Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 1

Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 1 Edited by Editor-in-Chief Jørgen S. Nielsen Edi...

Author: Jorgen S. Nielsen | Samim Akgonul | Nadia Jeldtoft | Brigette Marechal | Christian Moe

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Yearbook of Muslims in Europe

Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 1 Edited by Editor-in-Chief

Jørgen S. Nielsen Editors

Samim Akgönül Ahmet Alibašić Brigitte Maréchal Christian Moe Editorial Assistant

Nadia Jeldtoft

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2009

Published with the support of

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

ISSN 1877-1432 ISBN 978 90 04 17505 1 Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

CONTENTS The Editors ................................................................................. Editorial Advisers ........................................................................ Foreword .....................................................................................

ix xi xiii

PART I

COUNTRY REPORTS Edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Ahmet AlibašiÆ and Brigitte Maréchal Introduction ................................................................................ On Defining Muslims, by Nadia Jeldtoft ................................... Country surveys: Albania .................................................................................... Austria ..................................................................................... Belgium ................................................................................... Bosnia and Herzegovina ......................................................... Bulgaria ................................................................................... Croatia .................................................................................... Cyprus ..................................................................................... Czech Republic ....................................................................... Denmark ................................................................................. Estonia ..................................................................................... Finland .................................................................................... France ...................................................................................... Germany ................................................................................. Greece ..................................................................................... Hungary .................................................................................. Ireland ..................................................................................... Italy ......................................................................................... Kosovo ..................................................................................... Latvia ...................................................................................... Lithuania ................................................................................. Luxembourg ............................................................................ Macedonia ..............................................................................

3 9 15 25 35 49 61 69 75 89 97 111 117 127 141 151 161 167 179 193 199 205 211 221

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contents Malta ....................................................................................... Montenegro ............................................................................. Netherlands ............................................................................. Norway .................................................................................... Poland ..................................................................................... Portugal ................................................................................... Romania .................................................................................. Serbia ...................................................................................... Slovakia ................................................................................... Slovenia ................................................................................... Spain ....................................................................................... Sweden .................................................................................... Switzerland .............................................................................. Turkey ..................................................................................... United Kingdom .....................................................................

229 237 243 257 267 277 285 295 305 311 319 331 343 351 363

PART II

ANALYSIS Edited by Samim Akgönül and Christian Moe Turkey-EU relations: The impact of Islam on Europe ............. Ayhan Kaya European Muslim youth: Towards a cool Islam? ...................... Miriam Gazzah Muslim veiling controversies in Europe ..................................... Dominic McGoldrick Media and Muslims in Europe .................................................. Isabelle Rigoni Freedom of expression and religious feelings ............................ Niraj Nathwani

377 403 427 475 507

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PART III

BOOK REVIEWS Edited by Christian Moe and Samim Akgönül Islam in Europe: Diversity, Identity and Influence. By Aziz Al-Azmeh and Effie Fokas (eds). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007 (Christian Moe) ................................................... The New Frontiers of Jihad: Radical Islam in Europe. By Alison Pargeter. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, 2008 (Marc Sageman) ................................................................................. The Study of Religion and the Training of Muslim Clergy in Europe: Academic and Religious Freedom in the 21st Century. By W.B. Drees and P.J. van Koningsveld (eds). Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2008 (Martha Frederiks) ............................................... Islam and Muslims in Germany. By Ala Al-Hamarneh and Jörn Thielmann (eds). Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2008 (Gerdien Jonker) ..................................................................................... Young, British and Muslim. By Philip Lewis. London: Continuum, 2007 ......................................................................................... Young British Muslim Voices. By Anshuman A. Mondal. Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2008 (Claire Dwyer) ............. The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse. By Brigitte Maréchal. Leiden: Brill, 2008 (Lena Larsen) ......................... Penser l’islam dans la laïcité. Les musulmans de France et la République. By Frank Frégosi. Paris: Fayard, 2008 (Thierry Zarcone) ..... Stolen Honor: Stigmatizing Muslim Men in Berlin. By Katherine Pratt Ewing. Stanford/California: Stanford University Press, 2008 (Nikola Tietze) .....................................................

535 538

539 542 545 545 550 553 560

THE EDITORS Jørgen S. Nielsen is a Danish National Research Foundation Professor of Islamic Studies and Director, Centre for European Islamic Thought, Faculty of Theology, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. Previously at the University of Birmingham, he has been researching and writing about Islam in Europe since 1978. He is the author of Muslims in Western Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 3rd edn 2004). Samim Akgönül, is Associate Professor at Strasbourg University and researcher at the French National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS). He also teaches Political Science at Syracuse University and International Relations at Galatasaray University. Among his recent publications are Religion de Turquie, religions des Turcs: nouveaux acteurs dans l’Europe élargie (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006), and, as editor, Laïcité en débat: principes et représentations du concept de la laïcité en France et en Turquie (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2008). Ahmet AlibašiÆ holds an MA in Islamic Studies, Political Sciences, and Islamic Civilisation from Kuala Lumpur. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, and director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He has authored a number of articles on Islam in SE Europe and interreligious relations. Brigitte Maréchal is Professor, Faculty of Political and Social Sciences, and Director, Centre Interdisciplinaire d’Etudes de l’Islam dans le Monde Contemporain (CISMOC), at the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. She is in charge of the programme ‘Religious Sciences: Islam’. She is editor, with Stefano Allievi, Felice Dassetto and Jørgen Nielsen, of Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2003). Christian Moe is a PhD candidate in the history of religion, University of Oslo, and works as a freelance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights, and religious reform. He is co-editor of New Directions in Islamic Thought (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009).

EDITORIAL ADVISERS Dr Xavier Bougarel, Etudes Turques et Ottomans, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France Prof. Felice Dassetto, ANSO, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium Prof. Silvio Ferrari, Faculty of Law, Universities of Milan, Italy, and Leuven, Belgium Dr Franck Frégosi, Maison Inter-universitaire des Sciences de l’Homme, Strasbourg, Alsace, and Institut d’Etudes Politiques d’Aix en Provence, France Prof. Fikret KarÆiÆ, Faculty of Law, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Assoc. Prof. Talip Küçükcan, Adviser to the Council of Higher Education (YÖK), Ankara, Turkey Dr Lene Kühle, Faculty of Theology and Religious Studies, University of Aarhus, Denmark Dr Nico Landman, Department for Religious Studies, Utrecht University, Netherlands Prof. Dr. Jamal Malik, Chair of Islamic Studies, University of Erfurt, Germany Prof. Tariq Modood, Department of Sociology, University of Bristol, United Kingdom Dr Ferid Muhic, University of Sts Cyril and Methodius, Skopje, Macedonia Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk, Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland Prof. Alexandre Popovic, Directeur de recherche émérite au CNRS, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Socials (EHESS), Paris, France Dr Nina Clara Tiesler, Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lisbon, Portugal Dr Kari Vogt, Associate Professor, Institute of Cultural Studies and Oriental Languages, University of Oslo, Norway Dr Antonina Zheliyazkova, Director, International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations, Sofia, Bulgaria

FOREWORD The presence of Muslims in Europe has attracted increasing attention over the last two decades. Researchers started devoting attention to the subject during the mid- and late 1980s. During the following decade it attracted growing political attention, sparked especially by the ‘affairs’ of 1989—Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses in Britain and the foulards (head scarves) in France—and sustained by the critical geopolitical focuses on Islam and Muslims through crises in the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya added to existing ones—Palestine, Sudan, Kashmir—where Islam was an ever more forcefully expressed dimension. The events of 11 September 2001 in New York and Washington DC followed by a number of other terrorists attacks, especially those in Madrid and London, raised the profile in Europe yet further, now often driven by security considerations. That smaller countries could not escape the attention was demonstrated by the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam in November 2004 and the international impact of the cartoons of Muhammad published in Denmark at the end of September 2005. Throughout these events it has become clear that researchers, policy makers, journalists and other opinion formers have found it difficult to obtain with ease reliable information about the situation of Muslims in individual European countries. Nowhere has it been possible to find answers to the simple questions such as “How do other countries deal with Muslim burial?”, “In which countries are there Islamic schools, and how do they function?”, “Do any other countries make space for Islamic family law?”, etc. An attempt to establish an overview of both the data and the research was undertaken almost ten years ago at the behest of the Presidency of the European Union.1 This project was expanded into a major publication, which set out to take stock of both the state of research in the field and the data.2 The country data

Dassetto, F., B. Maréchal and J.S. Nielsen (eds), Convergences musulmanes: aspects contemporains de l’islam dans l’Europe élargies (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2001). 2 Maréchal, B., S. Allievi, F. Dassetto and J.S. Nielsen (eds), Muslims in the Enlarged Europe: Religion and Society (Leiden: Brill, 2003). 1

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were synthesised and published separately3 in a format which was later updated for the European Parliament.4 It was rapidly becoming clear that events were moving fast and published data was quickly becoming out of date. At the same time, it was also clear that much data was being interpreted without reference to the context to which it belonged. In particular, too much authority was being given to statistics that, by their very nature, were unreliable. So when the publishers Brill approached the editors of their book series Muslim Minorities, which had started appearing in 2003, with the suggestion that a Yearbook of Muslims in Europe would be timely, the response was positive. A new editorial team was assembled which took on the project both positively and with trepidation, knowing very well how much work would be involved, especially in the first year. But as the project has progressed, we have become convinced of the value and necessity of its publication. To meet our assessment of the needs of the users, the volume is divided into three main parts. The largest is the Country Reports, which cover 37 countries in western and central Europe, including all the members and prospective members of the European Union. In the light of the experience of this first year, it is our intention to reorganise the material slightly for the next volume, as well as to include one or two further sections. The editors welcome suggestions to help improve the usefulness of the country reports. It is also our intention over the next two years to expand the coverage with the goal of including all the member countries of the Council of Europe. The volume will then stretch eastwards into the Russian Federation and the southern Caucasus. Detailed information on how the reports are organised can be found in the introduction to that part. The second part comprises analytical articles on topics which in one way or another are of current interest, while the third part—which we expect to see expanding in future years—collects reviews of important books published during the period overviewed in the volume. Our thanks are due to the many researchers who have contributed to the volume—some of the authors of the country entries have in

3 Maréchal, B. (ed.), L’Islam et les musulmans dans l’Europe élargie: Radioscopie (Louvainla-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2002). 4 Dasetto, F., S. Ferrari and B. Maréchal, Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Culture and Education (IP/B/CULT/IC/2002_061), 2007), pp. 81–175.

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effect produced here the first account in English of the situation of Muslims in their countries. We are particularly indebted to staff at Brill, who first had the idea and then supported it actively all the way through: Nicolette van der Hoek, Sasha Goldstein, and Joed Elich, and to Carol Rowe for her as ever meticulous copy editing. In Copenhagen, student assistants Niels Valdemar Vinding and Line Stæhr have been enthusiastic and committed in helping to ensure that the process has gone surprisingly smoothly. We can now but hope that the volume will be found useful. The Editors Copenhagen, Ljubljana, Louvain, Sarajevo, Strasbourg, May 2009

PART I

COUNTRY REPORTS Edited by Jørgen S. Nielsen, Ahmet AlibašiÆ and Brigitte Maréchal Editorial assistant Nadia Jeldtoft

INTRODUCTION The purpose of this first main part of the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe is to provide essential data about the place of Muslims within each of the countries covered, in principle for the year 2008. Initially, the intention was to cover only the member countries of the European Union and those countries in various stages of entry or association. But as this left occasional geographical anomalies, it was decide to expand the coverage to include all the other countries of western and central Europe. In the end, it was not possible to find anyone to provide a report on Iceland—next year, we hope. As it is, this section includes 37 countries stretching from Portugal to Cyprus and from Norway to Malta. The information is structured in the same way for each country, so that users who wish to make comparisons across countries can quickly find the information they seek within the same numbered section of each country report. Although, of course, much of the material is of a more general nature, special attention is given to developments during the year. The statistics provided in the first section usually state clearly which year they apply to, which is not necessarily 2008, as there are many countries where such statistics are not gathered regularly. Any significant developments that have taken place in a country since the beginning of 2009 have been held over to the next volume. In the process of copy editing all the web sites cited in source references were tested, and they were functioning at the beginning of May 2009. It is in the nature of such a presentation of data that some of the information acquires a rather more authoritative character than is justified. This is particularly problematic in a volume which seeks to present ‘facts’ about Muslims in Europe. For a start, the mere use of the term ‘Muslim’ begs questions. Both the research tradition and much public debate on the subject tend to start from an assumption that anyone from a Muslim cultural tradition is Muslim—e.g. if their names are Muhammad or Fatima, and they are Turkish of origin, they must be Muslims. As many of the country reports indicate, this is too simplistic: there are ‘Muslims’ who have no practical relationship to Islam, its rites, institutions or organisations. The term ‘cultural Muslims’ has come into use to deal with this, while ‘practising Muslims’ is then intended to cover those who engage in some form of Islamic

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practice. Nadia Jeldtoft discusses this problem in her article preceding the country reports; the authors of the country reports have seen a draft version of this paper. The problem is reflected in the attempts to ascertain demographic data in section 1 of each of the reports. In a very few countries, official statistics register religious adherence, usually self-defined, but in most countries researchers have had to use data on nationality and/or ethnicity to deduce some form of reasonably reliable estimate. In a few countries, the law on civil associations requires that a register of members be kept, and this can also be a source of statistics on religious allegiance. Occasionally, Muslim organisations themselves give figures, but their reliability is also often open to question. Each country report sets out the nature of the basis for the demography provided. We have deliberately not tried to provide any summary statistical table, as this is liable to acquire an unjustified authority. So we apologise to those users who thought they might get some quick answers! As a matter of interest, adding the minimum and maximum estimates given for each country suggests a total Muslim population for the countries covered, excluding Turkey, of between 23.8 million and 25.1 million (of which some 16–18 million are in the former western Europe) out of a total population of about 450 million, i.e. somewhere around 5.5% of Europe’s population has some kind of Muslim background. It goes without saying that the situations in the various countries differ enormously in terms of numbers, complexity and occasionally the peculiarity of one aspect or another, usually to do with legal status. We have therefore not imposed any strict guidelines for the length of individual country entries, except to keep within a guideline maximum—and even that we have had to breach in certain, in our view, justified cases. Sections 1–12 in each country report have a focus that allows for the presentation of factual data, but it is inevitable that, in deciding what information to include and what to exclude, judgments have had to be made. This is the case especially in section 3 where we have had to choose which national Muslim organisations to include. In countries with smaller populations, two organisations may be all that exist in the country, while in other, larger countries some provincial organisations may have national impact. The same goes for Muslim media, covered in section 12. On the other hand, the last three sections, 13–15, are more evaluative in their intent. Given that the situation is so varied among the countries covered, section 13, on family law, can only touch very briefly on those aspects that are particular to the

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5

country in question and which especially impact on Muslims and on public awareness. Readers interested in more detail will need to go to the extensive and technical legal literature. To help readers use the country reports, especially if they intend to make thematic comparisons across Europe, a more detailed indication of what each section of the country reports is intended to include may be helpful: 1. Muslim populations: Muslim populations including their history within the country and ethnic composition, including overview statistics covering current numbers and ethnic and geographical distribution. This will include, as appropriate, an indication of the nature of the sources and a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of the statistics. Any statistics here and later, should specify the basis on which they have been worked out, including reference to ranges of uncertainty. 2. Islam and the state: A summary of the general relation between state and religion, including questions of official recognition where relevant, and data on the place of Muslims and Muslim organisations within this structure, their place in the public sphere, and access to public funding. 3. Main Muslim organisations: Identification of the main national and, if relevant, regional or ‘sectarian’ Muslim organisations, including contact details, indication of their relative importance and ethnic, religious (Sunni, Shi’i, Sufi, and other theological trend) and national allegiance. This will include as appropriate charities, cultural organisations, political parties and links with transnational and/or foreign organisations and movements. 4. Mosques and prayer houses: This section will provide an overview of mosques and prayer houses, including identification and locations of the main concentrations and overall numbers analysed according to local practice. Relevant legal issues, especially as regards official planning processes, will be referred to when relevant. 5. Children’s education: The place of Islam and Muslims in the general education system, including the teaching of Islam within the curriculum, any special arrangements for Muslim pupils, and provision for separate (private or public) Muslim-owned or managed schools. 6. Higher and professional education: The history and place of Islamic studies in further and higher education institutions, including the provision of private or public professional training for imams.

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7. Burial and cemeteries: Provision of facilities for Muslim burial both in terms of meeting ritual expectations and provision of space for Muslim cemeteries. 8. ‘Chaplaincy’ in state institutions: Provision of Muslim religious counseling and/or ritual services for Muslims in public institutions such as health services, prisons, and the armed forces. 9. Religious festivals: The status of the main Muslim religious festivals, how they are celebrated, and the extent to which they are publicly recognised, for example, in employment law or school holiday arrangements. 10. Halal food: Access to halal food, whether halal slaughter is permitted, and whether halal food is available in public institutions. 11. Dress codes: How far—and where—is Muslim dress, especially for women hijab (head scarf ) and niqab (face covering), permitted and practised. 12. Publications and media: A survey of the main Muslim print and electronic media. 13. Family law: The practice of elements Islamic family law, whether formally in the official legal systems or informally within local social environments. 14. Public opinion and debate: Main features of the public debate about Islam and Muslims, including reference to the results of significant public opinion polls. 15. Major cultural events: Reference to any significant cultural events at which Islam or Muslims as a religious or cultural group have been a focus, whether organised by Muslims or by others. The editors have entered into extensive correspondence with the country authors to seek clarification and to try to ensure that the information provided is as comparable across countries as possible. The form in which each country report is published is often the result of several exchanges back and forth between the author and the editors. It is also worth noting that, in many cases, the country authors were able to refer to previously published surveys, which were placed at the disposal of the authors of the country reports. The surveys which have been used are: Brigitte Maréchal (ed.), L’Islam et les musulmans dans l’Europe élargie: Radioscopie (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia Bruylant, 2002).

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Roberta Aluffi B.-P. and Giovanna Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 290–318. Felice Dasetto, Silvio Ferrari and Brigitte Maréchal, Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Policy Department Structural and Cohesion Policies, Culture and Education (IP/B/CULT/IC/2002_061), 2007), pp. 81–175. A final comment is necessary regarding the order of the countries. Rather than trying to be legalistic or carefully diplomatic, we have decided to use the names of the countries that are in common use in English as the basis for the alphabetical order. In the light of the experience of this first year, it is our intention to reorganise the material slightly for the next volume, as well as to include one or two further sections. The editors welcome suggestions to help improve the usefulness of the country reports. It is also our intention over the next two years to expand the coverage with the goal of including all the member countries of the Council of Europe. The volume will then stretch eastwards into the Russian Federation and the southern Caucasus.

ON DEFINING MUSLIMS Nadia Jeldtoft 1 A yearbook deals with data. This publication is of course no exception, but as already touched upon in the introduction to the country reports section, we are concerned not to give any quick answers to questions on the complex empirical situation in the 37 countries covered by the country reports. I will discuss how we have attempted to deal with the presentation of the data in the Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, whilst suggesting some caveats about how the data accumulated in this publication can be used. Data are often thought of as ‘hard facts’ that inform us about something on the basis of numbers and which we use to provide descriptive details about the world. Even though numbers and data may seem ‘objective’, statistics can be seen as a reality-producing process related to question of how we produce, reproduce and navigate in the social worlds that we inhabit. Basic statistics are arrived at by counting and this is by no means a neutral activity, because it involves identification, which is a power-related act of categorisation. In other words, acts of identification are simultaneously acts of naming, separating, and distilling some concepts from others by virtue of certain characteristics which are defined by the people doing the identifying. The process of counting and identifying is therefore neither objective nor neutral, because it is always dependant on contextual and relational circumstances. When we count things or people, we do so on the basis of certain premises, and we need to ask the relevant questions: Who is counting? Who is being counted? How is the counting taking place? Why is the counting taking place? And most importantly: is counting a sufficient description of the counted object? In most cases the answer to the last questions will

1 Nadia Jeldtoft is a PhD Fellow at the Centre for European Islamic Thought at Copenhagen University. She works on minority issues and religious identity with regard to Muslim minorities in Europe and is currently focusing on everyday forms of Islam among non-organised Muslim minorities. She has recently published “Andre Muslimske Identiteter—et studie af ikke-organiserede Muslimer (Other Muslim Identities—a study of non-organised Muslim minorities)”, Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, no. 1 (2008), pp. 59–82.

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be no, and we therefore need to complement the descriptive counting with other perspectives, or at least make it clear that there are other aspects which could possibly tell us other things about the individuals being counted. When it comes to counting people, it becomes highly relevant to explain the statistics have been generated in a transparent manner—i.e. how the data have become data. This Yearbook deals with Muslim minorities—a very heterogeneous group that we nonetheless choose to describe under a single category—‘Muslims’. The Yearbook therefore seeks to acknowledge the diversity of Muslims as a complex empirical reality, while at the same time wishing to describe Muslims in Europe by the use of data, because we find that this information provides a useful tool for a variety of possible uses. This apparent gap (between the apparent simplicity of the data and the complexity of the situations they describe) does not mean that we have to fudge completely the complicated realities we are facing. Rather than regarding this gap as an obstacle for the Yearbook, it is possible to see the issues it raises as generating a critical platform from which to conduct our research and perhaps develop policy. One way of creating a transparent critical platform is to distinguish between a ‘category’ and a ‘group’,2 such that a ‘category’ refers to the collection of data about Muslims. From this perspective, ‘Muslims’ can be viewed as a category with reference to the interest of our respective fields of research. It is thus an analytical construction which we use as an instrument that enables us to say something about the empirical reality of Muslim minorities. The term ‘group’, as an analytical category, takes into consideration the heterogeneous nature of Muslim minority groups in Europe. This concept points to the fact that Muslims might self-identify as Muslims but not necessarily in the same way that the very general categorization does, and that they do not see themselves as belonging to the same group. Nor does it mean that being Muslim is equally important or relevant for them at all times or in all situations. This means that we are attempting to describe a category, which is an analytical construction, to enable a platform for empirical studies of the complex realities of Muslim minorities groups in Europe.

2 Jenkins, R., “Rethinking ethnicity: Identity, categorization and power”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 17, no. 2 (April 1994), p. 203.

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It follows that the question of counting Muslim minorities is also related to processes of self-identification vs. categorisation. While selfidentification is an internal process of naming and defining one’s own group, categorisation is an external process, whereby one is defined by others.3 This latter process is dynamic and related to power relations and representation. When it comes to studying the identity processes of minority groups, it is particularly relevant to look at how power relations are exercised by both majority and minority actors. Even though some European countries have a long history of Muslim presence, and a few European countries have Muslim populations who are numerical majorities, Muslims in Europe can largely be described as minorities that are being and have been described mainly by the majority.4 The very wish to count and thus describe others systematically, as is the case here, is often connected to majority wishes about mapping, and it is therefore important to realise that the categorisations of Muslims as such for the purpose of this Yearbook is the result of a majority perspective. Counting Muslims is not the same as wholly adequately describing Muslims minorities, because Muslim minorities, as much as all other groups in society, can be approached from other angles that will tell us other things about them. Concepts such as identity, ethnicity, religion, culture and nationality are particularly ambiguous and dependent on relational issues, and as such they are dynamic and contingent.5 These concepts are contested categories used by everyone to make the world meaningful. In order to navigate in our social worlds, we need categories to define ourselves and others, and researchers are no exception. When we, in this Yearbook, categorise (and thereby identify) Muslims in Europe, this expresses a categorisation of ‘Muslims’ who can be distinguished from other social groups by virtue of their ‘Muslimness’. This categorisation reflects a use of the contested categories—Muslims are not simply and only ‘Muslims’. Some, but not all, of the members of the minority group of Muslims will fit into the scholarly understanding and categorisation of what it means to be a Muslim. However, not all Muslims think of themselves Ibid. Obvious exceptions to this are Turkey and certain regions of the former Yugoslavia, especially Bosnia. In latter years, many scholars who are themselves Muslims have contributed to the research on Muslims in Europe and some of them are contributors in this publication. 5 Baumann, G., The Multicultural Riddle: Rethinking National, Ethnic and Religious Identities (London: Routledge, 1999). 3 4

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as distinctly Muslim but rather in ethnic, national or cultural terms or in a mixture of, for example, ethnic and religious terms, while others do wholly self-identify as Muslims and actively articulate their Muslim identity as separate from their ethnic/national identity. Although all categorisations are ambiguous, it is relevant to draw attention to this fact when it comes to definitions of any social group, because of the implication that categorisations per se are problematic when studying heterogeneous (minority) groups. In addition to these questions of representation, the Yearbook covers a very large and varied context: 37 countries which have very different histories as regards their Muslim populations and different political systems, and thereby also very different ways of counting (and not counting) Muslims. In some countries, such as France, it is illegal to register people according to their religion while in other countries people may voluntarily register as Muslims in the national census. We lack information on what exactly this quantitative and descriptive ‘ticking the box’ actually means to the people who actively register as Muslims. Does it mean that they understand themselves more as Muslims than, for example, as Dutch, Pakistanis or Palestinians? Not to mention issues related to level of practice and denominational affiliation—does ‘ticking the box’ capture whether people are Sufis or Shi’ites? The figures used in various demographies of religion are extremely problematic. They are often biased because they are frequently based on the assumption that migrants of certain ethnic origins are Muslims. We need to be cautious with these figures as they contribute to what we might term the ‘ethnification of Islam’, which does not adequately describe these Muslim groups, because there is no one-to-one relationship between ethnicity/nationality on the one hand and religion on the other.6 Other figures come from Muslim organisations themselves and this presents problems related to whether Muslims can be described in terms of ‘organised’ vs. ‘non-organised’. The estimates provided by Muslim organisations are problematic for two reasons. On the one hand, they may simply be estimates based on a very weak and sometimes wishful foundation. So, for example, before the 2001 census in the United Kingdom asked a question on religion, some Muslim organisations were suggesting a figure as high as three million for the

6 Barth, F., Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organisation of Cultural Difference (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969).

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number of Muslims resident in the UK. On the other hand, figures may be based on membership of or affiliation to organisations, none of which can be regarded as fully representative or inclusive of all Muslims in the country concerned. These figures are also biased in that they describe only ‘organised’ Muslims and consequently exclude Muslims who are not active in Muslim organisations,7 a dimension which is further complicated by the fact that ‘organised’ means different things in different countries, reflecting differences in, for example, the laws governing associations. Being organised or non-organised should not be used as descriptive markers for Muslim minorities, because there is a wide variety of different attitudes and motivations for being or not being involved in a Muslim organisation for the individuals concerned. As a Muslim, you can be organised at some points in your life, while you are not at others, and the description ‘organised’ may cover very different types of affiliation, ranging from formal membership to loose and informal association. This means that we must be careful not to use only representatives of Muslims organisations as the representatives of Muslims in our research, because they—like all other groups—will have certain agendas in presenting issues as they do. With regard to the Yearbook, these facts are relevant because, when we attempt to systematise information on Islam and Muslims in Europe, a critical approach to the methodology used in the generation of the figures published in this volume is pertinent. In the country reports, the terms ‘practising’ and ‘cultural’ Muslims have occasionally been used in order to work with applicable analytical categories that will enable better navigation in the complex empirical realities of Muslim minorities in Europe. These categories are related to questions of how we can understand the various attitudes of Muslims. The description of Muslims in categories of ‘practising/observing Muslims’ and ‘cultural/nominal’ Muslims can be problematic because the descriptions are ambivalent and reflect contestation. They are often used as opposites and as such are in some contexts used politically to distinguish between ‘good’ (‘non-practising-and-therefore-secular and integrated/assimilated’) and ‘bad’ (‘practising-therefore-fundamentalist’) Muslims. In our use of these terms in this Yearbook, we therefore emphasise that, when it comes to describing Muslim minorities in

7 Jacobsen, B., “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35.

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Europe, it is relevant not to make matters of practice the only standard description for Muslims, because it is possible to self-identify strongly as a Muslim while, for example, not observing fasts or participating in any Islamic rituals. When it comes to the categories of ‘organised’ and ‘non-organised’ Muslims, these should equally not be used as equivalents for ‘practising’ and ‘non-practising’. Although many Muslims may be adequately described as either ‘practising’ or ‘cultural’, self-identification as Muslim may correlate with other issues than practical ones. It may express attitudes towards the majority, or other ethnic and national groups, it may be related to gaining minority rights as a ‘group’, or it may express attitudes and feelings of belonging to cultural, religious or ethnic or national communities that are not dependant on practice. Further, we cannot presume that the Muslim identity is equally important in all situations. A ‘practising Muslim’ or a ‘cultural Muslim’ is not restricted to being so at all times—depending on context, it may be relevant for a ‘cultural Muslim’ to accentuate his or her religious identity while a ‘practising Muslim’ might choose (more or less explicitly) to tone down his or her religious identity. And above all, Muslims have other identities as mothers, fathers, students, mechanics, teachers, Turks, Tartars and Lebanese, Lithuanians, British, etc. as well, which are not necessarily detached, i.e. self-understood separately, from being Muslims, but which might very well be understood as intrinsic elements of what it means to be Muslim. Particularly in Western Europe, where some of the third and fourth generation descendants of immigrants of Muslim background are articulating senses of global Islam and the Muslim umma, it is important to constantly evaluate and reality check the categories we use to describe these groups. All this is not to say that Muslim minorities are vague and indefinable concepts which can only be grasped theoretically, but only that we need to demarcate very carefully what we mean when we are describing Muslims. This Yearbook attempts to isolate information on these minority groups, which is a classical scholarly discipline. At the same time, it has been our wish to expose and critically evaluate and discuss some of the processes that are behind the analytical language employed so as to establish a conceptual framework for the users of the Yearbook.

ALBANIA Olsi Jazexhi1 1

Muslim Populations

There are no reliable statistics about religious affiliation in Albania at the present time. During the past decade a number of intellectuals have called for a national survey on the subject, but Albanian politicians have so far refused. As a result, the only official statistics available are from 1937, when Muslims were estimated to be 69.3% of the total population, and from 1945, when they made up 72%.2 After the fall of Communism, figures on the percentages of Muslims have been disputed by some Christian organisations, clergy and academics, as well as by Muslim organisations.3 Christians claim that Muslims no longer constitute the majority in Albania, but Muslims dispute this.4 The best contemporary source for population distribution by religion in Albania is the US Department of State Committee on Religious Freedoms report (17 September 2006), which estimates that citizens of Muslim background make up the largest traditional religious group in

1 Olsi Jazexhi is a PhD researcher on Islam and modern Albanian identity at the European University Institute, in Florence, Italy. He holds degrees in Communication and Islamic Civilisation and has researched on Muslims in Albania from the time of the Ottoman Empire. 2 Dela Roka, Roberto Moroko, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri 1920–1944 (Tirana: Eleni Gjika, 1994), p. 19. 3 For the debates over the number of Muslims in Albania see the Press Release of the Muslim Forum of Albania: “MFA denounces the intrigues of evangelist organizations with the religious percentages of Albania”, at http://forumimusliman.org/english/ encyklopedia.html, accessed 7 March 2009; the interview with the Christian Orthodox Archbishop Yanolatos, “Janullatos: Nuk jeni komb tipik musliman”, Gazeta Shekulli, 18 May 2007, available at http://www.shekulli.com.al/news/44/ARTICLE/10080/200705-18.html, accessed 7 March 2009, etc. 4 In a number of polls in recent years, the people who defined themselves as Muslims made up around 63% of the population, Orthodox Christians 15%, and Catholics 13% (see Hysniu, Jeton, “Përbërja e fetare e Shqipërisë: rezultatet e tre sondazheve”, Gazeta Start, 26 January 2007.

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Albania, amounting to 65% to 70% of the population.5 Most of them are Sunnis and there is a minority of Bektashis. The Muslims of Albania are generally classified as ethnic Albanians. However, after the fall of Communism, many Muslims have defined themselves as Bosnians, Gorans, Gollobordas, Turks, Roma and Egyptians. During Ottoman times, Sunni Muslims were usually concentrated in the towns, particularly in Gegëria, in the centre and north of the country, while the Bektashis were concentrated in the south,6 but since 1991, many Muslims, following a national trend, have moved towards the capital, Tirana. Islam is believed to have entered the regions that constitute modernday Albania in the ninth century,7 while the real Islamisation of Albania started after the seventeenth century, largely thanks to the privileges that the Albanian-speaking populations gained from the Ottomans.8 However, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire the numbers and positions of Muslims changed markedly and when Communism was established after World War II and Albania was declared an atheist state (from 1967 until 1991), the religious identity of both Muslims and Christians was suppressed. As a result of many decades of rigidly enforced atheism, the majority of the citizens of Albania today are secular in orientation. No reliable data are available on active participation in formal religious rites, but estimates range from 25% to 40%.9 2

Islam and the State

Albania is a secular parliamentary republic, in which the state guarantees freedom of religious belief. The Constitution of Albania recognises the equality of all religious communities and the state is neutral in

5 Department of State Religious Freedom Report—Albania (17 September 2006), available at http://tirana.usembassy.gov/06pr_0915a.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 6 Jazexhi, Olsi, “The Bektashi Tarikah of Dervishes”, paper presented at the Colloque International ‘soufisme-culture-musique’, Centre National de Recherches Préhistoriques, Anthropologiques et Historiques. Algiers, September 2007. 7 Basha, Ali M., Nëpër gjurmët e Islamit (Tirane: no publisher stated, 2005), pp. 48–52. 8 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, p. 20. 9 Department of State Religious Freedom Report—Albania (September 17, 2006), http:// tirana.usembassy.gov/06pr_0915a.html, accessed 7 March 2009.

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questions of faith.10 However, the Sunni Muslims (known as muslimanët), Bektashi Muslims (known as bektashijtë), Catholic Christians, and Orthodox Christians are ‘recognised’ as the four traditional religious communities and are often invited to national ceremonies and celebrations. Other faith communities include the Protestants, mostly associated with the Albanian Evangelical Alliance (VUSH), Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Bahais, the Holy Waqf of the Holy League,11 and other minor groups. Like the other traditional communities, Muslims do not receive any funding from the state. The present government has indicated its desire to fund the religious communities,12 but nothing has so far been done in this direction. 3

Main Muslim Organisations

Komuniteti Musliman i Shqipërisë (Muslim Community of Albania, Rruga “Punëtorët e Rilindjes”, nr. 50, Tirana, Albania, tel: +355 42 269123/ 04 22 37 01/23 04 92) is the largest Sunni Muslim organisation in Albania, and is recognised by the state as a national organisation. It administers most of the mosques and is perceived to be the main representative of Sunni Islam in the country. It was originally founded in 1923, when the Sunnis of Albania were officially separated from the Caliphate in Istanbul.13 After being abolished during Communist era, the Muslim Community was reorganised in 1991. Kryegjyshata Botërore Bektashiane (World Headquarters of Bektashism, Rruga “Dhimiter Kamarda”, Tirana, Albania, tel: +355 4 355 227/ +355 4 355 090, http://www.komunitetibektashi.org/. email: info@ komunitetibektashi.org) is the largest Sufi tariqa organisation in Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane is recognised by the state as a national organisation, and as a separate religious community. The Bektashis claim that their headquarters is the World Headquarters of Bektashism, but this is disputed by Bektashis living outside Albania. Kryegjyshata Bektashiane

10 Constitution of Albania/ Chapter I General Provisions/ Article 10, available at http://www.parlament.al/dokumenti.asp?id=855, accessed 10 October 2008. 11 The Holy Waqf of the Holy League is an indigenous Albanian sect, headed by Eleonora Bregu, who calls herself the Lady of the Soul. 12 Kryeministri Berisha merr pjesë në ceremoninë e nënshkrimit të marrëveshjes mes qeverisë shqiptare dhe komuniteteve fetare në Shqipëri, dated 24 October 2008, available at http://www .keshilliministrave.al/index.php?fq=brenda&m=news&lid=9609, accessed 7 March 2009. 13 Dela Roka, Kombësija dhe feja në Shqipëri, pp. 24–27.

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was transferred from Turkey to Albania in 1931, after the prohibition of the order in Turkey in 1925.14 In 1946, the tariqa was separated from mainstream Islam and became a separate religious community.15 Apart from the officially recognised organisations, a number of others are also active. The most important is the Sufi Union “Drita Hyjnore” (Divine Light) which is an umbrella organisation for the Sufi tariqas of Rifa’is, Qadiris, Sa’dis, Khalwatis and Tijanis. The Muslim Forum of Albania (Rruga Sami Frasheri, P. 20/3, Ap. 1, 1010, Tirana, Albania, http://www.forumimusliman.org/english/, email: info@forumimusliman .org) was established in 2005 as a lay Muslim organisation with the aim of combatting racism, Islamophobia and xenophobia. 4

Mosques and Prayer Houses

In 2007, the Muslim Community of Albania reported that some 498 mosques existed in the country. As of 2008, this number has increased by another four or five.16 Apart from the mosques, a small number of prayer houses, masjids (small mosques without minarets), operate throughout Albania. The Ahmadiyya community runs one mosque on the outskirts of Tirana. The Rifa’i tariqa also has one masjid in Tirana.17 The Bektashis have some 137 tekes (Sufi lodges) throughout Albania,18 and the Sufi tariqas (Rifa’i, Qadiri, Khalwati, Tidjani and others) have altogether an estimated 285 tekes, turbes, maqams and zawias.19

Jazexhi, “Bektashi Tarikah”. Kalicani, Baba Selim, Bektashizmi si sekt mistik islam (Tirana: KOHA, 1999), pp. 228–229. 16 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults, August 2008. 17 The exact number of mosques and masjids IN Albania is difficult to establish. In an interview on 16 August 2008, the deputy head of the Muslim Community declared that 568 mosques operate in Albania, but this contradicts data obtained from the State Committee on Cults, which also relies on the Muslim Community of Albania for its information. For more see “Raport ekskluziv / Në Shqipëri ka 638 xhami dhe 1119 kisha”, Gazeta Tirana Observer, 16 August 2008. 18 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults. August 2008. 19 Ibid. 14 15

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Children’s Education

Religious education was prohibited in Albania under Communism, and religion was attacked by the educational system. After the fall of Communism, school textbooks have adopted a more positive stance towards religion, but Islam is not always portrayed in very positive terms.20 Islam and other religions are not taught in Albanian public schools, but the Muslim Community of Albania and some other Albanian and foreign Muslim NGOs run a number of Muslim schools (madrasas). The schools run by the Muslim Community include seven high schools, two primary schools and five others.21 Mosques and some Muslim NGOs also provide Islamic instruction outside school hours. The Bektashi Community and the Sufi organisations have no registered schools or courses for teaching religion. 6

Higher and Professional Education

The Islamic institutions of Albania have no institute of higher learning and are dependent on institutions elsewhere in the Muslim world for training their staff. Since the Catholic and Orthodox Churches run their own institutes of higher learning, the question of building an Islamic university has been raised in Albania since 2005.22 The Muslim Community has repeatedly asked the state for permission to open an Islamic university and have received positive responses, but no university has yet been established. 7

Burial and Cemeteries

Due to the Communist legacy, separate Muslim cemeteries are not common in Albania. In graveyards built during the Communist era, such as those in Tirana, Christians and Muslims are buried together.

20 Jazexhi, Olsi, “Depicting the Enemy: the Image of the Turk and the Muslim in Albania’s High School Textbooks”, Islam in South East Asia Forum ISEEF, Paper No. 1, July 2008. 21 Information obtained from the Albanian State Committee on Cults and reported by the Muslim Community of Albania. 22 Kulla, Ilir, “Pse-te e universitetit islam!”, Gazeta Korrieri, 23 January 2005.

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However, a number of cemeteries exist outside Tirana, where Muslims are buried separately from the Christians. 8

‘Chaplaincy’ in State Institutions

‘Chaplaincy’ is not legally recognised in state institutions, but religious preachers may have access to prisons for teaching religion to inmates. However, religious chaplains are strictly prohibited in public schools. 9

Religious Festivals

The state recognises two Sunni religious festivals as national holidays in Albania. They are Bajrami i Madh (the Great Bayram, ‘Id al-Fitr) celebrated at the end of Ramadan and Kurban Bajrami or Bajrami i Vogël (Qurban Bayram or Little Bayram, ‘Id al-Adha) celebrated on 10 Dhu’l Hijja. Apart from the Bayrams, Sunni Muslims celebrate the month of Ramadan and five especially sacred nights. In recent years the Muslim Community has celebrated the birthday of Prophet Muhammad in the third week of April by organising a big concert in Tirana.23 Apart from the Sunni festivals, the Albanian state recognises as a national holiday the ‘Day of Sultan Nawruz’ on 22 March, celebrated by the Bektashis in memory of the birth of Imam Ali. In addition, Bektashis keep the day of ‘Ashura in memory of the massacre at Karbala, and some other local festivals such as their pilgrimages to local saints’ shrines and tombs. 10

Halal Food

Halal food and slaughter are permitted and are gaining popularity among the practising Sunni Muslim population of Albania. Halal food is available in halal shops, pizzerias and restaurants in major cities of the country. However, there is no central institution for halal certification in Albania.

The birthday of Prophet Muhammad is usually celebrated in the third weekend of the month of April and the organisers follow the solar rather than the lunar calendar. The initiators and organisers of this concert are the Nurcu Tariqah, which, since 2005, has developed a strong influence among the Muslim Community of Albania. 23

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Dress Codes

There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public places or for pupils in school. However, there have been a number of incidents in recent years involving girls wearing hijab being expelled from schools and universities or being required to remove their headscarf. The latest case occurred in March 2008 when two girls were expelled from a middle school in Tirana.24 Although the state does not officially prohibit Muslim women from wearing hijab, in most state and public institutions this practice is barred under the umbrella of compliance with internal uniforms and regulations, or with the claim that the secularity of the state must be maintained. 12

Publications and Media

The main Muslim newspapers and magazines in Albania are: Drita Islame (The Light of Islam), journal of the Muslim Community of Albania; Drita e Ehlil Bejtit (The Light of Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Qadiri tariqa; Dashuria për Ehlil Bejtin (The Love for Ahl al-Bayt), journal of the Rifa’i tariqa; Paqja (Peace), magazine of the Bektashi Community; Njeriu (The Man), periodical magazine of the Divine Light League of the Sufi tariqas; Besimtari (The Believer), journal of Shkodra’s Charitable Society; Drita e Dijes (The Light of Knowledge), journal of Drita Cultural Club of Shkodra; Familja (The Family), a magazine published by the ‘Women’ association—Shoqata Kulturore “GRUAJA”. Apart from the above newspapers, there are a number of Muslim publishing houses and organizations, which produce a variety of books, mainly translations from Arab and Turkish. The most prominent are

24 “Mbanin ferexhe, drejtoresha përzë dy vajza nga shkolla”, Gazeta Shqip, 5 March 2008, available at http://gazeta-shqip.com/artikull.php?id=37966, accessed 7 March 2009.

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the Albanian Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization, “Prizmi” Publishing House, Jehona Association, Tradita Association, Future’s Youth Organization, the ALSAR association and the Ardhmëria association. 13

Family Law

Albanian courts do not recognise any religious law in their juridical practice. The Sunni Muslim community recognises the practice of nikah (religious marriage), but this is not often practised and few people marry by having a nikah administered by an imam. 14 Public Opinion and Debate A number of issues pertaining to Muslims and Islam attracted media attention in Albania during 2008. The most controversial was related to the novel, Living on an Island, by the socialist politician Ben Blushi, which was condemned in April 2008 by ten Muslim organisations who claimed it was racist and Islamophobic.25 The deputy head of the Muslim Community of Albania, Saimir Rusheku, alleged that it undermined religious harmony in Albania.26 The indignation of the Muslims was followed by many debates in the Tirana media and the Albanian public was divided. One side perceived the novel as being Christian fundamentalist and insulting to Islam, the Roma, the Turks and the Muslims of Albania in general, while others defended it. The Muslim Forum of Albania, one of the main organisations that promoted public discussion about the novel, appealed to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to take note of the increase in Islamophobia and racism in Albania.27

25 “The Muslim Forum and other Muslim associations are annoyed by the racism and Islamophobia of Ben Blushi”, Press Release 28 April 2008, available at http:// forumimusliman.org/english/blushi.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 26 Rusheku, Saimir, “Romani i Ben Blushit minon harmoninë fetare në Shqipëri”, Gazeta Shqiptare, 25 April 2008, available at http://balkanweb.com/sitev4/index .php?id=19968, accessed 26 April 2008. 27 “Letter to Ambassador Robert Bosch, Head of the OSCE Mission in Albania: The Muslim Forum of Albania appeals to OSCE to help fighting Islamophobia and racism in Albania”, 3 June 2008, available at http://forumimusliman.org/english/osce .html, accessed 7 March 2009.

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Another issue that attracted media attention was the Muslims’ desire to build a major mosque in the centre of Tirana. The issue of the mosque was raised by the mufti of Tirana, Shaban Salihaj, during the Bayram sermon of 30 September 2008 when he asked Tirana’s municipality to grant the Muslim community permission to construct a central mosque, just as the Christians were allowed to build their cathedrals.28 The mufti’s request was widely publicised by the media and a local imam in Kavaja asked Prime Minister Berisha to intervene and do something for the Muslims since they were being discriminated against by Tirana’s mayor Edi Rama’ and his Socialist Party. The permission to construct a new mosque has not yet been granted. 15

Major Cultural Events

Major annual cultural organized by Muslims in Albania are: – the concert for the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad organised on the weekends around 20 April in Tirana by the Muslim Community of Albania; – public celebrations and prayers organised during the Bayrams and Ramadan throughout the country; – the celebrations of Sultan Nawruz on 22 March by the Bektashi Community; – Bektashi pilgrimages in the Tomori Mountain on 20–25 August in memory of the Shi’i saint Abbas Ali.

28 Mahmutaj, Fatos, “Bajrami, Myslimanët kërkojnë xhaminë”, Gazeta Panorama, 1 October 2008, available at http://www.panorama.com.al/index.php?id=19656, accessed 7 March 2009.

AUSTRIA Ednan Aslan and Petra Heinrich1 1

Muslim Populations

Groups of Hungarian Muslims settled in Austrian territories from the eleventh to the thirteenth century.2 With the peace treaty of Passarowitz (16 August, 1718), subjects of the Ottoman Empire received full permission to establish settlements and factories.3 In 1878, the former Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied by Austrian troops and were annexed in 1908. For the first time, the Habsburgs then assumed authority over a large consolidated Muslim population. With the collapse of the monarchy in 1918, most of the Muslims emigrated from Austrian territory because of the insecurity of economic and political conditions and only around 100 unorganised Muslim individuals stayed. After World War II, the number of working immigrants (‘guest workers’) from Yugoslavia and Turkey grew as a result of special agreements with Turkey in 1964, with former Yugoslavia in 1966 and because of a shortage of labour in Austria. Austria also received political refugees and students from Islamic countries. Immigration reached its peak during the 1960–1970s4 when most of the workers came as ‘tourists’ and then registered as migrant workers and worked hard for low wages. After the first oil crisis in 1974, a stop was put to the arrival of migrant workers because of the worsening economic situation. This

Dr. Ednan Aslan is Professor of Islamic Education in the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, University of Vienna. Petra Heinrich is a PhD Fellow at the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, Institute for Educational Sciences, Department for Islamic Religious Education, Vienna. 2 Aslan, E., “Muslime und ihre Zukunft in Österreich”, in Kohl, A., S. Karner and D. Halper (eds), Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 2007 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), pp. 258–272. 3 Potz, R., “Die Anerkennung der islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich”, in J. Schwartländer (ed.), Freiheit der Religion: Christentum und Islam unter dem Anspruch der Menschenrechte, Forum Weltkirche, vol. 2 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 1993), p. 135. 4 Schakfeh, A., “Die rechtliche Situation der Muslime in Österreich”, in Schneiders, T. and L. Kaddor (eds), Muslime im Rechtsstaat. (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005). 1

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changed in the 1980s when diplomats, businessmen and students, as well as OPEC and UN employees came to Austria. In 1986, a second wave of migrant workers began to arrive as a result of new economic and political problems in Yugoslavia and with the outbreak of war there in 1990. In the 2001 census, about 339,000 Muslims were registered, representing 4.3% of the total population of 8,032,926.5 The biggest group of Muslims in Austria have Turkish citizenship (123,000), followed by Austrians (96.000), Bosnians (64,628), Yugoslavs (i.e. Serbia and Montenegro) (21,594), Macedonians (10,969) and Iranians (3,774). According to the 2001 census, 71.7% of the Muslims in Austria have foreign citizenship and Muslims constitute about half of the total number of foreigner residents. Their distribution across Austria’s states varies according to the local employment and economic conditions. The figures are: Vorarlberg 29,334, Vienna 121,149, Salzburg 23,137, Upper Austria 55,581, Tyrol, 27,117, Lower Austria 48,730, Kärnten 10,940, Steiermark 19,007 and Burgenland 3,993.6 2

Islam and the State

The law concerning the recognition of religion of 1874, RGBl Nr 68, included the Islamic religion in the Austrian Empire.7 Today Austria is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute the majority (73.6% according to the latest [2001] census) of the population. The Muslim population is today the third largest religious community in Austria. The current equal status of Muslims in Austria rests on the Staatsgrundgesetz (Basic Law of the State) of the Austrian Empire of 1867 (art. 14, 15, 17) concerning freedom of faith, freedom of culture and freedom of knowledge and education. The Islamgesetz of 1912 recognises adherents of Islam as a religious community according to the ‘Hanafite rite’. The Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ, 5 See http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/bevoelkerung_1971_bis_2001_nach_ ausgewaehlter_staatsangehoerigkeit_und_bun_022887.pdf (accessed 10 December 2008); http://www.statistik.at/web_de/static/bevoelkerung_nach_dem_religionsbekenntnis_ und_bundeslaendern_1951_bis_2001_022885.pdf (accessed 10 December 2008). 6 Rohe, M., Perspektiven und Herausforderungen in der Integration muslimischer MitbürgerInnen in Österreich (Erlangen: Ministry of the Interior, 2006), available at http://www .bmi.gv.at/downloadareas/asyl_fremdenwesen/Perspektiven_Herausforderungen.pdf (accessed 10 December 2008). 7 Potz, “Die Anerkennung der islamischen Glaubensgemeinschaft”, p. 135.

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Islamic Religious Community in Austria)8 is responsible for the Mufti (in Vienna) and for imams, who work voluntarily. Islamic religious teachers are paid by the Stadtschulrat (School Agency) and are governed by a special section of the Stadtschulrat, the Islamisches Schulamt.9 There is no public funding for Muslim religious associations, but the state does provide funding for certain projects and for cooperation between, for example, the Muslimische Jugend Österreich (Muslim Youth Organization —MJÖ)10 and the Catholic Youth Organization. The MJÖ generates money through membership-fees and private sponsors. A major MJÖ project is the ‘umra (pilgrimage to Mecca) in April as well as current projects for sports, summer and winter camps, Arabic courses, etc. 3


The main Islamic organisation is the Islamische Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich (IGGiÖ)11 which was recognised by the government in 1979 as a corporation under public law on the basis of the 1912 Act. The affairs of the Muslim Religious Community are governed by: 1. the local council; 2. the regional committee; 3. the first Imam; 4. spiritual counsellors; then, specific to the IGGiÖ: 5. the Shura Council; 6. the Supreme Council; 7. the Advisory Committee; 8. the Mufti of the IGGiÖ; and 9. the Arbitration Tribunal. The Muslim Community is lead by a president, elected every five years, who is at the same time the chairman of the Supreme Council (Executive Body) of the IGGiÖ. The current president is Anas Schakfeh. The Supreme Council consists of twelve people who are elected by the Shura Council every five years. This is an important Islamic legislative body which also elects the Mufti. The Shura Council consists of a minimum of sixteen members who are elected by the chairmen of the regional committees. These regional committees, which have six members, are elected by the local councils in the provinces of Austria.12 Financial affairs are regulated by the Shura Council and the income of the IGGiÖ is a combination

www.derislam.at. www.schulamt-islam.at. 10 www.mjoe.at. 11 www.derislam.at. 12 http://www.derislam.at/islam.php?name=Themen&pa=showpage&pid=3 (accessed 12 May 2009). 8 9

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of donations, membership fees and Solidarbeitrag (solidarity fee) paid by teachers. Muslim associations exist throughout Austria,13 with approximately 260 being registered. There are no reliable details about the number of Muslims since this is not covered by the census statistics. The Alevis are represented by the Alevi Federation in Austria (Föderation alevitischer Kulturverbände), the Sunnis are united under the IGGiÖ, and the Shi’ites are represented by the Ahl-ul-Bayt Österreich. The number of Turkishspeaking associations (e.g, Islamische Föderation in Österreich (Milli Görus); Türkisch Islamische Union für kulturelle und soziale Zusammenarbeit in Österreich-ATIB,14 Union islamischer Kulturzentren;15 Dachorganisation Türkischer Kultur und Sportgemeinschaft) is presumably the highest, followed by Arab16 associations (e.g., Gesellschaft für Zusammenkunft der Kulturen; Liga Kultur; Schura Moschee) and a number of transcultural, supra-regional Muslim associations (e.g., Initiative muslimische ÖsterreicherInnen IMÖ,17 Kulturverein Al-Andalus,18 Liga Kultur Verein für Multi-Kulturellen Brückenbau).19 Bosnian Muslims are represented by the “Dachverband der Bosniaken in Österreich and Verein Bosnischer Muslime der hamefitischen Rechtsschule Gazi Husrevbeg. 4


There are two mosques with minarets in Austria (Vienna, 21st district; Telfs, Tyrol) and a third is due to be finished in 2009 close to Vienna in Bad Vöslau (NÖ).The approximate number of prayer rooms is 250 spread throughout Austria, most of them in private buildings often combined with a tea room. The biggest mosque, with a minaret 32m high, was built in the 1980s in Vienna, financed by the king of Saudi Arabia. The construction of mosques and prayer rooms is an entitlement under the principle of freedom of religious practice, but is also subject to local building regulations. The construction of minarets

13 Schmiedinger, T., “Islam in Österreich”, in Kohl, A., S. Karner and D. Halper (eds) Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 2007 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2008), p. 242. 14 www.deutsch.atib.at. 15 www.uikz.org. 16 www.aawleague.org. 17 www.islaminitiative.at. 18 www.andalus.at. 19 www.alnur.at.

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is regarded in law as a form of worship.20 Two Austrian provinces (Kärnten and Vorarlberg) have tightened their building regulations in such a way that, although there is no explicit prohibition on building mosques, in practice, applications face many legal difficulties and interminable negotiations. 5


Under the Religious Education Act 1949 (sections 4.1 and 6.1), the state pays for Islamic education in state schools. Islamic education is taught in Austria in 2,109 schools by 381 teachers. There are eight inspectors who control and supervise the teachers in schools. The Religionsunterrichtsgesetz of 1949 (with additions and renewals) says that religious education (§ 2. (1)) is conducted in cooperation with and under the supervision of the specific recognised religious community. The curricula for religious education (hours of teaching and content) are announced by the federal minister but recognised religious communities have responsibility for content (Art § 7 d). Only teaching materials that do not conflict with civic education are permitted. There are six private Islamic schools in Vienna, which are financed by Islamic associations,21 According to research by the Islamic Schools Agency, about 47,000 pupils go to Islamic religious classes in schools, of whom 83.3% (39,160) attend primary and lower secondary schools for at least nine years, 8% (3,770) attend high schools and 8.7% (4,075) go to professional schools (BMHS, Berufsbildende mittlere und höhere Schulen). Most of the pupils follow an apprenticeship and only a very low and statistically untraceable percentage go to university. The Private University for Islamic Education (IRPA, Islamische Religionspädagogische Akademie)22 was founded in 1998 in Vienna by the IGGiÖ and is also paid for by the state. The curriculum lasts six semesters, leading to in a Bachelors degree, and the course can be attended by primary school teachers. The number of students who currently attend the IRPA is 120, and the number of graduates since

20 http://diepresse.com/home/recht/rechtallgemein/327607/index.do?_vl_ backlink=/home/recht/index.do (accessed 16 March 2009). 21 SOLMIT (Solidarisch miteinander, ‘solidarity with each other’) is an association for the integration of citizens of foreign origin and acts as sponsor of private Muslim schools. http://www.igwien.com/. 22 http://www.irpa.ac.at/ (accessed 10 December 2008).

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its establishment is approximately 100.23 After graduation they work as teachers of Islamic religious education in primary, secondary and special schools. The secular system in Austria means there is a strict separation between state and church and for this reason religious establishments are not expected to become public or state-run. 6


The University of Vienna has had a tradition of teaching Oriental Languages since 1535 and in 1674 Giovanni Podesta was permitted to teach the Turkish, Persian and Arabian languages there, as well as ‘Qur’anic law’.24 Since 2006, the University of Vienna has offered a Masters degree in Islamic Religious Pedagogy (IRP)25 and this will be a required qualification for teaching religious education in Austrian high schools. The Masters course is linked to the Faculty of Philosophy and Educational Science. The course lasts for four semesters and is currently attended by 50 students, six of whom are preparing to present their Masters thesis. Most of the students are either alumni of the IRPA, students from abroad (Turkey, Germany, Egypt) or students who grew up in Austria/Germany and attended high school. A Masters degree for imams will be offered by the University of Vienna from 2010. The target group are imams who have already trained in their homeland and want to come to Austria to work in the religious community there. In cooperation with the IGGiÖ, the imams will be taught mosque management, European politics, and financial and educational skills. A qualification in German language is a prerequisite. The courses will last for four semesters and will be accessible by full-time study or through evening classes. 7


The historic cemetery close to Graz provides evidence of an early encounter of Eastern and Western attitudes and respect for diversity.

Information provided by the IRPA, 20 December 2008. Aslan, E., “Islamunterricht und Europa”, in Heidrich-Blaha, R., M. Ley and R. Lohlker (eds), Islam in Europa. Favorita Papers 01/2007 (Vienna: Diplomatische Akademie, 2007), pp. 77–99. 25 http://islamische-religionspaedagogik.univie.ac.at/ (accessed 10 December 2008). 23

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For three decades, a section of the main Vienna cemetery has been reserved for Muslims where approximately 500 burials have taken place. A high proportion of most Turkish families still return the bodies of their dead to their former homeland for burial, but every year some 100 Muslims are buried in Austria and, as burials according to the Islamic rite are permitted, this number will increase. An Islamic cemetery has recently been established in the 23rd district of Vienna and another is due to be opened in Vorarlberg.26 8


Catholic religious services are provided in state institutions and the right to practise one’s faith freely extends to chaplaincy services in state institutions for all religious communities. The Islamic chaplaincy service is provided and governed by the IGGiÖ and the chaplains (SeelsorgerInnen) are selected by the Supreme Council of the IGGiÖ. Islamic chaplains are required to have a qualification from an Islamic higher education establishment or adequate practical experience in chaplaincy work recognised by the IGGiÖ. Islamic chaplains have free access to state institutions, such as prisons, hospitals and the army. There is no permanent imam for the army, but two volunteer imams work in Vienna and Salzburg. Since 2004 there has been a prayer room in the Maria Theresien barracks in Vienna27 and the Austrian army seeks to ensure that Muslims do their military service there. The Islamischer Besuchs—und Seelsorgedienst (IBS, Islamic Visit and Chaplaincy Service) was founded in 2000 by the (IGGiÖ). It coordinates chaplaincy issues (for the army and prisons, as well as hospitals) and the 2006 census shows that 6,160 patients in the Vienna General Hospital made use of its services. There are two permanent IBS posts, in the Vienna General Hospital and the Franz Josef Hospital, and other medical institutions are visited by request. Members of IBS staff must be theologically and personally qualified and are obliged to attend courses of instruction and continuing professional development. The organisation now has three regular members of staff, six on call and many volunteers. In prisons,

http://www.derislam.at/ (10 December 2008). http://diepresse.com/home/politik/innenpolitik/351965/index.do?direct =351928&_vl_backlink=/home/politik/innenpolitik/351928/index.do&selChannel= (accessed 13 March 2009). 26

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chaplaincy is increasingly in demand and there are ongoing efforts to formalise the presence of an imam responsible for state prisons. The total number of prisoners in Austria is 8,248, of whom 1,198 (14.5%) declare themselves to be Muslims.28 9

Religious Festivals

Islamic festivals have no legal status in Austrian law and there are no state regulations concerning daily prayers, Ramadan or Hajj. Where necessary, employees must make private arrangements with their employers to make it possible for them to fulfil their religious obligations. Since April 2006, the IGGiÖ has been negotiating with labour market partners about the recognition of Islamic holidays but no satisfying compromise has yet been found. School pupils may apply for days off at school for Islamic festivities. 10

Halal Food

As yet there are no halal abattoirs, but in Turkish and Arab stores it is possible to buy halal food. Ritual slaughter is legally connected to the fundamental right of freedom of religious practice and thus comes under Article 14 StGG, article 63, paragraph 2 Staatsvertrag of St. Germain and article 9, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 1999, the Constitutional Court issued a judgment that halal slaughter was not forbidden, referring to both Austrian law and Article 9 of the ECHR. According to federal legislation on animal protection passed in 2004, an official licence is required for ritual slaughter including the provision that the animals are stunned instantly before.29 11

Dress Codes

The wearing of the Islamic headscarf in public places (schools, hospitals, etc.) or in employment or public service has not yet been the subject of a legal ruling. Concerning schools, the Federal Ministry for Education,

Information provided by the prisons directorate on 1 December 2008. Potz, R. and B. Schinkele, Religionsrecht im Überblick (Vienna: Facultas Verlag, 2007). 28

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Arts and Culture has decided that wearing a headscarf for religious reasons comes under the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion and is therefore permitted. Dress in physical education and swimming lessons may also comply with religious rules and regulations.30 12

Publication and Media

There is no Islamic newspaper in Austria, but the IGGiÖ sends information bulletins to its members. There is a monthly Turkish newspaper named Yeni Vatan Gazetesi which focuses on Turks living in Austria and discusses Austrian affairs as well as global events. The Islamic presence on radio and television is uneven and centres around certain topics, such as Ramadan, the Islamic headscarf debate and festivals, but there is no Islamic radio station. No specifically Muslim television programmes are broadcast on Austrian television (ÖRF). Islamic matters are covered by religious programmes such as Orientierung, Kreuz und Quer, and current topics are discussed in various debates, news and reports, such as Zeit im Bild, Offen Gesagt, Bundesland heute, Thema and Im Zentrum. A study of the Austrian Islamic Internet presence shows that the websites can be classified under the following headings: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Information about how to lead an Islamic life Communicating a coordinated Islamic stance. Teaching Islamic education, knowledge and tradition The views of specific associations, individuals or institutions.31

Examples are: http://www.kismetonline.at/; http://www.carima.at/; http://www.derislam.at/; www.ummah.net; www.ibikuz.net; www .ahmadiyya.at (all accessed 14 December 2008).

Schakfeh, A., “Die rechtliche Situation der Muslime in Österreich”, in Schneiders, T. and L. Kaddor (eds), Muslime im Rechtsstaat (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005). 31 http://www.arabic-islamic.org/documents/islam_in_internet_islam_in_austria .pdf (accessed 17 December 2008). 30

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Family Law

The majority of legal decisions relevant to Islam concern family law. Since a fundamental decision of the Supreme Court (SZ59/128/1986), the ban on forced marriage or polygamy is seen as part of the ordre public, and the unilateral repudiation of a woman (talaq) under Islamic law is not recognised. Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriage ceremonies in mosques, but this is a traditional rather than a legal act. Marriage contracts must be signed in a civil registry office in order to be legal. The legal and court system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant in any litigation. 14 Public Opinion and Debate The most important public discussion concerning Islam was about the building of a mosque close to Vienna in 2008, and compromises were found which all parties could accept. Recent polls show that Austrians have a mostly positive or neutral attitude towards the integration of Muslims, while 24% express sceptical opinions and 16% disapprove of attempts at integration efforts. There is a generally high level of acceptance of religious symbols in public places (only 20% against), but there is a clear dislike of ‘religious clothing’, with 40% of those interviewed disapproving of, for example, wearing hijab in public buildings.32 15


There are no typically Austrian-Muslim events, but the major Muslim festivals such as ‘Ashura (Martyrdom of the Prophet’s grandson Husayn), Mawlid al-Nabi (the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday), Laylat al-Isra (the Prophet’s ascension), Ramadan, Laylat al-Qadr (the night of refection), ‘Id al-Adha and al-Hijra (New Year) are celebrated partly in public with the participation of public figures and politicians. For example, the mayor of Vienna is invited to iftar (fast breaking) at the end of Ramadan. 32 Rohe, M., Perspektiven und Herausforderungen in der Integration muslimischer MitbürgerInnen in Österreich. Studie im Auftrag des BMI. und SIAK (Erlangen: Ministry of the Interior, 2006).

BELGIUM Ural Manço and Meryem Kanmaz1 1

Muslim Populations

During its colonial period Belgium had little contact with the Muslim world. The Muslims in Belgium are primarily the descendents of the migrant workers who began to arrive from the Mediterranean basin from the 1960s. In 1970, some 65,000 Muslim immigrant workers and their families lived in Belgium, and by 1985 this number had risen to 200,000 by 1985. The exact number of people of Muslim culture or Islamic faith living in Belgium today is difficult to determine, as there is no official registration of the population’s ethnic and religious ties. Until a few years ago, citizenship figures yielded a satisfactory approximation, since the overwhelming majority of the country’s Muslims were foreign nationals. Between 1990 and 2002, however, a series of legal reforms liberalised the acquisition of Belgium citizenship. As a result, more than two-thirds of Belgium’s Muslim population now have Belgian citizenship. The latest generally accepted estimates put the Muslim population at between 410,000 and 450,000, which amounts to at least 4% of the country’s population.2 Today, Moroccan and Turkish ethnic groups account for 80% of the country’s Muslim population. The remaining 20% are other immigrants (and their descendents) from Algeria and Tunisia and more recent arrivals, such as refugees and immigrants from the Balkans (Kosovo and Albania), South Asia (Pakistanis, Indians, Afghans, and Iranians), and Sub-Saharan Africa (i.e. Senegal and Mali).

1 Dr Ural Manço is a senior researcher at the Centre d’Etudes Sociologiques, Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis, in Brussels, where he leads the research team “Migrations, multiculturalité et appartenances ethnoreligieuses”. Meryem Kanmaz has finished her PhD in political and social sciences at the Centre for Islam in Europe, University of Ghent. 2 The estimate is based on data from the National Institute of Statistics (foreign population from countries with a Muslim majority) and the Centre for Equal Opportunities and Against Racism (official data of naturalisations by country of origin).

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The overwhelming majority of these Muslims are Sunnis. The Shi’is are very much in the minority, but there is evidence that some Sunnis have been converting to Shi’ism since the 1990s. With regard to the Sunnis, those from Morocco belong to the Maliki rite, whereas the Turkish Muslims are Hanafis (although some Kurds follow the Shafi’i school). There are also some Alevi Turks and Kurds (Alevism is a form of heterodox Shi’ism specific to Anatolia). The geographic distribution of the country’s Muslim population is very uneven. More than 40% of Belgium’s Muslims live in the BrusselsCapital Region, where they are concentrated in six central boroughs (City of Brussels, Schaerbeek/Schaarbeek, Molenbeek, Anderlecht, Saint-Josse/Sint Jos, and Saint-Gilles/Sint Gillis). It should be noted that Muslim residents account for 17% of the Brussels Region’s population. This makes Brussels, which is the capital of both Belgium and the European Union, one of the cities in the Western world with the largest Muslim population. The Muslim presence in the rest of the country is more modest. Only 3% of the population in Flanders are Muslims. This northern, Dutch-speaking half of the country contains some 39% of the country’s Muslims, who are mainly distributed between the region’s two major towns (Antwerp and Ghent) and the former mining province of Limburg. Similarly, in Wallonia, the southern, French-speaking region of the country, Muslims also make up about 3% of the population, living mainly in the industrial areas of Charleroi, Liège, and Mons. They number around 94,000 (or about 21% of the kingdom’s Muslim population). The average age of Belgium’s Muslim population is lower than the national average and it is generally estimated that a third are under the age of 18. Despite a noticeable improvement in the socio-economic situation of some of members of the Muslim community since the turn of the century, when it comes to higher education, home ownership and self-employment, a large proportion of Muslims continues to grapple with social problems such as failing at school and unemployment (a corollary of discriminatory hiring practices). Those immigrants of Muslim heritage and their descendants who have acquired Belgian nationality make up part of today’s electorate. Their participation can be important in the municipalities that have a strong population of immigrant origin, noticeably in Brussels. As a result, candidates and elected officials of Muslim culture may be found in all the political parties and in all the elected assemblies. Since the end of the 1990s, several ministerial positions in regional governments and

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several local councillors of Muslim origin have been active in political life. However, none of these politicians favour their religious identity over their ethno-national identification (Turkish or Moroccan). Indeed, it seems that the Muslim members of the electorate tend to vote for candidates according to their national origin. There have been several attempts to create an explicitly Islamic party during the last decade, but none of these initiatives has succeeded in getting an official elected.3 2

Islam and the State

Relations between the state and religions in Belgium are based on constitutional provisions adopted in 1831. Article 19 of the Constitution establishes the principle of freedom of religion and Article 21 the separation of church and state, which is considered to be a relationship of reciprocal non-interference. These provisions actually reflect the Belgian state’s spirit of neutrality towards religious affairs, which differs from the concept of laïcité or secularism that assumes a strict separation between the State and religion(s). Belgian law allows the public authorities to recognise and finance various religions. Six denominations (in addition to the non-denominational Ethics Movement) are recognised today. They are the Anglican, Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant churches, Islam, and Judaism. Belgium granted Islam official recognition through a law passed on 19 July 1974. In order for a religion to be officially recognised, the Belgian state requires that a head of the faith be designated, who will become its spokesman with regard to the religion’s secular administration and the representative of its followers. The federal government takes responsibility for the salaries of the recognised faiths’ ministers, including those of its chaplains in the prisons and the army. The upkeep of religious buildings is borne by the municipalities or regions (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels-Capital). The state broadcasting networks set aside time slots for religious broadcasts, while public schools must provide religious education in the recognised religions. The teachers and inspectors of these classes are on the payrolls of the Flemish Region (which has been merged with the Flemish Community) and the French-speaking Community, whose powers include education and cultural affairs. 3 The best known of these Islamic political parties is the Brussels based Parti des Jeunes musulmans led by the convert Jean-François Abdullah Bastin: http://www.mvjm.be/.

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The need to develop a new form of organisation for Islam, which does not have a structured clergy, that would meet Belgium’s constitutional requirements has been a constant factor in relations between the state and its Muslim communities. Another difficulty is the need to find a balance amongst the many ethnic and philosophical strands represented in the Muslim population. Because they lacked a ‘representative’ head of the faith, the Muslim communities could not access state financing until 1996, when provisional representatives were appointed. In 1998, the government gave the latter the right to hold elections to set up a definitive executive body for the Islamic faith, which was called the Executive of the Muslims of Belgium or EMB (Executif des Musulmans de Belgique/Executief van de Moslims van België). However, the creation of this body did not put an end to the search for recognition. The EMB has gone through various internal crises, the causes of which are linked as much to repeated attempts by the Belgian government and foreign (Turkish and Moroccan) diplomatic authorities to meddle in its affairs as to personal friction and competition between ethnic groups (Moroccan and Turkish) and ideological movements. The second election imposed on the Muslim community by the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs in March 2005 to elect a new EMB (which was largely boycotted by Belgium’s Moroccan Muslims), and its political and legal aftermath, have led to a situation where the recognition process is totally paralysed. As a result, the salaries of the imams of the recognised mosques are not being paid and the budget allocation for the Islamic faith, which rose from €500,000 in 2001 to close to €7 million in 2006, is likely to be frozen in 2009. The Federal Government’s slowness to take account of these developments has forced local authorities to take palliative and ad-hoc management measures, and the municipal administrations have filled the political and legal vacuum left by the Belgian state. As a result, the municipalities have dealt with certain matters concerning the organisation of Islamic religious practices (mosque settlement, cemeteries, religious festivals such as ‘Id al-Adha, halal food in public schools, etc.). Some policies have been driven by electoral motivations and others even reflect a certain populist demagoguery and Islamophobia.4 For more information on the local management of the Muslim presence, see Manço, U. and M. Kanmaz, “De la pathologie au traitement: La gestion municipale de l’islam et des musulmans de Belgique”, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien, no. 33 (2002), pp. 57–88; Manço, U. and M. Kanmaz, “From 4

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Aside from the official body for the Islamic faith, the EMB (Place Rouppe, 16/3, 1000 Brussels, tel. +32 2 648 35 60, fax. +32 2 626 15 99, http://www.embnet.be/), there are a great many associations and federations of all sizes making up a very dynamic Muslim civil society.5 These associations are organised mainly along ethnic lines. Among the Turks there is a small number of federations (which sometimes encompass a large number of local mosques) expressing competing ideological and religious tendencies, and among the Moroccans there is a host of associations, including many run by independent mosques and denominational associations, that cater, for example, for young people or Islamic teachers of religion. The best-organised and consequently most influential Turkish Islamic movement is the Belgian branch of the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey (Belçika Türk Islam Diyanet Vakfi), known as Diyanet (Chaussée d’Haecht 67, 1210 Brussels, Belgium, tel. +32 2 218 57 55, fax. +32 2 223 01 52, http://www.belcikadiyanet.be). The Presidency was founded in 1923 to promote a modern, national vision of Hanafi Sunni Islam subordinate to Kemalist secularism. Today, Diyanet unites close to two-thirds of the Turkish mosques in Belgium and receives imams and Islamic teachers trained in Turkey and financed by the Turkish government. The second Turkish Islamic group is the religious political movement Millî Görüs (lit. ‘denominational vision’) represented by the Islamic Federation of Belgium (Belçika İslam Federasy onu) (Chaussée de Haecht, 125, 1030 Brussels, Belgium, tel. +32 2 219 80 79, fax. +32 2 218 20 49, http://www.fibif.be), the parent chapter of which was founded in Germany in 1973. Millî Görüs maintains ties with non-Turkish Islamic groups and various European public authorities and close to a third of the Turkish mosques in Belgium

conflict to co-operation between Muslims and local authorities in a Brussels borough: Schaerbeek”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1105–1123; Kanmaz, M., Moslims in Gent: De ontwikkeling van gebedsruimtes, moskeeën en islamitische centra [Muslims in Ghent: the Development of worship Places, Mosques and Islamic Centres] (Ghent: Academia Press, forthcoming 2009). 5 For an overview of the different networks, movements and organisations within the Muslim community of Belgium, see Maréchal, B., “Courants fondamentalistes en Belgique”, Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1 (2008), available at http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal_fr/2008/issue1/jv3no1a5.html (accessed 16 May 2009); Kanmaz, Moslims in Gent.

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belong to this group. There are some other Turkish Islamic communities, but they are markedly smaller. The Islamic reform movement known as the Gülen movement (Boulevard Auguste Reyers 207–209/3, 1030 Brussels, tel. +32 2 736 90 11, fax. +32 2 742 30 11, http:// www.idp-pdi.be) is the third major group. It runs six primary or secondary schools (the Dutch-language Lucerna Colleges and French-language Ecoles des Étoiles), boarding schools, and religious training centres. Its vision centres on the creation of an economic and intellectual elite of believers, although its officers refuse to call its establishments ‘Islamic’. The Belgian Federation of Alevi Associations (Belçika Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu) forms the heterodox Shi’i variant of Turkish Islam in Belgium and presents a humanist culture. Moroccan religious associations and mosques in Belgium are not organised along such clear ideological lines. Groupings do exist, but it is more a matter of individual practising Muslims who identify with these religious and ideological orientations than lines taken by the mosques that they attend. The majority of Belgium’s immigrants from Morocco and their descendents feel close to the Moroccan monarchy and its form of traditional Islam. Some Moroccans subscribe to the principles of the pietistic Tabligh movement. Other believers—as a rule educated second-generation immigrants—identify with what they call the ‘reformist’ tendency of the Muslim Brotherhood,6 fewer with Wahhabism or the more recent strictness of Salafis with roots in Morocco. The Moroccan religious associations and mosques have formed federations by province. The Antwerp union, Unie des Moskeeën en Islamitische Verenigingen van Antwerpen (UMIVA) (Plantin Moretuslei 202, 2018 Antwerp, Belgium, tel.+32 3 235 48 33, umiva.vzw@antwerpen. be) for the Dutch-speaking part and the Brussels-Brabant union, Union des Mosquées de Bruxelles-Brabant Wallon (UMBB) (rue François-Joseph Navez, 6064, 1000 Brussels, Belgium, [email protected]) for the French-speaking part of the country, are the oldest. In 2002, the provincial unions came together to form the Federation of Mosque Unions (FUM). The Islamic and Cultural Centre of Belgium (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Belgique (ICC) (Parc du Cinquantenaire, 14, 1040 Brussels, Belguim,tel. +32 2 735 21 73, http://www.centreislamique. be), known as La grande mosquée, housed in the grand mosque of Brussels 6 For a recent analyse of this movement in Belgium and in Europe, see Maréchal, B., (2008), The Muslim Brothers in Europe: Roots and Discourse (Leiden: Brill, 2008).

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since 1969, is a historical player on Brussels’s Arab Islamic stage. It is a creation of the World Muslim League, controlled by Saudi Arabia, and played a decisive role in Belgium’s official recognition of the Islamic faith up until 1996. Although no longer officially recognised by the Belgian authorities, the ICC continues to have religious authority within certain parts of the North African population, and also for the majority of converts. The Centre is asked by these groups to provide statements of religious advice (fatwa), grant conversion certificates and organise Arabic language classes and courses in Islamic theology. 4


There are 333 mosques and prayer houses in Belgium, all self-financed and having the formal legal status of non-profit associations.7 Flanders accounts for half of the houses of worship, with 167 mosques or prayer houses. There are 89 in Wallonia and 77 in the Brussels Region. Close to half of the mosques are attended and managed by Moroccans. The Turkish mosques account for 42% of the total. The remaining 10% belong to Albanian, Bosnian, Pakistani and other Muslim groups. Only four Islamic houses of worship in Belgium are purpose built or retrofitted with the classical architecture of a mosque, with one or two minarets and a dome. The others are prayer houses converted from shops or industrial premises. Municipal regulations prevent the amplified broadcasting of calls to prayer. In 2005, the authorities published certain criteria for the official recognition of local Muslim communities. To be eligible for state support, a mosque must have at least 250 members and observe the Belgian constitution and human rights, and the Belgian security services must investigate the activities of the house of worship in question. In June 2007, the Walloon regional government recognised 43 mosques (26 Turkish and 17 Moroccan) on the basis of these criteria out of a total of 48 admissible applications. The mosques that failed to gain recognition were allegedly rejected after receiving an unfavourable report by the state security services. Recognition by the Walloon Region entails the regional authorities’ commitment to maintain the buildings, and the federal government, for its part, is responsible for

7 http://www.kbs-frb.be/publication.aspx?id=178192&LangType=1033 (accessed 16 May 2009).

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paying the salaries of the 50 imams who officiate regularly in these 43 mosques (some mosques enjoy the services of more than one imam). At the end of 2007, the Brussels-Capital Region accepted nine out of 28 admissible applications for mosques to be recognised and the Flemish government recognised seven of the 32 admissible applications filed at the end of 2007 and in early 2008. The Flemish recognition criteria are stricter than those applied in the rest of the country: the imams who draw salaries in recognised mosques in Flanders must take courses in ‘citizen-building’ (inburgering) organised by the regional authorities, and Dutch must be the official language of the mosque’s administration. 5


The country’s public primary and secondary schools offer the possibility of taking two hours a week of religion classes for the recognised religions, or non-denominational ethics classes. Under this general framework, classes in the Islamic religion have been organised in both Dutch- and French-speaking public education since 1975. The teachers of these classes are paid by the public authorities of the relevant language systems. For a considerable period, these teachers came from the immigrants’ home countries and often had insufficient teacher training (they did not have the requisite training) and/or Dutch or French language skills. Specific teams of inspectors (three Dutch-speaking and three French-speaking inspectors) were not appointed until 2003 and, even today, close to 700 Islamic religion teachers do not have a clear occupational status. One can thus assume that no standard curriculum exists and that there are inequalities when it comes to payment, seniority, appointments and pensions compared with other teachers within the educational system. Islamic religion classes are given in some 800–900 public primary and secondary schools. These courses are taken by an estimated 30,000 pupils (the general consensus is that this accounts for half of the potential Muslim student body). Belgian legislation allows the creation of private denominational schools that are eligible for public financing provided that they meet certain legal conditions. The first such denominational Muslim school was the Al-Ghazali School run by the Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels, founded in 1989. At the time, its creation triggered caused major political and media reaction. A second initiative was taken in September 2007 with the opening of the Avicenne Islamic Secondary

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School for only a score or so of pupils in a borough of Brussels (Molenbeek) with a large Muslim population. Besides the Islamic religion classes given in public schools, and sometimes even in Flemish Catholic schools in areas with large Muslim immigrant populations, and these rare cases of Islamic schools in Brussels, all the Belgian mosques offer Qur’anic study classes in Arabic, Turkish, French, and Dutch on Wednesday afternoons or Saturdays. 6


Almost all the imams who officiate in the Turkish mosques have been trained in theological schools in Turkey. Whilst their level of religious training is satisfactory, their French or Dutch language skills are very poor and, most importantly, they are not familiar with the socio-cultural context of Belgian society or the economic, social, and cultural conditions in which the Muslim populations of immigrant descent live. The situation of the imams in the Moroccan mosques is more complex. Some imams from Moroccan rural areas do not necessarily have indepth religious training, while those who are theologically well-trained received their training in Saudi or other institutions that preach a strict form of Islam and this can create problems with regard to adapting to the European context. More and more voices from the ranks of the younger generations of Moroccans are calling for imams trained in Europe. The public authorities became aware of this reality after the events of 11 September 2001.8 Since then, a few small pilot projects to train Islamic religious personnel have been run. In the French-speaking part of the country, the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) has been offering courses since 2007 for anyone who is interested—Muslim and non-Muslim. In the first year, most of the 50 students who attend the courses were teachers of Islamic religion in public schools.9 The ‘Observatory of the Relations between Religion, organized Secularity and the State’10 organised training for ministers of religion of foreign origin in Charleroi in 2007 with the assistance of

8 http://www.kbs-frb.be/uploadedFiles/KBS-FRB/05)_Pictures,_documents_ and_external_sites/09)_Publications/PUB_1694_TrainingImamsEurope.pdf (accessed 16 May 2009). 9 http://www.uclouvain.be/38784.html. 10 http://oracle.cifop.be/.

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federal public funds and the support of the government of the Walloon region.11 In Flanders, the minister of education has commissioned research from Antwerp University’s Centre for Migration and Intercultural Studies (Centrum voor Migratie en Interculturele Studies) into Muslim theological training and retraining for Islamic officials, as well as for imams from abroad (this research was ongoing in 2008). The Cultural and Islamic Centre of Brussels (Centre Culturel et Islamique de Bruxelles) has long offered theology courses in Arabic in order to train Islamic personnel. More recently, a certain number of Islamic academies have been created in both Arabic and Turkish-speaking circles, but none of these initiatives is likely to receive official recognition.12 7


The bodies of most Muslims who die in Belgium, even those who have acquired Belgian citizenship, are sent back to their homelands for burial. In order to pay for this, most Muslim families contribute to either commercial or association funds. There are no Islamic cemeteries per se in Belgium. Cemeteries are managed by the municipalities and some of those that have large Muslim populations have set aside specific areas for Islamic burials. There are nine such cemeteries in Flanders,13 three in Wallonia, and two in the Brussels Region. 8


Islamic counsellors have been able to visit patients in hospitals and inmates in prisons (a third of inmates in Belgium are of the Muslim faith) for years. The prison chaplains have enjoyed recognised legal status since 2005 and eighteen of them draw salaries for this work. The hospital counsellors are not paid by the state.

http://oracle.cifop.be/#form (accessed 16 May 2009). For example: Islamitische Universiteit van Europa-Afdeling Gent (European Islamic University, Section of Ghent), http://www.ifeg.be/ifeg/x; Faculté des Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: http://www.faculte-islamique.be/; Académie Européenne de Culture et de Sciences Islamiques de Bruxelles: http://www.alkhayria.com/index.htm. 13 http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/archief/docu3.htm. 11 12

belgium 9

45

Religious Festivals

Muslim religious holidays are not observed officially. The most problematic issue when it comes to Islamic holidays is that of the sacrifice. Slaughtering animals at home is strictly illegal in Belgium and the majority of the country’s Muslims obey this law. Municipalities with large Muslim populations have been trying to organise the ritual sacrifice of ‘Id al-Adha since the late 1990s. They set up temporary slaughterhouses (where EMB-approved halal butchers officiate) and arrange for the sacrificed animals’ carcasses to be collected, but organisational set-backs emerge in certain municipalities each year. Butchers and breeders are also allowed to make their services available to Muslims at such times. The political and media debate about giving Muslims an official holiday to celebrate the sacrifice of Ibrahim arises every year with no decision being reached. Muslim pupils and students stay at home, either without permission or on presentation of a sick note, and this is tolerated by the authorities to a certain extent. Workers and employees use a day’s leave to participate in each of the two main Islamic holidays (‘Id al-Adha and ‘Id al-Fitr). 10

Halal Food

The halal label for food only partially reflects the reality. The EMB is allowed to grant a certificate to Muslim butchers who request it, but does not have the resources or the authority to issue a halal label for food products (meat and others), or to control the supply chains or the production processes. 11

Dress Codes

The issue of wearing headscarves in school has been on the Belgian agenda since 1989 and discussions continue to be passionate. The wearing of a headscarf or hijab still is not regulated in the country’s constituent parts (Communities and Regions) and the governments leave school principals and employers free to decide in this matter. Women in white-collar positions are banned from wearing headscarves on the job in both the private and public sectors, with the

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exception of some rare cases where hijab is tolerated, but one finds female factory workers and cleaners wearing headscarves. Three major towns in Flanders (Antwerp, Ghent, and Lier) explicitly banned the wearing of the headscarf in 2007 and 2008 by female civil servants working in contact with the public. In the French-speaking part of the country, the school rules of 90% of public secondary schools and subsidised Catholic schools prohibit hats, hijab and ‘obvious’ signs of religious affiliation on school premises. Yet, according to national legislation and the international human rights conventions that Belgium has ratified, the wearing of headscarves may be prohibited only for safety reasons or to avoid proselytising. Private sector employers and the Flemish- and French-speaking public authorities alike hide behind the risks of proselytism to justify their prohibition of hijab. Wearing hijab for photographs for identity documents is allowed by the Belgian authorities if the face is visible between the forehead and the chin. 12


There are several Islamic publishing houses and book stores in Belgium which sell mostly traditionalist or Salafi publications. They include AlImen (Brussels), Editions al-Hadith, Al Iqra, etc. In addition, some French publishers also distribute publications such as Editions le Savoir, Editions Tawhid or Maison d’Ennour in French-speaking areas. They are various Belgian Muslim websites, including www.islambelgique.com, http://islamic-events-belgium.blogspot.com and http://www.hadith.be. A quota of time for Muslim programming is legally available on Flemish and French language state radio and television channels, but this is not used to the full by the Muslim population. The paralysis and the disorganisation of the EMB and the difficulty in finding qualified Muslim professionals undoubtedly go a long way towards explaining this situation. 13 No data.

