predecessors and could deliver on his proposals. Park Chul-un, Roh’s special advisor in charge of nordpolitik, acknowledged that prior policy had failed largely because it aimed at isolating Pyongyang and that, in contrast, Roh would keep sending a message that nordpolitik would assist Pyongyang in being recognized by the United States and Japan. Roh and his advisors reminded Pyongyang that their final destination was North Korea, not the Soviet Union and China, as efforts to improve ties to those states intensified. Roh declared nordpolitik to be a new détente to replace old tactics of containment, when he devised it as a tool to improve relations with the three socialist states of Northeast Asia. What kind of strategic assumptions enabled this radical change? At least several underlying motivations were present. First and foremost, Seoul believed that new relations with the Soviet Union and PRC would pressure Pyongyang and bring more favorable conditions for dealing with it. Second, they would be regarded as a diplomatic coup and would certainly help Roh’s standing in domestic politics. In April 1988, his party lost in the local elections, and he focused on foreign policy to reverse his weak position. Third, diplomatic breakthroughs would have a quelling effect on street demonstrations and social discontent. In the year Roh became president, student demonstrations intensified both in frequency and in the number of participants, as protestors appealed to anti-Americanism and the need to investigate former President Chun’s wrongdoings. Fourth, it would help stabilize the peninsula if the Soviet Union and the PRC exerted inf luence in shifting Pyongyang’s aggressive but isolationist attitude to a more cooperative one. Fifth, diversifying the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) economic ties would reduce the heavy dependence on the United States and Japan, while giving business new markets and a chance to use less expensive labor for reducing production costs. Sixth, Roh would fulfill his campaign promise to spread development by forging links across the Yellow Sea. Finally, Roh believed that Seoul could work with the United States in forging a multilateral security system in Northeast Asia, assuming that the United States would not oppose his

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initiative since it was encouraging Russia and China to get further involved in the global market economy. Conclusion Park’s stunning success in transforming a war-torn state into one of the fast-growing newly industrialized countries during his eighteen-year tenure resulted from key strategic decisions, including normalization with Japan. His vision and disciplined governing style gave many Koreans confidence, but he did not understand the way American politics operated and failed to adapt to a changing environment as he kept trying to pressure the United States with emotional pleas and unauthorized ways of lobbying. His greed for power blinded him as he became isolated from new information. His decisions to develop a clandestine nuclear weapons program and to impose the Yushin Constitution by exploiting détente with Pyongyang were examples of strategic failure. Chun worked closely with Amb. Richard L. Walker for five years in a favorable atmosphere resulting from Reagan’s strategic priority for South Korea. He bolstered ties with Southeast Asian states and nonaligned countries, restoring momentum to the economy. He also secured substantial new assistance from Japan as political ties were upgraded. Under Chun, contacts with China began to develop, serving economic ends but also laying the foundation for political gains. Yet, after achieving great success in South-South relations, Chun extended his tour to other countries that seemed unnecessary. Burma was not on the list of original destinations, but he later included it with insufficient regard to the safety of his delegation since it had good relations with Pyongyang and Chun was preoccupied with winning in the diplomatic competition. Roh’s strategic decision to use the Olympic Games and the peace offensive of July 7, 1988 as springboards to expand official relations with Eastern European communist countries was a great success. In the eyes of the world, nordpolitik was the crowning achievement of South Korean strategic thinking over half a century. It brought Seoul diplomatic relations with Moscow and Beijing, furthered extraordinary economic linkages with China that sustained economic development over the next two decades, and established the foundation for multilateral diplomacy long desired by the political elite. Yet, in dealing with Pyongyang, Roh failed to manage the pace of his diplomatic drive by giving an overall impression to the world that he was acting hastily. After a series of success, it seemed that he did not care how his victory

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affected Pyongyang. Despite his repeated pledge not to isolate North Korea, he was largely unable to create an environment in which Pyongyang felt less threatened. It was beyond his ability to push the United States and Japan to recognize Pyongyang in a reciprocal manner. Lastly, by rushing to sign the Basic Agreement with the North in 1991, Roh failed to demand full disclosure of North Korea’s nuclear arsenal or an investigation into past activities and suspicious sites. As we look back to the factors most important for formulating South Korean strategic thought, we find that both changes in the international system and national conditions enabled Korean leaders to initiate their assertive diplomatic drive to break out from the foreign policy preoccupation with the United States. The United States loomed large in South Korea’s overall foreign relations, but full support from the Reagan administration to Chun and South Korea’s rapid economic growth allowed Korean leaders to look beyond it as well as Japan in searching for new markets and business opportunities. Following Park Chung-hee, Chun and Roh elevated the goal of economic development to the supreme national objective. Much of their foreign policy was linked to that goal and maximum resources were put into producing meaningful results. Chun and Roh were strong, capable leaders who knew how to mobilize economic and human resources in launching their diplomatic initiatives. South Korea’s successful execution of its nordpolitik during the late 1980s clearly showed that it could not be done without the combination of economic dynamism, democratization, shifting strategic concerns, and public diplomacy efforts. There are many countries that made significant economic gains during the cold war period. However, as a consequence of South Korea’s successful nordpolitik, Pyongyang took the risky step of developing its own nuclear weapons in the hope that they would open the way to a long-term strategic relationship with Washington. Notes 1. This chapter treats South Korea as a small state during the cold war era, while the rest of the book, concentrating on later periods, regards it as a middle power. As its economy grew rapidly along with its rising military budget, a transition in power may be recognized. 2. David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 5; David Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power and Great Power Conflict (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 3–4.

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3. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), p. 8. 4. Margaret G. Hermann and Charles F. Hermann, “Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33 (December 1989), p. 363. 5. Gregory F.T. Winn, Korean Foreign Policy Decision Making: Progress and Structure (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1975), p. 21. 6. Wilfrid L. Kohl, “The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and U.S.-European Relation: Patterns of Policy making,” World Politics, Vol. 28 (October 1975), pp. 1–43. 7. Gerald L. Curtis and Sungjoo Han, The U.S.-South Korean Alliance (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983), p. 222. 8. Henry A. Kissinger, “Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy,” in J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 261–76. 9. Ahn Byung-Joon, “A Comparison of the Foreign Policy Making Process in the Republic of Korea and the U.S. after the Vietnam War,” Social Science Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1980), pp. 7–23. 10. Charles Morrison and Astri Suhrke, Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller Asian States (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), p. 30. 11. In 1989, the Soviets were hoping that South Korean construction firms might participate in the building of a giant trade center in Nakhodka and that the South would generate 50 percent of the financing for this project and fund other infrastructure projects. See Dan C. Sanford, South Korea and the Socialist Countries: The Politics of Trade (London: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 18–22. 12. The Pentagon Papers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), pp. 702–03. 13. Sungjoo Han, “South Korea’s Participation in the Vietnam Conf lict: An Analysis of the U.S.-Korean Alliance,” Orbis, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Winter 1978), pp. 893–912; Kyudok Hong, Unequal Partners: ROK-U.S. Relations during the Vietnam War (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1991). 14. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems, pp. 151–53. 15. Harold C. Hinton, Korea under New Leadership: The Fifth Republic (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 53. 16. Gerald L. Curtis and Sungjoo Han, The U.S.-South Korean Alliance, p. 223. 17. Dan C. Sanford, South Korea and the Socialist Countries, p. 24. 18. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems, pp. 225–28. 19. Charles Whelan, “Let the Games Begin,” in Donald Kirk and Choe Sang Hun, eds., Korea Witness: 135 Years of War, Crisis and News in the Land of the Morning Calm (Seoul: Eun Hang Namu, 2006), p. 309. 20. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems, p. 164. 21. Harold C. Hinton, Korea under New Leadership, p. 93.

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22. Hong Yung Lee, “South Korea in 1991: Unprecedented Opportunity, Increasing Challenge,” Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1992), p. 64. 23. “We Can Do It: Inaugural Address, February 25, 1988; A Single National Community: Special Declaration in the Interest of National Self-Respect, Unification and Prosperity,” July 7, 1988. 24. Okonogi Masao, “South Korea’s Experiment in Democracy,” James Cotton ed., Korea under Roh Tae-Woo: Democratization, Northern Policy, and InterKorean Relations. (Canberra: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 20. 25. Mark Clifford, “Gambleon Glasnost,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 7, 1991, p. 44. 26. George T. Yu, “China’s Response to Changing Developments on the Korean Peninsula,” in Tong Whan Park, ed., The U.S. and the Two Koreas: A New Triangle (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1998), pp. 260–61. 27. Dan C. Sanford, South Korea and the Socialist Countries, pp. 62–63. 28. Park Chung Hee, Toward Peaceful Unification (Seoul: Kwangmyong Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 78–79.

CHAPTER 3

Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Kim Young-sam Era In-Taek Hyun

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he Kim Young-sam government came into office in February 1993 on the heels of two major developments: 1) the global end of the cold war, culminating in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 2) genuine democratization in South Korea, as seen in the election of Kim as the first civilian president. In coping with an unsettled external strategic environment and a transformed domestic political environment, the munmin jongbu (civilian government) pursued new goals imbued with new strategic thinking. Beyond these factors, North Korea affected the conceptualization and implementation of South Korea’s foreign and national security policies in an entirely new fashion. The perennial dilemma over how to deal with the North took a dramatic turn owing to its pursuit of nuclear weapons and the impact on other states. With the convergence of these three factors, South Korea’s strategic environment was transformed significantly. Kim Young-sam and those helping to set policy faced great uncertainty and could not fall back on precedent as occurred in the cold war or respond to a consistent trend in world events as happened with the end of the cold war leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Now, they had to respond to f lux in relations with four great powers. For the first time in forty years, U.S.-North Korean ties vacillated between two extremes. Images of South Korean economic importance also changed rapidly from confidence in becoming an advanced economy gaining on Japan and benefiting from China’s rapid growth to alarm in the Asian

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financial crisis. Russian ties grew less important, but in 1996–97 Moscow began to assert itself again. As we trace the strategic thinking in South Korea of this period, we also look for factors that played the largest role in shaping it. This chapter proceeds first by examining what the Kim government meant by its “new look” at the North and whether it was able to successfully accomplish key objectives, and second, by assessing the external determinants of Kim’s strategic thinking, focusing on three variables: the North Korean nuclear conundrum, the changing U.S.-South Korean strategic relationship, and the transformed great power environment in Northeast Asia. The final section of the chapter analyzes South Korea’s relations with neighboring countries during Kim Young-sam’s years in power. New Korea, New Strategy As the first genuine democratic president in South Korea, Kim Youngsam made a vision of a “New Korea” (shinhanguk) the key platform of his government. He indicated that the regime would become strongly reformist, including comprehensive political, economic, and military initiatives. Kim’s reform measures included: 1) the creation of a strong civilian government through dissolution of the Hanahoi (a private group of elite Korean Military Academy graduates who had occupied key military posts during the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Republics), whose members included presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo, and dismissal of its members from key posts in the military; 2) the enactment of the Public Servants’ Ethics Law under which high-ranking government officials and National Assemblymen had to make public their assets; 3) the introduction of the so-called real-name financial transaction system; and 4) the amendment of laws regarding political funding, political parties, and election procedures. A civilian government with legitimacy and new political strength enabled Kim to pursue “stability through reform” rather than “reform within stability.”1 Reforms encompassed not only domestic political measures but also foreign policy initiatives, notably in South-North relations but also in dealing with the great powers. Even in the area of security, Kim attempted to depart fundamentally from previous policies. In his inaugural address he declared, “to President Kim Il-sung I say this: We must be genuinely willing to cooperate with each other . . . No alliance can supercede the aspirations enshrined in fostering closer national ties.” 2 He added, “No ideology or

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political belief can bring greater happiness than national kinship. If you really care about the Korean people and desire genuine reconciliation and unification between our brethren in the South and North, we can meet at any time and in any place to discuss this dream.”3 Emphasizing minjok or same ethnicity and national heritage, the new president clearly showed his desire to transform South-North relations. The first visible measure of the new policy came two weeks later with the announcement of the unilateral repatriation of the former North Korean guerrilla Li In-mo.4 This symbolic gesture drew heavy criticism from many South Korean conservatives, but in search of a breakthrough in long-frozen inter-Korean relations following a strategy session led by Unification Minister Han Wan-sang, Kim boldly decided to send him back.5 The new approach proved short-lived. One day after the announcement of Li’s repatriation, North Korea on March 12 withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The nuclear crisis would subsequently dominate foreign policy in the region; it could have sounded a death knell to the South’s new liberal approach toward the North, but Kim persevered for a time and later would find an opportunity to take the initiative again. Despite the crisis atmosphere, Kim delivered a speech entitled “The Pacific Era and Korea’s New Diplomacy,” at the Pacific Basin Economic Council meeting in Seoul on May 22, 1993. He proposed a roadmap for the post–cold war era, outlining a far-reaching strategy that had been designed by Foreign Minister Han Sung-joo. The five principles of Korea’s New Diplomacy were: 1) globalism; 2) diversification; 3) multidimensionalism; 4) regional cooperation; and 5) future orientation. 6 Through these principles, Kim attempted to forge a new era as part of what many claimed to be a “New World Order.” It was an ambitious plan for the “internationalization of Korean society”; however, the nuclear crisis deprived the Kim government of the opportunity to pursue it energetically. Diversification and regional cooperation could still go forward with the countries of Northeast Asia as the focus, while globalism centered on the United States. In response to the challenges posed by the crisis, Kim’s vision focused on ties with the great powers. In 1995 he began to emphasize segyehwa (globalization), delivering a New Year’s Message to the Nation, which explained that “the new era requires us to march out into the world if we are to build a brighter future for the nation. This is why we have made the hard decision to globalize . . . Only through globalization will our nation be able to extend its sphere of activity throughout the world and play a pivotal international role.” 7 On January 21, Kim proceeded

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to establish the Globalization Promotion Commission (Segyehwa chujin wiwonhoi). Segyehwa, was an overarching concept for the nation’s development into one of the “central states” ( jungshim gukka) of the world. It would reveal Korea’s unique way of reaching the level of the most advanced nations, becoming “the self-styled hallmark and the self-designated litmus test of Kim Young-sam’s government.”8 It included the globalization of every aspect of Korean society—politics, the economy, education, local autonomy, environment, and of course, South-North relations and foreign policy. After reforms in Kim’s first years aimed at abolishing vestiges of the old regime and associated wrongdoing, segyehwa was meant to give additional momentum to a bold reform agenda. If measures in the earlier phase were directed toward correcting past mistakes, segyehwa was future oriented, intended to bring about a new economic structure and advanced society. However, while overall reform measures were relatively successful in establishing new institutions, segyehwa only produced mixed results. The concept proved to be too broad and omnidirectional. Moreover, its down side, such as rapid liberalization in the financial sector and failure of economic reform and welfare policy including a social safety net, led to the virtual collapse of the South Korean economy in the fall of 1997.9 The process of overcoming the financial crisis was painful, even if, ironically, it may have brought about the expansion of globalization. In other words, the failure of globalization, which led to the financial crisis, actually compelled South Korea to understand more fully the forces of globalization, including more room for regionalism in Northeast Asia.10 In contrast to the cold war period, relations with each of the neighboring states were in flux. After the breakthrough with Moscow under Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam faced a declining state with a disappearing toehold in North Korea and no obvious regional partner, especially after negotiations with Japan failed in September 1992 and ties with China were allowed to wither. Few found strategic advantage in bolstering Seoul’s new cooperation with Moscow, given the latter’s weakened position. In contrast, the momentum in relations with China kept building, driven not only by a surge in trade and investment but also by increasing recognition of China’s vital role in influencing the behavior of North Korea. Yet, given the tensions in Sino-U.S. relations, new troubles between China and Japan, and China’s continued political ties to the North, South Korea had to take care not to place so much weight on it that other relations might be affected. Most uncertain in this period were ties to Japan, caught between political and strategic upgrading on the one hand, and

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emotional rekindling of historical issues on the other. In comparison to the cold war era, matters of regional balance tested strategic thinking. The First Nuclear Crisis and the Agreed Framework On March 12, 1993, even before Kim had completely announced his foreign policy initiatives and the equally new Clinton Administration had put in place key foreign policy officials, North Korea announced its intention to pull out of the NPT,11 seriously undermining Northeast Asian peace and security and the stability of the Korean peninsula. In order to defuse the tension and resolve the problem, the United States and North Korea, for the first time, held face-to-face talks in Geneva, which on July 19 reached an agreement, recognizing “the desirability of the DPRK’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea) intentions to replace its graphite moderated reactors and associated nuclear facilities with light-water moderated reactors”12 and the full and impartial application of IAEA safeguards. By early 1994, however, it became clear that there was no progress. Senior U.S. officials began to mention “sanctions” against the North, as the North began to remove 8,000 nuclear fuel rods from its reactors without the IAEA’s approval. Against this backdrop, former President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang to meet with North Korean leader Kim Il-sung on June 15, 1994 and successfully concluded a deal whereby the North would freeze its nuclear program and resume high-level talks. With talks set for July 8 and a planned summit between the South and the North to occur on July 25, the crisis seemed to be contained. However, on July 8, Kim Il-sung suddenly died of a heart attack at the age of eighty-two. After a delay the two sides signed the Agreed Framework on October 21, 1994,13 as the United States declared its willingness to improve bilateral political and economic ties with the North, commensurate with their continued cooperation to resolve the nuclear issue and to make progress on other issues of concern.14 During this process, on April 28, 1994, North Korea proposed to the United States to hold talks to discuss replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty, and it tried to nullify the armistice by withdrawing its officers on resident duty at the truce village after notifying the United Nations Command of its decision. It continued to emphasize that the most important part of the Agreed Framework was to sign a permanent peace treaty with the United States, its only dialogue partner. South Koreans felt marginalized by this North Korean strategy and were not altogether confident about the U.S. response.

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Even though this historic agreement appeared to be a turning point for the North Korean nuclear issue, there was mounting criticism in South Korea that the agreement did not clarify past nuclear activities of North Korea since it only stipulated a “freeze.” A more serious problem for South Koreans was that the agreement was made between the United States and North Korea, and South Korea was not a direct party. The North continuously tried to exclude South Korea in nuclear discussions, avoiding dialogue. The nascent spirit of Washington-Pyongyang détente was posing new and serious challenges to Seoul, which had taken the U.S.-South Korean alliance for granted. To this time, the South’s policy toward the North was based on “the principle of direct parties” in which all outstanding problems on the Korean peninsula, including the North Korean nuclear issue, should be dealt with directly by the South and the North. The 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation (known as the Basic Agreement between South and North) was a prime example.15 The prospect of North Korea signing a peace treaty with the United States without South Korea having a direct role shocked many in the South to take a fresh look at the country’s strategic options. Even if the Clinton administration assured the South Korean government that it had no intention to negotiate directly with the North without the South’s participation, South Korea’s fears did not subside. The question seemed to be when and how the United States and North Korea would normalize relations, rather than if they would do so. On April 16, 1996, Presidents Kim Young-sam and Bill Clinton met on Jeju Island and proposed four-way talks between the United States, South Korea, China, and North Korea to discuss a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean peninsula, military confidence building, and economic cooperation between the South and the North. The proposal had two important elements: first, Seoul and Washington opposed a peace treaty only between the United States and North Korea; and second, it allowed the United States and North Korea to have direct talks within the four-party framework. For South Koreans, this constituted a major departure not only for South-North relations but also for U.S.-South Korean ties, requiring adjustments in addition to factoring in North Korea’s overtures to the United States. There would also be implications for ties with China and later with Japan and Russia. Despite its diplomatic success and aggressive foreign policy, North Korea suffered severely from food shortage and economic difficulties during the period 1995–97. It became clear that North Korea could not find its way out of the quandary on its own since its dire food situation

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stemmed not only from natural disasters but also from gross structural problems in the economy.16 North Korean watchers became more attentive to the prospects of regime collapse. One expert argued that “the only question is whether North Korea will change suddenly and abruptly or gradually and incrementally. In either case, Korea will be unified.”17 Ref lecting such thinking, some policymakers in the United States and South Korea began to contemplate scenarios that would require emergency assistance. Unlike proponents of a hard-landing, however, those who anticipated a soft-landing policy argued that the Korean peninsula could be stabilized by pacifying the North, which feared unification by absorption or the complete collapse of the regime. Some argued that “Pyongyang is also moving away from self-imposed isolation and edging toward becoming a full member of the world community.”18 The United States at that time clearly adopted a soft-landing policy, as many realists argued that this was the only way to avoid a worst-case scenario. If a hard-landing materialized, it might drive North Korea to resort to military conf lict or a major war that would then result in unimaginable political and social disaster on the Korean peninsula. Accordingly, it was argued that the United States should favor the status quo unless North Korea possessed nuclear weapons. While Clinton faced strong criticism from Republicans who stressed that the Agreed Framework was flawed, its backers argued that it could at least give policymakers “the premium attached to buying time.”19 In turn the South Korean government was oscillating from a hard-line position to a moderate one, sending mixed messages to the North. But in the end, Kim Young-sam in his Liberation Day speech on August 15, 1996, announced that the South did not want instability and isolation of the North and that it would not seek a hasty German-style unification. This was the turning point for strategic thinking in the final period of his presidency. In contrast to the following two presidencies, this period was marked by a great deal of ambivalence about the soft-landing policy adopted toward the North. Many North Korean watchers in South Korea called into question whether the North could succeed in its economic reform without parallel structural reforms, arguing that only comprehensive reforms (including key political changes) could ensure regime survival. Moreover, neither a closed but stable system nor reform through openness could be feasible for long as an option. 20 The soft-landing policy posed a classical dilemma for the two Koreas. For the South, it meant that while it desired a peaceful resolution of the Korean problem, it was

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not willing to prop up the Stalinist regime. For the North, it also posed a catch-22 since Kim Jong-il wanted to ensure regime survival but without any enduring structural reforms. Throughout the Kim Young-sam era, South Korea had to cope with major changes in South-North relations and South Korea-U.S. relations as well as a rapidly shifting environment in the balance of power in Northeast Asia. The South found itself in a reactive state, as North Korea carefully calculated the timing of its brinkmanship and achieved many of its goals. In turn, many in the South believed that it was too passive and complained of the absence of a concrete and consistent strategy to cope with pressures from the North coupled with policy discord with the United States. The United States may have underestimated North Korea’s intentions, expecting either that the regime would collapse through mounting economic troubles or decide that incentives provided by the United States would suffice to solve the nuclear proliferation problem. North Korea’s real intention may instead have been to take whatever incentives it could get through its brinkmanship, while acquiring the status of a nuclear-weapons state and using this in pursuit of its longstanding goal to unify the Korean peninsula in its favor. Overall, the nuclear situation was symptomatic of intractable policy options that seemed to worsen over time. In these circumstances, Seoul considered alternatives to its reactive posture, including a strategy of soliciting China to play a more active role. Post–Cold War Developments in the ROK-U.S. Alliance and Northeast Asia During the Kim Young-sam era, ROK-U.S. relations evolved dramatically owing to the North Korean nuclear situation and the evolution in South Korean politics. Right after the cold war, the Pentagon submitted a report known as the East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI) to the U.S. Congress, which called for a phased reduction of U.S. forces in the South. 21 The first phase (1990–92) would be accomplished with the reduction of about 7,000 of the 45,000 troops, but the second and third phases were suspended as North Korea’s nuclear development program raised tensions on the peninsula. Although the shock that South Koreans felt was much less than in 1976, when the Carter Administration tried to withdraw its forces from South Korea in spite of the South’s vehement opposition, many South Koreans came to believe that even though they were allies with shared goals and interests, U.S. policy had been driven

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by unilateral decisions, raising concern that many more U.S. troops could be withdrawn even in the face of South Korean opposition. In February 1995, the Nye Report highlighted a new strategy for the East Asia Pacific region, reaffirming a commitment to maintain a stable forward presence in the region, at the existing level of about 100,000 for the foreseeable future. Even though the troop level in South Korea would remain nearly as it was, the underlying assumption was that the U.S.-South Korean alliance should be redefined in order to respond to new challenges: how the alliance could be maintained if North Korea ceased to exist or if it no longer posed a major threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. According to a joint study by R AND and the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses (KIDA), even in the postunification phase, the two countries would need to maintain an alliance with each other as a force for regional security. They would not want to cease their alliance relationship even if it became primarily political with only a limited military footprint. Depending on what kind of external threat Korea would confront and its domestic political environment, the alliance might develop into a regional arrangement rather than a strictly bilateral one. Clearly, regional issues and the possibility of a multilateral security arrangement including the United States were now coming under consideration. Already Koreanization had advanced with the transfer of peacetime operational control over Korean combat forces on December 1, 1994, 22 but U.S. operational control over the combined forces remained a symbol of dependency and a source of anti-Americanism as the wartime arrangement was not changed. Changing South Korea’s perception of North Korea’s military threats also impacted strategic thinking during the Kim Young-sam era. Since the Korean War, South Korea’s sense of insecurity has been largely defined by the nature of the threat from the North. Despite South Korea’s rapid economic growth, its defense spending as a percentage of GDP has continued to decline since the 1990s whereas North Korea’s defense spending has remained relatively unchanged at around 25 percent. In order to enhance its defense capabilities, South Korea adopted a more self-reliant posture as a long-term goal. Park Chung-hee pursued “a survival strategy,” which ref lected North Korea’s military superiority in the 1960s and 1970s. Chun Doo-hwan pursued “a parity strategy” in order to catch up with the North. As sustained economic growth made more money available for defense and North Korea suffered severe economic dislocation, South Korea came to believe by the early 1990s

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that its military capability was no longer inferior even though North Korea continued to field a significantly higher number of combat troops, long-range artillery, ballistic missiles, and so on. Recognizing the changing conventional military balance, it pursued “a stable deterrence strategy,” in the early 1990s. 23 Thus, perceptions of North Korea’s military threat changed. The North Korean nuclear program became an additional military threat, but political and economic difficulties proved more significant as many began to worry more about insecurity from the sudden collapse of the North Korean regime than about the military threat, including the nuclear program. Security norms also changed greatly. Owing largely to democratization, civil society became increasingly involved in defense matters. “Security pluralism” or lively discussions by diverse civil groups on security matters began to be full-blown in the Kim Young-sam era. Changing security norms and increasing pluralism in society affected especially defense spending policy, as a level of 6 percent of GNP during the late 1970s and the early 1980s fell to 3 percent of GNP in the mid-1990s, although spending continuously increased in absolute terms. Cost sharing for U.S. forces was climbing steadily to $360 million in 1997 from only $40 million in 1989. 24 South Korea was able to have both guns and butter as it looked anew at its strategic environment. 25 For the first time, the military buildup no longer was a top priority as the Kim Young-sam government emphasized robust social development, infrastructure, and welfare programs. The military factor in international relations had diminished as attention turned to cooperation with neighboring states, but it later gained ground again. In the first part of Kim Young-sam’s tenure, U.S.-Japanese relations were troubled by trade tensions, but at the end they focused on upgrading alliance ties. China’s rising military budget, arms imports from Russia, and assertive moves toward Taiwan led to this shift. Although there was some increase in South Korean military cooperation with Japan in this period, Kim was notably absent in this pursuit of new defense guidelines. In 1996 China and Russia declared their strategic partnership, making clear their joint appeal for multipolarity as Russia looked for ways to boost its voice in Asia. Again, the response from Kim Young-sam was muted; he was not inclined to get drawn into the new security maneuvering in Northeast Asia apart from keeping the focus on North Korea. In contrast, when the opportunity arose to join China and Japan in establishing an economic regional linkage through ASEAN 1 3, South Korea eagerly joined. Alert to rapidly changing currents in the regional environment, South Korea at times tried to stay

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aloof, at other times felt obliged to react but without a consistent approach, and in general was shifting toward more multilateralism and efforts to engage North Korea.

Strategic Thinking toward China, Japan, Russia, and Regionalism China Nordpolitik (Bukbang jongchaek) that was begun under the government of Roh Tae-woo (1988–93) opened new horizons in South Korea’s diplomacy. Through this foreign policy initiative, South Korea successfully normalized its diplomatic relations with socialist countries including Hungary in 1989, the former Soviet Union in 1991, and China in 1992. Even though it was a “revolutionary” diplomatic initiative from South Korea’s viewpoint at that time, it was basically a status quo policy designed to stabilize the Korean peninsula through coexistence with, but not containment against, North Korea. In order to achieve this goal, planners believed that South Korea should first normalize ties with China and Russia and then move to North Korea. Reconciliation and cooperation with North Korea through the Basic Agreement was the climax of nordpolitik. Notwithstanding the success of this policy, however, the Basic Agreement, as noted above, did not result in fundamental change in inter-Korean relations. Despite setbacks in SouthNorth relations, the strategic vision and goals of nordpolitik were, in the main, successfully accomplished. South Korea’s relations with China and Russia improved greatly, extending to economic cooperation. Strategic thinking in the Kim Young-sam period sought to capitalize on this achievement, focusing more on China with its stunning growth in trade and investment opportunities rather than on Russia mired in recession and chaotic conditions. Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Seoul on November 13, 1995 became a major turning point for South Korea-China relations. Even though their relationship had been renewed through diplomatic normalization, China continued to pursue a two-track policy in which it emphasized “political relations with North Korea and economic relations with South Korea.” Jiang’s visit, however, was interpreted by South Korean policymakers as signaling that China would no longer stick to this principle. It would improve not only economic relations but also security relations with the South. In a summit meeting at Chong Wa Dae, he agreed that inter-Korean problems should be solved

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through dialogue between South and North. He also pledged that China would take an active role in ensuring that the North’s nuclear issue would be solved in a peaceful manner. Indeed, at the press conference, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that China may ignore its treaty with North Korea that calls for China’s automatic involvement in an armed conf lict if it should occur on the Korean peninsula. 26 Together with the visits of Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng on October 31, 1994 and Chairman of the National People’s Congress Qiao Shi on April 18, 1995, Jiang’s visit meant that the three highest ranked figures in China visited South Korea in rapid succession. China supported South Korea’s efforts to solve the nuclear issue through the four-party talks and expressed its willingness to play “a constructive role,” if all parties agreed. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, in his meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Gong Ro-myung, supported South Korea’s position to introduce a Security Council resolution condemning North Korean agents’ armed infiltration by submarine into South Korea. 27 This resolution denouncing the infiltration as a military provocation against the ROK was adopted on September 23, 1996. Despite the fact that China improved its relations with South Korea on every front, it continued to maintain its security treaty with North Korea. Moreover, China increased its economic support to North Korea and announced that it would provide 500,000 tons of grain annually from 1996 to 2000, when a North Korean delegation visited Beijing in May 1996. 28 While total trade between China and South Korea was climbing precipitously, reaching $17 billion in 1995 with expectations of much higher figures in each coming year, North Korea-China trade only amounted to $600 million. North Korea’s trade was decreasing continuously from 1991. In 1997, the total trade volume was just $1.98 billion. 29 This is only one form of evidence that China’s Korea policy was moving from a Pyongyang-only one-Korea policy, to a de facto two-Koreas policy, and finally to a Seoul-centered one-and-a half Koreas policy.30 Within a short period of time after diplomatic normalization, China became a new locus of South Korea’s strategic thinking. The label “good, friendly, and cooperative relations” was applied during the Kim era.31 In addition, China began to play a “constructive role” in the North Korean nuclear crisis; however South Korea was for the first time faced with the dilemma of how to respond to conflict between China and its ally, the United States. During the March 1996 Taiwan crisis, after China launched missiles into international waters and the United States

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“intervened” by dispatching two aircraft carriers ostensibly on routine training, South Koreans had to consider their country’s national interest. The Taiwan Strait crisis strained not only Sino-American relations but also Sino-Japanese relations. Japan was very critical of China’s military intimidation, and Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro soon issued a joint declaration on security, which contained a reference to Japan’s extended military role, that is, “in the areas surrounding Japan.”32 While the phrase “areas surrounding Japan” did not specify Taiwan, China became suspicious of the wording and kept asking whether this was the intention, only to receive contradictory responses from officials in Japan. For South Korean strategic thinkers and experts, the Taiwan crisis posed a new security challenge. Before its normalization with China, South Korea’s defense policy toward the Taiwan Strait was rather simple and clear: it opposed any military provocation by China, however in 1996 South Korea had to balance ties with its major ally (the United States), new ties with an Asian giant (China), and decades-long ties with a former ally (Taiwan). China’s act was perceived as a military provocation, but for South Korea, the question was: how could it signal its displeasure vis-à-vis China’s provocative behavior without impairing Sino-Korea relations. It responded to the situation cautiously, saying that it supported the “one China” policy, but clearly opposed military escalation in the strait. Japan Over nearly thirty years from the time of normalization of diplomatic relations in 1965, four controversial issues cast a shadow on ties between South Korea and Japan: 1) historical and territorial issues; 2) Japan’s rearmament, often seen as militarization; 3) Japan-North Korean relations; and 4) economic cooperation, particularly the expanding trade imbalance. In particular, past history and territorial issues were the most contentious factor, arousing the South Korean public and an official reaction as well. The Kim Young-sam era was no exception. The relationship with Japan under the Kim government had its ups and downs as tensions heightened or decreased owing largely to the magnitude of the salient historical dispute. Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi visited Seoul on January 1992 in order to enhance the bilateral relationship even though there were no crucial, pending issues; however, he unexpectedly faced a highly critical Korean public when the comfort women issue came to the forefront. As a result, the summit meeting with Roh Tae-woo ended without any fruitful outcome. This, in turn,

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led to a round of “Korea bashing” in Japan, especially among the leftleaning political and policy community.33 When Kim Young-sam took office, he first had to deal with this controversial issue. South Korea-Japan relations during the Kim era can be divided into two phases. During the first phase, roughly Kim’s first three years, bilateral relations were relatively good, since new leaders in both countries, that is to say, Kim and non-LDP prime ministers in Japan, made unprecedented approaches to each other. Facilitating these overtures, Japan’s leadership demonstrated unusual sensitivity on historical issues. During the second phase, however, the earlier cautious enthusiasm for closer ties was transformed into anger and frustration in South Korea, since, under LDP control, the Japanese government’s stance on historical and territorial issues grew more conservative. At the outset, Kim’s administration enunciated a new vision for a significant improvement in relations with Japan just when Hosokawa Morihiro, the first non-LDP prime minister, was showing interest in establishing a new relationship with South Korea. At their summit in Kyongju on November 6, 1993, Hosokawa apologized for the atrocities committed during Japan’s colonial rule, saying, “We deeply repent our wrongdoings, and we again apologize for the intolerable pains which the Koreans suffered.”34 Based on this renewed recognition of the past, they agreed to expand bilateral economic cooperation. On March 24–26, 1994, Kim visited Japan to hold a second summit with Hosokawa, and they reaffirmed their close cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue. It was not long before, on July 23–24, a new prime minister Murayama Tomiichi of the Japan Socialist Party visited Seoul to discuss the situation on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia after the death of Kim Il-sung as well as the future of Japan’s relations with both sides of the peninsula. The Kim government and the two non-LDP leaders attempted to establish a future-oriented relationship based on renewed understanding on the past and close cooperation on major security and economic issues; however, historical and territorial issues have always been the Achilles heel of South Korea-Japan relations. Even Murayama was not free from them, but under Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro Japan turned more conservative. In February 1996 Foreign Minister Ikeda Yukihiko claimed at a press conference that Dokdo (Takeshima) was “clearly part of Japan.”35 Kim was greatly upset and ordered his administration to deal sternly with Japan on this matter, canceling the visit of Diet politicians. The territorial issue overrode all other positive developments, including the decision to cohost the 2002 World Cup.

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In the midst of these controversies, however, South Korea and Japan began to expand incrementally their security relationship. In the early 1990s security policymakers in the South Korean government felt the necessity of engaging Japan in a “security dialogue,” if not “security cooperation” (a term that would suggest substantial military-to-military ties and exceed what South Korean defense officials were prepared to accept). In 1994 the South Korean defense minister officially visited Japan for the first time, which led to annual exchange visits of defense ministers, high-ranking officers’ visits, port calls for naval cadets, and student exchange programs between army and naval colleges. 36 Security relations began to develop to the degree that de facto security cooperation existed. However, the Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation in 1997, which were a milestone for the U.S.-Japan alliance, became a contentious issue between the two countries. The phrase, “situations in areas surrounding Japan,” implicitly included a contingency on the Korean peninsula. Alarmists pointed to Japan’s expanded role, which could eventually lead to its remilitarization, even if there were some positive assessments that, given the fact that these specific guidelines operated within the rigid framework of the U.S.-Japan security treaty, there was more to gain than fear.37 From the South Korean perspective, if action were to proceed on the basis of this phrase, prior consultation with Japan would ensue. Even though this point was not publicized, there was mutual understanding. The development of Japan-North Korea relations also contributed to renewed South Korean concern over its own security and the situation on the Korean peninsula. While positively assessing Japan’s role in the nuclear crisis, South Koreans remained very sensitive about possible Japanese attempts to pursue a “two-Koreas policy.” They watched as delegates of Japan’s three–party ruling coalition, including Watanabe Michio of the LDP, visited Pyongyang and agreed to the resumption of normalization talks on March 30, 1995. This recalled the Kanemaru Shin visit of 1990 with its worrisome signs of an independent initiative that could complicate South Korean diplomacy with the North. Again it appeared that Japan felt the need to make its own space for negotiating directly with North Korea without sufficient regard for what others were doing, in this case when four parties (the U.S., China, and the two Koreas) were engaged in negotiations over proceeding to a peace regime and Japan was excluded because it was not a direct party to the Korean War armistice. However, Japan believed that it had its own agenda, including the abductions issue that would later become its preoccupation. The Japan-North Korea talks, however, were seen in South Korea

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as Japan’s hasty attempt at bridging the gap.38 In his summit meeting with Hashimoto in January 1997, Kim Young-sam expressed concern that these talks might complicate the ongoing four-party talks, and Tokyo agreed to proceed slowly.39 Clearly, Japan’s involvement in peninsula security drew mixed responses from South Korea. Despite the lingering caution over history issues, in the final year of the second phase in the Kim administration, economic issues rose to the fore and raised the strategic stakes in dealing with Japan. From early 1997, the South Korean economy began to suffer from multiple problems, including a slow recovery from an economic slowdown, failures in major businesses, and a shortage of foreign exchange reserves. These problems were accelerated after the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. In order to avoid a complete economic meltdown, South Korea had to ask the IMF for a bailout loan to stabilize the economy after failing to recognize the seriousness of the problem even a month before. At the time of the economic crisis, Korea-Japan relations were still not fully restored to their level of the early Kim era. Japan’s devaluation of the yen was seen as one of the causes of the collapse of the won, and the refusal of Japanese banks to roll over South Korean debt in December 1997 was the specific trigger that led to South Korea’s currency crisis.40 One day before Korea went to the IMF, Korea’s new finance minister requested a rapid infusion of cash, but Japan thought at the time that it was too late to provide emergency assistance. At any rate, Japan’s response was also partially shaped by South Korea’s ill management of its relationship with Japan. Above all, the financial crisis was the end result of South Korea’s “casino capitalism,” or crony capitalism,41 however, South Korea at that time was desperate. For the Korean public, Japan’s inability to come to Korea’s assistance at a time of national emergency distanced their country from the prospect of a “virtual alliance.”42 Japan’s contribution could have restored the bilateral political relationship in the short-run and worked as a catalyst for a future-oriented strategic relationship. Russia Shortly before Kim’s election victory, Boris Yeltsin came to Seoul, revealing secret documents on how the Soviet Union abetted North Korea in starting the Korean War. Yet, instead of accelerating the advance in relations that had begun under Gorbachev and continued after Russia replaced the Soviet Union, it proved to be the culmination of this process. Seeing that no interest was being paid on the loans that

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had led to normalization, South Korea stopped providing further loans to the anger of Russians who sought the full sum that had been promised. Although Kim made one visit to Moscow during his tenure, it was of little consequence. The first nuclear crisis gave Koreans the impression that Russia was irrelevant in relations with North Korea, and the further deterioration of the Russian economy lowered interest in trade or investment. When the Asian financial crisis occurred, risky investment grew even less tenable. As Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov in 1996–97 began to steer Russia toward stronger ties with China and a renewal of ties with North Korea, this did not draw much interest in Seoul. Strategic thinking about Russia had become only an afterthought. Regionalism The mid-1990s were not a time of much attention to regionalism. When Japan showed interest in taking the lead in some sort of regionalism or a localized variant of sub-regionalism, South Korea was not responsive, even when better ties with Japan and regular summits were on its agenda. When the idea for ASEAN 1 3 arose, it was accepted with little expectation that this would become a counterweight to APEC or a launching pad for the 13 group. Yet, at the end of Kim Young-sam’s tenure as the financial crisis brought tense talks over the role of the IMF in rescuing the South Korean economy, thinking was in flux. Even if no deal was reached with Japan to avoid IMF dependency, possibly linked to its proposal for creating an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), and rapidly growing economic integration with China had not yet led to plans for regional institutions, the seeds of regionalism began to sprout in this fertile environment. Conclusion The Kim Young-sam era began with high hopes for building a new Korea but ended with deep despair. Key components of the “New Korea” strategy—a Korea that was more democratic, outward looking, and competitive—offered an attractive agenda, but the Kim government did not properly handle changing domestic political and international environments. Five main implications can be drawn from this analysis. First, Kim’s strategic vision of the five principles of new diplomacy, segyehwa, and the concept of the “central state,” had promise, but were not fully pursued with sufficient vigor. The North Korean nuclear crisis did not allow the government to fully implement these concepts, while

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segyehwa and the central state lacked sophistication in their expression and also a concrete action plan. In place of strategic foresight, these became platforms for political slogans. Second, unexpectedly, the North Korean nuclear issue became South Korea’s top security agenda. Compared to the Roh Tae-woo government, which pursued nordpolitik and signed the Basic Agreement, the Kim government was obliged to be reactive in its relations with the North owing to the nuclear issue. In addition, the Agreed Framework was signed between the United States and the North, and the impetus for four-party talks came from the United States. Thus, the key principle that major issues in the inter-Korean relationship should be solved between the two direct parties was weakened considerably. Despite limited diplomatic space, Kim tried to cope, employing various strategies, including a linkage strategy to persuade the North through incentives and coercive diplomacy to pressure it along with the United States. While these policies were not a failure since they led to the Agreed Framework, neither can they be seen as a success. At the end of Kim Young-sam’s tenure, there remained great uncertainty on how to proceed. In these circumstances South Korea continued to strengthen its military capabilities. Its conventional forces provided a fairly stable deterrent capacity against the North, although perceptions of a state seemingly on the verge of collapse led to a decision not to pursue a hard-landing approach, just as the Roh Tae-woo government did not pursue a containment strategy vis-à-vis the North after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Third, the alliance with the United States was reinforced as a pillar of South Korea’s security policy, but changing circumstances raised more questions about how it should be adjusted. In the early 1990s, the United States laid the foundation for a limited withdrawal of its troops from South Korea but the North Korean nuclear issue prevented more than the first phase of reductions. The Nye report reaffirming the continuation of the deployment of these troops was one of the most visible achievements in the Kim Young-sam era in international relations, even if it was fostered by external circumstances more than bilateral strategic understanding. As a result, the longer-term issue of the viability of a U.S. military presence in South Korea continued to be debated in Seoul even after the end of the Kim government. Fourth, the legacy of nordpolitik remained the key element in South Korea’s policy toward its neighbors, China and Russia. South KoreaChina relations enjoyed a sharp boost from the late 1980s and China became one of the most important countries in terms of South Korea’s foreign relations and economic ties during the Kim Young-sam era.

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South Korea-Russia relations also were changing, although ties did not improve as significantly as both sides had initially hoped. Relations with Japan started off on a positive note but were quickly overtaken by a series of disputes over history and the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis of 1997. The Kim Young-sam government’s overall track record is a mixed one. The obvious failures of the government’s economic policies led to a rapid downturn in South Korea’s economy and also contributed to a sea-change in South Korean politics with the election of Kim Dae-jung in December 1997. The North Korean nuclear crisis was defused through the Agreed Framework, but acrimony between Seoul and Washington also intensified during the Kim Young-sam era. Yet, reforms in the South Korean military, greater transparency in the financial sector, and the institutionalization of a robust civil society were key achievements that were either introduced or strengthened. Ultimately, however, the growing gap between thoughtful strategic visions and calibrated policy options coupled with inconsistent policy objectives contribute to our conclusion that shortcomings outweighed achievements in this era. The years 1993–97 proved to be a transitional period in Northeast Asia and in the strategic thinking of South Korea. There were new heights of optimism about rising leverage in regional relations and economic accomplishment and new depths of pessimism about helplessness in the first nuclear crisis and the Asian financial crisis. During moments of increased hope, there was talk of breakthroughs with North Korea and Japan and of positive transformation in relations with the United States, China, and Russia. Yet, other times saw spreading despair over North Korea’s belligerence, Japan’s historical revisionism, and United States inclination to unilateralism or globalization. Kim Young-sam lacked a steady hand in assessing the limits of South Korean power and the promise of persistently bolstering ties with each of the great powers. Public opinion was missing any clear direction and was left mystified by the financial crisis and uncertainty in regional affairs that prevailed by the end of his presidency. Notes 1. Soong-Hoom Kil, “Political Reforms of the Kim Young Sam Government,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 419–31. 2. This is my translation. The English version distributed to the press was: “None of these nations can have more reasons to care and share than we do—for we are members of the same ethnic family.”

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3. The Korea Times, February 26, 1993. 4. At the time seventy-six years old, Li had been captured by the South during the Korean War while engaged in guerilla activities in Mt. Chiri. He was released in 1959 but was again imprisoned in 1961 on charges of spying for the North. After spending thirty-four years in prison, he was finally freed in 1988. 5. Korea Times, March 11, 1993. 6. Han Sung-Joo, “Fundamentals of Korea’s New Diplomacy,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Summer 1993), pp. 227–45. 7. The Korea Times, January 2, 1995. 8. Samuel S. Kim, “East Asia and Globalization: Challenges and Responses,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1999), p. 29. 9. Barry K. Gills and Dong-Sook S. Gills, “South Korea and Globalization: The Rise to Globalism?” Asian Perspective, Vol. 23, No. 4 (1999), pp. 199–228. 10. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 217–18. 11. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 12. The Korea Times, July 21, 1993. 13. The Agreed Framework included: 1) replacing the DPRK’s graphitemoderated reactors and related facilities with two light-water reactors; 2) full normalization of political and economic relations; 3) a nuclear-free Korean peninsula; and 4) strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. The United States promised to provide North Korea with 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually through KEDO to ease economic sanctions against North Korea and improve diplomatic relations and to prepare to set up a liaison office in Pyongyang. 14. A strategy of enlargement and engagement replaced the doctrine of containment that drove U.S. foreign policy during the cold war. Anthony Lake, “From Containment to Enlargement,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Dispatch, Vol. 4, No. 39 (September 1993), p. 3. 15. According to the Basic Agreement, the South and the North recognized each other’s sovereignty and agreed on a nonnuclear Korean peninsula coupled with an arms control regime. This was the first concrete agreement that the two had signed to assure peace and stability on the peninsula, and it stipulated that they would endeavor “together” to transform the current armistice into a peace mechanism. Not only had the North failed to comply with these provisions, it was pressing the United States to ignore them too. 16. Lee Young-sun, “Bukhan gyongjaenan oe kujojok bunsok gwa gaehyok ganungsong,” Sasang, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Fall 1997), pp. 47–70. 17. Kyung-Won Kim, “No Way Out: North Korea’s Impending Collapse,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 71.

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18. Richard Nelson and Kenneth Weisbrode, “Interim Arrangement for North Korea: Are They Secure?” The Bulletin of the Atlantic Council, Vol. 5, No. 12 (December 30, 1994), p. 2. 19. Chung-Min Lee, “Rethinking Military Dynamics in the Korean Peninsula,” paper presented at the conference, “Northeast Asian Conventional Net Assessment” (Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Strategy, August 1996), p. 6. 20. In-Taek Hyun and Masao Okonogi, “Coping with the North Korea Nuclear Nightmare,” in In-Taek Hyun and Masao Okonogi, eds., Korea and Japan: Searching For Harmony and Cooperation in a Changing Era (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1995), p. 232. 21. U.S. Department of Defense, A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking toward the 21st Century (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 18, 1990). 22. ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1994–1995 (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 1995), p. 122. 23. Hyun In-Taek, “Hanguk oe daeoi anbo hwangyong byonhwa e daehan daiung jonryak yongu,” in Kim Dong-sung, Hyun In-Taek, Kim Se-jung, Han Sung-joo, and Lee Shung-guen, Shin gukka jonryak oe mosaek (Seoul: Sekyung, 1993). 24. See ROK Ministry of National Defense, Defense White Paper, 1994–1998 (Seoul: ROK Ministry of National Defense, 1995–1999). 25. Chung-in Moon and In-Taek Hyun, “Muddling through Security, Growth and Welfare: The Political Economy of Defense Spending in South Korea,” in Steve Chan and Alex Mints, eds., Defense, Welfare and Growth (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), pp. 137–62. 26. The Korea Times, November 15, 1995. 27. The Korea Times, September 25, 1996. 28. Yonhap yonkam, 1997, p. 698. 29. Yonhap yonkam, 1998, p. 664. 30. Xiaoxong Yi, “Dynamics of China’s South Korea Policy: Assertive Nationalism, Beijing’s Changing Strategic Evaluation of the United States, and the North Korea Factor,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2000), pp. 71–102. 31. This was China’s way of describing the bilateral relationship. In the Kim Dae-jung era the relationship was upgraded to a “cooperative partnership.” Korea Herald, November 13, 1998. 32. U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation,” New York, September 23, 1997. 33. Hyun In-Taek “Hanil gwangye,” in Chung Il-young, ed., Hanguk oigyo banseki oe jaejomyong (Seoul: Namam Publishing, 1993), p. 255. 34. The Korea Times, November 7, 1993. 35. The Korea Times, February 10, 1996. 36. The Republic of Korea, Defense White Paper 1997–1998, p. 80.

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37. Lee Jung-hoon, “Miil bangwi jichim hyopryok gwa Dongbuka oe saeroun anbo jilso,” Jonryak yongu, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1998), pp. 96–110. 38. Seoul shinmun, March 30, 1995. 39. Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), p. 123. 40. Michael J. Green, “Japan and the Future of the Korean Peninsula,” Korea and World Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Summer 1998), p. 213; and Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism, pp. 137–39. 41. Susan Strange, Casino Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Richard W. Mansbach and Dong Won Suh, “A Tumultuous Season: Globalization and the Korean Case,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1998), pp. 243–68. 42. Ralph A. Cossa, “Peace on the Peninsula: How to Get There from Here,” in Ralph A. Cossa, ed., U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Building Toward a “Virtual Alliance” (Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 1999), pp. 175–99.

