Reason and Commitment Reviewed Work(s): Cognition and Commitment in Hume's Philosophy by Don Garrett David Owen Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 62, No. 1. (Jan., 2001), pp. 191-196. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28200101%2962%3A1%3C191%3ARAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research is currently published by International Phenomenological Society.
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Philosophy and Phenonzenological Research Vol. LXII, No. 1 , January 2001
Reason and Commitment DAVID OWEN
Universiv of Arizona
Don Garrett's strategy, in Cognition and Conzrizitment in Hurne's Philosophy, is to reconcile apparent contradictions in Hume's theory. Two examples occur early in Part I of Book I of the Treatise. Hume argues that all ideas are derivable from impressions (what Garrett calls "the Copy Principle"). Garrett defends Hume's rigorous attempt to found this principle empirically, taking Hume at his word when he describes it as "the first principle I establish in the science of human nature." (T 7)' Notoriously, Hume almost immediately provides a counter-example: suppose a person had experienced all shades of blue except one, and further suppose they were presented with a table of all these shades, with a blank where the missing shade ought to be. Clearly, Hume says, such a person could supply "from his own imagination" the relevant idea, without having first experienced the corresponding impression. This presents an apparent counter-example to the Copy Principle. Another example occurs a little later. Hume claims that "Where-ever the imagination perceives a difference among ideas, it can easily produce a separation." (T 10) Distinct ideas are separable. Garrett calls this "the Separability Principle", and it is almost as important for Hume as the Copy Principle. For one thing, it shows that Hume's theory of ideas, though heavily influenced by Locke, is importantly different from the earlier theory: Locke thought there were some necessary connections between distinct ideas, connections that could not be reduced to identities or partial id en ti tie^.^ More importantly, the separability of distinct ideas is the primary ground of Hume's conceivability criterion of demonstration, crucially employed in the arguments concerning the causation, necessary connection and induction. But Hume seems to present an apparent counter-example to the Separability Principle as well. When discussing distinctions of reason, Hume admits that we can distinguish between "the
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All references to Hume's A Treririse qf Hurrlnn Nnture are in the form "T n", where "n" is the page number in the Selby-Bigge edition, 2 n d edition edited by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987). Locke didn't think there were many "visible connexions" of this sort, but he did thlnk there were a few. F ~ g u r esupposes extension, for instance, and the communication of motion by impulse supposes solidity. See Locke's Essn)' IV.iii.14. See also IV.iii.15 and IV.vii.5.
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figure and colour " of a body. (T 24) but he denies that these ideas are separable. When we perceive a globe of white marble, "we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos'd in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the colour from the form." (T 25). Nonetheless, if we compare this impression to a globe of black marble and cube of white, "we find two separate resemblances, in what formerly seem'd, and really is, perfectly inseparable." These are important problems, and Garrett provides significant solutions to them. His solutions are based on a highly original account of Hume's notion of a simple idea. Garrett emphasizes that Hume's account of simple ideas allows "natural resemblances among simple perceptions." (p. 51).3 That is to say, two simple perceptions can resemble each other even though, ex hypotlzesi, they could contain no parts in common. "Blue and green are different simple ideas, but are more resembling than blue and scarlet; tho' their perfect simplicity excludes all possibility of separation or distinction." (T 637) As Garrett says: Given the existence of natural resemblances among simple perceptions, Hume has available a plausible explanation for a subject's ability to form a simple idea of the missing shade of blue in the absence of an exactly corresponding ~mpression:the subject has instead a very large number of simple impressions that naturally resemble the missing impression very closely and are even arranged in such an order as positively to poinr, given the nature of the resemblances, to the content of the misslng impression. (p. 5 1)
It is widely held that Hume's distinction between simple and complex ideas comes straight from Locke. Locke held that a simple idea consisted of "one uniform appearance... in the mind.. . and is not distinguishable into different Ideas" (Essay II.ii.1) Upon the appearance of a black globe and a white cube, Garrett correctly says that Locke would list the following among the simple ideas of sensation that we would receive: black, white, space, extension, rest, existence, unity, and (at least sometimes) figure." (p. 60) Now if we take this to be Hume's view as well, it looks as if Hume is saying that, in perceiving the white globe of marble, 1) we receive the simple impression of white, 2) we receive the simple impression of figure, 3 ) these impressions are distinct, and 4) these impressions are inseparable. But this contradicts the Separability Principle. Garrett's solution is to deny that Hume's enumeration of the simple impressions received upon perceiving a black globe and a white cube is anything like Locke's. Instead, when asked to enumerate the simple impressions, Hume would reply that there are quite a large number-a definite, finite number. but one not deducible from the information given-of simple impressions. These simple impressions will, however, be of just two kinds: simple impressions of a shade of white and simple impressions of a shade of black. (p 61)
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Bare page references In the text are to pages of Garrett's Cognltlon and Commltnlerzt