Family Law

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14 Public Opinion and Debate The image of Islam and Muslims remains negative in Belgian society. According to an investigation carried out by the Institute for Social and Political Research (ISPO) of the Catholic University of Leuven (KUL) and published in January 2008, 48% of the Flemish population believe that the values of Islam constitute a threat to Europe, and 37% believe that the majority of Muslims do not respect the European culture and lifestyle. 15 No data.


BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA Mirnes Kovač 1 1

Muslim Populations

According to the last official census in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter B&H or Bosnia), conducted in 1991, 1,902,956 (or 43.5%) of the 4,377,033 inhabitants of the country declared themselves to be ‘Muslims’ by nationality.2 Since ethnic and religious identities overlap to a large extent, this figure is usually taken as indicative of the number of adherents of Islam. Similarly, most Croats are usually considered Roman Catholic while most Serbs are considered Orthodox Christians. ‘Muslims’ were recognised as one of the Yugoslav nationalities in the late 1960s. The name ‘Muslims’ was replaced by ‘Bosniaks’ as the national name for Bosnian Muslims from 1993, although before the 1992–95 war, a significant number of Muslims declared themselves to be ‘Yugoslavs’. Due to war-related death, expulsion and internal and external migration, the numbers and demographic distribution of ethnic groups within B&H have significantly changed. A new census proposed for 2011, which msy include questions on ethnicity, religion or language, is a sensitive political issue and is opposed by some Bosniak and Croat politicians. They fear that it would put an official stamp on the new ethnic map resulting from the killings and expulsions of the 1992–95 war and the obstruction of refugee returns, thus ‘legitimising’ ethnic cleansing particularly in the Republika Srpska entity, where many areas were completely cleansed of non-Serbs. Estimates of B&H’s current population range from around 3.8 million up to 4.6 million people, and suggest that more than one million

1 Mirnes Kovac is the editor of the bi-monthly Preporod Islamic Magazine, published by the Supreme Council of Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH). He graduated in Islamic Studies from the Faculty of Islamic Studies in Sarajevo and has an MA in International Relations from the University of Sussex, UK. He is the author of Islam: Globalni izazov? (Islam as a Global Challenge) Zenica: IPA, 2004. 2 Federal Office of Statistics of Federation of B&H, available at http://www.fzs.ba/ Dem/Popis/PopisiStanB.htm (accessed 16 May 2009).

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Bosnians now live abroad.3 The CIA World Factbook estimates that in 2008 B&H had a population of 4.6 million people, of which 48% are said to be Bosniaks, 37.1% Serbs, 14.3% Croats and 0.6% others.4 While some sources indicate that there were sporadic contacts with Muslims before the Ottoman conquest, it is generally accepted that Islam arrived in Bosnia with the Ottoman armies. Bosnian Muslims are mainly descended from Christians (Catholics, Orthodox, or adherents of the extinct Bosnian Church) who converted to Islam during the four centuries of Ottoman rule from the mid-fifteenth century. Bosnia was under the Ottomans until 1878, and then became part of the AustroHungarian Empire until 1918, and later a part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918–41), the Independent State of Croatia (1941–45), and then Communist Yugoslavia (1945–92).5 A referendum on independence from Yugoslavia, already declared by Slovenia and Croatia, was held in Bosnia in February 1992 and boycotted by most Bosnian Serbs whose forces, assisted by Belgrade, initiated a bloody war in 1992–95. For about a year during 1993–94, the army of B&H also had to fight Croat forces on most fronts. In March 1994, Bosniaks and Croats signed an agreement creating a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of B&H. After the Srebrenica genocide6 ( July 1995), the Dayton peace agreement was signed in December 1995. The Dayton Agreement institutionalised the division of B&H into a Bosniak and Croat dominated entity, the Federation of B&H (51% of the territory), and a Serb dominated entity, Republika Srpska (49%), with the strategic town Brčko in the north as a constituent district. Estimates of the death toll of the war have ranged from 25,000 to 300,000, with about 200,000 being the accepted figure until recently

3 Agency for statistics of B&H, Estimated data as of 30 June 2007. See http://www .bhas.ba/new/ (accessed 16 May 2009). 4 World Factbook: Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/print/bk.html (accessed 16 May 2009). 5 Karčić, Fikret, The Bosniaks and the Challenges of Modernity (Sarajevo: El Kalem, 1999). 6 According to the ruling of the International Court of Justice the crime committed in Srebrenica in July, 1995 was named genocide in the article 5 which states: “[The Court] finds that Serbia has violated the obligation to prevent genocide, under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in respect of the genocide that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995.” See: ICJ, Press Release 2007/8, February, 27th 2008, “Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)”, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/index.php?pr=1897&pt=1&p1=6&p2=1 (accessed 19 May 2009).

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(2007), when a three-year investigation put the total number of victims at 97,207, of which 64,036 were Bosniaks, i.e., Muslims.7 The study revealed that more than 83% of civilian deaths were Bosniaks, rising to nearly 95% in Eastern Bosnia. During the conflict, more than two million people fled their homes (including over one million to neighbouring states and the West).8 Refugees and displaced persons, mainly Muslims, faced many obstacles when returning to their pre-war homes. Refugee NGOs say that, though more than 300,000 accommodation units have been rebuilt, there are still 145,000 families without housing, some 43,000 families still wish to return to their pre-war places of residence, and 7,000 persons still live in collective centres in B&H.9 Bosnian Muslims are Sunnis who follow the Hanafi school. During and after the 1992–95 Bosnian war, the first Salafis, locally known ‘Wahhabis’, emerged. Their exact number is not known but is estimated to be a few thousands. Contrary to general belief, they control no mosques. There are very few Shi’a Muslims and no Shi’a mosques, although there are pro-Shi’a associations. For many secular Bosniaks, their Muslim identity has much more to do with cultural roots than with religious beliefs. There are no reliable data on active religious practice. 2

Islam and the State

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a secular state with no state religion. The state has defined its relations with the churches and religious organisation in the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations in B&H passed in 2004.10 The law provides for freedom of religion and religious non-discrimination, the legal 7 Human Losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Research Results, Research and Documentation Centre, Sarajevo, June, 2007, available at http://www.idc.org.ba/prezentacija/ nacionalnosti.htm (accessed 16 May 2009). 8 Human Losses in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Research Results (Bosnia and Herzegovina: Civilians — killed and missing by ethnicity, PPT presentation, page 36.), Research and Documentation Centre, Sarajevo, June, 2007, available at http://www.idc.org.ba/presentation/ research_results.htm (accessed 16 May 2009). 9 RTV Mostar, “Još oko 145 hiljada porodica nema krov nad glavom”, 27 October 2008, available at http://sirlbih.org/Mediji%2027-10-08.html (accessed 7 April 2009). 10 The complete text of the Law on Freedom of Religion and Legal Status of Churches and Religious Organisations is available at http://www.mpr.gov.ba/userfiles/ file/Biblioteka/zakoni/bh/ZAKON%20O%20SLOBODI%20VJERE/ZAKON%20 o%20slobodi%20vjere.pdf (accessed 23 March 2009).

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status of churches and religious communities, and the establishment of relations between the state and religious communities. The Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church have signed agreements with the state. The Islamic Community in B&H (hereafter ICBH), after initial hesitation, is preparing to sign a similar agreement. The ICBH takes active part in the Inter-religious Council of B&H (MRV BiH), formed in 1997 to promote inter-religious dialogue, justice, peace and reconciliation. The MRV BiH only recently (in 2008) started receiving regular financial support for its activities from the government. Individual religious communities, including the ICBH, receive ad hoc funding for their projects, especially for the (re)construction of religious sites. Most of about a dozen religious schools, including Islamic ones, are however regularly supported by public funds. However the Law on Religious Freedom envisages the possibility of public funding for other expenses too. In post-war Bosnia the greater presence of religion in the public arena is clearly seen. Some welcome the religious revival as a healthy assertion of identity after the decades long de-Islamisation process during the Communist period, while others see it as a rising threat to the secular and politically fragile state. This process has also exposed religious communities to new challenges arising from publicity and public critique. In the post-war period, the ICBH has been strongly and regularly criticised by the media, often in a manner it finds unacceptable. Together with other religious leaders, the representatives of the ICBH are regularly invited to attend official meetings, state ceremonials and celebrations on all levels. 3


The main Muslim organisation in the country is the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ICBH) (Islamska zajednica u Bosni i Hercegovini, Zelenih beretki 17, Sarajevo, 71000, tel.: +387 33 533 000, www.rijaset.ba). The ICBH is, according to its Constitution, “the sole and united community of Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, of Bosniaks outside their homeland, and of other Muslims who accept it as their own. The autonomy of ICBH is based on the religious and legal institutions of Bosnian Muslims from the time of Ottoman administration in Bosnia.”11

11

Constitution of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Hercegovina, ed. Rijaset Islamske Zajednice


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The ICBH is recognised by the state as the institution that has traditionally represented Islam in B&H. It is independent in the regulation of its activities (rituals, Islamic education, management of Islamic endowments, publishing, charity, etc.) and the management of its property, and is financed mainly through waqfs, membership fees, zakah, sadaqat al-fitr, qurban, the revenue of its profit-generating agencies, gifts, legacies, etc. The organisational structure of the ICBH consists of jama‘ahs (community of at least 100 households), majlises (usually a group of not less than seven jama‘ahs in one municipality or city), muftiates (mufti offices, eight in Bosnia and three in Slovenia, Croatia and Sanjak), the Riyasat (Rijaset, main executive body of the ICBH), Rais al-ulama (the President of the Riyasat and the Grand Mufti or supreme authority in the ICBH), the Council of the ICBH (Sabor or the ICBH’s assembly) and the Constitutional Court. Since 1993 the ICBH has been headed by Dr Mustafa Cerić.12 The Riyasat comprises legal, financial, and faith and education departments, the El-Kalem publishing centre, the Preporod bi-weekly Islamic newspaper, Zakah Office, the Waqf Directorate, the Office for the Bosniak Diaspora, MINA (Muslim news agency), the Gazi Husrev Bey Library, etc. The Association of Ulama (Ilmija) runs activities that directly affect the work and social status of imams and teachers of Islamic religious classes in public schools. The Association publishes its own quarterly magazine, Novi Muallim, and organises seminars, symposiums and lectures. Several Sufi orders are active, mainly Qadiris and Naqshbandis. The Tariqah Centre (Tarikatski centar) in Sarajevo is in charge of the coordination of Sufi orders as part of the ICBH. In addition to the ICBH, there are many relatively small faith-based Muslim and Islamic associations with a variety of aims and orientations. Some are missionary, others are cultural, scientific, charitable, student or exclusively female. The most significant Islamic charity is the Muslim charitable society Merhamet (founded in 1913, banned 1946, and re-established 1990). During the war, it opened many branches throughout the Bosnian diaspora and collected humanitarian aid. Two of the main Muslim women’s NGOs are Nahla (founded in 2000 in Sarajevo, www.nahla.ba) and Kewser, (founded 1994 in Zenica,

u Bosni i Hercegovini (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1997), Articles 1–4, available at http://www .rijaset.ba/en/images/stories/Constitution.pdf (accessed 16 May 2009). 12 See Karčić, Fikret, “Administration of Islamic affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, Islamic Studies, vol. 38, no. 4 (1999), pp. 535–561.

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www.kewser-zehra.com.ba). The latter publishes the Zehra monthly family magazine (circulation ca. 3,000).13 4


There are approximately 1,700 mosques and masjids14 in B&H, all run by the ICBH. Most Muslim villages and towns with significant Muslims communities have a mosque or masjid either dating from Ottoman times or constructed by the local residents. In larger towns such as Sarajevo, Zenica, Bugojno, etc., a number of mosques were built after the war as a gift from friendly governments such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, Jordan, and Kuwait. Many mosques are still under reconstruction after being destroyed or damaged during the war, while others are new builds. The ICBH reports that 613 mosques, 218 masjids, 69 maktabs, 4 zawias, 37 turbes and 405 various other waqf properties were completely destroyed in the war of 1992–95.15 In at least one case (Divič), an Orthodox church was constructed on the site of a destroyed mosque and the ICBH recently paid the Serbian Orthodox Church to move it. The first attempt to start reconstruction of the sixteenth-century Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka on 7 May 2001 ended tragically with one of the attending Muslim believers being stoned to death by violent Serbian youths who were trying to stop the reconstruction. During the last ‘Id al-Adha, a mosque in south eastern Republika Srpska was completely burned. The Republika Srpska authorities claimed that this was due to faulty electrical installations, while the Muslim community believes that it was arson. 5


Confessional religious education is optional in public schools and is offered, to all practical purposes, in primary schools for only the three main religious communities. In secondary schools, it is offered only in

13 Magazine circulation figures are either stated in the magazines or obtained through direct telephone inquiries to editors. 14 In the Bosnian context, a mosque (džamija) is usually expected to have a minaret and a full-time imam. A masjid (mesdžid ) is a smaller place for prayer, usually with part-time service and in most cases without a minaret. 15 Omerdić, Muharem, Prilozi izučavanju genocida nad Bošnjacima (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), pp. 15–25, 461–463, 473, 476.


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the Federation of B&H, usually in the first and second year for one hour per week. Islamic teachers are trained and approved by the ICBH but employed by public schools. For years some local and international organisations led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have been trying to introduce a one-year mandatory non-denominational religious studies course, locally known as Culture of Religions, or History of Religions, with limited success. Progress is being made but the course is still at an experimental stage. Religious education has also been recently introduced as an option in public pre-school kindergartens in Sarajevo. The ICBH runs six Islamic high schools or madrasas: Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (the oldest, founded in 1537) in Sarajevo, Behram-bey Madrasa (founded in 1626, re-established in 1993) in Tuzla, Elči Ibrahim Pasha Madrasa (founded in 1706, re-established in 1993) in Travnik, Madrasa Osman-ef. Redžović (founded in 1992) in Visoko; Džemaludin-ef. Čaušević Madrasa (founded in 1993) in Cazin, and Kara¶oz-Bey Madrasa (founded in 1557, re-established in 1995) in Mostar. The madrasa programme has changed significantly over the past ten years, transforming them from institutions of imam and religious instructor training into regular high schools with an additional religious curriculum. Around 400 students (roughly equal numbers of boys and girls in recent years) graduate every year from these six schools, and most of them go on to study at public universities. Only 10–15% opt for Islamic studies. 6


The Islamic Community has three major higher educational institutions. The Faculty of Islamic Studies (www.fin.ba) in Sarajevo (founded in 1977) today offers three different study programmes: Islamic theology, Religious education teacher training, and Imam training. Some 300 full-time students and a similar number of part-time students are enrolled at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. The language of instruction is Bosnian. The faculty also offers a Diploma in Islamic studies, a three-month non-degree programme in Bosnian and English for laymen and women. The Islamic Education Faculties in Zenica and Bihać were established in 1993 and 1996 respectively as Islamic education academies with two-year programmes to train teachers for Islamic education in public schools, and in 2006 acquired the status of university faculties. The Faculty in Zenica (www.ipf.unze.ba) now

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offers three-year programmes in three different departments, leading to BAs in Islamic Pedagogy, Social Pedagogy and Pre-school Education. The Faculty in Bihać (www.ipf.unbi.ba) has developed similarly. The faculties in Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać are associate institutions of the universities of Sarajevo, Zenica and Bihać respectively.16 7


Separate cemeteries for the different religious communities have been standard practice for a very long time. In villages, burial practices have continued to observe the traditional separation, with many cemeteries located near the village mosque. In larger cities, there are mixed cemeteries with separate sections for adherents of different communities. Atheists and non-religious people are mostly buried in mixed public cemeteries. As a consequence of the war, many new Shahid graveyards were designated for the burial of both civilian and military Muslim dead. 8


‘Chaplaincy’ in the armed forces is organised at all levels of military service for all the main religious communities. The Islamic service for the military is headed by the military mufti (established in 1999), who is nominated by the Rais al-ulama. The military mufti, appoints the military imams and chief imams, subject to the approval of the Rais al-ulama. While there is still no official chaplaincy in prison facilities, weekly visits and Friday prayers are organised in some detention centers, mainly by the local branches of the ICBH. Chaplaincy in health institutions does not exist, but in some larger hospitals prayer rooms are available. 9

Religious Festivals

Bosnia and Herzegovina does not yet have a law pertaining to public holiday, but two ‘ids or bayram festivals, as well as two (Catholic and 16 For more on Islamic education in Bosnia see Alibašić, Ahmet and Asim Zubčević, “Islamic education in Bosnia and Herzegovina”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009).


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Orthodox) Christmases and Easters, are celebrated as public holidays in B&H. Both religious and secular media cover the celebrations of bayram. State television broadcasts live from the Begova mosque in Sarajevo, where ‘id prayers are led and the khutba is delivered by the Rais al-ulama or his deputy and local TV stations often broadcast all-day programmes devoted to bayram and traditional celebrations. Muslim religious authorities arrange bayram receptions for public and diplomatic personalities. The second day of Ramadan bayram is also designated the Day of Martyrs (shuhada’ ) in remembrance of those killed in the Bosnian war of 1992–95. On this occasion martyrs’ cemeteries are visited, flowers laid, and commemorative programmes organised by the local authorities and the Islamic Community. The ‘id celebration is famous for its rich Bayram meal (tur. Bayram sofra). 10

Halal Food

There are a number of halal abbatoirs throughout B&H. In February 2006, the ICBH established the Agency for Halal Quality Certification (Turali-begova 39, 75000 Tuzla, http://www.halal.ba), which certifies the compliance of processes and products with Islamic rules and the Halal Standards Rulebook. Generally speaking, consumer awareness of halal obligations is low. 11

Dress Codes

There are no special rules on dress code in any institution of learning or public offices that would affect the wearing of hijab, although there is evidence of discrimination against hijab-wearing women, especially in employment. After the 1992–95 war, it has become more common for Muslim women to wear hijab in public, and some women, mostly those who incline to the Salafi interpretation of Islam, wear niqab, although it is has not traditionally been very common in Bosnian Muslim tradition since its ban in 1949. 12


The oldest printed periodical is Glasnik (the Herald), a bi-monthly official journal of the ICBH (founded in 1933, circulation 2,200). The largest and most influential newspaper is the ICBH biweekly Preporod

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(founded in 1970, circulation around 25,000, www.preporod.com), which covers all the activities of the ICBH as well as Muslim affairs in the wider European region and world news concerning Islam and Muslims. The ICBH publishes the annual Takvim, a hijri calendar with accompanying articles on current issues in religion, culture and society. The Association of Ulama publishes its own education quarterly magazine, Novi Muallim. The Islamic faculties and madrasas have their own student magazines, the oldest being Zemzem, the student magazine of Gazi Husrev Bey Madrasa (first published in 1968, circulation around 1,000). Two independent Islamic magazines are published in Zenica: Novi Horizonti (founded in 1997, circulation around 3,000) and pro-Salafi Saff (founded in 1998, circulation around 5,000). The Faculty of Islamic Studies publishes Zbornik FIN-a, an annual scholarly collection of papers mainly written by its staff (first published in 1989, circulation 300). The Gazi Husrev Bey Library (founded in 1537, with a collection of over 10,000 oriental manuscripts) publishes annals (Anali, first published in 1972, circulation around 500), which included studies and texts in the fields of Islamic studies, history and bibliography. There are also a few Sufi publications: the quarterly magazine Kelamu-l-šifa (first published in 2004, with a variable circulation) and the older periodical, Šebi arus (first published in 1982). 13

Family Law

Since the abolition of the Shari’a courts in 1946, only civil marriages are valid in law, and the usual practice is that after a civil marriage contract is registered with the municipal authorities, a religious marriage, or so-called Shari’a marriage, is conducted in the presence of a local imam, usually in the mosque. This procedure is recommended by the ICBH authorities at all levels. The same applies to inheritance: only civil courts have jurisdiction in the distribution of the property, debts and obligations upon the death of an individual. 14

Public Opinion and Debate

The recent introduction of Islamic education in kindergartens in Sarajevo sparked heated debate in the secularly oriented media, even though the law provides for religious education in kindergartens. Similar debates


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were raised when plans for building of a new mosque in Sarajevo were revealed. The issue of Salafism and Wahhabism has been a regular subject of debate since the mid-1990s, but the controversy has recently subsided and given way to a debate on Islamophobia. 15


Certain religious festivals attract thousands of men and women from around Bosnia and neighbouring countries at places called dovišta, ‘supplication sites’ or places for prayer linked in local legends to miraculous events. The most important frstival is Ajvatovica, a yearly gathering of Muslims at the Ajvatovica plateau near the towns of Donji Vakuf and Bugojno in the last week of June, with a two-week cultural, religious and tourist programme. Other prayer sites include Djevojačka pećina (Maiden’s cave) near Kladanj, Lastavica near Zenica, and the Musalla plateu near Sanski Most. Concerts and festivals of spiritual music and nasheeds are organised throughout the country by associations such as Selam and Kewser on the occasions of religious holidays or Ramadan. An event called Mošus Pejgamberov (the Musk of the Prophet) is organized annually by the women’s association, Kewser, in memory of Fatimah, the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad, who is very much revered by pious Bosnian Muslim women. The Sufi orders have their own central annual gathering in the form of a great mawlid in Blagaj, at the spring of the Buna river, in early May. Since the Bosnian war of 1992–95 and the genocide in Srebrenica, 11 July is commemorated as Srebrenica day. During the ceremony, the collective funeral prayers ( janazah) are said at the Memorial Centre in Potočari, and newly identified victims of the genocide are buried.17

17 As a sign of recognition of Srebrenica massacre as genocide the European Parliament passed the Resolution on January, 7th 2009., proclaiming 11th July the European Commemorative Day for the victims of the Srebrenica genocide on 11 July 1995. The text of the resolution is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ sides/getDoc.do?type=MOTION&reference=B6-2009-0027&language=EN (accessed 19 May 2009).

BULGARIA Ina Merdjanova1 1

Muslim Populations

At the end of the fourteenth and the beginning of the fifteenth century, the Ottomans conquered the disintegrating medieval Bulgarian kingdom. Subsequently, Islam spread through the mass resettlement of Anatolian Turks, on the one hand, and through the conversion of the local Christian population, on the other. Ottoman rule lasted until 1878, when Bulgaria gained territorial autonomy. A mass exodus of Muslims followed. In 1881, an estimated 578,000 Muslims still lived in Bulgaria, comprising 28.8% of the total population.2 In 1900, the number of Muslims was 643,300, or 17.18% of the population, while in 1946 the number of Muslims had risen to 938,418, although in terms of percentage of the population, they were only 13.3%.3 According to the 2001 census, there are 966,978 Muslims in Bulgaria, comprising 12.2% of the population.4 The majority Muslims are Sunnis of the Hanafi school. An earlier census (1992), which also included data on the population by ethnic and sectarian affiliation, indicated that 7.7% of Muslims were Alevis (also called Aliani or Kizilbashi), a heterodox sect considered by some authors to be Shi’ite. In terms of ethnic affiliation, the Turks are concentrated in the south-east and north-east of Bulgaria and account for 75.3% of all Muslims in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (descendants of Slavic Bulgarians who converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule), also known as Pomaks, are concentrated in the central and western Rhodope mountain in southern Bulgaria and make up 13.5%; the Roma (dispersed throughout the whole country) amount to 10.5%, some 40% of whom are Muslims. The tiny Tatar community has some 4,500 members living in north-eastern Bulgaria. 1 Dr Ina Merdjanova is Director of the Centre for Interreligious Dialogue and Conflict Prevention at the Scientific Research Department of Sofia University “St. Kl. Ohridski”. She holds a PhD in philosophy of religion and publishes on religion in eastern Europe. 2 Eminov, Ali, Turkish and Other Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria (London: Hurst, 1997), p. 71. 3 http://www.nsi.bg/Census/StrReligion.htm, accessed 17 May 2009. 4 http://www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Census_e.htm, accessed 17 May 2009.

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The 2001 census indicated that Muslims are the majority population in Kurdzhali district in south-east Bulgaria (69.9%) and in Razgrad district in north-eastern Bulgaria (53.7%). Most Muslims live in rural areas, and have been seriously affected by the economic crisis following the collapse of Communism. The results of the two censuses showed that between 1992 and 2001 the number of Muslims decreased by 143,317. This has been explained by the emigration of Muslims to more prosperous countries (Turkey and various Western countries, and very rarely to Muslim countries) and, to a much lesser degree, by the conversion of some Pomaks to Orthodox Christianity and to various Protestant denominations.5 2

Islam and the State

Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic with no state religion, although the Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional” religion (82.64% of the population belong to the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, although the number of regular church-goers is extremely low). Each year, the Religious Confessions Directorate of the Council of Ministers allocates financial support from the state budget to several denominations with a longer historic presence, mainly for the renovation of their religious sites, and the Islamic community is one of these. In 2008, a new association, the National Council of the Religious Communities in Bulgaria, was established on the initiative of the Religious Confessions Directorate of the Council of Ministers. The Council includes the leaders of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Islamic community, the Central Israeli ( Jewish) Spiritual Council, the Catholic Church and the United Evangelical churches. The Council pledges to represent the Bulgarian model of religious tolerance to Europe and to the Balkans, and to develop interreligious dialogue as a means of improving understanding, preserving religious peace and the preventing intolerance, but it has not yet begun to function. Overall, Muslims are well represented in the public atena both religiously, through the Muftiate, and politically, through the Movement for Rights and Freedoms. This party, established

5 Eminov, Ali, “Social construction of identities: Pomaks in Bulgaria” (2007), available at http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/2-2007-Eminov.pdf, accessed 17 March 2009, p. 6.

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in 1990, has been represented in every parliament since 1990. It has drawn support primarily from Turks and other Muslims, although its political leaders have been careful to preclude any identification with Islamist or pan-Turkist ideas. 3


The Bulgarian Muslim community, called officially the Muslim Confession (Musulmansko izpovedanie) is very well organised. It is administered by the Supreme Muslim Council (Vissh Duhoven Savet), with its core institution, the Head Muftiate (Glavno Muftiistvo) (Bratia Miladinovi Str. N. 27, Sofia 1301, tel.: ++359 2 981 60 01, http://www.genmufti.net/). The Head Muftiate presides over all the Muslims in the country, irrespective of their ethnic or intra-Islamic divisions. Twelve regional muftis are responsible for the administration of the community at the provincial level. The current Head Mufti is Mustafa Alish Hadji. 4


There are 1,217 mosques, where Friday prayers are conducted, as well as 240 masjids, and some 50 tekes and turbes, most of which date back to Ottoman times. Around 350 of the mosques have been constructed since the fall of Communism. 5


Optional classes in Islam were introduced in public schools in 2000. Students use textbooks proposed by the Muftiate and approved by the Ministry of Education. The classes are conducted in Bulgarian once a week and are supported by the Muftiate. There are three Islamic secondary schools, in Shumen, Russe and Momchilgrad, which follow the general curriculum for state secondary schools, with extra classes in Islam. The graduates from these schools can serve as imams or continue their education in any discipline they choose. There is a growing tendency for imams to pursue higher education in the Higher Islamic Institute in Sofia. Apart from these three state accredited schools, there are several Qur’anic schools for young adults supported by various foreign organisations,

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such as Turkiye Diyanet Vakfu and the Ahmed Davudoglu Foundation, operating under the control of the Muftiate. The number of students in these schools has gradually decreased and two of them (in Surnitza and Ustina) recently closed down. In additionally, the Head Muftiate organises Qu’ran courses for children every summer. Earlier activities sponsored by certain Arab foundations have been curtailed. 6


About 1,000 imams serve the religious needs of the Muslim population. Most of the imams are elderly and privately educated, as no religious training was available under Communism. The younger imams were educated in the three secondary schools mentioned above, and very few of them were trained in the Qur’anic schools. Some of the imams have diplomas from the Higher Islamic Institute or from various Islamic schools in Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt. According to the Muftiate, around 100 students sent by them have graduated from various Islamic schools abroad. The number of students who have pursued studies abroad through private channels outside the Muftiate, seems to be very limited. The Islamic Institute was founded in 1991 as a semi-higher institution, and became a higher institute in 1998. It offers courses in Islamic theology and is currently working towards state accreditation. Academic courses on the history and culture of Islam and the Middle East are offered on a regular basis by the Department of Arabic and Semitic Studies at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”. 7


Muslims are free to perform the traditional funeral rites, and separate cemeteries, or separate burial plots allocated for Muslims, are available. 8


Imams have access to prisoners and may also visit patients in hospitals, although no special regulations exist. Imams (as well as Christian clergy) are not allowed in the armed forces, as military law bans any religious activities on military premises as well as ministry to the armed forces.

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Religious Festivals

Muslims regularly celebrate their religious festivals. The chief mufti announces the beginning and the end of the month of Ramadan on national television and greets the believers at Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr). Greetings are also offered on television on the occasion of Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha). Muslims are officially entitled to a day’s holiday for these festivals. 10

Halal Food

Muslims have access to halal food through local shops, which are supplied by two local firms that perform ritual slaughter. Private slaughter is not forbidden. Halal food is not available in public institutions. 11

Dress Codes

There are no formal regulations prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress, including hijab, in public places. There have been occasional bans on the hijab in state schools that require school uniform. 12


The Muftiate publishes a monthly bilingual journal Musulmani (Muslims) in Bulgarian and Turkish. The Fethüllah-Gülen related Zaman Foundation publishes the newspaper Zaman (in Bulgarian and Turkish), some 20% of the content of which is devoted to religious issues. Other publications have occasionally appeared, but these have either been short-lived or achieved limited circulation. There are no separate Muslim television or radio channels. Since the 2000 introduction of daily Turkish language programmes on national television and radio, national radio broadcasts a three-hour programme on Islam every Friday. Religious programmes are also available on some commercial television channels.

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Family Law

Under Communism, Muslims could only hold religious weddings privately, usually without a certificate being issued. Islamic marriage was practised mainly in the villages, after the couples had been married according to the civil law. At the present time, imams can issue certificates to those who conclude an Islamic marriage, but the state recognises only marriages contracted in a civil registry offices. The Islamic regulations on marriage, divorce, and inheritance are followed unofficially, and the function of the spiritual court at the Muftiate is limited to hearing cases of clerics’ misdemeanors. 14


In February 2008, the Commission for Protection against Discrimination rejected complaints filed by three Muslim students from Devin who claimed that their headmaster had warned them not to wear hijab in class, even though the school did not require school uniform. The Commission found insufficient evidence to confirm the headmaster’s alleged warnings. In November 2008 the head mufti met with the mayor of Sofia to streamline plans for the construction of a new Islamic compound in the country’s capital (where there is only one functioning mosque, the sixteenth-century Banya Bashi mosque.) The compound will include a new mosque, a cultural and a conference centre, as well as a building and a dormitory for the Higher Islamic Institute. Occasional debates surround sensationalist and mostly unverified press releases about alleged extremist Islamic organisations and activities on the territory of the country. A few cases of vandalism against mosques (offensive graffiti on the walls of the mosques in the cities of Pleven and Yambol, and a fire in the mosque in Kazanluk) also stirred some debate. The opinion seems to prevail that these incidents do not reflect any substantial change in the relaxed relations between people of different faiths in general, or in the attitude towards Muslims in particular.

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The week of the Prophet’s birthday is celebrated annually with both religious sermons and various songs, plays and conferences. There is an annual Islamic Education Week in the last week of Ramadan. Both events are organised nation-wide by the Head Muftiate and are very well attended.

CROATIA Jasmin Džaferović1 1

Muslim Populations

According to the last available census (2001), the Republic of Croatia has a Muslim population of 67,401, representing 1.52% of the total population of 4,437,460. The largest Muslim ethnic groups are Bosniaks (0.47% of the total population), followed by Albanians (0.34%), Roma (0.21%), Turks (0.01%), and others (0.49%), most of whom declared themselves to be Muslims (Muslimani). (For the controversy over the names Bosniak and Musliman, see section 14 below). Most Albanian Muslims in Croatia come from Kosovo and Macedonia. Muslims are mostly concentrated in the capital Zagreb, and the provinces of Istarska and Primorsko-goranska. The fifteenth-century Ottoman advances into what is today Croatia led to Muslim settlement. Having taken Belgrade a few years earlier, the Ottomans marched on Hungary through Slavonia, an eastern province of Croatia, in 1526, capturing the city of Osijek. By the end of the sixteenth century, Slavonia had 110,000 Muslim inhabitants. The Ottomans took control of the province of Lika in 1527. The local population fled from the area, and by the 1530s the Ottomans had established settlements of Muslims and Orthodox from Bosnia. The Catholics who remained in Lika accepted Islam. By the 1680s, the Muslims in Lika were an absolute majority, numbering more than 300,000 inhabitants. However, the Habsburg victories over the Ottomans in the late seventeenth century made the Muslims leave Slavonia and Lika and move to Bosnia. Muslims started to return to Croatia only two centuries later, from 1878, when the Austro-Hungarian Empire took control of present-day Bosnia and Herzegovina and Muslims had more contacts with Zagreb,

1 Mr. Jasmin Džaferović holds an MA in Strategy and Diplomacy from the National University of Malaysia and is currently Marketing Officer, Embassy of Malaysia, Zagreb.

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Croatia at that time also being under Austro-Hungarian rule.2 The monarchy recognised Islam as an official religion in 1912 while the Croatian parliament did the same on 27 April 1916. In the period between the two world wars, Muslims in Croatia started to organise by establishing the Islamic Office for Croatia in 1919, the Mufti’s Office in 1922 and, in 1935, the first Shari’a Court, which adjudicated in matters relating to Muslim marriage, family law and inheritance. An initiative to build a mosque in Zagreb was announced in 1938, but was not realized until 1944 under the pro-Nazi Croatian Ustaša regime with which some Muslim leaders collaborated, making the period after World War II even more difficult for Muslims in Croatia. In 1945, when the Communists came to power, the Mufti of Zagreb, Ismet Muftić, was arrested and killed and other imams were arrested and imprisoned or killed. In 1948, the Zagreb City authorities closed the mosque built in 1944, destroyed the minarets and demolished the interior. The Muslims organised themselves again in 1957. The Community made a decision in 1961 to build a new mosque and began construction twenty years later. The mosque was officially opened in September 1987 and since then has been the centre of Islamic life in Croatia.3 2

Islam and the State

Croatia is a parliamentary democracy. According to the Constitution, all religious communities are equal before the law and are separate from the state (Article 41). The government defines its relations with religious groups through special agreements. The agreement with the Islamic Community in Croatia was signed in 2002 and stipulates the rights of the Islamic community in terms of mosque construction, freedom of speech and publishing, religious education in public schools, financing, and chaplaincy in prisons, the armed forces, the police, etc. It also gives the Islamic Community the right to register marriages. Imams’ salaries, healthcare and pension fees are paid in full by the government. The government also supports ethnic minorities through projects such as seminars, publications and other activities.

Hasanbegović, Zlatko, Muslimani u Zagrebu, 1878–1945: Doba utemeljenja (Muslims in Zagreb, 1878–1945: The Period of Establishment) (Zagreb: Medžlis Islamske zajednice u Zagrebu i Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2007), p. 31. 3 For more see Omerbašić, Šefko, Islam i muslimani u Hrvatskoj (Islam and Muslims in Croatia) (Zagreb: Mešihat Islamske zajednice u Hrvatskoj, 1999). 2

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The Islamic Community in Croatia (ICC) (Islamska zajednica u Hrvatskoj, Gavellina street bb, 10000 Zagreb, http://www.islamska-zajednica .hr) is the main Islamic organisation in the country. It consists of a Parliament (Sabor), an executive body called Mešihat, the Muftiate of Zagreb, and the Zagreb Islamic religious school named after Dr Ahmed Smajlović (founded in 1992). The current mufti of Zagreb and president of the Mešihat is Ševko Omerbašić. The ICC is the only Muslim organisation that has relations with the government, city and municipal authorities and other religious communities. The ICC is in practice a quite independent religious institution, despite its symbolic connections with the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina whereby the ICC recognises the Rais al-ulama in Sarajevo as the supreme religious leader while the Rais al-ulama confirms the mufti as the head of the ICC. 4


There are two purpose-built mosques in Croatia, one in Zagreb and the other in the town of Gunja. The mosque in Zagreb comprises prayer facilities, a library, offices, apartments for imams, classrooms, a restaurant, a youth club, a theatre, Islamic high school premises, etc. There are prayer facilities in fifteen other cities. Construction of the new mosque in the city of Rijeka should start in summer of 2009. 5


Muslims have the right to organise confessional religious education in all public schools where there are seven or more Muslim pupils in a class. The Islamic community in Zagreb has been running an Islamic religious school since 1992. In 2006, due to the low enrolment of new pupils, it was converted into a general Islamic high school. The school’s curriculum conforms with that of state high schools. It includes Islamic subjects, but a graduate does not receive the title of imam.4

4 See also: Marinović Jerolimov, Dinka and Ankica Marinović Bobinac, “Islamische Ausbildung in Europa—kroatisches Modell”, in Ednan Aslan (ed.), Islamische Erziehungin Europa/Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 239–258.

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Universities do not offer Islamic studies. Plans for an Islamic Studies Faculty have been initiated, but little progress has been made. Imams are sent abroad for training, often to Bosnia. 7


Muslims have the right to be buried according to Islamic rituals. In Zagreb, Muslims have a separate section at Mirogoj cemetery. In other cities, burial places are usually mixed with those of non-Muslims. 8


Imams have the right to visit and ask for a separate room for prayer in all public institutions including the police, armed forces, prisons and hospitals (Article 17 of the Agreement). Muslims serving in the armed forces have the right to ask for pork-free food, and to be taken to the nearest mosque on Fridays to perform the prayer. 9

Religious Festivals

Muslims have the right to a take a holiday on both ‘ids, but in practice, private companies are unlikely to grant this right. Both ‘id prayers are broadcast live on the national television and radio stations. On the day of ‘id, prominent politicians usually visits a mosque to greet the Muslims. On ‘Id al-Adha in 2008, the prime minister of Croatia, Dr Ivo Sanader, paid his first visit to the Zagreb mosque. 10

Halal Food

The Halal Quality Agency of the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina has so far awarded 22 Croatian companies the halal quality certificate. (The full list is on the Agency’s webpage: http://www .halal.ba.) However, not all companies have all their products halal certified, and certified products still do not have halal logo on them, which makes them difficult to identify. Companies are required to label their halal certified products with the logo by 1 July 2009. Dining and

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fast food restaurants are not halal certified. The Islamic Community opened a butcher’s store on the mosque premises in Zagreb, but due to low revenues it had to be closed because most Muslims live too far from the mosque for it to be practical to shop there often. Unlicensed slaughter is strictly prohibited, while qurban slaughter is organised by the Islamic Community in cooperation with a local meat company. 11

Dress Codes

Civil law does not prohibit women from wearing hijab, though only few Muslim women wear it. Wearing hijab for ID photos is permitted. 12


The Islamic Community is involved in publishing Islamic books and books related to the Muslim heritage in Croatia. The Cultural Association of Bosniaks publishes the journal Preporod with the financial help of the government. Muslims usually read religious newspapers imported from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Imams have regular slots for sermons on national television and radio. 13

Family Law

All family legal issues, except registration of marriage, are referred to the civil courts. 14 Public Opinion and Debate Before the last parliamentary elections in Croatia in 2007, the Party of Democratic Action Croatia (Stranka demokratske akcije Hrvatske, SDAH) left the ruling coalition led by the Croatian Democratic Union (Hrvatska demokratska zajednica, HDZ) because the government of Croatia did not comply with the request of SDAH to change the status of 20,000 ethnic Bosniaks who were registered as ethnic ‘Muslims’ in the national population register. The government replied that they could not change the ethnic status of an individual by decree, but each individual could change her/his ethnic affiliation in the national register from ‘Muslim’ to Bosniak before each parliamentary election. According to Bosniak

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representatives, changing people’s status from ‘Muslim’ to ‘Bosniak’ would increase the number of Bosniaks to 41,000, and they would then be entitled to a separate electoral district and three members of parliament. Currently, Bosniaks have one MP who also represents twelve other minorities. After the HDZ won in the last parliamentary elections in 2007, the SDAH re-joined the HDZ-led coalition. The post-election HDZ-SDAH agreement refers to reinstating Bosniaks into the Preamble of the Constitution when it is next amended, and the government undertakes to give an “interpretation regarding the change of the national term for Muslims” which will enable the updating of the voters’ register.5 15


The Islamic Community organises an annual European competition in Qur’an recitation in conjunction with the celebration of the anniversary of the opening of the Zagreb mosque in September 1987.

5 “Postizborni (ne)sporazum” (editorial), Preporodov, nos. 106–107 (December 2008–January 2009), p. 3.

CYPRUS Ali Dayıoğlu and Mete Hatay1 1

Muslim Populations

The Muslim presence in Cyprus dates from the seventh century, but Islam took root, grew, and was institutionalised in the island during the period of Ottoman rule (1571–1878). Cyprus was a British colony from 1878 until 1960, when the island gained its independence and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was formed. The RoC was based on a consociational system of power-sharing between the Turks and Greeks of the island, each community dealing with its own religious affairs. However, this power-sharing arrangement broke down in 1963, leading to a period of intermittent inter-communal violence over the next decade. During this period, the RoC came under the sole control of Greek Cypriots, while Turkish Cypriots established their own administration in armed enclaves. A Greek-sponsored coup and subsequent Turkish military intervention in 1974 ultimately led to the island’s present division. Greek Cypriots residing in the north fled to the south of the island and Turkish Cypriots in the south to the north. By 1979, there were only around 1,000 Greek Cypriots remaining in the north (out of an original 142,000) and only 150 Turkish Cypriots remaining in the south (out of an original 55,000).2 After the division of the island, the RoC, under Greek-Cypriot control, in the south, became the only internationally recognised government of the island. Turkish Cypriots in 1983 proclaimed a state in the north, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), which remains to this day unrecognised by any country other than Turkey.

1 Ali Dayıoğlu is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations, Near East University, Northern Cyprus. He researches the Turkish-Muslim minority in Bulgaria and Greece and the non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. Mete Hatay is Project Leader at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Cyprus Centre, Nicosia. 2 Gürel, Ayla and Kudret Özersay, The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to ‘Bizonality’ and ‘Human Rights’ by the Two Cypriot Communities, PRIO Report 3/2006 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2006), pp. 3–4.

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Although the RoC is constitutionally a bicommunal state, in 2004 it became a member of the European Union without its Turkish Cypriot partners. Turkish Cypriots may carry European passports via the RoC, but the northern part of the island was excluded from the EU’s acquis communitaire. According to the 2006 Demographic Report of the RoC’s Statistical Service department, the current population in the south, under the RoC-controlled area, is 778,700. Of these, 118,100 are foreign residents who do not have Cypriot citizenship. Some reports also claim that there are 20,000–30,000 illegal or unrecorded foreigners living in the south.3 Of these, an estimated 15,000–20,000 are Muslims of various nationalities. During the civil war in Lebanon, many Lebanese fled and settled in Cyprus, and Cyprus is today an important receiving country for economic migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers from nearby Muslim countries, South East Asia and Africa. According to UNHCR, 900 refugees and more than 10,000 asylum seekers are currently living in Cyprus, the majority of whom are Muslims. Cyprus is also home to a number of private universities and colleges which attract international students, many from Bangladesh and Pakistan.4 Apart from this immigrant and student population, a substantial number of Turkish Cypriots, mostly of Roma origin, moved from the island’s north to the south after the 2003 opening of the ceasefire line that divides the island, especially since Cyprus’s 2004 European Union accession. However, according to a recent study, the Muslim population of Turkish Cypriot extraction living in the south still does not exceed 1%.5 In the north, the total population, according to the 2006 census, is 256,644, although this census does not include the rotating population of Turkish military, which is estimated at 30,000–35,000 at any one time. Of the total recorded population, 178,031 are citizens of the TRNC, although 27,333 of these gave their birthplace as Turkey. Although religion was not listed on the census, and even though the majority of the population is fundamentally secular, Turkish Cypriots are officially 3 Trimikliniotis, Nicos and Corina Demetriou, Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Cyprus, Cyprus Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, (Oldenburg: University of Oldenburg, 2005), p. 8 (www.uni-oldenburg .de/politis-europe). 4 Statistical Service of Republic of Cyprus, Statistics of Education 2005/2006, Nicosia 2007, available at www.mof.gov.cy. 5 Directorate General Internal Politics of the Union, “Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future?”, IP/B/CULT/IC/2006_061.

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considered to be Muslims. There are also 70,525 immigrants who are nationals of the Republic of Turkey who are recorded in the census, almost all of whom are Muslim. The majority of this group are either studying in the universities of north Cyprus or working in the island’s growing construction, tourism and manufacturing sectors. Amongst the latter group there are many Kurdish and Arabic speakers. Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims following the Hanafi or Shafi’i schools. In addition, there is a large Alevi immigrant population, approximately half of them Kurdish and half Turkish. The president of the largest Alevi association has claimed that they number around 4,000–5,000. The majority of Arabic-speaking Turkish nationals are Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school, but there is also a small population of Alawites or Nusayris (different from Alevis), most of whom are from the Hatay area of southern Turkey. The remaining 8,088 foreign residents are listed in the census as being of other nationalities, including the UK, Pakistan, Bulgaria, and African countries. Of these, approximately half are Muslim.6 2

Islam and the State

Article 18 of the 1960 Constitution of the RoC guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion for everyone. It also provides in principle that the administration of the RoC, in the application of the law, will not discriminate against any religion or religious institution. Because of the bi-communal nature of the RoC, provisions are made in the Constitution for the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the institution of waqf and the Laws and Principles of awqaf (Ahkamül Evkaf ). These religious foundations are among the principle institutions of the Turkish Cypriot community, and historically the Evkaf was one of the largest landholders in the island. In the past, funds generated from these properties supported schools and other public works and religious institutions. Article 110 of the RoC Constitution confirms that the control of these properties and their funds belongs solely to the Evkaf, and any laws and regulations shall be enacted by the Turkish

6 Hatay, Mete, Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking? An Overview of the EthnoDemography of Cyprus in the light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish-Cypriot Census, PRIO Report 2/2007 (Nicosia/Oslo: PRIO Cyprus Centre, 2007).

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Communal Chamber, which during its years of operation (1960–1963) was comprised of elected Turkish Cypriot deputies. Article 23 of the Constitution secures properties belonging to mosques and other Muslim religious institutions. According to this article, no confiscation, restriction or limitation of ownership rights may take place with regard to such movable or immovable properties without the approval of the Turkish Communal Chamber and subject to the Laws and Principles of Evkaf and for the purposes of town and country planning. Muslim institutions are exempt from taxes and are eligible for government subsidies. However, after 1974, the Evkaf lost control over all its properties in the south and operates only in the north. As with all other Turkish Cypriot property in the south, Evkaf property has been placed under the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management Service, an institution established after the departure of Turkish Cypriots from the south. Despite the provisions in the Constitution, many complaints have been lodged pertaining to violations in the form of acquisitions made by the RoC in respect of waqf properties. After the proclamation of their own state in 1983, Turkish Cypriots approved a constitution by referendum. Article 1 of the TRNC Constitution stresses the secular character of the state, while Article 23 guarantees freedom of faith and conscience. Provisions have been made regarding acquisitions, requisitions, restrictions and limitations relating to waqf properties in Article 42. According to this article, matters relating to acquisitions and requisitions of waqf properties are to be regulated by law enacted in accordance with the Laws and Principles of Evkaf. According to Article 131 of the Constitution, all matters relating to or in any way affecting the institution or foundation of waqf or any Muslim religious institutions shall exclusively be subject to the Laws and Principles of Evkaf and the legislation in force and the laws to be enacted by the Parliament. The same article further provides that properties belonging to the waqf institution shall be exempted from any form of taxation. 3


Historically, the two primary Muslim organisations in Cyprus are the Evkaf (Vakıflar İdaresi, Nicosia, PO Box 118, via Mersin 10, Turkey), which manages the affairs of land and business holdings that have been donated for religious purposes, and the Müftü (or Mufti) (KKTC Din

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İ leri Ba kanlığı, Müftü Raci sokak No. 24, Nicosia via Mersin 10, Turkey, http://www.kktcdinisleri.com/baskanligimiz.html), who is the official spiritual head of the community. As explained above, as representative of Muslims in Cyprus, the Evkaf Administration, currently called Vakıflar ve Din İ leri Dairesi (Evkaf and Religious Affairs Office), owns all the island’s mosques, cemeteries, tekes and turbes (shrines). As explained above, following the 1974 division of the island, the Evkaf lost control of all holdings in the south, both religious and commercial, and operates solely in the north. Similarly, although the Mufti is the official spiritual head of the Muslim community in Cyprus, after 1974 his office moved to the north, and he is effectively without power in the south. Because Muslim organisations controlled by Turkish Cypriots moved to the north after 1974, no such Muslim-controlled organisations remained in the south to provide religious personnel and ensure the maintenance and upkeep of mosques. The need to provide such services, especially for immigrant Muslims, is currently being met by the World Islamic Call Society, an organisation based in Libya. As explained above, the Evkaf was the most important institution responsible for religious affairs in Cyprus. The Mufti, once the spiritual leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, lost his influence during the twentieth century, as the Turkish Cypriot community was increasingly secularised. While once influential in legal and educational matters and in areas such as marriage and divorce, the Mufti lost his historical title and privileges in the 1980s and became the Director of Religious Affairs (DRA) under the control of the Evkaf Administration, which is run by a board appointed by the Prime Minister. In addition, the DRA has authority only in the north. Because of the isolation and nonrecognition of the north, these institutions receive significant financial contributions, personnel, and guidance from Turkey. In addition to these official institutions, two associations, the Evrensel Sevgi ve Karde lik Derneği (Association of Universal Love and Brotherhood) and the Kıbrıs Türk İslam Cemiyeti (Cyprus Turkish Islam Association) sponsor various activities and programmes, mainly for students from Turkey studying in the island. The former was founded by the former Mufti, who was educated in Saudi Arabia and espoused a particular interpretation of Islam that emphasised universal peace. The latter was influenced by the Turkish-Islam Synthesis, popular in Turkey in the 1980s, which attempted to combine nationalism and Islam. Certain tariqas also operate in north Cyprus, the most important being the Naqshbendi tariqa, whose leader, Turkish Cypriot Sheikh Nazım

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Kıbrısi (Nazim al-Qubrusi), has many followers from Europe and the Americas. His main dergah is based in the small town of Lefke, where he regularly receives disciples visiting from abroad. Along with the Sunni Muslim institutions, there are two Alevi associations, whose members are immigrants from Turkey. The larger of the two, Hacı Bekta i Veli Derneği, has recently acquired land from the government to build a cemevi, or Alevi place of worship. Currently, they use the association’s building for their rituals and gatherings. 4


Prior to the departure of Turkish Cypriots from their villages, either during the period of conflict in the 1960s or after 1974, there were 102 mosques in the south as well as four tekes and 148 cemeteries. According to a 2006 report prepared by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, 16 of these mosques have been completely destroyed, only 25 are in good condition, and the rest are neglected or partially ruined. Of the cemeteries, 43 have been totally destroyed; three are in good condition, and the rest are in a very poor state.7 Since the island’s division, these properties have been under the control of the Turkish Cypriot Properties Management, an institution established by the Greek Cypriot-controlled RoC after 1974. Although there is provision in this department’s budget for the repair and management of Muslim religious sites, until 2003 few repairs had been carried out. Until 1990, only €206,120 had been spent on the upkeep of Muslim religious sites. During the RoC’s EU accession process between 2000 and 2003, this amount was increased to approximately €100,000 per year. This increase followed the publication of a Council of Europe report that cited these religious sites’ disrepair.8 The amount then increased significantly in 2004, following the opening of Cyprus’ checkpoints, the subsequent return of many Turkish Cypriots to visit their villages, and the May 2004 accession of the RoC to the EU. From 2004 to 2006, the RoC spent approximately €500,000 each year for the upkeep of Muslim religious properties, and this was estimated to have 7 Erasing the Past: Turkish Cypriot Culture & Religous Heritage under the Control of the Greek Cypriot Administration (Nicosia: Political and Cultural Researches Department of the TRNC Presidency, 2006). 8 http://moi.gov.cy/new/admin/sections/filedepot/uploaded/file/PDF_FILES/ PDF_1st_OP_Cyprus.pdf, accessed 17 May 2009.

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increased further in 2007, to approximately €750,000.9 A more recent (2008) UNDP-funded project to list and evaluate religious sites found that 60 mosques in the south were in good condition after repairs.10 Today, only five of the above mentioned mosques in the south are in use, and these are in towns with immigrant Muslim populations. The mosques in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol are maintained and run by the Islamic Call Society of Libya. Another small mosque in Limassol has been recently renovated at the request of the growing Turkish Cypriot Muslim community there (mainly Roma). A Turkish Cypriot imam travels from the north to this mosque every week for the Friday prayers, and also on religious festivals. It should be noted that the largest Muslim immigrant community lives in Nicosia, where there is only one functioning mosque. Although two other mosques have been renovated and could be used, they have not been opened for use. The authors observed that the one operational mosque is not sufficient to meet the increasing demand of practising Muslims, especially during Friday prayers. The one functioning mosque accommodates 750 worshippers, according to the mosque’s imam, but during Friday prayers the authors observed that at least that number had overflowed to fill the mosque’s garden and even its car park, where worshippers used rolls of paper to cover the ground for prayers. In the north, according to data provided by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA) in 2007, there are 164 active mosques, of which 84 existed before the island’s division, while 24 were built after 1974. In addition, 52 churches have been converted into mosques, and four mosques are building previously used as cinemas or schools. There are 41 residential areas with no mosque.11 In recent years, in view of Greek Cypriot and international reactions against the conversion of churches into mosques, more weight has been given to building new places of worship. Mosques in north Cyprus belong in law to the Evkaf Administration. Although the Evkaf collects considerable revenue from its various properties, only 10% of the cost of mosque upkeep and clerical 9 http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/embassies/embassy_doha.nsf/misc_en/8367AC21D 2B39069432572E400246FC3?OpenDocument, accessed 17 May 2009. 10 See http://www.cyprustemples.com. 11 Atalay, Talip, Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Yaygın Din Eğitimi ve Cami Hizmetleri: Kurumsal Yapılanma ve Din Görevlileri (Widespread Religious Education and Mosque Services in North Cyprus: Institutional Formation and Religious Staff ) (İstanbul: Seçil Ofset, 2007), pp. 203–204.

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salaries is provided by this Administration. The remaining 90% comes from the Ministry of Finance, which in turn requests this amount from Turkey, so the cost of mosque maintenance and staffing, like much of the infrastructure in the north, is provided by Turkey. 5


There are no state-supported Islamic schools in either of the two parts of Cyprus. In the south, instruction in the Greek Orthodox religion is compulsory in primary and secondary schools. However, parents of different faiths may submit a written request for their children to be exempted from this subject. Turkish Cypriot pupils who attend schools in the south, if there are reasonable numbers of them, may receive religious instruction in their own language. Currently, a Turkish Cypriot teacher gives religious lessons in Turkish in Limassol, where most Turkish Cypriots in the areas controlled by the RoC live. It must, however, be noted that despite the provisions of the Constitution of the RoC and repeated assurances by the RoC administration to the United Nations Secretary General, to date no Turkish primary school has been opened in the south of the island.12 According to the TRNC Constitution, “Religious education and instruction shall be under the supervision and control of the state.” Until 2005, primary and secondary schools had compulsory religious instruction under the title Religious Culture and Morality (Ethics). Lessons included instruction about monotheist religions in general with concentration on the Hanafi branch of Sunni Islam. However, most schools had for years suffered from a lack of competent teachers and so these lessons were often neglected.13 New regulations in 2005 allowed each school management committee to decide on the provision of religious instruction at the secondary level of primary education. Following this decision, many schools have chosen not to include religion lessons in their curricula. Traditionally, families who wish their children to receive religious instruction have sent them to summer courses in local mosques. In recent years, however, these summer courses have been a source of

12 On this subject, see Dayıoğlu, Ali, “Kıbrıs’ta Okullar Sorunu II: Limasol Türk İlkokulu” (The School Problem in Cyprus II: The Limassol Turkish Primary School), Kıbrıs Yazıları, No. 2, (Bahar 2006), pp. 56–69. 13 Atalay, Kuzey Kıbrıs’ta Yaygın Din Eğitimi ve Cami Hizmetleri, p. 240.

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controversy, twice prevented by laws forbidding the teaching of religion outside school. In other words, imams in mosques are allowed to preach but not to teach. Until 1997, these courses were given in mosques where more qualified imams were employed, especially from Turkey. Following reactions in Turkey against the rise of the Islamic-based Refah Party, these courses were prohibited in north Cyprus, but as a result of heavy demand by families, especially in areas of the north primarily occupied by immigrants from Turkey, courses were re-instituted in 2004, with the support of the Religious Affairs Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. In all probability, this may be attributed to the 2002 rise to power in Turkey of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi), which has a conservative religious base. However, opposition to these courses continued amongst Turkish Cypriots, and they have been periodically prohibited since. 6


There are no institutions of higher education that offer training for imams and other religious professionals in the south. The clergy operating and performing their duties in north Cyprus are attached to two authorities, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA, under the control of Evkaf ), which is an institution of the TRNC, and the Religious Affairs Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy in Nicosia. There are no faculties of theology or imam-hatip lycées. Only one university, the Anadolu University, a Turkish university, which also has a campus in north Cyprus, has an Open Faculty, where there is a theology department at the undergraduate level. Most of the imams and muezzins attached to the DRA have received their education in private or official Qur’an courses run by the DRA. The education level of the 270 mosque employees under the DRA is therefore quite low, and only 10% of them are full-time employees, with the rest working on a temporary or part-time basis. However, since 2007, 64 imams from Turkey have been employed in north Cyprus mosques on four-year contracts, through auspices of the Religious Counsellor of the Turkish Embassy. They are at least imam-hatip lycée graduates, and quite a number are graduates of theology faculties.14

14

Ibid., p. 162.

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As noted above, only three of the 148 Muslim cemeteries in the south are in good condition. In April 2005 a Turkish Cypriot cemetery in Larnaca, which had recently been rehabilitated under a US-funded project aimed at improving bi-communal relations, was vandalised. In 2005, there were also reports of Turkish Cypriot cemeteries in the south being destroyed for the construction of roads and other development. In the north, there are over 150 Muslim cemeteries. The land is owned by the Evkaf Administration, which also provides for services conducted in these cemeteries. Maintenance is provided by municipalities. 8


There are no rules governing religious assistance in health facilities, prisons or the armed forces on either part of the island. Religious support is usually provided on an ad hoc basis according to need. Moreover, Muslims are not allowed to join the military in the south. The armed forces in the north have their own places of worship and provide their own religious personnel. Clergy visit Nicosia Central Prison, the only prison in north Cyprus, for special activities, especially during the month of Ramadan. 9

Religious Festivals

While no Islamic festivals are recognised in the south, all Islamic festivals are recognised in the north. Because Turkish Cypriot society is for the most part secular, most Turkish Cypriots take part in religious activities primarily during religious festivals, especially the major festivals of Ramadan and ‘Id al-Adha (Kurban Bayramı). Although there have been no surveys on the extent to which fasting is practised during Ramadan, it is the authors’ observation that most of those who fast are elderly Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey. Most people, however, actively participate in traditional ways in festivities associated with the bayrams. Beginning approximately ten years ago, Turkish Cypriots began to celebrate the Mevlid Kandili, or the anniversary of the Prophet’s birth, as Kutlu Doğum Haftası, or the Week of the Holy Birth. Mevlid-i Nebi, the

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Prophet Muhammad’s birthday, is fixed as the twelfth day of the third month (Rebi‘ ul-Evvel/Rabi‘ al-Awwal ) of the Hijri calendar. It was usually celebrated with mosque illuminations and preparation of special sweets. Although Mevlid Kandili was celebrated before, under the influence of trends coming from Turkey, this one-day event became a week-long festival, with religious educational activities, including conferences and seminars. In addition, clergy employed by the DRA are requested to visit the homes of people within their communities and to offer them a rose and a book about the Prophet Muhammad. Several minor Muslim festivals are also celebrated in north Cyprus, including Regaip Kandili, celebrating the night of Muhammad’s conception, Miraç Kandili, celebrating the Prophet Muhammad’s ascent into heaven; and Berat Kandili, the Day of Forgiveness. On these days main mosques in the cities are illuminated and the clergy offer special prayers in the mosques. Alevis also freely celebrate their festivals such as Ashura and qurban. During the celebrations many dedes and traditional ashik, or minstrels, are brought from Turkey. 10

Halal Food

Halal food is available in the south because of the immigrant Muslim population. One halal meat provider in Nicosia told the authors that he had reached an agreement with the government slaughterhouse to allow him to slaughter his own meat at this government-monitored area. He estimates that he slaughters approximately 25–30 large animals each week. All meat slaughtered in north Cyprus under the control of municipal slaughterhouses is halal. 11

Dress Codes

There are no laws or regulations concerning dress codes and hence no prohibitions on the hijab in workplaces in the south, though there have been some discussions about headscarves in private schools. In north Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots generally do not wear headscarves, and there are no laws regulating dress. However, in Turkey the headscarf has long been forbidden in universities and other public

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institutions, and implementation of the prohibition intensified from 1997. As a result, many young women from Turkey who wish to wear the headscarf come to north Cyprus to study. 12


The media operate freely in the south, though the local media sources do not publish or air informative content about Islam. Muslim immigrants in the south tend to read newspapers imported from abroad, listen to radio stations from neighbouring Arab countries, and watch Arab and Turkish television via satellite. In north Cyprus, there are no visual or printed media that consistently address religious issues, though some newspapers provide space on Fridays for articles on religion. Also, during the main religious festivals, local television and radio stations air religious programs. On the other hand, all religious publications including newspapers and periodicals that are published in Turkey are available on sale in the north and it is possible to view television channels with religious content via satellite. 13

Family Law

Until 2004, it was prohibited in the south for Christians to marry Muslims. With the RoC’s accession to the European Union, however, this law has been changed, and inter-faith marriage is technically allowed. Both civil and church marriages are recognised by the state, though marriages performed by Muslim clergy are not recognised. In north Cyprus, only civil marriages are recognised by the state. Some Muslims in the north do choose to perform religious ceremonies, but these must be accompanied by a civil marriage in order to be officially recognised. Most of those who choose religious ceremonies are immigrants to the north, primarily from Turkey. Only people who have been married in a civil ceremony recognised by the state may inherit from each other. Although other forms of conjugal relationship are not recognised as grounds for inheritance between the couple, children of unmarried couples may inherit from both parents.

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14 Public Opinion and Debate According to the 2008 US State Department report, an NGO in the RoC reported that Muslim asylum-seekers in the south had experienced difficulty finding employment because of their religion. The report states that the NGO “alleged that the ‘general climate’ was not amenable for asylees from countries where Islam is prevalent, and that citizens in general demonstrated ‘aggressive behaviour’ towards Muslim asylees”.15 In 2008, a number of families in the north chose to send their children to summer courses in Turkey. Approximately 400 pupils between the ages of 11 and 16 travelled to Turkey, and this was subsequently heavily criticised in local newspapers and by the teachers’ union. Newspapers presented the event as a violation of the society’s presumed secularism and as a reactionary move against the secular state.16 15


In November 2008, the Church of Cyprus held an international conference under the title The Civilization of Peace: Faiths and Cultures in Dialogue, in cooperation with the Saint Egidio Community of Rome. The meeting was attended by representatives of many different faiths. Although there were numerous Muslim representatives, there were no Turkish Cypriot participants. A report by the Cyprus News Agency, the official news agency of the RoC, suggested that the reason Turkish Cypriots were not represented was that securing their representation through official bodies would have implied recognition of the state in the north.17

http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108441.htm. Yalman, Sevgi, “Kızlar Bursa’ya, erkekler İstanbul’a (Girls to Bursa, boys to Istanbul)”, Kıbrıs, 28 August 2008. 17 http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/cna/2008/08-11-16.cna.html, accessed 17 May 2009. 15

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CZECH REPUBLIC Štîpán Macháček1 1

Muslim Populations

In the last Czech census in 2001 about 3,700 individuals indicated Islam in response to the option to enter their religious affiliation.2 However, the actual number of Muslims is higher, estimated at around 10,000,3 for many of them feel uncomfortable about identifying with the Islamic faith in official documents. No newer official figures on believers of different faiths are available. The territory that is today’s Czech Republic has never been under direct Islamic influence or rule so there is no indigenous Czech Muslim community. Three categories of Muslims in the Czech Republic can be defined: ethnic Czech converts, Czech citizens of foreign origin, and foreigners who live in the Czech Republic with permanent or temporary residency permits. There are only about 400 Czech converts, but they are very active in Muslim organisations. The second group consists of former students who came from then socialist-oriented developing countries to study in the former Czechoslovakia. Some stayed after their graduation and married and obtained citizenship. Most of them came from Arab countries, particularly Syria, Libya, Democratic Yemen, Iraq and Sudan. Muslims from the third category mostly arrived after 1989 as students or entrepreneurs, mainly from Arab countries (especially

1 Štîpán Macháček is a research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, now temporarily teaching Czech language at the University of Ain Shams in Cairo, Egypt. He is a graduate in Arabic and the history and culture of the Islamic world. He has researched on contemporary Islam in the Balkans and published several articles on the subject. 2 A figure given by the Český statistický ú®ad (Czech Department for Statistics), available at http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/o/4110-03--obyvatelstvo_hlasici_ se_k_jednotlivym_cirkvim_a_nabozenskym_spolecnostem, accessed 18 May 2009. 3 An estimate widely accepted by both the Czech authorities (see Rýdl, Karel and Marika Uiberlayová, “Education and Muslim minorities in the Czech Republic”, in Daun, Holger and Geoffrey Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 247–261 (253), and the Czech Muslim community (see Mendel, Miloš, Bronislav Ost®anský and Tomáš Rataj, Islám v srdci Evropy (Islam in the Heart of Europe) (Prague: Academia, 2007), p. 408).

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Egypt, Syria and Iraq) and the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia), but also from other countries (Chechnya, Turkey, Afghanistan etc.). Muslims are also represented among asylum seekers. According to Ministry of Interior figures, out of 3,016 applicants in 2006, several hundred came from Muslim countries, the most numerous being Egyptians (422 persons). Other applicants were from countries including Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Somalia, Bangladesh, Syria and Sudan. Muslims were relatively more successful than non-Muslim asylum seekers in being granted asylum, the highest numbers of successful applicants being Afghans, Iraqis, Iranians and Kazakhs.4 2

Islam and the State

Until 1918, the territory of today’s Czech Republic was subject to the laws of the Habsburg Empire (see Austria). Today the Czech Republic has no state religion and the constitution provides for freedom of religion. In comparison with other European countries, a high proportion of Czechs do not profess any religion, 59% according to the 2001 census.5 Since religious affiliation was an optional entry in the 2001 census forms, all figures are only approximations. Most Czech Muslim organisations are registered with the Ministry of Culture as cultural or social organisations. As such, they are not granted any public funding. In 2004, the umbrella organisation Úst®edí muslimských náboženských obcí (Headquarters of the Muslim Religious Communities, UMO) succeeded in registering as a religious community and, for the first time since the end of World War I, Czech Muslims were officially recognised as such by the state. For more privileges, such as the right to public funding or running religious schools, there are requirements that the UMO is unlikely ever to be able to fulfill (for example, established believers must form at least 0.1% of the total population, i.e. 10,000 for the Czech Republic). The UMO and other Muslim activities are funded by local and foreign believers’ contributions and donations.

Mendel et al., Islám v srdci Evropy, pp. 408–410. http://www.czso.cz/csu/2003edicniplan.nsf/p/4110-03, last accessed 21 May 2009. 4 5

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The UMO is a Muslim umbrella organisation. Its chairman was, until his death in March 2008, Mohamed Alí Šilhavý (born in 1917), a legendary Czech convert and symbol of Czech Muslims. The organisation is now led by another Czech convert Dr Vladimír Sáõka (for many years a very active and influential person in the Czech Muslim community) and Muneeb Hassan Al Rawi (of Iraqi origin). The core of the UMO is an executive council on which every Czech Muslim organisation is intended to have a representative. The UMO is now based in the Prague mosque (Blatská 1491, 198 00 Praha 9—Kyje, islamcz@ islamcz.cz), having moved there from the town of T®ebíč. Before the UMO was registered with the Ministry of Culture in 2004, several Muslim groups registered as ‘cultural’ or ‘social’ organisations formed a platform for Muslim activities. Some of them have continued functioning until today and become members of UMO. Islámská nadace v Praze (Islamic Foundation in Prague) has developed since 1989 with the aim of establishing a mosque in Prague and was registered in 2001. After having managed a small prayer room between from 1992 to 1999, it succeeded in opening the first mosque ever built in Prague in 1999 ([email protected], www.praha.muslim.cz). Since 2003, the Islamic Foundation has run an Information Centre in the centre of Prague (Politických vîzõ% 14, 110 00 Praha 1) and since 2004 it has managed the Islamic Centre, with a prayer room, in the spa city of Teplice in northern Bohemia. Islámská nadace v Brnî (Islamic Foundation in Brno) was registered in 1994 as a charitable society with the aim of establishing a mosque in Brno, the second largest city in the Czech Republic. The Islamic Centre, with a mosque, was opened in 1998 and was the first mosque to be built in the country. The Islamic Foundation is based at the mosque (Vídeõská 38a, 693 00 Brno, [email protected], www.mesita.cz). Svaz muslimských student% v ČR (Union of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic) was established by a Sudanese student, Muhammad Abbas al-Mu‘tasim, and it provides a platform for foreign Muslim students studying in the Czech Republic. It manages prayer rooms in student dormitories and publishes the web magazine Muslimské listy (Muslim News, www.muslimskelisty.cz). The Svaz has its own website www.svazmuslim.cz. Muslimská unie (Muslim Union) is another Muslim organisation in Brno (Chmelová 2893, Brno, [email protected]). It has a good informative website at www.muslim-inform.cz.

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The Muslim organisations listed above do not have specific ethnic, national or religious affiliation. Apart from the Union of Muslim Students, they welcome both Czech converts and Muslims of foreign origin. Members of the Union of Muslim Students are foreign students, or former foreign students, from various Muslim countries. 4


Since 1989, Czech Muslims have had several mosque-building projects. Most projects were rejected by the local authorities who ‘responded to the will’ of local inhabitants (based on protest petitions against a mosque in a neighbourhood or a city and supported in some cases by the stance of local church representatives). Such was the fate of two projects for mosques or Islamic centres in the spa city of Teplice in 1995 and 2004. Both were to be financed by donors from the United Arab Emirates. There are always tens or rather hundreds of patients from Arab countries staying in Teplice for treatment at the spa. Another mosque project in another spa town, Orlová in northern Moravia, although it attracted less attention, was rejected by the local authorities in 2004. Czech Muslims, however, finally succeeded in establishing mosques in the two largest cities, Prague and Brno. In Brno, after a struggle with the local authorities, local Muslims were allowed to build the first mosque in the Czech Republic in 1996. It was inaugurated in 1998. One year later, a mosque was inaugurated on the outskirts of the capital and this is the only Czech mosque with a professional imam. From 2002 to 2006, the imam was Karam al-Badawi, an Egyptian graduate of al-Azhar University and the Islamic University in Medina. Since 2006 there has been a Bosnian imam, Emir Omić (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in Amman), and Sheikh Ahmad (a graduate of the Islamic faculty in San‘a). In addition to these two mosques there are nine prayer houses, mostly associated with student accommodation. There are no special regulations in Czech law concerning the construction of places of worship. Like any other construction project, a mosque must be approved by the local council’s planning department. A project may be rejected on the basis of technical defects but also in consideration of opposition by local people. Approval of a project by local authorities may be conditional on certain modifications—for ‘aesthetic reasons’, for example. The approval of Brno mosque project,

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for instance, depended on the exclusion of characteristic features “alien to surrounding architecture”, i.e. a minaret. 5


The are no Muslim or Islamic schools in the Czech Republic. According to the 2002 Law on Churches and Religious Communities (Zákon o církvích a náboženských společnostech), on the basis of which the UMO was finally registered in 2004, religious communities have the right to establish their own, state-recognised schools ten years after their registration and only then if they prove to have at least 10,000 believers in the Czech Republic. The UMO does not meet these requirements. For the same reason, Muslim children do not have a right to religious education in primary and secondary schools. Courses in Islam and Arabic are organised in the two Czech mosques by the Islamic Foundation in Prague and the Islamic Foundation in Brno. The courses in Islam (similar to catechism) are attended by several dozen children at weekends (about 30 children attend in Prague on Saturdays). The Arabic courses are open to the non-Muslim public. 6


There is no higher Islamic education or imam training institution in the Czech Republic. Imams serving in Czech mosques obtain their qualifications abroad. Arabic and Islamic Studies programmes are offered at the Faculty of Arts, Charles University in Prague, where Islam is studied from the religious, sociological and historical points of view. Arabic, Turkish and Persian language courses are also available there. In recent years, Arabic and Islamic Studies have been introduced at the Faculty of Arts at Západočeská univerzita (Western Bohemian University) in Plzeõ and there are also classes in Islam in the religious studies programme at the Masarykova univerzita (Masaryk’s University) in Brno. 7


There are two Muslim cemeteries in the Czech Republic. The older one, with about 50 burial places, was established in 1994 in the town

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of T®ebíč, where the UMO had its former headquarters. Ten years later, another Muslim cemetery with a capacity of around 100 burial places, was established in Prague in a section of the large cemetery in the suburb Olšany. The ritual washing of the deceased are organised by the Islamic Foundations in Brno or Prague in hospitals or cemeteries at the request of the relatives. Prayers for the deceased are also be performed. No other special burial facilities or services are available. According to Czech civil law, Muslims, like everyone else, must be buried in a coffin. 8


There are no imams in the Czech army, prisons or hospitals, although Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and for that purpose most of them have a separate non-denominationally decorated space allocated for prayer and contemplation. The Islamic Foundation in Prague has succeeded in opening a small Islamic prayer room in the prison of Ruzynî in Prague, where the Foundation arranges the provision of a Friday sermon. In the spa towns of Dubí and Darkov, there are prayer rooms designated mostly for the Arab Muslim clientele of the spas. 9

Religious Festivals

Islamic religious festivals are generally not much publicised, and their celebration is limited to private homes, embassies, and mosques in Prague and Brno. In 2008, the Islamic Foundation in Prague had to hire a sports hall in Riegrovy sady for the celebration of ‘Id al-Adha because the mosque was not big enough for the 1,000 Muslims who attended. Representatives of Christian churches frequently come to the celebrations to greet the Muslims. On average, 30 Muslims from the Czech Republic every year perform the pilgrimage to Mecca. Typically, the pilgrims travel at their own expense and use specialist travel agencies in neighbouring Germany or Austria. In 2008, exceptionally, about 65 people traveled to Mecca as a result of the offer by the king of Saudi Arabia to cover pilgrims’ expenses.

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Halal Food

There are few opportunities for Czech Muslims to obtain strictly halal food. In Prague and Brno, several grocery shops and butcheries sell halal products and meat. Since its registration in 2004, the UMO has been exempt from veterinary regulations and has been allowed to appoint a Muslim butcher to slaughter animals in a slaughterhouse. This exemption is particularly exercised for ‘Id al-Adha. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules to limit Muslim dress in public or in schools. Although some Muslim women (including Czech converts) regularly wear hijab, no dress code incidents have been recorded. There is as yet no record of Muslim women wearing niqab in the Czech Republic. 12


The only periodical published by Czech Muslims is Hlas (The Voice), the magazine of the UMO, published in Czech three or four times a year. Hlas was revived in 1991 after first being published from 1937 to 1945. The editorial office is in the Prague mosque and the members of the editorial board are Dr Vladimír Sáõka, Muneeb Hassan, Jalal Atassi and Lazhar Maamri. It is registered with the Ministry of Culture under the number E 11633. There are several Czech Islamic websites. The UMO runs www .islamweb.cz to provide practical information for believers and Muslimská unie has its own website, www.muslim-inform.cz. Other Czech Islamic websites include www.muslimskelisty.cz, which presents world news from an Islamic standpoint, and www.infomuslim.euweb.cz which provides practical information. Czech Muslims also translate and publish books and booklets aimed to bring more information about the faith to Czech Muslim believers. There are three Czech translations of the Qur’an, and translations of works by the Bosnian Muslim intellectual Ali Izetbegović, as well as few booklets promoting Islam, have also been published by Czech Muslims in recent years.

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Family Law

Just as Muslim schools are not permitted, Islamic religious marriages are not recognised by the state. Muslims must have a civil marriage in order for it to be legally registered. They can arrange an Islamic marriage in the mosque in addition to this, but it has no legal standing. The Islamic Foundation in Prague arranged and registered about fifteen Islamic marriages in 2008 and keeps copies of all Shari’a marriage contracts in its archive. 14 Public Opinion and Debate No data. 15 No data.


DENMARK Brian Arly Jacobsen1 1

Muslim Populations

The earliest information we have on Muslims in Denmark is from the census in 1880, when eight ‘Mohammedans’ were counted.2 Subsequent censuses (the last was in 1970) have not referred to Muslims, either because there were none or because they were part of the category ‘other faiths’. Data summaries extracted from the central person data registry (Folkeregisteret) and published since 1970 only give figures for members of the official Lutheran church. As a result of active mission in Denmark, Ahmadis from a Pakistani background succeeded in establishing an Ahmadiyya community, which in 1966–67 constructed the first purpose-built mosque in Denmark, the Nusrat Djahan Mosque in Hvidovre (Copenhagen). The present Ahmadiyya community in Denmark consists mainly of Pakistani immigrants and their descendants and numbers around 600 according to their own estimates.3 From the late 1960s, the numbers of Muslims in Denmark became more significant, primarily as a result of immigration. From the mid-1960s to the early 1970s people came to Denmark as migrant workers from the former Yugoslavia, North Africa, Pakistan and Turkey, and then, from the mid-1970s till today, immigrants have been mainly refugees and the families of migrant workers already in the country. The waves of refugees have had various causes: the Iran-Iraq war (1980–88), the civil war in Lebanon (1975–90), the civil war in the

1 Brian Arly Jacobsen, is a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of History of Religions, University of Copenhagen, Denmark. His research is mainly in the area of religion and politics and religious minority groups in Denmark. He holds a degree in sociology of religion. His publications include Tørre tal om troen: Religionsdemografi i det 21. århundrede (Dry Numbers on Faith: Demography of Religion in the 21st Century), co-edited with Margit Warburg (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007) and “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 2 Statistiske bureau, Det (1883), Folkemængden i kongeriget Danmark, den 1ste februar 1880 [The statistical Bureau (1883) The Population in the Kingdom of Denmark, 1st of February 1880] (Statistisk Tabelværk IVR Serie A3 [Statistical Table Work IV R, Serie 3]). 3 Cf. www.islam-ahmadiyya.dk.

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former Yugoslavia (1991–2001), the war in Afghanistan (2001-present) and the wars in Iraq (1991 and 2003-present).4 The number of Muslims has increased significantly since 1980—from 0.6% of the population (29,284 people) in 1980, to 4.0% (221,800) in 2009.5 The Danish authorities do not register individual religious beliefs, so it is generally difficult to gather reliable information on individual religious affiliation. An estimate of the number of Muslims in Denmark must therefore be based on a number of assumptions about correlations between nationality, ethnicity and religion. Research conducted regularly since 1999, for example, has suggested that only 92% of Turkish immigrants and their descendants regard themselves as Muslims.6 The largest ethnic group is Turks (24.7% of all Muslims), followed by Iraqis (12%), Lebanese (10.8%), Pakistanis (8.2%), and Somalis (7.6%). The calculation also includes an estimate of converts and third generation Muslim immigrants. Estimates of the number of Danish converts to Islam range between 2,000 and 5,000, which can be reasonably calculated to 2,100–2,800.7 This estimate does not take account of internal religious differences within Islam and includes groups such as Alevis, Shi’ites and Sunnis. A survey from 2007 distributes eight different ethnic groups from predominantly Muslim countries as follows: 49% Sunnis, 13% Shi’is, 19% ‘Islam, other’, which may include Ahmadis, Alevis and Sufis.8 The remaining percentage is accounted for by people who said they belonged to other religions or no religion. It is estimated that 20%–25% of Muslims in Denmark (roughly 44,400–55,400 people) are associated with a mosque association,9 although formal membership numbers are much lower.

4 Colemann, David and Eskil Wadensjö, Indvandringen til Danmark (Immigration to Denmark) (Viborg: Spektrum, 1999), and Jacobsen, Brian, “Muslimer i Danmark: en kritisk vurdering af antalsopgørelser (Muslims in Denmark: A critical assessment of estimations)”, in Warburg, M. and B. Jacobsen (eds), Tørre tal om troen: Religionsdemografi i det 21. århundrede (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 143–165. 5 1980 is the first year in which Statistics Denmark has information on both the immigrants and descendants (Statistics Denmark 2008, www.dst.dk). 6 For background data, see Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1. halvår 2004 (The status on integration 1: Half-year 2004) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2004). 7 Jensen, Tina and Kate Østergaard, Nye muslimer i Danmark: møder og omvendelser (New Muslims in Denmark: Meetings and conversions) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2007), pp. 30f. 8 Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1999–2007 (The status on integration 1999–2007) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2008), p. 12. 9 Kühle, Lene, Moskeer i Danmark: Islam og muslimske bedesteder (Mosques in Denmark: Islam and Muslim places of prayer) (Højbjerg: Univers, 2006), pp. 39, 47.

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Islam and the State

The Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and other laws and policies contribute to the generally free practice of religion, although the Evangelical Lutheran Church, as the national church, enjoys some privileges not available to other religious groups. The national church is the only religious organisation that can receive state subsidies or funds directly through the tax system, but government does grant official status to other religious groups. Prior to 1970, a total of eleven religious communities were ‘recognized’ by royal decree. Since then, the state has ‘acknowledged’ more than 100 additional religious communities under the Marriage Act, by which the Minister of Justice can authorise clergy within non-recognised religious communities to conduct marriages. In February 2009, 22 Muslim communities were ‘acknowledged religious communities’.10 In April 2007, the Liberal-Conservative government passed legislation that would require all foreign religious workers (missionaries, imams, etc.) to pass a Danish language test within six months of entering the country. The intention of the law is said to be to restrict the entry of Muslim clerics, whose number had already been restricted under a 2004 ‘Imam Law’ that requires the number of religious residence visas to be reasonably proportionate to the size of the religious community in question.11 3


There are many different kinds of Muslim organisations in Denmark. The ethnic-religious associations dominate in terms of members and number. They were the first to be established in Denmark and are often related to a mosque. There are also a number of religious organisations, such as Sufi orders, that transcend ethnicity, and finally there is a growing number of politically oriented associations. In the last decade some Muslim organisations have started to organise themselves in Muslim umbrella organisations so that they can speak with one voice 10 Alevis are not included in this category. The six current Alevi associations are categorised as ‘other congregations’ (see www.familiestyrelsen.dk/11/godkendtetrossamfund (accessed 10 March 2009). 11 See “Integration: Omstridt danskprøve til præster og imamer skaber splid i Venstre (Disputed Danish test of imams and priests create conflicts in Venstre)”, Politiken, 8 January 2007.