CHAPTER 4

Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Kim Dae-jung Era Scott Snyder

K

im Dae-jung’s election as president of the ROK in 1997 marked the first time that South Korea had experienced a peaceful democratic transition from the ruling to the opposition party, and represented a dramatic transition in strategic thought toward North Korea and East Asia. This transition was catalyzed by a financial crisis that brought to its knees a rapidly growing Korean economy in the weeks before the December 1997 presidential elections, exposing serious weaknesses in government and corporate financial management and suddenly placing a South Korea that had proudly achieved Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) status and a $10,000 per year per capita GDP at the mercy of international debtholders and the IMF. The urgency of the crisis and the fiscal and corporate governance failures that it represented initially dominated all agendas and severely limited Kim Dae-jung’s strategic choices. Its resolution became a prerequisite for management of all other policy issues. Beyond the financial crisis, the international and regional security environment when the Kim Dae-jung administration took power provided sufficient stability and convergence of views among major powers for him to pursue his long-standing strategic vision for inter-Korean reconciliation. The North Korean food crisis of 1996 had led to internal changes within the country that opened the way for possible economic reforms. The crisis had already changed South Korean perceptions of

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the North from security threat to a poor, distant relation that faced extreme humanitarian need. Kim Jong-il’s public emergence as North Korea’s paramount leader following a three-year transition on the heels of Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994 satisfied concerns about North Korea’s near-term stability. A framework for stable U.S.-DPRK relations existed based on the Geneva Agreed Framework that had ended the first nuclear crisis in 1994. North Korea had reluctantly accepted provision of a South Korean-model light water reactor under the auspices of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), although American intelligence about a suspected covert nuclear weapons development site at Gumchang-ri raised serious questions through 1998 about North Korea’s willingness to implement its commitments to foreswear nuclear weapons development. The U.S.-China relationship during the second Clinton administration was on a more stable track under a policy focused on “engagement” and designed to deepen China’s integration into the international community, normalize Sino-U.S. trade relations, and most urgently, complete negotiations to bring China into the World Trade Organization (WTO). Steady growth in Sino-South Korean economic relations continued on the foundations of the 1992 normalization as China’s primary policy focus toward the Korean peninsula shifted from the objective of maintaining an equidistant relationship with the two sides to a focus on ensuring North Korean stability in the context of its food crisis while learning from South Korea’s model of economic development. There had been modest improvement in ROK-Japan contacts and nascent security cooperation with both Japan and the United States in dealing with the North Korean nuclear issue, despite longstanding disagreements over Japan’s handling of history-related issues. Russia was distant and preoccupied with its own economic difficulties as Kim Dae-jung took office early in 1998. Kim Dae-jung provided critical leadership to overcome the financial crisis while holding to his vision for comprehensive inter-Korean reconciliation and the establishment of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia. His core strategic choices were consistently articulated from the outset of his administration, despite the immediate challenges posed by South Korea’s financial crisis. Kim was helped in the implementation of his foreign policies by his positive international reputation and relationships forged as a leader of the antiauthoritarian democratization movement in South Korea for over three decades. Yet, Kim’s international reputation and his focus on inter-Korean reconciliation arguably distracted him from the need to address regional divisions within South

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Korean politics, including resentment deriving from changes in the longstanding regionally based (discriminatory) selection preferences for bureaucratic advancement that accompanied the transition in power. Kim’s Sunshine Policy was based on a process of reconciliation in which South Korea was a leader rather than simply an object of great power gamesmanship in Northeast Asia. It recognized the need for the ROK to maintain positive relationships with all of its neighbors as part of the management of an inter-Korean reconciliation process. In important respects, these initiatives represented a clear break from the strategic choices of Kim’s predecessors, constituting a national policy that for the first time placed a cooperative vision of inter-Korean reconciliation and peaceful coexistence above the imperatives of the cold war and ongoing competition for legitimacy on the Korean peninsula. Moon Chung-in argues that the Sunshine Policy, or what he terms the “DJ Doctrine,” has as its basis six central operating principles: 1) it is characterized by taking the strategic offensive; 2) it pursues “f lexible dualism” predicated on major changes in the sequential order of interKorean interactions; 3) it simultaneously pursues engagement and security through military deterrence; 4) it emphasizes international collaboration; 5) it requires domestic consensus; and 6) it pursues de facto “pseudo-unification.”1 The Sunshine Policy in its articulation and implementation led to the June 2000 inter-Korean summit, a symbolic breakthrough in inter-Korean relations that opened the way for renewed institutionalization of inter-Korean economic and humanitarian exchanges, cultural cooperation, and institutionalization of a ministerial dialogue. However, the joint declaration failed to address fundamental security issues between the two Koreas. Ultimately, the inter-Korean summit itself was incomplete in its effects, hobbled by two significant changes that constrained efforts to implement Kim’s policy vision in the second half of his administration. The first was a dramatic reversal in South Korea’s international environment and relations with the United States and Japan. U.S. policy toward North Korea changed in the direction of a more skeptical, even confrontational, approach compared to that of the Clinton administration. The renewal of Japan-ROK tensions as a result of controversies over history-related issues such as the approval of the Japanese government of a textbook that whitewashed Japan’s aggression during the Pacific War undermined significant improvements that Kim Dae-jung had initiated during his first meeting with Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo in 1998. Renewed tensions with Japan over history and textbook issues served to halt and in some cases reverse Kim Dae-jung’s

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reconciliation with Korea’s neighbors as part of his endeavors toward broader regional cooperation. The second major factor that hampered the implementation of Kim Dae-jung’s strategic choices was neglect of pressing domestic policy matters in South Korea, partially deriving from his intense focus on achieving progress and gaining international support for inter-Korean reconciliation. Failure to gain bipartisan support for the inter-Korean summit led to increasing domestic conflict, known as Nam-Nam galdung (South-South conflict) over aspects of policy toward North Korea that ultimately led to serious divisions over its implementation. In addition, revelations following the end of Kim’s term that the inter-Korean summit had been accompanied by payments of as much as $500 million of illegally transferred funds to the North tarnished his achievements and raised serious questions about the principles, costs of implementation, and results of the Sunshine Policy. This chapter focuses in detail on the strategic thinking of the Kim Dae-jung administration in five key areas: implementation of the Sunshine Policy, management of ROK-Japan reconciliation, development of Sino-South Korean relations, promotion of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, and handling of issues in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Attention is given to the contribution of both international and domestic factors in the implementation of these policies. In each case, Kim Daejung made substantial progress under a permissive international environment, but faced difficulties in the second stage of his administration due to changes in both the international and domestic environment. In tracing this pattern, the chapter provides data for further consideration regarding the relative influence of individual leadership, institutional constraints, and international structural conditions on South Korea’s strategic thought and the prospects for providing leadership as a middle power at the nexus of regional great powers. The Sunshine Policy and Strategic Thought in the Kim Dae-jung Administration Kim Dae-jung came to office with a clearly determined set of objectives that represented a new ordering of strategic priorities compared with those of past Korean presidents. Over the course of more than three decades, Kim had developed a vision for addressing the problem of Korea’s division and how to achieve national reconciliation, the issue that he had identified as the core strategic issue facing Korea since division into North and South in 1945. This resulted in a different set of

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priorities from those of his predecessors, who had viewed strategy within the context of an ongoing zero-sum competition for legitimacy with the North and through the lens of cold war dependence on alliance with the United States. In the post–cold war context, Kim’s vision was no longer out of reach since the level of international confrontation among Korea’s neighbors had been eased by the end of the cold war and the fruits of nordpolitik. The changed international context meant that Seoul could pursue inter-Korean reconciliation without having to face a strategic crossroads in its relationship with Washington; however Kim’s formulation did presume that Seoul should be in the driver’s seat for gradual inter-Korean reconciliation, with the interested powers—including the United States—pursuing supporting roles. While the Sunshine Policy was, arguably, a natural extension of nordpolitik, Kim had in mind a more cooperative means of achieving the core objective than encirclement as the vehicle by which to induce change. He sought dialogue as the basis for building trust between the two Koreas that would gradually lead the North to seek reform and integration with the outside world. His formula for unification was not based on a core strategy of winning the competition for legitimacy on the Korean peninsula. Instead, it focused on winning the North over through dialogue, cooperation, and persuasion to remove confrontation and open up possibilities for reform and pursuit of codevelopment with assistance from the South. Kim publicly ruled out unification by absorption as a possible end point, instead seeking a gradual process marked by negotiation, cooperation, and integration over the course of a long period of time through the mutually negotiated establishment of a Korean federation. In its initial stages, Kim’s approach was very much akin to Willy Brandt’s ostpolitik toward the former East Germany, and his timeline would require decades before unification. Ironically, the Korean financial crisis served to bolster such an approach by eliminating unification-by-absorption as a realistic possibility. It helped to produce a consensus among the South Korean public for engagement as a meaningful way of reducing tensions and promoting cooperation with North Korea. The resolution of the Korean financial crisis became the prerequisite for Kim Dae-jung to pursue his vision for inter-Korean reconciliation and for ending the cold war in Northeast Asia through the development of cooperative security and economic relationships with Korea at the center. Within two years, the South Korean economy under Kim’s administration had attracted record amounts of inward foreign direct investment, managed significant financial restructuring

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for debt-burdened Korean companies, promoted corporate governance reforms that drew to the Korean market significant portfolio investment, recovered Korean export-led manufacturing growth, placed Korea on a path to early payment of debt obligations, and begun to build a war chest of foreign reserves designed to ward off currency speculation by assuring that South Korea would have enough reserves to cover its debt obligations. Yet, the financial crisis did not mean a complete deferral of Kim’s dream of inter-Korean reconciliation. At his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, he announced a dramatic policy shift in the form of the Sunshine Policy, opening the way for the reestablishment of inter-Korean ties. Kim laid out the following principles: first, “we will not tolerate any military provocation of any kind”; second, “we do not have any intention to undermine or absorb North Korea”; and third, “we will actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation between the South and the North.” 2 In its initial stages, the focus of the Sunshine Policy was on the “separation of economy from politics,” the utilization of private sector led economic interaction as an entry point for efforts to build political trust and, eventually, the basis for political cooperation between the two Koreas. As Kim explained in his address to a joint session of Congress during his first official visit to the United States as president, “We are going to promote cooperation in a wide range of areas under the principle of separation of politics and economics . . . We hope such an approach gives North Korea psychological room to open its mind— and its doors.”3 The Hyundai Corporation chairman Chung Ju-young, who was born in North Korea, played an important role in securing the rights to development of the Mt. Gumgang area as a recreation zone for South Korean tourists. Kim Dae-jung’s close advisor and “architect” of the Sunshine Policy, Lim Dong-won, had worked at the Kim Dae-jung Peace Foundation after serving as a career bureaucrat through the early 1990s, at which time he lost a critical internal policy battle over how to engage the North following the signing of the Basic Agreement late in the Roh Tae-woo administration. Lim remained in key positions throughout Kim’s administration, first as a senior advisor at the Blue House, and later as head of the National Intelligence Service and Ministry of National Unification, the two branches of the South Korean bureaucracy most deeply involved in managing relations with the North. Kim Dae-jung was deeply aware of the need to synchronize the relationship between the international and inter-Korean aspects of confidence building, as was clearly illustrated in a May 5, 1999 CNN

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interview in which he listed five tasks to be undertaken as part of a reconciliation process with North Korea: 1) inter-Korean confrontation and distrust must be converted into reconciliation and cooperation; 2) the United States and Japan must improve their relations with North Korea; 3) the world community must create favorable conditions for North Korea to join it; 4) Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and nuclear weapons must be controlled and eliminated; and 5) a ceasefire regime should be replaced by a permanent peace regime. Together these steps would lead to a peaceful framework for Korean unification.4 The sequencing of steps laid out by Kim showed an awareness of the importance of keeping international and peninsular confidence building in synch, laying the conditions for institutionalization of a permanent peace regime for the Korean nation. One of the early points of contention in the political argument regarding the Sunshine Policy revolved around the extent to which there should be reciprocity in inter-Korean economic exchanges, and whether incentives to North Korea constituted a “reward” for North Korean bad behavior. This argument revealed different perspectives in South Korean strategic thought toward the North. The position of the South Korean government, as articulated by Foreign Minister Hong Soon-young, was as follows: The greatest criticism of engagement is that it is merely giving without taking. However, aside from purely humanitarian assistance, there is no such thing as one-way, indefinite giving in international relations. We have a clear purpose in trying to engage the North. But, “giving” and “taking” do not necessarily have to occur at the same time. There can be a time delay. The emphasis now is on giving, so as to demonstrate the goodness of our intentions to the North and to get engagement on track. Over time, however, engagement will be a give-and-take process.5

As time passed and South Korea gave more and more to the North, South Korean public support for engagement tended to revolve around the question of how the North was responding to magnanimity, but with an emphasis on a relatively loose form of reciprocity in view of the North’s strained circumstances. The Sunshine Policy also drew support from mainstream media outlets and many progressive NGOs who had a vested interest in supporting Kim Dae-jung’s approach. Public opinion became a critical factor in determining the pace, substance, and sustainability of the engagement process. 6 Although there were intense arguments within South Korea over the Sunshine Policy as it unfolded, the “liberal” and “realist” rationales for

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pursuing such a policy had converged. This explains why the public ultimately supported engagement of the North on a bipartisan basis, but strongly disagreed amongst themselves over its terms. Kim Daejung himself almost always presented a liberal rationale for pursuing it, arguing that the leadership in Pyongyang has finally recognized the “true intentions” of the Sunshine Policy and has decided that it is possible to trust South Korea. According to this rationale, unconditional giving is essential for showing good faith, and eventually North Korea will also respond in good faith as trust has been built between the two sides. The realist rationale was that engagement would induce economic dependency and thereby defang the North. This line of argumentation appealed to most conservatives, but was almost never used by the ROK government, no doubt partially in recognition that such a rationale would only intensify North Korean mistrust and hesitancy to engage with South Korea. Although Kim’s policies built on past South Korean efforts, including nordpolitik, the liberal justification for engagement was provocative to South Korean conservative elites who suspected that such arguments might be used to promote progressive ideology that would revolutionize South Korean politics and undermine national security. Despite bipartisan support for engagement, the partisan debate over rationales for engagement—and the failure of Kim Dae-jung to overcome partisanship in his pursuit of the North—led to the internal cleavages within the South that ultimately posed one of the most serious threats to the Sunshine Policy itself.7 To a certain extent, Kim had managed to bridge the political divide through a coalition with perennial political powerbroker Kim Jong-pil, head of the United Liberal Democratic party who became Kim Dae-jung’s prime minister. Yet, this coalition was clearly built on self-interest rather than ideology. The timing of the bombshell announcement of the summit itself took place less than seventy-two hours prior to the April 2000 National Assembly elections, leading opposition members of the GNP to believe that Kim was playing the “summit card” as a way to maximize the domestic political impact of the visit for partisan purposes. As a result of perceptions that the summit announcement was an instrument of politics, it became impossible for opposition party members to consider joining the inter-Korean summit. In the end, Kim’s failure to bring along any member of the opposition GNP as part of his delegation to Pyongyang illustrated the failure to build bipartisan support for his initiative to engage North Korea. Although there was a euphoric mood among many at the time of the summit on June 13–15, 2000, between

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Kim Dae-jung and Chairman of the Central Defense Commission Kim Jong-il, and in response to the North-South Joint Declaration, many conservatives were concerned that the public was dropping its guard. The summit succeeded in reestablishing a range of cultural and economic exchanges and regularizing inter-Korean ministerial and economic-focused meetings along with regular meetings in a highly controlled environment among divided families from North and South Korea, but the most serious trust-building measures were not on the agenda. As time passed, it became apparent that the North’s insistence on cash infusions was a prerequisite for most cultural exchanges to proceed. Based on momentum gained from the June summit, Kim focused almost single-mindedly on building international support for interKorean reconciliation, a factor that further fueled partisan opposition at home. To the extent that he failed to resolve tough domestic issues such as labor-management difficulties, the effects of growing personal credit card debt, the failure to deepen democratization, or the need to implement reforms in the public health system to separate the roles of physicians and pharmacists, domestic public opinion turned against Kim for spending too much time on international and North-South affairs. The perception grew that the inter-Korean summit had become a staging ground for a campaign to win the Nobel Peace Prize rather than a vehicle for achieving true reconciliation even as it distracted Kim from effective governance. The inter-Korean summit led to a brief flurry of activity between the United States and the DPRK at the end of the Clinton administration in what looked like an effort to retake the initiative from Kim Daejung. In October 2000, there was an exchange of high-level visits, including a welcome to the DPRK’s highest-ranking military officer, Cho Myong-rok, at the White House and a trip by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Pyongyang for the highest-level discussions ever involving the United States and the DPRK. Kim Jong-il joined her in a joint communiqué agreeing to discussions regarding North Korea’s missile program, but these discussions floundered along with hopes of a Clinton visit to Pyongyang in the context of the drawn out 2000 U.S. election imbroglio. George W. Bush had a different perspective on engaging North Korea that was ultimately fatal to the Sunshine Policy. Some members of his administration were deeply skeptical of the Agreed Framework, and rumors spread that perhaps the DPRK was not keeping up its end of the deal by pursuing covertly means to achieve a nuclear weapons

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program. Most career diplomats and observers of the incoming administration did not understand how deeply held the core perceptions of Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were regarding the DPRK and Kim Jong-il, who was perceived as a dictator who had failed to take care of his people. Even members of the Department of State who had been directly involved with Korean policy presumed that politics would not necessarily affect policy, and that the Bush administration would pursue the core of Clinton’s approach to North Korea, but perhaps with a harsher rhetorical edge. Kim Dae-jung concluded that a quick trip to Washington and personal appeal to Bush might be helpful. Kim believed in the legitimacy of his vision of reconciliation with the North and in his own capacity to convince Bush to follow the Sunshine Policy. After all, South Korean-led reconciliation would also serve to bring Pyongyang into a more normal relationship with the rest of the world. That logic had worked at the Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) held in Seoul in the fall of 2000, where Kim had successfully persuaded most of the European Union to support the Sunshine Policy by normalizing relations with North Korea. Soon thereafter, Kim had been selected for the Nobel Peace Prize, further boosting his confidence and standing. In March 2001, however, his approach turned out to be sorely mistaken. Despite positive meetings with Secretary Powell, who had publicly signaled prior to Kim’s meeting with the president that the Clinton administration’s core policies might be continued, Bush publicly expressed his skepticism toward Kim Jong-il, even as he promised to conduct a policy review. Thus began the unraveling of the positive international environment that Kim had tried to create. Even more than the effects of 9/11, Bush’s rebuff of Kim Dae-jung (and his vision) signaled a turning point in coordination on policy toward the North. It frustrated Kim’s effort to use international support to pressure Kim Jong-il to come to Seoul for a follow-up summit. There would be no further strategic breakthrough in the implementation of the Sunshine Policy. Reconciliation with Japan and Strategic Thought Kim attempted to make a major breakthrough in relations with Japan during his initial visit to Tokyo in October 1998. In light of Japan’s imperialist aggression, Kim’s decision to set aside the past should Japan do likewise and create a foundation for better relations was a significant effort to address longstanding problems. This statesmanship was based on a strategic decision to set aside “face” in favor of constructive,

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future-oriented ties, but new obstacles arose in the latter half of Kim’s term from South Korean public opinion in response to a hardening of the position of the government of Japan on historical issues During Kim’s summit with Obuchi Keizo, the two leaders put historical differences aside, creating the basis for more cooperative diplomatic relations. With Obuchi’s expression of “remorseful repentance and heartfelt apology” for Japan’s colonial rule of Korea, the two focused in the Joint Korea-Japan Declaration of a New Partnership for the 21st Century on building a “future-oriented relationship based on a spirit of reconciliation and friendship.” They agreed to enhanced exchanges and dialogue, working together to secure the post–cold war world order, promote international economic cooperation, and address various global issues, while agreeing to encourage North Korea to “take a more constructive posture through dialogues for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.” Kim expressed appreciation for Japan’s loans and other economic assistance to overcome the financial crisis. Both acknowledged the need to conclude a South Korea-Japan fisheries agreement, a treaty on the avoidance of double taxation, and an environmental policy dialogue, while pledging to cooperate in cohosting the 2002 World Cup. 8 After returning to Seoul, Kim made it clear that he would be vigilant against future statements by Japan’s leadership that contravened the spirit of the Joint Declaration as he followed through on commitments to open the Korean market in stages to Japanese cultural products such as films, concerts, and music that had long been restricted. This declaration paved the way for the development of more active ties between the two governments, including the promotion of regular exchanges among military institutions. This step toward reconciliation was particularly helpful in the context of American efforts to coordinate policies toward North Korea under the auspices of Special Coordinator for Policy toward North Korea William Perry. Due to the improvement in the Japan-ROK relationship, it was possible to establish the high-level Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) in early 1999 initially led by Perry, South Korean National Security Advisor Lim Dong-won, and senior Japanese representative Kato Ryozo. The Joint Japan-Korea Declaration established a stable framework through which it was possible to promote coordination and to deal with problems that arose, as when Prime Minister Mori quickly apologized for insensitive remarks when he had referred to Japan as a “divine nation” in May 2000, and Japanese public statements claiming Dokdo/ Takeshima were downplayed by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs during the fall of 2000. Yet, in early 2001, the Japanese Ministry of Education indicated that it would approve a revisionist textbook that whitewashed Japanese atrocities during World War II. In response, the National Assembly passed a resolution condemning the history book, but South Korean public opinion demanded stronger actions at a time when Kim’s popularity in South Korea was under siege. Although Kim tried to play down the textbook row by expressing his disappointment with the government of Japan while attempting to preserve the framework for a positive relationship, the public’s reaction resulted in the suspension of many local-level and nongovernmental exchanges with Japan, even leading to the temporary recall of the ambassador to Japan Choi Sang-yong in protest. In the end, the textbook in question was actually adopted by less than 1 percent of all school districts, but South Korean public sensitivities pressed the government to take more stringent steps than had been anticipated.9 The South Korean government continued to take measures to protest the adoption of the history textbook issue with the newly chosen Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro, but his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 13, 2001, introduced yet another challenge to the 1998 understanding. In his National Liberation Day speech on August 15, Kim asserted that “History does not only concern the past, but also things present and things yet to come,” backtracking from prior efforts to put the history issue aside based on an emerging assessment in Seoul that Japan had not been sincere in its pledges to implement the 1998 Joint Declaration.10 Kim Dae-jung faced a different international environment after Koizumi became Japan’s leader in combination with the policies of the newly elected Bush administration. Despite temporary optimism in the summer of 2002 when Bush appeared to be ready to resume dialogue with North Korea and when Koizumi announced that he would travel to Pyongyang, in Kim’s final months in office, Bush was accusing the North of violating its agreement and preparing for unilateral action in the shadow of his war plans for Iraq, while Japanese were becoming highly aroused over Kim Jong-il’s admitted abductions of their fellow citizens. These developments brought to an end Kim Dae-jung’s engagement with North Korea. As U.S. and Japanese policies came into rough alignment, the South’s engagement efforts were the odd man out. All that Kim Dae-jung could do was to keep expressing his hope for a policy reversal by the United States—and cooperation with Japan—that would be necessary to move forward in inter-Korean relations. Kim had taken tremendous political risks to establish a stable framework for relations with Japan, but in the end he was frustrated with the

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perceived failure on its part to respond correctly to overcome historical grievances. Even after he stepped down from the presidency, Kim expressed his desire for Japan to come to terms with its own history in very direct terms during a program held on May 23, 2005, at the University of Tokyo. “Japanese people must not look away from the historical issues that Japan has with Korea and China but instead should deal with it head on. You should admit the wrongs that were done as we also hope for a new start (in the relations),” Kim admonished his audience.11 Unfortunately, Kim’s presentation was overshadowed by news of Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi’s decision to snub Koizumi during her visit to Japan in response to his public statement that justified his continued visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.12 Kim’s efforts to promote forwardlooking relations with Japan were based primarily on his perception of what would be necessary to gain international support for inter-Korean reconciliation, not for the inherent value of these bilateral ties for regional stability. Sino-South Korean Relations and Strategic Thought In order to position South Korea to play a leading role in inter-Korean reconciliation, Kim Dae-jung understood that support from China would be particularly important. Nordpolitik had achieved the objective of normalization of diplomatic relations with China, and Kim Youngsam’s joint proposal with Bill Clinton to establish four-party talks had laid the groundwork for multilateral cooperation with China on issues related to North Korea. In addition, Sino-South Korean bilateral trade grew at double-digit rates throughout the 1990s and South Korean firms increasingly saw China as an attractive destination for foreign investment to take advantage of cheaper labor costs. China was attractive politically too, as a means of achieving more equal relations with the United States. Following trips to Washington and Tokyo, Kim Daejung visited Beijing in November 1998 as the next step in consolidating an expanded partnership through a joint communiqué entitled “SinoROK Cooperative Partnership for the 21st Century.” Building on improving Sino-ROK relations, Kim Dae-jung’s emphasis was to reassure the North that this would not be detrimental to it, while Jiang Zemin underscored Beijing’s willingness to play an active, constructive role in supporting inter-Korean relations.13 China supported the Sunshine Policy and reaffirmed that maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula was the core of its policy. It welcomed efforts to enhance mutual trust through inter-Korean dialogue and pledged to

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promote reconciliation. In October 2000 this “cooperative partnership” was elevated to an all-around cooperative partnership during Zhu Rongji’s state visit to South Korea in conjunction with the ASEM meetings.14 In light of the inter-Korean summit developments, China signaled its willingness to further expand its cooperation with South Korea to include political cooperation. Kim Dae-jung’s strategic thinking toward China had two direct inf luences that were both welcomed in Beijing. First, the Sunshine Policy helped China avoid conf lict in relations with the two Koreas since a fundamental premise underlying reconciliation is that it removes the basis for a competitive relationship between Pyongyang and Seoul and also the need to choose between the two. Second, a prerequisite of the Sunshine Policy was the need for a benign international security environment, thus prioritizing regional stability as an important condition for promoting inter-Korean reconciliation. Given China’s priority for continued economic development, this brought Chinese and South Korean foreign policies into alignment and created room for political cooperation and multilateral consultations on security issues involving the North. An indirect benefit that became a subject of discussion after the inter-Korean summit and drew China’s close attention was the possibility that independent efforts of the two Koreas in pursuit of reunification might have the effect of diminishing the strength of the U.S.-South Korean military alliance and eventually pushing U.S. forces off the peninsula. Kim Dae-jung was, of course, careful not to suggest this, given his desire for both China and the United States to give their full support to his initiatives. Ironically, Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Beijing and the consolidation of improved Sino-South Korean relations, almost at the same time as Jiang Zemin’s November 1998 visit to Japan, may have inadvertently contributed to strains in Sino-Japanese relations. If Jiang had visited Tokyo as originally scheduled in August of 1998 (that visit was delayed due to the impact of serious flooding in China), Kim would not have already visited Tokyo and Beijing and established a bar for reconciliation with Tokyo that Beijing was not willing to meet. Likewise, South Korea’s steady improvement of relations with China came in the context of volatility in the U.S.-China relationship, for example, Zhu Rongji’s difficult visit to Washington in 1998 failed to yield a breakthrough in negotiations over China’s WTO membership, and the accidental bombing of China’s Embassy in Belgrade early in 1999 unleashed vituperative Chinese criticisms of the United States, but none of these f luctuations in relations with Japan and the United States had spillover

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effects in Sino-ROK relations. In fact, one American scholar observed during this period that the success of Sino-South Korean economic engagement might be a model on how to gain strategic benefits of cooperation with China on issues related to North Korea.15 Regionalism and Strategic Thought Another component of Kim Dae-jung’s international relations strategy was a vision for regional cooperation in East Asia. This cooperation would be stimulated directly by the “dismantling of the cold war structure” on the Korean peninsula, making it a transit corridor within Asia rather than the end of the line. Interest in regional reconciliation, therefore, was directly connected with the concept of national reconciliation, as the dividing lines that marked the Korean peninsula, and therefore East Asia, would disintegrate in favor of a major expansion of economic prosperity derived from new opportunities for regional economic growth. This regional perspective served to expand international support for Kim’s policy toward North Korea as well as to promote his aspirations for a leadership role in regional and international affairs. At his first ASEAN 1 3 meeting, Kim proposed the formation of an East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), consisting of intellectuals from the ASEAN 1 3 countries to suggest how “to nurture East Asia into a single community of cooperation.”16 Approval meant that he was assigned the job of preparing the vision group’s statement, which became the basis for the East Asian Study Group (EASG) that followed, a working group of government officials at the level of directorsgeneral, and for initiatives that established the East Asian Summit (EAS) and the goal of an East Asian Community (EAC) after Kim Dae-jung left office. Regional cooperation was conducive to visualization of a peaceful region that is a prerequisite for the achievement of inter-Korean reconciliation. When Kim proposed the EAVG, he recognized that progress would require positive relations with Japan and China (as well as the United States). He supported the establishment of the “1 3” meeting among Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean leaders on the sidelines of the ASEAN 1 3 meeting from 1999 as a way to spur greater cooperation in Northeast Asia. In support of these initiatives, South Koreans have actively encouraged a range of functional cooperative activities, including ongoing research by economic organizations on how to promote three-way economic relations, active South Korean interest in the formation of a China-South Korea-Japan free trade agreement

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(FTA), cooperation in the area of information technology, and the establishment of a regular trilateral meeting among environmental ministers from the three countries. All of these initiatives were designed to dampen the major-power rivalries that had proved to be so costly to Korea at the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, formation of a regional security community in Northeast Asia would conform to realist logic for a middle power such as South Korea surrounded by great powers. Any cooperative body encompassing Northeast Asia would give it an equal place at the table with larger powers and an opportunity to influence regional discussions that otherwise would minimize its role. Seoul was the venue for the second ASEM in the year 2000, providing an opportunity for Kim to host twenty-four world leaders. Coming just a few months after the inter-Korean summit, it served Kim’s candidacy for the Nobel Peace Prize as well as his interest in having European countries normalize relations with North Korea as a way of promoting its integration into the international community. Kim personally promoted the vision of a unified Korean peninsula as the gateway for expanded Asian cooperation with Europe through a reconnected railway from Busan through North Korea to Vladivostok and then the Trans-Siberian Railway and on to the terminus at Rotterdam, which he termed the “iron silk railroad” between Europe and Asia. Government studies projected that this railway to Europe would save time and money from current sea transportation to Europe. Kim’s administration also stimulated interest in regional energy cooperation, promoting oil and gas pipelines from Siberia and the Russian Far East to South Korea. According to these schemes, North Korea could receive energy assistance and transit fees for pipelines crossing its territory without running huge risks that might otherwise come from opening up the country. This idea encouraged Russia to become more involved while reducing North Korean anxieties. Kim Dae-jung committed South Korean peacekeepers to the stabilization of East Timor following unrest there, barely convincing the South Korean National Assembly to support the operation. In its waning days, his administration promoted the concept of South Korea as a financial, logistics, and economic hub for Northeast Asia, an idea that the successor Roh Moo-hyun administration took and promoted as its own. Riding the boost in national confidence derived from the South Korean national performance in the jointly hosted World Cup in the final year of his administration, Kim touted a hope that the South Korean economy could become one of the top four economies in the

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world, matching South Korea’s semi-final performance in World Cup competition. Grandiose thinking was characteristic of his presidency to positive strategic effect at times, but by the end of his tenure suggesting an unwillingness to stick to ideas that were strategic. One threat to the promotion of a Korea-centered regionalism is that despite South Korea’s heavy trade dependence and highly interdependent export-driven economy, the psychology of national protection still remains strong. South Korean labor responded with skepticism to the forces of globalization, including penetration of the South Korean economy by foreign capital and investment, and the Korean labor culture of entitlement, protected by regular rounds of strikes and intimidation, and characterized by significant demands for wages and a voice in management, runs the risk of making the price of Korean-made manufactures uncompetitive in the international markets. This tension between the export dependence of the chaebol and the demands of labor was brought under control in the context of the financial crisis at the beginning of the Kim Dae-jung administration, but as time went on and South Korea experienced economic recovery, it became increasingly difficult to gain cooperation from labor to participate in a dialogue as part of the tripartite committee, including representatives from labor, management, and government. The irony was that Kim’s power and public support diminished, due to scandals that even reached into his family, as South Korea gradually recovered from the financial crisis and the situation returned to business as usual. Extended strikes imperiled its export performance, and public discontent grew in the aftermath of the financial crisis on perceptions that the politically sensitive gap between rich and poor had widened and charges of mismanagement of the economy. A second threat to regionalism emerged as Japan’s relations with South Korea and China started to deteriorate in the second half of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency. In addition, the Bush administration was distinctly uninterested in Asian regionalism, and became distracted and obsessed following 9/11 with the war on terror to the exclusion of all other matters. With its greater skepticism communicated especially to Japan, the momentum for Asian regionalism and prospects for American support for inter-Korean rapprochement were slipping away, and this reverberated in Koizumi’s decisions to ally closely with Bush. Even prior to 9/11, Japanese officials had noticed that senior officials in the Bush administration were applying a policy toward North and South Korea of “benign neglect,” and this only intensified.

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The U.S.-South Korean Alliance and Strategic Thought At the time of Kim Dae-jung’s election in December 1997, the immediate priority of the United States was to confirm Kim’s commitment to implementing the IMF-led reforms deemed necessary to respond to the Korean financial crisis. Treasury Undersecretary David Lipton was dispatched to Seoul immediately following the election for a crucial meeting with Kim, where Kim signed a deal referred to by some as “IMF Plus,” in which South Korea would receive necessary loans and financial assistance in return for drastic liberalization of the economy, including opening the financial sector to outside investment. Clinton also welcomed the Sunshine Policy as an approach supportive of the Agreed Framework and a basis on which it would be possible to strengthen inter-Korean contacts in support of South Korea’s leading role in the light water reactor project. It put South Korean policy more in line with the Clinton approach to North Korea than had been that of his predecessor Kim Young-sam. Yet, the U.S. position in late 1998 was in flux, combining the provision of food aid to stabilize the North’s economy with suspicions that North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework by developing a suspect nuclear site at Gumchang-ri and the fallout from the North Korean launch of a multistage Taepodong rocket over the Sea of Japan that dramatized North Korea’s growing ballistic missile capabilities. These incidents had eroded confidence in the U.S. Congress in Clinton’s approach to the extent that the Congress called for a review of U.S. policy toward the North. In response, Clinton appointed former Defense Secretary William Perry as Special Coordinator for Policy toward North Korea. Perry engaged in consultations with South Korean and Japanese counterparts, including Kim Dae-jung, and came to the conclusion that greater policy coordination was needed among the United States, South Korea, and Japan to reinforce efforts to draw North Korea out and integrate it with the outside world. Kim was able to convince the United States, through the Perry process, to synchronize its policy with the Sunshine Policy and to try engagement with North Korea instead of escalating confrontation. In response to U.S. concerns, South Korea accepted the principle that nuclear and missile issues must be managed as part of a negotiated engagement process—indeed, it became clear these issues had to be resolved in some fashion before it would be possible for an engagement process to go forward to any significant degree. Kim’s recognition that the success of inter-Korean engagement was inextricably related to the

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international context—backed by strong coordination that had the effect of further limiting Pyongyang’s alternatives—gave him the confidence to seek support for the DPRK to normalize its relationships with Japan and the United States. In turn, U.S. efforts to resolve doubts about the Gumchang-ri site through inspections in return for additional food aid and to gain from DPRK a moratorium on future missile tests were essential for the Sunshine Policy to go forward. A major issue that arose in the context of the inter-Korean summit was how the U.S.-ROK security alliance may be affected by the South’s reconciliation with North Korea. Kim’s vision of multilateral security cooperation ultimately envisioned the “dismantlement of the cold war structure” on the Korean peninsula, but whether such a vision requires the dissolution of the alliance relationship or simply its refashioning for broader purposes—perhaps as a platform for pursuing enhanced multilateral security dialogue—is an issue that has remained unclear and sharply contested in South Korea’s own political discourse. Despite this debate, Kim consistently argued that a continued U.S. troop presence would be desirable even in the context of a unified Korean peninsula. Kim often recounted his private conversations with Kim Jong-il on the future of the U.S. troop presence, noting that the latter did not contradict his assertions that the U.S. troop presence was useful as a vehicle for ensuring regional stability where major powers have historically striven against each other for supremacy with negative effects for Korea. Despite North Korean public statements opposing the U.S. troop presence, there have been private hints over the past decade that it does not necessarily oppose U.S. forward deployments in Asia—as long as the DPRK is not their primary target. However, the inter-Korean summit brought to the fore within South Korea serious issues relating to the U.S.-ROK security relationship. Many NGOs and citizen groups interpreted the advent of inter-Korean rapprochement as precisely the moment when the purpose and structure of the U.S. force presence should be publicly questioned, although most of the grievances raised have far more to do with the perceived need for adjustments arising from changes in the South rather than from any change in the North’s behavior or intentions. A number of incidents involving the U.S. forces and a shift in South Korean public opinion toward the U.S. military presence following the summit reinforced the longstanding need to address local irritations and inconveniences resulting from the configuration of these forces. Some questioned whether the Kim Daejung administration paid sufficient attention to these issues following

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his visit to Pyongyang, although he eventually made clear statements in support of a continued presence for these forces even beyond unification. Kim remained an active supporter of the alliance despite the negative turn in U.S. views of North Korea with the advent of the Bush administration. In fact, he had built his vision of inter-Korean reconciliation squarely on the assumption that U.S. reconciliation with North Korea must also occur. Even after his failure to persuade Bush to back his policy in March 2001 left his policy at an impasse, Kim never chose to take actions in opposition to the United States or to pursue ties with the North outside of the context of U.S.-ROK alliance coordination. Following 9/11, Kim continued to support the United States in the war on terror even while recognizing that the supportive international environment for inter-Korean reconciliation was eroding. Kim’s strategic thinking never envisioned sustainable inter-Korean reconciliation in the absence of full U.S. support. Conclusion Under Kim Dae-jung South Korea drastically refashioned strategic thinking regarding how to approach relations with the North as well as how to put forward a hopeful vision for regional reconciliation and cooperation with Japan, and by extension for East Asian regionalism. This vision of inter-Korean reconciliation and East Asian cooperation remained firmly based on alliance coordination with a United States that espoused the same liberal vision of cooperation and integration in East Asia. Kim made significant progress in achieving these objectives during the first half of his administration, overcoming a severe financial crisis, providing a positive framework for a futureoriented relationship with Japan, establishing a constructive partnership based on rapid expansion of economic opportunities with China, promoting a vision of regional community building through sponsorship of the EAVG, and coordinating effectively with an American administration that sympathized with Kim’s liberal vision of international community-building. During the second half of his presidency, however, the international environment for Kim Dae-jung’s vision of reconciliation on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia deteriorated. Relations with the Bush administration suffered in the face of significant differences in worldview; yet Kim himself remained committed to bridging differences in the context of alliance management. At the same time, the emergence of history

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textbook and territorial issues under Koizumi served to unravel the framework for South Korean-Japanese cooperation that had been set during Kim’s historic summit meeting with Obuchi. The war on terror and eventually, the revelation that North Korea indeed had begun to pursue a covert nuclear program brought the implementation of the Sunshine Policy to a standstill, although inter-Korean dialogue and economic cooperation remained in place. Following the inter-Korean summit, domestic support for Kim’s vision also proved to be limited. His neglect of critical domestic policy issues resulting from his single-minded priority on reconciliation and his failure to establish a bipartisan basis upon which to pursue the summit interacted with popular frustration that domestic politics remained unresponsive to rising expectations for performance. The South Korean public itself was increasingly discontent and divided, as the inter-Korean summit raised a whole host of questions related to the North that brought to the surface longstanding divisions within society. This polarization coincided with the deepening of democracy and freedom of expression, not only affecting every aspect of relations with North Korea but also having a direct inf luence on popular perceptions of the U.S.South Korean alliance. Although both the international environment and domestic politics proved to be key variables in determining the parameters of South Korean strategic thought and limits on its implementation, it is important to note the role of a single leader, that is, Kim himself, in remaking South Korea’s strategic orientation and objectives. His personal leadership clearly made a difference in the way South Korea defined and pursued its strategic objectives—with both positive and negative ramifications for South Korean strategic thought. To some extent, he was ahead of his time in attempting to shape matters rather than reacting to a global and regional context that accepted the status quo represented by a divided Korean peninsula, as he single-mindedly focused on the conditions necessary to achieve reconciliation. But his greatest strengths as a national leader also carried with them the seeds of failure. As a prodemocracy activist, Kim failed to gain bipartisan support for his central policy initiative, pursuing it in such a single-minded, top-down fashion that it appeared he had placed personal ambition for a Nobel Peace Prize above South Korea’s national security needs and substituted expediency and bribery for a principled stance toward advance work conducive to a summit. It is also important to recognize the role of South Korea’s middle power status in Northeast Asia as a factor influencing strategic thinking.

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On the one hand, South Korean economic influence as an industrialized nation in the late 1990s had grown sufficiently that even Chinese leaders went to Seoul to discover the secrets of its economic success. Even after the financial crisis it was not long before South Korea again demonstrated its economic inf luence. Moreover, its political inf luence, although less than that of the great powers active in the region, was not negligible. Under Kim South Korea attempted to maximize its international standing, especially through efforts to convince the world to support inter-Korean reconciliation and economic opening in North Korea. However, in the context of Northeast Asia, South Korean political inf luence remained limited and contingent on the actions of its larger neighbors. Repeatedly, in 2001–02 Kim Dae-jung confronted the limits of this inf luence. Especially after his string of successes in 1998– 2000 in dealing with each of the powers and with North Korea, the sharp turnaround proved deeply frustrating. The task of expanding South Korea’s strategic freedom of action in ways that it could set the international agenda decisively rather than remain in a reactive position vis-à-vis its larger and more inf luential neighbors remained a tantalizing objective that ultimately proved to be beyond Kim’s—and South Korea’s—grasp.

Notes 1. The author would like to acknowledge the support of Stanford University’s Shorenstein Asia Pacific Research Center, where he conducted this research as a visiting Pantech Fellow during 2005–06. 2. Chung-in Moon, “Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula,” in Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg, eds., Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp. 35–56. 3. The New York Times, February 23, 1998, p. 8. 4. Republic of Korea President Kim Dae Jung, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress,” June 10, 1998. 5. See Koh Yu Hwan, “Cooperation Between North and South for Establishing Peace Regime in the Korean Peninsula,” presented at Dongguk University 100th Anniversary International Conference on “The DMZ’s Ecology and Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” May 2–4, 2005, Seoul, South Korea, p. 48. See also, “Kim Daejung’s Live Interview with CNN,” The Korea Times, May 5, 1999. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource.gov, June 4, 2006. 6. See Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Hong Soon-young, “Changing Dynamics in Northeast Asia and the Republic of Korea’s Engagement Policy

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8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

13. 14. 15.

16. 17.

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Toward North Korea,” The XXVIIth Williamsburg Conference, Jeju Island, ROK, May 7, 1999, published by The Asia Society, 1999, p. 20. For more on the ups and downs of South Korean public opinion and its relationship to inter-Korean relations during the Kim Dae Jung administration, see Scott Snyder, “The End of History, the Rise of Ideology, and the Future of Democracy on the Korean Peninsula,” Journal of East Asian Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2 (2003), pp. 199–224. For further detail on political divisions in South Korea, their history, and their effects, see Hahm Chaibong, “The Two Koreas: A House Divided,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer 2005), p. 57. “Unofficial ‘Text’ of Joint Declaration,” The Korea Times, October 8, 1998. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource.gov, June 4, 2006. “ROK Envoy to Japan Notes Japanese Government Cannot Avert Responsibility for Textbooks,” Yonhap News Agency, April 13, 2001, and “Anti-Japanese Sentiment Revived by Japan’s Approval of Textbook,” April 15, 2001. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource.gov, June 4, 2006. “ROK President Expresses Disappointment With Japan in Liberation Day Speech,” Yonhap News Agency, August 15, 2001. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource.gov, June 4, 2006. “Ex-South Korean President Urges Japan to Face History,” Kyodo World Service, May 23, 2005. Accessed via Open Source Center, www.opensource. gov, June 4, 2006. The Washington Post, May 25, 2005, p. 23. “ROK-China Partnership Not Intended to Isolate NK,” The Korea Times, November 12, 1998. Piao Jianyi, “China’s Policy toward the ROK: An All-Around Cooperative Partnership,” unpublished paper sent via communication with author, January 2006. See Victor D. Cha, “Engaging China: Seoul-Beijing Détente and Korean Security,” Survival, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring 1999), pp. 73–95. As quoted in Paul Kelly, “The mega-tiger is now our main game,” The Australian, March 8, 2000. Accessed via Open Source Center, www. opensource.gov, June 4, 2006.

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CHAPTER 5

Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Roh Moo-hyun Era Seong-Ho Sheen

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his chapter examines South Korean strategic thinking under Roh Moo-hyun and how it was implemented in dealing with key issues in East Asia: North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, the rise of China, the unresolved history issue with Japan, and alliance restructuring with the United States. Formulating a national security strategy requires defining a nation’s most important priorities, how much they are wanted, what are the sources of possible threats, what means are available, alternative time frames and costs.1 Each country’s national security strategy is shaped by: political objectives; diplomatic, economic, and military resources; historical experience; geography; culture and ideology; the political system; military technology; and so on. 2 Inheriting the Sunshine Policy of Kim Dae-jung and the fallout of the nuclear standoff centering on the Bush administration and Kim Jong-il’s regime, Roh faced a difficult strategic environment. Under Roh South Korea initiated a systemic, strategic approach to national security. High on his agenda was the goal of building a transparent decision-making process within the government in place of independent directives from the president or insider politics. Rather than resorting to behind-the-scenes discussions with only a handful of advisors, Roh established committees under the presidential office comprised of experts from the government, the private sector, and academia to conduct open discussions and debate the policy agenda. The national security strategy was to be formulated through the involvement of these

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experts. For this, Roh expanded and strengthened the National Security Council (NSC) Advisor’s office, recruiting dozens of new members. Previously this office was a one-man post of advisor to the president. Under Roh, a staff was added from various sectors of the government, including the foreign and defense ministries, and from academia, and placed under a powerful director, who had daily consultations with the president. In March 2004 a year after Roh took office, the NSC office published a national security guideline, presenting a comprehensive strategic vision. Entitled “Peace, Prosperity and National Security: Security Policy Initiative of the Participatory Government,” this was the first ever official document on South Korea’s national security strategy by the presidential office.3 It provides an important insight into Roh’s strategic thinking toward East Asia and the world, as do the details on the Blue House web site fully covering all of the presidential speeches, cabinet meeting records, policy briefings, and so forth. South Korea’s strategy under Roh represents new thinking in foreign policy toward Asia and the world. He was elected as the sixteenth president of South Korea in December 2002, winning a tight race by appealing to popular anti-American sentiment. In his campaign, he portrayed himself as more independent of American inf luence than his opponent, Lee Hoi-chang, a conservative from the GNP. His approach attracted young and progressive voters who at the time were staging large-scale anti-American demonstrations over the death of two schoolgirls in an accident involving an American military vehicle. Roh promised that, once elected, he would demand more equal relations with the United States. Thus, his election signaled a drastic departure from the traditional foreign policy and strategic thinking centered on the importance of the U.S.-South Korean alliance, raising the stakes in thinking on Asia. Instead of emphasizing a strong bilateral relationship with the United States, Roh called for building a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asian community as one of his three most important goals.4 By “establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula,” he expected economic prosperity in Northeast Asia to follow. South Korea would assume a central role as “a Northeast Asian hub” between China and Japan. Also part of Roh’s thinking was a plan to build an “Advanced, Self-Reliant National Defense” capability.5 In pursing these goals Roh put as the priority inter-Korean reconciliation, including peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. The government would seek “cooperative self-reliant defense” and “balanced and pragmatic diplomacy.”6 Building a self-defense capability and readjusting the alliance were

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recognized as preconditions as well as costs that South Korea had to bear in order to achieve its long-term strategic goals. Peace on the Korean Peninsula: North Korea and Nuclear Development Building a peace regime on the Korean peninsula became an urgent policy goal.7 Indeed, peace on the peninsula and prosperity in Northeast Asia became the two pillars of Roh’s national strategy. Given North Korea’s nuclear development, peace on the peninsula was the more immediate task, requiring pursuit of two intertwined goals: interKorean reconciliation and peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. North Korea’s nuclear problem could and should be solved only by peaceful engagement with positive incentives rather than pressure through the threat or use of punishment. The two goals, in turn, were important steps toward ultimate unification of the two Koreas, which would then play a role of peacemaker/balancer in Northeast Asia. North Korea’s nuclear development presented a serious challenge. After the 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea, true peace on the peninsula seemed finally within reach, especially under Kim Dae-jung when the two Koreas held their first ever summit in 2000. Bill Clinton almost went to Pyongyang after North Korean Vice Marshal Cho Myong-rok’s visit to Washington in October 2000 followed by Secretary of State Madeline Albright’s visit to Pyongyang in the same month. However ties between Washington and Pyongyang began to unravel with the arrival of the Bush administration in 2001, to the extent that North Korea denounced Bush’s “axis of evil” speech as “little short of declaring war.”8 The nuclear standoff between North Korea and the United States was in full swing during the last month of Roh’s election campaign. After the United States confronted it over a secret uranium enrichment program in October 2002, the North turned off all the monitoring equipment at its nuclear facility at Yongbyon and expelled IAEA inspectors in December. During his campaign, Roh made the nuclear issue a focal point by arguing that Korea is at the crossroads between war and peace,9 warning that his opponent could lead the nation into a war with his hard-line approach toward the North. He emphasized that only diplomacy could prevent war and lead to a peaceful solution. The following month, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the NPT and insisted that only bilateral talks with the United States could resolve the conf lict, restarting the

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nuclear reactor in February right before Roh’s inauguration. With Bush refusing to hold bilateral talks with the North and ratcheting up the pressure unilaterally, Roh took office at the height of a full-blown crisis over which South Koreans felt they had little say. In dealing with the nuclear crisis, Roh adopted three principles: no nuclear North Korea, peaceful resolution through dialogue, and South Korea plays a leading role in the process.10 On occasion he emphasized that the South would not allow the North to become a nuclear power, asking the North during the campaign to stop its nuclear program as soon as possible.11 In his inauguration speech, Roh declared that North Korea’s nuclear development should not be allowed, insisting that it had a choice between economic prosperity and total isolation, depending on whether it would give up the nuclear program.12 Yet, Roh was reluctant to force Pyongyang to make the hard decision. Along with no nuclear North Korea, Roh favored dialogue and opposed pressure, making it clear that any kind of military tension should be avoided.13 This emphasis on peace was translated into strong opposition to any policy that might heighten tension with the North. Roh once said, “the U.S. wants us to join it in severing dialogue and exchanges with North Korea and put pressure on the North . . . We, however, think it is more favorable for us to adopt a strategy of dialogue and engage North Korea concurrently.”14 Roh continued the Sunshine Policy through economic cooperation and humanitarian aid, giving the North Korean regime little need to worry about isolation. From the beginning, Roh made it clear that he would continue the policies of his predecessor, praising him for contributing to peace on the Korean peninsula and repeating the position that Seoul does not want the collapse of the North Korean regime.15 He kept on Unification Minister Jeong Se-hyun, the only member of Kim Dae-jung’s cabinet to retain his post. The appointment of Lee Jong-seok as a key figure in the NSC and later as Unification Minister was seen as another indication of Roh’s drive for inter-Korean reconciliation. A North Korea specialist by training, Lee had been Roh’s close aide during the presidential campaign and a staunch advocate of engagement with the North since the Kim Dae-jung administration.16 Accordingly, Roh aggressively pursed a policy of institutionalizing peace through inter-Korean reconciliation, as the two governments discussed a wide range of economic cooperation through multiple rounds of ministerial talks. They agreed to expand the Mt. Gumgang tour, using the first ever land route across the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Pyongyang finally allowed Seoul to build a special economic zone in Gaesung, in which South Korean entrepreneurs hired

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over ten thousand North Korean laborers to work along with one thousand South Koreans in manufacturing facilities. South Korea surpassed Japan to become the second largest trading partner for North Korea after China, as trade levels rose steadily, reaching $1 billion in 2005. Annually, it provided the North with large amounts of food, fertilizer, cement, and medicine for humanitarian assistance; the total value from 1996 had climbed to $2 billion in 2007.17 Despite continued North Korean nuclear defiance and its steadfast refusal to discuss the nuclear issue with Seoul, inter-Korean reconciliation was surprisingly unaffected. Roh appeared to hope that expanded economic aid and exchanges would earn Kim Jong-il’s trust and bring reform to his impoverished people, while expecting that reconciliation would provide Seoul with leverage in the nuclear negotiations. Yet, this engagement effort was not well received by Washington, which saw it as excusing, if not rewarding, Pyongyang’s bad behavior. It was no secret that Washington, which sought to apply more pressure on Pyongyang, and Seoul had a serious disagreement over how to deal with the North’s nuclear programs.18 Along with his reconciliation efforts, Roh tends to see North Korea as a subject of sympathy. During his campaign, Roh said that confronting and pressing North Korea would only cause more tension and crisis on the peninsula.19 In a 2005 interview with CNN, Roh told a reporter that the United States needs the courage to drop its bigger sword first to persuade North Korea to give up its small knife. 20 In early 2006 he warned that any hard-line approach in Washington would create serious policy tension with South Korea. As the situation deteriorated in the second half of 2006, the gap between Washington and Seoul on how to deal with the North grew even starker. In an interview about the North’s missile test in July 2006, Unification Minister Lee told reporters that failed U.S. policy is the biggest factor causing North Korea’s belligerent behavior. 21 Speaking months later of the North’s nuclear test in the National Assembly, Prime Minister Hahn Myoung-sook said that U.S. pressure and financial sanctions could be a factor that led to the test. 22 In contrast, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill said that the Mt. Gumgang tour “seems to be designed to give money to the North Korean authorities.” 23 After the November APEC meeting, the New York Times reported that the gap between the two governments over North Korea was as wide as the Pacific Ocean. 24 Repeatedly Roh tried hard to persuade Bush to take a more conciliatory approach toward Kim Jong-il. Since the gap between Washington and Pyongyang was so big, Seoul was determined to take a leading role