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A uniform appearance of colour is not a simple impression for Hume. Such an appearance is made up of a finite number of irlinima visibilia, and it is these that are Hume's simple impressions of colour. And there is no simple impression of "globeness" or "cubeness" or even "extension". These impressions are composed of a finite number of simple impressions, either visual or tactile. How does this save the Separability Principle? The complex impression of the black globe of marble is made up out of simple impressions of black, while the complex impression of the white cube is made up out of simple impressions of white. In neither case is the shape separable from the complex array of colour. Now suppose we form a particular idea of a globe from the first of these impressions, and a particular idea of white from the second. Appealing to Hume's theory of abstract ideas, another topic on which Garrett sheds much illumination, the first idea can serve as an abstract idea of globeness, while the second can serve as an abstract idea of white. The first idea will thus resemble other ideas in the revival set of the abstract term "globe", which might include the idea of a globe of white marble, while the second idea will resemble other ideas in the revival set of the abstract term "white", which might also include the idea of a globe of white marb1e.j The two resemblances are explained in terms of the distinct revival sets of ideas associated with different abstract terms, without contradicting the Separability Principle: When we wou'd consider only the figure of the globe of white marble, we form in reality an idea both of the figure and colour, but tacitly carry our eye to its resemblance with the globe of black marble: And in the same manner, when we wou'd consider its colour only, we turn our view to its resemblance with the cube of white marble.. . A person, who desires us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble without thinking on its colour, desires an impossibility; but h ~ meaning s is, that we shou'd consider the colour and figure together. but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the globe of black marble, or that to any other globe of whatever colour or substance." ( T 25)
These topics illustrates a general feature of Garrett's book: Hume is here seen primarily as an inquirer into the nature and explanation of human cognitive capacities. Hume's science of human nature is 1 8 t h century cognitive science. Many have held that Hume should be seen more as a psychologist than as a philosopher, but it is has never been clear whether that claim amounts to anything more than pointing out Hume's determination not to go beyond experience in the science of human nature. Garrett gives content to the claim, not just by using the model of the cognitive scientist instead of psychologist, but also by grounding it in 1 7 t h and 1 8 t h century faculty "he
term "revival set" is Garrett's, introduced as a useful term in describing Hume's account of how particular ideas can serve as abstract ideas by being members of a set of ideas associated with an abstract term. Garrett makes good use of H u m ' s account of abstract ideas elsewhere, especially in Chapter 5, "Two Definitions of 'Cause"'.
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psychology. In the early modern period, the understanding was taken to be the faculty responsible for our cognitive activities. The objects of the understanding were ideas, with which various sub-faculties operated. For example, judgement formed propositions, known or believed to be true or false, out of ideas, while reason took the mind from one idea to another via some intermediary. Some philosophers, such as Descartes, thought that the understanding, or the intellect, operated best in isolation from other faculties such as the senses or the imagination. The intellect, he thought, had its own objects, and harm and error would result if these objects were confused with the ideas of the senses or imagination. Other philosophers, such as Locke, thought that the understanding had no unique objects, and that it operated, as did the imagination, only with those ideas provided by the senses and by internal reflection on its own activities. Garrett interprets all this in a bold fashion: Locke in effect denies the existence of the intellect, as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz describe that faculty, and he seeks instead to account for all human cognitive functions in terms of operations involving a single representational faculty that is very much like what they call the imagination. (p. 19)
The imagination is a faculty that doesn't produce ideas so much as manipulate the ideas it already has. Much the same can be said about the understanding: it perceives ideas, the connection between ideas, and the signification of signs, "though it be the two latter only that use allows us to say we understand." (Essay II.xxi.5) This leads to the view, more explicit in Hume than in Locke, that the understanding is not a separate faculty with its own objects; it is just a collection of activities or powers to manipulate ideas in the imagination. This interpretation of how Hume conceived of the understanding constrains how one interprets Hume's most famous argument, concerning induction or probable reasoning. Garrett argues that Hume, following Locke, thought that reason was the inferential faculty, i.e., that reason was the faculty that produces demonstrative and probable inferences, where "faculty of reason" is interpreted in much the same way as "faculty of the understanding" was in the last paragraph. But doesn't this make Hume's denial that we are determined by reason when we make probable inferences sound virtually selfcontradictory? How could Hume deny that probable inferences are not produced by the faculty that produces probable inferences? Here is Garrett's solution, based on consideration of several passages where Hume summarizes or re-states the conclusion of his famous argument: Hume should be interpreted quite literally, as making a specific claim, within cognitive psychology, about the relation between our tendency to make inductive inferences and our inferentiallargumentative faculty: he is arguing that we do not adopt induction on the basis of recognizing an clrgutnenr for its reliability, for the utterly sufficient reason that there is no argument ("reasoning" or "process of the understanding") that could have this effect.. . As a