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on issues affecting Muslims in general, such as the establishment of burial grounds. 3.1

The ethnic-religious associations

Dansk Tyrkisk Islamisk Stiftelse (Danish Turkish Islamic Foundation) is part of Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam Birligi (www.diyanetvakfi.dk). It is indisputably the largest Muslim organisation in Denmark and almost two out of three Danes of Turkish descent are members of the Diyanet funeral foundation (which has around 31,000 members). It was established in Denmark in 1985 and the Foundation’s 27 local mosque associations were recognised as religious communities in 2006. In 1986, various local Turkish mosque associations formed the DMGT (Danimarka Müslüman Göçmenler Tekilatı, Union of Muslim Immigrant Associations, www.dmgt .dk). The DMGT runs six Turkish mosques in Denmark and between 500 and 750 Muslims in total attend Friday prayers in these mosques. The movement is regarded by some observers as being linked to the Turkish Milli Görüs movement.12 Idara Minhaj-ul-Quran Denmark (www .minhaj.dk) was founded in 1987 as a Sunni educational and cultural centre in Copenhagen. It has around 1,200 members, including children. Its current Chairman is Muhammad Sarwar. Minhaj Denmark and all its units operate according to the Minhaj-ul-Quran movement’s constitution in Pakistan. Several of their mosques are recognised as religious communities. 3.2

Religious organizations

The Alevi association in Denmark (www.alevi.dk) was founded in 1994 in Aarhus. Its current Chairman is Bakan Feramuz Acar and there are today seven local associations and a national youth association. The Alevi associations in Denmark have approximately 1,000 members but some estimates put the number of Alevis in Denmark at about 6,500.13 Six local Alevi associations were approved as religious communities by the state in 2007.14 Many Sufi movements are currently experiencing success, especially among Pakistanis and Turks. They largely keep to themselves. Examples Cf. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, pp. 90–91. Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, pp. 138. 14 See also Jørgensen, Martin Bak, National and Transnational Identities: Turkish Organising Processes and Identity Construction in Denmark, Sweden and Germany, PhD dissertation, Aalborg University, 2006, pp. 195–218. 12 13

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are Tariqa Burhaniyya, Al-Murabitun and Sufi-oriented Turkish groups such as Nurcu groups and Dialog Forum (www.dialogin.dk) which is related to the Fethullah Gülen movement. Islamisk Trossamfund (Islamic Religious Community) or Wakf (www.wakf .com) was founded in 1996, when Palestinians in Copenhagen, headed by the charismatic imam Ahmed Abu Laban, who died in 2007, collected money to build their own mosque in Copenhagen. Its current Chairman is Bilal Assaad and the association is primarily made up of Sunni immigrant groups from various countries and has approximately 800 paying members, according to its own figures. Around 1,000 people attend the khutba every Friday. Wakf is rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood and has strong ties to Egypt. Its perception of Islam is closely identified with Arab culture. A Muslim youth movement, Muslimske Unge i Danmark (Young Muslims in Denmark, MUNIDA, see www.munida.dk), related to Wakf, was established in 1995. This is a trans-ethnic movement that aims to provide information on Islam and social activities for its members and its current Chairman is Imran Shah. There are also a number of Shi’i oriented organisations. Salam (www .salam.nu) is an association established in 2005, headed by young women of various ethnicities and educational backgrounds with the aim of promoting Islam. The number of its members is not known. The first Shi’is in Denmark were Twelvers and Isma’ilis of Pakistani descent. The Isma’ilis established an association in 1969 (and a mosque from 1970 in Copenhagen) and in 1981 the Islamic Centre Jaffariya (Rådmandsgade 56, Copenhagen N.) became the first mosque of the Twelver branch. The massive migration of refugees with Shi’i backgrounds fleeing from civil war in Lebanon and the Iran-Iraq war led to new organisations and mosques being established from the mid-1980s onwards. There are around ten Twelver mosques in Denmark, with related associations. 3.3

Politically oriented associations

Hizb ut-Tahrir in Denmark (www.hizb-ut-tahrir.dk) is part of the international ‘caliphate’ movement. It gets a lot of media coverage but is difficult for outsiders to contact. Its spokesperson is Fadi Abdullatif. Its members are estimated to number somewhere between 200 and 500.15 Some of their public meetings in Copenhagen have attracted

15 Estimated by the researcher Kirstine Sinclair in the newspaper Information, 4 March 2003.

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crowds of about 1,000. Demokratiske muslimer (Democratic Muslims, www.demokratiskemuslimer.dk) is a political movement founded by the Danish conservative politician Naser Khader and other Muslims in February 2006 after the escalation of the Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy. Its spokespersons are Adel Sadek and Sally Khallash Bengtsen. The association has democracy and human rights as fundamental principles and its purpose is to challenge fundamentalist Muslims in public debate. In 2007, the association claimed a membership of about 1,100, plus around 14,000 supporters, but membership has declined steeply since then. 3.4

Muslim network organisations

Muslimernes Fællesråd (United Council of Muslims, www.mfr.nu) was formed in 2006 born of a desire for a shared representation of Muslim organisations in Denmark. Its spokesperson is Zubair Butt Hussain and it currently acts as an umbrella organisation for 14 assorted Muslim associations, with a combined membership of up to 40,000. Dansk Muslimsk Union (Danish Muslim Union, www.dmu.nu) is also an umbrella body, consisting of approximately 30 Danish Muslim organisations. It was formed in March 2008 and the Union’s ambition is to create unity among Muslims across ethnic, cultural, political and religious divides. Its spokesperson is Osman Öztoprak. Muslimer i Dialog (Muslims in Dialogue, www.m-i-d.dk) was formed by a breakaway group from Minhaj ul-Quran in 2003 and organises dialogue activities between Muslims and non-Muslims. Its spokesperson is Zubair Butt Hussain and it is a Sunni association with 440 members, according to its own figures. Det danske Islamiske Råd (Danish Islamic Council) is an independent charitable institution, which is co-founder of the Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe. Its purpose is to bring together Muslim associations to lobby on joint Islamic issues. Its instigator was the politician Hamid El-Mousti and the first meeting, in 2000, was attended by approximately 30 Muslim associations. In 2001, a practising Muslim woman and a male non-Muslim social researcher took the initiative in forming the association Forum for kritiske Muslimer (Forum for Critical Muslims, www .kritiskemuslimer.dk). According to its website, the association describes its purpose as to “work for a democratic and pluralistic approach to Islam, with particular focus on the visibility of women as agents and public figures in Islam”. According to its spokesperson, Sherin Khankan, it currently has around 130 members.

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A survey in 2006 showed the following support for various major Muslim associations among Muslims in general: Islamisk Trossamfund: 5.4%; Demokratiske muslimer: 8.9%; Diyanet: 9.1%; Muslimer i Dialog: 6.0%, Hizb-ut-Tahrir: 0.7%, Milli Görüs: 2.9% and Forum for kritiske muslimer: 0.9%.16 4


According to a study in 2006, there are about 115 mosques in Denmark, eleven of them being Shi’i.17 The Shi’ite Isma’ilis claim to have acquired rooms for prayer in 1969/70, and the first Sunni mosques were established at the beginning of the 1970s, the first being the Islamisk Kulturcenter (Islamic Cultural Centre) in Brønshøj (Copenhagen) in 1972.18 Today, there are mosques all over Denmark, but they are most numerous in the major cities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Odense. Most mosques are located in former office and factory buildings and are often not big enough to accommodate all the people who want to participate in Friday prayers or other religious activities at the mosque. Three mosques are purpose-built, namely the mosque by the Ahmadis in 1967 and two Turkish mosques on Funen, one built in Odense in 1991 and the other in Svendborg in 2000.19 Several more local groups are planning to build mosques. One of the most controversial plans for a mosque is that for a central mosque in central Copenhagen. In 1981, the state leased a building lot to the Ærværdige islamiske komité (Honourable Islamic Committee). It was a 50-year lease with an annual rent set at 1,000 Danish kroner (roughly €134)—a minute amount for a lot with a central location in the municipality of Copenhagen. The Danish state has a long tradition, going back to the period of absolute monarchy, of handing over building lots to religious communities unconnected to the national church, but politicians from various parties and public bodies have regularly and increasingly forcefully attacked the state’s agreement

Mikkelsen, Flemming, IntegrationsStatus 1. halvår 2006 (The status on integration 1: Half-year 2006) (Copenhagen: Catinét Research, 2006), p. 39. 17 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 65. 18 Ibid. 19 Kühle, Moskeer i Danmark, p. 63. 16

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with the Committee for the Islamic Cultural Centre in Copenhagen, so the lot remains undeveloped.20 5


Religious education in primary and secondary schools in Denmark is termed ‘Christian studies’, and the subject has traditionally been taught on an Evangelical Lutheran basis, with the addition of elements about other religions including Islam. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from Christian studies on religious grounds, and some Muslim parents do so. Since the mid-nineteenth century, it has been possible for a group of parents to establish ‘independent schools’ which are entitled to state support to cover most of their budget. The first Muslim independent school was established in 1978 and since then over 30 such schools have opened.21 Many of them offer Arabic and Islamic studies. In the school year 2006–2007, there were 22 independent Muslim primary schools with a total of approximately 3,600 pupils, all with Muslim backgrounds.22 This means that the majority of Muslim pupils go to public school. The Ministry of Education carried out a study in 2006 which showed that 41% of the pupils in Muslim independent schools progressed into upper secondary school whereas the national average was only 26%.23 Most mosques and Muslim associations provide some form of Islamic instruction outside school hours.

20 Jacobsen, Brian A., “Muslims on the political agenda”, Nordic Journal of Religion and Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2009), pp. 15–35. 21 Shakoor, Tallat, “Formål for muslimske friskoler i Danmark: udviklinger i formålserklæringer og vedtægter i danske friskoler for muslimske børn (Purpose for Islamic free schools in Denmark: Developments of purpose statements and regulations in Danish free schools for Muslim children)”, Tidsskrift for Islamforskning, no. 3 (2008), pp. 29–43. 22 Ihle, Annette H., Magt, Medborgerskab og Muslimske Friskoler i Danmark: Traditioner, idealer og politikker (Power, Citizenship and Muslim Free schools in Denmark: Traditions, ideals and policies) (Copenhagen: Research priority area Religion in the 21st Century, Department of Cross-Cultural and Regional Studies, University of Copenhagen, 2007), p. 7. 23 “Muslimske friskoler sender flest i gymnasiet (Muslim independent schools send most of the pupils to upper secondary school)”, Jyllands-Posten, 16 August 2007.

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Islamic studies are offered as part of Arabic and Middle Eastern Studies programmes and at the departments of religious studies at the universities of Aarhus, Copenhagen and Southern Denmark. Discussions about possible imam training have surfaced on a couple of occasions in recent years but have not led to any formal proposals. In May 2008, a meeting of Muslim organisations from Norway, Sweden and Denmark took place in Copenhagen to consider possible common approaches to imam training. During 2008 Islamisk Trossamfund reached an agreement with Al-Azhar University, Cairo, to offer accredited courses. 7


Sections within fifteen existing municipal cemeteries (all Christian consecrated) have been reserved for Muslim use since 1975. Danish rules on funerals are based on a law of 1975, according to which the authorities can assign burial places for other religious groups. Religious groups also have the right to acquire land for the purpose. In 1996, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs also gave cemetery boards permission for an exemption for the specific funeral rituals of other faiths other than the national church. In 2006, a separate Muslim cemetery owned by the Danish Islamic Burial Fund was established outside Copenhagen after some years of lobbying. According to a committee member, about 200 Muslims die each year in Denmark, and the bodies of about half of them are flown back to their country of origin to be buried.24 In April 2008, the municipality of Herning agreed to sell a plot of land for the establishment of a Muslim cemetery in the town, and in October 2008 the municipality of Roskilde also agreed to the establishment of a Muslim cemetery near the city. 8


During the 1990s, there were some short-term projects to establish some form of religious counselling for Muslims in hospitals and prisons, but

24 “Gravplads: Religionsfrihed i praksis (Cemetery: Religious freedom in practice”, Jyllands-Posten, 22 September 2006.

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only in recent years has this been more firmly formalised. There are no imams in the armed forces. According to Danish and European law, prison inmates have the right to participate in worship with a priest or the equivalent of their own faith. The first proper ‘prison imam’ financed by the Danish state was appointed on 1 May 2002.25 In 2008, the state budget allocated an amount of 1.5million kroner per year in 2008 and 2009 and 2million per year thereafter for special approval procedures for imams and closer supervision of religious activities in prisons, with the hiring of up to 20 ‘prison imams’.26 In 2005, the first Muslim prayer room was appointed at Rigshospitalet (Copenhagen University Hospital) and the first hospital imam began to provide pastoral care for patients. Today, there are several imams affiliated with hospitals in major cities in Denmark. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are celebrated in mosques and sports centres all over the country. Several schools and kindergartens in the major cities which have a large number of pupils from ethnic minorities either plan holidays during Ramadan or else take it into account in their activities. In recent years, Shi’is have organised parades with 500 to 1,000 participants through the streets of Copenhagen in connection with ‘Ashura. These have avoided political statements and mostly call for action against disease and war. 10

Halal Food

Halal slaughter is permitted. Halal food is widely available and Denmark is a major exporter of halal meat to the Arab world. There have been political attempts from right- and left-wing parties to prohibit ritual slaughter since the mid-1990s.27 25 “Imam Hansen fra Hatting (Imam Hansen from Hatting)”, Nyt fra Kriminalforsorgen (News from Danish Prison and Probation Service), no. 3 (2002). 26 See “Flerårsaftale for Kriminalforsorgen 2008–2011 (Multi-year agreement for The Prison and Probation Service for 2008–2011)” at the Prison and Probation Service homepage: http://www.kriminalforsorgen.dk. 27 Jacobsen, Brian A., Religion som fremmedhed i dansk politik. En sammenligning af italesættelser af jøder i Rigsdagstidende 1903–45 og muslimer i Folketingstidende 1967–2005 (The

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Dress Codes

Hijab and the like are permitted in public schools and services. The Supreme Court, in a verdict in January 2005, upheld the right of retailers and others to insist on uniform codes without the female headscarf for employees dealing with the public. The Danish People’s Party tried to ban the wearing of the headscarf in Parliament in the spring of 2007, but failed. In the spring of 2008, there was a major political debate about whether female Muslim judges and other public authority figures should be allowed to wear the headscarf with judicial attire. In December 2008, the government proposed legislation that would ban judges from wearing religious or political symbols in court. The law has come to be called the ‘headscarf act’, because its real purpose is to ban Muslim women from wearing headscarves when acting as judges or jurors. The government and Danish People’s Party announced that they would pass the act at the beginning of 2009, but the proposal has met with strong opposition from judges’ and lawyers’ associations. 12


There are no Muslim newspapers in Danish, but there are a number of Internet sites in which Muslims (and non-Muslims) exchange information of various kinds. The largest Internet forum is Danmarks Forenede Cybermuslimer (Denmark’s United Cyber Muslims), formed in 1998, which currently (January 2009) has 455 members (cf. http://uk.dir .groups.yahoo.com/group/dfc/). This forum is related to one of the oldest websites established to inform Muslims and non-Muslims about Islam in Denmark (www.islam.dk). In 2004, a web-based Muslim newspaper, Sahafa, was launched, but it did not last. There are also Muslim publishing firms, the oldest of which, Alif Bogforlag, began to publish books of specific Muslim interest in 1983.

construction of otherness in the Danish Parliament: A comparison of the discussions about Jews and Muslims in the Parliamentary records from 1903–45 and from 1967–2005 respectively), PhD dissertation, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen, 2008, pp. 202–206.

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Family Law

Danish courts can only refer indirectly to Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. There is only limited scope for the courts to take variations in cultural customs into account in individual cases. According to observers, Shari’a is practised in some Muslim communities in Denmark in, for example, matters of family law, divorce cases and cases of child custody. There are no official Shari’a courts in Denmark.28 14 Public Opinion and Debate In February 2008, youths in immigrant neighbourhoods in major cities engaged in seven uninterrupted nights of rioting, which began the night after the alleged beating of an immigrant man by Copenhagen police on 9 February and continued after the 13 February re-publication of the Muhammad cartoons in several Danish newspapers. The events again focused attention on Muslims and formed part of the background to a number of minor subsequent debates, including responses to the question of free speech and Islam, Geert Wilder’s film Fitna (see Netherlands) and the question of Muslim women wearing headscarves in public. Questions about the Muslim presence in Denmark are a frequently and eagerly debated topic in the Danish media. A series of studies show a population that is very sceptical about the prospects for peaceful coexistence with Muslims. Some opinion polls from 2008 showed that only 38% of Danes would have a positive attitude towards their children marrying Muslims, while 48% of Muslim parents would welcome their children marrying Danes. The same survey shows that 24% of members of immigrant groups say that they feel reasonably or fully Danish. Finally, the investigation also revealed that 54% of Muslim immigrants in Denmark would consider voting for a democratically founded Muslim party, if one were formed.29 A report published in January 2008 by the World Economic Forum (WEF) showed that 79% of Danes see greater interaction with the Mus28 Cf. “The executioners of Sharia” (editorial), Jyllands-Posten, 31 October 2008, and “Religion and Law: The legal system must move with the community”, an interview with Jørgen S. Nielsen, Information, 9 September 2008. 29 See “Muslims want religious policy”, review of Catinét Research and Analysis Denmark, Ugebrevet A4 (Weekly Letter A4), 30 June 2008.

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lim world as a threat. The Danes are the most sceptical of the nations surveyed. Jyllands-Posten’s Muhammad cartoons published in the autumn of 2005 are mentioned repeatedly in the report as an event that had a major impact on Danish respondents’ views on dialogue between the West and Islam.30 On the other hand, a study in June 2008 showed that 54% of Danes did not have anything against female colleagues wearing the Muslim headscarf at work, while 39% were opposed to headscarves. Nearly half of those polled would not care whether a judge, a police officer or other persons with executive authority wear the headscarf, while a further 39% were undecided.31 15


Since 2004, Islamisk Viden- og InformationsCenter (Islamic Knowledge and Information Centre, IVIC, www.ivic.dk), a cross-ethnic association founded by Muslims in Aarhus in 2002, has held an annual ‘Day of the Mosques’, when mosques across the country open their doors to the community.

“Scepticism: Danes feel threatened by Islam”, Berlingske Tidende, 22 January 2008. 31 Cf. “Danes have nothing against headscarves”, survey by Catinét Research for the think tank Cepos, Newspaq, 19 June 2008. 30

ESTONIA Egdunas Racius1 1

Muslim Populations

The total number of ‘cultural’ nominal Muslims in Estonia in 2008 may be as high as 4,500, but regularly practising Muslims hardly exceed several hundred. The overwhelming majority of Estonia’s Muslims are said to be located in and around the capital city Tallinn (the Estonian Institute, February 1997). The official census in 2000 recorded 1,387 inhabitants of Estonia as Muslims, of whom 754 identified themselves as Tatars (the total number of Tatars in Estonia according to the same census was 2,582, of whom only 760 were Estonian citizens, while 681 were Russian citizens), 83 as Estonians, and 79 as Russians, while 455 came under the category ‘other ethnic nationalities’. The number of those who identified themselves as Azeri (Azerbaijani) was 880 (of whom only 162 were Estonian citizens), but there are no figures for Azeris who identified themselves as Muslims. After the Tatars, Azeris are the second largest community with a Muslim background. Up to 500 persons (132 Uzbeks, 127 Kazakhs, 48 Chechens, 24 Turks, 19 Arabs, 15 Kurds and others) identified themselves as being from ethnic groups traditionally associated with a Muslim background. Despite the fact that, in the official census, a large number of Estonia’s inhabitants with a Muslim background (more than 70% of Tatars and all(!) Azeris) did not indicate their affiliation to Islam, many if not most of them could potentially be considered to be at least nominal Muslims. This particularly applies to Azeris, traditionally Shi’is, who might have chosen not to identify with Islam but who might, nonetheless, be observant. By 2008, the number of Muslims in Estonia should have increased somewhat as a result of the arrival of several hundred immigrants of Muslim background, and conversion. Several public

Egdùnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. He has a PhD in Arabic and Islamic Studies from the University of Helsinki, Finland. 1

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sources provide unsubstantiated estimates of 10,0002 or even 20,0003 Muslims in Estonia but these are evident exaggerations. A more likely figure of 4,000 is indicated in Islam in Estonia published with the active participation of Estonia’s Muslims in 2008.4 The majority of Estonia’s Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. On the other hand, there was in the pre-Soviet independent Estonia a nascent Muslim community (around 170 strong according to a 1934 census), composed mainly of Tatar immigrants from Russia. 2

Islam and the State

Estonia is a secular republic with no state religion and no dominant faith. Traditionally, Estonians were Lutheran but today only a small percentage of the Estonian population identify with the Lutheran faith. Relations between the state and religious organisations are regulated in accordance with the Churches and Congregations Act (passed in 1993, new version adopted in 2002), which confirms the constitutional right of freedom of belief and religious practice. All faiths are deemed equal in the eyes of the state and there is no formal distinction between ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’ faiths. Religious communities are required to register formally with the state through local courts (until 2002 through the Department of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Interior). Unregistered religious communities are free to practise their religion as long as it does not violate public morals and/or disturb public order but have neither the status nor the rights of a legal personage. Registered religious organisations acquire tax exempt status, the right to conduct marriages with civil validity and the right to establish private schools. Muslims (like all other faith communities) have no public representation in state institutions and there is no public funding for their activities, although the state may fund the cultural activities of ethnic minority groups, such as Tatars and Azeris. 2 Huang, Mel, “A mosque with a view”, Central Europe Review, 2001, available at http://www.ce-review.org/01/3/amber3.html, accessed 4 March 2009. 3 Muslims in Estonia, Muslim American Society, 2003, available at http://www.masnet .org/news.asp?id=687, accessed 4 March 2009. 4 Abiline, Toomas (compiler), Islam Eestis. Islam in Estonia.    (Tallinn: Huma, 2008).

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The first Muslim congregation was officially registered in 1928 in Narva but, along with its sister organisation (registered in 1940) in Tallinn, it was dissolved in 1940 by the Soviets. Eesti islami kogudus (Estonian Islamic Congregation, Muhu str. 4-75, Tallinn), which is composed mainly of Tatar, Azeri, Kazakh and Uzbek elements, re-established itself in 1989 and was officially registered in 1994. In 1995, a small splinter organisation, Eesti Muhameedlaste Sunniitide Kogudus (Estonian Muslim Sunni Congregation), was formed. Alongside these Tallinnbased registered organisations, there are other informal groupings of Estonian Muslims: the Azeri dominated Nur Center of Islamic Religion and Culture in Maardu (established in 2001), mainly preoccupied with preserving Azeri cultural traditions, and the Islamic Crescent in Estonia (established in 2000), about which there is unfortunately virtually no information available. 4


Between the world wars, a house-turned-mosque in Narva served the needs of the Muslim congregation in that town, while in Tallinn the congregation rented an apartment to use for prayers. Currently, a rented apartment at J. Poska str. 45-15, converted into a prayer hall, serves as the main Tallinn mosque. Communal Friday prayers are also held in makeshift mosques in the Kopli suburb of Tallinn and the nearby town of Maardu. However, there have been announcements, and reactions to them, on proposals to build a mosque in either central Tallinn or one of its suburbs by the sea. In the early 2000s, a local Azeri businessman declared his intention of raising funds to build a mosque but has failed do so. The current chief Imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation in late 2008 confirmed that Sharjah, one of the principalities of the United Arab Emirates, had in the previous March communicated its intention of financing the building of an Islamic religious and cultural centre (housing a mosque) in Tallinn. The official reply from the Tallinn city council and the Estonian government was still pending as at December 2008.

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Religious education in public schools is optional and non-denominational: pupils are introduced to various faith traditions, though the general ethos is Christian. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. A class of no fewer than fifteen pupils can ask for confessional religious education conducted by a clergyman of the denomination, but till now there are no classes with this number of Muslim pupils. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, teaching of Islam is entirely extra-curricular, offered by Muslim communities in improvised weekend ‘schools’ (in Tallinn, Maardu). 6


Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at the University of Tartu (covering Arabic language, and an introduction to Islamic studies, both at the Department of Theology). Recently Tallinn University has started offering some instruction in the Arabic and Turkish languages, as well as introduction to Turkish culture. Elsewhere (Tartu Theological Seminary) teaching about Islam tends to be on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Estonia. Two of the four active imams received their higher religious education abroad (in Russia and Saudi Arabia) and the other two are self-taught. It is unlikely that there will be any need for local imam training in the near future. 7


During the tsarist period, Estonian Muslims (Tatar settlers from inner Russia) maintained their separate cemeteries in Narva, Rakvere and Tallinn. In the early years of the Soviet occupation, these were closed and later destroyed. Since then, Estonian Muslims have been using general cemeteries, where a separate section is allocated. No need for a separate Muslim cemetery has yet arisen.

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The imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation officially serves as an imam in the Estonian armed forces and is occasionally invited to prisons or hospitals to perform rites. 9

Religious Festivals

There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations, open to the public, in Tallinn, Maardu and Narva. The ‘Id al-Fitr communal prayer in Maardu in September 2008 was attended by a hundred or so Muslims. ‘Id al-Adha is attended by up to 500 perople every year. 10

Halal Food

No halal butchers have yet been opened. Some individual Muslims (among them the imam of the Estonian Islamic Congregation) perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers, and then sell the meat and this practice is not prohibited by law. Some imported ‘halal’ food (mainly sweets and other baked goods from the Middle East) is available at the only Tunisian-owned food store in Tallinn. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab, mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer, and no Muslim females have yet been observed wearing niqab. Since 2002, women have been legally permitted to wear the headscarf when photographs are taken for submission for official purposes. 12


There are no Muslim printed media in Estonia and www.islam.pri.ee (in Estonian and Russian) is the only website run by Estonian Muslims. However, information on the site is static and old and its on-line forum is apparently unused (since autumn 2008). A multilingual website

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http://azeri.ee is run by the Eesti Aserbaidžaani kultuurikeskus (Azerbaijan Cultural Centre of Estonia) but this is only indirectly related to Islamic issues (mainly through the history of Muslim presence in Estonia). 13

Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques (nikah), which are then registered with a municipal civil registry office. An imam wishing to serve as a state official must obtain official certification after attending special training, and no Estonian imam has yet been certified to serve as a state official. Up to five marriage contracts a year are signed under the supervision of an imam. Inheritances can be apportioned according to Islamic regulations if this is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the creed of the litigants is irrelevant. 14 Public Opinion and Debate There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Estonia in the local media. Occasionally local Muslim leaders are approached to comment on events and processes involving Muslims around the world or in Estonia itself. There have been recent reports on the initiative by the ruler of Sharjah to build an Islamic centre, including a mosque, in Tallinn. In September 2008, the Estonian daily Postimees conducted an on-line poll on the opinion of Estonians regarding the building of a mosque in Tallinn. Almost 76% of the 2,900 respondents were against it. As a result, a marginal radical political party, the Estonian Christian Democrats, has openly voiced its objection to the prospect of a mosque being built in Tallinn. 15 No data.


FINLAND1 Tuomas Martikainen2 1

Muslim Populations

The annexation of Finland from Sweden by imperial Russia in 1808 led gradually to the permanent settlement of Muslims. From the 1830s at the latest, there were Muslim soldiers, including Kazakhs and Tatars, among the Russian military in several garrisons. They practised their religion and were served by an imam. Since the 1870s, Tatar Muslims from the Nizhni Novgorod region started to arrive, and they eventually became the first permanently settled Nordic Muslim community. After Finnish independence (1917), Muslims were granted citizenship (1920 onwards) and they were able to organise officially as a religious community when the Freedom of Religion Act came into force in January 1923. By the mid-1920s, the main wave of migration ended following the closure of the Soviet borders.3 Muslim migration remained low, but the population grew gradually due to marriage, work, study and international tourism in the post-World War II period. The Muslim population started to grow rapidly at the turn of the 1990s as the number of UNHCR quota refugees and asylum seekers from Muslim countries grew, alongside other forms of migration. Currently, the largest groups are Somalis, Arabs (mainly from Iraq), Kurds, Kosovo Albanians, Bosnians and Turks. The majority of Muslims in Finland are Sunni and about a tenth Shi’i.4 By 2007, an estimated 45,000 Muslims were 1 I would like to thank the following people for commenting this article: Okan Daher, Anas Hajjar, Kristiina Kouros, Isra Lehtinen, Antero Leitzinger, Tuula Sakaranaho, Marja Tiilikainen and Kirsti Westphalen. 2 Tuomas Martikainen is a postdoctoral researcher at the Academy of Finland in the Department of Comparative Religion, Åbo Akademi University. He has researched and published widely on contemporary religious and ethnic diversity in Finland and is the author of Immigrant Religions in Local Society: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives in the City of Turku (Åbo Akademi University Press, 2004). 3 Leitzinger, Antero, Suomen tataarit: Vuosina 1868–1944 muodostuneen muslimiyhteisön menestystarina (Finland’s Tatars: The Success Story of the Muslim Community Formed during 1868–1944) (Helsinki: East-West Books, 2006). 4 Sakaranaho, Tuula and Heikki Pesonen (eds), Muslimit Suomessa (Muslims in Finland) (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 1999); Martikainen, Tuomas, “Muslims in Finland: Facts

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living in Finland, that is, 0.8% of the total population of 5.3 million.5 The Muslim average age is very young and about half are under the age of 20. This estimate of the total number of Muslims in Finland is conservative, and higher figures can be suggested. The Muslim population broadly consists of four parts. (1) The majority (about 30,000) of Finnish Muslims are first generation migrants. This number is based on country of birth data of migrants from Muslim majority countries,6 reduced by a fifth to exclude non-Muslim migrants.7 (2) The second generation and children of mixed marriages are increasing in number and currently number at least 10,000. This figure is based on parents’ country of birth data with either a fifth (migrant-migrant parents) or half (migrant-native parents) deducted from the number (data from

and reflections”, in Nils G. Holm (ed.), Islam and Christianity in School Religious Education: Issues, Approaches, and Contexts (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 2000), pp. 203–247; Sakaranaho, Tuula, “Finland”, in Maréchal, Brigitte (ed.), A Guidebook on Islam and Muslims in the Wide Contemporary Europe (Louvain-la-Neuve: Academia-Bruylant, 2002), pp. 61–68; Tiilikainen, Marja and Isra Lehtinen, “Muslim women in Finland: Diversity within a minority”, Tidsskrift for Kirke, religion og samfunn, vol. 17, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–64; Sakaranaho, Tuula, Religious Freedom, Multiculturalism, Islam: Cross-reading Finland and Ireland (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Martikainen, Tuomas, Tuula Sakaranaho and Marko Juntunen (eds), Islam Suomessa: Muslimit arjessa, mediassa ja yhteiskunnassa (Islam in Finland: Muslims in Everyday Life, Media and Society) (Helsinki: SKS, 2008). 5 In Finland, people are registered according to their official membership of staterecognised religious organisations (rekisteröity uskonnollinen yhdyskunta). These figures significantly under-report religious affiliation among all migrant groups, including Muslims, and there is no survey or census data (the last census was conducted in 1985) that provides accurate information on the religious affiliation, adherence or identity of immigrants. As a result, numbers of Muslims need to be estimated by using less reliable and direct means. As the majority of Muslims in Finland are first generation migrants, country of birth statistics are the best available starting point. Comprehensive statistical data on the second generation are still missing. See Martikainen, Tuomas, “Maahanmuuttajat ja uskonto: tausta, jäsenyys, yhdyskunnat (Immigrants and Religion: Background, Membership, Communities)”, in Laitinen, Aappo (ed.), Kristinusko Suomessa (Christianity in Finland) (Helsinki: Suomalainen teologinen kirjallisuusseura), pp. 205–240. 6 The estimate includes the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Ethiopia, former Yugoslavia, Gambia, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. StatFin online service, Population Structure, http://pxweb2 .stat.fi/database/StatFin/vrm/vaerak/vaerak_en.asp. 7 The proportion of non-Muslims varies significantly between countries of origin, thus to deduct one-fifth is somewhat arbitrary, but the intention is to avoiding the temptation to overestimate the number of Muslims and also to provide a general rule for estimates.

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Statistics Finland).8 (3) Isra Lehtinen, a long-standing Finnish Muslim activist, estimates the number of converts to be 1,000.9 (4) The two Tatar congregations have 660 members, according to official membership statistics provided by the Population Register Centre. There are no representative surveys regarding identification as a Muslim, nor are the majority of Muslims registered in official Muslim communities. Little is known about the religious activity and participation levels of Finnish Muslims, but it has been estimated that around one third are in contact with the mosque communities. The majority of Finnish Muslims live in the capital region and other large cities, most notably in Turku and Tampere. The geographical distribution between different ethnic groups is, however, very different. 2

Islam and the State

Freedom of religion was added to the Finnish Constitution in 1919 (revised 1999). The Freedom of Religion Act (1922, revised 2003) provides more detailed regulations on the matter. The Evangelical Lutheran and Finnish Orthodox Churches enjoy a special status as religious organisations with their own legislation. All other religious organisations are dealt with under the Freedom of Religion Act as recognised religious bodies, or under the Association Act as voluntary associations.10 Muslims are organised in both ways, and there also are informally organised groups. In 2007, there were 25 Muslim communities registered as religious organisations, but not all of them were active.11 Altogether, there are about 40 mosque associations and 20–30 other Muslim associations focused on specific issues, including women, youth and charity. Local organisations have to a varying degree been able to receive public funding, and the Ministry of Education started to fund minority religions that met certain criteria from 2008 onwards. Suomen Islamilainen Neuvosto (Islamic Council of Finland, SINE, www.sine.fi)

8 These reductions are somewhat arbitrary (see, n. 7) but nevertheless provide a clear standard that can be corrected when more reliable data becomes available. 9 Personal communication 20.1.2008. 10 Heikkilä, Markku, Jyrki Knuutila and Martin Scheinin, “State and Church in Finland”, in Robbers, Gerhard (ed.), State and Church in the European Union (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), pp. 519–536. 11 Ketola, Kimmo, Uskonnot Suomessa (Religions in Finland) (Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2008).

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receives its funding from the Finnish state. Muslim organisations have very little national, public visibility, although they are often consulted by the local authorities in many issues.12 Nevertheless, Muslim organisations are and have been represented on Etnisten suhteiden neuvottelukunta (the Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations, ETNO), whose aim is to incorporate minority voices into state administration. 3


Until recently, the focus of Muslim activity in Finland was mainly local or, in some cases, directed at the countries of origin. SINE was established in November 2006 and functions as an umbrella organisation for the representation of Muslims in Finland. In December 2008, SINE had eighteen member and one support organisation and it is currently funded by the Finnish state. The activities of SINE are still developing, but the society is working, among other things, on issues related to burial and cemeteries, Islamic law, media, religious education and youth. The council represents the main mosques (with the exception of the two Tatar communities) and the majority of registered Muslims in Finland. The main division of mosques in Finland is between Sunni and Shi’i, and the Sunnis are further divided between Tatars and newer arrivals. Little information is available about the religious orientations of new mosque communities, but most of them follow a traditionalist understanding of Islam. Tablighi Jamaat is also prominent in some mosques. In 2007, Suomen Islamilainen Puolue (Finnish Islamic Party, www .suomenislamilainenpuolue.fi) was founded, but by the end of 2008, it had failed to collect enough support to be formally registered as a political party. 4


There are around 40 mosques in Finland, of which two are purposebuilt and owned by the Tatar community. A wooden mosque was built in Järvenpää in 1942 and a house with one floor set aside as a mosque

Martikainen, Tuomas, “The governance of Islam in Finland”, Temenos, vol. 43, no. 2 (2007), pp. 243–265. 12

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in downtown Helsinki in 1960. The Tatars have five mosques (Helsinki, Järvenpää, Kotka, Tampere, Turku). Since the early 1990s, several new prayer-rooms have been established. New Sunni mosques exist in Espoo, Helsinki, Joensuu, Jyväskylä, Järvenpää, Kajaani, Kotka, Kuopio, Lappeenranta, Lahti, Lohja, Oulu, Pori, Tampere, Turku, Vaasa and Vantaa. New Shi’i mosques are to be found in Helsinki, Lempäälä, Tampere and Turku. Some of the mosques have had problems with neighbours, including complaints of noise and increased traffic, and have moved to new locations. Generally, mosque communities have positive relations with municipal authorities. There have been plans to establish new purpose-built mosques in several locations, but so far these have failed because of the lack of funding. 5


Most education in Finland is provided by the state and there are very few private schools, although the Tatars had their own primary school from 1948 to 1969. In general, Tatars have participated in regular school education. Religious education (RE) in Finnish schools is nonconfessional, but instruction is given in the religion of the pupils. This means that RE is focussed on providing information about religion, but religious practice in schools is not permitted. Due to the rise in the number of Muslim pupils in the 1990s, several Finnish cities established Islamic RE in local schools. The Religious Freedom Act of 2003 made it obligatory to organise RE in Islamic and all other minority faiths if at least three pupils asked for it within a municipality. In practice, the situation varies greatly between municipalities, but Islamic RE is already well established in all the larger cities. The Islamic Society of Finland had a private religious school in Helsinki from 2001 to 2005, but the school did not gain official status and was not financially viable. There are, however, some Muslim kindergartens. Issues related to the practice of Islam have been dealt with on an ad hoc basis and this is only gradually becoming more systematic, but diverse local guidelines have been created. The City of Helsinki guidelines are the most comprehensive and provide detailed recommendations on how to deal with many issues.13 13 Lehtinen, Isra, “Miten viranomaiset huomioivat muslimit” (How the authorities take into account the needs of Muslims), in Uskonnontutkija 1/2007, available at www .uskonnontutkija.fi/arkisto/2007_1/lehtinen.pdf, accessed 18 May 2009.

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Islamic theology and law cannot be studied in Finland. Arabic and Islamic Studies are offered at the University of Helsinki. In addition, courses on Islam can be found in several disciplines in Finnish universities, most notably in comparative religion at the Universities of Helsinki and Turku and in Åbo Akademi University. No discussions about imam training in higher education have taken place, but education of minority faith RE teachers at the Department of Comparative Religion, University of Helsinki, has been on-going since 2007. This consists of both pedagogical and Islamic studies and leads to formal qualification as an RE teacher in Finland. In autumn 2008, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) organised a course entitled “Integration: A Multifaith Approach”, which aimed to improve the integration of foreign-born religious leaders and their communities. Several Muslims participated in the course. 7


The Evangelical Lutheran Church takes care of most cemeteries in Finland. The Tatar Muslims have two cemeteries in the cities of Helsinki and Turku which are not open for use by other Muslims because the Tatars have reserved them for their own members. Discussion of the need for more Muslim burial sites has been taking place since the early 1990s, but no long-term solution has been found. Practices have varied between municipalities and a process involving the Ministry of Education, the Evangelical Lutheran Church and SINE is taking place to solve the problem. 8


Chaplaincy in state institutions has traditionally been organised by the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which also has, among others, full-time hospital, military and prison chaplains. In addition, the Finnish Orthodox Church and other minority Christian religions have been active. Islam is increasingly recognised as a religion to be noted in chaplaincy, although Muslim organisations have not provided chaplaincy systematically in these institutions. Several state institutions, including the police, the armed forces and health care providers, often together with publicly

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funded immigrant projects, have produced guidelines and information booklets on Islam, but it is currently unclear to what extent these are followed and the quality of these guidelines is very variable. 9

Religious Festivals

Religious festivals are customarily organised by cultural and mosque organisations in places with larger Muslim populations. Apart from Muslim organisations, various ministries have arranged invitation-only iftar dinners during Ramadan since 2001. All these events have been open either to Muslims only or, by personal invitation, to non-Muslim friends, researchers and others. Public access to religious festival celebrations is not guaranteed in state and other organisations. 10

Halal Food

In earlier times, Finnish Muslims used the services of a Jewish shop in Helsinki, and later halal food was imported into Finland and sold at outlets in mosques and ethnic stores. Today, fresh halal meat is available in Helsinki, where three halal shops currently sell meat slaughtered in Finland. Halal slaughter has occasionally been discussed in the Finnish media and in 1996, the Animal Protection Act provided guidelines for approved halal slaughter in Finland, which require the animal to be stunned simultaneously with the slaughter. 11

Dress Codes

So-called Muslim clothing, including head scarves, has not been a major topic of public discussion in Finland. For example, girls have the right to wear a scarf at school, even though modifications may be required for sport and other activities for safety or hygiene reasons. Employers are increasingly having to face the issue and some have provided guidelines regarding acceptable clothing at work, for instance in public health care.

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The media image of Islam is conflict-oriented and gives a violent and aggressive impression of Islam, as has been noted in many studies over the years. This is applies particularly to foreign news reporting, while Finnish Muslims are more often represented in a multicultural framework. Popular literature on Islam was scarce until the 2000s, but more has been published since then. The professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Helsinki, Jaakko Hämeen-Anttila, has been especially active and has produced more than a dozen popular books on various topics relating to Islam. Few books written by Muslims are published. The Qur’an has been translated into Finnish three times (1942, 1957 and 1995). Mosque communities and other Islamic associations increasingly distribute Finnish-language literature and leaflets, which are often translated from other languages. There are two small Finnish-language Muslim periodicals. A Sunni journal, An-Nur, has been published by the Islamic Society of Finland since 1994 and a Shi’i journal, Salam, by Resalat Islamilainen Yhdyskunta (the Resalat Islamic Community) since 2007. In addition, several ethnic communities produce journals including religious material, although this is not their primary focus. Beyond print media, the Internet provides several information and discussion forums for Muslims and on Islam, including Sunnapolku (The Path of Sunna, www.sunnapolku.com), a Finnish-language information and discussion forum on Islam, and Islam Suomessa (Islam in Finland, www.tulevaisuus.org), a Finnish language information portal on Islam. In addition, a global, high-volume and non-religious site for Muslims, Muxlim—Enhancing the Muslim Lifestyle (www.muxlim.com), has been run in Finland by Mohamed El-Fatatry since 2007. 13

Family Law

The relationship between family law and Islamic laws and traditions is still taking shape in Finland. Mosques and imams provide consultations in family matters, but there is no overview of how this takes place. Male circumcision has been a topic of heated public discussions, and some Finnish NGOs as well as the majority of Finnish medical doctors oppose the practice when carried out solely for religious or cultural

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reasons. Despite the recommendations of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, the position of male circumcision in public health care remains ambivalent and this has led to circumcisions being carried out at home, with consequent medical complications.14 Cases concerning the difficulty women face in obtaining an Islamic divorce have been reported. In 2007, the Finnish League for Human Rights published a survey of the relationship between Finnish and Islamic laws,15 according to which the majority of Finnish Muslims view Shari’a as a general moral guideline, but in practice follow national legislation. Only a small minority view Shari’a as the primary normative code. 14 Public Opinion and Debate Finnish public opinion regarding Islam and Muslims is generally cautious and negative and similar to general attitudes towards Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons and Scientology. About half the population express a negative stance, and this view seem to have stabilised over the years. The latest opinion poll was conducted in 2006 and found that 56% of Finns view Islam negatively and 9% positively.16 15


Local cultural centres and cultural and religious organisations have run several, small-scale events on Islamic culture since the 1990s. The first major national cultural event on Islam, the Minareetin kutsu (Call of the Minaret), was organised with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004–2005. It was part of a campaign called Tuhat

14 Sakaranaho, Tuula, Anne Alitolppa-Niitamo, Tuomas Martikainen and Marja Tiilikainen, “Religion in migration: Studies on Muslims in Finland”, in Puuronen, Vesa, Antti Häkkinen, Anu Pylkkänen, Tom Sandlund and Reetta Toivanen (eds), New Challenges for the Welfare Society ( Joensuu: University of Joensuu, Karelian Institute, 2004), pp. 124–139. 15 Kouros, Kristiina, Suomessa asuvien muslimien suhtautumisesta perhearvoihin ja perhelainsäädäntöön (The Relationship of Muslims Living in Finland to Family Values and Family Law) (Helsinki: Ihmisoikeusliitto, 2007). 16 Monikasvoinen kirkko: Suomen evankelis-luterilainen kirkko vuosina 2004–2007 (The Church with Many Faces: The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland in 2004–2007) (Tampere: Kirkon tutkimuskeskus, 2008).

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ja yksi askelta (A Thousand and One Steps) that aimed to inform Finns about global Islam. The first major event organised solely by Finnish Muslims took place in November 2008, when the Islamic Council of Finland in Helsinki put on a two-day “Islam-Expo”. This included panel presentations, exhibitions about Muslim communities and displays of Islamic products, and attracted around 200 visitors.

FRANCE Anne-Laure Zwilling1 1

Muslim Populations

Figures concerning the numbers of Muslims in France are very difficult to provide. Since 1872, it has been forbidden for a census to identify people according to religious affiliation. Article 8 of the revised law of 6 January 1978 forbids the collection of any data providing personal information on racial or ethnic origin, or philosophical, religious or political belief or affiliation.2 The French National Institute of Statistical Information (INED) therefore provides no such information and it can only be obtained from surveys carried out by companies such as BVA (www.bva.fr), IFOP (www.ifop.com/europe), CSA (www.csa-fr.com), IPSOS (www.ipsos.fr) and TNS-Sofres (www.tns-sofres .com) for newspapers or magazines, and from European surveys that include sections on France. Since the methods and techniques used in these surveys are diverse, results can sometimes vary significantly, and are always difficult to compare. It is also a sensitive issue as there are sometimes political, religious or personal motives for exaggerating or downplaying figures about Muslims. For all these reasons, only a general picture of the Muslim presence in France can be given. In 2000, the High Council for Integration estimated the number of Muslims in France to be 4million.3 Other estimates followed, the figures steadily increasing, up to 6 or 7 million. In 2003, the demographer Michèle Tribalat criticised the lack of serious work in this field, and provided

1 Anne-Laure Zwilling is research assistant at the research centre PRISME—Société, Droit et Religions en Europe (Societies, Law and Religions in Europe), Centre National de Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Strasbourg. She holds degrees in philosophy, theology and religious studies and works in the field of religious minorities in Europe. 2 “Il est interdit de collecter des données à caractère personnel qui font apparaître, directement ou indirectement, les origines raciales ou ethniques, les opinions politiques, philosophiques ou religieuses ou l’appartenance syndicale des personnes, ou qui sont relatives à la santé ou à la vie sexuelle de celles-ci.” 3 L’islam dans la République (Islam in the French Republic), November 2000, available at http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/014000017/0000.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009.

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her own result, based on a demographic analysis taking into account the ethnic origins of the population: 3.7million (or 4.1million if one includes the Harkis—Muslim Algerians who sided with the France during the Algerian war of independence), although she underlines that, like all the other statistics about Muslims in France, this can only suggest the number of ‘possible Muslims’, not of ‘actual Muslims’. There is currently a generally agreed estimate that there are 4.5million Muslims in France, predominantly Sunnis, representing 7.1%4 of a total population of 63,392million.5 France remains a very Catholic country: 69% of French people aged over fifteen say they have a religious affiliation—59% claim to be Catholics, 3% Muslims, 2% Protestants, 1% Jews and 1% Buddhists.6 The Muslim presence in metropolitan France is mainly the result of immigration. The starting point for the noticeable presence of Muslims in France is the end of World War I. Men from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia served in the French army and this led to the arrival in France of immigrants from these countries. These immigrants were estimated to number 120,000 in 1920, of whom 100,000 were from Algeria, which was then a French colony, Tunisia and Morocco being only French protectorates. From then on, with a marked increase after World War II,7 Muslim immigrants were mostly men, responding to a French demand for cheap labour. During the Algerian war of independence, up to 160,000 Algerians were soldiers in the French army. When the war ended in 1962, there were widespread reprisals against those who remained in Algeria, and many tried to find refuge in France. It is usually estimated that the number of these ex-soldiers, called Harkis, and their families who arrived in France between 1962 and 1968 amounted to 91,000. Unfortunately, not much effort was made to welcome them: they were lodged either in settlements near existing urban centres, in isolated purpose-built hamlets in the rural

4 French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE), 2007, available at http://www.insee .fr/fr/bases-de-donnees/default.asp?page=recensements.htm, accessed 19 May 2009. 5 INSEE, 2008. 6 TNS-Sofres survey, “Les enjeux du quotidien”, 2007, available at http://www .tns-sofres.com/etudes/pol/050407_religion.htm, last accessed 9 December 2008. 7 Blanchard, Pascal, Éric Deroo, Driss El Yazami, Pierre Fournié and Gilles Manceron, “L’immigration: l’installation en métropole des populations du Maghreb”, in Blanchard, Pascal and Sandrine Lemaire, Culture impériale 1931–1961 (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 2004).

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south, or in so-called temporary camps, some of which had formerly housed refugees and political prisoners. After France and the Turkish government signed a labour agreement in 1966, a large number of Turks began to migrate to France—18,000 in 1970, 200,000 in the early 1990s and 450,000 by 2005. Finally, a number of immigrants came from former French colonies and other countries with a Muslim population, such as Senegal and India. After the 1970s the immigration from Morocco and Turkey began slowly to increase and in 1974 the government passed a law allowing the families of immigrants to join them, so many children and wives moved to France. As a result of all these factors, the Muslim population in France is currently made up predominantly of people from North Africa (Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia), Turkey, Sub-Saharan Africa and their children born in France. There are also South Asians and people from the Middle East and, since the Yugoslav wars (1991–2001), Bosnians and Albanians. The high concentration of the Muslim population in socially deprived areas, major urban centres and suburbs (Paris, Lyon and Bouches-du-Rhône), and former industrial and mining areas such as the North or Haut-Rhin is the result of immigration, which also explains the Muslim presence along the Mediterranean coast, geographically close to North Africa. Turkish people living in France are mostly concentrated in Paris, Alsace and Lorraine and the region of Nord-Pas de Calais, where they live mainly in the cities of Calais, Lille and Roubaix.8 Very few Muslims live in rural areas.9 The first generation of Muslim immigrants, now retired from the workforce, often applied for French nationality before retiring in France. However, many live alone in housing estates, and have lost their ties with their countries of origin. The second generation, and now a third generation, of Muslims find integration difficult, though this may be highly dependent on their family origin.10 In 1975, the Harkis protested publicly against what they described as years of official amnesia, neglect, and marginalisation by the French authorities: in 1974 more than 14,000 8 IFOP survey on the geographical repartition of religions in France, 2006, http:// www.ifop.com/europe/docs/religions_geo.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009. 9 Cartographie des musulmans et des sans religions en France http://www.lemonde .fr/societe/infographie/2007/03/02/l-islam-affiche-une-presence-moyenne-de-3–dansde-nombreux-departements_878171_3224.html, accessed 19 May 2009. 10 Alba, Richard and Roxane Silberman, “Decolonization immigrations and the social origins of the second generation: The case of North Africans in France”, International Migration Review, vol. 36, no. 4 (2002), pp. 1169–1193.

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Harkis were still living in the camps set up as a ‘temporary solution’ in the 1960s. The second generation, being born in France, are French citizens, but a reform of the nationality laws in 1992 delayed the granting of French nationality until it was applied for in adulthood (where previously it was automatically granted). According to the 2005 data from the National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies,11 unemployment among people of French origin was then 9.2% while for those of foreign backgrounds, the rate was 14% (statistics adjusted to take account of educational qualifications). Furthermore, there was a 5% overall unemployment rate for graduates of French origin, but 26.5% of university graduates of Northern African origins were unemployed. All this has led to growing dissatisfaction among second and third generation Muslims.12 According to a CSA survey in 2006, 88% of people claiming to be Muslims fast during Ramadan; 43% pray five times a day; 20% read the Qur’an at least once a week; 17% go to the mosque at least once a week, and 8% at least once a month.13 Religious practice seems to be on the increase: a different survey conducted in 2007 showed that 23% of Muslims claimed to attend the mosque regularly, compared with 16% in 1989; 70% said they fasted during Ramadan, compared with 60% in 1989; and 6% had performed pilgrimage to the Mecca, compared with 4% in 1989.14 2

Islam and the State

The main religious regime in France, that of separation between religion and state, is defined by the law of 9 December 1905.15 It stipulates that the French Republic “guarantees freedom of conscience” and “the free exercise of religion”. But the state “does not recognise,

http://www.insee.fr/fr/ffc/docs_ffc/IP1042.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009. Lopez, Alberto and, Gwénaëlle Thomas, “L’insertion des jeunes sur le marché du travail: le poids des origines socioculturelles”, in Données sociales—lasociété française, Paris: INSEE, 2006, pp. 293–305. 13 “Portrait des musulmans (Portrait of Muslims)”, available at http://www.csafr.com/dataset/data2006/opi20060823b.htm, accessed 19 May 2009. 14 IFOP survey for La Croix, 8–17 December 2007, “Evolution de l’Islam en France”. 15 Text available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT 000006070169&dateTexte=20090401, accessed 19 May 2009. 11

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pay a wage to or subsidise any religious denomination”. This law did not establish any kind of religious status or regime, but does provide for support mechanisms such as the possibility of creating religious associations, tax exemptions, chaplaincies in the army, financial support for the maintenance of places of worship. These were to be granted to churches and religions that requested them. Because of their previous legal status as “recognised religions”, Catholic dioceses and, to a lesser extent, Protestants and Jews, automatically enjoyed the advantages provided for in this law. This regime does not apply in the Rhine and Moselle departments (Alsace and Moselle), which were part of Germany in 1905, where recognised denominations are organised within the framework of public law and financed by the state and the towns. Non-recognised religious groups are organised within the framework of private law. Local law also applies to the organisation of religion in the overseas territories and one of the overseas departments. 3


Muslim groups and associations are organised according to the law of associations (1901) and a large number of Muslim associations are therefore registered. The majority of them are small and of only local interest, but a few associations are of national importance. The Union des Organisations Islamiques de France (UOIF, www.uoif-online.com), often said to have links with the Muslim Brotherhood, aims at bringing together all French Muslims, but many of the main Muslim organisations in France reflect countries of origin: Algerian Islam is represented by the Grande Mosquée de Paris (www.mosquee-de-paris.org), and the Fédération Nationale des Musulmans de France (FNMF) is the organisation of Moroccan Islam. After an internal dispute, the FNMF split in 2007 and a second organisation of Moroccan Islam, the Rassemblement des Musulmans de France (RFM), was then created. Turks are grouped in the Comité de Coordination des Musulmans Turcs de France. There are also youth associations, the main one being Jeunes Musulmans de France (Young Muslims of France, www.jmf.asso.fr), founded in July 1993 with the support of the UOIF. The Conseil Français du Culte Musulman (French Council of the Muslim Religion, (CFCM, www.cfcm.tv) was founded in 2002 at the request of the French authorities as a body whose aim is to

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represent Muslims to the government and communicate the views of the state to Muslims. It has concerns regarding issues such as the construction of mosques, sections for Muslim burial in cemeteries, halal slaughter, nomination of chaplains and the training of imams, but it has neither real prerogatives nor any executive power. It was set up to represent Islam on a national level and is recognised by the French government,16 but its real capacity to represent French Muslims has often been questioned by Muslims themselves. The main challenge is that seats on the Council are granted according to the ground area of each mosque, which benefits affluent groups and is therefore not viewed as very democratic. The last elections took place in 2008, when 43 delegates elected Mohammed Moussaoui, vice-president of the Rassemblement des Musulmans de France, as president of the CFCM. In March 2005, the Fondation pour les Œuvres de l’Islam de France (Foundation for the Works of Islam in France) was established to be responsible for collecting all donations and distributing funds for the construction and renovation of places of worship and to support the training of imams, as well for financing the CFCM. There are substantial numbers of Sufi orders in France, including groups such as the Murid tariqas (www.acrim.org) from Senegal and Mali, the Naqshbandis (www.naqshbandi.fr, mostly Turkish) and the ‘Alawiyya tariqa, which is of Algerian origin. 4


There were around 2,150 places of Muslim worship in France in 2006, about twenty of which can accommodate more than 1,000 people. Eight are mosques with minarets, the eldest being the Grande Mosquée de Paris. Some 120 buildings are dedicated solely to Muslim practice and activities, but most are not, being either private houses or sometimes former factories and the like, often a simple garage, that are used for worship.17 The number of building projects is on

16 See the report of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Muslim faith in France, September 2007, available at http://www.ambafra-pk.org/IMG/pdf/muslim_faith.pdf, last accessed 19 May 2009. 17 http://www.la-croix.com/illustrations/Multimedia/Actu/2006/10/25/carte1 .jpg, accessed 19 May 2009.

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the increase and mosques are being built in Marseille, Strasbourg, Nantes, Paris, Tours, Villeneuve d’Ascq. Cultural centres, which can also host meetings and worship, are also planned.18 The mosque in Créteil, which can accommodate 2,000 people, opened its doors in December 2008 and is now the biggest mosque in the Paris region. 5


State education, which in France means all public schools, does not include the teaching of Islam. This is because the French school system, with the principle of separation, does not allow any religious instruction in state schools. Generally speaking, there are three kinds of school in France:19 private schools without contract with the state (écoles privées hors contrat), private schools with a contract with the state (écoles privées sous contrat d’association avec l’Etat), public school (écoles publiques). Private schools without contract receive no financial assistance from the state and they are free to organise as they wish (law Debré of 31 December 1959; code of education L 442). When private schools do have a contract with the state, they can receive public funding to cover up to a tenth of their costs, and possible official recognition of their curriculum and diplomas. They then have to comply with the Code of Education, Article L141–3 and Article R442–36, which states that religious education can be given either outside normal hours of schooling, or else as the first or last hour(s) of teaching of the day. Religious education must remain optional, and the school cannot discriminate about which students it accepts. Nearly all these private schools (90%) are Catholic schools. The same rules apply to primary and secondary education. Chaplaincies can be created at secondary level (collèges and lycées), but not in primary schools. In Alsace and Moselle, where the legal status of religions is different, state primary schools and secondary and technical education establishments are secular, but all must include religious instruction in their 18 “La création de mosquées se banalise en France”, Le Monde, 3 December 2008, available at http://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/2008/12/03/la-creation-demosquees-se-banalise-en-france_1126275_0.html, accessed 19 May 2009. 19 For a more detail, see Peiser, Gustave, “Ecole publique, Ecole privée et Laïcité en France”, Cemoti, no. 19—Laïcité(s) en France et en Turquie, available at http:// cemoti.revues.org/document1699.html, accessed 19 May 2009.

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curriculum. Students’ parents can have their children exempted from these classes upon request and, in primary schools, such pupils have classes in ethics. The content of religious instruction is left to the discretion of the relevant religious authorities. In reality, however, Christianity and Judaism are almost always the only possibilities, although the Archbishop of Strasbourg stressed in an interview with the Christian journal La Croix (12 December 2003), the necessity of allowing Islam to be taught in public schools along with the two other major religions. Three private Muslim secondary schools (receiving no public funding) have opened in France in the recent years: Aubervilliers, Lille (2003), and Lyon (2008). A private Muslim school with a contract with the state has existed since 1990 in La Réunion (French overseas department). On 10 March 2008, the Muslim private school Éducation et Savoir opened its doors in Vitry-sur-Seine (Val-de-Marne, Paris suburban region). Muslim children often attend Christian private schools to receive religious instruction, and some of these schools allow Muslim teachers for their Muslim pupils. In 2006, 317,000 pupils attended private schools for kindergarten, 565,000 at primary level, 655,000 in the first years of secondary school (collège) and 410,000 in the second part of secondary school (lycée).20 Outside school, Muslim religious education in France is delivered in mosque associations and is therefore very much connected to the country of origin. 6


Muslim higher education and imam training is currently organised in France only by private institutions: l’Institut Français des Etudes et Sciences Islamiques (Ile de France, www.ifesi.fr); l’Institut Avicenne des Sciences Humaines (Lille, www.avicenne.eu); and l’Institut Européen des Sciences Humaines (close to Nevers, www.iesh.fr). A specific programme for imams opened in September 2008 in the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at the Institut Catholique de Paris, a private Catholic faculty. It is a Diplôme Universitaire course, meaning a two-year study programme at higher education level, with the course

20 See the budget of the Ministry of National Education, available at http:// www.performance-publique.gouv.fr/farandole/2007/pap/html/DBGPGMPRESPGMACTPGM139.htm, accessed 19 May 2009.

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title: Interculturalité, Laïcité et Religions (Interculturalism, Secularism and Religions). Although the Grande Mosquée de Paris is sending its imams there for further training, not all Muslim institutions find this situation acceptable. A Masters in Law and Religious Studies with a specialisation in Islamic Studies, is due to start at the University of Strasbourg, in September 200921 and this will be the first degree programme in Islamic studies to be offered in a state university in France. 7


Even though, with the exception of Alsace, creating separate places in cemeteries according to religions is generally considered illegal, around 70 Muslim sections in cemeteries have nevertheless been opened in major cities such as Montpellier and Marseille and 23 are located around Paris.22 Circulars issued in 1975 by the Ministry of the Interior recommended that prefects and mayors should reserve specific areas for Muslims in cemeteries, while avoiding any physical separation of the allocated space. 8


The French law codes of education and health and the penal code permit the provision of chaplains. These people mostly work on a voluntary basis and have no real legal status. The CFCM has nominated head chaplains for hospitals, schools and prisons, but this remains an internal recognition. Chaplaincy has legal status only in the army. Since March 2005, a Muslim head chaplain has been appointed by the Minister of Defence, along with the three existing head chaplains (Catholic, Protestant and Jewish). The head chaplains nominate and manage the military chaplains of their own religious groups. 9

Religious Festivals

Religious festivals or feasts are never organised by the state. Muslim religious holidays are not recognised by the state and public holidays, 21 22

http://master-islamo.mineurel.info/, accessed 19 May 2009. Aggoun, Atmane, Les musulmans face à la mort en France (Paris: Vuibert, 2006).

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given the historical importance of Catholicism in France, follow the Christian calendar (Easter, Christmas, etc.). Official departments and agencies, state schools and employers nevertheless grant leave of absence to Muslims who wish to attend religious ceremonies on occasions such as ‘Id al-Adha, ‘Id al-Fitr and Mawlid. 10

Halal Food

Halal food is nowadays commonly found in supermarkets. Specialist shops also exist and halal business seems to work well.23 As in most European countries, exceptions for ritual slaughter have been made to the Rural Law Code, and the state has given official consent for this to the Paris Mosque (1994) and Lyon and Evry (1995). The local authorities usually try to facilitate the organisation of halal slaughter. Private associations such as A Votre Service (AVS, www.halal-avs.com) make sure that halal processes are properly monitored and provide information concerning halal food. 11

Dress Codes

The headscarf issue suddenly emerged in the public arena during the 1980s with the increased use—or at least increased visibility—of different types of head coverings worn by young Muslim girls in public places. Because of some local difficulties, the French President set up an investigative committee known as the Commission Stasi in July 2003. This Commission released a report on 11 December 2003, stating that wearing conspicuous religious symbols violated the secular principle of the French school system. On this basis, the law on secularism and religious symbols in state schools was passed in February 2004. Article 1 of the law states: “The wearing of symbols and apparel by which a student conspicuously expresses religious affiliation in public schools is prohibited. The rules of procedure provide for concilia23 See Bergeaud Blackler, Florence, “L’Etat, le culte musulman et le halal business”, Colloque Droits, libertés et obligations du culte musulman, available at http://hal. archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/05/19/05/PDF/papierhalal.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009; Bergeaud Blackler, Florence, “De la viande halal à l’halal food. Comment le halal s’est développé en France ?”, Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 21, no. 3 (2005), pp. 125–147; Brisebarre, Anne-Marie, “L’Aïd el kébir, entre bricolage et encadrement”, Pouvoirs locaux, vol. 69, no. 2 (May 2006), pp. 78–83.

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tory dialogue before disciplinary action is taken against an offending student.” This decision was followed by extensive debate as to its interpretation and application, but passions have nowadays settled. Another report was issued in 2004, on the manifestations of religious affiliation in schools.24 New regulations concerning photos used for passports and national identity cards required that the head must appear without any kind of cover, decoration or scarf; there are no exceptions. There were some protests, arguing that a woman wearing a veil should not appear without it, even on a photo, but this did not really lead to an intense public debate. 12


The broadcasting of religious programmes on public television stations is covered by the law on the freedom of communication No. 86–1067 of 30 September 1986, article 56: France 2 shall schedule religious programmes devoted to the main religions practised in France on Sunday mornings. Said programmes shall be produced under the responsibility of the representatives of said religions and be presented in the form of the live transmission of cultural ceremonies or religious comments. The company shall bear the costs of production within the limit of a maximum amount set in the annual provisions of the terms of reference.

A 30-minute programme on Islam, Connaître l’islam (Knowing Islam) (France 2, 7 Esplanade Henri de France, 75907 Paris cedex 15), is broadcast every Sunday. A very large number of Muslim television channels are accessible by satellite. A number of print publications concerning Islam have existed in France for some time but have now ceased: La Médina, Hawwa-Magazine, Réflexions-Reflets de l’Islam en France, Colombus, Actualis (UOIF), Sézame, Islam de France. They all closed down for financial reasons. The future may lie with electronic publications such as Hanut-ul-muslim (http:// blog.hanut-ul-muslim.com/).

Obin, Jean-Pierre, “Les signes et manifestations d’appartenance religieuse dans les établissements scolaires”, Rapport au ministre de l’éducation nationale, 2004, juin 2004 (2004–115) ftp://trf.education.gouv.fr/pub/edutel/syst/igen/rapports/ rapport_obin.pdf, accessed 19 May 2009. 24

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Family Law

The French legal system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is not relevant in legal matters. However, jurisprudence does sometimes take into account questions of religious affiliation and practice (in matters such as holidays for religious festivals, for example). In 2005, the French government raised the legal age of marriage for girls to 18 (it had been 15 for nearly 200 years). This was to counter the practice of arranged marriage. Chantal Brunel, a right-wing deputy (UMP—Union pour un Movement Populaire), proposed a law against polygamy in June 2004,25 and the issue regularly arises in public debate. This question will certainly have to be dealt with if Mayotte, which recognises polygamy, becomes a French department since Muslim family law applies there. 14 Public Opinion and Debate Public opinion has mostly focused on the question of religious symbols, specifically clothing. For example, the Haute Autorité de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l’Égalité (High Authority against Discrimination and for Equality—HALDE) recently had to deal with questions of wearing the burka, and pupils’ parents wearing a headscarf when taking part in school outings. Issues related to gender always lead to discussion (special opening hours in swimming pools for women or men only, for example). The question of religious practice regarding food is also an issue, especially in schools, but the debate is not very intense. However, signs tension between Muslims and non Muslims are noticeable. In a 2007 poll, 57% of French people said they would rather “not have a Muslim as neighbour”.26

25 http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/propositions/pion1645.asp, accessed 19 May 2009. 26 Borooah, V.K., K. Vani, and J. Mangan, “Love thy neighbour: how much bigotry is there in western countries?”, Kyklos, International Review for Social Sciences, vol. 60, no. 3 (August 2007), pp. 295–317.

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The UOIF organises an annual meeting of French Muslims (Rencontre Annuelle des Musulmans de France) and 120,000 people from across France, are expected for the 26th annual meeting in April 2009. Some 115,000 people participated in 2008. In Marseille, the Muslim community has organised a festival, l’Aïd dans la Cité (‘Id in the city) just before ‘Id.

GERMANY Gerhard Robbers1 1

Muslim Populations

There are about 3.1 to 3.4 million Muslims in Germany, of whom 1.0 to 1.1 million are of German nationality.2 These figures (from 2006) are based on rough estimates, since there is no register. The numbers are calculated primarily on the basis of immigration from Muslim countries such as Turkey (about 2.5 million), Bosnia-Herzegovina (190,000), Iran (130,000), Morocco (124,000), Afghanistan 96,000), Iraq (95,000), Lebanon (70,000), Pakistan (50,000), Tunisia (44,000) and Syria 43,000). About 2.5 million are Sunni, between 400,000 and 700,000 Alevis, 200,000 Twelver Shi’is, and according to their own statement, 40,000 Ahmadis. The Muslim population is spread throughout Germany, but in some major cities such as Berlin (220,000), Cologne, Hamburg, Stuttgart and Munich there are substantial Muslim concentrations. While there has been a small Muslim presence for centuries, immigration of large numbers of Muslims as ‘guest workers’ began in the 1960s. Initially expected to return home after finishing work, many of them have stayed in Germany. 2

Islam and the State

Muslim organisations are mostly structured as associations registered under the general association law. It is a matter of controversy whether these associations are religious communities in the sense intended by the constitutional law, which is a precondition for having 1 Gerhard Robbers is Professor of Public and Church Law and Constitutional History at the University of Triers, Germany. He heads the Institute of European Constitutional Law and has been a judge in the Constitutional Court of RheinlandPfalz since 2008. 2 BT-Drs. 16/5033-Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die große Anfrage der Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 2007; Lemmen, Thomas, Muslime in Deutschland: Eine Herausforderung für Kirche und Gesellschaft (Baden-Baden: Nomos 2001; en, Faruk and Hayrettin Aydın, Islam in Deutschland (Munich: Beck, 2002).

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confessional religious instruction in public schools. In 1998, the High Administrative Court of Berlin established that the Islamische Föderation Berlin (Islam Federation in Berlin) is a religious community, and the Alevi Community in North Rhine-Westphalia has similarly been recognised as a religious community. Various other court cases are pending. No Muslim organisation has as yet been acknowledged as a religious community under public law (Körperschaft öffentlichen Rechts), although a number have applied for this status, which gives a number of specific rights, such as the right to levy ‘church taxes’ on their members. Donations to religious communities and charitable associations are tax deductable up to a certain amount and this also applies to Muslim associations. Charitable organisations are in general exempt from corporation tax, trade tax, real estate tax and inheritance tax. Muslim organisations can and do receive public funding for cultural activities, like any other charitable organisation. Five Muslim organisations have been banned (Kalifatstaat, Al-Aqsa e.V., Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami, YATIM-Kinderhilfe e.V., Yeni Akit GmbH ) on the grounds that they carry out anti-constitutional activities. The most important Muslim organisations and individual Muslims who are representative of the variety of Muslim life in Germany participate actively in the Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islam Conference), which was set up by the German federal minister of the interior and discusses issues related to Muslim life in Germany. It is meant to improve the integration of the Muslim population in Germany and has produced recommendations for, inter alia, a basis for common values, the building of mosques, the introduction of Muslim religious instruction in public schools and improved media coverage. Muslim organisations actively participate in inter-religious dialogue and several inter-religious initiatives have been subsidised from public funds. 3


The local mosque community is the smallest organisational unit. These communities are usually structured as associations in private law and most are made up of members with the same national background. The majority of mosque associations are members of larger associations active on a national level and there are more than a dozen such

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associations.3 Among the most important are the Milli Görüs (Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs (IGMG), 26,500 members, 274 mosque associations, Boschstrasse 61–65, 50171 Kerpen, www.igmg.de) and the Nurculuk (Nurculuk-Vereinigung, 12,000 members, Jamaat-un Nur—Deutsche Provinz, Neustr. 11, 51063 Köln, www.jamaatunnur.de). Some of these larger associations have combined in umbrella organisations and alliances of Muslim organisations have been formed in some of the sixteen federal Länder. The largest umbrella organisations at the federal level are: – Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religion: Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e. V. (DITIB), 150,000 members (Subbelrather Str. 17, 50823 Köln; www.ditib.de). DITIB is under the guidance and supervision of the Turkish Presidency for Religious Affairs (Diyanet) and is regarded as its representative in Germany; – Central Council of Muslims in Germany: Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e. V. (ZMD) 12,000 members and incorporates nineteen umbrella organisations with their mosque associations (Steinfelder Gasse 32, 50670 Köln, http://zentralrat.de. Members of the ZMD are predominantly non-Turkish Muslims; – Islam Council for the Federal Republic of Germany: Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 136,000 members (Osterather Str. 7, 50739 Köln, www.islamrat.de). Its largest member group is Milli Görüs; – Union of Islamic Cultural Centres: Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e. V. (VIKZ) 20,000 members (Vogelsanger Straße 290, 50825 Köln, www .vikz.de)—a Sunni organisation. These four organisations have formed the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (Koordinierungrat der Muslime in Deutschland (KRM)) which is developing as an important interlocutor with the German public. The various organisations often compete with one another, but also cooperate in questions of common interest, such as Islamic religious instruction in public schools. Estimates suggest that about 10%–15% of the Muslims in Germany are involved in these organisations.

There is also the Federation of European Alevites: Föderation der europäischen Alewiten (AABF); 20.000 members, Stolberger Str. 317 50933 Köln; www .alevi.com.4 It is reported that Turkey, Saudi-Arabia and Iran provide funds for some Muslim organisations in Germany. 3 Wunn, Ina, Muslimische Gruppierungen in Deutschland: Ein Handbuch (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 2007). 4 See Sökefeld, Martin (ed.), Aleviten in Deutschland: Identitätsprozesse einer Religionsgemeinschaft in der Diaspora (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2008).

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There is no specifically Muslim political party and individual Muslims are members of all of the larger political parties. However, Muslim voters tend to support the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Green Party) in elections. 4


There are an estimated 2,600 Muslim mosques and prayer houses, of which about 150 are traditional mosques with minaret. About 100 more are being planned or are under construction. In addition, there are more than 120 teaching centres (madrasahs). There are more than 100 Alevi associations, which run a number of places of meeting and worship (cems), although there are no exact figures. The call to prayer is regarded as part of the free practice of religion, and it is legal for loud-speakers to be used. The interests of both the worshipers and the general population have to be taken into consideration in each case in order to determine what is an acceptable sound level. Urban planning law takes into account the religious needs of the local population and the views of religious associations have to be heard in order to establish the for constructing places of worship. 5


There are some 700,000 Muslim pupils in public schools and a great variety of initiatives have been taken to introduce Muslim religious instruction.5 In Germany, the general system of religious instruction in public schools according to the Basic Law is confessional. This makes it difficult to introduce Muslim religious instruction in a way that is compatible with the constitution, the most important problem being the lack of representative associations that qualify as religious communities that can determine the content of Muslim religious instruction. In the meantime, Islam is usually taught in classes where the mother tongue and culture of the specific community’s country

5 See Dietrich, Myrian, Islamischer Religionsunterricht: Rechtliche Perspektiven (Frankfurt a. Main: P. Lang, 2006); Coumont, Nina, “Islam und Schule”, in Muckel, Stefan (ed.), Der Islam im öffentlichen Recht des säkularen Verfassungsstaates (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2008), pp. 440ff.; Bock, Wolfgang (ed.), Islamischer Religionsunterricht? Rechtsfragen, Länderberichte, Hintergründe, 2nd edn (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007).

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of origin dominate. Some Länder work with the Turkish authorities to determine the content of this religious instruction and others with local mosque associations. The situation is very variable because schooling is governed by the sixteen Länder. In Berlin Muslim religious instruction in German is provided for about 4,300 pupils by the Islam Federation and for about 190 pupils by the Cultural Centre of Anatolian Alevis. Also in Berlin, foreign consulates are permitted to offer Muslim instruction under their own auspices, but only the Turkish consulate takes up this option. In Bremen, some schools offer courses in Islam and, since 1988, Bavaria has offered a course of Islamic instruction in Turkish for pupils of Turkish origin which some 13,000 pupils attend, and in 2001, Islamic instruction in German was introduced and some 1,700 pupils attended these classes in the school year 2005–2006. The intention is that this will eventually replace classes in Turkish. In Lower-Saxony Islamic instruction is provided within Turkish and Arabic language classes for pupils for whom these are their mother tongues. A similar situation exists in North Rhine-Westphalia, where classes are also given in Bosnian and Albanian; two of the five permitted hours of language study can be devoted to Islamic instruction. About 700 teachers in public schools in North Rhine-Westphalia teach Turkish, Arabic, Bosnian or Albanian and, since 1999, there have been experimental courses in Islamic studies in German in which about 8,700 pupils participate. In Rhineland-Palatinate, mothertongue courses in Turkish, Bosnian, Arabic and Albanian, which are taught under the oversight of the state authorities, are permitted to include Islamic instruction. In Saarland, this is done in the Turkish language classes, and this is the case in Schleswig-Holstein, where the courses are taught by teachers employed by the Turkish Republic via the Consulate General in Hamburg, and the Land has no influence on the curriculum. Alevi religious instruction under Article 7 Subsection 3 of the Basic Law (Constitution) has, since 2008, been the subject of pilot projects in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia and Hessen. A similar process was followed previously in Baden-Württemberg, where Islamic instruction has been provided in German since 2006–2007 in twelve elementary schools, ten of them Sunni and two Alevi. These courses are coordinated with parents associations and local mosque associations. In Lower-Saxony, about 1,030 pupils in 2006–2007 attended Muslim religious instruction coordinated with the main Muslim religious

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associations in the Land. In Rhineland-Palatinate, an experimental religious instruction programme has been introduced in an elementary school in cooperation with the Turkish Women’s Initiative, ChristianIslamic Discussion Circle, and a Muslim scholar working as voluntary imam at a mosque. In Schleswig-Holstein, Muslim religious instruction was introduced in a number of elementary schools in the year 2007–2008, from grade 1 onwards, in cooperation with the Turkish Community Schleswig-Holstein, the Islamic Religious Community Schleswig-Holstein and DITIB. There are seven public Muslim-run kindergartens (Berlin, Karlsruhe, Munich, Münster, Rüsselsheim, Frankfurt, and Wiesbaden) and many private initiatives for child care. In 2005, the Muslim kindergartens in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden received a public subsidy of around €34,000 in 2005, and Bavaria provided around €30,000 to fund the Munich kindergarten. Three private Muslim schools are functioning. In Bavaria, there are six Muslim childrens’ homes. 6


At the University of Frankfurt there is a chair and a visiting professorship in Islamic Studies. At the University of Münster there is a chair in Islamic Studies. These chairs train teachers for Muslim religious instruction. The professor of the University of Münster has faced severe criticism from Muslim associations recently because of his questioning of the nature of the Qur’an. In response the government of North Rhine-Westfalia has promised to establish another chair for Muslim religion at the university. Programmes for teachers of Islam are also offered at the universities of Osnabrück, Erlangen-Nüremberg and Erfurt. There is a growing federal and state interest in training for imams, although no programmes yet exists. 7


Most first-generation Muslims who die in Germany are buried abroad in their former home countries. German burial law has been largely amended to meet the needs of Muslim burial practice. Several Länder have repealed the former obligation to use a coffin, as well rules about the minimum period that can elapse between death and burial. In many cemeteries, including those operated by Christian churches,

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areas for Muslims have been set aside where it is possible to arrange the graves to face Mecca. However, there remain problems in a number of Länder. 8


Subject to negotiations in individual cases, imams may be allowed into prisons, health care institutions and the police departments to provide for Muslim religious needs. There are about 700 Muslims in the armed forces, but no military ‘chaplaincy’ equivalent to those provided for other religions has yet been established. 9

Religious Festivals

Muslim religious festivals are not explicitly or specially protected in the same way as Christian and Jewish religious holidays are. However, holidays that are not explicitly protected by the holiday laws enjoy protection under the right to freedom of religion or belief: believers in the religion in question have the right to take leave from their employment to attend the services, provided this is compatible with the needs of the employer. There are laws that cover the amount of time pupils and teachers in schools may be away from school to attend the services of their religious community. The range of protection differs in detail between the various Länder, but where there is no legally defined specific protection, a balance must be struck between the religious needs of the believers and the needs of their employer or institution. 10

Halal Food

Halal slaughter is permitted under legally defined conditions. The animal protection law provides for exceptions from the requirement of stunning animals before killing them, but some state authorities try to make ritual slaughter more difficult. No problems have been reported with respect to other types of halal food. In public institutions such as prisons, the armed forces, etc., halal food is available on request.

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Dress Codes

In general, people are free to wear religious clothing or symbols. The headscarf as a religious garment is not prohibited, and this applies to students in public schools and universities. However, covering of the whole face in school is not permitted for educational reasons. An employer must accept the right of a Muslim woman employee working, for example, as a sales person in a perfume shop, to wear the Muslim headscarf. Following intense public debate, a number of Länder (Baden-Württemberg, Hessen, Bremen, Berlin, Lower Saxony, Bavaria, Saarland, North Rhine-Westphalia) have introduced specific laws to prohibit teachers and other public officials from wearing specific religious symbols. This is in practice aimed at the Muslim headscarf in public schools, and in Berlin and Bremen it also covers other religions and fields of public service. The law in Baden-Württemberg reads: Teachers in public schools are not allowed to express political, religious, ideological or similar views or actions that may endanger or undermine the neutrality of the state towards pupils or parents or the political, religious or ideological peace of the school. Particularly prohibited is behaviour by a teacher that can appear to pupils and parents to contradict human dignity, non-discrimination, the rights of freedom or the free and democratic order of the constitution. The exercise of the task of education and the respectful presentation of Christian and western educational and cultural values or traditions does not contradict the duty of behaviour according to section 1.

The Federal Administrative Court has ruled that all laws prohibiting the wearing of religious clothing in public schools must be interpreted in a way that treats all religions equally while respecting the German cultural tradition. However, this issue remains a challenge to the establishment of an adequate balance between religious freedom for Muslims and restrictions on that right. 12


The major Muslim organisations issue their own print media. Newspapers and other print media from abroad, including Muslim countries, are also available. There are no specific Muslim broadcasting media. The radio provider Radyo Metropol FM offers a 24-hours, predominantly Turkish-language

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programme in Berlin, Mannheim, and Ludwigshafen. Muslim issues are covered broadly in the general media and public and private broadcasters allow room for Muslim ideas. Muslim organisations are not represented on the supervisory boards of the state media unlike Christian and Jewish religious communities. 13

Family Law

Only civil marriage is recognized in law. Exceptions apply for marriages contracted abroad between non-Germans. Everyone is free to contract their marriage through a religious institution, but such a marriage has no legal standing. There are no legal effects for divorce conducted outside the procedures laid down by state law. Child custody is governed exclusively by state law and is based on the equal rights of the spouses. Inheritance law is exclusively governed by state law. However, the extent to which people follow their own cultural traditions in their private and social lives is another matter. 14 Public Opinion and Debate Intense public debate6 has focused on the construction of the main mosque in Cologne, where building permission was granted despite opposition. In Duisburg, on the other hand, a large mosque has been inaugurated without much public debate. Inter-religious dialogue has continued; the Protestant Church in Germany has issued a hotly debated paper on its relationship with Islam.7 The Islam Conference called by the federal minister of the interior has continued its work. Some 30 Muslim organisations with about 33,000 members are under observation by the security services because they are suspected of anti-constitutional activities.

6 For general background information see Bielefeldt, Heiner, Muslime im säkularen Rechtsstaat (Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2003). 7 EKD, Klarheit und gute Nachbarschaft, available at http://www.ekd.de/download/ekd_texte_86.pdf, accessed 20 May 2009.

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As there is such a variety of Muslim organisations and so many Muslims, there are innumerable Muslim cultural events, but none that could be called countrywide. Every year there is an ‘Open Mosque Day’ on 3 October, organised by the major Muslim associations.8

8

http://www.ditib.de/default1.php?id=9&sid=50&lang=de, accessed 20 May 2009.

GREECE Konstantinos Tsitselikis1 1

Muslim Populations

At the establishment of Greece as an independent state (1830), Muslims constituted a very small group with almost no institutional special protection. By 1881 and with the annexation of Thessalia, Muslims communities (numbering about 40,000 at that time) were protected as a minority by the Treaty of Constantinople. In effect, the Ottoman system of millet (ethno-religious communal institutional autonomy) was preserved and the local muftis acquired quasi-juridical authority in personal status matters. Muslim schools and pious foundations (waqfs) were recognised in Greek law and were administered by local Muslim Community Councils. By the end of the Balkan Wars (1912–13) and with the annexation of the New Territories by Greece, the same status was extended to more than 500,000 Muslims who opted to stay and become Greek citizens. The legal status of the Muslim Communities was consolidated, community schools and the waqfs were kept under their authority, and the muftis acquired advisory jurisdiction on personal matters. After the Greek-Turkish war of 1919–1922, a mutual population exchange took place under the Lausanne Convention (1923) and 450,000 Muslims left Greece for Turkey. As an exemption, 92,000 Muslims with Greek citizenship remained in Thrace (Turkish-speakers and Bulgarian-speakers or Pomaks) and 26,000 Albanian-speakers in Epirus.2 The latter were forced to flee to Albania in 1945 at the end of the German occupation. In 1947, when the Dodecanese Islands were annexed by Greece, a population of about 12,000 Muslims (Greek and Turkish speaking) became Greek citizens. Today, Muslims 1 Konstantinos Tsitselikis is an assistant professor in the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki. He holds degrees in international law and human rights and is co-director of the Series of Studies of the Research Centre of Minority Groups (www.kemo.gr). 2 Tsitselikis, K., “The legal status of Islam in Greece”, Die Welt des Islams, vol. 44, no. 3 (2004), pp. 402–431 (402).

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with Greek citizenship residing in Greece (in total about 105,000) are mainly concentrated in Thrace (about 85,000) and Rodos and Kos (Dodecanese Islands), with about 2,000 on each island. Another 15,000 have emigrated from Thrace for economic reasons to Athens or other Greek cities. For political and economic reasons in the context of the Greek-Turkish confrontation in the 1960s and 1970s, a wave of Muslims emigrated from Thrace to Turkey and Germany too (more than 120,000 are estimated to live abroad).3 Muslims of Greek citizenship are mostly Turkish-speakers and express Turkish national feelings. About 20,000 of them have Pomak (Bulgarian dialect) as their mother tongue, partly expressing an ethnic Pomak identity, often along with a Turkish (national) identity, and about 5,000 speak Roma (partly expressing an ethnic Roma identity), although most of the Muslim Roma are monolingual Turkish speaking. The identity issue in Thrace became controversial insofar as Turkish nationalism, backed by Turkey, attempts to absorb the Muslim minority into a Turkish identity, and Greek policies attempt to foster internal divisions. As religion and mother tongue ceased to be a question in national census after 1951, all the above figures are roughly estimated. Immigrant Muslims have had an important presence in Greece since 1990 as part of the general flow of migration resulting from global political destabilisation and regional wars, and Greece’s geographical position.4 Muslim immigrants come from African and Asian countries, and from Albania. In 1998, 14% of Greece’s immigrants in the area of metropolitan Athens were Muslims from these regions. Sunnism is the most popular form of Islam and is followed by immigrants from Africa, Bangladesh, Pakistan and the Arab countries. Shi’ism is far less widespread, existing mainly among Kurdish, Pakistani and Iranian communities, while Alevism is found mostly among Turks and Kurds. In the 2001 census, immigrants exceeded 820,000, or 8% of the overall population. Around 200,000 of them were Muslims, not including Albanians, the majority of whom are of Muslim background, 3 Hersant, J., Mobilisations politiques, co-gouvernementalité et construction ethnique: Sociologie du nationalisme turc à travers le cas des Turcs de Thrace occidentale (Grèce, Allemagne, Turquie), (Political motivations, co-governmentality and ethnic building: Sociology of Turkish nationalism with reference to the Turks of W. Thrace (Greece, Turkey, Germany)), PhD thesis, Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, 2007. 4 Marvakis, A., D. Parsanoglou and M. Pavlou (eds), Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα (Immigrants in Greece) (Athens: Ellinika Grammata); Christopoulos, D. and M. Pavlou (eds), Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης (Greece of immigration) (Athens: Kritiki, 2006).

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but without strongly expressed affinities with Islam.5 Among the communities with an Islamic affiliation, the largest are the Pakistani (15,000–35,000), Egyptian (15,000–35,000), Bangladeshi (8,500– 20,000), Nigerian (2,000–3,000) and Algerian (1,000). Altogether, about 2,000 immigrants are from the Maghrib.6 Other communities have fewer than 300 members. The estimated Muslim population in 2008 (Greek and non-Greek citizens) was 350,000, making 3.1% of the total population of 11,000,000. 2

Islam and the State

According to the Greek constitution (art. 3) the dominant religion is Greek Orthodoxy. Islam enjoys the status of a recognised religion. In Thrace, three Muftiates (in Xanthi, Komotini and Didimotiho) function as public authorities, financed by the state. As a result of political confrontation between the Greek government and the pro-Turkish minority elite, there have been since the 1990s two ‘parallel’ (though not officially recognised) muftis, elected in Komotini and Xanthi, who exert a strong political influence.7 The imams serving in the mosques of Thrace should be contracted by the government under Act 3536/2007, but the act has not so far been implemented so the imams (hired in each mosque of Thrace) are appointed and paid (out of the waqf income) by the three official muftis and partially by the two elected muftis who are granted financial support from Turkey. The waqfs of Thrace and of the Dodecanese are administered by management committees under the supervision of the local authorities and the government. A new law on the waqfs of Thrace (3647/2008), which provides for elections of these committees, has not so far implemented.