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in the nuclear negotiations by brokering a deal between the two confronting parties. Roh figured that Seoul’s engagement with Pyongyang and alliance partnership with Washington put it in a strategic position to act as an intermediary. He hoped that his engagement efforts would earn Seoul enough leverage/trust from Pyongyang to be recognized as an honest broker. In the Six-Party Talks Roh’s administration asked both parties to make equal concessions. While emphasizing patience, it proposed that the two engage in a step-by-step approach. In May 2006, Roh even appeared to defend the North’s nuclear development by saying that it is mainly for self-defense, and not aggression. 25 He went on to say North Korea might have reason enough to pursue a nuclear program, implying that the U.S. hard-line is the main reason why it does not give up the program. South Korea’s soft position toward North Korea suffered a severe blow with North Korea’s nuclear test in October 2006, and Roh signaled a change, saying his government may have no choice but to reconsider engagement. 26 Under criticism for a slow reaction to the international call for sanctions, Roh defended himself, saying that South Korea’s decision to stop the promised delivery of rice and fertilizer after the July 2006 missile test was, in fact, a sanction against Pyongyang. 27 Seoul supported UN Security Council resolution 1718, which called for strong sanctions against North Korea’s nuclear program by the international community. Furthermore, it said “yes” on the UN resolution condemning North Korea’s human rights violations, after previously not wanting to discuss the issue and refusing to participate in UN votes on it in fear of antagonizing Pyongyang. In the second half of 2006, Roh showed signs of increased coordination with the international efforts aimed at pressuring the North to change course. Roh, however, was reluctant to join in forceful implementation of sanctions against Pyongyang. At their meeting in Hanoi during the APEC summit, Bush again failed to persuade Roh to participate in the U.S. led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) directed against North Korea’s possible transfer of WMD and related materials. 28 Instead, Seoul repeated its concern that any effort to intercept a North Korean vessel could lead to a military conflict in the area around the peninsula. It also did not take long after the nuclear test for Seoul to signal that it would continue its engagement policy toward the North. Despite souring public opinion, Roh made sure that Mt. Gumgang tourism and the Gaesung Industrial Complex manufacturing would continue. In the face of domestic criticism against continuing economic support for the North Korean regime, Roh defended it as a cost for peace on the

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peninsula as well as a long-term investment for unification. 29 After the departure of Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok amidst harsh domestic criticism of the engagement policy, newly appointed Lee Jae-jung pledged to expand inter-Korean exchanges in spite of North Korea’s nuclear test, saying in his first speech, “We should make strenuous efforts to further develop inter-Korean projects. That’s what the Ministry of Unification is required to do at this critical period.’’30 South Korea’s reluctance to take more forceful sanctions against the North comes from fear of regime collapse as well as nationalist sentiment. Despite the rhetoric in favor of national unification and Roh’s drive for reconciliation, actual unification of the two Koreas was defined as a long-term process. Speaking of three priorities in inter-Korean relations, Roh defined unification as last after safety and peace; political unification would only come after a long, gradual period of economic and cultural integration, he said. Sudden unification by absorption after regime collapse in Pyongyang was regarded as a disaster, economically as well as politically. Instead, Roh strongly urged that any kind of war should not be allowed in this process.31 South Korea’s policy toward North Korea and the nuclear issue is perceived by many as lacking strategic thinking for the following three reasons. First, its emphasis on carrots caused serious tension with Washington without exerting much inf luence on U.S. behavior. Second, Pyongyang tends to take Seoul’s goodwill for granted so that the latter’s investment in reconciliation does not provide any leverage. Third, efforts by Roh to take a leading role in the nuclear negotiations did not work as Kim Jong-il tried to bypass him. Former national security advisor and architect of the Sunshine Policy under Kim Dae-Jung, Lim Dong-won criticized the Roh administration’s misunderstanding of the North Korean nuclear issue, arguing that it can be solved only by the United States, whose central role cannot be replaced. It was wrong for Roh to try to assume a leading role in this from the beginning, Lim said,32 and to continue its peace offensive even as the North went from a “nuclear want-to-be” to a de facto nuclear state. After the nuclear test, Seoul suggested a grand bargain among the six party nations to build a peace regime on the Korean peninsula, as if this would satisfy the North’s concern for regime survival and lead to eventual dismantlement of its nuclear program; however the United States would not be interested in a peace regime without resolving the nuclear issue first. The government’s position was not well received by the South Korean public, who had become increasingly critical of North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship. According to a survey after the nuclear test, 63.9 percent

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of the public thought that the government’s engagement policy had failed.33 Another poll showed a sharp increase in negative views on North-South economic cooperation; 72.2 percent expressing this as 54.4 percent answered that economic engagement benefits only North Korea and 17.8 percent no benefit for either Korea. Compared to previous years, the negative view on South Korea’s engagement policy was up 30 percent. As for the future, 48.7 percent of those polled thought that the South should stop economic engagement with the North at once, while only 5.7 percent said it should continue regardless of the test, 24.4 percent said it should continue in a limited fashion, and 12.2 percent supported only humanitarian assistance.34 In spite of increased exchanges and reconciliation efforts under Roh, many South Koreans remain unconvinced of North Korean intentions. According to a survey in 2007, more than half (51.3 percent) still think that North Korea may start another war on the peninsula, and a larger majority (79.5 percent) also said that South Korea should limit its engagement with the North while only 17.8 percent supported continuation.35 Yet, when the U.S. position shifted in the early 2007 toward direct bilateral talks with the North, there was more agreement on synchronizing Seoul’s rewards with Pyongyang’s conduct in meeting the agreed deadlines of the Six-Party Talks.36 The North Korean nuclear crisis took a dramatic turn with the February 13, 2007 Joint Agreement, as Pyongyang returned to the Six-Party Talks, agreeing to shut down and later disable its Yongbyon nuclear facility in return for a resumption of economic aid and normalization of relations with the United States in a grand bargain to be carried out through five working groups and multiple stages. For this, Washington pursued bilateral talks with Pyongyang and displayed more f lexibility on the terms of the negotiations. The South Korean government welcomed the agreement, taking credit for making it possible as a result of its patient efforts to bridge the uncompromising positions of the two adversaries. South Koreans had long been skeptical of the way the United States was handling the crisis and reacted positively to the agreement that reinvigorated diplomacy and enlivened Roh’s engagement efforts. In the presidential election campaign of 2007, the conservative candidates also accepted the Joint Agreement and announced their own plans for further engagement, albeit with more stress or reciprocity than they attributed to Roh. Many South Koreans, however, remained doubtful that the North would completely abandon its nuclear weapons program, expecting that the agreement would break down if not in its first phase then in the second when more stringent demands would be placed on the North to

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list all of its nuclear programs and fissile materials and to proceed to the disablement of its reactors. In a survey after North Korea allowed the IAEA inspectors to return to Yongbyon nuclear facility as the first step of the February agreement, still 74.0 percent of the public doubted the North Korean promise of nuclear dismantlement and only 23.1 percent said they trusted North Koreans.37 Embracing the Joint Agreement and then the delayed completion of Phase 1, South Korean leaders continued to entice the North both when the U.S. delegate Chris Hill optimistically supported rewards, as in the delivery of 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil by the South in the summer, and when Hill preferred more caution until the North made clear that it would meet its obligations. While Roh apparently had assured Bush that Seoul would refrain from rewarding Pyongyang beyond what was promised in the agreement and Bush had indicated that Washington would pursue the deal in good faith, tensions soon began to resurface. As Phase 1 was being completed in the summer of 2007, Pyongyang made a sudden proposal to hold a second summit with the South. The Roh government quickly accepted the request and vowed to make it successful for both the Six-Party Talks and North-South reconciliation. Roh said the summit would accelerate the Six-Party process, promising for this to accelerate economic aid and exchanges.38 Indeed, during the summit meeting with Kim Jong-il, Roh did not raise the nuclear issue on the central agenda. Instead, the two leaders focused on how to expand inter-Korean economic engagement and ease military tensions. They agreed to accelerate and expand the Gaesung Industrial Complex, to build a new industrial park near Haeju, to start tours to Gaesung city and Baekdu Mountain, to rebuild a highway from Gaesung to Pyongyang, to create joint fishing areas in the troubled waters around the Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea, and so on. As for the nuclear issue, the joint statement vaguely mentioned that the two sides will work together for smooth implementation of the Joint Statement and Joint Agreement.39 Roh later explained that the nuclear issue was already being resolved by the Six-Party Talks; so that there was no need for further discussion during the summit. Indeed, he stressed establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula with a declaration of the end of the Korean War through a summit among four parties: the United States, China, and the two Koreas. The peace regime would accelerate peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue as the two issues are closely related, said Roh.40 While it was not clear whether the North would disable its nuclear reactors in Yongbyon and report a complete list of its nuclear assets,

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Roh’s haste to achieve progress in inter-Korean ties again raised concerns in Washington. While welcoming the second Inter-Korean summit, the United States emphasized that the Six-Party Talks are the “real center of diplomatic gravity” and the summit should, in no way, detract from them.41 Despite Bush’s about-face in the Six-Party Talks, Roh still had not won credit for finding a strategic balance in dealing with his country’s only ally on the most serious foreign policy issue facing the South. During his last interview with CNN as president, Roh recalled his differences with Bush over how to deal with North Korea, saying that his government objected to U.S. consideration of stronger measures including use of armed force and extreme sanctions.42 In December 2007 Chris Hill reported progress in disabling the nuclear facilities in Yongbyon but remained cautious on how complete would be the North’s declaration of its nuclear programs, including uranium enrichment and plutonium already extracted. At the same time, Pyongyang insisted that Washington now had to show progress in deleting it from the list of states sponsoring terrorism and lifting the sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Despite continued signs of a cooperative spirit between Washington and Pyongyang, it remained to be seen whether Kim Jong-il had made a strategic decision to give up nuclear weapons. Roh had tried hard to put an end to this ongoing nuclear saga with his last-minute peace drive at the inter-Korean summit; however, no resolution would come before the end of his term in February 2008. Prosperity in Northeast Asia: A Hub and a Balancer While peace on the Korean peninsula is more about the security interests of South Korea, Northeast Asian prosperity is more about its economic interests. If peace was defined as more urgent, prosperity loomed large as well as a mid- to long-term challenge that no longer was assured in a rapidly globalizing economy facing China’s rise as a manufacturing giant and Japan’s revival as a technological leader. Despite historical animosity and geopolitical rivalry, Northeast Asia is regarded as the future center of prosperity in the world, where an economic community should be established. Already the combined economy of China, Japan, and South Korea occupies 20 percent of the world GDP with almost 50 percent of total world foreign currency reserve as of 2007.43 The population of the three countries is more than four times that of Europe. At the center of the region is the Korean peninsula, which has been and should again be a bridge between China and Japan, the continental and the sea power.44 South Korea can become a center of economic

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integration in Northeast Asia by establishing FTAs with Japan, the United States, and China, and the government aspires for it to become a financial and transportation hub of the region, taking advantage of its geographic position. Roh anticipates that by becoming an economic as well as a political hub of regional prosperity, South Korea, especially Seoul, would transform itself from a periphery to the center of regional geopolitics.45 Reaching an agreement with Bush in April 2007 on an FTA with the United States, he set in motion initiatives across the region to keep pace with additional FTAs. Building a prosperous Northeast Asian community has a political and security dimension as well. This objective ref lects South Korea’s desire to become a more active player in Northeast Asian geopolitics, which has been dominated by China and Japan as well as the United States. A country’s strategy is not created in a vacuum. The new approach under Roh represents a unique worldview of the president and his staff, but it also has a deep historical and ideological background in Korea’s political development. Koreans are deeply conscious of their country’s past vulnerability that led to outside invasions over the centuries. No matter how strong Korea has become, it has remained no more than a middle power in comparison to its big neighbors. Today, Koreans often declare themselves a peace-loving nation in an effort to put a positive spin on their self-perception as an innocent victim of invasion by outside powers. In a public speech, Roh talked about Korea’s bitter experience with neighboring countries in the late nineteenth century. “A century ago, Korea tried China, Japan, and Russia as well as the United States as an ally to defend itself from imperial power politics in the region. But nothing worked, and Korea had become a colony in the end.”46 This obsession with the past and strong attachment to independence appears to be an important factor in explaining South Korea’s ambitious but “rather idiosyncratic” military project to development a “self-reliant defense posture”—and the corollary of possessing a strong domestic arms industry—a national goal since the late 1970s.47 This explains why it continues to increase the defense budget to upgrade its military despite dramatic changes in the threat perception toward North Korea in a more positive direction. Under Roh, a strong self-defense capability was viewed as a priority for South Korea’s national strategy not only to survive in the rough world of Northeast Asian geopolitics, but also to become a balancer in the region. In March 2005, Roh surprised many observers by saying, “depending on South Korea’s choice, the Northeast Asian balance of power will be determined. Korea would play a balancer role to promote

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peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia as well as the Korean peninsula.”48 A few days earlier, in his speech at the Korean Air Force Academy’s commencement, Roh said that South Korea would not be involved in any Northeast Asian conflict against its will,49 and he emphasized that it would make every effort to build a self-reliant defense capability. As a Northeast Asian balancer, it could be a facilitator of peace in the region, and mediate future conf licts or regional rivalries using its strategic position. Speaking of this balancer role, Roh made it clear that South Korea’s military should contribute to the peace and prosperity of Northeast Asia as well as the Korean peninsula.50 South Korea’s new strategic goal of becoming a balancer in Northeast Asia soon raised suspicions about its intentions, including deepening ties with China that led it to distance itself from the traditional alliance with the United States.51 Since normalizing bilateral relations in 1992, South Korea’s trade with China exploded at an annual rate of more than 20 percent, reaching $118 billion in 2006, 52 after China became its top investment destination in 2002 and its top trading partner in 2004, replacing the United States in each case. During his first visit to Beijing in July 2003, Roh emphatically called for unity with China in efforts to usher in a new era of peace and prosperity as, in his own words, “the age of Northeast Asia is arriving. On center stage are China and Korea.”53 Recently, China’s growing inf luence was best demonstrated by its mediation of the North Korean nuclear crisis, in which Seoul and Beijing largely shared the same approach. While Washington argued for more pressure on Pyongyang, the two suggested that more carrots be offered. They seemed to have a common interest in preventing North Korea from sudden collapse, which they perceived as a disaster. As for Japan, Beijing and Seoul expressed the same concern over Japan’s effort to revitalize its military role in the region. In the face of Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, both governments issued strong statements criticizing Japan and cancelled meetings with the Japanese leader. Some suggested that South Korea’s growing affinity with China could make it reconsider its traditional alliance with the United States.54 The controversy surrounding the “strategic flexibility” of U.S. forces in Korea showed the South’s delicate position between Beijing and Washington. As part of alliance restructuring, the United States asked that the South acknowledge the U.S. right to use its forces stationed in Korea for contingencies beyond the peninsula. Critics in Seoul argued that allowing “strategic f lexibility” would put South Korea at odds with China in case of a confrontation over the Taiwan issue,55 warning that U.S. force transformation on the Korean peninsula for rapid deployment

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was really a long-term strategy to contain China’s rise in the region. Seoul’s active cooperation in this process would antagonize its top economic partner. In early March 2005, Roh declared, “I clearly state that the U.S. forces in Korea should not be involved in disputes in Northeast Asia without our consent,” adding, “Our people will not get entangled in regional disputes against our will in the future.”56 This was understood as a rejection of the U.S. military transformation effort in the region, leading some to worry that the concept of balancer would, in practice, mean a departure from the U.S.-South Korean alliance in quest of building a new partnership with China.57 Nevertheless, there is no reason at present to expect that China will replace the United States as an ally, even if we should assume that Beijing will enjoy more inf luence on Seoul with deepening integration of the two economies. Given warming relations and great potential for economic cooperation, some expect that in the long term Seoul will develop a closer and stronger relationship with Beijing than with Washington. Yet, others doubt that, for the foreseeable future, South Koreans will have enough trust in Chinese intentions on security matters concerning the Korean peninsula. The question still remains whether the two former enemies during the Korean War will be able to achieve a full political partnership in Northeast Asia. Some point out that South Korea is not sure about China’s ultimate intentions toward unification and the Korean peninsula.58 Indeed, a survey showed that many South Koreans thought that China would pose the biggest threat to Korea in ten years (37.7 percent), followed by Japan (23.6 percent), North Korea (20.7 percent), and the United States (14.8 percent).59 It is clear that even in the vision of becoming a Northeast Asian balancer, South Koreans are not envisioning any kind of alliance with China. Strategic thinking about this concept treats a balancer as gaining independence from foreign inf luence, not as replacing one big brother with another. Indeed, before the 1880s, it was China that played the role of hegemonic power in the region for more than one thousand years. Despite the cultural affinity and rapidly increasing economic integration with China, Koreans are suspicious of Chinese ambitions in the region. The dispute over the history of Korea’s ancient kingdom of Goguryo after controversial writings in Northeast China is just one example of the potential conf lict between the two peoples. In 2004 many were angered when South Korean news media reported that a government-run academy of social sciences had argued that this kingdom was one of the local Chinese regimes at the time. The South Korean government responded that it would exhaust all diplomatic means to

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correct this incorrect history if it is, indeed, the official position of the Chinese government. When this issue flared again in 2006, it established the Northeast Asian History Foundation to promote objective research on the ancient history of this disputed region. This issue has raised doubts over China’s territorial aspirations as well as its acceptance of aspects of a united Korea’s national identity. Despite his claim that South Korea was becoming a balancer, Roh’s response to Japan ref lects the deep suspicion and strong antagonism of the South Korean nation, which is still unable to separate its regional strategy from the strong nationalist tendency associated with memories of its colonial experience and expressed in its recurring sensitivity to Japan’s approach to history. In the midst of substantial economic ties since diplomatic normalization in 1965 and improved cultural and security cooperation since the 1990s, disputes over Japan’s colonial past in Korea have been a recurring theme in bilateral relations. The Roh government proved to be no exception. Following his predecessor, Roh emphasized future-oriented relations with Japan in his first visit to Japan in 2003, but in 2005, the past returned with a vengeance to overwhelm the future. Shimane prefecture’s declaration of “Takeshima Day,” which challenged South Korean sovereignty over the island it knows as Dokdo, was followed in April 2005 by Japan’s adoption of a new school textbook that grossly omits recognition of Japanese wrongdoing in the era of colonization and war, insulting South Koreans. Roh reacted strongly, vowing to make every effort to correct the wrong approach by the Japanese government even at the risk of “diplomatic war.”60 Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in August only made the situation worse as the Korean government called off all summit meetings between the two leaders. This ongoing dispute over history has provided a useful staple for Korean nationalism, regardless of the fallout that may complicate strategic decisions at a time of regional instability or in conditions of Sino-Japanese rivalry for regional leadership. When Abe Shinzo became prime minister, he agreed to leave unstated whether he intended to visit the Yasukuni Shrine, and thus was accepted in Beijing and Seoul in his inaugural foreign travel in October 2006. In 2007, stormy relations with Japan appeared to be calming down. For the first time in years, no cabinet member visited the Yasukuni Shrine in August. Instead, in the summer of 2007 the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution critical of the Japanese government for not officially recognizing its responsibility for organizing the wartime “comfort women,” most of whom were Koreans.61

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As for Russia, Roh agreed to upgrade bilateral ties from a “constructive and mutually supplementary partnership” to a “comprehensive partnership of mutual trust” in his visit to Moscow in September 2004. Roh sought Vladimir Putin’s help in persuading Kim Jong-il to cooperate in the Six-Party Talks, while also agreeing to promote economic ties, especially in energy and technological cooperation. Bilateral trade has been rising, reaching almost $10 billion in 2006, well below the $78 billion figure for Japan, let alone the booming commerce with China. Rising oil prices and increasing competition for energy provide South Koreans with added incentives to seek closer cooperation with Russia as it plans to make new supplies available in Asia. With Russia considered a secondary actor in the region, perceptions of a balancer or other intermediary role focus on the growing rivalry between China and Japan, not between China and the United States. Unsure of their intentions, South Koreans increasingly assume that a position of neutrality between the two neighbors would be in their best national interest. This leads to the prospect of taking advantage of the rivalry, playing off the two big neighbors, one against another. This presumes a power rivalry where the two would each court the favor of South Korea, providing it with useful leverage. Yet, since 2005, many detect a tilt toward China, linked to protests over the history issue with Japan. Although it is justified as furthering a different reform strategy in favor of middle powers, South Korea’s opposition since 2005 against Japan’s bid to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council is shared with China. 62 Many question whether South Korea has overreached in considering a balancing strategy between the two neighbors. First, it underestimates the possibility of cooperation between Beijing and Tokyo. As much as they see each other as a potential threat, Beijing and Tokyo also understand that an intense rivalry is not in either’s best interest. As soon as Koizumi stepped down, China quickly held a summit with the new prime minister Abe and then showed restraint in the following months, even when the comfort women issue flared over Abe’s insensitive remarks, in preparation for a visit by Wen Jiabao to Beijing in April 2007. Second, critics pointed out that Japan is the most important ally of the United States. South Korea’s neutral position vis-à-vis Japan goes against the U.S. desire of building a strong U.S.-Japan-Korea alliance axis in East Asia, 63 and it could pose a direct challenge to U.S. security interests in the region. Critics charge that there is a more fundamental problem in strategic thinking that regards the role of balancer as feasible for South Korea in

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the regional environment it faces. Citing the example of Great Britain in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe, experts doubt that the South’s military capacity is strong enough to become a balancer between two Asian giants.64 Certainly there is a gap between South Korea and its two big neighbors in terms of national wealth and power. Japan enjoys superior technology in a wide array of weapons systems, while China possesses an arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons, just to mention two obvious differences. Even those optimistic that Seoul can amplify its voice in the region are inclined to foresee this largely in the context of either agreement on managing North Korea’s reintegration into the region or, further ahead, unification of Korea with continuing economic development that would make the country a power to be reckoned with in Northeast Asia. A close aide to the President suggested that a unified Korea would follow a path of neutrality between the continental power and the sea power, a powerful Switzerland of Asia with a population 70 million strong and a booming economy.65 Naturally, given uncertainties about the status of North Korea and the assertiveness of the powers in the region, many South Koreans doubt the feasibility of Roh’s bold thinking. Later, the Roh government changed the balancer rhetoric into talk of a Northeast Asian multilateral security regime, seen as promoting cooperation and integration. According to Roh, the existing alliance system cannot resolve bilateral confrontations—China-Japan, Russia-Japan, and Korea-Japan—in the region. It was assumed that Seoul would take a leading role in this process, bridging the different positions of all major powers through its “balanced diplomacy,” as an impartial partner for all.66 Roh tried to link the inter-Korean summit and the Northeast Asian peace mechanism, saying that establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula could both reinforce and benefit from the multilateral security efforts in the region, and hoping that the Six-Party Talks would develop into a permanent mechanism for regional multilateral security.67 As for building an economic hub, Roh announced a new plan to build a “Global Transport Network” instead of a “Northeast Asian Hub” by the end of 2006. Despite the more comprehensive title, the change was seen as an admission that the South could not compete with the Chinese counterpart of Shanghai and its hinterland. 68 Having long criticized Roh’s plan as too ambitious and unrealistic, many saw this as another example of ignoring strategic prudence. The idea of South Korea (or a unified Korea) becoming a hub of Northeast Asia, economically as well as politically, was practically dead by the time the lame

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duck Roh administration was ready to consider its final legacy. Ironically, the FTA agreement with Bush, arguably Roh’s foremost nemesis, was likely to stand instead as the principal accomplishment of Roh’s economic strategizing. Cooperative Self-Reliant Defense: ROK-U.S. Alliance Restructuring To achieve its strategic objective of peace on the peninsula and prosperity in Northeast Asia, the Roh government pursued a somewhat ambivalent, if not contradictory, policy towards the United States and the alliance relationship. While continuing to recognize the United States as the most important ally for deterrence and security against a North Korean attack, Roh also believed that South Korea should develop a truly independent defense capability apart from its ally. Building a selfreliant capability was regarded as a necessary condition for South Korea to take a leading role in resolving the nuclear issue and to become a balancer in Northeast Asia. From the very beginning of his presidency Roh expressed a strong interest in building a self-defense capability, raising suspicions that he sought the dissolution of the alliance, even if that might take some time. On his first meeting with the top generals in South Korea, he caught them by surprise with an abrupt question about whether such a self-reliant force could be developed. Since then, at every major military ceremony, Roh has returned to this theme. For example, in March 2005 at the Korean Air Force Academy, he declared that the military should build a “self-defense capability” along with close cooperation with the United States. He told the graduates, “We have sufficient power to defend ourselves. We have nurtured mighty national armed forces that absolutely no one can challenge.” Within a decade, he added, “we should be able to develop our military into one with full command of operations.”69 In the fall of 2005, the Ministry of National Defense revealed its plan for achieving a self-defense posture by 2020, calling for substantial increases in the defense budget by 11 percent a year for the next ten years. South Korea would build key strategic weapons systems including Aegis class destroyers, submarines, and air-borne early warning systems.70 Roh agreed to take over ten military missions that had been previously assigned to the United States by 2008.71 As one military expert observed, “for all its talk of ‘cooperative’ self-reliant defense, Seoul is also becoming much more independently minded and self-assertive

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in both security policy and its alliance arrangements with the United States.” 72 Among the controversies over self-reliant defense, no other issue caused as much tension as the transfer of wartime operational control from the United States. With its new focus on the war on terror and military transformation around the world, the United States wanted to downsize its large ground forces and transfer some of its missions. In 2003, the two governments started a series of talks on restructuring the alliance. The talks included moving the Yongsan garrison out of downtown Seoul to Osan-Pyongtaek, consolidating forty-three American bases into sixteen, withdrawing 12,000 U.S. soldiers from a force of 37,000 between 2004–08, as well as transferring some military missions from the United States to South Korea. In addition, Seoul was soon insisting on wartime operations control, as many questions arose about timing and feasibility as well as the political implications. Since the Korean War, such wartime control has been exercised by a commander of the U.S. forces in Korea, who doubled as UN commander. This decision was the outcome of asymmetrical military capabilities in the two allies. It was regarded as useful for South Korea’s national security, since it was understood to cement the U.S. commitment to intervene in case of a North Korean invasion.73 In the early 1990s, there had been talk of returning the wartime operational command to South Korea with its growing military capability.74 Under Kim Youngsam peacetime operational control was returned to in 1994, but the first nuclear crisis with North Korea postponed discussion of wartime control indefinitely. Despite the second crisis, in 2003 Roh raised the issue anew. He argued that the old agreement giving the Americans wartime control over South Korean troops was anachronistic, something of which South Koreans today should feel ashamed, adding that “To say that we South Koreans are not capable of defending ourselves from North Korea is to talk nonsense. It’s shameful. I hope we kick the habit of feeling insecure unless we have layers of guarantee that the Americans will intervene automatically in case of war.” 75 In a meeting between the two militaries in 2005, the two governments agreed to discuss concrete measures. One commentator noted that the return of wartime operational control would mean dissolution of the structure where a U.S. commander presides as the top military decision-maker, and no U.S. commander would take an order from a South Korean officer.76 The only solution would be to separate the combined command into two independent commands in which each country would

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exercise operational control over its own military, but that could have serious military as well as political implications. At a minimum the current alliance structure, which is the most closely integrated form, would become much looser with the two militaries operating as separate forces. The United States might feel less obligated to defend South Korea. It would force the South Korean military to develop a more coherent strategy to defend itself, serving Roh’s goal of creating an irreversible momentum to build South Korea’s self-reliant defense capability. North Korea’s nuclear test suddenly changed the dynamics. When Washington officially welcomed Seoul’s proposal and suggested speedy transfer by 2008, Seoul decided to take more time. Finally, the two agreed to complete the wartime operation control transfer some time between 2009 and 2012.77 Yet the South Korean public expressed its concern that the transfer would weaken the U.S. military commitment, and many military experts thought that the transfer was still premature given the huge disparity between the United States and South Korea in their military capability. Some suspected that Roh’s desire to be more self-reliant in defense meant more autonomy from U.S. inf luence as was shown in the case of the controversy over the strategic f lexibility of the U.S. forces in Korea. As discussed earlier, the U.S. plan of transforming relocated bases into launching pads for regional operations beyond the Korean peninsula caused controversy, with many worrying that the new regional mission of American forces would put South Korea in a difficult position. Yet, after intense public and governmental debate, in January 2006 the two governments announced a joint statement allowing the strategic f lexibility of United States forces in Korea.78 In early 2006 the Roh government launched new strategic consultations with the United States. In their first meeting between the two foreign ministers in Washington, the two governments emphasized nurturing and protecting common values, such as respect for democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as the basis of the alliance. The two also agreed that they would have regular high-level meetings to resolve pressing regional and global challenges.79 This represented a major development for South Korea’s approach to the alliance, which so far has exclusively focused on the Korean peninsula. This broadening scope showed South Korea’s willingness to play a more active role in the global agenda of the United States. Indeed, despite widespread antiwar sentiment among Koreans, the South Korean government had sent

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3,600 troops to Iraq, making it the third largest coalition force after the United States and Great Britain and kept its forces there even when others were withdrawing in 2006–07. In April 2007, Seoul and Washington agreed to an FTA after a year of tough negotiations with ratification pending on each side. Along with dispatching troops to Iraq, the FTA was seen as one of the most concrete proofs of South Korea’s commitment to the alliance, as Roh argued that it had been successfully restructured and was ready for a mutually beneficial relationship for the next fifty years. 80 Indeed, despite earlier anti-American sentiment and its support of North-South reconciliation, public opinion became more conservative regarding the alliance by the end of Roh’s administration. According to a survey in 2007, more people (12.8 percent) thought that South Korea should strengthen the alliance than in 2002 (6.3 percent), and more (55.3 percent) answered that the current alliance should remain unchanged than in 2002 (50.1 percent). Negative views had declined from 42.1 to 30.4 percent. 81 Conclusion South Korea’s strategy under Roh represents new thinking in relations with East Asia; however, its bold and innovative character seems to be driven more by traditional nationalist sentiment than by realistic assessment of the security environment surrounding the Korean peninsula. First, South Korea is taking advantage of the U.S. military restructuring on the peninsula to aggressively pursue a more nationalistic, self-reliant, and autonomous security and defense policy. Roh’s emphasis on a self-reliant defense capability was welcomed in the broad context of Washington’s global military transformation. As Washington strives to reduce its military presence on the Korean peninsula for a new global strategy, Seoul has no choice but to take increasing responsibility for its own defense. The U.S.-Japan alliance is going through the same restructuring in which Japan is taking more responsibility for its self-defense. The problem is that Roh’s approach treats the return of wartime operational control as about national pride and sovereignty more than anything else, and acts as if it can be done quickly regardless of cost and of regional conditions of instability. Many questioned whether it was necessary for the South Korean government to rush. Even though Roh on various occasions defended his commitment to the alliance, his tendency to stir nationalist sentiment sends mixed signals to Americans about South Korea’s intentions towards the alliance,

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handling of the North Korean nuclear issue, and long-term role in responding to the rivalry between China and Japan and uncertainties over China’s rise. Second, plans for making South Korea a hub of prosperity in Northeast Asia and a balancer were also hampered by nationalist sentiments with strong antagonism toward Japan. As long as South Korea sees Japan and its past through a nationalist framework, true reconciliation between Seoul and Tokyo will remain difficult. South Korea’s neutrality between Japan and China will be seen as only rhetoric. South Korea’s persistent antagonism toward Japan creates another dilemma. Since the early 1950s, Japan has been and will remain the most important ally for the United States in East Asia. Unless Seoul wants to dissolve its alliance with the United States, it will be the odd man out in the ever-growing ties between Washington and Tokyo. Even Roh later explained that South Korea’s balancer role would be based on its strong alliance with the United States, as he at least tacitly acknowledged the need for a continuing presence of U.S. forces after unification as a necessary “comprehensive deterrence capability” in “maintaining the balance of power in the region” even after the North Korean threat is ended. 82 Third, the biggest victim of South Korea’s nationalist approach is its handling of North Korea and its nuclear development. Despite its rhetoric against allowing North Korea’s nuclear weapons, it has repeatedly shown itself reticent to respond to the North’s nuclear provocations. Officials exhibited an almost mysterious optimism toward North Korean intentions, as if the weapons are only for defensive purposes or, as the unification minister told reporters, due to the North’s poverty.83 The South’s repeated compromises with Kim Jong-il aroused serious mistrust in the United States and Japan. Fourth, China has become the biggest beneficiary of South Korea’s nationalist approach in East Asia strategy. Whether intended or not, the consequence of all of the major strategic decisions of the Roh administration has been to strengthen China’s hand in dealing with Japan and the United States and in solidifying it as the central actor in the Six-Party Talks. While the Bush and Koizumi administrations also made decisions that served to boost China’s regional role, this does not relieve Roh of the responsibility of thinking strategically about the evolution of Northeast Asia and recognizing the value of managing China’s rise in the context of multilateral relations. South Korea’s new strategic thinking is driven by growing confidence among the leadership after its success in economic and political

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development. A changing power structure in Northeast Asia with the rise of China is another main driver in this thinking. Yet, to become a facilitator of peace in the region and cooperation between China and Japan, South Korea had reason to avoid the sort of assertiveness that was produced by Roh’s ambitious moves, such as for a self-reliant defense and to become Northeast Asia’s balancer. Roh’s new strategic thinking overlooked the reality of international politics surrounding the Korean peninsula, such as the seriousness of North Korea’s nuclear development, growing geopolitical rivalries, or the asymmetrical nature of the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Arguably, this resulted not just from the difficult environment in the region, but also from wishful thinking of an idealistic president and strong nationalist sentiments of former student activists who became his principal aides. South Korean strategic thinking faces difficult challenges in the transition from Roh to Lee Myung-bak in 2008. After its nuclear test, North Korea may be even more insistent on its position in inter-Korean talks and the later phases of the Six-Party Talks following the Joint Agreement. Differences between Seoul and Washington over how to deal with North Korea are likely to create further ripple effects on the alliance. Instead of becoming an active mediator between Pyongyang and Washington as well as between Tokyo and Beijing, Seoul may become more isolated in nuclear diplomacy and even in the geopolitics of Northeast Asia. As bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang continue, Seoul may have trouble making its voice heard. Moreover, rising Chinese influence in the region may pose a new dilemma as Seoul continues to depend on U.S. military protection. Harsh realities such as the above have strengthened the conservative opposition’s support for the old strategy of seeking refuge in the U.S. alliance. Notwithstanding the appeal of a stronger self-defense posture and a more autonomous role in Northeast Asia, they are inclined to shift South Korea back to where it left off: promoting and taking full advantage of the alliance. Yet, the failure of the Bush administration’s foreign policy on a global scale may make it impossible to go back. Japan’s nationalist orientation may also complicate rebalancing regional ties. With China ascendant in its multilateral diplomacy and economic rise, U.S.-Chinese cooperation on handling North Korea may set limits on what South Korea can achieve. Overreaching in strategic thinking in one period does not create the luxury of nostalgia about strategic thinking of another era. The next South Korean president will face an environment that is already greatly changed and must be addressed with new thinking.

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Notes 1. David Baldwin, “The Concept of Security,” Review of International Studies, Vol., 23, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 67–97. 2. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein, eds., The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 1–23. 3. ROK National Security Council (NSC), Pyonghwa bonyong gwa gukka anbo (Seoul: NSC, March 1, 2004). 4. The other two governing goals are democracy with people’s participation and equal and balanced development. “Gukjung mokpyo,” Blue House Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/ government/goal.html accessed on December 6, 2006). 5. The Ministry of National Defense, Participatory Government Defense Policy 2003 (Seoul, July 11, 2003), pp. 3–5. 6. ROK NSC, Pyonghwa bonyong gwa gukka anbo. 7. “12 gukjung gwaje,” Blue House Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http:// www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/government/agenda_01.php?m=1 accessed on December 6, 2006). 8. PBS, Frontline: Kim’s Nuclear Gamble, April 10, 2003 (http://www.pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/etc/cron.html accessed on January 2, 2007). 9. “Kija hoikyunmoon, December 15, 2002,” Blue House Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/popup_ archive_print.php? accessed on December 9, 2006). 10. ROK NSC, Pyonghwa bonyong gwa gukka anbo, p. 31. 11. “Woisin kija kandamhoi, December 4, 2002,” Blue House Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/popup_ archive_print.php? accessed on December 6, 2006). 12. “Je16dae daetongryong chuimsa,” in Roh Moo-hyun daetongryong yonsul munjip 2003.2.25–2004.1.31 (Seoul: Office of the President). 13. Ibid. 14. Yonhap News, March 3, 2004. 15. “Speech at the Heritage Foundation Seminar,” Blue House Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/archive/archive_ view.php?meta_id=pre_speech&id=53d7e852915352938ef0841d accessed on December 6, 2006). 16. Lee was a close aid to Lim Dong-won, an architect of the Sunshine Policy and a key foreign policy advisor to Kim Dae-jung in the previous administration. 17. Ministry of Unification, ROK, Monthly Report Inter-Korean Exchanges & Cooperation, October 2007 (http://59.25.110.6/unikorea/2007_10/index. html, accessed on December 14, 2007). 18. JoongAng ilbo, October 30, 2005. 19. “Press Conference Speech,” December 15, 2002.

124 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32.

33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

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“CNN hoikyun” (September 16, 2005) Office of the President. ROK. Dong-A ilbo, July 24, 2006, p. A5. Chosun ilbo, October 12, 2006, p. A5. JoongAng ilbo, October 19 2006. The New York Times, November 19, 2006. “Meeting with Korean Military Veteran,” May 29, 2006, Office of the President, ROK. Dong-A ilbo, October 10, 2006, p. A5. Chosun ilbo, September 16, 2006. The Washington Post, November 19, 2006. “Kun juyo jihwikwan kwaui daehwa, June 16, 2006,” Blue House Briefing (Office of Press Secretary, http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/kr/ archivepopup_archive_print.php?m=1 accessed on February 23, 2007). The Korea Times, December 11, 2006. “Kun juyo jihwikwan kwaui daehwa, June 16, 2006.” Ohmynews, December 14, 2006 (http://www.ohmynews.com/ArticleView/ article_view.asp?at_code=379810&bri_code=E00053 accessed on December 15, 2006). Chosun ilbo, October 10, 2006. Ibid., October 31, 2006 (http://news.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/ 2006/10/31/2006103160234.html accessed on April 23, 2007). Korea Gallup Survey, June 23, 2007. On January 16 Chris Hill met his counterpart Kim Kyekwan in Berlin for bilateral talks. Yonhop News, January 17, 2007. JoongAng ilbo, June 30, 2007. Roh Moo-hyun, “Speech to the August 15 Independence Day Ceremony” (Seoul, Office of the President, August 15, 2007) “North-South Summit Joint Declaration,” October 4, 2007 (http:// dialogue.unikorea.go.kr/ accessed on December 10, 2007). Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the 51st Meeting of the Standing Committee of National Unification Advisory Council, November 1, 2007 (ht t p://w w w.pre sident.go.k r/c wd / k r/v ip_ speeche s/v ie w.php?&id= 53d7e192729c75ddd16e6449 accessed on November 18, 2007). Daily Press Briefing by Shaun Mccormack, a spokesman for the State Department, August 9, 2007 (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2007/aug/ 90598.htm accessed on August 13, 2007). Roh, Moo-hyun, “Interview with CNN,” December 8, 2007 (http:// english.president.go.k r/c wd/en/a rchive/a rchive _view.php?meta _id= for_your_info&navi=issues&id=2585189b608eeb55fdbf7c6c accessed on December 10, 2007). According to the IMF in 2007, China tops the world list with $1.333 billion followed by Japan with $924 billion, Taiwan fourth with $266 billion, and South Korea fifth with $255 billion. Roh, “Inauguration Speech,” February 25, 2003.

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45. Roh, Moo-hyun, “History, Nationalism and Community,” Global Asia, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2007) (http://globalasia.org/articles/issue2/iss2_1. html accessed on December 14, 2007). 46. Roh, March 8, 2005. 47. Richard A. Bitzinger and Mikyoung Kim, “Why Do Small States Produce Arms?: The Case of South Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 197–201. 48. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the Graduation Ceremony of Korea Third Military Academy” (Seoul: Office of the President, March 22, 2005). 49. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the Graduation Ceremony of Korean Air Force Academy” (Seoul: Office of the President, March 8, 2005). 50. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the Graduation Ceremony of Korea Third Military Academy” (Seoul: Office of the President, March 22, 2005). 51. JoongAng ilbo, June 1, 2005. 52. Trade with China brought a $20 billion surplus in contrast to a $22 billion deficit with Japan. Park Hyun-jung, “2006nyun daejung mooyok hukja kamso wonin” KIEP Report, March 21, 2007. 53. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Speech to the Students of Tsinghua University” (Office of the President, July 9, 2003). 54. Chosun ilbo, May 19, 2005. 55. JoongAng ilbo, March 12, 2005, p. 30. 56. Ohmynews, March 8, 2005 (http://www.ohmynews.com/articleview/ article_view.asp?at_code=241437 accessed on March 9, 2005). 57. Chosun ilbo, April 19, 2005, p. A6. 58. Scott Snyder, “South Korea’s Squeeze Play,” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), p. 103. 59. JoongAng ilbo, March 19, 2006. 60. Roh Moo-hyun, “A Letter to Korean People with Regard to Korea-Japan Relations,” (Seoul: Office of the President, March 23, 2005). 61. Chosun ilbo, August 1, 2007, p. A08. 62. Yonhap News, May 10, 2005. In a meeting with the UN Secretary General, Roh said UNSC membership requires moral legitimacy. 63. Chosun ilbo, editorial, November 19, 2006. 64. Financial News, June 8, 2005; Seoul shinmun, April 15, 2005. 65. Bae Ki-chan, Korea, Dasi sang jon oe giroe soda (Seoul: Wisdom House, 2005), pp. 419–35. 66. “Chamyo jungbu 4nyon pyonggwa sunjin Hanguk jonryak,” Blue House Briefing (Office of the President, March 21, 2007, http://www.president. go.k r/c wd/k r/hotissue/4years _ appraisa l/archive_view.php?meta _id= 4ye a r s _ appr a i sa l& id= a57881a8d 36 4 69685392f a7c & c ate gor y=252 accessed on August 19, 2007). 67. Roh, Moo-hyun, “Opening Address to 2007 Hangyorae-Pusan International Symposium on Northeast Asian Peace and Prosperity,” November 13, 2007, Blue House Briefing (http://www.president.go.kr/cwd/

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71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81. 82. 83.

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kr/archive/archive_view.php?meta_id=speech&id=82ad77d98e93a3d026 dae6a0 accessed on November 18, 2007). Munhwa ilbo, December 18, 2006. Ohmynews, March 8, 2005. ROK Ministry of National Defense, “Press Release on National Defense Reform 2020,” September 13, 2005. To complete the plan South Korea would have to spend $621 billion. Kathleen T. Rhem, “U.S. to Transfer 10 Missions to South Korean Military,” American Forces Press Service, November 19, 2003. Richard Bitzinger, Transforming the US Military: Implications for the AsiaPacific (Sydney: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2006), pp. 27–30. ROK Ministry of National Defense, ROK-US Alliance and USFK (Seoul: MND, 2002), pp. 50–62. Jonathan D. Pollack and Young Koo Cha, A New Alliance for The Next Century (Santa Monica: R AND, 1995). International Herald Tribune, August 10, 2006 (http://www.iht.com/ articles/2006/08/10/news/korea.php accessed on December 27, 2006). Chosun ilbo, October 2, 2005. The Korea Herald, October 25, 2006. Yonhap News, January 19, 2006. The U.S. Department of States, Press Release, “United States and the Republic of Korea Launch Strategic Consultation for Allied Partnership,” January 19, 2006. Blue House Briefing, March 21, 2007. Hankook ilbo, June 8, 2007. JoongAng ilbo, February 15, 2004. Dong-A ilbo, January 3, 2007.

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CHAPTER 6

South Korean Strategic Thought on Reunification Jong-Yun Bae and Gilbert Rozman

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iscussions of the Korean peninsula veer between two extremes: 1) North Korea is bound to collapse with or without outside pressure, and however unprepared South Korea may be, it will take charge of a chaotic process of putting the North back together as part of a united state and 2) the North Korean regime firmly controls the land north of the 38th parallel and shows no sign of letting go no matter how much lip service is paid to reunification. These two ways of thinking share the conclusion that there is little point in strategic planning for a staged merger of the two sides of the peninsula, taking into account bilateral and multilateral diplomacy along with coordination of the public and private sectors. Until the second half of the 1990s when thinking about reunification started to go forward gradually based on two standing governments finding ways to compromise, few doubted the validity of one or the other view. The Sunshine Policy raised hopes, and, nine years later the February 13, 2007 agreement at the Six-Party Talks has intensified interest in negotiated, gradual integration of the peninsula. A review of how discussion of this theme has proceeded, incorporating various types of inter-peninsula cooperation, can shed light on how South Koreans have reasoned about this issue and are prone to link it to developments in the Six-Party Talks. Prospects for reunification starting with coexistence between South and North Korea remain highly uncertain. Despite wishful thinking among some advocates of “peaceful coexistence,” from every indication,

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the communist regime in charge of the North has no intention of submitting its people to the awakening that would come through any of the usual processes of integration and mutual exposure to the reality of the other. In this chapter we trace how the South Korean government has approached the issue of reunification, considering the North only as an object of strategic thinking and a force whose behavior and rhetoric provide the feedback that causes the South to change course. Looking successively at the various administrations in South Korea, we describe their evolving strategies toward reunification. In the process, we also recognize the realities that inf luence their choices and impose limits on how far they can press their case. On the surface, preparing for the nebulous goal of reunification may seem like nothing more than wishful thinking, but it has exerted an increasing impact on a wide range of strategizing about how to proceed not only in relations with the North but in dealing with the United States, China, Russia, and even Japan. It is an important component of regional policy, as seen in the inter-Korean summit of October 2–4 2007. Outside observers have tended to visualize reunification through the prism of the North’s collapse or as a mirage blurred by the spell of the Sunshine Policy. Writing in the mid-1990s, Nicholas Eberstadt detailed policy arenas—demographics, employment, health, education, and so on—where action would have to be taken should the North disband its system and accept peaceful reunification essentially on the South’s terms. The challenge was framed in terms of assimilating the North’s population into the existing society in the South, however the North’s disintegration occurred.1 Along the same lines, in the late 1990s, Japanese led in contemplating how neighboring states would respond to this kind of process, assessing the strategic implications and how economic assistance should be provided or relations with South Korea might be affected. 2 The inter-Korean summit in June 2000, however, stimulated a different manner of thinking, focused on stepby-step, negotiated integration. In the midst of the second nuclear crisis, doubts about the North’s collapse or any path to voluntary absorption further intensified. Many acknowledged that predictions of collapse and assimilation are a fallacy of wishful thinking that assumes a combination of highly improbable conditions. Instead of indulging in this sort of delusion, analysts would be better off turning their attention to a functional approach to unification by consensus, starting with gradual economic integration.3 Thinking along these lines has spread in South Korea. It has become a driving force in foreign policy, at times becoming interlinked with three other forces: boosting economic

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development in a country obsessed with this as the path to competitive national power, expanding national inf luence amidst four competing great powers, and achieving historical justice against “villainous” Japan. An extreme view that combined demonizing the North with insistence on defeating and absorbing it was fading in the face of no practical way of accomplishing this as well as growing concern about the high cost of proceeding in this way. With the end of the cold war, the logic of reconciliation with the help of a coalition of great powers swayed many. After the leap of faith in 2000 that the North was now a reliable partner for rapid reunification prepared to build confidence through ever-closer contacts, this other extreme view also was discredited. Thinking in South Korea about reunification settled on some sort of confederation with expanded ties over multiple stages lasting for decades and an essential role for outside powers. Even with this emerging consensus, questions persist about what realistically may work in a rapidly changing international environment. Having long retained the ideal of “absorbing” the North as convenient for domestic and international politics, South Korean leaders were gradually slipping into a compromise mode of accepting coexistence as the only feasible strategy. After the end of a quarter century of military dictatorships, this reality became openly acknowledged and ever more the basis of official pronouncements and policy initiatives. Under Roh Moo-hyun as well as Kim Dae-jung this was the official position, but only after the Joint Agreement in the Six-Party Talks that led to accelerated North-South dialogue did it become the focus. As the nuclear crisis has unfolded, observers have often been perplexed by the responses in South Korea. An ally of the United States and a prosperous democracy, the South seemed inexplicably conciliatory toward the North. Compared with the staunch anticommunism of its military dictators to 1987 and the hostile response to the North in the first nuclear crisis in 1993–94, perceived empathetic engagement elicits skeptical reactions, blaming leftist leadership and emotional nationalism. Some harbor the hope that Lee Myung-bak, as a new president in 2008, or a breakdown in the Six-Party Talks leaving a nuclear-armed, isolated North could at last cause a sober awakening. Omitted in such assessments, however, is serious ref lection on how South Korean reasoning about reunification has evolved and what it may tell us about likely responses to new developments. To fill this gap, we present a chronology of government strategic thinking on this issue, taking care at each stage to note realities that stood in the way of

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its realization. Over time we find a gradual shift from absorption to coexistence, reinforced by increasing assistance to the North, as well as reliance on other states to forge a favorable regional framework. While under Roh Moo-hyun this lowered vigilance about possible sobering actions of the North, we do not attempt to prejudge in the complex negotiations ahead to what degree a new South Korean administration may impose strict conditions on assistance and ensure that the timetable for integration linked to the goal of reunification awaits a full set of reforms. If reunification serves as an unassailable symbol, this does not mean that it stands in the way of cautious preparations for coexistence. For few South Koreans is it a priority. Instead, debates center on alternative strategies for coexistence with elements of gradual integration that are expected to advance haltingly and may even be reversed at times. In the aftermath of the 2000 summit, discussion has focused on how to balance economic assistance and security requirements, how much reciprocity from the North is needed, and to what extent do the wishes of the United States matter. Paying lip service to the long-term goal of reunification does not mean ignoring the need to make choices now. In the inter-Korean summit of Roh and Kim Jong-il these choices became more immediate. Perceptions of North Korea play a role in government strategizing on how to proceed. Is it at last serious about reform? Does it still pose a dangerous security threat? How do U.S. relations affect the readiness of the Kim Jong-il leadership to work with South Korea? In the shadow of the nuclear crisis in 2002–07 it was impossible to divorce the impact of aid to the North from calculations about how the crisis would be resolved. With the North playing its nuclear card and the United States insisting on pressure as a means to bring the North to the negotiating table and later on delaying rewards until no doubt was left about denuclearization, debates on incremental moves toward reunification could not be kept separate. The environment forged by U.S. relations with North Korea and its backers also mattered. U.S. policy changes toward China and the Soviet Union in the early 1970s had opened the way to the South’s early overtures to the North. U.S.-Soviet agreements from the late 1980s further encouraged engagement of the North. Synchronization faded under George W. Bush, especially when Roh Moo-hyun at times proceeded with the North in defiance of the United States, but with the Joint Agreement, Roh received more encouragement from both Bush and Kim Jong-il. He then intensified engagement offers to Kim, resulting in the dramatic October summit.