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result, we find that we can literally "give no reason" for our making inductive inferences. (pp. 9 1-92)
As he goes on to say, whatever it is that determines us to make the transition, it is not "any piece of higher level reasoning: there is no argument that could lead us to accept the conclusion that inductive reasonings will be reliable if we did not already accept that conclusion in practice." (p. 92) This is an elegant, new and important interpretation of Hume's argument, and it has several advantages. Nonetheless, here are some considerations against it. One of the most striking aspects of Garrett's overall interpretation is that when Hume claims that in some matter we are not determined by reason, or that some class of mental phenomena are not derived from reason, he is not making any claim about justification or warrant. So for instance, concerning moral evaluations, when Hume argues that moral distinctions are not derived from reason, he is not arguing that they have no rational warrant; he is only arguing that they are not produced by the faculty of reason and that some other account of their origin must be produced. Again, when Hume argues that reason or the understanding, when it acts alone, entirely subverts itself, he is not arguing that all knowledge or belief is unjustified. He is arguing that the understanding, considered as functioning in isolation from the rest of our nature, is incapable of sustaining the beliefs we in fact have. Similarly, when Hume argues that we are not determined by reason when we make causal inferences, he is not arguing that such inferences are unwarranted or that the beliefs so produced are unjustified. He is arguing that a different account must be given of the origin of those beliefs. I think these are important and true claims about Hume's philosophy. So I don't think any interpretation of Hume's argument about induction that considers it as denying the availability of any higher order arguments about the reliability of induction can be right. That sounds too much like an argument about justification for me, and, I hope, for Garrett. One way of putting the difference between Garrett and me is as follows: the phrase "not determined by reason" is ambiguous. It might mean:
1) the transition, the movement of mind from the impression to the idea, is not an activity of the faculty of reason, conceived of in some particular way. Different people will have different views concerning the details of the relevant conception; I think it is the way Locke, and perhaps Descartes, conceived it, as the discovery and use of intermediate ideas which explain the transition. Others think it is a 'rationalist' conception, usually characterized in terms of deduction. Or it might mean:
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2) when we make the transition (whatever the mechanical details of it are), we are not caused to do so "by any piece of higher level reasoning: there is no argument that could lead us to accept the conclusion that inductive reasonings will be reliable if we did not already accept that conclusion in practice." (p. 92)
I take Hume to be claiming 1); Garrett takes him to be claiming 2). I think Hume is talking about the mechanism by which the idea of the unobserved is produced; Garrett thinks that Hume is talking about the lack of any argument to show that the mechanism, whatever it is, is ~ e l i a b l e . ~ My main objection to Garrett's interpretation is that he treats Hume as asking about the cause of our engaging in probable reasoning: what explains this fact? On this view, Hume denies that we make such inferences because we have some argument for their reliability. There is no such argument. S o why is it that we make them? Garrett rightly says that Hume, in his positive account, claims that "an instinctive idea-enlivening mechanism-which we share with the animals and is an example of "custom" or "habitn-leads us to project experienced constant conjunctions of events onto unobserved cases, and thereby to arrive at beliefs about those cases." (p. 94) It seems to me that this is indeed an answer to Hume's question, but that Hume's question is not what Garrett takes it to be. Hume's question is: how is it that we manage to make these inferences? It is not: what explains our engaging in probable reasoning, whatever the details of the mechanism of probable reasoning are? At the very least, according to G a i ~ e t tHume's , answer changes the subject. If Garrett is right, Hume's negative argument shows that we have no reason to put the transition-making mechanism into effect; there is no argument to show that it is reliable. But then why is it relevant to go into the details of just how we manage to make the transition and produce the belief? On the other hand, if Hume's negative argument was meant to show that faculty of reason, functioning as usually supposed, was incapable of explaining how it is that we make the transition, then Hume's appeal to the mechanism of the association of ideas is completely appropriate. Hume's argument concerns the details of how we are able to make the transition, not the reasons why we might make the transition. Garrett's book is a model of how to do history of philosophy. No one with any interest in Hume or the philosophical problems he raised could fail to learn from, and be enlightened by, it.
One of the main advantages of Garrett's interpretation is that it allows him to see Hume's use of "reason" as univocal. Other interpretations, including 1) above, require one to interpret Hume as meaning one thing by "reason" when he denies that we are "determin'd by reason" in probable reasoning, but mean something else later on in the T~.etrtise.S ee Barbara Winter, "Hume on Reason" Hilnle St~rdiesV , 1979, pp. 20-35.
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