5 13% of the immigrant population of metropolitan Athens come from Muslim Asian and African countries (Kavounidou, Tz. and A. Hatzaki, Αλλοδαποί που αιτήθηκαν προσωρινής άδειας παραμονής (Aliens who applied for temporary stay permit) (Athens: Ethniko Institouto Ergasias, 1999). 6 On the Nigerian, Maghrib and Sudanese communities of Greece, see the contributions of P. Onde, S. Ali and M. Ahmet in Marvakis, et al., Μετανάστες στην Ελλάδα. 7 Aarbakke, V., The Muslim Minority of Greek Thrace, 2 vols, PhD dissertation, University of Bergen, 2000. Two of the mufti offices have websites: the official one of Komotini (www.muftikomotini.com) and the unofficial/elected one of Xanthi (www.iskecemuftulugu.org).

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When requested (before a court, in parliament, or in the army), there is provision for an Islamic oath. Act 2190/1994 (as amended by Act 3647/2008) provides for a quota of 0.5% of appointments in the public sector to be allocated to members of the Muslim minority, but it has not yet been implemented. 3


There is no central national Muslim organisation, but there are many associations of Muslims of Greek citizenship as well as of immigrant Muslims. Very limited contacts is observed between minority and immigrant associations, and that only in Athens. In Thrace, there is a number of cultural, educational and sports associations that are Turkish in character, a few regarded as Muslim Roma, and one Pomak. There are also a few that may be identified as Bektashi/Alevi. Two of the most important associations led by the Turkish political and professional minority elite in Thrace are: – Σύλλογος επιστημόνων μειονότητας Θράκης/Bati Trakya Azınlığı Yüksek Tahsilliler Derneği (Association of University Graduates of the Minority of Thrace); president: Ahmet Kara (Egnatias 75, 69100 Komotini, tel: 0030 25310 29705). – Τουρκική Ένωση Ξάνθης/İskeçe Türk Birliği (Turkish Union of Xanthi), not yet registered, president: Ozan Ahmetoglu (P. Ydras 2, 67100, Xanthi, tel: 0030 25410 23614). In Athens, a number of national associations have been set up by immigrant communities, such as the Pakistanis (Ελληνο-πακιστανικός μορφωτικός σύλλογος/Pakistano-Greek Cultural Association), the Egyptians, etc. Two interrelated associations attempt to express a common Islamic identity for all Muslims, both immigrant and Greek: – Ελληνο-αραβικό Μορφωτικό Κέντρο (Arab-Hellenic Centre for Culture and Civilization) (Kyprou 2 & Pireos str., Moshato 18346, Athens, tel: 0030 2106910492); – Ένωση Μουσουλμάνων Ελλάδας (Association of Muslims in Greece); president: Naim Elghandour (9 Galaxia str N.Kosmos, Athens, tel: 0030 2106916055).

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Intra Muslim dynamics are not obvious, as no clear discourse is articulated, but they are all united by concern about practical problems regarding places for worship and cemeteries. Their survival strategy, faced with an indifferent Greek society and alien Greek Orthodox mainstream ideology, is to keep a low profile while supporting the national (Turkish) character of the minority. Internal divisions regarding fundamentalism, the application of Shari’a, Sunni and Shi’a Islamic practices, and ethnic origins, occur but without open conflict, under the shadow of the global tensions engendered by the 11 September 2001 event. With regard to Islam in Thrace, theological dialogue and attempts to discuss the application of Shari’a, or other subjects, are very weak. Religion is entrapped in Greek-Turkish politics. 4


About 300 mosques in Thrace, two on Kos and one on Rodos are officially open and more than 80 unofficial mosques are functioning in greater Athens (also in Thessaloniki and other cities) for immigrant Muslims.8 According to Act 2833/2000 (art. 7), a mosque should have been built in Paiania (a suburb of Athens) for the Olympic Games. When this law was not implemented, the new Act 3512/2006 provided for the construction of a mosque in Athens (run by a foundation controlled by the state) through state funding, but this has still not been implemented. 5


Religious education in public schools is Greek Orthodox, to which are added occasional modules on world religions, Islam included. Parents have the right to withdraw their children from religious education. There are 208 elementary, two high schools and two madrasas (high schools with a full mainstream Greek curriculum plus extra Islamic subjects) that provide bilingual minority education in Thrace and are funded primarily by the state and also partially out of waqf income.

8 Tsitselikis, K., “Religious freedom of immigrants: The case of the Muslims” (in Greek), in Christopoulos and Pavlou, Η Ελλάδα της μετανάστευσης, pp. 267–302.

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These schools, as well as five public high schools, all in Thrace, provide Islamic instruction.9 More than 100 Qur’an courses (kuran kursu) are offered outside school hours by private minority groups, and on Kos (Platani), the local imam has also been offering kuran kursu since 1994. Since 1997, due to a special quota, 0.5% of student places in universities are available to Muslims from Thrace (487 in 2007–2008).10 A foreign school run by Libya since 1979 (the “7th April School”) caters exclusively for pupils from Arabic countries and provides Islamic religious education. In a few immigrant mosques and in the Greek-Arabic educational cultural centre in Athens, Islamic instruction is available to the vast majority of Muslims who cannot afford private school fees and attend Greek public schools, but very few students attend these courses. 6


Islam is offered for non-Muslim students as a subject in the theological schools of Greece over one or two semesters (Universities of Athens and Thessaloniki). An imam training school was envisaged by Act 1920/1991, but this was never implemented. Some imams are graduates of one or other of the two madrasas of Thrace or from Islamic faculties in Turkey, while others are self-taught. 7


Islamic cemeteries exist only in Thrace, Kos and Rodos and the lack of a Muslim cemetery outside these areas causes serious hardship. The construction of an Islamic cemetery is planned on the outskirts

9 Baltsiotis. L. and K. Tsitselikis, “Η μειονοτική εκπαίδευση στην Θράκη: Νομικό καθεστώς, προβλήματα και προοπτικές (The minority education of Thrace: Legal status,

problems and perspectives)”, in Fragkoudaki, A. and Th. Dragona (eds), Πρόσθεση όχι Αφαίρεση, Πολλαπλασιασμός όχι Διαίρεση. Η μεταρρυθμιστική παρέμβαση στην εκπαίδευση της μειονότητας της Θράκης (Addition vs. Subtraction, Multiplication vs. Division: The Reformative Intervention to the Minority Education of Thrace) (Athens: Metaihmio, 2008), pp. 57–87. 10 Hellenic Committee for Human Rights, Ετήσια έκθεση 2007 (Annual Report 2007) (Athens: National Printing House, 2007), p. 367.

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of Athens following the donation of a plot of land by the Church of Greece. 8


No prayer facilities for Muslims are provided in state institutions or public buildings. Voluntary initiatives are permitted. 9

Religious Festivals

In Thrace, all Islamic religious festivals (bayram, kandil, etc.) are celebrated and led by official and elected muftis. Minority schools also officially mark Islamic religious holidays. In the rest of Greece, the state is neutral on the subject of Islamic celebrations and halal slaughter. Employment law grants Muslim workers the right to free time for prayer and religious festivals, but implementation of this in practice is limited. Muslims immigrants face practical restrictions in the celebration of religious festivals, as there are not sufficient mosques, but they are free to organise celebrations as best they can using their own resources. 10

Halal Food

Halal food is freely accessible in Thrace and there are no restrictions. Similarities with Christian Orthodox Easter slaughter practices make qurban (the slaughtering of animals for ‘Id al-Adha) socially acceptable. In Athens and other towns, access to halal food relies on personal networking. 11

Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on Islamic dress codes. In Thrace, the head scarf is widely worn, but pro-Turkish secularist circles tend to be intolerant of Islamic dress, especially as far as the wearing of the headscarf in minority schools is concerned. In Athens, as the active female Muslim population is very limited, cases of intolerance have not been reported.

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There are about seventeen Turkish newspapers and magazines and about seven radio stations broadcasting in Turkish which are run by and for the minority in Thrace. Some, such as Akide, edited by the Muftiate of Komotini,11 have a Muslim ethos and some, such as Gündem,12 have a pro-Turkish orientation. There is one bilingual Greek-Turkish magazine, Azinlikca.13 Paratiritis, a Greek newspaper, contains some pages in Turkish. Local state radio broadcasts a limited news report in Turkish. In Athens, about five newspapers are published in Arabic and one in Urdu. Many more Albanian newspapers (mostly imported from Albania, but a few printed in Greece in the form of newsletters) circulate in Greece, but they make little, if any, reference to Islam. Act 3592/2007 on “granting permits for media enterprises” provides that the broadcast and print media should use Greek as the main language, or translation in Greek. Both limitations burden Muslim minority and immigrant papers as they mostly do not use Greek and have low budgets. Issues regarding Islam are discussed by the mainstream media when a ‘problem’ comes up, or out of curiosity about Islamic practices regarding celebration held by Muslim immigrants in Athens, for example. The issue of the lack of an official mosque and cemetery in Athens has become the most familiar topic of discussion. The issue of the minority in Thrace (and more rarely the Muslims in the Dodecanese) has much more political connotations and is presented from this perspective by the media, often linked to the question of Greek-Turkish relations. 13

Family Law

In the context of minority protection, which stems from Greece’s international commitments dating from 1881, 1913 and 1923, Islamic law is applied by the muftis’ courts of Thrace (Komotini, Xanthi and Didimotyho). The muftis have jurisdiction (under Act 1920/1991) in specific family law disputes such as divorce, pensions, alimony (nafaqa)

www.muftikomotini.com. www.gundemgazetesi.org. Among others: www.rodopruzgari.com, www.millet.gr, www.batitrakya.net and www.birlikgazetesi.info. 13 www.azinlikca.net. 11 12

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and custody14 and their decisions are ratified by the Greek courts. Although Muslims are in theory free to choose between Greek civil courts and Islamic courts, the overwhelmingly majority of Muslim family cases are judged by the latter. Women rarely apply to the Greek courts while men overwhelmingly opt for the Mufti. There are no rules to deal with conflict of jurisdiction. Important issues of constitutional principle, especially with regard to gender equality, are not accommodated in the muftis’ courts. Greek courts adjudicating cases of Muslims from an immigrant background can apply Islamic family law through the rules of International Private Law. No instances of this have been reported so far. 14 Public Opinion and Debate In general the media reflect mainstream attitudes, which are quite indifferent if not hostile to Islam, which is strongly linked with Turkey. Recent public debate on Islam in Greece has had two focuses: Thrace and immigrants. The former is related to the broader issue of the minority’s Turkish identity. As regards Muslim immigrants, a discussion took place after 2000 on the construction of the mosque and the cemetery in Athens. The reserved mainstream attitude of the Church of Greece is very often reflected by the media too.15 15


Events are mostly related to traditional religious festivals. Apart from that, cultural events in Thrace include the wrestling contests in the mountain areas, often related to the Alevi-Bektashi calendar.

14 Ktistakis, Y., Το ιερό Δίκαιο και Μουσουλμάνοι Έλληνες πολίτες. Μεταξύ φιλελευθερισμού και κοινοτισμού (The Holy Law and the Muslim Greek citizens. Between communitarianism and liberalism) (Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2006), and Tsitselikis, K., “Personal status of Greece’s Muslims: A legal anachronism or an example of applied multiculturalism?”, in Aluffi, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), pp. 109–132. 15 Anagnostou, Dia and R. Gropas, 2009, “Domesticating Islam and Muslim immigrants: Political and church responses to constructing a central mosque in Athens”, in Prodromou, E., V. Makrides and V. Roudemetof (eds), The Orthodox Church of Greece in the 21st Century: Religion, State and Society in an Era of Transition (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2009).

HUNGARY Gyorgy Lederer1 1

Muslim Populations

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman rule over a part of Hungary was the country’s main contact with the world of Islam although a number of ‘Ismaelite’ immigrants, also known as ‘Káliz’, had served as the eleventh-thirteenth-century Hungarian kings’ taxcollectors, money-minters and guards. The Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia in 1878 was the next major encounter with Muslims. This and the World War I alliance with Turkey led to the recognition of Islam by the Hungarian Parliament in Act 17 of 1916. Very few Hungarian Muslims are known from that period. The Bosniak refugees of the 1930s tried unsuccessfully to have their community legally registered. Currently, the majority of Muslims in Hungary are Arab and Turkish immigrants, including some naturalised Hungarian citizens, but the number of ethnic-Hungarian converts has grown. In the 2001 national census, 3,201 residents declared themselves to be Muslims, most living in or around the capital, Budapest. There are some much higher estimates, such as the widely suggested figure of 20,000, but these are difficult to prove. 2

Islam and the State

Hungary is a secular republic. The role of its few Muslims in public life has been limited in practice to their leaders’ declarations on matters such as international terrorism, perceived Islamophobia, the Muhammad cartoons and inter-religious dialogue. Religious communities can register, i.e., obtain recognition in court that they are covered by Act 4 of 1990 on Freedom of Conscience and Religion. Religious communities

1 Gyorgy Lederer is a Hungarian-Canadian Arabist. He has a PhD from the University of Budapest, where he currently runs a private foundation focusing on dialogue with, and research on, Muslims in post-socialist Eastern Europe.

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as such receive no direct public funding, although Hungarian residents can transfer 1% of their income tax to the religious community or church of their choice. A department of the Ministry of Culture is responsible for formal relations between government and religious leaders in general. 3

Main Muslim Organisations 3.1

Registered organisations

There are three registered Islamic religious communities, none of which has more than a few hundred active members: Zoltán Bolek, an ethnic-Hungarian who resides in Zala County, is the current national Chairman of Magyar Iszlám Közösség (MIK, www .magyariszlam.hu), founded in 1988 by Balázs Mihálffy. Its membership is primarily ethnic Hungarian. Its prayer house is run by Imam György Jakab at 104 Róbert Károly Körút, Budapest. It emphasises its Hungarian patriotism and strong disapproval of what it views as extremist ideas. MIK has been notably involved in national and international charitable activities. It cooperates closely with the Hanif Cultural Foundation (www.hanif.hu), led by the local representative of the Turkish Aziz Mahmut Hüdayi Foundation (the Topbas tariqa), Ahmet Bariscil. Two further separate Islamic communities are registered under Act 4 of 1990, both led mainly by people of Arab or part-Arab origin: in 2000, Magyarországi Muszlimok Egyháza (MME, www.iszlamegyhaz.net), and, in 2003, Iszlám Egyház (IE, www.iszlam.hu), following a split within MME. IE is headed by Salafi-oriented Palestinian-Hungarian Tayseer Saleh, who also manages a charity, the Al-Rahma Iszlám Jótékonysági Alapítvány. MIK has contested the legality of his control. The charity was founded in the early 1990s by the Sudanese Elfatih Ali Hassanein, a well-known regional representative of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth. Zoltán Sulok, an ethnic-Hungarian, serves as Chairman of MME. MME is member of, and ideologically associated with, the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe. IE’s Dar as-Salam prayer house is located at 29 Bartók Béla Út, while MME’s is at 43 Sáfrány Utca, both in Budapest. MME has branches in Szeged, which is the second city as regards the number of Muslims, and in Pécs.

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Civil organisations

The country’s largest prayer room is maintained by the Egyptian Sheikh Abdu Abdel-Moneim at 21 Dobozi Utca, Budapest. He and his foundation are practically independent of the three registered communities. There are two tariqas in Budapest, the Süleymanci (6 Makk Utca) and the Fethüllahci (7 Nagydiófa Utca, www.dialogusplatform.hu). In cooperation with MIK, the Süleymancis also have a centre in Pécs, at 3 Borostyán Utca. On Fridays, the Muslims of Pécs are allowed to pray in the Yakovali Hassan Pasha Djami, a sixteenth-century Turkish historical building. The same applies to the Malkoch Bey Djami Museum of Siklós, Baranya County. The independent Aluakf Foundation operates its own prayer house in Miskolc, at 30 Huba Utca. 4


Apart from the few Ottoman historical buildings, there are no purpose-built mosques in Hungary, only ambitious projects envisioning an Islamic centre in the capital. MME, IE and the civil organizations each rent private facilities for prayer, about ten altogether in the whole country. MIK owns its own centre, which it purchased from the Municipality of Budapest. It is assumed that MME, IE and Sheikh Abdu receive financial support from the Arab Gulf States, while MIK does not. Hungary has a large Saudi visa quota for the Hajj pilgrimage. This has been administered separately by the three registered communities. 5


There are no Muslim religious schools. 6


MIK, MME and IE offer lectures on Islam and free Arabic language courses. There are no Muslim institutions of higher education. A few Hungarian Muslims study religion in the Middle East and Turkey. Oriental languages and cultures are taught at several Hungarian universities, particularly Eötvös Lóránd Tudományegyetem (ELTE) in Budapest.

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Over the last twenty years, MIK has buried a number of Muslims near the World War I Turkish war cemetery, which it restored in Budapest’s Kozma Utca Cemetery. There is no separate Muslim cemetery. 8


On the basis of agreements with various government authorities, MIK has regularly arranged visits Muslims in refugee camps and prisons. Chairman Bolek of the MIK has been invited to explain Islam to the Hungarian military personnel sent on missions to Muslim countries. Upon request, MME also arrange visits to Muslim refugees and prison inmates. 9

Religious Festivals

All communities offer iftar meals at Ramadan and celebrate ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha. MME and IE do this together. 10

Halal Food

In Budapest, several Muslim-run shops and restaurants sell halal meat and one shop does so in Szeged. Halal slaughter has been arranged privately in the Hungarian countryside. 11

Dress Codes

Hijab is still a rare phenomenon in Hungary. The female members of IE and MME reportedly wear it and many female members of MIK do so too, although this is only expected when attending prayer. 12


The magazines of MIK (Hívó Szó) and MME (Új Gondolat) appear irregularly, sometimes with long interruptions. In addition to the websites referred to above, www.iszlam.com is another forum of Hungary’s

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online Muslim scene. All communities print proselytising literature, mostly leaflets of varying quality. The series of books published by the Hanif Foundation, including those of Sheikh Osman Nuri Topbas, are translations by Zsuzsanna Kiss Halima, the Head of MIK’s Women’s Section. The national press rarely reports on Hungary’s Muslims, apart from some coverage of MIK’s humanitarian activities abroad. 13

Family Law

Religious marriage, affiliation and belief have no relevance in civil law. 14


Public interest in Islam is limited. Most Hungarians discover it through the popular books of the late orientalist Hajj Abdul-Karim Julius Germanus (1884–1979). Post-9/11, anxieties have been obvious. In February 2007, someone shot into MIK’s then empty prayer house, through a window, from the street. IE Chairman Tayseer Saleh’s 70-day arrest in 2004 drew some public attention. He was wrongly accused of preparing to bomb the Budapest Jewish Museum. In 2008, the court awarded him rather modest compensation, with no formal apologies. Arabophobia has been noticeable, due mainly to racism and some immigrants’ earlier criminal activities. Anti-Islamic sentiment has been much weaker. Despite the 150-year Ottoman occupation of unpopular memory, some level of Turcophilia has emerged with time. This is rooted in other, more recent periods of Hungarian history, especially the late nineteenth century. Many Turks and some Hungarians regard each other as sister nations. 15


In addition to the ‘Id celebrations, community summer camps were held in 2008 by MIK in Uzsa, Veszprém County, and by MME near Szeged. In 2008, the Hanif Foundation invited MIK members to Istanbul for a summer course on Islam.

IRELAND Victoria Montgomery1 1

Muslim Populations

Ireland’s most recent census, carried out in 2006, showed that there were 32,539 Muslims in Ireland, which was a massive 69% increase on the 2002 census.2 However, Imam Hussein Halawa, Chairman of the Irish Council of Imams, has put the figure at closer to 45,000, made up of 50 nationalities.3 Unlike the UK and France, where the Muslim communities are linked to their former colonies, there is no dominant national or ethnic background within the Muslim community in Ireland. The census does, however, show that the majority of Muslims are non-Irish, which obviously correlates to high levels of immigration.4 The vast majority of Muslims in Ireland are Sunni; in 2007 the Shi’i Muslim community in Ireland was estimated to number approximately 5,000.5 While Muslims are found in every county in Ireland, more than half of the community live in Dublin county and city, with Cork home to Ireland’s second largest Muslim community.6 There are no exclusively Muslim residential areas even within Dublin or Cork. Muslim communities in Ireland are comparatively well-off financially, which is linked to patterns of Muslim settlement in Ireland. Sustained

1 Victoria Montgomery is the administrator of the Centre for Advancement of Women in Politics and a teaching assistant within the School of Politics at Queen’s University, Belfast. She has recently completed her PhD entitled Identity, Integration and Belonging: Muslims in Ireland, and is the author of “Are you a Protestant or a Catholic Muslim? The path of Muslim integration into Northern Ireland”, in Rehman, J. and S. Breau (eds), Religion, Human Rights and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), pp. 489–519. 2 The Republic of Ireland Census (2006), available at www.cso.ie. 3 McGarry, P., “Muslim community in plea for more burial grounds”, The Irish Times, 30 August 2008, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/ireland/ 2008/0830/1220023440449.html, accessed 5 September 2008. 4 Those citing an Irish nationality in the 2006 census numbered 9,761 while nonIrish numbered 21,613. 5 Interviews with members of the Shi’i community in Ireland in 2007. 6 The Republic of Ireland Census (2006), www.cso.ie.

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Muslim settlement from the 1950s until the early 1990s was made up primarily of students who came for higher education and then stayed, or those wishing to set up businesses. Thus, they had solid educational and professional backgrounds. The Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI) for example, estimates that there are more than 2,000 Muslim doctors in Ireland.7 However, Ireland’s economic boom since the 1990s has diversified the face of Muslim immigration. The early 1990s saw groups of Muslim refugees arrive from Bosnia, Somalia and Kosovo. Growing numbers of Muslim asylum-seekers have also arrived from Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Iraq, as well as large numbers of economic migrants from across the world.8 Therefore, it is likely that the socio-economic make-up of the community may alter in the coming years. There is a dearth of research and literature relating to the active participation of all minority ethnic groups in Ireland, although a report from 2005 did indicate that there was evidence of a growth in activism among immigrants in Ireland.9 While there are currently no Muslims in political office in Ireland, a new group called the Muslim Community Lobby was established in May 2007 to encourage Irish Muslims to use their vote.10 Furthermore, the main Muslim organisations do participate in government consultations on a wide range of issues.11 2

Islam and the State

Ireland is an independent republic based on representative democracy. Although the Irish constitution originally contained a clause (Article 44) which made explicit mention of the special position of the Catholic Church in Ireland, this was removed by referendum in 1973. The constitution now guarantees freedom of conscience and freedom of profession and practice of religion (subject to public order and moralThe Islamic Foundation of Ireland, www.islaminireland.com. Flynn, K, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 17, no. 2 (2006), pp. 223–238 (231). 9 Ugba, A., Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Ireland (Oldenburg: POLITIS, 2005), available at http://www.politis-europe.uni-oldenburg.de/download/Ireland .pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 10 The Muslim Community Lobby: www.muslimcommunitylobbyireland.blogspot .com. 11 See Islamic Foundation of Ireland: www.islaminireland.com and Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland: www.islamireland.ie. 7 8

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ity) to every citizen. It also guarantees that the state will not endow any religion or impose any penalties for religious belief.12 Religions and religious organisations are not publicly funded in Ireland with the exception that the state will fund denominational schools. However, religious organisations are eligible for charitable status, which allows for some tax exemptions. The IFI, for example, has been accorded the status of a Friendly Society (charitable status). Muslims are given legal protection from discrimination in Ireland. The Equal Status Acts 2000–2004 prohibit discrimination on religious (and other) grounds and aim to promote equality, while incitement to hatred legislation also applies to religious communities. In addition to these laws there are several state agencies which enforce equality and work on behalf of minority communities. These include the Equality Authority, the National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism and the Garda Racial and Intercultural Office (GRIO). Indeed the GRIO has intervened in two cases where Muslim women were refused passports due to wearing the hijab and resolved the cases in their favour.13 3


The first Islamic organisation in Ireland, the Dublin Islamic Society, was established in 1959. The name was changed in 1990 to the Islamic Foundation of Ireland (IFI) (163 South Circular Road, Dublin, Dublin 8, tel: +353 (0)1 4533242, www.islaminireland.com, email: [email protected]). The IFI established Ireland’s first mosque in 1976 and other branches of the IFI have been established throughout Ireland. The IFI has a written constitution and an elected council. Membership is open to all Muslims in Ireland and every Muslim is an honorary member. The IFI, on its own website, cites itself as the official representative of Muslims in Ireland. However, the Islamic Cultural Centre of Ireland (ICCI) (19 Roebuck Road, Clonskeagh, Dublin 14, tel: +353 (0)1 2080000, www.islamireland.ie, email contact via a contact form on the website) with a large purpose-built Mosque

Irish Parliament: http://oireachtas.ie. Islamic Human Rights Commission, “Briefing: Good practice on the headscarf in Europe”, 9 March 2004, available online at http://www.ihrc.org.uk/show.php?id=1030, accessed 20 May 2009. 12 13

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and Islamic Centre, which regularly welcomes politicians and other visiting groups, has become the public face of Islam in Ireland.14 The ICCI was established in 1996 with funding from Sheikh Hamdan Bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the deputy ruler of Dubai. It performs a wide range of religious and social functions, such as translation services, marital and funeral services, a library, a gymnasium and a women’s section. A community welfare office was established in 2005, which facilitates conferences and workshops for service providers. There are no significant differences between the ways in which the IFI and the ICCI publicly represent Islam in Ireland, and while clearly the leadership of the two organisations differs, many Muslims tend to pray at both centres, depending on which is most convenient on a particular day.15 Other Muslim organisations include the Galway Islamic Society established in 1978 (13 Sandyview Drive, Riverside, Galway, tel: +353 (0) 91 751621; alternatively this society may be contacted via the IFI), the Cork Muslim society established in 1984 (Unit D, Sitecast Industrial Estate, Togher, Cork, tel: +353 (0)21 4320301, www.corkmosque.org, email: [email protected]), and the Waterford Islamic Society, established in 1999 (Waterford Mosque, 1 Viewmount, Waterford; alternatively this society may be contacted via the IFI). Like the IFI and ICCI, these organisations also perform religious and social functions but on a much smaller scale. The Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland (163 South Circular Road, Dublin 8, tel: +353 (0)1 8218485, email: [email protected]) is an organisation set up by Sheikh Shaheed Satardien. However, Satardien’s unpopularity with the main organisations has meant that the Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland has not been particularly successful in establishing itself as an umbrella group for Muslims in Ireland.16 The most recent Muslim organisation established in Ireland is the Irish Council of Imams, which was set up in September 2006. (The council can be contacted via its secretary Ali Selim at the ICCI.) It represents all fourteen imams in Ireland, both Sunni and Shi’i. The various universities in Ireland have vibrant Islamic societies.

Flynn, “Understanding Islam in Ireland”, p. 226. Interviews with members of the Muslim community in Ireland, 2006–2007. 16 Sheikh Satardien has been vocal about what he perceives as growing extremism among Ireland’s Muslim communities, something which has been disputed by the IFI and ICCI. He has also accused the ICCI of inviting hard-line extremist clerics to preach: Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland Press Release, 29 October 2007. 14 15

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Ireland currently has three purpose-built mosques. The first, the Ballyhaunis Mosque in Co. Mayo was built in 1986 by a local Muslim businessman. The ICCI in Dublin is a large and impressive mosque, which was opened in 1996. Both ICCI and Ballyhaunis are Sunni mosques. Also in 1996, Ahlul Bayt Islamic Centre in Dublin was opened. Commonly referred to as Husseinia, it is a mosque and Islamic centre for the Shi’i community and is the only Shi’i mosque in Ireland. Shi’i Muslims outside Dublin tend to pray in private or rented houses or apartments. In addition to these, there is also the large Dublin Mosque and Islamic Centre which is run by the IFI and is currently raising money for an extension, for which planning permission has been granted. There are also rented or purchased houses used as mosques throughout Ireland.17 There has been some opposition to mosques in Ireland, usually related to traffic and planning issues. In Cork for example, the mosque was forced to shut in 2001 over a lack of planning permission for it to be used as a mosque. The community have been praying in rented houses and warehouses ever since, but they are raising funds for a purpose-built mosque. In addition to the mosques, there are also prayer rooms or halls in many hospitals and universities such as the Royal College of Surgeons and Roscommon County Hospital. It is quite difficult to quantify the number of prayer rooms in Ireland, as the number is continually increasing and the locations may change according to circumstance. While the main mosques, particularly in Dublin, are attended by Muslims of all ethnic and national backgrounds, there are growing numbers of prayer rooms based on particular schools of thought or language.18 The Blackpitts Mosque in Dublin is a Deobandi mosque with preaching in Urdu while the Tablighi Jamaat group are based around a mosque in Lucan (Dublin), and the Nigerian community worship in a business park in Dublin preaching what they term ‘African Sufism’.19 In addition

17 The IFI website lists mosques in Galway, Dundalk, Carlow, Portlaoise, Mullingar, Waterford, Limerick, Kerry and Clare. 18 Fitzgerald, M., “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”, The Irish Times, 10 October 2006), available at http://www.ireland.com/focus/gageby/identity.htm, accessed 11 December 2006. 19 Ibid.

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to these groups, there have been unconfirmed links between the ICCI and the Muslim Brotherhood. While Sheikh Satardien, the leader of the Supreme Muslim Council of Ireland, has made many such allegations in his publicised criticisms of the ICCI,20 this link may also be explained by the fact that the headquarters of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) is based at the ICCI. The ECFR is a group that was established in March 1996 with the aim of guiding and meeting the needs of Muslims in Europe.21 The president of the ECFR is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi. He is seen as one of the spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, although he claims to no longer be a member, and in fact was offered the leadership of the Brotherhood in 2004, although he declined it.22 5


There are currently two Muslim primary schools in Dublin, which are funded by the Department of Education. The Muslim National School was set up by the IFI in 1990 and the North Dublin Muslim School was established in 2001. They follow the Irish school curriculum but have an Islamic ethos, teaching Arabic and Qur’anic studies. There are no Muslim secondary schools in Ireland, so most Muslim children in Ireland attend mainstream Irish schools, the majority of which are denominational. Religious education is a part of the school curriculum in Ireland, and can often take the form of religious instruction. This is particularly the case at primary level where Catholic children are prepared for communion. However, parents do have the legal right to exempt their children from religious education. There are also many weekend schools for Muslim children run by the mosques and Islamic societies in Ireland. The ICCI established the Nur Al-Huda School in 1999 and have since extended it to two areas outside Dublin. There is currently a waiting list to attend the school. It also runs the Libyan school, which follows the Libyan curriculum

20 Satardien, S., “Combating extremism in religion worldwide” Metro Eireann, 8 and 15 November 2007, available at http://www.metroeireann.com/article/ combating-extremism-in-religion,791, accessed 20 May 2009. 21 The European Council for Fatwa and Research: www.e-cfr.org. 22 Belen Soage, A., “Shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi: Portrait of a leading Islamic cleric”, Middle Eastern Review of International Affairs, vol. 12, no. 1 (March 2008), pp. 51–68 (55).

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recognised throughout the Arab world. The IFI runs the Al-Falah Islamic School as well as the Sunday madrasa. There are also weekend schools attached to mosques in Cork, Galway, Limerick and Waterford among others. These weekend schools are not supervised by the Department of Education. For a discussion on the hijab in Irish schools please refer to section 14. 6


University College Dublin offers modules in Islam and the Crusades and Politics of the Middle East. Middle Eastern Politics is also offered in the Limerick University as part of its MA in Peace and Development Studies. Studies in Contemporary Islam form part of the Religions and Global Diversity Programme at University College Cork. Also at University College Cork, political Islam is studied within the Decolonization and Revolution module in the MA Politics programme, and the history department offers a course on the Crusades. The Near Eastern and Jewish Studies course at Trinity College Dublin charts the development of the Islamic religion and cultural traditions, while Medieval Islam is offered as part of the Religions and Theology course. The School of Ecumenics at Trinity also offers courses in MuslimChristian relations. There is no institution offering imam training in Ireland. The full-time teaching staff at the Muslim primary schools in Dublin are appointed by the Department of Education. In addition, there are part-time religious teachers who are privately appointed by the school, and whose salaries are not met by the state. 7


In 1976 the Dublin Islamic Society bought a section of the Mount Jerome cemetery in Dublin. However, this was full by the end of the 1980s and in 1990 the South Dublin City Council reserved a section of the Newcastle cemetery in Dublin for Muslim use only. The IFI and ICCI both arrange funerals and perform the religious rituals. There are no Muslim burial plots or cemeteries outside of Dublin.

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There are currently no Muslim chaplains within the state institutions. However, within the prisons in Ireland and the health service, Muslim representatives will be contacted upon request. There are no Muslim chaplains in the universities in Ireland, although many universities do have Muslim prayer rooms. 9

Religious Festivals

The main mosques in Ireland organise their ‘Id celebrations separately, within the mosque if it is large enough. The ICCI, for example, has a large hall which is used for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations, as well as breaking the fast during Ramadan. Outside of Dublin the largest ‘Id al-Fitr celebration takes place in Cork, where in 2006 more than 2,000 people attended. The community tends to rent space in order to accommodate such numbers.23 Apart from children attending Muslim primary schools or adults working for the Muslim organisations, Muslims have no automatic legal right to take holidays during the main religious festivals. This must either be negotiated with schools and employers or, in the case of working adults, taken as annual leave if agreement cannot be reached. 10

Halal Food

Ritual slaughter is legal in Ireland and there are many halal butchers in Dublin as well as other Irish cities. Frozen and tinned halal meat is also widely available. Indeed, in the recent past Ireland had a thriving halal industry which exported halal meat and dairy products to Muslims countries outside Ireland.24 However, the foot and mouth epidemic has negatively impacted on the halal slaughter industry in Ireland, although lamb and increasing amounts of halal diary produce, which are certified by the IFI, are still exported from Ireland.

Fitzgerald, “Ireland’s Muslims forging an identity”. Halal Certification Information is available on the Islamic Foundation of Ireland website, www.islaminireland.com. 23 24

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Dress Codes

Issues to do with religious dress in schools are currently a matter for each individual school board, although the government is in the process of drawing up an intercultural education policy, which may include guidelines on this issue. There are no rules limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public institutions although in organisations such as the Gardaí (police) which have a uniform, Muslims must conform to that uniform, which at present does not include a hijab option. It is now quite common to see Muslim women and men in religious dress, particularly in Dublin. With regard to women, this is mainly the hijab and jilbab; women wearing the niqab on Ireland’s streets are still quite rare. 12


No data is available on Muslim newspapers and magazines published in Ireland. However, foreign newspapers, including some in Urdu and Arabic, are widely available. The main organisations each have their own websites which contain extensive articles in English, Urdu and Arabic and audio and video resources available to download. There is also a website dedicated to the Shi’i community in Ireland, Shia Muslims in Ireland (www.shiamuslimsinireland.com). In addition to these, an Irish based website, Quran (www.quran.ie), has been recently set up, which provides abundant material on Qur’anic studies. 13

Family Law

Marriages can be conducted by an imam at a mosque which has been registered with the state; the married couple sign the official marriage register which the mosque returns to the appropriate Registrar in the area. However, beyond marriage, the legal system in Ireland is almost entirely secular. Catholicism did play a central role in the identity and politics of post-independence Ireland and Catholic teachings became enshrined in law. Divorce, contraception and abortion were all made illegal in Ireland.

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In spite of the Gardaí’s denial that Islamist extremism is rife in Ireland, there have been several negative newspaper articles in recent years linking the Muslim community in Ireland, particularly young Muslims, with extremism.25 However, in general the Irish media are rather indifferent towards the Muslim community. Indeed the only poll taken with Irish Muslims was in 2006. While a minority of young Irish Muslims took a more negative view of Ireland, the poll found that overall more than two thirds of Muslims felt Islam to be compatible with Irish life and 77% felt accepted.26 The main debate concerning Muslims in Ireland in 2008 has been the issue of hijab in schools, which has gained international media attention. Most schools in Ireland have to date adopted an accommodative approach where, as long as the hijab was in school colours, it was permitted. However, following a school principal’s request for proper guidelines, the education spokesmen from the two main opposition parties have stated that public schools should not allow hijab.27 As a result of this, the Irish Hijab Campaign was set up. The Department for Education has asked the Minister for Integration to address this issue in the new Intercultural Education Strategy that the government is currently compiling. In a poll for the Irish Times conducted by TNS mrbi research consultants, almost half the respondents said that Muslims students should be allowed to wear hijab in state schools, with a clear majority of young people in favour.28

25 National Consultative Committee on Racism and Interculturalism (NCCRI) (2006), “Challenging myths: The Muslim community in Ireland”, available at http://www .nccri.ie/pdf/ChallengingMyths-Muslims.pdf, accessed 30 August 2007. 26 Lansdowne Market Research (2006), “RTE Primetime investigates Muslims in Ireland” available at www.lmr.ie/Muslims%20in%20Ireland%20-%20Prime%20Time%20 Investigates.htm, accessed 29 January 2007. 27 Heimani, Z., (2008) “Opposition in Ireland calls for headscarf ban”, The Muslim News (online), www.muslimnews.co.uk/paper/index.php?article=3580, accessed 10 October 2008. 28 O’Brien, C., (2008), “Pupils’ right to wear hijab is backed by almost half surveyed”, The Irish Times, 9 June 2008, available at http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/frontpage/ 2008/0609/1212947712727.html, accessed 20 May 2009.

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The ICCI hosts an annual Qur’an competition attended by several hundred Muslim children from throughout Ireland. The event is hosted by the Al Maktoum Foundation.

ITALY Stella Coglievina1 1

Muslim Populations

The history of Islam in Italy dates back to the seventh and eighth centuries, when the general expansion of Islam in Europe took place. In the ninth century, Muslim Arabs invaded Sicily and some regions in Peninsular Italy, and Arab dynasties ruled Sicily until the Norman conquest (eleventh century). Arabic and Islamic art and science continued to be heavily influential in Sicily and some Arabic-speaking communities have survived in Sicily from that time (especially near Mazara del Vallo). Thereafter, Islam was almost absent in Italy until the 1970s. By the 1970s (and more consistently by the 1980s), Italy had begun to attract migrant workers, among them Muslims from North Africa (especially Morocco) and Albania. Today, Islam is the second largest religious presence in Italy, after Catholics (an estimated 87% of native-born citizens are nominally Roman Catholic).2 There is no official census of religious communities and little reliable data on the Muslim population in Italy. Muslims, who are mostly Sunnis, are an estimated 2.4% (about 1.42 million) of a population of over 59 million3 (data from 2008, www .islamicpopulation.com).4 According to a survey conducted in 2004,

1 Stella Coglievina holds a Ph.D. in Ecclesiastical and Canon Law from the Catholic University of Milan and is research assistant in the Faculty of Law at the Catholic University of Piacenza and the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Florence. Her research activity is focused on antidiscrimination law in the EU and on the status of religious denominations in the European Union. She is the editor of The Protection of Religious Freedom in Europe. Experiences and Challenges (CUSL,University of Florence, 2008). 2 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008 (Italy), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/108453.htm, accessed 21 May 2009. 3 The total population, according to the official census, June 2008, was 59,829,710 (Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT), www.istat.it). 4 Religious Intelligence, a research agency based in London, indicates 1,375,149 adherents (http://www.religiousintelligence.co.uk/country/?CountryID=181, accessed 20 March 2009). Caritas Migrantes, indicates 1,202,396 Muslim immigrants and about 10,000 Italian Muslim citizens (Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007 (Immigration Statistical

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Muslims, defined by nationality, make up about 33% of immigrants; the main countries of origin in that year were: Morocco (253,238), Albania (177,185), Tunisia (68,287), Senegal (52,598), Egypt (48,724), Pakistan (34,253), Bangladesh (33,525), Algeria (20,311), Nigeria (14,903), and Turkey (10,003) (estimates provided by Caritas Migrantes 2004).5 Muslims in Italy are mainly registered residents without Italian citizenship. Only about 40,000–50,000 Muslims have Italian citizenship (among them, about 10,000 converts from Christianity).6 Italian citizenship laws are very strict, while obtaining work and residency permits is easier; so many immigrants who have lived in Italy for years cannot obtain Italian citizenship. The high number of Muslim non-citizens, including illegal immigrants, is one of the obstacles to their integration into Italian society: as immigration is a quite recent phenomenon in Italy, most foreign Muslims are still first-generation immigrants, living in poor socio-economic conditions. They rarely participate in public life and the number of family reunifications is still small. Muslims are often perceived as an extremely diverse community, without ties to Italy. Muslim groups have settled throughout Italy, but those in the major Italian cities such as Milan and Rome are the most known and visible. Recently, Muslims have begun to make a place for themselves in Italian politics, mostly at the local level, while there are two Muslim members of parliament.7 In contrast, even though they are a small group, Italian Muslims are very active in Islamic organisations and in political, cultural and social life and they contribute towards making Islam visible in public opinion and public policies. Dossier 2007) (Rome: IDOS, 2008), pp. 192ff. The chapter “Il panorama multireligioso in Italia (The religious framework in Italy)”, is available at http://www.db.caritas. glauco.it/caritastest/informiamoci/Riviste_e_pubblicazioni/Sussidi2007/Libri/ dossierimmigrazione2007/materiale/panorama_multireligioso.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009. 5 “Le religioni degli immigrati all’inizio del 2004: gli effetti della regolarizzazione. Ricerca del Dossier Statistico Immigrazione Caritas/Migrantes, (Immigrants’ Religions at beginning of 2004: the consequences of regularization. Research of the Immigration Statistical Dossier Caritas/Migrantes”), available at http://www.db.caritas.glauco. it/caritas/dati/news/2004-05/25/Scheda.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009. 6 Open Society Institute, “Rapporto di monitoraggio della protezione delle minoranze nell’Unione Europea: la situazione dei musulmani in Italia, (Monitoring report on the protection of minorities in the European Union: the situation of Muslims in Italy)” (2002), available at http://www.abuondiritto.it/liberta/religiosa/pdf/rapporto_osi_ italia.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009. 7 See http://www.euro-islam.info/country-profiles/italy/, accessed 20 March 2009. (Euro-Islam is a Research Network Sponsored by GSRL Paris/CNRS France and Harvard University.) It should be noted that immigrants who do not have Italian citizenship have no voting rights.

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Islam and the State

Italy is a secular republic with no state religion. Roman Catholics nominally constitute the majority (an estimated 87%) of the population and the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges, stemming from the sovereign status of the Vatican and its historical political authority, that are not available to other religious groups. According to the Constitution (Articles 7 and 8), relations between the state and religious confessions are governed by bilateral agreements between the state and each confession: for the Catholic Church, the 1929 Lateran Pacts as amended in 1984; for non-Catholic confessions, separate accords (intese) with the government. The absence of an accord does not affect a religious group’s right to worship freely, but a religious community without an accord cannot benefit from direct financial support or obtain certain specific rights (such as automatic access by ministers of religion to state hospitals and prisons, the right of employees and students to observe religious holidays, etc.). Islam, like other confessions that have not signed an agreement with the state, is subject to the legislation of 1929 on Recognised Religions. Divisions among the country’s Islamic organisations, as well as the existence of multiple Muslim immigrant groups, have hindered the community’s efforts to sign an accord. Some attempts have been made over recent years to regulate relations between the state and Islamic communities. A decree of 10 September 2005 established a Consultative Council of Italian Islam (Consulta per l’Islam italiano)8 at the Ministry of Interior, which has a consultative role in discussing the status of Islam in Italy and the process of reaching an agreement with the state, but it seems that the work of this Council has slowed down considerably since the initial meetings. In 2007 (decree of the Minister of the Interior of 23 April 2007), the government published in the Official Gazette a charter of shared values for citizenship and integration, prepared by the Minister of the Interior and presented to the members of the Consultative Council, with the aim of reaffirming the values of a secular state and freedom of religion.9 A Declaration

8 Web page at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/temi/religioni/ sottotema003.html, accessed 15 January 2009. 9 An English translation is available at http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/ sites/default/it/assets/files/14/0919_charter_of_values_of_citizenship_and_integration .pdf, accessed 20 March 2009.

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of Intent (Dichiarazione di intenti per la federazione dell’Islam italiano),10 prepared by representatives of Muslim groups and professors of law and presented on 13 March 2008, tries to pave the way for the institution of a federation of Islamic groups to facilitate reaching an agreement with the state. Despite the absence of an accord with the state, all religious communities, including the Muslim community, are eligible for access to public funds for the construction of places of worship. According to Italian legislation, it is for the regional and local administration to approve requests for such funding, as well as publicly owned land for their construction. There are no consistent data about what is happening at the local level: many Muslims report experiencing difficulties in building a mosque and obtaining funding11 because of political concerns (mistrust of some Muslim organisations; concerns about the improper use of mosques; objections to minarets near Christian churches or historic places of worship in order to preserve the ‘identity’ of Italian towns, etc.; see also below, section 4). Sometimes, funds for building mosques come from the governments of Muslim countries.12 3


As Italy’s Muslim community mainly consists of immigrants and various groups that are not ethnically homogeneous scattered across diverse geographic areas, there are many Muslim organisations that represent only a fraction of Muslims living in the country. The relationships between them are not close and are sometimes even characterised by disagreements, leaving Italy’s Muslims without a unified leadership. The main Muslim organisations are: – Unione delle Comunità e delle Organizzazioni Islamiche in Italia (Union of Islamic Communities and Organizations in Italy, UCOII, via Quattro Fontane 109, 00184 Roma, e-mail: [email protected], www.islam-ucoii.it),

10 Text available at www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/ files/15/0679_DICHIARAZIONE_DI_INTENTI.pdf, accessed 15 January 2009. 11 See for example: “Italy: Bologna’s mayor backtracks on mosque”, ADN Kronos International, 29 April 2008, available at http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/ Religion/?id=1.0.2117752207, accessed 20 March 2009. 12 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Muslim Integration: Challenging Conventional Wisdom in Europe and the United States (2007), p. 41, available at http://www .csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070920_muslimintegration.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009.

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established in 1990 and promoted by a former organisation, the Unione degli Studenti Musulmani d’Italia (Muslim Students’ Union in Italy, USMI), created in 1971 by the first Muslim Sunni groups in Italy. UCOII is the main Muslim organisation in Italy and the best known, being connected with the most important Islamic centres (such as the Mosque of Segrate). Its leadership includes politicians, professionals and other well-integrated people whose national origin (mainly Syrian, Jordanian and Palestinian) is different from that of the majority of Muslims living in Italy. Centro Islamico Culturale d’Italia (Islamic Cultural Centre of Italy, viale della Moschea 85, 00197 Roma, tel.: +39-(0)6-8082258, fax: +39(0)6-8079515; e-mail: [email protected], www.lega-musulmana. it). This is the Cultural Centre of the Mosque of Rome, connected with the embassies of Muslim states and with the Muslim World League. It has a central role in the organisation of cultural and prayer centres and in establishing relations with public authorities. Comunità Religiosa Islamica (Islamic Religious Community, Co.Re.Is., via Giuseppe Meda 9, 20136 Milano, tel: +39-(0)2-8393340, fax: +39-(0)2-8393350, email: [email protected], www.coreis.it) is made up of Italian converts to Islam and active in the public debate. Unione Musulmani d’Italia (Union of Italy’s Muslims, UMI, c/o Edizioni Alethes, via Lago di Garda 46, 00030 Carchitti (Roma), tel. and fax: +39-(0)6-9586760, e-mail: [email protected]). Its aim is to constitute a sort of political party for Muslims in Italy. Its leader, the Italian convert Adel Smith, is famous for his radical opinions and often provocative speeches (especially his polemic against the crucifix and some lawsuits against Italian writers and scholars.13 Associazione Musulmani Italiani (Italian Muslims Association, AMI, Casella postale 7167, 00100 Roma, e-mail: [email protected], www.amimuslims.org) was established by Italian converts to Islam. Its importance has recently diminished.

There are also many other smaller organisations (a review is available at http://www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/islam.htm), such as the organisation of young Muslims in Italy (Giovani Musulmani d’Italia, GMI, www .giovanimusulmani.it) and, in several cities, centres connected with the main mosque. There are 628 Islamic associations, concentrated in

See Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR), Le religioni in Italia, available at http://www.cesnur.org/religioni_italia/i/islam_09.htm, accessed 10 January 2009. 13

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northern and central Italy, according to the US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008). The majority of Muslims, however, participate only in the cultural and religious life of their own mosque or prayer house, and participation in the activities of the various organisations is not widespread. 4


There are over 200 places of Islamic worship (258, according to US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008), mainly ‘garage’ mosques. There are only three ‘great mosques’: in Segrate (Milan), Rome, and Catania (Catania is infrequently used). Another mosque, in the municipality of Colle Val d’Elsa (near Florence) is under construction, despite continued vocal opposition by the Northern League political party and others.14 Muslim groups often gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls (basements and garages). According to the National Agency for Internal Information and Security (AISI) there are up to 774 Muslim places of worship, including prayer houses and associations (data of 2007).15 With regard to future construction, there are problems with funding and planning, often due to the lack of representation of Islamic communities and opposition by local authorities to granting permits to groups considered untrustworthy. During 2008, there was debate at a political level and extensive media coverage of plans to enlarge the Islamic Centre in Milan (the so-called ‘mosque of viale Jenner’): a huge number of Muslims, affiliated to that Centre, had to pray in the street because of the lack of an adequate prayer house and complications with building permits. In April 2008, the mayor of Bologna suspended plans for the construction of a new mosque on the grounds that the application did not satisfy construction regulations. In particular, they were unable to identify adequate sources of funding or to create a responsible organising body independent from the UCOII, which he alleged was affiliated

14 Many right-wing Italian politicians often make controversial remarks about the growth of mosques in Italy. See, among others, Brown, S., “Italy’s right to curb Islam with mosque law”, Reuters, 16 September 2008, available at http://www.reuters .com/article/worldNews/idUSLG21402720080916?pageNumber=1&virtualBrand Channel=0, accessed 20 March 2009. 15 http://www.camera.it/_dati/leg15/lavori/documentiparlamentari/indiceetesti/ 033/004_RS/INTERO_COM.pdf, accessed 10 January 2009.

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with the Muslim Brotherhood, although members of the UCOII have denied this. In December 2008, plans for a mosque were approved in Padova and discussions started in Florence.16 5


As set forth in the agreement between the state and the Catholic Church, public schools provide Catholic religious education, which is optional. Non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class, which is also optional, or they can leave school during this period. A minority of pupils opt out of Catholic religious education lessons (around 9%, varying between regions and schools),17 but there is no data about their religious affiliation. Neither is data available on the school attendance of Muslim pupils: estimates by Caritas-Migrantes indicate that in 2006/2007 they were 184,861.18 All religious communities, including those without an agreement with the state, such as the Islamic community, may use the classrooms of state schools for classes on religious culture if there are substantial numbers of pupils of that religion, and when no places of worship are available (art. 23 of decree no. 289 of 1930). The costs of such teaching are paid by the religious community, and a prior agreement with the Director of the Regional School Office is required. In practice, this option has never been taken up by Muslims. Article 33 of the Constitution grants organisations and private citizens the right to found schools and educational institutions without state funding. No Islamic private schools have yet been established under Article 33, but several foreign schools have been founded by the governments of foreign states, including Libya (in Rome and Milan), Egypt (in Milan) and Tunisia (in Mazara del Vallo, near Trapani).19 These schools are authorised by Italian law but their curricula (including language classes) are set by the country in question, which may hinder

16 See: http://www.minareti.it/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 534&Itemid=9, accessed 20 March 2009. 17 Data of Italian Conference of Bishops, available at http://www.chiesacattolica.it/ pls/cci_new/consultazione.mostra_pagina?id_pagina=328, accessed 20 March 2009. 18 Caritas Migrantes, Dossier statistico immigrazione 2007, p. 201. 19 Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R., “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe, (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), p. 146.

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the integration of pupils into Italian society. There is no data about how many pupils attend these schools.20 Some cases of ‘illegal’ Muslim schools (i.e., unauthorised private schools) have been reported. According to media reports (not official data) Muslim children sometimes attend this type of school instead of public schools.21 6


There is no provision for imam training. In 1996 the Muslim Universities League approved a project to run a school to prepare imams and female social workers. The UCOII has also planned the establishment of an educational centre in Bologna to train imams, leaders of the Islamic community and teachers of Islam. However, none of these initiatives has come to fruition. 7


Special and separate sectors of public cemeteries can be reserved for the burial of people belonging to religious minorities. Muslim communities have already taken advantage of this opportunity in cities such as Florence, Turin and Milan (where the cemetery is connected with the mosque of Segrate). There is also a Muslim cemetery in Trieste, which was established for Muslim subjects from the Balkans when the city still belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In May 2008, a 20 Ferrari, A., “La scuola italiana di fronte al paradigma musulmano (The Italian s confronting multiculturalism)”, in Ferrari, A. (ed.), Islam in Italia/Islam in Europa (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), pp. 194ff.; about the Tunisian school of Mazara del Vallo, see “Mazara e la scuola tunisina: ‘È un disastro’ ”, Il Corriere della Sera, 13 July 2004, available at http:// www.corriere.it/Primo_Piano/Cronache/2004/07_Luglio/13/mazara.shtml, accessed 20 March 2009. 21 The Ministry of Interior have reported 88 unauthorised Islamic schools (in Islamic cultural centres, etc.): see “In Italia 88 scuole islamiche rapporto segreto al Viminale”, La Repubblica, 21 September 2007, available at http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/ archivio/repubblica/2007/09/21/in-italia-88-scuole-islamiche-rapporto-segreto.html, accessed 20 March 2009. Some of these cases were reported in Parliamentary Hearings on 14 February 2002 (http://leg14.camera.it/_dati/lavori/odg/cam/allegati/20020214 .htm, accessed 20 March 2009) and 13 July 2006 (http://legxv.camera.it/resoconti/ resoconto_allegato.asp?idSeduta=25&resoconto=bt47¶m=n4-00543#n4-00543, accessed 20 March 2009); see also “Scuola araba di Milano: stop anche dal prefetto”, Il Corriere della Sera, 13 October 2006, available at http://archiviostorico.corriere .it/2006/ottobre/13/Scuola_araba_Milano_stop_anche_co_9_061013092.shtml, accessed 20 March 2009.

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proposal to create a Muslim section in some cemeteries in the municipality of Arezzo (Tuscany) was approved, despite strong opposition by some Italian residents. 8


Ministers of the religious denominations without an agreement under Article 8, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, including Islam, have access to prisons and hospitals to give assistance to prisoners or patients who have requested it. They also have access to barracks to give pastoral care to soldiers who seek it. Local authorities and hospitals have specific jurisdiction to make provisions for religious support in the health service: in Tuscany, the Hospital of Florence (Careggi) has an agreement with the local Muslim community to arrange better provision for Muslim patients,22 and in Turin hospital a ‘silent room’ for prayer exists, open to patients of all religions. 9

Religious Festivals

Italian legislation recognises some Catholic festivals and Sunday as day of rest. Two of the agreements signed between the state and non-Catholic confessions (the Jewish community and the SeventhDay Adventist Church) give the faithful the right to time off work for religious observance, with the proviso that employers’ needs must be taken into account, and allow pupils to be absent from school. Because there is not yet an accord with the state, current legislation does not cover the specific needs of Muslim workers or recognise any Islamic festivals. However, agreements have been reached between employers and the trade unions (mainly through collective agreements) to allow Muslim workers to take part in Friday prayers and to modify their normal working hours during Ramadan.23

22 Text at http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=2226, accessed 20 March 2009 (OLIR.it, Osservatorio delle Libertà ed Istituzioni Religiose—Observatory for Religious Freedoms and Institutions, law research database, headed by professor Anotnio Chizzoniti, Catholic University of Piacenza). 23 For example in Ragusa (Sicily): http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_ Document=4357 (accessed 20 March 2009).

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Halal Food

School menus often include special meals for Muslim pupils. At work, menus can be decided by agreement between employer and employees. In prisons, religious practices are to be taken into account, including the preparation of meals. According to the laws currently in force, animals must be stunned before being slaughtered, but an exception has been made for ritual slaughter performed by Muslim (and Jewish) communities. 11

Dress Codes

There is no ban on wearing headscarves in public buildings and schools. Under a circular issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (14 March 1995), Muslim women are allowed to wear their headscarves in identity document photos as long as their facial features are recognisable. A 1995 anti-terrorism law, amended in 2005, forbids the wearing of garments, such as the burka, that can hide their identity. In August 2008, controversy broke out over the decision by a museum guard in Venice to deny admission to a Muslim woman who was wearing niqab.24 A recent judgement of the Tribunal of Cremona (November 2008)25 has recognised the right to wear niqab or a burka in a public place, on condition that the woman can be required to have her identity checked. 12


There are several publications about Islam, mainly in Italian. There is little data on Muslim media, often referring to old publications. There is an Islamic publishing house (www.edizionidelcalamo.com) in Milan (connected with UMI and the Mosque of Segrate, which has published several books and puts out a journal, Quaderni Islamici. Other periodicals include:

24 http://www.religiousintelligence.co.uk/news/index.php?NewsID=2635, accessed 10 January 2009. 25 “Cremona, in tribunale con velo integrale moglie di imam assolta dopo tre anni”, La Repubblica, 27 November 2998, available at http://www.repubblica.it/2008/11/sezioni/ cronaca/velo-islamico/velo-islamico/velo-islamico.html, accessed 10 January 2009.

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– Rivista islamica, www.lega-musulmana.it/Rivista_Islamica/islamica. htm, published by the Italian office of the Muslim World League; – Il Messaggero dell’Islam, published by the Centro Islamico di Milano e Lombardia; – Il puro Islam, http://digilander.iol.it/ahlalbait/ilpuroislam-menu1.htm, published by a Shi’i association in Naples, Ahl al Bait; – Azad, a Pakistani review written in Urdu (director: Ahmad Ejaz); – Assadakah, www.assadakah.it, published monthly by the League of Arab States in Italy: from 1999 to 2001, it included a supplement edited by Co.Re.Is., L’Islam in Europa; – La porta d’Oriente (director: F. Cardini), ed. Pagine, Via G. Serafino 8, 00136 Roma, tel. +39-06-45468600, e-mail: [email protected]; – Yalla Italia, a supplement of the magazine Vita (a journal of not-forprofit organisations), edited by a group of young Muslims (secondgeneration immigrants). In addition, Co.Re.Is. has published various books about Islam in Italy (see www.coreis.it/pubblicazioni). Websites include: – Islam online, www.islam-online.it (administered by UCOII); – Geovani Musulmani d’Italia, www.giovanimusulmani.it (administered by the Organisation of Young Muslims in Italy); – Minareti, www.minareti.it, a website that offers information and news on Islam; its director is Khalid Chaouki, a Muslim journalist, former president of Young Muslims in Italy; – Mondo Arabo, www.mondoarabo.it. 13

Family Law

Religious marriages, recorded in the civil status registry, are recognised in law in Italy if performed by a Roman Catholic priest (art. 8 of the Agreement of 1985 between Italy and the Holy See), or by a minister of a denomination that has an agreement with the state, or by ministers authorised by the Italian Ministry of Interior to perform a religious ceremony (articles 7–12 of Law n. 1159 of 1929). No Islamic ‘minister’ has so far been recognised by Italian legislation, so religious marriages celebrated in a mosque have no legal validity. Muslim couples who want their union to be legally recognised must go through a civil ceremony in addition to their religious marriage. Polygamy is illegal in Italy and

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repudiation (talaq) as a form of dissolution of marriage has no legal validity. However, some aspects of Islamic family law have acquired some relevance because most Muslims in Italy are foreign citizens, so their family status, as defined in their country of origin, can warrant consideration under private international law. Case law on this issue is very limited. Problems have arisen, for example, in some cases of reunification of spouses in polygamous marriages or in cases concerning inheritance.26 A directive of the National Institution of Social Security (INPS) states that Italy will not pay welfare benefits to multiple wives.27 Kafala (the Islamic legal institution analogous to foster care) has been recognized as a form of adoption.28 The Italian Conference of Bishops has, on some occasions, urged parish priests to discourage Muslim-Christian marriages. 14


There is good coverage of the situation of Muslims in Italy in newspapers and other media and many issues have been recently taken up by the media and public discussion, such as the building of mosques, the issue of religious symbols and the headscarf, and the status of Islamic communities in major Italian cities. The media often create erroneous ideas and negative stereotypes of Islam, alleging that a huge number of Muslims are fundamentalists. Some Muslim organisations (UCOII) are alleged to be connected with the Muslim Brotherhood and to support fundamentalism and terrorism. This view leads to a widespread anti-Islamic feeling in the Italian population and, in some cases, to Islamophobia. Moreover, Muslims and Muslim leaders have little opportunity, compared with other religious communities (especially the Catholic Church) to be heard by the media and the general public. Those who succeed in being seen often represent a politicised and sometimes controversial Islam. For example, some members of UMI

26 Some examples can be found in Aluffi Beck-Peccoz, “The legal treatment of the Muslim minority in Italy”, pp. 150–155. 27 See http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=3927, accessed 10 January 2009. 28 See, among others, Judgement of Court of Cassation, 2 July 2008, at http://www .olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=4749, accessed 20 March 2009.

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have became famous for their negative attitude towards Catholics and towards some Italian politicians and scholars.29 14.1

Significant polls

Perceptions of the Muslim-West relationships were measured in a poll conducted in 2007 by Gallup and World Economic Forum. A majority of Italian respondents (67%) saw the interaction between the West and the Muslim world as a threat and only a 40% considered Islam compatible with democracy and Western life.30 A 2005 poll was conducted for the Unione delle Comunità Ebraiche Italiane (Union of Jewish Communities in Italy—UCEI) by ‘La Sapienza’ University in Rome to look at intolerance among young people. More than 50% of the sample (sample size: 2,000, aged 14–18, from more than 100 different towns in Italy) stated that Muslims “support international terrorism” and have “cruel and barbaric laws”.31 15


No data.

29 See section 3 above. Some Italian scholars have been cited by the leader of UMI, Adel Smith, for their opinions about Smith and his actions (see for example Guolo, Renzo, “Io, processato per una fatwa”, La Repubblica, 27 May 2007, available at http:// www.repubblica.it/2007/05/sezioni/cronaca/fatwa-adel-smith/fatwa-adel-smith/ fatwa-adel-smith.html, accessed 20 March 2009), including Professor Stefano Allievi, who was sentenced for libel to six months’ imprisonment and fined €3,000 in 2007 (see the judgement at http://www.olir.it/ricerca/index.php?Form_Document=4339, accessed 20 March 2009). 30 World Economic Forum, Islam and the West: Annual Report on the State of Dialogue, January 2008, available at http://www.weforum.org/pdf/C100/Islam_West.pdf, accessed 20 March 2009 (World Economic Forum is an independent international organisation based in Geneva, Switzerland). 31 See http://www.ucei.it/uceinforma/rassegnastampa/2005/marzo/unita/210305. asp (website of UCEI, accessed 20 March 2009) and European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia, 2006, p. 37, available at website of EU Fundamental Rights Agency: http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/Manifestations_EN.pdf (accessed 20 March 2009).

KOSOVO Xhabir Hamiti1 1

Muslim Populations

Achieving independence in 2009, Kosovo is the newest independent state in the Balkans. Kosovo was taken from the Ottomans by Serbia in the Balkan wars 1912–13 and became, with its fast-growing Albanian-majority population, an autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia within the federation of socialist Yugoslavia. Its autonomy was suspended in 1989 by the Milošević regime and, after a decade of repression, an escalating armed conflict that started in 1997 between Kosovo Albanian insurgents and Serbian forces was ended by NATO intervention against Serbia in 1999. Kosovo came under UN administration pending talks on its final status and then, in February 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. By April 2009, independent Kosovo had been recognised by 57 UN member states, including all but five EU members. No census has been carried out since 1981, and estimates of the total population vary widely, from 1.8 to 2.2 million.2 The majority of the population, about 90%, are ethnic Albanians, the vast majority of whom are Muslims. The largest minority are Orthodox Serbs. Other communities, Bosniaks, Gorans, Turks, Roma, Ashkalis and Egyptians, make up a small part of the total population.3 Islam in Kosovo dates

1 Dr.sc.Xhabir Hamiti is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Prishtina, Kosovo, and the President of the Assembly of the Islamic Communty of the Republic of Kosovo. 2 The CIA World Factbook estimates that the population will be 1,804,838 by July 2009 (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos /kv.html#People), while the Statistical Office of Kosovo estimates it at 2,153,139 (http://www.ks-gov.net/ESK/eng/, accessed 14 April 2009). 3 These are the ‘other communities’ recognised by the international administration. Bosniaks identify in national terms with the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Gorans live in the Gora region south of Prizren; they are Muslims and speak a local Slavic dialect. Roma, Ashkalis and ‘Egyptians’ (often grouped as ‘RAE’ to avoid the pejorative ‘gypsies’) differ in their use of Romani or Albanian language and their narratives of origin.

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back to the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire.4 The majority of the urban population, particularly the Albanians, became Muslims between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. The majority of the Muslims of Kosovo are Sunnis.5 The Community of Dervish Orders recognises 12 ‘authentic’ tariqas, of which nine were active before the start of the war in former Yugoslavia: the Rifa’i, Qadiri, Khalwati, Sa’di, Bektashi, Naqshabandi, Sinani, Mawlawi and Shadhili. Among them, the Khalwati, Sa’di, Qadiri and Rifa’i have large memberships with thousands of followers and wide networks of Sufi lodges.6 The Community in the early 1980s claimed to represent more than 50,000 dervishes mainly in Kosovo, and in the late 1990s, a figure twice as large was cited.7 2

Islam and the State

Kosovo is a secular republic with no state religion.8 Although the Islamic Community of Kosovo (ICK) is the main religious community in the country, it is still not officially registered as either an NGO, a foundation or a private organisation. However, even without a clear legal status, it is recognised as a legal entity by the state. The ICK continues to function within the framework of its legal status from the time of the former Yugoslavia, though ironically, even that old status is not officially recognised by the government. Apart from the ICK, many other Islamic organisations have been registered by the state since the 1999 war. The ICK has its headquarters in Prishtina, the capital of Kosovo and is led by the Presidency of the ICK, which is chaired by the Grand Mufti of Kosovo. The Grand Mufti and other religious leaders of the Islamic Community are regularly invited to official meetings and celebrations at the Presidential Palace and the Parliament. The budget of the ICK is mostly made up of donations by the Muslim population, such as zakah, sadaqat al-fitr, and qurbans (hides that

Malcolm, Noel, Kosovo: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1998). Norris, H.T., Islam in the Balkans (London: Hurst, 1993). 6 Duijzings, Ger, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo (London: Hurst, 2000), p. 114. 7 Ibid. 8 “The Republic of Kosovo is a secular state and is neutral in matters of religious beliefs” (Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo (2008), Article 8). 4 5

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are collected from sacrificed animals during the ‘Id al-Adha), and other forms of contribution. Since the ICK does not receive any support from the state budget, it depends on donations from the people in order to function. 3


The main national Muslim organisation is the ICK (Rr. Bajram Kelmendi Nr. 84 Prishtine, 10000 Kosovo, www.bislame.net), currently headed by Grand Mufti Naim Tërnava, which has 25 branches around Kosovo (called regional Islamic councils).9 The ICK is the only independent religious community for all Kosovo Muslim believers, whether living in Kosovo or living and working abroad, and it represents Islam vis-à-vis the state. The ICK is the main institution responsible for the organisation and control of Islamic educational institutions and other Islamic issues, and all mosques, imams and muezzins are under the ICK’s authority. There are other small Islamic foundations and organizations, but they do not officially represent Islam. They are privately owned and operated, and deal mostly with minor religious activities. 4


Kosovo today has more than 600 mosques. In the major cities, such as Prishtina, Prizren, Gjakova and Peja, there are several monumental mosques built during the time and in the style of the Ottoman Empire. The biggest mosque with the highest minaret in Kosovo is the seventeenth-century Sinan Pasha mosque in Prizren; and the most beautiful is Xhami e Hadumit in Gjakova, built in the fifteenth century.10

Kushtetuta e Bashkësisë Islame të Kosovës (Constitution of the Islamic Community of Kosovo) (Prishtina: ICK, 2003). 10 Drançolli, Fejaz, “Xhamia e Hadumit në Gjakovë (Hadum Mosque in Gjakova)”, Arkivi i Kosovës Vjetari, vol. 18–19 (Prishtina: Sh. Botuese Rilindja, 1984). 9

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During the 1997–1999 conflict, Serbian paramilitary and military forces destroyed and burned 215 mosques across Kosovo, most of which were historical monuments.11 After the war several mosques have been reconstructed and new ones built, particularly in the areas where the old Communist regime did not allow Muslim believers to have mosques, including major municipalities, such as Skenderaj, Gllogovc, Lipjan, Malisheve, Kline, Istog, etc.12 5


Neither Islamic nor Catholic religious education is permitted in public schools in Kosovo. There is one Islamic high school, the Alaud-din Madrasa, established in 1952 (during the communist regime). It is based in the capital, Prishtina, and has two branches, one in Prizren and one in Gjilan, and provides education for both boys and girls. The curriculum combines religious and non-religious subjects and more than 1,300 students graduated from 1952 to 2008. The ICK has repeatedly asked the government to include Islamic education in the public school curriculum, but the government has not responded positively to this request. 6


Kosovo’s first Faculty of Islamic Studies (www.fsi-ks.org) was established in 1992 with the aim of giving the young an opportunity to study Islam in their mother tongue and in their own country. Students apply to this faculty from various parts of the Albanian territories in the Balkans, such as Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and the Presheva Valley, as well as Kosovo. The teaching staff are Albanians who have completed their studies either in Kosovo or overseas. A four-year programme is offered. By the end of 2008, the Faculty had produced 140 male and female graduates. Both of the main Islamic educational establishments in Kosovo, the

11 Barbaria Serbe ndaj monumenteve Islame ne Kosove (Serbian Barbarities against Islamic Monuments in Kosova) (Prishtina: Kryesia e Bashkesise Islame te Kosoves, 2000). 12 Ibid.

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Alaud-din Madrasa and the Faculty of Islamic Studies, are under the jurisdiction of the ICK. The diplomas of the graduates are accepted and recognised by the Kosovan Ministry of the Education and they are usually employed as imams and teachers of Islamic education. 7


Most of the Muslim cemeteries in Kosovo are located alongside mosques. Cemeteries are under the control of municipalities and Muslim cemeteries are separate from those of other religious communities (Catholics and Orthodox). 8


‘Chaplaincy’ is still unknown in Kosovo and no imams are appointed to serve in public institutions, whether in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals. 9

Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are organised every year and both are recognised as official holidays by the state. All public institutions are closed during these periods. 10

Halal Food

Halal meat is available in supermarkets in Kosovo since the majority of the population is Muslim and is not an issue that is raised in daily life. 11

Dress Codes

There are some restrictions on Muslim dress in the public arena. The law does not strictly prohibit hijab but women wearing it are generally not allowed to attend public schools or to work in public institutions. There are hardly any cases of women wearing niqab.

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The Presidency of the Islamic Community has published the monthly religious, cultural and scientific review Dituria Islame (Islamic Knowledge) since 1986, the quarterly magazine Edukata Islame (Islamic Education) since 1971, and an annual Islamic calendar, called Takvim, since 1970. Beside these official Islamic publications, there are some newspapers and magazines, such as Paqja (Peace) and Argumenti (The Argument), published by private organisations. Muslims from the non-Albanian minorities do not have Islamic periodicals in their own languages (Turkish, Bosnian, Serbian or Romani) published in Kosovo, but literature is received from abroad. 13

Family Law

Muslims may conclude marriage contracts in mosques, but the certificate of marriage which they obtain from the officials of the Islamic Community is not accepted by the state authorities, so they must obtain a civil marriage certificate too. 14 Public Opinion and Debate The public media in Kosovo devote little space to Islamic religious matters. Television stations do cover the main annual Muslim celebrations, ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha, and during the month of Ramadan national television and other privately owned stations provide some space for religious scholars to speak about religion. Apart from that, it is very rare that they are invited to publicly discuss contemporary religious issues. Kosovo daily newspapers rarely report the activities and concerns of the ICKosovo. 15


Besides the two most important Muslim festivals, ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha, the dervishes also celebrate two big annual festivals: Sultan Nawruz at the vernal equinox, and the day of ‘Ashura. The celebration of the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad is another significant day for Kosovo Muslims and is celebrated in mosques in various parts of the country.

LATVIA Egdūnas Račius1 1

Muslim Populations

Though Muslims (mainly Tatar immigrants and other Muslims decommissioned from the Russian tsarist army) started arriving and settling in the then Russian-ruled Latvia in the second half of the nineteenth century, the first Muslim congregation in Riga was established only in 1902. By World War I, it had grown to around a thousand members but during and immediately after the war (by 1920), the Muslim community in the now independent Latvia had shrunk to a mere 150 and further declined to less than 70 by 1935. Today most Latvian Muslims are settlers and descendants of settlers from the Soviet period, when scores of people from the then Soviet Central Asian republics moved to the Baltics. The last Soviet census of 1989 reported more than 12,000 people with Muslim background (Tatars, Azeris, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, etc.) living in Soviet Latvia, although the majority of them did not practise Islam. It appears that the greater part of them chose to leave Latvia after it regained independence in the early 1990s. A small (less than 70 members) Muslim congregation in Riga was re-established in 1993. In 1994, a congregation in Daugavpils founded Daugavpils islāma centrs (Daugavpils Islamic Centre). These were soon followed by other congregations, including splinter groups. As the last official census did not include a question on religious identity, no official number of the size of the Muslim community in Latvia is available. Unsubstantiated estimates of Muslims in Latvia range between 500 and 10,000,2 but none of them distinguish between

1 Egdūnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science in Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. He has a Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic Studies from the University of Helsinki, Finland. His research interests encompass Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim community in Lithuania. 2 Banks, Elena, “Latvia’s Muslim community reaches out”, The Baltic Times, 2004, http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/9385/, accessed 4 March 2009.

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nominal (‘by background’) and practising Muslims. Islam in the European Union3 gives a figure of 5,000. The head of the Latvian Islamic Community estimated the number of nominal Muslims to be in the range of 5,000 in 2001—indeed, according to the latest statistics, there are some 2,800 Tatars, 1,700 Azeris, and 300 Uzbeks currently living in Latvia—but added that only 10% were practising. The total number of nominal Muslims in Latvia for 2008 (taking into account the steady emigration of Russian-speaking Muslims from Latvia and conversions to Islam by Latvians) could be as high as 5,000 (of whom only a tenth are Latvian citizens), but Muslims practising on a daily basis would hardly exceed a few hundred. Religious festivals are said to be regularly attended by between 300 and 400 worshippers and occasionally attract up to 500. The overwhelming majority of Latvia’s Muslims are located in and around capital city Riga and Daugavpils. 2

Islam and the State

Latvia is a constitutionally secular republic with no state religion, though Lutherans and Orthodox nominally constitute the majority of the population. Moreover, the state makes a distinction between the ‘traditional’ faiths (Lutheran, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish) and the ‘new’ faiths; Islam falls into the latter category. Under the Constitution, the state cannot finance religious organisations nor can religious institutions or their representatives take part in the governing of the state. Relations between state and religion are regulated by the Law on Religious Organisations (adopted in 1995). Religious organisations registered with the Board of Religious Affairs at the Ministry of Justice attain legal status and more rights and privileges than those that choose to remain unregistered, but there is no compulsion for religious communities to register with the state. Religious organisations of ‘nontraditional’ denominations are required to re-register annually for the first ten years of their existence. Ten registered congregations of the same faith can form a religious association or union to represent that particular religion vis-à-vis the state. Only one such association can register per religion. Currently Muslims in Latvia are in the process 3 European Parliament, Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future (2007), available at http://www.libertysecurity.org/article1582.html, accessed 4 March 2009.

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of registering new like-minded congregations in order to attain the required number of ten to be eligible to form an association. 3

Main Muslim Organizations

The Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia records sixteen registered independent Muslim religious congregations as of 2007. Latvijas islama kopienas (Latvian Islamic Community, including an Islamic Information Centre and a prayer hall) (Brivibas 104, Riga, www.islam.lv) is the main Muslim organisation in the country and is dominated by Russian-speaking Muslims (Tatars and those with origins in the former Soviet Central Asian republics). It has several affiliated congregations established, which are aiming to form a union of Muslim congregations, for which the law requires a membership of ten registered congregations, each with at least twenty members. There are several rival congregations with minuscule memberships that oppose the establishment of the union under the leadership of the Latvian Islamic Community. The second largest congregation is the Daugavpils Islamic Centre, also dominated by Russian speakers. In Riga, there is also a quasi-Muslim (its members in fact deny they are Muslims) Hazrat Inayat Khan Sufism Study Circle, a syncretic new-age-type offshoot of the traditional Chishtiya Sufi tariqa, brought to the Baltics by an Englishman, James Burgess, in the mid-1990s. 4


In the early twentieth century, a prayer hall was opened in Riga but did not survive the Soviet period. A new mosque (prayer hall) in purchased premises in an apartment, at Brivibas Street 104, was opened in 2005 by the Latvian Islamic Community. There are at least two other locations in private homes in Riga where some Muslims occasionally gather for communal prayer. The Daugavpils and Ventspils communities have makeshift prayer halls. Since the early 1990s, there has been much talk of building a purposebuilt mosque in Riga, but no practical steps have been taken towards achieving this goal, and the leader of the Latvian Islamic Community acknowledged that for the time being there is no need for a new purpose built mosque.

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Elective religious education (Christian and Jewish, e.g. of ‘traditional’ denominations) is part of the public school system. Islamic education (formally a ‘non-traditional’ religion) is not offered in public schools, but some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. The congregations in Riga and Daugavpils provide Islamic education for young people in improvised informal weekend ‘schools’. There are no private primary or secondary level schools run by Muslims. 6


Academic courses on the Middle East (especially Arabic language) are regularly offered at the University of Latvia (Department of Modern Languages). There is no institution for imam training in Latvia. Apparently, all acting imams (a Sudanese at the Brivibas Street prayer hall and several Russian-speaking Tatars elsewhere) are self-taught. Teachers in schools who deal with Islamic history and or religious doctrine have either history or religious studies degrees and certificates, but no specifically Islamic education. 7


Muslims have a separate cemetery in Riga dating back to the late nineteenth century. Though now rarely used for burial, it is still kept up by the Latvian Islamic Community. Muslims have been assigned separate sections in cemeteries in Riga and other major urban cnetres. So far no need has arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery. 8


While Lutheran, Orthodox and Catholic religious services are offered in the armed forces, prisons and hospitals, there are no imams in these institutions owing to the very small number of Muslims. The acting imam of the Latvian Islamic Community is occasionally asked to visit hospitals and prisons.

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Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Riga and Daugavpils take place in rented premises. They are open to the public and attended annually by between 300 and 500 people. During ‘Id al-Adha, animals are slaughtered in rural areas. 10

Halal Food

Halal meat can be purchased from Halal Chicken in the Plavnieki neighbourhood of Riga. Though Muslim ritual slaughter is prohibited by law for health and safety reasons, it is practised by Muslims privately and halal meat is available through individual members of the Latvian Islamic Community. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. Latvian laws allow head coverings (including hijab) in photographs for official documents. In fact, only a small number of Muslim women wear hijab (and even fewer niqab), mainly on Fridays while attending communal prayer. 12


There are no printed Muslim publications in Latvia, though ethnic minorities, including those of Muslim background (e.g., Tatars and Azeris), do occasionally publish brochures and pamphlets with sections related to Islam. One of the few websites run by Latvian Muslims is www.islam.lv (in Russian). It has an on-line forum (also in Russian), but this is apparently rarely used and the site seems not to have been updated since 2006). Another website is www.islammuslim.lv (in Latvian, run by Latvian converts to Islam), which is still under construction but already has a much more active forum. There is another website in Latvian at www.islamlv.netfirms.com.

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Family Law

Muslims, like others, have to register their marriages at a municipal civil registry office as imams are not authorised to act on behalf of the state. Several marriage contracts (nikah) are signed every year under the supervision of the imam in Riga. Inheritance can follow Islamic regulations if this is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious faith of the litigants is irrelevant. 14


There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Latvia in the local media. Local Muslim leaders are occasionally approached to comment on international events involving Muslims. Muslims generally avoid controversial issues and stay out of politics and even shun publicity. No current opinion polls on Latvians’ attitudes toward Muslims are available, but there is a consensus among Latvian social scientists that Islamophobia in Latvia is on the rise. 15


Sabantuj is an annual several-day gathering of Tatars with festivities (songs, dances, games and sports). It is not a religious event, though religious attendees may hold communal prayers and some lectures on religious issues may be offered.

LITHUANIA Egdūnas Račius1 1

Muslim Populations

The most recent official census (2001) included a question on religious identity and produced the following figures: 2,860 Sunni Muslims (no data on Shi’is available), or 0.1% of the total population, 1,679 (or 58.7% of all Sunni Muslims) of whom were ethnic Tatars, 362 (12.6%) Azeris, 185 Lithuanians, and 74 Russians. Tatars have been living in Lithuania (the eastern part of today’s republic of Lithuania) since the fourteenth century when they started settling in what was the territory of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as mercenaries and political immigrants. They were given land by the Lithuanian rulers they served. Though over time Lithuanian Tatars lost their mother tongue, they retained their religion and survived as a distinct ethnocultural yet well integrated group. Most of the other Muslimst are descendants of immigrants from the Muslim Central Asian and Caucasian republics who settled in Lithuania during the Soviet period. By 2008, the number of Muslims in Lithuania has probably increased due to immigration (around 700, mainly Chechens (Department of Migration data)) and conversion (between 150 and 250, mainly resulting from marriages Muslims).2 In the official census, a substantial number (around half of Tatars and Azeris) of Lithuania’s inhabitants from a Muslim background did not indicate their affiliation to Islam but might potentially be considered nominal Muslims. This especially applies to Azeris, traditionally Shi’is, who might have chosen not to identify with Sunnis but may still be observant. The total number of cultural or nominal Muslims

1 Egdūnas Račius is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science of Vilnius University, Lithuania, where he chairs the Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies section. He earned his Ph.D. in Arabic and Islamic Studies from the University of Helsinki, Finland. His research interests encompass Muslim revivalism throughout the world and specifically developments in the Muslim community in Lithuania. 2 Data from observations of on-line Muslim Internet forums and personal experience of the author.

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in 2008 could be as high as 7,000, but Muslims who actively practise on daily basis are unlikely to exceed 500. The Lithuanian media and Lithuanian Muslims usually accept the official number, while foreign (Muslim) sources sometimes produce unfounded numbers exceeding 10,000—(Islam Online in 2004 even gave a figure of 110,000!3 Almost two-thirds (over 64%) of Lithuania’s Muslims are concentrated in the capital city Vilnius, the second largest city Kaunas, and the districts surrounding them. 2

Islam and the State

Lithuania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Catholics nominally constitute a majority of the population (79% according to the 2001 census). Sunni Islam (the traditional faith of the Lithuanian Tatars) is recognised by a law adopted in 1995 as one of the nine ‘traditional’ faiths, and the Muslim community through its official representative institution, the Muftiate, is entitled to a modest annual state subsidy to be spent on the maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings. The Muftiate was first established in the inter-war period in Vilnius by the Polish authorities, who then controlled the eastern part of Lithuania, including Vilnius. It was disbanded in the Soviet period, and re-established in 1998. Both the Muslim community in general and the Muftiate in particular are dominated by Lithuanian Tatars. Leaders of the Muslim community (the mufti and the imam of the Kaunas mosque) are routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations at the presidential palace and the parliament. Other Muslim denominations (such as the Shi’is) have the right to freedom of religion and conscience but do not have the same official status as Sunni Muslims. So far there is no specifically Shi’i religious congregation. Registered quasi-Muslim groups, such as the Sufism Study Circle, enjoy legal rights and protection. Religious organisations of non-traditional denominations may seek state recognition after being registered for 25 years.

3 Ahmed, Damir. “Lithuanian Muslims Fearful After ‘Terror’ Arrests”. IslamOnline.net, 22 July 2004. http://islamonline.net/English/News/2004-07/22/article01.shtml, accessed 4 March 2009.

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There are almost a dozen registered Muslim organisations throughout Lithuania. The main one is the Vilnius-based Lietuvos Musulmon’ Sunit’ Dvasinis Centras —Muftijatas (The Spiritual Center of the Lithuanian Sunni Muslims—Muftiate, Vivulskio str. 3, Vilnius), (re)established in 1998 and dominated by Lithuanian Tatars. The mufti is elected for a five-year term by representatives of local Muslim (until today exclusively Tatar) congregations. Most other Muslim organisations (which are also dominated by Lithuanian Tatars) are subordinate to the Muftiate. The Muftiate has close relations with the Turkish embassy which supplies imams (appointed as cultural attachés at the Turkish embassy) for the Vilnius congregation. They are paid by the Turkish state and each remains in post for four years. The current imam is the fourth to be appointed under this arrangement. However, a much more active organisation is the Arab dominated Kaunas-based Lietuvos musulmon’ jaunimo bendrija (Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society, Totori’ str. 6, Kaunas), which is engaged in translating and publishing religious literature, and organises and takes part in the religious education of local Muslim young people. There are no other Muslim organisations of note, though some are engaged in the propagation of Islam on the Internet (e.g., a congregation called al-Tauhyd registered in Klaipëda). 4


Although a century ago there were well over a dozen purpose-built mosques, only four of them remain (three wooden, built in late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one brick, built in early 1930s), of which only the Kaunas (brick) mosque is regularly used, by both local Tatars and foreign (mainly Arab) students. In addition, in the capital city Vilnius there is one official prayer hall adjacent to the Muftiate, which is used by Tatars, Turks and others. A purpose-built mosque is expected to be erected in the near future on the outskirts of Vilnius, as the Vilnius City Municipality has finally allocated a plot for that purpose in 2008. However, the Muslim community has not yet formally accepted the offer. It is known that some Muslim groups (presumably ethnically/nationally orientated) gather for prayer in private apartments and other unofficial prayer halls (both in Vilnius, and in Klaipëda and Panevëžys).