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The Origins of Cooperative Reunification Thinking in the Cold War The legacy of the Korean War and the belligerent path taken by North Korea with backing from the Soviet Union or China favored tense competition over forward-looking cooperation. Arising in the occupation era before the war, claims of being the only lawful government in Korea set the tone.4 Through the time of Rhee Syngman, competing logics of legitimacy left little room to search for common ground. Park Chung-hee likewise started by emphasizing anticommunism as the basis of his regime’s legitimacy. This did not exclude, however, later paying lip service to ideas for cooperation that might be manipulated for political or propaganda benefit. From 1961 to 1979 his approach to this issue reflected the anticommunist predilections of a military administration intent on mobilizing the population for high-speed economic modernization under a developmental state. His “industrialization first, unification later” (son gonsol, hu tongil )5 set the tone for postponing serious consideration of how to engage the North. Yet, as early as 1960, Kim Il-sung had proposed a federation unification system (yonbangje), and on June 23, 1973, he went further by presenting a program setting forth what that could mean, having already acknowledged that the South would not try to conquer the North.6 As the international environment changed, Park, in turn, established a National Unification Board in 1969 giving a more formal cast to relations. In the midst of Sino-U.S. reconciliation and U.S.-Soviet detente, he approved a South-North Joint Communiqué on July 4, 1972, elucidating three principles for national unification—autonomy, peace, and solidarity of the Korean nation—, and he made clear that he would not oppose both sides entering the United Nations.7 This became the backbone for subsequent initiatives toward the North. At a time when barriers were falling in Northeast Asia, there were stirrings in South Korea too about how talks with the North might lead at least to a framework for coexistence. If terrorist attacks from the North had not undercut support, the growing balance between the two economically developing states might well have encouraged the South’s leadership to become more vocal in advocating such ideas. After all, interest was growing in opening ties with China and Russia. After being obliged by the United States to abandon a clandestine nuclear weapons program, strategic thinkers in the South could anticipate escaping one-sided dependency on a single power only by finding a path to coexistence on the peninsula. Given the gnawing dissatisfaction with Park’s abusive use of power, such escapist thinking offered an appealing outlet.

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On November 10, 1980, Kim Il-sung called for a Founding Formula for the Democratic Federal Republic of Koryo (Koryo minjujuoe yonbang gonghwaguk), and on January 22, 1982, Chun Doo-hwan responded with his formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification (minjok hwahap minju tongil bangan). South Korea matched the North with its own high-sounding proclamations that, at a minimum, paid lip service to the goal of reunification through joint endeavors. The ideal of reunification was kept alive, even if it seemed far-fetched in the absence of trust and of great power relations that offered support. Yet, suddenly in the mid-80s, hopes accelerated for multilateral diplomacy in a rapidly shifting global environment, raising for the first time the prospect of approaching the North through shaping a conducive regional context. Chun Doo-hwan’s administration found the pull from China’s reform and opening to the outside compelling and could have been expected—as he strengthened ties to the United States and Japan—to seek better ties with North Korea too. Indeed, many proposals were presented for informal, nongovernmental ties. However, the terrorist attack by North Korean agents in 1983 in Burma against the South Korean leadership set the process back, as did Chun’s efforts to win support from Ronald Reagan, who was warning of a new cold war in which North Korea had an active role. Despite some systemization of North-South relations and the beginning of exchanges, including an agreement on meetings of separated families, the results were meager. Yet, with Seoul preparing to host the 1988 Olympics and eager for China and the Soviet Union to participate as well as to make use of the opportunity to advance bilateral relations, a new mood arose for creating a positive environment in order to achieve reunification. Public consciousness in the South about finding a cooperative path toward reunification grew along with the Olympic spirit of bringing nations together. The very fact that the Olympic Games proceeded successfully affirmed the government’s declaration of victory over the North Korean terrorists, contributing to optimism that now the North would have no alternative but to switch to a cooperative strategy. The Roh Tae-woo Approach to Reunification A new attitude toward the North arose from the widening contrast between the two Koreas as well as the sense that the international environment was now favorable. As the North fell deeper into economic crisis and isolation, the South was riding a wave of global admiration

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for its continued economic dynamism and forging new diplomatic ties. Suddenly, the possibility of unification on favorable terms had arisen, but Roh Tae-woo decided to play down this prospect by stressing instead gradual steps toward functional integration. In the spurt of accelerated bilateral and regional diplomacy, Roh endorsed hopes for coexistence. He seized the spotlight on April 21, 1988, to proclaim a foreign policy known as nordpolitik, boldly calling for opening the curtain across the 38th parallel for the sake of peaceful reunification, and on July 7 he issued the Special Declaration for National Self-existence, Unification, and Prosperity. 8 Another milestone was the September 11, 1989, introduction of the Korean National Community Unification Formula (Han minjok gongdongche tongil bangan), including the suggestion that a Korean Commonwealth be formed as an interim stage.9 After declaring that in North-South relations competition had been replaced by an era of cooperation, Roh announced this formula, calling for wide-ranging contacts involving academics, opinion leaders, and economic circles. Compared to the North Korean proposal for a Korean federation (Koryo yonbang je) in one quick step, this was a more concrete, realistic appeal for the two nations to draw closer together. It has served as a basis ever since for efforts to expand contacts in order to narrow the gap between two nations that have taken sharply different paths for more than sixty years.10 It also stimulated much freer discussion in South Korea of the North and how to deal with it, allowing doves and even sympathizers to register views that once would have brought their arrest. Yet, some controls remained, and anticommunist themes persisted in schools. The period 1989 to 1992 is marked by two unprecedented developments. First, the two sides agreed to promote reunification after acknowledging common elements in the mutual proposals of the South for confederation and the North for federation at a lower stage.11 This produced a spurt of meetings, including a deal that permitted both to join the United Nations on September 17, 1991. Second, the end of the cold war spurred efforts by Moscow, Tokyo, and Beijing, each on its own, to work out a formula with Pyongyang to further the normalization process on the peninsula while aiming to strengthen its own inf luence over North-South relations. Although Roh had set this process in motion, the North’s increasing isolation not only intensified pressure on it to negotiate but also raised the potential for defiant actions. Much was accomplished in changing consciousness of the North among South Koreans. More open discussion of this long-sensitive topic allowed information to freely circulate, as contacts grew more frequent.

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In this period the South felt ever more superior to its adversary, the North. Its economy was booming. Global observers lauded it as an East Asian economic miracle, while the North’s economy went into a tailspin. Democratization had boosted political legitimation, marked by rising respect from Western leaders and social scientists, as the discredited communist system was being abandoned in most of the world apart from the North. Diplomatically, its successes were the mirror opposite of the North’s growing isolation. In these circumstances, proposals for reunification inevitably smacked of sugarcoating the North’s defeat with face-saving measures as it abandoned all that it held dear. When stress was placed on an era of cooperation replacing one of competition for the sake of peaceful unification, it was assumed that the competition had ended in victory for the South. When German reunification in 1990 led many to envision the possibility of a similar breakthrough on the Korean peninsula, confidence was rising not in a takeover but in series of stages, marked by expanding contacts and exchanges, which would give the South increasing opportunities to guide the North in functional integration.12 While Roh brought the reunification issue to the fore, it was not long before he was viewed as a transitional figure, tarnished by his links to the prior military dictatorship and losing political ground to various opposition forces claiming to be the representatives of true democracy. In these circumstances he found foreign policy to be the easiest outlet, but the more he succeeded in Moscow and Beijing, the more Pyongyang suspected that his goal was to pressure it into submission. Yet, Pyongyang also made moves that raised hopes in Seoul. Its overtures toward the United States, Japan, and other capitalist countries, legal reforms to attract foreign capital, and renewed inter-Korean dialogue, all whetted the appetite of many South Koreans. This created doubts whether Roh was really doing all that he could to end the cold war on the peninsula. In June 1988 only 33 percent of respondents thought that unification was possible, but by August 1991 the figure had risen to 81 percent.13 Many expected German-style absorption of the North, even if there were lingering worries about a possible attack by the North along with continuing distrust that it was really changing.14 The main achievement of the Roh period was the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchange and Cooperation (Basic Agreement) signed with North Korea in December 1991. There were also a Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and an agreement on the establishment of joint commissions, as each

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side formally accepted the official titles of the other. Rather than a relationship between states, they recognized each other as parts of a single country temporarily in the process of unification.15 Having resolved to treat their ties as a special relationship, they could proceed with plans symbolically to join together, as with sports teams at international events, and to organize more two-way meetings. An important turning point for the South Korean state was the change of the National Unification Board into the Ministry of Unification, an office that quickly gained considerable power over all matters connected to the North. From 1991, funds began to be allocated for inter-Korean cooperation, but the North was not yet convinced that such ties would not spring a trap spelling the regime’s demise, as it kept its eyes fixed on somehow normalizing relations with the United States. The Kim Young-sam Approach to Reunification Kim Young-sam presided over a transitional period when policy toward North Korea changed often. At first he stepped up efforts to engage the North, declaring at his inauguration that nation takes precedence over any alliance.16 Instead of crowing about victory in the cross-peninsula struggle, he disavowed arrogance in favor of friendship and charity, insisting that the days of competition were over. Yet, within weeks of taking office, he faced a newly belligerent North that declared it was pulling out of the NPT and was intent on bypassing Seoul as it focused on negotiations with Washington.17 Although this led to some hardening in the South’s position, contacts continued, even leading to plans for a summit with Kim Il-sung, but his death in 1994 complicated matters. Instead of taking this as well as the Agreed Framework reached with the United States as reason to respond positively to South Korean overtures, the North took affront at the absence of a delegation at Kim Il-sung’s funeral by suspending talks and keeping matters on hold for three years in the course of a leadership transition to Kim Jong-il.18 Indeed, at this important juncture, Kim Young-sam went to Russia and brought home the historical records that cast the blame for the Korean War on Kim Il-sung, vilifying him rather than paying respect. As many in the South pondered whether the regime in the North would collapse in the midst of severe famine and succession uncertainties, Kim Youngsam had little chance to make headway in this relationship. Yet, he again softened his line, setting forth negative assurances in 1996 to gain the trust of the untried and still reclusive Kim Jong-il. Altering the terms in which discussions about reunification proceeded, he declared

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that the South would not take advantage of the North’s troubles, isolate it, or seek unification through absorption.19 Seoul could proceed confidently since, ever more, the world recognized that it had already won the competition between systems, but it had to guard against a backlash in the proud North Korean regime, 20 as had earlier occurred toward Roh Tae-woo’s overtures. Kim Youngsam had found more ways to lend support to engagement based on coexistence, reaffirming his stress on cooperation, while appealing to establish long-term exchanges and a gradual, negotiated unification. At the war-end anniversary celebration on August 15, 1994, he announced a three-stage unification program: reconciliation and cooperation, commonwealth, and a final unification stage. 21 Then on August 15 in 1996 and 1997, he made clear the South’s willingness to provide economic assistance to help solve the North’s economic crisis. The severity of the North’s situation reinforced the notion that not only would it be extremely painful to try to absorb the South but also the two sides could not solve their problems by themselves. The KEDO agreement and the launch of four-party talks fueled growing awareness of the need for multilateralism and pursuit of a peace treaty; yet, the North declined to proceed from its weak position. The fact that Kim Young-sam enjoyed legitimacy as an elected civilian president as well as the economic clout and diplomatic multidirectionality of a state in excellent international standing made it easier to proceed from confidence. In the period of the first nuclear crisis, signs were visible of growing independence from the United States. At the November 1993 summit with Bill Clinton, Kim pressed for a “comprehensive solution” based on “a thorough and broad approach” to the North. 22 Yet, such an approach was undercut by the North’s warning in the crisis that Seoul could be turned into a sea of fire, 23 and by its ungrateful handling of aid, as in insistence that an arriving South Korean ship f ly a North Korean f lag. A backlash at home, along with loss of public confidence in his leadership, caused Kim Young-sam to pause in his engagement efforts. The war scare as well as the North’s early insistence on excluding the South in the four-party talks had driven home the message that the alliance with the United States remained vital to the country’s security. Even so, the legacy of livelier exchanges and humanitarian assistance further transformed the consciousness of South Koreans. As public opinion was gaining importance, Kim’s restraint toward the North along with the impact of his shift toward engagement and economic assistance left a foundation for a successor who might decide to go further in building trust. If even a

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conservative president could explore improved ties with the North, despite its provocations, a progressive might go much further. The international environment was changing rapidly between 1993 and 1998, as both Washington and Beijing were growing more confident. If the former under Bill Clinton remained firmly astride the global system, it was increasingly cognizant of the security complexities in Northeast Asia. China’s rise as well as the North’s belligerence had led it to expand alliance ties with Japan. Yet, after China’s warning salvoes against Taiwan’s independence moves and the response of U.S. aircraft carriers, Jiang Zemin went to Washington to forge a strategic partnership. At odds with the United States over financial globalization, Japan began looking to East Asian regional ties rather than APEC. In this continuing flux, South Koreans could again envision space for active diplomacy. The Kim Dae-jung Approach to Reunification While recognizing anew the importance of international relations in dealings with the North, Kim Dae-jung put increased stress on bilateral dialogue, marking a turning point in South Korean foreign policy. He took advantage of the improved international environment following the Agreed Framework of 1994, which was reinforced by the 1999 Perry process that put U.S.-North Korean relations on a more positive footing. By 1997 it was clear that the North would not soon collapse; Kim Jong-il established himself as the successor to his father, and the worst of the famine did not bring unrest. In 1998 Kim Dae-jung’s policies quickly proved that the Asian financial crisis, which erupted on the eve of his election, would not set back South Korea for long. In these circumstances, he made it clear that his state would benefit from a stable North Korea engaged in reform and opening to the outside rather than a North torn by crisis. He strove to gain the trust of Kim Jong-il to alleviate any suspicions, 24 turning the emphasis away from a “unification policy” to a “policy to the North” that stressed coexistence. In his inauguration speech he disavowed unification through absorption or use of force. 25 In a Berlin speech in March 2000, he went further, for the first time making preservation of the North’s security a subject of discussion. 26 He announced the principle of separating politics and economics, offering, irrespective of political problems, to go ahead with economic exchanges to revive the North’s economy while helping it to strengthen cooperation with international society. Intent on saving face for the North, he eschewed the term assistance, calling for

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“reconciliation and cooperation” for mutual benefit.27 Many of these overtures were not new—even the “sunshine concept” had been used by Kim Young-sam—, 28 but Kim Dae-jung proved to be persuasive as he pressed consistently forward even in the face of negative changes in the domestic and foreign environment. He was able to keep public opinion largely in favor of this approach, despite provocative moves by the North such as the August 1998 missile launch and the June 1999 attack on South Korean ships in the West Sea that threatened to derail the process. 29 Kim Dae-jung’s summits with the four concerned powers furthered his cross-peninsula strategy. Meetings with Bill Clinton in June and November 1998, where Kim embraced globalization and showed vigor in overcoming the financial crisis, helped win acceptance for the Sunshine Policy and bring the Perry process into being. The favorable response in Japan to the October 1998 summit that reached breakthroughs on history and culture as well as advancing security and economic ties facilitated Japan’s shift from a hard line adopted after the North’s missile launch toward the forward-looking Murayama mission in December 1999 to restart negotiations aimed at normalization. A November 1998 summit with China raised prospects for coordination in engaging the North that proved critical in the first half of 2000, as China reinvigorated its diplomacy with that state. Finally, in May 1999 Russia became the last of the powers to support Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy. After all, Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov with increased support from Boris Yeltsin, who had been angered by U.S.-led NATO attacks in Serbia, was keen to rebuild ties with North Korea as a means for boosting Russia’s inf luence. Recognizing an enormous gap between the economies of the North and South and the irreconcilable nature of the two systems, Kim Daejung was content with a long-term strategy proceeding toward de facto rather than de jure reunification.30 The South would cooperate in achieving a soft landing in the North, promoting balanced development of the national economy. Already in April 1998 “mutualism” meant that the South prepared to supply fertilizer in exchange for family reunions. It provided rice in the form of loans, not assistance. Calling leaders on the other side by their official titles was another form of respect visible at the June 15, 2000 summit. Formal recognition of each other’s existence was facilitated by submitting the major economic agreements reached at the summit for parliamentary ratification on each side. The fact that the top leaders of both Koreas were signatories and that formal processes were observed was a significant departure from the earlier

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North-South Joint Communiqué in 1972 and the Basic Agreement in 1991. This time the initiative was fully in the hands of the two Koreas and agreements were followed by action. In 1998, fourteen of forty South Korean laws restricting communications with the North were removed, and from that year the scale of exchanges and economic assistance to the North grew rapidly.31 If public support for engagement varied from a high of 98 percent when it was announced at Kim’s inauguration and 90 percent soon after the North-South summit to from one-half to two-thirds when problems arose, overall support was maintained during Kim Dae-jung’s tenure. Many South Koreans were satisfied with peace without unification, hoping to avoid the full costs by making more modest payments of assistance,32 but in the year 2000, a Kim Jung-il boom and a North Korea boom showed widespread receptivity to a surge in nationalist sympathy. In conservative circles too the summit produced ideological confusion, as many welcomed an atmosphere of reduced tensions even as they showed concern about rising gullibility, especially among young people, about the North’s intentions and Kim Dae-jung’s lack of conditionality in rewarding the North. Already from late 1998 Hyundai’s Chung Ju-young gained Kim’s approval for his personal “cash-cow” diplomacy. When near the end of his tenure it was revealed that Kim had made an undisclosed side-payment of about $500 million to Kim Jong-il in order to realize the summit, doubts mounted that relations had not been developed on the basis of reciprocity and mutual trust, adding to concerns that the North’s intentions were still opaque and that Kim Dae-jung’s strategy would be unlikely to hold the international coalition behind the Sunshine Policy together. Ever since that time, domestic controversy between conservatives and progressives has been rising. This window of opportunity lasted until Bush took office, shifting U.S. strategy, first casting doubt on his willingness to continue supporting Kim’s Sunshine Policy and then after the terror attack on 9/11, demonizing the North and talking of preemptive attacks. 33 In his final two years Kim Dae-jung found that he had little leverage with his ally and little to offer Kim Jong-il to sustain the momentum from their summit. Without much popularity at home or support abroad, the best he could do was to proceed on the basis of the agreements already reached, continuing supervised family reunions, pressing ahead with the Gaesung Industrial Complex, and skirting security matters because the North only focused on the United States as the key to its survival and economic revival.

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The Roh Moo-hyun Approach to Reunification In contrast to Kim Dae-jung’s explicit focus on North Korean policy, Roh Moo-hyun gave priority to nuclear policy in which the North is the main object along with the United States.34 Kim downplayed unification as a policy that could give the appearance of absorption and instead emphasized coexistence with multiple means of cooperation and even integration, but also strong reassurances against Seoul using economic and international superiority to pressure Pyongyang to bend to its will. Roh went further by presenting himself as protector of the North in the face of pressure for it to abandon its nuclear weapons program without sufficient compensation and security to offer it the means to face gradual reunification with confidence. Compared to the nuclear crisis in the Kim Young-sam era, Roh insisted on an active role for his government, often taking an independent stance in appealing to both sides on how to narrow their differences. He treated the crisis as both a threat to all of his plans for the South’s diplomacy and an opportunity to reach a settlement that would jump-start North-South relations. Carrying on Kim Dae-jung’s ideas, he acted boldly and not always with the care appropriate to the much more difficult environment South Korea faced. Roh proceeded as if the 1994 model could be revived, overcoming misunderstanding and distrust on both sides, and he was reluctant to accept the limits on his role as a mediator. Catering to anti-American sentiment in his campaign, surrounding himself with advisors and politicians of the 386 generation who distrusted the United States, and using the rhetoric of autonomy, Roh did not gain the trust of the Bush administration, whose unilateralism complicated matters. As the crisis grew more serious, the policy gap widened, with Bush and Koizumi’s drift toward sanctions to pressure Kim Jong-il prior to Bush’s about-face in late 2006. In lieu of raising the banner of reunification, Roh stressed the rewards from integration with economic reconstruction of the North a prime objective. Gradually the outline of a kind of Marshall Plan for the North became clear, proposed even before Roh’s inauguration.35 It eventually included energy supplies, especially an electricity plan unveiled in June 2005, a transportation network both across the 38th parallel and through Russia into the heart of Europe, industrial parks taking the showcase Gaesung project as the first of many, mining and agricultural initiatives, and many more proposals to revive the North’s economy. Not only was little of this tied to insistence on serious economic reforms, but increasingly it became divorced from denuclearization. When the United States, after the Joint

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Statement of September 2005, imposed financial sanctions for counterfeiting and was blamed by the North and many others for halting the momentum of the Six-Party Talks, Roh attempted to proceed directly with the North, making benefits unconditional on the North’s return to the talks. Yet, with his focus on the United States, Kim Jong-il raised the threat potential rather than boosting bilateral integration. It is important to keep in mind the three ingredients of a successful engagement strategy to the North: direct encouragement of expanded ties under the banner of cross-peninsula balance on the way to reunification without sacrificing demand for reciprocity; great power convergence in support of both North and South proceeding on the basis of relative equality toward reunification, but never forgetting that the South is the generous benefactor in this process; and consensus among the South Korean people in pursuit of the North as they trust their leaders to set conditions that prove the North’s sincerity. Roh required too little reciprocity, he failed to coordinate well with the great powers, and he dismissed the need for national consensus. In the shadow of the nuclear crisis, he found the North too focused on making the United States pay a price in security for its hard line, Bush too focused on pressuring the North into submission, and the South Korean public sympathetic to his engagement goals but too divided on how he pursued them to give him much credibility. Roh was not in step with the United States and Japan on the PSI and on human rights concerns, failing even to convey understanding for these moves important to many in the international community. Instead, his dichotomy of standing up for self-reliance ( jaju) and resisting outside pressure (oise) oversimplified what was at stake and how to manage important bilateral relations. This was how matters stood before a new environment emerged in 2007. Already in the summer of 2005 there were signs that Roh could benefit from a new environment in the Six-Party Talks. His peace and prosperity policy acquired new meaning after the September 19 Joint Statement, which was praised as setting forth the general principles on a regional level from which inter-Korean relations should proceed. He showed determination to proceed toward an action plan in order to implement these principles, even if it meant defiance of U.S. insistence on keeping pressure on the North, which was refusing to return to the Six-Party Talks until the United States dropped the newly imposed financial sanctions. Thus, his cabinet became bolder in specifying plans for economic cooperation with the North—a veritable economic development program ranging from agriculture to mining to multiple industrial parks. Roh was ready to open the cross-border railroad linking

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Seoul and Pyongyang. Yet, the North’s hesitancy to lower its military readiness scuttled this plan in 2006, followed by its decision to raise the stakes through multiple missile launches in July 2006 and finally a nuclear test in October 2006. For a time it appeared that Roh was isolating his country by persisting with engagement, although humanitarian assistance was suspended, but agreement on United Nations Security Council sanctions proved to be but a prelude to concerted diplomacy offering the North a way forward. Careful not to reward the North before a new agreement was reached and it began meeting its commitments, Roh, nonetheless, made clear that he was preparing a big package of incentives, many of which were justified as a down payment on costs that would have to be incurred eventually during the course of reunification.36 Reunification Prospects after the February 13, 2007 Agreement The establishment of five working groups at the third session of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks placed reunification in a wide-ranging context. One group brought together the United States and North Korea to discuss normalization. Given the North’s priority on dealing with this issue, it had clearly become a prerequisite for addressing reunification. As long as South Korea enjoyed normal relations with all of the region’s powers and a favored place in the international community, the North refused to deal with it from isolation. Ever since the Roh Tae-woo period, Seoul recognized the need for cross-normalization, and Roh Moo-hyun grasped this reality by focusing on the U.S. approach to the nuclear crisis as the key to what had become a triangular framework for peninsular progress. At last, progress in U.S.-North Korean talks opened the door for his initiatives, even if in the inter-Korean summit of October 2007 he left Washington wary that instead of the promised synergy with the Six-Party Talks Roh would undermine them. A second working group led by China was no less critical to resolution of the nuclear crisis. Its object was denuclearization. Although all six states had a role, the demands came from the United States, the focus was on the North’s fulfillment of its promises, and China stood poised to back up U.S. pressure while also taking care to satisfy the North that action-for-action would be achieved, synchronizing progress in the first and second working group. As part of this group, the South could coordinate its rewards to the North with that government’s cooperation on nuclear issues. Yet, before it had become clear whether

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the North would fully declare its nuclear assets and how it would meet its commitment to “disable” its reactor, Roh’s “creative and comprehensive approach” raised the danger that the North could get benefits that would make it immune from economic sanctions without actually denuclearizing. A third working group led by South Korea brought all six parties together to plan for economic and energy assistance to North Korea. Given the priority of rebuilding the economy of the North in the initial stage of reunification, this group would be laying the groundwork for integrating the infrastructure on the peninsula as well as forming a base for industrial production networks. The stakes were high for both sides of Korea to make sure that China’s economy did not subsume that of the North, but in Pyongyang there was also determination to achieve energy independence and leverage to prevent Seoul from gaining such economic control that it could steer moves toward reunification in its favor. Given his past moves, many South Koreans, especially conservatives, feared that Roh would be inclined to be too generous without adhering to the consensus of other states. His enthusiasm for establishing an “inter-Korean economic community” might boost the North’s confidence in the benefits ahead, even as it remained cautious about liberalization based on market forces, but it would not necessarily work in favor of linkage. Two complementary organizations would become the principal legacy of the Roh period in setting the path toward reunification. The first are ministerial consultations, which had a checkered history of steps forward mixed with interruptions from the 1990s, but were poised for acceleration after Roh met Kim Jong-il. Here Seoul could try out its proposals for exchanges, cultural cooperation, investment, and general improvement in the climate of inter-Korean ties. It only had to win approval of Pyongyang, although if it moved too fast it could alienate those who feared one-sided benefits would take the pressure off Pyongyang to denuclearize. The October 2–4 summit gave impetus to intergovernmental cooperation, perhaps tying down Roh’s successor with promises of large-scale financial assistance and plans for multiple, vast projects to rebuild the infrastructure and industrial base of the North. GNP opponents warned, however, that the next president would not be bound by Roh’s moves. The second organization that could emerge are four-party talks to establish a peace regime, forging with the help of the United States and China a framework for security on the peninsula that would be essential for moving forward with integration in all respects. While Bush had

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encouraged peace talks since the end of 2006, there was concern that a formal proclamation that the Korean War was ended might precede the important confidence-building measures necessary to reassure the South Korean people and other countries. The concept of peace would ring hollow without denuclearization and arms control measures. Through the spring of 2007 delays over the transfer of North Korean funds that had been frozen left in doubt how the February 13 agreement would be realized. Inside South Korea the focus turned to intense infighting within both the conservative and the progressive camps over who would be the candidates in the presidential race in the fall. Questions about the overall strategic direction, especially relations with the United States and North Korea, became linked to soul-searching about what kind of a country South Korea is and where it is heading. In a search for the broad framework for proceeding, Roh railed against the disastrous impact of electing a conservative, while leading voices on the conservative side blamed Roh for plunging the country into the trouble it faced. In the background were assumptions about national identity related to policy toward the North. National identity becomes a contested term in any struggle for reunification. If the North may call for far-reaching as well as symbolic political decisions on the assumption that one nation already exists and it urgently needs to realize its essence, citizens of the South are prone to differentiate sharply between the political as well as material culture of the two Koreas and postpone political moves that would force superficial integration until a common sense of national purpose and norms of citizenship have reached both sides. Fearful of a rush to political judgment based on zero-sum reasoning, the South is likely to emphasize a win-win situation as staged integration of the economies, societies, and cultures takes place. The North is unlikely to agree. The struggle over national identity may well precede other struggles in what is bound to be a difficult and highly contested process in pursuit of the elusive goal of reunification. Conclusion Under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, anticommunism that aimed to contain and best the North in a tense cold war environment left reunification to appear mostly as a symbol of unfulfilled aspirations whose expression could provide a public relations advantage. With Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam a shift occurred from competition to cooperation in which the South could gain a great advantage and steer the North toward reform and entry into the global community with

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reunification to come in stages of transformation coupled with absorption. Kim Dae-jung could not guarantee a union of equals, but he could emphasize support for the North’s diplomatic and economic resuscitation that would considerably equalize the playing field. Although Roh Moo-hyun had little choice but to concentrate on managing the nuclear crisis, he followed Kim Dae-jung in reassuring the North about its equality in a gradual process aimed at eventual reunification. The North’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006, which emboldened the conservative critics of Roh’s failed “appeasement,” and the February 13, 2007 agreement reenergizing Roh’s ties with the North as proof that the United States pull back from “unilateralism” will work, left a divide in South Korean strategic thinking in an election year. Critics charged that Roh’s “radical reunification policy” was emboldening the North’s nuclear adventurism and undercutting the coalition necessary to keep the pressure on to reform as well as end its threatening posture. In contrast, supporters of engagement gave Roh some credit for working bilaterally and in the Six-Party Talks to change U.S. policy, while keeping the North aware of the incentives that follow from its willingness to compromise. As the South led one working group on economic and energy assistance to the North and talk turned to a “peace regime” and to accelerated work through inter-Korean ministerial consultations, the reunification theme was rising in importance in 2007 after five years of being overshadowed in the crisis atmosphere. Yet, the crisis remained far from resolved, and it still held the key to any breakthrough that would allow reunification to become more than a symbol of goodwill. In the second half of 2007 the critical tests for realizing the Joint Agreement were only just becoming the center of attention. Phase 2 would test not only North Korean-U.S. relations, but also South Korea’s intermediate role in ending the crisis. Disputes over the 2007 inter-Korean summit demonstrate that it will not be easy in the near future to resolve the nuclear crisis or demarcate a path to reconciliation. Although most South Koreans were positively inclined to another summit, political strife persisted over whether: it should be held on the eve of the presidential election or delayed; the range of subjects should be limited to keep security concerns in the forefront or made quite broad even if the security posture of the South might in some way be jeopardized; a vigorous economic agenda would win the North’s trust or reduce pressure on it to accept denuclearization as well as complicate coordination in the Six-Party Talks; and the next administration should be bound by the results or be free to find its own way. In general, South Koreans want to conduct summits periodically,

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institutionalizing them as a path toward peace, while the North Korean regime seems narrowly focused on seeking gifts in order to reconstruct its economy or keen on splitting the other parties and diluting pressure for its denuclearization. At the same time, the South sought to convince the United States that a summit was useful in resolving the nuclear issue and advancing peace in the face of skepticism it might spoil the carefully balanced arrangements defined in the February 13 agreement. Amidst election-time political rancor, most accepted the desirability of some sort of engagement and that the October 4 Declaration charted the way forward to cross-peninsular ties through economic integration and a peace regime. Follow-up moves, such as opening freight rail service across the DMZ to Gaesung and preparing for tours of Mt. Baekdu, suggested its impact. Roh supporters accepted the logic that if economic benefits to the North are accelerated or guaranteed, military tensions and antagonism between the two Koreas would be reduced. They noted that areas with vital military bases of the North would be opened to the South for economic reasons. Since Kim Jong-il had not mentioned the issue of United States armed forces in Korea during the summit, they surmised that he had adopted a pragmatic approach at least with regard to inter-Korean relations. The logic of their strategic thinking was as follows. First, since Roh Moo-hyun after Kim Dae-jung had succeeded in holding an inter-Korean summit, future South Korean governments would make it a policy to institutionalize these meetings and deepen engagement. Second, the inter-Korean summit shifts the center of activism in dealing with issues on the peninsula to the two Korean states, and in the future this would become an indispensable mechanism for dealing with matters that arise. Third, although North Korean nuclear issues remain to be addressed, the agreement that there should be an end to the Korean War with the conclusion of a peace treaty is an important advance that South Korean leaders would continue to press. For progressives, Roh’s success in the final months of 2007 in regaining the initiative and advancing interKorean ties promises to be an enduring strategic contribution. Conservative critics reject these arguments. They see Kim Jong-il emboldened by Roh’s “payment of tribute” and intent on using the South to drive a wedge into the coalition seeking denuclearization. This means that the North would be less compromising with future leaders in the South and drive a harder bargain in defiance of its pledges in the Six-Party Talks. In their view, Roh has made it more difficult to achieve coordination with the United States and others and has complicated the process of implementing engagement moves with the North by paying

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so little attention to conditionality. Already at the end of 2007 delays were evident in fulfillment of the pledge of a full declaration as part of Phase 2, while doubts were intensifying about the prospects for realization of Phase 3 in 2008. The final verdict on how to judge Roh’s strategic thinking would depend heavily on how the Six-Party Talks proceeded. He was counting heavily on Kim Jong-il’s moderate, pragmatic intentions to rescue his place in history, while the United States, despite its new eagerness for cooperation with the North, doubted that Roh’s actions struck the right balance to serve this objective. Supporters of Lee Myung-bak, ready to work more closely with the United States, now faced the difficult challenge of timing continued assistance with the North to realize joint objectives with their ally and with the other states in the region. Notes 1. Nicholas Eberstadt, Korea Approaches Reunification (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). 2. Young-Sun Lee and Masao Okonogi, eds., Japan and Korean Unification (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999). 3. Samuel S. Kim, “The Mirage of a United Korea,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 2006 (http://www.feer.com/articles1/2006/0611/p009. html accessed February 15, 2007). 4. Rhee strongly denied the existence of North Korea based on the United Nations 3rd General Assembly, “Resolution 195(III)—The Problem of the Independence of Korea,” December 12, 1948, pp. 25–27. 5. This policy to win the competition with the North was revealed in Park’s New Year’s address on January 18, 1966. Office of President of ROK, Park Chung-hee daetongryong yonsol munjip, Vol. 2 (Seoul: Office of President of ROK, 1973), pp. 31–32. 6. Rodong shinmun, August 15, 1960. In 1973 Kim Il-sung proposed “Five Principles for National Reunification.” 7. Ministry of Unification (http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp). For Park’s call for a good neighbor and friendship policy and his end to opposition against the North becoming a member of the United Nations, see Tongilbu 30nyonsa, 1969–1999 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1999), p. 54. 8. Office of President of ROK, Roh Tae-woo daetongryong yonsol munjip, Vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of President of ROK, 1990). 9. http://likms.assembly.go.kr/kms_data/record/data1/147/147za0001b. PDF#page=1 accessed March 29, 2007; also Tongilbu 30nyonsa, 1969– 1999, pp. 68–72. 10. Korea Institute for National Unification, Minjok gongdongche tongil bangan oe eronchegae wa silchon bangan (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1994).

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11. Rodong shinmun, January 1, 1991. 12. See the results of surveys by the Ministry of Information, Chosun ilbo, June 25, 1992. Also see, Kim Kyung-ung, “Tongil oe sahoi munhwajok jopkun: Nambukhan sahoi munhwa gyoryu wa tonghap banghyang mosaek,” Hanguk jongchi hakhoibo, Vol. 29, No. 4 (1995), pp. 421–43; and Yu Young-ok, “Nambukhan ijilsung gukbok ul wihan simrisahoijok jomang,” Hanguk jongchi hakhoibo, Vol. 31, No. 2 (1997), pp. 173–201. 13. See the results of the annual survey. Dong-A ilbo, April 1, 1990. 14. Over 70 percent of South Koreans expressed anxiety in the poll of the Ministry of Information. Chosun ilbo, June 20, 1990. Later polls also showed distrust of the North, Segye ilbo, February 24, 1992. 15. In the preamble of the Basic Agreement, the two Koreas agreed to express their relationship as a “special one constituted temporarily in the process of unification,” http://www.unikorea.go.kr/index.jsp accessed March 29, 2007. 16. Office of President of ROK, Kim Young-sam daetongryong yonsol munjip, Vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of President of ROK, 1994). 17. Chosun jungang tongsinsa (Korean Central News Agency of DPRK), February 25, 1995. 18. North Korea repeatedly censured the South Korean government as “an immoral savage” for preventing a delegation from attending the funeral. Jungang bangsong (North Korea), July 15, July 16, and July 21, 1994. See, Jugan Bukhan donghyang, Vol. 185 (July 10–16, 1994) and Vol. 186 (July 17–23, 1994). 19. See the Kim Young-sam’s addresses on Independence Day, August 15, 1996 and August 15, 1997. Office of President of ROK, Kim Young-sam daetongryong yonsol munjip, Vols. 4, 5 (Seoul: Office of President of ROK, 1997, 1998). 20. Park Kyun-young, “Daebuk jongchaek oe saeroun jopkun,” Gukjae jongchi nonchong, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1998), pp. 92–94. 21. See the appendixes of the Tongil baekso 1997 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1997); and Korea Institute for National Unification, Minjok gongdongche tongil bangan oe eronchegae wa silchon bangan (Seoul: Korea Institute for National Unification, 1994). 22. Chosun ilbo, November 25, 1993. 23. In a meeting of the two Koreas, the North Korean Park Young-su menaced the delegates from the South with the statement, “Seoul could be a sea of fire,” which changed the South’s attitude to a hard-line. See Chosun ilbo, March 20, 1994 24. Rodong shinmun, February 4, 1999 and March 15, 2000; on September 27, 1999, Baek Nam Soon, the foreign minister of North Korea also criticized the Sunshine Policy as a wicked policy aimed at unification by absorbing the North. 25. Kim Dae-jung daetongryong yonsol munjip, Vol. 1 (Seoul: Office of President of ROK, 1999), p. 65.

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26. Ibid., pp. 152–59. 27. Tongil baekso 1999 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 1999), Ch. 2. 28. Han Wan-sang, the first unification minister under Kim Young-sam used the concept in 1993 (http://likms.assembly.go.kr/kms_data/record/ data1/161/161za0006b.PDF#page=1 accessed March 26, 2007. 29. After the North’s missile launching in August 1998, most South Koreans did not recognize it as a failure of the Sunshine Policy, which 70.9 percent supported (Hankyoreh, November 8, 1998), and later in the year 56.3 percent did (The Korea Economic Daily, December 22, 1998). Even after the military clash between the two Korean navies in June 1999, over 65 percent supported the policy (Seoul shinmun, October 8, 1999). 30. Chung-in Moon, “Understanding the DJ Doctrine: The Sunshine Policy and the Korean Peninsula,” in Chung-in Moon and David I. Steinberg, eds., Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy: Promises and Challenges (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp. 35–56. 31. Tongil baekso 2003 (Seoul: Ministry of Unification, 2003), Ch. 3. 32. Kookmin ilbo, February 27, 1998; Seoul shinmun, May 2, 1998; Hankook ilbo, August 20, 1998; Dong-A ilbo, June 17, 2000; Maeil business shinmun, August 18, 2000. 33. In spite of the North Korean foreign ministry’s expression of strong opposition against terrorism (Chosun jungang tongsinsa [Korean Central News Agency of DPRK], September 12, 2001), Bush included the North in the “axis of evil,” and it was listed in the annual terrorism report, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2002 (Washington, DC: Department of State Publication, 2003), p. 80. 34. Pyonghwa bonyong gwa gukka anbo (Seoul: Office of National Security Council, 2004), pp. 32–37. 35. On January 24, 2003, Chung Dong-young, who served as Unification Minister from July 1, 2004 to February 9, 2006, attending the 33rd World Economic Forum as special envoy of president-elect Roh Moo-hyun, said that Roh had been preparing a reconstruction plan, that is, a Marshall Plan for the North, Maeil Business shinmum, January 24, 2003. 36. Roh conceptualized these costs as an investment for the future, which would be returned as the united Korean economy f lourished. (See the “100 Minutes Discussion” on MBC-TV on September 28, 2006, http:// www.imbc.com/broad/tv/culture/toron/vod/index.html accessed March 29, 2007).

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CHAPTER 7

South Korean Strategic Thought toward China Jae Ho Chung

T

he principal assumption behind any systematic effort to explore Korea’s strategic thought is to conceive of Korea as a rational state, defined as a state that possesses the attribute of transitivity or an ability to order its preferences and opt for a solution that is interestmaximizing and, at the same time, cost-minimizing. Presupposing Korea—or any other country for that matter—solely as a rational actor may invite fierce debates but, for analytical purposes, we may, at the least, assume that we can reconstruct the process of such reasoning in an ex post facto manner.1 Having taken for granted that Korea is a rational state, we may proceed to delineate the boundary of its core interests and corresponding costs. As with most other countries, Korea’s core interests can be seen as three-fold: survival (national security), development (economic growth), and vision (prestige imperative). 2 To the extent that maintaining national security through internal balancing (i.e., increasing self- defense capabilities) is deemed crucial, the cost of spending huge sums of money on defense even at the expense of economic growth is regarded as acceptable. To the extent that preserving national security through external balancing (i.e., allying with other countries) is deemed necessary, the expense of increased dependency on other states may be considered acceptable. To the extent that sustaining economic growth is deemed crucial, on the other hand, external balancing is preferred to internal balancing even at the cost of reduced sovereignty.3

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When the imperatives of security and development are attained to a considerable degree, the third component of national interest—namely, prestige—may enter the equation. In fact, it is in the nature of all sovereign states, as of human beings, to aspire for higher prestige and self-esteem.4 Once the prestige imperative is sought, however, pay-offs for each of the options listed above become radically transformed. That is to say, to the extent that prestige becomes the top priority, rational states would be inclined to value independence and sovereignty and, therefore, to reduce dependency, in security or economic terms, on other states. Equally important is the set of factors that may change the perimeter of one’s strategic thought by introducing new variables. Generally speaking, two such categories can be conceived of. One refers to exogenous factors—that is, changes in the “environments” external to the state, including the structure of the global and/or regional systems and international atmosphere—such as the demise of the cold war and the ascendancy of China. The other denotes endogenous ones, that is, intrastate sources of change such as democratic transition, economic crises, political coalitional changes, and public opinion swings.5 The key questions that this chapter seeks to answer are as follow: 1) has there been contemporary strategic thinking on the part of South Korea toward China that we can discern?6 2) If there has, when did it start and under what circumstances? and 3) how has South Korea’s strategic thinking vis-à-vis China evolved over the years? In response to these questions, the following arguments are posed. First, there have indeed been discernible threads of strategic thinking on the part of South Korea toward China. Second, initially, the seeds of Seoul’s strategic thinking toward China were planted under the initiatives of Park Chung-hee during the early 1970s in the midst of the U.S.-China rapprochement and the June 23 Announcement. Third, in the period of three decades since then, Korea’s strategic thought toward China has experienced ebbs and flows but, with the diplomatic normalization in 1992 and the “rise” of China, has become increasingly more concrete and manifest. These arguments are set forth in six sections, structured temporally describing strategic thought toward China and its constraints during the administrations of Park Chung-hee, Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh Moo-hyun, and a concluding section. The Reign of Park Chung-hee: Planting the Seeds In the aftermath of World War II, the traditional China-Korea relationship was reformulated as two pairs of dyads—namely, ROK-ROC and

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DPRK-PRC relations. The impact of the Korean War (1950–53) was such that China maintained a special relationship with North Korea, one that was often dubbed as “brotherhood sealed in blood,” whereas South Korea sustained an amicable relationship with Taiwan under the auspices of the United States’ hub and spoke system of alliances in East Asia.7 During the 1950s under Rhee Syngman’s rule, U.S.-China relations, Sino-South Korean relations, and inter-Korean relations were so highly antagonistic that there was virtually no room for Seoul’s strategic thinking toward Beijing. The present danger of North Korean aggression and the cold war confrontation were such that the security imperative prevented South Korea from having second thoughts about its alliance with the United States against the communist threat at large. Accordingly, heavy dependence on the United States for security and development—and the corresponding cost of limited sovereignty—were simply taken for granted. The highly antagonistic relationship between China and South Korea had continued throughout the 1960s, with the occasional armistice meetings at Panmunjom providing the only venue of close encounters. When two Chinese pilots defected to South Korea with their AN-2 reconnaissance plane in 1961, Seoul simply chose not to communicate with Beijing and immediately sent the pilots and the plane to Taiwan, which South Korea then recognized as the sole legitimate government of China. 8 On the other hand, China often detained South Korean fishing vessels and their crew for up to twelve years, charging that the boats had intruded into Chinese territorial waters. South Korea then had no channel or means to negotiate with China for their return.9 International strategic environments changed dramatically during the early 1970s, manifested in China’s accession to the United Nations and the rapprochement between China on one hand and the United States and Japan on the other. Keenly aware of China’s potential influence over North Korea, Seoul began to think strategically that improving relations with Beijing would help reduce the tension and maintain peace on the peninsula. That is, for South Korea’s security equation, the China factor began to weigh in. In 1971, Foreign Minister Kim Yongsik commented that “[I]t is the policy of my government to approach the question of normalizing diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China with f lexibility and sincerity.”10 According to Seoul’s internal position as of 1972, it would not take an antagonistic posture unless Beijing chose to do so first.11 China also posed a challenge to South Korea’s development imperative. As China adopted a policy of discriminating against those Japanese

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and American corporations with close commercial ties in South Korea and Taiwan, grave concerns were voiced with regard to long-term implications of the “China fever” in the United States and Japan for South Korea’s economy.12 Seoul’s strategy was to face the challenge head-on. In 1972, South Korea amended Article 2 of its foreign trade laws so as to permit trading with communist countries other than North Korea and Cuba.13 According to a survey in early 1972, as many as 38 percent of the National Assembly members were in support of diplomatic normalization with Communist China.14 The South Korean media were also playing the tune that Seoul should remain alert in security terms but keep its diplomatic options open as far as China was concerned.15 South Korea’s Foreign Ministry sought hard to open windows of contact with China by permitting its diplomats to meet with their Chinese counterparts. Seoul even secretly designated the five embassies in Washington, London, Ottawa, Paris, and Tokyo, and the consulate general in Hong Kong as key points of contact with mainland China. Most importantly, expanding Seoul’s political relations with Taipei beyond what it had already maintained was tacitly discouraged.16 The essence of Park’s strategic thinking was encapsulated in the June 23, 1973 Announcement, which radically altered South Korea’s foreign policy posture by abandoning the long-held Hallstein Principles and thereby opening its door to all countries including China and the Soviet Union. In March 1973, South Korea suggested that China should participate in negotiations for delineating the boundaries of the continental shelf in the Yellow Sea and, for the first time, referred to Beijing as the People’s Republic of China, a proposal that was quietly turned down by China.17 In September 1974, South Korea lifted the ban on postal exchanges with communist countries, and China promptly responded by allowing Korean-Chinese to exchange letters with their relatives in South Korea through the International Red Cross. At the United Nations General Assembly, China also began to refer to South Korea as the Republic of Korea.18 Little overt development occurred during 1975–77 due to several factors.19 Above all, this was the period of extreme political uncertainty in China surrounding the death of Mao, the fall of the Gang of Four, and the ensuing struggle for succession at the Zhongnanhai. Furthermore, regional strategic environments were in flux as a major communist victory was scored in Indochina with the fall of Saigon. In 1975, Kim Il-sung allegedly proposed in vain to Mao Zedong that North Korea and China undertake a joint military action to regain South Korea and Taiwan. 20

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After the dust of succession politics settled in Beijing, the two sides resumed the minuet of 1972–74. Yet, the fall of Saigon led to South Korea’s reduced confidence in the U.S. defense shield against North Korea. Despite Washington’s effort to provide reassurance, Park Chunghee went for a clandestine nuclear program to build a reprocessing plant that would produce plutonium, only to be squashed by Washington. 21 Then, there came the “Carter chill” by which all U.S. ground combat forces were to be withdrawn from South Korea in four to five years from 1977. 22 While the specifics of Park’s strategic thinking toward China still remain veiled, it is interesting to note that many of his administration’s overtures toward China were concentrated in this last phase of his rule, concomitant to Seoul’s bumpy relationship with Washington. On November 1, 1978, Kim Kyung-won, special assistant to Park for international security affairs, made remarks at the Hong Kong Press Club that South Korea hoped to improve its relations with China. On November 17, Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin made it clear that “the government will not prohibit any commercial activities with communist countries, with which it does not have diplomatic relations.” 23 While this only reiterated the 1972 amendment of the foreign trade regulations, the statement was synchronized with China’s much publicized “opening” to the outside world. One month later on December 18, 1978, China’s Minister of Foreign Trade, Li Qiang, mentioned in an interview in Hong Kong that China might consider having trade with South Korea and Israel, signaling some success for South Korean efforts. 24 Chun Doo-hwan’s Rule: Active Trading Diplomacy Available evidence suggests that Chun Doo-hwan showed strong interest in improving relations with China, as well as with the Soviet Union. During his tenure he appears to have been particularly interested in developing close economic ties with China. In Washington in 1981, Chun commented, “[I]f the People’s Republic of China is a friend of the United States, I think I can extend the logic and say a friend of a friend is less of a threat to us.” 25 Deputy Prime Minister Shin Byung-hyun remarked in his work report to the National Assembly in November 1981 that “while no direct trade is currently being conducted with China, the situation will improve in that direction.” 26 China’s weighted emphasis on expanding economic cooperation with the outside world at large coincided with South Korea’s search for export markets and for peace on the peninsula. Seoul was more than prepared to respond with

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alacrity to any overtures Beijing might make. Then, two fortuitous windows of opportunities—the hijacking incident in 1983 and the Kunsan torpedo boat incident in 1985—enabled Seoul and Beijing to engage in direct contact for the first time. 27 These incidents led to official negotiations between the two countries and produced in the process an institutional derivative, that is, Seoul and Beijing managed to open telex communication, a temporary hotline via Tokyo, and an emergencyonly hotline via Hong Kong, respectively. 28 Exchanges could have developed beyond economic ties had it not been for the two tragic events—the Soviet downing of a Korean airliner in September 1983 and North Korea’s Rangoon bombing in October 1984—that poured cold water on Seoul’s efforts for rapprochement with communist neighbors. 29 Yet, sports diplomacy worked as a crucial catalyst for rapprochement. Mutual invitations and attendance at the Seoul Asian Games, the Seoul Olympic Games, and the Beijing Asian Games in 1986, 1988, and 1990, respectively, paved the way for closer relations.30 Available evidence suggests that Chun relayed a message to Deng Xiaoping in August 1985 through Takeyuri, head of the Japanese Komeito Party, proposing the development of bilateral trade.31 It was also during Chun’s tenure that the Inter-agency Commission on the Promotion of Northern Policy (Bukbang jongchaek chujin bonbu)— targeting China and the Soviet Union—was established in 1985. It is not clear, however, if these measures were based on any systematic thread of strategic thinking concerning Korea’s overall security interests as opposed to simply pursuing all-round trading diplomacy. By 1987, many seasoned observers predicted that Sino-South Korean economic relations would further expand, although the same could not be said of diplomatic normalization. Despite their low profile during this earlier period, designed mostly to shield them from criticism by North Korea and Taiwan, Sino-South Korean economic relations had already reached a point where any move in the reverse direction would be clearly not in the interest of either party. As its trade constituted 2.3 percent of China’s overall trade in 1986, South Korea became China’s seventh largest trading partner. Whereas the Chun Doo-hwan administration skillfully utilized the hijacking incident and the Kunsan torpedo boat incident in expanding economic exchanges with China, though mostly indirect and nongovernmental in nature, certain limits were clearly imposed. In retrospect, Chun appears to have been more strongly committed to the consolidation of South Korea’s traditional alliance relationship with the United

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States. This was understandable considering that his rise to power had been indebted to the military coup d’etat and bloody suppression of the Gwangju uprising and, therefore, America’s formal endorsement of his rule was deemed indispensable.32 His strategic thought toward China was rudimentary at best and largely in pursuit of diversification of the export market. Roh Tae-woo’s Nordpolitik: The Normalization Drive Succeeding Chun in February 1988, Roh Tae-woo was perhaps the most important figure in South Korea’s rapprochement and normalization with China.33 Popularly elected, Roh was not as constrained as Chun by considerations of his legitimacy as perceived by the United States. As a matter of fact, his administration aspired to adjust Seoul’s U.S.-centered diplomacy and seek omnidirectional foreign relations. In his inaugural address, Roh commented on his vision (i.e., prestige imperative) as follows: “[A] new beginning [is here], an era of hope, which will see Korea, once a peripheral country in East Asia, take a central position in the international community.” He went further by saying that “[W]e will broaden the channel of international cooperation with the continental countries with which we have had no exchanges . . . Such a northward diplomacy should also lead to the gateway of unification.” 34 Roh’s strategic thinking was epitomized by two documents. One refers to the July 7 Special Announcement in 1988: that Seoul would seek normalization of relations with Pyongyang’s allies and not object to Pyongyang’s diplomatic normalization with Seoul’s allies.35 The other denotes an article written by Roh’s key aide, Park Chul-un, which laid down three principal reasons for nordpolitik: 1) to attain an international environment favorable to unification; 2) to take a prominent role in the region and the world; and 3) to help the nation economically as well.36 The security imperative was largely missing due to Seoul’s soft stance toward Pyongyang and, instead, two prestige imperatives— unification and status—were enunciated. While nordpolitik was targeted at socialist countries at large, Roh’s proclivity toward China was almost a preoccupation. During his presidential campaign in late 1987, Roh had already addressed the mainland as China. In the immediate aftermath of the election, on December 24, 1987, Roh expressed his wish that South Korea could normalize relations with China during his tenure.37 According to a report, Roh even sent a secret envoy, former Foreign Minister Park Dong-jin, to Hong Kong to relay his wish to pay a visit to China even before the inauguration.38