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Religious education in public schools is optional but exclusively Catholic (in ethnic Russian schools, Orthodox); non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class in ‘ethics’. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. As there are no private primary or secondary schools run by Muslims, Islamic religious instruction is entirely extra-curricular, and is provided by Muslim communities in improvised weekend schools. There are around eight of these in Vilnius, Kaunas and the traditionally Tatar villages of Nemëžis, Keturiasdešimt totori’ (data from the Department of National Minorities and Lithuanians Living Abroad under the Government of the Republic of Lithuania). Such schools have no official status and their curriculum is not subject to approval by the Ministry of Education or any other state agency. 6


Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at Vilnius University (in the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, and the Centre of Oriental Studies) and the Lithuanian Military Academy. The Centre of Oriental Studies temporarily (between 2000 and 2006) offered a BA in Arabic Studies but abandoned it because of a shortage of academic staff. Elsewhere (at Vilnius Pedagogical University and Vilnius Theological Seminary), classes on Islam tend to be offered on an ad hoc basis. There is no institution for imam training in Lithuania. All acting imams received their formal education abroad (in Lebanon, Russia or Turkey). 7


Tatars have had separate cemeteries since the first began settling in Lithuania. Most Muslim cemeteries have been traditionally located next to mosques. A dozen cemeteries (in Nemëžis, Raižiai, on the outskirts of Vilnius and elsewhere) have survived till the present time and some still serve as burial sites for the community. A fair number of non-religious Tatars use general cemeteries for burial. no need has yet arisen for a new separate Muslim cemetery.

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There are no imams in either the armed forces, prisons, or hospitals as there is virtually no need for their services. Catholic religious services are provided in these institutions and for that purpose most of them have a separate non-denominational space allocated for prayer and contemplation. Muslims can make use of these for private prayer. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations in Vilnius, Kaunas and Raižiai (Alytus district) are open to the public. ‘Id al-Adha is attended annually by up to 500 people with several dozens of animals sacrificed in Raižiai. No permission to sacrifice animals near the mosque in Kaunas is given. 10

Halal Food

No halal abattoirs have yet been opened. Frozen halal meat (mostly chicken) is available in several supermarkets. Several individual Muslims perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers and they sell this halal meat to their coreligionists. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Islamic dress in public or by pupils in schools. However, only a handful of Muslim women wear hijab, mainly on Fridays when attending prayer. Some foreign Muslim females (Turkish exchange students) wear hijab in public and on daily basis. There have been no reports of Muslim women wearing niqab. 12


The sole printed Muslim periodical (with an on-line version) is a 32page monthly, Lietuvos Totoriai (Lithuanian Tatars, circulation 800), in Lithuanian with inserts in Polish and Russian, published by the Lietuvos totori’ bendruomeni’ s[junga (Union of Lithuanian Tatars’ Communities). It

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is ethnically focused with occasional articles on religion. The two main websites in Lithuanian run by Muslims for the benefit of Muslims and those wishing to get acquainted with Islam are www.islamas.lt (administered by Lithuanian converts to Islam residing abroad) and www .musulmonai.lt (run by Arabs residing in Lithuania). The former has an extensive on-line forum. The Lithuanian Muslim Youth Society has published a range of translated books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice, which are distributed at Kaunas mosque. There is a separate Shi’ite website at www.freewebs.com/shia_lt. 13

Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques, which are then registered with a municipal civil registry office. In the past decade a dozen or so marriage contracts have been signed under the supervision of the imam. Wills can stipulate that inheritance be apportioned according to Islamic rules if this is accepted by all the parties involved. Otherwise, the legal (and court) system is entirely secular and the religious affiliation of the litigant is irrelevant. 14


There is very little coverage of the situation of Muslims in Lithuania in the local media. Occasionally local Muslim leaders are approached to comment on international events involving Muslims, but otherwise Muslims tend to avoid publicity. The most recent though little discussed matter that was publicly reported was the allocation of a plot for the construction of a mosque on the outskirts of Vilnius. The media reported this but there was little public reaction. Recent polls show, however, that Lithuanian public opinion is slowly but steadily turning against Muslims: representative surveys (conducted by the Centre of Ethnic Studies) report that some 45% of Lithuanians would not want to have Muslims as neighbours. 15


Sabantujus is an annual several-day gathering of Tatars with festivities (songs, dances, games and sports) and there is an annual youth summer camp which includes some religious instruction.

LUXEMBOURG Sylvain Besch1 1

Muslim Population

It is impossible to assess the exact number of Muslims in Luxembourg, since it is forbidden to register the religious affiliation.2 In May 2004, the Muslim population was estimated at 8,898 persons (1.48% of the total population).3 This estimate is based on the numbers of people whose nationality indicates that they from a predominantly Muslim country (source: Répertoire Général des Personnes Physiques (RGPP, the civil register) and on estimates from the Centre Culturel Islamique de Luxembourg (CCIL, Luxembourg Islamic Cultural Centre), especially of people of various nationalities who have converted to Islam. According to this estimate the ‘European’ Muslim population accounts for 79% of the total Muslim population in the country. Using nationality as a basis, the biggest Muslim groups as of 1 January 2008 were: Bosnians (2,974), Moroccans (427), Turks (386), Albanians (339), Iranians (294), Tunisians (207) and Algerians (207) (RGPP). In addition, there would have been many Muslims among the 7,206 Serbian-Montenegrins and 1,602 Yugoslavs, especially people from Sandjak and Kosovo.4 Muslims are concentrated in the urban areas: 27% of the members of the biggest Muslim groups5 live in the city of Luxembourg and 43% in the four biggest cities of the country (RGPP). The municipality of Wiltz in the north of the country has a significant Bosnian community (5.4% of the total population).

1 Sylvain Besch is head of research at the SeSoPI-Centre Intercommuntaire and a member of the Consultative Commision on Human Rights in Luxembourg. 2 Article 15 of the law of 31 March 1979 on the use of data in a databank forbids the collection and registration of data concerning the activities and opinions of persons in the following fields: politics, trade union activities, philosophical and religious affiliation. 3 Estimates by SeSoPi-CI and the Centre Culturel Islamique du Luxembourg (CCIL), Besch, Sylvain, Lucile Bodson, Nénad Dubajic, Claudia Hartmann, Michel Legrand, Discrimination à l’emploi (Discrimination in the workplace). Complete version. CEPS/INSTEAD, December 2005, Cahiers PSELL, no. 151, pp. 91–92. 4 Estimated to number 2,985 in 2004. 5 I.e., the seven nationalities listed above.

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The majority of the Muslims in Luxembourg arrived in Luxembourg in the 1990s as refugees. There have been several waves of refugees from the former Yugoslavia: Bosnians from Bosnia, Albanians and Muslims from Kosovo, and Serb and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. By the municipal elections in 2005, 13% of the Bosnians aged 18 or over had registered on the electoral roll in order to be able to vote. Currently, about 300 adults attend Friday prayer regularly in the mosques. 2

Islam and the State

There is no official church in Luxembourg, although the Roman Catholic Church is the most important. The constitution provides for freedom of religion, the freedom to exercise religion in public and the freedom to express religious opinions (Art. 19). The constitution allows the state to enter into agreement with the various religions (Art. 22),6 which regulate the relationship between the state and those religions.7 The various agreements confer the status of legal personality on religious communities. On 6 July 2007, the government approved a proposal for an agreement to regulate the relationship between the state of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg and the Muslim community.8 In order to come into force, the agreement must be passed in law. Before that can happen, the Muslim Community must, within half a year of signing the agreement, adopt rules to regulate, among other things, the internal organisation of the religious community and the recruitment of members. These rules must be approved by the minister of religion on the recommendation of the government. The bill must then be presented in parliament within a month of approval being given. Religious communities, whether recognised or not, always have the possibility of creating profit-making and not-for-profit associations, and these associa6 A number of conventions were agreed upon on 31 October 1997 by the state and the following religions: the Roman Catholic Church, the Jewish Council, the Protestant Church of Luxembourg and the Orthodox Church of Greece. These agreements came into force by law on 10 July 1998. Since then, two more churches have obtained an agreement: the Romanian and Serbian Orthodox Church and the Anglican Church of Luxembourg. These agreements came into force by law on 11 June 2004. 7 “The intervention of the state in the nomination and appointment of the leaders of religious communities, the procedures or nominating and dismissing priests, the possibility for the above mentioned to correspond with their superiors and to publish their documents, as well as the relationship between State and Church.” 8 The proposal was presented to the press by the minister of religion on 24 July 2007.

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tions can obtain subsidies from the state and the municipality. Some of the Muslim associations so formed have already benefited from this for the organisation of public events, especially from the state (Ministry of Family—Commissariat du Gouvernement aux Etrangers). The proposed agreement foresees that the employed priests should be appointed on equal terms with civil servants. In the case of Islam it will be a mufti, whose nomination will be approved by the minister of religion after the mufti has taken an oath before him, five imams and a secretary. 3


The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg (Centre Culturel Islamique du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg (CCIL), in Mamer (2, rte d’Arlon, L-8210 Mamer, tel: 31 00 60, fax: 26 31 04 26, e-mail:ccil@ pt.lu) is the oldest (founded in February 1984) and the most important of the Muslim organisations. A regional branch of this centre was established on 1 February 2007 in Wiltz. It has about 600 paying members of 30 different nationalities, particularly Bosnians (2,500 people when their families are included). The Islamic and Cultural Association in the South (Association Islamique et Culturelle du Sud ) in Esch/Alzette (44, rue de Luxembourg, L-4220 Esch-sur-Alzette, tel/fax: 26540784, e-mail: [email protected]) was established on 1 March 2002, and its members are mainly Serbian and Montenegrin Muslims from Sandjak. The Islamic Cultural Centre in the North (Centre Culturel Islamique du Nord ) was established on 26 December 2006 and was initially named the Cultural Centre of Sandjak (Centre Culturel du Sandjak). Its main building is in Wiltz (26 rte de Noertrange, L-9543 Wiltz, tel. 26950680, fax: 26950681) and it is mainly frequented by Serb Muslims from Sandjak. The Islamic Religious and Cultural Centre in the West (Association Cultuelle et Culturelle Islamique de l’Ouest) in Differdange-Niederkorn (64, rue de l’Eglise, L-4552 Niedercorn) was established on 15 June 1999, when it was called the Association of Muslims in Luxembourg (Association des Musulmans du Luxembourg). Its members are first and foremost Bosnians from Bosnia and Kosovo and Montenegrins from Sandjak. These four cultural centres are organised within the framework of the Shoura, the Grand- Grand-Duchy Council of the Muslim Cult, established in 2003. An association called Le Juste Milieu (LJM, the Middle Way, also called in Arabic Al Wassat) was established on 1 February 2008 and

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is based in Luxembourg-Bonnevoie (32 Dernier Sol, L-2543 Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, tel: 621491979, e-mail: [email protected]) and its founding members are mostly people of Arab descent. 4


There are five mosques/prayer houses and they are situated in buildings in Mamer, Differdange, Esch/Alzette, Mamer, Luxembourg-Bonnevoie, Wiltz (Centre Culturel Islamique du Nord) of the five mentioned associations. There are currently two imams employed and paid by the community. 5


The Catholic Church benefits from an arrangement concerning religious education in primary schools.9 The Catholic Church organises the religious education in primary school, and the Archbishop of Luxembourg is the employer of the teachers who teach religious education and is responsible for their training. Legislation also provides for religious education in post-primary school. The students can choose in both primary and post-primary school to take lessons in either religion and ethics or ethics and civics. There is no third possibility. The educational programme in primary schools for lessons in religion and ethics anticipates that they will cover intercultural and interreligious topics.10 The major religions are covered in the classes on religion, ethics and civics and in history classes in post-primary school. All the Islamic organisations offer Islamic instruction for children and some of them also offer courses for adults. At present, around 370 children are taking Islamic education courses in the five mosques. 6


Education in Islam is part of the basic instruction provided by the Institute for Higher Education of Teachers of Religion (basic theology and history). In 2008/09 the further education programme for teachers Memorandum A No. 67, 21 August 1998. Erzdiözese Luxemburg, Rahmenrichtlinien für Religionsunderricht in der Primärschule, August 1998. 9

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of religion provides, among other things, for religious instruction in the framework of religious pluralism and dialogue between Christians and Muslims.11 The Archbishop of Luxembourg has organised a day of diocesan training in pastoral service for priests, the deacons and laypeople, and a week of study on the theme “Together before God?!? Possibilities for interreligious dialogue in Luxembourg, especially with Islam”. A further education course has been organised by the ethics committee at the Kirchberg Hospital on the theme “The end of life in various religions”. Both of the imams serving in Luxembourg were educated abroad. 7


There are no Islamic cemeteries in Luxembourg, but the Muslim community has at its disposal a parcel of land in the Merl cemetery in Luxembourg City, where they can bury according to the Islamic ritual. They will also be offered another parcel of land at the Esch-Lallange cemetery in Esch-Alzette. The CCIL established a mutual insurance company in 200112 and, when a member dies, an allowance is paid to meet the costs of a funeral service carried out with the assistance of the imam from CCIL. The costs of transporting the coffin to the home country of the deceased person can also be met. 8


Neutral prayer rooms and/or ‘farewell- room’ can be found in hospitals. In quite a few hospitals the nursing staff try to take account of the needs of the various religious communities. In Schrassig prison, Islamic prayers can be organised and the imam visits regularly. The law on the creation and organisation of the detention centre for people without a residence permit, specifically stipulates that the religious conviction of the detainees must be respected and provides for the availability of cultural, educational and spiritual activities for them.13 11 Cf., Kirchlicher Anzeiger für de Erzdiözese Luxemburg, No. 6, July-August 2008, p. 96 and 101. 12 Memorandum B No. 22, 2 April 2001. 13 Se articles 3(1) and 12(2) in: Document parlementaire No. 5947 of 4 November 2008.

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Religious Festivals

Before the holiday of ‘id/bayram the Minister of Education has informed the class teachers of the date of this holiday, and asked them to accept the letters of the parents asking for a day off for their children. Labour legislation does not anticipate any specific arrangements. It is up to the employee to ask for a day of absence to participate in the religious holidays. A study of discrimination at the workplace shows that in some cases the employers have paid attention to the religious practice of the employees and established facilities for them to practice their religion or to respect the religious diversity of the workforce.14 In the public sector the flexible work hours give a better opportunity to combine work with certain religious practices for example the fast. 10

Halal Food

There is one Islamic butcher’s shop and about ten Balkan grocery stores and a supermarket in Auchan in the city of Luxembourg, where halal meat is available. Halal slaughter is forbidden in Luxembourg.15 Muslims also buy halal meat in Belgium, France and Germany. Because of the prohibition on ritual slaughter, Muslims sometimes send a gift of money to their native country so that people there who are less well off can make the sacrifice. This is especially the case at ‘Id al ‘Adha. 11

Dress Code

As far as the dress code for students is concerned, the Minister of Education drew attention in 2004 to the regulations in force,16 which prescribe that “the dress of the students must be correct” and that “special clothes may be required for lessons of gymnastics, art and manual and practical classes”.

Besch et al., Discrimination à l’emploi, p. 99. Article 8 in the law of 15 March 1983 on animal welfare forbids the killing of animals without anaesthesia, cf. Memorandum A No. 15, 19 March 1983. 16 Article 10 of the regulation of 29 June 1998 on order and discipline in secondary and secondary professional schools. 14 15

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There have been no cases of students refusing to participate in sporting activities because of their religious conviction. The amended version of the law on education17 provides that, with the exception of teachers in religion and ethics, teachers are not allowed to demonstrate their religious or political affiliation by way of conspicuous dress or signs. 12


Al-Qalam (The Pen), the journal of the Muslims in the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg has been edited by the CCIL and published six times a year since 1990. The existing websites are: – The Islamic Cultural Centre of the Grand Duchy, www.islam.lu, in French and German, has existed since 1 September 1997; – The Islamic Cultural Center in the South http://dzematesch.zap. lu, in Bosnian; – The Islamic Cultural Center in the North www.ccin.lu, in five languages (French, German, English, Bosnian and Arabic). 13

Family Law

Civil marriage must precede religious marriage. Polygamy is forbidden.18 The laws in Luxembourg provide the legal basis for the annulment of forced marriages.19 The recognition of a marriage can be refused if the marriage is clearly in violation of the laws of Luxembourg (if it involves polygamy, for example). All foreign legal decisions and acts not sanctioned under a treaty or an EU directive are subject to a formal process of recognition before they can be legally accepted in Luxembourg.20 Divorce by repudiation is considered to be a violation of public order. It is possible for partial legal recognition to be given; for example, a

Document parlementaire No. 5758, 11 September 2008. Article 147 in the civil code stipulates: A second marriage is not allowed before the dissolution of the first. 19 Article 180 in the civil code. A bill has been put forward with the aim of fighting forced marriages or partnerships. 20 Article 678 in a new code on civil procedures. 17 18

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divorce may be recognised but not necessarily its consequences, such as arrangements for the custody of children. 14


In 2008, there was no public debate on Islam. In 2007, the planned agreement with the Muslim community provoked a debate about the separation between state and church and led to criticism of the planned agreement.21 The Luxembourg Socialist Party (LSAP) formally opposed the idea of teaching Islam in schools.22 Individuals and organisations have specifically criticised the ill treatment of animals in ritual slaughter.23 A public opinion poll carried out in October 2003 by l’Institut Luxembourgeois de Recherches Sociales et d’Etudes de Marché (ILRES) among 1,000 people on the perception of Islam showed both positive and negative opinions on Islam.24 According to a representative opinion poll on religious education in Luxembourg,25 49% of the population thought that living in a multicultural and multireligious society was an important subject in religious education.

21 The association Liberté de conscience (Freedom of conscience) mind has opposed the agreement with the Muslim community and this kind of agreements in general, cf. Zeitung, 3 October 2007, p. 10. 22 Cf., “Cours de religion à l’école: Interroger le CVS”, Quotidien, 4 October 2007, p. 3. 23 The Association Luxembourgeoise pour la Protection des Animaux (APA, Association for the Protection of Animals) has published its position concerning ritual slaughter: “Betrifft: Schlächten in Luxembourg”, Tageblatt Leserforum, 13 September 2007, p. 6. 24 Of the Islamic traits thought of positively, the diversity of Islam (88%), modesty and discretion (74%), the Muslim presence as an opportunity for cultural enrichment (64%), hospitality (56%) were among those that got the highest score, except that almost 90% of respondents thought that Islam sees women as inferior to men. Negative aspects of Islam expressed by less than 50% of respondents included: the strangeness of Muslims (48%), the various threats that Islam and Muslims represent: imposition of their laws (41%), temptation to terrorism (39%), inclination to violence (38%), threat to fundamental freedoms (36%), and threat to Christian religions (25%). In contrast, the contributions of Islam to culture and science were only recognised by 38% of respondents. Overall, there was a perception that Muslim dress was strange and a perception that physical and political violence were related to Islam (cf., Legrand, Michel, Les perceptions de l’Islam et des musulmans par les habitants du Luxembourg, in Forum No. 241, 2004. 25 Opinion poll on religious education in Luxembourg, TNS-ILRES, Luxembourg, July 2008.

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The Islamic Cultural Centre in Mamer took part in a friendship party organised by the parish of Mamer in July 2008 . The Centre organises celebrations at the end of the school year and since 2006 has arranged pilgrimages to Mecca. In 2007, the ICCL organised open-door events to inform the public about Islam in Luxembourg.

MACEDONIA Muharem Jahja1 1

Muslim Populations

The most recent official census (2002) recorded 660,492 Muslims (mainly Sunnis), or around 31% of the total population (2,022,547). Of these, 509,083 (or 77%) were ethnic Albanians, 77,959 (12%) Turks, 53,879 Roma, and 17,018 Bosniaks.2 Albanians, who speak a different language from Macedonian, which is a Slavic language, started to become Muslims with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans in the fourteenth century. Turks are the descendants of immigrants from Ottoman times. By 2008, the number of Muslims in Macedonia has probably increased due to a high fertility rate (around 2.5%). Conversions are relatively rare and may number between 20 and 30 in total since the fall of Communism.3 In the official census, Macedonian-speaking Muslims, as they are officially labeled (also informally known as Torbeshi, Pomaks or Gorani, and increasingly likely to call themselves Turks or Albanians), are classified under the ‘other’ category of the census and are not included among the country’s Muslims, but they constitute a considerable number (around 20,000), so the total number of Muslims in 2008 might be in the vicinity of 700,000. The number of Muslims practising on a daily basis might amount to 200,000 and another 300,000 might pray on Fridays and fast in Ramadan.4 Almost two thirds of Macedonia’s Muslims are concentrated in the north-western part of the country, in the capital city, Skopje, the

1 Muharem Jahja is a researcher at the Institute for Cultural and Spiritual Heritage of Albanians, Skopje. He holds a BA in Islamic Law and an MA in Islamic History. His research and writings relate to the sociology and history of Islam and Albanians in the Balkan region, specifically in Macedonia, and include his most recent paper, “The municipality of Gostivar in the period 1318–1900 according to the Salname (Yearbook) of the Vilayet of Kosovo”. 2 The State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia, Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002 (Skopje: State Statistical Office, May 2005). 3 Anecdotal data from the author’s personal experience. 4 Interview with representatives of the IRCM in Macedonia, Skopje, January 2009.

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second largest city, Tetovo, and in the districts surrounding these cities and others such as Gostivar, Debar, Kicevo, Kumanovo, Resne, Struga, and Ohrid. The rest live in the southern and eastern parts of the country in scattered communities. 2

Islam and the State

Macedonia’s Constitution describes it as a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority of the population, 66% according to the 2002 census, counting the ethnic Macedonians, Serbs, and Vlachs who are Orthodox Christians. The Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and provides for the right to express one’s faith freely and publicly, individually or with others. Islam is recognised by the Constitution as one of the five main faiths and is officially represented by the Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija (Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia, IRCM).5 The state does not fund religious communities, and all costs related to maintenance of mosques and other communal buildings, as well as the salaries of religious leaders, are paid for out of the private and voluntary contributions of the members of the community and income from waqf institutions. Leaders of the Sunni Muslim community are routinely invited to official meetings and celebrations at the presidential palace, the parliament and the government but, unlike Orthodox clergy, they are not invited to openings or construction launches of infrastructure or buildings. Other Muslim denominations, such as the Bektashis and Shi’a, have freedom of religion and conscience but do not hold the same official status as Sunni Muslims. Beside the Bektashis there are Sunni Sufi tariqas, such as the Khalwatis (mainly located in the cities of Kicevo, Ohrid and Struga), Malamis, Naqshbandis, Qadiris and Rifa’is (mainly in the capital Skopje).6 The IRCM and other Muslim religious communities and groups are free to establish schools and other social and charitable institutions by following a legally prescribed procedure.

5 6

The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, Article 19. The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 55.

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The main Muslim organization is the Skopje-based Islamska Verska Zaednica na Republika Makedonija (Islamic Religious Community in the Republic of Macedonia, IRCM, Çairska str. no 52, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia, tel: +389-2-3117410, fax: +389-2-3117883, www.bim.org.mk), (re)established in 1994 after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. It is dominated by Macedonian Albanians. The IRCM, which follows the Hanafi legal school,7 is organised into thirteen separate muftiates in the major cities around the country, each headed by a local mufti. The head of the IRCM is known as Rais al-ulama. Other active organisations are engaged in translating and publishing religious literature include the Skopje-based Logos-A (www.logos-a.com.mk). The main charity is the Skopje-based El-Hilal. There are tens of political parties affiliated to the Muslim communities in the country, some of which take part in government coalitions and are represented in the Parliament by more than 30 MPs. Their politics are ethnic rather than religious. 4


Currently, there are around 600 purpose-built mosques,8 some from the fifteenth century, of which 570 are regularly used. Twenty-one historic mosques have survived in the capital, Skopje, among which the most famous are those that date from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, namely the mosques of Yahya Pasha, Isa Bey, Mustafa Pasha, Murat Pasha, and Sultan Murat. Other famous mosques include: in Tetovo, the Painted Mosque (Aladja Mosque), and the Saat Mosque (Clock Mosque); in Bitola, the Isaac Mosque, Haydar Kadi Pasha and New Mosque; in Prilep, the Charshi Mosque; in Gostivar, the Saat Mosque; in Ohrid, the Hayati Baba Tekye and Ali Pasha Mosque. The languages used for preaching include Albanian, Macedonian, Turkish, Bosnian and Roma. There are also tekes that are used for prayer. Purpose-built mosques continue to be constructed in a number of places. A number of waqf institutions that belonged to the IRCM were nationalised with the advent of Communism after World War II.

7 8

The Constitution of the IRCM, Article 1. Interview with representatives of the IRCM, Skopje, January 2009.

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Despite the de-nationalisation process after 1991, not all waqfs, including mosques, have been returned to the ownership of the community. 5


Religious education in public schools, introduced in 2008, is optional and is offered in Islam, Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism to 11-year-old pupils only; non-religious pupils and those of other faiths are offered an alternative class in ‘history of religions’. Some history of Islam and the Middle East is taught within the history curriculum. Due to language differences, ethnic groups attends separate classes in public schools, based on their native language, from elementary to secondary level. There is a Skopje-based private religious secondary school (Isa Bey Madrasa), established in 1984 and run by the IRCM. It provides Islamic instruction as a core curriculum subject and has branches in the major Muslim cities around the country, such as Tetovo, Gostivar and Shtip. Isa Bey Madrasa has the status of a secondary school under the auspices of the IRCM, but its curriculum is not subject to approval by the Ministry of Education and Science or any other state agency, and as such it is funded not by the state but by the IRCM. However, the Ministry of Education and Science decided in 2009 that Isa Bey Madrasa will become a publicly funded school from 2010 and will be under the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. The school will receive finance from the state budget, in addition to donations from other sources. The changes will also entail changes in the curriculum, including the introduction of a large number of non-religious courses. In addition, Muslim children aged 6–15 are sent to mosques or maktabs (facilities adjacent to mosques) to study the Qur’an and basic Islamic teachings as an extra-curricular voluntary activity. 6


The main higher educational institution for Islam is the Skopje-based Faculty of Islamic Sciences, established in 1997 by the IRCM (Kondovo, 1000 Skopje, Macedonia, www.fshi.edu.mk). In 2008, parliament enacted the law on higher education institutions of religious communities, providing for the Faculty of Islamic Sciences to be transformed from a private institution to a private-public non-profit educational institution. The Faculty will receive funding from the state, in addition

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to donations from other sources. Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East in non-theological universities or faculties are provided on an ad hoc basis. There is no separate institution for imam training in Macedonia. All the imams who are in post received their formal education from Isa Bey Madrasa, the Faculty of Islamic Sciences and/or from abroad (mainly Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and Syria). 7


Muslims have separate cemeteries in each town where they live. Most Muslim cemeteries were historically located next to mosques, but cemeteries have increasingly been established away from mosques as space has become limited. Special plots have been allocated for this purpose by Muslims themselves as waqf. Muslim Roma tend to use separate Roma Muslim cemeteries for burial. As the Muslim community grows, a need has arisen for new separate Muslim cemeteries around the country. 8


There are no imams in the armed forces, prisons or hospitals. Though provided for by legislation, there has been no practice of chaplaincy involving any of the religions in the country. There are efforts to build or allocate separate spaces for prayer in prisons. 9

Religious Festivals

There are annual ‘Id al-Fitr (ramazan bayram) and ‘Id al-Adha (qurban bayram) celebrations in major Muslim towns such as Skopje, Tetovo, Gostivar, Struga, and Kumanovo. The first day of ‘Id al-Fitr is an official holiday for all citizens of the country and the first day of ‘Id al-Adha is an official holiday for Muslims only. Bayram prayers are attended by the large majority of the Muslims and are open to the public. In recent years, they have been attended by the president or prime minister (who are usually Orthodox Christians). ‘Id al-Adha is celebrated around the country with thousands of Muslims attending qurban sacrifice. Other festivals include the first day of Ramadan, Mi’raj Night, the Birthday of the Prophet, and the Day of Hijra.

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Halal Food

No specifically halal abattoirs have yet been opened, but a number of slaughter houses and local butchers do produce halal meat. Frozen halal poultry is available in several supermarkets, mainly imported from Brazil and Slovenia. Individual Muslims sometimes perform ritual slaughter privately after purchasing livestock from local farmers. A number of restaurants owned by Muslims sell halal food using meat from animals they slaughter themselves. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting the wearing of Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools. There are rules that ban the use of photographs taken in hijab for ID cards. Approximately half of Muslim women, mainly the older ones, regularly wear hijab in public, while the rest wear it mainly when attending prayers or funerals. A few Muslim women in Skopje wear niqab under Wahhabi influence. 12


The main periodical is the monthly El Hilal (Hena e re in Albanian), published in Albanian (formerly also in Macedonian and Turkish) by the IRCM; its main focus is on Islamic religion. The main Albanianlanguage print and broadcast media occasionally include news on religion, particularly in the month of Ramadan or other Muslim festivities. Zaman Macedonia, part of the Zaman daily published in Turkey, publishes a weekly local newspaper in both Albanian and Turkish and regularly includes articles on religion. The Asr publishing house produces Dritarja (Window), a children’s journal with Islamic religious content. Websites such as www.bim.org.mk (administered by the IRCM), www.fri.org.mk (administered by the Islamic Youth Forum) and www .makislam.info are the main websites maintained by Muslims in Macedonia both for a Muslim public and for interested non-Muslims. The main media outlets owned by Muslims and dedicated to general daily political issues include AlsatM TV and TV2 Macedonian National Television.

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Family Law

Muslims are permitted by law to conduct marriages in mosques or muftiates. However, the mosque or mufti certificate is not an official document; the marriage must be registered with a municipal civil registry office. Muslims continue to conduct nikah (religious marriage contract) under the supervision of an imam, with two witnesses from the family and setting of the amount of mahr (dowry) before proceeding to sign a civil marriage contract at a municipal registry office. Inheritance is not usually apportioned according to Islamic rules, although some Muslims try to do so. Such arrangements are not recognised by the local court. The legal system is entirely secular and affiliation to any creed is irrelevant in legal matters. 14


The rules for the appointment of the Head of the IRCM and other changes made in the constitution of the IRCM were a major point of public debate during 2008, and the media devoted substantial attention to the issue. The discussion rested on the confrontation between imams of various mosques and the head of the IRCM. Recent polls show that overall public opinion about Muslims is positive: a representative survey (conducted by Gallup Balkan Monitor, www.balkan-monitor.eu) shows that some 70% of ethnic Macedonians trust their Muslim neighbours. The results showed that the people of the country trust their religious organisations. 15


There are several ethnic cultural events, but no specifically Islamic cultural events, apart from Nawruz, which is celebrated only by Bektashis.

MALTA Martin R. Zammit1 1

Muslim Populations

The National Statistics Office (NSO) of Malta has never conducted a census concerning the Muslims in Malta.2 According to the estimate of Malta’s main imam, there are about 5,000 Muslims in Malta, amounting to 1.2% of the total population of 410,290.3 The majority of Muslims in Malta are Libyan Sunnis, while most of the rest hail from North Africa, the Middle East and Europe. A number of Lebanese and Iraqi Shi’is worship with the Sunnis at the mosque of the Corradino Hill Islamic Centre (Paola). Around 1,000 Muslims hold Maltese citizenship. The same imam reports that around 300 native Maltese have converted to Islam. Muslim illegal migrants housed in detention centres and open centres are estimated to number 2,000. Islam reached Malta in 870 CE with the Aghlabid occupation of Malta. During the ensuing Norman rule from 1091, the Muslims coexisted peacefully with the other inhabitants. The Muslims were expelled by the Hohenstauffen King Frederick I Sicily sometime before 1250. During the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, Islam was practised in Malta by Muslim slaves captured during maritime raids. In modern times, Islam made a return to Malta during the 1970s, with the establishment of close political and economic relations with the Arab world, particularly Libya. Muslims from various Arab countries settled in Malta, and in 1982 the Islamic Centre at Paola was established. The 1992 United Nations sanctions against Libya over the Lockerbie issue led to Malta being Libya’s only gateway to the world, and the number of Libyans in Malta increased substantially. Since Malta’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the number of Libyan visitors has fallen dramatically as a result of visa restrictions. In general, Arab Muslims in 1 Dr Martin R. Zammit is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Arabic and Near Eastern Studies, University of Malta. 2 The inhabited islands of the Maltese archipelago (316km2) are Malta, Gozo, and Comino. 3 NSO figures published in September 2008.

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Malta retain Arabic as the language of communication among themselves, but switch easily to Maltese or English with other members of Maltese society. Although retaining their ethnic and cultural identities, Malta’s Muslims in general integrate well with the Maltese context. They live in various towns and cities on the island of Malta, with a minority living on the second island, Gozo. 2

Islam and the State

Malta’s constitution establishes Roman Catholicism as the religion of the state, but provides for religious freedom.4 The Imam is on very good terms with state and religious authorities and has regular access to them. In 2008, the Catholic Archbishop of Malta visited the Islamic Centre and prayed with the Imam inside the mosque. However, Islam is not recognised by law, the Islamic Centre does not receive any state funds, and Muslims do not enjoy any educational, cultural, or social privileges. The state does allocate money to Catholic schools, which has prompted the Muslim community to make representations to receive similar treatment. 3


In 1984, the World Islamic Call Society (WICS) in Tripoli, Libya, established the Islamic Centre (Islamic Centre, Corradino Rd., Paola PLA 9037, Malta, tel. 00356-21-697203, fax. 21697574; e-mail: islamicsociety@ waldonet.net.mt). The Centre aims to provide services for the Muslim community, to acquaint the Maltese public with Islam, and to foster interfaith dialogue. The Centre offers religious services in the mosque (which has an area of 225m2 and space for around. 500 worshippers), organises seminars and meetings on interfaith dialogue, offers Arabic and English courses, conducts marriages, assists the poor and needy (including prisoners and refugees), and arranges for the burial of the dead. Apart from the mosque, it contains a conference hall, a library, offices, a playground, and the Imam’s residence. The Centre is responsible for the translation and publication religious literature, organises journeys to Mecca for the Hajj, and promotes a number of cultural and

4

About 95% of the Maltese are Roman Catholics.

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social activities, particularly during the month of Ramadan. The Imam is appointed by the WICS, his appointment is endorsed by the Maltese state, and he has diplomatic status.5 He enjoys substantial autonomy in the local affairs of his community and is the official point of contact between the Muslim community and the Maltese administration. In accordance with a protocol between the WICS and the government of Malta, the Islamic Centre and its officials enjoy diplomatic immunity. In 1997, the Mariam Albatool School was established within the Islamic Centre’s precincts. The Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat is also represented in Malta. There are no Muslim political parties in Malta and migrant communities are not officially organised on an ethnic basis. A number of Muslims endeavour to integrate into Maltese political life. 4


Apart from the official mosque at Paola, Muslims use five other unofficial places of worship. In addition, Maltese prisons and illegal migrants’ detention centres have spaces reserved for Muslim worship, and a space has been allocated for interfaith worship at the Mater Dei Hospital. The mosque at the Islamic Centre is regularly frequented by local and foreign Muslims, including students. In 2007, the Malta Environment and Planning Authority requested the closure of a space used for Muslim prayer in the town of Sliema, citing violations of the local planning code. 5


Roman Catholic religious education in state schools is compulsory and neither state nor private schools include Islam in their curriculum. Muslim students are given the option of either attending religious education class or following alternative subjects. This situation has prompted local Muslims to establish the Mariam Albatool School. It was opened in 1997 and is situated within the precincts of the Islamic Centre, Paola. A board of volunteer trustees administers the school, which operates at kindergarten, primary and secondary levels under

5

The Imam is Sheikh Muhammad el-Sadi and he is of Palestinian origin.

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Ministry of Education licenses (1998 and 2007). While following the Maltese National Curriculum, the school also offers an Islamic programme of studies which supports Islamic values and maintains the Islamic identity of the students. The school accepts students from all national, religious, and cultural backgrounds and in 2008–2009 the number of students enrolled reached 200, mostly Maltese nationals. It employs around 20 members of staff, mostly Catholics of Maltese nationality. Mariam Albatool School operates on a strictly charitable basis, receiving no government support, and fees are kept to a minimum. For this reason, the school has often faced financial difficulties and applications for subsidies have been made to the Ministry of Education. The School is constantly expanding, which has prompted the WICS to request the Maltese government to allocate to it additional land adjacent to the Islamic Centre. These matters are still under government consideration. In addition, the Libyan Secretariat for Education maintains the Al Fateh Libyan School at Ta’ Giorni, St Julians. This school is open to Arab students and follows the Libyan educational curriculum. Tuition is in Arabic. 6


Academic courses on Islam and the Near East are offered at the University of Malta within the Department of Arabic and Near Eastern Studies (Faculty of Arts). This department offers degrees in Arabic and in Near Eastern Studies at BA, MA and PhD levels. Courses covering Islamic philosophy are also offered in the Faculty of Theology. Both the Islamic Centre and the Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat have donated books to the library of the University of Malta. Malta was one of the first countries to offer university scholarships to Palestinian students and the University of Malta offers mentoring services to Arab students. There is no institution for imam training in Malta. Imams currently serving in Malta have received their formal education abroad. It is unlikely that the need for local imam training will arise in the near future.

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In 1874, a Muslim cemetery was built in the town of Marsa at the expense of the Ottoman government—hence its appellation ‘the Turkish cemetery’. It replaces an older Muslim burial ground and is a fine example of Moorish architecture. Till the 1970s, in the absence of any other mosque, the Turkish cemetery was used for Friday prayers. Between 1996 and 2006 a number of Muslim burials took place at the Maria Addolorata Catholic cemetery at Paola. Meanwhile the Maltese government allocated a piece of land adjacent to the Islamic Centre in Paola to the WICS for burial purposes. The first burials there took place in 2007. The land occupied by the cemetery belongs to the Maltese state. 8


There are no imams in the Maltese armed forces. The Imam of the Islamic Centre presides over prayers in Malta prisons during the main feasts of the Muslim calendar. The Mater Dei state hospital has a separate non-denominational space allocated for prayer and contemplation. The Imam participates regularly in interfaith meetings, including prayer meetings for peace, and other similar occasions. 9

Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated both communally, at the Islamic Centre, and privately. Even though the state does not recognise Muslim festivities, iftar is often attended by senior officials of the Maltese government, as well as by representatives of the Catholic Church and friends of the Muslim community. ‘Id al-Adha is also attended by a substantial segment of the Muslim community, and several dozen animals are slaughtered in local farms. 10

Halal Food

There are at least four halal butchers in Malta, and a local private company offers a variety of halal products. Some Muslims purchase

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livestock from local farmers, perform ritual slaughter privately, and sell the meat to their co-religionists. Frozen halal meat and other halal foodstuffs are also available in most supermarkets and shops. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public. The same applies to pupils in local state and public schools. The hijab is worn quite commonly by Muslim women, including university students. There are also a few cases of Muslim women wearing the niqab. 12


The WICS weekly newspaper Al-Da‘wa al-Islamiyya (‘The Islamic Call’) and the periodical Al-Tawāsul (‘The Contact’) are regularly available at the Islamic Centre.6 The Centre has published a number of books and brochures on various aspects of Islamic belief and practice, including a Maltese translation of the Qur’an.7 In addition, the Centre has regularly participated in the annual Malta Book Fair organised by the Ministry of Education and Culture. The Imam and other members of the community often take part in television and radio debates on religious and social issues. Neither the Islamic Centre, nor Muslim residents manage any internet websites. The e-mail address of Mariam Al-Batool School is: [email protected]. 13

Family Law

Maltese law does not recognise Muslim marriages contracted at the Islamic Centre, nor does it recognise documents pertaining to such marriages or divorces. It only recognises legal documents issued by states, and subject to such documents being in compliance with the laws of Malta. On the basis of a special agreement between Malta

www.daawaislamia.org and www.at-tawasul.info. Zammit, M.R. and el-Sadi, M., Il-Qoran Imqaddes (Tripoli: World Islamic Call Society, 2008). 6 7

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and the WICS, Muslims are allowed to contract Islamic marriages at the mosque of the Islamic Centre. Later, or sometimes alongside the signing of the Muslim contract, an official from the Marriage Registry administers the civil marriage. The Maltese state only recognises this civil marriage. With regard to inheritance, the division of property depends on the wishes of the parties involved and they may, on the basis of a will, choose to follow either Islamic law or the secular state law. 14


The local media cover the situation of Muslims in Malta sporadically. Such coverage is often triggered by immigration issues. Occasionally, local Muslims are approached to comment on Middle Eastern issues, or events involving Muslims worldwide. The Islamic Centre organises regular interfaith dialogue seminars on a variety of topical issues. For example, one such recent seminar (in 2008) discussed the protection of the foetus. The relationship between the Maltese public and the Muslim community is, in general, quite normal. Muslims enjoy a substantial degree of tolerance, without, however, being immune (especially the Libyans) to some negative prejudice and racism. Such sentiments tend to surface when Arabs are appear in court on criminal charges, or when African, Arab or Asian illegal immigrants reach the Maltese islands in dilapidated boats, thus exacerbating an already critical situation at the various detention centres on the island. In general, the Maltese are uneasy with this situation, believing it to have negative long-term economic, social and cultural repercussions, especially in view of the Malta’s limited size and resources. 15


During the month of Ramadan, a number of cultural, sporting and social activities are organised at the Islamic Centre, from early evening till late at night. The cultural activities include talks on various topics by local and foreign guest speakers, and poetry evenings, which are very much appreciated by the Muslim community.

MONTENEGRO Omer Kajoshaj1 1

Muslim Populations

The last official census held in Montenegro was in 2003, three years before the independence referendum, at a time of political and social turmoil. Its results are therefore contested today by many actors, including the Islamic community. The first results of the census showed that 21% of a total population of 680,000 were Muslims, but after several reviews and corrections, the number dropped to 17.7% of a total population of 620,145. Some Muslim estimates put the current number at more than 150,000 Muslims. They are divided into three main groups: Albanians, Bosniaks and Muslims ‘by nationality’. Albanians live mostly in the south-east of the country while Bosniaks live mostly in the north. The smallest group—those who are called ‘Muslims’ because of their nationality—a concept created in Tito’s Yugoslavia—are found mostly in the south-east and central regions of the country. Although the nationalities of the majority of Montenegrin Muslims are associated with the neighboring countries, Albania and Bosnia, they are indigenous people who embraced Islam, mostly during the time of Ottoman Empire. The history of Muslims in Montenegro can be divided into five periods: the first contact with Islam during the eighth and ninth century, when African-Arab sailors reached the coast of Montenegro for trade; the coming of the Ottomans and the Islamisation of the Balkans (fifteenthth century); the expansion of the Montenegrin state to Muslim-inhabited areas in the 1876–78 war and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913) and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire (1917–1920); the

1 Omer Halil Kajoshaj is Director of the Foreign Affairs Department, Islamic Community in Montenegro. He is also the Chairman of NGO “Horizonti-Center for Cross Cultural Understanding”. He is a graduate of the International Islamic University, Malaysia, Department of Communication, and is currently completing a Masters degree at the International University in Novi Pazar, Serbia. He has published several articles on religion, society and politics, in local and foreign newspapers.

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Communist period (1945–1990); and the bloody collapse of Yugoslavia (1991–1995), finally resulting in Montenegrin independence in 2006. The end of the nineteenth century and the whole of the twentieth century was tragic for the Muslims of Montenegro. They went through persecution, exodus, assimilation, anti-religious policies, and continuous discrimination. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the establishment of independent Montenegro are considered by many local Muslims to be a new beginning; more than 90% of the Muslim population are believed to have voted for independence in the referendum in 2006. 2

Islam and the State

Montenegro is a secular state. There is no state religion, religion is separated from the state, and religious communities have equal status (Montenegrin constitution, art. 14). Although the government assists religious communities financially, the assistance is insignificant when compared with their needs, especially in the case of the Islamic community, all of whose waqf properties were confiscated during the Communist period. 3


The Muslims of Montenegro are organised as one community through Islamska zajednica u Crnoj Gori (the Islamic Community in Montenegro, Ul. Gojka Radonjića 54, PF 42; 20000 Podgorica, Montenegro, tel: +38220622408, fax: +38220623812, email: [email protected], www.islam .org.me), which is divided into fourteen regional committees. The headquarters of the Community is in Podgorica, the capital. Mešihat Islamske zajednice (the Mashihat of the Islamic Community) is the main administrative body which coordinates the activities of all fourteen regions. The Chief Mufti (Reis) is the President of the Islamic Community and is elected every six years. The current Chief Mufti is Rifat Fejzić, elected in 2003 at the age of 29 and the youngest Mufti in the Balkans.

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On the territory of present-day Montenegro, over five centuries of Muslim rule, 162 mosques were built,2 out of which 90 were destroyed in the first half of the twentieth century. During the 1980s, mosques began to be rebuilt and 48 new mosques had been built by 2008. Today there are 124 mosques, including one of the most beautiful in the Balkans, the Husein Pasha Mosque, built in 1569 in the city of Pljevlja, and the biggest mosque, the Sultan Murat Mosque in Rožaje, rebuilt in 2008. One of the oldest mosques in the Balkans was the Mariner Mosque in the city of Ulcinj, said to have been built by African Arab traders in the fourteenth, which was completely destroyed in 1931 and is now under reconstruction. 5


The teaching of religion is not included in the public education system in any form. One reason may be the ongoing conflict between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Montenegrin Orthodox Church, a conflict in which the government is trying not to be publicly involved. The primary teaching of Islam in Montenegro is performed by local imams in maktabs, classrooms close to mosques or in mosques, and is attended on a voluntary basis. 6


8 October 2008 was a special date for all Muslims of Montenegro as it saw the opening day of the first contemporary Islamic middle school, the Madrasa. The last school of its kind was closed by the Montenegrin authorities in 1918. In the new Madrasa, 64 pupils enrolled in the first year of the four-year course of study. The curriculum is comparable to the state curriculum, with additional religious subjects. The school is regarded as the most important project of the Islamic Community in Montenegro. The school is recognised by the government but is still in the process of full integration into the governmental education

2 Agovic, Bajro, Islamic Community in Montenegro, Historical Evolution and Organization (Podgorica: Mesihat Islamske zajednice, 2007), p. 71.

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system. It grants a high school diploma allowing graduates to enroll in any faculty at state or private universities. Currently, it has only male pupils, but the Islamic Community is working on extending the building to establish a girls’ school. 7


Almost all Muslims practise traditional Islamic burial. However, in some cemeteries, especially in towns, where religion was weakest during the Communist period, Muslim graves look more like Christian tombs or mausoleums. Generally, in all villages, towns and cities where Muslims live there are separate Muslim cemeteries. 8


Generally speaking, there are no ‘chaplaincies’ in state institutions. However, some exceptions have been made in recent years and, in the main state prison, for instance, an imam nominated by the Mashihat has led the ‘Id (bayram) prayer. 9

Religious Festivals

The two ‘Ids (bayrams) are official holidays, with two days’ leave for each in both the public and the private sector. 10

Halal Food

Gradina Company, in Rožaje, is the only meat company that produces halal meat. The company, established in 1989, is privately owned by a local Muslim family. Its production capacity meets the needs of the Muslim population of Montenegro, but it is not the only provider of halal meat, because private slaughter is widely practised. In the main cities and towns where Muslim live, several restaurants provide halal meals. However, no company or restaurant has a recognised halal certificate.

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Dress Codes

Although there are no specific rules which limit or prohibit Muslim female dress, whether in the public or private sector, including universities and schools, there are so far no known cases of women wearing it, so it cannot be said what the reaction of the relevant authorities would be. However, there are positive indications that upcoming laws and regulations respect the rights of Muslim women. In 2007, after several discussions between the Islamic Community and relevant state authorities, the new law on personal identity documents provided that “every citizen who because of national or religious reasons wears a hat or a headscarf as a part of his/her dress can have the photo for ID taken wearing the hat or headscarf.”3 12


The main Muslim publication is Elif, the periodical of the Islamic Community in Montenegro. The first nine issues were published in 1990–1992. Twelve years later, in October 2004, the Islamic Community resumed publishing it and by February 2009, 58 issues had been published in all. It is a 24-page bilingual monthly with nineteen pages in Bosnian and five pages in Albanian. In addition, the Islamic Community has published several religious books, both original and translated, by prominent Muslim scholars. 13

Family Law

The law is secular and all family matters are referred to the civil courts. Marriage is legally acknowledged only after civil registration, but Muslims do carry out a parallel religious marriage ceremony (which is not recognised by the state). The religious marriage ceremony, with the fixing of the mahr, takes place before a local imam in the presence of relatives of the groom and bride.

3

Službeni list Crne Gore (Official Gazette of Montenegro), No. 12, 2007.

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In 2007–2008, one of the main public issues of importance to the Muslim population was a set of lawsuits over the deportation of Muslim refugees from the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina a decade and a half earlier. In 1992, a number of such refugees were rounded up and deported to captivity or death at the hands of Bosnian Serb forces. In December 2008, the government of Montenegro announced that a settlement had been reached and damages would be paid to survivors and next of kin. The media reported in positive terms on the opening of the Madrasa, which took place in the presence of the president of Montenegro and other prominent persons. The participation of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) in the construction of the Madrasa, and the attendance of a Turkish government minister, were greeted as a sign of strengthening diplomatic relations between Montenegro and Turkey. 15


At the time of the two ‘Ids, in several towns (such as Rožaje and Ulcinj), events are held in the local cultural centres. On 3 July 2008, the Islamic Community organised a major event in Rožaje to mark the achievement of its first hafiz (someone who has learned the Qur’an by heart), Asmir Abdurrahman ef. Kujević. The event was attended by prominent Muslim representatives from neighbouring countries.

NETHERLANDS Martijn de Koning1 1

Muslim Populations

After the independence of the Dutch East Indies (1949) and Surinam, a large number of immigrants came to the Netherlands. However, the largest groups of Muslims are migrants from Turkey and Morocco who were recruited as labourers during the 1960s and 70s, and their descendants. A large number of those from Turkey are Kurds. Other large Muslim groups have arrived later from Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Somalia. Most of them are asylum seekers who were persecuted in their home country and/or fled because of violence there. A small group of asylum seekers fled to the Netherlands because of their political-religious activities in countries such as Egypt and Syria; five of them continue their activities in the Netherlands and are considered to be ‘radical’ imams. In 1994, the number of Muslims in the Netherlands was estimated to be 944,000 (5.8% of the total population).2 The methodology of Statistics Netherlands (CBS) was based upon an estimation of the proportion of Muslims in the immigrants’ country of origin. This led to unreliable statistics for Iraqi, Iranian, Somali and Afghan migrants. In 2005 and 2006, a new methodology was introduced that was based upon selfidentification surveys.3 This has led to a new assessment of the number of Muslims in the Netherlands. According to the 2007 figures, there are 857,000 Muslims of whom 318,000 are Turkish-Dutch, 297,000 are Moroccan-Dutch, and 12,000 native Dutch converts.4 1 Martijn de Koning is a post-doc researcher at Radboud University in Nijmegen, the Netherlands. He has studied anthropology and his research focuses on Islamic movements, public religion and Muslim youth. In 2008, he defended his PhD on “Searching for a ‘true’ Islam: Religious beliefs and identity formation among Moroccan-Dutch youth”. 2 Phalet, Karen and Jessika Ter Wal, Moslim in Nederland (Muslim in the Netherlands) (The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004). 3 Herten, Marieke van and Ferdy Otten, “Naar een nieuwe schatting van het aantal islamieten in Nederland (Towards a new estimation of the number of Muslims in the Netherlands)”, Bevolkingstrends, 2007, pp. 48–57. 4 Statistics Netherlands, http://www.cbs.nl/nl-NL/menu/themas/vrije-tijd-cultuur/

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Besides Sunni Muslims, there are also Shi’is, Alevis and Ahmadis in the Netherlands. The Shi’i Muslims are mainly part of the Iranian diaspora, but it should be noted that they often have a secular outlook with little sympathy for the Islamic regime in Iran.5 The Alevi Muslims form an important section of the Turkish-Kurdish community. Among the Surinamese Muslims, the Ahmadi-Lahore community is well represented and very active, with its own mosques and national organisation and very sympathetic press reviews which present them as ‘liberal’ Muslims. Turkish migrants are also divided along other lines: the Milli Görü movement, the Nurçu and the Suleymançis all have strong networks in Dutch society. Most Muslims live in the west of the Netherlands, in the migrant-areas of the so-called Randstad area: Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and Utrecht. Several smaller cities in the east and the south also have relatively large Muslim populations (usually with either MoroccanDutch or Turkish-Dutch Muslims dominating), because of the labour intensive industries that used to operate there. Since 1986, non-nationals have voting rights in municipal elections if they have been legally resident in the Netherlands for five or more years. The migrant turn-out rates at municipal elections are very diverse. The turn-out of immigrants in Rotterdam has increased in every election since 1994, while in Amsterdam it declined between 1994 and 1998 but seems to have recovered in 2006.6 The Hague has one Islamic party, the Islam-Democraten (Islam-Democrats,ID), represented on the municipal council. However, Muslim organisations have been involved in trying to protect specific rights, such as the wearing of headscarves by women and the establishment of Islamic schools.7 publicaties/artikelen/archief/2007/2007-2278-wm.htm, accessed 10 March 2009. For more on converts in the Netherlands, see Nieuwkerk, Karin van, “Gender, conversion, and Islam: A comparison of online and offline conversion narratives”, in Nieuwkerk, K. van (ed.), Women Embracing Islam: Gender and Conversion in the West (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006), pp. 95–120. 5 Hessels, Thomas, Iraniërs in Nederland, een profiel (Iranians in the Netherlands, a profile) (The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2002), available at http://www.justitie.nl/images/Iraniers_in_Nederland_tcm74-38879_tcm34-18120.pdf, accessed 10 March 2009; Ghorashi, Halleh, Ways to Survive, Battles to Win: Iranian Women Exiles in the Netherlands and the US (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 2001). 6 Heelsum, Anja van, “Turn out and party choice in the local elections in the Netherlands”, 2006, available at http://users.fmg.uva.nl/avanheelsum/paperelections2006 .pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 7 Koning, Martijn de, “Understanding the ‘others’: Salafi politics in the Netherlands”, in Boubekeur, Amel and Olivier Roy (eds), Whatever Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam (London: Hurst, forthcoming).

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Islam and the State

The Netherlands does not have a state religion nor does it have a policy of officially recognising religious denominations. However, the relationship between the Dutch state and religion has always been characterised by extensive involvement of the state with religious expression in public life. In 1917, for example, the settlement of the ‘education struggle’ meant the passage of Article 23 of the Dutch Constitution, establishing complete state funding for schools with a religious (Christian) identity, while safeguarding the freedom of those schools to determine their curricula. With this settlement, the foundation for what is known as the Dutch ‘pillarisation’ (verzuiling) was laid.8 Under this system, society was deeply divided into distinct and mutually antagonistic religious and ideological groups. Because of overarching cooperation at the elite level, and by allowing each group as much autonomy as possible, a stable democracy was made possible.9 Muslim immigrants were able to make use of the remnants of the ‘pillar’ model according to which religious organisations were still considered to be a legitimate form of representation and community organisation. Muslims have the same right as other religious groups and, if they rely on the same principles as those applied to other religious groups, such as Christians, they can achieve recognition for their claims (although often after considerable struggle). However, the gradual shift in the Netherlands towards a more secularised society from the 1960s on has led to the emergence of opinion makers and politicians defending the secular outlook of Dutch society, making ‘secular’ not only a descriptive term but also a normative way of referring to part of identity politics in Dutch society. In recent years, Islam has become increasingly politicised, affecting relations with the state in the public arena. In particular, the rise of the populist leader Pim Fortuyn in 2001 and 2002 contributed to making a hard line position on Islam more salient.10 Instead of pacifying Islam,

8 Kennedy, James and Markha Valenta, “Religious pluralism and the Dutch state: Reflections on the future of article 23”, in Donk, W.B.H.J. van de, A.P. Jonkers, G.J. Kronjee and R.J.J.M. Plum (eds), Geloven in het publieke domein: Verkenningen van een dubbele transformatie (Religiosity in the public domain: Explorations of a double transformation) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), pp. 337–338. 9 Lijphart, A., The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). 10 Sniderman, Paul M. and Louk Hagendoorn, When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and its Discontents in the Netherlands (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

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several opinion leaders such as Ayaan Hirsi Ali argued for a more confrontational style in the public Islam debate, by claiming the right to insult Muslims’ religious convictions and feelings, for example, and, together with director Theo Van Gogh, made the film Submission I.11 Hirsi Ali received numerous death threats and lived in hiding for several weeks after van Gogh’s murder. Muslims’ attempts to participate in public life have become increasingly difficult after 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh, with controversies over the building of large mosques in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the wearing of niqab, and other issues that are seen as symbols of the Islamisation of the public life. This has not, however, led to policy measures forbidding the building of large mosques.12 3


There have been several attempts by both Muslims and the Dutch to establish a single representative body for all Muslims in Netherlands. Most of them have failed because of internal religious differences among Sunni and Shi’a Muslims and between Sunni and Ahmadiyya Muslims, and because the Dutch authorities have refused to cooperate with such attempts, considering them not representative enough of the entire Muslim population. After several incidents in which imams gave controversial opinions about homosexuality, for example, and in particular after the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 by a Moroccan-Dutch Muslim, the pressure from the Dutch state on Muslim organisations to unite under one umbrella grew significantly. First, the Contact Moslims Overheid (Muslim Contact Agency, CMO, Koninginnegracht 63, 2514 AG Den Haag, Postbus 85518, 2508 CE Den Haag, http://www.cmoweb.nl) was established but the Turkish and Moroccan Sunni organisations excluded the Ahmadiyya organisations. The CMO unites five Turkish organisations: Islamitische Stichting Nederland (Islamic Foundation Netherlands, ISN, Javastraat 2, 2585 AM Den Haag, www .diyanet.nl), Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie (Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation, TICF, Afrikaanderplein 40, 3072 EC Rotterdam, www.ticf.nl), 11 Leeuw, M. de and S. van Wichelen, “ ‘Please, Go Wake Up!’ Submission, Hirsi Ali, and the ‘war on terror’ in the Netherlands”, Feminist Media Studies, vol. 5, no. 3 (2005), pp. 325–340. 12 Maussen, Marcel, “Constructing mosques. The governance of Islam in France and the Netherlands”, PhD thesis, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, 2009.

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both sections of the Milli Görü movement, and the Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland (Foundation Islamic Centre the Netherlands, SICN Suleymanci, Van Lieflandlaan 3, 3571 AA Utrecht, www.sicn.nl). The CMO also includes the Unie van Marokkaanse Moskee Organisaties Nederland (Union of Moroccan Mosque Organizations The Netherlands, UMMON, Weesperzijde 74, 1091 EH Amsterdam, Postbus 94384), the SurinameseHindustani World Islamic Mission (WIM, Iqra Moskee, Hoogoord 257, 1102 CN Amsterdam, www.wimnet.org, www.worldislamicmission.nl), and the Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging (Sjiite Association, OSV,—mainly Iraqi Shi’a, Postbus 1113, 3260 AC Oud-Beijerland, www.shiaparlement .com). These organisations claim to represent 369 mainly Sunni mosques and about 500,000 Muslims. Later the Contact Groep Islam (Contact Group Islam, CGI, Paul Krugerlaan 16, 2571 HK’s-Gravenhage) was established, which included Sunni, Shi’a and Ahmadiyya Muslims, together with the Nederlandse Moslim Raad (Dutch Muslim Council, NMR)—a national Sunni organisation, Ahmadiyya Muslims and Alevi Muslims. The CMO and the CGI now both function as representative bodies and take part in regular meetings with the Dutch Minister of Integration and Immigration. The Dutch government consults and informs these organisations about their plans in this way. During the debate about Geert Wilders’ film Fitna, the CMO and CGI and their various member organisations played an important role in establishing dialogue between Muslims and Dutch civil society organisations and with local and national authorities. However, the CMO, CGI and their member organisations do not have much credibility among Muslim youth who regard them as cliques of first generation men and see them as too compliant with the Dutch government and anti-Islam politicians.13 There are several other national organisations including Al Nisa, the national organisation of Muslim women in the Netherlands (Stichting Al Nisa, Postbus 9, 3500 AA Utrecht, http://www.alnisa.nl), and the Vereniging van Imams in Nederland (VIN—Association of Imams in The Netherlands), which has 110 members, mostly of Moroccan descent 13 Koning, Martijn de, Zoeken naar een ‘zuivere’ islam: Geloofsbeleving en identiteitsvorming van jonge Marokkaans-Nederlandse moslims (Searching for a ‘Pure’ Islam: Religious Beliefs and Identity Construction of Young Moroccan-Dutch Muslims) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2008); Ketner, Susan, Marokkaanse wortels, Nederlandse grond: Exploratie, bindingen en identiteitsstrategieën van jongeren van Marokkaanse afkomst (Moroccan Roots, Dutch Soil: Exploration, Belonging and Identity Strategies of Youth of Moroccan Descent) (Groningen: Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 2008).

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(Van der Vennestraat 20, 2525 CG Den Haag, www.imamonline.nl). Both are Sunni. Hizb ut Tahrir (www.kalifaat.org) aims at uniting Muslims in one state and reviving the caliphate, but does not seem to be a strong organisation, although they do get a lot of exposure because of particular actions, such as the campaigns against Geert Wilders’ film Fitna. Stichting Islamitische Comité van Ahlu-Sunnah (Foundation Islamic Committee of Ahlu Sunnah) is a Salafi foundation including As Soennah Mosque in The Hague (As Soennah Mosque, Fruitweg 5–9, 2525 KE Den Haag, www .al-yaqeen.com) and El Tawheed Mosque in Amsterdam (El Tawheed Mosque, Jan Hanzenstr. 114, 1053 SV Amsterdam, www.eltawheed.nl). Together with other Salafi networks these organisations have become the most important targets of counter-radicalisation.14 4


The general policy framework regarding mosques is usually set by the state, but its execution is a local matter and this means that there are big differences between municipalities. For example, some municipalities have funded social and cultural activities run by mosques whereas in other cities such activities receive no funds.15 Plans to build large mosques in Rotterdam and Amsterdam have caused much debate.16 14 NCTb (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorisme bestrijding (National Coordinator Counterterrorism)), Salafisme in Nederland (Salafism in the Netherlands) (Den Haag: Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding, 2008); AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service)), Violent jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat (Den Haag: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, 2006); Koning, Martijn de, “Changing worldviews and friendship: An exploration of the life stories of two female Salafists in the Netherlands,” in Meijer, Roel (ed.), Global Salafism: Islam’s New Religious Movement (London: Hurst, 2009), pp. 372–392; Buijs, Frank, Froukje Demant, and Atef Hamdy, Strijders van eigen bodem: Radicale en democratische moslims in Nederland (Home grown warriors: Radical and democratic Muslims in the Netherlands) (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006). 15 Landman, Nico, Van mat tot minaret: De institutionalisering van de islam in Nederland (From Rug to Minaret: The Institutionalization of Islam in the Netherlands), Amsterdam: VU Uitgeverij; Koning, Martijn de, “Institutionele grenzen. De hulpverlening van RCJ/Het Woonhuis en moskee Nour (Institutional boundaries. The social work of RCJ/Het Woonhuis and the An Nour mosque)”, Sociale Interventie, vol. 11 (2002), pp. 5–14. 16 Roose, Eric, “50 years of mosque architecture in the Netherlands”, Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies, vol. 8, no. 5 (2005), pp. 1–46; Landman, Nico and Wendy Wessels, “The visibility of mosques in Dutch towns”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2005), pp. 1125–1140; Maussen, Marcel, Making Muslim Presence Meaningful: Studies

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Resistance to mosques seems to be largely unrelated to the kind of mosque that is planned. Features such as the minaret or the call to prayer are negotiable and restrictions are usually already taken into account in the initial plans.17 Of the 453 mosques in the Netherlands, 245 are affiliated to Turkish organisations (particularly Diyanet with 140 mosques, the Milli Görü with 35 mosques and the Suleymancis with 38 mosques). The second group are 150 mosques organised by Muslims of Moroccan descent. The Surinamese community has 25 mosques controlled by the World Islamic Mission, which has its headquarters in Bradford, UK, and is led by Shah Ahmad Noorani Siddiqi. These mosques have a Hanafi Barelvi orientation. In the past they have been hostile to the Ahmadiyya Muslims (also mainly of Surinamese descent), who have five mosques. Other communities, such as the Somalis, have also established their own organisations and have 62 mosques.18 5


There are 41 Islamic schools that are part of the public education system: two are secondary schools and the others are primary schools. This is 0.6% of all primary schools in the Netherlands with a total of 7,500 pupils (0.5% of all the pupils in the Netherlands or 5% of all the pupils of immigrant origin in the Netherlands). Like public schools and all other schools established by religious groups, these schools are funded by the state and come completely under the Dutch system of freedom of education and financial equality between confessional schools and public schools. The Islamic character of the schools is evident in an Islamic ethos such as Islamic instruction courses, Muslim festivals, prayer rooms and so on. The school curriculum is the same as in other confessional and public schools. There have been reports by the Ministry of Education for several years now about problems in Islamic schools on Islam and Mosques in Western Europe, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research working papers series (Amsterdam: ASSR, 2005); Lindo, Flip, Heilige wijsheid in Amsterdam: Ayasofia stadsdeel De Baarsjes en de strijd om het Riva terrein (Sacred Wisdom in Amsterdam: Ayasofia City area De Baarsjes and the Struggle for the Riva Terrain) (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1999); Sunier, Thijl, “The Western mosque: Space in physical place”, ISIM [Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World] Review, no. 18 (2006), pp. 22–23. 17 Sunier, “The Western mosque”; Landman and Wessels, “The visibility of mosques”. 18 Douwes, Dick, Martijn de Koning and Welmoet Boender, Nederlandse moslims. Van migrant tot burger (Dutch Muslims: From Migrant to Citizen) (Amsterdam: Salomé/ Amsterdam University Press, 2005).

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with regard to the educational regime and in some cases problems with anti-integration content and suspicions of financial mismanagement.19 6


There are two Islamic (Sunni) universities, the Islamic University of Rotterdam (associated with the Gülen movement) and the European Islamic University (also in Rotterdam), but they are not officially recognised as universities. After long discussions between Muslim organisations and the Dutch state, two mainstream academic centres for imam training were established in 2005: the Centre for Islamic Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Free University (VU) University Amsterdam, and the Theology Department of the University of Leiden.20 The Institute for Higher Vocational Studies in Amsterdam has its own vocational degree (HBO) programme for teacher training. All of the institutions cooperate with the national umbrella organisations, the CMO and CGI. Academic courses on Islamic and/or Middle East studies are given at Utrecht University, Leiden University, University of Amsterdam and Radboud University Nijmegen. Several universities, such as VU University Amsterdam and Radboud University, have set up their own institutes for religious studies. Besides the two Islamic universities, Muslims have also set up several other institutes for higher learning, such as the Sunni Dar al Ilm in Amsterdam and Al Islah in Lochem (affiliated to Tabligh Jama’at). It is not clear how many people follow courses in these institutes. These courses are intended for people who want to increase their knowledge of Islamic traditions and use it in their personal lives.

19 Driessen, Geert and M.S. Merry, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Expansion or marginalization”, Interchange, vol. 27, no. 3 (2006), pp. 201–223; Driessen, Geert and P. Valkenberg, “Islamic schools in the Netherlands: Compromising between identity and quality”, British Journal of Religious Education, vol. 23, no. 1 (2000), pp. 15–26 20 Landman, Nico, Imamopleiding in Nederland: Kansen en Knelpunten. Eindrapportage van een terreinverkenning in opdracht van het Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschappen (Imam Education in the Netherlands: Opportunities and Bottlenecks. Final Report of an Exploratory Study on Behalf of the Ministery of Education, Culture and Sciences) (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 1996); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Islamic religious education in the Netherlands”, European Education, vol. 38, no. 2 (2006), pp. 76–88. Boender, Welmoet, Imam in Nederland: Opvattingen over zijn religieuze rol in de samenleving (Imam in the Netherlands: Opinions about his Role in Society) (Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 2007).

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In 1991 the Wet op de Lijkbezorging (Law on Disposal of the Dead) was adjusted in order to allow Muslims to bury their dead within 24 hours and without a coffin.21 There are about 70 Islamic cemeteries, usually taking up part of public cemeteries. Many burial funds exist whose purpose is to help with the repatriation of the bodies of the dead for burial in their home countries. With the numbers of elderly Muslims on the increase, it is to be expected that there will be a need for more burial places in the future. The Stichting Islamitisch Begrafeniswezen (Foundation of Islamic Funeral Services, IBW, www.stichtingibw.nl) provides information on Islamic burials and lobbies for more burial sites. 8


There are Muslim chaplains ( geestelijk verzorgers) in the Dutch army, several hospitals, prisons and homes for the elderly. Several universities have their own prayer rooms for Muslims, paid for by the universities. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are widely celebrated within Muslim circles. ‘Id al-Fitr has in recent years become a public event since most mosques have opened their doors to celebrate the iftar meal with non-Muslims. Several of these iftar events take place under the umbrella of the Ramadan Festival. The Ramadan Festival is a series of lectures, debates, music events and so on, coupled with the iftar meal. There have been several discussions about making ‘Id al-Fitr a national holiday, but there are as yet no serious plans to implement this. The different dates of ‘Id for the various Muslim ethnic groups make it difficult to set one date for a national holiday and some political parties strongly oppose these plans, labeling them as the ‘(self-)islamisation of Dutch society’.

21 Dessing, Nathal M., Rituals of Birth, Circumcision, Marriage and Death among Muslims in the Netherlands (Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001).

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Halal Food

Almost every city with a Muslim minority has at least one or two halal butchers’ shops. The total number is not clear, but the butchers’ trade association estimates that there are about 3,500 butchers shops in the country, of which 10% are halal butchers. Under Dutch law, animals must be rendered unconscious before being slaughtered, but exceptions are made for Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter. This is opposed by some political parties and animal rights groups. There are many shops selling halal food and restaurants offering halal food. Several of the larger supermarket chains have special shelves with halal products. There have been attempts to produce a single certification for halal food, but they have not so far been successful and there are currently a variety of certifications, such as Halal Voeding en Voedsel (Halal Feed and Food Inspection Authority, HVV/HFFIA, Postbus 16786, 2500 BT Den Haag, www.halal.nl) and Halal Correct Certification (HCC active in the Netherlands and France, P.B. 179, 2300 AD Leiden, www.halalcorrect.com). 11

Dress Codes

The headscarf is an important issue in public debate and with regard to Muslim women’s religiosity and identity.22 Muslim girls and women are allowed to wear hijab in public schools. Apart from the police force and law court officials, the headscarf is allowed in public institutions (including for lawyers) and companies. Under certain conditions, Christian

22 Buitelaar, Marjo, “Negotiating the rules of chaste behaviour: re-interpretations of the symbolic complex of virginity by young women of Moroccan descent in the Netherlands”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 25, no. 3 (2002), pp. 462–489; Duits, Linda and Liesbeth Van Zoonen, “Headscarves and porno-chic: Disciplining girls’ bodies in the European multicultural society”, European Journal of Women’s Studies, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006), pp. 103–117; Hirsi Ali, Ayaan, The Caged Virgin: An Emancipation Proclamation for Women and Islam (Detroit, MI: Free Press, 2006); Bartels, Edien, ‘Eén dochter is beter dan duizend zonen’: Arabische vrouwen, symbolen en machtsverhoudingen tussen de sexen (‘One daughter is better than a thousand sons’: Arabic women, symbols and power constellations between the sexes) (Utrecht: Jan van Arkel, 1993); Bartelink, Yvon, Vrouwen over Islam: Geloofsvoorstellingen en—praktijken van Marokkaanse migrantes in Nederland (Brabant) (Women on Islam: Beliefs and Practices of Moroccan Female Migrants in the Netherlands—Brabant) (Nijmegen: Katholieke Universiteit, 1994); Shadid, W.A.R. and P.S. Van Koningsveld, “Muslim dress in Europe: Debates on the headscarf ”, Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 16, no. 1 (2005), pp. 35–61.

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schools may forbid the wearing of hijab by pupils and staff. There are cases of women who have been refused jobs because of wearing a headscarf. The Commission for Equal Treatment usually regards these practices as unlawful. The decisions made by the commission are not binding; they are to be seen as advice based upon its interpretation of the law. In recent years, the headscarf issue has been linked with concerns over social cohesion, integration and national identity.23 There have been discussions about dress codes pertaining to women wearing niqab or the burka. There are plans to ban both from school campuses, and staff in state education institutions are not allowed to wear them. 12


There are two Islamic broadcasting companies: Nederlandse Moslimomroep (NMO, Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company, Postbus 418, 1200 AK Hilversum, www.nmo.nl) and Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep (NIO, Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Company, Sumatralaan 45 1217GP Hilversum, www.nioweb.nl). They are both so-called ‘39f-broadcasters’, meaning that the state has allocated time to specific religious institutions based upon their (estimated) constituency. There are several small circulation magazines, such as the Al Nisa Maandblad (Al Nisa Monthly, www.alnisa.nl), produced by the Al Nisa women’s organization, which also publishes Anti Wa Anta, a quarterly magazine for children and As Siraata (for young women over sixteen). Wij Moslims (We Muslims) is published by Momtazah Publishers, one of the publishing agencies in the Netherlands that also produce books about Islam in Arabic, English and Dutch. There are bookstores, such as Boekhandel Nour (Bookstore Nour) and Islam Boeken (Islam Books, www .islam-boeken.nl), which sells books on the internet, as do several others. Time Media Group (related to the Fethullah Gülen Movement) publishes Zaman Nederland (www.zamanhollanda.nl), is a free monthly newspaper distributed among researchers, universities, Islamic institutions, policy makers and so on. The Ahmadiyya branch has its own monthly magazine, Al-Islaam (www.ahmadiyya-islam.nl). Hizb ut Tahrir publishes Expliciet (Explicit, www.expliciet.nl) four times a year.

23 Saharso, Sawitri and Doutje Lettinga, “Contentious citizenship: Policies and debates on the veil in the Netherlands”, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, vol. 15, no. 4 (2008), pp. 455–480.

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There are several mailing lists, discussion sites and sites from mosques on the internet. One of the best known Dutch weblogs is Wij Blijven Hier (We are here to stay, www.wijblijvenhier.nl) and another important meeting place for discussions about Islam and Muslims is Marokko.nl (www.marokko.nl).24 13

Family Law

Dutch family law does not allow individuals to settle disagreements or make particular arrangements without judicial consent. There are no demands by Muslims for the establishment of Islamic family law for Muslims. So-called ‘informal marriages’ take place, which are not sanctioned by law. Although no imam is required under Islamic law for a marriage to be contracted, it has come about in the Netherlands that imams, particularly Salafi imams, play a central role. Since these marriage contracts are not recognised by law, there is no right to alimony in the case of separation, and people do not automatically inherit if one of the spouses dies. Polygamy is not recognised by law, although it has happened that polygamous marriages contracted outside the Netherlands have been registered. If a polygamist wishes to acquire Dutch citizenship and nationality, he must divorce all his wives but one. It is possible for couples to record their relationship in a contract witnessed by a notary as a so-called ‘co-habitation agreement’ which in theory leaves open the possibility for multiple partners. It is possible to deal with inheritance in the same way, by registering a will.25 14


The film Fitna made by the populist anti-Islam and anti-establishment politician Geert Wilders attracted much international attention. The

24 Brouwer, Lenie, “Dutch-Muslims on the Internet: A new discussion platform”, Journal of Muslim Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–55; Koning, Martijn de, Identity in Transition. Connecting Online and Offline Internet Practices of Moroccan-Dutch Muslim Youth (London: London Metropolitan University, Institute for the Study of European Transformations (ISET), 2008), available at http://www.londonmet.ac.uk/londonmet/library/c52116_3 .pdf, accessed 10 March 2009. 25 Berger, Maurits, “Sharia in Nederland is vaak keurig Nederlands”, Mens en Maatschappij (People and society), vol. 57, no. 6 (2007), pp. 507–510; Dessing, Rituals of birth, circumcision, marriage and death; Dessing, Nathal M., “An Islamic wedding in a Dutch living room”, ISIM Newsletter, no. 31 (2002).

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film was meant to be a complaint against the Qur’an which, according Wilders, is a fascist book that incites believers to violence and hatred. Wilders is one of the most outspoken Dutch politicians on issues concerning security, immigration, the EU and matters related to Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands. He has warned against a ‘tsunami of Islamisation’ as a result of leniency towards Islam and the demands made by Islamic organisations and has proposed a ban on the Qur’an (comparing it to Hitler’s Mein Kampf ). Three themes have dominated the debate: the right to freedom of speech, the anxiety that angry Muslims might react violently to the film, and Fitna as a form of blasphemy or insult. Wilders’ Popular People’s Party (PVV) and the Conservative Liberal Party (VVD) have initiated a debate about women wearing the burka or niqab. They are seen as a sign of lack of integration (or even refusal to integrate), demeaning to women, and a threat to safety in the public domain. 15


The most important cultural event is the Ramadan Festival held throughout the country during the month of Ramadan (www.ramadanfestival.nl).

NORWAY Christine M. Jacobsen and Oddbjørn Leirvik1 1

Muslim Populations

The first wave of immigration from Muslim countries to Norway arrived at the beginning of the 1970s. Although a general ban on labour immigration was introduced in 1975, family reunification and the continuing influx of refugees and immigrants have made for a steady growth in the Muslim population. In 1980, only 1,000 out of around 10,000 immigrants had registered as members in a Muslim organisation. In 1990, the number of registered Muslims had risen to 19,000 out of an estimated total of 36,000 immigrants with a Muslim background. Recent estimates (2007) indicate that more than 150,000 Norwegian residents have a Muslim background. This means that Muslims (according to the widest definition) constituted 3% of a total population of 4.6 million.2 In 2008, 83,600 people (i.e., some 55% of those with a Muslim background) had signed up as members of a Muslim organisation. Approximately half of these are resident in Oslo, which means that about 6%–7% of Oslo’s population (560,000) are now members of a Muslim organisation. A survey among youth in Oslo, conducted in 2006 among pupils in 9th, 10th and 11th grades, showed that 17.6%

1 Christine M. Jacobsen is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Oslo, and a researcher with IMER (International Migration and Ethnic Relations) at Unifob Global. She holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from the University of Bergen, and has researched and published on Muslims in France and Norway. Oddbjørn Leirvik is Professor of Interreligious Studies at the Faculty of Theology, Univesity of Oslo. He has specialised in the field of Islam and ChristianMuslim relations, and his publications include Human Conscience and Muslim-Christian Relations: Modern Egyptian Thinkers on al-damir (London: Routledge, 2006). 2 These figures are based on estimates that consider immigration statistics in relation to the percentage of Muslims in a given country of emigration. Statistics of this kind are highly problematic for a number of reasons, not least because they are increasingly made the basis of competing political arguments. For updated statistics about Islam in Norway, see the website edited by Oddbjørn Leirvik: “Islam i Norge. Oversikt, med bibliografi” (http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html). This page also contains an updated bibliography of relevant studies and research on Muslims in Norway.

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gave Islam as their religion, up from 13.2% in 1996.3 Among those Muslims who first came as migrant labourers and later experienced family reunification and growth in Norway, by far the most numerous group are those with a Pakistani background, who in 2006 amounted to 28,000. In the same year, Turks numbered 14,000 and Moroccans 7,000. Among those who came as refugees and asylum seekers, Iraqis (20,000) and Somalis (18,000) were the most numerous in 2006, followed by Bosnians (15,000), Iranians (14,000) and Kosovo-Albanians (10,000).4 Converts constitute a small percentage (approximately 1.5%) of the Muslim community.5 The entire spectrum of Pakistani (Barelwi, Deobandi, etc.)6 and Turkish (Diyanet, Süleymanci, Milli Görüs) Islamic traditions is now well established, whereas the Bosnians and the Somalis represent radically different popular traditions.7 In 2006, 27% of Muslim respondents said in a Gallup opinion poll that they attended ‘religious ceremonies together with others’ on a monthly basis or more frequently, while 31% stated that they never took part in such activities.8 In a different survey of the frequency of attending religious meetings organised by faith communities, Pakistanis reported an average of 31, Somalis 25 and Turks 23 times a year, whereas the corresponding figure reported by Iraqis were 7 and for Bosnians and Iranians 2.9

3 Øia, Tormod and Viggo Vestel, “Møter i det flerkulturelle (Multicultural encounters)”, NOVA Rapport 21/07, pp. 162f. 4 These figures refer to country background and not to citizenship. Statistics Norway includes both people who themselves migrated to Norway and their children, regardless of their actual citizenship. Acquisition of Norwegian citizenship is regulated by a law of 2006 (www.udi.no/templates/Tema.aspx?id=7394). 5 Roald, Anne Sofie, New Muslims in the European Context: The Experience of Scandinavian Converts (Leiden: Brill, 2004). 6 See for instance Ahlberg, Nora, New Challenges —Old Strategies: Themes of Variation and Conflict among Pakistani Muslims in Norway (Helsinki: Finnish Anthropological Society, 1990). 7 For an overview of various tendencies, see Vogt, Kari, Islam på norsk (Islam in Norwegian) (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008 [2000]). 8 “TV2, Holdninger til integrasjon og internasjonale konflikter blant muslimer i Norge og den norske befolkningen generelt (Attitudes towards integration and international conflicts among Muslims in Norway and the Norwegian population in general)” (Oslo: TNS Gallup, Politikk & Samfunn, April 2006), available at http://pub.tv2.no/multimedia/TV2/ archive/00248/TNS_Gallup_-_muslim_248757a.pdf, accessed 25 May 2009. 9 Statistics Norway (SSB), “Levekår blant innvandrere i Norge 2005–2006 (Living conditions among immigrants in Norway)”, SSB Rapport 2008/5. The survey was based on interviews with 3,053 non-Western immigrants and descendents of immigrants.

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Islam and the State

Norway is a social-democratic welfare state with a state church whose status in the Constitution (where Evangelical Lutheran Christianity is stated as the public religion of the state) is currently being reviewed. Since the 1960s, religious pluralism has been increasingly accommodated, and a 1964 supplement to the Constitution guarantees that “All inhabitants of the Realm shall enjoy free exercise of religion.” The Lutheran Church of Norway, which comprises 83% of the population, retains a dominant public position, and is almost fully financed from the public purse (including salaries for priests and much of the running costs for the parishes, including maintenance of buildings). Under compensatory measures introduced in 1969, every faith and (from 1981) life stance community that registers itself is entitled to public funding, including registered Islamic organisations.10 3

Main Muslim Organsiations

The Islamic Council of Norway (Pb. 658 Sentrum, 0106 Oslo, tel: +4722357613, email: [email protected], www.irn.no), founded 22 October 1993, is the umbrella-organisation comprising the majority of Sunni Muslim congregations. An invitation from the Church of Norway to set up a Contact Group between Christian and Muslim leaders in Norway played some part in this process.11 As of 2008, it comprised the majority of Sunni Muslim congregations in Norway (according to the web-page around 40 member organisations, totalling more than 60,000 members). The political authorities have gradually established regular communication with the Islamic Council (as with other established faith communities and their umbrella organisations), and since 2007 the Council has also received a financial grant from the government which enables the Council to pay a full-time general secretary. In addition to its function as an ecumenical body for intra-Muslim consultation, the Islamic Council is a co-founder of the Council for Religious and Registration is easy and does not require a minimum number of members. See for instance Leirvik, Oddbjørn, Religionspluralisme: Mangfald, konflikt og dialog i Norge (Religious pluralism. Diversity, conflict and dialogue in Norway) (Oslo: Pax, 2007), and “Christian-Muslim relations in a state church situation: Politics of religion and interfaith dialogue”, in Malik, Jamal (ed.), Muslims in Europe: From the Margin to the Centre (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2004), pp. 101–114. 10

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Life Stance Communities (www.trooglivssyn.no) in which all the major religious communities in Norway as well as the Humanist Association participate. Through the interfaith council and sometimes directly, it is regularly consulted by the government in matters pertaining to the politics of religion. The Council is also an active and visible participant in public debates about religion and society in Norway. Transnational movements such as Tabligh-i-Jamaat, and the Muslim Brotherhood, several different Shi’ite groups, and a small but active Ahmadiyya community also have a presence. Since the mid-1990s, separate youth and students’ as well as women’s organisations have been formed, largely independent of national background.12 4


The varieties of Norwegian Islam are evident in different kinds of adapted architecture.13 Most of the 40 or so Muslim prayer locations in Oslo are in converted flats, factories or office premises, but three are purpose-built mosques, all of them established Norwegian-Pakistani organisations. There have been no major problems with permissions. There are no purpose-built mosques outside Oslo, but there are numerous prayer locations in other cities and towns throughout the country (with concentrations in cities such as Stavanger, Kristiansand and Drammen). In 2006, the total number of registered Muslim congregations was 120. 5


Private schools are relatively few in Norway, and took in only around 2.2% of primary school pupils in 2006 (up from 1.7% in 2000), which reflects the extraordinary strength of the ‘one school for all’ system (enhetsskolen). The Urtehagen Foundation runs a couple of Muslim kindergartens in Oslo, but there are currently no Muslim private schools. 12 See for instance Jacobsen, Christine M., Tilhørighetens mange former: Unge muslimer i Norge (The many forms of belonging: young Muslims in Norway) (Oslo: Unipax, 2002), and Jacobsen, Christine M., “Religiosity of young Muslims in Norway: The quest for authenticity”, in Cesari, Jocelyne and Sean McLoughlin, European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate 2005), pp. 155–168. 13 Naguib, Saphinaz-Amal, Mosques in Norway: The Creation and Iconography of Sacred Space (Oslo: Novus forlag (Institue for Comparative Research in Human Culture), 2001).

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Most mosques offer some kind of Qur’an instruction.14 In public primary and lower secondary schools, a joint course in religion and ethics was made compulsory for all students in 1997 (called “Knowledge of Christianity with Information about Religions and Life Stances” and from 2002 “Knowledge about Christianity, Religions and Life Stances”).15 Muslims, Jews, Buddhists and secular humanists protested against this because of the strong emphasis on Christianity. After a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights, the government initiated a revision of religious education (renamed “Religion, Life Stances and Ethics”) and of the schools’ traditional statutory statement of Christian purpose. Islam has been given increasing space in the religion and ethics curricula for both primary/lower secondary and upper secondary/high education, in line with its growing presence in Norwegian society. The subjects in question take a historical as well as doctrinal approach to world religions, the ideal being to present each religion on its own terms. Ethics is dealt with as a separate subject. In addition, both the ability to dialogue about religion and ethics and familiarity with modern criticism of religion are stated as competence aims. Any qualified teacher, of any background, may teach religion and ethics. 6 Higher and Professional Education No initiative to establish a national training programme for imams has been taken in Norway, but the University of Oslo has discussed the possibility of establishing a ‘centre for Islamic studies’ and a proposal was presented to the university in 2007 by a committee which included representatives of the Islamic Council. In 2007, the University of Oslo’s Faculty of Theology set up a programme for continuing education for imams, as well as for other religious leaders with a foreign background, under the heading of “Being a religious leader in Norwegian society”. The largest groups in these courses have been imams, but no imams have received their basic training in Norway.16

14 For a discussion of Islamic nurture and education see for instance Østberg, Sissel, Pakistani Children in Norway: Islamic Nurture in a Secular Context, Monograph Series (Leeds: University of Leeds, Community Religions Project, 2003). 15 Cf. the articles by Skeie, Geir, Sissel Østberg and Heid Leganger-Krogstad, in Jackson, Robert (ed.), International Perspectives on Citizenship, Education and Religious Diversity (London: Routledge Falmer, 2003). 16 Leirvik, Oddbjørn, “Islam and education in Norway”, in Aslan, Ednan (ed.),

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Several funeral agencies around the country offer assistance for Muslim funerals. There is also a Muslim funeral agency that provides Muslim funerals in large parts of the country. The Muslim funeral bureau AlKhidmat is a member of the umbrella association the Islamic Council of Norway, which has a funeral working group looking into the issue of Muslim burial sites. Several ordinary undertakers have developed their competence in Islamic (and other religious) burial traditions. In Oslo hospitals, rooms are set aside for the ritual washing. Muslims in Oslo have been allocated burial sites within existing cemeteries. Many Muslim migrants are buried in the country of emigration, but the proportion buried in Norway is increasing as people develop more important and permanent links with Norway.17 8


A study in 200318 concluded that, in spite of the fact that a growing number of prisoners and military personnel either are not members of any religion, or belong to other faiths, the Church of Norway retained its dominant position in military and prison chaplaincies. Up till now, state institutions provide only Christian chaplaincy on a regular basis, although the need to provide chaplaincy also for minority religions has been addressed several times. In prisons, some imams have offered chaplaincy on a voluntary basis, but the Islamic Council in Norway as well as a number of other actors have called for a more permanent structure to offer Friday prayers and religious guidance to inmates. In 2008, the Soldiers’ National Conference (Soldatenes landskonferanse) decided to promote a religiously neutral military and to hire imams in the Field Corps, but this has not been followed up politically. The possibility of employing imams in Norwegian hospitals has also been discussed, but not yet implemented.

Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 301–324. 17 Døving, Cora Alexa, Norsk-pakistanske begravelsesritualer: en migrasjonsstudie (NorwegianPakistani Burial Rituals: A Migration Study) (Oslo: Unipub Forlag, 2007). 18 Furseth, Inger, “Secularization and the role of religion in state institutions”, Social Compass, vol. 50 no. 2 (2003), pp. 191–202.

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Religious Festivals

‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha are celebrated by Muslims throughout Norway. A law of 13 June 1969 guarantees those who are not members of the Norwegian Church two days’ leave from work or school per year on the occasion of religious festivals. No permission to sacrifice animals is given, and some Muslims send their qurban to Muslims in poorer parts of the world through relief organisations. 10

Halal Food

The Islamic Council in Norway has worked actively for a number of years to secure access to halal food for all Muslims in Norway. In cooperation with existing slaughter houses, methods that satisfy both Islamic and Norwegian regulations have been developed, and halal meat (including beef, lamb and chicken) is now available on the Norwegian market. Although halal meat is available in some public institutions (for instance, in state universities), there is still a need to ensure access to halal meat in hospitals, prisons etc. 11

Dress Codes

Occasional calls have been made to ban religious headgear and the niqab from (parts of ) public space, but there are no rules limiting Muslim dress in public or for teachers or pupils in schools. In 2007, a debate occurred over the wearing of niqab in institutions of higher education, but the institutions have so far decided against the need to implement a ban. The right of employees to wear religious headgear is not explicitly regulated by Norwegian law, but nevertheless follows from the dominant interpretation of the Working Environment Act and the Gender Equality Act. The Norwegian Labour Inspectorate defines a refusal to allow religious headgear in the work place as discrimination, and several cases have been reported to the Equality and Discrimination Ombudsman. Hijab has been accommodated in combination with uniforms in the army, the health care system and customs officers, and in a few work places (notably IKEA, the Ullevål University Hospital in Oslo, and Nortura) hijab is now offered as a variation to work uniforms. In 2008/2009 a debate occurred over whether religious headgear should be allowed in combination with uniforms in the police force.

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Some Muslim organisations19 in Norway (including notably the Islamic Information Association, the Islamic Cultural Centre, the Ahmadiyya, and the Idara Minhaj ul-Quran) publish books and leaflets in Norwegian, most of which are translations. The Muslim Student Society has published the magazine Salam (previously Tankevekkende) since 1997 and brochures on various aspects of Islamic beliefs and practice. There are a number of online forums, of which the most significant is www.islam.no, which provides practical information (on prayer times etc.), as well as information on ‘Muslim events’ and a number of Islamic issues, and has a very active discussion forum. Several other mosques and organisations actively use the Internet, and there are also a number of private-initiative blogs and info-pages about Islam. As for national broadcasting, the issue of allowing other religions than Christianity access to broadcast devotional programmes is now being discussed. 13

Family Law

By applying to the Fylkesmann (County Governor), mosques can obtain the right to conduct marriages which are then registered with the City Recorder’s Office (byfogdembete) or the District Court (tingrett). The Norwegian marriage act guarantees the right to divorce, but marriages may still not be seen as dissolved according to religious law or the law in other countries. A controversial 2003 amendment to the marriage act, targeting the problem of so-called ‘limping marriages’,20 introduced a new condition for the conduct of marriages, namely that spouses grant each other equal rights to divorce, a move which upset the Roman Catholic Church. Critics have argued that this amendment will have little practical impact on solving the problem of so-called limping marriages. The possibility has also been discussed of establishing a Shari’a

19 For contact information, see Islam i Norge, http://folk.uio.no/leirvik/tekster/IslamiNorge.html, accessed 25 May 2009. 20 For a discussion of the debates and political processes on ‘limping marriages’ see Ferrari de Carli, Eli, “Muslimske kvinner, haltende ekteskap og skilsmisse: Prosessen rundt politiske initiativ til lovendringer (Muslim women, limping marriages and divorce: The process around political initiatives to change the law)”, Norsk Tidsskrift for Migrasjonsforskning, vol. 9, no. 1 (2008), pp. 5–26, and “Shari’a-råd til diskusjon (Shari’a councils under discussion)”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32, no. 2, (2008), pp. 58–72.

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council or a Muslim divorce council as options for dealing with these issues, but this has met with considerable resistance. Currently, several non-governmental organisations offer counselling on family related conflicts, including limping marriages. Inheritance is regulated by the law of inheritance. Distribution of inheritance can be public or private; in the latter case the heirs themselves agree on a distribution, for example by Islamic principles, but regulations covering minimum inheritance have to be observed. 14


The coverage of issues related to the Muslim population and Islam is quite significant in the Norwegian media. Studies indicate that most of the coverage is problem-oriented and stereotypical. From the mid1990s, most media discussions have focused on women-related issues such as arranged or forced marriages, the question of whether a Muslim woman may marry a non-Muslim man, female genital mutilation, and the headscarf.21 A particularly controversial theme in 2007 and 2008 has been the situation of homosexual Muslims and Islam’s position on homosexuality.22 This issue has partly come to the fore in connection with the gender neutral Marriage Act that was enacted on 1 January 2009, but also reflects a strong focus on gay rights in the general media as well as the emergence of a few gay Muslims who have decided to go public. Another significant debate has been on secularism and public religious expression, partly following a much debated essay about ‘secular extremism’ which was published by a young Muslim in one of the mainline newspapers. Muslims representing a variety of positions increasingly initiate and participate in public debate. Among the general public, inclusive attitudes compete with mounting anxiety with regard to Islam and Muslims. In 2007, a liberal think-tank launched a report23 based on a survey conducted by Gallup to find out what the general public thought

21 For a discussion of debates on gender and Islam in Norway see, for example, Roald, Anne Sofie, Er muslimske kvinner undertrykt? (Are Muslim Women Oppressed?) (Oslo: Pax, 2005). 22 Gressgård, Randi and Christine M. Jacobsen, “Krevende tolerance; Islam og homoseksualitet. (Demanding tolerance: Islam and homosexuality”, Tidsskrift for Kjønnsforskning, vol. 32 no. 2 (2008), pp. 22–39. 23 Rapport/Report 02/2007: Hva vet vi om hverandre? (What do we know about each other?), Martin E. Sandbu for Liberalt Laboratorium, October 2007.

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Norwegian Muslims’ attitudes would be on a number of ethical, social and political issues. According to the think-tank, the survey demonstrated that most people think that Muslims are less liberal and less positive towards integration than a survey (conducted by TV2 the previous year) had shown them to be. The report and its results were criticised on a number of methodological and political grounds. According to another survey, underlying the so-called ‘Integration barometer’ (IMDi 2007),24 eight out of ten respondents thought that the authorities should not further facilitate Muslim religious practices in Norwegian society. Half of the respondents opposed the building of mosques, and a clear majority the wearing of headscarves in public. Several dimensions in the ‘Integration barometer’ point towards a growth in negative attitudes towards Muslims. In the 2008 report European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, Norway was for the first time urged to take action against mounting Islamophobia. The report strongly recommends that the Norwegian authorities monitor the situation as concerns Islamophobia in Norway and take swift action to counter any such manifestations as necessary. It encourages the Norwegian authorities to cooperate with representatives of the Muslim communities of Norway in order to find solutions to specific issues of their concern.25

15


Since 2007, the Islamic Cultural Centre has staged an annual Eid Mela (festival) attracting around 5,000 visitors. The event includes food, exhibition stalls, children’s activities, and concerts featuring popular nasheed (Islam-oriented songs) artists. There is also a yearly ‘multicultural’ Mela featuring music styles and artists from around the world.

24 IMDi Rapport/Report 7/2007, Integreringsbarometeret 2006, Om befolkningens holdninger til integrerings- og mangfoldsspørsmål (Integration barometer 2006, On the population’s attitudes to questions concerning integration and diversity). 25 ECRI Report on Norway, 2008 (published 2009), paragraphs 91–92, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Norway/NORCbC-IV-2009-004-ENG.pdf, accessed 25 May 2009.

POLAND Agata S. Nalborczyk and Stanisław GrodΩ1 1

Muslim Populations

The presence of Muslims in Poland goes back to the turn of fourteenth/ fifteenth centuries when some Tatars (prisoners of war and refugees from the Golden Horde, officially Muslim from the thirteenth century)2 were settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (at that time in a shared monarchy with Poland, later forming the Kingdom of Two Nations).3 By the sixteenth century, they had lost their mother tongue, but they retained their religion and customs.4 In the second half of the seventeenth century a new wave of Tatar settlers was given land in Podlachia (Polish Podlasie, present day north-east Poland).5 After World War and the move of Polish state borders westward, only a tiny part (about 10%) of the Tatar settlement territories remained within the new Polish state. Post-war migrations dispersed the Tatars, resulting in small communities living in Gdańsk, or Gorzów Wielkopolski, places far from their original settlements in the Białystok district (in the north-east of the country) and Warsaw. The Communist regime did not formally revoke recognition of religions but in practice, in an atmosphere generally unfavourable to religion, Tatar communities kept a low profile.6

1 Dr Agata S. Nalborczyk is Assistant Professor in the Department for European Islam Studies, Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw. Dr Stanisław GrodΩ teaches at the Department of the History and Ethnology of Religion, Faculty of Theology, Catholic University of Lublin in Poland. 2 Borawski, Piotr and Dubiński, Aleksander, Tatarzy polscy: Dzieje, obrz\dy, legendy, tradycje (Polish Tatars: History, Legends, Traditions), (Warsaw: Iskry, 1986), p. 17. 3 Tyszkiewicz, Jan, Z historii Tatarów polskich 1794–1944 (From the History of the Polish Tatars, 1794–1944) (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2002), p. 15. 4 Borawski, Piotr, Tatarzy w dawnej Rzeczpospolitej (Tatars in the Erstwhile Commonwealth [of Poland and Lithuania]) (Warsaw: LSW, 1986), pp. 199–202. 5 Sobczak, Jacek, Położenie prawne ludności tatarskiej w Wielkim Ksi\stwie Litewskim (Legal Situation of the Tatar Population in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania), Warszawa-Poznań: PWN 1984, pp. 34–38. 6 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland: the past and the present”, Islamochristiana, vol. 32 (2006), pp. 229–230, 234.

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Muslim foreign students began to arrive in the 1970s. Some of them married locally and stayed in Poland. After the changes towards democracy in the late 1980s, they were joined by Muslim refugees, traders and professionals.7 Some of the immigrants have become Polish citizens and some have resident permits. They come from the Arab countries (Iraq, Palestine, Syria, Yemen) and the Balkans and live mainly in cities that are academic centres (Warsaw, Gdańsk, Lublin, Wrocław, Bydgoszcz, Kraków, Poznań, Opole, ŁódΩ, Rzeszów). The refugees are mainly from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Iraq.8 There are no official data on the total number of Muslims (the Constitution [sect. 7, art. 53] rules out asking a question about religious affiliation in the census). Estimates given by various offices and organisations place the number within the range 15,000–30,000 (0.04–0.08% of the total population). The latest firm figures on the Muzułmański Zwi[zek Religijny (Muslim Religious Union—MZR) are from 2002 and give a membership of 5,123s.9 The Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Muslim League in the Republic of Poland—LM) claims about 120 registered members. There are also some Polish converts but no figures are available. 2

Islam and the State

The republic of Poland is a secular state and various acts of parliament regulate relations between the state and the main religious organisations.10 Other religious organisations must be registered in the government register of churches and religious associations. The MZR is the only Muslim organisation that operates on the basis of the law of 21 April 1936 which gives Islam official recognition. The act was not repealed by parliament after the World War II or after the democratic changes of 1989, though the 1997 Constitution overruled some of its Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland”, p. 230. Settlers, people on contracts and refugees are categorised according to their former/present citizenship, not their religious affiliation. 9 Mały rocznik statystyczny 2003 (Small Statistical Yearbook) (Warsaw: GUS, 2003), pp. 135–137. The statistical yearbooks from 2004 on do not contain any data on MZR membership. In a television programme in early March 2009, the Mufti said that there were about 12,000 Muslim Polish citizens and official residents. 10 There are 15 of these: 12 Christian churches, the Union of Jewish Religious Groups, the Karaim Religious Union and the Muslim Religious Union (the last two on the basis of the law of 21 April 1936 governing recognition of religions). 7 8

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regulations (relating to financial support from the state, the official seat of the MZR, and the obligation for Muslims in Poland to belong to it11). The Act gives the MZR the right to conduct religious education in schools and provides for the teachers to be paid by the state. The state does not fund religious organisations but they can obtain public funds for specific projects. For example, the MZR has reported on its website the acquisition of national and local government funds for cultural projects (e.g. workshops, social events for the genreal public on Muslim feast days, printing of calendars). The legal regulations created in consultation with Polish Muslims in the 1930s made provision for only one official organisation to represent Muslims in Poland. However, according to current Polish law, any religious group with at least 100 members can register with the government. The MZR ceased to have the monopoly but has retained its privileged position.12 New legal regulations after 1989, ignoring the 1936 Act, made provision for the registration of new religious organisations (including Muslim ones). Two small Shi’i groups were registered in 1990 and a new Sunni organisation called Liga Muzułmańska (Muslim League—LM) was registered in 2004.13 3


In 1921, 19 Muslim religious communities with their mosques and cemeteries, enjoyed full freedom of religion within the borders of the new, independent Poland. The Muzułmański Zwi[zek Religijny (Muslim Religious Union—MZR) was founded in 1925 as an officially recognised autonomous organisation representing all Muslims in Poland.14

11 The Communist regime put an end to financing any religious bodies from public money. Vilnius, before World War II located within Polish state borders, was the official seat of the MZR. Compulsory membership of the MZR for Tatars was intended to ensure that there was only one Muslim organisation to represent Muslims before the state authorities. 12 Borecki, Paweł, “Położenie prawne wyznawców islamu w Polsce (Legal Status of Muslims in Poland)”, Państwo i Prawo, vol. 63, no. 1 ( January 2008), pp. 72–84 (73). 13 Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Islam in Poland”, pp. 231–233; Nalborczyk, Agata S., “Status prawny muzułmanów Polsce i jego wpływ na organizacj\ ich życia religijnego (Legal Status of Muslims in Poland and its Influence on the Organisation of Their Religious Life)”, in A. Parzymies (ed.), Muzułmanie w Europie (Muslims in Europe) (Warsaw: Wyd. Akademickie Dialog, 2005), pp. 232–233. 14 Sobczak, Jacek, “Położenie prawne polskich wyznawców islamu (Legal Situation of Polish Muslims)”, in R. Baecker and Sh. Kitab (eds), Islam a świat (Islam and the World) (Toruń: Mado, 2004), pp. 186–197.

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A Muslim religious leader (Mufti) was elected by democratic vote. In 1936, Islam gained official recognition from the Polish state in an act of parliament that defined relations between the state and the MZR, and confirmed the legal status of the latter.15 It stated that the Mufti, imams and muezzins would receive their salaries from the state.16 Registered religious communities (zwi[zki wyznaniowe): Muzułmański Zwi[zek Religijny w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Muslim Religious Union in the Republic of Poland—MZR): Sunni; established 1925; address: 15–052 Białystok, ul. Grzybowa 42; tel. +48 85 664 3516; website: www.mzr.pl; e-mail: [email protected]; Mufti, Chairman of the Highest Muslim Board—Tomasz Miśkiewicz. The Mufti was elected by the council of imams in March 2004 (the first council since World War II); apart from his religious/legal functions, he assumes the role of official representative of Muslims. Membership of the MZR is voluntary and open to Muslim Polish citizens and all Muslims who have permanent residence in Poland.17 Liga Muzułmańska w Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (Muslim League in the Republic of Poland—LM): Sunni; established 2001; address: 01-046 Warsaw, ul. Niska 25/43, registered 6 January, 2004; website http://www.islam .info.pl; Chairman of the General Council: Samir Ismail. Membership is open to Polish Muslims, Muslims with Polish citizenship, and Muslims holding a permanent or temporary residence permit.

15 Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (Monitor of the Acts of the Republic of Poland), vol. 30 (1936), point 240. 16 Archiwum Akt Nowych (Archive of the New Acts), Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Public Education) 1432, p. 80. The Mufti received a salary equal to that of a diocesan bishop. 17 MZR has been traditionally considered as a mainly (at times almost exclusively) Tatar organisation, which in fact is not true—15% of the members are non-Tatars (i.e. immigrants and converts). This fictitious exclusiveness led to the creation of other organisations and associations by non-Tatar Muslims, including the Muslim students’ cultural organisations listed below. Formation of the new religious organisation, the Muslim League (LM), was a step taken by Muslims (of mainly Arab origin and Polish converts associated with them) at the beginning of the present decade. Both cultural associations continue to exist. Officially, the relationship between the MZR and the LM is amicable. The Mufti takes part in events organised by the LM. Some prayer rooms are used by members of both organisations. The emphasis on ‘holding a residence permit’ is intended to maintain an orderly relationship with the state authorities. Both organisations were brought into existence by the will of members of the Muslim community and not at the instigation of or under pressure from any state authorities.

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Two registered Shi’i organisations (membership in each is less than 100): Stowarzyszenie Jedności Muzułmańskiej (Association of Muslim Unity): registered 31 January 1990; address: 02-679 Warsaw, ul. Pieńkowskiego 4/91; leader: Zbigniew Żuk; website: http://www.al-islam.org.pl. Islamskie Zgromadzenie Ahl-ul-Bayt (Ahl-ul-Bayt Islamic Assembly); registered 17 December 1990; address: 05–840 Brwinów, Moszna 4a; chief imam: Ryszard Ahmed Rusnak; website: http://www.abia.pl/; e-mail: [email protected]. Muslim cultural organisations:18 Stowarzyszenie Studentów Muzułmańskich (Muslim Students Society): website: http://www.islam.org.pl; e-mail: [email protected]. Muzułmańskie Stowarzyszenie Kształcenia i Kultury (Muslim Association for Education and Culture): websites: http://www.islam.com.pl and www.mskk-islam.8m.com; e-mail: [email protected]. Zwi[zek Tatarów Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej (The Tatar Union of the Republic of Poland): established 1992: president: Stefan Korycki; address: Bohoniki 24, 16–100 Sokółka. 4


There are three mosques (in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany in north-eastern Poland dating from the eighteenth-nineteenth century. and one opened in 1990 in Gdańsk). There are plans to build new mosques in Cracow and Warsaw. This was briefly announced in the local media and gave rise to hardly any discussion. Muslims distinguish between so-called Islamic centres (places for prayer, plus offices, libraries, meeting halls) and small ‘prayer houses’ (places for prayer), which are almost unnoticeable from the outside. Islamic Centres exist in Białystok (one running, and a second under construction), Warsaw, Lublin, Wrocław, Poznań, Katowice. Prayer Houses exist in Białystok, Suchowola, ŁódΩ, Katowice, Poznań. (http:// www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=16). The total number of prayer houses is not known. Some of the Islamic centres and prayer houses named

18 They are mostly involved in organising religious education for their members and for Muslim children, public lectures on various aspects of Islam, publication of Polish translations of Muslim authors’ works (mainly on ‘religious’ topics).

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on the official websites of the MZR and LM are used by members of both organisations, or used by one but listed by both. 5


The MZR, as a religious organisation operating under an act of parliament, has the right to teach religion in public schools and its teachers are paid by the state. The ministerial regulation of 1992 states that a minimum of seven pupils having a particular religious affiliation in the same school is required in order for separate religious education classes to be provided. The curriculum must be approved by the educational authorities. In Białystok and in nearby Sokółka, Islamic religious instruction is given to Muslim children in public schools. In other part of the country, religious education for Muslim children is provided by the local Muslim communities independently of the school system. At school, these children attend ethics classes together with all the others who do not wish to attend Roman Catholic or other religious instruction classes. 6


There are no facilities to train imams locally. Muslims do not run any schools or institutions of higher education. Islam features in the academic curricula of several universities in Poland, but the courses are mainly run by non-Muslims. Courses on the history of the Muslim world, Arabic language, and some aspects of Muslim doctrine are taught. Muslim religious education teachers and imams have to acquire their formal Islamic education abroad (formerly in Sarajevo, but now elsewhere). 7


Three Muslim cemeteries are currently in use (at Bohoniki, established in the second half of the eighteenth century; at Kruszyniany, established in the seventeenth/eighteenth century; and in Tatarska St., Warsaw, opened from 1868). Two more in existence from the late seventeenth century have been closed (Lebiedziew after World War I and Studzianka after World War II). Two more disused cemeteries still exist at Bohoniki (from the late seventeenth century in the village—the Bohoniki cemetery that

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is in use is located outside the village) and Młynarska St., Warsaw (used 1838–1868) (http://www.mzr.pl/pl/info.php?id=18). Special sections are reserved for Muslims in communal cemeteries in Gdańsk. 8


There are no Muslim ‘chaplaincies’. This is due to the fact that numbers of Muslims are small and their needs can be met on a communal basis, rather than to any official obstacles. 9

Religious Festivals

Muslim religious festivals are not public holidays. Muslims can have a day off provided that they make up for their absence. Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) is celebrated by MZR members in one of the north-eastern locations. It is a public event. Sometimes non-Muslims are invited as guests. Ramadan Bayram (‘Id al-Fitr) has generally been celebrated more privately, though the LM started a practice of organising so-called Wieczór ramadanowy (Ramadan evenings), an iftar for representatives of Muslim communities and invited non-Muslims. 10

Halal Food

An Act of 17 May 1989 (art. 2, act 9) allows for exceptions from the approved method of animal slaughtering (i.e. permits for not stunning animals prior to slaughter). The Council of Imams of the MZR traditionally (according to the Act of 1936) has the sole right to issue halal certificates for food products in Poland (in agreement with the Chief Veterinary Officer) (www.halalpoland.pl). 11

Dress Codes

There are no regulations restricting the wearing of hijab or niqab. Some young Muslim women (mainly converts of Polish origin) wear hijab in public.

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Muslim periodicals treat various aspects of Muslim culture and religious matters: Świat Islamu (in Polish)—published by the MZR till 2006 Rocznik Tatarów Polskich (in Polish)—published by the Polish Tatar Union Życie Tatarskie (in Polish; 96 issues since 1934, including 19 of the new edition since 1998)—published by Lokalna Grupa Działania ‘Szlak Tatarski’ (Local Action Group ‘Tatar Trail’) As-Salam—(in Polish, 15 issues between 2004 and 2008)—published by the LM Al-Hikmah—(in Polish, 59 issues between 1993 and 2006)—published by the Muslim Students Society Internet sites: www.mzr.pl—the website of the MZR http://www.islam.info.pl—the website of the LM www.muzulmanie.pl—official site of the Polish unit of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) http://www.tatarzy.tkb.pl/—a Polish Tatar site about their history, religion and culture www.muzulmanie.com—ownership not stated, but probably run by the members of the LM www.islam.net.pl—Muslim Cultural and Educational Centre, Wrocław (LM) www.arabia.pl—run by an association of alumni and staff of the Oriental Institute (now Faculty), University of Warsaw www.islamweuropie.info—a private site about Islam in Europe administered by a doctoral candidate in the Department for European Islam Studies, Oriental Faculty, University of Warsaw www.muzulmanka.pl—a site for Muslim women run by the LM www.bw.swps.edu.pl—periodical ‘Middle East’ published by Warsaw School of Social Sciences and Humanities (SWPS) www.islamic.org.uk/polish—Polish version of the UK site

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Family Law

Since marriage must be officially registered in a state civil ceremony at a state registry office, it is followed by a Muslim ceremony at Muslim premises. Marriages of people with non-Polish citizenship are valid under international private law, but polygamy is illegal. 14


Coverage of matters concerning Muslims is scarce. Local media reported on Muslim plans to build mosques in Warsaw and Cracow. Matters have been debated locally. The Warsaw case has a pre-World War II history. The MZR had a plot of land to build a mosque but funds collected for the construction were donated to the National Defence Fund in 1939 in preparation for the imminent war. After the war, the plot was confiscated by the Communist government. Recently, the MZR has been trying to regain ownership of the plot but the process is complicated. Other instances of local reporting on Islam in Poland are linked to interreligious encounters (e.g. the Day of Islam in the Roman Catholic Church in Poland—26 January). 15


Dni Kultury Muzułmańskiej (Muslim Culture Days)—a series of cultural events organised occasionally (so far) in various cities (Gdańsk, Białystok, Wrocław); Encounters in Kruszyniany, Białystok region (in June; including prayer for peace with representatives of other religions);19 Sabantuj—an annual Tatar gathering (songs, dances, games and sports); Podlaskie Dni Bajramowe (Bayram Days in Podlasie Region—Białystok region); Summer Academy of Tatar Lore.

If we consider only the number of people involved compared with the size of the population, the interreligious encounters may seem unimportant. However, the events organised by Muslims are their own initiatives and are not instigated by the Christians. This is an important fact that should be underlined. 19

PORTUGAL Nina Clara Tiesler1 1

Muslim Populations

Portugal has a rather small Muslim population which has grown mostly since decolonisation in 1974. Estimates of the communities themselves and by researchers suggest around 38,000–40,000 people, among whom are around 10,000 Isma’ilis, but who are mainly Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin, from Mozambique and, in greater numbers, from Guinea-Bissau. Other Muslim groupings from Morocco and Bangladesh have arrived more recently (noticeably since the early 1990s). Small numbers (500–1,500) of Muslims come from Iran, Senegal, India and Pakistan. While smaller Muslim communities are established in the north (mainly in Porto and Coimbra), the south (in the Algarve) and on the island of Madeira (the majority of Moroccan Muslims live in and around Porto and on the Algarve), the overwhelmingly majority live in and around the capital city Lisbon. In and around Lisbon, there is a certain (but not massive) geographical concentration in particular neighbourhoods, such as Laranjeiro and Odivelas (both having well established mosques). The ‘official’ figures from the immigration control/monitoring service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras, SEF) and the census2 do not reflect realities, and give numbers much lower than the estimates of researchers and the communities themselves. According to the 2001 census, Portugal’s total population was 10,356,117, of whom 12,014 were declared to be Muslims.3 The reasons for these low numbers are, first, that religious 1 Nina Clara Tiesler is a senior researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon (Centre of Excellence) and coordinator of the Luso-Afro-Brazilian research network on Muslims in Lusophone Areas (MEL-net). She holds a PhD in Comparative Religion and has researched on Muslims in Europe since 1990. She is the author of Muslime in Europa: Religion und Identitätspolitiken unter veränderten gesellschaftlichen Verhältnissen (Berlin: Lit-Verlag, 2006), and editor of “Islam in Portuguese-speaking areas”, Lusotopie, vol. 14, no. 1 (special issue, 2007). 2 National Institute of Statistics, www.ine.pt. 3 Leitão, J., “The new Islamic presence in Portugal: Towards a progressive intregration”, in Aluffi Beck-peccoz, R. and G. Zincone (eds), The Legal Treatment of Islamic Minorities in Europe (Peeters: Leuven, 2004), p. 180.

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affiliation is not an obligatory question in the census, so not everyone answers it, and, second, that Portuguese citizenship is quite widespread and so basing estimates from citizenship are unsatisfactory. In addition, in many cases the proportion of Muslims in the population of the countries of origin cannot be simply applied to the immigrants from those countries in Portugal, especially not in the cases of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL) has a register of official members and supporters of the community (Muslims and non-Muslims), who number around 4,180 (according to a spokesman in December 2008). It also aims to monitor the total number of Muslims living in the country and confirms the broadly accepted estimates of 38,000–40,000. The main mosques are frequently attended by 1,500 people on Fridays and up to 15,000 (at special festivities). 2

Islam and the State

The Constitution, which recognises freedom of religion and conscience and prohibits all discrimination in this respect, provides for a system of equality and separation between the state and religious denominations. However, the Roman Catholic Church enjoys privileges not granted to other religious groups.4 A decisive change came with the Religious Freedom Act of 22 June 2001, most of whose improvements for religious minorities were implemented from the year 2006. Before the implementation of the new law, the CIL, as well as smaller Islamic communities and other religious minorities, could only be officially recognized as ‘associations in private law’. In 2006, the CIL took advantage of the new rights by becoming a registered religious community, thus obtaining a legal status substantially equal to that of the Catholic Church, including agreements with the state with regard to marriages (see below) and the optional benefit of the voluntary consignment by individual tax payers of 0.5% of income tax, but no public funding. Several inequalities remain, as privileges depend on the number of adherents of the religious groups and on the period of their establishment in the country, with a minimum of 30 years required (the CIL was founded 40 years ago). In practice, the CIL can benefit from tax concessions, for example, on

4

Ibid., p. 291.

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buildings expenditure, etc. Whenever the main Islamic communities (Sunni and Isma’ili) celebrate an anniversary or special occasion, the Portuguese state is often represented at the highest level. In addition, at least one of the ex-presidents of the Republic is an honorary member of CIL, and the current CIL president was one of the advisers of the president of the republic during his last visit to India. During the visit of the Dalai Lama in 2007, the CIL organised and hosted a huge interreligious meeting in the Central Mosque, with the Dalai Lama as guest of honour—an important event, taking into account that the Portuguese government had been facing the same problems as other governments as regards to official relations. 3


The role of a small group of Muslims from Mozambique (a Portuguese colony until 1975), who were studying at the faculties of law, medicine and economics in the metropolis was decisive in laying the foundations of Muslim organisations. Most of these community founders, as well as other Sunni Muslims of South Asian origin, had already been Portuguese citizens under colonial rule. Consequently, they did not perceive themselves as ‘immigrants’. Many African Muslims gather around their Sufi leaders, and Muslims from Bangladesh have recently founded a prayer hall closer to their workplace. However, the vast majority of at least 30,000 Sunnis and their local communities are linked to and occasionally take part in the life of the central Islamic Community of Lisbon (CIL). The CIL, founded in 1968, acts as an umbrella organisation for Sunni Muslims, both formally and informally. The Mesquita Central de Lisboa, Lisbon Central Mosque, founded1985 (Av. José Malhoa (à Praça de Espanha), 1000 Lisboa, tel: (+351) 21 387 41 42 / 21 387 91 84, fax: (+351) 21 387 22 30, email: [email protected], www.comunidadeislamica.pt) has as its imam Sheikh David Munir. It is also the home of the Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa (Islamic Community of Lisbon, CIL). Alongside common religious, cultural and social infrastructures (including a bookstore, chatrooms or the community website), three types of association were founded in the 30-year-old Central Mosque at the heart of Lisbon: the Women‘s Association, several groups of Guinean Muslims, and the Commissão de Jovens da Comunidade Islâmica de Lisboa (Youth Association of the Islamic Community, CILJovem) which is organised and attended mainly (if not only) by young people of South Asian origin, including some Isma’ili Muslims.

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The other main Muslim organisations are: Colégio Islâmico, Ensino e Actividades Educativas, Av. Vila Amélia, lote 171, 172, Cabanas, 2950–805 Palmela, tel: 21 211 05 30, fax: 21 211 05 39, email: [email protected]. Centro Português Árabe Pullar e C. Islâmica, Rua José Estêvão, 3-A—r/c, Reboleira, 2720 Amadora, director: Prof. Bubacar Balde, tel: (+351) 21 496 47 12. Centro de Estudos Islâmicos de Portugal, Av. da Liberdade, 73, 3 Esq., 1200 Lisboa, tel: (+351) 211-558544. Centro Cultural Ismaili, Rua Abranches Ferrao, 1600–001 Lisboa, tel: (+351) 217 229 000, fax: (+351) 217 229 045, email: [email protected]. 4


Besides the Central Mosque mentioned above, there are two other mosques near Lisbon (in Odivelas and Laranjeiro) and another in Coimbra, and there are a total of 33 cultural centres and prayer halls across the country (but mainly near Lisbon), and around twelve madrasas, as well as the Jamatkhana of the Shi’a Imami Ismaili Muslim Community. 5


A recognised private Islamic secondary Islamic school exists in Palmela (near Lisbon). Among the approximately 100 pupils, only 5 or 6 are non-Muslims. Most young Muslims receive their Islamic education in one of the madrasas. The Law of Religious Freedom allows Islamic instruction in public schools, if there are enough pupils/parents who require it (a minimum of ten). In practice, there is currently no public school in Portugal which has enough Muslim pupils of more or less the same age who could benefit from this offer. Parents do not complain about the lack of such provision, as their children attend instruction in the madrasas. 6


The Religious Freedom Act (no. 16/2001) governs the role of imam in detail, equating imams with Roman Catholic priests in terms of legal

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status, and providing for the possibility of setting up specific training institutions.5 As a higher institution for the training of imams has not yet been founded, imam training is partly provided at the Islamic school of Palmela. Some imams have received their education abroad (mostly in the UK or in Pakistan). 7


There is no exclusively Islamic cemetery in Portugal, but several municipal cemeteries reserve areas for Muslims and their communities. Such an area has existed in the cemetery of Lumiar (a district of Lisbon) since 2005, donated by the City Hall and open to Muslims from all over Portugal. It has become the most important cemetery for both Sunni and Isma’ili families, and is called ‘our cemetery’. With the existence of these facilities and probably due to the fact that most Muslims in Portugal are either Portuguese citizens or in other ways deeply attached to the country, it is very rare that families prefer to arrange for relatives to be buried abroad. 8


The Religious Freedom Act (no. 16/2001) grants the Islamic and other communities the right to exercise of freedom of religion in special situations (such as during military service, on admission to public hospitals, and in prison). In practice, there are no imams working on a regular basis in such institutions due to the lack of demand. If the need arises (mostly in hospitals), the Commission of Social Affairs (Commissão de assuntos sociais) of the CIL provides special care and support for the individuals and their families, including, of course, the visits of an imam. 9

Religious Festivals

The state does not officially recognise Islamic festivals or holidays but permits absence from work and school for the main occasions on request. On these occasions, the CIL distributes information to the public, the Ministry of Justice, schools and employers and provides the appropriate

5

Leitão, “The new Islamic presence in Portugal”, p. 300.

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forms for applying to the authorities for leave of absence. Workers and employees are expected to maintain a flexible schedule and to make up time lost. Students may sit examinations on alternative dates. 10

Halal Food

According to a spokesman of CIL, ritual slaughter according to Islamic rules has been permitted since 1975. Nevertheless, most ritual slaughter for Muslims was performed by the rabbi of the Lisbon synagogue until first halal butcher shops were established from 1982 on. Today there are at least six halal butcher shops in Lisbon, and three in Odivelas, one in Martim Moniz Square in the city centre, one in Laranjeiro, and another (owned by a non-Muslim) in the city centre. Halal chicken is available in the major shopping malls/supermarket chains (Continente and Jumbo). There are at least nine halal restaurants in the main cities. 11

Dress Codes

The wearing of the headscarf and other distinctive clothing at school and work has not caused any conflict or controversy, but it is not a very common practice in public places. 12


There are two or three small edited journals. Along with other religious groups, Muslims take part in two television programmes on the public channel RTP2, where the presentation time is divided between the communities according to the numerical strength. In practice, the time is mostly occupied by the Roman Catholic Church and, second, by Protestant and Pentecostal churches. A radio programme put out by a public broadcasting station (Antena 1) is expected to be inaugurated in 2009. The CIL runs a website (www.comunidadeislamica.pt) and some younger community members have activated a chatroom (www.aliasoft .com/forumislam) where questions can be submitted to be answered by the imams. This chatroom is also frequented by Portuguese-speaking Muslims from outside Portugal (mainly from Brazil, but also from Mozambique and the UK).

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Family Law

As noted above, since Islamic communities (and other religious minorities with long-standing tradition in the country) can register and be recognised as religious communities (and not only as associations of private law, as was the case until 2006), they can perform religious marriages which, by submission of the appropriate declarations, will be accepted in civil law. According to a spokesman of CIL, the organisation is currently making the necessary legal preparations for this process, while the Jewish community has already solemnised at least two such marriages in 2008. 14


The historically recent ‘new’ Muslim presence (as distinct from the historical presence on the Iberian Peninsular before the fifteenth century) did not attract much attention before 11 September 2001. The rhetoric of the ‘war on terror’ now puts Portuguese Muslims in a very strange situation, leaving them quite alienated in response to questions arising from a new kind of public ‘interest’. Their spokesmen deal with such questions (and sometimes insults) in their normal, patient and calm way. Researchers and Muslims know about harassment, but public Islam in Portugal always stresses that “Muslims in Portugal are not suffering from discrimination. They are well integrated citizens and members of society.” The media mainly cover or mention special occasions (anniversies and famous visitors to the communities) and festivals (especially the beginning and end of Ramadan). 15


In 2008, the major event was the fortieth anniversary of CIL, with the President of the Republic among the guests of honour.

ROMANIA Irina Vainovski-Mihai1 1

Muslim Populations

The first Muslim communities in Romania were formed (mainly in northern Dobrudja and along the lower Danube) in the fourteenth century when Ottoman rule was established in the region. Dobrudja remained part of the Ottoman Empire for five centuries. After the Russian-Romanian-Ottoman War (1877), Romania gained its independence and the Treaty of Berlin (1878) acknowledged Dobrudja as a Romanian territory. As a result of the deteriorating economic conditions in the early twentieth century, Turks and Tatars migrated massively from Dobrudja to Turkey.2 Since its establishment as an independent state, the constitutions of Romania and special laws have guaranteed the rights of certain religious groups, in addition to Orthodox Christians, who represent the majority of the population. The law on religious denomination issued in 1923 lists the Muslim faith among the recognised ‘historical faiths’.3 The establishment of the Communist regime (1948) did introduce many formal changes with regard to the recognition of religious denominations, but put them under strict state control. Between 1948 and 1989, the Communist state acted systematically to impose atheism and limit the impact of religious creeds. After 1959, education in the Tatar and Turkish languages was gradually eliminated and in 1967 the Muslim Theological Seminary was closed. Today, the majority of Muslim communities live in Dobrudja and are mainly made up of the historical ethnic groups. The most recent official 1 Irina Vainovski-Mihai is Lecturer in Arabic Literature at Dimitrie Cantemir Christian University, Bucharest. She holds a degree in Arabic language and literature and has published studies in Arab literature, comparative literature and intercultural stereotyping. 2 Bara, Maria, “Relaflii interetnice dintre cre tinii ortodoc i i musulmani în Dobrogea. Studiu de caz: Medgidia i Cobadin (Muslim-Orthodox Christian interethnic relations in Dobrudja. A case study: Medgidia and Cobadin)”, Philologica Jassyensia, vol. 2, no. 1 (2006), pp. 93–104 (94). 3 Gillet, Oliver, Religie i naflionalism (Religion and Nationalism) (Bucharest: Compania, 2001), p. 6.

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census (2002) recorded 67,257 Muslims (0.3% of the total population of Romania), of whom 31,118 were ethnic Turks, 23,641 Tatars, and 3,310 Romanians.4 As regards levels of education, out of the total Muslim population over the age of ten (i.e., 57,687 individuals), 2,637 have a university degree.5 The main Muslim ethnic groups, the Turks and the Tatars, follow Sunni Islam. In the official census, a relatively small number of Turks and Tatars declared themselves to belong to religions other than Islam, to be atheists or to have no religion (980 Turks out of 32,098, and 294 Tatars out of 23,641).6 The total number of Muslim families is 16,807, out of which there are 12,584 families in which both spouses following the Muslim faith.7 By 2008, the number of Muslims in Romania should have increased slightly due to immigration from Middle Eastern countries, and conversion (mainly consequent on marriage). Updated estimates for 2008 vary: 70,000 according to the muftiate in Romania, with 87% living in the south-eastern county of Constanza,8 approximately 67,300 according to the Scretariatul de State pentru Culte (State Secretariat for Religious Affairs),9 and around 120,000 according to local Islamic associations and their websites such as Islamul azi (Islam Today).10 After the fall of the Communist regime in 1989, new Muslims groups appeared in major cities such as Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj and Timisoara. These groups are made up of Middle Eastern businessmen, former students who studied in Romania before 1989, and refugees. They are mostly Palestinians, Kurds (from northern Iraq and south-eastern Turkey), Iraqis, Syrians, Lebanese and Jordanians.

4 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 5 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t13.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 6 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 7 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t30.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 8 Muftiate of Romania figures available at http://www.muftiyat.ro/index.php?option= com_content&task=view&id=27&Itemid=26, accessed 1 February 2009. 9 Figures from the Ministry of Culture, Religious Affairs and National Patrimony, State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, available at http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteHtml.aspx?id=1745, accessed 1 February 2009. 10 http://www.islamulazi.ro/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1, accessed 1 February 2009.

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These new communities have not joined the old Muslim communities in Romania, the two groups live almost parallel lives.11 2

Islam and the State

Romania is a secular republic with no state religion, though Orthodox Christians constitute the majority (86.8% according to the 2002 census).12 The Islamic faith, as one of the eighteen religious denominations recognised by law (Law 489/2006), is considered a public-utility legal entity. Expenditures are financed primarily from the Muslim communities’ own income. Through their officially recognised national leadership and representative body (the muftiate), Muslims can receive material support from the state for the maintenance of mosques, monuments and other communal buildings. According to the law, the muftiate is the only religious institution which represents the followers of the Islamic faith in Romania and has the right to organise pilgrimages to Mecca and Medina. Any other individual or legal entity that wishes to organise pilgrimages must have the muftiate’s approval.13 The Synodal Council (Romanian: Consiliu Sinodal, Turkish: ura-i Islam), headed by the mufti, takes decisions regarding the functioning and organisation of the Muslim community. The Synodal Council is comprised of the mufti, four members nominated by Uniunea Democrată a Tătarilor Turco-Musulmani din România (UDTTMR, Democratic Union of the Turkish-Muslim Tatars in Romania), four members nominated by Uniunea Democrată Turcă din România (UDTR, Turkish Democratic Union of Romania), the principal of the Liceul Teologic Musulman i Pedagogic Kemal Atatürk (Kemal Ataturk Muslim Theological and Pedagogical High School) and fifteen clerics. The UDTTMR and the UDTR are two of the nineteen political parties and cultural associations representing ethnic minorities in the Romanian Parliament. The mufti must be a Romanian citizen, born in Romania and with no other previous citizenship, and a graduate of an Islamic theological institute in Romania (or abroad, provided

11 Grigore, George, “Muslims in Romania”, ISIM Newsletter, 3 July 1999, p. 34, available at http://www.isim.nl/files/newsl_3.pdf, accessed 30 March 2009. 12 National Institute of Statistics figures available at http://www.insse.ro/cms/files/ RPL2002INS/vol4/tabele/t5.pdf, accessed 1 February 2009. 13 Cf. Chapter III, Art. 3.e and Art. 4(1) of the “Goverment Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination”, officially published on 25 June, 2008.

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his qualification is recognised by the Romanian state). As the position of the head of a religious denomination is regarded as equivalent to a high-ranking public position, after being elected by the Synodal Council, the mufti is confirmed by a decree of the President of the Republic. Although the muftiate has a longer history in the region of Dobrudja, it has functioned as the only institution representing the Muslims in Romania since 1943. The present mufti, Murat Yusuf (b. 1977 in Medgidia, Constanfla), was elected to this position in 2005. He studied in Romania and Turkey, holds an MA from the Faculty of OrthodoxChristian Theology (University of Târgovi te)14 and is currently a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Orthodox-Christian Theology (University of Constanfla).15 3


The traditional Muslim denomination (Sunni) engages in public activities mainly through the muftiate (www.muftiyat.ro) together with the UDTTMR (President: Amet Varol; Constanfla 900613 , Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, tel.: (+40241) 61 66 43; (+40241) 52 01 86, http://www .tatar.ro) and the UDTR (President: Osman Fedbi; 900613 Constanfla; Str. Bogdan Voda nr. 75, tel./fax: (+40241) 55 09 03, http://www .udtr.ro). However, newly established associations and foundations dominated by immigrants from various ethnic backgrounds are also actively engaged in public activities, charities, translating and publishing religious literature, and teaching Arabic. The main such organisations are: Fundaflia Centrul Cultural Islamic Semiluna (Crescent Islamic Cultural Centre Foundation, str. Munflii Gurghiului nr. 50–52, sector 6, Bucharest, www.scoala-araba.ro), Fundaflia Taiba (Taiba Foundation, os. Colentina, nr. 373, sector 2, Bucharest; str. Maior ofran, nr. 11, Constanfla, www .islamulazi.ro) and Asociaflia Musulmanilor (Association of Muslims, at the same address as the Taiba Foundation, www.associatiamusulmanilor.ro), Fundaflia Tuna (Tuna Foundation, Bd. Regina Maria, nr. 34, Bucharest, www.tuna.ro), Liga Culturală i Islamică din România (Islamic and Cultural League in Romania, str. Fabrica de Gheaflă, nr. 14, sector 2, Bucharest,

http://ftl.teologie.info/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1 (Faculty of Theology, University of Târgovi te), accessed 31 March 2009. 15 http://www.univ-ovidius.ro/teologie/ (Faculty of Theology, University of Constanfla), accessed 31 March 2009. 14

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www.islam.ro). The most active of them appears to be the Taiba Foundation, with several websites, blogs, and Internet discussion groups in Romanian, publication of Islamic handbooks in Romanian, participation in book fairs, charitable activities, and a weekly two-hour television programme (see Section 12 below). Under the Law of Denominations (489/2006) and particularly the Government Decision regarding the Recognition of the Muslim Denomination (officially published on 25 June 2008), all Islamic NGOs, associations and foundations will need to be re-confirmed with the endorsement of the mufti. The mufti considers that many of these associations are harmful because of their insistent propaganda and radical views, and that they have taken advantage of legal ambiguities and the need for religious education after the collapse of Communism.16 The Taiba Foundation voices its contempt for this opinion, accusing the mufti and the Synodal Council of libel.17 The case is pending. 4


There are 73 purpose-built mosques in the region of Dobrudja and one in Bucharest (built in 1960).18 Ten of them are historical monuments and still in use. The oldest, Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Mangalia, was built in 1590. Although the muftiate can receive financial aid from the Romanian state, the costs of new buildings and maintenance of historical monuments are mainly provided by the Turkish state and/or foreign Muslim citizens with businesses in Romania. For example, the cost of restoring the sixteenth-century Esmahan Sultan Mosque in Medgidia, amounting to €1,000,000, were covered by the muftiate, the Consulate of Turkey in Constanfla and a Turkish businessman,19 and the erection of a new mosque in Constanfla, with an area of 500 m2 and a 33 m. minaret, was sponsored by a Palestinian businessman.20 Besides the 16 “There would be unity if Muslims respected what is written in the Qur’an”, interview with the mufti on the muftiate website, available at http://www.muftiyat.ro/ index2.php?option=com_content&do_pdf=1&id=140), accessed 30 March 2009. 17 See http://www.islamul.ro/stire.php?id=11, accessed 30 March 2009. 18 See Ministry of Culture, Religious Affairs and National Patrimony, State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, http://www.culte.ro/DocumenteHtml.aspx?id=1745, accessed 1 February 2009. 19 See http://www.muftiyat.ro/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id= 237&Itemid=75, accessed 27 March 2009. 20 “O noua geamie pentru musulmani”, Stiri Constanta, 17 November 2008, available

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main mosque, it is estimated that there are fifteen other mosques in Bucharest funded by foreign residents.21 In fact, they are prayer halls adjacent to the associations and foundations established in the capital city and principal towns. 5


The Law of Education adopted in 1995 introduced religion as a compulsory subject in public schools. A national curriculum is set for the legally recognised denominations, including Islam. National curricula for religion are set by each denomination and submitted first to the Ministry of Culture and Religious Affairs and then to the Ministry of Education for approval. Pupils can express their wish to take courses in a particular religion, those under sixteen being spoken for by their parents or guardians. Pupils are exempted from attending religious education classes if they declare themselves to be non-religious or if the school cannot provide instruction in the religion requested. The basics of Islam are also introduced in classes on the history and traditions of the Turkish-Tatar Minority, which are part of the national curriculum for the Turkish and Tatar minorities. According to the Law of Education (Law 4/1995, Ch. XII, Art. 120.4), each legally recognised ethnic minority can draw up a curriculum for special subject teaching on their history and the traditions. The curriculum and textbooks are approved by the Ministry of Education. Islam is taught in mosques and by religious and cultural associations on an extra-curricular and private basis, mainly in weekend schools, or within an Arabic language programme. 6


Academic courses on Islam and the Middle East are offered at the state University of Bucharest (as well as BA and MA degrees in Arabic and Turkish Studies), two private Universities (Dimitrie Cantemir Chris-

at http://www.stirilocale.ro/constanta/O_noua_geamie_pentru_musulmani_ IDN682242.html, accessed 27 March 2009. 21 Islam in the European Union: What’s at Stake in the Future? (Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 2007 (p. 155, available at http:// www.fnst-freiheit.org/uploads/974/Islam_in_Europe.pdf, accessed 1 July 2008.

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tian University and Spiru Haret University), the National Defence University, Ovidius University in Constanfla among others and consist of a general overview within courses on Arabic language, history of Arab culture and civilisation and history of Arab literature. In 1996, an Islamic secondary school (Liceul Teologic Musulman i Pedagogic Kemal Atatürk) was opened in Medgidia, a city with a sizable Turkish and Tatar population, which is now functioning with the support of the Turkish government.22 A similar institution existed before the Communist period and was closed in 1967. All the holders of academic degrees in Islamic theology have studied abroad, as no such higher education qualifications are offered in Romania. Diplomas issued abroad are subject to the recognition by the Romanian Ministry of Education after endorsement by the mufti. In 2007, disputes emerged after the mufti refused to endorse diplomas obtained from Islamic theological institutes in Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Sudan. The mufti officially requested the Ministry of Education not to recognise diplomas obtained by seven Tatars on the ground that they had studied a radical form of Islam23 and recognition of their diplomas was denied. 7


The muftiate owns 108 cemeteries. In some cities, e.g. Bucharest, there is an acute need for a cemetery, while in others, e.g. Constanfla, there is need for additional provision. The issue of creating a cemetery in Bucharest was put on the Municipality’s agenda some ten years ago. Muslims who die there are usually taken to Constanfla (250 km away) for burial. The matter seems to have been settled recently after the Muslim community was allotted land for this purpose on the outskirts of Bucharest.

22 Cf. a protocol signed by the Romanian and Turkish ministries of foreign affairs on 22 December 1999, valid until 2010 (see the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mae.ro/index.php?id=5746&unde=doc, accessed 29 March 2009. 23 “Teologi musulmani in ‘razboi’ cu muftiul”, Evenimentul zilei, 24 April 2007, available at http://www.evz.ro/articole/detalii-articol/439826/Teologi-musulmaniin-quotrazboiquot-cu-muftiul/, accessed 29 March 2009, and “Plangere catre Sura-i Islam”, Clubul român-arab de presă i cultură (Romanian-Arab Club for Press and Culture), 19 April 2007, available at http://www.ana-news.info/index.php?option=com_conte nt&task=view&id=440&Itemid=171, accessed 29 March 2009.

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There are no imams in the armed forces. On request of an inmate, the muftiate can assign an imam to visit him in the prison at the muftiate’s expense. The same applies to patients in hospitals. Most prisons and state hospitals have Orthodox Christian chapels. In hospitals in the towns of Dobrudja, where there are a significant number of Muslims, quotations from the Qur’an are often displayed on the walls of the wards. 9

Religious Festivals

The annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations take place in the main cities (with pop music concerts, etc.) and in villages with a significant Muslim population. They are open to the public. In Ramadan, iftar dinners offered by Turkish and Arabic restaurants are open to the public. Non-Muslims participate in events organised in public places (including sharing food), while in the regions without a historical tradition of Muslim-Christian coexistence (as in Dobrudja) they attend iftar meals in restaurants only if accompanied by a Muslim, being cautious that they may behave inappropriately. 10

Halal Food

In the main cities, there are several halal food shops with both Muslim and non-Muslim customers, as well as numerous ethnic restaurants (which offer halal food and Arabic and Turkish television programmes, and do not serve alcohol). The meat for the shops and restaurants is supplied by Romanian halal slaughter houses. 11

Dress Codes

There are no rules restricting Muslim dress in public or for pupils in schools, but it is mostly in villages with a large Muslim population that women wear hijab. No women have yet been observed wearing niqab.

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The main printed media are the monthly periodicals Hakses (The Authentic Voice, published by UDTR (Director: Prof. Dr Nuredin Ibram; Editor in Chief: Chiulten Abdulah, Constanfla 8700, Bd-ul Tomis nr. 99, bl. SO, ap. 3, tel./fax: +40241)55 09 03), Karadeniz (The Black Sea, Director: Memet Faruc; Editor in Chief: Osman Niat, Constanfla 8700, Str. Stefan cel Mare nr. 66, tel./fax: +40241)61 66 43) and Cas (The Youngster, same directorship and address as Karadeniz), both of the latter published by the UDTTMR. The website www.tatar.ro, although it focuses on information about the Tatar community, also offers also extended articles on the Muslims in Romania, in general. In March 2009, UDTR, UDTTMR and the muftiate opened a broadcasting station (Radio T, Director General: Ervin Ibraim) in Constanfla with programmes in Romanian, Turkish and Tatar, which adds to the already long-running similar programmes aired by the local station of the state-owned Societatea Română de Radiodifuziune (Romanian Broadcasting Society, SRR). DDTV (a television channel broadcasting from Bucharest nationally, although with a small audience, Director and Owner: Dan Diaconescu), hosts a weekly programme, Islamul azi (Islam Today) presented in Romanian by the Taiba Foundation. In March 2008, DDTV was penalised by Consiliul Naflional al Audiovizualului (National Audiovisual Council), an autonomous public institution that monitors the media, for infringements in the content of three programmes (the insinuation that Muslim women are superior to women of other faiths and the presentation at an inappropriate hour of a film comprising scenes of violence. See Decision 147/04.03.2008).24 13

Family Law

According to the Family Code, marriages are only recognised if they are performed and registered at a state (secular) authority. Marriages in mosques (as in the places of worship of other religions) have a rather ceremonial function. The Romanian legal system is secular. In litigation,

24 National Audiovisual Council, http://www.cna.ro/Decizia-nr-147-din-04-032008.html?var_recherche=%22Islamul%20azi%22, accessed 30 March 2009.

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a non-denominational premarital contract may be taken into account. The Family Code prohibits polygamy, but marriages are recognised if they were legal in the jurisdictions where they were contracted. There are circumstances (almost exclusively among Arab expatriates) when marriages contracted in countries with legal systems different from the Romanian are officially recorded as such in the Romanian civil status register. Painful litigation (mainly over custody of children) emerges in cases of separation when the spouses bring to court the laws of their respective countries. Generally, such cases are not resolved because they end with two separate court decisions pronounced under different legal systems. 14


With regard to the Muslims in Romania, media coverage on the national level focuses almost exclusively on significant events (cultural exhibitions, ethnic festivals and public performances). The regional media (in Dobrudja) cover in detail the life of the community, as it addresses a broad audience and presents both religious and ethnic points of view. Internal debates within the community and tensions between the version of Islam professed by the historical Muslim community and that professed by new-comers are irrelevant to the non-Muslim population and not understood by them. Events and debates about international Islam-related subjects are usually presented by non-Muslim commentators, researchers in Middle Eastern Studies and ad-hoc analysts. Probably as a result of the long tradition of coexistence with Muslims, those who are long-established in Romania are regarded as a familiar Other, while outsiders (i.e., Muslims from other countries, including the Balkan countries) are regarded with suspicion (even if contact is indirect, through media coverage, etc.). So media focus on Islam tends only to be related to international events. 15


Nevruz, the annual spring celebration, is observed with public festivities organised by the Turkish and Tatar minorities, as well as Kurdish immigrants. There are several other festivals and contests with a mainly ethnic dimension.

SERBIA Ahmet Alibašić1 1

Muslim Populations

Muslims are one of the traditional religious communities that have been present in Serbia for centuries. Serbian Muslims are almost all Sunnis following the Hanafi school of Islamic law. Islam started to spread in the territories of today’s Serbia with the Ottoman conquest of the late fourteenth century and some parts of Serbia remained under the Ottomans for three to five centuries. The conquest started with two battles in Kosovo in 1389 and 1448, followed by the capture of the mediaeval Serbian capital Smederevo in 1459, and was completed after the conquest of Belgrade in 1521. After the incorporation of the medieval Serbian state into the Ottoman Empire, Islam over time became the majority religion in a number of regions mainly due to the voluntary conversion of local population, as well as migration. The Ottomans withdrew from the territories of today’s Serbia slowly over centuries starting with the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci) in 1699. The withdrawal process was completed after the Balkan wars in 1912–13, when Serbia doubled its territory by taking over the Ottoman regions of Sandžak, Kosovo and Macedonia. At that time there were about 500,000 Muslims in Serbia. In the territories left by the Ottomans, Muslims were in various ways very quickly reduced to insignificant numbers. Soon after the first phase of Ottoman withdrawal in 1834, only 12,000 Muslims remained in the then Serbia (much smaller than today’s Serbia), and by 1866 there were only 5,000 Muslims, mostly Roma. Many of the expelled Serbian Muslims settled in Bosnia and Sandžak, which were then still under the Ottomans. Some migrated all the way to Anatolia, where there is today a significant Bosniak community. The migrations continued after World War I but on a smaller

Ahmet Alibašić holds an MA in Islamic Studies, Political Sciences, and Islamic Civilization from Kuala Lumpur. He is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Sarajevo, and director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Sarajevo. He has authored a number of articles on Islam in SE Europe and interreligious relations. 1

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scale, so that most Muslims in the territories acquired by Serbia after 1912 and 1913 stayed where they were.2 According to the latest census of 2002, there are 239,658 Muslims among a total Serbian population of 7.4 million. As 3.2% of the population, they constitute the third largest religious group in Serbia after Orthodox (6,371,584) and Catholics (410,976).3 As a result of historical developments, the Muslim population today is concentrated mostly in south western Serbia, known as Sandžak (where there are 142,685 Muslims, or 60.67% of the local population) and in south eastern Serbia, Preševo Valley (municipalities of Preševo, Bujanovac i Medve¶a, where there are 58,903, or 66.2% of the local population). In addition to these two regions, significant Muslim communities are present in Belgrade (20,366 or 1.3%), central Serbia (10,000 or 0.3%) and Vojvodina (8,000 or 0.4%). Sandžak is home to 60% and Preševo Valley to 25% of Serbia’s Muslims. They are a majority in the municipalities of Tutin (97%), Sjenica (83%), Novi Pazar (80%), and Prijepolje (51%) in Sandžak, and Preševo (89%) and Bujanovac (55%) in south eastern Serbia. If Belgrade Muslims are added to those of Sandžak and Preševo, it appears that around one ninth of Serbian territory hosts over 90% of its Muslim population. Ethnically speaking, Bosniaks make up 56% (136.087), Albanians 25% (61.647), Roma 8%, and ethnic ‘Muslims’ 7%, of the total Muslim population, which amounts to about 96% of all Muslims in Serbia. Most of the few thousand Arabs living in Serbia, mostly in Belgrade, are also followers of Islam. Conversions to Islam today are rare but do happen. Some Muslim representatives question the accuracy of 2002 census data and refer to much higher number of Muslims, up to 700,000. However they do not provide any evidence except that they claim that a much higher percentage of Roma are Muslims than is indicated in the census of 2002. There are no surveys on levels of practice but, generally speaking, the Muslims of Sandžak and Preševo Valley are more much more

2 Zirojević, Olga, Srbija pod turskom vlašću 1459 –1804 (Serbia under Turkish Rule 1459– 1804) (Belgrade: Čigoja štampa, 2007); Bandžović, Safet, Iseljavanje muslimanskog stanovništva iz Srbije i Crne Gore tokom XIX stoljeća (Migration of the Muslim Population from Serbia and Montenegro during the Nineteenth Century) (Sarajevo: no publ, 1998); Avdić, Hakija, Položaj Muslimana u Sandžaku (The Status of Muslims in Sandžak) (Sarajevo: Biblioteka Ključanin, 1991); Karčić, Fikret, Muslimani Balkana ‘Istočno pitanje’ u XX vijeku (Muslims of the Balkans: The ‘Eastern Question’ in the Twentieth Century) (Tuzla: Behrambegova medresa, 2001). 3 See the details at http://webrzs.stat.gov.rs/axd//en/popis.htm, accessed 22 April 2009.

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religious than those in other parts of the country. Of all ethnic groups Roma practise the religion least. 2

Islam and the State

The Constitution of Serbia states that religious communities are equal and separate from the state. The Law on Churches and Religious Communities (2006)4 has regulated the issue of state-church relations. The law distinguishes between seven traditional religious communities, including the Islamic community, and all other communities. These seven enjoy the privilege of having inherited their legal status from the days of the Kingdom of Serbia which Yugoslavia automatically recognised. This does not prevent the Serbian government from being an actor in the current dispute within the Muslim community (see below). Furthermore, the law particularly mentions the historical role of the Serbian Orthodox Church in the development of the national identity of the Serb people. In practice, the Serbian Orthodox Church enjoys a privileged status and plays an important social and political role in the country. 3


The most important Islamic organisation in Serbia is the Islamska zajednica u Srbiji (Islamic Community in Serbia, ICiS, Ul. 1. maja 70/b, 36300 Novi Pazar, tel: 020/331-620, fax: 020/331 622, email: mesihat@ptt .yu, www.islamskazajednica.org) with its headquarters in Novi Pazar, headed by the chief mufti Muamer Zukorlić. The competing Islamska zajednica Srbije (Islamic Community of Serbia, ICoS) was established in 2007 (see below). Upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during 1991–92 the united Islamic Community in Yugoslavia dissolved too. A separate Islamic Community of Sandžak (Mešihat islamske zajednice 4 http://www.mv.sr.gov.yu/cir/images/stories/pravna_akta/zakon_o_crkvama_ i_vz.pdf, accessed 22 April 2009. For the history of church state relations in Serbia, see Bremer, Thomas, “Relations between the church and the state: The case of the Serbian Orthodox Church”, in Devetak, Silvo et al. (eds), Religion and Democracy in Moldova (Maribor-Chisinau: ISCOMET and ASER, 2005), p. 88; Bašić, Goran, “Status of churches and religious communities in Serbia”, in Silvo Devetak, Silvo et al. (eds), Legal Position of Churches and Religious Communities in South-Eastern Europe (Ljubljana: IDSE, 2004), pp. 143–157.

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Sandžaka) was established on 30 October 1993, while the Muslim community in the rest of the country remained organised only at regional and local level. Since the Law on Churches and Religious Communities of 2006 envisages the registration of only one organisation, with the words ‘in Serbia’ in its name, for each of the seven traditional religious communities, the unification assembly of the ICiS was held on 27 March 2007 and the ICiS was registered by the state in the registry of religious organisations on 30 July 2007.5 The ICiS is organised into four muftiates, which are currently headed by three muftis: the Sandžak muftiate with Mufti Muamer Zukorlić as the chief mufti of all Serbia, Preševo muftiate with Mufti Mumin Tahiri, and Belgrade and Novi Sad muftiate with Rešad Plojović as its mufti. Its executive body is called the Mešihat, headed by chief mufti. Its main institutions are the Faculty of Islamic Studies and Gazi Isa Bey’s madrasa in Novi Pazar, a monthly newspaper Glas Islama (Voice of Islam), El-Kelime publishing house, the International Humanitarian Organization (IHO), a media centre, an agency for halal quality certification, and two kindergartens. It also has three associations: for women, Islamic scholars (ulama) and youth. All contact details can be found on the main website of the ICiS given above. However, this united community was opposed by the then long-time mufti of Belgrade, Hamdija Jusufspahić and his two sons, both imams. In October 2007 the family was joined by personal opponents of the chief mufti Zukorlić from within the ICiS and supported by his political opponents gathered around the Bosniak political leader from Sandžak, Sulejman Ugljanin, a Bosniak nationalist who is currently in alliance with Serb nationalists and radicals. The state joined in the dispute by supporting the Jusufspahić family, widely seen as compromised by the positions it took under the Milošević regime. Despite the fact that the Law on Churches and Religious Communities stipulates the registration of only one organisation for each religious community, the state recognises this alternative Islamska zajednica Srbije (Islamic Community of Serbia, ICoS, www.rijaset.rs, www.mesihatsandzaka.rs) under the formal leadership of Adem Zilkić. The real mover of events is assumed to be the current self-proclaimed mufti of Belgrade Muhamed Jusuf-

5 Bećirbegović, Edah, “Organizacija Islamske zajednice u Srbiji”, in Karčić, Fikret et al., Organizacija islamskih zajednica u regionu (Sarajevo: Udruženje ilmijje IZ u BiH, 2008), p. 39.

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spahić. The website of the Serbian Ministry of Religions has weblinks to both communities on its homepage (www.mv.sr.gov.yu/cir/). Only the ICiS enjoys the support of the Islamic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia.6 The two communities have been disputing each other’s legality and legitimacy since 2007. The dispute has on several occasions erupted into violent conflict on the ground. The ICiS controls most of the mosques and other Islamic institutions in the country, and is by far the better organised and more active, but the following of the ICoS is not insignificant. At the core of the dispute seem to be the relationship with Sarajevo, personal ambitions and animosities, and the ambition of some local Muslim politicians and the Serbian government to control the community. The ICiS would like the Islamic Community in Sandžak to stay formally connected to the Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and in the case of Preševo with the Islamic Community in Kosovo)7 while the ICoS wants complete independence. As of the moment no easy solutions seems to be possible soon. 4


According to the very thorough research conducted by Divna ÎurićZamolo, before the Great Vienna War (1683–99), Belgrade had at least 73 mosques and some sources give higher figures.8 However, after the withdrawal of the Ottomans, they were all destroyed, apart from the Bajrakli Mosque, which was torched in March 2004 in revenge for the burning of the Kosovo churches. Today, there are some 190 mosques in Serbia: about 120 in Sandžak, 60 in southern Serbia, and one in each of Belgrade, Niš, Mali Zvornik and Subotica. A number of mosques are under construction. In some cities, including Novi Sad, Muslims gather in unmarked premises, presumably out of fear of attack.

6 Jusić, Muhamed, “The split within the Islamic community in Serbia”, paper presented at the conference “Administration of Islamic Affairs in Secular States: SE European Experience”, Sarajevo, 17–19 April 2009. 7 Article 5 of the Constitution of the Islamic Community in Serbia. 8 Îurić-Zamolo, Divna, Beograd kao orijentalna varoš pod Turcima 1521–1867: Arhitektonskourbanistička studija (Belgrade: Muzej grada beograda, 1977), p. 62. See also: Djurdjev, B., art. “Belgrade”, in Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edn, vol. 1, pp. 1163–1165.

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Religious education in public schools was introduced in 2002 following joint lobbying by the Orthodox Church and other churches and communities, including the Islamic community. The law guarantees the right to religious education in elementary and secondary public and private schools (Art. 40). In public schools Islamic religious education is an ‘optional-compulsory’ subject, which means that pupils may choose the subject but may then not later withdraw. It is taught by Muslims trained and licensed by the Islamic community and paid by the state. The subject is offered once a week in all the grades if there are seven or more interested pupils.9 Islamic religious instruction for Muslim children is also organised within the Islamic community’s mosques and maktabs. The ICiS also runs two kindergartens. 6


The ICiS is founder of the Gazi Isa Bey madrasa and the Faculty of Islamic Studies. The madrasa (http://medresa.net/) is an Islamic high school whose male section was established in 1990 while the section for girls was established in 1996. Another girls’ section in Rožaje (Montenegro) was opened in 2001. The Faculty (www.fis.edu.rs) was established in 2001 as a two-year Islamic Pedagogical Academy. Today, it provides four-year training for imams and Islamic religious education teachers for schools. Programmes are offered at undergraduate, MA and PhD levels. The language of instruction is Bosnian. Many of the teaching staff are visiting lecturers from Sarajevo. In addition to these two institutions, the ICiS runs the International University of Novi Pazar (www.uninp.edu.rs), which is formally registered as a waqf. It is a secular university with several faculties and branches in a number of towns throughout Serbia which are attended by both Muslim and non-Muslim students.

9 Savić, Svenka, “Some notes on Islamic education in Serbia”, in Aslan, Ednan (ed.), Islamische Erziehung in Europa/Islamic Education in Europe, Wiener Islamisch-religionspädagogische Studien, 1 (Vienna: Böhlau, 2009), pp. 449–456. See also Kuburić, Zorica and Milan Vukomanović, “Religious education: The case of Serbia”, in Kuburić, Zorica and Christian Moe (eds), Religion and Pluralism in Education: Comparative Approaches in the Western Balkans (Novi Sad: CEIR, 2006), pp. 107–138.

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As the status, history, problems, ethnic and social composition of the Muslim community differs from one region to another, so does the situation with cemeteries. In Sandžak, Preševo Valley and some other parts of the country, Muslims have no difficulty in carrying out burial according to Islamic tradition. In some towns where there are no Muslim cemeteries, Muslims choose to be buried in the nearest city where there is one. Belgrade Muslims have been complaining for a long time about the need for a new cemetery, but to no avail. During the socialist period, most cemeteries were taken over from the Islamic community and are now managed by the municipal authorities. 8


There are no chaplains in state institutions in Serbia. Recently there have been statements suggesting that this may be introduced and legally regulated. 9

Religious Festivals

The two ‘Ids/Bayrams are the two main Muslim festivals in the country. On the occasion of both holidays the chief mufti holds an official reception. The manner in which the bayrams are celebrated varies significantly between Muslim majority and Muslim minority areas. In addition, Muslims in Serbia celebrate the beginning of the New Hijri year, the Birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, and the two sacred nights that fall in Ramadan. 10

Halal Food

Halal slaughter is permitted. In cooperation with the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the ICiS has started its own Halal Quality Certification Agency which operates on a commercial basis. Halal products can be found in some supermarkets. In addition, Muslims often slaughter animals privately following the halal practice.

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Dress Codes

There are no legal restrictions on wearing hijab, but few women would do so outside the Muslim majority regions of Sandžak and Preševo Valley. Hijab is now allowed in photographs for personal documents. 12


Most of the Muslim media in Serbia are religious. Glas islama (Voice of Islam, www.glas-islam.info) is a biweekly newspaper published by the ICiS since 1996. The Faculty of Islamic Studies issues an annual collection of articles in Islamska misao (Islamic Thought) while students at the Gazi Isa Bey madrasa publish their own magazine called Softa. A private Sandžačke novine (Sandžak Newspaper) has been issued with various degrees of regularity depending on the financial resources of the owners. It is difficult to brand any of the electronic media as strictly Bosniak or Muslim, apart from the private Bosniak television station in Novi Pazar, which broadcasts no news or cultural programmes. There are three other television stations: regional Radio and TV station of Novi Pazar owned by the municipality, the private TV station Jedinstvo, and in 2008 the International University in Novi Pazar started an experimental radio and television station, Universa. There are several other private radio stations in Novi Pazar. In Preševo Valley the municipal radio and television station Preševo and two private radio and television stations (Spektri and Aldi ) broadcast in Albanian. There are no printed publications in Albanian in this region. 13

Family Law

Only marriages conducted by a public registrar are legally valid. Both the rival Islamic community associations encourage ‘Shari’a weddings’ administered by an imam. Such weddings have no legal standing and are usually performed after the civil ceremony. Divorce is usually formalised only by the civil authorities. This is also true of inheritance; families may agree privately to divide an inheritance according to the norms of Islamic law but they must still go to the civil authorities to make it official. There have been cases of polygamy, including some

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involving officials of the ICiS. No formal ‘Shari’a divorce’ procedure has been adopted. 14


The dispute between the ICiS and the ICoS, and related violence and verbal attacks, has dominated public discourse on Islam and Muslims in Serbia during the last two years. In addition, the issue of Muslim extremism has been on and off the public agenda. Two groups of socalled Wahhabis are currently on trial in Belgrade for illegal possession of arms and planning terrorist attacks. In November 2008, a Belgrade publishing house, Beobuk, published the Serbian translation of The Jewel of Medina (Dragulj Medine) by Sherry Jones, which the Islamic authorities in Serbia considered insulting to the Prophet Muhammed. The book was briefly withdrawn from circulation at the request of Chief Mufti Zukorlić, but is now on sale again and has featured at the Sarajevo book exhibition in neighbouring Bosnia, where it has also provoked sporadic protests, although this did not stop retailers selling it at the exhibition. 15


Most Muslim cultural events take place in Sandžak, which is the centre of both religious and cultural life. The most common of these are concerts of religious songs (ilahije), literary evenings, the traditional days celebrating Bosniak culture, various exhibitions, and book promotions.

SLOVAKIA Štîpán Macháček1 1

Muslim Populations

The last census in Slovakia in 2001 did not offer the respondents the option of stating they were Muslims because the Islamic community has not yet been registered as a religious community and so Islam has not been recognised by the state as a Slovakian religion. Those respondents who indicated Islam were classified in the official results of the census as belonging to ‘other churches and religious societies’ and those Muslims who did not indicate any religion were classified as of ‘unknown’ religion.2 Figures for the number of Muslims in Slovakia are therefore only estimates. It is generally accepted that there are about 5,000 Muslims in Slovakia, including foreigners living temporarily in the country. Muslim community sources say there are about 4,000–5,000 Muslims, with only about 10% of them actively practising the faith.3 According to these estimates, Muslims constitute about 0.09% of the population of Slovakia. Despite the fact that some Muslims came to present-day Slovakia as early as the tenth century and today’s southern Slovakia was controlled by the Ottoman Empire for nearly 150 years, there is not (and most likely has never been) an ‘authentic’ Slovak Muslim population and the overwhelming majority of today’s Slovak Muslims are people of foreign origin. Similarly to the Czech Republic, there are Muslims from mostly Arab countries who came to the former Czechoslovakia to study and

1 Štîpán Macháček is a research fellow at the Oriental Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences, now temporarily teaching Czech language at the University of Ain Shams in Cairo, Egypt. He is a graduate in Arabic and the history and culture of the Islamic world. He has researched on contemporary Islam in the Balkans and published several articles on the subject. 2 Figures provided by the Štatistický úrad Slovenskej republiky (Department for Statistics of the Slovak Republic), available at http://portal.statistics.sk/files/Sekcie/sek_600/ Demografia/SODB/Tabulky/tab13.pdf, accessed 27 May 2009. 3 An estimate given in an article published 11 May 2007 in the influential Slovak daily Hospodárske noviny (Moravčík, Roman, “Posledná krajina bez mešity”), available at http://hnonline.sk/c6-10157090-21127090-kL0000_detail-posledna-krajina-bez-mesity, accessed 27 May 2009.

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stayed, and often also married. In the 1990s, they were joined by Muslim refugees from the Balkans (mostly Bosnians, but also Kosovan and Macedonian Albanians) and the former Soviet Union. Afghan refugees also form a significant component of the Slovak Muslim community. The number of Slovak converts is estimated only at about 200 persons, mostly Slovak women married to Muslims of foreign origin. Most Muslims and Muslim activities are concentrated in the capital Bratislava, with small numbers living in the cities of Košice and Martin and the spa town of Piešt’any. 2

Islam and the State

Slovakia has no state religion and the Constitution provides for religious freedom. The prevalent faith is Roman Catholicism, professed by an estimated 70% of the Slovak population. Registration of churches and religious communities is not obligatory. However, religious communities that do not register are not granted the right to public funding, or allowed to build places of worship for public religious services. The last restriction also applies in prisons and hospitals. The Muslim community has never been registered in Slovakia as a religious community and would probably not be able to meet the strict requirements for registration. The 2007 amendment to the 1991 Law on churches and religious communities registration requires that communities wishing to register must have a minimum of 20,000 members permanently resident in Slovakia, and information must be provided about members’ personal details and their knowledge of the basic tenets of the faith. These regulations make it impossible for Slovak Muslims to become a recognized religious community in the foreseeable future. 3


Islamská nadácia na Slovensku (Islamic Foundation in Slovakia, (POBox 247 Bratislava 814 99, email: [email protected]) is generally regarded as an official institution of the Muslim community. It was established in 1999 by Mohamad Safwan Hasna (who is Syrian by origin). Its activities are limited to organising religious and cultural events and worship, providing information on Islam, giving interviews in the media and helping Muslim asylum seekers with their problems. It runs an informative website at www.islamweb.sk.

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Všeobecný zväz moslimských študentov na Slovensku (General Union of Muslim Students in Slovakia), sometimes also Všeobecný zväz moslimov na Slovensku (General Union of Muslims in Slovakia) was founded in 1993 as a civil association. Its declared aim is to help Muslims living in Slovakia and to provide ‘objective’ information on Islam and its culture. Its activists overlap with those of Združenie priatel’ov islamskej literatúry (Association of Friends of Islamic Literature, Žabotova ulica č.2, 811 04, Bratislava, email: [email protected]), whose goal is to inform the Slovak public about the Islamic culture and traditions. A leading person in both organisations is Abdulwahab Al-Sbenaty, a Slovak-Syrian, and the translator of the only Slovak version of the Qur’an. 4


Bratislava is probably the only European capital without a mosque, and Slovakia the only European country without an Islamic shrine. All efforts to establish an Islamic centre in Slovakia, including a mosque, have so far been unsuccessful. In Bratislava, the Muslim community uses a hired space as a prayer room (Staré grunty 64, Karlova Ves, Bratislava). No information on other such places is available. 5


Primary and secondary schools in Slovakia provide lessons in Religious Education, which are organised by officially registered churches and religious communities. Islam is not registered so no Islamic Religious Education can be given. For those who do not wish to attend classes on an officially recognised (mostly Catholic) religion, classes in ‘Ethics’ are provide, which include some coverage of History of Religions. This is the option chosen by Muslim children. 6


There is a Department of Classical and Semitic Philology at Komensky University in Bratislava, which includes a programme on Arabic Language and Culture.4 At the Slovak Academy of Sciences, there is an Institute of Oriental Studies with several specialists in Islamic history 4

http://www.fphil.uniba.sk/index.php?id=kksf, accessed 27 May 2009.

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and religion.5 Arabic language is also taught at Nitra University in the Faculty of Political Sciences and European Studies. 7


The only burial place assigned for Muslims is part of the large municipal cemetery Slávičie údolie in Bratislava. Islamic burials have taken place there for several decades. There are about 200 burial places and the Muslim community now faces the problem of the lack of space—a general problem in the capital, which is not specific for the Muslim community. Members of The Islamic Foundation perform burial rituals. 8


Because Muslims are not registered as a religious community, they cannot perform any of these activities in government institutions and services. 9

Religious Festivals

No data. 10

Halal Food

Because Muslims are not registered as a religious community, they are not allowed to assist or slaughter in slaughterhouses, or to issue halal certificates. However, Vienna is only about 50 km away and this helps Muslims in Bratislava and elsewhere in Slovakia to have easy access to halal food. In Bratislava and a few other Slovak cities, there are fast food stalls serving imported halal meat. 11

Dress Codes

There is no law prohibiting or limiting the wearing of typical Islamic clothing by women, including hijab andr niqab. No dress code incident has so far been reported.

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http://orient.sav.sk.

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The only printed Islamic periodical publication is Al-Islam magazine, published irregularly, (usually several times a year) by the Islamic Foundation. It was originally, from 1994, published by Všeobecný zväz moslimských študentov. The Islamic Foundation has its own website (www.islamweb.sk), which is regarded as an official medium of the Slovak Muslim community. Združenie priatel’ov islamskej literatúry and Všeobecný zväz moslimov na Slovensku have a common website (www.islam-sk.sk), where the abovementioned Slovak translation of the Qur’an is also available. 13

Family Law

Islamic marriages are not officially recognised by the state because Muslims are not registered as a religious community. Muslims can (and do) perform Islamic marriage ceremonies, but must also have a civil marriage in order for the marriage to be registered. However, some Muslim countries recognise marriages conducted by the Islamic Foundation in Slovakia. 14


The 2007 amendment of the Law on church registration increased the requirements for registration. This aroused dissatisfaction in the Muslim community and gave rise to the view that the amendment was specifically intended to prevent them from registering. The construction of an Islamic Centre in Bratislava is discussed in the Slovak media but does not attract much public interest. 15 No data.


SLOVENIA Christian Moe1 1

Muslim Populations

According to the last census, 47,488 Muslims made up 2.4% of Slovenia’s population (2002). Though markedly higher than in the 1991 census, the figure may be low, as the 23% of the population whose religion is not known probably includes some Muslims. Census data on (ethnic) nationality, however, do not suggest that there are many more people of Muslim cultural background. The figure does not include guest-workers. The Islamic Community does not provide membership figures, as it has not yet centralised its records and no data are available on active participation in religious practice. For centuries, Slovenes encountered Muslims primarily as Ottoman armies, though in World War I, Bosnian Muslims fought for the Habsburg Empire on Slovenian soil. Significant numbers of Muslims first arrived from the 1950s onwards as internal migrants from other parts of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to meet the need for low-skilled workers in the growing economy of the most-developed Yugoslav republic. Consequently, nearly all Slovenian Muslims are urban dwellers, concentrated in industrial towns. In the 1990s, after Slovenian independence, they were joined by thousands of refugees from Bosnia. The Islamic Community began to organise itself in the early 1960s, and the first local Islamic community council was founded in Ljubljana in 1967.2 Census data on the ethnic makeup of Slovenia’s Muslims are open to interpretation, as some categories are contested, fluid, or overlapping. Of those who declared themselves Muslims by confession, some 74% declare themselves Bosniaks, Bosnians, or Muslimani (the Yugoslav-era 1 Christian Moe (PhD candidate, History of Religion, University of Oslo) is a freelance writer and researcher in Slovenia, focusing on Balkan Muslims, human rights and religious reform. He is co-editor of New Directions in Islamic Thought (London: I.B. Tauris, 2009). 2 Pašić, Ahmed, Islam in muslimani v Sloveniji [Islam and Muslims in Slovenia], Sarajevo: Emanet, 2002, pp. 103–106.

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category of ‘Muslims in the national sense’);3 they originate mainly from northern Bosnia or the Sandžak region. They are followed by Albanians (11%), mainly from Kosovo and Macedonia; Slovenes (6%); people of unknown nationality (ca. 4%); Roma (ca. 2%); and Montenegrins, Macedonians, and others (ca. 1% each).4 2

Islam and the State

Slovenia is a secular state. The 1991 constitution provides inter alia for freedom of conscience and for the separation of the state and religious communities. The new Religious Freedom Act (2007) replaced a Communist-era law on religious communities with a more accommodating model providing inter alia for state-funded spiritual care in public institutions. Religious communities (including two Islamic ones) are registered by a state Office for Religious Communities. In 2007, the Islamic Community concluded a separate agreement with the state detailing its legal status and rights, becoming the fifth Slovenian religious community to do so.5 The state contributes part of the mandatory social security payments for religious employees, including imams on the payroll of the Islamic Community. Under the new law, the state will also directly or indirectly employ some religious personnel as providers of spiritual care in institutions (but see section 8 below). The Islamic Community has received symbolic sums from the Office for Religious Communities, but has so far not managed to benefit from the opportunities for religious communities to apply for state funding for social programmes (probably because of limited capacity) or for maintaining cultural heritage (as they have little material heritage to maintain).

3 On these overlapping identities, see Kalčič, Špela, “Changing Contexts and Redefinitions of Identity among Bosniaks in Slovenia,” Balkanologie, vol. 9, no. 1–2 (December 2005), pp. 149–171. 4 Komac, Miran (ed.), Priseljenci: Študije o priseljevanju in vključevanju v slovensko družbo [Immigrants: Studies on immigration and inclusion into Slovenian society], Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 2007, p. 536 (Table 10). 5 See documentation in Čepar, Drago (ed.), State and Religion in Slovenia (Ljubljana: Office of the Government of the Republic of Slovenia for Religious Communities, 2008), available at http://www.uvs.gov.si/fileadmin/uvs.gov.si/pageuploads/razni_dokumenti/ DRZAVA_IN_VERA_V_SLOVENIJI_THE_STATE_AND_RELIGION_IN_ SLOVENIA.pdf, accessed 27 May 2009.