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Nordpolitik initially was predominantly economic in nature. Seoul’s announcement of a large-scale development scheme—called the Yellow Sea Plan (hwanghae gyehoik)—for its western region was followed by Beijing’s decision to open up the Shandong and Liaodong peninsulas.39 In early 1988, Vice Premier Tian Jiyun was the first top official to state that China would develop direct trade with South Korea.40 Remarks by Huang Hua, China’s former foreign minister, that characterized the situation as China’s “gate (to South Korea) remaining closed but not locked” (guanmen bu suoshang) were also revealed at this time.41 The 1988 Seoul Olympic Games were a key catalyst in helping South Korea and China to further expand their economic cooperation, manifested by the doubling of bilateral trade from $1.7 billion in 1987 to $3.1 billion in 1988. The China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) proposed to the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTR A) in January 1989 that they start negotiating for the exchange of trade offices. Speculation soon abounded that diplomatic normalization was imminent. Two sets of evidence lead us to believe that the Roh administration sought to develop certain alternative thinking that was quite different from the conventional line of diplomacy. One set of evidence denotes that, on several occasions, the United States expressed concern about the pace at which the Korean-Chinese rapprochement was proceeding at the time. In December 1988, Park Dong-jin, Korea’s Ambassador to Washington, characterized the American view of nordpolitik as South Korea’s “unilateral drive”—that is, lacking sufficient consultation with its key ally.42 The other set concerns South Korea’s response to the Tiananmen massacre, which was not synchronized with the tough measures adopted by the United States, Europe, and Japan. South Korea had been silent on the military suppression and more willing to resume business with China. After the target was reportedly adjusted downward from $4.3 to $2.5 billion, the actual trade turnover surpassed it by 28 percent.43 South Korea also sent more than 2,500 business delegations to China in 1989 alone, marking a 70 percent increase over 1988.44 South Korea was among the very few countries (others being the Philippines and the Soviet Union), which marked an increase in the number of visitors to China after the Tiananmen tragedy. In contrast, Japan and the United States scored a decrease of 40 and 29 percent, respectively.45 It was in June and August 1989 that Sino-South Korean ferry routes and charter f lights were opened for the first time. Furthermore, several South Korean business conglomerates went so far

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as to provide $5 million and over 400 passenger cars in goodwill donations to show their support for China’s hosting of the 1990 Asian Games.46 This background helps to explain the decision in late 1990 to exchange trade representative offices in Seoul and Beijing. Roh’s strategic thought toward China was affected by his preoccupation with attaining diplomatic normalization before the expiration of his term. While there was no “buying off ” involved with regard to China, unlike with the Soviet Union and Hungary, Seoul appears to have attached so much symbolic importance to normalization that it was willing to make concessions just to obtain Beijing’s diplomatic recognition.47 The most serious problem was, perhaps, that once the president made it clear that he wished to see normalization and pay a state visit to China during his tenure, this left very little room for front-line negotiators to maneuver.48 The Chinese side was keenly aware of Roh’s “haste” in pushing for normalization and willingness to make concessions.49 Close examination of the negotiations suggests that it was mostly the Chinese side that set the agenda and controlled the pace. There is little evidence that leads us to believe that the South Korean negotiators took crucial initiatives or obtained any substantial gains from these talks. The bottom-line for them was, unfortunately, that the historic South Korea-China summit had to materialize during Roh’s tenure and their Chinese counterparts were well aware of that.50 During a negotiating session in June 1992, Ambassador Kwon, South Korea’s chief negotiator, received instructions to this effect, and after that, the negotiators became totally preoccupied with realizing the summit, proposing a Roh-Jiang summit in July 1992 to announce the diplomatic normalization. This radical proposal was quietly rejected by China.51 In sum, nordpolitik was rooted in a sort of strategic thinking that aspired to enhance the nation’s self-esteem and international status by steering it toward a more “independent” and multidirectional line of diplomacy.52 Yet, micromanagement of the rapprochement with China left unclear if the immediate gains from the normalization at that particular time outnumbered the long-term costs attached to Korea’s posture vis-à-vis China.53 Kim Young-Sam’s Five Years: Moving beyond Economics Once the diplomatic normalization was attained, the growth of the bilateral economic relationship between Korea and China was further accelerated during Kim Young-sam’s presidency. The two-way trade—now

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mostly direct—increased from $6.4 billion in 1992 to $23.7 billion in 1997. Investment became another pillar of Sino-South Korean economic bilateralism. The impact of the investment guarantee agreement signed in 1992 was clearly felt thereafter. In 1993, South Korea already became the tenth largest investor in China.54 By 1995, China became the number one recipient of South Korea’s outbound investment. In 1996, 46 percent of South Korea’s total outbound investment was poured into China.55 As bilateral economic relations were maturing, the end of the cold war and diplomatic normalization opened up new possibilities of cooperation. South Korea-China relations began to move into hitherto uncharted terrain in the realm of security. Seoul’s strenuous efforts for rapprochement with China were conducted fairly independently of American direction.56 What led South Korea to seek room for a more independent foreign policy? In strategic terms, the desire to reduce heavy dependence on the United States played a crucial role, given that America’s changing threat perception had been the sole determinant of its defense commitment regardless of South Korea’s position.57 South Korea’s growing national pride—derived from its successful democratic transition and economic performance—also played a key role in pursuing a position on par with its newly acquired capabilities.58 As an analyst aptly put it: “Leaders in Seoul display a new appreciation that security means more than perpetuating the U.S. connection . . . [I]t still remains vital, but so are Seoul’s new-found diplomatic levers.” 59 This is not to suggest that there was at the time a firm consensus within the leadership concerning whether and how to adjust relations with the United States. As a matter of fact, disagreement and confusion more aptly described Seoul’s strategic thinking during the Kim Young-sam administration. Given that Seoul rarely made explicit linkages between its diversified diplomacy (oigyo dabyonhwa) and its Washington-centered foreign policy, a small incident in the spring of 1994 allows us a glimpse at Seoul’s diplomatic hedging in its very incipient form. At a press briefing on the night of March 29, 1994, concerning Kim Young-sam’s state visit to China, Hwang Byung-tae, South Korea’s ambassador to China, commented that “South Korea-China cooperation over the issue of North Korea’s nuclear program should go beyond the current level of simply notifying Beijing what has already been decided between Seoul and Washington . . . . South Korea’s diplomacy should break out of its heavy reliance exclusively on the United States.” In less than two hours, upon strong request by the president’s chief aide

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on security affairs, the ambassador rescinded his remarks and commented that they only represented his personal views. 60 Not surprisingly, the incident was widely publicized in the Korean media, which in turn generated some heated debates. Interesting is the fact that, despite the media’s predominant characterization of the incident as a “diplomatic mishap,” some diplomats, politicians, and policy analysts tacitly endorsed Hwang’s “unconventional” view. 61 Although Kim did not endorse it, the ambassador was not sacked; in fact, he remained in the post until 1996. Given the centrality of China’s role in the resolution of the North Korean nuclear crisis, this incident might simply have reflected Seoul’s wishful thinking about China exerting a more constructive inf luence. In hindsight, however, it was clearly a harbinger of the long-term possibility that South Korea was to maintain a certain balance of its own between the United States and China. 62 During the Kim Young-sam administration, possibilities existed for strategic cooperation over North Korea and Japan. On North Korea, expectations were not met; China mostly sat on the fence during the first nuclear crisis. Not surprisingly, it vetoed a United Nations condemnation of North Korea’s nuclear program; 63 yet, that was precisely when relations with North Korea began to cool down significantly, China’s provision of economic assistance notwithstanding. Although China’s “socialization” into the international community during the 1990s made South Korea increasingly more attractive relative to North Korea, this did not induce Beijing to abandon Pyongyang’s core strategic interests.64 On Japan, cooperation between South Korea and China might have been possible under circumstances where Washington was assigning an expanded military-strategic role to Tokyo largely irrespective of how Seoul viewed this.65 While South Korea managed to sustain an amicable official relationship with Japan under the auspices of the United States, security concerns had always lurked in the background.66 Regarding Japan, there exists a huge perceptual gap between the United States on the one hand, and South Korea and China on the other. 67 According to two nationwide surveys conducted in South Korea in 1995 and 1997, Japan was viewed as most threatening to South Korea’s security interests. In stark contrast, Americans have maintained much more favorable perceptions of Japan, which they regard as unique among Asian countries.68 While there were some shared perceptions between China and South Korea (and North Korea as well for that matter) of the latent threat that Japan may pose, the possibility of an anti-Japan “united front” seemed highly unlikely. 69 In the long run, however, South

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Korea, which has been increasingly eager to achieve a partner—as opposed to client—status in its security relationship with the United States even by shouldering huge defense burdens, may seek to add a meaningful security dimension to the already burgeoning Sino-South Korean bilateralism. Kim Dae-jung’s Peace Strategy: The Sunshine Dynamics The Kim Dae-jung administration inherited from its predecessor the most serious economic crisis that Seoul has ever faced. Deeply enmeshed within the international trade and financial regimes, South Korea had to rely to a considerable extent for its stable recovery on assistance from Washington, which responded, due in significant part to its security commitment to and economic linkages with Seoul.70 Yet, China offered South Korea no direct assistance, in contrast to its generous aid to Thailand. Until South Korea’s recovery, therefore, Kim could not afford to develop strategic thinking that would pull South Korea away from the United States. Quite a number of exogenous factors were also taking effect in the region at the time. The redefinition of America’s strategic commitment consolidated the U.S.-Japan alliance, best exemplified by the 1997 Defense Guidelines revision. The U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the missile defense controversies, and the reconnaissance plane (EP-3) incident between the United States and China in 2001 all added to the prevailing concerns with the regional strategic situation in f lux.71 Just as German unification was made possible by the active persuasion by the United States of the concerned European states and the tacit acceptance of the Soviet Union, so too might Korean reunification require consensus building.72 Consensus among the four major powers in Northeast Asia unfortunately appeared a remote possibility, which posed a problem for Seoul that had to elicit support—or at least no objection—from the United States and China in particular.73 Given that South Korea is structurally tied to the United States through the alliance framework, equating the rise of China with a China threat would constrain the range of strategic options available for Seoul in its pursuit of reunification.74 Kim Dae-jung pursued a dual-track strategy—the Sunshine Policy toward North Korea on the one hand and the engagement policy toward China on the other—that did not necessarily make the United States

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happy. The Sunshine Policy—engaging and assisting North Korea without requiring a quid pro quo—landed Seoul in the driver’s seat as far as inter-Korean relations were concerned. Kim’s Berlin announcement in March 2000 was not the result of close consultation with the United States or the other major powers in Northeast Asia. It was more the outcome of his strategic thinking on unification.75 More importantly, the Sunshine Policy was apparently supported more actively by China than the United States. The historic inter-Korean summit in June 2000 highlighted that South Korea’s search for a proactive and pivotal role in mitigating the tension on the Korean peninsula was more in line with Beijing’s policy framework than Washington’s. The summit communiqué, for instance, endorsed Beijing’s long-held position of “independent and peaceful unification” (zizhu he heping tongyi) as opposed to Washington’s “peaceful unification.” 76 Kim also capitalized on the changing public opinion toward China compared to the United States. The emergence of highly favorable views of China among the general public in South Korea marked a stark contrast with the plummeting popularity of America. Owing to the much-shared cultural and historical heritage, geographical proximity, and rapidly expanding bilateral ties, China was becoming a crucial intervening variable for South Korea-U.S. relations.77 It was also during the late 1990s that the initial expansion of bilateral military cooperation— resulting in defense ministers’ visits and exchanges of port calls by naval vessels—was facilitated.78 According to a multinational survey conducted in 2000, South Korean respondents ranked North Korea (54 percent) and Japan (21 percent) as their top two threats while Americans chose China (38 percent) and Russia (21 percent).79 As the improvement in inter-Korean relations became more visible and genuine after the summit in June 2000, the threat perceptions of Seoul and Washington became more diverging than converging. Furthermore, given Kim Dae-jung’s “soft” diplomacy toward Japan, how Tokyo’s relationship with Washington would evolve vis-à-vis Beijing also became a variable. While the Kim Dae-jung administration appears to have possessed some threads of strategic thinking of its own, which is discernible from those of its predecessors, we cannot say for sure whether it did indeed have a China focus, as a counterweight to the U.S.-centered diplomacy. Rather, Kim’s strategic thought revolved more closely around inter-Korean national cooperation (minjok gongjo) and reunification. Apparently, Seoul was more interested in the inter-Korean summit, family reunions, confidence building, economic cooperation, and overall

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tension reduction with Pyongyang, rather than paying specific attention to such issues cherished by Washington as nuclear non-proliferation, missile control, and WMD.80 Roh Moo-hyun’s Northeast Asia Initiative: Accommodating China’s “Rise” During the summer of 2002, news media in South Korea were literally f looded with reports and columns on “China fever,” commemorating the tenth anniversary of the normalization of relations between South Korea and China. Lavish receptions were held in diplomatic circles and academic conferences convened to put the historic event in perspective. At about the same time, South Korea-U.S. relations plummeted to a record low in the wake of candle-lit anti-American demonstrations ignited by the tragic incident where two schoolgirls had been run over by a U.S. army vehicle. The rise of anti-American sentiments contributed significantly to the election of Roh as president. The composition of the Roh administration, along with the National Assembly election in April 2004 that was won by Roh’s party, introduced a drastic—both generational and orientational—change to the elite strata in Korea. Over two-thirds (68 percent) of the National Assembly members in the incumbent Uri Party and nearly half (43 percent) of those in the Grand National Party were younger newcomers. More importantly, these were closely linked with the changes in South Korean elites’ perceptions of the United States and China.81 According to a survey on 138 newcomers to the National Assembly in 2004, 55 percent chose China as a more important foreign policy target than the United States. 82 The South Korean elite’s growing interest in China was further amplified by surveys of ordinary citizens. According to a JoongAng ilbo survey in 2003, over 60 percent of the respondents suggested that South Korea’s relations with the United States need a complete rethinking or, at least, its exclusive dependence should be reduced. 83 Another survey conducted by Dong-A ilbo in 2004 also found that 61 percent of the respondents regarded China as more important in South Korea’s diplomacy than the United States.84 As partisanship intensified, the debates became further politicized and bifurcated, focusing on the relative priority of the two states. 85 The Roh administration over five years adopted a three-pronged policy in its external relations. First, with regard to North Korea, it mostly continued its predecessor’s Sunshine Policy as engagement policy (poyong jongchaek). Inter-Korean cooperation and confidence building

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were still preferred and quid pro quo neither required nor prioritized. Second, concerning its traditional allies, the United States and Japan, Roh insisted on diplomacy with self-esteem—that is, different interests are to be explicitly noted rather than concealed or imposed just for the sake of the alliance. Third, the geographical focus of its diplomacy was defined as the region of Northeast Asia. Because of its inherited engagement policy, crucial discrepancies with the United States have been discernible in threat perception concerning North Korea. 86 This created the environment where China has emerged as the most inf luential player and mediator in resolution of the North Korean conundrum, 87 and questions have been posed as to the future of the U.S. alliance. The heated debates related to the size, location, and timing of dispatching South Korean forces to Iraq in early 2004 were indicative of the state of affairs in the relationship. Whether the Seoul-Washington relationship would worsen to the extent that there is actually room available for the third party China to wedge between them became a key question. 88 It is not entirely clear what Roh’s focus on Northeast Asia really signifies. It not only reduced the geopolitical scope of Korea’s diplomacy compared to Kim Dae-jung’s concept of East Asia, but it also did not pay sufficient attention to how the term Northeast Asia was generally interpreted in China or Japan. While it might have ref lected Roh’s vision of South Korea’s place as the hub in the region, the effort was not even welcomed by China with its eye on Shanghai as the regional hub. In contrast, its conceptual twin—Northeast Asian balancer—espoused by Roh, was received critically in Washington but rather favorably in Beijing. 89 South Korea’s approach to the second nuclear crisis since October 2002 has also highlighted the diverging threat perceptions between Seoul and Washington. As Bush took it out of the driver’s seat, Seoul until 2007 had been mostly singing peace and stability to the tune of Beijing in the backseat in efforts to prevent Washington from employing nonpeaceful measures against Pyongyang.90 Yet, it is not entirely clear whether South Korea’s strategic relationship with China has indeed improved to the extent of making up for the crack in the SeoulWashington relationship.91 While China became Korea’s number one trading partner and investment destination in 2004, grave concern began to appear over growing dependence on Beijing.92 Roh’s strategic thinking toward China was dealt a heavy blow in the summer of 2004. The publicity that the media gave to China’s Northeast Project (Dongbei gongcheng)—efforts to incorporate much of Korea’s

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ancient history into China’s local histories (difang zhengquanshi)— raised the eyebrows of many South Koreans. Many became deeply concerned that a stronger China could increasingly impose its views as the Ming and Qing courts did on Josun. The Goguryo history controversy left deep wounds in the minds of South Korean intellectuals as far as their view of China was concerned.93 As table 1 demonstrates, the impact of the Goguryo controversy was clearly felt in public opinion surveys. South Korean general perceptions toward China made an about-face with the summer of 2004 as the watershed, leading to increased amity toward the United States. A similar trend was discernible among the elite as well. According to a survey conducted among 187 members of the National Assembly in 2005, 68 percent chose the United States as the most important foreign policy target of South Korea.94 Compared to a similar survey conducted among 138 assemblymen in 2004, in which 55 percent of the respondents chose China, the impact of the Goguryo controversy was readily discernible. With the Korean perceptions of China changing, subtle shifts were discernible. One of Roh’s favorite new books depicts the United States as a constant—not a variable—in South Korea’s security equation but emphasizes the need to maintain the South’s “independent” status vis-à-vis China.95 Seoul’s rather sudden interest in the FTA with the United States in early 2006 also generated debates concerning South Korea’s shifting foreign policy focus, which were not ended even when an FTA agreement was reached in 2007.

Table 1

a

2003 2004 b 2005 c 2005 d 2006 e

The Impact of the Goguryo Controversy Chose China (%)

Chose the United States (%)

48 61 39 29 24

33 26 54 55 47

Notes a. JoongAng ilbo, February 12, 2003. The question: “where should South Korea’s foreign policy focus be placed?” b. Dong-A ilbo, May 4, 2004. The question: “which country should South Korea regard as most important?” c. Chosun ilbo, January 1, 2005. The question: “which of the four major powers do you feel most favorably toward?” d. Dong-A ilbo, November 7, 2005. The question: “on which country should South Korea’s foreign policy focus be placed?” e. Munhwa ilbo, September 16, 2006. The question: “which country should South Korea regard as most important?”

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The essence of Roh’s strategic thought toward China can be partly detected from Seoul’s negotiations with Washington since 2003 on “strategic flexibility”—that is, on what terms the U.S. forces can be freely deployed in and out of South Korea to cope with regional contingencies. While maintaining that it understands and respects the U.S. need for strategic flexibility in its global military management, Seoul does not wish to be sucked into an unwanted conflict—say, over the Taiwan Strait. There was clearly a shadow of China in Seoul’s hesitation to accept strategic flexibility in its fullest form. An interim agreement at the first South Korea-U.S. Strategic Dialogue in January 2006 was that Washington understood Seoul’s concern, while the latter accepted strategic flexibility in principle, with details pending to be sorted out later.96 Lee Myung-bak’s landslide victory in December 2007 is likely to bring about at least some changes in South Korea’s policies toward the United States, as he has always emphasized the centrality of the alliance. This will certainly impact relations with Beijing; yet at this time it remains unclear if his efforts to reframe Seoul’s foreign relations will fundamentally alter the evolutionary path that South Korean strategic thinking has taken over the past three decades. Conclusion The seeds of Seoul’s strategic thinking toward Beijing were planted by Park Chung- hee in the early 1970s. During the ensuing three decades, this thinking has had ebbs and flows but, overall, became increasingly manifest and concrete. The normalization in 1992 put relations on a hitherto inconceivable level. South Korea’s remarkable economic accomplishments and successful democratic transition led to enhanced national self-esteem, which in turn generated the pressure for reduced dependency on the United States. In the process, China has often been conceived, if not yet actually utilized, as a strategic alternative or counterweight. Seoul wishing to consider Beijing as a strategic alternative—or strategic supplement—is one thing, while the latter regarding such a contingency as a real possibility is quite another. Despite its unexpected decision in 1997 to join the four-party talks, which were initially viewed by Pyongyang as a three-against-one formula, Beijing managed not to tilt toward Seoul at Pyongyang’s expense.97 Similarly, Beijing has neither sacrificed nor abandoned Pyongyang just for the sake of Seoul, its proactive efforts for the Three- and Six-Party Talks since 2003 notwithstanding.98

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There are some indications that China’s management of North Korea under Hu Jintao appears to be somewhat different from the past.99 Its involvement in the Six-Party Talk process coincided with heated internal debates since 2003 on whether China should readjust its policy toward North Korea.100 Some take a nuclear North Korea for granted, while others actively call for its denuclearization even at the expense of worsened ties.101 Despite recognition that a nuclear North Korea is by no means beneficial to China, a consensus has yet to emerge as to longterm plans for the Korean peninsula. Until then, China’s policy toward North Korea is bound to have gaps between its pronounced tenets and actual policy measures. Against Beijing’s preferences, Pyongyang detonated a nuclear device on October 9, 2006, an act that the Chinese Foreign Ministry characterized as “brazen” (hanran). Yet, neither was Sino-North Korean trade adversely affected nor the inspection procedures of cross-border freight fundamentally altered.102 Even with the follow-up measures for “disablement” in February 2007, due largely to Beijing’s active cooperation and Washington’s change of policy, complete rollback of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program seems a remote possibility.103 There is no doubt that South Korea is approaching a crossroads in its strategic soul-searching. With so many uncertainties in the air, determining an optimal strategy that can satisfy all segments of the society is difficult, while simultaneously addressing core strategic interests. In the short run, South Korea is likely to continue with the dual strategy of maximizing benefits from the comprehensive cooperation with China and of minimizing the costs from the strained relationship with the United States. This may be viewed as an act of hedging, but given the bifurcation of security and economic logic in East Asia at large, this may be mostly unavoidable.104 Hedging has embedded risks but, as a middle power among great power players, South Korea has no other choice but to work hard to be on good terms with both the United States and China. Prudence comes at a premium and strategic thinking will help cultivate just that.

Notes 1. See, for instance, Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999); and David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).

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2. For a general discussion of this theme, see Karl J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1983), Chs. 4–5. 3. For the trade-offs, see James D. Morrow, “Arms versus Allies: Trade-Offs in the Search for Security,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring 1993), pp. 207–33. 4. Thomas Hobbes, “Leviathan,” in C.B. MacPherson, ed., Hobbes’ Leviathan (Harmonsworth: Pelican Books, 1968), p. 185. 5. Matthew Evangelista, “Internal and External Constraints on Grand Strategy,” in Richard Rosecrance and Authur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Base of Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 154–78. 6. The modifier “contemporary” has been attached here since quite a few studies are available on traditional Korea’s strategic reasoning vis-à-vis China, for example, Hae-jong Chun, “Sino-Korean Tributary Relations in the Ch’ing Period,” in John K. Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); Choi Soja, Myungchong sidae Junghan gwangyesa yongu (Seoul: Ewha Woman’s University Press, 1997); and Peter Yun, “Confucian Ideology and the Tribute System in Chosun-Ming Relations,” Sachong, No. 55 (September 2002), pp. 67–88. 7. Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 563–92. 8. Chosun ilbo, September 19, 1961. 9. Shin Myung-soon, “Hanguk gwa Junggong oe gwangye gaeson e gwanhan yongu,” Hanguk gwa gukje jongch’ i, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1985), pp. 55–56. 10. See Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea: Dynamic Relations (Stanford: The Hoover Press, 1996), p. 105. Nixon’s withdrawal of the Seventh Infantry Division, which led to a one-third reduction of the American forces, might have had some impact on Seoul’s overture toward China. 11. The Foreign Policy Archive of the Republic of Korea, File no. 721.1CH/CP (1972), Microfiche no. C-0044-021. 12. See Chosun ilbo, February 17, March 16, April 11, and July 24, 1971. 13. See Lee Beom-chan, “Hanso gyoryu hyonhwang gwa hwakdae bangan,” Kongsangwon yongu, Vol. 9 (May 1987), p. 15. 14. Chosun ilbo, March 30, 1972. 15. For the media’s self-criticism of its excessive anti-Communist tone in reporting on the mainland China, see Chosun ilbo, March 4, 1973. 16. See The Foreign Policy Archive of the Republic of Korea, File no. 721.1CP (1972), Microfiche no. C-0051-03; and File no. 722.2CP (1974), Microfiche no. C-0072-10. 17. Chosun ilbo, March 17, 1973. 18. Chosun ilbo, November 27, 1974; and Chi-jeong Park, “Han-Junggong mingan gyoryu hwakdae bangan,” Jungguk yongu, Vol. 5 (1986), p. 44.

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19. In 1974, Park purchased a building in Sheung Wan, Hong Kong, as the outpost for China diplomacy, which was later renamed the Korea Centre and housed the Korean Consulate General, Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTR A), and branch offices of Korean media organizations. His efforts to initiate economic contact with China during 1977–79 are described in Lee Ho, Hanjung so gan oe Bukbang oigyo silche (Seoul: Cheil Media, 1997), pp. 188–90; and Byung-gook Lee, Hanjung gyung jae gyoryu hyonjangron (Seoul: Nanam, 1997), p. 183. 20. Parris H. Chang, “Beijing’s Policy toward Korea and PRC-ROK Normalization of Relations,” in The Changing Order in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula cited in Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea, p. 68. 21. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1997), pp. 64–74. 22. William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 1999), Ch. 3. 23. Beom-chan, “Hanso gyoryu hyonhwang gwa hwakdae bangan,” p. 15. 24. See Chosun ilbo, December 19, 1978; and Washington Post, January 1, 1979. 25. Korea Overseas Information Office, Forging a New Era: The Fifth Republic of Korea (Seoul: KOIO, 1981), p. 78. 26. Shin Young-soo, “Han Junggong gyoryu odiggaji wanna,” Bukhan, April 1984, p. 86. 27. Chae-Jin Lee, China and Korea, pp. 106–08. For a Chinese take on the event, see Shen Tu, “Palyi jjalbaso aksu rul halsuopso,” Shindonga, August 1988, p. 520. 28. Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), Ch. 4. 29. The Rangoon bombing might have inf luenced the Chinese leadership’s view of North Korea, which in turn worked well for the improvement of Sino-South Korean relations thereafter. 30. Xing Fuquan, “Hanguo yu Zhongguo de tiyu waijiao ji weilai fazhan,” Dong fang zazhi, Vol. 17, No. 12 (December 1984), pp. 58–59. 31. Lee Byung-gook, Hanjung gyung jae gyoryu hyonjangron, p. 209. 32. Byung Chul Koh, The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), p. 16. For Washington’s view of the Chun regime at the time, see William H. Gleysteen, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, pp. 169–70. 33. Roh can be compared to Indonesia’s Suharto and South Africa’s Mandela in making the normalization of relations with China a sort of personal mandate. 34. The Presidential Secretariat of the Republic of Korea, ed., Korea: A Nation Transformed, cited in Kim Hak-joon, “The Republic of Korea’s Northern Policy: Origin, Development, and Prospects,” in James Cotton, ed., Korea

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35. 36. 37. 38.

39.

40. 41.

42. 43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

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under Roh Tae-woo: Democratization, Northern Policy and Inter-Korean Relations (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1993), p. 257. Park Chul-un, Barun yoksa rul wihan jungun, (Seoul: Random House JoongAng, 2005), Vol. 2, pp. 24–25. See his “Hanguk oe mirae wa Bukbang jongchaek,” Minjok jisong, April 1984, pp. 190–91. JoongAng ilbo, June 11, 1988; and Roh Tae-woo daetongryung yonsol munjip (Seoul: Office of the Presidential Secretariat, 1989), pp. 176–79. Hankook ilbo, October 28, 1996. Park Chul-un also reveals in his memoir that he had worked in vain to facilitate a meeting between Roh and Deng Xiaoping before the former’s inauguration, Barun yoksa rul wihan jungun, Vol. 1, p. 280. China Daily, January 27, 1988; and Zou Weidong, “Trends in South Korea’s Preparations for Developing Trade with China,” in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China (hereafter FBIS-China), September 15, 1988, pp. 7–8. The New York Times, March 14, 1988. Los Angeles Times, January 20, 1988 cited in Liu Jinzhi, Zhang Minqiu, and Zhang Xiaoming, Dangdai Zhonghan guanxi (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 1998), p. 104. Park Chul-un, Barun yoksa rul wihan jungun, Vol. 2, pp. 31, 148. Segye ilbo, August 3, 1989. The number of business delegations from the United States and Japan was reduced by more than 50 percent. See Thomas E. Jones, “Gaining Visibility: Sino-South Korean Commerce Is Becoming Too Big To Hide,” The China Business Review, November–December 1990, p. 46. China Trade Report, February 1991, p. 15; and Peter Polomka, “The Two Koreas,” in Gary Klintworth, ed., China’s Crisis: The International Implications (Canberra: RSPS, Australian National University Press, 1989), pp. 57–59. For South Korean corporations’ activism toward China in the wake of the Tiananmen tragedy, see Lee Byung-gook, Hanjung gyung jae gyoryu hyonjangron, pp. 42–44. Whereas $600 million and $3 billion were used to attain diplomatic recognition of Hungary and the Soviet Union, respectively, no such conditionality was attached to Seoul’s normalization with Beijing. Yet, the option of providing economic aid in exchange for diplomatic normalization with China was seriously considered in 1990 when Park Chul-un offered a $2.7 billion package. The offer was considered unrealistic and rejected by the presidential economic advisor, Kim Jong-in. See Lee Ho, Hanjung so gan oe Bukbang oigyo silche, pp. 150, 157, 172–73, 219; Hankook ilbo, October 7 and 14, 1996; and interviews in Beijing in January 1999 and in Seoul in May 2006. Chosun ilbo on February 12, 1994, characterized this as: “President Roh’s greed for the first South Korea-China summit totally messed up Seoul’s negotiations for normalization.”

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49. See the memoir of Qian Qichen, Waijiao shiji (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2003), pp. 145–54; and the memoir of Zhang Tingyan, China’s first ambassador to South Korea, Yan Jing, Chushi Hanguo (Jinan: Shandong daxue chubanshe, 2004), pp. 16–17. 50. In early 1992, South Korea’s Foreign Ministry designated 1992 as the year of “wrapping up the northern diplomacy.” See Lee Byung-gook, Hanjung gyung jae gyoryu hyonjangron, p. 196. 51. See Chosun ilbo, February 12, 1994; and Hankook ilbo, December 2, 1996. 52. One goal of nordpolitik was to “expand the horizons of Seoul’s foreign policy, which were hitherto limited to the countries like the U.S. and Japan.” See Ministry of Information, “Great Strides Made during the First Four Years of the Roh Tae-woo presidency,” Backgrounder, No. 94 (February 8, 1992), p. 10. 53. For the long-term impact of the normalization dynamics on Korea-China relations, see Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner, Ch. 6. 54. JoongAng ilbo, May 10, 1993. 55. Munhwa ilbo, February 20, 1997. 56. Several interviewees—particularly those of the Foreign Ministry— confirmed that much of Seoul’s northern diplomacy had been conducted independently of Washington. Ambassador Donald Gregg, in a conversation with this author in August 2004, on the other hand, argued that Washington had been well informed of Seoul’s northern initiatives. For America’s concerns on this, see Park Chul-un, Barun yoksa rul wihan jungun, Vol. 1, p. 355 and Vol. 2, p. 148. 57. See Joo-Hong Nam, America’s Commitment to South Korea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 153, 158. 58. These sentiments came to the surface within a decade, particularly after Roh Moo-hyun’s election. 59. Edward A. Olsen, “Korean Security: Is Japan’s Comprehensive Security Model a Viable Alternative?” in Doug Bandow and Ted G. Carpenter, eds., The US-South Korean Alliance: Time for a Change (New Brunswick: Transactions, 1992), pp. 146–48. 60. For an hour-by-hour description of the event, see Chosun ilbo, March 31, 1994. 61. For a strong endorsement of Ambassador Hwang’s view, see Sisa Journal, April 14, 1994, p. 112. My interviews with some South Korean diplomats at the time were also indicative of their empathy with Hwang’s remark. For a similar appraisal, see Dong-A ilbo, September 8, 1998, which characterized the event as a “meaningful incident.” 62. I noted this trend in The Rise of China and the Korean-American Alliance (Stanford: Institute of International Studies, February 1999); and “South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma,” Asian Survey, Vol. 41, No. 5 (September–October 2001) pp. 777–96.

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63. For a summary of this episode, see Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, pp. 320–21. 64. North Korea’s Decline and China’s Strategic Dilemmas, United States Institute for Peace Special Report (Washington, DC: USIP, October 1997), p. 6; and Phillip C. Saunders, “Korea as Viewed from China,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2005), pp. 234–37. 65. For American views of South Korea as a peripheral security interest at best, see Ted G. Carpenter, “South Korea: A Vital or Peripheral US Security Interest?” and Doug Bandow, “America’s Korean Protectorate in a Changed World: Time to Disengage,” in Doug Bandow and Ted G. Carpenter, eds., The US-South Korean Alliance, pp. 1–15, 75–93. Also see Sun Cheng, “Meiguo yao tisheng Riben,” Shijie zhishi, No. 8 (2001), pp. 14–15. 66. See Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), Ch. 1. 67. For details, see Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner, Ch. 8. 68. 1995 Sejong Survey (Seoul: The Sejong Institute, 1995), p. 78; and 1997 Sejong Survey (Seoul: Dongseo Research, 1997), p. 11; Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996), Ch. 7. 69. For China’s expressed concern with Japan’s potential military ambition, see Li Luye, “The Current Situation in Northeast Asia: A Chinese View,” Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Spring 1991), pp. 79–80. For the idea of a South Korea-China alliance against the Japanese threat, see Gerald Segal, “Northeast Asia: Common Security or A La Carte?” International Affairs, Vol. 67, No. 4 (1991), p. 765. In fact, one reason for Beijing’s decision to normalize relations with Seoul was allegedly to create an anti-Japanese coalition. See Yan Jing, Chushi Hanguo, p. 17. Also see Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 170. 70. See Lawrence B. Krause, The Economics and Politics of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998 (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 224–25, 228–30. 71. Had it not been for September 11, U.S.-China relations could have reached a much more confrontational phase. 72. See Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); and Gary L. Geipel, “The Diplomacy of German Unification: Lessons for Northeast Asia,” in Robert Dujarric, ed., The Future of Korea-Japan Relations (Washington, DC: The Hudson Institute, 2001), pp. 151–52. 73. Americans believe that China generally prefers the status quo on the Korean peninsula. Chinese, on the other hand, consider Americans as the

176

74.

75.

76. 77.

78.

79. 80.

81.

82. 83. 84. 85.

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one that least wants unification. See Chen Fengjun, “Ershiyi shiji Chaoxian bandao dui Zhongguo de zhanlue yiyi,” Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu, No. 4 (2001), pp. 8–9. Chung-in Moon and Taehwan Kim, “South Korea’s International Relations: Challenges to Developmental Realism,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 271. Samuel S. Kim, “Inter-Korean Relations in Northeast Asian Geopolitics,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), p. 170. Compare The Washington Post, June 21, 2000 with Renmin ribao, June 16, 2000. For the swing of public opinion in favor of China during this period, see Jae Ho Chung, “Dragon in the Eyes of South Korea: Analyzing Korean Perceptions of China,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot, pp. 258–59. For the role of cultural proximity as a key factor in Sino-South Korean relations, see Xu Derong and Xiang Dongmei, “Zhonghan jianli mianxiang 21shiji hezuo huoban guanxi de beijing fenxi,” Dangdai Hanguo, No. 22 (1999), p. 34. For an argument that Korea’s efforts to develop military-to-military ties with China is related to Seoul’s will to prevent the South Korea-U.S. alliance from taking up the role of constraining China, see Liu Ming, “Hanguo de diyuan weizhi yuqi waijiao he anquan zhengce,” Yatai luntan (AsiaPacific Forum), Nos. 3/4 (1999), p. 37. Dong-A ilbo, December 5, 2000. The differences in policy horizons in Seoul and Washington are noted in Catharin Dalpino and Bates Gill, eds., Brookings Northeast Asia Survey 2000–01 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 31. In elite interviews conducted by an American think-tank in 2002 with a new generation of South Korean opinion leaders, 86 percent wished to see South Korea’s future ties with China further strengthened as opposed to only 14 percent for the United States. See William Watts, Next Generation Leaders in the Republic of Korea: Opinion Survey Reports and Analysis (Washington, DC: Potomac Associates, April 2002), p. 12. See Dong-A ilbo, April 19, 2004. JoongAng ilbo, February 12, 2003. Dong-A ilbo, May 4, 2004. For the debate between the so-called Northeast Asian School and the American School, see Lee Soo-hoon, “Now, It Is the Era of China” and Chun Chae-sung, “It Is Still America Not China,” Chosun ilbo, April 21 and 25, 2004. The recent survey of Korea specialists in Washington, DC conducted by the Mansfield Foundation and Kyunghyang shinmun shows nearly unanimous

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87.

88.

89.

90. 91. 92. 93.

94. 95. 96. 97.

98. 99.

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agreement that the U.S.-Korea alliance is experiencing profound change. See http://w w w.mansf ieldfdn.org/pubs/pub_pdfs/khsm_summary.pdf (accessed on December 18, 2005). China’s provision of food and energy and growing investment and North Korea’s rapidly rising trade dependency—over 50 percent in 2005—has been central to the survival of the regime. Kim Jong-il’s visits to China in May 2000, January 2001, May 2004, and January 2006 should be interpreted as Pyongyang soliciting Beijing’s support for its new policy framework. It is often suggested that Roh’s focus on “independence” or “self-reliance” is closely related to taking a stance closer to China than to the United States. The outcome of its painstaking compromise can be found in National Security Council, Pyonghwa wa bonyong ul wihan Dongbukka (Seoul: NSC, February 2004). For China’s positive response to the concept, see Li Dunqiu, “Lu Wuxuan— zuo junhengzhe,” Shijie zhishi, No. 11 (2005), pp. 30–33. For a critical view of the concept in Korea, see Jae Ho Chung, “Gyunhyongja doegi wa gyunhyongjom chatgi,” Dong-A ilbo, April 27, 2005. See Norman Levin, Do the Ties Still Bind? The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship after 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: R AND, 2004). In January 2006, the Korean government was not notified of the visit to China by Kim Jong-il before or even during the event. See Dong-A ilbo, March 15, 2006; and Chosun ilbo, May 26, 2006. For such concerns, see Nan Liming, “Hanguo dui Zhongguo de wenhua kangyi,” Yazhou zhoukan, July 25, 2004, pp. 16–17; Dong-A ilbo, December 3, 2003, August 25 and December 25, 2004; JoongAng ilbo, December 4, 2003; and The Washington Post, September 23, 2004. For the goals of the Northeast Project, see Ma Dazheng, ed., Zhongguo dongbei bianjiang yanjiu (Beijing: Zhongguo shehuikexue chubanshe, 2003); and Jae Ho Chung, “Dongbuk gongjong oe hyonjaejok uimi wa Hanguk oigyo,” Wolgan JoongAng, September 2004. Dong-A Ilbo, April 13, 2005. Bae Ki-chan, Korea—dasi saeng jon oe giroe soda (Seoul: Wisdom House, 2005), pp. 426–28. See Dong-A ilbo, January 21, 2006 and Chosun ilbo, February 2 and 3, 2006. For Pyongyang’s initial perception of China’s participation, see Eric McVadon, “Chinese Military Strategy for the Korean Peninsula,” in James R. Lilley and David Shambaugh, eds., China’s Military Faces the Future (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 289. See Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: The Limits of Inf luence,” Current History, September 2003, pp. 274–78. Jae Ho Chung, “China’s Ascendancy and the Korean Peninsula,” in David Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 156.

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100. See the controversial article by Shen Jiru, which called for deleting the automatic involvement clause in the Sino-North Korean Friendship Treaty, “Weihu Dongbeiya anquan de dangwu zhi ji,” Shijie jing ji yu zhengzhi, No. 9 (2003), p. 57. In 2004, the prestigious journal, Strategy and Management, was terminated for publishing an article critical of the Kim Jong-Il regime. See Wang Zhongwen, “Yi xinde guandian lai guancha Chaoxian wenti yu Dongbeiya qingshi,” Zhanlue yu guanli, No. 4 (2004), pp. 92–94. 101. Compare Shen Dingli, “Accepting a Nuclear North Korea,” Far Eastern Economic Review, No. 168 (March 2005), pp. 51–54, with Zhang Liangui, “Stalemate and Solutions,” Beijing Review, Vol. 48, No. 33 (August 18, 2005), p. 11. 102. “Chinese Investors Keeping Eye on North Korea,” The Straits Times, March 9, 2007. 103. Rowan Callick, “US-China Alliance Reaps First Fruit,” The Australian, February 14, 2007. 104. See Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner, Ch. 9.

CHAPTER 8

South Korean Strategic Thought toward Japan Gilbert Rozman

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or South Koreans, it remains easier to criticize Japan than any other country. After all, it occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945 and has failed, even after normalization of relations in 1965, to show the remorse sought by the Korean nation. Indeed, satisfaction with the results of normalization with the Soviet Union/Russia and then with China have left many Koreans careful to avoid criticisms that might strain relations anew, but a different logic operates for Japan. Yet, after the cold war, as regional experts looked for ways to gain leverage in the region, successive Korean presidents recognized the disadvantage of one-sidedly pointing the finger at Japan. Repeatedly, efforts were made to put relations on a firmer footing and make strategic use of Japan, as had been done at times during the cold war by presidents whose dictatorial power could dismiss public opinion. We can see evidence of this in the maneuvering at the end of the cold war that led to nordpolitik, early attempts to set a new course on the basis of normalized relations with all regional powers that was interrupted by the first North Korean nuclear crisis, responses to the difficult environment of the Asian financial crisis, the hopeful mood of the Sunshine Policy, and the turbulent early days of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. With each new challenge, decisions had to be taken on the priority of Japan and whether to approach it more strategically. Despite the logic of healing lingering wounds in the first two decades after World War II, South Korea could not find common ground for

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normalizing relations with Japan. The fact that the two states shared dependence on an indispensable ally, the United States, and antagonism to a readily demonized foe, North Korea, failed to convince leaders in Seoul, or for that matter in Tokyo, to make a strategic decision to turn to their neighbor in a way that would elicit further support. It was only Park Chung-hee’s dictatorial power that permitted him to make the unpopular decision in favor of establishing diplomatic relations in 1965. Yet, the strategic wisdom of doing so, especially for the economic development of his country, did not subdue an emotional outcry that this move was not consistent with national pride. Japan’s refusal to accept standard historical verdicts on its colonial rule left Koreans without the psychological fruits of a strategic breakthrough. The distinct nature of the challenge posed by Japan was not simply because it uniquely offered a powerful temptation to indulge in emotionalism, but also because among the active powers in the region it presented the most genuine options. It was neither the South’s bedrock protector nor its implacable foe, and its relations with the North were not such that any shift might have immediate consequences for peninsular security. Also significant was the fact that dealing with Japan at crucial times required a triangular strategy, complicating the usual diplomatic challenges. Not surprisingly, the overall record is mixed; impressive strategic moves from Seoul involved breakthroughs with Tokyo, but at other times troubled relations testified to strategic failures. From Park Chung-hee to Chun Doo-hwan The twenty years after normalization brought rich economic rewards as well as increased security even as the United States, caught in the Vietnam War and in its aftermath, was lowering its profile in parts of Asia. Already at the end of the 1960s the United States had insisted on Japan doing more to support South Korea, in the 1970s Japan found it useful to bring the South under its wing in the f lying geese formation, and in the early 1980s Nakasone Yasuhiro seized the opportunity of Chun Doo-hwan’s unpopularity to offer a financial assistance package in return for closer political ties. Yet, observers are likely to notice the shallowness of bilateral political and cultural ties throughout this period. For a long time no summits occurred, South Korea maintained strict restrictions on Japanese cultural imports, and public opinion on both sides was filled with suspicion and even disdain. As regional security was being transformed, South Korean-Japanese ties were unresponsive.

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In the early 1970s breakthroughs in Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations along with detente between the United States and Soviet Union offered fleeting hope for an inter-Korean rapprochement. By the end of the 1970s strategic thinking in Seoul was gravitating to ways to develop economic ties with China with the possibility of political ties later.1 In the midst of this quest for broadening relations beyond onesided dependence on the United States, strategic calculations paid little heed to substantial political ties with Japan in disregard of the increasingly close integration of the South’s economy with it. Not only had normalization taken twenty years from the end of the war, through the following twenty years the absence of normal political and cultural ties handicapped the South as well as Japan, leaving the former much weaker relative to their mutual ally. In order to comprehend the pattern of South Korean strategic ties to Japan over the past two decades we need to look back to two critical postwar turning points: the 1965 normalization by Park Chung-hee, and the 1983 upgrading of political relations by Chun Doo-hwan. Desperate circumstances in each instance drove a leader to strategize anew about Japan. Subsequent presidents would turn their attention to Japan without the same degree of desperation, but each on at least one occasion during his tenure would significantly raise his estimation of Japan’s value for South Korean diplomacy and proceed accordingly. At other times, however, they would lower their estimation or simply succumb to the easy payoff of demagoguery before a readily aroused public. A cyclical pattern emerged in the Blue House’s strategic thinking. It had its roots in the incomplete results realized with the agreement on diplomatic relations of 1965 and with the improvement of political relations reached in 1983. They brought little satisfaction. After years of unsuccessful negotiations into the early 1960s and further failed talks at the beginning of the 1980s, a similar combination of factors overcame all obstacles in allowing Seoul and Tokyo to achieve a breakthrough. 2 The first condition was an economic imperative for Seoul to secure large-scale funding only available from Tokyo. In the early 1960s it was falling behind Pyongyang in industrialization, and Park Chung-hee desperately grasped for economic growth to legitimate a widely disliked regime founded through a military coup. In the second case Seoul was faced with a heavy military burden in trying not to fall further behind the sustained militarization of the North at the same time as Chun Doo-hwan after his suspect military takeover and repellent repression of demonstrating students at Gwangju was anxious to overcome a serious economic slump in order to keep his grip on power.

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In 1965, Japan in the midst of double-digit growth was understood to be ready to offer assistance in lieu of reparations, and in 1983 its brimming surplus could cover loans to a partner in regional security if the right appeal were made. Strategic moves responded to these economic imperatives, which gave Japan the advantage. The second condition favorable for a bilateral breakthrough was awareness of new U.S. determination to boost its security in East Asia through pressure on Japan to foot a large part of the bill for South Korea. In the first half of the 1960s the United States urged Japan to do much more to ensure the security of the South, interpreted broadly as supplying the capital and technology for a rapid economic rise essential for political stability and the capacity to compete with the North. Similarly, Ronald Reagan took office obsessed with strengthening the alliances that checked Soviet expansionism, and he appealed to an obviously prosperous Japan with its limited defense budget to find other ways to contribute to regional security in order to fulfill its international responsibilities. After making clear his commitment to the defense of the South Korea, Reagan called on Japan’s leaders to assist its continued economic development, finding in Nakasone a partner prepared to act without taking seriously the fact that he was also eager to gain some leverage over the history issue. Park and Chun deserve credit for strategic boldness, despite initial wariness by Japan’s leaders and public wariness at home. They changed the terms of debate in dealing with Japan, specifically citing the strategic imperative for U.S. alliance ties and their own country’s defense. Although public discourse continued to downplay the new realities of dependence on Japan, the strategic debate advanced toward realistic diplomacy as it led the way toward more breakthroughs with states previously demonized as enemies. Japan also had significance as a source of information on North Korea. There was an active league of Koreans in Japan ( Jochongryon) with close ties to Pyongyang. A few switched sides and provided information to the South Korean government. During the cold war era finding informants, including assistance from the Japanese government, met Seoul’s strategic aims. Only from the 1990s, as Tokyo took ever harsher measures to curtail the flow of money to North Korea and the community of its supporters split over abductions and nuclear revelations, did Seoul turn elsewhere for most of its information. By then, it had direct contacts in Pyongyang as well as extensive networks in China, but at earlier times Japan’s suspect pro-North Korean community served as a useful conduit.