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The Islamska skupnost v Republiki Sloveniji (Islamic Community in the Republic of Slovenia, IC, Grablovičeva 14, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel: +386(1)2313625, fax: +386(1)2313626, email: [email protected], www.islamska-skupnost.si), headed by Mufti Dr. Nedžad Grabus, is the main religious organisation that represents Islam, employs imams and organises the religious life of nearly all Slovenia’s Muslims. It is a branch of the Islamic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and stands for Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school (see Bosnia-Herzegovina for details). Its membership is multi-ethnic, but the large majority are Bosniaks. A very small Slovenska muslimanska skupnost (Muslim Community of Slovenia, MCS, Kotnikova 5, SI-1000 Ljubljana, tel: +386 1 430 4866, fax: +386 1 430 4866, email: [email protected], www.smskupnost. si) was registered in 2006 by Osman Îogić, the former mufti of the IC, who broke away after internal conflict blocked his re-appointment.6 The MCS is independent of Bosnia, but similar to the IC in ethnic make-up and doctrinal orientation. 4


Slovenia still has no purpose-built mosque with a minaret. Muslims have sought to build a mosque in Ljubljana since 1968 and have stepped up their efforts in the last decade. At the very end of 2008, major steps were taken: a new urban area plan provided for a definitive location for an Islamic Cultural Centre and mosque, and the IC bought most of the necessary land from the city, which turned down an anti-mosque referendum initiative. Local congregations have prayer-houses; standards vary. The IC recently acquired a house on the outskirts of Ljubljana for meetings, prayers, and a halal restaurant.

6 Îogić has given a detailed polemical account of the developments in the IC that led to his ousting. Îogić, Osman, Zaustavite IZlazim (Stop I’m Getting Off ) (Prozor: Fondacija Makljen, 2006).

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There is no religious instruction or other confessional activity in public schools. An elective non-confessional Religions and Ethics subject exists, but is not widely taught. There are no separate Muslim schools. Religious communities may establish private schools (eligible for 85% state funding if they teach the public curriculum), but due to limited capacity this is not on the agenda of the Islamic Community. Some Slovenian youths attend Islamic boarding-schools (medresa) in Croatia (Zagreb) or Bosnia. Islam is taught to children in mekteb classes organised in about a dozen towns by local congregations of the IC. Classes take place outside school hours and sometimes in inadequate facilities. The IC is developing a Slovenian curriculum and textbooks to replace the Bosnian ones currently in use. Some adult religious instruction is also offered.7 6


Slovenian imams typically get their higher Islamic education at institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see that section). The IC holds some internal training courses, and the Egyptian embassy arranged a shortterm scholarship to Al-Azhar in 2008. Slovenian universities have only recently begun to offer Religious Studies, let alone Islamic Studies, though some relevant courses are found in departments of sociology, anthropology and theology. Teacher training for the elective school subject on religion is offered jointly by the Faculty of Arts and the (Catholic) Theological Faculty in Ljubljana. 7


Imams may officiate at burials. The lack of Muslim cemeteries is a concern in many places. Cemeteries are publicly owned and, while a few towns have allotted separate cemetery sections for Muslims ( Jesenice, Maribor, Krško, Tržič), most, including the capital, have not.

7 Moe, Christian, “Islamic education in Slovenia,” in Aslan, Ednan (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2008).

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A heritage site, the graves of Muslim soldiers fallen in World War I, was marked with Muslim tombstones in 2007. 8


The 2007 Religious Freedom Act guarantees the right to pastoral or spiritual care for hospital and nursing home patients, detained persons, police and the army. When there is sufficient demand, the relevant authorities should provide religious personnel. This right to provide such care is also stated in the IC’s agreement with the state. However, Muslim spiritual care in state institutions has not yet been implemented. 9

Religious Festivals

No Muslim festivals are public holidays. Celebration of the two Bayram holidays has in recent years seen more public recognition, with official greetings and a nationally televised short address by the mufti. For lack of a mosque or other suitable facilities, communal Bayram prayers have to be held in rented sports halls. Some qurban sacrifice is discreetly carried out in private, limited by cost, practicalities and concerns over legality (see section 10). Mevluds (mawlids) and other events are also held to mark other important dates in the Muslim calendar (e.g., New Hijri Year, holy nights). 10

Halal Food

A new initiative to institutionalise the certification of halal meat was taken by the IC in 2007, and the first butcher’s shop so certified opened in Ljubljana in 2008. Previously, demand had mainly been met through informal arrangements, if at all. Several food companies have long held halal certificates, chiefly for export. The law requires the animal to be rendered unconscious before slaughter, but veterinary authorities may grant exceptions for ritual slaughter. Private slaughter, common on farms and formerly the occasion of a folk holiday, is allowed (regulated in 2004) for the personal consumption of one’s own animals, but as there are hardly any rural Muslims, the legality (and social acceptance) of private Muslim ritual slaughter is unclear.

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Dress Codes

While some older women may wear traditional headscarves, and new Islamic dress (often colourful) with hijab was adopted by some young women in the 1990s, most Muslim women go uncovered. The law does not regulate this or other religious attire. Hijab in schools has not been an issue, but some women who wear the headscarf report difficulties in job-seeking. A major contribution to the ethnography of Islam in Slovenia was a monograph on Muslim dress and identity published in 2007.8 12


The Islamic Community operates a website (www.islamska-skupnost.si), has started an internal bulletin, and distributes the (Bosnian) Preporod bi-weekly. A small independent group has produced a magazine, Iqre, oriented towards globalised, Arab-centered and revivalist discourses rather than local tradition. Other Slovenian media that are not specifically religious, but reach a Muslim audience and include Islamic contents, as they report on everything of interest to the Bosniak community, include the biweekly student radio broadcast Podalpski selam (Salaam under the Alps), the website www.bosnjak.si, and the monthly Bošnjak magazine. 13

Family Law

Family law is secular, and a valid marriage can only be performed by a public registrar in a secular ceremony. Couples may choose to have a religious ceremony in addition to this. The IC encourages Islamic marriages (‘Shari’a weddings’) performed by imams, and has recently begun to register them. Unofficial Islamic marriages exist,9 though the IC discourages the practice.

8 Kalčič, Špela, Nisem jaz Barbika: Oblačilne prakse, islam in identitetni procesi med Bošnjaki v Sloveniji (I am not a Barbie doll: Dress Practices, Islam and Identity Processes among Bosniaks in Slovenia) (Ljubljana: Filozofska fakulteta, Oddelek za etnologijo in kulturno antropologijo, 2007). 9 Kalčič, Nisem jaz Barbika, pp. 64–66.

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Public debate on Islam has continued to centre on the plans for an Islamic cultural centre and mosque in Ljubljana, which are opposed by a few politicians on plainly xenophobic grounds. The main representatives of the Islamic Community were positively portrayed inter alia in a European context (see section 15). Muslims are not very visible in the media, but both their visibility has increased and the quality of reporting has improved over the last decade. 15


During the Slovene presidency of the EU in the first half of 2008, the Mufti took part in high-level events connected with the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. In autumn 2008, the City Museum of Ljubljana held a pioneering exhibition on the life of Muslims in Slovenia. There are several ethnic cultural societies and Muslim women’s associations active in arranging cultural events and festivals, including religious content.

SPAIN Jordi Moreras1 1

Muslim Populations

For Spanish society, the memory of the splendour of the culture and civilisation of Al-Andalus is acting to some extent as a burden and an interference with the present. There is no connection between the past (although it is officially claimed as part of Spanish identity), and the present of the new Muslim immigration. The new Islamic presence is recovering the image of a historical cultural otherness. The contemporary Muslim presence in Spain is the result of waves of migration that started in the 1970s, but Spain has also had its own Muslim populations in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla since at least the fifteenth century. Today, Islam is one of the major religious minorities of Spanish society, although the majority of Muslims are of foreign origin. Article 16.2 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, according to which “no one can be forced to declare their ideology, religion, or beliefs”, makes it very hard to establish a statistical census of religious faiths in Span. For this reason, all that can be done is to attempt to develop a series of estimates of the Muslim population, estimates that may at times be biased and may not have an objective basis. The main source for these estimates is the statistics on foreign residents from countries where the majority of the population is Muslim, as well as figures for the granting of Spanish nationality to such residents. These data provide a trustworthy approximation, at least for drawing a rough outline of the Muslim population. However, despite the attempts made to interpret these data, the religiosity of these groups can in no way be inferred from them. The following four categories succinctly summarise this presence:

1 Jordi Moreras is Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences, University Rovira i Virgili (Tarragona, Spain), and member of Research Group on Social and Organizational Analysis (ASO-URV). He is the author of Els imams de Catalunya (Barcelona: Editorial Empúries, 2007) and Musulmans a Catalunya. Radiografia d’un islam implantat (Barcelona: Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània, 2008).

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1. People with Muslim roots (including residents of Muslim origin in Ceuta and Melilla, around 70,000 and 80,000 people); 2. Naturalised Muslims (between 1960 and 2006, 80,235 people of Muslim origin—mostly Moroccans, but also Arabs from the Middle East and Pakistanis- acquired Spanish nationality);2 3. New Muslims (Spaniards who choose the Muslim faith; the size of this group is always difficult to establish, although the last report of the Observatory Andalusí, UCIDE states that there are 33,750 Muslim converts in Spain,3 probably an overestimate);4 4. Foreign residents (including both people who are just passing through Spain, such as businessmen and students, and especially immigrant workers, mainly Maghrebian, African and Pakistani workers, whose migratory cycles began in the decades of the 1970s and 1980s. Data from 2008 indicate that they number some 860,755 people, the majority natives of Morocco. It is necessary to add a certain percentage to this figure to account for people whose legal situation is irregular). This gives a total of between 800,000 and 1,000,000 Muslims (representing 2.2% of the Spanish population).5 The regions where Muslims live in greatest numbers are Catalonia, Madrid, Andalusia and Valencia.

2 Foreigners may apply for Spanish nationality after living in Spain for ten years, while those born in Spanish overseas territories may apply after one year. In recent years there have been cases of refusal of citizenship to people who follow Islamic religious practises but, when challenged, the refusals have been overturned in the Supreme Court on the basis of the principle of religious freedom. 3 Observatorio Andalusí, Estudio demográfico de la población musulmana. Explotación estadística del censo de ciudadanos musulmanes en España referido a fecha 31 de diciembre de 2007 Demographic study of the Muslim population. Statistical analysis of the census of Muslim citizens in Spain conducted 31 December 2007) (Madrid: Unión de Comunidades Islámicas de España, 2008). 4 Muslim converts are an active minority within Islam in Spain in areas such as community representation, publishing and promotion of cultural activities. Their doctrinal spectrum is very different from the Sufi communities, progressive Islam or the doctrinal literalism. 5 1,145,424 Muslims in Spain according to the estimation of the Observatorio Andalusí.

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Islam and the State

The Spanish state is defined by a principle of non-confessionalism (aconfesionalidad), which guarantees religious freedom and establishes cooperative relationships with representatives of religious denominations (Spanish Constitution, Art. 16). There is no state religion, but the Catholic Church enjoys some privileges not available to other faiths. The General Directorate for Relations with the Confessions (Ministry of Justice) is responsible for relations with these religious denominations. At the regional level, there is in Catalonia a Department of Religious Affairs. The Foundation for Pluralism and Coexistence (www.pluralismoyconvivencia.es), established in October 2004, is the public body responsible for promoting religious freedom and establishing a line of financial assistance to minority religious communities. In 2007, this public funding amounted to €4,500,000, markedly less than the financing that Spanish government provides for the Catholic Church, through agreement with the Holy See of 1979.6 The Cooperation Agreement signed in 1992 between the Spanish State and the Islamic Commission of Spain establishes the framework for the recognition of Islam as a religion rooted in Spanish society.7 Seventeen years later, many aspects of this agreement have yet to be developed, which impedes the development and organisation of Islam in Spain.8

6 In September 2006, the Spanish government agreed to change the system by which the Catholic Church is financed. The new model is based on allowing the Catholic faithful voluntarily to allocate a portion of their taxes. It was estimated that the church would receive €175,000,000 in 2006. The Spanish state is also committed to eliminating the payment of VAT by the Catholic Church. 7 Motilla, Agustín (ed.), Los musulmanes en España. Libertad religiosa e identidad cultural (The Muslims of Spain. Religious freedom and cultural identity) (Madrid: Trotta, 2004). 8 There are four reasons for the non-implementation of this agreement: 1) the internal disputes between the two Islamic federations (FEERI and UCIDE), which limited the role of the Islamic Commission of Spain as a representative body; 2) the development of a centralised organisational model (the Islamic Commission) disregarding communal geographical distribution; 3) the lack of political will among the political authorities to promote the development of this agreement, due to distrust of the demands of Muslim communities; 4) the lack of interest expressed by Muslim communities because of their ignorance of the contents of the agreement. Representatives of the two federations have been unable to mobilise these communities in order to bring about the implementation of some aspects of the agreement, such as religious education and Muslim burials.

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In 1992, the Islamic Commission of Spain was created, made up of the Spanish Federation of Islamic Religious Entities (FEERI, La Unión 47, Málaga 29006, tel: +34. 629559273) and the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain (UCIDE, Anastasio Herrero 5, Madrid 28020, tel: +34.915714040, fax: +34.915708889, http://es.ucide.org). Both federations are very heterogeneous with regard to both the national origins of their members and the doctrinal guidance they provide. However, FEERI have always had larger numbers of converts, while the UCIDE attracts mostly Muslims from the Middle East, especially Syria, and its board is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. There are currently 651 Islamic religious institutions registered with the Ministry of Justice. Of these, 70% are affiliated to UCIDE and 10% to FEERI, while the rest are not affiliated. As a result of the stagnation of the Islamic Commission, new Muslim regional federations have asked the Spanish government to allow them to become part of it, which would necessitate a change to its statutes. 4


It is estimated that in Spain has some 450 Muslim places of worship (there is no official record), in addition to twelve major Muslim centres (4 in Ceuta and Melilla,9 Marbella, 1981, Madrid 1983, Madrid, 1992, Valencia, 1992; Fuengirola 1994, La Puebla de Don Fadrique 2001, Granada, 2003, Málaga, 2007). These mosques have been financed by Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In some cases, the Spanish authorities have granted land for their construction. There are other projects still under discussion in Seville and Barcelona. Most of them are Sunni mosques. In 1982, the Ahmadi Mission opened a mosque in Pedro Abad (Cordoba). The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the right of Muslims to open places of worship, but since 1990 (the date of the first protest against the construction of a mosque in Vic, Barcelona), there have been 50 conflicts concerning the

During the Protectorate period in Northern Morocco before 1956, the Spanish colonial administration built mosques, prayer halls and other Islamic religious buildings. The two main mosques in Ceuta (the Sidi M’barik Mosque) and Melilla (on Garcia Cabrelles Street) are good examples of this. 9

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opening of mosques, 35 of them in Catalonia.10 The Catalan regional parliament is debating a law on places of worship to establish conditions regarding their location.11 5


The only Islamic school in Spain is in Madrid. This is the Umm alKura school, which forms part of the Madrid Islamic Cultural Centre complex and was founded in 1992. It provides pre-school, primary and secondary education and is a school accredited by the Spanish state. According to the Islamic Centre, the school had 400 pupils in the year 2006–2007. Previously, there was an Iraqi school, attached to the Iraqi embassy, attended by the children of Arab consular employees. With regard to public schools, in 1996 the Spanish state and the Islamic Commission of Spain signed an agreement to include Islamic religious education in the national educational system.12 Despite the fact that the agreement established that this teaching should have begun in the 1996–97 school year, its application was in fact delayed until the 2003–04 school year, when the education began in some Autonomous Communities (regional/provincial authorities) to which the transfer of responsibility for education had not yet taken place (Ceuta, Melilla, Aragon, Valencia, and Madrid). Parallel to the development of this more formal Islamic religious education, the communities themselves

10 See Moreras, Jordi, Una mesquita al barri. Conflicte, espai públic i integració urbana dels oratoris musulmans a Catalunya (A local mosque. Conflict, public space and urban integration of Muslim places of worship in Catalonia) (Barcelona: Fundació Jaume Bofill, 2009). The reasons for these objections are related to the increasing visibility of the Muslim presence. The protests against mosques include arguments about the status of immigrant groups, as well as the ‘problematic nature’ of Islam. A latent Islamophobia generates social legitimacy for these protests. The fact that protests arise more in Catalonia than in the rest of Spain is due to the prolonged and extensive settlement of Muslims in Catalonia (with more than 180 mosques), and the challenges this represents to the development of a social and political debate on the pluralisation of Catalan society. 11 It is expected that this law will be approved during 2009. Basically, the law deals with the administrative regulation of the places of worship of religious minorities (i.e. not the Catholic Church) the provision of public land for the construction of religious buildings. 12 See Roson, Javier, Sol Tarrés and Jordi Moreras, “Islamic religious education in Spain”, in Alvarez Veinguer, A., G. Dietz, D.-P. Jozsa and T. Knauth (eds), Islam in Education in European Countries: Pedagogical Concepts and Empirical Findings (Münster/New York: Waxmann, 2009).

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have put forward various religious socialisation initiatives, focused on children, youth and women, and based on a traditional model of religious transmission (kuttab, or Qur’anic schools). Many of these initiatives are considered by parents to be complementary to the education their children receive in school, even though they are outside of the structured, formalised school environment. According to the Observatorio Andalusí, in 2006 there were 119,994 Muslim students in the Spanish educational system, and 41 teachers of Islamic religious education.13 6


As a result of the history of Al-Andalus, there is a long tradition of Arab and Islamic studies in Spain, including in many departments in Spanish universities and research centres (such as the universities of Madrid, Granada, Barcelona, Sevilla and Alicante). A recent shift to the study of contemporary Islam has generated new lines of training and interdisciplinary research in other academic fields. The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the right of Muslim communities to open training colleges. The only example was the International University Ibn Rushd of Cordoba, founded in 1992, but today closed as a result of the loss of institutional and financial support, after the death of its director, Ali Kettani, in 2001. This university offered Arabic language and Islamic sciences taught by Muslim teachers. More recently, since 2006, the UNED (Spanish public university for distance education) with the Junta Islámica14 has run a course on Islamic culture and religion.15 With regard to the training of imams, the first formal initiatives began in the 1980s. After the Cooperation Agreement of 1992, the Islamic Commission of Spain began an internal consultation to propose a training programme for imams. No projects were completed because 13 Observatorio Andalusí, Informe anual 2006. Institución para la observación y seguimiento de la situación del ciudadano musulmán y la islamofobia en España (Madrid: UCIDE, 2007), p. 10. No official data are available on the number of students who have received Islamic religious instruction. One of the problems for the development of this education is the rejection by various regions of the implementation of these programmes. This is the case in Catalonia, which has a Muslim student body of over 30,000 but no teachers of Islamic religious education. 14 Junta Islámica was one of the founders of FEERI in 1989. 15 “Experto Profesional en cultura y religión islámicas (Professional expert in Islamic culture and religion” (www.ciberuniversidad.com/islam/, accessed 27 May 2009).

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of internal disagreements. In Catalonia, the Islamic and Cultural Council of Catalonia has run a training programme specifically for imams since 2006, coordinated by the Moroccan Ministry of Religious Affairs, with support from the Department of Religious Affairs of the Generalitat of Catalonia. In January 2009, the UNED, sponsored by the Pluralismo y Convivencia (Pluralism and Coexistence) foundation,16 initiated another training programme for Islamic religious leaders, under the title “Islam and democratic principles”.17 7


The need to provide space for the Muslim population in municipal cemeteries has arisen recently, with the increasing settlement of Muslims in Spain. Until now, the existing cemeteries were either those in Ceuta and Melilla (whose Muslim cemeteries were managed by the different communities in both cities), or historical cemeteries (like those in Seville and Granada, opened in 1936 by the Franco regime to bury Moroccan troops who fought in the Civil War), or cemeteries that belonged to the governments of Muslim countries and were used for their employees or citizens (such as the cemetery of Griñón in Madrid, which has now reached capacity). In Andalusia, various groups of Spanish Muslims have always called for spaces, which were ultimately acquired and maintained by personal initiatives; they did not always provide appropriate conditions and are filling rapidly. Since 1992, the Cooperation Agreement has recognised the right of Muslims to make use of sites in public cemeteries. There are reserved spaces in Ceuta and Melilla, Seville, Granada, Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Benalmádena, Zaragoza, Palma de Mallorca, Manresa, Las Palmas de Gran Canaria and Terrassa. However, there are not enough spaces and this leads to a significant number of families returning the bodies of their deceased 16 “Pluralism and Coexistence Foundation is a foundation of the public sector, created by agreement of the Council of Ministers of 15 October 2004, at the proposal of the Ministry of Justice. Its purpose is to contribute to the implementation of programmes and projects of cultural, educational and social integration of minority faiths that have concluded cooperation agreements with the State or striking roots in Spain, as well as promoting the full exercise of religious freedom” (text taken from their website, www .pluralismoyconvivencia.es/). 17 Website: http://www.fundacion.uned.es/cursos/derecho/diploma-actualizacionprofesional/islam-principios-democraticos/index.html, accessed 27 May 2009.

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to their home country. Recognition of the right to an Islamic burial is conditional on there being no contravention of other legal principles which among other matters require the use of a coffin. 8


Articles 8 and 9 of the Cooperation Agreement of 2002 regulates Islamic pastoral care in public hospitals, prisons and the army. In 2006, the Spanish government has developed the regulations that facilitate this care. However, unlike that provided by the Catholic Church, Muslim pastoral care is still inadequate and is offered on a voluntary basis. In the case of hospitals, there are difficulties in the spiritual care of Muslim patients, especially in the treaty of the bodies of the deceased. In prisons, fear of the influence of radical imams who may visit prisoners has led efforts to control pastoral care there. Prison authorities, with the help of the Spanish National Intelligence Centre, have drawn up lists of imams who are considered suitable for this task. 9

Religious Festivals

Article 12 of the Cooperation Agreement recognises the right to take time off to celebrate the major Muslim festivals by prior agreement between Muslim workers and their employers. Prisons organise cultural and religious activities during the month of Ramadan. The celebration of the major prayers for ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha is becoming increasingly visible in neighbourhoods and towns with a substantial Muslim presence. City councils tend to assign public facilities or the use of public streets for these celebrations. 10

Halal Food

The emergence of initiatives for producing and marketing halal products is beginning to take shape in Spain. In the neighbourhoods of the large cities, where populations of Muslim immigrant origin are concentrated, a good number of halal butchers’ and grocers’ shops can be found as well as other types of establishment offering products and services that specifically target the Muslim community. All these commercial initiatives are in response to an incipient demand for these

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products on the part of the Muslim community, which then generates an infrastructure of production and distribution. In view of the potential of this new market, and as a way of guaranteeing the proper use of the term ‘halal’ to describe these products (as Article 14 of the 1992 Cooperation Agreement states), the Junta Islámica has promoted the creation of the Instituto Halal (Halal Institute, C/Arco, Nº13 Almodovar del Río, 14720 Córdoba, tel: +34 902431937, www.institutohalal.com/), which since 1999 has for the first time in Spain certified and regulated the use of the halal label.18 Carrying out the ‘Id al-Adha sacrifice by families is banned on health grounds, but the practice continues discreetly in some Muslim communities. 11

Dress Codes

There is no legal restriction prohibiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public places such as schools and workplaces. However, since 2002 there has been some controversy regarding the wearing of hijab in schools, as well as some complaints about the police’s refusal to photograph Muslim women with hijab when preparing identity cards. In January 2007, the nationalist party Plataforma por Cataluña in the municipal town of Vic (Barcelona) put forward a motion at the council plenary to ban the wearing of the burka (regarded as including niqab). This motion was rejected, but served to include the concept of burka/niqab in the political debate, as being synonymous with radicalisation. In the 2007 elections, two Muslim women who wear hijab were elected to the assemblies of Ceuta and Melilla. 12


Ever since the appearance of the first Islamic religious associations in Spain in the 1970s, there have been numerous initiatives to edit and publish journals. Some have had a very short life span, and others have been irregular. They include:

18 The Halal Institute is a proposal for companies to certify their products as halal, but not to organize trade between the Muslim halal.

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– País islámico (1983–1985, quarterly, edited by the Islamic Community in Spain-Murabitun in Granada—one of the first Muslim journals in Spain); – Al-Yama’a (1994–1997, monthly, edited by the Islamic Commission of Melilla); – Insha Allah (1994–2002, quarterly, bulletin of the Insha Allah Association of Muslim women in Barcelona); – Verde Islam (1995–2002, quarterly, edited by the Centre for Documentation and Publications of the Junta Islamica in Almodovar del Río, Cordoba); – Islam (1999–?, irregular, edited by the Islamic Community of Valencia). Muslim community leaders appear only occasionally in the media, in the context of conflicts that arise involving Islam and Muslim communities. Since 1985, Spanish state television has broadcast “Islam Today”, produced by Moroccan journalist Mohamed Chakor. More recently, Catalan public television has broadcast live the final prayer of Ramadan in 2006 and the ‘Id al-Adha prayers in 2007. Both programmes were discontinued in 2008. Muslim communities cannot be involved in setting the agendas for Catalan public television, but are sometimes consulted on certain topics such as Muslim women and the hijab, or Islamism. The Internet has been the alternative adopted by the Spanish Muslim community to express their views. There is a significant Muslim blogsphere, while the web portal of reference is Webislam (www.webislam .com) (created in 1997 by Junta Islámica). UCIDE also has its own website (http://es.ucide.org) and a blog (www.islamhispania.blogspot.com). 13

Family Law

The Cooperation Agreement of 1992 recognises the validity of a marriage celebrated in accordance with the form established by Islamic law. To ensure full legal recognition, the marriage must be registered in the Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths.19 Polygamy is not recognised in Spanish family law, although some instances of polygamy have

19 Motilla, Agustín, El matrimonio islámico y su eficacia en el Derecho español (Islamic marriage and its validity in Spanish law) (Cordoba: Publicaciones de la Universidad de Córdoba, 2003).

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occurred, especially among groups of Gambian and Senegalese origin. The main problems in relation to family law have to do with divorce by repudiation (talaq), a practice that is not recognised in Spanish law, which poses serious difficulties for divorced women. 14


A long history of accumulated stereotypes explains the routine use of a derogatory term such as moro. This historical stereotype is combined with the current perception that Islam in Spain is the result of recent immigration, which reinforces the presumption that Islam and Muslims are ‘foreign’. Many people in Spain only discovered the existence of Muslim communities and prayer halls in their cities after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Public interest in Islam and Muslims grew, particularly concerning their presence on Spanish soil. This interest made these spaces for religious practice more visible and consequently anxiety about them began to be publicly expressed. The 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks in Madrid were a real blow to the public consciousness because they were so unexpected and so indiscriminately brutal. Perhaps it was in response to what was felt as blind and senseless hate that there was such a powerful and shocked reaction, although just a year before there had been public demonstrations in the streets against the war in Iraq. In the weeks after the attacks, there were innumerable actions, demonstrations, initiatives and religious ceremonies, in which the representatives of the Muslim community openly expressed their rejection of these events. The media gathered the statements of the main Muslim bodies, which unanimously rejected the vindication in the name of Islam that had been proclaimed by the authors of the attacks. Coinciding with the first anniversary of the atrocity, the FEERI published a fatwa in which it declared the material and intellectual authors of the attacks to be apostates for having gone against the main principles of respect for life that Islam proclaims. However, after the impact of 11 March 2004, the old stereotypes were replaced in people’s minds by a sense of vague and unpredictable threat. The Observatorio Andalusí has reported and condemned the increasing Islamophobia among the Spanish public.20 The report of the European

Observatorio Andalusí, Informe anual 2006. Institución para la observación y seguimiento de la situación del ciudadano musulmán y la islamofobia en España (Annual report. Institute 20

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Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (2006)21 has also provided data on Islamophobia. During the year 2008, as in previous years, various controversies have included a clearly xenophobic discourse in relation to Muslims. New conflicts have arisen against the background of mosques being opened. Some statements by politicians in relation to certain Islamic practices, such as the wearing of hijab, have contributed further to reveal a latent bias against the Muslim presence that is historically rooted in the use of the pejorative term moro. Police actions against suspected Islamist activists has further contributed to a widespread perception of mistrust and threat in relation to the presence of Muslims in Spain. However, according to a survey of 2,000 Muslims prepared by the Ministry of Interior in December 2007, only 28% of respondents said that the Islamic religion is rejected in Spain. 15


Cultural events related to Islamic tradition tend to be linked to multicultural rather than specifically Islamic, initiatives. Since 2006, Casa Árabe (Arab House)22 in Madrid has organised a musical and cultural festival during the month of Ramadan. The city council of Barcelona has also joined this initiative with the cultural festival “Nights of Ramadan” in 2008.

to observe and monitor the status of Muslim citizens and Islamophobia in Spain) (Madrid: UCIDE, 2007). 21 Muslims in the European Union: Discrimination and Islamophobia (EUMC, 2006) available at http://fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/home/home_en.htm, accessed 27 May 2009. 22 Casa Árabe (www.casaarabe-ieam.es) is a public institution established in 2006 as a centre for the study the Arab world and as a point of support for Spanish diplomacy in relation to Arab countries. It is a consortium established through an agreement between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Spanish International Cooperation Agency, the Government of Andalusia, the Community of Madrid and the municipalities of Madrid and Cordoba.

SWEDEN Göran Larsson1 1

Muslim Populations

The last official census to include information about religious affiliation was collected in 1930 and fifteen individuals were recorded as Muslims in that year.2 However, larger numbers of Muslims started to arrive in the 1960s and 1970s, and the figure for today varies between 350,000 and 400,000 out of a total Swedish population of 9,000,000. This estimate is not supported by hard data as it is against the law to collect personal data on religious belief in order to protect individual freedom, and official bodies are not allowed to maintain records that include data that could be sensitive in relation to the personal integrity of the individual. The figures are therefore necessarily problematic, but they suggest that Muslims constitute 1.8%–3.5% of the population.3 According to the Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST), the number of practising Muslims (i.e. practising on a daily or at least regular basis) is estimated at 100,000. This estimate is probably on the low side, and 150,000 is probably a more realistic figure.4 The Muslim community in Sweden is heterogeneous and encompasses a large number of ethnic, religious and political outlooks, as well as a wide range of different languages. Muslims have come to Sweden as both economic migrants and asylum seekers, and their educational 1 Göran Larsson is Associate Professor and Lecturer in the Study of Religions/History of Religions at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. He is the author of Ibn García’s shuubiyya Letter: Ethnic and Theological Tensions in Medieval al-Andalus (Leiden: Brill, 2003), and editor of Islam in the Nordic and Baltic Countries (London: Routledge, 2009). 2 Svanberg, I. and D. Westerlund, “Från invandrarreligion till blågul islam? 50 år av organiserad muslimsk närvaro (From immigrant religion to blue-yellow Islam? 50 years of organised Muslim presence”, in Svanberg, I. and D. Westerlund (eds), Blågul islam? Muslimer i Sverige (Blue-yellow Islam? Muslims in Sweden) (Nora: Nya Doxa, 1999), p. 13. 3 Roald, A.S., “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’: Muslims in Sweden”, in Y.Y. Haddad (ed.), Muslims in the West: From Sojourners to Citizens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 101–120 (102). 4 Larsson, G. and Å. Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden. Integration or Fragmentation? A Contextual Study (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2008).

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background is varied. Up until the mid-1980s, the Turkish group was numerically the largest, but today it is not possible to say that one ethnic group dominates the Swedish Muslim scene and it is incorrect to analyse, present or view the Muslim community in Sweden as a homogenous phenomenon or a static group. It consists of large groups of Turks, Arabs (from Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, etc.), Somalis, Iranians, Bosnians and a growing proportion of Swedish converts. Roald estimates the total number of converts to Islam in Sweden at between 1,000 and 3,000, though as there are no reliable data, this figure too must be considered problematic.5 The great majority of Muslims have settled in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö, the three largest cities in Sweden and approximately 50% of all Muslims in Sweden live in Stockholm.6 However, Muslims have also settled in other parts of Sweden when opportunities for employment have arisen. Estimates of the number of Muslims living in Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö are also generally problematic and uncertain.7 2

Islam and the State

Since 1951, freedom of religion has been guaranteed in the Constitution, and the Muslim community is able to organise various welfare, religious and cultural activities under the laws of association. The Swedish Commission for Government Support to Religious Communities (SST, www.sst.a.se) is the authority, under the Ministry of Culture, that provides religious minorities with state funding and describes its grants as being divided into three categories: – An organisational grant enabling parishes to hold religious services, offer pastoral care and provide education. – A working grant to support specific areas that the state wishes to subsidise, e.g. the Hospital Church, and theological training at certain seminaries.

Roald, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism”, p. 102. Stenberg, L., Muslim i Sverige: Lära och liv (Muslims in Sweden: teachings and life) (Stockholm: Bilda, 1999), p. 67. 7 Larsson, G., Muslims in the EU. Cities Report (Sweden): Preliminary Research Report and Literature Survey (Budapest: Open Society Institute, 2007), available at http://www.eumap.org/ topics/minority/reports/eumuslims/country/sweden, accessed 27 May 2009. 5 6

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– Project grants, aimed at stimulating new forms of activity and cooperation. In 2007 the five Muslim organisations recognised by the SST received SEK4,880,000 in organisational grants, SEK258,000 in project grants and SEK113,000 in educational grants).8 The SST also supports spiritual care within the medical/hospital sector, and in 2007 granted SEK5,100,000 to be distributed among the religious communities they have recognised. Out of this sum, the five Muslim organisations received only a small sum (around SEK110,000).9 Economic support from the state is based on the principle that religious associations form important popular movements that contribute to society. However, it is the government that decides which religious communities are to be entitled to state grants. In order to receive this support, religious groups have to guarantee and observe the principles of democracy and equality and ‘Swedish values’. Registration also makes it possible to use the taxation system to collect levies from members, but if this provision is adopted, the state will automatically reduce the economic support that the organisation can receive from the SST. In 1963, the Swedish government decided to give anyone who had lived in Sweden for more than five years the opportunity to apply for citizenship10 and in 1976, the right to vote and stand in local elections was extended to anyone who had lived in Sweden for three years. In the 1990s, the question of dual nationality was debated, and in 2000 the citizenship law was amended to allow dual nationality.11 On the basis of existing data, it is not possible to estimate the number of Muslims who hold Swedish nationality, but it is likely that many Muslims are full citizens of Sweden. It is the mother’s nationality that determines the nationality of the child, but if the father is a Swedish national, it is possible for the child to apply for Swedish citizenship, even if the mother is not Swedish.

8 Figures available at http://www.sst.a.se/bidrag/utbetaldabidrag2007.4.34203c0 511c3ec0b58580004945.html, accessed 10 March 2008. 9 SST, Årsbok 2008 (Stockholm: Nämnden för Statligt Stöd till Trossamfund), p. 18. 10 See, for example, Roald, “From ‘people’s home’ to ‘multiculturalism’ ”. 11 Ibid., pp. 103–104; Lappalainen, P., Analytical Report on Legislation: Raxen National Focal Point Sweden (Vienna: European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia, 2004), p. 5.

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Even though Muslim communities in Sweden are split along political, economic and religious lines, a number of initiatives towards the formation of Islamic and Muslim umbrella organisations have been taken since the early 1970s. Today there are five umbrella organisations that operate nationally, and it is claimed that they serve approximately 75% of all Muslims in Sweden. However, this estimate is difficult to substantiate with hard facts, and the calculation is based on the opinions of these five organisations. The first national Muslim organisation, the Förenade Islamiska Församlingar i Sverige (Union of Islamic Congregations in Sweden, FIFS, Kapellgränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm, www.fifs.se), was set up in 1974. It later split because of internal tensions and criticisms, and in 1982 a new national organisation emerged under the title Sveriges Muslimska Förbund (Swedish Muslim Union, SMF, Kapellgränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm). Despite further tensions and conflicts over money and influence, the two organisations have been able to co-operate under an umbrella organisation called the Sveriges Muslimska Råd (Swedish Muslim Council, SMR, www.sverigesmuslimskarad.se). It is difficult to associate the three organisations with specific Islamic opinions, but it is clear that the ideology or ideologies of the Muslim Brotherhood movement have influenced the SMR. The establishment of Muslim organisations in Sweden is also linked to international developments. For example, at the beginning of the 1980s, the Islamiska Kulturcenterunionen (Union of Islamic Cultural Centres, IKUS, Bergsbovägen 15, SE-191 35 Sollentuna) was established, an organisation heavily influenced by the Süleymançi movement and its counterpart in Germany. The Svenska Islamiska Församlingar (Swedish Islamic Assemblies, SIF, Moränvägen 13, SE-136 51 Haningen) was founded in 2002. Islamisk Shiasamfund (Islamic Shi’a Communities in Sweden, ISS, Box 690, SE-175 27 Järfälla, www.shiasamfund.se/sida1 .html) is the first umbrella organisation for Shi’a Muslims in Sweden. In addition, it is also possible to identify a large number of ethnic and religious organisations, both locally and nationally. For example, Bosnian, Shi’a, Ahmadi and Sufi organisations have been established in various locations and a number of youth organisations have also been set up with the aim of representing all Muslims in Sweden (especially those born and raised in Sweden). The most significant of these is Sveriges Unga Muslimer (Young Muslims of Sweden, SUM), but it is also impor-

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tant to mention the Sveriges Eritreanska Unga Muslimer (Eritrean Young Muslims of Sweden, SEUM) and the Bosnien-Hercegovinas Muslimska Ungdomsförbund (Muslim Youth Organization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, BEMUF). “Islamic Peace Agents”, a project run by the educational associations Sensus and Ibn Rushd, should also be highlighted. Ibn Rushd (Kapellgränd 10, SE-116 25 Stockholm, www.ibnrushd.se) is the first recognised independent educational association with a Muslim profile. Among many other things, Ibn Rushd organises courses in the field of religion, culture and language. One of its aims is to strengthen the identity of the Muslim community and inform non-Muslim Swedes about Islam and Muslim cultures. 4


There are six purpose-built mosques in Sweden (four Sunni mosques, in Malmö, Uppsala, and two in Stockholm), one Shi’a mosque in Trollhättan, and one Ahmadi mosque in Göteborg (this is the oldest mosque in Sweden, being started in 1975/1976). In Gävle and Västerås, Muslims have adapted old churches and turned them into mosques. This demonstrates the difficulty in drawing a clear distinction between so-called purpose-built mosques and ‘basement’ mosques. There are plans to build mosques in Eskilstuna, Jönköping, Växjö, Umeå, Göteborg and Örebro, and a mosque is already under construction in Skövde. When a Muslim organisation applies for permission to build a mosque, it is the relevant town council that issues the building permit. In the three largest cities in Sweden (Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö), the number of basement mosques is estimated at approximately 20 in Stockholm, 15–20 in Göteborg and 10–15 in Malmö. As in other European countries, the building of mosques in Sweden has given rise to public debates and strong anti-Muslim reactions. For example, on ‘Id al-Adha in 2008, the building site of a new mosque in Göteborg was desecrated with pigs’ heads. This specific building was attacked because it was supported and funded by Saudi Arabia (see, for example, the anti-Muslim website www.ramberget.com). 5


Religion is a compulsory subject in the Swedish school system, but the subject is required to be taught in a balanced and neutral way, and

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pupils should not be indoctrinated into any specific religious system. Consequently, Islam should be presented as just one religion among many. Nevertheless, some textbooks have been criticised for being anti-Muslim and negative about Islam.12 All teachers (no matter what their own personal beliefs) must follow the curriculum and teach pupils about religion without any attempts at indoctrination. Besides the traditional Islamic communal education which takes place in the mosques (e.g. the Friday sermon, the teaching of the Qur’an and other types of study circle), the setting up of so-called independent, private or ‘free’ schools is the most distinguishing characteristic of Islamic religious education in Sweden today. Since the school reform of 1992, it has become much easier to receive support and economic subsidies from the Swedish state to establish independent schools. These schools are obliged to follow the national curriculum, but they can be influenced by particular pedagogical or religious and cultural profiles, although they should “not have a content which deviates from the value premises of Swedish society”.13 In addition to the national syllabus, the independent Islamic schools also teach Islam in a normative manner. However, this freedom does not allow them to present their religion in an “unbalanced or indoctrinating way”, and pupils must follow the national curriculum for religious education. This means that they have to learn about other religions, world views and ethical outlooks, and that religious education cannot be restricted to Islam or Muslim doctrines or rituals. Generally, education on Islam is confined to a few extra hours per week.14 Permission to start an independent school must be granted by the Swedish National Agency for Education. By 2006, the number of confessional independent schools was estimated at 72, of which nine were Islamic, Muslim and/or Arab.15 The first Muslim

12 Otterbeck, J., “What is reasonable to demand? Islam in Swedish text-books”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 4 (2005), pp. 795–812. 13 Daun, H. et al., “Educational strategies among some Muslim groups in Sweden”, in Daun, H. and G. Walford (eds), Educational Strategies among Muslims in the Context of Globalization (Leiden: Brill, 2004), p. 191. 14 On the content of the religious education in Muslim independent schools in Sweden, see Berglund, J., Teaching Islam: Religious Education at Three Muslim Schools in Sweden (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009). 15 Berglund, J., and G. Larsson (eds), Religiösa friskolor i Sverige. Historiska och nutida perspektiv (Religious free schools in Sweden. Historical and contemporary perspectives) (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2007), p. 10. See also Larsson, G., “Islamic religious education in Sweden”, in Aslan, E. (ed.), Islamic Education in Europe (Vienna: Böhlau Verlag, 2009), pp. 403–421.

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independent school was started in Malmö in 1993. When an independent religious school is recognised by the state, it receives 85% of the support given to public schools. However, it is important to stress that the great majority of pupils with a Muslim cultural background still go to municipal schools. 6


A large number of universities and university colleges offer courses in the History of Religions, Islam and Middle Eastern Studies, and there are a substantial number of researchers engaged in critical, academic studies of Islam and Muslims.16 Currently, the Ministry of Education is considering starting a training programme for Muslim clerics or imams, the final decision being expected in mid-2009. However, it is unlikely that the Ministry of Education will start a confessional educational programme for Muslim theologians, especially since the Church of Sweden was separated from the state in 2000. Nonetheless, the educational programme may focus on how to facilitate the work of imams by helping them and making their work in Sweden easier (i.e. by teaching them more about the Swedish system and its laws and by improving the language skills they need). 7

Burials and Cemeteries

For Muslims living in or close to larger Swedish cities, there are no problems in finding a burial site that follows prescribed Islamic norms. The practical organisation of burial sites, regardless of religious affiliation, is still in the hands of the dioceses belonging to the Church of Sweden through the Kyrkogårdsförvaltningen (Cemetery Administration). According to statistics from 2000, approximately 111 municipalities in Sweden provided burial grounds for Muslims.17 There is no prohibition on Muslims being buried in a shroud rather than a coffin (as many Muslims require), and certain local offices of the Cemetery Administration, as in Malmö, specifically permit Muslims to be buried in this way. See, for example, Larsson, G., “Islam and Muslims in the Swedish media and academic research, with a bibliography of English and French literature on Islam and Muslims in Sweden”, European University Institute Papers (RSCAS No. 2006/36), 2006. 17 Larsson and Sander, Islam and Muslims in Sweden, p. 336. 16

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No Muslim religious leaders or theologians are employed by the state in the health service, prisons or armed forces. However, through grants from the SST and the Swedish Prison and Probation Service, imams and religious leaders receive small grants to perform these kinds of social services.18 Nonetheless it is clear that most of the work in hospitals, prisons and other social institutions is done on a voluntary basis, and that there is a great imbalance between non-Christian denominations and the Church of Sweden and other Christian denominations, which have a long history and an established platform for such work. 9

Religious Festivals

Even though the major religious festivals are highlighted by the media in a positive and neutral way, such holidays are not recognised by the state. Muslims have to apply for leave to celebrate the ‘Id/bayram religious festivals, and it is up to the employer to decide whether the employee should be given the day off to attend. However, in 2008 the end of Ramadan was celebrated by the Museum of World Culture in Göteborg, which organised a party, lectures and a concert for the ‘Id (see www.eidfirande.se). The party was highlighted by the media, and part of the concert was broadcast by Swedish national television. The Muslim community in Gothenburg appreciated this initiative, and the Ramadan celebration was attended by a large number of Muslims and non-Muslims. The children were able to participate in games (for example, riding an electric bull), lectures and dialogue meetings were arranged, and the cafeteria served traditional Muslim food from various countries. 10

Halal Food

Halal slaughter without stunning has been prohibited by law since 1937. Methods of slaughtering animals are not regarded as a religious issue, but one of animal rights. There have been some attempts to organise halal methods of slaughter that comply with Swedish law (e.g., giving

18

SST, Årsbok 2008, p. 18.

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the animal an anaesthetic before it is killed), but this method is far from accepted by all Muslims. Today there is no problem in finding halal food in Sweden, and access to imported meat is good. The prohibition against halal slaughter is of symbolic importance for Muslims living in Sweden. There are no data on the availability of halal food in schools, public institutions or hospitals, but it is clear that most institutions have become aware of the fact that Muslims have certain requirements, and so-called ‘Muslim alternatives’ are generally available. 11

Dress Codes

There is no law that prohibits Muslim dress, but there have been some debates about women wearing hijab in the health-care sector, in schools, and in relation to police uniform, etc. In 2006, the National School Authority intervened to protect a student who had been banned from a school in Umeå because she wore hijab. These debates have been focused on health issues and practicalities rather than on religion, but it is clear that many Muslims perceive the discussion about the hijab as being coloured by Islamophobia and xenophobia. Figures published by the Board of Integration suggest that women who wear hijab have greater difficulty in finding jobs, and that it is often associated with negative opinions about Muslims. 12


Reports from the end of the 1990s have demonstrated that Islam, Muslims and the Middle East are generally associated with negative opinions and stereotypical media reporting. There is no current research on how Islam and Muslims are depicted in the media, but it is generally believed, at least among Muslims, that the Swedish media have a negative bias towards them. Most Muslim media are confined to the Internet (websites, blogs, discussion lists, etc.), and the number of Swedish Islamic webpages, such as www.islamguiden.com, is probably over 50. The journal Minaret: Tidskrift för Svensk muslimsk kultur is published by a group of Muslim intellectuals, while the al-Ghazali institute (http://al-ghazali.org/sidan/) has recently translated a number of Arabic and English books into Swedish (including Martin Ling’s book on the Prophet Muhammad). Besides journals and books published by Sunni Muslims, the Ahmadi community has

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published and translated a large number of Ahmadi books into Swedish (for example, a book on dhikr in the Ahmadi community). In 2008, three young Muslim women were given the opportunity to record a television series and broadcast it on national television. The series is called Halal-TV and it addressed questions of equality, gender, Muslim identities and generational differences within the Muslim community. The series has received both critical and positive reviews from both Muslims and non-Muslims and, according to the critics, has contributed to presenting the Muslim community in a stereotypical way. One of the programme’s leaders was also severely criticised for her opinions about Shari’a penalties and for not taking a stand against those that conflict with Swedish law, such as the stoning of women. 13

Family Law

No exceptions are made to the laws of Sweden, which Muslims have to follow. Consequently, Islam has no particular legal status. Muslim leaders (imams) can apply for a permit to conduct marriages. If the imam is approved by the state and has the correct papers, the marriage is accepted as legally binding in Sweden. Sweden does not apply a so-called double marriage rule (i.e., that one must go both to the mayor or city hall and to one’s own religious or ideological organisation). Some Muslim communities have tried to develop specific Islamic marriage contracts and forms for divorce, inheritance, etc. that comply with both Islamic and Swedish law, but hardly any information about these documents is available. The chairperson of SMF, Mahmoud Aldebe, sparked a row in the Swedish media in 2006, when he proposed that the Muslim community should be exempted from Swedish law and be governed by specific rules and regulations. This suggestion was primarily an attempt to start an advisory board for a so-called Shari’a council to protect Muslim interests, but Muslims and non-Muslims alike generally dismissed it.19

19 See, for example, Kihlström, S., “Muslimskt förbund kräver egna lagar” (Muslim association demands its own teachers), Dagens-Nyheter, 27 April 2006.

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Several studies indicate that many Swedes have negative views and preconceptions about Islam and Muslims, and Muslim leaders report instances of Islamophobia. Although it is very difficult to measure Islamophobic attitudes and incidents, mainly because of the lack of a clear definition, it is clear that many Muslims perceive that they are viewed as a problem, and that Islam is seen as something negative or even un-Swedish by many ethnic Swedes. Since 2006, the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) has included Islamophobia as a specific category in its report on hate crimes. For the year 2007, 200 incidents (6% of the 3,500 reported) were included in this category.20 15


In 2008, the celebrations of both Ramadan and ‘Id al-Fitr were highlighted by the Swedish media, and some of the festivities were broadcast on national television (this celebration was organised by WAMA, a Muslim cultural and event company). The 700th anniversary of the Sufi poet Jalal al-Din Rumi was also celebrated, and cultural events (e.g., readings and lectures organised by the cultural body ReOrient in Stockholm) were staged in various places in Sweden. In 2008, the Mediterranean Museum in Stockholm exhibited a selection of blue and white porcelain from the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul. This museum has also held a photographic exhibition called Los Otros/The Others, depicting religious and cultural minorities in Spain, Morocco and Turkey. In the city of Gothenburg, a network for peace and dialogue including people of various religions ( Jews, Christians and Muslims) organised lectures and a football match for peace on 11 September. Similar activities were also organised in other cities in Sweden.

Hatbrott 2007. En sammanställning av anmälningar med främlingsfientliga, islamofobiska, antisemitiska och homofobiska motiv (Hate crimes. A survey of reported incidents with xenophobic, islamophobic, antisemitic and homophobic motives) (Stockholm: BRÅ, 2008), p. 10. 20

SWITZERLAND Stéphane Lathion1 1

Muslim Populations

Prior to 1960, the presence of Muslims within the Swiss population was rare. That changed with three waves of immigration: one economicbased, one family-based, and one politically-based. The first wave, in the late 1960’s, was mainly caused by economic factors and consisted chiefly of men coming to work in Switzerland with no particular intention to stay permanently in the country. These immigrants were mostly from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The second wave came in the late 1970’s after Switzerland changed its legislation concerning foreigners to allow family regrouping. This decision had direct implications: from this point on, Islam was no longer only an ephemeral, male social factor in Switzerland but, with the presence of families, had become a reality. The last wave is a political one consisting of foreigners seeking asylum from oppressive dictatorships, various civil wars, famines and other situations. More accurately, this is not so much a wave as much as an ongoing movement, since it started in the 1960s (mainly from the Middle East) and continues today with the exodus of people from the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, North Africa and other African countries. According to the 2000 census, the total Swiss population numbers 7,288,010. For the first time, a question related to religious belief was included in the census. So, of this number, 310,807 are Muslims, meaning Muslims represent 4.3% of the total population of Switzerland. Muslims of Swiss nationality made up only 0.6% of the total population of Switzerland. The fact that statistics reveal the presence of 169,726 Muslim men compared with 141,081 Muslim women demonstrates that the Muslim presence has evolved and is no longer merely due to labour migration. Some estimates suggest that the number of Muslims 1 Dr. Stéphane Lathion heads GRIS (Research Group on Islam in Switzerland) and is a researcher at l’Université de Fribourg.

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today is much closer to 400,000 than the number indicated in the last census. It is a young community with about half under the age of 25. The great majority live in the urban cantons of Basel, Bern, Zürich, St Gallen, Vaude and Geneva. Automatic Swiss nationality is by descent and not by birth on Swiss territory. In general, foreigners must have lived a total of twelve years in Switzerland before they may apply for Swiss nationality, even if they were born in Switzerland. A federal referendum in 2004 eased access to Swiss citizenship for the descendants of immigrants. The majority of Muslims in Switzerland (58%) are from the former Yugoslav republics, followed by Turks (21%), Swiss (11%), North Africans (4%), Subsaharan Africans (4%) and Middle Eastern immigrants (2%). For more details, see www.gris.info. Muslim communities in Switzerland are 75% Sunnis, 7% Shi’is, 10%–15% Turkish Alevis, and some members of Sufi orders. 2

Islam and the State

Switzerland is a secular state, but the Swiss state recognises both Catholicism and Protestantism as official religions and relations with religious communities are based on the fundamental rights to freedom of religion and philosophy and to equality before the law (Swiss Constitution). However, since Switzerland is a federation of states, all matters of religion fall under the competence of the cantons, within the limits of federal (constitutional) law. That means that a canton is permitted to support a recognised religion. The only two cantons that have clearly separated the state and religion are Geneva and Neuchâtel.2 Muslims in Switzerland must abide by all Swiss laws and regulations. In general, no Swiss laws exist that directly interfere with any Islamic obligation. For example, no Swiss laws forbid Muslims from exercising their religious beliefs or practices, such as the five pillars. The issue of official recognition of non-Christian religions is a continual debate and was the subject of a referendum in the canton of Zürich in 2003. All the main political parties developed a strategic paper on the place of Islam in Switzerland during 2007–2008.

2 Mahnig, Hans, “L’intégration institutionnelle des Musulmans de Suisse: L’exemple de Bâle-Ville, Berne, Genève, Neuchâtel et Zurich”, in Tangram: Bulletin de la Commission fédérale contre le racisme, Berne: EKR, vol. 8 (2000), pp. 102–111.

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At present, there are 35 Muslim associations, four Muslim youth associations, three Muslim women’s associations and four Muslim aid associations. It should be noted that most of the established Muslim associations have substructures for their youth, and women are also often organised within the framework of the main association.3 Muslim associations are generally locally organised, but they are also starting to organise themselves within the frame of the cantons. In most cantons, the associations are gathering themselves into unions (for example, the Union of Muslim Associations of the canton of Fribourg), which gives them more weight in discussion on important issues (e.g., cemeteries, swimming pools, construction of mosques, etc.). At the national level, there are three main bodies: Musulmans et Musulmanes de Suisse (MMS) www.islam.ch, La Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (LMS) www .rabita.ch; and the Fédération des Organisations Islamiques de Suisse (FOIS, c/o Dr. F. Afshar, Kappelenring44c, 3032 Hinterkappelen), but there is no official representation as in France.The Ligue and the MMS were both founded in 1994 with the aim of helping Swiss Muslims to find ways of integrating and participating constructively in Swiss society. Their wish to develop some form of Swiss federation of Muslim organisations has not so far met with success. However, since 2002, in most cantons, united bodies have started to emerge: Union des organisations musulmanes de Genève (UOMG) in Geneva, Union vaudoise des associations musulmanes (UVAM) in Vaud, Union des associations musulmanes de Fribourg (UAMF) in Fribourg, Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Zürich (VIOZ) in Zürich, Vereinigung der Islamischen Organisationen in Luzern (VIOL) in Luzern, for example. 4


Switzerland has registered more than 100 mosques and/or prayer halls. Only four have the features of Islamic architecture needed for them to be considered mosques: in Geneva (financed by Saudi Arabia),

Schneuwly Purdie, Mallory, Etre musulman en Suisse romande, une enquête qualitative sur le role du référent religieux dans la construction identitaire (Being Muslim in the Suisse Roamnde, a qualitative enquiry into the religious dimension of the construction of identity). PhD thesis, University of Fribourg, 2006. 3

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Zurich (Ahmadiyya), and more recently in Winthertour (Albanians) and Wangen (Turks). The rest are mainly prayer halls without any outward indication of their Islamic activity. Some have facilities such as a library and/or cafeteria, but these are few and almost invisible from the outside. In the autumn of 2009, the Swiss population will vote on whether it accepts the referendum initiative against the building of any minarets in Switzerland, put forward by a right-wing political populist party, the Union Democratique du Centre (UDC). 5


The question of religious studies falls under the competence of the cantons. Each canton’s department for public education decides what weight to give to religion in its schools’ programmes (usually offering no more than one hour per week). In order to provide religious education for their children, Muslims must therefore organise it themselves. Religious socialisation takes place through families and Muslim organisations that offer various classes, such as introduction to Islam, the Qur’an and Arabic. Until now, Muslim pupils (like pupils from other religious communities) are not given any time off school to attend such classes, which often take place on Saturdays or in the early evening. At the Swiss primary school level, religious education often takes the form of catechism. However, this type of education is evolving and is slowly being replaced with non-religious and inter-religious classes. In secondary school, only an introduction to the history of religions is offered and is most often taught in a non-dogmatic or non-confessional fashion. Enbiro (Enseignement Biblique Romand) has developed a new pedagogy for teaching religion in school. This new programme gives an introduction to the world’s most influential religions and has been generally welcomed in French-speaking Switzerland, although not in the canton of Wallis, where a controversy erupted in November 2003. Some conservative Christian parents removed their children from the religious education class when they learned that Muhammad was presented as a prophet who received messages from God and the Qur’an as a holy book. These parents were concerned that Islamic teachings conflicted with the religious education that they wanted to provide for their children. All the objections to this new kind of religious education were related to Islam, and not to the other religions taught.

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With regard to Islamic religious instruction, there is so far one exception. In the canton of Lucerne, two communes decided to introduce Islamic religious classes for their Muslim pupils in the autumn of 2002. This class is given in German to all nationalities together and is optional. After a difficult start, this decision has now been accepted. 6


In Switzerland, there are a small number of chairs in Islamic studies (Geneva, Berne, Zurich, Basel, for example) but they do not present a contemporary view of the Islamic world, concentrating more on the historical , civilisational and sometimes political aspects. Only occasional courses at Lucerne University (about Islam in Bosnia, for example) and at Fribourg University (Islam and Modernity, Islam in Europe) present a more contemporary picture. A training course for Muslims association leaders will be starting in Fribourg in 2009. A related case, considered on 7 May 2003, in Wallis, a Catholic canton, concerned an imam from Macedonia. He was denied a work permit (to work as an imam in Switzerland) largely due to the fact that he had studied in Medina (Saudi Arabia) and the cantonal authorities considered him to be a potential threat to religious harmony. As a result, the issue of imam training became a political issue and a study group was established which will be reporting its findings in May 2009. 7


The situation with regard to cemeteries for Muslims in Switzerland varies. As a federation of states, Switzerland has left this issue to the competence of the cantons. The cantons usually allow the individual communes to find the solution that best suits their population. A number of Muslim cemeteries have been established in recent years. The oldest was started in Petit-Saconnex in Geneva in 1978, followed by Basel and Bern (2000), Lugano (2002), and Zurich (2004), but it was not till January that a law to make confessional cemeteries legal was proposed. In Neuchâtel and Fribourg, requests for Muslim sections to be allocated in existing cemeteries, or for a Muslim cemetery to be

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established, have recently been made but no official response has so far been given. As for funeral rites, Muslim organisations usually provide personnel to prepare the body for the funeral. When no local regulations exist regarding details of funeral rites, parishes usually try to do their best to find a solution that is acceptable to the family. 8


No chaplaincy arrangements are formally organized for Muslims, and what services there are depend exclusively on the good will of institutions and individuals. 9

Religious Festivals

No particular arrangements exist in Switzerland concerning Muslim religious holidays. However, Muslims are sometimes allowed to take days off work for Islamic festivals unless this would cause serious economic difficulties for the employer. There is no legal right to a reduction of working hours during the Ramadan fast, but arrangements can be made with the employer on an individual basis. One unofficial regulation that exists concerns gymnastics at school during Ramadan. Students fasting during Ramadan are exempted from gym class because of the risk of fainting or dehydration. 10

Halal Food

Halal slaughter is not permitted, although exceptions are made for special events. This is not a serious problem maybe because halal food imported from France, Italy, Germany, and Austria is readily available. 11

Dress Codes

There has been fierce debate on the subject of religious dress all over Switzerland, but emotions have been higher in the French part because of the impact of events in France and a similar perception of laïcité. Hijab is permitted in school for students and pupils but prohibited for teachers.

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Two cantons have had to deal with legal cases concerning hijab. As the result of a case in Geneva that went all the way to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, it was established that the principle of laïcité, which applies in Geneva, entitles the canton to rule that public officials may not wear ostentatious religious symbols, such as hijab. In theory this ruling could become a precedent for the whole of Switzerland, but the decision remains with the individual canton. 12


Muslims do not have their own programmes on either television or radio. However, there are a certain number of religious programmes in which Islam is discussed in an inter-religious context. Themes such as creation, death, health and fundamentalism are examples of subjects discussed. Similar topics are raised on the Internet, where Muslims are particularly active. Some of the Muslim websites that show how well organised the associations are becoming are: Islam en Suisse (http://www .islam.ch/); Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (http://www.rabita.ch/); Fondation Culturelle Islamique de Genève (http://www.mosque.ch/); Association Culturelle des Femmes Musulmanes de Suisse (http://www .femme-musulmane.ch/); Centre islamique de Genève (http://www .cige.org/); Stiftung Islamische Gemeinschaft Zürich (http://www.islamzh.ch/); Schweizerische Islamische Glaubensgemeindschaft (http://www .islamtoplumu.ch/). Er-Rahma—Die Barmherzigkeit: unahängige Zeitschrift von Muslimen in der Schweiz (Er-Rahma—Mercy: Independent journal of Muslims in Switzerland) is a quarterly bulletin. The articles can be read online at http://www.barmherzigkeit.ch/home.htm. Bulletins du Centre Islamique de Genève is a report produced three times a year. It can be read online at http://www.cige.org/bulletins/Bulletin_24.htm. 13

Family Law

In Switzerland, as in other European countries, polygamy is illegal. Conflicts may arise in inheritance law or in cases where women are called to testify in Swiss courts.4

4 Pahud de Mortanges, René and Erwin Tanner (eds), Muslime und Schweizerische Rechtsordnung (Muslims and Swiss law) (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 2002).

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To date, there are no Islamic or Muslim political parties in Switzerland. Only a few Swiss Muslims are involved politically and the few Muslims elected to office have not made Islam their cause. On the contrary, their religious affiliation usually remains unspoken. Similarly, no Swiss political party has directed its political views against Islam, even the far right Swiss parties, which tend to take a hard line against foreigners in general and are gaining in popularity. Note that the controversy referred to in section 5 was largely instigated by the UDC, a political party often identified as far right. The UDC initiated a similar popular movement in November 2003. The canton of Zurich was preparing a vote on the modernisation of relations between state and church and the recognition of new confessional communities. This project was intended to give some religious communities an official status that would allow them to receive religious taxes and organise religious education; it was rejected by a popular vote in 2004. In 2008, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) ambassador Orhun visited Switzerland to analyse the extent of discrimination against Muslims after this was identified as a problem in a report by the Federal Commission Against Racism. 15 No data available.


TURKEY Ahmet Yildiz1 1

Muslim Populations

The census conducted by the Turkish Statistics Institution (TÜİK) on 31 December 2008 recorded the population of Turkey as 71,517,100.2 Following the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1924, the nationbuilding process envisaged a thoroughly homogeneous population in religious and ethnic terms. The extreme sensitivity of the state elites has led to the ethnic and religious affiliations of the population being excluded from the official census since 1965, so we do not have official data for these factors, but there have been some significant surveys, the most important of which was conducted in 2006 by the Milliyet-KONDA company.3 This survey found that there were 55,484,000 self-identified Turks (76.03% of the population), 11,445,000 Kurds (15.68%) and 6,460,000 people from other ethnic groups (8.3%). The same survey also indicates the religious demography of the Turkish population and found that around 99% of the Turkish population identify themselves as Muslim. In terms of denominational affiliations, Sunni Hanafi Turks comprise 82.14% of the total population, Sunni Shafi’is 9.06% (of whom 72% live in Eastern-Southeastern Anatolia, 76% are Kurds, 13% Turks, 10% Arabs). Alevis comprise 5.73% of the population (4,500,000 people), of whom 43% are Turks, 42% Kurds and 7% Arabs, with the remaining 8% being made up of various ethnicities. About a third of all Alevis live in Istanbul with other major concentrations in central

1 Ahmet Yıldız is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Research Centre of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara. He has specialised in Kemalist and Kurdish nationalisms and the role of Islam as a socio-political actor in Turkish democracy, and contributed the article “Problematizing the intellectual and political vestiges: From ‘Welfare’ to ‘Justice and Development’ ” in Cizre, Ümit (ed.), Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party (London: Routledge, 2008). 2 Turkish Institute of Statistics (TÜİK) figures available at http://tuikapp.tuik.gov .tr/adnksdagitapp/adnks.zul, accessed 2 March 2009. 3 See Milliyet-KONDA, “Biz Kimiz?” Toplumsal Yapı Ara tırması 2006, MilliyetKONDA (Survey on the Social Structure 2006, “Who are We?”).

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Anatolia and the Mediterranean region. The Ja’faris are the country’s principal Shi’a community and number between 500,000 and 1,000,000 (concentrated mostly in eastern Turkey and Istanbul).4 Overall, Hanafis and Shafi’is regard their Sunnism as a powerful common denominator, while Alevis consider themselves a distinct group. In a survey carried out in 2006 by two prominent political scientists from the University of the Bosphorus, respondents were asked to reply, on a scale of 1 to 10, to the question: Where do you locate yourself in the continuum from ‘Islamist’ to ‘secular’? In reply, 20.3% of respondents identified themselves as ‘secular’, 48.5% as ‘Islamist’ and 23.4% as somewhere in between. One should not forget, however, that the meaning ascribed to the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘secular’ are vague, so these results are open to interpretation.5 2

Islam and the State

Under its 1982 Constitution, Turkey is a secular state providing for freedom of belief and worship, and freedom to privately disseminate religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these rights. Turkish laiklik (laïcité) prescribes not only a separation between religion and the state but also requires that religion be kept under state control. Accordingly, state policy imposes some restrictions on religious groups and on religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions, including universities, symbolised in the ban on wearing the Islamic headscarf. Article 219 of the penal code prohibits imams, priests, rabbis and other religious leaders from “reproaching or vilifying” the government or the laws of the state while performing their duties. As a corollary of the principle of laïcité, there are legal restrictions against insulting any religion, interfering with that religion’s services or damaging its property. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), which is under the authority of the Prime Minister’s office, administers Sunni Muslim

4 US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2008, http://20012009.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/index.htm, accessed 2 March 2009. 5 Source: Ali Çarkoğlu-Binnaz Toprak, Deği en Türkiyede Din, Toplum ve Siyaset (Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey) (Istanbul: TESEV, 2006), pp. 29–31 and 38–39.

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religious facilities and courses. The Diyanet is responsible for regulating the operation of the country’s registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are civil servants, and also covers the cost of utilities at registered mosques. Some groups, particularly some Alevis, claim that Diyanet policies reflect mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs and accuse the Diyanet of bias since it does not allocate specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership and does not cover the cost of utilities at ‘Alevi cem houses’ because they are not formally recognised as places of worship. 3


Sufi and other mystical, religious-social orders, brotherhoods (tariqas) and lodges (cemaats) are banned under the “Law on the Closure of Religious Shrines and Dervish Convents and Prohibition of Some Titles” of 30 November 1925, but tariqas and cemaats have nevertheless remained active and widespread. Some prominent political and social leaders continue to associate with them and other Islamic communities. Demands for the lifting of this ban are part of the on-going agenda of Turkish politics. On the other hand, Kemalists and neo-Kemalists are firmly against the growing power of brotherhoods in the political and social life of the country. Apart from unofficial Islamic groupings, the most important organisation is the Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs, Eski ehir Yolu 9. km. Çankaya-Ankara, tel: +90 312 295 70 00; http://www .diyanet.gov.tr), an official institution established by Law 429 on 3 March 1924, the same day as the abolition of the caliphate. It represents the highest Islamic religious authority in the country. According to Article 136 of the Constitution: “the Department of Religious Affairs, which is within the general administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in accordance with the principles of secularism, removed from all political views and ideas, and aiming at national solidarity and integrity.” It is empowered to regulate issues concerning Islamic belief, rituals and morality and providing society with religious guidance. Other notable Islamic organisations are as follows: The Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı (Turkish Foundation for Religious Affairs, Dr. Mediha Eldem Sokak no. 89, 06640 Kocatepe, Ankara, tel. +90

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312 417 12 35, fax +90 312 418 19 00 www.diyanetvakfi.org.tr) was established on 13 March 1975. It is a tax-exempt foundation and has the right to collect donations without prior permission and is the biggest foundation in Turkey in terms of its financial resources. Its purposes are to support the Directorate of Religious Affairs in its activities, to enlighten and guide the people in religious matters, to build mosques and to provide means of improving social solidarity. The prestigious Islam Ansiklopedisi (Encyclopedia of Islam), the first of its kind in the Muslim World, is a product of the Islami Ara tırmalar Merkezi (ISAM, Islamic Studies Centre, İcadiye Bağlarba ı Cad. 40, Bağlarba ı 34662, Üsküdar-Istanbul, tel. +90 216 474 08 50, fax +90 216 474 08 74, http://www.isam.org.tr/) established by the Foundation. The Türkiye Gönüllü Te ekküller Vakfı (TGTV, Foundation for the Turkish Volunteer Associations, Otakçılar Mh. Savaklar Cd. no. 134050, Edirnekapı/Eyüp/İstanbul, tel. +90 212 534 04 07, fax +90 212 534 04 08, http://www.tgtv.org) was established on 22 January 1994 and is based in Istanbul. It is an umbrella organisation made up of 700 foundations, associations and unions that have Islamic and Turkish nationalist leanings. There is a network of organisations linked to the Gülen Community, the controversial Fethullahçi or neo-Nurcu movement, founded and led by Fethullah Gülen now living in the USA, including the Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfı ( Journalists and Writers Foundation, Cumhuriyet Cad. no. 129/5, 34230 Harbiye-Istanbul, tel. +90 (212) 232 17 10, fax +90 (212) 232 15 88, e-mail: [email protected], http://www.gyv.org.tr/bpi .asp?caid=159&cid=230), established on 29 June 1994. The Foundation has three important organisational components through which it conducts its global outreach: The Dialogue Eurasia Platform, the Abant meetings and the Intercultural Dialog Platform.6 Anadolu Gençlik Derneği (Anatolia Youth Association, Hükümet Cad., Hilal Sokak no. 10, Kat: 1, Ulus-Ankara, tel. 0312 309 59 27, fax 0312 311 56 71, e-mail: [email protected], http://www.agd.org .tr) is the successor of the National Outlook Foundation (Milli Görü Vakfı), the most important social organisation of the National Outlook Movement. It was founded in Ankara in 2002 and has 700 branches throughout the country. It follows the ideology and programme devised by the founder of the National Outlook, Necmettin Erbakan.

6

http://www.gyv.org.tr/bpi.asp?caid=157&cid=226.

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Charitable Associations

There are many socially and financially powerful Islamically oriented charitable associations that have become widely known and acquired popular support. Areas of their activities include: social aid, food aid, care of orphan, housing and clothing aid, vocational training, and support for educational and health facilities. The prominent charitable associations are: International Humanitarian Help (IHH, www.ihh.org.tr), Kimse Yok Mu Solidarity and Aid Association (www.kimseyokmu.org.tr), Deniz Feneri (Sea Lighthouse, www.denizfeneri.org.tr),7 Cansuyu (www .cansuyu.org.tr) and Aid Hand (Yardımeli, www.yardimeli.org.tr). 4


The number of mosques in Turkey in the year 2007 was 79 096. The most famous mosques are those built in Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultans, called Selatin mosques, while the Kocatepe Mosque in Ankara is the most important one built in the Republican period. 5


The 1982 Constitution established compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools within the framework of the ideology of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, developed by the military government in response to leftist movements. In January 2007, the religious education curriculum was changed so as to include a very basic introduction to Alevism. Only the Diyanet is authorised to provide religion courses (Kuran Kursları) outside school, although clandestine/unofficial private courses do exist. Students who complete the first five years of primary school may enrol in Diyanet Qur’an classes at weekends and during summer vacations. Only children aged 12 and older may legally register for official Qur’an courses, which include 32-week courses, summer Qur’an classes and classes for memorising the whole Qur’an. Since 1997, it has been compulsory for children to attend eight years of secular education, after which those who wish to receive Islamic

7

This NGO also operates in Germany, where it has been accused of corruption.

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religious education may continue their studies at İmam-Hatip high schools (lycees). They cover both the standard curriculum and Islamic theology and practice. Imam-Hatip high schools are classified as vocational, and graduates of vocational schools face an automatic reduction in their university entrance examination grades if they apply for university programmes outside their vocational specialisation. This reduction effectively bars most İmam-Hatip graduates from enrolling in university programmes other than in theology. Many religiously devout citizens criticise the religious instruction provided in state schools as inadequate. Most families who enrol their children (especially girls) in İmam-Hatip schools do so to expose them to more extensive religious education, not to train them as imams. Apart from state-provided religious education and instruction, there are hundreds of private schools affiliated to Islamic communities. These schools are not designed as Islam religious schools but they provide a more conducive environment for Islamic socialisation. Many of these schools are very popular and most are affiliated with the Gülen community. Both sexes are usually taught together in the education system, both public and private. Students are strictly forbidden to wear the headscarf in both primary and secondary schools. 6


Although they date back to 1924, İmam-Hatip Schools were named İmam-Hatip High Schools in 1973 and authorised to provide education for both vocational and undergraduate study under Article 32 of the Basic Law of National Education of 1973. During the process of military intervention, the so-called “28 February 1997 post-modern coup”, the secondary schools of İmam-Hatip Lycees were closed down and the high schools part was made four-year lycees providing only vocational education. As a result of this change, graduates of these schools were effectively barred from entrance to universities, apart from faculties of theology and the number of students attending them fell from 500,000 to 60,000 in the space of five years. There are currently 444 İmam-Hatip schools in Turkey. In addition, there are twenty-two theology faculties offering undergraduate programmes. No new ones have not been opened since the 28 February 1997 military coup and the

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student numbers in these schools have radically diminished, although this has recently begun to slowly change.8 7


The TÜİK does not produce statistics on the number of Muslim cemeteries in Turkey. Municipalities deal with all issues related to Muslim funerals in accordance with Islamic practice, including burial and cemeteries. Muslims in Turkey face no problems at all in observing Islamic burial practice or in creating and maintaining their cemeteries. All relevant services are provided by the municipalities in accordance with the relevant legislation.9 8


There is no hospital, army10 or prison chaplaincy in Turkey.11 However, according to a protocol signed between the Ministry of Justice and the Directorate of Religious Affairs on 15 May 2001, Diyanet officials provide religious services in prisons on a weekly or monthly.12 Religious services in prisons date back to 1974, but are not well enough organised and established to be called ‘chaplaincy’. No religious services or moral guidance are provided in hospitals, and most hospitals do not have proper places of worship for patients. In 1995, religious services

8 See http://www.tihmed.org/kontenjan 3.htm, accessed 9 March 2009. This site is maintained by graduates of İmam-Hatip Schools. 9 For the relevant national legislation regarding funeral services and cemeteries, see, for example, Belediye Kanunu (2005), http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5393. html, accessed 16 March 2009. 10 Although there is a core army chaplaincy structure, this is reserved for times of war, and no army chaplains have been appointed since the 1974 war in Cyprus. See, Acar, Erkan, “Din İ leri Subayı Ataması Yapılmıyor”, Zaman, 11 May 2005. 11 See Akbıyık, Nur, “Dünya Ordularında Din Subaylığı”, ÖNDER-İmam Hatip Liseleri Mezunları ve Mensupları Derneği, 2007, available at http://www.onder.org.tr/projeleroku .asp?ID=6, accesssed 10 March 2009. 12 See Kaya, Talha, “Cezaevi Vaizliği (Prison chaplaincy)”, in T.C. Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Ba kanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu (Religion Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol.2 (Ankara: Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı Yayınları, 2008), pp. 158–159. Also see http://www.haber7.com/haber/20090312/Diyanettencezaevlerinde-irsad-hizmeti.php, accessed 12 March 2009.

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began to be provided by volunteers in some state hospitals, but this was stopped by the Council of State at the request of the Ankara Chamber of Doctors on the grounds that it violated the principle of secularism.13 9

Religious Festivals

Turkey observes Qurban Bayram (‘Id al-Adha) and Ramazan Bayram (‘Id al-Fıtr) as religious national holidays (the first lasting 3.5 days, and second 4.5).14 In addition to the usual religious holidays, there are other holidays known as Kandils that are religiously important and celebrated, but not offically recognised. Apart from kandils, the Day of Ashura is observed by both Sunni and Alevi Muslims and all prepare a special kind of dessert known as Ashura to share with their neighbours. Since the 1980s, the week that includes 20 April is celebrated as the Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet Muhammad (Kutlu Doğum Haftası). The first day of this week is named as the day of the rose, which symbolises the Prophet. 10

Halal Food

Food in Turkey is usually prepared according to halal regulations, but in recent years there have been suspicions that some meat products are mixed with pork without being so labelled, a matter of serious concern for the great majority of the population. The Turkish Institute of Standards is working towards a system whereby food products can be certified halal upon request.15 There is no restriction on the slaughter of animals in accordance with Muslim religious and hygiene regula-

See Ba ar, Serpil, “Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığının Yürüttüğü Cami Dı ı Din Hizmetleri Kapsamında Hastanelerde Din Hizmeti İhtiyacı,” in T.C. Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı Din Hizmetleri Dairesi Ba kanlığı, Din Hizmetleri Sempozyumu (Religion Services Symposium) (3–4 Kasım 2007), Vol. 1, Ankara: Diyanet İ leri Ba kanlığı Yayınları, 2008, pp. 621–23; also see, İlhan, Dr. Ay egül, “Dünya Hastanelerinde Din Hizmetleri,” ÖNDER-İmam Hatip Liseleri Mezunları ve Mensupları Derneği, 2007, accesssed 10 March 2009 in http://www.onder.org.tr/projeleroku.asp?ID=7. 14 For the relevant legislation regarding the religious holidays, see: Law on the National and Public Holidays (Ulusal Bayram ve Genel Tatiller Hakkında Kanun) (Law no. 2429,) Official Gazette, 19/3/1981 No. 17284. 15 See Malatyalı, Kenan, “Helal Gıda Nedir, Ne Değildir,” TSE Standart Dergisi, Eylül 2007, pp. 6–8. 13

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tions, provided that the place should be allocated for slaughter by the local (usually municipal) authorities in accordance with the Law on the Protection of Animals.16 11

Dress Codes

A ban on the wearing of headscarves in universities and by civil servants in public buildings has been in force for a long time. The debate on this question revolves around whether headscarf is a religious attire or a political symbol, and whether it should be banned to protect the secular foundations of the state or permitted on the basis of individual freedom of religion as a corollary of secularism. The ban is the result of the various decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court, although there is no law explicitly banning the wearing of headscarf in universities. In 2005, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Turkish universities had the right to ban the headscarf, while in February 2008, the Parliament passed constitutional amendments designed to lift the ban on wearing headscarves on university campuses. However, on 5 June 2008, the Constitutional Court ruled that the amendments violated the secular nature of the state and were therefore unconstitutional.17 Apart from the hijab issue, there is also a ban on the wearing of religious attire by men of religion outside their places of worship. Only the leaders of non-Muslim communities and the President of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs are entitled to wear their religious attire in public.18

16 For the Law on the Protection of Animals, see http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov .tr/html/1386.html, accessed 7 March 2009. 17 entop, Mustafa, “Headscarf ban:A quest for the solution”, SETA Policy Brief 8, March 2008, available at www.setav.org. For the relevant legislation see Article 17 of the Law on Higher Education, No. 2547, issued in the Official Gazette, 6 November 1981, No. 17506. For the relevant legislation regarding the wearing of headscarf in state institutions, see the Articles 5 and 10 of the Regulation on the Dress of Public Employees, issued in the Official Gazette, 25 October 1982, No. 17849. 18 For the relevant legislation, see the Law Banning the Wearing of Some Attires (Law No. 2596), issued in the Official Gazette, 13 December 1934, No. 2879.

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There is an important representation of religious concerns, interests and claims in the media. Currently, the most sold daily newspaper is Zaman, which is known to be affiliated with the Gülen community. Apart from Zaman, dailies such as Yeni afak, Milli Gazete, Anadolu’da Vakit, Yeni Asya and Türkiye Gazetesi are known to be affiliated to religious groups. Also there are ‘Islamist’ columnists writing in some mainstream, non-religious newspapers such as Bugün, Star and Radikal. Aksiyon news magazine is among the most widely read Islamic weeklies. Among the national Muslim television channels, Samanyolu is among the top five most watched national television channels. Kanal 7, Ülke TV, Kanal A, TV NET, Ses TV, TV 5, Hilal TV, Dost TV are known to be affiliated to Muslim religious groups. There are, of course, various representations of Islamic topics on other television channels too. Two news agencies with religious roots, Cihan Haber Ajansı (CHA) and İhlas Haber Ajansı (İHA), are among the most important news agencies in the country. Burç FM, Dünya Radyo, Radyo 15, Akra FM, Moral FM, TGRT FM may be listed as national radio stations with Islamic orientation. 13

Family Law

The Turkish Civil Code prescribes equality between men and women in all respects, including role sharing within marriage, although the husband is considered to be the de facto head of the family. In practice, however, polygamous relationships and, more frequently, purely religious (i.e. officially unregistered) marriage ceremonies, still take place. The civil code does not recognise religious marriage contracts and no religious rituals are permitted during the official, secular wedding ceremony, but a religious marriage ceremony commonly takes place parallel to the official procedures. Muslims in Turkey are not permitted by law to conduct marriage ceremonies in mosques, nor are men of religion (imams) entitled to register marriage contracts. ‘Honour killings’ and early marriages still occur. Adultery is not considered a crime, but is seen as a factor to be considered in divorce suits. According to the civil code, and contrary to the Islamic precepts, men and women are equal in term of their entitlement to inherit. The legal (and court) system is entirely secular and religious affiliation is irrelevant

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in litigation. However, in practice, in more traditional areas females are often prevented from receiving their share of an inheritance, or receive a smaller portion than male members of the family. 14


The case for closing down the religiously based government party, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), and two important decisions of the Constitutional Court (one about the parliamentary quorum needed for choosing the President, and the other the annulment of the constitutional change aimed at lifting the headscarf ban in universities) were the most important foci of public debate in 2008. A field study concerning the impact of conservatism on individual liberties led by a prominent academic, Binaz Toprak, provoked a heated discussion in the media about so-called ‘community oppression’ (mahalle baskısı) in Turkey. The law suit filed against the German-based Deniz Feneri e.V. about the misuse of donations collected by appealing to religious altruism, created important repercussions in Turkish politics. 15


The Islamic practice of circumcision takes place in Turkish tradition at the age of 6–8. It has become the occasion for major family celebrations with attached ceremonial activities in which the boy is dressed in colourful, often military-style, clothes. The month of Ramadan preceding ‘Id al-Fitr creates a special ambiance every year throughout the country, and book fairs organised by Diyanet have become a complementary part of this. The Hajj, occurring at the same time as ‘Id al-Adha also creates a very special country-wide awareness. The Week of the Holy Birth of the Prophet celebrated in the third week of April under the auspices of the Diyanet, the Hacı Bekta Festival in August celebrated by the Turkish Alevi community, and Ashura, complemented by the Muharram fast, especially marked by Shi’ites, may also be cited as important cultural events.

UNITED KINGDOM AND NORTHERN IRELAND Tahir Abbas1 1

Muslim Populations

Islam is the second largest faith group in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The census of April 2001, which included a question on religion for the first time since 1851, determined a total of 1,591,000 Muslims in the UK. There were approximately 1,540,000 in England and Wales, forming around 3% of the total population; 42,557 in Scotland, representing 0.84% of the population; and 1,943 in Northern Ireland, which is less than 1% of the population in that province. Taking into account approximations of natural increase and continuing immigration, estimates for 2009 suggest a total of around 2,200,000 Muslims in the UK. The first significant group of Muslims started arriving in the eighteenth century and were ‘lascars’ (merchant navy sailors), initially employed by the British East India Company, who gradually began to settle with British wives in or near port towns. They were later followed by Yemeni sailors employed after 1869 in Aden who came to cities such as Liverpool, South Shields and Swansea, with some also migrating to major industrial cities such as Birmingham and Sheffield.2 Soon after the end of World War II, there was significant migration to the United Kingdom from the former colonies, especially the islands of the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent. As a result, significant numbers of Muslim were found in a number of British towns and cities in the 1960s and 1970s. At present, Muslims remain concentrated in urban areas; around 40% of all Muslims are in London, forming around 8.5% of the citiy’s population, with concentrations in the boroughs of

1 Dr Tahir Abbas took his PhD at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, University of Warwick. After a period as a researcher at the Home Office he is now Associate Professor (Reader) in Sociology and Director of the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Culture, Department of Sociology, University of Birmingham. Information on Northern Ireland has been supplied by Victoria Montgomery (see Ireland). 2 Halliday, Fred, The Yemeni Community in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992); Ansari, Humayan, The History of Muslims in Britain, 1800 to the Present (London: Hurst, 2004).

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Tower Hamlets (36.4% of London Muslims), Newham (24.3%) and Waltham Forest (15.1%). Outside of the London, Blackburn (19.4% of UK Muslims) and Bradford (16.1%) have even more significant Muslim populations.3 Today, most Muslims living in the UK are migrants or descendants of immigrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and India. Pakistanis, at 43% of the Muslim total based on the 2001 census, form the dominant Muslim sub-population. Other smaller communities come from West and East Africa (the latter usually stemming from late nineteenth-century Gujarati migrants to present-day Kenya and Uganda), Cyprus and across the Middle East. Many Muslim communities, especially those of Bangladeshi origin, are acutely marginalised and generally suffer from critical social and economic deprivation. They experience low incomes, poor health and housing conditions, limited education and relatively high unemployment for men and low participation in the labour market for women.4 On the other hand, the East African Asians tend to be better off, and London is also host to a high number of often very wealthy Arabs from the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. More recent arrivals have been refugees, especially from Somalia and Iraq. The varieties within majority Sunni Islam, particularly those emerging in South Asia, are all to be found: key Sunni constituents are the Barelwi, Deobandi, Tablighi Jamaat and the Jamaat-i-lslami movements.5 2

Islam and the State

There is no common legal or constitutional regime governing the status of religion in the UK: each of the constituent countries has its own regime. Although the UK has no written constitution, the accumulated legal tradition, most recently the Human Rights Act 1998, guarantees freedom of religion and religious practice within the limits of public order as determined by the courts. There is no established religion in Wales, Northern Ireland or Scotland; although in the case of the latter the monarch has a privileged status in relation to the Reformed (Calvinist) Church of Scotland. In England, the monarch is the head 3 Peach, Ceri, “Muslims in the 2001 census of England and Wales: Gender and economic disadvantage”, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 29, no. 4 (2006), pp. 629–655. 4 Peach, Ceri, “Britain’s Muslim population: An overview”, in Abbas, T. (ed.), Muslim Britain: Communities under Pressure (London/New York: Zed Books, 2005), pp. 18–30. 5 Nielsen, Jorgen, Muslims in Western Europe, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004).

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of the Church of England (Anglican) and, through the Prime Minister’s Office, appoints its bishops, some of whom are ex officio members of the House of Lords, the upper chamber of Parliament. Each of the other main traditional churches of England, various Protestants (including the Quakers) and the Roman Catholics, as well as Jews, have their own particular status established by legislation. Other smaller and more recently arrived religious communities, including Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus and various ‘black-led’ churches mostly of Caribbean origin, tend to register as private associations, or ‘companies’ under the Companies Acts, as well as registering as ‘charities’ with the Charities Commission. Most Muslims in Britain have arrived with the nationality of countries within the Commonwealth, countries which were previously British colonies of one category or another. Commonwealth citizens, once they had entered the UK, had full political rights and could thus vote and stand for local and national elections. During the 1970s and 1980s, the majority were able to acquire UK citizenship (the UK allows multiple citizenship), and their children born in the UK acquired citizenship by birth. Currently, the vast majority of Muslims in the UK are UK citizens. The exceptions are those who have arrived as refugees from outside the Commonwealth since the 1980s. The official UK response to migrant communities was for many years formulated in terms of ‘race’ and then more refined in terms of ‘ethnicity’, but seldom in terms of religion. The Race Relations Act (1976) was designed to combat discrimination on grounds of ‘race’ and ethnic origin, but the courts were never able to interpret it to cover discrimination on religious grounds (although Jews and Sikhs are protected as ‘ethnic’ groups). An Act of 2006 finally made it an offence to ‘incite to religious hatred’. Socio-economic and cultural exclusion have had a negative impact upon some young Muslims, especially men. Many young Muslims who live in poor inner city areas are underachieving in educational spheres. This results in many being unable to participate in mainstream British society as effective economic and cultural citizens. Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, young men emphasise that increasing Islamophobia in the media, negative policing and regressive government policy have made them feel further excluded, even vilified.6 In relation to the ever stronger anti-terror legislation, there are

6 Amin, Ash, “Multi-ethnicity and the idea of Europe”, Theory, Culture and Society, vol. 21, no. 2 (2004), pp. 1–24; Kundnani, Arun, “Integrationism: The politics of antiMuslim racism”, Race and Class, vol. 48, no. 4 (2007), pp. 24–44.

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concerns about the negative impact it is having and how it may result in young people moving even further towards more radical identity politics. In particular, international issues are emphasised, with much reference made to suffering in Muslim lands. 3


In England, there are a number of umbrella organisations that claim to represent British Muslims at national and international fora. Formed in 1997, the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB, PO Box 57330, London E1 2WJ) has asserted that the centre of Muslim self-identity in Britain is a faith rather than ‘race’, and partly as a result of MCB lobbying, the government agreed to include religion as an identity category in the 2001 census. The MCB is committed to democracy in a practical way and not only urges Muslims to take part in elections but stresses that it is a religious obligation to do so. In 2007, Scottish Muslims announced the establishment of an umbrella body to represent their interests, the Muslim Council of Scotland (MCS, email: [email protected]), which brings together an assortment of Scotland’s mosques and Islamic organisations. There is also a Muslim Council of Wales (Broadway House, Broadway, Cardiff CF24 1PU), which aims to carry out similar work for Muslims in Wales. The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB, 124 Harrowdene Road, Wembley, Middlesex HA0 2JR) was founded in 1997, largely by people of Arab origin. One issue that distinguishes the MAB from other groups is its emphasis on political activism and interaction within wider civil society in Britain and one of its key objectives is to campaign for changes in British policy towards the Muslim world. The MAB became an important member of the Stop the War Coalition, formed in 2002 to campaign against UK involvement in the war in Iraq. It had a central role in the emergence of a Muslim-Leftist alliance with RESPECT (Respect, Equality, Socialism, Peace, Environmentalism, Community and Trade Unionism coalition). The differences within and between variant forms of political Islam can be illustrated by the way Finsbury Park Mosque in London, for a long time a hub for militant political Islamist groups under the infamous imam, Abu Hamza, was taken over by supporters of the MAB in 2005. The British Muslim Forum (BMF, PO Box 7517, Derby DE1 0HS) claims to embody the largest agglomeration of Barelwi Muslim groups and organisations in Britain. Formally launched in 2005, it represents


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nine sections of the Sunni Barelwi community. As well as providing national representation and structure for the Barelwi community, the setting up of the BMF is an attempt to counter the perceived outside influences on British Islam and on young people in particular. There remains a strong feeling in the Barelwi community that the MCB has not adequately represented the mosques or the (Azad) Kashmiri and Pakistani communities from the inner cities. Furthermore, the BMF is critical of the more ‘literalist’ interpretations of Islam promoted by certain Islamic reform movements, including the Salafi trends, and there is concern over the influence that this might be having on young Muslims. The BMF does acknowledge there is a key problem in relation to Barelwi imams not being able to speak English and in explaining the disaffection of many young people from the religion of their parents. The Sufi Muslim Council (SMC, PO Box 414, Rochdale OL11 5ZU) was established in 2006. It represents another attempt to counter the dominance and influence of certain schools of thought and ideologies among British Muslims, particularly from the more puritanical Salafi movements. Launched in 2007, the Quilliam Foundation (QF) describes itself as “the world’s first counter-extremism think tank”. It is based in London and was set up by ex-activists of the hard-line Hizb ut-Tahrir. It takes its name from William Abdullah Quilliam, an English convert to Islam during the 1880s. A major Shi’ite group, the Al-Khoei Foundation (Stone Hall, Chevening Road, London, NW6 6TN) is a global organisation working for the betterment of predominantly Shi’a Muslims in Britain and overseas. It manages two educational establishments in the UK, which provide education according to primary and secondary level national curriculum guidelines and stipulations. The main Muslim organisation serving Muslims in Northern Ireland in the Belfast Islamic Centre (BIC), established in 1978 (38 Wellington Park, Belfast, BT9 6DN; +44 (0)2890 664465). It is not only a place of worship, but also performs social and cultural functions. The Irish Council of Imams (see Ireland), although based in Dublin, also includes imams from Northern Ireland. Established in September 2006, it not only deals with purely religious issues but also aims to encourage the positive integration of Muslims into Ireland. None of these main Muslim organisations are related to any specific ethnic or national group and they include both Sunni and Shi’i Muslims (although Sunni Muslims are the most numerous and this is reflected in the organisations). In addition, there is also the Islamic Student Society of NI and Muslim Youth NI, both of which have close links to the BIC.

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Unofficially, there are around 2,000 mosques and Islamic centres in the UK, but it is estimated that as many as 600 may not have full planning permission. This has been a contentious issue over the years, with research highlighting the fact of disproportionately low approval rates for planning applications for mosques compared with the experiences of other faith groups in the UK.7 The first mosque in the UK was founded in 1860 at 2 Glynrhondda Street, Cathays, Cardiff. This was followed by the Shah Jahan Mosque, built in Woking, Surrey, in 1889. In the 1960s, mosques largely met the needs of Muslims of all the different sects and ethno-religious characteristics, but as these different Muslims began to raise their levels of confidence and as aspirations grew, they were able to delineate and advance their own unique and separate religious identities. These new mosques began to reproduce the various regional, linguistic and ethnocultural diversities found in the sending regions more generally. Before 1964, a mere seven new mosques were registered throughout the UK, but in that year alone an additional seven were registered and over the next ten years there were approximately eight new registrations every year. From 1974, registrations were found to be around 25–30 per year. The development of these mosques was indeed a function as well as an outcome of greater Muslim adherence to their faith as well as increasing levels of self-confidence. Originally, many of these mosques were developments to existing structures, but since the 1980s a growing number are purpose-built.8 5


Religion and religious communities have a place in the education system in various ways, based mainly on the Education Acts of 1944 and 1988 with some later amendments. Religious education (RE) is a 7 Gale, Richard, “Representing the city: Mosques and the planning process in Birmingham, UK”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 31, no. 6 (2006), pp. 1161–1179. 8 Cesari, Jocelyn and Sean McLoughlin (eds.), European Muslims and the Secular State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005); Lancashire Council of Mosques, Muslims in Britain (2009), available at http://www.lancashiremosques.com/discovery_muslims_in_britain.asp, accessed 13 May 2009.


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compulsory subject on the school timetable, but individual students can be withdrawn by their parents and teachers can decline to teach the subject. Since the 1970s, the RE syllabi, set by a process under the local government, have had a multi-faith content, which since 1988 has had to include Christianity and has guaranteed a proportion of time for the main world religions, including Islam. Teachers of the subject are ordinary, professionally trained teachers and do not require the approval of religious authorities, nor do they need to belong to any particular religion. Especially at the primary school level, a large number of publicly funded schools are managed by the Church of England (ca. 4,700) and the Roman Catholic Church (ca. 2,100) with very few Jewish and Methodist schools. Since 1998, a small number of Muslim schools have been admitted to this arrangement in England, currently totalling seven, and decisions are expected soon on the first such schools in Wales and Scotland. There are none in Northern Ireland. There are a large number of privately funded and managed Islamic schools. These require government approval, which depends on their being able to provide an education that meets the minimum expectations of the national curriculum. Over the years, most schools have accumulated experiences to make the necessary arrangements for the special needs of a variety of ethnic and religious groups. This applies to such matters as school uniform, where individual schools and local governments have adopted flexible approaches. More contentious, but usually solved, are issues around dress for physical education and swimming, music (where some conservative Muslim groups have opposed music teaching), and religious holidays. 6


Islamic studies are offered at a number of universities, usually in the context of religious studies departments or departments of Arabic and Middle East Studies. The main such programmes are at the universities of Birmingham, Cambridge, Cardiff, Durham, Edinburgh, Exeter, Glasgow, Lampeter, Leeds, Manchester, Oxford, Queen’s University Belfast and the School of Oriental and African Studies (University of London). The Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies is a privately financed centre for research and publication, whose staff offer teaching in some of the Oxford University colleges. A number of other universities also

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offer Islamic studies components in professional training degrees, especially in the training of teachers and youth workers. There is no imam training as such at publicly funded universities, but several private Islamic colleges offer both part-time and residential courses leading to the status of imam, often completed by taking a full degree at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. Most of these private colleges are established on the model of the dar al-‘ulum of the Deobandi networks of the Indian subcontinent. The Islamic Foundation, near Leicester (www.islamic-foundation.org.uk), has conducted research and teaching since 1973, particularly in the field of Islamic economics. In 2000, it set up the Markfield Institute of Higher Education (www.mihe. org.uk), which offers postgraduate degrees in Islamic studies awarded by the University of Gloucestershire, as well as short courses on Islam for various professional groups. 7


Many local authorities are able to provide for Muslim burial needs, which require that the deceased be washed in a certain way and laid in the ground facing Mecca. A particular problem has been the religious obligation for Muslims that the deceased be buried within 24 hours of death, but negotiations locally have usually led to a resolution. Most British cities and towns have cemeteries with areas reserved for Muslim burials, although it is also the case that they are rapidly filling up. In 1993 a group of Muslims purchased an area of a cemetery just outside Belfast for Muslim use, which is now almost full. This year a section of another cemetery within Belfast has been reserved for Muslim use. 8


Prison Services UK now employ a number of full-time and part-time imams in prisons. In November 2005, Imam Asim Hafiz was appointed as Muslim chaplain to the British Armed Forces.9 A growing number of hospitals and regional National Health Service (NHS) trusts also employ part- or full-time imams, as do some universities.

9 Rollins, Karen, “Armed forces Imam ‘doing duty’ ”, BBC News Online, 1 May 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6592031.stm, accessed 13 May 2009.

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Religious Festivals

Annual ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha celebrations are held throughout the UK, usually organised by local mosques and Islamic centres. Large halls or gymnasiums are sometimes rented to accommodate the significant number of people attending. There have been tendencies for different sectarian groups to hold the same celebrations on different days, but in some cities there have been attempts to coordinate the religious holidays because of their impact on schools and workers in general. It is common practice for employers and institutions in both the public and private sectors to allow Muslims to take the religious festivals off, usually as part of their statutory holiday entitlement. 10

Halal Food

Halal food is widely available across the UK. Since the 1970s, animal rights groups have on several occasions campaigned for legislation to abolish the right of exemption from animal slaughter regulations on religious grounds, but have failed in the face of opposition from Jewish, Muslim and Sikh lobbies, as well as sectors among anti-racist groups. In 1994, the Halal Food Authority (109 Fulham Palace Road London W6 8JA), a voluntary organisation, was initiated to scrutinise and certify the Islamic slaughter of meat in the UK. Similar initiatives had been taken before but had failed due to the extra cost that the certification process imposed. 11

Dress Codes

There is no legislation limiting the wearing of Muslim dress in public institutions, although questions of uniform in schools are a matter for individual school managers (see section 5 above). There have been a number of court cases in which schools, local authorities and employers have been sued for imposing dress codes which are alleged to have been discriminatory. Such complaints have usually been supported by the courts on the basis that they are a form of direct or indirect racial discrimination. The key case was the case of Mandla in the House of Lords in 1983 in which a Birmingham school was found guilty of racial discrimination against a Sikh boy because he wanted to wear a turban. A recent House of Lords decision (Shabina Begum, 22 March

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2006) appears to have determined that there are limits to this right. It is becoming more common to see women wearing hijab across the UK, and niqab is also becoming a familiar sight in most parts of the country although in Northern Ireland it remains virtually unheard of. Both the armed forces and the police have an approved version of hijab for Muslim women, as they have for the turban in relation to Sikh men. 12


There are a number of Muslim newspapers and magazines in circulation. The two longest running are Q-News (PO Box 4295, London, W1A 7YH, www.q-news.com) and The Muslim News (www.muslimnews .co.uk). A more recent addition is EMEL Magazine (4th Floor, Barakat House, 116 Finchley Road, London NW3 5HT, www.emelmagazine .com), which focuses on culture and lifestyle for professional Muslims. There are currently no printed periodicals or magazines by or aimed at Muslims in Northern Ireland. A number of local community radio stations, authorised by the Radio Authority operate to serve a Muslim audience, particularly around the annual festival of Ramadan. The main organisations all have their own websites. 13

Family Law

Successive cases and legislation have limited the application of some aspects of Islamic law, in particular polygamy and talaq. The persistence of Muslim cultural practices in some sections of the Muslim community regularly creates conflict with the English legal system. One response has been the establishment of ‘Sharia councils’, voluntary bodies which seek to provide solutions to family conflicts that satisfy both Islamic requirements, as viewed by the parties, and the requirements of English law. In 2008, it was announced that a number of such councils had been set up to offer family conflict solutions under the arbitration processes of the Arbitration Act 1996, which would give legal validity to solutions which were not otherwise available from normal family courts. Marriage in England is a civil status but the right to conduct a marriage can be delegated to an appropriately registered religious official by the local Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages (priests of the


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Church of England have the ex officio right to formalise marriages). An increasing number of mosques now have such an official, and those that do not have often had the building registered for the conduct of marriage, so that a civil official can be in attendance to formalise a wedding conducted according to Islamic practice. With local variations, the situation is similar in the other parts of the UK. Thus the imam of BIC has recently been registered as an Officiant under the provision of Article 10 of the Marriage in Northern Ireland Order 2003. 14


Muslim opinion is frequently sought in matters of schooling, identity, political allegiance and voting, and surveys are administered by large polling companies such as NOP, MORI and YouGov on a regular basis. The picture often painted is one of Muslims who somehow live separate lives or do not wish to integrate into majority society. However, official government research, the Home Office Citizenship Survey, points to instances of wider friendship networks among Muslims and greater trust and participation in public institutions as compared with non-Muslims.10 15


Islamic Awareness Week in England and Wales takes place during late November every year. It began in 2004, to “raise awareness and remove misconceptions surrounding Britain’s second largest faith group”. Many locally organised events, positive media and inter-faith and inter-cultural activities occur across the country. Islam Expo is now also an annual event, held at the Olympia in Earls Court, London, and attended by upwards of 30,000 Muslims and non-Muslims. First held in 2006, it has now become a regular feature of the Muslim calendar and a range of social, cultural and education and intellectual events and functions are laid out as part of the activities over a four-day period.

10 Communities and Local Government, 2005 Citizenship Survey: Active Communities Topic Report (London: CLG, 2006).

PART II

ANALYSIS Edited by Samim Akgönül and Christian Moe

TURKEY-EU RELATIONS: THE IMPACT OF ISLAM ON EUROPE Ayhan Kaya1 1

Introduction to the Context

The European Union (EU) project has recently attracted the support of a large portion of the Turkish public. The public polls register ongoing public support for the EU in the range of 60%–80%.2 Public support is likely to fall during times when EU circles become harsh on Turkish Cypriots, who actually said “Yes” to a federal Cyprus in the 2004 referendum, or when European countries, express their opposition to Turkey’s full membership, as France and Austria have done, and their support instead for the ambiguous proposals for a “privileged partnership” and “Mediterranean Union”. Such debates also prompt the Turkish public to see the EU as a ‘Christian club’, and harsh criticisms of its policies on minorities encourage some Turks to believe that the EU is actually willing to divide the country. However, rising political, social, economic and cultural interaction between the EU countries and Turkey has already begun to dismantle prejudices and stereotypes on both sides. For example, emerging European Studies programmes in Turkey have come to grips with the actual meaning of the EU project, and are disseminating this information to the Turkish public.3

1 Dr Ayhan Kaya is Senior Lecturer at the Department of International Relations and Director of the European Institute, Istanbul Bilgi University. His most recent publication is Islam, Migration and Integration: The Age of Securitization, London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009. 2 For further information see Yýlmaz, Hakan, “Euroscepticism as a type of political conservatism”, paper presented at the Third Pan-European Conference on European Union Politics of the European Consortium for Political Research, the Standing Group on the European Union, Istanbul, Turkey (21–23 September, 2006). 3 Several graduate and undergraduate EU programmes have recently been established in Turkey. For example, a BA programme in European Union Relations aims to train experts needed for the negotiation process. EU Institutes at Marmara University and Istanbul Bilgi University also host specialized graduate programmes on the Union, and several other universities have graduate programmes and research and documentation centres.

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Another relevant factor is the perception of the EU by Turkish migrants in the West, or ‘Euro-Turks’.4 The majority (55%) of the approximately 5 million Euro-Turks predominantly perceive the EU as an economic integration project; and only around 20% of them believe that the EU is a ‘Christian club’. Hence, the increasing volume of interaction not only between EU citizens and Turkish citizens, but also between Euro-Turks and Turkish citizens, is expected to contribute to dismantling dominant stereotypical images of the EU among the Turks. The increasing level of interaction between the EU public and the Turkish public is also due to the Socrates academic and student exchange programmes, EU Framework projects and other EU projects, by which Turks are prompted to internalise cooperation and interaction with diverse individuals, institutions, cultures and traditions. These programmes are certainly prerequisites for the creation of a transnational European space, based on the Habermasian assumption that Europe should be defined by the common commitment of peoples to the principle of diversity, but not to the construction of a homogenous European culture.5 This article has been written against a background of sometimes heated discussions about Turkey’s membership of the EU in both Turkey and the EU member states, as well as some political unrest in Turkey and neighbouring countries. However, Turkey has been reaping the benefits of its own relatively quiet revolution over the last decade, which has witnessed a transformation of its economic, political and judicial environment. The major catalyst for much of this silent revolution was the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, when European heads of state and government offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership of the EU, four decades after its application for association with the European Economic Community in July 1959 and just two years after the EU had rejected Turkey’s application for membership during the 1997 Luxemburg summit. The prospect of EU membership offered in Helsinki has radically transformed the political establishment in Turkey, opening up new possibilities for a multitude 4 For further information see Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat, Euro-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach between Turkey and the EU (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005); and Kaya, Ayhan and Kentel, Ferhat, Belgian-Turks: A Bridge, or a Breach between Turkey and the EU (Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation, 2007). 5 Habermas, Jürgen, “February 15, or, what binds Europeans together: Plea for a common foreign policy, beginning in core Europe”, in J. Habermas and J. Derrida (eds), Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe (London: Verso, 2005).

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of ethnic, religious, social and political groups. Kurds, Alevis, Islamists, Circassians, Armenians and other groups have become true advocates of the EU in a way that affirms the pillars of the political union as a project for peace and integration. The EU has provided an incentive for such groups to coexist in harmony, moving from a stance dominated by a retrospective past, coloured by ideological and political disagreements, to an environment in which ethnic, religious and cultural differences are democratically embraced as part of a prospective future. The ‘peace project’ discourse has become quite popular and political in Turkey. The EU as a ‘peace project’, which has been able to settle deep-rooted animosities between Germany and France and, more recently, between Germany and Poland, has also been debated in the Turkish media, with the EU being characterised not only as a peace-making political union, but also as one that exports peace.6 The vision of Europeanisation for Turkey has also been welcomed not only by Greece but also by other neighbours such as Syria, Iraq, Georgia, Armenia and Bulgaria. Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and some North African countries have also expressed their support for Turkey’s membership in the Union. The EU vision, then, has provided Turkey with a chance to be a source of stability in the region. In other words, the EU has become a beacon for Turkey, lighting her road towards democratisation, liberalisation and Europeanisation. It is also interesting to see that the timing of Turkey’s European bid partly coincided with the aftermath of September 11, when Turkey, with her orientation to moderate Islam, began to be instrumentalised by the USA and the EU as a model for Muslim nations. Turkey was pointed out as a bridge not only between continents but also between civilisations. The moderate Islamic state of Turkey was praised by Western countries in a way that also embraced the pro-Islamist ruling party in Turkey. The instrumentalisation of Turkey as a model for other Muslim countries was also welcomed by the Turkish political elite. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoðan and several other politicians, as well as academics, worked on the implications of this new role, expecting that it would bring Turkey into a more favourable position in the European integration process. Turkey’s role as a mediator between the Muslim On her latest visit to Ankara (10 June 2006), the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dora Bakoyani, expressed her wish to see Turkey and Greece take the same path as France and Germany had once taken towards peace and stability (see http://www .basinkonseyi.org.tr/lang_tr/news_detail.asp?newID=62 (accessed 11 May 2009). 6

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world and the non-Muslim world was also bolstered by the United Nations, as Erdoğan, together with the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, was appointed by the UN to launch the Alliance of Civilizations initiative. However, the momentum set in motion by the Justice and Development Party embracing moderate Islamic discourse as a bridging instrument between the Judeo-Christian world and the Islamic world has been challenged by Islamophobia, increasing the risk of Euroscepticism in Turkey. These two cuturally defined elements, which have made Turkey at the same time the model of moderate Islam and the object of Islamophobia, have placed Turkey’s candidacy on a very fragile ground. One should also consider the ways in which the structure of the EU could influence the form and the content of Islamic expression. The fortification of the European borders with the neighbouring countries through the Schengen Treaty (1985) reinforced the political and cultural borders separating Europe from its southern and eastern neighbours. The rise of the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse has also deepened the boundaries between the lifeworlds of Europeans and non-Europeans. At the same time, social issues such as the controversy surrounding the Gulf War, Sudan, Afghanistan and Iran, the publication of The Satanic Verses in Britain, the killing of the provocative Dutch film director, Theo van Gogh, in the Netherlands, the cartoon debate in Denmark, and the provocative intervention of Pope Benedict XVI7 regarding the violent character of the Prophet Muhammad, have all brought European Muslims together in protest, provoking hostile reactions from Europeans who viewed Europe’s immigrant Muslims as a unified whole. Even though the visit of the Pope to Turkey (27 November–1 December 2006) was presented by the mainstream European media as an attempt to revitalise dialogue between Christianity and Islam, it was rather implicitly aiming at easing the tension between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches. In other words, it was an attempt to unite Christianity. “The divisions among Christians are a scandal to the world,” said the Pope after an Orthodox ceremony on 30 November. All Christians, he said, should

7 During a theological lecture at the University of Regensburg (12 September 2006), in Bavaria, Pope Benedict XVI criticised the idea of jihad, quoting Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos, who said, “Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” For the text of the Pope’s lecture, see http://news. bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_09_06_pope.pdf (accessed 11 May 2009).

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“renew Europe’s awareness of its Christian roots, traditions and values”.8 All these events led to both the questioning of the significance of Muslims’ collective presence in Europe and the radicalisation of European Islamic identity. One should also note that recent debates in EU countries reveal that the European form of secularism is not yet equipped to accommodate Islam, which has recently become very visible in the public space. Interestingly, what has happened is that the Western secular left and the Christian Right seem to have set up an alliance against Islam.9 Analysing the contemporary transformation of Turkey—EU relations as well as the impact of Islam on Europe, this article will also reveal that the paradigms of ‘clash of civilisations’ and ‘alliance of civilisations’ are actually not different from each other in that they are both based on a religious world view. Relying on recent political changes in Turkey and EU countries, the article will propose that Turkish membership has the potential to turn the culturally and geographically defined EU into a politically defined post-national, post-civilisationalist vision and post-Western Union. 2

European Union: A Peace Project for Turkey

Despite being surrounded by the several political, ethnic, and religious predicaments of her neighbouring countries, Turkey went through one of the steadiest periods in the history of the Republic in the first half of the 2000s. At the Helsinki Summit (December 1999), the European heads of state and government for the first time offered Turkey the concrete prospect of full membership of the EU, more than four decades after its application for association with the European Economic

Popham, Peter, “Pope ends Turkey trip with visit to mosque”, http://news.independent .co.uk/europe/article2029284.ece (accessed 11 May 2009). Pope Benedict XVI, then Cardinal Ratzinger, had in 2004 already expressed his willingness to see Europe reasserting its “Christian roots”. In the same speech, the Cardinal also stated that Turkey should seek partners elswhere because its Muslim faith was in “permanent contrast” to Europe’s Christian legacy. His call for the Christianisation of Europe was even affirmed by secularist politicians. For an elaborate discussion on this issue see Silvestri, Sara, “Does Islam challenge European identity?”, in L. Faltin and M. Wright (eds), The Religious Roots of Contemporary European Identity (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), pp. 14–28 (15). 9 Roy, Olivier, Secularism Confronts Islam (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. xii; and Silvestri, “Does Islam challenge European identity?” 8

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Community in July 1959. The decision made in Helsinki was in almost direct opposition to the decision made at the Luxembourg summit of 1997. The Luxembourg summit decision was designed to crush Turkey’s hopes of membership of the EU and the public response in Turkey was remarkably immediate and harsh. Popular nationalism, minority nationalisms, Kemalism, religiosity, Occidentalism and Euroscepticism all reached their peak in the aftermath of the Luxembourg summit. Thanks to the December 1999 Helsinki summit, this destructive atmosphere in Turkey did not last long. One should also bear in mind that the EU perspective delivered to Turkey in Helsinki owes a lot to the letter sent by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit to the German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in May 1999. The letter was essential in the sense that Turkey was expressing her willingness to undertake structural reforms in the political, social and economic spheres of life in order to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria. These commitments were optimistically interpreted by the political elite of the EU countries, and especially by the German Greens and Social Democratic Party. The date of the letter corresponds to the immediate aftermath of the arrest of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Öcalan in January 1999. As one might imagine, the capture of Abdullah Öcalan boded the end of a traumatic reign of terror for both the political establishment and the nation in general. “If, in December 2004, the European Council, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey has fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay” states the conclusion of the European Council, summoned in Copenhagen in December 2002.10 However, both the political establishment and the public in each of the EU countries are aware of the fact that Turkey’s membership of the Union will stimulate further the discussions of ‘European identity’ and ‘the limits of Europe’. Recently, there have been heated public debates in several countries on Turkey’s membership of the Union, mostly discouraging the membership of a large country like Turkey with its overwhelmingly Muslim population and socio-economic conditions below the European average.11 Some put forward the socio10 Presidency Conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council, available at http:// www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf. 11 Kubicek, Paul, “Turkish Accession to the European Union: Challenges and opportunities”, World Affairs, vol. 168, no. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 67–78.

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economic disparities between Turkey and the EU, some underline the Islamic character of Turkey, some emphasise Turkey’s undemocratic and patrimonial political culture, and some even raise the clash of civilisations in order to reject Turkish membership.12 The decision of the 1999 Helsinki Summit brought about a stream of reforms. Indeed, Turkey has achieved more reform in just over two years than in the whole of the previous decade. Several laws were immediately passed in the National Parliament to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria, such as right to education and to broadcast in one’s mother tongue, freedom of association, limiting military influence on the judiciary, strengthening civilian control over the military, bringing the extra-budgetary funds to which the military had access under the general budget of the Defence Ministry, removing the military members of the High Audio Visual Board (RTÜK)13 and the Board of Higher Education (YÖK),14 abolishing the State Security Courts (DGM),15 extending the civil rights of officially recognised minorities (Armenians, Jews and Greeks), reforming of the Penal Code, abolishing death penalty, releasing political prisoners, abolishing torture by the security forces, and providing greater protection for the press.16 Furthermore, strict

For a detailed account of the Turkey-sceptic discourses see Aydin-Düzgit, Senemn, “Discursive Construction of European Identity in the EU’s Relations with Turkey”, unpublished PhD dissertation, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, 2008. Aydýn-Düzgit elaborately discusses the forms of Turkey-scepticism displayed by various members of the European Union Commission and the Parliament as well as the EU representatives of the four major countries, Germany, France, Belgium and the United Kingdom. 13 Established with the Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and Their Broadcasts Law No. 3984 of 20 April 1994, RTÜK is a public institution responsible for the supervision of all broadcasting in Turkey. 14 Established after the military coup of 1980, YÖK is is a fully autonomous national board of trustees without any political or governmental affiliation. The Council is a 22-member corporate public body responsible for the planning, coordination and supervision of higher education within the provisions set out in the Higher Education Law. 15 DGMs were established in 1973 and enshrined in law in 1982 in order to control Turkish political life. However, the revised Turkish Penal Code (TCK) included a new version of the former article 159, prohibiting the “public degrading” of ‘Turkishness,’ the Republic, the armed forces, and other institutions of state on pain of six months’ to three years’ imprisonment. A prominent Turkish-Armenian journalist, Hrant Dink, was sentenced to six months’ inprisonment for “insulting Turkishness”. (On the assassination of Dink, see below.) See Article 301 of the new Türk Ceza Kanunu, available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5237.html (accessed 11 May 2009). 16 Hitherto, there have been nine series of harmonisation reforms based on the Copenhagen political criteria, on 19 February 2002, 9 April 2002, 3 August 2002, 11 January 2003, 23 January 2003, July 2003, and August 2003, and two reforms dated 10 December 2003. For a detailed description of the reforms see Özbudun, Ergun 12

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anti-inflationist economic policies have been successfully enforced along with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) directives, institutional transparency and liberalism have been endorsed,17 and socio-economic disparities between regions have also been partly dealt with. However, there is still a lot to be achieved. The EU perspective has also provided the Turkish public with an opportunity to come to terms with its own past, a Turkish ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’.18 Controversial and polemical conferences on Ottoman Armenians during the Demise of the Empire and The Kurdish Question were eventually organised at Istanbul Bilgi University on 25–26 September, 2005 and 11–12 March 2006 respectively. Although the judiciary19 and Yazýcý, Serap, Democratization Reforms in Turkey (Ýstanbul: TESEV Publications, 2004); Akagül, Deniz and Vaner, Semih, L’Europe avec ou sans la Turquie (Paris: Editions d’Organisation, 2005), pp. 130–136; Benhabib, Seyla and Iþýksel, Türküler, “Ancient battles, new prejudices, and future perspectives”, Constellations, vol. 13, no. 2 (2006); and Aydýn-Düzgit, Senem and Carkoglu, Ali, “Turkey: Reforms for a consolidated democracy”, in Amichai Magen and Leonardo Morlino, International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law:Anchoring Democracy? (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 121–154. Özbudun and Yazýcý rightly state that “of the eight constitutional amendments, the one with the most far reaching effects on the fundamental rights and liberties was that of 2001”. However, one should note that harmonisation reforms actually date back to the 1993 constitutional amendment, which abolished the state monopoly on radio and TV broadcasting. Another wave of harmonisation took place in 1995, when the ban on political activities by NGOs was also lifted. Eventually, in 1999, State Security Courts were placed under civilian control, and the privatisation of public enterprises was recognised (Özbudun and Yazýcý, Democratization Reforms in Turkey, p. 15). 17 IMF policies have never before received such strong public support in Turkey. It is claimed that the main reason for this is the way the economic reforms have been presented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) elite, who publicly announced that the reforms were required by the EU harmonisation process. This political tactic has sucessfully softened the reception of historically disputed IMF regulations in the country (see, Çoban, Güney, “Yeni sosyal politikalar: Neoliberal paradigmadan avrupa paradigmasýna (New social policies: From neoliberal paradigm towards a European paradigm)”, Centre for European Studies Bulletin, available at http://www.bilgi. edu.tr/+OtherSites/docs/CESBulletin6.pdf, no. 6, February 2006. 18 For a detailed overview of the German ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’ (coming to terms with the past) see Nolte, Ernst, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will”, Frankfurter Algemeine Zeitung, 6 June 1986; Habermas, Jürgen, “Eine Art Schadensabwicklung: Die apologetischen Tendenzen in der deutschen Zeitgeschichtsschreibung”, Die Zeit, 11 July 1986, and Habermas, Jürgen, “Vom öffentlichen Gebrauch der Historie”, Die Zeit, 7 November 1986. 19 As regards the independence of the judiciary, the European Commission has criticised the inadequate separation between the judiciary and the executive in Turkey, pointing out the supervision of judges and prosecuters by the Ministry of Justice, which is charged with their appointment, promotion and discipline. Despite all the changes mentioned above, the judiciary remains the only branch of government that is still very much devoted to the principles of the Republic, aiming at the protection of the state against the individual.

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accepted the lawsuits brought by some ultranationalist lawyers, both conferences paved the way to public discussion on two of the taboo issues of contemporary Turkish history. A similar conference, called Meeting in Istanbul: Past and Present, was also organised by the Greekorigin minority in Istanbul (30 June–2 July 2006) to bring together the intellectuals of the Anatolian-Greek diaspora and the Greeks of Istanbul. Not only can such conferences be organised in contemporary Turkey without encountering any major public intervention, but the last conference was even hosted by the Justice and Development Party (AKP)-affiliated Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Despite all these reforms and good will, the public in the EU countries remain unconvinced concerning prospective Turkish membership. The latest Eurobarometer 69 (November 2008) public surveys indicate that only 31% of the European public supports Turkey’s entry into the Union, while 55% are against. However, there are strong indications that the image of Turkey in the West has changed for the better after 3 October 2005, when the Council of Ministers decided to start accession talks with Turkey. It is needless to underline that the decisions made by the EU countries concerning Turkey’s membership have had a strong impact on the democratisation process in all walks of life within the country. Since the military coup in 1980, Turkey has never been so politically polarised. Especially since 1999, the main faultline dividing Turkey in all spheres of life has been the EU debate. The debate has taken place between pro-Europeans (liberals, social democrats, moderate Muslims, ethno-cultural and non-Muslim minorities) and Eurosceptics (nationalist right, nationalist left, patriots, Kemalists and Muslim fundamentalist groups). One should note that every time any negative or pessimist statement has been made in EU circles or by individual EU countries, it has strengthened the position of the Eurosceptics. The debates on Cyprus, the Armenian ‘massacre’/‘genocide’/‘deportation’, Islamophobia, Kemalist values, decentralisation and devolution have always reinforced the position of the Eurosceptics in one way or another.20

20 For a detailed account of the Eurosceptics see, Güne -Ayata, Ay e, “From Euroscepticism to Turkey-scepticism: Changing political attitudes on the European Union in Turkey”, Journal of South Europe and the Balkans, vol. 5, no. 2 (August 2003), pp. 205–222; and Bilgin, Pinar, “Turkey’s changing security discourses: The challenge of globalization”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 44, no. 1 (2005), pp. 175–201.

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Rising Euroscepticism in Turkey

Euroscepticism, nationalism and parochialism in Turkey have been triggered by disapproval of the American occupation of Iraq, limitations on national sovereignty posed by the EU integration, the wave of feeling aroused by the ninetieth anniversary of the Armenian ‘deportation’/‘genocide’ among the Armenian diaspora (2005), the perceived risk that Turkey would recognise Southern Cyprus for the sake of the European integration, anti-Turkish public opinion in the EU countries (e.g. France and Austria) instigated by conservative elements, and Israel’s attacks on Lebanon in 2006. All these external factors were strong enough to revive a Eurosceptical and occidentalist discourse in Turkey. On the other hand, some internal developments also played a role in triggering this parochial reaction. For instance, the summer of 2005 was marked by debates about the sale of the country, piece by piece in the form of real estate, to foreigners, especially Israelis and Syrians. The Constitutional Court subsequently issued a decree banning the sale of real estate to foreigners. It did not then take long for the pro-Islamist Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi ) and similar groups to make a correlation between the sale of real estate to foreigners and the ‘sale of the country’ or the so-called “Second Treaty of Sèvres”.’21 This is why many Turks, demoralised by poverty, insecurity, unequal political representation, uncertainty and ambiguity about the future, could not resist drifting back into the ‘Sèvres syndrome’, i.e., the perception that they are surrounded by enemies attempting the destruction of the Turkish state. Debates and even offensive disputes took place within the framework of the assessments of the Progress Report before the EU summit of 17 December 2005, which identified the Kurds and the Alevis as ‘minorities,’ and the vicious public debates revolving around the critical report of Human Rights Commission, appointed by the Office of the Turkish Prime Minister, brought the discourse of ‘external enemies trying to divide our country’ to the forefront once more.22 It is possible to say that 21 The Treaty of Sèvres (10 August 1920) was the peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and Allies at the end of World War I. The Treaty was designed to colonise the remaining boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. In the end, the Treaty was not implemented, but always remained as a tool to be used by Turkish nationalists obsessed by the fear of the partition of the country and the nation. 22 The Human Rights Commission appointed by the Office of the Turkish Prime Minister was composed of prominent Turkish scholars, led by İbrahim Kaboğlu, a

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the concept of ‘minority’ that is occasionally used in the EU Progress Report to identify the Kurds and the Alevis was misunderstood by the public. Not only were non-Alevis and non-Kurds attracted by the nationalist, parochial and Eurosceptical discourse, but the Alevis and Kurds also rejected their “alleged minority status”, and they underlined “their being a constitutive element of the Republic”. The massive celebration of the ninetieth anniversary of the Çanakkale (Gallipoli) Victory on 18 March 2005, as a kind of retaliation for the ninetieth anniversary activities of the Armenian exodus held by diaspora organisations, added to the rise of a Eurosceptical and nationalist wave. The sudden revival of the memory of long-forgotten Ottoman military officers, murdered by British soldiers in the police station in ehzadeba ý, a district of Istanbul, during the occupation of Istanbul in 1920, added different shades to the ethnocentric and nationalist texture of everyday life in Turkey.23 Furthermore, when two Kurdish children in Mersin allegedly set the Turkish flag on fire during 21 March Newroz celebrations in 2005, the country was outraged. The day after the incident, some public figures initiated flag campaigns in the name of “responsible statesmanship”; others, in full uniform, read statements on national unity to the world.24 The “waved and unwaved flags”25 made the country look red, despite the opposing regulations of the Turkish Flag Law.26

professor of Law, and gave a critical view of the contemporary human rights record of Turkey. The Commission resigned on 7 February 2005. Ibrahim Kaboglu stated at a press conference: “We weren’t pushed out for neglecting our work, we were pushed out for performing our work properly. Some circles reacted negatively when we made a certain decision or became angry when we proposed something they did not like.” Turkish Daily News, 8 February 2005. 23 See http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2005/03/17/614827.asp (accessed 20 August 2008). 24 Similarly another flag campaign was widely organised in June 1996, after a young man of Kurdish origin climbed a pole from which the Turkish flag was flying to untie it and pull it down. The scene took place during a public meeting organised in Diyarbakýr of the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP), a political party founded by Kurdish intellectuals and activists. For further information, see Navaro-Yashin, Yael, Faces of the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 127–130. 25 “The reproduction of the nation-state depends upon a dialectic of collective remembering and forgetting, and on imagination and unimaginative repetition. The unwaved flag, which is so forgettable, is at least as important as the memorable moments of flag waving” (Billig, Michael, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage, 1995, p. 10). 26 The fundamental rules for the Turkish flag were laid down by Turkish Flag Law No. 2994 of 29 May 1936. Popular flag campaigns mostly disregard the law, which lays down the size of the flag and the places that can be covered by flags.

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Regrettably, the rapid population increase in Mersin from 200,000 to 800,000 within the last twenty years, and multiplying problems such as poverty, unemployment and urban tension resulting from the internal displacement of people caused by the violence in south-east Anatolia, has not drawn the attention of the media, local administrators, political parties or state institutions. The attitude of the former Minister of Interior of the AKP, who talks about the security problems resulting from internal migration rather than the reasons for it, is a typical example of the overall position of the government vis-à-vis the migration issue.27 Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s January 2007 statement about the option of issuing visas to those seeking to migrate to Istanbul is another indicator of how the recent government interprets the act of domestic migration.28 When the possibility arose that a decision of the European Court of Human Rights would require the re-trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, it did not take long for the media, taking advantage of the rise in nationalist sentiment, to revisit the issue. Ethnonationalism reared its head again, and the public were again exposed to PKK attacks in eastern and southeast Anatolia. Before 3 October 2005, when EU leaders decided to start negotiation talks with Turkey, the country experienced growing violence. In the meantime, a number of (highly unscientific) nationalist and ethnocentric books about Sabetaists,29 Zionism, Masonry and missionaries, reached millions of readers. Bookstores were filled with these kinds of books, including Mein Kampf, which was printed in a few hundred thousand copies. Metal Storm, a science-fiction novel in the same category, fuelled the rise of the anti-Western and antiAmerican nationalist wave with its stereotypical, racist and xenophobic discourse. Furthermore, the Armenian Conference—delayed upon the lynching attempt in Trabzon,30 and the sabotage of the activities

27 Aksu, Abdulkadir, “Keynote speech on migration and Turkey”, in Proceedings of the International Migration Symposium (8–11 December 2005), Zeytinburnu Municipality Culture Press, Istanbul (2006): 387–389. 28 For further details, see http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/news/396867.asp (accessed 11 May 2009). 29 Sabetaists are the followers of a self-proclaimed Jewish Messiah, Sabetai Sevi. His popularity alarmed the Ottoman authorities who arrested him and condemned him to death in 1666. In order to save his life, Sabetai Sevi converted to Islam. 30 While the social tension created by the flag burning incident in Mersin was still going on, on 6 April 2005 four representatives of the leftist journal Labour and Justice were threatened with lynching in Trabzon city centre while delivering a declaration

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marking the anniversary of the 6–7 September 1955 incidents,31 and obstructed for the second time by the judicial authorities—was finally realised in late September 2005. Despite all the handicaps, the only negative memory of the conference that remained was the throwing of tomatoes and eggs at some of the participants. Perhaps the most important outcome of all these experiences was to see that Turks could actually talk about some of their taboos. The Armenian question was then discussed and no unusual incidents occurred afterwards (25–26 September 2005). This Eurosceptical and nationalist discourse generated by the political parties seems to coincide with the reaction of urban middle-class and upper-middle-class groups who have suffered recently from dramatic social change in the cities as a result of insecurity, violence, crime, honour crimes, domestic violence, street children, poverty, unemployment, internally displaced people and other migration-related problems. Middle-class and upper-middle-class groups react to social changes that are likely to threaten the status quo at their expense. The securitisation of domestic migration by the government and other political parties triggers popular Turkish nationalism directed against the Kurdish population, which is becoming more visible in the major cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Mersin, Adana and Bursa. As these deeprooted social changes are taking place during the process of European integration, it is likely that middle-class and upper-middle-class groups will equate the rising social disorder with European integration. This is why Euroscepticism has become more widespread among such groups than among the poor. The contemporary xenophobia and racism prevailing in the urban space and cyberspace are aspects of what Ralph D. Grillo calls “cultural fundamentalism” or what Paul Gilroy calls “ethnic absolutism”,32 which is embodied in Article 301 of the reformed Turkish Penal Code with the aim of preventing the denigration of state institutions and of ‘Turkishness’. The discussions revolving around Article 301 refer to the intensification of an ethno-cultural anxiety that seems to be entitled, “There is death in isolation” prepared by TAYAD (Association for Solidarity with the Relatives of Arrested and Sentenced People) (Radikal, 7 April 2005). 31 Non-Muslims were attacked in Turkey’s three major cities (Istanbul, Izmir, and Ankara) on 6–7 September 1955, and the attacks compelled thousands of Turkish citizens of non-Muslim origin, particularly Greeks, to leave their native areas. 32 See Grillo, Ralph, “Cultural essentialism and cultural anxiety”, Anthropological Theory, vol. 3, no. 2 (2003), pp. 157–173; and Gilroy, Paul, There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (London: Hutchinson, 1987).

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a reaction to the destabilising effects of globalisation, Europeanisation and expanding modernity. To put it differently, the state’s distrust of its citizens may also refer to what Arjun Appadurai calls “the anxiety of incompleteness” of nationhood and the nation-state.33 One can easily see that the anxiety of incompleteness is still imbedded in the minds of the conservative political elite in Turkey. The Minister of Defence, Vecdi Gönül, stated in a speech given in Brussels to commemorate the anniversary of Atatürk’s death on 10 November 2008 that Turkey could not have become a nation-state if Armenians and Greeks were still in the country: The most important step during the establishment of the nation was the exchange of populations. Just imagine, would it have been possible for us to become a nation state, if the Greeks had continued to live in Aegean region and the Armenians in many parts of Anatolia?34

Apostles of purity—religious, ethnic, or linguistic—are everywhere. The search for purity arises from the assumed impossibility of managing diversity. A similar line of argument was taken by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan after his notorious visit to Hakkari, a south-eastern province of Turkey with a Kurdish majority, on 3 November 2008. In his statement, Erdoğan criticised the Kurdish protest in the city and recalled the slogan “one state, one flag, one nation”. “Those who are against these, have no place to live in Turkey. They can go anywhere they want,” he said (Milliyet, 4 November 2008). His statement was later condemned by the intelligentsia for its similarity with the racist discourse of “love it or leave it” previously coined by the ultra-right wing groups. The ruling AKP has also generated a Eurosceptical discourse since the debates on the latest electoral cycle started in late 2005. However, it was not only the nationalist surge in the country that turned the AKP into a Eurosceptical party; it was also the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in the headscarf case of Leyla ahin v. Turkey (2005). It was a monumental development that the Grand Chamber of the EctHR agreed to hear ahin’s case at all, since two previous applications concerning the Turkish headscarf had been ruled inadmissible. In ahin’s case, however, the outcome was a temporary

33 See Appadurai, Arjun, Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006). 34 Radikal, 11 November 2008, translation mine.

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defeat for headscarf supporters. The court ruled that there had been no violation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of thought, conscience and religion); Article 10 (freedom of expression); Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) and Article 2, Protocol No. 1 (right to education). In short, the Grand Chamber concluded that in the case of the headscarf, the interference/with fundamental rights might be necessary to protect the rights and freedoms of others and maintain public order. While the Chamber recognised that the ban interfered with ahin’s right to publicly manifest her religion, it stated that the ban was acceptable if it was imposed to protect the rights of third parties, to preserve public order, and to safeguard the principles of secularism and equality in Turkey. The decision of the ECtHR was not at all welcomed by the AKP leadership, who actually perceived the European Union as a liberating force with respect to lifting the ban on the headscarf, as well as to the freedom of religion. The AKP’s disappointment immediately turned its elite and clientele Eurosceptic, revealing that the AKP had actually perceived the EU as an instrument. Besides, Euro-skepticism within the AKP had been fed by rising Islamophobia and Turcophobia in the aftermath of September 11, internal crisis within the EU, and the increasing prominence of the ethno-culturally and religiously motivated conservative political forces in the major EU countries such as France, Germany, Denmark and Austria. With the AKP becoming outspokenly Eurosceptic, all the political parties in the country competed in both Euroscepticism and nationalism. The competition between the AKP and the secularist political parties, backed by the army, crystallised during the presidential election in May 2007. Preceding the presidential election, tension arose between the government and the General Staff of the armed forces, which became known as the ‘e-Coup’ affair. Just before midnight on 27 April 2007, the General Staff posted a declaration on its website cautioning the Prime Minister against nominating his right-hand man, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül, for the presidency. Erdogan did the unthinkable and publicly warned off the military the following day. It was later argued that the ‘e-Coup’ strengthened the AKP in the subsequent general elections to the tune of an additional 10% of the vote. However, Mr Gül did not fit the expectations of Turkey’s traditional political and military establishment, and he failed to reach the required two-thirds majority in the Parliament. This failure resulted from the fact that the presidential post has a rather symbolic importance in Turkey since it

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was first occupied by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. The establishment argued that, as someone with pro-Islamist values and a wife who wore a headscarf, Mr Gül was an inappropriate candidate for the office of president. However, the nationalist-military alliance against the AKP was unsuccessful in the general election, and on 22 July 2007 the party won a landslide victory, with 47% of the votes cast. Following the elections, Abdullah Gül was also elected to the office of president. 4

Landmarks of Contemporary Turkish Politics: The Agony of Democratisation

Turkish politics has been through a tremendous change since the beginning of the accession negotiations in December 2005. The landmarks of this change are: the assassination of the journalist Hrant Dink, the failure of the AKP to incorporate the Kurds and the Alevis, constitutional change to lift the headscarf ban in the public institutions, the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the lifting of the headscarf ban, the prosecution of the AKP with the aim of closing the party down, and the Ergenekon case. All these landmarks seem to reveal that the AKP leadership has so far instrumentalised the European cause in a way that has led the liberals and EU circles to question the AKP’s commitment to the European Union. 4.1

The assassination of Hrant Dink

Hrant Dink was a prominent journalist of Armenian origin, who was assassinated on 19 January 2007. He had earlier been sentenced to six months’ conditional imprisonment on the charge of ‘insulting Turkish national identity’. In an article published in early 2004, Dink had called for Armenians to “renounce the hatred towards the Turks that poisons their blood”. Article 301 (1 June 2005) of the Turkish Penal Code states that: A person who publicly denigrates Turkishness, the Republic or the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and three years; A person who publicly denigrates the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the judicial institutions of the State, the military or security organisations shall be punishable by imprisonment of between six months and two years; In cases where denigration of Turkishness is committed by a Turkish citizen in another country, the punishment shall be increased

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by one third; and expressions of thought intended to criticise shall not constitute a crime. This notorious article has been critically debated in various circles in and outside Turkey. Several charges have been brought against various intellectuals, among whom there are popular figures such as Hrant Dink, Orhan Pamuk, the 2006 Literature Nobel Prize Winner, Perihan Magden, a journalist, Ragip Zarakolu, a publisher, and even Joost Lagendijk, a European MP from the Netherlands, and Noam Chomsky. The court hearings against Hrant Dink and the others were accompanied by various public demonstrations by liberals on the one hand and ultra-nationalists on the other. The latter were later revealed to have had links with the illegal para-military organisation called Ergenekon. The hearings reflected a deep social divide, again between liberals and Euro-sceptics. Eventually, on 30 April 2008, a series of changes were made to Article 301, including an amendment which requires the approval of the minister of justice for a case to be filed. However, the AKP has not given up its nationalist position in keeping the very parochial and racist character of Article 301 intact. 4.2

Kurds

As stated earlier, the Helsinki summit led to the moderation of the official political discourse in Turkey regarding the recognition of cultural and ethnic diversity. Mesut Yilmaz, president of the Motherland Party back in 1999, has openly stated that “The road to the EU passes through Diyarbakir”, i.e., through resolving the Kurdish question: Democracy is the right of both the Turks and Kurds . . . We cannot transport Turkey into a new era with a nation offended by the state, with a system that views the society as a threat, with a bureaucracy that belittles the citizen, with a republic that ousts the individual, and with a political system that is impotent in the face of these adversities.35

Along the same line, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ismail Cem, announced that “broadcasting in other mother tongues should be allowed”.36 At this time, too, the issue of national security was opened up for public discussion. Yilmaz publicly criticised Turkey’s conception

35 “Yilmaz: Road to EU passes through Diyarbakir”, Turkish Daily News, 17 December 1999. 36 “Interview with Ismail Cem”, CNN-Turkey, 12 December 1999.

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of national security for being far too broad compared with its EU counterparts, and for being defined behind closed doors. In a speech he delivered at a meeting of the Motherland Party’s Chairmanship Council (15 August 2001), Yilmaz stated that “national security is an issue that concerns everyone in Turkey, therefore it should be discussed not only by the political parties, but by the public as well”.37 It has been a recurring pattern in Turkey since the early 1990s that Turkish political leaders have addressed the importance of the Kurdish question before the democratisation process. Süleyman Demirel was the first Prime Minister to publicly declare that the government recognised the “Kurdish reality” (1992); similarly Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the current Prime Minister also stated that his government was aware of the “Kurdish question” (2005). In spite of his positive messages until the July 2007 election, Erdoğan has not done much to improve the situation since then. Even worse, he has reversed his position and started using increasingly militaristic and nationalist language towards the Kurds, starting with his notorious visit to Hakkari as explained above. However, the ruling party has successfully taken further steps to extend the cultural rights of the Kurds in Turkey. Turkey’s state-run radio and television network TRT’s new TV channel, TRT 6, officially started a 24-hour broadcast in Kurdish language on 1 January 2009.38 In addition, it has been stated by the President of the Board of Higher Education (YÖK) that a Department of Kurdish language and letters will be established at two leading universities in Turkey.39 4.3

Alevis

The AKP leadership is generally known to be critical of Alevism, which is seen as a deviation from the mainstream Sunni Islam. However, the AKP tried to correct this Alevi-sceptical image by inviting a prominent Alevi-origin novelist and journalist, Reha Çamuroğlu, to be a parliamentary candidate in the July 2007 elections. After being elected to Parliament, Çamuroğlu was appointed as an advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to establish a bridge between Cited in Bilgin, “Turkey’s changing security discourses”, p. 191. “Turkey launches TV station in once-banned Kurdish language,” http://www .dw-world.de/dw/function/0,,12215_cid_3915390,00.html (accessed 11 May 2009). 39 See, “Turkey plans to start Kurdish language education in universities” available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10685024.asp?gid=244 (accessed 11 May 2009). 37

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the AKP and the Alevis.40 This initiative was not accepted by most of the Alevi organisations, whether in Turkey or in the Alevi diaspora. Çamuroğlu was declared a traitor by such organisations. There was an initiative to persuade the Alevis, who are ethnically and religiously quite heterogeneous, to set up a representative liaison association to communicate with the Directorate of Religious Affairs attached to the Prime Minister’s Office. However, the AKP has not ceased to consider Alevism a deviant faith, and it still does not recognise the Cemevis (Alevi communion houses) as equal to mosques. Furthermore, the AKP has tried to ‘Sunnify’ the Alevis by denying the heterogeneity of their rituals, customs and orientations. Some Alevis have also been concerned about their children being subject to Sunni-Islam based religious classes, which are compulsory for all Turkish students. Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik has stubbornly insisted on all Alevi children attending these classes, despite a decision by the European Court of Human Rights that this form of mandatory religious education was in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The ruling in Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey urged Turkey to conform with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, which covers the right to education. The protocol reads: In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.41

Against this background one could argue that the AKP’s European cause has so far been limited to furthering the demands of its own electorate. The Alevis have failed to make their claims heard. Thus, the aim of accommodating Alevis has not lasted more than a year. 4.4

The headscarf issue

The headscarf issue has been one of the tools by which the AKP has sought from time to time to win the public over. There were a few

40 For further information on this initiative see the Turkish Daily News webpapge, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=80103&contact=1, accessed 10 December 2007. 41 See the Judgement Decision in Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?sessionid=23448506&skin=hudoc-cc-en (accessed 11 May 2009).

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attempts by the AKP in the previous term between 2002 and 2007 to lift the ban on the headscarf. However, these attempts were repelled by secularist institutions, such as the Constitutional Court. The AKP’s landslide victory in the 2007 elections resulted in the return of the headscarf issue with a stronger resonance. This time, the AKP decided to change Articles 10 and 42 of the Constitution to lift the ban on the headscarf. The constitutional changes were drawn up by the AKP government with the support of the right-wing opposition MHP (Nationalist Action Party) on 29 January 2008 and passed by the Turkish Parliament on 6 and 9 February. On 22 February, President Abdullah Gül approved the changes. In response, the opposition CHP (Republican People’s Party) and the DSP (Democratic Left Party) applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of these changes on the grounds that they violated the principle of secularism in Article 2 of the Constitution. The amended Article 10, which deals with equality before the law, reads as follows: “State organs and administrative posts have to abide by the rule of equality before the law in all public procedures and public services.” Article 42, which relates to the right to education, has been amended thus: “Nobody can be deprived of exercising their right to higher education for a reason not specified in the law. Restrictions that apply to this right are to be stated by law.” Immediately after the constitutional change, on 24 February, the newly elected head of YÖK, Yusuf Ziya Özcan, made a statement to the universities, interpreting the constitutional changes. In his written statement, he said that the changes in the Constitution lifted the ban on the headscarf in the Turkish universities.42 Some of the universities complied with the interpretation of the president of YÖK, but some others preferred to wait for the interpretation of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court made a decision to annul these amendments in June 2008, at a time when there were massive demonstrations against the lifting of the ban as well. The Constitutional Court was also on the verge of making another decision, regarding closing down the AKP.43

42 For a detailed analysis of the headscarf debate see the Turkish Daily News webpage, http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/article.php?enewsid=95065, accessed 8 January 2008. 43 For further information on the decision of the Constitutional Court banning the headscarf in public institutions, see http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/06/ turkey19050.htm (accessed 11 May 2009).

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The trial for the closure of AKP

The chief public prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals filed a complaint against the AKP on 14 March 2008 and asked the Constitutional Court to close the party down, arguing that the party had become “a focus of anti-secular activities”. Yalçinkaya requested that 71 politicians be banned from politics, including Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and President Abdullah Gül. The Constitutional Court made its decision in the case on 30 July 2008, only about four and a half months after the chief prosecutor had filed the case. Under pressure at home as well as from the international community, the Constitutional Court felt the need to take immediate action to conclude the case. The Constitutional Court rejected the chief prosecutor’s demand: The party escaped closure and having 71 of its leading figures banned from politics for five years. However, the court did rule that the AKP had shown signs of being “a focal point for anti-secular activity” and recommended the party be deprived of 50% of the financial aid it received from the state treasury.44 The closure case was perceived both in Turkey and by the international community as a test case for Turkish democracy. The Court decision was a relief not only for Turkey but also for the European Union. 4.6

Ergenekon plot

Ergenekon is alleged by the Attorney of the Republic to be an illegal nationalist organisation intent on overthrowing the government and bringing in an isolationist dictatorial regime under the guise of regaining national sovereignty. It is claimed that the plot was set up by senior former generals in collaboration with secret intelligence service personnel and members of the media, extremist politicians and even some academics.45 When the Chief Prosecutor filed the lawsuit in the Constitutional Court demanding the closure of the AKP in March 2008, Prime Minister Erdoğan immediately responded with a midnight roundup of new Ergenekon suspects. Whereas previous suspects arrested had been largely fringe figures, this time the net was widened to

44 For further details, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7533414.stm (accessed 11 May 2009). 45 Ergil, Doğu, “Turkey’s Crisis and Future”, The Audit of Conventional Visdom 08, No. 11, (available at) http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/Audit_08_08_Ergil.pdf August 2008, accessed 7 January 2009.

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include some of the most prominent secular intellectuals in Turkey, such as Dogu Perincek, leader of the Workers’ Party; the editor-in-chief of Cumhuriyet, Ilhan Selcuk; and Kemal Alemdaroğlu, a former president of Istanbul University. It appears that Erdoğan also put the offending judges under surveillance. A scandal erupted in May 2008 when the vice-president of the Constitutional Court complained that he was being followed. Uniformed police responding to his complaint found that his pursuers were undercover officers.46 It was later discovered that surveillance by the National Intelligence Service (MIT) was very common. This caused an uproar in Turkey revealing further allegations with regard to new suspects within the framework of the Ergenekon case file, which was made ready on 25 July 2008, immediately prior to the Constitutional Court decision regarding the closure of the AKP. Eventually, after a long process of filing, Turkish prosecutors issued a 2,455-page indictment detailing an alleged plot to overthrow Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by an elaborate network of retired military officers, journalists, academics, businessmen, and other secular opponents of the ruling AKP.47 Although the precise facts of the case are not yet clear, the so-called Ergenekon conspiracy appears to be a largely fictionalised construct, with an ongoing investigation geared mainly to warding off constitutional challenges to the ruling party, rather than coups. It is also claimed that the moderate Islamist Gülen movement was also somehow linked to the Ergenekon plot, but so far no allegation has been made in this regard. However, the file has very serious charges concerning the killing of Hrant Dink, several murders whose perpetrators are unknown, nationalist and jingoist agitations which pop up from time to time, attempted military coups, and cooperation between the members of the Ergenekon, the PKK and the radical Islamist Hizbollah group, leading to constant instability in the country, particularly in the southeast. The police also uncovered documents that revealed plans for a sustained campaign of terror and intimidation against the Islamist government due to begin in early July 2008. A perfect storm of

46 See Jenkins, Gareth, “Alleged surveillance of senior judges raises questions about politicization of Turkish police”, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20 May 2008. 47 See Rubin, Michael, “Erdogan, Ergenekon, and the struggle for Turkey”, Mideast Monitor, 8 August 2008), available at http://www.meforum.org/article/1968 (accessed 11 May 2009).

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disruption was to be whipped up, beginning with a groundswell of popular protest, followed by a wave of assassinations and bombings, culminating in an economic crisis and army coup. Turkey’s moderate Islamist government would be ousted in favour of a right-wing secular dictatorship. The documents appeared to identify a 30-member assassination squad targeting judges and other prominent figures.48 When they made their decision regarding the closure of the AKP, the judges of the Constitutional Court were apparently influenced by the recent political events taking place in the country, as well as by the statements of the major political figures coming from within the European Union circles and the USA. Against the background described above, one could claim that the AKP is likely to win the battle for power. However, this is not an absolute certainty for the AKP, since lately, its culturalist, nationalist and religious discourse has been questioned by the Turkish public as well as the European Union. It has become clear that the AKP’s perseverance with the headscarf issue and religious references have become disturbing to the moderate seculars and liberals as well. It is also becoming clear that the AKP is no longer able to pursue the European Union integration project with its ‘alliance of civilisations’ thesis. 5

Conclusion: A Chance for a Paradigm Shift in Europe as well as in Turkey

It is evident that the continuation of the democratisation process in Turkey depends upon the path the EU is likely to take in the foreseeable future. One could also easily argue that Turkey’s EU bid strongly shapes the internal discussions within the EU concerning the identity of the Union. A pro-Turkey mood in the EU is likely to contribute to the disavowal of the cultural/civilisational/religious discourse, which has become dominant since the war in Bosnia in the early 1990s. Not only the native European public, but also Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants are highly tuned, in one way or another, to the debates regarding Turkey’s candidacy. It seems that most of those who are for or against Turkey are persuaded by the cultural/civilisational/

48 Robert Tait, “Turkish coup plot awakens fear of violent nationalism,” The Observer (6 July 2008), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jul/06/turkey.

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religious paradigm; that is, it seems that the debates regarding Turkey revolve around the religious and cultural domains. Furthermore, Euro-Turks have also become more vocal in their concerns about the recent European scepticism towards Turkey. Euro-Turks have become more resistant to the integrationist attempts of the European states in a time when Turkey is being neglected and rejected by European leaders.49 Thus, one could say that Turkey’s European bid has come to be about more than only Turkey’s candidacy alone. It has rather become a matter of a civilisational bridge between the EU and the Islamic world. However, the work of Antonia M. Ruiz Jiménez and Ignacio Torreblanca Payá, based on the Eurobarometer surveys, reveals that neither the instrumentalisation nor the culturalisation of the Turkish membership creates a positive image of Turkey for the European public.50 Neither has the emphasis on the civilisation-bridging capacity of Turkey and the compatibility of European and Turkish identities so far made a substantial impact on the Turkish public’s support for the EU. Apparently, instrumentalist and culturalist perspectives do not bring the EU and Turkey closer to each other. It seems that the only way to re-envision Turkey-EU relations is to break up the hegemony of civilisationist/religious/culturalist discourse, which has so far paved the way to nationalist, religious, parochial and local divides inside the EU as well as in Turkey. The European public should be reminded that the EU is a project of integration and peace, but not of division. The magnetic potential of the Union should be restored not only for the European public but also for the neighbouring countries and the world. This can only be done through efforts to construct a post-national and post-Western Europe, the boundaries of which are always in the making and transcend the retrospective, civilisational, cultural and religious contours of essentialist projects for the EU. It is such a political, postcivilisational, post-cultural, post-Judeo/Christian and prospective EU that both Turkey and the world need. A politically defined Europe that is subject to the developmental logic of enlargement is also what the EU needs in order to overcome ongoing structural problems in the Union.

49 For further dabate on this issue see Kaya, Ayhan and Ferhat Kentel, Euro-Turks, Brussels: CEPS Publications, 2005; and Kaya, Ayhan and Ferhat Kentel, Belgian-Turks, Brussels: King Baudouin Foundation, 2007. 50 Ruiz Jiménez, Antonia M. and Torreblanca Payá, Ignacio, European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession (Brussels: European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN), 2007).

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The debate on Turkish membership seems to provide the EU with the required tools to generate a post-national and post-Western Europe. It is clear that the Turkish democratisation process may be expected to be persistent in the case of a liberal, political and post-civilisational European project, which would be ready to welcome Turkey. On the other hand, a culturally and religiously defined Europe might abstain from welcoming Turkey, and this would certainly interrupt the democratisation process. Turkey’s democracy is highly linked to the ways in which the EU is being constructed and reconstructed. There are at least two definitions of Europe and the EU. The first is that proposed by the conservatives, which defines Europeanness as a static, retrospective, holistic, essentialist and culturally prescribed entity. The second is that proposed by the social democrats, liberals, socialists and greens, which emphasises the understanding that ‘Europe’ is a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, prospective, syncretic and nonessentialist process of becoming. While the first definition highlights a cultural project, the latter definition welcomes a political project. Civilisational Europe

Post-Civilisational Europe

Communal

Societal

Cultural

Political

Retrospective

Prospective

Essentialist

Non-essentialist

Heterophobia

Heterophilia

Physical geography

Political geography

Communal

Societal

Cultural

Political

Retrospective

Prospective

Essentialist

Non-essentialist

Heterophobia

Heterophilia

Accordingly, the conservative civilisational idea aims to build a culturally prescribed Europe based on Christian mythology, shared meanings and values, historical myths and memories, the Ancient Greek and/or Roman legacy, homogeneity and heterophobia. Civilisational Europe

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does not intend to include any other culture or religion outside of this European/Christian legacy. Hence, neither Turkey nor Islam has a place in this project. This is why Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (President of the EU Convention) and several other leaders in the wider Union both implicitly and explicitly advocate including an article in the EU Constitution regarding the Christian roots of the Union. On the other hand, the progressive post-civilisational idea proposes a politically dynamic Europe based on cultural diversity, dialogue, heterogeneity, and heterophilia. The advocates of a syncretic Europe promote coexistence with Turkey and Islam, and underline that the EU is, by origin, a peace and integration project. Joschka Fischer, Michel Rocard, and Gerhard Schröder are some of the leaders emphasising the secular character of the EU. Hence, Turkey’s future in the EU depends on the weakening of the civilisational and cultural idea of the EU, which divides the world into religiously defined clusters. A post-civilisational, post-national, post-Western, post-religious and secular idea of Europe would strengthen pro-European sentiments in Turkey.

EUROPEAN MUSLIM YOUTH: TOWARDS A COOL ISLAM? Miriam Gazzah1 1

Introduction

This article focuses on the role of music (in the broadest sense of the word) in Dutch-Moroccan youth culture. It explores the way DutchMoroccan Muslim youth appropriate particular kinds of music in order to express a specific kind of identity. How do they bring music consumption and conviction together—or not—and why? For DutchMoroccan youth, Islam is an important element in their lives, but other factors, such as ethnicity, are equally important. Before going into detail about Muslim youth culture in the Netherlands, this article will give a short outline of what youth culture is and the importance of (popular) music in it, and will then turn to the specific case of the Netherlands and, in particular, to Dutch-Moroccan youth. Youth culture is nothing new. From the early twentieth century until more recent times, youth culture in Western-Europe and the Western world has received much media and academic attention from sociological, anthropological and psychological perspectives. However, youth cultures evolving among European youth with non-European ethnic backgrounds, and especially among European Muslim youth, have not yet been covered by the same level of study as the ‘traditional’ youth cultures, such as the punks, the mods or the ravers. European Muslim youth are the children and grandchildren of immigrants and guest workers who moved to Europe in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s and came from Turkey and Northern Africa to Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands to work. Even though most of them dreamed of returning to their home countries, the majority stayed and in due course, were joined by their wives and children. These

Dr. Miriam Gazzah has a PhD from the Radboud University in Nijmegen and is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Amsterdam School for Social science Research (ASSR), working on the research programme ‘Islamic Cultural Performances: New Youth Cultures in Europe’. 1

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families form the core of most of the Muslim communities in Western Europe. Their different ethnic background and their religion, Islam—or, in short, their ‘otherness’—has given rise to considerable mistrust and caution among the Europeans. At present, the second and third generation offspring of the first Muslim immigrants are aged between 18 and 30 and these young people have been born, raised and educated in Europe. They are living in a post-migration situation; the myth of return is long gone. A great number of them (not all) have little or no ability to speak Turkish, Arabic or Berber, but are fluent in Dutch, French, German or English. Above all, they have as much mastery as any other young people of the language of youth culture. Popular culture, including pop music and the mass media, often serve as important reservoirs of images, expressions, loyalties and discourses, from which young people draw inspiration in the way they present, represent, articulate and express processes of identification. Popular culture and youth culture are intrinsically linked. Islam is often seen as having a tense relationship with many aspects of popular culture such as the arts, music, popular entertainment, or, as some say in one word: ‘fun’, but in the past decade, we have witnessed the emergence of forms of artistic and popular entertainment and consumer culture that find their inspiration in Islam. In particular, after the events of 11 September 2001, Muslim youth in Europe as well as in the US have become more involved in creating their own niches and markets, in music, fashion, food, leisure time activities (nightlife and dating events), humour, literature and a range of commodity goods. In Europe, styles and fashion are often inspired by American aesthetic standards or are simply a copy of them.2 Some examples: In the autumn of 2007, the Dutch daily newspaper Spits published a story on the first ‘Muslim singles-night event’ in the Netherlands.3 This first-ever dating event organised specifically for Muslims in search of a life-partner was, according to the reporter, a big success. Another Dutch daily newspaper De Volkskrant reported on “a Muslim comedy tour”, referring to the debut performance of three 2 Boubekeur, A., “Cool and competitive: Muslim culture in the West”, ISIM Review, vol. 16 (2005), pp. 12–13 (12). Muslim youth in the Muslim world are also in the process of creating new cultural practices. See for example Marc LeVine’s Heavy Metal Islam: Rock, Resistance, and the Struggle for the Soul of Islam (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008). The focus of this article, however, is on Muslim youth in Europe and especially on Dutch-Moroccan youth. 3 Karimi, A., “Eerste singlesnight moslims”, Spits, 22 October 2007.

european muslim youth: towards a cool islam?

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American-Muslim comedians in the Netherlands.4 The same newspaper that same day also contained a short item on “the production of an Islamic car”, about a Malaysian car-factory that wanted to produce an Islamic car, including a compass to find the direction of Mecca and special storage compartments for the Qur’an and headscarves. The Islamic mobile phone was introduced in the Netherlands as early as 2005. Invented and produced in the Middle East, it has several applications for Muslims: it reminds you of the call to prayer five times a day, it automatically points you in the direction of Mecca (qibla), it contains an English translation of the text of the Qur’an, and during Ramadan it presents a special calendar which reminds you of the times for breaking the fast. A Dutch company called Little Muslim recently introduced ‘Fulla’, a play doll for girls, which, according to the website (www.fullashop.nl), is the answer to Barbie. Fulla likes to shop, play and cook and also to pray. Beneath her clothes, Fulla always wears a bathing suit, so that she will never be completely naked. Fulla stimulates young Muslim girls to learn ‘Muslim’ values and norms, such as modesty, modest dress and respect for the elderly, but also motivates them to become teachers, doctors, lawyers or dentists. On the level of popular culture, Islamised consumer commodities are slowly but steadily becoming more common on the Dutch market. Besides commodity goods, in recent years ‘Islamic’ music, or Islamically inspired music, is also gradually surfacing. Islamic music is not completely new: Islamic hip-hop has already occupied a place in the American and British hip-hop scene and industry, but it appears to be still in its infancy in the Netherlands and has not yet reached the level of popularity it has attained in the UK and the United States. Islamic American hip-hop artists Native Deen and Soul Salah Crew, the British-Asian band Fun-da-mental, the British rap-band Mecca II Medina and the French rap-crew Médine have become known as Islamic hip-hop acts.5 Other examples of Islamic popular music acts 4 Henfling, M., “ ‘Moslims hoeven niet te beledigen’. Drie Amerikaanse stand-up comedians doen met ‘Allah made me funny’—tournee Nederland aan”, De Volkskrant, 12 November 2007. 5 Popp, M., Hip-hop, Islam and Islamic rap: hip-hop as a tool in identity politics for Muslims, unpublished paper (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University, 2004); Swedenburg, T., “Arab ‘world music’ in the US”, Middle East Report, vol. 31, no. 2 (2001), pp. 34–37; Solomon, T., “ ‘Living underground is tough’: authenticity and locality in the hip-hop community in Istanbul, Turkey”, Popular Music, vol. 24, no. 1 (2005), pp. 1–20; Solomon, T.,

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are the contemporary Islamic pop singers Sami Yusuf, with roots in Azerbeidjan, born and raised in London, and Cat Stevens, who converted to Islam in 1978 and changed his name to Yusuf Islam. They have both been active for several years in creating anasheed music in pop style that is popular among Muslim youth in both Europe and the Arab world. Traditionally, anasheed music is performed with a limited number of instruments or a cappella, because of the assumed prohibition of certain musical instruments in Islam. Anasheed is usually performed with a choir made up of either male or female performers. Pop idols such as Sami Yusuf and Yusuf Islam, however, perform with a band that uses (Western) instruments and they are the only performers around whom a fan-culture has emerged. In the UK, the all-girl band Pearls of Islam make music (rap, anasheed, poetry and spoken word) with percussion instruments and vocals. Their lyrics often praise Islam and the Prophet Muhammad.6 Of all Islamised popular culture, music is one of the most controversial. The tense relationship between Islam and music dates back to the early years of Islamic history. Ever since, Islamic scholars and laymen have been discussing the compatibility of Islam and music (i.e., the production or consumption of music). The combination of music and Islam is not accepted and appreciated by all Muslims, but in youth culture music is often a driving force. There are several reasons for this, the most important being that music and its related social activities are probably the primary form of leisure for most young people worldwide. In addition, since music is a relatively democratic cultural phenomenon, it is easily accessible to youth and it is far-reaching,

“Hardcore Muslims: Islamic themes in Turkish rap in diaspora and in the homeland”, in S. Pettan and J.P.J. Stock (eds), Yearbook for Traditional Music, 38 (International Council for Traditional Music/Unesco, 2006), pp. 59–78; Abdul Khabeer, S., “Rep that Islam: The rhyme and reason of American Islamic hip hop”, The Muslim World, vol. 97, no. 1 (2007), pp. 125–141. 6 Islamic music is also popular in Indonesia. A vibrant popular music culture of bands inspired by the success of Western boybands in the style of Backstreet Boys and Take That has emerged there. Barendregt reports on the superstar status of anasheed bands such as S’Nada, Raihan, and Rabbani in Indonesia and Malaysia (Barendregt, B., “The art of no-seduction: Muslim boy-band music in Southeast Asia and the fear of the female voice”, IIAS Newsletter, vol. 40 (Spring 2006), p. 10). A kind of (female) fan-culture familiar in the West, idolising boy bands like Take That, has also arisen around the Southeast-Asian Muslim boy bands, leading to heated public debates. Many have considered the bands too commercial and found that they focused their performance too much on the visuals (the good looks of the singers), rather than on the music and the vocals.


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being widely available and accessible through radio, television and the Internet.7 Moreover, music, as a cultural practice, is very open to influences from outside. It is easily mixed with new and/or other cultural practices and is consequently able to innovate and thus to articulate new identities, and this is at the heart of most youth cultures.8 Since the 1970s, the study of pop music has often been incorporated into research on youth, youth culture and identity from a wide range of scholarly perspectives. A noteworthy idea that stands out in many of these studies is how strongly pop music and identity are interconnected. Many ideas and theories within the study of youth culture, music and identity derive from the famous work Resistance through Rituals: Youth Subcultures in Post-War Britain (London: Hutchinson, 1976) edited by the sociologists Stuart Hall and Tony Jefferson of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) in Birmingham, which indicated that there is a connection between certain music styles and youth (sub-) cultures. Their pioneering study explained how British youth subcultures constructed and expressed their identity by means of clothing, lifestyle and music. The post-war period brought about a destruction of the traditional social structures of British society: changes in youth leisure patterns and the processes of modernisation and industrialisation resulted in unequal socioeconomic development, leading to a wide discrepancy between the social classes and between generations (youth and their parents). Researchers at the CCCS regarded youth subcultures as ‘magic solutions’ for the economic and social contradictions experienced by British middle- and lower-working-class youth. Hall and Jefferson’s ‘resistance through rituals’ may not, however, be the most appropriate term for the new youth culture(s) emerging among European Muslim youth. In their case, it may be better to speak of ‘resistance through consumption’, or ‘distinction through consumption’.

7 Bennett, A., Popular Music and Youth Culture: Music, Identity and Place (London: MacMillan, 2000), p. 1; Huq, R., (2006) Beyond Subculture: Pop, Youth and Identity in a Postcolonial World (London: Routledge), pp. 4, 42; Carrington, B. and Wilson, B., “Dance nations: rethinking youth subcultural theory”, in A. Bennett and K. Kahn-Harris (eds), After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 65–78 (65). 8 Baily, J. and Collyer, M., (2006) “Introduction: Music and migration”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 32, no. 2 (2006), pp. 167–182 (174).

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The Study of Music and Youth Culture in Europe

During the 1970s and 1980s, the studies and ideas produced by the CCCS on youth cultures dominated the field. Style, including fashion, behaviour, language and music, and the mixing and matching of all of these elements, were seen as a form of resistance to the hegemonic ideology of British society. This ideology consisted of the promotion of the nuclear family, as opposed to the extended family that was part of the lower- and middle-working-class ideology, and the imposition of media and school systems ruled by the bourgeoisie. By having recourse to alternative styles (in dress, language, behaviour and musical preferences), British youth tacitly and subtly expressed dissatisfaction with and resistance to the dominant middle-class ideology. The establishment of a youth culture was regarded as a claim to a symbolic space in which young people could freely express their powerlessness and discontent with the status quo, without the interference of parents or the authorities. However, as a result of exaggerating their concentration on these ideologies that lay hidden behind style, the CCCS did not investigate the reasons why certain groups used certain kinds of style, fashion, language or music to express this resistance.9 In due course, the CCCS’s concept of youth subculture was used as an all-encompassing term for whatever social aspects in the lives of youths were related in one way or another to some kind of music, style or fashion.10 Critics accused the CCCS of assuming that behind each youth subculture there were latent ideologies of resistance towards the hegemony of British bourgeoisie.11 In addition, the CCCS’s supposition that youth subcultures comprise a fixed group of people was criticised because it overlooked the possibility of fluidity and turnover of membership.12 Finally, the CCCS was criticised for attributing too much value to the role of class, and neglecting the role of gender and ethnicity, in the formation of youth subcultures. After a spate of publications in the 1980s and 1990s on youth and subcultures and the role of style and bricolage, still following for a 9 Bennett, A. and Kahn-Harris, K. (eds), After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 4–6. 10 Ibid., p. 1. 11 Huq, R., Beyond Subculture, p. 14. 12 Martin, P., “Culture, subculture and social organization”, in A. Bennett and K. Kahn-Harris (eds), After Subculture: Critical Studies in Contemporary Youth Culture (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 21–35 (30–31).


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large part the CCCS’s track,13 a new wave of studies dealing with the meaning and social significance of pop music entered the debate. The ongoing critique of the CCCS eventually resulted in the emergence of new perspectives on youth (sub-)cultures, the use of the term subculture gradually being replaced by new terms and concepts. Instigated, among other things, by flows of migrants into Europe and by the increasing popularity of African-American and Caribbean music genres such as reggae and hip-hop in Europe and the US during the 1990s, there surfaced new interests in the role of ethnicity, race and music in youth culture.14 In sum, during the 1980s and 1990s, there occurred a shift in the methodology of youth culture studies. The focus shifted from an ‘outsider’s’ perspective that analysed youth cultures from the outside, presupposing a resistance to political and socio-economic circumstances, with little attention given to the discourse by youth themselves about the reasons why they did the things they did, to an ‘insider’s perspective’ that focused more on the discourses of youth culture participants and their motivations, with an eye to external influences and changing circumstances. This renewed insight resulted in interesting studies in France, the UK and Germany on the role of ethnicity and the impact of post-migration situations on the emergence of youth culture among North African, Asian and Turkish youth. In France, since the 1990s, studies on the second-generation North Africans (in France often called beurs) have appeared regularly. For example, Gabriele Marranci’s articles15 show how raï music and its corresponding youth culture are significant in the identity construction processes of second-generation North African immigrants. Raï music is an Algerian genre that is known for its rebellious, taboo-breaking lyrics

Hebdige, D., Subculture: The Meaning of Style (London: Methuen, 1979); Thornton, S., Club Cultures: Music, Media and Subcultural Capital (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1995); McRobbie, A., In the Culture Society: Art, Fashion and Popular Music (London: Routledge, 1999). 14 Carrington, B. and Wilson, B., “Dance nations”, p. 71; Huq, R., Beyond Subculture, pp. 12, 24, 33–38. 15 Marranci, G., “Le raï aujourd’hui: Entre métissage musical et world music moderne”, Cahiers de Musiques Traditionelles, vol. 13 (2000), pp. 139–149; “A complex identity and its musical representation: Beurs and raï music in Paris”, Journal of Musical Anthropology of the Mediterranean, vol. 5 (2000), available at http://www.umbc.edu/MA/ index/number5/marranci/marr_0.htm (accessed 10 May 2009); “Pop-raï: from a ‘local’ tradition to globalization”, in G. Plastino (ed.), Mediterranean Mosaic: Popular Music and Global Sounds (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 101–121. 13

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in Algerian dialect and its fusion of Arab and Western music. Its most famous exponent is (Cheb) Khaled (born in 1960 in Oran). According to Marranci, raï music offers beurs the opportunity to construct and express identities that are distinctly different from the identities of their parents and other ethnic minority youth in France. Other scholars contributing to this field are Bouziane Daoudi and Hadj Miliani. They wrote one of the first studies on Algerian raï music16 and they have recently written on North African influences in French culture.17 Anthropologist Ted Swedenburg has also published on raï music and Arab music in general with varying focuses, ranging from an analysis of raï music in France to an examination of the link between hip-hop and Islam in Europe.18 His work often deals with ethnic minority youth in post-migration situations and music in European contexts. France and its North African youth have frequently been studied in relation to raï music and more recently in relation to hip-hop. A great many of these studies describe how, through the use and production of these types of music, youth try to escape their marginal position by striving for more acceptance in wider French society, but all the while maintaining and giving expression to their ‘otherness’. This becomes particularly clear in Marranci’s analysis of the case of singer Faudel, born to Algerian parents in 1979 in France (Mantes-la-Jolie, near Paris). He is a successful singer of modern raï music, including North African rhythms and melodies, but who increasingly sings his lyrics in French and also adds French translations of his Arabic lyrics in his CD-booklets, in order to reach a wider audience and get more airplay on French radio and television.19 Faudel’s 2006 album Mundial Corrida is predominantly sung in French. In Germany, Turkish youth are widely researched, the focus often being the vibrant German-Turkish hip-hop scene.20 Andy Bennett,

Daoudi, B. and Miliani, H., L’aventure du raï: Musique et société (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996). 17 Daoudi, B. and Miliani, H., Beurs’ melodies: Cent ans de chansons immigrés du blues berbère au rap beur (Paris: Editions Séguier, 2002). 18 Swedenburg, T., “Arab ‘world music’ ”; “Islamic hip-hop versus Islamophobia: Aki Nawaz, Natacha Atlas, Akhenaton”, in T. Mitchell (ed.), Global Noise: Rap and Hip-hop outside the USA (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2001), pp. 57–85; “Raï’s travels”, Middle East Association Bulletin, vol. 36, no. 2 (2003), pp. 190–193. 19 Marranci, G., “A complex identity”, p. 11. 20 Kaya, A., “Aesthetics of diaspora: Contemporary minstrels in Turkish Berlin”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol. 28, no. 1 (2002), pp. 43–62; Soysal, L., “Diversity of experience, experience of diversity: Turkish migrant youth culture in Berlin”, 16


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has done work on hip-hop in Frankfurt-am-Main21 and included the views and roles of ethnic youth within the German hip-hop scene in his study. Bennett’s work demonstrates how American hip-hop is not simply imitated, but is applied to a local context, Frankfurt in this case. Hip-hop made by German-Turks in Frankfurt, mostly deals with racism and citizenship. Bennett describes how hip-hop for German-Turkish youth is a very local expression; through rapping about local experiences and sensibilities and performing in ‘the right way’, the rapper offers a credible expression of a social connection to this local environment. In addition, hip-hop has become a means by which German-Turkish youth can act out their ‘coolness’, i.e. it becomes a way to express a certain authentic identity and to set oneself apart from others who are ‘not cool’.22 Authenticity and ‘coolness’ are important elements in all youth cultures throughout the world. 3

Dutch-Moroccan Youth Culture: Religion, Ethnicity and Politics

Being true to oneself is important for many young people. Credibility is often a synonym for authenticity; this means to be true to oneself and to make a credible presentation of this authentic identity. For young people who find themselves in a post-migration situation, it is often not all that easy to know who you are. Terms such as ‘living in two cultures’, ‘living in-between cultures’, ‘hybrid identities’, ‘multiple identities’ and so on, have been used to describe their often complex situation. For Dutch-Moroccan youth, music is an important tool for self-expression—to express their multitude of identities and to articulate which are the worlds to which they feel connected. Islam is an important aspect in the lives of Dutch-Moroccan youth. They often use it as a frame of reference around which they build up Cultural Dynamics, vol. 13, no. 1 (2001), pp. 5–28; El-Tayeb, F., “Kanak Attak! Hip-hop und (anti-)identitätsmodelle der ‘Zweiten Generation’ ”, in M. Sökefeld (ed.), Jenseits des Paradigmas kultureller Differenz: Neue Perspektiven auf Einwanderer aus der Türkei (Bielefeld: Transscript Verlag, 2004), pp. 95–110; Ça

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