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Arguably, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Japan and the first visit of a Japanese prime minister after the war were the two most important strategic shifts for South Korea in the quarter century between the war-torn 1950s and the waning of the cold war in the second half of the 1980s. They helped rally the South Korean economy at critical junctures and revitalized the U.S. alliance with a dose of triangularity at moments of uncertainty. Above all, they shifted the balance in the desperate struggle with North Korea, while prodding Japan to become more involved in regional security in a manner that buttressed the United States in its competition with the Soviet Union in Asia. Such strategic decisions forged a triangular framework vital to the South’s emergence from the cold war assured of its economic vitality and military security. In turn, these critical adjustments left a legacy of reliance on Japan, but without candid acknowledgment of how much that country mattered for the South’s successful rise into a middle power. On the contrary, both sides were guilty of mishandling sensitive matters, such as kidnapping Park’s opponent Kim Dae-jung from Japan in 1973 or failing to take responsibility after a Korean Japanese belonging to a proNorth Korean group attempted to assassinate Park, killing his wife instead in 1974.3 The strategic moves with Japan in the 1960s were aimed less at deterring war with North Korea than at building up the South Korean economy. After the pull back of U.S. troops by Richard Nixon in 1969 and the start of detente, both Japan and South Korea felt more vulnerable than before. South Korean strategy turned to ways to find more maneuverability. As success with other countries proved difficult, the importance of Japan rose. In the 1970s the security aspect of this was obscured, but it kept growing. When Park was angered by Jimmy Carter’s intention to withdraw U.S. troops, he turned to Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo for support and received it, as Japan took some credit for dissuading the United States. The possibility of appealing to Japan arose again. The alliance triangle could serve South Korean interests, even if many were hesitant to acknowledge its existence.4 Japan’s efforts under Nakasone to intercede in South Korean relations with China, as well as to represent Asia in foreign affairs, were met with suspicion. When Korea rose to the top of the agenda in Nakasone’s meetings with Chinese leaders, South Korean officials, fearful of a hasty move toward normalization with North Korea, doubted his motives. They also suspected that Japanese regarded their role on the peninsula as special, assigning themselves a major voice and failing to consult sufficiently.5 In the fall of 1984, when Chun made the first official visit

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to Japan of a Korean head of state, an important step occurred toward overcoming distrust, despite widespread concern among young Koreans about increasing economic dependence on Japan. 6 By calming these fears and those of an older generation still aroused against Japanese arrogance, Korean leaders could sustain their country’s economic ascent and position it for more active diplomacy. In the cold war era South Korea depended exclusively on the United States even as it found itself relying increasingly on Japan’s economy and on its politicians for loans. Rather than maneuver for leverage in the context of this triangle, it sustained a drumbeat of hostile rhetoric toward Japan. This may have served the legitimacy of unpopular autocrats and ref lected Japan’s own indifference to winning trust and seeking more strategic ties, but it indicates that even leaders who at times recognized the value of breakthroughs with Japan hesitated to try to sustain their strategic initiatives. The Roh Tae-woo Era The end of the cold war was accompanied by a more aggressive U.S. posture to open the South Korean as well as the Japanese economies. Having already successfully pressed Japan to increase the value of the yen, the United States in 1989 focused on the won. If Japan and the South had their own tensions over alleged unfair trading practices, this did not mean that their parallel positions in Washington did not allow for shared awareness. Yet, as Japanese triumphantly indulged in explanations of Nihonjinron (the theory of Japanese uniqueness) for why they were overtaking the United States, they blamed their neighbors for Hanguknon (the theory of Korean uniqueness), exaggerating through nationalism what made Korean culture different and superior.7 Cultural pride linked to historical narrow-mindedness left little room to view the other strategically, while preoccupation with U.S. economic policy removed the triangular frame for cooperation. At the start of the 1990s South Korea refrained from initiatives toward Japan. Lacking popularity and concentrating on his nordpolitik policy as well as North Korea, Roh lacked any incentive from Japan or the United States to turn his attention there. Indeed, the end of the cold war reduced calls for strengthening the weak leg in the U.S. alliance system, and the booming South Korean economy with attractive new prospects saw no need to single out Japan. At the same time, Japanese moves to assert leadership in the region and to forge a new Sea of Japan economic sphere aroused little interest. With Japanese leaders showing no

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foresight in responding to the newly empowered public in South Korea, all that could be expected was to keep relations from deteriorating. When Seoul sought Tokyo’s understanding for its new overtures to the North, it found not only support but also signs that this would be taken as an opening that freed Japan to make its own overtures. From 1988 to 1992 coordination was inconsistent. The same result was visible in the first half of the 1970s when South Korean moves toward the North gave Japan the green light to pursue a two-Korea policy. Many in Seoul were nervous that after Japan’s normalization with China it was too energetically pursuing the North in a manner that could unsettle the North-South dialogue and could signify that Japan was content with a divided Korea. It narrowly focused on its own gains, interfering with the unification process, they warned in the 1970s and again in the early 1990s.8 An exchange of visits in 1990–91 brought Roh Tae-woo to Tokyo and Kaifu Toshiki to Seoul. Roh agreed to look ahead toward cooperation in developing an Asian-Pacific community, while focusing on opening the Japanese market and drawing more Japanese investment and technology into his country. As the first presidential visit since 1984 and a sign of more coordinated bilateral ties advocated by diplomats on both sides, this momentarily raised hopes. Yet between the two visits, each country surprised the other, first when Roh met with Gorbachev causing fear that the latter could use the “South Korean card” in difficult talks with Japan over their territorial dispute,9 and then when Kanemaru Shin went to Pyongyang as South Koreans fretted that normalization of relations and a large influx of economic assistance would boost the North’s leverage. After the Kanemaru delegation’s daring attempt to reach a breakthrough with the North to the shock of many South Koreans, efforts were made to repair bilateral relations in a new international context. Roh’s appeal of October 1990 for Japan to change the way it dealt with the North, acting only in accord with the North-South dialogue, was accepted. As he pursued his own initiatives to the North, Japan’s leaders promised to coordinate more closely. In those days, LDP politicians eager to compromise with the North as well as reserved in their trust of the South had considerable clout, but the situation was kept under control. Indeed, the sudden need for coordination provided new glue for bilateral ties as U.S. pressure receded. After the two Koreas had agreed to simultaneous admission into the United Nations and made progress in bilateral talks, Japan again made the South nervous when Kaifu pressed for quick normalization. If it was soon stymied by the

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early emergence of the abduction issue and the North’s hardening position on the nuclear issue, a more important factor obstructing bilateral talks may have been the selection of Miyazawa Kiichi, a champion of close ties to the United States, as prime minister along with the weakening of Kanemaru and other figures in the LDP eager to achieve a breakthrough with the North even if it meant an independent foreign policy.10 After these uncertainties, Seoul and Tokyo in 1992–93 stabilized their relations, including new security cooperation. As the cold war ended, the United States flexed its muscles in the Gulf War while showing no interest in Gorbachev or Kim Il-sung’s separate overtures for negotiations to put in place a new architecture in Northeast Asia. Many in South Korea feared that Japan would draw the wrong lessons from the Gulf War on the need to boost military power, while regretting that it gave no encouragement to the United States to embrace multilateralism.11 In April 1991 when he visited Jeju island, Gorbachev proposed a treaty of good neighbors and cooperation that was welcomed by Roh until he realized that both the United States and Japan were concerned about its implications along with the speed of normalization.12 Already a gap was opening between the South’s inclination to a regional balance of power and the U.S. and Japanese desire to convert victory in the cold war into regional leadership. Yet, in this new context Japan and South Korea found more common ground not only on how to deal with North Korea but also on the need to regularize and diversify their ties. This led to more people-to-people exchanges and diverse, new economic arrangements. The Kim Young-sam Era Compared to the mid-1980s, South Koreans were decidedly more confident in the mid-1990s. Their economy was vastly stronger, in some sectors surpassing even that of Japan, and wanton criticisms of Japan with nary a refutation had given way to somewhat more objective coverage.13 As progressives grew more assertive, conservatives became more confident too; changing national politics and diplomatic options suggested that the South could play a more active role. A moderate agenda made globalization the priority after Kim Young-sam took office in 1993. This downgraded security issues in favor of economic and cultural ones such as human rights, while placing stress on the United Nations and on regional cooperation. In many ways, this overlapped with Japan’s foreign policy agenda, especially after the LDP was replaced by a coalition of parties. In place of the old discourse that kept the focus

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on Japan’s bad behavior and the danger of a large trade deficit with it, there was some scope for finding more common ground. Japan showed a more apologetic face to the past. It was looking for alternative pathways to Asia as ties with Russia, North Korea, and China all became more problematic, while trade tensions with the United States were slow to heal. Meanwhile, nordpolitik had run its course, and Seoul was searching for an encore without expecting early results with Pyongyang. For the first time an incoming Korean president focused on improving relations with Japan. Kim Young-sam’s strategic thinking toward Japan was more inconsistent than that of his predecessors. He started with efforts to improve ties, turned more negative for roughly two years, and then in 1997 repaired ties. At first, joint exploration of common interests led the two states to consult on the global economic talks that led to establishing the WTO. Miyazawa’s approval of an official statement recognizing the history of the comfort women earned Japan some trust in early 1993. Then Hosokawa visited South Korea, taking a more contrite position than his predecessors on historical matters. Finally, Murayama gained credibility as the prime minister most sincere in sustaining this spirit. Yet, his role as a socialist in a cabinet comprised mostly of LDP politicians loath to give ground on matters of history undermined his personal image. Koreans were frustrated by the backlash in the Diet against Murayama’s efforts to calm historical animosities. Moreover, his contradictory tone on the question of the legality of the annexation of Korea set back the recent reconciliation.14 Despite the best atmosphere in the past forty years for setting history aside, South Koreans turned away from taking a strategic approach, as Kim Young-sam raised emotions against Japan anew. Only near the end of his term when Hashimoto made efforts to calm the situation did ties improve. As China’s rapid rise as a regional power became clear and SinoJapanese ties hit a snag at mid-decade, South Korea gave at least the appearance of tilting toward China and putting pressure on Japan. As early as 1994 Kim Young-sam had raised the theme of a four-corner foreign policy that boosted China’s place, and his ambassador in Beijing went further by introducing the notion of equidistance with the United States, leaving Japan in the shadows. Moreover, Japan’s economic stagnation led many to no longer see it as capable of being the motor for regional development or a threat to dominate the region. This made it easier both to turn elsewhere in the region away from Japan and to improve relations with that country. South Korea’s options had increased.

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Having warmed to globalization, South Koreans increasingly also embraced regionalism with balance between China and Japan.15 The first nuclear crisis revealed a lack of agreement among the United States and its allies in dealing with an assertive North Korea. The South objected to U.S. efforts to impose economic sanctions,16 nervously watched preparations for war, and found Japan’s lack of preparation to take a stance troublesome too. Given that both Seoul and Tokyo felt marginalized in the crisis, both in the U.S. plan for a military strike and in the deal that was reached, they showed signs of increased cooperation— security ties rose in priority as the United States discussed with both sides the logistics of military operations. In this context, South Korea was prepared to include Japan in its call for a Northeast Asian regional security dialogue—,17 but the end of the crisis brought a downturn in ties. Coordination toward Pyongyang again proved difficult. Kim had tried at the outset of his term to upgrade cooperation with the North, offering the prospect of assistance, then when he was rebuffed and the crisis occurred, he had taken a tough stance, but after a deal was reached by the United States, he veered toward engagement once more only to be rejected after failing to send a delegation to the funeral of Kim Il-sung. Japan’s responses to the North did not suit this timetable. For instance, it took the lead in 1995 in offering food assistance just when the North was shunning the South, and it did so without advance coordination, arousing suspicion that it was again pursuing an independent policy toward the North.18 During the leadership transition in the North, the South focused elsewhere, but Kim Young-sam laid a foundation for policies to follow by insisting that the South would not take advantage of the North’s troubles, would not isolate it, and would not seek unification through absorption. As the United States and Japan recovered from troubled trade talks and committed themselves to a stronger alliance, the South seemed headed toward a more independent foreign policy. With greater legitimacy as an elected civilian president and more diplomatic options, Kim could approach Japan with few of the old restraints. This provided an opportunity both for new overtures, independent of pressure from the United States, and renewed demonization, less likely to be a quick fix for domestic unpopularity. With South Korean emotionalism heightened in 1995–96 after renewed historical consciousness at the fiftieth anniversary of the war’s end, some charged that the country was unable to think strategically. They accused the public of being easily aroused and the country’s leaders of overeagerness to pander to emotions. At this time, however, fear

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of the North was subsiding in the face of its severe famine and the 1994 Agreed Framework, and, unlike in Japan, China’s rise loomed as a great opportunity. After a downturn in ties with Japan, blamed by many Koreans on provocations over history issues (statements by high officials, revival of the Dokdo/Takeshima issue, and a 1996 visit to Yasukuni by Hashimoto) from a revitalized LDP losing restraints from the political left, Hashimoto took pains to repair ties with Kim at a 1997 Beppu meeting, even calling Kim “older brother.” On both sides there was caution about a downward cycle that could reawaken emotions only recently brought under some control. Altering the momentum, Kim’s visit paved the way for Seoul’s most significant strategic move toward Tokyo since 1965. The Kim Dae-jung Era Of all Korea’s presidents, Kim Dae-jung knew Japan best. He had the advantage too of working with Obuchi Keizo, who gave attention to bilateral ties, and of an urgent atmosphere due first to the Asian financial crisis and then to the Taepodong missile test by North Korea in August 1998, firing eastward over Japan with the intention of shaking the region into addressing its concerns. Making use of this opportunity, Kim became the only Korean president to gain popularity in Japan. Coming after Japan’s financial assistance in the crisis had boosted its image, Kim Dae-jung’s visit to Tokyo in October 1998 had tremendous impact on both nations, transforming bilateral ties, reshaping public opinion, and increasing scope for regional diplomacy. Prior to the visit the two states had reached common understanding on how to deal with the financial crisis and to put in place regional measures to prevent a recurrence. On the eve of the visit, the South Korean defense minister had gone to Tokyo to establish closer security cooperation in response to North Korea’s missile threat.19 Yet, in the aftermath of the summit, excessive optimism in Japan and among some in South Korea obscured the widening gap evident in how the two states were dealing with the missile launch and Kim’s proposed Sunshine Policy. If on the Japanese side the effect on public opinion proved more substantial than on policy, as many distorted the strategic impact of the summit, South Koreans were slow to shed their skepticism even as policy toward the region was quickly building on this foundation. Lack of coordination on North Korea kept reappearing as a principal barrier to strategic understanding and cooperation. 20

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In the face of contrasting policies toward North Korea, the United States came to the rescue in forging a security environment that eased tensions. The Perry process not only gave a powerful boost to Kim Daejung’s Sunshine Policy, setting U.S.-North Korean relations on a positive track and quieting concern about the North’s missiles as earlier had been done about its nuclear weapons potential, but it also led Japan to send a delegation headed by former Prime Minister Murayama to begin preparations for improving bilateral ties. This led Japan to remove the sanctions it had imposed after the missile test and served Kim Daejung’s strategy of establishing an international atmosphere conducive to North-South reconciliation. It helped boost coordination for a few years, despite the sharp divide in views of the historic inter-Korean summit. After Japan redefined its security activities in conjunction with the agreed new defense guidelines with the United States to range beyond homeland security to neighboring areas, South Korean leaders were clearer on both the danger of increased confrontation between Japan and China over Taiwan and the opportunity for more Japanese involvement in the security uncertainties related to North Korea as part of the U.S. alliance. Despite press discussion wary of Japan’s newfound military interests, far-sighted leaders might find some benefit in making alliance relations more triangular. Accepting Japan as an indirect ally could prove helpful for improving the military efficiency of the alliance with the United States and eliciting Japan’s support in the process of Korean unification. 21 This reasoning spread by the year 2000 in a setting where Seoul was taking the diplomatic initiative and optimism prevailed over the chances of cooperation with North Korea and U.S. support of this process, while China and Japan were joining with the South in the quest for regionalism. As these conditions faded in the following years, South Korean reasoning about Japan had to change too. Those Japanese who insisted that South Korea needs Japan because it would become the savior in the event of conf lict with North Korea, owing to its importance in resupplying U.S. forces, overstated the degree of common security interests. 22 Their effort to impose on South Korea a particular type of Japanese strategic thinking—linked to fear of a China threat and focused on regime change in North Korea— proved futile. The Asian financial crisis brought bilateral ties closer, as South Korea favored Japan’s proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund and beseeched Japan even after it failed to find a way to offer a large loan in lieu of IMF conditionality. Only after this path was closed and U.S. pressure

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intensified was agreement with the IMF possible; however, even as a presidential transition began, a facade of willing globalization was accompanied by more efforts at regionalism through encouragement of Japanese initiatives. After the financial crisis, the view spread that regional cooperation was necessary to prevent a further bout of financial destabilization as well as to make full use of the rapid economic integration under way. Kim Dae-jung explicitly linked his Sunshine Policy to a favorable regional environment, setting the context for future-oriented projects with Japan. 23 In the fall of 1999 the two agreed with China on upgrading ASEAN 1 3, making the summit meeting of their three states more formal, and over the next few years many initiatives followed to reflect shared strategic interests in regionalism. Yet, as Sino-Japanese relations grew more confrontational and security problems rose to the fore, the pull of regionalism was fading for both Japan and South Korea. Their bilateral relationship was critical for regionalism, but Seoul as well as Tokyo had other priorities. The framework for viewing Japan had changed to comprise the entire Northeast Asian region. The alliance triangle was receding, as was the notion that South Korea had no other option than to depend unconditionally on the United States, and in its shadow to nurture ties with Japan. Increasingly, the competition between China and Japan became an issue in thinking about Japan. China was more fully supportive of the Sunshine Policy and more interested in regional integration rather than keeping a wary eye on containing one or another power. When U.S. policy toward the region became more divisive and left the status of North Korea in greater doubt, South Korean leaders were inclined to side with China’s response rather than Japan’s, and Japan often failed to make a case for itself. 24 In 2001–02, with Bush’s support for the Sunshine Policy in doubt, Kim Dae-jung had good reason to seek Japanese help with their mutual ally. After all, he had closer ties to Japan than any previous postwar Korean leader, Japan was pursuing its own opening to the North, and Bush’s abrasive approach to the region contrasted with the cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo on regionalism through ASEAN 1 3. Despite the textbook controversy in the spring of 2001 that riled the Korean public and made it impossible to proceed with talks about inviting the Emperor to South Korea for the opening ceremony of the jointly hosted FIFA World Cup, the mood of reconciliation resumed and the World Cup results boosted the spirit of cooperation. In these circumstances, Seoul sustained the TCOG for developing common policies with Washington and Tokyo on North Korea, resumed its cultural opening

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to Japanese products, and took satisfaction from the growing Korean wave among the Japanese public. Yet, the downturn in relations in 2001 exposed the fragility of ties due to Japan’s insensitivity to the consequences of its revisionist leanings and South Korean emotional sensitivity. 25 The 2002 World Cup was accompanied by talk of a new era of cooperation, as if the opening of a new century in which both had become part of a global society meant a new direction. Finally, a large percent of Japanese (77 percent up from 55 percent before) regarded South Korea as a partner country and the number of South Koreans who thought of Japan similarly had risen more sharply (from 24 to 42 percent). 26 Now talk of common interests included not only democratic ideals and a free market system, but also security, where close cooperation was said to be needed. Yet, within months of the glory of shared success in soccer came the shock of nuclear crisis in October 2002. While South Korean leaders groped for Japan’s help and understanding in the face of Bush’s unilateral actions, Japan’s leaders wavered without showing great concern for the arguments raised in Seoul. It would not be easy for the South to sustain the elevated hopes for strategic cooperation with Japan, now buoyed by Bush’s whole-hearted backing in a triangle that left the South isolated and also newly insistent on symbolic manifestations of historical revisionism, above all Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine marked by defiant claims in Japan that this showed it no longer needed to bow to the sensitivities of its neighbors. The Roh Moo-hyun Era Roh Moo-hyun came to power rallying the progressives resentful not only of Japan’s historical conduct but of the legacy sustained under the South’s conservative “collaborators” and of the incomplete normalization. His own revisionist agenda aroused emotions not readily compatible with a sober approach to Japan’s role in Northeast Asia in conditions of regional insecurity. Just as many alert to the impact of anti-Americanism on Roh’s election doubted that he could manage relations with the United States well, many saw his background and the worldview of this enthusiastic backers as standing in the way of strategic thinking toward Japan. Yet, for two years Roh took pains to steady relations. Roh Moo-hyun had ample reason to show patience toward Japan in the first part of his tenure. Suspected of anti-Americanism from the

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time of his election and caught in the perilous grip of the North Korean nuclear crisis with scant leverage of his own on the Bush administration, he turned to Koizumi as a leader Bush was energetically wooing and the best hope to steer the crisis toward a compromise resolution. Second only to his reliance on China, Roh grasped at trilateralism with Japan as one means to control Bush. As long as Japan took a middle position on handling North Korea, this made sense. The June 2003 visit of Roh to Tokyo proved to be an important test. Across the political spectrum, Roh was seen as exercising restraint for strategic reasons. In the face of widely perceived Japanese arrogance, such as timing the visit on Korea’s Memorial Day, and Koizumi’s strong support for Bush’s tough posture toward North Korea, Roh showed restraint while repeatedly calling for peaceful resolution of the issue. 27 Yet, the conservative and centrist press faulted him for being soft on Japan on history issues, 28 similar to past criticism from the progressives of conservative leaders for the same transgression. It was hard to earn credit for strategic restraint with Japan. Moreover, the gap was too great to bridge in the face of a U.S. administration out of control in its unilateral and preemptive actions, and a North Korean regime ready to escalate the confrontation. If sober voices in Seoul and Tokyo stressed the importance of the two coordinating to keep this crisis from spiraling downward and preventing the North from seeking advantage in their differences, 29 Roh’s early efforts failed. His followers were impatient, and Japan’s leaders were insensitive. In these conditions, he overreacted, castigating Japan and letting foreign policy drift to the extent that some saw ideological factors at work.30 Samuel Kim refers to this response to the “constant war recall trigger” squeezed by Japan as “the total mobilization of national identity politics.”31 Given the priorities of Roh and Koizumi as well as Abe, finding common ground was not easy. Their notions of reordering their own societies appealed to clashing themes of nationalism. Their thinking about how to deal with Korean reunification took sharply contrasting approaches to the North and the international environment conducive to its transformation. Moreover, their ideas for regionalism and regional security differed on the role of both China and the United States, while their views of the international order as well as UN Security Council reform were at odds. With the strategic gap widening, insensitivity to symbolic and historical questions could more easily ignite tensions. In 2005 Roh faced a difficult strategic environment. Once reelected, Bush took a tough but unsustainable line toward North Korea, while Koizumi backed him at the same time as he pushed for Japan to become

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a permanent member of the UN Security Council without striving to improve ties with South Korea. While some in South Korea reluctantly called for acquiescence due to the country’s weak position, this would have sent the wrong message to all parties. Roh’s assertive response, especially to Japan after Shimane prefecture provocatively raised the territorial issue by proclaiming Takeshima (Dokdo) day, aroused further emotionalism. With obsessive talk in Japan about abductees taken by North Korea, the emerging China threat, and denying the historical consciousness of the victims of its colonization and aggression, South Koreans could do little to halt its self-induced isolation in the region. Yet, even if conditions were not ripe for any strategic initiative toward Japan, the overblown response did not position the South well for later developments, such as working with a new prime minister, Abe Shinzo, who came to Seoul as well as Beijing just after taking office, and coordinating following the February 13, 2007 breakthrough in the Six-Party Talks when the United States changed its position. With Japanese politics shifting to the right and South Korean politics to the left, finding common ground proved difficult. Elder statesmen who had worked to reduce differences in the 1980s–90s now appeared insufficiently nationalist to have credibility with decisionmakers. With the strong backing of his increasingly likely successor Abe, Koizumi after failing in direct talks with Kim Jong-il, found benefit in stressing the abduction issue. This demonized North Korea, focusing public opinion away from the strategic implications of the nuclear crisis and the multilateral diplomacy swirling around it. Roh, in turn, lashed out at Japan’s handling of historical and territorial issues.32 The tone of relations sharply deteriorated under the sway of emotionally charged criticisms. Indeed, in 2006 Abe’s baptismal visit to Beijing and Seoul showed more progress in restoring a business-like atmosphere in Sino-Japanese ties, where Hu Jintao emphasized pragmatism, than in South Korean-Japanese ties, where populism had resurfaced. Whether attempting to place the South in the middle of triangles with China and the United States, Japan and the United States, or North Korea and the United States, Roh overrated his country’s leverage. It lacked the power or maneuverability in Northeast Asia to become a balancer or an active center at a time of sharp conf lict. With Japan lacking an Asian strategy and insensitive to the South’s needs, this outcome was not so unexpected. Also with Japan marginalized in the Six-Party Talks, there was not a lot Roh could gain from cooperation with it. Yet, the February 13 agreement refocused the talks, suggesting

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that before long, regional diplomacy would become energized and it would be wise to prepare for a time when Japan was again energetically engaged in Northeast Asia. While in 2007 differences over how to deal with North Korea and the United States rose to the forefront, discussion of Japan remained obscured. Conservatives sometimes fault Roh for mismanaging relations with Japan, but they realize that there is little mileage to be gained with the Korean people by putting the blame largely on their own country rather than on Japan’s nationalist leaders. Yet, by recasting the problem not in terms of bilateral ties but in the context of the alliance with the United States and its strategy for the region, the arguments for closer ties with Japan could get a broader hearing. As Michael Green argued in an opinion perspective published in a Korean newspaper on June 13, 2007, South Korea is being tempted by the U.S.-Japan effort to establish a network of bilateral alliances involving Australia and even aiming to reach India. This open, inclusive, and security-oriented integration in the region, according to both American and Japanese proponents, would emphasize shared values. 33 Yet, its maritime focus and undisguised intention of putting pressure on China to reform politically and abandon attempts to forge other types of regionalism leave South Korea caught between two competing visions. If Japan insisted on focusing on this divisive approach, represented by Foreign Minister Aso Taro’s “arc of freedom and prosperity,” then South Korea would have to tilt its foreign policy substantially away from China and from the strategy it has been pursuing toward North Korea in order to participate. In contrast, it may be inclined to persist in working through ASEAN 1 3 and the EAS in the hope that SinoJapanese differences can be narrowed and existing mechanisms for boosting regionalism strengthened. As seen already, it is ready to give more weight to the Six-Party Talks as a lasting institution not only for dealing with further uncertainty about North Korea but also for advancing a regional security agenda in Northeast Asia. With China and Russia intent on developing the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) further and in other ways to boost continental regionalism as opposed to Aso’s maritime regionalism, we may be in store for the coexistence of three distinct approaches toward regionalism, none of which is apt to gain dominance in the next decade. Seoul may not throw its weight behind the U.S.-Japan plan and cannot subscribe to the SinoRussian one; it would become a f loater, emphasizing the Six-Party Talks as the driving force for regionalism as a bridge between the maritime and continental approaches.

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If the Six-Party Talks continue to progress, South Koreans would likely become more complacent about the military threat from the North and more seriously consider not only a reduced role for U.S. troops in their country but also a major justification for relying on Japan since the 1960s. Far-sighted strategic planning to use Japan as part of a balance of powers could be overlooked. Recognition of the benefits from a population receptive to Korean culture and supportive of democratic values could be lost in the emotionalism lingering from Japan’s historical outrages. It will require not only a more long-term, patient outlook by the South’s leaders to overcome this, but most likely also strategic cooperation from the United States and restraint from Japan to create the right conditions. With the completion of Phase 1 of the Joint Agreement assured, South Koreans had reason to be more concerned about Japan’s isolation in mid-2007. Talk was beginning about holding four-party talks on a peace regime to replace the armistice on the peninsula as Japanese nervously fretted about their absence, which would deepen their isolation after the United States changed its policy and the South accelerated steps for reconciliation with the North.34 Meanwhile, South Koreans could watch gleefully as the Japanese squirmed and resorted to desperate measures in an effort to avoid the U.S. House of Representatives passing the Mike Honda sponsored resolution condemning Japan’s handling of the comfort women issue. Reaching agreement on an FTA with the United States, before Japan had even begun to hold talks with the United States after blaming Japan for the breakdown in their own bilateral talks over an FTA, South Koreans could feel smug about Japan’s growing concern about its diplomatic exclusion. Yet, with the right wing in Japan insisting that evidence such as the Korean mass media calling the emperor “Japan’s king” proves that an abiding anti-Japanese bias exists,35 compounding the existing mutual distrust is unlikely to serve strategic objectives. Lee Myung-bak, Roh’s replacement, faces an even greater challenge than recent predecessors in improving relations. Conclusion No country has tested the strategic thinking of South Korean leaders in the cold war era and again over the past two decades as much as Japan. At first, strategic thinking toward Japan was focused on securing economic assistance and investment in a context where almost all attention went to deterring the outbreak of war. Then, in the wake of the Nixon Doctrine as Park sought more autonomy from the United States in the

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midst of its overtures to Beijing and Tokyo’s as well coupled with its moves toward Pyongyang, he broadened his concern to keeping them in check. Failing in his own efforts to engage Beijing and Moscow, his options were limited as economic and even strategic dependence on Japan was rising at a time both countries felt more vulnerable. At critical junctures South Korean leaders demonstrated strategic foresight toward Japan. Indeed, every president since Park Chung-hee boldly pursued an upgrading of ties early in his time in office. Each time it made triangular sense given the state of relations with the United States. Not only would Seoul be rewarded by Tokyo, economically at first and more broadly in regional political and security leverage at later dates, but it would also gain appreciably with its vital alliance partner. Increasingly, a third payoff also drew attention: benefit in the triangle involving North Korea. Instead of Japan developing an independent policy toward the North that could boost the North’s leverage with the South, leaders in Seoul were anxious to keep its full support. Moreover, as engagement with Pyongyang progressed, they sought reinforcement for their overtures and resistance to strong pressures from Washington to take a harder line. In both of these triangles, Japan figured repeatedly as a force that could affect the results. These triangles were not the only ones where Japan had strategic potential for South Korea’s policies. In two other triangles Japan only drew occasional attention. Despite the historical significance of Japanese-Russian competition over the Korean peninsula and the renewed divide between the two, as seen in their extreme positions in the Six-Party Talks, leaders in Seoul generally showed little interest in this triangle. An exception in the early 1990s came when first Gorbachev and then Yeltsin showed their pique at Japan’s leaders as their supporters talked about playing the “South Korean card.” Yet, it is not clear that South Korean officials had any plans of their own to use a “Russian card” with Japan. From the mid1990s this talk had been replaced by speculation about a triangle with China. After all, the three joined together in ASEAN 1 3 and other settings for discussion of regionalism. In 2005 Roh’s suggestion that the South could become the balancer drew attention to inf lated aspirations not only in the triangle with the United States and China but also in the triangle with China and Japan. He lashed out against Japan, as he seemed to rely increasingly on China. Yet, given U.S. sensitivities about strains between two allies and close ties with what had only recently been called a “strategic competitor,” the theme of balancing within a triangle of China and Japan was little pursued.36

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Arguably, the Bush administration played a big role in driving Japan and South Korea apart from 2001 to 2006. Despite calls for solidifying a triangular alliance, its blank check to Koizumi coupled with suspicion of Kim Dae-jung already in the first half of 2001 cast doubt on the pivot’s skill in aligning all sides of the triangle. After 9/11, the strategy for the war on terror, including the term “axis of evil,” left the South Korean public and policymakers nervous while it increasingly energized support in Japan. The triangle was tilted, Japanese were responding with security and regional thinking that only left South Koreans apprehensive.37 After the nuclear crisis became the dominant regional issue, U.S. appeals to Koizumi drew him ever further from a middle position that could bridge the gap with the South and appeal to Roh to stay close. If Clinton’s policies, especially in the late 1990s, generally facilitated triangularity, Bush’s mitigated against it. Yet, Roh’s own strategic thinking bears some of the responsibility, as his handling of Japan from March 2005 brought back memories of numerous occasions since 1945 when the South had let relations stagnate or decline despite the strategic imperative for making use of it. In 2007 Bush’s position at the Six-Party Talks had changed, but with Abe as prime minister and Roh unforgiving about his approach toward the Six-Party Talks, there was no prospect of reconciliation. A comparison of South Korean presidents’ strategic thinking toward Japan gives the edge to Kim Dae-jung and puts the onus on Roh Moo-hyun. Kim’s 1998 success in boosting all-around ties ref lected far-reaching insight into the benefits for his country, but his handling of Japan’s nervousness in the aftermath of the 2000 North-South summit and in the face of the Bush administration’s unilateralism did not suggest similar skill. Roh’s 2005 willingness to allow ties sharply to deteriorate ref lected inadequate awareness of their importance for his county, although his forbearance in 2003–04 had revealed more patience and strategic calculations. Earlier presidents had a mixed record too; each making an effort to improve ties with Japan for strategic ends but also exacerbating ties at potential cost to South Korea’s objectives. Circumstances have made sustained strategic thinking toward Japan difficult, but that does not remove the burden to achieve what is possible. Conservatives in the South are split between realists and ideological nationalists, which has not mattered much for thinking about the United States but has in approaching Japan. The result has been that conservative presidents have had difficulty finding a consistent formula for dealing with Japan. In opposition to Kim Dae-jung and

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Roh Moo-hyun, they vary in their criticisms from accusing these leaders of responding to provocations too weakly to charging that overly damaging relations with Japan does harm to the South’s strategic position. The fact that conservatives generally do not share the animus found in conservative circles in the United States and Japan toward China means that even the ones who eschew ideological nationalism are unlikely to let their realist approach lead very far in Japan’s direction. Yet, increasingly it is clear that because of different perceptions of North Korea and the United States, conservatives place a greater strategic priority on Japan than progressives such as Roh Moo-hyun. They fault Roh for a serious strategic error in 2005 and insist that, even in the face of provocations over history, they could better manage to keep equilibrium in dealing with the powers of Northeast Asia. Based on past records, this will not be easy. With democratization in the South, a changing balance in economic power, a revisionist upsurge in Japan, a shifting role of the United States, differing views of the rise of China, and clashing interpretations of the challenge from North Korea, Seoul has more difficulty in finding common ground with Tokyo. For strategic thinking, Japan has continued to be the most difficult challenge whatever the triangular or regional context. Even so, in 2008 Lee Myung-bak is likely to view improved relations with Japan as a strategic priority.

Notes 1. Jae Ho Chung, “Korea and China in Northeast Asia: From Stable Bifurcation to Complicated Interdependence,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: The Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe), pp. 200–13. 2. Kimiya Tadashi, “1960 nendai Kankoku ni okeru reisen gaiko no sanruikei: Nikkan kokkyo seijoka, Betonamu hei, ASPAC,” in Okonogi Masao and Moon Chung-in, eds., Shijo, kokka, kokusai taisei (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2001), pp. 96–105; Okonogi Masao, “Shinreisenki no Nichibeikan taisei,” in Okonogi Masao and Moon Chung-in, eds., Shijo, kokka, kokusai taisei, pp. 189–241. 3. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 47–56. 4. Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). 5. Han Sung-joo, Korea in a Changing World: Democracy, Diplomacy, and Future Developments (Seoul: ORUEM, 1995), pp. 345–48.

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6. Ibid., pp. 351–54. 7. Tei Taikin, Kankoku no nashyonarizumu (Tokyo: Iwanami gendai bunko, 2003), pp. 51–65. 8. Tae Youl Paek, “Korean Unification and Japan’s Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview,” in Young-Sun Lee and Masao Okonogi, eds., Japan and Korean Unification (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1999), pp. 37–43. 9. Chae-Jin Lee, “U.S. and Japanese Policies toward Korea: Continuity and Change,” in Hung Yung Lee and Chung Chongwook, eds., Korean Options in a Changing International Order (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993), pp. 45–46. 10. Hong Nack Kim, “Japan and North Korea: Normalization Talks between Pyongyang and Tokyo,” in Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 120–22. 11. Youn Jung-suk, “US and Japanese Foreign Policy toward the Korean Peninsula in the 1990s,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1992), pp. 364–83. 12. Chee Choung-il, “The United States and Japan’s Perspectives on South Korea’s Foreign Policy toward the USSR and the PRC,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1992), pp. 402–10. 13. Michigami Hisashi, Nihon gaikokan Kankoku funtoki (Tokyo: Bunshun shinsho, 2001), pp. 16–20. 14. Wada Haruki and Takasaki Soji, Kensho Nitcho kankei 60nenshi (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2005), p. 216. 15. Ko Ildong, et.al, Hanjungil gyong jae hyopryok oe chujin pangan gwa juyo bumunpyol gwaje (Seoul: Hanguk kaebal yonguwon, 2002), pp. 11–13. 16. Hideshi Takesada, “Korea-Japan Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Issues,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies (Seoul: Oreum Publishing, 2000), pp. 127–28. 17. 21 segi oe Hanil gwangye: chigum muos ul haeyahalgosin ga? (Seoul: Asia yongu gigum, 2003), p. 17. 18. Wada Haruki and Takasaki Soji, Kensho Nitcho kankei 60nenshi, pp. 214–18. 19. Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh, “Japan’s Asian Regionalism and South Korea,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center, p. 134. 20. Tsuneo Akaha, “Japan’s Multilevel Approach toward the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center, p. 186. 21. Sang-woo Rhee, “Introduction,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations, pp. vi–vii. 22. Hisahiko Okazaki, “Japan-South Korea Security Cooperation: A View towards the Future,” in Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., Korea-Japan Security Relations, pp. 90–96.

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23. Cheol-Hee Park, “The Development of Korea’s Regional Strategy in Northeast Asia,” in Hoon Jaung and Yuichi Morii, eds., Cooperation Experiences in Europe and Asia (Tokyo: Shinzansha Publisher, 2004), pp. 232–34. 24. Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Japanese Competition over the Korean Peninsula: The Nuclear Crisis as a Turning Point,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006), pp. 287–306. 25. Gilbert Rozman, “Japan and South Korea: Should the U.S. Be Worried about Their New Spat in 2001?” Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2002), pp. 1–28. 26. Gong Ro-myung, “Hanil gwa Dongbukkasia gongdongche: Hanil gwangye wa gukje jilso,” 21 segi oe Hanil gwangye: chigum muos ul haeyahalgosin ga? pp. 61–64. 27. Hankyoreh, June 9, 2003, p. 4. 28. Kyunghyang shinmun, June 10, 2003, p. 3 29. Mainichi shimbun, June 5, 2003, p. 3. 30. Byung-Kook Kim, “The Politics of National Identity: The Rebirth of Ideology and Drifting Foreign Policy in South Korea,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot, pp. 79–120. 31. Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 192. 32. Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha Lee, “Unraveling the Japan-South Korea ‘Virtual Alliance’: Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of Conf licting Regional Strategies,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 4 (September/ October 2006), pp. 661–84. 33. JoongAng Daily, June 13, 2007, p. 11. 34. “Chosen bando o yomu,” Sunday Mainichi, July 22, 2007, p. 43. 35. Sankei shimbun, June 23, 2007, p. 7. 36. Gilbert Rozman, “South Korea and the Sino-Japanese Rivalry: A Middle Power’s Options within the East Asian Core Triangle,” Pacific Review, Vol. 20, No. 2 (June 2007), pp. 197–220. 37. Heo Tae-hoi, “9–11 ihu daetero jonjaeng gwa Hanbando jongse: Miguk oe jonryak gwa yonghyang,” Anbo haksul nonjip, Vol. 13, No. 1 (June 2002), p. 120.

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CHAPTER 9

South Korean Strategic Thought toward Russia Gilbert Rozman

O

ver the past two decades Russia (the collapse of the Soviet Union did not alter the geographic reality) has recurrently served as a demanding test of South Korea’s rise as a middle power in Northeast Asia. It has done so as a great power active in the region with a rapidly changing strategic role in relation to other powers.1 We discern three sharply variant stages in Russia’s regional aspirations and also in South Korean strategy for dealing with them: 1) the Gorbachev era’s new thinking and Roh Tae-woo’s search for normalization; 2) Boris Yeltsin’s neglect of Northeast Asia and Kim Young-sam’s disregard of Russia; and 3) Vladimir Putin’s stress on security in Northeast Asia as Kim Dae-jung welcomed Russia’s role and Roh Moohyun followed him. So far in a series of ups and downs revolving around the nuclear crisis of 2002–07, we observe no major change in strategic thinking toward Russia, although the response is affected by the apathy of many, the romanticism of some, and a growing sense among a minority that it is becoming a negative factor. Based on recent signs, Koreans have reason to anticipate a fourth stage in Russia’s presence with implications for a series of triangular relations and for regionalism. The challenges shaping bilateral relations with Russia have differed sharply over time. Unavoidably, elites in Seoul perceived Russia less through the narrow lens of bilateral ties than through a prism of triangular relations, involving the United States, North Korea, China, and, at times, even Japan. Although the focus centers on power emanating

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from Moscow, on occasion Seoul also has taken into account the strategic implications of events in the nearby Russian Far East. Perceptions of Russia itself played an indirect role as calculations put that country’s actions or the vulnerability of its exposed Asian periphery mostly in the context of what the other powers were doing. Russia matters strategically to South Korea for at least four reasons. First, it may, as in the 1890s–1900s when its imperialism vied with that of Japan or the 1940s–50s when it aimed to control North Korea and approved its invasion of the South, have designs on gaining dominance or at least casting a strong shadow over the Korean peninsula. Second, it is prone to exert influence as a military and political force in Northeast Asia determined to shape a multilateral balance of power, sometimes by coordinating with China or by relying on North Korea, as in the cold war era. 2 Third, as a neighbor of the North and long its principal security benefactor, Russia sets its sights, apart from the early 1990s, on playing a large role in any reunification or even reconciliation process on the peninsula. Finally, in developing the Russian Far East and Siberia and wielding its energy resources through tight state control, Russia has increasing potential to inf luence regional economic security, including choice of partners as well as of routes for pipelines, electricity grids, and railroads. Given South Korea’s high energy dependence and intense concern with both North Korea and the regional balance of power, strategic thinking cannot avoid paying close attention to Russia. Three of Seoul’s priorities in Northeast Asia—reunification, regional security, and regionalism—cannot escape inf luence from Moscow’s decisions. Reunification was inconceivable as long as Moscow threw its full support to Pyongyang through the 1980s, and again since Putin reinvigorated ties to the leadership there, it has a voice that should be taken into account. Leverage among the great powers in order to reduce excess dependency on the United States without creating a security dilemma is another objective that may be affected by Moscow’s maneuvering for great power inf luence. How Moscow deals with Washington, Tokyo, and Beijing shapes the environment for Seoul to seek some balance. Finally, regionalism in Northeast Asia is a growing interest for economic as well as other reasons. While Russia is often omitted from the discussion, the importance of energy and transportation to plans for establishing a hub in the South draws repeated attention. Despite the rapidly changing prospects of Russia and the fluid nature of the Northeast Asian region, analysts in South Korea may overcome the recent pitfalls of apathy, romanticism, and antipathy by taking a more serious look at Russia’s evolving situation and its potential impact.

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Some may overlook Russia as basically a European state, whose population declining toward just six million east of Irkutsk and reduced conventional military power leave it marginalized in Northeast Asia. Often since the collapse of the Soviet Union this outlook has resurfaced; when Russia’s impact on the Six-Party Talks seemed marginal it was again widespread. Others may incorporate it into their strategic calculus for very limited concerns, such as to reassure Pyongyang to engage with Seoul or as an energy provider, giving it a definite, if not large, status in any regionalism. In contrast, advocates of a radically different regional order are tempted to overestimate Russia’s potential in order to bolster their arguments. Their romanticism cannot be separated from a desperate search for a major power that will give the South leverage it does not now have. The reality is that this imposing state occupying the entire northern part of Asia is a distant fourth among the powers that Seoul incorporates into analyses of regional forces, but that does not mean it has not been a factor in the minds of those searching for strategic reasoning to achieve national interests and priorities. Leaders in Seoul may only pay intermittent attention to Russia’s strategic role, but when they do, they are finding it increasingly difficult to find the right balance toward it. Strategizing toward Russia under Gorbachev and Yeltsin Beginning in 1986 in Vladivostok, close to the border with North Korea, Mikhail Gorbachev declared his intent to reorient Russia’s strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region. His “new thinking” soon expanded, opening a place for improved ties not only with China and Japan but also with South Korea. Preparing for the 1988 Olympics, which would be attended by the Soviet Union to the chagrin of the North, some in Seoul grasped the opportunity of achieving a rapid transformation in Moscow’s relations with both sides of the peninsula. Their goals included reshaping North Korean behavior and gaining long-sought leverage in relations with China, the United States, and Japan. Under the slogan nordpolitik, Roh made Moscow his immediate target. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to assert that for most of his presidency Moscow offered the most scope for strategic thinking. He responded well with emissaries, promises of generous assistance, and dogged pursuit of his target. The result was a strategic breakthrough. Beijing and Tokyo placed territorial demands on Moscow, and especially the former insisted on withdrawal of its support for occupations

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in Afghanistan and Cambodia as well as a reversal of its militarization of areas just north of China’s border. Negotiations aimed at normalization were approved with Beijing in the fall of 1982 and with Tokyo at the beginning of 1986, but they long faced difficult hurdles. In contrast, Roh was intent on asking for little, knowing that the mere fact of recognition would deal a powerful blow to Kim Il-sung’s reliance on a sharply divided region prepared for conf lict. By 1989 Moscow’s normalization with Beijing was realized, but within weeks the international community had reacted with horror to the massacre of students on Tiananmen Square and Moscow decided to be careful about consummating the new relationship for fear of alienating its Western partners. Meanwhile, talks with Tokyo were not proceeding smoothly. In addition, the Soviet economy had come unglued in the course of perestroika, raising the lure of a large infusion of money.3 Offering a mix of grants and loans, Roh succeeded in getting Gorbachev to normalize ties in 1990 without any agreement with Kim Il-sung on how to control the negative backlash, economically and strategically. As Pyongyang stewed in its anger and then turned to nuclear weapons development, Seoul bathed in the satisfaction of achieving a diplomatic coup that was then repeated with Beijing. It had rightly calculated that the road to China went through Russia, and it was amazed that Russia had gone so far as to desert the North. The immediate goal in approaching Moscow at the end of the 1980s was Koreanization of North-South relations. Pyongyang would lose its ability to play off the Soviet Union against China, while the Russian economy would be integrated into the regional economy and become a factor in favor of a new political orientation. In 1989 glasnost at last yielded articles in Moscow in support of cross-recognition of the two Koreas, South Korea’s entry into the United Nations, and a new approach to bilateral ties, following similar moves toward openness on Japan.4 Economic missions to Moscow helped to sway Soviet leaders. Optimists saw a bright future because the Soviets needed the Korean economy more than the other way around,5 and a strategic advantage from the fact that Seoul rather than Tokyo was quick to respond to the changes in Moscow. Nordpolitik was a dramatic case of strategic thinking in which Russia was the first target. Similar to the Sunshine Policy a decade later, its salience extended to the central themes of South Korean foreign policy: reunification, the alliance with the United States, and multilateralism. The sequence was first to end the cold war in Northeast Asia, then to forge a great power framework that would diminish exclusive dependency

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on the United States and encourage the North to come to the negotiating table as well as to end its siege mentality, and finally to explore the path to reunification through Koreanization and a supportive great power environment. Success with Moscow was vital for ending the cold war and forging a favorable great power atmosphere. With excessive expectations on each side, diplomatic relations were established in 1991. While Russians anticipated large-scale South Korean economic support without recognizing how dysfunctional their system was for utilizing it and reassuring donors as well as investors, Koreans did not realize how rapidly Moscow’s strategic clout would diminish, notably in North Korea. What had promised to be an ascendant relationship was floundering as early as 1993 with neither side seeing much further value in the other. Although Yeltsin’s fall 1992 visit countered these dead-end concerns with uplifting rhetoric about a special relationship rooted in shared values and interests, there was little more to discuss. The promised $3 billion in grants and loans that had launched the new relationship stopped flowing by 1993 after about half the sum had been delivered, leading to recriminations that Seoul reneged on its commitment and fretting that Moscow was not paying interest on loans, whose money had been lost. 6 In the second stage after the Soviet collapse, a weakened Russian state gave lower priority to Asia, and Seoul reduced its interest too. Challenges related to Moscow’s weakness replaced those of the military juggernaut or the fading superpower’s waning efforts to forge a regional security framework. Yeltsin’s visit desperately sought to prevent this transition, but instead it ushered in an era through the rest of the decade when Moscow had little leverage and Seoul along with others did not give it the status it desired. Why do so when Russia’s criminalized economy swallowed investments and its political leverage was inconsequential? Over this period there was at least satisfaction in outmaneuvering Japan. In the fall of 1992 Yeltsin cancelled his planned visit to Japan on short notice and then went to South Korea in part to demonstrate that Russia had other options. While Japanese exports to Russia had been ten times those of the South in 1988–92, by 1995 the South was ahead even if its imports trailed far behind and its own trade would slump after a peak in 1996.7 Yet, with South Korean investment partial to the Russian Far East, unlike other foreign investors who focused on Moscow, the South was particularly vulnerable to the widespread chicanery there and had no reason to be satisfied with the troubled state of economic relations after both it and Russia suffered financial crises in 1997–98. 8 Later in the decade, Moscow’s eyes were on Tokyo much more than

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Seoul even if normalization was not achieved, and its strategic partnership with Beijing reinforced the image of great powers maneuvering with Koreans sidelined.9 When Kim Young-sam went to Moscow in 1994, Koreans were still concentrating on solidifying the shift of Moscow away from Pyongyang, succeeding at that time in obtaining documents that revealed how Josef Stalin and Kim Il-sung had planned the war and also in getting reassurance that old treaty obligations would not lead Russia to assist the North if war should occur in the midst of the first nuclear crisis. Yet, it was largely taken for granted that Moscow had made its choice and that it had little more to offer as it focused whatever remaining diplomatic leverage it had on Europe. Russian ties slipped into obscurity. It seemed that Seoul was content with what had been gained by 1992 and would allow ties to drift. Given Yeltsin’s lack of a regional strategy and the dismal state of the Russian economy, this may not be surprising; however, resentment in Russia was growing, and widening divisions in the region would oblige South Koreans to look anew. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung with new intensity at the outset of his term as president paid attention to broadening South Korean options in dealing with the other three powers, and Russia only f leetingly entered the picture as the fourth target. Multilateralism’s economic emphasis marginalized Russia with its depressed economy. With the dual economic shocks of 1997–98, risky investments became less imaginable. Political ties also did not draw much interest. In the first nuclear crisis and its aftermath Russia appeared irrelevant. Even as Yeltsin and his foreign minister and then prime minister, Evgeny Primakov, showed new interest in Pyongyang, few foresaw serious strategic consequences. Only in 1999 did Kim Dae-jung make an effort to repair relations and seek Moscow’s support for his Sunshine Policy as he prepared the groundwork to engage Kim Jong-il. Because Yeltsin gave Korean leaders little reason to improve ties with Russia, we cannot fault strategic thought that bypassed it besides noting slow anticipation of the need for any change. The Russian Far East played a role in strategic thinking in the mid-1990s more than afterwards. For a few years South Korea seemed to be extending its nordpolitik of encircling the North with political and economic initiatives there. Only when a South Korean official was murdered was there a realization that this dangerous struggle served little purpose. After all, there were few ties between North Korea and this part of Russia, and they had no significance for the survival of the regime in Pyongyang. Moreover, the attempt to fill the vacuum in this

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area backfired when corruption and local troubles led to a loss of investments and little increase in trust. The much-heralded South Korean industrial park in Nakhodka was never built because of Russian failure to provide the legal framework or infrastructure. As late as 2003 textile firms from the South were employing as many as 10,000 workers in the town of Artem, near Vladivostok, in an effort to bypass quotas on exports to the United States in other markets, but labor productivity was low (leading the firms to replace Russian women with Chinese migrant labor), government harassment was frequent (sanitary inspections and methods to extort funds), and the advent of WTO regulations that eliminated quotas all led to a hasty retreat. The Russian authorities had not valued these jobs or the taxes that they could bring enough to try to overcome such problems. In contrast, some were eager to increase the quota for North Korean laborers to many times the figure of 3,000 (mostly for construction apart from a separate program for lumberjacks confined to North Korean run camps), but they were thwarted by Moscow. Rather than create attractive conditions for investment from South Korea where enthusiasm was highest, local interests were attracted to cheap labor from the North without any rights, while resisting North Koreans who might become refugees and cause disorder or human rights appeals. Seoul-Moscow ties emerged from a low point in 1998 to focus more on strategic understanding. If the first upsurge in 1988–92 centered on economic benefits from Seoul and even raised hopes in Korea that large amounts of raw materials and energy would f low its way, the second upsurge a decade later began with sobering economic news lowering trade levels. Likewise, the arrest of a Russian scholar for spying for South Korea amid charges of brazen acts by the Korean Intelligence Agency was a wake-up call about the South’s repeated interest in using Russia to outf lank North Korea. Fallout from this scandal after repeated warnings by Russian authorities brought the expulsion of diplomats and a nadir in relations.10 In contrast, the new, more modest upsurge arose from Kim Dae-jung’s desire for North Korea not to collapse and support for Russian ties to the North. Kim’s visit to Moscow in May 1999 brought mutual understanding, not in professed shared ideals such as democracy and a market economy later seen to be hollow in the light of Russian actions, but in signs of common strategic resolve not excluding the goal of a multipolar world. The notion of a six-country framework involving the countries to become part of the Six-Party Talks was already drawing interest. Before long, progress was achieved in arranging payment of the Russian debt through barter, including arms sales as

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part of new military cooperation. With Putin’s rise to power, South Korean strategic planners started with this improved foundation. Strategizing toward Russia under Putin The third stage began when Putin made the Korean peninsula a priority in his more energetic security-oriented and energy-based diplomacy just as Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy was bearing fruit. Understandably, more attention to Russia followed. It started with elements of overoptimism about Putin’s positive influence with Kim Jong-il, his similar view of the value of multilateralism in Northeast Asia, and his enthusiasm for foreign investments and economic openness on internationally acceptable terms. Some Korean analysts noted with approval that Putin had turned away from Russia’s pro-West orientation of the 1990s and was challenging U.S. unilateralism in support of multilateralism in a region where it could restore Russian inf luence. By resuming balance of power policies that Yeltsin had foresworn and finding room for maneuver where conf licts arose, he had made Northeast Asia as well as Europe the two wings that would determine Russia’s foreign clout. Asserting that Putin was ready to use Asia to overcome Europe, one book equated his diplomacy to Gorbachev’s shift in 1986 as a kind of new Asian doctrine. While China received priority in what was termed the golden age for Sino-Russian relations, the Korean peninsula became the arena for Putin’s prominent early diplomat success at the Okinawa G-8 summit relaying a reassuring message on missile tests from Kim Jong-il. Rather than criticizing this intense pursuit of North Korea, the book found his objectives in line with those of the South: preventing a monopoly on power by the United States or China, working to shape reunification so that it would not lead to anti-Russian policies, striving for a cooperative regional economic system through which Russia would export more, and, it followed, realizing a nonnuclear peninsula that could avoid military conf lict.11 If this optimistic response to Putin’s personalized ties with Kim Jong-il and turn to China was not shared by conservative analysts, it also was little criticized. Russia appeared to be marginal. In 2000–02 it was easy to give Putin the benefit of the doubt as a partner of South Korea. He was seen as seeking a balanced region, with the result that Russia was more supportive of reunification than China, which in turn was more supportive than Japan. To sustain the Sunshine Policy, China took priority, but if it bore fruit with the North, Russia’s weight might grow. Little concern was shown that Putin’s pursuit of

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Pyongyang might complicate direct ties across the peninsula or lead to a revival of Soviet-era logic. Russian arms had exerted a powerful inf luence on the Korean peninsula from 1945 to 1990 and again became a subject of attention from the late 1990s. Seoul dangled hope that Russia could repay much of its debt of the early 1990s through arms sales, even opening the bids for some large weapons procurement to Russian suppliers despite questions about how the United States would respond should the Russians actually be awarded a contract. Negotiations exposed a cultural gap, failing to proceed smoothly. Russia was faulted for not supplying information needed to assess the weapons to be sold, presumably distrusting the South, and Russians charged that the South was not serious and unwilling to use objective criteria because of its strong ties to the United States, as in the decision not to purchase SA-300 missiles. Even so, for a time military cooperation seemed to be a bright spot in improving relations. Yet, by 2001 attention was shifting to what arms Russia would provide North Korea. Rumors that it had in the mid-1990s sent vitally needed spare parts to the North in order to pave the way to this revival arose as more military missions were sent. Even if amounts were limited by the North’s lack of cash and disagreement over how to handle its huge debt as well as by Russia’s assurance that it was not providing offensive weapons, some in Seoul sought to convince it to place tighter limits on the arms trade. Yet, not seeing a security threat after the collapse of the Soviet Union and regarding Russia as seeking a role in a balance of power rather than aiming for domination, South Koreans responded to Putin’s intensified interest in North Korea without concern. Along with the security dimension in which Seoul accepted Moscow’s desire for equal relations to the North and South and an active role in shaping the North’s reintegration into the world community, there was an economic dimension tied to Russia’s expanded exports of natural resources including energy, as global prices soared, and its reemerging market, as its economy started to boom. For the former the focus was on the Russian Far East and Siberia, where marine resources, lumber, minerals, and especially oil and gas might be obtained. A friendship train with as many as 250 South Koreans, most from the business community, traversed the Trans-Siberian railroad in July 2002—a year after Kim Jong-il’s similar trip—to demonstrate the South’s interest. With Putin eager to diversify beyond China and North Korea in establishing a regional strategy, South Korea showed interest. Yet, Putin’s hasty visit to Seoul in early 2001 seemed more to prove that he wanted balanced

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relations with the two Koreas as he wooed Kim Jong-il than to suggest serious interest of his own. In return, Kim Dae-jung’s intermittent pursuit of Putin appeared mostly to be a way of demonstrating support for the Sunshine Policy and secondarily to keep South Korea’s foot in the door should Russia improve its investment climate to pursue grandiose plans heralded at summit meetings. By 2005 Russia was considered along with China, India, and Brazil to be one of the BRIC countries, newly grouped together as having promising prospects to move from 43 percent of the world’s population supported by only 8 percent of its GDP to become rising economic powers. In 2004 South Korean exports to this foursome had risen by 40 percent and the pace did not slow in 2005.12 Putin’s success in reviving the Russian economy as well as the global increase in commodities’ prices boosted economic ties and reasons for thinking strategically about what Seoul might gain from making them closer. Yet, the focus rarely veered from energy, where prospects were considerable but remained uncertain after many years of apparent agreement and few tangible results. The tone is positive about taking Russia seriously and exploring options, but there often is doubt about how much Russia is prepared to do in order to attract the foreign capital and international cooperation vital to its various proposals. One basic question is the geopolitical purpose of these energy proposals. Is Moscow really keen on developing its Far East and Siberia as part of regional integration or is it focused on producing more revenue for overall geopolitical ambitions with little likely to be ploughed back into the area and further wariness about letting the Far East draw close to the outside world.13 Koreans show understanding for Moscow’s shift from “excessive hopes in South Korea” in line with Yeltsin’s early foreign policy romanticism to a prolonged search for equidistance on the peninsula, and finally to strategic ties with Pyongyang that raised Russia’s national influence by renewing a traditional sphere of influence. That Putin accomplished this last step taking advantage of Kim Jong-il’s “nuclear card” and making it clear that Russia was amenable to preserving the North Korean system and Kim’s power did not hurt relations with Roh. Respected as realism, treated sympathetically as using both Koreas to check the United States and forging a new regional security system, Russian policy is credited with expanding its inf luence in ways helpful to South Korea.14 The nuclear crisis from the fall of 2002 changed the strategic environment. The primary foreign policy issue for Kim Dae-jung in his final months and for Roh Moo-hyun after he was elected was how to

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convince the United States to negotiate seriously with North Korea while engaging the North to urge it to become more accommodating. Among the other powers, China’s importance rose as a reliable support of a similar strategy and Japan’s declined as increasingly a stumbling block refusing to join in this effort. An early mission by Vice Foreign Minister Kim Han-kyung to Moscow began the process of consultations with the other relevant actor. Seoul encouraged Moscow to play an active role, hoping not only that the recent meetings between Putin and Kim Jong-il would give it leverage but also welcoming efforts that could attenuate U.S. stubbornness. If when the nuclear crisis erupted some in South Korea thought that Putin would seek coordination and were disappointed by his exploration of a shortcut to Pyongyang in January 2003,15 this did not prevent new versions of the romantic partnership on the part of leftist strategists toward a country that appears to share long-term objectives. After Alexander Losyukov’s mission to Pyongyang failed, it became clear that Russia would not play a major role; yet with Moscow soon accepted into Six-Party Talks and Seoul struggling to inf luence two recalcitrant adversaries, there was still reason to urge Moscow to voice reassurance to the North and resistance to U.S. hard-line thinking. In his first year as president, Roh focused on reassuring the United States as well as establishing good relations with Japan. In July 2003 he was scheduled to visit Russia, but the trip was cancelled to Russia’s annoyance. Having cultivated ties with Kim Jong-il and viewed his own 2001 visit with Kim Dae-jung as a milestone in Moscow’s growing role as a force on the peninsula, Putin was not pleased to be marginalized by a new leader making the rounds to prove the South’s centrality in regional diplomacy, as if Russia was an outlier, a state that does not warrant the kind of major voice that the United States, China, and even Japan expect. When in the summer of 2003 North Korea asked that Russia be included in the Six-Party Talks and China gave its assent, South Korea may not have seen benefit in this but calculated that any opposition would dampen North Korea’s interest and possibility alienate China. Yet, some saw Russia as the second positive influence after China in reassuring the North that it could get a fair hearing, and at times sought its help in bringing the North back to the talks. Given the assumption that Putin is serious about wanting the North to denuclearize, to abandon its missile development, and also to refocus on the South after it declined to participate in U.S. missile defense plans, many saw a realistic basis for cooperation even if some on the right appeared apathetic and others on the right romanticized Russia’s role.

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As Roh’s relationship with Bush became increasingly strained, the value of ties with Putin rose for some officials. Roh’s visit to Moscow in the fall of 2004 came amidst growing doubts that if Bush was reelected, the Six-Party Talks would make headway. This warm meeting in Putin’s dacha that highlighted shared thinking as U.S.-North Korean relations were at an impasse suggested that Russia’s place was rising in the South Korean strategic calculus. Yet, Putin no longer was seen as close to Kim Jong-il or as having strong interest in the Six-Party Talks, and there was little to gain from broadcasting a special Russian connection.16 Three triangles loomed in the background. For the inter-Korean and Russian triangle there was optimistic talk of five Eurasian corridors: an oil pipeline, a gas pipeline, the Trans-Siberian-Korean (TSK) railroad, an electricity grid, and an optic fiber line. This triangle depended on the Six-Party Talks and on subsequent plans for economic development linked to reunification, but basic agreement on how to handle the North made it easier to stress shared goals. In dealing with the nuclear crisis and security, Roh and Putin had the triangle with China in mind. Putin was largely going through China in the Six-Party Talks, and Roh’s position was close to Beijing’s too. In Roh’s increasing emphasis on moving toward a multilateral regional security structure, he finds that both Russia and China are supportive; yet, many recognize that it is concern over China’s rapid rise that may bring South Korea and Russia closer together some day. In the background is awareness of the U.S.-South Korean-Russian triangle. Even as Roh’s fear was mounting that Bush was pushing Japan toward a divisive approach to the region with longterm consequences, he understood the advisability of not appearing too close to Putin at a time of increasingly strained U.S.-Russian ties and warnings that Putin might again, as he had in 2001 with Kim Dae-jung on the antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty, be trying to lure the South into a statement alienating it from its ally. The brief meeting between Roh and Putin on May 9, 2005, at the sixtieth anniversary of the victory in World War II may have had some significance in shoring up the three-way coalition to soften the U.S. position in the Six-Party Talks. Hu Jintao and Putin had met a day earlier, and despite the great many foreign leaders who were not awarded an audience with the host at this busy time, Roh was so honored in light of the significance of the North Korean nuclear issue. They agreed that the negotiations must revive, and the burden was on the United States to not drive the North into a stalemate. With the shared goal of a peaceful resolution, the two had no need to discuss different notions about what might follow.17 An image of strategic consensus obscures what

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should be doubts about Russian policy toward the region as that country grows more assertive. Russian officials made the case that the two states have very similar approaches to critical international issues. In September 2005 Ambassador Gleb A. Ivashentsov on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations listed support for creation of a multipolar world based on equality among all states, support for the key role of the United Nations, and rejection of dictating to others in interstate relations, before adding combating international terrorism and securing WMD from proliferation. He added that Moscow plays a constructive role in the Six-Party Talks, supporting steps taken by both North and South Korea and building on the success of the September 19 agreement. Beyond this, he saw this achievement as laying the groundwork for the future structure of peace, security, and cooperation in Northeast Asia and called for creation of a special economic bond through joint investment projects in energy, petrochemicals, the automobile industry, and “Europe-Korea” through a Russian railroad corridor and an electrical energy supply system reaching North Korea from two sides. As Putin was preparing to visit South Korea in November, this was an appeal for reorienting the state from its maritime and U.S.-Japan orientation to a continental one, including greatly boosting the 2005 level of $8 billion in trade.18 When Roh and Putin met in the shadow of the Busan APEC summit, Putin was again trying to find financing for the oil pipeline planned from West Siberia to the Pacific and estimated by one Korean newspaper to cost $11.5 billion. With the argument that the first stage to Skovorodino on the Chinese border to be completed in 2008 will not mean that the bulk of the oil will go to Daqing leaving little for others and that Japan remains keenly interested in construction of the second stage, Russians appealed for Seoul to help with finances, perhaps also hooking up to the line, presumably through a North Korean spur.19 South Korean leaders showed interest, but there was no reason to make a commitment until the Sino-Japanese competition for the pipeline and Moscow’s own strategic thinking as well as feasibility studies were clear. 20 One interpretation of South Korean-Russian joint planning on pipelines and their high-sounding summit rhetoric is that they have been part of a persistent charade. For Russia the absence of agreement on how to incorporate foreign capital into big energy projects and industrial parks and the tolerance for lawless ways in the Russian Far East as elsewhere demonstrates a lack of seriousness about repeated

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agreements to welcome South Korean investment. The Kovytka gas fields, a gas pipeline from Sakhalin to the Korean peninsula, an Iron Silk Road through the TSK railroad, and the Nakhodka industrial park are showcase projects that cater to Russian vanity but have little prospect without fundamental rethinking in Moscow. Even after they have failed, summit talk attempts to resuscitate them, as in discussion of Nakhodka during Kim Dae-jung’s 1999 visit. 21 They give the impression that Russia has a regional strategy, when in fact its default position of reliance on China prevails. In turn, South Korea continues to find Russia useful in dealing with North Korea and looks for ways to keep its attention. Thus, at each summit big projects are revealed or revived, even if there is some awareness of the need to first resolve the nuclear issue. If there should be a deal leading to a multilateral economic program for the North, it may be that Russia’s proximity to the remote northeast of North Korea will give it low priority in comparison to cross-DMZ projects and Chinese interest in linking its Northeast provinces to North Korea and the sea as well as to the critical Shinuiju— Pyongyang—Seoul corridor. The latest false step in the effort to secure a beachhead in the Russian Far East was the oilgate scandal of 2005 under investigation by an independent counsel after it was revealed that a 2004 contract for oil exploration involving the Korean state railroad and influenced by political connections had been a fraudulent scheme that cost at least $3 million. 22 It was but one more in the long list of misguided efforts to invest across the Russian border with strategic overtones as well as economic objectives. Whether aimed at outflanking North Korea, building a closer relationship with Russia, facilitating the return of persons of Korean descent to areas from which they were deported, or just gaining access to energy resources, such projects invariably f loundered in the face of Russian duplicity or criminal conduct. If business skepticism abounds in Seoul, this often is not echoed in government dealings or comprehensive analysis of Russia’s role. An impression spread that in an effort to engage Moscow, some South Korean government figures exaggerated its positive contributions while overlooking its negative ones. In one speech on January 21, 2003, which was translated into Russian, So Chong-hwa, chairman of the Committee on Reunification, International Affairs, and Foreign Trade of the National Assembly, made a number of one-sided remarks. He stated that in 1884 when international relations between Russia and Korea were established, the two cooperated closely in order to restrain the pretensions of Japan to the peninsula, as if Russia did not display

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pretensions of its own that led Korean leaders to turn to Japan too. The division of the Korean peninsula is explained passively as a factor that forced an interruption in ties with the Republic of Korea rather than blamed on the Soviet leaders along with Stalin’s approval of the North Korean attack in 1950. Overoptimism is expressed toward the TSK project as having global historical significance without noting what Russia must do to make this remote possibility happen. Finally, we read of Seoul’s hope for a continued constructive role by Moscow in resolving the nuclear crisis without any sign of concern that its role in drawing closer to the North may not prove to be so constructive. 23 Although these were remarks in only one speech, they suggest the dilemma of a country that is anxious to stress the positive in relations with its neighbors while facing difficult challenges of convincing them on ways to cooperate. Without taking notice of the more negative Russian ties with the United States and signs that after the Joint Statement Russia was leaning closer to the North’s position, some in Seoul excused Russia as using the Six-Party Talks to try to position itself for reunification on the peninsula without thinking seriously about what kind of reunification it may prefer and how its backing might be utilized by the North. It does not seem to have registered that Russia is using the North’s belligerence as a mechanism for shaping the balance of power, especially seeking to gain a foothold versus the United States, China, and even Japan. During the nuclear crisis Russia’s role has, from the U.S. point of view, shifted from independent voice seeking its own solution, to constructive force serving a joint effort to convince the North, to a nonentity with few expectations, to signs of becoming a spoiler contributing to the North’s resistance. Seoul showed signs of seeking Moscow’s initiative in the few months prior to the failure of this effort in late January 2003. Then it showed little interest as Moscow coordinated with Washington and Beijing through much of that year and even less so as it kept a low profile for more than a year. Roh’s own discontent with the Bush policy deepened in late 2004 and 2005 just as Moscow’s role was starting to show signs of becoming more supportive of the North and even a spoiler in its resistance to U.S. efforts to rally the Other Four. While there was no sign of coordination and even some efforts to avoid the appearance of it, failure to look critically at what Moscow was doing came amidst some romanticism about an overlap of interests in dealing with the North and the region. As opposed to many South Koreans who see Russia as quite irrelevant, others attach some long-term importance to it as a country inclined

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to multilateralism in security and eager for partners for a regional balance of powers. The growing appeal of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia drew analysts to Russia’s longstanding advocacy of this. Unlike China and Japan, which are often suspected in South Korea of having hegemonic designs and have been hesitant about multilateralism, Russia is seen as wary of any country gaining dominance. In the 1990s it experienced a time of weakness with little inf luence, sentiments sometimes shared by South Korea, and under Putin it is grasping for a way to gain a larger role. Rather than behaving as in the time of the Soviet Union as a superpower bent on dominating or even as the three other powers active in the region inclined to putting South Korea in a subordinate role, Russia shares the South’s priority of seeking partners for multilateral ties that can limit assertive powers. It follows that Russian interest in having a say on the North Korean nuclear question poses no problem, while Roh’s priority on “a policy of peace and prosperity” with good ties to all meshes well with Russian thinking; however there are limits to the relationship. Seoul has no reason to follow Beijing’s path in forging close strategic ties to Russia, in part because it lacks great inf luence in dealing with the North and the peninsula in general. This is a sympathetic view of Russia as pragmatic and worthy of a “comprehensive, friendly, partnership” without urgency to reach for more. 24 Yet, there are also warnings that it is still early to say how Russia will play its role, 25 and in 2007 Putin’s high-profile diplomacy of protest drew some attention. This dearth of strategic foresight is a sign that some still cling to the goal of weaving a regional web around the North, including Russia. Not only does Russia border on the North and have historic ties to it with bold ideas for projects to integrate the region and use its energy card, but is also a middle power in this region with many overlapping interests with the South. This implies that together they can become region builders, straddling Japan’s alienation, U.S. distrust, and China’s potential for dominance. Romanticism toward Russia draws on Roh’s desperation for engaging the North and balancing the various powers. During 2005–06 the Roh and Putin administrations both resented the U.S. approach to North Korea that restricted their countries’ growing ties with the North and hopes to influence it. Both downplayed any threat. Each had its eyes on reunification as a process that would be welcome, offering economic opportunities and political clout. 26 Thus, Korean writings on Russia and the peninsula generally took a positive view of its objectives, despite its lack of influence. 27 Yet, this impression should be put in the context of widespread doubt that Russia’s role

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matters much, leading to relatively little attention to it. Given the dearth of criticism of Putin’s retreat to authoritarianism and state-centered economic control, South Korea may not be preparing itself for the next stage of Russian involvement in Northeast Asian affairs. Opinions differ on South Korea’s rank for Russia in Northeast Asia. Usually, it is assumed that it is a distant third after China and Japan. This led to not thinking seriously about strategy toward Russia. Yet, as Japan’s relations with Russia are mired in a territorial dispute accompanied by mutual distrust, and as Russia takes a fresh look at how the Korean peninsula may emerge from the nuclear crisis, some analysts see Russia raising its priority for the peninsula. After all, unlike China it has been dissatisfied with its weak role in the region and a major transformation on the Korean peninsula focused on the outsider North Korea could be just what is needed to change its fortunes. On one level, the deal necessary to rid the North of nuclear weapons can expose the weakness of the United States and Japan and shift the psychology toward them, especially in South Korea. On another level, a slow, difficult process of reunification could serve to boost Russia’s role as the country most trusted by the North. Finally, the Six-Party Talks show promise of becoming the very multilateral security framework for the region that Moscow has long espoused. South Koreans outlining this Russian strategy generally show sympathy for it, finding it similar to the outlook of the Roh administration without probing further into the likely differences, such as how close contacts with Pyongyang may harden its resolve and subvert the expected reunification process, according to current assumptions. 28 Roh’s popularity had fallen sharply already in 2006–07 as Putin’s image in the West was deteriorating. With the GNP skeptical of unilateral concessions and assistance to the North and disinclined to view Russia with a tinge of romanticism about overlapping objectives in the future, a more sober look at how Russia was seeking advantage from the crisis was likely. After all, it was relying mostly on the North to make its voice heard and could be expected to do so even after the crisis passed in ways that tilted the balance, if possible, toward the North and challenged the stabilizing role in the region of the United States and Japan. A conservative leader in Seoul would be prone to put relations on hold, while raising the strategic priority of sound U.S. relations as well as efforts to resolve the split with Japan. After all, some analysts are aware that Russian ambitions are far from realized. Through the outcome of the talks, it seeks many more concessions from South Korea, leading to energy and railway networks, a role in the industrial rebuilding of the

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North, an inf lux of South Korean capital into Russia, and an enduring voice in a reorganized great power balance. In short, it has a lot at stake in the Six-Party Talks, especially as a kind of sponsor of the North.29 In 2007 Russia flexed its military muscle by testing new strategic missiles and Putin openly challenged U.S. policies on many fronts. After the fall 2006 North Korean nuclear test, Russia showed less concern despite agreeing to some Security Council sanctions.30 Later the Russian media broke from the consensus over the Joint Agreement by stressing U.S. unwillingness to meet its commitments. The South Korean press, conservative and progressive, began looking anew at Russia’s rising clout. Earlier rosy assumptions could not be sustained, and awareness that Russia mattered was overtaking the prevailing apathy. Yet, with critical decisions ahead in a presidential election year and in Phase 2 of the February 13 agreement, it was easy again to overlook Russia’s involvement amidst its continued claims to be an “honest broker” and in accord with the thinking in Seoul, seeking to demonstrate independence from Washington.31 As Roh prepared for the inter-Korean summit with Kim Jong-il to create a “unified economic zone,” including many large-scale projects, talk revived of trilateral cooperation with Russia, an ardent supporter of the summit. Putin was also intensifying ties to the North, not waiting for denuclearization let alone progress in Phase 2 before increasing its economic benefits. Warding off warnings from the GNP that defending national security takes priority, Roh pressed for more economic interdependence as critical for guaranteeing peace on the peninsula, but his term ended before Russia’s role could be clarified. Conclusion Russia figures into the overall South Korean strategic calculus as a force for multilateralism and balance, but its presence is not necessarily reassuring. In the period 1988 to 1992 Moscow stood as a prize catch for a country intent on persuading Pyongyang to shift away from confrontation toward dialogue and mutual recognition. By withdrawing its support from the North and drastically lowering its own strategic profile in Northeast Asia, the collapsing Soviet Union and then the f ledgling Russian Federation exceeded South Korea’s expectations. In the period 1993–1999 Russia fell in importance, and its rising interest in rebuilding ties with the North and exerting some influence on regional change did not cause any anxiety. In fact, Kim Dae-jung included Moscow in his tour of foreign capitals as he built support for the Sunshine Policy.

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He welcomed it as a potentially reassuring voice for Pyongyang and as a weak regional force that could become useful for eventual balancing in the midst of a United States hesitant about acknowledging the rise of regionalism, China growing assertive about its central role in the region, and Japan still groping for its place in a rapidly changing context. After Putin made North Korea the launching pad for reasserting Russia’s place in Northeast Asia, Kim and his successor Roh continued with the course already set. Yet, assumptions on which Russia had been welcomed increasingly were cast in doubt. Russia’s ties with China improved, while those with the United States and Japan deteriorated. Meanwhile, the North Korean nuclear crisis raised the stakes of dealings with Pyongyang, and Moscow’s role became more ambiguous. With more immediate challenges in dealing with the other states, Roh was not inclined to make any visible shift in Russia policy, leaving in place the assumption that Russia’s role would be supportive of reunification and positive for great power dynamics. South Korea has at times raised Russian expectations, offering vast sums to sway Gorbachev to switch Moscow’s allegiance in 1990–91, encouraging Yeltsin in 1999 to play a more active role with Pyongyang in order to reassure it about the new Sunshine Policy, and praising Putin’s personal diplomacy with Kim Jong-il in 2000–02 as sustaining vital great power engagement, notably when Bush’s intentions were suspect. At other times, while Russian leaders complained about broken promises and marginalization, South Korean leaders were prone to accentuate the rosiest prospects for relations, including large-scale economic projects with questionable futures due to the uncertainty of the North’s economic reforms. Without attention to values, the illusion has surfaced from time to time that Seoul and Moscow have a special affinity and by working together can, to some degree, reshape an environment dominated by the United States, China, or even Japan. It is still unclear how far the Moscow-Pyongyang rapprochement will proceed and to what degree the Moscow-Beijing strategic partnership challenges cautious cooperation; however, by 2007 Russia’s role had become more problematic, and the need was growing to dispel overoptimism about it in order for South Koreans to achieve an overall understanding of the great power framework in Northeast Asia. Prevailing apathy and an excessive dose of romanticism have complicated the challenge of adjusting to the rapidly changing strategic role of Russia in the region. The success of strategic thinking in the Roh Moo-hyun era and the lack of serious problems from neglect under Kim Young-sam may have lulled observers. Kim Dae-jung had some success

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in involving Russia in his Sunshine Policy, but as Putin drew closer to Kim Jong-il and shifted policies to the region toward more assertiveness, the response has fallen short. Under Kim Dae-jung the impact was growing, and under Roh the presence of romanticism has become a more serious concern as even widespread apathy leaves strategists unprepared to interpret how Russia’s role is evolving. There has been insufficient triangular analysis of great power relations or analysis of how the North Korean nuclear crisis is contributing to shifting Russian ambitions. South Korea is at the center of tectonic movements within the global balance of power, and it cannot afford the luxury of fixing its gaze almost exclusively on Washington on the one hand, and Pyongyang on the other, without comprehending the regional great power framework as a whole. Accurate incorporation of Moscow into the analysis adds an essential element.

Notes 1. Gilbert Rozman, “Russian Foreign Policy in Northeast Asia,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 201–24. 2. Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Russian Shadow,” in Lam Peng Er, ed., Japan’s Relations with China: Facing a Rising Power (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 213–33. 3. Gilbert Rozman, “Ajia taiheiyo chiiki e mukete takamaru Soren no kitai,” Soren no kiki to Niso kankei (Tokyo, 1991), pp. 86–96 and 243–69. 4. Gilbert Rozman, “Moscow’s Japan-Watchers in the First Years of the Gorbachev Era: The Struggle for Realism and Respect in Foreign Affairs,” Pacific Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1988), pp. 257–75. 5. Byung-joon Ahn, “The Soviet Union, China, and the Korean Peninsula,” in Dalcheong Kim, ed., Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia (Seoul: Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, 1990), pp. 83–94. 6. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 119–22. 7. I Yun, “Hanguk gwa Roshia kan mujok oe tukjing gwa chonmang,” in Chung Yo-chon, ed., Hanro gyong jae gyoryu 10nyon oe pyongga wa Roshia gyong jae oe mirae (Seoul: KIEP, 2000), Ch. 1. 8. Gilbert Rozman, “Troubled Choices for the Russian Far East: Decentralization, Open Regionalism, and Internationalism,” The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer/Fall 1997), pp. 537–69. 9. Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Russian Relations in the 1990s: A Balance Sheet,” Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 93–113; Gilbert Rozman, ed., Japan and Russia: The Tortuous Path to Normalization, 1949–1999

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10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26.

27. 28.

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(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); Gilbert Rozman, “Russia’s Calculus and Japan’s Foreign Policy in Pacific Asia,” in Takashi Inoguchi, ed., Japan’s Asian Policy: Revival and Response (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 167–91. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism, p. 222. Hong Wan Suk, ed., Hyondae Rosia gukka cheje wa segye jonryak (Seoul: Hanul Publishing Co., Seoul, 2005), pp. 601–30. JoongAng Daily, November 19, 2005, p. 3. Yoon Yik-jung and Yi Yong-gwon, “Dongbukkasea enoji anbo paerodaim oe hyongsong kanungsong: Rosia oe yokhal gwa yonghyang ul chungshim uro,” Shin Asea, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2005), pp. 81–82. Seung-Ho Joo, “Russia and North Korea, 1992–2006: From Distant Allies to Normal Neighbors,” Korea Observer, Vol. 38, No.1 (Spring 2007), p. 96. Chung Taeik, “Bukhan haekmunje e taihan Rosia oe ipjang mit shisajom,” Oigyo, April 2003, pp. 26–33. Samuel S. Kim, The Two Koreas and the Great Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 140. Kwon Oguk, “Rosia aeso ogo gan Bukhaek: Guraedo 6jahoidam oe yuilhan haebop,” Tongil Hanguk, 2005, pp. 27–29. The Korea Herald, September 30, 2005, p. 4. The Korea Times, November 21, 2005, p. 1. Gilbert Rozman, “Sino-Japanese Competition over the Russian Far East: Is the Oil Pipeline Only a Starting Point,” in Akihiro Iwashita, ed., Siberia and the Russian Far East in the 21st Century: Partners in the “Community of Asia,” Vol. 1, Crossroads in Northeast Asia (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2005), pp. 1–20. Dongbukka 2003 (Seoul: The Korea Development Bank, 2003), pp. 583–93. The Korea Herald, June 29, 2005. So Chong-hua, “Budushchee Koreisko-Rossiiskikh otnoshenii,” Moscow, Diplomatic Academy, January 21, 2003. Cho Han-bom, “Bukhan e daehan yonghyangryok jisok ul tonghan dae Hanbando palongwon kanghwa rul uido,” Bukhan, September 2005, pp. 53–56. Chong Hui-sok, “Dongbukka dajaanbo hyopryok gwa Rosia,” Hanguk jongchi oigyosa nonchong, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2006), pp. 429–63. Alexandre Y. Mansourov, “The Past Is the Future: Russia and the Korean Peninsula,” in Jonathan D. Pollack, ed., Korea: The East Asian Pivot (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2006), p. 326. Yon Hyon-sik, “Rosia yonbang oigyo jongchaek gwa Hanbando tongil,” Jungso yongu, Vol. 29, No. 1 (May 2005), pp. 152–63. Chang Dok-jun, “Bukro gwangye oe jongae: Kongdonghwa toin dongmaeng uro puto saeroun hyopryok gwangye ro,” Jungso yongsu, Vol. 28, No. 3 (2004), pp. 139–44.

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29. Gilbert Rozman, Strategic Thinking about the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Four Parties Caught between North Korea and the United States (New York: Palgrave, 2007). 30. Hiroshi Kimura, “Putin’s Policy toward the Korean Peninsula: Why Is Russia Losing Its Inf luence?” in Hiroshi Kimura, ed., Russia’s Shift toward Asia (Tokyo: The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, 2007), pp. 171–75. 31. Ha Yongchool and Shin Beomshik, “Non-Proliferation and Political Interests: Russia’s Policy Dilemmas in the Six-Party Talks,” in Iwashita Akihiro, ed., Eager Eyes Fixed on Eurasia: Vol. 2. Russia and Its Eastern Edge (Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007), p. 197 and Steven Kim, “Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Problem: The Status Quo versus the Transformative Approach,” in Rouben Azizian and Boris Reznik, eds., Russia, America, and Security in the Asia-Pacific (Honolulu: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2006) pp. 177–79.

CHAPTER 10

South Korean Strategic Thought toward Regionalism Shin-wha Lee

D

uring most of the cold war period, South Korea remained ambivalent about the strategic value of participating in regional multilateral regimes. Since hegemonic U.S. power dominated the landscape of Northeast Asia, bilateral relations with the United States and the anticommunist coalition around the world were at the heart of Korean diplomacy. In addition, inter-Korean relations were fraught with distrust and propaganda, fomenting fear of confrontation and even armed conf lict. Therefore, maintaining a guarantee of security by the United States, seeking international recognition as the only legitimate country on the Korean peninsula, and triumphing over North Korea politically, economically, and socially were among the most critical goals in Seoul’s foreign policy. This cold war structure limited the scope of its regional security maneuvering and the extent of diplomatic engagement with the outside world. The years that followed the end of the cold war have marked a new era in South Korea’s pursuit of regionalism. Although bilateral efforts such as inter-Korean dialogue and the Korea-U.S. security alliance remain crucial to its strategic thought, the increasing salience of multidirectional diplomacy in the post–cold war security environment has not been lost. Enthusiasm for redirecting regional economic integration and enhancing national dignity, together with the imperatives of security stabilization on the peninsula, have guided evolving strategic planning toward East Asian regionalism.1

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As ideology no longer steers foreign policy decision making, South Korea has sought hard to enhance its regional position by boosting economic ties with its continental neighbors, China and Russia. It has also attempted to deepen multilateral cooperation in regard not only to its North Korean policy but also to its initiatives for realizing the vision of an EAC. 2 These endeavors reveal the nation’s growing self-assurance achieved through remarkable industrialization, all-around modernization, and democratization during the cold war period, successful hosting of major international events such as the 1988 Summer Olympics and the 2002 World Cup, and rapid recovery in the wake of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis. Recently economic regionalism and cultural ties have developed to a noticeable extent in East Asia and raised hopes for the emergence of a more integrated regional community, but there has been little progress on political or security regionalism. The growing rivalry between China and Japan has been proving problematic, as Japan anxiously has responded to the rapid rise of China and China in turn has fretted about Japan’s aspirations to become a “normal state” by strengthening its alliance ties with the United States and increasing its military capabilities. Resurgent nationalism, which is complicated by the history between the two countries and a sense of rivalry for future dominance in the region, has further aggravated their ties. The relations between Seoul and Tokyo also plunged in early 2005 as nationalism and populism distorted foreign policy planning. The latter’s “unapologetic” foreign policy, manifested in its controversial history textbooks, renewed attention to the disputed island Dokdo/Takeshima, and Japan’s troubling position on “comfort women” and Koizumi’s visits to the Yasukuni Shrine posed significant barriers to intraregional reconciliation. Recently, Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong’s call for joint efforts to promote healthy and stable development of China-Japan relations and Fukuda’s visit to China in December 2007 have raised hope for bilateral strategic relations.3 Yet, rivalry for oil, as well as their geopolitical rivalry, remains an unavoidable reality. Korea-Japan relations are also expected to improve as Fukuda’s focus on friendly ties with Asian neighbors will be complemented by Lee Myung-bak’s emphasis on closer Korea-U.S.-Japan ties, although aforementioned obstacles to trust remain. Meanwhile, the position of the United States toward Northeast Asian regionalism has been elusive. Its policy is focused on maintaining and consolidating bilateral alliance relations, so as to deter the rise of any potential powers in the region. The region’s initiatives for regionalism

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have often run afoul of the U.S. resolve to keep regional relations under its command, as evidenced by objections to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir’s notion of an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) in the early 1990s and Japan’s proposal for the establishment of an AMF in the late 1990s. From the perspective of countries in the region, a paradigm shift in the U.S.-centric approach to security is needed to construct a multilateral regional security cooperation regime that would complement existing bilateral security arrangements. Otherwise, East Asian regionalism will not go far, as the United States warns against even a “non-security” type of EAC.4 Another serious challenge obscuring South Korea’s pursuit of regionalism are the divisions related to perceptions and policies on how to deal with North Korea. While Tokyo has consolidated its alliance with the United States by upholding the Bush administration’s pre-2007 hard-line policy toward the North, Seoul continued to appease Pyongyang even after its recent nuclear weapons test. Such differences incapacitated the “virtual alliance” between South Korea, the United States, and Japan, which was based on the continuation of two solid alliances and the strengthening of security cooperation between Seoul and Tokyo,5 as well as on the establishment of the TCOG in 1999 bringing together high-level officials from the three countries to find a unified voice in dealing with Pyongyang.6 TCOG talks stalled as tensions mounted between Seoul and Tokyo over disputes related to the territorial and history issues and have been further constrained by discrepancies in perceptions of the North Korean threat. Such discrepancies generated a situation where Beijing has emerged as a key arbitrator in the process of addressing North Korean nuclear issues, leaving Seoul hesitant about siding with the United States and Japan. While Seoul has also tried to improve its relations with China and Russia in pursuit of “independent diplomacy” beyond the “asymmetric alliance” with the United States,7 many Koreans strongly favor maintaining strong security ties with their ally and trilateral cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington vital for resolution of the nuclear crisis. Against this backdrop, four sets of questions help us to examine the evolution of strategic thought on regionalism: 1) How does South Korean regional thinking differ from that of its neighbors, and how has it evolved over time? 2) Was there any discernable strategic thought to realize regional aspirations during the cold war era, and afterward how has it responded to the dynamics of regionalism in Northeast Asia? 3) Is South Korean strategic thought on regionalism long-term,

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goal-oriented, and consistent? Does it set priorities, recognize tradeoffs, and change in response to actual results or new developments in the region? How do competing visions of domestic forces define its scope and direction? 4) Under what circumstances has Seoul given regional multilateral cooperation a prominent place in its strategic thinking and national security doctrine? Is it based on careful deliberations and a realistic understanding of costs and benefits? This chapter reviews Seoul’s strategic thought on regional multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia during and after the cold war, followed by consideration of the challenges and opportunities for growing regionalism with Korean “centrality.” The Evolution and Characteristics of South Korean Regional Thinking In past centuries Korea had had little room to stake out its centrality in regional strategic balancing. It was under China’s tributary state system during the Ming and Qing dynasties. With the transition from the Sinocentric regional order to the modern international order, Korea began to see China in relative terms, but this provided little opportunity to assert itself given the rise of Japanese imperialism. After independence in 1945, a divided Korea could not escape the great power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the growing inf luence of the newly formed People’s Republic of China. In light of the geopolitical realities of the cold war period, South Korea had no choice but to depend heavily on the United States for its very survival. Peace and stability on the Korean peninsula has been maintained through South Korea and Japan’s security alliances with the United States, balancing the Soviet-China-North Korea coalition. In this setting, multilateral regional cooperation meant promoting trilateral security cooperation with the United States and Japan. As the 1980s ended, however, South Korea experienced internal and external transformations that greatly affected its regional relations. The democratic transition made it possible to alter “the ideological and institutional foundations of political and economic governance.”8 Shortly thereafter the end of the cold war system facilitated South Korea’s normalization of diplomatic ties with the former Soviet Union and China as well as its joint admission alongside North Korea into the United Nations, thus allowing it to employ multilateral diplomacy rather than solely depending on U.S. guidance in economic and security globalization.9

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One president after another seized the new opportunities to enunciate new ideas with implications for regional cooperation and institution building. Roh Tae-woo’s nordpolitik, Kim Young-sam’s “new diplomacy,” and Kim Dae-jung’s EAC all espoused “open regionalism” with broad membership and little exclusivity of functions in the era of globalization, ref lecting an increasing commitment to regionalism that reaches beyond Northeast Asia. Yet, perceptions predominantly focused on China and Japan, as South Korea aspired to position itself as a middle power at the nexus of two great powers, partly through playing a role as intermediary between the two rivals. For the most part, it views the three countries as constituting one region while recognizing obstacles to cooperation that slow the prospects for actually forming an institutional framework that could lead to regionalism on this basis.10 Roh Moo-hyun’s Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative and his suggestion that Korea be a “Northeast Asian balancer” echoed this strategic perspective. While the term “Northeast Asia” has different meaning for each of the three countries, the scope of “East Asia” is understood to mean the geographical sum of Northeast and Southeast Asia. The current trend of integration links the Northeast Asian states with the glue of ASEAN, as realized in ASEAN 1 3.11 In fact, East Asia is currently a “much more closely knit region than it was at the end of World War II or even a decade ago.” Yet, no single map of East Asia is “so inherently self-evident and logical as to preclude the consideration of equally plausible alternatives.” The inaugural EAS in December 2005 demonstrated why East Asia remains a contentious regional idea. Being wary of China’s dominance, Japan strongly promoted an expanded region, adding Australia, New Zealand, and India to ASEAN 1 3. On the other hand, China insisted that the pursuit of an EAC is the responsibility of the existing thirteen-member group, not the new sixteen-member EAS.12 Although the EAVG and EASG under Kim Dae-jung sowed the seeds for an EAC, Seoul’s voice was not heard in the process of establishing the EAS. Some proposed that it turn its diplomatic efforts to changing the name of the EAS to the “post-ASEAN 1 3 summit,” or “expanded (hwakdae) ASEAN 1 3 summit,” promoting East Asian cooperation in this framework for the foreseeable future. The organization would operate at four levels: ASEAN for the traditional tasks of that well-established entity; ASEAN 1 3 along lines developing since 1997 when that organization was formed; the EAS with a broader agenda; and a multipurpose summit in which the United States, Russia, the EU, Pakistan, Canada, and other countries that wish to join

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participate in discussing comprehensive security and political agendas. In this perspective, the development of the EAS into a communitybuilding association would become a long-term task requiring deepening “functional cooperation” over a considerable period.13 Regional integration, signifying changes beyond the domain of state sovereignty, would advance gradually led mainly by market forces, while regional cooperation, a process of negotiation among sovereign states that pursue their national interests within a certain geographical region, would gain momentum at those times when leaders reached agreement on their common interests. Seoul has preferred to use the term “regional cooperation” to regional integration, aware that East Asian countries are hesitant to transfer and share sovereignty with others.14 For instance, the objective of Roh’s Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative is to take the initiative for cooperation among Northeast Asian countries rather than pursuing regional integration. The term “regionalism” itself refers to a common sense of identity and objectives combined “within a specific international region in terms of economic, political and security linkages.”15 It can also be defined as the “transformation of a particular region from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity with regard to a number of dimensions, the most important being culture, security, economic policies and political regimes.”16 In this sense, in Korea regionalism has been conceptualized as a government-led national project to form a certain regional space through largely top-down efforts based on geopolitical conditions. It can thus be argued that regionalism there, as elsewhere in Northeast Asia, is for the most part realist, in contrast to idealist notions of letting nongovernmental forces reach across to each other across national boundaries. The Cold War Era: Restrained and Distorted Regional Aspirations The polarized cold war era divided most states along ideological lines, compelled them to see the world in terms of friends and foes, and made them depend on one of the two superpowers to be their security guarantor. This was particularly true on the Korean peninsula where ideological rivalries prevailed and a renewal of war between the two Koreas remained possible. Strategic thinking in Seoul during the cold war days therefore produced a foreign policy of bandwagoning with the United States and the anticommunist alliance. Accordingly, its pursuit of regionalism had clear goals and action plans based on ideologically guided strategic calculations. First, the origin of its strategic thought on

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regionalism was closely associated with its aspirations for bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relations within the Western bloc. Application of the Hallstein Doctrine until 1973 limited Korea’s formal diplomatic relations to Western countries.17 Second, Seoul engaged in a diplomatic war with Pyongyang to promote ideological causes and obtain political legitimacy within the international community, including at the United Nations until September 1991 when both gained membership. Third, Seoul recognized ASEAN as an anticommunist coalition to deter China’s expansion toward the Indochina peninsula.18 Fourth, Third World diplomacy was pursued as a diplomatic and security imperative to countervail the North’s advantageous position in bilateral and multilateral relations with the nonaligned movement countries in South Asia, Africa, and Latin America. During the 1960s, South Korea also played a key role in regional efforts to formalize collective security cooperation by proposing Asian and Pacific cooperation to contain China’s expansion in the region. In September 1964, the government seized the diplomatic initiative in creating the Asia-Pacific Council (ASPAC), in which Australia, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the Republic of Vietnam were founding members. None of the member states were communist; all but Malaysia were allied with the United States, and most were contributing troops to the war in Vietnam (except for Japan, Malaysia, and Taiwan). All member states, to a greater or lesser degree, perceived communist China as a threat.19 Pursuit of regional collaboration along ideological lines faced new challenges from the late 1960s. First, the Guam Doctrine, which was proclaimed by Richard Nixon in July 1969, brought new wariness regarding U.S. security guarantees on the Korean peninsula. The doctrine emphasized U.S. commitments in maintaining treaty agreements and providing a nuclear umbrella to allied countries, but asserted that the nation directly threatened was to take primary responsibility for providing the manpower necessary for its own defense. Although the doctrine was designed to signal the start of “Vietnamization” of the Vietnam War, it also required Asian states to create their own military organizations to provide mutual security assurances. 20 Second, the U.S.-China détente also posed a challenge. Although Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 was regarded as a U.S. effort to partner with China against the Soviet Union, this shift (together with the 1969 doctrine) caused profound reverberations. Neither Japan nor South Korea had a voice in the process. Japan quickly adjusted to the “Nixon

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shokku” (and the West German negotiations with the Soviet Union) by normalizing diplomatic relations with China in 1972. In contrast, South Korea’s rapprochement and normalization with China had to wait until the ideological iceberg thawed. In this altered environment, the anxious Korean government began to consider alternative measures such as “self-reliant national defense” and “inter-Korean reconciliation” (Nambuk hwahae), rather than exclusively depending upon the bilateral alliance with the United States for national security. Consequently, it sought ways of relieving tension on the peninsula, which eventually led to the South-North Communiqué (Nambuk gongdong sungmyong) on July 4, 1972, establishing the basic negotiating principles of autonomy, peace, and national collaboration in the process of reunification. Third, with the U.S.-China rapprochement, the fall of Saigon, and China’s increasing role in regional relations during the 1970s, the solid bipolar structure in Northeast Asia—the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea on one side and the United States, Japan, and South Korea on the other—came apart, leading to the breakup of ASPAC. Although the South’s relations with major communist countries were still limited, the change in the regional security structure facilitated strategic moves toward neighboring countries. The Hallstein Doctrine was abandoned on June 23, 1973, in favor of a Foreign Policy for Peaceful Unification (pyonghwa tongil oigyo jongchaek), which was followed by establishing diplomatic relations with “nonhostile” countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, as well as opening the door to the Soviet Union and China. If normalization of relations with communist countries was not accomplished until the era of nordpolitik, the Park Chung-hee government at least moved to extend its traditional security alliances with the United States and Western countries to include a more diverse set of relations. Such recognition became more prominent when the United States decided to downsize its commitment of soldiers to defend South Korea by withdrawing the 7th Infantry Division in 1976. Closer security ties with Tokyo were considered out of fear of abandonment by the United States. 21 Park also gave thought to normalization with China, reflecting reduced confidence in the U.S. defense against North Korea. 22 Still, such multilateral diplomacy remained at the incipient or even conjectural level as the U.S.-centered system of bilateral alliances was too sturdy to be replaced by any cooperative multilateral regional security architecture. Similar to Tokyo, Seoul regarded its alliance with the United States as the foundation of its foreign policy. South Korea’s multilateral approaches during the cold war were more driven by economic necessities than security imperatives, particularly

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since Park actively pursued an export-driven development strategy in the 1970s. Although its foreign policy toward many countries began in the context of its diplomatic competition with North Korea, relations expanded especially through trade and other commercial activities. As the South surpassed the North in the economic race by the mid-1970s, its economic impetus in foreign relations was further reinforced. In addition, though perceived as an anticommunist coalition at first, ASEAN was soon recognized as an important new market and provider of natural resources. 23 While the U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral alliance structure was central to security, cooperation with Japan in engaging ASEAN countries was troublesome due to competing economic development strategies. South Korea also became a founding member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) that was established in November 1966 to help finance economic growth. In addition, it emphasized the necessity of economic and social cooperation among ASPAC member states and considered setting up an economic coordination center under this council. 24 The Chun Doo-hwan administration expanded trade with other countries in the region and hoped to establish new regional arrangements for a stable and open environment. In 1985, the Working Team for Northern Policy was created under the Agency for National Security Planning to seek ways of advancing ties with the Soviet Union and China. Seoul’s interest in the concept of regional cooperation derived from its judgment that such multilateral arrangements could promote its diplomatic objectives, expanding its regional role and enhancing its global image. Since it was not yet a member of a regional organization such as ASEAN, a broad scheme designed for the Asia-Pacific region was believed to give easier access to other countries. Successive administrations demonstrated an interest in enhancing regional cooperation, reinforced by the development imperative, especially as the South Korean economy grew rapidly. Yet, the country’s strategic thought toward multilateral cooperation was rather restrained by the impregnable security alliance with the United States and the “diplomatic handicap” resulting from the ideological rivalry with North Korea. In addition, regionalism in the cold war context was distorted by superpower intervention that limited forces within the region focusing on their own common ground. 25Above all, the South’s primary motivation for participation in these regional multilateral processes was to win the diplomatic war with North Korea and to help the United States reinforce the coalition of noncommunist Asian and Pacific states, as stipulated in Korea’s initiatives for creating ASPAC.

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Regional Strategic Thinking at the Dawn of the Post–Cold War Era South Korea’s quest for regionalism during the initial post–cold war years was largely guided by two predominant strategies: Roh Tae-woo’s nordpolitik and Kim Young-sam’s “new diplomacy,” which espoused five strategic fundamentals, that is, globalism, diversification of interstate relationships, a multidimensional and pluralist approach to national interests (dawonhwa), regional cooperation ( jiyok hyopryok), and future orientation (mirae jihyang). The principal strategic idea of nordpolitik was to pursue wide-ranging relations with the traditional allies of North Korea, putting pressure on the North to cooperate with the South in the inter-Korean peace and unification process. 26 It enabled Seoul to expand the geopolitical range of its foreign policy, at the same time building momentum for awareness of regional identity as part of Northeast Asia. Rising awareness of regional ties extended also to Southeast Asia and a new sense of both East Asia and the Asia-Pacific. These changes created leeway to construct a favorable environment for security cooperation and increase South Korea’s international position as a middle power. Trade and other economic considerations became a higher priority after the cold war. In fact, nordpolitik was initially designed to expand trade relations by drawing Moscow and Beijing closer, at least partly to cope with the perceived increasing trade protectionism of the United States. 27 Under Roh Seoul sought to build on its economic accomplishments to enhance its regional and global role. It became one of the founding members of APEC in 1989. With intraregional trade growing rapidly in the 1990s, its economic foundation for regionalism developed at an accelerated pace. 28 Nordpolitik has been evaluated as a great success, as expanded relations with China and Russia paved the way for regional diplomacy on more autonomous and multilateral terms. “New diplomacy” was also a response to the emergence of a new global and regional order, which posed both profound challenges and opportunities for South Korea’s post–cold war diplomacy. It emphasized ties with countries that respected universal values such as freedom, justice, welfare, and human rights, and also stressed active participation in tackling global issues including arms control, poverty eradication, and environmental protection. In addition, diversified diplomacy encouraged the expansion of ties with ASEAN states, other Asian countries, the European Community, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, while improving relations with traditional partners. Diplomacy

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for regional cooperation meant pursuit of Asia-Pacific security and economic cooperation based on the assumption that the twenty-first century would be the Asia-Pacific era. It also aimed to channel efforts to realize an economic cooperation bloc in the Asia-Pacific region with APEC at the center, as well as multilateral security dialogues in the Asia-Pacific region and especially Northeast Asia while consolidating the South Korea-U.S. alliance. These efforts were part of a strategic adjustment to the dramatically changing security paradigm and economic dynamics of the post–cold war world. Under Kim Young-sam, there was growing consensus on the need for greater multilateral regional security cooperation. Mindful of their potential contribution to regional peace and stability and alleviation of tensions on the Korean peninsula, Kim not only pursued proactive participation in global and regional organizations such as APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD), and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), but also sought ways to increase North Korea’s involvement. 29 Although he emphasized the Asia-Pacific as a diplomatic arena, proposals and ideas that limited the scope of regional multilateral security cooperation to Northeast Asia were also put forward. The Korean proposal for a Northeast Asia Security Dialogue (NEASED) at the ARF Senior Officials’ Meeting in Bangkok in 1994 was to promote confidence building in the Northeast Asian region through interstate dialogue on issues of direct interest to the countries in the region, including the two Koreas, the United States, Japan, China, and Russia; however, neither North Korea nor China showed an interest. 30 Additional suggestions for establishment of a Northeast Asian Security Cooperation framework were made in the ARF on July 25, 1995. At the Track II level, Korean scholars and former government officials were instrumental in establishing CSCAP, a nongovernmental forum to promote multilateral security dialogue, in June 1993.31 Yet, Seoul had opposed the establishment of the EAEC, an exclusively Asian forum, despite some support from “pro-Asia” Korean officials, due to U.S. opposition. 32 The U.S. factor remained critical, as in the first North Korean nuclear crisis. Kim’s efforts to promote cooperation in the region stumbled against the rising tensions associated with this crisis. Although there were some tangible results in multilateral diplomacy during the Kim Young-sam period, as exemplified in South Korea’s gaining accession to the OECD (1996), the WTO (1996), and the United Nations Security Council (1997), as well as being awarded the right to host the third ASEM summit and participate in the NEASED

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and the ARF, all these multilateral cooperation efforts were seen as supplements to bilateral relations with the United States. In fact, Kim viewed NEASED and ARF as vehicles for keeping the alliance with the United States sturdy. Regional Strategic Thinking during the Kim Dae-jung Administration South Korean strategic thinking was notably reshaped during the Kim Dae-jung administration, particularly in terms of how to deal with North Korea and how to advance East Asian regionalism. There are at least five factors that explain how he was able to make discernable progress in advancing inter-Korean cooperation and the vision of the EAC, while maintaining steadfast relations with the United States. First, his Sunshine Policy “set off a spate of regional maneuvering for advantage on the Korean peninsula”33 by ameliorating ties with North Korea. When Kim assumed office in February 1998, inter-Korean relations were more or less hostile. North Korea, under the basic principle of “mobilizing South Korea through the United States,” focused on engaging in talks solely with the United States while intentionally excluding the South. In this light, his Sunshine Policy aimed at specifically redressing this forced exclusion through contacts with the North, and thus constructed a long-term plan with the goal of making the Korean issue wholly Korean. This policy was adopted under the assumption that reconciliation and cooperation are preferable to the possibility of another disastrous inter-Korean military conf lict. Kim also expected South Korea to take the initiative in promoting regional cooperation, raise its diplomatic status by adopting soft-power diplomatic techniques, and ultimately increase its power in persuading other countries to adopt a similar agenda. The historic South-North summit in June 2000 gave new momentum for regionalism as the four great powers, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia, increased their efforts to improve relations with the North. North Korea’s inclusion in the ARF as the twenty-third member in July 2000 provided the long-awaited opportunity to facilitate multilateral talks on Northeast Asian security issues by establishing a subregional Northeast Asia Security Forum within the ARF framework.34 A few months after the summit, talks on railroad construction and energy pipelines through North Korea became more earnest, serving as another impetus toward regionalism. Linking the process of Korean reunification and East Asian regionalism,35 Kim’s regional initiatives were tied

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to South Korea’s security imperatives, particularly in the context of inter-Korean reconciliation. In fact, such reconciliation—especially among South Korea, Japan, and China—was a prerequisite for maximizing the achievements from the Sunshine Policy. Therefore, Kim scurried to raise the global standing and regional influence of South Korea so as to convince the international community to support North Korea’s economic opening and the inter-Korean reconciliation process, as well as East Asian community building. Second, the 1997 Asian financial crisis, which hit South Korea during the last months of Kim Young-sam’s tenure, provided strong impetus to strengthen regional cooperation efforts and thus fostered the common perception that East Asia needed to institutionalize these to preempt or cope with similar problems that could reemerge. Kim Dae-jung stressed how closely the financial crisis was connected to the regional economy, acknowledging the deepening of economic f lows in East Asia, not only in terms of trade and financial exchanges but also in interstate policy coordination for building an economic safety net at the intraregional level.36 Therefore, it was natural for him to actively seek leading roles in ASEAN 1 3, including in the 1 3 separate sessions that became institutionalized in 1999, two years after the larger organization’s first meeting.37 Urging the ten ASEAN countries and three Northeast Asian states to integrate as one entity, Kim sought a regional arrangement that would prevent the recurrence of another financial crisis. Kim Dae-jung was enthusiastic about East Asian regional cooperation, as seen in his initiatives on the EAVG in 1999 and EASG in 2000. As a panel under ASEAN 1 3 without formal government representation, the EAVG was able to produce mid-term and long-term action plans and feasible policy guidelines aimed at building a foundation for regionalism. It emphasized the ultimate goal of creating an EAC, transforming the ASEAN 1 3 summit into an EAS. The EASG, which consisted of government officials, worked as a follow-up group to assess the recommendations of the EAVG’s Final Report and review the possibility of establishing an EAS. Third, Kim Dae-jung’s initiatives on East Asian regionalism did not run into U.S. resistance in contrast to past cases. One possible reason is that the United States preferred a close ally like South Korea—that neither has the power that Japan has in the region, nor the tendency to follow Malaysia’s path of anti-Americanism—to take the initiative in creating a regional cooperation framework if such a process was becoming inevitable. In fact, Kim’s vision of inter-Korean reconciliation and

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East Asian cooperation was developed based on the assumption that there would be solid alliance coordination with the United States, which respected South Korea’s liberal values.38 Fourth, Kim’s new approach for improving relations with Japan served as an important catalyst for putting forward a vision of regional community building. His visit to Japan in October 1998 achieved a breakthrough in relations, leading the two nations to decide to boost cultural exchanges and develop closer ties. As they agreed on a set of principles—open regionalism, “functional” cooperation in the economic, cultural, and environmental areas, and respect for the ideals of a liberal democracy—in the midst of increasing global economic liberalization, they shared a strong incentive to strengthen regional cooperation. Fifth, Kim Dae-jung’s personal inclinations and political orientation were also related to the progress that he made in pursuing East Asian regional cooperation. Among regional leaders, he was the one to express his perceptions of the region in the most systematic manner. First, he had already conceived of the East Asian region within the context of the U.S.-centered cold war system during the 1960s. In particular, he saw that the nucleus of U.S. policy toward East Asia was Japan and tried to understand ROK-Japan relations at the regional level in a manner consistent with that fundamental reality. Kim Dae-jung had also once tried to combine realism (establishing an anticommunist bloc against China) and idealism (apologizing for historical issues and mutual equality) in pursuit of fully normalized ROK-Japan relations. His visit to Tokyo in 1998 could be understood within the latter context. Of course, events demonstrated that engagement with China would be necessary and that South Korea could not play a leading role while competing against China and Japan. It had to try to bridge the gap between them on the basis of trust from both sides. Many of Kim’s ideas were already well ref lected in his congressional speeches during the 1960s, suggesting that the active regional strategy that he adopted after his inauguration had its roots in the ideals he articulated three decades earlier. 39 Kim Dae-jung’s East Asian regionalism, arguably, contributed to some extent to South Korea’s improved relations with North Korea. In particular, the South’s economic prowess was sufficient to lure China into closer ties, reshaping the triangle that would play an important role in inf luencing the North’s behavior. In addition, Kim’s personal character also facilitated this process. As can be seen, he wished to lead East Asian regionalism (including the establishment of a community) and wanted to be the first Korean president to attend the first EAS; yet, his

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personal desire and passion also suggested impatience in the face of hurdles to building a regional community. The government-led EASG was supposed to be established after the success of the nongovernmental EAVG, but he initiated the EASG when the EAVG process was still ongoing in the hope of accelerating the pace of community building.40 Kim’s vision for creating an EAC was directly related to his promotion of greater cooperation in Northeast Asia. The geopolitical environment in which South Korea is surrounded by four superpowers limited its capacity to pursue a regional community. Efforts to forge a cooperative, strategic, prosperous environment based on the South’s economic power and enhanced diplomatic capability were hindered by such geopolitical conditions. Realizing such goals was beyond the control of its president. The domestic situation also served as a constraint on Kim’s efforts to improve relations between the two Koreas and to pursue regionalism, which after seeming to sail smoothly during the first half of his term, were complicated in the second half due to the scandal that arose after the exposure of his secret payment of perhaps $500 million to North Korea and other corruption scandals. Kim’s failure to achieve bipartisan support for the Sunshine Policy gave rise to the expression “Nam-Nam galdung,” or South-South conf lict regarding North Korean policies.41 Another problem was Kim’s inclination to see improving relations between the two Koreas and regionalism as one. At the end of his term, the North Korean nuclear issue exploded into a tense international standoff, making difficult further moves to take the lead in advancing regional goals. Roh Moo-hyun’s Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative for Peace and Prosperity Roh Moo-hyun aimed to strengthen Kim Dae-jung’s policy for “East Asia,” also joining in multilateral efforts to expand the ASEAN 1 3 framework to the EAS. Yet Roh’s strategic orientation has been more directed toward Northeast Asia, as represented in his foreign policy slogan of making Korea the “Central State of Northeast Asia.” This was later revised as the “Hub of Northeast Asia” in the wake of diplomatic controversies over the use of the term “central state.” At his inauguration Roh announced the Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative for Peace and Prosperity and as a first step, the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Business Hub was launched in April 2003. The committee was designed to establish financial networks,

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attract foreign investment, and advance cooperation in developing the energy and railway sectors within the region, thus concentrating on items related to prosperity. In June 2004 Roh changed its name to the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative (Dongbukka sidae wiwonhoi) to expand its role beyond the economic arena and to formulate “a long-term vision and strategy for promoting a peaceful and prosperous Northeast Asia in the 21st century.”42 To realize such a vision, the committee suggested that Korea play the strategic role of a bridge linking continental and maritime powers, a hub of ideas and interregional networks, and a cooperator functioning as a catalyst for a regional community of peace and prosperity through a cooperative mechanism (e.g., a regional multilateral security cooperation regime and a Northeast Asian FTA). The principles for pursuing this vision are simultaneous linkage, multilayered (bilateral, subregional, regional, and multilateral) cooperation, open regionalism, and community building. 43 In the first half of his tenure Roh ambitiously pushed forward various projects to place Korea at the center of Northeast Asia, attempting to upstage Kim Dae-jung’s steps to put it in the spotlight. Various difficulties thwarted Roh’s aspirations. First, given the recent security developments in Northeast Asia—with the North Korean nuclear crisis, the realignment of U.S. troops and the planned reduction of these forces in Korea, China’s rise as a great power in the international community and as Korea’s largest trading partner (if not competitor), Japan’s inf lexibility in dealing with historical and territorial disputes with its neighbors, and Russia’s economic transformation and recovery and its growing strategic importance, especially in terms of energy security—Roh seems to have had little choice but to refocus his strategic thinking toward Korea’s neighbors and the United States, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Second, Roh’s prioritization on Northeast Asia appeared not to have been welcomed by its neighbors. Concerns have been raised regarding its compatibility with Japan’s desire to include the entire Asian region and China’s preference to encompass East Asia only. Furthermore, the concept of “Northeast Asian balancer” unveiled by Roh in February 2005 when he argued that Korea should play the role of a balancer or “honest broker” between China and Japan, and also between the United States and China, so as to reduce tensions in Northeast Asia, was received critically by several nations, particularly the United States.44 Although Roh did not suggest that South Korea side with China against the United States or Japan (he actually emphasized a strengthened Korea-U.S. alliance in various policy announcements), speculation

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arose that the “balancer policy” heralded Seoul’s intentions to adjust its longstanding alliance and shift its foreign policy in the direction of Beijing. Many argued that it is too weak to play such a big role in a turbulent environment dominated by traditional great powers.45 Third, debate in setting Korea’s geographic sphere for regional cooperation during the Roh administration has been mired in confusion about its identity: Are we talking about the broader Asia-Pacific region or a narrower East Asian (or even Northeast Asian) region? Those who promote broader regional cooperation such as the Asia-Pacific are hesitant about pursuit of the EAC. There were conflicting views at the end of 2005, toward APEC in Busan in November vis-à-vis the new EAS in Kuala Lumpur in December. In contrast, there was growing recognition of a need to develop a framework that is limited to the Northeast Asian region separate from ASEAN countries. The ARF has proven to be insufficient in dealing with sensitive issues in Northeast Asia as it still remains a loose forum for dialogue, not to mention the fact that it is an institution that was established under the initiative of ASEAN. Even in the nongovernmental CSCAP Korean representatives raise similar concerns. Therefore, there have been increasing appeals within the Northeast Asian region to develop an independent cooperation forum, which would address the security issues unique to the region, including the North Korean question. In 2003 establishment of the Six-Party Talks potentially provided the mechanism for this framework, and in 2007 its further division into five working groups suggested that it was becoming more institutionalized. Fourth, as nationalism has intensified in the region and Japan has antagonized Koreans, South Korea has increasingly demonized Japan. Roh and Koizumi both brought up history for their own political purposes, and after Abe took office there was little improvement.46 Sino-Korean relations have also been uneasy as China has attempted to validate academically and scientifically through the Northeast Asian Project its assertions about the ancient Goguryo kingdom, from which springs the basis of present Korean identity and legitimacy, being part of China. Fifth, domestic issues also play a role in discouraging Roh from trying to take a leading role in Northeast Asian cooperation, especially in the second half of his term. Popular frustration has mounted with the unification and security issues, and over the government’s perspective toward North Korea, the president’s frequent misstatements, his controversial real estate and educational policies, and other problems resulted in a loss of popularity, and fragmentation within the ruling party,

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including the president’s defection from it. As a consequence, Roh paid less attention to Northeast Asian cooperation, which was “apparently no immediate issue.” In addition, some critics claimed that the slogans and policies of his committee for the promotion of Korea-led Northeast Asian cooperation not only focused too narrowly geopolitically but also appeared to be idealist with weak realist considerations.47 Still, the new framework for security cooperation in Northeast Asia triggered by the Six-Party Talks may lead to a regular multilateral security forum. Some suggest that the notion of a Northeast Asian Multilateral Security Dialogue, or Northeast Asian Peace Community can be developed, modeled after the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although this would depend on whether the talks are successful in bringing about a multilateral solution to the North’s nuclear crisis, such expectations are totally new to the region. The second summit between the leaders of the two Koreas in October 2007 was regarded as good news by those who believe that inter-Korean reconciliation would have positive effects on the Six-Party Talks, particularly at the critical juncture after the first phase of the February 13 agreement had been concluded and the second stage requiring disabling of the North’s nuclear facilities and declaration of its nuclear assets was beginning. Some argued that, unlike the situation at the time of the first summit in 2000, the decision this time is affected by other nations and the state of the Six-Party Talks, thus raising hopes for resolving the nuclear issue and even ending the North Korean threat while advancing stability on the peninsula and in Northeast Asia. This optimism about the way forward, including a boost to regionalism, however, came amidst an uncertain outlook about whether North Korea would offer its counterparts a complete and correct declaration of all the nuclear development programs, materials, and infrastructure or facilities.48 The pursuit of a policy of “functional” regional cooperation has also been a characteristic of the Roh administration. Acknowledging the importance of continued close military and political relations with the United States, it aspired to increase South Korea’s influence among the great powers by promoting cooperation first in economic and cultural affairs as a catalyst for broader regional cooperation including in the political and diplomatic arenas. For instance, Roh’s strategy for Northeast Asia initiatives valued the expansion of social and cultural exchanges as the first step in establishing a regional “peace regime’ and “economic community.”49 However, such “functionalist” approaches may not prove effective in Northeast Asia, and the Korean peninsula in particular,

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where geopolitical complications and urgency prevail. Indeed, intensifying economic and social interdependence, people-to-people exchanges, and transboundary environmental problems alone have not generated the necessary conditions for a regional community. Therefore, consolidating confidence building measures in “more traditional” political and military sectors are crucial, demanding leaders with a strong commitment and the will to achieve political breakthroughs. Conclusion South Korea’s strategic thought towards regionalism was restrained by the cold war structure, though this did not entirely dislodge foreign policy considerations at the regional level. It often turned its limited capacity toward the region’s multilateral processes, which complemented its strong alliance with the United States. The ideological, political, and economic rivalry with North Korea in the international (and regional) community was also a factor restricting possible regional strategies. The record of regionalism in post–cold war Northeast Asia has been mixed, with some economic regionalization, but little political or security regionalism. Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam advocated regionalism, whether Asia-Pacific, East Asia or Northeast Asia oriented, in the context of internationalization and globalization campaigns. Kim Daejung aimed to create an EAC by engineering the ASEAN 1 3 formula, while Roh Moo-hyun put priority on addressing Northeast Asian issues. All the presidents advocated “open regionalism,” welcoming participant nations from the region and from other parts of the world, in order to promote peace and mutual prosperity in the region, but Korea’s regional idea has developed primarily from the perspectives of a geographic domain that includes Korea, Japan, and China. Their respective policies toward regionalism have been evaluated as inward-oriented and directly related to promoting the development of inter-Korean relations, while at the same time, adopting a protectionist approach in trade cooperation. Responding to Asian multilateral initiatives that exclude the United States as a member state has been a serious concern in Seoul’s strategic planning. So far, the United States has been stressing that “most problems [are] global and thus [lend] themselves to multinational rather than single country or small group solutions”50 as a means of expressing its reservations about evolving regionalism. It is difficult for Seoul to disregard these intentions because of the geopolitical reality in and

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around the peninsula. In particular, states in the post–cold war era still tend to collaborate with their “patron state” in situations of urgency. In fact, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, many states (e.g., the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) closely collaborated with the United States on a bilateral basis rather than within a regional framework (the EU) in order to respond to the threat of terrorism. The response of states also demonstrates that religion and civilization do not replace realpolitik, that is, pragmatism, national interest, and the principles that have traditionally dictated international relations. International relations in Northeast Asia can be characterized by the difficulty of enhancing integration through cooperation in areas of “low politics” that would eventually lead to cooperation on issues of “high politics.” As was argued by Stanley Hoffman, the anticipated “spill-over” effects of functionalist integration efforts to other issue areas are impeded by nationalistic aspirations and interest-centered state behavior.51 While economic regionalism has developed to some extent in post–cold war Northeast Asia amid increased hopes for a more integrated community, there has been little progress on political or security regionalism, as evidenced by the rocky bilateral relations of states triggered by past history issues and territorial disputes. This confirms that there are limits in applying the functionalist approach in the Northeast Asian region. Despite various obstacles to the development of regionalism, evolution in the institutional design of regional cooperation efforts is an irreversible trend in Northeast Asia. It is, thus, encouraging to note that the new leaders Fukuda and Lee Myung-bak seek stronger ties with Asian neighbors both bilaterally and multilaterally. This trend suggests that cooperation efforts will be encompassed within a bi-multilateral cooperation framework, a multilateral mechanism that will complement existing bilateral relations and alliances. More than 66 percent of the South Korean people believe that a regional community should be established in Northeast Asia.52 Such domestic support can encourage the government to continue to give regional multilateral cooperation a place in its strategic thinking, but this should be based on prudence while maintaining South Korea’s alliance with the United States. Lee begins his presidency with a pledge for a “greater Asian diplomacy.” His notion of an “Asian cooperative network” is to enrich South Korea’s relations with other Asian states and to serve as a bridge between Asia and the rest of the world. One plan is to expand cultural exchanges, beginning with China and Japan, as South Korea tries to position itself as a leader through the Korean wave, the IT industry, and cultural

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diplomacy. He has also proposed an “energy silk road” initiative, which demonstrates the pragmatic character of his regional plans. No matter how eager Lee is to develop his regional strategy, it is clear that he will not do so at the cost of the bilateral relationship with the United States. Regionalism remains a goal for South Korea, but it will not be allowed to supersede high priority objectives centered on the United States, North Korea, and triangular relations with China and Japan. Notes 1. Gilbert Rozman, “Regionalism in Northeast Asia: Korea’s Return to Center Stage,” in Charles K. Armstrong, Gilbert Rozman, Samuel S. Kim, and Stephen Kotkin, eds., Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism inNortheast Asia (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), pp. 151–66; Shin-wha Lee, “South Korea’s Strategy for Inter-Korean Relations and Regional Security Cooperation,” in Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya, eds., Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), pp. 106–27. 2. Shin-wha Lee, “South Korea’s Strategy,” pp. 106–27. 3. “Joint Efforts Urged to Promote China-Japan Relations,” Xinhua, December 24, 2007 (http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-12/12/ content_6317129.htm). 4. Donald S. Zagoria, “The Future of the Bilateral Alliances: US-Japan and US-Republic of Korea,” Trilateral US-Japan-ROK Track II Conference, Conference Report, October 3, 2005. 5. Ralph Cossa, US-Korea-Japan Relations: Building toward a “Virtual Alliance” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS, 1999). 6. Mitchell B. Reiss, “Japan II: A Path to East Asian Stability,” International Herald Tribune, June 22, 2002 (http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/06/22/ edreiss_ed3_.php accessed on September 9, 2007). 7. Gilbert Rozman, “Regionalism in Northeast Asia,” pp. 151–66. 8. Chung-in Moon and Taehwan Kim, “South Korea’s International Relations: Challenges to Developmental Realism,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., The International Relations of Northeast Asia (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), p. 251. 9. Gilbert Rozman, “Regionalism in Northeast Asia,” pp. 151–66. 10. Yong-hwa Chung, “Hanguk oe jiyok insik gwa gusang: Dongyang pyonghwa gusang,” in Sohn Yol, Chung Yong-hwa, Park Myoung-rim, Cho Young-nam, and Park In-hui, eds., Dongasia wa jiyokjuoi (Seoul: Jishik madang, 2006), Ch. 2. 11. East-West Center, “Asia in Search of an Identity,” East-West Wire, July 26, 2006 (http://www.eastwestcenter.org/news-center/east-west-wire/

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13.

14. 15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

20.

21. 22. 23.

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archived-news-wires/?class_call=view&news_ID=342&mode=view accessed on December 9, 2007). Mohan Malik, “The East Asia Summit: More Discord than Accord,” YaleGlobal, December 20, 2005 (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display. article?id=6645 accessed on December 5, 2007). Geung-chan Bae, “Je1cha Dongasia jongsang hoioe (EAS) gaechoi jonmang mit gwaje,” Presidential Report, 2005 (http://www.cwd.go.kr/cwd/kr/ common/download.php?id=f518829918419d71b4da5e32 accessed on December 7, 2007). Dong-yong Yum, “21segi Dongbukka gukjae jilso wa jonmang,” Sasang, Vol. 55 (Winter 2002), pp. 30–56. Christopher M. Dent, “Introduction: Northeast Asia-A Region in Search of Regionalism?” in Christopher M. Dent and David W. F. Huang, eds., Northeast Asian Regionalism: Lessons from the European Experience (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), p. 1. Björn Hettne, “Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia,” in Toshio Tanaka and Takashi Inoguchi, eds, Globalism and Regionalism: Proceedings in Global Seminar, ‘96 Shonan Session (Hayama, Japan: September 2–6, 1996), p. 8. The Hallstein Doctrine, named after Walter Hallstein, was a key in the foreign policy of West Germany between 1955 and 1969, giving it the exclusive right to represent the entire German nation, and with the exception of the Soviet Union, it would not establish or maintain diplomatic relations with any state that recognized East Germany. This doctrine was abandoned with the adoption of ostpolitik by Chancellor Willy Brandt, which resulted in mutual recognition between East and West Germany as two states. See “Hallstein Doctrine,” from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallstein_Doctrine accessed on December 2, 2007). Yoo Sok-yeol, “ASEAN chaeje wa Hanguk oigyo oe hyangbang,” Bukhan, Vol. 71, No. 11 (November 1977), pp. 118–27. Chris Braddic, “Japan, Australia and ASPAC: A Cooperative Security Framework,” Australian National University(ANU) Seminars and Events, October 14, 2005 (http://asianstudies.anu.edu.au/calendar/view_entry. php?id=223&date=20051014 accessed on December 4, 2007). “President Nixon’s Speech on ‘Vietnamization,’ November 3, 1969,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–09. Victor Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999). Jae Ho Chung, “South Korean Strategic Thought toward China,” ch. 7 this book. Yoo Sok-yeol, “ASEAN chaeje wa Hanguk oigyo oe hyangbang,” pp. 118–27.

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24. Yung-Hwan Jo, “Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia and Japan’s Role,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 30, No. 3 (August 1968), pp. 780–97. 25. Björn Hettne, “Globalization, the New Regionalism and East Asia,” p. 8. 26. Byung-Joon Ahn, “South Korean-Soviet Relations: Contemporary Issues and Prospects,” Asian Survey, Vol. 31, No. 9 (September 1991), p. 817. 27. Beom-shik Shin, “Bukbang jongchaek gwa Hanguk-Soryon/Rosia gwangye,” Segye jongchi, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2002), p. 291. 28. Martin Rudner, “APEC: The Challenges of Asiase Pacific Economic Cooperation,” Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2 (May 1995), pp. 403–37. 29. Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea, NEASED (Northeast Asia Security Dialogue), Oigyo tongsang yongo sajon (http://61.72.226.18/ MofaDic.nsf/webview_07/824504395A852918492567040023631A?Open Document accessed on November 30, 2007). 31. Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 153–85. 32. “Asean13 jongsang hoioe gaehwang,” Chongwadae Briefing (http://english. president.go.kr/cwd/kr/diplomacy/2004_11/index_04.html accessed on December 2, 2007). 33. Robert Sutter, “China, Asia, and Globalization” (http://www.ndu. edu/inss/symposia/topical2001/sutterpaper.htm accessed on December 6, 2007). 34. Ralph A. Cossa, “North Korea’s Coming Out: Party Continues,” The Korea Times, July 24, 2000. 35. Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization, Ch. 6. 36. East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity and Progress (Seoul: EAVG, 2001). 37. “ASEAN Plus Three Cooperation” (http://www.aseansec.org/16580.htm accessed on November 29, 2007). 38. Scott Snyder, “Korean Strategic Thought toward Asia in the Kim Dae-jung Era,” ch. 4 this book. 39. Park Myung-rim, “Hanguk oe jiyok insik gwa gusang: Kim Dae-jung oe sarye,” in Sohn Yol, Chung Yong-hwa, Park Myoung-rim, Cho Young-nam, and Park In-hui, eds., Ch. 3. 40. This assessment was made by the author based on her working experience for the EAVG as the chair’s advisor. 41. “Poyong jongchaek ijen no, jonmung adul sae taebuk jongchaek jaesi,” Dailian, February 5, 2007 (http://news.media.daum.net/society/ others/200702/05/dailian/v15626113.html accessed on December 4, 2007).

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42. Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperative Initiative, “Chairman’s Message” (http://www.nabh.go.kr/english/about/greeting. html accessed on November 27, 2007). 43. Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperative Initiative, “Goals and Principles: Building Peaceful and Prosperous NEA Community” (http:// www.nabh.go.kr/english/policy/vision.html accessed on November 29, 2007). 44. Zhiqun Zhu, “South Korea as Northeast Asia’s Honest Broker,” Asia Times (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/GD20Dg01.html accessed on December 4, 2007). 45. Lee Jang-gyu, “Dongbukka gogan gukkaga doeja,” JoongAng ilbo, April 12, 2005 (http://article.joins.com/article/article.asp?total_id=15928 accessed on December 8, 2007). 46. Gilbert Rozman and Shin-wha Lee, “Unraveling the Japan-South Korea ‘Virtual Alliance’: Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of Conf licting Regional Strategies,” Asian Survey, Vol. 46, No. 5 (September/ October 2006), pp. 761–84. 47. “Roh Moo-hyun jongbugga amatua jongburanni” (http://blog.chosun. com /blog.log.v ie w.screen?blog Id=2682& log Id= 438728 acce ssed on December 3, 2007). 48. “Disarmament Documentation: US briefing on Six Party talks, December 6, 2007,” Evening Walk-Through at Six-Party Talks Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kerry Center Hotel Beijing, China December 6, 2007 (http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0712/ doc08.htm accessed on December 23, 2007). 49. Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Cooperative Initiative, “Peaceful and Prosperous NEA Community” (http://www.nabh.go.kr/ english/policy/community.html accessed on December 3, 2007). 50. “The White House Rejects Pyongyang’s Invitation for the Chief US Envoy to the Nuclear Talks to Visit the DPRK,” CanKor, No. 251, June 5, 2006. 51. Stanley Hoffman, “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western Europe,” Daedalus, No. 95 (1966), pp. 865–85. 52. Nae Young Lee, Hanul Chung, and Wonchil Chung, Global Views 2004 (Seoul: East Asia Institute, 2005) and updated information by CCGA/ EAI Global Views 2006, provided by Hanul Chung at East Asia Institute on December 24, 2007.

List of Contributors

Jong-Yun Bae is a research professor at the Kim Dae-Jung Presidential Library and Museum, Yonsei University and was a research associate at the Princeton Institute of International and Regional Studies, Princeton University. His interests include Korean foreign policy and decisionmaking, unification of the Korean peninsula, and regional integration. Jae Ho Chung is Professor of International Relations at Seoul National University and Founder of the Asian Network for the Study of Local China (ANSLoC). He is the author of Between Ally and Partner: KoreaChina Relations and the United States (2007) and editor of Charting China’s Future (2006). Kyudok Hong is Dean, College of Social Sciences, Sookmyung Women’s University. He is currently the President of the International Policy Studies Institute, Korea (IPSI-Kor) and Secretary General of the Korean Academic Council to the United Nations System (K ACUNS). He coedited Asia-Pacific Alliances in the 21st Century (2007). In-Taek Hyun is Director of Ilmin International Relations Institute and Professor of Political Science at Korea University. He is currently serving as Senior Member of the 17th Presidential Transition Team of the Republic of Korea. Shin-wha Lee is professor and chair of the department of political science and international relations, Korea University. She was special advisor to the United Nations Independent Inquiry on Rwandan Genocide and chair’s advisor to the East Asian Vision Group. Her numerous publications on nontraditional security issues cover environmental and human security themes, UN peacekeeping, and an East Asian security community. Gilbert Rozman is the Musgrave Professor of Sociology at Princeton University, where he has taught since 1970. Apart from this series, he

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List of Contributors

wrote the monograph Northeast Asia’s Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (2004) and also coedited Korea at the Center: The Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia (2006). Seong-Ho Sheen is Assistant Professor and Director of the International Cooperation Office at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, where he teaches East Asian Security and U.S.-Korea Relations. He published “Preempting Proliferation: PSI and Its Challenges,” Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (Winter 2004). Scott Snyder is Senior Associate in the International Relations program of The Asia Foundation and Pacific Forum CSIS based in Washington, DC. He served in Seoul as The Asia Foundation’s Korea representative and with the U.S. Institute of Peace and The Asia Society. He wrote Paved with Good Intentions: The NGO Experience in North Korea (coed., 2003).

Index

Abductions issue, 69, 88, 182, 186, 194 Abe Shinzo, 19, 114–15, 193–94, 198, 241 Afghanistan, 43, 206 Agreed Framework of 1994, 16, 59–62, 72–73, 78, 85, 94, 103, 137, 139, 189 Albright, Madeleine, 85, 103 Alliance with the U.S., 18, 20, 22–28, 225; impact of changes in, 34, 72, 80, 143, 183; need for, 4–7, 63–64, 140, 186, 225, 235, 243–44; tensions in, 102, 111–20, 157; versus national reconciliation, 56–57, 88, 102–3, 137–38, 195 Anti-Americanism, 21, 36–38, 102, 119–20, 142, 166, 192, 237; and victimization, 23; causes of, 23, 63 Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, 214 Anti-communism, 37, 46, 131, 133, 136, 146, 205, 230–32, 238; and its legacy, 14 Arc of freedom and prosperity, 6, 195 Armistice agreement, 59, 69 ASEAN, 43–44, 229–34 ASEAN + 3, 17, 26, 64, 71, 91, 191, 195, 197, 229, 237, 243 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 235–36, 241 Asia-Europe (ASEM) meetings, 92, 235 Asian Development Bank (ADB), 233 Asian financial crisis, 16–17, 24, 55–58, 70–71; and Japan, 25, 70, 87, 179, 190–91; impact of,

77–78, 81–82, 93, 164, 179, 237; recovery from, 139, 226 Asian Games, 13, 44, 158, 161 Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), 71, 190, 227 Asian Pacific Economic Caucus (APEC), 71, 105–6, 139, 215, 234–35, 241 Asia-Pacific Council (ASPAC), 231–33 Aso Taro, 6, 195 Australia, 195, 229, 231 Axis of evil, 103, 141, 198 Baekdu mountain, 109, 148 Balance of powers in Northeast Asia, 1, 4, 121, 220–21; goal of, 7, 186, 204, 210–11, 218; and regionalism, 8, 26, 92–93, 197 Balancer (gyunhyongja), 2–3, 19–20, 95, 110–17, 121–22, 198, 240–41 Basic Agreement of 1991, 15, 49, 52, 60, 65, 72, 82, 136–37, 141 BRIC countries, 212 Bush, George H.W., 24 Bush, George W., 11, 195; and nuclear crisis, 88, 105–10, 192–93, 198, 223; and Sunshine Policy, 18, 24, 73, 85–86, 94–96, 141, 191; unilateralism of, 19, 119, 142, 178, 218 Carter, Jimmy, 36, 38, 59, 62, 157, 183 Central state (jungshim gukka), 2–3, 71, 239

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Chaebol, 87 Cheney, Dick, 86 China, and June 4, 1989, 15, 46; economic integration with, 10, 14, 25, 62 , 78, 83, 110–12, 161–63; engagement of, 7, 50, 58, 156–59, 166–67, 238; influence of, 12, 16–18, 23, 26–28, 62, 89–91, 121; opening in 1971–72, 1, 39, 132–33, 139–40, 181, 185, 197, 231–33; regional hegemony of, 4–5, 104, 229; role in strategic areas, 25–26, 65–66, 149, 150–51, 159, 227 China’s rise, and South Korea, 2, 26, 51, 121, 139, 154, 199, 240; and the U.S., 165–67, 170, 221; deference to, 4, 28; fever, 156, 166; threat of, 190, 194 Cho Myong-rok, 85, 103 Chun Doo-hwan, 13–15, 23, 34–45, 233; and China, 142–44, and the cold war, 2, 134, 146; and North Korea, 63, 146; legitimacy of, 9, 145, 180–83 Clinton, Bill, 23–24; and China, 78, 89–90; and Japan, 63; and Kim Dae-jung, 18, 94–95, 140; and Kim Young-sam, 16, 60, 94, 138–39; and North Korea, 10, 59–61, 85–86, 103 Cold war impact, 1–3, 23, 146, 155, 167, 186, 204, 228, 230–33, 218, 224; end of, 6, 13–15, 46–47, 55, 95, 131, 136–37, 179, 183–86, 205–7, 234–35, 243; legacy of, 27, 81 Comfort women, 114, 196 Confidence-building measures, 5–8, 21, 243 Confucian thought, 34 Congress of the United States, 94, 114, 196 Cooperative security, 2–3, 47 Corruption, 15, 93

Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), 235, 241 Cultural diplomacy, 29, 244–45 Cultural opening to Japan, 87, 192, 238 Declaration of June 23, 1973, 49 Declaration of July 7, 1988, 49–51, 159 Declaration of nuclear assets, 109–10, 242 Demilitarized zone (DMZ), 21, 27, 45, 104, 116, 142; and Panmunjom, 155 Democratization of South Korea, 2, 13–14, 35–37, 45–49, 77, 136, 139, 169, 228; and civilian president, 55–56, 64, 138; and legitimacy, 10, and the U.S., 23–24; deepening of, 85, 97, 199 Deng Xiaoping, 46, 158 Denuclearization, as goal, 6, 29, 104–10, 132, 136, 142–48; and China, 170; as a condition, 3, 9, 12, 22, 25, 220 Dependency, 3–4, 9, 81, 138, 180, 184, 228, 230; and self-esteem, 153–54, 168–70; deepening of, 13, 22, 140, 182; economic, 39–40, 46, 48; goal of reducing it, 7, 25, 36–40, 133, 143, 155, 162; symbols of, 63 Dialogue vs. pressure, 7, 104, 109 Dictatorship, 7, 13, 23, 43, 180 Diplomatic cross-recognition, 39–40, 49–50, 145, 206–7 Diplomatic diversification (oigyo dabyonhwa), 2–3, 15, 50, 57, 155–59, 161–62, 225, 228, 232–34 Dokdo/ Takeshima, 68, 87–88, 97, 114, 189, 194, 226 East Asian Community (EAC), 6, 91, 226, 229–30, 236–43

Index East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), 227, 235 East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI), 62 East Asian Study Group (EASG), 91, 229, 237–39 East Asian Summit (EAS), 91, 195, 229–30, 239–41 East Asian Vision Group (EAVG), 91, 96, 229, 237–39 East Timor, 92 Eastern Europe, 51, 65, 159–61 Economic assistance to North Korea, 21, 83–84, 104–5, 109, 138–45; by China, 163 Economic growth, and legitimacy, 34, 41, 180, 232–35; priority of, 6, 50, 117, 133, 145 Economics, linked to politics, 34, 37, 41, 42, 47–48; separate from politics, 11, 83, 139 Elections, for president in South Korea, 8–9, 15, 21, 26–27, 36, 102, 146–47, 169; and new leadership, 2, 77; for National Assembly, 12, 84, 168 Electricity, 142, 204, 215 Energy, as Russian asset, 4, 86, 115, 204, 211–12, 215; diplomacy, 29; for North Korea, 21, 142, 144; security, 13, 240; silk road, 245 Environment, 58, 87, 92, 234, 243 Europe, 22, 40–41, 47, 86, 116, 146; European Union (EU), 92, 229, 234, 244 Export industries, breadth of, 6, 93 Family reunions, 39, 50, 85, 134, 140 Famine, 10, 17, 60–61, 77–78, 138, 188 Financial liberalization, 58, 93–94 Fishing, 44, 87, 109, 140, 155 Flying geese model, 180 Four-party talks, 17, 60, 66, 70, 89, 138; after 2007, 109, 145, 169 Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 25, 91–92, 111, 117, 120, 168, 196, 240

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Fukuda Takeo, 183 Fukuda Yasuo, 19, 25, 226, 244 Gaesung Industrial Complex, 104–9, 141–42 German reunification and ostpolitik, 49, 61, 75, 136 Globalization (segyehwa) or globalism, 2–3, 15, 57–58, 71, 87, 139, 188, 191; or internationalization, 8 Goguryo, 12, 26, 113–14, 167–68, 241 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 13; and normalization, 46, 48, 70, 185, 197, 203–6, 221 Grand National Party (GNP, or Hannara dang), 8, 21, 77, 166, 219–20 Greater Asian diplomacy, 29, 244 Guam Doctrine, 36, 40, 180, 183, 231 Gulf War, 186 Gumchang-ri, 72, 88–89 Gumgang mountain tourism, 18, 45, 76, 104–6 Gwangju massacre, 14, 23, 35, 38, 41, 159 Hallstein Doctrine, 231–32 Hanahoi, 56 Han Sung-joo, 57 Hashimoto Ryutaro, 67–68, 187, 189 Hill, Christopher, 97, 109–10 Hosokawa Morihiro, 68, 187 Hu Jintao, 170, 194, 214 Hub of Northeast Asia, 102, 110–11, 116, 121, 167, 204, 239–40 Human rights, 12, 23, 106, 119, 143, 186, 209, 234 Humanitarian assistance, of South Korea, 16, 21, 78–86, 105, 108, 138–40; by others, 16, 66, 95, 188; suspension of, 144 Humanitarian issues, 21, 41 Hyundai’s Chung Ju-young, 82, 141

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India, 43, 195, 212, 229 Intelligence, 14, 78, 82, 182, 209 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 59, 103, 109 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 16–17, 25, 70–71, 77, 94, 190–91 Iraq War, 24, 88, 120, 167 Japan, 67–70, 86–89, 114; and historical justice, 10, 16, 27, 117, 179–80, 188–89; and history, 79, 91, 93, 182, 187, 192, 194, 227, 241; and normalization talks with North Korea, 140, 183–85, 197; bargaining with, 37, 181–83; loans from, 37, 40, 42, 51, 65, 182–84; occupation by, 3, 111, 179, 187, 228; power of, 4, 226; reentering Asia, 2, 28; regional leadership of, 1, 13–14, 184; sanctions of, 129, 190; security ties to, 78, 140, 183, 188–92, 232 Japan-Soviet/Russian relations, 46, 182–83, 197, 204–7, 219 Jiang Zemin, 16–17, 65–66, 90, 139, 161 Johnson, Lyndon, 42 Joint Agreement of February 13, 2007, 5, 8, 20–21, 113, 242; as turning point, 9, 12, 108, 116–19, 144–46, 170, 194; phases 1–2, 8, 21, 109–10, 149, 196, 220, 242 Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000, 18, 87 Joint Statement of 2005, 142–43, 215; implementation of, 109 Josun era, 3, 168 Kaifu Toshiki, 185 KAL 007, 36 Kanemaru Shin, 69, 185 Kim Dae-jung, 15, 17–19, 23, 41, 69, 139–42, 183; agreement with Japan in 1998, 10–11, 25, 79–80, 86–89, 165, 189, 198; and

reciprocity, 83–85, 165; and Russia, 190, 208–12, 222; assertive policy of, 2, 80–82, 91–92, 236; vision of, 80–81, 86, 89, 91–92, 96–97, 237–39 Kim Il-sung, 14, 38, 41, 49, 56, 133–34, 141, 186, 206–8; death of, 59, 68, 71, 137, 188 Kim Jong-il, 11, 18, 62, 78, 148–49; and nuclear card, 19; and nuclear disablement, 21; and Putin, 210–13, 221; and summits, 85–86, 95, 194; boom, 141; trust of, 105, 137 Kim Jong-pil, 84 Kim Young-sam, 15–17, 23, 54–59, 137–39, 187; and China, 65–67, 89, 161–64; and Japan, 63–64, 67–70, 186–89; and nuclear crisis, 59–62; and Russia, 70–71, 203, 208; and the post cold war, 3, 55, 62–63, 235 Koizumi Junichiro, 11, 18–20, 88–89, 112, 114, 226, 241; and Bush, 93, 193–94, 198 Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA), 160 Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), 78, 138 Korean War, 6, 27, 63, 70, 109, 113, 118, 133, 139–40, 204, 217; and separated families, 37; end to, 3, 109, 146, 148, 230; records of, 137, 208 Korean wave, 26, 192, 196, 244–45 Koreans, in Japan (Jochongryon), 182; in Russia, 216 Kosovo War, 90, 140, 164 Labor disputes, 48, 85, 93 Lee Hoi-chang, 94 Lee Jong-seok, 104–7 Lee Myung-bak, 8–9, 21–22, 25, 29, 122, 149, 169, 196, 199, 244–45; election of, 3

Index Li In-mo, 57 Liberation Day speech 1996, 61, 138 Light-water nuclear reactors, 59, 78, 94 Lim Dong-won, 82, 87, 107 Mahathir Mohamad, 227 Malaysia, 43, 227, 231, 237 Mao Zedong, 141 Maritime vs. continental strategies, 6, 14, 195, 240 Middle East, 43, 47 Middle power, 4, 74, 92, 97–98, 111, 115, 170; and China and Japan, 28, 229; of Russia, 204–5, 218 Military, background of leaders, 34, 159; bases of the United States, 9, 22, 117–18; spending, 63–64, 72, 111, 117, 138, 181 Ministerial consultations, 85, 132–34 Ministry of National Defense, 117–18 Ministry of Unification, 82, 104–7, 121, 137 Missiles, defense, 164, 213; freeze of North Korea, 17, 95; threat of, 94; tests in 2006, 105, 144 Miyazawa Kiichi, 67, 186–87 Mori Yoshiro, 87 Multilateral regional security framework, 22, 51, 92, 116, 195, 209, 225, 242; and alliance framework, 5–6, 63, 95, 186, 232–36 Multipolarity, 64, 215 Murayama Tomiichi, 68, 140, 187, 190 Nakasone Yasuhiro, 180, 182 Nakhodka industrial park, 216 National Assembly, 12, 19, 56, 92, 156, 168 National identity, 7, 12–13, 111–14, 120, 154, 162, 193, 226, 241; Hanguknon, 184; and minjok, 57; and Nihonjinron, 184 National Security Council (NSC), 102, 104 National Security Law, 49

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Natural resources, 39, 43–44, 211 New diplomacy (shin oigyo), 1, 8, 57, 71, 229, 234–35 New Korea (shinhanguk), 56, 71 New Zealand, 229, 231 Nixon, Richard, 36, 40, 183 Nobel Peace Prize, 86, 92, 97 Non-government organizations (NGOs), 83, 95 Nordpolitik, 2–3, 23, 46–52, 65, 72, 135, 159–60, 187, 205; as turning point, 10, 14, 81, 229; significance of, 34, 84, 89, 179, 234; start of, 155–58, 184–85, 205, 232 Normalization of relations, and diversified options, 4, 10–11, 14, 46–48, 133–35; hopes for, 9, 38, 124, 164, 197; with China, 23, 65, 89, 139–41, 154–58, 169, 228, 231–32, 234; with Japan, 36–37, 41–42, 121, 178–83, 192; with Soviet Union, 65, 70, 155, 203–7, 221, 228, 234 North Korea, and regional competition, 1, 120, 231–33, 242; and Chun Doo-hwan, 134; and Kim pDae-jung, 139–41; and Kim Young-sam, 137–39; and Roh Moo-hyun, 103–10, 142–46; and Roh Dae-Woo, 134–37; and U.S. troop withdrawal, 40, 45, 148; armed provocations of, 143; cultural cooperation with, 25, 79; freedom of action of, 4; labor of, 209; peaceful coexistence with, 23, 38, 129–32; nuclear card of, 19, 22; options toward, 5–8, 12; subsidies to, 10, 211; threat of, 2–3, 6, 9, 34, 167, 190, 227; threat receding, 10, 63–64, 71, 159, 199; trade with, 96; views of, 129–32 North-South summit, and transfer of funds, 11, 80, 97, 141, 239; hopes for, 14, 20–21, 59, 96, 103, 139–40; of 2000, 11, 17, 79,

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North-South summit—continued 84–85, 90, 94–95, 130, 140–41, 165, 190, 236; of 2007, 8, 12, 22, 109–10, 117, 119, 132, 145, 148, 183, 242 Northeast Asian era, 2–3 Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative, 229–30, 239–42 Northeast Asian History Foundation, 114 Northeast China, 47, 216 Northern Limit Line (NLL), 109 Nuclear crisis, comparison of two, 142; impact of the first one, 3, 10, 15–16, 24, 55, 59–62, 71–72, 118, 131, 138, 163, 188, 235; impact of the second one, 1, 8, 96, 104–5, 130, 167, 193, 199, 212–13, 240 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 57, 59, 103, 125 Nuclear reactor shutdown and disablement, 21, 108–9, 145, 242 Nuclear test of 2006, 98, 119, 122, 144, 147, 170; responses to, 8, 220, 227 Nuclear weapons, program of South Korea, 38, 40, 51, 133, 142; start in North Korea, 50, 190 Nye Report, 63, 72 Obuchi Keizo, 79, 87, 97, 189 Oil, 43–44, 211; deliveries to the North, 109 Olympics in Seoul, 2, 9–10, 13, 44–47, 51, 158, 160, 226; preparations for, 37, 134, 205 Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD), 71, 235 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 242 Park Chul-un, 50, 159 Park Chung-hee, 34–43, 50, 63, 133, 146; and China, 154–57, 231–33;

and Japan, 180–83, 196–97; and the United States, 49 Peace dividend, 6–7 Peace regime or treaty, 21, 59–60, 83, 102–3, 107–10, 145–48, 196; and Roh’s legacy, 3, 116, 242 Perry, William and the Perry process, 10, 17, 24, 87, 94, 139–40, 190 Persian Gulf War, 24 Philippines, 43, 160, 231 Pipelines, 92, 196–97, 236 Powell, Colin, 86 Primakov, Evgeni, 71, 140, 208 Progressive-conservative split, 12, 15, 22, 49, 94, 122, 138, 148, 186, 192–93, 198–99; nature of rift, 2, 7–8, 18–19; and elections, 26–27 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 106, 143 Public opinion, 35, 48–49, 113, 120, 143, 156, 163, 244; and China, 167–68; and Japan, 87, 160, 180–81, 185 188–96; and North Korea, 80, 83–85, 97, 106–9, 119, 134–41; importance of, 2 Putin, Vladimir, 11, 18–19, 115, 203, 210–20 Railroads, linking North and South, 21, 143–44, 148, 236; iron silk road or Trans-Siberian-Korean (TSK), 92, 142, 214–17 Rangoon bombing, 38 Reagan, Ronald, 23–24, 36, 42–43, 51, 134, 182 Realism, as a standard, 2, 182, 230, 238, 242 Red Cross, 39, 156 Regionalism, and South Korean initiative, 11, 91–93, 188, 197; as policy challenge, 2, 25–28, 193; emergence of, 6, 17, 57, 185, 225–28; interest in, 71, 191, 204, 221, 230–45

Index Reunification, 2; and competition of North and South, 6, 136–37, 181; and Koreanization, 3, 206; and regime collapse, 61, 117, 137; costs of, 117; path to, 11, 27, 79, 83, 106–7, 145, 210, 220; proposals of 1970s-80s, 39, 44–45, 133–36, 221; shifting views of, 27–28, 50, 81, 116, 141, 204 Revisionism, 2, 7, 11, 28, 192, 199 Rhee, Syngman, 37, 40, 133, 140 Roh Moo-hyun, 19–22, 101–3, 219, 239–42; and Bush, 213; and economic interdependence, 136, 220, and reciprocity, 7, 12, 108–9, 119, 142–45; boldness of, 2–3, 20, 119–22, 194, 242–42; Japan policy of, 192–96, 227, 241; Northeast Asian priority of, 110–17, 243 Roh Tae-woo, 35–36, 45–52, 72; and China, 159–61; and end of the cold war, 2, 14, 61, 135, 184; and Japan, 184–86; and North Korea, 138, 146, and Russia, 205–7; legitimacy of, 10, 15, 136, 145 Russia, imperialist history of, 216–17; loans to, 48, 206–7, 211, 221; power of, 4, 60, 218, 240; regional aspirations of, 28, 204–5, 212; relevance of, 16, 58, 70–71, 78, 92, 115, 208, 217; variations in responses to, 7, 29, 203, 220–21 Russian Far East, 92, 207–9, 215–16; and Siberia, 204, 211–12 Sadae, 3, 111, 113, 168 Self-reliant defense (jaju gukbang), 8, 94, 111–12, 117–22, 143, 232 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 195 Singapore, 43 Sino-Japanese-South Korean triangle, 54, 67, 93, 101, 197, 226, 243; diplomacy of, 17, 28, 46, 90–91,

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112–13, 158,187; economics of, 6, 110–11 Sino-Soviet/ Russian ties, 15, 41, 46–51, 147, 204–6, 228; and strategic partnership, 64, 71, 210, 221 Sino-U.S. relations, 66–67, 78, 90, 121, 160, 181, 197, 231–32 Six-Party Talks, coordination in, 20–21, 25, 108–10, 148–49, 170; and Japan, 195–98; impact of, 5, 242; rapprochement of U.S. and China in 2007, 6, 144; and Russia, 203, 213–20; working groups, 6, 21–22, 144–45, 242 Soft power, 26, 29, 235–36 Soft-landing vs. hard-landing, 60–62, 68, 140 South Korea, as driving force, 3–4, 8, 15, 22, 105–6, 110, 115, 160–61, 235; economic miracle, 2, 14, 38, 134–38, 169, 184, 186; generational differences, 19, 27, 142, 166; regional differences, 18, 27, 78–79 South-North Joint Communique (Nambuk gongdong sungmyong) of 1972, 39, 133, 138, 140, 232 South-South conflict (Nam-Nam galdung), 80, 239 South-South relations, 13, 43–44, 49 Southeast Asia, 13, 43, 49, 150, 229–31, 234 Soviet Union, and end of cold war, 1, 133–34; and airplane downing, 143; as a threat, 5, 23; collapse of, 55, 204–5, 211, 220 Sunshine Policy (poyong jongchaek), 1–2, 17–18, 104, 164–65, 179; as turning point, 9, 116–7; meaning of, 11, 79–86, 139–40, 236; responses to, 89–90, 94, 189, 191, 208 Taepodong missile launch in 1998, 10, 24, 94, 140, 189

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Taiwan, 48, 64, 112, 139, 154–58, 169, 190, 231; abandonment of, 15; crisis of 1996, 17, 6–67 Terror sponsoring states and Trading with the Enemy Act, 110 Terrorist bombing in 1987, 44 Thailand, 43 Three-party talks of 2003, 169 Tiananmen, 15, 160, 206 Tributary system, 3, 228 Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), 87, 191, 227 Unification through absorption, 11, 107, 116–18, 136–42, 188 United Nations, 156, 186, 215; simultaneous entry into, 15, 23, 40, 43–49, 133–36, 185, 206, 228, 231 United Nations Security Council, 235; and Japan, 115, 193–94; approved sanctions of, 5, 20, 144; resolutions, 62, 106 United States, abandonment by, 38, 72; and coordination over North Korea, 60–64, 85–88, 94–96; and regionalism, 6, 244; economic pressure of, 16, 24, 184–85, 234; sanctions for counterfeiting, 143–46; strategic flexibility of, 4, 108–10, 117–20, 169; troop realignment of, 16, 38–39, 157, 196, 232, 240; unilateralism of, 188 United States-Japan alliance, 64–69, 114, 120, 139, 181–83, 188; and

alliance triangle, 6, 25, 29, 191–93, 197–98, 227–28, 232, 238; and defense guidelines, 190 Universal values, 6, 23, 29, 119, 192–93, 195, 209, 234 Uranium enrichment, 110 Uri Party, 12, 19, 166 Vietnam War, 36–42, 156–57, 180, 231 Walker, Richard, L., 23, 51 War on terror, 27, 215; and U.S. response, 2, 103–4 118, 141, 198, 244 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 27, 83, 106, 215 Wen Jiabao, 115 World Cup in 2002, 68, 87, 93, 191–92, 226 World Trade Organization (WTO), 78, 90, 187, 209, 235 World War II, 3, 196, 198, 228 Wu Yi, 89 Yasukuni Shrine, 27, 88–89, 112, 114, 189, 192, 226 Yeltsin, Boris, 70, 140, 203, 207–8, 221 Yongbyon nuclear facilities, 103, 108–10 Yushin (Revitalized Reform) Constitution, 39, 51 Zeng Qinghong, 226 Zhu Rongji, 90